

Runtime Code Polymorphism as a Protection against Physical Attacks

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CZZLECN Leti & List

Runtime Code Generation to Secure Devices

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
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Core Idea: Runtime Code Polymorphism

Definition

Regularly changing the behaviour of a (secured) component, at runtime, while maintaining unchanged its functional properties




Definition

Regularly changing the behaviour of a (secured) component, at runtime, while maintaining unchanged its *functional properties*.

What for?

- Protection against reverse engineering of SW
 - the secured code is not available before runtime
- the secured code regularly changes its form (code generation interval $\omega \geqslant 1$)
- Protection against physical attacks
 - polymorphism changes the spatial and temporal properties of the secured code: side

Compilettes & deGoal in a Nutshell



Aim

- Modify kernel's binary instructions
- according to the input data
- whenever needed at runtime

The deGoal framework builds compilettes

channel & fault attacks

combine with usual SW protections against focused attacks

How?

deGoal: runtime code generation for embedded systems

■ fast code generation

■ tiny memory footprint: proof of concept on TI's MSP430 (512 bytes of RAM)

Polymorphic Code Generation

deGoal runtime capabilities	
Performed <i>in this order</i> :	
register selection	
2 instruction selection	
instruction scheduling	

Adaptation to achieve runtime code polymorphism:

- Portability to very small processors and secure elements
- Limited memory consumption
- Fast runtime code generation
- Ability to combine with hardware countermeasures
- Introduce alea during runtime code generation [1,2,3] Polymorphism:

A compilette is:

an ad hoc code generator that targets one kernel

aimed to be invocated at runtime

random mapping to physical registers [1] ■ use of semantic equivalences [2] instruction scheduling [3] ■ insertion of dummy operations [3]


Example: polymorphic AES

implementation of the Polymorphic SubBytes function:

```
void gen_subBytes( cdg_insn_t* code
     , uint8_t* sbox_addr
     , uint8_t* state_addr)
```

#[

Begin code Prelude Type uint32 int 32 Alloc uint32 state, sbox, i, x, y mv state, #(state_addr) mv sbox, #(sbox_addr) mv i, #(0) loop: lb x, @(state+i) // x := state[i] lb y, @(sbox+x) // y := sbox[x]



Execution times (in cycles), over 1000 runs:

	min	max	average
reference	6385	6385	6385
code generator	5671	12910	9345
polymorphic instance	7185	9745	8303

Impact of the code generation interval ω :

ω	k	%
1	2.76	53.0%
5	1.59	18.4%
20	1.37	2.1%

sb @(state+i), y // state[i] := y add i, i, #(1) bneq loop, i, #(16) rtn End]#;

1.31 100 1.1%

k: overhead vs. reference implementation **%**: percentage contribution of runtime code generation to the performance overhead

References

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