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R. M. ERRINGTON

## The Nature of the Macedonian State under the Monarchy

### *I. Introduction*

In 1931, after a long delay caused by the great inflation, appeared the doctoral dissertation of FRIEDRICH GRANIER, *Die makedonische Heeresversammlung: ein Beitrag zum antiken Staatsrecht*. The book was immediately taken seriously by scholars,<sup>1</sup> and although several sections were after critical examination found to be unacceptable, the basic assumptions about the nature of the Macedonian state which GRANIER made and which are apparent from his subtitle have only once been seriously challenged in their entirety<sup>2</sup> and still broadly shape the usual scholarly view of the Macedonian state. GRANIER was not however basically an innovator.<sup>3</sup> He shared the academic assumptions of his time, and his aim was not so much to investigate the role of the army in politics in Macedonia with an open mind and see what he could discover, but rather to define what he found in terms of *Staatsrecht*; his reference to MOMMSEN'S 'Römisches Staatsrecht' on the first page of his book demonstrates one of the academic traditions in which the book was conceived.

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In this article I have not attempted to cite all secondary literature. To do so for the sections dealing with Alexander and the Successors would merely uselessly lengthen an essay which is already quite long enough. I have therefore usually restricted myself to citing the most recent and (for my purpose) useful thorough treatments of some of the general problems where comprehensive bibliographical material may be found.

<sup>1</sup> See the list in P. BRIANT, *Antigone le Borgne*, Paris, 1973, 288 n. 2. I believed it in principle once myself: see *JHS* 90, 1970, 49 f.

<sup>2</sup> By PIETRO DE FRANCISCI, *Arcana Imperii II*, Milano 1948. BRIANT, *Antigone*, 288 ff., rejects most of GRANIER'S arguments, in so far as they concern the functions of the military assembly (*Heeresversammlung*); but since he merely replaces the *Heeresversammlung* with an even less probable people's assembly with the same functions (see below, p. 92 ff.) he still moves within the same tradition of thought and thus marks no advance on GRANIER. R. LOCK, *CPh* 72, 1977, 91–107, gives a short critique of GRANIER and his followers, but unfortunately restricts his detailed examination to the period of Alexander's rule and takes no account of BRIANT'S version of Macedonian *Staatsrecht*.

<sup>3</sup> His basic views were already common ground since K. J. BELOCH, *Griechische Geschichte IV*<sup>2</sup> 1, Berlin-Leipzig 1925, 379 ff.; E. BRECCIA, *Il diritto dinastico nelle monarchie dei successori d'Alessandro Magno*, Roma, 1903. But it is true to say that GRA-

GRANIER's basic assumption, therefore, was that something which could be called *Staatsrecht* existed in ancient Macedonia and that the army's role in politics was played out within the framework – however rudimentary – of this *Staatsrecht*: «Wir lernen die Heeresversammlung mit ihrem Auftreten in der Überlieferung in vollem Besitze und in Ausübung ihrer Funktionen kennen. Ja, wo wir sie vor allem bei ihrer eigentlichen staatsrechtlichen Aufgabe sehen, nach dem Tode Alexanders des Großen, scheint für kurze Zeit das Schicksal der Welt in ihrer Hand zu liegen. Nicht nur in der Enge des bergigen makedonischen Heimatlandes, nicht nur in der Weite des gewaltigen Alexanderreiches sehen wir die Heeresversammlung über Thronfolge und Hochgericht letzten Endes entscheiden, auch in die nach Zerfall des Weltreiches entstehenden Reiche der Diadochen bringen die makedonischen Dynastien mit ihren makedonischen Truppen das alte Recht des Volkes mit, in seiner Versammlung der Wehrhaften in freier Rede die Wünsche und Befugnisse des Volkes zu vertreten.»<sup>4</sup> GRANIER's views on the extension of the assumed constitutional function of the Macedonian army assembly to the hellenistic monarchies were soon demolished by E. BICKERMANN, who demonstrated that here the sources know of nothing other than tumultuary scenes, in which soldiers played a part only if they happened to be on the spot. BICKERMANN's chief interest however was directed to the Seleucid kingdom and he seems to have tacitly accepted GRANIER's assumption that the Macedonian homeland was different: «La théorie (that of GRANIER) ne s'avise pas, on le voit, de la différence entre le royaume national de Macédoine et les autocraties de l'Orient et de l'Égypte. A vrai dire, je ne vois pas de traces du rôle constitutionnel de l'armée dans l'Égypte des Lagides. En tout cas je crains fort qu'on n'en trouve aucune sous les Séleucides.»<sup>5</sup>

BICKERMANN's arguments were devastating for the theory of GRANIER, as far as Egypt and the Seleucid kingdom were concerned, and have been generally accepted. The later history of GRANIER's theory for the Macedonian monarchy, however, has not been so satisfactory, despite an almost equally devastating attack as BICKERMANN's as long ago as 1948 by PIETRO DE FRANCISCI, in the second volume of his huge work of synthesis, *«Arcana Imperii»*. This work has remained little known to ancient historians. Only ANDRÉ AYMARD seems to have recognised its importance for our problem and he devoted a whole article to the Macedonian section of it.<sup>6</sup> DE FRANCISCI examined at length GRANIER's detailed assump-

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NIER's book was the most thorough and influential exposition of these views (see the bibliography in BRIANT [n. 1]).

<sup>4</sup> pp. 1–2.

<sup>5</sup> E. BICKERMAN, *Institutions des Séleucides*, Paris 1938, 8 ff. (citation from p. 8).

<sup>6</sup> Sur l'assemblée macédonienne, *REA* 52, 1950, 115–137 (= *Études d'histoire ancienne*, Paris, 1967, 143 ff.) (cited from *Études*); AYMARD also devoted two further reviews to the work in general: in *REG* 61, 1948 and *REL* 27, 1949. Otherwise it seems to have been virtually ignored by historians.

tions, assertions and arguments and concluded that in Macedonia, both hellenistic and pre-hellenistic, the army assembly had no constitutional or juridical rights, only, particularly after Philip II, a de facto political power, the effectiveness of which varied from time to time and was directly related to the prevailing political circumstances. This view, more often ignored than taken account of, seems to me to be basically correct: details might be differently interpreted, nuances differently expressed as we shall see in part IV below; but in general DE FRANCISCI's arguments against GRANIER for the historical period of the Macedonian monarchy are sufficiently convincing to make it unnecessary to redo this basic work. His views have, however, not unnaturally been challenged, most influentially by ANDRÉ AYMARD in the long review article already noticed. He ends by rejecting the views of DE FRANCISCI on the constitutional nature of ancient Macedonia and tries to resurrect the traditional function of the army assembly in recent Macedonian scholarship – but, since he accepted the justice of much of DE FRANCISCI's criticism of GRANIER, with new arguments. More recently P. BRIANT<sup>7</sup> has added new refinements to AYMARD's structure (which he basically accepts) in a mammoth re-examination of the whole question. I do not intend to examine these modern works page by page, argument by argument. The arguments are, it seems, to a large extent interdependent. This means that it is necessary to deal only with the main arguments, those which the two recent scholars themselves regard as fundamental for their views and without which they are no longer tenable, in order to demonstrate the insubstantial nature of this ghost which has haunted Macedonian history in one form or another for three generations.

## *II. The Arguments*

AYMARD lays great stress on the alleged important formal difference between the Macedonian homeland and the other hellenistic monarchies, that Macedonia was a «national monarchy» (by which he means that the king was regarded as being in some sense the representative of the people), whereas the others were «personal monarchies».<sup>8</sup> I have already dealt at length elsewhere<sup>9</sup> with the main supporting argument for this view, the alleged juridical significance of the Macedonian royal titlature; there I showed that this did not have the formal significance which AYMARD claimed for it and thus cannot be used as an argument for the view that the Macedonian monarchy, from a formal standpoint, was basically different in nature from the Seleucid or Ptolemaic monarchies. AYMARD also regards the absence of ruler-cult in Macedonia as a significant difference; but this is really

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<sup>7</sup> In the book mentioned n. 1 above.

<sup>8</sup> *Études*, 147–150.

<sup>9</sup> *JHS* 94, 1974, 20–37.

irrelevant to the formal character of the monarchy; since hellenistic Macedonia was at least a reasonably unified <nation state>, it needed no artificially stimulated ruler-cult to help to unite its disparate peoples. Moreover, we shall see a conclusive indication that the fact that the ordinary Macedonians seem to have had a freer approach to their king than was normal in other hellenistic monarchies – also a characteristic difference, according to AYMARD – does not necessarily mean that they had any <right of free speech>, only that they had the habit of saying what they felt; and this characteristic, while perhaps providing evidence of a real difference in the political and social climate in which the Macedonian kings operated – remarked upon by Quintus Curtius when he described the Macedonians as being *adsueti quidem regio imperio, sed in maiore libertatis umbra quam ceteri degentes*<sup>9a</sup> – tells us in fact nothing at all about the formal legal character of the monarchy's power or about <constitutional rights> of Macedonian individuals or groups. Those of AYMARD's arguments, therefore, which avowedly rely on the alleged formal importance of these general characteristics of the Macedonian state to prove that the people or the army had constitutional rights against the king, will be ignored here.

There are two passages in the sources which AYMARD believes to be critical for his view against that of DE FRANCISCI. The first is a phrase of Arrian's.<sup>10</sup> AYMARD's treatment must be quoted: «L'essentiel, qu'une affirmation d'Arrien interdit de contester, est que les rois macédoniens, jusqu'à l'affaire de la proskynèse en 327, ont gouverné οὐδὲ βίᾳ ἀλλὰ νόμῳ, non par la force, mais par la loi. Il existait donc un *nomos* macédonien qui n'avait pas plus besoin que celui de Sparte d'être écrit pour être connu, admis et respecté, un *nomos* politique, différent, selon notre logique, mais inséparable, selon les conceptions antiques, de l'ensemble des coutumes réglant la célébration des sacrifices pour le roi: il précisait les droits et les devoirs du souverain dans ses rapports avec ses sujets. Cette certitude acquise . . .»<sup>11</sup>

All these alleged far-reaching implications of Arrian's phrase, which AYMARD here expounds, are the product of modern theorising. Moreover, it is modern theorising which, so far as I can see, is based on mere assertion, certainly not on source analysis; and neither AYMARD nor any other exponent of these views seems ever to have examined the context and character of the tiny commonplace rhetorical contrast on which it rests. Had this been done, its grotesque feebleness as primary evidence for the Macedonian <constitution> and the nature of the Macedonian state in general must surely have immediately become self-evident. First, the critical words occur in the middle of one of Arrian's speeches, the speech of Callisthenes, in which Callisthenes opposes Anaxarchus over the question of proskynesis. The fact that the phrase occurs in a speech at all, and

<sup>9a</sup> Curtius 4, 7, 31.

<sup>10</sup> Arr. Anab. 4, 11, 6.

<sup>11</sup> Études, 154–5.

only in a speech, is an immediate warning, for, like all ancient historians, Arrian wrote his own speeches and he here explicitly makes no claim to verbal accuracy, as his final phrase shows: ταῦτα δῆ καὶ τοιαῦτα εἰπόντα Καλλισθένην.<sup>12</sup> Arrian wrote, like all historians in antiquity, what seemed to him appropriate to the occasion as he saw it; the phrase therefore belongs without any doubt to Arrian and the second century A. D., not to Callisthenes and the fourth century B. C.<sup>13</sup> Arrian may, of course, have found something like it in a source (though nobody nowadays would maintain that Arrian, especially in a speech, merely transcribed his sources). But here again the ground is very unsolid and unreliable, for Arrian presents not only the speech but the whole scene of the contest between Anaxarchus and Callisthenes merely as a *logos*<sup>14</sup> (i. e. it was in neither Ptolemy nor Aristobulus); and since he also reports Chares' version of the affair, which should perhaps have a greater claim to authenticity,<sup>15</sup> it is difficult to see how the present version, which includes the speech, can go back to any source which can be regarded as reliable even for the general picture of events, still less for the tiny phrase which AYMARD regards as so important.<sup>16</sup>

Moreover, even the general unreliability of the context and the fact that the phrase is almost certainly Arrian's own, is not the sum of the objections to its use for this purpose. The rhetorical context of the phrase within the speech makes it seem unlikely that Arrian meant νόμῳ to be understood as 'law' (and we certainly have no right to supply a definite article, as AYMARD does). The basic meaning of νόμος is, of course, 'custom', 'traditional practice', and it is particularly widely used in the dative singular (as we have here) in exactly this basic sense;<sup>17</sup> and this meaning suits the immediate context here rather better.

The rhetorical contrast which Arrian makes in this passage is between the conventional Greek picture of the Persian kings as arbitrary and autocratic rulers

<sup>12</sup> Arr. Anab. 4, 12, 1.

<sup>13</sup> CH. HABICHT, *Gottmenschentum und griechische Städte*<sup>2</sup>, München 1970, 212 n. 66, points out that this very speech demonstrates a large number of reminiscences of Roman statements of the early empire about the suitability of certain honours voted to Romans by Greek communities. See on this M. P. CHARLESWORTH, *PBSR* 15, 1939, 1 ff. The most recent of many attributions to Callisthenes is by J. R. ELLIS, *Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism*, London 1976, 24–5.

<sup>14</sup> Arr. 4, 10, 5. Curtius (8, 5, 5 f.) has a similar version but makes Callisthenes' opponent the Sicilian Cleon. This variation shakes faith in the historical reliability of either passage.

<sup>15</sup> Arr. Anab. 4, 12, 3. Arrian presents this too as a *logos*, but Plut. Alex. 54, 3 tells us the source. For a discussion of Chares' reliability for this detail see J. R. HAMILTON, *Plutarch, Alexander. A Commentary*, Oxford 1969, 150, with bibliography.

<sup>16</sup> See HAMILTON's comment, *Plutarch, Alexander*, p. 151: «I see no reason to suppose that this speech is based on good tradition.» See also LOCK, *CPh* 72, 1977, 94–5.

<sup>17</sup> Cf., e. g., LSJ s. v. A nice example of the empty formality of the precise phrase used by Arrian is DITT., *Syll.*<sup>3</sup> 274, where Daochos I, who ruled in Thessaly for 27 years is praised for ruling οὐ βίαι ἀλλὰ νόμοι. I owe this reference to the kindness of ADALBERTO GIOVANNINI.

and the Macedonian kings who, for the purpose of the speech, are partially assimilated to the Greeks (their alleged Greek ancestry is emphasised in this very sentence) and given ideal Greek characteristics. Moreover, the whole speech is concerned with and limited to the discussion of *proskynesis*; and rhetorical phrases, it should hardly need saying, ought not be isolated from their context and given thereby the appearance of a general validity which their author did not intend. Arrian begins the critical passage:<sup>18</sup> «It would have been better if you (Anaxarchus) had never begun this discussion but had remembered that you are not an associate or adviser of Cambyses or Xerxes, but of the son of Philip, Heraclid by descent and Aeacid, whose ancestors came to Macedonia from Argos and have since ruled the Macedonians not by arbitrary violence (βίη) but in accord with traditional practice (νόμος).» It then becomes clear that Arrian has *only* traditional religious practice in mind (which is, after all, the subject of his speech), for he continues: «Yet not even Heracles himself was given divine honours by the Greeks while he was still alive, but only after his death, and even then not before the god in Delphi had given an oracle that they should honour him as a god. One might think that because our argument is taking place on barbarian soil we should adopt barbarian ideas. My view, however, is that you, Alexander, should remember Greece, for whose sake you undertook the whole expedition, and add Asia to Greece. Consider therefore the following problem: when you return, will you compel the Greeks, the freest of all men, to perform *proskynesis*, or will you exempt the Greeks but force the dishonour on the Macedonians?» (i. e. will you act βίη?); «or will you make a general distinction in the matter of honours, that by the Greeks and Macedonians you will be honoured in human and Greek fashion, and only by the barbarians in barbarian fashion?» (i. e. will you continue to act νόμος?).

It is now clear that ΑΥΜΑΡΔ's use of Arrian's conventional phrase οὐδὲ βία ἀλλὰ νόμος as a key to the general constitutional relationship between the Macedonian king and people is quite illegitimate. It cannot be traced to any reliable source but is Arrian's own; the context of the phrase is rhetorical and Arrian

<sup>18</sup> Arr. Anab. 4, 11, 6 ff.: οὐκ οὐκ ἄρχειν γε τοῦδε τοῦ λόγου πρόπον ἦν, ἀλλὰ μεμνησθαι γὰρ οὐ Καμβύση οὐδὲ Ξέρξη ξυνόντα ἢ συμβουλευόντα, ἀλλὰ Φιλίππου μὲν παιδί, Ἡρακλείδῃ δὲ ἀπὸ γένους καὶ Αἰακίδῃ, οὗτοι οἱ πρόγονοι ἐξ Ἄργου ἐς Μακεδονίαν ἦλθον, οὐδὲ βία, ἀλλὰ νόμος Μακεδόνων ἄρχοντες διετέλεσαν. οὐκ οὐκ αὐτῷ τῷ Ἡρακλεῖ ζῶντι ἔτι θεῖα τιμὰ παρ' Ἑλλήνων ἐγένοντο, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τελευτήσαντι πρόσθεν ἢ πρὸς τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ ἐν Δελφοῖς ἐπιθεσπισθῆναι ὡς θεὸν τιμᾶν Ἡρακλέα. εἰ δέ, οὐ ἐν τῇ βαρβαρῶν γῇ οἱ λόγοι γίνονται, βαρβαρικὰ χρὴ ἔχειν τὰ φρονήματα, καὶ ἐγὼ τῆς Ἑλλάδος μεμνησθαι σε ἀξιώ, ὦ Ἀλέξανδρε, ἧς ἔνεκα ὁ πᾶς στόλος σοι ἐγένετο, προσθεῖναι τὴν Ἀσίαν τῇ Ἑλλάδι. καὶ οὖν ἐνθυμήθητι, ἐκεῖσε ἐπανελθὼν ἄρα γε καὶ τοὺς Ἕλληνας τοὺς ἐλευθερωτάτους προσαναγκάσεις ἐς τὴν προσκύνησιν, ἢ Ἑλλήνων μὲν ἀφέξει, Μακεδόσι δὲ προσθήσεις τήνδε τὴν ἀτιμίαν, ἢ διακεκομμένα ἔσται σοι αὐτῷ τὰ τῶν τιμῶν ἐς ἅπαν, ὡς πρὸς Ἑλλήνων μὲν καὶ Μακεδόνων ἀνθρωπίνως τε καὶ Ἑλληνικῶς τιμᾶσθαι, πρὸς δὲ τῶν βαρβάρων μόνον βαρβαρικῶς;

would certainly not have dreamed of claiming authenticity for it (nor would his readers have expected this), merely appropriateness to the occasion as he depicted it. Moreover, the narrow context in which the phrase is used is deliberately flattering to Alexander (as is required by the purpose of the speech) and Arrian himself seems to have regarded it as valid only in the context of his speech, the sole subject of which is the planned imposition of *proskynesis* on unwilling people. Even then, Arrian does not say or imply that Alexander had no right to do what he seemed to be planning to do, that he would be acting illegally if he acted βίβη; only that it would be contrary to the tradition of the Macedonian royal house and would be unworthy of his Greek-inspired programme. We are therefore in no position to draw such arbitrary and wide-ranging conclusions from this short passage as AYMARD (and, before him, GRANIER) have done. It does not, cannot, bear the meaning which they attribute to it.

The second passage which AYMARD believes to be conclusive for his view comes from Polybius and concerns one aspect of the purge of his inherited advisers which the young Philip V carried out in 218 B. C., subsequently disguising it as 'the conspiracy of Apelles'.<sup>19</sup> The situation, briefly, is this: Leontius, the commander of the Macedonian peltasts, had made himself surety for a 20-talent fine which Philip, exercising his own personal judgement and only subsequently getting the approval of his 'friends', had imposed on Megaleas.<sup>20</sup> Shortly afterwards Megaleas absconded. Philip, who wished in any case to eliminate Leontius, separated him from his peltasts by sending them away under the command of Taurion, and then arrested him. Leontius sent a messenger to tell the peltasts what had happened; and it is the way in which Polybius describes their reaction that AYMARD uses to support his view of the nature of the Macedonian state: «For they immediately sent envoys to Philip, asking him not to try Leontius in their absence, if he had arrested him for something other than the surety; otherwise they would all regard themselves as being seriously slighted and offended – the Macedonians always exercised this kind of *isegoria* in their relations with their kings – but if Leontius was arrested because of his surety for Megaleas, they would themselves contribute and jointly pay it off. The king was angry at their *philotimia* and had Leontius killed sooner than he had intended.»<sup>21</sup>

<sup>19</sup> Études, 156–7. On the political background see my article: Philip V, Aratus and the «Conspiracy of Apelles», *Historia* 16, 1967, 19 ff.

<sup>20</sup> Pol. 5, 15, 9; 16, 7.

<sup>21</sup> Pol. 5, 27, 5f.: συνέντες δ' οἱ πελτασταὶ τὸ γεγονός, διαπεμφθεῖσιν τινὰ πρὸς αὐτοὺς τοῦ Λεοντίου, πρεσβευτάς ἐξαπέστειλαν πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα, παρακαλοῦντες, εἰ μὲν πρὸς ἄλλο τι πεποιήται τὴν ἀπαγωγὴν τοῦ Λεοντίου, μὴ χωρὶς αὐτῶν ποιήσασθαι τὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐγκαλουμένων κρίσιν, εἰ δὲ μή, ὅτι νομιῶσι μεγαλειῶς παρολιγορεῖσθαι καὶ καταγινώσκεισθαι πάντες – εἶχον γὰρ αἰετὴν τῆς τοιαύτης ἰσηγορίας Μακεδόνες πρὸς τοὺς βασιλεῖς – εἰ δὲ πρὸς τὴν ἐγγύην τοῦ Μεγαλέου, διότι τὰ χρήματα κατὰ κοινὸν εἰσενέγκαντες ἐκτίσουσιν αὐτοί. τὸν μὲν οὖν Λεόντιον ὁ βασιλεὺς παροξυνθεὶς θάπτον ἢ προέθετο διὰ τὴν τῶν πελταστῶν φιλοτιμίαν ἐπανείλετο.

According to AYMARD, «ce texte tranche le débat».<sup>22</sup> He points out that the peltasts' attempt to pressure the king must have been normal (or, at least, not revolutionary), otherwise they would probably not have tried it; and Polybius' comment about their *isegoria* makes this clear. So far we may follow him. But his further inferences are wholly unfounded: that, since this *isegoria* was, as Polybius says, normal practice, the peltasts were only demanding what they had a constitutional right to demand; and that their request invokes a privilege assured to the Macedonians by the *nomos* of their nation. The leap from attested practice to privilege assured by *nomos* is staggering, the more so since it finds no support in Polybius. What Polybius describes is an attempt by the peltasts, one small army unit, to put pressure on their young king in a crisis; in this attempt they threatened him, and it is precisely at this point, after the threats, that Polybius interrupts his narrative with the comment that such *isegoria* was normal. Moreover, he goes on to point out that in this case its exercise was self-defeating, since Philip reacted with anger and had Leontius quickly executed.

AYMARD claims that what matters here is not the result of the attempt but only the fact that the peltasts made it. This is clearly absurd. It is crucial, if we are trying to discover the constitutional rights of the soldiers, to emphasise that the king took no effective notice of their alleged rights, except to angrily resent their interference and autocratically do exactly what he wanted to do – an action which, moreover, seems to have had no constitutional consequences. Polybius does not say that he acted illegally or unconstitutionally in executing Leontius, nor did the peltasts apparently suggest this. The close connection of Polybius' comment about *isegoria* with the peltasts' threats shows that *isegoria* here is manifestly not to be understood as «freedom of speech» or «right of free speech», but rather «freedom of language»; the word refers directly to the threats, not to the intervention as such.<sup>23</sup> Moreover, Polybius uses the word εἶχον to describe this *isegoria*, which could theoretically equally well be interpreted as habit or right; but an implication of «right» seems in practice to be ruled out here, since Polybius ties his comment so closely to the peltasts' threats: if a constitutional right is implied here, it is thus not the right of making representations, but the right of using threatening language against the king. This is absurd and the inference cannot be accepted.

One final objection to AYMARD's interpretation of this passage of Polybius may be made. In Polybius' account, the peltasts do not urge Philip to wait until a Macedonian army assembly can be summoned: what they demand is, that he should wait until *they* are present. It would be ridiculous to suppose that they were claiming for their relatively small unit the (alleged) rights of the whole

<sup>22</sup> Études, 156.

<sup>23</sup> See also briefly in this sense A. MOMIGLIANO, La libertà di parola nel mondo antico, RSI 83, 1972, 514.

army assembly; their action can only be explained as an attempt to put sectional pressure on Philip. On the other hand, if there really existed normal constitutional machinery apart from the king for cases such as Leontius', why did the peltasts not explicitly demand it? For such a demand would obviously be much more effective than their angry and basically impotent blustering, that if Philip did not wait for them they would consider themselves insulted and affronted. The very absence of such demands here is therefore a further indication that no such established constitutional machinery existed.

We have now examined the two passages, which AYMARD himself regards as conclusive for his interpretation. They cannot, however, as we have seen, bear the inferences which he forced out of them. Indeed, the second passage, properly interpreted, actually provides an indication against his thesis of there having been a constitutional right of the army assembly to judge cases of treason. AYMARD also accepted from GRANIER – although he admitted openly that he could find no certain confirmation for it in any good source,<sup>24</sup> and therefore on this offered no arguments at all against DE FRANCISCI – the assertion that the army assembly had a regular constitutional function at the appointment of a new king or regent. This alleged aspect of the army assembly we shall examine further in sections III and IV below; but the feebleness of AYMARD's argumentation, which in the last resort relies on rhetoric rather than source analysis, requires nevertheless to be demonstrated here in extenso as a typical example of his highly influential attitude to the whole question: «Il n'est pourtant pas niable que, dans la période antérieure au récit détaillé de Polybe et selon des auteurs moins précis ou scrupuleux que lui, les soldats disent fréquemment leur mot en cette circonstance, plus souvent même qu'ils n'interviennent dans les procès. La logique impose de penser qu'ils avaient le droit de le dire, toujours selon le *nomos* macédonien. Car il serait, à coup sûr, arbitraire de distinguer les deux domaines où la période antérieure au récit détaillé de Polybe et selon des auteurs moins précis même caractère, à nos yeux surprenant, fait à la fois d'intermittence et de continuité.»

«Aussi tiendra-t-on pour acquis, malgré De Francisci, qu'il existait en Macédoine – ce qui ne pouvait exister ni dans l'Égypte ni dans l'Asie hellénistiques – une communauté nationale dont un *nomos* réglait les rapports avec la monarchie. L'absolutisme de celle-ci se trouvait, en droit, limité par l'intervention de l'assemblée aussi bien pour la désignation d'un nouveau roi que pour le jugement des *res capitales*.»<sup>25</sup>

One thing must be held firm and not lost in the rhetoric: AYMARD admits that he can find no adequate source which in his view gave decisive evidence that the army ever had the constitutional right to choose, appoint or acclaim a new king;

<sup>24</sup> Études, 157.

<sup>25</sup> Études, 157–8.

and we have now seen that the only evidence which he chose to regard as conclusive for the right of the army assembly to participate in treason-trials is incapable of supporting the inferences which he drew from it. In the last resort, therefore, his position against DE FRANCISCI amounts merely to a confession of faith. It is important to establish this firmly here, since BRIANT's *point de départ* is his complete acceptance of (it seems) every detail of AYMARD's arguments: «Partant en effet d'un passage de Polybe, A. Aymard a brillamment et définitivement démontré que l'Assemblée macédonienne disposait de droits judiciaires réels, et du droit d'acclamer le nouveau souverain. Ce point est donc, à notre sens, hors de discussion.»<sup>26</sup> As a result of this article of dogma, most of BRIANT's arguments need not be refuted in detail here. In the circumstances, belief in the rule of *nomos* (in AYMARD's sense – a belief shared also by at least one of BRIANT's critics)<sup>27</sup> makes discussion of the arguments which depend on this faith otiose. There is however one additional critical passage on which BRIANT, here following GRANIER rather than AYMARD, who oddly and interestingly enough, did not seem to wish to make a cardinal feature of his own case, bases a long and involved discussion, which we do not need to follow here in detail: once the key-stone is destroyed the house will fall down of its own accord.

The critical passage occurs in Curtius' introduction to his account of what modern writers normally call the trial of Philotas: *de capitalibus rebus vetusto Macedonum modo inquirebat exercitus – in pace erat vulgi – et nihil potestas regum valebat, nisi prius valuisset auctoritas*.<sup>28</sup> BRIANT comments: «Ce texte . . . paraît très claire, et autorise au moins deux conclusions: en premier lieu, l'autorité du roi, dans les affaires capitales, était limitée par les droits d'une assemblée devant laquelle était déféré l'accusé; cette assemblée, d'autre part, revêtait un caractère différent suivant ce qu'on appellera pour le moment les circonstances: soit une Assemblée de l'armée (*exercitus*) en temps de guerre (?), soit une Assemblée du peuple (*vulgus*) en temps de paix.»<sup>29</sup>

It should be unnecessary to emphasise that no generalising passage of any author may be freed from its context and treated as an independent statement of absolute validity. We have already noticed how misleading this can be in connection with AYMARD's treatment of Arrian's rhetorical commonplace οὐδὲ βίᾳ ἀλλὰ νόμῳ. Curtius has, however, suffered even more violence than this. Not only has his sentence often been torn from its context in his narrative, but his text as transmitted by all our best manuscripts – the text which I have quoted above – has suffered from «improvement» through a conjecture by the influential

<sup>26</sup> BRIANT, 289.

<sup>27</sup> P. GOUKOWSKY, *Antigone, Alexandre et l'Assemblée macédonienne*, RPh 49, 1975, 263 ff. at p. 273.

<sup>28</sup> Curtius 6, 8, 25. This is the text of the Mss, on which see below.

<sup>29</sup> BRIANT, 287.

EDMUND HEDICKE in his edition of 1867; and it is the «new improved version» of the text which is used without exception by those historians who have made the largest contributions to inventing constitutional functions for the Macedonian army assembly. HEDICKE seems not to have understood the text offered by the manuscripts – though, as we shall see, it makes excellent sense – and amended: *inquirebat* ⟨*rex, iudicabat*⟩ *exercitus*.<sup>30</sup> Most historians who have noticed that an editorial emendation is involved have been far less sceptical than they might reasonably have been with an emendation which so satisfactorily seems to provide precisely the evidence they were looking for. So GRANIER: «Die Einfügung von (*rex iudicabat*) durch Hedicke ist durch den Sinn gesichert»;<sup>31</sup> so AYMARD: «Les mots entre crochets, imposés par le sens, sont ajoutés par les éditeurs.»<sup>32</sup> BRIANT, it seems, is still not satisfied and has even added a *iudicare* of his own after *vulgi*, «pour préciser le sens de la parenthèse».<sup>33</sup> This technique of re-writing an awkward-seeming source to suit the interpretation of the moment is scarcely legitimate practice; and is not in this case even particularly helpful. The emendation of HEDICKE (who, himself, had no constitutional axe to grind) certainly produces a civilised constitutional interpretation: it turns the king into a sort of examining magistrate and the army into a jury. Unfortunately it makes nonsense not only of Curtius' further narrative but also of the second half of this same sentence.

The broad context of the passage as a whole is of the utmost importance. First, it is perhaps worth pointing out that Curtius' report of the Philotas affair is the most comprehensive which we possess. Arrian, based on Ptolemy, is virtually useless:<sup>34</sup> according to him Philotas had involved himself in a conspiracy (purpose and reasons are not mentioned); he was brought by Alexander ἐς Μακεδόνας and accused; he defended himself, but was confuted by witnesses;<sup>35</sup> Philotas and

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<sup>30</sup> The emendation goes back to HEDICKE's first edition of 1867, where he comments in the apparatus: «*rex, iudicabat addidi.*» He does not seem to have published a justification of this emendation anywhere, despite the fact that major editors before him, e. g. MÜTZELL (1841) and ZUMPT (1849) seem to have found no problem requiring a conjectural emendation. Since 1867, however, it has become de rigueur: even TLL s. v. *inquire* II E adopts it. Only the Tusculum edition of KONRAD MÜLLER (tr. by HERBERT SCHÖNFELD) (1954) has resisted modern orthodoxy and returned to the text of the manuscripts.

<sup>31</sup> GRANIER, 51 n. 111.

<sup>32</sup> AYMARD, *Études* 286. Also in this sense, ELLIS, Philip II, 246 n. 11.

<sup>33</sup> BRIANT, 286 and 287 n. 1. GOUKOWSKY, art. cit., 274, seems to be the first historian to have tried to come to terms with the transmitted text in print. However, since he regards the passage as the place where «Quinte-Curce cite le célèbre fragment du *nomos* relatif aux *res capitales*, qui précise les compétences de l'Assemblée macédonienne», he has not properly understood the nature of the situation as Curtius depicted it (see below), being still caught in the toils of Aymard's view of Macedonian *nomos*.

<sup>34</sup> Arr. Anab. 3, 26, 2.

<sup>35</sup> τοὺς ἐπιμηνυτάς τοῦ ἔργου παρελθόντας ἐξελέγξει Φιλώταν τε καὶ τοὺς ἄμφ'

his fellow-conspirators were then executed by the Macedonians.<sup>36</sup> No more details are given; there is no indication that «the Macedonians» actually did anything apart from listen and carry out the execution (presumably by some sort of firing squad).

Curtius on the other hand seems, as so often, to be well-informed. He reports a *contio* – that is, for any Roman, a non-decision-taking assembly<sup>37</sup> – of the whole army (not just of the Macedonians):<sup>38</sup> *rex edixit omnes armati coirent*, to which also *turba lixarum calonumque* came.<sup>39</sup> Throughout his whole account Curtius does not vary his description of the meeting as *contio*;<sup>40</sup> and it is dismissed before any decision was taken, as a Roman *contio* should be.<sup>41</sup> The decision to condemn Philotas seems to have been taken by the small circle of Alexander's friends.<sup>42</sup> The *contio* of *armati* thus merely listened and shouted. It

αὐτὸν ἄλλοις τε ἐλέγχοις οὐκ ἀφανέσι. ROBSON, in the Loeb edition, translates ἐξελέγξασι as «convicted» – but nobody to my knowledge has ever claimed that witnesses had a right to convict, even in a Macedonian court.

<sup>36</sup> It is worth emphasising here that Arrian, citing Ptolemy, does not say that the army or «the Macedonians» condemned Philotas, which most modern writers seem to have assumed.

<sup>37</sup> On the nature of *contio* cf. Paul. ex Fest. p. 38, 4: *contio significat conventum, non tamen alium quam eum qui a magistratu vel a sacerdote publico per praeconem convocatur*. See also, TH. MOMMSEN, *Römisches Staatsrecht I*<sup>3</sup>, 197 ff.

<sup>38</sup> Explicitly, Curtius 6,9,35: «*praeter Macedonas*», inquit «*plerique adsunt...*». Curtius makes Philotas talk Greek, not Macedonian dialect, explicitly in order that these non-Macedonians should understand. It was, therefore, in Curtius' view important that his speech should also be understood by the non-Macedonian elements. (BRIANT, 342, has noticed this and actually claims to detect regret in Philotas that he was being judged by non-Macedonians: there is nothing in Curtius of this.) This could not be the case if Curtius thought he was dealing with a mere Macedonian assembly. We are, therefore, justified in interpreting *omnes armati* in this sense. In Alexander's direct confrontation with Philotas after his formal speech, only the Macedonians count: Curtius 6, 9, 34: «*Macedones*», inquit, «*de te iudicaturi sunt; quaero, an patrio sermone sis apud eos usurus*», although in his formal speech itself he addresses the *contio* neutrally as *milites* (6, 9, 2; 20; 24 etc.). Philotas' reply to this question, however, already cited above, makes clear Curtius' view of the situation. In Ptolemy's version, as transmitted by Arrian (3, 26, 2), the affair was brought ἐξ Μακεδόνων, but whether this phrase is meant to cover Curtius' *contio* or the meeting of the *amici*, or whether it was simply intended to cover up by its imprecision the whole (for Alexander) disreputable affair, we cannot tell.

<sup>39</sup> Curtius 6, 8, 23. BRIANT (p. 341) thinks that this must have been by express wish of Alexander, «car cette participation est contraire à toutes les règles – mal connues – de l'Assemblée de l'Armée siégeant dans ses fonctions judiciaires reconnues par le *nomos*».

<sup>40</sup> Curtius 6, 9, 1; 9, 6; 9, 28; 9, 36; 11, 8; 11, 9.

<sup>41</sup> Curtius 6, 11, 9.

<sup>42</sup> Curtius 6, 11, 34. The *Macedones* of 11, 37 seem to be in this instance the nobles of the court, the *praefecti regis circumstantes* (ib.). See also, for Curtius' view of who did the judging, the speech of Philotas, 6, 10, 3–4. Philotas complains that Alexander has not even bothered to stay and listen to him: *abest quidem optimus causae meae*

was not only not a mere Macedonian assembly, it was not even a court. And the case of Philotas' friends, Amyntas, Simias and Polemon, sons of Andromenes, is similar. According to Curtius this examination too took place at a *contio* and ended with the king's vote: «*et ipse*», *inquit*, «*Amyntan mea sententia fratresque eius absolvo*». <sup>43</sup>

Now I am not here concerned so much to establish the true facts of what happened to Philotas, as with what Curtius understood to have happened to him, since only then can we understand Curtius' critical introductory comment cited above which is an integral part of his account<sup>44</sup> and whose purpose clearly was to help his Roman readers to understand the scene which follows. What does he in fact say in this passage? Certainly nothing about anybody passing judgement in the assembly. Rather: according to an old Macedonian practice (note: *modo*, not *lege*, not even *more*) the army used to inform itself about serious capital offences; in peacetime «the people» did this; and the king's *potestas* was useless unless his *auctoritas* had previously been made efficacious.

Curtius' account of the *contio* that follows is then precisely a testing out of Alexander's *auctoritas* – of his influence and prestige among the soldiers and of their willingness to accept his views. It does not depict a trial in any real sense.<sup>45</sup> The *contio* was necessary in order to test the strength of Alexander's personal political position against the popular family of Parmenio. This had nothing much to do with guilt or innocence: it was a straight trial of strength in which the credibility of Alexander was on trial. To this extent it was important to convince as many people as possible that Alexander was right (whether he was or not did not matter);<sup>46</sup> for if his *auctoritas* indeed proved powerful enough to allow

*iudex; qui cur me ipse audire noluerit non, mehercule, excogito, cum illi, utrimque cognita causa, tam damnare me liceat quam absolvere, non cognita vero, liberari absenti non possum qui a praesente damnatus sum. Sed quamquam victi hominis non supervacua solum sed etiam invisita defensio est, qui iudicem non docere videtur, sed arguere, tamen, utcumque licet me dicere, memet ipse non deseram nec committam, ut damnatus etiam mea sententia videar.* Also 6, 7, 32; 8, 16.

<sup>43</sup> Curtius 7, 2, 7.

<sup>44</sup> MÜTZELL, in his commentary on the phrase, remarks, «daß die ganze Stelle bis *auctoritas* offenbar nicht die Schilderung des damaligen Vorganges, sondern einer allgemeinen Sitte giebt», and thereby shows that he also failed to appreciate the importance of the whole context for the understanding of each part of Curtius' narrative: Curtius did not simply make such general statements unless his narrative gave him reason to.

<sup>45</sup> Curtius 6, 9, 34, «*Macedones*», *inquit*, «*de te iudicaturi sunt*», is clearly rhetorically intended and does not affect the general picture of the *contio*, since Philotas did not accept this view and in any case the decision was not taken by the *contio* (cf. n. 37 above). On the nature of the judging process see Curtius 6, 10, 3–4 (quoted n. 42 above). The attempt to get a confession out of Philotas only began *after* the *contio* had been dismissed.

<sup>46</sup> This aspect seems to be emphasised by Curtius also in his final summary of the affair, 6, 11, 39–40: *magno non salutis, sed etiam invidiae periculo liberatus erat Alex-*

him to commit Philotas to a Macedonian firing squad, this was politically by far the most satisfactory way of dealing with him; doubtless if the *contio* had indicated a different opinion, if a different climate had dominated the meeting, a different and less direct way would have had to be found to get rid of Philotas.

The same interpretative principle must be applied to understanding the, at first sight, more difficult *in pace erat vulgi*. This brief gratuitous comment of Curtius has obviously nothing directly to do with the Philotas affair;<sup>47</sup> and if it is based on anything other than Curtius' imagination, it must mean that in similar situations in peaceful times the king tended to sound out his support among 'the people' with a *contio*, just as he tested his *auctoritas* with the army in the precise case under consideration. If we then ask what this *vulgus* was, the answer must be: whomever the king regarded as being representative of the opinion he wished to test. This would doubtless normally be the population of Pella, though it is not difficult to conceive of other groupings which might, for certain purposes, be more important. The parallel is the fact that in the Philotas affair the whole army which happened to be with Alexander at the time – *omnes armati*, apparently not just the Macedonians, but still only some 6,000 in all<sup>48</sup> – constituted the *contio*, because what mattered to Alexander was the reaction of *those present* to his proposals.

All this has nothing to do with constitutional rights, neither of the king nor of the army nor of the people; it has nothing to do with 'judging', nor did Curtius think it had. Those who have ignored the *interpretatio romana* of the second part of Curtius' sentence have missed the whole point of his narrative: it is concerned precisely with the difference between *potestas* and *auctoritas*, which the emperor Augustus, in a famous passage of the 'Res Gestae', was first

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*ander; quippe Parmenio et Philotas, principes amicorum, nisi palam sontes, sine indignatione totius exercitus non potuissent damnari. Itaque anceps quaestio fuit dum infitatus est facinus; crudeliter torqueri videbatur post confessionem; et iam Philotas amicorum misericordiam meruit.* The emphasis placed on *palam sontes* (picked up again at 7, 1, 1: *Philotan sicut recentibus sceleris eius vestigiis iure affectum supplicio censuerant milites . . .*) and the expected *indignatio* of the whole army (once again, it seems, not just the Macedonian elements) makes it again clear that the army had nothing whatever to do with the process of condemning Philotas (if they had, *indignatio* at an unjust verdict could not have been expected, since they would have been themselves responsible for it). For Curtius the issue was one of *auctoritas*, as he declared at the beginning of his account. See also E. BADIEN, TAPhA 91, 1960, 332, on the political nature of the occasion.

<sup>47</sup> Unless it be some kind of advance explanation of the presence of the *turba lixarum calonumque* at the meeting in addition to the *armati*. In any case it was clearly this comment which misled MÜTZEL into commenting that the whole sentence has nothing to do with the concrete situation.

<sup>48</sup> Curtius 6, 8, 23. On the 6,000 soldiers, see GOUKOWSKY, 273–4, who, however, regards them all as Macedonians. Curtius not only does not say this but implies, as we have seen, that they were not.

to indicate,<sup>49</sup> and with the method whereby in critical situations the immediate strength of royal *auctoritas* could be tested and assessed. Clearly only a Roman of the early principate would have – indeed, could have – expressed himself in this way. Curtius clearly understood perfectly what was going on at the Philotas hearing, but as a Roman he naturally explained Macedonian affairs in contemporary political terms which his Roman readers would understand and appreciate. Otherwise his narrative creates no problem: it contains no inexplicable contradiction of his initial statement. The initiative for the *contio* came from the king<sup>50</sup> and the meeting had the purpose, as Curtius expresses it, of testing his *auctoritas* before he exercised his *potestas*. But the *potestas* was there. Curtius says nothing about the *contio* being constitutionally necessary – indeed, his phrasing seems to imply that it was not. He does not say that the king could not, if he wished, take the risk of exercising his *potestas* without first testing his *auctoritas*. Merely that it was the normal thing to inform those concerned and to test royal *auctoritas* in serious political situations. This passage of Curtius, therefore, interpreted within the context for which Curtius composed it as an intelligent Roman's view expressed with Roman vocabulary, offers no information at all about the alleged rights of the army to judge, or even about the practice of the army as a judge. The far-reaching conclusions which BRIANT, in the passage cited above, draws from it by ignoring its narrative context and the historical conditions under which it was written, are simply wrong.

### III. The People's Assembly

The evidence which modern writers have summoned to support the theory of a functioning formal assembly of the Macedonian army does not fulfill the demands which have been placed on it. This is in part already recognised by BRIANT, who tried to save AYMARD's views, on which his own directly depend, by assuming the existence of a regular assembly of the Macedonian people – an institution denied, in my view rightly, by GRANIER – which the army assemblies, which took place during Alexander's expedition and during the wars of the successors, in one way or another, regularly or irregularly, claimed to represent. The basis of this view is again Curtius' introductory sentence to the Philotas-affair, precisely the phrase *in pace erat vulgi*.<sup>51</sup> We have already seen that this passage should not be interpreted as a statement about the constitutional nature of the Macedonian state; it is rather a description of Macedonian royal practice; and this applies just as much to the indicated peace-time tests of prestige as to

<sup>49</sup> R. G. 34: *post id tempus auctoritate omnibus praestiti, potestatis autem nihilo amplius habui quam ceteri qui mihi quoque in magistratu conlegae fuerunt.*

<sup>50</sup> Curtius 6, 8, 23: *rex edixit omnes armati coirent.*

<sup>51</sup> BRIANT, *op. cit.*, 286 ff. Curtius 6, 8, 25 (cited in full above p. 86).

the events which occasioned Curtius' comment. His statement may not be used as evidence for a regularly functioning assembly of the people. Curtius' interpretation, however, might be wrong. Therefore the rest of the evidence which BRIANT has assembled in support of his view must be examined, since it might conceivably, even without Curtius, be strong enough to support alone the whole structure of the theory. Nevertheless, the fact that Curtius, by implication, interpreted such activity *de capitalibus rebus* merely as immediate tests of royal prestige suggests that he knew nothing about more formal constitutional functions of the army or «the People» at the appointment of a new king.

An unfortunate characteristic of BRIANT's argumentation is that he seems to take the view that by annihilating GRANIER's theory that the army assembly always formally participated in the appointment of a new king – which he does very adequately – he has thereby proved that an equally formal civilian assembly existed and participated on such occasions. The situation is not so simple. A much more careful source analysis is required, if such a far-reaching conclusion is to be upheld. Once again I shall concentrate merely on those passages in the sources which BRIANT himself regards as conclusive for his view. All concern the alleged functioning of a popular assembly at the appointment of a new king. There are, it seems, only three occasions on which the sources speak clearly enough, on the accessions of Antigonos Doson, of Alexander the Great and of Philip II.

For the accession of Antigonos Doson we have two reports which state more than the bare fact. Plutarch writes that at the death of Demetrius II the leading Macedonians (οἱ πρῶτοι Μακεδόνων) brought in Antigonos, a cousin of Demetrius, and married him to Philip's mother; at first they acknowledged him as *epitropos* and general, then when they had experienced his rule as moderate and beneficial, acknowledged him as king.<sup>52</sup> The second account is in Justin,<sup>53</sup> a briefer and less precise version of Plutarch's version: *his in Epiro gestis interim in Macedonia Demetrius rex relicto filio Philippo, parvulo admodum, decedit, cui Antigonus tutor datus accepta in matrimonium matre pupilli regem se constitui laborat*. Justin then reports on difficulties which Doson met *interiecto deinde tempore* when he was shut up in his palace *seditione minaci Macedonum*. Justin's further account is concerned with his getting over this political difficulty: Doson walked into the crowd without bodyguards, offered his diadem and purple garments to the masses and told them to give them to somebody else, *qui aut imperare illis nesciat aut cui parere ipsi sciunt; se adhuc invidiosum illud regnum non voluptatibus sed laboribus ac periculis sentire*; he reminds

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<sup>52</sup> Aem. Paul. 8,2: δέισαντες δὲ τὴν ἀναρχίαν οἱ πρῶτοι Μακεδόνων Ἀντίγονον ἐπάγονται τοῦ τεθνηκότος ἀνεψιὸν ὄντα, καὶ συνοικίσαντες αὐτῷ τὴν μητέρα τοῦ Φιλίππου πρῶτον μὲν ἐπίτροπον καὶ στρατηγόν, εἶτα πειρώμενοι τοῦ μετρίου καὶ κοινωφελοῦς βασιλεία προσηγόρευσαν. Cf. BRIANT, 314-5.

<sup>53</sup> JUSTIN 28, 3, 9-10.

them of his successes; if they were ashamed of them, he was ready *deponere imperium et reddere illis munus suum, quia regem quaerant, cui imperent*. The *populus* was then ashamed and told him to take back his kingship, which he allegedly refused to do until the ringleaders were punished. Justin's account of the *sedition* therefore clearly has as precondition that Antigonus was already king: he has the diadem and purple, he claims his *regnum* has been dangerous and troublesome so far, he has already military achievements to list; and the scene ends with the *populus*' demanding that he *take back* his kingship (*recipere regnum*). The *sedition* in Justin thus has nothing whatever to do with Antigonus' accession to the kingship.<sup>54</sup>

GRANIER failed to recognise this distinction and imagined the *sedition* to be the <confirmation> by the army assembly of the suggestion of the *πρωτοί*.<sup>55</sup> This fantasy is recognised by BRIANT as weak, though for some reason he still allows it as a possibility. His own version, however, pays equally little attention to what the source says: «De toute façon, nous pensons également que le document le plus important est celui de Justin, *qui décrit assez exactement les rapports entre le roi et les Macédoniens* (my italics) . . . Il y a d'autant moins de raison de nier le caractère populaire de cette assemblée, qu'elle se réunit dans la capitale, sur la place du palais royal.»<sup>56</sup> Justin does not speak of an assembly, he speaks of a *sedition minax*, that is, a hostile riot; and the speech which he ascribes to Antigonus fits precisely into a riotous occasion: he treats the rioters as ungrateful rebels, whose leaders must be punished before he is prepared to continue in office. It is certainly true that this was not a unique occasion, that indeed the relationship between king and people was in part at least, conditioned by such riots. But this provides no authority for interpreting what our single source

<sup>54</sup> The accuracy of this implication is denied by S. DOW and C. F. EDSON, HSPH 48, 1937, 168, but merely on general grounds relating to the rhetorical unreliability of Justin. It is, however, undeniable that Justin writes as if Doso were already king; and we have no evidence which suggests otherwise. It is a mere guess that «Antigonus took the royal title immediately after, and as a result of, his successful suppression of the revolution» (by «revolution» they mean Justin's *sedition*, which I have interpreted rather as a local riot. Cf. J. V. A. FINE, AJPh 61, 1940, 143 and n. 60, who, though accepting the general interpretation of Dow and Edson, refined their chronology and interprets the *sedition* as an army mutiny. There is, however, no trace of army activity in Justin: Doso is shut up in his palace at Pella, which suggests a mainly civilian affair; but FINE is right to call attention to the more limited nature of the *sedition*). Moreover, it is not a guess which in any way helps their main case about the chronology of the accession of Antigonus. I prefer, therefore, to follow the source, since it is entirely unobjectionable in outline.

<sup>55</sup> Heeresversammlung, 124–5. The same confusion in M. T. PIRAINO, Antigono Dosone, re di Macedonia, Atti della accademia di scienze lettere e arti di Palermo ser. 4, vol. 13, part. 2, 1952/3, 303; P. TREVES, Studi su Antigono Dosone, Athenaeum 22, 1934, 395.

<sup>56</sup> BRIANT, 314–5.

explicitly describes as a hostile riot as evidence for the right of the people to decide on their king, which BRIANT explicitly does: «Pour nous, l'existence d'une assemblée capable de déposer le roi (i. e. Justin's *sedition minax*) prouve a *contrario* qu'elle pouvait aussi l'acclamer.»<sup>57</sup> The demands of rioters cannot be used as evidence for the constitutional rights of the people. Indeed, if such generally recognised rights existed, the very fact of their existence ought to have excluded riots on these issues. Moreover, the motivation of the riot is modern:<sup>58</sup> Justin does not say why it happened. Nothing in his text suggests that it had anything to do with Antigonus' accession. The accession of Antigonus Dosoñ thus does not supply evidence for the constitutional right of the people of Macedonia to acclaim (and, as BRIANT suggests, to depose) a king.

The second instance which BRIANT uses is the accession of Alexander the Great.<sup>59</sup> He is content here merely to demolish GRANIER's arguments for acclamation by an army assembly, which, it seems, in his view amounts to a proof of acclamation by the 'assembly of the people'. The texts, however, again forbid this procedure. The scene of the murder of Philip, the theatre at Aigai, is described by Diodorus;<sup>60</sup> the occasion was explicitly a festival. The fact that the murder of Philip occurred at the theatre entrance when the theatre was already full of people waiting for the king's entrance rules out the possibility that this assemblage of persons could have been the assembly which appointed Alexander. In Diodorus' account the theatre audience, hardly surprisingly, plays no part in the proceedings. Philip was murdered by Pausanias, who was quickly pursued and killed by the bodyguards. In due course Attalos, Cleopatra and her baby were murdered; Philip's nephew Amyntas and two of the three sons of Aeropus of Lyncestis were also eliminated. The case of the one son of Aeropus, Alexander, who was not immediately murdered, merely confirms the impression that a great struggle was under way among the nobles: Alexander of Lyncestis was the first to address Alexander as king after Philip's death, and he was the son-in-law of Antipater, who also spoke out immediately for Alexander.<sup>61</sup> In this struggle for influence and power among the nobles there is as little place for BRIANT's civilian assembly as there is for GRANIER's army assembly. The opponents of Alexander, real, potential or imaginary, were ruthlessly eliminated: it was even possible for Plutarch to get the impression from some source (if he did not just invent it himself) that the most popular new king would have been Amyntas son of Per-

<sup>57</sup> BRIANT, 314 n. 5.

<sup>58</sup> For further speculation on this see FINE, *AJPh* 1940, 143, who connects it with Antigonus' Carian expedition.

<sup>59</sup> BRIANT, 315-6.

<sup>60</sup> Diod. 16, 92, 5 ff.

<sup>61</sup> References in BERVE, *Das Alexanderreich auf prosopographischer Grundlage*, München 1926, II, s. vv. On these events see E. BADIEN, *The death of Philip II*, *Phoenix* 17, 1963, 244-250; K. KRAFT, *Der «rationale» Alexander*, *Kallmünz* 1971, 11 ff.; A. B. BOSWORTH, *Philip II and upper Macedonia*, *CQ NS* 21, 1971, 93 ff.

diccas.<sup>62</sup> If he is right, he provides a further indication that general popularity was irrelevant in what was above all a struggle for supremacy among the nobles.

Why, then, has the possibility of the constitutional role of an assembly (of whatever kind) been considered in connexion with Alexander's accession? The answer lies again in a passage of Justin which has not been read with the necessary attention. Justin reports the death of Philip in book 9; his version of the accession of Alexander is here extremely brief: *huic Alexander filius successit et virtute et vitiiis patre maior*.<sup>63</sup> Nothing is said about the formalities of the succession. When Justin takes up Macedonian history again in book 11 he begins with an analysis of the state of Macedonian affairs after Philip's death and asserts that everybody was very worried about the future: *quis rebus veluti medela quaedam interventus Alexandri fuit, qui pro contione ita vulgus omne consolatus hortatusque pro tempore est, ut et metum timentibus demeret et in spem omnes impelleret. erat hic annos XX natus, in qua aetate ita moderate de se multa pollicitus est, ut appareret plura eum experimentis reservare. Macedonibus in-munitatem cunctarum rerum praeter militiae vacationem dedit; quo facto tantum sibi favorem omnium conciliavit, ut corpus hominis, non virtutem regis mutasse se dicerent*.<sup>64</sup> Diodorus also has an account of this, like Justin's separated from his version of Philip's death by a change of book. He also records Alexander's accession just as briefly as Justin: διαδεξάμενος τὴν βασιλείαν. Then: «He established his authority far more firmly than any did in fact suppose possible, for he was quite young and for this reason not uniformly respected, but first he promptly won over the Macedonians to his support by tactful statements. He declared that the king was changed only in name and that the state would be run on principles no less effective than those of his father's administration.»<sup>65</sup> Justin's *contio* thus has nothing to do with the accession of Alexander: he is already king when he summoned it (*ut corpus hominis, non virtutem regis mutasse se dicerent* [note the tense of *mutasse*]); and although Diodorus does not speak explicitly of a single meeting – indeed, his phrase τὰ πλήθη οἰκείοις λόγοις παρεστήσατο πρὸς εὐνοίαν suggests several meetings, therefore a procedure rather like Philip's – his version also clearly implies that Alexander was already king and was «establishing his authority».

Despite what the sources say, GRANIER decided that Justin's *contio* was an acclamation assembly of the army;<sup>66</sup> BRIANT seems to think that it was the conveniently assembled theatre audience (though he does not say so explicitly),

<sup>62</sup> Plut. Mor. 327 (= De fort. Alex. 1, 3).

<sup>63</sup> Justin 9, 8, 11.

<sup>64</sup> Justin 11, 1, 7–10.

<sup>65</sup> Diod. 17, 2, 1–2 (Loeb tr.). Philip's death is recorded at 16, 93 ff. BRIANT, in his table, p. 312, sees two separate incidents, one recorded by Justin («avènement»), the other by Diodorus («harangue»). This is most unlikely.

<sup>66</sup> GRANIER, 29–30, not entirely without reluctance, it seems.

since he, like GRANIER, claims to know that it took place at Aegae (which Justin does not say).<sup>67</sup> This cannot be right. In book 11 Justin does not mention Alexander's accession as such: he had already recounted it in book 9. Moreover, he claims to know exactly what happened at the *contio*: Alexander granted freedom from taxes and compulsory services except for military service. Clearly only a ruling king could do this. Alexander was, therefore, buying time and influence at the *contio* of Justin, not the kingship and royal power.

BRIANT's third case is that of Philip II.<sup>68</sup> Again we are concerned with a well-known passage of Justin: *itaque Philippus diu non regem, sed tutorem pupilli egit. At ubi graviora bella imminebant serumque auxilium in exspectatione infantis erat, compulsus a populo regnum suscepit*.<sup>69</sup> The basic trustworthiness of this account has recently been challenged, but indecisively.<sup>70</sup> We must still, it seems to me, seek to explain what happened within the framework of Justin's account. BRIANT quite rightly rejects as ludicrous GRANIER's suggestion that the army assembly was formally involved here; but he himself firmly believes in a formal intervention of his postulated civil assembly, because Justin uses the

<sup>67</sup> BRIANT, 316; 338. In this connection it is convenient to dispose of the alleged assembly of the Macedonians which concerned itself with judging and punishing Pausanias. The tradition about Pausanias' death which Diodorus (16, 94, 4) represents is that he was killed off by the *somatophylakes*. Justin (9, 7, 10) does not know who killed him, but depicts him in a passage of dubious authenticity as hanging dead on a cross (which is not necessarily incompatible, if Pausanias were hung up on display after his death). An Oxyrhynchus papyrus (P. Oxy. 1798 = BILABEL, Die kleineren Historikerfragmente auf Papyrus, Bonn 1923, no. 7 = FGrHist 148) seems to be concerned with the death of Philip (F 1). The text is at the critical point seriously damaged and cannot be fully reconstructed. Some important readings are uncertain. The text of JACOBY (lines 5–8) reads: . . . ἐν τοῖς Μ[α]κεδόσι παρῆδωκε [ν. | οὔτοι δ'] ἀπετυπάν[ισαν αὐτό]ν. According to HUNT, the dotted *mu* of Μ[α]κεδόσι might be a *lambda*. GRANIER (41) and his followers have made out of this anonymous fragment an army assembly which judged Pausanias and condemned him to crucifixion; BRIANT, 338 n. 2, sees a judicial assembly of the people which did the same (but ἀποτυπανίζω does not mean 'crucify' but 'beat to death', 'kill unmercifully': see LSJ<sup>9</sup> Addenda et Corrigena s. v.). But even if the reading and restoration Μ[α]κεδόσι were certain, there is no mention in the papyrus of any meeting or of any judgement: all we learn is that somebody (Alexander? Perdiccas?) handed something or somebody (Pausanias?) over to (?) the Macedonians, who beat him to death. That is all. The writer of the papyrus says nothing precise about which Macedonians were involved (if any). The text might even be a briefer version of Diodorus', with which it is broadly compatible. A direct comparison may be made with lines 8–10 of the same papyrus: τὸ δὲ σὸμ[α] | τοῦ Φιλίππου θερά[πουσι θάψ]αι παρέδωκε[ε---]. Nobody has (yet) suggested on this basis that the assembly of servants had a right to decide Macedonian burial practices.

<sup>68</sup> BRIANT, 316.

<sup>69</sup> JUSTIN 7, 5, 9–10.

<sup>70</sup> By J. R. ELLIS, in: Ancient Macedonia, ed. B. LAOURDAS and CH. MAKARONAS, Thessaloniki 1970, 68 ff.; also in JHS 91, 1971, 15 ff.; Philip II, 46–7. On some supporting aspects of ELLIS's theory see my comments in JHS 94, 1974, 26 ff.

word *populus*. This interpretation, however, can only with great difficulty be regarded as compatible with what Justin says. Even the civil assembly, as concocted by BRIANT, presumably could not simply assemble when it liked and for its own purposes.<sup>71</sup> It apparently needed to be summoned, and then merely ratified or rejected what was put to it. It is difficult to envisage how such a body could exert pressure. Moreover, Justin implies that the *populus* actually took the initiative in this appointment, when and because Macedonia was faced with serious military threats; this would also presumably have been impossible for the excogitated people's assembly.

How, then, can the situation be explained? We have already considered an occasion on which the *populus* took the initiative in Macedonian affairs: the *sedition* in the first period of Antigonos Doso's reign. We saw that it is absurd to regard this *sedition* as a regular formal meeting of the Macedonian people's assembly: yet it took place. An initiative which turned into a hostile riot when directed against a ruling king need not be described in the same terms if directed in favour of anybody. Nevertheless, *compulsus* ought to mean that pressure was brought to bear, indeed, pressure which led to the replacement of the ruling child-king Amyntas by his regent, pressure from circles outside the Macedonian nobility, by «the people». The precise content of *populus* cannot, in the absence of other information, be precisely defined. It is clear, however, that it must have included a far wider section of the population than just the nobles; and I would suggest that it be understood quite loosely as some kind of basically non-noble grouping favourable to Philip, perhaps at Pella or (why exclude the possibility?) in the army, a spontaneous (or manipulated) extraordinary expression of favour which, at that critical time, managed to exert sufficiently strong pressure to compel the formal acknowledgement of Philip as king in his own right.

One further aspect and incident is regarded by BRIANT as «la prouve décisive que «toute la population»... de la vieille capitale formait régulièrement l'Assemblée chargée d'acclamer le nouveau roi. On peut en outre supposer qu'en temps de paix, y participaient également les Macédoniens de l'intérieur qui pouvaient se déplacer à l'occasion d'une cérémonie aussi exceptionnelle. Ces A(ssemblées de) P(euple) mêlaient donc citadins et paysans, nobles et petit peuple. Elles symbolisaient bien l'unité de l'*ethnos* autour du nouveau roi.»<sup>72</sup>

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<sup>71</sup> This aspect, in fact, remains quite unclear in BRIANT's exposition. However, he speaks of the «formalism» and «acclamation» (218) and refers to a passage of AYMARD (Études, 160) where the same problems are treated. Nor does he seem to object to GRANIER's definition of these aspects of the «Heeresversammlung» (54 ff.), though he rightly objects to the greater part of GRANIER's theory. The alternative in any case seems to be to accept that the constitutional assembly of the people often manifested itself in the form of a rioting mob and still remained within its constitutional rights, which seems to be far from BRIANT's view.

<sup>72</sup> BRIANT, 317.

This assertion is the more remarkable, since the population (can BRIANT really mean this?) of Aegae has played only an accidental role in the events we have so far looked at, in the shape of the theatre audience at the murder of Philip (though since this was a special royal festival, the population of Aegae will scarcely have made up the whole of the audience). BRIANT confuses the picture of the sources by also assuming that Justin's *contio* at which Alexander made his expensive promises took place at Aegae, which Justin does not say; and that Aegae was the place where, according to P. Oxy. 1798 the (Macedonians?) beat Pausanias to death, which the papyrus does not say.<sup>73</sup> Doston's difficulties with the *seditio* occurred (presumably) at Pella, which BRIANT realises; this leaves us then as evidence for the importance of the people of Aegae only the alleged critical passage.

Philip II had difficulty, very early in his reign, with the pretender Argaeus, who was supported by Athens. Argaeus was sent out by the Athenians with a force of mercenaries from Athens' possession Methone to Aegae: οὔτος δὲ προσελθὼν τῇ πόλει παρεκάλει τοὺς ἐν ταῖς Αἰγαῖς προσδέξασθαι τὴν κάθοδον καὶ γενέσθαι τῆς αὐτοῦ βασιλείας ἀρχηγούς.<sup>74</sup> Those addressed declined the summons, whereupon Argaeus tried to return to the coast. GRANIER's view, that those concerned at Aegae were those capable of bearing arms, is rejected by BRIANT and rightly so in the context of GRANIER's general theory, though, of course, only the support of those capable of bearing arms and prepared to fight would in practice have been of much use to Argaeus. BRIANT himself, however, interprets the passage as an appeal to «toute la population» and continues with the construction cited above.

What is so decisive about the incident? If HAMMOND's identification of Verghina as Aegae is correct (which seems not unlikely),<sup>75</sup> Aegae was one of the two nearest Macedonian towns to Methone (ca. 25 km. away) and the furthest of them from Pella: it was therefore militarily the safest place on which to make an attempt from Methone.<sup>76</sup> Moreover acceptance, even irregular and unconstitutional, by the population of Aegae would doubtless, for traditional reasons, have a greater effect on the rest of Macedonia than acceptance by any other comparable community. But this is far from proving that the population of Aegae constituted the core of a Macedonian assembly. Since the reign of Archelaos at the latest Pella had been the chief royal residence and capital city;<sup>77</sup> and if a particularly influential section of the Macedonian people existed anywhere, then at Pella, not Aegae. But we do not need to follow BRIANT's arguments

<sup>73</sup> BRIANT, 316. See note 64 above.

<sup>74</sup> Diod. 16, 3, 5.

<sup>75</sup> N. G. L. HAMMOND, *A History of Macedonia I*, Oxford 1972, 156 ff.

<sup>76</sup> So also HAMMOND, *ib.*, 157–8.

<sup>77</sup> Cf. e. g. F. GEYER, *Makedonien bis zur Thronbesteigung Philipps II.*, München and Berlin 1930, 98 ff.

further. His whole structure, as we now see, is curiously artificial and his arguments, oddly similar at times to GRANIER's,<sup>78</sup> are no more supported by the sources than are GRANIER's. The «assembly of the people» as a constitutional body with judicial rights and the right to acclaim and reject a king is just as unknown to our sources as an army assembly possessing the same rights.

#### IV. *«The First of the Macedonians»*

We have now seen that modern theories, which evoke a mass assembly of the Macedonian army or people as the ultimate king-making authority in Macedonia, find no support in the sources, therefore cannot successfully explain the constitutional functioning of the Macedonian state. How, then, was the Macedonian king in normal circumstances appointed? To judge from the normally achieved practice of dynastic succession, it seems clear that in practice only members of the ruling dynasty normally came into the reckoning;<sup>79</sup> when an eldest son was old enough to take over independent rule from his father, he seems to have done so, normally without serious traceable difficulty.<sup>80</sup> This was not such a hard and fast rule that attempts were not made at the death of a king to influence the succession, either by relatives, by those who felt they had a claim, or by those who hoped to change the dynasty altogether. All known attempts were, however, ultimately unsuccessful. Nevertheless, within the established dynastic framework, since our sources exclude regular formal participation of any sort of mass meeting, we still need to identify the factors – the people or groups of people – which decided the succession, when it, for any reason, might be uncertain.

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<sup>78</sup> In the three cases we have examined where the sources know nothing of formal meetings, BRIANT interprets as evidence for a «popular assembly» those same passages (even including P. Oxy. 1798) which GRANIER had interpreted as evidence for an army assembly. Thus both do the same kind of violence to the sources, though BRIANT argues intensely against GRANIER's methods!

<sup>79</sup> There is evidence of some sort for each dynasty: for the Argeads, the importance which the nobles attached to Roxane's baby at Babylon and the arguments of the opposition for Arrhidaeus (even if owing much to Curtius' imagination: Curtius 10, 6 ff.); for Cassander's family, Eusebius' comment about Antipater Etesias (Euseb. Chron. [ed. SCHÖNE] I 235) that he was only appointed *κατὰ ἀπορίαν γένους βασιλικού*; for the Antigonids, the success which the series of Pseudo-Philips had in Macedonia after the abolition of the monarchy by the Romans is indicative.

<sup>80</sup> There is no evidence for association of a son with his father as king in Macedonia. The inscription often cited to prove this for Antigonus Gonatas and Demetrius II, SEG 12, 314, does no such thing: see my paper in: Ancient Macedonia II, Thessaloniki 1977, 115–122. BRIANT's attempt (330 ff.) to show that Philip III Arrhidaeus had been prepared for the succession by Alexander because Curtius (10, 7, 2) calls him *sacrorum caerimoniarumque consors*, which he interprets as «l'association à la royauté» and for which

There are several occasions which give us a fairly clear indication of what the normal procedure was. The first (in approximate order of conclusiveness), is the appointment of Antigonos Doson. As we have seen, Plutarch's account is quite straightforward: οἱ πρῶτοι Μακεδόνων chose him, acknowledged him at first as regent and general, married him to Philip's mother and in due course acknowledged him as king. Justin's account of the affair is very brief, but does not contradict Plutarch.<sup>81</sup> Here, then, we find a clear enough picture: what mattered was the support of οἱ πρῶτοι Μακεδόνων, which we can reasonably interpret as a consensus of nobles.<sup>82</sup> Plutarch's account of the accession of Antigonos Doson may not be enough in itself to support a reconstruction of the Macedonian monarchy for the whole of the historical period. But his version is strongly supported by accounts of other occasions where, it seems, the same practice prevailed.

At Babylon, after the death of Alexander the Great, Curtius describes a meeting which came together to decide the succession. The participants he describes as *principes amicorum ducesque copiarum*,<sup>83</sup> an expression which is a fairly precise equivalent, taking the circumstances into account, of Plutarch's οἱ πρῶτοι Μακεδόνων who decided on the succession of Antigonos Doson. Moreover, it is clear that the participants in this meeting fully expected to be able to arrange the succession amongst themselves, and would indeed have done so, had not Meleager's rabble-rousing created a riotous situation in which the nobles'

precedent he cites SEG 12, 314 is, in view of events at Babylon, quite fantastic: see on this also GOUKOWSKY, RPh 49, 1975, 272.

<sup>81</sup> Plut. Aem. Paul. 8, 2; Justin 28, 3, 9–10.

<sup>82</sup> We do not need to envisage a standing 'council' of nobles. There were no doubt occasions when such a council existed, also for purposes other than to appoint a king – under Alexander the Great, for instance, necessitated by the continuous military activity, or the advisory bodies of friends, which each king must have had even when we have no explicit evidence – but there is no evidence for any formal continuing body which existed for purposes other than acknowledging a new king: a body of informal Kurfürsten, acknowledged by each other, whose aim was to reach a consensus among themselves, is perhaps as far as we should risk defining this group. Its 'membership' will doubtless have varied from time to time.

The most eloquently extreme (and characteristically *ex cathedra*) rejection of what our sources say comes from W. W. TARN, CQ 18, 1924, 22, who embraces wholeheartedly the army-assembly theory, the weakness of which, in its developed form, had not then yet been exposed: «The story is very late and quite impossible. The nobles had nothing to do with the matter; the throne being vacant, all lawful authority was in the hands of the army; they alone could make a guardian, regent, or king». DOW and EDSON, HSPH 48, 1937, 161, while still asserting the importance of the Heeresversammlung in principle, are much more realistic in practice when they insist that «... there must have been individuals who because of their social or official position enjoyed exceptional prestige and who, therefore, could and did influence the army in its deliberations».

<sup>83</sup> Curtius 10, 6, 1.

meeting lost control of affairs.<sup>84</sup> It is therefore reasonable to regard this meeting as the normal machinery for appointing a successor king. BRIANT has emphasised that the political activities of the troops and the result which they were able to force were exceptional and abnormal and were only made possible because the army was not only a long way from home but had also been together long enough to develop a corporate spirit of its own; moreover, it felt itself at Babylon to be in a fairly desperate situation.<sup>85</sup> This is undoubtedly correct. But the important fact for our investigation is that the point in the proceedings at which the abnormal and exceptional took over from the normal and usual was precisely the moment when the soldiers of the phalanx began to exert riotous influence on the nobles.

A third instance, equally conclusive in its implications, took place around 284. Lysimachus and Pyrrhus had, since the expulsion of Demetrius from Macedonia 288/7, divided the country between them. Around 284 Lysimachus decided to try to push Pyrrhus out. His technique, as described by Plutarch, is of the greatest interest: εἶτα γράμμασι καὶ λόγοις διέφθειρε τοὺς πρώτους τῶν Μακεδόνων. This campaign was so successful that he won over many of the πρώτοι, Pyrrhus became afraid and abandoned Macedonia.<sup>86</sup> From this account it is clear that both Lysimachus and Pyrrhus recognised the importance of the πρώτοι for anyone who aimed to rule Macedonia. There is no mention of any mass meeting, which would not have been difficult for Lysimachus to arrange, had it been required, since he had an army with him at Edessa: it is clear that what counted was the favour of the πρώτοι.

An almost equally conclusive instance comes from the last years of the reign of Philip V. Livy, taking his information from Polybius,<sup>87</sup> records that in the course of the murky court struggles which, among other things, brought about the murder of Philip's younger son and Rome's favourite Demetrius, one Antigonus, son of Echebrates, a nephew of Antigonus Doso, became favoured by Philip over Perseus as his successor.<sup>88</sup> Philip tried to put his wish into practice as follows: *cum in Thracia Perseus abesset, circumire Macedoniae urbes principibusque Antigonum commendare*; moreover, Livy, doubtless echoing Polybius, continues: *et, si vita longior suppetisset haud dubium fuit, quin eum in possessione*

<sup>84</sup> This is a clear impression won from all the sources, not just from Curtius, who, however (10, 6 ff.), has the fullest account, on the value of which see JHS 90, 1970, 72–5.

<sup>85</sup> BRIANT, 337 ff. In JHS 1970, 50–1, I failed to distinguish sufficiently between the gathering of nobles and the soldiers' riotous activity: BRIANT has this right, p. 243.

<sup>86</sup> Plut. Pyrrhus 12, 6–7.

<sup>87</sup> This was first established by H. NISSEN, *Kritische Untersuchungen über die Quellen der vierten und fünften Dekade des Livius*, Berlin, 1883, ad locc. The general correctness of NISSEN's conclusion has never been seriously challenged.

<sup>88</sup> Livy 40, 54, 4.

<sup>89</sup> Livy 40, 56, 3 ff.

*regni relicturus fuerit*.<sup>90</sup> It is, of course, true that the body of material about events at the Macedonian court in which this incident is embedded, is uncheckable and in many respects probably unreliable.<sup>91</sup> For the present purpose, however, this is merely of secondary importance. Polybius transmitted the reports to Livy, either as rumours which he regarded as feasible or as facts in which he fully believed. We can therefore be reasonably confident that at least the technique of the *commendatio* is correctly described by Livy: Polybius must have known how the Macedonian king was appointed, and he would certainly immediately have spotted an obvious error, which would have proved the story wrong. Therefore, when he (through Livy) states that Antigonus might well have succeeded, had Philip only lived a little longer (whatever the validity of the judgement)<sup>92</sup> we can conclude that, in his view, what mattered in Macedonia for the succession was precisely the opinion of the *principes* whom Philip was canvassing: and if the prestige and influence of the ruling king were powerful enough, dynastic precedent might even be overlooked. Polybius' opinion, therefore – the opinion of a man who knew the Macedonian monarchy from personal experience – may be added to our list of evidence which supports the view of the critical importance of the *principes* (πρωτων).<sup>93</sup>

A final rather less clear instance, which nevertheless points in this same direction, is the accession of Alexander the Great. We have seen that the *contio* mentioned by Justin and the meetings implied by Diodorus (in practice, probably the same event) had nothing to do with the accession as such: Alexander was already king when it (or they) took place.<sup>94</sup> But what had gone before? We

<sup>90</sup> Livy 40, 56, 7.

<sup>91</sup> See C. F. EDSON, HSPH 46, 1935, 199 f.; F. W. WALBANK, Philip V of Macedon, Cambridge 1940, 252–3; E. S. GRUEN, GRBS 15, 1974, 220 ff., esp. 239 ff.

<sup>92</sup> It is at least an indication of the potential competitiveness of Antigonus that one of Perseus' first actions on his accession was to assassinate him: Livy 40, 58, 9.

<sup>93</sup> It might be worth mentioning here that Flamininus may also have recognised this fact. When Demetrius returned from Rome in 183 he brought a letter with him which, according to Polybius, urged Philip to send Demetrius back to Rome μετὰ τῶν φίλων ὡς πλείστων καὶ χρησιμωτάτων (Pol. 23, 4, 8). Philip was very angry. The odd demand about the φίλοι (obviously Philip's, not Demetrius') has been rather neglected by modern writers; they tend to turn into an «entourage» (so, e. g. GRUEN, op. cit., 235). EDSON (op. cit., 193) saw that the point of the operation was «obviously to build up a Roman party in Macedonia» (this is now doubted by GRUEN, ib., on, in my view, not very convincing arguments). But it is clear that the more of Philip's φίλοι (the χρησιμωτάτοι at least would certainly be *principes* [πρωτων] and would participate in the appointment of the new king), who could be personally convinced that Demetrius' succession would be more favourable to Romano-Macedonian relations than Perseus', the more effective would be the policy. Flamininus' letter was thus, I suggest, not just an attempt to build up a Roman party, but part of an attempt to convince the most important electors in person. Hence the insistence on ὡς πλείστων καὶ χρησιμωτάτων, hence, above all, Philip's anger at the letter.

<sup>94</sup> Above, p. 94 ff.

are told that Alexander of Lyncestis was the first to acknowledge Alexander as king, which in the short-term saved him from the fate of his two brothers;<sup>95</sup> and Antipater, it seems, was also quick to do so.<sup>96</sup> The string of murders which Alexander and Olympias perpetrated, all of influential nobles or members of the royal house,<sup>97</sup> suggests opponents, real or imaginary, among the nobles. This is not in itself conclusive; but there is no doubt that it points to the same conclusion as the events at Babylon and the accessions of Lysimachus and Antigonus Doseon, and the incident of Antigonus, son of Echeocrates. What mattered in Macedonia in normal times was the consensus of the nobles.

To have established this does not mean that what particular groups outside the nobility (which, for want of more precise information, may be called 'people' or 'army') felt or thought did not matter at all. Curtius, with his intelligent perception and personal experience of monarchy, has perhaps best caught the spirit of the relationship between king and people when, writing in early imperial terms in the context of the Philotas affair, he described the king's ability to act (*potestas*) as being, in certain circumstances, at least partially dependent on the strength of his prestige and influence (*auctoritas*).<sup>98</sup> He was referring specifically to critical situations of a judicial or semi-judicial nature which the army or people might be expected to have a lively interest in, though they had no formal means of expressing it. It was politic for the king to take account of this interest. Similarly, those who wished to challenge a ruling king might try to win popular support for themselves: Argaeus' attempt to win the people of Aegae for his challenge to Philip II is here a typical case. To rule securely he would eventually have required the support or toleration of the nobles; but he might try to force this by first building up his prestige among sections of the general population.

For the expression of popular opinion and the king's building up or testing his prestige in normal times, that is, in the periods before and after the expedition of Alexander and the wars of the successors, we have very little information. But there is some. The clearest example of spontaneous (or instigated) popular hostility towards a king is the *seditio* in Pella which Antigonus Doseon had to cope with in the early years of his reign.<sup>99</sup> It was a demonstration of hostility provoked by some immediate crisis which, had the circumstances been different, might, it seems, even have led to a change of king. This the nobles would have been in practice impotent to prevent. We must perhaps imagine a

<sup>95</sup> Justin 11, 2, 2; Curtius 7, 1, 6, cf. Arr. Anab. 1, 25, 2.

<sup>96</sup> Cf. Ps. Callisthenes 1, 26.

<sup>97</sup> Cleopatra and her baby; Attalus, Amyntas, Caranus, the two sons of Aeropos are those we know about: refs. in BERVE, Alexanderreich II s. v. v.

<sup>98</sup> Curtius 6, 8, 25. See discussion above p. 86 ff.

<sup>99</sup> Justin 28, 3, 11-16, cf. above p. 92 ff.

similar sort of riot on the occasion when, according to Syncellus, Amyntas III, after ruling only a year, ὑπὸ Μακεδόνων ἐξεβλήθη.<sup>100</sup> GRANIER wanted to interpret this report as an army assembly: «Die Form dieser <Vertreibung> würden wir uns dann so vorzustellen haben, daß die Versammlung einen Prätendenten als König begrüßte und dadurch dem bisherigen sein Thronrecht absprach.»<sup>101</sup> BRIANT interprets it as an example of the <assembly of the people> exercising its constitutional right to depose a king.<sup>102</sup> We do, however, know something of the background here. Diodorus<sup>103</sup> mentions that Amyntas was driven out Ἰλλυριῶν ἐμβολόντων εἰς Μακεδονίαν and that he recovered his kingdom with Thessalian help «after a short time». Isocrates refers to the same incident in the Archidamus,<sup>104</sup> where he says that Amyntas «beaten in battle by the neighbouring barbarians καὶ πάσης Μακεδονίας ἀποστερηθεῖς», fled to a little fort, which he used as a base for recovering his kingdom; this, according to Isocrates, he achieved in three months. It is interesting that neither Diodorus nor Isocrates says precisely who or what drove Amyntas out or «deprived him of all Macedonia.» If we may use Syncellus' phrase as being complementary,<sup>105</sup> we should probably envisage something like what Justin described as a *sedition minax*, whether of army or <people>, which the most influential nobles were temporarily unable or unwilling to resist, basically, therefore, a mutiny or riot stimulated by the military defeat at the hands of the Illyrians. This view might also be supported by a report which Diodorus brings<sup>106</sup> that Argaeus was said to have ruled διετῆ χρόνον – that is, presumably, at least more than a year – and only after this did Amyntas return. The detailed truth of these various accounts is probably irrecoverable; but a change of ruler could clearly be explained, if Amyntas' defeat had cost him the confidence of those Macedonians strong enough to expel him.

We have already examined the function of the *populus* at the accession of Philip II. It seems likely that this too was basically a matter of *sedition*, whereby the ruling king acknowledged by the πρότοι (the child Amyntas IV) was deposed and Philip set up in his place by a non-noble demonstration of some sort. In the case of Philip we have also our first evidence for the king's exercising or strengthening his *auctoritas* with the population at large. Diodorus sets the scene at the beginning of Philip's reign: Philip was not depressed at the

<sup>100</sup> Syncellus (ed. BONN) p. 500 (= Porphyry F 1 in FHG III 691).

<sup>101</sup> GRANIER, 25–6.

<sup>102</sup> BRIANT, 290–1.

<sup>103</sup> Diod. 14, 92, 3.

<sup>104</sup> Isocr. 6, 46.

<sup>105</sup> GEYER, Makedonien bis Philipp, 115 n. 4, regards the text as being a misunderstanding by the source. It might be; but it does not necessarily contradict our other sources.

<sup>106</sup> Diod. 14, 92, 4.

threatening dangers, ἀλλὰ τοὺς Μακεδόνας ἐν συνεχέσιν ἐκκλησίαις συνέχων καὶ τῇ τοῦ λόγου δεινότητι προστρεπόμενος ἐπὶ τὴν ἀνδρείαν εὐθαρσεῖς ἐποίησε.<sup>107</sup> The function of these meetings described by Diodorus was thus purely practical and directly related to the current military situation: the king (presumably) travelled around the country and tried to convince those whom he addressed to share his optimism: in a sense, therefore, he exercised his prestige.

The same kind of general interpretation is suggested by the meeting (or meetings) which, according to Justin and Diodorus, Alexander the Great held after his accession, at which he allegedly convinced his hearers that they had changed the physical person of their king but not his quality.<sup>108</sup> The function of this meeting (or series of meetings, as Diodorus' text suggests) was also purely practical: to make sure that no *seditio* made his position untenable. This, and his immediate frenetic military activity (precisely repeating the pattern of his father) had the function of establishing and stabilising his prestige and influence, which, as Curtius in a different context and in Roman terminology saw plainly, was a necessary precondition for his effectively exercising his royal power.

## V. Army, People and Politics: Alexander and the Successors

### 1. Alexander

The last section has brought us to the point where we can approach the abnormal period of Alexander's reign and the wars of the Successors when armies were composed, in effect, of professional soldiers<sup>109</sup>, who served long years together and developed a corporate spirit, identity and interests, unhindered by modern constitutional theory and with a clearer idea of the outline structure of politics in ancient Macedonia. We have identified two types of mass meetings which seem to have taken place outside the period of Alexander's and the Successors' wars: first, meetings called by the kings to listen to and react to news, information or encouragement: the 'frequent meetings' which Philip II called in the first period of his reign and the meeting or meetings at which Alexander, shortly after his accession, encouraged his hearers to believe that Philip's death did not mean disaster are examples of this practice; secondly, meetings not summoned by the king, therefore in no sense official; though not necessarily, in the strict sense, spontaneous, the organising influence was not the king. The function of these meetings of the second type seems to have been to exert pressure on the king; their nature was, therefore, basically riotous and irregular. The best

<sup>107</sup> Diod. 16, 3, 1.

<sup>108</sup> Diod. 17, 2, 2; Justin 11, 1, 7–10. See also above p. 95 ff.

<sup>109</sup> This is rightly emphasised by GOUKOWSKY, RPh 1975, 269.

attested example is the *sedition minax* which threatened Antigonus Doseon in the early period of his reign, a riot which certainly had identifiable rabble-rousers, *auctores seditionis*, who were arrested and punished;<sup>110</sup> similar incidents probably led to the expulsion of Amyntas III and to the rejection of Amyntas IV and appointment of Philip II. In no known case of either type of meeting, however, have we reason for thinking that it was intended to be in any way representative of «the Macedonians». On the official occasions, the king's purpose was to convince those who were present of the rightness of his point of view, in the riots, the rioters wanted to ventilate their own dissatisfaction, whether or not it was shared by other Macedonians. In both cases the interests involved were those of those present: they alone mattered.

Alexander's expedition, both in the length of time it occupied and in the distance from Macedonia which it reached, created a new situation for the Macedonians in the army. We may well believe that under Philip many soldiers and officers became in practice virtual professionals, but the physical link with Macedonia was never broken: men could usually reckon to be allowed to return home for the winter; and continual military pressure such as Alexander's expedition exerted on the troops could normally be avoided. Despite these developments, however, and despite the extent to which Alexander was in practice dependent on the goodwill of his army – a dependence which produced an inflated importance for the wishes and momentary moods of the troops – it is difficult to identify, during the expedition, any basic changes over what we have seen was usual in Macedonia in the way in which views were communicated, whether from king to army or from army to king: the chief difference is rather an increase in the importance which was attached to such occasions, an importance which results wholly from the conditions under which the army lived. This should not be regarded as an indication that the army in any political sense represented the Macedonian people, or thought that it did: it means merely that the interests, moods and favour of the army – and not just of the Macedonian elements in it – were the things which were of practical importance for the king, because they were the things that affected his ability to act. A distinction such as BERVE,<sup>111</sup> for instance, draws between two completely different sorts of assembly, the «makedonisch-traditionelle» and «die zweite, keineswegs auf die Makedonen beschränkte Form», which «hat nur für den Augenblick eine gewisse stimmungsmäßige Bedeutung» is quite unknown to our sources. Under Alexander, with one possible exception, our sources know only of meetings of the first type, gatherings summoned by the king, though since the army was a limited and clearly defined unit which was constantly together, the climate of opinion in the army could, and did, give cause for «official» meetings of the first type.

<sup>110</sup> Justin 28, 3, 16.

<sup>111</sup> BERVE, *Alexanderreich* I, 208, derived from GRANIER.

Six major incidents are recorded under Alexander, although, as we shall see, general meetings do not in fact seem to have been called on all six occasions. It is difficult to believe that these were the only six occasions on which Alexander addressed the troops or major sections of them en masse, or on which opinion from the ranks was expressed; but the sources inevitably record only the extraordinary or the very important incidents. A typical example is the first,<sup>112</sup> which took place after the death of Darius in 330. A rumour went round the camp that Alexander intended to return home and created such an uproar of enthusiasm that Alexander himself, after talking to his officers, summoned a meeting (in Curtius and Justin a *contio*) and successfully persuaded the troops to continue the campaign.<sup>113</sup> Formally this meeting was clearly a direct equivalent of the meetings which Philip II addressed in his earliest period. Its purpose was quite practical: not even GRANIER has suggested that it implies a right of the <army assembly> to decide about military objectives – indeed, he rules this explicitly out.<sup>114</sup> But for all practical purposes the meeting was just as important to Alexander as if it had had formal rights (as Alexander obviously realised) since, without the active willingness of the troops to go on, Alexander would either have had to give up or change his plans. The meeting after the death of Darius could thus be described as another occasion on which the king needed to assert his prestige, when his right to act alone might have been ineffective.

The second occasion is the meeting which occupied itself with the Philotas affair. This has already been examined in detail above.<sup>115</sup> We have seen that the function of this mass meeting of soldiers and camp-followers was in general terms precisely as Curtius describes it: to test Alexander's prestige (*auctoritas*) before he exercised his right to act (*potestas*). The material which the meeting was informed about was different from that of the gathering after Darius' death, but the technique and function were indistinguishable. Both were meetings summoned by the king to hear the king's views and to be convinced of their correctness, in order to ensure that he could take the action he intended without meeting serious objection from those who would be affected by his action.

A different aspect of prestige is demonstrated by the <Cleitus affair>.<sup>116</sup> There is no question here of a trial, of course. The sources vary over details of the responsibility for Cleitus' death, but there was no possibility of disguising the

<sup>112</sup> It is often alleged that after Gaugamela the army acclaimed Alexander as king of Asia: e. g. GRANIER, 31–2; SCHACHERMEYR, *Alexander der Große*, Wien 1973, 277, and many others. Our only source (Plut. Alex. 34, 1) does not say by whom Alexander was called king of Asia: see discussion by HAMILTON, *Plutarch, Alexander*, 90.

<sup>113</sup> Diod. 17, 74, 3; Curt. 6, 2, 15 ff.; Justin 12, 3, 2–4; Plut. Alex. 47.

<sup>114</sup> GRANIER, 35: «Eine tatsächliche staatsrechtliche Einwirkung der Heeresversammlung kann also aus der vorliegenden dürftigen Überlieferung nicht erschlossen werden».

<sup>115</sup> Above, p. 86 ff.

<sup>116</sup> Arr. 4, 8, 1 ff.; Curt. 8, 1, 20 ff.; Justin 12, 6, 1–16; Plut. Alex. 50–52. For bibliography and discussion see HAMILTON, *Plutarch, Alexander*, 139 ff.

fact that Cleitus was killed by Alexander with his own hand. After the murder Alexander professed remorse and shut himself in his tent; it was feared that he intended to starve himself to death, but he was ultimately prevailed upon to take food. Curtius then continues with an incident which he alone records: *quoque minus caedis puderet, iure interfectum Clitum Macedones decernunt, sepultura quoque prohibitori, ni rex humari iussisset.*<sup>117</sup> Curtius often shows a much sharper understanding of what mattered in politics than our other sources, and here we have no good reason for rejecting what he says. Unfortunately we do not know what he meant by *Macedones*. The word does not in itself allow any conclusion about the nature of the organ which reached the decision he describes:<sup>118</sup> most likely, indeed, on a comparison with the Philotas affair, is that the noble officers who composed the court council are involved here,<sup>119</sup> though a wider content cannot be ruled out. In any case, the essence of the incident is that Alexander's prestige, which under the circumstances, had not been able to be tested in advance, was explicitly confirmed retrospectively by some grouping which could be described as *Macedones*. The Cleitus affair was potentially very damaging for Alexander; and its immediate political danger was only abated when this group of *Macedones* took some of the personal responsibility off Alexander's shoulders by asserting that he had in any case been right to do what he did. This meant, in effect, that under those circumstances his prestige was sufficiently potent to justify even the irresponsible exercise of his power.

The same uncertainty as to whether a general meeting was involved exists in our next instance, the «conspiracy of the pages». Arrian reports, neither from Ptolemy nor Aristobulus, that «some say that Hermolaus was brought ἐς τοὺς Μακεδόνας and confessed the plot». He was then stoned πρὸς τῶν παρόντων.<sup>120</sup> Plutarch, citing a letter to Antipater, says the pages were stoned ὑπὸ τῶν Μακεδόνων but says nothing about the procedure which led to this.<sup>121</sup> Curtius is the only source to give precise information. He speaks of a *frequens consilium . . . cui patres propinquire eorum de quibus agebatur intererant.*<sup>122</sup> As GRANIER remarks,<sup>123</sup> this was clearly a limited meeting (though *frequens*) since the fathers and relatives of the pages would presumably in any case have attended a general

<sup>117</sup> Curt. 8, 2, 12.

<sup>118</sup> GRANIER, who usually leaps at every chance to interpret *Macedones* as Heeresversammlung has missed this opportunity: his interpretation is supplied, however, most recently by SCHACHERMEYR, op. cit., 369.

<sup>119</sup> Cf. Curt. 6, 11, 37, where *Macedones* clearly refers to the king's council, where the final hearing took place.

<sup>120</sup> Arr. 4, 14, 2-3.

<sup>121</sup> Plut. Alex. 55. On the authenticity of the letter see HAMILTON, PACA 4, 1961, 16.

<sup>122</sup> Curt. 8, 6, 28.

<sup>123</sup> GRANIER, 47-8.

meeting and would not have been explicitly mentioned in this way; nor does Curtius, in the speeches which he wrote for the meeting, give the impression that in his view they were held before a mass meeting of the army. He also seems to know more precise details of the mode of punishment than the other sources: *post haec consilium dimisit tradique damnatos hominibus qui ex eadem cohorte erant iussit*.<sup>124</sup>

The information of these three sources is by no means incompatible. It has often been pointed out, against GRANIER, that the use by a source of the expression οἱ Μακεδόνες (or *Macedones*, in a Latin source) by no means needs to express or be interpreted as a mass meeting.<sup>125</sup> Indeed, it would not even be appropriate for every mass meeting since, as we have seen, at least one important mass meeting, the meeting of *omnes armati* summoned for the Philotas hearing, could not be adequately so described. On the other hand, a limited meeting of officers and friends would often be a more appropriate content for the word. This means that Arrian's Μακεδόνες and Curtius' *frequens consilium* are by no means necessarily incompatible. The same holds good for the executors of the punishment: Curtius' *homines qui ex eadem cohorte erant* is not incompatible with Arrian's πρὸς τῶν παρόντων: the members of the pages' unit who were also present at the *consilium* are meant; and Plutarch's ὑπὸ τῶν Μακεδόνων is an acceptable way of expressing this idea in more general terms, in a context in which the contrast which the author wishes to draw is that between a punishment carried out by Alexander personally and one carried out by others, where further definition would have been pointless.

Our conclusion therefore is that a general meeting of the army seems to have played no part in dealing with the «conspiracy of the pages», that the whole affair was dealt with at a limited council meeting. In the Philotas affair, as we have seen, the scene of the main speeches which Curtius writes for his protagonists was a mass meeting, although the actual decisions were taken subsequently within the narrower circle of the friends. The case of the pages was politically by no means so difficult, by no means as complicated. The pages were themselves persons of no (or very little) political influence – though their families could have been influential; moreover, Hermolaus confessed his guilt. Alexander thus had no need to test his prestige in a mass meeting before he took action: the only people who, on this occasion, needed to be convinced that Alexander was right were the officers (who had had regular contact with the young men) and their parents and relatives; the hearing could accordingly without difficulty take place before a very limited audience, an audience nevertheless extended beyond the mere inner council of friends (the *consilium* was *frequens* and the parents and relatives were invited).

<sup>124</sup> Curtius 8, 8, 20.

<sup>125</sup> Most recently by BRIANT, 311.

Despite the absence of a mass meeting, this case is nevertheless very informative for our purpose and confirms the basic flexibility of Alexander's practice: he informed only those people whom he considered needed to be informed of what was happening and whose support he needed in each particular case. In the Philotas affair it was the whole available army; here his council, suitably extended. There was clearly nothing formally wrong in his doing this. Nothing prevented him from adapting his practice to needs of the moment; he was not bound by any formal rules or traditions of procedure: the decision lay in the king's hand.

In the instances which we have so far examined Alexander, in the end, achieved the result he wanted to achieve, more or less easily. The final two occasions were not so successful for him, in their nature, however, not fundamentally different. The first is that occasion which TARN, with the typically inaccurate precision of overdramatisation, called «the mutiny on the Beas».<sup>126</sup> The incident seems in fact rather to have been similar to that which followed the death of Darius, with the important difference that Alexander's audience this time refused to show the enthusiasm he demanded and caused him to drop his plans to invade India across the Beas (Hyphasis). Our two most extensive sources, Arrian and Curtius, differ on the formal nature of the meeting which Alexander summoned: Arrian speaks of a meeting of the ἡγεμόνες τῶν τάξεων, Curtius of a *contio* of the soldiers.<sup>127</sup> It may be that Arrian, reproducing the version of Ptolemy, has this detail right. But it perhaps does not matter much: also on the occasion after the death of Darius a meeting of officers preceded the *contio* of the soldiers; and here, as there, it is clear from both sources that the only reason for holding the meeting was that Alexander had got to know the feelings of the troops, this time, that they were dissatisfied about what they had heard, it seems unofficially, of his plans. Arrian mentions ξύλλογοι which had already taken place in the camp, Curtius recounts Alexander's suspicion that the Macedonians would no longer follow him; both sources report a speech of Alexander and an applause-provoking reply of Coenus; both relate that after this Alexander shut himself in his tent for two whole days; both report the setting up of twelve altars as a memorial; Arrian adds from Ptolemy that Alexander sacrificed for crossing the river, and only when the sacrifice was unfavourable did he officially call off his plan. Neither source attempts to disguise Alexander's disappointment.

Despite the differences in the two narratives, the outline of what happened is reasonably clear. Alexander had staked his whole influence on winning and had lost. Curtius chooses to describe in moral rather than in political terms his attempt to persuade the troops: *vicit ergo cupido rationem*. Arrian, more acutely, represents Alexander's withdrawal to his tent as an attempt to provoke

<sup>126</sup> W. W. TARN, *Alexander the Great*, Cambridge, 1948, I, 98–9.

<sup>127</sup> Arr. 5, 25, 2; Curt. 9, 2, 12; cf. Diod. 17, 94, 5.

the same emotional reaction which his similar withdrawal after the murder of Cleitus had produced, an occasion on which in the end his prestige had indeed been strong enough to swing important opinion behind him. But both are clear about the essentials of what was involved: Alexander suspected that his traditional royal right to act alone would not win support for his schemes; the assertion of his prestige, which had, as we have seen, by now become customary in more areas than simply in trials *de capitalibus rebus*, was the only possible way out for him, unless he was prepared to risk provoking an outright mutiny. Here, as on all other occasions, it was Alexander who took the initiative, Alexander who summoned the meeting. The formal initiative did not come from the soldiery; no order was given; no mutiny, therefore, took place. Given the general agreement of our sources, it is of no great importance whether the decisive speeches were held (as in Arrian) before a meeting of officers or (as in Curtius) before a gathering of soldiers. As on other occasions, Alexander no doubt summoned those whom, in his view, he most needed to convince; and it is clear from both accounts that a significant consensus existed between officers and men. For once, and on an important occasion, Alexander failed to make his arguments and appeals tell, had failed to get his way, had failed to get that enthusiastic support from those who mattered, which made his power effective. The essential truth of Curtius' earlier insight (though the early imperial flavour produced by the precise choice of words is of course anachronistic), that unless *auctoritas* had been firmly established, royal *potestas* was ineffective, could not be better illustrated.

The last occasion of this type recorded by the sources is the 'mutiny' at Opis. Once again the precise development of the incident is related differently by the different sources. Arrian records a meeting of Macedonians summoned by Alexander to hear about the discharge of veterans.<sup>128</sup> Curtius is less precise. He seems to imply spontaneous action by the soldiers, but this impression may result merely from a different emphasis: the action occurred *ut cognitum est alios remitti domos, alios retineri*,<sup>129</sup> information which, according to Arrian, was first communicated by Alexander at the meeting; Curtius goes on to depict Alexander's wish to speak being hindered by rowdy soldiers, which again is not wholly incompatible with Arrian. Since Diodorus also speaks of an ἐκκλησία and Justin of a *contio* summoned by Alexander,<sup>130</sup> we may perhaps conclude that Arrian's account is, at least in this formal respect, correct.

The beginning of the affair was, therefore, a meeting of a quite normal kind summoned by Alexander with the purpose of communicating information. It was indeed composed only of Macedonians, but only because the Macedonians alone were affected by the announcement. That it would turn into a political

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<sup>128</sup> Arr. 7, 8, 1.

<sup>129</sup> Curt. 10, 2, 12.

<sup>130</sup> Diod. 17, 109, 2; Justin 12, 11, 1.

trial of strength was not anticipated by Alexander: he seems to have been quite unprepared for the hostile reception of his announcement, and chose to interpret it as mutiny. He immediately had thirteen of the ringleaders summarily arrested and executed. Then, following a pattern of behaviour which seems to have become standard for such trials of strength, he shut himself in his quarters for two days, doubtless waiting for the emotional reaction which had helped him after the death of Cleitus – but for which he waited in vain at the Hyphasis. It did not occur at Opis either. But, having returned from India to the comparative security of the Persian homeland, Alexander could afford to take greater risks of a substantial breach with his Macedonians, and he reacted by ostentatiously favouring the Persians. This may, indeed, have been intended from the beginning; but now reaction set in among the Macedonians, with the result that Alexander in the end achieved precisely what he had set out to achieve: the acceptance of the despatch of the veterans to Macedonia and the retention of the younger men as partners with the Persians.

Even GRANIER finds no official action of his <army assembly> here: «In Opis ging es schließlich auch um keine Frage staatsrechtlicher oder kriegerischer Bedeutung, über die die Heeresversammlung zu entscheiden gehabt hätte, so wichtig auch für jeden Mann die Frage der endlichen Heimkehr war.»<sup>131</sup> What needs to be emphasised, however, is that as far as form and purpose is concerned, the meeting of the Macedonians at Opis was in no way different from the other occasions we have examined. In each case the king summoned the meeting; for each meeting the king decided who should be present, and his decision was conditioned, it seems, merely by the nature of the subject he wished to deal with; at each meeting the king wished to persuade without compelling, to test or assert his prestige for the immediate purpose in hand, not to exercise his royal power; in no case was a decision taken by the meeting, though Alexander's own decision was in each case conditioned by the attitude of the meeting. But this was a political assessment; an assessment of the strength of his prestige. Remarkably enough, on only one occasion, on the Hyphasis, did Alexander fail to achieve his aim.

During the expedition of Alexander we can thus trace no incident that does not fit into the normal political relationship between Macedonian king and people. It is, however, clear that the scope for spontaneous political activity during the military expedition was severely limited, for it could easily be interpreted as mutiny, as Alexander's arrest of the thirteen at Opis shows. The two incidents which moderns have chosen to call mutinies both took place at perfectly normal gatherings summoned by the king for the communication of information. Spontaneous expressions of opinion are only rarely (if ever) recorded: perhaps Alexander's acclamation as king of Asia after Gaugamela and possibly

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<sup>131</sup> GRANIER, 40.

the decision of <the Macedonians> after the death of Cleitus. On both occasions, however, the sentiment was favourable to Alexander. Thus, even if they were spontaneous expressions of mass opinion, they cannot be compared in their effect with the hostile gatherings which expelled Amyntas III or deposed Amyntas IV or expressed hostility to Antigonos Doson.

The reasons why it did not come to spontaneous expressions of hostility to the king, except in conditions which Alexander himself chose, are not hard to find. The temper of the troops during the expedition was of capital importance for him, in particular their temper as expressed in relation to himself and his military plans; but it was also much easier to test and to influence than in peacetime, since the greater part of the active army was usually together in one place, and officers were in constant contact both with their men and with Alexander. On occasions, therefore, when the climate of opinion in the army seemed to Alexander to be unsatisfactory, he usually had little difficulty in finding out about it and in taking measures which prevented dissatisfaction or lack of enthusiasm from becoming too dangerous, from reaching the stage where direct orders might be disobeyed. Two such occasions are recorded, after the death of Darius when the troops wanted to go home but Alexander, at a meeting, convinced them to go on; and on the Hyphasis, where the troops refused to be convinced. On both occasions the implications would have been much more serious, had Alexander ignored the temper of the troops and simply issued an order. Only at Opis does he seem to have been completely surprised; only here did a meeting summoned by the king threaten to get out of control or a situation resembling a riot threaten to develop. Alexander's reaction was this time to assert his royal power. But this was only practicable because, in the last resort, he was, it seems, ready to abandon the Macedonians and to turn his defeat into a victory by replacing them with more satisfactory orientals. That it did not, in Alexander's lifetime, ever develop so far lay in the ultimate recognition by the Macedonian troops that, in the short term at least, they needed Alexander more than he needed them: he might feel secure and at home in Iran, but they certainly did not. A second factor was Alexander's death shortly afterwards. The self-assertion of the soldiers at the Hyphasis and of the Macedonian troops at Opis was not forgotten. And it is doubtless no accident that, after Alexander's death, the troops begin to play an active political role in directing events, which the overwhelming prestige of Alexander had, for the most part, prevented during the expedition: it was the successors who rapidly discovered the whole truth of Curtius' illuminating epigram, that royal power was useless without prestige.

The technique of testing prestige before taking a major decision, which amounted in practice to testing in advance whether, or with what degree of enthusiasm, those who on any given occasion mattered would support the proposed course of action, had in it, though still latent, seeds of a concept of joint responsibility for major royal decisions. Under Alexander this concept never be-

came conscious, would never have been recognised by any contemporary; but the practice nevertheless seems to show such traces. In the Philotas hearing at least part of Alexander's purpose was to demonstrate to his nobles that his own personal influence with the army was greater than that of the most influential among them: in effect, he used the army as a political counterweight to the nobles, thereby perhaps for the first time creating a basically passive but nevertheless effective political role for the army, which was largely independent of its military function. The army, doubtless quite unconsciously, let itself be used in this way: in effect, by accepting Alexander's point of view, by agreeing with him that Philotas was guilty, it created a climate in which Alexander could safely judge Philotas guilty and have him eliminated. Formal responsibility of the mass meeting is not to be found: but had the army's opinion been different, events would doubtless, at least in detail, have taken a different course. A practical responsibility can, therefore, already be identified.

The aftermath of the Cleitus affair demonstrates another aspect of the development. Curtius reports that while Alexander was sitting in his tent the *Macedones* decided that Cleitus had deserved to be killed, a statement which amounts to a retrospective justification of Alexander's action. Now, although it is not clear precisely who these *Macedones* were, the fact that a group of people chose to issue such a statement implies that it was prepared to share the moral responsibility for Alexander's action: they imply that, had they been asked, they would have approved his action in advance, that is, they would have created a climate of opinion, just like in the Philotas hearing, in which Alexander's action would have been regarded as justified.

The crisis on the Hyphasis is the most extreme example of the influence of mass opinion on royal action in the whole course of the expedition. There is no doubt here that the views of the army alone were responsible for Alexander's decision, even if he chose to attribute it to the unfavourable outcome of the critical sacrifice. Yet although he did not forget this defeat, the formal responsibility for the decision not to cross the Hyphasis was not attributed to the troops' unwillingness to go, but to the unfavourable outcome of the sacrifice.

The continued separation of formal and effective responsibility which lasted until Alexander's death was normal Macedonian practice. That Alexander managed to maintain his right to decide (though at the Hyphasis so severely limited in practice that it virtually ceased to exist) despite the extraordinary strains and pressures of the expedition, both political and military, seems to be primarily attributable to Alexander's dominating personality, influence and prestige, based in the last resort on his military success, which Curtius summed up under *auctoritas*. The contrast between Alexander's formal control of the decision-making process, although this was clearly becoming more limited as time went on, and the efforts of the earliest successors to control their armies, is so striking that the explanation must be sought in the uncertain legal and politi-

cal situation in which the successors found themselves after Alexander's death, which prevented the individual generals at first from attaining the reputation and influence with their troops which Alexander had enjoyed.

## 2. After Alexander

The extraordinary, abnormal, character of the course of events at Babylon has been emphasised by BRIANT, in particular in connection with the activity of the infantry and their spokesman Meleager in choosing Arrhidaeus as king. This is undoubtedly correct in outline; but BRIANT, as we have seen, draws an illegitimate conclusion when he interprets their activity as «représentant en dehors de la Macédoine, dans les circonstances extraordinaires, du *vulgus* macédonien, c'est-à-dire de l'Assemblée du Peuple.»<sup>132</sup> Nothing in any of our sources so much as hints at a representative function – even a usurped function – for the rioting infantry. Everything points in the same direction: that the army was politically split, but that the phalanx simply wished to have *its* solution of the difficulty accepted, regardless of precedent or tradition.

Yet the procedure for solving the constitutional crisis caused by Alexander's death began normally enough. The highest officers of the army considered themselves to be able legitimately to decide on a new king; and the consideration paid to Antipater and Craterus in the deliberations at Babylon shows that the nobles at Babylon did not want to provoke them.<sup>133</sup> The new king should be appointed – as far as the extraordinary circumstances allowed – by the normal consensus of the nobles. So the conference began. The new and revolutionary aspect only emerged when the phalanx expressed riotous dissatisfaction at the inclination of the council to wait for Roxane's baby, and under the guidance of Meleager acclaimed Arrhidaeus king. It is probably broadly correct when BRIANT sees anti-noble peasant elements as the predominant influence here and regards the riot of the phalanx as a revolt against the automatically assumed superiority of the nobles, which the cavalry, which supported the council's decision, took for granted (though we cannot tell the extent to which non-Macedonian elements, which had never been excluded by Alexander from meetings of general interest and which in the last years had been increasingly employed in the army, also interfered). The split does not, however, seem to have been permanent, was rather specifically related to the situation at Babylon. The result is well known and does not need to be discussed here in detail. The compromise between the rival factions implied the capitulation of the nobles on the point of principle which had led to the riots in the first place: they agreed to accept Arrhidaeus as

<sup>132</sup> BRIANT, 331.

<sup>133</sup> On this and what follows in detail see JHS 90, 1970, 49 ff.

king. In the sequel it was possible, with no great difficulty, to 'purify' the phalanx by destroying the ringleaders of the riot, to eliminate Meleager, and to distribute the satrapies. But nothing could disguise the fact that Philip Arrhidaeus owed his kingship not, in the first instance, to the traditional nobles' consensus but to the riotous initiative of the troops of the phalanx. For once, in the peculiar and dangerous circumstances of Babylon, they had not been prepared to acknowledge and bow to noble prestige.

The mutual recognition of this sudden change in the balance of influence, both by the nobles and by the army, was, I suggest, the critical development which created the decision-taking army assemblies, which are so characteristic of the years of uncertainty between the death of Alexander and the establishment of the successor kingdoms, *but only of this period*. Alexander had maintained until the last, at whatever cost, his own right to take decisions, however formalistic this had occasionally been. His reputation and influence were strong enough to allow him to do this, though the opinions expressed at Opis sow doubt as to how long he would have continued to be able to. His death, however, destroyed the almost mystic aura of success, on which his own prestige and influence were based; Alexander had even himself contributed largely to the difficult situation after his death by deliberately preventing older men or men with established reputations, who might have competed with him, like Parmenio and Philotas or Antipater, from playing major roles. Even Craterus and Polyperchon had recently been sent home. All the 'bodyguards' were younger men who, apart from their (usually) noble birth, owed everything to Alexander.<sup>134</sup> It was, therefore, virtually impossible that any of the senior officers present singly (or, as it turned out, even all of them as a group) should immediately after Alexander's death, possess sufficient personal influence with the troops to keep them loyal in a difficult political situation; and the position of individual leaders in this respect soon became even more precarious, when it transpired that the army (or the various armies, which had developed out of Alexander's) were to be used for what amounted to civil war in which, it might at least be argued, the men could have a legitimate interest.

The competences which the various mass meetings, which conditioned so much political activity in the next years, exercised, were, of course, not formally laid down or defined; who could have dared to do so? The decisions which they took were always related to the momentary interests of the leader who put the questions. It was Meleager's relative initial success at Babylon which gave mass meetings their political influence under the *diadochoi*, although Alexander's practice, itself a normal Macedonian one adapted to the exigencies of army life outside Macedonia, had opened the way for it. If a riotous mob could, in effect, appoint a king, it is not surprising that decisions on a very wide range of topics

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<sup>134</sup> For refs. see BERVE, *Alexanderreich* II s. vv.

were taken by army meetings in the next few years. But this has nothing to do with Macedonian tradition. It was quite new. It was a direct product of the political uncertainty which followed Alexander's death, was directly related to the aims of the individual dynasts and the material interests of the troops who were, probably even more than under Alexander, dependent on their leaders' success for post-service rewards. It is the mutual recognition of this *de facto* interdependence of leader and led – which varied in its precise balance and effect on events from leader to leader, from situation to situation – which characterises and shapes the legal and constitutional uncertainty of the period of the *diadochoi*.

Perdiccas seems to have been first to recognise the implications of the new situation, the practical limitations which it imposed on his behaviour – but also the value, for a man with relatively untested influence as an independent leader, of entrusting awkward political decisions to a mass meeting of the troops, who then had to take open responsibility for them. The case of the 'last plans' of Alexander is the first such occasion recorded after the riots; and Diodorus' version, now reflecting his source Hieronymus, is quite clear: Perdiccas found the plans in the archive, thought it would be a good idea not to carry them out; but in order not to give the impression of destroying some of Alexander's reputation merely on his own personal judgement, he asked τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Μακεδόνων πλῆθος to decide about them. The plans were read out and the Macedonians decided (ἔκριναν) to carry out none of them. The army assembly had thus become a semi-formal force in politics.<sup>135</sup> Also at Babylon, though some time later, Roxane's baby was acclaimed king. Arrian's epitome is too brief to give us the necessary background of the occasion: but after Perdiccas' experience with Arrhidæus, we may be reasonably sure that some sort of meeting, called by Perdiccas, recognised the baby as king.<sup>136</sup> The nobles had, it seems, at least for the moment, capitulated completely to the implicit claims of the rioting phalanx.

Perdiccas seems also to have been first to realise the advantages which he might get from using the army as a law-court. The evidence is not clear enough to be certain about this; but on two recorded occasions he made use of some kind of court in political cases. The first concerns Antigonus. Photius' epitome of Arrian reports merely: Περδίκκας δὲ Ἀντιγόνῳ ἐπιβουλεύων εἰς δικαστήριον ἐκάλει.<sup>137</sup> The point of view represented by this statement is presumably Antigonus' own, transmitted through Hieronymus; but all we can say for certain is that the 'court' would undoubtedly be friendly towards Perdiccas. The second

<sup>135</sup> Diod. 18, 4, 2, cf. BADIEN, HSPh 72, 1967, 183 ff. BRIANT, 258, writes that Perdiccas merely 'informed' the army on this occasion: «mais l'armée réunie ne détenait aucun pouvoir de décision». This is not what Diodorus says.

<sup>136</sup> Arr. Succ. F 1,9: καὶ εἰς βασιλέα τὸ τεχθὲν ἀνέιπε τὸ πλῆθος. On this see CH. HABICHT, Akt. des VI. Int. Kongr. für Gr. und Lat. Epigraphik – München 1972, 1973, 367 ff.

<sup>137</sup> Arr. Succ. F 1, 20.

occasion was before Perdiccas' attack on Egypt in 320. Again the source is Photius' Arrian-epitome: κατηγορήσας δὲ Πτολεμαίου κάκεινου ἐπὶ τοῦ πλήθους ἀπολυομένου τὰς αἰτίας . . . The whole affair is shadowy; but we do not perhaps need to go as far as SCHWAHN and reject the whole episode, or as BRIANT and change the chronology to fit in with Diodorus.<sup>138</sup> It is indeed incredible that Ptolemy, after getting control of Alexander's body by cloak and dagger methods, should have been prepared to take the risk of appearing in person in a court constituted by Perdiccas to answer charges raised by him. Nevertheless, we do not have Arrian's full text, and in any case Photius' epitome does not necessarily imply a personal appearance by Ptolemy, only effective representation of his point of view. If we accept the basic historicity of the accusation, Photius' text certainly implies, by its mention of *πλήθος*, that a mass meeting of some kind was the scene of the affair: in the circumstances, only an army meeting seems to come into question, an army meeting which, however, did not do what Perdiccas asked it to do and which further demonstrates the political weakness of Perdiccas, which had already set in before the Egyptian expedition.<sup>139</sup>

The use of mass meetings as ad hoc courts seems to have rapidly found favour. After Perdiccas' death <the Macedonians> condemned to death Eumenes and fifty of his best-known followers, among them Perdiccas' brother Alcetas, and killed off Perdiccas' closest friends and his sister Atalante, who were unfortunate enough to be present in Egypt.<sup>140</sup> When the meeting began, Diodorus describes it as an *ἐκκλησία*, which can only be interpreted as a mass meeting.<sup>141</sup> It seems clear that none of the officers present was himself prepared to risk the odium of taking an action which all would have greeted; but no future difficulty on this issue could be anticipated from the army, if the soldiers themselves seemed to have taken the critical decisions. Similar considerations will have played a part with Cassander, when he had Olympias condemned by a meeting which Diodorus calls *κοινὴ τῶν Μακεδόνων ἐκκλησία*, Justin a *contio* of the *populus*.<sup>142</sup> The

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<sup>138</sup> Arr. Succ. F 1, 28; F. SCHWAHN, *Klio* 23, 1930, 231, who identified the source as Duris of Samos; BRIANT, 263 ff.

<sup>139</sup> I traced the increasing weakness of Perdiccas' position in 321 in *JHS* 90, 1970, 64–5, without, however, giving due weight to this failure at a vital moment to mobilise the army as a political weapon against Ptolemy. BRIANT, 264–5, argues that Ptolemy's <acquittal> is an impossibility, which renders the chronology of Arrian/Photius suspect, since Perdiccas would never have made such an attempt had he not been sure of the result. But this would not be the first occasion on which Perdiccas had recently misjudged the mood of the troops: the serious riot over the murder of Cynnane lay only a few months back; and the whole course of the Egyptian invasion suggests lack of enthusiasm in his army for its task, which is indeed also commented on here by Arrian: ὄμως καὶ τοῦ πλήθους οὐχ ἐκόντος πολεμεῖ.

<sup>140</sup> Diod. 18, 37.

<sup>141</sup> Diod. 18, 36, 6.

<sup>142</sup> Diod. 19, 51, 1–2; Justin 14, 6, 6.

precise composition of the meeting cannot now be discovered: doubtless elements of Cassander's army made up an influential part of it.<sup>143</sup> Certainly Olympias herself, according to Diodorus, seems to have claimed that its composition was partisan and Cassander's attempt to persuade her to flee so that *he* might avoid the odium of responsibility for her elimination points firmly in that direction. Not that we need to imagine that Olympias' alleged declaration, that she was prepared ἐν πᾶσι Μακεδόσι κριθῆναι means that such a gathering of all Macedonians had ever existed: it was merely, it seems, her (or Hieronymus' or Diodorus') way of drawing attention to the arbitrary character of Cassander's proceeding.<sup>144</sup> Cassander's technique fits neatly into the general practice of these years. Nor was this, apparently, the first occasion on which he had used it. Polyaeus mentions an ἐκκλησία at which Nicanor, the Macedonian governor of Munychia, in 318 was condemned to death. GRANIER is certainly right to think that an Athenian ἐκκλησία is here impossible: the only alternative is a mass meeting of troops friendly to Cassander.<sup>145</sup>

Antigonus was also not disinclined to employ his supporters to provide him with a propaganda platform. The best known occasion is the meeting at Tyre in 314 which condemned Cassander and approved Antigonus' policy of <freeing> the Greeks. We are fortunate that Diodorus' report of this meeting is precise with regard to its composition. It was not simply a meeting of the troops but τῶν τε στρατιωτῶν καὶ τῶν παρεπιδημούντων κοινὴ ἐκκλησία,<sup>146</sup> that is, its composition was in no way limited: all who might be expected to support Antigonus' point of view were called together; whether they were soldier or civilian was irrelevant. It was, it would seem, precisely the same type of mixture as Cassander had assembled to condemn Olympias, or as, earlier, Alexander himself had brought together for his public hearing of Philotas. They represented nobody but themselves. For the dynast what mattered above all was that *his* troops and *his* people would support him. Whereas for Alexander, equipped with his traditional office and his personal aura of military invincibility, it had been sufficient to win a general idea of the climate of opinion at a meeting, for the *diadochoi*, each struggling to build up and maintain his own personal position, it was desirable to bind their followers by making them formally responsible for critical decisions. The real point of the declaration of Tyre is lost if we fail

<sup>143</sup> So BRIANT, 297.

<sup>144</sup> Diod. 19, 51, 4. BRIANT, 298–9, lays great emphasis on this incident, without, however, paying attention to the nature of the source. He regards it as *proof* that a civil <people's assembly> existed: «C'est au nom de ce *nomos* (i. e. Macedonian traditions, as argued by AYMARD) qu'elle exige la convocation de tous les Macédoniens.» But the text will not bear this weight.

<sup>145</sup> Polyaeus 4, 11, 2; GRANIER, 85–6, though, of course, he interprets this in terms of the alleged constitutional rights of the Heeresversammlung.

<sup>146</sup> Diod. 19, 61, 1. On the date, normally given as 315, see my article in *Hermes* 1977, 482 f. and 496 f.

to appreciate that the meeting did not claim to represent «the Macedonian people» in any way, but was saying that it bound itself to the views and the policy of Antigonos. This was what mattered to Antigonos above all: not that he could claim that «the Macedonians» necessarily supported his policy (this would, in any case, have been of dubious propaganda value, since the Macedonians in Macedonia seem to have supported Cassander), but that he, his friends, and his opponents knew that his Macedonians<sup>147</sup> (and other supporters) supported it, indeed, had committed themselves publicly to it. This was the point of the exercise, this was the message which he broadcast – and the message which his new ally, Alexander son of Polyperchon, took back with him to the Peloponnese.<sup>148</sup>

The number and importance of the decisions entrusted to or taken by mass meetings during the twenty years after Alexander's death seems to stand in direct relationship to the influence and reputation of the individual dynasts. Perdikkas, in his initial weakness after Alexander's death, let important decisions be taken by mass meetings; and two important occasions before the mutiny in which he died, on which he failed to test his prestige before taking a decision, demonstrate the soundness of the generalisation: one was the failed attempt to condemn Ptolemy before the Egyptian invasion, which we have already looked at; the other occurred a little earlier at Sardis in 321, when Cynnane brought her daughter Adea/Eurydice to marry Philip Arrhidaios. Perdikkas opposed the marriage and had Cynnane assassinated by Alketas. The result was a riot among the troops which forced upon him the very marriage which Perdikkas had wanted to prevent.<sup>149</sup> Another prime instance of the weakness of most leaders at this time is the whole series of events following the murder of Perdikkas. Ptolemy was more or less in control of the situation; but since he had no ambitions to lead the royal army himself in the vain task of maintaining the unity of the empire, he seems to have seen his only way of avoiding this in the employment of a mass meeting of Perdikkas' army to appoint Peithon and Arrhidaios as temporary regents of the kings, to have Eumenes and the absent Perdikkas

<sup>147</sup> Cf. Diod. 19, 62, 1: τὰ δεδογμένα τοῖς μετ' Ἀντιγόνου Μακεδόσι.

<sup>148</sup> GRANIER, 95–6, argued on the basis of Polyaeus 4, 6, 14 that Antigonos had already before Tyre used a mass meeting (Heeresversammlung) to condemn Peithon, the satrap of Media. Polyaeus' text is, however, not clear. He writes: Ἀντίγονος δὲ ἐξ τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Μακεδόνων ἐσαγαγὼν Πίθωνα ἑλὼν τιμωρησάμενος ἀπέκτεινεν, where his phrase, τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Μακεδόνων is unique. Diodorus' account is more specific: ὁ δὲ κυριεύσας τοῦ σώματος καὶ κατηγορίαν ποιησάμενος ἐν τοῖς μετέχουσι τοῦ συνεδρίου ὁμολογῶς κατεδίκασε καὶ παραχορῆμα ἀπέκτεινεν (19, 46, 4). Since Diodorus' source Hieronymus was with Antigonos at the time, Diodorus' precision is likely to be based on good information. In which case this is not an instance of the army's performing as a law-court.

<sup>149</sup> Arr. Succ. F 1, 22–3; Diod. 19, 52, 5; cf. JHS 90, 1970, 64–5; BRIANT, 177 ff.

condemned to death, and to have Atalante and other present Perdiccans killed off.<sup>150</sup>

That the army now thought itself responsible for the formal appointment not only of the kings but also of the regent, that is, not only of the nominal but of the actual ruler – which it had not at Babylon – emerges also clearly from events at Triparadeisos, when Peithon and Arrhidaeus laid down their temporary commands. We do not need here to go into all the details of the events at Triparadeisos.<sup>151</sup> But one aspect needs to be emphasised for our purpose. Antipater, despite his reputation in Macedonia, did not find it easy to control events at Triparadeisos, and there is no doubt that he allowed himself formally to be elected regent by a mass meeting.<sup>152</sup> He doubtless, as a traditionalist Macedonian, felt that what mattered was his acceptance by the other nobles, which he in due course formally received;<sup>153</sup> but, it seems, he had not been able to avoid the popular election, which Ptolemy had just recently invented in order to give Peithon and Arrhidaeus sufficient authority with Perdiccas' army to be able to lead it off Egyptian soil. That Antipater held nothing of this practice should be clear from his own: shortly before his death he personally appointed Polyperchon as guardian of the kings.<sup>154</sup> On home ground in Macedonia itself, despite recent events in the east, there was no need for him to break with authoritarian tradition; and it may be that we can here discover a reason why Cassander was passed over: because for him, the son of Antipater, a consensus of the nobles could not be found.

By far the weakest politically of those who exercised independent commands in these years was Eumenes. As a Greek from Cardia he owed his reputation and such influence as he exercised to his ability and to his appointment as secretary by Alexander, which made him an influential man in the critical days after Alex-

<sup>150</sup> Diod. 18, 36, 2–37.

<sup>151</sup> Cf. JHS 90, 1970, 67 ff.; BRIANT, 229–34; 272–9.

<sup>152</sup> Diod. 18, 39, 2–3: ...συνήγαγον ἐκκλησίαν (Peithon and Arrhidaeus) καὶ τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἀπέειπαντο, οἱ δὲ Μακεδόνες ἐπιμελήτην εἶλοντο τὸν Ἀντίπατρον αὐτοκράτορα.

<sup>153</sup> The formal recognition by the nobles and officers seems to be what Arrian Succ. records at F 1, 33 where, after the riots instigated by Eurydice, in which Antipater was lucky to escape with his life: καὶ οἱ ἵππαρχοι Ἀντιπάτρου καλοῦντος πρὸς αὐτὸν ἦκον, καὶ μόλις τῆς στάσεως πεπαυμένης Ἀντιπάτρον πάλιν, ὡς καὶ πρόσθεν, ἄρχειν εἶλοντο. The riots had shown the popular election to be an unreliable mechanism and were perhaps interpreted by the nobles as in effect amounting to the deposition of Antipater (cf. BRIANT, 277, who interprets this as a formal deposition). The hypothesis which I advanced in JHS 90, 1970, 68 n. 134, that another mass meeting followed this re-election by the *hipparchoi*, does not now seem to me to be necessary. The *hipparchoi* were rather asserting the traditional rights of the nobles, which the rioters had called in question.

<sup>154</sup> Diod. 18, 48, 4.

ander's death.<sup>155</sup> As a Greek among Macedonians, Eumenes could only act as somebody else's representative, and it is hardly surprising that it was precisely Eumenes who seems to have most frequently been compelled to resort to consultation with his troops. Indeed, on two occasions our sources make a direct comparison with democratically ruled cities.<sup>156</sup> It may be that his Greek city-state experience made Eumenes more adaptable to the changed political circumstances than many of the Macedonians, who seem to have been merely waiting for the opportunity to return to traditional authoritarianism; but whatever the reason for his successes, Eumenes' basic political weakness and his constant struggle to maintain his authority, even in connection with purely tactical decisions, are one of the chief characteristics of his activities.

Eumenes was, however, unique in his weakness, which stemmed ultimately from his Greekness. Even then, had Polyperchon dithered less, Eumenes might have himself been more successful. He seems to have been the only first-rate general in the first years after Alexander's death to have had this tactical difficulty. The others, in matters in which they themselves had not taken the initiative, were quite ready to ignore the views of the troops, if Antigonos' attitude may be regarded as typical. His troops besieging Nora in 318 were induced by Eumenes to accept, on the absent Antigonos' behalf, an emended text of a treaty, which Antigonos had drafted as an agreed basis for lifting the siege. Antigonos not only refused to accept the treaty in its emended form but reprimanded his men severely for their action.<sup>157</sup> Disciplinary problems at this level of activity therefore seem to have been virtually a problem of Eumenes alone.

As the new political constellation gradually crystallised, so less and less is heard of the activity of mass meetings; and, with rare exceptions, after Triparadeisos the tumultuary character which the meetings immediately after Alexander's death assumed virtually disappears. The tendency to riot was clearly a creation of the emergency of Babylon. After Triparadeisos the uncertainty was less, and in any case no longer new: armies and generals were learning to live with it. Rebellious elements which had participated in events at Babylon, in Egypt and at Triparadeisos, were separated out from the rest of the army,<sup>158</sup> and the Macedonian generals could, it seems, cope with what remained. As time went on, so grew also the dependence of the troops on their commander, who alone might reward them adequately for their service: this applies especially to

<sup>155</sup> Plut. Eumenes 3.

<sup>156</sup> Plut. Eumenes 13; Diod. 19, 15, 4.

<sup>157</sup> Plut. Eumenes 12.

<sup>158</sup> Arr. Succ. F 1, 38. One might also compare Antigonos' treatment of the 'Silver Shields', whose indiscipline had caused Eumenes such difficulty, after Eumenes' death. These were put under the command of Sibyrtius, governor of Arachosia, who had orders to wear them out and make sure that they never could return to Macedonia or Greek lands: Plut. Eumenes 19.

those who served outside Macedonia with Ptolemy, Antigonus and Seleucus, who were, in effect, cut off from home and whose only hope of personal reward and security over and above their pay lay in their general, who, by the foundation of cities and distribution of land could provide some compensation for their having been caught in the wrong army when Cassander gained control of Macedonia.<sup>159</sup> But even Cassander founded cities, and we have no reason to believe that he did not regard himself as the continuator of the land-distribution policies of Philip and Alexander.<sup>160</sup> The dependence of each army on its general, therefore, created a situation in which, even in political crises, armies usually remained loyal. It is not reported that Cassander suffered difficulties from his own army or followers as a result of his treatment of Olympias, Roxane and Alexander IV: indeed, his army condemned Olympias to death. It was left to the army of his opponent Antigonus to express (for Antigonus' and its own tactical purposes) its objection to Cassander's behaviour.

The one general case of uncertainty, which affected all the dynasts equally, was the death of Alexander IV in 310. Yet it is clear that the uncertainty was merely of a formal nature. Diodorus reports from Hieronymus that all concerned were relieved when this happened;<sup>161</sup> and the formal practical difficulty was solved by continuing to date documents by the posthumous regnal years of Alexander.<sup>162</sup> His death was, at first, formally ignored. Since Alexander had in any case never ruled except as a dating mechanism, this was not immediately particularly troublesome. It was, however, now clear – and Diodorus indicates that this was the chief cause of the dynasts' relief – that no single person now existed who would receive universal recognition as king, even merely nominal recognition, in all sections of the Macedonian empire. The surprise, indeed, for the historian, is that it took quite so long after Alexander IV's death for one of the dynasts to make himself titular as well as *de facto* king in his own domains. The lack of reliable evidence about this process, except for Antigonus and Demetrius, suggests however that the purely formal aspect of the development of the hellenistic monarchies has perhaps been over-valued by modern commentators. Even for Antigonus, the sources – which probably all go back ultimately to Hierony-

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<sup>159</sup> The importance of possessions to these deracinated soldiers is perhaps best demonstrated by the 'Silver Shields' who handed over their general Eumenes to save their baggage (Plut. Eumenes 17–18). This is, of course, by no means a uniquely Macedonian phenomenon, but clearly played a major role.

<sup>160</sup> Sources in V. TSCHEKOWER, *Die hellenistischen Städtegründungen*, Leipzig 1927.

<sup>161</sup> Diod. 19, 105, 3–4.

<sup>162</sup> This is certain for Ptolemy (P. Dem. Louvre 2420 and 2427, of Hathyr of Alexander's 13<sup>th</sup> Egyptian year [Jan.–Feb. 304 BC]) and for Seleucus (the chronicle published by A. J. SACHS and D. J. WISEMAN, *Iraq* 16, 1954, 202–212, reaches year 6 S. E. [306/5] for Alexander). It is unlikely that other dating mechanisms were employed by the other dynasts before they called themselves king.

mus – are not completely satisfactory.<sup>163</sup> What seems to be reasonably certain, however, is that after Demetrius' naval victory over Ptolemy at Cyprian Salamis the decision was taken and the stage for the ceremony of Antigoneia set.

In order to appreciate the real nature of the occasion, we must ask: for whom was the stage set? The answer must be, in the first instance at least, for those who were present. The reports of our sources are dramatised, abbreviated and unreliable: but Plutarch speaks of the *ὄχλος* which accompanied Aristodemus (who is depicted as the bearer of the first news of Demetrius' victory), which he then seems to describe as *πλήθος*; and, as BRIANT has most recently pointed out, this use of words alone does not allow the conclusion that a formal meeting of the army was involved.<sup>164</sup> On a similar previous occasion, the declaration of Tyre, Antigonus explicitly used all soldiers and civilians who happened to be at Tyre to back his policy;<sup>165</sup> and although this is not explicitly stated for Antigoneia, the *prima facie* likelihood is obvious and Plutarch's language strongly suggests it. Antigonus needed, in the first instance, to convince those whom he ruled, among them, most importantly, the population of his capital city. His own prestige was strengthened by Demetrius' victory in Cyprus, perhaps even by spontaneous acclamations of troops on Cyprus;<sup>166</sup> it needed to pass the final test at the hands of the population of Antigoneia.

There can be no question that the demonstrations of the mass meeting at Antigoneia conferred any effective *power* on Antigonus which he did not have before. This was not the point of the exercise and is not suggested by any source. It was recognition of his prestige, not a change in his power, which was expressed by his royal title. The chief importance of the whole business lay rather, I suggest, in the immediate acknowledgement of Demetrius also as βασιλεύς, which Antigonus insisted on, that is, in the regulation of the succession to Antigonus' *de facto* power through the formal association of his son in his power and prestige.<sup>167</sup> Antigonus was already an old man;<sup>168</sup> he might conceivably die at any moment. Before 306 he held no formal <office> which

<sup>163</sup> Fullest recent discussion with citation of sources and literature (though not entirely satisfactory: see my review in JHS 95, 1975, 250–1) by O. MÜLLER, *Antigonos Monophthalmos und «Das Jahr der Könige»*, Bonn 1973, 78 ff. See also BRIANT, 303 ff.

<sup>164</sup> Plut. Demetrius 17, 4; 18, 1. BRIANT, 303 ff.

<sup>165</sup> Diod. 19, 61, 1, see above p. 119 f.

<sup>166</sup> Appian, Syr. 54. The reliability of this brief passage, which alone records this aspect, is, however, dubious.

<sup>167</sup> I can find no trace in any source that the taking of the royal title implied a claim to the formal succession to Alexander (a standard view, most recently argued by MÜLLER, *Antigonos Monophthalmos*, 92–3: for decisive arguments against see my review in JHS 95, 1975, 250–1) or that he thereby claimed the asiatic part, as argued by H.-W. RITTER, *Diadem und Königsherrschaft*, München 1965, 79 ff.

<sup>168</sup> At his death in 301 he was 81: Hieronymus (FGrHist 154) F 8.

could be inherited, and the maintenance of the security of his people and of his power within the family depended on preventing a repetition of events like those at Babylon. It was obviously unthinkable that Demetrius could become βασιλεύς without Antigonus; but the urgency caused by Antigonus' advanced age, made it imperative that Demetrius should also immediately become βασιλεύς. In this way began the practice of association in rule, which was subsequently employed by the Seleucids and Ptolemies, but never again by the Antigonids. This exception, however, finds its explanation easily enough in the fact that the later Antigonids ruled in Macedonia, where there was no history or tradition of such a practice and they adapted themselves to the Macedonian tradition.<sup>169</sup> The urgency of regulating the succession explains why it was Antigonus, in many ways the least secure of the successors (as Ipsus was to show), who first broke the ice of convention by calling himself βασιλεύς. Once he had done it, there was a certain political compulsion for the other dynasts to follow suit, since the title, unless it became widespread, was clearly liable to misinterpretation. Cassander, who ruled a kingdom with a royal tradition, allegedly never recognised the 'royalty' of the others, nor did he use the title for himself in correspondence with them;<sup>170</sup> but the others, in this personal political way created the 'personal' and, therefore shareable title βασιλεύς, which was to play such a part in the hellenistic world. The first objective of Antigonus was, however, primarily to secure the future of his 'kingdom'; and the population of Antigoneia, through its enthusiastic acclamation, seems to have recognised that this lay in its interest. In 306 nobody could have foreseen Ipsus and its devastating effect on the Antigonids.

The general taking of royal titles was a significant formal development in the establishment of the new dynasties; and in the eastern kingdoms of the Ptolemies and Seleucids a normal ordered succession-practice established itself in the course of the third century B. C. Here mass meetings, once the uncertainty caused by the absence of a secure dynastic succession was removed, seem to have played no further part. In Macedonia itself, however, the situation was different. Not so much because the practical tradition whereby mobs, whether military or civilian, tended to take affairs into their own hands, was different – though this tendency certainly affected events – as because a self-perpetuating dynasty, which created formal political security, took much longer to become re-established there; and the uncertainty and insecurity led various groups, various interests (not all of which can be identified) as at Babylon, to assert themselves and to influence events in their own favour. For Cassander and his sons, Philip IV, Antipater and Alexander V we have no satisfactory evidence. Syncellus says indeed that Cassan-

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<sup>169</sup> On the Antigonids, see my paper in: *Ancient Macedonia II*, 1977, 115–122.

<sup>170</sup> Plut. Demetrius 18, 2. He did nevertheless use the title: see my discussion in *JHS* 94, 1974, 23 ff.

der «called himself king for the Macedonians»,<sup>171</sup> but this tells us nothing about his «accession»; and for Philip IV we do not even have so much.

After Philip's death, a mere four months after Cassander's in 297, we receive nevertheless an indication that there seems to have been no question about the succession's not remaining within Cassander's family. The details are obscure; but the key figures were the two surviving sons of Cassander, the elder of whom, Antipater, cannot have been more than sixteen years old, and their mother Thessalonice.<sup>172</sup> According to Justin, Antipater murdered Thessalonice because she favoured Alexander; Plutarch does not give a motive for the murder, but agrees with Justin that Alexander's next step was to summon aid from Pyrrhus and Demetrius. Pyrrhus came quickly and settled affairs for Alexander, at the price of ceding some territory.<sup>173</sup> The general impression we win from this is clear: that the succession would in any case take place within the family of Cassander. The open question was, which of the two boys would succeed; and the mother of the boys was thought to have played a decisive role, though no source says she was formally regent, which is often stated by moderns.<sup>174</sup> Dynastic practice, therefore, seems to have re-asserted itself rapidly in Macedonia after the extermination of the direct line of the Argeads. We must assume that it was at least tolerated by the influential nobles who had supported Cassander – perhaps, not least, because Thessalonice was a daughter of Philip II and her children could be represented as being of Argead blood.<sup>175</sup> Plutarch and Justin know only of a struggle within the royal family, which seems to have been decided in favour of Antipater: Alexander would not otherwise have needed to ask Pyrrhus and Demetrius for help. The precise factors involved cannot now be discovered; but that the struggle was of a traditional sort, comparable perhaps in principle with the struggle of the sons of Alexander I<sup>176</sup> or with Philip II's early difficulties rather than with events following 323, seems clear.

Antipater fled to Lysimachus. When everything seemed happily settled for Alexander, Demetrius arrived. Alexander and his escort met him at Dium, where they reached some kind of agreement. Alexander then escorted Demetrius back as far as Larisa, where Demetrius had Alexander murdered.<sup>177</sup> According to

<sup>171</sup> Syncellus, p. 504 (Bonn): ὁ Κάσανδρος ἑαυτὸν Μακεδόσι βασιλέα ἀνηγόρευσε.

<sup>172</sup> Cassander and Thessalonice in 315: Diod. 19, 52, 1; 61, 2.

<sup>173</sup> Justin 16, 1, 1–6; Plut. Pyrrhus 6, 2–3; Demetrius 36.

<sup>174</sup> E. g. BELOCH, GG IV<sup>2</sup>, 1, 215, who even refers to Euseb. Chron. I 231 (SCHÖNE): but Eusebius has nothing about a regency; P. CLOCHÉ, *La dislocation d'un empire*, Paris 1959, 248; BENTSON, *Griechische Geschichte*<sup>5</sup>, München 1977, 386.

<sup>175</sup> See my comments on this, obviously deliberate, aspect of Cassander's policy in: *Alexandre le Grand: image et réalité* (Entretiens de la Fondation Hardt), Genève 1976, 147–8.

<sup>176</sup> On this see e. g. GEYER, *Makedonien bis Philipp*, 50 ff.

<sup>177</sup> Plut. Demetrius 36–37, 1.

Plutarch, Demetrius then appeared before the army and escort of Alexander, who promptly acclaimed him king. Plutarch speaks of οἱ Μακεδόνες, but the context makes it certain that he means «the Macedonians in Alexander's army who were present».<sup>178</sup> Justin begins his account: *occupatoque Macedoniae regno caedem apud exercitum excusaturus in contionem vocat*; he then offers a speech by Demetrius (in indirect speech) and ends: *per haec mitigato populo rex Macedoniae appellatur*.<sup>179</sup> The differences between Plutarch and Justin are slight, and it seems likely that Justin (or Trogus) has telescoped events by omitting the journey to Larisa (he does not localise the murder of Alexander at all) and interpreted the result of Alexander's death (wrongly, as it happens) as *occupato Macedoniae regno*. His further account makes it clear that this was not the same thing as the acclamation, since he places that after Demetrius' speech, just as in Plutarch. It seems very likely, therefore, that the two texts are trying to tell the same story, and that Justin's *contio* was, in his ultimate source, the meeting of Alexander's escort at Larisa, although Justin seems not to know this. Even as the passage stands, however, no distinction can be drawn between *exercitus* and *populus*: the two words are used to describe the same meeting.

We do not know the precise composition of Alexander's escort, but no royal entourage could be complete without a substantial number of the «friends» – they were at least sufficient to compose the company of the dinner party, as a result of which Alexander's murder took place. How large the purely military contingent was, we cannot tell; but the decision which the meeting of the escort took was clearly taken under pressure. It was thus a decision which, whatever the precise composition of the escort, cannot have been representative of Macedonia in general; it was taken not in Macedonia but in Thessaly, and under the pressure of a superior army. The occasion was unique. The whole travelling court had been captured by a competitor at one blow. Important, however, are the reasons why Demetrius insisted on being acclaimed by this obviously unrepresentative body, and why its decision was widely accepted when the combined forces reached Macedonia. These are not given by the sources; but it is difficult to imagine that the most important factor was not the circumstance that the meeting at Larisa included the royal council of «friends», that group of influential nobles which normally tried to control Macedonian affairs, within the framework of the royal apparatus. Had Demetrius merely needed the acclamation of an army, he could doubtless have had it from his own at any time: acceptance by the most important nobles on the other hand he could only hope to win by immediate compulsion. Demetrius' military power and reputation will doubtless have been a major contributory factor to his wider ac-

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<sup>178</sup> «The Macedonians» who are confused and frightened (37, 1) are contrasted with «the Macedonians at home» (37, 2).

<sup>179</sup> Justin 16, 1, 9; 18.

ceptance within Macedonia: Lysimachus soon gave up representing the interests of Antipater and made peace with Demetrius.<sup>180</sup> But if the most influential nobles had already made their peace with Demetrius before he entered Macedonia – though under pressure – it is clear that serious resistance within the country, when even Lysimachus was prepared to tolerate Demetrius, would have been particularly difficult to organise.

A similar incident seems to have been responsible for Demetrius' losing the kingship in Macedonia. In 288 Pyrrhus and Lysimachus invaded Macedonia with the intention of driving Demetrius out. Pyrrhus arrived at and occupied Beroea, and made such a good job of creating enthusiasm for himself in the ranks of Demetrius' army which came to oppose him that, according to Plutarch, certain men (τινες) advised Demetrius that he would be well advised to give up his kingdom and make his escape, which he duly did: ἐπελθὼν δὲ ὁ Πύρρος ἀμαχεῖ παρέλαβε τὸ στρατόπεδον καὶ βασιλεὺς ἀνηγορεύθη Μακεδόνων.<sup>181</sup> Plutarch's account of the acclamation is too general to allow us to penetrate far behind it; but it is clear that Plutarch's view was that the acclamation was by the army. The general similarities with Demetrius' acclamation at Larisa, however, cannot be overlooked: a whole royal army suddenly lost its king and acclaimed his competitor. As with Demetrius at Larisa, Pyrrhus could doubtless have had himself acclaimed, either by his own army or by the enthusiastic population of occupied Beroea, if he had wanted to. But this, I suggest, would not have given him the result he required. If Plutarch's two accounts are accurate, the 'certain men' (who appear in both versions) who in the end advised Demetrius to escape, can probably only have been senior advisers. This, in turn, suggests that Pyrrhus' acclamation by Demetrius' army was important, not so much in itself but because it was made possible by his already having won over many of the most influential nobles.

A partial confirmation of this hypothesis may be found in the way in which Lysimachus in 284 drove Pyrrhus out of Macedonia again. We have already examined the incident in connection with Lysimachus' accession: Plutarch reports that Lysimachus corrupted, with letters and conversations, τοὺς πρώτους τῶν Μακεδόνων, whereupon, when many had been won over, Pyrrhus abandoned Macedonia.<sup>182</sup> The critical importance of the πρώτοι as king makers in Macedonia we have already discussed and established beyond reasonable doubt. What concerns us here, however, is Plutarch's comment on the affair: ἀποβαλὼν Μακε-

<sup>180</sup> Justin 16, 1, 19.

<sup>181</sup> Plut. Pyrrhus 11, 3 f., cf. Demetrius 44. In the Demetrius Plutarch does not explicitly mention Pyrrhus' acclamation, since he was there primarily interested in what happened to Demetrius. Apart from such differences in balance the two accounts are virtually identical. For a detailed discussion of these events and the suggestion that Beroea had a particular importance for the Antigonids see EDSON, HSPH 45, 1934, 213–246, esp. 236 ff.

<sup>182</sup> Plut. Pyrrhus 12, 6; cf. above, p. 101.

δονίαν ᾧ τρόπῳ παρέλαβεν.<sup>183</sup> Given the context, we should perhaps not despise the comment merely as a moralising commonplace. Pyrrhus lost Macedonia, Plutarch says explicitly, through losing the support of the πρώτοι: the implication is, therefore, that he had also won it through gaining the support of the πρώτοι. This aspect, seems, in fact, to be implicit in Plutarch's whole account of Pyrrhus' expulsion, for the objections to the recent behaviour of the πρώτοι, which Plutarch ascribes to Lysimachus, are chiefly that *they* had earlier chosen Pyrrhus and rejected Lysimachus.<sup>184</sup> This can only refer to Pyrrhus' winning over Demetrius' army and supporters at Beroea in 288/7. Once again, therefore, the acclamation by the army seems to have been of secondary importance: what usually mattered in Macedonia, as in the past, was still the support of the great men of the land.

The death of Lysimachus 281/0 marks the beginning of a period of six years which Eusebius, after Porphyry, classified as ἀναρχία, thus indicating that no one of the known rulers of this period was recognised as king over the whole country.<sup>185</sup> The *anarchia* came to an end with the accession of Antigonus Gonatas, about the details of which, however, we have no reliable information. Of the very short-lived «rulers» who are recorded for the *anarchia*, Ptolemy Ceraunus, Meleager, Antipater Etesias and Sosthenes, the first three claimed to be king, since each was related to a royal house. Sosthenes, however, according to Justin, was *unus ex principibus* who achieved certain successes against the Gauls: *ob quae virtutis beneficia multis nobilebus regnum Macedoniae adfectantibus ignobilis ipse praepositur, et cum rex ab exercitu appellatus esset, ipse non in regis, sed in ducis nomen iurare milites compulit.*<sup>186</sup> Sosthenes' reasons for refusal can only be guessed at; but a clue may perhaps be found at the beginning of the same sentence of Justin, where he says that many nobles were striving for the crown. This will inevitably have meant that a nobles' consensus which, as we have repeatedly seen, was the essential precondition for success, would not be available for Sosthenes, however successful he might be against the Gauls; in this situation, I would suggest, the views of his army were encouraging, but for practical purposes irrelevant.<sup>187</sup>

<sup>183</sup> Ib. 7.

<sup>184</sup> Ib. 6: ὄνειδίζων εἰ ξένον ἄνδρα καὶ προγόνων αἰεὶ δεδουλευκότων Μακεδόσι δεσπότην ἐλόμενοι τοὺς Ἀλεξάνδρου φίλους καὶ συνήθεις ἀπωθοῦσι Μακεδονίας.

<sup>185</sup> Euseb. Chron. I p. 235 (SCHÖNE). After listing Ptolemy Ceraunus, Meleager, Antipater Etesias and Sosthenes he comments: καὶ γίνεται ἀναρχία Μακεδόσι διὰ τὸ τοὺς περὶ Ἀντίπατρον καὶ Πτολεμαίων καὶ Ἀριδαίων ἀντιποιεῖσθαι μὲν τῶν πραγμάτων, ὄλοσχερῶς δὲ μηδένα προστῆναι. He then dates the ἀναρχία from Ol. 124,4 to 126, that is six years from 281/0 to 276/5. This comes from Porphyry: see the Armenian version of Eusebius in KARST's translation in Porphyry (FGrHist 260) F 3, 11, where an identical version may be found. Arrhidaeus is otherwise unknown.

<sup>186</sup> Justin 24, 5, 12–14.

<sup>187</sup> A similar argument by BRIANT 324–5 (who also discusses earlier unsatisfactory

Of the three other short-time rulers during the *anarchia*, only for Ptolemy Ceraunus do we possess a moderately informative account. Photius' epitome of Memnon of Heraclea records the following: after Ceraunus' murder of Seleucus, he fled to Lysimacheia, where he began to wear a diadem. With an impressive escort he returned to the army (that is, to Seleucus' army). Those who had formerly been subjects of Seleucus accepted him by force of circumstances and called him *basileus*.<sup>188</sup> The prologue to Trogus book XVII records: *creatus ab exercitu rex*.

What does this mean? Since Porphyry must have had reason for including the few months of Ceraunus' rule in his six years of *anarchia*, Ceraunus can never have been universally accepted as king in Macedonia, that is, acknowledged by a consensus of Macedonian nobles. Now he already wore a diadem before he was acclaimed by Seleucus' troops; and on his formal visit to them he was accompanied by an impressive escort, which he had collected at Lysimacheia. This was clearly an escort of those who were prepared to acknowledge his kingship. The initial and decisive formal step must, therefore, have been taken at Lysimacheia, to which Ceraunus fled (φεύγει) after the murder of Seleucus and where he might indeed reasonably have expected to be accepted by Lysimachus' people and garrison.<sup>189</sup> What, then, was the function of the return visit to Seleucus' army? Clearly, to win it over for his own purposes, that is, to extort recognition from Seleucus' stranded and potentially dangerous troops that *they* would accept him – which they reluctantly did. But they represented nobody but themselves,<sup>190</sup> and were not even the first to acknowledge Ceraunus' kingship. From the point of view of constitutional practice, therefore, Ceraunus' acclamation by Seleucus' expeditionary force had no significance and was not generally recognised in Macedonia: why, indeed, should it have been? Its significance is limited to the

views), concludes rightly that «l'acclamation de l'armée victorieuse ne pouvait suffire à conférer le titre de roi». But this is far from proving his thesis that a popular assembly possessed this competence, as he seems to think (esp. pp. 326–7).

<sup>188</sup> Memnon of Heraclea (FGrHist 434) F 8, 3: πρὸς Λυσιμαχείαν φεύγει ἐν ἧ διαδήμα περιθήμενος μετὰ λαμπρᾶς δορυφορίας κατέβαινε εἰς τὸ στρατεύμα, δεχομένων αὐτὸν ὑπὸ τῆς ἀνάγκης καὶ βασιλεία καλούντων οἱ πρότερον Σελεύω ὑπήκουον. Useful recent discussion with earlier literature in H. HEINEN, Untersuchungen zur hellenistischen Geschichte des 3. Jahrhunderts v. Chr., Historia Einzelschriften 20, Wiesbaden 1972, 61 ff.

<sup>189</sup> We do not necessarily need to think of an acclamation, as HEINEN, op. cit., 63. Acceptance by the chief men and army officers would be entirely adequate for his purpose.

<sup>190</sup> This would be true, even if Seleucus' expeditionary force had been partially composed of the troops of Lysimachus which had been defeated at Corupedion. But this is in no source, though it has often been maintained by moderns, especially by C. F. LEHMANN-HAUPT, Klio 7, 1907, 450 f.

immediate military and political efforts of Ceraunus to gather an army in order to impress those who mattered in Macedonia.<sup>191</sup>

The remaining figures in the *anarchia* are so little known that nothing significant for our investigation emerges. The cases of Ceraunus and Sosthenes, however, seem to show that the opinion was becoming established, at least in some circles, that what *ought* to matter in Macedonia were the view of the strongest army or group. This situation has certain resemblances to the position at Babylon in 323, which, we have seen, is directly traceable to the political uncertainty caused by Alexander's death. Here the cause and the character of the chaos were different; but a similar kind of uncertainty existed.<sup>192</sup> It might, therefore, not be unreasonable to take the view that Meleager, the brother of Ptolemy Ceraunus, who in some sense succeeded him and ruled for two months before being expelled by 'Macedonians' ὡς ἀνάξιον φανέντα and his successor, Antipater Etesias, who was expelled by Sosthenes ὡς ἀδύνατον στρατηγεῖν were recognised by some army or group and rejected by others.<sup>193</sup> But the briefness of their 'rule' and Porphyry's inclusion of them all in the *anarchia* show clearly that none received that general acknowledgement which was essential for long-term success. Justin's declaration that *many* nobles were anxious to become king and Eusebius' mention of an otherwise unknown Arrhidaeus, whom he does not even include in his lists, but who was a competitor of Ptolemy and Antipater during the *anarchia*, demonstrate the chaotic uncertainty into which Macedonia had fallen, from which only the powerful self-assertion of Antigonus Gonatas and the re-establishment of regular dynastic succession freed it.

## VI. Conclusion

The purpose of this paper has been to lay some scholarly ghosts and to demonstrate some aspects of the functioning of the Macedonian state under the monarchy. In normal times, as far as the sources allow us to see, Macedonia had no formal or regular assembly of people or army with rights acquired by tradition and acknowledged by the nobles and kings. The evidence on which this traditional view has been based is inadequate to support it. Within the general framework of a dynastic succession, in which primogeniture played the most important role, the factors which controlled succession to the kingship were two: first, acknowledgement by a consensus of nobles (which may or may not

<sup>191</sup> So, in general, HEINEN, *op. cit.* 63.

<sup>192</sup> See the manumission at Beroea, apparently dated posthumously by years of rule of Demetrius Poliorcetes to either 280/79 or 279/78: SEG 12, 314 and my paper in: *Ancient Macedonia II*, 1977, 115–122.

<sup>193</sup> Euseb. Chron. I 235 (SCHÖNE).

have had a formal character) such as is indicated by the accessions of Antigonus Doson and Lysimachus, by the attempt of the nobles and officers to regulate the succession at Babylon after Alexander's death, and by the incident of Antigonus, son of Echecrates. Secondly, the willingness of «the people», whether formally organised in army or merely casually composing occasional pressure groups, to accept the instructions of their king. In normal circumstances this activity was usually quite unimportant and played merely a minor role (or no role at all, when general acceptance prevented riots from occurring). In the military crises, however, which played a regular part in Macedonian history, the prestige and influence of the king among «the people» or the soldiers, which Curtius, using early imperial terminology, described as *auctoritas*, was a critical factor in conditioning their willingness to do what they were told. Kings who cared about their position or who were, for any reason, unsure of themselves at their accession, did their best to establish this influence through personal contact with various sections of the population and (if possible) through immediate military success: the travels and meetings of Philip II, the meeting (or meetings) recorded for Alexander the Great and the attempt of Argaeus to win the population of Aegae for his hopeless cause are indicative of this. If, for any reason, they failed, riot or mutiny could make life so uncomfortable that flight might be necessary, as with Amyntas III and as might have happened to Antigonus Doson; or, the arrangement which the nobles had agreed amongst themselves might have to be changed or abandoned, as with the deposition of the child Amyntas IV and accession of Philip II, as with the riots at Babylon after the death of Alexander the Great. That groups of individuals, whether nobles or commoners, should wish and should try to put pressure on the king and on each other, seems thus to have been a normal part of Macedonian political life. This does not, however, mean that it was an acknowledged right: a right to riot and mutiny is merely a recipe for chaos.

The functioning of a king's prestige and power has also been examined in the unusual years of Alexander's expedition and the wars of the successors. Alexander struggled, at times against heavy odds, to maintain the Macedonian king's traditional right to take decisions on his own initiative; at his death his own actions and his overwhelming prestige made it in practice impossible for the *diadochoi* at first to assert themselves in this traditional way. In these years, beginning at Babylon in 323 immediately after Alexander's death, the army (or armies), as a direct result of the general emergency and in particular of the lack of prestige of the individual leaders, won for itself (themselves) a practical influence and decision-taking competence which, for a short time, was the decisive factor in Macedonian politics. This extraordinary phase did not last very long: as soon as each of the *diadochoi* achieved sufficient personal prestige with his own subjects and within his own area of authority, he returned at once to traditional Macedonian authoritarianism: only in Macedonia itself did the political uncertainty

last into the third century, and with the accession of Antigonus Gonatas here too authoritarian normality returned.<sup>194</sup>

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<sup>194</sup> This article, in various preliminary forms, has been the subject of several lectures: to the Trier meeting of the Mommsen-Gesellschaft (April, 1974), at Harvard University and before the Marburger Gelehrten-gesellschaft; it has also constituted the material for a Marburg colloquium. I am grateful for the contributions of those who participated in these discussions and to CHRISTIAN HABICHT, who kindly read a preliminary version of the whole. The Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, provided a congenial environment for its completion.

