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The Gulf Crisis and The Fragmentation of the Middle East: The Policies of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan

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Acknowledgements

The Gulf Crisis and the current Gulf War grew from an inter-state Arab conflict over boundaries. Kuwait and Iraq are nominally nation-states but lack historically developed and mutually accepted boundaries. Characterizing the post-colonial Middle East as a region in which "uncertainties over boundaries" prevail, the political geographers Drysdale and Blake view boundary disputes as "a hazard in international relations that can be eliminated."[1] Theoretically, at least, mediation would seem to be the most promising avenue for solving such disputes. However, in the Gulf Crisis all mediation efforts failed.

In fact, most states in the post-colonial Middle East are nominal in that they do not meet the substantive requirements of the modern nation-state, basically a European institution which in the authoritative definition of Anthony Giddens, is "a bordered power container ... a set of institutional forms of governance maintaining administrative monopoly over a territory with demarcated boundaries (borders), its rule being sanctioned by law."[2]

The lack of historical-structural underpinnings for the nation-state in the Middle East creates a great deal of conflict potential. Conceivably, the Arab state-system could mediate problems related to boundary disputes, as well as provide processes of conflict resolution that would eliminate such hazards to regional and international politics. However, the Arab state system has utterly failed to achieve this. Moreover, in the context of the 1990-91 Gulf Crisis, mediation efforts made by individual Arab leaders, such as those pursued by President Chadhli Benjedid of Algeria in December 1990, did not bear fruit. Chadhli's tour through Arab capitals ended in overwhelming failure.[3] The inability of the Arab state-system to deal with the Crisis transformed the affair into an exceedingly dangerous international situation that unfolded within the context of an evolving new post-Cold War order. The war that started on January 17, 1991 has shown just how perilous the ensuing dynamics could be.

This paper focuses on the fragmentation of the Arab World. The phenomenon will be dealt with by analyzing the responses of three major Arab states--Egypt, Syria and Jordan--to the Gulf Crisis.

The Fragmentation of the Arab World

The Gulf Crisis, perhaps the most epochal regional development of the past decades, exacerbated the fragmentation of the Arab World. Egyptian analysts argue that Iraq's aggression against Kuwait made clear "the structural weakness and paralysis of the Arab League system due to the absence of the balancing role of Egypt in the course of the past decade."[4] Now, despite the existing fragmentation, Egypt has resumed a leading role in the Arab World.[5] In September 1990, the Arab League returned to Cairo.[6] However only as a faction of twelve states that lacked the support of the entire body of 21 members.

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Still, Tunisia's withdrawal from the organization's work and the resignation of Secretary General Chadhli Klibi, himself a Tunisian, reinforce the impression that no overall Arab umbrella organization currently exists. Under the heading *Fursan Al Hall Al Arabi* ("The Knights of the Arab Solution"), Musa Sabri looked at the impact of the Gulf Crisis and raised the question:

> Where is the Arab solution? ... in short, there are five different Arab solutions proposed by different Arab states which, in turn, refused to participate in the meetings of Arab foreign ministers held at Cairo. I beg your pardon, there exists a sixth solution, I mean the one proposed by Yassir Arafat before, during and after the invasion.[7]

In fact, the PLO's role in this confusing fragmentation was not slight. PLO support of Iraq at the outset of the Gulf Crisis jeopardized the international--and to some extent the Arab--legitimacy the organization had partly acquired by dint of hard work over the past years.[8] Yassir Arafat sought to bolster the position of Saddam Hussein by proposing an "Arab solution" as an alternative to the ongoing effort at international crisis management. Basically, the formula proposed by the PLO and Jordan's King Hussein consisted of the request that foreign troops withdraw from the region in order to allow the Arabs to come to terms among themselves and by themselves. In other words, the solution's import was that Iraqi troops would remain in Kuwait. Aside from the fact that the full scale internationalization of the crisis rapidly left no room for any exclusively regional solution, there simply was no concept of a solution shared by all Arab states.

Even the sub-regional Arab alliances, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the Arab Cooperation Council (ACC), and the Union du Maghreb Arabe (UNA), were shattered by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Just prior to the onset of the crisis, one analyst noted that the GCC was giving increasing weight to strategic considerations: "The GCC nations ... are rapidly encouraging a defense axis with Saudi Arabia as the leader, as a counterpoise to Iraq's growing military power .... the emerging nature of the GCC is one of a NATO and an EEC into one."[9] The fall of Kuwait, of course, proved that the GCC was no NATO. Nor was it successful as a variant of the European Community.

Fred Halliday has pointed out that "the Arab Cooperation Council as in the case with the Gulf Cooperation Council involves a considerable security element."[10] Now, however, the two major members of the ACC, Iraq and Egypt, are at war.

Finally, the Union du Maghreb Arabe, which brings together the five Maghreb states in an effort to cope with challenges raised by the European Community, was also rent by divisions in the wake of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Algeria, captive of fundamentalist opposition groups (Front Islamique du Salut/FIS), whose leaders called for a *jihad* against the United states, dithered. Morocco took sides and sent token troops to support Saudi Arabia. Mauritania,

militarily allied with Iraq, took a clear pro-Iraqi stance. Ben Ali's Tunisia and Qadhafi's Libya refused to folllow Egypt's lead in supporting Saudi Arabia. In December, Qadhafi changed his mind and invited the Syrian and Egyptian presidents to a summit meeting held in a tent in Misrata.[11] Sudan's President Al Bashir unexpectedly joined the meeting hosted by Qadhafi, who was dressed as a Bedouin to stress his Arabness. Despite the theatrics, a commentary in the Egyptian newspaper *Al Ahali* aptly described the Arab World's systemic fragmentation in the following manner:

> The Gulf crisis disclosed a truth about the Arab states ... mutual distrust and suspicion have turned out to be the major characteristic of inter-Arab relations, which have become relations of enmity ... How could an Arab League unite such states ... The Gulf Cooperation Council vanished in a few seconds ... the Arab Cooperation Concil suffered a deadly heart attack and the Union du Maghreb Arabe is divided through the five different positions of its five member states.[12]

Why did the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait exert such a shattering impact on inter-Arab relations?[13] This question cannot be dealt with properly without analyzing the policies of the main regional actors--Egypt, Syria and Jordan--towards the Gulf Crisis.

The story of the current disintegration of the Arab state-system might be seen to start with accusations made by Saddam Hussein in a speech on July 17, after which Iraq generated an inter-state conflict with Kuwait. At the outset, the conflictive issues were restricted to the disputed oil field of Rumaila[14] and to charges that the oil production of Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates was exceeding alloted OPEC quotas. Basically, the underlying objectives of Iraqi behavior were three:

1. Claims on the oil field of Rumaila were meant to be a move to end the frontier dispute in Iraq's favor while obliging Kuwait to pay compensation for "illicitly" obtained oil;

2. Another objective was to force Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates to forgive Iraqi war debts;[15]

3. To impose restrictions on Kuwaiti oil production in support of Iraq's bid for higher oil prices.

Baghdad's Pan Arabist rhetoric sought to provide ideological legitimacy for this hegemonial regional policy. In referring to Iraq's claim of regional hegemony one has to bear in mind that Iraq, aside from a very limited coastline on the Gulf, is almost a totally land-locked country. The claim to Kuwait, or at least to the Kuwaiti islands of Warba and Bubian was a geopolitical claim designed to gain wider access to the Gulf shores.[16]

To sum up, a set of short and long term economic, political, geo-strategic and ideological factors underlay the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Iraq wanted to cure its economic ills by increasing its income from oil, to gain greater access to the sea in

order to reduce its geographical dependence on its neighbors and last, but not least, to establish its dominance in the Gulf and strengthen its claim of leadership over the entire Arab World. In the vision of Saddam Hussein, the basic instrument for attaining these goals was military might.[17] In my view, military expansionism presented as Pan Arabism was the major force that shattered the already fragmented system of Arab states.

Arab Responses to the Pan Arab Expansionism of Saddam Hussein's "Republic of Fear"

The Gulf Crisis produced considerable changes in the policies of major Arab states. During the Iraq-Iran War, fears of Islamic fundamentalism and of the late Ayatollah Khomeini's threats to export his "Islamic Revolution" were the underlying reasons for the substantial support Arab leaders extended to Saddam Hussein. Without the financial backing of the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council,[18] as well as indirect military and economic support provided by Egypt, Iraq would not have been able to endure that long war. Saddam Hussein heavily exploited the fears the Iranian revolution generated.[19]

When dealing with Arab responses to Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, one has to maintain a distinction between the reaction of the peoples and that of their rulers in the mostly undemocratically governed Midle East. Popular reactions reveal **public choices** while the reactions of leaders indicate **policy orientations**. On the first level, before the landing of American troops in Saudi Arabia, there were scarcely any notable responses. It was only on the eve of the deployment of foreign troops on Arab-Muslim soil, that Saddam Hussein started to evoke powerful and widespread Pan Arab feelings. Despite all comparisons with Gamal Abdel Nasser, Saddam Hussein never matched Nasser's popularity and charisma.[20] However, it was also true that "not everybody hates Saddam."[21] During the Gulf Crisis, the foremost constituency for such a Pan Arab feeling was the Palestinian population of Jordan and of the occupied territories. In those areas as in others, Pan Arabism merged with Islamic fundamentalism, as demonstrated by the violent demonstrations held in Jordan, Sudan, Tunisia, Yemen, Libya, Algeria, Morocco, and the occupied territories. Even in remote Indonesia, anti-American demonstrations took place.

Prior to his August 7 call for a *jihad* against the United States, Saddam Hussein had never looked kindly on Islamic fundamentalism. On the contrary, he had always presented himself as the Pan Arab secular alternative to Khomeini's fundamentalism. However, Saddam enjoyed a deserved reputation for being not only self-disciplined and dictatorial but also cunning. He was, of course, thoroughly familiar with the appeal of fundamentalism. After the landing of American troops in Saudi Arabia he lied publicly in stating that American soldiers have been deployed in Mecca and Medina. His fundamentalist formula was

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articulated in a widely publicized slogan: *drab al kufr kullahu bil iman kullahu* ("to beat complete unbelief with the full power of belief").[22]

Saddam Hussein's expedient conversion to fundamentalism had effect. It has been viewed by observers as a significant victory of Islamic fundamentalism. In Egypt, the leading fundamentalist journalist, Adel Hussein, rhetorically asked whether a previously secular leader like Saddam could assume leadership over Muslims. He answered affirmatively, arguing that "God has shown Saddam the right way" because "God wants to weaken America" and "Saddam is putting his efforts in the service of this goal."[23] In response to the heavy sorties (on average 2,000 daily) flown against Iraq after the war broke out on January 17, fundamentalist solidarity with Saddam Hussein grew considerably.

In moving from the level of public choices to the level of state policies, the focus of the ensuing parts of this work, it must be stated at the outset that none of the Arab states, not even Egypt, was willing to intervene militarily to protect Saudi Arabia against the threat of an Iraqi move beyond Kuwait. The initial response of Arab states to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was a jittery silence. The first meeting of Arab foreign ministers after the invasion of Kuwait has been aptly described as follows:

[It] merely served to strengthen an impression of a region powerless in the face of Iraqi aggression. ... Indeed, Mr. Hussein, in his drive to assert power and influence in the region, has paid scant regard to that holy grail of Arab politics: Unity of all Arabs. The invasion of Kuwait is a direct assault on that elusive goal. The much talked about "Arab Nation" has scarcely been more troubled.[24]

Disturbed by what they saw as a growing Iraqi threat, the Saudis asked for the deployment of American troops on Saudi Arabian territory. In the aftermath of direct American military involvement Egyptian President Mubarak abandoned his reserve and consented to send troops to Saudi Arabia.[25] The crisis also provided an opportunity for Syria to escape the isolation imposed on it by Iraq and to join other Arab states in confronting its old adversary. Syria also found opportunity to seek economic gains by demanding financial assistance in return for sending troops to Saudi Arabia. King Hussein of Jordan was in a much different situation. Ruling a country whose population is some 60% Palestinian and heavily riddled by Islamic fundamentalist currents, Hussein confronted the most precarious situation of his reign.

The reactions of Egypt, Syria and Jordan to the crisis and its impact on their policies will be dealt with separately in each of the ensuing sections.

Egypt: From Mediation to the Resumption of Arab Leadership

As the confrontation between Iraq and Kuwait heated up in July, and then escalated with the massing of 30,000 Iraqi soldiers on the Kuwaiti border, Egypt sought to contain the controversy by assuming the role of a mediator. When Iraq launched its invasion on August 2, Egypt strongly condemned the aggression but initially reacted with distant reserve to any hint that Saudi Arabia might be directly threatened.

The Arab summit held in Cairo on August 10 provided Egypt a chance to re-emerge as the leading Arab state, despite the summit's exposure of the profound disarray into which Arab politics had fallen. Mubarak expressed his sorrow that that Arab meeting had:

> No precedent among the many Arab and African summit meetings I have participated in. The disruption ranged from intentionally interrrupting the speakers to the lack of a commitment to a minimum of discipline one expects to find in a meeting of heads of states on this level.[26]

Nevertheless, Mubarak prevented the summit from becoming a fiasco. In a press conference before the meeting, he took a clear stance and urged the Iraqi leadership to see that:

> The situation is most dangerous. As a soldier I know that well. The Iraqis have created a risky situation. Nobody should confront me with the hackneyed reproaches of "imperialism and treason" ... We, as an Arab community, are rapidly losing ground.[27]

In that same press conference he did not refrain from expressing indignation over the fact that Saddam had falsely assured him in July that Iraq was not planning any military action against Kuwait. A prominent Western diplomat told me in Cairo that Mubarak, in a meeting with him, repeatedly addressed the issue of having been lied to by Saddam. In particular, the Egyptian President was embarrassed because he had gone to the Saudis and Kuwaitis to calm their fears of Saddam's intentions.

Feeling the need to restore his prestige and credibility, Mubarak was inclined to take a strong position against Iraq. However, he hesitated to do this until international, and particularly, American, reaction crystallized. Once the extent of international opposition to Iraq's adventure began to clarify, the Egyptian press openly attacked Saddam as a person "who cheated everybody ... and who does not keep his promises. There can be no trust in him and no security with him."[28] Finally, Mubarak succeeded in producing an Arab majority--not a consensus--in favor of sending Arab troops to Saudi Arabia (12 states of the 21-member Arab

League supported the decision).[29] On August 11, Egyptian troops joined the arriving American forces.[30] The decision to send troops to Saudi Arabia "was an abrupt turnabout for Mubarak."[31] Given the great split in the Arab World, Mubarak's call for meeting in Cairo has been a large risk. It was a major gamble that could have contributed to greater fragmentation. However, the Egyptian President was not only able to hold the Cairo summit together but also to produce a majority resolution supported by 12 Arab states.[32]

The authoritative Egyptian daily *Al Ahram* disclosed that debates at the Cairo summit revealed three Arab camps.[33] The first was the pro-Iraqi faction led by Iraq and the PLO which insisted on an exclusive "Arab solution" to the Gulf Crisis. However, this faction seemed determined to use this formula only to maintain the new status quo. The second camp was led by Algeria and Libya. It condemned the Iraqi invasion, if only half-heartedly. However, it very strongly rejected any deployment of foreign troops on Arab-Muslim soil. The third camp, the majority faction of 12 states (the six Gulf states, Syria, Lebanon, Morocco, Somalia and Djibouti) was led by Egypt and supported the Arab-American joint military venture in Saudi Arabia. Given this fragmentation, the assessment of a former Arab League official, Jamil Matar, seems justified: "The Gulf Crisis has become the testimony of the death of the Arab state-system."[34]

Initially the deployment of Egyptian troops in Saudi Arabia had a token character, restricted to a few thousand soldiers. U.S. Senator Sam Nunn complained that the Arab force in Saudi Arabia was "little more than a fig leaf unless Egypt deployed more forces."[35] Senator Nunn's statement revealed unfamiliarity with the history of Saudi-Egyptian relations. Although the Saudis promptly sought Egyptian backing in the Gulf Crisis, memories of the crushing of a Wahabi uprising in Arabia during the period 1811-1815 by Muhammed Ali's modernized Egyptian army lived on.[36] The same newspaper that published Senator Nunn's complaint later reported that "some Arab governments, notably Egypt, have been saying for weeks that they were willing to send more troops but the Saudis had not invited them."[37] When more Egyptian troops, including armored divisions, tanks and artillery, did arrive, it was only after American pressure had been exerted on the Saudis. Nothing more clearly indicated the prevalent mutual distrust among Arab states, even among those finding themselves in the same camp.

Addressing troops about to depart to Saudi Arabia, President Hosni Mubarak, accompanied by the entire command of his armed forces, made this strong statement:

> Thanks to its people and to its army, its civil institutions and its universities ...
> Egypt is very strong. No one will be able or allowed to contest Egypt's leadership, regardless of the wealth of oil that contenders may have at disposal ... .
> The real power of the Egyptian armed forces is known to everybody.[38]

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Egyptian analysts told me in Cairo that this statement is considered to be "the Egyptian way of declaring war." The declaration was clearly addressed to Saddam Hussein's Iraq. In his speech, Mubarak ironically referred to a note he had received from Saddam: "Unlike you," the Iraqi leader had written, "I am an offshoot of Quraish and a descendant of Ali Ibn Talib." Mubarak's retort was succinct: "May Saddam enhance his origins. I, myself, am content with simply being of Egyptian origin."[39] In this context the Egyptian press unfavorably compared Iraq's tribal tradition to Egypt's long history of centralized state government. It also critically pointed to the contradiction between Saddam's quasi-tribal Takrit clientele and the Iraqi regime's claim to be the vanguard of progressive Pan Arabism.

Two basic issues related to the Gulf Crisis had great impact on Egypt. One was the return of the Arab League to Cairo following the majority decision of the twelve foreign ministers who convened in that city on September 10. In legal terms, the return of the Arab League to Cairo was in line with Article 10 of the League's Charter, which prescribes Cairo as the venue for the League's headquarters. Politically, the return constituted an Egyptian victory. The Egyptian minister of foreign affairs, Abdul Majid, once remarked: "It is not Egypt that should return to the Arab League. It is the Arabs who may return to Egypt."

The other effect of the Gulf Crisis was mostly negative, involving economic repercussions and the related problem posed by Egyptian returnees from Iraq and Kuwait. According to Jamal Shawqi: "Saddam's tanks ... smashed the reform dreams of the Egyptian economy. They throw us five years back from where we were before the Iraqi invasion."[40]

Egypt's economic losses basically resulted from: 1) the loss of remittances from Kuwait and Iraq (some $ 1 billion); 2) losses in revenues from the Suez Canal arising from the economic blockade imposed on Iraq by the international community and the outbreak of war in the Gulf;[41] 3) the drastic decline in tourism that immediately attended the Gulf Crisis; 4) the loss of exports to Iraq and Kuwait.

According to Shawki's report, Egypt's losses of foreign exchange earnings in 1990 amount to $ 3 billion. In addition to these economic effects, the Crisis generated rising unemployment stemming from the inflow of Egyptians from Iraq and Kuwait. Egyptian economists argue that cancellation of Egyptian debts to the U.S. of $ 7 billion relieves the country only of debts incurred through arms purchases. They concede that the increase in the price of Egyptian oil and expected U.S. and European aid will provide additional revenues, but maintain that this will not completely compensate for overall losses. For this reason the Egyptian leadership has been keen on trying to derive economic benefits from Egypt's central strategic position. Increased World Bank support is not considered sufficient by Egyptians.[42] Deputy Prime Minister Kamal Al Ganzuri[43] warned that Egypt's balance of payments deficit would grow by $ 6 billion by the end of 1990. In this

context an Egyptian delegation went to Washington to negotiate improved terms with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.[44] Mubarak's government came under strong public domestic pressure to exert itself to the utmost to obtain the Bush administration's favorable intercession with both financial institutions.[45]

Western economists tend to be critical of figures offered by Egyptian government to demonstrate adverse economic effects of the Gulf Crisis. David Lennon claims these figures are "exaggerated." According to him:

> Egypt will have derived political and financial profits from the Gulf Crisis as a result of its resolute support for the coalition arrayed against Iraq .... The gains Egypt has derived ... include not only the debt write-offs, but billions of dollars of new aid from the Gulf and elsewhere.[46]

From Egypt's total $ 50 billion debt, $ 14 billion were written off by the U.S. and some Gulf states. In addition, in January 1991, the IMF officially announced its willingness to help Egypt weather the economic crisis.

Politically, Egyptian commentators have advanced the view that the Gulf Crisis reinforced Egypt's standing as the major ally of the United States in the Middle East. They see diminishing importance for Israel's role as a "strategic U.S. asset"[47] American pressure on Israel to "lie low" during the crisis, as well as Washington's endorsement of the UN resolution rebuking Israel after the Al Aqsa Mosque Massacre on October 8 are taken by Egyptian analysts as evidence supporting this view.[48]

To sum up, Egypt's reaction to the Gulf Crisis clearly supported U.S. policy while also aiming at economic benefits. Egyptian policy quickly subscribed to the view that there existed only "two solutions and there is no third one."[49] In Cairo's eyes, these entailed either a peaceful resolution based on Iraq's evacuation of Kuwait and the restoration of the *status quo ante*, or, on the other hand, a war to force Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait.

In other words, Egyptian leaders rejected the view that the Gulf Crisis was an Arab-American, let alone Muslim-non-Muslim, confrontation. Thus, Egyptian policymakers also held that the issue was not whether the Crisis would be resolved by a Muslim or an "Arab" solution as some Arab leaders suggested. Egypt's official outlook was equally directed against leftist and rightist domestic opposition. The left-wing Tagammu[c] Party rejected Egyptian involvement in Saudi Arabia. So too, did the fundamentalist opposition of the Islamic coalition (the Muslim-brothers, Al Ahrar Party, and the Al [c]Amal Party). However, underground fundamentalists constituted the strongest opponents of Mubarak and it must be noted that after war broke out Iraq's calls for support in "the confrontation between Islam and the West" were received more sympathetically and widely than might have been anticipated earlier.

On the other hand, Egyptian returnees--though a social burden on the government--were a political asset. Daily mass media coverage of this tragedy bolstered the Egyptian public's dislike of Saddam.[50] Thus, Saddam's call for a *jihad* failed to elicit favorable responses from the bulk of Egyptians, in contrast to its impact on Palestinians and in the Sudan, Yemen and North Africa.

Another source of support for Mubarak's policy was the Egyptian religious establishment. Religious leaders (among others, the popular Mutwalli Al Sha[c]rawi) argued strongly that excesses perpetrated by Iraqi troops during and after the invasion of Kuwait--the humiliation and robbing of Egyptian laborers, and more, the raping of their wives--violated Islamic values and that Saddam's policies could therefore never constitute a *jihad*. In Cairo, an angry and poor taxi-driver who had fought in the October War against Israel said to me that the Israelis treated him much better than the "so-called brethren of Iraq" treated his fellow Egyptians. He said: "They went to the Gulf to earn money, but they returned not only without money, but also deprived of their honor (*karama*). The Israelis did not do anything like that to Egyptian prisoners." His statement reflected the prevailing Egyptian popular attitude towards Iraq and Saddam Hussein. In other words: the Gulf Crisis not only brought Egypt back into the center of Arab politics, but also revived Egyptian nationalism and thus the complex relationship between Egypt and the rest of the Arab World.[51]

As a final note on Egypt's involvement in the Gulf Crisis, it must be observed that Egyptian complaints about the economic effects of the Crisis clearly serve Egyptian demands for more financial assistance. The grim state of Egypt's poorly functioning economy has far more profound causes than the Gulf Crisis. Moreover, there is no doubt that the crisis brought windfalls to the Egyptian economy, such as Saudi Arabia's payment of $ 1.5 billion "to offset losses ... as Cairo prepared to commit more troops and armor to join the U.S.-led military build-up confronting Iraq."[52] The link between the deployment of Egyptian forces in the Gulf and financial assistance was quite clear.

Syria: Changing Roles: The Sphinx of Damascus Turns "Moderate"

Within the sharpened fragmentation of the Middle East that accompanied the Gulf Crisis, political realignments were among the most surprising developments. One of these surprises was the shift to a pro-Western stance of the hitherto pro-Soviet state of Syria ruled by Hafez Al Assad, a member of Syria's now dominant ethno-religious [c]Alawi minority.[53] Syria's adherence to the Cairo-Riyadh-Washington axis was an effort to draw financial and political benefits from the Crisis as well as to break out of the country's growing diplomatic isolation. Above all the shift aimed at containing the security threat posed by the "brother" regime of the Iraqi Ba[c]th.

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Even though Saddam Hussein and Hafez Al Assad attained leadership of what is nominally the same party in their respective states, they remained the most bitter personal rivals in the Middle East. However, it would be inaccurate to cite this rivalry as an explanation for the seemingly surprising Syrian shift. To those familiar with the constraints under which Syria functions, the shift comes as no surprise. In fact, for Hafez Al Assad, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was a welcome event that accelerated a process of change in the Syrian leadership's orientation. At issue was an effort to reshape the regime's policies in ways that would alter its relations at the regional and international levels. Underlying Damascus' quest for such international "rehabilitation" was the decline of Soviet aid to Syria due to the waning Soviet economy and the impact of Perestroika on Soviet foreign policy. Syria's objective of military parity with Israel could no longer be pursued because the needed funds were no longer available.[54] In short, well before the Gulf Crisis erupted, Damascus recognized that its hard-line policy had not paid off. A new source of aid was urgently needed. Thus, a new policy had to be found that could pave the way for access to such sources.

Saudi Arabia and the United States were obvious and attractive potential donors of needed aid. In a way, Syria found itself in a position similar to that of Sadat in the post-October War period when he launched the *infitah* (open-door) policy. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait opened new channels for such an opening to the West. It is, however, most unlikely that the Ba[c]th dictatorship in Syria would subscribe to a democraticization process as the one Sadat introduced as a part of his *infitah* policy. The human rights expert Andrew Whitley aptly compares Syria with its sister-regime in Iraq.[55] Shortly after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait there was some speculation that the invasion would lead to a rapprochement between Iraq and Syria from which Syria could draw economic gain. Assad, it was suggested, might re-open the Iraqi pipeline that crosses Syria.[56] Assad's actions prior to the invasion of Kuwait seemed to provide some grounds for speculation along these lines. Between July 14 and 16, he visited Egypt and met with President Mubarak who was trying his hand at mediation between the two rival Ba[c]th states. However, Saddam Hussein was not very enthusiastic about Mubarak's idea of bringing Syria into the Arab Cooperation Council. Thus, the mediation effort failed.

Actually, had Hafez Al Assad opted for rapprochement with Iraq during the Gulf Crisis, Syria would not have achieved the gains won through its pro-Western policy. Having made this decision, Syria supported President Mubarak in making a success out of the post-invasion Arab summit of Cairo. It joined Egypt's pledge to send Arab troops to protect Saudi Arabia. Lara Marlowe, who was among those who at the outset speculated about the possibility of Syria coming to terms with Iraq, reported later about the Syrian move to join the pro-Riyadh-Cairo-Washington axis. Marlowe wrote from Damascus: "In return for its gestures Damascus is

likely to seek economic aid, favorable trade terms, political respectability [and] U.S. support for the presence of 40,000 Syrian troops in Lebanon."[57]

The Syrian Ba[c]th regime made full use of assets at its disposal. These included its military capacity and access to Tehran, its ally during the Iran-Iraq war. Syria's army is huge in relation to the country's size. As discussed below the decision to have Syrian troops join the multi-national forces in Saudi Arabia was a daring move that impacted on the regime's inner stability. The other asset, access to Iran, became most important when Saddam Hussein followed up his invasion of Kuwait by making peace with the Islamic Republic on Iranian terms.[58] Only Syria seemed able to have influence on Iran, and thus the capacity to thwart Iraqi hopes of establishing a relation with Iran that would undermine the international blockade and nullify international pressures on Saddam Hussein's "republic of fear." Any hint of an "Islamic" Iraqi-Iranian alliance, or even tacit rapprochement was of major concern to the international anti-Iraq coalition. Certainly, the visit of the U.S.-State Secretary Baker to Syria to negotiate with the "Sphinx of Damascus" must be seen in this light.[59] This also applies to the ensuing visit of Hafez Al Assad to Teheran in September. Although Iranian President Rafsanjani denied that Assad brought a message from Baker, Assad himself confirmed having briefed the Iranian leadership about his talks with the Secretary of State. The success of Assad's mission to Tehran was evident when Iran confirmed its commitment to the international blockade on Iraq. Rafsanjani said: "There was no point on which we did not reach agreement."[60] So long as the verbal assurance manifested itself in concrete policy, Iraq's dreams of an Iraqi-Iranian military alliance could only remain just that.[61]

As earlier noted, the driving force behind Syria's desire for opening to the West was the need for financial support to bolster the country's sagging economy. Syria demanded from the Saudis as much as $ 3 billion for its new commitment. Requests for U.S. aid were expected to follow. In August it was reported that Assad was determined "to destroy Saddam. But ... not ... before making the Saudis and the Americans pay a high price for his compliance with a pro-Western alignment."[62] Assad's Teheran visit was a test that he did not fail and after which further demands were raised. In December, 1990 Caryle Murphy reported from Saudi Arabia that Assad "committed a substantial number of troops (15,000) to the multinational force only after hefty payments from Saudi Arabia. In additon to $ 1 billion immediate aid, half of it in cash, the Saudis promised to resume annual aid payments."[63] Obviously, despite all the talk about "brotherhood," the Saudis distrusted the Syrians, even though they needed their military presence to deter Iraq. On the other hand, Syrian troops were not sent to Saudi Arabia to uphold "Arab brotherhood" but rather to pave the way for badly needed revenues. At the same time, of course, Damascus' policy was also motivated by the obvious fact that Iraq's military might was an ongoing a security threat to the Syrian regime,[64] a danger that would only be enhanced were Saddam to succeed in Kuwait.

Still, the shift was daring, in particular because the regime continued to cling to its hackneyed ideological Pan Arab and anti-Western rhetoric. The political acrobatics of the Syrian regime are well documented. In a telephone communication between presidents Bush and Assad the latter, as Bush announced, said that he essentially shared "the same thing - that he is pleased to be together on this."[65] However, the Syrian state-run press spread another version of the story: "Syrian troops would prevent U.S. intervention in the Iraqi Kuwaiti crisis."[66] Such verbal gymnastics put in question the already problematical credibility of the Syrian Ba[c]th regime. They also increased the level of resentment of the [c]Alawi minority regime that exists within the majority of the Syrian population. Pro-Iraqi demonstrations in Syria--denied by the regime "as ... strongly ... as [it] did ... the events of Hama [in] 1982"--may not have really reflected pro-Baghdad sentiment as much as dissatisfaction with Assad's rule.[67] Unlike Washington's support of Egypt--a relatively democratic regime in the Arab World--the U.S. approach to Syria made some Americans very uncomfortable. For some U.S. pundits, it was reprehensible that Washington suddenly appeared to forget the Assad regime's crimes. *Newsweek's* Christopher Dickey objected strongly to a friendly policy toward a regime which was "on and off the enemies list of U.S. Middle Eastern policy ... Questions like democracy and human rights, cornerstones of U.S. policy elsewhere, [now] seldom surface".[68] The U.S.-alliance with Syria made Arthur Schlesinger ask:

Do we really know enough about the Middle East?... Most of the time we don't know what we are doing in the Middle East .... One year Saddam Hussein is our pal; the next he is Hitler. One year Hafez Al Assad of Syria is the king of terrorists; the next year he is our pal....[69]

Indeed, Assad's Syria was the first state in the Middle East to draw substantial benefits from the Gulf Crisis. Unlike Egypt, Syria's returns were not restricted to economic gains. Damascus used the crisis to force Christian general Michele Aoun out of Beirut and establish complete Syrian control over Lebanon. The German *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* argued that in the swirl of events surrounding the Gulf Crisis, "the first victor has been Syria."[70]

Syria's ascendancy in Lebanon did not make members of the anti-Iraqi International Coalition pause before welcoming the Assad regime to their ranks. Despite outcries from some Western observers, such as A.M. Rosenthal, who termed Washington's new relationship to Damascus an "obscene comedy,"[71] Assad's troops cemented his new international alliance. By the end of November, Syria had some 15,000 soldiers, including armored divisions and other ground combat forces in Saudi Arabia. Despite the ongoing unrestrained talk about "Arab brotherhood", the fragmentation of the Middle East intensified to extents never known before.

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Nonetheless, doubts raised about the reliability of Syria as an ally in the anti-Saddam coalition prior to the outbreak of war in January, 1991 were misplaced. Concerns that the Syrians might again shift their alliance and join Saddam Hussein lacked insight into the situation in Syria. Al Assad had no option but to support the coalition for two reasons: Syria could not jeopardize Saudi financial assistance for the sake of an alliance with Saddam Hussein. In the second place, of course, the essence of Syrian-Iraqi relations has long been stark and profound hostility. It was not surprising, therefore, that the outbreak of war produced no change in Syria's policy toward the Gulf Crisis.

Jordan: The Moderate King Donning the Mantle of Anti-Imperialism as Sharif Hussein

In the course of recent realignments in the Middle East the erstwhile anti-Western Assad was not the only leader who suddenly changed direction. His mirror image was the once moderate King Hussein of Jordan, who in light of the Gulf Crisis discovered anti-Western sentiments. As repeatedly underlined in this work, it is erroneous to look at state policies as mere products of personal preference. King Hussein's calls for keeping foreign forces out of Arab lands were no more the product of personal preference than was Assad's shift to the West. Jordan is both politically and economically the most endangered state in the entire Middle East. Economically the kingdom is almost ruined. Politically, the Gulf Crisis threatened its very existence. In both Syria and Jordan, political and economic constraints, and not the whims of leaders, were the operative factors in policymaking. King Hussein's concern over the future of his throne and his equivocal political stance can be properly understood only in this light.

King Hussein is the survivor par excellence among Arab rulers. Since his coronation in August, 1952 he has been involved in almost all major political and military upheavals in the Middle East and has survived them all.[72] However, the Gulf Crisis put the king in "the most precarious position of his reign."[73] King Hussein's call --"The Middle East cannnot afford another war... the world should not impose one on it"--reflected his fear that the crisis could put an end to his reign.[74] The Saudi response was given by that country's ambassador to Washington, Prince Bandar Ibn Sultan: "I long had great respect ... for you ... but I no longer can feel that you are the same man I knew."[75] It reflected the reaction of the other Arab faction in the fragmented Middle East to the changed position of the once "moderate" and "pro-Western" Hashemite king. What happened to lead King Hussein to adopt his new position?

It is true that Arab leaders function within a context of personal tensions and friendships to which they nonetheless react on the basis of *realpolitik*. However, it is also true that expediency is not the sole guide to political action. In the Middle East, memories are long and the past sometimes provides political motive. The

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Hashemites never forgot that the House of Saud once ousted them from Arabia. King Hussein also had long felt humiliated when forced to ask the rich Gulf Arabs for financial assistance. Persons close to him report that "King Hussein's unhappiness with the Saudi and Kuwaiti ruling families .. was deep and enduring. He felt personally humiliated every time he was obliged to ask them for money, which was handed out parsimoniously."[76]

Jordan is structurally weak and has poor resources. Thus, it is highly dependent on external aid. Until 1990, Jordan annually received about $ 700 million from the Gulf states. However, during the Arab summit in Baghdad in May, 1990 it became clear that the Gulf Arabs were no longer willing to commit themselves to this payment.[77] At that meeting, Jordan supported Iraq's argument that the Arab oil weapon should be used more effectively. Prior to August 2, Iraq was keen on pursuing an oil policy within OPEC committed to high oil prices and directed against the oil glut. Iraq's aim was not restricted to reaching higher oil related revenues but also to employ those revenues for political ends. Baghdad claimed Arab leadership and sought to put the oil policy of all Arab states at the service of its own objectives. For this reason Iraq condemned the low oil price policy of the GCC states.

It must be noted that Jordan was not only dependent on the Gulf Arabs but also on Iraq. Iraq filled 90% of Jordan's oil needs. In addition, trade with Iraq provided Jordan's major source of revenue, income specifically derived from exports ($ 500 milion), transit fees and the labor involved in these activities. The port of Aqaba, which made these transactions possible, was the heart of Jordan's economy. In addition, $ 800 million flowed annually into Jordan from expatriates working in Iraq. In an effort to render Jordan's position in the crisis understandable, Jordanian Crown Price Hassan Ibn Talal stated:

> We do not wish to lose the friendship and goodwill of the Americans ... But Jordan is (having) .. economic difficulties ... Jordan's already fragile economy has been heavily dependent on trade with Iraq.[78]

In fact, by the summer of 1990 Jordan's economy was on the verge of collapse. The Gulf Crisis exacerated the situation when over half a million of Asian and Egyptian laborers fled from Kuwait and Iraq to Jordan. Some 100,000 of them remained stranded in Jordanian refugee camps.[79]

King Hussein first learned of Iraq's invasion through a 6:00 a.m. telephone call from Saudi Arabia's King Fahd, who expected him to urge Saddam Hussein to stop the Iraqi thrust into Kuwait.[80] King Hussein was unable to meet this expectation. Moreover, Jordan was among the Arab states that failed to support the Arab League's resolution of August 3 condemning Iraq and demanding the immediate withdrawal of Iraq troops from Kuwait. King Hussein argued that "no purpose is served by push Iraq into a corner."[81] However, far more

antagonizing to the Saudi dynasty was the claim of King Hussein to the title of his great grandfather, Sharif Hussein of Mecca. In an address to the Jordanian parliament on August 12, Hussein emotionally stated:

> I will be forever honored to be a soldier serving this nation. This is the history of my family and my circumstance. I plead with you as brothers: He who wants to honor me shall call me by my name, and he who wants to honor me more shall call me Sharif Hussein.[82]

Commentators have noted that this move by the King to change his title not only reflected deep anti-Saudi inclinations but also constituted a dramatic gesture of defiance vis-a-vis the Saudis. His request to be addressed as Sharif Hussein of Mecca must be seen as a revival of traditional Saudi-Hashemite enmity and memories of the Arab revolt of 1916-17.[83] It was also promptly seen as a harbinger of possible boundary changes in the Middle East were the crisis to turn into a shooting war. Bruno Etienne, a French authority on Islam, suggested that "Saudi Arabia may have to relinquish control of the holy places ... Mecca could then revert to King Hussein of Jordan."[84]

Jordan did not recognize Iraq's annexation of Kuwait. However, this did not antagonize Iraq since King Hussein refused to join the Washington-supported Saudi-Egyptian axis against Saddam Hussein. Nevertheless, Jordan pledged to uphold UN sanctions against Iraq, although it soon began circumventing them to the extent possible. The basic position of Jordan as articulated by Prince Hassan was to denounce the "massive build-up of non-Arab and non-Muslim armies in the heartland of Arabia and Islam" and to insist on "a peaceful solution" carried out by "the Arab states themselves."[85] For this reason, King Hussein himself denounced the U.S. for acting in an "explosive manner" in the Middle East and added: "The foreign powers aim to regain control of this Arab land and those who live on it."[86]

Such rhetoric must be seen in the light of the fact that 60 % of Jordan's population is composed of Palestinians, the vast majority of whom obviously agreed with the PLO's support of Saddam Hussein. In addition, Jordan--like the other two Arab states that reacted to the Gulf Crisis with similar ambivalence, Tunisia and Algeria--is a country riddled by Islamic fundamentalism. In all three states, leaders are to a degree captives of Islamic fundamentalism. In Jordan and Algeria, fundamentalists won national elections in the months before the outbreak of the Gulf Crisis. Jordanian fundamentalists, as Muslim fundamentalists elsewhere, responded positively to Saddam's use of Islamic imagery and his call for a *jihad* against the U.S. troops of "unbelievers" allegedly deployed in Mecca.[87]

Israel was yet another, but related, factor in Jordan's reaction to the crisis. Although King Hussein has traditionally, and correctly, been seen by students of Middle East politics as one of the least bellicose actors in the Arab-Israeli conflict, he had always had to act under the shadow of the state of war between his country

and the Jewish state. His established preference for a political settlement with Israel was motivated by an awareness of that country's overwhelmingly superior military force. It was also steadily frustrated after 1967 by Israel's reluctance to relinquish the occupied West Bank in the context of a peace settlement. Moreover, the King could not ignore the growth in Israel of the notion that Jordan is "the Palestinian state" and the even more omnious growth in that country of sentiment favoring the transferral to Jordan of the occupied lands' Arab population. These circumstances, combined with the significant levels of Palestinian nationalist and Islamic fundamentalist sentiment in Jordan, gave Hussein strong strategic as well as domestic reasons for welcoming a close relationship with Iraq.

In short, the constraints underlying Jordan's equivocal policy in the Gulf Crisis were: 1) economic pressures, 2) the overwhelmingly fundamentalist orientation of the Jordanian population, 3) the Jordanian view that Iraq's military strength and assertive leadership provide a counterweight to Israel, thus making Iraq a convenient ally. King Hussein cannot survive politically without taking all of these factors into account. In terming Saddam an "Arab patriot" and in having chosen him as a political ally, King Hussein risked miscalculations.

Yet, King Hussein seems to have had no other option than to move into a position supporting Iraq despite the fact that the effects of this policy decision were obviously dangerous. In January 1991 six fundamentalists were appointed as ministers in the new cabinet of Prime Minister Mudar Badran.[88] With his decision to side with Iraq, Hussein--at least temporarily--secured the allegiance of this segment of his population. However, he also strained the support traditionally accorded to him by the most loyal segment of his population, the Bedouins. By the fall of 1990, reports indicated that Jordan's Bedouins (40 % of the population) were becoming "victims of the Gulf Crisis, torn between their long loyalty to King Hussein and their traditional friendship and contacts with Saudi Arabia."[89]

Jordanian Bedouin tribes are no longer wandering nomads. Most are settled and make their living through cross-border commerce and the transit business. The Gulf policy pursued by King Hussein produced serious strains in Saudi-Jordanian relations, the economic effects of which were clearly harmful to the loyalty of these Bedouins to the King. Angered by King Hussein's policy, Saudi Arabia severed oil supplies to Jordan and halted the flow of Jordanian truck traffic through Saudi territory. The Jordanians retaliated by closing the border.[90]

The result was Jordan's growing regional and international isolation.[91] As of this writing (February, 1991) King Hussein still insists that Saddam is an "Arab patriot." In a recent interview the King praised Saddam for genuinely contributing to comprehensive peace in the area.[92] King Hussein's basic aim in responding to the Gulf Crisis was to minimize the extent to which Jordan might become a

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victim of events beyond its borders. Whether his approach succeeded or failed will only become clear once the crisis has run its course.

Conclusions and Future Prospects:
Options for Conflict Resolution in the Gulf in the
Changing Environment of the Post-Cold War Era

The Gulf Crisis developed while the bi-polar East-West conflict was coming to an end in the context of an evolving new post-Cold War world order.[93] No prudent person would predict the major traits that will mark this evolving order. However, by early 1991 it seemed clear that to a great extent "the practices that will make the new world order a reality are being worked out in the Gulf."[94] Political observers also agreed that the crisis was "not a game ... the outcome could largely determine the nature of the post-Cold War international system."[95] Thus, the Gulf Crisis strongly reinforced the importance of the Middle East as a regional subsystem in world politics second only to Western Europe. The basic lesson students of world politics may learn from the crisis is that regional conflicts are not simply extensions of global conflicts. A mixture of autonomy and external linkages characterizes the dynamic of regional conflicts in the Middle East.[96] The fact that the Gulf Crisis unfolded while the competition of the superpowers in Third World conflicts declined supports the view that these conflicts not only have their own regional dynamics, but also can shape their external environment.[97]

The focus of this work has been the policies of the major Arab states in the Gulf Crisis and the fragmentation of Arab politics. This fragmentation contributes to rendering linkages between the region and its changing international environment highly complex. The assessment of the policies of Egypt, Syria and Jordan towards the Gulf Crisis that has been presented here reveals a process of increasing fragmentation in the Arab state-system. Prior to the Gulf Crisis, the outstanding uniting elements in this system were the Palestine problem as a "core issue of Arab legitimacy"[98] and the ideology of Pan Arab nationalism.[99] In reality, however, Pan Arab formulae were touted verbally but actually belied by the concrete policies of most Arab states. The vociferously aired Pan Arabist position was contradicted by all regional realities.[100] The fragmentation of the Middle East is most clearly seen in the Ba^{c}thist regimes of Syria and Iraq.[101] Both fiercely subscribe to the virtually sacramentally rendered rhetoric of Pan Arab unity while being in fact the most established and bitter rivals in the Arab World. During the Iraq-Iran War, Syria supported Iran. During the recent crisis it sought to ensure that Iran would not side with Baghdad. The Syrian Ba^{c}th leadership supported its former enemy, Egypt, and sent troops to Saudi Arabia to be deployed against the regime of the sister party in Iraq.

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Arab fragmentatin applies even more dramatically to the PLO. The Egyptian newspaper *Al Ahram* ironically caricatured Yassir Arafat, who was torn between his patron, Saddam Hussein, and his financial backers in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states (according to the *Financial Times*, the PLO received $ 10 billion from the latter in the past two decades), as a pair of identical Siamese twins. One twin carried a placard proclaiming "Viva taking territories by force" and the other sported a sign reading "Down with taking territory by force."[102]

The shift of international and regional attention from the Arab-Israeli conflict to the Gulf Crisis was similar to the effects of the Iranian revolution and the Iran-Iraq war, which earlier also diverted interest from the Palestine issue. The unfolding of the *intifada* [103] seemed for a while to revive international concern with Palestine but had very little regional impact. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait rendered the *intifada* almost totally peripheral and reinforced the two basic features of the current state of affairs in Middle East politics: the political fragmentation of the region itself and the shift of focus from the Palestinian issue. Even after the outbreak of the war and the initiation of Iraqi Scud missile attacks on Israel, Saddam Hussein basically failed to weaken this shift of focus through his insistence on a linkage.

However, Iraq sought at the beginning to reverse both trends. In an initiative launched on August 12, Saddam Hussein proposed to establish a link between Kuwait and other conflicts in the Middle East, primarily the occupied territories (the West Bank and Gaza) and Lebanon.[104] The unexpected massacre by Israeli forces of unarmed Palestinian protestors on October 8, 1990 at Jerusalem's *Haram Al Sharif* was, as the distinguished Swiss journalist Arnold Hottinger put it, "a gift presented to Saddam Hussein by Israel."[105] The death of 22 Palestinians not only contributed to giving the *intifada* new momentum but also to an extent created what Saddam unsuccessfully sought to establish in his initiative of August 12: the opening of a "second front" in the Gulf Crisis linking that issue to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestine question. Thus, the Jerusalem massacre helped to realize what Saddam failed to achieve on his own: "the Israelization of the Gulf crisis."[106] However, no second **military** front materialized upon the outbreak of the war on January 17. What seemed actually more threatening was the ideological confrontation between "Islam and the West" as conjured up by Saddam Hussein.

Although Saddam failed--at least so far--to link the Gulf and the Palestine conflicts militarily, political "linkage" between the two has been established in the Middle East. In light of this, the "shift of focus" in regional affairs caused by the invasion of Kuwait must be understood as a question of emphasis rather than as a basic change in the region's political concerns. The Gulf promptly overshadowed the Palestine issue but by no means eclipsed it. More than any other single event, the Jerusalem massacre merged the two issues.

Saddam Hussein made full propagandistic use of the outrage. Iraq's *Abbas* and *Hussein* missiles were re-named *Hijara* missiles, a reference to the major weapon of the Palestinians in their *intifada*:: "stones" (in Arabic *hijara*).[107] After October 8, Saddam threatened to throw his *Hijara* on Israel. the symbolic comparison contributed greatly to his popularity among Palestinians. The Arab allies of the United States came under pressure to condemn Israel in order to deprive Saddam of his claim to be the only Muslim custodian of the Al Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem.[108] In order to keep its Arab allies in the anti-Saddam front,[109] the United States had no option but to support the UN Security Council resolution rebuking Israel for the Jerusalem massacre. The firing of Iraqi Scud missiles against Israeli cities after the outbreak of the war was aimed at playing even more upon the Palestinian issue.

The preceding analysis makes it abundantly clear that the overall fragmentation of the Arab state system prevented a purely regional resolution of the Gulf Crisis through an "Arab solution". The failure of the call of Morocco's King Hassan in November for an Arab summit was striking evidence of this. Moreover, the processes of fragmentation and realignment were not restricted regional events since their international linkages became part and parcel of the crisis itself.

Saddam Hussein was quick to link the possibility of Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait to an Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories and a Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon, in addition to the replacement of the U.S.-led multinational force in the Gulf by Arab armies (excluding Egypt). He also insisted on an "Arab solution". Even those Arab analysts who discarded this move as an effort to detract from the real issue--the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait--agreed that in the aftermath of the crisis all Middle Eastern conflicts would have to be addressed equally in a package deal. They also argued that the international community and both superpowers should participate in this conflict resolution. Iraq and its allies, in turn, firmly rejected any internationalization of the conflict resolution process, insisting that the conflict was only a regional matter to be dealt with in the context of an "Arab solution."[110] In fact, the idea of an "Arab solution" was mere propaganda aimed at gaining time. Moreover, the call for an "Arab solution" seemed to imply acceptance of Iraqi demands in Kuwait.

Saddam Hussein claimed to act on behalf of Pan Arab unity, but he shattered the existing Arab order instead.[111] In considering this, Egyptian analysts have drawn attention to the fact that both overall Arab security and sub-regional Gulf security vanished in terms of existing frameworks and threat perceptions. A good example of the change in Arab-Gulf threat perceptions is an article by a Saudi writer published in *Al Ahram* under the title: "Yes, for the peace with Israel."[112] The author, Zuhair M. J. Al Kutbi, argued that the threat posed by "Pan Arab" Iraq to the security of the Gulf states was much worse than the hitherto perceived Israeli threat. He concluded that peace with Israel was imperative and pledged to work for acceptance of the Camp David peace accords by all other Arab states. Needless to

say, however the Jerusalem massacre created serious obstacles to the spread of this altered perception. Indeed Israeli threats to the Al Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem may reinforce the classical perception of Israel as a menace to all Muslims.

Arab commentators increasingly now stress the need for "building up an Arab alliance to establish a new Arab order that takes into account the changing patterns in the relations of the superpowers and their impact on the Arab world."[113] *Al Ahram* analyst Usama Al Ghazali-Harb makes the point that Iraq's resort to violence to resolve the Iraqi-Kuwaiti conflict damaged Egypt's longstanding efforts to establish new patterns of inter-Arab interaction in cases of discord.[114] In Al Ghazali-Harb's view, Egypt has to resume these efforts and establish a new Arab order: "Egypt is in a position to resume the leading role in the needed ... new Arab politics."[115]

This vision has to be differentiated from the call for an international security system imposed on the Middle East by the superpowers and great powers. William Hyland has argued in *International Herald Tribune* : "Any peace plan has to deal not only with the liberation of Kuwait but with ... the establishment of new security arrangements for the Gulf, and perhaps for the entire Middle East."[116] This and similar calls have aroused great anxiety in the Middle East, even among the Arab allies of the U.S.. Iraqi propaganda refers to those calls for a new regional security order as manifestations of Western imperialistic designs. It is a charge that strikes responsive chords throughout the region. It portrays Egypt and Saudi Arabi as instruments of a plot directed by the United States to establish U.S. rule over the Middle East.

While it is obvious that Saddam Hussein's package deal of August 12 (parallel withdrawals by Israel from the occupied Arab territories, Syria from the Lebanon, and Iraq from Kuwait and Iran)[117] was not to be taken seriously, any idea of a security system imposed on the Middle East should also be rejected. Such ambitions not only revive old suspicions but also exacerbate tensions in a region "where anti-American sentiments - thanks in large part ... to America's support to Israel - run in the blood."[118] The U.S. and the international community are well advised to base their approach to the Middle East after the Gulf Crisis on the promotion of combined local-international efforts to establish a new order in which regional and exta-regional interests are balanced. It is important to make it clear to the people of the area that no external security arrangements are being imposed on them.

Resolution of existing regional conflicts in the Middle East, such as the Palestinian question and the Lebanon problem, must be envisaged from a broader perspective than the oil and security interests of extra-regional powers. Nor can the problems of the Middle East be confined to the "liberation of Kuwait" from Iraqi occupation. The invasion of Kuwait itself was only a symptom of much deeper issues, such as the lack of democracy in both Iraq and Kuwait and artificially drawn boundaries which, as Drysdale and Blake argue, create "uncertainties" that have

become "a hazard in international relations that can be eliminated."[119]   In other words: any definition of problems raised by the Gulf Crisis that remains limited to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait would be as unproductive as viewing a disease only in terms of symptoms rather than also considering its causes. In the short term, the restoration of Kuwait's sovereignty seems to be the basis on which other problems in the Middle East ought to be approached. However, the very fact that recent events have made this necessary reinforces the lesson that more fundamental, long-term regional issues must also be dealt with.

Viewed from the focal point of this work--the effects of the Gulf Crisis on the fragmentation of the Arab World--Arab leaders proved helpless in dealing with the invasion of Kuwait. Libya's leader, Colonel Qadhafi, viewed the mini-summit he convened in January 1991 at Misrata as marking the onset of a new year that would be "a point of departure for realizing Arab unity."[120]   Aside from wishful thinking, the year 1991 actually seems more likely to be a continuation of the ongoing fragmentation of the Arab World. Even among the anti-Saddam front there are great tensions. The two major Arab states involved in the military deployment in Saudi Arabia, Syria and Egypt, have "conflicting regional agendas," as Syria is using the Gulf Crisis "to promote its claim on the leadership of the Arab World .... (and) Assad is more concerned with ... his own designs on the region."[121]   Despite Qadhafi's pious Pan Arab pronouncements, the year 1991 hardly promised to be "a year of Arab unity."

The current Gulf War intensifies the Arab World's fragmentation. Arab leaders have failed to deal with the issue which King Hussein of Jordan terms "the Iraq-Kuwait dispute."[122]   Indeed, the King's very language indicates low esteem for the norms and values of international law, according to which the issue is actually one of aggression rather than merely a "dispute." The formula of an "Arab solution" gained life as propagandistic Iraqi rhetoric directed against the presence of non-Arab military forces in the Gulf. King Hussein repeatedly resorted to the formula in backing Iraq. One Arab leader who sided against Saddam, Morocco's King Hassan, also took up the call for an "Arab solution" to be achieved through an Arab summit. He also failed. President Mubarak rejected King Hassan's idea of an Arab summit in words that frankly exposed the chimerical assumption underlying the notion of "an Arab solution": "Why an Arab summit?... What would be there? We won't give blessing to his (Saddam's) occupation."[123]

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait not only contributed to furthering the fragmentation of the Middle East but also to the internationalization of the region's problems. Arabs can no longer deal with their troubles on their own; they need the mediation, and also the military force, of extra-regional powers. In the post-Gulf War period it will be necessary to establish order in the Middle East. Middle Easterners cannot deal with this on their own. However, to infer from this statement that an order ought to be imposed on the Middle East by outside powers

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would be sadly incorrect. Only a combined regional-international arrangement offers hope for a peaceful Middle East by the end of this century.

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NOTES

1. Alasdair Drysdale and Gerald Blake, *The Middle East and North Africa. A Political Geography* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 78.

2. Anthony Giddens, *The Nation-State and Violence* (Berkeley: California University Press, 1978), pp. 120f.

3. See the report of Arnold Hottinger, "*Missglueckte arabische Losung der Golf-Krise. Scheitern Prasident Chadhlis* ", (Failed Arab Solution to the Gulf Crisis) *Neue Zurcher Zeitung*, December 20, 1990, p. 3.

4. Nabil Abdul-Fattah, "Al ^CUdwan Al ^CIraqi", (The Iraqi Aggression) *Al Ahram*, August 12, 1990, p. 7. On the fragmentation thesis see Georges Corm, *Fragmentation of the Middle East* (London: Hutchinson, 1988), see also my review in *MESA-Bulletin*, December 1990, pp. 218-220.

5. On this see Bassam Tibi, "*Die irakische Kuwait-Invasion und die Golf-Krise. Lokale und regionale Bestimmungsfaktoren eines internationalisieraten Konflikts nach dem Ende des Kalten Krieges* ", (The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait and the Gulf Crisis) *Beitrage zur Konfliktforschung*, 20, 4 (1990), pp. 5-34, in particular pp. 17-21.

6. See "Jami^Cat Al Duwal Al ^CArabiyya ^CAdat ila Al Qahira", (The Arab League Has Returned to Cairo) *Al Musawwar*, no. 3440, September 14, 1990, p. 17 and *Al Akhbar*, September 11, 1990. With the same heading: "The Arab League has returned to Cairo".

7. Musa Sabri, "*Fursan Al hulul Al ^CArabiyya*", (Knights of Arab Solutions) *Al Akhbar*, September 10, 1990. On the elusiveness of the "Arab solution" formula see my article in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* referred to in note 110 below.

8. Menachem Z. Rosensaft, one of the American Jews who met with Arafat at Stockholm in 1990 under the auspices of Swedish Prime Minister Carlsson, published the article: "Do not Take Chairman Arafat Seriously", *International Herald Tribune*, August 8, 1990, p. 4.

9. S. Prakash, "No One Sleeps in the Gulf Tonight", *Defense and Foreign Affairs*, July 1990, pp. 12-21, here p. 13 and p. 21. Liesl Graz, *The Turbulent Gulf* (London: L.B. Tauris, 1990), pp. 226-262 clearly shows that the GCC was more designed as a security related organization than as one for economic cooperation, even though it lacked the capabilities needed for the pursuit of such a

security oriented policy. On the GCC see also Erik R. Peterson, *The Gulf Cooperation Council: Search for Unity in a Dynamic Region* (Boulder: Westview, Press 1988).

10. Fred Halliday, "Iraq and its Neighbours: The Cycles of Insecurity", *The World Today*, 46,6 (1990), pp. 104-106, here p. 105.

11. Tony Walker, "Misrata Summit is Sign of the Times", *Financial Times*, January 4, 1991, p. 4. See also the report "4 Arab Leaders Meet to Seek End to Divisions over Crisis", *International Herald Tribune*, January 4, 1991, p. 3.

12. *Al Ahali,* September 12, 1990.

13. See the *Financial Times* article by Tony Walker referenced in note 111 below.

14. On the disputed territory of Rumaila and on its complex oil field, see the reports in *International Herald Tribune*, September 4, 1990 by Thomas Hayes and in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, September 10, 1990 by Horst Rademacher.

15. Anthony McDermott, "Iraqi Economy struggling since Gulf War", *Financial Times*, August 4/5, 1990, p. 2.

16. Christine M. Helms, *Iraq: Eastern Flank of the Arab World* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1984), pp. 46-54. Helm's assertion that Iraq's coastline "is only 15 km long" is wrong. The length of the coastline is 50 miles. The area is not suitable for the development of a deep water harbor.

17. On Iraq's military potential, see Zeev Eytan, "Regional Military Forces: Iraq", *The Middle East Military Balance 1988-1989*, ed. Shlomo Gazit (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), pp. 174-184.

18. For more details see Gerd Nonneman, *Iraq, the Gulf States and the War* (London: Ithaca Press, 1986), in particular pp. 95ff.

19. See Bassam Tibi, "The Arabs and the Iranian Revolution", *Arab Studies Quarterly*, 8, 1 (1986), pp. 29-44.

20. See the Egyptian article: Yunan Labib-Ruzq, "*Abdel Nasser laisa Saddam Hussein wa Misr laisat Al ᶜIraq* ", (Nasser is not Saddam, nor is Egypt Iraq), *Al Musawwar*, no. 3439, September 17, 1990, pp. 14-15. In this article, the analogy with Suez 1956 is also strongly rejected.

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21. Bernard Lewis, "Not Everybody Hates Saddam", *Wall Street Journal*, August 13, 1990.

22. The full Arabic text of Saddam Hussein's declaration of holy war in August 1990 is included in *Al Muntada* (Amman), vol. 5, 60 (September 1990), pp. 21-22. Saddam repeated his call for an Islamic holy war against the U.S. on September 5, 1990. See the report "Iraq's Chief Renews *Jihad* Call", *International Herald Tribune*, September 6, 1990, p. 3.

23. Adel Hussein in the fundamentalist weekly *Al Sha^cb*, August 21, 1990. For more details in this issue see B. Tibi, *"Durefen sich Muslims von 'Unglaeubigen' verteidigen lassen? "*, (Are Muslims Allowed to be Defended by Infidels) *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, October 10, 1990, p. 8.

24. Tony Walker, "Jittery Silence from Leaders of the Arab World", *Financial Times*, August 3, 1990.

25. "Al Quwwat Al Misriyya Aasalt ila Al khalij", (Egyptian Forces Reached the Gulf) *Al Ahram*, August 12, 1990.

26. Mubarak's statement is printed in *Al Ahram*, August 12, 1990.

27. *"Alarmruf des aegyptischen Prasidenten "*, (Exclaim of Alarm by the Egyptian President) *Neue Zurcher Zeitung*, August 9, 1990. Mubarak's speech (Arabic text) delivered at the Cairo summit meeting is printed in *Al Muntada*, vol. 4, 60 (September 1990), pp. 22-24.

28. Editor-in-Chief of *Al Ahram*, Ibrahim Nafi^c, in his article in *Al Ahram*, August 24, 1990, p. 3.

29. "Arabs Agree on Force to Defend Saudis", *Washington Post*, August 11, 1990.

30. "U.S. Deployment May Reach More than 200,000 Troops", *Washington Post*, August 11, 1990.

31. William Claiborne, "Arab League Votes to Field a Military Force", *Washington Post*, August 11, 1990, p. A24.

32. William Claiborne, "Arabs Set Precedent with Summit Stance", *Washington Post*, August 12, p. A22, see also the earlier report of Claiborne, "Arab Leaders Postpone Summit, Seek to Negotiate Informally", *Washington Post*, August 10, 1990, p. A25.

33. Ibrahim Nafi^c, "Khabaya Al Umma Al Arabiyya", (Secrets of the Arab Nation) *Al Ahram*, August 12, 1990, p. 3.

34. Jamil Matar, "Wafat Al Nizam Al Arabi", (Death of the Arab Order) *Al Gomhuria*, September 20, 1990.

35. "Multinational Arab Force is Slow to Deploy in Gulf", *International Herald Tribune*, September 6, 1990.

36. For more deails about these memories see Bassam Tibi, *Arab Nationalism: A Critical Inquiry*, 2nd enlarged edition (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), pp. 88-90.

37. David Hoffman, "Saudis to Allow More Egyptian ... Troops", *International Herald Tribune*, September 8-9, 1990, p. 3.

38. Mubarak's address to the army of September 17 is printed in *Al Ahram*, September 18, 1990.

39. *Al Ahram*, September 18, 1990. For more details on this verbal duel between Saddam and Mubarak in the context of a revival of dynastic principles in Arab politics as related to the claim of that Saddam is descended from the family of the Prophet (i.e. of being a *Sharif* like his supposed cousin King Hussein of Jordan) see my article published in the Swiss newspaper *St. Galler Taqbatt* referenced in note 82 below.

40. Jamal Shawqi, *"Inqilab fi Mizaniyat Misr"*, (Disruption in Egypt's Budget) *Al Wafd*, September 15, 1990.

41. Abdulazim Al Basil, *"Qanat Al Suez: Dawamit Al Khasa'ir"*, (Suez Canal: The Whirlpool of Losses) *Al Ahram*, September 17, 1990 and Said Abdulkadir, *"Khasa'ir Qanat Al Suez "*, (Losses of the Suez Canal) *Akhir Sa^ca*, no. 2917, September 19, 1990, p. 9; see also the report "Azmat Al Khalij wa Kaifa Aan^cakis ala Misr", (The Gulf Crisis and How It Reflects on Eygpt) *Akhir Sa^ca*, no. 2916, September 12, 1990, pp. 41-42.

42. *Al Ahram*, September 16, 1990.

43. The memo of Al Janzuri is covered in *Al Ahram* report of September 19, 1990, p. 9.

44. See *Al Ahram*, September 22, 1990.

45. Izzat Al Sa^{c}dani argues in *Al Ahram*, September 15, 1990 that Egyptians have to make clear to the Americans that "Egypt is the really major state and its strong ally in the Middle East. Egypt has sent military forces to the Gulf and the Americans, and the entire West must help Egypt in its suffering." See also note 47 on "strategic assets."

46. David Lennon, "Gulf Pay-Off Transforms Egypt's Prospects", *Financial Times*, February 1, 1991, p. 4.

47. On the "straegic asset"-debate see Cheryl A. Rubenberg, *Israel and the American National Interest: A Critical Examination* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1986), pp. 1-22. As regards the competition between Egypt and Israel for American support see William Quandt, *The United States and Egypt* (Washington: Brookings, 1990) pp. 5-10 and on Quandt's interpretation, (see B. Tibi, "*Schluesselrolle im Schatten Israels. Aegyptisch-amerikanische Beziehungen im Lichte der Golf-Krise* ", (Key Role in the Shadow of Israel: Egyptian-American Relations in Light of the Gulf Crisis) *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, October 30, 1990, p. 10.

48. The greatest concern in this regard is to avoid a second military front in the Gulf conflict stemming from the Arab-Israel intrusion into the original Iraq-Kuwait conflict. See the reports by Jackson Diehl, "Israel Signals it Won't Make a Preemptive Strike", *International Herald Tribune*, December 27, 1990, p. 2 and by Youssef M. Ibrahim, "How to Respond to Iraqi Attack: Israel Ponders its Options", *International Herald Tribune*, January 2, 1991, p. 1 and 5. In my article "*Die zweite Front im Golf-Konflikt* " (The Second Front in the Gulf Conflict) published in the Swiss newspaper *St. Galler Tagblatt*, October 30, 1990, p. 2. I argue that the Jerusalem massacre heightened the danger of a second front in the Gulf conflict. Nonetheless, once war broke out and Saddam Hussein directed his Scud missiles at Israel, Israeli self-restraint contributed to Iraq's failure to open a second military front.

49. Mahmud A. Murad, "*Amamuna Mawqifan la Thalitha Tahuma*", (We Have Two Positions for Which There Is No Third) *October Weekly* (Cairo, in Arabic), September 9, 1990, pp. 14-15.

50. See for instance the reports in *Rose Al Yousef*, September 9, 1990, pp. 16-17, *Al Musawwar*, September 21, 1990, pp. 54-55 and most dramatically the report of *October Weekly* (in Arabic), September 9, 1990, pp. 24-25.

51. See Joseph P. Lorenz, *Egypt and the Arabs: Foreign Policy and the Search for National Identity* (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1990), in particular pp. 108-114.

52. Alan Cowell, "Saudis Pledge Aid to Egypt as Cairo Plans New Deployment", *International Herald Tribune*, December 6, 1990, p. 6.

53. See the books of Efraim Karsh, *The Soviet Union and Syria* (London: Routledge, 1988) and Moshe Maoz/Avner Yaniv (eds.), *Syria Under Assad* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986). On Assad see Patrick Seale, *Assad: The Struggle for the Middle East* (Berkeley: California University Press, 1988), in particular pp. 8-11 and 453-55 on the ᶜAlawis.

54. For more details see Moshe Maoz, *Asad: The Sphinx of Damascus* (New York: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1988), pp. 184ff.

55. "When it comes to respecting their own people's democratic rights, civil liberties and the rule of the law, there is little difference between Mr. Assad and Mr. Hussein." Andrew Whitley, "A Message for Baker and Assad", *International Herald Tribune*, September 9, 1990, p. 6. See also the comment by William Safire, "How the Crisis Players Score to Date", *International Herald Tribune*, August 18-19, 1990, p. 4.

56. Lara Marlowe, "Syria Sees Economic Gain from Invasion", *Financial Times*, August 8, 1990.

57. Lara Marlowe, "Saddam's Old Adversary Uses Conflict to Seek Respectability", *Financial Times*, August 16, 1990. See also Tony Walker, "Syria Confronts an Enemy as Old as Islam", *Financial Times*, September 18, 1990.

58. The Arabic text of the letter addressed to Rafsanjani and signed by Saddam Hussein is published in the special issue on the Gulf Crisis of *Al Muntada* (Amman), vol. 5, 60 (1990), pp. 27-28. See also the report "Saddam Offers Iran Peace Deal", *Financial Times*, August 16, 1990.

59. "Baker to Visit Syria in Bid to Further Isolate Iraq", *International Herald Tribune*, September 11, 1990 and "Baker's Syria Trip", *International Herald Tribune*, September 13, 1990.

60. Quoted in the report of Alan Cowell, "Iran and Syria Confront Iraq", *International Herald Tribune*, September 26, 1990.

61. See the speculative reports of the London based Arabic press *Asharq Al Awsat*, September 23, 1990 and *Al Hayat* of the same date.

62. Jackson Diehl, "Syrian's Move Runs Risks", *Washington Post*, August 15, 1990, pp. A12 and A16.

63. Caryle Murphy, "For Saudis, the Syrian Alliance Symbolized a Major Change", *International Herald Tribune*, December 19, 1990, p. 4.

64. For more details see Eberhard Kienle, *Ba^{c}th versus Ba^{c}th. The Conflict between Syria and Iraq 1968-1989* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990).

65. President Bush as quoted in *Financial Times*, August 16, 1990.

66. *Financial Times*, August 16, 1990.

67. Arnold Hottinger, "*Saddam als syrisches Sicherheitsproblem* ", (Saddam as a Syrian Problem of Security) *Neue Zurcher Zeitung*, September 9, 1990. On the "Hama Massacre" launched by Assad, see the chapter in Maoz, *Asad: the Sphinx of Damascus*, pp. 149-163.

68. Christopher Dickey, "A Common Purpose or a Common Enemy", *Newsweek*, September 24, 1990. In fact we face here the tribal Arab "L'ennemi de mon ennemi" as Jean-Pierre Langellier aptly observes in his article in the French paper *Le Monde*, September 23-24, 1990.

69. Arthur Schlesinger Jr., "America Doesn't Know What It's Doing in the Gulf", *International Herald Tribune*, December 17, 1990, p. 8. Schlesinger, who is not a Middle East expert, knows however that American decision-makers in Washington aren't that either. His charges are largely justified. For a scholarly critique of U.S.-Middle East policy see the valuable books of Dan Tschirgi, *The Politics of Indecision: Origins and Implications of American Involvement in the Palestine Problem* (New York: Praeger, 1983) and *The American Search for Mideast Peace* (New York: Praeger, 1989).

70. Wolfgang Koehler, "*Der erste Sieger heisst Syrien* ", (Syria Is the First Winner) *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, November 3, 1990, p. 10.

71. A.M. Rosenthal, "Lebanon, Cynical Payoff to Assad for Syria's Alliance", *International Herald Tribune*, October 24, 1990, p. 7.

72. On the background of the kingdom see Naseer Aruri, *Jordan: A Study in Political Development* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972). For information

concerning the problems Jordan faced prior to the crisis see Valerie Yorke, "A New Era for Jordan?", *The World Today*, 46,2 (1990), pp. 27-31.

73. Tony Walker, "King Hussein: Facing a Regional Checkmate", *Financial Times*, August 18, 1990.

74. Hussein Ibn Talal, "The Middle East Cannot Afford Another War", *International Herald Tribune*, September 24, 1990, p. 4.

75. Bandar Ibn Sultan, "A Letter to King Hussein About Facts", *International Herald Tribune*, September 27, 1990, p. 6.

76. Tony Walker, *Financial Times*, September 19, 1990.

77. Lamis Andoni, "Jordan Losses Could Exceed $3.5 bn", *Financial Times*, August 24, 1990.

78. Hassan Ibn Talal, "Do Critics of Jordan have Peace in Mind", *International Herald Tribune*, September 4, 1990, p. 4.

79. See the report in *International Herald Tribune*, September 5, 1990.

80. Joel Brinkley, "Futile Days for King Hussein", *International Herald Tribune*, September 22-23, 1990, p. 5.

81. King Hussein quoted by Tony Walker, "Saddam Divides and Rules", *Financial Times*, August 6, 1990.

82. King Hussein quoted in *Washington Post*, August 15, 1990, p. A16. For an interpretation of this move as a factor in revived dynastic elements in Arab politics and as a part of an effort to establish the legitimacy of siding with Iraq, see Bassam Tibi, "*Wer ist der wahre Huter von Mekka. Konig Husseins Pakt mit Irak gegen Saudi-Arabien* ", (Who Is the True Custodian of Mecca? King Hussein's Deal with Iraq against Saudi Arabia) *St. Galler Tagblatt*, October 22, 1990, p. 2.

83. For more details see B. Tibi, *Arab Nationalism: A Critical Inquiry*, 2nd ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), pp. 106-122.

84. "From the Gulf Crisis a New Power Balance Will Emerge", Interview with Bruno Etienne, *International Herald Tribune*, September 3, 1990, p. 2.

85. See the article of Crown Prince Hassan Ibn Talal quoted in note 78. The illusory character of "The Arab solution" formula is discussed in my article quoted in note 7 above.

86. Joseph Treaster, "Jordan Denounces U.S. for 'Explosive Tactics'", *New York Times*, August 14, 1990, p. A9.

87. "Saddam Issues Call for Arab Masses to Repulse 'Foreigners'", *Washington Post*, August 11, 1990 and "Iraqi Chief Renews *Jihad* Call, Urges Cairo-Riyadh Revolts", *International Herald Tribune*, September 6, 1990, p. 3.

88. See the report from Amman by Viktor Kocher, "*Jordaniens Regierung mit islamischem Akzent* ", (Jordanian Government with Islamic Accentuation) *Neue Zurcher Zeitung*, January 5, 1991, p. 4. Among the ministries obtained by fundamentalists are the department of justice and the department of education, the most important institutions for furthering the politics of Islamization.

89. Nora Boustany, "Bedouin Loyalties Tested in Jordan", *International Herald Tribune*, October 10, 1990, p. 6.

90. Alan Cowell, "Jordan in Retaliatory Move Closes Borders to Saudi Arabia", *International Herald Tribune*, October 2, 1990, p. 6.

91. Judith Miller, "When an Isolation is Not so Splendid, Jordan Stance on Iraq Angers West", *International Herald Tribune*, December 21, 1990, p. 8.

92. Quoted by Joel Brinkley, "Jordan's View of the Crisis", *International Herald Tribune*, December 8-9, 1990, p. 4.

93. See Bogdan Denitch, *The End of the Cold War* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990).

94. Jim Hoagland, "The New World Order," *Washington Post*, November 15, 1990, p. A25.

95. Hans Binnendijk (Deputy Director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies/London), *International Herald Tribune*, September 29-30, 1990. See also the article of Edward Mortimer, "Reality v. Rhetoric in New World Order", *Financial Times*, December 28, 1990, p. 8.

96. The argument pertaining to the regional dynamic of conflict in the Middle East is elaborated by: B. Tibi, *Konfliktregion Naher Osten* (Munich: Beck Press, 1989). See also my chapter in *The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Two Decades of*

Change, ed. Y. Lukacs and A. Battah (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1988), pp. 147-163.

97. For traditional analyses of this, see Marshall D. Shulman, ed., *East West Tensions in the Third World* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1986) and Robert Litwak/Samuel F. Wells, eds., *Superpower Competition and Security in the Third World* (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publ. Co., 1988).

98. Michael Hudson, *Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), p. 5.

99. For more details see B. Tibi, *Arab Nationalism*, 2nd ed., in particular the chapter added to this edition: "Arab Nationalism Revisited".

100. On this see the classic of Malcolm Kerr, *The Arab Cold War*, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971).

101. For more details see Nikolaos van Dam, "Minorities and Political Elites in Iraq and Syria", Talal Asad and Roger Owen ed., *The Middle East* (London: Macmillan Press, 1983), p. 127-144. See also Eberhard Kienle, *Ba^cth versus Ba^cth: The Conflict between Syria and Iraq* (full reference in note 64 above).

102. Tony Walker, "PLO Tries to Please Riyadh and Baghdad", *Financial Times*, August 21, 1990, p. 3. The source of the figure of $ 10 billion which the PLO received from the Gulf states is this article. See also the recent article by Tony Walker and Lamis Andoni, "Palestinians Count Cost of the Gulf Crisis", *Financial Times*, December 28, 1990, p. 3. This article includes an interview with PLO "finance minister" Jawid Al Ghussein. He is quoted as saying: "We haven't received anything since August 2". Saudi Arabia which annually paid $ 85 million to the PLO stopped all payments, as did the other Gulf states. The result has been a "PLO financial crisis".

103. For more details see David McDowall, *Palestine and Israel: The Uprising and Beyond* (Berkeley: California University Press, 1989), in particular Part II.

104. The text of Saddam's initiative of August 12, 1990 is printed in *Al Muntada* (Amman), vol. 5, 60 (1990), pp. 25-26.

105. Arnold Hottinger, "*Ein Geschenk Israels fur Saddam Hussein* ", (A Present from Israel for Saddam Hussein) *Neue Zurcher Zeitung*, October 12, 1990, p. 3. See also Jackson Diehl, "Jerusalem Police Kill 22 Arab Protesters in a Clash at Holy Sites", *International Herald Tribune*, October 9, 1990, p. 1 (see also note 48 above).

106. The term "Israelizaion of the conflict" was coined by the Jewish German journalist Josef Joffe in his comment *Suddeutsche Zeitung*, October 10, 1990, p. 4. See also B. Tibi, "Die Zweite Front im Golf-Konflikt", referenced in note 48.

107. David White, "Saddam's 'New' Missile Puzzles Experts", *Financial Times*, October 10, 1990, pp. 7: "It was not clear whether the *Al Hijara*, meaning 'the stones', was in fact a new weapon or a new name for a system already in existence ... The choice of name was evidently intended to link the weapon to Palestinian protests".

108. See *Al Ahram*, October 10, 1990 and also the furious comments in the October 10 issues of the dailies *Al Quds al Arabi* and of *Al Hayat*.

109. Tony Walker, "Bush Rebukes Israel over Killings", *Financial Times*, October 10, 1990. See also the significant comments of Hugh Carnegy, "Israel's Rising Tide of Troubles", *Financial Times*, October 10, 1990, p. 22 and Robert Mortimer, "More than one Kind of Linkage", *Financial Times*, October 16, 1990, p. 19.

110. On the viability and the options for an Arab solution, see the survey by B. Tibi, "*Ein dauernder Streit unter 'Brudern'. Gibt es eine arabische losung fur die Golf-Krise?* ", (A Continuous Fight among Brothers) *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, November 6, 1990, p. 14.

111. Tony Walker, "Saddam Shatters the Arab Order", *Financial Times*, August 9, 1990, p. 10.

112. Zuhair M.J. Al Kutbi, "*Na^c am lil Sulh Ma^c a Israel*", (Yes for Reconciliation with Israel) *Al Ahram*, September 23, 1990, p. 7.

113. Hasan Abu Talib, "*Hisabat Marhalat Al Lahall* ", *Al Ahram*, September 12, 1990, p. 11.

114. Usama Al Ghazali-Harb, "*Azmat Al Khalig wa Siyasat Misr Al ^c Arabiyya*", (The Gulf Crisis and Egypt's Arab Policy) *Al Ahram*, August 24, 1990, p. 6.

115. Ibid.

116. William G. Hyland, *International Herald Tribune*, September 28, 1990, p. 8.

117. See note 104 for a full reference.

118. *Financial Times*, August 9, 1990.

119. Alasdair Drysdale and Gerald H. Blake, (see note 1 above).

120. See the reports from Tripoli by Sayyid Al Najjar in *Al Akhbar*, January 3, 1991, p. 4. For references to two reports on the Misrata summit, see note 11 above and also the report of Ibrahim Nafi^c in *Al Ahram*, January 5, 1991, p. 1.

121. Alan Cowell, "For America's Arab Allies in the Gulf Crisis, Sharply Conflicting Aims", *International Herald Tribune*, December 17, 1990, p. 1 and 4.

122. *International Herald Tribune*, December 21, 1990, p. 8.

123. Quoted by Judith Miller, "Egypt Wants Time", *Washington Post*, November 17, 1990, p. A15.