

The copyright © of this thesis belongs to its rightful author and/or other copyright owner. Copies can be accessed and downloaded for non-commercial or learning purposes without any charge and permission. The thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted as a whole without the permission from its rightful owner. No alteration or changes in format is allowed without permission from its rightful owner.



**THE IMPACT OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INDICATORS ON FIRM  
VALUE: EVIDENCE OF SHARIAH COMPLIANT AND SHARIAH NON-  
COMPLIANT FIRMS IN PAKISTAN**



**RASHID KHALIL**

**UUM**  
Universiti Utara Malaysia

**DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY  
UNIVERSITI UTARA MALAYSIA  
2020**

**THE IMPACT OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INDICATORS ON FIRM  
VALUE: EVIDENCE OF SHARIAH COMPLIANT AND SHARIAH NON-  
COMPLIANT FIRMS IN PAKISTAN**



**By**  
**RASHID KHALIL**

---

Universiti Utara Malaysia

**Thesis Submitted to  
College of Business  
Universiti Utara Malaysia,  
in Fulfillment of the Requirement for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy**



Pusat Pengajian Perniagaan Islam  
ISLAMIC BUSINESS SCHOOL  
كلية إدارة الأعمال الإسلامية  
Universiti Utara Malaysia

## PERAKUAN KERJA TESIS/DISERTASI (Certification of thesis/dissertation)

Kami, yang bertandatangan, memperakukan bahawa  
(We, the undersigned, certify that)

RASHID KHALIL (900652)

Calon untuk ijazah DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (ISLAMIC FINANCE AND BANKING)  
(candidate for the degree of)

telah mengemukakan tesis/disertasi yang bertajuk:  
(has presented his/her thesis/dissertation of the following title):

***The Impact of Corporate Governance Indicators on Firm Value: Evidence of Shariah Compliant and Shariah Non-Compliant Firms in Pakistan***

seperti yang tercatat dimuka surat tajuk dan kulit tesis/disertasi.  
(as it appears on the title page and front cover of the thesis/dissertation)

Bahawa tesis/disertasi tersebut boleh diterima dari segi bentuk serta kandungan dan meliputi bidang ilmu dengan memuaskan, sebagaimana yang ditunjukkan oleh calon dalam ujian lisan yang diadakan pada:

**23 November 2020.**

(That the said thesis/dissertation is acceptable in form and content and displays a satisfactory knowledge of the field of study as demonstrated by the candidate through an oral examination held on:

**23 November 2020.**

Pengerusi Viva (Chairman for Viva)	: Prof. Madya. Dr. Norazlina Abd Wahab (IBSUUM)	Tandatangan (Signature)	
Pemeriksa Luar (External Examiner)	: Prof. Madya Dr. Noraini Mohd Ariffin (IIUM)	Tandatangan (Signature)	
Pemeriksa Dalam (Internal Examiner)	: Dr. Ahmad Khilmy Abdul Rahim (IBS/UUM)	Tandatangan (Signature)	

Tarikh : 23 November 2020  
(Date)

**Nama Pelajar**  
*(Name of Student)*

: Rashid Khalil (900652)

---

**Tajuk Tesis/Disertasi**  
*(Title of the Thesis/ Dissertation)*

: *The Impact of Corporate Governance Indicators on Firm Value: Evidence of Shariah Compliant and Shariah Non-Compliant Firms in Pakistan*

---

**Program Pengajian**  
*(Programme of Study)*


: Doctor of Philosophy

---

**Nama Penyelia/Penyelia-Penyelia**  
*(Name of Supervisor/Supervisors)*

: Dr. Mohd Sollehudin Shuib

---



**Tandatangan**

**Nama Penyelia/Penyelia-Penyelia**  
*(Name of Supervisor/Supervisors)*

: Dr. Arfan Shahzad

---



**Tandatangan**

## PERMISSION TO USE

In presenting this thesis in fulfillment of the requirements for a Post Graduate degree from the Universiti Utara Malaysia (UUM), I agree that the Library of this university may make it freely available for inspection. I further agree that permission for copying this thesis in any manner, in whole or in part, for scholarly purposes may be granted by my supervisor(s) or in their absence, by the Director of Postgraduate Studies Unit, College of Business where I did my thesis. It is understood that any copying or publication or use of this thesis or parts of it for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. It is also understood that due recognition shall be given to me and to the UUM in any scholarly use which may be made of any material in my thesis.

Request for permission to copy or to make other use of materials in this thesis in whole or in part should be addressed to:

Director of Postgraduate Studies Unit, College of Business

Universiti Utara Malaysia

06010 UUM Sintok

Kedah Darul Aman



UUM  
Universiti Utara Malaysia

## ABSTRACT

The existing literature highlights the several issues related to the implementation of corporate governance codes and problems of firm valuation in developing countries like Pakistan. Although codes of corporate governance and regulations have been formulated in Pakistan, there are several violations of laws and codes observed in the corporate sectors of Pakistan such as Crescent Bank, Mehran Bank, and Taj Company. Firms listed in the Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) have failed to effectively implement the codes of corporate governance particularly due to ownership structure, pyramidal structure, and board structure which significantly influence the firm value. Moreover, most of the listed companies are not able to fulfil the Shariah compliant screening criteria of KMI Islamic Index. Past literature affirms the issues related to Principal-Principal (PP) conflict as most of the firms are owned by the family businesses. The underpinning objective of the current study is to investigate the impact of corporate governance indicators on firm value of PSX and KMI listed companies. The theoretical framework of the current study is based on Principal-Principal agency theory and the concept of “Maqasid al-Shariah”. A total of 312 firms (164 Shariah Compliant and 148 Shariah Non-Compliant) were taken as samples from the KMI screening list for the period of 2009 to 2018. The results of the present study reveal that ownership, pyramidal, and board structures have a significant association with PP conflict and firm value except board independence. Moreover, PP conflict mediates the relationship between ownership, pyramidal structure, and board structure of listed firms. Based on the findings, the current study suggests that implementation of Shariah laws and regulations can facilitate firms in minimizing the PP conflict and effective implementation of codes of corporate governance.

**Keywords:** firm value, corporate governance, principal-principal conflict, shariah compliant

## ABSTRAK

Literatur sedia ada memberi penekanan kepada beberapa isu berkenaan pelaksanaan kod tadbir urus korporat dan masalah penilaian firma di negara membangun seperti Pakistan. Walaupun kod tadbir urus korporat dan peraturan telah dirangka di Pakistan, didapati terdapat beberapa pelanggaran undang-undang dan kod dalam sektor korporat di Pakistan seperti di Bank Crescent, Bank Mehran, dan syarikat Taj. Syarikat-syarikat yang tersenarai dalam Bursa Saham Pakistan (PSX) gagal untuk melaksanakan kod tadbir urus korporat yang berkesan terutamanya disebabkan struktur pemilikan, struktur piramid, dan struktur lembaga yang mempengaruhi nilai syarikat secara signifikan. Selain itu, kebanyakan syarikat tersenarai tidak dapat memenuhi kriteria penapisan patuh Syariah oleh Indeks Islam KMI. Kajian lepas mengesahkan isu-isu berkenaan konflik prinsipal-prinsipal (PP) kerana kebanyakan syarikat adalah perniagaan milikan keluarga. Objektif utama kajian ini adalah untuk menyiasat kesan penunjuk tadbir urus korporat ke atas nilai syarikat PSX dan syarikat tersenarai KMI. Kerangka kerja kajian ini adalah berdasarkan teori agensi prinsipal-prinsipal dan konsep *Maqasid al-Shariah*. Sebanyak 312 buah syarikat (164 syarikat patuh syariah dan 148 syarikat tidak patuh syariah) diambil sebagai sampel daripada senarai penapisan KMI bagi tempoh 2009 sehingga 2018. Hasil kajian ini menunjukkan pemilikan, piramid, dan struktur lembaga mempunyai perkaitan yang signifikan dengan konflik PP dan nilai syarikat kecuali kebebasan lembaga. Selain itu, konflik PP mengantara hubungan antara pemilikan, struktur piramid, dan struktur lembaga syarikat tersenarai. Berdasarkan dapatan, kajian ini mencadangkan bahawa pelaksanaan peraturan dan undang-undang syariah dapat memudahkan syarikat dalam mengurangkan konflik PP dan pelaksanaan kod tadbir urus korporat yang berkesan.

**Kata kunci:** nilai syarikat, tadbir urus korporat, konflik prinsipal-prinsipal, patuh syariah



## ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

In the name of ALLAH Almighty, the entirely gracious, the ever merciful. All praises are due to ALLAH, Lord of the worlds. May ALLAH's blessings and peace be upon the Holy Prophet Muhammad (صلى الله عليه وسلم) who being very honest, truthful and responsible conveyed the message of ALLAH (S.W.T), very sincerely through his companions (May Allah be pleased with them all! Ameen). First, I am extremely grateful to ALLAH Almighty for granting me the courage, strength and guidance to accomplish this research work in hand.

I would like to thank my remarkably marvelous and esteemed advisors; Dr. Mohd. Sollehudin Shuib and Dr. Arfan Shahzad for providing me valuable guidance, inspiration and support with their knowledge, experience and wisdom from the beginning until the end of my study at the Universiti Utara Malaysia. I feel myself honored and elated to have you both as my supervisors. I am very much obliged to Dr. Ahmad Khilmy Abdul Rahim - IBS UUM and Assoc. Professor Dr. Noraini Mohd Ariffin - International Islamic University Malaysia, for their valuable suggestions as examiners to improve my thesis. I sincerely acknowledge the support provided by entire academic and admin staff of IBS for facilitating me in the documentation and other formalities from the day I applied for admission in UUM till this day. I must appreciate very kind and caring friends, Dr. Hafeez Ahmad – SQS UUM and Dr. Haroon Hussain – SEFB UUM, for helping me out in the mapping of my study area.

I am particularly grateful to the management of my current employer *Middle East College Muscat Oman* for supporting me in research leaves and VISA processes to pursue my PhD study. It would never be possible for me to accomplish this programme without their generous and endless support.

Besides, my sincere appreciation is extended to my real brothers and my arms, Shahid Khalil (PhD Student - Malaysia University of Science and Technology Malaysia), M. Azhar Khalil (PhD Student - NIDA Business School Thailand) and M. Khuram Khalil (PhD Student – Prince of Songkla Univeristy Thailand) for continuous encouragement to upbringing my energy whenever I faced challenges. My sincerest thanks to my beloved wife Rahat Rani, my daughter Merab Fatima who sacrificed their time, love and support in last five years.

I dedicate this thesis to my parents (Rao Khalil Ahmad & Musarat Khalil) who devoted their love and without their prayers it would not have been possible for me to reach the position where I am today. Thank you all.

Rashid Khalil

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>TITLE PAGE</b>	<b>i</b>
<b>CERTIFICATION OF THESIS</b>	<b>ii</b>
<b>PERMISSION TO USE</b>	<b>ii</b>
<b>ABSTRACT</b>	<b>ii</b>
<b>ABSTRAK</b>	<b>iv</b>
<b>ACKNOWLEDGEMENT</b>	<b>v</b>
<b>TABLE OF CONTENTS</b>	<b>vi</b>
<b>LIST OF TABLES</b>	<b>xiii</b>
<b>LIST OF FIGURES</b>	<b>xv</b>
<b>LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS</b>	<b>xvi</b>
<b>CHAPTER ONE</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>INTRODUCTION</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1 Background	1
1.1.1 Issues prevails in Pakistan related to corporate governance	2
1.1.2 Governance and Firm value Challenges in Pakistan	4
1.1.3 The Rationale of Conflicts in Corporate Governance and Firm Value	7
1.1.4 Corporate Governance under Shariah (Islamic Laws)	9
1.2 Problem Statement	10
1.3 Research Questions	20
1.4 Research Objectives	21
1.5 Significance of the Study	22
1.5.1 Theoretical Perspective	22
1.5.2 Practical Perspective	24
1.6 Scope of the Study	25
1.7 The Definition of Key Terms	27
1.7.1 Corporate Governance	27
1.7.2 Shariah Compliant	28
1.7.3 Shariah Non-Compliant	28
1.7.4 Financial Sector	28
1.7.5 Non-Financial Sector	28
1.7.6 Firm Value	29
1.7.7 Ownership structure	29

1.7.7.1 Family-ownership	29
1.7.7.2 Ownership-concentration	29
1.7.7.3 Foreign ownership	29
1.7.7 Pyramidal Business Structure	30
1.7.7.1 Pyramidal group	30
1.7.8 Board structure	30
1.7.8.1 Board independence	30
1.7.8.2 Board size	30
1.7.8.3 CEO duality	30
1.8 Outline of the Study	31
<b>CHAPTER TWO</b>	<b>33</b>
<b>LITERATURE REVIEW</b>	<b>33</b>
2.1 Historical Aspects of Corporate Governance	33
2.1.1 Corporate Governance in 20 <sup>th</sup> Centaury	34
2.1.2 Why Corporate Governance Matters	36
2.1.3 Corporate Governance and Developed Economies	40
2.1.4 Corporate Governance and Developing Economies	41
2.2 Corporate Governance in the light of Shariah (Islamic Laws)	43
2.2.1 Shariah Compliance	44
2.2.1.1 Riba: Its Prohibition in the Shariah	46
2.2.1.2 Profit and Loss Sharing	48
2.2.1.3 Mudarabah	48
2.2.1.4 Musharakah	49
2.2.1.5 Gharar (deception) and Maisir (gambling)	51
2.3 Corporate Governance and Shariah-Compliant	53
2.4 Shariah Compliant Screening Criteria	56
2.4.1 Criteria of Maqasid al-Shariah	58
2.4.1.1 Necessities	58
2.4.1.2 Needs	58
2.4.1.3 Luxuries	58
2.5 The Rationale of Conflicts, Corporate Governance and Firm Value	59
2.6 Development of Corporate Governance Mechanism in Pakistan	64
2.6.1 Firm Value	70
2.6.2 Ownership Structure	73
2.6.2.1 Family Ownership	73

2.6.2.2 Ownership Concentration	78
2.6.2.3 Foreign Ownership	82
2.6.3 Pyramid Structure (Pyramidal Business Groups)	84
2.6.4 Board Structure	87
2.6.4.1 Board Size	88
2.6.4.2 Board Independence	90
2.6.4.3 CEO Duality	93
2.7 Corporate Governance in Shariah & Shariah Non-Compliant Firms	96
2.8 Theoretical Background	99
2.8.1 Agency Theory	99
2.8.1.1 Principal-Agent Model	102
2.8.1.2 Principal-Principal Model (PP Conflict)	104
2.8.2 Concept of Maqasid al-Shariah	108
2.8.2.1 Elements of Maqasid al-Shariah	110
2.8.2.2 Maqasid al-Shariah and Governance Principles	112
2.8.2.3 Maqasid al-Shariah and Value Maximization	113
2.9 Chapter Summary	115
<b>CHAPTER THREE</b>	<b>116</b>
<b>METHODOLOGY</b>	<b>116</b>
3.1 Introduction	116
3.2 Research Framework	116
3.3 Hypotheses Development	117
3.3.1 Ownership Structure and Firm value	118
3.3.1.1 Family Ownership	118
3.3.1.2 Concentrated Ownership	121
3.3.1.3. Foreign Ownership	123
3.3.2. Pyramid Structure and Firm value	126
3.3.3. Board Structure and Firm value	129
3.3.3.1 Board Size	129
3.3.3.2 Board Independence	132
3.3.3.3 CEO Duality	135
3.3.3.4 Principal-Principal (PP) Conflict	138
3.3.4. PP Conflict	141
3.3.5. PP Conflict as Mediator	146
3.3.5.1 Family-ownership, PP conflict, and firm value	146

3.3.5.2 Concentrated-ownership, PP conflict, and firm value	147
3.3.5.3 Foreign-ownership, PP conflict, and firm value	148
3.3.5.4 Pyramidal group structure, PP conflict, and firm value	148
3.3.5.5 Board size, PP conflict, and firm value	149
3.3.5.6 Family-ownership, PP conflict, and firm value	150
3.3.5.7 CEO duality, PP conflict, and firm value	150
3.4 Definition of Variables	151
3.4.1 Firm Value	151
3.4.1.1 Market-to-Book Ratio	151
3.4.2 Ownership Structure	152
3.4.2.1 Family Ownership	152
3.4.2.2 Ownership Concentration	152
3.4.2.3 Foreign Ownership	153
3.4.3 Pyramidal Structure	153
3.4.4 Board Structure	154
3.4.4.1 Board Size	154
3.4.4.2 Board Independence	154
3.4.4.3 CEO Duality	155
3.4.5 Principal-Principal Conflict	155
3.5 Econometric Models	156
3.6 Research Design	156
3.7 Population and Sample Selection	157
3.7.1 Population	157
3.7.2 Sampling Method	158
3.7.3 Sampling Procedure	158
3.7.3 Sample size	159
3.7.5 Data Collection Sources	159
3.8 Methods of Data Analysis	160
3.8.1 Diagnostic Tests in Regression	161
3.8.1.1 Normality Test	161
3.8.1.2 Linearity Test	161
3.8.1.3 Multicollinearity Test	161
3.8.1.4 Homoscedasticity Test	162
3.8.1.5 Autocorrelation	163
3.9 Panel Data Analysis	163

3.9.1 Fixed Effect Model	164
3.9.2 Random Effect Model	165
3.9.3 Hausman Test	166
3.9.4 Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier Test	166
3.9.5 Advantages of Static Panel Models	166
3.10 Mediation Analysis	167
3.11 Chapter Summary	167
<b>CHAPTER FOUR</b>	<b>169</b>
<b>RESULTS AND DISCUSSION</b>	<b>169</b>
4.1 Introduction	169
4.2 Data Screening	169
4.2.1 Missing Value	169
4.2.2 Outliers Detection	172
4.3 Descriptive Statistics	172
4.4 Correlation Analysis	176
4.5 Coefficient Estimations	179
4.5.1 Hausman Test	179
4.6 Regression Diagnostic Test	180
4.6.1 Normality	181
4.6.2 Multicollinearity	182
4.6.3 Linearity	184
4.6.4 Heteroscedasticity	185
4.6.5 Model Fit	186
4.7 Multiple Regression Analysis	187
4.7.1 Direct Relationships	189
4.7.1.1 Ownership Structure	189
4.7.1.1.1 Family Ownership	189
4.7.1.1.2 Concentrated Ownership	191
4.7.1.1.3 Foreign Ownership	192
4.7.1.2 Pyramidal Business Structure	193
4.7.1.2.1 Pyramidal group (PG)	193
4.7.1.3 Board Structure	194
4.7.1.3.1 Board Size	194
4.7.1.3.2 Board Independence	195
4.7.1.3.3 CEO Duality	196

4.7.1.3.4 Principal-Principal Conflict	197
4.7.2 Principal-Principal Conflict	198
4.7.2.1 Ownership Structure	199
4.7.2.1.1 Family Ownership	199
4.7.2.1.2 Concentrated Ownership	200
4.7.2.1.3 Foreign Ownership	201
4.7.3.1 Business Structure	202
4.7.3.1.1 Pyramidal Group (PG)	202
4.7.3.2 Board Structure	203
4.7.3.2.1 Board Size	203
4.7.3.2.2 Board Independence	203
4.7.3.2.3 CEO Duality	204
4.8 Mediation Analysis	207
4.8.1 Mediation in Shariah Compliant Firms	209
4.8.1.1 Ownership Structure	209
4.8.1.1.1 Family Ownership	209
4.8.1.1.2 Concentrated Ownership	210
4.8.1.1.3 Foreign Ownership	211
4.8.1.2 Pyramidal Structure	211
4.8.1.2.1 Pyramidal Group (PG)	211
4.8.1.3 Board Structure	212
4.8.1.3.1 Board Size	212
4.8.1.3.2 Board Independence	213
4.8.1.3.3 CEO Duality	213
4.8.2 Mediation in Shariah Non-Compliant Firms	214
4.8.2.1 Ownership Structure	214
4.8.2.1.1 Family Ownership	214
4.8.2.1.2 Concentrated Ownership	215
4.8.2.1.3 Foreign Ownership	215
4.8.2.2 Pyramidal Structure	216
4.8.2.2.1 Pyramidal group (PG)	216
4.8.2.3 Board Structure	216
4.8.2.3.1 Board Size	216
4.8.2.3.2 Board Independence	217
4.8.2.3.3 CEO Duality	217

4.9 Chapter Summary	218
<b>CHAPTER FIVE</b>	<b>220</b>
<b>CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION</b>	<b>220</b>
5.1 Introduction	220
5.2 Discussion	220
5.2.1 First Objective	220
5.2.2 Second Objective	225
5.2.3 Third Objective	229
5.2.4 Fourth Objective	230
5.3 Contributions to the Study	233
5.3.1 Theoretical Contributions	233
5.3.2 Empirical Contributions	235
5.3.3 Methodological Contributions	236
5.3.4 Contextual Implications and Recommendations	237
5.4 Conclusion	238
5.5 Limitations and Future Recommendations	239
<b>References</b>	<b>241</b>





## LIST OF TABLES

Table 3. 1: Market to Book Ratio	113
Table 3. 2: Family Ownership	114
Table 3. 3: Ownership Concentration	114
Table 3. 4: Foreign Ownership	115
Table 3. 5: Pyramidal Structure	115
Table 3. 6: Board Size	116
Table 3. 7: Board Independence	116
Table 3. 8: CEO Duality	117
Table 3. 9: PP Conflict	117
Table 4. 1: Final Sample and Observations	129
Table 4. 2: Descriptive Statistics Shariah Compliant Firms	131
Table 4. 3: Descriptive Statistics Shariah Non-Compliant Firms	131
Table 4. 4: Correlation Analysis (Shariah Compliant)	134
Table 4. 5: Correlation Analysis (Shariah Non-Compliant)	134
Table 4. 6: Hausman Test (Shariah Compliant)	135
Table 4. 7: Hausman Test (Shariah Non-Compliant)	136
Table 4. 8: Shapiro-Wilk W test for normality (Shariah Compliant)	137
Table 4. 9: Shapiro-Wilk W test for normality (Shariah Non-Compliant)	137
Table 4. 10: Multicollinearity (Shariah Compliant)	138
Table 4. 11: Multicollinearity (Shariah Non-Compliant)	139
Table 4. 12: Shariah Compliant	140
Table 4. 13: Shariah Non-Compliant	140
Table 4. 14: Breusch-Pagan and Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition test for SC	141
Table 4. 15: Breusch-Pagan and Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition test for NSC	141

Table 4. 16: Shariah Compliant	142
Table 4. 17: Shariah Non-Compliant	142
Table 4. 18: Random Effect Shariah Compliant (Firm Value)	143
Table 4. 19: Random Effect Shariah Non-Compliant (Firm Value)	144
Table 4. 20: Random effect Shariah Compliant (PP Conflict)	150
Table 4. 21: Random effect Shariah Compliant (PP Conflict)	150
Table 4. 22: Summary of Direct Hypotheses (Shariah / Non-Shariah Firms)	156
Table 4. 23: Summary of Indirect Hypotheses (Shariah / Non-Shariah Firms)	157
Table 4. 24: Mediation Analysis (Shariah Compliant Firms)	158
Table 4. 25: Mediation Analysis (Shariah Non-Compliant Firms)	162
Table 4. 26: Summary of Mediation Hypotheses (Shariah / Non-Shariah Firms)	165



## LIST OF FIGURES

<i>Figure 1.1: Mudarabah contact</i> .....	11
<i>Figure 1.2: Musharakah contact</i> .....	12
<i>Figure 1.3: Growth Rate of Industrial Production</i> .....	20
<i>Figure 1.4: Pakistan Stock Exchange Statistics</i> .....	21
<i>Figure 1.5: Growth Rate of Industrial Contribution to GDP</i> .....	22
<i>Figure 1.6: Large Scale Manufacturing Corporate Sector Share in GDP</i> .....	23
<i>Figure 1.7: Regional Market Performance</i> .....	24
<i>Figure 3.1: Research Framework</i> .....	95



## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<b>AAOIFI</b>	Accounting & Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions
<b>BI</b>	Board Independence
<b>BOD</b>	Board of Directors
<b>BS</b>	Board Size
<b>CAD</b>	Current Account Deficit
<b>CEO</b>	Chief Executive Officer
<b>CG</b>	Corporate Governance
<b>COB</b>	Chairman of the Board
<b>DJIMI</b>	Dow Jones Islamic Market Index
<b>FDI</b>	Foreign direct investment
<b>FO</b>	Family Ownership
<b>FTSE</b>	Financial Times Stock Exchange
<b>GDP</b>	Gross Domestic Product
<b>HSBC</b>	Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation
<b>KMI</b>	Karachi Meezan Index
<b>MNC</b>	Multi-National Corporations
<b>MSCI</b>	Morgan Stanley Capital International-Islamic Index
<b>NPV</b>	Net Present Value
<b>OC</b>	Ownership Concentration
<b>PA</b>	Principal Agent
<b>PBC</b>	Pakistan Business Council
<b>PG</b>	Pyramidal Group
<b>PP</b>	Principal-Principal Conflict
<b>PSX</b>	Pakistan Stock Exchange
<b>R&amp;D</b>	Research and Development
<b>SC</b>	Shariah Compliant
<b>S &amp; P</b>	Standard & Poor's Islamic Index
<b>SNC</b>	Shariah Non-Compliant
<b>SECP</b>	Security & Exchange Commission of Pakistan
<b>SOE</b>	State Owner Enterprises

# CHAPTER ONE

## INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 Background

The scope of codes of corporate governance is just about the governing or organizing functions and operations of corporations. Corporate governance is quite old phenomenon, and enough literature has been documented in this domain, however; still literature lacks sufficient investigations in various aspects. Codes of corporate governance deals with the various aspects of organizations for instance; practices of accounting standards, executive remuneration, board composition, board size, financial disclosures, and implementation of accounting standards (Bhagat & Bolton, 2008; Rezaee, 2009).

Moreover, literature defined the corporate governance as, “corporate governance is, to a large extent, a set of mechanisms through which outside investors protect themselves against expropriation by insiders” (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000). Corporate governance remains the key issue for the policy makers in developed and developing economies for the practitioners and policymakers. Since earlier 20<sup>th</sup> century with the emergence of corporate scandals (WorldCom, Enron, Taj company, and Paramalat) which affect the economies around the world.

The major reason behind these corporate scandals includes controllers of financial markets, board of directors, lack of board independences, agency issues (Manual of Corporate Governance, 2002). The emergence of these scandals shakes the trust of minority shareholders, stockholders, public at large on the stock markets, and corporations in business. Resultantly, every country demand for the new stricter corporate governance mechanism (Esqueda, & O’Connor, 2020).

## References

- Abbas, N., Ahmed, H., Malik, Q. A., & Waheed, A. (2018). Impact of investment efficiency on cost of equity: an empirical study on Shariah and non Shariah compliance firms listed on Pakistan Stock Exchange. *Pakistan Administrative Review*, 2(3), 307-322.
- Abbas, A., Naqvi, H. A., & Mirza, H. H. (2013). Impact of large ownership on firm performance: A case of non-financial listed companies of Pakistan. *World Applied Sciences Journal*, 21(8), 1141-1152.
- Abdallah, A. A. N., Hassan, M. K., & McClelland, P. L. (2015). Islamic financial institutions, corporate governance, and corporate risk disclosure in gulf cooperation council countries. *Journal of Multinational Financial Management*, 31, 63-82.
- Abu-Tapanjeh, A. M. (2009). Corporate governance from the Islamic perspective: A comparative analysis with OECD principles. *Critical Perspectives on Accounting*, 20(5), 556-567.
- Adams, R. B., & Mehran, H. (2003). Is corporate governance different for bank holding companies? Available at SSRN 387561.
- Adams, R. B., Hermalin, B. E., & Weisbach, M. S. (2010). The role of boards of directors in corporate governance: A conceptual framework and survey. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 48(1), 58-107.
- Afgan, N., Gugler, K., & Kunst, R. (2016). The effects of ownership concentration on performance of Pakistani listed companies. In *CBU International Conference Proceedings* (Vol. 4, pp. 214-222).
- Afza, T., & Mirza, H. H. (2011). Do mature companies pay more dividends? Evidence from Pakistani stock market. *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences*, 2(2), 152-161.
- Aguilera, R. V., & Crespi-Cladera, R. (2016). Global corporate governance: On the relevance of firms' ownership structure. *Journal of World Business*, 51(1), 50-57.
- Aguilera, R. V., & Cuervo-Cazurra, A. (2009). Codes of good governance. *Corporate Governance: An International Review*, 17(3), 376-387.
- Aguilera, R. V., Talaulicar, T., Chung, C. N., Jimenez, G., & Goel, S. (2015). Special Issue on "Cross-National Perspectives on Ownership and Governance in Family Firms". *Corporate Governance: An International Review*, 23(3), 161-166.
- Ahmad, Abu Umar Faruq, "Legislations and Issues on Islamic Banking in Bangladesh", paper presented at the First International Forum on Islamic Economics, Finance and Business for Young Scholars, Langkawi, April 18-20, 2006.
- Ahmad, N., & Nafiah, S. F. M. (2020). Impact of ownership structure and diversification on firm value: evidence from the Shariah and non-Shariah compliant REITs companies. *Journal of Islamic Management Studies*, 2(2), 59-66.

- Ahmed Sheikh, N., Wang, Z., & Khan, S. (2013). The impact of internal attributes of corporate governance on firm performance: Evidence from Pakistan. *International Journal of Commerce and Management*, 23(1), 38-55.
- Ahmed, P. (2014). Corporate governance and ethics of Islamic finance institutions. *Journal of Islamic Economics, Banking and Finance*, 113(3250), 1-24.
- Aitken, B. J., & Harrison, A. E. (1999). Do domestic firms benefit from direct foreign investment? Evidence from Venezuela. *American Economic Review*, 89(3), 605-618.
- Al Qur'an [3:130].
- Al Qur'an Chapter 73, Verse 20).
- Al- Qur'an, Al-Ankabut: 45.
- Al-Nisa` (Women), 160-161].
- Al-Qur'an Chapter 62, Verse 10
- Al-Qur'an Verse 198)
- Al-Qur'an, 2:219.
- Al-Qur'an, 30:39; 23:50; 2:265,276
- Al-Ajmi, J. (2008). Audit and reporting delays: Evidence from an emerging market. *Advances in Accounting*, 24(2), 217-226.
- Alam, N., Gupta, L., & Shanmugam, B. (2017). Corporate Governance in Islamic Banks. In *Islamic Finance* (pp. 359-396). Palgrave Macmillan, Cham.
- Al-dhamari, R., Ismail, K., & Izah, K. N. (2012). The association between board characteristics and earnings quality: Malaysian evidence. *Jurnal Pengurusan*, 41, 43-55.
- Al-Mamun, A., & Seamer, M. (2020). Board of director attributes and CSR engagement in emerging economy firms: Evidence from across Asia. *Emerging Markets Review*, 100749.
- Ali Shah, S. Z., Butt, S. A., & Hassan, A. (2009). Corporate governance and earnings management an empirical evidence form Pakistani listed companies. *European Journal of Scientific Research*, 26(4), 624-638.
- Al-Khazali, O. M., Leduc, G., & Alsayed, M. S. (2016). A market efficiency comparison of Islamic and non-Islamic stock indices. *Emerging Markets Finance and Trade*, 52(7), 1587-1605.
- Allen, F., & Gale, D. (1998). Optimal financial crises. *The Journal of Finance*, 53(4), 1245-1284.

- Almeida, H. V., & Wolfenzon, D. (2006). A theory of pyramidal ownership and family business groups. *The Journal of Finance*, 61(6), 2637-2680.
- Aloui, C., Hammoudeh, S., & Hamida, H. B. (2015). Co-movement between sharia stocks and sukuk in the GCC markets: A time-frequency analysis. *Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money*, 34, 69-79.
- Alsansosi, M. (2009). The concept of corporate governance in Sharia. *European Business Law Review*, 20(2), 343-368.
- Ameer, B. (2013). Corporate governance-issues and challenges in Pakistan. *International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences*, 3(4), 79.
- Amoako, G. K. (2017). Relationship Between Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and Corporate Governance (CG): The Case of Some Selected Companies in Ghana. In *Responsible Corporate Governance* (pp. 151-174). Springer, Cham.
- Anbarasan, P. (2018). Stakeholder engagement in sustainable enterprise: Evolving a conceptual framework, and a case study of ITC. *Business Strategy and the Environment*, 27(3), 282-299.
- Anderson, R. C., & Reeb, D. M. (2003). Founding-family ownership and firm performance: evidence from the S&P 500. *The Journal of Finance*, 58(3), 1301-1328.
- Anderson, R. C., & Reeb, D. M. (2004). Board composition: Balancing family influence in S&P 500 firms. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 49(2), 209-237.
- Anderson, R. C., Mansi, S. A., & Reeb, D. M. (2004). Board characteristics, accounting report integrity, and the cost of debt. *Journal of Accounting and Economics*, 37(3), 315-342.
- Arfa, I. (1984). Mukhtesan of Sidi Khalil, as cited in Abdur Rahman. *Doi, Shariah: The Islamic law*.
- Armour, J., Deakin, S., Sarkar, P., Siems, M., & Singh, A. (2009). Shareholder protection and stock market development: an empirical test of the legal origins' hypothesis. *Journal of Empirical Legal Studies*, 6(2), 343-380.
- Arshad, H., & Javid, A. Y. (2014). *Does inside ownership matters in financial decisions and firm performance: Evidence from manufacturing sector of Pakistan* (No. 2014: 107). Pakistan Institute of Development Economics.
- Ashfaq, S., Mujtaba Kayani, G., & Saeed, M. A. (2017). The Impact of Corporate Governance Index and Earnings Management on Firms' Performance: A Comparative Study on the Islamic versus Conventional Financial Institutions in Pakistan. *Journal of Islamic Business and Management*, 7(1), 126-139.
- Astrachan, J., Keyt, Lane, S., A., & McMillan, K. (2006). Guidelines for family business boards of directors. *Family Business Review*, 19(2), 147-167.



- Atalay, B., Gokten, S., & Turkcan, M. (2018). An overview of measuring and reporting intellectual capital. In *Global Approaches in Financial Economics, Banking, and Finance* (pp. 369-388). Cham: Springer.
- Azim, F., Mustapha, M. Z., & Zainir, F. (2018). Impact of corporate governance on related party transactions in family-owned firms in Pakistan. *Institutions and Economies*, 22-61.
- Bae, K. H., Kang, J. K., & Kim, J. M. (2002). Tunneling or value added? Evidence from mergers by Korean business groups. *The Journal of Finance*, 57(6), 2695-2740.
- Baek, J. S., Kang, J. K., & Lee, I. (2006). Business groups and tunneling: Evidence from private securities offerings by Korean chaebols. *The Journal of Finance*, 61(5), 2415-2449.
- Bagaeva, A., Kallunki, J. P., & Silvola, H. (2008). Can investors rely on the quality of earnings figures published by listed and non-listed Russian firms? *International Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Performance Evaluation*, 5 (1), 30-49.
- Bakardzhieva, D., Carlotti, J. E., Kamar, B., & Krueger, R. (2011). Essay on Establishing Conversion Values for the planned Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Currency Union. In *Economic Research Forum Working Papers* (No. 632).
- Balsmeier, B., Fleming, L., & Manso, G. (2017). Independent boards and innovation. *Journal of Financial Economics*, 123(3), 536-557.
- Baltagi, B. H. (2008). Forecasting with panel data. *Journal of Forecasting*, 27(2), 153-173.
- Baltagi, B. H., & Wu, P. X. (1999). Unequally spaced panel data regressions with AR (1) disturbances. *Econometric Theory*, 15(6), 814-823.
- Banchit, A., & Locke, S. (2011). Principal-principal conflicts: Is it a big problem in ASEAN 4 markets. *International Review of Business Research Papers*, 7(5), 1-15.
- Banchit, A., Boulanouar, Z., Wellalage, N. H., & Zainal Abidin, S. (2013). Relationship Principal-Agent or Principal-Principal Conflicts and Islamic Banks' Performances. *Business & Management Quarterly Review*, 4(3), 8-16.
- Bany-Ariffin, A. N. (2010). Disentangling the driving force of pyramidal firms' capital structure: a new perspective. *Studies in Economics and Finance*, 27(3), 195-210.
- Barney, J. (2002). *Gaining and sustaining competitive advantage*.
- Basco, R. (2017). "Where do you want to take your family firm?" A theoretical and empirical exploratory study of family business goals. *BRQ Business Research Quarterly*, 20(1), 28-44.
- Basco, R., Calabrò, A., & Campopiano, G. (2019). Transgenerational entrepreneurship around the world: Implications for family business research and practice. *Journal of Family Business Strategy*, 10(4), 100249.

- Basheer, M. F. (2014). Impact of Corporate Governance on Corporate Cash Holdings: An empirical study of firms in manufacturing industry of Pakistan. *International Journal of Innovation and Applied Studies*, 7(4), 1371.
- Basheer, M. F., Khan, S., Hassan, S. G., & Shah, M. H. (2018). The Corporate Governance and Interdependence of Investment and Financing Decisions of Non-Financial Firms in Pakistan. *The Journal of Social Sciences Research*, 316-323.
- Basheer, M. F., Waemustafa, W., & Ahmad, A. A. (2018). The Paradox of Managerial Ownership and Financial Decisions of the Textile Sector: An Asian Market Perspective. *The Journal of Social Sciences Research*, 184-190.
- Batool, I., & Jaffery, M. Y. (2020). Corporate governance bundles and corporate tax avoidance: A cross country study. *City University Research Journal*, 10(1).
- Baum, C. F., Schaffer, M. E., & Stillman, S. (2003). Instrumental variables and GMM: Estimation and testing. *The Stata Journal*, 3(1), 1-31.
- Beasley, M. S. (1996). An empirical analysis of the relation between the board of director composition and financial statement fraud. *Accounting Review*, 443-465.
- Bebchuk, L. A., & Roe, M. J. (1998). *A theory of path dependence in corporate governance and ownership*. Center for Law and Economic Studies.
- Becht, M., & Mayer, C. (2002). Corporate control in Europe. *Revue D'économie Politique*, 112(4), 471-498.
- Beiner, S., Drobetz, W., Schmid, M. M., & Zimmermann, H. (2006). An integrated framework of corporate governance and firm valuation. *European Financial Management*, 12(2), 249-283.
- Bellak, C., Leibrecht, M., & Damijan, J. P. (2007). "LICOS Discussion Paper Series".
- Berkman, H., Dimitrov, V., Jain, P. C., Koch, P. D., & Tice, S. (2010). Sell on the news: Differences of opinion, short-sales constraints, and returns around earnings announcements. *Journal of Financial Economics*, 92(3), 376-399.
- Berle, A. A., & Means, G. C. (1932). *The modern corporation and private property*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.
- Bernhardt, T., & Pollak, R. (2016). Economic and social upgrading dynamics in global manufacturing value chains: A comparative analysis. *Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space*, 48(7), 1220-1243.
- Bhatt, P. R., & Bhatt, R. R. (2017). Corporate governance and firm performance in Malaysia. *Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society*, 17(5), 896-912.
- Bhatt, R. R., & Bhattacharya, S. (2015). Board structure and firm performance in Indian IT firms. *Journal of Advances in Management Research*, 12(3), 232-248.

- Bhatt, R. R., & Bhattacharya, S. (2015). Do Board Characteristics Impact Firm Performance? An Agency and Resource Dependency Theory Perspective. *Asia-Pacific Journal of Management Research and Innovation*, 11(4), 274-287.
- Bloom, N., & Van Reenen, J. (2006). Management Practices, Work—Life Balance, and Productivity: A Review of Some Recent Evidence. *Oxford Review of Economic Policy*, 22(4), 457-482.
- Bodaghi, A., & Ahmadpour, A. (2010). The effect of corporate governance and ownership structure on capital structure of Iranian listed companies. In *7th International Conference on Enterprise Systems, Accounting and Logistics (7th ICESAL 2010)* (pp. 28-29).
- Bouzinab, K. (2013). Corporate governance, strategic capabilities of boards of directors and firm performance: the case of mergers and acquisitions.
- Bovaird, T., & Löffler, E. (Eds.). (2015). *Public Management and Governance*. Routledge.
- Brennan, L., & Crawford, R. (2017). Globalisation, branding and advertising's stakeholders. In *Global Advertising Practice in a Borderless World* (pp. 22-41). Routledge.
- Brockman, P., Martin, X., & Puckett, A. (2010). Voluntary disclosures and the exercise of CEO stock options. *Journal of Corporate Finance*, 16(1), 120-136.
- Bukhari, op. cit., Kitab al-Buyu', Bab Bai' al-Fiddah bi al-Fiddah; also, Sahih Muslim, Sunan al-Tirmidhi, Sunan al-Nasa'i and Musnad of Ahmad.
- Butt, H. A., & Sadaqat, M. (2017) Performance of Sharia based Investment: Evidence from Pakistani Listed Firms.
- Cadbury, A. (1992). *Report of the committee on the financial aspects of corporate governance* (Vol. 1). Gee.
- Calabrò, A., Campopiano, G., & Basco, R. (2017). Principal-principal conflicts and family firm growth: The moderating role of business family identity. *Journal of Family Business Management*, 7(3), 291-308.
- Caldwell, N., Roehrich, K., Howard, M., & König, C. (2018). *Service complexity and agency theory: Beyond alignment*. Retrieved 3 23, 2020, from <https://researchportal.bath.ac.uk/en/publications/service-complexity-and-agency-theory-beyond-alignment>
- Carney, D. R., Jost, J. T., Gosling, S. D., & Potter, J. (2008). The secret lives of liberals and conservatives: Personality profiles, interaction styles, and the things they leave behind. *Political Psychology*, 29(6), 807-840.
- Chakrabarti, A., Singh, K., & Mahmood, I. (2007). Diversification and performance: evidence from East Asian firms. *Strategic Management Journal*, 28(2), 101-120.
- Chang, S. J. (2003). Ownership structure, expropriation, and performance of group-affiliated companies in Korea. *Academy of Management Journal*, 46(2), 238-253.

- Chang, S. J., & Hong, J. (2000). Economic performance of group-affiliated companies in Korea: Intragroup resource sharing and internal business transactions. *Academy of Management Journal*, 43(3), 429-448.
- Chapra, M. U. (2008). The global financial crisis: can Islamic finance help minimize the severity and frequency of such a crisis in the future. In *A paper presented at the Forum on the Global Financial Crisis at the Islamic Development Bank on* (Vol. 25).
- Chapra, U. (2000). Why has Islam prohibited interest? Rationale behind the prohibition of interest. *Review of Islamic Economics*, 5-20.
- Chen, C., Xia, D. L., & Zhu, S. (2009). Pyramidal ownership structure, capital investment and firm performance: evidence from China. In *Annual Meeting of the American Accounting Association, New York, NY*.
- Chen, H.-L. (2012). Board Characteristics and R&D Investment: Evidence from Taiwan's Electronics Industry. *Advances in Management and Applied Economics*, 2(4), 161.
- Chen, J. (2001). Ownership structure as corporate governance mechanism: Evidence from Chinese listed companies. *Economics of Planning*, 34(1-2), 53-72.
- Cheng, S. (2008). Board size and the variability of corporate performance. *Journal of Financial Economics*, 87(1), 157-176.
- Cheung, Y. L., Rau, P. R., & Stouraitis, A. (2006). Tunneling, propping, and expropriation: evidence from connected party transactions in Hong Kong. *Journal of Financial Economics*, 82(2), 343-386.
- Cheung, Y. L., Rau, P. R., & Stouraitis, A. (2009). Helping hand or grabbing hand? Central vs. local government shareholders in Chinese listed firms. *Review of Finance*, 14(4), 669-694.
- Chhibber, P. K., & Majumdar, S. K. (1999). Foreign ownership and profitability: Property rights, control, and the performance of firms in Indian industry. *The Journal of Law and Economics*, 42(1), 209-238.
- Choi, A. H. (2018). Concentrated Ownership and Long-Term Shareholder Value. *Harvard Business Literature Review*, 8, 53.
- Choi, A. H. (2018). Concentrated Ownership and Long-Term Shareholder Value. *Harvard Business Literature Review*, 8, 53.
- Choi, S. B., Park, B. I., & Hong, P. (2012). Does ownership structure matter for firm technological innovation performance? The case of Korean firms. *Corporate Governance: An International Review*, 20(3), 267-288.
- Choi, Y. R., Zahra, S. A., Yoshikawa, T., & Han, B. H. (2015). Family ownership and R&D investment: The role of growth opportunities and business group membership. *Journal of Business Research*, 68(5), 1053-1061.

- Chowdhury, M. (2004). Capital Structure Determinants: Evidence from Japan & Bangladesh. *Journal of Business Studies*, 25(1), 23-45.
- Chrisman, J. J., Chua, J. H., Kellermanns, F. W., & Chang, E. P. (2007). Are family managers agents or stewards? An exploratory study in privately held family firms. *Journal of Business Research*, 60(10), 1030-1038.
- Chu, W. (2011). Family ownership and firm performance: Influence of family management, family control, and firm size. *Asia Pacific Journal of Management*, 28(4), 833-851.
- Chung, H. M., & Chan, S. T. (2012). Ownership structure, family leadership, and performance of affiliate firms in large family business groups. *Asia Pacific Journal of Management*, 29(2), 303-329.
- Claessens, S., Djankov, S., & Lang, L. H. (2000). The separation of ownership and control in East Asian corporations. *Journal of Financial Economics*, 58(1-2), 81-112.
- Claessens, S., Djankov, S., Fan, J. P., & Lang, L. H. (1999). *Corporate diversification in East Asia: the role of ultimate ownership and group affiliation* (No. 2089). The World Bank.
- Claessens, S., Djankov, S., Fan, J. P., & Lang, L. H. (2012). Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholdings. *The Journal of Finance*, 57(6), 2741-2771.
- Cohen, J. R., Krishnamoorthy, G., & Wright, A. (2004). The corporate governance mosaic and financial reporting quality. *Journal of Accounting Literature*, 87-152.
- Cohen, R. B. (2018). 12 The new international division of labor, multinational corporations and urban hierarchy. *Urbanization and urban planning in capitalist society*, 7.
- Coles, J. L., Daniel, N. D., & Naveen, L. (2008). Boards: Does one size fit all? *Journal of Financial Economics*, 87(2), 329-356.
- Combs, J. G., Crook, T. R., & Shook, C. L. (2005). The dimensionality of organizational performance and its implications for strategic management research. *Research Methodology in Strategy and Management*, 2(05), 259-286.
- Committee on Corporate Governance, & Hampel, S. R. (1998). *Committee on Corporate Governance: Final Report; [foreword by Sir Ronald Hampel (chairman)]*. Gee Publishing.
- Connelly, J. T., Limpaphayom, P., & Nagarajan, N. J. (2012). Form versus substance: The effect of ownership structure and corporate governance on firm value in Thailand. *Journal of Banking & Finance*, 36(6), 1722-1743.
- Corbetta, G., & Salvato, C. A. (2004). The board of directors in family firms: one size fits all? *Family Business Review*, 17(2), 119-134.
- Corbo, V. (1985). Reforms and macroeconomic adjustments in Chile during 1974–1984. *World Development*, 13(8), 893-916.

- Crabtree, A. D., & DeBusk, G. K. (2008). The effects of adopting the balanced scorecard on shareholder returns. *Advances in Accounting*, 24(1), 8-15.
- Crisan-Mitra, C. (2015). Good corporate governance: Priorities and principles. *Contemporary Legal and Economic Issues*, 5, 465.
- Crockett, A. D., & Evans, O. J. (1980). Demand for money in Middle Eastern countries. *Staff Papers*, 27(3), 543-577.
- Cuomo, F., Mallin, C., & Zattoni, A. (2016). Corporate governance codes: A review and research agenda. *Corporate governance: An International Review*, 24(3), 222-241.
- Daily, C. M., & Dalton, D. R. (1992). The relationship between governance structure and corporate performance in entrepreneurial firms. *Journal of Business Venturing*, 7(5), 375-386.
- Dalton, C. M., & Dalton, D. R. (2005). Boards of directors: Utilizing empirical evidence in developing practical prescriptions. *British Journal of Management*, 16(s1), S91-S97.
- Dang, C., Li, Z. F., & Yang, C. (2018). Measuring firm size in empirical corporate finance. *Journal of Banking & Finance*, 86 (1), 159-176.
- Dbouk, W., Jamali, I., & Soufani, K. (2014). The effectiveness of technical trading for Arab stocks. *Emerging Markets Finance and Trade*, 50(4), 5-25.
- De Jong, A., DeJong, D. V., Hege, U., & Mertens, G. (2010). Leverage in pyramids: when debt leads to higher dividends. *ECGI-Finance Working Paper*, (261).
- De Vos, A., & Cambré, B. (2017). Career management in high-performing organizations: A set-theoretic approach. *Human Resource Management*, 56(3), 501-518.
- Dellink, R., Chateau, J., Lanzi, E., & Magné, B. (2017). Long-term economic growth projections in the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways. *Global Environmental Change*, 42, 200-214.
- Deman, R., Jorissen, A., & Laveren, E. (2018). Board monitoring in a privately held firm: When does CEO duality matter? The moderating effect of ownership. *Journal of Small Business Management*, 56(2), 229-250.
- Demsetz, H., & Villalonga, B. (2001). Ownership structure and corporate performance. *Journal of Corporate Finance*, 7(3), 209-233.
- Denis, D. K., & McConnell, J. J. (2003). International corporate governance. *Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis*, 38(01), 1-36.
- Derigs, U., & Marzban, S. (2008). Review and analysis of current Shariah-compliant equity screening practices. *International Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern Finance and Management*, 1(4), 285-303.

- Desai, A., Kroll, M., & Wright, P. (2005). Outside board monitoring and the economic outcomes of acquisitions: a test of the substitution hypothesis. *Journal of Business Research*, 58(7), 926-934.
- Detthamrong, U., Chancharat, N., & Vithessonthi, C. (2017). Corporate governance, capital structure and firm performance: Evidence from Thailand. *Research in International Business and Finance*, 42, 689-709.
- Dewaelheyns, N., Locorotondo, R., & Van Hulle, C. (2011). Cash holdings within subsidiaries: impact of group health. *Status: published*.
- Dharwadkar, B., George, G., & Brandes, P. (2000). Privatization in emerging economies: An agency theory perspective. *Academy of Management Review*, 25(3), 650-669.
- Diacon, S. R., & O'Sullivan, N. (1995). Does corporate governance influence performance? Some evidence from UK insurance companies. *International Review of Law and Economics*, 15(4), 405-424.
- Dibra, R. (2016). Corporate governance failure: The case of Enron and Parmalat. *European Scientific Journal*, 12(16).
- Dieleman, M., & Sachs, W. (2006). Oscillating between a relationship-based and a market-based model: The Salim Group. *Asia Pacific Journal of Management*, 23(4), 521-536.
- Dittmar, A., & Mahrt-Smith, J. (2007). Corporate governance and the value of cash holdings. *Journal of Financial Economics*, 83(3), 599-634.
- Douma, S., George, R., & Kabir, R. (2006). Foreign and domestic ownership, business groups, and firm performance: Evidence from a large emerging market. *Strategic Management Journal*, 27(7), 637-657.
- Driffield, N., Mahambare, V., & Pal, S. (2007). How does ownership structure affect capital structure and firm value? Recent evidence from East Asia 1. *Economics of Transition*, 15(3), 535-573.
- Du Plessis, J. J., Hargovan, A., & Harris, J. (2018). *Principles of contemporary corporate governance*. Cambridge University Press.
- Dusuki, A. W. (2008). Understanding the objectives of Islamic banking: a survey of stakeholders' perspectives. *International Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern Finance and Management*.
- Dusuki, A. W., & Bouheraoua, S. (2011). *The Framework of Maqasid al-Shariah (Objectives of the Shari'ah) and Its Implications for Islamic Finance*. International Shari'ah Research Academy for Islamic Finance (ISRA).
- Dybvig, P. H., & Warachka, M. (2015). Tobin's q does not measure firm performance: Theory, empirics, and alternatives. SSRN eLibrary. <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm>

- Economy Survey of Pakistan. (2014-15). *Economy Survey of Pakistan*. Islamabad: Ministry of Finance. Retrieved from [http://www.finance.gov.pk/survey/chapters\\_15/Highlights.pdf](http://www.finance.gov.pk/survey/chapters_15/Highlights.pdf)
- Economy Survey of Pakistan. (2018). *Economy Survey of Pakistan*. Islamabad: Ministry of Finance. Retrieved from [http://www.finance.gov.pk/survey/chapters\\_19/Economic\\_Survey\\_2018\\_19.pdf](http://www.finance.gov.pk/survey/chapters_19/Economic_Survey_2018_19.pdf)
- Efron, B., & Tibshirani, R. J. (1994). *An introduction to the bootstrap*: CRC press.
- Eisenberg, T., Sundgren, S., & Wells, M. T. (1998). Larger board size and decreasing firm value in small firms. *Journal of Financial Economics*, 48(1), 35-54.
- Elmagrhi, M. H., Ntim, C. G., & Wang, Y. (2016). Antecedents of voluntary corporate governance disclosure: A post-2007/08 financial crisis evidence from the influential UK Combined Code. *Corporate Governance*.
- Epstein, R. A. (2017). *Banking on markets: the transformation of bank-state ties in Europe and beyond*. Oxford University Press.
- Esqueda, O. A., & O'Connor, T. (2020). Corporate governance and life cycles in emerging markets. *Research in International Business and Finance*, 51, 101077.
- Estwick, S. (2015). The Impact of Principal-principal Conflict on Financial Flexibility in Transition Economies: A Study of Caribbean Firms. *Journal of Eastern Caribbean Studies*, 40(2), 99-124.
- Eulerich, M., van Uum, C., & Zipfel, S. (2017). Comparing corporate governance codes in Germany and Eastern Europe—An analysis of different corporate governance characteristics. *Corporate Ownership and Control*, 17(3-1), 170-179.
- Faccio, M. (2010). Differences between politically connected and nonconnected firms: A cross-country analysis. *Financial Management*, 39(3), 905-928.
- Faccio, M., Lang, L. H., & Young, L. (2001). Debt and corporate governance. In *Meetings of Association of Financial Economics in New Orleans*.
- Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983). Agency problems and residual claims. *The journal of law and Economics*, 26(2), 327-349.
- Farooq, O., & AbdelBari, A. (2015). Earnings management behaviour of Shariah-compliant firms and non-Shariah-compliant firms: Evidence from the MENA region. *Journal of Islamic Accounting and Business Research*, 6(2), 173-188.
- Farooq, O., & Tbeur, O. (2013). Dividend policies of Shariah-compliant and non-Shariah-compliant firms: evidence from the MENA region. *International Journal of Economics and Business Research*, 6(2), 158-172.
- Farrar, D. E., & Glauber, R. R. (1967). Multicollinearity in regression analysis: the problem revisited. *The Review of Economic and Statistics*, 92-107.



- Fauzi, F., Basyith, A., & Foo, D. (2017). Committee on board: Does it matter? A study of Indonesian Sharia-listed firms. *Cogent Economics & Finance*, 5(1), 1316547.
- Fauzi, F., & Locke, S. (2012). Board structure, ownership structure and firm performance: A study of New Zealand listed-firms. *Asian Academy of Management Journal of Accounting of Finance*, 8(2), 43-67.
- Fayyaz, M. (2016). *Executive compensation, firm performance and corporate governance: Evidence from Pakistan* (Doctoral dissertation, Comsats Institute of Information Technology (CIIT), Islamabad, Pakistan).
- Ferran, E. (2001). Corporate Law, Codes and Social Norms—Finding the Right Regulatory Combination and Institutional Structure. *Journal of Corporate Law Studies*, 1(2), 381-409.
- Ferris, S. P., Jagannathan, M., & Pritchard, A. C. (2003). Too busy to mind the business? Monitoring by directors with multiple board appointments. *The Journal of Finance*, 58(3), 1087-1111.
- Filatotchev, I., Lien, Y. C., & Piesse, J. (2005). Corporate governance and performance in publicly listed, family-controlled firms: Evidence from Taiwan. *Asia Pacific Journal of Management*, 22(3), 257-283.
- Fitzgerald, R. (2015). *The rise of the global company: Multinationals and the making of the modern world*. Cambridge University Press.
- Flammer, C., Hong, B., & Minor, D. (2016). Corporate governance and the rise of integrating corporate social responsibility criteria in executive compensation: Antecedents and outcomes. Available at SSRN 2831694.
- Francis, B. B., Hasan, I., & Wu, Q. (2012). Do corporate boards affect firm performance? New evidence from the financial crisis. *New Evidence from the Financial Crisis (April 12, 2012)*. Bank of Finland Research Discussion Paper, (11).
- Fuzi, S. F. S., Halim, S. A. A., & Julizaerma, M. (2016). Board Independence and Firm Performance. *Procedia Economics and Finance*, 37, 460-465.
- Galant, A., & Cadez, S. (2017). Corporate social responsibility and financial performance relationship: a review of measurement approaches. *Economic Research-Ekonomska Istraživanja*, 30(1), 676-693.
- Gao, W., Li, W., & Huang, Z. (2017). Do family CEOs benefit investment efficiency when they face uncertainty?. *Chinese Management Studies*.
- Gaur, S. S., Bathula, H., & Singh, D. (2015). Ownership concentration, board characteristics and firm performance: a contingency framework. *Management Decision*, 53(5), 911-931.
- Gedajlovic, E., Lubatkin, M. H., & Schulze, W. S. (2004). Crossing the threshold from founder management to professional management: A governance perspective. *Journal of Management Studies*, 41(5), 899-912.

- Germain, L., Galy, N., & Lee, W. (2014). Corporate governance reform in Malaysia: Board size, independence and monitoring. *Journal of Economics and Business*, 75, 126-162.
- Ghosh, C., & Sirmans, C. (2003). Board independence, ownership structure and performance: evidence from real estate investment trusts. *The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics*, 26(2-3), 287-318.
- Globerman, S., Peng, M. W., & Shapiro, D. M. (2011). Corporate governance and Asian companies.
- Gohar, R., & Batool, A. (2015). Effect of corporate governance on performance of microfinance institutions: A case from Pakistan. *Emerging Markets Finance and Trade*, 51(sup6), S94-S106.
- Gomez-Mejia, L. R., Cruz, C., Berrone, P., & De Castro, J. (2011). The bind that ties: Socioemotional wealth preservation in family firms. *Academy of Management Annals*, 5(1), 653-707.
- Gomez-Mejia, L. R., Nunez-Nickel, M., & Gutierrez, I. (2001). The role of family ties in agency contracts. *Academy of management Journal*, 44(1), 81-95.
- Gordon, E. A., Henry, E., & Palia, D. (2004). Related party transactions and corporate governance. In *Corporate Governance* (pp. 1-27). Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
- Government of Pakistan. (2014-15). Economic Survey of Pakistan. Ministry of Finance Division, Economic Advisor's Wing, Islamabad, Pakistan. Retrieved from <http://www.finance.gov.pk>
- Government of Pakistan. (2017-18). Economic Survey of Pakistan. Ministry of Finance Division, Economic Advisor's Wing, Islamabad, Pakistan. Retrieved from <http://www.finance.gov.pk>
- Grais, W., & Pellegrini, M. (2006). *Corporate governance in institutions offering Islamic financial services: issues and options*. The World Bank.
- Grassa, R. (2016). Corporate governance and credit rating in Islamic banks: Does Shariah governance matters? *Journal of Management & Governance*, 20(4), 875-906.
- Gray, R. (1992). Accounting and environmentalism: an exploration of the challenge of gently accounting for accountability, transparency and sustainability. *Accounting, organizations and society*, 17(5), 399-425.
- Greenbury, R. (1995). *Directors' Remuneration: Report of a study group chaired by Sir Richard Greenbury*. Gee Publishing.
- Greene, W. H. (1990). A gamma-distributed stochastic frontier model. *Journal of Econometrics*, 46(1), 141-163.
- Gregory, H. J., & Simms, M. E. (1999, October). Corporate governance: what it is and why it matters. In *9th International Anti-Corruption Conference, Kuala Lumpur*.

- Griffith, S. J. (2015). Corporate governance in an era of compliance. *Wm. & Mary Literature Review.*, 57, 2075.
- Grimmett, R., Inskipp, C., & Inskipp, T. (2016). *Birds of the Indian Subcontinent: India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh and the Maldives*. Bloomsbury Publishing.
- Grossi, G., Papenfuß, U., & Tremblay, M. S. (2015). Corporate governance and accountability of state-owned enterprises. *International Journal of Public Sector Management*.
- Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D. (1983). Implicit contracts under asymmetric information. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 123-156.
- Groysberg, B., Lee, J., Price, J., & Cheng, J. (2018). The leader's guide to corporate culture. *Harvard Business Review*, 96(1), 44-52.
- Gu, Q., Lu, J. W., & Chung, C. N. (2016). Incentive or disincentive? A socioemotional wealth explanation of new industry entry in family business groups. *Journal of Management*, 45(2), 645-672.
- Gujarati, D. (2003). *Basic Econometrics Fourth Edition* McGraw Hill Gujarati, DN, (2003). Basic Econometrics: McGraw Hill. International Edition.
- Gujarati, D. N. (2009). *Basic econometrics*: Tata McGraw-Hill Education.
- Habbash, M. (2010). *The effectiveness of corporate governance and external audit on constraining earnings management practice in the UK* (Doctoral dissertation, Durham University).
- Habbershon, T. G., & Williams, M. L. (1999). A resource-based framework for assessing the strategic advantages of family firms. *Family Business Review*, 12(1), 1-25.
- Hafeez, D., & Muhammad, M. (2013). An analysis of corporate governance in Islamic and western perspectives. *International Journal of Business, Economics and Law*, 2(3).
- Hair, J., Anderson, R., Tatham, R., & Black, W. (2006). *Cluster Analysis. Multivariate Data Analysis*: Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Pearson Education, Inc.
- Hair, Joseph F, Arthur H. Money, Phillip Samouel, and Mike Page. (2007). *Research Methods for Business*. Chichester: John Wiley and Sons. Print.
- Hamid, M. A., Ting, I. W. K., & Kweh, Q. L. (2016). The Relationship between Corporate Governance and Expropriation of Minority Shareholders' Interests. *Procedia Economics and Finance*, 35, 99-106.
- Haniffa, R., & Hudaib, M. (2006). Corporate governance structure and performance of Malaysian listed companies. *Journal of Business Finance & Accounting*, 33(7-8), 1034-1062.
- Hanousek, J., Shamshur, A., & Tresl, J. (2019). Firm efficiency, foreign ownership and CEO gender in corrupt environments. *Journal of Corporate Finance*, 59(1), 344-360.

- Haqqi, A. R. A. (2014). Shariah governance in Islamic financial institution: An appraisal. *US-China L. Rev.*, 11, 112.
- Harford, J., Mansi, S. A., & Maxwell, W. F. (2008). Corporate governance and firm cash holdings in the US. *Journal of Financial Economics*, 87(3), 535-555.
- Hasan, A. (2017). Family Ownership, Excess Control and Firm Performance: A Focus on the Family Firms in Pakistan. *Paradigms*, 11(2), 141-150.
- Hashim, H. A., & Devi, S. (2008). Board characteristics, ownership structure and earnings quality: Malaysian evidence. *Research in Accounting in Emerging Economies*, 8(97), 97-123.
- Hashim, U. J., & Abdul Rahman, R. (2010). Board independence, board diligence, board expertise and impact on audit report lag in Malaysian market. In *Finance and Corporate Governance Conference*.
- Hassan, Y., Hijazi, R., & Naser, K. (2017). Does audit committee substitute or complement other corporate governance mechanisms. *Managerial Auditing Journal*.
- Hassan Che Haat, M., Abdul Rahman, R., & Mahenthiran, S. (2008). Corporate governance, transparency and performance of Malaysian companies. *Managerial Auditing Journal*, 23(8), 744-778.
- Hausman, J. A. (1978). Specification tests in econometrics. *Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society*, 1251-1271.
- He, E., & Sommer, D. W. (2010). Separation of ownership and control: Implications for board composition. *Journal of Risk and Insurance*, 77(2), 265-295.
- Heemskerk, E. M., Heemskerk, K., & Wats, M. M. (2017). Conflict in the boardroom: a participant observation study of supervisory board dynamics. *Journal of Management & Governance*, 21(1), 233-263.
- Hermalin, B. E., & Weisbach, M. S. (2001). *Boards of directors as an endogenously determined institution: A survey of the economic literature* (No. w8161). National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Hermalin, B. E., & Weisbach, M. S. (2003). Boards of Directors as an Endogenously Determined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature (Digest Summary). *Economic Policy Review*, 9(17-26).
- Hill, C. W., & Jones, T. M. (1992). Stakeholder-agency theory. *Journal of Management Studies*, 29(2), 131-154.
- Hnilica, J., & Machek, O. (2015). Toward a measurable definition of family business: surname matching and its application in the Czech republic. *International Advances in Economic Research*, 21(1), 119-120.
- Holmstrom, B. (1979). Moral hazard and observability. *Bell journal of Economics*, 10(1), 74-91.

- Hoskisson, R. E., Eden, L., Lau, C. M., & Wright, M. (2000). Strategy in emerging economies. *Academy of Management Journal*, 43(3), 249-267.
- Hoskisson, R. E., Hitt, M. A., Wan, W. P., & Yiu, D. (1999). Theory and research in strategic management: Swings of a pendulum. *Journal of Management*, 25(3), 417-456.
- Hourani, H. (2004). The three principles of Islamic finance explained. *International Finance Literature Review*, 23-46.
- Huang, W., & Zhu, T. (2015). Foreign institutional investors and corporate governance in emerging markets: Evidence of a split-share structure reform in China. *Journal of Corporate Finance*, 32, 312-326.
- Hud, M., & Hussinger, K. (2015). The impact of R&D subsidies during the crisis. *Research Policy*, 44(10), 1844-1855.
- Hull, M. S. (2012). *Government of paper: The materiality of bureaucracy in urban Pakistan*. Univ of California Press.
- Huse, M. (2000). Boards of directors in SMEs: A review and research agenda. *Entrepreneurship & Regional Development*, 12(4), 271-290.
- Hussain, D. (2019). *What's keeping PSX investors away?* Retrieved from DAWN: <https://www.dawn.com/news/1505446>
- Hussain, S. M., Korkeamäki, T., Xu, D., & Khan, A. H. (2015). What drives stock market growth? A case of a volatile emerging economy. *Emerging Markets Finance and Trade*, 51(1), 209-223.
- Huyghebaert, N., & Wang, L. (2012). Expropriation of minority investors in Chinese listed firms: The role of internal and external corporate governance mechanisms. *Corporate Governance: An International Review*, 20(3), 308-332.
- Iamsiraroj, S. (2016). The foreign direct investment–economic growth nexus. *International Review of Economics & Finance*, 42, 116-133.
- Ibn Ashur, M. A. T. (2006). *Ibn Ashur Treatise on Maqasid al-Shari'ah*. The Other Press.
- Ibrahiem, D. M. (2015). Renewable electricity consumption, foreign direct investment and economic growth in Egypt: An ARDL approach. *Procedia Economics and Finance*, 30, 313-323.
- Ibrahim, H., & Samad, F. A. (2011). Corporate governance mechanisms and performance of public-listed family-ownership in Malaysia. *International Journal of Economics and Finance*, 3(1), 105-115.
- Ibrahim. (2006). Corporate governance in Pakistan: Analysis of current challenges and recommendations for future reforms Washington university global studies law review VOL. 5:323

- ICMAP. (2015). Proposed Strategy for Economic and Industrial Growth of Pakistan. Karachi. Retrieved from [https://www.icmap.com.pk/downloads/Business\\_Climate\\_in\\_Pakistan.pdf](https://www.icmap.com.pk/downloads/Business_Climate_in_Pakistan.pdf)
- Ihsan, A., Nadeem, A., Afeef, M., & Haider, M. (2018). Demutualization and Stock Market Performance: A Comparative Analysis of Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE). *Journal of Managerial Sciences*, 12(2), 62-77.
- Ikram, A., & Naqvi, S. A. A. (2005). *Family business groups and tunneling framework: Application and evidence from Pakistan*. Lahore University of Management Sciences.
- Iqbal, A., & Strong, N. (2010). The effect of corporate governance on earnings management around UK rights issues. *International Journal of Managerial Finance*, 6(3), 168-189.
- Iqbal, J. (2012). Stock market in Pakistan: An overview. *Journal of Emerging Market Finance*, 11(1), 61-91.
- Iqbal, Z. (1999). Financial engineering in Islamic finance. *Thunderbird International Business Review*, 41(4-5), 541-559.
- Iqbal, Z., & Mirakhor, A. (2011). *An introduction to Islamic finance: Theory and practice* (Vol. 687). John Wiley & Sons.
- Isobe, T., Makino, S., & Goerzen, A. (2006). Japanese horizontal keiretsu and the performance implications of membership. *Asia Pacific Journal of Management*, 23(4), 453-466.
- Jann, B. (2008). The Blinder–Oaxaca decomposition for linear regression models. *The Stata Journal*, 8(4), 453-479.
- Jarque, C. M., & Bera, A. K. (1987). A test for normality of observations and regression residuals. *International Statistical Review/Revue Internationale de Statistique*, 163-172.
- Javid, F., & Saboor, A. (2015). Impact of Corporate Governance index on Firm Performance: evidence from Pakistani manufacturing sector. *Journal of Public Administration and Governance*, 5(2), 1-21.
- Javid, A. Y., & Iqbal, R. (2008). Ownership concentration, corporate governance and firm performance: Evidence from Pakistan. *The Pakistan Development Review*, 47(4-II), pp-643.
- Javid, A. Y., & Iqbal, R. (2010). Corporate governance in Pakistan: Corporate valuation, ownership and financing. *Working Papers & Research Reports*, 2010.
- Jensen, M. C. (1986). Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. *The American Economic Review*, 76(2), 323-329.
- Jensen, M. C. (1993). The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems. *the Journal of Finance*, 48(3), 831-880.

- Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and capital structure. *Journal of Financial Economics*, 3(4), 305–360. Retrieved from [http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X\(76\)90026-X](http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(76)90026-X)
- Jiang, L., & Kim, J. B. (2004). Foreign equity ownership and information asymmetry: Evidence from Japan. *Journal of International Financial Management & Accounting*, 15(3), 185-211.
- Jiang, Y., & Peng, M. W. (2011). Principal-principal conflicts during crisis. *Asia Pacific Journal of Management*, 28(4), 683-695.
- Jiang, Y., & Peng, M. W. (2011a). Are family ownership and control in large firms good, bad, or irrelevant? *Asia Pacific Journal of Management*, 28(1), 15-39.
- Jiang, Y., & Peng, M. W. (2011b). Principal-principal conflicts during crisis. *Asia Pacific Journal of Management*, 28(4), 683-695.
- Jin, K., & Park, C. (2015). Separation of cash flow and voting rights and firm performance in large family business groups in Korea. *Corporate Governance: An International Review*, 23(5), 434-451.
- Joh, S. W. (2003). Corporate governance and firm profitability: evidence from Korea before the economic crisis. *Journal of financial Economics*, 68(2), 287-322.
- Johannessen, J. A. (2017). The South Sea and Mississippi Bubbles of 1720. In *Innovations Lead to Economic Crises* (pp. 59-87). Palgrave Macmillan, Cham.
- Johl, S. K., Kaur, S., & Cooper, B. J. (2015). Board characteristics and firm performance: Evidence from Malaysian public listed firms. *Journal of Economics, Business and Management*, 3(2), 239-243.
- Johnson, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2000). Tunneling. *American Economic Review*, 90(2), 22-27.
- Johnson, Simon, John McMillan, and Christopher Woodruff. (1999). "Contract Enforcement in Transition." Stanford Graduate School of Business Working Paper Series. Stanford, Calif. Processed
- Jordan, C., & Majnoni, G. (2002). *Financial regulatory harmonization and the globalization of finance*. The World Bank.
- Juiz, C., & Toomey, M. (2015). To govern IT, or not to govern IT?. *Communications of the ACM*, 58(2), 58-64.
- Julio, B., & Yook, Y. (2016). Policy uncertainty, irreversibility, and cross-border flows of capital. *Journal of International Economics*, 103, 13-26.
- Kachelmeier, S. J., Rasmussen, S. J., & Schmidt, J. J. (2016). When do ineffective audit committee members experience turnover? *Contemporary Accounting Research*, 33(1), 228-260.

- Kalyanaraman, L. (2015). Exploring the moderating effect of family CEO on the association between family ownership and firm value: An empirical analysis of top Indian family firms. *Corporate Ownership & Control*, 12(2), 356-368.
- Kamali, M. H. (2008). *Maqasid al-Shariah Made Simple* (Revised edition ed.). London: *The International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT)*.
- Kapopoulos, P., & Lazaretou, S. (2007). Corporate ownership structure and firm performance: evidence from Greek firms. *Corporate Governance: An International Review*, 15(2), 144-158.
- Katper, N. K., Shaikh, S. S., Anand, V., & Ali, N. I. (2018). Analysing the Impact of Managerial Ownership on the Performance of Shariah-Compliant Firms in Pakistan. *International Business Research*, 11(11), 55-66.
- Khalil, R., Shuib, S. B., & Shahzad, A. (2019). Governance Indicators and Firm Value: Evidence of Non-Sharia Compliant firms from Pakistan. *Paradigms*, 13(2), 182-190.
- Khan, A. (2002). Developing Shariah-compliant product & services to fit today's market. Islamic Finance Summit 2002. In *Euro Money Seminars (slides)*.
- Khan, H. H., Ahmad, R. B., & Gee, C. S. (2016). Bank competition and monetary policy transmission through the bank lending channel: Evidence from ASEAN. *International Review of Economics & Finance*, 44, 19-39.
- Khan, M. A. (1991). The future of Islamic economics. *Futures*, 23(3), 248-261.
- Khan, M. A., Ilyas, R. M. A., & Hashmi, S. H. (2018). Cointegration between Institutional Quality and Stock Market Development. *NUML International Journal of Business & Management*, 13(2), 90-103.
- Khan, M. N., & Khan, F. (2011). Does ownership matter? A study of family and non family firms in Pakistan. *Problems of Management in the 21st Century*, 2(1), 95-109.
- Khan, S. N., & Ali, E. I. E. (2018). The Moderating Effect of Intellectual Capital on the Relationship between Corporate Governance and Companies Performance in Pakistan. *Journal of Governance and Integrity* 2 (1), 29, 55.
- Khanna, T., & Palepu, K. (2000). Emerging market business groups, foreign intermediaries, and corporate governance. In *Concentrated corporate ownership* (pp. 265-294). University of Chicago Press.
- Khanna, T., & Rivkin, J. W. (2001). Estimating the performance effects of business groups in emerging markets. *Strategic management journal*, 22(1), 45-74.
- Khasawneh, A. Y., & Staytieh, K. S. (2017). Impact of foreign ownership on capital structure and firm value in emerging market: case of Amman Stock Exchange listed firms. *Afro-Asian Journal of Finance and Accounting*, 7(1), 35-64.
- Kim, D. H., Lin, S. C., & Suen, Y. B. (2016). Trade, growth and growth volatility: New panel evidence. *International Review of Economics & Finance*, 45, 384-399.



- Kim, K. H., & Buchanan, R. (2008). CEO duality leadership and firm risk-taking propensity. *Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR)*, 24(1).
- Kim, K. H., Al-Shammari, H. A., Kim, B., & Lee, S. H. (2009). CEO duality leadership and corporate diversification behavior. *Journal of Business Research*, 62(11), 1173-1180.
- King, M. L. (2018). Testing for autocorrelation in linear regression models: A survey. In *Specification analysis in the linear model* (pp. 19-73). Routledge.
- Klai, N., & Omri, A. (2011). The governance role of the financial information: Empirical evidence in the Tunisian context. *Afro-Asian Journal of Finance and Accounting*, 2(4), 283-298.
- Klein, A. (2002). Audit committee, board of director characteristics, and earnings management. *Journal of Accounting and Economics*, 33(3), 375-400.
- Kostova, T., Nell, P. C., & Hoenen, A. K. (2018). Understanding agency problems in headquarters-subsidiary relationships in multinational corporations: A contextualized model. *Journal of Management*, 44(7), 2611-2637.
- KSE Stocks. (2020, March 15). *List of Companies listed at Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE)*. Retrieved from KSE stocks: <https://www.ksestocks.com/ListedCompanies/SortByName>
- Kuan, T. H., Li, C. S., & Chu, S. H. (2011). Cash holdings and corporate governance in family-controlled firms. *Journal of Business Research*, 64(7), 757-764.
- Kuan, Y. Y., Chan, K. T., & Wang, S. T. (2017). The governance of social enterprise in Taiwan and Hong Kong: a comparison. *Journal of Asian Public Policy*, 4(2), 149-170.
- Kumar, V., Lahiri, A., & Dogan, O. B. (2018). A strategic framework for a profitable business model in the sharing economy. *Industrial Marketing Management*, 69, 147-160.
- Kuran, T. (2004). *Islam and Mammon: The economic predicaments of Islamism*. Princeton University Press.
- Kurien, G. P., & Qureshi, M. N. (2011). Study of performance measurement practices in supply chain management. *International Journal of Business, Management and Social Sciences*, 2(4), 19-34.
- Kusnadi, Y. (2011). Do corporate governance mechanisms matter for cash holdings and firm value? *Pacific-Basin Finance Journal*, 19(5), 554-570.
- La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (1999). Corporate ownership around the world. *The journal of finance*, 54(2), 471-517.
- La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (2000). Investor protection and corporate governance. *Journal of financial economics*, 58(1-2), 3-27.
- La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997). Legal determinants of external finance. *The Journal of Finance*, 52(3), 1131-1150.

- Ladkani, R., & Banerjee, A. (2014). Lead Kindly Light? A Blended Neo-Classical and Behavioral Context of Merger Waves in Emerging Markets. In *ACRN Proceedings in Finance and Risk Series '13: Proceedings of the 13th FRAP Conference in Cambridge* (Vol. 2, p. 463). ACRN Publishing House.
- Lahsasna, A., & Sulaiman, R. (2010). Realizing Maqasid al Shari'ah in Islamic Financial Planning. In *4th Islamic banking, accounting and finance seminar (IBAF 2010)*.
- Lawal, B. (2012). Board dynamics and corporate performance: review of literature, and empirical challenges. *International Journal of Economics and Finance*, 4(1), 22.
- Lee, K., Peng, M. W., & Lee, K. (2008). From diversification premium to diversification discount during institutional transitions. *Journal of World Business*, 43(1), 47-65.
- Le, T. V., & Phung, D. N. (2013). Foreign ownership, capital structure and firm value: Empirical evidence from Vietnamese listed firms. *Working Paper (SSRN)*.
- Lebedeva, T. E., Akhmetshin, E. M., Dzagoyeva, M. R., Kobersy, I. S., & Ikoev, S. K. (2016). Corporate governance issues and control in conditions of unstable capital risk. *International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues*, 6(1S), 25-32.
- Lee, J., & Chung, K. H. (2018). Foreign ownership and stock market liquidity. *International Review of Economics & Finance*, 54(1), 311-325.
- Lee, K. W., Lev, B., & Yeo, G. H. H. (2008). Executive pay dispersion, corporate governance, and firm performance. *Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting*, 30(3), 315-338.
- Lee, K., & Barnes, L. (2017). Corporate governance and performance in Hong Kong founded family firms: Evidence from the Hang Seng Composite Industry Index. *The Journal of Developing Areas*, 51(1), 401-410.
- Leech, D., & Leahy, J. (1991). Ownership structure, control type classifications and the performance of large British companies. *The Economic Journal*, 101(409), 1418-1437.
- Lei, A. C., & Song, F. M. (2012). Board structure, corporate governance and firm value: evidence from Hong Kong. *Applied financial economics*, 22(15), 1289-1303.
- Lemmon, M. L., & Lins, K. V. (2003). Ownership structure, corporate governance, and firm value: Evidence from the East Asian financial crisis. *The journal of finance*, 58(4), 1445-1468.
- Lev, B. (2001). Intangibles: Measurement, management, and reporting. *Brookings Institution, Washington DC*.
- Li, C. H. (2016). Confirmatory factor analysis with ordinal data: Comparing robust maximum likelihood and diagonally weighted least squares. *Behavior Research Methods*, 48(3), 936-949.

- Li, H., & Ryan Jr, H. E. (2015). *Does Founding Family Ownership Affect Firm Performance? Evidence from the Evolution of Family Firms*. Working Paper.
- Li, S., Wu, H., & Song, X. (2017). Principal–Principal Conflicts and Corporate Philanthropy: Evidence from Chinese Private Firms. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 141(3), 605-620.
- Lin, C., Ma, Y., Malatesta, P., & Xuan, Y. (2013). Corporate ownership structure and the choice between bank debt and public debt. *Journal of Financial Economics*, 109(2), 517-534.
- Lin, F. L., & Lin, H. L. (2013). Ultimate controller ownership and firm value in Taiwan. *Emerging Markets Finance and Trade*, 49(1), 68-81.
- Lin, Y. R., & Fu, X. M. (2017). Does institutional ownership influence firm performance? Evidence from China. *International Review of Economics & Finance*, 49, 17-57.
- Lipman, F. D., & Lipman, L. K. (2006). *Corporate governance best practices: Strategies for public, private, and not-for-profit organizations*. John Wiley & Sons.
- Lipton, M., & Lorsch, J. W. (1992). A modest proposal for improved corporate governance. *The Business Lawyer*, 59-77.
- Liu, X., & Zhang, C. (2017). Corporate governance, social responsibility information disclosure, and enterprise value in China. *Journal of Cleaner Production*, 142, 1075-1084.
- Lodh, S., Nandy, M., & Chen, J. (2014). Innovation and family ownership: Empirical evidence from India. *Corporate Governance: An International Review*, 22(1), 4-23.
- Long, J. S., & Ervin, L. H. (2000). Using heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors in the linear regression model. *The American Statistician*, 54(3), 217-224.
- Lorsch, J. W. and E. MacIver. (1989). *Pawns or Potentates – The Reality of America's Corporate Boards*. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press
- Lozano, M. B., Martínez, B., & Pindado, J. (2016). Corporate governance, ownership and firm value: Drivers of ownership as a good corporate governance mechanism. *International Business Review*, 25(6), 1333-1343.
- Luan, C. J., Chen, Y. Y., Huang, H. Y., & Wang, K. (2018). CEO succession decision in family businesses—A corporate governance perspective. *Asia Pacific Management Review*, 23(2), 130-136.
- Lubatkin, M. H., Lane, P. J., Collin, S. O., & Very, P. (2005). Origins of corporate governance in the USA, Sweden and France. *Organization Studies*, 26(6), 867-888.
- Lubatkin, M. H., Schulze, W. S., Ling, Y., & Dino, R. N. (2005). The effects of parental altruism on the governance of family-managed firms. *Journal of Organizational Behavior: The International Journal of Industrial, Occupational and Organizational Psychology and Behavior*, 26(3), 313-330.

- Madhani, P. M. (2014). Corporate governance and disclosure practices in India: Domestic firms versus cross-listed firms. *The IUP Journal of Corporate Governance*, 13(4), 24-51.
- Magdi, R and R, Nadareh (2002): “Corporate governance: A framework for implementation”, Britain World Group Journal, Vol 20, pp 123- 132.
- Maher, M., & Andersson, T. (2000). Corporate governance: effects on firm performance and economic growth. Available at SSRN 218490.
- Malan, I. N. B., Salamudin, N., & Ahmad, N. (2013). Ownership and control divergence on firm value. *Indian Journal of Commerce and Management Studies*, 4(1), 78.
- Malik, M. S., & Makhdoom, D. D. (2016). Does corporate governance beget firm performance in fortune global 500 companies? *Corporate Governance*, 16(4), 747-764.
- Mallin, C., Mullineux, A., & Wihlborg, C. (2004). The financial sector and corporate governance—lessons from the UK. *Center for Law, Economics, and Financial Institutions on Copenhagen Business School (CBS), LEFIC. Working Paper*.
- Mandzila, E. E. W., & Zéghal, D. (2016). Content analysis of board reports on corporate governance, internal controls and risk management: evidence from France. *Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR)*, 32(3), 637-648.
- Mangi, R., & Siddiqui, K. (2013). Privatization of PTCL: Corporate Governance Failure. *The IUP Journal of Corporate Governance*, 12(4), 36-40.
- Marashdeh, Z. M. S. (2014). *The effect of corporate governance on firm performance in Jordan*. University of Central Lancashire.
- March, J. G., & Sutton, R. I. (1997). Crossroads—organizational performance as a dependent variable. *Organization Science*, 8(6), 698-706.
- Martin, G., Gómez-Mejía, L. R., Berrone, P., & Makri, M. (2017). Conflict between controlling family owners and minority shareholders: much ado about nothing? *Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice*, 41(6), 999-1027.
- Masulis, R. W., & Mobbs, S. (2014). Independent director incentives: Where do talented directors spend their limited time and energy? *Journal of Financial Economics*, 111(2), 406-429.
- Mayer, C. (1998). Corporate governance, competition and performance. In *Corporate Governance, Financial Markets and Global Convergence* (pp. 235-262). Springer, Boston, MA.
- Mehar, A. (2005). Corporate governance and dividend policy. *Pakistan Economic and Social Review*, 43(1) 93-106.
- Meng, Y., Clements, M. P., & Padgett, C. (2018). Independent directors, information costs and foreign ownership in Chinese companies. *Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money*, 53, 139-157.

- Merdad, H., Hassan, M. K., & Khawaja, M. (2016). Does faith matter in mutual funds investing? Evidence from Saudi Arabia. *Emerging Markets Finance and Trade*, 52(4), 938-960.
- Merendino, A., & Melville, R. (2019). The board of directors and firm performance: empirical evidence from listed companies. *Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society*.
- Miller, D., Le Breton-Miller, I., Lester, R. H., & Cannella Jr, A. A. (2007). Are family firms really superior performers? *Journal of corporate finance*, 13(5), 829-858.
- Minetti, R., Murro, P., & Paiella, M. (2012). Ownership structure, governance, and innovation: Evidence from Italy. *Government of the Italian Republic (Italy), Ministry of Economy and Finance, Department of the Treasury Working Paper* (10).
- Mir, S. R., & Nishat, M. (2004). Corporate governance structure and firm performance in Pakistan: An empirical study. Paper presented at the Second Annual Conference in Corporate Governance, 3-4 June, Lahore University of Management Sciences, Lahore, Pakistan.
- Mitton, T. (2002). A cross-firm analysis of the impact of corporate governance on the East Asian financial crisis. *Journal of Financial Economics*, 64(2), 215-241.
- Mohamad, M. H. S., Rashid, H. M. A., & Shawtari, F. A. M. (2012). Corporate governance and earnings management in Malaysian government linked companies: the impact of GLCs' transformation policy. *Asian Review of Accounting*, 20(3), 241-258.
- Mohamed, H. H., Masih, M., & Bacha, O. I. (2015). Why do issuers issue Sukuk or conventional bond? Evidence from Malaysian listed firms using partial adjustment models. *Pacific-Basin Finance Journal*, 34, 233-252.
- Mohandi, A., & Odeh, A. (2010). The effect of ownership structure on the quality of financial statements in Jordan. *Journal of Business Administration*, 19(2), 1-23.
- Monoarfa, M. A. S., & Djazuli, A. (2020, June). The Role of Profitability as A Mediator between Good Corporate Governance and Firm Value. In *23rd Asian Forum of Business Education (AFBE 2019)* (pp. 357-362). Atlantis Press.
- Morck, R., Wolfenzon, D., & Yeung, B. (2005). Corporate governance, economic entrenchment, and growth. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 43(3), 655-720.
- Mrabure, K. O., & Abhulimhen-Iyoha, A. (2020). Corporate Governance and Protection of Stakeholders Rights and Interests. *Beijing Law Review*, 11(1), 292-308.
- Muljawan, D. (2015). Financial sector assessment program for Islamic financial system (iFSAP). *Financial Stability and Risk Management in Islamic Financial Institutions*, 1.

- Mursitama, T. N. (2006). Creating relational rents: The effect of business groups on affiliated firms' performance in Indonesia. *Asia Pacific Journal of Management*, 23(4), 537-557.
- Mustafa, A., & Turner, C. (2011). Pressurized liquid extraction as a green approach in food and herbal plants extraction: A review. *Analytica chimica acta*, 703(1), 8-18.
- Muthumeenakshi, M. (2017). Perception of investors towards the investment pattern on different investment avenues-A review. *The Journal of Internet Banking and Commerce*, 1-15.
- Najwa, N. A., Ramly, Z., & Haron, R. (2020). Board size, chief risk officer and risk-taking in Islamic banks: role of Shariah supervisory board. *Jurnal Pengurusan (UKM Journal of Management)*, 57.
- Nawaz, T., & Haniffa, R. (2017). Determinants of financial performance of Islamic banks: an intellectual capital perspective. *Journal of Islamic Accounting and Business Research*, 8(2), 130-142.
- Naz, I., Shah, S. M. A., & Kutan, A. M. (2017). Do managers of sharia-compliant firms have distinctive financial styles? *Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money*, 46, 174-187.
- Nazir, M. S., & Afza, T. A. L. A. T. (2018). Impact of corporate governance on discretionary earnings management: A case of Pakistani firms. *Pakistan economic and social review*, 56(1), 157-184.
- Nguyen, P., Rahman, N., & Zhao, R. (2018). CEO characteristics and firm valuation: A quantile regression analysis. *Journal of Management & Governance*, 22(1), 133-151.
- Nishat, M., & Shaheen, R. (2004). Corporate governance and firm performance: An exploratory analysis. Paper presented at the Second Annual Conference in Corporate Governance, 3-4 June, Lahore University of Management Sciences, Lahore, Pakistan.
- O'brien, R. M. (2007). A caution regarding rules of thumb for variance inflation factors. *Quality & Quantity*, 41(5), 673-690.
- Omer, S. (2010). Some Lessons from Prophet Muhammad (SAW) in Architecture: The Prophet's Mosque in MadÊnah. *Intellectual Discourse*, 18(1), 115-140.
- Omran, M., & Pointon, J. (2004). Dividend policy, trading characteristics and share prices: empirical evidence from Egyptian firms. *International Journal of Theoretical and Applied Finance*, 7(02), 121-133.
- Ortega-Argiles, R., Moreno, R., & Caralt, J. S. (2005). Ownership structure and innovation: is there a real link? *The Annals of Regional Science*, 39(4), 637-662.
- Ozkan, A., & Ozkan, N. (2004). Corporate cash holdings: An empirical investigation of UK companies. *Journal of banking & finance*, 28(9), 2103-2134.

- Ozkan, N. (2011). CEO compensation and firm performance: An empirical investigation of UK panel data. *European Financial Management*, 17(2), 260-285.
- Padhi, S. K. (2019). Corporate governance the journey of indian corporate world. *International Journal of Management (IJM)*, 10(1).
- Pallant, J. (2007). *SPSS survival manual: A step-by-step guide to data analysis using SPSS version 15*. Nova Iorque: McGraw Hill.
- Pareto, V. (1971). *Manual of Political Economy*. New York: Augustus M. Kelley, Publishers, translation by Ann S. Schwier.
- Patra, B. P. (2012). Government, Governance and Corruption: The Case of 2G Spectrum Scam. *Vilakshan: The XIMB Journal of Management*, 9(2).
- Pauwelyn, J. (2015). The rule of law without the rule of lawyers? Why investment arbitrators are from Mars, trade adjudicators from Venus. *American Journal of International Law*, 109(4), 761-805.
- PBC. (2019). *Pakistan's Economic, Trade & Manufacturing Data*. Karachi: The Pakistan Business Council. Retrieved from <https://www.pbc.org.pk/research/>
- Pearce, J. A., & Zahra, S. A. (1992). Board composition from a strategic contingency perspective. *Journal of Management Studies*, 29(4), 411-438.
- Peng, M. W. (2012). The global strategy of emerging multinationals from China. *Global Strategy Journal*, 2(2), 97-107.
- Peng, M. W., & Sauerwald, S. (2013). Informal institutions, shareholder coalitions, and principal–principal conflicts. *Asia Pacific Journal of Management*, 30(3), 853-870.
- Peng, M. W., Wang, D. Y., & Jiang, Y. (2008). An institution-based view of international business strategy: A focus on emerging economies. *Journal of International Business Studies*, 39(5), 920-936.
- Perraton, J. (2019). The scope and implications of globalisation. In *the Handbook of Globalisation, Third Edition*. Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Pfeffer, J., & Salancik, G. R. (2003). *The external control of organizations: A resource dependence perspective*: Stanford University Press.
- Porta, R. L., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1998). Law and finance. *Journal of political economy*, 106(6), 1113-1155.
- Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (2002). Investor protection and corporate valuation. *The Journal of Finance*, 57(3), 1147-1170. 196.
- Porter, M. E., & Heppelmann, J. E. (2015). How smart, connected products are transforming companies. *Harvard business review*, 93(10), 96-114.

- Porter, M. E., & Kramer, M. R. (2019). Creating shared value. In *Managing sustainable business* (pp. 323-346). Springer, Dordrecht.
- Preacher, K. J., Rucker, D. D., & Hayes, A. F. (2007). Addressing moderated mediation hypotheses: Theory, methods, and prescriptions. *Multivariate Behavioral Research*, 42(1), 185-227.
- Primbs, M., & Wang, C. (2016). Notable governance failures: Enron, Siemens and Beyond. *Comparative Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation*, 3.
- Prommin, P., Jumreornvong, S., Jiraporn, P., & Tong, S. (2016). Liquidity, ownership concentration, corporate governance, and firm value: Evidence from Thailand. *Global Finance Journal*, 31, 73-87.
- PSX. (2020, July 10). *Pakistan Stock Exchange Limited*. Retrieved from re-composition of psx-kmi all share islamic: <https://www.psx.com.pk/psx/themes/psx/uploads/Notice-with-List-incoming-outgoing-KMI-ALL-Shares-July-01-2019-Dec-31-2019.pdf>
- Purkayastha, S., Veliyath, R., & George, R. (2019). The roles of family ownership and family management in the governance of agency conflicts. *Journal of Business Research*, 98, 50-64.
- Putman, R. L., Griffin, R. B., & Kilgore, R. W. (2005). A Model for Determination of the Quality of Earnings. *Academy of Accounting and Financial Studies Journal*, 9(3), 41. Retrieved 3 22, 2020, from <https://questia.com/library/journal/1g1-182468680/a-model-for-determination-of-the-quality-of-earnings>
- Rachagan, S., & Satkunasingam, E. (2009). Improving corporate governance of SMEs in emerging economies: a Malaysian experience. *Journal of Enterprise Information Management*, 22(4), 468-484.
- Ratnawati, V., Abdul-Hamid, M. A., & Popoola, O. M. J. (2016). The influence of agency conflict types I and II on earnings management. *International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues*, 6(4), 126-132.
- Rehman, R. U., Zhang, J., Ali, R., & Qadeer, A. (2015). Does growing economy and better governance impede banking efficiency? A DEA analysis. *Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR)*, 31(6), 2213-2224.
- Renders, A., & Gaeremynck, A. (2012). Corporate governance, principal-principal agency conflicts, and firm value in European listed companies. *Corporate Governance: an international review*, 20(2), 125-143.
- Renneboog, L., & Vansteenkiste, C. (2017). Leveraged Buyouts: A Survey of the Literature. *European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)-Finance Working Paper*, (492).
- Richard, P. J., Devinney, T. M., Yip, G. S., & Johnson, G. (2009). Measuring organizational performance: Towards methodological best practice. *Journal of Management*.



- Ringe, W. G. (2015). Changing law and ownership patterns in Germany: Corporate governance and the erosion of Deutschland AG. *The American Journal of Comparative Law*, 63(2), 493-538.
- Ríos, A. M., Bastida, F., & Benito, B. (2016). Budget transparency and legislative budgetary oversight: An international approach. *The American Review of Public Administration*, 46(5), 546-568.
- Robinson, K. (2007). Islamic finance is seeing spectacular growth. *Times Reader*, 2(5).
- Robinson, L. (2019). Open property and complex mosaics: variants in tenure regimes across pastoralist social-ecological systems. *International Journal of the Commons*, 13(1).
- Rodriguez-Fernandez, M., Fernandez-Alonso, S., & Rodriguez-Rodriguez, J. (2014). Board characteristics and firm performance in Spain. *Corporate Governance*, 14(4), 485-503.
- Rose, P. (2010). Common Agency and the Public Corporation. *Vanderbilt Law Review*, 63(5), 1353. Retrieved 3 23, 2020, from [https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\\_id=1565507](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1565507)
- Ross, S. A., Westerfield, R., & Jordan, B. D. (2008). *Fundamentals of corporate finance*. Tata McGraw-Hill Education.
- Ruan, W., Tian, G., & Ma, S. (2011). Managerial ownership, capital structure and firm value: Evidence from China's civilian-run firms. *Australasian Accounting, Business and Finance Journal*, 5(3), 73-92.
- Ruiqi, W., Wang, F., Xu, L., & Yuan, C. (2017). R&D expenditures, ultimate ownership and future performance: Evidence from China. *Journal of Business Research*, 71, 47-54.
- Safieddine, A. (2009). Islamic financial institutions and corporate governance: New insights for agency theory. *Corporate Governance: An International Review*, 17(2), 142-158.
- Sakawa, H., & Watanabel, N. (2018). Parent control and ownership monitoring in publicly listed subsidiaries in Japan. *Research in International Business and Finance*, 45(1), 7-14.
- Saleem, M. A., Bhutta, Z. M., Nauman, M., & Zahra, S. (2019). Enhancing performance and commitment through leadership and empowerment: An emerging economy perspective. *International Journal of Bank Marketing*, 37(1), 303-322.
- Salman, F., & Siddiqui, K. (2013). Mehrangate Scandal: Corporate Governance Failure. *The IUP Journal of Corporate Governance*, 12(4), 41-46.
- Sanda, A. U., Mikailu, A. S., & Garba, T. (2010). Corporate governance mechanisms and firms' financial performance in Nigeria. *Afro-Asian Journal of Finance and Accounting*, 2(1), 22-39.

- Sauerwald, S., & Peng, M. W. (2013). Informal institutions, shareholder coalitions, and principal–principal conflicts. *Asia Pacific Journal of Management*, 30(3), 853-870.
- Schmidheiny, K., & Basel, U. (2013). *The Multiple Linear Regression Model*: Citeseer.
- Schulze, W. S., Lubatkin, M. H., & Dino, R. N. (2003). Toward a theory of agency and altruism in family firms. *Journal of business venturing*, 18(4), 473-490.
- Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan. (2002). “*Manual of Corporate Governance*”
- Sekaran, U. and Bougie, R. (2009) *Research Methods for Business: A Skill-Building Approach*. 5th Edition, John Wiley and Sons Inc., Hoboken.
- Shah, H. I. (2008). Modern state-enacted Islamic family laws: Towards a purposive legal codification. *Shariah Law Report 1*, 41-48.
- Shahbaz, M., Van Hoang, T. H., Mahalik, M. K., & Roubaud, D. (2017). Energy consumption, financial development and economic growth in India: New evidence from a nonlinear and asymmetric analysis. *Energy Economics*, 63, 199-212.
- Shan, H., & Gong, G. (2017). The impact of ownership structure on firm performance: static and dynamic panel data evidence from china’s listed companies. In *2016 National Convention on Sports Science of China* (p. 01017). EDP Sciences.
- Shanmugam, B., & Zahari, Z. R. (2009). A primer on Islamic finance. *The Research Foundatin of CFA Institute*.
- Sheikh, N. A., & Khan, M. I. (2015). The impact of board attributes and insider ownership on corporate cash holdings: Evidence from Pakistan. *Pakistan Journal of Commerce and Social Sciences (PJCSS)*, 9(1), 52-68.
- Sheikh, N., & Wang, Z. (2012). Effects of corporate governance on capital structure: empirical evidence from Pakistan. *Corporate Governance: The international journal of business in society*, 12(5), 629-641.
- Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997). A survey of corporate governance. *The Journal of Finance*, 52(2), 737-783.
- Shukeri, S. N., & Islam, M. A. (2012). The determinants of audit timeliness: Evidence from Malaysia. *Journal of Applied Sciences Research*, 8(7), 3314-3322.
- Shukeri, S. N., & Nelson, S. P. (2011, December). Timeliness of Annual Audit Report: some empirical evidence from Malaysia. In *Entrepreneurship and Management International Conference (EMIC 2)*.
- Shukeri, S. N., Shin, O. W., & Shaari, M. S. (2012). Does board of director's characteristics affect firm performance? Evidence from Malaysian public listed companies. *International Business Research*, 5(9), 120.

- Shyu, J. (2011). Family ownership and firm performance: evidence from Taiwanese firms. *International Journal of Managerial Finance*, 7(4), 397-411.
- Siddiqui, K., & Fahim, S. M. (2013). Khanani and Kalia International: Corporate Governance Failure. *The IUP Journal of Corporate Governance*, 12(4), 52-56.
- Siddiqui, S. H. (2012). Anatomy and critique of Islamic banking. *Pakistan Horizon*, 65(3), 35-58.
- Sikandar, S., & Mahmood, W. (2018). Corporate governance and value of family-owned business: A case of emerging country. *Corporate Governance and Sustainability Review*, 2(2), 6-12. <http://doi.org/10.22495/cgsrv2i2p1>
- Singapurwoko, A., & El-Wahid, M. S. M. (2011). The impact of financial leverage to profitability study of non-financial companies listed in Indonesia stock exchange. *European Journal of Economics, Finance and Administrative Sciences*, 32, 136-148.
- Singh, S., Tabassum, N., Darwish, T. K., & Batsakis, G. (2018). Corporate governance and Tobin's Q as a measure of organizational performance. *British Journal of Management*, 29(1), 171-190.
- Sinha, R. (1993). Foreign participation and technical efficiency in Indian industry. *Applied Economics*, 25(5), 583-588.
- Smieliauskas, W., Bewley, K., Gronewold, U., & Menzefricke, U. (2018). Misleading forecasts in accounting estimates: A form of ethical blindness in accounting standards? *Journal of Business Ethics*, 152(2), 437-457.
- Smoke, P. (2015). Rethinking decentralization: Assessing challenges to a popular public sector reform. *Public Administration and Development*, 35(2), 97-112.
- State Bank of Pakistan. (2019). *Financial Statement Analysis of financial listed Companies*. Lahore: State Bank of Pakistan. Retrieved 12 30, 2019, from <http://www.sbp.org.pk/departments/stats/FSA-2012-16.pdf>
- Strand, R., & Freeman, R. E. (2015). Scandinavian cooperative advantage: The theory and practice of stakeholder engagement in Scandinavia. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 127(1), 65-85.
- Su, K., Li, L., & Wan, R. (2017). Ultimate ownership, risk-taking and firm value: evidence from China. *Asia Pacific Business Review*, 23(1), 10-26.
- Su, W., Peng, M. W., Tan, W., & Cheung, Y. L. (2016). The signaling effect of corporate social responsibility in emerging economies. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 134(3), 479-491.
- Su, Y., Xu, D., & Phan, P. H. (2008). Principal—Principal Conflict in the Governance of the Chinese Public Corporation. *Management and Organization Review*, 4(1), 17-38.

- Tyser. C. R. (1329) *The Mejjelle, Majallah Al-Ahkam Al-Adiyah. A Complete Code or Islamic Civil Law*, The Book House, Pakistan. (n.d).
- Tariq, Y. B., & Abbas, Z. (2013). Compliance and multidimensional firm performance: Evaluating the efficacy of rule-based code of corporate governance. *Economic Modelling*, 35, 565-575. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econmod.2013.08.015>
- Tatoglu, E., Glaister, A. J., & Demirbag, M. (2016). Talent management motives and practices in an emerging market: A comparison between MNEs and local firms. *Journal of World Business*, 51(2), 278-293.
- Teece, D., Peteraf, M., & Leih, S. (2016). Dynamic capabilities and organizational agility: Risk, uncertainty, and strategy in the innovation economy. *California Management Review*, 58(4), 13-35.
- The Edge Malaysia (2009). Big Money: Minorities at the Losing End. December 21, 2009, byline: Joyce Goh. Retrieved February 15, 2010 from LexisNexis database.
- The World Bank in Pakistan Overview. (2019). Retrieved from <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/pakistan/overview>
- Thillainathan, R. (1999). Corporate governance and restructuring in Malaysia—A review of markets, mechanisms, agents and the legal infrastructure. *joint World Bank and OECD Survey of Corporate Governance. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development*.
- Thomsen, S., & Pedersen, T. (2000). Ownership structure and economic performance in the largest European companies. *Strategic Management Journal*, 689-705.
- Tricker, R. B., & Tricker, R. I. (2015). *Corporate governance: Principles, policies, and practices*. Oxford University Press.
- Tsai, C. C. (2012). Cash holdings and corporate governance in business group affiliated firms. In *International Conference on Economics Marketing and Management* (Vol. 28, pp. 83-86).
- Tsui-Auch, L. S. (2004). The professionally managed family-ruled enterprise: ethnic Chinese business in Singapore. *Journal of Management Studies*, 41(4), 693-723.
- Turnbull, N. (1999). *Turnbull Report. London Stock Exchange, London*.
- Tyser. C. R. (1329) *The Mejjelle, Majallah Al-Ahkam Al-Adiyah. A Complete Code or Islamic Civil Law*, The Book House, Pakistan. (n.d).
- Ullah, M. W. (2017). *Understanding the Dynamics of Business Groups in Pakistan-A Focus on the Financial Performance and Dividend Policy* (Doctoral dissertation, CAPITAL UNIVERSITY).
- Ullah, H., & Shah, A. (2015). Related Party Transactions and Corporate Governance Mechanisms: Evidence from Firms Listed on the Karachi Stock Exchange. *Pakistan Business Review*, 17(3), 663-680.

- Ullah, W., & Hasan, A. (2017). Investigating the Group Diversification Premium and Discount in Pakistan. *Pakistan Development Review*, 56(4), 289-310.
- Ullah, W., Ali, S., & Mehmood, S. (2017). Impact of excess control, ownership structure and corporate governance on firm performance of diversified group firms in Pakistan. *Business & Economic Review*, 9(2), 49-72.
- Umrani, A. I., Johl, S. K., & Ibrahim, M. Y. (2017). Ownership Structure Attributes, Outside Board Members and SMEs Firm Performance with Mediating Effect of Innovation in Malaysia. *Global Business & Management Research*, 9.
- Usmani, M. T. (1998). *An Introduction to Islamic Finance* (PDF). Karachi.
- Usmani, M. T. (2005). *An Introduction to Islamic Finance*. Karachi, Pakistan: Maktaba Ma'ariful Qur'an.
- Vafeas, N. (2000). Board structure and the informativeness of earnings. *Journal of Accounting and Public Policy*, 19(2), 139-160.
- Valdez, S., & Molyneux, P. (2015). *An introduction to global financial markets*. Macmillan International Higher Education.
- Valentinov, V., & Chatalova, L. (2016). Institutional economics and social dilemmas: a systems theory perspective. *Systems Research and Behavioral Science*, 33(1), 138-149.
- Verbeke, A., & Asmussen, C. G. (2016). Global, local, or regional? The locus of MNE strategies. *Journal of Management Studies*, 53(6), 1051-1075.
- Villalonga, B., & Amit, R. (2004). How do family ownership, control and management affect firm value? EFA 2004 Maastricht Meetings Paper no. 3620.
- Visser, H. (2013). *Islamic finance: Principles and practice*. Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Vo, D., & Phan, T. (2013). Corporate governance and firm performance: empirical evidence from Vietnam. *Journal of Economic Development*, 62-78.
- Wahab, E., Haron, H., Lee Lok, C., & Yahya, S. (2011). Does corporate governance matter? Evidence from related party transactions in Malaysia. In *International Corporate Governance* (pp. 131-164). Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
- Wan, D., & Ong, C. H. (2005). Board Structure, Process and Performance: evidence from public-listed companies in Singapore. *Corporate Governance: An International Review*, 13(2), 277-290.
- Wan, D., & Ong, C. H. (2010). Board Conflict, Board Performance and Firm Performance in Singapore Listed Companies. *Indian Journal of Corporate Governance*, 3(2), 90-109.
- Wan, W. P. (2005). Country resource environments, firm capabilities, and corporate diversification strategies. *Journal of Management Studies*, 42(1), 161-182.

- Wang, A., Zhang, G., 2009. Institutional ownership and credit spreads: An information asymmetry perspective. *Journal Empirical Finance*, 16(4), 597-612.
- Wang, X., Du, M., Chen, S., & Shao, H. (2014). Corporate governance: institutional arrangement or market choice? *Chinese Management Studies*.
- Ward, D., & Filatotchev, I. (2010). Principal–principal–agency relationships and the role of external governance. *Managerial and Decision Economics*, 31(4), 249-261.
- Watson, P. K., & Teelucksingh, S. S. (2002). *A practical introduction to econometric methods: Classical and modern*. University of West Indies Press.
- Williams, C. A., & Conley, J. M. (2005). An emerging third Way-The erosion of the Anglo-American shareholder value construct. *Cornell International Literature Journal*, 38, 493.
- Wolfenzon, D. (1999). A theory of pyramidal ownership. *Unpublished working paper*. Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA.
- Wooldridge, J. M. (2005). Simple solutions to the initial conditions problem in dynamic, nonlinear panel data models with unobserved heterogeneity. *Journal of Applied Econometrics*, 20(1), 39-54.
- Wooldridge, J. M. (2010). *Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data*: MIT press.
- Wright, M., Filatotchev, I., Hoskisson, R. E., & Peng, M. W. (2005). Strategy research in emerging economies: Challenging the conventional wisdom. *Journal of Management Studies*, 42(1), 1-33.
- Wu, M. C., Lin, H. C., Lin, I. C., & Lai, C. F. (2009). The effects of corporate governance on firm performance. *Changua: National Changua University of Educaion*.
- Wu, S., & Cui, H. (2002). Consequences of the concentrated ownership structure in Mainland China-evidence of Year 2000. *documento de trabajo de la Universidad de la Ciudad de Hong Kong, Universidad de la Ciudad de Hong Kong*.
- Yangfan, T. N. (2015). Ownership concentration and innovation: Empirical examination from China. *Doctoral dissertation, Hong Kong Baptist University Hong Kong*.
- Yasser, Q. R., & Mamun, A. A. (2015). The impact of CEO duality attributes on earnings management in the East. *Corporate Governance*, 15(5), 706-718.
- Yasser, Q. R., & Mamun, A. A. (2017). The impact of ownership concentration on firm performance: Evidence from an emerging market. *Emerging Economy Studies*, 3(1), 34-53.
- Yasser, Q. R., Al Mamun, A., & Suriya, A. R. (2014). CEO Duality Structure and Firm Performance in Pakistan. *Asian Journal of Accounting and Governance*, 5, 57-69.

- Yasser, Q. R., Entebang, H. A., & Mansor, S. A. (2011). Corporate governance and firm performance in Pakistan: The case of Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE)-30. *Journal of Economics and International Finance*, 3(8), 482-491.
- Yazici, B., & Yolacan, S. (2007). A comparison of various tests of normality. *Journal of Statistical Computation and Simulation*, 77(2), 175-183.
- Yegar, M. (2002). *Between integration and secession: the Muslim communities of the southern Philippines, Southern Thailand, and western Burma/Myanmar*. Lexington Books.
- Yermack, D. (1996). Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors. *Journal of Financial Economics*, 40(2), 185-211.
- Yiu, D., Bruton, G. D., & Lu, Y. (2005). Understanding business group performance in an emerging economy: Acquiring resources and capabilities in order to prosper. *Journal of Management Studies*, 42(1), 183-206.
- Yoshikawa, T., & Phan, P. H. (2005). The effects of ownership and capital structure on board composition and strategic diversification in Japanese corporations. *Corporate Governance: An International Review*, 13(2), 303-312.
- Young, M. N., Peng, M. W., Ahlstrom, D., Bruton, G. D., & Jiang, Y. (2008). Corporate governance in emerging economies: A review of the principal-principal perspective. *Journal of Management Studies*, 45(1), 196-220.
- Yunos, R. M. (2011). *The effect of ownership concentration, board of directors, audit committee and ethnicity on conservative accounting: Malaysian evidence*. Edith Cowan University.
- Zafar, M., Sabri, P. S. U., Ilyas, M., & Kousar, S. (2015). The impact of trade openness and external debt on economic growth: new evidence from south asia, east asia and middle east. *Science International*, 27(1).
- Zaher, T. S., & Hassan, K. M. (2001). A comparative literature survey of Islamic finance and banking. *Financial Markets, Institutions & Instruments*, 10(4), 155-199.
- Zaher, T. S., & Kabir Hassan, M. (2001). A comparative literature survey of Islamic finance and banking. *Financial Markets, Institutions & Instruments*, 10(4), 155-199.
- Zahra, S. A., & Filatotchev, I. (2004). Governance of the entrepreneurial threshold firm: A knowledge-based perspective. *Journal of Management Studies*, 41(5), 885-897.
- Zattoni, A., & Van Ees, H. (2012). How to contribute to the development of a global understanding of corporate governance? Reflections from submitted and published articles in CGIR. *Corporate Governance: An International Review*, 20(1), 106-118.
- Zhang, Q., Chen, L., & Feng, T. (2014). Mediation or Moderation? The Role of R&D Investment in the Relationship between Corporate Governance and Firm Performance: Empirical Evidence from the Chinese IT Industry. *Corporate Governance: An International Review*, 22(6), 501-517.

Zhao, H., Seibert, S. E., & Hills, G. E. (2005). The mediating role of self-efficacy in the development of entrepreneurial intentions. *Journal of Applied Psychology, 90*(6), 1265.

Zulfiqar, M., & Fayyaz, M. A. (2014). A Review of Family Ownership and Non-Family Ownership Firms' Performance, Productivity, and Profitability. *Studies, 3*(4).

