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Are Phenomenology and Naturalism Compatible?

by

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at the

University of Johannesburg

supervised by

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&

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May 2021

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Statement

This dissertation contains 45,666 words, excluding the title page, footnotes, affidavit, acknowledgements, table of contents, and references.



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Abstract

We find in Husserl's texts – *Prolegomena to Pure Logic* (1900), *Philosophy as Rigorous Science* (1911), and *Ideas* (1913-4) – that the incompatibility of phenomenology and naturalism is self-evident because consciousness is treated: (a) as the foundation of experience of the world in phenomenology and, (b) as other things in the world in naturalism. Secondly, mental experience (a) is approached using intentionality in phenomenology and, (b) is approached using causality in naturalism. In this dissertation, I argue that Husserl does not mean, in all cases, that phenomenology and naturalism are incompatible, specifically, if Husserl's text, *Phenomenological Psychology* (1925) is analyzed and the themes of embodiment and enactivism are drawn out from the text. Firstly, I show that since phenomenology treats consciousness as the foundation of experience of the world, including natural experience, phenomenology swallows up naturalism – making them incompatible. Secondly, I abandon the transcendental version of phenomenology and combine some parts of phenomenology and naturalism to explain the mind. By so doing, I draw out, – using the analyses of Jack Reynolds, Francesco Varela, Evan Thompson, Eleanor Rosch, – the themes of (a) enactivism from the relationship between phenomenology and cognitive science, and (b) embodiment from the relationship between phenomenology and biological science, noting that the latter are naturalist disciplines. While embodiment studies the mind as it animates the body, enactivism studies the rise of cognition when the acting body interacts with the environment. Lastly, I present the possibility of compatibility of phenomenology and naturalism by analyzing Husserl's text, *Phenomenological Psychology* (1925) and drawing out the themes of embodiment and enactivism in the text. I show from the text that Husserl bypasses the transcendental questions and presents phenomenological psychology as a version that is compatible with naturalism.

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Chapter 1. Introduction

In 1911, the father of modern phenomenology, Edmund Husserl famously asserted that it is self-evident that phenomenology and naturalism are incompatible (1965, 1911: 9-10). The reason for the incompatibility was that Husserl's transcendental phenomenology studied consciousness as the foundation of knowledge or experience – perceptual or non-perceptual – of the world and the sciences, not a thing in the world, as it is done from the perspective of empiricist-naturalism.

Contrary to the view that asserts that the incompatibility of phenomenology and naturalism is Husserl's view, I argue in this dissertation that Husserl does not mean that phenomenology and naturalism are incompatible in all cases. Specifically, I show that if we analyze Husserl's 1925 text, *Phenomenological Psychology*, and the lectures on embodiment which are in the text, with a focus on the themes of enactivism and embodiment, it emerges that Husserl's view on the compatibility of phenomenology and naturalism is much more nuanced than the received view.

As I show in the literature review that follows in this introduction, the problem of the compatibility of phenomenology and naturalism is of great significance in the literature. One significance of the compatibility, as a philosophical theme today is that it recognizes the self-insufficiency of phenomenology or naturalism and aims to address it.

On one hand, Jack Reynolds explains that transcendental phenomenology is not “self-sufficient concerning the mind, agency, time-experience and so on, and should begin a systematic interaction with relevant empirical sciences” (2018: 21), like cognitive science.

On the other hand, Reynolds explains that the method of natural science that might do without “the first-person perspective” – a theme in phenomenology, – is “insufficient” (*ibid*). In addition, as Reynolds (2018) says, naturalism cannot account for “the evidence of the first-person experience”, which “includes meaning, morality, mentality and normativity” (*ibid*). Most cognitive scientists, like Jean-Michel Roy, Jean Petitot, Bernard Pachoud, and Francesco Varela also explain that cognitive science is a “theory of the

mind, without being a theory of consciousness” (1999: 7). As such, it excludes the first-person experience which is an important feature of consciousness.

Another significance of the compatibility, as drawn from Petitot *et al.* (1999) and Reynolds (2018), which is important to this dissertation, is that it enriches the account of the mind (2018: 21, 1999: 7). For Petitot *et al.*, the compatibility aims to recover an important theme of the mind, which is the testimony that comes from the first-person experience. (*ibid*). For Reynolds, the compatibility begins an interaction between phenomenology and the relevant empirical discipline – cognitive science on the mind (*ibid*), by contributing the first-person testimony to the explanation of cognitive science.

Another significance is to find out whether there is space in Husserl’s thinking for the compatibility of phenomenology and naturalism. Specifically, I investigate whether there can be seen compatibility of phenomenology and naturalism on Husserl’s own terms.

Phenomenology can be defined as the science of consciousness, and the relationship between the first-person experience and the essence of a phenomenon. Husserl’s phenomenology aims to establish the foundation of knowledge or experience of the world and every science, which is a study of every aspect of the world. Said another way, Husserl aims to answer the questions: (a) what establishes the “impeachable foundation” of every claim about the world (1965, 1911: 4-6) and (b) what unity the bases of all sciences that study the aspects of the world have, (1965, 1911: 5, 8, 11) respectively.

Given Husserl’s aims regarding establishing the foundation of knowledge and the sciences, Husserl advocates the study of consciousness, not as a thing in the world, but as the very foundation of experience of the world (1965, 1911: 10). To make clear Husserl’s aims, Reynolds summarizes that Husserl’s phenomenology has “a philosophical priority” which concerns laying “the epistemic grounds and justification for science” (2018: 1).

Husserl thinks that naturalism “cannot provide the foundation for knowledge and the sciences” that he argues phenomenology can do because he sees naturalism as grounded in empiricism, i.e., naturalism relies on sensory observation and causal laws to understand the aspects of the world (1965, 1911: 9, 10,

11). As Husserl explains, in naturalism, every natural science draws its assumptions from the natural attitude – the attitude that the world is independent of consciousness (of the first-person testimony) and understood from the “things in it which are causally related in time and space” (1983, 1913: 5-8).

Naturalism, characterized by its empiricist approach, cannot provide the impeccable foundation that Husserl looks for (1965, 1911: 4-6). This is because naturalism focuses on what comes from perceptual experience which is merely the appearance of physical things and the “appearance of physical things can change” in time and space and therefore produce relative truth (Husserl 1965, 1911: 104). From the difference in their approaches, I draw out two important themes which could be investigated: the foundation of knowledge and account of the mind.

In this dissertation, I focus on investigating the theme of the mind. By way of making clear the view that phenomenology and naturalism are incompatible, I explain the theme of foundation of knowledge in chapter one. I do this to lay the background to the focus of this dissertation.

1.1. Situating the Research Problem: A Brief Literature Review

The problem I address in this dissertation emerges from Husserl’s claim – supported by some of his interpreters including, Dan Zahavi (2003, 2004, 2008) and Dermot Moran (2013) – that phenomenology and naturalism cannot be reconciled due to their approaches to the foundation of knowledge and the mind. As I have already explained, Husserl’s phenomenology approaches knowledge from the consciousness of the world, while naturalism approaches knowledge from the sensory observation of the world.

In terms of their approaches to the mind, Husserl’s phenomenology explains mental experience by appealing to intentionality – how consciousness *intends* things in mental experience; while naturalism explains mental experience by appealing to causal laws – how sensory observations are causally related in mental experience. Husserl’s reasons can be grounded in some texts.

As I will show, the assumption that this received view is correct can be challenged by investigating Husserl's 1925 text, *Phenomenological Psychology* and his 1925 lectures on embodiment of which are in the text, considering the themes of enactivism and embodiment. I will show that Husserl's view on the compatibility of phenomenology and naturalism is much more nuanced than the received view.

In Husserl's texts – from the *Logical Investigations* (1900), *Philosophy as Rigorous Science* (1911) and *Ideas* (1913-4) –, Husserl consistently gave reasons to motivate the need for the foundation of knowledge of the sciences, in his explanation of phenomenology. A golden thread that could be seen in these texts is not only that Husserl introduces phenomenology as the discipline which produces or stands as the foundation of knowledge, but also how consciousness is studied in Husserl's phenomenology beginning with *Philosophy as Rigorous Science*. It does not mean that in *Logical Investigations* Husserl does not aim to establish the foundation of knowledge, specifically, in the first essay, *Prolegomena to Pure Logic* wherein Husserl does an epistemological critique of logic to help logic to produce objective meaning. What is important to this dissertation is not how logic is re-rooted, but why Husserl chooses phenomenology to perform the critique of logic.

Husserl defines logic as “the science of objective meaning and the foundation of other sciences – normative and practical” (1970, 1900: 40) and therefore its main objective is to become the foundation of the sciences and produce objective meaning. By objective meaning, Husserl refers to the irreversible and universal meanings that objects have if and only if “objects are in unity with their meanings” (1970, 1900: xxiii-xxiv, 24).

On the other hand, Husserl holds that empiricist-psychologism, which is the epistemic basis of logic at the time, “separates objects from their meanings” (1980, 1900: 24). To ensure that the theory of logic continues to produce objective meaning, Husserl applies phenomenology as the discipline to perform the epistemological critique of logic which requires phenomenology, not psychology, to become the epistemic basis of logic (*ibid*). This is because phenomenology is a science of subject and object of experience which studies the correlation of subject and object experience (*ibid*). Since what makes

objective meaning is the relationship between the subject and object, Husserl holds that phenomenology can help logic to produce objective meaning.

It is worthwhile to note that the application of phenomenology to the foundation of logic also means that phenomenology replaces psychology as the foundation of logic. With this replacement, Husserl refutes psychologism as an empiricist discipline that is flawed with sceptical relativism.

Husserl's phenomenology as the discipline which provides the epistemological foundation of the sciences, continues in *Philosophy as Rigorous Science* where Husserl aims to make "philosophy a rigorous science" (1965, 1911: 71-8). Making philosophy a rigorous science is to establish it as an absolute discipline that produces the "impeachable foundation" for how we understand the world (1965, 1911: 4-6, 42). Husserl begins by explaining how philosophy has wanted to become a rigorous science, and so attempted to "find that status in naturalism" (1965, 1911: 8). However, Husserl that naturalism is a "fundamentally flawed philosophy" (1965, 1911: 121) because its assumptions conflict with its practices and therefore, cannot give the foundation of the sciences.

In Husserl's reading, naturalism selects "psychology as the foundation of philosophy" because they both study the mind and the nature of knowledge (1965, 1911: 100). Meanwhile, in Husserl's reading, psychology explains consciousness as "a thing in the world like other objects", not like the foundation of our experience of the world (1965, 1911: 103). As a result, Husserl motivates instead the view that consciousness must be studied as "the foundation of knowledge and that such study occurs only in phenomenology" (1965, 1911: 10).

In *Ideas*, Husserl explains the eidetic¹ science of consciousness which he begins by suspending the natural attitude² and differentiating between the science of fact and science of essence³. By suspending the natural

¹ "Eidetic", in Husserl's reading, is a term that qualifies phenomenology as the science of essence, where some stages of *reductio* are performed to find the essence of things (1983, 1913: 161). Essence is an object of consciousness and it is what is universal in objects (*ibid*).

² As I will explain in more detail later in the dissertation, the natural attitude is Husserl's term to express the usual way of experiencing the world which is naïve (1983, 1913: 51-7).

³ The science of fact stands in contrast to the science of essence and is meant to convey the differentiation that Husserl makes between naturalism and phenomenology in shorthand form, respectively (1983, 1913: 15).

attitude, Husserl makes the field of experience less cumbersome such that prior epistemological and metaphysical assumptions do not interrupt the consciousness of the subject experiencing the world from a “presuppositionless standpoint” (1983, 1913: 59-62). Husserl asserts that consciousness, based on that differentiation, can have two kinds of experience – non-perceptual or categorical which intuits the essence of objects and independent of facts, and perceptual which perceives the physical identity of objects and dependent on facts (1983, 1913: 15).

Husserl continues to analyze the structure of consciousness by dividing it into noesis and noema – the former is the retention that comes from the subject of experience (1983, 1913: 236), while the latter is the filling in that comes from the object of experience (*ibid*). The bottom line is that Husserl presents this analysis of consciousness as what is solely responsible for how the world is constituted, and by it, we experience every aspect of the world.

In terms of the secondary literature, it is important to note that some scholars have taken up some contrary positions regarding the research question under investigation in this dissertation. Scholars like Jack Reynolds (2018) and Dan Zahavi (2003, 2004) hold that Husserl’s phenomenology has two versions – transcendental and psychological – the latter whose variant Reynolds (2018: 36) prefers to call “minimal”. What is important from Zahavi and Reynolds’ explanations is that naturalism might only be compatible with phenomenology at its psychological or minimal level.

Transcendental phenomenology maintains that consciousness constitutes the world, not for itself, but in subjective experience, which, in my view, is contrary to the view that the world is independent of consciousness and self-existing as it is done from the perspective of naturalism. In other words, the existence of the world is not independent of consciousness. Hence, in transcendental phenomenology, consciousness becomes the foundation of the experience of the world. Yet, both the psychological and minimal versions of phenomenology maintain that phenomenology is still a science of consciousness, without its transcendental element (Zahavi 2004: 343, Reynolds 2018: 32, 40-1).

Zahavi, in 'Phenomenology and the Project of Naturalization' (2004), speaks about the psychological version of phenomenology as what is restricted to what occurs in the "mental experience" of the subject experiencing the world (*ibid*). For Reynolds, in *Phenomenology, Naturalism and Science: A Hybrid and Heretical Proposal* (2018), a minimal version is not explained in terms of what occurs in mental experience but in terms of "the first-person experience as the starting point" as an important feature of phenomenology (2018: 36).

In my view, Reynolds and Zahavi agree here, because they are both concerned that what is unique about the first-person experience is not explained. Also, there cannot be a difference between the subject that experiences and the first-person except that one might say that the former is taken solely as the human person while the latter is equivocal to the human person and a type of (human person's) testimony.

Contrary to the readings provided by Zahavi and Reynolds, Jack Ritchie, in *Understanding Naturalism*, takes the position that there "is no idea of first philosophy" – a foundational discipline as Husserl's phenomenology, but that naturalism "shares an admirable attitude towards science" and holds that "philosophy is continuous with the natural sciences" (2008: 1). Ritchie explains that the world is a space – like a "giant box with the objects in it having a presence" (2008:15). It exists without being experienced by consciousness and therefore, it is self-existing. What emerges as important under this view is that if I take how consciousness is studied in transcendental phenomenology, it means that consciousness is not needed to ascertain the existence of the world.

Furthermore, in my view, it means that consciousness may be restricted to the mental awareness of things and mental activity only which denies the view that consciousness is the foundation of all experiences. Like other things in the world, consciousness is an object in the world. Objects are experienced as they relate to space and time, where, by space and time is meant, the position and moment in which an object is when it is perceived. This means that I have the objective fact of where objects are located. I can infer from the foregoing that the world is as I find it, and this is what, as Husserl says, common sense and science say about it (1983, 1913: 51-7). This inference further confirms that it is independent of consciousness.

This position as set out by Ritchie can be related to the work of W.V.O Quine in his texts, 'Epistemology Naturalized' in *Ontological Relativity and Other Essays* (1969), 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' (1951), and *Word and Object* (1960). Ritchie's position implies that the knowledge of the world is in the world, not as Husserl describes consciousness as what constitutes the world. Quine (1960: 275-6) argues that it is not in Husserl's study of consciousness which places reasons on "cosmic exile" that we find the foundation of knowledge. Instead, in Quine's view, the foundation of knowledge is in the neural input of the natural subject which psychology studies. So, psychology – a natural science – should be allowed explain to the process of knowledge because it studies both the mental process of the subject in the world.

Some thinkers such as David Papineau (1993), Huw Price (2004), and Mario De Caro and David Macarthur (2004) argue that naturalism in some aspect is liberal and might be compatible with phenomenology. Papineau, in *Philosophical Naturalism* (1993) explains that there is a view in naturalism that affirms that naturalism can model the methods of understanding the world to philosophy. De Caro and Macarthur, in *Naturalism in Question* (2004) explain that there is a "newly emerging hopes" for philosophy because there is the liberal version of naturalism which is not in terms of the experimental sciences (2004: 12).

Price in *Naturalism without Representations* (2004) explains that naturalism has two types – object and subject. Object naturalism is an epistemological doctrine that holds that all genuine knowledge is scientific knowledge, while subject naturalism is a methodological doctrine that holds that philosophy needs to begin with all science tells us about ourselves.

In my view, Price's position is that subject naturalism is compatible with philosophy and philosophy ought to draw its assumptions from this type of naturalism because philosophy aims to study the natural world. It is reasonable to say that Price's view is that such compatibility between naturalism and phenomenology must be established in the terms of naturalism, and so is a project of naturalizing phenomenology.

Naturalizing phenomenology is a project made popular by Jean-Michel Roy, Jean Petitot, Bernard Pachoud, and Francesco Varela in a book, *Naturalizing Phenomenology* (1999). In it, these scholars aim to resolve the gap problem between first-person testimony and third-person scientific explanation by integrating phenomenology into naturalism. There are other instances of naturalizing phenomenology, such as Francesco Varela's (1996) neurophenomenology, Daniel Dennett's (2012) heterophenomenology, Gallagher's (2008) frontloaded phenomenology. Other thinkers, such as Evan Thompson (2007), have contributed significantly to this project.

Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi, in *The Phenomenological Mind* (2012), explain that naturalizing phenomenology aims to extract some phenomenological themes, like the first-person experience, to use the "phenomenological method in the experimental natural sciences of the mind" (Gallagher and Zahavi 2012: 31). Similarly, in Petitot *et al.*'s view, naturalizing phenomenology aims to integrate "phenomenology into an explanatory framework where every acceptable property is made continuous with the properties admitted by the natural sciences" (1991: 1-2). In an instance of naturalizing phenomenology, Varela (1996) links some basic methodological principles of phenomenology to the scientific studies of consciousness to develop a neurophenomenology.

The approach of naturalizing phenomenology is about finding a relationship between modern cognitive science and a disciplined approach to human experience. This, as Francesco Varela (1996: 330) says, places cognitive science in the lineage of the continental tradition of phenomenology.

Critics of this approach argue that this remains an impossible task. Gallagher and Zahavi, for example, explain that Husserl constantly "emphasizes the limitations of a naturalistic account of consciousness" (2012: 31) and introduces the phenomenological method as "precisely a non-naturalistic alternative" (*ibid*). Husserl's followers like Dermot Moran vigorously oppose the attempt to naturalize phenomenology. In his "Let's Look at it Objectively: Why Phenomenology cannot be Naturalized", Moran explains that there are four objective reasons that make such a project impossible: phenomenality, cancellation of first-person, life-world and sedimentation.

Rafael Winkler, Catherine Botha, and Abraham Olivier, in the introduction to *Phenomenology and Naturalism*, acknowledge the split of the naturalist tradition into Anglo-American and European Philosophy, and note that that the Anglo-American naturalist tradition has “the method and outlook of the mathematical-physical and biological sciences” (2017:1).

In this dissertation, I take the biological sciences, in addition to the cognitive sciences, to fall under the label of the liberal naturalist disciplines. This is because my focus is on the themes of embodiment, and as Reynolds (2018), as well as Evan Thompson, Francesco Varela, and Eleanor Rosch (2016) show, the themes of embodiment and enactivism are drawn from the interaction which occurs between phenomenology, cognitive science, and biological science. In my view, cognitive science aims to understand the process of cognition in a biological being – human person or animal – the embodied person and turns to phenomenology to understand the first-person experience.

The relationship between the embodied cognition and enacted cognition is of significance for my dissertation: For the former, I take embodied cognition to refer to an activity of capability – the experience of the bodied person in an environment which occurs when the mind animates the body. In other words, I have a body that can find itself and move around in the world. For the latter, I take enacted cognition to refer to an exercise of capacity that occurs when the body interacts with the environment. In other words, like Thompson, Varela, and Rosch in *The Embodied Mind* (2016) notes, enacted cognition has to do with how much the body can know and understand the environment around it. In essence, Thompson in *Mind in Life* (2007), says that enactivism is the view that mind science and phenomenological investigations of human experience need to be pursued in a “complementary and mutually informing way” (2007: 14).

As mentioned earlier, this dissertation is devoted to unravelling my contention that there is a way to understand phenomenology and naturalism as compatible based on Husserl’s texts. To show the analysis of such compatibility, I return to Husserl’s 1925 text, *Phenomenological Psychology* where I find reasons to state that Husserl, in all cases, does not mean that phenomenology and naturalism are incompatible. Specifically, if we analyze Husserl’s 1923 text, *Phenomenological Psychology*, and the lectures on embodiment

which are in the text, with a focus on the themes of enactivism and embodiment, it emerges that Husserl's view on the compatibility of phenomenology and naturalism is much more nuanced than the received view.

1.2. Outline of the Dissertation

I approach the dissertation chapters as follows: In Chapter 2, I set out to explain the reason for the received view that Husserl's phenomenology and naturalism are not compatible and Husserl's motivation for aiming to establish the foundation of the sciences. I explain the argument that the epistemological objective of establishing the foundation of the sciences, which Husserl does with the explanation of consciousness, is the reason phenomenology and naturalism are incompatible.

I do this by establishing that Husserl's phenomenology does not compete with naturalism on what knowledge is. Instead, Husserl is concerned about the foundation of varying knowledge of every aspect of the world. I then defend the motivation of Husserl's phenomenology as the foundation of the sciences. Given the role consciousness plays in Husserl phenomenology, I draw out two themes which are the foundation of knowledge and the account of the mind.

In Chapter 3, I set out to weaken the received view of the compatibility of phenomenology and naturalism on the theme that I focus on in this dissertation – the mind. I explain that neither phenomenology nor naturalism offers a self-sufficient account of the mind but a third option that combines some parts of both accounts does. I answer the self-sufficient question of which between both accounts – phenomenology and naturalism – offers the best explanation of the mind to show that both accounts are not self-sufficient. I discuss the third option by showing that naturalizing phenomenology which is a candidate is flawed and defend embodiment and enactivism as a better third option by explaining Reynolds, Thompson, Varela and Rosch's views. I state my view and pursue the themes of enactivism and embodiment – the mind, from chapter two to the last chapter (chapter three).

In Chapter 4, I present a re-reading of the received view of Husserl's position on the relationship between phenomenology and naturalism by showing that Husserl does not in all cases mean that phenomenology and naturalism are incompatible. I do this by analyzing Husserl's 1923 text, *Phenomenological Psychology*, and the lectures on embodiment which are in the text, with a focus on the themes of enactivism and embodiment. It emerges that Husserl's view on the compatibility of phenomenology and naturalism is much more nuanced than the received view.

I conclude the dissertation by highlighting the importance of the chapters: In chapter one, I set out the background to the incompatibility of phenomenology and naturalism, with a focus on the theme of foundation of knowledge. In chapter two, I weaken the view that they are incompatible, with a focus on the theme of account of the mind, by explaining the themes of embodiment and enactivism. In chapter three, I return to find the extent of compatibility in Husserl, by analyzing his 1925's text, *Phenomenological Psychology*, and his lectures of embodiment in the text, with a focus on the themes of embodiment and enactivism. I discuss some limitations to the study by highlighting that Husserl's phenomenology, as characterized by its transcendental approach, cannot allow any multidisciplinary research which is important to secure its future. I propose that phenomenology must continue to refine its position to accommodate research in areas like artificial intelligence, robotics, Human-Robot Interaction (HRI) with a focus on the themes of embodiment and enactivism.

Chapter 2. Setting the Scene: The Received View on the Compatibility of Phenomenology and Naturalism in Husserl

2.1. Introduction

As I mentioned in the introduction to this dissertation, it is a widely acknowledged view that Husserl asserts that phenomenology and naturalism are not compatible (1965, 1911: 79). In this first chapter, I set out in detail the received view. I do this by providing a reading of Husserl's position on the incompatibility of phenomenology and naturalism as it appears in his *Prolegomena to Pure Logic* in *Logical Investigations* (1900), *Philosophy as Rigorous Science* (1911) and *Ideas* (1913).

I show how Husserl develops the position that it is only transcendental phenomenology⁴, not naturalism which establishes the epistemological foundation of the sciences. I show that since consciousness, as studied in transcendental phenomenology, is the foundation of experiences – perceptual and non-perceptual, hence phenomenology and naturalism are not compatible. This is the study of consciousness as the foundation of meaningful and valid claims, including claims made by naturalism, which emerge from experiencing the world. This implies that phenomenology swallows up naturalism.

As I have already discussed in the introduction, the received view⁵ of Husserl's assertion of incompatibility can be derived from Husserl's motivation to provide an answer to the important question of what the foundation of experience and all sciences is. In other words, Husserl aims to find the unity


⁴ To be reminded of the idea of transcendental phenomenology as explained in the introduction: "Transcendental" implies the position, as Husserl says, which is beyond any kind of science, such as, social, artistic, natural etc. (1983, 1913: 131). In my view, transcendental phenomenology applies as the study of consciousness of the world, including all its aspects.

⁵ By received view, I refer to the widely acknowledged view that Husserl thinks that phenomenology and naturalism are incompatible.

of all sciences have, since “every science is a study of a specific aspect of the world” (1970, 1900: 17; 1965, 1911: 5, 8, 11). For example, the biological sciences study only the biological aspect of the world.

The characteristic of the foundation of knowledge that Husserl speaks about is “impeachable” because it provides absolute meaningfulness and validity of things in the world (1965, 1911: 4-6). In Husserl’s reading, naturalism, characterized by its empiricist approach, cannot provide this kind of foundation because it relies on sensory observations and casual laws where all things, including consciousness, are treated as a thing in the world (1965, 1911: 9, 10, 11). In my view, objects of sensory observation change in appearance. This implies that the appearance of an object may be, in one time and space, different from another, and hence, provides relative truth.

Searching for this important foundation explains why Husserl discusses consciousness in a special way – not as a thing in the world, but as the foundation of our experience of every aspect of the world from which meaningfulness and validity of claims are given to the world. Husserl says how through consciousness, we experience and assign meaning to things in the world:


 I am conscious of a world endlessly spread out in space, endlessly becoming, and having endlessly become in time. I am conscious of it: that signifies, above all, that intuitively I find it immediately, that I experience it... I understand immediately what they objectivate and think, what feelings stir within them, what they wish or will (1983, 193: 51).

The excerpt above shows Husserl’s steps of thinking, which begins in his consciousness to experiencing things as they appear and assigning meaning to them by way of understanding them. In my view, these steps of thinking apply to every science (scientist) that studies aspects of the world. In Husserl’s analysis, all the sciences become a part of the science of the experience of the world.

The current chapter is organized as follows: in section 2.2., I focus on explaining Husserl’s reason that it is self-evident that phenomenology and naturalism are incompatible. I explain Husserl’s application of

the *eidetic*⁶ to show how the foundation of knowledge is established, beginning with preserving consciousness and ideality⁷ from naturalism.

In section 2.3., I focus on what motivates Husserl to assert that phenomenology and naturalism are not compatible. I aim to make clear why the foundation of the sciences is important to Husserl and how phenomenology stands, for Husserl, as the foundation of knowledge – as a science of consciousness and the science of experience. To test the significance of Husserl’s motivation, I explore Quine’s view that psychology, not consciousness as studied in Husserl’s phenomenology, provides the foundation for the sciences. In Quine’s view, all meaningful claims have their foundation in the causal relation of stimulus-response, which psychology – a naturalist discipline – adequately studies. I focus on whether the sciences truly need the kind of indubitable foundation Husserl wants for all sciences.

2.2. Explaining the Reason for Husserl’s View: Preserving Consciousness from Naturalism

As I mentioned in introducing this chapter, the reason which Husserl gives as to why phenomenology and naturalism are incompatible is that only transcendental phenomenology establishes the foundation of the sciences, not naturalism (1983, 1911). That only transcendental phenomenology does so is because of the way it treats consciousness – as the foundation of all kinds of experience – perceptual or non-perceptual, of every aspect of the world (1983, 1913: 15). On the contrary, naturalism does not treat consciousness in this way. To make clear Husserl’s view, consider the following example:

Imagine a person who experiences the world and knows every aspect of the world because the person is conscious of what the person experiences. The person studies every aspect of the world he experiences

⁶ I have explained “eidetic” in the footnote of the introduction.

⁷ Ideality, as Husserl says, is the view that the totality of reality resides in consciousness (1970, 1900: 45). I use the word, ideality to refer to what is transcendental and exact. I would have preferred to use the word, transcendental, but I do so because Husserl does not speak about what is transcendental at all times, specifically in the ‘Prolegomena to Pure Logic’. However, I find that ideality features in the text and the meaning given to the word in a manner that takes us to a level of the transcendental.

if and only if the person goes through the relevant scientific discipline. For examples, with biological science which begins in perceptual experience, the person studies the biological aspect of the world; or with mathematics which relies on a non-perceptual experience, the person studies the mathematical aspect of the world etc.

In my view, all kinds of claims that the person makes about the biological and mathematical aspects of the world, for example, are traced back to the person's consciousness of these aspects. In other words, it is through the consciousness of the person that the person gives meaningfulness and validity to his claims about every aspect of the world. This example shows how consciousness serves as the foundation of (a) experiencing the world and (b) the sciences which study aspects of the world.

Husserl, in *Philosophy as Rigorous Science*, states that naturalism is a “fundamentally flawed philosophy” (1965, 1911: 121) because its assumptions conflict with its practices. This is because naturalism aims to “naturalize ideality and naturalizing consciousness” (1965, 1911: 9, 80), which Husserl disputes. In my view, using phenomenology to preserve consciousness and ideality from naturalism is indicative of why Husserl thinks that phenomenology and naturalism are incompatible. This is because Husserl claims that while consciousness stands as the ultimate foundation for all kinds of experience, ideality is the view that the totality of reality resides in consciousness.

It is reasonable to think that preserving ideality and consciousness are major conditions that must be met before phenomenology can become the epistemological ground and justification of other sciences (1965, 1911; 1970, 1900; 1983, 1913). This is because, in Husserl's readings, the themes of consciousness and ideality feature in a manner that without preserving them, Husserl's phenomenology will not provide or stand as the foundation of all sciences. How these themes help in achieving the aim of this section – explaining why Husserl thinks phenomenology and naturalism are incompatible – becomes clear when focusing on Husserl's analysis of how naturalism treats the concepts of consciousness and ideality.

Another reason to approach this aspect from the themes of preserving consciousness and ideality. As earlier explained, ideality is the view that the totality of reality resides in consciousness and consciousness

is taken as the foundation of the experience of every aspect of the world. It is reasonable to say that there cannot be any other superior justification for consciousness, in Husserl's view, as the foundation of knowledge. To reject consciousness, for want of Husserl's understanding of consciousness, therefore is to reject, as Rafael Winkler *et al* say, "the first-person standpoint" (2017: 1) of what knowledge and meaning are. In other words, that it is said that consciousness is the foundation of experience and it is the evidence had for claims, simply mean that a thing or aspect of the world is known because one is conscious of it – one experiences it. I explain the theme of preserving consciousness from naturalism first.

Zahavi's remark that "a phenomenologist who embraced naturalism would in effect have ceased being a philosopher" (2013: 33) sums up Husserl's position well. It is because naturalism treats consciousness differently, and does not think that establishing the foundation of knowledge is as important as Husserl thinks it is that it cannot be thought to have any coherence with phenomenology. So Zahavi and some other thinkers like Moran (2013), assert that Husserl's phenomenology is anti-naturalism because of the differing views of phenomenology and naturalism on whether to establish the foundation of knowledge for the sciences. I now turn to a more detailed investigation of how Husserl preserves consciousness.

One major epistemic objective of Husserl's phenomenology is to preserve "consciousness from naturalism" (1965, 1911: 9, 80). For Husserl, naturalism cannot explain consciousness because the "phenomenon of consciousness eludes it" (1965, 1911: 101), because consciousness cannot be limited to the science of fact, which is what naturalism does. The conflict I mentioned earlier, emerges because naturalism aims to understand the totality of the consciousness of an individual, yet aims to make consciousness conform to empirical principles.

There are at least three reasons why Husserl objects to how consciousness is approached by naturalism. First, conforming consciousness to empirical principles will not give an understanding of the phenomenon of consciousness because naturalism treats consciousness like every other thing within causal laws. This implies that a category of experience which is independent of facts might be excluded.

Second, naturalism, characterized by its empiricist approach, cannot produce irreversible truths, because it focuses on perceptual experience. Perceptual experience is merely the appearance of physical things and, as Husserl says, the “appearance of physical things can change” in time and space and therefore produce relative truth (1965, 1911: 104).

Third and importantly, the treatment of consciousness as a thing in the world – as it is in naturalism, deemphasizes intentionality⁸ which, for Husserl, is how consciousness *intends* every aspect of the world and gives meaning and validity to the world (1983, 1913). To make clear my reason, intentionality is an activity embedded in subjective – first-person experience. In Husserl’s reading, the first-person experience appears in one of the dual structures of intentionality – the noesis (1983, 1913). The other part of the dual structure is noema – it is concerned with the directedness to self in a temporary and extended flow of experience (*ibid*). While noesis is concerned with the directedness of the individual to the object of experience – it is the place of subjective experience (*ibid*). Naturalism excludes the first-person experience because it cannot be explained by empirical science.

In contrast, Husserl suggests that consciousness ought to be studied as the source of all valid claims and knowledge of the world (1965, 1911: 4-6). The ideal treatment of consciousness, as Husserl maintains, establishes consciousness as the foundation of all “possible experiences”, i.e., perceptual which is natural-empiricist, non-perceptual which is mathematical etc (1983, 1913: 100-33).

As Reynolds explains, Husserl’s phenomenology aims to “deliver a scientific (in the broader sense) but a non-empirical account of consciousness” (2018: 2), where the experience of every aspect of the world is described in its terms without relying on “prior epistemological or metaphysical assumption” about aspects of the world (*ibid*). In my view, Reynolds’s view of Husserl’s aim is to ensure that the only validity and meaningfulness to the claims about the world is in the consciousness of the world.

⁸ Intentionality is a term of great significance in Husserl’s work. In short, it means that consciousness is always *intending* objects in subjective experience (1983, 1913: 199).

What is significant is that the only time Husserl mentions preserving consciousness from naturalism is in *Philosophy as Rigorous Science*, and here he mentions it because he says that naturalism treats consciousness like another object in the world in the context of causality (1965, 1911: 104-5). Naturalism does this with modern psychology, which, as Husserl says, is the same as “empirical psychology” (1965, 1911: 100). As Husserl sees it, modern psychology follows the laid down rules of empirical science and wants to make us understand what is mental in physical terms (*ibid*).

Said another way, Husserl contends that since empirical psychology follows the rules of empirical science, empirical psychology becomes bound to what is physical. In addition, Husserl says that empirical psychology cannot be separated from the physical because it “refuses introspection⁹”, which is, according to Husserl, an important theme in natural psychology (1965, 1911: 93). Husserl’s point is that empirical psychology refuses introspection – “self-investigation of the mental” (*ibid*) as said by Husserl. In my view, this implies that it will also refuse the directness of consciousness to receive objects in varying aspects of the world as they present themselves, which is intentionality. This is because empirical psychology, in its empirical approach, refuses the themes of subjective experience, like introspection or intentionality.

Intentionality, as Husserl says in *Ideas*, is a “principal theme of phenomenology” (1983, 1913: 199) and I make it clear briefly. The significant point is that intentionality as an important tool of consciousness enables consciousness to *intend* object in subjective experience, is inactive within causal laws like empirical psychology. It does so by *referent to, fulfilling or verifying* what is experienced. As Husserl says, intentionality is “contained” in consciousness, and at the same time, justifies why consciousness intends to objects in subjective experience (*ibid*).

Another related reason to support why empirical psychology is bound to the physical is, according to Husserl, that the empirical method which psychology follows exclusively applies to the world of space and time, not to what is psychical (1965, 1911: 103). As a result, Husserl says it always sees everything in

⁹ Introspection in natural psychology, as Husserl says, is an important theme because it enables the selves to obtain report about the self-investigation of mental state (1965, 1911: 93).

light of what is physical, defined by “space, time, and causality” (1965, 1911: 104). In my view, the problem with focusing only on the physical narrows the scope of consciousness to what is corporeal to make empirical investigation easy. Naturalism will likely say that the physical is all that exists, by excluding non-perceptual experience which, for Husserl, is a type of experience in consciousness.

Husserl says that the mental or non-perceptual experience is “composed of monadic beings with no causal relation” (1965, 1911: 106). Hence, there is no separation between the appearance and the being of a non-perceptual experience. In other words, the being of a mental state is in its appearing – or when a mental state is appearing, we are already perceiving its being.

Secondly, Husserl says what is mental is constantly in a “state of flux” and can only be caught in intuition (1965, 1911: 104). One might ask, how does naturalism intend to produce objective knowledge about the state of mental, given that naturalism relies on creating edges around its objects to differentiate them, one from another? Husserl says it “naturalizes consciousness” (1965, 1911: 80). Naturalism attempts to pin down the idea that consciousness has its nature and can be explained with facts, which Husserl deposes.

From this point forward in *Philosophy as Rigorous Science*, Husserl tells us that psychology is brought forth, by naturalism, as the “foundation of philosophy” (1965, 1911: 100). In contrast, Husserl aims to make philosophy an absolute science, i.e., the epistemological foundation of other sciences. Husserl argues that we cannot ground philosophy in naturalism, but rather in “a science¹⁰ of consciousness and experience” (1965, 1911: 73). This is because Husserl says that consciousness can receive both “non-perceptual and perceptual experiences” (1983, 1913: 203).

While categorical experience is independent of sensory observation, perceptual experience is dependent on sensory observation. For instance, psychology and the biological sciences are two different types of naturalist discipline, but they never overlap on the kind of experience that they have. An aspect of

¹⁰ It is worthwhile to note that Husserl strictly uses science as a unified discipline of knowledge which provides a basis to other sciences (1970, 1900: 11).

psychology (natural, not empirical psychology) – what is mental, can be grouped in the categorical experience, while biological science can be grouped in perceptual experience. I infer that with the various forms of naturalism, they are limited to their varied experience if testing the validity of their claims is not traced back to consciousness.

If consciousness is received as the foundation of experience, as it is in Husserl's phenomenology, then we have one foundation for the sciences (1983, 1913: 4-6). In my view, this means that consciousness is not to be understood based on a particular science. Instead, all particular sciences which study an aspect of the world should be understood based on consciousness (of their experiences of the aspects of the world). Consciousness, in my view, becomes the basis to understand other sciences – if, for example, I consider the consciousness of a person who is knowledgeable about every scientific discipline in the world. It is worthwhile to note that it is through the consciousness of that person that he knows about all these scientific disciplines.

Husserl says the phenomenon of consciousness does not have a “nature but an essence”, i.e., the essence which is universal or has objective validity (1965, 1911: 117). In addition, Husserl says that the experience of consciousness helps to “contradict or verify the physical identity” of an object through how the object presents itself to consciousness (*ibid*). The reason for this explanation is to present what consciousness entails and how it gives meaningfulness and validity to the experience of the world.

Husserl's attempt to preserve consciousness from naturalism also appears in *Ideas* (1983, 1913). Here we see an important attempt by Husserl to preserve consciousness through an application of the *eidetic* – the science of essence (please refer to the footnote on essence above). Although Husserl does not mention it, however, I find an explanation about how consciousness needs to be preserved from naturalism since consciousness enables the awareness of the subject-being in the natural attitude.

Husserl aims to preserve consciousness from naturalism follows these steps: (a) suspend the natural attitude and (b) apply the *eidetic* of consciousness. Reynolds explains that by applying *eidetic* of consciousness, Husserl aims to “secure an intersubjective agreement and consensus” (2018: 3) to ensure

that when different subjects experience an aspect of the world, they can give a uniform meaning to what they have in consciousness. In my view, what is important about Reynolds' view is that no uniformity of meaningfulness can be given to experience without a return to consciousness.

In my view, Husserl's position on what he calls the natural attitude¹¹ is also indicative of why he thinks naturalism is an inadequate approach. The natural attitude, as Reynolds says, is when "objects are presupposed", rather than looking at how "objects are constituted as objects for us and hence have meaning for us" (2018: 23). Although Husserl does not specifically say so, I think it is reasonable to conclude that it is from the natural attitude that naturalism draws its assumptions which spread across all disciplines of naturalism.

Husserl tells us that with consciousness in the world, the human subject is both a "natural and intentional being" (1983, 1913: 53). In natural attitude, human subjects as natural beings are psychophysical beings that are aware of things around them – the external, internal, material, or immaterial state of things around them. In contrast, in a phenomenological attitude, human subjects as intentional beings that *intend* objects in the world and grasp their essence, i.e., the ideal form of things around them in intuition (*ibid*).

Contrary to Husserl's view, Price (2004) argues from a naturalist viewpoint that the human subject is a natural being only. This is because he posits that humans are natural creatures, and therefore "claims of philosophy which conflict this view" should give way (2004: 73). As such, he excludes a part of Husserl's view that human persons are also intentional beings. In my view, since Price argues from a naturalist viewpoint and naturalism does not see intentionality participating in experiencing the world, but causality, then there is no need to account for any form of being apart from the *natural* form of the human person.

The problem which follows from denying the intentional being is that the human person, in Husserl's reading, will continue to experience the world in the natural attitude as "out there" (1983, 1913: 51) and

¹¹ The natural attitude, in Husserl's reading, can be defined as naïve experience of the world – as it out there, based on common sense (1983, 1913: 51).

made up of “facts of things” only (1983, 1913: 7). As Reynolds maintains, human persons will experience “things are presupposed”, without considering how they are “constituted for us” (2018: 23).

The foregoing implies that human persons will not grasp the essence of things, which is what makes things universal. They will also not realize that, as Husserl says that “fact and essence of things are inseparable” (1983, 1913: 7). Importantly, as Reynolds says, consciousness (of human persons) will not put out of action “prior epistemological and metaphysical assumptions” (2018: 3) if the natural attitude is not suspended.

In my view, Husserl seemed right to suspend the natural attitude. It is an attitude that pursues the knowledge of fact and realities. Since human beings experience the world and find things in the world, as Husserl says, they simply conclude that “other things are out there for them in the world” (1983, 1913: 51-6). Said in another way, Husserl says the natural attitude is when the “mind takes things in the world and the world for granted” (*ibid*). By taking the world for granted, in my view, means that things are thought to be out there in advance such that the mind does not bother to experience things on their terms.

To understand what these other things are since we are likely to find the kind of a thing, we previously saw somewhere else, natural science collects the instances of a thing to arrive at a general fact of it. Now Husserl says natural science only knows about a world of fact, whereas we can study the world with a “science of fact and science of essence” (1983, 1913: 7-18). This differentiation of science is what is contained in Husserl’s ontology. Husserl says that “natural science” can only become the “science of fact”, not of the science of essence (*ibid*). It is worthwhile to note that the “science of essence” is what Husserl’s phenomenology aims to establish (*ibid*).

The “science of essence”, for Husserl, is what helps us to catch the “universal property” of a thing, and not fact (1983, 1913: 18). This is because facts of what we know over time change – the claims are revisable. Therefore, we cannot rely on facts only to know the world because time and space subject facts to change. Instead, we need something which is universal and irreversible and hence, we should go back

to consciousness which, Husserl, as I have mentioned earlier, believes is the foundation of what we experience. The foundation of where we can, with self-evidence, intuit the essence of things, while we also experience the physical identity of things.

Husserl takes the crucial step of “suspending the natural attitude” and presenting phenomenology as the foundation of other sciences (1983, 1913: 57). To suspend the natural attitude with *eidetic* reduction, Husserl says there are “some stages” to follow (1983, 1913: 57, 139; 1977, 1925: 54-63).

In the first stage, natural attitude is *bracketed*, and as Husserl says, this involves “putting out of action” prior metaphysical and epistemological presuppositions (1983, 1913: 57). The aim is to make the field of experience less cumbersome. To make clearer what Husserl says, Donn Welton explains that the natural attitude is an “unsettling wonder” (2000: 13) that must be put out of action. As Welton adds, this is because things appear in ‘different modes or manners that are not themselves the things’ (*ibid*), while experiencing them, much so that the subject of experience is overwhelmed by changes in appearance.

In the second stage, we pursue how consciousness becomes intimate with a thing through intuition (Husserl 1977, 1925: 54-6). This involves the imaginary variants of an object and other possible forms in which an object appears.

In the third stage, consciousness catches the invariant form of the object – something it has which is universal (Husserl 1977, 1925: 57-60). The aim is to find what is evident of an object which can be intuited.

In the fourth stage, we make clear the time and attention that must be given to this activity for one to inculcate the eidetic attitude. Husserl does this with the eidetic reduction which returns us to things themselves and that can only be our consciousness of those things. The result of the *eidetic* is having the cognition of fact and essence. From the foregoing, we see that this explanation revolves around consciousness.

I infer from Husserl that it is almost impossible to attain apodictic truths if consciousness is not treated as the condition of the meaning of the world. It is more difficult for other sciences to attain apodictic truths if no science takes the research of consciousness seriously – not as a part of the world, that is, in causal relations with other objects in the world, but is the most reliable source we go-to for the ultimate validity of our claims. This is a closer step to the goal of transcendental phenomenology which is making consciousness the foundation of experience of the world.

I discuss another objective of making phenomenology the epistemic grounds and justification of the sciences, which is preserving ideality from naturalism. It is worthwhile to note that the transcendental or eidetic study of consciousness is to enable consciousness to produce ideal meanings. This is because it takes a science that produces ideal meanings and validity to become the foundation of other sciences.

One might ask, what does ideality entail?

2.3. Explaining the Self-Evident Reason for Husserl's View: Preserving Ideality from Naturalism

Husserl says ideality is the view that the totality of reality resides in consciousness (1970, 1900: 45), so it is not independent of consciousness, as it is in the naturalist-empiricist view (1965, 1911: 79-80). In my view, this means that consciousness constitutes the world, and as such, gives meaning to what is consciously experienced about aspects of the world.

In contrast, the naturalist position, as Husserl says, sees the world as real, factual, and existing “out there”, independent of conscious experience (1983, 193: 51). Consciousness is not needed to give meaning to the world.

The theme of ideality in Husserl's texts in the early 1900s (1900, 1911, 1913) reaches its highest form in what is taken as transcendental (Husserl 1983, 1913). What is transcendental in Husserl covers the aim Husserl pursued in logic as a theory of science in general (1900: 1979), philosophy as rigorous science (1911: 1965) and phenomenology as a transcendental science (1913: 1983). I provide an exploration of

what transcendental broadly entails in Husserl now. I do this by focusing on three levels of what transcendental entails: logical and mathematical, empirical, and metaphysical and supernatural. I provide more detail in what follows.

For Husserl, the transcendental is about a theory whose resolution cannot be restricted to the laws or matters of logic or mathematics (1983, 1913: 131). This means that it cannot be restricted to non-perceptual experience only. Secondly, it is beyond the scope of sense experience and theories that answer to sense experience (*ibid*). This means that it cannot be restricted to theories of sensory observation. Thirdly, it is also beyond religious and metaphysical questions (1983, 1913: 133). This means that it cannot be thought of as belonging to what is beyond the physical or what is divine. It is, for Husserl (1965, 1911: 6), the indubitable, exact, precise, universal foundation that all sciences of every aspect of the world be grounded in.

If this is right, then since it is beyond any kind of science, the transcendental swallows up all possible knowledge in the world. I take what is ideal as a different, perhaps a minimal interpretation of what is transcendental. I do this because, from the foregoing, the transcendental character of phenomenology enables phenomenology to swallow up all other sciences, while the ideal character of phenomenology enables phenomenology to describe consciousness as what enables the experience of the totality of the world.

In Husserl's reading, I think ideality may be received as the minimal of transcendental, but the transcendental at a weak level. The fair justification is that the first level of the transcendental, as Husserl says in *Prolegomena to Pure Logic*, is restricted to ideality (1970, 1900: 104). Ideality, as Husserl says, produces a function of the transcendental – “unity” (*ibid*) – to other sciences. In my view, this implies that the transcendental and ideality overlap in the area of providing unity to the sciences.

Given that ideality I receive ideality as a minimal interpretation of the transcendental is, shows why there is conflict in the aim of naturalism to conform ideality to empirical principles. Through what is transcendental, naturalism commits a fallacy of division by way of wanting to conform what is

transcendental – a whole to one of its parts, i.e., empirical-naturalism. I explain the theme of preserving ideality from naturalism now.

Another major objective of Husserl's epistemic intention about phenomenology is to preserve ideality from naturalism. The only time Husserl mentions preserving ideality from naturalism was in *Philosophy as Rigorous Science* (1965, 1911: 71). The text begins with a setback story of how philosophy had failed to become scientific despite a clear history that it had aimed to become so. Husserl says philosophy pursued this aim up to modern times where it finally “realized the aim in natural sciences” (*ibid*). If philosophy were a person, Husserl would have said philosophy was a beggar and beggars are no choosers. This is because Husserl thinks that a philosophy that is rooted in naturalism is not helping itself and it will abandon its epistemological objective.

The epistemological objective of truths; of having impeccable reasons as a basis for knowledge. The objective is not to resolve the problems in philosophy with the prefabricated systems as we see in the natural attitude – that is, the usual way of understanding the aspects of the world. But by taking these problems individually – on their terms and developing a specific solution for each using the phenomenological method. This objective is to produce ideal truths which Husserl says naturalism cannot do because naturalism makes philosophy abandon this goal by “naturalizing ideality” (1965, 1911: 79).

By naturalizing ideality, Husserl tells us of a conflict in the position in naturalism where it builds a theoretical position that is idealistic yet rejects idealism (1965, 1911: 74-92). The conflict is seen in how naturalism aims to arrive at objective truths, yet, in Husserl's reading, it aims to conform ideality to empirical principles (1965, 1911: 78-90). Why conforming to empirical principles will not produce universal truths is because truths acquired based on sensory observation may be different; one from another, if the change of time and space continue to influence how objects appear one time/space or the other. The kind of truth that we are likely to gain is relative to time and space, and therefore, naturalism cannot produce universal, irreversible truths.

In my view, what this means, for instance, is that if we take the idealist philosophy of Hegel that Husserl mentions, which is, in principle, independent of fact and concerned with the primal unity of the natural world, often called the Absolute. We see later in Hegel's philosophy that naturalism appeals to empiricism, i.e., relying on sensory observation. Instead, Husserl explains that by ideal principles we claim that the nature of reality lies in consciousness (1965, 1911: 85). The character of ideal principles meets all epistemic requirements – a priori and apodictic.

The former is a category of truths that are independent of facts and precise like mathematical truths. While the latter is a category of truths which dependent on facts and imprecise like not being sure if we are perceiving number nine or six if we stand at it from two angles. I turn now to another explanation where the theme of preserving ideality from naturalism appears.

Husserl's attempt to preserve ideality from naturalism also appears in *Prolegomena to Pure Logic* (1970, 1900). In this text, Husserl challenges the dominant empirical-naturalist interpretation of logic of his time which was developed by John Stuart Mill and others – a psychology-based logic, called psychologism (1970, 1900: 11-13). In my view, the aim of conforming the ideal principles of logic to empirical psychology badly affects the epistemological value of logic to produce objective meaning. I infer that what objective meaning is for Husserl, is when there is a unity of things and their meaning. In other words, if at all times, a thing has one meaning attached to it, then it can be taken to be objective. This is different in naturalism where there is no unity of things and their meanings.

This is because in empiricist-psychologism, things are observed based on sensory observation and when it is so, change in time and space may influence how things are to observation. Therefore, we cannot always say that a thing is the same at all times and for this reason, things are studied separately from their meanings in naturalism which may result in relative meanings. This is contrary to the ideal character of logic which Husserl aimed to preserve from psychologism, a form of naturalism.

In my view, to produce objective meaning, which is the ideal character of logic, Husserl takes logic as the theory of science that other sciences root in to understand the totality of the world. In other words, my

point is that in logic, we have the first mention of ideality when logic is presented as the foundation of other sciences, not psychologism.

Husserl aims to perform an “epistemological critique” of the concepts of logic (1970, 1900: 165). The epistemological critique is to find out whether logic still provides objective meaning and can become the foundation of the sciences. Husserl does this critique by showing how phenomenology interrogates the basis of logic. Why Husserl applies phenomenology is because, on one hand, logic is concerned with producing “objective meaning and rules that regulate” objective meaning (1970, 1900: 12). On the other hand, phenomenology is concerned with the “essential structures of cognition and their essential correlation” to things they cognize (1970, 1900: 166).

I infer that since phenomenology is concerned with the unity of things and the meaning of things, and that the unity of things and their meanings are taken as achieving objective meaning, phenomenology possesses the tool to make clear and distinct the nature of the concepts of logic, i.e., judgement, syllogism, inference etc. by tracing them to intuition. Therefore, what logic requires to become ideal – produce objective meaning and becoming the foundation of the sciences is to allow phenomenology to take logic back to a place of quick and ready insight into things, where logic does not rely on perceptual observation as psychologistic-empiricism wants.

In Husserl’s reading, empiricism pursues the non-foundation of knowledge which Husserl refutes in pursuit of what he calls, as Marvin Farber says, “a new theory of knowledge” (1968: 207). This is because Husserl’s aim was completely different from the naturalist aim. I infer from Farber that Husserl’s new theory of knowledge aims to establish an absolute science of knowledge where all kinds of knowledge have their foundation.

By extended work, phenomenology provides an epistemic basis to logic and prepares logic to achieve producing objective meaning. That Husserl defines logic as the science of objective meaning and the foundation of sciences suggests that logic is more than being a set of rules of thinking. Based on this, Husserl calls logic a “theory of science in general” (1970, 1900: 25). So, when Husserl calls logic the

foundation of the sciences, it is because it takes a theory of science in general to become the foundation of the sciences, not empirical psychology. One might then ask, why does psychology hold on firmly to logic?

Husserl says that Mill and others begin by arguing that all “issues of logic can only be resolved by psychology” (1970, 1900: 56). To make Husserl’s point clearer, Klaus Held explains that the psychologistic position as when the laws of logic are “nothing more than a natural regulation of the psychic processes we call thinking – just like there are laws of nature for process in the material world” (2003: 11).

Held’s understanding of Husserl’s view of psychologism shows that Husserl does not think the laws of thought are taken solely as laws that explain why something happens and abandons the important work of producing objective meaning. This is against what is important to empiricist-psychologism about how the psychologistic interpretation of logic has its foundation in naturalism and hence pulls the root of logic into naturalism, i.e., empiricism. To advance the empiricist interpretation of logic, Husserl says Mill and others have “three prejudices” as to why they pull logic into naturalism (1970, 1900: 101-19).

The first prejudice concerns the assumption that since logic is a mental activity hence what is “mental must have a mental basis” (Husserl 1970, 1900: 103). In other words, the rule of logic which separates what is right from wrong must be grounded in the knowledge of psychology. The second prejudice is about the assumption that the contents of logic, i.e., syllogism, judgement etc. are all parts of the processes of psychology (Husserl 1970, 1900: 111). In other words, the contents of logic cannot be used independently of mental processes.

The third prejudice is about the assumption that inner evidence stands for a particular mental character (Husserl 1970, 1900: 115). In other words, they say that when we have the evidence for a thing because we can trace it to a mental state. What these prejudices mean is that logic can only do its work if it is grounded in naturalism, i.e., empiricism. However, Husserl rejects this view because it has a negative consequence – that naturalism only produces revisable claims. This reduces naturalism to a body of

relative scepticism. How so? To understand how Husserl describes relative scepticism, Husserl identifies the “three consequences” of empiricism (1970, 1900: 46-54).

The three consequences of empiricism arise, in Husserl’s view, from psychologism not seeing that the programmes of logic and empirical psychology are different (1970, 1900: 13-4, 41). While the former produces *a priori* truths which are intuitive and mathematical which are precise and ideal. The latter produces empirical claims which rely on sensory experience which are imprecise and real. This would then mean that while the former involves producing necessary truths, the latter involves producing contingent truths. With the latter, we head in the direction of empiricism’s “first consequence” which is about how empiricism produces contingent truths, that is truths that are not the same for everyone and all times (Husserl 1970, 1900: 46).

If empiricism makes revisable claims – claims that can be revised – then, as Husserl says, its laws are not exact (1970, 1900: 51). Husserl then says that if empiricism cannot produce exact laws, then its rules are vague (*ibid*). The idea of vagueness points to how insufficient empiricism is, as Husserl says, in matters of claims produced by intuition or mathematical reasoning (*ibid*). Therefore, unlike empiricism, logic provides validity to claims of practical, normative, intuitive, or mathematical reasoning. Meanwhile, logic will only do this if it becomes a theory of science in general again – a theory of science in general which phenomenology will help logic to become.

The second consequence of empiricism in Husserl’s reading is that while “naturalism is about the laws of nature; logic is about the laws of thought” (Husserl 1970, 1900: 48). While the former does its work by being inductive – it collects singular facts of experience, the latter does its work by being intuitive – it provides direct insight into *a priori* conditions. What we see here is the obvious parallel line between empiricism and logic. Therefore, it is reasonable to say that logic cannot ground in empiricism.

The third consequence of empiricism for Husserl is that “naturalism implies facts, whereas laws of logic imply what is ideal” (Husserl 1970, 1900: 51). This implies that he thinks that we simply cannot transform facts into what is ideal or transform laws of logic to facts of mental life. Why so? What the ideal or ideal

condition is, for Husserl, is what only assures of self-evident condition. This is because what is ideal is about what should or ought to be. It is taken as what measures the truth of a claim. The idea of self-evident conditions implies objective meaning. In other words, what is factual is about what is. Based on this, Husserl says that naturalist-empiricism lacks self-evident conditions, and it is nothing but a body of “sceptical relativism” (1970, 1900: 75).

Ideality has another meaning in Husserl’s text, *Prolegomena to Pure Logic*. Husserl speaks in terms of self-evident truths in two respect – subjective and objective (1970, 1900: 150-60). While the former takes us back to *a priori* conditions, the latter takes us to the value of phenomenology which is the unity between things and the meaning of things.

In Husserl’s reading, empiricism, because it collects instances of things, does so by isolating objects, one from another in space and time (*ibid*). It applies sensory experience to carve an edge around objects because that is how it can differentiate one object from another. Its reliance on sensory observation will result in the notion man is the measure of all things. This is because it will at the time be about what a man can see for himself – this implies what is relative. More output of such knowledge will, in turn, result in the idea that there is no truth, knowledge or justification of objective knowledge.

One might ask, how does one go back to things themselves if there is no truth, or at the least, relative truths about things? This is a problem that Husserl believes must be resolved once and for all. The motivation required to carry out the task lies in how the theme of consciousness is properly developed as the foundation of the experience of the world.

At this juncture, consciousness becomes the consciousness of *something* and what it looks for is the essence of the things experienced. What consciousness does as Held makes clear is that it “fulfils or verifies” (2003: 13) the thing experienced even if it is not realized at the moment as the thing of experience. Therefore, phenomenology becomes the study of the essence (of things) and based on the essence (of things), it fulfils or verifies the thing in our experience.

2.4. Husserl's Motivation: Quine-Barrier and Making the Case for the Foundation of the Sciences

As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the importance of establishing the foundation of knowledge for Husserl is so that there is unity for the bases of all sciences. I refer to the unity which stands as an indubitable foundation for all sciences that study the aspects of the world. In the previous sections, I established that Husserl claims that consciousness is the foundation for any kind of experience we have of every aspect of the world (1965, 1911: 4-6). Also, I show how consciousness gives meaning and validity to the claims about these aspects of the world through the consciousness of these aspects of the world.

In this section, I aim to make a case for the importance of establishing the foundation of the sciences. I do this by discussing WVO Quine's natural-psychological view which is the strongest contemporary naturalist position that poses a threat to Husserl's epistemological aim. One might ask in this section, do the sciences need the kind of indubitable foundation that Husserl pursues? Naturalism which is a form of empiricism does not think so because, for example, Quine argues that the foundation of every evidence to the claims about the world is in psychology and it is nothing but the causal relation of stimulus-response.

I explain Quine's view because scholars – such as Reynolds (2018), believe that Quine's work influenced naturalism on acquiring knowledge. This is because Quine's work becomes a model for most other philosophies and can be taken as one that can match Husserl's view. To further provide support for the naturalist position, Quine refutes what he calls “cosmic exile” (1960: 275-6). This is about developing rules of reason which are beyond and outside the natural way of doing things.

To make clear Quine's general epistemological view along the line of the phrase – cosmic exile, Reto Gubelmann explains that Quine does not think there should be any “form of dualism” in the process of acquiring knowledge (2019: 2). As Gubelmann says, Quine's idea of knowledge acquisition does not allow for a difference between epistemology and natural science (specifically, psychology) (*ibid*).

In an essay titled, “Epistemology Naturalized”, Quine argues that epistemology “falls into place as a chapter of psychology and hence of natural science” (1969: 82). Beyond classifying the philosophical study of knowledge as being a part of psychology, Quine intends to present psychology as natural science and the foundation of knowledge. Therefore, I take Quine’s point to mean that psychology is, contrary to Husserl’s phenomenology, the foundation of all sciences because Quine thinks that psychology provides a better study of the natural human person who aims to know the world. In other words, if taken in light of Husserl’s pursuit, psychology gives unity or the indubitable foundation to the sciences of every aspect of the world.

Quine’s view began in an earlier essay, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” where he first argued that knowledge is nothing but a product of sensory stimulation. The knowledge received this way, Quine says, shifts towards pragmatism and blurs the lines between natural science and metaphysics. One dogma is the “dualism of analytic and synthetic claims” (1951: 20). The former is independent of fact – focuses on essence or ideality; while the latter is concerned with facts – focuses on the physical object. This dualism is directly an attack on phenomenology because phenomenology as a science of essence has two forms of consciousness, i.e., categorical consciousness which focuses on essence and independent of fact; and perceptual consciousness, which focuses on facts and physical object. The other dogma attacks naturalism. Quine identifies reductionism as a dogma that translates “every statement to immediate experience” (1951: 34).

While the first dogma takes us down farther away from the faculty of cognition which is responsible for knowledge, the second dogma takes us past the faculty of cognition to the immediate experience. To make Quine’s position clear, Roger Gibson explains that Quine believes that naturalism has two “negative sources – holism and unregenerate realism” which cause despair to what should be called the evidence of knowledge (1987: 58).

As Gibson explains, the despair with naturalist holism is the inability to define a theory in its context, while unregenerated realism is the view that any uncertainties which are not beyond what is internal to science are not a problem (*ibid*). In my view, Gibson’s understanding of Quine that the context to

knowledge is out of the mind and there cannot be evidence for knowledge if uncertainties internal to science are not addressed.

Quine's motivation stems from the need to provide evidence for our knowledge of the natural world which he claims is to be seen in the work of David Hume, Jeremy Bentham, Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell and Rudolf Carnap. Quine's summary of their attempts leaves us with two tenets of empiricism which Quine believes are not different from the issues these thinkers at different times set out to address. They are, as Quine says: (a) sensory evidence is the only evidence science has and (b) all meanings of the world must ultimately rest on sensory evidence (1969: 75). From this statement, Quine differs from Husserl who holds that all meanings of the world rest ultimately on our conscious experience of the thing of meaning. In Quine's view, the first tenet is less important compared to the second tenet since the question of where epistemology is founded has not been answered yet (*ibid*). To this question, Quine makes a bold statement:

The stimulation of sensory receptors is all the evidence anybody has had to go on, ultimately, in arriving at his picture of the world. Why not just see how this construction proceeds? Why not settle for psychology? (*ibid*).

The excerpt explains that evidence for the knowledge of the natural world is in some stimulation that occurs by receiving the world in the senses. Therefore, to explain this stimulation, there is a need to turn the attention to psychology because it is in psychology that an adequate account can be provided. Quine provides his reason with another statement:

Epistemology... simply falls into place as a chapter of psychology and hence of natural science. It studies a natural phenomenon, viz., a physical human subject. This human subject is accorded a certain experimentally controlled input-certain pattern of irradiation in assorted frequencies, for instance—and in the fullness of time, the subject delivers as output a description of the three-dimensional external world and its history. The relation between meagre input and the torrential output is a relation that we are prompted to study

for somewhat the same reasons that always prompted epistemology; namely, to see how evidence relates to theory, and in what ways one's theory of nature transcends any available evidence (1969: 82-3).

In this excerpt, we see expressed the view that there is a causal relationship between what scantily comes into human beings from their sensory and three-dimensional experience of the natural world and what goes out of the human beings' mental stimulation. In other words, there will be no output from the subject without being caused by what is perceived in the external world.

In disagreement with Quine's view, Donald Davidson argues that Quine's position is in itself "the third dogma of empiricism" (1974: 5) because Quine takes the evidence of knowledge as neural input. To understand what the neural input is, Davidson speaks about Quine's dualist approach to knowledge – content and scheme where the evidence for knowledge is taken from the scheme side. Although Quine does not speak in terms of scheme and content, it was Davidson who understands Quine that way. The content is the empirical input of knowledge, in other words, the perception that a cup is right before me, while the scheme is some sort of system of evidence that we have built over time.

In my view of Davidson's view, the idea that Quine intends to present evidence as a neural input is dogmatic because it is, in Quine's view, a long-time accepted explanation. However, in defence of Quine, Robert Sinclair argues that Davidson "wrongly assign concerns to Quine's view that it does not have" and "obscures the status of Quine's view of epistemology" (2007: 455). What I understand as Sinclair's reason is that Quine is in his place and right to advance an argument for the evidence of knowledge which is gotten from neural input because Quine aimed to 'improve the understanding of chains of causation that connects our surfaces and scientific output' (2007: 461, in Quine 1995: 349).

One might ask: Does Quine's psychology provide the indubitable foundation that Husserl thinks about? Do the sciences really need any indubitable foundation?

These are the kinds of question Moran describes as "original sin" (2013: 92). In my view, Moran's view is that failing to establish the foundation for the sciences is to commit a fundamental error that will not

help in establishing a precise, exact, or ideal means of attaining knowledge of the world. While the first question concerns Husserl and Quine, the second question concerns Husserl only. I take both questions as two-in-one which I answer with Husserl's motivation for the foundation of science in the next section.

Quine does not consistently pursue establishing the foundation of knowledge, unlike Husserl who in his texts, consistently does so. Husserl begins to pursue the foundation of the sciences from what passes as (a) grounding logic in phenomenology in *Prolegomena to Pure Logic* (1900), (b) grounding philosophy in phenomenology as rigorous science in *Philosophy as Rigorous Science* (1911), and (c) developing the idea of transcendental phenomenology in *Ideas* (1913). In my view, what matters most to Husserl is the notion of science, which he classified as “knowledge” (1970, 1900: 11) – another classification that consistently appeared in Husserl's texts.

Husserl aims to introduce a new method of philosophy which, as Held says, calls for “recognition of truth” (2003: 7). This is an attempt to prevent uncertain or confusing claims, emerging from relativism and scepticism. In my view, Held's view is that Husserl's idea of recognition of truth has a condition which is about meeting the requirement of true knowledge. As I have reiterated, the only evidence or true knowledge of any aspect of the world is in the consciousness of it. The first time Husserl introduced it, it appeared as ‘science in general’ only and it concerned logic becoming the foundation of the sciences (1970, 1900: 11).

2.5. Husserl's Motivation: Defending the Imperative of the Foundation of the Sciences

I defend the importance of Husserl's aim of establishing the indubitable foundation of the sciences – the idea of universal science – in this section. I do this by explaining Husserl's idea of the science of all sciences. To defend the importance of Husserl's phenomenology as the foundation of the sciences, I discuss my points around the themes of science in general, absolute science and the transcendental structures of consciousness.

The first way of defending the importance of Husserl's phenomenology as the foundation of knowledge is that Husserl sets out to explain the true meaning of science, against the misconception about the theory of science. And at the same time, Husserl was turning away from the dominant psychologistic interpretation of logic of his time, to the older tradition of logic which emerged with Immanuel Kant and others (1970, 1900: 12). Returning to the older tradition of logic is a search for the theoretical value of logic which psychology-based logic has led into naturalism.

This theoretical basis is unacceptable because naturalism cannot produce self-evident truths. Also, it is because of the loss of these self-evident truths that logic cannot become the foundation of the sciences. We also cannot allow psychology to become the foundation of sciences because it is grounded in naturalism. In other words, we find some sort of theoretical incompleteness with other sciences since logic which is supposed to become their foundation has been pulled into naturalism by its root. In this case, we must revive the idea of logic as a theory of science in general.

To do this, we must search for the science which theoretically completes the other sciences. Husserl says that the "idea of science, in general", indicates knowledge (1970, 1900: 21). When we talk about science in general, we refer to true knowledge. Therefore, science should provide direct conditions of knowledge so that we can attain truths.

Speaking about direct conditions, Husserl traces them back to correct judgement. However, I find in Husserl that not all correct judgements are enough for knowledge because some of them do not rely on clear evidence. Therefore, what must be called the foundation of knowledge must be clear, self-evident, certain, and free from vague claims. In simple terms, what the foundation of knowledge must rely on is some sort of inner evidence which according to Husserl is provided by consciousness (1965, 1911; 1983, 1913).

Another indication which Husserl gives to "science, in general, is in its unity of all other sciences" (1970, 1900: 33) which Husserl later says is provided by transcendental phenomenology to the sciences (1983, 1913). This indication is different from the misconception about science which has often been restricted

to disciplinary scientific activities only. In other words, Husserl says that the idea of science has been received in relation and limited to men and their intellectual activities about external nature (1970, 1900: 25). Therefore, their activities only represent a set of external arrangement of the world.

In my view, the danger with different sciences which are a study of each aspect of the world is that they only produce (and never beyond) the facts of objects, i.e., organism, mathematics, chemicals etc. Whereas the idea of science, in general, is presented as a unity for a variety of things, namely ideal properties, real properties, manifolds, numbers etc all of which transcendental phenomenology explains (Husserl 1983, 1913).

In my view, the idea of science is to provide a theoretical foundation to other disciplines. In other words, science, in general, provides a unity from which all sciences thrive. This scientific attitude is what Husserl pursues. The kind of scientific attitude, for example, helps logic to provide the foundation to normative and practical sciences.

For the former, we see logic become a yardstick to describe what psychology should have done. While logic at this stage involves what ought or should be, psychology involves what is. For the latter, we see logic as thinking or investigating the rules of judgement, reasoning – all of which are concepts in psychology. Here, logic preserves its connection with psychology. And it is to this end that Husserl applies phenomenology as a tool that performs an epistemological grounding of logic.

The importance of phenomenology to logic is to check if logicians catch the phenomenon in need of explanation when they look at the concept of logic. An important question is, what phenomenon should logicians catch about logic? To put it in other words, what experience is logic meant to express? Logic is an important discipline for Husserl because it provides the laws of achieving objective meanings.

Hitherto, Husserl has called logic the foundational science (1965, 1911). But along the line, logic has become equivocal to itself and psychology, which in turn, threatens the notion of logic as foundation science. If you recall, what makes a foundational science at the level of the phenomenological grounding of logic is truths that are found in intuition and mathematical principles, not restricted to sense

observation. Therefore, the phenomenon that logicians must catch about logic is its theoretical value which forms rules of thinking without referring to how the individual thinks. Not its normative value; not its practical value, but importantly, that logic produces objective meaning.

Why Husserl is interested in how phenomenology performs the epistemological critique of logic is because Husserl wants to ensure that “all matters of logic”, i.e., concepts, laws, present themselves to “consciousness as given in intuition” (1970, 1900: 173). In other words, the idea of the foundation of the sciences that Husserl pursues is what ensures all matters of experience present themselves to consciousness. Unlike in empiricism where intuition is restricted at the start, logic becomes a science of the idea of meaning and idea of knowledge. This will become possible by pursuing self-ideal truths, which are independent of space and time. This will include the knowing subject, object of experience and correlation between the experiencing subject and object of experience.

With the phenomenological grounding of logic, we will have a study that is committed to the essential structures of consciousness which are concerned with the matters in logic. I draw out that the role of consciousness cannot be separated from Husserl’s pursuit of the foundation of knowledge from the foregoing explanation given that consciousness is a foundation of experience within the application of logic.

The second way of defending the importance of Husserl’s phenomenology, as the foundation of knowledge, is that phenomenology only can be truly scientific and only a scientific philosophy can truly be philosophy. Phenomenology is concerned with absolute certainty. The kind of certainty that will not accept a conclusion that is not verified and seen fit as admissible to an absolute science. To do this kind of verification, it has to be a science in direct contact with the being of objects which the science of consciousness and experience is. By the being of the object, it catches the essence of an object – its self-evidence.

Phenomenology, in Husserl’s reading, does not deny the existence of the world or the extramental (1965, 1911; 1983, 1913). It only denies that existence is significant in philosophy because it is a material used

by naturalism to produce knowledge (*ibid*). In my view, this explains why Husserl traces both perceptual and non-perceptual experiences back to consciousness. Developing the absolute science, I find in Husserl that two important methods take us closer to the store of established truths. They are the activity of reflection and *eidetic* reduction.

The first step is the use of the method of reflection. What Husserl (1965) has in mind here is a kind of activity that allows a discipline to extricate the meaning of its own experience from the aspect of the world it studies. In other words, reflective activity is not an exercise that is equal to passive action. It does not merely observe what an individual has experienced. Instead, it is an exercise that helps a discipline to find its meaning again, especially if it lost it. How should philosophy do this? Husserl says it must turn to phenomenology, i.e., eidetic reduction.

The second step is the use of *eidetic* reduction. What is important that is worth noting here is that Husserl does not use *reduction* as it is used in naturalism. In naturalism, the word, *reduction* is used as translating immediate experience to sense-datum or translating conscious experience to the body and it takes place within causal laws. For Husserl (1965), reduction means neutralization or bracketing. Bracketing, or *epoche* as it is called, entails taking a discipline or position to its scientific root without prior empirical, epistemological, or metaphysical assumptions. It puts out of action the existing the assumptions of the sciences to find what makes the things what it is. It is expected to take us away from the natural attitude to the phenomenological attitude – the *eidetic* attitude.

In support of Husserl view, Steven Crowell makes clear that “the *epoche* expresses *eidetic* phenomenology’s commitment to the autonomy of the first-person experience” (2013: 28) such that there is no appeal to any kind of causal or third-person account. What I draw from Crowell is that existing causal explanation of the sciences have their basis in the natural attitude and the first-person, the subject that experiences the aspect of must inculcate the *eidetic* attitude to experience things as they are given.

The *eidetic* attitude is a level where a discipline finds the meaning which makes it what it is. In other words, when a discipline uses eidetic reduction, it is pushing aside the assertions, affirmations by natural sciences.

Therefore, when philosophy uses *eidetic* reduction, it pushes aside the assertions and affirmations of naturalism. This, it does by unbuilding and dismantling its existing structure, and philosophy must do so. Also, this, it does by questioning back to its foundation, and philosophy must do so. In other words, to question back to the foundation is to return to the science of consciousness, which is studied by transcendental phenomenology.

For Husserl (1965), a return to transcendental phenomenology continues with a rebuilding that takes research in consciousness pre-eminently. Here in the analysis of consciousness, the idea of objectivity becomes what is pursued to establish the foundation of knowledge. With the idea of objectivity, we are in pursuit of the essence of things, i.e., the universal property of a thing. At this juncture, Husserl's pursuit of the foundation of knowledge becomes a universal science where the idea of essence belongs to the sphere of what is ideal and can be caught in intuition (Husserl 1965). With the *eidetic* method of phenomenology, i.e., the science of essence, when we experience an object, two things come to our consciousness.

First, the physical identity of an object which belongs to perceptual consciousness. Here, we are interested in how the object relates to consciousness. Second, the essence of an object belongs to categorical consciousness. Here, we are interested in how the universal property or self-evidence of the object is captured in intuition or direct grasp. How the second type of conscious experience occurs to provide self-evidence is a high point in Husserl's study of eidetic reduction.

In support of this view, Zahavi and Gallagher explain that "the purpose of eidetic reduction is not to allow the focus on the given (freed from theoretical prejudices), but rather focus on givenness" (2008: 88) such that all matters of experience are captured in consciousness. What this means for me is that the *eidetic* reduction, beyond giving self-evidence to a claim about the world, includes the totality of appearance and reality of thing the world in what is given to consciousness. Therefore, consciousness becomes not just the foundation of knowledge but gives a panoramic experience of the aspects of the world.

The third way of defending Husserl's phenomenology as the foundation of knowledge is found in the text, *Ideas*. It is, in Husserl's reading, by the structure of consciousness – the “dualism of noesis and noema” (1983: 211-28). With this dualism, we can explain all kinds of experience in every aspect of the world. On one hand – noesis –, Husserl refers to what the mind adds to its experience of an object (*ibid*). What it adds is the self-evidence that we have about the object. It pulls this evidence out of the intellect, i.e., memory (*ibid*).

On the other hand, noema is the external impulse that reaches the mind from the object. This refers to the quality of things experienced in any aspect of the world. The dualism of noesis and noema as the structure of consciousness is what Husserl does differently about the treatment of consciousness (*ibid*). Therefore, when consciousness intends anything, it is aware of its physical identity and then intuits what (essence) correlates in the object with the evidence draw out of the intellect, i.e., memory.

In my view, based on this explanation, transcendental phenomenology becomes a science, not of fact, but importantly of the essence of things. In other words, it takes the essence of an object as what is ideal of an object, not fact which signifies what is real.

Husserl says that the advantage of the science of ideal or essence is that we can have two kinds of *eidetic* cognition – of the real and ideal (1970, 1900). For the former, the eidetic cognition of the real is about the physical nature of the world. This involves the claims of the natural sciences. For the latter, the eidetic cognition of the ideal is about, on one hand, the ideal of the mental processes which are outside the incorporation of the actual world and on the other hand, the ideal, which is phenomenological, i.e., essence (1983, 1913: 160-66). Based on the foregoing, we see that transcendental phenomenology covers every possible meaning of any part of the world. This is because of how phenomenology treats consciousness. It presents consciousness as the ultimate source which provides the ultimate validity to the claims we make about the world.

It seems to me that Husserl's phenomenology does not compete with naturalism on what passes as knowledge or whether we make valid claims. Instead, Husserl is concerned with digging out the source

of what knowledge ought to be and what valid claims emerge from it. To do this, Husserl aims to make clear the epistemic ground and justification of other sciences which requires replacing the existing basis of knowledge – naturalism. Naturalism is older than phenomenology in the history of philosophy and for that reason, it has developed a lifelong attitude which many other disciplines embrace. This is the attitude Husserl calls the natural attitude – taking things for granted and presuming that things are out there for us based on our sensory observations.


Husserl's point is that suspending the natural attitude is important before phenomenology can take us *back to things themselves* – borrowing Tom Sparrow's words, being “back in touch with the world of lived experience as it is lived” (2014: 1) This is so that the universal character of a thing is experienced in the consciousness of the thing. Returning to things themselves is expected to be the outcome of Husserl's phenomenology because we would have found an impeccable basis for our knowledge and claims of every aspect of the world. In attempting to replace naturalism in its three most familiar forms, Husserl refutes psychologism, empiricism, and suspends the natural attitude. I believe that when Husserl set out to replace naturalism, he had one important conviction which is what I will try to explain.

I believe that Husserl pursued the foundation of knowledge because he wanted to discover and make clear the ultimate evidence, we have for the claims we make about every aspect of the world. To do this, when it was seen that Husserl was challenging the existing basis and attitude of acquiring knowledge and validating claims, it became clear that naturalism might be displaced. The thought of a displacement arises because the analysis of consciousness presented by Husserl's phenomenology was so uncomfortable for others not to quake. This fear emerges with claims that Husserl's phenomenology will swallow up other disciplines and, in turn, may undermine the assertions of psychologism, empiricism, psychology etc. Hence, with a failed attempt to discredit the importance of phenomenology, especially on the analysis of consciousness, and preserve the success of naturalism, there has been a call for the compatibility of phenomenology and naturalism.

However, Sparrow does not seem to agree because he declares “the end of phenomenology” (2014: 12). What Sparrow understands about Husserl's phenomenology has attracted a strongly negative reaction,

especially from Zahavi who argues that Sparrow's argument and that of other speculative realists like Graham Harman, Ray Brassier and Quentin Meillassoux are a poor reading of Husserl's phenomenology. I will explain Sparrow's view because it represents the latter thinkers' views before I present Zahavi's counter-view.

The background to Sparrow's view is that speculative realism and phenomenology share the view that reality should be studied on its terms. However, Sparrow's view is that phenomenology rather gives us an account of how the world is for us, not the world for itself – as a real entity. What I infer from this outcome, for Sparrow is that phenomenology does not help to understand the world as it is, but as we experience it. In other words, phenomenology has no metaphysical commitment to understanding the aspects of the world. To support this view, Sparrow argues based on three reasons which for him, sum up the reason phenomenology has ended:



First, phenomenology has become so diffuse that its methodology seems no longer relevant to its practice. Ever since Heidegger the project of realizing phenomenology as a rigorous science complete with a worked-out method of investigation has been abandoned. This is already evident in *Being and Time*. In this respect, phenomenology began and ended with Husserl. Second, insofar as phenomenology lives on today, we must ask what it seeks to accomplish. Does it have a clear *telos*? What end does it have in view? Third, if phenomenologists are still eager to get philosophers “back to the things themselves,” I suggest that this task has a new, better-equipped vanguard (2014: 12).

I will not discuss how it concerns Heidegger due to space limitations. However, the excerpt reads clearly that Sparrow's view aims to show how phenomenology has no clear methodological approach or goal. As a result, I infer from Sparrow's view that phenomenology will need some sort of restart which will involve a review of its approach and layout of a plan which returns to things themselves by appealing to speculative realism.

By appealing to speculative realism, Sparrow refers to rejecting any kind of correlation between the “subject and object” of experience and “consciousness and phenomena” because that is how the entity of the world is distinct from the idea of the world for us (2014: 15). With the latter words – object and phenomena representing the world, in other words, I infer from Sparrow that the right attitude to understanding the world on its terms is to reject the idea of correlationism.

In Zahavi’s counter-view, while it is conceded that the future of phenomenology is not secure, Zahavi’s view is that Sparrow’s argument is questionable. What Zahavi understands about Sparrow’s argument reads that there is a reading of Husserl’s phenomenology which is “superficial, facile, lacking novelty and selective” (2016: 14-5). In other words, I infer from Zahavi’s view that a proper reading of Husserl’s phenomenology shows that despite the received view that Husserl aimed to establish the foundation of knowledge, there were bases to accept that Husserl was committed to the importance of epistemological and metaphysical questions. For instance, the questions of how we know what we experience and that through consciousness, it is seen to belong to an aspect of reality, respectively.

In my view of Zahavi’s understanding of Husserl’s philosophy, the idea of correlation does not only focus on subject and object and consciousness and phenomena but also on “phenomenology and other disciplines” (2016: 11-3) because the latter explains why Husserl aims to establish consciousness, as studied in phenomenology, as the foundation of other sciences. That phenomenology has a relationship with other disciplines and more so, might be compatible with naturalism is something I pursue in the remaining chapters of this dissertation.

To further make clear Zahavi’s view about the correlation between Husserl’s phenomenology and other disciplines, Held explains that Husserl’s phenomenology, in “many ways enriched, and to some degree substantially influenced philosophy and many other academic areas – modern sciences” (2003b: 32) and still does, based on how Husserl explains the constitution of life-world. In my view, Held’s view is that despite consciousness providing the foundation for the experience of the world, working on the grounds of the aspects of the world – grounds of the biological aspect of the world, requires a clearly explained correlation between Husserl’s phenomenology and biological naturalism.

However, as Reynolds (2018) and Zahavi (2004) hold, it cannot be the transcendental version of phenomenology, rather, a psychological version of phenomenology or what Reynolds calls “*minimal* phenomenology” (2018: 32-40). The important tenet of a *minimal* phenomenology is that it takes the first-person account as the first and most important component of phenomenology which might allow the compatibility of phenomenology and naturalism. While I will do this, but not continuing with the focus on the epistemological question of the foundation of knowledge, I pursue how both accounts – phenomenology and naturalism – explain the mind, whether from a self-sufficient standpoint or combining some parts of both accounts.

Nevertheless, from the foregoing, it is clear that it was never Husserl’s aim to find the compatibility of phenomenology and naturalism because such aim only appears as if phenomenology and naturalism compete for what knowledge should be. Instead, a crucial point for Husserl was that all knowledge must come from one ultimate source which must be found and made clear.

Secondly, while the naturalists had a different thought, particularly about how naturalism might fit in with phenomenology which we see in psychologism or in a general debate about the account of the mind which I pursue in the remaining chapters of this dissertation - two and three, for example, Husserl, on his part, was clear that even naturalism, in its various forms needed to ground in phenomenology. Husserl’s view stems from the view that naturalism, in its various forms, cannot produce the irreversible knowledge of things, let alone become the source of all other disciplines.

2.6. Conclusion

In this chapter, I set out the received view that Husserl thinks that phenomenology and naturalism are incompatible. It was important to do this at the start of this dissertation to establish that Husserl’s reason for the self-evidence of this conclusion. As I have shown, the reason why the two are seen as incompatible is a result of the way that consciousness is treated in Husserl’s phenomenology – not as a thing in the world, but as the very foundation of the knowledge or experience of every science that studies aspects of the world. I explained that Husserl in the texts, *Prolegomena to Pure Logic* (1970, 1900), *Philosophy as Rigorous*

Science (1965, 1911) and *Ideas* (1983, 1913), aims to establish the foundation of knowledge that he asserts naturalism cannot provide because it is founded on empiricism. In other words, empiricist-naturalism cannot produce the irreversible and universal truths which Husserl thinks form the foundation of the sciences. I have shown how Husserl aims to preserve consciousness and ideality from naturalism. I defend the imperative of Husserl's foundation of the sciences against the recent most influential naturalist position on knowledge by Quine.

I have shown that for the Husserl of *Prolegomena to Pure Logic*, "Philosophy Rigorous Science" and *Ideas*, phenomenology at the transcendental level and naturalism are incompatible. This is because consciousness in the special way phenomenology treats it, swallows up all possible kinds of knowledge, including what is natural. As Reynolds (2018) maintains, phenomenology and naturalism can be compatible if the transcendental version of phenomenology is dropped. I drop the transcendental version of phenomenology. As I mentioned in the introduction, I pursue the theme of the mind, which is a recent area of research in phenomenology and naturalism. I now turn to the next chapter – chapter two, to investigate which account – phenomenology, naturalism, or a combination of some parts of both accounts – provides the best account of the mental experience of the mind.

Chapter 3. Weakening the Scene: The Reviewed View on the Compatibility of Phenomenology and Naturalism on the Mind.

3.1. Introduction

In chapter one, I set the scene for this dissertation by explaining how the received view – that view Husserl flatly denies the compatibility of phenomenology and naturalism because he sees consciousness as the foundation of the experience or knowledge of every aspect of the world – appears in Husserl's works.

In this chapter, my focus shifts away from the theme of the foundation of knowledge that grounded the first chapter, towards another major theme that emerges in Husserl's thinking – the question of how to account for the mind. I do this to investigate whether there is space in Husserl's thinking for the assertion that phenomenology and naturalism are indeed compatible in some sense – regarding the question driving this dissertation: Are phenomenology and naturalism compatible?

At first glance, it seems obvious that the two are also not compatible in terms of the question of mind. Phenomenology uses the approach of intentionality to investigate mental experience, and naturalism approaches mental experience using causal laws. These accounts are then not compatible because the notion of the absolute status of phenomenology – that phenomenology swallows up other disciplines, including naturalism – still holds. This is because Husserl thinks that intentionality, by being the link of consciousness to the world (1983, 1913: 73), swallows up the naturalist approach to the world, which is causality – causal laws.

As I have discussed in chapter one, this is because consciousness as treated in phenomenology – as the condition of all possible meanings in the world, swallows up all other approaches, including naturalism and its causal laws. This would, again, show that phenomenology and naturalism are not compatible.

The debate in the literature is much more complex than this. The current debate on the mind has generated three contesting views on what would provide the best account of mental experience. The reason is about the search for the best account of mental experience. The first view, the phenomenological account of the mental experience, is characterized by an approach to mental experience as intentionality. Intentionality, as John Drummond says, involves the directedness of consciousness to the world (2012: 125). From this approach, mental experience cannot be discussed without the acknowledgement that the mind experiences the world.

In my view, the mind is what it is only when it experiences or acts in the world. This view also includes the important concept of first-person perspective or subjectivity which the phenomenological account uses to explain its view. As Zahavi says, the first-person perspective or subjectivity is “a crucial aspect of mental phenomena” (2004: 331) that must not be disregarded.

The second view is the naturalist account of the mental experience. The unique approach of this view to mental experience is causality or causal laws. In my view, causality can be understood as involving the relationship between two interdependent things at two levels – (a) when two or more mental experiences influence one another, and (b) mind and body influence each other. Cognitive science is an example of an approach that is based on a naturalist account of the mind.

Thompson defines cognitive science as “that part of the science of the mind traditionally concerned with cognitive processes” (2007: 3). As Zahavi implies, cognitive science approaches the mind by explaining “what is happening inside the black box” – mind – cognitive processes, not by explaining bodily behaviour (2004: 331-2). Generally, the naturalist view includes some important concepts like supervenience, congruence, third-person perspective, the theory of dualism which are used to explain how the mind experiences its objects.

Some scholars, including Petitot *et al* (1994), Varela (1996), Zahavi (2004), Gallagher and Zahavi (2012), Pollard (2014), Sparrow (2014), Thompson (2016), and Reynolds (2018) have argued that both approaches to mind – the phenomenological and the naturalist are by themselves insufficient. The phenomenological account of mental experience is accused of being too transcendental – too removed from what is real and so that it, as Sparrow says, cannot satisfy any metaphysical commitments (2014: 2, 11, 13).

What is meant by “being unable to satisfy metaphysical commitments” is that transcendental phenomenology does not explain the ontology of objects – the basis of things as they exist in the world (*ibid*). Another accusation, as Zahavi (2003) says, is that the phenomenological view is solipsistic¹² (2003: 109), and cannot hence, provide an objective explanation of mental experience.

The naturalist account of mental experience does not fare much better. It is, for example, as Zahavi says, accused of excluding or misinterpreting the role of first-person perspective or subjectivity in the cognitive process (2004: 331). Another accusation is that if it excludes or misinterprets the role of the first-person perspective, then it is only, as Roy *et al.* say, a “theory of the mind, without being a theory of consciousness” (1997: 7). Given the inadequacy of both accounts, the third view emerges.

The third view is a combination of some parts of both accounts of mental experience – the phenomenological and naturalist. This third view has been approached from two angles in the literature. From the first angle, cognitive scientists like Francesco Varela, Shaun Gallagher and Daniel Dennett lead us in the direction of naturalizing phenomenology. These cognitive scientists, as Zahavi says, attempt to close the explanatory gap¹³ – the problem of how to bridge the gap between third-person and first-person perspectives (2004: 332).

¹² “Solipsistic” expresses the character of the idea of solipsism. Solipsism, as Zahavi understands, “is a position that either claims that there only exists one single consciousness, namely one’s own, or that argues that it is impossible to know whether there are in fact any other subjects besides oneself” (2003: 109).

¹³ The “explanatory gap” is first mentioned by Joseph Levine in 1983, but in 2007, he describes it a gap between “the neurological description and our first-person conception” (2007: 167). Thompson sees it as the “radical separation of cognitive process from consciousness in the scientific theorizing about the mind” (2007: 6). Thompson says the explanatory has some synonyms in varying philosophy of mind position: In Cartesian dualism, it is the gap between mind and matter, consciousness,

From the second angle, phenomenologists like Jack Reynolds (2018), Varela, Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch (2016) lead us in the direction of enactivism and embodiment. Reynolds (2018), for example, if “phenomenology makes claims concerning ...embodiment..., this will need to include substantial and systematic interaction with the relevant empirical sciences” (2012: 21), like the biological sciences in this case. Reynolds also says that the most obvious empirical “fellow traveller” for phenomenology is enactivism (2012: 75). Reynolds speaks about focusing on “biological accounts of the structural coupling between an organism and environment and the affordances given via that relation” (*ibid*).

My position in this chapter is that the third view does not only provide a comprehensive explanation of the mind but also shows some promising ways in which one can argue that phenomenology and naturalism may be compatible to an extent. I will introduce both angles mentioned in the previous paragraph in this chapter but focus my analysis on the angle of cognition, embodied and enacted. This then prepares me to return to a text by Husserl *Phenomenological Psychology* (1925) and the lectures on embodiment and enactivism in the text, in the final chapter of this dissertation. Then I argue that Husserl’s position in those text does allow for a kind of compatibility between phenomenology and naturalism to emerge.

In section 3.2. of this chapter, I focus on exploring the phenomenological and naturalist accounts of the mental experience of the mind. I do this by drawing on selected theorists who have argued for each position. In section 3.3., I then focus on the contributions of selected scholars who have tried to develop a combination of both accounts. I base my discussion on the work of Reynolds (2018), drawing on the ideas of some other scholars’ perspectives of enactivism and embodiment, plus the idea of naturalizing phenomenology.

and nature (*ibid*). In cognitivism, it is a new gap between sub-personal, computational cognition and subjective mental phenomena (*ibid*).

3.2. The Self-Sufficient Question: Assessing the Phenomenological Account of Mind

If phenomenology were to start this debate, it would begin by emphasizing the role of consciousness in mental experience. Phenomenology would do this to prove that naturalism is unable to study mental experience in the first place. This is because, as I have already mentioned, Roy *et al* say that naturalism is “a theory of the mind, without being a theory of consciousness” (1997: 7). In their view, it lacks the tools to explain the first-person perspective and hence excludes or misinterprets subjectivity – an important component of the cognitive process.

Yet, if naturalism were to reply to phenomenology, it would begin by saying that the topic of mental experience is beyond the mere talk of consciousness. Naturalism would say, in Thomas Polger’s view (2004), that it has left the phase of “what is experienced of an object” to mainstream cognitive science, neuroscience etc. (2004: 1). As Polger explains, from a naturalist point of view, talking about the mental experience becomes clear if the mind-body relationship is made clear (*ibid*).

Both accounts differ on the point of where to begin. In phenomenology, describing mental experience begins and ends in consciousness, with intentionality as a tool. For naturalism, describing mental experiences begins with the causal laws, specifically how one mental experience causes another mental experience. For a phenomenologist, causality cannot be imposed on intentionality. This is because intentionality swallows up the idea of causality. This is because intentionality, as Husserl says, is a mark of consciousness (1983, 1913: 199). In my view, given how consciousness is studied in phenomenology, it swallows up all possible meanings and the approaches to attaining these meanings. Let us get a clearer sense of the phenomenological and naturalist accounts of mental experience. I do this in what follows, starting with the phenomenological account of mind.

3.2.1. The Phenomenological Account of Mind

I base my discussion on three concepts that are crucial to this account: consciousness, self-consciousness, and intentionality. I start with intentionality.

There is no intentionality without consciousness. In other words, there will be no discussion of how the mind of an individual *intends* an object if there is no consciousness of the object. I proceed in the direction of Husserl's account of consciousness. I do this to introduce consciousness as the theme which precedes the theme of intentionality, and for what it does, it is crucial to the phenomenological account of the mind.

Husserl describes consciousness as being aware of everything around us in the world (1983, 1913: 24). In my view, it is simply a function of what I experience. It accounts for whether the inner or outer experience of the first-person testimony is valid. What is important here is that Husserl takes the *experience* of anything as the central sense of consciousness (*ibid*).

Clarifying this central sense, Husserl does not classify *experiencing* as *perceiving*. This is because, as Siewert (2012) says, while *perceiving* is what is seen when I am looking at an object and I recall making some judgement about the object (2012: 397-8). On the other hand, as Siewert says, *experiencing* is the visual appearance of what remains before me because I recall having the appearance of the object (*ibid*). I may not recall making some judgements about the appearance.

In my view, what is important concerning *experience* is that appearance constantly changes, and I must be conscious of these appearances as they are in varying moments – particularly in perspectives. To be conscious of these changes is, as Husserl says, to recognize that consciousness flows out the subject of experience like a stream (1983, 1913).

In my view, the stream implies what is boundless, limitless and anything that enters it is grasped as it presents itself in whatever perspective. Meanwhile, the crucial point about the stream of consciousness is that consciousness is imbued in itself. I have consciousness giving itself to consciousness. This

character of consciousness accounts for the theme of self-consciousness. However, in my view, there is no easy way to understand self-consciousness without understanding intentionality first. This is because the theme of self-consciousness is one of the aspects of intentionality. I will discuss the theme of self-consciousness in the third aspect of intentionality.

The theme of intentionality¹⁴ is designated as the “directedness” of an individuals’ mind to their “objects” of experience (Drummond 2012: 125). In addition, intentionality relies on the activity of a knowing subject who pays attention to and cares about *something* which is experienced. With intentionality, Husserl makes clearer the central sense of consciousness not as what is phenomenal, but what is experienced (1983, 1913: 67-9). By phenomenal, Husserl shifts the notion of consciousness away from being restricted to mental act to the account of all experiences – mental, sensory and kinesthetic.

The basic components of intentionality, as Drummond says, are intentional structures, temporality, horizons, and reference (2012: 125-9). Given these components, it is clear that intentionality is not merely how the mind of an individual intends to the objects of his experience. I start with the first component, intentional structures.

The intentional structures take us back to the dualism of noesis and noema discussed in chapter one. The former, noesis, as Husserl says, is concerned with the directedness of the individual to the object of experience, while the latter, noema, is concerned with the directedness to self in a temporary and extended flow of experience (1983, 1913: 203). Despite the direction in which noesis and noema head, one factor unites them – directedness. The idea of directedness has different interpretations, which includes anticipating, referring, desiring, and intending etc.

However, in my view, these interpretations are not as important as what they direct to and where the directedness takes place. Concerning where the directedness takes place, Husserl maintains that it does

¹⁴ See my explanation of intentionality in chapter one. As this chapter develops, I explore the idea of intentionality deeper.

only in the conscious experience of the individual (1970, 1925: 576, 1983, 1913: 203). This point takes us back to the idea of experience as the central sense of consciousness.

In addition, the individual, as Drummond says, can have two types of intentions – empty or full (2012: 125). The former intends to object in that are not physically present in one's experience. It does not involve any contents which are based on sensory awareness because the object is not perceived. The latter involves content between the dualism of noesis and noema.

In my view, what is important here is that intentionality can be described as a bridge that connects point A to point B – subject and object of experience. I will have noesis and consciousness on the *subject end*: point A of the bridge. Noema and the extension of consciousness which returns to the subject of experience lie on the *object end*: point B – of the bridge. The subject end of the bridge closes when the individual is not having a conscious experience of an object, while the object end of the bridge never closes. The point is that, for Husserl, without conscious experience, there is no mind intending to an object. Having established the role of *experience*, one might ask, to what does the mind intend to? I turn in the direction of what these interpretations direct to.

Husserl says that they direct to real and intentional contents (1970, 1900: 576, 1983, 1913: 203). I will spend more time discussing real contents I have barely discussed, unlike intentional contents. On one hand, intentional contents are intuited via experience (*ibid*). They are the universal character of a content – essence. They give the experience the same meaning for everyone and all times. On the other hand, real contents are observable by sense and causally determined (*ibid*). The real represents the product of empirical consciousness.

In Husserl's reading, this form of empirical consciousness involves kinesthetic and sensory experiences (*ibid*). While in the latter, experiencing an object is based on sensory awareness; in the former, experiencing an object is based on sensory awareness but this awareness is influenced by the bodily movement of the subject and the constant change in the appearance of the object (*ibid*).

While experiencing real content, I apprehend the object in our experience by retaining the property. By retaining the object property, I have content that represents the object in our mental experience. Drummond maintains that Husserl maintains this distinction by ‘imaginative experiment’ (2012: 126). An instance of the imaginative experiment is to experience an object while it is still before the subject of experience and look away with the mental mark it leaves in the individual’s intellect (*ibid*). In other words, in Husserl’s reading, sensory contents change and to have a representing content, the perception of the object must be varied (1983, 1913).

In my view, the goal of perceptual variation is so that I have real content that will not change. The bottom line of intentional structures to make meaning of the object which the mind intends to. One might ask, can meaning be attained given that our experience may or not grasp the appearance of an object in a moment of constant change? This question leads us in the direction of the second component.

Temporality as the second component, as Drummond says, is concerned with whether the dynamic character of an individual’s experience grasps the content of an object whose appearance is constantly changing (2012: 127). It is important to note that the theme of temporality is in noesis. Husserl introduces three important sub-components or moments – impression, protention and retention (1983, 1913: 192). While impression involves intending to what is given, protention or retention presents what represents the experience of a thing, not the experience of a thing itself. Now, Husserl says that objects appear by presenting themselves or in association with one another (1920/26, 2001: 164-5).

While the former is less cumbersome, the latter is not if there is no original appearance of each object. The role of retention in particular is to recollect the original appearance of the object. While, as Drummond says, the role of protention is to modify what is recollected such that if the individual experiences an object in a given circumstance, and given a similar circumstance, he can *anticipate* the object again (2012: 128, 129, 130). Concerning how possible the circumstances in which an object is given may change, it is important to at least map out the area from which objects appear. This next focus leads us in the direction of the third important component of intentionality – horizons.

Husserl says that there two types of horizons – inner and outer (1920/26, 2001: 6). While the inner horizon is concerned with a directly given object that refers itself to its sides – for example, when I experience a table, I can, in my consciousness, experience that the table has sides, the outer horizon is concerned with the surrounding from which an object is given. What is important is that objects appear in the stream of consciousness and intentionality swallows up all kinds of mental experience, including one that is grasped in causal laws. In what follows, I turn in the direction of three broad aspects of intentionality. I take the theme of reference in intentionality as the first aspect. I do it this way to avoid repeating the account of reference as a component of intentionality.

Husserl develops three aspects of intentionality. The first aspect emerges in Husserl's claim that says intentionality is a "reference but also dynamic to experience the constant change" of an object (1920/26, 2001: 2, 14). This aspect of intentionality describes how an object of experience is given to consciousness. By reference, it is not concerned with mental representation which is having only the mental data of an experience. Instead, it concerns what is the referent of an object in our conscious experience (*ibid*). It does this by preserving the distinction of the referent data of objects which is in the consciousness of the subject and the referent property which is in objects of experience (*ibid*). And by intentionality, phenomenology correlates the referent data of the subject and referent property of the object in our experience (*ibid*).

In my view, intentionality is dynamic – since the object of experience in its colour or shape may appear in perspective. It can grasp the three-dimensionality of an object in whatever manner it appears. The goal of the referent correlation is to make a correct judgement about the experience of an object. Intentionality involves the sensory awareness of the subject of experience. When the individual experiences an object as it is given by itself, I have first-perspective awareness.

What is important is that the first ultimate contact of experience between the subject and object of experience is the first-person account. It is the gate that opens consciousness to the object out there. It is also the first ultimate claim of our mental experience. The first-person testimony of the mental experience as Husserl thinks meets the condition of the truths of sensory and mental experiences. This

is because the phenomenological account recognizes self-consciousness, which Husserl refers to as being conscious of the consciousness of *something* (1983, 1913: 24). I hold that the goal of the first aspect of intentionality is to make a correct judgement about both the sensory and mental experiences of an object. I pursue the role of sensory experience in intentionality, and it leads us to the second important aspect of intentionality.

The second aspect, as Drummond (2012) says, concerns the question of how sensory experience can provide evidence for correct judgement if it is referent to an object of experience that constantly changes. Experiencing an object in its constant change is what Husserl refers to as *kinesthetic* experience (1983, 1913: 53). Evidence in the phenomenological account of the mind is crucial because it serves to affirm or deny the first-person testimony of a mental experience. I see that evidence is what supports the referent data of the conscious experience of the subject.

Finding evidence, as Husserl argues, is to determine which experience is apparent or given because objects are grasped in their horizons (1983: 24, 35, 41). While what is apparent is a matter of what is there without being looked at, what is given is a matter of what is there as it is being looked at. The latter can be influenced as it is given is influenced by the objects' horizons – the field which is constantly going through changes in space and time. In other words, objects are there in space and time, and from perceiving them, they are seen to constantly change in appearance. The constant change of appearance is what results in the varying perspectives that objects appear.

As I pointed out earlier, kinesthetic experience involves experiencing objects as they constantly change. It also includes the bodily movement of the subject of experience. Intentionality, in this aspect, as Siewert says, also aims to correlate the constantly changing appearance of an object and the bodily movement of the subject of experience (2012: 400). It does this anticipating when a moment of a body in movement is the referent of what stable moment of an object constantly changing in its horizon (*ibid*). Intentionality becomes a character of consciousness that is always *anticipating* (*ibid*).

In this second aspect, intentionality uses perception to *anticipate* the moment where referents correlate and produce evidence (2012: 400). In other words, I can only have evidence when I grasp the moment the bodily movement of the subject of experience is referent with the constant change of an object (*ibid*). Returning to the first aspect of intentionality, I pursue how to account for self-consciousness as the third aspect of intentionality.

The third aspect, as Siewert says, is that intentionality, as it concerns self-consciousness, is about understanding whether self-knowledge is possible (2012: 401). In other words, it concerns whether truly the first-person testimony of the subject of mental experience can be affirmed to be correct. Another way to put it is whether what I testify as what is going in my mind or what I describe my mental experience as is correct. Husserl approaches self-consciousness from two standpoints – empirical and transcendental egos (1983, 1913: 51-60). One question to lead in this distinction is, what is the experience of self? This question maintains the notion of self-consciousness. Meanwhile, what it does more is to introduce Husserl's two distinctions of self-awareness.

For the former, Husserl describes the empirical ego as the subject of the experience which sees itself as part of the causal chain in the world (1983, 1913). It is there like every other object in the world, and it simply is governed by causal laws. The empirical ego is studied like an instance via sensory observation or stimulation and from the sensory instances, a general fact is arrived at. Zahavi points out that the empirical ego in this light is like any other object in the world (2004: 335). Meanwhile, I see, in Zahavi's view, that the condition for being an object in the world is to be simply causally determined. In other words, the empirical ego is aware of itself in the world as an object. By causal determination, Husserl's view maintains that the empirical ego is a being participating in the causal relation in the world.

For the latter, Husserl describes the transcendental ego as the subject of the experience which sees itself as 'the condition of possible experience', including the one which takes in the empirical ego (1983, 1913: 363-4). It is so because of how consciousness is studied in phenomenology as the condition of possible meanings. It is not restricted by causal laws. Rather, it experiences its objects by intending to them. And when it intends to them, it intuits the character which makes them universal – the essence of the objects.

As Zahavi confirms, the transcendental ego sees itself as the only subject in the world. It is the knowing subject (2004: 335). In my view, transcendental ego as the knowing subject is not only about being the consciousness of the knowledge of the world but also about being the consciousness of consciousness itself. This means that the transcendental ego provides an account of self-consciousness.

I have explained the role of the transcendental ego in mental experience. It is not different if I call it transcendental intentionality to situate it in the context of the theme of intentionality. Drummond agrees with the notion of transcendental intentionality because intentionality is to prove that the mind is not restricted to mental activity (2012: 125).

In my view, this important point further confirms the absolute status of phenomenology. Given that (a) intentionality as a character of consciousness, is concerned with how the individual's mind intends to the objects his experience (b) and consciousness, in the way it is studied in transcendental phenomenology, is the source of all possible experience in the world (c) therefore, intentionality swallows up all possible approach to mental experience, including the causal laws of the naturalist account of the mind.

One might ask, is the phenomenological account of the mind is self-sufficient?

The answer to the above question comes from two angles – the naturalist and phenomenological. A position leaning towards naturalism will maintain that phenomenology does not satisfy any metaphysical commitment and neither is it truly scientific. Therefore, it cannot give us a satisfactory account of the mind. This is the position is argued by Sparrow (2014). Sparrow holds that phenomenology has come to an end because it abandons the science of metaphysics, which studies the reality of all existing objects (2014: 2, 11, 13).

In my view, what is important here is that Sparrow does not equate the real contents with the being of objects. And if phenomenology is to be the first philosophy, it should start from making clear metaphysical issues. We did not see this in phenomenology – rather than take us to the objects, it takes us the consciousness of the object. For taking us to the individual consciousness of things, it runs into the problem of solipsism – the belief that the self can know nothing but its modification or existence.

Responding to Sparrow, Zahavi argues that Sparrow has a “facile and superfluous” interpretation of Husserl’s phenomenology (2016: 14). In defence of the phenomenological angle, Zahavi responds that Husserl’s phenomenology has proven more useful than before, considering that research in cognitive science has continued to benefit from phenomenology. This benefit comes under the project of naturalizing phenomenology. However, in my view, this position does not mean that Zahavi supports the idea of naturalizing phenomenology. Instead, Zahavi joins the conversation of how phenomenology and naturalism can mutually enlighten each other on the account of the mind (2004: 343). Zahavi (2004), Gallagher (2008), and Reynolds (2018) agree that the transcendental version of phenomenology is to be abandoned to foster a combination of phenomenological and naturalism account of mind.

Gallagher (2008) thinks that naturalizing phenomenology is a better option which he develops with the account of frontloading phenomenology, even though he admits that the approach from “enactivism and embodiment” (2008: 129, 130-2) has some merits. The merits, which Gallagher refer to, are properly developed by Reynolds. In my view of Reynolds’ reading, there are steps to gain the merits of a mutual relationship of phenomenology and naturalism. This means that without the steps, we cannot find the merits.

Speaking about the steps – if phenomenology studies other topics, such as mind agency, embodiment etc, then phenomenology should: Firstly, abandon its transcendental version (2018: 21). Secondly, find a minimal version that takes the first-person perspective as a crucial element (2018: 32). Lastly, interact with the sciences whose topics phenomenology studies (2018: 21). In what follows, Reynolds tells us what the merits are – the themes of ‘enactivism’ and ‘embodiment’ (2018: 75, 143). Based on these reactions – naturalist and phenomenological, I have hinted at what to expect in the third aspect of this chapter. To continue this chapter, I discuss the naturalist account of the mind.

3.3. The Self-Sufficient Question: Assessing the Naturalist Account of Mind

The naturalist account, as Polger says, explains the mind as it experiences the world (2004: 1). This, in Polger's view, is done by way of explaining the mental experience of the world using causal law (2001: 23). By causal law, the mental experience becomes the effect or cause of the world or vice versa (*ibid*). In my view, this means that the mind becomes the cause or effect of the experience of the world or vice versa. Also, in my view, the causal law becomes the unique approach that differs the naturalist account from the phenomenological account.

To understand the naturalist account of the mind, some themes require explanation: The question of consciousness, *no ghost rule*, the dualism of space and time, and causality which explains the modes of knowing mental experience – supervenience and congruence. I start with the theory of causality – causal laws.

To understand the naturalist account of the mind, our attention is more focused on the theory of causality. In my view, describing the theory is not a subject of varying views. A common definition of causality, as David Braddon-Mitchell maintains, is that there is “a necessary and conceptual connection between mental states and the cause of behaviour” (2014; 132). This definition is the same as what I have mentioned earlier regarding the relationship between mind and world. In my view, despite this causal connection of the world and mind, the world exists more or less separately from the mind.

However, it is reasonable to say that, based on this causal *connection*, developing causality is an important step in the right direction for the naturalist account. Its development, as Polger says, can be traced to the difficulty faced during the early phase of the naturalist account of the mind (2004: 1). Specifically, this difficulty concerns how hard it is to see the connection between mental and physical phenomena.

As Colin McGinn says, a causal explanation is when one...

...thinks reflectively of mental phenomena one finds that one acknowledges them to possess two sets of properties: one set which invites us to distinguish the mental realm from the physical, the other which firmly locates the mental within the physical world” (1996; 17).

This excerpt explains that, although McGinn distinguishes the role of causality into two levels, it does not mean that it relates the mental to the physical.

In my view, at the first level, causality draws the line between physical experience and its mental states as its effect. This can also be stated vice versa. Consider this example: my experience of someone who has just been hit by a car is physical while the pain which arose from empathy is mental. Causality separates someone being hit by a car from being in pain. Now if I am asked why I have a mental experience of pain; I will simply say I saw someone being hit by a car. What is important is that despite being hit by a car is not my experience – I only witnessed the incident, yet I have a mental state of pain. This point further shows the crucial role of causality in the naturalist account of the mind.

The second level, in my view – consider this example: Think of me screaming as if I was hit by a car, whereas it was someone else who was hit by a car. I think that causality has a way of going from what is mental to its physical basis in the world. It is reasonable to say that causality can be dynamic to an extent. In my view, this is because causality does not only trace mental to physical in one person, but it can also do so from one person to the other person. It can connect two individuals, by drawing what is mental from one and what is physical from the other – just like the example I gave earlier.

In my view, there is no doubt that causality is about explaining how the mental and the physical are connected. Therefore, it is reasonable to say that, for the naturalist account of the mind, the notion of dualism is an important theme. From McGinn’s view, the dualist structure of the mind is presented, and

the monist structure is denied. The earliest attempt to describe the structure of the mind, as McGinn (1996) says, is the monist account¹⁵.

Returning to the dualist structure, as John Heil (2003) says, is when “minds and bodies are distinct substances, but minds possess, in addition to mental properties, material properties as well” (2003: 9). In my view, although the dualist structure focuses on the mind, it has an outlet to material properties – bodily properties. Given this outlet, the dualist structure returns to the idea of causality. One might argue that without the dualist structure, there is no causality. In my view, this is because, without recognizing that there are the mental and the physical, and they can be connected, there is no causality.

As Heil (2003) says, there is a problem with the dualist structure because mental properties are first explained before they are connected to physical properties. In my view, this is because the dualist approach prioritizes mental properties over physical properties, much so that, in Heil’s definition, it is found that “physical properties are added to mental properties” (2003: 9) to find a correlation for mental properties in the physical world. I make the explanation clearer in the following example:

If why the person was hit by a car was because the driver was initially driving over the bridge and straight into the sea, one might think that the driver did not have bad intentions and the victim happened to be at the incident spot at the wrong time. My mental state of pain may override any other mental state even if the incident had some reason to be cheerful – the driver who could have driven straight into the sea! Let us even say that the victim was a bridge construction worker who was still on site after work hours. One would expect that since it was after work hours, he should not have been there. This gives us a

¹⁵ “The monist account”, as McGinn says, maintains ‘there are only matter and its material attributes, the mind being a particular kind of arrangement of the material world’ (1996: 17-8). The danger with the monist heads farther the direction of the material, therefore, it becomes deficient in explaining the mental (*ibid*). In my view of McGinn’s view, the mind is nothing to understand on its terms but only in terms of the material. In other words, the mind does not have its separate terms with which it could explain its structure. It is unacceptable that the monist account does not increase our knowledge of what I know about the mind. I cannot do anything about improving the monist account because it is, in theory, an outlook of a world that is material. Given its direction to what is material, it further, as McGinn says, ‘denies or distorts the distinctive characteristics of the mind’ (1996: 19).

reason that he may not have been in the wrong place but at the wrong time. Yet the mental state of pain may override every other mental state.

One of the physical properties that the mental state may not include is the normative feeling – the feeling of right or wrong. That the driver was going to drive over the bridge but swerved to hit someone could be the right action if I consider the intention of the doer. I can say, from the foregoing, that unlike the phenomenological account of the mind where, as Husserl says, consciousness is the source of experience, i.e., normative experience (1983, 1913: 15); the naturalist account of the mind cannot explain the issues of ethics.

Nevertheless, one might still argue that the naturalist account of the kind provides a better account of mental experience in causality. I now turn in direction of supervenience and congruence.

Supervenience, as Sydney Shoemaker (2001) says, has been widely discussed “to understand mental causation” (2001: 74). In my view, the aim of understanding mental causation emerges from how a mental state causes a physical state. I think it is reasonable to say that, in supervenience, there must be interdependence of the mental and the physical. I now turn to describe the idea of interdependence. Supervenience maintains that there is dependence because there are two classes of properties – mental and physical (*ibid*).

Supervenience, as Robert Francescotti explains, is like having a ‘class of properties A supervening on a class of properties B just in case a difference in A-properties requires some difference in B-properties’ (2014; 30). In my view of Francescotti’s view of supervenience, causality only applies if a mental state depends on a physical state. This is not to say that it happens only when the physical state is the basis of the mental state. A mental state can become the basis of the physical state. However, beyond becoming a basis, supervenience emphasizes the need to depend on the properties of the basis, not the basis.

Returning to my example – perhaps if my mental state supervened on the properties of my perception, I would not have any reason to feel pain because I was not hit by the car. In this light, I can submit that

supervenience applies much more when the mental properties and physical properties are in one subject of experience.

Congruence, as David Papineau holds, has two important layers: “(a) every mental event causes some physical effect (1933: 22); (b) all physical effects have complete physical causes” (*ibid*). Unlike in supervenience where mental properties depend on *all* physical properties, in the first layer of congruence, a mental event may result from *some* physical effect. Based on mental causation, consider this example of congruence – I can recall the mental state of pain if I hear that a toddler lost his right pair of shoes. This is because the thought of the toddler stepping on a thorn may be a reason to have a mental state of pain. Whereas the toddler does not even see why losing the right pair of his or her shoes can result in pain.

In the second layer of congruence, consider this example – I stepped on a thorn because I took off my shoes. If I did not take off my shoes, I would not feel any pain even if I stepped on a thorn. In my view, this means is that taking off my shoes is a physical cause of feeling pain when I stepped on a thorn.

I observe that supervenience and congruence may run into the problem of solipsism given that I cannot feel the pain of being hit by a car or stepping on a thorn because I was not the victim. In other words, I can only know my mental state because I had a mental experience.

I rehash the view that the basic component of the naturalist account of the mind is causality. It is about knowing the objects of experience in how (a) the world impresses on our minds or vice versa (b) a mental state can impress on another mental. That I know the world based on causality – the view that the naturalist account wants us to accept; does not mean that it is through causality only that I know the world. In other words, one might ask, does it mean that naturalism has no space for consciousness in its explanation? I turn now to the question of consciousness in naturalism.

Does naturalism have a theory of consciousness?

Naturalism hardly talks about consciousness, but talks about, as Polger says, the mind-body relationship (2004: 1). In my view, the body, in this relationship, gives the mind a presence in the world. This is

because, like other physical things, the body, as a physical thing, has a presence in the world. This means that the idea of what is present in the world becomes significant to this discussion. The world, as Ritchie (quoting Isaac Newton) explains, is a space that can be described as a giant box with the things in it having a presence (2008:15).

In my view, the world is, without being experienced by consciousness and therefore, it is self-existing. This also means that things in the world are self-existing, with consciousness. If I take how consciousness is studied in phenomenology, it means that consciousness is not needed to ascertain the existence of the world. Also, it means that how to account for consciousness in naturalism would be as a mere object in the world which can also be restricted to the mental awareness of things only. It is reasonable to say that this view denies consciousness as the foundation of all possible knowledge.

Things, in the world, are experienced as they relate to space and time (*ibid*). In my view, by space and time, there is a position and moment in which a thing is perceived. This, then, means that there is the objective fact of where things are present (*ibid*). In my view, the world is as it is found, and this is what, as Husserl says, common sense and science say about it (1983, 1913: 51-7).

I think that the question of consciousness may not be a serious one to the naturalist account of the mind. This is because naturalism, as Ritchie says, is happy with the success of empirical sciences (2008: 1) and advise philosophy (in specific term, phenomenology) not to interfere but rather study how sciences have achieved their success (*ibid*). For this reason, some thinkers like Ritchie (2008) and Sparrow (2014) hold that science ought to be a model to philosophy. Specifically, they say science should help philosophy to explain consciousness.

In my view, naturalism approaches the study of consciousness – as it does to other objects in the world, in causal law. As Peter Loftson (2007) says, causal law provides a ‘unity’ to bind the varying types of awareness – sensory awareness and mental awareness (2007: 125). For the former, it is a case of the senses, the world and how they cause an effect in each other, i.e., touching, seeing etc. (*ibid*). For the

latter, it is a case of two or more mental states causing an effect on one another (*ibid*). In my view, these levels of awareness show that nothing comes between explaining the mind and body.

Given this view, it is reasonable to say that consciousness becomes non-existent. This is also because mental experience is explained solely in terms of mind and body relation, and awareness is restricted to sense experience. It then follows that there will be no reason to believe that I *desire, anticipate, or intend to* something, as it is in intentionality.

Pursuing the view, Polger (2004) claims that although consciousness is being aware, it has not contributed to the problem of mental experience. In my view, Polger diverts our attention to the problems of mind and body which philosophy of mind has attempted to resolve, with accounts like parallelism, interactionism etc. I am not interested in these problems or the solutions proposed because it is not the focus of the chapter because of space limitation.

However, I cannot ignore the important point which Polger goes on to make about the mind. This point, as Polger says, concerns the question of how the mind is a part of the world (2004: 1). The concern is not whether the mind is a part of the world; it is (*ibid*). How is the mind a part of the world? The best attempt at this question, as Polger dedicates a chapter to, has been about explaining brain activity as it relates to the world, which is studied when a person perceives or imagines the world (2004: 1-38).

It is important to note that the brain, as it is described, needs information (stimulus) to act in such activity (*ibid*). In my view, this is because I may think that the brain is reactionary before it is any other thing. It reacts to the perception of things around and produces an idea that may match what it has received. In other words, the brain produces the effect of what has been passed to it.

In what follows, the mind-body relation becomes a point of enquiry which makes the much-needed difference for the naturalist account of the mind. It then becomes a crucial point, as McGinn says, when brain activity is taken to be the point where mental phenomena relate to physical phenomena (1996: 17). One might ask again, where is the space of consciousness? In my view, it appears that consciousness is left out and why it might have been left out is not clear.

Responding to this unclarity, in Rajakishore Nath's view (2016), consciousness plays an important role, but how it begins, or ends cannot be described in physical terms. In my view, it cannot be accounted for the extent of what it does. Therefore, it should be replaced with say, a mental state. Given this view, consciousness assumes a minor part of the mental experience since it is not explained in physical terms. Meanwhile, as Polger says, to explain consciousness in physical terms, the machine approach which (a) aims to root the origin of consciousness in nature, not the self (b) makes consciousness a physical phenomenon (2004: 72-4).

In my view, what underlays the foregoing explanation is that consciousness is taken as a *ghostly* entity and for that reason cannot be explained in terms of what is physical. With this viewpoint, I turn now to another theme – *no ghost rule*. In my view, the *no ghost rule* provides a basis for excluding consciousness. It is worthwhile to note that naturalism does not exclude consciousness because it is supernatural or spooky. Instead, it does so because consciousness cannot be explained in physical terms. The rule preserving this view against consciousness appeals to what is material to explain the mental experience.

In my view, the *no ghost rule* appeals to what is physical, material, and causal. Galen Strawson (2005) puts before us a puzzle that concerns whether consciousness can be equated to a mental state. Specifically, in my view, Strawson aims to find out what the *no ghost rule* says about mental states.

Strawson says that mental states cannot be described as consciousness because 'each mental state has a physical state' (2005: 60-1). This is because the physical state is a condition for a mental state, not consciousness. In my view, Strawson's view implies that mental state, not consciousness, confirms that there is a physical state. For example, if I felt pain, it is, perhaps, because I fell off a tree or suffered some physical discomfort of all sort. One might ask, is it always the case that all mental state has a physical basis?

This explanation leaves out the case where a mental state causes another mental state – pain. Some scholars like De Caro and Macarthur (2004) and Ritchie (2008) maintain that this causal relation also happens amongst different mental experiences (Ritchie 2008: 120-1, 173, De Caro and McArthur 2004:

10). In my view, again, the naturalist account of the mind understands the content of mental experience using causal law. This means that a current mental experience can be the cause or effect of the next or previous mental state.

In this case, I can recollect a memory of a painful experience that I had some years back. One might argue that the previous mental state of pain was based on a physical state which involves pain. The continued return to the physical state only, as Polger says, shows that the subject of experience is first a ‘conscious organism’ that lives in the world (2004: xiii). I cannot overstate that the *no ghost rule* is concerned with what is embodied. It is reasonable to say that, for the *no ghost rule*, consciousness is not embodied but it is an absentee feature of an embodied being.

One might ask, is the naturalist account self-sufficient?

The basic problem with the naturalist account of the mind, as Zahavi maintains, is that by excluding consciousness, one throws away the first-person – an important part of the cognitive process (2004: 331). Excluding the first-person perspective becomes more of an issue when trying to bridge the gap between the testimony from our consciousness of a thing and the result I find in the laboratory. Given the attempt to resolve this problem, cognitive scientists have developed the project of naturalizing phenomenology. Beyond this project, it is clear that the naturalist account is not self-sufficient.

One might ask, does a combination of some parts of the phenomenological and naturalist provide the best account of the mind? I answer the question next.

3.4. The Third Option: Integrating Phenomenological and Naturalist Accounts of the Mind – Assessing Naturalizing Phenomenology

The third option can be approached, I think in two ways – naturalizing phenomenology and two out of the 4Es theory of cognition – embodiment and enactivism. Naturalizing phenomenology, as Petitot *et al* (1999), is a project in cognitive science that aims to take some tools of phenomenology to understand the gap between the first-person and third-person perspectives of experience.

I contend that it does not in – any way – sincerely provide a third option. Instead, naturalism aims to have the tools of phenomenology for itself whilst still misinterpreting the first perspective of experience, and still not necessarily explaining the mind. I will provide a discussion on this project and how it arrives at the result I do not accept after I introduce the second option.

The second option, as Daniel Hutto and Erik Myin (2017) say, is taken from the theory of 4Es – the idea that cognition is embodied, embedded, extended, and enacted (2017: 1). I base my choice of embodiment and enactivism on Jack Reynolds's claim because they resonate more than others with Husserl's phenomenology. Specifically, because the themes of embodiment and enactivism are contained in Husserl's 1925 text, *Phenomenological Psychology* – I will show it in the final chapter.

The idea of taking cognition as a part of the body as it relates to its environment appears in Husserl's phenomenology. A quick example is a kinesthetic experience which I have explained earlier. I say more about other examples in the next chapter when I situate my argument in this dissertation in Husserl's texts, *Phenomenological Psychology*, and lectures on the embodiment in the text.

In this section, I provide a discussion of both options and then argue that the second option of embodiment and enactivism provides a more balanced exchange of tools and approaches between phenomenology and naturalism than naturalizing phenomenology. I start with naturalizing phenomenology.

3.4.1. Assessing Naturalizing Phenomenology

To naturalize phenomenology is a very popular way of working out the third option. A large number of thinkers including, Petitot *et al*, Varela, Dennett, Zahavi, and Dennett have joined the conversation on how to naturalize phenomenology. Given this insight, it means that naturalizing phenomenology is taken not as only a way of the compatibility of phenomenology and naturalism but also an instance that should be studied if some parts of phenomenology and naturalism are combined to explain the mind.

Despite the merits of naturalizing phenomenology, it has been considered an imbalanced third option account, compared with the 4Es of cognition. I turn to why it is imbalanced after I explore the problem which naturalizing phenomenology aims to resolve.

In my view, the problem of the explanatory gap is not a problem in phenomenology. Rather it is a loophole in the naturalist approach to the mental experience. This is, as Zahavi (2004) says because when the naturalist account of the mind underused consciousness, it excluded the value of the first-person perspective, an important part of the cognitive process, about the mental experience (2004: 331-2). The first-person perspective is important because it opens consciousness to the world (*ibid*). In my view, the challenge is about reconciling what it feels like to have a mental experience in the first-person perspective and what mental experience one has in the third-person perspective. This issue is what is called the explanatory gap in cognitive sciences (*ibid*).

The problem of an explanatory gap, as Zahavi (2004) says, requires closing the gap between the first-person and third-person perspectives of experience (*ibid*). If you recall, I mentioned earlier that the naturalist account of the mind aims to provide a good account of mental experience. But what is a good account of mental experience if I know nothing of what is unique about that individual's experience? How is it a good account if all I only know is what the individual experiences?

In my view, the crucial part of any mental experience is excluded because human experience is to be explained based on empirical testing. Even if some of our experiences are based on sense experience, I forget that there are a whole lot of other experiences independent of sensory observations and facts.

Another reason is that while the first-person relies on intentionality, the third-person relies on causality. That intentionality swallows up causality suggests that causality is part of the sum of intentionality. It is even fallacious that intentionality is represented by a part – causality, of its sum. Hence, it is fair to say that I have a reason the causal approach of the naturalist account of the mind cannot explain what it feels like to have a mental experience. The cognitive scientists know this problem and they assume that a way to resolve it is to integrate the method of phenomenology. They pick phenomenology as a tool to solve

the problem of first-person (Varela 1996, Reynolds 2018). Why this “first-person tool” is important has everything to do with the role of consciousness in my view.

In my view, these cognitive scientists seem to agree with Husserl’s view that consciousness is important to closing the explanatory gap. Consciousness, as Gallagher and Zahavi (2012) and Crick (1995) say, is taken as “the *a priori* condition for doing science” (2012: 31; 1995: 258). What is important to note is that naturalism takes the account of phenomenology which is not transcendental. Particularly, naturalism separates and drops the idea of consciousness as the source of all possible knowledge from the testimony of the first person.

This, in my view, is because what is transcendental about phenomenology swallows up all possible kinds of knowledge, including naturalism. Naturalism takes with it the first-person kind of phenomenology. What I mean by this kind of phenomenology is an account of experience which takes the first-person testimony as a crucial component of conscious experience.

Another reason which motivates naturalizing phenomenology comes from the belief that both accounts are not self-sufficient and hence should combine some parts of their explanations. In this light, Zahavi holds that both accounts must drop elements that make them incompatible. On one hand, Zahavi says that naturalism must stop ignoring what he calls the phenomenological dimension (2004: 331). This dimension refers to the first-person perspective. The reason Zahavi says so is that, for example, I cannot ignore the account of the individual who is having an experience if I am to have a good account of mental experience.

On the other hand, Zahavi explains that while it is a difficult thing to do, phenomenology should embrace casual themes and exclude its transcendental element (2004: 336). Already, by intentionality, phenomenology has a place for causality; a point I have mentioned earlier. What is important to note about Zahavi’s understanding is that to naturalize transcendental phenomenology is to attempt the impossible task of making the whole of a thing appear in the form of a part of it only.

In my view, this is because natural knowledge, as a part of possible knowledge, is swallowed up in how consciousness is treated in phenomenology, as the ultimate source of all possible meanings. Therefore, with transcendental phenomenology, phenomenology and naturalism are not compatible, let alone naturalize phenomenology. I take the reasons above as enough to understand what naturalizing phenomenology is.

To naturalize phenomenology has headed in two directions – as a formal affair¹⁶ and multidisciplinary disciplines. The latter is most popular, much so that the former is hardly talked about and can be traced to an interdisciplinary group of researchers at the *Centre de Recherche en Epistémologie Appliquée* in Paris. They include Petitot (mathematician), Roy (philosopher), Pachoud (psychiatrist), and Varela (neurobiologist). They say:

It is our general contention ... that phenomenological descriptions of any kind can only be naturalized, in the sense of being integrated into the general framework of natural sciences. (Roy *et al.* 1999: 42).

Speaking about integrating phenomenology into natural science, different thinkers have developed terms like constraint, reciprocity, and mutuality. With the first term, by constraint, there is a relationship between phenomenology and naturalism which allows empirical science to constrain phenomenology.

Most thinkers, like Ritchie, Gallagher, Thompson, Sparrow who develop this one-way view maintain that naturalism is closer to attaining knowledge of real objects than phenomenology. Since I am concerned with the mental experience of real objects, hence naturalism should constrain phenomenology, and not the other way around.

¹⁶ The first framework is the “formal affair” framework (Gallagher and Zahavi 2012: 35). The formal affair treats naturalizing phenomenology as “language translation to naturalistic terms and properties integration” (Gallagher and Zahavi 2012: 35). It is also seen in Eduardo Marbach’s (2010) proposal of language translation to naturalistic terms. The second framework is the most popular one owing to its wholehearted program to integrate phenomenology into naturalistic terms towards providing a complete conception of consciousness which is credited to Petitot *et al.*

With the second, by reciprocity, thinkers who develop this balanced exchange, for example, Zahavi (2004) proposes that phenomenology can have a fruitful exchange with empirical science by “contributing to the project of naturalization” (Zahavi 2004: 343). This view comes from (a) the belief that at a point, phenomenology was more or less psychological and therefore, it can, again, bring forward its psychological version, which is closer in spirit to naturalism, than transcendental phenomenology (b) the belief that liberal naturalism or specifically, as Reynolds (2018) argue that the weak version of methodological naturalism is farther away from empirical science and closer to phenomenology (2018: 41).

For these reasons, these thinkers believe that when you present both phenomenology and naturalism, not in their best forms, they simply want to rely on each other to gain strength. This is because transcendentalism and scientism are taken away from phenomenology and naturalism, respectively. This explanation, meanwhile, points us in the direction of the third term.

By mutuality, if they are presented not in their best forms and they rely on each other to gain strength, then, as Michael Wheeler (2013) holds, phenomenology and naturalism will mutually enlighten and constrain each other. Wheeler’s view summarizes the whole possible kind of relationship that can be between phenomenology and naturalism.

To naturalize phenomenology, over time, has appeared in some projects, i.e., neurophenomenology¹⁷, front-loading phenomenology¹⁸ and heterophenomenology¹⁹. While these projects attempt to resolve the same problem of the explanatory gap, they use the phenomenological accounts not differently. The

¹⁷ Neurophenomenology has a working hypothesis: “phenomenological accounts of the structure of experience and their counterparts in cognitive science relate to each other through reciprocal constraints” (Varela 1996: 343).

¹⁸ Frontloading phenomenology is a dialectical examination and incorporation of results “gained in phenomenology and preliminary trials that will specify or extend these insights for purposes of empirical investigation” (Gallagher and Zahavi 2012: 44).

¹⁹ Heterophenomenology is a “third-person methodology proposed by Daniel Dennett for using first-person reports as scientific evidence” (Piccinini 2010: 45). For Dennett (2003) heterophenomenology is just a conventional, third-person, scientific investigation of brain and behaviour that includes subjects’ reports of what they experience. It is “a phenomenology of another not oneself (Velmans 2007: 5).

problem with these projects is that they further disregard the first-person account because the projects were carried out within the purview of naturalism.

In my view, it was naturalism that needed phenomenology and hence phenomenology would be used as the cognitive scientists deemed fit. Now that we know what naturalizing phenomenology entails, let us see why it may or may not be the best third option, drawing our reasons from three lines of argument.

The first line of argument by Sparrow is that phenomenology naturalized is a condition to be met for him to retract the statement: the end of phenomenology. As Sparrow holds, that because naturalism is interested in phenomenology is “a factor of redemption, since phenomenology in itself had failed to deliver on its promise” (2014: 187). It is Sparrow’s opinion that phenomenology fails to take us back to things themselves. Instead, it takes away from metaphysical realism to transcendental idealism²⁰.

In the domain of the former, I am aware of real objects, but in the domain of the latter, I idealize what is real. Sparrow, although accepts that it is a paradoxical relationship, maintains that with naturalism, phenomenology is pulled down to earth. Responding to Sparrow, which I have earlier discussed, Zahavi proves that Sparrow’s reading of phenomenology is facile and superfluous. This is because phenomenology has been more useful than before across disciplines, which include, neuroscience, robotics etc.

The second line of argument by Thompson, Ratcliffe, and Pollard is that to naturalize phenomenology is an advantage but there are different issues to be addressed. I focus on the issues. Ratcliffe (2006) believes that to naturalize phenomenology is a difficult endeavour despite relying on the convergence principle. The convergence is motivated by firstly: “current science *does* reveal the world to be that way it has been – using objectification” (2006: 330) and “certain kinds of epistemic process, characteristic of scientific enquiry, are privileged over others” (*ibid*).

²⁰ Metaphysical realism, for example, denies that the objects of our experience are in any sense mind-dependent, while transcendental idealism claims that consciousness is the medium of access to the world, that the world has no significance apart from a consciousness that discloses that significance (Drummond 2007: 176-7).

Meanwhile, Pollard (2014) believes that the insights of phenomenology already have been extended beyond the narrowly human consciousness to an understanding of nature more generally. However, I find in Thompson's (2007) conclusion, that understanding consciousness is not yet complete because there is still a preoccupation with the problem of explaining consciousness, not nature generally.

Responding to the first two lines of argument, the third line of argument by Zahavi, Moran, and Reynolds is that naturalizing phenomenology is an unconvincing project. Zahavi argues that Husserl's phenomenology resists naturalism – from refuting psychologism, describing naturalism as a fundamentally flawed philosophy to suspending the natural attitude. For Moran's (2013), the project of naturalizing phenomenology cannot continue for four objective reasons: phenomenality, cancellation of subjectivity, culture, and sedimentation. I find in Moran's explanation that naturalism: Firstly, excludes subjectivity and intersubjectivity in experiencing objects of nature.

Secondly, it cancels out subjectivity, sometimes called the first-person perspective, in experiencing objects. Thirdly, it returns us to the culture of natural attitude and provides a single story about the history of the world. Fourthly, whereas, for Husserl's phenomenology, sedimentation is a principle that helps to understand the varying levels which constitute the history and structure of the world.

In my view, the first-person account can tell the difference in historical stages but naturalism although recognizing this fact yet develops a single narrative. This implies that it cannot attain the universal and necessary truths. Reynolds develops a hybrid system that involves what he calls "*minimal phenomenology*" and "liberal naturalism" (2018: 32, 40).

The former is a version of phenomenology that is not transcendental but takes the first-person perspective as its starting point, while the latter is a type of naturalism that is not empirical but gives respect to the findings in philosophy. Reynolds' initial position is a belief that it is heretic to naturalize phenomenology for the obvious reason have stated with Zahavi and Moran's views. However, Reynolds takes us through the themes of embodiment and enactivism for example that minimal phenomenology and liberal naturalism may be compatible.

3.5. The Third Option: Combining Phenomenological and Naturalist Accounts of the Mind – Assessing Phenomenology, Embodiment and Enactivism

Before I present a carefully written excerpt that puts my interest in perspective, let me mention that embodiment and enactivism is a fusion of three main disciplines which are phenomenology, cognitive sciences, and biological science. Apart from phenomenology whose position is stated clearly, there are two types of naturalist discipline – biological science and cognitive science here.

Another clarification which I have thought about making clear at the start is the relationship between embodied cognition and enacted cognition. For the former, I take the embodied cognition as an exercise of capability which occurs when the mind animates the body. In other words, I have the body as being able to find itself and move around in the world because of my psychic.

For the latter, I take the enacted cognition as an exercise of capacities which occurs when the acting organism interacts with the environment. In other words, as Thompson (2016) notes, how much the body can know and understand the environment around it. I continue with the carefully explained perspective that I have promised to present on the mind and the world by Varela *et al* to lead our way into the themes of embodiment and enactivism:

Minds awaken in a world. We did not design our world. We simply found ourselves with it; we awoke both to ourselves and to the world we inhabit. We come to reflect on that world as we grow and live. We reflect on a world that is not made, but found, and yet it is also our structure that enables us to reflect upon this world. Thus, in reflection we find ourselves in a circle: we are in a world that seems to be there before reflection begins, but that world is not separate from us (2016: 3).

In an excerpt that reads like being in the world without knowing until the mind of the person comes alive, I find that the mind in the world is the basis of intelligibility. It is with the mind as (a) self-producing

and (b) participating in a sensory-motor activity in the body, that I can experience the world and the changes in our experiences of the world.

In my view, what is important the world exists independent of the mind, and the mind depends on its environment – the body to know the world. It is in this light that I pin down the idea of embodiment. And when the mind is understood as self-producing and sensory-motor activity, I would have presented the idea of enactivism. Meanwhile, underlying these themes is the concept of cognition.

Cognition is often explained as following a mental process to acquire knowledge and understanding through thoughts or sense experience. The merit of this basic explanation is that it covers the forms of knowledge which are either dependent on or independent of fact. Given this, if I can have a grip of a theory that treats cognition as these forms of knowing and understanding at once, I may perhaps claim that phenomenology and naturalism are compatible, at least, to an extent.

Searching for a theory like the one I just mentioned is not an easy task. In fairness to our chance of getting one, I see how such theory concerning embodiment and enactivism holds that to give rise to cognition, the body of perception depends on its interaction with the world (Menary 2006, Hutto and Myin 2013).

While embodiment provides us with the idea that cognition is a constitutive part of a body of perception, enactivism provides us with the idea of an embodied cognition that depends on its environment to acquire knowledge and understanding. This belief troubles a high point of Husserlian phenomenology because the idea of cognition was not validated in any way that relies on empirical science. Instead, it was simply from the viewpoint of how things in experience are given to consciousness.

To leave behind the phenomenological notion and pursue the new viewpoint on cognition in the direction that I proceed in; is to show how the body, while depending on its environment, experiences the world. This view, as Reynolds holds, was started by phenomenologists until cognition became a topic studied with empirical orientation (2018: 143). The result of this study, made popular by Mark Rowlands

(2014), has described cognition as embodied, embedded, extended, and enacted – the 4Es theory of cognition.

As I mentioned earlier, I will focus on themes of embodiment and enactivism for two important reasons which Reynolds gives. Firstly, Reynolds maintains that cognition, as embodied and enacted, resonate more with Husserl's phenomenology (2018: 143).

In my view, Reynolds' view presents the idea that (a) consciousness is a part of the subject that experiences the world and (b) consciousness as a part of the subject which experiences the world acts on the things which are presented to the consciousness of things while being experienced.

Secondly, with the belief that these themes resonate more with phenomenology, Reynolds holds that they maintain the claim that phenomenology and naturalism, including cognitive science and psychology, are not compatible. Focusing on these themes, in the way that I know, holds that phenomenology and naturalism are not compatible. One might ask, in what way which I do not know yet, based on the themes of embodiment and enactivism are phenomenology and naturalism are compatible? This is the question I aim to answer in what follows.

One way to begin is to further tell why cognition is important to the third option. I do this with the two central themes of phenomenology in chapter one. Cognition as an important concept participates crucially in the themes of the foundation of knowledge and the mind. For the former, it is about the claim of what I know through consciousness. Husserl recognizes that the body has a place in its environment (1983, 1913: 54). The body senses the objects around it and a lot more, it experiences them. Now the process of knowing what I claim to know has everything to do with cognition. In other words, it is through cognition that the body aware is of being either closer or farther away from an object it is experiencing.

For the latter, it is about how I have mental experiences. It will be unimaginable if a mental experience suddenly occupies an individual's mental state without having an experience. In other words, to have a mental experience, there must contact between the body and objects within their horizons. These

explanations are to show why cognition is an important ground on which phenomenology and naturalism are compatible. This is because cognition participates in both the themes of the foundation of knowledge and the mind.

Another reason why cognition is important, in Thompson's view (2016), concerns providing a basis for embodiment and enactivism. If you recall, phenomenology aims to become an absolute foundation for all possible knowledge. And it is for this aim that I have argued that it is a received view that phenomenology and naturalism are not compatible. However, Thompson maintains that if we are making phenomenology and naturalism compatible, then phenomenology has to embrace the idea of groundlessness – the idea of no absolute foundation (2016: xviii, 217).

In my attempt to justify Thompson's view, Thompson takes the account of phenomenology with regards to biology and cognitive sciences. The latter disciplines with their focus on cognition, from two perspectives, hold that what is known has no foundation beyond its history. In perspective, while cognitive science is concerned with the activity of the cognitive process, biology is concerned with the embodied cognition. One might then ask, what becomes of the phenomenological belief that consciousness is independent or a condition of the world? Thompson replies:

...human cognition is not the grasping of an independent, outside world by a separate mind or self, but instead, the bringing forth or enacting of a dependent world of relevance in and through embodied action. Cognition as the enaction of a world means that cognition has no ground or foundation beyond its history, which amounts to a kind of "groundless ground (2016: xviii).

From this excerpt, it is truly so, just as Eleanor Rosch (2016) says that the use of embodiment and enactivism is about something real (2016: xxxvi). That I now have cognition from the body's dependence on the world is simply about attaining the substance of what can be known and understood. An important aspect of this dependence is how the living body reorganizes itself. I turn now to cognition as embodied and enacted, one after another.

Perhaps when Polger says the mind is beyond the mere talk of consciousness, it was meant to also hint that consciousness itself has evolved with some empirical clarification. For example, the idea that consciousness arises from cells (Kabat-Zinn Foreword in Varela *et al* 2016: xi, Reynolds 2018: 75). Who would have thought that, in no distant time, the idea of consciousness as the ultimate source of all possible claim is a product of some cellular activities? However, a concern that runs through my thought is whether *consciousness* is different from the *consciousness of something*.

The latter being phenomenological, I may assume that what goes on in it may not be different from what goes on in the former. I may call the difference thus: in the former, I am concerned about consciousness as simply being aware; in the latter, I can speak about it as an element of intentionality. However, this possibility can only get better given that I can explain how either in constituting intellect, in phenomenology or causal explanation of intellect in naturalism comes from an embodied action.

In my view, the idea is to make cognition a part of the body as it relates to its environment. In other words, the body knows about being in an environment because of cognition embodied. Therefore, I can say that the body, as I have it, is a constitutive part of the cognitive system.

I find in Varela *et al* (2016) that embodiment is of two sides and these sides have different descriptions which means the same thing. On one hand, there is a side that is about physical structures. It is biological and represents the outer part of the embodied mind. On the other hand, there is the other side, which is about lived, experiential structures. It is phenomenological and represents the inner part of the embodied mind. Cognition embodied is a case of bringing together two directions of two disciplines – cognitive sciences and phenomenology.

In my view, what is important is to attempt to make phenomenology and naturalism compatible. This is because the question of incompatibility in the perspective that Thompson puts it revolves around the question of what approach to knowledge is more reliable:

we habitually experience things as if they did have an absolute ground, either in what we take to be the outside world or in what we take to be our self. Is this discrepancy between

scientific knowledge and lived experience inevitable and insurmountable? Or are cognitive science and human experience somehow reconcilable? Is it possible for cognitive science and human experience to reshape each other in a transformative way beyond our scientific and habitual, experiential reifications of a separate self and an independent world? (2016: xvii)

From the excerpt, at least I know that the body, while habitually experiencing its environment, can know and understand the world either from the outer or inner approach. However, if I take Varela's *et al* idea of embodiment in the context I have earlier presented, then the body as I saw now becomes two sides of one entity harmoniously blending in together. From these sides of the body, an issue arises which Reynolds traces from Husserl's use which concerns *Leib* and *Korper*. While *Leib* refers to the lived-body, inner part, *Korper* refers to the physical living body, outer part.

The issue concerns whether I can adequately make sense of one aspect of embodiment without the other. Based on the belief that phenomenological and biological aspects of the body have different focuses, it becomes a matter of curiosity if, at any point, they align. Perhaps at the level of sense experience, one might argue that they align. In other words, the phenomenological aspect needs the biological aspect to move around the world to have a deeper knowledge and understanding of the world. It is for this reason that Reynolds holds that, compared to living-aspect – biological, the lived-aspect – phenomenological aspect gives us 'depth and an array of environmental availabilities' (2018: 152).

However, considering the merit of the living-body, if I pursue Rosch's idea of *something real*, then as Reynolds argues, the living-body, compared to the lived-body, gives us the structure of *I can* know the world because my body is in contact with the world. This is in comparison with the structure of 'I think I know the world seeing that I rely on 'I can' to validate our claim. So far, I know that the idea of embodiment is that the body has two senses and from these senses, knows and understands the world. One might ask, how does the body know the world? To answer this question, I head in the direction of the theme of enactivism.

Reynolds, in his view that enactivism is closer to phenomenology than scientific realism, would make us want to find out what enactivism stands for. Continuing from the pockets of meaning I have, from the foregoing, made about enactivism, Reynolds maintains that to go enactivist, I will focus on biological accounts of the structural coupling between an organism and environment and the affordances given via that relation' (2018: 75). The picture Reynolds puts before us is that of a biological understanding of an intentional being who lives in the world; occupies space, dwells in time, and evolves its knowledge and understanding of the environment around it. What enactivism entails is a direction I turn to now. To do this, I turn to Thompson's account.

Before I proceed, one important point I gain from Thompson's (2016: xxv) view is that enactivism is about the living body which is self-producing and self-maintaining. Making clear these characters of enactivism takes us closer to what enactivism constitutes. The first source of enactivism is the idea of autopoiesis. The idea of autopoiesis involves the possibility of living organisms to self-produce until it develops its cognitive domains – the kind of domain which is dynamic enough to capture possible changes in the world that I know. This explains how humans adapt to knowing a new environment and one would wonder how it appears seamlessly (although difficult in more cases) navigating through a new environment.

The second source is Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of the lived body. Merleau-Ponty's idea holds that the lived body has two aspects – inner and outer. I have spent time discussing this view. And the third source comes from the Buddhist philosophy of dependent origination. This involves the idea that the embodied cognition and the world experienced co-arise in some sort of 'mutual dependence' (2016: xxv, 10).

Let me stop the discussion on embodiment and enactivism here. I do this to preserve some explanations which I analyze in chapter three when I demonstrate the presence of the insights drawn here in Husserl. What is a concern is whether I can find these themes in Husserl's phenomenology, knowing that if I do, then I would have shown that Husserl does not, in all cases, mean that phenomenology and naturalism are incompatible?

To do this, I will spend the next chapter discussing Husserl's *Phenomenological Psychology* and the lectures on embodiment and enactivism. In what will follow, I analyze the insight drawn from Husserl in light of the recent position on embodiment and enactivism.

3.6. Conclusion

In this chapter, I addressed the second major theme – the mind – in line with the overarching question which I ask in this dissertation: Are phenomenology and naturalism compatible? Contrary to the views held by both accounts that they are by themselves self-sufficient accounting for the mind, I have explained that combining some parts of both accounts provide the best explanation of the mental experience. I came to this conclusion by discussing selected phenomenological and naturalist accounts of the mind.

For the former, I showed how intentionality is a crucial component of mental experience in phenomenology. I also showed briefly why the phenomenological account is not self-sufficient. For the latter, I showed how causality is a crucial component of mental experience in naturalism. I showed briefly why the naturalist account of the mind is not self-sufficient. I concluded that combining some parts of both accounts not only provides a better account of mental experience but also provides pointers as to how phenomenology and naturalism can be seen to be compatible, to an extent.

I did this by discussing two ways of the third option – naturalizing phenomenology and the 4Es theory of cognition. I showed that naturalizing phenomenology is not an imbalanced approach since it takes phenomenology on its terms. Therefore, I abandoned further exploration of the project of naturalizing phenomenology. I then explored what I refer to as a more balanced combination of naturalism and phenomenology, by considering the themes of cognition, embodied and enacted. These themes are two out of the 4Es of cognition – embodied, extended, embedded, and enacted. I based my choice of embodiment and enactivism, on Reynolds' explanation, because they keep us within the question: Are phenomenology and naturalism compatible? The question now is, can I find these themes in Husserl's

texts? To answer this question, I will draw on and analyze Husserl's texts, *Phenomenological Psychology* and evaluate Husserl's explanation based on secondary authors. I do this in the final chapter.



Chapter 4. Resetting the Scene: Husserl's Compatibility of Phenomenology and Naturalism.

4.1. Introduction

In chapter one, I provided a discussion of the received view that Husserl sees phenomenology and naturalism as incompatible. In chapter two, I discussed how the question of the compatibility of the two approaches is debated in the secondary literature. I showed how some theorists, including Reynolds (2018) attempt to show how phenomenology and naturalism can be seen as compatible to an extent. Specifically, I showed, with theorists like Reynolds, how the themes of embodiment and enactivism can be drawn out and analyzed to show how phenomenology intersects the biological and cognitive sciences on the concept of cognition or mental experience.

This analysis then prepared the way for this chapter, where I now will argue that drawing out and analyzing the themes of embodiment and enactivism in Husserl's 1925 book, *Phenomenological Psychology* can demonstrate that Husserl himself does not, in all cases, see phenomenology and naturalism as incompatible.

Embodiment could be said to entail giving physical or material form to what is mental or immaterial, i.e., the human being or animal is an animated being that is embodied (Menary 2006, Hutto and Myin 2013, Hutto and Myin 2017). Enactivism could be said to entail producing cognition when the acting organism, that is, the animated being, interacts with its environment – i.e., the human being or animal knows when it interacts with the environment (Menary 2006, Hutto and Myin 2013, Hutto and Myin 2017). It is the case of knowing only, not knowing a thing, which means that there is no knowing without interacting with the world. In this chapter, I draw out of Husserl's text, *Phenomenological Psychology* explanations that fit into the meanings of embodiment and enactivism.

In section one, I introduce Husserl's aim in the book, *Phenomenological Psychology* wherein Husserl noted that he avoided answering "questions which have to do with the transcendental contribution" of phenomenology because they lead back to consciousness as the foundation of the world (1977, 1925: x). Instead, Husserl aims to develop alternative psychology to empirical psychology. The alternative psychology which he calls the "new psychology" is, he says, to find its roots in phenomenology, not physicalism²¹ (1977, 1925: 2, 3, 34, 35, 65).

In section two, I then discuss how the themes of embodiment and enactivism are characterized by Husserl in selected lectures from the text. I show that Husserl's view of the incompatibility of phenomenology and naturalism is much more nuanced than is presented in the received view. Specifically, if found in Husserl's thinking, any explanation on (a) how the mind is embodied, able to move around and experience the world and (b) how cognition arises when the embodied mind is in contact with the environment of its habitation.

4.2. Phenomenological Psychology: The Other Face of Husserl

In *Phenomenological Psychology*, laying the foundation of the sciences featured in Husserl's explanation. Specifically, Husserl is interested in making clear the "foundation" of psychology (1977, 1925: xi). Most theorists agree that with phenomenological psychology, Husserl aims to make clear the foundation of mental life. By so doing, Husserl applies phenomenological methods to the issues of mental life that psychology aims to make clear – including, perception, experience, imagery emotion etc. (Dreyfus 1982, Misiak and Sexton 1973, Valle and King 1978, McCall 1983, Spinelli 2005, Langdridge 2006).

I provide a discussion of Ernesto Spinelli (2005) and Darren Langdridge's (2006) views in this chapter and draw from these thinkers' view. From their views, while Husserl's phenomenological psychology

²¹ "Physicalism", as Husserl explains, is a concept which subjects its study to "physicalist abstraction", and with "the method of physics can legitimately establish inductive regularities which govern all material entities as such and consequently govern also organisms considered merely as material entities, and finally indirectly also govern the psychic in its essential involvement with the organic" (1977, 1925: xiii-xiv).

aims to make clear the foundation of mental life, it becomes an alternative to (a) empirical psychology and (b) transcendental phenomenology – as incompatible with naturalism.

I think that the first alternative presents new psychology, while the second alternative presents, as mentioned earlier, a phenomenology that is compatible with naturalism. Beyond the alternatives, it is reasonable to say that Husserl addresses the foundational issues of psychology, as it explains human behaviour in the world. The aim is to make psychology a humanistic science, not empirical science.

I observe that Husserl chooses psychology because psychology has some basic concepts to help explain mental life and understand mental experience (1977, 1925: xi). Husserl's phenomenology makes clear what these basic concepts are and how they acquaint us with the “essential features and structures” of mental life (1977, 1925: xi).

Another reason Husserl has to choose psychology is arguably partly because, Husserl sees the success of psychology, as rooted in physicalism (1977, 1925: xii). In my view, beyond the success, Husserl sees a better prospect of psychology – describing and not only explaining the human mind –, if it is rooted in phenomenology. In Husserl's view, instead of pursuing phenomenology only, he applies phenomenology to strengthen psychology – pursuing what he calls “new psychology” (1977, 1925: 2, 3, 34, 35, 65).

Spinelli's (2005) understanding of Husserl's view is that “psychology and phenomenology had a great deal to contribute to each other” (2005: 32), concerning the mind. In my view of Spinelli's understanding, making clear the idea of mind requires psychology – as the science of the mind – having its foundation in a pre-scientific discipline, i.e., phenomenology. For the same reason stated above, in my view, phenomenology needs to replace physicalism as the foundation of psychology. The aim of phenomenology – as the new foundation of psychology – is to establish the new psychology.

Langdrige (2007) understands Husserl's aim, as being interested, in “people's perceptions of the world in which they live and what this means to them” (2007: 4). In my view, Langdrige thinks that Husserl aims to make clear the connection between subjects and objects of experience in the world. It is reasonable to say that, with Langdrige's view, living in the world requires the body of a person – the

theme of the embodiment – and through the mind, the body knows the world through its experience – the theme of enactivism. In my view, Langdridge’s view appears in Husserl’s aim of establishing new psychology.

The new psychology aims to study the mind of an animated being – animals or human beings – that becomes embodied before it exists in the material world. By so doing, it focuses on the animated being’s subjective experience and other subjects’ experience of the world. It does explain how they, in uniformity, attain the objective meaning of the world with evidence.

The new psychology, as Husserl says, entails the following features: Firstly, it should acquaint us with what is “universal to the essence” of things (Husserl 1979, 1925: 34), by experiencing things as they give themselves in the subject’s consciousness of the world. Secondly, it should acquaint us with the “essence in the subject’s intuition” (*ibid*), by perceiving things beyond their material appearance. Thirdly, it should present the psychic life as the “life of consciousness” (*ibid*), which involves the mind as embodied and the body.

Fourthly, it should establish itself as the “all-inclusive science of the world” (Husserl 1977, 1925: 35), which produces the pre-scientific experience of the world – experience preceding all scientific disciplines’ experience of the world. This means that pre-scientific experience – a subjective experience of the world – precedes the experience of, for example, the biological sciences of the biological aspect of the world. The contribution of phenomenology becomes increasingly obvious already.

Fifthly, it should study the “mental life” of the individual, as well as social relations of individuals and the world (*ibid*), to find the intersubjective experience of the world. Here also, the contribution of phenomenology becomes increasingly clear because Husserl is once again alluding to the fact that for him, intersubjective experience helps to attain objective meaning.

It is possible at this point to think that the concept of phenomenological psychology is then a variant of transcendental phenomenology. Henryk Misiak and Virginia Sexton explain that since transcendental phenomenology and psychology are incompatible, Husserl repeatedly “revised his views on how

phenomenology can contribute to psychology” until phenomenological psychology emerges (1973: 12-5). In my view, Misiak and Sexton think that phenomenological psychology emerged from Husserl’s aim to resolve the differences between phenomenology and psychology and more so, to develop new psychology – different from a psychology rooted in physicalism²².

Phenomenological psychology can then be understood, as Langdrige (2007) suggests, as a “family of approaches” [in my view, to varying issues of the approaches to experience], “which are informed by phenomenology, but with different levels of emphasis” (2007: 4). I understand Langdrige’s understanding of Husserl’s phenomenological psychology as having two layers.

Firstly, the acceptance that other disciplines like cognitive science and biological science have their approach to the issues which are inherent in their themes of investigations. Secondly, phenomenology can enter into these disciplines by way of contributing to their progress in areas needed, i.e., in the interest of this chapter, the themes of embodiment in biological sciences and enactivism in cognitive sciences.

I think it is reasonable to say that Husserl places phenomenology in a conversation with the biological and cognitive sciences – two naturalist disciplines – to make clear the extent compatibility of phenomenology and naturalism. Meanwhile, unlike in naturalist disciplines where there is a dualism of subject-object, the contribution of Husserl’s phenomenology is that to attain cognition, subject-object must be a unity – the same point, enactivism explores.

In Husserl’s new aim of the new psychology, he finds himself working in the natural attitude – an attitude which he suspended²³ in the *Ideas* (1987, 1913: 25). To remain in the natural attitude and yet achieve the aim of establishing new psychology, Husserl uses some important concepts – like experience, world etc., in *Phenomenological Psychology* as of two types – one as natural-scientific and the other as phenomenological.

²² See Husserl’s explanation of “physicalism” in the previous footnote.

²³ I explained, in Husserl’s reading, the stages of suspending the natural attitude in chapter one.

I agree with Joseph Kockelmans' explanation of Husserl working in the natural attitude. As Kockelmans says, Husserl wanted to bring psychology to the level of "an aprioristic, eidetic, intuitive, purely descriptive, and intentional science of the psychical" (1987: 6) yet remain in the natural attitude. This is so that psychology at that level can break away from the physical, empirical version and yet make clear the mental life of the human person who lives in the natural attitude.

What this, then, means is that Husserl provides a ground for the compatibility of phenomenology and psychology, a discipline of naturalism and at the same time, continues to promote the foundation of the scientific disciplines.

As I showed in chapter one, Husserl's motivation was to find the foundation of experience of the world, which was consciousness. However, the foundation of the sciences – consciousness in *Phenomenological Psychology*, in my view, featured scarcely in the whole text. I now turn to provide a background to Husserl's aims to produce *Phenomenological Psychology* (1925).

In my view, three lines of explanation to Husserl's aim of producing *Phenomenological Psychology* and the third line of explanation is itself the analysis of the text focus. The first line of explanation concerns the various foundations of psychology from the ancient era of Aristotle and Plato to the modern era (1977, 1925: 1).

Husserl says psychology finds a foundation in the 19th century, as contributed by the German physiologists and physicists, including J V Muller, EH Weber, and G T Fechner (1977, 1925: 2). These thinkers aimed to reduce psychology to a physical inquiry and make clear the connection between psychology and physical science. Husserl explains that, with their aim, they thought they could address "all psychological problems, including individual and cultural ones" (*ibid*).

The German thinkers believed that studying psychology, as rooted in physicalism, would resolve all issues emerging from psychology. However, Husserl explains that their attempt was a familiar one as thinkers like Rene Descartes and Thomas Hobbes had attempted to create naturalistic psychology (*ibid*). Husserl says that since the German thinkers turned their attention to psychology, the study of mental and psychic

life became more “physiological and experimental” (*ibid*). I think the German thinkers did not attain their aim of making psychology an experimental approach to mental life.

Husserl explains that although the German thinkers maintained that they had new psychology, their version of psychology simply lacked “inner certainty” (1977, 1925: 3). This is because they explained psychology from the external, material approach of natural-scientific-physiology (*ibid*).

Another reason, as Husserl explains, is that although psychology produced practically useful knowledge, it ran into “the problem of scepticism” (*ibid*). I think that the problem of scepticism, in Husserl’s work, is naturalism’s weakest point because Husserl repeatedly refutes naturalism for being sceptic.

Another reason, as Husserl explains, is that mental life cannot be studied singly like the facts of material life (*ibid*). While facts of material life allow the study of individual things and produce individual meanings, mental life is properly studied in its unity to produce objective meanings (*ibid*). I think that if there is no objective meaning, then there might be relative meanings, However, when relative meanings imply that there is no universal meaning, there might be doubts that there are meanings at all.

For Husserl, psychology became less precise compared with the actual natural scientific disciplines like physics (1977, 1925: 3-4). This is because immaterial issues are exclusive to mental life and can only be addressed in psychology as a humanistic science, and not in physicalism – physical-empirical science (*ibid*).

In my view of Husserl’s explanation, immaterial sciences study things as having a unity. While physical-empirical sciences study things singly or in isolation. Husserl says it is this same rebuttal that Wilhelm Dilthey expresses concerning psychology, as rooted in physicalism (1977, 1925: 3, 6).

If Dilthey holds this view before Husserl, then why does Husserl pursue the founding of new psychology?

An answer which comes to mind is that Husserl might have found out that Dilthey failed in replacing the foundation of psychology. I now turn to the second line of explanation by way of Husserl’s examination of Dilthey’s attempt.

The second line of explanation flows from the first line of explanation which explains the abnormality of psychology, as rooted in physicalism. Dilthey responds to this abnormality before Husserl, but it is not Dilthey's response that is important to this dissertation. Rather, it is Husserl's view of Dilthey's response. I focus on why Husserl explains that Dilthey's response is insufficient.

Husserl says that Dilthey's critical remarks of psychology, as rooted in physicalism, fail to gain "broad acceptance" (1977, 1925: xii, 7). Husserl does not think Dilthey was wrong to hold the view. Instead, Husserl thinks that Dilthey did not provide well-developed reasons to gain due acceptance (*ibid*). Husserl agrees with Dilthey that to understand mental life, it must be studied in "unity" (1977, 1925: xii). In my view, Husserl presents Dilthey's position as that mental states in the subjects of experience are connected with the world through causality. Husserl introduces causal connection (*ibid*)

I think Husserl means that mental states are causally connected not only because mental states have causal properties in them which enable the connection. What this means for Husserl and Dilthey is that the study of mental life is properly carried out when the unity of mental states is carefully explored.

Dilthey and Husserl believe that psychology, as rooted in physicalism, cannot explain mental life in its unity. If Husserl and Dilthey share the same view, then where do they differ? So far, I have explained only Husserl's understanding of Dilthey's critical remarks. I now turn to Husserl's assessment of Dilthey's remarks – which could not gain broad acceptance.

Husserl says Dilthey could not gain broad acceptance because he could not convince philosophers and psychologists (1977, 1925: 7). This is because before physicalism took interest in psychology, it had been successful in its area of this discipline. Physicalism's interest in psychology seemed appropriate for philosophers and psychologists alike. In my view, Husserl thinks that Dilthey could not provide a better alternative to physicalism. Husserl further motivated his non-conviction of Dilthey's critical remarks in the following:

Dilthey offered brilliant examples of the interpretation of broad historical events and movements and individual and typical historical figures, but he never established a

rational foundation for such studies by scientifically disclosing the universal concept proper to mental life (1977, 1925: xii-xiii).

From the excerpt, I note that Husserl aims to chart a different course – a departure from Dilthey’s position.

By rational foundation, Husserl expected to see a specific humanistic discipline – for Husserl – phenomenology – with a clear approach to the study of mental life. This is what Dilthey fails to achieve in Husserl’s understanding. In my view, if Dilthey’s remark is accepted and psychology is uprooted from physicalism, it will leave psychology *hanging in the air* without a new foundational discipline.

Andrew Fuller explains that while Dilthey wanted psychology as a humanistic science which “explains” human behaviour, Husserl wanted psychology as a humanistic science that produces the ‘understanding’ of human behaviour in everyday contact (1990: 33). In my view, Fuller’s understanding of Husserl’s position is that human behaviour in everyday life is beyond being explained. At this level of Dilthey’s view, psychology is still rooted in physicalism. In addition, human behaviour must be understood to make clear everyday life meanings in human behaviour. Hence, for psychology to become an ideal humanistic science, it needs a foundation that enables it.

What stands as the humanistic science that also provides the foundation of psychology? Husserl introduces phenomenology to meet both requirements – the specific humanistic science and the desired rational foundation (1977, 1925: 20). This, as Fuller says, is because phenomenology focuses on the lifeworld (1990: 24). The lifeworld, as Fuller says, entails subjective experience and intersubjective experiences as they relate to the object of experience to provide meanings deriving from the objective experience of the world (*ibid*). From this point to where Husserl brings his submission is a long third line of explanation in the next section of this dissertation.

So far in this section, I have discussed the popularly held view of phenomenological psychology by secondary thinkers in agreement with Husserl. I have explained the four important features of phenomenological psychology. I have also provided some background to why Husserl produces the text

with two of the three lines of explanation which flowed from Dilthey's response to the German thinkers, philosopher, and psychologists., which Husserl thinks is inadequate. I now turn to the third line of explanation.

The third line of explanation contains the major interconnected discussions that Husserl envisioned for the text at the start. I delve into more substantial analyses of Husserl's aim of making phenomenology the foundation of psychology. Husserl's aim in the entire study, as mentioned earlier, is to create new psychology. Husserl does this by replacing physicalism with phenomenology as the foundation of psychology.

4.3. Laying out the Bases of New Psychology: The Third Line of Explanation

Husserl begins by setting the standard for what the new psychology ought to be. Husserl says the new psychology must understand the mind as being able to perceive the world as it presents itself in "pre-scientific experience" (1977, 1925: xiii, 40). Sebastian Luft (2012) explains that pre-scientific experience is what needs to be "uncovered or recovered" (2012: 249) because it lays beneath the layers of the empirical science of the world. In my view, the pre-scientific experience is to directly experience the world as it is – in all its structures and aspects – not through empirical science.

In the experience everyone sees the world from a pre-scientific stance and attains the same objective meaning, Husserl calls it "intersubjective experience" (1977, 1925: 12, 27). As Zahavi says, in intersubjective experience, all things "do not exist for me alone, but for everybody" (2003: 110). In my view, intersubjective experience is to ensure that everyone who sees the world as it is, does so, without the interference of some scientific presupposition.

In Husserl's reading, psychology – as rooted in physicalism – cannot explain the intersubjective experience. Husserl explains that its experimental basis eliminates subjectivity and leaves behind the residue of what is material-physical (1977, 1925: xiii). In my view, because the experimental sciences study

the physical, physicalism would not be the right foundation of psychology – since psychology focuses on the mental. This, in Husserl’s view, means that psychology, as rooted in physicalism, cannot produce an experience that is completely free from experimental-physical assumptions.

It is reasonable to say that we do not have a discipline of pre-scientific experience yet – the experience that precedes all empirical-physical experience – until Husserl’s new psychology emerges. It is then to find how Husserl aims to make psychology a pre-scientific discipline. Husserl says that we must begin by making “sense of the origin” of psychology (1977, 1925: 38). In my view, Husserl is not yet focused on psychology, but the foundation of psychology. Here, Husserl speaks about phenomenology.

The first step to make sense of the origin of psychology, as Husserl says, is for the origin to be able to provide “absolute evidence” (*ibid*). This kind of evidence, as Husserl says, emerges if phenomenology can enable psychology to explain how human subjects experience things in the world and draw out of things, what he calls essence – what is universal and absolute (*ibid*). Zahavi makes clear that Husserl wants psychology to “live a life of absolute self-responsibility” (2003: 68), by which it is responsible for the account of the mind.

The second step to make sense of the origin of psychology, as Husserl says, is for the origin to be able to return to the “sense-investigation” of psychology (*ibid*). Sense-investigation, in Husserl’s reading, commences if phenomenology can enable psychology to find its “theme of knowledge” and through it, give “context to the mental experience” of the world (1977, 1925: 38).

Phenomenology will bring up psychology to a level it can explain contexts help to determine the relationship between the content and horizon of experience in the perception of the subject (1977, 1925: 39). On the other hand, phenomenology will enable psychology, as Husserl says, to identify its theme of knowledge as being that mental experience has an “essential unity” (*ibid*). By essential unity, Husserl refers to psychology studying what holds immaterial, mental life together. In addition, it should ensure that the subject and object of experience are studied in unity, not isolation (*ibid*). This, in my view, is because while physical things are studied as singles, mental life is not studied as having unity.

I have explained the two important things which Husserl does to make clear the origin of the new psychology. One might ask, what is the science of mind – new psychology – like? I now turn to answer the question in the following sub-sections.

4.3.1. The Science of Experienced World

The new psychology, in Husserl's reading, must recognize the experienced world as "the source of study of the world" for all sciences (1977, 1925: 47). I think Husserl aims to make the new psychology the discipline which unites other sciences because (a) it possesses, in Husserl reading, the synthesis of phenomenology – the character to unite the subject and object of experience (1977, 1925; 20), and (b) it takes, as Husserl says, the world as the field of experience (1977, 1925: 41).

In Jan Linschoten's (1987) reading, the experienced world gives itself to persons, but when persons give up on it, they withdraw and give up on the world (1987: 86). In my view, Kockelmans' view is that the world is inconceivable without the mind *intend* it. Another leg of it is that because the mind (of persons) constitutes the world, persons can choose to study it as they see it. This informs why, for example, there are different aspects of the world studied by different groups of persons.

We face the issue of different sciences studying the world, based on their theme, without any form of unity. Husserl does not see the unity elsewhere other than in an all-inclusive science, which has "the experience of all-inclusive world-structure and seeks theoretical truth" (1977, 1925: 48).

In my view, Husserl aims to make the new psychology as being able to explore all the experienced world, even its aspects – biological, physical aspects. The all-inclusive science, as Husserl says, must focus on the "cognitions of other sciences and the structures they study" (*Ibid*).

On the one hand, I think that the structures represent the aspects of the world. On the other hand, the cognitions of other sciences refer to the mental process which takes place when the scientists of each science experience the aspects of the world. For example, the mental process takes place when the biological scientists study their experience of the biological aspect of the world.

Said another way, the aspects are studied by each particular science, and as Husserl says, the all-inclusive science is “a generic science” of the world, composing of particular sciences related to one another (*ibid*). As Fuller (1990) says, Husserl aims to make new psychology a modern science that reveals the “true being of the world” (1990: 12) and guides the particular sciences to explain the world.

In my view, it is Husserl’s aim that the new psychology does not only explore the aspects of the experienced world but also unites these particular sciences. I now turn to what these particular sciences entail.

4.3.2. The Science of Particular Sciences

In Husserl’s reading, the new psychology must recognize that particular sciences have particular experiences of the world (1977, 1925: 48, 69), not the all-inclusive or pre-scientific experience. The particular experience is strictly the experience of each aspect of the world by the relevant particular science (*ibid*).

In my view, for example, biological science experiences the biological aspect of the world. The particular sciences, as Husserl says, have in common “space and time”, and are alerted to “the material significance” of the aspect of the world (*ibid*). Material significance, as Husserl says, refers to “the forms” in material things which are “familiar to us and universal” (*ibid*).

As Spinelli (2005) says, material significance impresses the “physical appearance of objects or human beings” on our perception (2005: 59-60, 61). For the former, Spinelli explains that the perceiver builds an “impression” of the object perceived based on what is inferred from the object (*ibid*). For the latter, Spinelli explains that the perceiver goes “beyond the physical characteristics of the perceived person to the underlying motives, interests, social status etc.” (*ibid*).

In my view, the perceiver is led from the physical characteristics of the perceived person to the perceiver’s mental states, where the perceiver opens a correlation with the perceived or object. Husserl calls “the correlation” as occurring in intuition (1977, 1925: 48). Again, in my view, Husserl stresses one issue which

results from the particular experiences of particular sciences – the possibility of limiting what is experienced of the world.

To address this issue, firstly, Husserl says we must enter the “empty horizon which opens to us multiple possible experiences and in the possible experiences, we gain sight of what is previously invisible” (1977, 1925: 47-8). By empty horizon, in my view, is the perceived which appears in our pre-scientific experience of the broadly and widely expanse of the world that endlessly spreads in our perception.

It is reasonable to say that gaining sight of multiple possible experiences is by paying attention to perceiving the world. As Zahavi (2003) says, paying attention to the perceived world does not merely exist for me, but refers to a plurality of possible subjects (2003: 119). In my view, it can be said, for Zahavi, that multiple possible experiences do not appear to one only, but they are there for others.

Secondly, in the category of possible experience, Husserl refers to “every past active or passive experience which could be imagined if there was a direct course of actual experience” (1977, 1925: 49).

In my view, Husserl simply explains what the recollection of previous experience entails – more so, the recollection is to find harmony between a new experience and the one we are familiar with. Thirdly, if there are things that familiar, Husserl says there are others which “are not familiar that are known based on expectation” (*ibid*), and they are formed based on previous actual experience.

Speaking more about what expectation entails, as Husserl says, “every arbitrary transformation of experience into possible experience” is performed to make expectation meet an actual experience of a thing (1977, 1925: 49). This, again, is because expectation itself does not refer to a particular thing, but it is based on previous actual experiences. Husserl says things – real things, since we are discussing the particular physical sciences, have “temporal and spatial things” (1977, 1925: 50).

In my view, these things have a duration of appearance as time and space change. And in space and time – duration – the appearance of the thing ends when the thing appears within another space and time. I turn now to the particular experience of things.

4.3.3. The Science of Particular Experience of Things

The new psychology must recognize the particular experience of things. As Kockelmans (1987) says, Husserl aims to correct a “misconception of traditional science” of not “questioning things themselves”, and not “going back to experience” (1987: 9)

In my view, particular things appear to the subject of experience in different types. However, there is often a part of the appearance of a thing which every subject of experience is familiar with – it is what, in Kockelmans’ view, we must go back to.

All particular things – when experienced, have an essence – things themselves. To intuit the essence, our experience must go beyond the appearance of things. What is important, as Husserl says, is that when things appear – they are “empirical” and when we go beyond appearance, they become “eidetic²⁴” (1977, 1925: 77). I continue Husserl’s explanation of the empirical appearance of things.

Husserl says that appearance can either be “self-sufficient or non-self-sufficient” (*ibid*). While the former is “real, concrete, individual” and unchanging or fixed in appearance, the latter are mere “modification” – from or to a real thing (*ibid*). Husserl explains, with causality, that self-sufficient things cause non-self-sufficient things to become self-sufficient things (1977, 1925: 77-8).

As Kockelmans (1987) further makes clear, the “psychical manifests itself in immediate experience as non-self-sufficient” because it appears in animated beings only – animals and humans (1987: 11). The physical manifests in experience as self-sufficient as both animated and non-animated beings, i.e., plants etc. (*ibid*)

In my view, the experience of self-sufficient things causes the modification of non-self-sufficient – the effect. This is because, as Husserl says, “real things have stable causal properties” (1977, 1925: 78). By

²⁴ I reserve the next sub-section to discuss the eidetic of things.

stable causal properties, Fuller (1990) says Husserl refers to the properties in real things that enable them to have an “objective and constant” relation with their counterparts (1990: 10).

In my view, real things – whether, as Husserl says, of higher or lower (1977, 1925: 78) – have inherent qualities that make their relationship with their counterparts the same across time and space. I now turn to higher and lower real things.

For the former, Husserl refers to “single real things which are united into real complexes of things” (*ibid*).

In my view, there are single real things that are identical - variants whose difference is not obvious, like human beings. For the latter, Husserl speaks about singular things which are not given as “pluralities but joined to make up the unity of one thing” (*ibid*). In my view, some things appear to not belong to the same category, but they are, i.e., heavenly bodies.

Two important points follow through and they are, firstly, real things have a stable causal property which I have earlier stated. Secondly, real things can be broken down into, on one hand, ‘living things in the world, animality which is psychically living and acting things’ and on the other hand, “things that lack psychic life”, like stones, houses, plant etc. (*ibid*).

For the former, I find that Husserl refers to human beings and animals because they “sense, perceive, feel, strive” and perform “thought-activity” which involves the following stages: “considering together, comparing, distinguishing, exercising, universalization and ideation, concluding and proving” (1977, 1925: 79). I now turn to the eidetic of things.

4.3.4. The Science of Essence

The new psychology, as Husserl says, must be able to evolve the mind to a level where it captures the “essence” of experience (1977, 1925: 68). As Husserl adds, the new psychology should do so by stripping away with its prior “vague or empty concept” which parades psychology as “traditional prejudices, one-sided views, or unclarities” (*ibid*). Kockelmans makes clear Husserl’s aim in the following excerpt:

Husserl tries to find the necessity of such a new kind of psychology by pointing to the fact that traditional empirical psychology still lacks a systematic framework of basic concepts grounded in the intuitive clarification of the psychical essences (1987: 6).

In this excerpt, Kockelmans presents Husserl's new psychology's aim that is still in the natural attitude but able to describe the essence of mental experience.

Concerning the essence of experience, Husserl maps out two broad methods. I think that, in Husserl's reading, psychology can capture the essence of its experience, if it is stripped of vague or empty concept. Husserl says grasping essence is done in the following two methods (1977, 1925: 68):

Firstly, Husserl says it should make clear the "intuitive method of original universalization" (*ibid*). Through this method, we grasp the universal property of a thing experienced by intuition (*ibid*). In my view, this requires experiencing a category of different things and drawing out what is universal about them.

Secondly, Husserl says it should make clear "the method of pure induction which taken universally is the method of all insights into principles" (1977, 1925: 69). The outcome of the method, as Husserl says, is an "all-embracing invariant" (*Ibid*).

If I take Reynolds' (2018) explanation of how phenomenology treats the mind, then Husserl wants to develop psychology as a broad science that is free of prior "epistemological and metaphysical assumption" of the mind (2018: 1)

In my view, the method helps to identify that certain things are in the right category. So, the rightness of category, as a condition, determines that this collection of things can produce what is universal – the essence of these things. It is reasonable to say that we intuit the essence of things in a category because we, as a condition, must first perceive them. I now turn to perception.

4.3.5. The Science of Perception

The new psychology, in Husserl's reading, must be able to explain and understand perception (1977, 1925: 43). I think Husserl aims to explain that the mind experiences the world, if the body senses the world – this is because the body is corporeal. This implies that the mind experiences the world through the body. When the world is sensed by the body, Husserl refers to it as perception (1977, 1925: 43). This, in my view, means that the new psychology does not only study the mind, but also the body.

Husserl says psychology must be able to explain that perception entails “the perceived as giving itself immediately and presently as it is” (*ibid*). In addition, in a person's memory, perception entails that “the perceived has been present as being perceived” (*ibid*). In my view, the perceived refers to things in my sensory observation and data of things in my memory. As Langdridge says, if a “thing is perceived, then it has entered our reality” – our consciousness (2007: 4).

I think, by reality, Langdridge implies that the perceived (in sensory observation or memory) is what we know of our world and that it shapes our reality. In my view, this implies that there might be: (a) a case where the perceived give themselves without the subject of experience paying attention – they still participate in shaping our reality, and (b) a case where attention is paid to some as they give themselves.

Said another way, the perceived does not yet provide the unity which mental life needs to produce objective meaning until the perceiver synthesizes them. It means that the perceiver needs to pay attention while perceiving. This, as Husserl says, is because most times perceived individual things are faintly connected or not connected (1977, 1925: 50-7).

To synthesize them, we might need to return to Husserl's pre-scientific experience (1977, 1925: 40). As mentioned, pre-scientific experience enables us to see the world of experience which lies infinitely and openly before us as it is given – not a biological aspect which, by explanation, may contradict a chemical aspect.

If in pre-scientific experience, the world in its openness and infinity is given as it is, does it mean that we can perceive the whole world, including the things in it, at once?

In Husserl's reading, it is not so. Things are singly perceived, and perhaps things newly perceived in new perceptions as the bodies sense the world (1977, 1925: 43, 124). It appears that, if so, things cannot be synthesized. In response, Husserl says that synthesis can be seen if "everything still joins together in the unity of experience" (1977, 1925: 43).

If you recall, I mentioned that, for Husserl, perception involves sensory observation and memory. As Husserl explains, the sense-data of the *already* perceived in our memory and the newly perceived or repeated perceived "unite in one stream of experience" (1977, 1925: 45). This explanation makes clear the idea of the unity of mental life.

The perceived, as Husserl says, sometimes "appear in illusion or semblance" of the actual thing. (1977, 1925: 44). In this case, the previously perceived that is accepted as original can be contested by new perception. An unavoidable issue is that the perceiver may begin to doubt what is perceived if new perceptions contest the original perception.

Addressing this problem, as Husserl says, psychology must be able to "modify experience" to widen the scope of the *harmony* between the previously experienced and newly perceived (1977, 1925: 44). I think, in Husserl's aim, psychology should be able to explain that the mind can *harmonize* the discordance which may arise because of new perceptions or experiences. As Thompson (2007) says, the mind has the capacity of "embodied dynamism", that is, as the animated body of a person, it "corresponds to the changes in the space" of experience (2007: 11).

In my view of Thompson's explanation, the body of a person learns to react to the changes of the environment by way of the mind self-organizing and self-producing itself. The makes the mind is a dynamic system that can adapt and express the changing world. In addition, I think that modifying experience is like upgrading or creating more linkage lines within the experience to smoothen the harmony of new and previous experience.

Experience becomes limitless if the world is experienced as it spreads endlessly, openly, and infinitely before our perception. I think this is what Husserl aims to inculcate in psychology as the science of the mind with phenomenology as its foundation. If it is the new psychology is foundational, as Husserl often says, it must be universal (1965, 1911; 1983, 1913). I now turn to universal forms.

4.3.6. The Science of Universal Forms

The new psychology, as Husserl says, psychology “is a science of the most universal forms and laws of mental facts” (*ibid*). I think Husserl, with this explanation, aims to bring forth psychology as a science that does not only find what is universal – the essence of things but is also universal in itself. As Rochus Sowa (2012) says, these universal forms enable psychology to explain the minds of human beings and animal despite the difference in time and space (2012: 258).

In my view, measuring this universality, these universal forms and laws are by way of psychology providing the same explanation of human beings and animals as mental beings in different time and space. Hence, referring to human beings and animals as mental beings is to speak about what makes them sense or experience the world – the mind. I turn now to the relationship between the mind and the world.

Husserl says that, firstly, the mind projects the world as “the field of experience” (1977, 1925: 41). As Zahavi (2003) explains, there cannot be a field of experience without the intersubjective relation of persons who have had subjective relation with the world (2003: 76). In my view, Zahavi explains that the subjective mind must have a relation with the world first before there is an inter-relation of minds with the world.

I think it is reasonable to add that the *field* of experience is the open space that is outside of the mind and experienced by the mind. In addition, It implies that there is no experience is independent of the mind’s encounter with the world. Without the field of experience – the world – Husserl says there cannot be thought-activity that involves “naming, predicating, theorizing activity and other activities” (1977, 1925: 43) as they play out. In my view, for the mind to *think*, it needs the world of things to fill it with events and activities.

Husserl says that, secondly, the mind finds a presence (in this field of experience) by being “the causal supplement of the body” (*ibid*). I think that Husserl aims to explain that the mind experiences the world, not the body. However, in Husserl’s reading, the mind needs the body to map out its position in an environment. And in the body, the mind experiences and moves in its environment (*ibid*).

My explanation introduces the mind-body as a psychophysical being, that is, human beings and animals who are understood as having the causal connection of mind-body. It is worthwhile to note that the mind is what keeps the body alive in the world of experience.

If the mind keeps the body alive in the world, how does Husserl make this clear? I turn now to the selected lectures of embodiment in Husserl’s text, *Phenomenological Psychology*. By so doing, I draw out the themes of enacted cognition and embodied cognition. I do this in the next section.

4.4. Themes of Embodiment and Enactivism in Husserl’s *Phenomenological Psychology*

In this section, I aim to draw out the themes of embodiment and enactivism in Husserl’s explanation of psychic life – human beings and animals. To make clear my aim in this section, consider the following: Thomas Fuchs says that “consciousness feels alive” – when it “emerges deep inside an organism” and then “direct itself towards the environment” (2018: vi, see also Anya Daly²⁵ 2019: a review of Fuchs). This is exactly what I aim to find out in Husserl’s lectures on the embodiment.

I think it is reasonable to say that embodiment is broad enough to accommodate the theme of enactivism. If I take Fuchs’ view, the embodied approach is when we study consciousness feeling alive when it emerges inside an organism, while the enacted approach is when we study how consciousness directs itself towards the environment.

²⁵ Daly says that a key to appreciating Fuchs’ (2019: np) approach is his insistence on the fact that the brain is an organ of a living being, not of the mind and moreover, it is a mediating organ – mediating between aspects within the organism/ subject, between subjects, and between the subject and the environment.

If you recall, I provided the explanation of psychic life which Husserl broke into two – human beings and animals²⁶ (1977, 1925, 77-8). In this section, I home in on the mental part of the animating beings – human beings and animals.

Specifically, the discussion focuses on the animating being's experience of the world who, as Husserl says, are “farsighted or near-sighted”, “choleric or melancholic”, and have “normal, weak, or extraordinary memory”, “active or rich imagination” (1977, 1925: 79). I think Husserl introduces an animated being – animal or human being in its basic psychic potentials. I use the explanation of psychic potentials to introduce the themes of enactivism and embodiment in Husserl's analysis in the following sub-sections.

4.4.1. Enactivism

The psychic potentials, as Husserl says, are the basic abilities of the animating beings (1977, 1925: 80). The basic abilities include “sense-life, feeling-life, active thinking-life, willing-life etc.” (*ibid*). In my view, these basic abilities help organisms to give rise to the cognition of the world. Considering what enactivism entails – the rise of cognition when the organism interacts with the world – cognition arises when the organism senses, feels etc. while interacting with the world.

To make clearer the point, as Thompson (2007) explains, with these psychic abilities, the animated beings “bring forth their cognitive domains” which allow them to generate and maintain their reality in the world (2007: 13). In my view of Thompson's explanation, these cognitive domains that human beings develop a usual way by which they know. Said another way, the animated beings bring forth space where knowing the environment becomes familiar.

One would think, as inferred from Husserl's explanation, that the mind cannot apply the basic abilities of psychic life without the body (1977, 1925). In my view, this is because the mind without the body is

²⁶ I did so in sub-section 3.2.3.

without form or shape, while the body without the mind is empty. It, then, is reasonable to say that when the human person is talked about, two counterparts – psychic life and corporeal body are referred to at the same time.

On one hand, one can see that Husserl places the potential of psychic life over the corporeal body. How so? Consider Husserl's example of death in the following: when there is death, it is not the body that is lifeless. Instead, it is the "psychic part of the person that has become lifeless" (1977, 1925: 80). In other words, as Husserl shows, one is dead "when humans are reduced to the mere body" (*ibid*). This is because the psychic part that enacts the corporeal body has become lifeless (*ibid*). In my view, it is reasonable to say that the activity of the body continues as long as the mind is alive.

The above example shows the significance of the psyche to the body. It can be seen that a living body is inconceivable without a psychical life. Even when the biological organs are still functional – the beating heart – it makes no difference as one can be seen as a *Zombie*²⁷.

The significance of Husserl's idea, as Thompson (2006) says in his third idea of enactivism, one knows one's body by "cognition exercising skilful know-how in situated and embodied action" (2006: 13). My interpretation of Thompson's explanation is thus: Firstly, the mind must always be aware of the actions carried out by the body while interacting with the environment. It is impossible to say this concerning *Zombies* because it is unconscious although it appears as living.

Secondly, there cannot be an organized and meaningful action of the body without the influence of the psyche. The human person creates meaning for the use of body organs and how they enable him to create more meanings while experiencing the world. When meaning is discussed, it is not yet clear what it entails or how it should be understood.

As Mark Johnson (2017) asks, where does meaning come from? Johnson explains that meaning comes from "experiencing the environment" and experience is a "continuous process out of which the subject

²⁷ "Zombie" can be seen as will-less and speechless organism.

and object emerge” (2017: 99). I draw out two points from Johnson’s view. Firstly, no meaning can be attained if there is no experience of the world. Said another way, if the subject of experience does not report about its object of experience, then there cannot be meaning.

Secondly, although there is a place of experience, it will remain unknown without the subject which perceives the object. The subject experiences both physical and mental and does not exclude either emotional or rational meaning taken from experiencing the environment. What this means for us is that at the level of subjective-bodily experience, we can only be sure of one’s bodily experience from which meaning emerges, not of another bodily experience.

Since one can be sure of one’s bodily experience only, Husserl says it is one’s “most original source of the sense of the body and mind” (1977, 1925: 81). In my view, Husserl’s point stresses that a reliable experience of the world resides in one’s bodily experience and not in another one’s bodily experience. Although, on the other hand, the others’ bodily experience of the world can be understood, when there, as Husserl says, is an “analogy of experience” following one’s bodily experience (*ibid*).

Making clear Husserl’s point, Linda Finlay (2006) says analogy of experience can be explained with her second aspect of embodiment called “embodied empathy” – it involves one body paying attention to another body in its movement and “general demeanour” (2006: 25). In my view, with one’s body and the physical manifestation of mental activity, one can understand the mental activity of another body as they manifest physically.

To further support the self and other body, Spinelli (2005) explains that the self and the others share “intentionally derived conscious experience of the world” (2005: 29). In my view, each self knows the world when it *intends* the world in its consciousness. Meanwhile, I observe that the experience of each self may become unique and may be different from other selves.

If experience is intentionally derived, then how does that happen? Thompson (2007) says, with his second idea of enactivism, that every human person has “a nervous system” which is a “dynamic system” (2007:

9). Its purpose is to enable each person to “actively generates and maintains his own coherent and meaningful patterns” of activity (*ibid*). I draw two things from Thompson’s view.

Firstly, considering the view that every person has a nervous system²⁸ – it is possible that when each person experiences a thing, they develop a mutual understanding of the thing. Secondly, if each person generates and maintains his patterns of activity, then this explains why each person may have a unique way of experiencing the world.

It is reasonable to say that this explains why different persons in the world have different perspectives of the world, and different groups have different cultural world views. For the latter, a group creates an analogy where its members have the same world view which is different from another group. So far, I have discussed the role of analogy. I now turn to a case of non-creation of analogy.

The non-creation of analogy, in Husserl’s reading, has two consequences. Firstly, Husserl says that if there is a “lack of analogy or its shatters”, my bodily style may assume that others’ bodily style is inadequate (1977, 1925: 81). This is because, as mentioned earlier, one’s bodily experience is the most original source of experience. Secondly, it follows, as Husserl say, that it is impossible to “experience what goes on in the mind of others who experience becomes impossible” (1977, 1925: 81-2). This is because without analogy we cannot give a clue about others’ mental activity (*ibid*).

In my view, what this means so far is that one’s bodily experience is a subjective experience of the world. Suppose every person has a subjective-bodily experience – it becomes an issue to determine how objective meaning is attained by every person. How Husserl resolves this issue takes us in another direction.

Since every person has his experience of the world – suppose, in a world of different persons who interact. One might ask, how do they attain objective meaning? Husserl responds to this issue by, firstly,

²⁸ The nervous system, as Thompson says, is the joint operation of the brain, spinal cord, nerves, ganglia, and receptors through which stimuli are interpreted and transmitted to the appropriate organs (2007: 9).

maintaining that the world experienced is an “objective world” (*ibid*). By objective world, in my view, Husserl refers to a world that appears to different persons who experience it – specifically, it appears the same to every person.

To make clear what Husserl explains about the world appearing the same to everyone, Thompson (2007) explains with his fourth idea of enactivism that there is a “relational domain” enacted or brought forth by that human agency and the environment (2007: 13).

I draw out two things from Thompson’s understanding of Husserl’s view. Firstly, the world does not appear without the human person who has the autonomy to create the environment being interacted with. Secondly, the world as it appears the same to everyone is the result of the relational domain. In other words, if every person creates the relational domain, then they create a subjective meaning of the experienced world. One might ask, how do subjective experiences translate to the objective meaning of an objective world?

Husserl says that objective meaning is attained in the “intersubjective experience” of the world (1977, 1925: 82). To make clear what intersubjective experience entails, Husserl speaks about the “intersubjective harmony of reciprocal experiences” (*ibid*). Said another way, Husserl says that co-habiting persons in the world gain “mutual understanding” of their experience of the world (*ibid*). In other words, they “establish the mutual exchange” of their experience of the world (*ibid*).

To make clear Husserl’s point, Finlay (2006) explains that intersubjective harmony called be explained by her third aspect of embodiment called “embodied intersubjectivity” which involves the meaning which one body and other bodies mutually have about experiencing the world (2006: 30). When there is a change in mutually exchanged and understood experience, the harmony of the experience of the world, as Husserl says, must be reviewed²⁹ (1977, 1925: 44). One might ask, what determines the bodily subjective experience of the world?

²⁹ I discussed this in sub-section 3.2.5

In Husserl's reading, we see that human persons are both mentally related and aware of things in the world (*ibid*). Therefore, in my view, it is reasonable to say that the person's relation and awareness of things in the world determine what is grasped in the world. As Husserl says, subjective relation and awareness can be described as "I-centred acts" – "I grasp, I compare, I distinguish, I universalize, I theorize, or I exercise" (*ibid*).

Spinelli explains that "I's" stand for "our experience of self", acting in the world like it is conscious of now – experience now (2005: 27-8). In my view, these "I's" imply a description of a human person who lives in the world and experiences the world in psychic experience. Said another way, the psychic occupies space and time when embodied, and the validation of its actions depends on whatever he calls himself, i.e., a dancer, politician, doctor etc. Therefore, its I-acts only experience and demonstrate the aspect of the world the human person belongs to.

Slightly differing from the foregoing, Husserl says that "the most immediate and most original animation" of the physical body is the lower level of psychic life – psychic passivity (1977, 1925: 100). In my view, this is because the "I", although mentally related and unaware of the surrounding, has a cultural connection with the body that it animates. It does not need any special way to know that it is embodied. Consider the following example by Husserl: "foot is part of the body, but my foot is more than being part of the body" (1977, 1925: 101).

The former – foot is part of the body that enables walking, dancing, or standing. It is nothing other than a biological organ or physiological part when the psychic is lifeless. The latter – my foot is more than being part of the body enables one to walk, dance or stand. It has both bodily and psychical capacities because the body is animated by the psychic.

To make the latter view clearer, Husserl says that one's foot is governed by "the field of touch-sensation and contact-sensation" (1977, 1925: 100). What I find as a two-sided understanding of one's foot, for Husserl is that the former is to be accepted as a "mechanical being" with a physical form in space. While

in the latter the subject enacts to move the foot in a “continual coincidence” with the machinal movement (*ibid*).

In my view, the meaning of this explanation is that human beings are psychophysical beings who are understood as either body animated, or psychic embodied beings. But preferably, it is mostly understood as the body animated because without the psychic animating the body, there is the death of the body. The role of animation takes us in another direction of Husserl’s explanation.

So far, I have attempted to draw out the enacted approach to the human mind in Husserl’s *Phenomenological Psychology*. Reynolds (2018), for example, explained that enactivism is the “empirical fellow traveller” with Husserl’s phenomenology (2018: 75). My discussion of Husserl’s position on enactivism has, I think, shown that Reynolds’ view can be supported. If I take Reynolds’ view that enactivism is compatible with phenomenology, then one can say that phenomenology is not only compatible with cognitive science when the mind is studied, but also relevant to contemporary issues in psychology and cognitive science itself. I turn now to the embodied approach in the same Husserl’s text.

4.4.2. Embodiment

Considering what embodiment entails – the body becomes an acting organism when it is animated by the psyche. It is reasonable to say that a living body is inconceivable if it is not animated by the psyche.

For Husserl, when the psychic part becomes lifeless, the corporeal body becomes an “inanimate” being (1977, 1925: 81) – the stones, houses etc. This is because the difference between “real things:” human beings and animals – versus – plants and houses, is that the former has psychic life while the latter does not. Therefore, when the former loses psychic life, it becomes lifeless. However, this does not mean that the mind is self-significant without the body.

Said another way, this does not mean that the psyche can be seen separated from the body. As Johnson (2017) says, the psychic part dwells “at once in itself – the mind, and the body” (2007: 65). Therefore, it does not make sense to think of distinguishing “mind” from “body” (*ibid*).

One can see that, for Husserl, the corporeal body has some merit over the psychic life (*ibid*). It is following the view that without the body, psychic life is formless or shapeless. As Husserl says, when “the psychic is experienced”, the organic body becomes its “substratum” – its basis (*ibid*). In my view, the body being the basis of the psychic becomes a crucial part of the human person’s bodily perception. Speaking about bodily perception, this is the body as it perceives its environment and itself.

The former – as the body perceives its environment – is about the human persons as they live in and move in the world while knowing the world. The latter – as the body perceives itself -, as Husserl says, is when “one’s body is given to one only” (*ibid*). This is because one’s body can be differentiated from another body (*ibid*). What it means by given, is about the psychic life knowing itself and knowing that it is embodied in an organic body. As Husserl says it “I can experience my body and mind, the bodily and animating” respectively (*ibid*).

To make clear Husserl’s view, Finlay (2006), in one of her three aspects of embodiment, calls this “embodied self-awareness” (2006: 20). It is when one is self-aware and examines one’s action (*ibid*). In my view, this supposes that one knows what goes on in one’s body and one cannot say the same about another body.

Given the issue of not knowing what goes on in another body, Husserl introduces the idea of cultural objects (1977, 1925: 83). Husserl says that human persons are cultural objects to one another (1977, 1985: 85). I now turn to what the idea of cultural objects entails.

Husserl says “cultural objects” are known as they relate to the subjects of experience (*ibid*). What is *cultural* about objects which relate to the subjects of experience is that, as Husserl says, objects have a body with which they are known by the subject of experience (1977, 1925: 85). The body of an object gives an object its cultural appearance – how objects are used to appearing to the subject.

As Fuchs says, cultural objects appear as they are used, not because they can, but because “the brain is shaped by cultural influences” (2018: 58). His reason is that the brain is a “malleable carrier medium” that is capable of adopting cultural rules (*ibid*). In my view, one can say that the brain adapts to cultural

objects as they appear in their environment. As Husserl says, these objects connected within “space and time” (1977, 1925: 90).

In my view, space and time reveal which object follows the other in our experience. Given the scope of cultural objects, there is no reason to say that objects have psychic parts. On the contrary – in Husserl’s reading, even lifeless objects can impress mental qualities which become the sense-data in our memory (1977, 1925: 84). These mental qualities, as Husserl says, “are known in the intuition” of the subject of experience (1977, 1925: 86, 92).

As Husserl says, these objects give us their “sensible features” which pass as “mental sense” (1977, 1925: 84). In my view, Husserl divides the appearance of cultural objects into sense and matter. The former – sense concerns the meaning drawn from the sensible features of an object. While the latter – matter concerns the body of an object in which mental qualities are embodied.

Husserl says that objects are “two-sided – material-mental” and can be seen as the analogy of the bodily-psychical human person (*ibid*). The significance of bodily-psychical, as Varela (2016) *et al.* say, is that it addresses the issue of correlation of “intention and act” – “mentally one knows what to do, but one is physically unable to do it” (2016: 29).

In my view, sometimes, it can be a case of bodily incapacitation – like when one is handicapped, colour blind. In other times, it may be a matter of self-application that can be addressed by mastery. While this explanation focuses on the self, there is the optics perspective of it – concerning the public domain. This is because one does not exist in communities alone and one participates in communities to make meaning of experience.

Every bodily-psychical person who belongs to the same community of experience - intersubjective experience – creates a cultural way around how an object appears to them. They can experience the sense-matter of an object. I find the reasons in Husserl’s reading. Firstly, Husserl says that the significance of “mutual understanding” enables them to have the same experience (1977, 1925: 88).

Secondly, Husserl explains that every bodily-psychical person sees one another in that cultural way of experiencing objects' sense-matter. Said another way, they educate and expect one another to perceive objects in a way known to one another. This is because, as Husserl says, they are "cultural objects to one another" (1977, 1925: 85). It is reasonable to say that Husserl addresses the issue of not knowing another body with cultural objects.

In my view, since bodily-psychical persons are cultural objects to one another, they can educate and expect one another to experience aspects of the world on agreeable terms. This takes us in another direction of Husserl's explanation.

Husserl says that "human beings have a culture in many sorts of possible forms" – scientific, artistic, or practical form (*ibid*). In other words, human beings have agreeable terms concerning aspects of the world. These forms, in my view, in turn, help to develop cultures – the usual ways human beings experience the world (*ibid*). I observe that these cultural forms of experiencing objects are put in place to meet a purpose. Said another way, every usual way of experiencing objects provides an unchanging sense or meaning.

Consider the following example: The unchanging experience of a hammer is that it continues to appear to us as a tool that drives a nail into a surface.

It is reasonable to say that the unchanging sense is important because it helps to attain objective meaning. For the reason that, as Husserl says, the experiential world as the world of our cultural ways, has a "history of changeability which occurs in our perception" (1977, 1925: 87). This changeability, in my view, refers to every new change in our perception of the world which forms a theme of *new physical* science. The *new physical* science emerges from a new perception of the world.

On the contrary, Husserl stresses the view that a "humanistic science has a double-direction which studies culture and the culture creating subjects" (1977, 1925: 97). In my view, the goal is not to study physical aspects of the world or study mental aspect as it is done through a physical approach. Instead, the goal is to have a humanistic science study the subjects' mental ability, and how they create cultures of mental experience.

Said another way, human beings develop mutual exchange and understanding to create a cultural way of experiencing aspects of the world, even in its changeability. In other words, the aggregate of every person's mental experience of the world validates the cultural way of experiencing an object. If every person grasps the same meaning, then the objective meaning is attained. As Husserl says, the cultural way of experiencing "an object refers to personal mentality" (*ibid*) of each person and results in the objective meaning of inter-subjectivity.

Husserl says that "human beings are personal subjects because of what animates" the person (1977, 1925: 86). In my view, that we have personal subjects by the psychical-mental life which animates the body, does not mean that the material part of a person is insignificant.

The material part of a person is what relates to the material world. As Husserl says, it is "time-related" (1977, 1925: 88). Firstly, it is constrained by time since it dies (*ibid*). It is reasonable to say that that the material body cannot perceive the world forever. Secondly, the material part of a person cannot be everywhere at once (*ibid*).

As Thompson says, although one is not ubiquitous, one is "never bound to one's material composition" (2007: 155). This is because the significance of the material part is more than being an encasement for the mind. As Thompson says, one cannot understand the significance of the material part enough until an organism dies (*ibid*).

In my view, the significance, as it concerns a living organism, becomes more obvious when the material part of a person is not perceiving an object. It is likely, then, within a space of perceiving another object – this can go on in temporality.

The material part of a person does not change the view that experience is subjective. Husserl says this because:

Everything experienced in the subjective modes has together concerning these modes simultaneously reference to the respective physical body of the ones experiencing (1977, 1925: 98).

This except takes us back to the psycho-physical connection and importantly the psychic as embodied. In other words, by experiencing the material, the mental sense is also experienced. Given this fact, Husserl says that even “normal and abnormal perceptions³⁰ have this experience in common” (1977, 1925: 98).

The subjective is confined in space when it is embodied, and it explains why a human person may be mentally related yet unaware of some things in the world. Husserl calls it “psychic passivity” (1977, 1925: 99). In my view, being mentally related yet unaware can be a sort of lower psychic life where the things are experienced but ungrasped, and we are unable to have a cultural sense of them.

So far, I have explained the theme of enacted and embodied approaches to cognition in Husserl’s text, *Phenomenological Psychology* (1925). It is reasonable to conclude that these approaches open a path of compatibility of phenomenology and naturalism.

Beyond that, Daniel Hutto and Erik Myin (2017) explain that with the “E-movement” – embodied and enacted approaches, the mind is now a “staple feature of the cognitive science landscape” (2017: 1). For Hutto and Myin’s view, the themes of embodiment and enactivism are central approaches to explain the mind in cognitive science which are extended to the phenomenological study of consciousness.

³⁰ The former – normal perception, human beings can have a stable sensory contact with the world, as the example given by Husserl which is about the “normal eyes of a human being” (*ibid*). The latter – abnormal perception is the unstable sensory contact of the world, which Husserl refers to as the “abnormal eyes” of a human being, in case of, for example, colour-blindness (1977, 1925: 98).

4.5. Some Supplemental Themes of Husserl's Phenomenological Psychology

In Husserl's reading (1977, 1925), some other important themes, including animation, causality and all-inclusive – help to drive home Husserl's aim of new psychology. I discuss these themes in this section because they are independently significant to Husserl's aim, and they require special treatment. I start with animation.

4.5.1. Animation

Husserl speaks about animation as the capacity of the mind to “acquire a locality in the spatial world” (1977, 1925: 101). For Husserl, the idea of animation is lower or higher. In the former – lower animation, Husserl speaks about the enablement that “makes a person's body a system of subjective organs” (1977, 1925: 101). Here, the enablement is still the psychic.

For the latter – higher animation, Husserl speaks about a kind of operation that is above “all personal subjectivity” (*ibid*). In Husserl's reading, the mind holds “personal subjectivity as I-acts in the body” which enables the animated body to experience and understand “the surrounding world” (*ibid*).

In my view, although these levels read similarly, the difference is in the latter which focuses on psychic operation, unlike the former which focuses on both the mind and body. As Husserl maintains, this mind-body relationship is based on causality. I now delve into the idea of causality.

4.5.2. Causality

Husserl says that causality stands for the “dependence of individual changes” which happens in the experience of the world (1977, 1925: 102). In my view, while experiencing the world in its changeability, causality is what is depended on to harmonize old subjective experience and new experience. Said another way, that the body adapts to the changing world is an effect of causal action that begins with the mind in the changing world.

To make clear Husserl's idea of mind and world causal relation, Thompson (2007) explains with his fifth idea of enactivism that the mind is not "epiphenomenal", that is, lacking a causal relation with the world (2007: 13). Instead, it relies on its causal relationship with the world and must be studied in a "careful phenomenological manner" (*ibid*). In my view, it means that the mind does not *intend* anything if it has no relationship with the world. It follows that there will be nothing about intentionality if the mind does not have a causal connection with the world.

In simpler term, Husserl describes causality as "nothing other than a stable regularity of co-existence and succession" (1977, 1925: 103). Aside from this description, Husserl lists out three important features of causality.

Firstly, causality occurs in "objective experience" in certainties of expectation (*ibid*). In my view, there is no causality if the subject does experience the world in its changeability. This changeability, in turn, makes the certainty of expecting a new experience of the world when it changes.

Secondly, causality occurs when there is an expectation that the change will happen now – as Husserl says: "now this must happen" (*ibid*) This follows the view that causality is nothing other than succession (*ibid*). In my view, it based on what has happened on previous occasions.

Thirdly, causality occurs inductively, that is, in a single real entity for a single experience. In other words, it cannot apply to multiple experiences in multiple entities. This is because, as Husserl says, every physical thing has "a distinctive real property" (*ibid*).

By distinctive real property, Husserl means that – although the psychic is limitless and becomes individual when it is embodied – what embodies the mind is a real material body, for example, human beings. From this explanation, Husserl takes us in the direction of inductive causality. This is because now causality can

be seen in a person since the mind is embodied by real property. Meanwhile, we find in Husserl's reading that there are inductive causality and unitary causality³¹.

Husserl says that inductive causality can extend "beyond mere physis and inductively encompass the psychic also" (1977, 1925: 104). In my view, it can be more than the body which enables external perception or the mind which enables internal perception. What it does, as Husserl says, is that inductive causality "harmonizes expectation" of a changing experience and the "existence" of an experience (*ibid*). In my view, it is reasonable to say that inductive causality does not only occur in one's body but also in other bodies. Importantly, the body is empowered by the psychic which animates it. On the contrary, Husserl discusses "unitary causality" – the one we find in the all-inclusive science (1977, 1925: 109). This pursuit takes us in another direction of Husserl's explanation.

4.5.3. All-inclusive Science

Husserl says that the all-inclusive science must ensure that the "forms of space and time" are unitary, causality is unitary, and "all things are unities of stable causality" in the space and time world (*ibid*). In my view, Husserl aims to ensure that there is a unity of the world and experience of the subject. The aim is to have a pre-scientific experience that guarantees objective meaning.

Also, the all-inclusive science, as Husserl says, must address the "prejudices which make up the external natural world" (*ibid*). This is a world understood by its physical structures and the prejudices that emerge from the study of each aspect of the world by particular sciences. In my view, with the all-inclusive science, Husserl aims to return to the kind of experience which precedes the experiences of the aspects of the world emerging from particular sciences.

³¹ I discuss unitary causality in the next sub-section.

I think it is clear Husserl aims to return to the subjective experience of the world – the human being’s experience of the world. Husserl uses *subjective* as it culminates to objective knowledge – as Husserl says, “objective element” emerges “multiple subjective” (1977, 1925: 111).

The former – *objective element* – refers to a quality of objectivity that resides in the independence of what is objective. The latter – *multiple subjective* – refers to merging more than one subjective experience which emerges from the difference in perceiving the world. What is important here is how the subjective – one’s experience can make up an objective experience of the world.

Husserl says that the subject can have a “continuity of noticing things in space” and grasping them in themselves (1977, 1925: 116), while perceiving the world. Husserl says so because human subjects can synthesize the experience of things “as they are given” and “things in the modes”, (1977, 1925: 112, 120), when things are experienced within space. The former experience refers to things that are perceived straightforwardly (*ibid*). While the latter refers to things as perceived, in reflective experience, with their environment (*ibid*).

To make clear Husserl’s view, Spinelli explains that while straightforward experience involves “experiencing a thing itself” (2005: 26-7), reflective experience involves “explaining and giving the meaning” to that experience (*ibid*). In my view of Spinelli’s view, these experiences follow each other but I do not think that you can experience and explain the experience simultaneously.

In this final chapter, it is reasonable to say that Husserl uses some themes of phenomenology – “perception, body, I-acts, experience” – to illustrate how scientific results can be produced at a foundational level of phenomenological psychology (1977, 1925: 166). If we look at Husserl’s phenomenology in its division into “immanent and transcendental”, he presupposes the “internal and external”, respectively (1977, 1925: 169).

The former – immanent – internal refers to the subjective experience where such experience does not need any anticipation. The latter – transcendental – external refers to experience directed to the objective

world in space and time. And it is carried out by the “I” who suspends the natural-scientific – particular sciences’ presuppositions of the world.

The underlying view is to ensure that phenomenology enables psychology to advance the study of the embodied mind to experience, perceive, *intend* the world from a pre-scientific stance. The animated body must continue to perform both as (a) perceptual – where it is a network of organ and (b) experiential – where it is acting on the world to understand it in its natural forms.

It is important to note that Husserl tried to avoid transcendental questions of phenomenology. By so doing, we focus on how phenomenology aims to help psychology to describe and explain how the mind in the body makes meaning of the world.

The following points are significant in the dissertation:

(a) a proper and adequate account of the mind and body relationship can be found in Husserl’s work. Specifically, Husserl’s point on the idea of death adequately stresses what the mind and body are to each other. Husserl does not promote a dualist view. Instead, in my view, it is an idea of the mind being the basis of the body, while the body is an encasement of the mind.

(b) our thoughts and meaning are embodied. In Husserl’s initial view, thoughts and meaning are restricted to the mind – consciousness (1965, 1911; 1983, 1913). In Husserl’s 1925 text, *Phenomenological Psychology*, it can be seen that thoughts are formed, and meanings are made from how the body interacts with the environment.

(c) the idea of knowledge - objective, intersubjective, relative, subjective – is embodied because the possession of knowledge, although traced to brain activity, does not have an identity unlike the body of the human being which encases it.

(d) Truth and logic are embodied because they belong to the body of a human being who has been animated by mental life.

(e) The study of the mind continues to bring forth more scientific disciplines, some of which draw from phenomenology. Specifically, the themes of enactivism and embodiment as we see in this dissertation.

From the last point, it will be interesting to see more multidisciplinary research which involves phenomenology and naturalism. Specifically, between phenomenology and disciplines of artificial intelligence, and robotics. Even if the future of phenomenology is bleak, as Zahavi (2016) says, we cannot deny that it has contributed to ongoing research in many other fields like dance study, sociology, psychology, and the natural science disciplines.

4.6. Conclusion

In this last chapter, I have aimed to show that Husserl does not, in all cases, mean that phenomenology and naturalism are incompatible. I have done this by explaining Husserl's aim in the text, *Phenomenological Psychology*, wherein Husserl develops alternative psychology to empirical psychology and bypasses the transcendental question of phenomenology. Importantly, I have drawn out and analyzed Husserl's lectures on the theme of embodiment which featured embodied action and enacted action.

The importance of this section is that Husserl is seen combining the themes of phenomenology with the themes of two natural science disciplines – the biological sciences which study the human body and cognitive sciences which study the human mind, i.e., cognition. As a result, this chapter has been to establish that Husserl's phenomenology can be seen as compatible with naturalism to an extent, on Husserl's terms.

Conclusion

In the preceding chapters, I have, in this dissertation, attempted to answer the question: Are phenomenology and naturalism compatible? This inquiry was motivated by addressing the self-insufficiency of phenomenology or naturalism. Another motivation was to provide a combination of the two to enrich the account of the mind. Thirdly, it was to find if there was space for the compatibility of phenomenology and naturalism in Husserl's thinking.

I argued that Husserl does not mean in all cases that phenomenology and naturalism are incompatible. I argued that this is the case if the themes of embodiment and enactivism, as discussed in Husserl's 1925 text, *Phenomenological Psychology*, are drawn out and analyzed. In it, Husserl avoided answering the transcendental questions which would revive the idea of consciousness as the foundation of knowledge and the sciences, while he aimed to create alternative psychology to empirical psychology. I demonstrated this argument by focusing on Husserl's contribution in the text to the study of mind-body.

As a result, I have made two important contributions – substantial and textual – to the literature dealing with the question of the compatibility of phenomenology and naturalism. Although, the overarching contribution comes from two broad themes – enactivism and embodiment which I draw out of Husserl's phenomenology in this dissertation.

The first substantial contribution concerns establishing the foundation of knowledge and justification of the sciences and it underlines the epistemic theme in Husserl's philosophy. Husserl studies consciousness as the foundation of experience of the world in his transcendental phenomenology, not as a thing in the world, as it is done in naturalism. Husserl introduces consciousness as the most reliable evidence for the claims about the world.

This implies that Husserl's phenomenology, given the way it studies consciousness, swallows up naturalism. It is, then, reasonable to say that the compatibility is not solely because they have opposing themes. For this reason, I hold that Husserl asserts that phenomenology and naturalism are incompatible.

The second substantial contribution concerns explaining the mind–mental experience and sets out the debate between phenomenology and naturalism, i.e., cognitive science. In the attempt to provide a better account of the mind, I consider approaches made by some scholars to combine some parts of phenomenology and naturalism. The first approach I discussed was by some cognitive scientists – Petitot *et al.* who aimed to close the gap between the scientific third-person and phenomenological first-person experience – such is a project of naturalizing phenomenology.

Another approach that is more recent concerns how the themes of enactivism and embodiment furnish the relationship between the psychological version of Husserl's phenomenology and two type of naturalist discipline – cognitive science and biological science. I discussed the view of some scholars like Reynolds, Thompson, Varela *et al.* on how those themes not only study the mind and body of human beings but also understand human beings in a making meaning world.

The textual contribution emerges from how I provide a rereading of Husserl's texts. In chapter one, I set out in detail the received view. I do this by providing a reading of Husserl's position on the incompatibility of phenomenology and naturalism as it appears in his *Prolegomena to Pure Logic* in *Logical Investigations* (1900), *Philosophy as Rigorous Science* (1911) and *Ideas* (1913).

In chapter two, I investigate whether there is space in Husserl's thinking for the assertion that phenomenology and naturalism are indeed compatible in some sense, with a focus on the mind. I explored the phenomenological account of mind, as well as the naturalist account of mind. I drew on secondary scholars, including Petitot *et al.*, Reynolds, Thompson to explore the combination of some parts of phenomenology and naturalism, to explain the mind. I drew out the themes of enactivism and embodiment.

In chapter three, I drew out and analyze the themes of embodiment and enactivism in Husserl's 1925 text, *Phenomenological Psychology* where Husserl avoided the transcendental questions, aimed to create alternative psychology to empirical psychology, and explained the human behaviour in the world through mental experience and body. I drew out in this final chapter the following:

Firstly, a proper and adequate account of the mind-body relationship is developed by Husserl and it makes clear any sort of confusion that arises in the mind-body relationship. Husserl's point on the idea of death adequately stresses what the mind-body relationship is. Husserl does not promote a dualist view, rather it is an idea of the mind being the basis of the body, while the body is an encasement of the mind.

Secondly, thoughts and meaning are embodied, unlike Husserl's initial view – *Philosophy as Rigorous Science* (1911), *Ideas* (1983) – which limits these concepts to the mind, the other face of Husserl in the text, *Phenomenological Psychology* (1925) recognizes that thoughts are formed, and meanings are made depending on how the body interacts with the environment.

Thirdly, knowledge - objective, intersubjective, relative, or subjective – is embodied because the evidence of knowledge, although traced to brain activity, is in the human body that encases it. Fourthly, truth and logic are embodied because they belong to the body of a human being who has been animated by mental life.

The secondary literature that I discussed help to situate the question of the compatibility of phenomenology and naturalism. On one hand, some secondary authors, including Farber (1968), Drummond (2012), Zahavi (2004, 2013), Moran (2013), Reynolds (2018) provided made clear Husserl's philosophy – Husserl's view on the mind and epistemic foundation of the sciences.

On the other hand, Quine (1951, 1960, 1969), Papineau (1993), De Caro and Macarthur (2004), Polger (2004), Ritchie (2008), Sparrow (2014), to mention a few, made clear the naturalist view on the mind. On the themes of enactivism and embodiment, Thomson (2007), Varela *et. al* (2016), Reynolds (2018) helped to make them clear in Husserl's 1925 text, *Phenomenological Psychology*.

However, it remains a limitation to Husserl's phenomenology, as characterized by its transcendental approach, that it cannot participate in any sort of multidisciplinary research that is important to secure its future. In terms of what I have done, I propose that, for future research, phenomenology must continue to refine its position to accommodate research in areas, like robotics, neuroethics, Human-Robot Interaction (HRI) with a focus on the themes of embodiment and enactivism.

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