

## Minimizing Violence: A Good Practice Local Elite-Based in the Madura Island, Indonesia

Pardamean Daulay<sup>(1)</sup>, Ardhie Raditya<sup>(2)</sup>, Nur Afni Khafsoh<sup>(3\*)</sup>

### ARTICLE INFO

\*Correspondence Author

<sup>(1)</sup> Universitas Terbuka

<sup>(2)</sup> State University of Surabaya (UNESA)

<sup>(3\*)</sup> UIN Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta, Jl. Laksda Adisucipto, Papringan, Kota Yogyakarta, Special Region Yogyakarta, Indonesia 55281. Email: [nur.khafsoh@uin-suka.ac.id](mailto:nur.khafsoh@uin-suka.ac.id)

#### How to cite:

Daulay, P., Raditya, A. & Khafsoh, N.A. (2022). Minimizing Violence: A Good Practice Local Elite-Based in the Madura Island, Indonesia. *Jurnal Pemberdayaan Masyarakat: Media Pemikiran dan Dakwah Pembangunan*, 6(1), 90-110.

### ARTICLE HISTORY

Received 28 December 2021

Accepted 10 Juli 2022

### KEYWORDS

Minimizing Violence,  
Local Elites, Madura Island

### ABSTRACT

The success of democracy in a nation is measured by the existence of a peaceful, civilised social life. In Indonesia, however, ornaments of violence remain while resolving issues, as in Madura. This study outlines the underlying factors that lead to the formation of violence and pinpoints the function that local elites play in curbing the use of violence. The Galtung theory of violence is utilised in the investigational analysis. In order to analyse the data for this study, we used qualitative research, a case study procedure, and an integration strategy. The findings demonstrated that violence had permeated the Madurese culture. Internally passed down and socially sanctioned, it has been used to cope with various life concerns, such as issues involving wives or women, misunderstandings, inheritance, land, religion or belief, theft, and debts and receivables. Because they have historically served as a point of reference in times of conflict, local elites such as *Bhuppa/Bhâbu*, *Ghuru*, and *Rato* (parents, *Kiai* or the leader in the Islamic religion/teacher, and government) are crucial to the realisation of a culture of non-violence. The local elite's necessary development of their function does not restrict but somewhat dampens and empowers, notably among the *Bâjing*.

## Introduction

Over the last decade, the study of violence has become a trend in empirical research. On the other hand, the problem of violence is also the duty of the government to find a solution. It is inseparable from the emergence of a new perspective that views people who live in an area free from violent practices that will create intensive and humanistic communication and social interaction (Daulay, 2019; Izudin, 2021; Kaprabowo, 2019; Ryberg-Webster, 2019). Between them, they will not hold grudges against various negative stigmas and a narrow and naive mind-set. The emergence of social tension issues can be solved in a peaceful, polite, dialogical, educative, and wise way (Donnellan, 2019; Kusuma & Susilo, 2020; Muhammad, 2018). According to Larry Diamond, harmonious life is a measure of the success of implementing a democratic life system (Diamond, 2010). The less violent practices are used to resolve social disputes, the higher the quality of democratic life in a country. In this case, the author argues that minimally violent community life can create social integration and accelerate economic development at the local level.

Based on the sociological reality, in Indonesia, many local people's lives are decorated with ornaments of violence when resolving various conflicts and violence (Jati, 2013; Rachmawan, 2015; Trisno et al., 2019). Madura is one of Indonesia's regions full of a culture of violence in its society called *Carok*. *Carok* is usually related to individual acts of violence; however, sometimes, mass *Carok* begins from the individual cause. In 2007, there was a mass *Carok* involving two groups of supporters of the village head (*Klebun*) and the opposition mass in Bujhur village, Pamekasan Regency (Bambang, 2006; El-Rumi, 2020).

The practice of violence such as *Carok* and whatever form it takes without realizing it can severely threaten the integration and harmonization of the nation, state, and society. So far, research has demonstrated that the causes of violence cannot be addressed uniformly, nor can the issues of reducing and eliminating it. A report entitled *The 'War on Terrorism': 12-month audit and future strategy options* Elworthy & Rogers (2002) explain that there are seven stages of emotions felt by humans that cause violence to always repeat itself. When the violence occurred, the first impact felt shocked at the action—secondly, fear, pain, and sadness. Furthermore, the feeling then turned into anger. Fifth, anger turns to bitterness. Sixth, bitterness turns into a desire for revenge. Seventh, revenge then leads to retaliation, which then returns to violence.

In general, violence in Madurese culture always arises because of feelings of shame or humiliation in the perpetrator because others abuse his pride. This feeling

is transformed into a *Carok* ritual (fighting with sharp weapons). The issue of self-esteem becomes very important for the Madurese community. To restore their self-esteem, they take extreme actions (murder) against the harassing person. In the author's observation, the values of *Carok*, namely defending self-esteem, are recorded very powerfully in Madurese, even those of the same age as school students. Although students at school do not commit murder, *Carok* values play an influential role in the occurrence of conflicts. It requires severe handling and needs to involve all elements and local elites in criminalizing violence. It is seen as critical because the group ties within the Madurese community are solid, allowing for further conflicts involving a larger mass of people from the two warring parties. It is where the role of the local elite is further strengthened to reconcile the *Carok* violence (Yonefendi et al., 2018).

Previous findings have reviewed several studies related to the tap culture of the Madurese community. One of the studies conducted by Wiyata showed that violence such as *Carok* in Madura was classified as an act of maintaining self-esteem (Wiyata, 2002). Three kinds of self-esteem must be maintained and fought for by the Madurese, namely, women (*Rèng Bini*), behavior (*Tèngka*), and tongue/words (*Caca*). If other parties disturb and hurt his self-esteem, then violence is a reasonable effort to maintain Madurese's dignity. Meanwhile, Raditya's and Rozaki's research shows that violence tends to occur in the strong Madurese community with high courage (Ardhi, 2008; Rozaki, 2004, 2021). Some refer to this community of strong people as *Blatèr* (specifically in Bangkalan and parts of northern Sampang). Others call it *Bàjing* (especially in Pamekasan, Sumenep, and parts of southern Sampang). *Carok* is a measure of a person's courage or not for members of the Madurese community, so violence like *Carok* among them is the last resort when facing the fatal risks and threats that come from the opposing side.

Other studies only examine the *Carok* culture, which generalizes the self-image of the Madurese. Not much has been discussed about efforts to reduce violence. The government has made various efforts in Madura to reduce violence locally, but these efforts are often still half-hearted. It is because the approach used is not intensive. It seems haphazard, is too structural and constrained, is repressive and not preventive (muffles), is not proven (empowering), and does not involve the role of local elites. In fact, in the perspective of Madurese culture, there are several norms and values, such as affection, *Tepo Seliro* (Respectness), politeness, and exclusivity, that already exist and are transmitted by the local elite in Madura (Rifa'i & Mien, 2007). The strategy of local elites like this needs to be studied because they can play an essential role in changing the perspective and culture of a society that is full of violence. The

author views that the local Madurese elites and the actors in them have an essential role in realizing a culture of non-violence (Kellner, 1995).

This article aims to identify the role of local elites in reducing the culture of violence and develop a model for minimizing violence based on the local Madurese elite. This research is fundamental in the presence of reform and regional autonomy after the collapse of the New Order in 1998. It expanded access to the Madurese community's political economy because local governments could freely find solutions to problems such as economic backwardness and education, which are seen as triggers for a culture of violence. The Suramadu (Surabaya-Madura) bridge megaproject is an opportunity for development efforts in Madura, at least as a starting point to provide opportunities for investors to implement economic and educational programs in Madura. Therefore, after the Suramadu megaproject, development in Madura must be supported by a social life that is harmonious, stable, and away from violent practices. Importantly, the image of the Madurese community in the eyes of Madurese foreigners, which is synonymous with aggression, ethnic superiority, brutality, and exclusivity, has the potential to be transformed into a moderate, tolerant, inclusive, democratic, dialogical, and civilized society.

### **The Culture of Violence and the Role of the Local Elite**

Violence means “transferring power to the outside/another party” (Galtung, 1988). Therefore, violence is also synonymous with strength. Arendt says that what is meant by violence and strength have not many different meanings (Arendt, 2013). Strength and violence are actions that restrain the other party through many strategies. In violence, there will usually always be aspects of restraint, limitation, or elimination of a person's human potential (as a victim or victim).

The causes of the emergence of violence take various forms—first, psychological factors. According to Gurr, the emergence of violent acts in society is due to relative deprivation, namely the emergence of disappointment due to a mismatch between community expectations (value expectation) and what is obtained by the community (value capability) (Mas'ood & Et.al, 2000). For example, the people's desire to get economic resources is limited by other parties, resulting in disappointment and erupting into violence—second the political factor. According to Charley Tilly (Mas'ood & Et.al, 2000), acts of violence result from mass mobilization by leaders to respond or gain support and political positions. That means violence is emotional and results from rational action and political calculation. Third, cultural and ecological factors. According to Wiyata (2002), humans and their natural environment are very

close. Thus, natural limitations make humans compete with each other for these limited resources. Violence arises because of the increasingly fierce competition among humans. Violence is an effective strategy to obtain limited natural resources. Then, the four economic factors. According to Kusumandaru (2003), violence is a strategy used by capital owners to minimize public protest space. However, a mass that has matured and is qualified in motion will not be quickly subdued. So they will take countermeasures. All this violence leads to one goal: justice and economic equality/welfare. In Madurese society, violence is part of their culture. It is what makes the practice of violence distributed from generation to generation. Thus, the Madurese considers violence a socially legitimized step when facing various problems.

Following Galtung, acts of violence in people's lives can be seen from psychological, social, and cultural aspects (Galtung, 1988). This analysis is popularly known as the Galtung hardness triangle. First is the psychological dimension, usually seen from relative deprivation (disappointment, anger, or social unrest that arises because the wishes or expectations of the community are not maximally achieved). Second, the social dimension relates to the influence of the people around who support and hope for violence. This social dimension examines the involvement of violent actors and the root causes of violence (economics, politics, environment, power, to experience). Third, the cultural dimension relates to the order of meaning and the symbolic order, including local values and historical violence committed. However, Galtung's violent triangle has not yet demonstrated the role of strategic local elites. Strategic local elites' role in reducing the violence culture in Madura will be analyzed.

Speaking of elites is synonymous with the legal government and an honest government that is not written in positive law but is socially and culturally legitimized. Kellner refers to these elites as strategic or powerful elites (Kellner, 1995). Strategic elites are responsible for the running of social processes. They have ideas, strategies, political power, and the spirit to work selflessly to bring about a harmonious life in society (Kellner, 1995). This elite provides enlightenment for ordinary people still stuck in ignorance and ignorance (Mannheim, 1991).

Furthermore, Kellner (1995) said that the strategic elite is different from the ruling class. Strategic elites have always existed and emerged in society. Evers et al. (1990) say that the strategic elite (they call it a strategic group) arose and existed because it broke the traditional history of feudalism and colonialism. The strategic elite present in the colonialism period as a form of government legality gradually transformed with the presence of elites with populist backgrounds and humanitarian

vocations, both in the past and in the present (Evers et al., 1990). The emergence of the strategic elite is motivated by morality, solidarity, knowledge, and skills used for efforts to empower the wider community.

Meanwhile, the ruling class is present because of its orientation to material power, position, and service to the pro-status quo. The strategic elite have a high value of empathy, while the ruling class has the potential to exploit. These strategic elite may not have a formal educational background, but the ruling class is usually formed because of high and tiered education.

Every society always has and presents its strategic elite figure (Evers et al., 1990; Kellner, 1995). Thus, the Madurese also have a strategic elite figure. In general, the strategic elite in Madura is reflected in the daily knowledge of Madurese about *Bhuppa'/Bhâbu'*, *Ghuru*, *Rato* (parents/elders, teachers/Kiai, and the government). This strategic elite in Madura has become a reference for the local community in carrying out their daily lives and a source of solving various problems (Ardhi, 2008). Furthermore, Raditya elaborated on the role of the local Madurese elite in the Dutch colonial era. When there was famine and misery in Madura because of the cruelty of the colonial regime, the role of parents, Kiai, and local Madurese kings became the mobilizers of the people to carry out anti-colonial resistance movements. The values of resistance coupled with the independence war movement became the moral grip of the Madurese community because of the influence of the example of the Madurese parents. Therefore, violence such as *Carok* during the colonial period was considered a noble act to maintain the nation's independence and the social solidarity of the Madurese, who had long been the object of exploitation by the colonial regime (De Jong, 2002).

In its development, the influx of modernization into Madura did violent practices such as *Carok* questionable and their meaning questioned. Modern life that upholds openness, dialogue, tolerance, and educative inter-ethnic interactions are the main factors for criticizing the culture of violence in Madurese society. In today's era, when people hear about cases of violence such as *Carok* or revenge killings, people feel both concerned and disappointed with the violent solution carried out by the two warring parties. When they heard about cases of violent conflict, not a few people immediately asked for help from village elders, Kiai, or the local government to act immediately to resolve the tension before bloodshed occurred.

The results of Raditya's research show that often cases of *Carok* or revenge attempts due to existing conflicts (self-esteem issues) can be immediately suppressed when there is the involvement of a Kiai figure or village elder (Raditya & Nugroho, 2008). However, the

biggest obstacle was when the strategic elite in Madura faced Madurese master (Blater) who still adhered to the culture of violence. It then became a challenge for the strategic elite in Madura to provide enlightenment and awareness to the Blaters to minimize the culture of violence. Thus, in the current era, the role of these strategic elite has a dual role. Namely, as moral guards and social balancers, on the other hand, they have to fight hard to reduce the culture of violence at the community level and among Madurese master (Blater). This was done to follow or adapt the life of the Madurese community in the era of democracy and openness as it is today.

### Research Methods

This research uses a qualitative method which is post-ethnography and phenomenology. Latter said that post-ethnography or critical ethnography was placed as a research model that wants to describe the cultural life of local society that connected with power aspect or empowerment (social change) (Atkinson et al., 2007). Post-ethnography intends to look for historical data and power influence by searching the literature, socio-historical interviews, or historical life. Meanwhile, phenomenology is the approach used to explore recent data behind human awareness (Moustakas, 1997).

This research was conducted in the regencies of Pamekasan and Bangkalan (Madura Island). Three types of considerations led to the selection of both places. First, violence and strife persist in Pamekasan and Bangkalan. Even though the local population's desire to end violent culture is sufficient, the local government has implemented social integration programs. Consequently, the problem is still discovered since the technique is too structuralist and limited. It is not empowering and preventative.

The research data was obtained by observation, interview, and focus group discussion. First, observation was conducted to observe the fact directly in the research location by noting all about local people conditions (politic, social, economic) and social integration strategy done by strategic elites. The researcher noted and recorded all social symptoms, either structure or semi structured, asking some questions to find empirical facts. Denzin & Lincoln (1994) said that the observation technique is found in visual data and all senses that can observe, like smell, hearing, touch, and taste. Through this observation, the researcher also tries to build trust with the informant and connect with the local society. It is necessary to make it easy to enter inside research subject. Also, the researcher could be expected well to get the information needed. The observation was conducted in the office of the village head, Islamic boarding school, school, and society socio-cultural agendas.

Moreover, the observation was conducted in the informant's house to know daily activity in detail. However, the observation has limitations because the information was hesitant in answering. After all, the data was secret. Therefore, the observation used an informal approach to the informant by bringing the local person into the research.

Second, researchers deal directly with informants and ask questions related to the research. The interviews conducted were in-depth interviews with key informants and supporting informants. The determination of informants was based on a purposive sampling technique, namely those who understand the history of the culture of violence, perpetrators of violence, and strategic elites on the island of Madura. This study does not question the number of samples (informants), so it can be a little or a lot. The most important thing is determining the main informant (key informant) to get information according to the research focus and the diversity of social phenomena being studied. The informants interviewed were divided into three groups:

- Parents/village elders, Kiai, were interviewed to get information on how the socialization process occurred until a culture of violence emerged.
- The Blater (both existing and former Blate) includes community leaders who are still related and have worked with the Blater. It is to obtain information on the relationship between the culture of violence and the profession as a Blater.
- Public school and religious teachers were interviewed about their opinions about efforts to reduce violence starting from the school environment.

The interview process was carried out from July – September 2020, and several additional interviews in June 2021. The interview process was not only done at home but also carried out in the workplace. Changing the place of the interview is used as a variation to improve the quality of the interview. So, the data obtained are complete and valid. The type of questions asked to the informants is open-ended and leads to a greater depth of information, and the interviews are conducted informally to explore the informants' perspectives in greater detail in accordance with the research's aim. This interview stage was carried out using an interview guide that had been prepared in advance, and the interview results were recorded after obtaining approval from the informant. However, the interview procedure might still have flaws and barriers, such as when there is no interview guide and when the informant has trouble recalling past occurrences. Those have difficulty expressing what he has experienced and cannot capture the researcher's questions. For this reason, the researcher used tools like a tape recorder and photo camera during the interview.



Third, Focus group discussions (FGD) were conducted to collect data to capture public opinion related to mapping the roots of violence and efforts to reduce the culture of violence. This FGD involved community leaders, clerics, teachers, government officials, The Regional Representative Council (DPRD) members, NGOs, lecturers, and the police. Involvement of police officers in FGD activities to obtain input related to efforts to minimize violence on the island of Madura. So far, the police are the representatives of the structure that plans, implements, and monitors the occurrence of violence. In addition, the structure as an embodiment of the government has three main groups: significance, dominance, and legitimacy. Through the research subject of this bureaucratic apparatus, this study can understand the duality relationship and the mutual influence between the desires of the Madurese community as agents and the model of minimizing violence that the government needs to implement (structure).

## Results and Discussion

In this section, the author will explore the research findings. In the beginning, the author explains the transformation of the culture of violence in Madura and identifies the role of local elites in reducing the culture of violence in Madura.

### *The Transformation of Violent Culture in Madura*

The Madurese have a lengthy history of *Carok* violence that has been passed down from generation to generation. It becomes the self-image of the Madurese. The field data results reveal that the culture of violence in Madura is related to the geographical aspect, characterized by barren natural resources and less fertile for agricultural activities. Ecologically, Madura has natural conditions that are less favorable than the agricultural sector (Kuntowijoyo, 1992). Compared to Java Island, Madura Island has barren land conditions and is less fertile for agricultural activities. The land surface in Madura is dominated by limestone and limestone deposits, with a marine alluvial layer along the north coast and four river alluvial plains (one in the west, two in the south, one in the south, and one in the south in the east). Natural conditions like this have resulted in agriculture as the primary source of income for the population in Madura not yielding good results. In general, the economic level includes the lower middle class as the view of social analysis, which says that economic interests or sentiments can create a significant enough potential for violent behavior like *Carok*. In addition, several results of previous studies also revealed that sterile soil conditions also influenced the

formation of the behavior and characteristics of the Madurese, who are known to be hard, persistent, and tenacious.

However, although the stereotype that develops in society in general, Madurese is attached to violence and tradition (*Carok*), which has claimed many victims, the motive of the Madurese to commit violence can be identified from 3 (three) factors. First is the disturbance of the wife. Madurese will be easily provoked and defend themselves in the form of *Carok* if their wife is bullied or has an affair with another man. Second, revenge against a family member killed in the *Carok* incident. Third, maintain inheritance.

Based on the description above, it can be drawn that *Carok*'s case stems from the feeling of being "*malo*" or insulted by the perpetrator because other people abused his pride. In other words, Madurese who is abused in their self-esteem will feel "*malo*," then do *Carok* against those who abuse them. The results of an interview with one of the informants revealed that if someone was insulted by their dignity but then did not dare to do *Carok*, they would get ridiculed by the community. Even the informant called him not a Madurese, saying, "*mon lo bangal acarok ajiha'ngako areng Madhure* (if you do not dare to do *Carok*, do not claim to be Madurese). So, Madurese do *Carok*, not only because they do not want to be seen as a coward, even though they are afraid of death, but also because they can still be considered Madurese. If this is the case, then *Carok* violence is a way for the Madurese to express their ethnic identity. It further strengthens the assumption of previous studies that *Carok* is not an act of violence in general but violence full of socio-cultural meanings, so it must be understood according to the context.

Along with the presence of reform and regional autonomy, the collapse of the New Order Regime in 1998, an increase in rapid technological developments, and fixing the social problem by local governments made the Madurese community able to expand access to the political economy, which were seen as triggers for a culture of violence. In addition to success in economic progress, improving access to education services in Madura is also considered to reduce the culture of violence. Unfortunately, although the development progress and economic access of the Madurese community have changed for the better, it turns out that the practice of violence in Madura is still happening. One of the informants confirmed that violence persists in Madura. However, recently violence is mainly caused by differences in beliefs (deviant teachings) and religious blasphemy (claiming to be a prophet after Prophet Muhammad SAW, as in the case of the Shia-Suni conflict in Sampang). Sexual harassment, 3C or Curat (stealing without violence), Curas (Robbery), Curanmor

(motorbike theft), and Gendam (Hypnotic). The informant, the administrator of a well-known Islamic boarding school in Bangkalan, that cases of Carok violence have begun to decrease, but that does not mean that the culture of violence has completely disappeared in the social life of the Madurese community. Only the form of the trigger turned into political interests, such as violence triggered by the implementation of the Village Head election and simultaneous elections (Members of Parliament, presidential elections, etc.). Cases of violence with political nuances have recently become the most dominant.

Thus, in the present context, the results of this study indicate that the roots of violence in Madura are not solely triggered by *Carok* violence but are currently being transformed into two forms. Namely; First, political violence arose during the regional elections, village head elections, and Members of Parliament/Presidential elections. Second, violence based on Religion (Sunni – Shia), (NU – Muhammadiyah = mass organization), (public schools – religious schools/traditional Islamic boarding schools).

First, violence has a political nuance. The use of violence as a strategy to gain political structural power cannot be separated from the political nuances in Indonesia, especially the reality of the implementation of the presidential or parliament elections in Madura in 2019. Online media reports state that in East Java, 351 cases of persecution occurred during the simultaneous elections and two cases occurred on Madura Island. The first occurred in TPS (polling place) in Shebuh, Tobadung Village, Klampis District, Bangkalan. Two of the perpetrators were arrested by police officers who are supporters of the Gerindra (name of party), HT, and AA candidates for the National Democratic Party (NasDem) candidates. Chronology of events, at that time AA was checking at TPS 3. However, by H and eight other HT supporters, AA was suspected of cheating. Over the dispute, there was almost a Carok using a sickle between them. Second, the case of confiscation of polling boxes at TPS 2 Cekocek, Bierem Village, Tambelangan District, Sampang, Madura. Two perpetrators were arrested, namely AS (50), supporters of Welfare Justice Party (PKS, name of party) candidate number 4, and MT (50), PKS candidate number 4. The emergence of violence started from dissatisfaction with the vote count results. The two perpetrators came to the TPS 2 and took two polling boxes by force, then brought them to the house of the suspect MT.

In addition, violence with political nuances at the local level also occurred in village head elections (known as Pilkades). One of the chaotic Pilkades that led to acts of violence occurred in Tadden Village, Camplong District, and Bira Barat Village, Ketapang District. Protests by some prospective voters triggered the case

of violence in Bira Barat Village because they did not receive an invitation to vote from the election organizing committee. Meanwhile, in Tadden Village, Camplong District, violence cases were initiated by a resident who intended to make a fuss so that officers could arrest the perpetrators. The actions in these two villages were carried out by a group of people with sharp weapons who allegedly organized the residents to create a noisy situation by using violent means.

Second, violence is based on differences in beliefs. The Madurese are very religious. In addition to kinship ties, religion is an essential element as a marker of their identity. For Madurese, Islam has become an inseparable part of their identity. If there are Madurese who embrace a religion other than Islam, their mature identity can be lost entirely.


Furthermore, the religious observance of the Madurese can be seen in their obedience to the Kiai. The teachings conveyed by the Kiai must be followed and passed on from generation to generation. What can be observed at the location of this research shows that the Kiai in Madura is known as NU people (Nahdhatul Ulama, an Islamic organization in Indonesia), so it is not surprising that in the religious life of the Madurese, the values of NU teachings are attached. An anecdote develops in the Madurese community that there is only one religion, namely NU.

The era of globalization continues to grow in rural areas, causing more and more Madurese to migrate to cities to work and continue their education. During their life in the city, Madurese interact with many people so that they begin to gain new knowledge, including teachings and beliefs that are different from the beliefs of the majority of Madurese people. When they return to Madura, they bring their teachings and beliefs, then introduce them to the local community. However, people who do not accept and are disturbed by these teachings and beliefs then staged protests, and expulsions, resulting in the emergence of social conflicts. One example, the bloody conflict in Sampang, was not 100 percent related to religion but rather caused by differences in beliefs. The seeds of conflict between the two warring groups have been going on for quite a long time, namely around 2006. At that time, the ulama (master in Islamic culture) and local community leaders rejected the teachings of Tajul Muluk, which they considered eccentric. Tajul himself is known to have openly spread teachings and recruited Shia congregations in Sampang since 2003. Several times, protests to mediation and meetings did not resolve conflicts due to differences in understanding.

*Minimize Violence Based on Local Elites in Madura*

Violence in the form of *Carok* is one way for the Madurese to express their ethnic identity. It further strengthens the notion that *Carok* is not an act of violence as is commonly known but an act of violence full of socio-cultural meanings that must be understood according to its context. Thus, the violent conflict in Madura can be reduced if it involves local elites. Unfortunately, so far, policymakers have forgotten the role of local elites in suppressing violence in Madura. Historically, the Indonesian state has various ethnicities with noble cultural capital. Culture is present as a transformation by having symbols and norms through the support of social institutions that function for life (Kuntowijoyo, 2006)—reflected in the Madurese community who have a culture of *Bhuppa* ‘*Bhabbu*’, *Ghuru*, and *Ratoh*. The concept of *Bhuppa*’*Bhabbu*’, *Ghuru*, *Ratoh* touches on the pillars of parents, teachers, and government. The results of data analysis found that the three local Madurese elites, *Bhuppa*’*Bhabbu*’, *Ghuru*, and *Ratoh*, could be a dose to reduce the prevalence of violent cases. (See Figure)

Figure 1. The model for minimizing violence based on local elites in Madura



First, *Bhuppa'- Bhabbu*. The Madurese people respect the position of their parents in their lives. A child will interpret his life through knowledge channeled by his parents. On that basis, the formation of character, knowledge, and perspective of a child's life cannot be separated from the influence of parents. In the reality of life, parents in Madura get high respect from their children. Even though they have migrated, children will still miss the presence and advice of their parents (Rifa'i & Mien, 2007). *Bhuppa'* means the father is a mirror for his children in acting. Some *Bhuppa'* in Madura tend to educate their children with a village *Pencak Silat* (traditional martial art) approach to provide for themselves outside the home. Not to educate to be a haughty and arrogant hero outside the home, but towards power management, an understanding of violence, and self-defense. The research results obtained in the field show that parents, especially fathers, often educate their children hard. One of them is through self-defense education, either at home or accompanied by a martial arts college in the village. Self-defense education for children is intended so that children do not arbitrarily commit violence against others. Because the basic principle of self-defense in Madura village is *Je' Gomejago neng bong-embong*, meaning do not act great on the streets. The meaning of this principle is aimed at the owners of the self-defense abilities of Madurese children so as not to carelessly show off their self-defense skills on the streets, let alone carry out violence at will in their environment. Thus, village self-defense in Madura is not only a practice of practicing the arts of movement, but also becomes part of alternative education for Madurese children about what violence means, violence management, and when to use self-defense skills.

Meanwhile, *Bhabhu'* or mothers provide education with a gentle approach. The mother gave a polite understanding. *Bhabhu'* for Madurese often emphasizes empathy for their children. The influence of mothers in educating children in the social life of the Madurese is very close. In contrast to the father or *Bhuppa'* who became the first role model for their children. Mother as the first teacher for Madurese children has a strong legitimacy in the child's mind. How naughty Madurese children are; they will hurry if Mother's orders enter their ears. In this way, the harsh upbringing of the *Bhuppa'* and the gentle approach of the *Bhabhu'* will give distractions a comprehensive understanding of the identity of the mature person through education from home.

Second, *Ghuruh*. After leaving home, Madurese children will move on to the play and school environments. Zunita stages of socialization that occur in children, namely socialization in the family environment, play, school, work, and mass media (Zunita & Ratna, 2010). In the play and school environment, the education of

Madurese children is held by the role of *Ghuruh*. *Ghuruh* or teachers in the Madurese tradition are oriented toward formal education teachers such as schools. However, it also refers to the Al Qur'an teacher, the Pencak silat teacher, to the Kiai. Like parents, the position of teachers in the elite hierarchy in Madura has strong recognition. Teachers are given a direct mandate by parents to educate their children outside the home. In this way, teachers contribute to educating and providing socialization on an understanding of violence outside the home.

Based on field data from Madurese children, education outside the home is at least three—first, formal education. Formal education means education in primary schools, secondary schools, and higher education. The second is Madrasah (Islamic education). Madrasah education is usually carried out during the day after formal school returns. Usually, lessons start at 2 pm and end at 4 pm. The lessons taught include general to specific religious subjects. The third is the education of the Al-Qur'an. Al-Qur'an education usually begins before the Maghrib call to prayer and ends after the congregational Isha prayer. The learning activity is reading the Qur'an independently and together to practice reading fluency and understanding its meaning and meaning. In this way, the *Ghuruh* in the Bhuppa'-Bhabhu' Ghuru *Ratoh* concept hierarchy includes formal school teachers, Madrasah school teachers, Al-Qur'an teachers, and clerics. The complexity of education outside the home makes the role of the teacher as an agent of socialization becomes crucial in minimizing the number of violence. Thus, teachers in the three layers of education can become the core of the elite who can suppress the number of violence with their cultural and symbolic capital (Bourdieu, 2020).

Third, *Ratoh* is a term for formal leaders of the Madurese community, such as hamlet heads, village heads, regents, school principals, etc. *Ratoh* is integral to the Madurese community's concept of Bhuppa'-Bhabhu' Ghuru *Ratoh*. The concept of Bhuppa'-Bhabhu' Ghuru *Ratoh* is a pillar supporting Madurese culture. In this way, *Ratoh* becomes one of the figures who can impact compliance, including by providing socialization of solutions to problems of violence.

The Madurese people respect and position *Ratoh* as a local elite with the basic construction. *Ratoh* is a person who has a high social status. Moreover, *Ratoh*, in the social environment of the Madurese community, tends to have an established economy and knowledge (education) that is capable of leading the community structurally. Based on the position of *Ratoh* that is upheld by the Madurese community, at least *Ratoh* has 3 (three) structural components: signification, dominance, and legitimacy. The significance of the *Ratoh* lies in the symbol of his position in the government,

village head, school principal, or member of the DPR (Member of Parliament). With its significance as an individual who has an important position in the structure, the *Ratoh* can effectively dominate awareness, understanding, and control over the actions of the Madurese community at the local level. Moreover, the form of domination carried out by the *Ratoh* will be legitimized by the community as part of its authoritative resources (Giddens, 2010; Kurniawan, 2020; Wirawan, 2012).

As a leader with formal legal legitimacy, *Ratoh* has the same commitment to release the entanglement of intertwined problems in people's lives. As a local elite, *Ratoh* has a more humane understanding of violence. Violence is something that must be removed from the root. In addition, violence is no longer a reference for one's maturity. Various village heads in Madura, based on field data, have consciously reconstructed the concept of violence. Violence is no longer a measure of a person's mature identity. The battle of ideas has become *Ratoh's* reference in openly educating the Madurese community.

*Ratoh* is fully responsible for educating an understanding of politics in a democratic manner (Addams, 2021). Democracy cannot be separated from diversity, and diversity is synonymous with emancipation. Therefore, political education rooted in diversity will produce a complete understanding of emancipation. This understanding respects every individual's differences while assuming they have their uniqueness (Fakih, 2011). Violence can be suppressed massively with an emancipatory understanding rooted in public awareness.

The field data show that village heads' political education can maximize the momentum of the Musrebang (Development Planning Conference). Musrebang is an annual meeting agenda for the village government with its staff, sub-district officials, and people to discuss village development and the budget for the following year. At the moment of the Musrebang openly, the community must be given space to speak to village political officials about their complaints over the last few years and ideas for aspirational village progress. This moment can provide understanding and reference for the public to be aware that their voice has a direct contribution to the decisions of the local political elite (*Ratoh*) openly.

Furthermore, political education can also be carried out by members of the People's Representative Council with an aspirational netting program. Aspiration nets are usually carried out 3 (three) times in 1 (one) year. The location of the aspiration net is adjusted to the constituency of the council members. The momentum of this aspiration net also can become a public space for the community, especially young people and students, to learn about politics to open their eyes to the democratic



political system in this country. Thus, various outstanding issues do not settle and then be forgotten. However, there is a way for complaints to be circulated and followed up in a bureaucratic manner.

Based on that, efforts to minimize violence can be based on the concept of the local Madurese elite, *Bhuppa'-Bhabhu' Ghuru Ratoh*. In a patterned manner, the role of elites can be summarized in their respective contexts and power spaces. *Bhuppa'-Bhabhu'* as agents of socialization at home, *Ghuru* outside the home, and *Ratoh* among the broader community with their well-established formal legal legitimacy. These three critical components are considered capable of contributing to building a valve to reduce the possibility of violence in Madura.

## Conclusion

Violence for the Madurese community has become part of a culture. It is internalized from generation to generation and socially legitimized to be carried out when facing various life problems, including wife or woman issues, misunderstandings, inheritance, land issues, religion or belief, theft, and debts. The culture of violence in Madura is also related to the geographical aspect, characterized by barren natural resources and less fertile for agricultural activities. Natural conditions like this have resulted in agriculture as the primary source of income for the population in Madura not yielding good results. In general, the economic level includes the lower middle class. Economic interests or sentiments can create violent behaviour in Madurese.

The progress of development and economic access of the Madurese community has changed for the better. However, the practice of violence in Madura is still happening. This study indicates that the root of violence in Madura is not solely triggered by Carok violence but has now been transformed into two forms. Namely, political violence that arose during the Head of Village/Parliament/Presidential elections and violence based on Religion (Sunni – Shia), (NU – Muhammadiyah = mass organization), (public schools – religious schools/traditional Islamic boarding schools). This further strengthens the notion that violence for Madurese is loaded with socio-cultural meanings, so it must be understood according to the context.

Violent conflict in Madura can be quelled by involving local elites as reflected in the prevailing social structure in Madurese society, which has a culture of *Bhuppa'-Bhabbu'*, *Ghuru*, and *Ratoh*. The involvement of local elites, including *Bhuppa'/Bhabbu'*, *Ghuru*, *Ratoh* (parents/elders, teachers/Kiai, and the government) have an essential role in minimizing violence and creating a culture of non-violence because so far, these local elites have

become a reference when conflicts occur. In the future, the role of local elites that needs to be developed is not a constraint but preventive (damping) and proven (empowering).

## Acknowledgement

This work was funded by LPPM (research and Community Service Institution) of Universitas Terbuka. We thank to all informants (Madura Local elites, Kiyais, Blaters, Gurus, Headmaster, Elementary School Teachers, Elementary School Students, Police officers). I am grateful to the anonymous reviewers.

### Author's declaration

No information

### Availability of data and materials

No information

### Competing interests

No information

### Additional information

No information

## References

- Addams, J. (2021). *Demokrasi dan Etika Sosial* (D. Wiyayanti (ed.)). Idoliterasi.
- Ardhi, R. (2008). *Genealogi Kuasa Bhejing Madura*. Tidak dipublikasikan.
- Arendt, H. (2013). Reflections on violence. *New York Review of Books*, 60(12), 1. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003001287-5>
- Atkinson, P., Coffey, A., Delamont, S., Lofland, J., & Lofland, L. (2007). *Handbook of Ethnography* (P. Atkinson, A. Coffey, S. Delamont, J. Lofland, & L. Lofland (eds.); 1st ed.). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Bambang. (2006, July). *Otak Carok Massal Ditangkap*. Antara News.
- Daulay, H. (2019). Toleransi Tanpa Batas: Outlook Agamawan dan Kebijakan Migrasi Suku Batak Kristen ke Pedalaman Duri Bengkalis. *Jurnal Pemberdayaan Masyarakat: Media Pemikiran Dan Dakwah Pembangunan*, 3(1), 1–28. <https://doi.org/10.14421/jpm.2019.031-01>
- De Jong, H. (2002). *Madura dalam Empat Zaman*. Gramedia.
- Diamond, L. (2010). Lessons from Iraq. *Iraq, Democracy and the Future of the Muslim World*, 16(1), 36–49. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315633657>

- Donnellan, L. (2019). Modeling the Rise of the City: Early Urban Networks in Southern Italy. *Frontiers in Digital Humanities*, 6, 1–19. <https://doi.org/10.3389/fdigh.2019.00015>
- El-Rumi, U. (2020). The Young Kyai (Lora) and Transformation of the Pesantren in Madura. *Islam Realitas: Journal of Islamic and Social Studies*, 6(2), 121. [https://doi.org/10.30983/islam\\_realitas.v6i2.3484](https://doi.org/10.30983/islam_realitas.v6i2.3484)
- Elworthy, S., & Rogers, P. (2002). The “war on terrorism”: 12-month audit and future strategy options. *Oxford Research Group*, September.
- Evers, Schiel, D. &, & Tilman. (1990). *Elit-Elit Strategis*. YOI.
- Fakih, M. (2011). *Jalan Lain: Manifesto Intelektual Organik* (2nd ed.). Pustaka Pelajar.
- Galtung, J. (1988). What If the Devil Were Interested in Peace Research? *Journal of Peace Research*, 25(1), 1–4. <https://doi.org/10.1177/002234338802500101>
- Giddens, A. (2010). *Teori Strukturalis (I)*. Pustaka Pelajar.
- Izudin, A. (2021). Revealing the Orientation of the Post-Reformation Islamic Student Movement in Indonesia. *Politika: Jurnal Ilmu Politik*, 12(1), 11–24. <https://doi.org/10.14710/politika.12.1.2021.11-24>
- Jati, W. R. (2013). Kearifan Lokal sebagai Resolusi Konflik Keagamaan. *Walisongo: Journal of Socio-Religious Research*, 21(2), 393–416. <https://doi.org/10.21580/ws.21.2.251>
- Kaprabowo, A. (2019). Beyond Studies Tarekat Rifa'iyah Kalisalak: Doktrin, Jalan Dakwah, dan Perlawanan Sosial. *Jurnal Pemberdayaan Masyarakat: Media Pemikiran Dan Dakwah Pembangunan*, 3(2), 377–396. <https://doi.org/10.14421/jpm.2019.032-07>
- Kellner, S. (1995). *Kelompok Elit Penentu Sejarah*. YOI.
- Kuntowijoyo. (1992). *Esei-Esei Sejarah Radikalisasi Petani* (2nd ed.). Bentang.
- Kuntowijoyo. (2006). *Budaya dan Masyarakat*. Tiara Wacana.
- Kurniawan, K. N. (2020). *Kisah Sosiologi*. Yayasan Pustaka Obor Indonesia.
- Kusuma, J. H., & Susilo, S. (2020). Intercultural and religious sensitivity among young Indonesian interfaith groups. *Religions*, 11(1), 1–22. <https://doi.org/10.3390/rel11010026>
- Kusumandaru, K. B. (2003). *Karl Marx, Revolusi dan Sosialisme*. Resist Book.
- Mannheim, K. (1991). *Ideologi dan Utopia: Menyingkap Kaitan Pikiran dan politik*. Kanisius.
- Mas'oe'd, M., & Et.al. (2000). *Kekerasan Kolektif: Kondisi dan Pemicu*. P3PK UGM.

- Moustakas, C. (1997). *Phenomenology, Science and Psychotherapy*. Mineruva Shobo.
- Muhammad, F. (2018). Pesona Kearifan Lokal Sebagai Wahana Peningkatan Produktifitas Ekonomi Masyarakat. *Jurnal Pemberdayaan Masyarakat: Media Pemikiran Dan Dakwah Pembangunan*, 1(2), 301. <https://doi.org/10.14421/jpm.2017.012-05>
- Norman, D. K., & Lincoln S. Yvonna. (1994). *Handbook of Quality Research*. SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Rachmawan, D. (2015). Pola Eskalasi Konflik Pembangunan Infrastruktur Studi Kasus Pembangunan Waduk Jatigede Kabupaten Sumedang. *MASYARAKAT: Jurnal Sosiologi*, 20(2), 193–211. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.7454/mjs.v20i2.4618>
- Raditya, A., & Nugroho, H. (2008). *Kekuasaan Bhejing Madura :: Studi reproduksi kekuasaan jagoan dan pelaku kriminal di Madura Timur*. UGM Repository.
- Rifa'i, A., & Mien. (2007). *Manusia Madura*. Pilar Media.
- Rozaki, A. (2004). *Menabur Kharisma, Menuai Kuasa*. Galang Press.
- Rozaki, A. (2021). *Islam, Oligarki Politik, dan Perlawanan Sosial*. IRCiSoD.
- Ryberg-Webster, S. (2019). Community development and historic preservation: Exploring intersections in Seattle's Chinatown-International District. *Community Development Journal*, 54(2), 290–309. <https://doi.org/10.1093/cdj/bsxo46>
- Trisno, A., Indrawadi, J., Dewi, S. F., & Montessori, M. (2019). Potensi Konflik Sosial Masyarakat Nagari Padang Sibusuk dengan Desa Kampung Baru Pasca Resolusi Konflik. *JUPIIS: Jurnal Pendidikan Ilmu-Ilmu Sosial*, 11(2), 283–294. <https://doi.org/10.24114/jupiis.v11i2.14146>
- Wirawan, I. B. (2012). *Teori-Teori Sosial dalam Tiga Paradigma*. Prenadamedia Group.
- Wiyata, A. L. (2002). *Carok; Konflik Kekerasan & Harga Diri Orang Madura*.
- Yonefendi, Y., Pawito, P., & Wijaya, M. (2018). Cultural Identity Post-Conflict : Crisis of Madurese Culture Identity in Sampit Central Borneo after 2001 Ethnic Conflict. *International Journal of Multicultural and Multireligious Understanding*, 5(5), 303–311.
- Zunita, & Ratna, P. (2010). Fenomena Pengemis Anak: Studi Kualitatif Proses Sosialisasi serta Eksploitasi Ekonomi pada Pengemis Anak di Makam Sunan Giri Kecamatan Kebomas Kabupaten Gresik. *Jurnal Sosial Dan Politik*, IX(116), 1–9.