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The Christian and Government

By A. M. REHWINKEL

GOOD government is one of the most precious temporal gifts God gives to a people, while a vicious, corrupt, and incompetent government may become the greatest curse. Every citizen is therefore vitally interested in the establishment and maintenance of good government. The Christian, however, as a citizen in "two realms" has an even greater stake in good government than the non-Christian. According to 1 Tim. 2:1-4 good government is necessary not only for the individual's physical and temporal well-being, but also — and this primarily — for the carrying out of God's gracious purposes concerning the eternal welfare of all men.

The Christian will therefore view with grave alarm the political upheavals which have occurred in our time, especially in Russia, Germany, Turkey, Spain, England, Japan, and China. Nor will he close his eyes to the changes which are taking place in our own country today.

The whole world is affected. Never before has there been a revolution so wide in scope as that which is occurring today. Technological changes have altered our way of life, and the secularism and materialism of our age have changed our attitude toward the meaning of life. A new social order and new forms of government are emerging which are all inclusive and absolute and unlimited in power, which are absorbing the functions and prerogatives of all the other creation orders established by God. Brunner states:

The cause of this acute crisis in the State is the triumph of the principle of autonomy, the severance of the order of the State from all connections with the eternal world. Inevitably this has led on the one hand to the absolutism of the State, and on the other to the downfall of authority of the State, as the outcome of unrestrained individualism. Antiquity knew only States with a religious basis; primitive Christianity recognized the State as ordained by God, in spite of the fact that it was actually "without God." The Middle Ages based the State on the Church; the

Reformation returned to the standpoint of primitive Christianity. The autonomy of the State was proclaimed by the philosophy of the Enlightenment, prepared by the Renaissance; this view, however, was also at least in part derived from a semireligious conception of reason — from the Stoic doctrine of Natural Law, which was permeated with Christian ethics — and was supported by it. It was only after the positivism and materialism of the last century had shaken off even this last remnant of transcendental connection by the naturalistic explanation of Natural Law that the State became completely autonomous in the sense of freedom from all transcendental connection, and this freedom has been its ruin. It is this process of disintegration and the reaction to this process which constitutes the crisis of the State. Thus this crisis is not due to outward events, as, for instance, in the dominance of the power of economic interest over the authority of the State. Reflection on the meaning of the State has, therefore, ceased to be merely an academic matter and has become the only means of escaping from the practical crisis. It has also become the duty of the theologians to reflect upon this question, for the Church, the community of believers, cannot understand itself and its task in the world without having its own view of the meaning and the function of the State.¹

While a study on government, its origin, constitution, and functions, seems to belong exclusively to the field of political science, nevertheless the Christian theologian must concern himself with this study as a part of Christian doctrine. Scripture not only describes government and offers directions to those in authority, but it also in particular shows the Christians how to use these gifts of God for their temporal and eternal welfare.

I. ORIGIN OF GOVERNMENT

The first question which presents itself when examining the problem of government is the question of origin. What is the origin of government? How did it come into being? Why is it found among all peoples? Where does it get its sovereign authority? Why do men submit to government? Is it simple usurpation, or does it owe its origin and existence to voluntary action on the part of those over whom its authority is exercised? Is there any actual or theoretical limit placed to its power?

These are all interesting but difficult questions, and it is no wonder, therefore, that the mystery of government has at all times challenged the imagination of philosophers and thinkers. Our attitude towards government and our political behavior will be influenced by the answer we give to these questions.

Concerning the origin of the State from the historical standpoint, Dr. Willoughby of Johns Hopkins University writes:

Concerning its absolute origin of political authority among men, history does not afford definite information, nor does it appear possible that there will ever be furnished final light upon this subject. A study of origins is always an attractive one, and the work of many anthropologists has thrown a vast amount of light upon early history of social and political institutions. The parts played by consanguinity, by religion (especially by the worship of ancestors), by the communal ownership of land and other economic interests, and, above all, by the influence of the family upon the development of social and political life have been carefully considered. The significance of totem worship, of endogamy and exogamy, of polygamy and polyandry, and of patriarchal life has been discussed in the light of the facts presented by the earliest literary and archaeological records, and interpreted by analogy with the present customs of races now in the lowest stages of civilization. All of these facts have been compared and exhaustively studied, but the absolute origin of civic life has not been historically determined. The fact is that the first subjection of man to public authority of some sort or other was practically and necessarily with the beginning of his social life, and this carries us back to periods of human development anterior to those that furnish historical records.²

As we study man in his social life, we discover a strange paradox. On the one hand we find that man of all creatures alone is a person. That is, man is endowed with freedom and self-determination. Man is a free moral agent, which means that his very essence demands freedom. But in conflict with this we find on the other hand that man everywhere has voluntarily surrendered part of his freedom and is subject to coercive control by a general governing authority, whose power extends even to matters of life and death. The question therefore arises, How does it happen that man everywhere submits to a limitation of his freedom by subjecting himself to

government and authority? In trying to find an answer to this question a number of theories have been advanced at various times. We shall briefly examine a few of the more important of these theories.

1. *The Patriarchal Theory*

The most prominent of the theories regarding the origin of political institutions pretending to rest on historical data is the so-called Patriarchal Theory, represented chiefly by Sir Henry Maine. According to this theory the origin of government is to be sought "in separate families, held together by authority and protection of the eldest valid male ascendant." There is no doubt that primitive government started in the family and that the family grew into the clan, and the clan eventually into the tribe and nation, but this theory merely states the fact, but does not explain why this happened, why people submitted to the authority of others, what gave rise to the sovereignty of government. In short, this theory does not answer the basic questions concerning the origin of government. The two institutions of family and State are essentially different. In the family the location of authority is natural, i. e., in the father. In the State it is one of choice. Subordination is the principle in the family, equality that of the State. Furthermore, the functions and aims of the family are essentially different from those of the State. The family exists primarily for the biological perpetuation of the race; not so the State. The individual family is of comparatively short duration: the State is perpetual. "In other words," says Willoughby, "though it is entirely improbable that a single, isolated family should ever become politically organized, it is not logically impossible. It is not the size, but the lack of that element of possible perpetuity of dominion that prevents the family from becoming as such, a State."³

2. *Natural or Instinctive Theory*

According to this theory the solution is to be found in "the natural sociability of man." Bluntschli, who is the chief proponent of this theory, explains the origin and nature of the State as follows:

We have still to discover the common cause of the rise of States as distinct from the manifold forces in which they appear. This we find in human nature, which, besides its individual diversity,

has in it the tendencies of community and unity. These tendencies are developed, and peoples feel themselves nations and seek a corresponding outward form. Thus the universal impulse to society (*Staatstrieb*) produces external organization of common life and the form of manly self-government, that is, in the form of the State. . . . Here we have indeed the cause of the State, that is, the natural elements in human nature which urge its establishment and maintenance. But this theory is not the real answer to our problem. It does not answer the question how its empiric manifestation is brought about, nor show the manner in which its control over the individual may be harmonized with the latter's natural freedom. In a general way this was the view of the Greeks, who considered political authority almost a metaphysical necessity arising from the social life of man, as existing in and of and for itself and as determined by the very nature of things."⁴

3. *The Social Contract Theory*

According to the Social Contract Theory government came into existence as a free contract of individuals. Men made a covenant with one another and thus created government.

The first great exponent of this theory was Thomas Hobbes (1588—1679). He held that to understand the nature and origin of government, we must go back to primitive times in human history when there was as yet no civil society and when the instinct of self-preservation was the supreme law. In this primitive condition every man was a law unto himself, and everyone had a right to do as he saw fit, whatever served his own selfish ends and whatever he considered conducive to his happiness. This state of affairs naturally led to a condition of anarchy, lawlessness, and universal conflict. Every man's hand was against everyone else. To put an end to such a reign of anarchy and to save the race from self-destruction, men agreed by a free covenant or contract to create a government for the establishment of peace and order. To make such government possible, everyone agreed voluntarily to surrender his own rights and powers and to subject himself to such unified sovereignty and power. In return for the surrender of all personal powers and rights, the government would guarantee security to every individual or the contracting groups. But this could be done only if the government be invested with power

strong enough to keep in check all individual powers. Hence, the more absolute the power of the State, the better will it be able to fulfill the purpose for which it was created. From this contract the rights of absolute monarchy are deduced. The contract once made not only gives the ruler absolute power, but all rights of revolution on the part of the people are, according to Hobbes, forever lost. By this contract the ruler becomes "that mortal God to which we owe, under the immortal God, our peace and defense."⁵

Other representatives of the Contract Theory were John Locke in England, Rousseau in France, Kant and Fichte in Germany, and Jefferson and Madison in America. But while Hobbes was led to absolute monarchism by the Contract Theory, Locke, Rousseau, and others arrived at Democratic Absolutism via the same road. Both Locke and Rousseau exercised a profound influence on political thought in England and in continental Europe. In fact, this thought dominated political thinking during the 18th century and provided the theoretical arguments for the French Revolution and other political upheavals which followed. But probably even greater was the influence of this theory in America. The Contract Theory is recognized in the Preamble of the Declaration of Independence and is explicitly accepted in nearly all of the Bills of Rights of the Constitutions of the various States of the Union. And also in the private writings of Jefferson and Madison and other statesmen of that period we find the Social Contract Theory accepted in purest form.

4. *The Social Organism Theory*

The Social Organism Theory is based on the theory of organic evolution. Society is viewed as a living organism, which develops like other organisms. The chief exponent of the Social Organism Theory is Herbert Spencer. Spencer attempts to explain the origin of the State as the product of organic evolution. Everything in the universe is regarded as the result of a slow and progressive evolution. Under this same law of evolution individuals are brought together to form a social organism. Political organization is the link in the evolution process: first man, then marriage, then the family, then the tribe, and finally the State. Primitive man, according to Spencer, was in a state of savagery, and only gradually,

after a long evolutionary process, did he acquire a fitness for social and political life.

This theory requires no refutation. The evolution of man is a myth and not a fact. "If savages," writes Max Mueller, "means people without a settled form of government, without laws and without religion, then go where you like, you will not find such a race." And, continues Osgniath, "nor has ethnology been more propitious to Spencerian evolution. In vain have all the continents been traversed, from the forest of South America to the farthest parts of Greenland; from the Eskimos to the Hottentots; from the Hindus to the savage tribes of Africa; the answer has always been the same: Among all human races no vestiges of subhuman have been found. All the numerous and insistent attempts to prove the animal descent of man, as Spencer conceives it, have failed, because it is impossible to obliterate the differences, not of degree, but of kind, which separate man essentially from the brute."⁶

5. *The Force Theory*

This theory is based on the idea that government grows out of force, that might makes right, that might *per se* is a warrant for coercion. This means in practice that if an individual, or a group or an invading power, is able to force his will upon a group of people, then a *de facto* and a *de iure* government has been established. Machiavelli was the first to enunciate these ideas, and modern totalitarian States are based on this principle. Machiavelli writes:

Hence it comes that all armed Prophets have been victorious, and all unarmed prophets have been destroyed. For, besides what has been said it should be borne in mind that the temper of the multitude is fickle, and that while it is easy to persuade them of a thing, it is hard to fix them in that persuasion. Therefore matters should be so ordered that when men no longer believe of their own accord, they must be compelled to believe by force.⁷

6. *The Communist Theory of Government*

A sixth theory of government is that of the Communists, who hold that government grew out of the capitalistic system. It is an instrument of the ruling class to keep the proletariat in subjection.

When Communism has established a no-class society, all forms of government will "wither away," because there will no longer be any need for them.

7. *The Biblical Theory*

From what has been said we see that from the time of Plato and Aristotle philosophers and political theorists have wrestled with the problem of the origin of government, but have found no adequate answer. The only satisfactory answer is found in the Scriptures, where we are told that government is ordained by God. Hence, we accept what we might call the *Biblical Theory*.

There is no definite statement in the Bible concerning the history of government, but on the basis of various references to government we are able to arrive at some conclusions which, in order to continue the same terminology, might be called the *Biblical Theory of Government*.

This doctrine of government is based on the two well-known passages of Scripture, Rom. 13:1-7 and 1 Peter 2:13-14.

In accordance with these specific instructions from the Letters of Paul and Peter, the Augsburg Confession states:

Of Civil Affairs they teach that lawful civil ordinances are good works of God, and that it is right for Christians to bear civil office, to sit as judges, to judge matters by the imperial and other existing laws, to award just punishments, to engage in just wars, to serve as soldiers, to make legal contracts, to hold property, to make oath when required by the magistrates, to marry a wife, to be given in marriage."⁸

And the Apology to the Augsburg Confession says:

We have confessed that it is lawful for the Christian to bear civil office, sit in judgment, determine matters by the imperial law, and other laws in present force, appoint just punishment, engage in just wars, act as a soldier, make legal contracts, hold property, take an oath when magistrates require it, contract marriage; finally, that legitimate civil ordinances are good creatures of God and divine ordinances, which a Christian can use with safety."⁹

In Romans 13 Paul speaks of government as a "higher power." The term used by Paul is *exousia*. This raises the question, What does Paul mean by *exousia*? He uses this word five times in the

first three verses of Romans 13. In the Latin Vulgate, Jerome translated *exousia* with *potestas*. Luther translated it with *Obrigkeit, die Gewalt ueber ihn hat*.

The English translators were evidently influenced by the Latin version and simply translated the word with *power*. In this connection we should not forget that the translation was prepared under the instruction of James I, during whose time the great controversy was raging regarding the personal power of the king and the constitutional power of Parliament. The king claimed absolute divine right in his person, and the theologians of the Established Church generally supported him in his contention as against the Puritans, who stood with Parliament. Hence, tradition and the ideology of environment are powerful factors in the social viewpoint. Wengert states:

Exousia in Greek ideology is primarily a philosophical theological concept and only very remotely contains a juridical connotation. But it never contains the idea of individual power of the person, while *potestas* is definitely a juridical concept in the Roman ideology. Moreover, *exousia* in Greek ideology, both in the popular understanding and in Stoic-Pantheism, carried the idea of the supernatural, the ordering power in nature. For the Greek the idea of nature was synonymous with the idea of the supernatural cosmological force, which was never arbitrary.¹⁰

According to Kittel, *exousia* means *power, sovereign right, authority*. "Vollmacht, die Macht, die zu sagen hat, die unsichtbare Macht Gottes, Machtverhaeltnis." We could translate *exousia* with sovereign power or sovereignty or full power to act with responsibility only to him who conferred that power.

Both Paul and Peter remind us that government is a divine institution. They do not say where or when God instituted government among men, but take it for granted; and more than that, neither the Old nor the New Testament contains any direct statement to the effect that God at any given time established the ordinance of government upon earth.

Government is not an invention of man, it did not grow out of the experience of man, but is in its essence a part of God's creation order. When God made man, He created him a social being. Man is not a solitary independent individual, but an individual

in community; and as He wills that human beings should live together in marriage and in the family, so God also wills that there should be the enlarged community, the State and the nation. In order that man could and would live in community with his fellow men, God implanted in his very nature the law of government. This law implanted in him becomes the social imperative. Hence man has at all times and in all places established government and has subjected himself to government. Even in the lowest forms of human society there is some form of government.

Historically government had its beginning in the family. Adam was father, king, and priest, all in one. The family grew into the clan, the clan into the tribe, and the tribe into the modern nation, and thus government gradually assumed its modern form.

Government by nature grows out of a people, because it is there that God placed it in the creation order; government cannot be superimposed. The *exousia*, or sovereign right and authority, belongs to man in community, just as the Office of the Keys belongs to Christians in community, i. e., in the Church.¹¹

II. FORMS OF GOVERNMENT

God established the ordinance of government among men, but the forms and details of government He left to the judgment and experience of man. "In itself there is no Christian and non-Christian form of State; no form in itself is wholly good or bad."¹² No specific type of government is prescribed by God, but just as people and races differ in language, customs, and other characteristics, so they may also differ in their form of government. What is the most desirable and salutary form of government for one people is not necessarily the same for another. History, geography, traditions, religions, character of the people, economic conditions, are factors which may determine the form of government of a people. Willoughby writes:

Geographic, ethnic, economic, and moral conditions all have their influence in determining the direction in which the development of political forms shall proceed. Distinctions arise as to the number of interests to be regulated by the State, as to the extent to which people generally shall participate, either actively or by way of popular control, in the administration of their public affairs, and

as to the manner in which the powers of the State shall be distributed among the several departments. Thus arise all those varieties of governments ranging from the despotic Oriental State to the Democracy of the Swiss Communities.¹³

This also implies that government in its form is not static but dynamic. Government is a social institution. It must accommodate itself to the changed social conditions and hence must change from time to time. In the Middle Ages feudalism was the accepted form of government and was believed to be, and probably was, the best attainable in human society for that time. But feudalism gave way to nationalism and absolute monarchianism in the 17th and 18th centuries. This was followed by the Revolution of the 18th century and gave way to the republican, or democratic, type of government, and today totalitarianism, State feudalism, and Communism, or some new form of government seems to be emerging from the current political and economic confusion of the world.

III. THE POWER AND FUNCTION OF GOVERNMENT

The State is the organization of a people into a sovereign unity of authority and power. It is all-inclusive. Membership in all other organizations is optional; not so membership in the State. No citizen can resign from the State. The essence of the State is sovereignty and power. Power is the means by which sovereignty is exercised. Or we may say, "The State is the all-powerful ruling organization of the people."¹⁴

This sovereignty, or supreme will, of the State is of necessity a unity; that means, it is indivisible. It may be exercised through a variety of organs, but the will itself is a unit. It can be divided as little as the will of a person can be divided. This implies that sovereignty denotes independence, or complete freedom from external control. If a person is subject to the will of another, he is not free. If a State is dependent upon the consent of another power, its sovereignty does not exist or has been destroyed. "The State requires power for the sake of law, in order to fulfill its task of establishing peace, order, and justice among men who would not be willing or able to be peaceful and just without it. Law unsupported by power is impotent."¹⁵

To fulfill its function among men as intended by God, the State

must have a monopoly of physical force, and for that reason God also gave it power over life and death. The very existence of the State is based on this monopoly of power over life and death. Without it, it does not exist. Without power, says Brunner, the State cannot exercise either its legal or its social functions. Power is given to it by God for the sake of order, community, and law.

But power is not an end, but a means to an end. God conferred power upon government for the purpose of performing certain functions for the good of man. Its primary function is justice, the maintenance of the moral order, peace between individuals composing the State, protection against danger from within or without, in short, the common good.

Among the most important tasks of the State, according to St. Augustine, is securing and maintaining peace. "For peace," he says, "is so great a good that even in this earth and mortal life there is no word we hear with such pleasure, nothing we desire with such zest, or find to be more thoroughly gratifying."¹⁶

When force is used for the attainment of these ends, then the use of force is justified. "He beareth not the sword in vain," Rom. 13:4. Luther writes:

For this reason God has ordained secular [government] which restrains the unchristian and wicked so that they must needs keep the peace outwardly, even against their will. So Paul interprets the secular sword, Romans 13, and says it is not a terror to good works but to evil. And Peter says, "It is for the punishment of evildoers." . . . Because the sword is a very great benefit and necessary to the whole world to preserve peace, to punish sin and to prevent evil, he [the Christian] submits most willingly to the rule of the sword, pays taxes, honors those in authority, serves, helps, and does all he can to further the government, that it may be sustained and held in honor and fear. Although he needs none of these things for himself and it is not necessary for him to do them, yet he considers what is for the good and profit of others, as Paul teaches in Ephesians 5.¹⁷

Power and authority must be the servants of right, freedom, and justice. Sovereignty dare not exercise power arbitrarily. The State is not the creator or measurer of justice, but the guarantor. Justice and certain inalienable rights of man antedate the State and have

an existence apart from the State. The State does not create them. "Without justice there can be no enduring society," says St. Augustine.¹⁸

Besides the primary functions of government mentioned, there are others. These have been called *non-essential functions*. They include in general the economic, industrial, the physical, moral, cultural, and other interests of the people. These activities are assumed, not because they are a *sine qua non* for the existence of the State, but because their public administration may be advantageous to the people. They are such that if left in private hands they would either be performed unsatisfactorily or not at all. But the determination of just what powers shall be assumed by the State is solely one of expediency and is, therefore, a matter of experience and political wisdom. In each case the particular circumstances must determine the best course to be followed. No *a priori* limits can be fixed on governmental activities in the life of a people. But experience has shown that as the industrial society develops and increases in complexity, the social interests will become more numerous and important and conditions demand that the individual interest be more and more subordinated to the general welfare. And this implies that the powers exercised by the State are increased accordingly. The wider the sphere of the activities of the State, the greater will be its power, but the State can grow in power only at the expense of individual freedom; and there lies the danger. At what particular point the proper balance can be preserved is difficult to determine.

But there is also another side to government, of which Brunner reminds us in very forceful language when he says:

But just as power, both material and personal, is based on the Divine Will, so also it is an almost perfect instrument for that egoism which is opposed to God. The superior material power of the State leads to tyrannical misuse of the Holy. Material power makes the State terrible. Religious power makes it horrible. No sphere on earth provides a better playground for the satanic element than the power of the State. It appears in its most dangerous form in the idolatry of the power of the State, that is, when the power of the State is confused with the Absolute, with the Holy itself. We cannot say only that in the State men express their

most savage lust for power, but in the State their will to power receives a wholly different, even a pseudo-religious character. It is, therefore, no accident that in the New Testament the State is described quite as often under the figure of the Dragon (Satan), Rev. 12:3, as by the title of an authority ordained by God."¹⁹

And Luther writes:

You must know that from the beginning of the world a wise prince is a rare bird indeed; still more so a pious prince. They are usually the greatest fools or the worst knaves on earth; therefore one must constantly expect the worst from them and look for little good from them, especially in divine matters, which concerns the salvation of souls. . . . If a prince becomes wise, pious, or a Christian, it is one of the great wonders and one of the most precious tokens of divine grace upon the land. For the usual course is according to the saying in Isaiah 3, "I will give children to be their princes, and babes shall rule over them"; and in Hosea 13, "I will give thee a king in My anger and take him away in My wrath."²⁰

And Augustine:

God did not intend that His rational creature who was made in His image should have dominion over anything but the irrational creation — not man over man, but man over beast. And hence the righteous men in primitive times were made shepherds of cattle rather than kings of men; but through sin came slavery as its just desert, together with the lust of power and the manifold evils of the *Civitas Terrena*.²¹

Again, Brunner says:

Every State represents human sin on the large scale; in history, in the growth of every State, the most brutal, antidivine forces have taken a share to an extent unheard of in the individual life, save in that of some prominent criminals. In the State we human beings see our own sin magnified a thousand times. The State is the product of collective sin. . . . Over every State there broods something of the light of the divine creation and a heavy cloud of antidivine forces.²²

And George Washington said:

Government is not reason, it is not eloquence, it is force! Like fire, it is a dangerous servant and a fearful master!

Christians everywhere would do well to heed these warnings. They, too, may be carried away by the modern idolatry of the State

or be motivated by the naive idea that such things cannot happen in America and thus add to the confusion. Patriotism in our day has become a religion, and for many in America it is the only religion.*

St. Louis, Mo.

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- ¹ Emil Brunner, *The Divine Imperative*, p. 440.
- ² W. Woodbury Willoughby, *An Examination of the Nature of the State, A Study in Political Philosophy*, p. 18 ff. Macmillan.
- ³ *Ibid.*, p. 24
- ⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 32 f.
- ⁵ Hobbes, *Leviathan*, p. 84.
- ⁶ Osgniath, *The Christian State*, pp. 10—11.
- ⁷ Machiavelli, *The Prince*, p. 21.
- ⁸ Augsburg Confession, Art. XVI, *Trigl.*, p. 14.
- ⁹ Apology to Augsburg Confession, Art. XVI, *Trigl.*, p. 100.
- ¹⁰ Eugene Wengert, *The Lutheran Idea of the State*.
- ¹¹ To Luther, the ordinance of government resided in the king or ruler personally. The king is placed in this status as an individual and as such individual he has the authority from God by virtue of his office and is responsible only to God for his conduct. If he exercises the functions of his office unfaithfully, then "vengeance is Mine," saith the Lord; the Christian must patiently accept the situation. He cannot use arms against the person who rules, because this person rules by the will of God. In his theology, Luther broke completely with the Middle Ages and his own environment, but in his political theory he remained a child of his age. Nevertheless Luther did call the princes to account and urged them to perform their God-given duties.
- ¹² Brunner, *op. cit.*, p. 465.
- ¹³ Willoughby, *op. cit.*, pp. 29—30.
- ¹⁴ Willoughby, *op. cit.*, p. 192.
- ¹⁵ Brunner, *Justice and the Social Order*, p. 212.
- ¹⁶ *De Civitate Dei*, XIX, 11.
- ¹⁷ Martin Luther, *Holman ed.*, III, 236, 239—240.
- ¹⁸ F. W. Laetscher, *Church History*, Vol. IV, 28. St. Augustine, "Conception of the State."
- ¹⁹ Brunner, *Divine Imperative*, pp. 407—408.
- ²⁰ Luther, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 258.
- ²¹ Laetscher, *op. cit.*, pp. 29—30.
- ²² Brunner, *op. cit.*, pp. 445—446.

* An early issue will bring the second installment of this essay. — ED. COM.