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# Karl Heim: Panentheism and the Space of God

By ROBERT C. WHITTEMORE

**S**UCH is the secularism of our century and our society that whoever today wishes to raise the question of God must first find someone interested. Theology in our time is largely a talking of priests and theologians to themselves and a handful of philosophers. Religion is universally tolerated and widely ignored; occasionally it is discussed—dispassionately. But the rest is silence. Rare indeed is the person who now takes religion seriously enough to denounce it. The militant atheist and the anticlerical of earlier ages are gone, and in their place is the serene secularist, secure in the conviction "that he alone has returned to the solid ground of reality and that the rest of us are still pursuing chimeras which have long since lost their significance."<sup>1</sup>

If this account of the religious situation in our time is accurate, and Karl Heim is convinced that it is,<sup>2</sup> then the Christian in contemporary society is faced with a question far more difficult than any which confronted theology in ages past. "It is the question whether for people of the present time, whose thought is shaped by the contemporary conception of the physical universe, any other philosophy is still possible than that of secularism. Does not any

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<sup>1</sup> Karl Heim, *Christian Faith and Natural Science* (London, 1953), p. 21. Hereafter cited as *CFNS*.

<sup>2</sup> Born in Württemberg in 1874, Heim began his distinguished career as a preacher and philosopher as secretary of the Student Christian Movement in Germany (1899—1902). Turning to philosophy, he became *Privatdozent* at Halle in 1907, and in 1914 was elected *ordinarius* at Münster. From 1920 on he occupied a chair in theology at Tübingen, where during the 30s his was the leading academic voice critical of the Nazi German Faith Movement. His works in English translations include *Spirit and Truth* (1935), *The New Divine Order* (1930), *The Church of Christ and the Problems of the Day* (1935), *The Power of God* (1937). Heim's *Weltanschauung* is set forth in his *Der evangelische Glaube und das Denken der Gegenwart*, 5 vols. (1931—51): Vol. I, *Glaube und Denken* (3d ed. translated as *God Transcendent. Foundation for a Christian Metaphysic*); Vol. IV, *Der christliche Gottesglaube und die Naturwissenschaft I: Grundlegung* (translated as *Christian Faith and Natural Science*); Vol. V, *Die Wandlung im naturwissenschaftlichen Weltbild* (translated as *The Transformation of the Scientific World View*). Karl Heim died Aug. 30, 1958.

other outlook imply a relapse into the world-picture of our fathers which has long since been rendered obsolete by scientific research and the experience of everyday life?" (*CFNS*, p. 25). It is a question which cannot be avoided. "We have," insists Heim, "no right to raise a passionate protest against the reinterpretation of all religious and ethical fundamental concepts which secularism is undertaking and to oppose it as a rebellion against God and a human self-deification, so long as we are not in a position to propose, as an alternative to the overall view of reality from which this reinterpretation necessarily follows, another conception of the universe and one in which nature and man appear in a different light" (p. 24). It is important to notice that the question is not to be resolved by reducing our conception of God to something compatible with the current scientific world view (p. 32). The religious man cannot be satisfied by a conception at the mercy of every shift of theory. On the contrary, we require, as Heim sees it, a position independent of all the momentary currents of scientific opinion, "a position which does not have to be defended against scientific objections, a position from which, if the necessity should arise, we could go over from the defensive to the attack in our relations with natural science. Does any such impregnable stronghold exist? . . . That is the question on which everything depends." (Pp. 32, 33)

## I

The answer, according to Heim, is to be found by directing our attention to "what is closest and most intimately known to all of us, what we find when we try to look around ourselves in the world" (p. 35), that is, our inward self, our ego. My ego is for me, as your self is for you, the primary reality anterior to all experience. However much I seek to make myself an object to myself, I must realize finally that "I am neither in my body, nor above it nor beside it. I am on this side of all objectivity, and consequently outside all three-dimensional space" (p. 38). In this nonobjectivizable ego, then, we find, says Heim, "the impregnable stronghold which is prior to the objective world of experience and must form the basis for our settlement of accounts with natural science." (P. 55)

Yet even as I recognize myself as this nonobjectivizable ego

before which the universe in all its objectivity unrolls, I am disturbed by the awareness that I am not alone in my subjectivity.

Something dark and strange breaks in upon the quiet, ordered world of the ego and shakes its foundation. . . . The picture of the whole world which I necessarily form for myself from this particular central vantage-point is all at once disturbed and called in question by the coming on the scene of a second ego which is as irremovably and unexchangeably welded to another position as I am to mine. From this there arises a world which has two centres and yet which logically can have only one centre. For each of us, both you and I, must make the same demand and the same claim, namely, that we are the centre, the only standpoint from which everything is seen correctly. The non-objective seeing point is located in two positions, yet it *can* only be located in one position and *can* only be one seeing point.<sup>3</sup> (Pp. 52, 53)

Within this objective world space of bodies, the common medium of encounter, appears a relation which cannot be objectively expressed. I distinguish the nonobjective space of I and Thou from this objective space of I and It,<sup>4</sup> and I begin to see that reality has other sides, "dimensions," of which it is impossible to give an objective representation.<sup>5</sup> "The great significance which this non-objectivizable region possesses, not only for our knowledge but for our entire life, becomes clear to us," notes Heim, "only if we now extend the scope of our considerations to include the most important aspect of reality, namely the fact that the world of experience in which we are located is not at rest in a static condition but advancing in time and involved in continuous change." (*CFNS*, p. 57)

Objectively considered, this passage is physical time, equably flowing, the world as measured, as having become.

<sup>3</sup> "Thus the situation here is similar to that which we shall later find in quite a different connection when we consider the physical study of the elementary particles. There again experimental observation will confront us with two pictures which on the objective plane are irreconcilable, the corpuscle picture and the wave picture. But the fact that the two contradictory aspects are 'complementary,' and together form a higher unity, indicates that perceptual space is not adequate for the representation of this situation, and that, in order to explain it, we must have recourse to non-perceptual dimensions which can be expressed only in mathematical terms." (P. 149)

<sup>4</sup> *The Transformation of the Scientific World View* (London, 1953), p. 147.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 200.

That is the picture which time presents if I consider it apart from myself. A completely different picture of reality arises, however, if I no longer leave myself out of account but relate my own existence to this conception of time. . . . From the nonobjective space in which I stand there runs, so to speak, a line which extends to this one definite position in the world of objects. In this way this position acquires a special significance deriving from a different dimension. Since the world of experience is not in a state of rest but continually moving forwards in the flow of time, one point on the time line, although objectively in alignment with all the other points on the line, in this way suddenly acquires a special significance which distinguishes it from the rest of the series. It acquires the character of being now. (P. 58)

What objectively considered is but one arbitrary point, *now* in an infinity of similar "nows," subjectively considered is pure becoming. In Heim's words: "The *now* is the red-hot forge where the future is to be hammered into shape. *Now* everything is still in a state of flux. Each of us from his own point of view must say: 'I will strike the iron while it is hot.' This struggle between the I and the Thou for the new conformation of the world is precisely what we call will" (p. 67). "What is the position of the will in this cosmos which is in a continual state of transformation? The will is . . . a form of existence of the ego . . . thus belongs to the non-objectivizable space to which the ego belongs, the space in which the encounter takes place between the I and Thou" (p. 66). But if this is so, then, Heim argues, we are impelled to conclude that what we call the will, in contradistinction to impulse and instinct . . . is not an energy within the narrow field of our human organism, existing side by side with the other, far more powerful energies in the world, such as gravity, electricity, magnetism and the chemical and biological forces. If it were that, then the will of us puny human beings would be of no consequence at all for the course of world events. But the invisible force which we designate with the word "will" is not comprised within the narrow confines of our tiny human existence. For since the volitional ego is non-objectivizable it transcends the whole objective world space and all its spatial dimension. (P. 70)

In this ubiquity of will we find, Heim thinks, the key whereby the secularist conception of the universe is to be overcome.

Attention to the self as ego has led us to the recognition of a reality anterior to the objective world: consideration of the relation of the Self to other selves has brought awareness of a second, nonobjective space coincident with the space of bodies: realization of the relation of selves in the *now* of becoming as the expression of ubiquitous will has rendered possible the replacement of the world view of secularism by one having religious significance. We have now to determine the nature of the universe revealed by these preliminaries.

## II

We begin with the conjecture that this universe is, in its innermost structure, panpsychic. Heim remarks:

We must reckon with the possibility that the "medial" significance of the objective world does not apply only to the relation between one human being and another and to the relation between man and non-human nature, but that even within the world of non-human nature itself there may exist psychical relations which do not differ essentially, even though they may have quite another form, from what we ourselves experience in our own human sphere as the encounter between the I and the Thou. We cannot help thinking that the whole of reality around us is not simply an inanimate mass, but that there lies behind it something which presents an analogy, however distant, with what we call a Thou. (P. 82)

The justifiability of our analogical inference to the existence of a human Thou inevitably suggests the extension of our inferential procedure to cover the inner world of the animal kingdom (pp. 87, 88). Indeed, it is, Heim feels, only our habitual tendency to foreshorten our perspectives to the recognizably human that deters us from extending the possibility of the Thou to the inner life of plants, and thence to everything organic (p. 98). Nor can we stop here.

As soon as we have extended the principle of animation to the world of plants, the modern conception of the analysis of matter into periodically motivated systems of electrons brings us quite automatically to the question whether it is really conceivable that the two-sidedness of reality, the correspondence of an invisible "inner picture" with the visible "outer picture" suddenly ceases when we reach the limits of the organic world. (P. 95, cf. p. 104)

"It is," Heim thinks, "a step of fundamental importance for the understanding of the whole reality of which we are parts, when sober natural scientists, not on the basis of any idle speculation but under the impulsion of the facts they have observed, are driven to the conclusion that not only organic structures but even inorganic processes possibly conceal something which, even though only in a very figurative sense, is 'analogous to the ego' or 'perhaps life and will'" (p. 94). It is this "impulsion of the facts" which leads Heim, as it had led Bruno and Fechner, Bergson and Whitehead, to panpsychism.<sup>6</sup> It is his recognition that panpsychism implies the extension of the I-Thou relationship to the cosmos in every finite part and infinite whole that leads him to conclude that there exists simultaneously with the three-dimensional space of objectivity and the uni-dimensional objective flow of time "a second space which, together with the whole of reality, we traverse at every instant and which surrounds us from all sides just as the space of objectivity does" (*GFNS*, p. 108). The thinking in spaces which began with the disclosure of the ego-object polarity of space thus reaches its goal in the realization that, with this extension of nonobjectivizable ego space to the universe as a whole, we have discovered a space wherein "the whole world-form of polarity is transcended, yet not by the blotting out of the entire contents of the world but by the recasting of them in a new form" (pp. 163, 171). This "new form," this new dimension, is what Heim calls the "suprapolar" space, the space of God. (Pp. 163, 167)

Yet we must not conceive this discovery of a new dimension as implying something simply additional to the Euclidean dimensionality of our common life. It is not a question of passing from one space to another. As Heim explains it . . . "what we have here is two spaces, each of which embraces the whole universe but each in quite a different aspect . . ." (p. 169). Each dimension of reality is absolutely exclusive of all others, but at the same time it is a dimension of the self-same whole. ". . . while we are encompassed on all sides by the temporal world, we stand at the same time even now in the midst of eternity and are enclosed

<sup>6</sup> Pp. 82 ff., 102, 108, 214. See also *The Transformation of the Scientific World View*, pp. 175, 202, 212, 214, 229 ff., 239, 241, 243.

within the archetypal space (*Urraum*) of God."<sup>7</sup> But though we live in the space of God, it is not God Himself in whom we live. "The suprapolar space is indeed . . . the space in which God *is present for us* . . . (but) . . . the suprapolar space, in which God is present for us, *is not the reality of God itself*. This ultimate reality remains that which is 'wholly other,' totally incomprehensible and entirely inaccessible to our thought and observation."<sup>8</sup> The world ground, we are told,<sup>9</sup> is beyond all intuition or representation. Even as Heim asserts its omnipresence he denies its perceptibility.<sup>10</sup> "The Original Power . . . 'dwelleth in light unapproachable.'" <sup>11</sup>

If in the discovery of the suprapolar space we come near to God, it is therefore only by the power of God that we can do so. "The 'central vision,'" as Jakob Boehme called it, that insight which penetrates the whole, must, as Heim sees it, "come to us as a gift."<sup>12</sup> "Access to this supra-polar space of God's omnipresence is something which has to be directly granted to us by God."<sup>13</sup> "If the space of eternity is to be discovered, there must have first taken place in the depths of our existence a transformation which is not within our control" (*CFNS*, p. 241). Such a transformation is the revelation of God (p. 191); the recognition of it is, in Heim's vocabulary, "faith." (P. 240)

What is the meaning of the word "faith"? Clearly it does not mean any human action such as trust, or the acceptance of invisible

<sup>7</sup> P. 171. "In opposition to this polar space of temporality, including as part-spaces both the objective perceptual space and the non-objective space of the Thou relations, there stands the archetypal space of eternity or of the omnipresence of God." (Pp. 168, 169. See also pp. 205, 206)

<sup>8</sup> P. 163. My italics. "Everything that has been said so far has, in the first place, shown us one thing, namely that not God Himself but His omnipresence within the world is a space in the comprehensive sense in which we have been employing this concept throughout the book." (P. 174. See also *God Transcendent*, p. 211 f.)

<sup>9</sup> *The Transformation of the Scientific World View*, p. 112.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 250. *CFNS*, pp. 194, 205, 211, 213.

<sup>11</sup> *The Transformation of the Scientific World View*, p. 112.

<sup>12</sup> *CFNS*, p. 191. "We can be released from the bondage of polar thinking, which determines our whole interpretation of the world and all our logical processes, only if, in a totally inexplicable manner, resembling what happens when one who has been born blind receives the gift of sight, there is disclosed to us the new suprapolar space, so that at a single stroke the whole of reality shines out in a new light." (P. 196)

<sup>13</sup> *The Transformation of the Scientific World View*, p. 151.



realities as true. The term faith has a much more comprehensive significance. This begins to dawn upon us only when we begin to think in terms of "spaces." Faith is the mode by which we exist in a space, by which we live from its resources, and are utterly rooted and grounded in it. . . . Faith is then the being of the whole man in the suprapolar space.<sup>14</sup>

With this definition Heim's world view is complete.

### III

To determine the cogency of a world view for which faith is an ultimate fact would seem difficult enough. It becomes more so when we note that for Heim the cosmological problem is precisely the translation of the contents of this faith into the scientific language of our time.<sup>15</sup> However, when we understand how for Heim the expression of this translation is at once the transformation of the scientific world view brought about by the recognition in modern physics of the trans-Euclidean character of world space, the difficulty seems to resolve itself into the problem of space as a common denominator.<sup>16</sup> The idea (which in the age of Einstein has become a scientific commonplace) that three-dimensional (Euclidean) space is merely one among many possible types or

<sup>14</sup> *The Transformation of the Scientific World View*, p. 148. "That something should become accessible to us which lies outside the entire polar space, and pertains to the space of eternity, is possible only if there is a knowledge that is directed towards something which can neither be seen nor inferred from what has been seen. It must be a knowledge, then, which, for anyone who has access only to the polar space, appears totally inconceivable. . . . This knowledge, the very possibility of which stands or falls with the existence of a suprapolar space without which it is unthinkable, is what the Bible calls 'faith.' . . . If we wish to express . . . (it) . . . in the terminology of the present work, we must say that faith is the general condition in which we find ourselves if we are living completely consciously in the suprapolar space, with the same confidence and security with which the thoroughgoing secularist lives entirely in the polar space. . . ." (CFNS, pp. 239, 240)

<sup>15</sup> "For it is only if we are entitled to call the suprapolar region a space that it is really possible to accomplish what Pascual Jordan sets before us as an ideal, namely the 'translation' of the contents of faith 'into the language of our present time, which is after all bound to be a scientific language.'" (CFNS, p. 162, cf. p. 126)

<sup>16</sup> "For it is only then that the religious person ceases, for those who think in terms of mathematics and physics, to be like one who speaks in tongues. . . . A concept has been found which bridges the gulf that gapes between the polar and the suprapolar zones. This is the concept of space, which is here applied to the suprapolar realm but is at the same time one of the fundamental concepts with which modern physics works." (CFNS, p. 126)

*dimensions* of space leads us, says Heim, to recognize that "a space may possess a structure which cannot be mathematically formulated at all, because this space lies completely outside the entire objective world. And yet," he concludes, "this may still be a space in the true sense of the word, because in it too a multiplicity of entities are arranged in order according to a definite principle."<sup>17</sup>

Elsewhere Heim defines space as "every interminable continuum within which a manifold of different contents may be distinguished according to the special law of its structure. This interminable whole may also be differentiated dimensionally from another no less infinite sphere."<sup>18</sup> It is this last assertion that gets us to the heart of the matter, for if infinite space is dimensionally differentiate, and Heim thinks the coexistence of Euclidean and non-Euclidean spaces is evidence that it is, then not only does it follow that a space may exist which cannot be mathematically formulated, but "it is also possible that a space may lie altogether beyond the range of what we can see or infer mathematically, even beyond all the spaces in which we stand existentially without ever yet having become conscious of it" (*CFNS*, p. 141). That is to say, the recognition of dimensionality is the warrant for the postulation of the suprapolar space!

Yet difficulties multiply as soon as the notion of "dimensionality" is brought under close scrutiny. Space, we are told, is dimensional, and a space, it is added, may exist which cannot be mathematically formulated. May we, then, infer the existence of a *dimension* which cannot be mathematically formulated? Hardly, for not only the mathematician and the physicist, but the dictionary itself will inform us that we are inferring a contradiction in terms, since "dimension" *means* measurement, which is as much a mathematical function as "dimension" is a mathematical term. Hence it is only by an analogical extension of the meaning of the term that Heim can speak of nonmathematical *dimensions* of space. The significance of the discovery of space as dimensional is not, therefore, that it provides a scientific foundation for the assertion of

<sup>17</sup> "We have an immediate knowledge of this principle, just as we have of the axioms of Euclidean geometry, and its universal validity appears to us to be equally self-evident. This is the case with the non-objective space in which encounters take place between subjects." (*CFNS*, p. 140)

<sup>18</sup> *God Transcendent*, p. 60.

the polarity of space, but rather that it furnishes an analogical base whereby the nonobjective region of ego may be described as a space. That the whole of Heim's reasoning is similarly analogical in form may be seen by attending to his account of the polar and suprapolar manifestations of the I-Thou relation.

In terms of the I-Thou relation, the problem of the transcendence of the polar in the suprapolar is the problem of how I can pass from the intuition of you as Thou to the revelation of God as cosmic Thou. We are told that we "stand before the eternal Thou in whose omnipresence we all live" (p.229). We are told of "a personal God who confronts me as a Thou and makes me His partner in conversation and so allows me to partake in His eternity" (p.232). But how we come to stand, confront, and partake, Heim does not tell us. Indeed, if his assertion that the space in which God is present for us is not the reality of God itself, be taken literally, he could not tell us even were he so minded. Here analogy dissolves into faith in that which, as Heim would have it, is "totally incomprehensible and entirely inaccessible" (p. 163). But if so, how then can we confront it as a Thou? If we take seriously Heim's distinction between God and the space of God, it would seem that we should not speak of God as Thou at all. And when he is concerned to make this distinction, Heim says as much: ultimate reality "confronts us neither as an object . . . nor as a Thou, in the sense in which the I and the Thou confront one another in the polar space." (Pp. 163, 164)

Is Heim then contradicting himself in speaking, as above, of the "eternal Thou"? Not necessarily, for while God is not a Thou in the literal sense of the term (as used in the polar relation), "Thou" may by analogical extension be applied to God in the same way in which the suprapolar space is analogically termed a *dimension* of space. Nonetheless, the position does not seem wholly satisfactory. The analogical inference is at best tenuous, for there is, after all, a difference in the way God qua Thou transcends the universe and the way you as Thou transcend me.<sup>19</sup> For whereas you transcend me not merely as a thou but as an it, God transcends us both as Thou alone.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>19</sup> M. Channing-Pearce, *The Terrible Crystal* (London, 1940), p. 127 ff.

<sup>20</sup> "In any case, whatever we may say regarding His nature, God stands over against the whole 'I-Thou-It' world which has hitherto confronted us, an indivisible unity, as something *Wholly Other*." (*God Transcendent*, p. 187)

It is only when we realize that analogy, as employed by Heim, is in no way to be identified with the Scholastic doctrine of the *analogia entis* that the radical nature of this difference between finite and infinite Thou becomes plain. "In the case of the *analogia entis*," as Heim understands it, "the mode of the being of God and the mode of being of the world are placed on the same level and reduced to a common denominator" (*CFNS*, p. 164). Whereas for Heim, as we have seen, as between the mode of being of the world (polar space) and the mode of the being of God (supra-polar space) there neither is nor could possibly be any common denominator whatever! Reflecting on this, we finally see just how unsatisfactory Heim's position must be for the man of reason. For analogical inference without a common denominator by any other name is but — a leap of faith!

#### IV

Karl Heim is usually categorized by his German and English critics as an epigone of Karl Barth,<sup>21</sup> and that there are Barthian elements in his teaching can hardly be denied. His consistent stress on faith and grace, his voluntaristic emphasis on will and decision, his notion of God as Wholly Other, all tend to confirm the label. His conception of the cosmological problem as the translation of the contents of faith into contemporary scientific language seems but fideism updated. On the other hand, there is throughout his work such appreciation and acceptance of the world picture of modern science as to cast serious doubt on whether he is, in fact, a Barthian at all. Since Heim does not mention Barth by name, whatever conclusion we draw must, of necessity, be based on the cosmology outlined above. Hence if it can be shown that the logical outcome of this cosmology is not at all that fideism it appears to be, but is rather a species of panentheism,<sup>22</sup> then it is as an instance of this latter, and not as an apologetic, that we must finally judge of its philosophical worth.

<sup>21</sup> The phrase is Channing-Pearce's. See also E. P. Dickie's Introduction to *God Transcendent*.

<sup>22</sup> As defined in *The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church* (New York, 1957) panentheism is "The belief that the Being of God includes and penetrates the whole universe, so that every part of it exists in Him, but (as against Pantheism) that this Being is more than, and is not exhausted by, the universe."

But if Heim's world view is panentheistic, how is it that Heim himself could be so unaware of this as to conclude his cosmology with a declaration of faith? The answer lies in attending to the Barthian element of Heim's thought. Having assumed, antecedent to the exposition of his world view, a Barthian conception of God and the divorcement of the secular and the religious, and conceiving the cosmological problem in fideistic fashion as the translation of the contents of faith into the language of modern science, Heim ends, as any Barthian must, in the mystery of faith. But what Heim qua Barthian has debarred himself from seeing is that the very recognition of an area of meaning common to both faith and science, a recognition upon which the very possibility of any translation of the contents of faith depends, is incompatible with his assumption of an utter disparity between the religious and the secular! For if the assumption of such disparity is correct, where are we to find the common area of meaning that makes translation possible? On the other hand, translation being possible, as Heim qua cosmologist has shown, how can we keep the secular and the religious apart? When he is concerned to develop his personalistic conception of the universe as panpsychic, Heim must and does imply that fusion of secular and religious which as a fideist he denies. In short, what Heim teaches as a cosmologist contradicts what he preaches as a Barthian.

It is only when we have, to borrow a term from Husserl, "bracketed" this Barthian element in Heim's thought that his cosmology emerges as a world hypothesis deserving of serious philosophical consideration. I have suggested that this cosmological scheme is properly described as a species of panentheism because, when we have regard to the outcome of Heim's panpsychism as "something which presents an analogy, however distant, with what we call a Thou," we find this Thou to be the same that we encounter in the space of God. In other words, Heim's panpsychism is but the cosmological obverse of that which, theologically considered, is panentheism. This is not to say that Heim is only a panentheist insofar as he is first a panpsychist. In Heim's world view panpsychism and panentheism happen to coincide, but it is not necessary that they should. One might well believe the universe psychic and animate throughout yet never give a thought to the

transcendence of God, whereas the very meaning of panentheism is its conception of transcendence as part-inclusive wholeness.<sup>23</sup> It is because Heim's notion of the "beyondness of the omnipresent God"<sup>24</sup> expresses precisely this panentheistic conception of transcendence that the label is properly applied to his world view.

But why, one may ask, should what is essentially a matter of classification especially concern us? Granting the propriety of the description, what difference does it make? The answer is that it makes a great deal of difference *if* panentheism is in truth what many thinkers, past and present,<sup>25</sup> have found it to be, namely, the only conception of the relation of God to the universe in which the demands of logic, religion, and science are met in a way which satisfies reason and feeling alike. This is a controversial claim, and one the answer to which would carry us far beyond the scope of this paper, but insofar as it bears even obliquely on Heim's theological position it must be taken into account. Yet we should not conclude from this that the validity of Heim's thesis is the validity of panentheism *per se*. At this point we must recognize the absolute uniqueness of Heim's expression of the panentheist position. Since the doctrine of the space of God has no parallel, historical or contemporary, among the philosophies of the panentheistic tradition, Heim's view, when all is said and done, must be judged primarily on its own merits.

These merits, I think, are not inconsiderable. The wealth of illustrative material drawn not only from the reigning theories of physics, but from medicine, psychology, and biology argues Heim's thorough comprehension of the shibboleths of secularism. It is not as a stranger to science that this Lutheran theologian assays his transformation of the scientific world view.

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<sup>23</sup> That is to say, as the whole is more than the sum of its parts, and yet does not exist as separate from the parts of which it is the whole, so God, as that in which we live and move and have our being, transcends the universe and yet does not exist apart from the universe. Herein panentheism differs on the one hand from theism (according to which God *literally* transcends the universe as its Creator), and on the other from pantheism (for which God does not transcend the universe in any sense at all).

<sup>24</sup> *God Transcendent*, pp. 205, 230.

<sup>25</sup> Hegel and Schelling, Fechner and Bradley, Whitehead and William James, James Ward, Berdyaev, Soloviev, W. P. Montague and Charles Hartshorne are names which, in this connection, come to mind.

Has Heim, then, succeeded in bringing off his "transformation"?<sup>26</sup> If we allow his conception of "dimension" to stand the answer could be—yes. Whether we can allow the conception to stand is another matter. It may be that Heim has confused multidimensionality with nondimensionality. According to Heim, the demonstration of the possibility of non-Euclidean space is the clue to the recognition of the polar space as multidimensional, and from this we infer, by analogy, the dimension of the suprapolar space. But if the suprapolar is trans-Euclidean rather than non-Euclidean, and Heim seems sometimes to imply that it is (*CFNS*, pp. 71, 167), then the analogy breaks down, since it by no means follows that a trans-Euclidean region is dimensional in any sense comparable with the dimensionality of non-Euclidean space! That Heim has confused the multidimensional with the nondimensional (trans-dimensional), appears the more possible as we reflect upon his theory of time. Time, we are told (pp. 60—62), is polar (objective and nonobjective), at once physical and existential. Qua existential (nonobjective) it is in some wise "touched" (p. 62) by eternity. Heim adds further that it is only in relation to ego that time becomes real (p. 103). Insofar as *time* is a dimension, the notion as here described is certainly multidimensional. But is *eternity* dimensional? Heim is as silent on this point as he is vague on the relation between time and eternity. A relation there must be, but in this connection all that Heim has to offer us is an exceedingly amorphous analogical inference, the inadequacy of which proponents of the rejected *analogia entis* will hardly fail to point out.

The discovery of the space of God may or may not be the theological event of our time, but this, at least, seems plain: Its exploration remains, for the most part, a task for the future.

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<sup>26</sup> In the closing section of *The Transformation of the Scientific World View* (Vol. V of *Der Evangelische Glaube*, etc.) Heim indicated another volume to come, wherein the whole complex of questions comprehended under the rubric "eschatology" was to be resolved. What effect this might have as regards the "transformation" is difficult to say. However, we are, I think, entitled to assume that the exposition of this "transformation" is in substance complete as given.