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SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC SECURITY
AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Saad Z. Nagi
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The quest for security is perhaps the most fundamental and most universal of human concerns. It underlies the aggregation of people into groups, communities, and nations. It has also contributed greatly to the development of social institutions such as the family, the economy, law, politics, the military, health care, and welfare. Of the many aspects of individual and collective security, this paper is addressed to those of a social and economic nature. More specifically, concern here is with insecurities which emanate from such conditions as ill-health and disability; poverty; and the reduction of cessation of earnings because of retirement, unemployment, or the death of breadwinners. Central to this discussion will also be policies, programs, organizations, and professions which evolve to prevent these problems and to alleviate their consequences.

To further a common framework for this discussion, we need also to explain to sense in which the phrase "national development" is used here. The already massive and rapidly expanding literature on development conveys a variety of definitions and indicators. It has been equated with modernization; attributed to such orientations as secularization and rationality; defined in terms of advancement in science and technology and the routinization of the change they engender; and characterized by urbanization, industrialization, and means of increased production.¹ Undoubtedly most of these traits are associated with development. Less emphasized in the definitions of this phenomenon, however, are the quality of life a society offers its members and the

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quality of citizens a society produces. This lack of emphasis is perhaps due to the elusiveness of "quality" conceptually and empirically, the doctrine of cultural relativity which tended to inhibit comparative assessments along these lines, and to political constraints that deny the search into these dimensions. The phrase "quality of life" is evaluative of the physical, cultural, and social environments. Examples of important aspects are the healthfulness and aesthetics of the physical surroundings; the arts and their influence on taste and civility; levels of prosperity and the effectiveness of economic institutions in handling distributive justice, productivity, and incentives; the political institutions and the balance they strike among liberties, rights, and responsibilities; the strength and fairness of the legal institutions in maintaining security, justice, equity, and equality of opportunity; and the ability of the various human services to cope with such individual and national problems as ignorance, poverty, and ill-health. If these sound broad and inclusive, it is because they are intended to be.

Social and economic security is closely intertwined with many of these dimensions of development, which, among themselves, are highly interdependent. The reciprocity or mutuality of influences among these aspects of social life renders analysis very complex. However, an understanding of the history of policies and programs addressed to the social and economic security and the value contexts that shaped their evolution can help greatly in understanding the current situation. These policies and programs are primarily concerned with poverty and dependence, and therefore their history is that of the relations between poverty and society. While moral values imbedded in the great religions provided the foundations for society's care for the poor and the needy, the evolution of policies and programs in the various parts of the world followed somewhat different paths. Since many of the social innovations related to this problem emanated in the West, we will turn first to an historical account of developments in Western societies, followed by those in developing societies, especially Egypt, and then we will identify some areas of needed research. We will conclude the paper with a note on the role of the social and behavioral sciences in the analysis of policies and programs.

POVERTY AND SOCIETY IN THE WEST

Christianity and Judaism, which exerted considerable influence on the Western societies, both stressed charitable acts toward those in need of assistance. Prior to the Reformation, philanthropy consisted of communal care delivered along the guidelines of religious teaching and aimed primarily at saving the indigent and disabled from death or misery. Four characteristic features of that care are worth special notice: it was meant to assist those who would probably perish if they had not received help, it was communal, it was intertwined with religion, and it was delivered as a form of volunteer charity. As we shall see, none of these features of societal care proved to be permanent. Over time there has been phenomenal change in value and in the role of government.

The communal organization of early charities played an important role in the development of other forms of life in medieval Europe. Charity was not, as might be expected, a part of the responsibilities of governments and municipalities. Actually, these administrative bodies often themselves "were an outgrowth from charitable fraternities which had been the earliest form of anything like popular and democratic organization in the regions concerned."²

It may be difficult to assess now the exact motivation of the rural communes and early townships which set up hospitals, brotherhoods, and other forms of rudimentary organizations to give help to the poor and the disabled. Undoubtedly, the altruistic and religious motives were very important. But at the same time much of what was done for the sick and the poor served a very specific interest of the communities involved, such as, for example, separating them from the plagued and the lepers. Leper houses might have been the most widespread form of communal assistance. It is estimated that there were nineteen thousand houses for lepers in western Christendom in the 13th Century, and both rulers and local communities proved amazingly generous in supplying means for the sustenance of the afflicted.³ Many modern hospitals in France and England may be traced back to these early eleemosynary institutions.

As far as we can say now, religion offered a much stronger support for the altruistic motive than any other possibly independent moral consideration. Both Christianity and Judaism claimed an authoritative rule over all moral matters that might have occasioned a debate. Both religions, however, seem to have converged in their teaching about due care for the indigent and the disabled. According to Thomas Aquinas, there were seven classes of work of mercy that every Christian was expected to perform: to feed the hungry, give drink to the thirsty, clothe the naked, ransom the captive, shelter the homeless, visit the sick, and bury the dead.⁴ Neither Christian philosophy nor theological doctrine, however, were quite specific as to the form and circumstances in which all these works of mercy should be done. But although the method was undetermined, the content was clear. Merciful deeds encompassed all kinds of assistance that are traditionally subsumed under the notion of charity.

Judaic principles were relatively more scrupulous about the form of meritorious charity, though at the same time somewhat more vague about its scope. Maimonides identified eight grades of charitable giving, which, according to some authors, have "characterized the administration of Jewish charity of all lands and times."⁵ These grades ranked as follows: (1) charity that aids the poor in supporting themselves by advancing money or by helping them to some lucrative position; (2) charity administered under conditions in which the beneficiary is known to the benefactors and vice versa; (3) charity administered in secret; if almsgiving, by leaving the money at the houses of the poor who remain ignorant of the benefactor; (4) charity given without knowing the recipient, and the giver remains unknown to the recipient; (5) charity given before being asked; (6) charity given after being asked; (7) charity given inadequately but with good grace; and (8) charity given with bad grace.⁶ Obviously, the lower numbered grades were considered more meritorious than the higher numbered ones. It may be noted that the other major religions of the world placed equal emphasis on charitable acts. A more compact gradation of works of mercy was also known to Buddhism, which similarly praised efficiency and grace in almsgiving. And, as will be explained later, regulated charity constituted one of the main pillars of Islam.⁷

In respect to other features of the medieval philanthropy, it should be stressed that whatever assistance was given, it never extended beyond the rudimentary aid to the poor and sick who might otherwise die of starvation, fever, exhaustion, or cold weather. The needy had no rights or means to demand the kind of help their condition required. Almost certainly, they must have faced denial, grudge, and derision. It may be said of the beseeching that they seldom enjoyed sufficient resources to accord them secure life and, more often than not, lived just slightly above the standard of basic subsistence.

Nevertheless, we shall be justified in saying that, up to the times of the Reformation, communal charity was an institution which somehow coped with the misery and impotence of the poor and the unfit. The Reformation, the mercantilist values which prevailed in the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries, the American and the French Revolutions, and the liberal tradition which followed all had great influence on the place of the poor and the disabled in society. In this respect, the Reformation brought about a number of unfortunate changes. Brotherhoods and charitable endowments sponsored or administered by the church or monasteries were repressed and confiscated. This repression was not only inflicted in Protestant countries, as might be expected, but also in Catholic ones.⁸ One of the results of this disruption of care was a rapidly growing mendacity and vagrancy.⁹ Repressive legislation soon followed suit, and Poor-law decrees were instituted in England, France, and other continental countries. Singular efforts to address the problem of growing numbers of homeless and poor marked the passage from medieval philanthropy. The *Aumone Generale*, introduced in Lyons in 1533 to care for 19,000 poor, gave way fifty years later to the opening of a first general hospital for the poor--*Notre Dame de la Charite*.¹⁰ Similar endeavors were also undertaken by the despot of Milan, Francesco Sforza, who founded a large medical establishment for the poor (*Ospedale Maggiore*) by incorporating several smaller institutions which had existed before.¹¹

These large scale efforts exemplify the growing involvement of the state or central governments in the problems which had formerly fallen within the exclusive responsibilities of religious establishments and local communities.

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However, the state took over these responsibilities only when it became evident that the existing forms of social philanthropy were insufficient and that parishes and local communes could no longer support all the beggars and homeless who chose to reside in their areas. The period of frustration and possible confusion caused by overlap and competition did not last long; the general population was soon legally forbidden to give charity indiscriminately. In 1536, an act in England stipulated that "no person shall make any command or shall give any ready money in alms otherwise than to the common gatherings."¹² Such statutes were intended to counter the indiscriminate tendencies of medieval charities, where "major motivation was the salvation of the giver rather than the behavior of the recipient."¹³ In contrast, the initial concern of European governments with the problems of the poor was for the maintenance of law and order rather than the alleviation of want; and therefore, "the legislation relating to the poor began with measures to punish beggars and kept its repressive character until recent times."¹⁴

Following medieval times, Europe was to become dominated by mercantilist values and attitudes toward poverty. Though including varied and often inconsistent principles, mercantilists generally viewed the poor with disdain. "Not only were the lower classes thought to be crude, ignorant, and inclined to vice and riotous behavior, they were, above all, guilty of the inclination to idleness, the mother of all vices."¹⁵ They were to be protected against these inclinations through low wages, keeping the poor industrious while relieving the rich from expenditures. The presence of poverty was no longer viewed as a social problem. On the contrary, what Furness referred to as the "doctrine of the utility of poverty" considered the poor as a national asset as long as they were kept productive.¹⁶ The obsession of the mercantilist policies with increasing the population of the working poor and combating idleness led Spengler to observe that their doctrine was "that the common man lives only to work and breed for the state."¹⁷ Unemployment and the right to work and relief were among the major issues of the time. Punishment for idleness and other undesirable traits of the poor, and character reform primarily through work, were the privilege and responsibility of the ruling classes. The stress on connecting work with relief became a fundamental feature in the

Elizabethan Act of 1601, which provided the foundation for "poor laws" in England well into the nineteenth century. Criticisms of the influence of poor laws on incentives to work led to changes culminating in a 1723 law authorizing the refusal of outdoor relief and sending applicants to the workhouse. Acting as relief deterrents, "most of the workhouses and almshouses, even when they were started by a burst of philanthropic fervor, usually ended up as "Houses of horror."¹⁸

Important voices (including that of John Locke) called for differentiating between the able bodied and the disabled among the unemployed. Punishment rather than public work and relief was to await only the first group, while the disabled were to be provided with public employment under sheltered conditions. Parallel developments in France also led to the movement toward clearing the streets of paupers and beggars, and to "lock up the poor."¹⁹ The Hopitaux Generaux were established in major cities such as Lyons and Paris, and depots de mendicite were created as penal institutions for the unemployed. While "the aged and the sick and women and children were to be locked up in the hopitaux," the depots "collected all kinds of people, men and women, old and young, the honest worker without a job as well as the criminal vagrant, the healthy and the sick, the innocent as well as the debauched, in other words, the content of the English workhouse."²⁰ Signs of this "great confinement," as Foucault called it, were found across Europe during the eighteenth century:

...purely negative measures of exclusion were replaced by a measure of confinement; the unemployed person was no longer driven away or punished; he was taken in charge at the expense of the nation but at the cost of his individual liberty. Between him and society, an implicit system of obligation was established: he had the right to be fed, but he must accept the physical and moral constraint of confinement.²¹

Around the mid-eighteenth century this oppressive paternalism began to give way to enlightened and reasoned views about the relations between individuals and society:

Humanitarianism, which had hitherto presented no appeal to the Church, suddenly awoke once more in the voices of

Voltaire, Rousseau, Blacke and Goldsmith. There was also Locke, who held that general well-being was the ruling moral law, and Adam Smith, who was the apostle of sympathy as the voice of conscience. From these so widely divergent aspects the idea of humanity shook the citadels of European conservatism. The voice of the right to live surged up against the Church and State. It uttered a final and terrible verdict upon the past in the French Revolution, and lifted up its voice for the future in the songs of Burns and the gospel of Paine."²²

However, the growing pauperization of some sectors of the population was aggravated in France by the French Revolution as in England by the institution of workhouses and the new Poor Law. The French Revolution dealt the same blows as the Reformation by totally abolishing tithes and feudal dues. Consequently, hospitals were deprived of a third of their revenues and totally lacked medications which had been previously supplied by the King. All private charity was branded as improper and inefficient, and the name itself was considered opprobrious. A Committee of Mendacity was appointed and made six reports offering numerous suggestions, most importantly a proposal to confiscate all private charitable institutions and replace them with a new national agency bearing a more appropriate name. Unfortunately, the French Assembly could not collect taxes, so its only lasting contribution was the suppression of the former forms of charity.²³

In England, the Reform Parliament instituted in 1833 the new Poor Law which discontinued the previous practice of supplementing inadequate wages and assisting families with numerous children. As time went on, the proportion of paupers grew. The introduction of machines into the cotton and other textile industries left a great number of hard laborers in these industries unemployed. To assuage the problem, farmers were allowed to hire idle men at the low rate of a shilling a day, with additional pay being supplied by the overseers of the hired. The landowners jumped at the opportunity by turning away their own laborers, forcing them into idleness, and rehiring them later at cheaper rates. Under these circumstances, some laborers could only be better off giving up attempts to maintain the status of being self-supporting laborer. The workhouses soon became shelters for destitute women and children, while men "found jails more comfortable and did little to escape

imprisonment for a week or two for vagrancy or petty thievery."²⁴

Three trends mark the change in socio-economic and political values and the place of the poor in Western societies, beginning in the latter part of the eighteenth century: (1) the industrial revolution, (2) economic liberalism, and (3) social Darwinism.

The Industrial Revolution is a phrase usually applied to the period between 1750 and 1825, "during which the accelerated application of mechanical principles, including steam power, to manufacturing in Great Britain produced an identifiable change in economic structure and growth."²⁵ Industrialization in other countries, primarily in Europe and the United States, followed a similar pattern after the turn of the nineteenth century. The poor working conditions in mines and factories and the poor housing and other living conditions associated with low wages contributed to the spread of occupational diseases, disablement, and other forms of ill-health. Industrialization posed a challenge to the poor laws in that their effects were perceived, by important leaders of economic thought including Adam Smith, to limit the mobility and "free circulation of labor."²⁶ However, "the most severe conflict between the imperatives of industrialization and these laws was the rapidly growing burden of relief in the late eighteenth and the early nineteenth centuries...related to rapid increase in population, for which contemporaries held the poor laws, at least, partly responsible."²⁷ Strong voices, among whom Malthus' was perhaps most forceful, attacked the poor relief as destructive to the recipient's initiative, and undermining to their sense of liberty and spirit of independence. Malthus also linked these laws and the population increase they effected to the lowered standards of living.

The second trend marking change in the place of the poor and the disabled in the Western societies of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was that of the rise of "liberalism." Fostered by the Renaissance and the Reformation, with their contributions to individualism, liberalism gained influence through the writings of the civil liberations and the humanists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries such as Locke, Voltaire, Rousseau, Adam Smith,

and others. Concerned initially with religious liberties and tolerance, constitutionalism, and political rights, "liberalism, both as a doctrine and as a political program, developed most fully in England between the Glorious Revolution (1688) and the Reform Act of 1867."²⁸ Among the political objectives were the rule of law, the separation of powers, the right to opposition, and the freedom of the press. All of these principles were incorporated into the Declaration of Independence of the United States, where constitutional liberalism found a fertile ground. Led by Adam Smith, economic liberalism was built upon the doctrine of "laissez-faire," which called for free contract and "a self-regulating market understrained either by monopoly or political intervention."²⁹ It should be noted that the strength of traditional authority and that of the state impeded the development of liberalism in Europe, where it never gathered the momentum of the coherent and powerful movement it became in England and the U.S.

As punitive paternalism yielded grounds to the liberal ideals, the poor gained in civil liberties and in equality before the law. "Liberalism related industriousness to freedom and independence instead of to obedience and fear of starvation."³⁰ The doctrines and programs of the liberals had two other major influences upon the place of the poor in society. First was the opposition to government intervention in market operations, which were viewed as governed by natural laws. This position led to curtailing the role of government in dealing with social and economic programs. With the exception of limited philanthropic activities, the market and the family became the two primary institutions within which the needs of people were to be met. Neither proved to be wholly adequate for the task.³¹ On the other hand, espousing individualism led liberals to place great emphasis on political rights and suffrage. This gave the poor a voting power that eventually became a source of influence on the role and policies of government in regard to social problems.

Evolutionary thought, rising during the second half of the nineteenth century and continuing well into the twentieth, also had significant impacts upon the place of the poor in society. Championed by Herbert Spencer and his American disciples, especially William Graham Sumner, Social Darwinism, as it

is often called, exerted greater influence upon values and attitudes in the United States than in England or on the continent. Central to Social Darwinism is the idea that the process of natural selection eliminates the unfit and thus improves the human race. "Spencer looked on progress as the result of a constant struggle by which organisms 'purify' themselves; the weak, the sickly, the malformed are weeded out and kept from reproducing their own kinds."³² Highly compatible with the laissez-faire doctrine was the generally held social evolutionist principle of nonintervention of government either in the market or in the process of natural selection. Any such interference was viewed as only upsetting the laws of nature and retarding progress.

The principle of a "free market" proved to be more ideal than real, and "for a long time reality has been moving steadily further away from this liberal idealization."³³ Myrdal described this process and its consequences as follows:

Among the main internal causes of the development towards an increased volume of state intervention in the Western countries, I have mentioned the gradual breakdown of the competitive markets, resulting from the technological and organizational developments and the sophistication of people's attitudes in regard to the economic processes in which they were participating as buyers and sellers of services and goods. The price in the market, and the market itself as an institutional frame for the interplay of demand and supply, were no longer placidly accepted as given objective norms, but were manipulated.

Society, faced with this illiberal trend, would become disorganized, if it stayed liberal and declined to intervene. And if left unchecked, the clever and strong would exploit the others. The existence of monopolistic combines as such was always recognized as implying the usurpation of the state's power of taxation, which could not be permitted.³⁴

The limited success of measures to restore free competition to the market resigned the state to accepting the trend and promulgating policies and programs to regulate it. "And thus a powerful but state-controlled infra-structure of collective organization has come into being, beneath the constitutional frame of the state."³⁵

In the Western countries, this development represents, on the one hand, an extension, and probably the most important one, of state interference in economic life. On the other hand, it has left an even bigger scope for interference by the organizations. The interest of equity in particular, as determined by the increasingly democratic political process, has led the state to take measures to strengthen the bargaining power of the weaker groups, sometimes by aiding them to become organized when necessary, but more generally by improving the conditions under which they are bargaining.³⁶

Greatly aided by Keynesian theories and prescriptions imploring systematic intervention by government to regulate the economy, and the articulation of structural explanations of social problems, making them a legitimate domain for public policies and programs, this departure from classical liberalism paved the way toward the rise of collective bargaining and the dawning of the welfare state. Myrdal predicts that in the West, and particularly in Scandinavia, collective bargaining will become the rule "of general income settlements among the main organized interest groups," and "all prices and wages and, in fact, all demand and supply curves, are then in a sense political."³⁷

At the end of the nineteenth and in the early twentieth century the fate of the impoverished part of the population had become a matter of grave social importance. Economic and industrial growth had basically altered the relationship between the needy and the rest of the population. An average member of the society could no longer be said to have lived much over the level of mere subsistence. But economic rewards tended to grow disproportionately to the contributions which different individuals made to create them. This imbalance of inputs and outputs was attributed by early socialists to the laws of property and a system of production based on capital. Some of the socialists believed that the undesirable effects of the unfair system of production and remuneration could be compensated for by the redistribution of income. Others felt that restricted redistributive measures would be far from effective, and that the whole socio-economic order should be changed and replaced with a more equitable one.

The radical socialist solution was first adopted in Soviet Russia, and

after World War II by some other countries in Europe and elsewhere. The moderate proposal was first adopted by Bismark, who, in an attempt to pacify his socialist opponents, introduced a compulsive social insurance legislation. On the same occasion, and for the same reasons, a progressive income tax was inaugurated ranging initially from 0.67 to 4.00 percent. Many continental countries soon followed Prussia; only Great Britain and the United States seemed for a long time impervious to the pressure of socialist ideas. Eventually, however, in the second decade of this century, both Great Britain and the United States adopted a graduated income tax system which rose to the then spectacular levels of 8.25 and 7.00 percent for the two countries respectively. Thirty years alter, these figures soared to 97.5 and 91.0 percent in that order.³⁸ Leading these changes in the West during this century was a new liberalism based on a conception of liberty as "the opportunity to form and accomplish self-appointed goals, rather than freedom from the State."³⁹ The shift from classical liberal philosophy created more favorable conditions for an increased role for government in the solution of social problems including those connected with poverty. The following excerpts further explain these point:

An important cause of this revision was the success of liberalism itself: the securing of a considerable measure of political and economic liberty and the conversion of liberalism from a sectarian demand for non-interference into a program of political and economic organization. Success raised not only the question, What next? but also, Liberty for whom? Aristocrats and the bourgeoisie now had substantially the bundle of rights they needed. The franchise gave them the means of self-defense. But the same concessions - even when granted - were not enough for the peasant or the worker...

One question that arises is whether modern, or 'revised' liberalism can still appropriately be called liberalism. Liberty and equality, rights and powers are not the same things. Modern liberalism advocates collectivist means, invoking the state in aid of individuals and disadvantaged groups.⁴⁰

Whether through collective bargaining and demands placed by interest groups upon political decision makers, as in the case of Western democracies, or through centralized planning, as in Communist societies, the Twentieth century has witnessed major policy and program developments concerning social and economic security.

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An important cause of this revision was the success of liberalism itself: the securing of a considerable measure of political and economic liberty and the conversion of liberalism from a sectarian demand for non-interference into a program of political and economic organization. Success raised not only the question, What next? but also, Liberty for whom? Aristocrats and the bourgeoisie now had substantially the bundle of rights they needed. The franchise gave them the means of self-defense. But the same concessions - even when granted - were not enough for the peasant or the worker...

One question that arises is whether modern, or 'revised' liberalism can still appropriately be called liberalism. Liberty and equality, rights and powers are not the same things. Modern liberalism advocates collectivist means, invoking the state in aid of individuals and disadvantaged groups.⁴⁰

Whether through collective bargaining and demands placed by interest groups upon political decision makers, as in the case of Western democracies, or through centralized planning, as in Communist societies, the Twentieth century has witnessed major policy and program developments concerning social and economic security.

My intent is neither to present an exhaustive account of current programs nor the specifics of particular programs, for they vary from one society to the other. Rather, the following represents important examples of reasons for social and economic insecurity and the types of current programs addressed to them:

- Redistributive graduated tax systems designed to offset some of the income differentials and to lessen the burden of those with low income;
- Income maintenance for dependent children usually in the form of family allowances;
- Income maintenance during times of unemployment, sickness, disability, retirement, and the death of breadwinners;
- Workers' compensation for persons who sustain injuries of occupational diseases in connection with work which limit their capacities to earn;
- Economic assistance in payments for the costs of health care, or the provision of free or low cost care through national health services systems;
- Rehabilitation services, including restorative care, and assistance in returning the disabled to gainful activities;
- Employment and training services;
- Social services to provide counselling over individual and family problems and referral to specialized agencies.

Each of these categories include complex policies and programs;⁴¹ many countries have instituted other programs addressed to specific populations, such as benefits for veterans of war and the military, sheltered workshops for the severely disabled, homemaker services for the homebound, and the like. While countries vary in the levels of development of these programs, most are represented to some degree in Western societies. Finally, it should be noted that each of these types of programs has an evolutionary history within each of the nations, as well as a history of diffusion across nations.

POVERTY AND SOCIETY IN EGYPT

Concern for social and economic security in Egypt dates back to the times of the Pharaohs. Inscriptions on tombs show that a king took pride in attending to the needs of the population:

"He was the healer of the sick."

"He was the eye of the blind man, and the foot of the lame."

"He gave grain to the widow - and her son - was the husband of the widow - the refuge of the orphan...the support of old men."

"I am the unshakable support for him who is in needs."⁴²

Accounts of the Ancient Egyptians point out a fairly well developed system of charity where endowed property and funds were exempt from taxation. The fundamental principles of modern social security schemes were applied in protecting workers and several free services were established, such as "education, shelter for the homeless, hospitals for the sick, and cemeteries for the poor."⁴³ In pre-Islamic times, Christianity prevailed and so did its emphasis on the care for the poor and needy through charitable contributions. As one of the pillars of Islam, charity became highly structured and institutionalized into specific government operations. For example, the "Zakat," which is equivalent to alms or tithing, took on the form of taxation until the Ottoman conquest in the early Sixteenth Century.⁴⁴ The "Wakf" represents trusts in perpetuity for given purposes, often of a philanthropic nature. This institution is said to have existed in Egypt for over 1200 years, and is now managed by a special ministry in the national government. In addition, Moslems are urged to exercise informal personal generosity whether in money or in kind. Currently, the Zakat also is left to individual charitable acts.

Considering the period between the Seventeenth and the Nineteenth centuries, when changing values and economic conditions in Europe evolved formal mechanisms for dealing with poverty and need, coping with these problems in Egypt remained largely informal. Dependency and need were first a responsibility of the family. Those unable to cope were aided through the generosity of members of the community with better means. Islamic emphases tended to strengthen family, neighborhood, and community obligations. Assistance was

often given directly in the forms of cash, food, crops, clothes, and/or shelter. Indirect assistance constituted another channel for voluntary acts of charity, through such means as the "Wakf," where revenues of given estates were devoted totally or in part to aiding the needy, or the "tiquiahs", which were endowed with support to offer food and shelter. It is important to note also that much of the care for the poor and the needy during this period in Egypt depended on the goodwill and benevolence of employers toward their employees or workers.

The beginnings of modern systems of social insurance in Egypt may be traced back to 1854, when laws providing civil pensions to civil servants came into being.⁴⁵ Organized voluntary relief and charity grew during the latter party of the Nineteenth century with the establishment of the Moslem Benevolent Society in 1878 and the Grand Coptic Benevolent Society in 1880.⁴⁶ Citizens' movement toward the organization of charitable societies was given further impetus by the declaration of independence in 1922 and reportedly was "met with widespread acceptance in the communities."⁴⁷ During the fifty years that followed, Egypt was to share with the rest of the world a number of major events and to have some of its own which had much significance to the development of social and economic security and welfare programs. Important among these events are the Great Depression of the 1930's; World War II; the establishment of the United Nations and a number of other international organizations such as the ILO, UNESCO, UNICEF, and WHO; the adoption by the U.N. General Assembly in 1948 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which included several articles dealing with social and economic security; the exposure of Egyptians to the West through mass media and the education of increasing numbers in Western societies; the Middle East wars; and the 1952 revolution, which changed the political and economic order. These events generated awareness and debate concerning trends in national development, distributive justice, and social and economic security. They also engendered challenge to the paternalistic attitudes which prevailed for centuries in the care for the poor and needy.

The most significant expansion in public social and economic security programs, after the 1854 introduction of pensions for civil servants, came

in the form of workers' compensation statutes which were enacted in 1936. The influence of the ILO in this respect is evident in that Egypt had joined that organization in the same year.⁴⁸ In 1939, government entered into the regulation of relief activities, attempting to apply certain principles of public assistance, although such assistance was only "temporary and limited to emergency cases."⁴⁹ With most of the population residing in rural areas, and with advances in the conditions of industrial workers through the influence of the ILO, attention was refocused on the problems of poverty and community development in rural areas. Experimentation led to the institution of a public system of rural social centers designed to improve the social and health conditions in villages. In 1950, a social security scheme (actually public assistance rather than contributory social insurance) was adopted, to become effective in early 1951. Benefits were based on a means test, and were provided to widows with dependent children, orphans, disabled persons including the blind, and the aged. This scheme was totally financed through general revenues; it was reported to have suffered from inadequacy of funds and lack of trained personnel.⁵⁰ There were parallel developments aimed at the improvement of rural health. A 1942 law provided for protection against infectious diseases, sanitary facilities, purified drinking water, and health care units for every 30,000 people. Here again, shortage in funds and trained capability imposed severe limitations on the application of these provisions.

Under a changed form of government introduced in 1952, social and economic security programs experienced considerable expansion and frequent alteration. The following brief history of social insurance, presented in a government publication, illustrates the point:

As for workers in the non-government sector, they were subjected to social insurance system in the form of compulsory savings and lump sum compensation in cases of invalidity and death under law no. 419, 1955, which came into force as from 1st April 1956. In 1958 a compulsory insurance system and labour injuries and occupational diseases compensation were applied to these workers under law no. 202, 1958.

As from 1st August 1959, the social insurance system no. 92, 1959, replaced laws no. 419 and 202, 1958. The death and disability lump sum compensation was turned into pen-

sion, then the compulsory savings system became old age pensions system from 1st January 1962.

On March 3, 1964, social insurance law no. 63, 1964, was issued comprising health insurance (gradual) and unemployment insurance as from 1st October 1964.

On August 21, 1975, law no. 79, 1975, replaced civil pensions legislation for government workers and social insurance for public and private sectors workers as from 1st September 1975.

The law no. 79, 1975, was substantially amended by law no. 25, 1977, and some of its provisions were amended by laws 30, 32 and 44, 1978.⁵¹

Social reform was one of the important objectives of the new political order which was pursued along a variety of fronts. A pervasive land reform set upper limits to ownership and distributed property to landless tenants. New laws and regulations were issued to govern the relations between tenants and owners in regard to both agricultural lands and housing. Labor laws were also adopted to govern the relations between workers and employers. As pointed out above, income maintenance programs have undergone and continue to experience rapid change. The current laws include a social security program, equivalent to what is referred to in Western societies as public assistance, which provides support to the needy, disabled, aged, or families with dependent children. In addition, there are five types of insurance systems.⁵² The first covers civil servants, workers in the public sector, and workers in regular employment in the private sector. This system provides: (1) old age, disability, and death insurance benefits; (2) benefits for labor injuries and occupational diseases; (3) health insurance (sickness and maternity); (4) unemployment insurance; and (5) pensioners' social welfare. The second is an insurance system for manpower categories in casual employment such as temporary workers in agriculture, in fishing, small landowners (less than 10 feddans), proprietors of small businesses (less than LE 250 per year in revenues), self-employed seasonal workers, domestic servants, and the like. The benefits include old age, disability, and death benefits. The third insurance system covers employers and the regularly self-employed and those in high earning occupations. The benefits include old age and disability pensions as well as

lump sum compensation under certain conditions. The fourth system, addressed to Egyptians working abroad, requires contributions in hard currency (U.S. dollars) and provides benefits similar to those included in the system for employers and self-employed. Fifth, and finally, there is a workers' savings system applicable to persons in regular employment with earnings above certain levels. The method for calculating returns from this system is tied to those used in calculating pensions, with the provision that it should assure the return of contributions plus investment revenues.

Briefly, these are the current policies and statutory provisions concerning social and economic security in Egypt, and their historical background. Why did policies and programs evolve in these directions? How does this evolution relate to national development? How large of a gap is there between policies and laws on the one hand and their application on the other? What constraints limit application? What negative side effects do these programs have? All of these are important questions amenable to research. In the remainder of this paper, we will explore the dimensions of these and related questions, and identify researchable problems we consider important.

AREAS OF NEEDED RESEARCH

Such a pervasive aspect of society as social and economic security is bound to raise a multitude of questions and to offer innumerable research topics. Some may fall within the domains of given disciplines while others would require multidisciplinary, if not interdisciplinary, approaches. These topics and issues can also be stated at various levels of abstraction. Thus, whatever selections are presented here, they must be considered as somewhat arbitrary in that they represent a given disciplinary orientation and a subjective assessment of priority. With this qualification, I believe four general areas of research deserve serious attention: (1) explanation of social and economic security policies and programs; (2) relations of these policies and programs to national development; (3) the layout of services and benefits; and (4) the performance of programs addressed to these problems. As will become evident, each of these areas includes a number of important topics.

EXPLANATION OF POLICIES AND PROGRAMS .

Robertson identifies three lines of explanation for the growth in welfare services and benefits.⁵³ The first is a structural functional interpretation based on the decline of the family and the changes in market conditions brought about on technological and industrial developments. Falling within this perspective is the "convergence theory" of Clark Kerr and his associates. "With regard to the emergence and subsequent development of social policy and social welfare systems, convergence theory essentially states that technical change gives rise to change in the social structure; these in turn create the kinds of problems which tend to be experienced by all industrialized societies, leading to the provision of welfare services to deal with such problems. Within this framework, it is argued that, because of the complexity of its economy and technology, the state must perforce become the primary regulatory agency in any advanced industrial society having to take on, among other things, the responsibility for the economic and social security of its citizens."⁵⁴

The second explanation stems primarily from a Marxist emphasis on "the role of class conflict in fostering the development and expansion of social policy. From this standpoint, social policy may be seen as a means employed by the dominant class to control the proletariat in order to protect its own interests."⁵⁵ Thus, to those who espouse this explanation, social services and benefits are viewed as designed to mute and stave off civil disorders or to reinforce work norms among the needy. "The (perceived) threat of popular revolt is, therefore, seen as the most important factor in producing expansions in the welfare services."⁵⁶

The third type of explanation falls within "social behaviorism." By contrast with the emphasis placed by both Marxism and structural functionalism on large-scale processes, and their resulting tendency to reify concepts like 'industrial society' and 'social class,' social behaviorism focuses on individuals as its primary units of analysis.⁵⁷ Predictability of social life is attributed to shared beliefs, values, and expectations; a change in these would lead to alterations in the social structure. According to this

line of reasoning, expansion in social welfare results from change in the perception of social problems and the role of government on the part of policy makers and/or the public. Such change can also be reflected in voters' preferences determined by their beliefs, values and expectations.

Undoubtedly all of these three forces have contributed to developments in Western societies; therefore, they should be viewed as complementary rather than competing explanations. It would seem also that these explanations might be more plausible for the evolution of social and economic security policies and programs in the West than in developing societies including Egypt. Another, and possibly more appropriate, interpretation for the introduction and expansion of related measures in the latter countries is the process of diffusion and the emulation of advanced societies. Important in this process are persons educated in social services abroad, planning specialists from other countries, and the influence of international organizations, especially the ILO, UNESCO, UNICEF, and WHO. The questions of origins, impetus for expansion, and the direction of expansion are highly significant in regard to the appropriateness of policies and programs to societal needs and economic capabilities. For example, we see many Western societies, including the U.S., attempting to search for alternatives to highly public and formal systems--alternatives that would strengthen the traditional informal mechanism of the family, the community and of volunteerism. Have the developing societies rushed too quickly into emulation of Western systems without studying its negative side effects? Can the experiences of the West, when studied carefully, save the developing societies these negative effects? In other words, did or can developing societies learn from the trials and errors of the Western societies? Are there conscious attempts to do so? These questions can be pursued through an examination of records of searches for models and justifications, as well as through interviews with the framers of policies and initiators of programs.

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC SECURITY AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

This relationship lies at the heart of concern in this paper. In spite of years of experience with varying systems of social and economic security,

attempts to assess the role of social and economic security programs in national development are fairly primitive. The literature concentrates on calls to link planning for these programs with that for national development but fails to explain how this can be accomplished.⁵⁸ "Cost-benefit analysis" and similar analytic techniques are not appropriate for this task. Some important analysts call for assessing social and economic security programs basically in social rather than in economic terms; as Rys states it:

...the question to be asked at the outset is not 'How much of social security can we afford?' but rather 'What social security objectives must be reached within the period of the plan?' No sacrosanct laws of economic development are likely to be broken in this process, since no one has so far been able to prove 12, 15, or 20 percent of the gross national product spent on social security represents the absolute limit to which a country can go without running the risk of economic disaster; these economic limits are mainly based on convention and the underlying assumptions have never been tested in practice.

Opponents of this position would be quick to point out that the inability to demonstrate the economic risks inherent in overextending expenditures for social security are more indicative of limitations in data and analytical methods than the absence of the risk itself. Rys qualifies the position stated above by saying that this "does not mean that economic constraints should not play a prominent role in arriving at decisions in this matter, it only means that they should not be given an overall priority in all planning considerations." And on that there will be little disagreement. The problem, however, lies in the availability of appropriate data for informative social and economic evaluations. These would require micro type data about the impacts of the programs on the quality of people's lives, especially the recipients of benefits and services. Such assessments would also necessitate macro level data on finance, savings and investments, productivity, patterns of consumption, labor market behavior, and stability in economic conditions and growth.

THE LAYOUT OF BENEFITS AND SERVICES

Policies, statutes, and programs addressed to human services in most

societies have evolved in an incremental manner in response to varied stimuli and pressures, which results in many organizational problems. Commenting on this phenomenon, Arroba states that:

There is therefore no cause for surprise in finding that the present state of development in most of the countries of the Third World consists of a mosaic of provisions, benefits and grants which are frequently quite unrelated to the true needs of the social and economic requirements of the populations concerned.⁶⁰

Studies of the organization of services and benefits should be concerned with identifying and explaining gaps and overlaps. Gaps may exist between statutes and programs in the sense of failure to implement existing laws. There are also gaps in the populations covered by the various programs. Such populations and their needs should be identified. On the other hand, programs might overlap where certain sub-populations derive benefits from two or more sources. Some offset provisions might be appropriate.

The fragmentation and proliferation of programs are also compounded by increased specialization in knowledge and technology. This situation is particularly acute in developed societies, and creates special difficulties for persons with multiple problems such as the disabled, the frail elderly, and abused and neglected children. The fragmentation of specialized programs requires mechanisms of coordination for people with multiple problems whose needs fall within the domains of several programs. Since developing societies, including Egypt, are moving toward the development of specialized programs, it would be advisable to examine models for the organization and delivery of benefits and services.

Two patterns of organization suggest themselves.⁶¹ The first is through "functional" specialization in the types of services and benefits rendered regardless of differences among eligible populations. Thus, services and benefits would be organized along such categories as income maintenance, health care, education, training and employment, rehabilitation, child protection, nutritional services, housing, counselling, and institutional care. The sec-

ond approach is through "categorical" specialization in the types of populations to be served, regardless of the nature of services and benefits they might need. In this sense, there would be programs for the poor, the disabled, the veterans, the children, and so on. It is crucial to recognize that both patterns need to be considered in the structure and delivery of services and benefits. The population categories mentioned above share among themselves and with other sectors of the population many of the functional services and benefits. To organize programs on a strictly categorical basis would result in massive and costly duplications. A sensible model would call for both functional and categorical arrangements, as illustrated in Chart 1.

CHART 1
FUNCTIONAL AND CATEGORICAL PROGRAMS:
AN APPROACH TO THE ORGANIZATION OF SERVICES AND BENEFITS

Functional Programs	Categorical Programs		
	The Disabled	Multiproblem Aged	Vulnerable Children
Income Maintenance	-----	-----	-----
Health Care	-----	-----	-----
Mental Health Services	-----	-----	-----
Counselling Services	-----	-----	-----
Vocational Training	-----	-----	-----
Job Placement	-----	-----	-----
Nutritional Services	-----	-----	-----
Education	-----	-----	-----
Housing	-----	-----	-----
Institutional Care	-----	-----	-----

The purposes of the functional programs need no elaboration. Those of the categorical programs are to articulate relations among programs and to insure integration in the delivery of services and benefits to their clients. As pointed out, the need for such mechanisms is greatest among persons with

multiple problems. The role of these programs would include; (1) case identification; (2) case management across as many functional programs as needed in order to provide for coordination and continuity in services and benefits; (3) counselling; (4) support and representation when needed; and (5) development of community resources for services and benefits needed by their respective clientele. To perform this role, these categorical programs must be operational at the local level. Furthermore, they must be equipped with the necessary legal mandates and resources that would render the practice of other public agencies consistent with these definitions of responsibilities. It should be noted that what is specified above describes what I would consider as the optimal role of the profession of social work.

The important point here is not to advance these particular approaches to organizing services and benefits, but to emphasize the need for research on the problems involved and for demonstrations to test different patterns. Whatever evolves should meet the criteria of efficiency, effectiveness, and compatibility with the prevailing cultural conditions and social structures.

PERFORMANCE OF PROGRAMS

The effectiveness of policies and programs depends in large measure on the interaction of consumers of services and benefits with agencies and the professionals who provide them, and the results of these interactions. In this respect, it should be noted that the original reasons for the initiation of organizations and professions are not necessarily the same reasons that nurture their continuation. In the pursuit of organizational and professional interests, clients' needs are often relegated to secondary importance. Furthermore, it is often the case that eligibility criteria lack validity and that "gate-keeping" decisions entail subjective influences, which perpetuates inequities in the distribution of benefits and services.⁶² On the other hand, problems in the provision of services are not all induced by organizational factors. The changing expectations of clients and their lack of information about the functions of different organizations further compound the problems.

Assessments of the performance of human services programs should be con-

ducted with the objectives of: (1) optimizing the effectiveness of available services within each program; (2) identifying new directions for program development according to emergent and changing needs; and (3) optimizing coordination among programs for greater combined results in services to multiple-problem individuals and families. To pursue these objectives systematically, it is fundamental to develop a broad and complex base of up-to-date knowledge about a number of dimensions:

1. The epidemiological patterns of problems in the population such as poverty, health conditions, disabilities, unemployment, etc. This would include both the distributions of these problems as well as their explanations.

2. The patterns of needs, demands, and utilization of services, and the results of services. This aspect of research would address such questions as: How do people perceive their needs for services? What are the important factors associated with differing perceptions? Among those who report similar types of needs, why do some seek services and others not? How do clients and former clients evaluate the results of services? For those who do not seek, or were refused, services, what other avenues do they follow in attempting to cope with their problems, if any, and with what results?

3. The development of criteria, indicators, and measures of severity of social problems and needs for assistance and services. The significant concerns here are those of reliability, validity, and administrative feasibility.

4. The identification of target populations for the various programs (data on this topic may require professional as well as self assessments).

5. The experiences of applicants, clients, and former clients, with human services organizations. These data would include: the reasons for which a given agency is selected, decisions about the appropriateness of given agencies for the services needed, the initial contacts, previous experiences with the same organizations for similar or different services, the types of services expected, and the ways applications and applicants are handled by personnel in or related to the agencies. For persons accepted for services and benefits, information would need to be collected on the accepted services actually received, and the difficulties, if any, in maintaining service relations with the agencies. For persons denied benefits and services, there should be

data on the ways denials were explained, whether or not there were referrals to other agencies, and any follow-up on the part of applicants or agencies.

6. The experiences of service agencies with applicants and clients.

Three types of data are necessary for exploring this objective: (a) information collected through interviews with personnel of service organizations; (b) analysis of official reports about demands for, and utilization of services; and (c) analysis of policies and operational procedures that govern the decision making processes in these agencies. Among the important questions are: How appropriate are the applicants' perceptions of the functions of the respective service agencies? How informed are the applicants about the nature and types of services? What are the formal and informal criteria and practices in gate-keeping and other service decisions? What are the perceptions within agencies regarding the results of services? What mechanisms and criteria are used in assessing effectiveness, if any? What follow-up information does the organization obtain on former clients and denied applicants? And what effect, if any, does this information have on the agencies' operations?

7. The relationships among agencies. The important questions here relate to: (a) the patterns of cooperation, and competition, and exchange of resources, services, and/or referrals of clients; (b) the relation of these processes to the delivery of services and benefits; (c) the ways organizations define their boundaries; and (d) barriers to the coordination of services.

Optimal data files for assessment purposes should include four types of information: (1) from applicants, clients, and other segments of the population; (2) from interviews with administrators of agencies and their staffs; (3) official statistics and reports of agencies as well as their statutes and regulations; and (4) comparative information from other countries with more developed programs. The value of comparative information must be assessed in view of the comparability of cultural, social, and economic conditions, and the implications of differences in these conditions to programs in question.

THE ROLE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES IN
POLICY AND PROGRAM ANALYSIS

The many claims for, and charges against, current and potential roles of social sciences in public policies and programs have contributed to what has been described as an "uneasy partnership" between these disciplines and government agencies.⁶³ My position on this matter can be summarized in four points:

First: The norms of "validity" and "reliability" which govern scientific knowledge are not of much assistance in determining social value. Models of "cost-benefit analysis" or approaches to "program planning and budgeting" cannot assess the relative value of placing priorities upon services to children versus services to the aged, or the relative value of policies and programs concerned with education versus those concerned with health care. Other norms must be invoked in such assessments--justice, equity, fairness, and balance.

Second: Social sciences can be of great assistance in almost all other aspects of policies and programs: (a) conceptualizing, identifying, and measuring the prevalence and intensity of social problems; (b) assessing available technologies and trained capabilities in view of the requirements of policies and programs in question; (c) evaluating the effectiveness and efficiency of alternative modes of implementation and ways of organization; and (d) developing new approaches to technologies, manpower training, and patterns of organizing and delivering services and benefits.

Third: Codification of social science knowledge has considerable bearing upon its utilization. Typically, the disciplines are organized around hierarchical theories which provide a only segmental explanations for complex social problems. To illustrate, consider the problem of unemployment, which can be partly explained through economic theories of finance and market behavior, partly through psychological theories of learning and motivation, and still partly through sociological theories of differential opportunities and discrimination. The basic interest of these disciplines is the development of principles as embodied in hierarchical theories. Interest in unemployment,

in these cases, is incidental to the verification of deductions from these abstract principles.

Building this form of abstract knowledge is essential. However, for social science knowledge to be more applicable explanations need to be more complete and more concrete.⁶⁴ Especially suited for codifying knowledge in a way that would meet these criteria of applicability is a model for theory construction referred to by Abraham Kaplan as the "concatenated or pattern" type.⁶⁵ In this form of organizing data, a number of explanatory or independent factors converge upon the phenomenon around which the theory is organized. To pursue the same example, where unemployment is the dependent variable, the theory becomes one of unemployment; this social problem becomes the focus of a pattern that explains as much of the variance within the problem as possible. Although attempts to construct such theories are prevalent, in most cases they remain bounded within the narrow scopes of specific disciplines. They therefore fail to provide explanations for sufficiently numerous varieties of social problems and program performances and thus can not guide appropriate planning and management responses.

The fourth and final point to be made in regard to the role of social sciences is that policy and program analysis in the area of human services and benefits is a very fruitful area for collaboration among government agencies, academia, and research organizations. Social actions, social problems, professions, organizations, and decision making lie at the heart of social science knowledge. Studies of these can help test existing theories, expand them, and develop new ones. At the same time, the sound theoretical and empirical information resulting from these studies is bound to improve the foundations for policy formulation and program management.

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