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A. B. BOSWORTH

The Emasculation of the Calchedonians: A Forgotten Episode of the Ionian War

The early years of the Ionian War have always attracted their fair share of scholarly attention. Naturally so. The point of intersection between Thucydides and his continuators is of great historiographical interest. There are also acute chronological problems, thanks to the cursory coverage of the period in all our extant sources and the notorious inadequacy of Xenophon, who has compacted the events of two campaigning years into a single year of narrative.¹ Too few incidents are recorded, and there are too few chronological pegs. Given this dearth of evidence, it is all the more surprising that a small but instructive piece of information has been universally overlooked in the standard histories of the period. If properly interpreted, it can provide a chronological anchor point, and, more importantly, it casts a sharp, not to say lurid, beam of illumination on the relations between Greeks and Persians after the treaties of 412/11 BC.

Our source is the *Bithyniaca* of Flavius Arrianus, which was probably written in the Hadrianic period and covered the history of Bithynia from mythical times to the death of Nicomedes IV (75/4 BC) and its establishment as a Roman province.² The work is not extant, and the numerous citations deal overwhelmingly with the mythical period and related problems of nomenclature. However, the history of the area during the Peloponnesian War must have figured fairly prominently. Arrian must have known and used Thucydides' brief description of Lamachus' abortive expedition to Heracleia and his return by land through Bithynia to Calchedon,³

¹ On the chronology see the recent discussions of N. ROBERTSON, *The sequence of events in the Aegean in 408 and 407 BC*, *Historia* 29, 1980, 282–301, and A. ANDREWES, in *CAH* v², Cambridge 1992, 503–5. The fullest general treatment of the period is that of D. KAGAN, *The Fall of the Athenian Empire*, Ithaca and London 1987, esp. 244–85.

² On the *Bithyniaca* (by far the most frequent spelling of the title) see PH. A. STADTER, *Arrian of Nicomedia*, Chapel Hill 1980, 152–61.

³ Thuc. 4. 75. 2. This was an episode of intrinsic interest, as Lamachus anticipated the last stage of the march of the Ten Thousand (Xen. *Anab.* 6. 2. 1–6. 38) and, unlike the Ten Thousand, completed the journey without serious incident. Lamachus' exploits were commemorated by the local historians of Heracleia (Just. 16. 3. 10–12, probably based on Nymphis [so JACOBY, *FGrH* iii.b Text 255]), and they can hardly have escaped Arrian's attention. See now S. HORNBLLOWER, *A Commentary on Thucydides* ii, Oxford 1996, 245–7.

and he will also have dealt with Alcibiades' later foray into the territory of the Bithynians.⁴ Both these episodes concern Calchedon, and Calchedon is the subject of the critical fragment, included in Eustathius' commentary on Dionysius <Periegetes>:⁵ ἰστορεῖ δὲ ὁ αὐτὸς καὶ ὅτι τοῖς Χαλκηδονίοις ἀποφρὰς νομίζεται παντὸς μηνὸς φθίνοντος ἑνάτη ... διότι ἐν τοιαύταις ἡμέραις ἄλλας τε δυστυχίας αὐτοὶ ἔπαθον καὶ Φαρνάβαζος δὲ ὁ Πέρσης τοὺς αὐτῶν παῖδας ἐκτεμῶν εἰς τὸν Δαρεῖον ἀνέπεμψε. Κατασκήψαι δὲ φησιν αὐτοῖς καὶ νόσον ἐν θεομηνίας, τὸ αὐτοὺς τὰ σφῶν ἀποτέμνειν αἰδοῖα, διότι θυσῶν τιμῶν κατημέλησαν. «The same writer (sc. Arrian) records that among the people of Calchedon the twenty second of each month is considered *nefastus* ... because on such days they experienced disasters, notably the occasion when Pharnabazus the Persian castrated their male children and sent them up country to Darius. He says that a disease also afflicted them through divine anger, causing them to cut off their own genitals, because they had neglected certain sacrifices.»

Arrian presumably had two explanations for the emasculation of the Calchedonians. One provided a divine agent, exacting retribution for neglected sacrifices, a story all too reminiscent of Arrian's picture of the slighted Dionysus, who drove Alexander to the murder of Cleitus, avenging the transfer of his sacrifice to the Dioscuri.⁶ The other version attributes the blame to Pharnabazus, and dates the episode to the reign of the Persian king, Darius II. Arrian is following his regular practice, familiar from the Alexander history, of juxtaposing incompatible traditions.⁷ There was agreement that many of the Calchedonians lost their manhood

⁴ Xen. Hell. 1. 3. 2–3; Plut. Alc. 29. 5–7. Diodorus (12. 82. 2) also records a particularly savage attack on Bithynian territory in 416/5, carried out by a combined force from Byzantium and Calchedon.

⁵ Eustath. ad Dionys. 803 = Arr. Bithyn. F 37 ROOS = JACOBY, FGGrH 156 F 79–80. I can find no reference to the text in any history of the period, though it figures, usually without comment, in specialist literature on Calchedon (e.g. W. RUGE, RE 10, 2, 1919, 1556, s. v. Calchedon; H. MERLE, Die Geschichte der Städte Byzantion und Kalchedon von ihrer Gründung bis zum Eingreifen der Römer in die Verhältnisse des Ostens, Diss. Kiel 1916, 27; R. MERKELBACH, Die Inschriften von Kalchedon, Bonn, 1980, 92, 111). The historical discussions come close to an illustration of L. ROBERT's mordant dictum: «Il arrive que des érudits lisent somme toute assez peu, et très peu en dehors des passages où ils sont renvoyés par leurs prédécesseurs.»

⁶ Arr. Anab. 4. 8. 1–2, 9. 5–6. On the background see now A. B. BOSWORTH, A Historical Commentary on Arrian's History of Alexander ii, Oxford 1995, 52–3, 64–5. The Bithyniaca was written immediately after the Alexander history, and Arrian may well have had the parallel in his mind.

⁷ JACOBY (FGGrH 156 F 80) somewhat misleadingly prints the second variant as an independent «fragment». It is clear that we have two versions of the same event, which Arrian has placed side by side. He could have reported the traditions without appending the authors' names (cf. Anab. 6. 28. 1; 7. 22. 4); alternatively Eustathius could have slurred over precise references to sources («in universum magis sententiam rettulit quam auctoris verba diligenter servavit»: A. G. ROOS – G. WIRTH, Flavius Arrianus: I Alexandri Anabasis, Leipzig 1967, XLI).

on the twenty second of the month. However, one version represented it as an atrocity, a deliberate act of repression; the other explained it as divine retribution. Already there is clear evidence of controversy. One branch of the tradition available to Arrian inculcated Pharnabazus. The other shifted responsibility on to the broad shoulders of a god.

The disaster visited upon Calchedon was famous. A generation before Arrian's Bithyniaca Plutarch had included it in the famous list of dated catastrophes in his *Life of Camillus*. The month of Metageitnion, he alleged, was persistently unlucky for Greeks, who suffered at the hands of barbarians. On the seventh they lost the battles of Crannon and Chaeronea to the Macedonians, and Archidamus III of Sparta died in battle against the barbarians of South Italy. Plutarch continues: «the Carthaginians also guard against the twenty second because it always brings them the worst and greatest of their disasters.»⁸ As G.F. UNGER observed more than a century ago, the received text cannot here be correct. The Carthaginians have no place in a catalogue of Greek disasters, and the twenty second is exactly the day of the month which Arrian claimed was *nefastus* at Calchedon. There is clearly a corruption; «Carthaginians» (Καρχηδόνιοι) must be changed to «Calchedonians» (Καλχηδόνιοι). The emendation is simplicity itself,⁹ and it has been accepted as axiomatic in the most recent Teubner and Budé editions. Plutarch, then, echoes the tradition of Arrian and adds to it. His inclusion of the Calchedonian calamity in a list of losses to barbarians presupposes the first of Arrian's variants – Pharnabazus was the agent of disaster. More interestingly Plutarch supplies a month, Metageitnion, and corrects Eustathius' somewhat slipshod reproduction of Arrian. The Calchedonians did not commemorate the twenty second of every month, but the twenty second of every Metageitnion.

At this stage a slight complication supervenes. In Plutarch the other Greek disasters are dated by the Attic month of Metageitnion, the second month of the year, which fell in high summer. At Calchedon the calendar included the month of Metageitnion (Πεδαγείντιος), but, as in neighbouring Byzantium, it apparently fell in midwinter, between the months Machaneios and Dionysios.¹⁰ Now, given the precise dating of the catastrophe, it would seem unavoidable that Plutarch is referring to the Calchedonian month. The Calchedonians commemorated the twenty second of their local month, and it was reported as such in the historical tradition. Accordingly Plutarch included it in his list of disastrous days in Meta-

⁸ Plut. Cam. 19. 9: Καρχηδόνιοι δὲ τὴν ἐνάτην φθίνοντος ὡς τὰ πλεῖστα καὶ μέγιστα τῶν ἀτυχημάτων αὐτοῖς ἀεὶ φέρουσαν παραφυλάττουσι.

⁹ There is another possible instance, not nearly so clear cut, at Arr. Anab. 3. 24. 5 (on which see BOSWORTH, op. cit. [n. 6] i, 353–4).

¹⁰ The sequence is provided by local inscriptions (SIG³ 1009 [I. Kalchedon (above, n. 5) no. 12]; cf. SIG³ 1011 [I. Kalchedon no. 10]). On the Byzantine calendar see J.F. MOUNTFORD, *De mensium nominibus*, JHS 43, 1923, 111–12; A.E. SAMUEL, *Greek and Roman Chronology*, Munich 1972, 87–8.

geitnion. It is improbable to the last degree that he worked out a calendric equivalence, and calculated that the Calchedonian disaster fell in the local month which happened to correspond to the Attic Metageitnion.¹¹ I take it, then, that the month is the Calchedonian Pedageitnios, the season midwinter. We must now take the next step, and identify a historical context.

Arrian gives us two parameters, first the period when Pharnabazus was in control of Calchedon and secondly the reign of Darius II. From the latter we have a lower limit of 405/4, the year in which Darius died.¹² The upper terminus is 411. In the summer of that year Byzantium revolted from the Athenian empire, and (though Thucydides does not mention the fact) Calchedon must have followed suit.¹³ It was in the Spartan camp from at least the time of the Battle of Cyzicus (410), and remained in revolt from Athens until early 408,¹⁴ when it capitulated to the Athenian blockading force. Calchedon then stayed under Athenian control until late 405, when it was placed under a Spartan harmost along with Byzantium.¹⁵ Almost certainly the period between 411 and 408 is the time slot for the atrocity attributed to Pharnabazus, and we should look most carefully at the first eighteen months. In 409 Calchedon came under the direct control of the Spartan Clearchus, and in 408 the city had a harmost of its own.¹⁶ If Pharnabazus had inflicted his collective punishment during that time, he could only have done so with Spartan acquiescence. That is far from impossible, but it is perhaps unlikely.

The nature of the punishment provides a valuable clue. Mass castration of young males was a draconian measure by any standard, and it recalls vividly the Persian reprisals at the end of the Ionian Revolt, back in 494. Before the Battle of Lade the Persian generals threatened to enslave the rebels, castrate their sons, and transplant their daughters to Bactria. Subsequently Herodotus notes that they carried out their threat to the letter: «once they gained control of the cities, they chose the most handsome of the boys, castrated them, and made eunuchs out of

¹¹ The other disasters were easily datable through the Atthidographic tradition. Plut. Dem. 28. 1 gives the sequence of events in 322: Crannon in Metageitnion, the entry of the Macedonian garrison in Boedromion, and the death of Demosthenes in Pyanepsion – all dates which would have been noted by Philochorus. Chaeronea similarly would have been recorded and dated by any historian of Athens; and the synchronism with the death of Archidamus was notorious (Diod. 16. 88. 3).

¹² The year is certain, and, if Diodorus (13. 108. 1) may be trusted, Darius' death came immediately after the fall of Athens, in March/April 404, at the very end of the Babylonian year. Cf. D. M. LEWIS, *Sparta and Persia*, Leiden 1977, 120 n. 81.

¹³ For the revolt of Byzantium see Thuc. 8. 80. 2–4; 107. 1. It is common belief that Calchedon defected at the same time: cf. KAGAN (above, n. 1) 176; MERLE (above, n. 5) 26; LEWIS (above, n. 12) 128 n. 120: «its revolt will have followed that of Byzantium fairly closely.»

¹⁴ See the detailed discussion below, pp. 306–9.

¹⁵ Xen. Hell. 2. 2. 1–2; cf. Anab. 7. 1. 20.

¹⁶ Xen. Hell. 1. 1. 35, 3.5–6. See below, pp. 304–5.

them; the most beautiful of the girls they took up to the King.»¹⁷ Mass castration suggests rebellion, or intended rebellion, and it ensured that there would be no new generation of rebels. We therefore need to look for a period when Calchedon was under the control of Pharnabazus and in a position to plan defection. In my opinion there is only one plausible context, in the aftermath of the Battle of Cyzicus. After that crushing victory, which saw the temporary annihilation of the Peloponnesian fleet in the Hellespont, the Athenians exploited their advantage. They moved along the north coast of the Propontis to the Bosporus, and there, at the narrowest point of the straits, they established a base at Chrysopolis, in the territory of Calchedon.¹⁸ This was a very substantial presence. Chrysopolis became the headquarters of some thirty triremes under the control of two Athenian generals (Theramenes and Eumachus), who exacted a tithe from all shipping in the Bosporus and «did whatever damage to the enemy they could».¹⁹ In the front line of the enemy were the people of Calchedon, who had revolted from Athens the previous year and whose agricultural land was exposed to ravaging by the troops at Chrysopolis. Under those circumstances it would not have been surprising if there were a change of heart at Calchedon. On a sober analysis the defection had been catastrophic. Within a year of the revolt the Athenians were ensconced in force at the Bosporus, milking its trade, and threatening the Calchedonians with starvation. Such constraints encouraged second thoughts. The Calchedonians may well have considered returning to the Athenian fold and opened negotiations with Theramenes and Eumachus. If, then, Pharnabazus was informed of the projected betrayal, he would have envisaged a drastic reprisal, punishing the families of the ringleaders in the most exemplary fashion. If the penalty for treason was to be castration of one's progeny, it would concentrate the mind wonderfully.

So far the argument has been hypothetical. The Calchedonians could have negotiated for a reconciliation with Athens, and Pharnabazus could have suppressed an incipient conspiracy. However, there is a piece of direct evidence which adds substance to the hypothesis. Xenophon describes the miserable condition of the Pelop-

¹⁷ Hdt. 6. 32 (for the original threat see Hdt. 6. 9. 4). Collective castration was a punishment which clearly had some appeal for the Persian authorities, given the apparently insatiable demands of the court for eunuchs (the annual tribute of Babylonia is said to have included 500 castrated boys: Hdt. 3. 92. 1). The revulsion felt in the Greek world is strongly expressed by Herodotus (8. 105. 1: ἔργων ἀνοσιωτάτων).

¹⁸ Xen. Hell. 1. 1. 22; Diod. 13. 64. 2; Theopompus, FGh 115 F 7; Polyb. 4. 44. 4. A brief and uninformative papyrus fragment might also refer to this event (P. Oxy. ii 302 [p. 303]; cf. F. CROENERT, Arch. Pap. 1, 1901, 530–1; E. MEYER, Theopomps Hellenika, Halle 1909, 159–60). Chrysopolis also figured in Arrian's Bithyniaca (F 36 Roos = FGh 156 F 20b), which alluded to a crossing of the Bosporus by night. The historical context is unfortunately irretrievable.

¹⁹ Xen. Hell. 1. 1. 22. Diod. 13. 64. 3 states that Theramenes' force comprised 50 triremes, and his mission was «to lay siege to Calchedon and Byzantium». Theramenes was still in situ early in 408, and was busy ravaging the territory of Calchedon (Diod. 13. 66. 1).

ponnesian fleet, leaderless and starving after its defeat at Cyzicus. It only survived through the direct intervention of Pharnabazus, who provided food, clothing and finance, and, more importantly, established a safe haven at Antandrus, south of the Troad. There was access to the forests of Mt. Ida, and a new fleet could be built from scratch.²⁰ Pharnabazus supervised the operation in person, but then «he immediately went to Calchedon to give assistance there» (εὐθὺς εἰς Καλχηδόνα ἐβόηθει).²¹ The terminology suggests some urgency. There was a need for Pharnabazus' presence at Calchedon, and the crisis arose from the Athenian occupation of Chrysopolis. It may simply have been the military threat that concerned him, but, if a conspiracy had been denounced, there was also a pressing internal emergency. There was every reason to leave the incipient fleet at Antandrus and repress the dissidents at Calchedon.

If this combination of material is acceptable, it transpires that Pharnabazus' castration of the males of Calchedon must be dated to the local month of Pedageitnios, in the winter following the Battle of Cyzicus; that is, around January of the Julian year 409 BC. That produces a leisurely but not impossible chronology for the events of 410. The year was dominated by the Battle of Cyzicus, as are the extant sources, which record little else of interest. The battle itself took place some time after the end of winter. Diodorus provides the primary evidence.²² Typically he abbreviates the antecedents to the battle, but he does record that the Spartan admiral, Mindarus, concentrated his fleet at the end of winter, including a new and substantial contingent from the Peloponnese. That new contingent presumably sailed out at the beginning of spring, when the seas were considered safe. It was only when they (and others) reached the Hellespont that the Athenians sent

²⁰ Xen. Hell. 1. 1. 23–6. ANDREWES, CAH v² 504, notes that the rebuilding of the fleet must have taken some considerable time: «when Thrasyllus reached Ephesus, roughly in the middle of June, the Syracusans were there with twenty ships, plus five more recently arrived from home;» (Xen. Hell. 1. 2. 8) «if this was in 410 the rebuilding had been done with astonishing speed, if in 409, there is no problem.» Antandrus later served as a shipbuilding centre for Lysander (Xen. Hell. 2. 1. 10).

²¹ Xen. Hell. 1. 1. 26. Theoretically one might suppose that Calchedon was now defecting from the Athenian empire, and that Pharnabazus was assisting the rebels (the implication of an allusive footnote by LEWIS [above, n. 12] 128 n. 121). It is, however, unlikely to the last degree that the Calchedonians meditated revolt at a time when the Peloponnesian fleet was wiped from the seas. It is much more probable that Pharnabazus was bolstering the faction which had organised the revolt from Athens and was now threatened from within (cf. Xen. Hell. 4. 8. 24 ἐβόηθει τοῖς τὰ αὐτῶν φρονούσιν; 5. 1. 2; 7. 1. 29).

²² Diod. 13. 49. 2 (ἦδη τοῦ χειμῶνος λήγοντος). It is difficult to control the sequence in Diodorus. One may perhaps compare 12. 81. 4–5, where Diodorus' source covers the same ground as Thuc. 6. 7. 1–2 (which Diodorus has antedated by a year). There «the decline of the year» corresponds to Thucydides' simple dating to winter (τοῦ αὐτοῦ χειμῶνος). Diodorus continues with the Athenian counter-attack which in Thucydides takes place «some little time afterwards» (οὐ πολλῶ ὕστερον). The interval disappears in Diodorus, and one has a mistaken impression of simultaneity.

emergency summonses to Alcibiades on Lesbos and the generals operating in Thrace.²³ These movements required time, and the battle which followed the concentration of forces on both sides need not have taken place much before midsummer. In that case it was close to autumn 410 when Pharnabazus established his dockyards at Antandrus, and the Athenian intervention at Chrysopolis took place at roughly the same time. By midwinter the pressure at Calchedon had driven some at least of its leading citizens to open negotiations with the Athenian commanders, and Pharnabazus retaliated with an atrocious collective punishment. These events are quite broadly spaced, but it must be emphasised that the sources are sparse and far from exhaustive in their coverage. The fact that there are few events on record does not entail that there were in fact few operations, or that the generals were inactive.²⁴ With authors like Xenophon and Diodorus the argument from silence is a very dangerous tool.

If this reconstruction is accepted, it follows that Calchedon was under the direct control of Pharnabazus over the winter of 410/9. In that case the satrap had been reasonably successful in his diplomacy. He had made overtures to Sparta during the winter of 413/12 with the intention of regaining the coastal cities of his satrapy which were then subject to Athens, and the price of his assistance (as it was for Tissaphernes) was the political domination – and tribute – of the cities which were prized from the Athenian empire.²⁵ The bargain was controversial from the beginning. In Ionia the renewed Persian presence was an irritant and worse. As early as 411 the Milesians had chafed at the garrison imposed upon their territory by Tissaphernes, and did not take kindly to the exhortations of Lichas, the Spartan commissioner, who advised them that their role – and that of all the Greeks in Asia – was to put up with a moderate slavery for the duration of the war.²⁶ They sent a deputation of complaint to Sparta, which was countered by Tissaphernes' representative, a Carian bilingual. At this point, as has been observed, Thucydides breaks off, and the broadcast is interrupted.²⁷ However, we can be sure that a heated debate took place in the Spartan assembly, and the Spartans at large can have been left in no doubt about the resentment of their allies. The visible presence

²³ Diod. 13. 49. 2–3; cf. Xen. Hell. 1. 1. 12–13; Plut. Alc. 28. ANDREWES' estimate of the date of Cyzicus, «March or April 410» (JHS 73, 1953, 2; cf. KAGAN [above, n. 1] 247), seems to me distinctly too early.

²⁴ ANDREWES, for instance, insists that the generals were inactive after Cyzicus («hard to excuse in generals, who had just shown such capacity in action»), and ventures a political explanation for it (JHS 73, 1953, 2–5; CAH v² 504–5; contra ROBERTSON [above, n. 1] 285 n. 13; KAGAN [above, n. 1] 265–8).

²⁵ Thuc. 8. 6. 1; cf. LEWIS (above, n. 12) 127–8; KAGAN (above, n. 1) 28–9, 34.

²⁶ Thuc. 8. 84. 4–5. Lichas had had a change of heart, once he had been convinced that there was no Persian threat to the Greek mainland (8. 43. 2–3; cf. LEWIS [above, n. 12] 99–100, 104–5).

²⁷ Thuc. 8. 85. 2–4. Cf. LEWIS 111: «It is as if we were watching a complex play on television, and reception is disrupted by an electrical storm.»

of the Persians came at considerable cost to good relations, as the Spartans again found when Lichas died and the angry Milesians denied him burial in the location chosen for him.²⁸ For Pharnabazus' early activities in the north there is no direct evidence. The sources attest him operating in conjunction with Spartan commanders but record no actions in his own right. Nevertheless he must have had close relations with Greek cities on the south of the Hellespont and Propontis. Late in 411 he had offered to supply Mindarus with ships with the intention of annexing «the cities of his province which still remained».²⁹ In other words a substantial number of cities were in his hands, and we can hardly doubt that one of them was Calchedon, which must have joined Byzantium in its secession from Athens a few months previously.

The events of winter 410/9 came as a rude shock. The castration of the young Calchedonians evoked the worst memories of Persian repression, and it was surely a propaganda windfall for the Athenians. They could spread the message to their reluctant allies, and show them graphically what defection from the alliance might bring upon them. There is some evidence that the Spartans were aware of the damage to their cause, and did their best to limit it. Again it is Xenophon who supplies the crucial detail, and again he blurs the context – deliberately so. The information is provided in the famous scene of King Agis at Decelea. Late in 410/9, after the reverse at Cyzicus, the Spartan king observed the grain fleet putting in to Piraeus and stated impatiently that it was no use sitting there to deny the Athenians their land unless one also blocked their sources of supply by sea. He therefore recommended the dispatch of Clearchus to take control of Byzantium and Calchedon (Xen. Hell. 1. 1. 35). It was very late in the day to make the elementary discovery that Athens was dependent upon sea-borne grain, and, if Thucydides is to be believed, Agis' father, Archidamus, had made that very point trenchantly at Sparta over twenty years before.³⁰ Admittedly after the demise of the Spartan fleet at Cyzicus there may have been an unusually large influx of grain ships when the Pontic harvest was delivered, in September 410,³¹ and no doubt it was particularly

²⁸ Thuc. 8. 84. 5.

²⁹ Thuc. 8. 99. ANDREWES in: A. W. GOMME – A. ANDREWES – K. J. DOVER, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides v*, Oxford 1981, 342, observes that most of the northern coast of the Troad was in Peloponnesian hands by late 411.

³⁰ Thuc. 1. 81. 2. In 412 the Spartans had been aware of the strategic importance of the Hellespont, and made it their third priority after negotiating revolt on Chios and Lesbos (Thuc. 8. 8. 2, 22. 1).

³¹ In the fourth century the grain fleet came down from Pontus after the rising of Arcturus, that is, in mid September ([Dem.] 35. 10, 50. 19). In autumn 340 Philip was spectacularly successful in capturing the Athenian grain fleet at its mustering point at Hieron (Philochorus, FGrH 328 F 162; Theopompus, FGrH 115 F 292; cf. GRIFFITH, in: N. G. L. HAMMOND and G. T. GRIFFITH, *A History of Macedonia ii*, Oxford 1979, 575–8). That well illustrates the importance of the Athenian base at near by Chrysopolis. Between 410 and 408 it forestalled any hostile action that might be launched from Byzantium or Calchedon against the grain convoys.

galling to Agis. However, it cannot have been a revelation that it needed action at the Bosphorus to curtail the supply, and with a large and formidable Athenian contingent at Chrysopolis a single Spartan harmost with fifteen troop carriers was inadequate for the task. Xenophon, it would seem, is giving us only part of the story. Clearchus' mission could be in large part damage control. It is the last event before the advent of the new campaigning year, and it would make sense if he were sent out at the very end of winter³² – a Spartan response to Pharnabazus' drastic police action a few months before. Calchedon was now to have its own Spartan commander, a *proxenos* of Byzantium who had recent experience in the Propontis, and Pharnabazus was presumably persuaded to remove any garrison he had installed in the city or, at the least, to place it under Spartan control.

Clearchus was sent specifically to Calchedon and Byzantium at the end of winter 410/9. Xenophon's report is circumstantial and hardly, as many have argued, a doublet of Clearchus' earlier commission in the summer of 411.³³ At that earlier date he was dispatched with forty triremes to assist Pharnabazus and engineer the defection of Byzantium from Athens. Byzantium then eluded him. He foundered in a storm en route and was forced to travel by land from Miletus to the Hellespont, while Helixus of Megara won over Byzantium for the Peloponnesians.³⁴ Subsequently Clearchus remained in the vicinity of the Hellespont until the Battle of Cyzicus, where he was attached to Pharnabazus' forces.³⁵ It looks as though he returned to Sparta after the disaster, and early in the following year he was sent out on a second mission, specifically to Calchedon and Byzantium. On this occasion he had a smaller force, which reached the Hellespont, lost three ships to the permanent Athenian squadron there, and arrived at Byzantium otherwise intact. There was now a Peloponnesian garrison to replace or supplement any mercenary forces introduced by Pharnabazus, and Calchedon had the advantages of a

³² It is unlikely that Clearchus with his slow-moving fleet (Xen. Hell. 1. 1. 36: στρατιωτῶν μᾶλλον ἢ ταχειῶν) was sent out before the beginning of spring 409. The news of Pharnabazus' actions may have broken in Greece at the end of winter. That allowed a response at the very start of the campaigning year (signalled at Xen. Hell. 1. 2. 1). A Peloponnesian garrison, drafted in part from Calchedon's mother-city, Megara, was dispatched in haste to take over the 'protection' of the city from the Persian satrap.

³³ A common hypothesis, aired and rejected by ANDREWES (above, n.29) 21; CAH v² 504. See particularly ROBERTSON (above, n.1) 283 n.4: «it is simplest to suppose that Xenophon has wishfully or inadvertently post-dated by a year or more an interesting detail which otherwise would find no place in his narrative.»

³⁴ Thuc. 8. 80. 1–3.

³⁵ Diod. 13. 40. 6 (Cyzicus adheres to Pharnabazus and Clearchus); 13. 51. 1. It looks as though Clearchus stayed in the vicinity of the Troad in 411/10 and cooperated with Pharnabazus throughout the campaign of Cyzicus. There is no indication that he came anywhere close to Byzantium. The details of his later journey, as recorded by Xen. Hell. 1. 1. 36, cannot be correlated with the incidents of 411/10 which are described in Thucydides and Diodorus.

Spartan protectorate. Clearchus would keep it out of the Athenian fold and guarantee the payment of tribute to Persia.

A year after the mission of Clearchus came the concerted Athenian attack upon Calchedon, in spring 408.³⁶ There is rough agreement between Xenophon, Plutarch and Diodorus that the Athenians walled off Calchedon «from sea to sea» and repelled a sortie by the Spartan harmost, Hippocrates. Hippocrates was killed, his men routed, and the status of Calchedon was ratified by treaty.³⁷ That much is relatively certain, but there is major disagreement between the sources. For Xenophon and Plutarch (who is largely derivative) Pharnabazus played a key role in the defence. He brought an army to relieve the siege, and attacked the Athenian fortifications from the outside while Hippocrates attempted to break out from Calchedon.³⁸ Both commanders were unsuccessful. Hippocrates was killed, and it was Pharnabazus who contracted the agreement which defined the status of Calchedon. In Diodorus' account, by contrast, Pharnabazus is notable for his absence. Diodorus (13. 66. 1-2) duly records the Athenian siege works and Hippocrates' heroic death, but there is no mention of any relief force under Pharnabazus. Nor is there any reference to Pharnabazus' negotiations with the Athenian generals. After Alcibiades' departure for the Hellespont Diodorus states that the senior general, Theramenes, received the surrender of the Calchedonians on condition that they paid the same tribute as before.³⁹ This is a straightforward bilateral treaty. The Calchedonians accept the suzerainty of Athens, and resume their subject status without further reprisals.

In the face of this conflict of evidence scholars have universally opted for Xenophon and Plutarch. The author of the most subtle and authoritative treatment of the episode, MOSHE AMIT, has stated dogmatically that it is the version of Xenophon and Plutarch «qui est conforme à la vérité historique».⁴⁰ For Diodorus, AMIT claims, it is a simplistic story of Athens restraining a recalcitrant ally; there is nothing about Pharnabazus or the Spartans.⁴¹ That is a misstatement. Pharnabazus is indeed absent from Diodorus, but on the other hand Diodorus knows that

³⁶ If Pharnabazus' intervention at Chalcedon came in winter 410/9, then there was a full year of activity before the Athenian attack on Calchedon. The intermediate events are conveniently compiled by Xen. Hell. 1. 2.

³⁷ Xen. Hell. 1. 3. 1-9; Plut. Alc. 29. 5-30. 2; Diod. 13. 66. 1-3.

³⁸ Xen. Hell. 1. 3. 5-7; Plut. Alc. 30. 1-2.

³⁹ Diod. 13. 66. 3: οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Θηραμένην ὁμολογίαν ἐποιήσαντο πρὸς Χαλκηδονίους φόρον λαμβάνειν παρ' αὐτῶν ὅσον καὶ πρότερον.

⁴⁰ M. AMIT, *Le traité de Chalcédoine entre Pharnabaze et les stratèges athéniens*, AC 42, 1973, 436-57, esp. 441. AMIT's general interpretation has been absorbed into all standard works on the period: cf. LEWIS (above, n. 12) 128-9; KAGAN (above, n. 1) 279-82; ANDREWES, CAH v² 486-7.

⁴¹ «Chez Diodore, le traité est conclu entre les Athéniens et les Chalcédoniens, sans qu'il y ait aucun mot au sujet de Pharnabaze ou des Lacédémoniens. Si l'on croyait Diodore, on pourrait dire que la campagne n'était qu'un épisode de la lutte des Athéniens contre leurs

the leader of the Calchedonian forces was a Spartan, and he underlines his position as harmost.⁴² His source was perfectly aware of the complications of the situation. What is more, that source was presumably dependent upon the Oxyrhynchus Historian, as is the case with the descriptions of Thrasyllus' operations in Ionia and the battle at Cerata in the Megarid,⁴³ which immediately precede the action at Calchedon, and the information it provides cannot be lightly disregarded. Admittedly Diodorus is capable of distorting his source material, and the brevity of his narrative makes it perilous to rest a fabric of speculation upon his silence. However, in this case his account is reasonably detailed. He is interested in the circumstances of Hippocrates' death, and ought to have included the simultaneous diversionary attack by Pharnabazus, had his source mentioned it. In fact Diodorus' version makes excellent sense in itself. The Calchedonians are attacked, lose their Spartan harmost, and capitulate to superior forces when they have no hope of breaking the blockade. Xenophon and Plutarch can only be preferred if their version is equally free of problems and internal inconsistencies.

That is far from the case. In Xenophon Pharnabazus is barred from Calchedon by the Athenian fortifications, and encamps perforce some distance away in the city's territory.⁴⁴ A fortiori he has no direct control over the Calchedonians and their decision making. Yet it is he who bargains for the future of the city, and the Athenian generals negotiate with him to conclude a most extraordinary agreement. Pharnabazus pays twenty talents and agrees to conduct Athenian ambassadors to the Persian court; he then guarantees that the Calchedonians pay their customary tribute to Athens as well as an indemnity, and the Athenians agree not to make war on Calchedon until the ambassadors return from Susa (Xen. Hell. 1. 3. 9). As AMIT has well shown, this agreement leaves the status of Calchedon undecided.⁴⁵ It seems to remain in the hands of Pharnabazus, and the Athenians hold off operations for a conservative six months, while their ambassadors visit the court of Susa. Meanwhile Calchedon pays tribute for the suspension of hostilities, just as (in the

alliés qui avaient fait défection, et que la règlement intéressait uniquement Athènes et la cité révoltée qui s' avouait vaincue.»

⁴² Diod. 13. 66. 2: ὁ δ' ἐν τῇ πόλει καθεσταμένος ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων Ἴπποκράτης ἡγεμών, ὃν οἱ Λάκωνες ἀρμοστήν ἐκάλουν κτλ.

⁴³ Diod. 13. 64. 1 seems a drastic abbreviation of Hell. Oxy. 1–3 CHAMBERS; cf. L. Koenen, Stud. Pap. 15, 1976, 63–4. In the following chapter (13. 65. 1) Diodorus deals with the Athenian victory at Cerata, which was omitted by Xenophon but described in detail by the Oxyrhynchus Historian (Hell. Oxy. 4. 1–2 CHAMBERS = 1. 1–2 BARTOLETTI).

⁴⁴ Xen. Hell. 1. 3. 7; cf. Plut. Alc. 30. 1.

⁴⁵ AMIT (above, n.40) 445–8, arguing that Calchedon «was not occupied by the Athenians». However, even on Xenophon's account, the passage cited does not prove his case. When Pharnabazus delayed ratifying the treaty (see below), he «remained in Calchedon» (περιμένεν ἐν Καλχηδόνι), but he need not have resumed control of the city. He probably remained at his base at the Heracleum, in the territory of Calchedon, still excluded from the city itself.

terms of the Peace of Nicias) the Chalcidian cities were to pay Athens the traditional tribute in return for their «autonomy». ⁴⁶ It is perhaps not outside the bounds of possibility that the Athenians failed to capitalise on their victory, and traded the control of Calchedon for a modest subsidy and the prospect of access to the Persian court. ⁴⁷ The advantages, however, are tenuous, and can hardly balance the profit which would accrue from undisputed sovereignty over Calchedon.

So at least Plutarch (or, more probably, his source) appears to have thought. Although he follows Xenophon's version of events in general, he differs significantly in the particular matter of the treaty. For him the status of Calchedon is not undecided; the city is explicitly subject to the Athenians. As a corollary the Athenians refrain from attacking Pharnabazus' territories, not Calchedon alone. ⁴⁸ If Calchedon was relinquished to Athens, it made no sense to suspend hostilities against the city, as Xenophon claims the Athenians agreed to do. The armistice was accordingly wider, and applied to the entirety of Pharnabazus' satrapy. It would seem that Xenophon's version of the treaty was far from holy writ in antiquity, and his chronology certainly leaves much to be desired. He explicitly dates the onset of hostilities at Calchedon to the beginning of spring. ⁴⁹ The treaty with Pharnabazus took place after a short campaign, and the main result of the agreement was the diplomatic mission to the King. The ambassadors then assembled at Cyzicus, and Pharnabazus took them personally up country (Xen. Hell. 1. 3. 13-14). Winter found them still in the satrapy of Pharnabazus; the news of the fall of Byzantium reached them at Gordium, on the eastern borders of Hellespontine Phrygia. ⁵⁰ On any calculation this is slow going. The siege of Calchedon had begun in spring, yet the Athenian delegation did not move east until late autumn at earliest;

⁴⁶ Thuc. 5. 18. 5-6. The agreement clearly did not come into effect; less than a year after the peace the Olynthians were still openly at war with Athens (Thuc. 5. 39. 1).

⁴⁷ So AMIT (above, n. 40) 451-4; KAGAN (above, n. 1) 279-80.

⁴⁸ Plut. Alc. 31. 1: καὶ Χαλκηδονίους ὑπηκόους πάλιν Ἀθηναίοις εἶναι, τὴν δὲ Φαρναβάζου χώραν μηδὲν ἀδικεῖν. There have been repeated attempts, dating back to SCHNEIDER, to impose consistency on the texts; and Φαρναβάζω has been substituted for Καλκηδονίοις at Xen. Hell. 1. 3. 9 (J. HATZFELD, Alcibiade, Paris 1957, 285 n. 2; AMIT [above, n. 40] 456 n. 19). According to KAGAN (above, n. 1) 278 n. 16: «Xenophon and Plutarch simply reported different clauses of the same treaty.» On that hypothesis Xenophon and Plutarch were independent of each other.

⁴⁹ Xen. Hell. 1. 3. 1 (ἔαρος ἀρχομένου). Diod. 13. 66. 1 gives no temporal fixing, only a rough synchronism with events at Megara and Chios.

⁵⁰ Xen. Hell. 1. 4. 1. In 394 Gordium formed part of Hellespontine Phrygia (Hell. Oxy. 24, 5-6 CHAMBERS = 21. 5-6 BARTOLETTI). The chronology is even further muddled by the sequel in Xenophon, when (on Cyrus' instructions) Pharnabazus detains the Athenian ambassadors for three years before returning them to the Athenian camp (Xen. Hell. 1. 4. 5-7). It is usually conceded that three years is an implausibly long period of detention (ANDREWES, CAH v² 504; see, however, ROBERTSON [above, n. 1] 286: «[it] ought to be accurate because it is so surprising»), and most commentators have toyed with emendation (three months for three years: AMIT [above, n. 40] 452 n. 16; KAGAN [above, n. 1] 285 n. 38).

and we must envisage a period of stalemate with the Athenians endlessly waiting behind their palisade until Pharnabazus finally offered to negotiate. It is true that Xenophon attempts to fill the gap. Pharnabazus agrees to the treaty in principle, but refuses to ratify it until Alcibiades returns from his successful foray to Selymbria. Finally the two parties swear oaths, Alcibiades in Chrysopolis and Pharnabazus in Calchedon (presumably at the Heracleum, where he had encamped earlier, not the city itself, which on Xenophon's account was still under siege).⁵¹ All this is far more complicated and less credible than Diodorus' story of capitulation by the Calchedonians without reference to Pharnabazus. There may indeed have been a later treaty with the satrap, after the city's surrender. Pharnabazus had apparently suffered badly from Athenian raids on his territory, which his Peloponnesian allies had been helpless to prevent.⁵² He could well have considered it prudent to conclude a non-aggression pact with the Athenian generals, conceding their control of Calchedon and paying a subsidy in return for a guarantee that his satrapy would not be injured. Such a pact would have been concluded by Alcibiades and Pharnabazus late in the season, so that the truce ensued in the autumn. It allowed the Athenians to turn their attention to Europe and make their highly successful impromptu attack on Byzantium. In that case Plutarch (through his source) transmits a more accurate version of the treaty, although it is still placed in the context of the siege of Calchedon, where Xenophon had recorded it.

Xenophon's account most probably suffers from factual distortion, and there appears to be an element of apology. If we accept Diodorus' version of events, the Calchedonians surrendered quickly, soon after their Spartan harmost came to grief. There was no tenacious resistance, no doctrinaire antipathy to Athens. If a number of their male adolescents had been castrated as a reprisal a little more than a year before, then they can have had little love for the perpetrator of the atrocity or for the city which had committed them to his care. That is glossed over in Xenophon's narrative, which has Pharnabazus make a determined effort to raise the siege and save the city.⁵³ There is no capitulation by Calchedon, rather an agreement made on their behalf by Pharnabazus, an agreement which keeps the Athenians out of the city in return for payment of tribute. What is obscured (to my mind, deliberately so) is the Calchedonians' detestation of the recent regime and their willingness to return to the Athenian fold.

⁵¹ Xen. Hell. 1. 3. 10–12; Plut. Alc. 31. 2.

⁵² Xen. Hell. 1. 2. 16–17; Diod. 13. 64. 4, where the intention of the looting is to lighten the burden of *eisphorai* at Athens.

⁵³ The details of his intervention, as supplied by Xen. Hell. 1. 3. 5–7 and Plut. Alc. 30. 1, are not impossible in themselves (though there are some obscurities: cf. C.J. TUPLIN, in: I.S. MOXON – J.D. SMART – A.J. WOODMAN [ed.], *Past Perspectives*, Cambridge 1984, 44); but, given Diodorus' silence on the matter, there is a real probability that Pharnabazus stayed away from Calchedon altogether. To put it mildly, he was *persona non grata*.

Xenophon's narrative is distorted in the interests of Pharnabazus, and one of the most sensational and disreputable episodes of the satrap's career seems suppressed. One may easily see why. Pharnabazus receives a consistently good press in Xenophon. Unlike the shifty and unscrupulous Tissaphernes he is the barbarian with whom the Greeks can do business.⁵⁴ But there is a darker side, revealed by a famous anecdote in Xenophon. There Pharnabazus' son (whose name Xenophon deliberately withholds) exchanges gifts with Agesilaus and establishes a guest friendship, which later stands him in good stead when he is driven into exile. According to Xenophon (Hell. 4. 1. 40) Agesilaus took care of his interests in Greece, and threw his patronage behind him when he attempted to get his Greek lover preferential treatment at the Olympic Games. The story is curious and important. Xenophon is remarkably brief and allusive. The name of Pharnabazus' son is never given, even though Xenophon must have been well aware of it. The Greek lover is equally elusive, defined only as «the son of Eualces, an Athenian».⁵⁵ The specifics are omitted – or rather, the specifics that matter. Similarly it is hard to fathom from Xenophon's language just what favour Pharnabazus' son required at Olympia. Plutarch clearly believed that his lover was in danger of expulsion from the boys' events on account of his size.⁵⁶ Modern commentators, somewhat less plausibly, suggest that the favour was admission to the men's event – the boy thought he could compete effectively with his seniors.⁵⁷ It hardly matters. In either event Pharnabazus' son was exerting impro-

⁵⁴ Notably in the description of his meeting with Agesilaus in 394 (Xen. Hell. 4. 1. 29–40; on the literary inspiration of the passage see VIVIENNE GRAY, *The Character of Xenophon's Hellenica*, London 1989, 52–8). The scene was deservedly famous, and Theopompus gave his own version of it in Book 11 of his *Hellenica*, attempting to improve on Xenophon's dialogue (FGrH 115 F 21; cf. M. A. FLOWER, *Theopompus and Greek Historiography*, Oxford 1994, 159–60). This is *prima facie* evidence that Theopompus' treatment of Pharnabazus was also favourable (see below).

⁵⁵ That is the universal interpretation, and the most probable (compare Mem. 1. 3. 8–10 and Apol. 30, where youths are identified by their patronymics alone). It is, however, just possible that Ἀθηναῖος should be taken as a personal name, in which case the boy was Athenaeus, son of Eualces (or even Eualces, son of Athenaeus).

⁵⁶ Plut. Ages. 13. 3: μέγας ὢν καὶ σκληρὸς Ὀλυμπίασιν ἐκινδύνευσεν ἐκκριθῆναι. The passage is clearly based on Xenophon, but Plutarch has added the detail that the boy was tough (σκληρός), and represents the danger as exclusion from the event (ἐκκριθῆναι), whereas in Xenophon the issue is inclusion (ἐγκριθεῖν). Plutarch is probably writing from memory, assuming that the event was boxing or wrestling, in which σκληρότης might be a significant factor. He also inferred that the pressure to be included implied a danger of exclusion. He may have been correct (see n. 57), but he was patently imposing his own interpretation.

⁵⁷ So, for instance, G. F. UNDERHILL, *Commentary on the Hellenica of Xenophon*, Oxford 1900, 121. I doubt, however, that this interpretation is as evident as UNDERHILL maintained. J. K. ANDERSON, *Xenophon*, London 1974, 160, clearly prefers Plutarch. This is probably correct. The youth was presumably in the predicament of Epharmostus of Opis,

per pressure to bend the rules in his favour, and Agesilaus was abetting him. One can detect Xenophon's embarrassment. He is recounting an episode which illustrates Agesilaus' legendary devotion to his guest friends, but, as so often, that devotion was manifested by somewhat disreputable behaviour.⁵⁸

Whatever the truth of the matter, the story brings Pharnabazus' son into close proximity with Agesilaus and with Xenophon. At the time of the story it is clear that the Persian had lost his good looks,⁵⁹ and Agesilaus was in a position to exercise influence at Olympia. It was, then, an Olympiad during the Spartan supremacy, most probably in the 370s. At that time Xenophon was comfortably ensconced at Scillus, in the immediate neighbourhood of Olympia, and was in an excellent position to offer hospitality to a rich Persian exile. He presumably talked with him and extracted details of his father's relations with successive Spartan commanders. Those details are not likely to have included the atrocity at Calchedon. Given the Persian's relationship with a large and virile young Greek, the less said about mass castration the better. Xenophon, I believe, suppressed the entire story of the atrocity, consigning it to the oblivion to which he relegated all that was awkward or unpalatable. The reputation of Pharnabazus was too closely connected with that of Agesilaus for it to be lightly sullied.

Xenophon was not the only author to be concerned for Pharnabazus' reputation. We have already noted the variant in Arrian which makes the Calchedonians incur divine wrath and perform their own emasculation.⁶⁰ In this version Pharnabazus was not involved. Exactly the same Tendenz is found at the end of Plutarch's Life of Alcibiades. Most sources associate Pharnabazus with the assassination of Alcibiades. Either he planned it himself (as Ephorus reported),⁶¹ or he acted as the agent of Lysander and the Thirty.⁶² In either case the killers were his brother and uncle, Bagaeus and Susamithres.⁶³ Plutarch, however, cites a variant

who was excluded from the youths' event at Marathon and had to compete with the men (Pind. Ol. 9. 89–90: *συλαθείς ἀγενείων μένεν ἀγῶνα προεσβυτέρων*; cf. WILAMOWITZ, Pindaros, Berlin 1922, 350). Similarly the Olympic authorities may have had their suspicions of the age of the son of Eualces, and it took all of Agesilaus' good offices to keep him in the boys' event. Given the kudos of victory, it is unlikely that the youth voluntarily sought admission to the open event, which he could hardly have expected to win.

⁵⁸ Cf. Plut. Ages. 5. 1–2 (*οὐδὲν γὰρ ᾤετο τῶν φιλικῶν ὑπουργημάτων αἰσχρὸν εἶναι*). Similar testimony from a different perspective is provided by Xen. Ages. 11. 13. For a general discussion see P. CARTLEDGE, *Agesilaus and the Crisis of Sparta*, London 1987, 139–59.

⁵⁹ Note Xenophon's careful comment (*καλὸς ἔτι ὄν*) at Hell. 4. 1. 39.

⁶⁰ See above, pp. 298–9.

⁶¹ Diod. 14. 11. 1–4 = FGRII 70 F 70; Nepos Alc. 9. 4–5.

⁶² Plut. Alc. 38. 1–39. 8; Nepos Alc. 10. 1–6; Justin 5. 8. 12–14; cf. Athen. 13. 574 E; Arist. HA 6. 578^b 26–8. On the source tradition see HATZFELD (above, n. 48) 340–9, and on the site of Alcibiades' murder L. ROBERT, *À travers l'Asie Mineure*, Paris 1980, 257–99.

⁶³ The names are given by Nepos Alc. 10. 3 and Plut. Alc. 39. 1.

from 'some sources' which blamed Alcibiades himself.⁶⁴ That notorious rake had seduced a local girl of good birth; and her outraged brothers set fire to his lodgings, and shot him down as he tried to escape. The motive of the story can only be to exculpate Pharnabazus from allegations that he had betrayed his own guest friend. It seems a consistent strand of propaganda, and goes much further than Xenophon. Pharnabazus' actions are not simply passed over in silence; the story is entirely rewritten, and perversely the victims become the culprits. The very existence of this apologetic tradition suggests that the facts were a continuing embarrassment and needed a counter-explanation, however unconvincing. One possibility (which is clearly no more than that) is that the ultimate source was Pharnabazus' illustrious son, Artabazus, his successor in the satrapy of Hellespontine Phrygia. For some years in the late 340s he was at Philip's court, at precisely the same time as the historian Theopompus;⁶⁵ and it is possible that the same relationship developed as that between Xenophon and Artabazus' half-brother. This time, however, silence was not sufficient. The 340s were the period of Isocrates' open letter to Philip in which he urged war against Persia and universal liberation from the 'barbarian despotism' (Isocr. 5. 154) and emphasised the achievements of Alcibiades (5. 58-61). That was hardly a comfortable message for an exile at Pella whose father had committed one of the most spectacular acts of barbarian despotism and had treacherously murdered his great Athenian guest friend. Under those circumstances truth was best replaced by fiction.⁶⁶ Theopompus' Hellenica, then, may have propagated a tendentious and apologetic portrait of Pharnabazus, written in the political interest of his progeny. That is only one of many possibilities, but I think the hypothesis has some attraction.

On the other hand the brute fact of the atrocity at Calchedon was also enshrined in the literature of the period. At Calchedon it was commemorated in the local calendar as an infamy, and bulked large in the local historical tradition. Perhaps it also found an echo in the Oxyrhynchus Historian, whose work, transmitted through Ephorus and Diodorus, emphasised the ease of the Calchedonian sub-

⁶⁴ Plut. Alc. 39. 9: αἰτίαν δὲ φασιν οὐ Φαρνάβαζον ... παρασχεῖν, αὐτὸν δὲ τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην γνωρίμων τιῶν διεφθαρκότα γύναιον ἔχειν σὺν ἑαυτῷ κτλ.

⁶⁵ For Artabazus' sojourn at Pella and his rehabilitation in Persia after the reconquest of Egypt in 343/2 see Diod. 16. 52. 3; Curt. 5. 9. 1; 6. 5. 2; cf. H. BERVE, *Das Alexanderreich auf prosopographischer Grundlage*, Munich 1926, ii 83, no. 152; GRIFFITH (above, n. 31) 484, 521. The reconquest of Egypt also defines the time when Theopompus attended the Macedonian court (Epist. Socr. 30. 12 [Letter of Speusippus] = FGrH 115 T 7; cf. FLOWER [above, n. 54] 19-21). The two must surely have met.

⁶⁶ It is true that Theopompus' portrait of Alcibiades was far from negative. According to Nepos (Alc. 11. 1-3 = FGrH 115 F 288) Theopompus and Timaeus both praised his genius for adapting to the customs of any society in which he found himself. Among the Persians *fortiter venari, luxuriose vivere* (Nepos Alc. 11. 5; cf. Athen. 12. 534 E; Plut. Alc. 23. 5; Ael. VH 4. 15; FLOWER [above, n. 54] 122-3). That is perfectly compatible with the story that he seduced a girl of good family, and died for doing so.

mission in 408 and did not attempt to obfuscate the details of the capitulation. There can be little doubt of the historicity of the story. There was an atrocity, and it seriously embarrassed the Spartan regime in its policy of cooperation with the satraps of Asia Minor. The affair was damaging both to Pharnabazus and his Spartan supporters, and it was felt necessary to resort to omission and downright fabrication. The suppression was almost completely successful, and it is only the perverse erudition of Eustathius of Thessalonica that has enabled the truth to filter through to the modern world.

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