WestVirginiaUniversity
THE RESEARCH REPOSITORY @ WVU

Graduate Theses, Dissertations, and Problem Reports

2022

A Shock to the System: Analyzing Ethnocentric Populist Support Before and After Crises

Kyu Chul Shin
kyshin@mix.wvu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/etd

Part of the American Politics Commons, and the Comparative Politics Commons

Recommended Citation

Shin, Kyu Chul, "A Shock to the System: Analyzing Ethnocentric Populist Support Before and After Crises" (2022). *Graduate Theses, Dissertations, and Problem Reports*. 11320.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/etd/11320

This Dissertation is protected by copyright and/or related rights. It has been brought to you by the The Research Repository @ WVU with permission from the rights-holder(s). You are free to use this Dissertation in any way that is permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you must obtain permission from the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by a Creative Commons license in the record and/ or on the work itself. This Dissertation has been accepted for inclusion in WVU Graduate Theses, Dissertations, and Problem Reports collection by an authorized administrator of The Research Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact researchrepository@mail.wvu.edu.

A Shock to the System: Analyzing Ethnocentric Populist Support Before and After Crises

Kyu Chul Shin

Dissertation submitted to the Eberly College of Arts and Sciences at West Virginia University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctorate of Philosophy in Political Science

Erik S. Herron, Ph.D., Chair

Matthew L. Jacobsmeier, Ph.D.

Mason W. Moseley, Ph.D.

William I. Brustein, Ph.D.

Department of Political Science

Morgantown, West Virginia

2022

Keywords: Ethnocentrism, Party, Populism, Right-Wing Populism, Trump, Voting, Western Europe

Copyright 2022 Kyu Chul Shin

Abstract

A Shock to the System: Analyzing Ethnocentric Populist Support Before and After Crises

Kyu Chul Shin

Using the question of what is driving the support for populists in the mid-late 2010s in Western Europe and the United States as the starting point, this dissertation attempts to answer a number of different questions related to populists: Were the reasons behind support for populists in countries that saw an increase in support for populisms similar to those that saw a decrease in support? Are the reasons for supporting right-wing populists different from more general ethnocentric populists? Are the reasons that Americans supported Donald Trump similar or different from the reasons behind support for Western European populists? Following migration-related crises in the 2014-2015 time period, many parts of Western Europe and the United States saw an increase in electoral support for populist actors. This dissertation argues that the activation of status threat, or the perception that a dominant social and/or ethnic group's position is being threatened by an influx of newcomers, along with ingroup salience and outgroup bias, are key factors that helped increase electoral support for populist actors. The results provide a complicated picture on the state of populism in Western Europe and the United States; while there is evidence of a growth in outgroup bias in Western Europe, this is not the case in the United States. However, there is evidence of a convergence between Trump supporting Republicans and Western European populists.

Acknowledgements

I would have never reached this step in my life without the many different people who have supported me unconditionally. My parents, Hyun Wook Shin (who also goes by Andy) and Yoon Jung Hyun have also supported my professional goals and have stood by me. My brother from another mother, Anthony J. Mollica, has been very understanding and supportive since I told him I would embark for graduate school. My advisor and chair, Dr. Erik Herron, who was also among the first faculty members I had the pleasure of meeting all the way back in 2015, has been very, very patient despite the many mistakes I have made over the course of writing this dissertation. Dr. Matthew Jacobsmeier, the graduate director, has always answered my many questions and gave me the background knowledge needed to add the American analysis for this dissertation and run the analysis. Dr. Mason Moseley, the first professor I worked for as a research assistant, has also been extremely patient despite my many mistakes and taught me so many of the skills related to research and publication that I hope to take with me through my professional career. Dr. William Brustein provided important insights related to previous research and I am deeply thankful that he was willing to serve as an outside committee member despite his many obligations. I also need to thank the other professors I had at WVU, including Dr. Matt Wilson who is no longer at WVU, who also helped me get to this stage. My undergraduate advisor, Dr. Rebecca Evans, was critical in helping me get into graduate school. I also would be remiss to not thank my colleagues at Rhodes College, where I was employed while making corrections, for their support while I was finishing up. I am also deeply thankful to all of my WVU graduate student colleagues, both in and outside the department, especially but not limited to, Ali Ahsan, Liza Gordon, Joshua Huffman, Michael Jones, Tyler Mentzer (who taught me you can be a professional graduate student without sacrificing your personal passions), Maxwell Nimako, Bryan Sell, Trevor Semaha, Joshua Squires, Abdul Wahid Uqaily, Adam AlRowaiti, Haley Wahl (in physics), and many others. Without them, graduate school would have been just a little less fun.

Table of Contents

Chapter 1: A Shock to the System ... 1

Introduction: A Populist Powder Keg? ... 1

2014-2015: Immigration Crises and Increases in Support for Ethnocentric Populists ... 4

On Europe ... 5

On the United States ... 10

Plan of the Dissertation ... 14

Chapter 2: Previous Scholarship and the Issue of Conceptualization ... 20

Introduction ... 20

Introduction to Previous Scholarship ... 20

Party Categorization ... 23

On Left and Right ... 27

On Left and Right: Economics ... 27

On Left and Right: Social ... 29

On Ideology ... 32

Discussion of Populism ... 33

On Left and Right-Wing Populism ... 35

Introduction to the Theory ... 38

Theory for This Dissertation ... 39

Alternative Theories ... 47

Economic Anxiety, Euroskepticism, and Immigration ... 50

Conclusion ... 54

Chapter 3: The Research Design ... 55

Introduction ... 55

Case Selection by Other Scholars ... 55

Country Case Selection ... 61

On the Decision to Include the United States ... 66

Discussion of the Time Period ... 68

Discussion on Populism and Left-Right Classification ... 69

The Dichotomous vs. Continuous Debate ... 70

Use of Manifestos and Party Documents ... 71

Individual-Level Survey Data ... 74
On Cutoffs ... 75
On Left and Right ... 77
On Expert Surveys ... 77
On Mass Surveys ... 78
On The Use of Manifestos ... 79
The Classification Plan for this Project ... 84
The Manifesto Project ... 85
Selection Process for Ethnocentric Populism Scores ... 88
Selection Process for Left-Right Scores ... 93
Dependent Variable Creation ... 96
Criteria for Party Support Data ... 98
The European Social Survey (ESS) ... 98
The American National Election Study (ANES) ... 100
Analysis: European Social Survey (ESS) and American National Election Study (ANES) ... 102
Conclusion ... 104
Chapter 4: Party Placement Analysis ... 107
Introduction ... 107
Creation of Ethnocentric Populist and Right-wing Populist List ... 113
Regional and In-Country Party Placement Analysis ... 114
Regional Party Placement Analysis ... 116
United Kingdom ... 120
Electoral System ... 120
Disillusionment and Party Attachment ... 120
Movement to Center ... 121
Hardline Immigration Policy Acceptance ... 122
France ... 124
Electoral System ... 124
Disillusionment and Party Attachment ... 125
Movement to Center ... 126
Hardline Immigration Policy Acceptance ... 126
Germany ... 129

Electoral System ... 129
Disillusionment and Party Attachment ... 130
Movement to Center ... 130
Hardline Immigration Policy Acceptance ... 131
Italy ... 134
Electoral System ... 134
Disillusionment and Party Attachment ... 135
Movement to Center ... 136
Hardline Immigration Policy Acceptance ... 136
Netherlands ... 139
Electoral System ... 139
Disillusionment and Party Attachment ... 139
Movement to Center ... 140
Hardline Immigration Policy Acceptance ... 140
Sweden ... 143
Electoral System ... 143
Disillusionment and Party Attachment ... 144
Movement to Center ... 144
Hardline Immigration Policy Acceptance ... 145
Austria ... 148
Electoral System ... 148
Disillusionment and Party Attachment ... 148
Movement to Center ... 148
Hardline Immigration Policy Acceptance ... 149
Switzerland ... 152
Electoral System ... 152
Disillusionment and Party Attachment ... 152
Movement to Center ... 153
Hardline Immigration Policy Acceptance ... 153
Denmark ... 156
Electoral System ... 156
Disillusionment and Party Attachment ... 156

Movement to Center ... 157
Hardline Immigration Policy Acceptance ... 157
The Four Countries Where Support Declined ... 159
Belgium ... 159
Electoral System ... 159
Disillusionment and Party Attachment ... 160
Movement to Center ... 160
Hardline Immigration Policy Acceptance ... 161
Finland ... 164
Electoral System ... 164
Disillusionment and Party Attachment ... 164
Hardline Immigration Policy Acceptance ... 165
Greece ... 167
Electoral System ... 167
Disillusionment and Party Attachment ... 168
Movement to Center ... 168
Hardline Immigration Policy Acceptance ... 169
Norway ... 171
Electoral System ... 171
Disillusionment and Party Attachment ... 172
Movement to Center ... 173
Hardline Immigration Policy Acceptance ... 173
United States ... 175
Electoral System ... 175
Disillusionment and Party Attachment ... 175
Movement to Center ... 176
Hardline Immigration Policy Acceptance ... 176
Conclusion ... 179
Chapter 5: Western Europe Analysis ... 182
Introduction ... 182
Preliminary Examination of Populist Data in Western Europe ... 182
Connecting the Theoretical Framework to the ESS Variables ... 186

Analysis 193
Difference of Means Tests 194
Difference of Means Tests (Ethnocentric Populist Parties vs. Non-Ethnocentric Populist Parties) 195
Difference of Means Tests (General Ethnocentric Populist Parties vs. Right-wing Populist) ... 207
Logistic Regression 208
Logistic Regression Analysis Results, Countries that Saw a Rise in Support 211
Logistic Regression Analysis Results, Countries that Saw a Decline in Support 215
Logistic Regression Analysis Results, Dependent Variable: Right-wing Populist 220
Conclusion 223
Chapter 6: United States Analysis 224
Introduction 224
Populism in the United States 224
On Trump's Rhetoric and Ethnocentric Populism 228
Scholarship on Support for Trump 230
Finding Variables: Congruous ESS Variables in the ANES 234
Analysis 244
Difference of Means Tests 244
Logistic Regression Analysis Results 256
Conclusion 260
Chapter 7: Conclusion: Beyond a Shock to the System 262
Introduction 262
The Contribution: On the Research Side and Substantive Real-World Implications 264
Future Avenues for Research 266
Experiments 267
On Ethnocentrism Driving Voters Away 268
Conclusion 273
Appendix 275
Appendix 1: Ethnocentric Populist Calculations 275
Appendix 2: Left-Right Calculations 278
Work Cited 282

Chapter 1: A Shock to the System

Introduction: A Populist Powder Keg?

Populist political actors have been a part of the Western political scene for many decades with some of the parties, such as the National Front/Rally in France, having operated for many decades (Judis 2016). While some populist political actors experienced success, such as the Freedom Party of Austria securing a place in a coalition government after 1999 legislative elections (McGann and Kitschelt 2005), electoral success was often isolated to a single country. However, something unusual occurred in the late 2010s. Like a fuse detonating multiple consecutive charges, populist party after populist party enjoyed increased vote shares. In September 2014, the Sweden Democrats won parliamentary seats for the first time (Aylott and Bolin 2015). In June 2015, the United Kingdom Independence Party earned over 12 percent of the vote cast that election (Cutts et al. 2017). A month later the Danish People's Party won over 21 percent of the votes cast in an election that saw the party become the second largest in the country (Kosiara-Pedersen 2016). Later that year, the Swiss People's party won 29.4 percent of all votes cast for the lower house; this was the highest percentage earned in the party's history up to that point (Bernhard 2016). The powder keg did not stop going off in 2015. The next year, in the 2016 United States presidential election, a populist presidential candidate, Donald Trump, secured victory (Judis 2016).

This surge continued. In May 2017, the National Front of France won a place in the second round of presidential elections and secured the party's best performance in history with 33 percent in the second-round vote (Ivaldi 2018). In September 2017, during the German Federal Election, the Alternative for Germany, which did not win five percent of the vote during the 2013 election, secured its historic record of 13 percent of the votes (Hansen and Olsen 2019)

and became the first populist party to enter the German parliament (Bundestag) since the end of the Second World War (Siri 2018).

Populist momentum continued in 2017. In March 2018, the Northern League of Italy secured a plurality of the seats in the lower house of the Italian legislature (D'Alimonte 2019). In September 2018, the Sweden Democrats again enjoyed an increase in support and earned over 17.5 percent of the vote (Aylott and Bolin 2019).

The big finale occurred in Spain. While in Germany populist actors tended to win seats at the regional level, such as the Republicans during the 1980s (Art 2007), this was not the case in Spain. In December 2018, the regional legislative elections held in Andalusia saw the populist Vox Party, which previously failed to win a single seat in regional elections, win 11 percent of the votes cast and 12 seats during the Andalusian Regional Election. This was the first time that a populist political party had won seats at any level of government since Spain's return to democracy in the 1970s (Turnbull-Dugarte 2019). The next year in April 2019, the Vox Party won 10.7 percent of the vote and won 10 out of 99 seats in the Valencia regional parliamentary election. That same April, in elections for the national parliament (the Cortes), the Vox Party won about 10 percent of the vote and 24 out of 350 seats. After a failure to form a coalition government, a second national election occurred in November and Vox increased its vote share to 15 percent and acquired 52 seats; it was at this point the third largest party in the Spanish parliament. In a span of over a year, Vox secured its place as a mainstay of Spanish politics and ended the region's long history of not electing populists (Turnbull-Dugarte et al. 2020). While this narrative suggests that the Migrant Crisis led to a string of populist victories across the whole of Western Europe, the actual vote totals in the region tell a different story.

Table 1.1: Western European Populist Party Election Results, Pre and Post-Migrant Crisis

Country	Legislative Election Results		Difference
	Pre-Migrant Crisis (Before 2014)	2014 and After	
Austria (Freedom Party)	2013: 20.5%	2017: 26.0%	+5.5%
Belgium (Vlaams Belang)	2010: 7.8%	2014: 3.7%	-4.1%
Cyprus (National Popular Front)	2011: 1.1%	2016: 3.7%	+2.6
Denmark (Danish People's Party)	2011: 12.3%	2015: 21.1%	+8.8%
Finland (True Finns)	2011: 19.1%	2015: 17.7%	-1.4%
France (National Front)*	2012: 8.9%	2017: 11.2%	+2.3%
Germany (Alternative for Germany)	2013: 4.7%	2017: 12.6%	+7.9%
Greece (Golden Dawn)	2012: 6.9%	2015: 6.3%	-0.6%
Italy (Northern League)	2013: 4.1%	2018: 17.4%	+13.3%
Luxembourg (Alternative Democratic Reform Party)	2013: 6.6%	2018: 8.3%	+1.7%
The Netherlands (Party for Freedom)	2012: 10.1%	2017: 13.1%	+3.0%
Norway (Progress Party)	2013: 16.3%	2017: 15.3%	-1.0%
Sweden (Sweden Democrats)	2010: 5.7%	2014: 12.9%	+7.2%
Switzerland (Swiss People's Party)	2010: 26.3%	2015: 29.4%	+3.1%
United Kingdom (United Kingdom Independence Party)	2010: 3.1%	2015: 12.6%	+9.5%

*French legislative election results combine the first and second rounds.

Table 1.1 presents electoral data from fifteen Western European countries. The parties highlighted have been considered populist by other scholars and the table outlines the percentage of votes these parties received in the last pre-Migrant Crisis election and the first election to take place after the pre-Migrant Crisis election. A short examination of the fifteen different parties indicates that in the pre-Migrant Crisis, the parties run the gamut in popularity. The Freedom Party of Austria and the Swiss People's Party managed to secure over twenty percent of the votes in the years before 2014 but are the only ones to do so among the fifteen. There are an additional

four parties, Danish People's Party, True Finns, Party for Freedom, and the Progress Party, which managed to secure at least ten percent of the vote. In other words, only six out of fifteen parties were popular enough to secure at least ten percent of the vote and only two out of fifteen received twenty percent of the vote.

Vote shares for these fifteen parties change markedly during and after the Migrant Crisis. While only three of the fifteen, the Freedom Party of Austria, Danish People's Party, and the Swiss People's Party, crossed the twenty percent threshold, the True Finns, National Front, Alternative for Germany, Northern League, the Party for Freedom, Progress Party, Sweden Democrats, and the United Kingdom Independence Party secured at least ten percent of the vote. This indicates a rise from six out of fifteen to eleven out of fifteen.

Yet the story in four of these countries, Belgium, Finland, Greece, and Norway, is different. Rather than witnessing an increase in vote shares, the populist parties in these countries suffered a decline in support. This brings up a key research question beyond a general question asking what is driving ethnocentric populist parties: Are the reasons behind supporting populists in countries that witnessed an increase in vote shares different from the reasons behind supporting the populists in countries that failed to increase their vote shares? In other words, will the marginal effects of certain variables differ between the two groups of countries?

2014-2015: Immigration Crises and Increases in Support for Ethnocentric Populists

While the 2014-2015 Migrant Crisis did not lead to a universal surge in support for populist actors across the Western European region, it is an integral part of the story presented here. The European Migrant Crisis, along with the Immigration Crisis in the United States, were major socio-political events which occurred in the 2014-2015 time period. This section presents information on why these years are landmarks and then explains both events. In Europe, a sharp

increase in the number of migrants entering the continent in 2014-15 subsequently became known as the Migrant Crisis. In the United States, the summer of 2014 also saw a sharp increase in the number of migrants. This, combined with President Barack Obama's attempt at expanding Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) for undocumented migrants (Aldana 2016; Zug 2014), represented an American equivalent of the European Migrant Crisis. While the surge in the number of migrants entering both regions was temporary, the argument here is that the effects of these shocks lasted beyond the initial events.

Prior to 2015, Western nations on both sides of the Atlantic had taken in large numbers of immigrants from all over the world for approximately five decades. In many Western European nations, such as the United Kingdom and France, large numbers of migrants from former colonies made their way to these places (Caldwell 2009; Heisler 1986; Jackson et la. 2001; Pettigrew 1998). In the United States, large numbers individuals from Latin America and Asia entered the country (Massey 1981; Reimers 1983; Yang 2010).

On Europe

This subsection assesses the political culture in Europe surrounding immigration, the demographic change occurring in Europe, and how the Migrant Crisis changed political and social culture in Europe. Many Western European states decided to accept large numbers of migrants from non-European regions of the world after World War II. Most countries looked to former colonies as a source for immigration. The United Kingdom brought in many individuals from its former colonies such as India (Algan et la. 2010; Girma and Yu 2002), while France looked to the Maghreb and Francophone Sub-Saharan Africa (Algan et al. 2010; Caldwell 2009).

A number of individuals started to speak out against immigration, such as British politician Enoch Powell, in the late 1960s (Tomlinson 2018). Shortly afterwards, Powell lost his

cabinet position and never held a senior post for the rest of his political career (Caldwell 2009). Jean-Marie Le Pen, the founder of the National Front (later National Rally) in France, also criticized lax immigration policy forcefully in the 1970s but failed to find success at the ballot box (Stockemer and Amengay 2015). These attempts at speaking out did not gain much traction in the 20th century because migrants were thought to be contributing economically as Europe suffered a labor shortage in the years following World War II (Hansen 2003; McDowell 2009).

Changes started to occur in the 1990s when conversations about the place of immigration in Western Europe became more commonplace (Lubbers et al. 2002; Mudde 2013; Oesch 2008). During this time period, a number of populist parties increased their electoral support. Mudde (2013) argued that the average vote shares of actors he labels “populist radical right parties” increased from 1.7 percent in the 1980s to 4.8 percent in the 1990s. Data also indicated that certain demographics, such as the working class, were supporting populist actors (Oesch 2008). The increasing support for such actors was connected with different circumstances in Western Europe by the early 1990s. The economic boom years, where extra labor was needed, had ended in the 1970s. The size of the immigrant community, however, had continued to grow during this time period. Eurobarometer data indicated that between 1988 and 1991, there were sharp increases in the number of respondents who believed that there were "too many foreigners" in their countries, with a majority of respondents in Belgium, West Germany, France, and Italy stating this to be the case (Pettigrew 1998).

While there was a change in fortunes for populist parties and their supporters, there were still clear lines on what was publicly acceptable discourse for politicians. For example, Hans Janmaat, a Dutch politician, declared that the Netherlands was not a multicultural society and asserted his desire to get rid of multiculturalism if given power. Not only did these comments

effectively end his political career, he was indicted and convicted for making discriminatory statements (Maussen and Grillo 2014; Vink 2007). Tensions started to increase by this time as the large number of neighborhoods that were majority-minority, among the most famous the "suburbs" of France, were portrayed by populists as bastions of crime and a symbol of the inability of these newcomers to integrate (Wiles 2007). Such feelings became especially powerful in the aftermath of riots led by the children and grandchildren of immigrants who were born and raised in these suburbs (Haddad and Balz 2006).

This level of demographic change represents a new political environment in which members of specific ethnic groups who long dominated the politics of their home societies reach a point when they are no longer dominant. The possibility of changing representation in governing legislative bodies means fewer resources and other benefits for the once dominant group (Mansbridge 1999). If this is the case, why did support for populist actors increase in the late 2010s instead of the 1990s or the 2000s? One possibility is the lack of an exogenous shock. Such events can change an existing environment and create an opening that incentivizes changes to one's behaviors and actions (Todd 2017). A sudden rush of new information sometimes forces individuals to reevaluate existing beliefs (Jervis 1976). Just before the rise in populist support across much of the Western World, two major exogenous shocks occurred in the 2014-2015 time period.

Starting in 2014, the European Union experienced a large influx in the number of individuals who attempted to cross into its territory (Pachocka 2016). For many years, migrants had used the Mediterranean Sea to enter European countries such as Greece, Italy, and Spain. From 1998-2013, the yearly total of migrants entering through this route never exceeded 70,295.

However, in 2014, the total increased to 209,553 and in 2015 the number of entrants grew to 895,934 (Fargues 2016).

By Autumn 2014, some Europeans felt uneasy with the changing situation. For example, protests against the acceptance of migrants by the Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the West (PEGIDA) became a weekly occurrence in the city of Dresden (Czymara and Schmidt-Catran 2017). In 2015, more than 1.3 million migrants from the Middle East/North Africa region, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Asia made their way to the European Union's borders (Karolewski and Benedikter 2017). This large influx was partly the result of events that had occurred around the same time. The year 2011 saw the beginning of the Syrian Civil War and the fall of longtime Libyan dictator Muammar Qaddafi which made both Syria and Libya unsafe for civilians. Large numbers of sub-Saharan Africans left their homes to look for work, Iranians sought to flee their home country's regime, Afghans looked to escape violence in their country, and Eritreans sought to leave behind their country's dictatorship (Bhambra 2017; Judis 2018; Karolewski and Benedikter 2017).

The large number of migrants fomented debate regarding whether the European Union should accept these newcomers. Notably, a number of politicians from mainstream parties dissented. The Bavarian Christian-Social Union Party's chief Horst Seehofer, head of a party that was in a coalition with Angela Merkel's Christian Democratic Union, argued that accepting so many migrants was not a good idea as many Germans did not like this policy (Karolweski and Benedikter 2017). Some of the other arguments moved away from the practical towards more identity lines. PEGIDA, an anti-immigrant group, argued that bringing in so many migrants from the Middle East would turn Germany into an Islamic country while the political party PRO NRW, which operates predominately in the state of North Rhine-Westphalia, argued that male

migrants from the region would be dangerous to German women (Czymara and Schmidt-Catran 2017). At times, disagreements did not remain civil. In 2015 alone, there were over 1,000 documented attacks on migrants in Germany (Karolewski and Benedikter 2017). Despite these dissenting voices, Angela Merkel, the Chancellor of Germany, argued that Europe was able to handle this influx of newcomers and allowed large number of migrants into Germany. The over one million individuals almost quadrupled the number of new arrivals from the 259,000 who sought to enter the continent in 2010 (Judis 2018) and doubled the number of individuals who sought entry in 2014 (Czymara and Schmidt-Catran 2017).

Many migrants chose to settle in specific parts of the European Union. Approximately a third of the arrivals from 2015, or about 442,000 people, settled in Germany, increasing Germany's population to 81.8 million (Eckardt 2016). The number of migrants entering Germany that year accounted for about 0.54 percent of the country's population. This figure doubles the percentage of individuals who entered West Germany during the late 1950s and early 1960s.

Such a rapid change netted a negative reaction from the populace. In July 2016, polling data from the Pew Center showed that a majority of respondents from Western European countries such as Germany, the United Kingdom, Netherlands, Italy, and Sweden believed that admitting more migrants would increase terrorism in their home countries (Judis 2018). Politically, openly discussing immigration and its repercussions was a major component of the partisan effort to extract the UK from the EU (pro-Brexit) and played an important role in the decision to leave the EU in June 2016 (Judis 2018; Taggart and Szczerbiak 2018). Western Europe had now changed.

On the United States

The Migrant Crisis did not have a direct effect on the United States. However, a different exogenous shock related to immigration, which occurred around the same time as the European Migrant Crisis, happened on the other side of the Atlantic: the 2014-2015 American Immigration Crisis and the subsequent attempt by the Obama administration to expand the Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA).

While the United States experienced an exogenous shock, the country has a distinct political history from most Western European countries. While there is no major political party completely dedicated to a populist platform, there have been a number of presidential candidates such as William Jennings Bryan (DeCanio 2011; Frieden 1997), Pat Buchanan (Jelen 1993), and Ross Perot (Barr 2009) who have adopted populist tactics. Nevertheless, none of these individuals became president.

The United States, like many Western Europe countries, had developed certain norms in the post-World War II era regarding race and immigration. Partly due to the Civil Rights movement that took place in the 1950s and 1960s, American politicians became extremely reluctant to support policies that affect the delicate racial balance of the country. While indirect racialized appeals occurred, particularly among Republican presidential candidates, direct attacks on a specific group remained taboo in the United States (Mendleberg 2001).

While this taboo was widely understood by politicians through the early 2010s, the United States experienced an event similar to that of the Migrant Crisis of Europe which had the opportunity to change this norm. In the summer of 2014, large groups of migrants from Central American countries, predominately El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, attempted to enter the United States through the Mexican border (Zug 2014). By the end of 2014, it was clear that

an increasing number of individuals had attempted to enter the United States. The number of unaccompanied children alone increased from 24,481 in 2012 to 38,833 in 2013. In 2014, that number increased to 68,684. While the numbers dropped in early 2015, attempts to cross the US-Mexico border again grew as the weather warmed in 2015; the number of children taken into custody in August and September 2015 exceeded the numbers from August and September 2014 (Musalo and Lee 2017). While the poor economic health of many Central American nations played a role in decision of many to escape, many of these migrants were fleeing gang violence (Cruz 2015).

This spike in the number of individuals attempting to enter the United States had a chilling effect on attempts at immigration reform in the United States. In 2012, then-president Obama created Deferred Action for Child Arrivals (DACA) by executive order as a way to allow undocumented migrants who had arrived in the country as children to live and work in the United States. However, opponents of DACA became vocal in the aftermath of the 2014 crisis as they believed that the program would be seen by undocumented migrants as a way to secure their children's place in the United States (Zug 2014).

Ultimately, the United States government decided to resettle about 54,000 unaccompanied children across the United States. The effects of this decision and subsequent decisions taken by the Obama administration had long-lasting impacts. Some local communities resented these children. Anti-migrant sentiment grew as many Americans questioned why the country accepted so many migrants and challenged the idea that the southern border was secure (Chisti and Hipsman 2014; Zug 2014).

While the Migrant Crisis in Europe and the Immigration Crisis in the United States are different events, they share similarities. Both Europe and the United States, around the same time

period, were faced with a decision. Large numbers of migrants were attempting to enter the two regions due to political and social instability. The Europeans and the Americans could have refused entry, but both decided to allow many of the migrants into their countries. In both situations, vocal opposition to the decision emerged.

These two events provided an exogenous shock to both regions. Immigration, and the question of what type of immigration policy should be adopted, became prominent topics of political debate. The incumbent governments in Europe and the United States opted to let in migrants despite opposition. This policy decision provided an opening for populist actors to publicize their immigration stances. In the United States, it gave an opening for an outsider like Donald Trump to make a mark on the political scene.

Existing norms made it difficult for politicians to make direct appeals against policies calling for cuts on immigration and at times calling for more resources towards curbing illegal migration. However, in the United States, the Immigration Crisis of 2014 opened the door for debate. Genuine anger over the handling of the crisis led those opposed to the Obama administration to start questioning whether the borders were truly secure and whether the incumbent was capable of handling this situation (Chisti and Hipsman 2014).

Worries over the situation spilled over into 2015 with a number of states attempting to challenge the Obama administration's DACA expansion (Kagan 2016). These events provided an opportunity for an actor willing to present hardline views on immigration. In June 2015, around a year after the start of the 2014 crisis, Donald Trump, a real estate mogul who was at that point was probably best known as the star of the reality TV show *The Apprentice*, announced his candidacy for the United States presidency. Initially, Trump's candidacy was not considered to be serious by observers of US politics. However, during the primary season, he

defeated his Republican Party rivals and then his Democratic rival, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, to become president (Judis 2016).

Trump's victory was not expected when he first announced his candidacy in 2015, in part due to his willingness to blatantly flaunt post-Civil Rights era norms that made explicitly targeting specific ethnic, racial, or religious groups unacceptable (Mendleberg 2001). On the campaign trail, he called illegal migrants from Mexico "rapists" and "criminals" while also calling for a shutdown on Muslim immigration (Judis 2016). Trump directly attacked members of the establishment, such as career politicians, and members of the media in a way that most previous presidential candidates had not. Part of the reason behind the effectiveness of these attacks was that Trump had no political experience before running (Donovan and Redlawsk 2018; Judis 2016). Trump's rhetoric focusing on criticizing immigration was similar to existing strategies used by populists in Europe.

Just a year before Trump declared his candidacy for the presidency, the United States also experienced its own version of an immigration crisis. While in scale it was much smaller than the 1.3 million new arrivals experienced by Europe in 2015 (Judis 2016), over 66,000 unaccompanied minors, predominately from Central American countries, attempted to enter the United States (Hernandez 2015). While the number of unaccompanied minors increased steadily since 2008, 66,000 represented almost double the 38,833 recorded in 2013, and almost triple the 24,481 minors found in 2012 by the United States Border Patrol (Hernandez 2015; Musalo and Lee 2017). Major media platforms such as Fox News extensively covered the surge and public opposition to accepting these migrants increased (Zug 2014). Considering this shift in public opinion, Trump's willingness to tackle immigration, despite his harsh rhetoric, may have been

the key to his growth in support during the primary season and his eventual victory during the general election cycle.

Plan of the Dissertation

This investigation examines how exogenous events, particularly migration, can potentially change partisan support and focuses on how these changes can affect populists. This project is also interested in examining whether there are any major differences between supporters in the nine countries that saw a rise in support in the immediate aftermath of the Migrant Crisis and the countries that did not see a rise in support. The final section of the analysis related to Western European examines whether there is a major difference between right-wing populists and more general ethnocentric populists.

This investigation also extends the discussion to the American case. This project examines whether an exogenous shock also played a role in affecting support for the Republican Party's presidential candidate. As a secondary question, the project also examines whether there are any changes to the composition of the Republican Party support base over time. In particular, it addresses the question of whether the supporters of the Republican Party have become more like supporters of European ethnocentric populist parties over time.

Beyond the key research questions, the overall purpose of this investigation is to understand what populism is and what direction its adherents want to take society. While there is no agreed upon definition of populism (Otjes and Louwerse 2015), a number of scholars have noted that adherents emphasize a conflict (Halikiopoulou 2019; Schmuck and Matthews 2017) between "regular people," who can be defined in either in an exclusive manner such as an ethnic group (Stavrakakis et al. 2017) or as a more inclusive group that deemphasizes ethnicity such as working class (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013; Stavrakakis et al. 2017). These "regular

people" are often seen as being on the side of good (Mudde 2004; Jagers and Walgrave 2007; Schmuck and Matthews 2017). This good group is seen as being in conflict with an enemy group which can take many different shapes or forms. Sometimes the enemy is portrayed as a minority group that is threatening cultural and/or ethnic homogeneity (Schmuck and Matthes 2017), cosmopolitan individuals who seek to change society (Halikiopolou 2019) or elites such as establishment politicians who are portrayed as uncaring (Stavrakakis et al. 2017). Regardless of how the enemy group is defined, it is seen as not having the interests of those who are part of the group at heart and a danger to the side of good (Lamour 2021).

While populism is often seen as a “thin ideology” (Bernhard and Kriesi 2019; Jupskas and Ivarsflaten 2016; Kalsnes 2019; Mudde 2004), this thinness allows a proponent to infuse it with different policy stances. For example, one subset of populists, right-wing populists, have instituted anti-immigration policies that are radically different from more mainstream administrations that preferred policies friendlier to immigrants (Judis 2016; Zaslove 2004).

With a large number of strains, however, comes a degree of confusion regarding definitions. The term right-wing populism is used extensively by scholars (Arzheimer 2015; Halikiopoulou 2019; de Lange and Mugge 2015; Lees 2018; Schmuck and Matthes 2017; Rydgren 2005; Shehaj et al. 2021; Swank and Betz 2003; Winberg 2017 among many others) and definitions often emphasize the importance of excluding foreigners from participating in national life as a way to restore power to the people (Berbuir et al. 2015; Halikiopoulou 2019; Winberg 2017). In other words, these scholars emphasize the social policy aspect of the right-wing.

However, these scholars tend to ignore another crucial aspect of right-wing parties: Economic attributes. The terms left and right-wing have also extensively been used to refer to

economic policy positions with many scholars considering left-wing economics to emphasize more government intervention and right-wing economics less intervention (Conover and Feldman 1981; Jost et al. 2003; Neumayer 2004; Powell and Whitten 1993; Tsebelis and Garrett 2000). Considering the prominence of the economic definition of the term right-wing, some consideration of this definition should be discussed when conceptualizing right-wing populism.

If populism, particularly the right-wing variant, continues to grow in prominence, the fundamentally contentious nature of populism that emphasizes conflict between groups (Roberts 2006) may prove to have far-reaching consequences in the political sphere. While many mainstream politicians attempt to stay away from racially divisive language (Mendleberg 2001), many populists use direct and controversial language that could create a more contentious environment. For example, Donald Trump, then candidate for president of the United States, explicitly called for a shutdown of Muslim immigration to the United States (Judis 2016) while Filip Dewinter, a Vlaams Belang politician, once stated that Muslims were attempting to colonize the West (Betz and Meret 2009). If such language continues, tensions between groups could become increasingly inflamed in the years to come.

While these are questions that the entirety of the dissertation tackles, each of the individual chapters also have their own specific purposes. This chapter sought to introduce an empirical puzzle and lay out the basic research questions. There was less focus on analysis and more emphasis on telling a story about how the events of 2014-2015 changed the political environment of many Western countries.

Chapter two moves away from a story-telling narrative to focus more on understanding the empirical puzzle in general. This chapter is divided into two components: Discussion of previous findings and a theory section. The discussion's purpose is to lay out various concepts

that are of importance. While populism is an important term, the survey will start by examining a number of different concepts that are closely related. As political parties are an important part of the story, there is discussion on party categorization in the Western context. The review section will also examine definitions of left, right, ideology and then conclude with a review of the most important concept for this investigation: populism.

The second half of chapter two focuses on theory. After examining alternative theories that explain support for populists and discussing why these approaches fail to explain what we have observed, the chapter presents the main theory to explain growth in populist support: Status threat. This concept argues that individuals who feel that they are being threatened demographically and/or politically will attempt to prevent a further decline in group power. This theory will be combined with political psychology theories which discuss the importance of exogenous shocks in affecting support for populists.

Chapter three focuses on describing the research design and data. Initially, much of the discussion focuses on what type of data is appropriate in order to test the hypotheses including the Manifesto Project, European Social Survey (ESS) and the American National Election Study (ANES). There will also be a focus on what types of variables serve as good indicators for analysis.

The second half of chapter three focuses on research design, and especially, case selection. The discussion addresses why the United States is included and why analysis involving the United States deserves its own chapter. After discussing the cases, the next step is to explain which type of analysis is most appropriate. Reflecting back on the basic research questions posited in the first chapter, a placement analysis, difference of means tests, and logistic analysis will be presented as the bulk of the analysis presented in chapters four, five, and six.

Chapter four involves conducting a placement analysis of all the major parties from countries chosen in the previous chapter. It takes a first step towards answering the main research question regarding the surge in electoral support among populist actors in major Western countries. To do this, it looks at the remaining case countries that were outlined in the case selection section of chapter three. In this chapter, using the Manifesto Project, populism scores and left-right scores are created to place all parties that won at least one seat in the last pre-Migrant Crisis election and the first post-Migrant Crisis election. These scores are used to create cutoff points for whether a party can be considered populist. After doing this, the European parties are pooled together with the median populism score and median left-right score adjusted to be zero. The purpose is to take into account any regional variation on populist and left-right scores. Afterwards, the parties from each country are looked at separately to see where the populist parties lie. The objective is to see whether within each country, the populist actor is considered to be closer to the center or not.

Chapter five continues the analysis by looking at the European case. This chapter uses the European Social Survey to conduct two different types of tests. First, difference of means tests are used to see whether there are any statistically significant differences between voters who support populist and non-populist parties. The second part of the analysis utilizes logistic regression analysis.

This chapter also emphasizes a slightly different conceptualization of the term "right-wing populist." While the term generally refers to a variation of populism that focuses on putting out an anti-immigration platform (Judis 2016), there tends to be little emphasis on whether these actors also follow right-wing economic policy prescriptions. The chapter emphasizes that right-wing populists are distinct from another type of populists (called ethnocentric populists) and

evaluates whether supporters of right-wing populist parties are voting for them because of their right-wing economic policies, right-wing social policies, or both.

Chapter six applies the approach of chapter five to the distinct case of the United States. The chapter uses the American National Election Survey to determine what variables drive support for Donald Trump. Difference of means tests are again used to see whether there are statistically significant differences between Republican supporters, the main unit of interest, in different time periods.

Chapter seven is the conclusion. Here, the findings are summarized and there is discussion about the broader contributions of this dissertation. The chapter also outlines potential ways to move this research agenda forward. The concluding section provides some parting remarks on populism.

Chapter 2: Previous Scholarship and the Issue of Conceptualization

Introduction

The introductory chapter argued that in the late 2010s, populist parties in much of the Western world started to earn larger electoral shares than they had historically. A brief examination of vote shares from 2004 through the late 2010s indicated this to be the case within some European Union member states. While the chapter noted the importance of populists and populism, it did not define these terms. This chapter defines these and other critical concepts including such as left-wing, right-wing, and ideology.

This chapter also lays out other important pillars of the research design and analysis. Research within the social sciences is driven by theories (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). Before presenting the theory guiding this project, the chapter outlines competing theories and their weaknesses. It subsequently presents the theoretical approach arguing that status threat, a feeling of fear driven by no longer being the dominant social and political player due to the rise of newcomers (Morgan 2018), drove individuals to support populists. The chapter then discusses how the theory applies to Western Europe and the United States. It concludes by connecting theoretical expectations to the research design.

Introduction to Previous Scholarship

Both colloquially and within the scholarship, there are a number of parties which have been considered populist. In Europe, several parties are commonly identified as populist, including: Alternative for Germany, the Freedom Party of Austria, the Party for Freedom in the Netherlands, the Sweden Democrats, and the Swiss People's Party. While it did not do particularly well electorally, the United Kingdom Independence Party helped spearhead the United Kingdom's departure from the European Union (Judis 2016) and is also a populist party.

These parties share a number of attributes. Most notably, they advocate for white Europeans and policies disadvantageous to immigrants and minorities. The Freedom Party of Austria is firmly anti-immigrant (Ennser-Jedenastik 2016) while the Sweden Democrats are described as ethnonationalists who seek a more ethnically homogenous nation-state in which social order and traditional values are prioritized (Jylhä, Rydgren, and Strimling 2019). The Swiss People's Party espouses xenophobic and anti-immigrant views (Bernhard 2017) while supporters of the Alternative for Germany often value Germany's cultural legacy and are concerned with the levels of immigration to the country (Lees 2018). The Dutch Party for Freedom, in the 2010 election program, notes that the Dutch people are distinct and have no equals (Lubbers and Coenders 2017). While a cursory look, the available scholarship indicates that these parties are ethnonationalist, anti-immigrant, and are not advocates of change (Rydgren 2005).

This list of traits also suggests that there are multiple types of populism. For example, the American populist candidate Bernie Sanders shared a disdain for the establishment just like the populist parties mentioned in the previous paragraph. However, he deliberately made no attempt at discussing racial or ethnic divisions nor did he attempt to discuss immigration in a negative light. His take on populism was often labeled as "left-wing populism" while those who espoused a more racially and ethnically divisive form of populism were said to follow "right-wing populism" (Judis 2016).

The variation in views held by different types of populists appears to add another layer to the broader research question on populism. Depending on the types of views held, scholars have called the parties either left-wing or right-wing populists. When discussing the types of populist actors who are anti-immigrant and ethnonationalist, the scholarship tends to label them right-

wing (Judis 2016). However, the term "right-wing" by itself has many different connotations that are related to both economic and social policy positions. The variations in how right-wing is defined requires a conversation regarding the accuracy of this label. While many populists prefer more government intervention in the economy, or traditionally left-wing policies, and often call for protectionist measures for workers, this is not universally the case. Kitschelt and McGann (1997) called a number of political actors who called for a curbing of immigration and the shrinking of the welfare state the "new radical right."

However, even within the discussion of the radical right, there is little agreement about how these actors should be defined. Mudde (2000) indicated that there was not much support for less government intervention in the economy among members of the radical right. De Lange (2007) argued that some of these parties, such as the National Front of France and the Vlaams Blok of Belgium, desire curbs to immigration and oppose further expansions of the welfare state. However, others such as the List Pim Fortuyn did not. Further complicating matters is the possibility that parties could change over time. Kriesi et al. (2006) indicated that the Austrian Freedom Party moved further right on economic policy in the post-Cold War era.

The discussion about parties, populism, and right and left cannot be conducted in isolation from a discussion of ideology. While there are questions on what ideology means at its core (Gerring 1997), within the scholarship there have been questions on whether populism and its variations constitute an ideology or not (Stanley 2008). In particular, the ability to say whether populism is an ideology can greatly contribute to categorizing parties into either populist or non-populist varieties.

The disputes in the scholarship raise important questions: What are some of the important concepts related to the main research question in the introductory chapter? How have populist

parties been categorized by scholars? How do related concepts such as left and right play a role in defining populism?

Party Categorization

While finding a clear method of categorizing parties is central to the analysis, discussion of previous scholarship presents methods that go beyond dividing parties into populist or non-populist camps. While applying the language of party categorization is common in research, there is no universally agreed upon method of classification. Nevertheless, a useful starting point is the seminal review essay by Mair and Mudde (1998) which notes the challenges of classifying political parties. Taking a page from biology scholars, the two emphasize that party "family" classifications can be deeply problematic as at times there is disagreement on "genetic" relations among parties.

Despite these challenges, this section examines how scholars have classified parties and some of the strengths and weaknesses of each major method. It then chooses one of these and digs into some of the concepts that are key to this method and define terms such as left and right while discussing what traits scholars have given to each. It repeats the process with the concepts of populism and left-wing and right-wing populism. The attributes found through this examination are then used to find policy variables in the Manifesto Project, a collection of party platforms that code specific policy positions. This data are then be used to place parties on a left-right spectrum and give each a populism score.

The Interest Approach

Mair and Mudde (1998) provide a widely-cited approach emphasizing four different types. The interest, or constituency, approach emphasizes that parties exist due to the desires of various social groups and are the result of whatever dominant social groups happen to operate in the broader political environment in a given time. There is an unequal relationship between the party and the constituency, where the party's survival is contingent on a constituency's willingness to see the party as a vehicle for its interests (Panebianco 1988). Of particular interest is who the party serves. This approach is rooted in previous scholarship including that of Lipset and Rokkan (1967). The argument here is that parties are founded on the basis of similar interests. Because of this, one needs to take a closer look at examining the many different constituencies that formed.

Transnational Approach

Other interests and constituencies represent important components of a party. In the years since the Cold War, actions taken by a number of parties provided another opportunity at creating a new classification method. For example, parties with similar beliefs and philosophies have formed transnational groups such as the Asia-Pacific Socialist Organization (Mair and Mudde 1998). This approach looks the actions of the parties themselves and at the rosters of these transnational clubs.

While the transnational party lists have grown to encompass many different parties, it is unlikely that all types of specific parties from across the world would be on any specific list. There is also the potential issue of "coding." While the existence of these transnational rosters simplifies the coding process, there remains the question of whether the lists are truly representative of the parties themselves. For example, some parties belong to two different lists

at the same time (Mair and Mudde 1998): A party highly focused on environmental issues could also be Socialist.

Label Approach

While creating a transnational roster list is a straightforward method of classification, some scholars believe that classification using party names or labels is sufficient. In other words, it is best to let the party itself judge where it belongs. For example, parties that call themselves Socialist or Green parties should be considered as such and self-classification should be taken at face value (Mair and Mudde 1998). While this method is simple, some parties have names that do not correspond with their policies. For example, the PILZ List of Austria was given its name due to founder Member of Parliament Peter Pilz and does not say anything about where the party stands (Buzogany and Scherhaufer 2018).

Ideology Approach

While transnational roster lists, party labels, and interests/constituency-based approaches are prominent approaches to labeling parties, other scholars believe that ideology should be the main source for classification. While there is no universally agreed upon definition of ideology, Gerring (1997) indicated that many scholars, at a minimum, agree that ideology involves a group of ideas that come together as a coherent bundle. In this way, this method focuses on examining what a party says and does rather than simply examining its name (Mair and Mudde 1998). The ideological approach lines up well with the rational model of examining organizations as it argues that a party's internal composition and membership should line up with a specific goal in mind (Panebianco 1988).

While this method has the advantage of grouping parties on the basis of how they behave, there are a number of challenges to this approach. For example, how can one measure how

"Christian Democratic" a party happens to be. It is unlikely that the strength of adherence to the set of beliefs labeled Christian Democracy is equal for all parties that fit the category. While some prefer looking at party rhetoric such as statements made by leading politicians in the chambers of the legislature or documents such as party platforms (Laver and Schofield 1990; Laver and Hunt 1992), this method assumes that there is consensus among leaders of the party when this may not be the case.

In addition, there is also some debate on whether ideology can travel cross-nationally. While labels or transnational groups have the advantage of being able to travel across the world, ideology may mean something different in each part of the world (Sartori 1970). A summary of the four methods is outlined below in table 2.2.

Table 2.2: Four Major Classification Methods

Interests Approach-Focus on the constituencies and interests of a party. **Strength(s)-**Easy to follow priorities of parties, rooted in empirical realities of Western Europe. **Weakness(es)-**Rooted too deeply in Western Europe. Difficult to generalize beyond that region.
Transnational Groups Approach-Group by international party group membership. **Strength(s)-** Straightforward and simple as one is examining a list. **Weakness(es)-**Not all parties that belong to a type will be on the list.
Labels Approach-See what the party calls itself. **Strength(s)-**Gives agency to the party. Simple as one is reading the name of a party. **Weakness(es)**-Not all parties have names that match a label. Even when the name does match a label, no guarantees of perfect replication of party ideology/actions and name.
Ideology Approach-Code a party's ideological rhetoric or actions. **Strength(s)**- Places strong emphasis on a party's actions. **Weakness(es)**-Difficult to agree on how to code, difficult to use same coding scheme for parties across time and space.

While each of these methods has its strengths and weaknesses, the analysis here is best served by using the classification method that focuses on ideology and coding party actions/rhetoric. This method is the most useful because it emphasizes what a party says/does rather than just taking its name at face value, and allows the researcher to map out the different parties visually.

On Left and Right

The next step addresses the concepts of "left" and "right" when discussing ideology. While the general bundle of ideas of what constitutes the left and right has remained relatively consistent in the 21st century, there is still debate on some of the finer points on conceptualizing these terms. A major issue is that the terms left and right are used to describe social policy, economic policy, and sometimes both simultaneously. It is difficult to find unanimity in what constitutes each, but examining scholarship on these different dimensions is useful.

In general parlance, the right became conflated with conservativism. Reflecting the centrality of the word "conserve," the term is often used to define someone who prioritizes defending the status quo over change (Allen 1981). Historically, on the social dimension, this led to a commitment to long-standing values such as the importance of family, nation, and monarchy (Greiffenhagen 1979). On the economic dimension, right-wing meant opposition to changing existing economic hierarchies. This extends to opposing the working class and socialism (Boix 1999) while also being suspicious towards redistribution (Iversen and Soskice 2006).

On Left and Right: Economics

The left, also defined in many different ways over time, has been equated with liberalism and an emphasis on equality, social reform, and tolerance of those who are different from the majority (McClosky and Zaller 1984). In economics, the left has been synonymous with the need

for more equitable economic policies that emphasize redistribution (Piurko et al. 2011). The important thread connecting these arguments is that the left, unlike the right, has been portrayed as more open to change especially when it is designed to help those believed to be in need (Jost et al. 2003).

Despite the use of the terms left and right for many years, conceptualization proved to be a challenge in the 21st century. On the economic side, Tsebelis and Garrett (2000) indicate that a major divergent point for left and right-wing parties in the European context is their differing views on economic regulation; the left desires more regulation while the right prefers deregulation. Powell and Whitten (1993) note that right-wing governments are concerned with fighting inflation, curbing taxes, and staying away from using the powers of the state when possible.

One of the most important divergent points between the left and right is how they think about unregulated markets; the left is skeptical of any positive benefits while the right embraces limitations on regulations. On the issue of environmental regulation, parties classified as left-wing across the industrialized world appear to prefer policies which focus on environmental protection such as the preservation of natural resources (Neumayer 2004). This indicates that at least on the issue of environmental policy, left-wing parties prefer a degree of government intervention.

Iversen and Soskice (2006) discuss left-wing political parties as entities that desire redistribution and decreasing inequality. Powell and Whitten (1993), when discussing left-wing governments, note that they are concerned with full employment, income redistribution, and state-sponsored intervention. Neumayer (2004) notes that the left is highly skeptical of unregulated markets while Potrafke (2010) emphasizes that leftist governments generally prefer

more government responsibility and action in the economic realm. Overall, these scholars, despite writing in different time periods and examining different policy dimensions, look at left-leaning political actors as those who are less comfortable with the economic status quo than those who are right leaning. This is especially reflected on right-leaning individuals holding more favorable views on capitalism and big business (Conover and Feldman 1981). Writing in the 1960s, Rossiter (1968) also noted that those who are more conservative or right leaning are more resistant to economic changes. On economic policy, this line of thinking appears to be reasonably consistent through time (Jost 2003 et al; Jost 2006).

On Left and Right: Social

While there is a degree of difference depending on the country (Zechmeister 2006), under a social-focused framework, right-wing emphasizes the importance of deference to authority figures and a heightened sense of prejudice towards outgroups such as homosexuals and those of different racial backgrounds (Hodson and Busseri 2012). Thorisdottir et al. (2007) also emphasize the social aspect of the right-wing; for them, traditionalism, or resistance to change, acceptance of inequality, the need for order, high need for security and low need for openness is associated with the right. Jost et al. (2003) emphasize the social nature of the right-wing by noting a strong resistance to change. Devos, Spini, and Schwartz (2002) echo these sentiments by noting the importance placed on power, security (including national security), and conformity while exhibiting more trust in status quo institutions. While each of these authors focus on different aspects of the right, they all maintain a common thread. Whether it involves outsiders or a desire for more conformity, there is general suspicion towards change (Jost et al. 2003).

This same issue plays out with regards to defining the left. From a social dimension, Devos, Spini, and Schwartz (2002) note that left-wing supporters tend to reject hierarchical

organizations of society and promote the welfare of outgroup individuals such as minorities and the poor. Jost et al. (2003) indicate that the left favors more equality and desire a breakdown of hierarchy. In other words, change in favor of decreasing inequalities is a central tenet.

While discussions on the economic aspects of left and right are ultimately rooted in whether the government should play a big or smaller role in economic matters (Jost et al. 2003; Tsebelis and Grant 2000), there is considerable variation in how those on the left and right position themselves on social policy. If debates regarding policy are ultimately rooted in what is considered to be acceptable and/or moral (Koch 2017), the expectation is that there is strong variation in what positions are taken by the left and right in a given country and time period. Positioning is also affected by salience at a given time. For example, in many Latin American countries, the role of religion in public life has been a major flashpoint between the left and the right for much of the twentieth century (Zechmeister 2006). Advocates for homosexuals, before the 1960s, had trouble finding advocates among both left and right-wing groups in the West (Hekma et al. 1995).

If being left or right-wing involves specific views on social and economic policy, then what qualifies as mainstream left and right? Mulloy (2004) notes that what does not constitute the mainstream is anything that falls outside of established norms or rules of engagement. It is difficult to systematically parse out norms and rules because of the difficulty in finding unanimous agreement on specific courses of action. The existence of these rules indicates that the oppression of dissent and the lack of desire to negotiate could be considered a violation of the mainstream in most Western societies because such actions constitute violations of existing methods of interaction. This indicates that the mainstream left and right, at least as a baseline, should accept the importance of protecting debate, deliberation, and the acceptance of respecting

proper institutional channels. With this definition in mind, the mainstream right espouses social views that are highly skeptical of change and outsiders, prefers an economic policy that is reluctant to pursue government intervention, and generally accepts the importance of status quo institutional mechanisms of political action. The mainstream left desires to change status quo society, and advance acceptance towards outsiders, institute an economic policy where inequality is mitigated, and maintain the importance of status quo institutional mechanisms of political action with mostly peaceful means. A summary of the discussion on the left and right is below on table 2.3.

Table 2.3: Short Survey on Left and Right-Wing Attributes (Historic and Contemporary)

Left-Wing	Right-Wing
Social Dimension • Human/individual rights • Helping minority groups • De-emphasis of traditional values such as family, nationalism • Government role in addressing social inequalities	Social Dimension • Deference to authority figures • Emphasis on conformity and hierarchy • Emphasis on tradition • Acceptance of social inequality • Suspicion of government role in social policy
Economic Dimension • Preference for redistribution • Desire to help those in the working classes • Preference for market regulation	Economic Dimension • Suspicion of redistribution • Suspicion of the working class • Preference for free markets • Suspicion of government role in addressing economic inequality

• Government role in addressing economic inequalities	

On Ideology

Ideology is an important component of categorization as it potentially provides attributes that could be used to group parties together. While ideology is often used to group parties together (von Beyme 1985) and is a ubiquitous part of political jargon, many definitions have been used. However, by the post-World War II era, ideology's purpose had changed from being a way to examine different belief systems to examining policy preferences. It was now a mark for understanding how the average person thought about specific policy points (Converse 1964; Knight 2006). The movement towards using ideology to describe the general public also gave rise to the belief that ideology could predict voting behavior although scholars in the Michigan school of voting suspected that party identification was more important (Campbell et al. 1960).

Ideology has also become a popular way of dividing up parties. Mair and Mudde (1998) and others have noted that Communist parties, social democratic parties, labor parties, Christian democratic parties, agrarian parties, conservative parties, liberal parties, left-libertarian parties, regionalist parties, nationalist parties, extreme right parties, and green parties, are among some of the labels given to parties based on their bundle of ideas. Bakker et al. (2015) also classify parties based on ideology and put labels depending on how far left or right the party appears to be. For example, parties labeled radical left, green, and liberal belong on the left side of the spectrum while Christian democrats are placed closer to the center-right, and the radical right on the right most part of the spectrum. Each of these types of parties hold distinct groups of ideas and use these as a guide to move towards one side of an issue (Levitin and Miller 1979).

While many definitions of ideology have been used within the scholarly community, Gerring (1997)'s examination indicated that most of these researchers consider ideology to be a set of ideas that are bound together. Knight (2006) corroborates Gerring's findings and notes that as one moves closer to the end of the 20th century, an increasing number of political scientists define ideology as a stable set of ideas that compete and contrast another set of interrelated ideas. Knight (2006) notes that most scholars have converged on utilizing a continuum of left-right or liberal-conservative to place actors spatially. This dissertation uses the Gerring/Knight definition of ideology as a set of ideas that are coherently bound together in some logical way.

Discussion of Populism

For some, populism entails a specific style of governance where those in power should do what the people desire. In other words, the will of the people should be the dominant factor in what sort of policies get passed. As long as a majority of people want it, it should be done. However, there are a number of potential issues with this line of thinking. When discussing the issue of preferences, knowing the true will of the people is at times impossible. This is especially true in a situation where there is no clear majority of individuals who want a specific policy (Riker 1982). Nevertheless, this definition of populism describes it as a tool to help restore popular sovereignty in which majority rules dominate over the backroom dealings of career politicians who may or may not respond to the general will of the people (Abts and Rummens 2007). Using this definition, populism argues against negotiating; if a policy has a clear majority, then there is no need to negotiate with the minority as it is the will and desire of the majority (Canovan 2002).

Another definition focuses on populism as a campaign style where politicians attempt to rally the masses and espouse rhetoric that rails against mainstream politicians and their failures

(Mudde and Rovira-Kaltwasser 2017). Here, populists agree that elites are a distinct and separate group that do not have the interests of the general population at heart (Ivaldi et al. 2017). It is then a way to appeal to the general population against established power players (Canovan 1999).

While this second definition is more focused on rhetoric than governance, it shares an important connection to populism as a style of governance; they both divide political actors between "the people" and some sort of governing class that is often presented as uncaring and/or incompetent (Mudde and Rovira-Kaltwasser 2017; Riker 1982). Populism as a rhetorical device requires those who utilize it to appeal to those in the margins of society such as the working class and those who operate in the informal economy.

While one definition focuses more on examining populism as a mode of governance and another as a rhetorical style, there is a general thread connecting both viewpoints. In essence, the thought process behind populism is that there are powerless individuals who can be considered the "have-nots" of the world, while those who are considered the "haves" are in power (Ellner 2003; Mudde and Rovira-Kaltwasser 2017). For populists, either the people or the elites are victorious in this struggle. There cannot be a middle ground. An overview of the definitions is presented below on table 2.4.

Table 2.4: An Overview of Three Definitions of Populism

Populism as a Style of Governance	Populism as a Style of Campaigning	Populism as a Mindset
• Institute policies in the name of the people • No need for negotiation if majority of people want something	• Belief that world divided between elites and non-elites • Focuses on directing anger towards elites	• Politicians should heed the desires of the people

• Sometimes difficult to know the will of the people	• Appeal to have-nots	• Career politicians do not care about regular people • World divided into one or the other

On Left and Right-Wing Populism

What further complicates defining and labeling populism is that there are also left and right-wing variations. While both variations believe that there is currently a competition between elites and "regular people" in which regular people should rule, the two disagree on a number of issues including the question of where to direct their anger. For left-wing populists, anger is focused mostly on an economic elite that is believed to be exploiting the working class (March 2007). This means that toppling that wealthy elite is the main goal for left-wing populists (Abts and Rummens 2007). Left-wing populists also seek to supplement protections for workers by emphasizing the importance of economic protectionism and the dangers of an uncontrolled free market (Judis 2016).

Right-wing populists also believe that economic injustices are pervasive and are weary of free market economics. While they do not ignore economic elites, there is an ethnocentric element to right-wing populism. The logic behind this ethnic element is that the unity of the general population is not possible under a more ethnically and culturally heterogeneous environment (Abts and Rummens 2007). In other words, there is a core group of individual insiders who make up the "heart" of the people (Taggart 2000). Because of this belief, outsiders, such as immigrants and ethnic minorities, are considered as big of a threat as economic elites.

Ivarsflaten (2008) goes as far as to say that anti-immigration sentiment is the only thing that binds all successful right-wing populist parties together.

Both left-wing populists and right-wing populists emphasize a narrative where ingroups and outgroups are fighting for control. However, the main difference between the two is rooted in their targets. Left-wing populists believe that wealthy elites who refuse to help the working class should be criticized. For right-wing populists, while wealthy elites are often a target, immigrants and racial/ethnic minorities also exist as a target outgroup (Mudde 2007).

The idea of right-wing populism requires more scrutiny. While conceptualization of left-wing populism is relatively consistent with modern day leftism on both the social and economic dimension, there appears to be a gap between right-wing populism and the right in some ways. On the social dimension, while right-wing populism highlights the differences between ingroups and outgroups, the mainstream right often tries to minimize tensions between individuals of different ethnicities and races and will often outright ignores differences (Hawley 2017). Nevertheless, a general coolness towards broad changes to society color the perceptions of both the mainstream right and right-wing populism.

There is a strong disconnect on economic policy. Right-wing populists desire to dismantle free market policies in favor of protectionism and prefer government intervention into the economy. However, that does not appear to be consistently the case among populist parties given the label right-wing (Mudde 2000). Otjes and Louwerse (2015) note this definitional issue when they state that parties labeled as right-wing populists will sometimes prefer free market policies while others prefer more state intervention. The general right-wing traditional conservative, on the other hand, prefers a hands-off approach when dealing with economic

policy. This disconnect indicates that on the economic dimension, labeling right-wing populists as "right-wing" can be misleading.

A number of European scholars have abandoned the term right-wing populist and prefer radical right or radical right-wing (Kitschelt and McGann 1997; Erlingsson et al. 2014; Jylhä et al. 2019), radical right populism/populist radical right (Muis and Immerzeel 2017; Rydgren 2002), and extreme right (Golder 2003). However, the fundamental issue of the usage of the word "right," which has the aforementioned economic connotations, remains. Rather, it may make more sense to use the already existing term ethnocentric populist (Rydgren 2005) to refer to these actors.

Table 2.5: Attributes Specific to Left-Wing Populism and Ethnocentric Populism (Differences Italicized)

Left-wing Populism	Ethnocentric Populism
• Focuses anger at economic elite and institutions • Anyone who is not an elite is welcome as member of "the people" • *Does not focus anger at immigrants* • *Attempts to mitigate differences between ethnic and racial groups*	• Focuses anger at economic elite and institutions • Argues that there is a core group of individuals who are "the people" • *Highly suspicious of immigration* • *Highly suspicious of ethnic/racial outsiders and minorities*

The attributes of ethnocentric populism are be divided into three ways above in table 2.5: General mindset, economic, and social. The general mindset, which is shared with all variations of populism, is that politicians and policymakers should heed the desires of the people, career politicians do not care about the welfare of regular people, and the world is divided those who have and those who have-not. In economics, populists of all stripes prefer redistribution, more

government intervention, and a rejection of the free market. On the social side, however, there is some variation. While populism does not say much about immigration and ethnic minorities in general, different strains have different views on the subject. Ethnocentric populism is strongly against immigration and is highly suspicious of ethnic minorities while left-wing populism is not. A summary of the concepts is presented below in table 2.6.

Table 2.6: Summary of Concept Definitions for This Investigation

- **Party Categorization**- Use ideology and coding party actions/rhetoric as the basis for dividing up populist and non-populist parties.
- **Left**- Can refer to social or economic policy. On social policy it emphasizes a desire for change while on economic policy a desire for more government intervention. Will be used mostly in relation to economic policy.
- **Right**- Can refer to social or economic policy. On social policy it emphasizes suspicion of change while on economic policy a desire for less government intervention. Will be used mostly in relation to economic policy.
- **Ideology**- Bundle or set of ideas that is coherently bound together in a logical way
- **Populism**- Mindset in which an individual believes that the foremost political issue is the conflict between the elites and people
- **Left-wing Populism**- Follows fundamentals of populism. Focuses on economic inequality and attempts to minimize any racial or ethnic divisions among people
- **Right-wing Populism**- Follows fundamentals of populism. Emphasizes anti-immigration sentiment and ethnonationalism while also espousing less government intervention in economy.
- **Ethnocentric Populism**- Follows fundamentals of populism. Emphasizes anti-immigration sentiment and ethnonationalism.

Introduction to the Theory

The introduction of the term ethnocentric populism forces a modification of the main research question guiding this dissertation: What is causing an increase in the electoral support for ethnocentric populist actors in the late 2010s? The cursory examination indicated that the parties doing well in the late 2010s tended to be a part of this strain of populism and so the theory needs to address what is driving support for ethnocentric populists in particular. To do this, the theory is divided into a number of different sections. To start, the theory and alternative

theories will be discussed. The final section of this chapter connects these ideas to the research design.

Theory for This Dissertation

The theory has a number of different components. It is rooted in the difficulties of changing fundamental political orientations and the importance of group-based identity as important antecedents. It moves to a discussion of exogenous shocks and their effects on support for populist actors by activating a feeling of status threat among individuals of a dominant group. The argument concludes by noting that individuals who feel status threat will most likely consider voting as their primary option of bringing changes that push back against the exogenous shock of mass migration.

Scholars have long debated how partisan attitudes affect political attitudes and form behaviors (Campbell et al. 1960). The impressible years hypothesis argues that individuals, on average, in their early adulthood years often change their views but generally maintain their fundamental political attitudes in their later adult years (Krosnick and Alwin 1989). This indicates that human beings are wired to maintain world views that are solidified in adulthood (Hatemi et al. 2009; Jervis 1976; Prior 2010). In particular, fundamental political orientations tend to remain in place through one's adult life (Searing et al. 1976; Sears and Funk 1999). This appears to be especially true for highly symbolic political attitudes such as partisan attachments and loyalties (Krosnick 1991), suggesting that short-term changes in partisanship and consequently election outcomes should be less likely.

However, spikes in populist support have happened over time. What causes these increases in support to occur? One of the fundamental building blocks of humanity is the creation of societies in which groups of individuals work together to improve their station

(Shinada et al. 2004). Enforcing collective action to help make sure that a society is capable of running is not an easy task and there is always the possibility of individuals reneging on their duties (Olson 1965). However, one way to encourage cooperation is working alongside with individuals who look similar and share cultural norms. In circumstances where a person is forced to interact with others, showing more trust in someone who looks similar can be a non-cognitively taxing action that helps establish a relationship (Hammond and Axelrod 2006). Establishing cooperation and trust is difficult; in order to facilitate group-building, individuals will even use mundane and inconsequential traits as a heuristic to build a relationship (Woolley and Fishbach 2017). A more substantive attempt at building relations can be through working with those of the same ethnic group as such individuals tend to be more closely related genetically than those who are of a different background (Axelrod 1984; Jones 2018).

Conversely, according to this argument, it is more difficult to establish relations with those who are of a different. Without the ability to utilize simple heuristics like ethnic affiliation, hostilities may erupt more quickly. Realistic group conflict theory argues that tangible reasons for conflict could include the finite nature of resources and divergent life goals that different groups may hold (Sherif and Sherif 1969). Conflict leads to a zero-sum circumstance where victory by one group automatically leads to defeat for the other.

What the realist group theory indicates is that insiders consider outsiders to be rivals worthy of suspicion. Consider this within the context of the Immigration Crisis and the Migration Crisis in the United States and Europe respectively. In both countries, a large influx of newcomers brought the possibility of new competition with the possibility of future citizenship extending competition to the political arena. Conflict between an already existing group and a newcomer outsider group generates an opportunity for populist parties, particularly those of the

ethnocentric strain, to break the mostly solidified political orientations of individuals formed during their most impressionable years (Krosnick and Alwin 1989). The exogenous shock of being forced to deal with a new political and social landscape can force some individuals consider voting and supporting actors once considered to be outside the mainstream.

An exogenous shock is an unexpected external event that can affect actors who may not be directly involved in causing the occurrence (Rosenfeld 2018). People desire physical safety and when this is taken away, they may be willing to look to ideas and actors who can provide this (Echebarria-Echabe and Fernandez-Guede 2006). An exogenous shock can activate fear that can also threaten not just the individual but entire groups (Finseraas and Listhaug 2013; Larsen et al. 2020). Considering such events, individuals may reevaluate what they consider to be the best ways to protect themselves (Haner et al. 2019).

When evaluating the new environment, an individual may consider trading freedom for more physical security (Morella and Zechmeister 2009). There is also evidence that during such a shock, there may also be increased negative sentiments directed at outgroups which may be considered a threat (Echebarria-Echabe and Fernandez-Guede 2006). These sentiments could produce policy preferences for strict border controls and ending immigration for outgroups (Haner et al. 2019). The effect may be particularly powerful in relatively homogenous communities that have little experience with outsiders (Nussio et al. 2019).

The possibility of an exogenous shock causing changes to one's thoughts can occur in non-security related scenarios as well. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, political norms that limited participation were suddenly gone. Russians, who for decades had been socialized to accept authoritarian values, were forced to accept a new environment of multi-party elections. Mishler and Rose (2007), by examining data from 1992 through 2005, concluded that some older

Russians were willing to embrace democratic values such as multi-party elections, but younger Russians were more likely to embrace these changes.

This examination into exogenous shocks indicates that there is the possibility of individuals changing their minds given the right circumstances. When experiencing a security threat such as terrorist attacks, some evidence shows that individuals are more willing to give up their personal liberties (Hetherington and Suhay 2011; Morella and Zechmeister 2009) while also being more willing to take up more hardline stances on immigration (Echebarria-Echabe and Fernandez-Guede 2006; Finseraas and Listhaug 2013).

With the understanding that individuals tend to retain their fundamental political stances under most situations, but are willing to change under circumstances in which an exogenous shock forces a reassessment on how to live safely, ethnocentric populists have a strong opportunity to present themselves as a potential solution. As such actors are keen on espousing the importance of maintaining ingroup solidarity while maintaining suspicion of outsiders (Rydgren 2005), they are a natural choice for those who feel troubled by the growing number of outsiders.

The 2014-2015 Migrant Crisis presented a strong opportunity for ethnocentric populists to present their case to the general public as it showed, in real time, large numbers of migrants entering the European continent. The effects of these events were not temporary. The immigrants who entered the United States and Europe planned on making these places their permanent homes. This influx of permanent residents represents a possibility of a change to the low salience of group-based identification around 2014-2015. An influx of outsiders may represent a multifaceted threat to an existing group. Collectively, these threats could be seen as representing a threat to the existing dominant group and in particular, a threat to that group's ability to remain

as the largest actor in a country. This event was especially threatening to whites, representing the possibility that their power would be reduced on both sides of the Atlantic.

An anxiety born out of the dual issue of security and cultural-based challenges could cause enough of a shock to individuals to start reconsidering their options. In the event of a large influx of individuals who are believed to cause increased security issues while also diluting cultural homogeneity, it is reasonable to consider that many individuals feel a certain degree of fear. Fear potentially forces individuals to reconsider existing frameworks of reference and look for ways that could help better protect their interests (Barbalet 1998). In particular, whenever possible individuals may feel inclined to be around people who have similar qualities while attempting to distance themselves from those who are different (Blanton et al. 2000). This helps explain the phenomenon of white flight from urban areas in the United States along with the phenomenon of white avoidance in Europe in which whites, when they attempt to move, avoid areas that are home to many ethnic minorities (Andersen 2017; Bråmå 2006).

Figure 2.1 Graphic Illustration of Theory



Figure 2.1 provides an illustration of how the theory works. The ways in which an individual perceives ingroups and outgroups is a key point regarding what type of parties an individual may choose. If a person believes that an outgroup is not a threat to their safety, they

have no incentive to vote for ethnocentric populist parties. However, if they feel that their safety is being compromised, as was the case during the Immigration and Migrant Crises, they may start to feel status threat. If they no longer feel that their dominant place in society is secure, then they may choose to vote for ethnocentric populist parties. Overall, perceptions at the individual level, and a feeling of decreased safety, are key driving forces of attitudes and behavior.

While there is a possibility that the Immigration and Migrant Crises have changed the political landscape permanently, it should also be noted that the rise in support for ethnocentric populist actors may be a temporary phenomenon. The crises which had been salient in the 2014-2015 time period did not continue beyond those years. With immigration no longer being as salient, the vote shares for ethnocentric populists may start to decrease. Without a migrant-related crisis, individuals may no longer feel that their safety, demographic or otherwise, was being threatened. As the argument focuses on immigration-related issues being the primary driver of support for ethnocentric populists, the end of the crises may cause some voters to rethink their voting preferences. This could lead to a situation in which ethnocentric populist vote shares may start to return to pre-Crisis levels.

How does this translate into support for ethnocentric populist actors? The previous paragraph mentioned that decades of immigration already changed the West's demographic composition. The children of immigrants sometimes maintain a distinct identity within Western countries. If a group maintains a distinct identity, it is plausible that it could also exercise this identity through political action. For example, the Dutch Denk Party, a party founded by Muslims and focusing on the interests of Muslims, won seats in the 2017 Legislative Election (Otjes and Krouwel 2019). The rise of such parties creates a situation where status threat could be felt more tangibly. Groups may desire "descriptive representatives," or those who mirror their

own background in experience and personal characteristics. The assumption is that such a representative has a stronger attachment, understanding of their own groups' interests and sentiments, and loyalty to that group's interests (Mansbridge 1999).

The rising numbers of outsiders could potentially undermine the psychological benefits individuals accrue when seeing their group do well (Brown 2000). Witnessing the loss of their own group's dominance could lead to resentment and negative attitudes towards the newcomers (Mutz 2018). These sentiments may be compounded by a feeling that immigrants can usher in a cultural change that may not be welcomed by the existing population. The belief among some is that such a large influx could make society harder to navigate as a more diverse society can make it difficult for individuals to build social capital and trust (Putnam 2007).

The fear born from these shocks may encourage individuals to consider new ways to protect themselves (Barbalet 1998). One way is using physical violence to intimidate a minority group and attempting to get them to leave through the threat of violence. However, physical conflict and the possibility of large-scale armed conflict is not enticing due to the costs. While this does not mean that armed conflict is impossible, a long-term fight forces people to make many sacrifices and so a dominant group often desires to maintain the status quo by doing the bare minimum (Sidanius and Pratto 1999). In addition, actions such as protests, riots, and intimidation of rivals are costly in terms of time and resources (Nadler and Halabi 2002). These costs make any form of physical conflict difficult to pursue.

However, one political act that is not particularly costly, in most situations, is voting. While it sometimes requires an individual to spend a day in line, it is a relatively painless act that should not put a participant's life in danger and does not require long-term investment. Because it is not as costly of an action as long-term violent conflict, those feeling status threat might

consider making an adjustment to their voting patterns (Mutz 2018). Those who have dominated the political, economic, and social landscape, such as White Americans and the various white ethnic groups across Europe, may be incentivized to choose policies that reinforce status quo demographic and political power (Halabi, Dovidio, and Nadler 2008).

The theory here is multistep. It first argues that, as an antecedent, human beings are wired to maintain worldviews that are solidified in adulthood. It also argues that humans are interested in forming group identities, and one major outlet for forming these identities is on ethnic and/or racial lines. While these identities exist, they are not always salient. However, if a dominant ethnic or racial group feels challenged by another group, particularly when an exogenous shock occurs, some individuals may feel status threat. Operating in such an environment, those who feel threatened consider actions that will help stop change. While violence is possible, the potential costs are high. There are other potential options such as protesting, rioting, attempting to influence members of the legislature, and pressuring large companies, but these require solving a collective action problem; many individuals will need to coordinate their actions (Olson 1965). A less costly alternative that does not require solving the collective action problem is voting. Ethnocentric populist actors, because of their xenophobic attitudes (Rydgren 2005), make choices that advance their interests.

An important aspect of the theory is the intervention of the exogenous "treatment." The theory indicates that due to events from the 2014-2015 time period, attitude changes are a possibility. One hypothesis is whether anti-immigration sentiment is playing a stronger role in supporting ethnocentric populists in the post-2014/2015 time period. The argument here is that a large influx of outsiders makes some individuals prefer being around those who look more like themselves as it provides a certain degree of comfort and peace of mind (Blanton et al. 2000).

This provides a second hypothesis: Those who support ethnocentric populists should feel more ingroup solidarity in the post-2014/2015 time period than in the pre-2014/2015 time period.

Ultimately, the argument is that in the pre-2014/2015 time period, the economic stances of right-wing populists played a role in whether a person supported them or not. Considering the importance of the 2014-2015 shocks, the expectation is that new voters for these parties are more interested in their social/immigration stances. This is the basis for the third hypothesis: More right-leaning economic stances increase support for right-wing populists, but this should lose salience in the post-2014/2015 time period as immigration issues increase salience.

H1: On average, the coefficient for anti-immigration sentiment should be larger in the post-2014/2015 time period than the pre-2014/2015 time period.

H2: On average, the coefficient for ingroup salience for ethnocentric populist actors should be larger in the post-2014/2015 time period than the pre-2014/2015 time period.

H3: On average, the coefficients for right-leaning economic stances for right-wing populists should be larger in the pre-2014/2015 time period and smaller in the post-2014/2015 time period.

Alternative Theories

Many competing theories attempt to explain the causes of support for populism. At times, contradictory findings make it difficult to say whether any one reason absolutely holds across all cases (Arzheimer 2009). Overall, the scholarship appears to make a distinction between these two groups (Judis 2016; Otjes and Louwerse 2015; Rodrik 2017; Stavrakakis and Katsambekis 2014). Rodrik (2017) and argues that left-wing populism, which focuses predominately on economic grievances, is mostly fueled by economic destabilization. Right-wing populism is fueled, according to this approach, by large scale migration of individuals who hail from countries with distinct cultures and religions. For the purpose of this discussion, ethnocentric populism, radical right, far right, and other related terms are subsumed under right-wing populism.

If loathing of elites is the key link among all populists, then a combination of dissatisfaction with the status quo and a feeling of helplessness in changing the system may play a role in supporting populists. The logic is that if an individual feels that those in power are not capable of bringing positive changes to society, they should be voted out (Cutts et al. 2011; Lubbers et al. 2002; Ramiro and Gomez 2017; Roodujin et al. 2016; Spruyt et al. 2016; Zhirkov 2014). Notably, these findings appear to hold when examining right-wing populist-style parties (Fieschi and Heywood 2004; Lubbers et al. 2002; Werts et al. 2013) and also left-wing populist-style parties (Ramiro and Gomez 2017).

Dissatisfaction differs from feelings of social alienation in which an individual believes that he or she is being left out of society (Oesch 2008). This argument focuses on individuals feeling that they are not welcome and because of this, will go on to support populists who also happen to be outsiders (Gest 2016; Gidron and Hall 2020; Oesch 2008). The theory on social alienation can be extended to a phenomenon in which rural voters who have felt the rise of urbanization feel the need to support populists (Sänkiaho 1971; Scoones et al. 2018).

Scholars have studied the importance of an individual's psychological status as a potential driving force for supporting right-wing populism. Particularly when conceptualizing right-wing populist parties, authoritarian values are considered to go hand in hand with such actors (Mudde 2007). Authoritarian values, which can be defined as the desire for more law and order and stability (Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Muis and Immerzeel 2017), have been found to play a role in increased support for right-wing populist parties' desire to prevent change (Eke and Kuzio 2000; McCarthy 2019; Norris and Inglehart 2019; Van Hauwaert and van Kessel 2017).

Some research links gender and support for populists. Particularly for many right-wing populist parties, there tends to be a culture of promoting traditional gender norms which may not be agreeable to many women (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2015). This factor could create a situation in which more men vote for right-wing populists than women (Harteveld et al. 2015; Rashkova and Zankina 2017; Spierings and Zaslove 2015). Support even appears to extend to other forms of participation, such as liking Facebook posts by populist parties (Bobba et al. 2018). However, it is not always the case that populist parties completely fail with female voters. After the ouster of Jean-Marie Le Pen and the beginning of his daughter Marine Le Pen's control over the National Front, the party softened a number of its stances on traditional gender norms which may have contributed to increased support from women (Mayer 2013).

Those with lower levels of education, who have often been hurt by economic globalization, also appear to be more likely to support populists (Matthes and Schmuck 2017; Rydgren and Ruth 2011; Schmuck and Matthes 2015). Individuals with higher education may have already formed opinions regarding political topics and may be less likely to be swayed (Schmuck and Matthes 2015; Zaller 1992).

There may also be a link between religiosity, particularly a commitment to Christianity and its teachings, and support for right-wing populists. Populists often try to appeal to religious individuals by incorporating Judeo-Christian values into their platforms, but religious individuals historically have avoided right-wing populism. This may be the result of Christianity's stances regarding charity and tolerance which differ from right-wing populism's general hostility to those who hail from different backgrounds (Huber and Yendall 2019). Religious individuals also tend to be firmly attached to more mainstream conservative parties such as Christian Democrats

and appear to be less likely to vote for right-wing populist parties (Arzheimer and Carter 2009; Immerzeel et al. 2013; Montgomery and Winter 2015).

Evidence suggests that a party's stance on the welfare state can play a role in support for populists. As a more robust welfare state can better protect working class individuals, this group is less inclined to vote for outsider parties such as right-wing populists who are not interested in expanding the welfare state (de Koster et al. 2013; Swank and Betz 2003).

While somewhat beyond the more individual-level focused nature of this overview, there are also some scholars who have researched broader structural variables which may play a role in increasing or decreasing support for populists. One possible influence in support for populist parties depends on how elections are conducted. For example, countries with large district magnitudes and low electoral thresholds give populist parties the opportunity to increase their seat totals and gain a voice in a national legislature (Golder 2003; Smith 2010; Veugelers and Magnan 2005).

Economic Anxiety, Euroskepticism, and Immigration

A major branch of the literature connects economic anxiety to the rise of populist support. The argument is that non-populist political actors, who have maintained control over policy for many decades, are perceived to have failed a large segment of the population. From the 1970s through the 2010s, a number of large-scale structural changes occurred in the economies of many Western countries. Working class individuals, who had been able to enjoy a stable middle-class lifestyle, slowly but steadily lost their jobs due to a combination of offshoring and automation (Gest 2016; Rodrik 2018).

Areas with high unemployment rates also appear to increase the likelihood of support for populists (Cochrane and Nevitte 2014; Georgiadou et al. 2018; Rydgren and Ruth 2011). It is

possible that right-wing populist parties' rhetoric painting immigrants as scapegoats who are taking jobs away from native-born residents during hard times was effective (Cochrane and Nevitte 2014). However, while the Great Recession helped bring populists to government in Greece (Aslanidis and Kaltwasser 2016), it did not serve as a catalyst for a right-wing populist party's electoral success in Spain (Alonso and Kaltwasser 2015). According to Anduiza and Ricio (2019), who conducted work on nine different European countries and examined an individual's vulnerability, deprivation, and negative sociotropic perceptions, there appears to be widespread variation in the effects of these variables. However, they did find some cross-national evidence that of the three, sociotropic perceptions appear to have the biggest influence.

At its surface, the theory is logical. Individuals who are struggling economically may consider moving away from more mainstream parties to support populists. However, when examining the events that occurred across the Western world, economic anxiety is unlikely to be the main cause of this surge in support. If economic anxiety were the most salient variable, then why did the spike occur in the late 2010s? The West had collectively experienced a recession in the late 2000s. Around the late 2000s and early 2010s, on the European side, there was also a Eurozone crisis that threatened to irreparably damage the integrity of the European project (Pisani-Ferry 2014). Yet across the West, the surge did not happen until the late 2010s. Studies also indicate that those who suffered economically do not necessarily support populist actors (Lubbers and Scheeper 2002; Ramiro and Gomez 2017).

Aside from economic anxiety, another high-profile theory is Euroskepticism. The argument is rooted in a mistrust of the European Union. The logic is that the growth in support for populism emanates from changes in European political life in which the European Union has gained more strength and influence. Following the end of the Second World War, a number of

Western European policymakers decided to strengthen economic, political, and social ties among the different nations of the continent. They argued that stronger ties would reduce chances of war and generate more unity. To create this stability, they instituted a single currency, the Euro (Pisany-Ferry 2014). While in the latter years of the twentieth century the growing strength of the European Union did not engender widespread opposition, the implementation of the Euro and other projects, such as the breakdown of movement between member states, was not universally supported (Judis 2018). These policies, which were championed by the European Union, appeared to be infringing on the independence of individual European Union members. This in turn upset some individuals who were not happy that a supranational organization was gaining more power (Hooghe and Marks 2005; Ivarsflaten 2005; Werts, Scheepers, and Lubbers 2013).

The lack of borders within the European Union permitted the large number of migrants who entered the EU to disperse throughout the member states. The 2014-2015 Migrant Crisis is also not the first time that anger was directed at increased European integration. During the Eurozone Crisis of the late 2000s and early 2010s, Southern European countries such as Greece, Spain, Italy, and Portugal experienced financial hardships due to their strong budget deficits; they had borrowed and spent large amounts of money after adopting the Euro and ran large budget deficits (Judis 2018). While countries can devalue their currencies if they control their own monetary policies, this was not the case among Eurozone countries (Pisani-Ferry 2014). In addition, Euroskepticism's effects are not constant across all demographic groups; for those who have less education and work in blue collar jobs, the marginal effects of perceived ethnic threat are great than that of Euroskepticism's (Werts et al. 2013).

Considering this predicament, why did a spike in support for populists fail to occur during this time period? If Euroskepticism was the key, then what explains spikes in support in

other parts of the world such as North and South America? In particular, Euroskepticism is a European phenomenon and does not help explain why Donald Trump, an American presidential candidate who adopted populist talking points succeeded electorally in 2016.

Another possible explanation for populism's success is immigration (Zhirkov 2014). Immigration has changed the social landscape of many Western countries. In places such as the United Kingdom and France, large numbers of migrants dominate housing in many neighborhoods and districts. This demographic change has caused a number of issues, including complaints by some native Europeans who argue that many immigrants have segregated themselves and are not integrating into society (Caldwell 2009).

The theory suggests that a stronger presence of minorities causes more right-wing populist support because the newcomers are perceived as an economic, cultural, or security threat (Dinas and van Spanje 2011; Ford and Goodwin 2010; Hangartner et al. 2018; Janssen et al. 2019; Strömblad and Malmberg 2016). In an analysis of Sweden, living in areas with large minority populations appears to increase support for right-wing populists (Stromblad and Malmberg 2016). An analysis of the British National Party in the United Kingdom produced similar results (Bowyer 2008; Ford and Goodwin 2010).

However, it is not always the case that living near non-whites causes more hostility towards minority groups; increased exposure and a chance to get to know minorities on a personal level could dampen hostilities (Kaufmann and Harris 2015). There is also evidence that the relationship is not linear; an analysis in the Netherlands indicates that areas with small minority populations exhibit high support for the right-wing populist Party of Freedom. However, as the percentage of minorities gets closer to 25 percent, support for the Party of Freedom decreases. When the percentage is over 25, support for the Party of Freedom again

increases (van Wijk et al. 2020). The difficulties in establishing hard connections between immigration and populist support could be partly due to preexisting attitudes among individuals. Some evidence also indicates that whites who remain in communities that become more diverse feel more hostility towards minorities than those who choose to move into more diverse communities (Laurence and Bentley 2016). It is also possible that immigration by itself is not enough but requires a mediating variable, such as political cynicism (Bos et al. 2018). The broader theory that immigration is the cause of a spike in populist support does not tell the whole story.

Conclusion

This chapter outlined two fundamental building blocks that are needed to create a feasible research design. The theory is also important guide for the research design as it is meant to lay out the causal pathway of the analysis. The theory allows for the operationalization of independent variable(s) and dependent variable(s) that could be used to test hypotheses. For the research design and analytical chapters, this means finding appropriate variables that measure status threat and ingroup salience will be an important task.

The next chapter describes the countries will be included in the analysis, discusses the dependent variable, the type of data needed for the analysis, which datasets will suffice, and also some flaws of the data.

Chapter 3: The Research Design

Introduction

In order to present the overall direction of the analysis, this chapter has a number of missions. The first mission is to lay out the country case selection process. The second is to provide a selection process for deciding which parties should be considered ethnocentric populist parties. The third is to delineate which parties should be considered "left" and "right" on a traditional economic policy scale. The next step is creating a dependent variable. Afterwards, the discussion moves on to discusses what type of data might be appropriate for analysis and then outlines the datasets chosen for the analytical chapters.

Case Selection by Other Scholars

The introductory chapter suggested that the increase in populist support occurred in Western Europe and the United States. Case selection needs to take into consideration what "Western Europe" means. In other words, which countries have membership?

To better understand the selection process, 65 different peer-reviewed articles which either have the term "Western Europe" in the title or make reference to the term in the text have been gathered. To keep the articles relatively close to the topic at hand, all the articles were related to, in one way or another, elections, parties, and/or political behavior.

Table 3.1: List of Western European Countries Selected by Researchers

Austria (33)	Allen (2017), Arzheimer (2009), Arzheimer and Carter (2009), Bornschier (2010), Chappell and Veiga (2000), Dassonneville and Hooghe (2017), Evans (2005), Golder (2003), Gomez et al. (2016), Harteveld et al. (2015), Jackman and Volpert 1996, Immerzeel et al. (2013), Ivarsflaten (2008), Jesuit et al. (2009), Kessler and Freeman (2005), Kriesi et al. (2006), Lubbers et al. (2002), Mau and Burkhardt (2009), Matthes and Schmuck (2017), Mudde (2013), Oesch (2008), Pettigrew (1998), Rydgren (2008), Schumacher and van Kersbergen (2016), Smith (2010), Spierings et al. (2017), Spies and Franzmann (2011), Stockemer (2017), Stoll (2010), Swank and Betz (2003), Van Spanje (2010), Veugelers and Magnan (2005), Zhirkov (2014)

Belgium (36) (Individual Analysis of Flanders and Wallonia Combined)	Adams et al. (2006), Allen (2017), Arzheimer (2009), Arzheimer and Carter (2009), Chappell and Veiga (2000), Dassonneville and Hooghe (2017), Evans (2005), Ezrow (2005), Golder (2003), Harteveld et al. (2015), Jackman and Volpert 1996, Immerzeel et al. (2013), Ivarsflaten (2008), Jesuit et al. (2009), Kessler and Freeman (2005), Knigge (1998), Lubbers et al. (2002), Mau and Burkhardt (2009), Matthes and Schmuck (2017), Montgomery and Winter (2015), Mudde (2013), Oesch (2008), Pettigrew (1998), Rydgren (2008), Rydgren (2009), Smith (2010), Spierings et al. (2017), Spies and Franzmann (2011), Stockemer (2017), Stoll (2010), Swank and Betz (2003), Van der Brug et al. (2000), Van Spanje (2010), Veugelers and Magnan (2005), Werts et al. (2012), Zhirkov (2014)
Cyprus (3)	Dassonneville and Hooghe (2017), Gomez et al. (2016), Ramiro (2016),
Denmark (35)	Adams et al. (2006), Allen (2017), Arzheimer (2009), Arzheimer and Carter (2009), Chappell and Veiga (2000), Clark (2009), Dassonneville and Hooghe (2017), Evans (2005), Ezrow (2005), Golder (2003), Gomez et al. (2016), Harteveld et al. (2015), Jackman and Volpert 1996, Ivarsflaten (2008), Jesuit et al. (2009), Kessler and Freeman (2005), Knigge (1998), Lubbers et al. (2002), Mau and Burkhardt (2009), Montgomery and Winter (2015), Mudde (2013), Ramiro (2016), Rydgren (2008), Rydgren (2009), Schumacher and van Kersbergen (2016), Smith (2010), Spierings et al. (2017), Spies and Franzmann (2011), Stockemer (2017), Stoll (2010), Swank and Betz (2003), Van der Brug et al. (2000), Van Spanje (2010), Veugelers and Magnan (2005), Zhirkov (2014)
Finland (22)	Allen (2017), Arzheimer (2009), Chappell and Veiga (2000), Dassonneville and Hooghe (2017), Golder (2003), Gomez et al. (2016), Harteveld et al. (2015), Jackman and Volpert (1996), Immerzeel et al. (2013), Lubbers et al. (2002), Mau and Burkhardt (2009), Mudde (2013), Ramiro (2016), Schumacher and van Kersbergen (2016), Smith (2010), Spierings et al. (2017), Spies and Franzmann (2011), Stockemer (2017), Stoll (2010), Swank and Betz (2003), Veugelers and Magnan (2005), Zhirkov (2014)
France (42)	Adams et al. (2006), Allen (2017), Arzheimer (2009), Arzheimer and Carter (2009), Bornschier (2010), Chappell and Veiga (2000), Clark (2009), Dassonneville and Hooghe (2017), Evans (2005), Ezrow (2005), Golder (2003), Gomez et al. (2016), Harteveld et al. (2015), Husbands (1988), Jackman and Volpert (1996), Ivarsflaten (2008), Jesuit et al. (2009), Kessler and Freeman (2005), Knigge (1998), Kriesi et al. (2006), Lubbers et al. (2002), Mau and Burkhardt (2009), Matthes and Schmuck (2017), Montgomery and Winter (2015), Mudde (2013), Oesch (2008), Pettigrew (1998), Ramiro (2016), Roodujin and Akkerman (2017), Rydgren (2008), Rydgren (2009), Schumacher and van Kersbergen (2016), Smith (2010), Spies and Franzmann (2011), Stockemer (2017), Stoll (2010), Swank and Betz (2003), Van der Brug et al. (2000), Van Spanje (2010), Veugelers and Magnan (2005), Werts et al. (2012), Zhirkov (2014)
Germany (33) (West	Adams et al. (2006), Arzheimer (2009), Bornschier (2010), Chappell and Veiga (2000), Clark (2009), Dassonneville and Hooghe (2017), Evans (2005), Ezrow (2005), Golder (2003), Gomez et al. (2016), Husbands (1988),

Germany Included)	Ivarsflaten (2008), Jackman and Volpert (1996), Jesuit et al. (2009), Kessler and Freeman (2005), Knigge (1998), Kriesi et al. (2006), Lubbers et al. (2002), Mau and Burkhardt (2009), Matthes and Schmuck (2017), Mudde (2013), Pettigrew (1998), Ramiro (2016), Roodujin and Akkerman (2017), Smith (2010), Spies and Franzmann (2011), Stockemer (2017), Stoll (2010), Swank and Betz (2003), Van der Brug et al. (2000), Van Spanje (2010), Veugelers and Magnan (2005), Zhirkov (2014)
Greece (18)	Adams et al. (2006), Arzheimer (2009), Clark (2009), Dassonneville and Hooghe (2017), Ezrow (2005), Golder (2003), Gomez et al. (2016), Harteveld et al. (2015), Jackman and Volpert (1996), Lubbers et al. (2002), Mau and Burkhardt (2009), Montgomery and Winter (2015), Mudde (2013), Ramiro (2016), Smith (2010), Spies and Franzmann (2011), Stockemer (2017), Stoll (2010)
Iceland (7)	Dassonneville and Hooghe (2017), Golder (2003), Gomez et al. (2016), Smith (2010), Spies and Franzmann (2011), Stockemer (2017), Stoll (2010)
Ireland (17)	Adams et al. (2006), Chappell and Veiga (2000), Dassonneville and Hooghe (2017), Ezrow (2005), Golder (2003), Gomez et al. (2016), Jackman and Volpert (1996), Lubbers et al. (2002), Mau and Burkhardt (2009), Mudde (2013), Ramiro (2016), Smith (2010), Spies and Franzmann (2011), Stockemer (2017), Stoll (2010), Swank and Betz (2003), Veugelers and Magnan (2005)
Italy (31)	Adams et al. (2006), Arzheimer (2009), Arzheimer and Carter (2009), Chappell and Veiga (2000), Clark (2009), Dassonneville and Hooghe (2017), Evans (2005), Ezrow (2005), Golder (2003), Gomez et al. (2016), Harteveld et al. (2015), Jackman and Volpert (1996), Immerzeel et al. (2013), Ivarsflaten (2008), Jesuit et al. (2009), Kessler and Freeman (2005), Knigge (1998), Lubbers et al. (2002), Mau and Burkhardt (2009), Ramiro (2016), Roodujin and Akkerman (2017), Smith (2010), Spierings et al. (2017), Spies and Franzmann (2011), Stockemer (2017), Stoll (2010), Swank and Betz (2003), Van der Brug et al. (2000), Van Spanje (2010), Veugelers and Magnan (2005), Zhirkov (2014)
Luxembourg (12)	Adams et al. (2006), Dassonneville and Hooghe (2017), Ezrow (2005), Golder (2003), Gomez et al. (2016), Lubbers et al. (2002), Mau and Burkhardt (2009), Mudde (2013), Ramiro (2016), Smith (2010), Spies and Franzmann (2011), Stoll (2010)
Malta (3)	Dassonneville and Hooghe (2017), Golder (2003), Harteveld et al. (2015)
The Netherlands (38)	Adams et al. (2006), Allen (2017), Arzheimer (2009), Arzheimer and Carter (2009), Bornschier (2010), Chappell and Veiga (2000), Clark (2009), Dassonneville and Hooghe (2017), Ezrow (2005), Golder (2003), Gomez et al. (2016), Harteveld et al. (2015), Husbands (1988), Jackman and Volpert (1996), Immerzeel et al. (2013), Ivarsflaten (2008), Knigge (1998), Kriesi et al. (2006), Lubbers et al. (2002), Mau and Burkhardt (2009), Montgomery and Winter (2015), Mudde (2013), Pettigrew (1998), Ramiro (2016), Roodujin and Akkerman (2017), Rydgren (2008), Schumacher and van Kersbergen (2016), Smith (2010), Spierings et al. (2017), Spies and Franzmann (2011), Stockemer (2017), Stoll (2010), Swank and Betz (2003),

	Van der Brug et al. (2000), Van Spanje (2010), Veugelers and Magnan (2005), Werts et al. (2012), Zhirkov (2014)
Norway (27)	Allen (2017), Arzheimer (2009), Arzheimer and Carter (2009), Dassonneville and Hooghe (2017), Evans (2005), Golder (2003), Gomez et al. (2016), Jackman and Volpert (1996), Immerzeel et al. (2013), Ivarsflaten (2008), Lubbers et al. (2002), Mau and Burkhardt (2009), Matthes and Schmuck (2017), Mudde (2013), Oesch (2008), Rydgren (2008), Rydgren (2009), Schumacher and van Kersbergen (2016), Smith (2010), Spierings et al. (2017), Spies and Franzmann (2011), Stockemer (2017), Stoll (2010), Swank and Betz (2003), Van Spanje (2010), Veugelers and Magnan (2005), Zhirkov (2014)
Portugal (17)	Arzheimer (2009), Chappell and Veiga (2000), Clark (2009), Dassonneville and Hooghe (2017), Ezrow (2005), Golder (2003), Gomez et al. (2016), Jackman and Volpert (1996), Lubbers et al. (2002), Mau and Burkhardt (2009), Mudde (2013), Ramiro (2016), Smith (2010), Spies and Franzmann (2011), Stockemer (2017), Stoll (2010), Swank and Betz (2003),
Spain (19)	Adams et al. (2006), Arzheimer (2009), Chappell and Veiga (2000), Clark (2009), Dassonneville and Hooghe (2017), Ezrow (2005), Golder (2003), Gomez et al. (2016), Jackman and Volpert (1996), Lubbers et al. (2002), Mau and Burkhardt (2009), Mudde (2013), Ramiro (2016), Smith (2010), Spies and Franzmann (2011), Stockemer (2017), Stoll (2010), Swank and Betz (2003), Veugelers and Magnan (2005),
Sweden (21)	Arzheimer (2009), Chappell and Veiga (2000), Dassonneville and Hooghe (2017), Golder (2003), Gomez et al. (2016), Harteveld et al. (2015), Jackman and Volpert (1996), Lubbers et al. (2002), Mau and Burkhardt (2009), Mudde (2013), Ramiro (2016), Schumacher and van Kersbergen (2016), Smith (2010), Spierings et al. (2017), Spies and Franzmann (2011), Stockemer (2017), Stoll (2010), Swank and Betz (2003), Van Spanje (2010), Veugelers and Magnan (2005), Zhirkov (2014)
Switzerland (25)	Allen (2017), Arzheimer and Carter (2009), Bornschier (2010), Dassonneville and Hooghe (2017), Golder (2003), Gomez et al. (2016), Husbands (1988), Jackman and Volpert (1996), Immerzeel et al. (2013), Ivarsflaten (2008), Kriesi et al. (2006), Mau and Burkhardt (2009), Matthes and Schmuck (2017), Montgomery and Winter (2015), Mudde (2013), Oesch (2008), Pettigrew (1998), Rydgren (2009), Smith (2010), Spierings et al. (2017), Stockemer (2017), Stoll (2010), Swank and Betz (2003), Van Spanje (2010), Zhirkov (2014)
United Kingdom (Great Britain Included) (26)	Adams et al. (2006), Bornschier (2010), Chappell and Veiga (2000), Clark (2009), Dassonneville and Hooghe (2017), Ezrow (2005), Golder (2003), Harteveld et al. (2015), Ivarsflaten (2008), Jackman and Volpert (1996), Jesuit et al. (2009), Kessler and Freeman (2005), Kriesi et al. (2006), Lubbers et al. (2002), Mau and Burkhardt (2009), Mudde (2013), Pettigrew (1998), Roodujin and Akkerman (2017), Smith (2010), Spies and Franzmann (2011), Stockemer (2017), Stoll (2010), Swank and Betz (2003), Van Spanje (2010), Veugelers and Magnan (2005), Werts et al. (2012),

An examination of the 65 different articles, presented as table 3.1, shows that twenty different countries have been included in the analysis. It is worth noting that microstates (Andorra, Vatican City, and San Marino, Liechtenstein, and Monaco) do not appear in any of these papers. This may be because smaller countries are often considered to have distinct political traits which make analyzing them with larger countries difficult (Anckar 2002). In addition, the authors do not include any of the former members of the Warsaw Pact. For these scholars, the main distinguishing factor between Western Europe and Eastern Europe appears to be whether the country was under Soviet influence. Beyond this point, there appears to be a wide range of case selection criteria that may be contingent on data availability, the identity of the scholars, the research question asked by the scholars, and/or other factors.

Many of the scholars were explicit in the reasoning behind their case selection and these varied widely. Some scholars noted that their selection process for Western European countries relied on another source. Mudde (2013) explicitly notes that his selection criteria for Western Europe was based on the website Electionresources.org. Werts et al. (2012) state that they used the CIA World Factbook (2009) in order to make distinctions between the regions of Europe.

Another group of scholars noted that their selection was the result of data availability. Depending on the dataset, sometimes scholars were limited by the questions that were available and for how long (Adams et al. 2006). Spierings et al. (2017) note that their selection process for Western European countries depended on whether the respondents could choose to vote for a populist radical right party. Gomez et al. (2016) limit their analysis to countries that were part of the European Election Studies and had at least one radical left party among the list of parties that respondents voted for in the previous national elections. Jesuit et al. (2009) also note that available data limited their analysis to seven countries. Kessler and Freeman (2005) state that

they had to exclude Sweden because eonly two respondents were known to have supported an extreme right party.

The most common justification was the result of a scholar's research interest and question. Allen (2017) focuses on comparing far right voters and honed in on countries where far right parties managed to win at least 3.5% of the vote or more in a national election between 2001 and 2008. This limited his sample to eight countries. Arzheimer and Carter (2009) analyze Western European countries that experienced a strong and persistent support for the radical right and this also limited their case selection to eight countries. On a similar note, Kessler and Freeman (2005) examine countries with national organized extreme right parties. Bornschier (2010)'s focus was on countries where right-wing populist parties managed to trigger a new cultural divide. Dassonneville and Hooghe (2017) scrutinize established democracies and opted to exclude post-Communist democracies. Gidron and Hall (2017)'s inquiry applies to developed democracies and includes not just Western European countries but also a number of East-Central European countries that had also successfully transitioned to democracy by the 2010s. Ivarsflaten (2008) examines countries that had successful populist right parties and conceptualizes such parties as those that were identified as populist right by other scholars and achieved at least 5% of the vote in the previous national election. Veuglers and Magnan (2005), on the other hand, focus on any Western European country where a new radical right party competed in elections. Montgomery and Winter (2015) select their countries on the basis of whether a serious populist contender was active in the most recent legislative election. Rydgren (2008), Oesch (2008), Roodujin and Akkerman (2017), and Van der Brug et al. (2000) use a similar criterion. An important consideration for Ramiro (2016) was whether a radical left party gained parliamentary representation in either the national parliament or European parliament from 1989-2009 to

exclude smaller groups from the analysis. Stockemer (2017) looks at the relationship between economic crises and electoral support and only includes countries with official subnational unit data. Veuglers and Magnan (2005) echo Kitschelt (1995) and examine ten Western European countries which they believed to have experienced post-industrial capitalism, the convergence of the main left and right parties, and the development of a patronage-based party system and political economy dubbed partocracy.

Many of these scholars omitted a number of Western European countries depending on how much success an ethnocentric populist-style party enjoyed. Golder (2003) challenges this approach, explicitly stating that the omission of prominent Western European countries, such as Ireland, Portugal, Iceland, Finland, Greece, and Luxembourg, undermines causal inferences because case selection decisions could overestimate the marginal effects of certain variables that purportedly increase the success of extreme right parties. Jackman and Volpert (1996) provide a different argument, stating that adding these countries and coding electoral support for far-right parties as zero assumes that traditional factors considered to increase support for such parties such as unemployment and immigration had no effect in those countries.

Country Case Selection

Before discussing the selection process of Western European countries, this section will outline why Eastern European countries that fell under Soviet hegemony in the Cold War are not included. It is true that Eastern European countries were affected by the Migrant Crisis. Over 350,000 migrants moved through Hungary with some even choosing to settle there (Kallius et al. 2016). Considering this shared experience, why not include Eastern European countries in the case selection?

Eastern European populist actors experienced increases in support before the Migrant Crisis. The reasons behind the success of populists may be due to differences in historical experiences. Eastern Europe was exposed to longstanding rule under Communist governments (Allen 2017) creating major institutional differences that may have aided ethnocentric populists.

Some scholars argued that long-term Communist rule weakened social trust and civil society in Eastern Europe and may have contributed to trust of ethnocentric populists. Under Communism, many spies and informers were embedded into society, although the intensity of scrutiny varied across time and countries. Because anyone could be working for the Communist Party, it was difficult to develop trust in others. Consequently, even after the end of Communist rule in the early 1990s, the region suffered from lower levels of trust and weaker civil society (Rydgren 2011). However, there is no conclusive evidence indicating that those who feel lower levels of social trust, on average, are more likely to support ethnocentric populist actors (Rydgren 2011; Zhikov 2014).

One clear advantage Eastern European populists enjoyed over their Western European counterparts was that almost all parties were created at the same time in Eastern Europe. Parties in Eastern Europe, with the exception of the Communist Party, are fairly new as they only emerged following the collapse of the Soviet Union in the late 80s/early 90s. All of these parties, including populists, started operating almost simultaneously allowing each an equal opportunity to reach out to voters (Allen 2017).

In Western Europe, many non-populist parties had already planted themselves firmly in certain ideological niches and controlled certain voting blocs (Allen 2017; Hanley 2004). By the time the first wave of ethnocentric populist parties gained prominence in the 1980s (Judis 2016; Rydgren 2010), Western Europe had already experienced many decades of multiparty democracy

(Boix 1999). In many Western Europe countries, Christian religious voters, who may have been a target of interest for ethnocentric populists, had long given their allegiance to Christian Democratic or other types of mainstream right parties (Arzheimer and Carter 2009). However, such voters were up for grabs in Eastern Europe (Allen 2017).

While displays of overt racism are considered a taboo in mainstream Western European society (Fennema 1997), this is not necessarily the case in Eastern Europe. For example, strong anger and mistrust directed towards the Roma, an ethnic minority that lives across Europe, is observable in much of Eastern Europe (Kende and Kreko 2020). This general hostility allows politicians such as Viktor Orban, longtime Prime Minister of Hungary, to make statements calling immigrants a threat to Hungary without facing severe repercussions (Bocskor 2018).

Due to historical experiences, Eastern European countries operated under differing institutional legacies that may have aided ethnocentric populists. Because ethnocentric populists in Eastern Europe did not get a late start, they were able to compete for a much larger portion of the electorate than their Western European counterparts. In addition, they benefited from a different culture in which general mistrust of outsiders and overt displays of this mistrust were more commonly accepted. Because of these differences, Eastern Europe represents a distinct institutional and cultural environment that may have allowed ethnocentric populists to gain prominence there before the beginning of the Migrant Crisis.

While a case can be made to include such parties, Eastern European countries are not included because Communist rule resulted in a distinct institutional legacy that makes such countries different from their non-Communist counterparts (Allen 2017; Bustikova and Kitschelt 2009; Harteveld et al. 2015). This project echoes the scholarship by noting that different political traditions resulted in differences between the Eastern and Western European populist radical

right parties in ideology and style (Immerzeel and Pickup 2015; Montgomery and Winter 2015). In Eastern Europe, even mainstream right parties have adopted staunchly exclusionary rhetoric calling against immigration and more freely employ ethnocentric, racist, and anti-Semitic appeals (Butikova and Kitschelt 2009; Montgomery and Winter 2015). This has caused a situation where ethnocentric populist parties operating in Eastern Europe have made even more ideologically extreme appeals than their Western European counterparts (Harteveld et al. 2015; Montgomery and Winter 2015). In addition, ethnocentric populist-style parties in Eastern Europe have not experienced Muslim immigration at the same levels of Western European countries and so rhetoric directed at outgroups in Eastern Europe often target minority groups such as the Roma and Jews that have resided in the region for many centuries (Montgomery and Winter 2015).

There are a few Western European countries, such as Ireland, Portugal, and Iceland, which do not have a prominent ethnocentric populist-style party operating in the national legislature (Golder 2003). The relatively new Moviment Patrijotti Maltin of Malta, which adopted the xenophobic and ingroup orientation espoused by ethnocentric populists (Cachia et al. 2020), did not exist until after the height of the Migrant Crisis. Alonso and Kaltwasser (2015) noted that Spain was not home to any successful ethnocentric populist-style parties. However, like Malta, Spain would eventually see the rise of the ethnocentric populist-style Vox Party following the end of the Migrant Crisis (Turnbull-Dugarte 2019).

Because Iceland, Ireland, Malta, Portugal and Spain did not host an ethnocentric populist-style political party during the years preceding the Migrant Crisis, these five countries are left out of the analytical chapters. This is in line with scholars who have argued that the existence of a successful and well-organized populist party was an important driving force behind their case

selection (Rydgren 2008; Montgomery and Winter 2015; Oesch 2008; and Van der Brug et al. 2000).

While not explicitly outlined here, other countries such as Canada, Australia, and New Zealand are also home to parties which might be considered ethnocentric populist. These include the One Nation Party in Australia and New Zealand First in New Zealand (Donovan and Redlawsk 2018). These countries did not experience the large influx of migrants that the United States and Europe experienced in the 2014-2015 time period. The People's Party of Canada did not exist during the time period under evaluation. They are also excluded from the analysis.

There is also one final consideration related to the size of a country. The Migrant Crisis was an international exogenous shock that involves a large number of countries. Some of the countries might be deemed small states, or countries that have populations less than five million. Because of their smaller size, scholars have argued that such states are often not fully independent and often more easily affected by outside forces (Jervis 1976; Vanhanen 1997). If case selection is also at least partly built on the idea that only countries most similar to one another should be grouped together (Knigge 1998; Kriesi et al. 2006), then countries that would not be similarly affected by an exogenous international crisis like the Migrant Crisis should be excluded (Rhodes, Wanna, and Weller 2009). On this basis, Cyprus and Luxembourg are omitted.

This leaves Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom as part of the main analysis. These Western Europe countries share similarities in patterns of state formation, nation-building, and democratization (Caramani and Manucci 2019). They also experienced increases in support for ethnocentric

populist parties. They will be examined separately from Belgium, Finland, Greece, and Norway which experienced a downturn during this time period.

On the Decision to Include the United States

The introductory chapter noted the 2016 success of President Donald Trump. A number of scholars have noted that Trump's behavior rhetoric greatly resembled that of a populist (Donovan and Redlawsk 2018; Lammers and Baldwin 2020). As someone who embodied the style of past populists, he has also been called the avatar of American populism (Guth 2016). With Trump's subsequent electoral victory, the United States merits inclusion in the analysis.

Instead of analyzing the United States together with Western European countries, it will be analyzed separately. While the United States differs from Western Europe is many ways, there are two pertinent reasons related to the analysis: The United States has a different history regarding government intervention in the economy and a distinct populist experience. On the issue of welfare, all Western European countries have adopted some sort of welfare state. While some, such as those in the Nordic countries, are more generous than others, redistributive policies have been the norm in Western Europe (Ennser-Jedenastik 2018). While there have been calls for a reduction in how much is spent by some parties (Afonso and Rennwald 2018), a complete cut of the social welfare system does not have much traction.

In the United States, there is no cradle to grave social welfare system. In addition, for many conventional conservatives, the expansion of government intervention into the economy is not particularly popular. For many conservatives in the United States, a free-market along with cuts to existing social welfare policies, which are already less extensive than those in Europe, is preferable (Hawley 2018). The possibility of a cradle to grave system is out of the question.

While the United States has seen its share of populist actors over its history, it has not experienced a long and constant post-World War II history with populist actors. There is no dedicated major, national-level populist party. Instead, on occasion there have been populist political candidates who have attempted to take over a party and win the presidential election. The only populist political candidate who has managed to not only win the party nomination but also the general election is Donald Trump (Judis 2016).

Aside from differences regarding the political legacy of populism on both sides of the Atlantic, there is also a major difference in terms of the salience of ethnonationalist-style politics. Such a political style would involve open hostility towards minorities and immigrants that emphasizes the need for societal and demographic consistency (Mayer 2013). In the pre-Civil Rights era, and in particular the years before World War I, ethnonationalist-style politics was common in the United States. Presidential candidates made openly racialized appeals that called for segregating blacks and whites and strongly advocated for the United States to remain a white man's country (Mendleberg 2001). However, this rhetoric lost acceptance by the end of the Civil Rights era.

This was not the case in Western Europe where parties with strong Nazi and/or more general Fascist roots such as the Vlaams Party, the Freedom Party of Austria, and the National Front managed to run candidates and provide a small, but very public, outlet for ethnonationalist viewpoints. Such actors have not been afraid to openly come out against certain cultural practices by newcomers such as the wearing of headscarves by Muslim women nor have they tried to hide their disdain for accepting large numbers of migrants (Mayer 2013). In Europe, these parties have held ethnonationalism as core beliefs. Table 3.2 below summarizes the major relevant differences.

Table 3.2: Relevant Differences between US and Western European Cases

- United States-History of populism but no large dedicated populist party
- United States-Declining acceptance of ethnonationalist appeals in post-WWII era by almost all political actors
- Europe-Ethonationalist appeals made by ethnocentric populists
- United States-Idea of social welfare and government intervention in economy not as popular

Discussion of the Time Period

This project seeks to extend existing findings that emphasize the importance of exogenous shocks on public opinion and policy preferences. Past scholarship indicated that external shocks can cause shifts in policies and public opinion even before the beginning of the Migrant Crisis. The 9/11 attacks are illustrative. While the events did not occur in Europe, there was strong interest in Western Europe as the region was home to large number of Muslims (Bowen 2009). Following the attacks, there was a surge in anti-immigrant sentiment in Germany despite the attacks not occurring there (Schuller 2012). A similar surge occurred following the murder of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh by a Muslim man. Data from the European Social Survey indicated an uptick in the percent of those who were interested in restrictive immigration policies not just in the Netherlands but across Europe (Finseraas and Listhaug 2013). Similar findings are presented by Ratcliffe and Von Hinke, Kessler, and Scholder (2015) who noted that following the 7/7 bombings, neighborhoods with large numbers of South Asians saw housing prices drop.

While clear shifts in attitudes have occurred in the past, these did not lead to the unprecedented electoral successes that many ethnocentric populists enjoyed following the Migrant Crisis. For example, in Germany, a country that had long resisted supporting any actor that resembled ethnocentric populism (Art 2007), the AfD won unprecedented levels of support

and became the first ethnocentric populist-style party of win seats in the Bundestag since the end of the Second World War (Art 2018). A similar situation unfolded in Switzerland where the Swiss People's Party had its best election by winning 29.4 percent of lower house votes (Bernhard 2016). In 2019, the ethnocentric populist Vox became the first ethnocentric populist actor to win seats in Spain's national parliament since the country's return to democracy in the 1970s (Turnbull-Dugarte et al. 2020).

Discussion on Populism and Left-Right Classification

With the discussion of case selection complete, the next major step of the research design is classifying ethnocentric populist and right-wing populist parties. This requires the creation of ethnocentric populism scores and left-right scores. While there has been a surge in attention devoted to the study of populism (Rooduijn 2019), scholars have not yet developed systematic methods to empirically measure populism across cases and over time (Rooduijn and Pauwels 2011). Rather, a multitude of different methods have been presented by researchers. Overall, one can argue that measurement of populism has developed into two different tracks; one track focuses on examining the supply side, or the parties and politicians, while the other track, the demand side, focuses on the study of regular individuals who might support parties/politicians.

While there was difficulty in measuring populism, particularly before the 2010s, due to a lack of agreement on conceptualization (Akkerman et al. 2014) and a lack of common features which binds populism research (Canovan 1981), the scholarship appears to have coalesced around a definition of populism as an ideational approach (Meijers and Zaslove 2020). As a brief summary, scholars argue that populists believe that "regular people" are noble; elites, or those in charge, are corrupt and uncaring; and the right to rule should held by regular people. In other words, there is a deeply antagonistic relationship between the people and the elites and a zero-

sum struggle for power (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2007; Canovan 1999; Elchardus and Spruyt 2016; Mudde 2004; Stanley 2011; Taggart 2000; Weyland 2001).

This ideational approach, which emphasizes that populism is a set of ideas, has become popular within the subfield as the ideational approach is arguably the easiest to measure quantitatively (Meijers and Zaslove 2020; Rooduijn 2019). Through the use of the ideational approach, scholars have, at a minimum, noted that a people-centrism and an anti-elite sentiment are key components of populism (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2007; Canovan 1999; Elchardus and Spruyt 2016; Mudde 2004; Taggart 2000; Weyland 2001). This has been an important starting point for the scholarship and has become particularly important for those who attempt to measure populist attitudes of the people.

The Dichotomous vs. Continuous Debate

Through the 2000s, most attempts at measuring populism were qualitative in nature and some scholars even classified parties as populist as long as other scholars before them had done so. An example comes from Rooduijn et al. (2014) who classified parties as populist if at least two other scholars called them such.

However, since the beginning of the 2010s, scholars have moved towards quantitative approaches (Meijers and Zaslove 2020). An ideational approach has been popular because it allows for measuring the populist positions of both regular individuals and also the parties (Van Hauwaert and van Kessel 2018).

While scholars appear to agree on the ideational approach, there is less agreement on whether attempts at classifying populist actors and supporters should emphasize a dichotomous or continuous approach. Among scholars who prefer a dichotomous measure (Leininger and Meijers 2020), the logic is rooted in its simplicity and clarity. Aslanidis (2016) notes that for

followers of certain ideologies such as Socialism, Marxism, or Liberalism, in colloquial speech it is extremely rare for people to speak of degrees; one is either a Socialist, Marxist, a Liberal or not. Using this logic, an actor or party would either be a populist or not. Dichotomous variables emphasize that there is a clear and transparent boundary unlike continuous variables which potentially allow for gray spaces between concept poles.

While such a method is particularly useful in situations where a clear quantitative cutoff point is available (Wuttke et al. 2020), other scholars have noted that these dichotomous measures cannot account for the multi-dimensionality of populism and cannot differentiate between degrees of populism; they instead opt for a continuous measure (Meijers and Zaslove 2020). However, continuous measurements, while providing more detail, come with the caveat of not being providing any guidance on at what point a party or actor becomes populist (Wuttke et al. 2020).

Both dichotomous and continuous measurements have been used extensively within the scholarship and each comes with their strengths and weaknesses. Ultimately, scholars have chosen to pursue different paths depending on their goals. Continuous measurements have gained momentum among scholars who examine populist attitudes among the people while those who use manifestos and party documents often use dichotomous measurements.

Use of Manifestos and Party Documents

Among scholars who have attempted to measure populism and classify populist parties, many researchers focused on the supply side with party manifestos, speeches, interviews, and broadcasts (Aslanidis 2016; Jagers and Walgrave 2007; March 2017; Mudde 2007; Van Hauwaert and Van Kessel 2018). These scholars often worked on content analysis and often trained individuals who would examine the various manifestos and see whether the documents

referred to the people or elites. Generally, the coder would be responsible for picking out each word referring to the people or elites or coding the paragraph. The percentage of words or percentage of paragraphs with references to populism would then be calculated (Bernhard & Kriesi, 2019; Hawkins et al., 2012; March 2017; Rooduijn & Pauwels, 2011).

This approach held sway, particularly in the 2000s and the early 2010s, because the parties and politicians were considered to be active players who were influencing what was thought to be a mostly passive public (Elchardus and Spruyt 2016; Hawkins 2009; Jagers and Walgrave 2007; Pauwels 2011; Rooduijn et. 2014). In addition, many scholars chose to use manifestos and other documents officially released by the party because they are authoritative and give a clear idea of where a party stands (Rooduijn and Pauwels 2011; Rooduijn et al. 2014). While party members can and sometimes will diverge from a manifesto, they can be punished if stray too far from official party stances (Laver and Garry 2000). In addition, such documents are well-suited for cross-national analysis because most parties will release a manifesto (Rooduijn and Pauwels 2011; Rooduijn et al. 2014).

Some examples of work using documents include Hawkins (2009) who looked at more than 200 speeches by 40 political leaders and relied on textual analysis of speeches. Rather than relying on word count or sentence counts, a group of undergraduates trained to look for specific themes were asked to give each of the speeches a grade of either 0 (nonpopulist), 1 (mixed), or 2 (populist). In other words, the readers were asked to interpret the speech as a whole. Pauwels (2011) also used a similar method and measured the relative share of words pertaining to "populism" in party manifestos and internal party communication. Reungoat (2010), like Pauwels (2011), also examined the proportion of manifestos, by word number, dedicated to specific concepts related to populism.

Rooduijn et al. (2014) coded paragraphs within manifestos and decided whether they were populist or not. Coders identified whether paragraphs contained traces of people-centric or anti-elite elements to determine which party programs were populist. However, unlike Hawkins (2009) who preferred a 0-1-2 coding, Rooduijn et al. (2014) opted to give individual party's scores which ranged from 0 through 100 scale. Scores were calculated on the basis of the percentage of a paragraph with a populist reference.

Other scholars preferred two-dimensional spatial analysis to map out where parties stand relative to one another. They used two equal subdimensions to measure populism. Jagers and Walgrave (2007) use political party broadcasts to create two subdimensions: Proportion of populism and intensity of populism. They explain that proportion is the share of broadcasts which can be considered populist because they refer to the people. Intensity for the authors is the number of times the people are mentioned in a broadcast. They then create a compound people-index and also map out parties in two-dimensional spatial analysis.

Schumacher and van Kersbergen (2016) do something similar. They were interested in the welfare positions of populist parties and opted to use the Manifesto Project to create a welfare score, and a multiculturalism score which served as a proxy for the populist nature of the party. The welfare score was created by adding the percentages of phrases or sentences referring to welfare state expansion in a manifesto and then subtracting it from the number of references to welfare state limitation. For multiculturalism, they subtracted the number of positive references to multiculturalism from the number of negative references.

Jungar and Jupskas (2014) focused on Nordic populist radical right parties and created two-dimensional spatial analysis using the Comparative Manifesto Project. For their project, economic issues were plotted on the x-axis and an authoritarian/liberal scale the y-axis. Using

the Comparative Manifesto Project, they found a number of variables which are relevant to both subjects and created scales ranging from -100 through +100. This was possible as the Comparative Manifesto Project gives a percentage score to each variable depending on how much of the manifesto is dedicated to a topic. For example, if a party spends 4.5 percent of the manifesto railing against multiculturalism, its negative references to multiculturalism score is 4.5. If the content pertained to an economic issue and called for more government intervention, the score would be subtracted from zero while if calling for less intervention, it would be added to zero. A similar procedure exists for the authoritarian/liberal scale; if a variable measures authoritarianism, it would be added to zero and if it measures liberalism, it would be subtracted from zero.

Individual-Level Survey Data

While party documents can be useful for measuring parties or politicians, another group of scholars focuses on individual-level survey data to measure populist attitudes. Particularly starting in the 2010s, researchers have emphasized the individual citizens and the extent of populist attitudes they might hold at a given time (Van Hauwaert and Van Kessel 2017). Scholars who look at individual attitudes share a methodological consideration with those who have created two-dimensional spatial analysis to measure and classify populists; authors of attitudinal studies recognize that measuring populism requires not looking at one dimension but multiple dimensions (Aslanidis 2016). These scholars have come to a consensus that populism is not a dichotomous variable but one of degrees (Pappas 2016). A key objective was measuring populism in a valid and precise manner which acknowledges the concept to be multiple and related but distinct subdimensions. These scholars believe that populism is latent and in order to successfully measure it, one needs to acknowledge that there are multiple parts (Meijers and

Zaslove 2020). All the subdimensions of populism must be present as missing even one would not be an accurate reflection of all parts of the concept (Schulz et al. 2018; Wuttke et al. 2020).

Akkerman et al. (2014) are in many ways the pioneers of the multidimensional approach in which questions that measure pluralist attitudes and elitist attitudes make up their populism score. These are recorded using a Likert scale ranging from 1 (I very much disagree) to 5 (I very much agree) in which the means of the sum scores are tallied. Elchardus and Spruyt (2016) also use a similar approach in which four survey items that measure the antagonism between ordinary people and elites were presented to respondents. They had five different categories, which ranged from completely disagree through completely agree, as choices. Aslanidis (2015); Hawkins (2009), Deegan-Krause and Haughton (2009); Jagers and Walgrave (2007); March (2017); Meijers and Zaslove (2020); Muller et al. (2017); Mohrenberg et al. (2019); Pauwels (2011); Pauwels and Rooduijn (2015); Rooduijn and Pauwels (2011); Rooduijn et al. (2014), Schulz et al. (2017); Stavrakakis et al. (2017), among others use similar methods. Because of the growing popularity of this method in measuring populist attitudes of individuals, the approach is becoming the standard (Van Hauwaert et al. 2020).

On Cutoffs

Regardless of whether a scholar chooses a dichotomous or continuous measure of populism, a method that clearly shows where a line is drawn between populism and non-populism is necessary. While there are a number of works which have attempted to address this topic, there is no clear consensus on the matter.

Many scholars who have worked on classifying or measuring populism have avoided this topic. Rather, they have worked with the assumption that some parties have already earned a populist designation and examined whether those parties differ from parties which do not have

the label. Jungar and Jupskas (2014), through their use of two-dimensional analysis, looked at the mean distance between parties in the same party family. In other words, the authors had already accepted the labels given by other scholars and tested to see whether those considered populist are clustered together. Reungoat (2010) created a populism index and noted that there is a strong difference between parties that were considered populist and non-populist, with mainstream parties with non-populist parties having a high score of 2.34 while populist parties ranged from 1.61 to 23.08 (Rooduijn et al. 2014). Stavrakakis et al. (2017) noted that parties generally not considered populist by other scholars scored less than 3.5 while parties generally considered populist scored over 3.5.

While many researchers have relied on a priori designations, others have touched on addressing cutoffs. Particularly among those who focus on using multidimensional scales, strong emphasis has been placed ensuring that a party or actor cannot be considered populist unless it has high scores across all indices (March 2017; Wuttke et al. 2020). In other words, while each writer might subscribe to different aggregation rules, an individual cannot have a high populism score when anti-elitist sentiment is low even when a person strongly supports the remaining components of populism (Wuttke et al. 2020).

A number of these scholars have created more explicit cutoff points. Lubbers et al. (2002) considered only parties which scored higher than 8.5 on a ten-point anti-immigration question to be considered extreme right-wing. Deegan-Krause and Haughton (2007) used nine different questions which allowed for three possible answers and then converted the values into either 0, 0.5, and 1. Lubbers et al. (2002) considered only parties which scored higher than 8.5 on a ten-point anti-immigration question to be considered extreme right-wing. Meijers and Zaslove (2020), in a 0-11 scale, state that a low-level populism score is anything below 5, a moderate

level populism score anything between 5 and 7.5, and a high populism score to be anything above 7.5.

While these attempts at creating continuous scales are an advancement in the study of measuring populism, there is no standard method for creating a clear cutoff point (Pappas 2016). Rather, any cutoff points employed within the scholarship are arguably idiosyncratic (Aslanidis 2016). Despite the advancements which have occurred since the beginning of the twenty-first century, when undertaking quantitative analysis, scholars have struggled to separate populism from non-populism or interpret the substantive meaning of populism scores (March 2017). This has led to the suggestion that rather than relying on a continuous populism variable, the subfield might be better served by an ordinal scale (Pappas 2016).

On Left and Right

Previous discussion showed that the term right-wing populist is not necessarily accurate unless a party is right-wing in both a social and economic sense. Because not all ethnocentric populist parties meet the criteria to be considered a right-wing populist party in the social and economic sense, it is worth examining whether right-wing economic policy stances play a role in votes for right-wing populist parties. This will require not just categorizing parties into ethnocentric populist parties and non-ethnocentric populist parties, but also further dividing ethnocentric populist parties into general ethnocentric populist parties and right-wing populist parties.

On Expert Surveys

In the expert survey method, scholars are asked to place parties and/or other actors on a spectrum (Gabel and Huber 2000; Huber and Inglehart 1995). This approach can be advantageous because of its simplicity; Huber and Inglehart (1995) mailed one-page

questionnaires to over 800 political scientists across dozens of countries and asked these experts to place parties on a one-to-ten-point space representing a left-right scale and asked them to list key hot topic issues in their respective countries (Pedersen et al. 1997). Castles and Mair (1984) also created their own survey and used a twelve-point scale. For the most part, the two surveys produced similar results. The smallest distance between the leftmost and rightmost party in the Castles and Mair (1984) survey was the United States at 0.18 while the greatest distance was a tie between Italy and the Netherlands at 0.78. In Huber and Inglehart (1995)'s version of the survey, the smallest distance also was in the United States at 0.27 and the greatest was in Italy at 0.83 (Pedersen et al. 1997).

There is a relatively high degree of correlation among expert surveys (Volkens 2007). While these can be useful in showing a degree of unity among researchers, expert surveys are infrequent and often use different formatting (Gabel and Huber 2000). In addition, a survey will often not have any information on a scholar's reasoning for giving a score nor do they show what an expert considers to be left or right. It is also unclear what happens when scholars have conflicting views (Jahn 2010).

On Mass Surveys

While expert surveys can be useful for creating left-right placement scores, other scholars have opted for mass surveys, such as the World Values Survey and the Eurobarometer, which asks individual respondents from the general population where they stand on the ideological spectrum (Gabel and Huber 2000; Huber and Inglehart 1995). There is some evidence indicating that, on average, supporters of different types of parties differ from one another. For example, the 1979 Euro-Barometer survey indicated that British Labour Party supporters had a mean ideological self-placement of 4.48 out of a ten-point scale while supporters of the Conservative

Party had a mean placement of 6.95. In Italy in the same survey, Communist Party supporters had a mean score of 2.16 while Italian Social Movement supporters, a neo-fascist party, had a score of 8.88 (Huber 1989).

While these provide good information regarding how the general populations thinks about left and right, this method also shares a critical issue with expert surveys. Oftentimes a survey will not have any information on respondents' reasoning for giving a score. In addition, there is an issue of potentially conflicting views held by members of the general public (Jahn 2010). Further complicating matters is that respondent survey data from before the 1970s is not readily available and conducting comparative research with different types of surveys is difficult because issues with translations; respondents may also hold very different ideas of what is considered left and right and these tend to vary widely by region and sometimes even country (Kim and Fording 1998).

On The Use of Manifestos

Another method used to create left-right scores involves the use of manifestos and similar party-released documents (Gabel and Huber 2000; Huber and Inglehart 1995). Manifestos provide the advantage of allowing scholars to examine a party's left-right positioning over long periods of time and across many different countries (Gabel and Huber 2000). Using manifestos allow the parties to speak for themselves (Franzmann and Kaiser 2006). In addition, while there may be a disconnect between a party's manifestos and actions, manifestos provide clues as to a party's underlying stances (Jahn 2010).

While the use of expert surveys and mass surveys has been straightforward, with respondents generally asked to place a party, or themselves, on a scale, the creation of similar scores using manifestos has proven to be complicated. Part of this problem is rooted in the

different directions that scholars have taken in the creation of left-right scores. Principal component analysis, which analyzes dozens of different policy categories for the most relevant categories, has also been used (Gabel and Huber 2000). Arguing that using dozens of different categories is too cumbersome, others have called for creating separate left-right score depending on the policy (Otjes and Katsanidou 2017). Others have opted to abandon a unidimensional score and opted for the creation of a two dimensional one (Hooghe and Marks 1999; Kitschelt 1994).

Considering the large number of different views on the use of manifestos, it is worth highlighting that the question which has been particularly salient is the list of relevant policy positions that should be considered a part of any left-right scale. Because so many different issues are politically salient, many scholars have selected a multidimensional approach (Laver and Garry 2000). For the creation of such a scale, scholars have considered policy areas as diverse as of economic-class conflict, centralization of power, authoritarianism vs democracy, isolation vs internationalism, traditional vs new culture, conservatism vs change, xenophobia, property rights, constitutional reform, and national defense (Huber and Inglehart 1995).

Some of the earlier attempts at creating a left-right score were additive in nature and often involved many different policy categories. Laver and Budge (1992) created a left-right score by using the Manifesto Project; they did this by adding up the percentages of thirteen different policy categories, or right-leaning categories, and subtracted them from thirteen policy categories that were more left-leaning in nature. The difference became a "right-left index," or RILE,[1] which eventually became a separate variable within the Manifesto Project (Jahn 2010).

---

[1] RILE is calculated by adding the percentages the categories in the first parentheses and then subtracting them from a second group encapsulated in another parentheses: (Positive references to the military + references to freedom and human rights + positive references to constitutionalism + references to political authority + positive references to the free market economy, positive references to incentives + negative references to protectionism + economic orthodoxy + welfare state limitation + positive references to the national way of life + positive references to traditional morality + positive references to law and order + positive references civic mindedness) – (References to anti-imperialism + negative references to the military + references to peace + positive references to internationalism + positive

While this attempt at creating a left-right score using different policy positions was a major step in creating systematic quantitative left-right score, it was challenged by other scholars. In particular, it was criticized for having diverse areas related to military policy, constitutionalism, societal morality, and law and order all added together into a single unidimensional variable took into consideration too many different topics (Keman 2007). RILE also treats each of the different policy categories with equal weight and does not acknowledge the salience of a policy at a given time (Jahn 2010). Instead, McDonald et al. (2007) argue that any method which uses a number of subdimensional components should use a calculated weighted sum.

Many subsequent attempts at creating a left-right score were indirect or direct attempts at improving the RILE approach. Kim and Fording (1998) combine the percentage of a manifesto that advocates left-wing positions and subtract it from the combined percentage of manifestos which support right-wing positions. The categories include economic policy, foreign policy, and general governance questions. Afterwards, they then divided the difference by the total percentage of a manifesto dedicated to the left and right. This approach allows for a final score ranging from -1 to +1 which can also be transformed into a 0 to 100 range.

While disagreeing with the broader logic behind RILE's methodology, some scholars agreed that many policy positions should be considered. In an attempt to find which categories are most relevant to the creation of a left-right score, scholars have used principal factor analysis as the primary method for creating a left-right placement. In these attempts, scholars have often considered dozens of different policy categories for the left-right score. Budge et al. (1987)

---

references to market regulation + references to economic planning + positive references to protectionism + positive references to a controlled economy + positive references to nationalization + welfare state expansion + education expansion + positive references to labor groups + positive references to democracy).

divided the categories which are most relevant to left-right positioning and placed them into seven policy domains. Afterwards they extracted from each domain one or two factors. Laver and Budge (1993) took 54 categories and collapsed them into twenty dimensions where thirteen are one category and seven are the sum of two or more categories. These categories were placed into clusters. Afterwards, they calculated left-right scores as the difference between the sums of references of one cluster, the right, and the second cluster called the left. Gabel and Huber (2000) also used 54 categories to create their own left-right score. For both Laver and Budge (1993) and Gabel and Huber (2000), many different policy positions were used to create their scores including foreign policy, social policy, and economic policy. Klingemann (1995) considered the use of dozens of categories for the analysis to be too cumbersome and considered only domestic policy positions for a principal factors analysis to extract the most relevant positions. He then made a 1–10-point scale which is treated as a left-right dimension.

Echoing Klingemann's (1995) argument that the left-right placement score should at least be divided into foreign and domestic spheres, some scholars have argued that aggregating multiple dimensions creates a left-right placement score that takes into account too many distinct policy points. Instead, these scholars have argued that left-right should focus on a small number of contentious and salient issues (Huber and Inglehart 1995). Otjes and Katsanidou (2017) argue that much of the distinction between left and right is related to economic issues and cultural issues. In other words, the large numbers of subdimensions used for the left-right by some scholars should be cut down significantly (Katsanidou and Otjes 2016).

While agreeing that dozens of subdimensions are too cumbersome, other scholars have instead opted to create a two-dimensional rather than unidimensional left-right score (Bakker et al. 2012; Otjes and Katsanidou 2017). Hooghe and Marks (1999) created a two-dimensional

system in which an economic dimension focused on questions related to regulation while a second dimension dealt with national sovereignty issues. Kitschelt (1994) also agrees with the two-dimensional scale but focused on creating a socialist-capitalist dimension which reflects economic divisions and a libertarian-authoritarian dimension which honed in on contentious cultural issues.

Some scholars believe that many different issues are salient (Keman 2007), but others have emphasized the importance of a singular "super issue" as a proxy for left-right placement (Laver and Budge 1992; Otjes and Katsanidou 2017). This is achieved by looking at a manifesto and finding one dimension using principal factor analysis to best identify which of the dimensions best accounts for covariation (Laver and Budge 1992). McDonald et al. (2007) focused to what extent goods and services should be handled by the government. Their argument was that the left wanted less privatization and the right more privatization.

Manifestos have been used extensively to create left-right scores but on at least one point, their use has induced pushback. Saliency theory argues that parties prioritize using manifestos to increase the prominence of any issue that they believe is important rather than using them as a way to place themselves on the left-right scale. The emphasis of a particular topic by a party may be done strictly to increase vote shares rather than situate the party on the left-right spectrum (Gabel and Huber 2000). If a manifesto is only meant to accentuate salient positions, then it may not be the best option to create left-right placement score (Gabel and Huber 2000; Jahn 2010; Laver and Garry 2000). In addition, the lack of policy saliency in some countries may result in parties to leave issues associated with the left-right dimension out of their manifestos. In Finland, for example, foreign policy is rarely mentioned in manifestos because there is little disagreement on the matter (Volkens 2007).

The Classification Plan for this Project

Manifestos are particularly useful for this project because individual speeches made by politicians, either on the campaign trail or within the legislature, and actual legislative voting behavior (Laver and Benoit 2002), may deviate from the wishes of the party's majority. Manifestos on the other hand are authoritative and agreed upon by the party elites while also giving a clear idea of where a party stands at a given time (Rooduijn and Pauwels 2011; Rooduijn et al. 2014). While party members can and sometimes will diverge from a manifesto, they can theoretically be punished if stray too far from official party stances (Laver and Garry 2000). In addition, such documents are particularly well-suited for cross-national analysis because most parties will release a manifesto (Rooduijn and Pauwels 2011; Rooduijn et al. 2014). In addition, examining the text of parties can allow for historical, temporal examinations of party positions (Laver and Garry 2000). Ultimately, manifestos allow the parties, as a whole, to speak for themselves (Franzmann and Kaiser 2006).

While manifestos have their positive points, they have their flaws as an analytical tool. One major issue is that these documents are perhaps a better tool for measuring the relative intensity and focus on an issue rather than what a party believes at a given time. Parties might strategically deemphasize an issue if they believe that doing so will lead to victory (Janda et al. 1995). This indicates that when researchers are taking the percentage of a manifesto which refers to a specific policy, they are only measuring the relative emphasis a party places and not the party's actual position (Laver and Garry 2000).

While this argument is important to note, there appears to be at least some evidence that parties, when gaining power, at least attempt to abide by these documents. In an examination of the British Conservative, Labour, and Liberal party manifestos from 1945-1987, Hofferbert and

Budge (1992) found that when parties call for more spending in their manifestos and gain power, there is a corresponding spending increase. Examining election pledges from the Netherlands, Mansergh and Thomson (2007) found in 1986, 1989, and 1994 that if a member of the party received a ministerial position, the party would partially enact the promises made during the election cycle. Examining pledges made by the Polish cabinet between 2008 and 2011, Zubek and Kluver (2015) found that less divisive issues, along with issues that are more salient, are more likely to be pursued by the government. In the United States, where parties are weaker and more beholden to the power and influence of individual politicians, an analysis of Republican and Democratic Party platforms from 1948-1984 indicated that patterns of government spending appear to, at a minimum, correlate with election manifestos. For example, if a party that emphasized more government spending won office, there was an analogous increase in federal expenditures (Budge and Hofferbert 1990). Overall, these findings appear to indicate that manifestos provide clues as to a party's underlying stances (Jahn 2010) and are written at a minimum to signal tacit commitment to carry out a plan if the party happens to win an election (Budge and Hofferbert 1990).

The Manifesto Project

Arguably the most fitting dataset for this project is the Manifesto Project. The Manifesto Project was created in the 1970s to record party manifestos from around the world. Since its creation, those who have worked on the dataset have read party manifestos of post-World War II democracies released during a campaign year (Volkens et al. 2015). Its goal was to create a common framework to examine the potential ideologies and strategies of political parties in order to get a better understanding of their views (Janda et al. 1995). The data is a type of panel data study in which researchers track changes through time.

The Manifesto Project is divided into seven different types of variables. Six of these are only marginally relevant to the research design in this dissertation. Identification variables tell the researcher data such as country and time period. Coding and data quality variables show the type of coder worked on the project. Electoral data variables present the performance of parties, such as the percentage of votes received. Programmatic data variables provide information such as whether a manifesto belonged to a single party or more. The dataset variables section helps identify the same observations between different dataset versions (Volkens et al. 2020b).

The final type of variable is the content analytical data section in which there are 56 categories catalogued and divided into seven different domains. The first domain is external relations. Parts of manifestos which mentions topics such as special relations with other countries, anti-imperialism, references to the military, peace, and internationalism go under this domain. The second domain deals with items related to freedom and democracy. This includes any references to human rights and constitutionalism. The third domain relates to the political system and includes references to decentralization, centralization, governmental and administrative efficiency, political authority, and political corruption. The fourth domain focuses on the economy and includes any references to the free market, incentives, market regulation, and economic planning. The fifth domain focuses on welfare and quality of life, and records references to environmental protection, welfare state expansion, and education expansion. The sixth domain gathers any variables related to the fabric of society such as references to a national way of life, traditional morality, law and order, and multiculturalism. The seventh domain assembles references to social groups such as labor groups, farmers, the middle class, and minority groups (Volkens et la. 2020b).

The coding process includes several steps: After deciding how to sort a sentence, the coder chooses a category. The coder then assesses what percent of the sentence fits in the category. There are 56 standard categories that record many policy areas and when possible, all sentences within a manifesto are assigned to one of these 56. If a sentence contains more than one category, then it is broken down into "quasi-sentences" which are parts of a sentence that are categorized (Janda et al. 1995). Each category is given a score. This score is the percent of the manifesto the coders believed belong to this category (Volkens et al. 2009). For example, if 2.6 percent of the sentences within a manifesto make negative references to multiculturalism, then the category of "negative references to multiculturalism" is given a score of 2.6. This means that all variables that are part of the Manifesto Project are continuous variables. The value of each variable is between zero and one hundred, depending on what percentage of the manifesto was dedicated to a specific topic. This also means that it is possible that a party may spend none of its manifesto space discussing a specific topic. Particularly for smaller niche parties, it is possible that issues such as economic policy may end up being a small part of the overall dataset.

The Manifesto Project relies on human coders (Laver and Garry 2000; Volkens 2007). While machine processing has become increasingly popular since the beginning of the 21st century partly because of its low time cost, it is difficult to code for idiosyncrasies related to language (Laver and Garry 2000). Although strong advancements in computer technology have been made, an automated method cannot be a complete and perfect replacement for human assessment (Grimmer and Stewart 2013).

While the Manifesto Project is extensive and allows scholars to analyze different types of questions, it has several deficiencies. This specific dataset does not permit researchers to disaggregate the data and combine responses into new policy categories. In addition, while the

dataset allows readers to understand what percentage of the document mentions a policy positively or negatively, it does not record "neutral statements." If a neutral sentence is embedded within a paragraph that expresses support or displeasure for a policy, the entirety of the paragraph is often coded as "positive" or "negative" (Laver and Garry 2000).

Selection Process for Ethnocentric Populism Scores

The Manifesto Project, and other datasets like it, uses trained coders who look for specific words or paragraphs. In the case of populism, coders would seek words about the people and elites and calculate what percent of the manifesto space is dedicated to this topic (Bernhard and Kriesi, 2019; Hawkins and Castanho Silva, 2018; March 2017; Rooduijn and Pauwels, 2011). This project will follow their lead. For example, if a party spent approximately five percent of its manifesto railing against political authority, it would mean an extra five points added to an ethnocentric populism score.

As noted by a number of scholars, such as Jagers and Walgrave (2007) and Meijers and Zaslove (2020), populism is composed of different features such as anti-establishment sentiment. The multifaceted nature of populism is important when detailing with ethnocentric populism because it combines the feeling of disdain towards elites and an ethnonationalist component that emphasizes suspicion of outsiders. In order to have a score which accurately reflects the concept of ethnocentric populism, every feature that makes up the concept must be a part of a final score (Schulz et al. 2018; Wuttke et al. 2020). While many different topics are explored in the Manifesto Project, there are five which measure disdain for elites as they either reference a policy position held by elites or are direct criticisms of the existing system: Positive references to internationalism, positive references to the European Union, Governmental and Administrative Efficiency Political Corruption, and References to Political Authority.

This project will also follows Schumacher and van Kersbergen (2016) who created welfare policy scores by adding positive references to welfare policy and subtracting them from negative references to welfare policy. Shown below on table 3.4, the percentage of the manifesto that makes up three categories (agreement with populism's disdain for elites, more references to a lack of governmental and administrative efficiency, political corruption, and references to political authority) are added together because they constitute positive references to the populist cause. The percentage of the manifesto dedicated to positive references to internationalism and positive references to the European Union, which see elite-supported positions in a positive light, are also added together. This final score for the populist component of ethnocentric populism involves subtracting the sum of the positive references to the populism minus the sum of positions which are positive references to elite-supported positions.

The next step is to consider the ethnocentric portion of ethnocentric populism. Shown on table 3.4, the variables related to positive references to the national way of life, positive references to traditional morality, positive references to law and order, and negative references to multiculturalism are added together as they are considered to see ethnocentrism in a more positive light. Positive references to equality, positive references to underprivileged minority groups and positive references to refugees ultimately see ethnocentrism in a negative light and are also added together. The total percentage of positive references to ethnocentrism are subtracted from the total percentage of negative references to ethnocentrism. The two different final scores are then added together to make a final ethnocentric populism score. The number can theoretically range from -100 through +100 or if simplified, -1 through +1.

Table 3.4: Manifesto Project Variables Used for Ethnocentric Populism Scores

Variable Coding	Variable Description	More Mainstream	More Mainstream Right or Less?	More Ethnocentric

		Left or Less?		Populist or Less?
Ethnocentric Populist Variables				
"Populist" Variables				
Per 107	Positive References to Internationalism	N/A	N/A	-
Per 108	Positive Reference to the European Union	N/A	N/A	-
Per 303	Governmental and Administrative Efficiency	N/A	N/A	+
Per 304	Political Corruption	N/A	N/A	+
Per 305	References to Political Authority	N/A	N/A	+
"Ethnocentric" Variables				
Per 503	Equality: Positive	N/A	N/A	-
Per 601	Positive References to National Way of Life	N/A	N/A	+
Per 603	Positive References to Traditional Morality	N/A	N/A	+
Per 605	Positive References to Law and Order	N/A	N/A	+
Per 607	Negative References to Multiculturalism	N/A	N/A	+
Per 705	Positive References to Underprivileged Minority Groups	N/A	N/A	-
Per 7062	Positive References to Refugees	N/A	N/A	-

It is important to address a potential deficiency in this method of coding party orientations. The raw scores only take into account how much of the manifesto the party dedicated to a specific topic. In an attempt to address saliency theory, which argues that parties focus on increasing the prominence of any issue that they believe is important rather than maximize votes through their left-right position (Gabel and Huber 2000; Harmel et al. 1995; Jahn 2010; Laver and Garry 2000), the process here will try to decouple the scores from how invested the party may have been in terms of discussing a topic.

To create an adjusted/decoupled score, the raw score, which are the calculations for the ethnocentric populism score components addressed in table 3.4, is divided from the percent of

the manifesto that addressed populist issues. The new score measures how ethnocentric populist or “unpopulist” the party happens to be at the time of writing the manifesto. For example, if a party’s raw ethnocentric populism score is 1.62, while 23.54 percent of the manifesto was dedicated to populist issues, then the following calculation would take place: 1.62 divided by 23.54 which would then lead to an adjusted score of 0.07. The final adjusted scores may be anywhere between -1, least “unpopulist” to +1, or most populist. This process is in line with Kim and Fording (1998) who combined the percentage of a manifesto that discussed policy points related to left-wing ideological spectrum positioning and subtracted it from the combined percentage of manifestos which support right-wing positions and then divided the difference by the total percentage of a manifesto dedicated to the left and right.

There are two additional considerations which need to be addressed when creating final ethnocentric populism scores: The percentage of the manifesto dedicated to ethnocentric populist issues which would qualify a party to be considered ethnocentric populist and a cutoff for the final ethnocentric populism score. It is possible that a party might have a very high score without actually dedicating enough of their manifesto to relevant issues. Echoing March (2017) and Wuttke et al. (2020)’s concerns that a party or actor cannot be considered populist unless it has high scores across all relevant components, a way to ensure that a party makes enough relevant references to be considered populist is necessary. The creation of the score outlined in table 3.4 presented the combination of two components: ethnocentrism and populism. Because there are two different components, it is possible that a party might score high on, for example, the populist portion of the score while not scoring high on the ethnocentric portion.

When considering an appropriate percentage of the manifesto dedicated to ethnocentric populist issues, some scholars have noted the importance of the percentage of paragraphs in

manifestos dedicated to populist topics (Rooduijn and Pauwels 2011; Schumacher and van Kersbergen 2016; Wuttke et al. 2020). While the Manifesto Project does not present the actual manifestos of the parties, in the newest iteration of the dataset there are 57 different topics covered in total. Of those 57, as shown on table 3.4, eleven topics are used for the ethnocentric populism score and eleven were used to create an ethnocentric populism score. In the Manifesto Project, there are 57 categories. Seven categories out of 56 are used to construct the ethnocentric portion of the score while five out of 56 are used to construct the populist portion of the score. The idea is that about 7/56 or 12.5 percent and 5/56 or 8.9 percent of the manifestos respectively are dedicated to these two topics.

There is one final consideration for creating an ethnocentric populism score: The actual cutoff score. Within the scholarship there were a number of different methods. One uses a cutoff in which a score higher than 8.5 on a ten-point anti-immigration question (Lubbers et al. 2002) is a requirement. Another argues for the use of a three-tier score of low, medium, and high which correspond to 0, 0.5, and 1 (Deegan-Krause and Haughton 2009). Another uses a 0-11 scale where a low-level score of populism was less than 5, a moderate level populism score was between 5 and 7.5, and a high populism score was above 7.5 (Meijers and Zaslove 2020). Another group of authors argue for the use of a 75 percent threshold for all subdimensions for an aggregate populism score (Wuttke et al. 2020).

The method used here is inspired by Wuttke et al. (2020) who modified all the indicators to a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. This project emulates their decision to use standard deviation. The implementation of a final cutoff point takes all the adjusted/decoupled scores of parties that have won at least one seat in the national election. After sorting from least to greatest, the median party's score is adjusted to zero and all other parties' scores are adjusted

accordingly. In this analysis, the median party was Italy's Popular Civic List with a decoupled/adjusted score of 0.22. Because the score was 0.22, all other party scores were adjusted by subtracting 0.22.

Subsequently, each of the parties were sorted by country of origin, listed from least to greatest in score, and adjusted again by the median party's score. After this final in-country adjustment, any party that is one standard deviation above the mean in ethnocentric populism score, which also met all other requirements outlined in this section, are considered to be ethnocentric populist parties. If none of the parties that have a score one standard deviation above the mean meet the other requirements, the party that has the highest score which meets all other requirements outlined in this section will be considered that country's "representative."

Selection Process for Left-Right Scores

There is a temptation to simply use the Manifesto Project dataset's "RILE" variable[2] which is a left-right placement score. Theoretically, parties can have scores which range from -100, or a perfectly left score, through 100, or a perfectly right score. While this is convenient, this cannot be used because the RILE aggregation does not match the conceptualization outlined in chapter two.

Jahn (2010), who examines the historical root sources of left and right, provides a good place to start. Jahn also noted the work of Bobbio (1996) and the left and the right's ultimate

---

[2] It is calculated by adding the percentages the categories in the first parentheses and then subtracting them from a second group encapsulated in another parentheses: (Positive references to the military + references to freedom and human rights + positive references to constitutionalism + references to political authority + positive references to the free market economy, positive references to incentives + negative references to protectionism + economic orthodoxy + welfare state limitation + positive references to the national way of life + positive references to traditional morality + positive references to law and order + positive references civic mindedness) – (References to anti-imperialism + negative references to the military + references to peace + positive references to internationalism + positive references to market regulation + references to economic planning + positive references to protectionism + positive references to a controlled economy + positive references to nationalization + welfare state expansion + education expansion + positive references to labor groups + positive references to democracy).

dividing question being rooted in differing ideas regarding equality; the left prefers to use the government to relieve existing inequalities while the right is far more suspicious of using the government to do so and would prefer that the government not get involved on this question.

Perhaps because this theme of inequality is so central to left and right, the economic subdimension has gained salience in left-right placement score creation. Otjes and Katsanidou (2017) noted the importance of an economic left-right dimension and argue that this dimension has gained prominence in the twenty-first century due to the rise of economic globalization (Kriesi et al. 2006; Otjes and Katsanidou 2017). For their own project, Otjes and Katsanidou (2017) focused on variables measuring the importance of a voter's position on economic egalitarianism, a voter's position on the government and intervention in the economy, and whether a voter favors tax cuts above investments in public services. McDonald et al. (2007) made a similar argument regarding the centrality of the economic question and referred to the government's role in organizing the economy as the key component of left-right scores. Laver and Garry (2000) created an economic left-right scale by adding up all of the economic-related policy points which call for reducing government intervention in the manifesto and subtracting them from the percentage of all points which call for more government intervention.

Table 3.5: Manifesto Project Variables Used for Left-Right Scores

Variable Coding	Variable Description	More Mainstream Left or Less?	More Mainstream Right or Less?	More Ethnocentric Populist or Less?
Left-Right Variables				
Government Role Variables				
Per 401	Positive Reference to a Free Market Economy	-	+	N/A
Per 402	Incentives: Positive (Supply-Side Economics)	-	+	N/A
Per 403	Market Regulation	+	-	N/A
Per 404	Economic Planning	+	-	N/A

Per 406	Positive References to Protectionism	+	-	N/A
Per 407	Support for Free Trade/Open Markets	-	+	N/A
Per 413	Nationalization	+	-	N/A
Per 504	Welfare State Expansion	+	-	N/A
Per 701	Positive References to Labor Groups	+	-	N/A

As outlined on table 3.5, positive references to a free market economy, positive references to supply side economics, and support for free trade/open markets are all variables which call for less direct government action. Because of this, references to these will increase a left-right score. On the other hand, references to market regulation, economic planning, positive references to protectionism, nationalization, welfare state expansion, and positive references to labor groups will decrease a left-right score.

Any final score which is less than zero makes the party fall on the left while any score greater zero fall on the right. Theoretically, parties can have scores which range from -100, or a perfectly left score, through 100 or a perfectly right score (Volkens et al. 2020). This system echoes the work of a few scholars who have opted to create left-right scores which range from a negative number, signifying left, and a positive number, signifying right (Harmel et al. 1995; Jungar and Jupkas 2014; Kim and Fording 1998). The existence of an established cutoff point, in which negative numbers reflect left and positive numbers right, makes the creation of a left-right score easier compared to the creation of cutoff points for ethnocentric populism scores.

However, like the process for creating ethnocentric populism scores, the raw score presents an incomplete picture. Echoing Kim and Fording (1998), this project will combine the percentage of a manifesto that advocates left-wing positions, subtract it from the combined percentage of manifestos which support right-wing positions, and then divide the difference by the total percentage of a manifesto dedicated to the left and right.

Dependent Variable Creation

The basic research question that binds the entire investigation together involves answering what might be driving the success of populist actors, more specifically ethnocentric populist actors, in the post-2014/15 time period. The research question hints that division between ethnocentric populist actors and non-ethnocentric populist actors is needed.

There are a number of potential ways to construct a dependent variable that measures support. The variable that records all the parties into different groups can be a dummy variable in which all parties considered ethnocentric populist are grouped and coded as one while all other parties are coded as zero. Another option is creating an ordinal variable in which five indicates "most ethnocentric populist" and one "least ethnocentric populist." There is also the possibility of creating a continuous variable in which all parties are given a score of zero through one hundred.

Each of these potential paths has positives and negatives. The dummy variable is simple but does not provide much description in terms of the potential differences among the various ethnocentric populist actors. Not all ethnocentric populist actors are created equally and some of them might have more "extreme" positions than others. These differing traits are hidden in a dummy variable.

For the creation of an ordinal or continuous variable of support, how an individual feels about that party might be an appropriate way to construct a dependent variable. Such a variable might run from one through five in which one indicates "most favorability" and five "least favorability." Barring access to such a variable, the use of a thermometer rating might also prove useful in the creation of an ordinal variable. For example, the ANES asks respondents to give the

Democratic Party and the Republican Party a value between 0-100 with 0 indicating coldest feelings and 100 warmest feelings.

A continuous variable or an ordinal variable can be used to show that there are differences among ethnocentric populist parties and even show the levels of "ethnocentric populist-ness" among a range of different parties. This ability to provide nuance is useful. However, there are still some issues here as well. For example, what is the difference between a score of 20 and 30? They both seem to infer coldness towards a party, but how can one explain the substantive difference between the scores?

Many scholars who have analyzed relationships between attitudinal variables and voting behavior have also used a dichotomous dependent variable. Among scholars who focus on European populism, Arzheimer and Carter (2009), in an analysis investigating a potential link between the strength of one's Christian faith and support for radical right parties, created a dichotomous dependent variable. Immerzeel and Pickup (2015) also used a dummy variable in which successful populist radical right parties are coded as one while those that were unsuccessful were coded as zero. Rydgren (2011) created a dependent variable by coding all who voted for a radical right-wing populist party as one while all others as zero. Spierings and Zaslove (2015) also created a dichotomous dependent variable in which those who voted for radical right-wing populists were coded as one and all others were coded as zero.

Many scholars who researched voting behavior related to Donald Trump, particularly those who conducted research before 2016 general election data was available, used a thermometer rating (Donovan and Redlawsk 2018; Manza and Crowley 2018). While a thermometer rating can provide insights, positive feelings towards an individual is not the same as voting (Manza and Crowley 2018). After vote choice data became available, many researchers

used a dichotomous variable for Trump support (Frasure-Yokley 2018; Setzler and Yanus 2018), with some variation in their coding approaches (Ganzach et al. 2019). Whitehead et al. (2018), who also excluded non-Democratic and Republican Party voters, made a point that there was no substantial deviation between an analysis with all voters compared to an analysis with only Democratic and Republican Party supporters. Following the example of these scholars, the dependent variable design for the American chapter will include all voters.

Criteria for Party Support Data

This section outlines the data needed to answer the question of why individuals support populist actors. Unlike the data for party placement, which focused on manifestos written by the party elites, the data here relies on surveys from the general population. The data will need to take a randomly selected sample of individuals from the countries noted in the case selection section of this chapter. There is also an issue of time span. The data must cover the years preceding the Migrant Crisis and the Immigration Crisis, or before the 2014/2015 time period, while also having data available in the post-2015 time period. Further complicating matters is that it would be ideal if the questions asked in each iteration of the data are similar. Finally, optimal data would include a long-standing panel. A thorough examination of a randomly selected sample of individuals that spans preferably at least a decade before the beginning of the crises would highlight the point that the 2014/2015 time period changed people’s thinking.

The European Social Survey (ESS)

The European Social Survey (ESS) is a large-scale social survey funded by a number of different European agencies including the European Commission, European Science Foundation and the U.S. National Science Foundation. The initial purpose of the ESS was the creation of a survey that maps out European attitudes on various social issues (Reeskens and Hooghe 2008).

The ESS is a cross-sectional dataset, first conducted in 2002, which provides nationally representative surveys on a two-year cycle. Over two dozen different European countries have been a part of the survey at one point or another (Bilsky et al. 2011) and most countries have response rates of 70% or higher (Immerzeel and Pickup 2015).

Aside from basic demographic questions (Reeskens and Hooghe 2008), the survey poses almost two dozen questions related to personal values (Bilsky et al. 2011). There are items related to attitudinal and group characteristics (Montgomery and Winter 2015) which allows a researcher to analyze attitudes held by voters (Rydgren 2008). According to the ESS website, the following topics have been covered at least in one iteration: "media and social trust, politics, subjective well-being, gender, household, socio demographics, human values, immigration, citizen involvement, health and care, economic morality, family, work and well-being, timing of life, personal and social well-being, welfare attitudes, ageism, trust in justice, democracy, health inequalities, climate change and energy use, justice and fairness, and digital social contacts" (European Social Survey Website).

While the ESS has its positive points, it also has drawbacks. Ideally, the research question on whether the Migrant Crisis changed patterns of electoral support can be best answered through the use of panel data. Unfortunately, the ESS does not make use of panel data. In addition, a question regarding one's pride in one's ethnic group is unfortunately not available for all iterations of the ESS and so other variables were used as proxy measures.

Nevertheless, the ESS works well for projects related to voting behavior. Arzheimer and Carter (2009) used the first round of the ESS in their investigation on a potential relationship between Christian faith and support for radical right parties. Montgomery and Winter (2015) examined the relationship between religiosity and populism and used data from the fifth iteration

for their analysis. Dinas and van Spanje (2011) used the first round of the ESS to examine a potential interaction between an individual's position on crime and anti-immigration sentiment on support for anti-immigration parties. Gidron and Hall (2020) used the sixth round of the ESS to study potential links between support for radical right and left parties and social marginalization. Immerzeel and Pickup (2015) used multiple iterations of the ESS to look at voter turnout for populist radical right parties. Rydgren (2011) discussed the effect of social isolation and social capital on the likelihood of voting for radical right-wing populists. Spierings and Zaslove (2015) studied the effect of gender and support for populist radical right parties. Spierings et al. (2017) analyzed whether sexually modern individuals, or those who are accepting of the LGBT community, who held nativist tendencies supported the populist radical right. Werts et al. (2012) assessed a potential relationship between Euroskepticism and support for radical right-wing voting.

The American National Election Study (ANES)

Since 1948, the American National Election Study has conducted a nationwide survey during presidential election years (Frasure-Yokley 2018). Data is collected through the use of a multistage, stratified cluster sample of all Americans who are age 18 or older and residing in the continental United States (Setzler and Yanus 2018). In addition, the probability sampling procedure for the ANES also includes cluster sampling of geographic areas (Wright and Esses 2019).

Like the ESS, the ANES hosts an extensive number of variables and covers a wide range of topics (Murray and Scime 2010). In addition, many questions are asked in every iteration to gauge long term trends, along with specific questions which are generally asked once or twice to gauge a time-specific issues (Frasure-Yokley 2018). The ANES covers all the sections that the

ESS covers, such as important questions related to immigration, economics, and socio-demographic characteristics.

The ANES has recorded data on presidential vote choice (Murray and Scime 2010). The theory portion of the analysis requires a question that measures status threat. The best measure is a question that asks respondents about threats from immigration. The ANES has questions related to this issue through a question that asks individuals about immigration rates (Citrin et al. 1997). In addition, there is also the question of whether the data covers the appropriate time period. There is data available not just in the pre-2015 time period, but after 2015 as well. The ANES thus meets the requirements to be used in this analysis.

The ANES's long history provides important snapshots of the American population and this fact makes it a strong candidate for use in this dissertation. However, there are some important potential negatives that can come with such a long history. For example, question wording has changed throughout the years. Small changes to wording could elicit different reactions from respondents. Other questions, while remaining relatively similar in composition throughout the years, have had their placement changed through time. This has the potential to change reactions from respondents depending on what the preceding question entailed. The coders have also recoded a number of the variables so that question responses would be consistent through time.

While the ANES has existed in some shape or form since 1948 (Bartels 1999), some of the questions do not have a particularly long history. While by the beginning of the 21st century, there were over 900 different questions (Murray and Scime 2010), many of these questions were added through time. This means that some questions have a short history. For example, questions about immigration were first asked in newer iterations of the ANES (Citrin et al. 1997).

However, there is still data since 1992 and this allows for using six datasets that took place before the rise of Trump and the Migrant Crisis.

As noted by Guth (2019), the ANES also has multiple variables available which allow scholars to examine populist attitudes. The fact that the ANES includes questions which can be used to measure how respondents feel about certain aspects of populism makes it a particularly useful dataset for this analysis. Frasure-Yokley (2018), in an analysis of sexist attitudes and support for Trump, used the ANES dataset. The ANES also allowed Morgan and Lee (2019) to analyze both economic attitudes and racial attitudes simultaneously to see which affected Trump support. Smith and Hanley (2018) were able to use the ANES to gauge whether authoritarian attitudes played a role in Trump support. Wright and Esses (2019) use the ANES to analyze whether there a link between immigration and support for Trump.

Just like the ESS, the existence of multiple iterations of the ANES also allowed scholars to compare time periods. Ganzach et al. (2019) used the 2012 and 2016 ANES to compare the cognitive abilities of Obama vs. Romney voters and Clinton vs. Trump voters. Morgan and Lee (2018) analyzed variables that led white working-class voters to defect from the Obama camp to the Trump camp in 2016. Valentino et al. (2018) examined the 2004, 2008, 2012, and 2016 ANES and noted that it was only in the 2016 ANES in which sexist attitudes played a significant factor in support for the Republican Party.

Analysis: European Social Survey (ESS) and American National Election Study (ANES)

The European Social Survey (ESS) and American National Election Studies (ANES) will be used in a similar way. First, the discussion will focus on the general pattern of analysis that both datasets conform to while afterwards shifting towards a discussion on how they differ. As noted in an earlier section in this chapter, the dependent variable is a dummy variable of whether

individual respondents voted for an ethnocentric populist party or not. The ESS does not have a question that directly asks this. However, such a dependent variable can be created by looking at ESS questions which ask respondents from every country what party they voted for in the last election. Respondents who voted for the list of ethnocentric parties, which will be presented in the party placement chapter, will be coded as one while all other individuals who voted for other parties will be coded as zero. Like other scholars who have done research on support for populist actors (Arzheimer and Carter 2009; Rydgren 2011; Spierings and Zaslove 2015), a dummy variable using the ESS data will be used for the analytical chapters.

For the ANES data, the question of interest is which party's presidential candidate the respondent voted for in the last election. As the Republican Party's presidential candidate in 2016, Donald Trump is of interest here. The ANES's question on which party an individual voted for the presidential election would be the most appropriate dependent variable. Like a number of other scholars who have studied support for Trump (Frasure-Yokley 2018; Setzler and Yanus 2018), the coding will be modified so that those who answered Democratic Party or other are coded as zero and those who voted for the Republican Party coded as one.

The analytical chapters also account for independent variables that help test the theory. Variables that measure status threat and ingroup-outgroup preferences are available within both datasets. Economic anxiety can also be measured through the use of variables that ask about unemployment and general feelings on where the economy is headed in the respondent's home country. Control variables that are outside the scope of the theory, but considered by scholars to have an influence on populist support, such as gender, will also be added to the regression model. More details on the variables will be provided in the analytical chapters.

The analysis is divided depending on the time period as the basic research question attempts to examine what caused the spike in support for populist actors in the post-Migrant Crisis/Trump time period. Because of the importance of the 2014/15 time period, the most important distinction involves comparing the data from before and after this time. Within the ANES, the iterations that will be used in the American analytical chapter take place during the United States presidential election cycle. Under most circumstances, data is collected once every four years. The ESS data is collected, on the other hand, once every two years during even years.

While most of the analysis is similar across both the Western Europe and United States chapters, the former will also examine the marginal effects of economics playing a role in supporting right-wing populist parties. For the purposes of the analysis, right-wing populist parties are defined as parties that espouse right-wing economic and social policy stances.

Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was to lay out case selection, the classification process behind ethnocentric populist and right-wing populist parties, create usable dependent variables, discuss what type of data is needed for the three analytical chapters, and provide an introduction on how the analysis will be conducted.

Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States have been chosen to be part of the analysis. The United States is also a part of the analysis despite being outside of the Western European region because of the electoral success of a populist in Donald Trump during the 2016 US Election.

Instead of relying on labels given by other scholars, the decision was made to use Manifesto Project data on party attributes related to anti-elite sentiment, ethnonationalism,

xenophobia, and other related traits to construct an ethnocentric populism score. The data from the Manifesto Project was also used to create a left-right score. The process took inspiration from previous scholarship while also taking into consideration the unique needs of this project.

The dependent variable is a dummy in which zero signifies support for a non-ethnocentric populist party while one support for an ethnocentric populist party. A similar dependent variable will be used for the American dataset in which zero signifies support for non-Republican presidential candidates and one support for Republican presidential candidates. The decision was made to use a dummy variable as the basic research question asks about what is driving the success of ethnocentric populist parties.

The data comes from three different sources which are separated into three analytical chapters. The first analytical chapter uses the Manifesto Project. This data will be used to help place the parties on a two-dimensional spatial analysis in which ethnocentric populism scores and left-right economic placement scores help determine where ethnocentric populist parties exist relative to other parties. The same data will be used to help create cutoff points needed to determine which parties are ethnocentric populist and which are not. The second part of the analysis will involve adjusting the left-right scores and ethnocentric populism scores and examining where ethnocentric populist parties are placed within the context of their own countries.

The second and third analytical chapters use the American National Election Study (ANES) and the European Social Survey (ESS) to construct a dependent variable measuring support for ethnocentric populist actors. The independent variables include a number of controls but the main variables of interest are those that measure status threat. The ESS has a second regression component in which the dependent variable is again coded as zero and one but this

time those that are coded as one are right-wing populist parties and those that are coded as zero are ethnocentric populist parties that did not make the cut to be considered right-wing populist parties. The next three chapters will provide the actual analysis that will then in turn help guide the direction of the conclusion.

Chapter 4: Party Placement Analysis

Introduction

Which parties are populist? Do populist parties match their popular and/or academic labels? Up to this point, a major component of the investigation is the creation of a list of ethnocentric populist parties. While this specific type of populist is the major focus of the analysis, terms such as right-wing radical, fringe right (Pupcenoks and McCabe 2013) or extreme right (Golder 2003) are often used to highlight the non-mainstream nature of these actors. Operating outside the mainstream, the general expectation is that this fringe status hinders electoral performance (Jackman and Volpert 1996).

This statement aligns with findings by Downs (1957) who noted that parties desire to move towards the center in order to maximize vote shares. If the definition that extreme or fringe refers to those outside the mainstream (Mulloy 2004), these characteristics constitute an electoral disadvantage that hinders a party's chances at winning and maintaining power (Mayhew 1974).

The broader question that ties the entire investigation together involves attempting to answer what drove support for ethnocentric populist actors in the post-Migrant Crisis time period. One possibility is that this increased support is rooted in changes made by the parties themselves. Is it possible that the increased support for populist actors was the result of moderated policy positions? This chapter examines where parties stand relative to one another.

This chapter also provides a list of ethnocentric populist and right-wing populist parties. Chapter two noted that ethnocentric populism refers to a worldview in which regular individuals are seen as being in conflict with establishment elites while also espousing some combination of ethnonationalism and xenophobia. Right-wing populism refers to combining the worldview of ethnocentric populism while also espousing economic stances that oppose government

intervention in the economy. To build on this, the left-right dimensions first discussed in the research design chapter will be used to create scores.

Before creating a list of ethnocentric populist and right-wing populist parties, a look at the scholarship provides a reference for which parties are commonly referred to as populist. Because the term ethnocentric populist is specific, an examination of the parties deemed as radical right, extreme right, extreme radical right, populist right, or right-wing populist in peer-reviewed work from the thirteen Western European countries selected to be a part of the analysis can provide important insights.

Table 4.1: Parties Considered to be Radical Right, Extreme Right or Right-wing Populist

Party	Author(s) Who Reference the Party
Alliance for the Future of Austria (Austria) (4)	Caramani and Manucci (2019); Dunn (2015); Werts et al. (2012); Zhirkov (2014)
Alternative for Germany (Germany) (10)	Arzheimer (2015); Caiani and Kroll (2017); Caramini and Manuccci (2019); Decker (2013); Huber and Yendall (2019); Lammers and Baldwin (2020); Lees (2018); Louwerse and Otjes (2019); Salmela and von Scheve (2017)
British National Party (United Kingdom) (12)	Abedi and Lundberg (2009); Bowyer (2008); Ford and Goodwin (2010); Harteveld et al. (2015); Jesuit et al. (2009); Lubbers et al. (2002); March (2017); Pupcenoks and McCabe (2013); Spies and Franzmann (2011); Stockemer (2017); Veugelers and Magnan (2005); Werts et al. (2012)
Centre Democrats (Netherlands) (4)	Caramani and Manucci (2019); Lubbers et al. (2002); Spies and Franzmann (2011); Veugelers and Magnan (2005)
Centre Party (Netherlands) (4)	Arzheimer (2009); Caramani and Manucci (2019); Spies and Franzmann (2011); Veugelers and Magnan (2005)
Danish People’s Party (Denmark) (16)	Allern (2012); Bergh (2004); Cutts et al. (2011); Ennser (2012); Green-Pedersen and Odmalm 2008; Jungar and Jupskas (2014); Keskinen (2012); Mayer (2013); Meijers and Zaslove (2020); Moore (2010); Mudde (2013); Oesch (2008); Rydgren (2010); Skidmore-Hess (2003); Soderlund and Kestila (2009); Yilmaz (2012)
Democratic Union Party (United Kingdom) (2)	Ingle (2008); Mudde (2007)
Fatherland Party (Norway) (1)	van Spanje (2010)

Federal Democratic Union (Switzerland) (2)	Stockemer (2017); Werts et al. (2012); Zhirkov (2014)
Flemish Interest (Belgium)	Billet and de Witte (1995); Burscher et al. (2015); Dandoy (2014); Dassonneville and Stiers (2018); de Jonge (2020); de Lange and Mugge (2015); de Winter et al. (2006); Ennser (2012); Erk (2005); Hooghe and Marks (2008); Janssen et al. (2019); Mudde (2013); Pauwels (2011); Rydgren (2010); Schmuck and Matthes (2017); Soderlund and Kestila (2009); van der Brug et al. (2000); van Spanje (2010); Williams (2011)
Forum for Democracy (Netherlands) (1)	Pirro and van Kessel (2018)
Forza Italia (Italy) (3)	Caiani and Kroll (2017); Caramani and Manucci (2019); Rooduijn et al. (2014)
Fratelli d'Italia (Italy) (2)	Bobba and Roncarolo (2018); Caiani and Kroll (2017)
Freedom Party (Austria) (29)	Afonso and Rennwald (2018); Arzheimer (2009); Betz (1993); Caramani and Manucci (2019); Downes and Loveless (2018); Dunn (2015); Ennser (2012); Evans (2005); Hakhverdian and Koop (2007); Halla et al. (2017); Harteveld et al. (2015); Heinisch and Marent (2018); Jesuit et al. (2009); Kessler and Freeman (2005); Lammers and Baldwin (2020); Louwerse and Otjes (2019); Lubbers et al. (2002); Mols and Jetten (2016); Mudde (2007); Oesch (2008); Rydgren (2007); Salmela and von Scheve (2017); Smith (2010); Spierings et al. (2017); Spies and Franzmann (2011); Stockemer (2017); Veugelers and Magnan (2005); Werts et al. (2012); Zaslove (2004); Zhirkov (2014)
Freedom Party (Netherlands) (1)	Caramani and Manucci (2019)
Freedom Party (Switzerland) (6)	Caramani and Manucci (2019); Hakhverdian and Koop (2007); Smith (2010); Stockemer (2017); Werts et al. (2012); Zhirkov (2014)
Geneva Citizen's Movement (Switzerland) (1)	Bernhard (2017)
German People's Union (Germany) (7)	Arzheimer (2009); Caramani and Manucci (2019); Ennser (2012); Evans (2005); Lubbers et al. (2002); Stockemer (2017); Werts et al. (2012)
Golden Dawn (Greece) (8)	Aslanidis (2016); Bernhard and Kriesi (2019); Ellinas (2013); Fouskas (2013); Halikiopoulou (2019); Teperoglou et al. (2015); Tsakatika and Eleftheriou (2013); Vasilopoulou (2018)
Group Verdonk (Netherlands) (1)	Dunn (2015)
Independent Greeks (Greece) (3)	Aslanidis (2016); Bernhard and Kriesi (2019); Vasilopoulou (2018)
Italian Social Movement (Italy) (4)	Evans (2005); Lubbers et al. (2002); Spies and Franzmann (2011); Stockemer (2017)

List Pim Fortuyn (Netherlands) (12)	Arzheimer (2009); Caramani and Manucci (2019); Ennser (2012); Hakhverdian and Koop (2007); Ivarsflaten (2008); Louwerse and Otjes (2019); Mols and Jetten (2016); Smith (2010); Spierings et al. (2017); Spies and Franzmann (2011); Werts et al. (2012); Zhirkov (2014)
Livable Netherlands (Netherlands) (3)	Arzheimer (2009); Caramani and Manucci (2019); Hakhverdian and Koop (2007)
Lombard League (Italy) (1)	Smith (2010)
Movement for France (France) (2)	Spies and Franzmann (2011); Stockemer (2017)
National Alliance (Italy) (8)	Arzheimer (2009); Caramani and Manucci (2019); Clarke et al. (2016); Downes and Loveless (2018); Ennser (2012); Evans (2005); Kessler and Freeman (2005); Spies and Franzmann (2011)
National Democratic Party of Germany (Germany) (12)	Arzheimer (2009); Caramani and Manucci (2019); Ennser (2012); Evans (2005); Lubbers et al. (2002); Minkenberg (2000); Spies and Franzmann (2011); Stockemer (2017); Veugelers and Magnan (2005); Werts et al. (2012); Zhirkov (2014)
National Front (Belgium) (4)	Burscher et al. (2015); Ennser (2012); Mudde (2013); van Spanje (2010)
National Front/National Rally (France) (33)	Afonso and Rennwald (2018); Arzheimer (2009); Bonikowski (2017); Bornschier (2012); Caiani and Kroll (2017); Caramani and Manucci (2019); Clarke et al. (2016); Della Posta (2013); Downes and Loveless (2018); Ennser (2012); Evans (2005); Hakhverdian and Koop (2007); Harteveld et al. (2015); Ivaldi (2015); Ivarsflaten (2008); Jesuit et al. (2009); Kessler and Freeman (2005); Lammers and Baldwin (2020); Lubbers et al. (2002); Minkenberg (2000); Mudde (2007); Oesch (2008); Rooduijn et al. (2014); Rydgren (2007); Salmela and von Scheve (2017); Shehaj et al. (2021); Smith (2010); Spierings et al. (2017); Spies and Franzmann (2011); Stockemer (2017); Veugelers and Magnan (2005); Werts et al. (2012); Zhirkov (2014)
National Front (United Kingdom) (4)	Jesuit et al. (2009); Pupcenoks and McCabe (2013); Spies and Franzmann (2011); Veugelers and Magnan (2005)
National Republican Movement (France) (2)	Werts et al. (2012); Zhikov (2014)
New Democracy (Sweden) (7)	Arzheimer (2009); Caramani and Manucci (2019); Hakhverdian and Koop (2007); Lubbers et al. (2002); Smith (2010); Spies and Franzmann (2011); Veugelers and Magnan (2005)
Northern League (Italy) (23)	Afonso and Rennwald (2018); Arzheimer (2009); Betz (1993); Caramani and Manucci (2019); Della Posta (2013); Downes and Loveless (2018); Ennser (2012); Hakhverdian and Koop (2007); Harteveld et al. (2015); Jesuit et al. (2009); Kessler and Freeman (2005); Lubbers et al. (2002); Mudde (2007); Rooduijn et al.(2014); Rydgren (2007); Smith (2010); Spierings et al. (2017); Spies and

	Franzmann (2011); Stockemer (2017); Veugelers and Magnan (2005); Werts et al. (2012); Zaslove (2004); Zhirkov (2014)
Party for Freedom (Netherlands) (12)	Afonso and Rennwald (2018); Bos et al. (2018); Clarke et al. (2016); Della Posta (2013); Downes and Loveless (2018); Hakhverdian and Koop (2007); Mols and Jetten (2016); Spierings et al. (2017); Stockemer (2017); van Wijk et al. (2020); Werts et al. (2012); Zhirkov (2014)
Popular Orthodox Rally (Greece) (6)	Aslanidis (2016); Burscher et al. (2015); Gemenis (2009); Halikiopoulou (2019); Mudde (2013); Tsatsanis (2018)
Progress Party (Denmark) (3)	Ennser (2012); van er Brug et al. (2000); van Spanje (2010)
Progress Party (Norway) (12)	Allern (2012); Bergh (2004); Bjerkem (2016); Burscher et al. (2015); Ennser (2012); Kestila and Soderlund (2007); Mayer (2013); Moore (2010); Oesch (2008); Thomas (2020); van Kessel (2015); van Spanje (2010)
Republicans (Germany) (15)	Arzheimer (2009); Betz (1993); Caramani and Manucci (2019); Ennser (2012); Evans (2005); Hakhverdian and Koop (2007); Jesuit et al. (2009); Lubbers et al. (2002); Mudde (2007); Smith (2010); Spies and Franzmann (2011); Stockemer (2017); Veugelers and Magnan (2005); Werts et al. (2012); Zhirkov (2014)
Republican Movement (Switzerland) (1)	Caramani and Manucci (2019)
Sweden Democrats (Sweden) (9)	Caramani and Manucci (2019); Downes and Loveless (2018); Hakhverdian and Koop (2007); Harteveld et al. (2015); Lubbers et al. (2002); Norocel (2016); Spierings et al. (2017); Stockmer (2017); Zhirkov (2014)
Swiss Democrats (Switzerland) (5)	Caramani and Manucci (2019); Ensser (2012); Stockemer (2017); Werts et al. (2012); Zhirkov (2014)
Swiss People's Party (Switzerland) (17)	Afonso and Rennwald (2018); Caramani and Manucci (2019); Coffe and Voorpostel (2010); Dunn (2015); Ennser (2012); Fitzgerald and Lawrence (2011); Hakhverdian and Koop (2007); Ivarsflaten (2008); Kessler and Freeman (2005); Muis and Immerzeel (2017); Oesch (2008); Shehaj et al. (2021); Smith (2010); Spierings et al. (2017); Stockemer (2017); Werts et al. (2012); Zhirkov (2014)
Team Stronach (Austria) (1)	Caramani and Manucci (2019)
Ticino League (Switzerland) (7)	Bernhard (2017); Caramani and Manucci (2019); Hakhverdian and Koop (2007); Smith (2010); Stockemer (2017); Werts et al. (2012); Zhirkov (2014)
Tricolour Flame (Italy) (7)	Caramani and Manucci (2019); Ennser (2012); Evans (2005); Jesuit et al. (2009); Mudde (2007); Werts et al. (2012) ; Zhirkov (2014)
True Finns (Finland) (5)	Arter (2010); Burscher et al. (2015); Jungar and Jupskas (2014); Keskinen (2012); van Kessel (2015)
Union of German People (Germany) (1)	Spies and Franzmann (2011)

United Kingdom Independence Party (United Kingdom) (10)	Abedi and Lundberg (2009); Clarke et al. (2016); Hakhverdian and Koop (2007); Hayton (2016); Lammers and Baldwin (2020); March (2017); Mierina and Koroleva (2015); Muis and Immerzeel (2017); Rooduijn et al. (2014); Stockemer (2017)
Venetian League (Italy) (1)	Smith (2010)

Table 4.1 identifies peer-reviewed publications which classified at least one party as radical right, extreme right or right-wing populist. Works were chosen to present the names of as many different authors as possible with some of these articles focusing on examining parties from specific countries or even just a single country. Because of this approach, the party with the most mentions, the National Front/National Rally of France, appears in only 33 entries. Many of these parties no longer operate and some of them had short lifespans. There are also nine parties only mentioned by one work: The Forum for Democracy (Netherlands), Freedom Party (Netherlands), Geneva Citizen's Movement (Switzerland), Group Verdonk (Netherlands), Lombard League (Italy), Republican Movement (Switzerland), Team Stronach (Austria), Union of German People (Germany), and the Venetian League (Italy).

Overall, each scholar has his or her own ideas on which party should be considered radical right, extreme right or right-wing populist. There are even situations where the scholars disagree in how the parties should be classified. For example, Caiani and Kroll (2017), Caraman and Manucci (2019), and Rooduijn et al. (2014) all consider the party Forza Italia to be either a radical right, extreme right, or right-wing populist party. However, Ennser (2012) argues that Forza Italia should be considered a conservative or Christian Democratic party.

Creation of Ethnocentric Populist and Right-wing Populist List

The selection process for ethnocentric populist parties and the method for creating the left-right score is described in detail in the previous chapter. In total, 110 different parties which secured at least one seat in the national election in the post-Crisis time period are included for this analysis. Using the table above which combines the ethnocentric populist and left-right score system from the research design chapter to once again show which variables are used to create a final list of ethnocentric populist parties.

Table 4.2: Parties and the Ethnocentric Populist Cutoff (By Country of Origin)

Country of Origin	Party	Decoupled Country Score
Austria	*Freedom Party*	0.13
Belgium	**New Flemish Alliance**	0.73
Belgium	*Flemish Interest*	0.99
Denmark	*Danish People's Party*	0.69
Finland	*True Finns*	0.54
France	*National Front*	0.47
Germany	**Alternative for Germany**	1.17
Greece	*Popular Association-Golden Dawn*	0.24
Italy	*Democratic Party*	0.53
Netherlands	**Reformed Political Party**	0.54
Netherlands	**Forum for Democracy**	0.71
Netherlands	**Party for Freedom**	0.79
Norway	**Progress Party**	0.43
Sweden	**Centre Party**	0.31
Switzerland	**Geneva Citizen's Movement**	0.49
Switzerland	**Swiss People's Party**	0.61
United Kingdom	**Democratic Unionist Party**	0.48
United Kingdom	**United Kingdom Independence Party**	0.49

Note: Parties in bold met criteria for right-wing populist classification while italicized did not.

In total, using the standards outlined in chapter three, Table 4.2 shows that eighteen parties made the cutoff to be considered ethnocentric populist parties. With 110 parties examined in the post-Migrant Crisis data, about 16 percent of parties are considered to be ethnocentric populist parties. The parties in bold had in-country left-right scores greater than zero and so

qualify as right-wing populist parties, while those italicized did not and should not be considered right-wing populist.

This system leads to some omissions. For example, the Northern League of Italy is left out of this analysis. This may partly be the result of the party's dual mission of being an ethnocentric populist party and a party that advocates for more regional autonomy for Northern Italy (Massetti and Toubeau 2013). The Sweden Democrats are also omitted despite being considered by some to be an ethnocentric populist party (Jylhä, Rydgren, and Strimling 2019; Rydgren 2010). To maintain the consistency of the selection process, these parties will not be included in the analysis.

Regional and In-Country Party Placement Analysis

Several environmental features need to be examined due to their influence on ethnocentric populist success. Was there an electoral system in place which facilitated the rise of populist parties (Golder 2003)? Is there evidence of growing disillusionment with mainstream parties and/or decreasing partisan attachments (Oesch 2008; Zhikov 2014)? Was there movement by existing mainstream parties which allowed an ethnocentric populist party to form and/or did policies put forth by ethnocentric populists gain more acceptance in broader political discourse (Gruber and Bale 2014; Meguid 2005)? Is there evidence that hardline immigration policies have gained acceptance in the country (Oesch 2008)? Answering these questions should provide details on the political environments in the target countries in the years leading up to the crises.

To answer these questions, the in-country analysis is divided into two broad parts. The first focuses on the country's political and social environment. The second section describes the electoral system with a focus on whether the system helps or hinders a challenger. The third section discusses whether the country has experienced a growth in disillusionment with the status

quo and/or a decrease in party attachment. The fourth section focuses on whether the parties in the country have moved closer to the ideological center. The fifth section discusses whether hardline immigration rhetoric has gained more acceptance by the eve of the exogenous shocks.

The second part of the analysis examines party placement and is divided into two subsections. The first is a regional party placement analysis. Here, all of the Western European parties are examined together and placed on a two-dimensional graph using their unadjusted scores. The x-axis will show their left-right spectrum scores and the y-axis their ethnocentric populism scores. The general purpose of this exercise is to see whether parties are clustered together.

The second subsection examines the countries individually. Within the broader political science scholarship, there is an argument that, assuming the preferences of the electorate are normally distributed, parties moving towards the center will capture more votes (Downs 1957). This brings up the question whether the rise in support for ethnocentric populist parties in the years following the Migrant Crisis/Immigration Crisis is the result of the parties moving closer to the center. For the purposes of this analysis, the main focus is examining where ethnocentric populist parties stand relative to their in-country counterparts in the pre- and post-Crisis time periods.

The creation of party placement data in the pre-2014 time period follows the same principles. For the thirteen Western European countries, the time span of the pre-Migrant Crisis data starts with the United Kingdom's May 2010 Legislative Election through Germany and Austria's September 2013 elections. The post-Migrant Crisis data spans the Swiss Federal Election from October 2015 to the March 2018 Italian Legislative Election. The United States is analyzed separately with data coming from pre and post-Immigration Crisis. The pre-crisis data

comes from the November 2012 General Election while the post-crisis data comes from November 2016's General Election.

While the Manifesto Project provides data on many different parties across a large number of countries, there is unfortunately missing data which makes a complete comparison infeasible. Notably, data on the United Kingdom is missing. For the 2010 Election, there is only data available for the country's three largest parties: The Conservative Party, Labour, and the Liberal Democrats. Data for the United Kingdom Independence Party is unavailable. In order to create as complete of a left-right and ethnocentric populism score collection as possible, the three UK parties that had data were included when conducting in-region adjustments. In addition, while party placement data was not available in the UK, a qualitative description was used to describe where the United Kingdom Independence Party stands relative to other countries.

Regional Party Placement Analysis

Table 4.3: Decoupled Scores for Western European Parties Before the Migrant Crisis



Table 4.4: Decoupled Scores for Western European Parties after the Migrant Crisis



The aggregate decoupled scores for Western European countries in the pre- and post-Migrant Crisis time period presents a number of findings. In both time periods, most countries have left-right spectrum scores less than zero. In other words, by the metrics employed for this analysis, most parties are left wing in their economic policies. As the region has a long history of accepting large-scale welfare spending (Oliver and Matzke 2014) with some traditional mainstream right parties advocating for such policies (Earles 2011), this is in line with expectations.

In-country analysis on the left-right spectrum indicates that some of the countries are clustered closer to the center. In the pre and post-Migrant Crisis data, many Italian parties are clustered further to the right than the parties of many other countries. This might be the result of the Eurozone Crisis that occurred in late 2000s and earliest 2010s which pressured the Italian government, and the governments of a number of other Southern European countries, to cut back on welfare programs and other forms of government intervention into the economy (Pisany-Ferry

2014). On the other hand, the Swiss parties, with the exception of the Swiss People's Party which is further to the right than the majority of the parties in both the pre- and post-Crisis time periods, are further to the left. This observation indicates that parties from the same country are close to one another.

Shifting to discussing ethnocentric populism scores, there is evidence indicating change over time. For example, the pre-Crisis data indicates that French parties, relative to their Western European counterparts, were closer to the middle in terms of ethnocentric populism scores. However, in the post-Crisis data, French parties appear to have moved higher than zero. In the 2000s and 2010s France experienced a situation in which more mainstream politicians started to use populist rhetoric. For example, former president Nicolas Sarkozy, while often seen as a right-wing politician, used populist rhetoric (Mayaffre and Scholz 2017) as did the centrist Emmanuel Macron (Fougere and Barthold 2020). Dutch parties also appear to have behaved similarly. This may be from the growing momentum enjoyed by ethnocentric populist-style actors such as the Party for Freedom in the 2010s (Pellikaan et al. 2018).

A breakdown by country of origin also indicates that there are regional differences. In both time periods, a larger percentage of Italian parties have positive ethnocentric populism scores. Part of this observation relates to Italy's distinct political history in the post-World War II era. After the end of the war, the country was under one-party rule by the Christian Democrats until the early 1990s. However, populist parties played a role in ending the dominance of the one-party system. Partly because of their importance in helping bring about the current iteration of the Italian political system, populist parties have played an important part in Italian politics since the 1990s and arguably have been the dominant actors (Verbeek and Zaslove 2016). In the pre-Migrant Crisis time period, most of the Swedish and French parties have negative

ethnocentric populism scores. For most of the remaining countries with sufficient data, about half of the parties have positive scores and half have negative scores; among this group of countries, Italy is the only country where positive ethnocentric populism scores were found more readily in the pre-Migrant Crisis time period.

In the post-Migrant Crisis time period, there are still country-level differences. Many Dutch, Swiss, and German parties have negative ethnocentric populism scores. German parties maintaining lower ethnocentric populism scores is in line with the country's general disdain for anything seen to be extreme or fringe (Bornschier 2012). In the Netherlands and Switzerland, a long-standing desire to maintain consensus may be preventing many parties from adopting more ethnocentric populist positions (Pennings 2005).

It appears that in Sweden the opposite observation is occurring. Most of the parties are clustered further to the left. This is within expectations as Sweden has a different welfare state culture in which economically conservative parties are in favor of the welfare state (Earles 2011). Many of the Dutch, French, and Swiss parties are also further to the left. However, this does not appear to be universal with some of the parties in these countries being further to the right. Overall, however, there appears to be at least some evidence of country-level clustering on the economic scale.

In some of the other countries, party placement does not appear to change much between time periods. In Finland, about half the parties have scores above zero on the ethnocentric populist scale in both time periods. Greek parties predominately had ethnocentric populism scores greater than zero in both time periods. The ethnocentric populism scores for Norwegian parties in both time periods tend to cluster closer to zero in both time periods. Belgian parties also do not appear to move much between the two time periods.

Arguably the biggest takeaway from this regional analysis is that that there has been a small shift towards greater ethnocentric populism scores in the post-Migrant Crisis time period. While about 59 percent of parties in the pre-Migrant Crisis time period had a positive decoupled ethnocentric populism score, about 63 percent of parties had such a score in the years after the Migrant Crisis. There appeared to be a slight but noticeable movement towards adopting ethnocentric populist platforms.

United Kingdom

Electoral System

The improving performance of UKIP occurred in spite of electoral institutional constraints which did not favor the party. When attempting to gain access to the House of Commons, parties learn quickly that the electoral system is not particularly friendly towards newcomers. In the United Kingdom, House of Commons seats are won using a first-past-the-post, single member plurality electoral system (Bale and Gruber 2014; John et al. 2014). These types of systems favor the growth and development of two major parties (Cox 1997; Duverger 1954; Riker 1982).

Disillusionment and Party Attachment

While the electoral system was not friendly to UKIP and others like it, there were other factors which benefited the party. Political party membership continuously declined in the UK for many years (Gauja 2012) and disillusionment with party government and parties has increased since the 1960s. According to the Gallup Political Index, between October 1967 and December 1992, the percentage of respondents who stated that they had "not very much" or "no confidence at all" in parliament increased from 59 to 75 percent. The British Election Survey indicated that while partisan identification dropped by four percent from 93 to 89 between 1964

and 1992, the percentage of those who felt a very strong identity fell from 48 to 19 percent (Webb 1996).

This appears to indicate that the British electorate, on average, was growing more dissatisfied with the status quo. UKIP was particularly effective at attracting individuals who were disaffected with the existing political system in which mainstream political actors dominated the conversation (Bale 2018). The United Kingdom had undergone a number of social and economic changes where working-class voters had lost their jobs (Gest 2016) and rhetoric railing against those in charge appeared to have found a home in UKIP.

Movement to Center

Further potentially aiding parties such as UKIP was the movement towards the center in the United Kingdom by both the Conservatives and Labour. By the late 1990s, Labour, the mainstream left party, argued for mandatory work-related activities and cut back on rhetoric supporting redistribution without work (Deeming 2015). It became increasingly clear that the Labour Party opted towards a deference to free markets and adopted greater openness to a globalized economy (Hindmoor 2004).

When the Conservatives gained power late 2000s, they continued reforms made by Labour which emphasized reducing welfare spending (Deeming 2015). This combined with the Conservatives' favoring of policies that aided big business (Murphy 2019) meant that the distance between Labour and the Conservatives decreased. On another economic front, however, the Conservatives moved closer to the center. Following a Conservative and Liberal Democrat coalition formed after the 2010 Election, the Conservatives supported curbing banking activity and imposed capital requirements (Howarth and James 2020).

On the question of convergence, the two major players in British politics, the Conservatives and Labour have moved closer to the center. While movement makes sense if one subscribes to the theory that capturing the center means maximizing the number of voters (Downs 1957), this leaves an opening on the party's left or right flank depending on where it originally stood (Gruber and Bale 2014). This movement to the center created a subsequent opening for a party like UKIP to take away disaffected voters.

Hardline Immigration Policy Acceptance

One of the key tenets of ethnocentric populist-style parties is a strong opposition to immigration. Yet in the earlier days of British politics, there was strong opposition to anti-immigration rhetoric. When Enoch Powell made his "Rivers of Blood" speech in which he criticized immigration, his comments led to the end of his political career (Caldwell 2009).

For many years following Powell's comments in 1968, hardline immigration positions were not profitable for political parties. However, after the 9/11 attacks and the 7/7 2005 bombings, in which British-born Muslims committed terror attacks in London, the political landscape changed (Bowen 2009). Anti-immigrant sentiment became large enough that then-Conservative prime minister David Cameron promised to hold a referendum on the UK's membership in the European Union after securing election. After several UKIP candidates during 2013 Council Elections won seats, the Conservatives realized that this challenge was becoming serious. Despite some opposition within the party to adopting UKIP-style policy positions that could alienate moderates, the Conservatives introduced legislation calling for stricter immigration laws, stop and search campaigns to find illegal immigrants, and cutbacks to social security and child benefits for immigrants (Gruber and Bale 2014).

These developments suggest that in the United Kingdom, discussing and proposing hardline immigration policy indicated that in the years leading up to the Migrant Crisis. This cultural shift provided a strong advantage to any actor seeking to win votes by instituting a hardline immigration message.

Table 4.5: British Party Placement During the 2015 Elections



While party placement analysis examines where the parties stand before and after the Migrant Crisis, the Manifesto Project dataset does not have enough data on UKIP and almost all third parties which secured seats in the 2010 Election. However, there is data from the 2015 British Legislative Elections and is shown on table 4.5. Instead, qualitatively describing UKIP's place relative to its counterparts will take the place of graphical representation.

Between 2010 and 2015, UKIP maintained its image as an outsider party and members of its leadership, such as Nigel Farage, pressed the attack with hardline immigration rhetoric. For example, he declared, following terror attacks in Paris, that a "fifth column" was present in Europe (Cutts et al. 2017). Overall, the party focused on its core messaging of Euroskepticism

and anti-immigration rhetoric in the 2015 election (Usherwood 2019). The party increased its vote share to 12 percent (Cutts et al. 2017).

The description of the Conservative Party by scholars indicated that, at least on the ethnocentric populist scale, there should be movement towards a higher ethnocentric populism score between 2010 and 2015. After recognizing many Conservative-leaning voters were thinking of supporting UKIP (Cutts et al. 2017; Gruber and Bale 2014), the Conservatives adopted a more hardline immigration rhetoric. If this were shown on a graph, the Conservatives would have had a lower ethnocentric populism score in 2010 but by 2015, the Conservatives should be much closer to UKIP. In effect, UKIP became a victim of its success. As part of the effort to curb immigration, the party had, for many years, pushed for the United Kingdom's departure from the European Union. After a 2016 referendum, the British electorate voted to leave. The key reasons to vote for UKIP was no longer important and this hurt the party's influence in the British political scene (Hobolt 2018).

France

Electoral System

The two major national-level prizes in the French electoral system directly elected by the people are the presidency and the National Assembly. Presidents are chosen on the basis of a two-round system in which the two candidates who received the greatest number of votes go on to the second round unless one of the candidates receives a majority (Mayer 2003; Murray 2013).

Legislative elections, with the exception of 1986 Elections which were conducted using proportional representation, follow the similar rules to the presidential elections. Until 2000, the president held office for seven years while the deputies of the National Assembly had five year terms. Since a 2000 referendum and other major reforms, presidents hold office for five years

with legislative elections held a few weeks after the second round of the presidential election. The logic behind this system is that the winning presidential candidate can actively campaign for a legislative majority and build off the momentum from his/her victory (Murray 2013).

Like the British system, the French system uses single member districts. While this hurts a smaller party's chances to win seats, the French system has a two-round system. This creates a situation where a smaller party such as the National Front has a chance to win enough votes to find itself in the second round and subsequently a chance at securing victory.

Disillusionment and Party Attachment

While in the earlier years of the Fifth Republic, partisan salience was high with individual voters often lining up behind either the mainstream left or right parties. However, by the middle of the 1980s, the political situation had changed (Marthaler 2010). The fortunes of various parties changed quickly in some cases, with the Communists, for example, seeing large fluctuations in vote shares (Pierce 1992). Because of the instability of the French system, a number of scholars have argued that partisan identity matters less than ideological commitments among the French electorate (Haegel 1990; Inglehart and Klingemann 1976; Percheron 1977).

The lack of stability also undermined confidence in the parties. Even as far back as the 1960s, IFOP (The French Institute of Public Opinion) polls indicated that over 40 percent of respondents did not feel the parties could address their needs. Polling from the same period also indicated that about 50 percent of voters felt strong partisan attachment (Pierce 1992).

The existence of many unattached voters proved to be useful for elites who desired to create their own parties. The electorate pushed back against incumbents who broke promises and has swung back and forth between the mainstream right and left (Clift 2013). There has been a

growth in anger and disillusionment with mainstream parties; in 1978 the abstention rate was about 15 percent and almost 40 percent by 2007 (Delove 2012).

Movement to Center

The French system saw some changes in the 1980s which indicated that parties were willing to capture voters in the middle (Downs 1957). The Socialist Party, starting in the 1980s, started to move away from previous attempts at breaking with France's capitalist culture, publicly accepted the continued existence of a market capitalist system, and moved away from promising large-scale social programs (Bergounioux and Grunberg 1992; Clift 2013).

This was not just rhetoric but was backed by action. Socialist president Francois Hollande, despite nominally representing a Socialist Party, adopted policies that were not particularly different from most mainstream center-left parties (Clift 2013). The mainstream right moved closer to the center and instituted large-scale welfare expansion under both right-wing presidents Charles de Gaulle and Georges Pompidou (Kus 2006). In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the French government adopted a neoliberal approach that deemphasized state involvement, but public anger forced it to backtrack in the early 1980s. Welfare spending subsequently increased through the 1980s, 1990s, and the 2000s under both left and right-wing administrations (Kus 2006). Despite attempts at cutting spending, the maintenance of public services and social welfare remained an important pillar of French society that neither left nor right could touch (Le Queux and Sainsalieu 2010). Overall, the ideological distance between the left and right became smaller (Marthaler 2010).

Hardline Immigration Policy Acceptance

Even before the Migrant Crisis, President Nicolas Sarkozy, despite being a prominent member of national politics since 1993, adopted aspects of the National Front message such as

stating an intention of withdrawing from the Schengen Zone and cutting legal immigration by half (Mondon 2014). Hardline immigration stances slowly gained traction. This movement was partly due to the salience of immigration and integration following several important events, both domestic and international, such as the 2004 Madrid Train Bombing, the 2005 7/7 Bombing in London (Bowen 2009), and the 2005 urban riots (Haddad and Balz 2006). By the time the Migrant Crisis became an important part of the French political discourse, the political culture had shifted enough that hardline immigration rhetoric was more palatable.

By the time the Migrant Crisis occurred, the National Front's hardline immigration policies, once considered too extreme, became more palatable to the mainstream. For example, one faction of Socialists, led by Manuel Valls, in the aftermath of the Migrant Crisis, argued against accepting more migrants. On the far left, Jean-Luc Melenchon stated that accepting more refugees was not going to solve the broader problems facing the region (Ivaldi 2018).

The mainstream right was more united in moving towards positions held by ethnocentric populists. There were public statements calling for a French referendum on the European question and/or a negotiation of France's role within the EU. For example, former president Nicolas Sarkozy openly endorsed a French referendum and advocated for a new treaty which proposed to limit the powers of the EU (Ivaldi 2018).

Table 4.6: French Party Placement During the 2012 Elections



Note: The Left Front and Radical Party of the Left are almost on top of each other.

Table 4.7: French Party Placement During the 2017 Elections



Data on the French parties come from the 2012 and 2017 elections and are presented on tables 4.6 and 4.7 respectively. Where the two graphs stand out is in the number of parties which

have won seats in the French National Assembly. In both years, at least nine parties won seats. Overall, parties operate across the ideological spectrum in both the 2012 and 2017 elections. While scholars indicate a convergence to the center by some of the major actors such as the Socialists (Clift 2013; Kus 2006), the parties appeared to have staked out places all along the ideological spectrum.

Arguably the most important takeaway from these two graphs for the purposes of this project is that the National Front, within the context of French politics, has the highest ethnocentric populism score in both years. Despite maintaining the highest score in both 2013 and 2017, the party increased its vote shares in the National Assembly between these two elections. This indicates that despite maintaining its hardline stance, the party was still able to attract more votes.

Germany

Electoral System

The German electoral system is a hybrid that merges a single member district system and proportional representation (Cox and Schoppa 2002; Hoff and Hough 2014). The single member district component of the German electoral system hurts access to the Bundestag for smaller parties. However, the proportional representation system with a five percent threshold (Allen 2009; Art 2007) is more forgiving to smaller parties.

The mixed-member system is arguably more favorable to smaller parties than the British single member first-past-the-post system and even France's two-round system. Ultimately, the mixed-member proportional system allows voters to not only have a personal representative who represents the district but also allows for parties which did not win any district to win seats in the Bundestag (Hoff and Hough 2014). Voters also have access to a dual ballot which allows for a

splitting of the ticket (Kreuzer 2000). These aspects of the system provide smaller parties with an opening.

Disillusionment and Party Attachment

Since the end of World War II, Germany has enjoyed party continuity and the major parties enjoyed high degrees of loyalty from the electorate. Vote shares for the major parties, the right-leaning Christian Democrats and the left-leaning Social Democrats, shifted less than four percent in the 1950s and 1960s and about 70 percent of respondents always voted for a certain party (Norpoth 1978).

However, partisanship started weakening as early as the 1970s (Baker et al. 1975). Overall, the strength of party identity declined among those born after 1930 (Norpoth 1978). By the end of the 1980s, evidence emerged that the longstanding party system was beginning to alienate many voters. The increasing strength of the Greens, which billed itself as an outsider, and the increased anger directed at the larger mainstream parties, indicated that attitudes towards the status quo were changing. In 1992, President Richard von Weizsacker, a Christian Democrat, expressed his sympathy for disillusioned voters and criticized the mainstream parties as being filled with career politicians who only care about winning (Scarrow 1996). The once dominant Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats captured a total of about 85 percent of all votes during the 1960s and 70s and almost 80 percent in the 1990s. However, by 2005 that number had dropped to 69.4 percent (Allen 2009). By the 2000s, data indicated that Germans no longer had had strong partisan attachments and the two main parties were at their weakest (Debus 2009).

Movement to Center

The German mainstream was also moving towards the center. Social Democrats, starting in the late 1970s, deemphasized social welfare programs and moved away from arguing for

increased market regulation (Paterson and Sloam 2006). The Social Democrats further moderated their position in the 1990s and moved closer to the center. However, by doing so, leftist parties such as the Greens filled the gap (Allen 2009). The movement towards the center was best characterized by Peer Steinbruck, the leader and public face of the Social Democrats during the 2013 Federal Elections, arguing pro-business positions. Steinbruck was specifically chosen by the party elites to appeal to the business community and economic moderates (Hoff and Hough 2014).

The Christian Democrats also increasingly became a catch-all party (Grabow 2001). The party moved closer to the center (Clemens 2013) and became more moderate by the years of the Great Recession. For example, the leadership, in the aftermath of a national banking crisis, attempted to curb the size of banks (Howarth and James 2020). This movement towards the center by both the Social Democrats and Christian Democrats eventually left a hole in German politics (Reinl and Heinrich 2018).

Hardline Immigration Policy Acceptance

Germany's history with Nazism made it difficult for parties with hardline positions on social or cultural outsiders, such as immigrants, to succeed. The Republicans, founded by a Waffen-SS veteran named Franz Schonhuber, emerged in 1983 as an ethnocentric populist-style actor. In 1989, the party won enough votes to take seats in the Berlin state parliament. The mainstream left immediately began a process of marginalizing the Republicans. While some in the conservative Christian Democrats initially thought about an alliance, they realized public opinion was squarely against the Republicans. Major newspapers and regular citizens actively called out the Republicans as Nazis. Restaurant owners refused to rent out space to the

Republicans. The relentless social pressure led to the party losing members and the party collapsed by the beginning of the 2000s (Art 2007).

However, like in the UK and France, international shocks played a role in changing the conversation. The 9/11 attacks and the assassination of filmmaker Theo van Gogh by a man of Moroccan ancestry in neighboring Netherlands made immigration a more salient topic. Critically, these events helped loosen existing societal norms on immigration rhetoric (Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart 2009). By the time the Migrant Crisis hit Germany, the country's political culture had changed enough that publicly espousing hardline immigration rhetoric was feasible.

The real change occurred during the Migrant Crisis. Christian Democrat politicians were particularly active in calling for a cap in the number refugees who are admitted into the country. They advocated the deportation of those whose asylum claims were denied or if an individual had committed a serious criminal offense. The Christian Social Union Chairman, Horst Seehofer, was forceful in his demands and publicly asked for the creation of a wall in order to prevent migrants who had entered other parts of the European Union from entering Germany. The mainstream right also advocated the suspension of family reunification to prevent more migrants from being enticed to come to Germany (Bielawska 2019). The change in the nation's culture can be best summarized through a comment made by Frauke Petry. Petry, the leader of the Alternative for Germany during the Migrant Crisis, called for shooting migrants who attempted to cross into Germany's borders during the height of the crisis (Art 2018). The party increased its vote share two years later in 2017 Federal Elections (Hansen and Olsen 2019).

Table 4.8: German Party Placement During the 2013 Elections



Table 4.9: German Party Placement During the 2017 Elections



The data comes from the 2013 and 2017 Federal Elections and is presented on tables 4.8 and 4.9 respectively. On the left-right spectrum, it appears that there is a gap between many of the smaller parties such as the Greens and Free Democratic Party. However, especially in the 2017 election data, the distance between the Social Democratic Party and the Christian

Democrats is small (Allen 2009; Hoff and Hough 2014). An examination of ethnocentric populism scores from the two time periods yields several findings related to the Alternative for Germany. Reflecting the Alternative for Germany's early history as an actor which did not engage in hardline anti-immigrant rhetoric (Art 2018; Arzheimer and Berning 2019), the Alternative for Germany and the Christian Democratic Union have similar ethnocentric populism scores; the Alternative for Germany's ethnocentric populism score is lower in the 2013 time period. This is most likely the result of many of its initial core members being former Christian Democrats (Hoff and Hough 2014).

While slightly below the Christian Democrats in the 2013 election, the Alternative for Germany adopted a hardline immigration policy and its score increased to the highest score in Germany. Despite taking a more clearly anti-immigration position, the party still won more votes. This indicates that at least in the German context in the 2013-2017 time period, taking a more hardline position did not alienate voters.

The Alternative for Germany has the highest ethnocentric populism score in 2017 and it recorded the highest number of seats in its history. The party's strong gains despite being more ethnocentric populist appears to counter expectations that a strongly ethnocentric populist manifesto would lead to less electoral success.

Italy

Electoral System

Italy's electoral system has been reformed several times since the beginning of the Second Republic and its modern form is the result of a 2005 electoral reform which allowed a voter to choose both a party and a coalition. The latter vote helps determine which coalition will have a majority in the Chamber of Deputies (Donovan and Newell 2008).

Despite reforms, the country's mixed-member system has remained. For both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, three-quarters of seats are decided through single member, first-past-the-post districts while another quarter are distributed through a national proportional representation system with a four percent threshold (Katz 1996). Italian Senators are also elected through the same mixed-member proportional representation system (Vercesi 2017). However, the Senate is also home to lifelong senators who are not elected (Katz 1996).

Because of this system, Italy's electoral environment is similar to Germany's. The layout of this system has strongly benefitted the Northern League. The party has a natural constituency in Northern Italy and won several single member district seats outright (Donovan and Newell 2008). In addition, it has also secured enough of the national vote share to obtain more seats through the national proportional representation system.

Disillusionment and Party Attachment

Parties like the Northern League have also been further aided by sentiments held within the broader Italian population. While party identification during the First Republic was stable and high, with the percentage of Italians who felt that they were close to a party at nearly eighty percent in 1968 (Garzia and Viotti 2012), cracks in the system started to develop. While Italians were starting to become disillusioned starting in the 1960s, by the early 1990s such feelings became widespread (Bardi 1996). The Clean Hands Affair elicited strong anger from the population and led to the de-legitimization of the entire system (Massetti and Toubeau 2013; Scarrow 1996).

The parties that competed in the new Second Republic recognized anti-establishment feelings in the public and among the parties that performed well in the 1994 election, Let's Go Italy, the Northern League, and National Alliance, all took anti-establishment positions. Among

the thirteen main parties running in the 1994 election, none had participated in the 1987 election; they were either new parties or had changed their names (Bardi 1996). The early 1990s also saw large numbers of new parliamentarians entering national politics for the first time; for example, 69.5 percent of Northern League parliamentarians and 90.4 percent of Let's Go Italy parliamentarians had never won office at the national level. In addition, about 80 percent of Let's Go Italy representatives in the Chamber of Deputies had never held a political office (Katz 1996).

Movement to Center

However, where the Italian party system differs from what is seen in the UK, France, and Germany is that there is no concentrated movement towards the center. While the fragmented party system allows for the existence of centrist parties and these actors have even take part of coalition building (Allen 2009), Italy's recent history has made centrism unpopular. The Christian Democrats, which had long dominated Italian politics, operated as a centrist party. Its implication in scandals made the idea of moving towards the center and becoming a catch-all-party a difficult proposition for most parties. In other words, because of the centrist nature of the Christian Democrats, taking the middle ground on the spectrum is seen as holding something in common with a party tainted by widespread political corruption (Donovan and Newell 2008). Rather, members of the Italian electorate appear to value authenticity (Garzia and Viotti 2012). This has led to a situation where parties have staked their place in the ideological spectrum rather than attempting to expand their appeal.

Hardline Immigration Policy Acceptance

While immigrants were often considered to be objects of fascination in Italy in the early Cold War years, the Italian mainstream press has portrayed migrants as a social ill since at least

the 1970s. This portrayal became more negative in the 1990s as more migrants entered the country (Sciortino and Colombo 2004). This political environment helped parties such as the Northern League. While Let's Go Italy mostly operates as a mainstream right party with its emphasis on individual freedoms, suspicion of big government, pro-business policies, it and other right parties have openly taken up anti-immigration stances since the 1990s (Betz 1994). This includes proposing the use of the Italian Navy to curb the arrival of undocumented migrants and the use of biometric information to identify migrants. Even the manifestos of mainstream left parties, such as the Democratic Party, adopted language stating that criminal acts committed by immigrants should be dealt with harshly (Massetti 2015).

Table 4.10: Italian Party Placement During the 2013 Elections



Note: The Northern League and the People of Freedom are almost on top of one another. The Union of the Center is somewhat to the left of these two parties.

Table 4.11: Italian Party Placement During the 2018 Elections



The Italian data comes from the 2013 and 2018 Italian election with placement data shown on tables 4.10 and 4.11 respectively. Overall, parties are all over the ideological spectrum, although many of them are on the right. The spatial analysis indicates that the Northern League does not have the highest ethnocentric populism score in either the 2013 or 2018 time period. Unlike the National Front and the Alternative for Germany, the Northern League operates in an environment where it is arguably not the most ethnocentric populist option in the country.

Yet the Northern League, like the National Front and Alternative for Germany, also enjoyed increased electoral support in 2018. These three parties, which enjoyed increased support between two elections, have different recent histories. The National Front had the highest ethnocentric populism score in both elections examined here. The Alternative for Germany went from having a score lower than the Christian Democratic Union in 2013 to having one higher than that party in 2017. The Northern League did not have the highest score in either the 2013 or 2018 election. So far, the evidence indicates that a party's ethnocentric populism

score, relative to other parties in the country, does not appear to provide strong evidence for supporting ethnocentric populist parties.

Netherlands

Electoral System

The Dutch electoral system favors small parties. The lower house of the Dutch parliament, the Tweede Kamer, is elected through a single national constituency and a semi-open list with a low threshold of 0.67 percent for winning seats in the legislature (Aarts et al. 1999). These rules permit a party to gain seats by winning a small percent of the vote share (Louwerse and Otjes 2016). Like in France and Germany, the members of the Dutch Senate, or Eerste Kamer, are chosen indirectly by provincial councils. While these council members are chosen through elections, which also use proportional representation, the Dutch electorate does not have a direct say in the choosing of their country's upper house (Broeksteeg 2010).

Disillusionment and Party Attachment

Aiding any newcomer is that among industrialized nations, the Netherlands has the lowest parent-offspring partisanship transmission rate (Nieuwberta and Witterbrood 1995). In addition, partisan attachment is not particular strong in the country with many members of the electorate choosing to support a different party in the following election (Mair 2008). In other words, the country also has a culture of low stable party identification (Thomassen 1976; Westholm and Niemi 1992). Support for the three oldest mainstream parties, the Christian Democratic Appeal, Labour Party, and the People's Party for Freedom and Democracy, dropped from about 84 percent in 1981 to 55 percent by 2010 (Pellikaan et al. 2016). The support enjoyed by List Pim Fortuyn in the 2002 Election indicated some members of the electorate were willing to give a newcomer a chance.

Movement to Center

Part of the reason behind the lack of enthusiasm for the Dutch party system is that many of the major parties have moved closer to the center. In the 1990s, a "purple" coalition between the Labour Party, the People's Party for Freedom and Democracy, and Democrats 66 formed. While parties nominally on the opposite sides of the ideological spectrum joining forces is an anomaly, the People's Party for Freedom and Democracy and the Democrats 66 had become centrist parties by 1994 (Green-Pedersen 2004). The Christian Union also made similar moves and moved closer to the center (Pellikaan et al. 2016). Labour opted to back cuts to welfare which jeopardized the party's relationship with unions. It also sought to promote market solutions and deemphasized transfer spending (Green-Pedersen and van Kersbergen 2002). Labour had moderated its position and became closer to a centrist party (Green-Pedersen 2004).

Part of the reasoning behind moving towards the center is the consensus-rooted nature of Dutch politics and the fragmented nature of the party system. Moving further away from the center makes it more difficult to become a part of a coalition as other parties see a large gap in ideological distance as a liability. However, while moving towards the center makes a party a more attractive coalition partner, the convergence makes each party less distinguishable and opens up opportunities for smaller parties to distinguish themselves (Pennings 2005).

Hardline Immigration Policy Acceptance

On the question of immigration, there was strong opposition to hardline immigration rhetoric for much of the twentieth century. While the question of immigration and integrating newcomers became increasingly important in the 1990s (Aarts and Thomassen 2008; Van Heerden et al. 2014), there was a line. An attempt by Centre Democrat politician Hans Janmaat to espouse hardline rhetoric on migration led to his shunning and eventual ousting from national

politics (Judis 2016). However, the 9/11 attacks were a powerful exogenous shock that changed the political culture in the Netherlands. Afterwards, more Dutch people began openly questioning the country's immigration policy (Pellikaan et al. 2007).

While the rise of Fortuyn initially led to a similar reaction with mainstream parties attempting to shame and shun members of the List Pim Fortuyn, Fortuyn's success at the polls led to several mainstream parties, such as Labour, the Christian Democratic Appeal, and the People's Party for Freedom and Democracy, to reconsider their actions. Instead of continuing a policy of shaming and shunning, they instead followed Fortuyn's lead and adopted more hardline immigration stances such as demanding that immigrants adapt and integrate to Dutch society (Pellikaan et al. 2007). In particular, the Christian Democrats moved further right during the 2000s (Pellikaan et al. 2016). This movement occurred concurrently with the assassination of Fortuyn in 2002 and filmmaker Theo Van Gogh in 2004 which further led to more public debate on the question of immigration (Penninx 2006). By the eve of the Migrant Crisis, Dutch culture had changed to an extent that hardline anti-immigration rhetoric became acceptable to a segment of the electorate.

Table 4.12: Dutch Party Placement During the 2012 Elections



Table 4.13: Dutch Party Placement During the 2017 Elections



Election results come from the 2012 and 2017 elections and are presented in tables 4.12 and 4.13 respectively. What immediately stands out regarding party placement in between the two elections is that the parties are more closely clustered together on the left-right spectrum in

the 2017 election. This is in line with the scholarship which notes that the parties have moved closer to the center (Green-Pedersen 2004; Green-Pedersen and van Kersbergen 2002; Pellikaan et al. 2016).

In both the 2012 and 2017 Elections, the ethnocentric populism scores indicate that the Party for Freedom was beyond all other parties. Its party placement is similar to the National Front as both parties had the highest ethnocentric populism score in both election cycles. Yet the party secured more votes in the 2017 election than in the 2012 election. As in France, evidence indicates that taking a hardline ethnocentric approach may not lead to a loss in votes.

Sweden

Electoral System

Unlike the UK, France, Germany, and Italy, Sweden does not use a single member district system. Instead, the country uses proportional representation with a four percent electoral threshold (Allen 2009). Unlike the Netherlands which uses a single national district, the Swedish system uses 29 different multi-member constituencies that range in size from two to thirty-nine (Karlsson 2018). This indicates that the Swedish electoral system is relatively friendly to smaller parties. If the party is able to meet the electoral threshold of four percent of the vote in one of these constituency districts, it can win at least one seat.

Overall, one can argue that the Swedish system is more favorable than the British and French systems which only utilize single member districts. It is also friendlier than the German and Italian systems which also utilize a national proportional representation system with a four percent threshold and single member plurality districts. Nevertheless, the Swedish system is more difficult for smaller parties than the Dutch system which has a 0.67 percent threshold.

Disillusionment and Party Attachment

Like the other Western European countries highlighted here, party attachment in Sweden had been decreasing for many years (Hagevi 2015). The percentage of Swedes who stated that they felt a strong affinity towards a party declined from 53 percent in 1960 to 15 percent by 2006 (Oscarsson and Holmberg 2008). By 2002, a majority of Swedish respondents stated that they had little or no confidence in political parties (Holmberg and Weibull 2003; Rydgren 2010). From the 1950s to 2010, party identification decreased by as much as two-thirds and strong identification with a party went from 45 percent in 1956 to 17 percent by 2010 (Oscarsson and Holmberg 2013).

Particularly in the case of Sweden, it is important to look at how those affiliated with unions have trended because unions figure prominently in Swedish politics; membership in a union is higher than in any other EU member state (Ebbinghaus and Visser 2000). As recently as 1998, 75 percent of industrial workers picked the Social Democrats or the Left Party in elections. However, this percentage dropped to 63 percent by 2006 (Rydgren 2010).

Movement to Center

In Sweden, the left-leaning Social Democrats moved closer to the center and overall, the distance between the left and right has decreased substantially (Oskarson and Demkar 2015). In particular, the gap between left and right parties on economic issues has become smaller (Jansen et al. 2013). Starting in the late 1970s, Social Democrats deemphasized social welfare and moved away from arguing for increased market regulation (Paterson and Sloam 2006). The Swedish Social Democrats further moderated their positions in the 1990s and moved closer to the center. However, by doing so, mirroring the experience of the Conservative Party in the UK, parties further left on the spectrum such as the Greens filled the available space (Allen 2009).

The Swedish Left Party, sensing an opportunity, fully embraced leftism and increased its vote share to 12 percent (Allen 2009).

However, the left-leaning Social Democrats were not alone in moving to the center. The Moderate Party, an ostensibly center-right party, also attempted to moderate its policies. It proposed tax cuts while also maintaining existing labor market regulations. The Christian Democrats supported abolishing a national property tax while also advocating for a new policy that made it easier for parents to leave children in a kindergarten (Aylott and Bolin 2007). By the 2002-2006 time period, it had become clear that there was strong ideological convergence between many of the mainstream left and right parties (Widfeldt 2008).

Hardline Immigration Policy Acceptance

Through the early post-Cold War years, the topic of immigration was not salient in Sweden. Rather, potential cuts to the welfare state, healthcare spending, and education spending dominated the political conversation (Rydgren 2010). When the ethnocentric populist-style New Democracy advocated for hardline immigration policies, such as a 1992 proposal that made the ability to speak Swedish mandatory for those who wished to naturalize, mainstream left and right strongly disagreed and pushed back against this line of thinking (Green-Pedersen and Odmalm 2008).

Despite initially being against this proposal, the Moderate Party inserted similar language to New Democracy's proposals in its manifesto by the end of 1997 (Green-Pedersen and Odmalm 2008). In addition, just like in the Netherlands, the 9/11 attacks were an important turning point: After that event, it became more socially acceptable to publicly question Muslim immigration to Western Europe (Arzheimer 2018). The Swedish political climate had changed enough so that more hardline immigration policy proposals became palatable to the public

(Green-Pedersen and Odmalm 2008). Noting the changing tides in Swedish society, both sides of the political spectrum, especially right-wing parties, adopted hardline immigration rhetoric (Green-Pedersen and Odmalm 2008). Sensing that their right flank was open (Gruber and Bale 2014), these parties wanted to prevent the Swedish Democrats from becoming the main arbiters of the immigration question (Green-Pedersen and Odmalm 2008).

Table 4.14: Swedish Party Placement During the 2010 Elections



Table 4.15: Swedish Party Placement During the 2014 Elections



Data comes from the 2010 and 2014 elections and is presented in tables 4.14 and 4.15 respectively. In left-right placement, the data indicates that a change occurred in Swedish politics in between those years. In the 2010 data, the parties were clustered towards the middle. This is in line with scholars who stated that many of the major parties were moving closer to the center (Allen 2009; Jansen et al. 2013; Oskarson and Demker 2015). However, in the 2014 election, it appears that the parties started to move away from one another. Instead of clustering around the center, they appear to be moving towards the left or the right. In other words, there has been a reversal of the trend towards the middle.

Regarding ethnocentric populism scores, the Sweden Democrats in 2010 had the highest ethnocentric populism score. However, in the 2014 election, other parties increased their ethnocentric populism scores. Following the Sweden Democrat's platform, several right-leaning parties such as the Christian Democrats and Moderates appear to have adopted more extreme positions. Yet despite having a party placement like that of more mainstream parties, the Sweden Democrats still improved on their 2010 performance. This indicates that having other larger

more mainstream parties adopt ethnocentric populist stances may not lead to a smaller ethnocentric populist party's electoral failure.

Austria

Electoral System

The electoral system used for the lower house in Austria is similar to what is found in Sweden: proportional representation (Art 2007; Erk 2004) with a four percent threshold (Ferwerda 2014). Such a system can help a smaller party gain a foothold.

Disillusionment and Party Attachment

Austria witnessed decreasing party attachment and increasing disillusionment with the de facto two-party system. The People's Party and Social Democrats in the early years following the Second World War enjoyed high rates of partisan loyalty. However, this loyalty has decreased over time (Aichholzer and Willmann 2014). In addition, the two parties also suffered from a decrease in party membership (Selle and Svasand 1991).

Anger against the two mainstream options started to grow in the late twentieth century and many voters started to switch over the Freedom Party as a protest against the long-standing two-party system (Rose 2000). Despite the Freedom Party having a strong Neo-Nazi contingent, particularly during the Jorg Haider years, it was one of the few options that had a chance at breaking the two-party system which had existed for so long.

Movement to Center

What aided disillusionment and anger with the existing system is the relatively small ideological gap between the People's Party and Social Democrats. The gap was small enough for most of Austria's post-World War II history that the two parties have even formed coalitions with one another; notably from 1947 to 1966 (Erk 2004) and once again from 1986 to 1999 (Art

2007). In the 53 years from 1947 to the dawn of the new millennium, the mainstream left and right option in Austria were in a coalition together for more than half of those years.

While the close ideological convergence between the Social Democrats and the People's Party made coalition governance more viable, it also left the parties open to attack from their flanks (Gruber and Bale 2014). These concerns became reality in the later years of the Cold War era where the Greens and the Freedom Party moved to cover the left and right flanks respectively (Gruber and Bale 2014; Rose 2000).

Hardline Immigration Policy Acceptance

The Social Democrats' leadership instituted a policy of shunning and shaming after the Freedom Party's turn towards hardline anti-immigration rhetoric. However, this was not universal. Prominent figures within the Social Democratic leadership, including a governor, Karl Stix, and the mayor of Vienna, Michael Haupl, actively engaged in dialogue with the Freedom Party (Art 2007; Bailer-Galanda and Neugebauer 1997). The People's Party was even more open to negotiations. At times the People's Party adopted the more hardline policies, such as limiting immigration and restricting the number of asylum seekers. The Freedom Party and the People's Party even entered into coalitions together and maintained a six-year coalition at one point (Gruber and Bale 2014).

Outside of the political realm, the Freedom Party had the support of Austria's largest newspaper, *Kronen Zeitung*. The paper defended Haider after he was removed from his post as governor following pro-Nazi comments. Protests against Haider were concentrated in the Vienna metropolitan area and did not have the same level of vitriol directed at the German Republicans; because of these reasons, many young Austrians willingly joined the FPO and constituted a continuous pipeline of young talent which the German Republicans did not enjoy (Art 2007).

Part of the reasoning behind why neither the Social Democrats nor the Freedom Party fully committed to a policy of shunning and shaming was due to the electoral landscape in the country. The country operated in a two-party system. Depending on how well the Freedom Party did in elections, it could serve as a kingmaker. The People's Party was aware of this and openly threatened to leave coalitions with the Social Democrats and join the Freedom Party in order to extract concessions (Art 2007).

Table 4.16: Austrian Party Placement During the 2013 Elections

Table 4.17: Austrian Party Placement During the 2017 Elections



Data comes from the 2013 and 2017 elections and is presented on tables 4.16 and 4.17 respectively. While the discussion on the Social Democrats and the People's Party noted that, at least at one point, the two parties had moved close to the center (Rose 2000), the data from these two elections shows that the two parties are the furthest away from one another. Overall, despite only having five parties win seats in the Nationalrat in both the 2013 and 2017 elections, on the left-right ideological spectrum the five parties are spread out.

The ethnocentric populism score in the 2013 data shows that the Freedom Party had the highest score. However, it is in second place in the 2017 election. This was the result of the PILZ List placing a strong emphasis on the anti-establishment portion of the ethnocentric populism score and not so much emphasis on the ethnocentric portion. The Freedom Party remained as the most prominent actor that emphasized both the ethnocentric and populist aspects of ethnocentric populism. Despite maintaining a strong ethnocentric populism score in both time periods, the Freedom Party increased its vote share between 2013 and 2017.

Switzerland

Electoral System

Instead of the national-level constituency used in the Netherlands, or the purely single member district preferred in the UK or France, seats are divided depending on the size of the Canton. Because of the inequities in the size of populations, some Cantons are only given one seat in the National Council. These seats function as single member plurality elections. Most cantons, however, have a large enough population to be multi-member districts. The district magnitude varies, but includes a maximum of 34 seats. In these multi-member districts, the seats for the National Council are chosen using the Hagenbach-Bischoff quota (Buhlmann et al. 2006).

Disillusionment and Party Attachment

Not unlike the other Western European countries highlighted here, a major legacy of the longstanding Grand Coalition system is a general apathy many Swiss felt towards the political system (Rose 2000). The average Swiss citizen had become indifferent to the political process; low rates of participation have become an extremely common in federal legislative elections and the growth of single-issue protest parties such as the Automobile Party indicated that the patience of Swiss electorate was wearing thin even as early as the 1980s. Apathy towards the existing political class was strong in a 1992 referendum on entering the European Economic Area, with . the Swiss electorate overwhelmingly rejecting the proposal (Lehmbruch 1993).

Like in Sweden, it is difficult to make a definitive statement regarding party attachment. While the evidence from Sweden indicated that partisan attachments were being replaced by bloc attachments (Hagevi 2015), the situation in Switzerland differs depending on the region. In the French speaking part of the country, partisan attachment has remained high (Fatke 2014) and closer ties with the European Union are seen more positively (Lehmbruch 1993). However, in

the German speaking parts of the country, the situation is more in line with most of the other Western European countries outlined here; there is overall lower partisan attachment (Fatke 2014).

Movement to Center

From the beginning of the Grand Coalition years through the 1970s, three of the four grand coalition members, the Swiss People's Party, the Free Democratic Party, and the Christian Democratic People's Party, had moved closer to the middle (Hug and Schulz 2007). While it became easier for these parties to work together due to the shrinking of the ideological gap, the lack of differentiation between the three major parties was a major point of contention among members of the Swiss electorate. The gap on the right side of the flank (Gruber and Bale 2014) allowed the Swiss People's Party the opening to provide something different; the anti-immigrant and anti-establishment message paid off in subsequent elections (Rose 2000).

Hardline Immigration Policy Acceptance

Due to the country's longstanding history of neutrality and isolation, hardline immigration rhetoric found a home in many parts of Switzerland. However, there is a strong divide between the two largest ethno-linguistic communities. French speakers, on average, are more open towards the idea of immigration and European integration while German speakers are more suspicious of both concepts. The 1992 referendum proposed Swiss entry into the European Economic Area but was rejected because of opposition from the majority of ethnic Swiss Germans (Lehmbruch 1993). A 2004 referendum called for granting citizenship to the children of immigrants born in Switzerland and any grandchildren of immigrants to be granted citizenship if they were born in the country. However, after fierce campaigning by the Swiss People's Party, the measure failed (Skenderovic 2007).

The Grand Coalition understood the general suspicion towards immigration, especially in the Swiss German parts of the country, and attempted to pass legislation that reflected this. In the early 1990s, the Grand Coalition attempted to create a three-tiered immigration policy. For the most part, migrants from EU member states would have been allowed to enter easily while there were more restrictions in place for those hailing from "culturally near" and "other" countries. This proposal, however, was closely defeated in a referendum (Afonso 2005). In 2006 amendments related to further immigration and asylum restrictions championed by the Swiss People's Party were also largely supported by the mainstream right Liberals and Christian Democrats (Cranmer 2011). Overall, even in the pre-Migrant Crisis era, many segments of Swiss society were strongly suspicious of immigration.

Table 4.18: Swiss Party Placement During the 2011 Elections



Table 4.19: Swiss Party Placement During the 2015 Elections



The data comes from the 2011 and 2015 elections and is presented in tables 4.18 and 4.19. What the 2011 and 2015 data show is that most of the parties, not just the members of the Grand Coalition, are clustered around the center (Hug and Schulz 2007). In both years, one party, the Swiss People's Party, was further to the right on the left-right spectrum. The Swiss People's Party's distinctly rightist stance on the left-right spectrum is the result of changes in the party which occurred under the Blocher years. In the late 1990s and the 2000s, the Swiss People's Party led the charge against welfare expansion and did not favor more government spending (Afonso and Papadopoulos 2015). Due to the party's strong desire to cut state involvement in welfare programs and general aversion to government intervention, its left-right economic placement further to the right is expected.

The ethnocentric populist placement of the Swiss People's Party, among the most prominent ethnocentric populist-style parties, is the highest in 2011 and just behind Geneva's Citizen Movement in 2015. Yet despite the Swiss People's Party maintenance of a relatively high ethnocentric populism score, it did not suffer in elections and instead increased its vote

share. Just like in countries such as France, maintaining a comparatively high ethnocentric populism score does not lead to less success at the polls.

Denmark

Electoral System

Denmark's parliament has 179 members, with the Faroe Islands and Greenland having two seats each. Of the 175 who represent the Danish mainland, 135 of these individuals are elected in 17 multi-member districts through proportional representation (Elklit 1993; Lundell 2008). The remaining 40 seats depend on how many votes each of the parties won at the national level (Lundell 2008). The country uses a low two percent threshold for seats in the parliament (Harmel and Svasand 1997; Lundell 2008) which helps smaller parties.

Disillusionment and Party Attachment

Two events may have played a role in the disillusionment of the Danish electorate. Anger directed at the establishment started to grow as early as the late 1960s and early 1970s when successive Danish governments increased the tax rate to expand the welfare state. Some voters did not approve of the old guard implementing these changes and voted for the Progress Party in 1973 (Andersen and Bjorklund 1990). The distrust of those in power continued in the years that followed (Bergh 2004). Anger directed at the system did not end with issues related to the welfare state and taxation; with the rise in the number of immigrants at end of the twentieth century, some members of the electorate felt that the existing asylum-seeking system was being abused by the newcomers (Ostergaard-Nielsen 2003).

The upheaval of the party system in the 1960s in which new parties were introduced to the system may have also played a role in the lower party identification of the Danish electorate in comparison to most of their Western European counterparts (Borre and Katz 1973). By the last

years of the twentieth century, the country witnessed a general weakening of party attachment, but this effect was particularly strong among the young (Andersen 1986; Christiansen and Togeby 2006). Those years also saw a decline in party membership along with actual participation in party events/meetings (Togeby 1992).

Movement to Center

While the Danish system in the earlier years of the twentieth century was home to a large Socialist contingent alongside bourgeois-backed parties, by the 1970s, the left moved closer to the center. During the late 1970s and 1980s, the leftist Social Democratic-Liberal Party coalition instituted welfare cuts, advocated for privatization, and overall moved closer to the right on economic issues (Andersen 1986; Harmel and Svasand 1997). This is a pattern seen in many of the other countries examined previously; left-wing parties, particularly during the 1970s and 1980s, started to move towards the center leaving a vacuum on the left.

Hardline Immigration Policy Acceptance

In the early 1980s, the question of immigration was a topic more frequently debated in the public sphere. However, after the passage of a law restricting migration in the mid-1980s, it disappeared from public discourse for a few years (Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup 2008). In the 1990s, with growing numbers of immigrants entering the country, the topic of immigration reappeared and would remain as a point of contention over the long term. By 2001, it was arguably the most important issue in the country (Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup 2008) due to the 9/11 attacks (Hellstrom and Hervik 2013). The Danish People's Party had already made anti-immigration rhetoric a central part of the platform, but with the changing political climate, the Liberals, Conservatives, and Social Democrats advocated further restrictions on immigrants (Bay et al. 2013; Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup 2008). The question of immigration's place in Danish

society was an important focal point; open debate characterizing Islam and Muslims as a danger had become a prominent part of Danish society (Hellstrom and Hervik 2014). Taking advantage of an environment where hardline immigration policies became more accepted, the Danish People's Party negotiated stronger border controls in exchange for supporting an early retirement plan in the early 2010s (Kosiara-Pedersen 2012).

Table 4.20: Danish Party Placement During the 2011 Elections



Table 4.21: Danish Party Placement During the 2015 Elections



Note: The Conservatives and Socialist People's Party are almost on top of one another.

The data comes from the 2011 and 2015 elections with placement positioning shown on tables 4.19 and 4.20 respectively. Between 2011 and 2015, the relative placement of parties changes due to their ethnocentric populism scores. The Danish People's Party, the country's prime ethnocentric populism party, remains near the top in terms of ethnocentric populism. There is no evidence of the party moderating its stance between 2011 and 2015, yet the party increased its vote shares in 2015. In both time periods, it appears that several parties, such as Venstre in 2015, have scores close to the Danish People's Party. The hardline stances of the Danish People's Party were not unique in either 2011 and 2015.

The Four Countries Where Support Declined

The previous nine countries saw a rise in support for ethnocentric populist actors. For the next four Western European countries, Belgium, Finland, Greece, and Norway, ethnocentric populist actors witnessed a decline in electoral support. Before moving towards discussing the United States, this subsection examines whether there are any important differences between these four countries and the nine that saw an increase in support.

Belgium

Electoral System

Belgium has a proportional representation system with a five percent threshold in which voters can choose individual candidates or a list running in multi-member districts (De Vet et al. 2019; Hooghe 2012) Belgium's system, at least in regards to its electoral threshold, is less forgiving to smaller parties than other countries in this study. However, Belgian elections are divided into three different elections: One election takes place in Flanders, one in Wallonia, and one in the capital Brussels (Hooghe 2012). If a small party focuses its resources and gains enough votes in one of the regions, it could win seats.

Disillusionment and Party Attachment

Anger at the mainstream increased in the 1990s when Belgium suffered from several corruption cases involving policing and food quality control (Swenden et al. 2006). Disillusionment also increased following the inability of the Christian Democrats, Liberals, and Socialists to negotiate a coalitional government in 2007 (Hooghe 2012). This event caused Belgians, especially, those in the Flemish portion of the country, to abandon the existing parties and throw support behind outsiders such as Populist List Dedecker, Flemish Interest, and Flemish Alliance (Hooghe and Dassonneville 2018).

Like many other Western European countries, Belgium's political parties during the mid-century enjoyed strong support and loyalty from the general population (Selle and Svasand 1991). Following a wider trend across Western Europe, party attachment has fallen (Dassonneville and Stiers 2018). However, Belgium maintains one of the highest levels of party attachment in the region. The reason behind this may be that the country is home to parties, for example, both a Flemish and French Christian Democratic Party, that cut cross different cleavages. For example, the French-speaking Christian Democratic Party can satisfy a supporter's ideological needs while also helping the voter feel that his/her ethno-linguistic identity is being represented. The ability of parties to form intimate links between individual voters and the party on many different levels may have helped preserve partisanship in the country (Huber et al. 2005).

Movement to Center

A major point of contention regarding welfare policy in Belgium is the income inequality between wealthier Flanders and poorer Wallonia. Because of this economic disparity, financial transfers between Flanders and Wallonia are a point of contention (Cantillon et al. 2006). On the

question of social security, cuts have been instituted, just like in other Western European countries (Hemerijck and Unger 2000). While the more right-leaning Christian Democrats and Liberals advocated for cuts to the welfare system in response to economic issues in the 1980s (Kuipers 2006), the Socialist Party did not call for the wholesale welfare cuts seen in other parts of Western Europe. While the party has recognized that increasing the size of the welfare state was not a tenable prospect, it also fully attempted to defend existing benefits (Delwitt 1999) and did not move towards the center as many left-leaning parties have in other parts of Western Europe. In other words, Belgium did not have a situation where the main left-wing options abandoned its traditional economic position; there was no wholesale movement to the center.

Hardline Immigration Policy Acceptance

While the Belgian government first instituted changes in immigration policy in the 1970s when it took steps to curb immigration, the topic did not become a sustained point of contention until later (Martiniello 2003). Ethnonationalist appeals, predominately to the Flemish half of the country, have been the norm in the Belgium system before the Migrant Crisis (Hooghe 2012), but hardline immigration rhetoric led to shunning and shaming in the pre-Migrant Crisis time period (Pauwels 2011). In the 1990s, for example, the Flemish Interest's calls for a separate social security system for immigrants and forced repatriation led to it being shut out of any potential governing coalition (Adam and Deschouwer 2016; Erk 2005).

Perhaps with the realization that maintaining an extreme position was untenable, internal changes occurred within the ethnocentric populist-style parties. The Flemish Interest wanted to restrict naturalization and opposed accepting asylum seekers. However, while the Flemish Interest has focused on nationalist appeals, portrayed itself as a defender of Flanders, and maintained a hardline stance on immigration, it has also avoided making racially/culturally

antagonistic comments (Adam and Deschouwer 2016). The Flemish Alliance would follow the Flemish Interest and tone down its rhetoric for 2014 elections (Baudewyns et al. 2015).

Table 4.22: Belgian Party Placement During the 2010 Elections*



Note: The Three parties clustered together are, from the top to the bottom, are New Flemish Alliance, Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats, and Reformist Movement.

Table 4.23: Belgian Party Placement During the 2014 Elections*



Note: The Flemish Socialist Party and Socialist Party are almost on top of each other.

The party placement results come from the 2010 and the 2014 elections with data presented in tables 4.21 and 4.22 respectively. Regarding the left-right spectrum, the Flemish Interest is placed a bit left of center, but several parties that explicitly cater to the Flemish population, such as the Flemish Alliance and Christian Democratic and Flemish, are placed to the right of center. As the French speaking part of the country has traditionally benefitted from welfare transfers and has fought to maintain existing welfare policies (de Jonge 2020), the Flemish parties being placed closer to the right is in line with expectations. In addition, compared to results from 2010, a major difference between the two time periods is that the parties are a bit more spread out in 2014 with the Flemish parties further to the right. This result may indicate that the distance between parties that explicitly cater to Flemish Belgians and parties that do not has grown wider.

Vlaams Belang, or Flemish Interest, has the highest ethnocentric populism score. It is followed by the New Flemish Alliance which also adopted ethnonationalist language used by Flemish Interest. As many of the parties that cater to Flemish Belgians are more likely to make ethnocentric appeals (Hooghe and Dassonneville 2018), they should be expected to have higher ethnocentric populism scores. Despite the observations by scholars that the Flemish Interest and Flemish Alliance has toned down their anti-immigration rhetoric (Adam and Deschouwer 2015; Baudewyns et al. 2015), the two parties still maintain the highest ethnocentric populism scores.

While one could argue that their higher ethnocentric populism scores are a detriment to potential electoral success, placement analysis in other countries, such as the results from France, indicated that higher scores do not always dampen electoral support; the National Front in France

had the highest score in both the pre and post-Migrant Crisis time period yet enjoyed stronger electoral support in the post-Migrant Crisis election.

Finland

Electoral System

Finland started to use a proportional representation system in 1906 and was the second to adopt such a system after Belgium. The Finnish parliament (Eduskunta) has 200 members who are elected in 15 multi-member districts. Seats are allocated using the d'Hondt method with no electoral threshold (Lundell 2008; Raunio 2005). This system appears to be more forgiving to a smaller party attempting to gain seats.

Disillusionment and Party Attachment

The collapse of the Finnish telecommunication giant Nokia was a source of great shock to many Finns. The inability of the elites to prevent societal-level changes such as Nokia's collapse did not go unnoticed by many Finns who looked for an alternative in a party like the True Finns (Arter 2015). This event, along with growing anger and resentment towards rapid changes to Finnish society through increased immigration (Patana 2020), created an environment that could be helpful to an ethnocentric populist challenger like the True Finns.

Consistent with changes in other parts of the region, party loyalty has declined in the country; in the 1970s about 80 percent of respondents stated that they voted for the same party in the previous election, but this decreased to about 65 percent in the 1990s (Paloheimo 2003). Just like growing disillusionment, decreases in party attachment also helps create an environment that is more friendly to a smaller ethnocentric populist challenger.

Movement to Center

While the movement towards the center by left parties was a trend in many Western European countries, the movement towards the center in Finland was at least partly the result of the longstanding three-party system. The three parties, the Conservatives, Agrarians, and the Socialists, all attempted to capture the middle and the ideological differences between the main parties have become smaller over time. This trend has also led to a more personalized system (Paloheimo 2003). By the early days of the new millennium, all three major parties had become center parties (Green-Pedersen 2004).

Hardline Immigration Policy Acceptance

True Finns are a newer party founded in 1995 and did not adopt hardline immigration rhetoric until the twenty-first century. The party's lack of hardline immigration rhetoric, combined with operating in a consensus-centered political culture where shunning and shaming were not implemented, created an environment in which immigration was not salient in national level politics during the early twenty-first century. As late as the 2011 election, the Social Democrats did not mention immigration and mainstream right parties only noted the need for immigrants to maintain the economy. Even as recently as the 2011 elections, the True Finns did not put out an "explicitly anti-immigration position." While the party noted its stance against asylum seekers and family reunifications, it also noted that the state should offer immigrants help to integrate into society (Kuisma and Nygard 2017).

The political environment changed by the beginning of the 2015 election. At that time, the True Finns decided to make immigration a more central part of their manifesto (Kuisma and Nygard 2017). Jussi Halla-aho, a True Finns MP, argued that Muslims were invading Europe and were a danger to the West. Yet despite a slight drop in vote shares during the 2015 election, the

anti-immigration wing of the party consolidated its hold on the party with MP Olli Immonen, in June 2015, attending a meeting with neo-Nazis (Wahlbeck 2016).

Table 4.24: Finnish Party Placement During the 2011 Elections*



Note: The Christian Democrats and Social Democratic Party of Finland are almost on top of one another.

Table 4.25: Finnish Party Placement During the 2015 Elections



The data comes from the 2011 and 2015 elections with positioning in tables 4.23 and 4.24, respectively. The ethnocentric populism scores indicate that the True Finns have the highest score as anticipated. The Christian Democrats are in second place in both elections. The Christian Democrat's placement follows a trend seen in other countries where mainstream right parties tend to have high ethnocentric populism scores. In addition, like in most of the other countries highlighted here, left-leaning parties such as the Social Democratic Party of Finland and the Left Alliance have the lowest ethnocentric populism scores.

On the left-right spectrum, the True Finns are situated to the left of center and cannot be considered a right-wing populist party. Other parties also appear to have moved rightward between 2011 and 2015. While most of the parties were silent regarding the question of immigration (Kuisma and Nygard 2017), they may have moved towards the right on questions regarding welfare and redistribution with the increase in numbers of migrants before and during the 2015 election.

Greece

Electoral System

The country uses a proportional representation system with a three percent threshold (Gemenis 2009; Karamichas 2008). While the majority of the unicameral legislature's deputies, 282 out of 300, are elected using multi-member electoral districts with party lists, 12 seats are decided by the number of votes a party wins nationally. An additional six seats are elected using first-past-the post (Kazamias and Papadimitrious 2002). Overall, the Greek electoral system is somewhat forgiving to smaller parties due to its three percent threshold and multi-member districts.

Disillusionment and Party Attachment

Anger and disillusionment, like in Finland, increased following an economic shock to the system. At the outset of the Eurozone Crisis, the implementation of austerity measures greatly angered segments of the Greek population (Markou 2017). While membership and attachment to both PASOK and ND increased between the fall of the dictatorship and the beginning of the crisis, (Afonso et al. 2015), the Eurozone Crisis broke these links. In the 1980s, about two-thirds of Greeks aged 18-30 stated that they felt attached to a party; this number plummeted to 21.8 percent by 2010. The percentage of older Greeks who felt attachment also decreased from over 70 percent in the 1980s to under 40 percent by 2010 (Lisi 2015). Overall, with lowering levels of partisanship combined with anger on the rise due to austerity measures (Markou 2017), an environment very favorable to outsider populist actors was created.

Movement to Center

When Greek politics was dominated by a nominally left and right party before the Eurozone Crisis, the two maintained similar economic practices; both relied heavily on clientelist practices and maintained strong relations with unions (Afonso et al. 2015). Economically, prior to the Great Recession, Greece had enjoyed decades of consistent economic growth (Afonso et al. 2015) and never implemented serious privatization policies through the end of the twentieth century (Featherstone and Papdimitriou 2008). While in most other Western European countries left-leaning parties moved closer to the center by adopting neoliberal economic policies, both PASOK and ND decided to spend more money by increasing welfare payouts and expanding the civil service (Fouskas 2013). The actions of the two parties indicate that both were on the left side of the ideological spectrum.

The Eurozone crisis forced the left-wing PASOK to implement wide-ranging changes that cut social welfare programs. This gave newcomers and smaller parties such as the left-wing populist SYRIZA a chance to fill a power vacuum (Aslanidis 2016). Under PASOK prime minister George Papandreou, welfare spending was cut, and taxes increased, to help make up for shortfalls (Afonso et al. 2015; Zartaloudis 2014). New Democracy, despite being billed as a conventional right party, opposed austerity and fiercely criticized the PASOK-led government's time in leadership (Afonso et al. 2015). The two parties effectively switched sides, with the nominally right ND taking up leftist talking points and PASOK implementing right-leaning policies. Unlike some of the other changes that occurred in Greece, the conventional parties in Greece did not move towards the center.

Hardline Immigration Policy Acceptance

Soon after immigration increased in the early 1990s, public discourse was marked by hostility. A Law for Aliens passed in 1991 with the justification that migrants could be dangerous to the country's welfare. Minister of Public Order Stelios Papathemelis in 1993 called out Albanians as criminals (Karyotis and Patrikios 2010; Karydis 1996) with his successor in 1995, Sifis Valirakis, also calling out aliens for criminality (Karydis 1996). The Greek media followed a similar tone and covered migrants as criminals (Karyotis and Patrikios 2010). Despite attempts at backtracking some of the harsher rhetoric (Dimitras 1999; Karyotis and Patrikios 2010), the tone had already been set in 1990s that it was acceptable to portray migrants as criminals (Karyotis and Patrikios 2010).

Table 4.26: Greek Party Placement During the 2012 Elections



Note: Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA) and Democratic Left overlap a bit.

Table 4.27: Greek Party Placement During the 2015 Elections



The results of the 2012 and January 2015 elections are presented above in tables 4.25 and 4.26. The most notable finding is that the Communist Party is ahead of Golden Dawn, as shown

in 2012 elections, or just below the Golden Dawn in the 2015 elections. This is primarily the result of the Communist Party investing much of their manifesto in anti-establishment rhetoric but not dedicating the manifesto to ethnocentrism. Golden Dawn, however, has the highest score in the 2015 election. New Democracy, one of the old guard parties, appears to have moved closer to adopting ethnocentric populist-style language between 2012 and 2015; considering the success of such rhetoric following the Eurozone Crisis, it may have been an act of self-preservation. PASOK appears to remain steadfast in avoiding ethnocentric populist language.

On the left-right scale, Golden Dawn remains closer to the left side of the spectrum and does not merit inclusion as a right-wing populist. The Independent Greeks, however, are on the right side of the spectrum. Most of the parties are clustered together on the left-right scale with the occasional party much further to the right. Considering the unpopularity of austerity measures during this time period, the parties clustering together closer to the left is within expectations.

Norway

Electoral System

Norway uses a proportional representation system in which the parliament's 169 members are selected through two different methods. Most of the legislators (150) are chosen in 19 multi-member districts and the rest are selected in a national at-large system that divides the seats depending on the percentage of the national vote received by a given party. The electoral threshold is four percent (Lundell 2008). Representatives are selected for four-year fixed terms, forcing parties to cooperate as there is no way to call early elections (Harmel and Svasand 1997). The existence of multi-member districts is helpful to smaller parties, but the somewhat higher

electoral threshold compared to other countries such as the Netherlands may be detrimental to smaller challengers.

Disillusionment and Party Attachment

In the late 1960s and the early 1970s, the Norwegian government raised the tax rate to increase the size of the welfare state. Voters were not happy with this decision (Andersen and Bjorklund 1990). Further spurring alienation among the general population was a major recession in the 1980s that increased the country's unemployment rate to Great Depression levels. During this time period, confidence in the government dropped by over 20 percent (Bjorklund 1992). Particularly among those who supported the Socialist Left and the Progress Party, there was a growing disdain of elites during this time period (Bergh 2004).

Sample data from 1957 indicated that Norway, like the United States and other Western democracies, was home to high partisan attachment. Part of the reason behind strong attachments was the strong class identification with parties; for example, working class Norwegians felt strong attachment to left-leaning parties such as Labour (Campbell and Valen 1961). However, even as early as the 1970s, party attachments started to decrease as the traditional class-based cleavages started to decline in importance (Hansen 1982). While party attachment and membership was still higher than most other Western European countries (Heidar and Saglie 2003; Mair and Biezen 2001), aggregate membership and identification dropped at the beginning of the twenty-first century (Heidar and Saglie 2003; Jenssen 1999). The decrease in partisan attachment was particularly noticeable among those who supported the Agrarians (Selle and Svasand 1991). Overall, it appears that Norway also witnessed the growth in disillusionment and a decrease in party attachment seen elsewhere in Western Europe.

Movement to Center

The Socialist Left, which espoused Marxist ideas of class struggle early in its history, abandoned it in favor of more moderate economic policies by the 1970s and 1980s (Allern and Aylott 2009). Like many of its Western European counterparts the Labour Party moved rightward on a number of different issues such as taxation, regulation, and state ownership (Harmel and Svasand 1997). Labour also talked about the need for individual responsibility in tackling poverty. Notably, the Socialist Left Party did not offer any public opposition to this statement (Allern et al. 2013). Echoing the movement in many Western European countries, other parties such as the Liberals, Centre Party, Christian People's Party, New Liberal Party (Bjorklund 1992), and the Progress Party (Bjerkem 2016; De Lange 2007) started to make their way to the center of the ideological spectrum.

Hardline Immigration Policy Acceptance

Overall, Norway differs from many other Western European countries as the immigration question has not become as salient as in other countries (Bay et al. 2013). Restrictions on immigration occurred quickly and was even initially implemented by a leftist government; in 1975, the Labour-led government passed legislation that limited immigration to the country (Bay et al. 2013; Fangen and Vaage 2018). This event created a culture where discussing immigration caps was acceptable (Brochmann 2008).

The Progress Party has also not faced a cordon sanitaire (Gudbrandsen 2010). This decision may have convinced the Progress Party to maintain a more moderate platform (Bjerkem 2016; Hagelund 2002); the party even voluntarily opted to tone down rhetoric targeting Muslims (Fangen and Vaage 2018).

Table 4.28: Norwegian Party Placement During the 2013 Elections



Table 4.29: Norwegian Party Placement During the 2017 Elections*



Note: The Green Party and Christian Democratic Party labels are almost on top of one another.

The party placement data comes from 2013 and 2017 elections and is shown on tables 4.27 and 4.28, respectively. The Progress Party in both the 2013 and 2017 elections has the highest ethnocentric populism score and is followed by the Conservative Party. This is a trend that has been seen in other Western European countries; the ethnocentric populist party is

followed by a mainstream right party. In addition, just like in most other countries examined here, more left-leaning parties such as the Socialist Left Party are near the bottom of the list.

On the left-right spectrum, the Progress Party is much further to the right than most other parties shown here. Considering the party's origins as an anti-tax protest party (Allern 2012; Fangen and Vaage 2018), its placement far away from most of the other parties is not surprising. The Progress Party's comparatively more conservative placement on the left-right scale puts it closer to other ethnocentric populist parties such as the Swiss People's Party. Overall, the placement of ethnocentric populists across the left-right spectrum indicates that there is very little relationship between left-right spectrum placement and a party's ethnocentric populism score.

United States

Electoral System

For the House of Representatives and the Senate, the United States predominantly uses a first-past-the-post system (Aldrich and Lee 2016) and single member districts (Welch and Studlar 1990). Such a system often leads to a two-party system and is overall not friendly to smaller parties (Cox 1997; Duverger 1964; Lijphart 1984; Riker 1982). However, there are a few places in the country, mostly Southern states, which employ a runoff system for the top two candidates if no individual is able to earn a majority of the votes (Engstrom and Engstrom 2008).

Disillusionment and Party Attachment

The issue of declining party attachment and identification has been a prominent feature of American politics. Attachments to the major parties continuously eroded since the end at least the 1960s (Abramson 1976). This has occurred concurrently with a decline in trust for political parties (Wattenberg 1981).

Overall, by the eve of the Trump Presidency, the United States witnessed a trend in which respondents, on average, had become increasingly mistrustful of the government and mainstream politicians (Judis 2016). One of the first major shocks to public perceptions was the Watergate Scandal in which investigators found that President Richard Nixon spied on the Democratic Party. While there were increases in trust, such as during the first Ronald Reagan administration in the early 1980s (Miller and Listhaug 1990), overall trust in government, and especially Congress, has trended downward (Dennis and Owen 2001). In addition, more Americans have come to the conclusion that special interests have a disproportionate say in the government (Hetherington 1998).

Movement to Center

While George Wallace's statement that there is "not a dime's worth of difference" between the Democratic and Republican Parties was uttered in the Civil Rights era (Shipan and Lowry 2001), there is evidence that polarization emerged soon after Wallace's statement. Instead of moving closer to one another to capture the center, the two parties began to move away from one another (Poole and Rosenthal 1984). For example, the Republican and Democratic parties have moved away from one another in environmental policy; Democrats have become friendlier towards the idea of passing stricter laws meant to protect the environment while Republicans have more likely to be suspicious of the idea (Shipan and Lowry 2001). In other words, polarization, especially among political elites, has become more salient in American politics (Abramowitz and Saunders 2008).

Hardline Immigration Policy Acceptance

While Trump's hardline statements regarding immigration, including calls for a ban on Muslim immigration, came as a shock to many Americans (Judis 2016; Montgomery 2017), his

hardline immigration rhetoric was not new in the context of American politics. Rather, just like in the Western European countries detailed in this section, American political culture had already started to shift in a direction which allowed hardline immigration rhetoric to be more readily accepted.

Decades before the rise of Trump, during a 1994 race to win re-election as governor, Pete Wilson championed a proposal, Proposition 1987, designed to deny social services to undocumented migrants (Diamond 1996). While running for the Republican nomination for president in both 1992 and 1996, Patrick Buchanan made opposition to illegal migration a cornerstone of his campaign (Diamond 1996) and argued for the creation of a fence along the border with Mexico to curb migration (Dowd 1992; Judis 2016).

While Buchanan failed to win the nomination, the issue of illegal migration continued to increase in salience. In the 2006 and 2008 primary campaigns, Republican candidates used the term “illegal” while the Democratic candidates preferred the word “undocumented.” Congressman Tom Tancredo, who briefly ran for president on the Republican side in 2008, focused his campaign on arguing that illegal migration was a danger to the country. Democratic candidates attempted to skirt the issue or advocated something akin to a pathway to legalization (Knoll et al. 2011).

The rise of Donald Trump in the United States in many ways mirrors Jorg Haider in Austria and Christoph Blocher in Switzerland. The Republican Party, Freedom Party, and Swiss People’s Party were large parties that already had a built-in base of electoral support thanks to many years of operation. These parties were not ethnocentric populist in their early years and did not utilize hardline immigration rhetoric before their takeovers. The ability of one person and a

group of supporters to take over a party is amplified in the United States because of the primary system which allows outsiders to challenge and potentially win presidential primaries.

Table 4.30: American Party Placement During the 2012 Elections



Table 4.31: American Party Placement During the 2016 Elections



The data for the two American parties comes from the 2012 and 2016 presidential elections. Because the United States is outside of Western Europe, the two major parties, the

Democratic and Republican Party, were not part of the in-region adjustment. Instead, the unadjusted ethnocentric populism scores are used. In the 2012 election, the Republican Party has a left-right score is slightly to the left. This placement goes against conventional wisdom which considers the Republican Party to be a mainstream right party (Hawley 2017). However, during the 2012 Election cycle, the Republican Party's nominee was former Massachusetts governor Mitt Romney. Romney was criticized as a moderate during the Republican primary cycle due to his pro-gay and pro-choice stances and was particularly hit hard for his role in creating a universal health care system for the state of Massachusetts (Jacobson 2013). As the Republican nominee was moderate, the party's placement slightly to the left reflects Romney political alignment.

The Republican Party's ethnocentric populism score, however, has changed markedly between the 2012 and 2016 election. In the 2012 election, the ethnocentric populism score was a little over 0.6. Considering the more moderate stances of candidate Mitt Romney (Jacobson 2013), a corresponding action that matches the party's leader is deemphasizing stances that increase an ethnocentric populism score. However, the data demonstrates that during the 2016 election, the party deemphasized ethnocentric populist-style ideas. Nevertheless, during both the 2012 and 2016 elections, the Republican Party had a higher ethnocentric populism score. The comparatively high ethnocentric populism score compared to the Democratic Party did not harm the party in key swing states in the 2016 election.

Conclusion

This chapter had two major objectives: Creating list of ethnocentric populist and right-wing populist parties while also providing party placement analysis. To do this, the Manifesto Project, mentioned in the research design, was used to create both ethnocentric populist and left-

right scores. This was used to create a list of ethnocentric populist parties and right-wing populist parties

One of the larger takeaways from the party placement analysis was that having high ethnocentric populism scores did not prevent a party from doing well in elections. For example, the French National Front maintained the highest ethnocentric populism score in both the 2012 and 2017 elections and increased its vote share. However, this analysis does not answer whether these parties will be able to maintain their increased vote shares. More research is needed to answer this question.

One of the findings from chapter four was the large swings in the ethnocentric populism scores of a few parties. For example, the Centre Party in Sweden had a much higher ethnocentric populism score in the 2014 election cycle. A similar effect can be seen with the Conservatives in Denmark between 2011 and 2015. These swings may be supported by research indicating that large shifts are not uncommon; rather, some mainstream conservative right parties, having felt pressure from ethnocentric populists, adapted their strategies and policies (Bale 2003).

At times, ethnocentric populist parties managed to put strong pressure on mainstream conservative parties to adopt ethnocentric populist positions. In the 2000s, the Conservative Party in the United Kingdom opted to no longer treat Euroskepticism as a priority. This action meant that questions about the UK's membership in the European Union were placed on hold. This decision allowed the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) to adopt Euroskeptic positions and UKIP successfully forced the Conservative Party to restart discussions on leaving the European Union (Bale 2018). Ultimately, some members of the Conservative Party even opted to leave and join UKIP (Webb and Bale 2014). Eventually, pressure became great enough

that the Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron promised a referendum on the question of whether the United Kingdom should remain a part of the European Union (Bale 2018).

Decisions to adopt some of the policies and positions of ethnocentric populists are not necessarily permanent. The Austrian People's Party had been competing against the Freedom Party since the 1980s. Struggling to defeat the Freedom Party, the People's Party has at times completely ignored its electoral counterpart while at other times it has adopted some of its policies and positions such as restricting immigration (Gruber and Bale 2014). Ultimately, the People's Party's decisions were rooted in whatever happened to be most electorally advantageous in each time period.

Overall, there is some evidence indicating that some mainstream right parties have become "contaminated" by ethnocentric populist thought and policies (Eatwell 2000). Like a virus spreading itself across different hosts, the proximity of the mainstream right to these actors, especially among those who have decided to form coalitions with ethnocentric populists (Bale 2003; Eatwell 2000; Gruber and Bale 2014), has put pressure on the mainstream right to move closer to parties that they once considered to be pariahs (Gruber and Bale 2014). While it remains to be seen whether there will be a permanent shift in which mainstream right parties effectively meld with ethnocentric populists, examples of large shifts have occurred in the 2000s and 2010s.

This chapter also serves as a major building block for the next two analytical chapters. Using Manifesto Project data, a list of parties that met the criteria to be considered ethnocentric populist was created in this chapter. This list will be useful for the analytical chapters as it allows for the coding of an ethnocentric populist dependent variable.

Chapter 5: Western Europe Analysis

Introduction

The main purpose of chapter five is to answer what explains support for ethnocentric populists among those who voted for these parties in countries that saw a downturn in support and among those in countries that saw an increase in support. It also addresses a second question: What factors differentiate support for right-wing populists and more general ethnocentric populists? Conceptually, right-wing populists differ from more general ethnocentric populists because of their economic stances. Does this mean that there is a link between an individual's economic stances and their desire to vote for a right-wing populist party? If so, does a relationship exist for both the adjusted and unadjusted list of right-wing populist parties? An implicit assumption of these questions is that supporters of one type of party should differ from supporters of another and that differences between supporters may not be constant over time.

To help better understand what might be driving support, the analysis is divided between two components: Difference of means tests and logistic regression analysis. Difference of means tests compare two different subsets: Ethnocentric populist supporters and non-ethnocentric populist supporters along with right-wing populists and general ethnocentric populists. The purpose of these tests is to see if there are differences in average scores given by supporters and if changes occurred in the Migrant Crisis time period. Logistic regression analyses in which support for ethnocentric populist parties and support for right-wing populists (adjusted data) serve as the dependent variables complete the analysis.

Preliminary Examination of Populist Data in Western Europe

The process starts by finalizing a list of ethnocentric populist parties from the countries under study. Chapter four generated a list of parties from the eight Western European countries

selected to be a part of the analysis called radical right, extreme right, extreme radical right, populist right, or right-wing populist.

The next task is to calculate electoral performance and determine the time period that should be covered. The previous chapter argued the importance of the lower house in these countries and in this preliminary analysis, the most important variable is the percentage of votes earned in each national legislative election. Instead of examining the vote shares of each party separately, the analysis presented here adds the vote share of all ethnocentric populist-style parties that competed in a given election within a country.

While the 2014-2015 time period is the most critical part of this analysis and needs to be included, the question of when to start the analysis remains. The analysis could go back many decades as some ethnocentric populist parties such as the National Front/Rally have existed since the 1970s (Judis 2016). However, most of the research examined in the last chapter were written in the twenty-first century and list parties that have become active since the 1990s. Because of this, the analysis begins in 2000 because the list of peer-reviewed works comes from the twenty-first century.

In addition, there are also several national electoral differences that affect the calculations. While voting in places such as the United Kingdom is straightforward, with a voter selecting a party-affiliated candidate in a constituency, other electoral systems create challenges. France uses a two-round voting system in which the top two candidates that receive the most votes advance to a runoff. If a party received votes in both rounds, the vote shares of both the first round and second round are combined and then divided by two. Germany gives each citizen two votes. Each voter is allowed to cast a vote for district race and one vote for a party list. Because this analysis is more interested in party vote shares, the percentage of the party list vote

share earned is recorded as the German vote share. Greece had situations in both 2012 and 2015 where two elections took place. If a party received votes in both elections, the percentage of votes received was added and divided by two.

Table 5.1: Ethnocentric Populist Vote Percentage, 2001-2019



Table 5.1 is a line graph which represents the percentage of votes won by the list of previously mentioned parties considered to be radical right, extreme right or right-wing populist in table 4.1. It covers 2001-2019 with a reference line put in the year 2014 as it is the start of the Migrant Crisis in Europe. Examining all thirteen Western European countries in tandem, a complicated picture emerges. Starting in the early 2000s and through the beginning of the Migrant Crisis, ethnocentric populist-style parties enjoyed varied success. Austrian, Belgian, Italian, Norwegian, Swiss ethnocentric populist-style parties surged in support in the years before the Migrant Crisis. In most of the other countries, ethnocentric populist-style parties struggled in

these elections, with vote shares less than ten percent for much of the pre-Migrant Crisis time period. German, French, and British ethnocentric populists failed to capture even ten percent of the vote for most of the pre-Migrant Crisis time period. Italian ethnocentric populist parties, while enjoying success earlier in the new century, struggled with a vote share dip in the late 2000s.

Examining the trends before and after 2014, nine of the countries, Belgium, Finland, Greece, and Norway witnessed a dip in support taking place in the pre- and post-Migrant Crisis. In the other nine, ethnocentric populists increased support after the beginning of the Crisis, with the exception of Austria. Austria's overall decrease in support may be attributed to the dissolving of a second ethnocentric populist party called Team Stronach just before the beginning of the 2017 election. However, the other major ethnocentric populist in the country, the Freedom Party, increased its vote share (Bodlos and Plescia 2018). Overall, the data indicates that while some countries experienced a surge during and shortly after the beginning of the Migrant Crisis, the data suggests that this rise in support was not a permanent feature of the electoral system.

While most of these countries saw a rise in support for ethnocentric populists in the first election taking place after the start of the Migrant Crisis, there is variation among countries that held multiple elections following the beginning of the Migrant Crisis. The United Kingdom had two elections after 2015 and each time, the collective vote shares of ethnocentric populists went down.

While the UK experienced a significant downturn in support following the end of the Migrant Crisis, Swiss ethnocentric populists did not endure as disastrous of a result. While they lost a part of their 2015 vote share, they held on to 28 percent of the overall vote. The Sweden Democrats, on the other hand, avoided this trend. Between the 2014 election, which took place in

the earliest days of the Migrant Crisis, and the 2018 election, vote shares for the Sweden Democrats increased.

The existence of a spike merits investigation. Vote share data that indicates a rise in support begs the question of what was driving support for these actors? Were the reasons behind support in the post-2014 time period markedly different from reasons behind voting for these same actors before the beginning of the Migrant Crisis? Attempting to answer potential differences in temporal variation is a major task of this analytical chapter.

Connecting the Theoretical Framework to the ESS Variables

While ideally variables would be chosen strictly based on their ability to serve as good indicators, an additional consideration is having as many of the respondents be a part of the analysis as possible. Unfortunately, respondents skip questions. Sometimes, when two variables both served as good indicators, the one that had more respondents is used. In addition, because the ESS has had nine different iterations through 2018, several questions have only been used a few times instead of all nine iterations. To increase the number of respondents for the analysis while also seeking to examine temporal variations, only questions that were available for all nine different iterations were used in the final analysis.

Status threat, ingroup salience, and outgroup bias are the three most important components of the theory. Status threat's main argument is that individuals who hail from a dominant group will start to feel displaced in a situation where large numbers of newcomers enter. The large number of newcomers could threaten the social and political power of the once dominant group (Morgan 2018). In the ESS, a question on whether a country's cultural life is undermined or enriched by immigrants, with the possible answers ranging from cultural life undermined (0) through cultural life enriched (10), could serve as a good indicator for status

threat. The question directly discusses the potential of a dominant group's nexus of power, cultural life, being undermined by newcomers.

For a variable on ingroup salience, one question asks respondents whether it is important to follow traditions and customs. The potential responses include Very much like me (1), Like me (2), Somewhat like me (3), A little like me (4), Not like me (5), and Not like me at all (6). The logic behind ingroup salience is that an individual feels solidarity with those who are similar. As traditions and customs are shared by individuals of an ingroup, those who feel higher ingroup salience should answer that traditions and customs are of importance to them.

To measure outgroup salience, the ESS has a question which asks individuals whether they would allow many or few immigrants of a different race or ethnic group from the majority to enter the country. The potential responses are Allow many to come and live here (1), Allow some (2), Allow a few (3), and Allow none (4). While this question is related to the status threat variable as they both fundamentally ask about immigration, this question measures how individuals feel about outsiders. The logic is that those who are more suspicious of outsiders would want fewer immigrants of a different ethnic or racial group to come live in their countries.

Moving towards alternative explanations that serve as control variables, one of the major explanations for ethnocentric populist support is Euroskepticism. It can be defined in several ways but generally the concept identifies disdain or mistrust of the European Union's mission regarding further political, economic, and social integration of the various European nation-states (Hooghe and Marks 2007; Krouwel and Abts 2007; Serricchio et al. 2013; Taggart 1998). Fundamentally, Euroskepticism identifies a feeling of mistrust towards European Union's mission regarding further integration. A trust in the European Parliament variable, which runs from No trust at all (0) through Complete trust (10), is used to identify this sentiment. While the

ESS asks a more direct question on European integration, unfortunately this question is not available in all iterations. As an alternative, the question on the European Parliament works well as a proxy.

Populism encompasses the view that elites and non-elites are competing against one another and that elites do not care about the people (Judis 2016; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017). This anti-establishment feeling is often directed at politicians who control policy. The ESS has a question asking respondents about their trust in politicians which runs from No trust at all (0) through Complete trust (10). Those who feel stronger anti-establishment sentiment should give much lower scores as they would have less trust in politicians.

The feeling of alienation regarding whether an individual feels that he or she is a genuine part of the system has been seen as a potential catalyst for supporting populism. The logic behind choosing this variable is that alienated individuals feel a degree of congruity with the outsider image that populism brings (Oesch 2008; Sankiaho 1971; Scoones et al. 2018). Identifying this sense of alienation is a question asking the individual how satisfied he or she is with life as a whole, scaled from Extremely dissatisfied (0) to Extremely satisfied (10). The expectation is that those who feel more alienated would most likely feel more dissatisfied with life.

Many ethnocentric populist actors have espoused a desire for more government intervention in the economy through the use of protectionist measures and the elimination of free trade agreements (Judis 2016). Considering the possible importance of economic policy positions, particularly in terms of support for right-wing populists, a question that identifies economic policy can also be useful for the analysis. Previous discussion noted that the main difference in economic policy boils down to a desire for more government intervention vs. less intervention. The ESS has a question on whether the government should reduce differences in

income levels. The potential answers are on a Likert scale ranging from Agree strongly (1) to Disagree strongly (5). The expectation is that those who want more government intervention in economic matters would agree or strongly agree with the government reducing differences in income levels.

Economic anxiety, particularly among those who have been hurt by globalization, may be playing a role in increased support for populism (Hatton 2016). Anxieties brought by an unstable economic market could be making some individuals consider an outsider option like ethnocentric populists. A good variable would be able to measure a fear of uncertainty. A question from the ESS that may serve as an appropriate proxy asks how satisfied the respondent is with the present state of the economy in the country. The responses range from Extremely dissatisfied (0) to Extremely satisfied (10). Those who feel less economically anxious should feel more satisfaction with the economy as a strong economy would assuage most fears an individual would feel.

Past research appeared to indicate that lower levels of education correlated with more support for populist actors (Matthes and Schmuck 2017; Rydgren and Ruth 2011). For education, the ESS records a respondent's educational background using the International Standard Classification of Education, or ISCED. Within the context of the ESS, individuals were placed into a five level system in which Less than secondary education (ISCED 0-1), Lower secondary education completed (ISCED 2), Lower tier upper secondary education completed (ISCED 3b), Upper tier upper secondary non-tertiary education completed (ISCED 3b), and Advanced vocational, sub-degree and beyond (ISCED 4).

On gender, some evidence indicated that women are, on average, less likely to support ethnocentric populist-style actors possibly because of their support for traditional gender norms

(Mudde and Kaltwasser 2015). The ESS has a very simple gender variable, recoded for the analysis.

Research also indicates that more religious individuals tend to, on average, oppose populist actors. This could be related to the calls for tolerance and compassionate for those who are different found in many different religions (Huber and Yendall 2019). The ESS has a straightforward way to assess religiosity by asking individuals how religious they are with a scale ranging from Not at all religious (0) to Very religious (10).

Authoritarian values, which can be defined as the desire for more law and order and stability (Hetherington 2009; Muis and Immerzeel 2017), have been found to play a role in increased support for right-wing populist parties' desire to prevent change (Eke and Kuzio 2000; McCarthy 2019). To measure this desire for more stability, the ESS's question asking respondents whether it is important that government is strong ensures safety is on a Likert scale from Very much like me (1) to Not like me at all (6).

Ideological placement, and especially placement further to the right, has been used as an argument for supporting ethnocentric and right-wing populist parties (Donovan and Redlawsk 2018). The ESS asks individuals about their placement on the left-right scale with 0 indicating furthest left and 10 furthest right.

The last variable is the year. While the ESS officially does not record the year in which a dataset was created but instead records data by ESS Round, each of the rounds correspond to a specific year. For example, most of the survey interviews for Round 1 took place in the September through December 2002 time period with some of the interviews taking place in early 2003 (ESS Grant Report 2002). Overall, each of the rounds correspond to a specific year. Round

1 is mostly analogous to the year 2002 and each subsequent ESS Round has taken place in intervals of two years.

The theoretical concerns outlined previously highlight the importance of the beginning of the Migrant Crisis as an exogenous shock which may have caused large numbers of individuals to vote for ethnocentric populists. As the Migrant Crisis started to become a major issue in 2014, the data will be divided into three analyses. The first examines all the data together. Here, the model includes a dummy variable in which pre-Crisis data are coded as zero and post-Crisis data are coded as one. The second analysis only examines ESS data that was collected before the beginning of the Migrant Crisis and does not include the dummy variable. The third analysis will only examine ESS data collected during and after the Migrant Crisis and does not include the dummy variable.

Determining which rounds of the data should be coded as zero and one was dependent on the time period the surveys took place. As the first through sixth ESS Rounds took place between 2002 and 2012, these should be coded as pre-Crisis. Data for the seventh round was gathered in the Fall of 2014 (ESS Round Seven Field Procedure Report) at a time when the Crisis had begun. While the total number of migrants entering through the Mediterranean Sea never exceeded 70,295 annually in the 1998-2013 time period, the number of migrants reached 209,553 by the end of 2014 (Fargues 2016). The large influx that was already occurring was noticed by members of the general public; by the middle of the Fall of 2014, some Germans were protesting the large number of migrants weekly in the city of Dresden (Czymara and Schmidt-Catran 2017). As members of the general public were aware of the migration issue by the time the survey data for the Seventh ESS Round was being collected, it appears that Western Europeans had already been exposed to the “treatment” of the Migrant Crisis. This interpretation argues that the “post-

Migrant Crisis" period is any time in which the people of Western Europe have experienced the large influx of migrants. By this measure, the 2014 data should be part of the post-Crisis data. This variable will be called "Post 2012" in the analysis as all data from after the 2012 round of the ESS is coded as one and all other data coded as zero. For some of the variables, the coding was flipped in order to convey that greater values indicated stronger feelings. For example, the original coding for the status threat variable was reversed. These changes were made for the status threat, ingroup salience, economic policy, and authoritarianism variables. The complete list of variables is below on table 5.2.

Table 5.2: ESS Variables Used

ESS Variable and Short Description
• (Euroskepticism) Trust in the European Parliament: 0 No Trust at All, 10-Complete Trust • (Anti-Establishment) Trust in Politicians: 0-No Trust at All, 10-Complete Trust • (Alienation) How Satisfied with Life as a Whole: 0-Extremely Satisfied, 10-Extremely Dissatisfied • (Economic Policy) Government Should Reduce Differences in Income Levels: 1-Disagree strongly, 5-Agree strongly • (Economic Satisfaction) How Satisfied with Present State of Economy in Country: 0-Extremely Dissatisfied, 10-Extremely Satisfied • (Education) Highest level of education: 1-ES-ISCED I, less than lower secondary, 5-ES-ISCED IV, advanced vocational, sub-d • (Female) Gender: 0-Male, 1-Female • (Religiosity) How religious are you: 0-Not at all religious, 10-very religious • (Left-Right Scale) Placement on left right scale: 0-left, 10-right • (Authoritarianism) Important that government is strong and ensures safety: 1- Not like me at all, 6- Very much like me • (Left-Right Scale) Placement on Left-Right Scale (0-Left, 10-Right) • (Ethnocentric Populist Partisanship) Which party does the respondent feel closer to? 0-Feel Closer to Non-Ethnocentric Populist Parties, 1-Feel Closer to Ethnocentric Populist Parties • (Right-Wing Populist Partisanship) Which party does the respondent feel closer to? 0-Feel Closer to Non-Right-Wing Populist Parties, 1-Feel Closer to Ethnocentric Populist Parties • (Status Threat) Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants: 0-Cultural life enriched, 10-Cultural life undermined • (Outgroup Bias) Allow many/few immigrants of different race/ethnic group as majority: 1-Allow many to come and live here, 4-Allow none

- (Ingroup Salience) Important to Follow Traditions and Customs: 1- Not like me at all, 6-Very much like me
- (Year, Called "Post 2012") Dummy variable in which all data which take place before 2014 are coded as zero and all other data coded as one.

The last set of variables, the two dependent variables, are critical in answering the two main research questions for this chapter: What is driving support for ethnocentric populist actors? Are economic considerations an important driving force for supporting right-wing populists? To answer these, a dependent variable would need to make a clear distinction between ethnocentric populists and non-ethnocentric populists along with right-wing populists and non-right-wing populists.

The ESS does not have variables which separate respondents depending on whether they voted for specific types of parties. However, the ESS asks individuals from each country which party they voted for in the last election. Two new variables, ethnocentric populist support and right-wing populist support were created. For the ethnocentric populist support variable, respondents who voted for the parties that are classified as ethnocentric populists in chapter four were coded as one while respondents who supported all other parties were coded as zero. For the right-wing populist variable, all individuals who voted for the sixteen right-wing populist parties were coded as one while all other supporters of the remaining three ethnocentric populist parties were coded as zero. These distinctions will be very important for the difference of means tests and in the logistic regression.

Analysis

The analysis section seeks to answer whether exogenous events affect populist support using difference of means tests and logistic regression. The two types of analysis have different

objectives. The difference of means tests seek to examine whether there are different average scores given by respondents who support certain types of parties. They also provide preliminary evidence of time variations in the averages. Because of the importance of the Migrant Crisis as a potential exogenous shock, the analysis examines whether there are any noticeable changes in scores after 2014. Each of the two sets of difference of means tests compare and contrast different groups: The first looks at non-ethnocentric populist supporters and supporters of any type of ethnocentric populist party. The second looks at general ethnocentric populist supporters and supporters of right-wing populists.

The logistic regression analysis is also divided into two different subsections. The first examines what might be driving support for ethnocentric populist parties. It is further divided between one set of logistic regressions that examines countries that saw an uptick in support for populists and another that witnessed a downturn during/after the Migrant Crisis. Each subset is divided into three analyses: One that looks at the entire time period, one that examines the pre-Migrant Crisis time period, and another that examines the post-Migrant Crisis. The second limits the respondents to those who supported the ethnocentric populist parties and is interested in understanding what sort of variables might be driving support for right-wing populists.

Difference of Means Tests

The section presents two sets of difference of means tests and analyzes whether there are differences between the groups of supporters and whether there is significant time variation in average scores. The next step involves discussing which variables might be most relevant to an analysis seeking to understand reasons behind support for ethnocentric populists.

An earlier section outlined which ESS variables would be used. While these variables are an important component of the logistic regression analysis, not all of them may be relevant to the

difference of means tests. These tests trace whether attitudes related to ethnocentric populism differ across critical categories. Because of this, only variables which are relevant to ethnocentric populism are part of the analysis.

Ethnocentric populism is composed of two different concepts. The populism portion is strongly related to anti-establishment feelings, while the ethnocentric portion is more focused on xenophobia and ingroup biases. For the populism component, the trust in the European Parliament and trust in politician variables best serve as indicators of how individuals feel about the establishment.

For the ethnocentric portion, measuring xenophobia and ingroup biases is necessary. The questions on immigrants potentially undermining culture, the importance of customs and traditions, and whether individuals who are of a different ethnic/racial group being allowed into a country measure the ethnocentric component. The general theme of all three questions emphasizes the importance of insiders and outsiders. A final variable is part of the analysis because of its potential usefulness in setting up the analysis for the second research question on economic policy. The question on whether an individual agreed or disagreed with the government intervening to reduce gaps in income levels was added for this purpose.

Difference of Means Tests (Ethnocentric Populist Parties vs. Non-Ethnocentric Populist Parties)

The most important objective in conducting these tests is to see whether supporters of both types of parties, on average, differ from one another. If they do, is it only through a specific point in time or is it consistent throughout the entire time period under examination? The hope is to see whether, on average, supporters of ethnocentric populist parties are closer to ethnocentric populism in their views. If this is not the case, it would open interesting questions about why they are supporting such actors.

This section also examines whether there is a change in average scores among the two groups of voters around 2014. As the Migrant Crisis started to ramp up around 2014 and into 2015 (Pachocka 2016), it is possible that Western Europeans could have experienced enough of a shock to their worldviews that they started to shift their feelings about status threat, ingroup salience, and outgroup bias. The expectation would be that ethnocentric populist supporters would feel more status threat, ingroup salience, and outgroup bias, but it is possible that others could feel the same as well. The following subgroup of difference of means tests attempt to answer whether the two groups differ from one another, whether differences are constant through time, and whether differences start to grow in the years since the Migrant Crisis.

Table 5.3: Euroskepticism

<table>
<tr><th>Year</th><th>NEPP Median
(Observations
in Parentheses)</th><th>NEPP Median
(Observations
in Parentheses)</th><th>Difference
Degrees of Freedom/Z-Score
Significance</th></tr>
<tr><td>2002</td><td>5.326
(22,969)</td><td>6.131
(787)</td><td>-0.805
t(23754)= -9.547
P>|t|=0.000*</td></tr>
<tr><td>2004</td><td>5.501
(20,981)</td><td>6.184
(895)</td><td>-0.684
t(21874)= -8.595
P>|t|=0.000*</td></tr>
<tr><td>2006</td><td>5.555
(19,338)</td><td>5.992
(869)</td><td>-0.437
t(20205)= -5.500
P>|t|=0.000*</td></tr>
<tr><td>2008</td><td>5.359
(19,027)</td><td>5.695
(1,113)</td><td>-0.337
t(20138)= -4.754
P>|t|=0.000*</td></tr>
<tr><td>2010</td><td>5.747
(18,517)</td><td>5.796
(1,152)</td><td>-0.05
t(19667)= -0.673
P>|t|=0.501</td></tr>
<tr><td>2012</td><td>5.407
(17,908)</td><td>5.875
(1,311)</td><td>-0.468
t(19217)= -7.080</td></tr>
</table>

			P>|t|=0.000*
2014	5.686 (18,321)	6.614 (1,584)	-0.928 t(19903)= -14.622 P>|t|=0.000*
2016	5.605 (18,630)	6.386 (1,830)	-0.782 t(20458)= -13.197 P>|t|=0.000*
2018	5.301 (19,964)	6.073 (1,730)	-0.772 t(21692)= -12.676 P>|t|=0.000*

*Significant at 95% Level

For table 5.3, a variable on trust in the European Parliament, which runs from Complete trust (0) to No trust at all (10), serves as an indicator for Euroskepticism. As ethnocentric populists are skeptical of the European Union, the expectation is that they would on average give higher scores than their non-ethnocentric populist counterparts. The analysis indicates that on average those who supported ethnocentric populist gave a high score than their counterparts, indicating more Euroskepticism.

In the middle of and in the immediate aftermath of the Migrant Crisis, respondents who support ethnocentric populist parties, on average, became more skeptical of the European Parliament. The gap between the two groups also peaks in 2014 but decreases somewhat in 2016 and 2018. However, the gap even in the 2016 and 2018 remains higher than most of the pre-Migrant Crisis years. There is unfortunately no evidence to indicate whether the gap between the two groups will continue to decrease in the years to come.

Table 5.4: Anti-Establishment Sentiment

Year	NEPP Median (Observations in Parentheses)	NEPP Median (Observations in Parentheses)	Difference Degrees of Freedom/Z-Score Significance
2002	5.812	5.842	-0.029

	(25,147)	(859)	t(26004)= -0.376 P>|t|=0.707
2004	5.933 (22,928)	6.012 (980)	-0.079 t(23906)= -1.073 P>|t|=0.283
2006	5.858 (20,970)	5.891 (969)	-0.033 t(21937)= -0.449 P>|t|=0.653
2008	5.855 (20,383)	5.655 (1,188)	-0.200 t(21569)= 3.002 P>|t|=0.003*
2010	6.175 (19,909)	5.757 (1,244)	+0.418 t(21151)= 5.961 P>|t|=0.000*
2012	5.671 (19,083)	6.283 (1,371)	-0.612 t(20452)= -9.765 P>|t|=0.000*
2014	5.721 (19,233)	6.352 (1,641)	-0.631 t(20872)= -10.636 P>|t|=0.000*
2016	5.881 (19,421)	6.495 (1,871)	-0.613 t(21290)= -10.743 P>|t|=0.000*
2018	5.658 (20,923)	5.974 (1,797)	-0.317 t(22718)= -5.561 P>|t|=0.000*

*Significant at 95% Level

For table 5.4, the trust in politicians variable meant to measure anti-establishment sentiment, which runs from No trust at all (0) to Complete trust (10), serves as the anti-establishment variable. Considering the anti-establishment nature of all strains of populisms, the

expectation is that ethnocentric populist supporters would, on average, give higher scores than their counterparts. Overall, this appears to be the case with the exception of the 2010 time period.

There is also some strong variation in the gap between the two groups depending on the time period. In the earlier time periods of 2002-2006, the gap between the two groups is smaller than 0.1. However, the gap widens in the 2010s with non-ethnocentric populist supporters expressing more anti-establishment sentiment in 2010. This changes in 2012 with a gap of approximately 0.6 which is maintained through 2016. The gap drops to about 0.3 in 2018. In other words, anti-establishment sentiment appears to increase in prominence on both sides starting around 2012, before the beginning of the Migrant Crisis, and remains strong through 2016. However, it appears to die down a bit by 2018; perhaps indicating anti-establishment sentiment loses some of its resonance as time passes.

Table 5.5: Status Threat

Year	NEPP Median (Observations in Parentheses)	NEPP Median (Observations in Parentheses)	Difference Degrees of Freedom/Z-Score Significance
2002	5.150	6.291	-1.141
	(24,585)	(850)	t(25433)= -13.273
			P>|t|=0.000*
2004	5.294	6.486	-1.192
	(22,671)	(975)	t(23644)= -14.471
			P>|t|=0.000*
2006	5.165	6.285	-1.120
	(20,831)	(956)	t(21785)= -13.749
			P>|t|=0.000*
2008	5.142	5.931	-0.789
	(20,308)	(1,182)	t(21488)= -10.490
			P>|t|=0.000*
2010	5.432	6.129	-0.697
	(19,824)	(1,237)	t(21059)= -9.402

			P>|t|=0.000*
2012	5.866 (19,039)	4.866 (1,354)	+1.000 t(20391)= -14.830 P>|t|=0.000*
2014	4.969 (19,166)	6.470 (1,628)	-1.501 t(20792)= -23.740 P>|t|=0.000*
2016	5.160 (19,327)	6.480 (1,860)	-1.320 t(21185)= -21.318 P>|t|=0.000*
2018	5.020 (20,876)	6.375 (1,789)	-1.355 t(22663)= -21.875 P>|t|=0.000*

*Significant at 95% Level

For table 5.5, a question on whether a country's cultural life is undermined or enriched by immigrants, which ranges from Cultural life enriched (1) to Cultural life undermined (10), serves as a measure for status threat. The expectation is that ethnocentric populists, because of their general xenophobic stance (Rydgren 2005), should, on average, give lower scores throughout the entire time period. While this is true for most of the time period examined, it is not the case in 2012 where non-ethnocentric populist supporters, on average, feel more status threat. Nevertheless, unlike the previous variables, the results indicate that there is a statistically significant difference between the groups for the entire time span.

The gap between the two groups first starts out to be great, but fluctuates with time. While the gap between the two groups was a bit over 1.0 from 2002-2006, it decreases in 2008 and 2010. While there is an uptick in 2012, starting in 2014, the difference becomes wider and topped out at 1.5 in 2014. The averages seen among ethnocentric populists grew while the

averages for non-ethnocentric populist supporters are on average lower in the post-Migrant Crisis era. However, it remains to be seen whether this gap will continue to decrease moving forward.

Table 5.6: Ingroup Salience

Year	NEPP Median (Observations in Parentheses)	NEPP Median (Observations in Parentheses)	Difference Degrees of Freedom/Z-Score Significance
2002	4.168	4.240	-0.072
	(22,879)	(830)	t(23707)= -1.449
			P>|t|=0.147
2004	4.192	4.366	-0.174
	(22,245)	(945)	t(23188)= -3.753
			P>|t|=0.000*
2006	4.052	4.322	-0.270
	(20,367)	(927)	t(21292)= -5.816
			P>|t|=0.000*
2008	4.132	4.411	-0.279
	(19,704)	(1,152)	t(20854)= -6.686
			P>|t|=0.000*
2010	4.215	4.338	-0.123
	(10,737)	(1,234)	t(20969)= -3.024
			P>|t|=0.003*
2012	4.142	4.258	-0.116
	(19,132)	(1,356)	t(20486)= -2.973
			P>|t|=0.003*
2014	4.051	4.307	-0.256
	(19,121)	(1,629)	t(20748)= -7.175
			P>|t|=0.000*
2016	4.100	4.369	-0.269
	(19,430)	(1,863)	t(21291)= -7.975
			P>|t|=0.000*
2018	4.150	4.445	-0.295
	(21,012)	(21,012)	t(22808)= -8.628

			P>|t|=0.000*

*Significant at 95% Level

For table 5.6, a question asking respondents whether it is important to follow traditions and customs, which runs from not like me at all (1) to very much like me (6), serves as a measure of ingroup salience. The expectation here is that ethnocentric populist supporters would feel much more ingroup salience than their counterparts. The results match up well with expectations. For all years examined, in both the pre- and post-Migrant Crisis era, ethnocentric populist supporters, on average, gave lower scores although this difference is not significant in 2002. Overall, the data indicates that, on average, ethnocentric populist supporters felt more ingroup salience.

There is a degree of fluctuation in the average scores over time. Averages for ethnocentric populist party supporters increased from the beginning to the end of the 2000s. There was a drop in the early 2010s, but the averages increased consistently from 2014 to 2018. A drop followed by an increase can also be seen among non-ethnocentric populist supporters. Overall, there is evidence that in the post-Migrant Crisis time period that ingroup salience has grown among both the ethnocentric populist and non-ethnocentric populist supporting groups. It is possible that the continued presence of migrants in these countries could make Europeans feel more ingroup salience for many years to come.

Table 5.7: Outgroup Bias

Year	NEPP Median (Observations in Parentheses)	NEPP Median (Observations in Parentheses)	Difference Degrees of Freedom/Z-Score Significance
2002	2.483	2.771	-0.288
	(24,573)	(844)	t(25415)= -10.172

			P>|t|=0.000*
2004	2.495 (22,782)	2.791 (970)	-0.296 t(23750)= -10.559 P>|t|=0.000*
2006	2.443 (20,869)	2.746 (959)	-0.303 t(21826)= -11.040 P>|t|=0.000*
2008	2.400 (20,246)	2.592 (1,185)	-0.192 t(21429)= -7.673 P>|t|=0.000*
2010	2.469 (19,776)	2.696 (1,237)	-0.227 t(21011)= -8.879 P>|t|=0.000*
2012	2.290 (18,995)	2.627 (1,359)	-0.337 t(20352)= -14.747 P>|t|=0.000*
2014	2.224 (19,110)	2.723 (1,635)	-0.499 t(20743)= -23.751 P>|t|=0.000*
2016	2.257 (19,237)	2.667 (1,854)	-0.410 t(21089)= -20.056 P>|t|=0.000*
2018	2.234 (20,771)	2.604 (1,785)	-0.370 t(22554)= -18.035 P>|t|=0.000*

*Significant at 95% Level

For table 5.7, a question on whether to allow immigrants of different race/ethnic groups, included responses ranging from allow many to come and live here (1) and allow none (4), serves as a way to measure outgroup bias. The expectation is that those who support ethnocentric populists would, on average, give higher scores as such individuals likely would be suspicious of

allowing outsiders into their countries. Overall, there is a consistent pattern through the entire time period in which ethnocentric populist supporters, on average, gave higher scores and are closer to stating that no immigrants of different racial/ethnic groups should enter European countries.

While the gap between the two groups remains for the whole time period, the rebound effect again appears for ethnocentric populist supporters. While in 2014 the average was above 2.7, it dropped in both 2016 and 2018. The averages drop from 2016 to 2018 for non-ethnocentric populist supporters. In other words, there appears to be some evidence indicating that supporters of ethnocentric populist parties are softening up on allowing immigrants of different racial/ethnic groups into their respective countries; this could be the result of the Migrant Crisis potentially losing salience as the years pass.

Table 5.8: Gov. Econ. Intervention

Year	NEPP Median (Observations in Parentheses)	EPP Median (Observations in Parentheses)	Difference Degrees of Freedom/Z-Score Significance
2002	3.709	3.473	+0.236
	(24,900)	(848)	t(25746)= 6.324
			P>|t|=0.000*
2004	3.727	3.560	+0.167
	(22,780)	(979)	t(23757)= 4.763
			P>|t|=0.000*
2006	3.684	3.487	+0.197
	(20,933)	(966)	t(21897)= 5.592
			P>|t|=0.000*
2008	3.741	3.600	+0.141
	(20,368)	(1,187)	t(21553)= 4.470
			P>|t|=0.000*
2010	3.739	3.534	+0.205
	(19,883)	(1,248)	t(21129)= 6.525

			P>|t|=0.000*
2012	3.717 (19,060)	3.726 (1,365)	-0.009 t(20423)= -0.297 P>|t|=0.767
2014	3.699 (19,192)	3.682 (1,635)	+0.017 t(20825)= 0.602 P>|t|=0.547
2016	3.803 (19,389)	3.800 (1,855)	+0.003 t(21242)= 0.123 P>|t|=0.902
2018	3.819 (20,974)	3.717 (1,790)	+0.102 t(22762)= 4.142 P>|t|=0.000*

*Significant at 95% Level

For table 5.8, a question on whether government should reduce differences in income levels, which ran from Disagree strongly (1) to Agree strongly (5), serves as an indicator for how respondents felt about government policy. The expectation is more difficult to state outright as ethnocentric populists have different views on government intervention in economic matters. While there is some evidence indicating that such actors are generally interested in extending welfare programs as much of their constituency is working class (Afonso and Rennwald 2018), during times of crisis, such as during economic recessions or rise in immigration, ethnocentric populist parties tend to prefer cutting these same welfare program (Otjes et al. 2018). Because of this phenomenon, one could argue that ethnocentric populists might not differ from the rest of the population in the pre-Migrant Crisis era, but might move toward preferring less intervention following the Migrant Crisis. Overall, it appears that ethnocentric respondents, on average, give lower scores with the exception of 2012. In other words, for the most part, they are closer to

disagreeing that the government should reduce differences in income level. Supporters of ethnocentric populist parties, on average, appear to be more suspicious of government intervention in economic matters, on average.

As with other variables, there are fluctuations in the averages for each group. While there is a statistically significant difference from 2002 through 2010, the data from 2012 through 2016 indicated that there is no statistically significant difference between the two groups; this could be possible because government intervention in economic matters may have lost salience as a question during the Migrant Crisis. There is also no indication that either group is consistently interested in increasing or decreasing government intervention in economic matters. This is somewhat unexpected as the Migrant Crisis saw many potential new welfare recipients entering Europe.

Does the analysis show a statistically significant difference between the two groups? If so, is it through the entire time period? What of the post-Migrant Crisis time period? Overall, it seems that supporters for the two different groups of parties differ from one another in many ways. For the most part, the data is in line with expectations. There is a statistically significant difference between supporters of ethnocentric populists and non-ethnocentric populists and in most of the ESS Rounds, the expectations are met.

However, there were a number of areas where the results differed from assumptions. If there is a general takeaway from this subsection, it is that while there appears to be reasonably strong gap between ethnocentric populist supporters and non-ethnocentric populist supporters, it is unknown whether the Migrant Crisis will cause a permanent change in either camp. For ethnocentric populist supporters, there appears to be a change in averages generally in 2014 and 2016 but a rebound effect in 2018.

Difference of Means Tests (General Ethnocentric Populist Parties vs. Right-wing Populist)

This subsection uses a modified list of general ethnocentric populist parties (GEPP) and right-wing populists (RWP) to evaluate if the two groups differ on economic matters. The section also assesses if there are differences between the two groups on other questions, and whether a change occurred in the years during and after the Migrant Crisis.

Table 5.9: Gov. Econ. Intervention

Year	NEPP Median (Observations in Parentheses)	NEPP Median (Observations in Parentheses)	Difference Degrees of Freedom/Z-Score Significance
2002	3.528 (288)	3.445 (560)	+0.083 t(846)= 1.023 P>|t|=0.307
2004	3.637 (366)	3.514 (613)	+0.123 t(977)= 1.655 P>|t|=0.098
2006	3.538 (368)	3.455 (598)	+0.083 t(964)= 1.076 P>|t|=0.282
2008	3.620 (308)	3.593 (879)	+0.027 t(1185)= 0.384 P>|t|=0.701
2010	3.666 (308)	3.490 (940)	+0.176 t(1246)= 2.435 P>|t|=0.015*
2012	3.941 (690)	3.507 (675)	+0.434 t(1363)= 7.238 P>|t|=0.000*
2014	3.847 (635)	3.577 (1,000)	+0.270 t(1633)= 4.721 P>|t|=0.000*
2016	3.998	3.596	+0.502

	(941)	(914)	t(1853)= 8.319 P>|t|=0.000*
2018	3.845 (1,019)	3.547 (771)	+0.298 t(1788)= 6.076 P>|t|=0.000*

*Significant at 95% Level

Overall, those who support right-wing populist parties, on average, tend to give lower scores which indicates more disagreement with government playing a role in reducing differences in income levels. Such results indicate that right-wing populist party supporters are more in line with their own party's stronger aversion to government intervention in economic matters. However, in the 2002-2008 time period, the difference between the two groups was not big enough to state that there is a statistically significant difference between the two groups. However, the gap grew enough in the years after to indicate significance at the 95 percent level. In 2014 and 2016, both general ethnocentric populist supporters and right-wing populist supporters appeared to move closer to agreeing with more government intervention. Overall, the data indicates that right-wing populist supporters are more suspicious of government intervention in the economy.

Logistic Regression

The regression analyses presented in this section attempt to answer the research questions presented in earlier sections of this broader investigation. This section is interested in answering how exogenous events can affect support for populists. As a secondary project, it also examines if there are differences between supporters in the nine countries that saw a rise in support in the immediate aftermath of the Migrant Crisis and the countries that did not see a rise in support.

The final section of the analysis also examines whether there is a major difference between right-wing populists and more general ethnocentric populists.

The rest of the European analysis focuses on the results from logistic regressions to answer the question of what is driving support for ethnocentric populist parties and right-wing populists. Temporal variation in average scores from the difference of means tests leaves open the possibility that exogenous shocks could affect support for populists. As the Migrant Crisis started in 2014, the expectation is that individuals living in Europe would feel a heightened sense of status threat, ingroup salience, and outgroup bias after the beginning of the Crisis.

Logistic regression is used because the dependent variables are dichotomous. Of the variables discussed in an earlier section, most can be put into a regression model without making any modifications except for the year dummy. Time is a major component of the analysis as the theory argues that within the context of Western Europe, the Migrant Crisis of 2014-2015 was a powerful exogenous shock that affected support for ethnocentric populist actors. The implication is that in the post-Migrant Crisis time period, there should be stronger ingroup and outgroup biases along with stronger suspicion of immigration. As there could be differences between the pre- and post-Migrant Crisis time periods, a year dummy, in which surveys which take place through 2012 are coded as zero and the rest as one, is a part of the analysis.

Overall, the argument is that an exogenous event can affect support for ethnocentric populist parties. The same could be said about support for right-wing populist parties; during and after the Migrant Crisis, the coefficient of economic policy for supporting right-wing populist actors could decrease due to the increased salience of immigration and outsiders during and after the Migrant Crisis. These expectations yield four hypotheses.

H1: On average, the coefficient of status threat on support for ethnocentric populist parties should increase after the Migrant Crisis.

H2: On average, the coefficient of ingroup salience on support for ethnocentric populist parties should increase after the Migrant Crisis.

H3: On average, the coefficient of outgroup bias on support for ethnocentric populist parties should increase after the Migrant Crisis.

H4: On average, the coefficient of economic policy on support for right-wing populist parties should decrease during and after the Migrant Crisis.

The analysis for this chapter is divided into a few sections starting with the nine-country models. This section examines countries that saw an increase in support for ethnocentric populist actors following the beginning of the Migrant Crisis. The nine-country section is also divided into two sections. First, the analysis focuses on the findings related to non-theory variables. The second part of this analysis focuses on examining the predicted probabilities for the three theory variables: Status threat, ingroup salience, and outgroup bias. Here, the focus is on reporting the predicted probabilities of support for ethnocentric populist parties or right-wing populist parties.

The four countries are analyzed separately from the nine countries as ethnocentric populists experienced a decrease in support following the beginning of the Migrant Crisis. In this section, the modeling is also divided into two sections presented in the same exact manner as outlined in the previous paragraph.

A final subsection examines a different question. Instead of focusing of what variables are driving ethnocentric populists as a whole, the question here is whether right-wing populist supporters are driven by different variables than their more general ethnocentric populist counterparts. There is strong interest in whether economic considerations are playing a role in driving right-wing populist supporters.

It is also important to note that the ESS also has population and design weights which are also a part of the logistic regression analysis. The population weights are to be used in situations

where data from multiple countries are combined as at times, the sample sizes from a country are not commensurate to the size of the country's population. The ESS's design weights were created as in some of the countries, not every adult in the population had an equal chance of selection; some individuals who belong to certain groups or those who live in some regions had lower or higher probabilities of being chosen. To help rectify these issues, the ESS researchers recommend using both the population and design weights by multiplying the two, or pweight*dweight. This new weight is used as the weight for the logistic regression.

Logistic Regression Analysis Results, Countries that Saw a Rise in Support

This subsection focuses on examining the results for a logistic regression analysis in which support for ethnocentric populist parties is the dependent variable and only examines the nine countries that saw a rise in support. This analysis provides evidence indicating whether there is strong temporal variation in the coefficients of certain variables related to status threat, ingroup salience, and outgroup bias but will first start off by discussing each significant variable individually. Afterwards, the rest of the discussion will discuss variables not significant at the 95 percent level.

Table 5.10 Logistic Regression for Countries that Experienced Populist Vote Share Increase

Independent Variables	Vote for Ethnocentric Populist Actor (Dependent)		
	All	Pre-2012	Post-2012
Post 2012	0.833*	-	-
	(0.041)	-	-
Status Threat	0.109*	0.105*	0.109*
	(0.009)	(0.015)	(0.012)
Ingroup Salience	0.071*	0.054*	0.083*
	(0.017)	(0.027)	(0.022)
Outgroup Bias	0.158*	0.017	0.282*
	(0.029)	(0.046)	(0.037)

Euroskepticism	-0.019 (0.011)	-0.076* (0.018)	0.023 (0.013)
Anti-Establishment Sentiment	0.067* (0.012)	0.082* (0.020)	0.052* (0.015)
Alienation	-0.029* (0.010)	-0.027 (0.015)	-0.030* (0.014)
Gov. Econ. Intervention	0.087* (0.021)	0.182* (0.033)	0.004 (0.027)
Economic Anxiety	-0.056* (0.010)	-0.058* (0.015)	-0.057* (0.013)
Education	-0.060* (0.015)	-0.088* (0.023)	-0.040 (0.020)
Female	-0.269* (0.041)	-0.334* (0.064)	-0.224* (0.052)
Religiosity	0.031* (0.007)	0.071* (0.012)	0.002 (0.009)
Left-Right Scale	0.062* (0.012)	0.090* (0.020)	0.032* (0.014)
Authoritarianism	0.081* (0.019)	0.055 (0.030)	0.100* (0.025)
Constant	-5.499* (0.189)	-5.278* (0.292)	-4.779* (0.246)
N	113,437	72,359	41,078

*Significant at 95%

The results from Table 5.10 indicate that there was a positive relationship between many of the control variables and the dependent variable. The positive direction of the time dummy

indicates that ethnocentric populist parties enjoyed greater support in the post-Migrant Crisis time period. There is also evidence that a stronger desire for more government in the economy, religiosity, being closer to the right, and more authoritarian sentiment all increased populist support. Economic anxiety and religiosity are no longer significant in the post-Migrant Crisis time period. However, authoritarianism became significant; this result indicates that some previously salient issues became less important to respondents in the post-Migrant Crisis time period.

For some variables, there was a negative relationship between increases in that variable and populist support. The direction of the anti-establishment sentiment variable indicated that increases in this sentiment decreased populist support. This also held true for alienation, economic anxiety, education, and being female. Among these variables, education lost significance while alienation gained it. Again, there appears to be some variations in the relationship between variables depending on the time period.

While the direction of most of the variables remain the same throughout the entire time period, the direction for the Euroskepticism variable changes. The results for the Euroskepticism variable showed a positive and significant relationship between the variable and support for ethnocentric populist parties. However, the relation is now negative and not significant in the post-Migrant Crisis time period; this perhaps indicates that Euroskepticism lost salience in the post-Crisis time period.

While the directions of the status threat, ingroup salience, and outgroup bias variables were within expectations, the results of the outgroup bias variable are arguably most in line with the theory. While there is a growth in the size of the coefficients for status threat and ingroup salience between the pre- and post-Migrant Crisis time periods, there was a significant

relationship in both time periods. However, the outgroup bias variable is significant only in the post-Migrant Crisis time period; this indicates that such feelings were only activated in the time period following the 2012 ESS.

Table 5.11 Probability of Supporting an Ethnocentric Populist Party among Countries that Saw an Increase in Support (Variables Held at Means)

	Predicted Probability		
	All	Pre-2012	Post-2012
Status Threat (Lowest Value)	2.888%*	2.491%*	3.870%*
Status Threat (Highest Value)	6.707%*	5.965%*	8.897%
Ingroup Salience (Lowest Value)	3.397%*	2.665%*	5.002%*
Ingroup Salience (Highest Value)	4.263%*	3.292%*	6.301%*
Outgroup Bias (Lowest Value)	3.889%*	3.978%*	4.702%*
Outgroup Bias (Highest Value)	4.773%*	3.331%*	8.156%*

*Significant at 95%

The results from Table 5.11 indicate that the predicted probability of support increases with higher values for all three theory variables. The results for the predicted probabilities of supporting ethnocentric populist actors indicate that there is a clear difference between the pre- and post-Migrant Crisis time periods. Overall, among respondents in the lowest values of status threat, ingroup salience, and outgroup bias, the increases seen between the pre- and post-Migrant Crisis time periods are much smaller than the results seen among those who responded in the highest values. The difference among respondents who responded with the lowest value of status threat between the two time periods is about 1.4%. However, it increases to over 3 percent for those who responded with the highest value of status threat. For ingroup salience, the increase among those who responded in the lowest value was a little less than 2.5%. However, the increase for those responding in the highest category was slightly over 3%. For both the status

threat and ingroup salience, there is evidence that increasing feelings for both will increase the probability of support for ethnocentric populists.

The results for outgroup bias are where there is a significant difference among those who responded with the lowest value and the highest value. The difference in the predicted probability for support between the pre- and post-Migrant Crisis time periods among those who responded in the lowest value is less than 1%. However, among those who responded in the highest category, the difference is over 4% and close to 5%. This large difference, relative to the status threat and ingroup salience variables, indicates that increases in outgroup bias had the largest marginal effect among the three variables.

Logistic Regression Analysis Results, Countries that Saw a Decline in Support

This subsection examines the four different countries, Belgium, Finland, Greece, and Norway, that saw a decline in support for an ethnocentric populist party in the elections between the beginning of the Migrant Crisis and after its start. This subsection also compares the results between the previous group of regressions that focused on countries that saw an increase in support and this group of regressions below. Just like in the previous subsection, the discussion on each logistic regression will focus on those variables which are significant at the 95 percent level and then shift to discussing non-significant variables.

Table 5.12 Logistic Regression for Countries that Experienced Populist Vote Share Decrease

Independent	Vote for Ethnocentric Populist Actor (Dependent)		
Variables	All	Pre-2012	Post-2012
Post 2012	0.509*	-	-
	(0.039)	-	-
Status Threat	0.129*	0.120*	0.164*
	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.014)
Ingroup Salience	0.065*	0.054*	0.091*

	(0.015)	(0.019)	(0.025)
Outgroup Bias	0.126*	0.056	0.228*
	(0.027)	(0.035)	(0.043)
Euroskepticism	0.099*	0.078*	0.113*
	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.017)
Anti-Establishment	-0.005	0.008	-0.021
Sentiment	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.019)
Alienation	-0.075*	-0.099*	-0.019
	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.019)
Gov. Econ. Intervention	-0.060*	-0.083*	0.013
	(0.018)	(0.023)	(0.031)
Economic Anxiety	0.044*	0.041*	0.026
	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.015)
Education	0.034*	0.035*	0.028
	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.023)
Female	-0.217*	-0.211*	-0.227*
	(0.038)	(0.048)	(0.063)
Religiosity	-0.101*	-0.121*	-0.061*
	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.011)
Left-Right Scale	0.227*	0.215*	0.257*
	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.015)
Authoritarianism	-0.080*	-0.125*	0.015
	(0.015)	(0.019)	(0.025)
Constant	-4.413*	-3.572*	-5.438*
	(0.178)	(0.219)	(0.0297)
N	47,238	33,535	13,703

*Significant at 95%

Just like the results from the previous section, the results on Table 5.12 indicate that there was a positive relationship between many of the control variables and the dependent variable. Like the previous group of models, the positive direction of the time dummy indicates that ethnocentric populist parties enjoyed greater support in the post-Migrant Crisis time period. There is also evidence that more Euroskepticism, economic anxiety, education, the left-right scale, and authoritarianism all increased populist support. However, economic anxiety, education, and authoritarianism are no longer significant in the post-Migrant Crisis time period. Just like in the nine-country model, the results indicate that some previously salient variables were no longer as relevant in a different time period.

For some variables, there was a negative relationship between increases in that variable and populist support. The direction of the alienation, gender (female), and the religiosity variables indicated that increases in this sentiment decreased populist support. All of these, however, remained significant in all three time periods examined.

There were more variables that changed direction in the four-country model than in the nine-country model. The anti-establishment sentiment variable never reaches significance. A similar result is seen with the government economic intervention variable as this variable also sees a shift albeit from negative to positive; in addition, this variable loses significance in the post-Migrant Crisis time period.

There are some important differences in the relationship between the control variables and the dependent variable between the two groups of countries. In the nine-country model, stronger desire for more government in the economy, religiosity, being closer to the right, and more authoritarian sentiment all increased populist support. The opposite was the case for the alienation, economic anxiety, education, and female variables. The Euroskepticism variable

flipped direction from positive to negative. In the four-country model, there is a positive relation between economic anxiety, education, and the left-right scale. The opposite was the case for Euroskepticism, alienation, being female, and religiosity, while anti-establishment sentiment, government in economy, and authoritarianism flip direction between the time periods. Ultimately, only the variables for alienation, female, and left-right scale are share the same direction across both models. In addition, during the post-Crisis time period, six of the control variables are significant in the nine-country model while only four are for the four-country model. It could be possible that in the four countries, ethnocentric populist parties failed to attract a more diverse coalition to their cause; this may have caused them to not do as well in elections. Ultimately, the results from the nine-country model and the four-country model indicate that the supporters in both areas are driven by different variables.

While the results for the control variables indicate that there are many differences in terms of what drives ethnocentric populist supporters, the results for the status threat, ingroup salience, and outgroup bias variables mirror those of the nine-country model. The directions are the same and the size of the coefficients increase between the two time periods. Perhaps most importantly, the outgroup bias variable is once again significant only in the post-Migrant Crisis time period; this indicates that such feelings were activated in the time period following the 2012 ESS. Ultimately, it is on status threat, ingroup salience, and outgroup bias where the two groups of ethnocentric populist supporters hold the most in common.

Table 5.13 Probability of Supporting an Ethnocentric Populist Party among Countries that Saw a Decrease in Support (Variables Held at Means)

	Predicted Probability		
	All	Pre-2012	Post-2012

Status Threat (Lowest Value)	3.076%*	2.555%*	4.655%*
Status Threat (Highest Value)	8.774%*	6.377%*	18.755%*
Ingroup Salience (Lowest Value)	4.517%*	4.048%*	5.772%*
Ingroup Salience (Highest Value)	6.419%*	5.250%*	10.166%*
Outgroup Bias (Lowest Value)	4.189%*	3.654%*	6.183%*
Outgroup Bias (Highest Value)	7.968%*	6.550%*	12.449%*

*Significant at 95%

While the results from Table 5.13 indicate that the general pattern of increases holds when compared to the results from the nine-country model, the increase in probability is much greater. For example, among those who responded with the lowest value of status threat, there is about a 2% increase in the probability of support. However, when examining those who responded with the highest value of status threat, the probability increases by over 12%. A similar difference can be seen with ingroup salience. While the predicted probability among those who responded with the lowest value increased by a bit less than 2% between the two time periods, the increase was almost 5% among those who responded with the highest value.

Just like in the nine-country model, there is also evidence indicating a strong difference across time periods for the outgroup bias variable. Among those who responded in the lowest value, the increase between the two time periods was about 2.5%. However, among those who responded with the highest value of outgroup bias, the increase was nearly 6%. Just like in the nine-country model, the increases between time periods among those who responded with the highest value for outgroup bias was highest.

Logistic Regression Analysis Results, Dependent Variable: Right-wing Populist

This subsection examines whether economic policy positions are a driving force for right-wing populist supporters compared to more general ethnocentric populist supporters. While the previous sections examined all of the variables, this section provides analysis only for the main variable of interest: The economic policy variable.

Table 5.14 Logistic Regression for Right-Wing Populist Support

Independent Variables	Vote for RWP Parties (Dependent)
Status Threat	-0.041*
	(0.016)
Ingroup Salience	0.099*
	(0.029)
Outgroup Bias	-0.169*
	(0.049)
Euroskepticism	0.291*
	(0.019)
Anti-Establishment Sentiment	-0.220*
	(0.021)
Alienation	-0.018
	(0.020)
Gov. Econ. Intervention	-0.119*
	(0.033)
Economic Anxiety	0.362*
	(0.018)
Education	0.138*
	(0.030)
Female	0.340*

	(0.070)
Religiosity	-0.089*
	(0.012)
Left-Right Scale	0.161*
	(0.016)
Authoritarianism	-0.029
	(0.029)
Constant	-2.457*
	(0.320)
N	10,432

*Significant at 95%

Comparing the results from the theory variables used for the nine-country, four-country models, and the model from Table 5.14, status threat, ingroup salience, and outgroup bias, indicate that there are some important differences between right-wing populist supporters and more general ethnocentric populist supporters. Of particular interest are the theory variables; the direction of the coefficients indicates that, for example, more support for status threat and outgroup bias decreases the chances of supporting right-wing populist parties while there is an opposite relationship with ingroup salience. In other words, it appears that supporters of right-wing populist parties are driven by the theory variables in a different way compared to their more general ethnocentric populist counterparts.

There are also other differences between the two groups. More anti-establishment sentiment, more religiosity and more authoritarian sentiment decrease the likelihood of supporting right-wing populist parties. Conversely, more feelings of Euroskepticism, alienation, economic anxiety, education, and being female all increased the likelihood of supporting right-

wing populists. However, the alienation variable is not significant. Overall, the results indicate that beyond differences related to country-level differences, there are also differences between supporters of right-wing populist parties and more general ethnocentric populist parties.

The direction and significance of the variable measuring a respondent's feelings regarding government intervention in economic matters indicates that right-wing populist supporters are suspicious of more government intervention. The result indicates that supporters of right-wing populist parties are not just interested in the ethnocentric rhetoric of these parties; rather, they also line-up with right-wing populist parties on economic preferences too.

Table 5.15 Probability of Supporting a RWP (Variables Held at Means)

	Predicted Probability
Gov. Econ. Intervention (Lowest Value)	27.248%*
Gov. Econ. Intervention (2nd Lowest)	47.615%*
Gov. Econ. Intervention (Median)	49.655%*
Gov. Econ. Intervention (2nd Highest)	43.440%*
Gov. Econ. Intervention (Highest Value)	32.585%*

*Significant at 95%

The results from the predicted probability analysis on Table 5.15 differed from what was seen in other sections. While previous predicted probabilities would consistently move in one direction, increasing consistently, this was not the case with the government economic intervention variable. Instead, the predicted probability increases until reaching the median but then decreases. Because of this distinct relationship, the predicted probabilities of all five values are presented for this variable. Overall, the results differ from what might have been expected given the negative relationship shown in the previous table. The direction of the government intervention in the economy variable indicates support for the idea that right-wing populist supporters may, on average, also be right-wing in their economic stances. However, the results

for the predicted probability indicates that there is an increase of about five percent between the lowest value and the highest value.

Conclusion

The biggest takeaway from the chapter is that there is statistically significant evidence, in both the nine-country model and the four-country model, that outgroup bias was a salient variable only in the post-2012 time period. The results from the four-country model also indicated that there were differences among supporters of the four countries versus the supporters of the nine countries in the post-2012 time period. There is evidence indicating that anti-establishment sentiment, alienation, economic policy, economic satisfaction, education, and authoritarian sentiment, which were significant in the post-2012 time period in the nine-country model, were not significant in the four-country model. This result indicates that the factors driving support in the four countries that saw a decrease in support were less diverse.

For the secondary research question presented for this analysis, there is also some evidence indicating that economic policy was a systematic driving force behind supporting right-wing populist parties. In other words, among supporters of right-wing populist parties, economic principles were an important consideration.

Overall, there is evidence supporting the argument that exogenous shocks can affect support for ethnocentric populists. The next step is to see if the findings in the American case are relatively similar. While there are several differences between the American and Western European cases, on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean ethnocentric populism has gained a stronger foothold in the late 2010s. To see where the two cases overlap and where they differ, the next chapter focuses on conducting analysis on the American case.

Chapter 6: United States Analysis

Introduction

What drove support for an ethnocentric populist candidate in the United States? Are the reasons for voting for the Trump-led GOP different from previous generations of GOP voters? To help answer these questions, this chapter describes populism in the United States, Trump's connection to ethnocentric populism and his rhetoric, and scholarship explaining why Americans voted for Trump. After identifying appropriate variables, the chapter replicates the analysis in the previous chapter.

Populism in the United States

The existence of only two viable parties, the Democratic Party and the Republican Party, has undermined the creation and maintenance of a dedicated populist party in the United States. From an electoral standpoint, the first-past-the-post system for most legislative elections in the country makes challenging the two existing parties difficult (Cox 1997). Early populist challengers such as William Jennings Bryan failed to win the presidency (Judis 2016) and while there have been occasions in which a populist challenger ran under a third party's label in the post-Cold War time frame, such as Ross Perot in 1992 (Tonn and Endress 2001), these attempts ended in losses. Most populist challengers have, instead of creating a populist party, contested the primaries of one of the two major parties. For example, in 1992, Pat Buchanan attempted to challenge incumbent George H.W. Bush during the Republican Party primary season (Judis 2016). The populist presidential candidate Bernie Sanders attempted to win the Democratic Party's presidential nomination in the 2016 election cycle (Groshek and Koc-Michalska 2017).

Speaking specifically to the issue of ethnocentric populism, Trump's adoption of ethnocentrism is not the first instance of such an event in American politics. Elements of

ethnocentric populism can be traced back to the 1800s. In the 1850s, the American Party, also known as the Know-Nothing Party, espoused a nativist platform that specifically targeted "Catholics, immigrants, and unresponsive politicians" (Levine 2001). The party was also the result of work by "the people, not professional politicians" and included many individuals among its support base who were "men outside of politics" (Levine 2001). These descriptions indicate that the Know-Nothing Party was similar to modern day ethnocentric populist parties.

While the Know-Nothing Party would eventually lose relevance (Levine 2001), it was not the last time an ethnocentric populist-style actor became prominent in the United States during the 1800s. In the 1880s, the American Protective Association, like the Know-Nothing Party, espoused anti-Catholicism and anti-Irish sentimenst; members often argued that Catholic immigrants served as economic competition (Fanning 1999). However, the American Protective Association would also fade away from American political life.

The twentieth century also saw tenets of ethnocentric populism being used as a political tool. In the 1930s, Father Charles Coughlin, a priest best known for being a radio host, espoused populist views that targeted establishment actors. His base was composed primarily of working-class Midwesterners who felt like outsiders. Coughlin criticized the increasing role that national-level politicians and bureaucrats were playing in American life. He also saw the banks as an enemy of regular people and was interested in curbing their power through banking and financial reforms (Brinkley 1984).

In addition to targeting the national government and the banks, Coughlin espoused an ethnocentric streak that targeted Jews. Coughlin took pages from the Know-Nothing Party and the American Protective Association playbooks by focusing on a scapegoat. While initially targeting banks, he started to ramp up criticism of Jews and even openly built alliances with

fascists such as Italian dictator Benito Mussolini (Cannistraro and Kovaleff 1971). By the late 1930s, he made targeting Jews a critical component of his radio show and accused Jewish bankers of being war-hungry (Jeansonne 2012).

While Coughlin would quietly retire from the radio business after America went to war against fascists, the “Dixiecrats” continued many of the same ethnocentric traditions espoused by previous actors. Shortly following the end of World War II, upset at policies such as integration, several Southern Democrats opted to break away from the Democratic Party and ran candidates who opposed desegregating blacks and whites (Norrell 1991). While not explicitly against the establishment, as many of its core members were mainstream politicians, one could argue that the Dixiecrats’ rhetoric arguing that the Federal government were interlopers interfering in Southern affairs (Rayback 1954) was an attack on a segment of the establishment.

A few years after the Dixiecrats disappeared from the political scene in 1948, George Wallace adopted anti-establishment sentiment and ethnocentrism in the 1960s. Reflecting the "people vs. elite" narrative of populism, Wallace, running as a candidate for the United States presidency, spoke glowingly of the average working class American and railed against the federal government and big business. Wallace also made clear that he believed in maintaining southern heritage, or the ingroup, and protecting the Southerner’s rights from the encroachment of the federal government (Lee 2006).

One of the last major ethnocentric populist figures before the rise of Trump in 2015 was Pat Buchanan, who employed both ethnocentrism and anti-establishment sentiment. Running as a presidential candidate, Buchanan criticized the government for being indifferent and no longer listening to “the forgotten men and women…of this country” (Weakleim 2001). He, like many of his predecessors, found a target that would stoke ethnocentric sentiment: Immigrants. Buchanan

was particularly interested in cutting immigration levels and even expressed interest in building a fence along the Mexican border to keep out migrants (Judis 2016).

While the names of these actors differed, their core messaging of anti-establishment sentiment and ethnocentrism was very similar. They were suspicious of mainstream politicians whom they believe did not care about the interests of regular Americans. In addition, while their target populations differed, ranging from Irish Catholics, Jews, Blacks, and migrants from south of the U.S. border, they focused their ire on an outsider group while espousing the importance of an insider group.

Ultimately, the rise of Trump was not new but rather the next iteration of a long history of ethnocentric populism. Trump's comments on "draining the swamp" (Quinlan and Tinney 2019) and his calls for shutting down Muslim migration (Judis 2016) are in line with the general anti-establishment rhetoric and ethnocentric views espoused by his predecessors. However, unlike his predecessors, Trump won.

The losing streak endured by populist actors came to an end with the rise of Donald Trump. Although Trump considers himself an "American-First" actor (Judis 2016), his victory should not be seen in isolation from the success of populist actors outside of the United States. Trump's victory occurred in the middle of a rise in ethnocentric populist support in Western Europe; in the 2014-2015 time period when this region experienced a massive exogenous shock due to the large numbers of migrants (Judis 2016). For some Europeans, this was a potentially life-altering event as they feared the possibility of a rise in societal tensions (Karolewski and Benedikter 2017).

On Trump's Rhetoric and Ethnocentric Populism

Is Trump's campaign rhetoric ethnocentric populist? Trump's style differed from previous iterations of Republican political actors. His willingness to call out specific groups such as Mexicans and Muslims veered away from previous Republican candidates who rarely made blatantly racialized appeals in the post-Civil Rights era (Mendleberg 2001). In addition, the Republican Party before Trump was made from career politicians who generally stuck to a rhetorical style emphasizing policy points including free market economics and the importance of the traditional family structure (Hawley 2018). Trump, by contrast, was not afraid to employ rhetoric that emphasized xenophobia and ingroup biases while also criticizing elites.

He criticized politicians as incompetent and insinuated that they should not be called leaders (Montgomery 2017). He gave nicknames to a number of high-profile rivals, who had been considered mainstream politicians, such as "Lyin' Ted" for Senator Ted Cruz, "Low Energy Jeb" for Governor Jeb Bush, and "Crooked Hillary" for Secretary of State Hillary Clinton (Winberg 2017). One of his signature rhetorical points made on the campaign trail involved a phrase in which he invoked the need to "drain the swamp" (Hooghe and Dassonneville 2018). This line was a direct attack at longtime Washington DC-based politicians and bureaucrats who were described as uncaring and corrupt. His attacks on the elites were supplemented by commentary regarding the hardships faced by working class individuals whom he considered the forgotten people of the United States (Montgomery 2017).

These comments showed the disdain that Trump felt towards mainstream politicians. He was able to make these attacks because he successfully portrayed himself as an outsider. Previous Republican presidential candidates had a political background; Mitt Romney served as governor of Massachusetts, John McCain as US Senator, and George W. Bush as governor of

Texas. Trump, before running, had spent his professional life in the business and entertainment world. As a genuine outsider to the political world, his anti-establishment rhetoric held weight.

Trump also utilized rhetoric that could be construed as xenophobic while also ingroup-focused. While Trump made several direct appeals to working class Americans, who constituted his base, and asserted that curbing immigration and globalization were keys to improving the lives of the working class (Montgomery 2017). He also directly attacked specific groups; he stated that illegal migrants of Mexican heritage were “criminals” and “rapists” and called for a complete shutdown of Muslim migration into the United States (Winberg 2017).

It is particularly Trump’s rhetoric targeting specific social groups in which he most strongly resembles ethnocentric populists. The leader of France’s National Front/Rally, Marine Le Pen, made comments that France is fighting a war against Islamism and asserted her desire to close Islamist mosques (Maksic and Ahmic 2020). Geert Wilders of the Freedom Party in the Netherlands also made similar comments targeting Islam as a totalitarian ideology (Vossen 2011). Trump, by specifically calling out Muslims as a group to be banned from the United States, places himself in the tradition of Western European ethnocentric populists.

In addition, Trump has also shown disdain for free trade and invested time on the campaign trail attacking trade policy. In speeches, he attacked international organizations and multilateralism. At various points he called out the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the World Trade Organization (WTO), and NAFTA (North American Free Trade Organization). He also called for protectionist policies and large tariffs to be implemented on economic rivals such as China (Judis 2016; Judis 2018). This indicates that Trump did not support a purely free market system. Instead, he wanted a greater degree of government intervention than traditional Republicans.

Scholarship on Support for Trump

Many scholars have argued that Trump's ability to attract working class Americans was a major key to his electoral success. Specifically examining members of the white working class, Morgan and Lee (2018), using American National Election Studies (ANES) and American Community Surveys, found that a substantial number of white working-class individuals flipped from Obama to Trump in the six states in which Trump managed to win from the Democrats. Examining 73 formal speeches Trump made on the campaign trail, Lamont, Park, and Ayala-Hurtado (2017) noted that he consistently made several different appeals to members of the white working class. He called them victims of globalization and convinced many subgroups within the working class, such as unemployed or underemployed factory workers, waiters/waitresses, and small business owners, that they had no place in the Democratic Party (Berezin 2017).

Closely related to the working-class argument is one of economic anxiety. Mutz (2018) found that after including a number of different controls such as partisanship, most of the economic variables were not significant. However, the trade anxiety variable proved to be the exception and was significant. Morgan (2018) includes several variables such as an economic indicator that asks for a respondent's view on their nation's economy and notes that economic anxiety was a significant predictor. The salience of the economic anxiety argument is also found in research on European populism (Cochrane and Nevitte 2014; Georgiadou et al. 2018; Rydgren and Ruth 2011).

Others have noted that Trump's willingness to use simple language played a role in his ability to garner support. Ganzach et al. (2019) found a relationship between verbal ability and voting for Trump. Using data from the ANES, they noted that higher verbal ability was a

negative predictor for supporting Trump, but not for Romney. Kayam (2018) noted that Trump's word choice on the campaign trail allowed those who had a fourth or fifth grade education to comprehend him while most of his rivals preferred using ninth-grade level language and longer and more complex sentences. This language argument has some parallels with the education argument seen in discussions on support for European populists (Werts et al. 2013).

Trump's ability to draw support among religious individuals, particularly evangelicals, has also attracted attention. Gorski (2017) noted that Trump's willingness to take a pro-life position during the electoral campaign helped assuage fears held by evangelicals about supporting him. The author also noted that Hillary Clinton's support of abortion rights and Planned Parenthood made it difficult for evangelicals to vote for her. Further aiding Trump's case with the evangelical community was his active attempts to present himself as a defender of Christian heritage. He openly discussed his own Protestant heritage, quoted the Bible while on the campaign trail, and gave speeches at Christian higher education institutions such as Liberty University and Oral Roberts University (Whitehead et al. 2018). The willingness of evangelicals to support Trump represents a major difference between religious individuals in Western Europe and those in the United States as religiosity tends to dampen support for ethnocentric populists. Instead, the American Evangelical community's willingness to support Trump is more in line with Eastern European religious individuals who have shown no hesitation in supporting such actors (Allen 2017).

Another camp emphasized a racial threat/status threat argument which outlined Trump's ability to attract those who felt uncomfortable with immigration and minorities. These include several related arguments which use a racial resentment line of reasoning and/or status threat as an explanation for support. The racial resentment argument, which uses questions related to how

individuals feel about Blacks, has been used as an explanation for Trump's success. Those who feel more racial resentment were also driven to support Trump and this result is reflected among both white men and women (Tien 2017).

Also drawing strong attention from the scholarship was the argument related to status threat. This feeling of status threat is believed to particularly affect white Americans, the dominant ethnic/racial group in the United States, due to the coming demographic change in the United States where white Americans are projected to be a minority (Mutz 2018). Suspicion towards outsiders was a critical factor behind Trump support with 2016 ANES Pilot Study indicating that Trump supporters during the primaries were three times more likely than those who favored Marco Rubio or Jeb Bush to prefer cutting immigration (Donovan and Redlawsk 2018). Major et al. (2018) also noted that higher feelings of status threat led to an increased probability of support for Trump.

Special focus has been given towards explaining a relationship between negative feelings towards Muslims and support for Trump. Braunstein (2017) noted that Trump's casting of Muslims as outsiders was an important part of his campaign strategy; for example, Trump recounted a story where he claimed that he saw thousands of Muslims in the U.S. celebrating 9/11 and blamed the Muslim community for not doing enough to prevent domestic terror attacks such as the June 2016 Orlando Nightclub Shooting. Lajevardi and Oskooii (2018) and Lajevardi and Abrajano (2019) also found evidence that negative feelings towards Muslims were an important predictor of support for Trump. Overall, this argument focusing on racialized anxieties and status threat are reflected among scholars who argued that fears over immigration was a major driver of support for populist actors in Europe (Dinas and van Spanje 2011; Ford and Goodwin 2010; Hangartner et al. 2019).

Some scholars discussed a strong link between authoritarian tendencies and support for Trump. MacWilliam (2016) noted that authoritarian tendencies, measured by using questions on child-rearing meant to estimate a desire for more stability (Hetherington and Weiler 2009), also proved to be a significant predictor for preferring Trump; this result was not seen among those who preferred Republican presidential candidate supporters in the 1992-2012 time period (MacWilliam 2016). In an analysis using the 2016 American National Election Study, Smith and Hanley (2018) found that authority variables are significant. Ultimately, Trump supporters wanted a dominant leader who would be willing to defeat those considered to be the enemy, such as feminists and liberals (Smith 2019). Similar links between authoritarian values and populists have been found in Europe as well (Eke and Kuzio 2000; McCarthy 2019; Norris and Inglehart 2019).

Sexist attitudes, measured through indirect questions such as how much discrimination was faced by women (Kuklinski et al. 1997) also appear to have played a role in support for Trump; those who held more sexist attitudes appeared to be more willing to support Trump (Frasure-Yokley 2018; Ratliff et al. 2018; Setzler and Yanus 2018). These results appear to hold even after controlling for competing explanations such as authoritarian values and partisanship (Valentino et al. 2018). However, Georgeac et al. (2019) find mixed results in their analysis. They note that while there is evidence of greater sexist attitudes among Trump supporters in post-election survey data, there is no statistically significant evidence in pre-election data. There is also similar work done in the European context where scholars have noted women, on average, have been less willing to support populists (Harteveld et al. 2015; Rashkova and Zankina 2017; Spierings and Zaslove 2015).

Finding Variables: Congruous ESS Variables in the ANES

Finding analogous variables to replicate the European study was difficult. Where a non-analogous variable is used, the most important priority is finding a question that still measures the general sentiment of the concept. In addition to these considerations, just like with the ESS, the frequency in which a question appears is also an important determinant on whether it is chosen to be a part of the analysis. Ideally, a question should appear over the entire course of the ANES, but this is not always the case with many of the dataset's questions being added over time. There is also the consideration regarding the number of respondents who answered a question. Ideally the final analysis should have a relatively large number of respondents. There are 59,944 total respondents in the cumulative 1948-2016 ANES data file and the hope is that a large number of them will be available for the final analysis.

One of the key control variables in the European analysis, Euroskepticism, represented by a question on trust in the European Parliament, is not relevant to the American analysis. Because of its lack of salience on the American side, and also because the ANES does not ask a question related to the European project, a Euroskepticism variable is not used for the American analysis.

The variable used for anti-establishment sentiment in the American model differed from the one used in the European models because of data issues. One of populism's central tenets is anti-establishment sentiment or a feeling that politicians are uncaring and/or corrupt; in this point of view, the longtime establishment and regular individuals are in conflict with one another (Judis 2016; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017). In the ESS, there is a ten-point "trust in politicians" question. In the cumulative ANES, there is no equivalent question. However, there was a question about whether the government is crooked. Unfortunately, this question was discontinued following the 2012 ANES. A potentially analogous question is one on government

responsiveness. The question is on a 100-point scale from Least responsive (0) to Most responsive (100). This variable was reversed so that higher numbers would indicate more anti-establishment sentiment. This question serves as a proxy indicator for anti-establishment sentiment as a key tenet of populism is that those in charge are uncaring and/or incompetent (Judis 2016; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017). In addition, the question has a relatively long history in the ANES with it being first asked in 1964. Because of these factors, this question was included.

The variable for alienation in the American model differed from the one used in the European models because of data issues. There was some evidence indicating that those who felt alienated from society, or felt that they were not an integral part of society, were more willing to support outsiders like populists (Oesch 2008). To capture this alienation aspect of populism, the ESS analysis used a ten-point scale question on how satisfied an individual was with life as a whole. In the ANES, an analogous question asks whether respondents are satisfied with their life on a five-point scale, with responses ranging from Extremely satisfied (1) through Not satisfied at all (5). Unfortunately, this question is only available from 2008 onward.

Instead, a question on whether people like the respondent have any say in what the government does is used to measure alienation. This is an ordinal variable that has the potential responses of agree (1), disagree (2) and neither agree nor disagree (3). In the analysis, it has been recoded so that the responses range from 1-agree, 2-neither agree nor disagree (which was first used in 1988), and 3-disagree. While it differs from the ESS question, this item still measures a general feeling of detachment from the mainstream; those who feel like that they have no say are probably more likely to feel isolated. In addition, this question also has a relatively long history of usage with first appearance occurring in 1952.

The variable used for economic policy in the American model is similar to the one used in the European models. To measure where respondents stood on economic policy, the ESS analysis uses a question about the respondent's beliefs that the government should reduce differences in income levels with the responses (with responses ranging from 1-Agree strongly through 5-Disagree strongly). An analogous question in the ANES asks respondents what they think about guaranteed jobs and income. It is an ordinal variable in which 1 represents a belief that the government should see to jobs and a good standard of living while 7 indicates that the government should let each person get ahead on his or her own. This variable, like the one used in the ESS, attempts to measure how a respondent feels about the government intervening in economic matters. It has also been asked continuously in the ANES since 1972.

The variable used for economic satisfaction (anxiety) in the American model is similar to the one used in in the European models. Like this ordinal variable in the ESS, the ANES has a similar question that asks respondents how much better or worse the economy has been in the past year. The potential responses are much better (1), somewhat better (2), stayed same (3), somewhat worse (4), and much worse (5). Just like its ESS counterpart, the ANES question measures how individuals feel about the economy and in particular measures whether they feel hopeful or not. In addition, the question also has a long history as it was first asked in the 1980 ANES.

The variable used for education in the American model is also similar in principle to the one used in the European models. For education, the ESS used international standards of education. In the cumulative ANES, there are several different education variables with four, six, and seven category variables available. The seven-category ordinal variable, which has the potential responses of: 1-8th grade or less; 9-12th grade, no diploma; 12th grade, diploma or

equivalency; 12th grade diploma or equivalency plus non-academic; some college, no degree; junior/community college; BA level degrees; and Advanced degrees including LLB. This seven-category variable was chosen because it provided more descriptive power then its counterparts. In addition, it is a longstanding variable available since 1952.

The female variable is identical in both data sets. Starting in the 2016 ANES respondents were able to answer Other. While there is an argument for incorporating gender fluidity and seeing gender as a spectrum in a gender variable, for simplicity's sake the analysis is limited to respondents who answered male and female. This question has also been variable since the very start of the ANES.

The variable used to capture religiosity in the American model is similar to the one used in the European models. In the ANES, there is an ordinal variable on how much guidance one receives from religion. Respondents are given the choice of: Some guidance (1), Quite a bit (2), A great deal (3), and Religion not important. For the actual analysis, the coding was reworked so that there is more order to it. Religion not important was moved to be coded as zero while Some, Quite a bit, and A great deal stayed the same. This question also has a relatively long history with it being first asked in the ANES in 1980.

The variable used for self-placement in the American model differed from the one used in the European models because of data issues. The left-right scale in the ESS is a respondent placement on a ten-point scale. In the ANES, the same variable exists but it was discontinued before the 2016 ANES. However, a similar variable exists on the liberal-conservative scale. The potential responses an individual could give are 1-Extremely liberal, 2-Liberal, 3-Slightly liberal, 4-Moderate, middle of the road, 5-Slightly conservative, 6-Conservative, and 7-Extremely conservative. While the terms liberal and conservative differ from left and right, they present a

spectrum in which those on the left favor more government intervention to bring about changes (Devos et al. 2002) while those on the right generally oppose more intervention to bring about change (Jost et al. 2003; Thorisdottir et al. 2007). The variable is also available from 1972 and so has a long history in the ANES.

The variable used for authoritarianism in the American model differed from the one used in the European models because a similar question did not exist. Authoritarianism within the context of the American political system does not necessarily refer to an all-powerful dictator. Rather, it refers to personality traits that seek order and stability (Oliver and Rahn 2016) along with a desire for a strongman leader who can bring about that stability (Mather and Jefferson 2016). While child-rearing questions have been used to measure authoritarianism (Smith and Hanley 2018), for the purposes of this project, questions that measures a desire for stability are used because they better approximate the research done in Europe (Eke and Kuzio 2000; McCarthy 2019; Norris and Inglehart 2019). Within the ANES, respondents are asked whether they believe that federal spending for dealing with crime should be 1-increased, 2-same, or 3-decreased (which was, before 2012, an alternative choice of "cut out"). This question is also available for a long span of the ANES's lifespan with it first being asked in 1984.

Aside from finding analogous variables, there also needs to be some consideration for the distinctness of the American case. When Trump took over the Republican Party in 2016, he gained control over an organization that had maintained a long history with a distinct identity. In this regard, the success of ethnocentric populism in the American context differed from that of Western Europe. On the other side of the Atlantic, dedicated ethnocentric populist parties had existed for decades. However, in the United States, an ethnocentric populist outsider took control over an existing party. This leads to the potential question of whether there was a complete

turnover in what might be driving support for the Republican Party. Two items in particular, partisanship and racial resentment, appear to be good explanations for support for the Republican Party.

For decades, American politics scholars have argued that partisanship is a good explanation for supporting a specific political party (Campbell et al. 1960). Particularly for those who are not politically engaged at all times, partisanship can be useful as a quick and simple heuristic (Zaller 1992) for choosing which party to select on the ballot. Within the context of the ESS, there is no comparable variable and ultimately one was not included in the European analysis. However, because this analysis is focused on votes for the Republican Party, a partisanship control variable is more feasible and is also included for the analysis. In the ANES, respondents are asked about their party identification. It is a seven-point scale that runs from 1-Strong Democrat, 2-Weak Democrat, 3-Independent-Democrat, 4-Independent-Independent, 5-Independent-Republican, 6-Weak Republican, and 7-Strong Republican. This question also has a very long history in the ANES with it first being asked in 1952.

In addition to partisanship, there also appears to be some evidence indicating, particularly in the Obama years, that racial resentment may have been playing a role in votes for Republican presidential candidates (Tesler 2016). Among some on the American right, the rise in the political and social influence of certain groups has been met with suspicion (Henderson and Hillygus 2011; Knuckey 2011; Mendleberg 2001; Zelizer 2010). Attempting to capture racial resentment, however, is a complicated task. Because of social desirability bias which makes it difficult for individuals to outright disclose views on race, several scholars have developed more indirect ways of measuring racial resentment (Kuklinski et al. 1997; Mendleberg 2001). Instead

of asking questions such as whether a respondent believes one race is better or superior to another, the ANES has a number of racial resentment questions that capture these sentiments.

While the ESS analysis would have been better served with the inclusion of a similar variable, unfortunately the ESS does not have a comparable variable. The ANES has several racial resentment questions which serve the same purpose. Unfortunately, many of these questions are not available in the 1996 ANES. One question that is available in the entirety of the post-Cold War time period is a seven-point hardworking-lazy scale placement for Blacks in which 1 is hard working and 7 is lazy. This question was first asked in the 1992 ANES and is available in all presidential year ANES waves.

The next step is to examine the variables related to exogenous shocks. Exogenous shocks caused by the Migrant Crisis in Europe and Immigrant Crisis in the United States affected support for populists; in the case of the United States, that would be Trump. As migration levels had increased substantially on both sides of the Atlantic during the crises, the argument is that fear over losing one's dominant status to these newcomers is driving support for ethnocentric populist actors while also increasing ingroup salience and outgroup biases (Morgan 2018). These three sentiments should be powerful drivers in the immediate years following the crises but perhaps not so in the years preceding the crises.

To start, status threat is related to a feeling that one is being displaced and losing one's dominant place in society (Morgan 2018). The ANES had a question that lined up well with the general feeling of status threat which asked respondents how likely was it that immigration levels would take jobs away from people. Unfortunately, the cumulative ANES does not questions that are similar to the ESS question used in the previous chapter; in other words, nothing that directly asks about immigrants serving as a form of competition. However, a question asks respondents

about their tolerance of different moral standards which ranges from 1-Agree strongly, 2-Agree somewhat, 3-Neither agree nor disagree, 4-Disagree somewhat, 5-Disagree strongly, and 8-DK. This question measures the general sentiment of status threat because it asks respondents whether they are willing to accept different individuals and not see them as a potential threat. In addition, many immigrants would also potentially hold different moral standards as they hail from different countries. Because this question measures the general suspicion one might have of outsiders, it is used as the status threat variable for the ANES analysis. Those who responded DK have been recoded as missing.

Beyond status threat, the theory outlines that increased outgroup bias could lead to more support for ethnocentric populists. This indicates that suspicion towards outsiders should grow immediately after the exogenous crises that Western Europe and the United States experienced. Finding appropriate variables to measure outgroup bias and ingroup salience in the ESS was difficult; the cumulative ANES unfortunately does not have variables which are a close match to the ones used in the ESS. However, there are variables available which provide measurements for the general spirit of ingroup salience and outgroup bias.

For both the ESS and the ANES, similar questions exist that can be used for the outgroup bias variable. For outgroup bias, in the ESS analysis, a question asking respondents whether they would allow many/few immigrants of different race/ethnic group as the majority: 1-Allow many to come and live here, 4-Allow none, was used. The ANES has an analogous question asking about immigration where respondents are asked whether they believe the number of immigrants to the U.S. should be increased or decreased. The potential answers are 1-Increased, 3-Same as Now, 5-Decreased.

Similar questions were available for the ingroup salience variable in both the ESS and ANES. In the ANES, there is a fairly similar question to the one posed in the ESS. It asks individuals whether there should be more emphasis on traditional values. The responses range from 1-Agree strongly, 2-Agree somewhat, 3-Neither agree nor disagree, 4-Disagree somewhat, 5-Disagree strongly, and 8-DK. Respondents who answered DK were recoded as missing.

Because the importance of demarcating when the exogenous shock occurs, a time dummy is needed. In the European analysis the year variable was originally titled by ESS Round with the data from rounds taking place in 2014 and beyond coded as one and all other data as zero. For the ANES, data from the 1992-2016 time period is used as the variables needed for this analysis only span that time period. Data taken before the Immigration Crisis of 2014-15 is coded as zero while the data from the 2016 ANES is coded as one. Table 6.1 below summarizes the ESS variables and the analogous ANES variables that will be used for the logistic regression.

Table 6.1: List of ESS Variables Along with Analogous ANES Variables

ESS Variable	ANES Variable
(Status Threat) Country's Cultural Life Undermined or Enriched by Immigrants: 0-Cultural Life Undermined, 10-Cultural Life Enriched	(Status Threat) Tolerance of Different Moral Standards: 1-Agree strongly, 2-Agree somewhat, 3-Neither agree nor disagree, 4-Disagree somewhat, 5-Disagree strongly
(Ingroup Salience) Important to Follow Traditions and Customs: 1-Not like me at all, 6-Very much like me	(Ingroup Salience) Should be More Emphasis on Traditional Values 1-Agree strongly, 2-Agree somewhat, 3-Neither agree nor disagree, 4-Disagree somewhat, 5-Disagree strongly
(Outgroup Bias) Allow many/few immigrants of different race/ethnic group as majority: 1-Allow many to come and live here, 4-Allow none	(Outgroup Bias) Increase or Decrease Number of Immigrants to U.S. 1-Increased, 3-Same as Now, 5-Decreased
(Year) 0-All Years Before 2014, 1-2014 and After	(Year) 0-All Years Before 2016, 1-2016
(Euroskepticism) Trust in the European Parliament: 0 No Trust at All, 10-Complete Trust	None as Euroskepticism not Salient in United States

(Anti-Establishment) Trust in Politicians: 0-No Trust at All, 10-Complete Trust	(Anti-Establishment) Government Responsiveness Index: 0-Least Responsive, 100 Most Responsive
(Alienation) How Satisfied with Life as a Whole: 0-Extremely Satisfied, 10-Extremely Dissatisfied	(Alienation) How Satisfied is Respondent with Life: 1-Extremely Satisfied, 2-Very Satisfied, 3-Moderately Satisfied, 4-Slightly Satisfied, 5-Not Satisfied at All
(Economic Anxiety) How Satisfied with Present State of Economy in Country: 0-Extremely Satisfied, 10-Extremely Dissatisfied	(Economic Anxiety) How Much Better or Worse Economy in Past Year: 1-Much Better, 2-Somewhat Better, 3-Stayed Same, 4-Somewhat Worse, 5-Much Worse
(Education) Highest Level of Education: 1-ES-ISCED I, 2-ES-ISCED II, 3-ES-ISCED IIIb, 4-ES-ISCED IIIa, 5-ES-ISCED IV, 6-ES-ISCED V1, 7-ES-ISCED V2	(Education) Highest Level of Education: Collapsed to 1-Less than High School 2-High School Graduate, 3-Some College, 4-Associate Degree, 5-Bachelor's Degree, 6-Anything Above a Bachelor's Degree
(Female) Gender: Recoded to 0-Male, 1-Female	(Female) Respondent-Gender: Recoded to 0-Male, 1-Female
(Religiosity) How Religious are You: 0-Not at all Religious, 10-Very Religious	(Religiosity) How Much Guidance from Religion: 0-Religion not important, 1-Some, 2-Quite a bit, 3-A great deal
(Authoritarian Values) Important that Government is Strong and Ensures Safety: 1-Not Like Me at All, 2-Not Like Me 3-A Little Like Me, 4-Somewhat Like Me, 5-Like Me, 6-Very Much Like Me	(Authoritarian Values) Federal Spending-Dealing with Crime 1-Decreased (before 2012: or cut out), 2-Same, 3-Increased
None as No Comparable Variable Available	(Partisanship) Party Identification of Respondent-7-point scale: 1-Strong Democrat, 2-Weak Democrat, 3-Independent-Democrat, 4-Independent, 5-Independent-Republican, 6-Weak Republican, 7-Strong Republican
(Ideology) Placement on left right scale: 0-left, 10-right	(Ideology) Liberal-Conservative Scale: 1-Extremely liberal, 2-Liberal, 3-Slightly liberal, 4-Moderate, middle of the road, 5-Slightly conservative, 6-Conservative, 7-Extremely conservative
None as No Comparable Variable Available	(Racial Resentment) Hardworking-lazy (7pt) scale placement for blacks (1 Hard-working, 7-Lazy)

Analysis

Along with the shock caused by the Immigration crisis of 2014-2015, Trump's more direct overtures towards increasing the salience of status threat, ingroup salience, and outgroup bias could potentially create a situation in which this exogenous shock continued to be in the minds of many Americans even in 2016. In other words, it is possible that pre-Trump Republican voters may not have considered these variables when voting but started to do so in the Trump era. These observations lead to the following hypotheses.

H1: On average, the coefficient for status threat should be larger in 2016 than in the pre-2016 time period.

H2: On average, the coefficient for ingroup salience should be larger in 2016 than in the pre-2016 time period.

H3: On average, the coefficient for outgroup bias should be larger in 2016 than in the pre-2016 time period.

Difference of Means Tests

This section conducts difference of means tests related to ideas and policy positions relevant to ethnocentric populists to see if respondents believed in ethnocentric populist ideas before the rise of Trump. To do this, this subsection will first discuss which individuals are a part of the analysis, the variables which will be examined, and then the relevant time period before conducting the actual analysis. An important question is whether those who supported the Republican Party in the pre-Trump era differ from the post-Trump era. In the ANES, those who are included in this analysis are respondents who in the question of party identification answered that they are either independent-Republican, weak Republican, or Strong Republican recorded as Republican while all other individuals were grouped together.

The next step is establishing which variables are relevant for the analysis. Within the ANES there are a few variables which have been highlighted in the previous section which could

be useful as a way to track ethnocentric populist sentiments through time. Regarding populism's key conflict between the people and elites, the ANES's question on government responsiveness (0-Least responsive, 25, 50, 75, and 100-Most responsive) is used. The ethnocentric element can be captured by the status threat, ingroup salience, and outgroup bias variables. The status threat variable related to immigration goes from 1-increased, 3-same as now, and 5-decreased. The ingroup and outgroup variables, or the white and the Hispanic variables respectively, are also used in their original 100-point scales to provide more descriptive power.

Additional variables could also be useful to look at broader trends. For example, an economic policy question is also introduced as Trump broke with his Republican predecessors by deemphasizing free market policies and calling for more government intervention through increased tariffs. To measure how Republicans and leaners feel about economic policy, the ANES's question on guaranteed jobs and income scale (1-government see to job and good standards of living, 7-government left each person get ahead on his own) is used. In addition, because of the strong salience of race and ethnicity as part of this analysis, this section uses the same question as highlighted in the variables section which asks whether Blacks have gotten less than they deserve over the past few years.

The variables which will be used for the difference of means tests first appeared in the ANES during different time periods. However, it may be more instructive to only look at the same 1992-2016 time periods for all the different tests as this is the time period of interest for the logistic regression analysis.

Finally, the results seek to answer the following questions: Are there any noticeable difference between Republicans and non-Republicans during the 1992-2016 time period? Is there any indication that those closer to the Republican Party were trending towards positions that

indicating an openness towards ethnocentric populism? These questions are of particular interest as there had been a debate regarding just how polarized the American public is in the 21st century (Fiorina et al 2008). Here, one might be able to extend the question towards whether white Americans are increasingly becoming polarized on questions related to ethnocentric populism.

Table 6.2: Anti-Establishment Sentiment

Year	N-GOP Median (Observations in Parentheses)	GOP Median (Observations in Parentheses)	Difference Degrees of Freedom/Z-Score Significance
1992	45.149 (1,376)	43.935 (845)	+1.214 t(2219)= 1.042 P>|t|=0.2976
1996	43.4 (928)	45.516 (591)	-2.116 t(1517)= -1.412 P>|t|=0.1582
2000	42.543 (932)	41.240 (605)	+1.303 t(1535)= 0.903 P>|t|=0.367
2004	45.511 (607)	30.769 (442)	+14.741 t(1047)=9.490 P>|t|=0.000*
2008	31.091 (1,457)	34.193 (601)	-3.102 t(2056)= -1.868 P>|t|=0.062
2012	45.897 (3,875)	46.715 (1,994)	-0.818 t(5867)= -0.837 P>|t|=0.403
2016	48.208 (2,511)	51.101 (1,726)	-2.893 t(4235)= -2.537 P>|t|=0.011*

*Significant at 95% Level

The results for the difference of means tests for the anti-establishment sentiment variable are shown on table 6.2. The anti-establishment sentiment variable is a Government Responsiveness Index in which zero indicates "Most responsive" and one hundred "Least responsive." Through much of the pre-2016 time period, with the exception of 2004, there is no statistically significant evidence of a major difference. The changes in 2004 may be the result of the contentious nature of the Iraq War; Republicans may have felt a strong desire to support the government's war efforts while Democrats may have felt that the government was making a mistake. However, beyond that time period, Republicans and non-Republicans, on average, appear to feel about the same way about government responsiveness through the pre-Immigration Crisis time period: Feelings are lukewarm towards the government.

By 2016, the situation has changed with both groups, on average, exhibiting their respective group's highest level of anti-establishment sentiment in the time period examined in this analysis. During the primary stage, both sides saw the rise of staunchly populist candidates with Bernie Sanders running as a Democrat and Donald Trump as a Republican (Judis 2016). Perhaps owing to the anti-establishment mood of supporters in both parties, Sanders in the primary stage nearly defeating former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Trump not only defeated his Republican rivals but also won the presidency.

An analogous result was also presented using ESS data. In Western Europe, among both populists and non-populists, scores started to trend downwards, among both supporters of non-ethnocentric populist parties and ethnocentric populist parties. Overall, on both sides of the Atlantic, evaluations of the government indicated that there was mounting dissatisfaction by individuals across the political spectrum. Such an environment would give populist actors a chance to present their case as outsiders.

Table 6.3: Status Threat

Year	N-GOP Median (Observations in Parentheses)	GOP Median (Observations in Parentheses)	Difference Degrees of Freedom/Z-Score Significance
1992	2.357 (1,374)	2.937 (844)	-0.581 t(2216)= -10.773 P>|t|=0.000*
1996	2.305 (927)	3.107 (588)	-0.802 t(1513)= -13.279 P>|t|=0.000*
2000	2.282 (933)	2.752 (601)	-0.470 t(1532)= -7.348 P>|t|=0.000*
2004	2.198 (605)	2.715 (442)	-0.517 t(1045)= -7.356 P>|t|=0.000*
2008	2.216 (1,456)	2.737 (601)	-0.521 t(2055)= -9.093 P>|t|=0.000*
2012	2.267 (3,622)	2.999 (1,854)	-0.732 t(5474)= -22.738 P>|t|=0.000*
2016	2.129 (2,137)	2.825 (1,478)	-0.696 t(3613)= -18.112 P>|t|=0.000*

*Significant at 95% Level

The results for the difference of means tests for the status threat variable are shown on table 6.3. The question asked respondents about their tolerance of different moral standards with the potential responses ranging from 1-Agree strongly, 2-Agree somewhat, 3-Neither agree nor disagree, 4-Disagree somewhat, and 5-Disagree strongly. The results from the entire time period indicate that there are strong differences, on average, between the two groups. For every year,

Republican supporters on average gave higher scores than their non-Republican counterparts. Such a result indicates that Republican supporters are, on average, less willing to accept those who live differently. An ethnocentric populist-style candidate's message would be received more readily among Republican supporters under these conditions.

While it is clear from the data that an ethnocentric populist candidate would find a more receptive audience in the Republican Party's support base, there is no evidence indicating that those in the party were becoming less tolerant by 2016. On the other hand, those who support the Democratic Party and those who considered themselves independents had the lowest average in 2016. Overall, the result indicates that there was a consistently strong gap between the two group of supporters through the entire time period.

The strong gap between Republican supporters and non-Republican supporters in the 1992-2016 time period mirrors the results seen among ethnocentric populist supporters and non-ethnocentric populist supporters. In Western Europe, the two types of supporters showed clear gaps in how much status threat they felt with ethnocentric populist supporters, on average, feeling more status threat.

Table 6.4: Ingroup Salience

Year	N-GOP Median (Observations in Parentheses)	GOP Median (Observations in Parentheses)	Difference Degrees of Freedom/Z-Score Significance
1992	4.049 (1,377)	4.365 (843)	-0.317 t(2218)= -7.300 P>|t|=0.000*
1996	4.132 (927)	4.485 (590)	-0.353 t(1515)= -7.263 P>|t|=0.000*
2000	4.167 (932)	4.547 (605)	-0.380 t(1535)= -7.552 P>|t|=0.000*

2004	4.387 (607)	3.717 (442)	-0.670 t(1047)= -9.604 P>|t|=0.000*
2008	3.887 (1,457)	4.319 (602)	-0.432 t(2057)= -8.148 P>|t|=0.000*
2012	3.574 (3,617)	4.290 (1,855)	-0.716 t(5470)= -21.961 P>|t|=0.000*
2016	3.283 (2,139)	4.188 (1,480)	-0.905 t(3617)=-22.481 P>|t|=0.000*

*Significant at 95% Level

The results for the difference of means tests for the ingroup salience variable are shown on table 6.4. Respondents were asked if there "Should be More Emphasis on Traditional Values" with the potential answers ranging from 1-Disagree strongly to 5-Agree strongly. The results indicate that for the entire time period, there is a statistically significant difference between the two groups. In addition, except for a slight respite in 2008, the two groups are moving in opposite directions from one another. Those who identify as Republican supporters are increasingly closer to stating that they agree strongly that that there should be more emphasis on traditional values while non-Republican supporters are moving the opposite direction. There also appears to be a growing gap between the two groups with the difference the highest in 2016.

The Republican Party's support base moving towards greater ingroup salience is like what was seen among ethnocentric populist party supporters in the ESS analysis. In the previous chapter, the results indicated that ethnocentric populist party supporters were increasingly feeling greater ingroup salience than their non-ethnocentric populist party supporters. On both sides of

the Atlantic, there is at least one group of supporters that have moved towards feeling more ingroup salience.

Table 6.5: Outgroup Bias

Year	N-GOP Median (Observations in Parentheses)	GOP Median (Observations in Parentheses)	Difference Degrees of Freedom/Z-Score Significance
1992	3.773	3.885	-0.113
	(1,341)	(818)	t(2157)= -2.002
			P>|t|=0.045*
1996	4.007	4.111	-0.103
	(914)	(582)	t(1494)= -1.637
			P>|t|=0.102
2000	3.631	3.827	-0.196
	(1,072)	(658)	t(1728)= -3.040
			P>|t|=0.002*
2004	3.675	3.820	-0.146
	(593)	(439)	t(1030)= -1.751
			P>|t|=0.080
2008	3.557	3.621	-0.064
	(1,430)	(596)	t(2024)= -0.932
			P>|t|=0.351
2012	3.446	3.804	-0.358
	(3,545)	(1,827)	t(5370)
			P>|t|=0.000*
2016	3.180	4.203	-1.023
	(2,129)	(1,476)	t(3603)
			P>|t|=0.000*

*Significant at 95% Level

The results for the difference of means tests for outgroup bias variable are shown on table 6.5. The question on immigration gave respondents the potential options to respond either 1-Increased, 3-Same as now, or 5-Decreased. Although supporters of the Republican Party on

average gave higher scores than their non-Republican supporting counterparts, for much of the time period examined here, there is no statistically significant difference between the two groups except for data from 2000.

However, there is evidence of a growing divergence between the two groups by the 2010s. The 2012 and 2016 analysis indicate that the two groups are moving in opposite directions. Republican supporters are, on average, moving closer to wanting immigration decreased, or feeling more outgroup bias, while their non-Republican supporting counterparts are moving closer to stating that they want immigration levels kept the same. Notably, non-Republican supporters recorded their lowest averages during this time period; in other words, those who did not support the Republican Party seem to feel less outgroup bias as time passes.

Of note is that the gap between the two groups started to grow before Trump announced his candidacy; 2012 showed evidence of a significant gap. This result perhaps provides some evidence that by the time Trump announced his candidacy in 2015, supporters of the Republican Party were already starting to adopt more hardline stances on immigration. If this is the case, then rather than activating latent feelings on immigration that were not active prior to the 2016 election cycle, it appears that Trump was taking advantage of an already occurring change among Republican Party supporters.

The results from the data using American respondents differ from Western European respondents. Among non-ethnocentric populist supporters and ethnocentric populist supporters, there was clear evidence of a statistically significant difference between the two groups through the entire 2002-2012 time period. However, in the United States, there was no evidence of a significant difference between the two groups until the 2010s.

Table 6.6: Gov. Econ. Intervention

Year	N-GOP Median (Observations in Parentheses)	GOP Median (Observations in Parentheses)	Difference Degrees of Freedom/Z-Score Significance
1992	4.105 (1,316)	3.043 (839)	+1.062 t(2153)= 14.003 P>|t|=0.000*
1996	4.018 (935)	2.807 (611)	+1.211 t(1544)=14.265 P>|t|=0.000*
2000	3.733 (565)	2.745 (337)	+0.988 t(900)=8.496 P>|t|=0.000*
2004	4.371 (645)	2.980 (445)	+1.391 t(1088)=13.000 P>|t|=0.000*
2008	4.487 (714)	2.957 (299)	+1.531 t(1011)=12.259 P>|t|=0.000*
2012	4.396 (3,563)	2.744 (1,896)	+1.652 t(5457)=34.961 P>|t|=0.000*
2016	4.390 (2,183)	2.769 (1,577)	+1.621 t(3758)=30.196 P>|t|=0.000*

*Significant at 95% Level

The results for the difference of means tests for the economic variable are shown on table 6.6. A guaranteed jobs and income scale, which ran from 1-Government let each person get ahead on his own to 7-Government let each person get ahead on his own, served as an economic policy variable. The analysis indicates a consistent gap between the two groups. On average,

supporters of the Republican Party are consistently more suspicious of more government intervention in the economy.

The overall lack of a shift among Republicans in their stance regarding government intervention in economic matters makes Trump's messaging on economic matters interesting. Unlike previous mainstream Republican politicians who preferred less government intervention in economic matters (Hawley 2017), Trump argued for more government intervention in economic matters; in particular he was very forceful in stating that the United States should impose protectionist measures, such as tariffs, to better protect the American worker, pull out of free trade agreements, and calling for more infrastructure spending (Judis 2016). While it may be the case that Republicans in 2016 may have become more receptive of specific interventionist policies, there is no evidence indicating that these individuals have become more receptive to more government intervention as a whole.

In Western Europe, there was less evidence indicating a strong difference between ethnocentric populists and non-ethnocentric populists on the question of government intervention in the economy. While there was evidence of a difference in the 2000s, with non-populist supporters more likely to prefer more intervention, for much of the 2010s, there was no evidence of a statistically significant difference between the two groups.

Table 6.7: Racial Resentment

Year	N-GOP Median (Observations in Parentheses)	GOP Median (Observations in Parentheses)	Difference Degrees of Freedom/Z-Score Significance
1992	4.008 (1,324)	4.176 (818)	-0.168 t(2140)= -2.972 P>|t|= 0.003*
1996	3.821 (900)	4.194 (571)	-0.373 t(1469)= -5.674 P>|t|= 0.000*

2000	3.931 (900)	4.140 (592)	-0.209 t(1490)= -3.144 P>|t|=0.001*
2004	3.818 (593)	4.032 (440)	-0.214 t(1031)= -2.918 P>|t|=0.004*
2008	3.623 (1,584)	4.232 (630)	-0.609 t(2212)= -8.214 P>|t|=0.000*
2012	3.631 (3,608)	4.179 (1,851)	-0.549 t(5457)= -13.489 P>|t|=0.000*
2016	3.611 (2,093)	4.171 (1,459)	-0.560 t(3550)= -11.770 P>|t|=0.000*

*Significant at 95% Level

The results for the difference of means tests for the racial resentment variable are shown on table 6.7. The variable uses a seven-point scale which asked respondents to place blacks on how hardworking they are, with 1 meaning hard working and 7 meaning lazy served as a racial resentment indicator. Just like the economic question, there is a statistically significant difference between the groups for each time period. Republican supporters gave, on average, higher scores than their counterparts. The average score decreased for non-Republican respondents over time, increasing the gap between the two groups. Like on the question on immigration that measured outgroup bias, the data indicates that in the 1992-2016 time period, the two sides started to diverge. For the most part, the average scores for those in the Republican camp slightly decreased from 2008-2016 while the scores in the non-Republican camp continued to move in the opposite direction.

The comparison with the Western European case yielded results that shared some similarities but also differed. Often anti-establishment sentiment, feeling of status threat, ingroup salience, and outgroup bias, which are important components of ethnocentric populism, were most salient in the years during and after the Migrant Crisis. However, this is not always observed in the American case. Republican Party supporters recorded their strongest feelings of anti-establishment sentiment during the Trump campaign. On this front they matched up well with ethnocentric populist supporters. However, on ingroup salience and outgroup bias, there appeared to be no activation among Republican Party supporters like supporters of ethnocentric populist parties experienced in Europe. In other words, it appears that Republican Party supporters more closely resembled ethnocentric populists in the 2016 time period but did not completely resemble them.

Logistic Regression Analysis Results

This subsection focuses on examining the results for a logistic regression analysis in which support for the Republican Party presidential candidate is the dependent variable. This analysis provides evidence indicating whether there is temporal variation in the size of the coefficients of status threat, ingroup salience, and outgroup bias, discusses the effects of the control variables, and compares the results with the previous chapter.

Table 6.8 Logistic Regression for GOP Presidential Support

Independent	Vote for GOP Presidential Candidate (Dependent)		
Variables	All	Pre-2012	Post-2012
Post 2012	0.342*	-	-
	(0.141)	-	-
Status Threat	0.151*	0.142	0.218
	(0.071)	(0.090)	(0.113)
Ingroup Salience	0.393*	0.340*	0.577*
	(0.076)	(0.097)	(0.103)

Outgroup Bias	0.277*	0.203*	0.458*
	(0.053)	(0.063)	(0.092)
Anti-Establishment	0.004	0.003	0.006*
Sentiment	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Alienation	-0.016	-0.106	0.195
	(0.071)	(0.088)	(0.124)
Gov. Econ. Intervention	-0.254*	-0.209*	-0.379*
	(0.045)	(0.057)	(0.071)
Economic Anxiety	0.656*	0.639*	0.827*
	(0.064)	(0.076)	(0.128)
Education	-0.024	0.032	-0.194*
	(0.046)	(0.055)	(0.083)
Female	0.026	-0.040	0.115
	(0.133)	(0.163)	(0.230)
Religiosity	0.109	0.126	0.087
	(0.056)	(0.069)	(0.094)
Left-Right Scale	0.503*	0.474*	0.484*
	(0.060)	(0.071)	(0.116)
Authoritarianism	-0.053	-0.026	-0.075
	(0.109)	(0.135)	(0.182)
Republican Party ID	0.864*	0.913*	0.797*
	(0.043)	(0.053)	(0.073)
Racial Resentment	0.074	0.103	0.056
	(0.050)	(0.062)	(0.086)
Constant	10.329*	-10.196*	-10.946*
	(0.624)	(0.750)	(1.178)

N	6,728	4,714	2,014

*Significant at 95%

The results from Table 6.8 indicate that there was a positive relationship between many of the control variables and the dependent variable. The results for anti-establishment sentiment, economic anxiety, religiosity, the left-right scale, party ID, and racial resentment all consistently indicated that there was a positive relationship with the dependent variable. The religiosity and racial resentment variables were not significant at any time period. The anti-establishment variable was the only one to become significant in the post-Immigration Crisis time period. Its growing significance provides some evidence that a populist streak had entered the Republican Party.

For some variables, there was a negative relationship. This was the case for the government intervention and authoritarianism variables. The former was significant in all time periods while the later was not in any time period. As the Republican Party was considered a mainstream right-wing party for many years before the rise of Trump (Hawley 2017), the general aversion to government intervention in economic matters is not surprising.

There were also variables that switched directions in the post-Immigration Crisis time period. There is a positive and non-significant relationship between the education variable and the dependent variable in the pre-time period but this becomes a negative relation that is significant in the post-time period. The gender (female) variable, while not significant in either time period, shifts from having a negative relationship to a positive one. The education, along with the anti-establishment sentiment variable, provides some evidence that a shift had occurred among supporters of the Republican Party.

The directions of the status threat, ingroup salience, and outgroup bias variables are similar to what was seen in the European models, but they differ in terms of significance. Overall, the directions indicate a positive relationship just like with the European models with the coefficients growing in size between the pre- and post-periods. However, the status threat variable is not significant when divided between periods while the ingroup salience and the outgroup bias variables are significant in both time periods.

Unlike the European models, the American analysis produces less evidence that conforms to the theory. While there is evidence of a growth in the size of the coefficients of the theory variables, the variables are either not significant in both the pre- and post-time periods, like status threat, or are significant in both time periods.

In addition, there are some other important distinguishing factors. For example, the direction of the education coefficient moves in opposing directions. In the U.S., the Trump era has brought in many individuals with less education and perhaps indicates a growing contingent of working-class support for the Republican Party. However, in Western Europe, the opposite occurred. Following the beginning of the Migrant Crisis, the education variable lost significance. Whereas in the pre-Migrant Crisis time period those with less education, or those with a profile closer to a member of the working class, were systematically supporting ethnocentric populist parties, the beginning of the Crisis brought in a new group of individuals with different educational profiles.

Table 6.9 Probability of Supporting the Republican Presidential Candidate (Variables Held at Means)

	Predicted Probability		
	All	Pre-2012	Post-2012
Status Threat (Lowest Value)	32.659%*	31.880%*	31.912%*
Status Threat (Highest Value)	41.490%*	38.947%*	49.302%*
Ingroup Salience (Lowest Value)	20.736%*	26.618%*	9.485%*
Ingroup Salience (Highest Value)	57.704%*	55.576%*	63.652%*
Outgroup Bias (Lowest Value)	34.634%*	38.581%*	23.182%*
Outgroup Bias (Highest Value)	56.542%*	54.428%*	60.038%*

*Significant at 95%

The results shown on Table 6.9 indicate that the predicted probability of support increases significantly between those who answered with the lowest value of a theory variable and those who answered with the highest value. The difference between those who answered with the lowest and highest values of status threat is about 7 percent in the pre-time period but this jumps to over 17 percent in the post-time period. There is also a significant jump for ingroup salience too with the difference being about 29 percent in the pre-Immigrant Crisis time period and about 53 percent in the post-time period. Similar results can also be seen with the outgroup bias variable where the difference between the lowest and highest value goes up from about 16 percent to about 37 percent. Overall, these differences are much greater than the single digit differences often seen in the European models.

Conclusion

The big takeaway from this chapter is that the theory's argument regarding exogenous shocks affecting populist support does not conform with the results of the American analysis as much as it did with the Western European analysis. In addition, the data from the difference of

means tests and the logistic regression analyses indicate that for some of the variables, such as anti-establishment sentiment, there is evidence that by 2016 Republican supporters had become more similar to ethnocentric populists. However, in other ways, the two groups of voters differed markedly; for example, ethnocentric populist supporters rely heavily on men for support while this is not the case for the Republican Party even in the post-Immigration Crisis time period.

What the results for chapter five, and to an extent chapter six, indicate is that exogenous shocks can matter. Sometimes, due to the result of exogenous shocks such as the Migrant Crisis and the Immigration Crisis, sentiments can be activated within a broader population of supporters. It is possible that new supporters who have different demographic characteristics may come to support a populist party as evidenced by the influx of less educated supporters of the Republican Party.

Chapter 7: Conclusion: Beyond a Shock to the System

Introduction

What drives support for ethnocentric populist actors? This was the fundamental question that started this investigation. The first three chapters provided an outline of ethnocentric populism and how this project sought to conduct its analysis. The following three chapters provided the analysis.

The introductory chapter discussed two events which occurred in 2014-15: The Migrant Crisis in Western Europe and the Immigration Crisis in the United States. After initially mapping out the situation on both sides of the Atlantic, chapter two discussed research related to ethnocentric populism. It also provided definitions for key concepts such as left, right, and populism. The rest of the chapter was dedicated to presenting a theory that discussed the importance of exogenous shocks affecting support for ethnocentric populist parties.

Chapter three discussed the research design. An important component of the chapter was case selection, and the decision was made to examine thirteen different Western European countries. These countries were divided into two different groups: One group of nine countries that saw an increase in support for ethnocentric populist parties in the immediate aftermath of the Migrant Crisis and another group of four that did not. The United States, which witnessed an ethnocentric populist-style candidate win an election, was also added the analysis as a separate case. The chapter also discussed the use of party manifestos as the basis for the creation of ethnocentric populism scores and left-right scores which were used to determine which parties should be considered ethnocentric populist parties and right-wing populist parties. The last section of the chapter focused on discussing the datasets that were to be used for the analytical

chapters and explained why the European Social Survey (ESS) and the American National Election Study (ANES) worked well for the project.

Chapter four provided qualitative descriptions of the thirteen Western European countries and presented placement analysis for the parties that won at least one seat in the national election. This chapter provided preliminary analysis on ethnocentric populist actors through the use of party placement. Examining results of the party placement analysis from the pre- and post-Migrant Crisis time periods indicated that many of the parties that saw increased electoral support did not moderate their stances. In other words, being an outlier did not necessarily impede an ethnocentric populist party from earning support.

Chapters five and six focused on the idea that exogenous shocks can affect support for ethnocentric populist actors. In Western Europe, outgroup bias became a significant variable only in the post-2012 model. One important takeaway from chapter five is that in the four-country model, there were not as many diverse factors driving support for ethnocentric populists. For example, economically anxious individuals do not appear to have been supporting ethnocentric populists to the extent that they were in the nine countries. In addition, those who felt anger at the establishment or those who felt alienated do not appear to be systematically supporting ethnocentric populists in the four countries where support did not increase. There also appears to be less support from women in the four countries. This failure to garner a support structure like the nine countries in the analysis may have hurt their electoral results. This chapter also provided some insights into support for right-wing populist parties compared to more general ethnocentric populist parties, with the evidence indicating that the economic positions of the voters line up well with the more right-leaning economic positions of right-wing populist parties.

In chapter six, which focused on the United States, one major takeaway was the growth of the marginal effects of ingroup salience and outgroup bias in 2016. While the outgroup bias variable did not reach significance in 2016, the evidence indicates that GOP voters in the 2016 time period were becoming similar to ethnocentric populist voters in Western Europe in other ways. For example, GOP voters in 2016 appeared to be economically anxious and to feel anti-establishment sentiment just like their counterparts across the Atlantic Ocean. However, GOP supporters, even in the Trump era, still differ from ethnocentric populist party supporters in Western Europe; for example, women are a much stronger component of the GOP's base of support than they are among ethnocentric populist parties.

This investigation provided some evidence indicating that exogenous shocks matter. The rest of the conclusion will discuss the substantive real-world implications of the research and comment on future avenues for research. It will then conclude with some parting thoughts.

The Contribution: On the Research Side and Substantive Real-World Implications

One of the major difficulties of this project was making a major contribution to a topic, populism, that has received strong interest from scholars (Drapalova and Wegrich 2021; Lacatus 2019; Pauwels 2014; Peters and Pierre 2019). These authors have made many important contributions that have helped increase understanding of this subject, but a question remains: Where does this project fit into the grand scheme of populism research? Ultimately, this project sought to build on existing research on changes through time, broaden intercontinental dialogue on populism, and help increase the generalizability of findings.

The first contribution involved showcasing the importance of exogenous shocks. Previous research has emphasized the importance of exogenous shocks causing changes in preferences and this project attempted to build on the existing foundations. In the Western

European context, changes in attitudes and preferences occurred after the 9/11 attacks (Bowen 2009), following the murder of filmmaker Theo van Gogh (Finseraas and Listhaug 2013), and after the 7/7 bombings (Ratcliffe and Von Hinke Kessler Scholder 2015). This project sought to extend the relationship between shocks and changes in preferences by bringing the Migrant Crisis and Immigrant Crisis into the discussion.

The second contribution involved extending the research on European populism to the case of the United States. If scholars argue that Trump is a right-wing populist (Donovan and Redlawsk 2018; Montgomery 2017), then further research on Trump needs to be done using a right-wing populist lens. Future research on Trump will need to draw not only from American scholars but also those who have researched right-wing populism in other contexts. In other words, the available research on right-wing populism in the European context needs to be actively applied when examining Trump and his supporters. This project sought to examine whether the findings presented in the European case can be generalized to ethnocentric populist attitudes and support for such parties to the United States. The hope is that future projects attempt to use the European literature and findings on populism as a framework for conducting research related to the United States.

This section also focuses on what the analysis means for the real-world. During the late 2010s, ethnocentric populist actors gained considerable influence in several countries due to their electoral success. In some places, such as Austria, they secured a place in a coalition government. If these electoral victories mean ethnocentric populists taking power and influencing public policy, then it is important to understand why members of the electorate are voting for these actors and what supporters expect from these parties if they enter government. From the research presented here, it appears that an important driving force for support in the

late 2010s is a feeling of status threat. Those who are voting for these actors may be fearful that the large number of immigrants entering their countries are bringing fundamental societal-level changes.

Assuming that ethnocentric populists continue to remain a powerful force in these countries, what sort of policies might they implement? If supporters of these actors fear the large numbers of newcomers entering their countries, then ethnocentric populists in power may push for legislation which would cut immigration. Such policies would not be without their detractors. For example, cutting the number of immigrants entering a country could elicit the anger of business groups, which rely on immigration as a source of labor, and people of color who might feel that they are being targeted as many immigrants to the Western world hail from non-White majority countries. These decisions could lead to bitter conflicts. Finding a middle ground could prove to be very difficult; ethnocentric populists would desire strong cuts to immigration while business and minority groups would prefer no cuts at all. The wide gap could make negotiations difficult.

Future Avenues for Research

While this dissertation sought to show a link between ethnocentric attitudes and support for ethnocentric populist parties, there are many more questions related to this topic could provide extend this project. Some of these include the use of experiments, modifying the existing model to answer the question of what might drive away support, and expanding the time frame beyond the crisis time period could provide more generalizable answers. In addition, further highlighting the point of connecting regions and expanding generalizability could elucidate this investigation's contributions.

Experiments

While this investigation primarily made use of regression analyses, it may also benefit from the use of an experiment. As the theory of this investigation focused on how exogenous shocks can change the way that individuals feel and leading to an increase in support for ethnocentric populist parties, an experiment might better help scholars understand how shocks can affect support.

The experiment could make use of the racialized nature of both the Migration Crisis and the Immigration Crisis. In the Migration Crisis, most of the migrants from the former predominately hail from Africa and Asia (Judis 2016) while those involved in the Immigration Crisis predominately hail from Central America (Zug 2014). Images showing many individuals who look nothing like the dominant population entering Western Europe and the United States may have been a shock to many who were watching the situation unfold.

One potential way to structure the experiment would be taking a page from an experiment run by Gilliam and Iyengar (2000). The authors examined local television news and wanted to know if looking at news reels of Black crime suspects would affect a respondent's feelings towards hardline crime prevention measures. The subjects were Americans from the L.A. metro area with White, Black, Hispanic/Latino, and Asians recruited. All were exposed to one of four different treatments: Some were exposed to a story in which the murder suspect was a Black male. Others were shown the same story but with a White male suspect. Another group was presented an edited version of the story where mentions of the suspect's race was omitted while the final group was exposed to a different story not related to crime. The authors found that White respondents exposed to the Black suspect news reels were more willing to accept hardline measures, this was not the case among Black respondents.

Gilliam and Iyengar (2000) provide at least one interesting avenue for extending the analysis of this dissertation. Their findings on the racialization of media images and the power of these images to affect a respondent's policy position could be extended to show how the Migration and Immigration Crises affected policy positions. Their division of the test subject pool into people of different races and ethnic groups helped show that the same treatment can results in different effects. The 2022 Ukrainian Refugee Crisis provides a way to conduct this type of analysis.

On Ethnocentrism Driving Voters Away

Another potential avenue of future research is examining whether ethnocentric populist attitudes drive away certain groups. Research indicates that some communities may be repelled by ethnocentrism, including members of the LGBTQ+ community (Spierings et al. 2017), women (Mayer 2013), and ethnic minorities (Pettersson et al. 2016). Despite some indications that these groups would oppose ethnocentric populist actors, there is no current evidence linking these communities and their level of support for ethnocentric populists.

For example, there is evidence indicating that ethnocentric populism may not repel all LGBTQ+ individuals. A common foundational logic among many ethnocentric populists is the adulation of the heterosexual nuclear family as the core foundation of nation building. However, to court members of the LGBTQ+ community, a number of ethnocentric populists, such as Geert Wilders, have argued that tolerance for "alternative lifestyles" is a core value of Western society. These populist actors frame themselves as champions protecting the LGBTQ+ community from immigrants who might mean them harm. This attempt at building support has worked to a degree as there is evidence indicating that a segment of the LGBTQ+ community support actors like Geert Wilders (Spierings et al. 2017).

Despite earlier evidence indicating that women tended not to support ethnocentric populists, more recent evidence indicates that, at least in the case of the National Front, this generalization no longer holds. Populist rhetoric involving heterosexual nuclear families often promotes traditional gender norms which may not be agreeable to many women (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2015). However, the National Front, led by Marine Le Pen, has shown a commitment to moving away from rhetoric that may have alienated many women in the past (Shields 2013). Her attempts at softening the image of the party appears to have worked as a larger percentage of the National Front's base is now composed of women than in years past (Mayer 2013).

There is also evidence that despite the strongly ethnocentric nature of these actors, at times minority groups have supported either the parties themselves or their policies directly. One of the United Kingdom Independence Party's core policy positions, leaving the European Union, was favored by some South Asians (Leidig 2019). There is also evidence that at least some Indian immigrants have supported the Freedom Party in the Netherlands (Roopram and van Steenbergen 2014). The Sweden Democrats is home to a wide variety of individuals of immigrant backgrounds such as those hailing from South Korea, Iraq, and Poland (Pettersson et al. 2016). Despite the ethnocentric nature of these actors, they have managed to find supporters from all different backgrounds.

While the literature indicates that certain demographic groups may, on average, be repelled by ethnocentric populism, this is not universally the case. Rather, there are at least some examples of individuals from backgrounds that may be outside of the core constituency of ethnocentric populists showing their support. It will be interesting to see whether there will be a systematic shift in which ethnocentric populists are able to bring in more new supporters.

On Religiosity: The Case of the United States and Brazil

A potential extension of this project could be through further examining the relationship between religiosity and support for ethnocentric populist actors. More religiosity could theoretically decrease support for ethnocentric populist parties as there is a mismatch between ethnocentric populist parties and religious individuals. Ethnocentric populist parties tend to treat outsiders, such as Muslim immigrants, as a threat. Such assertions clash with Christian teachings that emphasize compassion for those in need (Arzheimer and Carter 2009).

While this finding is important, research need to be extended cross-nationally. In the 2010s, Donald Trump of the United States and Jair Bolsonaro of Brazil both won presidential elections running ethnocentric populist-style campaigns. A cursory examination of how religious individuals in these countries reacted to their campaigns indicates that the relationship between religiosity and support for ethnocentric populists is more complicated than previous recognized. Yet in the United States and Brazil, evangelicals supported Trump (Gorski 2017) and Bolsonaro (Burity 2021). As the United States and Brazil are two recent examples of a rise in ethnocentric populism, an examination of how religiosity might affect support for an ethnocentric populist actor in these two countries may provide more generalizable findings.

In Brazil, evangelicals maintained a clear world view and were interested in advancing a specific agenda. They were strongly interested in maintaining God as a central figure in life and strongly championed the traditional family of a male provider, wife, and children (dos Santos Duarte 2020). They were also staunch nationalists who were also deeply suspicious of non-mainstream Brazilian culture (Kibuuka 2020). In addition, because they were a minority in a predominately Catholic Brazil, they were interested in maintaining their political independence as a group (Burity 2021). Many evangelicals also maintained an authoritarian streak and had supported the military dictatorship (dos Santos Duarte 2020).

Evangelicals were, however, mostly ignored by the political class. Unlike the Western European situation where religious individuals were actively courted by Christian Democrat and mainstream right parties (Arzheimer and Carter 2009), Brazilian evangelicals were mostly ignored by political figures for much of the twentieth century despite their strong allegiance to the military dictatorship that had dominated much of the late twentieth century (dos Santos Duarte 2020; Kibuuka 2020) partly due to making up only a small percent of the nation's population (Burity 2021).

However, evangelicals were strongly interested in influencing the political process. During the 2000s, evangelicals worked with the leftist Worker's Party, which did not share these values but were in power for much of the early 21st century, to influence policy. However, growing discord following an economic crisis and emergence of government corruption (Burity 2021) eventually led to a full breakdown in relations when Evangelicals called for removing President Dilma Rousseff, a member of the Worker's Party, from office (dos Santos Duarte 2020).

Jair Bolsonaro, a former military officer turned politician, courted evangelicals and presented himself as their champion when he ran for president in 2018 (Kibuuka 2020). "God Above All!" was a key campaign slogan used by Bolsonaro's campaign and biblical verses such as "Know the truth and the truth will set you free [John 8:32]" were used extensively during the campaign (dos Santos Duarte 2020). Bolsonaro's authoritarian slant (Burity 2020), staunchly nationalist views, and his suspicion of outsiders (Setzler 2020) resonated with evangelicals who were more than willing to support then candidate Bolsonaro (Kibuuka 2020).

While many Brazilian evangelicals embraced Bolsonaro, the reaction to Donald Trump was more muted. Part of the reluctance was rooted in the life that Trump led before running for

office. As someone who had been divorced multiple times and bragged about grabbing women, his lifestyle went against what many American evangelicals viewed to be good. Others were reluctant to support a man who had used highly racially divisive rhetoric. Because of these issues, many evangelicals refused to support Trump and during the primaries preferred to support other candidates such as Ben Carson, Ted Cruz, or Marco Rubio (Gorski 2017).

However, many evangelicals came around to the idea of voting for Trump due to several different reasons. One important factor was abortion. During the 2016 campaign trail, Trump steadfastly asserted his opposition to abortion, an important issue to many American evangelicals, while his primary opponent, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, endorsed Planned Parenthood and abortion (Judis 2016). Trump's messaging of an America that is in the middle of a cultural and economic decline also spoke to evangelicals who also believed that America was not on the right path (Gorski 2017). Trump also had an additional advantage in the strong connection between evangelicals and the Republican Party. By the time that Trump was running for office, evangelicals had been a part of the Republican Party for many decades (Margolis 2020). These factors all helped Trump convince evangelicals to support him.

This short examination into the American and Brazilian situations indicate that the causal relationship between religiosity and support for ethnocentric populist actors is a complicated one. Western European religious individuals' general reluctance to support ethnocentric populists, the open embrace of Bolsanaro by Brazilian evangelicals, and the view of Trump as "the lesser of two evils" (Gorski 2017) by American evangelicals all indicate the relationship between religiosity and support for ethnocentric populist actors may not be clear-cut. Rather, different groups of religious individuals appear to react very differently.

Conclusion

The investigation provided in this dissertation attempted to create a framework to analyze support for ethnocentric populist actors. The theory was that exogenous shocks such as the Immigration Crisis and Migration Crisis affect support for populist actors. The analysis provided evidence that outgroup bias became activated among Western European supporters of ethnocentric populists following the beginning of the Migrant Crisis.

Considering the role played by exogenous shocks in the growing electoral support for ethnocentric populist actors, Western powers may consider creating plans to help mitigate major political crises in other countries; the Syrian Civil War and gang violence in Central America were primary drivers of migrants in Western Europe and the United States respectively. Helping aid these types of conflicts could stem migration into the Western World which in turn would deprive ethnocentric populist actors an important driving force behind their rise.

While the analysis presented here focuses on the populist wave in a select group of Western countries, one possible extension of this project is the analysis of the reasons behind the support for Brazilian president Jair Bolsanaro. While a cursory glance does not appear to indicate that his rise was driven by immigration-related exogenous shocks, further investigations will be needed to see how similar or different supporters of Bolsanaro are to their counterparts in the United States or Western Europe. Extending this project to Brazil will be the next step in attempting to answer the question on what is driving support for ethnocentric populists in the late 2010s.

Understanding why some individuals have chosen to support ethnocentric populist actors may remain an important task for many years to come. If support for such politicians is here to stay, an inevitable clash between those who want to cut immigration and those who wish to keep

immigration at current levels may be a recurring political battle. Finding a negotiated settlement between two sides that want two very different outcomes is not an easy task. However, the first step of attempting to understand what drives supporters of ethnocentric populists is perhaps somewhat clearer now than it was in the past. The next step will be to find a solution that both sides can accept.

Appendix

Appendix 1: Ethnocentric Populist Calculations

Country and Party	Per 107: Positive Reference to Internationalism	Per 108: Positive Reference to the European Union	Per 303: Governmental and Administrative Efficiency	Per 304: Political Corruption	Per 305: References to Political Authority	Per 503: Equality: Positive	Per 601: Positive References to National Way of Life	Per 603: Positive References to Traditional Morality	Per 605: Positive References to Law and Order	Per 607: Negative References to Multiculturalism	Per 705: Positive References to Underprivileged Minority	Per 7062: Positive References to Refugees	Total	% of Manifesto (Populist Issues)	Final Score
Austria (September 2013)															
Austrian People's Party	3.44	2.58	3.87	1.64	1.55	5.94	1.29	1.38	4.3	0.78	0.17	0	2.68	26.94	0.0995
Social Democratic Party	1.93	0.83	1.24	1.24	0.69	12.28	0.97	0.28	1.1	0.83	0	0	-8.69	21.39	-0.406
Freedom Party	0.87	0	1.74	0.87	12.17	6.09	12.17	4.35	5.22	0	0	0	29.56	43.48	0.6799
NEOS	0.2	1.96	13.99	4.7	1.17	6.36	0.29	0.59	0.59	3.23	0	0	16.04	33.08	0.4849
The Greens	1.84	1.96	3.84	5.17	1.75	11.31	0.21	0.04	0.88	1.63	0.29	0	-1.88	28.92	-0.065
Team Stronach	0.16	0.16	11.33	8.41	3.48	5.18	0.73	1.21	1.86	0.16	0.08	0	21.6	32.76	0.6593
Austria (October 2017)															
Austrian People's Party	1.9	0.39	7.55	0.54	0.54	4.72	3.11	1	5.83	3.58	0.07	0	15.07	29.23	0.5156
Social Democratic Party	1.87	1.73	7.56	0.77	0.77	12.81	1.8	0.15	4.41	1.5	0.44	0	0.11	33.81	0.0033
Freedom Party	0	0	3.54	1.55	1.55	5.75	5.75	4.87	6.42	3.32	0	0	21.25	32.75	0.6489
NEOS	3.17	9.52	11.11	6.35	0	12.7	0.79	0	0.79	1.59	0	0	-4.76	46.02	-0.103
PILZ	0	0	1.41	18.31	15.49	5.63	2.82	0	1.41	1.41	0	0	35.22	46.48	0.7577
Belgium (June 2010)															
New Flemish Alliance	2.21	2.35	11.18	0	14.71	3.31	0.37	0.37	5.88	1.32	1.62	0	24.34	43.32	0.5619
Socialist Party	1.34	1.92	5.77	0.09	1.43	10.68	0.09	0.27	5.14	0.81	3.71	0	-4.05	31.25	-0.13
Christian Democratic and Flemish	3.48	2.55	12.68	0.25	11.75	6.22	0.25	1.52	6.95	0.2	3.92	0	17.43	49.77	0.3502
Reformist Movement	1.06	1.55	16.27	0.82	3.74	4.01	0.84	1	6.42	0.31	2.41	0	20.37	38.43	0.5301
Flemish Socialist Party	3.48	1.41	10.44	1.63	7.17	10.11	0.11	0.44	10.22	0	2.5	0	12.51	47.51	0.2633
Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats	2.25	1.12	12.23	1	10.67	5.93	0.44	0.87	10.36	0.69	1.56	0	25.4	47.12	0.539
Vlaams Belang	1.61	1.03	2.49	0.15	18.91	0.44	0.29	1.32	18.62	0.88	0.88	0	38.7	46.62	0.8301
Humanist Democratic Centre	1.75	1.78	16.92	0.69	0.34	8.09	0.25	2.31	3.31	0.65	1.07	0	11.78	37.16	0.317
Ecolo	7.36	2.72	8.14	2	0.03	5.1	0	0.19	0.56	0.91	6.89	0	-10.2	33.9	-0.302
Groen!	2.67	0.85	5.98	1.21	12.77	12.17	0.15	0.4	4.37	2.31	3.37	0	8.13	46.25	0.1758
Lijst Dedecker	0	0	4.88	2.44	7.32	4.88	0	0	9.76	0	0	0	19.52	29.28	0.6667
Belgium (May 2014)															
New Flemish Alliance	2.19	2.71	11.82	0.71	0.93	4.87	5.09	0.33	4.57	0.04	0	0	13.72	33.26	0.4125
Socialist Party	2.11	2.02	6.07	0	0.01	17.83	0.96	0	3.3	1.06	0	0	-10.6	33.36	-0.317
Christian Democrats and Vlaams	2.81	1	6.9	0.04	0.98	8.85	2.23	1.97	3.44	0.8	0	0	3.7	29.02	0.1275
Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats	3.52	1.09	10.4	0	1.34	8.64	3.19	0	3.02	1.59	0	0	6.29	32.79	0.1918
Flemish Socialist Party	2.11	2.02	6.07	0	0.01	17.83	0.96	0	3.3	1.06	0	0	-10.6	33.36	-0.317
Groen	2.24	1.72	3.52	0.2	0.07	15.49	0.32	0.15	2.75	0.92	0	0	-11.5	27.38	-0.421
Vlaams Belang	1.84	0	4.98	0.13	2.36	4.06	7.47	0.39	14.68	0	0	0	24.11	35.91	0.6714
Worker's Party of Belgium	1.24	0.07	0.6	1.12	1.05	22.51	0.55	0.26	1.6	1.22	0	0	-17.4	30.22	-0.576
Denmark (September 2011)															
Venstre	0	0	0	0	3.1	4.42	0.44	0.44	0.89	1.77	0.89	0	1.33	11.95	0.1113
Social Democrats	0	0	8.28	0	13.02	2.37	1.18	0	0	0	0	0	20.11	24.85	0.8093
Danish People's Party	0	0	0	0	8.38	3.18	5.49	0.29	12.43	0	0	0	23.41	29.77	0.7864
Social Liberals	2.36	15.75	0	0	0	1.58	0	0	2.36	11.81	1.58	0	-7.1	35.44	-0.2
Socialist People's Party	0.81	0.41	0.81	0	5.5	7.54	0	0	0.2	0.61	0	0	-1.64	15.88	-0.103
Red-Green	2	0	0	0	1.78	11.78	0	0	0	6.67	0	0	-5.33	22.23	-0.24
Liberal Alliance	0	0	4.6	0	10.35	1.15	0	0	0	0	0	0	13.8	16.1	0.8571
Conservative	0	0	0	0	6.34	12.68	8.45	4.22	14.79	0	0	0	21.12	46.48	0.4544
Denmark (June 2015)															
Social Democrats	1.04	1.57	0	0	12.72	10.28	4.7	0	7.67	0	0	0	12.2	37.98	0.3212
Danish People's Party	0	0	0	0	0	0	25	0	18.75	0	0	0	43.75	43.75	1
Venstre	0	0	0	0	4.95	0.99	4.95	0	15.84	0	0	0	24.75	26.73	0.9259
Red-Green	0.89	0	0	0	0	21.43	0	0	0	2.68	0	0	-19.6	25	-0.786
Liberal Alliance	5.56	0	11.11	0	0	11.11	7.41	0	0	0	0	0	1.85	35.19	0.0526
The Alternative	0	0	5.46	0	0.61	4.85	0.61	0	0	0	0	0	1.83	11.53	0.1587
Social Liberals	3.13	3.13	0	0	12.5	15.63	3.13	0	0	0	0	0	-6.26	37.52	-0.167
Socialist People's Party	0	0	0	0	4.66	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4.66	4.66	1
Conservative People's Party	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2.86	28.57	0	0	0	31.43	31.43	1
Finland (April 2011)															
National Coalition Party	3.75	1.25	2.25	0	6.25	2	0.25	0.25	1.75	2.25	0	0	6	20	0.3
Social Democratic Party of Finland	0.17	0	6.66	0	0.7	3.85	0	0	0	1.23	0	0	4.57	12.61	0.3624
True Finns	1.21	0.2	5.13	0	4.52	4.25	10.45	2.23	5.33	1.48	0.14	0	23.34	34.94	0.668
Centre Party	3.13	0.95	5.02	0	1.23	3.79	0.28	6.82	0.28	0.76	0.38	0	6.14	22.64	0.2712
Left Alliance	1.16	0	1.16	0	5.81	11.63	0	0.58	2.91	0	0	0	-2.33	23.25	-0.1
Green League	2.59	0.97	5.35	0	0	7.62	0	0.65	0.65	2.11	0	0	-2.42	19.94	-0.121
Swedish People's Party	1.75	1.75	3.51	0	0	3.51	0	0	0	0	9.36	0	-12.9	19.88	-0.647
Christian Democrats	2.67	0.94	2.04	0	0.47	4.39	1.25	7.05	4.86	2.19	0.16	0	9.7	26.02	0.3728

Finland (April 2015)															
Centre Party	2.61	1.74	6.09	0	0	2.61	0	2.61	1.3	0	0	0	3.04	16.96	0.1792
True Finns	0.72	0.11	4.16	0.06	1.33	4.27	6.43	2.94	6.71	2.5	0.83	0	18.2	30.06	0.6055
National Coalition Party	2.51	1.95	6.41	0	0	1.11	0	0	3.06	0	0	0	3.9	15.04	0.2593
Social Democratic Party	0.81	2.42	1.61	0	0	10.48	0.81	0	1.61	0.81	0	0	-8.87	18.55	-0.478
Green League	1.08	0	0.72	0	1.44	12.95	1.8	0.36	0	0	0.36	0	-10.1	18.71	-0.538
Left Alliance	3.39	0.18	2.5	0.18	0	9.45	0	0	0.89	0.36	0	0	-9.09	16.95	-0.536
Swedish People's Party of Finland	3.82	1.53	3.56	0.25	0	4.58	0	0.76	0.51	4.33	0	0	-0.52	19.34	-0.027
Christian Democrats	2.32	1.49	3.48	1.16	0.33	2.15	0.83	4.8	7.45	0.17	0	0	12.26	24.18	0.507
France (June 2012)															
Union for a Popular Movement	8.26	9.75	3.39	0	0	2.75	5.72	1.06	8.05	0	0	0	-2.54	38.98	-0.065
Socialist Party	4.67	2.34	1.4	0	0	6.54	0	0	4.21	0.47	1.4	0	-8.87	21.03	-0.422
National Rally	1.35	0	3.03	0	0	1.35	9.43	3.03	13.13	0	1.01	0	24.91	32.33	0.7705
The Greens	3.72	7.26	1.5	0	0.09	5.13	0.09	0	5.04	0.09	1.5	0	-10.8	24.42	-0.442
Radical Party of the Left	0.87	9.17	0	0	0.66	7.86	0	0	1.09	0	1.75	0	-17.9	21.4	-0.836
New Center	0.28	6.94	3.19	0	0.56	12.64	0	0	3.75	0	0	0	-12.4	27.36	-0.452
Centrist Alliance	1.39	0	2.78	0	6.94	1.39	1.39	0	0	0	0	0	8.33	13.89	0.5997
Left Front	3.08	6.02	0.27	0.13	0.13	9.37	0	0	1.07	0.27	1.07	0	-17.7	21.41	-0.825
Centre for France	3.39	7.02	1.45	0.48	1.94	6.29	1.94	0.24	3.39	0.48	0.48	0	-7.26	27.1	-0.268
Radical Party	3.5	8.04	12.94	0	0.35	4.2	5.25	0	3.15	0	2.8	0	3.15	40.23	0.0783
France (June 2017)															
The Republicans	0	2.34	5.45	0.39	0.39	7.39	7.39	0.78	8.56	0.78	0.78	0	13.23	34.25	0.3863
Socialist Party	0	5.26	1.32	2.63	2.63	9.21	0	0	11.84	0	0	0	3.95	32.89	0.1201
National Rally	0.78	0	3.88	0	0	5.43	12.4	1.94	12.02	3.1	0	0	27.13	39.55	0.686
En Marche	0	4.7	9.12	2.76	0.28	11.88	4.97	0	6.35	0.83	0	0	7.73	40.89	0.189
La France Insoumise	4	0.1	2.05	1.17	2.34	7.02	3.8	0	2.34	0.39	0.68	0	0.29	23.89	0.0121
French Communist Party	0	0	0	0	16.67	8.33	2.78	0	2.78	0	0	0	13.9	30.56	0.4548
Democratic Movement	2.21	3.98	5.97	2.43	2.43	7.08	4.65	0	3.1	2.21	0	0	7.52	34.06	0.2208
Union of Democrats and Independents	0	2.34	5.45	0.39	7.39	7.39	7.39	0.78	8.56	0	0.78	0	19.45	40.47	0.4806
Radical Party of the Left	0.56	5.03	7.26	0.37	1.3	4.84	1.12	0	4.1	0.37	0	0	4.09	24.95	0.1639
Germany (September 2013)															
Christian Democratic Union	3.23	2.02	2.99	0	1.36	2.68	2.64	2.49	5.21	0.82	1.28	0	6.3	24.72	0.2549
Social Democrats	2.86	2.62	1.03	0.41	2.69	9.35	1	0.34	2.31	1.17	0.41	0	-6.29	24.19	-0.26
Alternative for Germany	2.74	1.37	12.33	0	0	8.22	2.74	5.48	0	1.37	1.37	0	8.22	35.62	0.2308
Linke	1.34	0.48	1.66	0.48	3.88	14.36	0	0.24	0.53	0.69	1.62	0	-10.3	25.28	-0.408
The Greens	2.71	2.65	3.9	0.5	2.62	11.33	0.31	0.29	0.88	0.83	1.01	0	-8.37	27.03	-0.31
Free Democratic Party	4.24	6.6	2.84	0	0.39	6.12	0.67	0	2.74	0.05	0	0	-10.3	23.65	-0.434
Germany (September 2017)															
Christian Democratic Union	5.14	1.64	1.86	0	0	3.65	6.63	2.53	3.73	1.64	0.07	0	5.89	26.89	0.219
Social Democrats	5.03	4.46	0.79	0.34	0.34	9.3	1.51	0.6	5.71	0.15	0	0	-9.35	28.23	-0.331
Alternative for Germany	2.09	0	1.79	4.48	4.48	2.59	12.35	7.77	3.88	6.17	0.1	0	36.14	45.7	0.7908
Linke	1.32	1.09	0.28	0.81	0.18	20.28	0	0	0.56	0	0	0	-20.9	24.52	-0.851
The Greens	4.03	4.16	0.39	0.49	0.47	13.45	0.16	0	2.32	0	0	0	-17.8	25.47	-0.699
Free Democratic Party	4.24	6.6	2.84	0	0.39	6.12	0.67	0	2.74	0.05	0	0	-10.3	23.65	-0.434
Greece (June 2012)															
New Democracy	0	0	0	0	0	13.64	4.54	0	0	0	0	0	-9.1	18.18	-0.501
Coalition of the Radical Left (Syriza)	2.13	1.69	1.42	3.19	6.57	1.95	1.33	0.09	0.35	0	0	0	7.18	18.72	0.3835
Panhellenic Socialist Movement	8.16	8.16	0	0	42.86	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	26.54	59.18	0.4485
Independent Greeks	0	2.58	0	3.23	11.61	4.52	16.77	1.29	0	0	0	0	25.8	40	0.645
Popular Association-Golden Dawn	0	0	0	5.91	11.83	3.76	20.43	1.08	4.3	6.45	0	0	46.24	53.76	0.8601
Democratic Left	1.77	2.4	3.86	3.67	2.98	2.79	0.13	0	3.67	0.95	0	0	8.3	22.22	0.3735
Communist Party of Greece	0	0	0	0	34.97	0.61	0.61	0	0	0	0	0	34.97	36.19	0.9663
Greece (January 2015)															
Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA)	1.33	0.66	3.97	6.62	0.66	0.66	0	0	0	0	0.66	0	7.94	14.56	0.5453
New Democracy	0	0.62	2.47	8.64	3.7	0.62	1.24	0	0	0	0	0	14.81	17.29	0.8566
Popular Association-Golden Dawn	0	0	0	4.65	5.81	0	13.95	2.33	11.05	1.74	0	0	39.53	39.53	1
The River (Potami)	3.06	2.13	2.26	5.59	2	0.93	2.53	0	0.27	0	0	0	6.53	18.77	0.3479
Communist Party of Greece	0	0	0	4.84	40.32	3.23	6.45	0	0	0	0	0	48.38	54.84	0.8822
Independent Greeks	0	0	0	0	0	7.69	46.15	11.54	0	0	0	0	50	65.38	0.7648
Panhellenic Socialist Movement	2.4	8.73	2.91	1.03	0.51	3.42	1.03	0	0.17	0	0	0	-8.9	20.2	-0.441
Italy (February 2013)															
Left Ecology Freedom	4.86	1.34	3.02	2.01	0.34	7.04	0	0	4.19	0	0	0	-3.68	22.8	-0.161
Five Star Movement	0	0	1.29	5.16	0	0	0	0	1.29	0	0.65	0	7.09	8.39	0.8451
Partito Democratico	1.47	11.77	8.33	0.98	9.8	18.63	0	0	3.43	0	0	0	-9.33	54.41	-0.171
South Tyrolean People's Party	0.15	2.77	4.92	0	3.38	5.07	8.45	1.38	1.23	2.15	0	0	13.52	29.5	0.4583
The People of Freedom	0.48	2.86	9.52	2.38	0.48	0.95	0	0.95	4.29	0	0	0	13.33	21.91	0.6084
Brothers of Italy	0	0.22	8.03	2.39	4.99	0.65	0	1.52	15.4	0	0	0	31.46	33.2	0.9476
Northern League	0.48	2.86	9.52	2.38	0.48	0.95	0	0.95	4.29	0	0	0	13.33	21.91	0.6084
Civic Choice	3.27	7.14	11.61	2.68	0	10.12	0	2.08	10.12	0	0	0	5.96	47.02	0.1268
Union of the Center	3.1	1.43	0.24	3.1	31.27	5.73	1.91	5.49	1.67	0.95	0.24	0	34.13	55.13	0.6191
Aosta Valley	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-
Italy (March 2018)															
Lega Nord	0.76	0.15	5.34	0.69	2.37	1.53	4.05	0.92	11.15	2.75	5.72	0	19.11	35.43	0.5394
Forza Italia	1.04	0	8.33	0	4.17	5.21	2.08	1.04	9.38	0	1.04	0	17.71	32.29	0.5485
Fratelli d'Italia	0.55	0	2.75	0.55	1.1	1.65	4.95	1.65	11.54	3.85	0.55	0	23.64	29.14	0.8113
Noi com Italia	0.56	3.37	5.06	0	1.69	0	4.49	1.69	5.62	0	0.56	0	14.06	23.04	0.6102
Five Star Movement	0.75	1.06	3.75	4.54	5.65	0.8	0.17	0	4.39	0	0.38	0	15.51	21.49	0.7217
Partito Democratico	1.56	8.03	7.64	0.16	5.46	5.62	1.4	0	2.03	0	0.7	0	0.78	32.6	0.0239
Più Europa	0.23	14.52	7.6	0	0.92	3.23	0	0	0.92	0	0	0	-8.54	27.42	-0.311
Insieme	0.95	7.84	0.71	0	4.04	5.94	0.95	0	0.24	0.24	0.24	0	-8.79	21.15	-0.416
Civica Popolare	0	3.6	2.7	0.9	4.05	3.6	1.35	1.35	2.25	0	0.9	0	4.5	20.7	0.2174
SVP–PATT	0	0	5.88	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5.88	5.88	1

Netherlands (September 2012)															
Christian Democratic Appeal	2.1	3.69	4.95	0.17	2.69	3.36	1.26	4.36	5.37	1.93	3.27	0	8.31	33.15	0.2507
Labour Party	3.51	2.36	3.95	0.14	5.69	8.19	1.41	0.29	5.04	0.83	4.71	0	-1.42	36.12	-0.039
Party for Freedom	1.57	2.73	9.89	0.17	5.59	2.44	0.47	0.47	10.59	0.29	2.97	0	17.76	37.18	0.4777
Democraten'66	3.32	6.58	4.67	0.16	3.37	2.23	0.21	0	2.9	0.36	3.11	0	-3.57	26.91	-0.133
GroenLinks	4.69	3.97	2.44	0.07	1.26	7.2	0.2	0.4	3.04	1.65	6.74	0	-13.5	31.66	-0.428
Socialists	3.59	1.3	4.89	0.33	3.19	6.52	0.13	0	6.71	0.91	5.87	0	-1.12	33.44	-0.033
ChristenUnie	2.99	1.15	3.48	0	3.73	2.25	0.41	4.7	5.1	2.99	4.1	0	9.92	30.9	0.321
Party for the Animals	2.86	0.25	0.42	0.34	1.43	2.02	0.08	0	2.69	0.08	1.76	0	-1.85	11.93	-0.155
50Plus	2.43	0.97	10.19	0.97	8.74	3.88	0	0	6.31	0	0.97	0	17.96	34.46	0.5212
Reformed Political Party	4.58	0.94	3.48	0	1.93	1.93	0.44	22.74	7.29	3.42	4.86	0	26.99	51.61	0.523
Party for Freedom	2.7	0.22	4.75	1.62	9.06	0.86	4.32	0.32	10.68	0.22	0.43	0	26.76	35.18	0.7607
Netherlands (March 2017)															
Christian Democratic Appeal	1.91	2.05	1.2	0.21	0.21	2.19	1.13	8.62	8.55	2.19	0	0	15.96	28.26	0.5648
Labour Party	3.97	2.06	2.51	0	0	7.95	5.43	1.37	2.37	0.69	0	0	-1.61	26.35	-0.061
Party for Freedom	0	0	0	0	0	0	28	0	8	12	0	0	48	48	1
Democraten'66	3.73	6.3	3.07	0	0.71	6.28	0.6	0.94	1.84	0	0	0	-9.15	23.47	-0.39
GroenLinks	1.32	3.88	1.06	0.35	1.85	9.88	2.56	0.97	2.38	0	0	0	-5.91	24.25	-0.244
Socialists	3.39	0.23	2.57	0.35	0.82	6.08	0.12	1.4	7.6	0.82	0	0	3.98	23.38	0.1702
ChristenUnie	2.47	1.45	1.83	0	0.27	3.99	2.24	8.02	3.92	0.53	0	0	8.9	24.72	0.36
Party for the Animals	3.78	0.28	2.31	0	1.12	2.31	0.21	0.84	1.54	0.42	0	0	0.07	12.81	0.0055
50Plus	1.62	0	2.22	0.81	2.42	7.47	2.83	0	7.07	0	0	0	6.26	24.44	0.2561
Reformed Political Party	3.74	0.04	1.55	0	0.34	0.71	1.76	18.66	7.35	2.14	0	0	27.31	36.29	0.7525
Denk	3.43	0.46	0.46	0	0	9.38	0.69	0	6.29	0	0.46	0	-6.29	21.17	-0.297
Forum for Democracy	1.76	0	7.25	14.12	6.67	0	9.22	0.78	4.9	0	0	0	41.18	44.7	0.9213
Norway (September 2013)															
Labour Party	4.31	0.33	5.87	0	0.33	4.5	2.9	1.15	5.02	3.57	0.22	0	9.48	28.2	0.3362
Conservative Party	3.66	0.73	6.23	0	0.15	1.39	1.76	1.47	8.21	0.81	0	0	12.85	24.41	0.5264
Progress Party	2.58	0.36	6.59	0	0	0.52	2.42	0.64	6.39	0.44	0	0	13.02	19.94	0.653
Christian Democratic Party	6.56	0.28	3.42	0.06	0.03	2.95	0.5	6.65	5.31	3.09	0	0	9.27	28.85	0.3213
Centre Party	2.22	0.12	4.32	0	0.06	1.99	1.58	1.81	3.21	0.99	0	0	7.64	16.3	0.4687
Liberal Party	4.25	0.66	4.6	0.04	0.35	2.28	0.54	0.31	3.71	0.89	0	0	3.25	17.63	0.1843
Socialist Left Party	3.32	0	1.85	0	0.11	6.58	0.97	0.47	6.83	2.71	0	0	3.04	22.84	0.1331
Green Party	5.03	0	3.09	0.24	0.12	3.39	0.36	1.03	1.82	0.24	0	0	-1.52	15.32	-0.099
Norway (September 2017)															
Labour Party	3.98	0.25	1.9	0.13	0.09	4.87	1.23	0.34	2.62	0.55	0	0	-2.24	15.96	-0.14
Conservative Party	2.76	0.73	4.06	0.05	0	3.17	1.41	1.09	4.22	1.25	0	0	5.42	18.74	0.2892
Progress Party	1.6	0	2.65	0.22	0.16	2.69	3.8	0.35	4.83	0.26	0	0	7.98	16.56	0.4819
Centre Party	2.24	0	3.15	0.08	0	5.32	1.41	1.29	4.21	1.52	0	0	4.1	19.22	0.2133
Socialist Left Party	2.58	0.04	0.68	0.07	0	11.51	0.39	0.18	2.62	3.55	0	0	-6.64	21.62	-0.307
Liberal Party	3.51	0.87	2.91	0.63	0	7.18	0.46	0.14	1.71	2.23	0	0	-3.48	19.64	-0.177
Christian Democratic Party	3.64	0.07	1.01	0.07	0	7.91	0.65	7.67	1.88	1.91	0	0	1.57	24.81	0.0633
Green Party	2.63	0.34	0.68	0.34	0.05	3.7	0.24	0.1	2.92	3.36	0	0	1.02	14.36	0.071
Red Party	1.43	0	0.3	0.35	0.05	11.87	0.05	0.05	3.26	3.21	0	0	-6.03	20.57	-0.293
Sweden (September 2010)															
Moderate Party	2.69	2.11	3.11	0.11	1.11	6.38	0.47	2	2.79	0.37	1.58	0	-2.8	22.72	-0.123
Swedish Social Democratic Party	0.71	0	0	0	6.03	14.18	0	0.35	1.42	0	1.06	0	-8.15	23.75	-0.343
Sweden Democrats	2.94	0	0.49	0	0.98	1.47	12.26	4.9	8.82	0	0	0	23.04	31.86	0.7232
Green Party	0	0	0	0	1.15	7.63	0	0	3.05	0.38	1.15	0	-4.2	13.36	-0.314
Centre Party	2.11	2.24	0.4	0	1.71	5.4	0	0	0.79	0.53	0.79	0	-7.11	13.97	-0.509
Left Party	0.39	0	0	0	10.24	16.54	0.39	0	0.39	0.39	0.39	0	-5.91	28.73	-0.206
Liberals	1.97	2.51	0.76	0	2.51	2.95	0.76	0.98	9.06	0.66	2.62	0	4.68	24.78	0.1889
Christian Democrats	2.3	0.21	0	0	1.25	6.05	0	8.35	5.43	1.46	1.25	0	6.68	26.3	0.254
Sweden (September 2014)															
Moderate Party (Sweden)	2.08	1.41	2.93	0	0.31	4.52	0.06	0.12	8.19	2.57	0.06	0	6.11	22.25	0.2746
Swedish Social Democratic Party (Swed	3.5	0.74	1.11	0	2.39	6.45	0.18	0	2.95	0	0	0	-4.06	17.32	-0.234
Sweden Democrats (Sweden)	5.7	0	0	0	1.27	3.8	9.81	0.95	7.59	0.63	0	0	10.75	29.75	0.3613
Green Party	1.41	0	0.2	0	2.41	7.04	0.6	0	4.22	2.82	0	0	1.8	18.7	0.0963
Centre Party	0	0	1.58	0	6.32	2.63	0	0	0.26	1.32	0	0	6.85	12.11	0.5656
Left Party	1.11	0	0.56	0	5.28	15.83	0	0	0.56	0	0	0	-10.5	23.34	-0.452
Liberals	0.92	2.06	1.84	0	6.19	5.5	0	0	8.95	1.84	0.69	0	9.65	27.99	0.3448
Christian Democrats	1.03	0	2.31	0	1.03	7.2	1.03	1.54	7.46	0.51	0	0	5.65	22.11	0.2555
Switzerland (October 2011)															
Christian Democratic Party	1.35	0	1.35	0	8.11	0	1.35	6.08	13.51	0	0	0	29.05	31.75	0.915
Social Democratic Party	0	0	0	0	5.63	11.27	0	0	0	0	0	0	-5.64	16.9	-0.334
Swiss People's Party	0	0	0	0	16.67	0	2.5	0	7.5	0	0	0	26.67	26.67	1
Free Democratic Party	0.96	0	9.13	0	25.48	0.48	9.13	0	1.44	0	0	0	43.74	46.62	0.9382
Green Party	5.77	0	0	0	0	8.41	0.24	0	0.24	0.96	0	0	-12.7	15.62	-0.816
Green Liberal Party	2.82	4.22	1.41	0	0	4.22	1.41	0	1.41	2.82	0	0	-4.21	18.31	-0.23
Conservative Democratic Party	0	1.3	0	0	0	2.6	5.2	3.9	10.39	0	0	0	15.59	23.39	0.6665
Evangelical People's Party	12	0	0	0	0	8	0	12	0	4	0	0	-4	36	-0.111
Geneva Citizen's Movement	0	0	5.26	0	0	0	0	0	21.05	0	0	0	26.31	26.31	1
Switzerland (October 2015)															
Christian Democratic Party	1.8	1.8	1.08	0	0	0.72	4.68	1.44	12.23	3.6	0	0	18.71	27.35	0.6841
Social Democratic Party	0.77	4.62	0	0	0	17.69	0.77	0	0	0	0	0	-22.3	23.85	-0.935
Swiss People's Party	1.2	0.15	5.42	0	0	0.53	8.13	5.49	5.94	4.82	0	0	27.92	31.68	0.8813
Free Democratic Party	6.31	0	4.5	0	8.11	0	9.01	0	3.6	2.7	0	0	21.61	34.23	0.6313
Green Party	3.55	0	1.58	1.97	0.99	6.11	0.2	0	0.39	0	0	0	-4.53	14.79	-0.306
Green Liberal Party	4.89	2.67	4.89	0	1.33	4.89	0	0	2.67	1.33	0	0	-2.23	22.67	-0.098
Conservative Democratic Party	12.46	1.82	4.25	0	0.61	6.08	1.52	0	7.6	1.22	0	0	-5.16	35.56	-0.145
Evangelical People's Party	2.88	0	1.62	1.08	0	2.7	0.54	6.13	2.7	0.36	0	0	6.85	18.01	0.3803
Swiss Party of Labour	0.28	0	0	0.28	2.83	1.13	0	0	0.28	0	0	0	1.98	4.8	0.4125
Geneva Citizen's Movement	0	0	4.76	0	4.76	0	19.05	9.52	0	0	0	0	38.09	38.09	1

United Kingdom (May 2010)															
Conservative Party	4.68	0.99	8.72	1.71	12.14	0.99	2.43	3.24	5.67	0.18	0.63	0	26.8	41.38	0.6477
Labour Party	4.85	1.5	1.77	1.15	3.88	3.35	1.06	6.35	3.8	0.09	2.38	0	6.02	30.18	0.1995
United Kingdom Independence Party	1.3	0.28	3.89	2.04	2.04	3.89	6.11	1.11	9.81	1.57	1.57	0	19.53	33.61	0.5811
Scottish National Party	1.4	2.92	1.78	0	0.64	6.48	0.38	0.25	2.41	0	0.64	0	-5.98	16.9	-0.354
Liberal Democrats	5.03	2.21	5.52	1.1	10.18	3.19	0.12	2.7	3.8	0	1.72	0	11.27	35.57	0.3168
Democratic Unionist Party	0.46	0.23	6.24	0	6	1.39	12.01	0	5.08	0.46	1.16	0	26.55	33.03	0.8038
Sinn Fein	0.52	12.44	0	2.07	1.55	9.33	0	0	0	0	0	0	-18.7	25.91	-0.721
United Kingdom (June 2015)															
Conservative Party	3.4	0.57	2.58	0.25	0.38	4.66	4.16	0.82	8.44	0.13	0	0	8.13	25.39	0.3202
Labour Party	3.37	2.87	0.69	0.1	0.3	5.75	3.67	0	7.73	0.1	0	0	0.6	24.58	0.0244
Scottish National Party	1.23	2.47	0.34	0	1.01	8.3	0.11	0	2.69	0.22	0	0	-7.63	16.37	-0.466
Liberal Democrats	3.86	2.66	1.25	0	0.1	15.23	0.36	0.16	3.39	0.47	0	0	-16	27.48	-0.583
Democratic Unionist	0	0	9.61	0.44	2.62	9.61	19.21	0	0.87	0	0	0	23.14	42.36	0.5463
Sinn Fein	0	2.21	1.47	0	0.73	9.56	0	0	0	1.1	0	0	-8.47	15.07	-0.562
Plaid Cymru	2.06	0.9	0.39	0	0.52	13.53	0.26	0	0.13	5.54	0	0	-9.65	23.33	-0.414
Social Democratic and Labour	1.72	5.16	0	0.98	0	13.51	0	0	2.21	4.67	0	0	-12.5	28.25	-0.444
Ulster Unionist	0	0.72	1.92	0	0	13.19	6.95	0	4.08	3.36	0	0	2.4	30.22	0.0794
United Kingdom Independence Party	0.96	0.67	3.19	0.82	0.74	3.49	8.46	0.15	4.82	0	0	0	13.06	23.3	0.5605
Green Party	4.29	0.81	0.27	0.85	1.39	16.91	0.04	0.13	0.18	0.54	0	0	-18.6	25.41	-0.732
United States (November 2012)															
Republican Party	1.97	0	4.36	0.78	3.17	2.03	3.05	6.93	2.81	0.78	0.06	0	17.82	25.94	0.687
Democratic Party	9.88	0	2.27	1.1	3.66	5.86	2.42	1.32	2.86	1.46	0.59	0	-1.24	31.42	-0.039
United States (November 2016)															
Republican Party	3.79	0	1.23	0.36	0.36	5.7	2.83	8.48	3.37	0.14	0	0	7.28	26.26	0.2772
Democratic Party	5.51	0	1.08	1.08	1.08	17.01	2.35	0.2	1.82	0.07	0	0	-14.8	30.2	-0.491

Appendix 2: Left-Right Calculations

Country and Party	Per 401: Positive Reference to a Free Market Economy	Per 402: Incentives: Positive	Per 403: Market Regulation	Per 404: Economic Planning	Per 406: Positive References to Protectionism	Per 407: Free Trade + Open Markets	Per 409: Keynesian Demand Management	Per 412: Controlled Economy	Per 413: Nationalization	Per 504: Welfare State Expansion	Per 701: Positive References to Labor Groups	Total	% of Manifesto Addressing Populist Issues	How Populist (or Unpopulist)
Austria (September 2013)														
Austrian People's Party	2.67	4.04	4.22	0	0	0.09	0	1.12	0.52	6.28	4.82	-10.16	23.76	-0.42761
Social Democratic Party	0.41	1.93	5.66	0	0.14	0	0.55	0.28	1.93	12.55	10.48	-29.25	33.93	-0.86207
Freedom Party	0	2.61	2.61	0	0	0	0	0.87	0	10.44	4.35	-15.66	20.88	-0.75
NEOS	1.96	2.15	4.5	0	0.1	0.2	0	0.49	0	4.3	3.13	-8.21	16.83	-0.48782
The Greens	0.5	1.67	5.09	0	0	0	0.33	1.21	0.17	6.84	5.93	-17.4	21.74	-0.80037
Team Stronach	1.46	0.81	6.71	0.24	0.16	0	0	0.89	0	3.15	1.78	-10.66	15.2	-0.70132
Austria (October 2017)														
Austrian People's Party	4.62	5.97	1.72	0	0.07	0.57	0.18	0.11	0	6.26	4.19	-1.37	23.69	-0.05783
Social Democratic Party	0.15	4.48	5.1	0	1.87	0.11	0.33	1.47	0.33	8.63	7.82	-20.81	30.29	-0.68703
Freedom Party	0.22	2.88	1.11	0	0	0	0.22	1.99	0.44	5.53	4.87	-11.06	17.26	-0.64079
NEOS	3.17	1.59	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3.97	2.38	-1.59	11.11	-0.14311
PILZ	0	1.41	5.63	0	0	0	0	0	0	5.63	5.63	-15.48	18.3	-0.8459
Belgium (June 2010)														
New Flemish Alliance	2.43	0.52	2.21	0	0	0.22	0	0	0.22	4.56	8.68	-12.5	18.84	-0.66348
Socialist Party	0.13	2.59	9.88	0.89	0.09	0.09	0.22	2.1	0	20.3	3.08	-33.75	39.37	-0.85725
Christian Democratic and Flemish	2.4	1.52	5.39	0.05	0	0.1	0	0	0.44	6.56	6.81	-15.23	23.27	-0.65449
Reformist Movement	3.48	1.17	7.69	0.15	0	0.09	0.02	0.13	0	11.65	2.5	-17.4	26.88	-0.64732
Flemish Socialist Party	0	0.44	12.61	0.11	0	0.11	0	0.76	0.65	8.37	6.52	-28.47	29.57	-0.9628
Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats	2.68	0.44	1.81	0.25	0	0.06	0	0	0	3.74	10.92	-13.54	19.9	-0.6804
Vlaams Belang	2.93	0.29	1.47	0.15	0	0	0	0	0.59	0.59	3.67	-3.25	9.69	-0.3354
Humanist Democratic Centre	1.19	1.24	7.49	0.5	0.01	0.01	0.04	0.53	0	23.11	1.26	-30.5	35.38	-0.86207
Ecolo	0.06	2.13	4.76	0.22	0	0	0.69	3.6	0	14.68	3.07	-24.83	29.21	-0.85005
Groen!	0.65	0.6	5.68	0.15	0.1	0	0	0	0.1	7.09	5.08	-16.95	19.45	-0.87147
Lijst Dedecker	19.51	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2.44	0	17.07	21.95	0.777677
Belgium (May 2014)														
New Flemish Alliance	2.34	3.16	1.71	0.04	0.07	0.41	0	0.04	0	4.24	5.5	-5.69	17.51	-0.32496
Socialist Party	0.23	2.82	6.27	0.41	0.11	0.24	0.39	1.08	0.03	8.62	5.55	-19.17	25.75	-0.74447
Christian Democrats and Vlaams	0.9	2.54	0.94	0.29	0.12	0.33	0.16	0.57	0	5.8	4.06	-8.17	15.71	-0.52005
Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats	3.44	4.87	3.52	0.08	0	0.5	0	0	0	6.63	8.56	-9.98	27.6	-0.36159
Flemish Socialist Party	0.23	2.82	6.27	0.41	0.11	0.24	0.39	1.08	0.03	8.62	5.55	-19.17	25.75	-0.74447
Groen	0.16	1.07	8.06	0.15	0.05	0.07	0.07	0.86	0.18	5.26	4.63	-17.96	20.56	-0.87354
Vlaams Belang	0.39	0.92	0.92	0	0.13	0	0	0	0	5.64	3.54	-8.92	11.54	-0.77296
Worker's Party of Belgium	0	0	8.42	0.41	0.14	0	0.62	2.8	4.28	6.87	9.79	-33.33	33.33	-1

Denmark (September 2011)													
Venstre	6.64	1.77	0	0.44	0	0	5.31	0	0	20.8	5.31	-23.45	40.27	-0.58232
Social Democrats	0.59	1.77	1.18	0	0	0	4.73	4.73	0	13.61	7.1	-28.99	33.71	-0.85998
Danish People's Party	0.87	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5.78	0.58	-5.49	7.23	-0.75934
Social Liberals	1.58	3.94	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3.15	6.3	-3.93	14.97	-0.26253
Socialist People's Party	0	0.61	2.44	0.2	0	0	3.06	8.15	0	17.31	6.11	-36.66	37.88	-0.96779
Red-Green	0.22	0	5.33	1.56	0	0	0.22	9.56	0.89	9.56	12	-38.9	39.34	-0.98882
Liberal Alliance	14.94	6.9	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	8.05	0	13.79	29.89	0.461358
Conservative	10.56	1.41	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3.52	8.45	15.49	0.545513
Denmark (June 2015)														
Social Democrats	0	1.92	0	2.27	0	0.35	2.09	0	0	20.56	1.39	-24.04	28.58	-0.84115
Danish People's Party	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	25	0	-25	25	-1
Venstre	4.95	1.98	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	19.8	2.97	-15.84	29.7	-0.53333
Red-Green	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5.36	24.11	14.29	-43.76	43.76	-1
Liberal Alliance	18.52	0	0	0	0	0.93	0	0	0	3.7	0	15.75	23.15	0.680346
The Alternative	1.21	10.3	1.82	0	0	0	0	5.46	0	0.61	20.61	-16.99	40.01	-0.42464
Social Liberals	0	3.13	0	6.25	0	0	0	0	0	6.25	12.5	-21.87	28.13	-0.77746
Socialist People's Party	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	22.28	0.52	-22.8	22.8	-1
Conservative People's Party	34.29	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	34.29	34.29	1
Finland (April 2011)														
National Coalition Party	1.5	0.75	1.5	0.25	0	0	0.5	0	0	10	8.75	-18.75	23.25	-0.80645
Social Democratic Party of Finland	0	3.68	1.75	3.33	0.7	0.35	0.17	0	0.7	3.15	15.41	-21.18	29.24	-0.72435
True Finns	0.07	1.55	5.73	0.81	0	0.07	0.14	0.14	0.2	9.64	1.15	-16.12	19.5	-0.82667
Centre Party	1.33	2.46	2.08	0.28	0.1	0.1	0.76	0	0.66	10.98	4.83	-15.8	23.58	-0.67006
Left Alliance	0	0.58	5.81	1.16	0	0	0	1.74	0	24.42	8.72	-41.27	42.43	-0.97266
Green League	0.16	1.78	3.73	0.32	0.32	0.32	0	0	0	12.32	6.64	-21.07	25.59	-0.82337
Swedish People's Party	2.34	5.26	1.75	2.34	0	0	0.58	0	0	14.04	8.19	-19.3	34.5	-0.55942
Christian Democrats	0.31	3.61	3.13	0.31	0.63	0.16	0	0	0	18.65	8.46	-27.1	35.26	-0.76858
Finland (April 2015)														
Centre Party	0.87	7.39	0.87	0.44	0.87	0	0	0	0.44	12.61	6.09	-13.06	29.58	-0.44151
True Finns	0.78	1.94	3.16	0	1.28	0	0.17	0.39	0.06	16.81	1.72	-20.87	26.31	-0.79323
National Coalition Party	0	5.57	1.67	0	0.84	0.56	0	0	0	8.91	9.19	-14.48	26.74	-0.54151
Social Democratic Party	0	4.03	1.21	0.81	0.4	0	2.82	0	0	17.74	14.52	-33.47	41.53	-0.80592
Green League	0	1.8	0.72	0.72	0.36	0	0.36	0	0	15.83	8.63	-24.82	28.42	-0.87333
Left Alliance	0	0.54	4.81	0.54	0.36	0	3.03	0.54	0.71	12.48	9.8	-31.73	32.81	-0.96708
Swedish People's Party of Finland	0.76	3.56	2.29	0.25	0.25	0.51	0.51	0	0	8.91	9.41	-16.79	26.45	-0.63478
Christian Democrats	0.17	8.11	2.98	0	0.66	0.33	0.33	0	0.17	13.24	2.98	-11.75	28.97	-0.40559
France (June 2012)														
Union for a Popular Movement	0	5.09	2.12	0	0.21	0	0	0	0	9.32	0	-6.56	16.74	-0.39188
Socialist Party	0	4.67	12.62	0	0	0	0	0	0.94	11.22	1.4	-21.51	30.85	-0.69724
National Rally	0	2.02	8.08	0	1.01	0	0	0	0.34	11.45	1.01	-19.87	23.91	-0.83103
The Greens	0	1.06	12.21	0	0.18	0	0	0.09	0.35	13.36	2.12	-27.25	29.37	-0.92782
Radical Party of the Left	0	1.97	18.56	0	0	0	0	0.44	2.18	12.88	1.97	-34.06	38	-0.89632
New Center	0	6.11	2.78	0	0	0	0	0	0	17.5	0.97	-15.14	27.36	-0.55336
Centrist Alliance	1.39	5.56	13.89	0	0	0	0	0	0	2.78	2.78	-12.5	26.4	-0.47348
Left Front	0	1.34	11.78	0	0.13	0	0.13	1.87	1.47	14.73	1.87	-30.64	33.32	-0.91957
Centre for France	0	6.54	6.29	0	0	0	0	0	0.24	9.93	0.73	-10.65	23.73	-0.4488
Radical Party	0	4.54	5.94	0	0	0	0	0	0	13.99	1.75	-17.14	26.22	-0.6537
France (June 2017)														
The Republicans	2.34	3.5	0.39	0	1.95	0	0	0	0	6.23	8.56	-11.29	22.97	-0.49151
Socialist Party	0	0	0	0	1.32	0	0	1.32	0	17.11	9.21	-28.96	28.96	-1
National Rally	0.78	1.55	3.49	0.78	5.43	0	1.16	1.94	1.16	5.81	5.81	-23.25	27.91	-0.83303
En Marche	1.93	3.04	1.38	0.55	1.11	0	0	0	0	5.25	5.53	-8.85	18.79	-0.471
La France Insoumise	0	0	6.24	0	2.53	0	1.27	2.05	2.05	3.9	9.55	-27.59	27.59	-1
French Communist Party	0	0	2.78	0	0	0	2.78	8.33	0	0	27.78	-41.67	41.67	-1
Democratic Movement	0.22	1.99	5.75	1.11	0.66	0	0.44	0.44	0	6.42	3.98	-16.59	21.01	-0.78962
Union of Democrats and Independents	2.34	3.5	0.39	0	1.95	0	0	0	0	6.23	8.56	-11.29	22.97	-0.49151
Radical Party of the Left	0	5.21	6.52	0	0.56	0	1.3	0.56	0	4.84	5.59	-14.16	24.58	-0.57608
Germany (September 2013)														
Christian Democratic Union	1.98	4.43	4.62	0.35	0	0.58	0.54	0.23	0.16	4.82	3.46	-7.19	21.17	-0.33963
Social Democrats	0.79	2.97	7.87	0.1	0.04	0	0.48	1.03	0.66	10.04	7.73	-24.19	31.71	-0.76285
Alternative for Germany	1.37	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2.74	0	-1.37	4.11	-0.33333
Linke	0.16	0.97	3.32	0.28	0.45	0	0.81	2.23	3.28	9.63	10.64	-29.51	31.77	-0.92886
The Greens	0.55	1.22	6.15	0.09	0.07	0.17	0.37	0.55	0.31	6.5	5.25	-17.35	21.23	-0.81724
Free Democratic Party	6.88	5.83	7.61	0	0	0.72	0.1	0.19	0	3.95	5.63	-4.05	30.91	-0.13103
Germany (September 2017)														
Christian Democratic Union	0.89	4.25	5.22	0.22	0.22	0.15	1.49	1.64	0	6.18	4.1	-13.78	24.36	-0.56568
Social Democrats	0.19	2.76	3.59	0.04	0.04	0	0.23	5.41	0.11	7.26	6.35	-20.08	25.98	-0.7729
Alternative for Germany	4.08	2.29	3.98	0	1.2	0	0	1.49	0.6	3.59	2.79	-7.28	20.02	-0.36364
Linke	0	0.18	3.1	0	0.46	0	0.08	8.43	1.98	11.22	9.14	-34.23	34.59	-0.98959
The Greens	0.05	1.55	5.37	0	0	0	0.03	4.36	0.03	5.6	6.48	-20.27	23.47	-0.86366
Free Democratic Party	6.88	5.83	7.61	0	0	0.72	0.1	0.19	0	3.95	5.63	-4.05	30.91	-0.13103

Greece (June 2012)														
New Democracy	9.09	0	0	2.27	0	18.18	0	0	0	6.82	20.45	-2.27	56.81	-0.03996
Coalition of the Radical Left (Syriza)	0	0	0.8	0.18	0.44	0	0	0.53	2.93	8.43	8.43	-21.74	21.74	-1
Panhellenic Socialist Movement	0	6.12	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	8.16	6.12	-8.16	20.4	-0.4
Independent Greeks	1.29	0	0	0	9.68	0	0	2.58	1.94	6.45	1.94	-21.3	23.88	-0.89196
Popular Association-Golden Dawn	0	0	0	0	0.54	0	0	0.54	1.61	2.69	0	-5.38	5.38	-1
Democratic Left	0.06	0.95	0.51	0	0.13	0	0	2.02	0.51	6.08	0.44	-8.68	10.7	-0.81121
Communist Party of Greece	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5.52	1.84	14.11	-21.47	21.47	-1
Greece (January 2015)														
Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA)	0	0	1.99	0.66	0	0	2.65	0.66	1.99	18.54	10.6	-37.09	37.09	-1
New Democracy	4.94	8.64	2.47	0	0	0	0	0	0	20.37	8.64	-17.9	45.06	-0.39725
Popular Association-Golden Dawn	0	0	0	0	0.58	0	0	0	3.49	5.81	0	-9.88	9.88	-1
The River (Potami)	0.67	1.73	0.67	0.27	0.27	0	0	0	0	7.86	4.79	-11.46	16.26	-0.7048
Communist Party of Greece	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1.61	1.61	-3.22	3.22	-1
Independent Greeks	3.85	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3.85	0	0	7.7	0
Panhellenic Socialist Movement	0	1.03	1.88	0.34	1.03	1.54	0	0	0.17	16.1	2.4	-19.35	24.49	-0.79012
Italy (February 2013)														
Left Ecology Freedom	0	2.51	1	0	0	0	0	0	1.51	5.53	5.86	-11.39	16.41	-0.69409
Five Star Movement	0	2.58	23.23	0	0	0	0	0	0.65	14.19	1.29	-36.78	41.94	-0.87697
Partito Democratico	0	0.49	3.43	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	9.8	-12.74	13.72	-0.92857
South Tyrolean People's Party	2.92	1.69	2.46	0	0.31	0	0	0.46	0	6.3	4.15	-9.07	18.29	-0.4959
The People of Freedom	2.38	16.19	6.19	0.48	0	0	0	0	0	6.67	3.33	1.9	35.24	0.053916
Brothers of Italy	3.47	7.38	3.47	0	0	0	0	0	0	6.07	4.12	-2.81	24.51	-0.11465
Northern League	2.38	16.19	6.19	0.48	0	0	0	0	0	6.67	3.33	1.9	35.24	0.053916
Civic Choice	0	5.66	3.27	0	0	0	0	0	0	7.74	3.57	-8.92	20.24	-0.44071
Union of the Center	2.39	2.63	0.95	0	0	0	0	0	0	2.15	2.86	-0.94	10.98	-0.08561
Aosta Valley	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	9.09	9.09	-18.18	18.18	-1
Italy (March 2018)														
Lega Nord	0.23	3.51	4.2	0	0.92	0	0	2.21	0	4.81	2.06	-10.46	17.94	-0.58305
Forza Italia	5.21	7.29	1.04	0	0	0	0	0	0	9.38	0	2.08	22.92	0.09075
Fratelli d'Italia	0	5.5	4.95	0	4.95	0	0	0	1.1	8.79	1.65	-15.94	26.94	-0.59169
Noi com Italia	0	12.92	7.3	0	0	1.12	0	0	0	6.74	0.56	-0.56	28.64	-0.01955
Five Star Movement	0.08	0.83	4.73	0.11	0.35	0.09	0.34	0.49	0.45	3.09	1.55	-10.11	12.11	-0.83485
Partito Democratico	0.16	4.6	1.17	1.17	0.08	0.23	0.16	1.01	0	9.52	5.46	-13.58	23.56	-0.5764
Più Europa	3	5.76	0.46	0	0	0.69	0	0	0	5.99	2.77	0.23	18.67	0.012319
Insieme	0	1.43	1.19	0	0	0	0	0	0	8.08	5.46	-13.3	16.16	-0.82302
Civica Popolare	0.9	13.51	0.9	0	0	0	0	0	0	16.67	6.31	-9.47	38.29	-0.24732
SVP–PATT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-
Netherlands (September 2012)														
Christian Democratic Appeal	2.94	1.34	1.59	0	0	0.17	0	0	0.17	6.63	2.1	-6.04	14.94	-0.40428
Labour Party	1.96	1.09	3.8	0.07	0.11	0.07	1.01	0.72	1.2	5.14	6.59	-15.52	21.76	-0.71324
Party for Freedom	7.74	1.4	2.27	0	0	0.17	0	0	0	2.73	4.54	-0.23	18.85	-0.0122
Democraten'66	3.52	1.14	3.27	0	0	0.26	0	0	0	5.81	1.5	-5.66	15.5	-0.36516
GroenLinks	0.46	0.33	4.36	0	0.13	0.46	0.33	0.07	0	4.43	3.31	-11.38	13.88	-0.81988
Socialists	0	0.59	6.26	0	0.13	0.2	0.52	0.98	2.22	8.67	3.13	-21.12	22.7	-0.9304
ChristenUnie	3.07	1.52	5.92	0	0.04	0.04	0	0	0.19	3.62	2.11	-7.25	16.51	-0.43913
Party for the Animals	0	0.17	2.77	0.34	0.08	0.08	0	0.08	0.42	4.03	0.5	-7.97	8.47	-0.94097
50Plus	0.48	0	1.94	0	0	0	0	0	0.97	11.16	2.91	-16.5	17.46	-0.94502
Reformed Political Party	2.81	0.44	1.38	0	0.06	0.06	0	0	0	2.81	1.38	-2.32	8.94	-0.25951
Party for Freedom	2.16	0.22	1.62	0	0	0.32	1.51	0.11	0.32	3.99	1.62	-6.47	11.87	-0.54507
Netherlands (March 2017)														
Christian Democratic Appeal	1.27	0.64	6.5	0	0.21	0	0.56	4.24	0.42	10.18	0.42	-20.62	24.44	-0.8437
Labour Party	0.32	0.5	2.74	0.59	0.69	0	0.09	6.26	1.64	8.68	0.46	-20.33	21.97	-0.92535
Party for Freedom	4	0	4	0	0	0.07	0	4	0	12	0	-15.93	24.07	-0.66182
Democraten'66	2.68	1.23	2.39	0.03	0.24	0	0.29	2	0.03	5.83	0.53	-7.43	15.25	-0.48721
GroenLinks	0.35	0.18	1.85	0	0.44	0	0.53	2.73	1.06	6.26	0.79	-13.13	14.19	-0.9253
Socialists	0.23	0.58	4.44	0.23	0.47	0	0	4.68	2.69	7.95	1.29	-20.94	22.56	-0.92819
ChristenUnie	0.42	2.02	4.98	0.3	0.84	0	0	1.18	0.49	7.68	1.41	-14.44	19.32	-0.74741
Party for the Animals	0.21	0.7	5.96	0	3.08	0.07	0	2.24	0.77	5.47	0.56	-17.1	19.06	-0.89717
50Plus	0.2	1.01	2.22	0.61	0	0	0	3.64	0.81	31.31	0	-37.38	39.8	-0.9392
Reformed Political Party	0.92	1.35	0.59	0.08	0.59	0	0	2.77	0.13	5.63	0.25	-7.77	12.31	-0.63119
Denk	0.8	5.61	2.17	0	0.57	0	0	1.6	0.57	16.59	0.34	-15.43	28.25	-0.54619
Forum for Democracy	8.63	1.57	0	0	0	0	0	0	2.75	0.98	0.2	6.27	14.13	0.443737
Norway (September 2013)														
Labour Party	0.04	0.22	1.12	0	0.04	0	0.48	0	0.82	17.02	4.46	-23.68	24.2	-0.97851
Conservative Party	2.05	0.73	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	17.44	2.2	-16.86	22.42	-0.75201
Progress Party	4.92	1.51	0.12	0	0	0	0.2	0	0.04	14.73	3.06	-11.72	24.58	-0.47681
Christian Democratic Party	0.03	0.81	1.47	0	0.14	0.06	0	0.03	0.22	16.24	2.03	-19.23	21.03	-0.91441
Centre Party	0	0.35	0.99	0	0	0	0	0	0.7	16.06	1.81	-19.21	19.91	-0.96484
Liberal Party	1.51	1	0.7	0	0	0	0.08	0.08	0	14.53	1.7	-14.58	19.6	-0.74388
Socialist Left Party	0	0.3	1.8	0.19	0	0	0.17	0.28	0.75	15.25	6.3	-24.44	25.04	-0.97604
Green Party	0	0	0.85	0	0	0	0.3	1.09	0.06	8.61	1.15	-12.06	12.06	-1

Norway (September 2017)														
Labour Party	0.04	0.89	7.36	0.97	0.13	0	0.04	0.09	1.48	11.81	6.22	-27.17	29.03	-0.93593
Conservative Party	2.92	5.21	0.83	1.51	0.16	0.21	0.26	0.1	0.42	11.09	3.12	-9.15	25.83	-0.35424
Progress Party	11.89	1.05	2.97	0.26	0	2.01	0	0.1	0.1	10.36	1.15	0.01	29.89	0.000335
Centre Party	1.63	2.43	4.4	0.42	0.68	0	0.08	0.19	1.22	13.93	2.28	-19.14	27.26	-0.70213
Socialist Left Party	0	1.5	6.45	0.22	0.14	0	0.11	0.97	1.54	11.36	3.23	-22.52	25.52	-0.88245
Liberal Party	1.79	2.04	5.38	0.63	0.14	0.73	0.52	0.35	0.08	8.24	1.9	-12.68	21.8	-0.58165
Christian Democratic Party	0.48	1.3	3.98	0.24	0.07	0	0.1	0.36	0.34	14.11	1.57	-18.99	22.55	-0.84213
Green Party	0	2.04	3.36	0.73	0.2	0.29	0	0.1	0.63	7.93	1.36	-11.98	16.64	-0.71995
Red Party	0	0.1	5.49	0	0.4	0	0.05	0.5	1.73	14.39	5.64	-28.1	28.3	-0.99293
Sweden (September 2010)														
Moderate Party	1.64	4.06	0.69	0	0	0.32	0.05	0	0	11.97	0.79	-7.48	19.52	-0.3832
Swedish Social Democratic Party	0	3.55	1.06	2.13	0.35	0	0	0	0	25.89	3.9	-29.78	36.88	-0.80748
Sweden Democrats	0.49	5.88	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	13.73	0	-7.36	20.1	-0.36617
Green Party	0	5.72	1.15	0.38	0	0	0	0	0	11.83	1.15	-8.79	20.23	-0.4345
Centre Party	4.74	5.01	0	0.26	0	0	0	0	0	8.83	0.66	0	19.5	0
Left Party	0	0	0	1.18	0	0	0	0	0.79	16.14	12.99	-31.1	31.1	-1
Liberals	0.66	3.38	1.53	0	0	0.66	0	0	0	15.94	0.22	-12.99	22.39	-0.58017
Christian Democrats	2.09	3.76	0	0.21	0	0.63	0	0	0	17.12	0	-10.85	23.81	-0.45569
Sweden (September 2014)														
Moderate Party (Sweden)	3.61	1.22	0.73	0.49	0.12	0.92	0.8	0	0.61	12.65	11.49	-21.14	32.64	-0.64767
Swedish Social Democratic Party (Swed	0.37	2.58	0.18	1.66	0.18	0	0	0	0.18	19.89	17.5	-36.64	42.54	-0.86131
Sweden Democrats (Sweden)	0.95	2.53	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	16.46	8.54	-21.52	28.48	-0.75562
Green Party	0.6	1.41	0.2	0.2	0	0	0	0	0.4	11.07	10.66	-20.52	24.54	-0.83619
Centre Party	5.53	7.89	0	0.26	0	0.79	0	0	0	5	10	-1.05	29.47	-0.03563
Left Party	0	1.39	0.56	1.39	0	0	0	0	0	19.72	17.78	-38.06	40.84	-0.93193
Liberals	0.69	2.29	0	0	0	2.52	0.69	0	0	5.5	9.86	-10.55	21.55	-0.48956
Christian Democrats	0.51	6.17	0	0	0	0	0.51	0	0	21.08	4.11	-19.02	32.38	-0.5874
Switzerland (October 2011)														
Christian Democratic Party	0	0.68	6.76	0	0	0	0	0	2.03	14.87	2.7	-25.68	27.04	-0.9497
Social Democratic Party	0	0	15.49	0	0	0	0	8.45	0	28.17	2.82	-54.93	54.93	-1
Swiss People's Party	0.83	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.83	0	1.66	0
Free Democratic Party	0.96	4.33	0.48	0	0	0	0	0	0	12.98	5.77	-13.94	24.52	-0.56852
Green Party	0	0	0	0	1.68	0	0	0.24	1.2	5.53	0.72	-9.37	9.37	-1
Green Liberal Party	0	1.41	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	16.9	0	-15.49	18.31	-0.84599
Conservative Democratic Party	0	1.3	6.49	0	0	0	0	0	0	1.3	0	-6.49	9.09	-0.71397
Evangelical People's Party	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	24	0	-24	24	-1
Geneva Citizen's Movement	0	5.26	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	15.79	5.26	-15.79	26.31	-0.60015
Switzerland (October 2015)														
Christian Democratic Party	0.72	2.88	5.75	0	0	0.36	0	0	0.72	17.63	1.08	-21.22	29.14	-0.72821
Social Democratic Party	0	0	3.85	0	0	0	0	5.38	0	25.39	12.31	-46.93	46.93	-1
Swiss People's Party	10.01	1.43	4.82	0	0	0.68	0	0.07	0	1.28	0.53	5.42	18.82	0.287991
Free Democratic Party	0.9	0	2.7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1.8	-3.6	5.4	-0.66667
Green Party	0	0.59	0.99	0	2.17	0	0	3.94	0	5.33	2.56	-14.4	15.58	-0.92426
Green Liberal Party	3.11	0.44	4	0	0.44	0.44	1.33	3.11	0	2.22	0	-7.11	15.09	-0.47117
Conservative Democratic Party	1.82	0	2.74	0	0	0	0	0	0	9.73	0.3	-10.95	14.59	-0.75051
Evangelical People's Party	0.36	0.36	5.41	0	0.9	0.18	0	3.42	0.72	5.59	2.34	-17.48	19.28	-0.90664
Swiss Party of Labour	0	0	0	0	0.57	0	0	4.53	3.4	8.21	6.52	-23.23	23.23	-1
Geneva Citizen's Movement	0	4.76	0	0	9.52	0	0	0	0	0	0	-4.76	14.28	-0.33333
United Kingdom (May 2010)														
Conservative Party	0.63	3.33	1.8	0.27	0	0	0	0	0	5.22	1.08	-4.41	12.33	-0.35766
Labour Party	0.35	3.44	2.03	0.97	0	0	0	0	0	8.21	4.06	-11.48	19.06	-0.60231
United Kingdom Independence Party	1.48	2.13	2.04	0.19	0.37	2.41	0.56	0.09	0	14.54	2.31	-14.08	26.12	-0.53905
Scottish National Party	0.38	2.29	5.84	0	0	1.52	0	0.89	0.38	17.66	6.86	-27.44	35.82	-0.76605
Liberal Democrats	0.25	2.7	3.07	0.86	0	0	0	0	0.37	3.68	1.84	-6.87	12.77	-0.53798
Democratic Unionist Party	1.62	2.31	0.23	0.23	0	4.62	0	1.85	0	4.62	3.23	-1.61	18.71	-0.08605
Sinn Fein	0	0.52	0.52	0	0	5.18	0	0	0.52	13.47	5.18	-13.99	25.39	-0.551
United Kingdom (June 2015)														
Conservative Party	1.26	2.65	4.97	5.86	0.38	0	0.57	0.57	0	8.69	1.57	-18.7	26.52	-0.70513
Labour Party	0.3	0.79	8.13	0.4	0.1	0	0.99	1.19	0.3	12.79	6.94	-29.75	31.93	-0.93173
Scottish National Party	0	6.05	7.62	2.24	0.45	0	2.69	1.91	0.79	13.9	2.92	-26.47	38.57	-0.68628
Liberal Democrats	0.47	1.25	6.42	0.1	0.36	0	0.16	0.52	0.1	10.12	2.4	-18.46	21.9	-0.84292
Democratic Unionist	0.44	5.24	2.62	0	0	0	0	0	0	5.68	0.44	-3.06	14.42	-0.21221
Sinn Fein	0	5.88	0.73	0	0	0	0	0.73	0	9.56	5.51	-10.65	22.41	-0.47523
Plaid Cymru	0	1.42	6.19	0.26	0.26	0	0.13	1.16	1.55	11.73	4	-23.86	26.7	-0.89363
Social Democratic and Labour	0	1.72	2.7	0	0	0	0	0.49	0	16.22	3.44	-21.13	24.57	-0.85999
Ulster Unionist	0	6.71	3.36	0	0	0	0	1.2	0	14.15	0	-12	25.42	-0.47207
United Kingdom Independence Party	0.82	3.71	5.19	1.04	2.89	0.59	0.22	0.15	0.3	15.13	1.41	-21.21	31.45	-0.6744
Green Party	0	0.09	6.85	0	0.09	0	0.31	0.63	3.09	10.78	2.86	-24.52	24.7	-0.99271
United States (November 2012)														
Republican Party	5.85	1.37	1.08	0	0.9	1.08	0	0	0	3.58	3.17	-0.43	17.03	-0.02525
Democratic Party	0.59	2.93	4.39	0	0.22	1.9	0	0.29	0	5.42	6.15	-11.05	21.89	-0.5048
United States (November 2016)														
Republican Party	9.71	1.82	3.15	0	0.36	0.46	0	0	0	2.28	1.55	4.65	19.33	0.240559
Democratic Party	0.47	1.01	9.62	0	0.13	0.27	0.27	0.27	0	7.73	5.04	-21.31	24.81	-0.85893

Work Cited

1961 West Germany Census.

Aarts, Kees, Stuart Elaine Macdonald, and George Rabinowitz. 1999. "Issues and Party Competition in the Netherlands." *Comparative Political Studies* 32(1): 63-99.

Aarts, Kees, and Jacques Thomassen. 2008. "Dutch Voters and the Changing Party Space 1989–2006." *Acta Politica* 43(2): 203-234.

Abedi, Amir, and Thomas Carl Lundberg. 2009. "Doomed to Failure? UKIP and the Organisational Challenges Facing Right-Wing Populist Anti-Political Establishment Parties." *Parliamentary Affairs* 62(1): 72-87.

Abts, Koen, and Stefan Rummens. 2007. "Populism versus Democracy." *Political Studies* 55(2): 405-424.

Abramowitz, Alan, and Jennifer McCoy. 2019. "United States: Racial Resentment, Negative Partisanship, and Polarization in Trump's America." *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 681(1): 137-156.

Abramowitz, Alan I., and Kyle L. Saunders. 2008. "Is Polarization a Myth?." *The Journal of Politics* 70(2): 542-555.

Abramowitz, Alan, and Ruy Teixeira. 2009. "The Decline of the White Working Class and the Rise of a Mass Upper-Middle Class." *Political Science Quarterly* 124(3): 391-422.

Abramson, Paul R. 1976. "Generational Change and the Decline of Party Identification in America: 1952–1974." *American Political Science Review* 70(2): 469-478.

Adam, Ilke, and Kris Deschouwer. 2016. "Nationalist Parties and Immigration in Flanders: From Volksunie to Spirit and N-VA." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 42(8): 1290-1303.

Adams, James, Michael Clark, Lawrence Ezrow, and Garrett Glasgow. 2006. "Are Niche Parties Fundamentally Different from Mainstream Parties? The Causes and the Electoral Consequences of Western European Parties' Policy Shifts, 1976–1998." *American Journal of Political Science* 50(3): 513-529.

Adorno, Theodore, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel J. Levinson, R. Nevitt Sanford. 1950. *The Authoritarian Personality.* New York, NY: Harper.

Afonso, Alexandre. 2005. "When the Export of Social Problems is no Longer Possible: Immigration Policies and Unemployment in Switzerland." *Social Policy & Administration* 39(6): 653-668.

Afonso, Alexandre, and Yannis Papadopoulos. 2015. "How the Populist Radical Right Transformed Swiss Welfare Politics: From Compromises to Polarization." *Swiss Political Science Review* 21(4): 617-635.

Afonso, Alexandre, and Line Rennwald. 2018. "Social Class and the Changing Welfare State Agenda of Radical Right Parties in Europe," in Phillip Manow, Bruno Palier, and Hanna Schwander. Eds. *Welfare Democracies and Party Politics: Explaining Electoral Dynamics in Times of Changing Welfare Capitalism*, pgs. 171-194. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Afonso, Alexandre, Sotirios Zartaloudis, and Yannis Papadopoulos. 2015. "How Party Linkages Shape Austerity Politics: Clientelism and Fiscal Adjustment in Greece and Portugal During the Eurozone Crisis." *Journal of European Public Policy* 22(3): 315-334.

Aichholzer, Julian, and Johanna Willmann. 2014. "Forecasting Austrian National Elections: The Grand Coalition Model." *International Journal of Forecasting* 30(1): 55-64.

Akkerman, Agnes, Cas Mudde, and Andrej Zaslove. 2014. "How Populist are the People? Measuring Populist Attitudes in Voters." *Comparative Political Studies* 47(9): 1324-1353.

Albertazzi, Daniele, and Duncan McDonnell. 2007. "Introduction: The Sceptre and the Spectre." In *Twenty-First Century Populism*, eds Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave. 1-15.

Aldana, Raquel. 2016. "Congressional Dysfunction and Executive Lawmaking During the Obama Administration." *Chi.-Kent L. Rev.* 91: 3-12.

Aldrich, John H. 1995. *Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America.* Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Aldrich, John H., and Daniel J. Lee. 2016. "Why Two Parties? Ambition, Policy, and the Presidency." *Political Science Research and Methods* 4(2): 275-292.

Algan, Yann, Christian Dustmann, Albrecht Glitz, and Alan Manning. 2010. "The Economic Situation of First and Second-Generation Immigrants in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom." *The Economic Journal.* 120(February): F4-F30.

Allen, Christopher S. 2009. "'Empty Nets' Social Democracy and the 'Catch-All Party Thesis' in Germany and Sweden." *Party Politics* 15(5): 635-653.

Allen, David Y. 1981. "Modern Conservatism: The Problem of Definition." *The Review of Politics* 43(4): 582-603.

Allen, Trevor J. 2017. "All in the Party Family? Comparing Far Right Voters in Western and Post-Communist Europe." *Party Politics* 23(3): 274-285.

Allern, Elin Haugsgjerd. 2013. "The Contemporary Relationship of 'New Left'and 'New Right' Parties with Interest Groups: Exceptional or Mainstream? The Case of Norway's Socialist Left and Progress Party." *Scandinavian Political Studies* 36(1): 67-90.

Allern, Elin Haugsgjerd, and Nicholas Aylott. 2009. "Overcoming the Fear of Commitment: Pre-Electoral Coalitions in Norway and Sweden." *Acta Política* 44(3): 259-285.

Almond, Gabriel A. 1988. "Separate Tables: Schools and Sects in Political Science." *PS: Political Science & Politics* 21(4): 828-842.

Alonso, Sonia, and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser. 2015. "Spain: No Country for the Populist Radical Right?." *South European Society and Politics* 20(1): 21-45.

Amengay, Abdelkarim, and Daniel Stockemer. 2019. "The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Meta-Analysis of Structural Factors." *Political Studies Review* 17(1): 30-40.

Anckar, Dag. 2002. "Why are Small Island States Democracies?." *The Round Table* 91(365): 375-390.

Andersen, Hans Skifter. 2017. "Selective Moving Behaviour in Ethnic Neighbourhoods: White Flight, White Avoidance, Ethnic Attraction or Ethnic Retention?." *Housing Studies* 32(3): 296-318.

Andersen, Jorgen Goul. 1986. "Electoral Trends in Denmark in the 1980's." *Scandinavian Political Studies* 9(2): 157-175.

Andersen, Jørgen Goul, and Tor Bjørklund. 1990. "Structural Changes and New Cleavages: The Progress Parties in Denmark and Norway." *Acta Sociologica* 33(3): 195-217.

ANES 1948-2012 Codebook.

Archdeacon, Thomas J. 1992. "Reflections on Immigration to Europe in Light of US Immigration History." *International Migration Review* 26(2): 525-548.

Art, David. 2007. "Reacting to the Radical Right: Lessons from Germany and Austria." *Party Politics* 13(3): 331-349.

Art, David. 2018. "The AfD and the End of Containment in Germany?." *German Politics and Society* 36(2): 76-86.

Arter, David. 2009. "From a Contingent Party System to Party System Convergence? Mapping Party System Change in Postwar Finland." *Scandinavian Political Studies* 32(2): 221-239.

Arter, David. 2010. "The Breakthrough of Another West European Populist Radical Right Party? The Case of the True Finns." *Government and Opposition* 45(4): 484-504.

Arzheimer, Kai. 2009. "Contextual Factors and the Extreme Right Vote in Western Europe, 1980–2002." *American Journal of Political Science* 53(2): 259-275.

Arzheimer, Kai. 2015. "The AfD: Finally a Successful Right-Wing Populist Eurosceptic Party for Germany?." *West European Politics* 38(3): 535-556.

Arzheimer, Kai, 2018. “Explaining Electoral Support for the Radical Right,” in *The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right*. Jens Rydgren, Oxford, UK Oxford University Press, 143–165.

Arzheimer, Kai, and Elisabeth Carter. 2009. "Christian Religiosity and Voting for West European Radical Right Parties." *West European Politics* 32(5): 985-1011.

Arzheimer, Kai, and Carl C. Berning. 2019. "How the Alternative for Germany (AfD) and Their Voters Veered to the Radical Right, 2013–2017." *Electoral Studies* 60(2019): 1-10.

Ashbee, Edward. 1998. "Immigration, National Identity, and Conservatism in the United States." *Politics* 18(2): 73-80.

Aslanidis, Paris, and Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser. 2016. "Dealing with Populists in Government: the SYRIZA-ANEL Coalition in Greece." *Democratization* 23(6): 1077-1091.

Aslanidis, Paris. 2016. "Is Populism an Ideology? A Refutation and a New Perspective." *Political Studies* 64(1_suppl): 88-104.

Aslanidis, Paris, and Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser. 2016. "Dealing with Populists in Government: The SYRIZA-ANEL Coalition in Greece." *Democratization* 23(6): 1077-1091.

Awan, Akil N. 2008. "Antecedents of Islamic Political Radicalism among Muslim Communities in Europe." *PS: Political Science and Politics* 41(1): 13-17.

Axelrod, David. 1984. *The Evolution of Cooperation.* New York, NY: Basic Books.

Aylott, Nicholas, and Niklas Bolin. 2007. "Towards a Two-Party System? The Swedish Parliamentary Election of September 2006." *West European Politics* 30(3): 621-633.

Bailer-Galanda, Brigitta and Wolfgang Neugebauer 1997. *Haider und die Freiheitlichen in Österreich*. Berlin, Germany: Elefanten Press.

Baker, Kendall L. 1974. "The Acquisition of Partisanship in Germany." *American Journal of Political Science* 18(3): 569-582.

Bakker, Ryan, Catherine De Vries, Erica Edwards, Liesbet Hooghe, Seth Jolly, Gary Marks, Jonathan Polk, Jan Rovny, Marco Steenbergen, and Milada Anna Vachudova. 2015. "Measuring Party Positions in Europe: The Chapel Hill Expert Survey Trend File, 1999–2010." *Party Politics* 21(1): 143-152.

Bale, Tim. 2003. "Cinderella and Her Ugly Sisters: The Mainstream and Extreme Right in Europe's Bipolarising Party Systems." *West European Politics* 26(3): 67-90.

Bale, Tim. 2018. "Who Leads and Who Follows? The Symbiotic Relationship between UKIP and the Conservatives–and Populism and Euroscepticism." *Politics* 38(3): 263-277.

Bale, Tim, and Torbjörn Bergman. 2006. "Captives No Longer, but Servants Still? Contract Parliamentarism and the New Minority Governance in Sweden and New Zealand." *Government and Opposition* 41(3): 422-449.

Balliet, Daniel, Junhui Wu, and Carsten KW De Dreu. 2014. "Ingroup Favoritism in Cooperation: A Meta-Analysis." *Psychological Bulletin* 140(6): 1556-1581.

Barbalet, Jack. 1998. *Emotion, Social Theory and Social Structure*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Bardi, Luciano. 1996. "Anti-Party Sentiment and Party System Change in Italy." *European Journal of Political Research* 29(3): 345-363.

Barr, Robert R. 2009. "Populists, Outsiders and Anti-Establishment Politics." *Party Politics* 15(1): 29-48.

Bartels, Larry M. 1999. "Panel Effects in the American National Election Studies." *Political Analysis* 8(1): 1-20.

Batifoulier, Philippe, Nicolas Da Silva, and Victor Duchesne. 2019. "The Dynamics of Conventions: The Case of the French Social Security System." *Historical Social Research/Historische Sozialforschung* 44(1(167)): 258-284.

Baudewyns, Pierre, Régis Dandoy, and Min Reuchamps. 2015. "The Success of the Regionalist Parties in the 2014 Elections in Belgium." *Regional & Federal Studies* 25(1): 91-102.

Bay, Ann-Helén, Henning Finseraas, and Axel West Pedersen. 2013. "Welfare Dualism in Two Scandinavian Welfare States: Public Opinion and Party Politics." *West European Politics* 36(1): 199-220.

Bednar, Jenna. 2011. “The Political Science of Federalism.” *Annual Review of Law and Social Science* 2011(7): 269-288.

Bennett, W. Lance, and Bart R. Salisbury. 1987. "Rational Choice: The Emerging Paradigm in Election Studies." *Research in Micropolitics* 2: 1-30.

Berbuir, Nicole, Marcel Lewandowsky, and Jasmin Siri. 2015. "The AfD and Its Sympathisers: Finally a Right-Wing Populist Movement in Germany?." *German Politics* 24(2): 154-178.

Bergh, Johannes. 2004. "Protest Voting in Austria, Denmark, and Norway." *Scandinavian Political Studies* 27(4): 367-389.

Bergman, Torbjörn. 2004. "Sweden: Democratic Reforms and Partisan Decline in an Emerging Separation-of-Powers System." *Scandinavian Political Studies* 27(2): 203-225.

Bergounioux, Alain. and Gérard Grunberg. 1992. *Le Long Remords du Pouvoir: Le Parti Socialist Français*. Paris, France: Fayard.

Berezin, Mabel. 2017. "On the Construction Sites of History: Where Did Donald Trump Come From?." *American Journal of Cultural Sociology* 5(3): 322-337.

Bernhard, Laurent. 2016. "The 2015 Swiss Federal Elections: The Radical Right Strikes Back." *West European Politics* 39(4): 879-889.

Bernhard, Laurent. 2017. "Three Faces of Populism in Current Switzerland: Comparing the Populist Communication of the Swiss People's Party, the Ticino League, and the Geneva Citizens’ Movement." *Swiss Political Science Review* 23(4): 509-525.

Bernhard, Laurent, and Hanspeter Kriesi. 2019. "Populism in Election Times: A Comparative Analysis of 11 Countries in Western Europe." *West European Politics* 42(6): 1188-1208.

Bettiza, Gregorio. 2014. "Civilizational Analysis in International Relations: Mapping the Field and Advancing a "Civilizational Politics" Line of Research." *International Studies Review* 16(1): 1-28.

Betz, Hans-George. 1993. "The New Politics of Resentment: Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western Europe." *Comparative Politics* 25(4): 413-427.

Betz, Hans-Georg. 1994. "The End of Post-War Politics in Italy: The Landmark 1992 Elections." *SAIS Review* 14(2): 172-173.

Betz, Hans-Georg. 2001. "Exclusionary Populism in Austria, Italy, and Switzerland." *International Journal* 56(3): 393-420.

Betz, Hans-Georg, and Susi Meret. 2009. "Revisiting Lepanto: The Political Mobilization against Islam in Contemporary Western Europe." *Patterns of Prejudice* 43(3-4): 313-334.

Bhambra, Gurminder K. 2017. "The Current Crisis of Europe: Refugees, Colonialism, and the Limits of Cosmopolitanism." *European Law Journal* 23(5): 395-405.

Bielawska, Agnieszka. 2019. "Christian Democrat Policy in the Face of the Influx of Syrian Immigrants to the Federal Republic of Germany (2015–2017)." *Środkowoeuropejskie Studia Polityczne* 3(2019): 147-180.

Bilsky, Wolfgang, Michael Janik, and Shalom H. Schwartz. 2011. "The Structural Organization of Human Values-Evidence from Three Rounds of the European Social Survey (ESS)." *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology* 42(5): 759-776.

Bjerkem, Johan. 2016. "The Norwegian Progress Party: An Established Populist Party." *European View* 15(2): 233-243.

Bjørklund, Tor. 1992. "Unemployment and Party Choice in Norway." *Scandinavian Political Studies* 15(4): 329-352.

Bjørklund, Tor. 2007. "Unemployment and the Radical Right in Scandinavia: Beneficial or Non-Beneficial for Electoral Support?." *Comparative European Politics* 5(3): 245-263.

Blais, Andre, Donald Blake, and Stephane Dion. "Do Parties Make a Difference? Parties and the Size of Government in Liberal Democracies." *American Journal of Political Science* 37(1): 40-62.

Blanton, Hart, Jennifer Crocker, and Dale T. Miller. 2000. "The Effects of In-Group versus Out-Group Social Comparison on Self-Esteem in the Context of a Negative Stereotype." *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 36(5): 519-530.

Bobba, Giuliano, Cristina Cremonesi, Moreno Mancosu, and Antonella Seddone. 2018. "Populism and the Gender Gap: Comparing Digital Engagement with Populist and Non-

Populist Facebook Pages in France, Italy, and Spain." *The International Journal of Press/Politics* 23(4): 458-475.

Bobba, Giuliano, and Franca Roncarolo. 2018. "The Likeability of Populism on Social Media in the 2018 Italian General Election." *Italian Political Science* 13(1): 51-62.

Bobbio, Noberto. 1997. *Left and Right: The Significance of a Political Distinction.* Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Bocskor, Ákos. 2018. "Anti-Immigration Discourses in Hungary During the 'Crisis' Year: The Orbán Government's 'National Consultation' Campaign of 2015." *Sociology* 52(3): 551-568.

Bodlos, Anita, and Carolina Plescia. 2018. "The 2017 Austrian Snap Election: A Shift Rightward." *West European Politics* 41(6): 1354-1363.

Böhmelt, Tobias, Vincenzo Bove, and Enzo Nussio. 2020. "Can Terrorism abroad Influence Migration Attitudes at Home?." *American Journal of Political Science* 64(3): 437-451.

Bohrer, Robert E., and Glen S. Krutz. 2005. "The Devolved Party Systems of the United Kingdom: Sub-National Variations from the National Model." *Party Politics* 11(6): 654-673.

Boix, Carles. 1999. "Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies." American Political Science Review 93(3): 609-624.

Bolin, Niklas, and Nicholas Aylott. 2019. "Right-Wing Populist Party Leadership in Sweden: One of a Kind or One of the Crowd?." *Polish Political Science Review* 7(1): 24-40.

Bonikowski, Bart. 2017. "Ethno-nationalist Populism and the Mobilization of Collective Resentment." *The British Journal of Sociology* 68 (S1): S181-S213.

Boomgaarden, Hajo G., and Rens Vliegenthart. 2009. "How News Content Influences Anti-Immigration Attitudes: Germany, 1993–2005." *European Journal of Political Research* 48(4): 516-542.

Borenstein, Michael, Larry V. Hedges, Julian PT Higgins, and Hannah R. Rothstein. 2010. "A Basic Introduction to Fixed-Effect and Random-Effects Models for Meta-Analysis." *Research Synthesis Methods* 1(2): 97-111.

Bornschier, Simon. 2010. "The New Cultural Divide and the Two-Dimensional Political Space in Western Europe." *West European Politics* 33(3): 419-444.

Bornschier, Simon. 2012. "Why a Right-Wing Populist Party Emerged in France but not in Germany: Cleavages and Actors in the Formation of a New Cultural Divide." *European Political Science Review* 4(1): 121-145.

Borre, Ole, and Daniel Katz. 1973. "Party Identification and its Motivational Base in a Multiparty System: A Study of the Danish General Election of 1971." *Scandinavian Political Studies* (1973): 69-111.

Bos, Linda, and Kees Brants. 2014. "Populist Rhetoric in Politics and Media: A Longitudinal Study of the Netherlands." *European Journal of Communication* 29(6): 703-719.

Bos, Linda, Penelope Sheets, and Hajo G. Boomgaarden. 2018. "The Role of Implicit Attitudes in Populist Radical-Right Support." *Political Psychology* 39(1): 69-87.

Bowen, John R. 2009. "Recognising Islam in France after 9/11." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 35(3): 439-452.

Bowyer, Benjamin. 2008. "Local Context and Extreme Right Support in England: The British National Party in the 2002 and 2003 Local Elections." *Electoral Studies* 27(4): 611-620.

Bråmå, Åsa. 2006. "'White Flight'? The Production and Reproduction of Immigrant Concentration Areas in Swedish Cities, 1990-2000." *Urban Studies* 43(7): 1127-1146.

Braunstein, Ruth. 2017. “Muslims as Outsiders, Enemies, and Others: The 2016 Presidential Election and the Politics of Religious Exclusion.” *American Journal of Cultural Sociology* 5(3): 355-372.

Brinkley, Alan. 1984. "Comparative Biography as Political History: Huey Long and Father Coughlin." *The History Teacher* 18(1): 9-16.

Brochmann, Grete. 2008. "Immigration, the Welfare State and Working Life–The Case of Norway." *European Review* 16(4): 529-536.

Broeksteeg, Hansko. 2010. "Foreign Voters in the Netherlands. Towards an Enlargement of the Right to Vote." *Electronic Journal of Comparative Law* 14(3): 1-16.

Brouard, Sylvain. 2009. "The Politics of Constitutional Veto in France: Constitutional Council, Legislative Majority and Electoral Competition." *West European Politics* 32(2): 384-403.

Brown, Rupert. 2000. "Social Identity Theory: Past Achievements, Current Problems and Future Challenges." *European Journal of Social Psychology* 30(6): 745-778.

Budge, Ian, and Richard I. Hofferbert. 1990. "Mandates and Policy Outputs: US Party Platforms and Federal Expenditures." *The American Political Science Review* 84(1): 111-131.

Budge, Ian, David Robertson, Hearl Derek, and Derek Hearl, eds. *Ideology, Strategy and Party Change: Spatial Analyses of Post-War Election Programmes in 19 Democracies*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Bühlmann, Marc, Sarah Nicolet, and Peter Selb. 2006. "National Elections in Switzerland: An Introduction." *Swiss Political Science Review* 12(4): 1-12.

Bull, Hedley. 1982. *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*. New York, NY: Macmillan International Higher Education.

Burity, Joanildo. 2021. "The Brazilian conservative wave, the Bolsonaro administration, and religious actors." *Brazilian Political Science Review* 15(3): 1-19.

Burscher, Bjorn, Joost van Spanje, and Claes H. de Vreese. 2015. "Owning the Issues of Crime and Immigration: The Relation between Immigration and Crime News and Anti-Immigrant Voting in 11 Countries." *Electoral Studies* 38 (2015): 59-69.

Burstein, Paul. 1976. "Social Networks and Voting: Some Israeli Data." *Social Forces* 54(4): 833-847.

Bustikova, Lenka, and Herbert Kitschelt. 2009. "The Radical Right in Post-Communist Europe. Comparative Perspectives on Legacies and Party Competition." *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 42(4): 459-483.

Cachia, Jean Claude, Fabrizio Ellul, Mark Harwood, and Carmen Sammut. 2020. "Malta and the 2019 EP Elections–Maximising Popular Engagement with “Europe”." *Review of Economics and Political Science* 5(4): 305-322.

Caiani, Manuela, and Patricia Kröll. 2017. "Nationalism and Populism in Radical Right Discourses in Italy and Germany." *Javnost-The Public* 24(4): 336-354.

Caldwell, Christopher. 2009. *Reflections on the Revolution in Europe: Immigration, Islam, and the West.* New York, NY: Anchor Books.

Campbell, Angus, Philip Converse, Warren Miller and Donald Stokes. 1960. *The American Voter*. New York, NY: Wiley.

Campbell, Angus, and Henry Valen. 1961. "Party Identification in Norway and the United States." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 25(4): 505-525.

Campbell, Donald T., and Donald W. Fiske. 1959. "Convergent and Discriminant Validation by the Multitrait-Multimethod Matrix." *Psychological Bulletin* 56(2): 81-105.

Cannistraro, Philip V., and Theodore P. Kovaleff. 1971. "Father Coughlin and Mussolini: Impossible Allies." *Journal of Church and State* 13(3): 427-443.

Canovan, Margaret. 1981. *Populism*. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Press.

Canovan, Margaret. 1999. "Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy." *Political Studies* 47(1): 2-16.

Canovan, Margaret. 2002. "The People, the Masses, and the Mobilization of Power: The Paradox of Hannah Arendt's ‘Populism’." *Social Research: An International Quarterly* 69(2): 403-422.

Cantillon, Bea, Veerle De Maesschalck, Stijn Rottiers, and Gerlinde Verbist. 2006. "Social Redistribution in Federalised Belgium." *West European Politics* 29(5): 1034-1056.

Capuno, Joseph J. 2020. "Dutertenomics: Populism, Progress, and Prospects." *Asian Economic Policy Review* 15(2): 262-279.

Caramani, Daniele, and Luca Manucci. 2019. "National Past and Populism: The Re-Elaboration of Fascism and its Impact on Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe." *West European Politics* 42(6): 1159-1187.

Careja, Romana, Christian Elmelund-Præstekær, Michael Baggesen Klitgaard, and Erik Gahner Larsen. 2016. "Direct and Indirect Welfare Chauvinism as Party Strategies: An Analysis of the Danish People's Party." *Scandinavian Political Studies* 39(4): 435-457.

Carnes, Nicholas. 2012. "Does the Numerical Underrepresentation of the Working Class in Congress Matter?." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 37(1): 5-34.

Castles, Francis G., and Peter Mair. 1984. "Left–Right Political Scales: Some 'Expert' Judgments." *European Journal of Political Research* 12(1): 73-88.

Chagas-Bastos, Fabrício H. 2019. "Political Realignment in Brazil: Jair Bolsonaro and the Right Turn." *Revista de Estudios Sociales* 69: 92-100.

Charalambous, Giorgos, and Panos Christoforou. 2018. "Far-Right Extremism and Populist Rhetoric: Greece and Cyprus During an Era of Crisis." *South European Society and Politics* 23(4): 451-477.

Chappell Jr, Henry W., and Linda Gonçalves Veiga. 2000. "Economics and Elections in Western Europe: 1960–1997." *Electoral Studies* 19(2-3): 183-197.

Chishti, Muzaffar, and Faye Hipsman. 2015. "The Child and Family Migration Surge of Summer 2014: A Short-Lived Crisis with a Lasting Impact." *Journal of International Affairs* 68(2): 95-114.

Christiansen, Peter Munk, and Lise Togeby. 2006. "Power and Democracy in Denmark: Still a Viable Democracy." *Scandinavian Political Studies* 29(1): 1-24.

Chishti, Muzaffar, and Faye Hipsman. 2015. "The Child and Family Migration Surge of Summer 2014: A Short-Lived Crisis with a Lasting Impact." *Journal of International Affairs* 68(2): 95-114.

Ciftci, Sabri. 2012. "Islamophobia and Threat Perceptions: Explaining Anti-Muslim Sentiment in the West." *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 32(3): 293-309.

Citrin, Jack, Donald P. Green, Christopher Muste, and Cara Wong. 1997. "Public Opinion Toward Immigration Reform: The Role of Economic Motivations." *The Journal of Politics* 59(3): 858-881.

Clark, Michael. 2009. "Valence and electoral outcomes in Western Europe, 1976–1998." *Electoral Studies* 28(1): 111-122.

Clark, Tom S., and Drew A. Linzer. 2015. "Should I Use Fixed or Random Effects." *Political Science Research and Methods* 3(2): 399-408.

Clarke, Harold, Paul Whiteley, Walter Borges, David Sanders, and Marianne Stewart. 2016. "Modelling the Dynamics of Support for a Right-Wing Populist party: The Case of UKIP." *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties* 26(2): 135-154.

Clift, Ben. 2013. "Le Changement? French Socialism, the 2012 Presidential Election and the Politics of Economic Credibility amidst the Eurozone Crisis." *Parliamentary Affairs* 66(1): 106-123.

Clout, Hugh D. 1971. "French Population Growth, 1962-8." *Geography* 56(2): 119-123.

Coleman, David. 2010. "Projections of the Ethnic Minority Populations of the United Kingdom 2006–2056." *Population and Development Review* 36(3): 441-486.

Cochrane, Christopher, and Neil Nevitte. 2014. "Scapegoating: Unemployment, Far-Right Parties and Anti-Immigrant Sentiment." *Comparative European Politics* 12(1): 1-32.

Coffé, Hilde, and Marieke Voorpostel. 2010. "Young People, Parents and Radical Right Voting: The Case of the Swiss People's Party." *Electoral Studies* 29(3): 435-443.

Coleman, David. 2016. "RIP this Britain: With Academic Objectivity, Oxford Professor and Population Expert David Coleman Says White Britons could be in the Minority by the 2060s - or Sooner." May 27. *Daily Mail.* https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3613682/RIP-Britain-academic-objectivity-Oxford-Professor-DAVID-COLEMAN-one-country-s-population-experts-says-white-Britons-minority-late-2060s-sooner-current-immigration-trends-continue.html.

Collier, David, and James E. Mahon Jr. 1993."Conceptual" Stretching" Revisited: Adapting Categories in Comparative Analysis." *American Political Science Review* 87(4): 845-855.

Collingwood, Loren, Nazita Lajevardi, and Kassra AR Oskooii. 2018. "A Change of Heart? Why Individual-Level Public Opinion Shifted against Trump's "Muslim Ban"." *Political Behavior* 40(4): 1035-1072.

Conover, Pamela Johnston, and Stanley Feldman. 1981. "The Origins and Meaning of Liberal/Conservative Self-Identifications." *American Journal of Political Science* 25(4): 617-645.

Converse, Philip E., and Georges Dupeux. 1962. "Politicization of the Electorate in France and the United States." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 26(1): 1-23.

Converse, Philip E. 1964. "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in *Ideology and Discontent*, ed. David E. Apter. New York, NY: Free Press of Glencoe, pgs. 206–61.

Cotton, Matthew, Imogen Rattle, and James Van Alstine. 2014. "Shale Gas Policy in the United Kingdom: An Argumentative Discourse Analysis." *Energy Policy* 73 (2014): 427-438.

Cox, Gary W. 1997. *Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems.* New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Cox, Gary W., and James W. Ingram. 1992. "Suffrage Expansion and Legislative Behavior in Nineteenth-Century Britain." *Social Science History* 16(4): 539-560.

Cox, Karen E., and Leonard J. Schoppa. 2002. "Interaction Effects in Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: Theory and Evidence from Germany, Japan, and Italy." *Comparative Political Studies* 35(9): 1027-1053.

Craig, Maureen A., and Jennifer A. Richeson. 2014. "On the Precipice of a "Majority-Minority" America: Perceived Status Threat from the Racial Demographic Shift Affects White Americans' Political Ideology." *Psychological Science* 25(6): 1189-1197.

Cranmer, Mirjam. 2011. "Populist Communication and Publicity: An Empirical Study of Contextual Differences in Switzerland." *Swiss Political Science Review* 17(3): 286-307.

Cruz, José Miguel. 2015. "The Root Causes of the Central American Crisis." *Current History* 114.769: 43-48.

Curato, Nicole. 2017. "Flirting with Authoritarian fantasies? Rodrigo Duterte and the new terms of Philippine populism." Journal of Contemporary Asia 47.1 (2017): 142-153.

Cutts, David, Robert Ford, and Matthew J. Goodwin. 2011. "Anti-Immigrant, Politically Disaffected or Still Racist After All? Examining the Attitudinal Drivers of Extreme Right Support in Britain in the 2009 European Elections." *European Journal of Political Research* 50(3): 418-440.

Cutts, David, Matthew Goodwin, and Caitlin Milazzo. 2017. "Defeat of the People's Army? The 2015 British General Election and the UK Independence Party (UKIP)." *Electoral Studies* 48: 70-83.

Czymara, Christian S., and Alexander W. Schmidt-Catran. 2017. "Refugees Unwelcome? Changes in the Public Acceptance of Immigrants and Refugees in Germany in the Course of Europe's 'Immigration Crisis'." *European Sociological Review* 33(6): 735-751.

Da Silva, Sidney Antonio. 2013. "Brazil, a New Eldorado for Immigrants?: The Case of Haitians and the Brazilian Immigration Policy." *Urbanities* 3(2): 3-18.

D'Alimonte, Roberto. 2019. "How the Populists Won in Italy." *Journal of Democracy* 30(1): 114-127.

Dann, Philipp. 2006. "The Gubernative in Presidential and Parliamentary Systems-Comparing Organizational Structures of Federal Governments in the USA and Germany." *Journal of Comparative Public Law and International Law (Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht-ZaöRV)* (2006): 1-40.

Dalton, Russell J., and Martin P. Wattenberg. 2002. *Parties without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Dalton, Russell J., and Steven Weldon. 2007. "Partisanship and Party System Institutionalization." *Party Politics* 13(2): 179-196.

Damgaard, Erik. 1974. "Stability and Change in the Danish Party System over Half a Century." *Scandinavian Political Studies* (1974): 103-125.

Damgaard, Erik, and Palle Svensson. 1989. "Who Governs? Parties and Policies in Denmark." *European Journal of Political Research* 17(6): 731-745.

Dandoy, Régis. 2014. "Regionalist Parties and Immigration in Belgium," in *The Politics of Immigration in Multi-Level States*. Eds. Eve Hepburn and Ricard Zapata-Barrero. London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 200-222.

Dardanelli, Paolo. 2005. "The Parliamentary and Executive Elections in Switzerland, 2003." *Electoral Studies* 24(1): 123-129.

Dassonneville, Ruth, and Marc Hooghe. 2017. "Economic Indicators and Electoral Volatility: Economic Effects on Electoral Volatility in Western Europe, 1950–2013." *Comparative European Politics* 15(6): 919-943.

Dassonneville, Ruth, and Dieter Stiers. 2018. "Electoral Volatility in Belgium (2009–2014). Is there a Difference between Stable and Volatile Voters?." *Acta Politica* 53(1): 68-97.

De Lange, Sarah L. 2007. "A New Winning Formula? The Programmatic Appeal of the Radical Right." *Party Politics* 13(4): 411-435.

De Lange, Sarah L., and Liza M. Mügge. 2015. "Gender and Right-Wing Populism in the Low Countries: Ideological Variations across Parties and Time." *Patterns of Prejudice* 49(1-2): 61-80.

Debus, Marc. 2009. "Analysing Party Politics in Germany with New Approaches for Estimating Policy Preferences of Political Actors." *German Politics* 18(3): 281-300.

Della Posta, Daniel J. 2013. "Competitive Treat, Intergroup Contact, or Both? Immigration and the Dynamics of Front National Voting in France." *Social Forces* 92(1): 249-273.

Déloye, Yves. 2012. "Une Democratie a` Reinventer." *Projet* 327(2): 46–52.

DeCanio, Samuel. 2011. "Populism, Paranoia, and the Politics of Free Silver." *Studies in American Political Development* 25(1): 1-26.

Decker, Frank. 2013. "The "Alternative for Germany": Factors Behind Its Emergence and Profile of a New Right-Wing Populist Party." *German Politics and Society* 34(2): 1-16.

Decker, Scott H., Tim Bynum, and Deborah Weisel. 1998. "A Tale of Two Cities: Gangs as Organized Crime Groups." *Justice Quarterly* 15(3): 395-425.

Deegan-Krause, Kevin, and Tim Haughton. 2009. "Toward a More Useful Conceptualization of Populism: Types and Degrees of Populist Appeals in the Case of Slovakia." *Politics & Policy* 37(4): 821-841.

Deeming, Christopher. 2015. "Foundations of the Workfare State–Reflections on the Political Transformation of the Welfare State in Britain." *Social Policy & Administration* 49(7): 862-886.

Delwit, Pascal. 1999. "The Belgian Socialist Party," in *Social Democratic Parties in the European Union*. Eds. Philippe Marliere and Kurt Richard Luther. London, UK : Palgrave Macmillan, 30-42.

De Jonge, Léonie. 2020. "The Populist Radical Right and the Media in the Benelux: Friend or Foe?." *The International Journal of Press/Politics* 24(2): 189-209.

De Koster, Willem, Peter Achterberg, and Jeroen Van der Waal. 2013. "The New Right and the Welfare State: The Electoral Relevance of Welfare Chauvinism and Welfare Populism in the Netherlands." *International Political Science Review* 34(1): 3-20.

De Lange, Sarah L. 2007. "A New Winning Formula? The Programmatic Appeal of the Radical Right." *Party Politics* 13.4 (2007): 411-435.

De Master, Sara, and Michael K. Le Roy. 2000. "Xenophobia and the European Union." *Comparative Politics* 32 (4): 419-436.

de Vet, Benjamin, Monica Poletti, and Bram Wauters. 2019. "The Party (Un) Faithful: Explaining Party Members' Defecting Voting Behaviour in Different Contexts (Belgium and Britain)." Party Politics 25(5): 690-700.

De Vries, Catherine E. 2018. "The Cosmopolitan-Parochial Divide: Changing Patterns of Party and Electoral Competition in the Netherlands and Beyond." *Journal of European Public Policy* 25(11): 1541-1565.

Dennis, Jack, and Diana Owen. 2001. "Popular Satisfaction with the Party System and Representative Democracy in the United States." *International Political Science Review* 22(4): 399-415.

Deudney, Daniel, and G. John Ikenberry. 1993/1994. "The Logic of the West." *World Policy Journal* 10(4): 17-25.

Devos, Thierry, Dario Spini, and Shalom H. Schwartz. 2002. "Conflicts among Human Values and Trust in Institutions." *British Journal of Social Psychology* 41(4): 481-494.

Diamanti, Ilvo. 2007. "The Italian Centre-Right and Centre-Left: Between Parties and 'the Party'." *West European Politics* 30(4): 733-762.

Diamond, Sara. 1996. "Right-Wing Politics and the Anti-Immigration Cause." *Social Justice* 23(3): 154-168.

Dimitras, Panayote. 1999. “Greece: Racist Government Answers to Racism on the Rise. *Greek Helsinki Monitor*, Athens, 1 August.

Dinas, Elias, and Joost van Spanje. 2011. "Crime Story: The Role of Crime and Immigration in the Anti-Immigration Vote." *Electoral Studies* 30(4): 658-671.

Dingle, Lesley, and Bradley Miller. 2005. "A Summary of Recent Constitutional Reform in the United Kingdom." *Int'l J. Legal Info*. 33 (2005): 71-102.

Donovan, Mark, and James L. Newell. 2008. "Centrism in Italian politics." *Modern Italy* 13(4): 381-397.

Donovan, Todd, and David Redlawsk. 2018. "Donald Trump and Right-Wing Populists in Comparative Perspective." *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties* 28(2): 190-207.

Donovan, Mark. 2016. "The Election of the President of the Republic in Unstable Times." *Italian Politics* 31(1): 99-117.

Dos Santos Duarte, Tatiane. "‘Our Time Has Come! It’s Time for the Church to Govern’: Evangelicals in Brazilian Politics and in Our Ethnographies.” *Vibrant* (17): 1-24.

Dowd, Maureen. 1992. “Buchanan’s Alternative: Not Kind and Gentle.” *New York Times* (January 15).

Downes, James F., and Matthew Loveless. 2018. "Centre Right and Radical Right Party Competition in Europe: Strategic Emphasis on Immigration, Anti-Incumbency, and Economic Crisis." *Electoral Studies* 54 (2018): 148-158.

Downs, Anthony. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy.* New York, NY: Harper & Co.

Drápalová, Eliška, and Kai Wegrich. 2021. "Technocratic Populism and Subnational Governance." *Government and Opposition* 56(4): 640-660.

Dunn, Kris. 2015. "Preference for Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties Among Exclusive-Nationalists and Authoritarians." *Party Politics* 21(3): 367-380.

Duverger, Maurice. 1964. *Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State.* London, UK: Methuen Press.

Duverger, Maurice.1980. "A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government.” *European Journal of Political Research* 8(2): 165-187.

Earles, Kimberly. 2011. "Swedish Family Policy–Continuity and Change in the Nordic welfare State Model." *Social Policy & Administration* 45(2): 180-193.

Eatwell, Roger. 2000. "The Rebirth of the 'Extreme Right' in Western Europe?." *Parliamentary Affairs* 53(3): 407-425.

Ebbinghaus, Bernhard, and Visser, Jelle. 2000. *Trade Unions in Western Europe Since 1945*. London, UK: Macmillan.

Echebarria-Echabe, Agustin, and Emilia Fernández-Guede. 2006. "Effects of Terrorism on Attitudes and Ideological Orientation." *European Journal of Social Psychology* 36(2): 259-265.

Eckardt, Andy. 2016. "Germany Took in the Entire Population of Houston Last Year." July 14. *NBC News*. https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/europes-border-crisis/germany-took-enough-people-fill-houston-last-year-n609186.

Eitle, David, and John Taylor. 2008. "Are Hispanics the New 'Threat'? Minority Group Threat and Fear of Crime in Miami-Dade County." *Social Science Research* 37(4): 1102-1115.

Eke, Steven M., and Taras Kuzio. 2000. "Sultanism in Eastern Europe: The Socio-Political Roots of Authoritarian Populism in Belarus." *Europe-Asia Studies* 52(3): 523-547.

Elchardus, Mark, and Bram Spruyt. 2016. "Populism, Persistent Republicanism and Declinism: An Empirical Analysis of Populism as a Thin Ideology." *Government and Opposition* 51(1): 111-133.

Elgenius, Gabriella, and Jens Rydgren. 2019. "Frames of Nostalgia and Belonging: The Resurgence of Ethno-Nationalism in Sweden." *European Societies* 21(4): 583-602.

Elklit, Jørgen. 1993. "Simpler than Its Reputation: The Electoral System in Denmark Since 1920." *Electoral Studies* 12(1): 41-57.

Ellinas, Antonis A. 2013. "The Rise of Golden Dawn: The New Face of the Far Right in Greece." *South European Society and Politics* 18(4): 543-565.

Elliott, Mark. "United Kingdom: Parliamentary Sovereignty under Pressure." *Int'l J. Const. L.* 2 (2004): 545-554.

Ellner, Steve. 2003. "The Contrasting Variants of the Populism of Hugo Chávez and Alberto Fujimori." *Journal of Latin American Studies* 35(1): 139-162.

Elklit, Jørgen. 1993. "Simpler than Its Reputation: The Electoral System in Denmark Since 1920." Electoral Studies 12(1): 41-57.

Engstrom, Richard L., and Richard N. Engstrom. 2008. "The Majority Vote Rule and Runoff Primaries in the United States." *Electoral Studies* 27(3): 407-416.

Ennser, Laurenz. 2012. "The Homogeneity of West European Party Families: The Radical Right in Comparative Perspective." *Party Politics* 18(2): 151-171.

Ennser-Jedenastik, Laurenz. 2016. "A Welfare State for Whom? A Group-Based Account of the Austrian Freedom Party's Social Policy Profile." *Swiss Political Science Review* 22(3): 409-427.

Ennser-Jedenastik, Laurenz. 2018. "Welfare Chauvinism in Populist Radical Right Platforms: The Role of Redistributive Justice Principles." *Social Policy & Administration* 52(1): 293-314.

Epstein, Leon D. 1980. *Political Parties in Western Democracies*. New Brunswick, US: Transaction Publishers.

Erk, Jan. 2004. "Austria: A Federation without Federalism." *Publius: The Journal of Federalism* 34(1): 1-20.

Erk, Jan. 2005. "From Vlaams Blok to Vlaams Belang: The Belgian Far-Right Renames Itself." *West European Politics* 28(3): 493-502.

Erlingsson, Gissur Ó., Kåre Vernby, and Richard Öhrvall. 2014. "The Single-Issue Party Thesis and the Sweden Democrats." *Acta Politica* 49(2): 196-216.

ESS Grant Report 2002. http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/docs/about/ESS1_end_of_grant_report.pdf

ESS Round Seven Field Procedure Report.

https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/docs/round7/survey/ESS7_data_documentation_report_e03_2.pdf

European Social Survey Website. "Modules/Themes." https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/data/themes.html?t=personal

Eurostat News Release. 2015. "First Population Estimates EU Population Up to 508.2 Million at 1 January 2015: Over 1 Million More People Living in EU than in 2014." 10 July *Eurostat News Release.* https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/6903510/3-10072015-AP-EN.pdf/d2bfb01f-6ac5-4775-8a7e-7b104c1146d0?t=1436453574000.

Evans, Jocelyn AJ. 2005. "The Dynamics of Social Change in Radical Right-Wing Populist Party Support." *Comparative European Politics* 3(1): 76-101.

Ezrow, Lawrence. 2005. "Are Moderate Parties Rewarded in Multiparty Systems? A Pooled Analysis of Western European Elections, 1984–1998." *European Journal of Political Research* 44(6): 881-898.

Fangen, Katrine, and Mari Vaage. 2018. ""The Immigration Problem" and Norwegian Right-Wing Politicians." *New Political Science* 40(3): 459-476.

Fanning, Patricia. 1999. ""Boycott!": Louis Imogen Guiney and the American Protective Association." *Historical Journal of Massachusetts* 27(2): 166-180.

Fargues, Philippe. 2016. "Who are the Million Migrants who Entered Europe without a Visa in 2015?." *Population Societies* 4: 1-4.

Fatke, Matthias. 2014. "Allure or Alternative? Direct Democracy and Party Identification." *Party Politics* 20(2): 248-260.

Featherstone, Kevin, and Dimitris Papadimitriou. 2008. *The Limits of Europeanization: Reform Capacity and Policy Conflict in Greece*. New York, NY: Springer.

Fennema, Meindert. 1997. "Some Conceptual Issues and Problems in the Comparison of Anti-Immigrant Parties in Western Europe." *Party Politics* 3(4): 473-492.

Ferwerda, Jeremy. 2014. "Electoral Consequences of Declining Participation: A Natural Experiment in Austria." *Electoral Studies* 35(2014): 242-252.

Fieldhouse, Edward, Mark Tranmer, and Andrew Russell. 2007. "Something about Young People or Something about Elections? Electoral Participation of Young People in Europe: Evidence from a Multilevel Analysis of the European Social Survey." *European Journal of Political Research* 46(6): 797-822.

Fieschi, Catherine, and Paul Heywood. 2004. "Trust, Cynicism and Populist Anti-Politics." *Journal of Political Ideologies* 9(3): 289-309.

Fieschi Catherine, James Shields, and Roger Woods. 1996. “Extreme right-wing parties and the European Union: France, Germany and Italy”, in *Political Parties and the European Union*. Ed. John Gaffney. London, UK: Routledge, pgs. 235–253.

Finseraas, Henning, and Ola Listhaug. 2013. "It can Happen Here: The Impact of the Mumbai Terror Attacks on Public Opinion in Western Europe." *Public Choice* 156(1-2): 213-228.

Fiorina, Morris P. 1981. *Retrospective Voting in American National Elections*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Fisk, Catherine, and Erwin Chemerinsky. 1997. "The Filibuster." *Stanford Law Review* 49(2): 181-254.

Fitzgerald, Jennifer, and Duncan Lawrence. 2011. "Local Cohesion and Radical Right Support: The Case of the Swiss People’s Party." *Electoral Studies* 30(4): 834-847.

Fleury, Christopher J., and Michael S. Lewis-Beck. 1993. "Anchoring the French Voter: Ideology versus Party." *The Journal of Politics* 55(4): 1100-1109.

Ford, Robert, and Matthew J. Goodwin. 2010. "Angry White Men: Individual and Contextual Predictors of Support for the British National Party." *Political Studies* 58(1): 1-25.

Ford, Robert, Matthew J. Goodwin, and David Cutts. 2012. "Strategic Eurosceptics and Polite Xenophobes: Support for the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) in the 2009 European Parliament Elections." *European Journal of Political Research* 51(2): 204-234.

Fougère, Martin, and Charles Barthold. 2020. "Onwards to the New Political Frontier: Macron’s Electoral Populism." *Organization* 27(3): 419-430.

Fouskas, Vassilis K. 2013. "Whatever Happened to Greece?." *The Political Quarterly* 84(1): 132-138.

Franklin, Mark N. 1996. "Electoral Participation," in *Comparing Democracies: Elections and Voting in Global Perspective*, ed. Laurence LeDuc, Richard G. Niemi, and Pippa Norris. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Franzmann, Simon, and André Kaiser. 2006. "Locating Political Parties in Policy Space: A Reanalysis of Party Manifesto Data." *Party Politics* 12(2): 163-188.

Frasure-Yokley, Lorrie. 2018. "Choosing the Velvet Glove: Women Voters, Ambivalent Sexism, and Vote Choice in 2016." *Journal of Race, Ethnicity and Politics* 3(1): 3-25.

Frieden, Jeffry A. 1997. "Monetary Populism in Nineteenth-Century America: An Open Economy Interpretation." *Journal of Economic History* 57(2): 367-395.

Fukui, Haruhiro, ed. 1985. *Political Parties of Asia and the Pacific.* Westport, CT: Greenwood.

Gabel, Matthew J., and John D. Huber. 2000. "Putting Parties in Their Place: Inferring Party Left-Right Ideological Positions from Party Manifestos Data." *American Journal of Political Science* 44(1): 94-103.

Ganor, Boaz. 2011. "An Intifada in Europe? A Comparative Analysis of Radicalization Processes among Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza versus Muslim Immigrants in Europe." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 34(8): 587-599.

Ganzach, Yoav, Yaniv Hanoch, and Becky L. Choma. 2019. "Attitudes Toward Presidential Candidates in the 2012 and 2016 American Elections: Cognitive Ability and Support for Trump." *Social Psychological and Personality Science* 10(7): 924-934.

Garzia, Diego, and Federico Viotti. 2012. "Party Identification, Leader Effects and Vote Choice in Italy, 1990-2008." *World Political Science* 8(1): 1-23.

Gauja, Anika. 2012. "The 'Push' for Primaries: What Drives Party Organisational Reform in Australia and the United Kingdom?." *Australian Journal of Political Science* 47(4): 641-658.

Gemenis, Kostas. 2009. "A Green Comeback in Greece? The Ecologist Greens in the 2007 Parliamentary Election." *Environmental Politics* 18(1): 128-134.

Gemenis, Kostas, and Roula Nezi. 2015. "Government–Opposition Dynamics during the Economic Crisis in Greece." *The Journal of Legislative Studies* 21(1): 14-34.

Georgeac, Oriane AM, Aneeta Rattan, and Daniel A. Effron. 2019. "An Exploratory Investigation of Americans' Expression of Gender Bias Before and After the 2016 Presidential Election." *Social Psychological and Personality Science* 10(5): 632-642.

Georgiadou, Vasiliki, Lamprini Rori, and Costas Roumanias. 2018. "Mapping the European Far Right in the 21st Century: A Meso-Level Analysis." *Electoral Studies* 54 (2018): 103-115.

Gerring, John. 1997. "Ideology: A Definitional Analysis." *Political Research Quarterly* 50(4): 957-994.

Gerring, John. 2012. *Social Science Methodology: A Unified Framework*, 2d ed. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press

Gest, Justin. 2016. *The New Minority: White Working-Class Politics in an Age of Immigration and Inequality.* New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Giddens, Anthony. 1998. *Beyond Left and Right: The Future of Radical Politics.* Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press.

Gilliam Jr, Franklin D., and Shanto Iyengar. 2000. "Prime Suspects: The Influence of Local Television News on the Viewing Public." *American Journal of Political Science* 44(3): 560-573.

Girma, Sourafel, and Zhihao Yu. 2002. "The Link between Immigration and Trade: Evidence from the United Kingdom." *Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv* 138(1): 115-130.

Glaser, James M. 1994. "Back to the Black Belt: Racial Environment and White Racial Attitudes in the South." *The Journal of Politics* 56(1): 21-41.

Gidron, Noam, and Peter A. Hall. 2017. "The Politics of Social Status: Economic and Cultural Roots of the Populist Right." *The British Journal of Sociology* 68(S1): S57-S84.

Gidron, Noam, and Peter A. Hall. 2020. "Populism as a Problem of Social Integration." *Comparative Political Studies* 53(7): 1027-1059.

Golder, Matt. 2003. "Explaining Variation in the Success of Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe." *Comparative Political Studies* 36(4): 432-466.

Gomez, Raul, Laura Morales, and Luis Ramiro. 2016. "Varieties of Radicalism: Examining the Diversity of Radical Left Parties and Voters in Western Europe." *West European Politics* 39(2): 351-379.

Goodwin, Matthew J. 2007. "The Extreme Right in Britain: Still an 'Ugly Duckling' but for How Long?." *The Political Quarterly* 78(2): 241-250.

Gordon, Dan. 1986. "Limits on Extremist Political Parties: A Comparison of Israeli Jurisprudence with that of the United States and West Germany." *Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.* 10(2): 347-400.

Gorski, Philip. 2017. "Why Evangelicals Voted for Trump: A Critical Cultural Sociology." *American Journal of Cultural Sociology* 5(3): 338-354.

Grabow, Karsten. 2001. "The Re-Emergence of the Cadre Party? Organizational Patterns of Christian and Social Democrats in Unified Germany." *Party Politics* 7(1): 23-43.

Green-Pedersen, Christoffer. 2004. "Center Parties, Party Competition, and the Implosion of Party Systems: A Study of Centripetal Tendencies in Multiparty Systems." *Political Studies* 52(2): 324-341.

Green-Pedersen, Christoffer, and Pontus Odmalm. 2008. "Going Different Ways? Right-Wing Parties and the Immigrant Issue in Denmark and Sweden." *Journal of European Public Policy* 15(3): 367-381.

Green-Pedersen, Christoffer and Kees van Kersbergen. 2002. "The Politics of the 'Third Way': The Transformation of Social Democracy in Denmark and the Netherlands." *Party Politics* 8(5): 507-524.

Greiffenhagen, Mortin. 1979. "The Dilemma of Conservatism in Germany." *Journal of Contemporary History* 14(4): 611-625.

Gress, David R. 1997. "The Drama of Modern Western Identity." *Orbis* 41(4): 525-545.

Grimmer, Justin, and Brandon M. Stewart. 2013. "Text as Data: The Promise and Pitfalls of Automatic Content Analysis Methods for Political Texts." *Political Analysis* 21(3): 267-297.

Groshek, Jacob, and Karolina Koc-Michalska. 2017. "Helping Populism Win? Social Media Sse, Filter Bubbles, and Support for Populist Presidential Candidates in the 2016 US Election Campaign." *Information, Communication & Society* 20(9): 1389-1407.

Gross, Dominique M. 2002. "Three Million Foreigners, Three Million Unemployed? Immigration Flows and the Labour Market in France." *Applied Economics* 34(16): 1969-1983.

Gruber, Oliver, and Tim Bale. 2014 "And It's Good Night Vienna. How (Not) to Deal with the Populist Radical Right: The Conservatives, UKIP and Some Lessons from the Heartland." *British Politics* 9(3): 237-254.

Gunther, Richard, and Larry Diamond. 2003. "Species of Political Parties: A New Typology." *Party Politics* 9(2): 167-199.

Guth, James L. 2019. "Are White Evangelicals Populists? The View from the 2016 American National Election Study." *The Review of Faith & International Affairs* 17(3): 20-35.

Haddad, Yvonne Yazbeck, and Michael J. Balz. 2006. "The October Riots in France: A Failed Immigration Policy or The Empire Strikes Back?." *International Migration* 44(2): 23-34.

Haegel, Florence. 1990. "Le Lien Partisan," in *L"ilecteur Franfais en Questions*, Ed. Daniel Boy and Nonna Mayer. Paris, France: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques.

Hagelund, Anniken. 2002. "Problematizing Culture: Discourses on Integration in Norway." *Journal of International Migration and Integration/Revue de l'Integration et de la Migration Internationale* 3(3): 401-415.

Hagevi, Magnus. 2015. "Bloc Identification in Multi-Party Systems: The Case of the Swedish Two-Bloc System." *West European Politics* 38(1): 73-92.

Hajnal, Zoltan L., Elisabeth R. Gerber, and Hugh Louch. 2002. "Minorities and Direct Legislation: Evidence from California Ballot Proposition Elections." *Journal of Politics* 64(1): 154-177.

Hakhverdian, Armèn, and Christel Koop. 2007. "Consensus Democracy and Support for Populist Parties in Western Europe." *Acta Politica* 42(4): 401-420.

Halabi, Samer, John F. Dovidio, and Arie Nadler. 2008. "When and How Do High Status Group Members Offer Help: Effects of Social Dominance Orientation and Status Threat." *Political Psychology* 29(6): 841-858.

Halla, Martin, Alexander F. Wagner, and Josef Zweimüller. "Immigration and voting for the far right." *Journal of the European Economic Association* 15(6): 1341-1385.

Halikiopoulou, Daphne. 2019. "Right-Wing Populism as a Nationalist Vision of Legitimating Collective Choice: A Supply-Side Perspective." *The International Spectator* 54(2): 35-49.

Hammond, Ross A., and Robert Axelrod. 2006. "The Evolution of Ethnocentrism." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50(6): 926-936.

Haner, Murat, Melissa M. Sloan, Francis T. Cullen, Teresa C. Kulig, and Cheryl Lero Jonson. "Public Concern about Terrorism: Fear, Worry, and Support for Anti-Muslim Policies." *Socius* 5 (2019): 1-16.

Hangartner, Dominik, Elias Dinas, Moritz Marbach, Konstantinos Matakos, and Dimitrios Xefteris. 2019. "Does Exposure to the Refugee Crisis Make Natives More Hostile?." *American Political Science Review* 113(2): 442-455.

Hanley, Seán. 2004. "Getting the Right Right: Redefining the Centre-Right in Post-Communist Europe." *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 20(3): 9-27.

Hansen, Erik Jørgen. 1982. "The Progress Party in Denmark is a Class Party-But Which Class?'." *Acta Sociologica* 25(2): 167-176.

Hansen, Randall. 2003. "Migration to Europe since 1945: Its History and its Lessons." *The Political Quarterly* 74 (s1): 25-38.

Hansen, Michael A., and Jonathan Olsen. 2019. "Flesh of the Same Flesh: A Study of Voters for the Alternative for Germany (AfD) in the 2017 Federal Election." *German Politics* 28(1): 1-19.

Harmel, Robert, and Kenneth Janda. 1994. "An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party Change." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 6(3): 259-287.

Harmel, Robert, Uk Heo, Alexander Tan, and Kenneth Janda. 1995. "Performance, Leadership, Factions and Party Change: An Empirical Analysis." *West European Politics* 18(1): 1-33.

Harmel, Robert, and Lars Svåsand. 1997. "The Influence of New Parties on Old Parties' Platforms: The Cases of the Progress Parties and Conservative Parties of Denmark and Norway." *Party Politics* 3(3): 315-340.

Harries, Owen. 1993. "The Collapse of 'The West'." *Foreign Affairs* (September): 41-53.

Harteveld, Eelco, Wouter Van Der Brug, Stefan Dahlberg, and Andrej Kokkonen. 2015. "The Gender Gap in Populist Radical-Right Voting: Examining the Demand Side in Western and Eastern Europe." *Patterns of Prejudice* 49(1-2): 103-134.

Hatemi, Peter K., Carolyn L. Funk, Sarah E. Medland, Hermine M. Maes, Judy L. Silberg, Nicholas G. Martin, and Lindon J. Eaves. 2009. "Genetic and Environmental Transmission of Political Attitudes over a Life Time." *The Journal of Politics* 71(3): 1141-1156.

Hatton, Timothy J. 2016. "Immigration, Public Opinion and the Recession in Europe." *Economic Policy* 31(86): 205-246.

Hawkins, Kirk A. 2009. "Is Chávez Populist? Measuring Populist Discourse in Comparative Perspective." *Comparative Political Studies* 42(8): 1040-1067.

Hawkins, Kirk A., and Castanho Silva, Bruno. 2018. "Text Analysis: Big Data Approaches," in Kirk A. Hawkins, Ryan E. Carlin, Levente Littvay, and Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasse. Eds., *The Ideational Approach to Populism: Theory, Method & Analysis*. New York, NY: Routledge.

Hawkins, Kirk A., Scott Riding, and Cas Mudde. 2012. "Measuring Populist Attitudes." Political Concepts: Committee on Concepts and Methods Working Paper Series.

Hawley, George. 2017. *Making Sense of the Alt-Right.* New York, NY: Columbia University Press.

Hawley, George. 2018. *The Alt-Right: What Everyone Needs to Know*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Hayton, Richard. 2016. "The UK Independence Party and the Politics of Englishness." *Political Studies Review* 14(3): 400-410.

Hayton, Richard, and Libby McEnhill. 2015. "Cameron's Conservative Party, Social Liberalism and Social Justice." *British Politics* 10(2): 131-147.

Heidar, Knut, and Jo Saglie. 2003. "A Decline of Linkage? Intra-Party Participation in Norway, 1991-2000." *European Journal of Political Research* 42(6): 761-786.

Heinisch, Reinhard, and Vanessa Marent. 2018. "Sub-State Territorial Claims Making by a Nationwide Radical Right-Wing Populist Party: The Case of the Austrian Freedom Party." *Comparative European Politics* 16(6): 1012-1032.

Heisler, Barbara Schmitter. 1986. "Immigrant Settlement and the Structure of Emergent Immigrant Communities in Western Europe." *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 485(1): 76-86.

Hekma, Gert, Harry Oosterhuis, and James Steakley. 1995. "Leftist Sexual Politics and Homosexuality: A Historical Overview." *Journal of Homosexuality* 29(2-3): 1-40.

Hellmann, Gunther, Benjamin Herborth, Gabi Schlag, and Christian Weber. 2017. "The West: A Securitising Community?." *Journal of International Relations and Development* 20 (2): 301-330.

Hellström, Anders, and Peter Hervik. 2014. "Feeding the Beast: Nourishing Nativist Appeals in Sweden and in Denmark." *Journal of International Migration and Integration* 15(3): 449-467.

Hemerijck, Anton, Brigitte Unger, and Jelle Visser. 2000. "How Small Countries Negotiate Change: Twenty-Five Years of Policy Adjustment in Austria, the Netherlands, and Belgium." *Welfare and Work in the Open Economy* (2): 175-263.

Henderson, Michael, and D. Sunshine Hillygus. 2011. "The Dynamics of Health Care Opinion, 2008–2010: Partisanship, Self-Interest, and Racial Resentment." *Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law* 36.6 (2011): 945-960.

Hernández, David M. 2015. "Unaccompanied Child Migrants in “Crisis”: New Surge or Case of Arrested Development." *Harvard Journal of Hispanic Policy* 27(11): 11-17.

Hetherington, Marc, and Elizabeth Suhay. 2011. "Authoritarianism, Threat, and Americans' Support for the War on Terror." *American Journal of Political Science* 55(3): 546-560.

Hetherington, Marc J., and Jonathan D. Weiler. 2009. *Authoritarianism and Polarization in American Politics*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Hetherington, Marc J. 1998. "The Political Relevance of Political Trust." *American Political Science Review* 92.4 (1998): 791-808.

Hindmoor, Andrew. 2004. *New Labour at the Centre: Constructing Political Space*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Hirano, Shigeo, and James M. Snyder Jr. 2007. "The Decline of Third-Party Voting in the United States." *Journal of Politics* 69(1): 1-16.

Hobolt, Sara B. 2018. "Brexit and the 2017 UK General Election." *Journal of Common Market Studies* 56(S1): 39-50.

Hodson, Gordon, and Michael A. Busseri. 2012. "Bright Minds and Dark Attitudes: Lower Cognitive Ability Predicts Greater Prejudice through Right-Wing Ideology and Low Intergroup Contact." *Psychological Science* 23(2): 187-195.

Hoff, Benjamin-Immanuel, and Dan Hough. 2014. "Not Much Ado About Quite a Lot? The German Election of September 2013." *Representation* 50(1): 129-137.

Hofferbert, Richard I., and Ian Budge. 1992. "The Party Mandate and the Westminster Model: Election Programmes and Government Spending in Britain, 1948-85." *British Journal of Political Science* 22(2): 151-182.

Hoffman, Robert R., and Lewis F. Hanes. 2003. "The Boiled Frog Problem [Knowledge Management]." *IEEE Intelligent Systems* 18(4): 68-71.

Holm, John D., and John P. Robinson. 1978. "Ideological Identification and the American Voter." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 42(2): 235-246.

Holmberg, Sören and Lennart Weibull. 2003: “Förgängligt Förtroende,” in *Fåfängans Marknad: SOM-Undersökningen 2002*, ed. Sören Holmberg and Lennart Weibull (Gothenburg: SOMInstitutet: 44.

Hooghe, Marc, and Ruth Dassonneville. 2018. "A Spiral of Distrust: A Panel Study on the Relation between Political Distrust and Protest Voting in Belgium." *Government and Opposition* 53(1): 104-130.

Hooghe, Liesbet, and Gary Marks. 1999. "The Making of a Polity: The Struggle over European Integration." EUI Working Paper RSC no. 97/31

Hooghe, Liesbet, and Gary Marks. 2005. "Calculation, Community and Cues: Public Opinion on European Integration." *European Union Politics* 6(4): 419-443.

Hooghe, Liesbet, and Gary Marks. 2007. "Sources of Euroscepticism." *Acta Politica* 42(2): 119-127.

Hooghe, Marc. 2012. "The Political Crisis in Belgium (2007–2011): A Federal System without Federal Loyalty." *Representation* 48(1): 131-138.

Horowitz, Donald L. 2000. *Ethnic Groups in Conflict: Updated Edition with a New Preface*. Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press.

Howarth, David, and Scott James. 2020. "The Politics of Bank Structural Reform: Business Power and Agenda Setting in the United Kingdom, France, and Germany." *Business and Politics* 22(1): 25-51.

Huber, John D. 1989. "Values and Partisanship in Left-Right Orientations: Measuring Ideology." *European Journal of Political Research* 17(5): 599-621.

Huber, John D. 1992. "Restrictive Legislative Procedures in France and the United States." *The American Political Science Review* 86(3): 675-687.

Huber, John, and Ronald Inglehart. 1995. "Expert Interpretations of Party Space and Party Locations in 42 Societies." *Party Politics* 1(1): 73-111.

Huber, John D., Georgia Kernell, and Eduardo L. Leoni. 2005. "Institutional Context, Cognitive Resources and Party Attachments across Democracies." *Political Analysis* 13.4 (2005): 365-386.

Huber, Stefan, and Alexander Yendell. 2019. "Does Religiosity Matter? Explaining Right-Wing Extremist Attitudes and the Vote for the Alternative for Germany (AfD)." *Religion and Society in Central and Eastern Europe* 12(1): 63-83.

Hug, Simon, and Tobias Schulz. 2007. "Left—Right Positions of Political Parties in Switzerland." *Party Politics* 13(3): 305-330.

Hunt, W. Ben, and Michael Laver. 1992. *Policy and Party Competition.* New York, NY: Routledge.

Hunter, Wendy, and Timothy J. Power. 2019. "Bolsonaro and Brazil's Illiberal Backlash." *Journal of Democracy* 30(1): 68-82.

Huntington, Samuel P. 1957. "Conservatism as an Ideology." The American Political Science Review 51(2): 454-473.

Huntington, Samuel P. 2004. *Who Are We? The Challenges to America's National Identity.* New York, NY: Simon and Schuster.

Husbands, Christopher T. 1981. "Contemporary Right-Wing Extremism in Western European Democracies: A Review Article." *European Journal of Political Research* 9(1): 75-99.

Husbands, Christopher T. 1988. "The Dynamics of Racial Exclusion and Expulsion: Racist Politics in Western Europe." *European Journal of Political Research* 16(6): 701-720.

Hutter, Swen, and Marco Giugni. 2009. "Protest Politics in a Changing Political Context: Switzerland, 1975–2005." *Swiss Political Science Review* 15(3): 427-461.

Ignazi, Piero. 2005. "Legitimation and Evolution on the Italian Right Wing: Social and Ideological Repositioning of Alleanza Nazionale and the Lega Nord." *South European Society & Politics* 10(2): 333-349.

Immerzeel, Tim, Eva Jaspers, and Marcel Lubbers. 2013. "Religion as Catalyst or Restraint of Radical Right Voting?." *West European Politics* 36(5): 946-968.

Immerzeel, Tim, and Mark Pickup. 2015. "Populist Radical Right Parties Mobilizing 'The People'? The Role of Populist Radical Right Success in Voter Turnout." *Electoral Studies* 40 (2015): 347-360.

Ingle, Stephen. 2008. *The British Party System: An Introduction*. London, UK: Routledge.

Inglehart, Ronald. 1988. "The Renaissance of Political Culture." *The American Political Science Review* 82(4): 1203-1230.

Inglehart, Ronald, and Hans Klingemann. 1976. "Party Identification, Ideological Preferences, and the Left-Right Dimension among Western Mass Publics," in *Party Identification and Beyond.* Eds. Ian Budge, Ivor Crewe, and Denis Farlie. London, UK: Wiley.

Ivaldi, Gilles. 2015. "Towards the Median Economic Crisis Voter? The New Leftist Economic Agenda of the Front National in France." *French Politics* 13(4): 346-369.

Ivaldi, Gilles. 2018. "Contesting the EU in Times of Crisis: The Front National and Politics of Euroscepticism in France." *Politics* 38(3): 278-294.

Ivaldi, Gilles, Maria Elisabetta Lanzone, and Dwayne Woods. 2017. "Varieties of Populism across a Left-Right Spectrum: The Case of the Front National, the Northern League, Podemos and Five Star Movement." *Swiss Political Science Review* 23(4): 354-376.

Ivarsflaten, Elisabeth. 2005. "The Vulnerable Populist Right Parties: No Economic Realignment Fueling Their Electoral Success." *European Journal of Political Research* 44(3): 465-492.

Ivarsflaten, Elisabeth. 2008. "What Unites Right-Wing Populists in Western Europe? Re-Examining Grievance Mobilization Models in Seven Successful Cases." *Comparative Political Studies* 41(1): 3-23.

Iversen, Torben, and David Soskice. 2006. "Electoral Institutions and the Politics of Coalitions: Why Some Democracies Redistribute More than Others." *American Political Science Review* 100(2): 165-181.

Jackman, Robert W., and Karin Volpert. 1996. "Conditions Favouring Parties of the Extreme Right in Western Europe." *British Journal of Political Science* 26(4): 501-521.

Jackson, James S., Kendrick T. Brown, Tony N. Brown, and Bryant Marks. 2001. "Contemporary Immigration Policy Orientations among Dominant-Group Members in Western Europe." *Journal of Social Issues* 57(3): 431-456.

Jackson, Lynne M., and Victoria M. Esses. 2000. "Effects of Perceived Economic Competition on People's Willingness to Help Empower Immigrants." *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations* 3(4): 419-435.

Jacobson, Gary C. 2013. "How the Economy and Partisanship Shaped the 2012 Presidential and Congressional Elections." *Political Science Quarterly* 128(1): 1-38.

Jagers, Jan, and Stefaan Walgrave. 2007. "Populism as Political Communication Style." *European Journal of Political Research* 46(3): 319-345.

Jahn, Detlef. 2010. "Conceptualizing Left and Right in Comparative Politics: Towards a Deductive Approach." *Party Politics* 17(6): 745-765.

Janda, Kenneth, Robert Harmel, Christine Edens, and Patricia Goff. 1995. "Changes in Party Identity: Evidence from Party Manifestos." *Party Politics* 1(2): 171-196.

Janssen, Heleen J., Maarten van Ham, Tom Kleinepier, and Jaap Nieuwenhuis. 2019. "A Micro-Scale Approach to Ethnic Minority Concentration in the Residential Environment and Voting for the Radical Right in the Netherlands." *European Sociological Review* 35(4): 552-566.

Jeansonne, Glen. 2012. "The Priest and the President: Father Coughlin, FDR, and 1930s America." *The Midwest Quarterly* 53(4): 359-373.

Jelen, Ted G. 1993. "Echoes of Discontent: Jesse Jackson, Pat Robertson, and the Resurgence of Populism." *Sociology of Religion* 54(4): 428-430.

Jenssen, Anders Todal. 1999. "All that is Solid Melts into Air: Party Identification in Norway." *Scandinavian Political Studies* 22(1): 1-27.

Jervis, Robert. 1976. *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Jesuit, David K., Piotr R. Paradowski, and Vincent A. Mahler. 2009. "Electoral Support for Extreme Right-Wing Parties: A Sub-National Analysis of Western European Elections." *Electoral Studies* 28(2): 279-290.

John, Peter, Shaun Bevan, and Will Jennings. 2014. “Party Politics and the Policy Agenda: The Case of the United Kingdom,” in *Agenda Setting, Policies, and Political Systems: A Comparative Approach*. Eds. Christoffer Green-Pedersen and Stefaan Walgrave, Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, pgs. 19-35.

Jones, Doug. 2018. "Kin Selection and Ethnic Group Selection." *Evolution and Human Behavior* 39(1): 9-18.

Jost, John T. 2006. "The End of the End of Ideology." *American Psychologist* 61(7): 651-670.

Jost, John T., Jack Glaser, Arie W. Kruglanski, and Frank J. Sulloway. 2003. "Political Conservatism as Motivated Social Cognition." *Psychological Bulletin* 129(3): 339-375.

Jost, John T., Laurie A. Rudman, Irene V. Blair, Dana R. Carney, Nilanjana Dasgupta, Jack Glaser, and Curtis D. Hardin. 2009. "The Existence of Implicit Bias is Beyond Reasonable Doubt: A Refutation of Ideological and Methodological Objections and Executive Summary of Ten Studies that No Manager Should Ignore." *Research in Organizational Behavior* 29(2009): 39-69.

Jost, John T., and Erik P. Thompson. 2000. "Group-Based Dominance and Opposition to Equality as Independent Predictors of Self-Esteem, Ethnocentrism, and Social Policy Attitudes among African Americans and European Americans." *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 36(3): 209-232.

Johnson, Kenneth M., and Daniel T. Lichter. 2010. "Growing Diversity among America's Children and Youth: Spatial and Temporal Dimensions." *Population and Development Review* 36(1): 151-176.

Judis, John B. 2016. *The Populist Explosion: How the Great Recession Transformed American and European Politics.* New York, NY: Columbia Global Reports.

Judis, John B. 2018. *The Nationalist Revival: Trade, Immigration, and the Revolt Against Globalization.* New York, NY: Columbia Global Reports.

Jungar, Ann-Cathrine, and Anders Ravik Jupskås. 2014. "Populist Radical Right Parties in the Nordic Region: A New and Distinct Party Family?." *Scandinavian Political Studies* 37(3): 215-238.

Jupskås, Anders R., and Elisabeth Ivarsflaten. 2016. "Norway: Populism from Anti-Tax Movement to Government Party,” in *Populist Political Communication in Europe*. New York, NY: Routledge, 2016, pgs. 64-77.

Jylhä, Kirsti M., Jens Rydgren, and Pontus Strimling. 2019. "Radical Right-Wing Voters from Right and Left: Comparing Sweden Democrat Voters who Previously Voted for the Conservative Party or the Social Democratic Party." *Scandinavian Political Studies* 42(3-4): 220-244.

Kagan, Michael. 2016. "Binding the Enforcers: The Administrative Law Struggle Behind President Obama's Immigration Actions." *U. Rich. L. Rev*. 50: 665-736.

Kallius, Annastiina, Daniel Monterescu, and Prem Kumar Rajaram. 2016. "Immobilizing Mobility: Border Ethnography, Illiberal Democracy, and the Politics of the 'Refugee Crisis' in Hungary." *American Ethnologist* 43(1): 25-37.

Kalsnes, Bente. 2019. "Examining the Populist Communication Logic: Strategic Use of Social Media in Populist Political Parties in Norway and Sweden." *Central European Journal of Communication* 12(23): 187-205.

Kanmaz, Meryem. 2002. "The recognition and institutionalization of Islam in Belgium." *The Muslim World* 92(1-2): 99-113.

Karamichas, John. 2008. "Red and Green Facets of Political Ecology Accounting for Electoral Prospects in Greece." *Journal of Modern Greek Studies* 26(2): 311-336.

Karlhofer, Ferdinand, and Günther Pallaver. 2013. "Strength through Weakness: State Executive Power and Federal Reform in Austria." *Swiss Political Science Review* 19(1): 41-59.

Karlsson, David. 2018. "Putting Party First: Swedish MPs and Their Constituencies." *Representation* 54(1): 87-102.

Karolewski, Ireneusz Pawel, and Roland Benedikter. 2017. "Europe's Refugee and Migrant Crisis: Economic and Political Ambivalences." *Challenge* 60(3): 294-320.

Karydis, Vasilis. 1996. *The Criminality of Migrants in Greece: Issues of Theory and Criminal Policy*. Athens, GR: Papazisis.

Karyotis, Georgios, and Stratos Patrikios. 2010. "Religion, Securitization and Anti-Immigration Attitudes: The Case of Greece." *Journal of Peace Research* 47(1): 43-57.

Katsanidou, Alexia, and Simon Otjes. 2016. "How the European Debt Crisis Reshaped National Political Space: The Case of Greece." *European Union Politics* 17(2): 262-284.

Katz, Richard S., and Peter Mair. 1995. "Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party." *Party Politics* 1(1): 5-28.

Katz, Richard S. 1996. "Electoral Reform and the Transformation of Party Politics in Italy." *Party Politics* 2(1): 31-53.

Kaufmann, Eric, and Gareth Harris. 2015. ""White Flight" or Positive Contact? Local Diversity and Attitudes to Immigration in Britain." *Comparative Political Studies* 48(12): 1563-1590.

Kayam, Orly. 2018. "The Readability and Simplicity of Donald Trump's Language." *Political Studies Review* 16(1): 73-88.

Kazamias, George, and Dimitris Papadimitriou. 2002. "The Elections in Greece, April 2000." *Electoral Studies* 21(4): 649-655.

Keman, Hans. 2007. "Experts and Manifestos: Different Sources–Same Results for Comparative Research?." *Electoral Studies* 26(1): 76-89.

Kende, Anna, and Péter Krekó. 2020. "Xenophobia, Prejudice, and Right-Wing Populism in East-Central Europe." *Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences* 34: 29-33.

Kessler, Alan E., and Gary P. Freeman. 2005. "Support for Extreme Right-Wing Parties in Western Europe: Individual Attributes, Political Attitudes, and National Context." *Comparative European Politics* 3(3): 261-288.

Kibuuka, Brian Gordon Lutalo. 2020. "Complicity and Synergy between Bolsonaro and Brazilian Evangelicals in COVID-19 Times: Adherence to Scientific Negationism for Political-Religious Reasons." *International Journal of Latin American Religions* 4(2): 288-317.

Kim, Heemin, and Richard C. Fording. 1998. "Voter Ideology in Western Democracies, 1946–1989." *European Journal of Political Research* 33(1): 73-97.

King, Gary, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba. 1994. *Design Social Inquiry.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Kirchheimer, Otto. 1966. “The Transformation of the Western European Party Systems”, in *Political Parties and Political Development*, eds. Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pgs. 177–200.

Kitschelt, Herbert. 1994. *The Transformation of European Social Democracy*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Kitschelt, Herbert. 1995. "Formation of Party Cleavages in Post-Communist Democracies: Theoretical Propositions." *Party Politics* 1(4): 447-472.

Kitschelt, Herbert and McGann, Anthony. 1997. *The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

Klein, Bradley S. 1990. "How the West was One: Representational Politics of Nato." *International Studies Quarterly* 34(3): 311-325.

Klingemann, Hans-Dieter. 1995. "Party Positions and Voter Orientations," in *Citizens and the State*. Eds. Hans-Dieter Klingemann and Dieter Fuch. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Knigge, Pia. 1998. "The Ecological Correlates of Right-Wing Extremism in Western Europe." *European Journal of Political Research* 34(2): 249-279.

Knoll, Benjamin R., David P. Redlawsk, and Howard Sanborn. 2011. "Framing Labels and Immigration Policy Attitudes in the Iowa Caucuses: “Trying to Out-Tancredo Tancredo”." *Political Behavior* 33(3): 433-454.

Knuckey, Jonathan. 2011. "Racial Resentment and Vote Choice in the 2008 US Presidential Election." *Politics & Policy* 39(4): 559-582.

Koch, Insa. 2017. "What's in a Vote? Brexit beyond Culture Wars." *American Ethnologist* 44(2): 225-230.

Koch, Koen. 1991. "Back to Sarajevo or Beyond Trianon-Some Thoughts on the Problem of Nationalism in Eastern-Europe." *Netherlands Journal of Social Sciences* 27(1): 29-42.

König, Thomas. 2001. "Bicameralism and Party Politics in Germany: An Empirical Social Choice Analysis." *Political Studies* 49(3): 411-437.

Kosiara-Pedersen, Karina. 2012. "The 2011 Danish Parliamentary Election: A Very New Government." *West European Politics* 35(2): 415-424.

Kosiara-Pedersen, Karina. 2016. "Tremors, No Earthquake: The 2015 Danish Parliamentary Election." *West European Politics* 39(4): 870-878.

Kotkin, Joel. 2010. *The Next Hundred Million: America in 2050.* New York, NY: Penguin.

Knight, Kathleen. 2006. "Transformations of the Concept of Ideology in the Twentieth Century." *American Political Science Review* 100(4): 619-626.

Kramer, Gerald H. 1971. "Short-Term Fluctuations in US Voting Behavior, 1896–1964." *American Political Science Review* 65(1): 131-143.

Kreiss, Daniel. 2017. "The Fragmenting of the Civil Sphere: How Partisan Identity Shapes the Moral Evaluation of Candidates and Epistemology." *American Journal of Cultural Sociology* 5: 443-459.

Kreuzer, Marcus. 2000. "Electoral Mechanisms and Electioneering Incentives: Vote-Getting Strategies of Japanese, French, British, German and Austrian Conservatives." *Party Politics* 6(4): 487-504.

Kriesi, Hanspeter, Edgar Grande, Romain Lachat, Martin Dolezal, Simon Bornschier, and Timotheos Frey. 2006. "Globalization and the Transformation of the National Political Space: Six European Countries Compared." *European Journal of Political Research* 45(6): 921-956.

Kriesi, Hanspeter, Edgar Grande, Romain Lachat, Martin Dolezal, Simon Bornschier, and Timotheos Frey. 2008. *West European Politics in the Age of Globalization. Vol. 10*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Krosnick, Jon A. 1991. "The Stability of Political Preferences: Comparisons of Symbolic and Nonsymbolic Attitudes." *American Journal of Political Science* 35(3): 547-576.

Krosnick, Jon A., and Duane F. Alwin. 1989. "Aging and Susceptibility to Attitude Change." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 57(3): 416-425.

Krouwel, André, and Koen Abts. 2007. "Varieties of Euroscepticism and Populist Mobilization: Transforming Attitudes from Mild Euroscepticism to Harsh Eurocynicism." *Acta Politica* 42(2): 252-270.

Kubiak, Stefan. 2016. "Why is Kwame Anthony Appiah's Proposal to Dismiss the Concept of "The West" Premature?." *Crossroads. A Journal of English Studies* 02 (13): 22-40.

Kuklinski, James H., Michael D. Cobb, and Martin Gilens. 1997. "Racial Attitudes and the" New South"." *The Journal of Politics* 59(2): 323-349.

Kuipers, Samuel. 2006. *The Crisis Imperative: Crisis Rhetoric and Welfare Reform in Belgium and the Netherlands in the Early 1990s.* Amsterdam, NL: Amsterdam University Press.

Kuisma, Mikko and Mikael Nygard. 2017. "Immigration, Integration and the Finns Party: Issue-Ownership by Coincidence or by Stealth?," in *The European Mainstream and the Populist Radical Right.* Eds. Pontus Odmalm and Eve Hepburn. London, UK: Routledge, 1-28.

Kus, Basak. 2006. "Neoliberalism, Institutional Change and the Welfare State: The Case of Britain and France." *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 47(6): 488-525.

Lacatus, Corina. 2019. "Populism and the 2016 American Election: Evidence from Official Press Releases and Twitter." *PS: Political Science & Politics* 52(2): 223-228.

Lajevardi, Nazita, and Marisa Abrajano. 2019. "How Negative Sentiment toward Muslim Americans Predicts Support for Trump in the 2016 Presidential Election." *The Journal of Politics* 81(1): 296-302.

Lajevardi, Nazita, and Kassra AR Oskooii. 2018. "Old-Fashioned Racism, Contemporary Islamophobia, and the Isolation of Muslim Americans in the Age of Trump." *Journal of Race, Ethnicity, and Politics* 3(1): 112-152.

Lammers, Joris, and Matthew Baldwin. 2020. "Make America Gracious Again: Collective Nostalgia can Increase and Decrease Support for Right-Wing Populist Rhetoric." *European Journal of Social Psychology* 50(5): 943-954.

Lamont, Michèle, Bo Yun Park, and Elena Ayala-Hurtado. 2017. "Trump's Electoral Speeches and His Appeal to the American White Working Class." *The British Journal of Sociology* 68 (1): S153-S180.

Lamour, Christian. 2021. "Orbán Urbi et Orbi: Christianity as a Nodal Point of Radical-Right Populism." *Politics and Religion* (2021): 1-27.

Larsen, Erik Gahner, David Cutts, and Matthew J. Goodwin. 2020. "Do Terrorist Attacks Feed Populist Eurosceptics? Evidence from Two Comparative Quasi-Experiments." *European Journal of Political Research* 59(1): 182-205.

Lascombe, Michel. 1981. "Le Premier Ministre, Clef de Voute des Institutions? L'Article 49, Alinea 3 et les Autres." *Revue du Droit Public et de la Science Politique* 97(1981): 105-161.

Lassen, Aksel. 1966. "The Population of Denmark, 1660-1960." *Scandinavian Economic History Review* 14(2): 134-157.

Laurence, James, and Lee Bentley. 2016. "Does Ethnic Diversity have a Negative Effect on Attitudes towards the Community? A Longitudinal Analysis of the Causal Claims within the Ethnic Diversity and Social Cohesion Debate." *European Sociological Review* 32.1 (2016): 54-67.

Laver, Michael, and Kenneth Benoit. 2002. "Locating TDs in Policy Spaces: The Computational Text Analysis of Dáil Speeches." *Irish Political Studies* 17(1): 59-73.

Laver, Michael, and Budge, Ian., Eds. 1993. *Party Policy and Coalition Government in Western Europe*. London, UK: Macmillan.

Laver, Michael, and John Garry. 2000. "Estimating Policy Positions from Political Texts." *American Journal of Political Science* 44(3): 619-634.

Laver, Michael, and Norman Schofield. 1990. *Multi-Party Government: The Politics of Coalition in Western Europe.* Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Laythe, Brian, Deborah Finkel, and Lee A. Kirkpatrick. 2001. "Predicting Prejudice from Religious Fundamentalism and Right-Wing Authoritarianism: A Multiple-Regression Approach." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 40(1): 1-10.

Le Queux, Stéphane, and Ivan Sainsaulieu. 2010. "Social Movement and Unionism in France: A Case for Revitalization?." *Labor Studies Journal* 35(4): 503-519.

Lee, Michael J. 2006. "The Populist Chameleon: The People's Party, Huey Long, George Wallace, and the Populist Argumentative Frame." *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 92(4): 355-378.

Lees, Charles. 2018. "The 'Alternative for Germany': The Rise of Right-Wing Populism at the Heart of Europe." *Politics* 38(3): 295-310.

Lehmbruch, Gerhard. 1993. "Consociational Democracy and Corporatism in Switzerland." *Publius: The Journal of Federalism* 23(2): 43-60.

Leidig, Eviane Cheng. 2019. "Immigrant, Nationalist and Proud: A Twitter Analysis of Indian Diaspora Supporters for Brexit and Trump." *Media and Communication* 7(1): 77-89.

Leininger, Arndt, and Maurits J. Meijers. 2020. "Do Populist Parties Increase Voter Turnout? Evidence from Over 40 Years of Electoral History in 31 European Democracies." *Political Studies* (2020): 1-21.

Levine, Bruce. 2001. "Conservatism, Nativism, and Slavery: Thomas R. Whitney and the Origins of the Know-Nothing Party." *The Journal of American History* 88(2): 455-488.

Levitin, Teresa E., and Warren E. Miller. 1979. "Ideological Interpretations of Presidential Elections." *American Political Science Review* 73(3): 751-771.

Lijphart, Arend. 1968. "Typologies of Democratic Systems." *Comparative Political Studies* 1(1): 3-44.

Lijphart, Arend. 1984. *Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries.* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Lijphart, Arend. 1997. "Unequal Participation: Democracy's Unresolved Dilemma Presidential Address, American Political Science Association, 1996." *American Political Science Review* 91(1): 1-14.

Lipset, Seymour Martin, and Stein Rokkan. 1967. *Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction*. New York, NY: Free Press.

Lisi, Marco. 2015. "Partisanship and Age Effects in Recent Democracies: Southern Europe from A Comparative Perspective." *Comparative European Politics* 13(4): 493-513.

Llanos, Mariana, and Detlef Nolte. 2003. "Bicameralism in the Americas: Around the Extremes of Symmetry and Incongruence." *The Journal of Legislative Studies* 9(3): 54-86.

Lodge, Milton, Patrick Stroh, and John Wahlke. 1990. "Black-Box Models of Candidate Evaluation." *Political Behavior* 12(1): 5-18.

Louwerse, Tom, and Simon Otjes. 2016. "Personalised Parliamentary Behaviour without Electoral Incentives: The Case of the Netherlands." *West European Politics* 39(4): 778-799.

Louwerse, Tom, and Simon Otjes. 2019. "How Populists Wage Opposition: Parliamentary Opposition Behaviour and Populism in Netherlands." *Political Studies* 67(2): 479-495.

Lowenstein, Karl. 1953. “The Role of Ideologies in Political Change.” *International Social Science Bulletin* 5(1): 51-74.

Lubbers, Marcel. 2008. "Regarding the Dutch ‘Nee' to the European Constitution: A Test of the Identity, Utilitarian and Political Approaches to Voting ‘No'." *European Union Politics* 9(1): 59-86.

Lubbers, Marcel, and Marcel Coenders. 2017. "Nationalistic Attitudes and Voting for the Radical Right in Europe." *European Union Politics* 18(1): 98-118.

Lubbers, Marcel, Mérove Gijsberts, and Peer Scheepers. 2002. "Extreme Right-Wing Voting in Western Europe." *European Journal of Political Research* 41(3): 345-378.

Lubbers, Marcel, and Peer Scheepers. 2000. "Individual and Contextual Characteristics of the German Extreme Right-Wing Vote in the 1990s. A Test of Complementary Theories." *European Journal of Political Research* 38(1): 63-94.

Lubbers, Marcel, and Peer Scheepers. 2002. "French Front National Voting: A Micro and Macro Perspective." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 25(1): 120-149.

Lundell, Krister. 2008. "Electoral Reform and Party System Change: An Analysis of Nordic Elections with Two Different Electoral Systems." *Scandinavian Political Studies* 31(4): 363-383.

Luther, Kurt R. 2003. “The FPÖ: From Populist Protest to Incumbency”, in *Right-wing Extremism in the Twenty-first Century*. Peter H. Merkl and Leonard Weinberg Eds. London, UK: Cass, 191–219.

MacWilliams, Matthew C. 2016. "Who Decides When the Party Doesn't? Authoritarian Voters and the Rise of Donald Trump." *PS: Political Science & Politics* 49(4): 716-721.

Mahbubani, Kishore. "The Dangers of Decadence." *Foreign Affairs* 72(4): 12-14.

Mair, Peter, and Cas Mudde. 1998. "The Party Family and Its Study." *Annual Review of Political Science* 1(1): 211-229.

Mair, Peter, and Ingrid Van Biezen. 2001. "Party Membership in Twenty European Democracies, 1980-2000." *Party Politics* 7(1): 5-21.

Mair, Peter. 2008. "Electoral Volatility and the Dutch Party System: A Comparative Perspective." *Acta Politica* 43(2): 235-253.

Major, Brenda, Alison Blodorn, and Gregory Major Blascovich. 2018. "The Threat of Increasing Diversity: Why Many White Americans Support Trump in the 2016 Presidential Election." *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations* 21(6): 931-940.

Maksic, Adis, and Nihad Ahmic. 2020. "Constructing the Muslim Threat: A Critical Analysis of Marine Le Pen's Twitter Posts during the 2017 French Election Campaign." *J. Regional Security* 15(1): 131-148.

Mansbridge, Jane. 1999. "Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women Represent Women? A Contingent" Yes"." *The Journal of Politics* 61(3): 628-657.

Mansergh, Lucy, and Robert Thomson. 2007. "Election Pledges, Party Competition, and Policymaking." *Comparative Politics* 39(3): 311-329.

Manza, Jeff, and Ned Crowley. 2018. "Ethnonationalism and the Rise of Donald Trump." *Contexts* 17(1): 28-33.

Marc Clemens, Clayton. 2013. "Beyond Christian Democracy? Welfare State Politics and Policy in a Changing CDU." *German Politics* 22(1-2): 191-211.

March, Luke. 2007. "From Vanguard of the Proletariat to Vox Populi: Left-Populism as a 'Shadow' of Contemporary Socialism." *SAIS Review of International Affairs* 27(1): 63-77.

March, Luke. 2017. "Left and Right Populism Compared: The British Case." *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 19(2): 282-303.

Margolis, Michele F. 2020. "Who Wants to Make America Great Again? Understanding Evangelical Support for Donald Trump." *Politics and Religion* 13(1): 89-118.

Markou, Grigoris. 2017. "The Rise of Inclusionary Populism in Europe: The Case of SYRIZA." *Contemporary Southeastern Europe* 4(1): 54-71.

Marks, Gary, Liesbet Hooghe, Moira Nelson, and Erica Edwards. 2006. "Party Competition and European Integration in the East and West: Different Structure, Same Causality." *Comparative Political Studies* 39(2): 155-175.

Marks, Gary, and Carole J. Wilson. 2000. "The Past in the Present: A Cleavage Theory of Party Response to European Integration." *British Journal of Political Science* 30(3): 433-459.

Marthaler, Sally. 2010. "La Course au Centre: Policy Convergence and Partisanship in France, 1981-2002." *French Politics, Culture & Society* 28(2): 75-95.

Martiniello, Marco. 2003. "Belgium's Immigration Policy." *International Migration Review* 37(1): 225-232.

Massetti, Emanuele, and Simon Toubeau. 2013. "Sailing with Northern Winds: Party Politics and Federal Reforms in Italy." *West European Politics* 36(2): 359-381.

Massetti, Emanuele. 2015. "Mainstream Parties and the Politics of Immigration in Italy: A Structural Advantage for the Right or a Missed Opportunity for the Left?." *Acta Politica* 50(4): 486-505.

Massey, Douglas S. 1981. "Dimensions of the New Immigration to the United States and the Prospects for Assimilation." *Annual Review of Sociology* 7(1): 57-85.

Mather, Robert D., and Kurt W. Jefferson. 2016. "The Authoritarian Voter? The Psychology and Values of Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders Support." *Journal of Scientific Psychology* (2016): 1-8.

Matthes, Jörg, and Desirée Schmuck. 2017. "The Effects of Anti-Immigrant Right-Wing Populist Ads on Implicit and Explicit Attitudes: A Moderated Mediation Model." *Communication Research* 44(4): 556-581.

Matznetter, Walter. 2002 "Social Housing Policy in a Conservative Welfare State: Austria as an Example." *Urban Studies* 39(2): 265-282.

Mau, Steffen, and Christoph Burkhardt. 2009. "Migration and Welfare State Solidarity in Western Europe." *Journal of European Social Policy* 19(3): 213-229.

Maussen, Marcel, and Ralph Grillo. 2014. "Regulation of Speech in Multicultural Societies: Introduction." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 40(2): 174-193.

Mayaffre, Damon, and Ronny Scholz. 2017. "Constructing 'the French people'–On Sarkozy's Populism." *Journal of Language and Politics* 16(5): 683-705.

Mayer, Jean-François. 2011. "A Country without Minarets: Analysis of the Background and Meaning of the Swiss Vote of 29 November 2009." Religion 41(1): 11-28.

Mayer, Nonna. 2003. "Le Pen's Comeback: The 2002 French Presidential Election." *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 27(2): 455-459.

Mayer, Nonna. 2013. "From Jean-Marie to Marine Le Pen: Electoral Change on the Far Right." *Parliamentary Affairs* 66(1): 160-178.

Mayhew, David R. 1974. *Congress: The Electoral Connection.* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

McCann, Anthony J., and Herbert Kitschelt. 2005. "The Radical Right in the Alps: Evolution of Support for the Swiss SVP and Austrian FPÖ." *Party Politics* 11(2): 147-171.

McCarthy, James. 2019. "Authoritarianism, Populism, and the Environment: Comparative Experiences, Insights, and Perspectives." *Annals of the American Association of Geographers* 109(2): 301-313.

McClosky, Herbert, and John Zaller. 1984. *The American Ethos: Public Attitudes Toward Democracy and Capitalism*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

McDonald, Michael D., Silvia M. Mendes, and Myunghee Kim. 2007. "Cross-Temporal and Cross-National Comparisons of Party Left-Right Positions." *Electoral Studies* 26(1): 62-75.

McDowell, Linda. 2009. "Old and New European Economic Migrants: Whiteness and Managed Migration Policies." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 35(1): 19-36.

McInnes, Neil. 1997. "The Great Doomsayer: Oswald Spengler Reconsidered." *The National Interest* 48 (Summer 1997): 65-76.

McKay, David. 1989. "Presidential Strategy and the Veto Power: A Reappraisal." Political Science Quarterly 104.3 (1989): 447-461.

McLaren, Lauren M. 2002. "Public Support for the European Union: Cost/Benefit Analysis or Perceived Cultural Threat?." *Journal of Politics* 64(2): 551-566.

McNeill, William H. 1997. "What We Mean by the West." *Orbis* 41(4): 513-524.

Meguid, Bonnie M. 2005. "Competition between Unequals: The Role of Mainstream Party Strategy in Niche Party Success." *American Political Science Review* 99(3): 347-359.

Mendleberg, Tali. 2001. *The Race Card: Campaign Strategy, Implicit Messages, and the Norm of Equality.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Meijers, Maurits J., and Andrej Zaslove. 2020. "Measuring Populism in Political Parties: Appraisal of a New Approach." *Comparative Political Studies* 54(2): 372-407.

Mieriņa, Inta, and Ilze Koroļeva. 2015. "Support for Far Right Ideology and Anti-Migrant Attitudes among Youth in Europe: A Comparative Analysis." *The Sociological Review* 63(S2): 183-205.

Miller, Arthur H., and Ola Listhaug. 1990. "Political Parties and Confidence in Government: A Comparison of Norway, Sweden and the United States." *British Journal of Political Science* 20(3): 357-386.

Minkenberg, Michael. 2000. "The Renewal of the Radical Right: Between Modernity and Anti-Modernity." *Government and Opposition* (2000): 170-188.

Mishler, William, and Richard Rose. 2007. "Generation, Age, and Time: The Dynamics of Political Learning during Russia's transformation." *American Journal of Political Science* 51(4): 822-834.

Morella, Jennifer L., and Zechmeister, Elizabeth J. 2009. *Democracy at Risk: How Terrorist Threats Affect the Public*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Min, Pyong Gap. 1999. "A Comparison of Post-1965 and Turn-of-the-Century Immigrants in Intergenerational Mobility and Cultural Transmission." *Journal of American Ethnic History* (1999): 65-94.

Mondon, Aurelien. 2014. "The Front National in the Twenty-First Century: From Pariah to Republican Democratic Contender?." *Modern & Contemporary France* 22(3): 301-320.

Mols, Frank, and Jolanda Jetten. 2016. "Explaining the Appeal of Populist Right-Wing Parties in Times of Economic Prosperity." *Political Psychology* 37(2): 275-292.

Montgomery, Kathleen A., and Ryan Winter. 2015. "Explaining the Religion Gap in Support for Radical Right Parties in Europe." *Politics & Religion* 8(2): 1-25.

Montgomery, Martin. 2017. "Post-Truth Politics?: Authenticity, Populism and the Electoral Discourses of Donald Trump." *Journal of Language and Politics* 16(4): 619-639.

Montiel, Cristina Jayme, Arvin Jay Boller, Joshua Uyheng, and Ervina A. Espina. 2019. "Narrative Congruence between Populist President Duterte and the Filipino Public: Shifting Global Alliances from the United States to China." *Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology* 29(6): 520-534.

Morgan, Stephen L. 2018. "Status Threat, Material Interests, and the 2016 Presidential Vote." *Socius* 4: 1-17.

Morgan, Stephen L., and Jiwon Lee. 2017. "The White Working Class and Voter Turnout in US Presidential Elections, 2004 to 2016." *Sociological Science* 4: 656-685.

Morgan, Stephen L., and Jiwon Lee. 2018. "Trump Voters and the White Working Class." *Sociological Science* 5: 234-245.

Morgan, Stephen L., and Jiwon Lee. 2019. "Economic Populism and Bandwagon Bigotry: Obama-to-Trump Voters and the Cross Pressures of the 2016 Election." *Socius* 5: 1-15.

Morlino, Leonardo. 1996. "Crisis of Parties and Change of Party System in Italy." *Party Politics* 2(1): 5-30.

Mudde, Cas. 1995. "Right-Wing Extremism Analyzed: A Comparative Analysis of the Ideologies of Three Alleged Right-Wing Extremist Parties (NPD, NDP, CP'86)." *European Journal of Political Research* 27(2): 203-224.

Mudde, Cas. 1996. "The War of Words Defining the Extreme Right Party Family." *West European Politics* 19(2): 225-248.

Mudde, Cas. 1999. "The Single-Issue Party Thesis: Extreme Right Parties and the Immigration Issue." *West European Politics* 22(3): 182-197.

Mudde, Cas. 2000. *The Ideology of the Extreme Right.* Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press.

Mudde, Cas. 2004. "The Populist Zeitgeist." *Government and Opposition* 39(4): 541-563.

Mudde, Cas. 2007. *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe.* Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Mudde, Cas. 2013. "Three Decades of Populist Radical Right Parties in Western Europe: So What?." *European Journal of Political Research* 52(1): 1-19.

Mudde, Cas, and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser. 2013. "Exclusionary vs. Inclusionary Populism: Comparing Contemporary Europe and Latin America." *Government and Opposition* 48(2): 147-174.

Mudde, Cas, and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser. 2015. "Vox Populi or Vox Masculini? Populism and Gender in Northern Europe and South America." *Patterns of Prejudice* 49(1-2): 16-36.

Mudde, Cas, and Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser. 2017. *Populism: A Very Short Introduction.* Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Muis, Jasper, and Tim Immerzeel. 2017. "Causes and Consequences of the Rise of Populist Radical Right Parties and Movements in Europe." *Current Sociology* 65(6): 909-930.

Mullins, Willard A. 1974. "Sartori's Concept of Ideology: A Dissent and an Alternative," in Allen R. Wilcox, ed., *Public Opinion and Political Attitudes,* New York, NY: Wiley, pgs. 223-237.

Mulloy, D.J. 2004. *American Extremism: History, Politics, and the Militia Movement.* New York, NY: Routledge.

Murphy, Joshua. 2019. "Populism and British Stories of Decline." *American Journal of Economics and Sociology* 78(3): 741-759.

Murray, Gregg R., and Anthony Scime. 2010. "Microtargeting and Electorate Segmentation: Data Mining the American National Election Studies." *Journal of Political Marketing* 9(3): 143-166.

Murray, Rainbow. 2013. "Towards Parity Democracy? Gender in the 2012 French Legislative Elections." *Parliamentary Affairs* 66(1): 197-212.

Musalo, Karen, and Eunice Lee. 2017. "Seeking a Rational Approach to a Regional Refugee Crisis: Lessons from the Summer 2014 "Surge" of Central American Women and Children at the US-Mexico Border." *Journal on Migration and Human Security* 5(1): 137-179.

Mutz, Diana C. 2018. "Status Threat, not Economic Hardship, Explains the 2016 Presidential Vote." *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 115(19): E4330-E4339.

Nadler, Arie. 2002. "Inter-Group Helping Relations as Power Relations: Helping Relations as Affirming or Challenging Inter-Group Hierarchy." *Journal of Social Issues* 58(3): 487-502.

Nadler, Arie, and Samer Halabi. 2006. "Intergroup Helping as Status Relations: Effects of Status Stability, Identification, and Type of Help on Receptivity to High-Status Group's Help." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 91(1): 97.

Navarrete, Carlos David, Melissa M. McDonald, Ludwin E. Molina, and Jim Sidanius. 2010. "Prejudice at the Nexus of Race and Gender: An Outgroup Male Target Hypothesis." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 98(6): 933-945.

Navot, Suzie. 2008. "Fighting Terrorism in the Political Arena: The Banning of Political Parties." *Party Politics* 14(6): 745-762.

Nieuwbeerta, Paul, and Karin Wittebrood. 1995. "Intergenerational Transmission of Political Party Preference in the Netherlands." *Social Science Research* 24(3): 243-261.

Neumayer, Eric. 2004. "The Environment, Left-Wing Political Orientation and Ecological Economics." *Ecological Economics* 51(3-4): 167-175.

Newell, James L. 2006. "Characterising the Italian Parliament: Legislative Change in Longitudinal Perspective." *The Journal of Legislative Studies* 12(3-4): 386-403.

Niemi, Richard G., G. Bingham Powell Jr, Harold W. Stanley, and C. Lawrence Evans. 1985. "Testing the Converse Partisanship Model with New Electorates." Comparative Political Studies 18(3): 300-322.

Norocel, Ov Cristian. 2016. "Populist Radical Right Protectors of the Folkhem: Welfare Chauvinism in Sweden." *Critical Social Policy* 36(3): 371-390.

Norpoth, Helmut. 1978. "Party Identification in West Germany: Tracing an Elusive Concept." *Comparative Political Studies* 11(1): 36-61.

Norrell, Robert J. 1991. "Labor at the Ballot Box: Alabama Politics from the New Deal to the Dixiecrat Movement." *The Journal of Southern History* 57(2): 201-234.

Norris, Pippa, and Ronald Inglehart. 2019. *Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism.* New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Nussio, Enzo, Vincenzo Bove, and Bridget Steele. 2019. "The Consequences of Terrorism on Migration Attitudes Across Europe." *Political Geography* 75 (2019): 1-10.

O'Brien, Conor Cruise. 1992/1993. "The Future of 'the West'." *The National Interest* 30 (Winter 1992/1993): 3-10.

O’Brien, Robert M. 2007. "A Caution Regarding Rules of Thumb for Variance Inflation Factors." *Quality & Quantity* 41(5): 673-690.

O’Hagan, Jacinta. 2002. *Conceptualizing the West in International Relations: From Spengler to Said.* New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.

Oesch, Daniel. 2008. "Explaining Workers' Support for Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western Europe: Evidence from Austria, Belgium, France, Norway, and Switzerland." *International Political Science Review* 29(3): 349-373.

Oliver, Rebecca J., and Margitta Mätzke. 2014. "Childcare Expansion in Conservative Welfare States: Policy Legacies and the Politics of Decentralized Implementation in Germany and Italy." *Social Politics* 21(2): 167-193.

Oliver, J. Eric, and Wendy M. Rahn. 2016. "Rise of the Trumpenvolk: Populism in the 2016 Election." *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 667(1): 189-206.

Olson, Mancur. 1965. *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Oosterwaal, Annemarije, and René Torenvlied. 2010. "Politics Divided from Society? Three Explanations for Trends in Societal and Political Polarisation in the Netherlands." *West European Politics* 33(2): 258-279.

Oscarsson, Henrik and Sören Holmberg, 2008. *Regeringsskifte: Väljarna och Valet 2006*. Stockholm, Sweden: Norstedts Juridik.

Oscarsson, Henrik. & Holmberg, Sören. 2013. *Nya Svenska Väljare*. Stockholm, Sweden: Nordstedts Juridik.

Oskarson, Maria, and Marie Demker. 2015. "Room for Realignment: The Working-Class Sympathy for Sweden Democrats." *Government and Opposition* 50(4): 629-651.

Østergaard-Nielsen, Eva. 2003. "Counting the Costs: Denmark's Changing Migration Policies." *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 27(2): 448-454.

Otjes, Simon, Gilles Ivaldi, Anders Ravik Jupskås, and Oscar Mazzoleni. 2018. "It's not Economic Interventionism, Stupid! Reassessing the Political Economy of Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties." *Swiss Political Science Review* 24(3): 270-290.

Otjes, Simon, and Alexia Katsanidou. 2017. "Beyond Kriesiland: EU Integration as a Super Issue after the Eurocrisis." *European Journal of Political Research* 56(2): 301-319.

Otjes, Simon, and André Krouwel. 2019. "Why do Newcomers Vote for a Newcomer? Support for an Immigrant Party." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 45(7): 1148-1167.

Otjes, Simon, and Tom Louwerse. 2015. "Populists in Parliament: Comparing Left-Wing and Right-Wing Populism in the Netherlands." *Political Studies* 63(1): 60-79.

Owen, Diana, and Jack Dennis. 1996. "Anti-Partyism in the USA and Support for Ross Perot." *European Journal of Political Research* 29(3): 383-400.

Pachocka, Marta. 2016. "Understanding the Visegrad Group States' Response to the Migrant and Refugee Crisis 2014+ in the European Union." *Yearbook of Polish European Studies* 19: 101-132.

Paloheimo, Heikki. 2003. "The Rising Power of the Prime Minister in Finland." *Scandinavian Political Studies* 26(3): 219-243.

Panebianco, Angelo. 1988. *Political Parties: Organization and Power*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Pappas, Takis S. 2016. "Modern Populism: Research Advances, Conceptual and Methodological Pitfalls, and the Minimal Definition," in *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*.

Patana, Pauliina. 2020. "Changes in Local Context and Electoral Support for the Populist Radical Right: Evidence from Finland." *Party Politics* 26(6): 718-729.

Paterson, William, and James Sloam. 2006. "Is the Left Alright? The SPD and the Renewal of European Social Democracy." *German Politics* 15(3): 233-248.

Pauwels, Teun. 2011. "Explaining the Strange Decline of the Populist Radical Right Vlaams Belang in Belgium: The Impact of Permanent Opposition." *Acta Politica* 46(1): 60-82.

Pauwels, Teun. 2014. *Populism in Western Europe: Comparing Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands*. New York, NY: Routledge.

Pedersen, Mogens N., Peter Mair, and Francis G. Castles. 1997. "Left–Right Political Scales." *European Journal of Political Research* 31(1): 147-157.

Pellikaan, Huib, Sarah L. De Lange, and Tom Van der Meer. 2007. "Fortuyn's Legacy: Party System Change in the Netherlands." *Comparative European Politics* 5(3): 282-302.

Pellikaan, Huib, Sarah L. de Lange, and Tom Van der Meer. 2018. "The Centre Does Not Hold: Coalition Politics and Party System Change in the Netherlands, 2002–12." *Government and Opposition* 53(2): 231-255.

Pennings, Paul. 2005. "Parties, Voters and Policy Priorities in the Netherlands, 1971-2002." *Party Politics* 11(1): 29-45.

Percheron, Annick. 1977. "Ideological Proximity among French Children: Problems of Definition and Measurement." *European Journal of Political Research* 5(1): 53-81.

Peters, B. Guy, and Jon Pierre. 2019. "Populism and Public Administration: Confronting the Administrative State." *Administration & Society* 51(10): 1521-1545.

Pettersson, Katarina, Karmela Liebkind, and Inari Sakki. 2016. "You Who are an Immigrant–Why are You in the Sweden Democrats?." *Discourse & Society* 27(6): 624-641.

Pettigrew, Thomas F. 1998. "Reactions Toward the New Minorities of Western Europe." *Annual Review of Sociology* 24(1): 77-103.

Pierce, Roy. 1992. "Toward the Formation of a Partisan Alignment in France." *Political Behavior* 14(4): 443-469.

Pirro, Andrea LP, and Stijn Van Kessel. 2018. "Populist Eurosceptic Trajectories in Italy and the Netherlands During the European Crises." *Politics* 38(3): 327-343.

Pisany-Ferry, Jean. 2014. The Euro Crisis and Its Aftermath. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Piurko, Yuval, Shalom H. Schwartz, and Eldad Davidov. 2011. "Basic Personal Values and the Meaning of Left-Right Political Orientations in 20 Countries." *Political Psychology* 32(4): 537-561.

Polk, Jonathan, Jan Rovny, Ryan Bakker, Erica Edwards, Liesbet Hooghe, Seth Jolly, Jelle Koedam, Filip Kostelka, Gary Marks, Gijs Schumacher, Marco Steenbergen, Milada Vachudova, and Marko Zilovic. 2017. "Explaining the Salience of Anti-Elitism and Reducing Political Corruption for Political Parties in Europe with the Chapel Hill Expert Survey Data." *Research & Politics* January-March 2017: 1-9.

Poole, Keith T., and Howard Rosenthal. 1984. "The Polarization of American Politics." *The Journal of Politics* 46(4): 1061-1079.

Potrafke, Niklas. 2010. "Does Government Ideology Influence Deregulation of Product Markets? Empirical Evidence from OECD countries." *Public Choice* 143(1-2): 135-155.

Powell Jr, G. Bingham, and Guy D. Whitten. 1993. "A Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting: Taking Account of the Political Context." *American Journal of Political Science* 37(2): 391-414.

Prior, Markus. 2010. "You’ve Either Got It or You Don’t? The Stability of Political Interest over the Life Cycle." *The Journal of Politics* 72(3): 747-766.

Pupcenoks, Juris, and Ryan McCabe. 2013. "The Rise of the Fringe: Right Wing Populists, Islamists and Politics in the UK." *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 33(2): 171-184.

Putnam, Robert D. 2007. "E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-First Century the 2006 Johan Skytte Prize Lecture." *Scandinavian Political Studies* 30(2): 137-174.

Quinlan, Stephen, and Deirdre Tinney. 2019. "A Populist Wave or Metamorphosis of a Chameleon? Populist Attitudes and the Vote in 2016 in the United States and Ireland." *The Economic and Social Review* 50(2, Summer): 281-324.

Ramiro, Luis. 2016. "Support for Radical Left Parties in Western Europe: Social Background, Ideology and Political Orientations." *European Political Science Review: EPSR* 8(1): 1-23.

Ramiro, Luis, and Raul Gomez. 2017. "Radical-Left Populism during the Great Recession: Podemos and its Competition with the Established Radical Left." *Political Studies* 65(1_suppl): 108-126.

Rashkova, Ekaterina R., and Emilia Zankina. 2017. "Are (Populist) Radical Right Parties Männerparteien? Evidence from Bulgaria." *West European Politics* 40(4): 848-868.

Ratcliffe, Anita, and Stephanie von Hinke Kessler Scholder. 2015. "The London Bombings and Racial Prejudice: Evidence from the Housing and Labor Market." *Economic Inquiry* 53(1): 276-293.

Ratliff, Kate A., Liz Redford, John Conway, and Colin Tucker Smith. 2019. "Engendering Support: Hostile Sexism Predicts Voting for Donald Trump over Hillary Clinton in the 2016 US Presidential Election." *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations* 22(4): 578-593.

Raunio, Tapio. 2005. "Finland: One Hundred Years of Quietude," in *The Politics of Electoral Systems.* Eds. Michael Gallagher and Paul Mitchell. London, UK: Oxford University Press, 473-490.

Rayback, Joseph G. 1954. "Our" Dixiecrat" Revolts—A Case Study." *Social Science* 29(3): 138-146.

Rees, Philip, Pia Wohland, Paul Norman, and Peter Boden. 2012. "Ethnic Population Projections for the UK, 2001–2051." *Journal of Population Research* 29(1): 45-89.

Reeskens, Tim, and Marc Hooghe. 2008. "Cross-Cultural Measurement Equivalence of Generalized Trust. Evidence from the European Social Survey (2002 and 2004)." *Social Indicators Research* 85(3): 515-532.

Reimers, David M. 1983. "An Unintended Reform: The 1965 Immigration Act and Third World Immigration to the United States." *Journal of American Ethnic History* 3(1): 9-28.

Reinl, Ann-Kathrin, and Tassilo Heinrich. 2018. "The Christian Democratic and the Christian Social Union: Party and Voter Shifts during the Chancellorship of Angela Merkel." *Informationsdienst Soziale Indikatoren* 60 (2018): 6-13.

Rejai, Mostafa. 1991. *Political Ideologies: A Comparative Approach.* Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.

Rensmann, Lars. 2014. "The Reluctant Cosmopolitanization of European Party Politics: The Case of Germany." *German Politics and Society* 32(3): 59-85.

Reungoat, Emmanuelle. 2010. "Anti-EU Parties and the People: An Analysis of Populism in French Euromanifestos." *Perspectives on European Politics and Society* 11(3): 292-312.

Rico, Guillem, and Eva Anduiza. 2019. "Economic Correlates of Populist Attitudes: An Analysis of Nine European Countries in the Aftermath of the Great Recession." *Acta Politica* 54(3): 371-397.

Riker, William H. 1982. *Liberalism against Populism: A Confrontational Between the Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice.* San Francisco, CA: W.H. Freeman.

Roberts, Kenneth M. 2006. "Populism, Political Conflict, and Grass-Roots Organization in Latin America." *Comparative Politics* 38(2): 127-148.

Rodrik, Dani. 2018. "Populism and the Economics of Globalization." *Journal of International Business Policy* 1(1-2): 12-33.

Rokkan, Stein. 1970. "The Growth and Structuring of Mass Politics in Western Europe: Reflections of Possible Models of Explanation." *Scandinavian Political Studies* 5(A5): 65-83.

Rooduijn, Matthijs. 2019. "State of the Field: How to Study Populism and Adjacent Topics? A Plea for Both More and Less Focus." *European Journal of Political Research* 58(1): 362-372.

Rooduijn, Matthijs, and Tjitske Akkerman. 2017. "Flank Attacks: Populism and Left-Right Radicalism in Western Europe." *Party Politics* 23(3): 193-204.

Rooduijn, Matthijs, and Brian Burgoon. 2018. "The Paradox of Well-Being: Do Unfavorable Socioeconomic and Sociocultural Contexts Deepen or Dampen Radical Left and Right Voting among the Less Well-Off?." *Comparative Political Studies* 51(13): 1720-1753.

Rooduijn, Matthijs, Sarah L. De Lange, and Wouter Van der Brug. 2014. "A Populist Zeitgeist? Programmatic Contagion by Populist Parties in Western Europe." *Party Politics* 20(4): 563-575.

Rooduijn, Matthijs, Wouter Van Der Brug, and Sarah L. De Lange. 2016. "Expressing or Fueling Discontent? The Relationship between Populist Voting and Political Discontent." *Electoral Studies* 43 (2016): 32-40.

Rooduijn, Matthijs, and Teun Pauwels. 2011. "Measuring Populism: Comparing Two Methods of Content Analysis." *West European Politics* 34(6): 1272-1283.

Roopram, Shashi, and Esther van Steenbergen. 2014. Challenging the Post 9/11 “We-They” Configuration in Dutch Society: Hindustanis and the Populist Anti-Muslim Vote in Netherlands,” in *West-European Muslims post-9/11* P. Smets & Taslem Shakur (Eds.), pg. 48–61). The Netherlands: Joint South Asian Cultural Studies and Global Built Environment Review Special Edition.

Rose, Richard. 2000. "The End of Consensus in Austria and Switzerland." *Journal of Democracy* 11(2): 26-40.

Rosenfeld, Richard. 2018. "Studying Crime Trends: Normal Science and Exogenous Shocks." *Criminology* 56(1): 5-26.

Rossiter, Clinton. 1968. “Conservatism,” in *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences,* David L. Sills (eds). New York, NY: Macmillan and Free Press, pgs. 290-295.

Russell, Meg, and Maria Sciara. 2009. "Independent Parliamentarians En Masse: The Changing Nature and Role of the 'Crossbenchers' in the House of Lords." *Parliamentary Affairs* 62(1): 32-52.

Rydgren, Jens. 2005. "Is Extreme Right-Wing Populism Contagious? Explaining the Emergence of a New Party Family." *European Journal of Political Research* 44(3): 413-437.

Rydgren, Jens. 2007. "The Sociology of the Radical Right." *Annu. Rev. Sociol*. 33 (2007): 241-262.

Rydgren, Jens. 2008. "Immigration Sceptics, Xenophobes or Racists? Radical Right-Wing Voting in Six West European Countries." *European Journal of Political Research* 47(6): 737-765.

Rydgren, Jens. 2009. "Social Isolation? Social Capital and Radical Right-Wing Voting in Western Europe." *Journal of Civil Society* 5(2): 129-150.

Rydgren, Jens. 2010. "Radical Right-Wing Populism in Denmark and Sweden: Explaining Party System Change and Stability." *SAIS Review of International Affairs* 30(1): 57-71.

Rydgren, Jens. 2011. "A Legacy of 'Uncivicness'? Social Capital and Radical Right-Wing Populist Voting in Eastern Europe." *Acta Politica* 46(2): 132-157.

Rydgren, Jens, and Patrick Ruth. 2011. "Voting for the Radical Right in Swedish Municipalities: Social Marginality and Ethnic Competition?." *Scandinavian Political Studies* 34(3): 202-225.

Salmela, Mikko, and Christian von Scheve. 2017. "Emotional Roots of Right-Wing Political Populism." *Social Science Information* 56(4): 567-595.

Sänkiaho, Risto. 1971. "A Model of the Rise of Populism and Support for the Finnish Rural Party." *Scandinavian Political Studies* (1971): 27-48.

Sartori, Giovanni. 1969. "Politics, Ideology, and Belief Systems." *American Political Science Review* 63(2): 398-411.

Sartori, Giovanni. 1970. "Concept Misinformation in Contemporary Politics." *American Political Science Review* 64(4): 1033-1053.

Sartori, Giovanni. 1976. *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis.* Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Sauger, Nicolas. 2009. "Party Discipline and Coalition Management in the French Parliament." *West European Politics* 32(2): 310-326.

Scarrow, Susan E. 1996. "Politicians against Parties: Anti-Party Arguments as Weapons for Change in Germany." *European Journal of Political Research* 29(3): 297-317.

Schamis, Hector E. 2006. "A" Left Turn" in Latin America? Populism, Socialism, and Democratic Institutions." *Journal of Democracy* 17(4): 20-34.

Scharpf, Fritz W. 1988. "The Joint-Decision Trap: Lessons from German Federalism and European Integration." *Public Administration* 66(3): 239-278.

Schumacher, Gijs, Catherine E. De Vries, and Barbara Vis. 2013. "Why do Parties Change Position? Party Organization and Environmental Incentives." *The Journal of Politics* 75(2): 464-477.

Schumacher, Gijs, and Kees Van Kersbergen. 2016. "Do Mainstream Parties Adapt to the Welfare Chauvinism of Populist Parties?." *Party Politics* 22(3): 300-312.

Schmuck, Desirée, and Jörg Matthes. 2015. "How Anti-Immigrant Right-Wing Populist Advertisements Affect Young Voters: Symbolic Threats, Economic Threats and the Moderating Role of Education." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 41(10): 1577-1599.

Schmuck, Desirée, and Jörg Matthes. 2017. "Effects of Economic and Symbolic Threat Appeals in Right-Wing Populist Advertising on Anti-Immigrant Attitudes: The Impact of Textual and Visual Appeals." *Political Communication* 34(4): 607-626.

Schüller, Simone. 2016. "The Effects of 9/11 on Attitudes Toward Immigration and the Moderating Role of Education." *Kyklos* 69(4): 604-632.

Schulz, Anne, Philipp Müller, Christian Schemer, Dominique Stefanie Wirz, Martin Wettstein, and Werner Wirth. 2018. "Measuring Populist Attitudes on Three Dimensions." *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* 30(2): 316-326.

Sciortino, Giuseppe, and Asher Colombo. 2004. "The Flows and the Flood: The Public Discourse on Immigration in Italy, 1969–2001." *Journal of Modern Italian Studies* 9(1): 94-113.

Scoones, Ian, Marc Edelman, Saturnino M. Borras Jr, Ruth Hall, Wendy Wolford, and Ben White. 2018. "Emancipatory Rural Politics: Confronting Authoritarian Populism." The Journal of Peasant Studies 45(1): 1-20.

Searing, Donald, Gerald Wright, and George Rabinowitz. 1976. "The Primacy Principle: Attitude Change and Political Socialization." *British Journal of Political Science* 6(1): 83-113.

Sears, David O., and Carolyn L. Funk. 1999. "Evidence of the Long-Term Persistence of Adults' Political Predispositions." *The Journal of Politics* 61(1): 1-28.

Sears, David O., and P. J. Henry. "The Origins of Symbolic Racism." J*ournal of Personality and Social Psychology* 85(2): 259-275.

Seliger, Martin. 1976. *Ideology and Politics.* London, UK: George Allen and Unwin.

Selle, Per, and Lars Svåsand. 1991. "Membership in Party Organizations and the Problem of Decline of Parties." *Comparative Political Studies* 23(4): 459-477.

Senik, Claudia, Holger Stichnoth, and Karine Van der Straeten. 2009. "Immigration and Natives' Attitudes Towards the Welfare State: Evidence from the European Social Survey." *Social Indicators Research* 91(3): 345-370.

Serricchio, Fabio, Myrto Tsakatika, and Lucia Quaglia. 2013. "Euroscepticism and the Global Financial Crisis." *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 51(1): 51-64.

Serwer, Adam. 2019. "The President's Pursuit of White Power." January 13. *The Atlantic.* https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/01/trump-embraces-white-supremacy/579745/.

Setzler, Mark. 2021. "Did Brazilians Vote for Jair Bolsonaro Because They Share his Most Controversial Views?." *Brazilian Political Science Review* 15(1): 1-16.

Setzler, Mark, and Alixandra B. Yanus. 2018. "Why Did Women Vote for Donald Trump?." *PS, Political Science & Politics* 51(3): 523-527.

Shehaj, Albana, Adrian J. Shin, and Ronald Inglehart. 2021. "Immigration and Right-Wing Populism: An Origin Story." *Party Politics* 27(2): 282-293.

Sheingold, Carl A. 1973. "Social Networks and Voting: The Resurrection of a Research Agenda." *American Sociological Review* 38(6): 712-720.

Sherif, Muzafer, and Carolyn W. Sherif. 1969. "Interdisciplinary Coordination as a Validity Check: Retrospect and Prospects." *Interdisciplinary Relationships in the Social Sciences* (1969): 3-20.

Shih, Chih-yu. 2010. "The West that is not in the West: Identifying the Self in Oriental Modernity." *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 23(4): 537-560.

Shin, Michael E., and John Agnew. 2002. "The Geography of Party Replacement in Italy, 1987–1996." *Political Geography* 21(2): 221-242.

Shinada, Mizuho, Toshio Yamagishi, and Yu Ohmura. 2004. "False Friends are Worse than Bitter Enemies: 'Altruistic' Punishment of In-Group Members." *Evolution and Human Behavior* 25(6): 379-393.

Shipan, Charles R., and William R. Lowry. 2001. "Environmental Policy and Party Divergence in Congress." *Political Research Quarterly* 54(2): 245-263.

Sidanius, Jim, & Pratto, Felicia. 1999. *Social Dominance: An Intergroup Theory of Social Hierarchy and Oppression*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Sides, John, Michael Tesler, and Lynn Vavreck. 2017. "The 2016 US Election: How Trump Lost and Won." *Journal of Democracy* 28(2): 34-44.

Siri, Jasmin. 2018. "The Alternative for Germany after the 2017 Election." *German Politics* 27(1): 141-145.

Skarbek, David. 2011. "Governance and Prison Gangs." *American Political Science Review* 105(4): 702-716.

Skenderovic, Damir. 2007. "Immigration and the Radical Right in Switzerland: Ideology, Discourse and Opportunities." *Patterns of Prejudice* 41(2): 155-176.

Smith, David Norman. 2019. "Authoritarianism Reimagined: The Riddle of Trump's Base." *The Sociological Quarterly* 60(2): 210-223.

Smith, David Norman, and Eric Hanley. 2018. "The Anger Games: Who Voted for Donald Trump in the 2016 Election, and Why?." *Critical Sociology* 44(2): 195-212.

Smith, Jason Matthew. 2010. "Does Crime Pay? Issue Ownership, Political Opportunity, and the Populist Right in Western Europe." *Comparative Political Studies* 43(11): 1471-1498.

Spierings, Niels, Marcel Lubbers, and Andrej Zaslove. 2017. "'Sexually Modern Nativist Voters': Do They Exist and Do They Vote for the Populist Radical Right?." *Gender and Education* 29(2): 216-237.

Spierings, Niels, and Andrej Zaslove. 2015. "Gendering the Vote for Populist Radical-Right Parties." *Patterns of Prejudice* 49(1-2): 135-162.

Spies, Dennis, and Simon T. Franzmann. 2011. "A Two-Dimensional Approach to the Political Opportunity Structure of Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe." *West European Politics* 34(5): 1044-1069.

Spruyt, Bram, Gil Keppens, and Filip Van Droogenbroeck. 2016. "Who Supports Populism and What Attracts People to It?." *Political Research Quarterly* 69.2 (2016): 335-346.

Stanley, Ben. 2008. "The Thin Ideology of Populism." *Journal of Political Ideologies* 13(1): 95-110.

Stavrakakis, Yannis, Ioannis Andreadis, and Giorgos Katsambekis. 2017. "A New Populism Index at Work: Identifying Populist Candidates and Parties in the Contemporary Greek Context." *European Politics and Society* 18(4): 446-464.

Stavrakakis, Yannis, and Giorgos Katsambekis. 2014. "Left-Wing Populism in the European Periphery: The Case of SYRIZA." *Journal of Political Ideologies* 19(2): 119-142.

Stavrakakis, Yannis, Giorgos Katsambekis, Nikos Nikisianis, Alexandros Kioupkiolis, and Thomas Siomos. "Extreme Right-Wing Populism in Europe: Revisiting a Reified Association." *Critical Discourse Studies* 14(4): 420-439.

Stavrakakis, Yannis, Alexandros Kioupkiolis, Giorgos Katsambekis, Nikos Nikisianis, and Thomas Siomos. 2016. "Contemporary Left-Wing Populism in Latin America: Leadership, Horizontalism, and Postdemocracy in Chávez's Venezuela." *Latin American Politics and Society* 58(3): 51-76.

Stemmann, Juan Jose Escobar. 2006. "Middle East Salafism's Influence and the Radicalization of Muslim Communities in Europe." *The Middle East Review of International Affairs* 10(3): 1-14.

Stockemer, Daniel. 2017. "The Economic Crisis (2009–2013) and Electoral Support for the Radical Right in Western Europe—Some New and Unexpected Findings." *Social Science Quarterly* 98(5): 1536-1553.

Stockemer, Daniel, and Abdelkarim Amengay. 2015. "The Voters of the FN under Jean-Marie Le Pen and Marine Le Pen: Continuity or Change?." *French Politics* 13(4): 370-390.

Stoll, Heather. 2010. "Elite-Level Conflict Salience and Dimensionality in Western Europe: Concepts and Empirical Findings." *West European Politics* 33(3): 445-473.

Strömblad, Per, and Bo Malmberg. 2016. "Ethnic Segregation and Xenophobic Party Preference: Exploring the Influence of the Presence of Visible Minorities on Local Electoral Support for the Sweden Democrats." *Journal of Urban Affairs* 38(4): 530-545.

Strozza, Salvatore. 2010. "International Migration in Europe in the First Decade of the 21st Century." *Rivista Italiana di Economia Demografia e Statistica* 64(3): 7-43.

Studlar, Donley T. 1974. "British Public Opinion, Colour Issues, and Enoch Powell: A Longitudinal Analysis." *British Journal of Political Science* 4(3): 371-381.

Sunstein, Cass R. 2002. *Designing Democracy: What Constitutions Do.* New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Svallfors, Stefan. 2010. "Policy Feedback, Generational Replacement, and Attitudes to State Intervention: Eastern and Western Germany, 1990-2006." *European Political Science Review: EPSR* 2(1): 119-135.

Sveinsson, Kjartan Páll. ed. 2009. *Perspectives: Who Cares about the White Working Class?* London, UK: Runnymede Trust.

Swank, Duane, and Hans-Georg Betz. 2003. "Globalization, the Welfare State and Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe." *Socio-Economic Review* 1(2): 215-245.

Swenden, Wilfried, Marleen Brans, and Lieven De Winter. 2006. "The Politics of Belgium: Institutions and Policy under Bipolar and Centrifugal Federalism." *West European Politics* 29(5): 863-873.

Syed, Imran. 2015. "The Resonance of "Islam Versus the West" in Pakistan's Foreign Policy–1947 to 1957." *Journal of Political Studies* 22(1): 167-180.

Taggart, Paul. 1998. "A Touchstone of Dissent: Euroscepticism in Contemporary Western European Party Systems." *European Journal of Political Research* 33(3): 363-388.

Taggart, Paul A. 2000. *Populism.* Buckingham, UK: Open University Press.

Taggart, Paul A., and Aleks Szczerbiak. 2018. "Putting Brexit into Perspective: The Effect of the Eurozone and Migration Crises and Brexit on Euroscepticism in European States." *Journal of European Public Policy* 25(8): 1194-1214.

Tajfel, Henri. Ed. 1978. *Differentiation between Social Groups: Studies in the Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations*. New York, NY: Academic Press.

Tarvainen, Kyösti. 2018. "Population Projections for Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Finland, 2015–2065." *Bulletin of Geography. Socio-Economic Series* 39(39): 147-160.

Tay, Richard. 2017. "Correlation, Variance Inflation and Multicollinearity in Regression Model." *Journal of the Eastern Asia Society for Transportation Studies* 12(2017): 2006-2015.

Tesler, Michael. 2016. *Post-Racial or Most-Racial*?. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Thomassen, Jacques. 1996. "Party Identification as a Cross-Cultural Concept: Its Meaning in the Netherlands." *Acta Politica* 1996(4): 416-435.

Thomas, Graham P. 2004. "United Kingdom: The Prime Minister and Parliament." *The Journal of Legislative Studies* 10(2-3): 4-37.

Thompson, Christopher Glen, Rae Seon Kim, Ariel M. Aloe, and Betsy Jane Becker. 2017. "Extracting the Variance Inflation Factor and Other Multicollinearity Diagnostics from Typical Regression Results." *Basic and Applied Social Psychology* 39(2): 81-90.

Thomson, Robert. 2001. "The Programme to Policy Linkage: The Fulfilment of Election Pledges on Socio-Economic Policy in the Netherlands, 1986–1998." *European Journal of Political Research* 40(2): 171-197.

Thorisdottir, Hulda, John T. Jost, Ido Liviatan, and Patrick E. Shrout. 2007. "Psychological Needs and Values Underlying Left-Right Political Orientation: Cross-National Evidence from Eastern and Western Europe." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 71(2): 175-203.

Tien, Charles. 2017. "The Racial Gap in Voting among Women: White Women, Racial Resentment, and Support for Trump." *New Political Science* 39(4): 651-669.

Todd, Jennifer. 2017. "From Identity Politics to Identity Change: Exogenous Shocks, Constitutional Moments and the Impact of Brexit on the Island of Ireland." *Irish Studies in International Affairs* 28: 57-72.

Toft, Monica D. 2005. *The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests, and the Indivisibility of Territory*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Togeby, Lise. 1992. "The Nature of Declining Party Membership in Denmark: Causes and Consequences." *Scandinavian Political Studies* 15(1): 1-19.

Tonn, Mari Boor, and Valerie A. Endress. 2001. "Looking Under the Hood and Tinkering with Voter Cynicism: Ross Perot and" Perspective by Incongruity"." *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 4(2): 281-308.

Tsebelis, George. 2000. "Veto Players and Institutional Analysis." *Governance* 13(4): 441-474.

Tsebelis, George, and Geoffrey Garrett. 2000. "Legislative Politics in the European Union." *European Union Politics* 1(1): 9-36.

Tsebelis, George, and Jeannette Money. 1995. "Bicameral Negotiations: The Navette System in France." *British Journal of Political Science* 25(1): 101-129.

Turnbull-Dugarte, Stuart J. 2019. "Explaining the End of Spanish Exceptionalism and Electoral Support for Vox." *Research & Politics* 6(2): 1-8.

Turnbull-Dugarte, Stuart J., José Rama, and Andrés Santana. 2020. "The Baskerville's Dog Suddenly Started Barking: Voting for VOX in the 2019 Spanish General Elections." *Political Research Exchange* 2(1): 1-21.

Valentino, Nicholas A., Carly Wayne, and Marzia Oceno. 2018. "Mobilizing Sexism: The Interaction of Emotion and Gender Attitudes in the 2016 US Presidential Election." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 82(S1): 799-821.

Van der Brug, Wouter, Meindert Fennema, and Jean Tillie. 2000. "Anti-Immigrant Parties in Europe: Ideological or Protest Vote?." *European Journal of Political Research* 37(1): 77-102.

Van der Waal, Jeroen, and Willem De Koster. 2018. "Populism and Support for Protectionism: The Relevance of Opposition to Trade Openness for Leftist and Rightist Populist Voting in The Netherlands." *Political Studies* 66(3): 560-576.

Van Hauwaert, Steven M., Christian H. Schimpf, and Flavio Azevedo. 2020. "The Measurement of Populist Attitudes: Testing Cross-National Scales using Item Response Theory." *Politics* 40(1): 3-21.

Van Hauwaert, Steven M., and Stijn Van Kessel. 2018. "Beyond Protest and Discontent: A Cross-National Analysis of the Effect of Populist Attitudes and Issue Positions on Populist Party Support." *European Journal of Political Research* 57(1): 68-92.

Van Heerden, Sjoerdje, Sarah L. de Lange, Wouter van der Brug, and Meindert Fennema. 2014. "The Immigration and Integration Debate in the Netherlands: Discursive and Programmatic Reactions to the Rise of Anti-Immigration Parties." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 40(1): 119-136.

Van Spanje, Joost. 2010. "Contagious Parties: Anti-Immigration Parties and Their Impact on other Parties' Immigration Stances in Contemporary Western Europe." *Party Politics* 16(5): 563-586.

Van Wijk, Daniël, Gideon Bolt, and Jochem Tolsma. 2020. "Where Does Ethnic Concentration Matter for Populist Radical Right Support? An Analysis of Geographical Scale and the Halo Effect." *Political Geography* 77 (2020): 1-15.

Vatter, Adrian. 2016. "Switzerland on the Road from a Consociational to a Centrifugal Democracy?." *Swiss Political Science Review* 22(1): 59-74.

Verbeek, Bertjan, and Andrej Zaslove. 2016. "Italy: A Case of Mutating Populism?." *Democratization* 23(2): 304-323.

Vercesi, Michelangelo. 2017. "What Kind of Veto Player is the Italian Senate? A Comparative Analysis of European Second Chambers." *Journal of Modern Italian Studies* 22(5): 604-623.

Veugelers, John, and André Magnan. 2005. "Conditions of Far-Right Strength in Contemporary Western Europe: An Application of Kitschelt's Theory." *European Journal of Political Research* 44(6): 837-860.

Ventura Miller, Holly, J. C. Barnes, and Richard D. Hartley. 2011. "Reconsidering Hispanic Gang Membership and Acculturation in a Multivariate Context." *Crime & Delinquency* 57(3): 331-355.

Vink, Maarten P. 2007. "Dutch 'Multiculturalism' Beyond the Pillarisation Myth." *Political Studies Review* 5(3): 337-350.

Volkens, Andrea. 2007. "Strengths and Weaknesses of Approaches to Measuring Policy Positions of Parties." *Electoral Studies* 26(1): 108-120.

Volkens, Andrea, Ares, Cristina, Bratanova, Radostina, and Lea Kaftan. 2015. "Scope, Range, and Extent of Manifesto Project Data Usage: A New Research Tool for Manifesto Project Database's Users." *RIPS: Revista de Investigaciones Políticas y Sociológicas* 14(2): 217-232.

Volkens, Andrea, Burst, Tobias, Krause, Werner, Lehmann, Pola, Matthieß, Theres, Merz, Nicolas, Regel, Sven, Weßels, Bernhard, and Zehnter, Lisa. (2020): The Manifesto Data Collection. Manifesto Project (MRG / CMP / MARPOR). Version 2020b. Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB).

Von Beyme, Klaus. 1985. *Political Parties in Western Democracies*. London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.

Von Beyme, Klaus. 1988. "Right-Wing Extremism in Post-War Europe." *West European Politics* 11(2): 1-18.

Vossen, Koen. 2011. "Classifying Wilders: The Ideological Development of Geert Wilders and His Party for Freedom." *Politics* 31(3): 179-189.

Wagner, Markus. 2012. "Defining and Measuring Niche Parties." *Party Politics* 18(6): 845-864.

Wahlbeck, Östen. 2016. "True Finns and Non-True Finns: The Minority Rights Discourse of Populist Politics in Finland." *Journal of Intercultural Studies* 37(6): 574-588.

Warwick, Paul. 1992. "Ideological Diversity and Government Survival in Western European Parliamentary Democracies." *Comparative Political Studies* 25(3): 332-361.

Wattenberg, Martin P. 1981. "The Decline of Political Partisanship in the United States: Negativity or Neutrality?." *American Political Science Review* 75(4): 941-950.

Weakliem, David L. 2001. "A New Populism? The Case of Patrick Buchanan." *Electoral Studies* 20(3): 447-461.

Webb, Paul D. 1996. "Apartisanship and Anti-Party Sentiment in the United Kingdom: Correlates and Constraints." *European Journal of Political Research* 29(3): 365-382.

Webb, Paul. 2013. "Who is Willing to Participate? Dissatisfied Democrats, Stealth Democrats and Populists in the United Kingdom." *European Journal of Political Research* 52(6): 747-772.

Webb, Paul, and Tim Bale. 2014. "Why do Tories Defect to UKIP? Conservative Party Members and the Temptations of the Populist Radical Right." *Political Studies* 62(4): 961-970.

Weizenmann, Pedro Paulo. 2019. "'Tropical Trump'?: Bolsonaro's Threat to Brazilian Democracy." *Harvard International Review* 40(1): 12-14.

Welch, Susan, and Donley T. Studlar. 1990. "Multi-Member Districts and the Representation of Women: Evidence from Britain and the United States." *The Journal of Politics* 52(2): 391-412.

Werts, Han, Peer Scheepers, and Marcel Lubbers. 2013. "Euro-Scepticism and Radical Right-Wing Voting in Europe, 2002–2008: Social Cleavages, Socio-Political Attitudes and Contextual Characteristics Determining Voting for the Radical Right." *European Union Politics* 14(2): 183-205.

Westholm, Anders, and Richard G. Niemi. 1992. "Political Institutions and Political Socialization: A Cross-National Study." *Comparative Politics* 25(1): 25-41.

Weyland, Kurt. 2001. "Clarifying a Contested Concept: Populism in the Study of Latin American Politics." Comparative Politics 34(1): 1-22.

Weyland, Kurt. 2013. "Latin America's Authoritarian Drift: The Threat from the Populist Left." *Journal of Democracy* 24(3): 18-32.

Whipple, Amy. 2009. "Revisiting the" Rivers of Blood" Controversy: Letters to Enoch Powell." *Journal of British Studies* 48(3): 717-735.

Whitehead, Andrew L., Samuel L. Perry, and Joseph O. Baker. 2018. "Make America Christian Again: Christian Nationalism and Voting for Donald Trump in the 2016 Presidential Election." *Sociology of Religion* 79(2): 147-171.

Widfeldt, Anders. 2008. "Party Change as a Necessity–The Case of the Sweden Democrats." *Representation* 44(3): 265-276.

Wiesehomeier, Nina. 2018. "Expert Surveys, in *The Ideational Approach to Populism: Concept, Theory, and Method*. Hawkins, Kirk A., Ryan E. Carlin, Levente Littvay, and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser Eds. London, UK: Routledge.

Wiles, Ellen. 2007. "Headscarves, Human Rights, and Harmonious Multicultural Society: Implications of the French Ban for Interpretations of Equality." *Law & Society Review* 41(3): 699-736.

Willumsen, David M., and Klaus H. Goetz. 2019. "How Does Staggered Membership Renewal Affect Parliamentary Behaviour? Evidence from the French Senate." *European Political Science Review: EPSR* 11(2): 267-284.

Winberg, Oscar. 2017. "Insult Politics: Donald Trump, Right-Wing Populism, and Incendiary Language." *European Journal of American Studies* 12(12-2): 1-15.

Woolley, Kaitlin, and Ayelet Fishbach. 2017. "A Recipe for Friendship: Similar Food Consumption Promotes Trust and Cooperation." *Journal of Consumer Psychology* 27(1): 1-10.

Wood, Robert H. 2016. "*The Crushing of a Dream: DACA, DAPA, and the Politics of Immigration Law Under President Obama*." *Barry L. Rev.* 22: 27-45.

Wright, Joshua D., and Victoria M. Esses. 2019. "It's Security, Stupid! Voters' Perceptions of Immigrants as a Security Risk Predicted Support for Donald Trump in the 2016 US Presidential Election." *Journal of Applied Social Psychology* 49(1): 36-49.

Wuttke, Alexander, Christian Schimpf, and Harald Schoen. 2020. "When the Whole is Greater than the Sum of its Parts: On the Conceptualization and Measurement of Populist Attitudes and other Multidimensional Constructs." *American Political Science Review* 114(2): 356-374.

Yang, Philip Q. 2010. "A Theory of Asian Immigration to the United States." *Journal of Asian American Studies* 13(1): 1-34.

Yılmaz, Ferruh. 2012. "Right-Wing Hegemony and Immigration: How the Populist Far-Right Achieved Hegemony through the Immigration Debate in Europe." *Current sociology* 60(3): 368-381.

Zaller, John R. 1992. *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion.* New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Zartaloudis, Sotirios. 2014. "The Impact of the Fiscal Crisis on Greek and Portuguese Welfare States: Retrenchment before the Catch-Up?." *Social Policy & Administration* 48(4): 430-449.

Zaslove, Andrej. 2004. "Closing the Door? The Ideology and Impact of Radical Right Populism on Immigration Policy in Austria and Italy." *Journal of Political Ideologies* 9(1): 99-118.

Zechmeister, Elizabeth. 2006. "What's Left and Who's Right? A Q-Method Study of Individual and Contextual Influences on the Meaning of Ideological Labels." *Political Behavior* 28(2): 151-173.

Zelizer, Julian E. 2010. "Rethinking the History of American Conservatism." *Reviews in American History* 38(2): 367-392.

Ziblatt, Daniel. 2017. *Conservative Political Parties and the Birth of Modern Democracy in Europe*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Zhikov, Kirill. 2014. "Nativist but not Alienated: A Comparative Perspective on the Radical Right Vote in Western Europe." *Party Politics* 20(2): 286-296.

Zubek, Radoslaw, and Heike Klüver. 2015. "Legislative Pledges and Coalition Government." *Party Politics* 21(4): 603-614.

Zug, Marcia. 2014. "The Mirage of Immigration Reform: The Devastating Consequences of Obama's Immigration Policy." *U. Kan. L. Rev*. 63: 953-980.