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R. P. DUNCAN-JONES

## Metic Numbers in Periclean Athens\*

In Pericles' speech describing Athens' strength at the outset of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides gives a total of 29,000 hoplites, citizen and metic, a figure substantially corroborated by Diodorus. Thucydides states that 13,000 form the citizen field army. The remaining 16,000 who garrisoned the forts and guarded the 17 miles of wall, were a) the youngest and oldest citizen hoplites, and b) metics of hoplite census.<sup>1</sup> Whatever demographic model we employ to extract the total number of citizen hoplites, the implications of the figures as they stand are likely to be much the same: citizens account for only 60% of the hoplites, and the residue is about 40%.<sup>2</sup> If we believe Thucydides to be accurate in such matters, we can either accept his figures and anything that they imply, or try to modify the figures, as BELOCH did.<sup>3</sup>

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\* I should especially like to thank Mr G. T. GRIFFITH for helpful and constructive comments. Dr R. SMITH kindly gave advice about demographic models. I should also like to thank Professor J. K. DAVIES, Professor A. J. GRAHAM and Mr G. E. M. DE SAINTE CROIX for their comments on another version of this paper. None of those who have helped me are responsible for any views expressed here.

<sup>1</sup> 2, 13, 6-7. Thucydides justifies what he evidently recognises as a high garrison total by following it with an explanation of the length of each of the four portions of wall which were kept under guard (148 stadia in all or about 17 miles). The sense of the passage surely makes clear that 16,000 is intended as the combined total of those «in the forts and on the walls», and that Thucydides is not making Pericles dilute the force of his own remarks by omitting to give any figure for the forts. GOMME nevertheless assumed that an additional figure for the fort-garrisons must be restored. He arbitrarily assigned them a total of 500-1,000 on top of Thucydides' figure (*The Population of Athens in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries B.C.* 1933, 5-6; *Historical Commentary on Thucydides II*, 1956, 35). Cf. J. DE ROMILLY, *Budé Thucydides*, II, 90.

<sup>2</sup> Though M. CLERC, *Les métèques athéniens*, 1893, 369, drew his analogy from the population of nineteenth century France, his estimate of metic hoplite numbers (11,750) is close to those based here on the Princeton life tables (see Table 1). For the uses of model life-tables, cf. E. VAN DE WALLE, *Annales de démographie historique*, 1972, 153-177 and 225-7.

<sup>3</sup> J. BELOCH, *Bevölkerung der griechisch-römischen Welt*, 1886, 65-6 (changing 16,000 to 6,000); for a time he abandoned that conjecture (*Klio* 5, 1905, 356-74), though he never accepted the figure as it stood. See A. W. GOMME, *Class. Quarterly* 21, 1927, 142-150 at 143.

Rejecting the hoplite figures as transmitted, on the ground that single manuscript figures may be corrupt, is difficult to reconcile with the fact that Diodorus, whose version presumably derives from Ephorus, gives what are substantially the same numbers. Diodorus's figures are still sufficiently different to suggest that he is not merely copying Thucydides. Diodorus's total is the same, 29,000; but the field army is 1,000 smaller, and the garrison 1,000 larger than in Thucydides.<sup>4</sup>

If as suggested below, Thucydides' figures imply the existence of some 12,000 metic hoplites, this would still have little interest from a military point of view, since there is no real evidence that Athens used metic hoplites in battle to a significant extent. But it could throw an interesting light on the composition of Athens' permanent population at the start of the Peloponnesian War. If metics were to account for 2 men out of every 5 among those of hoplite wealth, lower down the social scale the metic element could be larger. Metics were immigrants without political rights, and were presumably less likely than citizens to be in a position of economic advantage.<sup>5</sup> An eventual implication might be that metics made up as much as half the free resident population of Athens.

If there is little in the evidence we have that corroborates such high metic numbers, there is also little that contradicts them. In the fleet, the sources seem to show that non-Athenians predominated. Pericles is only made to claim that the pilots (*kybernetai*) were citizens, and he speaks of the danger that the Peloponnesians might buy up Athens' naval mercenaries.<sup>6</sup> Thucydides makes the Corinthians say that the majority of Athens' crews were foreign; other evidence for Athenian naval crews also argues a large slave element among the rowers.<sup>7</sup> Nicias's speech to the crews in Sicily can be taken to imply that they were predominantly metic. And Pseudo-Xenophon ascribes the presence of metics in Athens partly to *nautikon*.<sup>8</sup>

#### *Analysis of the hoplite figures*

Thucydides gives a total for the hoplite field army of 13,000. The remaining 16,000 are youngest and oldest citizens of hoplite wealth, and metics of hoplite wealth.<sup>9</sup> 'The youngest' are evidently the ephebes, youths of 18 and 19; the field army itself seems to have been made up of the years 20-49, and 'the oldest' seem to be men of

<sup>4</sup> 12, 40, 4, cf. GOMME, loc. cit.

<sup>5</sup> GOMME was reluctant to think that «there were more poor metics than rich» (GOMME 1933 [n. 1], 25 n. 7).

<sup>6</sup> Thuc. 1, 143, 1. Cf. K. WELWEI, *Unfreie im antiken Kriegsdienst I*, 1974, 68.

<sup>7</sup> 1, 121, 3; B. JORDAN, *The Athenian Navy in the Classical Period*, 1975, 240-264.

<sup>8</sup> Thuc. 7, 63, 3-4, interpreted by the scholiast as a reference to metics; Ps.-Xen. *Ath. Pol.* 1, 12.

<sup>9</sup> 2, 13, 6-7.

50–59.<sup>10</sup> Athenian citizen population was apparently growing in Pericles' time; Thucydides calls Athens the most populous state in Greece.<sup>11</sup> If we assume growth in the citizen population of the order of 1% per year, and use the closest approximations to this in the Princeton life-tables, the metic residue remains 42–43% of the total, whether the life-expectation at birth of citizens is assumed to be 20 or 40 years. In general it is unlikely that a Mediterranean population before any modern medical advances would have had an average life-expectation at birth of much more than 30.<sup>12</sup> But even a figure of 40 years makes little difference to the implied metic total, as Table 1 shows.

TABLE 1  
*Projections of citizen and metic numbers in the hoplite force*

	Life-expectation at birth = 19.9 Population growth (citizens) = 0.7% per year	Life-expectation at birth = 40.6 Population growth (citizens) = 1.1% per year
1. Ages 20–49 (field- army of 13,000) as % of all ages	39.53	40.44
2. Ages 18–19, 50–59 as % of all ages	10.67	11.89
3. Citizens aged 18– 59 (line 1 + line 2)	16,509 (57%)	16,822 (58%)
line 1		
multiplied by 13,000		
4. Residue (metics)	12,491 (43%)	12,178 (42%)
5. Hoplite total	<u>29,000 (100%)</u>	<u>29,000 (100%)</u>

Age-ratios from A. J. COALE and P. DEMENY, *Regional model life-tables*, Princeton 1966, Model South, p. 824 and p. 842.

*The role of metics in the Peloponnesian War*

It would be reasonable to expect a priori that if a force of some 12,000 metic hoplites existed in 431, almost equalling the citizen field army, this force would

<sup>10</sup> BELOCH 1886 (n. 3), 61–2. JONES's view that the garrison numbers may have included cleruchs is not convincing (A. H. M. JONES, *Athenian Democracy*, 1960, 177; see GOMME 1956 [n. 1], 38).

<sup>11</sup> 1, 80, 3; Plutarch, *Pericles* 11, 5; cf. Xen. *Hell.* 2, 3, 24 and Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 25, 1.

<sup>12</sup> For example A. LAIOU-THOMADAKIS, *Peasant Society in the Late Byzantine Empire*, 1977, 276, estimates a life-expectation at birth of 25 years for a Macedonian rural popula-



have played an important part in the war, all the more since Athens was soon hit by a plague which severely reduced her citizen land-army. Yet seven years after the outbreak of the war, Athens does not seem to have assembled more than 7,000 hoplites for the battle of Delium, when citizens, metics and *xenoi* were all conscripted on a basis which Thucydides calls *pandemei*.<sup>13</sup> At least 3,000 metic hoplites were included in the force that had invaded the Megarid in 431. Thucydides also says that metics were included in the army embarked to ravage the Peloponnese in 428.<sup>14</sup> Apart from these three allusions, there is no mention of metics in the account of land-fighting in the Peloponnesian War.<sup>15</sup>

This evidence does not serve to demonstrate that metics were normally used in the striking force.

1. The metic contribution at Delium in 424 can have amounted to very little. Despite plague losses recorded as 4,400 citizen hoplites, the 7,000 hoplites that Athens apparently put on the field at Delium could not have represented much more than the surviving part of the original *citizen* force of 13,000 hoplites.<sup>16</sup>
2. The 3,000 or more metics taken to the Megarid in 431 were called out at a time when 3,000 citizen hoplites were away fighting at Potidea. The invasion itself seems only to have been a «razzia» or ravaging expedition, as CLERC pointed out. The metics were probably used only because full numbers were wanted for a formal show of strength in a central arena during the first campaigning season, at a time when those numbers could not be made up from citizens alone.<sup>17</sup>
3. In 428 when metics and citizens of the two lower census classes were embarked to ravage the Peloponnese, 52 ships and their war crews were already out on campaign, 40 at Lesbos, and 12 with Asopicus.<sup>18</sup> Consequently, it took a special effort to find troops to send on the further 100 ships that were now despatched. This again is a case where metics were included in a striking force under unusual circumstances.

Since we have no evidence for the inclusion of metics in major land-campaigns save Delium, where their contribution appears to have been slight, it seems that metics were not part of Athens' normal striking force. As CLERC observed, the separation between a citizen field army and a partly metic garrison in Thucydides'

tion in the fourteenth century (also using the South model in the Princeton tables, based on populations of southern Europe). For a possible suggestion of a life-expectation at birth of about 27 in Roman Egypt, see K. HOPKINS, *Population Studies* 20, 1966, 264 n. 33.

<sup>13</sup> 4, 90, 1; 93, 3-94, 1.

<sup>14</sup> 2, 31, 1-2. 3, 16, 1.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. D. WHITEHEAD, *The Ideology of the Athenian Metic*, 1977, 82.

<sup>16</sup> 3, 87, 3. See Appendix below.

<sup>17</sup> CLERC (n. 2) 48; JONES (n. 10) 164.

<sup>18</sup> 3, 3, 2; 3, 7, 3.

account seems to be deliberate.<sup>19</sup> The garrison was there for use as a garrison, and was not used for other purposes, either because reducing Athens' own protection was too risky, or because the garrison troops were not suited to field warfare. Had they been suitable, it is difficult to believe that some metic troops would not have been permanently transferred to the field army as Athens' citizen hoplite force diminished. The fact that metics figure so little in the fighting may argue that they were not adequate for field combat.

Metics presumably did not receive the military training that citizen hoplites were given. If so, even if they could afford hoplite equipment, they would not necessarily form an effective fighting force. Metics do not figure in the lists of ephebes that survive from the fourth century onwards, and they do not start to occur in such lists until the second century B.C.<sup>20</sup> The metic hoplites in 431 should perhaps be viewed as a Home Guard, the majority of whom did not possess the training that would have turned them into front-line fighting troops.

### *Conclusion*

It might still be argued that the 12,000 metic hoplites whose existence a straightforward reading of Thucydides seems to imply are ghosts in the mind of the modern scholar, who must owe their existence to some lacuna or ambiguity in Thucydides' account. But we may ask why the 3,000 or more metic hoplites explicitly mentioned as taking part in the Megarid expedition in 431 are so little heard of elsewhere. They cannot all have been killed by the plague of 427, if the proportions given for citizen mortality are anything to go by;<sup>21</sup> yet the metic contribution to the force at Delium in 424 seems to have been minuscule. The reason for their continued absence from our source must surely be that metics as such were not part of the front-line army, and could not usually be called on for expeditions, presumably because they were needed at home, or because they were not to be relied on overseas. If that is so, silence about metics in Thucydides' narrative of the main campaigns of the war has little bearing on the number of metics of hoplite wealth at Athens.

It is true on the other hand that a single passage which is less than totally explicit is a somewhat slender peg on which to hang a major inference about the composition of Athenian population. There are other ways of interpreting Thucydides' figures for Athenian hoplite manpower, even if they involve going beyond what our sources say. We can conjecture with GOMME that the garrison total included

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<sup>19</sup> CLERC (n. 2) 48-9.

<sup>20</sup> WHITEHEAD (n. 15) 82; cf. W. K. PRITCHETT, *The Greek State at War II*, 1974, 208-9.

<sup>21</sup> 3, 87, 3, cf. 2, 58, 3. The stated loss of 4,400 citizen hoplites is 26½% if youngest and oldest were included: see Appendix below.

large numbers of unfit persons, though Thucydides gives no hint of it.<sup>22</sup> That seems to take Pericles' encomium of Athens' strength into the sphere of empty boasting, which is hardly the effect that Thucydides intended. Or we can assume with JONES that the garrison included the citizen hoplites over 40, though that conflicts with the evidence of Socrates' career that hoplites stayed in the field army until 50.<sup>23</sup>

Thucydides' account of Athenian manpower in 431, while presenting problems of interpretation, is an important datum which cannot be ignored. If, as the corroboration in Diodorus suggests, the figures should be taken as they stand, they appear to argue the existence of a massive metic component in the population of hoplite census at Athens. Failing that, the figures must point to some hidden element in Athens' forces as Thucydides describes them, which it is equally desirable to clarify. If neither approach is admitted, that leaves little alternative to rejecting part of Thucydides' figures for 431, which would have inevitable repercussions on our view of the other manpower information that he transmits.<sup>24</sup> The straightforward interpretation which leads to a high number of hoplite metics probably remains the most effective. It is consistent with the description in Pericles' speech that their military role should have been that of a garrison and little more, even though that leaves us little chance of finding corroborative evidence for their existence elsewhere in Thucydides' history.

## Appendix

### *The Delium figures*

I. Thucydides only allows us to assess Athenian numbers at the battle of Delium in 424 by a roundabout route. He gives the strength of the opposing forces as follows (4, 93, 3):

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<sup>22</sup> GOMME 1933 (n. 1), 3-4, 26 (5,500 metic hoplites in 431); GOMME 1956 (n. 1), 35-6. His estimate that 3 out of every 16 men between 20 and 50 would be unfit for service, nearly 1 in 5, is rather high in itself. The very heavy infant mortality likely in a traditional Mediterranean society would probably have eliminated a great many of the unfit before they reached adulthood.

<sup>23</sup> See BELOCH (n. 3); JONES (n. 10) 164-5 (7,000 metic hoplites). JONES's hypothesis is discussed in the Appendix below.

<sup>24</sup> Though Thucydides is generally scrupulous and plausible in the figures he gives, the case of the 3,000 Acharnian hoplites is a well known problem (2, 20, 4). Acharnae, though the largest deme in Attica (2, 19, 2), contributed only 22 of the 500 *boulentai* (GOMME 1956 [n. 1], 73-4), about 4% of the total. 3,000 citizen hoplites would be not less than 18% of the total in 431, even if youngest and oldest are included (see Table p. 103). On the face of it, these proportions seem irreconcilable.

1. About 7,000 hoplites
2. More than 10,000 light-armed troops (*psiloi*)
3. 1,000 cavalry
4. 500 peltasts

The total Boeotian strength is thus 18,500 or more.

In the next chapter, Thucydides says that the Athenian hoplites were equal in number to those opposite (*ἰσοπαλεῖς τοῖς ἐναντίοις* 4, 94, 1). He then mentions the cavalry on either wing, and the light-armed troops who, though much more numerous than those opposite (*ὄντες πολλαπλάσιοι τῶν ἐναντίων*) were mostly absent from the battle. The two instances of *ἐναντίος* appear to link what Thucydides says about the Athenian forces to the corresponding items in the catalogue of Boeotians. So the strength of the Athenian hoplite force is implied as about 7,000, and that of the mainly absent force of *psiloi* as much more than 10,000.

JONES explained the hoplite figures for 431 on the basis of a field army restricted at that time to the age-classes 20–39 (JONES [n. 10] 164 ff.). Assessed in terms of the Princeton age-ratios used above, this leads to a total citizen hoplite-force of about 22,500 (Table 2 below, line 5; JONES's analogies from Roman tombstones, though more doubtful, gave virtually the same result, JONES 165). But the inclusion of the 40–49 age-group in the army at Delium is argued by the presence of Socrates, aged 45 or 46, in the Athenian ranks (Plutarch, Alcib. 7). There is no direct evidence that this group was ever excluded from the fifth century field army. But if it was excluded in 431, as JONES argued, partly from later evidence, the decade 40–49 would account for another 4,500 men (Table 2, col. 3  $\frac{\text{line 1}}{\text{line 2}} \times 13,000$ ). That would give the age-classes of citizen hoplites present at Delium (generally agreed to have been 20–49, cf. GOMME 1927 [n. 3], 142) an original strength in 431 of about 17,500 (13,000 + 4,500).

Thucydides' figure of 4,400 citizen hoplite dead in his account of the plague-losses can be interpreted as applying to the field army alone (GOMME 1956 [n. 3], 388), making the death-rate 34%; or as applying to the total body of citizen hoplites (JONES 165–6). In this case, related to a total of 22,500 (Table 2, col. 3, line 5), the death-rate is 20%. We should thus allow that if the age group 20–49 was 17,500 in 431, its numbers would have been reduced by between 3,500 and 6,000 as a result of plague by 427 (3, 87, 3). On this basis, the approximate numbers of the age-group called up at Delium would have been either 14,000 or 11,500. Why then were there as few as 7,000 hoplites in the Athenian force at Delium, for which a levy had been carried out *πανδημεί* (4, 90, 1)?

Part of the answer must lie in the fact that some Athenian hoplites were absent elsewhere. Thucydides mentions 400 with Demosthenes in Sicyon (4, 101, 3). GOMME is perhaps right in deducing that there were Athenian troops in Thrace, though what Thucydides says (4, 82) hardly demonstrates this (GOMME 1927 [n. 3], 149). Garrisons had recently been established at Pylos (4, 41, 2) and Cythe-

ra (4, 54–5). But Thucydides gives no indication that the force of allies under Athenian generals in the Hellespont (4, 75) included Athenian hoplites. The evidence might be consistent with the absence of 1,500 hoplites from Attica, but hardly more. There must also have been some war-casualties in the first seven years of fighting.

Even so, the gap between the 7,000 hoplites who fought at Delium, and the 17,500 in the relevant age-classes in 431 on JONES's interpretation still seems much too wide. After deducting (with JONES) 20% or 3,500 for plague-losses, then a further 1,500 for those serving elsewhere, and 500 for war-casualties up to 424, the pool available should have amounted to 12,000, instead of the 7,000 implied by Thucydides as taking part in the battle. It seems unlikely that GOMME's alternative view of the plague-losses can be right; it means supposing that the Athenians did not record fatalities among youngest and oldest citizen hoplites (cf. JONES 165). But even on this basis, a 34% death-rate would still leave 9,500 after deductions as before, 2,500 more than the number of hoplites at Delium.

The simple interpretation suggested in the main text both removes the need to conjecture a change in the age-classes of the field army between 431 and 424, and can bring the figures for 431 into line with those for 424. On a steady-state view of the field army age-groups (20–49 in 424 and in 431), the total citizen hoplite force including youngest and oldest would have been about 16,600 (table 1, line 3). If, as likely, the plague-losses of 4,400 refer to the whole body of citizen hoplites, the death rate would thus have been about 26½% (rather than 20% as in JONES's extrapolation). Thus plague-losses would have reduced the field army of 431 from 13,000 to about 9,500 by 424. If as before we allow 2,000 for casualties and hoplites serving elsewhere, the pool available for service at Delium becomes 7,500, a reasonably close approximation to the 7,000 implied by Thucydides.

JONES's view that the age-classes of the field army in 431 were 20–39 is thus in serious conflict with the evidence about hoplite numbers at Delium in 424. The straightforward alternative that the age-classes indicated at Delium were already in force in 431 avoids this difficulty. Salvaging the view that the age-classes were different by effectively setting the Delium figures aside, and conjecturing an inadequate levy in 424 carried out under conditions of maximum secrecy (JONES 178), is hardly convincing.

II. The present interpretation still leaves little if any room for metics in the Delium hoplite total. Thucydides does not say that there were metic *hoplites* at Delium, only that metics were included in the call-up (4, 90, 1). This leaves it possible that the metics recruited were *psiloi* or light-armed troops (of whom there were great numbers, 4, 94, 1), and that the garrison of metic hoplites at Athens remained untouched.

TABLE 2

*Numbers of citizen and metic hoplites in 431 if field army contained only ages 20–39 (Jones's hypothesis, using Princeton Tables)*

	Life-expectation at birth 19.9 Population-growth (citizens) 0.7% per year		Life-expectation at birth 40.6 Population-growth (citizens) 1.1% per year		Average of cols. 1 & 2
<b>CITIZENS</b>					
1. Ages 20–39 (field army)	29.73	} ratios	29.68	} ratios	29.71
2. Ages 40–49	9.80		10.76		10.28
3. Ages 50–59	6.71		8.15		7.43
4. Ages 18–19	3.96		3.74		3.85
5. Ages 18–59	21,951		22,921		22,436
(lines 1–4 line 1 x 13,000)					
<b>METICS</b>					
6. 29,000 less line 5	7,049		6,079		6,564

For source of age-ratios, see Table 1.



## Plato's Academy and Timotheus' Policy, 365–359 B.C.

## 1

After the Oropian affair, which to some extent compromised Callistratus, and his own fortunate campaigns around Samos ending in the foundation of the Samian cleruchy early in the summer of 365, Timotheus must have been for several years the most influential of the Athenian statesmen.<sup>1</sup> Despite many uncertainties of detail and chronology, his activity of the subsequent *quinquennium* is rather well known. During the first half of 365/4, he co-operated with Ariobarzanes against Cotys and Autophradates (cf. Xen. Ages. 2, 26), and obtained Sestos together with Crithote;<sup>2</sup> the appeal of the oligarchs from Heraclea Pontica addressed to him to help the city in its internal discord, as well as his refusal to intervene, obviously belong to this period (Iust. 16, 4, 3 f.). At the beginning of the sailing season of 364,<sup>3</sup> he replaced Iphicrates in the North, «as commander-in-chief to Amphipolis and Chersonese» (Demosth. 23, 149), an eloquent sign of Iphicrates'

<sup>1</sup> On his siege of Samos and the dispatch of the cleruchy (slightly before the close of 366/5) see J. K. DAVIES, *Historia* 18, 1969, 309 ff. DAVIES is probably right in explaining (p. 332) Callistratus' participation in the cleruchy expedition (IG II<sup>2</sup> 1609, l. 95. 103) as compulsory and extracted from that demagogue by Timotheus himself ([Timotheus'] «price for not assisting Philostratos and Leodamas in their prosecutions»).

<sup>2</sup> Isocr. 15, 108. 112; Corn. Nep. 13, 1, 3. Against the traditional chronology (in e.g. K. J. BELOCH, *Griechische Geschichte*, III<sup>2</sup> 2, Berlin–Leipzig 1923, 162 f. 246 f., and: *Die attische Politik seit Perikles*, Leipzig 1884, 317 ff.; K. KLEE, *RE* 6 A [1937] 1328), R. SEALEY (*Historia* 5, 1956, 198 with n. 153) places these events in 364, after the first attack of Timotheus upon Amphipolis. But SEALEY's argument for that, Demosthenes' wording in 23, 150 init., is inadequate: Demosthenes refers there to the possibility of the *third* engagement in the Chersonese, in 363 (cf. *ibid.* μετὰ ταῦτ' with Nepos' plural *adversus Cotum bella gessit*, 13, 1, 3; see KLEE, loc. cit.), and Isocrates, 15, 111 f., seems to imply that the Hellenistic operations immediately followed those around Samos (cf. DAVIES, loc. cit., 329 n. 133. 332 n. 155). Besides, after his replacement by Timotheus at Amphipolis, Iphicrates did not return to Athens until 362 or there about, which tends to exclude the dating of this deposition as early as 365, in view of an Attico-Pisatan treaty of the second half of 365 (S. DUŠANIĆ, *MDAI[A]* 94, 1979, 127).

<sup>3</sup> His appointment must have antedated the Aegean cruise of Epameinondas – which undoubtedly belongs to 364 (SEALEY, loc. cit., 198 n. 150), probably to the spring-summer (i.e. the sequence of events concerning Heraclea Pontica, rather condensed [note the *mox*



political and military eclipse.<sup>4</sup> There are indications to suggest that Conon's son retained the same post in 364/3 and 363/2 too,<sup>5</sup> but it is extremely difficult to assign all the available pieces of evidence concerning his exploits in the North-West and North-East respectively, their exact places within these years.<sup>6</sup> The attempt to take Amphipolis, of the spring-summer of 364 approximately, was unsuccessful, due

in Justinus, loc. cit.], shows that Epameinondas' sailing should not be put as late as the summer-autumn) —, as the Theban was directly opposed then only by Laches (Diod. 15, 79, 1), a minor figure. Cf. the next note.

<sup>4</sup> The change (SEALEY, loc. cit., 199 n. 162, aptly points to Demosthenes' usage of the strong term ἀποστράτηγος in that connection, 23, 149) was considered humiliating for Callistratus' general, as shown by Iphicrates' retirement to Cotys; that circumstance also speaks for the thesis that the deposition antedated the end of the official year.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Demosth. 23, 150 init. (referring to the choice Timotheus had for the *whole* of the campaigning season in 363 [the latter part of 364/3 and the first half of 363/2]?; see the following note) and the data on the presence of Timotheus in both Chalcidice (schol. Aesch. 2, 31; Demosth. 23, 149 fin.) and the Marmara (Diod. 15, 81, 6: considerations of historical character support the Sicilian's dating of the intervention at Cyzicus to 364/3, see below, notes 6, 14) within Timocrates' year. Other generals active in these districts may have served as his associates then, which tends to create some difficulties in classifying the strategi of 365/4–363/2 according to the labels of «Hellespont» and the «Ἐπὶ Θράκης» respectively (see BELOCH, GG III 2, 246 f.; SEALEY, loc. cit., 198 f.).

<sup>6</sup> Two chronological guides, however, may be proposed here. (A) What Demosthenes says of Timotheus' relations with Charidemus (23, 149 ff.) contains three consecutive points: (1) a failure at Amphipolis (149 med.), obviously dating from the spring-summer of 364, (2) an abortive attempt to hire Charidemus for a campaign which, directed virtually against Cotys, must have taken place in the Chersonese (149 fin., cf. 152 init. and note 2 above), and (3) Timotheus' decision «to take the operations against Amphipolis before those against the Chersonese» (150 init.). This last event is likely to have occurred at the beginning of the warm season, when the general certain of re-election makes his plan of operations for the whole campaign; the spring of 363 is the preferable alternative to the spring of 362 as, inter alia, (3) fell, according to Demosthenes (152 f.), quite some time before the reopening of the hostilities between Cotys and Athens (the summer-autumn of 362). Thus, (2) will have coincided with Timotheus' action, of the autumn of 364 approximately, aimed at minimizing the consequences of Epameinondas' naval campaign, (B) Diodorus' omission of Pydna and Methone, especially the important Pydna, at 15, 81, 6 (under the year of Timocrates), proves that these cities were captured in a campaign other than the campaign which saw the seizure of Torone and Potidaea. The listing of all these three or four cities together, in later speeches of Aeschines, Demosthenes, Deinarchus and Isocrates, has no chronological value, neither has the rhetorical τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον in Isocr. 15, 113, despite SEALEY, loc. cit., 199 n. 161 (the fact that the orators usually cite Potidaea as the last of Timotheus' gains of 364–363 may be due to the geographical [West-East], rather than chronological, order they followed in their enumeration, and/or to the topicality of Pydna [a cleruchy was settled there, as late as the summer of 361, TOD, GHI 2, 146]). For several reasons (cf. infra, n. 24), not the least the mention of the strategi περὶ Μακεδονίαν in the Menelaus decree (infra, notes 17, 21), the fall of Methone and Pydna is likely to have followed, not preceded (so F. GEYER, RE 19 [1937] 602; CHR. M. DANOFF, RE Suppl. 10 [1965] 838), that of the Chalcidian cities.

i. a. to the anti-Athenian orientation of the *condottiere* Charidemus.<sup>7</sup> The Amphipolitans had the support of the Odrysaes and the Chalcidians rallied around Olynthus;<sup>8</sup> an Attico-Olynthian war followed, which brought Timotheus the gain of Torone and Potidaea (? summer, 364).<sup>9</sup> Perdicas III, who seems to have begun his reign as an ally of Thebes,<sup>10</sup> actively aided Timotheus' army on that occasion.<sup>11</sup> His new attitude may be explained by both the Macedonian hostility toward the Confederacy of Olynthus and Timotheus' political pressure, through at least the Pelagonians and the pretender Pausanias of Mygdonia,<sup>12</sup> upon Perdicas' throne. Very probably, Timotheus had to spend (roughly) September–October of 364 in the North-East, to mend the harm done by Epaminondas' cruise, together with the parallel manoeuvres of the Thracians and the Persians, to Athenian interests in the Straits and the Marmara.<sup>13</sup> Timotheus' interventions at Byzantium and Cyzicus are explicitly recorded, if not safely dated to the first half of 364/3,<sup>14</sup>

<sup>7</sup> Demosth. 23, 149 (cf. above, n. 6).

<sup>8</sup> «The Thracians»: schol. Aesch. 2, 31 (364/3 B. C.); «the Olynthians» («the Chalcidians»): Demosth. 23, 150; Polyæn. 3, 10, 14; 4, 102, et alii (enumerated e.g. by M. ZÄHRNT, *Olynth und die Chalkidier*, München 1971, 101, who is probably right in suggesting the existence at that time of a comparatively small federal state, allied to Amphipolis, Potidaea and Torone, with Olynthus as its capital).

<sup>9</sup> Diod. 15, 81, 6, etc. Cf. supra, n. 6.

<sup>10</sup> That option could explain «the release of Philip, who returned home in 365» and the hypothetical supply of Macedonian «timber for the building of the fleet which Epameinondas intended to launch (N. G. L. HAMMOND [– G. T. GRIFFITH], *A History of Macedonia*, II, Oxford 1979, 186).

<sup>11</sup> Demosth. 2, 14; Polyæn. 3, 10, 14.

<sup>12</sup> The Pelagonians: IG II<sup>2</sup> 190; TOD, GHI 2, 143 (Menelaus). Cf. HAMMOND, op. cit., 19 f. 186 (who argues from Demosth. 4, 4 f., for the possibility that on the same occasion «Timotheus used other inland princes too against Perdicas»). – Pausanias of Mygdonia: Ehippus' frg. 5 (from the «Geryones»), KOCK II 252 f. (366/5 B. C.?, cf. DUŠANIĆ, *The Political Context of Plato's Phaedrus* [RSA, forthcoming]). The hypothesis of a collaboration between Pausanias and the imperialist Odrysaes (e.g. U. KAHRSTEDT, RE 11 [1921] 1552; A. FOL, in: *Hellenische Poleis*, II, Berlin 1974, 1004) is based on the misidentification of the Θερμαίων βασιλεὺς mentioned in Diod. 16, 2, 6, with Cotys instead of Berisades, who, chronologically and geographically, can be the only candidate here (BELOCH, GG III 1, 225 n. 1).

<sup>13</sup> Cf. e.g. SEALEY, loc. cit., 198 (whose observations go back to W. JUDEICH, *Kleinasiatische Studien*, Marburg 1892, 275). Note two additional comments that scholar justly makes: «doubtless Timotheus provided for the safe transport of corn to Athens late in the summer [of 364 B. C.]», and «presumably [Alcimachus] was a subordinate to whom Timotheus entrusted operations against Amphipolis» (schol. Aesch. 2, 31) during this same period of Timotheus' absence (cf. G. BUSOLT–H. SWOBODA, *Griechische Staatskunde*, II, München 1926, 1374 n. 2).

<sup>14</sup> Corn. Nep. 13, 1, 2 (cf. S. ACCAME, *La lega Ateniese del sec. IV a. C.*, Roma 1941, 179 n. 1; G. L. CAWKWELL, CQ 66, 1972, 270 f. with nn. 3–4): Byzantium. Diod. 15, 81, 6 (under 364/3; the sequence Torone–Potidaea–Cyzicus seems chronologically significant, above, n. 6); Corn. Nep. 13, 1, 3: Cyzicus. In both cases, Timotheus probably had to face,

while those at Proconnesus and Heraclea Pontica should be assumed on various pieces of indirect evidence.<sup>15</sup> In the spring of 363 he decided to operate first against the Amphipolitans, not against the Thracians in the Chersonese,<sup>16</sup> to which his attention seems to have been devoted at the close of the campaigning season of 364.<sup>17</sup> Though he was able to hire Charidemus' mercenaries this time, Amphipolis successfully resisted again.<sup>18</sup> Two major events, obviously coincident and interdependent, will have occurred immediately after, say in the summer-autumn of 363: Timotheus shifted his attention to the cities of the Macedonian coast,<sup>19</sup> and the Athenian relations with Perdicas, the owner of these cities or aspirant to them,<sup>20</sup> seriously deteriorated (Aesch. 2, 29 f.). The reference to the *strategi περὶ τῆς Μακεδωνίαν* in the Attic stela of January–February 362 honouring Menelaus the Pelagonian (TOD, GHI 2, 143), is best interpreted if connected with Timotheus' efforts to neutralize Perdicas in the districts of Amphipolis and Pydna alike.<sup>21</sup> This he achieved only partially: Amphipolis remained free and hostile, and received the Macedonian garrison before 359 B.C. (cf. Diod. 16, 3, 3),

beside anti-Athenian local elements, also anti-Athenian foreign factors (Epameinondas' influence at least, and possibly, at Cyzicus, a satrap loyal to Susa [RUGE, RE 12 [1924] 229]), and we should not forget the alignment of Byzantium and Cyzicus in the late summer of 362 (Ps.-Demosth. 50, 4 ff.). Cf. *infra*, ch. 2, on Cnidus.

<sup>15</sup> For Proconnesus see Ps.-Demosth. 50, 5 (cf. ACCAME, *op. cit.*, 180 f.), for Heraclea below, ch. 2.

<sup>16</sup> Above, n. 6, on Demosth. 23, 150 init.

<sup>17</sup> Demosth. 23, 152 (the phrase *ὡς οὐδὲν ἐκεῖ* [= Chersonese, cf. *ibid.* 150: *ἐκ Καρδίας*] *κακὸν εἶχε ποιεῖν ὑμᾶς* reflects doubtless an unsuccessful confrontation of Charidemus with Timotheus the year before; for *κακὸν εἶχε ποιεῖν* «was [un]able to do some harm» see e.g. L-S-J s.v. *ἔχω* A III); Nep. 13, 1, 2 ([*Timotheus*] *adversus Cotum bella gessit ab eoque mille et ducenta talenta praedae in publicum rettulit*). One at least of the wars mentioned in Nepos (probably the second: the first will have resulted from the expedition of early 365/4), that providing the rich booty, postdated the operations of the summer of 364, during which Conon's son had badly needed financial means (Polyaen. 3, 10, 14, etc.; cf. Isocr. 15, 113 init.). Of the two possibilities – the autumn of 364 or 363 – the former should be preferred (though he may have fought in the Chersonese for some time both in 364 and 363) since the latter half of 363 seems to have been primarily devoted to the North-West (cf. TOD, GHI 2, 143, 1. 15 f.).

<sup>18</sup> Demosth. 23, 150, 152.

<sup>19</sup> Dinarch. 1, 14 (Τιμοθέω ... λαβόντι ... Μεθώνην καὶ Πύδναν καὶ Ποτεΐδιαινα καὶ πρὸς ταύταις ἑτέρας εἴκοσι πόλεις) et al. Cf. above, n. 6.

<sup>20</sup> In the period after Archelaus their status is unknown; they may have formed a part of Macedonia (GEYER, *loc. cit.*, 602; DANOFF, *loc. cit.*; the numismatic evidence cited by HAMMOND, *op. cit.*, 192, provides no argument to the contrary) or, if that was not the case, the Argeadae must have tried to regain them (note the typological affinity of the bronze coinage of Pydna and Methone with the issues of Amyntas III and Perdicas III, HAMMOND, *op. cit.*, 192).

<sup>21</sup> Cf. II. 8 f. (τὸν πόλεμον τὸν περὶ τῆς Χαλκιδικίας καὶ πρὸς Ἀμφίπολιν) and 14 ff. (note the *ἕαν* του δέηται). In view of his immediately subsequent career (GEYER, *loc. cit.*, 603), the praise of Menelaus early in 362 must have carried an anti-Macedonian connotation.

whereas Pydna and Methone adhered to the Second Confederacy.<sup>22</sup> Whether these bases in the Thermaic Gulf were occupied during one expedition (? summer-autumn, 363) led by Timotheus – who spent the winter of 363/2 elsewhere, perhaps at Thasos<sup>23</sup> – or whether there were two such expeditions (the second in ? spring, 362), we do not know, but it is almost certain that Timotheus' winning possession of Pydna and Methone contributed decisively to the general's fame and glorious return to Athens (Plut. Sulla 6, 3) at the end of 363/2.<sup>24</sup> In other places he had done little, if anything, during Charicleides' archontate: according to a not implausible conjecture,<sup>25</sup> he even tended to entrust to his subordinate strategi the fighting at Amphipolis (Callisthenes)<sup>26</sup> and in the Hellespont (Ergophilus),<sup>27</sup> which appeared both unpromising and dangerous because of the people's sensitiveness about repeated failures there.<sup>28</sup>

We are not informed whether Timotheus held the *strategia* in 362/1 and 361/0; if he did, there are reasons to believe that his commands were neither long nor especially fruitful (cf. Plut. Sulla 6, 4). The opening of 360/59 saw a new abortive attack by him upon Amphipolis,<sup>29</sup> which is likely to have been his last engagement in the North. Nevertheless, his northern policy of the 360's had a strong impact on the internal situation at Athens, sorely troubled as it was in 362–361,<sup>30</sup> and involved Timotheus in the struggles of the Athenian *politaiomenoi*. Of his two main enemies among them, the demagogue Callistratus and the general Iphicrates, the latter was soon compelled to cede under Timotheus' threat, in the assembly, of an indictment on the charge of usurpation of the rights of citizenship.<sup>31</sup> Around the

<sup>22</sup> Though their membership in the League may not have been a complete one (cf. A. G. WOODHEAD, *AJA* 61, 1957, 373, on the «allies of <the-Athenians-and-their-allies>»; for a different view, e.g. ACCAME, *op. cit.*, 181).

<sup>23</sup> Like Timomachus in 361/0 (Ps.-Demosth. 50, 48 ff.; on the strategic position of Thasos vs. Thrace see e.g. Demosth. 20, 59; 4, 32); to judge from the contrast in the wording of ll. 6 and 15 f. of *TOD*, GHI 2, 143, Timotheus was not, in any case, *περὶ Μακεδωνίαν* then.

<sup>24</sup> The difficult but fertile *στρατεία* referred to in Plut. Sulla 6, 3, must have been that in the Macedonian coast: of the successes in the North dating from the summer and the autumn of 364, Timotheus presumably could not have said *ἀλλὰ ταύτης γε τῆς στρατείας οὐδέν . . . τῇ τύχῃ μέτεστι* (at least not for the easy victory over Torone, Polyæn. 3, 10, 15); besides, they formed more than one campaign and were no novelty in 362.

<sup>25</sup> SEALEY, *loc. cit.*, 199.

<sup>26</sup> BELOCH, *GG III* 2, 247; SEALEY, *loc. cit.*

<sup>27</sup> BELOCH, *GG III* 2, 246.

<sup>28</sup> On Demosth. 23, 130, see DAVIES, *loc. cit.*, 330 (the *ὑμέτεροι στρατηγοί* may have included, beside Alcimachus, also Callisthenes and Ergophilus).

<sup>29</sup> Schol. Aesch. 2, 31, cf. Polyæn. 3, 10, 8. On the date, BELOCH, *GG III* 2, 247 and 457.

<sup>30</sup> BELOCH's «Prozeßsturm» (*Att. Politik*, 159 ff.). Cf. CL. MOSSÉ, in: *Hellenische Poleis*, I, Berlin 1974, 176 f.

<sup>31</sup> Ps.-Demosth. 49, 66. Cf. SEALEY, *loc. cit.*, 200 n. 164: «The ground for the suggested *γροφή ξενίας* may have been the adoption of Iphicrates by Amyntas (Aesch. II 28)»; DAVIES, *Athenian Propertied Families*, Oxford 1971, 250.

beginning of 362/1, Iphicrates and Timotheus formed a lasting alliance, cemented by a political marriage.<sup>32</sup> The issue of the conflict with Callistratus was bound to be less peaceful. With good reason, political motifs have been surmised behind Apollodorus' prosecution of Timotheus (Ps. Demosth. 49: ὑπὲρ χρέως) early in 362/1 – the plaintiff's father, Pasion, had been Callistratus' friend (ibid. 47) – as well as Timotheus' influence behind Callistratus' definitive forensic defeat of spring 361.<sup>33</sup> The victorious reconciliation with Iphicrates in 362 and the exile of Callistratus in 361 probably mark the zenith of Timotheus' public career.

It would be wrong to put the trials of 362 and 361 down to differences of merely personal and party interests.<sup>34</sup> There were also differences of wider programmes. In the sphere of foreign policy, Timotheus pursued what might be called an Attico-centric Panhellenism, which tended to propagate the Second Maritime League through, in principle, mild methods.<sup>35</sup> Such a programme was criticized by a double opposition, Spartophile and Persophile moderates, Callistratus inter alios, who inclined to reduce Athens' foreign ambitions,<sup>36</sup> and extremists of Aristophon's type, whose ways in treating other Greeks were much less considerate than Timotheus'.<sup>37</sup> At home, Timotheus passed for an aristocratically unpopular man (Isocr. 15, 131 ff.) but, in constitutional matters, his line probably led between Boeoto-

<sup>32</sup> Ps.-Demosth. 49, 66; Corn. Nep. 13, 3, 2. The chronology of the whole sequence of events (Timotheus' and Iphicrates' returns to Athens, Timotheus' threat, Menestheus' marriage, Apollodorus' charge upon Timotheus) is established, rather firmly, on Ps.-Demosth. 49, 66 f., and 50, 4–10, in particular (cf. e.g. SEALEY, loc. cit., 199 f. with n. 164; DAVIES, Ath. Families, 510).

<sup>33</sup> SEALEY, loc. cit., 198 ff. The reserves of CL. MOSSÉ as to the first point (loc. cit., 177) are not justified (Apollodorus' break with the group of Callistratus c. 360 [Demosth. 36, 53, cf. SEALEY, loc. cit., 200 n. 166] is explained by Callistratus' irreparable failures in 362–361, whereas, on the other hand, Apollodorus certainly held Timotheus' activity in Thrace 365–359 B. C. politically vulnerable, cf. Demosth. 36, 53. On the dates of Callistratus' departure for voluntary exile and of his plot with Timomachus see: Arkadika, MDAI[A] 94, 1979, 134, note 78).

<sup>34</sup> As is usually done. For a discussion of the problem of the political programmes in fourth-century Athens see: The Political Background of Demosthenes' Speech Against Leptines, Živa Antika 29, 1979, 41–71.

<sup>35</sup> Isocr. 15, 121 ff. Though not untendentious, Isocrates' characterization of Timotheus should not be treated as a fiction, despite such contentions in modern scholarship.

<sup>36</sup> Callistratus' «moderation» in foreign affairs found a clear expression in his course of 371–367 (cf. the paper on the Athenian *koine eirene* of 371, infra, n. 41); less than two decades later, virtually the same policy was pursued by Eubulus, whose contacts with the group of Callistratus, via e.g. Diophantus (SEALEY, JHS 75, 1955, 79 f.; G. L. CAWKWELL, ibid. 83, 1963, 48), are manifest.

<sup>37</sup> Contrast e.g. the roles of Aristophon (schol. Aesch. 1, 64; Plat. Leg. 1, p. 638 b) and Chabrias (TOD, GHI 2, 142; cf. IG II<sup>2</sup> 179c, l. 4: [τὰς διαλλ]αγὰς) in the affair of 363/2(?) concerning Ceos and Naxos; at least after 365 B. C., Chabrias followed Timotheus' Pan-Athenian line (cf. the article on the «Phaedrus» referred to above, n. 12). Naturally, the attitudes toward Athens' allies revealed differences in social and individual ment-

phile collectivism and laconizing oligarchical sympathies, as suggested by a passage of Demosthenes' *Ἐν Λεπτινῆμ*.<sup>38</sup> Seen in that light, the policies of both Timotheus and his rivals of 365–359 display some interesting signs of consistency. These will be studied in some detail in the following chapters; it may be noted here only that Iphicrates' friendly attitude to Cotys after 365, which was eventually labelled simply treacherous from the Athenian standpoint,<sup>39</sup> could have been defensible from the standpoint of Callistratus' moderates. Iphicrates' protector since at least 373, Callistratus probably used to represent Iphicrates' stay at Cotys' court as a necessary neutralization of the provocative and dangerous operations of Timotheus in the North, and there can be little doubt that Cotys' kind letter to the Athenians of 361 was written to reinforce the arguments of the Thracophile (and Persophile at the same time) opponents to Timotheus' Panhellenism.<sup>40</sup> Actually, internal conflicts of a collective and individual character made Athens have two divergent but contemporary policies in the North during the years 365–359, in the same way she had them in other places<sup>41</sup> and other periods, notably under the leadership of Demosthenes and Aeschines.

It is symptomatic of the affinity of the aristocratic patriotism of the strategus and the philosopher, intimately connected by personal links (FGrHist 328 F 223) as they were, that Timotheus' policy enjoyed the constant support of Plato and Plato's Academy, except in cases which brought that policy too near to the radicals' line. Their collaboration, on the practical and theoretical level alike, was clearly demonstrated in the crises of about 373–371, 366/5 and 356, among other instances.<sup>42</sup> An analysis, in the same sense, of what was written and done during the period of c. 366–359 will help to improve our understanding of both these eventful years and the contemporary facets of Plato's thought and activity.

ality, not only political alignment: in marked opposition to Timotheus, Iphicrates, the general of the *ἄποδοτῶν* 378–362 B.C., stood close in that respect to the radicals (cf. e.g. Arist. Rhet. 3, 10, 7).

<sup>38</sup> 20, 108 ff. In general, this speech defends Timotheus' and Chabrias' political programmes (as argued in the paper cited supra, n. 34). The *via media* had, understandably, its counterpart in the foreign affairs, Demosth. 16, 2, 23.

<sup>39</sup> Demosth. 23, 130 ff.; Ps.-Aristot. Oec. 2, p. 1351 a 18 ff.

<sup>40</sup> Demosth. 23, 115, cf. 104. 114. SEALEY, loc. cit., 199 f., notes justly that, while «the (Athenian) groups disagreed on the policy to be pursued towards Cotys», «perhaps he (Iphicrates) hoped to restore his fortunes by promoting good relations between Cotys and the Athenians, as he had done in the eighties».

<sup>41</sup> The example of Alexander of Pherae is instructive in that respect (infra, ch. 2).

<sup>42</sup> The *ἑκκλησία* (especially Book X) reflects i.a. the political polarizations of the Athenians culminating at the time of the *koine eirene* in the summer-autumn of 371, and the *ἑκκλησία* those of the Social War; the *ἑκκλησία* interprets the anti-Persian reaction to the Common Peaces of 367 and 366/5. See, in addition to the article cited above, note 12: L'Académie de Platon et la *koine eirene* athénienne de 371 av. J.-C., and: Plato's Atlantis, to appear in REG and Ant. Class. respectively.

In this chapter, we propose to examine the following six points, tentatively placed in chronological order: (a) Plato's letter to Perdiccas III, (b) Clearchus' installation at Heraclea Pontica, (c) Plato's letter to Leodamas, (d) Eudoxus' legislation at Cnidus, (e) topical matters in the Pseudo-Platonic *«Sisyphus»*, and (f) Python's and Heracleides' attempt on Cotys' life. For our present purpose it is especially important to establish whether the events concerned are historical, at what time they happened, and what place, if any, belonged to them within Timotheus' policy and Plato's political conceptions.

The historicity of (b) and (f) is beyond any doubt, and that of (d), never questioned as far as I know, may be safely admitted. The problem is somewhat different with (e): though not from Plato's pen, the *«Sisyphus»* is certainly a product of the Academy, and, as we shall see, probably dates from the beginning of Callistratus' exile (c. 361). What might arouse dispute in this connection is our thesis that the author of the dialogue drew his inspiration from some issues of contemporary practical politics. That thesis rests on several specific arguments to be developed in the sequel; its general cogency depends on the value of our reconstruction of Plato's and Timotheus' collaboration during the interval 365–359 as a whole. The same may be said of the historical setting of the Fifth (a) and Eleventh (c) Epistles, whose allegedly apocryphal character, albeit pleaded for by a number of (hypercritical) scholars, has not been demonstrated through any formal proof<sup>43</sup> or reconciled with the additional evidence on Plato's contacts with Macedonia and Thasos.<sup>44</sup> In our opinion, their authenticity finds a corroboration, and not the least one, in the fact that the two letters fit perfectly into the framework of the collaboration just mentioned.

To begin with Perdiccas.<sup>45</sup> If the date of the Fifth Letter is difficult to fix precisely within his reign (365–359), it is certain that Euphraeus' mission announced by the letter should not be put at the end of that reign – when Amyntas' son fought the Athenian troops in the North – for we know from other sources that Euphraeus remained some time at the Macedonian court and enjoyed a position there which could not have been obtained at once.<sup>46</sup> On general probability, it has

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<sup>43</sup> See e.g. A. E. TAYLOR, *Plato, the Man and his Work*<sup>7</sup>, London 1960, 541. 543; F. NOVOTNÝ, *Platonis Epistulae*, Brno 1930, 119 ff. 275 ff.; G. C. FIELD, *Plato and His Contemporaries*<sup>8</sup>, London 1967, 199 f.

<sup>44</sup> For Ep. 5 see below, n. 46; for Ep. 11, J. POUILLOUX, *Recherches sur l'histoire et les cultes de Thasos*, I, Paris 1954, 222 f.; F. SALVIAT, *Études classiques* 2, 1967, 43 ff. (cf. *Chiron* 8, 1978, 73 n. 121).

<sup>45</sup> For a better understanding of Macedonian history of the 360's and the 350's, I have profited much from discussions with Professor F. PAPAZOĞLOU.

<sup>46</sup> *Athen.* 11, p. 506 e. 508 d (FHG 4, p. 356 f. nos. 1–2), cf. *Ep. Socr.* 30, 12.

already been supposed that Plato wrote to Perdiccas in the period of the Attico-Macedonian alliance, i. e. in the period of the operations around Amphipolis dating roughly from the summer of 364 to the spring of 363 (preferably in the earlier part of the interval).<sup>47</sup> We could even venture the hypothesis that Timotheus himself mediated between the philosopher and the young king. There are probative indications in that direction, beside those concerning Timotheus' relations with Plato and his cobelligerency with the Argead. First, Timotheus was on friendly terms, after 373 B.C., with the king's father Amyntas,<sup>48</sup> and his favourable attitude to Perdiccas and hostile one to the usurper Ptolemy of Alorus, evident through the option of Pausanias of Mygdonia, Timotheus' ally,<sup>49</sup> must have had something to do with Timotheus' legitimist line (not shared by Iphicrates or by Pelopidas)<sup>50</sup> in Macedonian internal affairs c. 365–363. Second, Timotheus' manifold contribution to the pro-Athenian orientation of Euphraeus' native city, Oreus-Histiaea in Euboea,<sup>51</sup> makes in turn a private connection between Euphraeus and Conon's son, both Panhellenic,<sup>52</sup> a possible, even probable, factor in the events c. 364. Third, to judge from the complex Athenian reaction to the Macedonian crisis created by Perdiccas' death – a reaction continuing Timotheus' policy toward Pella of the previous years<sup>53</sup> and enjoying, to a degree at least, the sympathies of Plato – Timo-

<sup>47</sup> GEYER, RE 19 (1937) 602.

<sup>48</sup> Inter alia, Demosth. 49, 26, suggests that the document Staatsverträge II<sup>2</sup> 264 should be connected with Timotheus' expedition of 373.

<sup>49</sup> Above, n. 12. Pausanias' loyalty to Perdiccas is not only shown through the fact that he never attacked Macedonia during 365–359, so far as we can tell, but it also helps us understand Philip's promotion recorded in the texts cited supra, n. 46 (notwithstanding the fact that Philip's partisans were close to Pausanias, schol. Aesch. 2, 26; HAMMOND's proposal, op. cit., 184 n. 2 [against e.g. GEYER, RE 19 [1938] 2267], to see in that Philip a personage other than the future ruler is quite unfounded). Naturally, we should not insist too much on the sincerity of the personal commitments of the leading men involved in Macedonian affairs during the 360's (as we have seen, there are reasons to postulate a certain tension between Pausanias and Perdiccas in the season of the latter's pro-Theban orientation in 365); both Timotheus and Perdiccas (not to speak of Iphicrates) were capable of sacrificing their own friendships to the political interests of their countries (cf. Corn. Nep. 13, 4, 3; Aesch. 2, 30).

<sup>50</sup> They supported Ptolemy, Plut. Pel. 27, 3 f.; Aesch. 2, 28 f. Regardless of the noble motives which were ascribed to Iphicrates' gesture of 368 by the Athenian Philomacedonians of Philip II's epoch, Iphicrates' alliance with Eurydice undoubtedly ran against the interests for her sons, as shown by the fate of Alexander II.

<sup>51</sup> The Attico-Histiaean contacts of 377 (Arist. Pol. 5, p. 1303 a 18 f.: Heracleodorus' pro-Athenian leaning is indirectly proved by IG II<sup>2</sup> 149, l. 7; on the date of the reform mentioned by the Stagirite, R. WEIL, Aristote et l'Histoire. Essai sur la «Politique», Paris 1960, 275 n. 139), 373 (Staatsverträge II<sup>2</sup> 257, B, l. 18) and 357/6 B.C. (IG II<sup>2</sup> 147 [for the pan-Hellenic context of this, note the Ἑλλήνων[ν] in l. 12]) coincide significantly with Timotheus' activities in the island. – Even Charidemus was from Oreus, Demosth. 23, 213.

<sup>52</sup> On Euphraeus, Demosth. 9, 59 ff.

<sup>53</sup> The continuity is evident through many details: in addition to those dealt with in the sequel, we should underline the choice of Mantias for the Athenian strategus in Macedonia



theus' influence upon the Argead notables must have been considerable and attests indirectly to his rather intensive contacts with Macedonia c. 364–363.<sup>54</sup> Namely, of Philip's opponents in the struggle for the succession to the throne, there were three who probably had the support of Athens and Timotheus (even Plato) at the same time. Diodorus cites, it is true, only one claimant – Argaeus, evidently the same who ruled Macedonia for two years in the late 380's<sup>55</sup> – with Athenian backing (16, 2, 6, 3, 3 and 5), but he also speaks (*ibid.*) of Pausanias' plans «to join the contest with the aid of the Thracian king» (Berisades),<sup>56</sup> and we are entitled to suppose that Pausanias could reckon on that occasion on an understanding on the part of Athens and Timotheus, his ally since 366/5, the more so as Berisades, too, figured as an Athenian protégé then.<sup>57</sup> Seen in that light, the case of Argaeus and Pausanias offers a clue to explaining a fragmentary testimony of Theopompus (*ap. Harpocr. s. Ἀργαῖος*), enigmatic so far:<sup>58</sup> . . . περὶ τούτου καὶ Θεόπομπος ἐν τῷ ᾧ τῶν Φιλίππων λέγει «τὸν Ἀρχέλαον καλοῦσι καὶ Ἀργαῖον καὶ Παιυσανίαν».<sup>59</sup> In my opinion, the only acceptable interpretation of this obviously incomplete quotation<sup>60</sup> is to give the verb a meaning «summon» or the like<sup>61</sup> and, bearing in mind the transparent reference of the phrase to the circumstances of 359, to restore it to run e.g. [ἸἈθηναῖοι πρὸς Φίλιππον ἀλλοτριῶς ἔχοντες] τὸν Ἀρχέλαον καλοῦσι καὶ Ἀργαῖον καὶ Παιυσανίαν.<sup>62</sup>

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(Diod. 16, 2, 6; the personage stood close to Periander [DAVIES, *Ath. Families*, 462 B]), another partisan of Timotheus c. 361 B. C. [see my article cited above, n. 21]), and Philip II's complete adherence to Perdiccas' later policy (Aesch. 2, 30), which discloses the enmity to Timotheus as the common denominator of Callistratus' collaboration with one of these two kings (Ps.-Arist. *Oec.* 2, p. 1350 a, cf. SALVIAT, *loc. cit.*, 54 n. 57).

<sup>54</sup> A circumstance to explain also Euphræus' intervention in favour of Philip, close as the prince was to Pausanias (c. 364 B. C.; above, n. 49)?

<sup>55</sup> J. KAERST, *RE* 2 (1896) 685 (no. 6); BELOCH, *GG* III 1, 102. 224 f. III 2, 57 f.; J. R. ELLIS, *Makedonika* 9, 1969, 1–8. The high chronology of Argæus' interim (c. 393–391 B. C.), defended by HAMMOND, *op. cit.*, 172. 175, remains untenable.

<sup>56</sup> That Berisades is meant here is next to certain (above, n. 12).

<sup>57</sup> Demosth. 23, 8 ff. 170 f., cf. *Staatsverträge* II<sup>2</sup> 303.

<sup>58</sup> Other proposals, presupposing the meaning *καλέω* «*nomino*», are desperate: «Argæos, auch Agelaos und Pausanias genannt», Ed. SCHWARTZ, *Festschrift für Th. Mommsen*, Marburg 1893, 9 (contra, BELOCH, *GG* III 1, 225 n. 1, and others), «they call both Argæus and Pausanias the son of Archelaus (MS. ἀγ(γ)έλαον : Ἀρχελάου)», HAMMOND, *op. cit.*, 175 f. (factual difficulties apart, the language is impossible), «... an ... emendation ... ἀγελα(ι)ον, with the sense «the commoner», contradicted by the fact that «neither Argæios nor Pausanias was in any sense a commoner», ELLIS, *Historia* 22, 1973, 350 n. 2.

<sup>59</sup> FGrHist 115 F 29. MS. ἀγ(γ)έλαον : Ἀρχέλαον GRONOV (an emendation commonly adopted, with good reason), Ἀρχέλεων VALCKEN (cf. ELLIS, *loc. cit.* [supra, n. 58]).

<sup>60</sup> «Unvollständig und deshalb unklar», F. JACOBY, FGrHist 115 F 29 comm.; the «ruthless abbreviation» (ELLIS, *loc. cit.*) is perhaps too much to say.

<sup>61</sup> L-S-J s. v. I 1 (a well-known example is Xen. *Anab.* 5, 6, 8). For the praesens historicus see e.g. the πέμπει in FGrHist 115 F 30 a and, in general, H. ERBSE, *Philologus* 101, 1957, 290.

<sup>62</sup> Of course, this restoration (cf. Diod. 16, 2, 6, reproducing Ephorus[?]) cannot pretend to contain the exact wording of the original; it only shows what was the probable

The inclusion of Amyntas' son Archelaus in that series of the pro-Athenian rivals of Philip II makes clear an aspect of Theopompus' and Philip's criticism of Plato's attitude to Philip in 359, criticism which we know only from a diplomatic reply in [Speusippus'?] Letter to Philip.<sup>63</sup> Πλάτωνος . . . διὰ τέλους χαλεπῶς φέροντος, εἴ τι γίνοιτο παρ' ὁμῶν ἀνήμερον ἢ μὴ φιλάδελφον<sup>64</sup> obviously aims at Plato's protests against the murder of Archelaus, and that murder – like the protest<sup>65</sup> – must have had its political point.<sup>66</sup> If we are correct in interpreting Theopompus' fragment 29 J and surmising a role of Timotheus in the realities it reflects,<sup>67</sup> we are led to assume that the preparation of the ambitious triple coalition against Perdiccas-Philip (cf. supra, n. 53) did not take a short time – probably commencing immediately after the break with Pella in the summer-autumn of 363<sup>68</sup> – and presupposed an earlier phase of the general's deep influence on Macedonian politics; Perdiccas' address to Plato,<sup>69</sup> probably inspired by Timotheus in a way analogous to Nicocles' address to Isocrates,<sup>70</sup> will have belonged to that phase.

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sense of Theopompus' phrase. The article τὸν Ἀρχέλαον probably reflects the mention of the prince in an earlier chapter (devoted to a summary of Amyntas' life and reign?, cf. Iust. 7, 4, 3 ff. [esp. 5]) of the Philippica I.

<sup>63</sup> Even if Speusippus' authorship were certain, the Ep. Socr. 30 would nevertheless not have disclosed the pro-Philip attitude of the Academy in the 350's and early 340's (the school remained divided in that respect), as it was composed, c. 343/2, for very practical purposes (M. M. MARKLE III, JHS 96, 1976, 93 f.). The first ἐπίτροπος of Plato's testament (Diog. Laert. 3, 43), Leosthenes, must have been the famous anti-Macedonian, PA 9142.

<sup>64</sup> Ep. Socr. 30, 12.

<sup>65</sup> Theopompus' hostility toward both Plato and the democratic and imperialist Athens was notorious.

<sup>66</sup> Drawing attention to the case of Philip's nephew Amyntas, GRIFFITH, op. cit., 699, warns us that «Philip did not make a habit of killing those who by birth and blood stood closest to the throne merely because of the relationship».

<sup>67</sup> True, Timotheus' connection with Argaeus, unlike that with Pausanias and Archelaus (this latter is postulated by the political context of Ep. Socr. 30, 12), remains hypothetical, but it may have been created c. 380, along the line of their common opposition to Amyntas and Lacedaemon then (the letters mentioned in Ep. Socr. 30, 13, were probably sent to the demos during Timotheus' Euboean *strategia* of 378/7).

<sup>68</sup> The initiator and the immediate cause of the break are unknown; nevertheless, a certain anti-Athenian feeling at Pella may have reinforced, even prompted, Timotheus' decision to occupy Pydna and Methone. That feeling could explain the self-defensive accents in Plato's Ep. 5 (321 e 1, 322 a 2, 322 a 4 ff.), Euphraeus' end in 343–342 B. C. (it was principally his Macedonian mission of 364–363 which caused his death, cf. the ὄθην in frg. 2 of Carystius) and, on the other hand, the tradition of the court intrigues against Perdiccas c. 359 (Iust. 7, 5, 6–8).

<sup>69</sup> ΝΟΤΩΝΥ appropriately comments, ad 321 c 4 καθάπερ ἐπέστελλες: «initium commercii quod erat inter Perdiccam et Platonem, a Perdicca ortum esse apparet».

<sup>70</sup> For which see e.g. the end of the *hypothesis* to Isocr. 2; on Timotheus' mediation between Nicocles and Isocrates (continuing probably Conon's mediation between Euagoras and the same rhetorician), W. JAEGER, *Paideia*, III, New York 1944, 94. It is another question why Plato, and not Isocrates, was chosen in 364: differences in their theoretical

The close of the Perdiccas' episode brings us near to (f). Late in 360 or early in 359,<sup>71</sup> Cotys was murdered by the two Academicians from Aenus.<sup>72</sup> Though their act was officially treated as a personal revenge,<sup>73</sup> it was certainly inspired by Athens' political interests:<sup>74</sup> Athens rewarded the revengers with the right of citizenship and other honours. We do not know the precise character of Python's and Heracleides' relationship with Plato,<sup>75</sup> nor can we tell whether Plato was acquainted with their schemes, but the political murder *was* envisaged by the author of the «Statesman» (especially in the «kill-and-banish» passage, 293c ff.) as a solution in some difficult situations. On the other hand, Cotys' death clearly corresponded with Timotheus' wishes – and our general reappears in the North in 360/59 – to get rid of that enemy who was a danger to Athens' ambitions in the Chersonese and around Amphipolis. What is more, the Athenian methods applied c. 359 to the Macedonian and the Odrysan problems display a significant parallelism: in both countries, a mighty but hostile king was to be replaced by three princes dependent on the good will of the city.<sup>76</sup> This accords well with Timo-

view may have been involved, as well as the fame of Isocrates' letters against Amyntas (above, n. 67, on Ep. Socr. 30, 13), which could not recommend Isocrates for the position of adviser to Amyntas' son (Timotheus, however, succeeded in reconciling himself with the Argead in 373 B. C. [supra, n. 48]).

<sup>71</sup> BELOCH, GG III 2, 61. 87. A terminus ante quem is Berisades' accession, preceding that of Philip II (summer, 359; cf. supra, n. 12).

<sup>72</sup> Demosth. 23, 119. 163; Arist. Pol. 5, p. 1311 b, et al. Cf. H. H. SCHMITT, RE 24 (1963) 610 f.

<sup>73</sup> Arist. loc. cit. (accepted e.g. by A. HOECK, Klio 4, 1904, 269).

<sup>74</sup> Plut. Mor. 1126 c (Dion ~ Python and Heracleides). Cf. SCHMITT, loc. cit.; FOI, loc. cit., 1005.

<sup>75</sup> Beside the fact that both the Aenians were Plato's pupils, one detail may be of interest here: Diog. Laert. 3, 65 (after Diocles), ascribes Cotys' death to the sceptic Pyrrhon of Elis, and Aristotles MSS. at Pol. 5, p. 1311 b, give Heracleides' brother the name of Πύρρων or Πιάρρων. These coincident errors have arisen, in our opinion, from a confusion of two Pyrrhons from Elis: in addition to the famous philosopher, whose acme fell at the end of the fourth century (born c. 365–360), there was an Elean Pyrrhon who had collaborated politically (E. SCHWYZER, DGE 53, 1. 8; cf. the article in REG cited supra, n. 42) with Phormion, another disciple of Plato and the Elean reformer c. 371–368 (Plut. Mor. 805 d, 1126 c; cf. REG, loc. cit.). The confusion between Python and the Elean Pyrrhon flourishing c. 371–368 may be easily conceived if its source is identified with a (lost) treatise or a digression on the political activity of the Academy. Such a text would have included the names of both Python and the middle-fourth-century Pyrrhon (the latter being likely to be confused with his more highly reputed, if younger, namesake and compatriot) and originated the subsequent doublet *Python/Pyrrhon*, palaeographically simple as it is; if our conjecture is not wrong, the (presumed) mention of Python's name and act in that source tends to show that Python's connections with the Academy were not unimportant, though he ended as Philip II's partisan (Demosth. 23, 127).

<sup>76</sup> Above, n. 57, on Thrace. The idea of the division of Cotys' former territory into three parts antedates Athenodorus' revision of Cephisodotus' pact with the Thracians (cf. Demosth. 23, 8. 170) and, in view of many indications discussed here, Athenodorus'

theus' active attitude in the North Aegean, opposed by some *polituomenoi* of Callistratus' type willing to deal with Cotys,<sup>77</sup> and must have been approved by Plato's patriotism and his Panhellenic sympathies – which were probably intensified by the origin of some of his pupils<sup>78</sup> – for the Greek cities of the Thracian and the neighbouring coasts.

The points (a) and (f) contribute to explaining (c). It appears now that the controversial date of the Eleventh Epistle may be fixed to the sailing season<sup>79</sup> of 363, the Epistle being (slightly)<sup>80</sup> anterior to the death of Socrates the Younger, which occurred in 363/2 approximately,<sup>81</sup> and posterior to the beginning of the Aegean piracy of Alexander of Pherae,<sup>82</sup> which is to be placed in the spring of 363.<sup>83</sup> Furthermore, this dating is supported by Plato's own remark at 358e on his physical incapacity, *διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν*, for long journeys. In view of the seriousness of the Thasian problems (359b.f.) and the nature of Plato's relationship with Leodamas,<sup>84</sup> a conventional refusal of Leodamas' appeal should not be considered, so that the remark quoted seems out of place at a moment immediately preceding the Second (366/5) or the Third (361/0) Sicilian Visit, and perhaps impossible at a moment immediately following either of them. The popular attribution of the Letter to the events leading to the foundation of Crenides c. 359 B.C.<sup>85</sup> runs counter

probable connection (via Pausanias and Berisades [cf. Demosth. 23, 10]?) note ΤΟΔ, GH1 2, 149 [with the editor's remark ad l. 2], of September–October 364 [?, cf. above, text and notes 13–15]) with Timotheus included, goes back to Timotheus' Thracian policy of the later 360's.

<sup>77</sup> Above, text to notes 39–41. Cf. Demosthenes' attack on these men, 23, 9 ff.

<sup>78</sup> Beside those from Thasos, Aenus and Heraclea Pontica, whose activities are dealt with in this paper, note those from Mende (Philippus), Stagirus (Aristotle), Amphipolis (Demetrius), Scepsis (Erastus and Coriscus), Lampsacus (Euaeon), Cyzicus (Timolaus), Perinthus (Hestiaeus), Byzantium (Leon) and Chalcedon (Xenocrates): Diog. Laert. 3, 46; Acad. Ind. Herc. 6, p. 33–36 Mehl.; Procl. in Eucl. 67 Friedl. It is tempting to identify the third *ἐπίτροπος* of Plato's testament (Diog. Laert. 3, 43) with Demetrius the Amphipolitan.

<sup>79</sup> Cf. 358 e: *κατὰ τε γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν*.

<sup>80</sup> Obviously, the *στραγγουρία* (358 d) caused his death soon.

<sup>81</sup> As should be deduced from the much-debated data on Socrates' teaching of Aristotle, combined with the reference of the Ps.-Ammoniana to the length of that collaboration (three years), cf. E. KAPP, RE 3 A (1927) 890 f. (whose general attitude in the matter must be right, notwithstanding different opinions); below, n. 139.

<sup>82</sup> The dangers spoken of at 358 e admittedly resulted from Alexander's *ληστεία* (cf. Xen. Hell. 6, 4, 35).

<sup>83</sup> Cf. e.g. SALVIAT, loc. cit., 47. Culminating in 362, the piracy was a consequence of Alexander's treaty with Thebes (Staatsverträge II<sup>2</sup> 288), concluded in the second half of 364 (M. SORDI, La Lega Tessala fino ad Alessandro Magno, Roma 1958, 219 n. 4; Y. BÉQUIGNON, RE Supplb. 12 [1970] 1060).

<sup>84</sup> Cf. Diog. Laert. 3, 24 (and 3, 61). See also SALVIAT, loc. cit., 45 f.

<sup>85</sup> SALVIAT, loc. cit., 47 ff., with bibl. (ED. MEYER, H. RAEDER, P. COLLART, G. PASQUALLI, J. B. SKEMP, etc.).

to the chronological indications just listed, and implies the great improbability that Plato's Thasian friends collaborated for a while with Callistratus, one of the initiators of the Crenides enterprise,<sup>86</sup> despite the long-lasting tensions between Plato's school and the demagogue's party. It was J. POUILLOUX who showed that the Platonic *politeia* envisaged by the correspondence with Leodamas<sup>87</sup> was planned for the reformed Thasos itself – some of whose institutions do, in fact, reflect a Platonic influence<sup>88</sup> – and not for a new colony.<sup>89</sup> We do not know how that influence eventually reached the Thasian lawgivers, whom the Letter denied direct help, thus probably expressing Plato's disillusion, c. 363 B.C., with Dionysius II, Perdiccas and even Clearchus.<sup>90</sup> It may be that the Platonic elements in the Thasian constitution resulted from a special visit of Leodamas to the Academy made c. 363/2 for legislative studies, or that another Academician, or another Academician's writings, went to Thasos in the same time for the same purposes, or at least that such elements were a fruit of the earlier collaboration of Leodamas with his Master.<sup>91</sup> But we have no serious reasons to doubt their reality and their chronological connection with the Attico-Thasian relations centred on the Academy and culminating in the late 360's.<sup>92</sup> There is one more point against referring the Epistle to Crenides and 359 B.C., a point which bears on the Athenian and Thracio-Macedonian policies of 363–359: the foundation of that settlement was likely to be qualified by both Berisades and some Greek cities of Thrace (one recalls the Thasian conflict with Maronea of 361<sup>93</sup>) as an act of aggressive expansionism,<sup>94</sup> which may have harmonized with the schemes of Perdiccas III, Philip II and his supporter

<sup>86</sup> Ps.-Scylax 67 (p. 54 f. MÜLLER); Isocr. 8, 24, etc.

<sup>87</sup> Our Epistle was not first in that series, cf. 358 d.

<sup>88</sup> J. POUILLOUX, in: Akten des VI. Int. Kongresses für Gr. und Lat. Epigraphik – München 1972, 1973, 363 f.

<sup>89</sup> Id., Recherches sur l'histoire et les cultes de Thasos, I, Paris 1954, 222 f. 237. Cf. Chiron 8, 1978, 73 n. 121.

<sup>90</sup> For an analogous <denial> of Plato, concerning Cyrene c. 362 B. C., see Chiron, loc. cit., 72 f.

<sup>91</sup> Cf. above, n. 87, and Chiron, loc. cit., 73, with notes 125–127.

<sup>92</sup> F. CHAMOIX's reserves (REG 72, 1959, 358 n. 2) as to the reality of a Thasian religious reform in the 360's, postulated by POUILLOUX, Recherches I, 237 et passim, do not seem well-founded. Probably resulting from the Thasians' general tendency toward civic reconciliation in that epoch, the presumed reform would certainly correspond with Plato's ideal of the social (cf. Chiron, loc. cit., 65 ff. [esp. 72 n. 113]) and spiritual (cf. Ep. 11, p. 359 b: θεοί) harmony of the polis; its historicity, however, would not be incompatible with the continuation of some internal conflicts in the island (cf. DUŠANIĆ, REG, loc. cit., on the Demosthenic passage 20, 59, which really seems to speak of the [early] fourth-century Thasians).

<sup>93</sup> Demosth. 50, 14 ff. (note the mention of the barbarians, obviously Maronea's allies, at 50, 22). Cf. POUILLOUX, Recherches I, 221 ff.

<sup>94</sup> Appian calls Crenides-Philippi «an excellent stronghold against the Thracians» (BC 4, 105).

Callistratus,<sup>95</sup> but not with the Pan-Athenian needs as interpreted by Timotheus and Timotheus' men.<sup>96</sup> All this indicates the importance of the Letter's context for our subject; two elements from that Attico-Thasian complex should be noted at once. To judge from the role in the reform of Thasos which was intended for Academicians of the stature of Leodamas and Socrates the Younger, the legislative project must have enjoyed considerable attention on the part of Plato. On the other hand, that Timotheus also had to help them and vice versa, may be deduced from several indications: the chronological coincidence between the Letter and Timotheus' activities around Thasos in 363,<sup>97</sup> the contact of the Thasian ἀτιμίζοντες with the Pan-Athenian party attested in the early 350's,<sup>98</sup> and the possibility that one at least of the Thasian Platonists originated in a family of pro-Athenian orientation.<sup>99</sup>

In the Aegean world of the fourth century, whose states were politically inter-related to a high degree, Timotheus' operations around Thrace, Chalcidice and Macedonia were bound to affect more than one power interested in the North, especially the Thessalian and Anatolian neighbours to Timotheus' front. These latter will be dealt with à propos of the points (b) and (d); the attitudes of the former may be analyzed here through (e).

The Thessalian situation of the 360's was defined by the traditional rivalry of great aristocratic houses and by the opposition of the bulk of the tribe to the Pheraean tyrant. Rather isolated, Alexander of Pherae had to rely upon external support: from Athens in 368–364, and Thebes after his defeat by Pelopidas' army in the summer of 364. Macedonia also played its part in the struggles between

<sup>95</sup> Philip II apparently did not like the peaceful settlement of the Thasian-Maronean hostilities about Stryme (Demosth. 12, 27). – Cf. above, n. 53.

<sup>96</sup> The settlement referred to in the preceding note was due to Timotheus' *strategia* of 360/59; Timomachus remained too short a time in Thasos after his Stryman expedition to accomplish it; besides, his ambitions as to the χωρίον were different (Demosth. 50, 21 fin.).

<sup>97</sup> Above, text to the notes 16, 18 and 23.

<sup>98</sup> Demosth. 20, 59. Cf. supra, n. 92, DUŠANIĆ, The Arcadian League of the Fourth Century (in Serbian with English Summary), Belgrade 1970, 286 with n. 31 (on IG II<sup>2</sup> 33: the Mantinean and Thasian refugees at Athens [for the connections of the former with Plato and Timotheus, *ibid.* 288–290; REG, forthcoming]), and the article on the <In Leptinem>, *Živa Antika* 29, 1979, 41–71.

<sup>99</sup> I.e. Mnesistratus (Diog. Laert. 3, 47, after Sabinus; cf. W. CAPELLE, RE 15 [1932] 2281), appropriately pointed to by SALVIAT, *loc. cit.*, 63 f. Pro-Athenian sympathies were hereditary in certain families of Thasos (POUILLOUX, *Recherches* I, 204); it is tempting to derive our Mnesistratus (Hegetorides, son of Mnesistratus, and Mnesistratus, son of Hegetorides, figure in the catalogue of the Thasian *theori*, I, col. 3, l. 20, and col. 6, l. 58: POUILLOUX, *Recherches* I, the text facing p. 262) from the house to which belonged Hegetorides, partisan of Athens in the critical year of 463 (Polyaen. 2, 23, cf. POUILLOUX, *Recherches* I, 61 n. 1). Note that the Mnesistratus cited by Diogenes Laertius wrote about (the Pan-Hellenic orator) Demosthenes as Plato's pupil.

Alexander and the Thesalians centred on the Aleuadae at Larissa, Daochidae at Pharsalus, and Jason's sons at Pherae itself.<sup>100</sup> The alignment of the tyrant's enemies in Macedonia and Thessaly was consistent with his own choice of the friends at Athens, where – for several reasons – his main ally should be sought in Callistratus' personage.<sup>101</sup> Even Callistratus' trial leading to the final exile of the demagogue in 361 has been interpreted, attractively enough, as a consequence of failures the administration of Callistratus experienced in its relations with Alexander c. 363–361.<sup>102</sup> We should modify that interpretation somewhat: more than by the Athenian defeats on the part of Alexander, the position of Callistratus in 361 must have been weakened by Callistratus' support for the tyrant in the *ekklesia* after the switch in Pherae policy of 364 B.C.<sup>103</sup> Very probably, Callistratus tended to represent that change as temporary and enforced by the Theban pressure upon the potentate of Pherae. Now, the Pseudo-Platonic *«Sisyphus»* seems to echo, and discuss, the political questions topical in the year of Callistratus' exile and the Athenian formal option against Alexander. Socrates' interlocutor and the eponym of the dialogue, a *Φαρσάλιος* (387c), bears a name well attested in the family of Daochidae.<sup>104</sup> That a historical person was chosen by the author may be inferred from the occurrence, in the same text, of another notable; at 388c–d Callistratus is spoken of, in an analysis of the process of inquiry (*τὸ ζητεῖν*). Significantly enough, the dialogue's Socrates exemplifies Sisyphus' thesis of the nature of inquiry thus: ὅμοιον ὥσπερ εἶ τις Καλλίστρατον γινώσκει μὲν ὅστις ὁ Καλλίστρατος, μὴ μέντοι ἐπίσταται ὅπου εἶη ἔξευρεῖν (c 4–6), and repeats twice that the point is to find Callistratus, not to learn what man he is, for this is already known (c 9–10, d 4–5). Though the identity of this Callistratus has been disputed,<sup>105</sup> it should hardly be doubted that Callistratus of Aphidna, the notorious rival of Timotheus, is meant. In the same

<sup>100</sup> SORDI, *op. cit.*, 193–260.

<sup>101</sup> Politically and chronologically, it is Callistratus' party which must be credited with the pact of 368 (*Staatsverträge* II<sup>2</sup> 276), as well as with the project recorded by Xenophon, *Hell.* 7, 1, 28 *init.* Athens had some material benefit from the alliance *Staatsverträge* II<sup>2</sup> 276 (Ephippus' frg. 1, KOCK, II p. 250 f.), of a kind in which Callistratus' demagogy was especially interested (cf. Eubulus' frgs. 11 and 12, KOCK II p. 168 f.; *Plut. Mor.* 193 d–e).

<sup>102</sup> SEALEY, *loc. cit.*, 201 f.; cf. BELOCH, *Att. Politik*, 158.

<sup>103</sup> That support could explain the fact that «curiously enough, [the stele recording the Athenian alliance with Alexander] seems to have remained untouched [till 361/0 B.C.] despite Alexander's acts of hostilities to Athens and her allies» (TOD, *GHI* 2, 147, ll. 39 f.). Chares, another enemy of Timotheus, avoided the battle with Alexander in 361 (*Diod.* 15, 95, 3).

<sup>104</sup> F. HILLER, *RE Supplb.* 6 (1935) 819; Y. BÉQUIGNON, *RE Supplb.* 13 (1970) 1055. With regard to the date of the composition of the dialogue and other circumstances, our Sisyphus must have been the so-called Sisyphus I (cf. below, n. 112).

<sup>105</sup> Cf. the sceptical comment of J. SOUILHÉ, in his edition of the *Dialogues apocryphes* (the Budé series of Plato, vol. XIII 3), Paris 1930, 61, on J. PAVLU's identification of the dialogue's Callistratus with the rhetor from Aphidna (*Mitt. des Ver. klass. Phil. in Wien* 3, 1926, 28).

manner as Plato in his writings, the anonymous author of the Sisyphus refers to famous figures only<sup>106</sup> (Sisyphus, Stratonicus [387b]) – the difference being that Plato disguises the prominent contemporaries in the fifth-century characters, while the anonymous, in his simplicity, presents them without masks – and, on the other hand, the continuation of the discussion on the inquiry clearly reveals that the example at 388c–d concerns a man with a public activity (389c–d, on the *στρατηγία* and the *κωβερνητική*). With this identification accepted, we obtain a probable *terminus ante quem* for the dialogue, usually dated to the latter half or the end of the fourth century.<sup>107</sup> The dialogue will not have been much later than the politician Callistratus' exile c. 361 and/or death c. 355, events which must have made him, before long, a forgotten personage, unsuitable for a conversational illustration.<sup>108</sup> To my thinking, Socrates' insistence on the question of where Callistratus is to be found would fit in best with a date after Callistratus' departure from Athens early in 361. The year of 361/0 – especially its first half, to which the Attico-Thessalian treaty *Staatsverträge* II<sup>2</sup> 293 presumably belonged<sup>109</sup> – provides an appropriate framework for the composition of the 'Sisyphus', as that treatise seems to allude to the circumstances of the conclusion of the accord in such a way that it should be roughly contemporary with the accord itself. The detail which is most instructive chronologically is read at 387b–c: the day before his meeting with Socrates, Sisyphus was consulted by the Thessalian (or Pharsalian) *ἄρχοντες* on some political issues, and the consultation obviously took place at Athens.<sup>110</sup> The *ἄρχοντες* must have been the envoys of 361/0 offering the alliance to Athena's city (*Staatsverträge* II<sup>2</sup> 293, ll. 8 ff. 40 f.), who profited by the presence, in the town to which they had been sent, of a notable compatriot of theirs from whom they might learn something of recent political relations among the Athenians. This explanation of 387b–c, the only one possible as it seems, would correspond with a normal practice of the Greek diplomacy;<sup>111</sup> moreover, it provides Sisyphus with a

<sup>106</sup> SOUILHÉ, *op. cit.*, 60.

<sup>107</sup> Though without a proper argumentation. See e.g. *ibid.* 64 f. (SOUILHÉ states, however, that the language of the 'Sisyphus' generally corresponds to Plato's epoch); M. ISNARDI, *PP* 9, 1954, 431.

<sup>108</sup> The same holds for Sisyphus, HILLER, *loc. cit.*

<sup>109</sup> Cf. e.g. N. G. L. HAMMOND, *A History of Greece to 322 B.C.*, Oxford 1959, 511 f.

<sup>110</sup> Stratonicus will have had his show there (387b; besides, Socrates was notoriously unwilling to leave his native town, cf. e.g. *Phaedr.* 230c–d); one day (cf. the *χθές* at 387b 1, 8) would not suffice for Sisyphus to travel from Pharsalus to Athens. The Athenian setting of the conversation has appeared confusing to exegetes, who have not realized that the *ἄρχοντες* constituted an embassy (TAYLOR, *op. cit.*, 547 n. 2: «Then is Socrates supposed to be in Thessaly, or were the 'government offices' of Pharsalus at Athens?»).

<sup>111</sup> Cf. e.g. *Isocr.* 17, 5, 8, for an analogous use of the *ἐπιδημοῦντες*. I believe that the majority of the symmachical documents honouring, in addition to the ally's embassy itself, some other citizens of the allied polis, reflect a similar collaboration between the envoys and their compatriots resident in the city which has passed the document in question (like *Top.*, *GHI* 2, 97, ll. 18 ff.: Poses with his sons).



role politically consonant with his earlier career (whose direction, it is true, may only be surmised) and the orientation – against Alexander as well as (implicitly) Callistratus (ll. 31–34, 39f.) – of the symmachy in question.<sup>112</sup> Another feature of the dialogue – its analysis of the remarkable question of the possibility of inquiring into the future (390d ff.)<sup>113</sup> – is likely to corroborate our thesis, since the alliance of 361/0 was declared, surprisingly enough,<sup>114</sup> εἰς τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον, a fact which may easily have occasioned the discussion of the περὶ τῶν μελλόντων βουλευέσθαι.<sup>115</sup>

If our interpretation of the «Sisyphus» is correct, judging from the scepticism of his reasoning, the attitude of the anonymous Platonist to the treaty with the Thessalians was not quite favourable, evidently because of the absence of any time-limit in the text of the decree Staatsverträge II<sup>2</sup> 293, which contradicted Plato's views on the current politics;<sup>116</sup> in the present case, a *permanent* alliance of Athens and the Thessalian *koinon* against Pherae (cf. ll. 31–34) would run contrary to the interests of Jason's sons and Timotheus' friends,<sup>117</sup> who did not abandon all hope of regaining their city – as subsequent events will amply illustrate (358 B.C.). But the (implicitly) critical characterization of Callistratus is next to certain: he is coupled with Stratonicus (389c–d), whose frivolity (cf. Plut. Mor. 602a), caustic wit and musical innovations must all have been heartily disliked by Plato.<sup>118</sup>

<sup>112</sup> On Sisyphus, H. D. WESTLAKE, *Thessaly in the Fourth Century B. C.*, London 1935, 61 with n. 5 (even Sisyphus' link to Euboea [cf. above, n. 51], FGrHist 115 F 18, and the enmity of Theopompus evident through that fragment, may be of interest here). Agelaus, the chief magistrate of the Thessalians in the year of the Staatsverträge II<sup>2</sup> 293 and one of the initiators of the Attico-Thessalian rapprochement (cf. 11. 34 ff.), was also a Pharsalian (which explains the presumed ambivalence Thessalian/Pharsalian ἄρχοντες at 387b–c), probably a Daochid (WESTLAKE, *op. cit.*, 155), another point of contact between the stele and the dialogue.

<sup>113</sup> On it, TAYLOR, *op. cit.*, 548.

<sup>114</sup> WESTLAKE, *op. cit.*, 154. In the whole volume of the Staatsverträge II<sup>2</sup> (some 250 numbers), the «ewige Verträge» are a rarity (cf. the index, p. 341: eleven instances), particularly if the early, non-Athenian treaties are excluded (nos. 120, 126), together with those regulating the membership in the First and Second Maritime Leagues (nos. 132, 162 f., 223, 248, 263), which were something more than simple alliances. Of the remaining examples, nos. 280 (ll. 10–12) and 290 (ll. 17–20) might provide a parallel for ours but, epigraphically at least (cf. the prominent place of ll. 2–4 within Staatsverträge II 293), their case is less striking.

<sup>115</sup> In the Thessalian context, Isocrates' Ep. 6 (see *infra*, n. 117), 2 f., comments significantly on the short duration of the Athenian treaties of alliance.

<sup>116</sup> Cf. e.g. Politicus, 294 a–c.

<sup>117</sup> That the well-known friendship of Jason and Timotheus was inherited by Jason's family may be concluded from the Sixth Letter of Isocrates, Timotheus' adviser and intimate (cf. the first paragraph referring to the Ἰόσονος καὶ Πολυαλκοῦς ξενία).

<sup>118</sup> On Stratonicus, KIND, RE 4 A (1931) 326 f. Against the «utterance of scoffs» Leg. 11, p. 935 a ff., against the changes in music, Rep. 4, p. 424 c; Leg. 2, p. 657 a f.; 7, p. 799 a. Stratonicus' show referred to at the Sisyphus, p. 387 b (SOULHÉ, *op. cit.*, 68 note, con-

This tends to condemn, in the context of the dialogue with a Thessalian as the other *dramatis persona*, Callistratus' Thessalian policy too,<sup>119</sup> and reflects the understanding of the Academy for the new option of Athens and Pharsalus,<sup>120</sup> which could not only neutralize Alexander but also separate Thessaly from Perdiccas' Macedonia.<sup>121</sup> However, the main interest of the apocryphal treatise is that it renders transparent – as epigonic works frequently do when compared with their models – some of the complicated devices of the messages on contemporary politics in the dialogues of the Master himself: the use of tendentious anachronisms (Socrates listening to Stratonicus), of public characters of importance, veiled or unveiled (Callistratus, Sisyphus), and of topical matters adapted for the major themes of Socratic discussion (a perpetual alliance *περὶ τῶν μελλόντων βουλευέσθαι*). An evaluation of such messages in Plato's production as a whole has not been done as yet.

Not without justification, a modern historian wrote of the Boeotian reaction to «the progressive policy» of Timotheus in the North of 364 B.C.: «The two Theban enterprises of this year, the expedition of Pelopidas to Thessaly and the naval venture of Epaminondas, may have been not wholly unconnected in their objects».<sup>122</sup> The same holds, obviously, for the anti-Theban engagement of the Academy in both the wings of Timotheus' front *after* the crisis of the summer of 364. The right wing was more important than the left one, since – naturally enough – the ambitions of the generals of the Second Maritime Confederacy had concentrated upon the East and the North-East. However, Epameinondas' activity at Chios, Rhodes and Byzantium, not to speak of other places, dangerously coordinated the

lectures plausible that the citharist may have developed, on that occasion, «un thème sur son art et l'illustrer par des exemples pratiques»), was praised ironically, like e.g. the two sophists' show in the Euthydemus; cf. what is said on the «clapping of applauders» to the (incompetent) musicians at Leg. 3, p. 700 c.

<sup>119</sup> Callistratus and Stratonicus were similar in more than one way; we should signal here their common contempt for lesser Greek nations (KIND, loc. cit., justly takes the dictum Athen. 8, p. 352 a, as typical of that side of Stratonicus' mentality; on the demagogical xenophobia of Timotheus' political opponents see the article on the Phaedrus cited above, n. 12), a contempt which was wrong both morally and politically.

<sup>120</sup> It would be useful to know more about Execestides, the mover of Staatsverträge II<sup>2</sup> 293. He is generally identified with the man occurring in Staatsverträge II<sup>2</sup> 256 (l. 18), as given a mission which could perfectly accord with a Pan-Athenian orientation. On the other hand, a sign of the anonymous Platonist's wider interest in Thessalian affairs might be seen, behind the «Sisyphus», in his borrowings from the «Meno» (ΣΟΥΛΗÉ, op. cit., 61 f.), another dialogue with the Thessalian elements.

<sup>121</sup> In search of foreign help, the disunited Thessaly was constantly tempted to appeal to its northern neighbour – as in the times of Alexander II (Diod. 15, 61, 3) and Philip II.

<sup>122</sup> WESTLAKE, op. cit., 148. CAWKWELL, loc. cit., 271 ff., is inclined to reduce the scope of this latter enterprise as described by Diodorus and others; see however, against the proviso «presumably there was no great increase in the Boeotian navy [c. 365–364]» (p. 271), J. M. FOSSEY, in: Teiresias Suppl. 2, 1979, 9 ff.

Greek, internal and external alike, with the non-Greek opposition<sup>123</sup> to Athens. That circumstance helps to explain the seemingly inconsistent attitude of Timotheus to Heraclea Pontica. In the second half of 365 he had declined to intervene in her home conflicts; a year later he could not afford the same reserve as the Athenians needed all the bases they could obtain around the vulnerable but vital point of Byzantium.<sup>124</sup> There is no doubt whatsoever that the installation of Clearchus in Heraclea (September–October, 364?)<sup>125</sup> was regarded as a political success of Clearchus' friend Timotheus and of Athens at the same time,<sup>126</sup> which makes us postulate an active role of Timotheus' fleet in the whole affair (b). The initial collaboration of the Heracleian with Ariobarzanes' son Mithradates – of the two Orientals, the father had certainly, the son probably, been allied with Athens and Timotheus during the anti-Persian operations of 365<sup>127</sup> – would point to the same; subsequently, the relations between Mithradates and the ruler of Heraclea deteriorated, in the same way as the personage of the latter.<sup>128</sup> Even the social facet of Clearchus' (and Timotheus' ?) coup at Heraclea might be characteristic of their adherence to the Pan-Athenian line: they supported the democrats against the oligarchs, and Timotheus' change of mind concerning Heraclea in 365–364 may have been due to the politico-social (the appeal of 365 was virtually directed *adversus plebem*, Iust. 16, 4, 3), not only strategical, premises. Now, whether also the Academy was responsible for, or at least had a role in, the accession of her member<sup>129</sup> Clearchus is a less simple question. Though Clearchus soon became a really cruel tyrant – an unexpected evolution for some of his acquaintances (Isocr. Ep. 7, 12) – certain connections between him and Academus' garden may have

<sup>123</sup> In the East Aegean, the chief opponent was Artaxerxes II, allied with Cotys and Thebes, but there were also rather independent satraps hostile to Athens, an orientation resulting from their hostile relations with the rebellious satraps *friendly* to Athens. Save for short periods of great successes of the Athenian and anti-Persian cause, Mausolus numbered among the former (cf. below, [d]).

<sup>124</sup> The sphere of pretensions of Clearchus' Heraclea extended westward at least as far as Astacus (Polyaen. 2, 30, 3; note the mention of the «Thracians»).

<sup>125</sup> On the date, BELOCH, GG III 2, 95 (364/3 B.C.) and supra, text to n. 13 (the end of the sailing season of 364).

<sup>126</sup> Demosth. 20, 84 (cf. e.g. PA 13700 [p. 317]). Timotheus' and Clearchus' friendship found expression also in the choice of the name of the tyrant's son, born (slightly?) before 363/2 (BELOCH, GG III 2, 96).

<sup>127</sup> Above, text with n. 2, on Ariobarzanes. Note that his sons (and Mithradates has been generally considered as such) were included in Timotheus' decree mentioned by Demosthenes, 23, 202 (cf. 141).

<sup>128</sup> Iust. 16, 4, 6, et al. Probably, it was Clearchus' break with (Ariobarzanes-)Mithradates that favoured the establishment of good relations between Heraclea and Susa (Memnon, frg. 1, 5 [FHG III p. 527]).

<sup>129</sup> Memnon, frg. 1, 1 (FHG III p. 526; Clearchus' studies with both Plato and Isocrates are paralleled by Timotheus' and his followers' mediation between these two men); Aelian, frg. 86 H.

persisted,<sup>130</sup> especially at the beginning of the reign, particularly as Heraclea possessed several points of contact with Plato.<sup>131</sup> The very fact that Clearchus fell in the conspiracy (353/2 B.C.) led by two (perhaps three) Platonists<sup>132</sup> tends to attest, indirectly, to rather close links uniting him to the Academy; the murder seems to have been at least partly inspired by *esprit de corps*: the desire to save the face of the school, compromised by Clearchus' despotism.<sup>133</sup>

Finally, point (d). A legislative initiative of an Academician – outside of Athens, not infrequently in the native town of the law-giver – tended to have Pan-Athenian connotations, as the law-making of 371 in Arcadia, Elis and Pyrrha well illustrates.<sup>134</sup> Plato's student and a scientific collaborator,<sup>135</sup> Eudoxus is not likely to have been an exception in that respect; moreover, the striking interdependence between the political oscillations in the Cnidian and Hellespontine regions of the later 360's (infra, notes 155–156) suggests a connection of (d) with Timotheus' engagement in the East and the North of 365–359 B.C. The date of Eudoxus' legislations presents the first problem, complicated by the chronological uncertainties concerning his life and the foundation of the Cnidian Neapolis. We shall state at once that we find the 'high' chronology of Eudoxus' curriculum, placing his birth c. 408, his death c. 355,<sup>136</sup> decidedly preferable to the 'low' chronology (birth c. 395, death in 342/1),<sup>137</sup> which contradicts a number of explicit testimonies, notably those of Apollodorus, on Eudoxus' floruit (FGrHist 244 F 76: 103rd Olympiad = 368/7–365/4), and of Plato's Thirteenth Epistle, furnishing a terminus

<sup>130</sup> Clearchus founded a public library at Heraclea (Memnon, frg. 1, 2 [FHG III p. 527]), a well-known fact which may show that he had not lost all interest in higher matters.

<sup>131</sup> Through its Platonists: Heracleides, Amyntas, Chion and Leonides (Acad. ind. Herc. 6, 1 [p. 33 Mehl.]; Iust. 16, 5, 12, et al.), perhaps also Antitheus (Aelian's frg. 86 H). It has been assumed (J. K. DAVIES, *Democracy and Classical Greece*, Glasgow 1978, 235) that Clearchus' younger son Dionysius (born in 359: BELOCH, GG III 2, 96) was named after the Syracusan Dionysius II – an imitation which could have been due to the Syracusan's and Heracleian's shared relationship with the Academy – but the name seems rather a reflection of the local cult of Dionysus (cf. HEAD, HN<sup>2</sup> 515 f.).

<sup>132</sup> Iust. 16, 5, 12 (Chion et Leonides) and Aelian, frg. 86 H (Χίων; Λεωνίδης, Ἀντίθεος). Cf. Memnon, frg. 1, 3 f. (FHG III p. 527 [Χίων, Λέων, Εὐξένων, «καὶ ἔτεροί»]) and note 131, supra.

<sup>133</sup> Contrast the charge of the Academicians' sympathy for tyrannies, Athen. 11, p. 508 f–509 b (Demochares et al.).

<sup>134</sup> See the paper on the *koine eirene* of 371, cited above, n. 42.

<sup>135</sup> Cf. the testimonia 7 (paras. 86–88)–10, 12, 20, 24 f., 27, etc. in F. LASSERRE, *Die Fragment des Eudoxos von Knidos*, Berlin 1966, 3 ff. (the editor's comment upon their value, pp. 139 ff., is too reserved).

<sup>136</sup> E.g. F. HULTSCH, RE 6 (1909) 931 f.; F. JACOBY, FGrHist 224 F 76 comm.

<sup>137</sup> LASSERRE, op. cit., 137 ff. (with references to his predecessors in proposing such a chronology). A date c. 420–419 for Eudoxus' birth (G. F. UNGER) is impossible, in view of T 4 fin. as compared with e.g. TT 6 a (ἐπὶ Εὐδόξου: 366/5 B.C.) and 24 (early 365 B.C.) LASS.

ante quem for Eudoxus' stay at Cyzicus (360c–d: it began long before the spring of 365, the date of the letter).<sup>138</sup> Sharing the traditional confidence in the value of Apollodorus' frg. 76 J, we are able to fix rather precisely the last two phases of Eudoxus' career: back from Cyzicus to Athens before 366/5, he replaced Plato as scholarch during the Second Visit to Sicily;<sup>139</sup> between 366/5 and 361/0(?),<sup>140</sup> he returned from Athens to Cnidus, and conceived a new constitution for his compatriots, to die there before reaching the age of 53.<sup>141</sup> The resultant dating of Eudoxus' legislation at Cnidus to c. 365–355 has recently been objected to<sup>142</sup> as running counter to the indications that Eudoxus' πολιτεία envisaged the (epigraphically attested<sup>143</sup>) Cnidian Neapolis, presumably erected at the site of modern Tekir (the archaic and classical Cnidus should be sought, according to that theory, at Burgaz Dağca), which is alleged to have begun its existence only in the second half of the fourth century.<sup>144</sup> However, though both the relationship between the

<sup>138</sup> Helicon was Eudoxus' pupil, obviously at Cyzicus, for quite some time (περὶ πάντα τὰ ἐκείνου [Εὐδόξου] πάντα χαριέντως ἔχων); after his study at Cyzicus he must have stayed for a while in Athens, in contact with Plato, with an Isocratean, and with Polyxenus (360 c 5 f.). – On the date of the letter see e.g. 361 b «we arrived too late . . .» and SOULHÉ, Platon (the Budé series), vol. XIII 1<sup>3</sup>, Paris 1960, p. LXX; ΝΟΤΟΥΝΉ, op. cit., 285 (it fell not long after Plato's return from the second voyage to Syracuse, of 366/5 [W. K. GUTHRIE, A History of Greek Philosophy, IV, Cambridge 1975, 26 n. 1]). LASSERRE's scepticism concerning T 24 is significant for the imperfections of his chronology, which puts the opening of Eudoxus' school at Cyzicus as late as c. 363 B.C.

<sup>139</sup> FGrHist 328 F 223: ἐπὶ Εὐδόξου (σχολαρχοῦντος), with comm. All the attempts to explain away this evident interpretation of the dating formula quoted from Aristotle, Vita Marciana 11, have proved unsuccessful; Aristotle must have entered the Academy at the end of 367/6 (on the year, FGrHist 328 F 223 comm., note 6) and begun his work with Socrates the Younger (above, n. 81) somewhere in the summer of 366, when Eudoxus had already replaced Plato as the head of the school.

<sup>140</sup> The terminus post quem non has been conjecturally established on two observations: (1) if he were at Athens during Plato's absence of 361/0 (and we know that he was not in Plato's company then), Eudoxus would have been given the scholarchate again, as in 366/5, but Heracleides held the interim, Suda, s. n.; (2) Eudoxus' visit to Syracuse in 361/0 (Ael. VH 2, 17; doubts as to its historicity have been expressed e.g. by HULTSCH, loc. cit., 932; LASSERRE, op. cit., 146), makes it improbable that Plato and he had seen each other in the recent past (cf. what HULTSCH, loc. cit., says of the hypothesis of a «Nachreise»).

<sup>141</sup> TT 4 and 7 (para. 88) Lass.; Plut. Mor. p. 1126 d.

<sup>142</sup> LASSERRE, op. cit., 142; cf. G. E. BEAN–J. M. COOK, BSA 47, 1952, 210–212.

<sup>143</sup> GIBM 796, cf. BEAN–COOK, loc. cit., 206 f., BSA 52, 1957, 85 f.; J. and L. ROBERT, Bull. ép. 1954, 228 (p. 169); 1955, 171. In our opinion, the number of the *prostatai* of the Neapolis (fifteen, versus the five at Cos, Rhodes, Iasus etc.) reveals that New Cnidus – Neapolis came into being through a synoecism of three settlements, which may have implied only a partial, and slow, transfer of the population to the new centre, if such a transport and centre were planned at all (a synoecism factually matching a simple sympolity of Burgaz Dağca, Tekir and Triopion may be assumed, cf. below, n. 154).

<sup>144</sup> BEAN–COOK, loc. cit. The archaeological evidence seems ambivalent in this connection (cf. the following note); palaeographically, GIBM 796 has been described as

two sites<sup>145</sup> and the terminus a quo for Neapolis remain enigmatic – in any case, the possibility has to be allowed that the astronomer's constitution was drawn up long before the actual transfer (or synoecism), if there was any, of the city<sup>146</sup> – there is at least one sign to suggest a legislative process at Cnidus as early as c. 364–363. G. E. BEAN and J. M. COOK have pointed to Pliny's data (NH 36, 5, 20–22) on statues of Praxiteles, Bryaxis and Scopas at Cnidus – especially the famous Aphrodite of Praxiteles – as implying that the Cnidians were intensively building new sanctuaries at a time *before* the 350's; furthermore these scholars plausibly infer from Pliny's story on Praxiteles and the Coans (ibid. 20) that the Cnidians acquired their Aphrodite shortly after the foundation of New Cos in 366/5 B.C.<sup>147</sup> Such building munificence may perfectly accord with a constitutional reform,<sup>148</sup> and a date for the change c. 363 B.C. would satisfy, in addition to the political circumstances delineated in the sequel, two precise pieces of evidence: Eudoxus' νομοθεσία was a part of a democratic *coup d'état*,<sup>149</sup> and did not fall immediately before his death.<sup>150</sup> Both exclude its attribution to the context of c. 357–355, even of 362–355 B.C.<sup>151</sup> The other side of the problem of Eudoxus' legislation pertains to his and its relationship with Plato and Athens (Timotheus) respectively. Not only was he very close, as a man and a thinker, to the Master, he shared the Master's Pan-Hellenic and Pan-Athenian affinities, to judge i.a. from the politi-

«distinctly later than the middle of the fourth century» (BEAN–COOK, BSA 52, 86) but it certainly need not be ascribed to the first year of Neapolis' existence.

<sup>145</sup> The excavations carried out by I. CORNELIA LOVE (e.g. AJA 1973, 413–424) at Tekir have unearthed some archaic objects and made the excavator believe that Cnidus was situated there from its beginning.

<sup>146</sup> Cf. the case of Megalepolis, whose *politeia* was conceived in 369, perhaps even earlier, and whose synoecism was achieved only in 361 (DUŠANIĆ, Arc. League, 317–331).

<sup>147</sup> BEAN–COOK, BSA 47, 211 (the Coans were anti-Theban c. 364 B.C. [schol. Theocr. 7, 21 a, cf. S. M. SHERWIN-WHITE, Ancient Cos, Göttingen 1978, 64 f.]). Praxiteles may have been linked to the Academy: DUŠANIĆ, Arc. League, 289 n. 53.

<sup>148</sup> As in the case of Thasos (POUILLOUX, Recherches I, 237 et passim), not to speak of the reforms following an actual synoecism.

<sup>149</sup> See Aristot. Pol. 5, p. 1305 b and 1306 b, two notices obviously referring to the same event (R. WEIL, Aristote et l'Histoire. Essai sur la «Politique», Paris 1960, 283) – that leading to Eudoxus' legislation (cf. L. BÜRCHNER, RE 11 [1921] 919 [with a conjectural date c. 366, somewhat too early]; BEAN–COOK, BSA 47, 1952, 211 f.; LASSERRE, op. cit., 142, et al.).

<sup>150</sup> Its contribution to Eudoxus' reputation in the Greek world has been cited in the first place (T 7 [para. 88]).

<sup>151</sup> The chronological relevance of the detail referred to in the preceding note is obvious. As to the democratic character of Eudoxus' laws (cf. the social character of Clearchus' intervention at Heraclea), it should be borne in mind that the external political constellation of 357–355 was quite unfavourable for an anti-oligarchic (pro-Athenian) revolution anywhere in Caria or its neighbourhood (cf. Demosth. 15, 14 ff.); the same might be said of the years of Athens' twilight after 362 (cf. Ps. Demosth. 50, 4 ff., especially on the attitude of Byzantium and Chalcedon).

cal missions to Egypt and Caria c. 380 B.C.<sup>152</sup> Being energetically anti-oligarchical, the orientation of the partisans of his nomothesy certainly corresponded with Timotheus' anti-Persian and anti-Carian (Mausolus) schemes in the South-eastern Aegean.<sup>153</sup> We could venture a further step: one aspect<sup>154</sup> of the revolutionary nature of this reform probably reacted to the Theban-Persian collaboration against Athens of the summer of 364, a collaboration which temporarily rallied Cnidus, Rhodes, Chios and Byzantium,<sup>155</sup> and which was almost revived in 357, with Callistratus presumably supporting Timotheus' enemies in the Straits.<sup>156</sup>

## 3

The results of the foregoing analyses enable us to examine, in a political perspective, the position of Plato himself during the years 365–359. What little we know

<sup>152</sup> Diog. Laert. 8, 8, 87 init. = T 7 LASS. (on the date, HULTSCH, loc. cit., 932): for the anti-Persian nature of Agesilaus' correspondence with Nectanebis cf. the simultaneous Spartan dealings with Glos, Diod. 15, 9, 3 ff. (T. T. RYDER, *Koine Eirene*, Oxford 1965, 52 f.). Eudoxus met Plato in Egypt (T 12) then, and probably travelled with him to Caria (cf. Plut. Mor. p. 579 a–d: that visit of Plato to Caria had its political points, DUŠANIĆ, REG [forthcoming]).

<sup>153</sup> Contrast Demosth. 15, 27 f.; Eudoxus' visit to Mausolus (Diog. Laert. 8, 8, 87 fin.) belonged perhaps to a period of Mausolus' opportunist, temporary adherence to the Pan-Athenian line (in 371/0?). If there was a transfer of the Cnidian gravity centre from the southern coast (Burgaz Datça) to the cape (Tekir) as a consequence of the changes in which Eudoxus participated, it was inspired by the Cnidians' need of protection against Mausolus (J. and L. ROBERT, *Bull. ép.* 1954, 228 [p. 168]) rather than by the dynast's wishes (the alternative preferred by BEAN-COOK, BSA 47, 212).

<sup>154</sup> It could explain i.a. the structure of the body of the *prostatai* of the Cnidian Neapolis, which seems to have acknowledged the rights of all the three constitutive units of New Cnidus (above, n. 143) and presupposed an agglomeration very moderately centralized; such agglomerations were to the taste of the Pan-Athenians but not of Epameinondas (who had before his eyes, as a model, the mighty position of Thebes within the Boeotian Confederacy), as demonstrated in 371/0 (DUŠANIĆ, REG [forthcoming]) and 363/2 (the case of Ceos, centralized by the Theban and decentralized by Chabrias: U. KAHRSTEDT, RE 4 A (1932) 1440) alike.

<sup>155</sup> With good reason, BEAN-COOK, BSA 47, 1952, 187 n. 9, refer the «well-known alliance coins» of Rhodes, Samos, Ephesus, Cnidus, Iasus, Byzantium, Lampsacus and Cyzicus (F. G. HILL, *Greek Historical Coins*, London 1906, 62 ff.) to «the Theban attempt to wrest the control of the Aegean from Athens in 364 B.C.». The series has clear typological affinities to Boeotia (COOK, JHS 81, 1961, 67 f.) and metrological ones to Persia (CAWKWELL, *ibid.* 83, 1963, 152–154), which is a chronological indication. There is at least one more sign that Cnidus, in the epoch shortly preceding Eudoxus' democratic legislation, sided with the enemies of Athens in the North-East: the Cnidian proxeny decree for Iphiadas of Abydos (Syll.<sup>3</sup> 187, found in the neighbourhood of Burgaz Datça), an anti-Athenian (Demosth. 23, 176 f., cf. 158 f.) and the leader of an oligarchic *betairia* in his city (Arist. Pol. 5, p. 1306 a, cf. 1305 b; WEIL, *op. cit.*, 262); cf. another inscription

of his life during those years accords quite well with the Attico-centric Pan-Hellenism of Timotheus. Two notices from the Thirteenth Letter seem to allude to Plato's success in persuading Dionysius II, in 366/5, to endorse Athens' claim to Amphipolis at Susa, and that pact between the Syracusan archon and Timotheus' party will have been parodied in a long fragment of Ehippous' «Geryones».<sup>157</sup> Plato's attendance at the Anolympiad of 364<sup>158</sup> underlines his option for Timotheus' Peloponnesian policy as well as his own (earlier) interest in Arcadian federalism,<sup>159</sup> for the games of 364 must have been boycotted by the Greeks unwilling to accept the Arcado-Pisatan *prostasia* in Altis.<sup>160</sup> In about 362, the philosopher probably advised Chabrias, Timotheus' brother(?) Cratinus and the Cyrenean ἀττικίζοντες to initiate an Attico-Cyrenean rapprochement and design a new, moderately democratic constitution for Cyrene.<sup>161</sup> But his contacts with Dionysius after 365, if intensive, became less and less fertile with regard not only to their personal and philosophical relations but probably also to their collaboration in Pan-Athenian policies. These contacts, ending in the unhappy Third Visit of 361/0, were bound to occupy Plato's attention to a high degree; nevertheless, it is a (common) fault – rather understandable, it is true, in view of our one-sided documentation (the Sicilian letters) – to look at Plato's Syracusan engagement as the only, or even main, source of inspiration for his political writings of the middle and late periods. To judge from what has been said here, Plato had every reason

of the same type and provenance, SEG 12, 418 (for a Lampsacene), probably also of the same date (approximately, «the second quarter of the fourth century», according to the lettering as judged by BEAN-COOK, BSA 47, 187 [with the comments upon «the Cnidian – Hellespontine connection» in that period]). The occurrence of the Cnidian *prostatai* in these two decrees shows that the opinion that the board represented an innovation of the democratic coup (BEAN-COOK, BSA 47, 1952, 212 n. 41) is wrong; the institution is naturally an ancient one, cf. H. SCHAEFER, RE Supplb. 9 (1962) 1291. See n. 147 above, for the anti-Theban reaction of New Cos c. 364 B.C., which suggests – in view of what can be inferred from Pliny, NH 36, 5, 20, on the Coan-Cnidian contacts at the time of Eudoxus' reform – that Cnidus took a similar direction then.

<sup>156</sup> Diod. 16, 7, 3; 21, 1 (Chios, Rhodes, Cos and Byzantium in 357), cf. ACCAME, op. cit., 189 ff. Callistratus lived in Byzantium (schol. Aesch. 2, 124) during his last years, which might be connected with the anti-Athenian option of that city c. 357, after an interim of about two years of probably peaceful relations between it and Athens (SEALEY, loc. cit., 201).

<sup>157</sup> Ep. 13, p. 363 b and c; KOCK II p. 252 f. (frg. 5). Cf. DUŠANIĆ, The Political Context of Plato's Phaedrus (above, n. 12).

<sup>158</sup> Ep. 2, p. 310 d (for the date of the games cited there, E. CAVAINAC, REG 39, 1926, 247 f.).

<sup>159</sup> Cf. DUŠANIĆ, Arc. League, 288 f., and: L'Académie de Platon et la koinè eirenè athénienne de 371 av. J.-C., REG (forthcoming).

<sup>160</sup> MDAI[A] 94, 1979, 117–135 (esp. p. 128 n. 45; cf. p. 120 n. 6, p. 125–128, p. 135 n. 82).

<sup>161</sup> Chiron 8, 1978, 72–76; on Cratinus see the article referred to above, n. 157.



to persist in studying and influencing Athenian politics,<sup>162</sup> especially the city's deep division into two components, a good one and an evil one, as reflected in the events of party strife and foreign affairs.<sup>163</sup> In that field, Timotheus stood against Callistratus and Aristophon, the leaders of two streams in public life – the «moderates» and the «radicals» – which, though differing in their practical aims, were at one with regard to their moral deficiency.

At this juncture, our subject leads us to consult Plato's dialogues as a source for the Athenian history of the 360's, a source which may complete the details adduced here (chs. 1–2) from his letters and non-Platonic texts. Established rather firmly, in its broad outline, on stylometric evidence, the sequence of the dialogues posterior to the «Republic» (Book X) runs: the «Parmenides», the «Theaetetus»,<sup>164</sup> the «Phaedrus», the «Sophist-Politicus», the «Philebus», the «Timaeus-Critias» and the «Laws» (these last, admittedly written as Plato's ultimate work, being a fruit of a long research).<sup>165</sup> The arrangement according to absolute dates is inevitably far less certain or unanimous. With the end of the «Republic» placed c. 370 B.C.<sup>166</sup> and the «Theaetetus» c. 368 B.C.,<sup>167</sup> the «Parmenides» would belong to c. 369. The «Phaedrus» has recently been interpreted as a reaction to the political circumstances of 366/5 (above, notes 12,42), and the «Sophist-Politicus» are commonly assigned to the interval c. 366–360.<sup>168</sup> Though the sequence offers no chronologically useful lower limit for these twin dialogues – the «Philebus» seems to discuss questions concerning the *ephebia* topical as late as c. 357 and reflected also in the immediately following «Timaeus-Critias» (356/5 B.C.)<sup>169</sup> – their dating to the context of the

<sup>162</sup> The influence was understandably indirect (a direct one being impossible, cf. Ep. 5, p. 322 a–b) but one of which Plato was proud, to judge from the Politic. 259 a, 292 e (cf. P. FRIEDLÄNDER, *Platon*, III<sup>2</sup>, Berlin 1960, 272 f., who justly refers these passages to the philosopher himself but errs in seeing in them an allusion to the philosopher's relations with Dionysius).

<sup>163</sup> Philosophically, the problem of the division plays an important role in the «Phaedrus» (see the article cited supra, n. 157) and, with special reference to the crisis of the Social War, in the «Timaeus-Critias» (DUŠANIĆ, *Plato's Atlantis*, Ant. Class. [to appear]).

<sup>164</sup> The «Parmenides» seems to be cited in the «Theaetetus», GUTHRIE, op. cit., 53 with n. 2.

<sup>165</sup> For the relative chronology see e.g. H. LEISEGANG, RE 20 (1950) 2369 ff.; FRIEDLÄNDER, op. cit., 415 ff.; GUTHRIE, op. cit., 41 ff. Except for the position of the «Parmenides» (cf. the preceding note; FRIEDLÄNDER places it after the «Theaetetus») and the «Phaedrus» (GUTHRIE places it before the «Republic», LEISEGANG between the «Republic» and the «Parmenides», but see below), the sequence is identical in all the three representative tables.

<sup>166</sup> Above, n. 42.

<sup>167</sup> As follows from the introductory conversation of the work (E. SACHS, *De Theaeteto Atheniensi*, Diss. Berlin 1914, cf. GUTHRIE, op. cit., 52 n. 2).

<sup>168</sup> See, in addition to the books cited supra, n. 165, J. B. SKEMP, *Plato's Statesman*, London 1952, 13 ff. There were also isolated later datings, in the beginning of the 350's (J. GEFFCKEN, R. V. SCHELIHA).

<sup>169</sup> On the date of the «Timaeus-Critias» and the references of the «Critias» to the problem of the *ephebia* see DUŠANIĆ, *Plato's Atlantis*, Ant. Class. (to appear). That the «Philebus»

events treated above must be correct. It may be made somewhat more precise: the *«Politicus»*, in which Socrates the Younger figures as a *dramatis persona*, must be posterior to Socrates' death in 363/2, and the same should be postulated for the *«Sophist»*, composed simultaneously with the *Politicus* or nearly so.<sup>170</sup> In anticipation of the historical analysis to be developed in the sequel, we could fix a terminus ante quem as well: the months around Callistratus' flight from Athens and the failure of his plan to re-establish his power there by the aid of Timomachus' fleet (spring-summer, 361). For, the political criticism in these two dialogues, especially the *«Statesman»*, presupposes the activity, at Athens, of an influential demagogue of Callistratus' type whose forensic aggressiveness was dangerous to Plato,<sup>171</sup> a danger disappearing with Callistratus' end.

There is more than one sign of correlation between some ideas of the *«Sophist-Politicus»* and the exploits of the Academy examined in the foregoing chapter. The chronological coincidence with Timotheus' glorious return to Athens in the summer of 362 and with the political trials of the next year<sup>172</sup> certainly gave the

was occasioned by a discussion on the ephebic issues may be concluded from (a) the name of the dialogue's fictitious eponym, which resembles an Ephebos; (b) the presence of a silent audience constituted of young men (16 a 4), and (c) from the relevance of the dialogue's main theme, pleasure, to the politico-pedagogical aspects of the epheby (as evident e.g. in Aristotle's *«Nicomachean Ethics»* [Books VII and X] and contemporary comedy [cf. Ehippus' *«Ephebi»*, KOCK II p. 255 frgs. 8–10]). The whole matter must have interested the author of the *«Laws»* highly (on the *diaita* of the *agronomi* see M. PIÉRART, *Platon et la Cité grecque*, Bruxelles 1973, 282 f.).

<sup>170</sup> Of these *«Zwillingsdialoge»* (WILOMOWITZ), the *«Sophist»* is probably slightly earlier (cf. GUTHRIE, *op. cit.*, 53, on *Politic.* 284 b); on the other hand, FRIEDLÄNDER must be right in stating that Plato never planned the *«Philosophus»* as the third part of the *«Sophist-Politicus»* (*op. cit.*, 261 f.). Socrates the Younger appears only as a silent character in the *«Theaetetus»* (147 d) and the *«Sophist»* (218 b); such an inactive role is not incompatible with his being alive at the moment of composition of the *«Theaetetus»*, perhaps even the *«Sophist»* (our chronology of the years 363–362 shows that the *«Politicus»* shortly postdated Socrates' death, the *«Sophist»* still more shortly, if at all). The Platonic *«rule not to introduce living persons as speakers»* is fundamentally correct (L. PARMENTIER, *La chronologie des dialogues de Platon*, Bruxelles 1913, et al.) despite some exceptions (*contra*, TAYLOR, *op. cit.*, 22; FIELD, *op. cit.*, 75 f.).

<sup>171</sup> That threat, rather real in 366/5 (cf. Diog. Laert. 3, 24) and 362/1, when Plato's relatives Chabrias and Timotheus were exposed to political trials which involved, or could have involved, Plato himself (cf. what G. RYLE says [*Plato's Progress*, Cambridge 1966, 148 ff., esp. 157, on *Gorg.* 508 c] of the charges against *«Socrates»* alluded to in Plato's dialogues) explains not only the dramatic dates of the *«Theaetetus»*, *«Sophist»* and *«Politicus»*, close to the day of Socrates' trial, but also the emphatic passage at *Politic.* 299 b–c (cf. FRIEDLÄNDER, *op. cit.*, 261, 277 f.).

<sup>172</sup> We do not know whether the *«Politicus»* was finished before Plato started on his Third Journey (the voyage ended by May 12, 361: U. v. WILAMOWITZ-MOELLENDORF, *Platon*, I<sup>2</sup>, Berlin 1920, 550, on *Plut. Dion* 19) but by that time Apollodoros' prosecution of Timotheus was already over, and the preliminaries of Callistratus' trial had probably begun. – Despite the differences of our respective attitudes to the collaboration between

discussion of the kingly art a link with the realities always dear to Plato as the theoretician of the polis; the participation of Socrates the Younger in the *Politicus* recalls the Eleventh Epistle, which mentions him as a candidate for promoting the Thasian reform of c. 363 in the context of the collaboration between Thasos and the Pan-Athenians.<sup>173</sup> The image of the kingly weaver whose task is to affirm the mean between a peaceful and an aggressive foreign policy (*Politic.* 307d–e et passim) – the harmony may be achieved, «when a single magistrate happens to be needed», by choosing «a man possessing both characteristics», when «several magistrates are wanted», by bringing together «some representatives of each type to share the duties»<sup>174</sup> – has already been found<sup>175</sup> as pertaining to Athenian conditions, but it has not been realized that it defended Timotheus' line in conflict with the extremes of Callistratus' and Aristophon's programmes. Three details at least tend to connect it to Timotheus' activity of the later 360's. The *via media* includes the knowledge of the *καιρός*, the «due time» (ibid. 307b, cf. e), which reminds us of the controversies on Timotheus' *τύχη* in 362.<sup>176</sup> The gentle and spirited characters are to be combined and improved through opportune marriages, while the popular fault is that both the classes «look for a partner like themselves» (ibid. 310c–d); this seems to contain a criticism of the wedding of Iphicrates' son Menestheus with Timotheus' daughter, a political event of some topicality in 362, which could not have been approved by the Academy for many reasons.<sup>177</sup> Lastly, the (selective and indirect) compliment to the barbarians of 262c–d, which looks so surprising to certain exegetes,<sup>178</sup> accords well enough with Timotheus' alliances with Ariobarzanes, Tachos, Pausanias and the Odrysian successors to Cotys as contrasted to Callistratus' usual *xenophobia*.<sup>179</sup>

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the philosopher and Conon's son, it is instructive to read, in this connection, WILAMOWITZ' pages in: *Platon I*, 489 ff. (esp. 493 f.).

<sup>173</sup> FRIEDLÄNDER, op. cit., 260 (of Socrates the Younger's occurrence in Ep. 11 and the *Politicus*: «Gewiß ist sein politisches Interesse ein Grund, warum Plato ihm in der Diskussion über den politischen Menschen die Rolle gibt, die im Sophistes der junge Theaitet hatte»); SKEMP, op. cit., 53. – The case of Theodorus' participation in the *Theaetetus* and the *Sophist–Politicus*, may have been similar, in view of the Attico-Cyrenean undertaking referred to above, n. 161.

<sup>174</sup> *Politic.* 311 a, J. B. SKEMP's translation. Note ibid. 308 a: «You have described a hard and a bitter experience».

<sup>175</sup> SKEMP, op. cit., 66, with the comments on Eubulus and Demosthenes.

<sup>176</sup> *Plut. Sulla* 6, 3 f. For the assimilation of «Chance and Occasion» which, together with God and Art, help a good general, see *Leg.* 4, p. 709 b.

<sup>177</sup> Morally (cf. *Ps. Demosth.* 49, 66) and politically (Iphicrates' unreliability may have provoked reserves among the friends of Timotheus, cf. DUŠANIĆ, *The Political Background of Demosthenes' Speech Against Leptines*, *Živa Antika* 29, 1979, 57 n. 63 a.), the reconciliation of Timotheus and the former partisan of Callistratus was open to criticism.

<sup>178</sup> FRIEDLÄNDER, op. cit., 267, with bibl. (p. 480 n. 15).

<sup>179</sup> Above, n. 119. In about 370, Callistratus opposed Timotheus' Pan-Athenian diplomacy by proposing a law which restricted somewhat the honorific grants of Attic citizen-

On the level of home policy, Plato's main field of interest, the condemnation of Callistratus becomes sharper still. As shown by the introduction to the *«Sophist»* (216c–217a) and several passages in the *«Politicus»* (e.g. 291a ff., 303b ff.), the common point of the joined dialogues is to distinguish the sophist from the true statesman. Though Plato endeavours to make his analysis relevant to all Greek constitutions, the historical reality which required and inspired that distinction was obviously the Athenian – where the sophists' «race of many tribes» (*Politic.* 291a) had more of «party leaders» (*ibid.* 303c) than anywhere else –, certainly not that of the Sicily of Plato's days, where the reformer's problem consisted primarily in the frailty of Dionysius' individual character. Even tyranny is treated in the *«Politicus»* – through the myth of the reversal of the universe in the period when God abandons the world-ship<sup>180</sup> – in an analogous way as in the *«Republic»*:<sup>181</sup> it arises from a corrupt democracy, not from the succession to the usurpation, as was the case of Dionysius II's rule in Syracuse. The general resemblance between the false statesman of these dialogues and Callistratus' personage, which is satisfactory but rather impersonal, tends to be strengthened by two particulars especially characteristic of Callistratus. In our opinion, Plato's insistence upon the thesis that the «shepherd of the human folk» should not be «charged with the bodily nurture of his herd» (*Politic.* 275b–276b) does not reflect a «tendency to ignore economic considerations», as it is sometimes qualified,<sup>182</sup> but reveals Plato's attitude toward one of the supports of Callistratus' demagoguery, his care for the Athenian food supply.<sup>183</sup> On the other hand, WILAMOWITZ<sup>184</sup> has already pointed out the root of Plato's discreet protest against the lot which, in the Athenian democracy, designates the King-Archon (*ibid.* 290e f.): a scandal ultimately due to Callistratus<sup>185</sup> compromised that high office, as we happen to know from a pseudo-Demosthenic speech (59, 72. 79 ff.).

All this brings us near to the major theme of the *«Politicus»*: the problem of the relation between the laws and the sovereign statesman. Highly differentiated, Plato's discussion of it envisages, on the level of the existing society, two convergent corruptions of the ideal solution – a monarchy subject to good fundamental laws –, viz. the quasi-constitutional disregard of the traditional νόμοι by constant-

ship; the measure obstructed i.e. Timotheus' Persian policy (DUŠANIĆ, *L'Académie de Platon et la koinè eirèné athénienne de 371 av. J.-C.*, REG [forthcoming]).

<sup>180</sup> 268 d–274 e, esp. 269 c. For this interpretation of the μεταβολή πολιτειῶν resulting from the myth's inverse cycle see J. LUCCIONI, *La pensée politique de Platon*, Paris 1958, 203. We could conjecture that, for Plato, the period of God's «retirement» corresponded in the microcosm of fourth-century Athens to the period of Callistratus' predominance.

<sup>181</sup> 8, p. 562 f.

<sup>182</sup> G. M. A. GRUBE, *Plato's Thought*, London 1935, 282 n. 1.

<sup>183</sup> Above, n. 101.

<sup>184</sup> *Op. cit.*, 577 n. 1.

<sup>185</sup> As Stephanus' protector (*Ps. Demosth.* 59, 43). The precise date of the affair is unknown; it should be now put before c. 362.

ly changing them and introducing new ones (300d–e, 301a),<sup>186</sup> and the rule of open defiance of law, in the bad imitation of the scientific *princeps legibus solutus* (301b–c). Both ways, practically concurrent in a democratic régime and virtually leading to tyranny,<sup>187</sup> seem to have been followed by Callistratus. At the end of 362/1, the man from Aphidna contemplated an anti-constitutional act to regain power in Athens, which probably induced a politician not unfriendly to Plato or Timotheus to refer implicitly, in an official act, to the danger of Callistratus' aspiration to a tyranny.<sup>188</sup> Callistratus' earlier career disclosed also his inclination for excessive lawmaking, another device of the political sophists of a democracy. A fragment of the comic poet Eubulus makes fun of the salient traits of Callistratus' personage: his eloquence, homosexuality, financial ability, his appearance, and says of him νόμον ἐξ νόμου ἔλλκων.<sup>189</sup> These last words, though variously interpreted,<sup>190</sup> are best understood as a literal allusion to Callistratus' legislative fertility, which was so much disliked by Plato.

Finally, line 4 of the same fragment, (Καλλίστρατος) ἐν δ' ἐστὶν καὶ πολλά, may provide a clue to the political exegesis of a philosophic issue which is given such an important place in the «Parmenides», «Theaetetus» and «Sophist». Though Eubulus' assertion just quoted is generally taken as a humorous tribute to nothing more than Callistratus' every-day versatility,<sup>191</sup> I prefer to see in it a reference to the philosophic problem of unity and multiplicity, which doubtless used to be connected in some way with the demagogue's activity. That interpretation would add one more item to the rather wide repertory of famous philosophic questions cited in the Attic comedy because of their topicality and relevance to notable men;<sup>192</sup> it has the distinct advantage over the other in strictly respecting the wording of the verse.<sup>193</sup> Now, for Plato at least, the great metaphysical problem of the One and the Many clearly correlates with the problems of motion, change, and the value of knowledge and half-knowledge (δόξα) of the phenomenal world; his opinion on these matters, as expressed in the dialogues of the «critical» period, is admittedly

<sup>186</sup> Plato's protest against «multiplying ... petty laws and amending them» became a topos: Rep. 4, p. 425 e ff.; Leg. 7, p. 798 a ff.; Strab. 6, 1, 8 (from a Platonic lecture?).

<sup>187</sup> Cf. Isocr. 7, 41 and the comic poets' allusions chosen e.g. by T. B. L. WEBSTER, *Studies in Later Greek Comedy*, Manchester 1953, 32 (note the image from KOCK I p. 605 f., frg. 22, which may have inspired the «kingly weaver» of the «Politicus»). Anarchy, of course; announced a tyranny (cf. Rep. 9, p. 574 e f.).

<sup>188</sup> H. BENGTON, *Staatsverträge* II 290, 1. 26 f. Cf. MDAI[A] 94, 1979, 135 with n. 82.

<sup>189</sup> Athen. 10, p. 449 e = KOCK II p. 201 f., frg. 107 (from the «Sphingokarion»). Cf. WEBSTER, op. cit., 30.

<sup>190</sup> Cf. KOCK's note ad loc.: «modum ex modo, cantum ex cantu, eine Melodie nach der anderen».

<sup>191</sup> KOCK glosses these words «callidum Callistrati ingenium designant». Cf. WEBSTER, op. cit., 30.

<sup>192</sup> WEBSTER, op. cit., 34 ff. 50 ff. 110 ff.

<sup>193</sup> See e.g. Soph. 251 b 7 f.

of the most difficult to reconstruct.<sup>194</sup> One line of modern scholarship, to which we are inclined to adhere, treats the 'Parmenides' as Plato's reply to the Megarian Eleatics' criticism of Plato's postulating «an intermediate state between complete reality and absolute non-reality which was characteristic of the world of sensible objects».<sup>195</sup> To my thinking, that postulate, which determines the logical discussions of the 'Theaetetus' and the 'Sophist',<sup>196</sup> underlines the 'Statesman's' thesis of the *via media* in public affairs<sup>197</sup> and originated essentially from Plato's role of political spectator and adviser. In a simplified pattern, the extreme pluralists were the Athenian radicals, the monists the Athenian conservative moderates of the 360's;<sup>198</sup> the tone of the analysis in the 'Parmenides' suggests that the controversy on Megarian monism entered the Academy,<sup>199</sup> and, perhaps, the moderate *politēumenoī* also, not only Timotheus, found some supporters there in about 369.<sup>200</sup> A later Athenian politician of Callistratus' type was known to maintain contacts with Stilpon, the Megarian critic of Plato;<sup>201</sup> analogous theoretical interests of Callistratus himself could easily have provoked Eubulus' ridicule.<sup>202</sup> The formula «one thing it (he) is, yet many» may show that the poet did not bother his head about correctly defining the theoretical basis of Callistratus' option in public affairs or, which is more probable, that he reproached Callistratus for opportunistically abandoning the moderate orientation in 366/5.<sup>203</sup> What-

<sup>194</sup> Cf. the fine succinct discussion of G. C. FIELD, *The Philosophy of Plato*, Oxford 1949, 80 ff. (and R. C. CROSS' Appendix to the second edition of the book [Oxford 1969, 161 f.], with some references to those who disagree).

<sup>195</sup> FIELD, *op. cit.*, 36 (cf. 80 ff.).

<sup>196</sup> See e.g. A. DIÈS, *Platon. Le Sophiste*<sup>3</sup> (the Budé series, vol. VIII 3), Paris 1955, 283 ff.; E. A. WYLLER, *Der späte Platon*, Hamburg 1970, 56. 86 ff. 153.

<sup>197</sup> As well as elsewhere, of course. The *via media* may be discovered by the aid of the δόξα, cf. *Politic.* 284 a f. with *Phil.* 59 a.

<sup>198</sup> On the ideological background of this scheme, K. R. POPPER, *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, I<sup>5</sup>, London 1966, 7-85.

<sup>199</sup> W. JAEGER, *Aristotle*<sup>2</sup>, Oxford 1962, 172; TAYLOR, *op. cit.*, 370. On the 'Alcibiades' I, see below, n. 206.

<sup>200</sup> Phocion, for instance. In the Academy, the dissent as to Timotheus' policy may have been rather wide, comparable to the division between the pro-Macedonian and anti-Macedonian Academicians of the second half of the fourth century.

<sup>201</sup> Sophilus' or Diphilus' fragment from the Γάμος (KOCK II p. 547 frg. 23). Stilpon's pupil in the art of arguing in a public dispute was the philomacedonian politician (WEBSTER, *op. cit.*, 43; 52; 159 with n. 4) of Demosthenes' epoch (cf. the conflict between Demosthenes and another Megarian champion of eristic: KOCK III p. 461, frg. 294); as a rule, Philip II's partisans in Athens arose from among the moderates of the earlier generation.

<sup>202</sup> For a similar case concerning other persons (Plato and a Pan-Athenian) see Ephippus' famous verses from the Ναυαγός (KOCK II p. 257 f., frg. 14).

<sup>203</sup> Cf. *Soph.* 242 d-e: «certain muses in Ionia and Sicily» are Heraclitus and Empedocles (TAYLOR, *op. cit.*, 383) whom, together with Protagoras, Plato held to represent the philosophical source of the pluralism and the political radicalism (*Th.* 152 e, 179 e ff.,

ever the truth, Plato wrought into the *«Parmenides»* and the *«Theatetus»* indubitable indications of his messages on the contemporary politics as centring on the fate of Timotheus, Callistratus and the radicals. We should draw the readers' attention to those passages which seem the most marked in this connection. The quite exceptional setting of the *«Parmenides»*, with its narration in the triple «cascades» (A. Diès), has obviously a point beside the usually acknowledged<sup>204</sup> wish to leave the impression of a distant past. A. E. TAYLOR must be right in assuming Plato's intention to create a stage for a great duel between the great antagonists of thought, Socrates and Parmenides.<sup>205</sup> However, the duel manifestly displays its political as well as its dialectic facet: this is shown through the polarization of the characters present – or absent, but alluded to –, of whom Aristoteles «was afterwards one of the Thirty» (127d). Analogous to, but different from, that of the *«Alcibiades»* I,<sup>206</sup> the polarization groups Parmenides with the opponents to Pericles and the democratic, expansive, anti-Persian and anti-Spartan Athens (the same Aristoteles as Parmenides' companion; Pythodorus, Parmenides' host and a moderate politician of the 420's;<sup>207</sup> indirectly present, Parmenides' pupil Melissus of Samos, the victor over the fleet of Pericles in 441/0 B.C.).<sup>208</sup> On the other side, behind Socrates, we see Cephalus of Clazomenae, Anaxagoras' compatriot and, obviously, a member of the school founded at Clazomenae by Pericles' teacher, together with Plato's relatives of whom Antiphon was a son of the statesman Pylilampes, Pericles' ἑταῖρος.<sup>209</sup> The position of Socrates-Plato is nearer to Anaxa-

esp. 171 eff.). – On Callistratus' radicalizing after 366/5, see DUŠANIĆ, *The Political Context of Plato's Phaedrus* (to appear).

<sup>204</sup> DIÈS (Platon. *Parménide*<sup>3</sup> [the Budé series, vol. VIII 1], Paris 1956, 7) et al.

<sup>205</sup> TAYLOR, op. cit., 352. That scholar thought of the «encounter of Socrates with the great Eleatics» as a «real historical fact» but, rather, it is a literary fiction.

<sup>206</sup> With TAYLOR, op. cit., 522, we take the dialogue as apocryphal and not very early; it may be roughly contemporary with the discussions reflected in the *«Parmenides»*.

<sup>207</sup> Parm. 126 b (127 b, 136 e); two traits of his biography seem characteristic of his moderate orientation, his resignation from Athenian imperialism in Sicily (Thuc. 4, 65, 3; note the meaningful role of Hermocrates in the *«Timaeus-Critias»*!), and his presumable contribution to the peace of 421 (Thuc. 5, 19, 2; 24, 1; cf. H. GÄRTNER, RE 24 (1963) 550). – For Plato's opinion on the tyranny of the Thirty, Apol. 32 c f. Ep. 7, 325 a.

<sup>208</sup> Melissus is coupled with Parmenides (himself a rich aristocrat, Diog. Laert. 9, 3, 21) at Th. 180 e, 183 e; for his naval victory, Plut. Pericl. 26. – Plato's attitude to Pericles presents complex problems; suffice it here to say that, after the Gorgias, it became less and less hostile so that the *«Phaedrus»* (269 e f.) has both Pericles and Anaxagoras as comparatively laudable figures (R. HACKFORTH, *Plato's Phaedrus*, Cambridge 1952, 149 with n. 3). That the contrasting of Pericles (Anaxagoras) and Pythodorus ([*«Parmenides»*] Zenon), evident from Alc. I, 119 a (cf. 118 c), had its aspect concerning Athenian relations with Susa, Lacedaemon and other Greeks hardly needs any proof; it explains what is said of Alcibiades, Persian and Spartan kings *ibid.* 120 a ff.

<sup>209</sup> The Clazomenians (~ Anaxagoras, cf. TAYLOR, op. cit., 352, who points appropriately to the fact that Socrates was «the favourite pupil of Anaxagoras' successor Arche-laus»), Adeimantus and Glaucon: 126 a; Antiphon, son of Pylilampes: 126 b (for Pylilam-

goras and Pericles than to Parmenides and the *λακωνίζοντες*, not only philosophically – the denial of Megarian Eleaticism –, but also personally, with regard to the alignment of the Adeimantus, Glaucon and Antiphon of the dialogue. Matters appear similar in the *«Theaetetus»*, and reveal the relevance of the controversy to events contemporary with the date of the dialogue's composition. For, the *mise en scène* of the *«Theaetetus»* contains an impressive, if implicit, condemnation of the Corinthian campaign of 369 which cost the young Academician his life; that warfare was due to Callistratus' laconophile, anti-Panathenian policy, unsparingly enforced against all opposition at home.<sup>210</sup> Megara – probably also its philosophers – accepted, like Callistratus' Athens, the laconophile option in the post-Leuctran period.<sup>211</sup> Such an attitude may have contributed to the dialectic disagreement reflected in Plato's dialogues later than the *«Republic»*: a very striking page of the *«Theaetetus»* attacks social prejudices of the *λακωνίζοντες*.<sup>212</sup> We seem to be able to trace an evolution of Plato, during the 360's, parallel to the political vicissitudes of the Pan-Athenians. From 370 to 366/5, both the Academy and Timotheus were rather close to the radicals as the main enemies of Callistratus' *«moderate»* régime,<sup>213</sup> and no philosophical compromise between *«One»* and *«Many»* emerges from the *«Parmenides»* or the *«Theaetetus»*. After 366/5, especially in 363 and 362,<sup>214</sup> the Pan-Athenians unmistakably separated from the radicals, to take a direction between them and the moderates, which inspired the teaching of the middle way

pes and Pericles, Plut. Pericl. 13, 10). Of course, the polarization Pericleans–Parmenideans was not one of the personal hostility (note the good relations between Socrates and Parmenides, Antiphon and Pythodorus): it must have reflected a division of opinions within the Academy itself.

<sup>210</sup> Ps. Demosth. 59, 27; Xen. Hell. 6, 5, 49; Demosth. 16, 12.

<sup>211</sup> Isocr. 5, 53 (cf. ED. MEYER, *Geschichte des Alterthums*, V, Stuttgart–Berlin 1902, 459. 460) et al.

<sup>212</sup> 174 e ff. (the mention of the «progenitors going back to Heracles» is directed against the Spartan kings, see Alc. I, 120 e), cf. 173 d–e. To POPPER (op. cit., 281 n. 50 [6], 321 f.), it appears incompatible with Plato's usual aristocratic and Hellenic idiosyncrasies to such a degree that this scholar attributes the passage to Socrates' teaching and dates the *«Theaetetus»* earlier than the *«Republic»*!

<sup>213</sup> There is a significant parallelism of the passages referred to in the preceding note and the anti-Spartan and socially liberal ideas of Alcidas' *«Messeniakos»*. The collaboration between Timotheus and the radicals after 371/0 may be deduced i.a. from their collaboration at the moment of the Oropian trial.

<sup>214</sup> Note the conflict between Chabrias and Aristophon about Ceos (supra, n. 37; cf. Leg. 1, p. 638 b) and Apollodorus' prosecution of Timotheus (supra, text to n. 33). If Apollodorus began his public career as a partisan of Callistratus, he ended it, in Demosthenes' epoch, as a radical (cf. BELOCH, *Att. Politik*, 160). Besides, there was no personal or programmatic consistency in the careers of some demagogues, including Callistratus after 366/5: thence i.a. Plato's comments on the «leaders of bogus government» and «supreme imitators and tricksters» (*Politic.* 303 c), and, in general, on the «bottomless abyss of unlikeness» (ibid. 273 d).



in the *«Sophist»* and the *«Politicus»*.<sup>215</sup> The *«Timaeus-Critias»* and the *«Laws»* tell us that the trend of Plato's gradual estrangement from the radicals and approach to the conservative friends of Sparta continued into the sixth decade of the fourth century.

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<sup>215</sup> Even the change of Socrates-Plato's attitude to Parmenides, from the *«Parmenides»* to the *«Sophist-Politicus»*, is characteristic in that respect: from the opponent, Socrates-Plato became – in the person of the Eleatic stranger – Parmenides' better self (cf. TAYLOR, *op. cit.*, 374 f.).

Addendum to n. 107:

To my regret, I have come across C. W. MÜLLER's careful study of the *«Kurzdialoge der Appendix Platonica»* (München 1975) too late to use it in my discussion of the Sisyphus and to note our virtual agreement on several important points. These last include the problems of the dialogue's date and of the identification of the personage spoken of at 388c-d. Cf. p. 103: «Der *«Sisyphus»* ist demnach in den Jahren seiner [Kallistratos von Aphidnai] Abwesenheit von Athen entstanden [zwischen 361 und etwa 350], als die Frage *«Wo ist Kallistratos?»* [Sis. 388d] tatsächlich in der Stadt die Gemüter bewegte [Seneca, *De ben.* 6, 37, 1], während die Frage *«Wer ist Kallistratos?»* noch für niemanden eine Frage war.»