

5-1-1950

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Recommended Citation

Pelikan, Jaroslav (1950) "The Relationship of Faith and Knowledge in the Lutheran Confessions," *Concordia Theological Monthly*. Vol. 21, Article 32.

Available at: <https://scholar.csl.edu/ctm/vol21/iss1/32>

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Concordia Theological Monthly

VOL. XXI

MAY 1950

No. 5

The Relation of Faith and Knowledge in the Lutheran Confessions

By JAROSLAV PELIKAN

I

The proper understanding of the nature of faith is a matter of central importance in Christian theology. For this reason the Christian Church has sought for terminology by which to describe faith in a manner that will do justice to all the affirmations of Holy Scripture concerning it. The origin and development of some of this terminology was the topic of a recent essay in the pages of this journal.¹ There it was indicated that the distinction between the believing (knowing) subject and the believed (known) object was intended to safeguard an integral element in the Christian definition of faith and knowledge; but that it could, and sometimes did, lead to an objectivism and to a subjectivism both of which surrendered what the distinction aimed to preserve. This very circumstance makes further investigation of the question necessary.

That need is heightened by developments in several areas of modern thought. Ever since Descartes, philosophy has tended to stress the "subjective" at the expense of the "objective." It has sought to understand the meaning of the world and of God from the inner nature of man, as in the immanentism of Kant. During exactly the same period, however, the development of the natural sciences and of the scientific method has tended to endow the study of the physical universe with an objectivity which its speculative predecessors never possessed.² This ambivalent development

accounts for the curious phenomenon, recently noted by Karl Barth, that during the nineteenth century "der Mensch gleichzeitig mit einem ruckartigen Fortschritt in der Entfaltung seiner Moeglichkeiten sich selbst ein Unbekannter wurde."³

As philosophy moved from the objective to the subjective and science moved from subjective to objective, doctrinal theology followed the lead of subjective philosophy. A prime example of this is Schleiermacher, who sought to develop theology from the pious self-consciousness of the theologizing subject.⁴ In our own time, Schleiermacher's interpretation of the relation of faith and knowledge has been called seriously into question, notably by Karl Barth⁵ and Emil Brunner.⁶ But it is symptomatic of the dilemma of modern theology that Brunner's positive treatments of the question, his *Divine-Human Encounter* and his *Revelation and Reason*,⁷ do not manage to free themselves from the very subjectivism which they criticize in Schleiermacher.

The crucial historical nexus for the entire problem in Protestant theology is the period of the Reformation, for in that period there were set down patterns of Christian thought and expression which have occurred and recurred throughout the past four centuries. Almost without exception, both the "objectivists" and the "subjectivists" of Protestantism have claimed support for their views from the theology of the Reformation, and specifically from Luther and from the Lutheran Confessions.⁸ In a sense, the claims of both might be said to be justified, but only because the theology of the Lutheran Reformation cannot be classified as either "objectivist" or "subjectivist." Rather, it defines the nature of faith, and the relation of faith and knowledge, in a manner that transcends these two alternatives.

Roman Catholic objectivism has accordingly interpreted the theology of the Lutheran Confessions as subjectivist.⁹ In the view of Albrecht Ritschl, on the other hand, the Lutheran Confessions assert "dass alle Christen, um Gott recht zu verehren, im Besitz seiner richtigen Erkenntnis sein sollen; und darunter lassen sie keine andere als deren technisch-theologische Darstellung verstehen."¹⁰ As a matter of fact, neither of these interpretations tells the whole story. In opposition to Roman Catholic objectivism and

to Reformed subjectivism the Lutheran Confessions teach a view of faith that refuses to be compromised by either of these alternatives. To make that point clear, this essay will seek to present the relation between faith and knowledge according to the Lutheran Confessions; and since the Confessions claim to be nothing more nor less than a summary of Holy Scripture,¹¹ we shall devote considerable attention to the Biblical presentation of that relation as well.

II

The origin of all Christian faith, as of all Christian knowledge, is God. Christ is "the Light which lighteth every man that cometh into the world" (John 1:9). All human wisdom is derivative wisdom, created by the Wisdom that has been with God from eternity (Proverbs 8). Indeed, by the coming of Christ ἐμώρανεv ὁ θεὸς τὴν σοφίαν τοῦ κόσμου, and He has made Christ θεοῦ σοφίαν, which His Church proclaims as a σοφίαν ἐν μυστηρίῳ (1 Cor. 1:20 to 2:7). There is no knowledge or wisdom, much less any faith, which is not grounded in God.

As there is no knowledge of things without God, so there is especially no knowledge of man without God. The answer to the phenomenon noted by Barth is to be found in the fact that man cannot know himself because his knowledge of himself must be rooted in God. For "solche Erbsuende ist so gar eine tiefe, boese Verderbung der Natur, dass sie keine Vernunft nicht kennt, sondern muss aus der Schrift Offenbarung geglaubt werden."¹² "Neque enim potest iudicari nisi ex Verbo Dei."¹³ How can I know man if I do not know God, in whose image man was created?¹⁴ Man's knowledge of himself as sinner presupposes the knowledge of God; much less, then, can man know himself as a child of God without the knowledge of God.

But what is the basis of this "knowledge of God"? The answer of the Scriptures would be that knowledge *about* God presupposes knowledge *by* God, that the phrase "of God" in "knowledge of God" must be subjective genitive before it can become objective genitive. It is because the Shepherd knows His sheep that His sheep know Him (John 10:14). It is because His knowledge of them is as complete as it is, and not because their knowledge of Him

is complete, that no one will be able to snatch them from His hand.¹⁵ Addressing himself to the Galatians, Paul characterizes them in their previous heathen condition as οὐκ εἰδότες θεόν. By way of contrast, he describes them in their new state as νῦν δὲ γινόντες θεόν, μᾶλλον δὲ γνωσθέντες ὑπὸ θεοῦ (Gal. 4:8-9). The μᾶλλον δέ is well taken. They had not merely passed from not knowing God to knowing God, but they had passed from not knowing God to being known by Him and therefore knowing Him. In the same way Paul portrays the present life and the future hope of the Christian. The Christian even now has a γνῶσις ἐκ μέρους, but he lives in God's ἐπίγνωσις of him and therefore in the hope that he will attain to a similar ἐπίγνωσις (1 Cor. 13:12); a parallel to this view of γνῶσις is 1 Cor. 8:1-3.

The setting for such a radical view of divine knowledge is provided by the Hebrew verb יָדַע, especially as this is applied to God. "O Lord," confesses the Psalmist, "Thou hast searched me and known me" (Ps. 139:1); and the theme of the Psalm is the important truth "dass Gott nicht allein vor dem Fall menschliche Natur geschaffen habe, sondern dass sie auch nach dem Fall eine Kreatur und Werk Gottes sei".¹⁶ Far from denoting a mere perception that a man exists, יָדַע here suggests God's creative knowledge, His "nosse cum effectu et affectu." It was, therefore, more than euphemism which prompted the sacred writers to employ the verb יָדַע for man's participation in the divine "creatio continua."¹⁷ יָדַע is an active, personal, intimate, creative knowing by God. No Greek could have used γινώσκω in this sense; for the God of the Greeks, even of the wisest Greeks, lived in ἀπάθεια, knowing little, and caring less, about the lives of mortal men.¹⁸

Not from Greek usage, but from the Old Testament comes the pregnant use of γινώσκω and its derivatives in the New Testament.¹⁹ The foundation of God is as sure as it is because it has this seal: ἔγνω κύριος τοὺς ὄντας αὐτοῦ (2 Tim. 2:19). Realizing that the verb ἔγνω here cannot signify a mere intellectual awareness on God's part that some persons belong to Him, the Formula of Concord saw this passage as a parallel to the promise (John 10:27-28) that the Shepherd knows His sheep and that therefore no one will be able to tear them from His hand.²⁰

A similar viewpoint makes possible an answer to the critical

question of how *προέγνω* is used in Rom. 8:29. As George Stoekhardt has shown with much learning, the term *προέγνω* here does not wish to say that God was aware of, much less that He took into consideration, the conduct or faith of those whom He chose.²¹ This was a knowledge in the Old Testament sense of *נָחַ*, a "nosse cum effectu et affectu." Stoekhardt's interpretation is substantiated by the immediate context, where *οὐκ οἶδαμεν* (v. 26) and *οἶδαμεν* (v. 28) are connected by *ὁ δὲ ἐρευνῶν τὰς καρδίας οἶδεν* (v. 27). We do not know what to ask for; God knows the mind of the interceding Spirit; and therefore we know that all things work together for good. Our certainty is rooted not in our knowledge of our needs, but in God's knowledge; because He knows, we can know also.

III

The root of man's knowledge of God, then, is God's knowledge of man. Man's knowledge is ever a response to God's knowledge. It does not arise from within man, but is given from without. For this reason, faith does not fasten upon itself; in classical terms, faith is never its own object. Luther's statement: "Ich glaube, dass ich nicht . . . glauben . . . kann"²² is a fine summary of the divinely wrought "salutaris desperatio"²³ over faith's ability to be or to create its own object. Precisely this attempt to fasten faith upon itself or upon any other good creates "Abgott".²⁴ Because we do not know what we ought to ask, we must look outside ourselves. "Ich komme her in meinem Glauben und auch der andern, noch kann ich nicht darauf bauen, dass ich glaube, und viele Leute fuer mich bitten, sondern darauf baue ich, dass es dein Wort und Befehl ist; gleichwie ich zum Sakrament gehe, nicht auf meinen Glauben, sondern auf Christus' Wort, ich sei stark oder schwach, das lasse ich Gott walten".²⁵

Only in this way can there be certainty of faith, if faith does not build upon faith but upon the Word of God. When directed inwardly, to his own merits or faith, a man will lose himself in despair or in "securitas," but he will never find true certainty.²⁶ For the certainty of faith is not founded upon me but upon God. This is the meaning of Luther's classic dictum: "Nostra theologia est certa, quia ponit nos extra nos: non debeo niti in conscientia mea, sensuali persona, opere, sed in promissione divina, veritate, quae

non potest fallere."²⁷ Faith, then, is tied to the promise (Rom. 4:16).

The close association of faith and the promise—the Apology calls them "correlativa"²⁸—is another way of showing the origin of Christian faith and knowledge. Albrecht Ritschl claims that Lutheran theology makes faith in the promise of Christ subsidiary to faith in the Bible.²⁹ While it must be granted that there have sometimes been tendencies in that direction,³⁰ Lutheran theology at its best has always insisted that the object of saving faith "ist nur das Evangelium, nicht auch das Gesetz oder die ganze Heilige Schrift."³¹ This insight is substantiated by the Biblical use of the verb πιστεύω and the noun πίστις. They occur with the dative, with the genitive, with the infinitive, and with various prepositions,³² but almost always in the sense of "trust" or in direct relation to the promise of Christ.

Especially illuminating are the occurrences of a ὅτι clause with πιστεύω. The usage is relatively rare, rarer, it would seem, than the English "I believe that . . ."³³ And in those instances where it does occur, the content of the ὅτι clause is almost inevitably Christological. For example, among the almost 100 instances of πιστεύω in the Gospel of John, there are only twelve, or perhaps thirteen,³⁴ with a ὅτι clause.³⁵ Every one of these ὅτι clauses refers to Christ's lordship, to His Messianic office, or to some related theme. The two instances in the Johannine epistles where πιστεύω is followed by a ὅτι clause (1 John 5:1; 5:5) both refer to Christ's office as the Messiah and the Son of God. In Paul the combination of πιστεύω with a ὅτι clause is even less frequent: twice in Romans (6:8; 10:9) and once in 1 Thessalonians (4:14). All three clauses speak of Christ's resurrection and its benefits.

Thus faith and the promise are indeed correlative. An examination of the New Testament use of πιστεύω can only confirm the correctness of the Apology's succinct and oft-repeated phrase "velle et accipere oblatam promissionem."³⁶ The same insight is contained in the Apology's definition of faith as obedience to the Gospel,³⁷ and deepened when it speaks of faith as the worship of God.³⁸ "Fides est λατρεία, quae accipit a Deo oblata beneficia; iustitia legis est λατρεία, quae offert Deo nostra merita. Fide sic vult coli Deus, ut ab ipso accipiamus ea, quae promittit et offert."

Faith is obedience, but obedience to the Gospel, obedience that accepts because it has nothing to offer.³⁹ In this sense the Apostle can speak of a *ὑπακοή πίστεως* (Rom. 1:5) and can seem to use *πίστις* and *ὑπακοή* interchangeably.⁴⁰ For faith is a *ὑπακοή*, a hearkening to the promise of the Gospel.

Faith hearkens to the promise of the Gospel in that it hears the Word of the Gospel. There is a close connection between *ὑπακοή πίστεως* and the *ἀκοή* out of which *πίστις* comes according to Rom. 10:17.⁴¹ The *ἀκοή*, in turn, is *διὰ ῥήματος χριστοῦ*.⁴² The *ῥῆμα χριστοῦ* is the means which calls the *ἀκοή* and the *ὑπακοή πίστεως* into being. And what is the *ῥῆμα χριστοῦ* but the creative "promissio" of which the Apology speaks? It is most significant that the Apology refers this passage, Rom. 10:17, to absolution.⁴³ For absolution, as the Apology points out more than once, is "vox evangelii"⁴⁴; "haec est ipsa vox evangelii propria, quod propter Christum, non propter nostra opera, fide consequamur remissionem peccatorum."⁴⁵

A faith that is born of the *ῥῆμα χριστοῦ*, spoken in the absolution, is no mere intellectual assent that a set of propositions corresponds to an external, objective reality. If it were rooted in an internal, self-acquired knowledge, it would remain such an intellectual assent. But since our *ἐπίγνωσις* is only in response to God's *ἐπίγνωσις*, as pointed out above, and since our *πίστις* is *ἐξ ἀκοῆς*, *ἢ δὲ ἀκοῆ διὰ ῥήματος χριστοῦ*, it necessarily follows that Christian *ἐπίγνωσις* and Christian *πίστις* are not an "Abart des Wissens,"⁴⁶ but "velle et accipere oblatam promissionem."

Failure to realize this central characteristic of Christian faith is what has led critics, ancient and modern, to deny that little children can have faith.⁴⁷ If faith is interpreted as a conclusion to which I come as the result of intellectual deliberation and/or argumentation, then a child, which is incapable of such deliberation and argumentation, cannot believe. But the New Testament does not evaluate the faith of children in terms of mature deliberation; it does the exact opposite, insisting that everyone must accept the Kingdom *ὡς παιδίον* (Luke 18:17). "So wenig," comments Franz Pieper, "ist der Kindeszustand oder das noch nicht zur Vernunft Gekommensein ein Hindernis des Glaebigwerdens."⁴⁸ Children really believe, theirs is a "fides actualis."⁴⁹ What is more, God

ignites and works "rechte Erkenntnis Gottes und Glauben"⁵⁰ through Baptism, also through the Baptism of children. In both the "Erkenntnis" and the "Glaube," the *παιδία* are to serve us as examples.

IV

We are now in a position to delineate the relation of faith and knowledge more precisely. The medieval theologians sought to distinguish between faith and knowledge in order to provide room for the advanced knowledge of the medieval theologians.⁵¹ As a matter of fact, they succeeded in turning faith into a "notitia historiae seu dogmatum."⁵² In opposition to this, the Lutheran Confessions equate "credere" and "nosse,"⁵³ but they do so by giving each of them a meaning it did not have in medieval theology. Knowledge becomes "beneficia Christi cognoscere"⁵⁴; faith becomes "velle et accipere." If both terms are understood this way, they can truly be equated.

So it is that knowledge and faith are sometimes virtually equated in the New Testament. Thus *πιστεύομεν* in Rom. 6:8 and *εἰδότες* in 6:9 are parallel; a similar instance appears in 2 Cor. 4:13-14. To the consternation of philosophical epistemology the Apostles declare *πεπιστεύκαμεν καὶ ἐγνώκαμεν* (John 6:68). Whatever may be the correct text of John 10:37-38, it does command: *πιστεῦτε, ἵνα γνῶτε*; and the fact that *γινώσκητε* is replaced by *πιστεύσητε* in several important manuscripts only serves to bear out the close relation between the two concepts. Such a close relation can exist because the New Testament refuses to define Christian knowledge as "notitia historiae seu dogmatum" or faith as intellectual assent to such knowledge. And because they hold closely to this New Testament usage, the Lutheran Confessions are equally free of the intellectualism that is sometimes attributed to them.

If faith is interpreted in this way and knowledge of God is viewed as the New Testament views it, then one may well be able to speak of an "object" and a "subject" in faith. In all other fields of knowledge, the "subject" is the initiator of the knowledge: the scientist is the "subject" of scientific study, the historian the "subject" of historical study, etc. But in Christian knowledge and faith the initiative comes not from man, but from God, whose Son Jesus Christ is *ὁ τῆς πίστεως ἀρχηγὸς καὶ τελειωτῆς* (Heb. 12:2) —

ἀρχηγός because He initiates it, τελειωτής because He completes it. Here again it becomes necessary for the theologian to employ such terms as he can find and to endow them with specifically Christian meaning. The object-subject antithesis, too, can be given such meaning if it is cast in the framework of the relation between faith and knowledge which we find in the Lutheran Confessions.

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- ¹ "The Origins of the Object-Subject Antithesis in Lutheran Dogmatics. A Study in Terminology," *CONCORDIA THEOLOGICAL MONTHLY*, XXI (1950), pp. 94—104.
- ² For a stimulating, if overly sympathetic interpretation, cf. J. H. Randall, *The Making of the Modern Mind* (2d ed.; New York, 1940), esp. pp. 458—532.
- ³ Karl Barth, *Kirchliche Dogmatik*, III, *Die Lehre von der Schoepfung*, 2. Teil (Zurich, 1948), p. 104.
- ⁴ A brief but useful analysis is Ferdinand Kattenbusch, *Die deutsche evangelische Theologie seit Schleiermacher* (4th ed.; Giessen, 1924), pp. 18—31; a more complete analysis is Richard B. Brandt, *The Philosophy of Schleiermacher* (New York, 1941).
- ⁵ Barth's earlier critique, "Das Wort in der Theologie von Schleiermacher bis Ritschl," *Zwischen den Zeiten*, VI, pp. 92—110, has been somewhat modified in his recent *Die protestantische Theologie im 19. Jahrhundert* (Zurich, 1946).
- ⁶ Though Brunner mentions Schleiermacher in almost every book he writes, his most thorough criticism is still his youthful work, *Die Mystik und das Wort* (Tuebingen, 1924).
- ⁷ *The Divine-Human Encounter*, translated by Amandus W. Loos (Philadelphia, 1943). *Revelation and Reason*. The Christian Doctrine of Faith and Knowledge, translated by Olive Wyon (Philadelphia, 1946); on Schleiermacher, esp. pp. 396 ff.
- ⁸ On this phenomenon see some representative quotations in my essay "Luther's Endorsement of the *Confessio Bohemica*," *CONCORDIA THEOLOGICAL MONTHLY*, XX (1949), pp. 831—832, notes 11—14.
- ⁹ This underlies the charge that the Lutherans made the Church a "Platonica civitas," Apology, Art. VII, par. 20, *Concordia Triglotta* (St. Louis, 1921), p. 232.
- ¹⁰ Albrecht Ritschl, *Fides implicita* (Bonn, 1890), p. 57.
- ¹¹ See Edmund Schlink, *Theologie der lutherischen Bekenntnisschriften* (3d ed.; Munich, 1948), pp. 35—43.
- ¹² Smalcald Articles, Part III, Art. I, par. 3, *Triglotta*, p. 476.
- ¹³ Apology, Art. II, par. 13, *Triglotta*, p. 108.
- ¹⁴ On "imago Dei" in the Confessions, see Formula of Concord, Solida Declaratio, Art. I, par. 10, *Triglotta*, p. 862; Apology, Art. II, par. 18—22, *Triglotta*, pp. 108—110.
- ¹⁵ John 10:27-28; the passage is thus interpreted by the Formula of Concord, Solida Declaratio, Art. XI, par. 30, *Triglotta*, p. 1072.
- ¹⁶ Formula of Concord, Solida Declaratio, Art. I, par. 34, *Triglotta*, p. 868.

¹⁷ For example, in Gen. 4:1; on this use of $\epsilon\gamma\omega\gamma$, cf. Luther's comments, "Enarratio in Genesis," *Werke* (Weimar, 1881 ff.; hereafter abbreviated as W. A.), 42, 179.

¹⁸ On the backgrounds of this idea in Greek thought, see the remarks of Werner Jaeger, "Theories of the Nature and Origin of Religion," *The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers* (Oxford, 1947), pp. 172—190.

¹⁹ Though somewhat radical in its presuppositions and methods, Rudolf Bultmann's article on $\gamma\iota\nu\omega\sigma\kappa\omega$ in Gerhard Kittel (ed.), *Theologisches Woerterbuch zum Neuen Testament*, I (Stuttgart, 1933), pp. 688—719, does emphasize the derivation of the New Testament concept from $\epsilon\gamma\omega\gamma$; cf. esp. pp. 696—700, 703—708.

²⁰ Formula of Concord, Solida Declaratio, Art. XI, par. 90, *Triglotta*, p. 1092. — Cp. the study of $\epsilon\gamma\omega\gamma$ by Wm. Arndt in previous issue, p. 299.

²¹ The predestinarian controversy of the nineteenth century had forced consideration of the question; Stoeckhardt's *Commentar ueber den Brief Pauli an die Roemer* (St. Louis, 1907), pp. 395—400, demonstrates that $\pi\rho\omicron\epsilon\gamma\gamma\omega$ here does not refer to the "praesentia" of God, but to His efficacious, active knowing.

²² Small Catechism, Part II, par. 6, *Triglotta*, p. 544; cf. the verbal parallel between the Latin of this and the Latin of Augustana, Art. II, par. 3, *Triglotta*, p. 44.

²³ Luther, "De servo arbitrio," W. A. 18, 719.

²⁴ Large Catechism, Part I, par. 1, *Triglotta*, p. 580; this against Ritschl's exegesis of this passage, *op. cit.*, pp. 60—61, in favor of his view that faith is merely a value judgment.

²⁵ Large Catechism, Part IV, par. 56, *Triglotta*, p. 746; see also Formula of Concord, Solida Declaratio, Art. VII, par. 68—71, *Triglotta*, p. 996.

²⁶ This is one of the central themes of Art. IV of the Apology. On despair, Art. IV, par. 36—37, *Triglotta*, p. 130; Art. III, par. 7, p. 156; Art. III, par. 174, p. 202. On "securitas," Art. IV, par. 19—21, pp. 124—126; Art. III, par. 25, p. 162; Art. III, par. 200, p. 208. On true certainty, Art. IV, par. 85, p. 146, esp. the German text; Art. III, par. 223—224, p. 216.

²⁷ "In epistolam S. Pauli ad Galatas commentarius" (1531), W. A. 40—I, 598; cf. Formula of Concord, Solida Declaratio, Art. II, par. 54—55, *Triglotta*, pp. 932—934.

²⁸ Apology, Art. III, par. 203, *Triglotta*, p. 208; Art. IV, par. 50, p. 134.

²⁹ *Fides implicita*, pp. 94—96.

³⁰ Cf. "Object-Subject Antithesis," p. 99, notes 44—49.

³¹ Franz Pieper, *Christliche Dogmatik*, II (St. Louis, 1917), p. 505.

³² On some of the different usages with $\pi\iota\sigma\tau\epsilon\upsilon\omega$, cf. A. T. Robertson, *A Grammar of the Greek New Testament* (2d ed.; New York, 1915), p. 540.

³³ This is evident from the fact that in passages like Acts 15:11 and Rom. 14:2, where $\pi\iota\sigma\tau\epsilon\upsilon\omega$ appears with the infinitive, the English translators use a "that" clause.

³⁴ Depending upon whether one reads $\gamma\iota\nu\omega\sigma\kappa\eta\tau\epsilon$ or $\pi\iota\sigma\tau\epsilon\upsilon\sigma\kappa\eta\tau\epsilon$ in John 10:38.

³⁵ They are 6:69; 8:24; 9:18; 11:27; 11:42; 13:19; 14:10; 16:27; 16:30; 17:8; 17:21; 20:31. The $\delta\tau\iota$ in 12:39 is causal rather than substantive.

³⁶ Apology, Art. IV, par. 48, *Triglotta*, p. 134 Art. III, par. 106, p. 182; Art. III, par. 183, p. 204; Art. III, par. 189, p. 206.

³⁷ Apology, Art. III, par. 187, *Triglotta*, p. 206; also Large Catechism, Part IV, par. 61, *Triglotta*, p. 746.

³⁸ Apology, Art. IV, par. 49, *Triglotta*, p. 134; par. 57, p. 136; par. 60, p. 136.

³⁹ See the discussion in Pieper, *Dogmatik*, II, p. 528.

⁴⁰ Cf. Rudolf Bultmann, *Die Theologie des Neuen Testaments*, I (Tuebingen, 1948), pp. 310—313.

⁴¹ This connection is also indicated by ἐπίκουσαν τῷ εὐαγγελίῳ, v. 16; on Rom. 10:17, cf. Formula of Concord, Solida Declaratio, Art. II, par. 51, *Triglotta*, p. 900, where ἀκοή is translated "Predigen."

⁴² ὁῦμα χριστοῦ seems to be preferable to the ὁῦμα θεοῦ which underlies the Authorized Version.

⁴³ Apology, Art. XII, par. 39, *Triglotta*, p. 260.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*; it is also called "vox evangelii" in Art. III, par. 150, *Triglotta*, p. 198; cf. also Formula of Concord, Solida Declaratio, Art. XI, par. 38, *Triglotta*, p. 1074: "dass wir so wahrhaftig, wenn wir dem Wort der Absolution glauben, Gott versoehnt werden, als haetten wir eine Stimme vom Himmel gehoert."

⁴⁵ Apology, Art. III, par. 153, *Triglotta*, p. 198.

⁴⁶ Ritschl, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

⁴⁷ Luther's strong words, Large Catechism, Part IV, par. 47—63, *Triglotta*, pp. 742—748, apply no less to the critics of our time than to the critics of his.

⁴⁸ Pieper, *Dogmatik*, II, p. 537.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 517—524.

⁵⁰ Formula of Concord, Solida Declaratio, Art. II, par. 16, *Triglotta*, p. 886.

⁵¹ Cf. Etienne Gilson, *Christianity and Philosophy*, translated by Ralph MacDonald (New York, 1939), pp. 129—130, note 20, on the Thomistic distinction between faith and knowledge.

⁵² Cf. "Object-Subject Antithesis," p. 98.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 103, note 33.

⁵⁴ On this phrase, its abuses, and its proper significance, cf. Schlink, *op. cit.*, pp. 124—125.

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