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Motivating Genocide: Indirect Colonial Rule as a Motivator of Genocidal Ideology and Policy

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Motivating Genocide: Indirect Colonial Rule as a Motivator of

Genocidal Ideology and Policy

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A thesis submitted to the faculty of The University of Mississippi in partial fulfillment of the
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
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Abstract

Trevor Rockstad: Motivating Genocide: Indirect Colonial Rule as a Motivator of
Genocidal Ideology and Policy
(Under the direction of Dr. Megan Shannon)

In this study I have explored indirect colonial rule as a motivation of genocide. I use case studies of the 1994 Rwandan and 1975 Cambodian genocides to illustrate the way that indirect colonially rule divided societies, creating *colonially relegated* and *colonially elevated* sections of society. Genocide becomes a more likely possibility if the *colonially relegated* group gains power after decolonization. If this group does gain power, it will pursue a policy of retribution for oppression suffered during the colonially period, repression of the *colonially elevated* group, and minimization of the return to the colonially order in which they were the relegated group. Under the right conditions, these divisions can result in genocide.

Table of Contents

Chapter 1: Introduction

In 1994, members of the Rwandan Hutu ethnicity began a large scale killing of members of the rival Tutsi ethnicity. The systematic, state-sponsored murder of Tutsi men, women, and children was carried out by Hutu militia and citizens alike. As Hutu hunted for Tutsi with their blood covered machetes, the Tutsi body count rose higher and higher. A strong ethnic divide, which had widened to the point where Hutu refused to acknowledge the humanity and individuality of each Tutsi, led to the killings. In 1994, every Tutsi was deemed the enemy of the Hutu ruling class. According to the Hutu, the enemy class was no better than cockroaches and so deserved to die.

When the Rwandan killings ceased, the death toll had reached a disputed level somewhere between 500,000 and one million Rwandan Tutsi. What led to such an extreme case of ethnic conflict, in which people were murdered based solely on their ethnicity? Were the Hutu perpetrators simply deranged psychopaths with an innate desire to kill? This seems unlikely because a large portion of the Hutu population took part in the genocide. Surely an entire population was not born with a need to kill or with an inherent hate for the Tutsi ethnicity. The perpetrators of this terrible crime were human, and to view them as anything else is to misunderstand the motivations of genocide (Midlarsky 2005, 10). Rather than a common hate or a desire for destruction, these Hutu,

4

and many other genocidal perpetrators, were driven to kill by historically motivated ideology.

Genocide has occurred throughout history with very few instances of prevention. Why should we take the time to study genocide? The empirical and theoretical study of genocide is a relatively new field of inquiry. The term genocide was not coined until the early 1940s and was not prohibited by the international community until 1948. We should explore the motivations and circumstances underlying genocide, so that we can predict and prevent it in the future. If the international community is aware of what causes genocide, it will be more able to intervene or recommend social, economic, or political measures to prevent its onset. Once a genocidal episode has begun, intervention is difficult and diplomatic efforts are often futile.

For prevention to become a plausible option for the international community, an understanding of genocidal ideology and policy must be established. The possibility for genocide exists in a wide array of countries, largely unique in their politics and history, and yet many of these countries have certain common attributes. In this study I do not claim that any one aspect of a country's society, economy, history, or political system is the sole cause or motivation of a genocidal episode. An assertion of this nature would be absurd, as each country's genocide is the result of a distinct series of events. I argue that certain historical and social characteristics make countries more susceptible to genocide. These specific characteristics may not always cause genocide, but combined with other internal and external forces, they will create an environment more favorable to genocide.

I suspect that one characteristic that promotes genocide is a history of indirect colonial rule. In such a colonial administration, which characterized colonial Africa and much of colonial Asia, a section of society is elevated to an elite status in order to rule on behalf of the colonial authority. This elevation of one section of the population leads to a severe and imposed division within the society of the colonized country. For various reasons, this division creates an environment in which genocide is able to emerge. Though I assert that this history of indirect colonial rule is a possible motivation of genocide, it is not the only motivation. It is one aspect which provokes genocidal ideology and increases the likelihood that this ideology will emerge in policy.

In Chapter Two I establish a basic definition of genocide in order to clarify what differentiates it from other forms of mass murder. I provide an introduction to genocide, as a basic understanding of the crime is necessary to any further exploration into its motivations. In Chapter Two, I also explain the list of genocidal episodes which I use throughout this study in order to illustrate the relationship between indirect colonial rule and genocide. In Chapter Three I explain my hypothesis and my theory. As my theory involves indirect colonial rule, a contrast to direct colonial administration, I discuss the distinct features of each form of colonialism. I also discuss the reasons for indirect colonialism's link to genocide. In Chapters Four and Five I introduce the case studies that support my theory. Chapter Four explains the relationship between indirect colonialism and genocide in Rwanda and Chapter Five explains the relationship in Cambodia. Each of these chapters includes a brief history of the pre-colonial era and the colonial period, highlighting the changes implemented in Rwandan society by the

colonial authority. I also discuss the events of decolonization and the years which followed, culminating in each country's genocide. Each of these histories is written in the context of the link between indirect colonialism and genocide. Through this study, I hope to offer some insight into the motivations of genocide. I do not claim that my theory is the only explanation for genocide, but that it is one which can provide an understanding of many genocidal states. This theory will make us more capable of predicting some future occurrences of genocide.

Chapter 2: Introduction to Genocide

Prior to any study of the causes and sources of genocide, a definition of the act must be established. The term genocide was invented by Raphael Lemkin during World War II, a time when the crime was an increasingly apparent problem, but was still the topic of very little scholarship. Lemkin defined the newly-coined word as "a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves" (Lemkin 1944, 79). The word which he used to describe this act of group annihilation is a combination of the Greek word *genos* (race or tribe) and the Latin word *cide* (killing), giving the word its core definition (Lemkin 1944, 79). Though definitions of genocide often vary among genocidal scholars, many find origin in Lemkin's definition, along with the Genocide Convention or *Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide* of the United Nations. Approved by the United Nations' General Assembly in 1948, the Convention defines genocide in the following manner:

In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious groups, as such as
      (a) Killing members of the group;
      (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;

(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;

(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;

(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group (Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 1948, Article II).

Though these initial definitions of genocide do not mention the destruction of a group along political lines, political genocide, or politicide, will be included in this study's established definition. The killing or mistreatment of non-combatants with the goal of an eventual extermination of an entire group, whether this group is aligned nationally, ethnically, racially, religiously, or politically, is equally contemptible. The first draft of the United Nations' Genocide Convention included killings with political motives under the term genocide, but the draft was rejected by the Soviet Union. This rejection is the primary reason for the final draft's failure to mention political killings in its definition of genocide (Harff 2003, 58).

The lines between politicide and genocide are sometimes blurred, presenting difficulties in the decision to only examine instances of genocide along national, ethnic, racial, or religious lines, while neglecting episodes of politicide. An example of this lack of concrete distinction between genocide and politicide, which is often evident in genocidal occurrences, can be seen in the 1994 Rwandan genocide. While the widespread killing of Tutsi by Hutu was primarily based on ethnic motives, the situation was highly political. Additionally, the sources of the genocidal ideology which initiated and encouraged the killings were equally political, as each ethnic group possessed a specific political past and existed as a distinct political entity within the country. This example will be discussed in more detail in later examination of the Rwandan genocide.

For the time being, I argue that politicide and genocide have similar sources and structures (Harff 2003, 58) and so will be considered one and the same in this study.

For an instance of widespread killing to be considered genocide, it must meet two criteria. First, the victims must be non-combatants. A massacre of a large number of soldiers involved in combat does not constitute genocide, because the victims of genocide are non-combatants according to the U.N.'s definition. Lemkin explained genocide as the opposite of the Rousseau-Portalis Doctrine, which states that warfare is "directed against sovereigns and armies, not against subjects and civilians"(Lemkin 1944, 80). Though this contrast between simple warfare and genocide is logical, it is possible to translate this assertion into an argument that all instances of total warfare, in which cities are bombed with no regard for the safety of the civilian population, are genocides. As an example, the American use of nuclear weapons against Japan during World War II is, by some genocide scholars such as Kuper, termed genocide. Though civilians are often killed, sometimes in high numbers, during the bombing of cities, nuclear or conventional, these tragic deaths should not be labeled as genocide (Fein, 1994 99). These occurrences might be examples of war-crimes, but the civilian population's direct relationship with the enemy state prevents them from being episodes of genocide. Though these attacks do target non-combatants who offered no real threat and had no opportunity to surrender, the civilian population must be completely disassociated from the state in order for these killings to be termed genocide (Fein 1994, 105). Supporting this claim against the use of the term genocide to describe all acts of war which target civilians, Chalk states: "If we

include every form of war, massacre, or terrorism under genocide, then what is it that we are studying?"(Chalk 1994, 60)

The second criterion for genocide is that it must be state sponsored. However, in instances of civil war, non-state actors are possible perpetrators of genocide (Harff 2003, 58). This factor often presents difficulties in the process of deciding if an episode of widespread killing is genocide. In many cases, the state does not admit its involvement in the killings. This is one reason why the international community is often hesitant to use the term genocide. While an example of genocide such as the killing of European Jews by the Nazi Germany state is easily classified as an instance of state-sponsored genocide, the current massacres of Sudanese non-combatants in the Darfur region of Sudan are more complex due to the lack of concrete proof of the Sudanese government's involvement.

With these two factors considered, along with the decision to include politicide in this study, a definition of genocide can now be established. Genocide is the state-sponsored attempt to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, religious, or political group by exterminating non-combatants of such a group through such acts as described in sub-topics *a* through *e* of the United Nations' 1948 Genocide Convention. While I use the terms national, ethnic, racial, religious, and political alignment to define the types of groups that are potential targets of genocide, these types of groups should not be considered the only possible targets of genocide. Any distinct group of human beings, whose members are aligned along a consistent motivation, is a potential target of genocide. To require a group to be aligned along an established list of specifications is to

11

risk the neglect of certain groups, such as the thousands of homosexuals and mentally impaired individuals who fell victim to the Nazi genocide (Chalk 1994, 50).

Though the crime of genocide has a significant history, I am concerned primarily with episodes that occurred after the colonized sections of the world began to gain independence and create their own autonomous governments. Examples of genocide from the 19th century and early 20th century provide little evidence toward an argument for the relationship between indirect colonialism and genocide, as decolonization had not yet occurred when these genocidal episodes took place. I will occasionally reference precolonial episodes of genocide in order to illustrate certain aspects of the genocidal state, as much of the literature on this topic is primarily concerned with pre-colonial genocide.

The list of genocidal occurrences which will be used in this study originates from two lists compiled by Barbara Harff and Ted Robert Gurr. The first list is from a study performed by Harff and Gurr in 1988 and includes occurrences of genocide from 1943 to 1985. The second list is found in a study performed by Harff in 2003 and includes instances of genocide occurring from 1956 to 1999. Because these lists were formed by the same authors, they have many similarities in the instances occurring between the common years 1956 and 1985. In the formulation of these lists, genocide and politicide are:

> The promotion, execution, and/or implied consent of sustained policies by governing elites or their agents–or in the case of civil war, either of the contending authorities–that are intended to destroy, in whole or part, a communal, political, or politicized ethnic group (Harff 2003, 58)

This definition is similar to the United Nation's definition, and so the two lists compiled by Harff and Gurr are adequate for the purposes of this study. Though the lists are sufficient, they omit a few instances of widespread killing which seem to fit the definition of genocide. The primary reason for this neglect is the fact that many of the possible instances have not yet been analyzed (Harff 1988, 366). It is beyond the scope of this study to classify these unanalyzed episodes of genocide, and so I focus solely on those identified by Harff and Gurr.

The majority of genocides occur in similar environments, and the perpetrators of each one possess similar ideologies. These factors are general aspects of the genocidal state, which are common to the genocidal episodes of the last fifty years. Almost all genocides took place during or immediately following revolutions, regime collapses, or civil wars. An unstable political situation, which is inevitable during these periods of turmoil, creates an adequate environment for genocide. The ideologies behind these revolutions, regime collapses, and civil wars are often translated into genocidal ideology, as the new regime or government targets its enemies (Harff 2003, 57). This does not necessarily mean that the revolution, regime collapse, or civil war is the cause of the genocide, but that it creates an environment in which genocidal ideologies and policies are able to emerge.

Another factor common to genocidal states is a severe division within the society of the country. This division and its relationship to genocide are the primary concerns of this study. The definition of genocide requires two groups of people to be separated nationally, ethnically, racially, religiously, or politically to an extent that allows for

13

violent ideologies and policies. The rift between the two groups must also be great

enough to lead to an ignorance of individuality. All members of the would be victimized

group become guilty of the real or imagined crimes for which the group is being blamed.

Similarly, the members of the perpetrating group all become victims or possible victims

of those same crimes (Kuper 1981, 86). Victims of genocide are targeted for the sole fact

that they are members of the victimized group (Andreopoulos 1994, 1). The victims are

denied individuality. A severe division in society is needed for such a refusal to exist.

This rift, which leads to violent ideologies and policies and a refusal of individuality, is

observed in a large portion of genocides throughout history. In reference to the early 20th

century Ottoman genocide against Turkish Armenians, Hovannisian explains that the

clearly drawn racial, religious, and cultural differences contributed to the emergence of a

genocidal policy (Hovannisian 1994, 117). As with the existence of political turmoil

within a country, this rift in society is a necessary aspect of a pre-genocidal state, but it is

not a sufficient cause of genocide.

In order for a group to be targeted for elimination, whether in whole or in part, an

ideology must emerge which undermines the group member's status as human-beings

(Kuper1981, 84). This ideology of dehumanization is generally intended to achieve a

larger political or social agenda (Kuper 1981, 87). Large-scale murder is still possible

without this ideology, but a failure to dehumanize the victims forces the perpetrators of

genocide to view themselves as common murders (Kuper 1981, 84). The policy of

genocide is reached only when the final ideology of dehumanization is complete. The

two conditions that generate this ideology are a threat from the victimized group and

vulnerability on behalf of the perpetrators (Midlarsky 2005, 4). This threat and

vulnerability may be real or imagined, but in genocidal episodes it leads to political or

social agendas that hide behind a dehumanizing ideology and motivate a genocidal

policy. These agendas find origin in the perpetrators' need to protect their own power

and to strengthen the stability of their position (Midlarsky 2005, 4). A dehumanizing

ideology is more easily established if there exists a real or imagined threat to one's own

power or position. As Midlarsky explains, if "physical destruction of human life is not

motivated by an existential threat to one's own way of life, then it cannot be

justified"(Midlarsky 2005, 101).

Threat and vulnerability lead to an increased need for a state-sponsored policy

directed toward increasing the security of the state. This policy emerges in the form of

minimization of risk from a particular group and repression of that group's current power

(Midlarsky 2005, 106). Genocidal policy, supported by proper dehumanizing ideology,

achieves both aspects of increased state security. If a group is eliminated or severely

weakened, it no longer threatens the state or the position of the perpetrating group. The

idea of vulnerability on behalf of the perpetrating group is required in order for the state

or perpetrating group to feel any true threat from the victimized group. The victims must

also be vulnerable so they can be severely weakened or eliminated by the perpetrators

(Midlarsky 2005, 4).

Another contributing factor to genocidal policy occurs when the perpetrating

group blames a victimized group for a loss. Midlarsky combines this concept of loss and

blame with the ideas of threat, vulnerability, and the desire for in increase in state

15

security. Using the term "loss compensation" he explains the rise of genocidal policy as a response to current or recent loss (Midlarsky 2005, 141). Nazi killings of European Jews are an example, as the Jews were blamed for the poor state of the German economy in the period between World War I and World War II (Midlarsky 2005, 139). As the security of Nazi Germany began to deteriorate following the German invasion of the Soviet Union, the Jewish population was once again blamed by Nazi ideology. This blame led to increased violence against the Jewish population (Midlarsky 2005, 141).

In the post-colonial instances of genocide with which I am concerned, genocide as retribution is primarily a response to crimes committed against the perpetrating group during the era of colonization. In many of the cases the perpetrating group is not in a state of decline, but retribution remains a vital part of the genocidal ideology directed at the victimized group. As decolonization concludes, the population of a former colony often desires revenge for hardships they suffered during the colonial era. In many post-colonial occurrences of genocide, repression of the colonial political and social order, minimization of the risk of a return to that order, and retribution for crimes committed during the colonial era combine to create a powerful ideology. The ideology serves to strengthen the power and position of the ruling group and to exact revenge upon the victimized group for their elite status during the colonial period.

Chapter 3: Indirect Colonial Rule as a Motivation of Genocide

Between the 15th and 20th centuries, Europe maintained colonial interests in much of the world. While they are each unique in many ways, the majority of countries on the continents of Africa, Asia, and South America share one common historical aspect: a European colonial period. The decision to colonize the world outside Europe can be attributed primarily to a desire to acquire resources within the colonized countries and to convert the colonized populations to Christianity. The effects of this decision to colonize are much more complex, resulting in long-lasting consequences, many disastrous. In the process of colonization, great hardships often plagued the colonized populations. The violence of conquest, newly introduced disease, and slave-like conditions are just a few examples of the hardships imposed by European colonialism. Colonization was brutal, and in many cases, brought little improvement to the lives of the colonized people. Many post-colonial societies have suffered from political turmoil, violence and poverty, as institutions introduced by the Europeans became weapons with which war was waged.

Direct and indirect colonial practices must be differentiated, as each has a unique influence on the colonized population. As Europe began to colonize the countries of South America, Central America, and Mexico, a direct form of colonial administration was implemented. Beginning in 1492 with Christopher Columbus's arrival in the New World, the Spanish and Portuguese governments began sponsoring exploratory voyages, which led to an increase in the number of settlers living in the newly found land. As

conquest became more common, the natives of the New World became subjects of European governors (Burkholder 1990, 180-189).

In the period of history preceding the arrival of Europeans, three civilizations dominated South America, Central America and Mexico. The Aztecs, Incas, and Mayans were advanced societies with their own governments, cultures, and technologies. With the arrival of the Europeans, the populations of these civilizations all became indistinguishably indigenous. Social, cultural, and linguistic diversity characterized the pre-colonial Americas, but as the Europeans furthered their conquest, this rich culture was eventually eliminated. This elimination of diversity began with the creation of a common racial identity, the Indian (Burkholder 1990, 189).

Along with the terrible conditions that colonization brought to the indigenous populations of the New World existed an administrative authority completely comprised of Europeans. The Spanish viceroys, who acted as governors in the colonized countries were with few exceptions born and raised in Spain. The Council of the Indies, which oversaw Spanish colonial affairs and every level of colonial government, was run exclusively by Spaniards. This Council was in existence from 1524 to the early 18th century (Burkholder 1990, 72-75).

The Spanish colonial authority attempted an initial recognition of the native elites in order to ease tension among the newly conquered populations. Captive rulers were used as intermediaries to the populations, but this attempted use of former elites was unsuccessful. The last remaining captive rulers died in Spain in 1627 (Burkholder 1990, 190-191). Rather than the elevation of a minority which was common in direct rule

systems, a demotion of the ruling class to teaching and bureaucratic positions characterized the direct rule of colonial Latin America. In addition to this general demotion of the ruling class, the Indian nobility became increasingly racially mixed as Spaniards often married women of the top sections of the nobility (Burkholder 1990, 191). This mixing of natives with colonizers led to a nobility that was culturally Spanish. Thus, these former elites were no longer truly indigenous. In direct rule societies in the Americas, colonization created a rift between the colonizers and the colonized indigenous population.

Unlike the direct colonial rule of the Americas, the indirect colonial rule common to Africa and Asia created a rift between indigenous groups. The use of indirect rule in African colonies was much greater than in the Americas for several reasons. Much of Africa was not easily reached by Europeans. The continent has little seacoast in comparison to its massive area and African rivers are generally unnavigable by large vessels which made early voyages into the continent impossible by boat. Mountain ranges and hill systems run parallel to much of the African coastline, providing another barrier to European ventures into the more central parts of the continent (Hoskins 1930, 3-4). Prior to 1870, European possessions in Africa were characterized by seaports and fortified trading posts (Hoskins 1930, 32). It was not until 1877 that the primary features (natural resources and landmarks) of the entire continent were roughly established (Hoskins 1930, 37). Even after Europeans had a strengthened knowledge of Africa, a large scale immigration of Europeans to Africa was still not plausible. In the era of colonization, Europeans had no desire to migrate to the African continent (Hoskins 1930,

19

102). Though the land was rich in resources, much of the continent maintained climates and terrains unsuitable to European populations.

As a result of the impossibility of a widespread European immigration to Africa, indirect rule was implemented. Though direct rule was the initial form of colonial authority in Africa, the shift to indirect rule was eventually undergone by all the European colonial authorities (Mamdani 2001, 24-25). In this form of colonial administration, the European colonizers promoted native allies which they could rely on to positions of authority with little consideration given to traditional "rights of rulership"(Ajayi 2000, 188). European colonizers needed order among the colonized population. An orderly colony was most easily achieved by maintaining the traditional institutions of the colonized country, while filling the positions of authority with people that could be influenced and controlled. The colonial authorities did not truly wish to legitimize the changes they brought to Africa, but simply to force Africans to accept their influence and control. To the Europeans, both in colonial and domestic settings, the authority imposed on African populations was justified by the imagined racial, cultural, moral, technological, and intellectual superiority which they possessed over the colonized populations of Africa (Ajayi 2000, 188-189).

Indirect rule was not unique to the African continent; this form of colonial administration also characterized much of colonial Asia. In Indonesia, the Dutch exploited divisions within the population in order to strengthen their own authority; the Dutch also elevated the elites of Indonesia to a status "beyond traditional limits" and created within the elites a group structured to serve the colonial government (Kingsbury

1998, 30). Indirect rule was also used in India by the British East India Company and the British government. Though subordinate to British parliament, Indian elites held positions of authority throughout the country. An "India Secretary," advised by an "India Council", collaborated with the British viceroy in matters of legislation (von Albertini 1982, 14). Thus, colonial India was developed with the help of Indian elites. The British were also aided in colonial India by an "intermediary Indian class," members of which acted as district officers. These Indian officers provided the British authority with information collected from the villages and subordinates in their districts (von Albertini 1982, 16). By 1939, almost half of the Indian Civil Service was filled by Indians (Kumar 1998, 234-235).

In a direct form of colonial rule there is a division between colonized natives and the foreign colonizers. This division may lead to a struggle against the colonial authority– a struggle where the indigenous population aligns itself along racial lines due to the racial basis of the division between colonized and colonizer. With much of the colonial administration of an indirect rule colony filled by members of an indigenous group, the population was divided. A *colonially elevated* group was constructed by indirect colonial rule, allowing for an official separation between different indigenous groups. The native, colonized population was divided along lines of ethnicity. While there was still a rift between colonized and colonizer, the indigenous population could no longer unite against the colonial authority due to its own ethnic divisions (Mamdani 2001).

Indirect rule was still a form of colonization, regardless of the amount of de facto authority allowed to the native population. The section of society which was elevated to the position of authority acted only in the interest of the colonizing country. They were not autonomous rulers, nor were they always the traditional ruling class. Indirect rule created a division, sometimes hostile, between the chosen native elites and the section of society over which these elites possessed de facto authority. This division often became a source of hate and violence during the years of decolonization and the period which followed independence. In some of these former colonies, genocide emerged as a technique to solidify the current power of the ruling majority and punish the minority which had ruled during the colonial period.

Twenty-six of the thirty-two countries which have experienced genocide since 1943 are former colonies. The overwhelming majority of former colonies in the list of genocidal episodes must lead us to consider a possible link between colonization and genocide. Do colonization and the temporary or permanent effects of colonization lead a country to a greater degree of susceptibility toward genocide? As I have explained, strong divisions within a country's society must exist in order for genocide to occur. Formerly colonized countries often possess rifts within their societies which were implemented or influenced by the European colonial process. During indirect colonial rule, colonial authorities created an unnatural pluralism within these former colonies in which one section of society was elevated to a privileged, elite status. I will call this first elite section of society the *colonially elevated* group. Another section of society was relegated to a condition of second-class citizenship. In some cases, this second group was

22

completely denied citizenship. I call this section of colonial society the *colonially relegated* group.

This separation of society, which can be seen in the manipulation of existent divisions or in the European invention of divisions, was a result of the colonizing state's desire to control the colonized population without dedicating the manpower and administration to a direct rule of the country. The elevated section of the colonized society was held as a ruling class and given almost complete control over the country, although their authority was generally granted by the European colonizing government. A minority group was often chosen for this privileged status, as the small population numbers of a minority can be more easily controlled and manipulated. The colonially elevated class, in some cases, was imagined by the colonial authority to be non-indigenous to the country, previously migrating to the country, and therefore in possession of a natural right to rule over the indigenous population. The invented right to rule provided to the elite section of society seems to be a result of the colonial-era Europeans' belief that the colonized populations were heathens, unfit for self-government. In some instances, the elite group may have actually been foreign. This was true in many of the Latin American countries, as a more direct system of colonial rule was used to control these populations. If it is true that the colonial process creates and strengthens divisions within society, it can be established that a condition that encourages genocide, a deep rift within society, was often produced in colonies by colonial authorities.

While a divided society is vital to the occurrence of genocide, it is not a sufficient cause. An ideology must also emerge which creates the possibility for genocidal policy. Three ideas discussed in chapter two must be recalled here: the minimization of the risk of return to a former, oppressive social and governmental order; the repression of any remaining institutions or members of the former order; and a retribution for crimes committed against those currently in power during the time of the former order. These are three foundations for an ideology that provokes genocidal policy. The pluralism of inequality introduced or strengthened by the colonial process provides these three motivations and has the potential to produce a genocidal ideology. This unequal pluralism is invented or manipulated and is rarely influenced by an actual division (at least not one equal in strength to those introduced by colonial authorities) existent in pre-colonial society. In many cases, the *colonially relegated* group was demoted from a relatively equal status within the society to a position of second-class citizenship over the course of only a few decades. After decolonization, the *colonially relegated* group acquires control of the country through violent or non-violent means. Once the colonially relegated group is in power, it may feel a need to repress the former order and to minimize the risk of a return to the colonial order.

The issues of vulnerability and threat must also be recalled at this point. In order for a genocidal policy to be justified, the perpetrating group must feel a certain level of vulnerability and a threat from the colonially elevated group. The fact that the *colonially relegated* group is demoted to a lower-class existence within society during colonization allows for feelings of vulnerability. The historically proven idea that at any moment the

24

majority group may once again be relegated to the bottom of society leads to the embrace of repressive and risk-minimizing motivations. If the formerly elite minority is eliminated, the current ruling class strengthens its power, and minimizes the risk of a return to its status under colonial rule. The colonial elite, often a minority group, suffers strong vulnerability due to its lack of quantitative strength. The current ruling class is aware of this vulnerability. The consequences, such as violent reprisals or casualties from a strong defense, of attempting to eliminate a segment of society are greatly diminished as the vulnerability of that segment increases.

The motivation of retribution for crimes committed during the colonial period is also embraced by the post-colonial ruling class. The hostility felt by the new elite class is exacerbated by the invented or manipulated alien status of the colonial elites. The period of this alien elite's rule is seen as a time of foreign occupation and the oppression under which the majority suffered is seen as a crime committed by a group of invaders or an occupying force. Retribution against the actual invaders, the European colonial authorities, is not a plausible option, so revenge is enacted upon the pawns of the colonial administration.

The three motivations of genocide (repression, risk-minimization, and retribution) must be viewed in the post-colonial context. The colonial authority is ousted, often leaving behind a strong nationalist movement. The colonially elevated group becomes the target of nationalism after decolonization. The emotions and ideology of nationalism lead to a desire, especially on the part of the *colonially relegated*, to repress all remnants of the colonial authority, minimize risk of a return to the colonial order, and seek

retribution for colonial oppression. The lack of protection from the former colonial authority allows this nationalism to emerge in violence, even genocide, against the *colonially elevated* group.

The susceptibility to genocide of societies with a history of indirect colonial rule is evidenced by the list of post-colonial occurrences of genocide. Of the twenty-six former colonies which have experienced genocide, nineteen possess some history of indirect rule, while only seven are former direct rule colonies. Some of the colonial periods of these countries were dominated by direct rule, but did experience periods of indirect rule. Table 1 on page fifty-six shows the breakdown of the types of colonial rule experienced by the thirty-two post-colonial genocidal countries.

Countries with a history of indirect colonial rule are more likely to experience genocide than countries with no colonial history or with a history of direct colonial rule. Indirect colonization often divided the populations of colonies into *colonially elevated* and *colonially relegated* groups. The *colonially elevated* section of society was given elite status and special privileges. This group also ruled or governed the country on behalf of the colonial authority. The *colonially relegated* section of society was oppressed and demoted to an inferior citizenship. After decolonization, if the *colonially relegated* group gains power it often seeks a violent policy against the *colonially elevated* group. This policy is motivated by three ideologies: the minimization of the risk of a return to the colonial order, repression of the *colonially elevated* group, and a retribution for the oppression which the *colonially relegated* group suffered during the colonial period. The motivating ideologies possess varying levels of strength in different

26

countries. Though indirect colonial rule is not a sufficient or necessary cause of genocide, in certain genocidal countries it has been a primary motivating factor. I will use the cases of the 1994 Rwandan genocide and 1975 Cambodian genocide to illustrate this theory.

Chapter 4: Case Study: Rwanda

Beginning in the final years of Belgian colonial rule, Rwanda was plagued by ethnic conflict. The conflict between Tutsi and Hutu has inflicted violence and hardship on the population of Rwanda, and the Tutsi have most often been the victims. The ethnic conflict in Rwanda culminated in 1994 with one hundred days of violence against Tutsi. This state-sponsored genocide targeted all Tutsi, along with their Hutu sympathizers, killing approximately 800,000 Rwandans. What motivated this horrific instance of directed violence? The simple answer to this question is extreme social division. The pursuits of each ethnic group had become so contrary to those of the other that the division warranted a body count close to one million.

It would seem that genocide results from years of ethnic fractionalization, but this is not true of Rwanda. The violent division is a relatively new aspect of Rwandan society, largely implemented by the Belgian colonial authority. The division is not easily recognized, even by Rwandans. Often, ethnicity in Rwanda is only signified by a government issued identity card. The ethnic division in Rwanda is not based on an ancient difference of culture, religion, or ancestry. This division is based on the relatively recent manipulation of the Rwandan population by colonial authorities.

Pre-colonial Rwanda

Before the arrival of European colonizers in Rwanda, a distinction between Tutsi and Hutu existed, but was not as acute as that of the post-colonial era. The monarchy of pre-colonial Rwanda was traditionally Tutsi. This dominance of the kingship by Tutsi was considered a sacred right. Rwandan mythology imagines three sons of God, Gatwa, Gahutu, and Gatutsi, representing the three distinctions of Rwandan society, the Twa, Tutsi, and Hutu. In one myth, God tests his sons by entrusting each with a container of milk. Both Gatwa and Gahutu fail the test, drinking and spilling the milk respectively. Gatutsi maintains his milk and is given authority over his brothers and over Rwanda by his divine father (Mamdani 2001, 79). Along with the monarchy, the Tutsi population of pre-colonial Rwanda dominated a patron-client system. This was a system of inequality, but as it existed in early Rwandan history, the system can be most closely compared to a "modern protection racket"(Mamdani 2001, 65). The system, until the early 19th century, was one of reciprocal benefits for Tutsi and Hutu. Hutu gained protection from their Tutsi patrons and Tutsi benefitted from occasional gifts from their Hutu clients (Mamdani 2001, 65).

I want to emphasize three aspects of the early domination of Rwandan society by Tutsi. First, this domination was considered divine in nature, not just by Tutsi, but also by Hutu. Second, in the case of the patron-client system, the relationship between Tutsi and Hutu was considered to be one of reciprocity. The term patron accurately signifies this reciprocity – an "I'll scratch your back if you scratch mine" attitude was at the core of this system. The third aspect of the pre-colonial relationship between Tutsi and Hutu

29

is that of brotherhood. In the mythology of Rwanda, Tutsi and Hutu are always imagined as brother forces. Though the Tutsi brother is chosen by God to rule, the Hutu brother does not rebel against this divine allowance of authority. Indeed, prior to the arrival of European colonizers to Rwanda, there was no memory of systematic violence between Tutsi and Hutu (Prunier 1994, 39).

Though the Tutsi did occupy the primary positions of authority in pre-colonial Rwanda, the Hutu were not without power. While the Mwami, or king, of Rwanda was the ultimate authority, three types of chiefs ruled under the king. The "chief of landholdings", "chief of men", and "chief of the pastures" were not solely Tutsi (Prunier 1994, 11). In fact, a large number of "chiefs of landholdings" were Hutu (Prunier 1994, 12). This share of chieftain positions signifies the position of pre-colonial Hutu. They were not the dominant ruling class, but the Hutu were not completely relegated in the Rwandan political arena. The fact that there were no severe instances of violence between Hutu and Tutsi before colonization is evidence that the unequal system of power-sharing in Rwanda was accepted. It can be concluded that the system functioned smoothly for an era with beginnings predating the collective memory of the Rwandan population upon colonization.

While a political division existed in Rwanda prior to colonization, Hutu and Tutsi were culturally unified. Banyarwanda was the primary cultural identity of Rwanda, an identity comprised of both Hutu and Tutsi (Mamdani 2001, 36). For centuries, Hutu and Tutsi lived side by side and commonly intermarried, creating a single cultural identity. The two groups shared a common language, Kinyarwanda (Mamdani 2001, 74). Hutu

and Tutsi also recognized mutual kin groups. Members of the *inzu,* or lineage, shared a common ancestor four or five generations back. The *inzu* did not include both Hutu and Tutsi (Mamdani 2001, 54-55). The *ubwoko*, or clan, did include members of both ethnic groups. This kin group was the largest and was comprised of different Hutu and Tutsi lineages which shared a common ancestor many generations back (Mamdani 2001, 54). Though this large kin group had little influence on its members' lives, it points to the fact that Hutu and Tutsi recognized a brotherhood, similar to the one conveyed by Rwandan mythology. This recognition is not rare, as all eighteen major clans in Rwanda included both Tutsi and Hutu (Mamdani 2001, 54).

Pre-colonial Rwanda also possessed unity in the religious realm. The Kubandwa cult of Rwanda was believed to be of Hutu origin and was largely led by Hutu. Ceremonies were generally performed by Hutu, but the cult's following was comprised of both Hutu and Tutsi (Prunier 1994, 15). While the Tutsi controlled much of political life, the Hutu dominated the leadership of the "supernatural" life of pre-colonial Rwanda. The two areas were associated with one another; a mutual agreement existed between the two groups that each area of life was dependant on the other (Mamdani 2001, 64). Religious unity acted as another form of social cohesion, allowing Hutu and Tutsi to coexist in harmony.

Though large-scale violence between Hutu and Tutsi was non-existent in pre-colonial Rwanda, war was common in the early history of the country. War was commonly used as a means to conquer, protect the kingdom, and to steal cattle from non-Rwandan neighbors (Prunier 1994, 14). The positions of leadership in the Rwandan

31

military were filled by Tutsi, but all men of Rwanda were active in military roles. The Hutu were respected as warriors, primarily due to their efficiency on the battlefield (Prunier 1994, 15). In war, Tutsi and Hutu considered themselves Banyarwanda who faced a common enemy in the interest of the state (Prunier 1994, 15). The ranks were unequally weighted to Tutsi advantage, but this was accepted, similar to the acceptance of Tutsi control of the political sphere. Hutu warriors were often rewarded by their Tutsi leaders for their achievements in battle; the cohesion of the military benefitted both Hutu and Tutsi and existed for centuries (Prunier 1994, 14). Pre-colonial Rwandan society was unified, with Hutu and Tutsi sharing a mutually beneficial relationship. Though the power in this relationship was unequally distributed, the distribution was accepted and Hutu and Tutsi lived harmoniously for centuries. I attribute the cohesion of Hutu and Tutsi to the fact that the relationship between the two groups was traditional. Power was not given to the Tutsi, they had possessed authority for as long as the population could collectively remember. Also, the power was not total and it was not unfair. Hutu maintained some positions of authority and were generally respected by the Tutsi population. The authority of the Tutsi was not oppressive. Though the identities of Hutu and Tutsi existed, they were often blurred, as much of the population intermarried. In many areas of life, Hutu and Tutsi were simply Banyarwanda, sharing a common cultural community.

Rwandan society maintained a level of unity, though unequal, which allowed its members to live peacefully for centuries before the arrival of European colonizers. Indirect colonization destroyed this unity, replacing it with a system which strictly polarized Hutu and Tutsi. In the years immediately preceding colonization, the Rwandan monarchy had begun to centralize its kingdom. Prior to this centralizing movement, several Hutu principalities existed in Rwanda (Prunier 1994, 17). The monarchy intended these independent principalities to become part of its kingdom. German colonizers arrived in Rwanda in 1897 and implemented a system of indirect colonial rule. This system allowed and encouraged the monarchy to continue its centralizing movement and aided the movement by directly controlling certain areas with or on behalf of the monarchy. The German colonial authority also enlisted and supported Tutsi chiefs to control areas which, due to a lack of manpower, they could not control themselves (Prunier 1994, 25). This is one of the earliest examples of a colonial authority giving new power to Tutsi in order to indirectly control Rwanda. German colonial rule in Rwanda was short, ending in 1916, and did not severely influence Rwandan society. The Belgians then assumed colonial authority in Rwanda.

Belgium forcibly took control of Rwanda in 1916, but the new colonial authority waited until 1926 to implement any real colonial policy. The Belgian authority viewed the Tutsi in terms of a "migration hypothesis" and the European opinion that only non-indigenous groups were capable of ruling Africa (Mamdani 2001, 43). Their belief was primarily influenced by the "elongation of physical features" of the Tutsi population

33

(Mamdani 2001, 47). The Belgians believed that at some point, the Tutsi population migrated to Africa, and thus were of European or Caucasian ancestry. In fact, wherever an organized state existed, European colonizers assumed that the ruling class originated from a foreign source (Mamdani 2001, 80). The Belgian colonial authority used their beliefs on Tutsi origin to justify a Tutsi right to rule. In this justification the Belgians neglected the fact that Hutu and Tutsi had shared a cultural community for a span of time which reached beyond the collective memory of the population.

As European colonizers overlooked certain unifying factors in Rwanda, their beliefs led to the racialization of Rwandan society. The Tutsi of Rwanda were seen as superior group, especially in relation to the Hutu population. The Catholic church, which was the Belgian authority's partner in colonization, viewed the Tutsi as "superb humans"(Mamdani 2001, 87). In 1917, a church official in Rwanda wrote that "a Tutsi was a European under a black skin"(Mamdani 2001, 88). The Catholic church and the Belgian colonial authority created an ideology which racialized the differences between Hutu and Tutsi and elevated the Tutsi population to a superior status in all realms of life. The Belgians completed an "ideological reconstruction of Rwanda's past and, from the artificial past, of the present"(Prunier 1994, 36). This ideology drove the colonial policy, which completely elevated Tutsi while relegating the Hutu population. The ideology also was a source of hate for the Hutu population, as the Tutsi were hailed as an inherently superior class which had migrated from a foreign region. European ideology began the process of dismantling the pre-colonial unity between Tutsi and Hutu. Colonial institutional policy completed this process.

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In order to create an elite that was capable of acting as a surrogate ruling class for the colonial authority, the Belgians constructed a system of education which greatly separated Hutu and Tutsi. From an early age Tutsi were taught their elevated role in society and Hutu were taught they were inferior to the Tutsi. In this indirect system of colonial rule, the Belgians created a class of people which would act as their pawns in Rwanda. This system of education also served to polarize the two segments of the population, further destroying the unity which had existed in pre-colonial Rwanda.

If the Tutsi children educated by the Belgian authority and Catholic missionaries were to be the ruling class of Rwanda, the system of rule in the colony had to be transformed into one institutionally dominated by Tutsi. The system which had existed before colonization was dominated by Tutsi, but Hutu maintained a share of power. The institutional changes implemented by the Belgians erased the idea of shared power and mutually beneficial relationships. In 1929, the traditional three-chief system was abolished and the three former positions were merged into one (Prunier 1994, 27). Formerly, one of the positions had been largely held by Hutu, which allowed for a balance of power among the chiefs (Mamdani 2001, 91). This balance of power was lost in the 1929, as the single chieftain position was given completely to Tutsi (Mamdani 2001, 91). The central power and local power of Rwanda was put solely into the hands of the Tutsi population.

The power of the Tutsi population over the Rwandan Hutu was increased by the creation of the Native Tribunals. Completely comprised of Tutsi chiefs, this 1936 reform added judicial power to the executive and legislative powers which the chiefs already

35

held (Mamdani 2001, 91-92). During the years of colonial implementation of institutional reform in Rwanda, the monarchy was weakened by the Belgian authority. As this occurred the power of the country was given to the local chiefs. The authority of the Tutsi chiefs became increasingly despotic, as the elites took full advantage of the compete authority which the Belgian authority had given them (Mamdani 2001, 91).

The patron-client system of pre-colonial Rwanda was greatly altered during colonial rule. While the pre-colonial system had been beneficial to both sides of the agreement, under Belgian control the system was changed into one which oppressed the Hutu and benefitted the Tutsi. The system was also spread to areas of the country which had previously not known it. In these cases the system began to be seen as a colonial invention which Tutsi used for their own benefit. Even where the system had previously existed, it was resented due to its increased benefit for Tutsi and decreased advantage for Hutu (Prunier 1994, 30).

The influence of the Catholic church on Tutsi-Hutu relations is apparent in its role in the discriminatory education system and its promotion of an ideology which imagined Tutsi to be superior to Hutu. The Catholic church also destroyed, or at least severely weakened, the Kubandwa cult. This early religion was an important institution for pre-colonial social cohesion, but as colonial influence increased, the influence of the Catholic church also strengthened. Kubandwa was characterized by dual Hutu-Tutsi membership, which provided social cohesion. The cult was also an indigenous religion with little political influence. Catholic converts were often only converts because they were forced into conversion by a fear of losing their positions of authorities or a desire to be allied

36

with the colonial authority. Catholicism failed to replace Kubandwa as a tool of social

cohesion because it was dominated by Tutsi and its converts often lacked true religious

devotion on which common ground could be found. Also, the religion was a foreign

institution, so it was not respected as an institution in which Tutsi and Hutu could equally

coexist. No other Belgian institutions provided such coexistence, so why would

Catholicism? It is important to recall that the Kubandwa cult had been led by Hutu.

Once again a pre-colonial unifying institution was destroyed and the Hutu population lost

one of its former sources of authority.

The final dividing institution which the Belgian authority imposed on Rwandan

society was a system of identity cards which labeled each individual as Hutu, Tutsi, or

Twa (a quantitatively insignificant Rwandan minority). An official census was

undertaken by the Belgian authority from 1933 to 1934. Upon completion of this census,

each Rwandese individual was officially distinguished as a Hutu, Tutsi, or Twa. The

distinction was imposed using information from the church, physical features and

measurements, and ownership of large numbers of cattle (a traditional Tutsi

characteristic), in order to decide who belonged to each group (Mamdani 2001, 99).

Prior to colonization, Hutu and Tutsi had existed as separate groups which were often

indistinguishable due to intermarriage. The two groups possessed different

responsibilities, such as government for Tutsi and religious leadership for Hutu. Hutu

and Tutsi shared a common cultural identity and common interests. The common

interests of the two groups are evidenced by their cooperation in military and religious

pursuits. The Belgian authority erased all that was common between Hutu and Tutsi and placed them in officially documented and identifiable groups (i.e. identity cards).

During colonization, the Tutsi population of Rwanda was given complete political control of the country, the religion which had formerly bonded Hutu and Tutsi was destroyed, Hutu were forced into unfair economic relationships, colonial ideology imagined the Tutsi population as superior to Hutu, and the population which had coexisted peacefully prior to colonization was increasingly divided by Belgian-introduced institutions. Hutu were told that they were inferior to Tutsi and that they "deserved their fate" of being "deprived of all political power and materially exploited by both the whites and the Tutsi" (Prunier 1994, 39). These aspects of colonial Rwanda planted a Hutu ideology of hate for all Tutsi (Prunier 1994, 39). This ideology of hate grew and eventually emerged as genocide against the Tutsi population.

Decolonization and the Years Leading to Genocide

Throughout Rwanda's colonial period, the minority Tutsi had remained in a position of absolute authority. As Rwanda began to move toward independence from Belgium and an autonomous, democratically elected government, the Hutu majority inevitably took its position as the new ruling class. Even before independence, Belgium began to show favor to the Hutu majority, whom they had formerly relegated and oppressed. In November of 1959, a Hutu activist was attacked by a group of young Tutsi men, leading to violent reprisals against Tutsi throughout the country. As Hutu burned the homes of Tutsi, the Belgian authorities refused to intervene (Prunier 1994, 49)

38

Beginning in the early 1960s, the Belgian authority in Rwanda began to replace the predominantly Tutsi chiefs throughout the country with Hutu chiefs (Prunier 1994, 51). The shift of policy enacted by the Belgian authority was an obvious attempt to secure a positive relationship with the Hutu majority, as they would become the ruling class once the country democratized. In 1960, communal elections were held in Rwanda, with the Hutu parties winning 210 of the 229 communal authority positions. The Party for Hutu Emancipation, or PARMEHUTU, won 160 of the total positions.

During the emergence of the Hutu majority as the ruling class of Rwanda, Tutsi were increasingly persecuted. By late 1963, 130,000 Tutsi had fled to the Belgian Congo, Burundi, Tanganyika, and Uganda. In a total population of just 2.7 million, this led to an ever-widening quantitative gap between the Tutsi minority and the Hutu majority (Prunier 1994, 51-52). On September 25, 1961, legislative elections were held in Rwanda, with the Hutu party PARMEHUTU winning seventy-eight percent of the vote. The party now possessed thirty-five of the forty-four seats in the new legislative body of Rwanda (Prunier 1994, 53). Between the years of 1959 and 1966, the primary period of decolonization, violence against Tutsi in Rwanda was severe for which Hutu leaders were not punished. The violence continued until the 1994 genocide.

As the Hutu became secure in their position of authority, violence against Tutsi consistently occurred. It is estimated that between 1960 and 1990, six hundred to seven hundred thousand Tutsi fled or were forced to leave Rwanda (Prunier 1994, 63). The early violence against Tutsi was primarily retribution against and repression of the old order. After years of oppression at the hands of the colonial Belgians and their Tutsi

stooges, the Hutu suddenly held complete power over the country. In order to secure this power, the Hutu government encouraged violence against Tutsi. This violence was readily accepted by the Hutu population due to the ideology of hate against Tutsi which had matured and strengthened during colonization. The Tutsi became scapegoats for the oppression which the Hutu suffered during colonization (Cretien 2003, 305). While retribution and repression were strong forces in the years following decolonization, risk-minimization had not yet emerged.

Gregoire Kayibanda, the president of Rwanda's First Republic, which began in 1962, transformed Rwanda into a Hutu state. All political activity was limited to the Hutu population. The Belgian authority had created a migration ideology which imagined the Tutsi population as foreign. "The First Republic considered this claim reason enough to treat them [Tutsi] as politically illegitimate"(Mamdani 2001, 134). The First Republic ended on July 5, 1973 when Major General Juvenal Habyariman led a non-violent coup against the current regime, beginning the Second Republic (Mamdani 2001, 138). The Second Republic introduced a more systematic system of retribution, though it was an institutional retribution rather than a violent one. In order to "redress historical wrongdoings", the Second Republic imposed quotas on Tutsi dominated institutions. The education, employment, and religious sectors of Rwanda were forced to maintain a percentage of Hutu which matched the Hutu percentage of the population. This "affirmative action program" was intended as a way in which the Hutu population could be compensated for their oppression during the colonial period. However, the

program also served as a repressive tool, as countless Tutsi were forced into unemployment (Mamdani 2001, 138-150).

The years of the Second Republic were generally peaceful, though life was often difficult for the Tutsi population. Habyarimana imposed a single party political system, in which the Mouvement Revolutionnaire National pour le Developpement, or MRND, was the sole party. Habyarimana also introduced "peace and stability" to Rwanda (Prunier 1994, 76). Tutsi faced discrimination and were largely excluded from the military and the political sphere (Prunier 1994, 75), but enjoyed certain rights within society (Mamdani 2001, 140). I see the relative peace of this period as a result of the completion of retribution and repression. The Tutsi order had been repressed. Revenge for past oppression had been taken on the Tutsi population, both through political and violent means. However, in the early 1990s, the ideologies of repression and retribution would be awakened by the ideology of risk-minimization.

In October of 1990, a force of the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), a Tutsi rebel army, invaded Rwanda. The initial invasion failed, ignited a civil war that lasted four years. While the RPF was small and militarily weak in October of 1990, its strength grew throughout the civil war (Mamdani 2001, 186). Civil war endangered the Hutu authority. During the civil war, Hutu were reminded by their leaders of the horrible oppression which they had suffered during the colonial period of Tutsi elevation. Propagandists explained that an RPF victory would result in an immediate return to the colonial order, in which Tutsi had been elevated to complete dominance over Hutu. The colonial migration hypothesis was reenforced throughout the civil war. The Tutsi were

41

portrayed as foreign invaders who had formerly led an oppressive order and would

reconstruct that order in the event of a RPF victory (Mamdani 2001, 190-191). The Hutu

of Rwanda feared any allowance of authority to the Tutsi population. The Hutu

population had suffered almost sixty years of complete Tutsi dominance during the

colonial period, so it is not surprising that they were willing to use genocide in order to

maintain their post-colonial power.

Peace talks held in Arusha, Tanzania in July of 1992 offer a perspective on the

perceived risk of a return to the Tutsi dominated colonial order. The final agreement

gave Tutsi charge of the Ministry of the Interior, forty percent of enlisted positions in the

army, fifty percent of the officer position in the army, and guarantee of the peaceful

return of all Tutsi refugees to Rwanda. The peace talks were seen by many Hutu as an

agreement between the Rwandan Patriotic Front and its internal Hutu accomplices

(Mamdani 2001, 210). At this point, the authority and comfort which the Hutu

population had enjoyed since decolonization were decisively endangered. Hutu media

and leaders used these talks to mobilize the ideology of retribution, repression, and risk-

minimization into a genocidal policy, which emerged in the horrific 1994 genocide.

In 1994, the *colonially relegated* Hutu attempted to minimize risk by eliminating

the *colonially elevated* Tutsi. During the sixty years of colonial rule, the Hutu population

suffered under an oppressive Tutsi dominance of society and government. The

dominance was implemented by the colonial authority and created a deep rift between the

Tutsi and Hutu populations that was not present prior to colonization. Colonial ideology

elevated Tutsi to a status of privilege and superiority. Hutu were told that they were

relegated because they were an inferior population. Although the Hutu population gained power after decolonization, in 1994 was threatened by the rising political power of the Tutsi population. In order to maintain power, the Hutu leadership incited the Hutu population to genocide against the Tutsi population.

The Hutu ruling elite used propaganda to incite the Hutu peasantry to a hate and fear of Tutsi. This was accomplished during the civil war, and was a vital aspect of the 1994 genocide. Propaganda reminded the common Hutu of colonial oppression and of the Tutsi participation in the colonial order. The ruling elite were minimizing the risk of a loss of power and common Hutu were minimizing the risk of a return to Tutsi rule. The move toward genocide was engineered by the Hutu elite, but was accepted by the Hutu population due to the existence of three factors. The first factor was the renewed ideology of hate for Tutsi which had been planted by colonization, which led to a continued desire for retribution against the Tutsi population. The second factor was the propagandized need to further repress the Tutsi order. The third factor, also dependent on propaganda, was the instilment of fear of a return to the oppressive colonial order into the Hutu population, thus creating the imagined need to minimize a risk of this return.

The 1994 Rwandan genocide consisted of a *colonially relegated* group attempting to destroy a *colonially elevated* group. Indirect colonization implemented the necessary social division within Rwanda for genocide to occur. The division was created and manipulated by the colonial authority in order to adequately serve its own interests. This invented and manipulated division produced a hate for the Tutsi population and a fear of the oppressive order which the Tutsi had led. Prior to colonization there had been little

violence between Tutsi and Hutu. Colonization polarized the two groups, providing a

motivation for genocide. In 1994, the need for risk-minimization emerged and the Hutu

leadership used the motivations of retribution, repression, and risk-minimization to drive

the Hutu population to pursue genocide.

Chapter 5: Case Study: Cambodia

The Genocide

In April 1975, the Communist Party of Kampuchea, known as the Khmer Rouge, took complete control of Cambodia, beginning with the country's capital and urban center, Phnom Penh. The period of CPK control that followed fostered one of the worst instances of genocide of the twentieth century. The killing of between 1.5 and 2 million people by the Khmer Rouge is normally considered politicide because the victims were seen as enemies of the Communist revolution and "what was likely the world's most radical political, social, and economic revolution"(Kiernan 1994, 191). I see the killings as a clear example of genocide, as religious and ethnic groups were specifically targeted. Whatever term is used, the massacre was horrendous, destroying a quarter of the Cambodia's total population (Kiernan 1994, 191). The killings in Cambodia can be credited to the Khmer Rouge's desire to eradicate all classes which posed a threat to the imposition of Communism and to the Communist regime. Though there is basic truth in this statement, I see the genocide as a result of ulterior motives held by the peasant dominated Khmer Rouge forces. French colonial rule altered Cambodia, and the changes imposed by colonization had a strong influence on the Cambodian genocide.

The victims of the Cambodian genocide came from a wide array of various segments of the population. Unlike the Rwandan genocide, the victim-perpetrator relationship is not easily specified. In Rwanda, the victims were primarily Tutsi, but in Cambodia the victims were urban, rural, indigenous, and non-indigenous. However, a large number of the victims were urban dwellers and people with foreign ancestry. The

45

victimized population is divided into two distinctions, "new people" and "base people"(Kiernan 1994, 192). While areas of each distinction were targeted, the percentages of members of each distinction that perished are evidence of the goals of the perpetrators. This goal was the destruction of all remnants of the colonial order.

Total death counts and counts of the victimized from each segment of society vary among experts on the genocide. According to Kiernan's (1994) calculations of the 1.5 million total death count, twenty-nine percent of Cambodia's "new people" were killed. "New people" included urban Khmer, rural Khmer, urban Chinese, urban Vietnamese, and rural Lao. A much lower percentage of Cambodia's "base people" were victimized. Sixteen percent of this group was killed, including another section of rural Khmer, rural Cham, rural Vietnamese, rural Thai, and upland minorities (Kiernan 1994, 193). The Khmer people belong to an ethnic group which is common throughout South-East Asia, and comprised the majority of the Cambodian population. The segments of Cambodian population which owe their demise to the French indirect colonial rule are all the victimized urban dwellers and the victimized minorities, especially the Vietnamese and Chinese. I will not attempt to explain the motivations behind the massacre of rural Khmer, though a large portion of this group was killed.

In April 1975, as the Khmer Rouge took control of Cambodia, the first step of the genocide began. The cities of Cambodia were emptied, their inhabitants forced into the countryside where they starved to death, were deported to work camps where they eventually died, or were executed by the Khmer Rouge. Approximately one third of Cambodia's urban population was destroyed during the genocide. The second target was

46

the minority population of Cambodia. Foreign and minority languages were outlawed, an attempt to destroy the culture of the minority population and make its continued existence difficult (Kiernan 1994, 191). The Vietnamese population of Cambodia was completely destroyed through forced emigration or execution. Cambodia's Chinese population was also severely damaged; fifty percent of the population perished during the genocide. Along with the Chinese language, Chinese culture was also prohibited, essentially destroying the life of this minority (Kiernan 1994, 198-199).

Due to the wide array of victimized groups, I will focus on the urban, Chinese, and Vietnamese populations targeted during the genocide. The destruction of these three groups provides the best explanation of the link between indirect colonial rule and genocide. Though the Cambodian genocide was carried out in a revolutionary disguise, the eradication of one-third of the urban population, half of the Chinese population, and the total Vietnamese population require a deeper consideration. These killings were not simply the result of a Communist revolution, but were the result of fifty years of colonially imposed oppression and social division. The victims of the colonial oppression were the rural peasants, which I will consider the *colonially relegated* group. The beneficiaries of French colonial rule, and thus the country's *colonially elevated* group, were the urban, Chinese, and Vietnamese populations. Similar to the Rwandan case, the Cambodian genocide was carried out by the *colonially relegated* group against the *colonially elevated* segment of the population.

Prior to French colonization, Cambodia was a rural, peasant based society. The largest pre-colonial city was Phnom Penh, which supported less than twenty-five thousand inhabitants. In a distant second, the royal capital of Udong only held ten thousand people. Most of the Cambodian population existed in small villages with little interaction with a central government or regime (Chandler 2000, 100). A system of patronage was maintained in pre-colonial Cambodia, which often existed within villages or families. The relationships of this system were viewed as natural, and were generally mutually beneficial. The client of the relationship provided his patron with crops and services in return for protection. A Cambodian proverb adequately summarized this patron-client relationship, and its traditional role in Cambodian society: "The rich must protect the poor, just as clothing protects the body" (Chandler 2000, 105). Pre-colonial Cambodia consisted of only two social classes, the rich and the poor (Chandler 2000, 87). Social relationships were not viewed in terms of rural vs urban or farmer vs merchant. Cambodians lived their lives in their villages, and political, economic, and social relationships, while often unequal, were primarily held within the boundaries of these villages (Chandler 2000, 100-110).

Pre-colonial Cambodia maintained no bureaucracy or standing army (Chandler 2000, 110). The monarchy was a remote, but respected entity, finding its primary source of respect in Cambodian mythology (Chandler 2000, 106). While respected, the power of the king was "rarely enforced, and seldom face-to-face"(Chandler 2000, 107). Pre-colonial Cambodian society centered around the village, and any oppression faced by the

population was generally rooted in the patronage system and existed primarily in the individual village. The rural population gave little practical thought to the central government (Chandler 2000, 100-110).

Colonization

During the first half of the nineteenth century, Cambodia was constantly threatened by Thai and Vietnamese forces, as Vietnam slowly began to control its Cambodian neighbors. Initially, Vietnam exercised loose control over Cambodia in response to Thai-Vietnamese conflict (Chandler 2000, 119-122). In 1835, Vietnam began to strengthen its hold on Cambodia in order to protect itself from Thai aggression. Vietnamese Emperor Minh Mang "sought to mobilize and arm the Khmer, to colonize the region with Vietnamese, and to reform the habits of the people"(Chandler 2000, 125). Vietnamese efforts to "reform" Cambodia were largely unsuccessful. These early colonizers were unable to change "Cambodian agricultural techniques" and their "efforts to quantify and systemize the land holdings, tax payments, and irrigation works came to little"(Chandler 2000, 126). The Vietnamese were also unsuccessful in their attempts to alter Cambodian culture. The one truly lasting effect which Vietnamese control of Cambodia had on the country was the elevated status afforded to the newly immigrated Vietnamese in Cambodia. The Vietnamese placed their own citizens in positions of power in the Cambodian government. Many of these citizens remained in Cambodia after Vietnam was ousted from the country (Chandler 2000, 128). Vietnamese control over Cambodia ended in 1848, with Prince Duang taking the relatively autonomous

49

throne. Duang would eventually seek the protection of France against the Vietnamese, who were a constant threat to Cambodia and the country's "traditional enemies"(Chandler 2000, 135).

French involvement in Cambodia began in the 1850s, but the country truly began to feel the institutional alterations as France began to tighten its control over Cambodia in the final years of the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth century. In 1892, collection of taxes from the Cambodian population had been taken over by the French. In 1904 Prince Monivong Sisowath became the king of Cambodia, hand-picked by the French authority. The French slowly modernized Cambodia, but the Cambodian elite resisted change. The elite saw no value in widening "their intellectual horizons" or need "to tinker with their beliefs"(Chandler 2000, 148). Since the Cambodians had no desire to modernize their country, Chinese and Vietnamese immigrants dominated the French-encouraged modernization (Chandler 2000, 148). French colonial rule was technically indirect, as the Cambodian monarchy was left intact and a large part of the government was comprised of minorities, such as Chinese and Vietnamese. However, there were also French *residents* who acted as vice-roys in colonial Cambodia. Throughout the early twentieth century, these French officials became more remote to the Cambodian population. Automobiles allowed the residents to inspect the country from established roads, but these inspections were "superficial" as much of the country was still distant from the system of roads (Chandler 2000, 151). The authority figures that the majority of Cambodians would come in contact with were Vietnamese agents of the French administration. The colonial administration was filled with Vietnamese immigrants, as

they often spoke French, and thus were more suited for cooperation with the French (Chandler 2000, 151). Throughout its colonial rule, the French authority encouraged Vietnamese immigration to Cambodia.

Under French colonial rule, Cambodia economically prospered. This prosperity did not reach the peasant population. Cambodian farmers could expect to earn about ninety *piastres* per year or forty if they farmed independently and sold their crops, while a French official earned up to twelve thousand *piastres* per year. Cambodian peasants were also subjected to severe taxes. The same farmer that earned a maximum of forty piastres was taxed as much as twelve *piastres* per year. The Cambodian peasantry was not only at an economic disadvantage to the French, but also to Chinese merchants, who enjoyed great prosperity during colonization (Chandler 2000, 155). The Cambodian peasantry was excluded from the benefits of modernization and was oppressed by the institutions of colonization. In addition, the peasantry was increasingly separated from the growing cities of Cambodia, primarily Phnom Pehn. In 1922, according to a French official, medical services, electricity, and running water "were almost unknown outside Phnom Penh"(Chandler 2000, 156). The French built modern cities in Cambodia, using tax revenue from the impoverished peasantry, who received very little benefit from the French authority (Chandler 2000, 155). With this in mind, it is no surprise that the first step in the 1975 peasant revolution of the Khmer Rouge was the emptying of Cambodia's cities and the eradication of one-third of the urban population.

Though they were taxed heavily, the Cambodian peasantry rarely saw the French colonial authority. Thus, their anger and hate for the oppressive colonial order was

placed on the minorities, especially the Vietnamese, who they saw as French stooges. The *colonially elevated* were seen as the initiators of the changes which had occurred in Cambodia. In 1975, when Cambodia's peasantry finally revolted against a century of institutional oppression, it was this *colonially elevated* section of society which bore the brunt of the peasants' retribution. The peasantry saw the French colonial authority in the Vietnamese who acted as its pawns, in the Chinese merchants who became rich while they suffered, and in the urban population who enjoyed the amenities of the city at the peasantry's expense. Retribution for the suffering of the peasantry was directed at the *colonially elevated*, who benefitted greatly from French colonization. Retribution was also exacted against Vietnamese for the early Vietnamese control of Cambodia. The high death rate in the Vietnamese population during the 1975 genocide is not an anomaly. The Vietnamese had been the *colonially elevated* group since the beginning of the nineteenth century. The peasantry's desire for retribution was the overarching motivation in the destruction of these three sections of the Cambodian population, evidenced by the large percentages of the population of each section of society that were killed during the genocide. Clearly the Khmer Rouge wanted to completely destroy these segments of the population.

While retribution was the primary motivation behind the Cambodian genocide, repression and risk-minimization were also important factors. These motivations can be partially attributed to the Communist revolution. Retribution is ideological, often driven by emotion, while repression and risk-minimization are political. While the need for retribution can be felt by every peasant, the need for repression and risk-minimization is

primarily felt by the actual leaders of the revolution and the genocide. These leaders are

able to convey this need to the rest of the population, but it begins with them. Though

repression of the former regime and the minimization of risk of a return to the order of

the *colonially elevated* groups can be explained by the revolutionary manner of the

Khmer Rouge period, I see these factors as closely related to the colonial period.

Colonization proved to the Cambodian peasantry that it was possible for their peasant

society to be destroyed, and that they were vulnerable to oppression. In peasant

revolutions, an ideology of a new social order, "a visionary utopia where all men are

brothers", is constructed (Gamst 1974, 48). The peasantry often attempts to restore a real

or imagined social order of the past (Gamst 1974, 48). In Cambodia, the idea of the pre-

colonial peasant society was important to the revolution, as it represented the golden days

of pre-colonial Cambodia. In order to lessen the vulnerability of the newly established

peasant society, the Khmer Rouge destroyed everyone who might oppose them, and

consequently targeted the *colonially elevated* Vietnamese, Chinese, and urban

populations.

French indirect colonially rule alienated the Cambodian peasantry. This large

portion of the country's population was neglected in favor of urban populations and

minority groups. Similar to the Rwandan genocide, the Cambodian genocide consisted of

a *colonially relegated* group killing members of a *colonially elevated* group. Indirect

colonial rule polarized these two groups, and made it possible for the colonially relegated

group to create an ideology that incited hate and fear of the colonially elevated group.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

Rwanda and Cambodia have both experienced something which is frightening and horrendous. Genocide does not simply harm the victimized population, but also the political system and economy of the country. Large sections of the population disappear, including children, creating a hole in the population and the future society of the country. The exact motivations of the perpetrators of genocide can never be known completely, but theoretical exploration is an important part of preventing future genocide. I do not want to blame European colonizers for the atrocities committed during the genocidal episodes discussed in this study. To blame these people, who are long dead, would be an empty gesture. I do however want this study to provide a theoretical framework of the motivations of genocide.

Can we prevent genocide? I think that if we understand the wide array of motivating factors which influence genocide. My theory allows for the prediction of genocide in certain former colonies. By examining the divisions which the colonial authority implemented in these countries, we can distinguish the *colonially elevated* and *colonially relegated* sections of society. It is not possible to predict the year of the genocide with this information, but by understanding who the possible perpetrators are (i.e. the *colonially relegated* group), certain diplomatic efforts can be made to ease the tension between the colonially relegated and *colonially elevated* groups. If the international community can bridge the social rift that was created by indirect colonial

rule, it can prevent the *colonially relegated* group from pursuing a policy of retribution, repression, and risk-minimization.

I cannot say what country will suffer the ills of genocide next, but I can say that genocide is not a thing of the past. This crime has existed since the beginning of humanity and, unless a way in which to predict and prevent it is found, it will continue to plague us until the end of time. Whether it is in Iraq, Tanzania, or Niger, the next genocidal episode will be just as horrific as the last. The next instance of genocide will shock the world, just as it did in Rwanda and Cambodia. If the international community takes preemptive action, using theoretical studies of the motivations of genocide to predict the perpetrators of the next genocide, maybe a few genocidal episodes can be stopped. Simple action now can save thousands, if not millions, in the future.

Table 1: Types of Colonial Rule in thirty-two post-1943 Genocidal Countries.

Genocidal Country	Type of Colonial Rule
Equatorial Guinea	Indirect
Nigeria	Indirect
Congo	Indirect
Uganda	Indirect
Burundi	Indirect
Rwanda	Indirect
Ethiopia	No Colonial Rule
Somalia	Indirect
Angola	Indirect
Algeria	Indirect
Sudan	Indirect
Madagascar	Direct
Iran	No Colonial Rule
Iraq	Indirect
Syria	Direct, with some periods of Indirect
Afghanistan	Indirect
China	No Colonial Rule
Pakistan	Indirect
Burma	Direct
Sri Lanka	Direct
Cambodia	Indirect
Laos	Indirect
Vietnam	Indirect
Philippines	Indirect, with a later shift to Direct
Indonesia	Indirect, with a later shift to Direct
Guatemala	Direct
El Salvador	Direct
Chile	Direct
Argentina	Direct
U.S.S.R.	No Colonial Rule
Bosnia	No Colonial Rule
Serbia	No Colonial Rule

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