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## The Study of City Governance and Public Policy Making: A Critical Appraisal

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## DEVELOPMENTS in RESEARCH

H. GEORGE FREDERICKSON, *Editor*

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# The Study of City Governance And Public Policy Making: A Critical Appraisal

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Municipalities have traditionally been assigned a large role in our federal system by politicians, administrators, and citizens alike. Today, however, the very worth of cities as appropriate governmental structures is severely challenged. Banfield, in *The Unheavenly City*, argues that urban citizens are better off than they realize and that “do-gooder” efforts, including most current urban-oriented programs, often only serve to make matters worse; public policy (at all governmental levels) has minimal impact (10). Written essentially in the tradition of metropolitan reform advocates, the Committee for Economic Development report, *Reshaping Government in Metropolitan Areas*, advances a solution to metropolitan problems in which existing municipal governments would play little or no role (20). To similar effect, some advocates of community control have implicitly relegated cities to a role of nonimportance by suggesting structural changes which either largely ignore city government or attempt to wrest away its powers (49).

Yet, when contrasted with the range of formal powers exercised by cities and their apparent potential for affecting citizens’ lives, any proposal deprecating the role of cities needs to be carefully

scrutinized. Unfortunately, existing studies of city politics and administration are ill-equipped to describe the role cities presently play in their citizens’ lives or to provide the basis for an improved redefinition of the role of cities.

Why is this so? All too often cities have been studied as isolated, service-providing governmental units. This orientation emphasizes internal processes of administration and political decision making, leading to proposals intended to further apolitical, efficient service provision. Such a definition of the role of city governance is dominant in the field of public administration.

This view of cities is, however, over restrictive and lends credence to arguments that cities are vestigial or impotent organs of government. It ignores two areas of inquiry crucial to the public policy choices of today and the future. Both the impacts of municipal government upon citizens and the external interdependencies of cities are little illuminated in the traditional model.

In this essay we critically review existing studies of municipalities (based upon the traditional model) and suggest new research directions which are necessary if study of urban governance is to contribute to public policy making. As examples of our concerns, attention must be redirected from concern with the character of local government personnel and processes (Is the city dominated by a monolithic power elite? Is there a city manager? Have they a computerized data system? Do they use a program planning budget system?) to the

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results of governmental activity for citizens (Did it increase or reduce anxiety? Did it provide opportunities for economic advancement? Were problems of drug users alleviated? Was the living environment of the community improved?). Even applications of "systems" approaches to the study of local jurisdictions do not extend analysis to include adequate conceptualization of the impacts of public policies upon citizens. Systems approaches suggest critical factors affecting policy choices, but, turning casual connections around, they have not been used for systematic examination of the impact of policy upon the attitudes and behavior of citizens of municipalities (2) (28).

### I. Six Current Models of Municipal Governance

The systems approach is, however, a valuable departing point for organizing the more limited approaches to the study of municipalities that are under review. In section I of this review we examine six different models of urban governance, distinguishable as falling within three categories on the basis of whether they emphasize input factors, intervening political structure and conversion processes, or policy outputs. Input-oriented approaches focus either upon cleavages or culture. Intermediate structural approaches emphasize either repetitive patterns of behavior (the informal power distribution) or the formal delegation of offices and authority (institutions). Finally, output approaches emphasize either tangible, resource allocation manifestations of public policy (expenditure patterns) or more intangible, symbolic governmental actions. While a considerable body of recent research has looked at relationships among these key dimensions, we are still largely unable to relate these "theory fragments" to suggestions for public policies for metropolitan America.

Our review of these six models is a prelude to section II, which explicitly raises the problem of how to study municipal politics in a way more relevant to public policy making. Taking as a starting point conventional analyses of budgetary allocations, we argue that to handle impact-oriented questions researchers need to look first at micro-outputs, or policy as it is manifested in the stable and repetitive behavioral patterns of governmental actors, and secondly, at the impacts of governmental policies on citizens. One other area of analysis is also discussed in the concluding section as requiring more emphasis in studies — relationships of cities with their external environments.

Most research on cities has concentrated upon

specific questions, attempting to illuminate the substance of concepts like culture, power, or policy, and formulating hypotheses about how these limited dimensions of urban governance are related. This research initially culminates in six different ways of describing systems of municipal governance, based upon three distinguishable conceptual "entry points": inputs, intervening structure and process, and policy outputs. Yet, the ultimate consequence of these studies is something more than description. Implicitly, through selection of certain questions as important, and of certain phenomena as relevant, relatively coherent "models" of municipal governance are revealed: images of political man, of the nature of the political system, of the "good polity," and of the locus of change mechanisms are developed. Although dangers of distortion and over simplification are present, extracting these basic commonalities can illuminate why researchers using one of these models as an approach have chosen particular questions as important and selected particular phenomena for analysis.

At times, of course, researchers employ more than one of the basic models identified in a particular analysis; for example, Dahl uses both the cleavages and the power models in his classic, *Who Governs?* (23). Moreover, distinction between models on the theoretical level is at times murky, as for example, when it is noted that the power model ordinarily assumes cleavages within cities. However, the models are still distinguishable, at least for analytical purposes; in the case of the power model, for example, economic cleavages are often seen as *the* bases of conflict in a city, while the cleavages model is less restrictive in this regard.

#### I. INPUT-ORIENTED MODELS

1. In the *cleavages* model, the social and economic characteristics of the city are the major independent, explanatory variables, while the level of intracommunity conflict and the nature of political processes and of outputs are considered the main dependent variables.
2. As a basic organizing concept for the analysis of municipal politics, *culture* consists of deep, settled citizen values and beliefs regarding the proper scope of governmental activity and appropriate governmental processes and styles. Conventionally, cultural differences between (rather than within) communities are used to account for differences in governmental structure, administrative styles, and the functional emphases of policies pursued.

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## II. INTERMEDIATE STRUCTURE-ORIENTED MODELS

3. In the *institutional* model, description of legal structure (offices and authority) is the primary task. In the reform literature, the purpose for looking at formal structure is to discover the best set of legal institutions of government. More recently, formal structure has been used variously as a dependent variable (accounted for by cultural differences), as an independent variable (explaining policy choices), and as an intervening variable between the city's resource base and policy outputs.
4. The *power* model focuses on determining who has the influence to determine and/or prevent local policy choices, questions concerning the background and homogeneity of decision makers, the access to and permeability of power structures, and the persistence of key groups in remaining in control.

## III. POLICY OUTPUT-ORIENTED MODELS

5. In the *resource* model policy outputs are expressed by performance (per capita) and functional emphasis (proportion of the total budget) expenditure measures. These types of outputs are "explained" by variations in a city's resource and demographic base (economic and socioeconomic status variables).
6. The *symbolic* model examines the causes and nature of intangible allocations of values (e.g., fluoridation, or general style). Employing theatrical metaphors, the approach emphasizes the dramaturgical roles of decision makers and the manipulation of value-laden political symbols and rituals. There is a distinction between two levels (and arenas) of politics: the mass public is seen as attentive to the dramaturgy, symbols and rituals of politics, while political elites are seen as attentive to the tangible benefits of alternative public policies.

Before turning to consideration of studies using each of these six basic models of urban governance, a summary graphic presentation contrasting their characteristics on five dimensions is offered in Table 1. Despite the inevitable risk of over simplification inherent in such a presentation, Table 1 captures contrasts among the six models in a manner difficult to equal with sequential exploration of the models. The five dimensions on which the models are compared are:

*Image of political man* – the stimuli and mechanisms which lead to an individual's political behavior.

*Image of political system* – definition of the manner in which the political system operates.

*Image of the "good polity"* – conception of the most desirable political system.

*Concepts of change and points of leverage* – how the political systems of cities change and the points of manipulation which effect change.

*Type of model* – characteristics of the models employed, defined as: normative (prescriptive or advocative of a particular political system); descriptive (*post hoc* explanations of relationships among dimensions of political systems); predictive (anticipatory hypotheses relating changes among dimensions of political systems).

For the purposes of this review, the impacts of public policies upon citizens is the most crucial dimension in the study of local politics. However, in these six models, the impact of governmental actions upon citizens is seen neither as a dimension on which political systems vary nor as a critical dependent variable needing to be explained. Understanding of government-citizen linkages remains tacit. Nevertheless, the studies that have used these six models do contribute substantially to our understanding of other aspects of city governance.

### Political Inputs: The Cleavage Model

The idea that politics revolves around factionalism and divergent interests is well matured. Madison, for example, was greatly concerned with the role of "factions" in his Federalist Paper (10). More recently, national electoral processes have been characterized largely in terms of partisan cleavages (16), and a sophisticated simulation model of national elections has been based on cleavages in the American electorate (60). In studies of city politics, the concept of cleavages has played a considerable role, finding expression in the work of Banfield and Wilson (8), Sayre and Kaufman (64), Lowi (52), and Dahl (23), among others.

Basic to the cleavages model is the conception of the political system as a more or less competitive arena in which groups compete for political advantage and in which individuals take cues for political behavior from the reference groups with which they identify. The bases for

TABLE 1  
CHARACTERISTICS OF MODELS USED IN THE STUDY OF URBAN GOVERNANCE

Model	Image of Political Man	Image of Political System	Image of "Good Polity"	Concepts of Change and Points of Leverage	Type of Model
Institutional	Uniform, mechanistically responding to legal/structural stimuli	Exactly reflected in legal structures	The "best laws and legally defined institutions"	Change laws and legally defined institutions; change is intentional	Descriptive; for reformers, normative
Power	Responds to force stimuli; assumption of differing interests and of action which is intentional	Conflictual, with power interrelationships as basic structure	Elitists: equalitarian Pluralists: equality of access	Elitists: economic power Pluralists: group organization	Descriptive-normative
Cleavages	Individuals enmeshed in a referent group, responding to its cues in political behavior	Competitive group politics	Marketplace image, no restrictions on organization or access, but controlled (e.g., cross-pressures)	Group organization and tactics	Descriptive-predictive
Culture	Evaluative standards of politically appropriate behavior and structures serve as cues to political behavior	System whose activities are bounded by the "culturally acceptable"; may be conflictual or consensual	Widely shared political culture, both among citizens and between citizens and elites	Changes in culture, most frequently through socialization and opinion	Descriptive
Resource	Mechanistically translating socioeconomic characteristics into political demands	Transforms demands into expenditures seen as proxies for services	System which most sensitively transforms community socioeconomic characteristics into political outputs	Unspecified, except as community characteristics change	Predictive
Symbolic	Bifurcated: masses reactive to political symbols and seeking reassurance; elites seeking tangible goods	Competitive, manipulative: elites manipulate masses through symbols while seeking tangible rewards	Ill-defined: ambivalence between system stability facilitated by bifurcated political man and desire for less dependence on symbols	Little real change possible; seeming change as symbols shift and issues change	Descriptive



cleavages, that is, the dimensions along which groups separate, include economic class (8), organized group interests (64), socio-ethnic factors (23), and ideology (19). Other bases of stratification often cut across income and occupational strata (11)(25)(72). In small cities even formal political groups were frequently ideologically based and only very rarely reflective of economic class (48).

Users of the cleavages model employ the degree of homogeneity or heterogeneity of a city as an independent variable, equating greater heterogeneity with more cleavages. The general hypotheses offered relate greater heterogeneity with greater political conflict, decision makers who are brokers for various interests, and a political process characterized by log-rolling and compromise on economic issues. In regard to the outputs of the political system, the cleavages model suggests that attempts will be made to direct the activities of government to identifiable groups, thus reinforcing identification with groups which are the bases of cleavages.

Given the potential for divisiveness seen by adherents of the cleavages model, what binds a heterogeneous community together? In the past, most researchers employing the cleavages approach have relied upon the concept of cross-pressures, in which conflict is internalized within individuals because of their membership in conflicting groups, i.e., groups with different interests (31)(45)(60). However, recent evidence casts doubt on this position (59).

Indeed, it seems that group memberships of decision makers appear to be congruent, with interests of the groups in which they hold membership coinciding (73). If this pattern is general, observation of less divisive conflict than expected may best be explained not by cross-pressures, but by the differential potentials for organization of various economic, religious, racial, and ethnic strata. That is, politics may be quiescent because interests with a potential for causing group conflict, such as the poor, minority groups, or consumers, have not organized to press their claims. In such cases, conflict might very well increase as these groups organize and make political demands.

In the cleavages model, two conceptions of the public interest may also serve to integrate the community and reduce or control conflict. In the heterogeneous community, as Williams and Adrian (75) point out, there may be a pluralistic, procedural concept of the public interest, i.e., a public

interest served when all groups' interest are given consideration in a decision-making process characterized by compromise. In contrast, in homogeneous communities, politics may be quiescent when citizens share interests and agree upon some unitary, substantive concept of the public interest. The cleavages approach to the study of local politics seems most appropriate in cases where group interests are well organized (6)(64).

From our perspective, two major criticisms of the cleavages model can be made. The dynamics by which "potential groups" become active claimants in the political arena are little illuminated (71). Furthermore, the relationship between cleavages and governmental structure, public policies, or impacts on citizens is left largely unclear – for example, are cities of similar cleavages alike in these three aspects?

#### Political Inputs: The Culture Model

The notion of political culture or "ethos" expresses a set of shared public value commitments toward such questions as the scope of the local public sector (7), appropriate governmental structures (79), and policy "styles" and outputs (76)(77). Because culture seems to be operative on all elements of the local political system – voting behavior, structure, style, policy orientations and outputs – its meaning as a concept is fuzzy. There is general agreement on the notion that it signifies *shared values*, but the following problems remain: (a) whose values are being talked about; (b) values concerning what; and (c) where do these values find expression?

When speaking of a city's political culture, analysts are often really addressing putative or presumptive culture, i.e., the common values of elite decision makers (5)(23)(75)(80). A preferable strategy is to speak of the extent of consensus on key values rather than presume that it exists (1)(53).

More fundamental conceptual problems are found in the questions of what values researchers are talking about and how they find expression. As a total body, this research appears to relate *all* variations in local systems to underlying cultural differences. Culture becomes ubiquitous, "explaining" citizens' residential (80) and voting choices (8); their usage of local political institutions such as courts (42); the scope of the local public sector (1); a city's formal governmental structure (79); general policy orientations (75); and specific policy styles and outcomes in such diverse areas as

education (22), fluoridation (63), welfare assistance (26), and the police (77). This raises two heretofore unexplored areas. First, how can idiosyncratic or situational factors, such as leadership, that expand the boundaries of the politically feasible, be included in the analysis? For example, would urban renewal have been possible in New Haven without Mayor Lee? In short, system dynamics and change are difficult to account for in a cultural model. Secondly, what about the antecedent question of what causes cultural differences between communities? To explain all (or nearly all) intercommunity variations on the basis of cultural differences is not greatly illuminating. As Stinchcombe (70) notes, this begs the question of the causes of the phenomenon (culture) being used to explain the phenomena which we seek to understand.

Thus, although the culture model appears to have a broad range of explanatory power — explaining differences in all facets of a community's political system — researchers need to be aware of the problems of defining whose culture is being talked about, what these cultural values are, how the dynamics of change are dealt with, and how cultural differences themselves are explained.

#### **Political Structure: The Institutional Model**

As in all fields of political analysis, one approach to the study of urban politics is within the legal-historical analytic framework, here designated as the institutional approach. The objective of this research is basically enumeration and description of the formal governmental structures in urban areas. Those formal institutions provide the boundaries of this approach, and the emphasis is upon description of the division of legal responsibilities among these structures.

Distinct from the traditional institutional approach are the variety of policy analyses employing formal structural variables as intervening variables between input and output factors in order to examine their independent impact upon policy outputs. These studies of formal political structure, e.g., codified in the city charter and specifying types of positions, elections, and lines of authority, commonly posit two types of governmental structure, "reformed" and "unreformed." Reformed structures usually refer to the presence of nonpartisan elections, city managers, and at-large elections for city councilmen, whereas unreformed refers to partisan politics, a strong (or weak) mayor system and councilmanic ward elec-

tions (50). The research question is, can differences in policies between communities be attributed to formal structural differences? The results are mixed: some researchers find an impact while others do not (29)(50). One interpretation is that formal structure in itself makes little difference, since structural differences, historically, are associated with certain sets of demographic characteristics (50)(79). Thus, for example, unreformed systems are associated with larger, more heterogeneous communities, so formal structure may be a "lagged" dependent variable, changes in which follow by some years changes in more basic characteristics of political systems.

#### **Political Structure: The Power Model**

Another famous approach to the study of urban politics in the past two decades focuses upon political power as the phenomenon to be described and explained. Following Hunter's (41) pioneering work, and the development of the principal alternative thesis by Dahl (23), scores of analysts have employed this approach (see, among others: (5)(24)(36)(46)(61)(74)).

Studies of the informal power structure — who, if anybody, "runs things" — deal largely with describing the configuration of the power structure rather than directly assessing its impact upon policy (23)(41). Most researchers using this approach operationalize power in one of two ways — reputation for power, or actual participation in decision making. This work suggests a business-dominated structure is found when the "reputational" approach is used, and elected public officials are most influential when the decision-making method is employed.

The debate between the "elitists" (who find businessmen in control) and the "pluralists" (who find politicians dominant) is often misleading, since each protagonist still finds a small group of influential individuals in control (61). The more basic question is, does it make any difference for the public or for public policy whether businessmen or politicians are the most influential group in the community? Norman Luttbeg (53) compared the attitudes of local businessmen, politicians, and the general public on questions of local policy in two Oregon communities. Surprisingly (at least for the elitists), he found businessmen typical of the community in their attitudes; furthermore, on many issues, politicians were more atypical of the public than were businessmen. Luttbeg's method of analysis — comparing attitudes of elites and

nonelites – is quite useful for gaining information about the political homogeneity of the community. However, rather than taking public issues as given, it may be more interesting to find what each group perceives as problems and ascertain which problems are believed susceptible to governmental solution and which are not.

#### Policy Outputs: The Resource Model

Much of the recent comparative research on cities treats a certain type of policy decision – budgetary allocations – as the dependent variable. The question is what accounts for inter-community variations in expenditures. The tenor of much (but not all) of this work is that resource base (the community's economic characteristics) accounts for a large share of these variations (29)(67). Political structure and process have little independent explanatory power; they act as "neutral transmission belts" converting resource capabilities into budgetary allocations. Somewhat strangely, analysts attacking the position that political factors have little impact on expenditure patterns largely play by the set of rules laid down in the early work by economists. That is, they similarly assume that a community's demographic profile somehow captures its political demand patterns. This is tenuous, since cleavages develop over noneconomic issues dealing with the regulation of behavior and cannot be inferred from standard demographic figures, and even on economic issues, cleavages form within economic strata as well as between. More centrally, what can we infer about political behavior on the basis of aggregate distributions?

The history of the argument that political factors make little difference can be traced back to early comparative work by economists (15)(35) featuring correlational analysis of aggregate demographic and expenditure data. The main finding was that selected demographic variables, particularly the troika of per capita income, urbanization, and population density, "accounted for" approximately 70 per cent of the expenditure variation between cities. The implication, made more graphic in later analyses, was that political variables exerted little independent impact upon expenditures. Also using an aggregate comparative approach, several other researchers sought to operationalize political variables to determine their effect upon expenditures. For example, Dye (29) defines the political process solely in terms of formal structural characteristics, i.e., "reformed"

versus "unreformed" government. He concludes these political structure variables have little impact on expenditures if suitable demographic controls are used. And since he assumes these types of variables adequately represent the more general political process, he argues that politics itself has little impact on policy outputs.

Other social scientists generally concede the first part of Dye's argument, namely, that formal structure has little impact; yet they counter by saying these sorts of factors do not adequately represent the entire political process. The political variables they choose to highlight are: (a) power structure (17)(40), (b) interest group demands (18)(34), and (c) the policy orientations of decision makers (27)(34). Except for Downes (27), these researchers found an independent and significant effect of their operational definitions of political structure on expenditure measures of governmental policy. Only Hawley (40) goes beyond expenditure data as measures of policy. Even though the tenor of their findings is similar – there is a relationship between politics and policy – these authors disagree as to the nature of the relationships. For example, Clark (18), who employed an "elite reputational" measure of power structure, argues that "decentralization" (many nominated influentials active in each policy scope with little overlap) is associated with higher per capita expenditures for urban renewal. On the other hand, Hawley (40), who also studied urban renewal, differs from Clark. Using an aggregate index of power structure (defined as the ratio of managers, proprietors, and officials to the total labor force; the lower the ratio the more centralized the power structure), Hawley found urban renewal "success" (a city reaching the execution stage) to be associated with a centralized structure.

What has not yet come under scrutiny is the assumption that demographic characteristics express citizen demand (behavior) patterns and the equation of local public policy with budgetary allocations. More precisely, the reasoning that correlates demographic profiles with subsequent policies glosses over not one but two critical relationships. First, it assumes that community aggregate characteristics are predictably translated into political demands. Second, these demands are translated into policy. Both assumptions are highly problematic, and amenable to empirical investigation instead of presumption. Furthermore, the notion that budgetary allocations somehow capture the gamut of community policy is quite



open to question; there is a real problem in determining the meaning of expenditure figures. In discussing policy outputs and their impacts on citizens, we address these problems.

### Policy Outputs: The Symbols Model

While the resource approach conceives of outputs in terms of budgetary allocations, it is important to note that this is only one type of value allocation and one point in the process of allocating tangible goods and benefits. In reality, both tangible and intangible allocations occur in the same arena. The most extensive consideration of the symbolic aspects of politics has been furnished by Murray Edelman (32). Looking largely at policy with tangible implications (e.g., welfare), Edelman suggests that goods and benefits are conferred upon a small attentive elite, while the output for the mass public is largely expressive, creating either psychic reassurance or anxiety. In order to accommodate a variety of studies dealing with intangible policies, Edelman's notion of symbolic policies can be extended to include allocations of values in policy scopes which are totally intangible. The best example is fluoridation decisions. The impact of such policies is real (though non-monetary), as they influence important value commitments of the community, creating reassurance or anxiety.

A growing body of work deals with symbolic or expressive allocations, primarily in the fields of school desegregation, planning, fluoridation, and the police. Some analysts examine administrative decisions, suggesting that variations between communities cannot be explained solely on the basis of budgetary allocations (77). Critical variables in fluoridation cases seem to be the belief systems of decision makers and the nature of the recruitment and socialization processes (22). Symbolic policy is expressed as behavior ill-measured by expenditures. As the following section suggests, there is a critical need for more work on symbolic outputs of politics, especially if we are concerned with addressing the question of policy impact on citizen attitudes and behavior.

## II. New Directions in the Study of Local Political Systems: "Micro" Outputs, Their Impact on the Influences of the External Environments

We believe that the conventional approaches to the study of local politics and administration offer few clues for the study of policy impacts. In this

section we sketch the outlines of such a research orientation. It consists primarily of the following two aspects: (a) a more behavioral way of looking at local governmental actions; and (b) a consideration of both the objective and subjective dimensions of policy impact. Third, further research ought to be done on the critical role (among others) of the city's external environment, i.e., the regional economy and other political jurisdictions.

### Micro-Outputs

As the first aspect of an impact orientation, research on policy outputs must be extended to include what may be termed "micro-outputs," defined as the actual services rendered to citizens and the manner (norms) of service providers. Thus, it is necessary not only to know that a particular percentage of a city budget goes to parks and recreation activities, but also to know what services are rendered (defined as the incidence of different types of services received by various groups of the city's citizens), and the behavioral norms of the service-rendering personnel (are they, for example, disdainful of the elderly, or surly to minorities?). While data are immensely more difficult to obtain than budgetary allocations, what we are calling micro-outputs, as relatively stable patterns of behavior, are identifiable and subject to empirical analysis.

Expansion of our rationale for emphasis on the need to research micro-outputs clarifies both the necessity of such research and what it entails. To begin, the present state of debate over usage of expenditure figures as output measures is detailed. At the grossest level, budgetary allocations do represent some sort of authoritative allocation of values, but there is real ambiguity to the meaning which can be assigned the concept at this level. One researcher has noted the accountant's "ledger-demean" exercised in municipal finance, arguing that while budgets express allocations between programs and functional areas, suballocations within a given area are often artfully concealed (21). What this means for resulting service levels is by no means apparent (67).

There is, indeed, a growing movement questioning the usefulness of budget categories as output measures. But the most commonly suggested remedy is not a more concrete and behavioral perspective but rather higher levels of abstraction, such that nominal categories (e.g., police or fire) are lumped together on the basis of their regula-

tive, distributive, redistributive, areal, or segmental characteristics (37)(51)(65). But what of local policy conceived and executed *within* functional areas such as by police departments, welfare agencies, and school boards? A start has been made at examining the micro-outputs of departments and agencies, suggested by the work of Wilson on police handling of juvenile delinquents (77), Gardiner's study of traffic law enforcement (39), Derthick's analysis of welfare programs (26), Rabinovitz' study of planning (62), and Crain and Vanecko's examination of school board desegregation decisions (22). While policies such as these are subject to general budgetary constraints, not much concerning them can be gleaned from budgets per se. In short, there are a series of decisional processes operating concurrent with and subsequent to the budgetary process, but not illuminated by the end result of the yearly fiscal review. Two examples further demonstrate the complexities in the actual formation of micro-outputs.

Consider first a police department's decision to adopt a "stop and frisk" posture in high crime-rate areas. This policy may have real and immediate consequences for residents affected, but, like the tip of an iceberg, little of this policy is visible in the municipal budget. And the notion of local policy outputs extends even below the departmental policy level. To continue the example of public safety, justice (and injustice) is daily meted out in the streets. Routine police patrol behavior is a local government output, irrespective of its sources. Conceding the enormous amount of individual officer discretion (and the difficulties of hierarchical control), many observers have noted the structured attitudinal set or "working personality" of the officer on the beat, expressed in his demeanor and interpersonal tactics (69)(54)(58). As another example, take the behavior of welfare officials and case workers. As Derthick (26) suggests, their application of state rules and regulations, having immediate and real consequences for potential recipients, is oftentimes governed by nonbudgetary considerations, including the value systems of the officials themselves. These policy outputs, with impacts at the micro level, are not measured by macro, aggregate expenditure variables.

In short, the notion of local political outputs includes a broad range of decisions and structured behavior not found or implied in municipal budgets. If analysts are concerned with examining the impact of policy, they must progress beyond non-

inal expenditure categories, for what happens at the aggregate, macro level is not the same thing (nor even the major cause) of what occurs at the micro level, and while part of this behavioral output is situational and unpredictable, much of it is not. These micro-outputs may vary both within and between cities in ways unrevealed in budgetary variations. We turn now to the impact of policy.

#### Impacts of Urban Governance on Citizens

Second, and closely related to research on micro-outputs, is the need to study directly the impact of local governmental activities on citizens. Included here is not only the actual incidence of services received and the manner in which they are received (micro-outputs), but, most importantly, citizens' perceptions and evaluations of governmental action and nonaction. Crucial to this area of inquiry is taking citizens' perspectives on city politics; we are urging, then, that local governance be looked at "from the bottom upwards," from the citizens' points of view. Here the six models of urban politics and administration previously discussed offer precious little theoretical insight. One theme is made clear by these models, however: citizens' demands on local political systems and their perceptions and evaluation of them will differ — only the institutional model does not explicitly recognize this possibility. Moreover, the few existing empirical analyses of citizens' demand for local governmental services reveal such differences. It is clear that usage rates, felt needs, and demand for different services vary by income, education, family status (children or not), residential status (homeowner or renter), sex, and political affiliation (12)(13)(44).

Beyond the demand for services, however, further consideration needs to be given to the impact of government on the psychological states of citizens. In his book, Banfield stated this concern as follows:

If some real disaster impends in the city it is not because parking spaces are hard to find, because architecture is bad, because department store sales are declining, or even because taxes are rising. If there is a genuine crisis, it has to do with the essential welfare of individuals . . . not merely with comfort, convenience, amenity and business advantage, important as these are . . . whatever may cause people to die before their time, to suffer serious impairment of their health or of their powers, to waste their lives, to be deeply unhappy or happy in a way that is less than human affects their *essential welfare* (10, p. 10).

In regard to citizens' perceptions and evaluations of city governance, none of the six models conventionally used in analyses are very helpful. However, various "case study" examples of the impacts of local governmental actions on citizens' psychological states have been documented (4)(38)(43)(56)(57)(66), all of which relate micro-outputs to citizens' attitudes and behavior. As we argued elsewhere in an analysis of the impacts of metropolitan reform efforts, if this orientation is to be included in the analysis of the impacts of local politics on citizens, psychological data on citizens have at least as much relevance to a analyses as do the more traditional sociological and economic data:

... it is quite clear that governmental institutions and actions have historically affected citizens' psychological states, and it is therefore important to at least try to evaluate institutional changes and policies in terms of their effect on affect (33, p. 30).

#### External Relationships

A third area in which further analysis is needed is in exploring the relationships among cities in metropolitan areas with their typical pattern of

multitudinous governmental jurisdictions and between cities and state and federal agencies and programs. The need for expanding the domain of analysis beyond the jurisdictional city limits in both of these regards is obvious (55): the interdependencies of cities in metropolitan areas make mockery of any view of these cities as totally isolated units, and the increasing impact of states and the federal government on cities is well-known, running the gamut from statutory control over the manner in which cities provide services through intergovernmental fiscal transfers. In the face of these interrelationships, however, studies of municipal politics and administration have almost universally sought to isolate the cities as independent objects of inquiry and have often sought geographically isolated cities as objects for study, deficiencies which must be remedied.

The research we suggest is needed to determine to what extent and how public policies can affect urban America and to assess the worth of local institutions; the absence of such research greatly contributes both to the position that nothing can be done (10) and that cities are vestigial institutions of government (20).

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