University of Tennessee, Knoxville

TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange

Doctoral Dissertations

Graduate School

5-2022

Autocracies as Mediators in Conflicts

Jonathan A. S. Honig
University of Tennessee, Knoxville, jhonig@vols.utk.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss

Part of the Comparative Politics Commons, International Relations Commons, and the Other Political Science Commons

Recommended Citation

Honig, Jonathan A. S., "Autocracies as Mediators in Conflicts. " PhD diss., University of Tennessee, 2022.
https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss/7166

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized administrator of TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. For more information, please contact trace@utk.edu.

To the Graduate Council:

I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by Jonathan A. S. Honig entitled "Autocracies as Mediators in Conflicts." I have examined the final electronic copy of this dissertation for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, with a major in Political Science.

Krista E. Wiegand, Major Professor

We have read this dissertation and recommend its acceptance:

Wonjae Hwang, Eric Keels, David Houston

Accepted for the Council:

Dixie L. Thompson

Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School

(Original signatures are on file with official student records.)

Autocracies as Mediators in Conflicts

A Dissertation Presented for the

Doctor of Philosophy

Degree

The University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Jonathan Andrew Stewart Honig

May 2022

Copyright © 2022 by Jonathan Andrew Stewart Honig.

All rights reserved.

DEDICATION

For my loving parents, Kathryn Lynn Stewart Honig and Allen Honig, who always believed in me, whose love and patience knows no bounds, and whose encouragement to work hard and dream big made me who I am.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

It seems like an impossible task to acknowledge everyone who supported me in this endeavor. I've been blessed to have so many people in my life who have uplifted me, who have given me insight, and who have kept a smile on my face despite everything else going on. To my parents, Kathryn Lynn Stewart Honig and Allen Honig, thank you for being the best parents that anyone could possibly hope for, and for being there for me through so much. Anything of substance in my character, any internalized words of wisdom, any value that I bring to this world, all of it is because of you two. To my siblings, I love you so much and am so happy to have you in my life. To my grandparents, Edith and Abraham Honig and Ruth and James Stewart, you and your memory have taught me the meaning of courage and the miracles that can be wrought through hard work. For my Uncle Steven Stewart and for my Aunt Chris and Uncle Greg Robinson, thank you for setting such a great example for me, for showing me how to roll with the punches, how to accept life's changes and challenges with grace, and to never stop making and achieving new goals. And to all of my dear friends, you are as my family to me. I love you all, and through celebrating the good times and facing down the bad, you have made my life one that is worth living.

The faculty of the Political Science Department at the University of Tennessee have been pivotal in forming me into the academic I aspire to be. The members of my dissertation committee have been even more important and inspirational to me, both on a professional and personal level. It is nigh impossible to properly thank you all. I must express my ceaseless gratitude to my dissertation chair Dr. Krista Wiegand, who helped me discover my passion for conflict mediation and who guided me in distilling my passion into this dissertation. To Dr. Wonjae Hwang, thank you for always taking the time to offer advice and support to me both as an instructor but also outside of the classroom in my endeavors to complete my degree and to seek my career path. To Dr. David Houston, who from the first week of class believed in me when I didn't believe in myself. And to Dr. Eric Keels, who despite not even working at the University of Tennessee at the time of my dissertation still took the time and made the effort to help me hone it and to serve on my committee. Along this academic journey, I have also been blessed by other incredible mentors and sources of support throughout the years and at multiple different institutions, including Dr. Richard Pacelle, Dr. Sojeong Lee, Dr. Brandon Prins, Dr. Michael Fitzgerald, Dr. John Scheb, Dr. Jane Marcellus, Dr. Matthew Booth, Dr. Jan Quarles, Mrs. Leslie Tolman, and Mrs. Dianna Beeler. Further, this dissertation would not exist without the foundational research conducted by Dr. Jacob Bercovitch.

ABSTRACT

It is puzzling why autocracies, which typically are not renowned for their human rights record or their observance of international norms related to human rights and are frequently inured in their own violent conflicts, would choose to take on the seemingly humanitarian role of peacemaker as often as democracies in the conflicts of other states in the absence of such things as a former colonial relationship or shared geographic proximity with them. I argue that autocracies will offer more often to mediate when they are subjected to international scrutiny, sanctioning, and/or condemnation, as well as materially and immaterially benefitting from their efforts afterwards. I also posit that based on institutional attributes such as the presence of a professional bureaucracy (such as is found in a party "machine" autocracy) or by contrast an all-powerful autocrat (such as is found in personalist regimes), different autocratic regime-types will be more likely to offer to mediate than others. To test my theory, I utilize Large-N datasets about international mediation and autocratic regimes, as well as qualitative sources including information derived from the United Nations, the U.S. State Department, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, news articles/reports, and statements and criticisms from various states, in order to investigate when autocracies offer to mediate interstate conflicts, as well as which types of autocracies are most likely to offer to mediate an end to an international conflict. Quantitative analysis yielded some inconclusive results, however finding that Party-based autocracies are most likely to offer to mediate an international conflict when being sanctioned relative to other types of autocracies, while qualitative analysis did indeed uncover evidence that when being subjected to international condemnation and scrutiny, autocracies are likely to offer to mediate international conflict.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter 1: Introduction....................1

Chapter 2: Literature Review....................8

Chapter 3: Theory....................26

Chapter 4: Methodology....................72

Chapter 5: Quantitative Results....................82

Chapter 6: Qualitative Autocratic Case Studies Analysis....................89

Chapter 7: Conclusion....................146

References....................152

Vita....................181

CHAPTER 1: Introduction

Mediation, as defined by the United Nations, is "a process whereby a third party assists two or more parties, with their consent, to prevent, manage, or resolve a conflict by helping them to develop mutually acceptable agreements" (Akpinar, 2015). States that mediate can arrange how disputants interact in a bargaining scenario, confirm facts, relay information, provide "good offices," facilitate, prevent, or screen communications, recommend concessions, moderate extreme demands, propose possible settlements, and can moot compromises to the disputants (Beber, 2012). Mediation has become a favored tool for states to utilize in order to end interstate conflicts. Becoming more prevalent after the Cold War (Beber, 2012; Crocker et al, 2005; Melin, 2013), mediation amounted to greater than 20 percent of all third-party actions in their totality occurring between the conclusion of World War II through the beginning of the new millennium (Frazier, Dixon, 2006; Beber, 2012). There is also evidence that interstate mediation produces results, with mediation efforts leading to an agreement in 45.5% of interstate conflicts in addition to resulting in more than twice as many ceasefires relative to civil conflicts, as well as more full settlements and fewer partial agreements (Gartner, 2014).

Democratic states, understood as states in which candidates compete for political office through fair and frequent elections and where a large portion of the adult populace can vote (Frieden et al, 2016), are often seen to be most likely to act as mediators in violent conflicts, generating more and longer lasting peace agreements between disputants as opposed to their autocratic counterparts (Melin, 2013). In addition, they have been traditionally theorized as domestically more attracted to peace than autocracies, in that they veer towards opposition to conflict (for example, coherent democracies experience fewer

civil wars than anocracies or autocracies), the valuing of human life and welfare above power, more peaceful leaders, and propounding human rights (Wright, 1942; Hegre et al, 2001).

Indeed, Mitchell (2002) observed that historically "The first efforts to resolve disputes by processes such as…mediation can clearly be traced to…democratic states…" (pg. 751). This in part can be attributed to the norms with which democracies are associated. Scholars have noted that the difference between autocratic and democratic norms and institutions starts at the domestic level. Mitchell et al (2008) observed that "Whereas authoritarian governments are ruled by methods such as coercion, repression, religious edict, and despotism, democracies are ruled by…consent…Leaders are elected and controversies are settled with a system of bargaining, negotiation, and jurisprudence", and they elaborate that "States tend to externalize the norms governing their domestic politics" into their international relations (pg. 7). Because democracies externalize these norms of solving disagreements via negotiations and bargaining, they are thought to be at a greater likelihood to offer, accept, and be successful at mediation between conflicting countries, with these countries being at a greater likelihood of being in favor of mediation by democracies due to their perception of trustworthiness and legitimacy in acting as a third-party (Mitchell et al, 2008; Melin, 2013). This tendency towards, and success in, mediation is even thought to extend into such difficult and intractable areas as territorial, maritime, and river-related conflicts all over the world, both historically and contemporarily (Mitchell, 2002; Mitchell et al, 2008; Mitchell et al, 2009).

Further, democratic states are thought to be better at international cooperation as a whole (Gaubatz, 1996; Leeds, 1999; Martin, 2000; Mansfield et al, 2002; McGillivray, Smith, 2008; Mattes, Rodriguez, 2014). For example, Mansfield et al (2002) observed that

"…the superior ability of elections in democracies to constrain leaders prompts democratic rulers to be more cooperative internationally than their nondemocratic counterparts," and that "Hence, the probability of a country concluding an international…agreement increases as its domestic institutions become more democratic" (pgs. 478-479). Mansfield et al (2002) go on to note that "International…cooperation can…help democratic governments boost their chances of re-election, thereby provide a strong inducement for them to pursue such agreements" (pg.480). Mattes and Rodriguez (2014) agreed, stating "Whether in treaty-making or informal policy coordination, democracies have been shown to possess an advantage at international cooperation (for example, Gaubatz, 1996; Leeds 1999; Martin, 2000; Mansfield, Milner and Peter Rosendorff, 2002; McGillivray and Smith, 2008)…Democracies' superior track record is usually attributed to three institutional factors that make them particularly desirable partners: accountability of leaders, limited decision-making flexibility, and transparency" (pg. 528). Further, democracies behave more cooperatively and in a less conflictual manner towards other states regardless of those states' regime-types (Leeds, Davis, 1999).

This inclination towards international cooperation can reasonably be expected to extend into the realm of mediation. Melin (2013) postulated that "The ideal state mediator will have…democratic governance structures…Democratic third parties and disputants are more likely to agree to generate an agreement" (pg. 90), while noting that "Mediation and accepting offers of mediation are more likely when democracies are involved, as these states are accustomed to third-party involvement in conflict and garner other states' trust, making them a more attractive option for conflict resolution…Democratic third parties are more likely to be accepted as mediators…Mediation is therefore best encouraged when

democracies are involved as…mediators" (pgs. 84-85). Other scholars agree, with Crescenzi et al (2011) postulating that "…democratic mediators face costs for deception in the conflict management process", leading them to behave as more honest brokers, as well as arguing that "Third-party conflict management occurs more frequently and is more successful if a potential mediator is a democracy…" (pg. 1069).

This stands opposed to autocratic regimes. These regime types can be understood as a political system where a small group of people or a single individual wields power with little constraints, competition, or political participation by the general populace (Frieden et al, 2016; Honig, 2019), and as mentioned are often known for abuses such as political imprisonment, repression, and torture (Frantz, Kendall-Taylor, 2014; Akpinar, 2015), which can lead to reputational costs to autocracies. Interestingly, autocracies have in fact been found to not be less active in mediating the conflicts of other states when compared to their democratic counterparts (Bercovitch, Schneider, 2000), even in seemingly unrelated conflicts for the mediator. Current mediation literature proposes that states may mediate given such considerations as trade ties, former colonial relationships, alliances, and geographic proximity (Crescenzi et al, 2011). Yet, examples such as former Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi's attempted peacemaking between Ethiopia and Eritrea, China's attempts at mediation between Israel and Palestine, Qatar's efforts at mediation between Djibouti and Eritrea, and Turkey's mediation efforts between Afghanistan and Pakistan, autocratic governments which do not fit this characterization continue to play a role in conflict mediation (Adebajo, 2011; Akpinar, 2015; Guner, 2015; Rieger, 2016; Chaziza, 2018a).

It is puzzling why autocracies, which typically are not renowned for their human

rights record or their observance of international norms related to human rights and are frequently inured in their own violent conflicts, would choose to take on the seemingly humanitarian role of peacemaker in the conflicts of other states in the absence of such things as (for example) a former colonial relationship or shared geographic proximity with them. This lack of observation for human rights and norms has been well documented by academics. For example, autocracies are much more likely to wage war than are democracies, particularly with each other (Garnham, 1986; Reiter, 2012). On the other hand, democracies are less likely to go to war than autocracies because the population (who will suffer the tragic humanitarian consequences from war) can directly eject their leaders, and thus their leaders will be afraid of the reaction to war from the voters (Bueno de Mesquita et al, 1999). Autocracies suffer no such inhibitions, as the members of society who are likely to suffer the most have no say in the leadership. As opposed to democracies, autocracies have been found to be more likely to be enmeshed in a crisis with the potential for warfare as a result (Chan, 1997). Because democratic leaders are accustomed to negotiation and compromise, they typically should resolve disputes peacefully because of shared norms that are not commonly found among autocracies. Puzzlingly, autocracies still function in the seemingly humanitarian role of mediating interstate conflicts that are apparently unrelated to them directly.

The number and influence of autocracies and their resulting behavior underscores the importance of studying their role in the realm of mediation, as the international system has typically had more autocracies than democracies (Hagan, 1994). These autocracies include a significant amount of variation between countries, including Libya, Qatar, China, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey, Russia, etc. Despite all of this, research on autocratic

mediation has lagged behind that of mediation by democratic states. Further, there are different types of autocracies that have also been understudied in the area of cooperative activities such as mediation, including single-party systems such as China, military regimes/juntas such as Myanmar, and personalist dictatorships such as North Korea (Mattes, Rodriguez, 2014). The lack of research on interstate mediation by autocracies, active as they are, as well as the typological differences between them underscores the importance of elucidating insights into the efforts of these numerous, influential, and resilient regime types in mediation. Further research into the motivations for autocracies to engage in mediation would not only be important for practical policymaking reasons and helping to expand our theoretical understanding of mediation in general, but would also add to the important and necessary endeavor of research on comparative politics in authoritarian regimes and the analysis of conflict management (Wiegand, 2019).

Thus, in this dissertation I focus on investigating how autocratic regimes play a part in the phenomenon of mediation in international conflict, filling the gap in the literature on mediation and different autocratic regime-types. I argue that autocracies will offer more often to mediate when they are subjected to international scrutiny, sanctioning, and/or condemnation, as well as materially and immaterially benefitting from their efforts afterwards. I also posit that based on institutional attributes such as the presence of a professional bureaucracy (such as is found in a party-based autocracy) or by contrast an all- powerful autocrat (such as is found in personalist regimes), different autocratic regime-types will be more likely to offer than others.

To test my theory, I utilize Large-N datasets about international mediation and autocratic regimes, as well as qualitative sources including information derived from the

United Nations, the U.S. State Department, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, news articles/reports, and statements and criticisms from various states, in order to investigate when autocracies offer to mediate interstate conflicts, what the results are, as well as which types of autocracies are most likely to offer to mediate an end to an international conflict. In the next chapter, I introduce the concepts, theories, and review the literature surrounding autocracies, the reputations of states, international conflict, and mediation. Following the second chapter, I develop novel theories and several hypotheses which attempt to fill in the gaps in the literature on the subject, and explain autocratic mediation in a fuller and more holistic manner.

CHAPTER 2: Literature Review

The research on mediation in interstate conflicts and civil conflicts has provided extensive insight into the factors that determine the offer, acceptance, and success of mediation efforts. This is despite the fact that the literature on mediation is lacking in such areas as the study of mediation by autocracies. Before any novel theories involving autocratic mediation can be introduced, it is important to review the existing literature surrounding the study of mediation of interstate conflicts by third-parties in order to obtain a grounding in the subject.

2.1 Interstate Conflict and Mediation

Interstate conflict and war has proven to be pernicious in the post-World War Two era. From 1945 to the end of the new millennium alone there were 309 international conflicts, these being defined as militarized conflicts involving states which are continuous and organized, or the demonstration of the intention to utilize military force (Bercovitch, 2000). However, there does seem to be evidence for a post-World War Two trend towards peace (Clauset, 2020), due in part because of mediation. Of the aforementioned 309 conflicts, an impressive 190 of them were mediated (with some of them undergoing several mediation attempts), yielding a total of 1990 international mediation cases, not including 204 mediation offers which were rejected (Bercovitch, 2000). Certain characteristics of conflicts seem to lead to a greater occurrence of mediation. For example, mediation occurrence increases when the disputants are rivals and/or there is reoccurrence of conflict between them, when violence increases (which interestingly also seems to increase mediation success), when previous mediation has occurred, when there is a conflict stalemate, as well as if the conflict is international in nature (Melin, 2013). In the next section, I will discuss the literature and

theories regarding the prolific and growing use of mediation by states in interstate conflicts.

2.2 Mediation

Out of all the activities of statecraft practiced historically by human beings, mediation is ancient. States in the past and present have always intervened in the business of other states (Annan, 1999), with mediation being one of the oldest and most frequently found methods for successfully ending international conflicts when applied correctly (Bercovitch, Lee, 2003). The first mediation effort recorded happened in 209 B.C. when Greek city-states aided Macedonia and the Aetolian League in creating a truce during the first Macedonian war, and contemporarily there have been well over 1334 mediation attempts by states to end over 333 conflicts since the end of the Second World War, with over half of these efforts happening since the Cold War ended (Melin, 2013). Indeed, after the end of the Cold War, the practice of mediating conflicts became much more prevalent (Beber, 2012; Crocker et al, 2005; Melin, 2013). The increasing use of mediation to solve violent interstate disputes has resulted in both painful failure, like the inability of the UN Commission for India and Pakistan in 1948 to facilitate peace, as well as impressive successes, like the Camp David Accords that led to peace between Israel and Egypt (Gartner, 2014).

To review, mediation as defined by the United Nations is "a process whereby a third party assists two or more parties, with their consent, to prevent, manage, or resolve a conflict by helping them to develop mutually acceptable agreements" (Akpinar, 2015). Another commonly used definition of mediation conceptualizes mediation as "…a reactive process of conflict management whereby parties seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an individual, group, or organization to change their behavior, settle their conflict, or resolve their problem without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of law

(Bercovitch, Houston, 1996). The mediation of international conflict is a process where a third party works with at least two disputants in order to attain an acceptable peace agreement between them. As opposed to other conflict resolution methods involving third parties that are judgmental and binding (like arbitration), mediation is both contractual and voluntary where the third party cannot impose a solution on the disputants but can aid them in their quest to obtain a peaceful end to their conflict (Gartner, 2014). In other words, mediation is legally non-binding. This results in the adherence by disputants to any settlements being self-sustaining in order to last, as well as voluntary (Gartner, 2014). The lack of third-party enforceability found in mediation, as well as the naturally open-ended nature with respect to if a settlement will actually be achieved, profoundly differentiates it from legal-based dispute adjudication (Beber, 2012). In fact, third- party mediation is the most frequently employed method to resolve violent interstate conflicts (Gartner, 2014), with states being the most common mediator (Melin, 2013). Taking into account the relative ineffectiveness of conventional ways of addressing conflicts, mediation is critical as a method for their resolution (Akpinar, 2015).

As such, mediation has increasingly become a favored tool for states to utilize in order to end interstate conflicts. Notably, mediation amounted to greater than 20 percent of all third-party actions occurring between the conclusion of World War II through the beginning of the new millennium (Frazier, Dixon, 2006; Beber, 2012). There is also evidence that interstate mediation produces results, with mediation efforts leading to a peace agreement in 45.5% of interstate conflicts in addition to resulting in more than twice as many ceasefires relative to civil conflicts (Gartner, 2014).

Generally speaking, there are four different main types of mediators: regional

governmental organizations like the Organization of American States, individuals like former President Jimmy Carter, international organizations like the United Nations, and most commonly, states such as Qatar (Melin, 2013). Mediation consists of disputants, their dispute (most of which start with two main disputants), mediators, and outcomes (Gartner, 2014). The types of interstate disputes take place over a range of topics, security being the root of 32.5% of interstate conflict, territory at 27.5%, ethnicity at 20.8%, colonialism at 7.9%, ideology at 5.8%, and resources at 5.5% (Gartner, 2014). In all cases, the objectives of mediators include both shaping the nature of the conflict's outcome as well as changing the actual physical circumstances of a conflict (Bercovitch, Schneider, 2000). Further, the mediation of interstate conflict takes place across the globe, with the Middle East experiencing most of it at 33.6%, followed by Africa at 16.8%, East Asia and the Pacific at 15.1%, Europe at 14.9%, Central and South America at 11.2%, and Southwest Asia at 9.1% (Gartner, 2014).

2.3 Research on Mediation

Some of the main areas that research on mediation has focused include offers and acceptance by a third-party to mediate, tactics used during the process of mediation, and mediation outcomes. Literature on offers and acceptance to mediate focuses on topics including: the potential moral altruism of a mediator, direct geopolitical concerns (such as access to resources), the level of violence in the conflict (which if intense can particularly impede the free flow of finances, individuals, etc.), the presence of especially intimate trade ties, alliances, geographic proximity, the presence of a rivalry, the recurrence of conflicts, and the regime type of the mediator.

Research on the tactics that are used by mediators acknowledge that mediators

are constricted in their ability to end a conflict due to the voluntary and contractual nature of mediation. However, the literature indicates that mediators typically employ three different strategies, these being directive strategies (where mediators try to structure the substance, content, and outcome of the process of bargaining in mediation), procedural-formulative strategies (which are used to help facilitate a positive environment for conflict management, such as a neutral location, constructing the agenda of the mediation, the distribution of information, etc.), and communication-facilitation strategies (which concentrate on encouraging conflicting parties to communicate via the mediator's shuttle diplomacy or directly, and is a passive strategy designed to provide information to the conflicting parties). The third area of research, outcomes of mediation, is concerned about whether a state is likely to mediate and/or be successful, as well as the four possible outcomes of mediation: whether they are completely successful, partly successful, there is a ceasefire, or they are unsuccessful at ending the conflict. Existing literature focuses on the willingness to mediate as well as whether it will be successful, and how this ties into the characteristics of the mediating state. Issues studied include whether that state has mediated before, established connections with the conflicting parties, the ongoing debate about the impact of mediator bias, institutional features of the mediating state (its domestic structures, for example), the status and capabilities of a mediating state (whether that state is a member of the UNSC or if it is a former colonial power of one or more of the conflicting parties, for example), as well as the communication, procedural, and timing skills of the mediator.

2.3.1 Reasons for Offers and Acceptance to Mediate by Third-Parties

There are many factors that could influence a third-party actor to offer or accept mediation efforts in interstate conflict. It may be true that in some cases, third-party states mediate out of some degree of moral altruism. However, the ultimate goal of the mediating state may differ from this, but instead may be more aligned with the achievement of its goals in foreign policy, making the success of mediation subordinate to the mediating state's personal concerns (Akpinar, 2015). For example, a third-party state may engage in or offer to mediate a conflict if it can strengthen their immediate strategic concerns such as regional or global influence, power, and/or access to resources (Melin, 2013: Akpinar, 2015; Kamrava, 2011). This can make the mediation of an interstate conflict an attractive proposition to a state after they consider the costs and benefits associated with it, even if there is no firm guarantee of success (Melin, 2013; Bercovitch, Schneider, 2000).

Strategic concerns such as the costliness of a conflict in terms of violence may also lead to a third-party state deciding to mediate. For example, these conflicts can impact the free flow of things such as individuals, trade, access to resources, and finances which can make it more attractive for a third-party state seeking to quash these strategic inconveniences. Mediators may also reasonably expect that less mediating actions will be necessary to resolve costly violent conflicts and are thus more effective, taking into account the high costs associated with death, destruction, and expenditures which would otherwise have to be faced by the disputants (Melin, 2013). Other strategic concerns that may lead a third-party state to mediate may have to do with especially intimate trade ties, alliances, and/or geographic proximity to one or more of the disputants (Crescenzi et al, 2011), or whether the disputants are involved in a rivalry. According to Melin (2013), "Such conflicts tend to be recurring, and

especially destabilizing and violent— not only to the disputants but to third-party state actors either located in the region or with other strong relationships to the disputants…although there is some risk in taking on the mediator role in such circumstances, the risks of declining such an invitation may be even greater" considering the costs to the parties who are associated with regionally or even globally destabilizing, lingering, and violent conflicts (pg. 87).

Mediation in this regard can produce what may be construed as global public goods. Wiegand (2019) observed that "On a macro level, public goods…include the reduced likelihood of future conflict (Gibler, 2007; Owsiak, 2012), increased likelihood of rivalry terminations (Owsiak, Rider, 2013),…and international legal recognition of borders that reduce uncertainty and, therefore, future conflict (Simmons, 2005; Carter, Goemans, 2011, 2014)" (pg. 5). The successful resolution of conflicts and disputes creates global public goods, where mutual gains amongst concerned states are facilitated (Wiegand, 2019), which can then behoove a potential mediating state in a variety of tangible strategic ways. Some of these can include such material concerns as the resumption of or continued access to mineral resources, petroleum, water, and access to arable land (Wiegand, 2019). The cessation of conflict also helps create a situation which is conducive to improved economic relationships as an aggregate with neighboring states (Simmons, 2005). Other benefits include the acquisition by the mediating state of a reputation for global good citizenship, as well as possibly helping facilitate a reduction in military expenditures which can then be spent on other state interests and policies (Wiegand, 2019).

2.3.2 Mediation Tactics

The second major aspect of mediation research examines the factors that influence the process of mediation Even though mediators are limited in their influence because of the contractual and voluntary nature of mediation where a solution for the disputants cannot be

imposed, third-party states who mediate have a number of strategies that they can pursue in order to end the conflict. Although one of the main characteristics of the mediation of international conflict is its dearth of formulaic procedures and the wide degree of variation in practices and procedures utilized by mediators in different disputes (Gartner, 2014), states that mediate have tactics including arranging how disputants interact in a bargaining scenario, confirming facts, relaying information, providing "good offices," facilitating, preventing, or screening communications, recommending concessions, moderating extreme demands, proposing possible settlements, and mooting compromises to the disputants (Beber, 2012; Kamrava, 2011). However, mediators typically do not stay involved after the conflict ends, while tending to promote settlements which are not self-enforcing (Kamrava, 2011).

However, this does not mean that mediators hold no sway. For example, mediators can prove successful in ending interstate conflicts by checking and shaming the disputants to control violence, by recommending final settlement terms which create the opportunity for disputants to consider previously unacceptable settlements by shielding them from domestic pressure, and by putting pressure on the disputants to settle peacefully by providing logistical support as well as incentives/disincentives that promote settlement (Schenoni et al, 2020). This pressure can manifest itself along military lines in the form of threats to cease military aid or offers to provide it to one or more of the disputants, or along economic lines, including offering preferential trade agreements, removing sanctions, or providing other forms of economic aid to one or more of the conflicting states. This creates a situation that is designed to make settlement more palatable and thus incentivize it (Schenoni et al, 2020). Mediators can also underwrite settlements in order to increase their sturdiness when the disputing states may have incentives to renege on their settlements or peace treaties. When states sign a treaty

as they frequently do in world politics (Mitchell, Powell, 2009), this creates an authoritative rule system where the normal organizational presumption is one of compliance so as to help states credibly commit to each other upon agreed upon actions, as well as to indicate that they intend to keep their promises in a particular policy area (Chayes, Chayes, 1993; Simmons, Hopkins, 2005). This underwriting by mediators of settlements and peace treaties serves to reassure the disputants that they won't have to renegotiate the settlement later from a more disadvantageous position during the post- agreement settlement or treaty implementation phase (Schenoni et al, 2020).

Mediating states can also render aid to disputants in terms of state capacity in order to ensure that they have the capability of behaving in such a way as to make successful mediation and the peaceful settlement of conflict possible. Mediators can help disputants implement their commitments by helping to identify problems, and then rendering aid building up state capacity, knowledge, and resources (Joachim et al, 2008). Mediators with capabilities best suited for these activities are in an advantageous position to promote commitment to peace treaties and settlements, including by improving the noncomplying state's bureaucratic efficacy. Indeed, it has been found that bureaucratic efficacy in terms of state capacity raises levels of compliance with treaties, inferring that noncompliance can be conditioned on a state's capacity to fulfill its treaty or settlement terms, and thus noncompliance may be inadvertent (Cole, 2015). Mediators can help states to behave in a way which allows for settlements by providing diplomatic resources and knowhow, and under the right institutional conditions can encourage compliance without coercion (Helfer, Voeten, 2014; Karns et al, 2015).

When setting out to peacefully mediate a conflict, third-party states usually employ

three different strategies, these being directive strategies (used 29.6% of the time), procedural-formulative strategies (used 14.2% of the time), and communication-facilitation strategies (used 43.7% of the time), ordered from first to last in terms of the intensity of mediator involvement (Gartner, 2014; Bercovitch, Lee, 2003). Directive strategies by mediators attempt to structure the outcome, content, and substance of the bargaining process in mediation. These strategies are utilized to cope with and change the behavior and motivation of the disputants, with the mediator perhaps advocating for a specific outcome and attempting to rally support for it (Gartner, 2014). According to Bercovitch and Lee (2003), the specific tactics associated with directive strategies include "…changing the parties' expectations, taking responsibility for concessions, making substantive suggestions and proposals, making the parties aware of the costs of non-agreement, supplying and filtering information, suggesting concessions parties can make, helping the negotiators to undo a commitment, rewarding party concessions, helping devise a framework for acceptable outcomes, changing perceptions, pressing the parties to show flexibility, promising resources or threatening withdrawal, and offering to verify compliance with agreement" (pg. 4). As mentioned, this strategy requires the largest degree of involvement by mediators.

Procedural-formulative strategies, on the other hand, create the structure for the negotiations between the disputants. These strategies are created in order to facilitate a beneficial environment for the management of conflict. This can encompass the mediator selecting the location for mediation to occur, the structure of the mediation's agenda, the frequency of how often the parties meet, as well as the distribution of information about the progress of mediation (Bercovitch, Lee, 2003; Gartner; 2014). In addition, Bercovitch and Lee (2003) noted that further aspects of the procedural-formulative strategy include "…controlling

constituency influences and media publicity, enhancing situational powers of weaker parties, chairing the communication process…controlling the pace and formality of meetings, controlling the physical environment, establishing protocols, suggesting procedures, highlighting common interests, reducing tensions, controlling timing, dealing with the simple issues first,…helping parties save face, and keeping the process focused on issues" (pg. 4). This strategy is secondary in intensity relative to directive strategies.

The last strategy that mediators can opt for is the communication-facilitation strategy, which focuses on encouraging the conflicting parties to communicate with each other directly or via the mediator along the lines of shuttle diplomacy. By utilizing this strategy, mediators primarily furnish information to the disputants (Gartner, 2014). A mediator utilizing a communication-facilitation strategy adopts a more passive role than what is found in directive or procedural-formulative strategies. The mediator functions by funneling information to the disputants and aiding cooperation while exhibiting little direct control over the content of mediation or the formal process. Bercovitch and Lee (2003) observed that this strategy employs tactics including "…making contact with the parties; gaining the trust and confidence of the parties; arranging for interactions between the parties; identifying issues and interests; clarifying the situation; avoiding taking sides; developing a rapport with the parties; supplying missing information; developing a framework for understanding; encouraging meaningful communication; offering positive evaluations; and allowing the interests of the parties to be discussed" while adopting the role of a "go-between" (pgs. 3-4).

As previously mentioned, this last strategy is the most common found in mediation by a wide margin. However, the effectiveness and choice of mediation strategies is highly contextual and situational, depending on the dispute and the disputants. Although directive

strategies may be effective in high-intensity conflicts, they may come off as pushy (Gartner, 2014). Therefore, context and balance are thought to be vital for mediators in selecting mediation strategies in order to lead to a peaceful end of a conflict.

2.3.3 Outcomes of Mediation

The third avenue of research on mediation focuses on the success of mediation efforts. Mediation outcomes can be viewed in the context of four possible results: they are unsuccessful, there is a ceasefire, they are partly successful, or they are fully successful (Bercovitch, Schneider, 2000). Typically speaking, successful mediation of a conflict is not a "one and done" sort of affair. For example, it has been found that for every agreement reached, there were typically an average of 30 conflict management peace-making attempts leading to a three percent success rate for any particular effort in conflict mediation (Gartner, 2014). On the other hand, a mediating state is more likely to serve (and to be successful) if they have already engaged in mediation with the disputants. According to Melin (2013):

> These prior mediation experiences, or mediation history, establish rapport and signal a commitment to peaceful conflict management…Each instance creates a mediation history of the state's experience as a mediator and the disputants' experiences in working with mediators…Previous disputant experiences with mediation signals a disputant's willingness to work with an outsider and encourages mediation offers by states…A state's mediation experience can signal to disputants the mediator's ability, preferred methods, resourcefulness, and objectives. To be effective, the state mediator must be perceived as having access to suitable techniques for encouraging bargaining, and as having sufficient authority and experience to be able to utilize them. (pg. 88)

Other aspects of individual states are also thought to influence the likelihood of mediation as well its success. One of the most contested of these aspects as far as its effect is the role of bias. Bias can be regarded as a tendency that affects a mediator's ability to act impartially, and can cause a negative conflict of interest that may undermine voluntary conflict resolution, and restrict disputants to less effective conflict management methods

(Gartner, 2014). Indeed, Kamrava (2011) postulated that "Disputants often assume that an unbiased mediator whose sole interest is to reduce the level of conflict is far more likely to be believed by both disputants, and therefore be successful, as compared to a mediator perceived to be biased…This assumption prompts the disputants to seek out an impartial negotiator or to welcome offers of negotiations by a third party that they perceive to be unbiased" (pg. 543). However, even though unbiased mediators are more attractive to disputants, it is this very impartiality which can damage the credibility of the mediating state, and with it negatively affect their performance in successfully mediating (Crescenzi et al, 2011). An unbiased mediator's immediate focus is on securing a peace agreement first and foremost, which can introduce the possibility of the mediator lying to the disputants in order to secure this outcome (Kydd, 2003). And without trust in a mediator to not lie, proposals put forward by them are not likely to be accepted by the disputants (Bercovitch, Lee, 2003). This introduces a catch-22. Since a biased mediator can influence and credibly signal information to the disputant it is biased towards, it is more likely to be trusted, creating a situation where biased mediators offer successful conflict resolution at the cost of the willingness of other states to utilize them in the first place (Crescenzi et al, 2011). However, there are factors that can lead to unbiased mediators being more successful by way of improving their credibility. For example, Crescenzi et al (2011) summarized some of these aspects of unbiased mediators as such:

> First, the institutional features of the mediator's home state influence the reputational, electoral, and policy failure costs for deception in the mediation process. The second…emanates from the aggregate effects of the global democratic community, which provides better and more frequent information about the dispute and the mediator to the disputants…The third…begins with the supply of information provided by international organizations. As the supply of neutral information from international organizations increases, potential mediators face higher costs for deception. (pg. 1073)

The status of a state is also thought to be a characteristic that affects their chances of success (Kamrava, 2011). For example, a state's membership on the United Nations Security Council has been thought to lead to an increased likelihood that that state will be chosen to mediate an international conflict (Bercovitch, Schneider, 2000). Further, former colonial powers are in demand for such a role if they pursue a unilateral mediation mandate, and potential mediators are more likely to be sought after if they are perceived as having the ability to comprehend the positions of the disputants, possessing knowledge about the conflict, and having a sense of timing, procedural skills, active listening, and communication skills (Bercovitch, Schneider, 2000). Some of the factors that are thought to be especially important for successful mediation include stamina, intelligence, patience, energy, and a sense of humor (Bercovitch, 1984). The capabilities of a third-party state also play a part in the occurrence of interstate mediation, with mediators that possess greater capabilities leading to a greater likelihood of the occurrence of mediation and its success. Melin (2013) observed that "States…with material strength and diplomatic prowess are likely…and successful as mediators because these actors have access to resources and negotiating experience that makes them attractive as mediators and able to create and sustain peace…Mediators with material capabilities can incentivize agreements by using the proverbial carrot and stick to increase an agreement's appeal or threaten failed compliance" (pgs. 85-86). Directly pursuant to this dissertation, the role of the mediating state's regime type is also thought to be very important. On one hand, scholars like Melin (2013) propose that "Mediation and accepting offers of mediation are more likely when democracies are involved, as these states are accustomed to third-party involvement in conflict and garner other states' trust, making them a more attractive option…" (pgs. 84-85), as well as apparently being more successful at doing so than

autocracies. However, contradicting this viewpoint, other scholars have found that (despite their seeming lack of success) autocracies are not significantly less active than democracies in mediating international conflicts (Bercovitch, Schneider, 2000). Explanations as to why this puzzling behavior by autocracies is occurring, as well as speculation about which autocratic regime types are the most successful at interstate conflict mediation, will be found in the theory chapter of this dissertation.

2.4 Selection Effects

When studying mediation in an empirical fashion, it is necessary to take into account selection effects (also known as selection bias). It is well recognized that a lot of the samples utilized for statistical analysis are the result of some selection process, and it could be construed that if the premise of politics is the result of decision making by individuals, then all political interaction is one of repeated selection (Signorino (2002). Selection effects is the bias which is introduced, for example, by the selection of states, groups, individuals, or data to be analyzed in a way where proper randomization can't be attained, meaning that the obtained sample isn't representative of the population which is to be analyzed (Wooldridge, 2006). Just as individuals self-select into specific programs or behaviors, selection effects can cause participation by states in various endeavors to not be determined randomly (Wooldridge, 2006). States may select themselves into alliances, disputes, arbitration, or the role of (or offering to be) a mediator in an international conflict based on unobservable factors like expectations, preferences, or resolve (Reed, 2002). In this way does the selection effects problem rear its head in the empirical study of mediation of interstate conflicts.

For example, it has been posited by some scholars that, as opposed to other forms of conflict resolution like bilateral negotiation, international conflicts that undergo mediation

aren't as likely to result in an agreement for peace, and agreements that are mediated are at a likelihood of failing (Gartner, 2014). However, selection effects have a powerful effect on what is observed about mediation, suggesting that poor conflict management results are produced by mediation. However, this is actually a deception. There are three aspects of the mediation of international conflicts which are important for understanding this deception, these being that adherence to the outcomes of mediation as well as participation in it are voluntary, mediation is associated with costs (such as the damage to a mediator's reputation from failure, operational expenses, political costs, and forgoing other peace efforts), and that the costly and voluntary characteristics of mediation form selection effects which can vastly obscure empirical inferences of observations (Gartner, 2014). In mediation, selection effects identify specific populations of cases with specific traits of conflict management, and both mediators and disputants take into account the likely repercussions of mediation when deciding whether to engage in it (Beber, 2012). For example, Gartner (2014) explains how selection effects can obscure the effectiveness of mediation by offering this anecdotal scenario:

> …imagine there are two types of disputes, *hard* (difficult to resolve) and *easy* (open to resolution). Difficult to resolve disputes typically involve higher levels of violence, greater stakes and more intransigent belligerents than easy to resolve disputes…on average, hard disputes are less likely to result in peacemaking success than easy ones. Thus, identifying the dispute's type (hard or easy) helps to predict the likely outcome of any conflict resolution…selection effects signal the conflict's likely type and thus its odds of a peaceful outcome…Because mediation is costly, belligerents try to avoid it…If bilateral negotiations fail…then disputants…turn to a third-party mediator. As a result, mediators work on tougher cases…disputes that, as a result of the selection process, are less likely to result in peace…When the nature of the dispute is taken into account…international dispute mediation has a positive…effect on reaching durable agreements. (pgs. 290-291)

Another example of selection effects in the study of mediation and its effectiveness involves the bias of mediators. As mentioned, some scholars believe that unbiased mediators

prove to be more effective and are more credible than biased mediators, who derive utility from the divvying up of the stakes to each disputant (in particular in regards to their preferred side). Because biased mediators derive utility from the way a dispute turns out, they don't care as much about the fixed costs involved in mediating since this is offset by any impact that the mediator has on the peace agreement reached between the conflicting sides. This causes mediators that are ineffective because they are biased to be more likely to select into being mediators. In this situation, Beber (2012) noted that "…impartial mediators are relatively more likely to produce settlements, but they also have fewer incentives to become involved…and are hence more likely to forgo mediation…This can create a selection effect by which an unadjusted empirical analysis will indicate lower mediation success rates than we would observe otherwise" (pg. 419). Because of these sorts of problems involving selection effects in mediation, addressing them is a necessary prerequisite for empirical evaluation (Reed, 2002). This dissertation similarly seeks to avoid the problems associated with selection effects regarding mediation, and the measures it takes to address this problem will be enumerated upon in the research design chapter. Although the aforementioned scholarly work and literature contribute to the study of conflict mediation, there are indeed gaps in it that should be filled in order to advance research on the subject. Benefits for future research are not only important in the academic sense, but also important in regards to informed foreign policy decisions. This not only applies to mediation by third-party states in general, but also specifically for the numerous different types of autocracies found globally in both the past and the present. In the next chapter, I will delve into mediation by several different autocratic regime types, advancing new hypotheses and proposing novel theories which build on the limited existing research on autocratic mediation in international conflicts. It may be that

autocracies offer or accept to mediate as a response to when they feel that their reputation is under attack due to condemnation, negative press, etc. However, autocracies are not one size fits all, and just because an autocracy offers to mediate does not mean it will be successful. In the next chapter, I disaggregate autocracies into different types, and propound the notion that some types of autocracies are better suited to successfully mediating than others.

CHAPTER 3: Theory

3.1 Novel Theories on Autocratic Mediation

I argue that autocracies mediate conflicts to protect their prestige and reputation when they are under scrutiny for negative behavior. States may mediate for reasons that are more related to the potential mediating state's strategic interests rather than purely humanitarian reasons, but not necessarily in a direct manner. As mentioned, interests can be to build and enhance a mediating state's international reputation, cement their legitimacy, increase their level of prestige, as well as burnish their image (Akpinar, 2015; Melin, 2013; Bercovitch, Schneider, 2000). Although not being as successful in conflict mediation when compared to their democratic counterparts (Melin, 2013), autocratic states may have particularly strong strategic motivations for mediation, which would explain their proclivity for activity in this realm. My theory posits that autocracies are more likely to offer to mediate an international conflict for the sake of sanitizing their global image when they are subjected to negative international attention such as criticism for perceived undesirable behavior, are experiencing sanctions, and/or are being censured by international bodies like the UN for issues such as human rights. The presence of such negative international attention and actions are important, as it indicates that states such as autocracies are beyond the norms of acceptability propounded by the international community (Krain, 2012). Sanctioning and negative international attention such as condemnation can badly damage a state's reputation with potential military allies, trade partners, donors, and IGOs (such as the World Bank, for example), as well as indicating that other international actors may permissibly sanction the state subjected to such scrutiny (Schneider, 2000; Lebovic, Voeten, 2006, 2009; Krain, 2012). Thus, negative global attention and condemnation of a state may result in real, tangible consequences for that state (Franklin, 2008; Lebovic, Voeten, 2006).

Autocracies in particular may be vulnerable to negative international attention and condemnation as they are known to use repression as one of their main instruments (if not the main instrument) for maintaining power (Escriba-Folch, 2013), and have often been found to utilize repression more intensively than their democratic counterparts (Davenport, 1999, 2004; Poe et al, 1999). This opens them up for international scrutiny. By mediating a conflict, autocracies can work to offset potential damage to their reputation which could result from international scrutiny, sanctioning, and condemnation, and instead foster a reputation as a peacemaker (Melin, 2013). Burnell (2006) notes that “In fact, a growing acknowledgement of the international dimensions…suggests that external judgements of [autocratic] regime legitimacy may now carry more weight than perhaps at any previous time…” (pg. 552), while mediation in conflict serves to enhance such legitimacy for an autocracy (Akpinar, 2015) and potentially offset the aforementioned negative scrutiny and international condemnation. The obtainment by an autocracy of international legitimacy can bestow upon them numerous other benefits as well, such as attracting international investment and aid that can be used by the regime to maintain its survival (Kendall-Taylor, Frantz, 2014), and possessing a good international reputation can also be invaluable for the creation of domestic legitimacy (Burnell, 2006). Were an autocracy to not only offer but to successfully mediate the conclusion of an international conflict, it could reasonably expect its image and legitimacy to improve internationally (and to ideally benefit from it), as the successful mediation of an international conflict provides global public goods. For my next theories, I turn my analysis towards investigating the differences in mediating behavior found amongst different autocratic regime types. Given that autocratic mediation does occur frequently, not all authoritarian regimes may offer to mediate as frequently as others. For example, personalist autocracies, military juntas, or

monarchies may not be the best equipped or naturally dispositioned to peaceful conflict mediation. There is considerable variation across autocratic regime-types as to their ability and willingness to have convivial, cooperative, and collaborative relations with other states. For example, autocracies that more closely resemble democracies (particularly in the realm of policy flexibility, transparency, and leader accountability like party-machine autocracies) have been found to be more inclined for international cooperation than personalist autocracies of either the civilian or military type (Mattes, Rodriguez, 2014). In addition, autocracies with large winning coalitions that resemble democracies (such as party "machines") have been found to contribute to cooperative activities such as peacefully ending conflicts and providing public goods more often than other autocratic regime types with smaller winning coalitions (like personalist dictators).

As such, it may be that autocrats like personalists or monarchs are not the most prolific in offering to mediate an international conflict. It may instead be party-based autocracies, where there is the presence of a strong domestic audience and selectorate made up primarily of civilian regime insiders with a broader range of policy options, political points of view, as well as experiences, and who don't instinctively prefer other solutions over diplomacy (Weeks, 2014; Frantz, Kendall-Taylor, 2014). This is opposed to military regimes or bosses/strongmen who rely primarily on the military, and who may be socialized to military solutions (Sagan, 2003; Walt, 1987; Lai, Slater, 2006). Leaders of regimes with larger winning coalitions, such as autocracies which are more similar to democracies than other autocracies (Bueno de Mesquita et al, 1999; Weeks, 2014), need to produce policy results, such as the preservation of their state's reputation or to otherwise further its national objectives.

Kendall-Taylor and Frantz (2014) observed that unlike other autocracies, autocratic regimes which "…control by altering democratic processes often still seek to portray themselves as 'democrats,' making them likely to be more vulnerable to international and domestic criticism that highlights the inconsistency between their behaviors and democratic norms" (pg. 81). The pressure to escape the highlighting of inconsistencies with democratic norms may result in "machines" offering most often to successfully mediate international conflicts, relative to other autocratic regime-types. Further, Melin (2013) observed that the offering of mediation is "…more likely when democracies are involved, as these states are accustomed to third-party involvement in conflict and garner other states' trust, making them a more attractive option for conflict resolution…Mediation is therefore best encouraged when democracies are involved as…mediators" (pgs. 84-85). Evidently, autocratic "machines" are more closely similar to democracies than other autocracies (Weeks, 2014), so it stands to reason that aspects of democracies which lead to them offering to mediate more often and to be more successful at it could also be applied to autocratic "machines" (Melin, 2013). It is postulated that the transparency associated with democracies, including the possession of a free press, creates greater credibility for democracies' foreign policy actions and greater audience costs for foreign policy failure (Fearon, 1994; Downs, Rocke, 1995; Smith, 1996; Van Belle, 1997; Schultz, 1998). In addition, Crescenzi et al (2011) states that "…transparency and oversight of democratic political systems disciplines democratic mediators to remain honest, which means…democratic mediators become an attractive option for conflict resolution and can successfully help the parties reach a peaceful settlement" (pg. 1075). As mentioned, these characteristics for successful mediation possessed by democracies may also carry over into

the behavior of autocracies that closely resemble them, i.e. non-personalist autocratic "machines" (Weeks, 2014).

Switching regime focus, because they lack an ideology, military regimes struggle to justify their long term rule in the absence of achieving national goals (such as the preservation of reputation as well as the pursuit of other strategic objectives and benefits), and due to a lack of institutional infrastructure they are not as capable as other autocracies in securing elite cohesion and deflecting popular dissent through co-optation. Further, although there is less of a winning coalition for junta leaders than autocratic "machines," they still have a larger winning coalition of officers and officials to please than monarchies or personalist autocracies. As mentioned, political leaders with larger winning coalitions need to produce successful policy and to protect the national interest to stay in power (Bueno de Mesquita et al, 1999). By extrapolation, the above mentioned characteristics of juntas may cause their leaders to be more sensitive than monarchies or personalists to condemnation and a tarnished national image, pressuring them to offer to mediate international conflicts more often than those autocratic regime-types as a means of producing "output legitimacy" for their regime both domestically and internationally through the production of global public goods (Burnell, 2010).

On the other hand, monarchies are relatively insulated from challenges to their credibility and other criticisms by relying on tradition for domestic and international legitimacy, leading them to be less sensitive to international and domestic criticism and condemnation. Thus, they may not feel the same pressures to offer to mediate international conflicts that "machines" and juntas face, leading to them offering to mediate less than those regime-types but more than personalists since it is still feasible that members of the ruling

family or court might punish or remove the monarch for foreign policy failure and for failing to protect national interests (like a positive reputation or access to other benefits).

Moving on to personalist autocracies, Cassani (2017) observed that "…the institutional features that differentiate contemporary authoritarian regimes can have significant implications for leaders' efforts to legitimize themselves…" (pg. 354). For personalist autocracies, the interests of the state such as its reputation and legitimacy are institutionally subordinate to the interests of the personalist (such as rewarding their small and immediate selectorate). Because their winning coalition is so small, the survival of personalists is based less on successful foreign policy and the promotion of the national interest as opposed to the rewarding of an inner circle of cronies. This leads to a low likelihood of the leader being punished by other elites (who owe their position to the personal favor of the personalist dictator) for poor leadership or state stewardship (Weeks, 2008). Since they are less sensitive to domestic or international challenges and questions to their legitimacy, personalists will be least likely to offer to mediate international conflicts than the other mentioned autocratic regime-types since they will feel the least pressure to respond to international criticism or punitive measures as long as they grease the palms of their small inner circle. In the following sections, I will elucidate my novel theories to a greater extent, discussing the role of reputation, prestige, and legitimacy in the context of international ire and autocratic mediation. I will than discuss the differences in autocratic regime-types, and how this influences their individual mediation behavior in terms of offering to mediate.

3.2 Reputation and Prestige

States are known to covet and strive to preserve a good reputation amongst the

international order. Indeed, conflicts and wars have been started and fought, along with their accompanying casualties, for the sake of the reputations of states (Mercer, 1997). To put it succinctly, reputations are subjective beliefs that actors (such as states) utilize in order to forecast the future behavior of other actors based on actions they have taken in the past (Mercer, 1996; Miller, 2003; Sartori, 2005; Weisiger, Yarhi-Milo, 2015; Lupton, 2018a; 2020), with the value of a reputation varying depending on how other actors interpret it (Nalebuff, 1991). Actors such as states are not in direct possession of their reputations, as they exist "in the eye of the beholder" (in this case, other states) (Harvey, Mitton, 2016; Lupton, 2018a). This makes a good reputation a valuable commodity for autocracies, whereas a bad reputation is something to be avoided if at all possible.

Reputation as a concept when applied to states can be broken down into more specific areas. For example, it is understood that a general reputation is a dispositional attribution which has cross-situational validity, whereas it can be understood that a specific reputation is a dispositional attribution which has same-situational validity (Mercer, 1997). As such, reputation can be regarded as the sending of information about a state's likely actions, with states gleaning this information from prior direct or indirect experience (Peterson, 2014). For a state wishing to change their reputation amongst the community of nations, this can be a difficult proposition. It is thought that once a state's reputation has been formed, it can be challenging for a state to subsequently change it (Copeland, 1997; Lupton, 2018b).

In order for a state to gain a reputation due to a specific act, there are twin conditions which must be satisfied. First, other states must chalk up the actions of a state according to its character as opposed to the specific situation which concerns that state at a particular place in time, while secondly other states must utilize this dispositional attribution in order

to forecast a state's behavior down the line (Copeland, 1997). States which aren't directly involved in a situation are still able to form a reputation about states which are dealing with whatever circumstance they find themselves in. As such, states are clearly concerned about their own reputations, and subsequently invest in actions designed to bolster them (Walter, 2006; Sechser, 2018; Lupton, 2018a). The lack of direct control over their state's reputation is a cause of concern for policymakers of that country. For example, Lupton (2020) observed that "Leaders worry about their reputations…because they believe certain reputations, such as a reputation for irresolute action, will make them and their states more vulnerable to international threats; but other reputations, such as a reputation for resolute action, will make them and their states more secure" (pg. 2). Thus the pursuit of reputations regarded as "good" in some regard is something to be striven for by policymakers of states, whereas a "bad" reputation is something to be avoided or, if possible, ameliorated.

As previously noted, the pursuit of a good reputation in some manner is one which states put a lot of time and effort into developing and inculcating. The manner of reputation for which a state designates the term "good" as attached to it varies across countries and time. For example, a reputation for strength and fortitude is one which states have historically striven to achieve at great cost, with reputation being regarded as one of the few areas worth fighting for between states (Schelling, 1966). Having a reputation for martial strength has been posited to be like a property which can be built up and invested in, with Guisinger and Smith (2002) noting that "…countries make and follow through on threats not for the immediate gains but to achieve a reputation for a certain trait, typically labeled aggressiveness, resolve, or toughness…Countries anointed with a strong reputation are expected to encounter fewer threats and are more likely to be believed when they say they will resist than those branded as

weak or irresolute" (pg. 176). For a state which sees itself as in the midst of threats, a reputation for these martial tendencies is perceived by them as a positive characteristic for other states to view them as. On the other hand, a reputation for being an honest, peaceful state is regarded by some countries as being equally if not more positive. Whereas a reputation for strength can be developed through aggressive actions and investment in armaments, it has been posited that an honest reputation instead must be defended vigorously (Guisinger, Smith, 2002). A reputation for honesty is valued by states because, as an example, it can be used by states to determine the intent of other states and thus avoid unnecessary conflict (Guisinger, Smith, 2002), with the leaders of states developing an honest reputation via their deeds and statements (Lupton, 2018b). States may also desire to establish a positive reputation as a peacemaker, enhancing their image and influence in the outcomes of conflicts (Melin, 2013). By undertaking certain actions (such as facilitating and/or advocating for mediation), the leaders of states can successfully develop reputations for credibility amongst other countries (Lupton, 2018b; Guisinger, Smith, 2002; McGillivray, Smith, 2000, 2006). A positive reputation as a peacemaker carries with it special benefits for a state, due to the proclivity for human societies to reward those who contribute altruistically for the greater good of humanity (Van Vugt et al, 2005). For states, these rewards can include much desired memberships in organizations like the European Union or NATO, or the injection of funds by investors (Lebovic, Voeten, 2006).

Clearly it is in a state's best interest to maintain a positive reputation whenever possible. There are numerous reasons why states seek to improve their reputation and status regardless of the circumstances. But even more deleterious than not having a good reputation as a state would be the designation of having a poor one. This isn't solely for cosmetic reasons

of national vanity, but also because of the real world hazards which can plague a state in the present and future. For example, Weisiger and Yarhi-Milo (2015) observed that "…countries that have earned a bad reputation will be more likely to be challenged, whereas those who have earned a good reputation will be less likely to face challenges…More precisely, a bad reputation leads observers to believe that they can convince the country in question to make more significant political concessions than they otherwise would have been willing to make…A similar relationship applies in reverse for countries with a good reputation who are less attractive targets" (pg. 481).

For a state with a bad reputation (such as in the arena of human rights), shame which is heaped on them by other states delineates the offending state as an outsider who is separate from the community of civilized states (Franklin, 2008), a pariah state if you will. This ostracizing of states of ill repute for things such as the violation of human rights, according to Krain (2012), frames states "…as violating international norms and as untrustworthy partners in future interactions; [and] publicly signals international disapproval to perpetrators, their allies, partners or donors, and to domestic challengers..." (pg. 576), making it difficult for other states to conduct business with and/or support a state with a bad reputation for fear of themselves also gaining a negative reputation (Schneider, 2000; Peterson, Drury, 2011). Given the challenges for a state in changing its reputation once established, this concern remains at the forefront of the minds of policymakers.

With some similarities to a good reputation, as well as some notable differences, the possession of "prestige" is also highly coveted by states. This term denotes admiration and respect in a widespread fashion, and is something which (much like a good reputation) states value and take seriously. Reputation and prestige are similar enough to where policymakers

occasionally mix the two up. Both of them are relational concepts and refer to aspects of a state instead of its environment, but a state's reputation (unlike prestige) doesn't entail voluntary deference (meaning compliance with a state without the presence of coercion or threat), it doesn't depend on a community's shared beliefs, it isn't relative, it doesn't depend on a hierarchy, and it always predicts that a state will behave similarly in the future (Mercer, 2017). Whereas reputation is not relative but instead is relational, prestige is both. It has been argued that states seek prestige both because it has value in of itself as well as serving to increase the power of states who possess prestige in the eyes of others. Taking this into account, the notable scholar Hans Morgenthau (1955) referred to prestige as an "indispensable element of a rational foreign policy" (pg. 75).

When discussing prestige as applied to states, scholars typically highlight five characteristics. According to Mercer (2017), prestige is first "…the collective beliefs of a community that determine what merits respect and admiration…Second, prestige is a relational (not a property concept)…Prestige depends on what a community of states thinks of a community member, not on what an actor thinks of itself…Third, prestige is relative…It exists in a social hierarchy…Fourth, prestige and status are synonyms…[and] a fifth aspect of prestige— that it elicits voluntary deference—characterizes a strategic view of prestige" (pgs. 135-136).

For states, the quest for prestige is a rational endeavor since it may result in voluntary deference from other states, and is in this way a type of soft power. Policies intended to increase the prestige of a state (such as landing a man on the Moon, or successfully mediating a conflict) can deplete the material capabilities of a state, but are designed to spur the creation of admiration and respect from other states. Prestige, whether of a social group of people, an

individual, or a state, is a product of several different components: basic characteristics, the values of the others who grant prestige, short run activities partly governed by prestige considerations, and activities chiefly governed by such considerations. According to Etzioni (1962):

> The prestige of a country rests first of all on its basic characteristics, including the nature of its political structure (democratic or authoritarian), its economy (rich or poor), its "culture," the general level of its technology, its basic military potential, and the like…Not less crucial are the values of the persons, groups, or nations which grant prestige. Prestige is a judgment about the relative standing of one party made by other parties. This judgment depends not only on what a country is, but also on the standards by which the country is evaluated…It is only within the limits established by the characteristics of the society which is evaluated and the values of those doing the evaluating, that action can be undertaken to affect the international status of a country. This may be attained either by introducing prestige as *one* consideration in directing short-run, manipulative activities, or by allowing prestige-considerations to be the chief determinant of a course of action. (pgs. 24-25)

Prestige is valued both for its own sake, but also for the tactical and strategic benefits that come along with its possession. Prestige for a state can endow them with both influence and power, as well as bequeathing upon them material benefits such as foreign direct investment, low interest rate loans, as well as trade concessions and/or preferential trade agreements (Carnegie, Dolan, 2015). Possessors of prestige have also been found to be at a greater likelihood of being tapped for representative and leadership roles (Van Vugt et al, 2005). Prestige is thus a treasured commodity for states, and its lack is often seen by policymakers as troubling. Thus, under any circumstance, states are concerned with their level of prestige, reputation, and the status they denote because of the material and immaterial benefits which are associated with having a good one. According to Mercer (2017):

> Status can mean prestige, but it can also mean one's rank in a hierarchy, an official classification, or a position in a process…As Deborah Larson, T.V. Paul, and William Wohlforth conclude: 'No matter how irrational or petty they may seem, status concerns cannot be evaded because they are inherent to human preferences.' Joslyn Barnhart suggests that humans are 'hardwired' to care about their status; it is an 'innate human trait'. This universal desire for self-esteem persists because it confers evolutionary

advantages. Because human nature drives concern for prestige, it will be just as important between states as within them. (pgs. 136-137)

This concern with status by states (and how to improve them) under any international circumstance does indeed seem to be hardwired from the bottom up. Etzioni (1962) pointedly observed that "Members of nations see in the state more than an agency to which they pay taxes and which supplies them with security, welfare, and other services; they identify with it and its fate…Most citizens derive symbolic gratifications and deprivations from…the international status of their nation" (pg. 22), which in turn is often dependent on the roles which states choose to enact in the international arena (and how those roles are perceived by other states, for example the role of a peacemaker and mediator). The predilection of states for seeking to adopt roles and identities seen as positive by other states as a means for the pursuit of status can be understood through the lens of role theory. According to Thies (2009), "Role theory…contains its own model of *social identity* based on…status…The status dimension refers to a position in a social structure and its associated duties, rights and legitimated power or authority…" (pg. 12), all of which status-seeking states are concerned with as a matter of course. The perception of role and status is of course in the eyes of the beholder, with role theory explaining this via the concept of the audience of states. In role theory, this audience creates the agreed upon reality of the role. Thies (2009) observed that "If the audience accepts the role enactment as appropriate then they serve as confirmation of the reality of the role…Second, the audience provides *cues* to guide the performer's role enactment (Walker, 1979: 177)...Third, the audience engages in social reinforcement through the positive and negative sanctions associated with the role enactment", in this case of status-seeking states trying to improve their reputation (pg. 11).

Although status and prestige, both maintaining and improving them, are always a

concern for states for the abovementioned material and immaterial reasons, leaders and denizens of these states will feel personal umbrage if their state's international status were to suffer a negative change from where it had been (Etzioni, 1962). As such, the loss of prestige which may occur due to condemnation and sanctioning by other states can lead to a spectrum of responses, from enhanced efforts by states to regain prestige and enhance their status through some action (such as seeking the role of mediator and peacemaker), or to enhance already existing efforts being put forward by that state (Etzioni, 1962). Much like reputation, the pursuit of prestige by states is one which has been deemed worthy of fighting for and which has spurred conflict over the course of human history. This may be particularly true when the reputation, prestige, and status of a state is deemed to be under threat by their regime.

3.3 Autocracies and Reputation/Prestige

Autocracies in particular may be vulnerable to negative international attention and condemnation as they are known to use repression as one of their main instruments (if not the main instrument) for maintaining power (Escriba-Folch, 2013) and have often been found to utilize repression more intensively than their democratic counterparts (Davenport, 1999, 2004; Poe et al, 1999). This opens them up for international scrutiny. The reputations of states, which are formed by their patterns of past behavior (Mercer, 1997; Weisiger, Yarhi-Milo, 2015; Press, 2001; Crescenzi, 2007) and are held in the eyes of other international actors (Harvey, Mitton, 2016; Lupton, 2018a), are not directly possessed by that state (Lupton, 2014) and are frequently difficult to alter once established (Copeland, 1997). Thus a negative reputation can be especially pernicious for an autocracy once it is in place. Indeed, scholars have posited that a reputation for openness in particular is much harder to develop

than to defend (Guinsinger, Smith, 2002).

However, research indicates that states and their leaders can and do alter their reputations with both their contemporary words and deeds (Lupton, 2018a; Lupton 2018b; Lupton 2020). By mediating a conflict, autocracies can work to offset potential damage to their reputation which could result from international scrutiny, sanctioning, and condemnation, and instead foster a reputation as a peacemaker (Melin, 2013). Burnell (2006) notes that "In fact, a growing acknowledgement of the international dimensions…suggests that external judgements of [autocratic] regime legitimacy may now carry more weight than perhaps at any previous time…" (pg. 552), while mediation in conflict serves to enhance such legitimacy for an autocracy (Akpinar, 2015) and potentially offset the aforementioned negative scrutiny and international condemnation.

This may be especially important and problematic for autocracies, given the spreading of democratic norms internationally by numerous influential democratic states and entities. Burnell (2010) notes that for international supporters of democracy, "…the legitimacy of any regime other than liberal democratic must depend heavily on its material record," which is also referred to as "output legitimacy" (pg. 7). Although difficult to measure, legitimacy as a concept can be understood as what members of a state believe about their ruler's right to rule, with popular support for the legitimacy of a regime resting on the shared belief that the institutions and rules which make up a political regime are valid (Cassani, 2017). The aforementioned "outputs" can include cooperative actions such as peacekeeping. Such actions have been found to shield states from condemnation from the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (Lebovic, Voeten, 2006) for example, which is valuable for autocracies since human rights are not something for which they are particularly known. A notably public way

that autocracies can seek to distract other states from their negative behavior, offset potential damage to their reputation, and to improve and sanitize their global image is to offer to mediate in a conflict between other states. Mediation in conflict serves to enhance international legitimacy for an autocracy (Akpinar, 2015), and potentially offset the aforementioned negative scrutiny and international condemnation. Through mediation, closed autocratic regimes can develop a reputation for openness as an "honest broker" and peacemaker of international conflicts, increase their level of prestige, status, and visibility, and cultivate a more positive image for themselves both internationally and domestically (Melin, 2013; Barakat, 2014; Legarda, Hoffmann, 2018; Chaziza, 2018a, 2018b). Mediation by an autocracy can therefore act as a way of countering negative international scrutiny, sanctioning, and condemnation, while simultaneously increasing the perception of international legitimacy of that autocracy by other states and political actors.

The obtainment by an autocracy of international legitimacy can bestow upon them numerous other benefits as well, such as attracting international investment and aid that can be used by the regime to maintain its survival (Kendall-Taylor, Frantz, 2014), and possessing a good international reputation can also be invaluable for the creation of domestic legitimacy (Burnell, 2006). In many ways autocratic legitimacy lies in the ability of these regimes to provide desired policy outcomes and material benefits (Cassani, 2017), the aforementioned "output legitimacy" (Burnell, 2010), to both domestic and international audiences. For autocracies in particular, legitimacy is a challenge which if not met can bring down the autocratic regime and consign former autocrats to the dustbin of history. Although legitimacy for autocracies can be derived through traditions (such as a hereditary monarchy), ideology (such as communism), or charisma (such as the case with many personalist

dictators), these are considered weak when put alongside democratic legitimacy.

The wielding of seemingly altruistic behavior by autocracies in order to obtain benefits seems to be a hallmark of the human experience. Van Vugt et al (2005) elaborated on this notion by observing that "…human societies often reward people for their altruistic contributions through medals for bravery in wars, statues for political and military leaders, and awards for nurses and teachers…At the same time, they punish those who fail to consider the interests of others, for example, public condemnation of cheaters, imprisonment of criminals, and execution of army deserters in wars (Levine, Moreland, 2002; Van Vugt, Chang, 2005)" (pg. 3). Acting in a seemingly altruistic manner can bring benefits even if not successful so long as others are observing the behavior, which can then result in opportunities being available to those who altruistically provide public goods which wouldn't otherwise be present (Van Vugt et al, 2005). For example, experiments have shown that contributors of public goods obtain greater prestige, status, and are more likely to be selected to act in leadership roles (Van Vugt et al, 2005), all of which offer ample reasons for states to act as mediators in order to be these public goods providers.

This is not a solely contemporary phenomenon, but actually has historical precedents. For example, as far back as the 17th century, King Louis XIV's diplomats counseled him as to the prestige and reputational benefits for acting as an honest broker of peace, stability, and soft power which can be derived from mediating international conflicts (Kamrava, 2011). As appearances in international politics can be as good as actual substance, successful mediation may not be necessary in order to foster this image. This can be especially useful in the case of rivalries and/or costly conflicts, as Melin (2013) noted that "The increased international pressure and the disputants' cost-benefit calculus create an appealing climate for state-led

mediation efforts…Costly conflicts generally attract international interest…The international spotlight offers a state mediator the opportunity to gain in terms of reputation and influence" (pg. 86).

3.4 Autocracies and Mediation

As such, one public way that autocracies can seek to improve and sanitize their global image is to offer to mediate in a conflict between two other states. When autocracies are subjected to negative international attention, such as criticism for perceived undesirable behavior, are experiencing sanctions, and/or are being censured by international bodies like the UN for issues such as human rights, there is an increased need to disrupt the negative attention and perception of the autocratic states. The presence of such negative international attention and actions are important, as it indicates that states such as autocracies are beyond the norms of acceptability propounded by the international community (Krain, 2012). Sanctioning and negative international attention such as condemnation can badly damage a state's reputation with potential military allies, trade partners, donors, and IGOs (such as the World Bank, for example), as well as indicating that other international actors may permissibly sanction the state subjected to such scrutiny (Schneider, 2000; Lebovic, Voeten, 2006, 2009; Krain, 2012). Thus, negative global attention and condemnation of a state may result in real, tangible consequences for that state (Franklin, 2008; Lebovic, Voeten, 2006).

I argue that autocracies offer mediation as a relatively low-cost attempt to generate international legitimacy to reduce the negative perception that other states have about autocracies and in some cases, to polish the image of their regime when they are subjected to international scrutiny, sanctioning, and condemnation. When a state mediator like an autocracy seemingly altruistically utilizes mediation, it is in line with the foreign policy goals of that

state (Akpinar, 2015), which could reasonably be assumed to include such factors as seeking opportunities to obtain foreign aid, investment, an improved reputation when under fire, etc. According to Van Vugt et al (2007) “To behave altruistically could…bring benefits, even if it was not reciprocated directly, as long as there were observers…Reputations matter a great deal…and it might pay off to develop an altruistic reputation because being seen as an altruist would create opportunities unavailable to non-cooperators” (pg. 8). By mediating, autocracies benefit by having an opportunity to expand their influence, stable and strategic cooperation with other states, develop trade with other parties, expand their economic interests, and accessing resources such as arable land which was previously unavailable to them before their seemingly altruistic behavior (Melin, 2013; Kamrava, 2011; Sun, Zoubir, 2018; Chaziza, 2018a, 2018b). Through mediation, international pariahs like Muammar Gaddafi have been brought in from the cold and into the welcome embrace of other states (Peterson, 1999; Huliaras, 2001). Through mediation, closed autocratic regimes can develop a reputation for openness as an “honest broker” of international conflicts, increase their level of prestige, status, and visibility, cultivate a more positive image for themselves both internationally and domestically, while at the same time serving the regime’s political and economic goals (Barakat, 2014; Legarda, Hoffmann, 2018; Chaziza, 2018a, 2018b). The decision to offer to mediate an international conflict can also be related to the very survival of the mediating state’s regime. Certain characteristics of a potential mediating state may lead to that state calculating that assuming the role of mediator can help ensure its intactness and security despite its geopolitical challenges. Giving the example of Qatar, Kamrava observed:

> As a small state in a rough neighborhood…Qatari diplomacy, including the country’s mediation efforts, is informed by a broader survival strategy that is aimed at ensuring the security of the ruling Al Thanis. Mediation has helped carve out an image of Qatar as a proactively neutral state in the multiple national and cross-border conflicts raging across

> the Middle East. At the same time, and to reinforce regime security, Qatar seeks to maintain open lines of communication between disparate disputants in an effort to ensure that its regional and global opponents remain as few as possible. The substance of the country's mediation efforts may be lacking in depth and long-term resilience, but by its very hyper-activism, Qatar has begun to shape global perceptions of itself as regional peacemaker, an honest broker, a proponent of mediated peace and reconciliation in a region long ravaged by war. (pg. 556)

By virtue of being a smaller state with limited options (such as a lack of hard power) in navigating its numerous challenges, Qatar has been able to leverage its role as a mediator as a foundation of its policy for national survival. A state such as this can use mediation as a tool for limiting the amount of global or regional adversaries that they might face otherwise, thus utilizing it as a potent weapon for combating threats to their survival, with mediation functioning as a strategy for state protection (Akpinar, 2015).

Thus, although not being as successful in mediation as democracies (Melin, 2013), the relatively similar level of mediation-related activity by autocracies in international conflict (Bercovitch, Schneider, 2000) may be explained by the pertinent realpolitik motivations of these states when they feel that their reputation is under threat. Despite their relative lack of success in conflict mediation compared to democracies (Melin, 2013), the potentially rich benefits for autocracies in maintaining international stature and legitimacy that could result from effectively rolling the dice on successful mediation may greatly outweigh the minimal costs of failure, thus motivating autocracies to seek an active role in this endeavor when their regime's character is being called into question. Croissant and Wurster (2013) note that compared to democracies, autocracies are "structurally disadvantaged…in providing legitimacy" (pg. 7), since traditional sources of autocratic legitimacy (personal charisma, ideology, and tradition) are seen as weak and scarce compared to democratic legitimacy (Cassani, 2017).

Given the critical importance afforded to international reputation by states (Mercer, 1997; Guisinger, Smith, 2002; Crescenzi, 2007; Clare, Danilovic, 2012), criticism, sanctioning, scrutiny, and condemnation on the international stage may potentially threaten an autocratic regime's survival (with survival being the main filtering mechanism which autocrats utilize in crafting foreign policy, pursuing external support to prop up their regimes) (Shulman, 2008). Damage to an autocracy's reputation undermines its credibility (Press, 2001) and can lead other states to believe that they can coerce autocracies to make substantial political concessions that would not have been made otherwise (Weisiger, Yarhi-Milo, 2015); while maintaining a good reputation can lead to material and immaterial benefits and may be perceived as a desirable sign of leadership (Van Vugt et al, 2007; Carnegie, Dolan, 2015). Mediation therefore can act as a way of countering negative international scrutiny, sanctioning, and condemnation by providing a global public good.

The nature of the benefits of the aforementioned global public goods are that they don't limit themselves to any particular generation of people (present or future), aren't biased based on any demographic or population group, and extend to greater than one group of states (Kaul et al, 1999). This is particularly true of peace, as Hamburg and Holl (1999) note that "…peace benefits all, much like the public good of law and order at the national level…Where peace and security prevail, everyone can enjoy the fact that there is no war or threat of it, international travel and trade are unimpeded, people can go about their work…everyone everywhere can enjoy the benefits of peace, the enjoyment of one not detracting from that of another" (pg. 388). Using the example of successful territorial dispute resolution by autocracies, Wiegand (2019) observed that "On a macro level, public goods…include the reduced likelihood of future conflict (Gibler, 2007; Owsiak, 2012),

increased likelihood of rivalry terminations (Owsiak, Rider, 2013),…improved economic relationships with neighboring states (Simmons, 2005), and international legal recognition of borders that reduces uncertainty and, therefore, future conflict (Simmons, 2005; Carter, Goemans, 2011, 2014)" (pg. 5).

As previously mentioned, since autocracies tend to use repression as one of the main instruments for maintaining power (Escriba-Folch, 2013), this can give them a poor international image by other actors on matters such as civil liberties and human rights (which can open them up to international criticism and sanctioning by actors such as the United Nations Commission on Human Rights as well as other states and groups around the world); this may be countered by an autocracy if they contribute to collective global public goods, such as peacekeeping operations and, theoretically, conflict mediation. For example, many analysts believe that the reason that China contributed peacekeepers to the UNTAC mission in Cambodia from 1992-1993 was that China was seeking to improve its international reputation after suffering large-scale international condemnation following its brutal crackdown on protesters in Tiananmen Square in 1989, as well as its previous support for the genocidal Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia (Hirono, 2011). In the words of Mendez (1999) "…the maintenance of global peace…is the quintessential global public good, in both substance and form," and by providing peacekeepers to the UNTAC mission, autocratic China was able to put itself in the position of a provider of this good (pg. 404). According to Lebovic and Voeten (2006), "Because countries that contribute toward collective goods within the [international] community seem to receive more favorable treatment than countries that shirk their responsibilities, it appears that 'good citizenship' or at least a 'good reputation' matters within the international community…States…might also acquire

reputations as reliable coalition partners, which could make them less inviting targets for condemnation" (pg. 885). This leads me to my first hypothesis:

- *Hypothesis 1: When autocracies are subject to international scrutiny, sanctioning, and/or condemnation, it is more likely that they will offer to mediate international conflicts.*

3.5 Variations in Autocratic Regime Types

In the second part of my theory, I examine the role of different autocratic regime types to assess whether specific regime types may influence mediation by autocracies. In order to elucidate the similarities and differences of different manners of autocratic regimes, four of the main autocratic regime types (autocratic party machines, military regimes, personalist regimes, and monarchies) will be analyzed one by one. The basis for the division of these groups is founded primarily on the rules that delineate leadership groups and how these groups represent specific interests in the making of policy decisions, the number of political actors involved, which societal actors form the leader's support basis, who exercises influence over policymaking, who determines access to high office, the limited amount of political pluralism that exists, as well who controls the security apparatus (Geddes et al, 2014; Mattes, Rodriguez, 2014; Davenport, 2007).

It may be expected that leaders of autocracies function in a totally unconstrained environment, able to indulge their whims as a matter of state practice. However, even leaders of authoritarian regimes don't function in a totally unconstrained environment (Moore, 1966; Geddes, 1999; Bueno de Mesquita et al, 2003; Horowitz et al, 2005), but instead inhabit a spectrum of different autocratic institutional arrangements and regimes (Geddes, 2003;

Gandhi, Przeworski, 2006, 2007; Gandhi, 2008; Weeks, 2008; Svolik, 2009; Conrad et al, 2014). In fact, there are not only different types of autocratic regimes but sub-types as well, ranging from autocratic party "machines" to personalist dictatorships, traditional monarchies to military junta regimes (Burnell, 2010). To clarify, a regime can be commonly characterized as the informal or formal organization at the heart of political power (and its connections with society at large) which decides who can access power politically, as well as the way in which those in power deal with those who do not possess it (Lawson, 1993). When referring to a regime type, this regards the formal structures, principles, and norms that govern how political leaders come to power and the institutional setups that affect their ability to choose and carryout policies (Hagan, 2010). In this sense, regimes can be seen as the different types of political systems found amongst states in the global system (Siaroff, 2011). Regime types themselves have been posited to be a function of multiple characteristics, namely the degree of governmental functions, the different types of political participation, the manner in which authority is regarded, the decision-making latitude and the independence and characteristics of executive policymaking, the type of political opposition and competition, as well as the method for selecting the executive (Gurr, 1974; Maoz, Abdolali, 1989). In the autocratic context, regimes can be further understood as basic formal and informal rules that delineate which interests are represented in the autocratic leadership group and if these interests can impose constraints on the dictator, with these interests in turn holding some degree of sway over an autocratic leader's elevation to power as well as their policy choices and actions (Geddes et al, 2014). Far from being a one-size-fits-all regime type, the differences amongst autocratic regimes may be as significant as the differences between democracies and some autocracies (Weeks, 2014).

There are three primary variables which differentiate an autocracy from their democratic counterparts. These involve the degree of organized and open participation politically, such as by utilizing established political parties, the amount of constraints institutionally on executive power, and the occurrence of public elections of the executive (Hagan, 2010). In different autocracies, there is a spectrum of these variables playing out across regime types. An autocracy can be understood as a political system where a small group or person has power with little constraints, and without real participation by the general public or actual political competition (Frieden et al, 2016). Compared to democracies, pivotal power and support for the regime in autocracies is derived from a much more limited constituent set of stakeholders, which can include the military, business interests, bureaucrats, and politically active religious groups (Bueno de Mesquita, Siverson, 1995; Levy, 1998).

Beginning in the mid-2000s, researchers noticed an increased trend of state "autocratization," with less than a quarter of leadership changes in autocratic regimes resulting in subsequent democratization, and half of all regime changes being a transition from one autocracy to another (Cassani, Tomini, 2019; Geddes et al, 2014). There is tremendous variation in the demographics and characteristics amongst autocracies. According to Burnell (2006):

> …autocracies…show much diversity in the following: demographic size; territorial size; geographical location; size of economy; average income per capita; recent economic performance (growth rate); socioeconomic inequality; culture (including religion); military capability and general state strength or weakness (autocracies may all claim 'despotic power'—the power to control and suppress through coercive means—but they differ considerably in their 'infrastructural power', that is the power to penetrate and transform society, and the capacity to promote modernization and development)…They vary too in respect of the state's patronage resources…and in their record of addressing society's material wants and other needs…also…how integrated they are into the global trading system and their openness to foreign private capital flows, in their interaction with peoples from…democracies through international communications, foreign travel…and in the state of diplomatic relations with other countries…autocracies differ also in regard to how much domestic legitimacy they enjoy…and, just as

important…*how* they legitimate their rule. (pgs. 547-548)

As such, autocracies are hardly monolithic in their national aspects. Weeks (2014) elaborates by noting that among autocracies there are states "…with massive economic and military power, such as China and Russia; countries with important natural resources, such as Iran and some Arab nations; and economically fragile countries that have nonetheless managed to develop potent weapons, such as North Korea" (pgs. 2-3). The trend towards autocratization amongst states is an increasingly salient phenomenon politically, particularly in the post- communist states, Asia, Latin America, and sub-Saharan Africa (Cassani, Tomini, 2019). There has been speculation academically that underlying conditions of certain social groups and societies lead them to be more receptive to autocratic regimes (such as lawlessness and a lack of security), or that indigenous cultural values and beliefs can predispose societies to accept authoritarian regimes in their country (Burnell, 2010). The apparent surge in autocracies globally raises the specter of a rising set of autocracies not only tightening their grip domestically in their own countries, but also garnering influence through their international relations over other states (Burnell, 2010). Further, compared to past autocracies, today's autocratic regimes are far sturdier. For example, from the end of the Second World War through the winding down of the Cold War in 1989, the average length of authoritarian regimes was twelve years, while post-Cold War this number increased to an average of twenty years (Kendall-Taylor, Frantz, 2014), with less than a quarter of autocratic leadership changes seeing democratization as the result (Geddes et al, 2014). It has been postulated that the transparency associated with democracies, including the possession of a free press, creates greater credibility for democracies' foreign policy actions (such as cooperating with other states), and greater audience costs for foreign policy failures (Fearon, 1994; Downs, Rocke,

1995; Smith, 1996; Van Belle, 1997; Schultz, 1998). However, many autocratic regimes face similar curbs as democratic leaders (Marin, 2015; Frantz, 2007). In order for autocratic states to credibly commit to cooperation and collaboration with other states, the generation of audience costs in particular is important for autocracies to be taken seriously. According to Conrad et al (2014):

> …the generation of audience costs requires that a domestic political audience has the means and incentives to coordinate to punish the leader. Second, domestic actors must view backing down…as worse than conceding…Third, outsiders must be able to observe the possibility of domestic sanctions for backing down…the institutions in nondemocratic states vary greatly with respect to these three criteria, and therefore, in their ability to generate audience costs. (pg. 543)

Although it has been thought that autocracies do not suffer the degree of audience costs which leaders of democratic regimes do, this has been found to be an oversimplification. Weeks (2008) observed that "While the small groups of supporters in autocratic regimes differ from the more inclusive audiences that can punish democratic leaders, autocratic elites can nevertheless visibly remove incumbents when elites have incentives to coordinate to punish the leader…" (pg. 36). Kendall-Taylor and Frantz (2014) observed that unlike other autocracies, autocratic "…regimes that…control by altering democratic processes often still seek to portray themselves as 'democrats,' making them likely to be more vulnerable to international and domestic criticism that highlights the inconsistency between their behaviors and democratic norms" (pg. 81). In regimes where the leader has direct control over the intelligence and security organs of the autocracy (such as in a personalist dictatorship) as opposed to collective control by a political party, mounting a challenge to the incumbent can prove very difficult because of the ability of the leader to monitor and repress any challengers (Weeks, 2008). On the other hand, in some autocracies, "regime insiders" can have the capability of punishing the autocratic leader (Wiegand, 2019). The presence of audience costs

holds sway over the ability of autocratic leaders to broadcast resolve and commitment to other states (Weeks, 2008; Marin, 2015). Typically, autocratic leaders need the support of domestic elites who, in a very similar way as voting publics in democracies, act as audiences (Weeks, 2008). The important question in the generation of credibility internationally (and thus whether an autocracy is seen as a desirable partner in cooperative and collaborative endeavors with other states) is if domestic elites have the ability and willingness to coordinate with each other to punish the leader (which varies across autocratic regime types), leading the leaders to hypothetically select the foreign policy that will make their winning coalitions happy (Weeks, 2008; Shulman, 2008). Further, the stability of an autocratic regime is vital for other states to observe alterations in the structure of the leadership, which then can create a situation where an autocracy can gain credibility (Weeks, 2008). These scenarios are reminiscent of democratic countries, and conversely autocracies that more closely resemble democracies (particularly in the realm of policy flexibility, transparency, and leader accountability) have been found to be more successful in international cooperation than personalist autocracies of either the civilian or military type (Mattes, Rodriguez, 2014).

According to Mattes and Rodriguez (2014):

> …because their leaders are most likely to be held accountable by ruling elites, decision making is relatively constrained, and they are potentially more open to outsiders, single-party regimes should have a cooperation advantage among autocracies. Elites in military regimes are also in a position to hold leaders accountable and check their policymaking, so, while these regimes appear to be considerably less transparent, we also expect them to do relatively well at international cooperation. Personalist dictatorships, on the other hand, should not be popular cooperation partners…the fact that leaders are unlikely to be held accountable for bad decisions and that policies can be changed on a whim should deter prospective partners. (pg. 536)

As such, there is considerable variation across autocratic regime types as to their ability to have convivial, cooperative, and collaborative relations with other states. Whereas

states that have democratic characteristics (such as party machines) have been found to be less conflictual and to cooperate to a significant degree internationally (Leeds, Davis, 1999), the combination of a lack of constraint, the dearth of leader accountability, and personal quirks lead personalist leaders to gamble to a greater extent on foreign policy when compared to other autocratic or democratic leaders (Weeks, 2014; Mattes, Rodriguez, 2014).

In addition, autocracies with large winning coalitions that resemble democracies (such as party machines) have been found to contribute to cooperative activities such as peacefully ending conflicts and providing public goods more often than other autocratic regime types with smaller winning coalitions (like personalist dictators). According to Wiegand (2019), "…authoritarian regimes with larger winning coalitions, and therefore broader domestic mobilization opportunities and accountability, have greater incentives and ability to provide public goods and…pursue dispute resolution…Not only has it been demonstrated that single- party regimes are the regime type most similar to democracies…but…they are most likely to pursue peaceful resolution and the most likely to pursue legally binding methods" (pg. 17). This in all likelihood makes them more attractive for cooperative endeavors such as international conflict mediation, as well as more effective at successfully carrying mediation out. Given that autocratic mediation does occur frequently, not all authoritarian regimes may be equally likely to offer to mediate or to bring it to a successful conclusion. For example, personalist autocracies or monarchies may not be the best equipped or naturally dispositioned to peaceful conflict mediation, and even the personal aspect of mediation by these types of regimes can be a downside in of itself. A pertinent example of this is the case of Qatar, which has mediated a number of both international and civil conflicts. However, a downside is that much of the mediation has

been centered around the personality of the Emir, as opposed to a professional diplomatic corps that is better suited for following through with mediation implementation on the ground (Kamrava, 2011).

As such, it may be that autocrats like personalists or monarchs are not the most prolific in offering to mediate international conflict. It may instead be autocratic party-based regimes, where there is the presence of a strong domestic audience and selectorate made up primarily of civilian regime insiders with a broader range of policy options, political points of view, as well as experiences, and who don't instinctively prefer other solutions over diplomacy (Weeks, 2014; Frantz, Kendall-Taylor, 2014). This is opposed to military regimes or bosses/strongmen who rely primarily on the military, and who may be socialized to military solutions (Sagan, 2003; Walt, 1987; Lai, Slater, 2006). Leaders of regimes with larger winning coalitions, such as autocracies which are more similar to democracies than other autocracies (Bueno de Mesquita et al, 1999; Weeks, 2014), need to produce successful policy results, such as the preservation of their state's reputation or to otherwise further its national objectives.

3.5.1 Party-Based Autocracies

Although declining in number somewhat after the end of the Cold War, political party- based autocratic "machines" (such as the Soviet Union or China) have been some of the most common autocracies in the post-World War Two period (Geddes et al, 2014), as they seem to possess an institutional makeup which leads them to be resilient to challenges to their authority (Marin, 2015). In these regimes, there is only one legitimate party in politics which has strong control over society, or occasionally multiple minor political parties that are under the thumb of the dominant political party in the autocracy (Davenport, 2007; Wiegand, 2019). These party- based machine regimes can be understood as autocracies where the party

has some degree of constraint and influence over the leader regarding policy, possesses functioning local-level organizations, adopts some of the facades of democracy, and controls the majority of access to government jobs and political power (Peceny et al, 2002). In addition, they frequently possess a coherent ideology such as communism (Shulman, 2008). Some of the limited restraints in these types of autocracies can include the legislature blocking the implementation of some executive decrees, approving some types of executive-nominated appointments, and initiating some legislation, as well as the failure of the executive in changing constitutional restrictions to their authority, the presence of an independent or semi-independent judiciary, and the ruling party performing some administrative functions independently of the executive (Shulman, 2008).

Single-party autocracies appear to be the most peaceful autocracies. Personalist dictatorships and military regimes have been found to be more likely to initiate militarized interstate disputes than single-party autocracies (Weeks, 2014). Further, since autocratic "machines" seem to be more closely similar to democracies than other autocracies (Weeks, 2014), it stands to reason that aspects of democracies which lead to them peacefully ending conflicts such as offering to mediate more often could also be applied to party-based autocracies (Melin, 2013). Single-party autocracies also experience less civil war than do military regimes and multi-party autocracies, in part due to their fully controlled party institutions which can monitor, co-opt, and coerce opponents without stifling political action too much (like military juntas) or lacking effective institutions (like monarchists and personalists) (Fjelde, 2010). Oftentimes challengers in autocratic "machine" are co-opted via seemingly democratic institutions and political parties, which serve the double purpose of both being a means for channeling perks and influence to co-opted challengers (causing them to

have a vested interest in the longevity of the regime), as well as identifying who they are for the regime to see.

One important reason autocracies use pseudo-democratic institutions is the hope that they confer an aura of domestic and international legitimacy. For an autocracy, the obtainment and conservation of legitimacy can be a struggle compared to the popular mandate which is bestowed on democracies via their institutional practices. It has been postulated that the transparency associated with democracies, including the possession of a free press, creates greater credibility for democracies' foreign policy actions, such as cooperating with other states or mediating conflicts, and greater audience costs for foreign policy failures (Fearon, 1994; Downs, Rocke, 1995; Smith, 1996; Van Belle, 1997; Schultz, 1998). For example, Crescenzi et al (2011) states that "…transparency and oversight of democratic political systems disciplines democratic mediators to remain honest, which means…democratic mediators become an attractive option for conflict resolution and can successfully help the parties reach a peaceful settlement" (pg. 1075). These characteristics for successful mediation possessed by democracies may also carry over into the behavior of autocracies that closely resemble them, i.e. non-personalist autocratic "machines" (Weeks, 2014). It is notable that autocratic regimes can face similar curbs as democratic leaders (Marin, 2015; Frantz, 2007), particularly party-machine types. In order for autocratic states to credibly commit to cooperation and collaboration with other states, the generation of audience costs in particular is important for autocracies to be taken seriously, and has thought to take place more often in party-based machine type autocracies (Weeks, 2008; Marin, 2015). Typically, autocratic leaders need the support of domestic elites who, in a very similar way as voting publics in democracies, act as audiences (Weeks, 2008). The important

question in the generation of credibility internationally (and thus whether an autocracy is seen as a desirable partner in cooperative and collaborative endeavors with other states) is if domestic elites have the ability and willingness to coordinate with each other to punish the leader (which varies across autocratic regime types), leading the leaders to hypothetically select the foreign policy that will make their winning coalitions happy (Weeks, 2008; Shulman, 2008). Further, the stability of an autocratic regime is vital for other states to observe alterations in the structure of the leadership, which then can create a situation where an autocracy can gain credibility (Weeks, 2008). These scenarios are reminiscent of democratic countries, and conversely autocracies that more closely resemble democracies (particularly in the realm of policy flexibility, transparency, and leader accountability like party-machine autocracies) have been found to be more successful in international cooperation than personalist autocracies of either the civilian or military type (Mattes, Rodriguez, 2014). According to Mattes and Rodriguez (2014):

> …because their leaders are most likely to be held accountable by ruling elites, decision making is relatively constrained, and they are potentially more open to outsiders, single-party regimes should have a cooperation advantage among autocracies. Elites in military regimes are also in a position to hold leaders accountable and check their policymaking, so, while these regimes appear to be considerably less transparent, we also expect them to do relatively well at international cooperation. Personalist dictatorships, on the other hand, should not be popular cooperation partners…the fact that leaders are unlikely to be held accountable for bad decisions and that policies can be changed on a whim should deter prospective partners. (pg. 536)

In addition, autocracies with large winning coalitions that resemble democracies such as party-based autocracies (Wiegand, 2019) have been found to contribute to cooperative activities such as peacefully ending conflicts and providing public goods more often than other autocratic regime types with smaller winning coalitions (like personalist dictators). Interestingly, the pressure to escape the highlighting of inconsistencies with democratic

norms may result in “machines” volunteering most often and putting in the greatest effort (resulting in greater effectiveness) to provide global public goods relative to other autocratic regime-types. According to Wiegand (2019), “…authoritarian regimes with larger winning coalitions, and therefore broader domestic mobilization opportunities and accountability, have greater incentives and ability to provide public goods and…pursue dispute resolution…Not only has it been demonstrated that single- party regimes are the regime type most similar to democracies…but…they are most likely to pursue peaceful resolution and the most likely to pursue legally binding methods” (pg. 17). This in all likelihood makes them more attractive for cooperative endeavors such as international conflict mediation, as well as more effective at successfully carrying mediation out.

Differentiating themselves from other types of autocracies like personalist dictatorships, party-based autocracies have a hierarchical structure where political elites aren’t personally bound to the leader of the autocracy (enabling them to be able to act to remove the leader from power without fear of losing their job), and where regime insiders and leaders rise up through the ranks based on seniority and merit as opposed to family or otherwise personal relationships with the autocratic leader (Conrad et al, 2014; Weeks, 2008, 2014). Hypothetically, this leads the leaders of party-machine autocracies to get rid of policies that don’t satisfy the interest of the party (Shulman, 2008). In this type of autocratic regime, domestic institutions aren’t necessarily “rubber-stamp” organizations, the party regularly holds intraparty elections competitively for certain positions, regime insiders and factions may coalesce around specific policy issues and competition for important jobs (Weeks, 2008; Davenport, 2007). In addition, because they attempt to parrot democracies, this can cause party-based autocracies to be vulnerable to pressure to live up to their

supposedly democratic image. Kendall-Taylor and Frantz (2014) observed that unlike other autocratic regimes, autocracies which utilize pseudo-democratic institutions "…often still seek to portray themselves as 'democrats,' making them likely to be more vulnerable to international and domestic criticism that highlights the inconsistency between their behaviors and democratic norms" (pg. 81). The pressure to escape the highlighting of inconsistencies with democratic norms may result in party-based autocracies offering most often to mediate international conflicts, as compared to other types of autocracies. Further, Melin (2013) observed that the offering of mediation is "…more likely when democracies are involved, as these states are accustomed to third-party involvement in conflict and garner other states' trust, making them a more attractive option for conflict resolution…Mediation is therefore best encouraged when democracies are involved as…mediators" (pgs. 84-85). Evidently, autocratic "machines" are more closely similar to democracies than other autocracies (Weeks, 2014), so it stands to reason that aspects of democracies which lead to them offering to mediate more often to mediate could also be applied to autocratic "machines" (Melin, 2013). It is postulated that the transparency associated with democracies, including the possession of a free press, creates greater credibility for democracies' foreign policy actions and greater audience costs for foreign policy failure (Fearon, 1994; Downs, Rocke, 1995; Smith, 1996; Van Belle, 1997; Schultz, 1998). In addition, Crescenzi et al (2011) states that "…transparency and oversight of democratic political systems disciplines democratic mediators to remain honest, which means…democratic mediators become an attractive option for conflict resolution and can successfully help the parties reach a peaceful settlement" (pg. 1075). These characteristics for successful mediation possessed by democracies may also carry over into the behavior of autocracies that closely resemble them, i.e. non-personalist

autocratic “machines” (Weeks, 2014).

- *Hypothesis 2: Party-based autocracies will be most likely to offer to mediate international conflicts when being sanctioned or condemned relative to the other types of autocracies*

3.5.2 Military Regimes

This type of autocratic regime has several important differences with party-machines, but also some similarities which may lead to them offering to mediate (and to be successful at it) relatively often. Although there is less of a winning coalition for junta leaders than autocratic “machines,” they still have a larger winning coalition of officers and officials to please than monarchies or personalist autocracies. Political leaders with larger winning coalitions need to produce successful policy and to protect the national interest to stay in power (Bueno de Mesquita et al, 1999). This characteristic of juntas may lead to their leaders being more sensitive than some other types of autocracies (such as personalists or monarchs, but not party-based autocracies that have a large winning coalition) to criticism and a disgraced national image, pressuring them to produce public goods more often than these other autocratic regime-types as a means of producing “output legitimacy” for their regime both at home and globally (Burnell, 2010).

Further, because military juntas have collegial structures that are hierarchical and observable to an international audience (and where individuals in the elite won’t necessarily discover their careers to be in tatters if the junta leadership falls from power) military regimes have some ability to create audience costs that bear a degree of similarity to that possessed by more democratic regimes (Weeks, 2008). According to Weeks (2008):

> *Military regimes*…are 'governed by an officer or retired officer, with the support of the military establishment and some routine mechanism by which high-level officers could influence policy choice and appointments.' Mechanisms for leadership transfer typically involve juntas or military councils of officers. Furthermore, the military hierarchy is preserved and the army stays under the control of the military rather than the leader. Countries are…military regimes if 'merit and seniority [are] the main basis for promotion, rather than loyalty or ascriptive characteristics' and if the leader has 'refrained from having dissenting officers murdered or imprisoned.' Moreover, because most elites in military regimes are not personally connected to the incumbent, they can expect to stay in power if the leader falls…in stable military regimes, these facts are observable to foreigners. (pg. 46)

This may allow military regimes to be more effective at cooperative activities (such as mediation) relative to personalist dictatorships or monarchies, but still not as much as autocratic "machines" which are much more similar to democracies than other autocratic regime-types (Weeks, 2014).

Military regimes typically lack political parties and institutions through which the populace's political energies can be funneled and controlled. They are also thought to have a comparative advantage over other autocracies when it comes to coercive force (due to the military's expertise with the mechanisms of violence), are more likely to be repressive in the violation of personal integrity rights (such as torture and mass killing), and are likely to put an extra premium on internal order (Fjelde, 2010; Nordlinger, 1977; Davenport, 2007). As such, military regimes are often obsessed with domestic security.

Direct military control involves technocratic and apolitical military officers making direct decisions regarding their state's foreign and domestic policies and where decisions must be approved by at least a portion of the officer corps (with leaders ruling out policy options that don't please the ruling junta) (Peceny et al, 2002; Mattes, Rodriguez, 2014; Shulman, 2008), whereas indirect military rule refers to autocratic regimes where formal political leaders are selected through elections which are competitive, but the military retains control over key

policy choices and/or prevents political parties that could attract significant numbers of the electorate from politically participating (Geddes et al, 2014).

In the case of military regimes, there is a smaller group of supporters that excludes most of the domestic population as compared to autocratic machines (Wiegand, 2019). This can create a legitimacy challenge for military regimes. However, military regimes can rummage up a degree of legitimacy by providing robust economic performance, domestic and global public goods, and by furnishing political stability, although there is the danger of divisions between officers which can make them vulnerable to challengers coming from within the ruling elite (Lai, Slater, 2006). Because they lack an ideology, military regimes struggle to justify their long term rule in the absence of peace, prosperity, and the achievement of other policy success. Because they lack an ideology, military regimes struggle to justify their long term rule in the absence of achieving national goals (such as the preservation of reputation as well as the pursuit of other strategic objectives and benefits), and due to a lack of institutional infrastructure they are not as capable as other autocracies in securing elite cohesion and deflecting popular dissent through co-optation. Further, although there is less of a winning coalition for junta leaders than autocratic "machines," they still have a larger winning coalition of officers and officials to please than monarchies or personalist autocracies. As mentioned, political leaders with larger winning coalitions need to produce successful policy and to protect the national interest to stay in power (Bueno de Mesquita et al, 1999). By extrapolation, the above-mentioned characteristics of juntas may cause their leaders to be more sensitive than monarchies or personalists to condemnation and a tarnished national image, pressuring them to offer to mediate international conflicts more often than those autocratic regime-types as a means of producing "output legitimacy" for their regime both

domestically and internationally through the production of global public goods (Burnell, 2010).

- *Hypothesis 3: Military juntas will be less likely to offer to mediate international conflicts when being sanctioned or condemned relative to party-based autocracies*

3.5.3 Monarchies

Although they share some characteristics with other autocratic regime types depending on their configuration, monarchies are unique in that they rely heavily on a lengthy pedigree of tradition immemorial. A monarchy can be understood as a political system in which sovereignty is vested in an individual (such as a sultan or a queen) who is empowered by custom and/or law to remain in power for life, and can be regarded as a kind of autocracy with customary and/or legal foundations (Tullock, 1987; Kokkonen, Sundel, 2014). Concerning the level of plurality and democratic characteristics found in monarchies, these autocracies normally possess the lowest polity scores of all the autocratic regime types (Geddes et al, 2014). Amongst monarchies, it is widely speculated that the important determinant of whether the monarch can be considered accountable is whether they reign on their own or with help from the extended royal family, or in other words whether the monarchy is dynastic or non-dynastic. Monarchies are seemingly well protected from challenges to their authority via historical tradition for legitimacy both at home and abroad, leading them to be less sensitive to domestic and international criticism and condemnation. As such, they may not feel the same degree of pressure to offer to provide domestic and/or global public goods (such as ensuring peace and mediating international conflicts) that party-

based autocracies and juntas face, leading to them offering to provide these less than those types of autocracies, but more so than personalists since it is still possible that individuals of the royal court or ruling dynasty might invoke punitive measures or depose the monarch for foreign policy failure and for failing to protect national interests (such as the monarchy's level of prestige and/or positive reputation).

Monarchies can be classified as either dynastic or non-dynastic. According to Weeks (2008), "In *dynastic monarchies*…members of the family share an interest in maintaining the continued health of the dynasty, and cooperate to keep the leader in check…The leader does not control appointments; instead, family members rise to high office through seniority, and the 'king or emir cannot dismiss…relatives from their posts at will…the family has the authority to remove the monarch and replace him with another member of the dynasty'…Importantly, dynastic monarchies differ from personalist regimes in that although family members hold high office, they do not hold their position at the whim of the leader and will retain power and influence even if the leader is removed" (pg. 48). The hierarchical structure of a dynastic monarchy typically possesses mechanisms to credibly threaten or remove the reigning monarch, and in this way possess similarities with military or party-machine regimes in that they can generate some audience costs (Weeks, 2008; Conrad et al, 2014). This allows insiders of the monarchy to possess incentives and opportunities to remove the reigning monarch if they put in danger the prestige or authority of the royal dynasty (Weeks, 2008), although the removal of still living monarchs is rare with the royal family seldom killing, arresting, or overtly punishing them (Geddes et al, 2014).

On the other hand, according to Weeks (2008), non-dynastic monarchies "…tend to more closely resemble personalist regimes…Although family members…can expect that

one of them will inherit the throne, they are excluded from holding important posts in the regime…Rather, the king can promote loyal followers to high positions, similar to his personalist counterparts…Moreover, leaders of nondynastic regimes…have 'solid control over the state and its coercive apparatus…'" (pg. 48). In this way, the characteristics of nondynastic monarchies function through the consolidation of power (Conrad et al, 2014). In this way, nondynastic monarchs possess a large degree of unlimited authority to rule by decree and to ignore or suspend any inconvenient legislature or constitution which could restrain them (Shulman, 2008). That being said, members of the court or the royal family who conceivably have a claim to power can still credibly threaten or remove the reigning monarch, and in this manner there exists similarities to other regime types in that they can generate a degree of audience costs.

Although monarchies often possess a substantial degree of historical and/or religious authority (endowing them with a traditional sense of legitimacy), they often reign without political institutions which can monitor and control opposition from the populace, thus meaning they lack the infrastructural advantage of a broadly based political party to both identify subversive elements and to monitor societal groups and organizations (Fjelde, 2010). Monarchies are relatively insulated from challenges to their credibility and other criticisms by relying on tradition for domestic and international legitimacy, leading them to be less sensitive to international and domestic criticism and condemnation. Thus, they may not feel the same pressures to offer to mediate international conflicts that "machines" and juntas face, leading to them offering to mediate less than those regime-types but more than personalists since it is still feasible that members of the ruling family or court might punish or remove the monarch for foreign policy failure and for failing to protect national interests

(like a positive reputation or access to other benefits).

- *Hypothesis 4: Monarchies will be less likely to offer to mediate international conflicts when being sanctioned or condemned relative to military juntas*

3.5.4 Personalists

This is one of the more common autocratic regime types found in both the past and the present. Post-Second World War, the proportion of personalist autocracies steadily increased to the point where they now rival party-machines as the most frequent form of autocracy (Geddes et al, 2014). Leaders of personalist autocracies (such as Saddam Hussein in Iraq or Colonel Qadhafi in Libya) don't possess influential domestic audiences to be concerned about for their support or for fear of punishment, and they typically have a very limited winning coalition of fiercely loyal and close cronies and family members who have everything to lose if the personalist leader falls from power (Weeks, 2014; Wiegand, 2019; Mattes, Rodriguez, 2014; Geddes et al, 2014). This allows personalist leaders to be insulated from negative consequences that result from their policy choices. For personalists, seemingly important national objectives such as the state's reputation and legitimacy are fundamentally beneath the interests of the dictator, such as channeling perks to their very limited selectorate or weakening state institutions which could pose a threat to the regime. As a result, personalist leaders will dismiss policies which stand to endanger their hold on political power as opposed to a collegial decision making approach or one that favors the political party over the leader (Shulman, 2008).

Since their winning coalition is so limited, the political and literal survival of

personalist dictators is founded not as much on successful domestic and foreign policy and the promotion of the national interest as opposed to the rewarding of their inner circle. This results in a low likelihood of the dictator suffering punitive measures or usurpation by their very small selectorate, who owe their jobs and power to the individual whim of the personalist dictator, for bad leadership or a lack of effective national administration (Weeks, 2008). As such, because they are insulated in this way from both domestic and/or international criticism and challenges to their legitimacy, personalist dictators may be least likely to offer to produce global public goods such as conflict mediation than party-based autocracies, military juntas, and monarchies since they will experience the least pressure to protect their state's reputation by, for example, responding to international punishment and/or scrutiny as long as they keep their inner circle happy by hook or by crook. In addition, because of the often intentional absence of merit-based officials, bureaucrats, and diplomats (as well as the ability of the international community to see that personalist dictators are subject to few consequences for foreign policy failures and abrupt changes to state policies and actions) personalist autocracies should be least likely to successfully cooperate with other states or to care about providing global public goods.

Personalists come closest to the characterization of an unrestrained autocratic leader whose whims and impulses are as good as law. Personalists (in order to remove threats) generally weaken their armed forces to stay in office and are thus constrained from foreign wars (Peceny et al, 2002). As such, they enjoy relatively unlimited authority relative to other autocratic regime types. For example, there are no regular constraints on the executive's actions (such that if there is even a constitution that it can be easily suspended or ignored), the executive often rules by personal decree, and the legislature and/or judiciary (if they even

exist in a meaningful way) can be packed with the executive's supporters or outright dismissed (Shulman, 2008). In fact, it has been argued that due to their political isolation, personalist autocracies are the most repressive of all autocratic regime types and are built in such a way that the personalist leader and their cronies control access to the political system, and are the sole movers and shakers of power within the regime; in the absence of this access, repression can be used to proactively get rid of challengers and control the disbursement of influence (Davenport, 2007). According to Weeks (2008):

> *Personalist regimes*…most closely reflect the conventional wisdom about non-democracies: there is no domestic audience that can effectively coordinate to sanction the leader. This is for two reasons: the leader has the means to punish internal critics, and the fate of elites is…connected to the leader's survival in office, reducing incentives to punish leaders. For example, among the criteria for personalist regimes are whether the leader 'personally control[s] the security apparatus' and whether 'access to high office depend[s] on the personal favor of the leader.' Personalist leaders therefore can discipline elites much more harshly than leaders of regimes where power is less concentrated…For elites in personalist regimes, keeping a poor leader in office is more often preferable to ousting the incumbent…foreign decision makers can observe that personalist rulers face no consistent threat of punishment. (pgs. 46-47)

It is through their absolute control over their regime that personalists facilitate a political environment where it is hard for elites to credibly threaten a personalist with punishment and removal (Conrad et al, 2014). Personalists do have to derive their enforcement power from some source, however. For example, personalist regimes where the leader originates from and derives their power via political parties are referred to as "bossist" regimes, whereas personalists who originate from and rely on the military for enforcement are known as "strongmen" (such as Qadhafi) (Lai, Slater, 2006). However, the military is often the biggest threat for personalists who will (as a result) systematically weaken it while creating multiple overlapping intelligence and security forces to keep watch for any threats. According to Peceny et al (2002), "…personalist dictatorships…thrive by destroying independent

institutions, personalizing all politics, and ensuring that important political decisions are funneled through the one supreme leader…Dictators gain allies through the creation of…patronage networks…Graft and corruption bind…bureaucrats to the leader rather than to rational, insulated bureaucracies…Those who cannot be coopted…are purged" (pg. 18). Because personalists have the final say in the selection of their advisers, they are more likely to be misinformed about policy but still able to stay in power regardless of policy failures (Marin, 2015). Further, although personal charisma has provided some degree of legitimacy to personalist regimes historically, these types of autocracies are often seen as the most illegitimate amongst autocratic regime types. Cassani (2017) observed that "…the institutional features that differentiate contemporary authoritarian regimes can have significant implications for leaders' efforts to legitimize themselves…" (pg. 354). For personalist autocracies, the interests of the state such as its reputation and legitimacy are institutionally subordinate to the interests of the personalist (such as rewarding their small and immediate selectorate). Because their winning coalition is so small, the survival of personalists is based less on successful foreign policy and the promotion of the national interest as opposed to the rewarding of an inner circle of cronies. This leads to a low likelihood of the leader being punished by other elites (who owe their position to the personal favor of the personalist dictator) for poor leadership or state stewardship (Weeks, 2008). Since they are less sensitive to domestic or international challenges and questions to their legitimacy, personalists will be least likely to offer to mediate international conflicts than the other mentioned autocratic regime-types since they will feel the least pressure to respond to international criticism or punitive measures as long as they grease the palms of their small inner circle.

- *Hypothesis 5: Personalist autocracies will be least likely to offer to mediate international conflicts when being sanctioned or condemned relative to the other types of autocracies.*

CHAPTER 4: Methodology

In order to assess my theory and test my hypotheses about why autocratic regimes and specific regime-types mediate in international conflicts, I conducted both quantitative and qualitative analyses by using a mixed methods approach. So as to effectively investigate when autocracies offer to mediate interstate conflicts, the results of the mediation, as well as which types of autocracies are most likely to offer and be successful at mediating an end to an international conflict, I utilized Large-N datasets on international mediation, sanctioning, condemnation, political and economic ties, and regime-types, and used many qualitative sources from international bodies, nongovernment organizations, news articles, and state archives.

For the quantitative portion of this dissertation's analysis of all five of its hypotheses, I used Probit regression as my primary testing method. I utilized a Probit regression model because the data was time-series cross-sectional with binary dependent and independent variables. Further, I also used OLS linear probability models as a robustness check on direction and significance, due to its unbiasedness and its distinction of having the least variance among all linear unbiased estimators, its linear properties, its asymptotic unbiasedness, and its status as a consistent estimator. I also investigated predicted probabilities for my dissertation's quantitative analysis, as these show real likelihood and substantive effects above and beyond what Probit on its own would provide. So as to obtain the correct estimates and their confidence intervals, I simulated the Probit model using the "Clarify" program, which King et al (2000) note "…uses Monte Carlo simulation to convert the raw output of statistical procedures into results that are of direct interest to researchers, without changing statistical assumptions or requiring new statistical

models" (pg. 3). In order to avoid problems with heteroscedasticity of observation, I tested for robust standard errors as well. Further, instead of creating a figure of 95% CI, I generated a figure of 84% (which could be equivalent to 95%) when I tested for the substantive importance of my binary explanatory variable, as Payton et al (2003) found:

> If the researcher wishes to use confidence intervals to test hypotheses, it appears that…using 83% or 84% size for the intervals will give an approximate $\alpha = 0.05$ test. Theoretical results for large samples as well as simulation results for a variety of sample sizes show that using 95% confidence intervals will give very conservative results, while using standard error intervals will give a test with high type I error rates. (pg. 5)

Qualitatively, I examined three cases of autocracies being motivated to mediate a conflict after being condemned, negatively portrayed, and/or sanctioned, and were subsequently rewarded with tangible and/or intangible benefits in order to illustrate the plausibility of this phenomenon. After analyzing these cases, in order to ground my theory within the context of existing literature, I examined two cases of autocracies that did not experience substantial or new condemnation, portrayal, or sanctioning, but still chose to attempt to mediate (one successfully) international conflicts.

4.1 Autocracies and Mediation Offers

In order to conduct my quantitative analysis, I required a set of conflicts in which mediation could have been offered by autocracies, and a subset of cases in which mediation was offered by them (only autocracies are included as mediators/potential mediators for the sake of my analysis, although in the future this may be broadened to include other regime types. In order to satisfy these requirements, I used the Bercovitch International Conflict Management (ICM) Dataset (Bercovitch, 2004) on international conflicts and conflict mediation from 1945 to 2000, which is the time period of this study. It contained 116,327 observations. The purpose of this dataset is to provide a comprehensive, chronological

account of international conflict, and to elucidate knowledge of its management and occurrence. My unit of analysis was a potential mediator for each year of a dyadic conflict.

For my first hypothesis, my dependent variable was the dichotomous variables *Mediation Offer*. If mediation was offered for an international conflict during any calendar year in the dataset, the dependent variable is coded as 1 (and 0 if not). In determining how to measure international condemnation, the independent variables take into account both material interests and symbolism. Beginning with mediation offers provided the best initial steps for an extended elaboration on my theory, as it functions to eliminate potential selection bias that might arise.

For my independent variables, I used tangible and nontangible measures. My tangible measure was economic sanctions, and was the dichotomous variable labeled *Sanctions*. Burnell (2006) noted that for autocracies "…international legal recognition and support, whether material and/or symbolic—that is to say *external* legitimation—are very valuable to the manufacture of legitimacy…a regime's main claim to legitimacy can shift over time, adjusting to…changes in the international environment" (pg. 549). If sanctions were levied and/or threatened during any calendar year in the dataset on a mediating state or potential mediating state, this independent variable was coded as 1 (and 0 if not). The data for these sanctions were derived from the Threat and Imposition of Sanctions (TIES) Dataset 4.0 (Morgan et al, 2013) which covers sanctioning cases from 1945-2005, which I then merged with the Bercovitch International Conflict Dataset. According to the TIES Dataset, by definition a sanction must involve at least one sender state and a target state, and be implemented by the sender in order to alter the actions of the target state. In addition to the material manifestation of condemnation embodied by sanctions, there is heavy international symbolism attached to the action itself. Peterson (2013, 672) observed

that “The sending of messages—that is, signaling—has become central to our understanding of sanctioning behavior…recognizing the logic of sanctions as international symbolism.”

In order to capture nontangible symbolic international condemnation, I utilized condemnation of a state by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) as my second independent variable. This was the dichotomous variable *UN Condemnation*, which was coded as 1 if a resolution on a mediating state or potential mediating state’s human rights record was formally discussed by the UNCHR in a given year, and 0 if not. Data for this variable was derived from Lebovic and Voeten’s (2006) dataset on targeting and punishment by the UNCHR from 1977-2001, which was then merged with the Bercovitch International Conflict Management Dataset (2004) for the analysis.

Because of the limited time frame for the UNCHR variable from 1977-2001, the data analysis involves two different models – one with sanctions and one with condemnation. The analysis for sanctions includes the years 1945-2001, while the analysis for condemnation covers the years 1977-2001. There are 69,273 observations in the sanctions dataset that examines mediation onset. For the analysis of the effect of condemnation, there are 41,338 observations in the dataset for mediation onset. In order to assess the likelihood of offering mediation, both datasets include all states in the international system that existed in any given year between 1945-2001 or 1977-2001. This universe of cases allows comparison of autocracies to democracies and other mixed regime types. The data analysis includes a variable for *Sanctions* as well as *Condemnation*, and a variable for *Autocracy* (which is coded as such if these regimes possess formal and informal structures through which the state exercises power in a way which doesn’t reflect the

sovereignty of its people, and who often have a democratic façade but are not sufficiently legitimized by the people, including regimes run by the military or traditional military, family, clan, and tribal-run polities, which are measured as being an autocracy by when they cross a polity threshold of halfway through the scale reflecting the regime's possession of these attributes) (Bercovitch, 2004). These are the variables that are used to test the first hypothesis. Also, in order to interpret my results, I tested for joint significance.

I also included several control variables which may affect a state's decision to offer mediation, which were fixed at their modes. These included *Same Polity*, which compares the polity of the mediator with the polities of the parties of the conflict. This variable is coded 0 if the mediator's polity is different than the belligerent parties' polities, 1 if it is the same as one party, and 2 if it is the same as both parties. Potential mediators might be more likely to offer their services if they share a government type with one or more of the conflicting parties due to common political bonds and beliefs. Another control variable included was *Same Region,* which indicates if the mediator shares the same geographic region as one or more of the conflicting parties (these regions being North America, Central and South America, Africa, South West Asia, East Asia and the Pacific, Middle East, and Europe). This variable was coded as 0 if the mediator doesn't share the same region as either belligerent party, 1 if it shares its region with one party, and 2 if it shares its region with both parties. States that share their geographic region with one or more of the conflicting parties may be more motivated to attempt to mediate. A further control variable included was *UN Security Council Member*, which indicated if a mediator is a permanent member of the UN Security Council (UNSC). I included this variable since powerful states are thought to act as mediators more frequently and with greater success (Crescenzi,

Kadera, Mitchell, 2011). This variable was coded as 1 if the mediator is a permanent member of the UNSC, and 0 if not. These control variables were all derived from the Bercovitch dataset (2004). My last control variable was *Previous Relationship*, which is based on previous alliances and/or economic relationships between the conflicting parties and the potential mediator. This particular control variable was derived from Gibler's (2009) International Military Alliances dataset and Kohl et al's (2013) Trade Agreement Dataset. This variable was coded as 0 if there was no previous relationship between the mediator and either belligerent party, 1 if the mediator has a previous relationship with one of the conflict parties, and 2 if the mediator has a previous relationship with both conflict parties. Because the data was time-series cross-sectional with binary dependent variables, I utilized a Probit regression model (as well as OLS for a robustness check). Further, in order to avoid problems with heteroscedasticity of observation, I tested for robust standard errors.

4.2 Autocratic Regime-Types and Mediation, Offers

For hypotheses 2-5, I continued my quantitative analysis with the previous dichotomous variable. Again, this was coded 1 if mediation was offered, and 0 if not. I derived this information from the Bercovitch (2004) conflict dataset. The unit of analysis for these hypotheses was state year. I merged the Bercovitch (2004) dataset with the Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2004) dataset covering authoritarian regime types from 1946-2010. This dataset divides autocracies into four different types of regimes, *monarchies, personalist dictators, party-based autocracies,* and *military regimes/juntas*. The basis for dividing these groups up as such is based primarily on the rules that delineate leadership groups, as well as how these groups represent specific interests in the making of decisions (Geddes et al, 2014). Part of the reasoning for choosing the Geddes et al. (2014) dataset was

that the specific autocratic regime-types that they identify can be tied directly to specific levels of regime flexibility, transparency, and accountability, grounded in how these regimes measure on scores of these concepts and on existing academic work on the subject (Mattes, Rodrigues, 2014). Via the same line of reasoning, I derived information for states with less than a million inhabitants which were omitted from the Geddes et al. (2014) dataset from Magaloni, Chu, and Min's (2013) dataset on autocracies of the world from 1950 through 2012, as well as via the CIA World Factbook's (2021) database. The data analysis includes a variable for Sanctions as well as Condemnation, and a variable for *Party, Military, Monarchy, and Personalist.* These are the variables that are used to test the final four hypotheses about offers of mediation. Also, so as to interpret my results, I tested for joint significance. In order to test hypotheses 2-5, I utilized Probit with OLS as a robustness check for significance and direction, with robust standard errors to analyze the breakdown of autocratic regime-types. I ran multiple models, one for each regime type and independent variable, where I coded that regime type as 1, while combining the remaining three in that variable and coding them as 0. The data analysis included a variable for *Sanctions* as well as *Condemnation*, and the combined interacted variables *Sanctions*Party, Sanctions*Military, Sanctions*Monarchy, Sanctions*Personalist, UN Condemnation*Party, UN Condemnation*Military, UN Condemnation*Monarchy, and UN Condemnation*Personalist* (with one model for each regime type corresponding to each interaction term). I used this strategy in order for me to draw a proper comparison between all of the regime types in order to establish which one is more likely to offer to mediate relative to the others, and I do this for both sanctions and condemnation. Further, I included the four control variables from the analysis of my first hypothesis, all of which

were coded identically.

4.3 Cases of Autocratic Mediation

In order to focus and contextualize my investigation into autocratic mediation, I used a least-similar case studies approach to explore offers of conflict mediation by an autocracy when they are being condemned and/or sanctioned, and whether that will lead to increased rewards in the form of tangible benefits (such as foreign aid, trade, and investment) and intangible benefits (such as praise, acceptance, avoiding criticism, and the bestowing of legitimacy) being conferred upon the autocracy. The use of process-tracing in the case studies approach, a detailed examination of a portion of a historical episode to test historical explanations that may be generalizable to other events, is appropriate due to its high level of conceptual validity, as well as its ability to model and explore complex causal relations in detail in relatively infrequent phenomena (a quality that can be missing from quantitative analysis) (George, Bennett, 2004; Bennett, Elman, 2007). The use of a least-similar case studies approach enables one to identify interactions between variables, and helps create a chronological sequence of events that aids in mapping out the pathways connecting the dependent variables (offers and successful conflict mediations by an autocracy) to the independent variable (international condemnation of that autocracy) (Sambanis, 2004).

In order to contextualize my theory, my unit of analysis was the mediator. I utilized a qualitative least-similar case studies approach in my analysis by studying three cases in which an autocracy offered to mediate (and in two of them was successful) after being internationally condemned, and was subsequently rewarded with tangible and/or intangible benefits. Specifically, I analyzed mediations by the monarchic regime of Qatar, Libya under the erstwhile personalist military strongman Colonel Muammar Qaddafi, and Communist Party- dominated China. I selected these cases for variation with the independent variables,

as well as their geographic, temporal, and autocratic regime-type variations. The countries involved in these cases come from a variety of areas around the globe, including Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. The cases occur over the course of decades, exhibiting variation due to the passage of time. By selecting cases with such a degree of dissimilitude between them, this helps furnish evidence that the independent variables account for the common dependent variable between them (Bennett, Elman, 2007). After analyzing these cases, in order to ground my theory within the context of existing literature, I examined two cases of autocracies (Iran and Turkey) that did not experience substantial or new condemnation, portrayal, or sanctioning, but still chose to attempt to mediate (one successfully) international conflicts. These cases provide variation on the independent variable and help to tease out the mechanisms that influence authoritarian regimes to offer and succeed in mediation.

In conclusion, so as to analyze my theory and hypotheses regarding mediation by autocracies, I utilized a mixed methods approach hoping to observe that autocracies are more likely to offer to mediate international conflicts when being subjected to punitive measures on the international stage, and that the most likely autocracies to offer and successfully mediate international conflicts will be party-based autocracies, followed by military juntas, monarchies, and lastly personalists. In order to deduce when autocracies offer to mediate interstate conflicts as well as which types of autocracies are most likely to offer, I utilized Large-N datasets on international mediation, sanctioning, condemnation and autocratic regimes, and used many qualitative sources. Quantitatively, for my first hypothesis I utilized Probit regression, with OLS as a robustness check for direction and significance, testing for robust standard errors as well. For the quantitative analysis of my remaining four hypotheses, I once again analyzed the same datasets and utilized Probit

regression, once again with OLS as a robustness check, with robust standard errors to analyze the breakdown of autocratic regime types. My quantitative analysis required using several different merged datasets on sanctioning, condemnation, regime-types, political and economic ties, and conflict mediation. Qualitatively, I examined three cases of autocracies (China, Libya, and Qatar) being motivated to offer to mediate a conflict after being condemned, negatively portrayed, and/or sanctioned, and were subsequently rewarded with tangible and/or intangible benefits in order to illustrate the plausibility of this phenomenon, as well as analyzing two cases of autocracies (Iran and Turkey) that did not experience substantial or new condemnation, portrayal, or sanctioning, but still chose to attempt to mediate international conflicts. In the next chapter, I will discuss the results from my quantitative analyses before delving into my case studies in the chapter after that.

CHAPTER 5: Quantitative Results

5.1 Effects of Sanctioning and Condemnation on Autocracies

My first hypothesis provided assessment of whether autocracies are influenced by international scrutiny and actions, such as economic sanctioning and international condemnation. I hypothesized that it is more likely that autocracies will offer to mediate in international conflicts when they are subject to negative international actions, such as sanctioning and condemnation. My quantitative analysis yielded inconclusive results, largely failing to produce evidence before or against my hypotheses.

5.1.1 Mediation Offers from Autocracies

Starting with my first analysis, this generated results of Probit regression and OLS regression after simulating the models with Clarify for mediation offers by autocracies when being condemned by the UNCHR. Unfortunately, UN Condemnation was negatively correlated and statistically insignificant. This yields results which do not providence or detract support fry hypothesis 1. The control variables behaved largely as expected, with a previous relationship between a potential mediator and one belligerent, previous relationship between a mediator and both belligerents, and UN Security Council Membership all achieving rather strong significance in both OLS and Probit (except for UNSC membership for OLS, which was slightly significant). Other than that, there was nothing substantively to report regarding my hypothesis.

Moving on to Sanctions, results again were inconclusive. Analysis showed the results of of Probit regression and OLS regressions. My results indicated that for both OLS and Probit, Sanctions were positively correlated yet insignificant. This provided neither support nor rejection of my first hypothesis. Regarding the control variables, for both a previous relationship between a mediator and one belligerent, a previous relationship between both belligerents, UNSC

memberships, and a shared region between a potential mediator and both belligerents were all positively correlated and strongly significant.

5.1.2 Mediation Offers from Different Types of Autocratic Regimes

For my next stage, I examined specific autocratic regime types and tested hypotheses about these different regime types and international condemnation and sanctioning. I hypothesized that autocratic Party-based regimes will be the most likely out of the autocratic types analyzed to offer to mediate when being sanctioned or condemned, with Military juntas being less likely to mediate than Party-based autocracies, with Monarchies being less likely to mediate than military juntas, and with Personalist autocracies being the least likely to offer to mediate. However, again my results largely did not yield support or rejection of my hypotheses.

The next stage of my analysis involved using Probit and OLS regressions after simulating the models with Clarify for mediation offers by Party-based autocracies when being condemned by the UNCHR. UN Condemnation on its own for autocracies in general yielded slight significance and was negatively correlated for both OLS and Probit. Party-based autocracies on their own were both negatively correlated for OLS and Probit, and were statistically significant. UN Condemnation*Party was positively correlated yet statistically insignificant. After testing for joint significance in Probit, it was found to be absent. As such, these results yielded neither support or rejection for my hypotheses regarding Party-based autocracies being the most likely autocracy to offer to mediate international conflicts when being condemned by the UN. The control variables behaved as expected, with a previous relationship between a potential mediator and one of the belligerents, a previous relationship between a potential mediator and both belligerents, shared geographic region with both of the belligerents, and UNSC

membership all being positively correlated and strongly significant for both Probit and OLS (although slightly less so for UNSC membership with OLS). Shared geographic region between a potential mediator and one of the belligerents was slightly statistically significant and positively correlated for Probit.

The next stage of my analysis moved on to using Probit and OLS regressions after simulating the models with Clarify to discover whether Military regimes would be less likely to offer to mediate international conflicts than Party-based autocratic regimes. Again, my results came back inconclusive, neither providing or detracting from evidence regarding this behavior. UN Condemnation on its own (reflecting all autocracies) was negatively correlated and statistically insignificant, as was the variable for Military in both OLS and Probit. UN Condemnation*Military was negatively correlated for both OLS and Probit, with it achieving slight statistical significance for OLS and none for Probit. After testing for joint significance, it was found to not be present, causing making inferences to be problematic. Regarding control variables, they again largely behaved as expected. A previous relationship between a potential mediator and one belligerent, a potential mediator having a previous relationship with both belligerents, and a shared geographic region between a potential mediator and both belligerents all having strong statistical significance and a positive correlation. UNSC membership was statistically significant (although slightly less so) for both OLS and Probit.

Turning to Monarchies, again results were inconclusive. The results of Probit regression and OLS regression after simulating the models with Clarify found that UN Condemnation on its own was negatively correlated yet statistically insignificant for both OLS and Probit. Monarchy on its own was positively correlated yet only slightly significant for OLS. UN Condemnation*Monarchy was positively correlated yet insignificant for both OLS and Probit.

After testing for joint significance, the analysis did not find any, thus neither providing or detracting support for my hypothesis. Control variables again largely behaved as expected. A previous relationship between a potential mediator and one belligerent, a previous relationship between a potential mediator and both belligerents, UNSC membership, and a shared geographic region between a potential mediator and both belligerents were all found to be positively correlated and strongly statistically significant in both OLS and Probit (although UNSC membership was slightly less significant for OLS). In addition, a shared geographic region between a potential mediator and one belligerent was positively correlated and slightly statistically significant for Probit.

Turning to Personalists, again results were inconclusive. The results of Probit regression and OLS regression after simulating the models with Clarify found that UN Condemnation on its own was negatively correlated and statistically significant for both OLS and Probit, while Personalist on its own and UN Condemnation*Probit was both positively correlated and statistically insignificant for both OLS and Probit. This required carrying out a joint significance test, which found that it was not present. Again, most of the control variables behaved as expected. A previous relationship between a potential mediator and one of the belligerents, a previous relationship between a mediator and both belligerents, UN Security Council membership, and a shared geographic region between a mediator and both belligerents were strongly statistically significant and positively correlated (although for OLS, UNSC membership was slightly less significant). For a shared geographic region between a potential mediator and one of the belligerents, Probit found it to be positively correlated and slightly statistically significant.

Moving on to Party-based regimes, my results after simulating the models with Clarify

found support for my second hypothesis, that Party-based autocracies will be the most likely to offer to mediate international conflicts when being faced with sanctions. The variable for Sanctions on its own (applied to all autocracies, since I am not testing for democracies) was strongly statistically significant yet negatively correlated for both OLS and Probit, while the variable for Party on its own was negatively correlated for OLS yet positively correlated for Probit (neither achieving statistical significance). Very importantly, Sanctions*Party was positively correlated and strongly statistically significant for both OLS and Probit (in sharp contrast to the statistically significant negative correlations found in Sanctions by itself for both OLS and Probit). After conducting a joint significance test, significance was indeed found. These results lend support to my hypothesis, that Party-based autocracies are the most likely to offer to mediate international conflicts when being confronted with sanctions. These autocracies are the most affected by sanctions, which has a negative effect on all other regimes combined. An additional note of substantive results is that Party-based autocracies are 82% more likely to offer to mediate international conflicts when they are confronted with sanctions. Regarding control variables, they again behaved largely as expected. A previous relationship between a potential mediator and one belligerent, a previous relationship between a potential mediator and both belligerents, UNSC membership, and a shared geographic region between a potential mediator and both belligerents were all positively correlated and strongly statistically significant for both OLS and Probit.

Turning to Military regimes, after simulating with both OLS and Probit models with Clarify, my results did not offer either evidence supporting or detracting from my hypothesis. Sanctions on its own was positively correlated yet insignificant for both OLS and Probit. However, Military came back both negatively correlated and statistically insignificant for both

OLS and Probit. The variable Sanctions*Military was both negatively correlated and statistically insignificant for both Probit and OLS. After testing for join significance, I was not able to find any. Regarding my results variables, they nearly uniformly behaved as predicted. A previous relationship between a potential mediator and one belligerent, a previous relationship between a potential mediator and both belligerents, UNSC membership, and a shared geographic region between a potential mediator and both belligerents were all positively correlated and strongly statistically significant.

Lastly turning to Monarchies, once again my quantitative results yielded neither support nor rejection for my hypothesis. After simulating both OLS and Probit models with Clarify, I found that Sanctions on its own was positively correlated yet insignificant for both OLS and Probit. Monarchy, however, was positively correlated and strongly statistically significant for both Probit and OLS, while Sanctions*Monarchy was negatively correlated and statistically insignificant for both OLS and Probit. After testing for joint significance, I found that it was not present. This makes inferences as to my hypothesis impossible to make, since my results provide neither support nor rejection for my hypothesis.

Control variables, yet again, behaved as expected. A previous relationship between a potential mediator and one belligerent, a previous relationship between a potential mediator and both belligerents, UNSC membership, and a shared geographic region between a potential mediator and both belligerents were all positively correlated and strongly statistically significant. According to my research design, I wanted to also conduct a similar analysis for Personalist regimes and sanctioning. However, due to a lack of variation, STATA was not able to produce results in this regard.

In order to focus and contextualize my investigation into international condemnation's

and economic sanctioning's effects on autocratic mediation (particularly given the frequent statistical insignificance or lack of variation in my quantitative analysis), in the next chapter I switched from quantitative analysis on this aspect of my theory and used a qualitative least-similar case studies approach to explore whether international condemnation and the threatening of and/or implementation of economic sanctions leads autocratic regimes to offer to mediate international conflicts doing so, and whether this action by an autocracy will lead to increased rewards in the form of tangible benefits (such as foreign aid, trade, and investment) and intangible benefits (such as praise, acceptance, avoiding criticism, and the bestowing of legitimacy) being conferred upon the autocracy. The use of process-tracing in the case studies approach (a detailed examination of a portion of a historical episode to test historical explanations that may be generalizable to other events) which I adopted in the following chapter is appropriate due to the high level of conceptual validity as well as the ability to model and explore complex causal relations in detail in relatively infrequent phenomena (a quality that can be missing from quantitative analysis) (George, Bennett, 2004; Bennett, Elman, 2007). The use of a least-similar case studies approach enabled me to identify interactions between variables, and helped me to create a chronological sequence of events that aided in the analysis of the phenomena at hand (Sambanis, 2004).

CHAPTER 6: Qualitative Autocratic Case Studies Analysis

By mediating an international conflict when being subjected to international condemnation, theoretically an autocracy can burnish its image, enhance its reputation and prestige, and reinforce its legitimacy with tangible and intangible benefits resulting from it. Hypothetically, this should motivate autocracies to offer more frequently to mediate an international conflict given these conditions. In order to illustrate this notion in practice, I examined three cases of an autocracy seemingly being motivated to offer to mediate a conflict after being condemned, negatively portrayed, and/or sanctioned, and was subsequently rewarded with tangible and/or intangible benefits. Such examination helps me to illustrate so that I may further test the plausibility of this phenomenon, as discussed in the methodology chapter. Specifically, I cover mediations by the monarchic regime of Qatar between Djibouti and Eritrea, Communist Party-dominated China in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (which continues to this day), and Libya's mediation between Eritrea and Ethiopia under the erstwhile personalist military strongman Colonel Muammar Qadhafi. I will also introduce two cases, Turkey and Iran, where autocracies mediated for more traditional reasons in order to draw a contrast with the cases that support my theory.

6.1 Qatar

I start with the case of Qatar as a mediator in the dispute between Djibouti and Eritrea in 2008. Not too long after a long-running border dispute erupted into a shooting conflict in June of 2008, the absolute monarchy of Qatar interceded and successfully mediated an end to militarized hostilities. Whereas intense efforts to mediate the conflict by international organizations and other states alike had failed, the centralized and extremely personalized engagement of Qatar was successful in halting the conflict. The high-level contacts,

communiques, and personalized mediation by chief policymakers and members of the ruling family, as well as the Emir of Qatar himself, demonstrated trustworthiness and a heavy commitment to mediation by the kingdom. It seems that capitalizing on the individual personalities of these upper members of Qatar's monarchy was key for Qatari mediation in the conflict, and after involving themselves in 2010 Qatar succeeded in bringing Djibouti and Eritrea to the mediating table. The shuttle-diplomacy, provision of good offices, and importantly the personal touch by key members of the Qatari monarchy helped to convince Djibouti and Eritrea to set up a commission for ending the conflict chaired by Qatar's prime minister alongside representatives of the belligerents. On June 6th of 2010, Eritrea and Djibouti inked a Qatari-mediated agreement which stipulated there be a ceasefire, withdrawal, and a buffer zone be created under the auspices of Qatar.

This was an important success for Qatar, and soon afterwards the kingdom benefitted in several ways. As the Qatari mediation took place in the backdrop of negative scrutiny and attention which was being paid to Qatar globally, this case supports my theory that autocracies will mediate in seemingly unrelated conflict in order to improve their image and obtain rewards. As such, the following sections discuss the conflict broadly, introduce the mediating state, reflect on the negative scrutiny which Qatar was enduring at the time, expound on the successful mediation efforts of Qatar in the conflict, and then recount the tangible and intangible rewards which Qatar was able to derive post-mediation.

6.1.1 The Conflict

As with many conflicts around the world, the 2008 Djibouti-Eritrea border conflict in the Horn of Africa was rooted in a territorial dispute left over from colonialism. Prior to independence, Djibouti was part of the French colonial empire while Eritrea was part of

Italy's. The modern border between Djibouti and Eritrea extends for around 63 miles from the Red Sea to the tri-border meeting area of Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Djibouti. The northernmost portion of the border between Djibouti and Eritrea was defined by an agreement that took place between 1900 and 1901 between Italy and France as following the watershed along the Doumeirah peninsula, which forms a prominent headland located on the coastline of the Red Sea (Durham University, 2010). Problematically, although this portion of the border was defined by the Franco-Italian agreement, it was never actually officially marked and eventually became the locale for the border conflict between Djibouti and Eritrea (Frank, 2015).

Relations between the two states deteriorated in February of 2008. This occurred when the government of Djibouti observed that Eritrea was building fortifications on both sides of the border on the Ras Doumeira ridge, a strategic promontory overlooking the entrance of the Red Sea to the north of the city of Djibouti (the capital and largest city of the country of the same name), and which the two states had opposed over twice in 1996 and 1999 (Frank, 2015; Shaban, 2017). Cursory contacts between officials from the two states came to no avail, and by April 17th of 1999 Djiboutian military forces were deployed to the Ras Doumeira ridge in order to meet the threat. The positions of the two states' military forces were so close that they were literally toe- to-toe with each other, only distinguishable by the Djiboutians' use of tin for cover as opposed to the Eritreans' use of palm fronds (Durham University, 2010; Frank, 2015). Not only was this sort of geographic proximity problematic due to the increased risk of clashes, but unhappy Eritrean conscripts began to take advantage of the closeness of the Djiboutians' lines by defecting to the other side (thus exacerbating tensions).

On June 10th of 2008, during one of these incidents of desertion, shots were exchanged

by both sides with armed clashes continuing for days, eventually drawing in French military support for Djibouti (Frank, 2015). During the clashes, it was reported that 44 Djiboutian soldiers died, 55 were wounded, and 19 were missing in action; there were also reports of the defection of 21 Eritrean soldiers, with 100 killed and 100 captured during the fighting (Frank, 2015; "Djiboutian-Eritrean Border Conflict," 2020). Although this spate of fighting was the only violent clashes that occurred, both French-backed Djiboutian forces and their Eritrean counterparts continued to remain and/or increase in numbers in the area. The conflict brought international concern, condemnation, and mediation efforts by international actors including a variety of states worldwide, the United Nations, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and other regional organizations; however, Eritrea refused to even acknowledge the existence of the conflict while all mediation efforts throughout the next couple years failed (Frank, 2015).

6.1.2 The Mediator

Located across the Red Sea and the Arabian Peninsula from the conflict, bordering on the Persian Gulf sea, is the small state of Qatar. With a population of 2,444,174 (of which only 11.6% are Qatari) clustered mostly around the capital Doha, Qatar is a hereditary absolute monarchy governed by the Al-Thani family, who have ruled since the mid-1800s (CIA World Factbook: Qatar, 2020). Located on a peninsula in the Gulf between Iran and Saudi Arabia, Qatar's metamorphosis into a high profile and independent actor only came about when Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani seized control of Qatar from his father, Emir Khalifa, in 1995 (Barakat, 2014). After this point in time, Qatar emerged from under the influence of Saudi Arabia to begin its own ventures. Barakat (2014) noted that "Qatar…began to chart an independent and pragmatic foreign policy in which it has attempted to maintain good relations

with apparently contradictory actors, such as Iran and the United States or Hamas and Israel…Domestic stability allowed Qatar to engage externally 'in an imaginative and daring way that challenged perceived norms in the region'" (pg. 7).

The assumption of power by Sheikh Hamad ushered in reforms that facilitated its petroleum-based economy towards providing the highest per capita income in the world, while simultaneously avoiding domestic violence and unrest which occurred in other countries during the Arab Spring (CIA World Factbook: Qatar, 2020). In 2013, Sheikh Hamad transferred power to the current leader of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani, who as absolute monarch maintains control of the country. Political parties in Qatar are forbidden, the state is governed according to Sharia law, and there is an officially imposed absence of elections for national leadership (U.S. Dept. of State, 2009).

By using Qatar's immense wealth to create and support public works, healthcare, and education, Al-Thani has proven by and large to be a domestically popular leader. However, relations between Qatar and its neighbors hasn't always been harmonious (particularly since 2011), as Qatar has supported popular revolutions around the region, leading to the deterioration of relationships between it and Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates (CIA World Factbook: Qatar, 2020). Perceived misbehavior by Qatar has also resulted in the imposition of sanctions. However, tensions between Qatar and its neighbors have recently begun to relax ("Arabian Gulf Leaders…," 2021), and Qatar has continued to pursue a role of prominence in international affairs. As Barakat (2014) noted, Qatar has attempted to create and maintain "…an image as a modern, daring, and dynamic actor—an image it has tried to carry over into the foreign policy arena" (pg. 9).

6.1.3 International Condemnation

However, the maintenance of such a positive image has at times been problematic for Qatar, particularly given its own domestic human rights issues. Although Al-Thani has by and large proven to be popular, the regime maintains an iron grip on the state and society. And although Qatar has attempted to position itself as an advocate for humanity, it has gained negative attention and been condemned for such matters as the violation of human rights domestically, implying a mismatch between practice and rhetoric (Akpinar, 2015). The presence of said negative attention and condemnation was very much the case during 2008-2009. During that time period, the U.S. Department of State (2009) charged that:

> Citizens lacked the right to change the leadership of their government by direct ballot. There were prolonged detentions in overcrowded and harsh facilities, often ending in deportation. The government placed varying restrictions on civil liberties, including freedoms of speech, press (including the Internet), assembly, association, and religion. Foreign laborers faced restrictions on foreign travel. Trafficking in persons, primarily in the labor and domestic worker sectors, was a problem. Cultural discrimination against women limited their full participation in society. The unresolved legal status of "Bidoons" …stateless people with residency ties…resulted in discrimination against these noncitizens. Worker rights were severely restricted, especially for foreign laborers and domestic servants. (pg. 1)

Qatar also gained notoriety for its deprivation of Qatari nationality to members of the Al- Murra tribe, for which the government blamed for a failed coup attempt in 1996, denying them social security, healthcare, employment, and entry into the country; in addition, the presence of numerous individuals on death row with no rights to recourse and Qatar's UN General Assembly vote against a resolution calling for a global moratorium on executions also raised eyebrows (Amnesty International, 2009). In May of 2008, the Qatari government acceded to the Gulf Cooperation Council Counter Terrorism Convention, which has gained negative attention for its ability to suppress activities which are seen as legitimate exercises of the rights to assembly, association, and expression, as well as allowing the state to detain

suspects for extended periods of time with no charge and/or trial (Amnesty International, 2009).

Corporal punishment, including flogging for minor offenses, was noted internationally to be a continuing phenomenon in Qatar during this time period, as was its lack of an independent judiciary (U.S. Dept. of State, 2009). This was particularly bad for non-Qatari migrant workers, whose plight and slavery-like conditions observed during 2008-2009 brought worldwide negative attention and condemnation from a variety of international actors. Amnesty International (2009) reported that foreign migrant workers were "…exposed to, and inadequately protected against, abuses and exploitation by employers…Women migrant domestic workers were particularly at risk of exploitation and abuses such as beatings, rape and other sexual violence…Some 20,000 workers were reported to have fled from their employers in 2007 alone due to delays in or non-payment of their wages, excessive hours and poor working conditions" (pg. 2). Numerous reports also stated that compulsory labor for children occurred during this time period (U.S. Dept. of State, 2009). Individual states whose workers were abused in Qatar charged that when cases of rape came up, the migrant workers were typically deported with no criminal charges being filed against the employer. In 2008, numerous foreign embassies reported that the Qatari government responded to any labor unrest involving their nationals by sending large numbers of its security forces to work sites to quell dissension, while the Sri Lankan Embassy charged that it had 700 cases of sexual harassment against its workers on its hands, the Indian embassy complained that 236 maids were forced into physical and sexual exploitation and were not protected by labor legislation, the Nepalese Embassy reporting it had received about 1,500 complaints relating to failure to pay overtime, nonpayment of salaries, the refusal to obtain residence permits, and the deaths

of 85 of its nationals, and finally the Indonesian Embassy decried an increase in the amount of complaints of sexual harassment and physical abuse against its citizens as well as five cases of alleged rape (U.S. Dept. of State, 2009). In addition to both private international organizations and states, during this time period Qatar also experienced condemnation from the United Nations. During this time period, the U.S. Department of State (2009) recorded that:

> …the UN Special Rapporteur (UNSR) on Trafficking in Persons noted that the country is a destination and, in some instances, transit point for trafficking of migrant workers, mainly for forced labor…and for sexual exploitation. The UNSR criticized the sponsorship system as an unjust arrangement that increases the vulnerability of foreign migrant workers by rendering them dependent on their sponsors, thus fostering demand for trafficking. The UNSR also raised concern that [Qatari] labor law excludes foreign domestic workers from protection…Women and girls…were vulnerable to domestic servitude and physical and sexual exploitation and unprotected by labor legislation...[and] Legislation guiding the sponsorship of foreign laborers created conditions constituting forced labor or slavery. (pg. 16)

From the period of 2008-2009, Qatar thus endured a withering string of negative attention and condemnation from a variety of international actors which put it up for severe scrutiny, globally.

6.1.4 Mediation

The practice of mediating interstate conflicts is one which Qatar has proven itself to be capable. The extremely personalized and centralized decision-making within the monarchy allows for the state to make sharp foreign policy decisions quickly when opportunities arise, particularly when it comes to deciding where and when to mediate (Kamrava, 2011; Khatib, 2013; Barakat, 2014). And with this manner of decision making, Qatar in 2010 chose to involve itself with the task of mediating the simmering conflict between Djibouti and Eritrea. Where other countries and organizations had failed or failed to act to attempt to bring the conflict to an end, Qatar thrust itself into the conflict, and by June 6th of 2010 it was able to bring the belligerents to the mediating table (Frank, 2015).

Qatar in this case was successful at bringing Djibouti and Eritrea to the bargaining table in much the same way that it has brought other combatants into mediation. The intensively personal engagement provided by members of the monarchy to the practice of mediation helps demonstrate Qatar's commitment to mediation to combatants while promoting the trust of these belligerents in the mediation process and also members of the monarchy themselves (Barakat, 2014). Indeed, Kamrava (2011) noted that "Qatar's mediation efforts have been intensely personal, capitalizing on the personalities of the Emir and other chief policymakers who have acted as objective, dispassionate, well-informed, and well-intentioned mediators interested in turning intractable disputes into win-win scenarios…This has been extremely effective in getting the disputants around the negotiating table and motivating them to move the negotiations forward" (pg. 555). This seems to have been the case with Qatar's mediation efforts in resolving the conflict between Djibouti and Eritrea.

On June 5th, 2010, Eritrea withdrew its forces from the disputed territories, and on June 6th Eritrea and Djibouti signed a Qatari-mediated agreement brokering a ceasefire, a withdrawal, a buffer zone under Qatar's auspices, as well as allowing for Qatar to address the problem of prisoners of war and missing people; this was in addition to creating a mechanism to aid in demarcating the boundary by an international company (Security Council Meetings Coverage, 2010; Frank, 2015; Bukhari, 2020). This staccato of developments can be at least partially attributed to the personal touch which members of the Qatari monarchy gave to ending the conflict between Eritrea and Djibouti. The agreement mediated by Qatar, announced on June 9th of 2010, set up a commission chaired by Qatar's Prime Minister Hamad bin Jassem Al-Thani with representatives from the two former belligerents, while simultaneously the combatants agreed to a Qatari force to monitor the cease fire until a final

resolution had been achieved (Durham University, 2010; Shaban, 2017). When compared to the efforts at ending the conflict that had been put forth (or withheld) prior to this point, the Qatari mediation was seen as being quite successful.

6.1.5 Rewards

For a country that had only just previously been experiencing scathing international condemnation and negative attention for a host of problems related to human rights violations, modern day slavery, and a closed political system amongst other issues, post-mediation of the Djiboutian and Eritrean conflict seems to have brought Qatar rich rewards. These rewards manifested themselves in both tangible and intangible ways. Just months prior, multiple states across the world, as well as private international organizations and the UN, were united in a chorus of criticism about Qatar on a wide-ranging spectrum of subjects. Now, these same actors (in addition to merely Djibouti and Eritrea) sung Qatar's praises, giving its image a much needed refurbishment. The combatants themselves were so publicly won over, that even seven years later Eritrea was still insisting on mediation by Qatar (and Qatar only) in its occasional territorial disagreements (Shaban, 2017).

The United Nations, only shortly before condemning Qatar for its quasi-slavery like practices with migrant workers, duly conferred accolades upon the kingdom for its part in ending the conflict. On July 20th, 2010, then UN Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs B. Lynn Pascoe heaped praise upon Qatar for its singular role in obtaining a mediated settlement of the Djiboutian-Eritrean conflict (Security Council Meetings Coverage, 2010). In an official United Nations Security Council press statement on June 11th, 2010, it was specifically noted:

> The members of the Security Council welcome and fully support the mediation efforts by the State of Qatar, under the auspices of Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani, Emir

> of the State of Qatar, aiming to resolve the border dispute between the Republic of Djibouti and the State of Eritrea…They welcome further the signing of the agreement and the issuance of the implementation document by which the leaders of both countries entrusted the Emir of the State of Qatar to undertake the mediation efforts…The members of the Security Council attach great importance to the resolution of the border dispute and to the normalization of the relations between the two countries for the overall stability and security in the region. (pgs. 1-2).

This commendation on all sides by actors who had just been decidedly negative with regards to Qatari actions did much to draw attention away from the negative scrutiny and condemnation which Qatar had previously undergone just shortly before its efforts in mediation. Then came the most tangible reward for Qatari efforts thus far. In December of 2010, Qatar won its much coveted bid to hold the 2022 FIFA World Cup (Barakat, 2014). This conferral represented both a matter of national pride and investment, and has served to raise Qatar's profile globally amongst even non-politically inclined actors. Thus it seems that Qatar's mediation efforts between Djibouti and Eritrea, after suffering much negative scrutiny and condemnation internationally during the years immediately prior, were rewarded in both substantial tangible and intangible ways.

6.2 China

In the summer of 2014, the bedeviling and long-running Israeli-Palestinian conflict erupted into a major military confrontation, with thousands of rockets fired by Palestinians into Israel and a major Israeli military operation in Gaza taking place. A wave of violent conflict commenced, and in 2015 Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas asserted that Palestinians would no longer be bound by previous peace agreements. As a result, communist China ramped up their mediation efforts in 2016 and 2017 by hosting high-level members of the belligerents in Beijing as well as directly involving senior members of the Chinese government, including President Xi Jinping, in peace efforts. As an important part of China's

conflict-management diplomacy, Xi put forward a new four-point Middle East peace proposal calling for the advancement of the two- state solution. The proposition stipulated the promotion of peace coupled with development, enhanced coordination and the strengthening of concerted efforts for peace, the upholding of a comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable security concept, as well as the Palestinians having East Jerusalem as the capital of their state. The Palestinian and Israeli governments signaled their welcoming of the proposal and their willingness to engage with China in the mediation process. In addition, during the course of high-level meetings between President Xi Jinping and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas in China, Xi proposed the establishment of a tripartite dialogue mechanism between Israel, China, and the Palestinians, as well as the holding of a peace conference to help end the conflict. Much like Qatar, high-level meetings between top echelon members of the Chinese government and members of the belligerent governments, and the provision of good offices by the hosting Chinese, helped to convince the Israelis and the Palestinians of the utility and seriousness of China's continuing involvement in peace efforts. And much like Qatar, China benefitted soon after these stepped-up efforts to end this most difficult of conflicts. However, unlike Qatar, at the time of this writing China was not able to successfully bring an end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict yet. However, China was still able to incur the same benefits and improved image which Qatar had. This supports the basic mechanism of my theory, that mediation in a seemingly unrelated conflict can be used by an autocracy in order to improve its image and to derive tangible and intangible benefits. As the Chinese mediation attempt took place in the backdrop of negative scrutiny and attention which was being paid to China globally, this case supports my theory that autocracies will mediate in seemingly unrelated conflicts in the hope of deriving image improvement and rewards. This also

opens up the possibility that successful mediation is not absolutely necessary for image improvement and the obtainment of rewards, and that perhaps the mere effort will suffice. As such, the following sections discuss the conflict broadly, introduce the mediating effort, reflect on the negative scrutiny which China was enduring at the time, expound on the (so far unsuccessful) mediation efforts of China in the conflict, and then recount the tangible and intangible rewards which China was able to derive from these efforts.

6.2.1 The Conflict

Considered one of the world's most intractable, the conflict between the Israelis and Palestinians has been ongoing for a lengthy period of time and has largely defied resolution. The violent conflicts between them can be construed as the result of Arab-Jewish friction which had been ongoing since the 1800s, when Jewish immigrants from Eastern Europe (driven by both religious devotion as well as fleeing anti-Semitic pogroms back home) traveled to the area of Palestine to settle and fulfill the "Zionist" dream (Morris, 2008). For their part, Muslims had conquered the area back in the mid-seventh century and had been there ever since, and now considered these Jewish immigrants as the "new Crusaders" bent on a land grab (Morris, 2008). Zionists, on the other hand, believed that it was a matter of reestablishing a Jewish state in their traditional homeland after largely being scattered by the Roman empire during "the Diaspora," which followed several Jewish revolts during Roman times. This disagreement over whose land is whose helped create the conditions for conflict over the next several decades, and even contemporarily the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is grounded on contested territory (Bar-Tal, Salomon, 2006). Both the majority of Israelis as well as Palestinians believe that they are the victims of aggression at the hands of the other, and that the other group wishes to take over their land (Hausofer et al, 2010).

Shortly after World War Two, violent conflicts between Palestinians and Israelis broke out into all-out war. In 1947, the United Nations adopted what was known as the "Partition Plan" (officially Resolution 181), which aimed to divide the British Mandate of Palestine into Jewish Israeli and Arab Palestinian states, and on May 14th of 1948 the State of Israel was created (Global Conflict Tracker, 2020). This began the first Arab-Israeli War, pitting the nascent state of Israel against the Palestinian Arabs, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. The Israelis emerged victorious, with the territory now divided into the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and the State of Israel; in the process, 750,000 Palestinians were displaced following the conflict (Global Conflict Tracker, 2020).

Tensions continued throughout the region, with Israel fighting several wars with its neighbors over the years and capturing territory in the Gaza Strip and Sinai Peninsula from Egypt, the West Bank and East Jerusalem from Jordan, and the Golan Heights from Syria. In 1979, Israel and Egypt inked the Camp David Accords, ending their 30-year conflict and helping to improve Israeli relations with its neighboring states. However, the matter of self-rule by the Palestinians remained an unresolved issue. In 1987 the First Intifada broke out, with hundreds of thousands of Palestinians living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank rising up against the Israeli government. However, according to the Global Conflict Tracker (2020), "The 1993 Oslo I Accords mediated the conflict, setting up a framework for the Palestinians to govern themselves in the West Bank and Gaza, and enabled mutual recognition between the newly established Palestinian Authority and Israel's government…In 1995, the Oslo II Accords expanded on the first agreement, adding provisions that mandated the complete withdrawal of Israel from 6 cities and 450 towns in the West Bank" (pg. 3).

Violence reared its ugly head soon enough between the Israelis and Palestinians. Upset

by a peace process which seemed to be going nowhere, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's visit to the al-Aqsa mosque, and Israeli control over the West Bank, Palestinians launched the Second Intifada from 2000-2005; as a response to this and continued terrorist attacks by Palestinians against Israelis, the government of Israeli gave the go-ahead for construction of a security fence around the West Bank in 2002, drawing worldwide condemnation (Frieden et al, 2016; Global Conflict Tracker, 2020). Although the United States tried to restart the peace process between the Palestinians and Israelis, these peace talks were disrupted when rival Palestinian factions Fatah and Hamas (the latter of which is designated as a terrorist organization by both the U.S.) formed a unity government with each other, further aggravating efforts at mediation. The peace process began to unravel, and clashes between Israelis and Palestinians continued.

Finally, in the summer of 2014 clashes between Israel and Hamas (who never recognized the Oslo Accords) led to a major military confrontation between the two, leading to a major Israeli military offensive in Hamas-ruled Gaza and the launching of about 3,000 rockets by Hamas towards Israel before a ceasefire was negotiated by Egypt (Global Conflict Tracker, 2020). Numerous casualties were reported on both sides during this conflict, and tensions continued to simmer. Finally, following a wave of violent conflict between Palestinians and Israelis in 2015, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas declared that Palestinians would no longer be constrained by the territorial divisions founded by the Oslo Accords (Global Conflict Tracker, 2020), dealing a mediated end to the conflict a substantial blow. To date, no complete resolution to the conflict between Palestinians and Israel has manifested itself, although many actors continue to try to mediate.

6.2.2 The Mediator

Slightly smaller than the United States and one of the oldest known cultures in the world, China's history dates back to at least 1200 BC. For two thousand years following the 3rd century BC, China oscillated between periods of disunity and unity under a series of imperial dynasties (CIA World Factbook: China, 2020). During the latter portion of the 1800s and the first half of the 1900s, China struggled with foreign occupation, defeats on the battlefield, natural disasters such as famines, and civil unrest. Shortly after the end of World War Two, the Chinese communists prevailed over the formerly ruling Nationalist forces in a heated civil war which ran from 1927-1950. Following victory, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) under Chairman Mao Tse-Tung created an authoritarian socialist state which ensured the sovereignty of the country, but one which imposed strict restrictions and controls over all aspects of the lives of people in addition to costing tens of millions of people their lives (CIA World Factbook: China, 2020). Nevertheless, China remains the world's most populous country.

To date, the Chinese Communist Party maintains a firm grip on their authoritarian state. Ruling from the capital of Beijing, the CCP is the ultimate authority in the country, members of which stand astride all the top security and government posts. Top authority in the government is the CCP Central Committee's 25-member Political Bureau (also known as the Politburo) and its seven-member Standing Committee; currently Xi Jinping continues to occupy the three most powerful positions in the country as state president, chairman of the Central Military Commission, and CCP general secretary (U.S. Dept. of State, 2020). As such, China is a single party-dominated autocratic machine-type state (there are 8 nominally independent small parties, but all are controlled by the CCP), where civilian authorities remain

in control over the security apparatus consisting of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), the People's Armed Police, the Ministries of State Security and Public Security, and the state penal, prosecutorial, and judicial systems (U.S. Dept. of State, 2020; CIA World Factbook: China, 2020).

China politically has some outward trappings in common with democracies, albeit not infrequently superficially. For example, China's constitution specifies for an independent judiciary. In reality, however, the judiciary largely is subject to the desires and influence of the CCP (particularly if the cases are considered to be politically sensitive). Although previously a strict communist state, Chairman Mao's successors began to open up China's economy to the world. Although communism continues to provide the official theoretical grounding of Chinese politics, Mao's successors focused on market-oriented economic development and decentralization of the Chinese economy (phasing out collective agriculture, fiscal decentralization, the growth of a private sector, the opening up to foreign trade and investment, etc.), and by the beginning of the new millennium Chinese output had quadrupled (CIA World Factbook: China, 2020).

This opening up of the Chinese economy has dramatically improved the living standards of Chinese citizens, and there is currently a burgeoning middle class in the country. However, strict controls on many aspects of society remain in place. Individuals who advocate for civil and political rights, ethnic minorities, and public interest causes are frequently subject to repression; citizens don't have the right to select their government (with elections only existing at the most minor level of government), independent candidates in whatever elections do exist are heavily screened and sometimes prevented from running for office, and citizens have limited mechanisms for redress against official abuse (U.S. Dept. of State, 2020).

Nevertheless, compared with China's recent past during such events as the Cultural Revolution, life for everyday Chinese citizens is more prosperous then it once was. In addition, China has sought to put on a charm offensive over the years, and has increased its participation in international organizations and global outreach while portraying itself as a reliable and trustworthy partner (CIA World Factbook: China, 2020). That being said, it is notable that despite being a permanent member of the UNSC, China has traditionally opted for a foreign policy based on nonintervention in the domestic matters of other states, distinguishing itself from other permanent members of the UNSC.

6.2.3 International Condemnation

However, despite its attempts at portraying itself positively, 2016 and early 2017 saw China receiving an especially large amount of international criticism, condemnation, negative attention, and the threat of sanctions and tariffs for perceived bad behavior, such as the increasing amount and variety of human rights infractions and abuse. In addition, during this time period China also received negative scrutiny and condemnation due to the passage of restrictive laws which open fresh horizons for the abuse of Chinese citizens. In 2016, Human Rights Watch released a scathing report of Chinese behavior around and during that time which observed that:

> Senior Chinese leaders…now explicitly reject the universality of human rights, characterizing these ideas as "foreign infiltration"…Freedoms of expression and religion, already limited, were hit particularly hard…by several restrictive new measures…The government also proposed or passed laws on state security, cybersecurity, counterterrorism, and the management of foreign NGOs; these laws conflate peaceful criticism of the state with threats to national security…Activists seeking to defend human rights have faced a surge of reprisals…The government has increasingly used vague public order charges to silence human rights defenders...the State Internet Information Office issued multiple new directives, including tightened restrictions…the government passed a cybersecurity law that will require domestic and foreign Internet companies to practice censorship, register users' real names, localize data, and aid government surveillance…the government announced that it would station

> police in major Internet companies to more effectively prevent "spreading rumors" online…[and] Education Minister Yuan Guiren told universities to ban teaching materials that promote Western values and censor speech constituting "attack and slander against the Party." (pgs. 1-3)

In addition, during this time period the Chinese authorities were charged with removing crosses from (and occasionally demolishing) churches, with observers noting that in August of 2015 the National's People's Congress increased the penalty for participating in "cults" (the term that the government typically refers to religious groups outside their control, such as Falungong) up to life imprisonment (Human Rights Watch, 2016; Amnesty International, 2017). China during this time also received attention for its increased pressure on other countries to forcibly return allegedly corrupt Chinese (including those from Taiwan) to China, with dire consequences often waiting for these individuals there (which then raised eyebrows around the world) (Human Rights Watch, 2017). Some of these individuals had been granted refugee status by the UNHCR, but were still repatriated to China to be detained to the UNHCR's public dismay (Amnesty International, 2017). Human Rights Watch (2017) observed that, during this time period, Chinese "Authorities' hostility toward those who advocate for human rights reached new heights…" (pg. 188), and that during this period "Freedom of expression, already severely restricted through censorship and punishments, was hit particularly hard in 2016" (pg. 191).

China was accused of drafting even more restrictive laws and regulations as time went on between 2016 and 2017. According to Human Rights Watch (2017), "Authorities increasingly use vague public order charges against activists, including 'creating disturbances' and 'disturbing social order,' in addition to serious political charges such as 'subversion'…In a disturbing trend, charges of 'subversion,' which previously had been reserved for those who voiced opposition to the [CCP], are now being extended to lawyers and activists who do not

directly challenge the party…" (pg. 189). Further restrictive legislation during this time period that garnered negative attention included guidelines to increase the use of law enforcement of cultural matters to "safeguard the 'national cultural and ideological security" of China, proposed amendments to the Regulations on Religious Affairs that would extend the power of authorities to monitor, control and sanction religious practice (amongst other things requiring that religion "protect national security" as well as forbidding people and groups who aren't officially approved as religious bodies from attending meetings abroad on religion), the Foreign NGO Management Law (which placed NGOs under the supervision of the Ministry of Public Security and which created additional barriers to the already constricted rights to freedom of expression, association, and peaceful assembly), the Cyber Security Law (which obligated internet companies working in China to store the names of domestic users, enforce a name registration system, and censor content), the Film Industry Promotion Law (which prohibited the production of movies which include subjects considered to incite ethnic hatred, violate religious policies, and otherwise endanger Chinese national security), as well as other similar restrictions for videogames and live- streaming (Amnesty International, 2017; Human Rights Watch, 2017; U.S. Dept. of State, 2017).

During this time period, foreign governments and international organizations, universities, and trade and business associations expressed dismay globally via statements as well as directly via submissions to the National People's Congress about China's restrictive laws concerning NGOs and the punishment of Chinese citizens who took part in them. The UN Secretary-General publically observed that China had still not replied to questions about the death in custody of Cao Shunli (a prominent human rights defender), and both the Committee against Torture (aka "CAT") and the UN Committee on the Elimination of

Discrimination against Women expressed concern at Chinese attempts to limit the participation of civil society in the treaty body reviews (Human Rights Watch, 2016). Amnesty International (2017) blasted China for the notable increase of the use of "…'residential surveillance in a designated location', a form of secret incommunicado detention that allowed the police to hold individuals for up to six months outside the formal detention system, without access to legal counsel…their families or anybody else from the outside world, and placed suspects at risk of torture and other ill- treatment…Family members of those detained were also subject to police surveillance, harassment and restriction of their freedom of movement…[and] The number of carefully choreographed televised 'confessions' increased…" (pgs. 119-120).

China also received negative attention worldwide for its behavior in the UN, including voting against a resolution designed to create an expert post dedicated to addressing violence and discrimination based on gender identification and sexual orientation, attempting to block discussion of the human rights situation in North Korea, and opposing the granting of UN accreditation to the Committee to Protect Journalists, prompting a public outcry (Human Rights Watch, 2017). In February of 2016 particularly, China received worldwide condemnation from a variety of groups, international organizations, and countries all over the globe over its drastic and increasingly dismal record. According to Human Rights Watch (2017):

> In February [of 2016], the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights expressed concern regarding China's continued arbitrary detention and interrogation of lawyers, harassment and intimidation of government critics and NGO workers, and the negative impact on basic rights of the new Foreign NGO Management Law. In February 2016, the European Parliament adopted a strong resolution condemning human rights abuses in China and in March, a dozen governments led by the United States signed on to an unprecedented statement condemning China's "deteriorating human rights record" at the UN Human Rights Council. Several governments, including those of Canada, the European Union,

> Germany, and the United States, issued statements in 2016 about the crackdown on civil society, disappearances of the Hong Kong booksellers, and the Foreign NGO Management Law…UN Secretary-General…Ban Ki-moon…expressed concern about the crackdown on civil society, and urged Chinese authorities to give "citizens a full say and role in the political life of their country." (pg. 198)

Despite the fact that Hong Kong is guaranteed autonomy in every way outside of defense and foreign affairs (enjoying expanded civil liberties compared to mainland China as well as having an independent judiciary) under its Basic Law, the encroachment of China was observed to be taking place during this time period in the areas of personal expression, freedom of assembly (for example, over 1,000 individuals were arrested in connection with the "Umbrella Movement"), and political participation (Human Rights Watch, 2016; Human Rights Watch, 2017). Further, individuals who disappeared from Hong Kong made global headlines when they reappeared on television in mainland China, later alleging ill-treatment, forced confessions, and arbitrary detention on the part of mainland Chinese officials (Amnesty International, 2017; Human Rights Watch, 2017). During this time period, China also declined to clarify whether, and under what sort of situation, its security forces were operating in Hong Kong, adding to the uncertainty in the situation and causing anxiety worldwide. China made headlines globally with its encroachment on Hong Kong in 2016, with Human Rights Watch (2017) publicly noting that:

> In July [of 2016], Hong Kong's Electoral Affairs Commission announced a new requirement that candidates running for the semi-democratic Legislative Council…must formally declare their recognition of Hong Kong as an 'inalienable part of China'…Election officers then disqualified six candidates who have peacefully advocated for the territory's independence. In August, a spokesperson for the Education Bureau warned teachers that they could lose their professional qualifications for advocating independence…In November, China's top legislature issued an interpretation of a provision of the Basic Law…on oath-taking that seemed designed to compel the Hong Kong High Court to disqualify two recently elected pro-independence legislators from taking office. It marked the first time Chinese authorities had issued a ruling on the Basic Law while legal proceedings were ongoing in Hong Kong. (pg. 193).

During this time period, China received dramatically amplified attention for their increasing discrimination and persecution of their Uighur minority population. In their 2016 indictment of China's human rights record, Human Rights Watch observed:

> …authorities have detained, arrested, or killed increasing numbers of Uighurs alleged by police to have been involved in illegal or terrorist activities, but the authorities' claims are impossible to verify independently…Xinjiang authorities promulgated comprehensive yet vaguely worded new religious affairs regulations…These prohibit "extremist" attire and ban "activities that damage the physical and mental health of citizens." In recent years, authorities have used similar…directives to discourage or even ban civil servants, teachers, and students from fasting during Ramadan. In March, a Hotan court convicted 25 Uighurs of "endangering state security" for their participation in "illegal" religious studies—in this case, private religious classes. (pg. 8)

Some Uighurs who were detained were Uighur language website editors and writers. Yet despite the outcry, the Chinese government vowed that it would continue to maintain its "strike hard" policy against "violent terrorism" indefinitely. Amnesty International noted that in March of 2016 all unofficial preaching in the XUAR (Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region) had been shuttered, while also publically documenting that:

> In October, media reported that several localities within the XUAR had announced that they will require all residents to hand in their passports to the police. Thereafter, all XUAR residents would be required to present biometric data, such as DNA samples and body scan images, before being permitted to travel abroad. The measure came amid a security crackdown and greater travel restrictions targeting ethnic minorities in the XUAR. In August, the provincial government announced a large-scale plan to send 1,900 Uighur teachers to schools throughout mainland China to accompany Uighur students living in boarding schools in Han-majority areas. The government pledged to increase the number of such dispatched teachers to 7,200 by 2020. The move is billed as a way to "resist terrorism, violent extremism and separatism and promote ethnic solidarity," but Uighur groups overseas have criticized the plan as a means to dilute Uighur cultural identity. (pgs. 122-123)

These reports were corroborated by other sources such as Human Rights Watch, who in 2017 broadcast to the world that since Xinjiang authorities issued new directives to implement China's "abusive" Counterterror Law in 2016, 10 Uighur middle school students were arrested for terrorism (with no other information after that available), and that Uighur

economist Ilham Tohti was serving a life sentence for peacefully criticizing the Chinese government's policies in Xinjiang. The denial of passports was particularly applied to travel to Saudi Arabia for the Hajj, to other Muslim countries, and to Western countries; further, during this time period Reuters reported that movement inside the XUAR was internally restricted via the requirement of travel documents and other identification checks, and that family members of Uighur activists who were residing abroad were denied visas to reenter China (U.S. Dept. of State, 2017).

The crackdown on rights nationwide was decried for its increasing impact on the Tibetan people and their ability to move about, speak freely, and assemble peacefully. During this period, negative attention globally was aroused when the surveillance of monasteries and Tibetan villages experienced a marked uptick, resulting in a greater frequency of arrests of Tibetans involved in cultural and social activities, writers and singers who produced content which was deemed as sensitive, and also of local community leaders in the Tibetan regions (Human Rights Watch, 2016). Multiple prominent Tibetan prisoners died in jail, with the authorities sometimes refusing to release the corpses or allowing independent investigations as to their deaths (Human Rights Watch, 2016).

In addition, during this time period China received considerable negative press for destroying a large portion of Larung Gar, thought to be the largest Tibetan Buddhist Institute on the globe. Amnesty International (2017) observed that "Local Chinese authorities ordered the population of Larung Gar to be reduced by more than half to 5,000 in order to carry out 'correction and rectification'…Thousands of monks, nuns and lay people were at risk of forced evictions" (pg. 122). It also came to international attention that multiple Tibetans had died in Chinese custody, and that the Tibetan areas of Qinghai and Sichuan provinces were

scheduled for greater extraction of resources (prompting protests that were violently put down) (Human Rights Watch, 2017). China was also accused of making it increasingly difficult for Tibetans (particularly monks) to acquire passports. The U.S. Department of State (2017) publicly reported that "The unwillingness of Chinese authorities in Tibetan areas to issue or renew passports for Tibetans created, in effect, a ban on foreign travel for…the Tibetan population…Han Chinese residents of Tibetan areas did not experience the same difficulties…The government continued to try to prevent many Tibetans and Uighurs from leaving the country and detained many who were apprehended while attempting to leave."

6.2.4 Mediation

With a reputational bloody nose after receiving scathingly negative international attention and condemnation worldwide as well as being threatened by sanctions and tariffs during 2016 and early 2017, it appears that China tried to counterbalance this negativity through providing global public goods associated with conflict resolution. Case in point, China turned its attention to mediating the Palestinian-Israeli conflict (Legarda, Hoffman, 2018). Interestingly, since the founding of China in 1949, by and large China has seldom (relatively speaking) acted as a mediator in international conflicts. This is thought to be because of China's foreign policy of non-intervention, the belief that the status of being a neutral onlooker is better at maximizing China's national interests (since it provides more diplomatic wiggle room), and that China prefers to avoid conflict and confrontation unless there is a direct impact to Chinese core interests (security, sovereignty, etc.) (Chaziza, 2018b). However, there does appear to be a trend away from these traditional stances in regards to mediation.

This foreign policy pivot in of itself doesn't necessarily diverge from China's official presentation of its purpose in international affairs, namely to promote peace (Large, 2008). In

1955 at the Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai expressed support for the adoption of a ten-point "declaration on promotion of world peace and cooperation" (Li, 2019). That being said, there are some notable differences in mediation tactics between Western countries and China. Wu and Qian (2010) observed that:

> Unlike Western mediation approaches that emphasize truth finding, the Chinese approach is concerned more with creating and sustaining, from beginning to end, a peaceful or harmonious state, even if only at a superficial level. Nor do Chinese mediators follow a fixed protocol or procedure, preferring flexible processes that can be navigated to a mutually acceptable conclusion. Chinese mediators also tend to be context oriented; there are no right or wrong, only workable and unworkable processes. Chinese mediators also naturally take into account, looking forward to the outcome as well as in the process that leads up to it, face-saving for all parties. Finally, because among Chinese the selection of mediators might be based not on professional background, but on seniority and authority within the context of a specific dispute, it is not uncommon for the mediation process to be led by figures of authority or individuals who enjoy good relations with the disputants in lieu of professional mediators. (pg. 8)

China has no colonial, historical, religious, or political baggage in the Middle East, which seems like it would be conducive to China being perceived as an "honest broker" in conflicts (such as the Palestinian-Israeli conflict) there (Chaziza, 2018b). Further, China was engaged in nine mediation projects in 2018 (rising from just three in 2012), behavior which suggests that its mediating behavior with the Palestinians and Israelis might just be part of an overall strategy to act as a mediator more often (Li, 2019).

The problem with that assessment (and what makes Chinese involvement in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict so unique) is that China's mediating efforts to date outside of those involving its immediate neighbors have involved states which are part of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (Li, 2019), or are otherwise important in an immediately strategic sense. This is not the case with either Israel or Palestine, as neither of them have signed a Memorandum of Understanding with China so as to be a part of the BRI, as opposed to the vast majority of

countries on the planet (Nedopil, 2021). Thus, explanations as to why China mediates in other countries (their direct geographic proximity to the conflicting states, whether the belligerents are members of the BRI, etc.) do not apply to Israel and Palestine. Further, as an aggregate, China's important economic and core interests which might be impacted by this conflict are exceedingly minimal in scope (Sun, Zoubir, 2018). This opens up the probability that China has other reasons for attempting to mediate between the two parties, perhaps as a means of rehabilitating its reputation after it has come under scrutiny and condemnation by acting as a mediator in a conflict which garners a large degree of global attention.

Given the lambasting which China experienced from 2016 through part of 2017, it is notable that coincidently there was a widely noticeable increase in China's mediation efforts in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict (Chaziza, 2018a). The year 2017 saw a flurry of high-level diplomacy between the Chinese and both the Israelis and Palestinians. Chaziza (2018a) observed:

> In 2017, Chinese President Xi Jinping, put forward a new four-point Middle East peace proposal, as part of China's conflict-management diplomacy. The new peace proposal signaled China's heightened engagement with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The proposition called for advancing the political settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian issue on the basis of the two-state solution of the 1967 lines, which stipulated: East Jerusalem as the capital of a future Palestinian State; the upholding of a common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security concept; enhanced coordination and strengthening of concerted efforts for peace; and the promotion of peace with development…Moreover, in July 2017, Chinese President Xi Jinping, during a meeting with Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, proposed the establishment of a tripartite dialogue mechanism between Israel and the Palestinians…[and] Later [that year] China will hold a peace conference…to discuss possible ideas for managing the conflict. (pg. 36)

All of this activity represented a marked increase in Chinese involvement in this most intractable of conflicts, and as such is a notable departure from previous Chinese efforts in this area.

6.2.5 Rewards

It is notable that China, after previously experiencing a large amount of negative scrutiny in 2016 and earlier in 2017, in the latter half of 2017 saw a significant amount of praise and recognition for both its role in mediating the conflict as well as its human rights record and government policies in general. After China's proposal for its new four-point Middle East peace proposal, both Israel and Palestine praised and welcomed the proposal and declared their willingness and desire to engage with China in the mediating process (Chaziza, 2018a). The secretary-general of the Palestinian Presidency and aide to President Abbas, Tayeb Abdul Rahim, praised China for its possible role as an "honest broker" between Palestine and Israel (and that China could have a vital role in future mediation and peace agreements) (Chaziza, 2018a). This positive feedback and praise from the two belligerents in such a high profile conflict inherently drew in international attention from both states and international organizations alike.

Praise and positive attention for China was not only relegated to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict specifically, but extended out into other areas which it had hitherto fore been criticized in. Less than a year after China noticeably stepped up its mediation efforts in the conflict, China received international recognition in the area of human rights achievements by both the United Nations as well as numerous other countries. According to Shukun (2018):

> China's achievements in advancing human rights…received the United Nations Human Rights Council's recognition when its human rights report was discussed at the Universal Periodic Review [in 2018]…The report…includes details about how China had made progress in legislation on protection of human rights and the rights of special groups of people, and developing human rights in other areas…China has outperformed all countries in poverty alleviation and fulfilled the UN Millennium Development Goals ahead of schedule, an achievement the international community has praised. China's poverty reduction work could be used as an example by other developing countries,

> said Mozambique's representative to the UN-UPR…The Anti-Domestic Violence Law promulgated by China was hailed by Mali's representative to the UN-UPR as an important move to promote human rights…At the Universal Periodic Review meeting, the Mauritius representative praised China's inclusive development, and the Nepal representative complimented China for adhering to interactive contact in human rights. (pgs. 1-2)

At the UPR meeting, multilateral human rights values which China put forth were well-received, with the Chinese-proposed global governance model (characterized by the notions of shared benefit, common development, and consultation) receiving international recognition (Shukun, 2018). This praise in the realm of human rights by other countries and the United Nations was a stark departure from 2016 and the first part of 2017, when China received much negative attention and condemnation in this area.

Even the United States, under notorious China-baiter President Donald Trump, was effusive with its praise of China in a wide variety of areas in the latter part of 2017. Trump, a staunch supporter of Israel, just a year before on the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign trail brutally criticized China in areas as far ranging as trade practices to human rights. Amongst some of his more inflammatory criticisms of China was his assertion that China was using the U.S. as "a piggy bank to rebuild China" and that China was "taking our jobs" (Beech, 2016). At a campaign rally in Indiana in 2016, Trump excoriated China for "raping" the U.S., accusing it of being a "currency manipulator" and promising to rip up trade deals and confront China with trade barriers such as tariffs and sanctions (Corasaniti, Burns, Appelbaum, 2016; Wilson, 2016). But shortly after China's increased mediation efforts between Israel and Palestine, Trump sang a very different tune in the latter part of 2017. In November of that year, Trump met Xi and effusively praised him on areas ranging from trade to narcotics control to North Korea. Munroe (2017) recounts:

> "My feeling toward you is an incredibly warm one," Trump said, standing beside Xi...

> "As we said, there's great chemistry, and I think we're going to do tremendous things, both for China and the United States," Trump said…Trump went so far as to call Xi a "very special man" in a joint briefing on Thursday, and seemed so enthusiastic that Secretary of State Rex Tillerson was asked if Trump had been too deferential… "I don't blame China," Trump said of the trade deficit. "Who can blame a country for being able to take advantage of another country for the benefit of their citizens? I give China great credit."

For someone who had just accused China of "raping" the U.S. months before in trade matters while threatening China with sanctions and tariffs, this was a startling change of rhetoric. It can't help but be noted that Trump was a staunch supporter of Israel as president, with a vested interest in seeing an end to the conflict during his term in order to please his evangelical supporters.

6.3 Libya

From 1998 to 2000, Ethiopia fought a bloody border war with Eritrea which left tens of thousands dead, sparked an arms race between the two impoverished countries, as well as resulting in a buildup of military personnel between the belligerents. The pariah state of personalist dictator Muammar Qadhafi took this opportunity to act as mediator, opening up Libyan good offices for ending the conflict in 1998. From this point through 2000, shuttle diplomacy commenced. Qadhafi and his top cronies, as well as the leaders of Ethiopia and Eritrea, travelled amongst Africa in a series of high-profile meetings with the goal of ending the conflict. The personal involvement of Qadhafi, who held the entirety of Libya in his direct control, put the entire state of Libya behind these intense efforts at conflict mediation. After this personalized involvement, the provision of good offices, and shuttle diplomacy across Africa, it was reported in 1999 that Eritrea and Ethiopia had accepted a Libyan-brokered peace plan. The Libyans stated that Ethiopia and Eritrea had agreed to a cessation of military operations, and not too long after that a peace agreement was signed in 2000 that called for

the belligerents to abide by an independent ruling over their 1,000 kilometer contested frontier.

Similar to the other autocracies which have been analyzed, Qadhafi was to materially and immaterially benefit from his energized and personal involvement in mediating the conflict. As the Libyan mediation took place in the backdrop of negative scrutiny and attention which was being paid to Qadhafi's regime globally, this case supports my theory that autocracies will mediate in seemingly unrelated conflict in order to improve their image and obtain rewards. As such, the following sections discuss the conflict broadly, introduce the mediating state, reflect on the negative scrutiny which Libya was enduring at the time, expound on the successful mediation efforts of Libya in the conflict, and then recount the tangible and intangible rewards which Libya was able to derive post-mediation.

6.3.1 The Conflict

One of the more vicious international conflicts which have taken place in modern times, the border war between Ethiopia and Eritrea around the end of the 20th century was seemingly as intractable as it was deadly. Between 1998 and 2000, at least 70,000 individuals perished in the war between the two belligerents, a conflict which fueled a serious arms race between two of the globe's poorest countries, and which was characterized by mass expulsions (also referred to as "forced repatriations") of a large amount of each state's citizenry (Hamilton, 2000; Malone, 2009). The two countries were once one, federated together since 1952, but in 1993 Eritrea obtained its independence from Ethiopia. For several years later, relations between the two countries experienced no serious bilateral problems. However, relations between the two countries began to sour in 1997. According to Hamilton (2000):

> The first military incident occurred in July of that year when Ethiopian troops took over a small village in southwestern Eritrea and dismantled the civilian administration there. A month later, Ethiopian forces took similar action in the village of Badme in the Yirga Triangle, along Eritrea's southwestern border. Eritrea says that on 6 May 1998, a group of its officers went, unarmed, to tell the Ethiopians that they were on Eritrean territory; six of its officers were then shot dead. Ethiopia claims that there were casualties on both sides. A week later, Eritrea sent troops and armored units into and beyond Badme—into territory administered by Ethiopia. After several weeks of fighting, a number of areas previously administered by Ethiopia fell under Eritrean control. (pgs. 115-116)

At this juncture, international mediation attempts began with a joint U.S.-Rwandan shuttle-diplomacy effort led by Rwandan Vice-President Paul Kagame and U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Susan Rice. Their four-point peace plan stipulated that both sides should return their troops into their own territory and away from the border, the border would then be placed under international observation by means of monitors, civilian authority would then be brought back to the disputed areas followed by an investigation into the events which occurred on May 6th. But this peace effort was not to last. Although both belligerents said they agreed to the plan, Ethiopian forces were instructed to take any steps necessary to "foil the Eritrean invasion" while Eritrea stated it would only withdraw its soldiers once the border was demilitarized; on June 5th of that year, the Eritrean air force reportedly bombed Mekele, the capital of Ethiopia's Tigrayan province, while the Ethiopian air force bombed the Eritrean capital of Asmara (Hamilton, 2000). After this, fighting was reduced to a lull as the belligerents agreed to a U.S.-brokered airstrike moratorium as the rainy season began in the Horn of Africa.

During the months which constituted this lull, a vicious arms race and the recruitment/training of an increasing amount of soldiers on both sides commenced. Both Ethiopia and Eritrea were ranked amongst the most impoverished countries on the planet during this time period. Yet both sides engaged in this increased militarization. Ethiopia

commissioned Israel to modernize its bomber fleet as well as purchasing T-55 tanks from Bulgaria and SU-27 fighters from Russia, while Eritrea doubled its air force by purchasing four MiG-29s from Ukraine and $50 million worth of missiles and rockets from Romania (Hamilton, 2000). During this arms race amidst the lull in combat (which lasted until February of 1999), the Organization of African Unity (OAU) put forth a "Framework Proposal" to end the conflict. This proposal was more or less identical to that put forth by the US and Rwanda, and called for the border to be settled by a joint Eritrean-Ethiopian-UN cartography team. Although Ethiopia agreed with the proposal, Eritrea refused since it would allow Ethiopia to continue to administer civilian authority in parts of the contested area. The proposal was unsuccessful, and in February of 1999 military conflict once again recommenced. According to Hamilton (2000):

> On the 6th, at Badme, Ethiopian forces advanced against dug-in Eritrean fighters with the goal of winning back the territory lost nine months earlier…the battle for Badme was characterized by mass processions of infantry, meant to overwhelm the enemy by sheer numbers…the second phase of the Ethio-Eritrean war "turned out to be something of a first-world-war throwback, with human waves walking into banks of machine-gun, tank, and artillery fire…the Ethiopians managed to coax the Eritreans out from their trenches and engage them in…fierce hand-to-hand fighting. The Eritrean line buckled, and Ethiopia's "Operation Sunset" succeeded in retaking Badme…[Eritrea] announced that [it] was ready to sign the OAU peace proposals. But [Ethiopia], who had accepted the deal nine months earlier, now refused to sign. Instead, Ethiopian forces opened fire on a second front a few weeks later…on the plain of Tsorona. Employing the same archaic battle tactics, the Ethiopians sent waves of tanks and infantry towards the Eritrean line, suffering a casualty count of 10,000 in the span of just sixty hours. This time, the Eritreans repulsed the attack, leaving the conflict to simmer on in an uneasy stalemate through the summer months. (pgs. 117-118).

Finally, not too long after mediation attempts by Colonel Qadhafi's Libya (which will be covered more in depth shortly), a peace agreement was signed in 2000 that called for both sides to abide by an independent ruling over the 1,000 kilometer frontier; however, both Ethiopia and Eritrea kept their forces close to the border and tensions remained high (Malone, 2009). It wasn't until 2018 that Ethiopia and Eritrea signed a peace agreement to end this

"frozen war" and settle what appeared to be an intractable border dispute (Stigant, Phelan, 2019).

6.3.2 The Mediator

Roughly 3,000 kilometers away from where the fighting between Ethiopia and Eritrea took place in the Horn of Africa region, Libya is a relatively sparsely populated state with a current population of about 7 million people (mostly living close to the Mediterranean coast), it is about the size of Alaska, and it is located in the MENA geographic region (CIA World Factbook: Libya, 2020). Its capital is Tripoli, an ancient city which was founded in the 7th century BC by the Phoenicians. Libyan wealth primarily is derived from (and dependent on) petroleum and natural gas, which has been used liberally at times to finance both revolutionary movements as well as other states. Libya has traditionally been a part of another state or empire during its history, with early inhabitants being invading Berbers who arrived in 3,000 BC ("Libya, Qadhafi, and the African Union," 2021). However, Arabs have had the most lasting impact of these groups (having converted the population to Islam), and traditionally Libya has identified itself as a Mediterranean Arab country instead of African. The Ottomans conquered Libya in the sixteenth century and ruled until the early twentieth century, followed by the Italians until the end of World War Two. In 1951, the United Nations gave its blessing to Libyan independence under the repressive King Idris, who promptly banned political parties and drove opposition to his rule underground; this was to prove a fatal mistake, because on September 1st of 1969, Colonel Muammar Qadhafi led a bloodless military coup with a cabal of around 70 other disaffected officers ("Libya, Qadhafi, and the African Union," 2021).

Qadhafi's foreign policy goals, amongst other things, involved opposition to Israel and

support of Palestinians, pursuing a federation of Arab nations, the advancement of the Muslim religion, and opposition to colonialism. He was a key player in advocating for the use of oil embargoes against the West, viewing capitalism as a violation against the human race. Born in 1942 in Sirte, Qadhafi was expelled from school for organizing student demonstrations but was able to continue a military education which helped him to overthrow King Idris with the backing of powerful elements of the Libyan armed forces ("Libya, Qadhafi, and the African Union," 2021). Once in power, Qadhafi instituted a revolutionary regime in Libya (which at that juncture was named "The Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya") which combined elements of Islam and socialism, which he attempted to export using his countries petroleum wealth (CIA World Factbook: Libya, 2020). Qadhafi drew much of his power from the Libyan military, but was also in charge of a number of other intelligence and security entities tasked with safeguarding the regime.

Initially, Qadhafi was an active advocate for Arab unity, advocating for a single legal system, business infrastructure, foreign policy, and a centralized military. When this didn't work, Qadhafi instead turned to proposed regional alliances (supporting Egypt during the Yom Kippur War, for example) and offering to dissolve his borders in order to create a union with other nearby Arab countries ("Libya, Qadhafi, and the African Union," 2021). Despite his calls for unity, Libya under Qadhafi actively supported groups throughout the MENA which planned coups against Arab countries, conspired to assassinate leaders which Qadhafi disagreed with, and aided in setting up guerrilla armies ("Libya, Qadhafi, and the African Union," 2021). Libya began to acquire a reputation as a pariah state, opening it up to condemnation and negative press on issues ranging from terrorism to human rights (as well as to the consequences of such a bad reputation, such as sanctions).

This reputation coalesced amongst Western nations during the 1980s after high profile terrorist attacks (supported by Libya) against Western targets. In 1986, a Berlin discotheque bombing killed two U.S. servicemen and injured over 200 others; eventually a German court found a former employee of the Libyan embassy and three other individuals guilty in connection to the bombing ("Foreign Relations of Libya Under Muammar Gaddafi," 2021). Then in 1988, the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland killed 259 passengers and crew as well as 11 people on the surface; this prompted sanctions and an air embargo by the United Nations and the United States, which crippled the Libyan economy and solidified its pariah categorization (CIA World Factbook: Libya, 2020; "Foreign Relations of Libya Under Muammar Gaddafi," 2021). To his horror, Qadhafi was shocked at the Arab countries' willingness to enforce sanctions, further isolating his regime

Later in the 1990s, after actions designed to deflect criticism and his regime's bad reputation (actions which included his mediation efforts between Eritrea and Ethiopia in the late 90s), Qadhafi was able to rehabilitate his regime's image in the eyes of the West and other states (more of which will be covered below). However, this wasn't enough to save his regime from his own disaffected citizens. According to the CIA World Factbook for Libya (2020), "Unrest that began in several Middle Eastern and North African countries in late 2010 erupted in Libyan cities in early 2011…Qadhafi's brutal crackdown on protesters spawned a civil war…After months of seesaw fighting between government and opposition forces, the Qadhafi regime was toppled in mid-2011 and replaced by a transitional government known as the National Transitional Council (NTC)" (pg. 1). Although the fall of Qadhafi was an interesting phenomenon in its own right, the study of such is beyond the scope of this analysis.

6.3.3 International Condemnation

Even for a regime renowned for its autocratic nature and human rights violations (Human Rights Watch World Report 1998, 1997), 1997 and early 1998 saw it receive condemnation and negative press to such a large degree that it threatened Qadhafi's attempts to rehabilitate Libya's image and reputation. Libya was already known for a lack of an independent judiciary and general political participation, restrictions on academics and the freedoms of the press, assembly, association, religion, speech, privacy, collective bargaining in labor disputes, movement, as well as forced abductions and disappearances of undesirables both domestically and abroad. But international condemnation and negative press over Libyan human rights violations in 1997 and early 1998 threatened to irrevocably tip the scales of global opinion and sink any Libyan hopes of shedding this image. According to the U.S. Department of State (1998):

> There were reports of mass expulsions of foreign workers and residents to neighboring countries in 1997, and the regime again contemplated the return of the approximately 30,000 Palestinians currently residing in Libya. Traditional attitudes and practices…discriminate against women, and female genital mutilation (FGM) is…practiced in remote areas of the country. The government discriminates against and represses certain minorities and tribal groups…A large number of offenses, including political offenses and "economic crimes" are punishable by death…In July 1996, a new law went into effect that applies the death penalty to those who speculate in foreign currency, food, clothes, or housing…and for crimes related to drugs and alcohol. On January 2, two civilians and six army officers were executed, the civilians by hanging and the army officers by firing squad; while at least five others were given prison sentences, all convicted on charges of being American spies, treason, cooperating with opposition organizations, and instigating violence to achieve political and social goals. (pg. 2)

Despite Libya being party to the UN Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, in 1997 Libya was accused of torturing prisoners (chaining them to walls, applying electric shocks, pouring acid in open wounds, breaking bones and letting them heal without treatment, suffocation, starvation, beatings, etc.)

and holding them incommunicado without allowing visits by human rights monitors; in addition, Libya was condemned for failing in 1997 to comply with UNSC demands relating to the bombing of Pan Am 103 (U.S. Department of State, 1998). According to a scathing report by Amnesty International (1998):

> In March [of 1997] a new law came into force authorizing collective punishment for communities deemed to have protected or helped those responsible for "terrorism," acts of violence, unauthorized possession of weapons or sabotaging "people's power." Under the new law, which also provides for the punishment of those who fail to report such "criminals," the authorities could cut off water and electricity supplies, deprive villages or tribes of subsidized food, petrol, and public services, and transfer development projects to other parts of the country…In April, Libyan soldiers dismantled a camp on the border between Libya and Egypt, where around 250 Palestinian refugees had been stranded since they were forcibly expelled from Libya in 1995. The Palestinians were believed to have been forcibly relocated to another camp near Tubruq inside Libya…Hundreds of political prisoners…remained held without charge or trial…Scores of people, including possible prisoners of conscience, were detained during the year in connection with their political or religious beliefs or activities. Many were believed to…remain detained at the end of the year…Torture and ill-treatment was reported. Reports suggested…cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. (pgs. 1-2)

In January of 1997, Libya received condemnation for executing eight men, while in June a report surfaced that detailed a large amount of human rights violations, calling for Libyan authorities to cease such activities (Amnesty International, 1998). Then, in May of 1997, The UN Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights accused Libya of threatening to lock up anyone accused of disobeying disciplinary rules, causing a large amount of societal and human rights problems related to its domestic policies, and providing shoddy and inadequate housing to its citizenry (U.S. Dept. of State, 1998). Libya was also condemned for implementing previously passed legislation which had up to that point gone unenforced. According to the U.S. Department of State (1998):

> The Purge Law of 1994 provides for the confiscation of private assets above a nominal amount, describing wealth in excess of such an undetermined nominal amount as the fruits of exploitation or corruption. In May 1996, Qadhafi ordered the formation of

> hundreds of "Purge" or "Purification" Committees composed of young military officers and students. The Committees…implemented the Purge Law through mid-1997. The "Purification" Committees reportedly seized some "excessive" amounts of private wealth from members of the middle and affluent classes; the confiscated property was taken from the rich to be given to the poor, in an effort to appease the populace and to strengthen Qadhafi's power and control over the country. (pg. 5)

Reeling from these criticisms, Qadhafi sought a way to deflect such scathing condemnation and negative press in order to improve his and the country's reputation.

6.3.4 Mediation

Traditionally speaking, Libya (both under Qadhafi and in general) identified itself with and aimed its foreign policy at other countries in the MENA region, these efforts having pride of place over sub-Saharan Africa (Huliaras, 2001). However, the brutal and bloody war between Ethiopia and Eritrea provided Qadhafi with a high-profile arena for his efforts to cast Libya as a peace-loving and humanitarian nation, and to neutralize the recent scathing attention and condemnation which his regime had endured in 1997 and 1998. This explains his persistent efforts to get the belligerents to sit down together at the bargaining table. Huliaras (2001) observed that "…Qadhafi embarked on systematic and intensive efforts to give his country a new image as a moderate and peace-loving state, with himself as a peacemaker in Africa…Hence, since 1998, the Libyan leader has tried to use his good offices towards ending the hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea" (pg. 17).

These mediation attempts very often took the form of personalized shuttle diplomacy on the part of Qadhafi (who met with both Ethiopian and Eritrean leaders in early 1999) and senior members of his regime (such as Deputy Foreign Minister Ali Abdulsalem Attaricki). On July 2nd of 1999, after engaging in shuttle diplomacy, it was reported that Eritrea and Ethiopia had accepted a Libyan-brokered peace plan designed to end the border conflict, with the Libyans stating that the belligerents had agreed to an immediate cessation of military

operations ahead of the signing of a cease-fire (“Eritrea and Ethiopia ‘Agree Peace Deal’,” 1999). On July 10th, it was reported that the Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Meles Zenawi, held talks with Qadhafi personally on his way to the Organization of African Unity (OAU) summit in Algiers; following this meeting, Qadhafi then spoke to the Eritrean President, Isaias Afwerki, in a personalized effort to move the peace process forward (“Gaddafi Talks Peace with Ethiopian PM,” 1999). Both belligerents had agreed to a previous OAU agreement regarding a ceasefire, but did not agree to its implementation (“Little Progress at Horn Peace Talks,” 1999). Finally, not too long after mediation attempts by Qadhafi, a peace agreement was signed in 2000 that called for both sides to abide by an independent ruling over the 1,000 kilometer frontier (Malone, 2009).

6.3.5 Rewards

Shortly after Libya’s mediation efforts between Ethiopia and Eritrea, Qadhafi was the beneficiary of both tangible and intangible rewards at the end of the 1990s and into the early 2000s for his efforts at portraying his country as a humanitarian, peace-loving country that seeks to bring conflicts to an end. These efforts seemingly quashed the negative attention which Libya had so recently endured. Praise and positive recognition from numerous states was one of the most notable of these benefits, considering the rough press and condemnation which Libya had only just previously been going through.

Indeed, now heads of state heaped accolades upon Qadhafi, as well as demanding a Libyan role in future negotiations to end conflicts. For example, according to Huliaras (2001), “In August 1999, the newly elected Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo visited Tripoli and commended Qadhafi for his efforts towards ending conflict…’The world knows Muammar Qadhafi as the leader of the world revolution, which is contributing to the liberation of

peoples'…'And now that the liberation stage has ended, the world wants to know Muammar Qadhafi as the leader of peace and development in Africa and other countries…In fact, I hope that Muammar Qadhafi meets this description'…" (pgs. 15-16). This represented high praise from not only the leader of Africa's largest economy and most populous country, but also from a staunch ally of both the U.S. and the West.

Further, although the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea remained a "frozen war" after the signing of the peace agreement, the belligerents insisted on and supported a continued Libyan role as mediator between them in the future. In 2009, Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi expressed that his country supported Qadhafi's efforts to mediate between it and Eritrea, and that Ethiopia was open to peace talks. Expressing the belief that Gadhafi would "devote a lot of energy," Zenawi stated that "We very much welcome (Gaddafi's) offer to help us resolve our problem…The only way for us to do that is for us to get together and iron out our issues" (Malone, 2009). And no less of a personality than Nelson Mandela had Qadhafi come to South Africa that eventful July in 1999 as his last official guest as president, referring to him as "my brother leader" ("Mandela Welcomes 'Brother Leader' Gaddafi," 1999). Mandela also helped engineer one of the more tangible benefits for Libya post-mediation due to its recent positive policy actions, namely successfully lobbying for the removal of Western-inspired UN travel and economic sanctions on Libya in 1999 (Adebajo, 2011).

Perhaps the crown jewel amongst the benefits which Libya received as a result of its newfound reputation was the manifestation of Qadhafi's persistent dream of a regional union of countries within which he could function as a major player (if not leader). According to reports, "In 1999, Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Abu Minyar al-Qadhafi…called a meeting of all African heads of state to discuss the creation of a new union of African states…The new

union Qadhafi proposed was to be far stronger than the existing Organization of African Unity (OAU), which had been formed by 32 independent African states in 1963 in order to promote unity and to defend the sovereignty of its members and eradicate all forms of colonialism on the continent…Following several meetings and a two-day summit of 40 African heads of state in Sirte, Libya, in March 2001, Libya announced the creation of a new African Union, to be roughly modeled on the European Union…Upon the announcement of the new pact, established by a unanimous decision of all 53 member states of the OAU, Colonel Qadhafi flashed a victory sign" ("Libya, Qadhafi, and the African Union," 2021, pg. 1). For a former pariah state recently on the receiving end of withering international criticism, attention, and sanctions, this development represented a huge turnaround in terms of Libya's reputation as a good global neighbor. The inception of the African Union brought many benefits to Libya in terms of support from other states as well as this new regional body, and on February 2nd of 2009, Qadhafi himself took up the mantle of chairman of the African Union (with Prime Minister Zenawi of Ethiopia specifically going on the record as having voted for Qadhafi's bid to be chairman of the Union, suggesting gratitude for Libyan mediation put in action) (Malone, 2009).

6.4 Turkey

For the two cases that did not experience condemnation and yet still offered mediation, I start with the case of Turkey's mediation attempts in the 1990s conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. From 1992 to 1995, ethnic conflict broke out in Bosnia and Herzegovina after the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia. Conflict broke out between Muslim Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs in the new state. Several years of bitter fighting between the ethnic groups as well as elements of the Yugoslav army ensued. After several years of combat, NATO and Western

countries managed to create a cease-fire between the groups with the Dayton Accords in 1995. However, conflictual relationships amongst the ethnic groups and the successor states to the former Yugoslavia continued, and the situation remained volatile. In 2009, both the Western countries of the EU and an increasingly autocratic Turkey conducted separate mediation attempts to settle the conflict once and for all, with the EU's attempt seen as a failure while Turkey's mediation was considered a success.

Unlike the previous examples of Qatar, China, and Libya, at the time of the Turkish mediation effort, Turkey was not experiencing a steep increase or significant amount of international condemnation and/or sanctioning. In fact, Turkey was well-integrated with the West at that point diplomatically, politically, and militarily, and was not subject to negative scrutiny from other actors such as the United Nations or private organizations. Turkey's mediation effort therefore seems to have been for more traditional geopolitical reasons such as regional security, religious affiliation, economic interests, and national influence. This case offers a contrasting example of my theory on autocratic mediation. However, this case does not undermine my theory in practical ways. The theory is not meant to completely supplant traditional reasoning for third-party state mediation, but instead is designed to fill the gaps in these theories which cannot explain cases of autocratic mediation in seemingly unrelated conflicts to the mediating state. The following sections discuss the conflict broadly, introduce the mediating state, discuss the more traditional motivations which Turkey had in mediating the conflict, and then analyze the nature of the Turkish mediation.

6.4.1 The Conflict

During the final years of the Cold War in the 1980s, the decline of Yugoslavia's command economy resulted in public dissatisfaction with the communist political system. In

addition, politicians began to agitate nationalist feelings as a means of drumming up support, which further led to the destabilization of the political situation in Yugoslavia. In 1991, several areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina which were heavily populated by Serbs declared themselves as "Serb Autonomous Regions," and by August of that year full-scale war had broken out in Croatia. In early 1991, Bosnia and Herzegovina was recognized as independent by the U.S. and the EC (the precursor to the EU). In response, Serbian groups began shelling Sarajevo while paramilitary and Yugoslav army units launched an offensive in several towns in eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina, leading to ethnic cleansing of Bosniaks and Croats. After both cooperating and fighting each other at different points in time, in 1994 Bosniaks and Croats formed a joint federation. However, neither the federation nor the United Nations was able to prevent the massacre of 7,000 Bosniak men by Bosnian Serb forces in what was supposed to be a UN protected "safe area." From 1994 to 1995, NATO airstrikes and a Bosniak-Croat offensive led to the Bosnian Serbs agreeing to the Dayton Accords in December of 1995.

The Dayton Accords resulted in a federalized Bosnia and Herzegovina where 51% of the land was governed by a Croat-Bosniak federation and 49% was governed by a Serb republic. However, the Dayton Accords did not result in non-conflictual and placid relations between the ethnic parties and the successor states to Yugoslavia. Despite high profile international efforts, the large amount of support for rival ethnic-based parties caused the conflict to continue to act as a fearful specter for those concerned. Zenelaj et al (2015) noted that conflict continued to be of great concern, observing that amongst other destabilizing dynamics at play that "Republika Srpska (RS), one of the two semi-autonomous entities founded with the 1995 Dayton Agreement, has repeatedly asserted its right to secede from Bosnia-Herzegovina…Furthermore, two major Croat parties excluded from the government

of the other entity, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, refused to recognize its legitimacy and formed their own assembly…The Croat parties' occasional calls for separation from the Federation further threaten…stability…Despite this precarious situation, and its possible negative spillovers in the region, the international community…lost interest and became increasingly unwilling to intervene…" (pg. 415). In addition, the Dayton Accords did not include any arrangement for the demobilization of ex-combatants or the reduction of armed forces (Zenelaj et al 2015). Despite the perilous situation, Turkey successfully mediated between rival parties by mediating between the successor states to Yugoslavia involved (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia) in order to put the post-Dayton Bosnian conflict to rest in its entirety.

6.4.2 The Mediator

The successor state to the Ottoman Empire, Turkey is a majority Muslim state which straddles Europe and Asia (with deep cultural and historic ties to both) and is slightly larger than the U.S. state of Texas, with a population of over 80,000,000 citizens. Modern Turkey was founded in 1923, and after a period of one-party rule, an experiment with a multi-party political system resulted in the 1950 election of the opposition Democrat Party and a peaceful transition of power. However, Turkey has increasingly become more autocratic. According to the CIA World Factbook (2021), "Since [1950] …democracy has been fractured by periods of instability and military coups (1960, 1971, 1980)…In 1997, the military again helped engineer the ouster…of the then Islamic-oriented government…An unsuccessful coup attempt was made in July 2016 by a faction of the Turkish Armed Forces" which resulted in hundreds of deaths and thousands of injured citizens. Further, although political parties have to an extent been able to compete in Turkish elections, this hasn't resulted in a deep democratic

tradition. According to McLaren and Cop (2011):

> …[Turkish political] parties have generally been able to compete freely in Turkish elections. What occurs after an election, however, is a different matter…in the past 45 years there have been 25 closures of political parties, all occurring after general or local elections. In addition…Turkey has experienced…difficulties in the area of respect for free speech and human rights. The lengthy war in the south-east of the country in the 1980s and 1990s and the perceptions that the state was under significant threat…led to large-scale human rights violations and restrictions on free speech…The adoption of Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code in 2005…introduced…severe restrictions on free speech, as the Article stipulates that it is illegal (and punishable by imprisonment) for a person to publicly denigrate Turkishness, the Turkish Republic, the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, the Turkish government, [and] the judicial institutions or the military or security organizations…the Article itself and the possibility of punishment are both considered to be fundamental restrictions on speech that is normally protected in a democracy…The final major problem to note regarding Turkish democracy is that…the military has been relatively actively involved in politics when compared to established democracies, with…high-ranking military officials…implying that force will be used to produce policy change. (pgs. 486-487)

To summarize, military interference in Turkish politics, the shuttering of political parties, and curbs on freedoms of speech and expression make it clear that democracy has not managed to take root in Turkey (McLaren, Cop, 2011). In fact, autocratic tendencies and actions have continued to abound in the country, with the failure of political elites to reach a complete settlement on the basic functioning of Turkey's ostensibly democratic institutions resulting in a lack of will to defend democratic rules of governance (McLaren, Cop, 2011).

6.4.3 Motivations to Mediate

As opposed to the examples of Libya, Qatar, and China, Turkey was motivated to mediate between Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina for more traditional reasons, which could be considered as alternative explanations that are common in the literature on mediation. For example, Turkey and Bosnia enjoy cultural, historic, and social bonds which stretch back centuries. In addition, there are more practical contemporary political, military, regional, and economic dynamics which contributed to Turkey's desire to lay the conflict to

rest once and for all. Zenelaj et al (2015) noted:

> Turkey supplied arms to the Bosnian fighters…Military-wise, it takes an active part in…the EU's peacekeeping operation to assist [Bosnia and Herzegovina] consolidate its statehood. Economically, Turkey has significantly contributed to the reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The two countries also concluded a Free Trade Agreement in 2002. Lastly, Turkey supported Bosnia-Herzegovina's integration with Euro-Atlantic institutions including NATO and the EU. Similarly, Turkey and Croatia have shared common goals such as integration to the Euro-Atlantic structures, and the establishment of regional cooperation schemes. Turkey had also supported Croatia's mediation efforts to bring Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims under the Federation of Bosnia- Herzegovina under the 1994 Washington agreement. Unlike its relations with Bosnia and Croatia, Turkey's relations with Serbia were icy at best…Despite these tensions, Turkey did not overlook the key role Serbia could play to establish peace and stability in the troubled regions of the Balkans…To conclude…Turkey has always been close to Bosnia-Herzegovina, and took a firm position in defending Bosnia's territorial integrity and sovereignty. This stance led Turkey to occasionally confront Croatia and Serbia when the latter two refused to recognize Bosnia's independence. Turkey, however, has not hesitated to improve relations when the two countries changed positions towards recognizing a sovereign and independent Bosnia. (pg. 426)

In addition to these reasons for mediating, Turkey has also increasingly taken up conflict mediation in general as a tool of statecraft. Akpinar (2015) observed that Turkey has repositioned itself "…as a peace and stability promoter and a soft power in neighboring regions…It reconstructed its identity by referring to its historical-geographical depth in addition to its social and cultural affinities…Subsequently, Turkey has…mediated in a number of peace talks, including the ones between Syria-Israel, Iran-the West,…the Sunni-Shia groups in Iraq, Somalia-Somaliland, Palestine-Israel and Georgia-Russia," as well as in a number of conflicts involving Bahrain, Libya, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen during the Arab Spring (pg. 256). These motivations place Turkey in contrast to the examples of mediation by China, Libya, and Qatar.

6.4.4 Mediation

As opposed to the EU mediation effort which attempted to focus on important

domestic political stakeholders in Bosnia, the Turkish mediation effort focused on the international aspects of the post-Dayton Bosnia conflict by reconciling the states of Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia in an effort towards maintaining Bosnia-Herzegovina's territorial integrity and sovereignty (which Turkey viewed as essential to the region's stability) (Zenelaj et al, 2015). According to Zenelaj et al (2015), "…Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia have a history of intense conflict. The memories of massive killings and destruction in the three years of war after Bosnians self-declaration of independence are still fresh in the region…While Bosnia's relations with Croatia improved due to the latter's apology for crimes committed in Bosnia from 1992-1995, relations with Serbia remained hostile…A main reason for this tension related to Bosnia's perception that Serbia did little to halt the Bosnian Serb leader Milorad Dodik's actions aiming to undermine the effectiveness of Bosnia's central government institutions" (pg. 425).

An intriguing and innovative approach that Turkey utilized in mediating between the three states was to maintain two sets of dialogues independent from each other but on parallel tracks, one track with Turkey mediating between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia, and another track with Turkey mediating between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. Turkey offered several carrots for expanding cooperation with Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia on both economic and diplomatic levels during these talks. Zenelaj et al (2015) recounted that "Turkey and Serbia signed six agreements including the free visa travel agreement, cooperation in the construction sector and reviewed their military, cultural and administrative relations…They also held several talks on the prospect of selling Serbia's financially distressed main airliner (JAT Airways) to Turkish Airlines…Lastly, Turkey has started undertaking projects to help develop the infrastructure in Sandzac, a Serbian

province populated with Muslims…Similarly, Turkey and Croatia agreed to raise the trade volume between the two countries to one billion Euros by the end of 2013" (pg. 428). The Turkish mediation efforts with Croatia, Serbia, and Bosnia met with success, with a number of tangible outcomes following. In 2009, relations between the states were finally normalized. In February of 2010, Serbia agreed to accept the Bosnian ambassador to Belgrade, and just over a month later the Serbian Parliament officially apologized for its role in the Srebrenica Massacre in 1995 by adopting the *Declaration of Srebrenica*. Finally, in April of 2010, Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina signed the *Istanbul Declaration on Peace and Stability in the Balkans*, helping to wind down the conflict and returning peace between the neighbors to the region.

Through its mediation, Turkey accomplished a number of its objectives which are traditionally seen as important for why states mediate international conflicts, including regional security, religious affiliation, economic interests, and national influence. I included Turkey because, similar to the cases of Libya, China, and Qatar, we see an example where an autocratic government offered and (in the cases of Libya and Qatar) was successful at mediating an international conflict. Otherwise, though, there were important differences between these cases. For example, some of the control variables utilized during my quantitative analysis apply to the case of Turkey. Turkey has extensive previous economic and political ties to Balkan nations, as well as sharing the same region of the globe with these states. As such, the causal mechanisms and motivations for their offer and success at mediation appear to be different than the cases of China, Libya, and Qatar, demonstrating that although there is evidence to back up my theory, it is not able to fully explain all cases of autocracies mediating international conflicts. However, in of itself the case of Turkey is not

sufficient enough to disprove my theory on mediation by autocracies, in light of the previous case studies on China, Libya, and Qatar.

6.5 Iran

With origins stemming back to the 1990s, the internationalized conflict in Yemen has proven to be as intractable as it is tragic. Indeed, this conflict has been referred to as one of the worst humanitarian crisis in existence in the world today. Despite both international military support for the various sides including a Saudi-led coalition in opposition to Iran as well as mediation efforts by a number of parties, the Yemeni conflict remains undecided in terms of its conclusion. Amongst other potential mediators who have attempted to insert themselves into this quagmire, Iran offered to mediate in April of 2015. However, their efforts were rebuffed on the grounds of their tactical support for the Shiite Houthis in their endeavor to gain control. At the time of this writing, the conflict has continued to wreak havoc and bloodshed amongst Yemenis and their backers.

At the time of the Iranian mediation attempt, Iran was not experiencing a steep increase or significant amount of international condemnation and/or sanctioning. In fact, Iran's standing globally at that time was on the upswing. Iran had successfully weathered massive protests that had followed the controversial 2009 Iranian elections and its domestic convulsions associated with the Arab Spring, as well as the international condemnation which it endured for its heavy- handed responses. Further, 2015 saw the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which helped bring Iran in from out of the cold by leading to the lifting of crushing economic sanctions and a general rapprochement with Western and other countries as well as institutions. Iran's failed mediation effort therefore seems to have been for more traditional geopolitical reasons such as regional security, religious affiliation,

and national influence, and offers a contrasting example with my theory on autocratic mediation. However, this case does not undermine my theory in practical ways. My theory is not meant to completely supplant traditional reasoning for third-party state mediation, but instead is designed to fill the gaps in these theories that cannot explain cases of autocratic mediation in seemingly unrelated conflicts to the mediating state. The following sections discuss the conflict broadly, introduce the attempted mediator, discuss the more traditional motivations which Iran had in attempting to mediate the conflict, and then analyze the outcome of the Iranian mediation attempt.

6.5.1 The Conflict

Following the reunification of Yemen in the 1990s, President Ali Abdullah Saleh tacitly supported the Houthis which resulted in them gradually gaining power. However, after Saleh arrived at a border demarcation agreement with Saudi Arabia in 2000, Saleh sought to disarm the Houthis (Montgomery, 2021). In 2004 the Houthis rebelled, leaving hundreds of dead. From 2005-2010, the situation oscillated between the Houthis and the government fighting each other and periodic ceasefires. However, with the advent of the Arab Spring in 2011, street protests and violence led Saleh to hand over power to his deputy Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi. After various attempts at forming a unity government which ultimately resulted in Hadi dissolving his cabinet in August 2014, from September to October of that year saw the Houthis take control of the majority of Yemen's capital of Sanaa and the Red Sea port of Hodeida (AP News, 2021; Montgomery, 2021). After being placed on house arrest by the Houthis in January of 2015, Hadi fled Sanaa to Aden and (after the Houthis seize Aden International Airport) from there to Saudi Arabia in March. At this juncture, a Saudi-led and U.S.-backed coalition including the UAE, Egypt, Kuwait, Sudan, Bahrain, Jordan, and

Morocco began Operation Decisive Storm to bolster up Hadi's supporters via airstrikes, small-scale ground deployments, and a naval blockade (AP News, 2021; Montgomery, 2021). In April of 2015, the Houthis took the city of Ataq and fired mortars and rockets into Saudi Arabia (killing at least three Saudis). By August the Houthis had taken over the Shabwah governorate, and despite UN-sponsored peace talks fighting continued.

In November of 2017, the Houthis claimed responsibility for firing missiles into Saudi Arabia (widely believed to have been made possible by Iranian support and technical expertise). By this point in time Yemen was facing a severe humanitarian crisis with rampant civilian casualties and food insecurity, and the next month the Houthis killed former president Saleh after he reached out to the Saudi-led coalition. In July of 2018, the Saudi-led coalition launched an offensive on the port of Hodeida, which is Yemen's primary entry point for humanitarian aid and food (AP News, 2021; Montgomery, 2021). International concern continued to grow, but UN-led mediation efforts continued to be in vain. UAE-backed separatists began fighting the government near Aden in August of 2019, further destabilizing the country. The next month, the Houthis engaged in drone attacks on Saudi Arabia's oil facilities (again thought to be made possible due to Iranian support and expertise), severely affecting the world's supply of oil (AP News, 2021; Montgomery, 2021). Fighting continued, and in October of 2020 Iran announced the arrival of its ambassador in Houthi-controlled Sanaa (AP News, 2021; Montgomery, 2021). The Biden administration placed temporary holds on several large arms sales to the UAE and Saudi Arabia in January of 2021, with Biden stating that the U.S. is ending support for the Saudi coalition in February. From February to March of 2021, the Houthis launched drone and missile attacks against Saudi Arabia (AP News, 2021; Montgomery, 2021; Global Conflict Tracker, 2021). At the time of this writing,

combatants are still wrangling for control with no sign of abatement.

6.5.2 The Attempted Mediator

Iran is an ancient country located in the Middle East, and was known as Persia up until 1935. The country is slightly smaller than the U.S. state of Alaska with a population of 85,888,910 citizens. The vast majority of Iranians (90-95%) are Shia Muslims, with smaller populations of Sunnis, Zoroastrians, Christians, and Jews also residing within the country (CIA World Factbook, 2021). Ruled by the monarchic and despotic Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi up until 1979, the monarchy was toppled that year and an autocratic Islamic republic was declared. Although having some institutions which appear to be democratic, in reality the absolute power to have the final say on all state matters as well as acting as commander-in-chief of Iran's armed forces and security services is vested in the person who is Supreme Leader (Nalapat, 2009). According to the CIA World Factbook (2021):

> Conservative clerical forces led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini established a theocratic system of government with ultimate political authority vested in a learned religious scholar referred to commonly as the Supreme Leader…US-Iranian relations became strained when a group of Iranian students seized the US Embassy in Tehran in November 1979 and held embassy personnel hostages until mid-January 1981. The US cut off diplomatic relations with Iran in April 1980. During the period 1980-88, Iran fought a bloody, indecisive war with Iraq that eventually expanded into the Persian Gulf and led to clashes between US Navy and Iranian military forces. Iran has been designated a state sponsor of terrorism and was subject to US, UN, and EU economic sanctions and export controls because of its continued involvement in terrorism and concerns over possible military dimensions of its nuclear program until Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) Implementation Day in 2016. The US began gradually re-imposing sanctions on Iran after the US withdrawal from JCPOA in May 2018.

Although the Biden administration is reportedly pursuing a revival of the JCPOA with the Iranians as a means of keeping them from possessing a nuclear bomb, the future of the deal remains up for conjecture. Iran continues to be isolated for its support of the Syrian

government of Bashar al-Assad, Hezbollah, as well as the Houthi rebels in Yemen. The sanctioning of Iran continues to be practiced, as well as ongoing proxy wars between Iran and Saudi Arabia and a cold war between Iran and Israel.

6.5.3 Motivations to Mediate

Since the advent of the Arab Spring, Iran has attempted to utilize mediation as a means of staving off counter-revolutionary ideas and efforts as well as a tool of meddling in the domestic situation of various countries. Post-Arab Spring, Iran began to change tactics from those designed to facilitate expansionism to those which are conducive to the survival of the Iranian regime (Akpinar, 2015). After witnessing the toppling of leaders across North Africa and the Middle East as well as the civil war in Syria, Iran came to be known for its use of hard power tactics rather than utilizing soft power statecraft. As such, by attempting to mediate conflicts, Iran sought to cultivate a more stable geopolitical situation for itself. Iran has attempted to support and mediate in favor of other Shia parties in the region. Achieving a preferential regional configuration is one that is commonly thought to be a reason for mediation attempts by third- party states, as well as the supporting of a favored side in a conflict. As such, the motivations for Iranian mediation attempts are more in line with what is cited in conventional literature on the subject as opposed to the given examples of Qatar, China, and Libya, namely concerns involving regional security, religious affiliation, and national influence.

6.5.4 Mediation

As the war in Yemen raged, Iran offered to mediate the internationalized conflict in Yemen in April of 2015. However, the Iranian mediation effort failed as it was simply a nonstarter. The offer of Iranian mediation was rejected by Yemeni Foreign Minister Riad

Yassin, who noted that "Iran has become a major part of the Yemeni crisis and those who are a party to the crisis…cannot become mediators" (Akpinar, 2015). Support for the Shia Houthis led to the perception of Iran as a biased meddler, one who could not be trusted. The rejection and failure of the Iranian mediation effort was part of a pattern involving Iran's various mediation attempts in the region. During the course of the Arab Spring, Iran offered to mediate in Syria, Iraq, and Bahrain. However, all of these mediation efforts were rejected due to the unfavorable light which Iran was viewed with across the region and the globe because of its role in supporting the sides involved in the various conflicts at hand. Akpinar (2015) nicely summarized the situation by observing that "…Iran clearly lacked legitimacy as a mediator since it was perceived rather as a party to the conflicts it aimed to mediate…Similarly, Iran lacked an audience that was receptive to its mediator role…In all of the mediations it offered, its role was made unwelcome by at least one of the conflicting parties…It was perceived as a biased, partial mediator" (pg. 262).

In this regard, the Iranian efforts at mediation in the Yemeni conflict were doomed to failure from the start. I included Iran in my analysis because, similar to the cases of Libya, China, and Qatar, we see an example where an autocratic government offered to mediate an international conflict. Otherwise, though, there were important differences between these cases. For example, some of the control variables utilized during my quantitative analysis apply to the case of Iran. Iran has extensive previous economic and political ties to Yemen as well as numerous states in the Saudi-led coalition fighting there, and shares the same region of the globe with many of these states. As such, the causal mechanisms and motivations for Iran's offer to mediate appear to be different than the cases of China, Libya, and Qatar, demonstrating that although there is evidence to back up my theory, it is not able to fully

explain all cases of autocracies mediating international conflicts. However, in of itself the case of Iran is not sufficient enough to disprove my theory on mediation by autocracies, in light of the previous case studies on China, Libya, and Qatar.

6.6 Conclusion

This chapter discussed and analyzed five cases of offers of mediations in international conflicts by autocracies. In line with my theory that autocracies will be more likely to offer to mediate seemingly unrelated conflicts when subjected to negative scrutiny and/or condemnation by Qatar and Libya when they were being subjected to negative scrutiny lends support to my theory. The case of China, which mediated when it was under negative scrutiny but has not to this point been successful, lends support to my theory because China did improve its image and derived benefits from the mediation. However, because China still derived benefits even though they were not ultimately successful suggests that merely offering and/or attempting to mediate in a conflict may be enough for a state to improve its image and obtain benefits when enduring international scorn.

Unlike these three examples, the cases of Turkey's mediation effort and Iran's failed mediation offer are not ultimately supportive of my theory. It would appear that these mediation efforts were grounded in more traditionally understood motivations for third-party states to mediate in conflicts. However, these cases are not sufficient to discount the validity of my theory on autocratic mediation since the theory is not meant to completely scrap traditional reasoning for third-party state mediation. Instead, examining these latter cases is used to fill holes in the theories that cannot explain cases of autocratic mediation in seemingly unrelated conflicts to the mediating state.

The qualitative case studies analysis covered in this chapter also sought to supplement

my quantitative analysis by delving more in depth into different autocratic regime-types and their experiences involving mediation. Ultimately, this qualitative analysis uncovered evidence that when being subjected to international condemnation and scrutiny, autocracies are likely to offer to mediate international conflict.

CHAPTER 7: Conclusion

7.1 Review

Democratic states, understood as states in which candidates compete for political office through fair and frequent elections and where a large portion of the adult populace can vote (Frieden et al, 2016), are often seen to be most likely to act as mediators in violent conflicts, generating more and longer lasting peace agreements between disputants as opposed to their autocratic counterparts (Melin, 2013). In addition, they have been traditionally theorized as domestically more attracted to peace than autocracies, in that they veer towards opposition to conflict (for example, coherent democracies experience fewer civil wars than anocracies or autocracies), the valuing of human life and welfare above power, generating more peaceful leaders, and propounding human rights (Wright, 1942; Hegre et al, 2001). Further, democratic states are thought to be better at international cooperation as a whole (Gaubatz, 1996; Leeds, 1999; Martin, 2000; Mansfield et al, 2002; McGillivray, Smith, 2008; Mattes, Rodriguez, 2014). This stands opposed to autocratic regimes. These regime types can be understood as a political system where a small group of people or a single individual wields power with little constraints, competition, or political participation by the general populace (Frieden et al, 2016; Honig, 2019), and as mentioned are often known for abuses such as political imprisonment, repression, and torture (Frantz, Kendall-Taylor, 2014; Akpinar, 2015), which can lead to reputational costs to autocracies.

Interestingly, autocracies have in fact been found to not be less active in mediating the conflicts of other states when compared to their democratic counterparts (Bercovitch, Schneider, 2000), even in seemingly unrelated conflicts for the mediator. Current mediation literature proposes that states may mediate given such considerations as trade ties, former

colonial relationships, alliances, and direct geographic proximity (Crescenzi et al, 2011). Yet, examples such as former Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi's attempted peacemaking between Ethiopia and Eritrea, China's attempts at mediation between Israel and Palestine, Qatar's efforts at mediation between Djibouti and Eritrea, Saudi Arabia's efforts at mediating between Algeria and Morocco in Northwest Africa, and Turkey's mediation efforts between Afghanistan and Pakistan, autocratic governments which do not neatly fit this characterization continue to play a role in conflict mediation (Adebajo, 2011; Akpinar, 2015; Guner, 2015; Rieger, 2016; Chaziza, 2018a). It is puzzling why autocracies, which typically are not renowned for their human rights record or their observance of international norms related to human rights and are frequently inured in their own violent conflicts, would choose to take on the seemingly humanitarian role of peacemaker in the conflicts of other states in the absence of such things as (for example) a former colonial relationship or shared geographic proximity with them.

Thus, in this dissertation I focused on investigating how autocratic regimes play a part in the phenomenon of mediation in international conflict, attempting to fill the gap in the literature on mediation and different autocratic regime-types. I argued that autocracies will offer more often to mediate international conflicts when they are subjected to international scrutiny, sanctioning, and/or condemnation, as well as materially and immaterially benefitting from their efforts afterwards. I also posited that based on institutional attributes such as the presence of domestic audience costs, transparency, and a professional bureaucracy (such as is found in a party-based autocracy), or by contrast an all-powerful and unconstrained autocrat (such as is found in personalist regimes), different autocratic regime-types will be more likely to offer to mediate than others. I hypothesized that when being

condemned or sanctioned, party-based autocracies will offer mediation more frequently than other autocratic regime types, followed by military juntas, monarchies, and lastly personalists.

7.2 Sanctions, Condemnation, and Autocratic Mediation for Mediation

Unfortunately for the purpose of this analysis, nearly all of my quantitative results came Statistically insignificant. In many ways this is a plus, however. Although I'm unable to make many inferences based on my quantitative analysis, my results also did not undermine my hypotheses at all. In fact, the results that I did attain which were statistically significant were those stating that autocracies indeed were more likely to offer to mediate international conflicts when being confronted with sanctions. This has several implications for future research, and provides need insight into the different facades of various autocracies. For example, understanding the sensitivity to international economic consequences which Party-based autocracies seem to have not only allows them to potentially be more manageable through the court of public opinion, but also suggests that there are indeed important comparative differences in the behavior of autocracies, especially when the results were compared to how other autocracies performed at large when being confronted with sanctions. Clearly there is much to learn here, and the sensitivity which Party-based autocracies have to outside pressure is a boon not only for academia (which all too often seems to neglect investigating the comparative differences in autocratic behavior, conflict-related or otherwise), but also offers a valuable tool for affecting the behavior of many repressive states around the world while they are engaging in negative policy behavior (at least in the eyes of the beholder). The fact that many of my results came back inconclusive also opens the door for further analysis on this subject, since clearly there is a lot out there to learn if only we can figure out the means in

which to do so. For the purposes of my dissertation, I chose to do so by shifting into an in-depth cases studies analysis on a variety of autocratic regimes to fill in the gaps left over from my analysis.

7.3 Qualitative Analysis of Autocratic Mediation

In order to focus and contextualize my investigation into autocratic mediation, I shifted into qualitative analysis and used a least-similar case studies approach to explore whether international condemnation and sanctioning leads autocratic regimes to offer to mediate international conflicts and whether this will lead to increased rewards in the form of tangible benefits (such as foreign aid, trade, and investment) and intangible benefits (such as praise, acceptance, avoiding criticism, and the bestowing of legitimacy) being conferred upon the autocracy. In addition, I sought to delve deeper into the different experiences of different types of autocratic regimes with the offering of mediation. The use of process-tracing in the case studies approach I adopted for my qualitative analysis, a detailed examination of a portion of a historical episode to test historical explanations that may be generalizable to other events, was appropriate due to the high level of conceptual validity as well as the ability to model and explore complex causal relations in detail in relatively infrequent phenomena (a quality that can be missing from quantitative analysis) (George, Bennett, 2004; Bennett, Elman, 2007). The use of a least-similar case studies approach enabled me to identify interactions between variables, and helped create a chronological sequence of events that aided in the analysis of the phenomenon at hand (Sambanis, 2004). Indeed, examples of multiple types of autocratic regimes were found during my qualitative research which responded to international condemnation and sanctioning by offering to mediate international conflict. In line with my theory that autocracies will be more likely to offer to mediate seemingly unrelated conflicts

when subjected to negative scrutiny and/or condemnation so that they can improve their image and derive tangible and/or intangible rewards from it, the cases of the mediations of monarchic Qatar, communist China, as well as Libya under the erstwhile personalist military strongman Colonel Muammar Qadhafi when they were being subjected to negative scrutiny lends support to my theory. Ultimately, this qualitative analysis uncovered evidence that when being subjected to international condemnation and scrutiny, autocracies are likely to offer and succeed at international conflict mediation, as well as to benefit from it. This fills in crucial gaps, not only due to my lack of quantitative results which could prove definitive, but also demonstrates the unique workings of autocracies, how they are fundamentally different in their architecture and governing style, while at the same time establishing a clear habit of behavior when regarding mediation offers while they are experiencing autocratic condemnation and/or sanctioning. This teaches us how these governments can be manipulated to adopt a good neighborly approach to their fellow global citizens, as well as demonstrating their priorities and how they go about to achieve them. Much of the literature on regime-types seems to curiously omit discussing autocracies and their subtypes in the same way which more democratic states are feted, and thus creates not only a repository of background information on autocracies but fills in the gaps in current literature which seems to have a curious lack of insight into the comparative behavior of autocracies, and their behavior within such high stakes endeavors like war and peace, and "good" and "bad" policy behavior.

7.4 Limitations

As previously mentioned, because of the lack of statistical significance frequently found in my quantitative analyses on autocratic mediation, it may be perhaps beneficial to obtain more quantitative data and observations regarding the independent variables than what

was used in this dissertation. For example, the dataset used to capture international condemnation was the most appropriate one to use in this dissertation, however it only covered observations from 1976 to 2000 (amounting to thirty less years than the dataset on sanctioning). It is conceivable that this more modest mustering of observations led to problems achieving statistical significance. Fortunately, my qualitative results were able to help fill in this gap when it came to successfully completing analysis on this matter.

7.5 Suggestions for Future Research

The degree of the lack of evidence for or against mediation offers by autocracies as a group as well as for which ones stand where in relation to each other is frustrating, although it could be a function of a lack of updated data or a more thorough evaluation of past evidence which could increase the sample size. Rectifying this issue, although slow and steady work, would be worthwhile in rounding out the study of the responses of autocracies to punitive measures internationally as well as the comparative differences in autocratic regime-types. Similarly, collecting more quantitative data on international condemnation over a longer period than what is provided in the dataset used in this dissertation would be a way of supplementing my qualitative findings regarding condemnation, and autocratic mediation from a statistically significant quantitative standpoint. This would also require a significant amount of academic investment, and could yield many different routes of research on the subject once it has been completed. Lastly, investigating autocratic regimes and the outcome of their mediation attempts would be an excellent way to discern the important institutional and policymaking differences in these prolific and complicated regimes.

References

Adams, K. R. (2017). *The Causes of War*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Adebajo, A. (2011, August 26). *Gaddafi: The Man Who Would Be King of Africa.* Retrieved from: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/aug/26/gaddafi-legacy-meddling-africa

Akpinar, P. (2015). Mediation as a Foreign Policy Tool in the Arab Spring: Turkey, Qatar and Iran. *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, 17*(3), 252-268.

Amnesty International Report (1998). *Amnesty International Report 1998 – Libya*. Retrieved from https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a9f5e.html

Amnesty International Report (2009). *Amnesty International Report 2009: Qatar.* Retrieved from https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/48000/pol100012009en.pdf

Amnesty International Report (2017). *Amnesty International Report 2016/17*: *China*. Retrieved from https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/POL1048002017ENGLISH.PDF

Annan, K. (1999). Intervention. *Medicine, Conflict, and Survival, 15*(2), 115-125.

AP News (2021). *Timeline: Yemen War Began in 2014 When Houthis Seized Sanaa.*

Arabian Gulf Leaders Sign a Declaration Easing Tensions with Qatar (2021). Retrieved from https://www.cbsnews.com/video/arabian-gulf-leaders-sign-a-declaration-easing-tensions-with-qatar/

Bak, D. (2020). Autocratic Political Cycle and International Conflict. *Conflict Management and Peace Science, 37*(3), 259-279.

Bapat, N. A., and Morgan, T. C. (2009). Multilateral Versus Unilateral Sanctions Reconsidered: A Test Using New Data. *International Studies Quarterly, 53*, 1075-1094.

Bar-Tal, D., Salomon, G. (2006). *Israeli-Jewish Narratives of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Evolvement, Contents, Functions and Consequences.* In R. I. Rotberg's (editor) *Israeli and Palestinian Narratives of Conflict: History's Double Helix.* Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.

Barakat, S. (2014). *Qatari Mediation: Between Ambition and Achievement.* Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institutions.

Beber, B. (2012). International Mediation, Selection Effects, and the Question of Bias. *Conflict Management and Peace Science, 29*(4), 397-424.

Beech, H. (2016). *Donald Trump Talked a Lot About China at the Debate. Here's What China Thought About That.* Retrieved from https://time.com/4509121/china-presidential-debate-hillary-clinton-donald-trump/

Bercovitch, J. (1984). *Social Conflicts and Third Parties: Strategies of Conflict Resolution.* Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Bercovitch, J. (2000). *International Conflict Management 1945-1995.* Retrieved from https://www.canterbury.ac.nz/arts/research/bercovitch-data-centre/

Bercovitch, J. Houston, A. (1996). *The Study of International Mediation: Theoretical Issues and Empirical Evidence.* In Bercovitch's (editor) *Resolving International Conflicts: The Theory and Practice of Mediation*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Bercovitch, J., Schneider, G. (2000). Who Mediates? The Political Economy of International Conflict Management. *Journal of Peace Research, 37*(2), 145-165.

Bercovitch, J., Lee, S. (2003). Mediating International Conflicts: Examining the Effectiveness of Directive Strategies. *International Journal of Peace Studies, 8*(1), 1-17

Brandt, P. T., Mason, T. D., Gurses, M., Petrovsky, N., Radin, D. (2008). When and How the Fighting Stops: Explaining the Duration and Outcome of Civil Wars. *Defense and Peace Economics, 19*(6), 415-434.

Bukhari, I. (2020). *GCO Highlights Qatar's Past Mediation Efforts*. Retrieved from https://www.thepeninsulaqatar.com/article/13/09/2020/GCO-highlights-Qatar's-past-mediation-efforts

Bueno de Mesquita, B., Siverson, R. M. (1995). War and the Survival of Political Leaders: A Comparative Study of Regime Types and Political Accountability. *The American Political Science Review, 89*(4), 841-855.

Bueno de Mesquita, B., Morrow, J. D., Siverson, R., Smith, A. (1999). An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace. *American Political Science Review, 93*(4), 791-807.

Bueno de Mesquita, B., Smith, A., Morrow, J. D., Siverson, R. M. (2003). *The Logic of Political Survival*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Bueno de Mesquita, B., Morrow, J. D., Siverson, R., Smith, A. (2004). Testing Novel Implications from the Selectorate Theory of War. *World Politics, 56*(3), 363-388.

Burnell, P. (2006). Autocratic Opening to Democracy: Why Legitimacy Matters. *Third World Quarterly, 27*(4), 545-562.

Burnell, P. (2010). "Is There a New Autocracy Promotion?" FRIDE Working Paper No. 96. Retrieved from: https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/130597/WP96_Autocracy_ENG_mar10.pdf

Cameron, I. (2012, March 23). *International Sanctions*. Retrieved from http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo9780199796953/obo-9780199796953-0032.xml

Carnegie, A., Dolan, L. (2015). The Effects of Aid on Recipients' Reputations: Evidence from Natural Disaster Responses. Retrieved from: http://docs.aiddata.org/ad4/files/carnegiedolan_2015_aid_legitimacy.pdf

Carter, D. B., Goemans, H. E. (2011). The Making of the Territorial Order: New Borders and the Emergence of Interstate Conflict. *International Organization, 65*(2), 275-309.

Carter, D. B., Goemans, H. E. (2014). The Temporal Dynamics of New International Borders. *Conflict Management and Peace Science, 31*(3), 285-302.

Cassani, A. (2017). Social Services to Claim Legitimacy: Comparing Autocracies' Performance. *Contemporary Politics, 23*(3), 348-368.

Cassani, A., Tomini, L. (2019). Post-Cold War Autocratization: Trends and Patterns of Regime Change Opposite to Democratization. *Italian Political Science Review, 49,* 121-138.

Chan, S. (1997). In Search of Democratic Peace: Problems and Promise. *Mershon International Studies Review, 41*(1), 59-91.

Chayes, A., Chayes, A. H. (1993). On Compliance. *International Organization, 47*(2), 175-205.

Chaziza, M. (2018a). China's Mediation Efforts in the Middle East and North Africa: Constructive Conflict Management. *Strategic Analysis, 42*(1), 29-41.

Chaziza, M. (2018b). China's Approach to Mediation in the Middle East: Between Conflict Resolution and Conflict Management. *Middle East Institute.* Retrieved from https://www.mei.edu/publications/chinas-approach-mediation-middle-east-between-conflict-resolution-and-conflict

Chiozza, G., Goemans, H. E. (2004). International Conflict and the Tenure of Leaders: Is War Still *Ex Post* Inefficient? *American Journal of Political Science, 48*(3), 604-619.

CIA World Factbook (2020). *China*. Retrieved from https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/china/

CIA World Factbook (2020). *Libya.* Retrieved from https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/libya/

CIA World Factbook (2020). *Qatar.* Retrieved from https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/qatar/

CIA World Factbook (2021). *Turkey.* Retrieved from https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/turkey/#introduction

CIA World Factbook (2021). *Iran*. Retrieved from https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/iran/#introduction

Clauset, A. (2020). *On the Frequency and Severity of Interstate Wars.* In N. P. Gleditsch's (editor) *Lewis Fry Richardson: His Intellectual Legacy and Influence in the Social Sciences*. Cham, Switzerland: Springer.

Clausewitz, C. V. (1984). *On War.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Cole, W. M. (2015). Mind the Gap: State Capacity and the Implementation of Human Rights Treaties. *International Organization, 69*, 405-441.

Conrad, C. R., Conrad, J., Young, J. K. (2014). Tyrants and Terrorism: Why Some Autocrats Are Terrorized While Others Are Not. *International Studies Quarterly, 58*, 539-549.

Copeland, D. C. (1997). Do Reputations Matter? *Security Studies, 7*(1), 33-71.

Corntassel, J. (2007). Partnership in action? Indigenous Political Mobilization and Co-optation During the First UN Indigenous Decade (1995-2004). *Human Rights Quarterly, 29*(1), 137-166.

Cortright, D., Lopez, G. A. (2002). *Smart Sanctions: Targeting Economic Statecraft.* New York, NY: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

Crescenzi, M. J. C., Kadera, K. M., Mitchell, S. M., and Thyne, C. L. (2011). A Supply Side Theory of Mediation. *International Studies Quarterly, 55,* 1069-1094.

Crocker, C. A., Hampson, F. O., and Aall, P. (2005). *Grasping the Nettle: Analyzing Cases of Intractable Conflict.* New York, NY: United States Institute of Peace Press.

Davenport, C. (2007). State Repression and the Tyrannical Peace. *Journal of Peace Research, 44*(4), 485-504.

Dey, A. (2020). *Inter and Intra-State Conflicts.*

Drezner, D. W. (2011). Sanctions Sometimes Smart: Targeted Sanctions in Theory and Practice. *International Studies Review, 13,* 96-108.

Durham University (2010). *Djibouti and Eritrea Agree to Boundary Mediation with Qatar*.

"Eritrea and Ethiopia 'Agree Peace Deal'" (July 2nd, 1999). Retrieved from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/384637.stm

Escriba-Folch, A. (2013). Repression, Political Threats, and Survival Under Autocracy. *International Political Science Review, 34*(5), 543-560.

Etzioni, A. (1962). International Prestige, Competition and Peaceful Coexistence. *European Journal of Sociology, 3*(1), 21-41.

Farber, H. S., Gowa, J. (1997). Common Interests or Common Polities? Reinterpreting the Democratic Peace. *The Journal of Politics, 59*(2), 393-417.

Fearon, J. D. (1995). Rationalist Explanations for War. *International Organization, 49*(3), 379- 414.

Fjelde, H. (2010). Generals, Dictators, and Kings. *Conflict Management and Peace Science, 27*(3), 195-218.

"Foreign Relations of Libya Under Muammar Gaddafi" (2021). Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_relations_of_Libya_under_Muammar_Gaddafi

Frank, K. K. (2015). Ripeness and the 2008 Djibouti-Eritrea Border Dispute. *Northeast African Studies, 15*(1), 113-138.

Franklin, J. C. (2008). Shame on You: The Impact of Human Rights Criticism on Political Repression in Latin America. *International Studies Quarterly, 52*(1), 187-211.

Frantz, E. (2007). Tying the Dictator's Hands: Leadership Survival in Authoritarian Regimes. *SSRN Electronic Journal*, March 2007, 32 p.

Frantz, E., Kendall-Taylor, A. (2014). A Dictator's Toolkit: Understanding How Co-Optation Affects Repression in Autocracies. *Journal of Peace Research, 51*(3), 332-346.

Frazier, D. V., Dixon, W. J. (2006). Third-Party Intermediaries and Negotiated Settlements, 1946-2000. *International Interactions, 32*(4), 385-408).

Frieden, J. A., Lake, D. A., and Schultz, K. A. (2016). *World Politics, 3rd Edition.* New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company.

"Gaddafi Talks Peace with Ethiopian PM" (July 10th, 1999). Retrieved from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/390955.stm

Gallagher, M. E., Hanson, J. K. (2015). Power Tool or Dull Blade?: Selectorate Theory for Autocracies. *Annual Review of Political Science, 18*(1), 367-385.

Gandhi, J. (2008). *Political Institutions Under Dictatorship*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Gandhi, J., Przeworski, A. (2006). Cooperation, Cooptation, and Rebellion Under Dictatorships. *Economics & Politics, 18*(1), 1-26.

Gandhi, J., Przeworski, A. (2007). Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats. *Comparative Political Studies, 40*(11), 1279-1301.

Garnham, D. (1986). War-Proneness, War-Weariness, and Regime Type: 1816-1980. *Journal of Peace Research, 23*(3), 279-289.

Gartner, S. S. (2014). *Third-Party Mediation of Interstate Conflicts: Actors, Strategies, Selection, and Bias.* Retrieved from https://elibrary.law.psu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1063&context=arbitrationlawreview

Gat, A. (2009). So Why Do People Fight? Evolutionary Theory and the Causes of War. *European Journal of International Relations, 15*(4), 571-599.

Gates, S., Hegre, H., Jones, M. P., Strand, H. (2000). *Institutional Inconsistency and Political Instability: Persistence and Change in Political Systems Revisited, 1800-1998*. Presented at the annual meeting of American Political Science Association, Washington, DC.

Gaubatz, K. T. (1996). Democratic States and Commitment in International Relations. *International Organization, 50*(1), 109-139.

Geddes, B. (1999). Authoritarian Breakdown: Empirical Test of a Game Theoretic Argument. Paper prepared for the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association. Retrieved from http://www.uvm/edu/~cbeer/geddes/Geddes.html

Geddes, B. (2003). *Paradigms and Sand Castles*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

Geddes, B., Wright, J. Frantz, E. (2014). Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: A New Data Set. *Perspectives on Politics, 12*(2), 313-331.

Gibler, D. M. (2009). *International Military Alliances, 1648-2008*. Congressional Quarterly Press. ISBN: 978-1-56802-824-8.

Global Conflict Tracker (2020). *Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*.

Global Conflict Tracker (2021). *War in Yemen*. Retrieved from https://microsites-live-backend.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/war-yemen

Goldsmith, B. E., Chalup, S. K., Quinian, M. J. (2008). Regime Type and International Conflict: Towards a General Model. *Journal of Peace Research, 45*(6), 743-763.

Guisinger, A., Smith, A. (2002). Honest Threats: The Interaction of Reputation and Political Institutions in International Crises. *Journal of Conflict Resolution, 46*(2), 175-200.

Guner, R. (2015). *Turkey's Mediation Initiatives Between 2002 and 2015: A Discourse and Content Analysis* [Master's Thesis, Middle East Technical University].

Gurr, T. R. (1974). Persistence and Change in Political Systems, 1800-1971. *American Political Science Review, 68*(4), 1482-1504.

Hagan, J. D. (1994). Domestic Political Systems and War Proneness. *Mershon International Studies Review, 38*(2), 183-207.

Hagan, J. D. (2010). *Regime Type, Foreign Policy, and International Relations.* In Robert A. Denmark's (editor) *The International Studies Encyclopedia (Vol. IX)*. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.

Hamilton, K. (2000). Beyond the Border War: The Ethio-Eritrean Conflict and International Mediation Efforts. *Journal of Public & International Affairs, 11,* 113-136.

Harvey, F., Mitton, J. (2016). *Fighting for Credibility: US Reputation and International Politics*. Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto Press.

Haushofer, J., Biletzki, A., Kanwisher, N. (2010). Both Sides Retaliate in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America.* Retrieved from https://www.pnas.org/content/pnas/107/42/17927.full.pdf

Hegre, H., Ellingsen, T., Gates, S., Gleditsch, N. P. (2001). Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816-1992. *The American Political Science Review, 95*(1), 33-48.

Herb, M. (1999). *All in the Family: Absolutism, Revolution, and Democracy in the Middle Eastern Monarchies.* Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.

Hermann, M. G., Kegley, C. W. (1995). Rethinking Democracy and International Peace: Perspectives from Political Psychology. *International Studies Quarterly, 39*, 511-534.

Honig, J. A. S. (2019). Of Democracies, Dictatorships, and Resource Deposits: A Time-Series Analysis of Third-Party State Military Interventions in Civil Wars. *Journal of Global Peace and Conflict, 7*(2), 1-10.

Horowitz, M., McDermott, R., Stam, A. C. (2005). Leader Age, Regime Type, and Violent International Relations. *Journal of Conflict Resolution, 49*(5), 661-685.

Huliaras, A. (2001). Qadhafi's Comeback: Libya and Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s. *African Affairs, 100*(398). 5-25.

Human Rights Watch (1997). *Human Rights Watch World Report 1998*. Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/news/1997/12/03/human-rights-watch-world-report-1998

Human Rights Watch (2016). *China: Events of 2015.*

Human Rights Watch (2017). *China: Events of 2016.*

Joachim, J., Reinalda, B., and Verbeek, B. (2008). *International Organizations and Implementation: Enforcers, Managers, Authorities?* New York, NY: Routledge.

Kamrava, M. (2011). Mediation and Qatari Foreign Policy. *Middle East Journal, 65*(4), 539-556.

Kendall-Taylor, A., Frantz, E. (2014). Mimicking Democracy to Prolong Autocracies. *The Washington Quarterly, 37*(4), 71-84.

Khatib, L. (2013). Qatar's Foreign Policy: The Limits of Pragmatism. *International Affairs, 89*(2), 417-431.

King, G., Tomz, M., Wittenberg, J. (2000). Making the Most of Statistical Analyses: Improving Interpretation and Presentation. *American Journal of Political Science, 44*(2), 347-361

Kohl, T., Brakman, S., Garretsen, H. (2013). Do Trade Agreements Stimulate International Trade Differently? Evidence from 296 Trade Agreements. CESifo Working Paper, No. 4243, Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich.

Kokkonen, A., Sundell, A. (2014). Delivering Stability—Primogeniture and Autocratic Survival in European Monarchies 1000-1800. *The American Political Science Review, 108*(2), 438-453.

Krain, M. (2012). J'accuse! Does Naming and Shaming Perpetrators Reduce the Severity of Genocides or Politicides? *International Studies Quarterly, 56*(3), 574-589.

Kutner, M. H., Nachtsheim, C. J., Neter, J. (2004). *Applied Linear Regression Models.* Blacklick, OH: McGraw-Hill Education.

Kydd, A. (2003). Which Side Are You On? Bias, Credibility, and Mediation. *American Journal of Political Science, 47*(4), 597-611.

Lai, B., Slater, D. (2006). Institutions of the Offensive: Domestic Sources of Dispute Initiation in Authoritarian Regimes, 1950-1992. *American Journal of Political Science, 50*(1), 113-126.

Large, D. (2008). China's Role in the Mediation and Resolution of Conflict in Africa. *Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue.* Retrieved from https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/90798/China_Mediation_06_08.pdf

Lawson, S. (1993). Conceptual Issues in the Comparative Study of Regime Change and Democratization. *Comparative Politics, 25*(2), 183-205.

Lebovic, J. H., Voeten, E. (2006). The Politics of Shame: The Condemnation of Country Human Rights Practices in the UNCHR. *International Studies Quarterly, 50,* 861-888.

Leeds, B. A. (1999). Domestic Political Institutions, Credible Commitments, and International Cooperation. *American Journal of Political Science, 43*(3), 979-1002.

Leeds, B. A., Davis, D. R. (1999). Beneath the Surface: Regime Type and International Interaction, 1953-78. *Journal of Peace Research, 36*(1), 5-21.

Legarda, H., Hoffman, M. L. (2018). China as a Conflict Mediator: Maintaining Stability Along the Belt and Road. *The International Institute for Strategic Studies.* Retrieved from https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2018/08/china-conflict-mediation-belt-and-road

Levy, J. S. (1998). The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace. *Annual Review of Political Science*, *1,* 139-165.

Li, J. (2019). Conflict Mediation with Chinese Characteristics: How China Justifies its Non-Interference Policy as an Arbitrator. *The Stimson Center*.

"Libya, Qadhafi, and the African Union" (February 28th, 2021).

"Little Progress at Horn Peace Talks" (July 11th, 1999). Retrieved from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/391302.stm

Lupton, D. L. (2018a). Reexamining Reputation for Resolve: Leaders, States, and the Onset of International Crises. *Journal of Global Security Studies, 3*(2), 198-216.

Lupton, D. L. (2018b). Signaling Resolve: Leaders, Reputations, and the Importance of Early Interactions. *International Interactions, 44*(1), 59-87.

Lupton, D. L. (2020). *Reputation for Resolve: How Leaders Signal Determination in International Politics.* London, UK: Cornell University Press.

Magaloni, B., Chu, J., Min, E. (2013). *Autocracies of the World, 1950-2012 (Version 1.0).* Dataset, Stanford University.

Malone, B. (February 14th, 2009). *Ethiopia Welcomes Gaddafi Intervention on Eritrea.* Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/ozatp-ethiopia-eritrea-20090214-idAFJOE51D05120090214

"Mandela Welcomes 'Brother Leader' Gaddafi" (June 13th, 1999).

Mansfield, E. D., Milner, H. V., Rosendorff, B. P. (2002). Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements. *International Organization, 56*(3), 477- 513.

Maoz, Z., Abdolali, N. (1989). Regime Types and International Conflict, 1816-1976. *Journal of Conflict Resolution, 33*, 3-35.

Marin, A. (2015). *Dictatorial Peace? Comparing the Conflict-Proneness of Authoritarian Regimes in Post-Soviet Eurasia: A Research Agenda.*

Martin, L. L. (2000). *Democratic Commitments: Legislatures and International Cooperation*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Mattes, M. Rodriguez, M. (2014). Autocracies and International Cooperation. *International Studies Quarterly, 58,* 527-538.

McGillivray, F., Smith, A. (2000). Trust and Cooperation Through Agent-Specific Punishments. *International Organization, 54*(4), 809-824.

McGillivray, F., Smith, A. (2006). Credibility in Compliance and Punishment: Leader Specific Punishments and Credibility. *Journal of Politics, 68*(2), 248-258.

McGillivray, F., Smith, A. (2008). *Punishing the Prince: A Theory of Interstate Relations, Political Institutions, and Leader Change.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

McLaren, L., Cop, B. (2011). The Failure of Democracy in Turkey: A Comparative Analysis. *Government and Opposition, 46*(4), 485-516.

Melin, M. M. (2013). When States Mediate. *Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs, 2*(1), 78-90.

Mercer, J. (1996). *Reputation and International Politics*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Mercer, J. (1997). Reputation and Rational Deterrence Theory. *Security Studies, 7*(1), 100-113.

Mercer, J. (2017). The Illusion of International Prestige. *International Security, 41*(4), 133-168.

Miller, G. (2003). Hypotheses on Reputation: Alliance Choices and the Shadow of the Past. *Security Studies, 12*(3), 40-78.

Mitchell, S. M. (2002). A Kantian System? Democracy and Third-Party Conflict Resolution. *American Journal of Political Science, 46*(4), 749-759.

Mitchell, S. M., Kadera, K. M., Crescenzi, M. J. C. (2009). *Practicing Democratic Community Norms: Third Party Conflict Management and Successful Settlements*. In Bercovitch and Gartner's (editors) *International Conflict Mediation: New Approaches and Findings.* New York, NY: Routledge.

Mitchell, S. M., Powell, E. J. (2009). Legal Systems and Variance in the Design of Commitments to the International Court of Justice. *Conflict Management and Peace Science, 26*(2), 164-190.

Montgomery, M. (2021). *A Timeline of the Yemen Crisis, From the 1990s to the Present.*

Moore, B. (1966). *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant Making in the Modern World.* Boston, MA: Beacon

Moravcsik, A. (1997). Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics. *International Organization, 51*(4), 513-553.

Morgenthau, H. J. (1955). *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.

Morris, B. (2008). *1948: A History of the First Arab-Israeli War*. London, UK: Yale University Press.

Munroe, T., Shepherd, C. (2017). *Trump Heaps Praise on 'Very Special' Xi in China Visit.* Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/instant-article/idUSKBN1D91C8?edition-redirect=in

Nalapat, M. D. (2009). *Iran's Long Slide Back to Absolute Rule.*

Nalebuff, B (1991). Rational Deterrence in an Imperfect World. *World Politics, 43*(3), 313-335.

Nedopil, C. (2021). "Countries of the Belt and Road Initiative"; Beijing, IIGF Green BRI Center, https://green-bri.org/countries-of-the-belt-and-road-initiative-bri/

Nordlinger, E. A. (1977). *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Government*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Oneal, J. R., Ray, J. L. (1996). *New Tests of the Democratic Peace: Controlling for Economic Interdependence, 1950-1985*. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, San Diego, CA.

Oneal, J. R., Russett, B. M. (1996). *Exploring the Liberal Peace: Interdependence, Democracy, and Conflict, 1950-85.* Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, San Diego, CA.

Owsiak, A. P. (2012). Signing Up for Peace: International Boundary Agreements, Democracy, and Militarized Interstate Disputes. *International Studies Quarterly, 56*(1), 51-66.

Owsiak, A. P., Rider, T. J. (2013). Clearing the Hurdle: Border Settlement and Rivalry Termination. *Journal of Politics, 75*(3), 757-772.

Payton, M. E., Greenstone, M. H., Schenker, N. (2003). Overlapping Confidence Intervals or Standard Error Intervals: What Do They Mean in Terms of Statistical Significance? *Journal of Insect Science, 3*(34), 1-6.

Peceny, M., Beer, C. C., Sanchez-Terry, S. (2002). Dictatorial Peace? *American Political Science Review, 96*(1), 15-26.

Peterson, S. (September 21st, 1999). *Qaddafi's New Role: Peacemaker.* Retrieved from https://www.csmonitor.com/1999/0921/p6s1.html

Peterson, T. M. (2013). Sending a Message: The Reputation Effect of US Sanction Threat Behavior. *International Studies Quarterly, 57*(4), 672-682.

Peterson, T., Drury, A. C. (2011). Sanctioning Violence: The Effect of Economic Coercion on Third-Party Conflict. *Journal of Conflict Resolution, 55*(4), 580-605.

Reed, W. (2002). Selection Effects and World Politics Research. *International Interactions, 28*(1), 1-3.

Reiter, D. (2012). Democratic Peace Theories. *Oxford Bibliographies.*

Rieger, R. (2016). *Saudi Arabian Foreign Relations: Diplomacy and Mediation in Conflict Resolution.* Oxfordshire, UK: Routledge.

Rowland, E. V. (2021). *Who Mediates Matters: The Impact of Individual Mediator Competency Skills on International and Civil Conflict Mediation*. [Doctoral dissertation, University of Tennessee].

Sartori, A. (2005). *Deterrence by Diplomacy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Schelling, T. C. (1966). *Arms and Influence*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Schenoni, L. L., Goertz, G., Owsiak, A. P., Diehl, P. F. (2020). Settling Resistant Territorial Disputes: The Territorial Boundary Peace in Latin America. *International Studies Quarterly, 64*, 57-70.

Schneider, V. (2000). *The Global Social Capital of Human Rights Movements: A Case Study on Amnesty International.* In Ronit and Schneider's (editors) *Private Organizations in Global Politics*. London, UK: Routledge.

Schramm, M. V. (2019). *Making Meaning and Making Monsters: Democracies, Personalist Regimes and International Conflict*. [Doctoral Dissertation, Georgetown University, Washington D. C.]. ProQuest Dissertations Publishing.

Sechser, T. (2018). Reputations and Signaling in Coercive Bargaining. *Journal of Conflict Resolution, 62*(2), 318-345.

Security Council Meetings Coverage (2010). *Under-Secretary-General, Briefing Security Council, Commends Recent Steps by Eritrea, Djibouti to Negotiate Settlement of 2008 Border Dispute.* New York, NY: UNSC.

Security Council Press Release (2010). *Security Council Press Statement on Mediation Efforts by Qatar to Resolve Djibouti-Eritrea Border Dispute.* New York, NY: UNSC.

Shaban, A. R. A. (2017). *Eritrea Insists on Qatari Mediation in Territorial Dispute with Djibouti.*

Shukun, Z. (2018). *UN Praises China's Progress in Human Rights.*

Shulman, D. (2008). *Regime Strategy and Foreign Policy in Autocracies: Egypt, Jordan, and Syria in the Gulf Wars.* PhD Dissertation, Yale University, New Haven, CT.

Siaroff, A. (2011). *Regime (Comparative Politics).* In Bertrand Badie, Dirk Berg-Schlosser, and Leonardo Morlino's (editors) *International Encyclopedia of Political Science.* Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications Inc.

Signorino, C. (2002). Strategy and Selection in International Relations. *International Interactions, 28*(1), 93-115.

Simmons, B. A. (2005). Rules Over Real Estate: Trade, Territorial Conflict, and International Borders as Institutions. *Journal of Conflict Resolution, 49*(6), 823-848.

Simmons, B. A., Hopkins, D. J. (2005). The Constraining Power of International Treaties: Theory and Methods. *American Political Science Review, 99*(4), 623-631.

Stigant, S., Phelan, M. V. (2019). A Year After the Ethiopia-Eritrea Peace Deal, What is the Impact? *United States Institute of Peace*. Retrieved from https://www.usip.org/publications/2019/08/year-after-ethiopia-eritrea-peace-deal-what-impact

Sun, D., Zoubir, Y. (2018). China's Participation in Conflict Resolution in the Middle East and North Africa: A Case of Quasi-Mediation Diplomacy? *Journal of Contemporary China, 27*(110), 224-243.

Svolik, M. (2009). Power Sharing and Leadership Dynamics in Authoritarian Regimes. *American Journal of Political Science, 53*(3), 477-494.

The Correlates of War Project (2020). *Militarized Interstate Disputes.* Retrieved from https://correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/MIDs

Thies, C. G. (2009). *Role Theory and Foreign Policy*. International Studies Association Compendium Project, Foreign Policy Analysis Section. Retrieved from http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.467.8733&rep=rep1&type=pdf

Tullock, G. (1987). *Autocracy*. Dordrecht, Holland: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

U.S. Department of State (1998). *Libya Report on Human Rights Practices for 1997*. Retrieved from https://1997-2001.state.gov/global/human_rights/1998_hrp_report/libya.html

U.S. Department of State (2009). *Qatar: 2008 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.* Retrieved from https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/nea/119125.htm

U.S. Department of State (2017). *2016 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau).*

U.S. Department of State (2020). *2019 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau).*

Van Vugt, M., Roberts, G., Hardy, C. (2007). Competitive Altruism: Development of Reputation-Based Cooperation in Groups. In R. Dunbar and L. Barret (editors) *Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology* (pgs. 531-540). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Walter, B. (2006). Building Reputation: Why Governments Fight Some Separatists but Not Others. *American Journal of Political Science, 50*(2), 313-330.

Weeks, J. L. P. (2008). Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve. *International Organization, 62*(1), 35-64.

Weeks, J. L. P. (2014). *Dictators at War and Peace.* Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Weisiger, A., Yarhi-Milo, K. (2015). Revisiting Reputation: How Past Actions Matter in International Politics. *International Organization, 69*(2), 473-495.

Wiegand, K. E. (2019). Peaceful Dispute Resolution by Authoritarian Regimes. *Foreign Policy Analysis, 0,* 1-19.

Wilson, B. (2016). *Trump Accuses China of "Raping" US with Unfair Trade Policy*. Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/election-us-2016-36185012

Wooldridge, J. M. (2006). *Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach, 3rd Edition.* Mason, OH: Thomson South-Western.

Wright, Q. (1942). *A Study of War.* Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Wu, X., Qian, C. (2010). Culture of China's Mediation in regional and international Affairs. *Belfer Center.*

Zenelaj, R., Beriker, N., Hatipoglu, E. (2015). Determinants of Mediation Success in Post-Conflict Bosnia: A Focused Comparison. *Australian Journal of International Affairs, 69*(4), 414- 437.

Vita

Jonathan Andrew Stewart Honig is originally from Southern California. He graduated from Middle Tennessee State University with a BA in Business Administration in 2012 and a MSc in Media and Communication in 2017. He served as a Graduate Teaching Assistant at Middle Tennessee State University for two years before beginning a PhD in Political Science at the University of Tennessee in 2017, where he also earned a Graduate Certificate in Global Security Studies in 2020 and an MPPA in Public Policy and Administration in 2021. His research interests include militarized conflict, conflict mediation, autocracies, human rights, and foreign policy. Currently, he is a Graduate Teaching Associate and the International Student Liaison for the Political Science Department's graduate students at the Knoxville campus of the University of Tennessee.