*Author:*
**Rivera Ugarte, Victoria S**

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*understanding institutions from a decolonial perspective. Qualitative research using a new institutional and decolonial approach.*

# Participation in Indigenous Development Areas in Chile: understanding institutions from a decolonial perspective.

Qualitative research using a new institutional and decolonial approach.

Victoria Rivera Ugarte

**Supervisors:**

Dr. David Sweeting

Dr. Noemi Lendvai-Bainton

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
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# Author's declaration

I declare that the work in this dissertation was carried out in accordance with the requirements of the University's *Regulations and Code of Practice for Research Degree Programmes* and that it has not been submitted for any other academic award. Except where indicated by specific reference in the text, the work is the candidate's own work. Work done in collaboration with, or with the assistance of, others, is indicated as such. Any views expressed in the dissertation are those of the author.

SIGNED: ....████████████.................... DATE:..6th January 2022.......................

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# Abstract

This research aims to understand the formal and informal institutions that exist in the implementation of Indigenous Development Areas (ADIs) in Chile and to consider to what extent these practices reconfigure the distribution of power away from the state and towards indigenous communities. ADIs aim to coordinate public policies and programmes in specific territories with high concentrations of indigenous people. A central element of the policy is development through a participatory process, which respects indigenous communities' perspectives.

The analysis was framed by two theoretical approaches: new institutionalism, drawing on sociological, historical and critical institutionalism; and a decolonial perspective expressed on the colonial matrix of power, in particular, knowledge, power, and being. The study analyses the interaction between the institutional bricolage and participatory practices in the context of ADI policy. Empirically, the work comprises two case studies from the North and South of Chile, to represent diverse indigenous populations. This research used a qualitative approach, with fifty-nine interviews and four focus groups conducted with policy managers from ADI and from other agencies, and with indigenous peoples.

Analysis indicates that the institutional arrangements are strongly defined by the central level of government, limiting the power of local actors to reshape ADI policy. Formal arrangements of ADI tend to be weak in achieving transformative participatory spaces that allow indigenous communities to represent and resolve their demands. The reproduction of traditional indigenous institutions lies mainly in informal arrangements. Although weak, formal institutional arrangements demonstrate durability, maintaining the hierarchies that concentrate the power of decision-making in central government, leaving indigenous communities on the margins of decision-making spaces. Institutional arrangements operate to reproduce the colonial relationships between indigenous communities and the state and do not distribute power between the actors involved.

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# List of abbreviation and acronyms

**ADI**: Indigenous development Area

**CEPI**: Special Commission on Indigenous Peoples

**CONADI**: National Indigenous Development Corporation

**GDP:** Gross domestic product

**INE**: National Statistics Institute

**OECD**: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

**PNUD**: United Nations Development Programme

# Chapter 1. Introduction

## 1.1 Introduction

The proposal of this research is twofold. Firstly, it is to understand, from a qualitative perspective, how the institutional processes, conceptualised as institutional bricolage, affect the participatory practices that take place in the implementation of the policy Indigenous Development Areas (ADI) in Chile. Secondly, the thesis aims to analyse to what extent these institutions reconfigure the distribution of power among the actors involved, specifically, policy managers and indigenous communities. From these aims, the research questions that raised were: what are the institutional arrangements – formal and informal – in participatory processes and practices in ADI policy? How does institutional bricolage affect participatory processes and practices in ADI policy?, and, given the decolonial context, to what extent does ADI policy promote equality of relationships between indigenous peoples and other actors?

This thesis is an academic journey throughout the ADI policy, not only as a conceptual abstraction, but as a material space were policy managers, citizens and territory coexist with power, history, and rules. The first section of this chapter will provide the basis to understand the general situation of indigenous peoples in Chile, historical aspects, and demographic characterisation. Secondly, it is presented the formal framework that directly addresses the indigenous peoples in the country, which includes the ADI policy, as well other international conventions, laws and decrees. In the third part of the chapter is presented a critical discussion about the formal framework for indigenous peoples' participation in the Chilean context. The fourth and fifth sections present the main description of the cases of study where this thesis focuses: ADI Alto Andino Arica y Parinacota and ADI Puel Nahuelbuta[1]. Finally, the sixth section examine the literature review, the research problem, and contributions of this thesis.

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[1] To simplify the enunciation of the cases, along the rest of the thesis, ADI Alto Andino Arica y Parinacota will be referred as "ADI North", while ADI Puel Nahuelbuta will be named ADI South. There are other territories in the north south of the country that are covered by the ADI policy. However, they were not part of this research.

**1.2 Understanding the indigenous people situation in Chile**

### 1.2.1   General situation of Chile

Chile is a country located in South America, between the Andean Mountains and the Pacific Ocean. It is bordered to the north by Peru and Bolivia, to the east by Argentina, to the south by Antarctic continent and to the west by the Pacific Ocean. According to the National census of 2017, the total population is 17.574.003 people (National Statistics Institute 2022). The capital city is Santiago, which although represents 2.0% of the total country's surface area, it concentrates 40.1%. of the total national population (National Statistics Institute 2022).

Administratively, the country is divided into sixteen regions, which in turn, are divided in provinces (Chilean State 1980, Art 110-111). Until 2021, the maximum political authority of regions was the *Intendente* and in the case of provinces, it was the *Governador*, both appointed directly by the President of the Republic[2]. Finally, provinces are divided into *comunas* or communes, which are headed by an *alcalde* or mayor (Chilean State 1980, Art. 118) elected by popular vote. In total, currently there are 56 provinces and 346 *comunas* along the country.

With a GDP per capita of US$24,648 Chile is considered a high-income economy country (World Bank 2021). The economical grow that characterised the country along the last decades allowed to reduce the poverty levels, from 34,7% in 1990 to 7,4% in 2017 (Ministerio de Desarrollo Social 20017). At the same time, Chile is one of the more inequal countries of the OCDE – organisation of which Chile is a member from 2010 – with a Gini index of 4.7, surpassed in inequalities only by Costa Rica (OECD 2021).

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[2] In this matter, in 2018 two important modifications were made to Law 21.073, which regulates the election of regional governors. On the one hand, it is determined that the election of regional governors will be democratic and by means of voting, eliminating their direct assignment by the President of the Republic. On the other hand, the figure of the Intendants is eliminated. In its replacement, the position of regional presidential delegate is created, which, like the former figure of the intendant, will be the representative of the President of the Republic in the Region. These changes began to take effect from the elections of 2021.

## 1.2.2 Indigenous peoples[3] in the current Chilean territory

The oldest traces of human life in Chilean territory date back 14,800 years ago and they were found in the South of the country, specifically in Monte Verde (UNESCO 2004). Before the arrival of the Spanish conquerors, it is estimated that there were around 1 million indigenous peoples living throughout the current Chilean territory, number that fell sharply in around 80% during the 16th century (INE 2009). This reduction of indigenous population was caused by epidemics brought by the conquerors (INE 2009; Guillermo Acuña 2014), the dismantling of traditional ways of life and the brutal exploitation of native labour through the *encomienda* system (Salazar 2000). *Encomienda* was a system of slavery, which consisted of groups of the native population that the Crown gave as a reward to the conquistadors for military and financial services provided during the conquest. In return, the conquistadors were obliged to protect and evangelise the Indians, who were considered to be relatively incapable, such as children (Araya Espinoza 1999; Salazar 2000; INE 2009; Memoria Chilena 2021).

In Chile, the current legislation, in particular the Law 19.253, recognises the existence of nine different groups of indigenous peoples: Mapuche, Aymara, Rapa Nui, Lican Antai, Quechua, Colla, Diaguita, Kawésqar, Yagán and Yamana. It should be noted that the official definition of the category of 'indigenous' is an open debate. In particular, the UN does not have an official term that encapsulate this concept, adopting instead a flexible understanding that includes "self- identification as indigenous peoples at the individual level and accepted by the community as their member; historical continuity with pre-colonial and/or pre-settler societies, strong link to territories and surrounding natural resources; distinct social, economic or political systems, distinct language, culture and beliefs; form non-dominant groups of society; and resolve to maintain and reproduce their ancestral environments and systems as distinctive peoples and communities" (United Nations-Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues 2021).

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[3] Given that the focus of this thesis is social policy, it was determined that the term "indigenous peoples", as used by the UN, will be used to refer generally to communities and individuals who self-identify as part of indigenous groups. This does not invalidate the diversity of concepts and terms used by other international and national organisations, as well as the denominations that indigenous peoples themselves adopt to name their people and traditions.

The National Institutes for Statics (INE) of Chile, uses the self-identification criterion to statistically determine the indigenous population. In particular, to the question "Do you consider yourself to belong to any indigenous or native people?", 12,4% of the population – 2,185,792 people – declare themselves belonging to one of the nine indigenous people groups that the Chilean state recognises (https://www.censo2017.cl/). The distribution of this population among the groups recognised by the Chilean state is as follows:



*Chart 1-Indigenous population in Chile. Chart of own elaboration based on data from https://www.censo2017.cl/*

As can be seen, the Mapuche and Aymara populations have the highest percentages of identification in the country.  Are these groups, as well, which mainly inhabit the ADI territories selected for this thesis, as will be describe in detail in the next chapters of this document.

Today, 75,3% of these communities are concentrated in urban areas, percentage that have been increasing during the last decade (Ministerio de Desarrollo Social 2017a). Due to some territorial agreements made during the colony – process which was held during the XVI and XVII century – the distribution of this population is concentrated in the south of Chile (Comisión verdad histórica y nuevo trato. 2003; Zavala 2015). Specifically, two of three regions with the highest concentration of this population are located at the south of Bio-Bio River, which are Los Lagos (13,1%) and La Araucanía (19,6%). Metropolitan Region – where

Santiago, the capital city, is located – concentrates 30,1% of this population. Additionally, the three territories with the highest concentration of indigenous people, in comparison to the rest of the inhabitant are La Araucanía, where 31,7% of the population is indigenous, and Aysen with 25,5%, and Arica y Parinacota, located in the extreme north of Chile, with 25,9%.

Regarding social indicators, it has been argued that economic growth and social development that have characterised the country, have not been equally distributed among indigenous and non-indigenous population (World Bank 2015). Regarding to poverty, while 15,8% of the non-indigenous people live in poverty, the same figure for indigenous people is 26,4% (Ministerio de Desarrollo Social 2017a). Additionally, figures show that people who live in extreme poverty is the double – 6,6% - compared to those who do not belong to this category – 3,2% (Ministerio de Desarrollo Social 2017a).

Education is a relevant right to access for better incomes and job opportunities. For this reason, it is important to note that 4,7% of indigenous people are illiterate, while 3% of non-indigenous people are in the same situation (Ministerio de Desarrollo Social 2017a). Also, the inequalities between indigenous and the rest of the Chilean population can be seen in the percentage of head of households who have not finished either primary or secondary school. In the case of indigenous families, 57,7% of head of household are in that situation, versus 45,5% in the rest of the population (Ministerio de Desarrollo Social 2017a).

In terms of identity, the National Survey of Socioeconomic Characterisation (Ministerio de Desarrollo Social 2017a) indicates that 78,6% of indigenous people do not speak nor understand their native languages. This percentage is higher for the younger generation: 62% for people over 60 years old, 74,1% in the range of 30-44 years old, and 88,6% in the range of 0-14 years old. This situation shows that losing native languages is affecting the new generations.

Another important indicator for this research is social participation. Figures provided by the National Survey of Socioeconomic Characterization in Chile (Ministerio de Desarrollo Social 2017a) show that indigenous people have higher levels of participation than the rest of the population, with 37,3% and 25,3% respectively. However, their participation is concentrated mostly in religious organizations and churches (29,6%) (Ministerio de Desarrollo Social

2017a), which is not associated to having influence in public policies and, thus, it does not directly aims to change the current distribution of power.

As it is possible to see, the current inequalities suffered by indigenous people affect their access to rights and weaken their citizenship. Consequently, since the sense of full citizenship is connected to individual agency and community empowerment (Mahmud 2004), their possibilities of participate in public life is affected. In this context, the understanding of causes and factors that underlie this situation is essential for social policies.

### 1.3 Current institutional framework in the recognition of indigenous people in Chile

The relationship between the Chilean state and indigenous peoples is affected by an institutional frame, which defines roles, hierarchies, access to rights, power distribution, among other elements. Beyond the long-standing historical perspective, which will be address in further chapters, for the purposes of this section the institutional framework that will be presented is that which defines the recent relationship between the Chilean state and indigenous peoples.

Having made this observation, it is pertinent to note that the current formal institutional framework that regulates the relationship between the state and indigenous peoples began to take shape in 1989. At that time, Chile was under the rule of the civic-military dictatorship imposed on the country through a coup d'état on 11 September 1973. In 1989, after a referendum, the dictator Augusto Pinochet agreed to call for democratic elections, to then withdraw from executive power. It was in the process of preparation of this first democratic election, when indigenous representatives and the then candidate for the presidency Patricio Aylwin, signed the Nueva Imperial Agreement. In this document, the potential government committed to establish the constitutional recognition for indigenous peoples and their rights, and to create a specific institution to attend to the indigenous demands (Aylwin 1989). Also, the agreement established the creation of the Special Commission for Indigenous People (Comisión Especial de Pueblos Indígenas-CEPI) comprised of experts and indigenous representatives to develop proposals for their social, economic and cultural development. For their part, indigenous peoples' representatives were committed to use the

participatory mechanisms that the democratic governments from 1990 onward will create, as a mean to express and resolve their demands.

### 1.3.1 Indigenous Law 19.253

As a result of the mentioned Nueva Imperial Agreement, in 1990, period of the democratic transition in the country, was enacted the Decree No 30, which creates the Special Commission for Indigenous Peoples, CEPI, in order to canalise the discussions and decisions regarding the new institutions to regulate the relationship between the indigenous peoples and the Chilean state. According to Art. 6 of the decree, CEPI was composed by indigenous organisations and government representatives (Ministerio Secretaría General de Gobierno), with the purpose of advice the President of the Republic about the indigenous ethnic groups of Chile and their economic and social development, the conservation, strengthening and dissemination of their cultural expressions and values, and their correct participation in the national community (Ministerio Secretaría General de Gobierno, Art. 1).

The main outcome of this Commission was the designing of the Law 19.253, generally known as the Indigenous Law, which was enacted in 1993 (Ministerio de Planificación y Cooperación 1993). As part of this law, it was created the National Corporation for Indigenous Development – CONADI, as a public organisation in charge of manage the indigenous peoples' demands. The Indigenous Law defines a set of mechanisms that address some of the main aspects of these demands. It can be stressed the sections of the Law related to ancestral lands' regulation, protection, and acquisition, in particular by the Land and Water Fund and the Indigenous Land Registry. Additionally considers the Indigenous Development Fund which aims to support the indigenous development throughout special credit schemes, capitalisation systems and subsidies.

In terms of participation, the Indigenous Law declares the right of indigenous peoples to preserve and develop their cultural manifestations (Ministerio de Planificación y Cooperación 1993, Art. 7). In its fifth section, it is declared the obligation of the state and its services to listen to and consider the opinion of the indigenous organizations recognized in the law (Ministerio de Planificación y Cooperación 1993, Art. 34). As well, it defines the framework for indigenous organisations, establishing the conditions for the constitution of

an indigenous organisation and the aims that they can pursue, such as promotion of education and culture, as well professional and economic activities (Ministerio de Planificación y Cooperación 1993, Art. 36-37)

All the actions, decision and activities framed by this Law must consider these participatory elements. This is the case of the ADI policy, which will be presented as follows.

### 1.3.2   ADI policy

In 1993 the Indigenous Law 19.253 concerning indigenous peoples was enacted. Under this law, the government created the National Corporation of Indigenous Development (Corporación Nacional de Desarrollo Indígena-CONADI) and the Indigenous Development Areas-ADIs. The Article 27 of the Indigenous Law, states that the policy, throughout the Corporation [CONADI] aims to study, plan, coordinate and agree on plans, projects, works and developments with ministries and public agencies; regional governments and municipalities; universities and other educational establishments; corporations and non-governmental organizations; international cooperation and technical assistance agencies, and public and private companies (Ministerio de Planificación y Cooperación 1993).

The ADIs were created as spaces that can be the material expression of development from the perspective of communities' self-development, according to their own identity and forms of indigenous organization, which will be achieved as a result of a management with indigenous peoples leadership (Corporación Nacional de Desarrollo Indígena 2020).

ADI policy's specific objectives are (Corporación Nacional de Desarrollo Indígena 2020):

- To respect, protect and promote the development of indigenous people, their cultures, families, and communities.
- To protect the indigenous lands, to watch over the adequate exploitation of these lands.
- To watch over the ecological balance of these lands.

ADI seeks to encourage and strengthen the indigenous peoples' own self-management capacities for the rational use of their own natural, human, economic and cultural resources and thus provide themselves with sustainable processes leading to development with identity as defined by the communities involved (Corporación Nacional de Desarrollo Indígena 2020).

Currently, this policy is implemented in ten territories along the country, which are defined considering the ancestral areas where indigenous communities have been allocated and concentrated, existence of lands of indigenous communities or individual, ecological homogeneity, and dependence on natural resources, such as watersheds, rivers, banks, flora and fauna (Ministerio de Planificación y Cooperación 1993, p.253).

The geographical distribution of ADIs is shown in the next maps:



*Map 1 - Territories covered by the ADI policy*

*Map 3- Territories covered by the ADI policy*



*Map 3- Territories covered by the ADI policy*

In terms of participation, as it was mentioned, ADI is framed by the Indigenous Law, which explicitly recognise the states duty of considering the indigenous organisations (Ministerio de Planificación y Cooperación 1993, Art. 34). A central element for this policy is to achieve local development on the basis of a highly participatory plan of the indigenous social base in a delimited territorial space (Dirección Regional CONADI Arica – Parinacota 2014). In this context, ADI policy recognises the role of different actors, such as ministries, public institutions, local governments, councils, universities and other educational institutions, private and public companies, among other stakeholders (Ministerio de Planificación y Cooperación 1993). As well, ADIs indicate that the state should respect indigenous communities' identities, so as to promote their active involvement and acknowledge of their competences for self-development and self-management (Corporación Nacional de Desarrollo Indígena 2017).

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### 1.3.3 International framework: Convention 169 ILO and UN convention for Indigenous peoples

The participatory component of this law and policy cannot be understood without the consideration of the enactment of the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, No. 169 in 2008 (International Labour Organization 2017). This is the most relevant milestone in Chile related to participation and recognition of indigenous peoples during the last decade. This agreement establishes as a compulsory element the use of participatory mechanisms and the promotion of self-determination processes of indigenous communities in the definition of their own developments and use of their lands. In its 7th Article, it states that indigenous communities shall participate in the formulation, implementation and evaluation of plans and programmes for national and regional development which may affect them directly" (International Labour Organization 2017)

Additionally, setting up global standards for indigenous peoples, the Chilean state enacted in 2008 the Convention 169 of International Labour Organisation, which recognises the relevance of provide standard to promote autonomy, control and self-determination of their own lives and projects of development (International Labour Organization 2017).

Beside the importance that this institutional framework gives to participation, its achievements in the distribution of power have been poorly reached. For example, even when the Convention 169 defines that any popular consultation should pursue a consensus among the participants, the Decree law 66 and 40 (Ministerio del Medio Ambiente 2013; Ministerio de Desarrollo Social 2014) meant to limit the scope of these mechanisms. Specifically, they eliminate the achieving a consensus among the actors affected, as a condition to develop projects which affect directly indigenous communities. Also, they establish that the participatory processes should start only when the projects that will affect the indigenous communities, have been already declared as admissible. The Indigenous Law, which regulates the role of CONADI and ADIs, has been slightly modified after the enactment of this agreement to provide the conditions to achieve the new standards. Additionally, some of the last modifications have set up some limits to participation, such as the definition of narrower deadlines to collect the opinions of the indigenous communities – generally up to thirty days – and define a non-legally binding participatory process (Ministerio del Medio

Ambiente 2013; Ministerio de Desarrollo Social 2014).

Thus, despite the institutional efforts in the recognition of rights of indigenous peoples, this period has been marked by some contradictions that should be attended to the by Chilean Government. In this sense, there is a consensus that the current institutional frame needs to be improve, replacing the assistant paradigm and incorporating the international standards on rights and participation (Figueroa et al. 2015; Instituto Nacional de Derechos Humanos 2015). With regard to the Indigenous Law, there is no central level to coordinate its implementation; and the mechanisms of participation that this law considers have to do only with the consultation and not with the deliberation (Figueroa et al. 2015).

## 1.4 Formal framework for participation in policy-making processes in Chile: implications for indigenous peoples.

Participation is an objective that the Chilean government has been strongly promoting not only for indigenous peoples, but for the whole population, since the return to democracy in Chile, after the authoritarian government of Pinochet mentioned in the previous section. In the first period after the return to democracy, the promotion of the participation was expressed by re-establishing the election of political representatives in the different territorial levels, and subsequently, by enhancing participation in the policy-making processes (Delamaza 2011).

Among these last efforts, highlights the Pro Participatory Agenda for 2006-2010. This initiative proposed a set of instructions for public institutions, regarding four dimensions: citizens' right to public information, participatory public management, the strengthening of civil society and non-discrimination and respect for diversity (Ministerio Secretaría General de Gobierno-División de Organizaciones Sociales 2008). In 2011, Law 20.500 was enacted (Social Organisations Division - Gobierno de Chile 2016), establishing the use of participatory mechanisms as a compulsory element for any public institution (Ministerio Secretaría General de Gobierno 2011).

Although formal institutional expressions are clear in their intentions to promote the participation of citizens in the policy-making process, there is a consensus that the aims have

been poorly met. For example, the National Council of Citizen Participation and Strengthening of Civil Society (2017) sustains that despite efforts promoting political participation, a considerable distance exists between institutions and citizens, since the mechanisms to include the perspective of Chilean people are not sufficient and not adequate. In this context, in Chile, citizens' perspectives are not properly included in the decision-making process, since participation is considered only when the central decisions are already made at the top levels of the government (Avedaño 2009; Gómez and Rivera 2015; Ministerio de Desarrollo Social 2017b).

Furthermore, important inconsistences have been found in the design of the participatory programmes managed by public organisations. The problems lies in the design, because of a lack of coherence between objectives, activities, indicators and in the definition of the targeted users, but also in the implementation, since the policy managers do not have sufficient methodological skills to promote participation (Espinoza et al. 2007). In addition, the initiatives about participation mentioned are characterised by an ambiguity in the indicators of evaluation and low levels of participation, which usually reaches only the consultative level (Raczynski and Serrano 1998; Espinoza et al. 2007; Fernández and Ordóñez 2007; Social Organisations Division - Gobierno de Chile 2016). – which means that the voice of the people is heard, but there are no mandatory rules to include it in the decision-making (Serrano 1998). Consistently, Carrasco Soto (2021) agreed that there are weak incentives for citizen participation, as government efforts have not been translated into decrees, laws or binding mechanisms that impact on public service practices.

Regarding Law 20.500, the mechanisms that have been used by public institutions reached only the information and consultation levels. Consequently, the indigenous population expressed frustration with this initiative, because they did not feel that their voices had a relevant influence in public decisions (Social Organisations Division - Gobierno de Chile 2016). In this sense, it is possible to see a weak influence of the law in the policy-making decisions and a high level of barriers to promote effective processes of participation (Consejo Nacional de Participación Ciudadana y Fortalecimiento de la Sociedad Civil 2017).

In the light of new institutionalism, the complexity of policies can be understood considering the existence of a formal and informal dimension in policies. While formal rules can be identified in the legislation and official reports, informal rules are deployed in the practices (Lowndes and Roberts 2013a) by the actors involved, re-shaping the original goals of the policy (Lipsky 1980; Clarke 2015). These informal rules are not explicit, but influence the policies, since they express, in the different stages of the policies, the cultural and values background that surround the policy process (Cleaver and De Koning 2015). Considering this, decolonial perspectives are essential to analyse critically the current colonial relationship between the Chilean state and indigenous people.

The case of the indigenous peoples' participation is consistent with the overall picture of participation in Chile. Participatory initiatives are seen more as an assimilation process rather than a space for autonomy and self-determination, where indigenous people are expected to fit in a set of pre-defined policies (Avedaño 2009; Rubilar Palma and Roldán Tonioni 2014). For example, although the Indigenous Law promotes the participation of indigenous peoples, it also defines a specific framework where indigenous organisations need to fit so as to be recognised by the state, instead of validating the ancestral ways that the communities already have to organise their social and political life.

Considering the participation of indigenous people in public policies it is possible to see that while some relevant efforts have been done to promote the participation of indigenous people, others have been set so as to limit this objective. This is the case of the Decree Supreme No 40 for the Environmental Impact Assessment System, which frames the participation of indigenous peoples in environmental projects that affect them (Ministerio del Medio Ambiente 2013). However, it has been widely criticised, as who has the power to defining which projects will be will to consultation is the government, without the need for prior dialogue with the communities concerned (Astudillo Becerra 2017). In addition, the Article 8 of the Decree Supreme No 40 defines the indigenous impact of the investment refers exclusively for those cases in which the project is located "in or near" the indigenous population (Ministerio del Medio Ambiente 2013). The above shows a clear limit imposed on the idea of "susceptibility to affect", as called for in ILO Convention 169. In this sense, the regulation limits the idea of susceptibility by arbitrarily defining not only when to consult,

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but also who should be consulted and, in this sense, by defining vertically who is affected by the projects (Peralta García 2019).

Another significant example are the consultations framed by the ILO Convention 169, which, despite having raised high expectations among citizens, have had insufficient results in their procedures and final outcomes (Pé and García 2018; Peralta García 2019). In the specific case of Mapuche communities, Carrasco Hernríquez' analysis about the relationship between Mapuche and forest companies (2021), indicates that the incorporation of Mapuche professionals, especially those who speak Mapudungún – Mapuche language – is highly valued, but only for instrumental purposes.

In this vein, *Mapuche's* demands for recovering lands that were dispossessed, and the political recognition of their sovereignty "have clashed with private and state interests over development projects and territorial claims, in some cases reaching a level of violence reminiscent of the dark days of the Pinochet dictatorship" (Richards 2010, p.60). As a consequence of the limited outcomes of the collaborative efforts between Mapuche communities and the state, such as the Nueva Imperial Agreement already mentioned, Bidegain (2017) indicates that more radical and non-institutionalised movements have emerged to demand indigenous collective rights recognition.

In conclusion, in Chile citizen participation is still a challenge. The obstacles in promoting it are rooted in its historical tradition and its political culture, expressed on an unitary state, with a political power strongly centralised in the President of the Republic, and reinforced by neoliberal policies imposed during the dictatorship period from 1973 to 1990, context in which changes are usually promoted "from above" (Delamaza 2011).

The next table summarises the major milestones regarding the indigenous' rights recognition from the Chilean state mentioned in this chapter:

*Table 1 - Conventions, laws, and decrees regarding to indigenous peoples in Chile*

| Conventions, laws, and decrees regarding to indigenous peoples in Chile | |
|---|---|
| **Year** | **Description** |
| **1989** | Nueva Imperial Agreement |
| **1990** | Creation of CEPI-Special Commission for Indigenous Peoples |
| **1991** | Law 19.253 <br> Creation of ADI policy |
| **2004** | 20th August <br> Enactment of Decree 168, that creates ADI Puel Nahuelbuta. <br> Enactment of Decree 224, that creates ADI Alto <br> Andino Arica y Parinacota |
| **2007** | United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples |
| **2008** | Ratification of Convention 169 - Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989. |

## 1.5 Antecedents about ADI North, Alto Andino Arica y Parinacota.

ADI Alto Andino Arica y Parinacota is located in the region of Arica and Parinacota, Chile. This is the northernmost region of the country, at an approximate distance of 2,000 kilometres from Santiago, the capital city. The region covers from the coast in the Pacific Ocean, to the Andean mountains, being bordered to the north by the Republic of Peru, to the South by the Chilean region of Tarapacá, to the east by the Republic of Bolivia and to the west by the Pacific Ocean. According to the last national census of 2017, the total population of the region is 226,068 (National Statistics Institute 2022).



*Image 1 - Landscape and people of Putre, part of the ADI-North*

The region is divided in two provinces: province of Arica and province of Parinacota. Additionally, each province is composed by *comunas* or counties. The province of Arica is composed by the *comunas* of Arica y Camarones. In turn,

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the province of Parinacota is composed by the *comunas* of Putre and General Lagos. The regional capital is Arica. Being the northernmost city of the country, Arica plays essential role in the interrelations between Chile, Peru and Bolivia.

*Table 2 - Demographic figures of Region Alto Andino Arica y Parinacota, Chile. Elaborated from data published by Census 2002 (INE 2021)*

| REGION ARICA Y PARINACOTA | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Total population** | 226,068 | | | |
| **Indigenous population** | 78,883<br>35% (9.5% overall in the country) | | | |
| **Main indigenous groups** | Aymara (75%)<br>Quchua (3%)<br>Diaguita (2%) | | | |
| **Provinces** | **Comunas ADI-South** | **Total population (number)** | **Indigenous population (number)** | **Indigenous population (%)** |
| **Arica** | Arica | 221364 | 75883 | 34% |
| | Camarones | 1255 | 888 | 71% |
| **Parinacota** | Putre | 2765 | 1604 | 58% |
| | General Lagos | 684 | 508 | 74% |

The climate of the region has a great significance, as its characteristics in each area influence the identity of the local inhabitants. Particularly, the region is mainly desertic, arid and with very little vegetation, as a result of the low rainfall along the year (https://www.bcn.cl/siit/nuestropais/region15). However, as the territory covers from the sea to the Andean mountains, there is an ecological diversity, commonly known as *pisos ecológicos* [ecological floors]. While Arica, located in the coastal area, has an average annual temperature of 18.8°C, the area becomes more deserted as it approaches the mountains. Over the 3,000 metres of height, where part of the ADI Alto Andino Arica y Parinacota is located, the temperatures decrease, achieving an average of 10° C in the Altiplano (https://www.bcn.cl/siit/nuestropais/region15/clima.htm).

Another relevant characteristic of the territory is the volcanos presence, such as the Parinacota, Guallatiri, and Tacora. They play an important role for the ancestral Aymara culture, representing an entity that can be considered good or bad by the communities, with the power to provide the essential elements for life, crops, and wellbeing (Martínez 1983).



*Image 2 - Left image: General Lagos, representing the Altiplano, highlands area. Right Image: Parinacota volcano and Chungará Lake.*

The indigenous communities that inhabit the territory are predominantly Aymara. According to the National Institute of Statics (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas 2018), the Aymara people are concentrated in the north of Chile. In specific, in the region of Arica and Parinacota they represent 26.29% of the regional population (59,432 people). The second region with the highest concentration of Aymara people in the country is Tarapacá, where this group represent the 14.81% of the total population (48,964 people).

### 1.6 Antecedents ADI-South, Puel Nahuelbuta

Located at the region of Araucanía, in the South of Chile, the ADI Puel Nahuelbuta is characterised for having the highest concentration of indigenous people of the country. Nationally, 12% of the total population declare to identify themselves as indigenous, and 9,9% as a Mapuche person. In Araucanía, 33,1% of people identified as indigenous, of which 99,1% identify themselves as Mapuche (Ministerio de Desarrollo Social 2017a). This is consistent with the history of this territory, which ancestrally concentrates Mapuche communities.

In this regard, it is important to note that the region was formally recognised as Mapuche territory by the Spanish crown. It was only in 1883, when Chile was an independent republic, and after more than twenty years of the so-called "Pacification de la Araucanía", also known as the 'Occupation of Araucania', that the territory was annexed to the country (Bengoa 1999; Bengoa 2008).

The region comprises two provinces: Malleco in the north and Cautín in the south. Its capital and largest city is Temuco, which is, as well, the capital of the province.

*Table 3 - Demographic figures of Region Araucanía, Chile. Elaborated from data published by Census 2002 (INE 2021)*

| REGION ARAUCANÍA | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Total population** | **957,224** | | | |
| **Indigenous population** | **321,328** <br> **33, 1%** | | | |
| **Main indigenous groups** | **Mapuche** <br> **99.5% of people of the region who identified themselves as indigenous, identify as Mapuche** | | | |
| **Provinces** | **Comunas ADI-South** | **Total population (number)** | **Indigenous population (number)** | **Indigenous population (%)** |
| **Cautín** | **Nueva Imperial** | **32,510** | **18,286** | **56%** |
| | **Cholchol** | **11,611** | **8,743** | **75%** |
| | **Galvarino** | **11,996** | **8,307** | **69%** |
| **Malleco** | **Angol (province capital)** | **53,262** | **6,825** | **13%** |
| | **Traiguén** | **18,843** | **5,662** | **30%** |
| | **Lumaco** | **9,548** | **4,351** | **46%** |
| | **Purén** | **11,779** | **3,305** | **28%** |
| | **Los Sauces** | **7,265** | **2,120** | **29%** |

The main economic activities are linked to agriculture of traditional crops, forestry and tourism (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile 2022).



*Image 3 - Agricultural use of soil in Araucanía Region*

This is also the region with the highest levels of poverty of the country: while the average in the country is 8,6% of population living in poverty, in the Araucanía region is the 17,2% (Ministerio de Desarrollo Social 2018).

### 1.7 Research problem, literature review and contributions of this thesis

In the literature that address directly or indirectly the situation about indigenous peoples and participation in Chile, prevail three main approaches: the historical (Bengoa 1999; Bengoa 2004; Diaz Araya and Tapia Ladino 2013), the cultural - anthropological and sociological (González Miranda 2000; Gundermann Kroll et al. 2003; Richards 2010; Gundermann Kroll 2018), and the law and policy assessment one (Rubilar Palma and Roldán Tonioni 2014; Figueroa et al. 2015; Instituto Nacional de Derechos Humanos 2015). In general, these studies agree that despite the recent efforts to foster indigenous peoples' self-determination, their political power has been consistently unequal in comparison with other groups of the country. Likewise, they stress the role of the state in reproducing these asymmetries.

In order to understand this situation, this thesis analyses the role of institutions in reconfiguring these power relationships. Similarly to the idea of "institutional matrix" used by Lowndes (2005, p.292) in the analysis of local governance, this thesis focuses on the ADI as an institutional matrix that permits to analyse the processes of citizen participation of indigenous communities, from the perspectives of policy managers, indigenous communities and other stakeholders in local areas, and the factors that affect the participation.

In this context, institutions are not seen only as formal rules that determine the individual or collective actors' behaviour, as it was conceptualised by the called traditional institutionalism (March and Olsen 2008; Lowndes and Roberts 2013a). Instead, new institutional theories permit to link the structural and historical level, with the agency of actors as bricoleurs, that is, agents that conscious and unconsciously shape institutions throughout their daily actions (Carstensen 2011a; Koning 2011; Johnson 2012; Cleaver and De Koning 2015). Their actions are not only driven by rational decisions and knowledge formally determined by the policy, but also by interests that involve the political dimension of institutions and, therefore, the distribution of power.

Thus, in this research participation in ADI is understood as the possibilities of different local actors of shaping the set of rules-in-use that frame this policy. Therefore, levels of participation of specific actors will be expressed in their influence in creating, transforming and/or adapting the formal and informal rules that drive the implementation of ADI. This is linked to the distribution of power of influence in the rules-in-use. If only some actors have high influence in the definition of rules, more than symmetric relationships, the policy is the expression of the concentration of power. In the case of ADI, the distribution of power between local actors is especially relevant, from the decolonial perspective.

In the institutional bricolage, old and new actors' knowledges are operating. This is relevant to understand the participation of indigenous peoples, as despite the long and profound colonisation, traditional old rules, such as political consensus, relationship with lands, festivities, authorities, among others, are still current, even when they are not necessarily written or recognised by the state. In this sense, the analysis of the institutional processes that frame the current asymmetrical distribution of power, and the scopes of ADI policy in

advance toward a more equal participation, cannot avoid the coloniality of power (Mignolo 2007a; Quijano 2010).

Despite the extensive work regarding the coloniality (Santos 1991; Apel and Dussel 2005; Mignolo and Escobar 2010) and its current expressions in Latin-America and, in particular, in Chile (Bengoa 1999; Bengoa 2000; Gundermann Kroll et al. 2003; Grebe Vicuña 2010; Richards 2010), an understanding about how that coloniality is reproduced by institutional arrangements is missing. It is interesting to mention the study of Aillapán Quinteros (2020), which appeals for the decolonial turn of the Indigenous Law 19.253. Although the links of this study with this thesis – both assume the concept of colonial matrix of power and the decolonial turn – Aillapán Quinteros does not deepen in the contributions of an institutional approach.

The literature suggests that the action of the state, far from generating autonomy of these people, has triggered a low representation of them in the public sphere, imposed a continuous loss of their cultural heritage, and insisted on the assimilation of these groups to the rest of the Chilean society (Bengoa 1999; Salazar 2000; Bengoa 2008; Grebe Vicuña 2010). In this respect, the institutional approach is not a recurring framework in the decolonial analyses.

It should be noted that it is possible to find contributions of the new institutional approach in other social studies in Chile and Latin-America, mainly centred in the analysis of policies (Aguilar Villanueva and Lasswell 1992; Aguilar et al. 1993; Cavadias 2001) and the formal and informal institutions on which they lie (Aguilar et al. 1993; Cavadias 2001; Montecinos Montecinos 2005; Miranda 2012; Patricio Miranda-Rebeco et al. 2012). By introducing this institutional approach into the analysis of ADI policy, this thesis aims to contribute to understanding the rules – bureaucratic and social embedded – that frame the participation of the indigenous communities.

Likewise, although the recent contributions made by new institutionalist (Hall and Taylor 1996a; Peters 2012; Lowndes 2014a) and critical institutionalism (Koning 2011; Cleaver 2012; Hall et al. 2014a; Cleaver and Whaley 2018) in understanding the role of actors and their often asymmetrical distribution of power in shaping institutional processes, a decolonial turn

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is necessary to give concepts and frameworks to understand the specific expression that institutional processes have in Latin-American contexts (Mignolo 2007a; Quijano 2010).

In addition, the contributions address the theoretical dimension. The link between new institutionalism and decolonial perspectives is put forward as a new approach to understand the political participation of indigenous people. Consequently, this research aims to move beyond the positivist and economistic roots of traditional institutionalism, and pursues new and innovative approaches, emphasizing that institutions affect society in terms of their formal and informal rules, but at the same time, institutions are affected by society. Complementing this focus, decolonial perspectives provide a framework to understand the relationship between the state, as a modern institution, and indigenous people, from a historical and sociological approach.

In the conjunction of these two perspectives – new institutionalism and decolonial – ADI appears a policy rooted in institutions historically and politically built. At the same time, the policy is not independent of the local actors. On the contrary, its implementation affects the actors, at the same time are produced and reproduced by them, insofar actors are bricoleurs that enable the synthesis between the traditional set of rules of indigenous peoples, and the new modern rules set by the state.

# Chapter 2. Theoretical framework

## 2.1 Introduction

The multiplicity of dimensions that characterise the implementation of the ADI policy necessitate a complex and nuanced theoretical approach. This chapter outlines the relevance of the main theories that ground this thesis

The chapter is structured as follows. First, the new institutional theory (Hall and Taylor 1996b; Peters 2012; Lowndes and Roberts 2013a) is outlined as a meta-approach to understand the institutional framework of the ADI policy, new institutionalism represents a dual perspective that facilitates not only analyses of the ADI policy as a formal rule, but also as a space where the mutual relationships between agents and the structures are established. Adopting to Hall & Taylor's (1996b) differentiation between three new institutional perspectives, this thesis is inclined towards the cultural approach offered by sociological and historical perspectives in the analysis of institutional processes, prioritising this over the calculus approach offered by the rational choice approach. This means the understanding of the interrelationships between institutions and actors' behaviour which includes but transcends merely using rational individual calculus.

In particular, historical institutionalism and sociological institutionalism are placed in dialogue to understand the complex processes of institutions. From these approaches, this institutional process can be understood as being a mixture of historically patterns (Skocpol and Pierson 2002), and a constant adaptation driven by specific actors, conceptualised as bricoleurs (Cleaver 2012). In this regard, and according to the research questions of this thesis, this theoretical framework also considers the contributions of critical institutionalism (Koning 2011; Hall et al. 2014b; Cleaver and De Koning 2015). This line of thought introduces the concept of institutional bricolage. Although this concept has been used in several other

fields, it is to be understood here in the institutional framework as a permanent and dynamic process of the combination of different elements and rules, formal and informal, which shape the behaviours of local actors. This critical institutionalist analysis pays special attention to the role of actors as agents who can both resist and promote specific practices.

Secondly, in order to situate institutionalist analysis in the context in which ADI operates, as well as to address the widely discussed tensions in the relationship between indigenous people and states in Latin America, this thesis also assumes a decolonial perspective, in particular, the Latin-American approach of the decolonial theory, as a meso approach of institutions. Specifically, the notion of coloniality (Mignolo 2007a) offered by this perspective, considers the idea that colonial relationships surround and shape the institutional processes. In this sense, from a historical perspective, the implementation of ADI is strongly linked to the coloniality of power (Quijano 2000a) that has framed the relationships between indigenous communities and the state as a colonial institution. More specifically, the colonial matrix of power proposed by Quijano (2000) and Mignolo (2007a) offers the concepts of power, knowledge and being as each being constituent parts of the colonial matrix of power  framing institutions as contexts which are defined by colonial backgrounds.

Finally, having set up the scenario of the relationships between institutions and the specific contexts where ADI operates, the third central element that emerges in the micro-level of the analysis is the concept of participation. Considering the contributions of new institutionalism, for this research participation is not the starting point of analysis. Rather, it is the expression of a specific interaction between institutional arrangements – rules of the game (Lowndes and Wilson 2001; Lowndes et al. 2006b; March and Olsen 2008)- and the concrete and symbolic contexts and actors. Taking this institutional framework into account, a variety of conceptual models to analyse participation is used to understand the practices of participation.

In order to guide the reading of this section, the next figure summarise the main elements of the theoretical framework of this thesis:

Macro-level　　　　　Meso-level　　　　　Micro-level

**Sociological institutionalism**

*Cultural factors*

**Colonial matrix of power**

**Ladder of participation**

**New institutionalism**

**Historical institutionalism**

*Historical patterns*

**Decolonial perspective**

- *Coloniality of power*

- *Coloniality of knowledge*

**Participation**

**Matrix of social participation**

**Critical institutionalism**

*Institutional bricolage*

- *Coloniality of being*

**CLEAR model**

*Role of bricoleurs in shaping ADI's institutions*

*Institutional processes are embedded in the concept of coloniality/ decolonial theory*

*To what extent ADI's institutional framework enables local actors to shape rules/norms/practices.*

*To what extent ADI's institutional framework is a result of local actors' decisions*

*Figure 1: Theoretical framework*

## 2.2 New institutionalism

It should be noted that systematic analyses of the role of institutions in the structure the individuals' behaviour are not new. The first institutional studies, also known as "old institutionalisms", based on rational choice and behaviourism, held that political and social phenomena could be understood and even explained by the aggregation of individual preferences (Immergut 1998; Lowndes 2001). From this rose critics that theorised a new generation of institutional thought during the 1980s (Hall and Taylor 1996b; Immergut 1998).

It was in 1984 when March and Olsen (1984) began talking about the emergence of a new institutionalism. In addition, Ostrom (2015) analysing the problems of collective action in the field of natural resource management, argued that in the management of common properties people created their own institutional frameworks to organise collective behaviour under formal and informal rules. Her analyses were a milestone in the realisation that institutions are a phenomenon which cannot be reduced to an economic perspective, as "political and social structures could block and distort these 'normal' economic processes" (Lowndes 1996, p.183).

This emergent perspective, commonly referred to as 'new institutionalism', in opposition of the 'old institutionalism' (Lowndes 1996), is far from being a homogeneous and consistent theoretical system. Rather, it is possible to recognise several strains that, again, have been categorised from different perspectives by different authors. For instance, Lowndes, in order to examine the differences between the old and the new institutionalism, discusses the idea of vulgar institutionalism, broadly criticised by some scholars who inaccurately focused on "an amalgam of the worst bits of traditional 'institutionalism'" (Lowndes 2001, p.1958). Thus, considering the contributions of Peters (1999, p.149), Lowndes sustains that the old institutionalism is questioned for being focused on organisations, and for assuming institutions are formal, static, homogeneous and contextually disconnected structures, framed by an already defined set of values (2001, p.1958). As a respond, new institutionalism includes the informality in the analysis of institutions, its dynamic processes, a critical perspective about the values that regulate institutions, and a differentiated analysis of them, taking into account the contextual characteristics operating in the process (Lowndes 2001, p.1958).

Beyond the differences and nuances inside this theory, Lowndes (1996) states that this approach understand institutions are characterised by their stability over time, which confers them legitimacy and value even beyond the short-term outcomes that institutions may bring. Institutions are understood for this author as a 'middle-level' concept, since they are created by individuals, but at the same time, institutions are part of the social construction- since they influence human behaviour through various incentives and/or punishments. Additionally, she argues that institutions are composed by formal and informal rules; the first are expressed by rules or laws, and the second represented by informal norms and customs and even when they are not necessarily constructed consciously, they are present in our daily lives (Lowndes 1996).

Likewise, in the task of identifying some common characteristics of new institutionalism, Peters (2012) distinguishes four main characteristics of this theory in the conceptual definition of institutions. One is the assumption of their existence is of a structural element in society, which can have a formal expression – such as laws or bureaucratic rules – or an informal expression – such as implicit shared norms or rules which organise the interactions of actors (Peters 2012; Lowndes and Roberts 2013a). Secondly, institutions tend to be stable over time, to the point where their rules and behaviour can be even, at times, be successfully predicted (Peters 2012). Thirdly, institutions affect and even constrain, formally or informally, the individual behaviour of their members. Related to this, March and Olsen (1984) mention the "logic of appropriateness", which refers to the influence of institutions over individuals, through which the accuracy of their rules is even more relevant than the consequences that those rules may have over individuals. Finally, members of institutions have a set of shared values and meanings as a condition for their existence (March and Olsen 1984; Peters 2012).

It should be noted that a relevant point for new institutionalist theory and, in particular, for this research, is the distinction between formal and informal institutions, as well as how they interact with each other. As mentioned, informal institutions corresponds to unwritten rules expressed on social practices, customs and traditions that represents the 'raw material' (Lowndes 2001, p.1958) from which institutions are built. On the other side, institutions framed by formal arrangements correspond to explicit rules enforced by actors with a legitim

power (Lowndes 2001; Peters 2012). According to Knight (1992) formal institutions serve the function of stabilising informal formal ones, framing some social interactions, as well as structuring collective decision-making, usually considering the role of the law and the state in enforcing sanctions that encourage the expected behaviours. However, as Helmke and Levitsky (2004) point out, the inappropriateness of behaviours to formal rules may be evidence of weak formal institutions, but this does not necessarily mean the presence of informal rules. In other words, weak institutions are not synonymous with informal institutions.

According to Levi (1990) what the two institutions have in common is that the existence of a clearly defined expected behaviour. Additionally, it must be stressed that both, formal and informal institutions, coexist simultaneously and not necessarily in conflict, but not harmoniously either. In this vein, the mentioned study of Helmke and Levitsky (2004) has made important contributions to understanding the nuances in this interconnection, recognising that "many 'rules of the game' that structure political are informal--created, communicated, and enforced out- side of officially sanctioned" (2004, p.725). Attempting to overcome dichotomous perspectives on the relationship between informal and formal institutions, both those that assume the intrinsic efficiency of the former in solving the problems of social interaction involved in the latter, as well as those that question the apparent capacity of informal rules to produce dysfunctional dynamics, the authors propose a model of understanding that grasps the complexities in this relationship. In the model, they use two dimensions: the convergence, which analyse how similar or different are the informal institutions' results from the expected ones, according to the formal rules, and the effectiveness, which focuses on to what extent formal institutions are translated into practices. (Helmke and Levitsky 2004, p.728). In the intersection of these two dimensions, four typologies emerge, as follows:

*Table 4: A typology of informal institutions of Helmke and Levitsky (2004, p.728)*

| Outcomes | Effective formal s institutions | Ineffective formal institution |
|----------|--------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Convergent | Complementary | Substitutive |
| Divergent | Accommodating | Competing |

Another relevant conceptual definition regard with the existence of an informal space which is affecting the interaction between institutions and individuals is a central issue in institutional analysis, from which Hall and Taylor (1996b) distinguish three main new institutional approaches. On the one side, from a calculus approach, drawing on rational choice as an analytical framework, this interaction can be understood by analysis of how institutions affect individuals' behaviour. The assumption here is that individuals are motivated by seeking specific goals according to their preferences. Coherently with this, the institutions' function is to stabilise certainty about the present and future, by providing information relevant to affecting individuals' expectations about other' individuals' behaviour and their potential interactions (Hall and Taylor 1996b).

On the other side, from a cultural approach, these authors sustain that individual behaviour is considered as an action motivated by the interpretation that individuals have with regard to a specific situation, which can include calculation, but it is not necessarily reduced to it. In this context, institutions provides a set of symbols and meanings which frame interpretations and duly affect individuals' action (Hall and Taylor 1996b). From this cultural approach, two strains of new institutionalism are examined by these authors: historical institutionalism and sociological institutionalism. The last will be the main approach guiding analysis in this thesis. Complementarily, historical institutionalism is considered to understand the tendency of institutions remaining loyal to their original frameworks.

Specifically, for this thesis institutions are understood as formal and informal rules that oscillate between the stabilization through time and change and adaptation to the contexts and interests of different groups. To understand the first tendency, historical institutionalism offers a robust set of elements that will be incorporated into the analysis. Likewise, the analysis of institutional change throughout everyday life actions is framed by the sociological institutionalist perspective.

### 2.2.1 Historical institutionalism

Historical institutionalism is considered an approach (Thelen and Steinmo 1992; Steinmo 2008) that, as mostly of the new institutional theories, understands institutions "as the formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the

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organizational structure of the polity or political economy" (Hall and Taylor 1996b, p.6). However, its specific contribution is to focus "more squarely on the themes of power and interests" (Immergut 1998, p.16). Specifically, it addresses analysis of the role of institutions in the reproduction of asymmetries of power, understanding "a world in which institutions give some groups or interests disproportionate access to the decision-making process; and, rather than emphasize the degree to which an outcome makes everyone better off, they tend to stress how some groups lose while others win"(Hall and Taylor 1996b, p.9). Consequently, the outcomes that different institutional arrangements achieve does not depend on pre-defined goals, but rather on the rules of game – both formal and informal (Thelen and Steinmo 1992; Peters 2012) - which they set (Immergut 1998; Steinmo 2008) and that, in turn, will ultimately define which groups will be part of the decision-making process and in what way and to what degree they will participate in it (Steinmo 2008).

Regarding the outcomes, historical institutionalism, as part of the new institutionalist tendency, addresses critics of the reductionist analysis made by "old" institutionalism. In response to this, this perspective pays particular attention to the unexpected outcomes of institutional arrangements. It is "especially concerned to integrate institutional analysis with the contribution that other kinds of factors, such as ideas, can make to political outcomes" (Hall and Taylor 1996b, p.7). It is at this point where the historical dimension comes to the fore in understanding institutions as a set of formal and informal rules which "embody historical experience and stabilize norms, expectations, and resources" (March and Olsen 2008, p.5). Peters (2012) argues that institutions tend to routinise their rules and actions, thus, there is an "inertial tendency" (2012, p.70) that make the original policies and decisions persist over time.

This tendency is usually known in historical institutionalism under the concept of path dependency (Hall and Taylor 1996b; Pierson 2000; Peters 2012; Lowndes and Roberts 2013a), from which "institutions are seen as relatively persistent features of the historical landscape and one of the central factors pushing historical development along a set of 'paths'" (Hall and Taylor 1996b, p.9). Therefore, for this approach "the formative moment is crucial" (Peters 2012, p.76), as it is fundamental to understanding the subsequent institutional events, as "institutions create elements of order and predictability. They

fashion, enable, and constrain political actors as they act within a logic of appropriate action. Institutions are carriers of identities and roles and they are markers of a polity's character, history, and visions" (March and Olsen 2008, p.2). Consistently, Immergut concludes in her comparative analysis about health policies, that institutional development depends on the institutional features set historically and, consequently, "national political institutions have often been designed in such a way as to impede extreme factions (often popular ones) from introducing radical political changes" (1990, p.395).

However, history not only provides the conditions of the stabilization of rules, but also it will frame, the constant processes of the interpretation of these rules (March and Olsen 2008). A relevant factor that historical institutionalism identifies in causing institutional change is the 'historical inefficiency', as new rules appear as attempts to resolve problems in which the old rules are no longer sufficient (March and Olsen 2008; Peters 2012). Also at critical junctures, they usually come from external factors, which can trigger radical changes (Lowndes 1996).

This adaptative process of institutions over time suggests that institutional analysis needs to pay attention not only to the patterns, but also to the evolution and transformation of institutions. In this regard, it is relevant to mention the contributions of W. Streeck and K. Thelen (2005), who identify five typologies of institutional change as a gradual process: displacement, layering, drift, conversion, and exhaustion (Streeck and Thelen 2005, p.19). For these authors, displacement takes place when, in the face of changes in the exercise of power in society under specific historical circumstances, the current dominant logic of action is questioned, allowing for the emergence of alternative institutional models. A relevant point of this process is that the displacement can be an endogenous process, as well as an 'invasion', even in a literal way, such as "supplanting of indigenous institutions and practices with foreign ones" (Streeck and Thelen 2005, p.21). Another model can be recognised when over time there is a continuing imbrication, or layering, of different interests and actors who introduce changes in the institutional path dynamics, throughout the differential grow, which means the overlapping and consequent supplantation of old institutional rules for new ones (Streeck and Thelen 2005; Thelen and Conran 2016). Similarly, conversion involves an

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institutional change, based on an active redirection of goals and functions, to face new contextual circumstances or as a result of a reconfiguration of power relations.

On the contrary of the above, either driven by an active interest in eroding certain institutions or as a result of negligence, the lack of efforts for maintaining and adapting institutions so as to make them current and efficient in facing environmental changes, is what is known as drifting (Hacker 2005; Streeck and Thelen 2005; Thelen and Conran 2016). Similarly, exhaustion derives in institutional change, by fostering or simply allowing behaviours that will gradually collapse the current rules (Streeck and Thelen 2005).

In all the above models, institutional change does not necessarily correspond to a consequence of a change of the structural level but, moreover, institutions are permanently challenged, subverted and evaded, according to the interests of different actors. In this sense, institutional change can be originated and produced internally by actors involved, following a not only rational and cognitive oriented interests.

Although the role of institutional weaknesses and external factors in promoting changes, in this historical perspective the role of individuals as agents of change is not very clear (Peters 2012), especially in explaining how actors can represent endogenous forces for institutional change (Peters 2012; Lowndes and Roberts 2013a) and also the "potentially transformative impact of small, evolutionary adjustments over time" (Lowndes and Roberts 2013a, p.40).

To tackle the issue of social change, the role of agents and other elements, Hall and Tylor (1996b) identify in institutional analysis two main approaches: the rational choice or calculus approach, and the interpretation or cultural approach. In this thesis, the interpretation approach is deemed the most relevant in understanding the institutional processes, which will be referred to in more detail in the following section.

### 2.2.2  Sociological approach to institutionalism

Wholly consistent with the challenge of the new institutional analyses for overcoming the mere description of structures, the sociological approach of new institutionalism becomes relevant to deepening understanding of the 'rules of the game' operating in the political field. Following the contributions of March and Olsen (1984), Lowndes sustains that in its

'sociological' approach, new institutionalism integrates in its analyses elements like values, norms, interests, identities and beliefs (Lowndes 1996). These are elements that go further than the analysis of individual motivations. Assuming the same task but now applied to the analysis of participation in the implementation of ADI policy, this thesis assumes the influence of the sociological approach in institutional studies. This approach introduces a combined analysis between the formal dimension of structures, as well it integrates the informal dimensions embedded in individuals and collective behaviour, culture and political interests (Hall and Taylor 1996b).

Consistent with the above, new institutionalism addresses the need to incorporate collective action as a focus of analysis (March and Olsen 1984), over the study through the aggregation of individual decisions, as mainstream approaches used to emphasise (Lowndes and Roberts 2013a; Cleaver and De Koning 2015). For this purpose, sociological and historical branches of analysis are both essential to analyse institutions beyond their economic perspective (Goodin 1996). In this regard, Hall and Tylor (1996, p.14) state that sociological new institutionalism critiques the assumption of rationality behind institutions, stating that institutions are also a scheme of the reproduction of cultural practices, and that "even the most seemingly bureaucratic of practices have to be explained in cultural terms". According to these authors, the incorporation of a cultural dimension brings a broader understanding about the factors affecting the institutional framework and the interrelationships between institutions and individuals. In particular, Hall and Tylor (1996b) argue that institutions have a normative dimension, as they create specific contexts that work as models of the socialization of individuals; but in turn, this normative dimension also operates on a cognitive level, as individuals internalise the rules given by institutions, adapting their behaviour to what is prescribed by them.

In this vein, Dryzek (1996, p.103) emphasises that the influence of institutions is not only over specific behaviour, but also the informal aspect of their design also has the power to "reinforce, reshape, or undermine particular discourses". Finally, for these authors addressing the institutional change issue, understanding this corresponds to a process that goes beyond the rational pursuit of efficiency. It aims for the social legitimacy of institutions. Specifically, they state that "organizations embrace specific institutional forms or practices

because the latter are widely valued within a broader cultural environment" (Hall and Taylor 1996b, p.16).

In this regard, from a sociological perspective, the study of people's behaviour enables them to turn the focus from the structures to people's perspectives, and also to consider the bi-directional influences between individuals and the institutional context (Goodin 1996). According to Immergut (1998), both behaviouralism and new institutionalism, are focused on individual behaviour in political contexts; however, whilst the first assumes that the behaviour can be observed and empirically studied, new institutionalists support the idea that the understanding of institutions involves the study of the meanings that underpin the social phenomena.

### 2.2.3   Critical institutionalism

Also as a sub-category of new institutionalism, and also classified as a post-institutional approach (Koning 2011), this thesis adopts some elements from critical institutionalism. This perspective focuses on the "multi-scalar complexity of institutions entwined in everyday social life; their historic formation dynamically shaped by creative human actions; and the interplay between the traditional and the modern, formal and informal arrangements" (Cleaver and De Koning 2015, p.104). It is also relevant to mention that within this perspective, along with the sociological dimension, the historical approach is relevant as it entails an extensive and in depth comprehension of the institutions' context, beyond the boundaries of the current discourses or social configurations (Hall et al. 2014b). In this sense, institutions are viewed as a dynamic process of constant change and adaptation.

This is the case of the relationship between the Chilean state and indigenous communities. The historical trajectory shows that from the state's origins, whose establishment comes back to the colonization as a period and process, relationships have been characterised by homogenization rather than the acknowledgement of differences in traditions (Bengoa 1999; Gundermann Kroll et al. 2003). However, as was explained at the beginning of this document, nowadays this country has received international agencies' recommendations to enhance the active participation of these communities in any process which could affect them. This cannot be achieved solely through a formal rule as the complex and strong

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interconnections between institutions and social life – unequal power distribution, political context, geographical conditions, wide and mixed individuals' motivations and so on – render it impossible to assume a direct relationship between the institutional aims and their outcomes (Cleaver and De Koning 2015).

This interaction between institutions and social life operates under certain rules of the game, defined by critical institutionalism as institutional arrangements. Paying attention to the problematic nature of a dichotomous differentiation given by the category of formal and informal institutions, this perspective proposes the concepts of bureaucratic arrangements and socially embedded arrangements (Hall et al. 2014b; Cleaver and De Koning 2015). Similar to the traditional idea of formal and informal rules, these arrangements are expressions of stable expectations which frame individuals and collective groups, which can be explicitly stated in laws, rules, contracts or another formal bureaucratic instrument; or expressed in cultural arrangements operating in daily peoples' lives (Koning 2011). Nevertheless, they discard the use of the categories of formal and informal institutions, arguing that formal arrangements can reach a socially embedded status, while traditional cultural values can potentially evolve into a bureaucratic arrangement (Koning 2011). Consequently, the usage of the categories of bureaucratic and socially embedded arrangements are less static, recognising the interweaving between regulation, which can be socially embedded, together with cultural expressions that can be, at the same time, explicitly defined as a formal rule (Koning 2011). Although the relevant distinction between socially embedded and bureaucratic arrangements is useful, this is a quite emergent concept in institutional studies. Considering this and acknowledging the broad understanding of institutions as formal and informal rules of the game, in this thesis the traditional categories of formal and informal rules will be deployed. Specific clarifications will be made where it is necessary to offer further precision to some elements in the analysis.

These rules or arrangements constrain individuals' behaviour, at the same time they are produced by individuals' agency. This process cannot be understood merely as an application of a design, but rather as a constant improvisation – actions and decision – of actors who look for the adaptation of institutions to the demands of the everyday contexts and to their own individual and collective interests. In this thesis, the mutually constitutive relationship

between institutions and individuals (Lowndes and Roberts 2013a), will be understood with reference to the concept of institutional bricolage, which will be discussed in the following section.

### 2.2.4 Institutional bricolage and everyday practices

Bricolage is a concept with several roots and expressions within social theories. A well-known iteration comes from Lévi-Strauss (2004), whose concept of bricolage, to understand how mythical thought – or 'prior science' according to the author – operates by the selection of elements from another culture, so as to create a new one. This process, according to Lévi-Strauss (2004), is similar to the job made by the 'bricoleur', who is someone who carries out do-it-yourself work.

Thus, although bricolage as a concept was rooted in structural anthropology, Johnson (2012) shows that it has been appropriated by both humanities, and also the sciences like molecular biology and evolutionary theory, becoming a universal concept which has the potential of being used beyond its narrow original meaning. Especially relevant for this thesis is the recent use of bricolage in the understanding of institutional processes, provided by the critical institutionalist perspective. This concept refers to an ongoing process of assembling and reshaping institutional arrangements by the conscious and unconscious agency of actors, who juxtapose and blend new arrangements with the current ones (Cleaver and De Koning 2015, p.4). It stresses human agency constructing and reinventing institutions, so as to face daily tasks with appropriate practices (Cleaver 2002; Koning 2011).

This notion of reinventing institutions does not refer to the new set of arrangements prescribing and consequently shaping new behaviour and is also not a radical process of transformation. Rather, bricolage emphasizes the fluid character of institutions, over stability, understanding that institutions are in a constant process of the recombination of different elements, whereby individual or collective actors – in this case, bricoleurs - keep some of the old ones, but mix them with some of the new arrangements (Carstensen 2011b; Allain and Madariaga 2020).

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Additionally, this process of reshaping is not always planned and rationally designed. Instead, according to Cleaver (2002; Hall et al. 2014b), institutional bricolage is a practice of improvising and adapting arrangements to face the characteristics of specific contexts, by using the flexible and multiple purposes and interests that organisations have. Here, the political dimension appears as an essential element, as institutional bricolage is a process where a set of several actors with interests – not always complementary – will operate. In this respect, in critical institutionalism power is a key dimension as some groups "are more able to shape collective rule making and to benefit from the outcomes than others" (Cleaver 2012, p.15). In this vein, Allain and Madariaga (2020) emphasize the relevance of the political consequences of institutional bricolage and also the institutionalisation process, as the role of the "bricoleur" is not reduced to the interpretation of the symbolic world; instead, the role of recombining elements through the selection of some ideas and, therefore, the exclusion of others is inherently political.

The concept of bricolage moves beyond the assumption of institutions only as a stabilization of ideas instead viewing institutionalization as a constructive process where the ideas of those who won the political game can set rules which, in turn, will be internalised by agents as a paradigm. Conversely, the bricolage approach emphasises the notion that institutions cannot prescribe a set of shared beliefs, values and actions that will be reproduced by actors as insiders in the function of maintaining the stability of institutions. In this approach, only external influences may trigger crises that can provoke institutional change. Rather, institutional bricolage recognises the critical sense of actors even when they are institutional insiders and, therefore, agents that may challenge the paradigm built by institutions (Carstensen 2011b).

Regarding this, Lowndes (1996) states that these new institutional analyses are not reduced merely to understanding  how individuals organizations are institutionalised, as the process of institutionalisation is wider and includes the general elements of the social context. Consequently, the analyses are not centred on institutions as static objects, but rather on institutional processes that although they have some stability through time, are also contingent, this is to say, in a state of constant change and adaptation. This is institutional bricolage.

Certainly, from this framework the dynamics that affect the institutional processes are strongly grounded in the power relationships between different actors. Therefore, critical institutionalism is interested in incorporating the daily life political dimension of the exercise of power, into institutionalist analysis, since institutions are surrounded not only by rational decisions and formal rules, but also by several dimensions of everyday social life – cultural, historical, political and so on – which affect them significantly (Cleaver and De Koning 2015). This process of permanent and politically concerned reshaping and interpretation of policy, which is referred to as bricolage, understands institutions as a set of layers which are being overlapped across time (Cleaver and De Koning 2015). This can be an excellent framework to understand how the unequal distribution of power among social relationships, specifically the historical asymmetrical relationship between the Chilean state and indigenous people, affects policy participation.

It should be noted that critical institutional perspectives have usually utilize the concept of institutional in the analysis of natural resources management (Koning 2011). Even though this thesis is not focused on natural resource management, as will be demonstrated in Chapters four and five, amongst several other elements, the access and management of land and water, are crucial issues for indigenous communities who participate of the ADI policy. In addition, the concept is still accurate and relevant for analysing participatory practices at the local level, as it emphasises how institutions are adapted to and reshaped in local territories (Cleaver 2002). Finally, critical institutionalism and institutional bricolage are relevant to incorporate to the analysis of ADI not only informality, but also discussion about the historical roots, enhancing more nuanced understandings of the central issue. Thus, in this research, the concept of institutional bricolage is understood as the formal and informal processes which reshape power, meanings and institutional processes, which affect the distribution of power, knowledge and the conditions of being (see next section).

**2.3 Decolonial perspectives as an approach to frame the participation in ADI policy**

The previous section provided a framework with which to understand the relevance of institutional analysis, in particular the historical, sociological and critical institutionalist approaches. In this section, the aim is to present the decolonial perspective and its links with the institutional processes in the Latin American context. Specifically, by using the concept

of coloniality of power (Quijano 2000a) this section pays attention to the meso-level of analysis, given by the colonial origins of institutions in Latin America and, moreover, the current expressions of coloniality manifest themselves within institutions.

### 2.3.1 Colonialism and the formative moment of modern institutions in Latin-America

In the section dedicated to historical institutionalism, the formative moment (Peters 2012) of institutions were mentioned. They are essential for understanding their subsequent paths. In the case of the analysis of the ADI policy, its historical dimension takes us back to the establishment of the modern state in Latin-America. To understand this process, this thesis assumes the "perspective of coloniality", which is defined by Mignolo (2007b, p.156) as a point of observation which emphasises colonial history to understand the construction of the idea of the American continent.

From this perspective, coloniality refers to the current expressions of 'colonial situations', which are "the cultural, political, sexual, spiritual, epistemic and economic oppression/exploitation of subordinate racialized/ethnic groups by dominant racialized/ethnic groups with or without the existence of colonial administrations" (Grosfoguel 2007, p.220). In this regard, Quijano clarifies that coloniality must be differentiated from the idea of colonialism. While colonialism refers to the explicit political order of domination and exploitation that has already disappeared, coloniality addresses the current effects of colonialism in the relationships between peoples (Quijano 2007).

Within decolonial theory there is no explicit link between the concept of coloniality and the 'formative moment' which is introduced by historical institutionalism. Nevertheless, it is interesting to emphasise the relevance of the perspective of coloniality to understand the path dependency of institutions, no matter if the formal colonial organisations were already dismantled. According to Mignolo, coloniality is inextricably linked with the concept of modernity, which is an expression of the European point of view that was expanded through colonial processes (Mignolo 2007b; Mignolo 2017).

Since modernity and colonisation have followed the same path, Dussel (2005) warns us about the viability and validity of development, considering Latin American countries are perceived not to have achieved modernity, which often appears as an incomplete project. Understanding the institutional process in Latin-American has to consider the 'locus of enunciation' (Dussel 2011). In this regard, it should be noted that in the colonial studies of Latin America, it is usual to find the concept of decoloniality, which is different from post-colonialism, postcolonialism and even decolonial studies.

So as to attend to these conceptual distinctions, Hiddleston (2009) argues that while post-colonialism refers to the period that follows the end of formal colonial rule, the postcolonial concept is broader as it includes the period after colonial rule, and "the events that succeeded its beginning" (Hiddleston 2009, p.4). Although postcolonialism is more accurate for analysing the institutional process of ADI with a historical approach, the concept is broadly associated to "British and French colonialism in the second half of the twentieth century" (Hiddleston 2009, p.3). In turn, Walsh (2005; 2020) introduced the concept of decoloniality to address not only the processes held during the past conditions of coloniality, but also the current processes of marginalisation. She stresses that the conceptual debate about de-coloniality, (de)coloniality, and decoloniality, underlies the dehumanisation that the coloniality of power, knowledge, being, and nature brings, producing "existence-based struggles of peoples historically sub-alternised by race, gender, and geopolitical location" (Walsh 2020, p.605). Mignolo (2008) adds the concept of decoloniality is relevant as it places emphasis on the specific genealogy, different from the 'descolonization' popular during the Cold War and the 'post-colonialism' and 'postcolonialism' used within European critical theories (Mignolo 2008). Specifically, the process of colonization in Latin-America was held from the XVI century, as part of Spanish colonialization and its efforts to replace the traditional political institutions of indigenous peoples with the European ones.

Having made this conceptual clarification, it is now possible to focus on the formative moments of the state in Latin-America. In this regard, Dussel (1973) indicates how the institutions of the state, along with their bureaucratic arrangements, were imposed in Latin America from outside in a top-down manner by the Spanish colonisers. They exerted their role as bureaucrats of the Spanish Empire, looking to replicate Spanish political and

economic institutions. This process was not characterised by an intersubjective encounter between individuals, who created a set of rules to frame social life, that can be understood sociologically from the works of Weber, in particular in his analysis of modern western societies (Weber and Roth 1978). In opposition to this, the attempt of setting the Spanish institutions in Latin America was defined by the unequal distribution of power between the colonisers and the indigenous people who inhabited the continent. Therefore, the rational construction of institutions was substituted – or at least mixed – with violence-based domination (Dussel 1992). From the new institutional perspective, this corresponds to a new way to build the rules in use, formerly based mainly in rational agreements, latterly based in violence and domination.

The perspective of coloniality is relevant to understand that the process of modernisation of societies in the former Portuguese and Spanish colonies in South America went hand-in-hand with the violence of coloniality (Mignolo 2007b). As Quijano (2014) states, while Europe held social struggles that redefined the spaces of domination throughout the formation of nation-states, in the colonized regions the formation of nation-states was rather an instrument of domination of the colonial empires. Moreover, this author states that economic and racial domination were essential aspects of the establishment of a new model of domination, since the national identification of European populations was encouraged by their process of colonization and the racialization of colonies and populations (Quijano 2014). As a consequence, with modernity, a new geopolitical relationship between Western Europe and America emerged, grounded on the conquerors' perspectives. In this relationship, while Western Europe was located in the hegemonic centre of control of power and production of subjectivity, culture and knowledge; America was located in the margins, as the opposition of civilization, rationality and modernity (Quijano and Ennis 2000).

Consequently, in Latin America the national state and its bureaucratic organisation were not the expression of an internal process of social differentiation and autonomy (Habermas 1984; Hegel et al. 1991; Weber 2001; Luhmann 2007). Rather, these institutions were imposed over the traditional organisation of indigenous people, so as to support and enforce the conquerors' power. Thus, the previous social systems were annihilated as a legitimate way of social life through the oppression, assimilation or syncretism, as a deliberate process

of mixture between the American and Spanish traditions (Dussel 1992; Quijano 2000b; Mignolo 2002; Bengoa 2008).

Regarding to above, the colonization of indigenous peoples and everything that it implies and represents their world view today, have been institutionalised, so as to settle an institutionalised structure of oppression. According to Dussel (2011) there were three elements that defined the institutionalisation of domination. Firstly, the indigenous were dominated through the work relationships, based on the *encomienda,* a sort of contract where the indigenous were evangelised and they would work in return. Evidently, this exchange was based on the idea that the traditional religiosity of indigenous people was not valid, thus it should be replaced by the conqueror's belief system(s). Secondly, King Philip II, who was governing Spain at that moment, organised and unified the colonization policy, which was to be implemented in all the colonies in America. The bases of this policy were the document "Opinion of Yucay" (Dussel 2011, p.211), which stated that the Incas – indigenous people and empire allocated in South America – were a tyrannical power. Consequently, the Spanish crown assumed the responsibility of 'emancipating' people through the conquest. Finally, Dussel (2011) states that the monopoly of the European ownership of lands, mineral and payment of taxes oppressed indigenous peoples in the context of colonisation.

In this context, decolonial theorists emphasise a conceptual and historical difference and, likewise, a connection between the modern nation-state and the colonial nation-state. In this regard, Mignolo (2007a) argues that in Europe, the emergence of the 'modern nation-states' was grounded on two elements: a centralised authority of imperial/ colonial domination, and the idea of nations constructed around 'whiteness'. In turn, at the same time in South America and the Caribbean  'colonial nation-states' emerged (Mignolo 2007a, p.157).

To elaborate the idea of coloniality and the formation of local elites that promoted an 'internal colonialism' in Latin-America, Mignolo elaborates the concept of a colonial 'matrix of power' (Mignolo 2007a). This refers to the existence of institutions of domination with "centralized political power" (Quijano and Ennis 2000, p.558), where the modern nation-state has an essential role in its production and permanency. In particular, the efficacy and

permanency of the colonial model hinged upon the efficacy of the homogenization of internal dynamics within the countries, so as to ensure the control of the nation-states. In this sense, democracy has been an effective way in achieving the homogenisation of the distribution of the control of power. However, "such a sphere could not be democratic (involving people placed in unequal relations of power as legally and civilly equal citizens) if the social relations in all of the other spheres of social existence are radically undemocratic or antidemocratic" (Quijano and Ennis 2000, pp.557–558). Additionally, homogenisation facilitates the concentration of efforts toward to a unique horizon of development (Dussel 1992; Apel and Dussel 2005). In this sense, the hegemony of Eurocentric thinking, and the homogenisation of this project depicts the change as something linear and unidirectional, discouraging the arising of local and specific projects.

The process of coloniality has resulted, therefore, in the extension of a highly Eurocentric rationality. Its two outcomes, i.e. capitalism and the state as a modern institution, were considered the universal and highest level of civilization (Dussel 1992). This idea remains valid even after the independence of the Latin-American countries which started at the beginning of the XIX century. To understand how the colonial process of domination was set and  extended beyond the formal domination of the Spanish crown, this thesis will use the concept of the coloniality of power (Quijano 2000b; Mignolo 2008; Mignolo 2017), which is presented in detail in the next section.

### 2.3.2   Coloniality and the current rules of the game in Latin-America

In the previous section the context of the formative moment of the modern institutions and Latin-America and the relevance of the 'perspective of coloniality' was presented. In this section, the aim is rather to understand why coloniality as a concept refers not only to the past of the former colonies. Instead, it is a contemporary phenomenon that affects the 'rules of game' in the region until the present day. In this sense, colonial institutions were essential in the reproduction of these Euro-centred relationships with the former colonies in the continent of America, even after their formal independence.

In this regard, the colonial matrix of power, as mentioned earlier, framed the colonial nation-state in Latin-America. According to Quijano and Ennis, this matrix is expressed through four

central elements: "(a) the disputes over the control of labor and its resources and products; (b) sex and its resources and products; (c) authority and its specific violence; (d) intersubjectivity and knowledge" (Quijano and Ennis 2000, p.557). Likewise, these elements are based and interconnected by three dimensions, which are the coloniality of power, the coloniality of knowledge and the coloniality of being (Mignolo 2017).

Specifically, according to Mignolo (2017), the **coloniality of power** gave legitimation to unequal social relationships between the colonisers and the colonised. This asymmetrical relationship and domination of colonised peoples was based on supposed biological differences. However, the historical social identities ground the creation of phenotypes which define social classification. In particular, this social distinction defined a hierarchy with white Europeans as part of society and the public sphere, while Indians, black and *mestizos* or mixed race were excluded (Quijano and Ennis 2000). Thus, the definitions of hierarchies, domination and the distribution of power are based on race as a social category, especially in the definition of the workforce and slavery (Quijano 2007; Quijano et al. 2014). As Dussel (1992) states, invasion and colonization excluded the oppressed from the hegemonic communities of communication, became the other-face of modernity, the under covered discovered.

Regarding the **coloniality of knowledge**, this refers to the hegemonic position of the coloniser in the production of valid knowledge, whereby American knowledge was reduced to a "peasant subculture" (Quijano and Ennis 2000, p.541). This asymmetrical model of knowledge production is called Eurocentrism, and is based on race and its subsequent binary reason/body (Dussel 1992; Quijano 2007; Mignolo 2017). Specifically, non-white people were not recognised for their capacity to produce valid knowledge, being relegated to being bodies only valuable as a workforce or for reproduction. In this sense, domination cannot be possible without the production of a framework of knowledge which legitimizes the new order. In this sense, domination includes a "systematic repression, not only of the specific beliefs, ideas, images, symbols or knowledge that were not useful to global colonial domination, while at the same time the colonizers were expropriating from the colonized their knowledge, especially in mining, agriculture, engineering, as well as their products and work" (Quijano 2007, p.169).

Finally, the **coloniality of being** refers to the idea of Western Europe as the highest stage of civilization (Dussel 1992; Hegel 2001; Weber 2001). Thus, this domination involved the fact that colonised people were forced to replace their own culture with the European one, especially in the case of the imposition of religion (Quijano and Ennis 2000). This expression of coloniality is, therefore, reproduced through the system of culture, which refers to the repression of cultural symbols and meanings and production patterns (Quijano et al. 2014). This domination gave indigenous cultures a systematic and formalised disadvantaged position in comparison to the European culture (Quijano et al. 2014).

The concealment of some knowledge and world views is produced predominantly by a mono-cultural rationality, whereby modern science become the hegemonic criteria of production of valid knowledge (Santos 2011). Thus, the community of equals who deliberate about public issues is reduced to elites and excludes those who have been traditionally excluded as barbaric. According to Mignolo (2008) the de-colonial option looks to overcome this universal thinking from a pluri-versal standpoint. This colonial option is open to incorporate as valid perspectives those that come from different languages, traditions, and subjectivities, taking into account the 'colonial injury' as a critical position (Mignolo 2008).

In social policies, the above is represented by the reduction of valid knowledge to scientific and technical perspectives, which undermine popular knowledge rooted in citizens whose evidence lies in their own experiences. Although critical perspectives have already warned about the hegemony of the technical rationality (Weber and Roth 1978) and the 'colonization of lifeworld' (Habermas 1984). However, the starting point in this tradition is the diagnosis of modern western societies. To ignore the historical and political background in the understanding of social phenomena that are held in Latin America implies the assumption that theories may function without any contextual mediation.

It should be noted that institutional analysis from a decolonial perspective is not a new concept. In the analysis of European colonies, Johnson and Robinson (2001) introduced the concept of constructive institutions, to refer to the process of production and reproduction of European economic institutions in European colonies. However, when the conditions were inadequate for developing those institutions, extractive institutions were set up, in order to grab natural resources in favour of European states (Acemoglu et al. 2001; Parent

2018). However, institutional theory is not the framework that decolonial theory has adopted in the analysis of power relationships in Latin-America. As this thesis aims to explore the links between new institutionalism and the perspective of coloniality in the analysis of participation, it is possible to suggest that these three dimensions – coloniality of power, coloniality of knowledge and coloniality of being – can be considered as elements that affect the rules of the game, as they are recognised as permanent rules which have framed social relationships in the former colonies. These asymmetries have enabled the control of labour which is expressed in slavery, serfdom and the domination of resources of production (Maldonado-Torres 2007; Quijano 2007).

In the case of Chile, Salazar (2000) states that during the first period of the colony held in the XVI century, access to the means of production was centrally managed by the Spanish crown. According to Salazar (2000), since the costs of the exploration of new territories were paid for mostly directly by individuals and not by the crown, conquerors saw in the oppression of indigenous people as a way to maximise their profits. This kind of labour oppression is called "*trabajo-masa*" – mass-work – which refers to the maximisation of the number of workers and of the intensity of the work that they ought to carry out (Salazar 2000). Consequently, the racial distinction was essential to validating oppression, as well as for keeping that social relationship as a structure whereby the social mobility, far from the modern concept of society, was not a possibility for indigenous people and was limited to mixed-race people.

### 2.4 Participation as a strategy to include citizens' voices in the decision-making.

The previous section provided a theoretical framework for understanding the relationship between individuals and institutions. This was based on new institutional and decolonial perspectives. This section examines the ways that relationship can be understood from the concept of participation. To do this, first it will look the contributions of institutional theory, in order to understand participation as an expression of the 'rules of the game' (Lowndes et al. 2006b). Secondly, different kinds and levels of participation are presented, paying specific attention to local political participation. The final section addresses the micro-level of institutional analysis, focusing on the participation and its specific considerations including indigenous peoples.

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### 2.4.1 Participation and rules of game

From an institutional perspective, Lowndes (2006b) identifies three factors which significantly affect local participation: resources, relationships and rules. Considering the contributions of Verba (1995), beyond socio-economic status (SES), there are certain resources, i.e. money, education and civic skills, which are directly related to the participation (or otherwise) of citizens. However, resources have different meanings, even inside the same territory. Similar to the concept of functioning offered by Amartya Sen (1988), which broadly says that the potential of a good in achieving depends on personal and social factors, the resources considered as relevant means to achieve participation will be defined by the specific contexts. For instance, education does not have an unequivocal meaning as a resource of participation, as it can include, or not, formal academic training or traditional knowledges that indigenous communities can have.

Regarding relationships, Lowndes and Wilson (2001) indicate that social capital can be understood as a bilateral influence between civil society and government: while the first affects the decision-making process due to organisation and collective action, the second provides the institutional framework to enhance or hinder social capital development. For these authors, in the contexts of low levels of social capital, the government's role can be essential for reverting this trend and promoting trust and collaboration between people (Lowndes and Wilson 2001). This can be a relevant aspect in considering studies about participation, where the institutions play an important role, along with their aims and actions which are influenced by social action as well. In this vein, Lowndes (2006b) argues that studies in the UK show that there is no strong influence between social capital and participation. However, "while policymakers (especially at the local level) can do little to change the underlying SES of a locality, and have limited scope to nurture social capital, they can shape the institutional rules of the participation game" (Lowndes et al. 2006b, p.542).

Considering the limitations of these two factors in the analysis of participation, Lowndes (2006b) incorporates a third factor into the analysis of participation: rules or, in particular, 'rules-in-use'. Lowndes (2006b) takes the concept of rules-in-use from Ostrom (2007) to refer to the influence that formal and informal institutions have on individuals' behaviour and on institutional change. Consistently with this, critical institutionalism emphasises the

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role of agents in shaping institutions in their everyday practices (Cleaver 2002; Koning 2011; Cleaver and De Koning 2015).

In this thesis, the participatory goals of the policy are focused on a specific group of the population, which is the indigenous communities who inhabit the territories where the ADI is implemented. Beyond the differences in individual levels, money, education and civic skills, there tends to be homogeneous distribution among the local indigenous communities. Therefore, SES or other approaches centred on the resources are not effective to identify patterns of participation within the same group. As Pattie et al (2004, p.207) state "people living in the same place exhibit roughly similar levels of citizenship". In this sense, the difficulties of achieving strong participation from indigenous peoples are an antecedent previous to the implementation of the policy, thus, the challenge is to include the rules of the game which enable us to overcome this gap in their participation.

Similarly, Immergut (1990) developed the concept of 'veto points' and 'veto groups' in her analysis about professional power in public health. She argues that in order to understand the power that a minority has "one should turn from the particular resources of the minority group to the specific characteristics of democratic political institutions" (Immergut 1990, p.395). Although her research focused on groups considered as relatively powerful in comparison with others, in this thesis the focus has to be on the identification of those rules of the game and the analysis of their suitability to change the patterns of exclusion of indigenous communities from the decision-making processes in their local areas.

In promoting participation, robust institutions are essential, usually grounded by informal arrangements, (Lowndes et al. 2006b; Cleaver 2012; Lowndes 2014b), as in this way, they can provide spaces where citizens can channel their specific demands (Cleaver 2012). However, the influence is not only in unilateral from institutions to the actors' behaviour. Moreover, institutional bricolage has a circular dynamic where also actors shape those institutions (Cleaver 2002; Cleaver 2012; Lowndes and Roberts 2013a; Allain and Madariaga 2020). In this vein, participation is the power that, given the institutional framework, bricoleurs have to shape institutions, in order to achieve their interests.

It should be noted that, according to Lowndes & Roberts (2013a), along with the rules,

institutions shape actors' behaviour by practices. According to Lowndes and Roberts, 'rules' correspond to the formal and explicit dimension of institutions, while 'practices', in opposition, refers the reproduction of institutions by demonstrations, whereby "actors understand how they are supposed to behave through observing the routinized actions of others and seeking to recreate those actions" (Lowndes and Roberts 2013a, p.57). Additionally, as Cleaver and De Koning argue (Koning 2011; Cleaver and De Koning 2015), institutional arrangements can be embedded in social and/or in bureaucratic arrangements. Likewise, informal rules – or practices – are not necessarily consistent with formal rules and, even from a normative perspective, it is possible to say that they can "support 'positive' patterns of behaviour, like accountability or probity or a 'public service ethos'; equally they may underpin 'negative' frameworks, like patronage, paternalism or sexism" (Lowndes and Roberts 2013a, p.58). The relevance of this distinction for this thesis is participation will be analysed not only as a formal rule, but also as the impacts that the ADI policy has over the actors involved, both as a policy manager, and as a member of an indigenous community. In turn, the participation, from this perspective, should be expressed as actions and decisions made by the actors in their daily interaction with the ADI policy.

### 2.4.2   Levels and types of participation

According to Cornwall and Coelho (2007), from 1990 policies have being characterised by a "deliberative turn" which has enhanced democratization in the relationship between the state and citizens. Despite the universal acceptance of democracy and participation in the current debates about development, "what democracy meant in practice was increasingly elastic" (White 1996, p.142), so this concept "can be used to evoke - and to signify- almost anything that involves people" (Cornwall 2008, p.269). Consequently, a range of practices can be presented under the label of participative (Cornwall 2008). Similarly, Barret & Brunton-Smith (2014) state that participation can be understood as a behaviour and not only as an intention.

Although participation is an ongoing concept that tends to be ambiguous, in the literature it is possible to identify some relevant approaches which help to clarify and understand it. In this sense, civic participation is not only the expression of the citizens' voice, but also considers "citizen rights and a manifestation of citizen agency" (Mahmud 2004, p.11). This is

based on collective action which is developed in a context of full citizenship and beyond the traditional participation which is associated with charity or patronage. For Barret & Brunton-Smith (2014, p.2), civic participation includes "working collectively to solve community problems, belonging to community organizations, attending meetings about issues of concern, volunteering, making donations to charities, etc." Since participation has a political and democratic component, participation is related to an active exercise of citizenship: "to become a citizen is to participate, to struggle, to exercise the right to participate in order to achieve, materialise and guarantee other rights" (Dagnino 2005, p.9).

Alternatively, 'engagement' is associated with "having an interest in, paying attention to, or having knowledge, beliefs, opinions, attitudes or feelings about either political or civic matters" (Barrett and Brunton-Smith 2014, pp.1–2). Examples of engagement are "paying attention to the news media (newspapers, magazines, television, radio, internet), having political or civic knowledge or beliefs, understanding political or civic values, and holding opinions about and attitudes towards political or civic matters" (Barrett and Brunton-Smith 2014, p.2). Although engagement is not an activity, Mahmud (2004) argues that this increases in the influence of citizens in the public sphere and impacts in the relationship with the state compels states to incorporate citizens' perspectives. Another category related to this is civic participation. This is different from political participation, since civic participation is related to the actions which are directed toward communities, rather than policies or electoral campaigns, such as resolving the problems of the community and the promotion of charity (Mahmud 2004, p.11; Barrett and Brunton-Smith 2014).

In the case of this thesis, since the focus is on the ADI policy and its relationship with indigenous people, political participation is another category which emerges relevant for the analysis. According to Barret and Brunton-Smith (2014), this concept refers to the interest in affecting directly or indirectly, the different levels of public policies – local, national or supranational level. The influence of political participation encompasses electoral systems, but also other actions, such as public demonstrations, protests or petitions (Brady et al. 1995; Barrett and Brunton-Smith 2014). Political participation appears also as a relevant distinction, which is associated with the actions "that has the intent or effect of influencing either regional, national or supranational governance, either directly by affecting the making

or implementation of public policy or indirectly by influencing the selection of individuals who make that policy (Barrett and Brunton-Smith 2014, p.1). It can be expressed by means of participation in the electoral system, alongside non-conventional processes, such as supporting petitions or being involved in political demonstrations.

Political participation can have different scopes. For example, the concept can be used to refer to the attempts to be part of the political system – as in the case of political parties. Regardless of the specific interests of the participants of this thesis, the scope of participation that will be considered in the analysis is that of local political participation, according to the aims of the ADI policy. This kind of participation refers to "the action taken by citizens in seeking to influence decisions ultimately taken by public officials and elected representatives at the local level" (Lowndes et al. 2006b, p.542). These actions consider, although are not reduced to, participation in the electoral system, but also include attempts of citizens to communicate and engage with local authorities, attending to demonstrations and other formal and informal interactions (Brady et al. 1995). Local political participation is not reduced to the description of the relationship between state and society. Moreover, participation is about how the institutional framework – a dynamic process which is understood in this thesis as an institutional bricolage – influences the possibilities of different groups to achieve their interests and thereby shape the institutional framework itself.

Additionally, in an academic understanding of participation it is possible to identify distinct levels of participation. A classical, but highly relevant contribution has been proposed by Arnstein (1969), who proposes a ladder with eight steps of participation and non-participation. The two first levels, namely manipulation and therapy, refer to the levels of "non-participation", which is when some activities are labelled as participatory, but they are, in fact, a way to "educate" or "cure" (Arnstein 1969, p.217) people from top-down by the powerholders. Informing, consultation and placation are the next three levels, labelled "degrees of tokenism", where disadvantaged people can be heard and have a voice, but there is no distribution of power, since the same powerful people ultimately make the decisions. Finally, the top level of participation is identified as "degrees of citizen power" and includes the categories of partnership, delegated power and citizen control (Arnstein 1969, p.217). Here, the disadvantaged people pass from the negotiation to having a prominent role

in decision-making.

Another relevant distinction in the concept of participation is offered by White (1996), who states that the analysis of participation has to address two main questions: who participates? which must consider the different challenges in achieving the participation of disadvantaged groups; and the level of participation, which regards to how people are involved in the decision-making process. Having this in consideration and the outcomes of empirical studies, she identifies four ways in which participation can be expressed: nominally, instrumentally, representatively and transformatively (White 1996). As per Arnstein's ladder of participation, White's typology also represents the increasing levels of citizens' involvement, that oscillate from the mere pursuit of legitimation of local authorities and inclusion of residents in meetings or formal report in the nominal level, to the empowerment of the population which characterise the transformative level of participation, where people have "the practical experience of being involved in considering options, making decisions, and taking collective action to fight injustice" (White 1996, p.146)

In the Chilean debate, Serrano (1998) represents a relevant reference regarding the conceptualisation of participation and her model has been widely used, at least in the design stage, of different public organisms in the country (Ministry of Public Works (Ministerio de Obras Públicas) 2014; Social Organisations Division - Gobierno de Chile 2016). She argues that since the predominance of individualism and the market dynamics in society, governmental interest in promoting participation has not been translated into participatory practices and, thus, in the policy design and implementation in Chile, there is a distinct absence of a theoretical framework to understand and support policy-making processes. As a respond of this, this author proposes an analytic matrix of participation analysis (Raczynski and Serrano 1998; Serrano 1998).

**Build social capital**

Social enabling and
empowerment
participation

Consultative
participation

*Citizens' influence*
**Influence the programme**

*Citizens' influence*
**Use the programme**

Management
participation

Instrumental
participation

*What social participation is for?*
**Satisfy basic needs**

*Figure 2 - Analytic matrix of participation (Serrano, 1998)*

The matrix is based in two axes. The vertical axis addresses what social participation is for, which can be represented, on the one side, by the satisfaction of a concrete and limited need, such as participation to access to a house or a loan; or, on the other side, participation for the accumulation of social capital, such as access to rights or power. The horizontal axis refers to the influence that citizens have over the programme, which can be no influence or a significant influence on programme decision-making (Serrano 1998).In the intersection of the axes, the author proposed categories of participation, where the lowest levels tend to the instrumentalization of participation – focusing on satisfaction of basic needs using pre-defined policies – and the highest levels tend to promote empowerment of citizens and their possibilities to influence in the policies decision-making.

Although this model offers a more complex approach to citizen participation, compared to the linear analysis that for example Arnstein proposes, and considering its wide and effective use in the study of participatory processes in Chile, its limitation for using it in this thesis lies in the fact that it does not have explicit links to the new institutional theory. Historical

patterns, institutional and contextual cultural characteristics, and power relations between the actors involved are elements that the matrix does not address.

Another model to analyse participation that will be taking into account in this thesis is the CLEAR model (Lowndes et al. 2006a). Despite the design of the model not aiming to specifically analyse Latin-American contexts and its implications for indigenous communities, this approach is still relevant to examine some aspects of the ADI policy, as it provides a flexible framework with which to understand participatory practices in the implementation of policies, such as ADI, from the citizens' perspectives (Lowndes et al. 2006a). Additionally, considering the new institutional framework, this model permits description of participation not by using categories, but by offering elements to understand the 'rules of the game' which shape participation at the local. Specifically, the effectiveness of participation will be higher if practices involve the following elements (Lowndes et al. 2006a):

- Can do: related to access to the resources and knowledge that participatory processes require.
- Like to: people will be more engaged with the participation when they have sense of attachment and identity.
- Enable to: refers to the local context of participation, including other actors and organization. In this sense, collective participation and civic infrastructure reinforce and support specific participatory practices.
- Asked to: Participation will be stronger and more effective when this is mobilized by the invitation of official bodies, especially when it comes from those who are responsible for decision-making.
- Responded to: which means that the capacity of institutions to respond to the people's voice.  That is, to see evidence that their views have been duly considered. Therefore, people will know that their perspectives have been considered.

This model aims to inform the decision-making for policy makers in their efforts to promote citizen participation (Lowndes et al. 2006a, p.285). Although this is a positive purpose and useful approach, is limited in understanding the conflictive implementation of participatory agendas. An example of this is the manipulation in participation mentioned by Arnstein

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(1969), referring when an apparent participatory strategy is promoted for, contrarily, to limiting the exercise of citizens' power.

Notwithstanding the enormous contribution of these theories and approaches about participation, as the focus of the participation is put on the institutional arrangements, in this thesis the analyses will not be framed by one specific theoretical construction regarding the levels of participation or types of participation. Moreover, the understanding of the participatory processes will be framed by the new institutional theory and the decolonial perspective. From here, this thesis proposes participation is imbricated in a circular institutional bricolage (Lowndes and Roberts 2013a; Cleaver and De Koning 2015), in which agents, have different levels of power to shape the rules-in-use (Lowndes et al. 2006b) and, in turn, the possibilities that these rules offer to the agents to exercise this power. These rules are determined by historical paths (Hall and Taylor 1996a; Steinmo 2008), which in the case of Latin-American contexts, involve a colonial relationship between the state and the indigenous communities, expressed in the colonial matrix of power (Quijano 2000b; Mignolo 2007a).

### 2.4.3 Participation, power and policymaking.

Although the policymaking process is affected by different factors, the institutional arrangements will have a relevant role in framing the rules that the actors involved in the process will play. In this sense, the significance of the relationship between the institutional analysis and policymaking process is expressed, according to Hall (1986), for the fact that political interests that actors aim to achieve, are affected by an institutional framework. This will be relevant in defining the power relations and the consequent hierarchies between these actors.

In this context, power distribution is a dimension that should be considered the conceptualisation of citizen participation since, according with Baño (1998) citizen participation refers to the relationship between state and civic society, where the latter tries to influence the former. This process has a positive value, because it is assumed that the citizens' goals are beneficial and, because that influence is itself a value.

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According to Cornwall (2008), spaces for participation have specific features which impact on participatory processes. The author differentiates between spaces from above, which are 'invited spaces' offered by institutions and policy makers; and spaces from below, referring to those created by people in consideration of their common aims and where the officials have an essential role in facing local obstacles to power distribution. Related to this, Mahmud (2004) argues that in participatory spaces, power and hierarchical relationships will still be persisting and decentralizing from the top to the local levels might not be sufficient to resolve the local centralization of power. This distinction is relevant since the practice of participation involves "relations of power between different actors, each with their own 'projects', shape and reshape the boundaries of action" (Cornwall 2008, p.276).

Thus, paying attention to the specific local conditions that affect participation is essential. For instance, some groups can have the sense of insufficient possibilities for making change, which can hinder participation, especially if the spaces of participation are not familiar or imply costs in time, transport, etc. that people cannot afford (Mahmud 2004). Also, Brady et al (1995, p.285) demonstrate that resources of "time, money and civic skills are also powerful predictors of political participation in America". This is relevant for this thesis as indigenous people have been especially affected, since their relationship within the institutional dimension is rooted in Spanish colonisation and the subsequent *chilenización* – an internal process of domination led by the Chilean state (Salazar 2000; Gundermann Kroll et al. 2003; Bengoa 2008; Jofré 2017).

Beyond the complexity of the concept of participation, Mahmud (2004) sustains that participation is desirable because it increases people's influence, and facilitates reaching goals in a more effective way, which is especially relevant for disadvantaged groups. As a risk, Dagnino (2005) argues that because of the association between participation and neoliberalism, there is an ambiguity in participation, in its theory and practice alike. Thus, participation has been instrumentalized, morphing into a means for neoliberal project achievements rather than a means to access to human rights and citizenship.

According to this, citizenship seems to be an unavoidable concept for understanding participation. Related to this, Dagnino (2005, p.11) sustains that "the meaning, reach and significance of participation with respect to citizenship needs to be examined in each

concrete case", since participation might have different meanings in each context. Formal citizenship will be embodied in a sense of full citizenship, when people act collectively, overcoming the passive client role to becoming active citizens. Mahmud (2004) argues that this requires an individual dimension, which means individual agency and empowerment, and the "sense of control over one's lives and individual agency, the feeling that you can contribute by participating" (2004, p.12). Also, Mahmud (2004) states that there is a collective dimension, which is community empowerment, which means the trustworthiness of collective voice's influence. Finally, the institutional dimension should be considered, which is associated to mechanisms meant to foster deliberation and equal engagement.

In this context, a specific group which is especially affected by inequalities is the indigenous communities. In this regard, Barret & Brunton-Smith (2014) suggest that ethnicity as a demographic factor should be included in the analysis of participation, since it is associated to specific patterns of engagement. Specifically, they indicate that although ethnic minorities tend to have less political and civic knowledge, they tend to be keener to participate in volunteer activities in their own communities or with other minorities. Additionally, indigenous knowledge is essential to development projects, as it enables institutional learning about local traditions, and thus adapting global practices to local contexts (World Bank 1998; Tripathi and Bhattarya 2004).

In this debate, it should be noted that participatory practices will not intrinsically achieve a higher level of influence in public policies, since they always bring the risk of reproduction of traditional hierarchies (Dagnino 2005; Cornwall and Coelho 2007). Thus, political participation is not disconnected from the institutional framework that determines the scope of the influence of citizens in policies, especially in the context of acute and violent inequalities. In those, some cultural and social characteristics should be taken in account, such as education, wealth, and ethnic, racial and linguistic background, because they affect the political influence of specific groups (Verba et al. 1987; Brady et al. 1995). In this research, the ethnic background and its link to political participation is placed at the centre of analysis, since it concentrates on some historical and social characteristics which affect political participation. Historically, from the colonisation period during XVI and XVII centuries, these communities have been oppressed through the structures of the colonial

matrix of power being based in the generation of asymmetrical relationships between colonisers and indigenous people founded in race, capitalism, and subjective and cultural relationships (Quijano 2000b). Thus, race was useful in establishing differences between whites – the European colonisers – and indigenous people, capitalism produced domination of workforce and means of production, and the subjective dimension is associated to the knowledge and cultural meanings production (Quijano 2000b).

Considering the differences between these groups and the hegemonic forms of participation, Cornwall and Coelho (2007) suggest that institutional spaces of participation should consider an educational role oriented towards communicative skills development, taking into account the fine line between education and colonization and patronizing behaviour. This is especially relevant when the validation of "rational modes of argumentations of deliberative democracy" (Cornwall and Coelho 2007, p.20) can represent a straitjacket where indigenous people should fit, regardless their own traditions and knowledges. From a cultural perspective, lack of participation is "culturally associated with groups to which they do not belong or activities with which they are unfamiliar or uncomfortable" (Cornwall 2008, p.279). Also, self-exclusion can be interrelated with previous futile experiences of participation, which can be the reason which gives rise to a sense of rejection rooted in "participation fatigue" (Cornwall 2008, p.280).

### 2.5 Conclusions of the chapter

In order to present the standpoint from which future analyses will be conducted, in this chapter three main theoretical approaches were examined. Firstly, the institutional framework, drawing on new institutionalism, in specific historical, sociological and critical institutionalism, were presented as a macro-level of analysis of participation in ADI. This is a useful approach to understand ADI policy as set of formal and informal rules that are affected by agents, as well they affect agents as well (Lowndes 1996; Lowndes and Roberts 2013a). The production and reproduction of institutions is conceptualised as a bricolage, this means, an in-building process, where both the structural and the daily life level play a role (Koning 2011; Lowndes and Roberts 2013b; Cleaver and De Koning 2015). Special attention is paid to the power relationships involved between different actors, who according to the levels of

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power and resources that they have, are capable to shape the institutional framework and, in particular, the creation and rules in use (Carstensen 2011b; Cleaver 2012).

However, to address the specific characteristics of the ADI policy implementation and its inherent link with the indigenous position in the Latin-American context, a decolonial turn was necessary. For this purpose, the theoretical framework draws on the colonial power matrix of power (Mignolo 2007a; Quijano et al. 2014), which helps to understand the relationship between the current disadvantaged position of indigenous peoples in front of the state, as a result of a colonial process that affected the dimensions of power, knowledge and being. Finally, it was introduced the concept of participation as the power of individuals and collective actors of achieve their interests in the public arena (Cornwall and Coelho 2007). In this vein, CLEAR model was presented as an operative framework to examine how participatory processes are held in organisations, in this case ADI policy.

In the intersection of the new institutional and the decolonial theories, the conceptual definition of institutions is expressed in different ways. Along with the differentiation of formal and informal institutions mentioned in the light of the new institutional theory, the critical institutionalism brings also the categories of bureaucratic and socially embedded arrangements (Cleaver 2002). This categorisation stresses the interchangeable and less static character of institutions, since written norms can be socially embedded, as well as culture-based norms can be written (Koning 2011).

As previously said, these institutional dynamics are understood under the concept of bricolage which corresponds to a continue process of shaping the rules, where "old arrangements are modified and new ones invented" (Cleaver and De Koning 2015, p.4). In the case of the ADI policy, the bricolage is marked by the colonial process, which gives rise to another conceptually binary categorisation: the distinction between old and new institutions. Throughout this thesis, old institutions are those rules that have traditionally organised the Aymara and Mapuche communities, and which have existed since before the installation of modern institutions by the Spanish crown and, later, by the Chilean state. Without trying to reduce complexity, but rather assuming these dualisms as guiding categories for analysis, in the following chapters formal institutions, bureaucratic arrangements and new institutions tend to be overlapped and associated to rules reinforced

by the Chilean state, while informal institutions, social embedded arrangements and old institutions tend to represent indistinctly, albeit with nuances to be specified where necessary, the rules safeguarded and reproduced by communities and individuals who self-identify themselves as indigenous.

From the theoretical approaches presented in this chapter, this thesis aims to contribute to the current debates about participation, moving forward the traditional understanding of this concept, such as the ladder of participation of Arnstein (1969) by integrating the institutional analysis of the rules that underlie the relationship between citizens and the social policies that affect them. In concrete, a concept of citizen participation was developed, which refers to the power that actors, as bricoleurs, have to shape institutions according to their interests. This understanding of participation pushes the predominant static and lineal concepts. In addition, this thesis links participation with the historical patterns of domination that currently affect the distribution of power, in particular, the coloniality of power (Quijano 2000b).

# Chapter 3. Methods and research aim, questions, and objectives

## 3.1 Introduction of the chapter

In the previous chapter, the theoretical standpoint to approach the main body of this thesis was established – that is particularly to analyse the participatory practices that take place in the implementation of the Indigenous Development Areas (ADI) in Chile, and to analyse to what extent these practices redistribute power away from the state and towards indigenous communities. In the current chapter, the objective is to present the methodology used throughout this research. The first section addresses the constructivist approach and the epistemologies of the South, as ontological and epistemological positions assumed by this thesis in discerning participation in the implementation of ADI policy. Following this, the research questions and aims and objectives that guide this research are introduced. The third section of this chapter focusses on the method of data collection, highlighting the instruments used in the field-work process and the criteria used in the selection of the participants. The fourth section defines the main characteristics of the territories. The fifth section describes the analytical processes used, including the implementation of the theoretical and conceptual elements involved in the data analysis. Finally, the sixth section presents a critical reflectivity and about the procedures and the personal statement of the researcher about the thesis.

## 3.2 Ontological and epistemological position

This section considers valid knowledge and the relationship between social entities and reality (Bryman 2004). Vromen (2018), in her analysis about methodologies for institutional studies, explains that qualitative approach aims a "detailed thick description and depth" (2018, p.257), for which adaptability of the methods according the context of study. Considering the focus of analysis of this thesis lies on the experiences and perspectives of

local actors related to participation in ADI, it was considered a qualitative approach to capture the formal and informal processes imbricated.

This also leads to a discussion of the ontological perspective underlying this research, which refers "to the nature of reality and its characteristics. When researchers conduct qualitative research, they are embracing the idea of multiple realities" (Creswell 2013, p.20). in particular, this thesis assumes the constructivist approach as an ontological position. Constructivism states that social phenomena are composed of meanings produced by the social interaction of actors' subjectivities, hence, the reality is not external to the individuals (Bryman 2004). As Lowndes and Roberts (2013a) argue, this approach states the world does not exist on its own, it is constructed by individuals, who follow their own beliefs. These authors, however, explain how the synchronised realities of different people, simultaneously derive similar courses of action. Here the institutional approach is relevant in acknowledging that social life is not solely constructed by individual constructions of realities. Instead, there is a dialectic relationship between actors and institutions, expressed in institutions as a representation and consolidation of various people's philosophies (Lowndes and Roberts 2013a). Consequently, in the case of this thesis, the analysis of ADI and the participatory process that it offers cannot be reduced to the individual behaviour of the actors involved. Moreover, the constructivist position is consistent with the analysis of social interactions between the policy managers and indigenous peoples, their sense of involvement and the resulting actions that they can undertake, and their relationship with the law, policies, and institutionalised expectations about how to formulate decisions in the context of a social policy.

Another relevant contribution of constructivism to this thesis, is its approach to power relationships. According to Parsons (2018), the study of social construction involves the study of power and, in particular, the process of social construction of it, and its underlying norms and ideas. Along with socialisation and persuasion, Parsons (2018) mentions the bricolage as a mechanism that operates in the social construction process in a daily life level. This level of construction of power through institutions is essential to understand how the ADIs operates as a mechanism that affect the participation of different actors, beyond the formal rules already defined.

Considering the above, constructivism as an ontological perspective, cannot ignore the constant possibility of conflict between different individual or group perspectives and how the power relationships between different actors affect the emergency of institutions.

In addition, in this research a second perspective considered is the epistemologies of the South, which is relevant in the understanding of influential power in the construction of the reality and considering the decolonial context in which this research is situated. Epistemologies of the South is an approach based on the Santos' ideas (2003; 2011; 2018), which states the starting point of knowledge covers the material conditions of life in the Global South and the new thoughts that have emerged from social movements and other social groups who have being resisting the injustice caused by capitalism, colonialism and patriarchy (Santos 2018). Santos claims that the responses to the current conflicts – as updated expressions of historical processes – cannot be understood exclusively from the Western perspective. Instead, these responses are developed not only from actors organised around unions or political parties, as western theoretical philosophies might anticipate, but from, for instance, indigenous peoples' campaigns instead; and the articulation derived from languages and concepts that cannot be translated directly to the dominant colonial languages. In this context, epistemologies of the South strive to challenge the epistemicide by recognising new possibilities of comprehensive thought and practices from the Global South (Santos 2011).

A relevant idea in the Epistemologies of the South is the lineal concept of time, which considers the past a period that has already ended, and the future where advancement takes place, is not plausible. In the Global South, the contemporary ideas are, in fact, rooted in the past – a revised and reconceptualised past (Santos 2011). According to Santos, the acknowledgement of the South as a place where it is possible to identify an epistemological framework, involves three key concepts: sociology of absence and emergence, contextual knowledge and intercultural translation, and trade practices.

Concerning the sociology of absence (Santos 2003), this recognises that the lack of legitimation of some perceptions is a consequence of some specific social processes, as the sociology of the absence refers to concepts that have been rejected by the hegemonic globalisation. This resulted in the fragmentation of the domestic endeavours and in the

absence of encompassing global links, which eliminate the possibilities of strengthening their potential to build new counter-hegemonic alternatives. In response, a sociology of emergences is proposed, so as to convert absences into emergences through the expansion of knowledge. In this sense, knowledge is no longer produced solely by western contemporary philosophy, but it can also come from actors and spaces usually considered illegitimate for reason of being ignorant, residual, inferior, local or unproductive (Santos 2011).

Opening the epistemology to the validation of margins as creative spaces for the production of knowledge, brings a second central element: ecological knowledge and intercultural translation. On the one hand, ecology as a concept that addresses the plurality of understandings of knowledge – consequently, diverse epistemological worlds – and their interconnections (Santos 2007; Rivera Cusicanqui 2010a; Mignolo and Escobar 2010; Santos 2016). On the other hand, this diversity requires an intercultural translation, so as to achieve a dialogical relationship and coexistence, which involves the identification of common interests, perspectives and also conflicts between the different epistemological traditions (Santos 2007).

Having this ontological and epistemological standpoint, the main problem for this research concerns the ambiguity of participation in the ADIs of indigenous communities, which can be understood from two key issues. On the one hand, there is the invisibility of the indigenous communities' perspectives in policy-making process. On the other hand, this situation has a colonial background, which started in the XVI and XVII centuries with the Spanish colonisation, and was reproduced and intensified by the Chilean state following independence which took place during the XIX century – until today (Bengoa 1999; Gundermann Kroll et al. 2003; Richards 2010). In this context, this research presents a methodology acknowledging the perspectives of the indigenous peoples.

Thus, the methodology of this research is framed by a qualitative approach, which goes beyond generalising the outcomes to a wider population, its objective is in understanding the specific circumstances in a historical and geographical context. Consequently, qualitative studies provide forums for the creation of knowledge where the perspectives of the participants and the significance that they give to their social environment are the main focus

in understanding the problem (Bryman 2004; Flick 2011).

This perspective provides a good setting to promote reflexivity among the participants. According to Freshwater and Rolfe (2001) in opposition to technical rationality, which assumes the research as a linear and unproblematic process where the analysis of the findings of the research, and the critical reflexivity encourages research as an interactive process focussed on social change. Within this framework, the challenge exists in overcoming the research-practice dualism, promoting reflexivity in three ways as an introspective reflexion; as a reflection which connects the local context with a social and political scenario; and as a practical reflection that contributes to improve the current practices (Freshwater and Rolfe 2001). According to Flinders (2013), reflexive knowledge is related to critical sociology, which far from assuming an objective position, is unreservedly politically involved, based on the knowledgeable collusion with a non-academic audience.

In the case of this research, it should be noted that in spite of the fact the researcher is not taking part in the implementation of ADIs, the study of ADIs explores creating knowledge from the perspectives and reflections of the participants of this policy.

### 3.3 Aims and research questions

The general research question is what are the institutional elements frame citizen participation of indigenous communities in ADIs? To respond this question, drawing on the new institutionalism and decolonial perspective, this thesis focuses on two case studies. One is the ADI Alto Andino Arica y Parinacota, territory located in the North of Chile which ancestrally has been inhabited by Aymara communities. The second case is the ADI Puel Nahuelbuta, which covers part of the southern territories that traditionally harbour Mapuche communities.

Considering the above, this study aims to analyse citizen participation in ADIs using institutional and decolonial perspectives.

Having this into account, the specific objectives are:

i)    To analyse the interaction between institutions, processes of institutional bricolage and participatory practices in ADI policy

ii)   To analyse the extent to which the participatory practices that take place in the context of ADI policy impact on the distribution of power between the actors involved.

To address these objectives, the questions that guided the research questions were:

1.  What are the institutional arrangements – formal and informal – in participatory processes and practices in ADI policy?

2.  How does institutional bricolage affect participatory processes and practices in ADI policy?

3.  Given the decolonial context, to what extent does ADI policy promote equality of relationships between indigenous peoples and other actors?

From the theoretical perspective, the framework presented in the previous section is intended to fully encompass the thesis. Despite the complex interconnections between the different elements of the thesis, in the specific case of these research questions, it is possible to highlight some direct links with the theories and concepts. Specifically, new institutionalism is the framework that will guide the analysis related to the first research question. From the concepts of institutions as rules-in-use (Lowndes and Roberts 2013a), this theory permits to identify the formal and informal rules that frame the participatory processes that ADI policy held. Along with this,  a conceptual construction about participation presented in the theoretical chapter, which includes the CLEAR model (Lowndes and Pratchett 2006a), Arnestein's ladder of participation (1969), Serrano's typology for citizen participation (Raczynski and Serrano 1998; Serrano 1998), guided the specific elements related to the participatory dimension that the first research question addresses. In this research, the perspectives that will be included will be those related to policy managers – such as officials – indigenous people – leaders and participants – and other stakeholders – such as local government, NGOs, and others public services.

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In the case of the second research question, the analysis is guided particularly by critical institutionalism. According to this theory, decisions are not the only expression of an impartial logic which engenders particular behaviours. Rather, institutions are a representation of historical, cultural and political layers (Cleaver 2002). In this process, named bricolage (Hall et al. 2014b; Cleaver and De Koning 2015), the policy is reshaped constantly by the actors involved, who have to face local conditions from their various coterminous perspectives, and in a complex network of power relationships. This framework is essential in understanding and revealing the ambiguity that characterises the participatory practices in ADIs policy, since it provides elements to explore beyond the formal and apparently neutral institutional objectives. Additionally, critical institutionalism allows analysis of ADIs not as an immobile expression of formal rules, but as a process that is shaped by actors, in consideration of historical, political, cultural, and other factors. Identifying these factors, their interconnections and interactions with ADIs is essential in understanding the participatory practices and processes promoted by this policy.

Finally, facing the historical dimension and the current expressions of the asymmetrical and conflictive relationship between the state and indigenous people, the third research question embraces the coloniality of power (Quijano 2000b; Mignolo 2002; Mignolo 2007a; Quijano 2007). This perspective permits to understand that the participatory practices and processes involved refer not only to the promotion of self-determination and recognition of the local traditions – as the formal rules show – but at the same time, they are comprised of new expressions and development of the joint relationship between the state and indigenous people, based on domination and resistance (Dussel 1992; Bengoa 1999; Rivera Cusicanqui 2010b; Rivera Cusicanqui 2010a).

### 3.3.1  Research design: case study and the relevance of the contrasts.

To respond the research questions, it was decided to conduct a case study method. Focusing on a specific context of study is consistent with the 'embeddedness' that characterises the studies framed within the framework of new institutionalism (Lowndes 2001), as well with the 'locus of enunciation' (Mignolo and Verdesio 2013), not only as a researcher, but also of each participant and their interaction with the territory. In addition, the study case method is relevant in the light of constructivism, given that by focusing my analysis on two cases, it

is possible to understand not only the way in which isolated individuals interact with institutions. In this vein, interpretivist perspectives of case studies (Stake 1995; Bartlett and Vavrus 2017) stress the understanding of the construction of meanings of the research participants. For this thesis and its qualitative framework, the cases, also known as 'multiple bounded systems' (Creswell 2013, p.73), facilitated the interpretation of a collective discourse situated in a specific shared context, trying to 'capture' the multiple and even contradictory perspectives (Stake 1995) and to contribute to scientific knowledge, not by the generalisation of the findings, but by extending the current literature (Yin 2008) about participation of indigenous communities in the process of shaping policies.

As mentioned, the literature, current political agenda and the interviews that will be analysed in the next chapters, are clear in defining the relevance of the Southern territory in understanding the extreme conflictive relationship between the Chilean state and the Mapuche communities, expressed in militarisation policies carried out by governments, situations of violence and even assassinations and attacks against both indigenous communities and former settlers who inhabit the territory.

In this context, the selection of a case study in the South of the country would have been an obvious decision, under the category of "typical case" (Seawright and Gerring 2008) or "critical case" (Henry 2008). However, I have chosen a "two-case" case study (Yin 2008), selecting one case where the ADI policy has been implemented in the historical conflictive context of the South, adding as well a second case, under the 'most different design method' (Druckman 2005), also known as contrasting cases (Henry 2008) or maximum variation cases (Flyvbjerg 2011, p.307). This design, suggested more than a century ago by Mill (1843), aims to compare two or more cases, emphasising their contrast and differences (Flyvbjerg 2006). Following the Yin (2009) typology of case studies, in this thesis the comparison of the two cases aims to achieve an exploratory level, which is based in the collection of data and the identification of patterns of similarities and differences, as well as the descriptive level, consisting in linking those patterns with the theories and concepts that frame this research.

In the next sections, further details of the methods will be presented.

### 3.4 Instruments, selection of participants and description of the main characteristics of the territories.

#### 3.4.1 Methods

From a qualitative viewpoint, this research considers instruments that help to unfold discourses of actors that have been seldom represented in and by institutions related to ADIs implementation: indigenous peoples, ADI managers and associated policy managers. Since the core focus of this study are the implications and practices as expressions of the interplay between the state and indigenous communities in the implementation of ADIs, two methods are considered in the data generation. It should be noted that, taking the contributions of Mason (2002, p.52), 'generation of data' refers to the idea of data is not an external element to be collected by the researcher. Moreover, the researcher produced the knowledge from the moment when the data is generated by the methodological design.

Firstly, individual semi-structured interviews were used[4]. This technique creates the ability to drive the questions according to the goals that the study expects to explore (Gubrium and Holstein 2001; Flick 2011). Even when this kind of interview predetermines topics, it is appropriate since it allows me as a researcher to establish my own standpoint as an active and reflexive researcher. Additionally, it gives the flexibility to incorporate potential modifications in the field work, in the light of the theoretical characteristics. Finally, individual interviews were a vehicle to generate first contacts with the participants, to build confidence in the relationship between researcher and community, and to introduce myself, my viewpoint, approach, and interests, etc.

Secondly, focus groups were conducted so as to promote the interaction between indigenous peoples and data generation. This collective technique aims to simulate the daily contextual framework of conversation among participants, obtaining the information regarding their implications related to the research (Bryman 2004; Flick 2011; Creswell 2014). The role of the researcher is relevant in driving the discussion toward the salient

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[4] For both, individual semi-structured interviews and focus groups, see Appendix 1: consent forms, appendix 2: Participant information sheets, and appendix 3: Interview guide, at the end of this document. It should be noted that due the interviews, both individuals and focus groups, were semi-structured, the guide inserted in the appendix was adapted for each case, according to the course of the conversation and the topics covered by the participant(s).

points that should be studied, in promoting an environment where everyone can feel confident to express their opinions, and balancing the power distribution in the discussion – moderating times for discussion, inviting people who are in silent, etc.

### 3.4.2   Selection of participants

Consistent with the qualitative framework of this research, sampling criteria and strategies do not pursue representation of the general population. Instead, the selection of participants aims to be representative of specific features of involvement of the indigenous people in the local spaces of implementation of public policies (Flick 2011).

Since the focus is on the ADI policy and the participative process, which is developed in this context, the methodology considers two stages in the selection of the participants.  The unit of analysis was the actors who expressly declared to be involved in the implementation process of ADIs. This includes indigenous people who are participating as users of ADIs, the officials who are in charge of the implementation stage of this policy, and other actors involved in specific areas related to the local priorities, such as actors who work in education, health, and economic development, amongst others.

To access the unit of analysis, the selection process considered the following focus:

*a.   Territorial selection:*

The criteria for sampling selection followed the "a prior determination of the sample structure" (Flick 2011, p.115), which proposed abstract or theoretical criteria (Gubrium and Holstein 2001) that were considered relevant in order to produce and analyse the data.  This aimed to incorporate a wide diversity of participants, considering the available information about the territorial characteristics of ADIs. Specifically, the three criteria included are:

1.  Access to the territory:  access to high-quality data is essential. However, it is relevant to consider the real possibilities in the access to some territories which are specifically isolated and their effect on the feasibility of the research. Considering this, two territories were excluded from the sample. One is the ADI implemented in Easter Island, since the extreme distance of this area to the rest of the country makes

the trip significantly expensive and therefore unaffordable to the researcher. For the same reasons, another territory that was excluded was the ADI Cabo de Hornos, located in the most southern area of the country.

2. Geographical and historical criteria: the relationship between the Chilean state and indigenous peoples had a milestone event when during the colony period the *Mapuche* territory was defined from the Biobío River to the south of the country. Considering the current geopolitical division of Chile, this limit now coincides with the VIII Region. Even today, the main concentration of indigenous people is, consequently, situated at the south of this river, and more specifically in the IX region[5], which concentrates 19.6% of indigenous people outside Santiago, the capital city. Since the relevance of this agreement for the location of the indigenous communities until the present day, the selection therefore considers the identification of two sub-regions: North of Biobío and South of Biobío.

3. Concentration of population: developing participatory spaces in the implementation of policies in local areas face the challenge of integrating diverse voices. In this research, the two regions that have the highest concentration of population were selected, since they can show higher diversity of perspectives, one in the North of the Biobío River and another in the south.

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[5] From 1974, the Chilean territory is divided in regions, which represent political and geographical territories where the governmental institutions are allocated. Today, there are sixteen regions, each one called by a roman numeral and a name, but usually only the number is used to refer to them.

*Table 5: Total population of councils covered by ADI North and ADI South*

| Historical territorial limit | ADI | Council | Population |
|---|---|---|---|
| North of Biobío | Alto Andino Arica Paricanota | CAMARONES | 783 |
| | | PUTRE* | 2090 |
| | | GENERAL LAGOS | 555 |
| South of Biobío | Puel Nahuelbuta | GALVARINO | 12469 |
| | | CHOLCHOL | 12026 |
| | | LOS SAUCES | 7818 |
| | | LUMACO | 11217 |
| | | PURÉN | 12885 |
| | | TRAIGUÉN* | 19707 |

First, considering the information provided by the National Corporation for Indigenous Development, the ADIs that concentrate the highest population are Alto Andino Arica Parinacota in the North of Biobío and Puel Nahuelbuta in the South of Biobío. In turn, each ADI is comprised of *muncipalidades* or councils which are local governments with a defined territory. Considering the criteria of concentration of population, inside each selected ADI, a second level of selection is the *municipalidad* with the highest population. This corresponds to Putre in the North and Traiguén in the South. In the event of the local or contextual scenario making it difficult to access these territories, the second or third *municipalidad* in each ADI was selected as an alternative.

As a strategy to access territories, an e-mail was sent to the directors of each area, in order to ascertain the interest and feasibility to undertake research in each area. Since their e-mails are considered public information, the e-mail addresses can be found on the official web sites of the policy, or the information can be solicited by e-mail from the information and claim office of the National Indigenous Development Corporation. This strategy was complemented by in-person visits to the offices of public services to ask directly to different public servants' information about names and contact details of people involved in ADI policy and other associated initiatives related with participation of indigenous peoples.

*b. Individuals' selection*

Three groups were selected in this step, considering prior categories (Flick 2011). Therefore, the next criteria guided, but did not totally define, the selection of participants. Specifically, three groups of participants were included:

i. Indigenous peoples as users of ADIs: the research includes people who are formally recognised as active users of ADI. Firstly, under the label of "active participants of ADI", the list of people was requested to the head of the policy in each selected territory. This helped in the selection of those indigenous people who were willing to assume the role of leader in the ADIs. Each ADI had their own structure, but in each case, some of the indigenous peoples took a representative role in certain stages of the policy.

A relevant factor here is that the oral and personal invitation is essential for the development of confidence and also because people might have an educative barrier with e-mails or written communication in general.

In this group, the methods for data generation were focus groups and semi-structured interviews. Two focus groups were conducted in each territory. Additionally, individual semi-structured interviews with key informants were included, in order to understand in more depth, the context of the territory, and to analyse the key concepts that should be translated from the academic perspective to the local language. The key informants were official leaders of organisations that are participating in ADIs and, specifically, at management level.

ii. Policy managers as representatives of the state's perspective in the local area: the researcher contacted by e-mail the head of the programme who is formally working in the implementation of ADI in those territories that fulfil the requirements mentioned above. In this case, the criteria of the selection was the "a priori" selection (Flick 2011), considering the role that they have in the implementation of ADIs. Specifically, two criteria were considered.

Firstly, they should be formally recognised as policy managers of the ADI at the time of establishing the contact and they should have at least six months of experience in that role,

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in order to guarantee that the participants had got the relevant knowledge relating to the implementation of the policy. Secondly, they should formally declare their interest in participating and the availability of access to the data that the research needs. As a context, it is relevant to note that in 2018, year when the fieldwork was undertaken, a new president of the republic had been elected, changing the party in power from the left wing to the right wing. This context generated a significant uncertainty among officers and their likelihood of being able to give their commitment to participation in the research.

For this group, the methods of data generation used were the individual semi-structured interviews, including participants directly involved in decision-making process in the territory, and others directly involved in the implementation of the ADI.

iii.  Associated policy managers: each ADI should define their priorities in the process of development. This definition includes access to soil, access to water sources, education, culture enhancement, amongst others. In each territory, local associated policy managers related to public services, councils, other local programmes, NGOs, unions, were included, being selected according to the areas relevant to the ADI. The selection used theoretical criteria, considering the information about the defined areas that were a priority for each ADI. The ADI managers and indigenous peoples were asked for the names of associated policy managers and their contact information.

For this group, the method for data collection was the individual semi-structured interviews.

As a summary, this methodology reached the next sample:

*Table 6: Sample achieved by group of participant, territory and technique*

| Participants | Technique | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | *ADI Alto Andino Arica y Parinacota-North* | *ADI Puel Nahuelbuta-South* | TOTAL |
| Indigenous peoples | 11 Leaders | 13 Leaders | 24 |
| | Focus 1 | Focus 1 | 4 focus groups |
| | Focus 2 | Focus 2 | |
| Policy managers | 7 | 6 | 13 |
| Associated policy managers | 10 | 12 | 22 |

### 3.4.3  Data collection

The process started in May 2018, visiting the two territories, Putre and Traiguén, for around one week, both for very first time in my life. That first trip had two main aims. Firstly, to have information of logistics, such as to find a place (or places) to stay during my fieldwork, availability of transportation means to get to the different areas, timetable of buses, and, in general, the costs of time and resources involved. It should be noted that in the two territories, beyond the immense differences in weather, connectivity and others, it was one scheme that can summarise the geographical trajectories. Firstly, the existence of a central town for the data collection– Putre in the North and Traiguén in the South –. Secondly, a focus represented by the capital city of the region which concentrates the main headquarters of the social services- Arica in the North and Temuco in the South. And thirdly, I had to visit different specific villages, usually located in rural areas, where some of indigenous representatives live. This scheme defined my journeys and times dedicated to the data collection.

*Figure 3: Territories involved in data collection process*

The second aim of this first trip was to introduce myself and my work to civic officials and indigenous representatives relevant for the ADI. Although some of the contact details of the services were already available on internet, the face-to-face contact and conversations with local actors was essential for getting the information to mapping the network of potential participants of the research, as well as to build trust with local actors and to expand this initial network of contacts. Finally, the first trip allowed me to settle in the territories in the most comfortable way possible, within the resources available.

The second phase of the fieldwork took place between June and mid-July in the South (four weeks of actual work), and between mid-July and mid-August in the North. The objective was to carry out a first stage of immersion in each territory, in order to then, have a time for reflection and comparative pre-analysis of my interviews. With this, I would have the possibility to go back to both territories and make changes, adapt the data collection strategies, interview guidelines, etc.

In this first stage, I could understand, as it will me mentioned in the following chapters, how different the ADI policy worked in the two territories. For instance, in the South the implementation of the policy did not follow a formal procedure and, consequently, I needed to create different strategies to reach the practitioners and indigenous representatives. This factor made my data collection process longer that I originally expected. Likewise, I realised the relevance of the cultural aspects of how indigenous communities inhabit the territory, for example, the need of walk long distances throughout the countryside to get to the people's houses, or the difficulties in reaching people in the North who, traditionally, have

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inhabited the territory in a constant movement around different towns, as it will be analysed later under the concept of trans locality (Gundermann Kroll 2018). The number of trips, isolated areas where some of participants live, and the bus availability to get to the different cities and towns, was another element that delayed my calendar.

Having those reflections and learnings in mind, then, between mid-August until mid-September, I continued my data collection in the North, and from mid-September until mid-November, I went back to the South to finish the fieldwork. In total, I was in Chile from the beginning of May until the third week of November 2018, during which time I spent three months in the South and two months in the North.

### 3.5 Analysis process

The information generated in the fieldwork was analysed using thematic analysis, which was useful in the identification and analysis of patterns (Braun and Clarke 2006; Gray 2014). This was undertaken in two phases. Firstly, an open coding was done, using the software NVivo 12.0. Secondly, the analysis focussed on the identification of patterns, considering the previous coding. These patterns were organised in themes, using NVivo 12.0 as well.

The thematic analysis (Bryman 2004) was done following all the interviews and then focus groups were made, by the principal researcher, using the software NVivo 12.0, in order to find codes which depicted common themes and trends among them. In a second phase, the researcher identified patterns in the interviews. Operationalisation of the concepts in the analysis:

The topics which comprised the interviews and focus groups were those related to new institutional theory (Lowndes et al. 2006a) and the coloniality of power (Quijano 2000b; Quijano 2007), aiming to find preliminary answers to the research questions. Specifically, questions that guided the discussion were:

- To what to extent these participatory practices promote a more proportionate distribution of power, considering the coloniality of power: distribution among ethnic background, knowledge and culture?

- Which formal rules affect the participatory practices that are developed in the context of implementation of ADIs?
- Which informal rules affect the participatory practices that are developed in the context of implementation of ADIs?

Theoretically, the analysis was driven in considering a primary level of elementary codification, identifying relevant codes related to the aims and research questions of this study. On a secondary level, the aim was to conduct a thematical analysis. With the interviews already codified, the themes were created by an empirical process, considering the dialogue between new institutionalism and decolonial perspectives. Along with the codes and themes, following the Vromen's ideas (2018), the use of direct quotations was essential to ground the analysis from the participants' perspectives. In this sense, "using the actual words of different individuals and presenting different perspectives" (Creswell 2013, p.20) helps to give evidence of the multiple realities involved in the construction of the phenomen. Direct quotes from interviews were especially relevant in the final written document, as it will be presented in the chapters 4 and 5.

Additionally, consistently with the literature review, in this thesis participation is understood as the power of bricoleurs to make decisions by themselves, shaping the institutions that affect them (Lowndes and Roberts 2013b; Hall et al. 2014b; Funder and Marani 2015). From the new institutional approach, the transformative practices are understood as the power of some bricoleurs of shaping institutions, in this case, which frame ADI policy. This includes not only policy managers and practitioners, but other actors involved in the implementation of the policy.

In addition, the institutional complexity of ADI policy requires the inclusion of specific approaches in order to understand the historical, social, cultural and political context. In particular, participatory practices are linked with the relationship between the state and citizens. In Latin America, the understanding of this relationship cannot avoid the coloniality embedded in the history of these two actors, and also in its current manifestations. Analysis of the colonial matrix of power (Quijano 2000b; Mignolo 2007a), as a theory, offers pertinent categories in incorporating the specific characterisations of the power relationships that frame the participatory practices deployed in the implementation of ADI and their historical

production.

Specifically, Quijano (2007) claim that the colonisation process established domination over the Latin-American people in a three axes structure. Firstly, the definitions of hierarchies, domination and distribution of power are based on race as a social category, especially in the definition of its workforce and slavery (Quijano 2007; Quijano et al. 2014). Secondly, domination cannot be possible without the production of a comprehensive framework to legitimize the new order. In this sense, domination includes a "systematic repression, not only of the specific beliefs, ideas, images, symbols or knowledge that were not useful to global colonial domination, while at the same time the colonizers were expropriating from the colonized their knowledge, especially in mining, agriculture, engineering, as well as their products and work" (Quijano 2007, p.169). Finally, coloniality is expressed and reproduced through the cultural systems, which refer to the repression of cultural symbols and meanings production patterns (Quijano et al. 2014). This domination gave indigenous cultures a disadvantaged position in comparison to European culture (Quijano et al. 2014). These three ways of exercising power are currently existing today and can help to understand the current disparities.

It should be stressed that the connection between the new institutional and the decolonial perspective involves deep epistemological issues. The last perspective aims to emphasize modern institutions as a representation of current colonial structures of power that reproduce the domination of sections of the population, in particular their knowledge and being. From this standpoint, decolonial perspectives look for the legitimation of the knowledge produced by these repressed groups as an epistemological and political viewpoint. In turn, new institutionalism focused on constructivism as a standpoint understanding the relationship between institutions and the contexts that produce them and are produced by them. In this dialectic production between institutions and contexts, the new institutionalism acknowledges the unequal distribution of power among the various agents involved. Despite these differences, the critical concept concerning power as a pivotal axis in the relationship between contexts and institutions, is understood, in this thesis, as an element that articulates the dialogue amongst the two different perspectives.

### 3.6 Critical reflections about the research procedures.

Several criteria have been developed so as to assess the quality of social research (Lincoln and Guba 1985; Tracy 2010). According to Creswell & Miller (2000) , from a critical paradigm in social research, the researcher flexibility is essential in guaranteeing the validity of the procedures. Consequently, this section aims to address the trustworthiness in the procedures associated to this thesis. As this is an exercise of self-reflection, as a researcher I will refer to my first-hand experiences and personal thoughts in the first person, rather than the neutral voice predominantly used throughout this thesis.

First of all, one relevant criteria of the quality of the thesis the reliability of procedures, which refers to the replicability of the methods to achieve the same findings (Flick 2011; Flick et al. 2018). It should be noted that from the constructivist approach, there are some critics about the possibility of replicating the findings, as under this goal lies the idea of methodologies permit to capture phenomena which are outside, instead of assume that reality is always constructed by the research, under specific contexts (Ritchie and Lewis 2011). However, it is still possible to identify some criteria for reliability in the qualitative literature.

According to Flick (2018), reliability can be assured by the triangulation, which refers to the use of a variety of methods to approach the phenomena. In this research, two different techniques were used: semi-structured interviews and focus groups. It should be noted that Flick (2018) stated that the triangulation is far from being linked to the validation of the hypothesis, usually associated to the objectivity as an approach. Moreover, the use of different methods contributes to achieve a deeper and more comprehensive understanding. Along with this, the triangulation was also considered by including different perspectives in discourses, in order to have a complex understanding of the phenomena of study, and to reduce biases from the researcher in the selection of participants.

It should be noted that the informal encounters with local residents, my participation in meetings organised by the local services and communities, and other informal observations were essential for my immersion in the territories. Nevertheless, since beyond my field noted, I did not systematically register this information, I was not able to use it as part of my analysis. This was probably a missed opportunity to have incorporated a third method that

would have enhance the triangulation.

Another element that contributes to the trustworthiness of the thesis is the procedure that guided the thematic analysis. Particularly, the validity of the process can be critically analysed according to criteria proposed by Braun & Clarke (2006) and widely used in order to provide accountability of the procedures (Maguire and Delahunt 2017; Nowell et al. 2017):

- Phase 1, familiarising yourself with data, which includes, among other elements, a prolong engagement with data, triangulation of different methods for data generation, organisation of the information and reflection during the research process. In the case of this thesis, the researcher was the person who conducted all the interviews and focus groups, as well the transcription of them, and the translation of the selected quotes included in the final document. This role permitted the researcher immersion in the data and, consequently, the familiarisation with it. During the whole process, the reflections, preliminary analysis, and thoughts were annotated in a field notebook, as well in the NVivo programme, which offers the option of inserting comments.

It should be noted the organisation of the interviews, 59 in total, took longer than I initially planned. However, it allowed me to conduct a deep and complex understanding of the phenomena of study.

- Phase 2, generating initial codes: Although at this point, the research had already a theoretical framework, as well aims and research questions, in this phase the coding process prioritised an inductive analysis. In particular, the interviews were read line-by-line, adding open and in vivo codes (Charmaz 2006).

In these two phases, it is relevant to mention the use of Spanish and English language. I am a native Spanish speaker and originally from Chile, as are the participants in the research. Thus, the interviews and focus groups were conducted and, afterwards, transcribed in Spanish. In this level, my background allowed me not merely to translate the words, but also the meanings in the context where the narratives were produced. However, taking into account the contributions of Tuhiwai-Smith (2012), I am not an insider for the indigenous communities' members, as I my formal and informal education was not framed by the

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indigenous worldview and, therefore, I actually do not identify myself as an indigenous. Additionally, I may be identified as an academic, due to my role as a researcher, rather than a policy maker. Consequently, I was an outsider as well for the policy makers.

Considering these limits and possibilities regarding language and meanings, in the initial coding process, Spanish was mainly used, in order to keep the original meanings of the participants' voices. Hence, mostly of the codes were written in Spanish, while the Nvivo 12.0 codes were not translated in this stage of the analysis. However, considering this is a constructivist approach, were the data and the theoretical framework were directly and indirectly guiding the analyses, English language was used when the codes were clearly linked to concepts that framed the research.

- Phase 3, searching for themes: To elaborate preliminary conceptual maps, I used the tools offered by NVivo 12.0, combined with maps elaborated manually. I wrote the list of the main codes in terms of frequency and relevance in responding the research questions, then I printed them, cut them and organised them in different ways – or theme-piles (Braun and Clarke 2006) – looking for a coherent narrative and links between them. This allowed me to create the first themes, guided by the theoretical framework.

- Phase 4, reviewing themes: in this stage, the revision of the themes consisted in, firstly, checking the consistency with the theoretical framework. This was essential in linking the data with the research questions. Secondly, this phase was the moment to adjust the themes, in order to achieve an accurate description of each case. Additionally, from a comparative perspective, I looked for similarities and differences between the two cases.

- Phase 5, defining and naming themes: as the authors mention, the phase is about finding the themes that permit to "identify the story" (Braun and Clarke 2006, p.92). From this exercise, it was decided to structure the chapters, reflecting the theoretical categories based on new institutionalism and decolonial theory, as well as the new elements that emerged from the data.

- Phase 6, producing the report: although during the whole process different reports were produced, in this phase I defined and wrote the final structure of the thesis. It should be noted changes were constantly introduced, in order to shape the story and present the analysis. In the writing process, quotes from the interviews were used to validate and support the analysis. As it was mentioned, the translation of these quotes from Spanish into English prioritised the accuracy in terms of meanings, more than the literal translation. In occasions, I needed to go back to the codes in order to verify the accuracy of the descriptions, findings, and translations, in regard to the original narratives of the participants.



*Image 4 - Example of initial thematic analysis, by grouping codes by themes.*

The final criteria to validate the procedures is the critical reflectivity of researchers about "their assumptions, beliefs, and biases" (Creswell and Miller 2000, p.127), which may be affecting the procedures. Therefore, regarding my position as a researcher, it is possible to say that during the process of this thesis, my perspective, far from being a personal and

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irrelevant issue, was a voice that articulated the different elements that are presented in this document. In this sense, my locus of enunciation – as "the geo-political and body-political location of the subject that speaks" (Grosfoguel 2007, p.213) – is from a Chilean PhD study, which does not identify itself as part of an indigenous community. However, I am aware I belong to a colonial society, where along with the indigenous peoples who currently resisting the current expression of colonial repression, and with the power of those conquerors in this process of colonisation – both external and internal - there are diverse groups where it is possible to find elements of both. Regarding this, *mestizo* is a common term used in Spanish to talk about mixed race people, which refers, not only to the ethnic and biological elements involved, but also a forced cultural, political and institutional outcome achieved by the colonial process.

An approach to understanding my stance as part of a *mestiza* culture is the one offered by Rivera Cusicanqui (2010a), who proposes the concept of ch'ixi.  Ch' ixi – which comes from the Quechua language spoken by indigenous Andean communities –means mottled and refers to the juxtaposition of adversarial identities, which are not integrated, but coexist without pursuing a synthesis, creating a third identity (Rivera Cusicanqui 2010a).

Firstly, my locus of enunciation is the *mestiza,* as I am descended from those *mestizos* who migrated from the extreme deserts in the North of the country and also from the rural South to the capital city looking for opportunities to improve their lives. In order to do this, they forget their origins  and ancestry,  something quite usual for working class people in Chile (Salazar 2000), and they found a different identity that does not eradicate, but coexists with the previous one. For this reason, my stance does not represent the indigenous voices per se, but it does not confer an opposite viewpoint either. As a researcher, I am a *mestiza* too, as I aim to understand the indigenous peoples' voices from the mainstream academic codes, considering western methodologies to validate my analysis and outcomes. In addition, as a third layer of this miscellany, the interpretation of the phenomena requires the use of the English language, personally translated myself from its original Spanish form from the voices of all the participants of the research.

At this juncture it is relevant to mention that all the interviews and also the informal conversations with the participants were made in Spanish, since, as a consequence of the

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colonial process, this is the dominant language in the whole Chilean territory, and it is used even by the indigenous people, as it is the only possible way of interacting with public services. From my position of a mestiza researcher, I was able to communicate on a regional level with the locally based indigenous communities and policy managers. Finally, as a *mestiza,* my consideration is in facilitating the dialogue between the different identities, comprehensions, and cultures. Viewed in this way, from my standpoint I endeavour to create an arena for engagement and dialogue with North and South as geopolitical centres for learning (Santos 2018). However, I am aware of the limitations of achieving this outcome from the academic domain, which restricts me from representing the indigenous' perspectives and the public services.

It must be also stressed my specific skills in research. In my previous experience working with people as a social worker, I had the opportunity to develop some negotiation skills, together with listening and organising people in order to achieve common goals. Specifically, I used to work in local development projects in the poor areas of Santiago. These projects were done from a bottom-up perspective, including weekly sessions with groups of people, organising social projects related to the diagnosis that they elucidated. In the course of this work, together with the empowerment process, it was quite common to have to support people in resolving some interpersonal conflicts. In this basis, I expect to have the skills that the process of fieldwork requires.

### 3.7 Ethical consideration

Considering this research involves the participation of people, some ethical considerations have been taken into account.

Firstly, to reassure the voluntary and informed participation, an informed consent was used. This was in a written form that the participants who agreed to participate would sign. It set out the aims of the research, sampling criteria, the commitment to confidentiality, use of the generated data and health and safety criteria considered in the study (Gibson and Brown 2009; European Union 2017). In the case of indigenous communities, this form was initially explained by the researcher in the presence of the leader of the community, in the event people considered it necessary.

Secondly, confidentiality was assured since the information (audio and documents) was stored in the cloud under the auspices of the University of Bristol and which can be accessed remotely with a personal password. In this point, also anonymity was safeguarded by not providing names or any other information that could allow individual identification of participants. Only one respondent explicitly requested, as a condition of participation, that his name be disclosed, so that the information provided would acknowledge his authorship.

Thirdly, with regard to health and safety, it should be noted that participatory mechanisms in research involve the investment of time of the participants in a process which is uncertain (Khanlou and Peter 2005). To avoid the feeling of inconsequence by participants, it is important to emphasize the relevance of the study, not only in terms of the researcher, but also because the information was be fed back to the community in a document whose aim is to benefit the generation of thought processes once the study is finished. Also, a clear and transparent establishment of roles, schedules and times related to their participation is essential.

Finally, it is relevant to mention that this project was approved by the University of Bristol's Ethical Committee.

### 3.8 Conclusions of the chapter

The chapter examined the methodological process used in the thesis, in order to respond to the research questions. The presentation aimed to connect the epistemological and ontological level, with the specific strategies and methods used to select the participants, produce the data, and conduct the analysis.

The chapter also addressed the critical reflection about the procedures and position of the researcher, as part of the assessment of the quality and validity of the research.

# Chapter 4. The case of ADI Alto Andino Arica y Parinacota

## 4.1 Introduction

This chapter locates analysis in the Northern territory of Chile, which ancestrally has been inhabited by Aymara communities and from 2004, has the ADI status and is known as Alto Andino Arica y Parinacota. In this instance, taking into account the theoretical framework (see chapter 2) and the information that was collected between June and November 2018, analysis aims to address the participation of indigenous peoples in this policy, from the new institutionalist perspective  As a macro-level analysis, the research questions that this chapter addresses are the institutional arrangements in participatory processes and practices in ADI policy, the relationship between the institutional bricolage and participation in this policy, the factors involved in these processes, and finally the reconfigured power relationships which emerge from the implementation of ADI.

In order to articulate these different elements of analysis, along with this introduction, the chapter starts by presenting the institutional historical background of the Chilean-Aymara relationship. Based on new institutional theory, the section that follows refers to the analysis of formal and informal institutions who oversee participatory practices in ADI. Subsequently, the power of local actors involved in the institutional bricolage to shape the ADI institutions is analysed. The final section presents conclusions about the layers and nuances of participation in the ADI Alto Andino Arica y Parinacota.

## 4.2 Presentation and analysis of institutions and bricoleurs ADI Alto Andino Arica y Parinacota

From the perspective of new institutional theory, the analysis of participatory processes in the Northern territory will focus on how interactions between actors are affected by rules,

norms and beliefs. In turn, participation refers as well to the power of bricoleurs in shaping those rules. This final process, however, will be addressed later in this chapter.

### 4.2.1 Historical Perspective on Institutional Formation in Alto Andino Arica y Parinacota

*"There are 500 years of colonisation, 200 years of the Chilean State and a Chileanization policy. (...) You cannot reverse this situation in just two decades (…) You can't erase everything after years of a policy of extermination of the indigenous peoples"* **(Policy Manager 2, ADI North).**

From a historical perspective, the relationship between the Chilean state and indigenous communities can be traced back to a specific period, namely the end of the *Guerra del Pacífico* – War of the Pacific, also known as the Saltpetre War – that Chile fought against the Peruvian-Bolivian alliance between 1879 and 1884. Chile emerged victorious and the result was the formal annexation of former Peruvian and Bolivian lands to Chile in 1929 (Díaz Araya and Tapia Ladino, 2013). Part of these new territories correspond to the area of the ADI Alto Andino y Parinacota.

In this period, it is possible to discern two main dimensions that have shaped institutional processes: the *Chilenización* of Arica and Tarapacá, and the formal territorial definition of these by the Chilean state.

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## a. *Chilenización of Arica and Tarapacá*

The occupation of these territories by the Chilean state was accompanied by the Chileanization of Arica y Parinacota, which took place in northern Chile from 1907, with military possession of the territory. This ran for the rest of the 20th century (Gundermann Kroll et al. 2003; Díaz et al. 2013). Chileanization was based on formal and informal institutions set up by the government, in order to develop a new identity for the territory, by promoting Chilean symbols and systematically marginalising and undermining Aymara traditions. In this way Aymara came to be considered a strange culture. This legitimised its oppression throughout organisations



*Image 5 - Expression of spiritual fiesta, where ancestors are celebrated.*

such as armies, schools, and the church, which were key to establish new rules for social life organisation (González Miranda 2000). Expressions of this are, for instance, state schools set up in the northern territory until the 1950s, in order to train "*profesores chilenizadores*" or "Chileanising teachers", with the use of Spanish as the main and official language until 1990 (González Miranda 2000; González Miranda 2002).

As a consequence of this Chileanization, the embeddedness of Aymara rules and beliefs, were significantly weakened. This was borne out in the decrease in the number of people who speak the Aymara language, an acute decline in power of the traditional political organisations, and, in general, in terms of a lack of spaces where the Aymara culture is valued. This process has been common until the present day, familiar to the experiences of local communities. For example, an Aymara interviewee offered the following *"I think that we were very damaged by the Chileanization. After the Pacific War (…) in Chile our people*

*were forbidden from even wearing our own clothes, developing our own traditions, running our traditional festivities (…) The state decreed that all their people, like teachers, priests and the church, had to replicate and spread their traditions from the South of Chile here. They mocked and jeered at the Aymara culture"* **(Representative Aymara 3, ADI North)**.

From the historical institutional perspective, this process can be considered the formative period of the current formal institutions. With the Chileanization, a new set of rules were imposed in the territory where now the ADI Alto Andino-North is implemented, continuing to shape the interrelationships between local actors.

### b. Trans locality and definition of territory

A second historical aspect in the Aymara-Chilean relationship is with regards to the meaning, use and definition of territory. According to the Andean cosmovision, territory is understood as unity, organized from the top-down and bottom-up, following the Andean geographic structure (Bengoa 2004). Under this definition of territory, Aymara people have developed a historical transition around territory. Although this dynamic of mobility has changed through time – because of the rural-urban migration and specific political and economic configurations – the trans locality is an institutionalised practice which is still expressed in the way Aymara people use the notion of territory (Bengoa 2004; Salazar and González 2021).

This ancestral Aymara territorial organisation was affected by the actions of the Chilean state. As mentioned, from 1879 with the annexation of these lands to Chile and following the Chileanization and *desperuanization* process (Diaz Araya and Tapia Ladino 2013), the Aymara definition of the territory was formally replaced by the institutions set up by the Chilean state, and their new political and administrative boarders (Bengoa 2004; Gundermann Kroll 2018).

Until the present, translocality, remains a social embedded rule in Aymara communities, running into tension with the formal rules set by the state. The introjected Chilean identity, shaped and reinforced by years by the Chilean state, has created division within the Aymara communities, based upon their nationality. This situation coexists with the mobility flows of Aymaras, who still move between the ancestral territory, beyond the modern administrative

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boarders. One expression of this observed during the fieldwork is the trend of some Aymara people putting the Chilean category above the Aymara one. An example of this is given by an Aymara person who was born in Bolivia but migrated to the current ADI territory. This person mentioned the experience of not being recognised as an equal – considering their shared indigenous identity – but as a foreigner without the same rights to participate wholly in the local community. As a consequence of this, in ADI meetings *"many people prefer to keep muted because there is a lot of discrimination (...) Many people say: 'why is that foreigner speaking out?' (…) Just attending the meetings can be scary. And that hurts. (...) So I prefer to keep quiet". (Focus group 1, ADI North).*

In addition to the Chileanization period, there is another recent formal rule which has affected the definition of the territory inhabited by Aymaras. In 2007 then president Michelle Bachelet enacted Law No. 20.175 creating the Region of Arica and Parinacota (Gobierno Regional Arica y Parinacota 2021). Before that, this territory was administratively a province of the Region of Tarapacá. Setting the new territorial limits caused a division and weakening of the relationships between Aymara communities, as they did not follow the ancestral definition of the territory and population flows of mobility. One policy manager indicated that *"when the territory was divided, the relationship that the indigenous people had with the indigenous people of Tarapacá was also divided. (…) The whole population followed the economic and the socio-cultural circuits through the ravines"* (**Policy Manager 1, ADI North).** The effects of these rules in the territorial division also affected the political Aymara organisation. An indigenous representative argued that *"we were part of the region of Iquique, Tarapacá. I remember that we were around 10 Aymara National representatives and only one was elected as a spokesperson. (…) Today Arica and Tarapacá remain divided. (…) There is disunity, and we have not been able to achieve the union of the people" (Aymara representative 3, ADI North*).

The examination of these three historical elements allows an understanding, as it will presented hereafter in this chapter, of the paths that the current institutions tend to follow.

### 4.2.2   Framing ADI Alto Andino Arica y Parinacota: analysis of rules-in-use

Taking into account the contributions of new institutionalism, ADI policy is understood in this

thesis in terms of the rules of game that frame it. From this framework, deriving formal and informal rules for the implementation of the ADI in the territory, which are now presented in the next table:

*Table 7: Identification of formal and informal institutions operating in ADI*

| Formal institutions | Informal institutions |
| --- | --- |
| Indigenous Law 19.253 | Traditional Aymara authorities |
| Definition of territory as ADI | Fiestas as a form of Aymara social organisation |
| ADI board as a decision-making space in designing methodologies to participate/being informed. | Interaction between Chilean and Aymara institutions |
| Indigenous representatives on the ADI Board: ADI councillor and Representative of Aymara Congress | Territory and trans-locality as Aymara institution |
| 169/consultations | Intercultural practices in the implementation of ADI |

## 4.3 Formal institutions in ADI Alto Andino Arica y Parinacota

### 4.3.1   Indigenous Law 19.253

In the specific case of the ADI Alto Andino Arica y Parinacota, enacted in 2004, it is possible to discern a clear formal institutional framework. This formal institutional framework is based primarily on Law 19.253, commonly known as the Indigenous Law, from which the ADI policy emerges. This Law was enacted in 1993, during the early years of the democratic era, after 17 years of dictatorship from 1973 to 1990. It represents the bureaucratic institutional arrangements which formally recognise indigenous individuals and communities. Indigenous communities were invited by the then candidate to the presidency and his coalition of

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political parties, who participate in the design of this law. In this process, *"the communities demanded, in light of legal discussion, the establishment of ADI policy as a form of protection, so indigenous people were looking forward to its implementation in the short term. So, when CONADI started working in 1994, we decided to set up an organisation in the community. We decided that the participatory scheme would be based on the election of representatives, who would have responsibility for organising assemblies in each village. Likewise, communities should organise a congress where they could raise their demands. CONADI would be the bridge between communities and the government"* **(Policy Manager 1, ADI North)**.

From the beginning, the indigenous peoples involved in the discussion of the Indigenous Law were aware of the relevance of the formal arrangements set to guarantee the power new rules would offer to indigenous communities in the decision-making process. In particular, along with the enactment of the Indigenous Law, it was necessary to set explicit rules to provide the new public services the conditions of effectiveness. Cornelio Chipana, a current policy manager and a former indigenous leader, stresses this point, indicating that *"the director of CONADI must be a position of trust of the President [*of the country*], so that he can call him directly and say 'Sebastián [Piñera, current President] look, the* Intendent *hasn't done anything for the ADI' (…) That's the point of really having that power. But what actually happens? The poor director can't even call the doorman of the government palace"* **(Cornelio Chipana, Policy Manager-ADI North)**. In this quote, it is possible to see that decision-making is strongly centralised with the president of the country. In addition, although new rules were set pursuing the recognition of indigenous peoples, the interviewee claims that there is an informal rule in practice, which is discrimination against the indigenous peoples. In particular, he stated *"we knew that public services were going to discriminate internally against indigenous public services".* In this sense, beyond the enactment of Indigenous Law and the subsequent creation of CONADI, what is really ruling these interactions between the indigenous communities and the state is the effort to limit indigenous powers, even within the realm of the formal rules accepted by the state, such as the implementation of the ADI.

### 4.3.2 Territorial definition of ADI

Another formal rule that exists in the ADI is the definition of the territory that the policy recognises as an indigenous area and, consequently, the role of local services in coordinating their actions so as to address the communities' demands and needs. Formally, considering the National Corporation of Indigenous Development, the ADI policy covers territories which have traditionally been inhabited by indigenous peoples and which continue to have a high concentration of indigenous inhabitants in the present-day, among other geographical and economic criteria (Corporación Nacional de Desarrollo Indígena 2020). In these territories, the law states that public organisations must make sure that their actions benefit the indigenous population. This is achieved by promoting equal access to better conditions of life and by overcoming poverty, resolving problems with lands and water. In addition to this, the aim of reaffirming local identity, self-determination and respect for indigenous organisations is formally recongised (Corporación Nacional de Desarrollo Indígena 2020).

Coherently with the territorial definition and the relevance of the local identity and self-determination, this ADI is set in territory ancestrally inhabited by Aymara people (Ministerio de Planificación y Cooperación 2005). At the moment when the territory was declared as being part of the ADI policy, the high concentration of indigenous people in the communes of General Lagos, Putre, and the high Andean area of the commune of Camarones was formally recognised. Along with this, an important group corresponding to indigenous people who live in the urban sectors of the province of Arica, remain connected to the Andean territorities (Ministerio de Planificación y Cooperación 2005). According to the Chilean state, the ADI policy recognises the relevance of the territory, its ecological levels - the foothills and the altiplano – and also the historical use by the Aymara people in the production and exchange of work and culture, such as silvo-agricultural activities and on livestock (Ministerio de Planificación y Cooperación 2005).

Although this recognition is effective in formally framing the actions of the state over the territory, from the perspective of local actors, *"the fact that the territory was formally defined as an indigenous development area hasn't yet had any impact, because I repeat, this area has always been indigenous"* **(Associated Policy Manager 3, ADI -North)**. In this sense, the indigenous institutions do not depend on the formal recognition from the state in order

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to operate in the territory. Moreover, the indigenous rules and beliefs have resisted the action of the state, which is enforced through formal rules to organise social life in the territories. For instance, as was mentioned earlier, ADI policy was formally established as an aim promoting the self-determination of indigenous communities. Consequently, the formal institutionalisation of territory recognition was also expressed within a new system of the election of community representatives within ADI policy. As one Aymara representative states *"an ADI councillor represents the territory. And his duty is to communicate the demands of his area"* **(Aymara representative 1, ADI North).** This territorial definition allows communities to convey their demands through their representatives but following the rules that the state proposes and crucially not in the traditional way in which the Aymara communities define their own authorities.

### 4.3.3   ADI board as a decision-making space in designing methodologies to participate/being informed.

It should be noted that the spaces to communicate demands are framed by a formal institutional structure. Specifically, local actors in this territory formally agreed on the definition of a particular system of participatory spaces to articulate the ADIs policy actions: a) pre-assemblies in villages, with the participation of residents and community leaders, where  participants could diagnose problems and duly prioritise their demands; b) assemblies, also based in villages, where representatives of public services are invited to propose solutions to  simpler demands discussed among the community; c) meetings of the Directive Council of ADI, where the *intendente* (mayor of region), who is the president of the local ADI, calls public services, local mayors and ADI representatives of Aymara communities, to discuss the deepest and more complex demands.

Pre-assemblies and assemblies are meetings which are held in the territories. They consist of an intermediary space of dialogue between communities and public services. Thus, it is expected that the assemblies be a space to communicate and resolve these demands. Rather,  the practices undertaken are not consistent with this formal institution, as, according to an ADI representative, *"we invite public servants to listen to our demands, but they use this space only as an opportunity to talk about their own issues... I think public servants come here just as a political strategy. We assumed they would listen to us and take*

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*on board what our needs are. Nevertheless, what the public officials do is to talk about their own projects. After all this, there's no time for us to express our demands" **(Aymara 2 representative, ADI North)**.* This representative suggested that beyond the bureaucratic arrangements that frames the implementation, informally the assemblies operate in ways which reinforce institutional knowledge rather than enabling communities to participate in dialogue and to shape institutions. In this sense, even when assemblies are physically and politically decentralised – as these meetings are conducted in the villages where Aymara people live – and even when they are open to hear, at least formally, and nominally incorporate the voices of all residents, they are still directed entirely by the perspective of the government.

Another institution, at the next stage of the ADI policy, after the assemblies, is the Directive Council of ADI. This council is composed by representatives of different public services, the *intendente* (mayor of region), *gobernador* (mayor of province) and Aymara representatives discuss the demands of the communities and propose solutions that the services can offer. From the perspective of one contributor, who is also Aymara, *"participation will remain nominally, friendly. They* [indigenous representatives] *have the right to give their comments. There are many spaces where we can comment, but it's not binding in relation to decision-making. So, people always just repeat the same things" **(Cornelio Chipana, ADI Policy Manager, Alto Andino-North)**.* In this quote, it is possible to see those valid actors in making the decisions are those linked to the boundaries of government organisations and to formal political parties, while the local organisations, whilst allowed to express freely their opinions, are ultimately marginalised and excluded from the decision-making process.

### 4.3.4 Indigenous representation in ADI: ADI councillor and Representative of Aymara Congress

It is relevant to note, that the overlap between already established traditional Aymara organisations and new organisations created and established under formal rules defined by the state indicates a lack of faith in and recognition of the knowledge of Aymara people in creating and developing their own political structures. This is because traditional Aymara political structures become less efficient in achieving communities' demands in their dialogue with the state, in this case, in the context of the ADIs implementation. Thus, the

state extends its own perspective about how an organisation should be structured and defines the rules which will be used to achieve this, beyond the rules that Aymara communities already have. A clear expression of this in the ADI is the fact that even when spiritual and health traditional leaders already existed, when Aymara representatives and policy managers were asked about traditional organisations of Aymara people, only modern organisations were mentioned. These is a consequence of the effective attempts of the state to promote formal institutions to supplant established authorities with newer ones. ADI North establishes a specific structure for decision-making processes, whereby each territory has to elect a representative. In total, there are nine local representatives, plus three more from each of the macro areas. This structure is part of a system of participation, composed also of clubs of older people, neighbour unions, and representatives from each sectoral consultation – such as education, culture, health, and others – unions for water access, among others.,

Having this formal institution, indigenous representatives have the power to call and invite people to participate in the different spaces of the ADI. One policy manager mentioned that *"the role of the ADI and the CNA [National Aymara Congress] is essential, as they have to make calls, organise trips, and so on, always being supported by the consultant, who in the end does most of the work (…) But everything is defined by the agreements between representatives and the CONADI [National Corporation for Indigenous Development]. The consultant doesn't have any influence over that. The ADI [Aymara] representatives are the most influential actors, and they have a lot of power in making decisions. However, they cannot manage the budget. It is the consultant who has that role"* **(ADI Policy Manager 3, ADI North)**.

In this vein, the power exercised by the Aymara representatives consists of defining strategies for inviting local residents to participate in pre-assemblies and assemblies. In this respect, *"the methodology differs county by county. Each county has its own way of doing things. For instance, in General Lagos* [the remotest county] *representatives used to visit village by village, but now they prefer to divide the team to visit in one day all the different sectors, according to the territorial definition of the ADI. In Putre* [the most central county of the ADI]*, the representatives will visit some of the larger areas, but in others, they will visit*

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*town by town, village by village. In Camarones* [an ADI county] *the pre-assembly will be run by visiting village by village, place by place. (…) The assembly then invites public services to confront them with the representatives and the communities to make conclusive decisions"* **(ADI Policy Manager 2, ADI North)**. According to this interviewee, Aymara leaders have the power to adapt the strategies of participation, considering the specific characteristics of each community and territory. To implement these strategies, the ADI policy provides a budget, managed by the consultant. This flexibility provides the possibility of including cultural relevance at this stage of the implementation, especially considering the invitation is made directly by Aymara leaders, in their role as representatives. However, as mentioned, the outcomes that the interviewees recognise as being associated with the ADI are very dispersed and are marginal.

Specifically, one of the Aymara leaders said that they *"chose door-knocking instead of meeting all the people in the same meeting (…) however, these pre-assemblies should have been ready before the main meeting with the ADI Council, but we couldn't because the government has just defined that the consultant will ultimately implement the policy. Now we're late and in a rush, so we have to act fast"* **(Aymara representative 5, ADI North)**. In this interview, this leader emphasised the obstacles of the policy and how the methodologies that they have proposed are subordinated to activities led by the government. As a consequence, ADI representatives struggled in their attempts to achieve their goals.

In this sense, even when this arrangement was agreed with indigenous representatives, it is possible to see that their participation starts out from a very clear frame and proposals from institutions which delimit what may or may not be possible. For example, representatives of the indigenous communities stated that most of the meetings are done in Arica, the capital city of the region, and not in the villages where actually people live. Also, the meetings with public servants do not lead to any open discussion regarding the communities' demands. Rather, the topics are defined by the same institutions which instigate them in the name of participation of excluded groups. These elements show how centralisation of the policy and a generalised lack of participation manifest in the implementation of the ADI. The centralisation of policy was an obstacle mentioned by some actors, who identified a lack of flexibility in how people are allowed to participate in shaping the policy: *"Pre-assemblies and*

*assemblies are always held in the territory, but the rest is all done in Arica, which is located some 200 kilometres from the indigenous territory. So, to attend these meetings, I have to leave my animals alone. This is why community members don't want to be leaders* [ADI representatives] *anymore. (…) I am disappointed myself and they say 'I'm going to be disappointed anyway. I'm going to waste time there. I'm going to tell problems to the authorities but there will be no solution, for what?'"* **(Aymara Representative 3, ADI North)**.

Along with the above, the recognition of traditional authorities as valid actors in the implementation of ADI, becomes an essential dimension of the power dynamics at play. However, the overlapping of organisations and roles created by the state and the traditional ones, as mentioned previously, clouds clear determination of who the valid representatives are, regardless of how limited the power they may wield may be. Regarding this matter, one manager mentioned the contradictions between the bureaucratic arrangements and the implementation of them: *"the main issue of the consultations is the fact that the ILO Convention 169 requires the participation of community authorities. However, there are several authorities depending on the sector in question"* **(Associated Policy Manager 3, ADI North)**. In this sense, the formal rules related to social organisations divide the organisations by sectors, such as sports, older people, young people, culture, etc. Even when the different roles can potentially be held by the same people, especially as the territory is composed of small settlements, the recognition of the traditional authorities is weakened when they have to exercise their role under a label and the rigid functions set by an external bureaucracy, or when new leaders emerge, elevated and backed not by the Aymara political tradition, but by the rules of the state.

### 4.3.5   ILO 169 Convention and consultations

It should be noted that the ADI, as a national policy, formally depends on the Indigenous Law. In turn, the Indigenous Law is subordinated to the International Labour Organization Convention 169. Its Article 6 indicates that state members have to provide means to promote the full development of indigenous peoples (International Labour Organization 2017). Between 2008 and 2018, three consultations were conducted: one was on the topic of whether the country's new constitution should be redacted, the second was on the topic of whether to create the new Ministry of Cultures and Indigenous Peoples, and the third

consultation was regarding the implementation of an education reform. However, these processes of consultations did not consider resources for the implementation of projects or programmes which respond to the demands of communities that have emerged from these consultations. Rather, the resources are focused on the initial goals as defined by the government.

This convention frames the national actions targeted toward indigenous peoples through processes of consultation in areas where indigenous communities are affected. These consultations are not actually formally linked with the ADI policy. In this sense, ADI policy has its own processes of participation, with a specific budget to hold consultations and meetings with communities and representatives. However, as with Convention 169, the recognition of the communities' demands and their specific characteristic and needs during the process of consultation are insufficient, as material conditions, specifically, a budget to implement specific actions to face these demands, are not considered as part of the remit of this policy. In this sense, there are efforts to congregate people, but not to resolve or even engage with the problems they discuss when they are participating in these meetings, hence the expectations remain unfulfilled, and an apathy towards the policy appears. As one of the local managers mentioned, *"there are no funds to support people's needs. We organised an assembly and 200 people came, but just because we invested a lot of money"* **(Associated Policy Manager 8, ADI North).** In addition to this, some participants considered Convention 169 to be not very well known by policy managers and communities and moreover consider its scope to be limited to the consultation stage. In general, participants do not identify relevant outcomes from the Convention or any important impact in the ADI implementation.

In this regard, one policy manager argued that *"in my opinion, there are some people who don't even know what it is. People who are leading the organisations are more familiarised, because they are Aymara representatives who have meetings with the governor"* **(Associated Policy Manager 9, ADI North).** Regarding this, it was mentioned that the national and local formal rules are not coherent with this convention and, consequently, they find several institutional hindrances in the implementation of this convention. One Aymara representative argued that *"we have to be aware of the fine print and the bad faith in the application of the endeavour. Decree 40 talks about the environmental issue. In one of its*

*articles, it says that if someone would like to carry out some investigation here in the centre of Putre and something very important for development would be found, that decree says that we can be displaced from here (…) That is what the legislators are doing to us"* **(Aymara representative 4, ADI Nort)**.

Neither is there is no consensus among the participants as to whether the ADI policy promotes participation. On the one hand, some of the participants indicated that this framework has a positive effect, as it is a formal tool that allows communities to demand consultation processes from the Chilean state. At the same time, Convention 169 is a formal response to an old demand for recognition and for the self-determination of indigenous peoples. Additionally, Convention 169 is an institutional framework for policy managers in their role of facing the locals' demands. However, policy managers do not recognise a direct effect of the ADI policy. Rather, Convention 169 is implemented throughout consultations about health, education and across other sectors, but it is an isolated strategy. In this regard, *"historically, this is the first time that the spirit of the law has been followed. Accompanied by the Convention, with the indigenous consultation about language (…) all the nine indigenous groups recognised by Chilean law were consulted (…) ADI representatives and other people were also consulted, because nobody has been excluded"* **(ADI Policy Manager 6, ADI North)**. Additionally, the influence of local organisations has been enhanced by Convention 169, which is recognised as being essential for running consultations *"as they were always demanding to be invited to participate. For us, inviting means considering peoples' opinions. So, the essential principles of the 169 were not far from what people always demanded"* **(Associated Policy Manager 3, ADI North)**.

As one manager indicated, the definition of the territory as an ADI has not brought any positive outcomes in the enhancement of the local culture and its self-determination, as the decisions are still controlled by the higher echelons of decision-makers:

> *"The ADI regulations came out and it's not bad to declare this as an area of indigenous development in a formal way, because in reality it has always been an indigenous area. But if this declaration could allow us to reach a greater level of focus and prioritisation, but also a flexibility in investment instruments, it would create a real tangible impact. (…) But there hasn't been such flexibility*

*with respect to the population, to considering certain budgets due to climatic conditions, remoteness, etc. that prioritisation with that perspective… the most depopulated border areas. The fact that the territory was formally defined as being an indigenous development area hasn't had any impact, because I repeat, this area has always been an indigenous one"* **(Associated Policy Manager 3, ADI North).**

There is an emphasis here on the fact that the territory has always been indigenous, and also on the fact that the formal rules have not changed the implementation of the local policies. In this sense, the indigenous culture's existence is reproduced in alternative spaces, different from the formal institutions. In the next sub-section, the informal institutions that frame the implementation of ADI Alto Andino Arica y Parinacota will be presented.

### 4.4 Informal institutions in ADI Alto Andino Arica y Parinacota.

Even though formal and informal institutions are in constant interaction with each other, for analytical purposes, these two dimensions of the institutional process are addressed separately. The previous section presented the rules-in-use formally recognised as a framework for the implementation of ADI North. However, considering that for new institutionalism the understanding of social phenomena cannot be reduced  explicitly to formal rules (Hall and Taylor 1996b; Lowndes 1996; Lowndes and Wilson 2001; March and Olsen 2008; Peters 2012), this section pay attention to the informal dimension of institutional arrangements. This means, those practices (Lowndes and Roberts 2013a) or routines (March and Olsen 2008) that without being formally recognised, have the power to constrain or shape individuals' behaviours.

#### 4.4.1   Traditional Aymara authorities

In light of the previous analyses, the formal rule of the recognition of participatory processes in the ADI policy consists of a set of formal rules which organise the dialogue spaces between social servants, public authorities and Aymara communities. The rules explicitly define the process of the selection of the Aymara representatives and their roles in policy. However, a policy manager who also identifies his/herself as Aymara, indicated that "*in 2006 the ADI*

*was declared, but this area has always been indigenous, and a structure of existing leaders was thus created. Something new was created that people were not used to. Our organizations are much older than this. Before Spain, there were already forms of political organization. Then came 500 years of another political structure. Then the Chilean state comes and adds more sub-delegation judges, the neighbourhood unions and in 2006... there was very little time for the people to integrate to this political structure, which was created by the CONADI* **(Associated Policy Manager 3, ADI North)**. This complexity in the local political network divides the spaces of participation, which are consistent with the problems of coordination between services mentioned in the previous section. As well, this is linked with how these problems of coordination affect political power within the communities along with their ability to achieve their demands.

### 4.4.2 Fiestas as a traditional Aymara organisation of social life

In concrete terms, beyond the formal arrangements that drive the implementation of ADI, Aymara culture is part of the development of the territory. This is expressed by informal rules which organise the social life of local communities. An important role here is played by the different festivities, such as the carnivals in February, *fiestas patronales* [patron saint feasts] throughout the year in different villages, ceremonies related to alpaca and llama cattle, and other events which are milestones throughout the year. During these celebrations, communities hold massive meetings that can last two or more days, gathering together most of the residents. Even those who have moved to the big cities go back to the villages where their families come from to participate in the dances, processions, masses and other activities. Although the relevance of these festivities for the Aymara culture and the social organisation around them is clear, they are not recognised as part of the formal institutions of this ADI. As one of the Aymara representatives indicated, *"the ADI was set up by the government, following the prescriptions of the Indigenous Law. Before that, there were other authorities, for example, the judge of peace, who were Aymara, responsible for mediation in cases of conflicts between community members. Other authorities are the 'majordomo' – religious administrators, and alferez [standard bearers and hosts of the fiesta]"* **(Aymara representative, ADI North).**

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These *fiestas* are a relevant expression of the Aymara organisation of social roles. Being a host of the *fiesta* is an opportunity to give thanks to the community and to the land, called by this community *pacha mama*. One representative *says "Aymara people are very respectful, and we have a deep connection with the pacha mama. This is because we carry out our ceremonies. (…) We make great ofrendas (offerings) to the pacha mama for what she has given us. Because here we are born, here we die* **(Aymara representative 2, ADI North)**. At the same time, hosting the *fiesta* is a duty, because as an Aymara *person "I have to return to my community and to deserve my place in it (…) It's a role with big responsibilities, because he/she represents the voice and has to participate in all of the fiestas for a period of three years (…) This role is related to political and religious structures. So, the majordomo needs to be a married person with a well-respected family (…) The social control is very strong"* **(Associated policy manager 3 – ADI North).** In addition, an Aymara representative says *"why must I meet the needs of that role? Because being majordomo was mandatory in each village. This is because you benefit from the use of water, crops etc. If the Pachamama gives you, all this, you have to give something back too"* **(Aymara representative 5, ADI North)**.

These roles and spaces of Aymara social organisation have not been integrated within the current processes of decision-making and participation in the ADI. Instead, they have been kept separated from any intervention by the state. An example of this is the organisation of water access. Traditionally, this issue is resolved by the *mita*, a system of shifts to water the crops. This system is community based, where a person who is elected by the residents, called a *comisario de agua* [water commissioner] — organises and controls the shifts to watering the crops, while the communities *"collect money to pay for the water commissioner. The state has not been involved there"* **(Aymara representative 5, ADI North)**.

### 4.4.3   Interaction of Chilean and Aymara institutions

As acknowledged earlier, this does not mean there is not interaction between the two dimensions of the formal and informal institutional processes in the territory. On the contrary, they assemble two layers of the rules-in-use within this ADI. With regard to this, the same public officer added that *"you cannot just take a traditional role with the intention of campaigning to get a political chair in the future. However, I do think that everyone who wants to be a political representative* [such as a mayor, MP, etc.] *must have had experience*

*of this in a traditional role"* **(Associated Policy Manager 4, ADI North)**. An Aymara representative, talking about consultation related to the creation of the Ministry of Cultures, Art and Heritage, mentioned that: "*we have proposed that having taken a role in these feasts must be a requirement for those who want to represent the Aymara people. I know the government won't consider it, but we have said that, because if you haven't hosted any feast, how could you have any genuine affection for your community'?"* **(Aymara Representative, 7, ADI North)**.

Added to this, it is important to note then, that formal recognition of the indigenous peoples' self-determination somewhat informally "*depends on the will of the mayor. Some mayors are keen to receive our voice and meet with us when we ask for a meeting, but others are just not interested and the law doesn't help us to demand or guarantee this recognition, so we cannot do anything. With the* intendenta [regional council] *it is different, because she's the director of the ADI, so if I need a meeting with her and I talk with the respect that she deserves, she'll be able to talk, at least for a couple of minutes"* **(Aymara representative 7, ADI North)**. The quote shows that the power of the indigenous representatives of the ADI is inherently limited, at least within the realm of formal arrangements, to this specific space. Outside the areas that the ADI controls in term of decision-making, the power of these representatives is not ensured by the formal framework. In turn, it depends on the personal recognition of each individual mayor. From the perspective of informal institutions, the quote is relevant in illustrating the significance that individual and personal efforts have in enabling dialogues between local and government organisations. The coordination of local services, which is an aim of ADIs policy, requires the formal participation of mayors in the meetings of the ADI council, held each month in order to discuss the local agenda for the development of the area. However, the formal rules of recognition are unidirectional, as they do not consider the recognition of indigenous representatives by the mayors.

### 4.4.4 Territory and trans-locality as Aymara institution

Another informal institution related to ADI is the territorial dimension of the Aymara culture. The ADI territory represents only a fraction of the overall Aymara territory. Ancestrally, the Aymara territory covers part of Peru, Bolivia and a longer extension of the current Chilean territory. Currently, this territorial dimension is expressed by the trans-locality of the Aymara people – they are not based in only one village, but they constantly transit in between two



*Image 6 - Façade of Socoroma, village which is part of the Putre county. As many others, this house is closed and empty for most of the year. Local people indicated that the owners visit their homes during the fiestas, and then they go back to the cities*

or more areas -, the cultural and economic exchange between these three countries Bolivia, Peru and Chile, and the depopulation of the territory. These three territorial elements are connected to several demands of the local communities. As one policy manager states, *"there is the concept of ADI territory as a geographic space (…) But territory is also extended through a cultural manifestation of the ways of living. Then I have multiple cases of transit, right? of that transitory identity. The person who lived their childhood in General Lagos and then migrated, does not stop being indigenous. Do you understand? Identity comes with you, with your culture. You take it with you everywhere you go. This is something that we may think about in the ADI"* **(Policy Manager 4, ADI North)**.

Beyond the formal geographical definition of the ADI, Aymara people are still connected with the different localities within the territory. As mentioned, fiestas are a very important event

for the development of the Aymara culture. This is the example of the Virgen de Las Peñas ceremony, which is described by this same policy manager as being *"a celebration that takes place twice a year in a sector called Livilcar, (...) all the devotees come to the Sanctuary of the Virgin and among those devotees there are many people from Arica, many people from Peru, (...) who are relatives but due to the historical issues of Chileanization today are settled in Peru .... but the town of Livilcar comes to life twice a year. Today I think there are only two or three families living there permanently, you understand me? but they all feel that deep attachment to the territory (...) it is still an ancestral territory to them. It is not inhabited, but there are their dead there"* **(Policy Manager 4, ADI North).**

This trans-locality is not always formally incorporated into the ADI. Aymara people ancestrally have travelled around the territory, but public servants formally recognise the population as a single county. One policy manager argues that *"they always say 'I didn't receive any benefit', but they were not here, they were in Arica. They shouldn't be complaining there if they're not living there. We cannot guess what they need* **(Policy manager 6, ADI North)**. In this case, there is no acknowledgement of the complexity of the territorial dimension for Aymara communities and their differences within formal institutions. In others policy managers, these contradictions are assumed more as a challenge that they have to face. One of them who works in Putre and identifies his/herself as Aymara states that *"I have a regulation to respect (…) So the fact that a good part of our population is in Arica and I cannot help them, is very hard. (…) We have a mailbox there in Arica, but people think that this is not enough (…) I cannot allow our civil servants to go down there. The law tells me that Arica is not in my jurisdiction, but the cultural jurisdiction is there as well, because all our life we have walked. (…) The management of the territory has always been from the coast to the mountains* **(Associated policy manager 6, ADI North).**

Regarding this territorial dimension, the ADI North follows the formal recognition of the territory, while the trans-locality is just a pending recognition. One Aymara representative indicates that *"they should have understood that we're in an indigenous development area. If I kill an animal here at my house [in Arica], I'm still an indigenous person. This is because it's important that all the region declares they're in an indigenous area"* **(Aymara representative 2, ADI North).** In this sense, the trans-locality is part of the social embedded

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rules practiced by Aymara communities. However, the territorial definition where the ADI policy operates is static and it does not recognise this dynamic conceptualisation of the territory by the communities, who move around an extensive geographical area, without regard for any formal rules. In addition to this, the depopulation of the area raises the need for recovering the traditional transit between the zones, as a development strategy.

The lack of recognition of this trans-locality has concrete effects on local development. This is the case related by an Aymara representative, who recounted the difficulties in running a project consisting of capturing wild vicunas. In his/her experience, because of depopulation it was hard to find local people to work with. Although the ancestral and still constant transit of Aymara people between the ADI territory and Bolivia, both Aymara territories, the current formal institutions were hindering these traditional interactions, which may be relevant for the development of the economy and Aymara arrangements. Specifically, this representative indicated that *"in 2012 the capture of wild vicuna was implemented (…) I asked the carabineros for permission to bring people from the other side of the border [Bolivia] (…) It was a success. Then we couldn't do it anymore (…) that was possibly thanks to the goodwill of the head of the police station, just because of that. But if they had come to work, they would have needed a work visa or a job contract. But the vicunas are sheared for two days. They are not going to have a contract for two days. So, it was impossible"* **(Aymara representative 1 and camelid sheppard, ADI North)**.

### 4.4.5   Intercultural practices in the implementation of ADI

As it is possible to see, the previous formal and informal institutions of the policy in this territory tend to run into tension or, at the very least, are not in dialogue. Informally, local actors as bricoleurs, have developed some strategies to integrate these two dimensions, the formal and the informal. In this context, as will be developed in detail in the section about bricolage, Aymara leaders have played an informal but essential role in adapting institutions so as to achieve an intercultural mediation between their communities and the social services who are involved in the ADI policy. Specifically, they mention that it is essential to study and train themselves about public policies and laws that will affect them. This strategy helps them to talk to the technical teams of public services, to understand their proposals and to make their own. In this regard, one ADI representative indicated that *"the learning*

*process is very long. You can imagine how hard it would be to learn all these things related with consultations, for a representative who barely reads and to write, even if he has all the Aymara knowledge… that knowledge is useless. As representatives, we have to use appropriate language with our people, to help them to understand the consultation processes and other subjects in a very straightforward way, so they can understand it a bit"* **(Aymara representative 8, ADI North)**. This situation undoubtedly represents a constant challenge and a personal sacrifice, since in addition to carrying out their work with their families and the community, they must also dedicate time and resources to attending the training and meetings necessary to exercise their roles as leaders. Although ADI representatives have not necessarily received technical or professional training, they do not have a workday or salary linked to their tasks; they must also fulfil complex roles and understand specific knowledge that requires high commitment from them and makes it difficult for them to achieve their goals.

Considering the efforts for achieving a dialogue between the formal and the informal institutions is especially relevant. In spite of formal institutions of ADI declaring the aim of recognising indigenous communities, informally there is a predominance of technical rationality as a language for the ADI. In relation to this, one Aymara representative indicated that *"many people believe that we are indigenous, so we are ignorant. I've seen that among public officials. (…). I realised that discrimination occurs in all spheres, and I have had to raise my voice and speak their language. If I'd speak to them* [a specific public official] *about indigenous culture they wouldn't listen to me. But if I speak to him about percentages, numbers and statistics, then they'd listen to me. So, I have had to study and prepare myself for the meetings"* **(Aymara representative 8, ADI North)**. It is interesting to note in this quote the differentiation made between "their language" – the one used by public officials and government organisations – and the indigenous perspective, where language does not refer to the dichotomy of Spanish versus Aymara language, but to the worldview and the hegemonic status of the dominant culture over the marginalised one.

In this sense, ADI policy lacks a formal intercultural perspective in its arrangements, as the dialogue between cultures relies on personal initiatives from policy managers and from leaders of indigenous communities. The organisation of the policy does not include formal

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spaces in which to frame this dialogue. Regarding this, an ADI representative indicated that *"we have had to teach them about the indigenous worldview but doing so is exhausting. Some public services are interested, but others are not, and these last ones make a kind of performance when we meet them, but then they say goodbye and don't demonstrate any commitment or political will for promoting the self-development of indigenous peoples"* **(Aymara representative 8, ADI North)**. In this quote, it is possible to discern how intercultural efforts from this Aymara leader are strongly resisted by state organisations. It should be noted that actors involved in the ADI policy have developed an intercultural perspective from a socially embedded institutional arrangement more than from any particular formal rules. In this sense, weak connections between the cultures are shown in the hegemony of the bureaucratic perspective.

From the policy manager perspective, developing strategies for integrating the Aymara traditional institutions into social services is also an informal practice. As there is not a formal arrangement that frame, this is a task is assumed as a personal and an individual commitment. A policy manager who identifies as Aymara, indicated that her/his exercises of the public role followed the commitment and devotion of the traditional Aymara roles, such as *mayordomo* and *alferez*: *"I take my public position with that moral significance, I carry out community services on Saturdays, Sundays, etc. (…) it's not only an administrative and legislative role, but rather, it is primarily to serve the community"* **(Associated Policy Manager 3, ADI North)**.

The personal efforts made as a strategy to support the implementation of ADI North are also expressed in the coordination of different social services. It is relevant to consider that the ADI policy is defined as being the coordination of different services and the contribution of public actors, in order to implement programmes and projects with cultural and territorial relevance promoting the self-determination of indigenous communities. Thus, the resources have to come from each service which, in coordination with other services, pursues a contribution to the local plan of development. Even though this coordination is required by Indigenous Law, it often does not happen in practice. In this sense, beyond the ADI meetings, where the public officials attend and discuss the demands of local communities *"ADI is a policy of coordination, but we haven't achieved that, because each service has its own*

*budget. (…) The budget should be defined in May every year, for the following year. That means from January to May you already have to define the investment areas and in September you then close the discussion. So, when ADI meetings are done, the public services have already decided how to invest their money"* **(Associated Policy Manager 3, ADI North).**

Regarding this, the ADI policy is part of a wider system that pursues the development of the territory, usually throughout participatory spaces. In this sense, it is relevant to analyse to what extent this policy promotes the coordinated efforts between local organisations and other participatory spaces available in the territory, so as to foster the distribution of power among actors. This is related to the coordination of local policies and services and their effects on the enhancement of the local social fabric and its organisations. Specifically, the interviews generally indicated that, even though the coordination is a formal aim of the ADI, this policy has insufficient links with other services and participatory spaces implemented in the territory.

The interviews consistently indicated that ADI meetings involved different public services, as it is formally established in the aims of this policy. Nevertheless, the coordination with representatives in other spaces, such as consultations related to the ILO Convention 169, neighbourhood unions, older people's associations, community health councils and others, is practically absent from the formal arrangements. "*In my opinion, there are some people who don't even know what it* [ADI] *is. People who are leading the organisations are more familiarised, because the Aymara representatives have meetings solely with the governor. In the case of consultations about education, there was very little participation of people at all"* **(Associated Policy Manager 9, ADI North)**.

From the institutional perspective, these two layers of rules-in-use are unfolded within the same territory, by the same communities, but in different spaces. On the one hand, there is the traditional Aymara level. From the Chileanization process, Aymara communities learnt how to develop their culture as a set of shared rules, not only outside the law, but hidden from it. On the other hand, the formal rules were implanted by the Chilean state, without first recognising the existence of established authorities and forms of social organisation. From the historical institutionalist perspective, the formative period defined the path for the following decisions. In the case of ADI, which was enacted years after the Chileanization

process, this path was followed and new roles and representatives were defined, nevertheless the recognition of indigenous self-determination was formally addressed by Indigenous Law and the definition of the ADI policy.

### 4.5 Bricoleurs in the institutional process of ADI North

From the critical institutionalist perspective, bricoleur is a concept that refers to actors who, consciously and unconsciously, adapt and reshape the institutional arrangements throughout their everyday practices (Cleaver and De Koning 2015, p.4). In this context, individuals' behaviour is not constantly driven by conscious reflection. Instead, their daily practices can also be an expression of non-conscious decisions, usually framed by the ethos of informal institutions. In this case study, they refer to the actors who shape the rules-in-use that frame the implementation of the ADI North by using formal or informal institutions.

*Table 8: Identification of bricoleurs in ADI North*

| Bricoleurs official services | Bricoleurs from the indigenous community |
|---|---|
| Intendente (regional mayor) | Indigenous representatives: shape the formal rules in local methodologies to outreach communities. |
| Gobernador (province mayor) | |
| Local mayors | |
| CONADI | |

One of the key actors in the implementation of the ADI North are those people who occupy the role of mayor at different levels of the territory. Consciously, and following the formal institutions that frame this policy, the ***Intendente*** – mayor of the region – has the power to lead local decisions and to give guidelines to local services. The person in this role is formally at the highest level of decision making in the ADI. He/she has the power to "*oficiar*", to give formal indications, to the local services to carry out the support tasks for the ADI implementation. Along with the intendente, each region is divided into provinces, which are politically managed by the ***Governador*** – mayor of province – who is the head of decision-making processes at this level. In this ADI, the Governador can be considered as a bricoleur,

as he/she is the closest representative of the national executive power in the territory. The Governador leads constant dialogues with local residents, visits the villages in the province and implements the governmental agenda for the territory. The physical proximity to the territory is especially relevant for the villages located in the highlands, which are extremely isolated from social services. It should be noted that both, the Intendente and Governador, are directly appointed by the President of the country, without citizens' participation. Consequently, the permanence in their roles depends upon evaluation made at the top-levels of political power in the country, with no direct accountability to the local community. In this sense, the fulfilment of their role is crossed by the local interests of Aymara communities, along with the president's agenda. As part of the ADI policy, they have to validate their work at the local level the governmental policies, which, as is going to be analysed in the next section, are implemented by a weak participatory institutional framework.

A different case is represented by the **alcaldes or mayors**, who are the political authorities of the *comunas*. Even though *comunas* correspond to a subdivision of provinces, *alcaldes* have higher levels of autonomy in the exercise of their role. Firstly, the main formal institution that frames their actions is the Organic Law for Municipalities. In its 1st Article, it established that "the municipalities are autonomous corporations under public law, of legal character, whose purpose is to meet the needs of the local community and to ensure its participation in the economic, social and cultural progress of the respective communes" (Ministerio del Interior; Subsecretaría de Desarrollo Regional y Administrativo, Art. 1) . Under this institutional framework, *alcaldes* have the power to create their own plan of development for the *comunas* or counties.

From a participatory perspective, it should be noted that *alcaldes* are directly elected by residents of the territories that they represent, so they have to be accountable to them. Additionally, they are formally part of the ADI board, so they have the power to influence the implementation of this policy. However, in the context of a formal system of local organisations composed by clubs and neighbours' unions, along with informal traditional Aymara organisations, the structure of the ADI appears as a graft that was recently added to the administration of the *comunas*. According to the interviews, ADI policy is, consequently,

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not a relevant institution for *alcaldes*' local management. Instead, they prefer to run their own consultations and assemblies with the community, separately from the ADI. In this sense, alcaldes are a formal bricolage for the ADI North, but informally, they do not conduct any relevant activities framed by this policy.

Along with these actors, the **CONADI** is a bricoleur which shapes the ADI North by conducting operative decisions in the implementation of the policy. To achieve this, CONADI supports Aymara representatives by providing a budget and organising the administrative aspects of their role. CONADI outsources some tasks to an external consultant, for example, the coordination of meetings, booking the venues and transporting vehicles, writing the meetings' minutes, among others. The power of shaping the ADI North has a conscious dimension, as it is given by the formal institutions of the policy. These define CONADI as the formal actor responsible for leading development programmes for indigenous communities. Informally, shaping the rules is also grounded in the practices that public officials endeavour towards, based on their personal commitments with communities. Here, the role of those officials who identify themselves as Aymara is relevant. For them, the Aymara culture, principles, and traditions represent an implicit knowledge expressed in their daily practices, beyond the formal institutions. This facilitates the adaptation of the formal institutions to the local culture.

### 4.4.6   Indigenous communities' representatives

Another group of bricoleurs is composed of the indigenous communities' representatives. These actors have less power in shaping the formal institutions of ADI, but more informal power in the representation of reproduction of Aymara culture. On the one hand, it is possible to mention the three representatives of the Aymara Congress. Aymara Congress is a permanent space of representation of Aymara communities in front of the public and private organisations in general matters, beyond the ADI, but including this policy as well. On the other hand, indigenous representatives bricoleurs are those elected specifically to be part of the ADI board. There are three representatives, one for each sub-territory or ecozone. They have the power to define methodologies, lead the meetings with the communities and to communicate local demands to the public services.

Considering the complex material conditions of the population and the lack of perceived outcomes of this policy, this power is very limited, as it allows indigenous communities to discuss and raise demands, but not to resolve them. For instance, the budget for the development of the territory is not defined in coordination with Aymara representatives and not even among the services, as *"each service already has its own budget. Can you imagine? The budget plan is sent in May for the following year. That is, from January to May you already must have guidelines on what is going to be invested in 2019. And in September, you close the budget discussion altogether. Then it's always from one year to another and when we meet [ADI meetings] the services are already clear where they are going to invest their money"* **(Associated Policy Manager 3, ADINorth)**. This situation reduces the policy managers' ability to shape local policies and to affect the distribution of power among indigenous communities.

In this regard, there is a broad consensus among the interviewees about the relevance of local participation and the essential role of ADI in this regard. However, there is also a consensus about the difficulties that they have in transforming local spaces of dialogue into concrete responses. They interpret the formal institutions of ADI as being a weak framework to achieve relevant outcomes. In turn, there are higher levels of decision-making spaces that restrict the agency of local bricoleurs. However, Cornelio Chipana, a policy manager, states that *"if there is political will, this can be corrected. A modification to the Indigenous Law is not a difficult thing to achieve"* **(Cornelio Chipana, Associated policy manager, ADI North).** In relation to this, in the interviews, the agency of different actors from the public sector was described as 'political will' and it was identified as being an essential element in participatory spaces. Political will appeals to the personal commitment of policy managers in developing their work beyond its formal requirements. This is seen to be a condition for promoting changes that cannot be achieved by using the formal rules. For instance, a policy manager mentions how the will, or in this case the lack of it, affects the ADI*, as "what I want to emphasise is that if there's not the will... in other words, it works because it has to work, because the paper says that's the role that the intendente or the CONADI have to be fulfilled. But it is different when you put your heart into your work, when you put your motivation into it so that it works. Not just do it for the sake of doing it"* **(Policy Manager 2, ADI North)**. In

other words, political will can be understood as the ability of bricoleurs to adapt formal institutions to real contexts and needs.

The personal agency of local bricoleurs is essential also in accomplishing the formal aims of ADI. This is the case of coordination, which are based on personal relationships *"the hard work is done by the executives, while the authorities only give the general framework. (…) In Iquique I knew all the managers, we knew each other. So we would call each other. (…) That was based more on personal contacts. We knew each other. I invited them to my activities. (…) It was satisfying, it wasn't just about the numbers, but we did things that really improved their quality of life, not just in monetary terms, but in other dimensions. (…) I reiterate, this is because of the middle-level management, it is based on the will of the managers. (...) At the end of the day it is all about people"* **(Policy Manager 2-ADI North).**

Although the formal rules are meant to enable local development, the translation of these rules into specific actions is very limited. Responding to local demands is an informal institution that depends on its own resources and the initiatives of policy managers, without being supported or backed up by the institutional framework. In this sense, policy managers have the power to shape the ADI policy. However, their participation in the shaping process is more of an expression of self-advocacy. A policy manager says *"this is the hardest project within CONADI. We're doing this work with a lot of sacrifices, working overtime. We usually meet until 10pm (…) Our role is absolutely technical. Now, as a person, I talk with them, but that is in very personal terms. I'm friends with most of them and we talk a lot and debate a lot"* **(Cornelio Chipana, Associated Policy Manager, ADI North).** Another policy manager adds that he/she has to do tasks beyond the formal role, in order to achieve some impact on the community, such as *"answering the phone on Saturdays and Sundays, buying things that people need to run their projects, getting quotes, delivering the grass, loading the grass bales. That's not my job. I should be sat here. But I haggle on the prices so that old people can get cheaper grass. (…) For me it would be easier to say, "here is the cheque, you cash it at the bank and buy your bundle".* **(Associated Policy Manager 8, ADI North)**.

Considering the inherent weakness of the institutional framework of ADI, to foster local development, **policy managers** encourage local leaders to use different paths to achieve their demands. In this regard, one manager indicated that informal encounters with Aymara

leaders can be useful in order to encourage them to take some actions to access the spaces of power: "*I have very little time to be alone with the leaders. For instance, in the last meeting I had to wait until my boss and some of the other people left the room, to tell them: dear people, why don't you ask me to coordinate a meeting with the Chief of Health of the Regional Council, so you can ask him for what you always ask for: more health appointments*" **(Associated Policy Manager 5, ADI North)**. What this manager and public official is doing is based on knowledge of who the actual policy makers are, so he/she advises indigenous leaders to meet with them directly. Likewise, this advice indicates that the formal participatory strategy is, in practice, not the real space for decision-making. Finally, the fact that the boss and other professionals do not know about this indicates that the formal arrangements of the institutions are, in fact, an obstacle to the Aymara representatives driving for and looking to lead social changes. In turn, developing strategies to encourage the action of local leaders seems to be unwelcome by the head of this programme. Another policy manager also sees the limitations of his/her role to respond the demands risen in the ADI. As a strategy *"the only way in which I can achieve changes is by persuading the local leaders, by indicating to them what to do, giving them some advice. Because I have no say in the public services to be able to change the policy, we don't have that power".* **(Policy manager 3, ADI North).**

A special example of the personal commitment in adapting institutions to the local context is the case of those policy managers who identify as Aymara. They embody the contradictions of formal and informal institutions, as well as facing the challenges or the integration of both. In the section of informal institutions, how the public role is assumed as a mixture between the formal institutional framework, and the traditional and informal ones were mentioned. Regarding the role of this category of policy managers, one interviewee mentioned that the mayor or *alcalde "is seen as the main leader of the ancestral structure. (…) is still in people's mind that someone has to lead and be the mother or father of the comuna* **(Associated policy manager 3-ADI North).** These expectations about the public roles are understood by Aymara policy managers and are thus integrated into their daily activities. This policy manager mentions that *"I know the two languages and I live in these 'two worlds' from the anthropological perspective. But for me it's only one world. (…) Having studied in the university and my ten years working in the public area allow me to understand the*

*administrative side. A lot of bureaucracy, papers…because you're managing public funds. (…) I can understand these two sides. (…) And that's something that you have to experience"* **(Associated policy manager 3, ADI North)**. Another policy manager adds that *"you have to resolve how to implement the world vision in the development. That's hard work. I've been researching about the indigenous world vision and it's complex (…) I do it following my own personal interest. I received a westernised education (…) and the Aymara world vision is very different, it is holistic"* **(Policy Manager 2, ADI North)**.

The identification as indigenous also affects the relationship between policy managers and the Aymara communities. Beyond the formal institutions that regulate this relationship, a policy manager indicates that *"it was very difficult for me, mainly because of the personal relationship. Technically, you can be very correct, right? You can be very clear with all the regulations, but the personal relationship is always going to be marked by a certain tension. Why? Because no matter how nice and empathetic you are, or how many skills you may have as a social worker. You're still ultimately a representative of the state and being a representative of the state means you are not indigenous (…) I'm indigenous, but for them (in my role) I am not. For them I'm a representative of the state from the moment that I sit to talk with them. It's not that I'm an enemy, but since there is a historical pain, there is a historical resentment that I represent, do you understand me? So you are identified as being different, and on top of that, you owe them a lot".* **(Policy manager 4-ADI North)**.

Understanding the Aymara world vision and integrating it into local policy management is something that can be assumed as a personal commitment. To do this, bricoleurs associated with public services have to overcome formal institutional barriers to face local needs. In the case of the local health services *"there are some doctors who are more resistant to changing the paradigms of what they have always understood about health (...) We have asked them to participate in the election of professionals (...) but the doctors are chosen in Santiago (...) It was a doctor who was here for two or three months, and then he told us 'I didn't think the interculturalism was so strong here. It's not my thing'. (...) He was shocked by every intercultural procedure in the CESFAM [Family Health Centre]. He didn't understand, he didn't respect this health system and traditional medicine"* **(Associated policy manager 2, ADI North)**. Another policy manager who had not risen under the Aymara culture and did not

have any training related to interculturality says that *"the truth is before working for this programme; I was incredulous about the Andean cosmovision. I didn't see any sense in them making a pawa [thanksgiving ceremony]. (…) I didn't understand the background of it. For example, the vilancha, when they sacrifice a llama, they talk to it before killing it. These are things you learn when you are here"* **(Associated policy manager 5, ADI North)**.

The lack of knowledge about local traditions was not an obstacle to be hired to work on the programme. In this case, the experience in the territory allowed this bricoleur to learn and change some of the strategies in the implementation of the programme. This was motivated by a personal interest, as *"it helps me to do my job and to build good relationships with people"* **(Associated policy manager 5, ADI North)**. However, the formal institutions prohibit the participation of public officials in local *fiestas*, one of the most relevant spaces of interaction with the Andean culture. This bricoleurs says that "*sometimes I am criticised because I don't participate but I can't. (…) According to regulations that we have, we public officials can't participate in fiestas or anything. This is because it can be seen as leading to corruption. And we can't receive anything either from people. But I still receive some gifts, because if you don't receive them, trust from people is lost"*.

Something interesting about this programme is that they achieved an integration between the formal institutions and the local characteristics of the territory. The reason for having this flexibility, according to this policy manager, *"this is a national programme, so this started in the Araucanía region, which is a conflict-ridden zone. People there are rather more confrontational. I think there the decision to give people what they want and not to impose anything has started"* **(Associated Policy Manager 8, ADI North).** It is interesting to notice that this policy manager acknowledges the informal and confrontational actions of Mapuche people as a factor that allows him as a bricoleur, to foster community participation in the north, over the formal institutions of ADI.

Indigenous representatives, as mentioned, develop informal practices related to strategies of contestation. These are exercised when there is urgency in achieving the community's demands, or when formal institutions have not been efficient in resolving permanent problems. One example is the recent conflict that Aymara communities faced with a mining company who planned to set in the area of Belen, in the Andean Highlands. Instead of

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appealing via the formal spaces, *"the community of Belen made the decision of going to the streets on their own. This was without using any formal means to assert their rights (…) they said that was the only way to raise and elevate their demands **(Policy manager 3, ADI North).***

Related to this, Aymara representatives have struggled to achieve their goals. Along with the weak institutional framework, the conditions that they have to exercise their role, they are considered precarious. In this sense, *"there are more and more instances of participation: the neighbourhood council, the indigenous community, the ADI, the CNA councillors, the CONADI councillor, the consultations. (...) Influencing is basically an economic issue. In other words, we cannot fight against Goliath if we don't have anything to eat or to feed ourselves with. So people generally... are not poor, but they have a very weak economy. They cannot continue, because to be involved in leadership you have to have resources, money and time.* **(Aymara representative 8, ADI North).** This is a limitation for the representatives to do their work with the communities. As a consequence, the lack of resources affects their power of decision-making over the territory and by extension their possibilities to fulfil their role. A representative mentioned in this regard that *"our regulation is very basic in terms of participation (…) but with or without money, I visit and travel around the territory anyway. I hitchhike. (…) There are no buses, but I have to get to meetings. (...) I'd like to visit the communities more frequently, but it is hard for me because of time and resources. I don't have a car here in Arica, so I can't just go there wherever and whenever I want*. **(Aymara representative 2, ADI North).**

**4.6 Conclusions of the chapter**

To understand the participatory processes of the ADI policy, this chapter has focused on the ADI in the Northern territory of Chile, analysing the institutional dimension of participation and its specific expressions in the context of coloniality. The institutional perspective offers the possibility to pay attention to the role of local actors in building the rules which frame their local interactions, while the decolonial approach allows an embedded institutional analysis, according to new institutional theories (Lowndes 2001)

As it is possible to see, the previous formal and informal institutions of the policy in this territory tend to be in conflict or, at the very least, not actively in dialogue. This is related to

the highly centralised exercise of power, concentrated in the intendente and gobernador as the main bricoleurs with the power to shape the institutions. Less power for policy shaping resides with the policy makers and the managers of public services, who are part of the hierarchical government structure. Finally, Aymara communities' power in shaping the institutions are recognised in formal rules in terms of participation and promotion of self-determination, in particular in the Indigenous Law and 169 ILO Convention. However, these rules do not translate into power at the level of shaping policy.

In this context, beyond the (ostensible) openness of recent governments to promoting greater spaces of power for indigenous communities, the ADI has followed a pattern that is constant in the history of the North of Chile from the Chileanization period, which is the imposition of the centralised states' rules over the Aymara people and their territory.

In this context, the ADI holds fragile formal institutions to recognise distribute the power between the actors involved. It is more as a principle, whose implementation lies with the personal commitment of local actors. Therefore, the specific expressions of the Aymara institutions do not find a space of recognition in the formal institutions of ADI. As a consequence, the Aymara institutional expressions -such as its calendar and festivities, roles and social organisation of life, language – are expressed only an informal practice.

In conclusion, regarding participation and political organisations, it is possible to see that the current institutional arrangements do not recognise traditional knowledge, as the traditional political organisations were completely replaced in the implementation of the ADI and other spaces of participation. Furthermore, the lack of recognition and the efficacy of traditional political organisations has resulted in their extinction, not only as channels of communication between indigenous communities and the state, but also in the relationships among indigenous people, who are now formally organised under these bureaucratic arrangements.

The head of the ADI is the *intendente* and *gobernador* at the regional and provincial level respectively. They are not democratically elected by the citizen vote, but they are directly appointed by the president of the republic. Therefore, the accountability is to the top levels of decision making, more than to the people. Regarding the local social services, they play a

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technical role in responding to the ADI's agenda. In this centralised and hierarchical model where ADI is inserted, they also have to respond directly to the goals defined by the service. As was mentioned, these goals and the corresponding budget are defined every year prior to the meetings with ADI representatives. When the pre-assemblies, assemblies and ADI board meetings are held, the power that these actors have is limited to the framework that was pre-defined outside the participatory spaces.

Without strong formal institutions which involve binding participatory processes, participation lies with the efforts made by individual policy managers. From an institutional perspective, these managers follow informal rules every time when they endeavour towards actions beyond the explicit rules made for their roles.

Finally, it is interesting that local actors validate the ADI policy as a relevant space of dialogue, even though they are aware of the limitations of its formal institutions as a way of accomplishing their demands, indicating that "*it is in vain playing inside the borders [of institutional frameworks], because you can progress only a little. (Aymara representative 4-North).* It seems to be that the recognition of that little progress in achieving their demands allows Aymara communities recognise the ADI as relevant as a space of dialogue with the state. ADI, although does not bring the outcomes that the communities expect, it is functional as it is compatible with the reproduction of the traditional Aymara institutions. There is, in this sense, a balance between the old and the new institutions. In this context, others informal strategies have been developed when the formal rules are insufficient to meet their urgent demands.

# Chapter 5. The implementation of participatory strategies in ADI Puel Nahuelbuta

### 5.1 Introduction

This chapter aims to present an analysis of how institutions are driving the local processes of participation of indigenous communities, in the context of the implementation of the ADI Puel Nahuelbuta. The chapter addresses these issues drawing on the categories provided by new institutionalism, emphasising the formal and informal institutions that operate in this policy, and the historical dimension of their formation. From the critical institutionalist perspective, the concept of bricoleur is used in this analysis to identify and understand the power of different actors in shaping the institutions that frame the ADI implementation in this territory.

The sections of this chapter are guided by this theoretical framework, in the light of the categories and the elements that have emerged from the data. At the same time, the chapter also addresses the limitations of this framework, by adapting it, when necessary, in order to analyse the phenomena depicted by the data.

### 5.2 Presentation and analysis of institutions ADI South-Puel Nahuelbuta

The ADI Puel Nahuelbuta was created in 2004, the year when Decree 168 was enacted, considering the quantitative relevance of the indigenous population of this region, along with the isolation of its indigenous communities and the general disadvantages of the territory in comparison with the rest of the national territory (Ministerio de Planificación y Cooperación 2004). Thus, this policy was meant to contribute to facing and overcoming these difficulties by means of the coordination of local programmes.

Along with the coordination of local programmes, the implementation of the ADI policy requires the establishment of an ADI board, which, following the same formal structure as ADI North, is headed by the *Intendente*, or the mayor of the region. The *intendente* is the most significant political head for the region and being directly appointed by the president of the country. Another formal role in the implementation of the ADI policy is the *gobernador*, or the mayor of the province, who is also directly appointed by the president of Chile. From the territorial administration, the mayors of the counties involved, the *alcaldes*, are also part of the ADI board. These last, distinct from the other two mayors, are elected by public elections. From the government, representatives of public services – such as education, health, social development, and others, are also formally invited to participate on the ADI board. Along with them, the ADI board should also incorporate the participation of local indigenous communities, called as ADI councillors, who refer to various indigenous leaders elected through a democratic process.

Beyond this formal framework, it is important to mention three main processes crucial to understanding the implementation of the ADI in the territory. Firstly, since 2004, the ADI board of this territory has never been formally established. Consequently, it is not possible to identify consistent actions nor participatory strategies driven by and associated with this policy. From 2017, a group of Mapuche leaders have been active in trying to activate the ADI, starting with the definition of specific formal rules that will guide the ADI Puel Nahuelbuta council. This was achieved at the end of the 2017, which was also the end of the period of government of the president in power at that time, Michelle Bachelet. After that milestone and following further steps under the new government – now led by the right-wing coalition – the group of Mapuche leaders have been looking for opportunities to implement the ADI and to achieve local development through participatory processes with a cultural relevance. As will be demonstrated in this chapter, public institutions were not especially keen to respond to the demands of Mapuche communities. As a consequence, the Mapuche representatives are those who are managing the policy in this territory, while the government, although it is leading other participatory actions, does not have an active role in the ADI Puel Nahuelbuta-South.

Nevertheless, it is important to clarify that in this thesis the interviewees are labelled according to their formal role as policy managers or Mapuche representatives, despite the fact that in reality, the policy managers associated to CONADI and other services involved in the ADI are not actually implementing the policy and, in turn, the indigenous representatives are actually playing the role of managers of the policy. Thus, the quotes from actors formally defined as managers of the policy will be labelled as 'ADI Policy Manager', despite the fact that they are not exercising that responsibility in reality; Mapuche leaders' quotes will be labelled as 'Mapuche Representative', even when informally they are in effect managing certain elements of the policy; and quotes from actors involved in associated policies and public services, education, health, environment, NGOs, and others – are labelled as 'Associated Policy Managers'.

A second relevant element is the political context during this process. At the time, the narratives were being generated a new government was formed, following the presidential elections in 2018. As a result, the *Nueva Mayoría* (New Majority), an alliance of social-democratic parties, lost the elections, and *Chile Vamos* (Go Chile), a right-wing alliance of political parties, took power. The ADI was impacted upon by this change, as the conversations about promoting the ADI as a participatory space of local development were started by Mapuche leaders when the social-democratic government was still in power. Subsequently, the arrival of new teams of public officials pushed back those agreements.



*Image 7 - Wood truck probably owned by a forest company. A typical image of the region. Source: author of the thesis.*

Finally, a relevant element in the territory is the militarisation strategy. Specifically, in June 2018 – when this fieldwork was just starting, the *Comando Jungla*, the Jungle Command was publicly presented. This consisted of an elite group of special police forces of *Carabineros*, the Chilean police, who were trained in Colombia in jungle security tactics used to face guerrillas. It was expected that the *Comando Jungla* would use those tactics to suppress violence and terrorism in the Araucanía, the region which has the highest number of Mapuche inhabitants.

Having sketched the above context, the following sections of the chapter will analyse the ADI Puel Nahuelbuta-South, considering the categories of formal and informal institutions, bricoleurs, and how these are rooted in the legacy of the colonial matrix of power.

Understanding the implementation of the ADI South from an institutional perspective involves analysing the formal and informal institutions that frame the policy. From this theory, institutions are rules with power over the impact of individuals' behaviour. Therefore, either formally or informally, they define the possibilities of individuals to affect their context. In turn, institutions are themselves constructed by individuals, in particular by those who have the power to do it.

From this approach, this section presents the antecedents to understanding the historical dimensions of the institutional framework of the ADI Puel Nahuelbuta. The second part examines the institutions which drive the implementation of the ADI Puel Nahuelbuta, emphasising their effects on the (non-)participation of local actors. The last part of this section addresses the analysis of the role of local actors, policy managers and Mapuche communities discussing to what extent they are configured as bricoleurs who shape the institutional process of the ADI.

### 5.2.3    Historical perspective of institutional bricolage in ADI Puel Nahuelbuta

The contribution of the historical approach to the analysis of institutions of the ADI Puel Nahuelbuta is to emphasise the power dimension of the formation and reproduction of institutions (Immergut 1998, p.16). In this sense, by considering historical institutionalism in the analysis of the ADI policy, it is possible to examine how institutions are, in some respect, an expression, in the form of a chain, of previous institutions and decisions. The historical perspective pays attention to the role of this chain of institutions in the reproduction of power relationships among actors and their different interests (Thelen and Steinmo 1992; Hall and Taylor 1996b). As a Mapuche leader clearly expressed, the historical background in the Chilean-Mapuche relationship is far from being considered as a series of events that have been left in the past. Moreover, the autonomy in implementing the indigenous rules is still a community demand against state oppression. This Mapuche leader said, in particular, that this process started with

> "T*he Chilean military invasion, which they call the 'Pacification of the Araucanía' and 'the Desert campaign' in Argentina. From then and onwards, Mapuche society has been prohibited from freely exercising its own institutions in order to drive its destiny. Moreover, Mapuche society has been oppressed under a colonial policy which has imposed everything on it. There have already been three generations who have experienced that. There has been no real possibility where Mapuche society today can think for itself about its future. The political demands aim at attaining that situation. When they talk about self-determination, autonomy, they talk about letting us think about what we want for the future*" **(Mapuche representative 4-ADI South)**.

Taking this perspective into account, in the case of the ADI Puel Nahuelbuta it is possible to recognise a series of events that have been left in the past three main historical elements in the formation and evolution of the institutions that frame the policy today:

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- *Parlamentos* **as a historical space of dialogue between Mapuche communities and**
  **state.**

From a historical perspective, an essential aspect to emphasise in the historical relationship between the Mapuche people and the Chilean state, is colonisation by the Spanish crown, starting in the mid-fifteenth century. Colonisation marked the context of the formative process (Peters 2012) of the institutional framework that Mapuche people have faced until the present day. In this period, the success of Spanish conquest over indigenous people across the country was hampered when approaching the Southern territory as it faced the Mapuche people's sustained resistance (Bengoa 2008; Richards 2010). Being unable to defeat Mapuche communities and take control over their territory, Spanish conquerors began developing strategies of dialogue with the Mapuche nation. This is the origin of parliaments or *parlamentos,* "a sophisticated diplomatic and high political institution that took place on more than forty occasions between 1593 and 1825" (Cayuqueo 2018, p.215). Parlamentos consisted of explicit formal agreements about the territorial boarders of the country. Attending to their continuity over time, the shared acknowledgement among the parts and mutual recognition of sovereignty (Zavala 2015), it is possible to consider them as a strong institution that regulated the relationship between the Spanish Crown and the higher echelons of Mapuche authority.

It is important to stress the fact that the relationship between the Mapuche nation and the Spanish crown was not based entirely on political dialogue. Rather, the parliaments were reached as a strategy, in the middle of bloody and violent attempts at the colonisation and domination of the Mapuche people, framed by the process known as the Guerra de Arauco or Arauco War[6] during 1550 and 1656 (Bengoa 1999; Bengoa 2008). The intensity and violence of this process decreased significantly from 1641, when the *parlamento de Quillín was held* (Cayuqueo 2018)*.* The result of this *parlamento* was an agreement on the territorial boarders, defining the Biobío River as a limit between the Mapuche peoples and the Spanish

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[6] The term Arauco was the name that Spanish peoples give to the Mapuche territories, while "Araucanos" was the Spanish name for Mapuche peoples.  It should be noted that the name of Araucanía region keeps the Spanish semantic to refer to this territory.

Crown (Bengoa 1999; Zavala 2015; Cayuqueo 2018). Then, other *parlamentos* were conducted to define aspects related to the relationship between these two parts.

In this sense, the formative process of the institutions that regulated this relationship was characterised by violence sponsored by the Spanish crown and resisted by the Mapuche communities. The attempts of Spain to conquer the territory resulted in an effective and self-governed institution of political dialogue between the two parts. However, following the triumph of the independence movements over the monarchists in 1810, and the beginning of the construction of the Chilean nation-state, the agreements reached in the formal institution represented by *parlamentos* were marginalised by the new elites governing the country (Cayuqueo 2018).

Mapuche communities' demands are largely rooted in the fight for recognition of this historical process as an antecedent that the current negotiations have to be based on: *"Mapuche were the only indigenous people in the world who fought and resisted. During the colonial period,* lonkos [traditional political head of Mapuche communities] *managed to sign those treaties with the Spanish crown, which were later ratified by the Chilean state. So, the state cannot invalidate them unilaterally"* **(Mapuche Representative 1, ADI South)**.

The above represent a claim for the legitimacy of the political knowledge and historical achievements of the Mapuche peoples in their political relationship with the state. Currently, these agreements tend to be presented as historical antecedents without relevance for the present day, denying their significance as a valid starting point for new negotiations with Mapuche demands. The challenge, as presented by this representative, lies in gaining recognition of the validity of these antecedents constituting a formal arrangement which frames the current relationship between the Mapuche people and the Chilean state. The recognition of these agreements includes the validation of the Mapuche people as legitimate political subjects and, at the same time, the recognition of the colonial history which has shaped the relationship between indigenous people and the Chilean state.

The "*Acuerdo de Nueva Imperial*" – Nueva Imperial Agreement – held in 1989 in the city of Nueva Imperial, can be considered the last attempt of achieving agreements at the structural level between the Chilean state and the Mapuche. Although this agreement gave the basis

for the design of Indigenous Law 19.253, a significant response to the long-standing demands for constitutional recognition remains pending (Aguas and Nahuelpan 2019).

- **Militarisation**

As mentioned, another chapter in the Mapuche-Chilean relationship started, when the country achieved independence from the Spanish crown. The previous agreements related to the territorial borders that delineated the spaces of sovereignty between the two parts moved back when, after three centuries of recognition of Mapuche as an independent nation, in 1852 the Arauco county was created. By doing this, the Chilean state, motivated by the exploitation of resources for the development of the new nation, decided unilaterally, to extend its sovereignty (Cayuqueo 2018, p.2204) beyond the Biobio River. Along with denying the previous border agreements, this decision erased the recognition of *parlamentos* as a dialogical institution to define agreements with the Mapuche peoples.



*Image 8 - "Documents relating to the occupation of Arauco: containing the work carried out from 1861 to the present day". By Cornelio Saavedra. Santiago, Chile. 1870. Source: Memoria Chilena*

With the Chilean state attempting to occupy the territory from the Biobio River to the South, and the consequent resistance from Mapuche peoples as a response, new conflicts and violent confrontations emerged. In this context, a formal institution was created in 1861 by the Chilean state: referred to as the Pacification of the Araucanía (Bengoa 1999; Salazar and Pinto 1999; Richards 2010). Contradictorily, pacification consisted of a conscious military occupation plan of Mapuche territories.

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Although the Pacification of the Araucanía, as well as *parlamentos*, corresponded to a formal institution, the most relevant difference in this new era in the Mapuche-Chilean relationships was not rooted in an agreed process of dialogue among two equals actors. Moreover, the occupation process established new rules which were unilaterally imposed by force by the Chilean state.

According to Richards, militarisation was accompanied by a conscious construction of the national identity based around the "myth of mestizaje" (Richards 2010, p.62). This means, a Chilean identity rooted in a racial and cultural mixing between Spanish and indigenous peoples. However, the Chilean identity is different from the indigenous one, the reason why this strategy corresponds to an attempt at the assimilation of Mapuche people to this new identity. Similar to the Chileanisation process held in the North of Chile at the beginning of the 20th Century, the formation of new institutions to regulate the relationship with the indigenous communities denied the Mapuche organisation of life. Instead, of being considered as a valid political counterpart by the Spanish crown, the Mapuche people became being considered as "barbarous, uncivilised beings whose conquest could no longer be delayed" (Richards 2010, p.62).

For this purpose, the Chilean state created formal institutions.  History shows the origin of these institutions defined a path that was followed by the subsequent processes of institutional definition of the relationship between the state and the Mapuche communities. According to Richard, "the Mapuche who survived the Chilean *Pacificación* were excluded symbolically and materially, paving the way for their erasure throughout the remainder of the century" (Richards 2010, p.63).

Subsequently, the republican Chilean state has consistently followed this institutional path, in order to guarantee its sovereignty and control of the territory. This intensified during the civic-military dictatorship of the 1970s and 1980s and has been maintained by subsequent democratic governments until the present time. According to Richards (2010),  this strategy hinges upon a public construction of the Mapuche people as terrorists, while the Chilean people are portrayed as victims. This author sees in this construction a pretext for the state, local elites and forest companies to ignore the colonial history that frames the Chilean-Mapuche relationships. Considering the action of the Chilean state against Mapuche

communities, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has condemned the anti-terrorism laws applied by the Chilean state against some Mapuche leaders (Inter-American Court of Human Rights 2014). In one specific case, as the fake accusation affected a *lonko* – political head of Mapuche communities – the Chilean state was sentenced to pay reparations for the damages for the unfair trial, not only to the victim as an individual, but also to the wider community that he represented.

In this context, *Comando Jungla* addressed the local violence, targeting the Mapuche communities. However, on the 14th of November of 2018, just five months after it was launched, Camilo Catrillanca, a young Mapuche leader, was assassinated by a *Comando Jungla* officer while he was training a boy to use a tractor. The excessive force and the 'ambiguous' procedures of the police during the ensuing investigation, were widely reported on by the mass media, triggering an uprising in the country. As a consequence, the government decided to remove *Comando Jungla* from the territory.

Nevertheless, the militarisation of the territory, with origins dating back to the colonial process, continues in the territory. From a historical perspective, the *Comando Jungla* represents only another example of the military oppression of the Mapuche territory which has persisted, beyond the political party of the national or local government. As one Mapuche representative indicates *"when the Region of Araucanía was militarized, it was Lagos who was in power. The businesspeople were happy with him. With Bachelet, the region became militarized once again. And today this other one... There is no difference between the governments! Apparently, they think differently, but in practice, all the laws are the same."* **(Mapuche representative 1, ADI South)**. Ricardo Lagos was the president of Chile from 2000 to 2006, supported by the *Concertación*, the former leftist coalition*,* while Michelle Bachelet, also supported by the leftist coalition, was president from 2006 to 2010, and then from 2014 to 2018. The "other one" mentioned by the interviewee refers to the president Sebastian Pinera, supported by the right-wing coalition. Whoever has been in power, the military strategy has been deployed in the same way until the present.

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- **Land dispossession**

Strongly linked to the militarisation and occupation of the Region of Araucanía, another historical antecedent to be considered in the institutional analysis of the ADI Puel Nahuelbuta is land dispossession. This refers, as mentioned, to the occupation of the territoriesthe of Mapuche people, first by the Spanish colonisers, then by the Chilean state. After the period of the Pacification of the Araucanía, it became a formal institution, attracting a significant number of settlers to inhabit the new lands incorporated into the national territory, in place of the indigenous communities. This was a plan that, according to Cayuqueo (2018), between 1896 and 1915 enabled the allocation of 2.502 Chilean families on 149.245 hectares, only in the provinces of Malleco and Cautín, where currently the ADI Puel Nahuelbuta is currently being implemented. In addition to this, between 1882 and 1915, the State gave 870 foreign families, 51,118 hectares in Malleco, while in Cautín, during the same period, 459 families were given 26,208 hectares (Cayuqueo 2018). These were mainly Swiss, German and French families. The Mapuche communities formerly living in those lands were displaced to lands usually known as *reducciones*, or reductions, as they represent vastly smaller tracts of land in comparison with the previous territories.

During the second half of the 20$^{th}$ Century, this concentration of lands and *inquilinaje*, a sort of peonage or feudalist labour arrangement in rural areas, was considered an obstacle for the modernisation of the country (Bengoa 1990). As a consequence, agrarian reforms were enacted from 1962 to 1973 (Bengoa 1990). From historical institutionalism, plans of industrialisation and the modernisation of the country can be considered a critical juncture (Lowndes 1996), as they responded to an external factor which pushes the current institutional arrangement to be changed, so as to advance towards more modern labour relationships, based on formal agreements more than on paternalistic and traditional relationships.

However, the institutional shaping followed the path of the non-recognition of Mapuche people's right over the lands. Although these reforms helped the Mapuche communities to recover some of the land lost during Pacification, they were not an institution based on the restitution of indigenous lands. Moreover, these reforms focused on the peasants and the rural areas, such as the "Chilean reformist and revolutionary movements privileged class

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ideology with little ethnic content" (Richards 2010, p.64). Following the same pattern, in 1974, under the civic-military dictatorship, Decree Law 701 was enacted. This decree consisted of a bonus for forest companies which fostered plantations of pine and eucalyptus. As a consequence, the dispossession of lands from Mapuche communities increased, in favour of these forest companies. When democracy was reinstated in 1990, Decree Law 701 was extended and confirmed by different governments, no matter what the political tendency of the parties in executive or legislative power. The last extension of the decree was in 2014, when President Michelle Bachelet, supported by the New Majority and the National Congress of Chile – legislative power of the country, equivalent to the Parliament of the United Kingdom – supported the process by arguing that the forest companies have contributed over time to the reduction of carbon emissions.

It should be noted that there are bureaucratic rules in place whereby the Mapuche people are able to receive back parts of the lands from which they have been dispossessed by the state, by buying them through a specific public budget. However, there are several criticisms of these arrangements, for example the long time that families have to wait to do this – the process can take ten years or more. Another criticism focuses on the extent of the lands that the communities can access. In fact, the recovered lands are based on the *títulos de merced*, documents that certify that they own the land. However, these documents usually only consider a small percentage of the total dispossessed lands. In this sense, these documents are a formal institutional arrangement that, although allowing Mapuche communities to recover some of their lands, is limited to a an extremely small proportion of the overall lands that are registered. For example, according to the Economic Commission for Latin-America and the Caribbean and the Mapuche Territorial Alliance, Mapuche are now confined to 5% of their original territories (CEPAL and Alianza Territorial Mapuche 2012, p.30), while for example in the Province of Arauco, forest companies are using 60% of the total territory (Grosser Villar and Carrasco-Henríquez 2019, p.148).

As a consequence of this slow and inefficient process of recovering the lands and the inefficiency of the bureaucratic arrangements in responding to the communities' demands, some Mapuche communities have actually set up informal occupations. This reinforces the militarisation of the region by the state, as it is used to justify the actions from the specialised

police. It should be noted that from the perspective of Mapuche people, land is an essential element for their development and the reproduction of life, not as individual private property, but as a collective geopolitical space. In this sense, "*Convention 169 mentions collective rights, which include the management of natural resources on top of the soil and under the soil. However, it's impossible to manage the resources on the ground without a law which allows them to do this. For instance, the waters of this region are owned by people, and several of these people are not indigenous, but are actually businesspersons, who don't even live in this area or have ties to it. Cascades, tributaries, and rivers are registered as the property of outside third parties*" **(ADI Policy management 1, ADI South)**.

## 5.2 ADI Puel Nahuelbuta: analysis of institutions

The previous section focused on the historical dimension of the institutional framework of the implementation of ADI Puel Nahuelbuta. The purpose of this section is to analyse the current formal and informal institutions that drive this policy.

In the following table, the main institutions referred to by the policy managers and indigenous representatives during the interviewees are listed. According to the conceptualization of new institutional theory, the table and later analysis distinguishes between formal and informal institutions. While the latter refer to those practices and customs undertaken without conscious reflection, the former alludes to explicit rules written in laws, decrees or other formal document (Hall and Taylor 1996b; Peters 2012; Lowndes and Roberts 2013a).

Thus, the main institutions operating in the implementation of the ADI Puel Nahuelbuta identified are:

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*Table 9: Identification of formal and informal institutions operating in ADI South*

| Formal Institutions | Informal Institutions |
| --- | --- |
| Law 19.253 | Self-determination in ADI implementation |
| ADI Decree 168 | Mapuche political organisation |
| Convention 196 ILO | Demonstrations (protests, rally, occupations of public buildings) by Mapuche communities |
| Militarisation | |

The following section consists of an analysis of the role of institutions in allowing these different local actors to participate in the implementation of this ADI. This highlights power as a factor that both produces and is produced by the institutional framework, as well as shaping the power dynamics and relationships between local actors.

### 5.2.3 Formal institutions in ADI Puel Nahuelbuta

The main national institution that formally frames the implementation of the ADI Puel Nahuelbuta is the Law 19.253 which was enacted in 1993, also known as the Indigenous Law. As was mentioned in previous chapters, this law establishes that "it is the duty of society in general and of the state in particular, through its institutions, to respect, protect and promote the development of indigenous peoples, their cultures, families and communities" (Ministerio de Planificación y Cooperación 1993). Additionally, this law has a section which recognises the participation of the indigenous communities. Specifically, the Article 34 of the Law establishes "the services of the state administration and the organisations of a territorial nature, when dealing with matters that have a bearing on or are related to indigenous issues, shall listen to and consider the opinion of the indigenous organisations recognised by this law" (Ministerio de Planificación y Cooperación 1993). This law is the formal basis for the actions led by the state, which focus on the indigenous population, including the ADI policy and the policy which regulates rights over indigenous lands.

Consequently, another formal institution to be analysed is, in fact, the Articles 26 and 27 of the Indigenous Law, which address the specific rules that govern the ADI policy, emphasising the relevance of local communities' participation. Its article 26 refers to the ADIs as territorial spaces in which the State promotes the harmonious development of the indigenous people and their communities" (Ministerio de Planificación y Cooperación 1993). According to CONADI, this process must consider the local identity, as defined by the communities involved, and strengthen the indigenous people's own self-management capacities by sustainable processes (Corporación Nacional de Desarrollo Indígena 2020).

The institutional perspective enables to understand how these institutions operate in concrete contexts, as well as how they are shaped by these scenarios. In the specific case of the ADI Puel Nahuelbuta, although Indigenous Law 19.253 and the ADIs are both formal institutions that explicitly stipulate the development and participation as aims which drive public actions, it is not possible to identify actions which are derived from this policy from its enactment in 2003. There is a case study (Rubilar Palma and Roldán Tonioni 2014) which describes some ADI-related actions led by public organisms during the first year following its enactment. These actions include a budget for the building of houses for *machi* (spiritual Mapuche leaders), and the building of public routes/paths in rural areas inhabited by indigenous communities, implemented during the government of President Frei (from 1994 to 2000).

However, this policy requires the constitution of an ADI board in order to provide a formal space for participation in the design of local strategies of development. As mentioned in the case of ADI North, although the policy has achieved very limited outcomes, this board has at least provided a strategic space for discussing and decision-making about local demands. Furthermore, it has allowed the articulation of communities around assemblies to raise demands. In the case of the ADI Puel Nahuelbuta, the board has never been formally established. The relevance of the ADI board lies in the fact that this is at the centre of decision-making, where the participation of communities, coordination of services and the sharing of territorial perspectives takes place. Without an ADI board, despite the specific efforts made by the state just after the ADI was enacted, and especially in terms the

autonomous actions that the local Mapuche communities have carried out to achieve the revitalization of the policy, the state cannot be said to be operating as an ADI.

The institutional analysis about why this ADI has not been implemented and the conflicts between the bricoleurs' interests will be presented in the following sections.

### 5.2.4 Decree 168 and the creation of ADI Puel Nahuelbuta: formal institutions in the design, informal institutions in the implementation

In 2017, when some Mapuche leaders became aware of the existence of the ADI decree 168 enacted in 2004, decided to call on the local authorities, i. e council and CONADI, to implement this policy. From this point onwards, a group of Mapuche leaders have been taking actions in order to activate the ADI, starting with the definition of the formal rules guiding the ADI council. This was achieved at the end of the 2017, which was also the end of the period of government of the president in power at that time, Michelle Bachelet. This year ADI council was finally formed, not because of the existence of a decree, but because of pressure from Mapuche representatives, who autonomously organised local communities, ran elections of representatives and convened the first meetings.

The above depicts an unusual situation, given the fact that those who benefit from the policy are, at the same time, those implementing it. After that milestone and following further steps under the new government – now led by the right-wing alliance of parties – the group of Mapuche leaders have been looking for opportunities to implement the ADI and achieve local development through participatory processes with cultural relevance. However, the arrival of the new government and the subsequent changes of local authorities who hold a position of trust from the central government, meant a setback, as the ADI council, which was in the process of conformation and still was not recognised as a formal space of decision-making by the new local authorities.

Although far from representing a successful case of participation and collaboration between institutions and communities, the ADI Puel Nahuelbuta represents a particular case in which public services do not follow the formal rules but rather, resist the implementation of the policy, especially in terms of its participatory aspects. From the perspective of a policy

manager, the informality in the implementation of the ADI is far from being an asset. Moreover, it *"obscures how the ADI works. So today the communities participate in the ADI only in an informal way (…). They organise assemblies where they can reach agreements and elect representatives. Then, they meet with another community, communicate their demands to the city council, to the regional government, to the CONADI, to the government, to the Ministry of Social Development, to the central government. This is how they work"* **(ADI Policy Manager 1, ADI South)**. The lack of recognition of Mapuche actions from public services, which actually discouraged the participatory process of ADI Puel Nahuelbuta, is a barrier to communities' purposes.

Regarding this, the high levels of resistance on the part of formal authorities to promote the process of implementation of ADI South, raises the question about the informal rules which frame the roles of these authorities, as well as the roles that the Mapuche communities assume. In this context, there is a clear reconfiguration of the relationships between local actors, driven by the informal rules that usually operate outside of the policy, as a response to the inefficient formal rules in implementing the ADI. This case illustrates the limitations of the formal paths in conveying the local demands of the Mapuche communities, when these demands cannot be resolved with the existing services, but rather, with opening the spaces of power for these communities to be part of a transformation of the current rules.

Hacker's analysis of institutional change offers the typology of institutional drift, as a 'hidden type of change' (Hacker 2005, p.45) referring to those cases in which to face changing scenarios, actors 'drift' certain institutions into gradual barely perceptible change or stasis, so as to hinder their adaptation and updating to the new contexts, and privileging the status quo. According to Hacker, policy analyses demonstrate that, drift not only limits institutional changes, but also obstruct the attempts of reducing the gaps between the implementation and the original goals of policies. The state's neglect of the ADI Puel Nahuelbuta can be seen as a case of institutional drift, as rather than being a non-intentional collective indifference toward this policy, this situation represents a pattern followed by policy makers of different services and different levels of the policy. If bricolage is the process in which bricoleurs shape institutions so as to adapt them to specific contexts, drift can be perceived as a non-bricolage. In this case, the individual and collective power of agents find themselves at the

service not of institutions' adaptation, but rather of their stabilisation, favouring the status quo. This being a shared and constant behaviour, it is possible to indicate that this corresponds to an informal institution operating in the ADI South, and this deliberate non-decision has been effective in defending certain ingrained interests.

In particular, without having established this council as a formal space of decision-making, the conditions for participation and the distribution of power among the different actors become ambiguous, especially for those who are not formally part of decision-making spaces. If there is no official space for participation from the perspective of the public services, ways of influencing decisions are limited as there are no formal rules in place to ensure this can happen. In this respect, one indigenous representative indicates that this policy *"does not have any effect on the communities, because the institutions are defined by the central government's perspective"* **(Mapuche Representative 4, ADI South)**.

Considering that informality is the main framework of the implementation process of the ADI South, details of this analysis will be presented in the section focused on informal institutions.

### 5.2.5 ILO Convention 169

Along with Indigenous Law 19.253 and its specific decrees referring to ADI policy, it is possible to identify other formal institutions running in this system of participatory efforts. One of the main ones is ILO Convention 169, which is a formal arrangement enacted by the Chilean state in 2008. This convention makes it mandatory for member states to promote the participation and self-determination of indigenous communities.

According to the interviews, there are two main trends in participants' perspectives related to this topic. The first trend highlights the relevance of ILO Convention 169 in promoting consultations related to specific services. This is the case for the three consultations that the government has run thus far in the territory since the enactment of ILO Convention 169: a consultation on education in 2018 (Ministry of the Education 2018), one on the environment in 2017 (Ministry of Environment 2017), and one on the changes to the new constitution in 2016. Here, ILO Convention 169 provides the frame and conditions for offering a

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participatory space. As one participant said, *"the 169 allows us to meet effectively as a Mapuche community and discuss the basis of education in schools (…) so we had the opportunity to participate in the local area"* **(Associated Policy Manager 4, ADI South)**.

However, the scope of these participatory spaces is limited to specific areas of consultation that the government has pre-defined, in this case, education and the environment, without providing conditions of coordination between these services and other areas of interests. In this sense, the principle of self-determination defined by ILO Convention 169 is processed by local institutions from the perspective of the segmentation of social services. Hence, the power of decision-making is limited by the boards of the departments that form the bureaucratic system of the state. Thus, although these bureaucratic arrangements provide the conditions for participation, it limits the redistribution of power among the state and the Mapuche communities, as the possibilities to strengthen self-determination in the territory are reduced to specific areas, maintaining power over the territory concentrated in the institutions.

The second trend within the discussion of ILO Convention 169 as a condition for participation focuses on the participation of indigenous people in promoting social change and, in particular, if the social change achieved is coherent with their perspectives. The interview data indicates an agreement among participants with regard to some of the obstacles which ILO Convention 169 and ADI policy create vis-à-vis participation. Specifically, although the Convention, as an international agreement, must be the umbrella for any institution run by the government, including the ADI policy, interviewees also mentioned the lack of coherence between the national formal rules and the Convention as an institutional obstacle addressing the communities' demands.

A central principle mandated by ILO Convention 169 is that of self-determination throughout the mechanism of consultations in areas where the indigenous communities are affected. In order to drive the operations of consultations, Decree 66 was enacted in 2013. However, this decree states that the duty of consultation will be considered fulfilled even if participants do not achieve any agreement to guide further decisions (Decree Law 66). As a result of this, the principle of the self-determination of indigenous peoples is not enhanced by local formal institutions. In contrast, it is limited by this decree, making it *"abstract and not really*

*meaningful"* **(Associated Policy Manager 1, ADI South)**. Another representative added to this that there are really no relevant changes achieved through the consultation and thus the influence of this Convention is *"very minimal. (…) Chile supposedly should respect Mapuche people (…) Then, Piñera* [current President of the country] *also enacted Supreme Decree 66, which inherently limits any real participation"* **(Mapuche Representative 1, ADI South)**. This quote above shows that the national bureaucratic rules which framed the operations of ILO Convention 169 are not coherent with the principles of participation and self-determination that the document purports to pursue.

In particular, as was mentioned in the introductory chapter, although Supreme Decree 66 was meant to frame the operations of ILO Convention 169 specifically the rights of indigenous peoples to be consulted in decisions which directly affect them, its design was conducted unilaterally by the state, as it was not agreed upon with indigenous communities (Pé and García 2018; Peralta García 2019). In this context, a Mapuche leader mentioned that *"most of the outcomes of the consultations are already defined. We can discuss them, but in the end, the government or the state will come out with what they want. In the end, we can influence very little. (…) According to Chile, this is a Chilean land"* **(Mapuche Representative 3, ADI -South)**.

The aforementioned is an indicative example of how bureaucratic arrangements end up as a useful mechanism for maintaining the asymmetries of power indigenous communities face in front of other actors who may have interests in the territory. Moreover, it weakens the possibilities of ILO Convention 169 of becoming a formal institution which allows Mapuche participation, to be *"the state always makes everything upside down. They talk about carrying out a consultation and working together, but then, they bring us all the documents already written. They just run the consultations to fulfil the requirements for participation that they have to meet"* **(Mapuche Representative 3, ADI South)**.

Considering the above, self-determination is a principle defined by formal institutions who regulate ADI. Nevertheless, other formal institutions, such as Decree 66, and informal institutions, like the centralisation of the power by the state, significantly limit its implementation.

### 5.2.6 Militarisation strategy for the control of the territory

The historical Chilean-Mapuche relationship, as mentioned, has been defined by military oppression against riots and also by uprisings led by indigenous leaders. As one Mapuche leader describes it *"how do they answer us when we fight for our rights? (…) They send public forces to be trained abroad to control terrorism in this region. If we claim for bread, they will threaten us with weapons"* **(Mapuche Representative 3, ADI South)**. Militarisation focuses on the idea of Mapuche people as potential terrorists and as a risk for non-Mapuche citizens and thus it "*incites non-Mapuche people to fear Mapuche people"* **(Associated Manager 4, ADI South)**.

The militarised control of the territory and the population – or at least showing the potential threat of force – demonstrates in this case a deep fissure in the relationship between the state and the Mapuche communities. At the same time, this strategy follows the historical path of military oppression and occupation of the territory, that has persisted right through from the colonial times until the present day. Currently, this approach coexists with the formal interests of promoting democratic dialogue through participatory spaces. According to Streeck and Thelen (2005), when dominant modes of action are inflexible and resistant to change, new institutions cannot be effective in replacing them, therefore, there is a combination of the old and the new. This model of institutional change is referred to by these authors as layering, being particularly accurate for the case of ADI. In particular, while drift, which was mentioned before, is accurate to describe the specific behaviour of bricoleurs

According to a Mapuche representative *"during the government of Lagos and Bachelet* [former presidents of Chile] *this region was highly militarised, and businesspeople were happy with it. And today it is the same"* **(Mapuche representative 5-ADI South)**. This point of view is coherent with the lack of trust in the Chilean state, the organisations of which are set up to protect private interests and not those raised by Mapuche peoples. This perspective is consistent with the promotion of spaces of participation controlled by the state's organisations, as the interconnection of different groups along the territory can put the status quo at risk, especially in relation to land, natural resources and governability.

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**5.4 Informal institutions of ADI Puel Nahuelbuta**

The ways in which self-determination is a principle formally recognised by the Chilean state, and the limitations in its implementation have already been presented. In turn, self-determination also has an informal expression. As this ADI has not been implemented by local services, Mapuche communities began their own implementation process outside of the formal institutional frameworks. As a Mapuche representative mentioned, they recognise the existence of two ways to achieve their demands: *"there is the constitutional path based on laws, but there is also the path where you exercise your rights without waiting for the others to recognise them. That's what we call self-determination or territorial control"* ***(Mapuche Representative 4, ADI South)***. Given the extreme rejection of the Mapuche's demands, the use of strategies outside the formal framework of participation is a reality for Mapuche representatives. This has become especially relevant, considering that formal rules are insufficient to guarantee the legitimation of agreements and the accurate implementation of participatory policies.

Mapuche communities, throughout their representatives, decided to demand that local authorities implement the formal institutions of the ADI. As a result of the absence of active formal conditions to implement the ADI, these actors, through a self-determination process, decided to take control of the policy and implement it themselves. Following an informal process of organisation, communities called for the election of representatives, in order to conform an ADI board. In this context, Mapuche communities are trying to incorporate a bottom-up process which considers local demands as an interconnected way of developing the ADI territory. One of the representatives stated that the ADI *"is an instrument designed by the state, but when communities try to use it with self-determination, they resist it. (…). We expected to start working this year with the support of the government, with a formal resolution. (…) but we only saw obstacles"* ***(Mapuche representative 9, ADI South)***.

This way of implementing the ADI is consistent with the principle of self-determination between international agreement 169 and the actions of Mapuche communities. Interestingly, the conflict appears when the actions come from the state, are developing a process of non-decision or non-bricolage, which obstructs the promotion of the Mapuche involvement in shaping the ADI policy by using formal institutions. Drift (Thelen and Conran

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2016) here is a strategy from the state to preserve the status quo, confronting the Mapuche communities' efforts to change the current institutional framework. As a representative indicates *"the fact that we're using the ADI to plan our own development has changed the paradigm of this policy. (…). We, as a leading group, are getting more decision-making power, because not only Mapuche people participate in the ADI, but also the mayors, and maybe other non-Mapuche actors too. This is because we have a territorial perspective"* ***(Mapuche Representative 4, ADI South)****.* In this sense, Mapuche people are the target of the policy, and, at the same time, they are the ones who are implementing it.

### 5.4.1 Mapuche political organisation

The Mapuche communities have a clear identity and rules which, although they are not written and do not have official recognition by the state, are still highly significant as socially embedded arrangements. As a representative stated *"the law that we grow up with aims to protect the land. This law is inside us and no other law will be superimposed over it. This is a life law, and it is not related with the law created by thinking men, which can change. Our law is oral and belongs to our minds, to our* kimun [Mapuche philosophy]*"* ***(Mapuche representative 5, ADI South)****.* In this sense, the daily life of Mapuche communities is developed considering traditional institutions which, regardless of the formal recognition of the state, are the rules respected among the Mapuche people. Informality represents for this communities the space of power for shaping their lives according to their ancestral rules that have challenged the colonial efforts for eliminate them, or at least debilitate them.

According to the interviewees, the ADI policy, itself, is insufficient to promote participation, as it is based in a technocratic perspective which does not recognise the Mapuche arrangements. In this regard, one policy manager states that:

> *"we're involved in a process. These dialogues took time, as the Mapuche people traditionally don't like to make decisions quickly. They rather prefer to wait until the ideas reach maturity, considering their dreams or 'peumas', to dialogue. In opposition to this, the western world moves rapidly, with quick and efficient decisions. This is because we as a government preferred the dialogue through the president of the community as a representative, because they're closer to the*

*western perspective, not like* lonkos*, the traditional Mapuche leaders. But it didn't work"* **(ADI Policy Manager 2, ADI South)**.

In this sense, regardless of the efforts that the Chilean state has been making in promoting participatory policies, according to the interviewees there is no consistent formal institutional framework for promoting participation with a cultural relevance and aiming at a distribution of power between the actors involved. Moreover, traditional political knowledge has been constantly replaced by new structures designed by the Chilean state. These new structures overlap with the traditional ones which, although weakened, continue to prevail in spaces outside of the bureaucratic borders.

One example of the above is the recognition of the Mapuche people's political heritage at state level. Mapuche's informal rules recognise a number of roles, including *lonko* as the political head of communities, *machi* as the spiritual leader, *werken* as the messenger and bridge between communities and between Mapuche people and other actors, such as the Chilean government or Spanish crown in the past. Additionally, their traditional institutions for political organisation are represented by the *trawun,* a space which reproduces the hierarchical relationships between members of the Mapuche communities, and the different roles that each one represents: *"the* trawun *is the result of a Mapuche participatory process. It is not about calling for a* trawun *and people attend it as individuals. Here, the* lonkos *won't participate without knowing the subjects that will be discussed in the* trawun *and they will always communicate the information with their community prior to attending. The* trawun *gives everyone the opportunity* to take part in the dialogue*, to participate and it also includes long-term agreements"* **(Mapuche Representative 4, ADI South)**.

Considering the independence that the informality of the implementation if ADI is offering to the communities, the *Trawun* is an institution that has been used in the meetings related to the ADI, as well in other meetings, such as those related to health. The differences between this institution and any other meeting or assembly are deep, as they represent another way to regulate power relationships between participants. A Mapuche representative, comparing the *trawun* with meetings organised by the state, described it in this way:

*"Trawun are completely different. We cannot explain in detail, because that information is just for us [Mapuche people] and there's a lot of things that you won't understand. (…) It is different because there, Mapuche people gather with others, they feel free, you sit in circles. It is not like those meetings where you seat next to the other people. And everything is in Mapudungun [Mapuche language] (…) I remember when I closed my eyes and all those memories of my mom and grandma came to me (…) There you can get connected with others because you can talk about everything: health, development, illness, death, history. (…) They can last for four hours"* **(Mapuche Representative 6, ADI South).**

Trawun is, thus, an institution validated by the Mapuche people, where the diversity of topics that affect a person, community and land can be discussed in a space which pursues symmetry between the participants. Although it can be considered an informal institution, as it is not written or validated by any formal document, its relevance among Mapuche people lies in its traditional use. Thus, it can be described as a social embedded arrangement, using the critical institutionalist perspective.

ADI policy formally recognises the territory itself as being a focus of development, coordinating the elements that converge in this geographical space. This is consistent with the Mapuche perspective of development, as it is portrayed by the interviewees as a holistic, since the territory, environment, community, health, education, and other aspects of daily lives are interconnected. However, the formal institutions that regulate ADI Puel Nahuelbuta do not consider a strategy of participation which integrates the Mapuche institutions present in the decision-making.

From there, the use of social embedded arrangements in the implementation of the ADI allows validation of the process among the communities. Moreover, it is useful in promoting dialogues about the public offer. In this sense, the implementation run by the Mapuche communities attempts to build a bridge between the communities and the public offer. In coherence with this with this, a representative stressed the relevance of using bottom-up strategies, in terms of "*we decided to use an instrument that was meant to be used from the government to the people, top-down. (…) So, we talked with leaders with experience in struggles for rights – lands, health, education, and so on – so as to promote the ADI with a*

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*bottom-up strategy, strengthening our power, and promoting the local territorial identity"* **(Mapuche representative, ADI South)**.

### 5.4.2 Demonstrations (protests, rally, occupations of public buildings) by Mapuche communities

Facing the difficulties in being recognised by local authorities, communities have also used political pressure as an informal strategy to achieve some goals. This is the case of the formal resolution to implement the ADI, which was achieved with the previous government:

> *"By forcing them, complaining, saying that if they don't listen, we will organise some demonstrations in public buildings. If we could collect 100 people for each county, we could organise 600-700 people protesting in the regional government buildings (…) We saw some meetings organised two or three days in advance with the mayors, but for us, they never had any space in their calendars (…). Everything has limits. If we see they are only delaying our demands, we don't have another chance except for using other strategies, like popping up at the regional government office, all the leaders together, to claim a meeting and demand our right to participate fully"* **(Mapuche Representative 9, ADI South)**.

Protests and other informal, and sometimes violent strategies are also used by the communities, in order to achieve their demands. It should be noted, however, that these strategies were not reported in direct relation to the ADI, but in other activities. In this sense, protests are an institution, as a result of the historical pattern of oppression and resistance. A policy manager described a situation where he/she was involved, in which pressure from the communities was effective in achieving some agreements. Specifically, he/she said:

> *"I wanted to meet them in my office, and they said 'no, you have to come'. (…) They locked me in. (…) The police arrived. It was a mess. And we started working (…). They realised that my position was positive toward them. (…) We ended up drinking mate [herbal tea], eating tortillas, hard-boiled eggs, hugging each other. They thanked me for the gesture that I was willing to work. (…) They also*

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*understood that territorial recovery was impossible, because the [169 ILO] Convention does not have the resources for that. (Policy Manager 1-ADI South).*

The situation also expresses the validation of the strategy used by the communities, to reach agreements with the state, as the government, through its representatives, was opened to accept the conditions of negotiation, which, finally, led not to go against the formal rules, but merely to make them operate, breaking with the tendency of institutional drift (Thelen and Conran 2016) from the state.

## 5.5 Bricoleurs in institutional process in ADI Puel Nahuelbuta

According to critical institutionalism, along with the bureaucratic arrangements, institutions are constantly shaped by the actions and agency of actors. These actors, conceptualised as bricoleurs, can consciously or unconsciously, adapt institutions according to the local contexts. As explained in earlier sections, the case of the ADI Puel Nahuelbuta is an example of how the analysis of the formal and informal institutions is insufficient to understanding how the policy really works. Moreover, the dynamics of local actors, their roles, strategies, and power relationships are essential to understanding how this policy is shaped.

In this vein, 'political will' was frequently mentioned as a capacity of policymakers for driving changes beyond their formal duties. From the theoretical framework, individual agency can be understood as shaping institutional processes (Cleaver 2002; Koning 2011; Funder and Marani 2015), in this case, the ADI implementation. Political will was frequently mentioned by the participants, policy makers and indigenous representatives, to refer to the gap between the formal rules that guide the policy, and the actual actions that the policy makers undertake. In particular, political will appears frequently within the interview data as being something which makes shaping the ADI possible. According to one interview participant *"political will comes from people who are in power at a specific moment when they communicate their demands. But then they face the structural difficulties of the state, which is that there's no budget. The result is this: people get bored and become hopeless. They say, 'we know they won't listen to us' (…) I know there's no lack of good faith from the authorities, but there's a structural impossibility" (ADI Policy Manager 1, ADI South)*. In a similar vein, one Mapuche leader states that *"the political will is something that politicians don't have at*

*present. The ADI will never have life if there's no political will. This is a political problem. The political will should help to overcome local problems. What does it mean? It means dictating laws, establishing plans, and programmes, but not from a clientelistic perspective"* **(Mapuche Representative 1, ADI South)**.

In this sense, institutional bricolage is not played out only following the rules, but also by pushing the rules so as to adapt them to local contexts and interests. Policy managers are demanded not only to have the technical skills to perform their role. Political will, in this sense, is a political standpoint, which emerges out of informality, as it is this commitment which needs to be updated constantly. From the decolonial perspective, and moreover according to the Mapuche leaders, this political will, or the lack of it, is the concrete actions (or lack thereof) for distributing the currently concentrated power, among the local Mapuche communities.

As a summary, the next table presents the main bricoleurs who are operating in the institutional bricolage which frames the ADI Puel Nahuelbuta. Then, an analysis of their interaction with the policy is presented.

*Table 10: Identification of bricoleurs in ADI South*

| Public services | Mapuche communities |
|---|---|
| Senior CONADI officials | Mapuche ADI representatives |
| Local CONADI practitioners | |
| Mapuche policy managers | |
| Mayor of local government | |

In the analysis of this ADI, the formal roles of each actor are particularly imprecise in portraying their roles in the implementation. In this sense, this section will present the formal and informal roles of the bricoleurs, their relationships and how power frames their interactions with the ADI policy.

### 5.5.1 CONADI's Senior officials

A first finding was that there was a difficulty in accessing policy managers in charge of the implementation of the ADI Puel Nahuelbuta. Following the formal path in the hierarchy of public services, it was not possible to find the "local head of the ADI policy" or an equivalent role. What it was possible to identify was a set of senior officials working for CONADI and for the Ministry of Social Development, who indicated that being aware of the existence of the ADI policy and the process which Mapuche representatives undertook with the previous government was important. Considering the ADI Puel Nahuelbuta is formally defined by decree 168 (Ministerio de Planificación y Cooperación 2004) its implementation is a duty that the local services and government must undertake. A rejection of implementing the policy cannot be considered as simply negligent, firstly, because from 2017 local communities have been demanding the implementation of the ADI and they have even offered support to start the process. Having an organised community, mobilising their resources in order to support the implementation of a policy could be considered an ideal situation for policy makers who promote participatory processes; however, this is not the case with this policy. Likewise, the non-implementation of the ADI can hardly fit into the category of dereliction of duty or simple abandon, as this has not brought any consequences from the highest bureaucratic power.

Considering the theoretical framework, this can be a case of non-participation (Arnstein 1969), hidden non-participation (Fernández and Ordóñez 2007) or non-decision making (Bachrach and Baratz 1963). Beyond these nuances, these concepts address the situations when decision-makers and decision-managers use their power to obstruct participatory processes and to manipulate citizens' expectations regarding their role and agency in the policy. In the case of the ADI South-Puel Nahuelbuta, although this 'non-bricolage', as the opposition of the action of shaping the institutions, is not consistent with the bureaucratic arrangements, it is, in fact, consistent with the historical colonial pattern of oppressing Mapuche institutions that can alter the current asymmetrical distribution of power.

The current expression of the above is the perspective of the bricoleurs of the highest levels of decision-making, which question the accuracy and validity of Mapuche demands. One of these bricoleurs interpreted the Mapuche as being an ideological struggle rooted in "*a*

*socialism that only seeks the personal advantage of some people. I recognize that some of these people look for the Mapuche nation and seek their self-determination. But the question is to what ends? (...) I don't see much clarity in the eagerness that some of them have to make noise, which is more typical of anarchist ideology"* **(Policy manager 6, ADI South).** For this reason, their participation should be limited.

Another senior official recognises that the formal institutions mandate the government to implementing the ADI, "*considering that there is regulation. (…) It is up to the government now as to which issues to address and which not to address, because there are so many decisions in the ADI territory at the governmental level. So perhaps not all of them can be discussed by the ADI council (…) It cannot be an independent territory"* **(Policy manager 2, ADI South).** While the first quote emphasises the political and ideological limitations that the current process of implementation may bring, the second focuses on the fact that the ultimate decision power is, beyond the formal institutions of the ADI, centralised in the government's hands. Both are revealing of the contradictions of their roles in promoting the participation of Mapuche communities but informally, they have adapted the ADI by limiting it to the borders defined by the government.

The above is an expression of the centralised character of the exercise of power, and the hierarchies which operate over the policy-managers, who are constrained by actors from outside the ADI territory. As a Mapuche representative complains *"we do not have a law, a statute, something that favours us, like a political party. If I wanted to run for mayor or councillor, nobody would consider me, because I must be part of a political party (...) but I would never be able to run myself, as a Mapuche."* **(Mapuche Representative 5, ADI South)**. In this regard, political parties are part of a hierarchy of power relationships that limit the possibilities for Mapuche people to participate in political elections with autonomy. This interviewee is emphasising the power that political parties have in defining local policies, without considering the local knowledge about how to overcome local problems. In opposition to this, the strategy that Mapuche communities are using is to be in charge of the implementation of the ADI. In this way, local communities can express their demands and take action in resolving them.

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### 5.5.2 Local practitioners

Getting closer to the local territories where the ADI policy interacts with Mapuche communities, it is possible to see other expressions of the power that public officials have in shaping the institutional process. From a critical institutionalist perspective, this means that they are able to introduce changes to adapt the policy according to local characteristics, and those affected by these changes are, at the same time, active participants in implementing those change.

Although in general the narrow spaces that formal institutions offer to them in managing the policies is recognised, some policy managers indicated that they do have some scope for discretion that allows them to introduce participatory spaces for communities. To do this, policy managers develop some strategies informally to invite people to participate in different spaces of dialogue with the state. Formally, the means of communication are based in written documents sent to all individuals as equals. However, a local practitioner mentioned that he/she is aware, according to the Mapuche protocols of invitation, that "*as a public official, I have to talk with* lonkos *and traditional authorities, to invite them one by one. This process must not be done by a document, because the oral word is a valid means of expressing respect to them. In the western world, the invitation is written. Once the document has been delivered, you assumed the person was already invited, and then it is not your problem if they come or not" **(Associated Policy Manager 5, ADI South)**.* The intercultural mediation between the formal institutions and Mapuche protocols are based on his/her own will and efforts. Something interesting is the informal institutions present in the communities are widely known as "protocols", not because they are written, but because they are clear institutions which regulate relationships in the Mapuche communities.

Finally, a local bricoleur is the case of one of the city councils involved in the ADI. They are an example of the action and decisions that local actors take in shaping the policy and, specifically in this case, providing resources for participation. One Mapuche leader indicated that *"the mayor gave us the space and he's participating along with the people. When people can't go to the meetings, he made them go. (…) We can appeal to his good will with respect to this ADI. The* [ILO Convention] *169 indicates that the state has to fund ADIs and their implementation. But the central state is not doing this. The mayor provides us with venues,*

*water, sometimes some coffees, but he does it through the city council using the 169. However, that should be the role of the central government"* **(Mapuche Representative 1, ADI South)**. In this quote, the role of the local mayor reveals that bricoleurs who operate closer to the territories and communities, are more proactive in facing the local demands by using participatory practices.

In contrast, the role of central government, mentioned above, usually refers to the *Intendente* and *Gobernador, who* operate under a different framework. On the one hand, their non-decision about the participation of Mapuche communities, or drift (Streeck and Thelen 2005; Thelen and Conran 2016), is effective in maintaining the status quo of the distribution of power. On the other hand, the absence of the central government adds extra responsibilities, but not extra power, to the local practitioners in their role facing activities with the communities. In this regard, a policy manager said that in the process of consultations to the communities *"I was not very well accompanied by my boss (…).There are some territories considered more violent, so maybe to protect themselves, some authorities did not participate (…) Some colleagues were physically beaten, assaulted, and this was known by the Intendente (…) Nevertheless, one still has to play one's role, one is subordinate and does not have to do it, even though it is not so safe"* **(Associated Policy Manager 1-ADI South)**.

Violence as an institution in the relationship between the state and the Mapuche communities, is expressed through activity related participation. Here, as the quote describes, policy managers are not supported by the highest levels of the policy hierarchy. This policy manager, who identify him/herself as a Mapuche, used his/her personal knowledge and skills to resolve the situation and to promote the dialogue. In particular, when asked about the strategies used to deal with this conflict, the practitioner indicated: *"I used the Mapuche strategy of counselling them a bit. I went to some specific entities, such as a machi [spiritual leader] and to some other leaders (…) I did it because of the commitment I have as a Mapuche. (…) And the machi said that I was right. (…) I also used our Mapuche elements, such as mate [herbal infusion]. (…). That helped to make the following meetings feel less confrontational* **(Associated Policy Manager 1-ADI South).** This policy manager, although are unable to resolve the historical problems of violent oppression and the

subsequent reactions from some communities, was able to face specific situations of violence. To achieve it, not formal rules, but social embedded rules that operate in this community were essential in shaping the policy according to local knowledge and demands.

### 5.5.3 Mapuche policy-managers

Following the previous idea, another relevant dimension in the power relationships that influence the implementation of participatory practices is the role of indigenous policy managers who identify themselves as Mapuche. Specifically, they play an essential role in promoting participation, by facilitating dialogue between the bureaucratic perspective and the demands of the Mapuche people. According to one policy manager, "*I'm interested in our culture being respected. It won't change because I'm working for a public institution (..) And I have that sensibility and if I can do something for my people, I will do it. For instance, when I go to a community I say 'peñi* [word to name each other between Mapuche men]*, can I take my municipal jacket [part of the civil officials' uniform] off and let's talk as peñi?'*" ***(Associated Policy Manager 10, ADI South)***. This is also the case of the consultation in education which is framed by the ILO Convention 169. Here, the role of professionals who belong to the Mapuche community and speak *Mapudungun*, the Mapuche's language, was essential for encouraging the participation of some members of the community.

The correct use of the language helps to reach a deep and accurate understanding of the communities' ideas; hence, it was a positive factor in acknowledging Mapuche identity, something that was clearly relevant for the participants. Additionally, offering a space of dialogue, where the local indigenous language is welcome, is consistent with the principles of ILO Convention 169, relating to the principle of the cultural relevance of the processes of participation. One of the professionals who participated in the implementation of this consultation indicated that being a speaker *"has been a very relevant element. The fact that 100% of the people running the process were speaking in Mapudungun was very much appreciated by Mapuche families and communities. So, it was very positive, safe and trustworthy"* ***(Associated Policy Manager 4, ADI South)***. Another Associated policy manager added *"I really appreciate that a knowledge of the language and culture is considered in the children's learning. Now this is a relevant task, and it has triggered a change in the children's cultural perspective"* ***(Associated Policy Manager 3, ADI South)***.

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### 5.5.4 Mapuche representatives as bricoleurs in the implementation of ADI: and upside-down process

As explained earlier, several barriers for the implementation of ADI Puel Nahuelbuta have been found. From the perspective of Mapuche leaders, *"the ADI was enacted, but it was imposed. It was enacted eight years ago and since around one year ago, we have been self-organising to implement this ADI"* **(Mapuche Representative 1, ADI South)**. This quote stressed that to face the lack of a community-based strategy in the ADI, Mapuche representatives, as active bricoleurs, have had the opportunity to adapt the policy to the local identity. In this context, the current self-organisation of Mapuche representatives, towards leading the implementation of the ADI policy, represents a strategy to overcome the top-down orientation of this policy. With this, communities expect to achieve more symmetrical relationships among the actors involved in the policy. This autonomous action opens up the possibilities to shape the ADI, by integrating its formal institutions with social embedded arrangements that have traditionally regulated Mapuche relationships, such as local identities, communities' knowledge, and traditional political organisations.

Mapuche representatives are now struggling to encourage the implementation of the policy, after years of inactivity from the government. One of the strategies used is to generate links with the other territories of the region defined as ADIs, so as to make a coordinated effort for the territory to be developed with participation and cultural relevance. However, as one ADI policy manager said:

> *"I have a particular vision about it. I think although ADIs are part of a Mapuche world vision, which is the local work with their representatives (…) there are certainly differences in each territory which have to be attended to in different ways (…) The development has to be inside each ADI. I'm not sure if it is worth putting them all together. Instead, I think it'd be better to focus our work on each ADI. There may be a political motivation for working all together. (…) Putting all people together means more political capital for those who are leading"* **(ADI Policy Manager 6, ADI South)**.

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The quote above reflects an interest in prioritising focused on policies in particular areas – education, health, economic development, and others – rather than on promoting a coordinated strategy to plan the development of the territory. Analysing the power distribution between the actors involved, it is possible to say that while the Mapuche communities are implementing strategies to start the implementation of the ADI, which has not been easy work, the state is deploying strategies aimed at hindering not only the implementation of the ADI, but also Mapuche leaders' efforts to access more power in decision-making. In this context, the focalisation of the policy represents a political strategy to keep decision-making power concentrated within the government.

Another strategy implemented by the Mapuche leaders on ADI policy, is the coordination of meetings between local services, in order to organise development. Nevertheless, as mentioned previously, they are struggling to be recognised as formal and valid actors in the decision-making spaces by the current authorities. One Mapuche community leader stated that their *"objective is to set a collegial body with the participation of institutions and representation of communities. (…) as we understand it, ADIs can be transformed into territorial spaces where indigenous communities, in this case the Mapuche, can have an impact on thinking about and planning their development in the medium and long term"* **(Mapuche Representative 4, ADI South)**. The recognition of the indigenous representatives is relevant to promoting spaces where local actors, by using their traditional knowledge, are able to shape policies. This is because the Mapuche representatives are those who embody the communities' perspectives in promoting participatory practices.

However, this process based on social embedded institutions that are characteristic of the Mapuche communities, but lacking bureaucratic arrangements' support, involves an important barrier, which is the lack of access to material resources. One representative and Mapuche leader involved in the implementation of this policy, mentioned that they have been implementing the policy:

> *"With a lot of sacrifice. We have been using our own resources. We tried to get funding from the government to do this, but it was extremely hard. I think if the idea of promoting the ADI would come from the government, it would be different and they would have arrived in the territories with all their resources, teams of*

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*workers to work with the people, everything would be politically planned to achieve some outcomes from them to us. But in this case, we were the ones who started the policy of development with support from the state, but these authorities are not used to doing this"* **(Mapuche Representative 9, ADI South)**.

The constant barriers that the Mapuche have faced in implementing the policy themselves are a clear expression that their agency and interest for distributing power is resisted by the government in an informal dimension. One representative and Mapuche leader involved in the implementation of this policy, mentioned that they have been implementing the policy:

### 5.5.5 Private sector: an invisible bricoleur

As mentioned earlier, the economic development of the Araucanía Region, where the ADI Puel Nahuelbuta is located, is based in the action of timber companies. They were fostered by the Chilean state, using formal institutions, such as the Chilean occupation and the consequent land dispossession that affected the local communities from the mid-19th century onwards. This was framed by a militarisation strategy, another formal institution, which has been present until the present day. Later, it was Decree Law 701 enacted in 1976 by the authoritarian government of Augusto Pinochet, and consolidated after by the democratic governments, the institution that tremendously helped these companies, by state subsidies. These institutions endowed these private companies with decision-making power across the territory.  Indigenous Law 19.253 has a decree that promotes and regulates the access of land for Mapuche communities. However, its scope in distributing lands is considerably less than in Decree 701.

As a consequence of this institutional framework, forest and timber companies are, undoubtedly, a relevant bricoleur in the ADI territory. This situation affects the trust of the Mapuche people in formal institutions led by the state. As a Mapuche representative argues, "w*hen the ADI was enacted in the Nahuelbuta mountain, we did not agree with it, because from the outset we were not consulted. Then, other sectors took advantage of it, but we didn't. They supported other people, the big forestry companies, they supported them with a lot of resources, but there was nothing for us. The development became on their side"* **(Mapuche representative 1, ADI South)**. From the policy managers' perspective, it was

explained how the consultations strategy operate when private investors call on the public services to support processes of negotiation. However, companies are not a formal actor who is invited to the ADI. Alluding to a specific case, he/she mentioned that *"communities can't know that we're there to promote a dialogue and negotiation because the company called us, or they could think we are colluding with the company"*.

The situation described above is an example of the unequal power dynamics in the territory, buttressed by formal institutions. In fact, the participatory strategies have focused on the Mapuche communities, but the dialogues have barely involved private actors. The environmental consultations framed by the ILO Convention 169, involved private companies' interests, as their activities impacted upon indigenous peoples. However, as mentioned, achieving an agreement is not always a mandatory goal. The national law stated that it is possible to define the consultation was fulfilled simply because the process has been conducted, independently of the outcome of that process. This means that communities do not have the power to stop a project that they consider affecting adversely their interests.

## 5.6 Conclusions of the chapter

As has been shown throughout this chapter, the implementation of the ADI has followed an unstable route, mainly because of the barriers set by public services to the implementation of the ADI policy. In this context, the initiative of the Mapuche leaders to implement the ADI policy themselves, came as a response to the rejection of the state to obey Decree 168 that defined the territory covered by the ADI Puel Nahuelbuta. Mapuche leaders have developed a role of bricoleurs by conducting an autonomous process in the organisation of the communities around the ADI policy.

The autonomous actions from the communities can mislead the understanding of this situation and interpret ADI implementation as an empowering framework for indigenous communities. The fact that the communities are trying to implement the policy, without the provision of formal institutions is not only an example of citizen participation, as this process is not a result of an intended and expected process of distribution of power promoted by the state. Moreover, it is the result of the state reneging on its responsibilities defined by the formal rules related to the indigenous law 19.253 and, specifically, to the ADI policy. Based

on this, the implementation of the ADI Puel Nahuelbuta correspond to a strategy of resistance of the Mapuche communities, through which they are establishing new rules in their relationship with the state.

A second conclusion is about the lack of effectiveness of the strategy in shaping the policy, beyond the limits of power set by the same institutions of the ADI. The weaknesses of the rules that frame this policy, the unavailability of resources to address the local demands, and the resistance from public services in promoting the policy implementation, are some of the factors. In this regard, although Mapuche leaders have started a deep process of participation with the communities and with local municipalities, there is a consensus among the participants of this research about the lack of outcomes of the ADI policy. Moreover, ADIs are a coordination of policies, programmes and services, which have been designed at the central level of the state. Since there is no clear framework for local practitioners to implement the policy, it is hard for them to shape the policy beyond the current formal institutions. For example, there is no budget to develop projects designed by the communities who live in the territories considered as ADIs. So, the ADIs should fit within the general rules of projects and programmes, which were designed from a national rather than from a local perspective. Thus, while some interviewees indicated that decision-making spaces were limited, some others have implemented actions grounded in their own initiatives.

From the perspective of policy managers, especially those who have closer interactions with the communities, adapting the policy to local contexts is a daily challenge. Here, a conclusion is the relevant role met by those who identify themselves as Mapuche. Informally, their knowledge about the Mapuche language, and social embedded arrangements, called protocols, that regulate Mapuche social life is a valuable resource to mediate between the policy and the communities.

Finally, considering the theoretical framework, formality and informality in institutions are helpful categories in the analysis of the ADI policy. However, they also have some limitations in understanding the weight which should be attached to the ancestral rules that indigenous communities have been using until the present days. Although these rules are not usually written, they are widely known and are validated by the Mapuche, so they are efficient in

mediating social interactions. Reconceptualising the idea of formality and informality to acknowledge this nuance, then, is a theoretical challenge to be addressed.

Thus, bricoleurs have to develop their actions in a centralised context, where decisions are usually made in top-level spaces at government level, far from the territories and peoples' perspectives. As a consequence, the weak framework of ADI is insufficient for promoting autonomous decisions made by local actors. In opposition, their agency is limited to an inflexible body of rules that reduces the levels of participation of communities.

# Chapter 6. Discussion of the two case studies from a decolonial perspective

## 6.1 Introduction

The previous chapter analysed the institutional processes that frame the implementation of ADI policy in the two cases of study. In that section, each territory was analysed separately, in order to present their characteristics clearly. Having made the first presentation and examination of the cases from the institutional approach, in this chapter it was decided to unify the two cases under the categories related to the colonial matrix of power, so as to emphasise their similarities and differences.

Drawing on the decolonial perspective, this chapter aims to understand to what extent the institutional process of ADI policy affects the distribution of power among the actors involved. In particular, this section focuses on analysing the three main elements of the colonial matrix of power in the implementation of the ADI in these two territories: the distribution of power, the perspectives and knowledges underpinning the decisions and practices, and to what extent ADI policy helps local communities to produce and reproduce their being.

## 6.2 Colonial matrix of power

From a decolonial perspective, the colonial matrix of power corresponds to a replacement of the traditional rules by a new set of institutions, so as to reproduce colonial asymmetrical relationships (Quijano 2000b). In other words, coloniality of power is an analytical construction that enables to understand the current relationships of power based on race or, in the case of modern categorisations of populations, the category of indigenous peoples defined by laws or another formal rules.

From the new institutional approach, the above can be understood by the concept of displacement, offered by Streeck and Thelen's (2005), which refers to the emergence of new institutional frameworks that question and replace the old ones, changing as a consequence the distribution of power. In this process, however, these authors stresses that what changes in the processes of displacement is the dominant logic of action, but expressions of the old institutions may remain, either in conflict or in harmony with the new (Streeck and Thelen 2005). What this concept lacks, and in general the new institutional perspectives, is a theoretical framework to understand what happen when the replacement of the old institutions for new ones correspond to the result of a colonial process.

The analysis of the effects of rules, practices and narratives (March and Olsen 1984; March and Olsen 2008; Lowndes and Roberts 2013a), the historical paths (Thelen and Steinmo 1992; Skocpol and Pierson 2002; Steinmo 2008), the rational individual decisions (Hall and Taylor 1996a), the institutional bricolage (Cleaver 2002; Cleaver and De Koning 2015) or other concepts offered by the new institutional theories are excellent approaches to understand the broader level of the institutional process. However, in this thesis, the embeddedness that characterises the new institutionalist studies (Lowndes 2001) requires to move the analysis forward, by including a second level of understanding. Based on the colonial matrix of power, developed by Quijano (1992; 2000b; 2014) and Mignolo (2002; 2007a; 2018), the concepts of coloniality of power, knowledge and being permit to understand the specific expressions of the replacement of the traditional indigenous institutions, for the new modern ones that the Spanish colonisers brought and established during the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries, but reproduced and updated from the 18th century to the present day, by the Chilean state.

### 6.2.1 Power and symmetry in relationships

As was mentioned in the institutional analysis, ADI institutions concentrate the power in the governmental actors – intendente as a representative of the executive political power, CONADI in power of the operative processes, social services deciding the possibilities to include local demands. This is consistent with the coloniality of power, as the ancestral Aymara institutions were replaced by institutions set by the Chilean state, in the context of coloniality and, therefore, the concentration of power over territories and inhabitants.

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Having set this, the distribution of power in the implementation of ADI refers, in this thesis, the actions to transform the indigenous peoples' interests into concrete actions in the implementation of this policy. Considering the current status quo, distribution of power from the state to the indigenous communities involves a transformation of the asymmetries set by the colonial institutions. In this context, some factors that affect the distribution of power have been found in the implementation of the ADI policy.

*a. Distribution of power among local indigenous individuals*

The first level in the analysis of the distribution of power refers to the power of local indigenous actors in shaping the ADI institutions, reconfiguring the power relationship with the other actors involved. ADIs are framed by the Indigenous Law 19.253 which is, at the same time, guided by the principles of ILO-Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention 169. As mentioned in the previous chapters, these two rules stress "the services of the State administration and the organizations of territorial character, when dealing with matters that have interference or relation with indigenous issues, must listen and consider the opinion of the indigenous organizations recognized by this law" (Ministerio de Planificación y Cooperación 1993, Art. 34) and the relevance of indigenous peoples "participate in the formulation, implementation and evaluation of plans and programmes for national and regional development which may affect them directly" (International Labour Organization 1989, Art 7.). Under this framework, among other eight territories, the Decrees 224 and 168 were enacted in 2004 and 2005, respectively, creating the ADI North-Alto Andino Arica y Parinacota and ADI South-Puel Nahuelbuta.

Thus, there is a formal rule that obligate the state to implement the ADI policy, and to promote the participation of the communities involved. From the perspective of one public official responsible for the implementation of this ADI, the local government has a formal obligation instructed by the central government to "*work with indigenous peoples, not for them. (…) We are here to facilitate what they want to accomplish, within the limits of state's action, because there are certain limits. (…) The state is not a dad who has to give them everything*" **(ADI Policy Manager 6, ADI South)**. In this quote it is reflected an interesting interpretation about the role of the state in the indigenous territory, were participation is recognised as a duty, but beyond that, the main responsibility is to respect the current

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dominant logics of action (Streeck and Thelen 2005) set by the state. From the colonial matrix of power, this means the configuration of power relationships established by the state should not be modified in order to validate the limits or frameworks according to the indigenous communities. In this sense, the "limits of the state's action" mentioned by the policy manager represents the status quo that he/she has to protect. Additionally, the distribution of power states by the formal institutions, is replaced for this policy manager by the distribution of benefits. Contrary to the formal institutions, which stablish rights, this policy manager critics the idea of a state as a dad. As a response, it is important to limit its action over the communities.

Consistently, another policy manager mentions, in the relationship between Chilean state and Mapuche communities operates an interest of "*calming the desire of communities for taking action. (…) At the end, the ADI are purely symbolic*" **(ADI Policy Manager 1, ADI South)**. In this sense, beyond the formal rules related to participation or at least the consideration of indigenous peoples' opinion, for policy managers operates an informal rule, which is ADI is not aiming to distribute power, but preserving the order throughout dissolving the potential conflicts. Thus, participation is a way to control from the state to the local communities. In addition, participation is efficient in reproducing the colonial relationships between these actors, as to participate indigenous communities need to ignore their ancestral authorities and play their role inside the rules set by the state. In this sense, the policy pursues stop any attempt from local communities to balance power throughout demonstrations or any other organised action.

Considering ADI policy is part of a system of participation composed of different other actions, it is relevant to indicate that the resistance from the government to distribute power among the local actors, is reflected as well in the case of the consultations framed by the 169 Convention. These processes may have used to enhance ADI as a local strategy of participation. Instead, the consultations are also spaces where the power is concentrated in the government boarders, as "*the state calls for indigenous consultations, but they never call directly the* machi [spiritual leader] *or the* lonko [political leader]*. They always invite the presidents of the communities, who are valid as legal persons*" **(Mapuche Representative 3, Puel South)**. This shows not only an overlapping and complex, but not necessarily effective,

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set of organisations. It also demonstrates the challenge of incorporating a dialogue between the institutional arrangement of the ADI policy and the traditional political organisations that currently operate in the informality.

In this context, the case of ADI Puel Nahuelbuta is unique, because of the withdrawal of public organisations in the policy implementation. As a consequence, the distribution of power is not held inside the formal institutions that frame the policy. Instead, communities decided to take action and implement the ADI on their own. A Mapuche representative adds: *"since the last year, here in Nahuelbuta we have been looking for available instruments to think through the development and to participate in defining the development in this territory. (…) However, we depend on the political will from the government bureaucracy, so they can understand the relevance of the ADI for us as communities. And we're still waiting for it"* **(Mapuche Representative 4, ADI South)**.

In the case of the ADI-North, formal institutions of ADI policy address the relevance of self-determination of indigenous peoples and the relevance of the development of the territories inhabited by them. Nevertheless, these institutions do not provide a framework for local bricoleurs to transform these rules into concrete actions. An Aymara representative adds that *"public policies should enable that the resources really have an impact in the development. There is not an integrated development planning. They cover a little bit here, a little bit there, but those little efforts don't produce any outcome"* **(Aymara representative 2, ADI North)**.

Regarding to the above, as was mentioned, the relationship between the Chilean state and the Aymara communities is rooted in the period known as the Chileanisation. During this period, held at the beginning of the 20th Century, the state made efforts to eradicate the Aymara culture, by replacing it for a Chilean identity, language, and national symbols. It was not until the 1990, when the first policies of recognition of indigenous rights were enacted. In this context, under the frame of the Indigenous Law 19.253, in 2004 the ADI policy Alto Andino Arica y Parinacota was implemented for the first time. As a consequence, there has been a revival of the Aymara identity during recent decades. However, from the power perspective, the institutional framework is not efficient in promoting symmetrical relationships.

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On the one hand, ADI policy managers' actions are constrained, as formal institutions of the policy declare to pursue the participation, but in practice, they are not sufficient to respond to local demands. Instead, centralisation is enforced in ADI policy in its strategies of interaction with the communities. For example, the mere realisation of meetings with communities is considered as an outcome itself, no matter the concrete results that they can bring. Thus, it is enough for policy managers to hold the meetings to have fulfilled their roles, even if the conflicts and demands remain unresolved. As one policy manager indicates "*the pre-assemblies, the assemblies are products, and the meetings of the ADI council are products. All these spaces are intertwined, since the pre-assemblies and assemblies allow the indigenous leaders to be closer with the local communities and to talk and agree about their concerns, needs and demands (…). To achieve that, representatives of the ADI and the CNA* [Aymara National Congress] *have to do the phone calls and the trips to the territories (…) in coordination with CONADI*" **(ADI Policy Manager 3, ADI North)**. On the other hand, the recognition of Aymara arrangements is limited by the formal frame, which sets forth that even when the representatives participate during the whole process, the highest level of decision-making lies with the public services. Specifically, this same manager indicated that "*the representatives of communities in the ADI make a proposal. Then, that proposal is analysed, modified, and finally approved by the directors (…). Every action has to be completely agreed and approved by the ADI representatives; there must always be a signature of all*" **(ADI Policy Manager 3, ADI North)**.

Aymara people are aware of "*you can't [change the rules of application for state aid] because they already have set these requirements. They are sent from above, by the higher authority*". **(Focus group).** This affects the validation of ADI as a relevant policy where communities can shape the policy and to get power decisions about their lives and development. In opposition, ancestral rituals and festivities are a space where the power is in the community and not in the state. However, this cannot be considered as a way of distribution of power, since the festivities and the whole social embedded institutions that frame them do not have effects in the ADI policy. In turn, probably as a way of protecting this space from the intervention from the state "*it's been frowned upon when hosts of the feast get public funding to run the celebration in their communities. This is because they have the entire year*

*to prepare the feast. Hosting the feast is a way of giving back to your community what you have received from them"* **(Associated Policy Manager 4, ADI North**).

In this sense, the way in which ADI is implemented is in opposition of the original expectations of indigenous communities, when they were invited to participate in the discussion of the Indigenous Law, at the beginning of the democracy in 1990. During this process:

> "*We had the idea that if this is an indigenous territory, the indigenous perspective will be applied here, then the state and the development model to be implemented will be aligned with that. Therefore, the legislation, budget, etc. will be adapted to this perspective as well. The aim was to domesticate the state and not the other way around, not to domesticate the Indian, as has always happened"* **(Policy Manager Cornelio Chipana – ADI North).**

b. *Distribution of power and indigenous organisation*

The institutional distribution of power in ADI policy is expressed as well in the possibilities of the grass-rooted organisations that ancestrally operate in indigenous communities of achieve their demands throughout this policy. Consistently with the colonial matrix of power, understood by Quijano (2014) as the dismantling and replacement of ancestral institutions by new ones in order to establish the domination of one group over the other, in ADI policy new rules were created by the Indigenous Law in replacement of the ancestral ones, in the implementation of this policy. This is how traditional authorities recognised by Aymara and Mapuche communities, as well their political spaces of participation, such as *fiestas* in the North and their subsequent definition of roles for the communities or *trawun* as a deliberation space for Mapuche peoples, were replaced in the formal spaces of participation, by the ADI board and assemblies led by representatives elected by vote. These new institutions created a separation between the formal dimension of the participation, based on these new authorities and the social embedded arrangements valid for indigenous communities.

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These two kinds of institutions, formal and social embedded, represent different perspectives about the exercise of power. On the one hand, for the Aymara perspective by hosting the feast "*you achieve the consideration and respect from your community. In the past, nobody could give their opinion if they hadn't hosted the feast. People used to say if you haven't taken any role, how can you dare to give your opinion?'. But now, everyone speaks in the meetings. This is because of the right to express your opinion, but I wonder how does this right to give your opinion coexist with the social duty of serving your community?* **(Associated policy manager 3, ADI North)**. From this perspective participation is a right that people receive in return of their commitment and gratefulness with the community and the nature or *pachamama*. In this sense, the individual participation cannot be understood without a link with the community. On the other hand, the western perspective of participation that grounds the formal institutions of ADI is based on the representative democracy. Under this rule-in-use "*just like in the rest of the Chilean population, they [Aymara communities] delegate representation. So, they should rotate in the positions. each person should occupy the position of president of treasurer Assuming a communal responsibility, but that does not start to happen* **(Policy Manager 1, ADI North)**.

In terms of power, this situation is interpreted as an obstacle for the exercise of the role and discourage other members of the community to assume that role. As one representative indicates, *"people elect their representatives, but they cannot exercise the role. Why? Because they live too far away. 80% of the meetings are held in Arica, not in the villages. The pre-assemblies and assemblies are held in the villages, but the rest are all in Arica. And to get there you have to travel down 200 km from the Andean villages. You have to leave the animals abandoned to go to the meeting, and then come back again... the community members don't want to be leaders anymore. (…). I myself am disappointed and people say 'I will be disappointed too. I'm going to waste time. I'm going to plan the problems to the authorities and there won't be a solution, so why should I bother?"* **(Aymara representative 1, ADI North)**. In this sense, the ADI institutions compel local communities adapt their political organisation to the state structure. ADI representatives highlight that in order to be recognised by the state: *"we have adapted our roles to the institutional requirements and that shows we have to accept the institutional structures. If the state decrees that from now on the indigenous communities must be formally registered and get the number registration,*

*that's what we have to do, although before we understood that you belong to a community just because you're living in this territory. It's a very western-centred and very modern structure, nothing related to us"* **(Aymara representative 4, ADI North)**.

These unfulfilled expectations create a distance between Aymara people and the formal institutions of ADI. Policy managers, who embodies these rules, exercise their role *"is in constant tension with the communities and this is expressed in the ADI. When you attend an ADI meeting with social services, directors and the Aymara leaders, you can smell that tension in the air all the time (…). It has nothing to do with political parties but is related with the way in which the state decides to solve the problems by imposing new forms of organisations. So, it is the state who decides how the indigenous leaders are chosen, what the leaders have to do, what their limits of decision-making are, what their power is, how long they will last"* **(ADI Policy Manager 4, ADI North)**." In addition, the lack of outcomes of ADI weakens the power of representatives *"But we go to the public services and there is no hearing, no response. And then how do I feel? That I am not needed here. The community members gave me a vote of confidence, but I am not complying 100%. So, it makes me feel bad, it makes me feel a disappointment. I want to finish the position so that someone else can take over"* **(Aymara representative 1 and camelid breeder, ADI North)**.

As a consequence, the power of ancestral authorities was weakened as they are not formally recognised by the ADI. From the informality, they still have power in the *fiestas* and ceremonies. However, their power of shaping the institutions related with the ADI is reduced in comparison with the new authorities. One concrete example of the above is the recognition of the Mapuche political heritage, from the state. Mapuche's informal rules recognise a number of roles, including *lonko* as the political head of communities, *machi* as the spiritual leader, *werken* as the messenger and bridge between communities and between Mapuche people and other actors, such as the Chilean government or Spanish crown in the past. Additionally, their traditional institution in the political organisation is represented by the *trawun,* a space which reproduces the hierarchical relationships among the members of the Mapuche communities, and the different roles that each one represents: *"the* trawun *is the result of a Mapuche participatory process. It is not about calling for a* trawun *and people attend it as individuals. Here, the* lonkos *won't participate without*

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*knowing the subjects that will be discussed in the* trawun *and they will always communicate the information with their community prior to attending. The* trawun *gives everyone the opportunity* to take part in the dialogue*, to participate and it includes long-term agreements"* **(Mapuche Representative 4, ADI South)**.

Considering the independence that the informality of the implementation if ADI is offering to the communities, *Trawun* is an institution that has been used in the meetings related to the ADI, as well in other meetings, such as those related to health. The differences between this institution and any other meeting or assembly are deep, as it represents another way to regulate the power relationships between the participants. A Mapuche representative, comparing the *trawun* with meetings organised by the state, described:

> *"Trawun are completely different. We cannot explain in detail, because that information is just for us [Mapuche people] and there's a lot of things that you won't understand. (…) It is different because there, Mapuche people gather with others, they feel free, you sit in circles. It is not like those meetings where you seat next to the other people. And everything is in Mapudungun [Mapuche language] (…) I remember when I closed my eyes and all those memories of my mom and grandma came to me (…) There you can get connected with others because you can talk about everything: health, development, illness, death, history. (…) They can last four hours"* **(Mapuche Representative 6, ADI South).**

Trawun is, thus, an institution validated by the Mapuche people, where the diversity of topics that affect a person, community and land can be discussed in a space that pursues the symmetry between the participants. Although it can be considered as an informal institution, as it is not written or validated by any formal document, its relevance among Mapuche lies in its traditional use. Thus, it can be described as a social embedded arrangement, using the critical institutionalist perspective.

ADI policy formally recognises the territory itself as a focus of development, coordinating all the elements that converge in this geographical space. This is consistent with the Mapuche perspective of development, as it is portrayed by the interviewees as holistic, since the territory, environment, community, health, education and other aspects of daily lives are

interconnected. However, the formal institutions that regulate ADI Puel Nahuelbuta does not consider a strategy of participation that integrates the Mapuche institutions present in the decision-making.

It is relevant to note that in general, interviewees did not report conflicts between the traditional and the new authorities, as both support the recognition of Aymara traditions. However, the overlapping of old and new institutions divides the power among the population, limit the scope of influence of local authorities, and make the coordination of representatives a complex task. One of the representatives indicated that *"in the last few years the leadership has been going through a tremendous crisis because of the lack of unity. When there is a problem affecting the people, all the Aymara people from my perspective, it is difficult to get all the leaders together, because they are all fighting for representation, 'who is going to be the leader?'. So, we have not been able to agree with that"* **(Aymara representative 3, ADI North)**. In addition, the division of the spaces of participation becomes very demanding for the Aymara representatives. They need to make their work as representatives compatible with their family, job and personal life. To do that, they have to divide their time and to make important personal efforts: *"My mother-in-law is missing me. I haven't visited her because of the ADI Council meeting, I have to be at one meeting for education on Monday, on Tuesday I have to be back at a meeting here for micro-entrepreneurship, I am also an entrepreneur, and so on"* **(Aymara representative 5, ADI North).**

### c. Distribution of power among state's actors

The last level of analysis of the coloniality of power is the distribution of power among the organisations of the state, from the central level to the local ones, especially those closely related to indigenous matters. As mentioned, to lead and to implement the rules associated to the Indigenous Law 19.253, including the ADI policy, in 1993 it was created a new governmental organisation: CONADI. Although the relevance of setting an organisation specialised in indigenous matters, according to some interviewees, the power in the decision-making process continued to be is strongly centralised in the headquarters of the public services. They are usually located in Santiago, the capital city of the country, or in the case of these ADIs, in Arica and Temuco, capitals of the regions. In this context, *"CONADI is*

*a victim of this. So, there is not a real policy from the regional government, in despite of the fact that the law says so. (…) The law was very weak in formulating institutions do to it. But if there is political will, this can be corrected. A modification to the Indigenous Law shouldn't be hard to achieve"* **(Cornelio Chipana, policy manager ADI North)**. However, these changes which could contribute to the distribution of power among the region have not been supported by the governments. A very common topic mentioned by the interviewees made in the ADI North is the abandon of the territory by the governmental authorities. Although many social services are set in the ADI-North territory, including CONADI, the ADI itself, consultations and permanent meetings between the people and governmental organisations, interviewees tend to not identify relevant outcomes from these institutions. In other words, the decisions that drive the development of the territory and communities are not only ineffective, but also are made by people who are not part of the community, but still have the power to effect on them, and even more that the local residents.

In the case of ADI South, although the policy was enacted in 2004, CONADI has not formally started its implementation with local communities. The internal distribution of power among the organisations of the state saw in the ADI an opportunity for fostering local development through a participatory process, a representative says "*we have had this experience with two governments – the* Nueva Mayoría *and now the right wing (…) they put up bureaucratic obstacles. They are very jealous in sharing their power. Seems to be they are not allowed to do this with self-determination*" **(Mapuche representative 1 – Adi South)**.

The ADI South also shows another factor that affects the distribution of power, which does not only affect the territory, but also the relationship between the state and the indigenous communities. This refers to the discretion of local services should be recalled that although this territory was included as part of the ADI policy since 2004, the formal meetings where the communities' representatives and government authorities can discuss and decide on local development have not been established yet. In this case, it was not until 2017, during the last year of the previous national government, that some representatives of indigenous communities and public officials met for the first time to activate the ADI and to define specific strategies. The interviewees did not recognise relevant outcomes from the process during this period. In 2018, a new national government was elected, changing the political

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party in power. At the time the fieldwork was done, the process of activating the ADI was being driven only by indigenous communities, who conducted a process of electing representatives for each of the six districts that comprises this indigenous area. In the narratives of the ADI policy managers, it is possible to identify how the formal goals of participation of indigenous communities are resisted. One of them states *"from my opinion, I don't think that the indigenous world, including Mapuche, Aymara, Rapa Nui, etc., have the possibility of self-determination as the international law establishes. (…) indigenous people in Chile are not prepared for that. However, I do think we have to have some guaranteed spaces of power for each ethnic group"* **(Policy Manager 1, ADI South)**. In this sense, beyond the principles of self-determination that the bureaucratic arrangements establish, policy managers are not required to replicate them in their daily practices, which can affect the face-to-face interaction between them and citizens. At the same time, the personal interpretation of the policy manager can reshape the policy and its expression in the local areas.

The above is not consistent with the formal framework for participation, but as theories of critical institutionalism emphasise, agents and actors involved incorporate informal arrangements, based in practices and traditions.

In addition, the formal institutional framework compels public services to operate in a coordinated way, in order to promote the development of the territory and Mapuche communities. Coordination involves the capacity of local services to make decisions according to the contexts and establishing channels of communication with other services and organisations. This entails certain degrees of distribution of power from the top-levels of decision-making to the local levels. In this respect, the case of ADI Puel Nahuelbuta expresses the lack of will from the government to open spaces of discretion in that territory.

The data is not showing a problem of abilities or resources that obstructs the coordination, as the policy is just not implemented by the government. One policy manager indicates the limitations of ADI as a formal institution, but stresses the fact that, finally, its implementation depends on the decision of the services. Concretely, he/she states that "*ADI is not a very relevant law, because it is not a binding instrument (…) so when the government has to prioritise investment, they don't consider if the territory is or is not part of the ADI. They*

*consider more the vulnerability, previous commitments, and other things (…) In my opinion, this depends on, unfortunately, not on the political programmes, but on the will of those who are at the head of the services"* **(Associated Policy Manager 5, ADI South)**. A Mapuche representative adds: *"since the last year, here in Nahuelbuta we have been looking for available instruments to think through the development and to participate in defining the development in this territory. (…) However, we depend on the political will from the government bureaucracy, so they can understand the relevance of the ADI for us as communities. And we're still waiting for it"* **(Mapuche Representative 4, ADI South)**.

According to one public official responsible for the implementation of this ADI, the local government has a formal obligation instructed by the central government to "*work with indigenous peoples, not for them. (…) We are here to facilitate what they want to accomplish, within the limits of state action, because there are certain limits. (…) The state is not a dad who has to give them everything*" **(ADI Policy Manager 6, ADI South)**. In this quote it is reflected an interesting interpretation about the role of the state in the indigenous territory. The distribution of power states by the formal institutions, is replaced for this policy manager by the distribution of benefits. Contrary to the formal institutions, which stablish rights, this policy manager critics the idea of a state as a dad. As a response, it is important to limit its action over the communities.

The above is also related with the coordination of public services. Specifically, the intersectoral perspective allows local actors to develop a collaborative work among different organisations. However, the coordination has been hard to achieve, because of the separation of the spaces of decision-making of each service. The lack of coordination interferes with the autonomy of the local organisations, as *"the leaders of communities have said it explicitly: 'if I had to go to all the meetings, I'd be in meetings all month'[?]. That's impossible. (…) But this has not been resolved, and it is very difficult to solve, precisely because we don't have an ADI development plan. And ADI was meant precisely to overcome the problems of orientation of policies. So, everything should be resolved with the ADI leaders at the ADI meetings, but the truth is the decisions are dispersed everywhere"* **(Cornelio Chipana, Policy Manager ADI North)**.

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**6.2.2 Colonial matrix of power and its implications in knowledge.**

The concept of the 'coloniality of knowledge' describes how traditional indigenous subjectivities were replaced by a new understanding of the world valid from the colonisers' perspective. In this sense, from a decolonial perspective, the recognition of identities and knowledge is an essential frame for participation, as it is a way to revert the attempts of epistemicide (Santos 2016) undertaken first by the Spanish crown and then, from the 19<sup>th</sup> Century, by the Chilean state.

One of the members of the local community remembered the prohibition of the expressions of Aymara traditions was a rule imposed by the Chilean state *"from the period of Carlos Ibáñez del Campo [*president of Chile between 1952 and 1958*]. In those years, parents were forbidden to teach Aymara to their children. I am over 60 years old, and I don't know how to speak Aymara. My parents spoke Aymara very well, but when I came into the room, they stopped talking (Focus group, ADI North)"*.

*a. Scope of the indigenous peoples' knowledges*

From the institutional perspective, in the case of ADI North the Aymara knowledge is considered as part of the formal rules, when it leads to decisions related to the operative and methodological elements of the implementation of the policy. Specifically, representatives have the power to design methodologies to invite people to participate in the pre-assemblies and assemblies. This is an institution of the ADI implementation that enable the recognition of representatives' knowledge about the territory and people who inhabit it. Their knowledge is recognised at this stage of the policy, when the main interactions are between them and the communities that they represent. However, the knowledge that leaders have because they are part of the Aymara community is not sufficient for the perspective of the social services. A policy manager indicated *that "many of the people who are leaders live in the villages and they don't have the knowledge to work and face public services. Sometimes maybe they don't have the cognitive capacity, I'm not sure how to say it, but they're people who didn't even have education" (ADI Policy Manager 3, ADI North).* Although it is true that there is not a significant number of people living in these villages, and, consequently, there are not many people who can alternate the roles of

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leaders, indigenous leaders are elected by local communities, who evaluate whether they are able to represent their demands. From their perspective, they do have the knowledge to exercise the role. However, the quote indicates that their adequacy and aptitudes are considered not suitable for the role, from this policy manager's perspective.

Bureaucratic institutional arrangements are based on technical and specialised language and knowledge. A concrete example of this is the elaboration of a baseline for the ADI, so as to know *"the outcomes, the indicators about the situation of ADI territory, about local economy, housing, health, etc" (Policy Manager, ADI North).* When this policy manager was asked about the participatory elements that may be involved in this study, he/she said that was still in process, but they are indeed considering the participation of the communities, as *"sometimes leaders just demand and demand and demand, but without coherency or strategy. So, we have made these demands more concrete"*. This quote is an expression of how the technical rationality pursues the incorporation of participation and the improvement of the policy. However, is not to serve the communities interests, but to "fix" problems of leaders and their demands.

In the case of the South, the Mapuche knowledge is rejected by the ADI. Therefore, the scope of shaping the policy is more as a space of resistance that come from informal spaces. It should be noted here that the limits of the concept of informality in institutions has in the analysis of the ADI, in particular of those institutions that ancestrally have ruled the indigenous communities' life, in this case, Mapuche people, but it can be also applied for Aymara communities.

*b. Hegemonic knowledge*

If the Aymara and Mapuche knowledge is limited to some specific spaces, what is the dominant knowledge in the ADI?

Therefore, the hegemonic knowledge in public institutions is based on bureaucratic and technical language, such as statistics and evidence. This is strategically used to concentrate the 'valid' decisions among those who access and understand that knowledge. This issue is observed as well in the ADI-South. In the case of the ADI-South, one of the representatives mentioned that they have had a hard road in implementing ADI policy, suggesting that the

reason is *"the different government authorities have the ideology that they are the ones who have to bring the ideas to the people. They don't accept the idea that people, as civic society, can drive their own development policy"* (**Mapuche Representative 9, ADI Puel Nahuelbuta-South**). For instance, language plays a relevant role, thus *"Chilean state should be obligated to have professionals who understand the Mapuche's knowledge in their own language. This is not happening* (**Mapuche representative 1, ADI South**).

The above open the question about to what extent ADI policy is reproducing the coloniality. In the case of the North, its implementation, although involves local communities, also reinforces the replacement of Aymara knowledge by the technical knowledge: *"they* [government representatives] *called them 'the baseline'. And what is the baseline? (…) the whole western knowledge installed. They say, 'we have to empower women because they are being discriminated against.'. But the Aymara world has a huge theoretical, technical and scientific proposal for gender! (…) But nothing of this knowledge is applied, because nobody knows it, nobody studies it, and nobody systematises it. They say that knowledge belongs to Bolivian people, so they no longer use it. Of course, this is because they have been Chileanised"* (**Cornelio Chipana, ADI Policy Manager, ADI North**). As a consequence, the invitation to participate involves the assimilation of the Aymara people by the institutional bureaucracy, incorporating only what these institutions consider as valid for social change.

In the context of ADI policy, the recognition and reproduction of Mapuche identity is strongly associated with the transition from the currently dominant technical and bureaucratic language to an intercultural one. This transition will enable dialogue between the different participants' perspectives. In relation to this, one representative indicates that the efforts of the policy in incorporating elements of the Mapuche political heritage are *"not too much. Actually, these efforts are almost inexistent. They try to adapt policies to the communities' demands, but they haven't got so far"*.

According to the participants of this research, formal institutions of the ADI policy emphasise the recognition of indigenous rights. However, they stress on the predominance of the technical rationality as a valid language for the ADI policy. This predominant use of the technical rationality represents an informal institution that frame the spaces of dialogue defined by the policy. Interviewees mention the relevance of be trained to learn the policy

processes, especially for indigenous leaders. Using this technical language is a condition to participate in the formal spaces of dialogue set by the policy. The predominance of this rationality is consistent with the lack of formal recognition of the traditional Aymara social organisation mentioned in the section related with the coloniality of power. This includes traditional Aymara leaders and the rituals and festivities of this culture, which represent an informal institution. In this sense, there is a separation of ADI, where its formal institutions are dominated by technical rationality, while the Aymara perspective remains in the informal institutions.

This situation is interpreted by the interviewees as a challenge in building a dialogue between those two perspectives of the policy. In this context, the intercultural dialogue is an informal institution that lies in the personal efforts of the bricoleurs. According to a policy manager, "*I am a westerner with an indigenous surname, with indigenous complexion, but I am a westerner, because I have been studying, for example, Cartesian logic for 40 years. (…). I don't know if in economics you have heard the term ceteris-paribus: when you want to analyse an economic phenomenon, to simplify the subject, you leave the other variables constant and focus on one or two variables. But this is not the case in the Aymara world. So, for example, the westerner says music is for leisure time. But in the Aymara world, music is part of the productive processes. It's more integral. And that's hard to understand when you have a Cartesian mentality*" **(Policy Manager 2, ADI North)**. Likewise, interculturality is embedded in the daily practices of local actors, but there are not formal rules that frame those practices. In this sense, there was evident consensus among the interviewees that historically there has been a cultural barrier between the Chilean state and the indigenous communities.

Indigenous participants declare that they have suffered discrimination because of their knowledge and traditions. As an example, the leaders pointed out that that having their leadership and knowledge recognised by public services is a constant struggle. They mentioned, for example, that it is expected to educate themselves about issues related to public administration, since their traditional knowledge and the fact of having been elected by their bases is not sufficient to be validated by government organisations. On one side, some actors individually acknowledge the relevance of considering the local culture in the

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implementation of the ADI. On the other side, other actors are aware of the need of managing the hegemonic perspective, so as to be listened by the policy. In both cases, the practices of interculturality relies on personal efforts of some specific actors. In front of the predominance of the technical rationality, interculturality does not appears as an extended practice encouraged formally by this policy. However, it is permanently expressed as a challenge by the interviewees. Finally, the personal commitment of local actors is as well an informal institution in the adaptation of ADI policy to the local context.

The above has concrete consequences for local communities. For example, in periods of extreme weather conditions – such as drought, snow or rain – the government should help families with the provision of food for families and animals, materials to refurbish houses and stables and other basic items. Regarding the demand for help under such circumstances, one interviewee mentioned that *"some people try to take advantage even when they don't need any help. I remember one person came along and said to me 'I've got 600 animals, what will I do?'. If I would have 600 animals, I'd buy two houses on the beach, two houses in Aspen to go and skiing. I told this person 'You have lots of money. You can't ask me for help'"* **(ADI Policy Manager 6, ADI North)**. It should be noted that for Aymara people, animal husbandry, especially of alpacas and llamas, is a traditional activity rooted on their culture. Thus, the concern with their alimentation and wellbeing is something that the policy should consider.

A similar situation applies to the community's access to public funds. Regarding this, some interviewees reflect on the predominance of technical rationality in the implementation of local projects. This rationality is seen as a barrier for local people, as they do not know how it works. In the group discussion, people agreed with *"the problem with projects is you have too little time to apply for. In one week, you have to collect all the papers so as to meet the deadline (…) It's difficult to understand. Now they do everything by computer, the elderly people are completely lost. (…) The deadlines are very short. We have to travel to Arica to get a paper, that's already a week"* **(Different people's quotes, focus group, ADI North)**. Thus, even though it is impossible to deny the important efforts that the state has made during the last decades in promoting Aymara culture, according to the interviews, institutions have not consistently promoted forms of participation according with traditional Aymara knowledge.

The issue is promoting the Aymara knowledge is not a task that can be achieved separately from the other dimensions of the community and the territory. The reason is Aymara knowledge cannot be reduced to the language, or economical activities, or religion, etc. As mentioned along this chapter, the territory covered by the ADI Alto Andino Arica y Parinacota has been affected by the depopulation. As a consequence of the lack of development and services that the territory offers to their population, many people have decided to migrate Arica, the capital city of the region. With this, the daily interactions and reproduction of culture have been weakened.

From the Mapuche knowledge, territory and land represents a relevant condition for development of their culture and life. As one Mapuche leader mentioned: *"fortunately, ADI Puel Nahuelbuta's borders match with the old traditional Nagche territory, which is one of the four territorial identities of the Mapuche culture, (…). We want the reconstruction of the Nagche territory (…) through rebuilding the Nagche institution, having the* trawun *as a space of decision-making and discussion about the pivots of our Nagche economic development"* **(Mapuche Representative 4, South)**.

### 6.2.3 ADI and the developing of the being.

According with Maldonado-Torres "the emergence of the concept 'coloniality of being' responded to the need to thematize the question of the effects of coloniality in lived experience and not only in the mind" (2007, p.242). Bringing the Fanonian concept of *damné,* for Maldonado-Torres the idea of 'coloniality of being' refers when the withdrawal of ethics as a foundation of intersubjective relationships becomes the norm in the production of the world (Maldonado-Torres 2007). Although the author does not assume an institutional perspective, it is relevant to stress the idea of 'norm' in his conceptualisation of coloniality of being. From an institutional perspective analysis, which is the aim of this thesis, norms, either formal or informal, are associated with stable rules along time and generally known by actors involved. Thus, coloniality of being is represented as a set of institutions, formal or informal, which affects the material experience of life of indigenous communities living in territories where ADI North and ADI South are implemented. The analysis will highlight the role of institutions of ADI in providing the conditions for an entire expression, production and reproduction of the 'being' of indigenous communities.

*a. Coloniality of being in living conditions*

The first element to highlight is the existence of concrete effects of coloniality in the daily material experience of indigenous peoples in the territories. In the case of the ADI North, there is a consensus about the process of depopulation that affects this area. The climate conditions – around 3.500-4.000 metres high – alongside a lack of access to electricity, jobs, and even food causes precarious conditions of life, especially for new generations who aim to study or adopt other lifestyles. One of the indigenous representatives who is also a camelid breeder and divides his/her life between the Andean villages and Arica, the capital city of the region, declared: *"ADI began here around 10-15 years ago, so you can expect some effects on the repopulation. But nothing has happened. The depopulation continues, we're abandoned. (…) It isn't worth living there. The weather there is unbearable. When I go there, I become tan, my skin gets burnt, and thin. When I was living there, I weighed 50 kilograms and now living in the city I weight 67. Going there means you kill yourself"* **(Aymara representative and camelid producer 1, ADI North)**.

In this vein, another representative emphasised the abandon of the territory by the state: *"villages are becoming more and more abandoned. And the Chilean state has failed to find the solution to this problem. They have to implement a different development policy* **(Aymara representative 4, ADI North)**. 'Is not worth living there' and 'going there means you kill yourself' are strong statements about how tough is for Aymara people to stay in the territories where ancestrally they have inhabited. This is also expressed in the ancestral economic activities of the territories, which was affected by the depopulation: *"we have no market. We have no one to sell to. Years ago, there was a slaughterhouse in Arica, so we used to take the cattle there to sell to the butchers. We had a small income, but they closed the slaughterhouse, and we have no one who buy from us".* **(Focus Group, ADI North).**

As well, it is a clear evidence that the coloniality is expressed in lived experience of the communities, "and not only in the mind" (Maldonado-Torres 2007, p.242). Along with the weather conditions of the highlands, the quotes stress the role of the state, and specifically of the ADI, in improving the conditions for the reproduction of life of Aymara people. To describe this role, these indigenous representatives use the idea of abandon. Considering coloniality of being is related with the ethical relationships, the refers to the withdrawal of

the state as an institution that guarantees the minimal conditions of the being for the Aymara communities. Without having that, Aymara people have been forced to migrate and, consequently, the territory has become depopulated, making hard the reproduction of the Aymara life.

One policy manager who implements projects in the territory said that the living conditions in the area also affects professionals who go to work there, so is not easy to find people keen to apply for those jobs: *"The work that I do here is very nice, I really like it and I'd like to have more tools to do it better, to have more people in the team. (…) It's hard to get people to want to work in the highlands. The salaries are good, but loneliness is what kills you"* *(Associated Policy Manager 8, ADI North)*.

In the case of the South there, as was mentioned, one factor that strongly affect the experience of life of Mapuche is the militarisation. Although not each individual is living under the direct threat of the military action, the fact of the territory is under permanent control of the military forces is considered as a violent treat in the relationship with the Chilean state. A representative indicates that *"when the carabineros (police) returned from Colombia and set themselves in the ninth region (Araucania), and came with drones, is not that violence? That is violence. And when Piñera talks there in Santiago or elsewhere about fighting crime, he talks in general, but he does talk about the ninth region when he talks about terrorism. So, there are clear facts saying that this government is very much against the people"* *(Mapuche representative 1, ADI South)*. This leader emphasises the public representation of Mapuche people that the president Pinera promotes, by linking the territory with terrorism and, consequently, the justification of sending specialised military forces trained in Colombia. As well in the North, here there is a withdrawal of the ethics in the Mapuche/Chilean relationship, expressed in the militarisation strategy. This situation contrasts with the ADI, in terms of the role of the state in improving the conditions of life of indigenous peoples. While new forces of territorial control are implemented, *"CONADI doesn't have resources to implement the ADI (…). Peñi [comrade] demand routes, access to water, electricity, improvement of health services, closer services to rural areas. Additionally, they demand lands. So you reach a point where you can't go progress in responding these demands, because everything is finally about resources"* *(Policy manager 1, ADI South)*.

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As a consequence of this life conditions, the reproduction of the Mapuche being is affected. This being is related *to "environmental issues as 'huinca'* [non-indigenous peoples] *says (...), the natural resources that exist on earth, the resources of the air, of the wind, as well as the water, the nature, the 'menoko'* [sacred site, usually a wetland that held biodiversity, including medicinal herbs]. *These are also disappearing, because of the deterioration caused by the state and the forestry companies (...). Many exotic plants have been planted. What was native, what was from the land has been replaced (…) Where the natural spring used to flow for the communities, today they lack this water resource that is essential for human life"* **(Mapuche representative 3, ADI South).**

b. *Land in living experience*

Depopulation is strongly related with the colony of being, as the lack of interaction between people, and between communities and their territory decreases the spaces for the production of the intersubjectivities of Aymara people. One concrete example of this was given by a policy manager involved in the promotion of local culture, who indicated that *"small communities come and ask for help to refurbish their church which is falling down because it's very old. But they need help because they're elderly people or because they don't have too many neighbours in their villages to work with. In the past, people used to work with their communities to build their own houses"* **(Associated Policy Manager 10, ADI North)**.

Another example is the language, which is strongly connected with the daily experiences of people, as *"it is not the same to teach English, because I learn English to communicate with others, same with French or Spanish. But with the indigenous language, it is not because I just want to communicate, but it's because... my history has been lost, my cosmovision has been lost, my community has been lost. So how do I rescue it? By teaching. And how are you going to teach something that you haven't lived? That' s what we lost it and only the grandparents still know it* **(Aymara representative 8, ADI North)**. According to Mignolo, quoted by Maldonado-Torres (2007, p.242), "since languages are not something human beings have but rather something of what humans beings are, coloniality of power and of knowledge engendered the coloniality of being [colonialidad del ser]".  In this sense, the interaction between the state and communities includes several trainings and talks that aim

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to teach them different subjects related to gender, citizenship, how to start your own business, among others. However, for the communities there is a conflict between their interest in participating in these spaces and their work of subsistence, which is strongly related with the daily reproduction of Aymara being: *"People are bored of attending meetings. They want to work on their farms, but the state invades them with meetings, with training sessions. People want to participate, they go to the trainings, they want to learn something, but they go to the meetings and get bored (…). Institutions [governmental organisations] come and teach us our own customs, but they do not know about them (…). We decided to revitalise the indigenous rituals ourselves, only among us, without the state"* **(Aymara representative 6, ADI North).** This quote shows that the action of the state in the territory is perceived as an obstacle to the reproduction of Aymara culture.

For the ADI-South, the conditions for participation of Mapuche people provided by the current institutions address the distribution of lands as a material condition for the reproduction of life. In this sense, land is a fundamental part of Mapuche culture and, consequently, it has been an essential demand from communities. One Mapuche leader says that they *"we talk about territory, because if we will talk about recognition, first we have to talk about territory, because if we don't have a physical space, where we will set the development?"* **(Mapuche representative 1, ADI South)**. Considering land is an essential condition for the reproduction of life for Mapuche culture, the lack of outcomes related to this issue is an obstacle in promoting participation. "*It's hard to think about achieving an understanding, because what is the state doing? While we're demanding more lands, the state is stuck in papers, abolishing some articles of the Law 19.253* [Indigenous law] *that benefit Mapuche people in recovering the lands that were dispossessed. Because we have to remember that these lands were affected by colonisation, right?"* **(Mapuche Representative 3, ADI South)**. This representative emphasises the link between land and the historical relationship of colonisation with the state. In this context, recovering land is not only the fact of receiving a material resource for development. It is also related to the compensation for the historical disadvantaged position that Mapuche had in the context of the colonisation. In this sense, recovering land is recovering a space for the development of the Mapuche subjectivity.

The perspective of the states about lands, however, follows the path of dispossession of lands and occupation of them for the country development, now under the neoliberal narrative. This reproduces the very inequalities between Mapuche communities and the private sector. This is framed by the decree 701 mentioned earlier, which formally states that all land, no matter who owns it, can be used for forest economic activity, so as to defend any public interest when it is threatened. It also establishes important economic support for the companies involved in forest investments. This decree is still active, and the asymmetrical distribution of lands has not been reverted, despite the sustained demands of the Mapuche communities.

In this regard, as a policy manager indicates, *"the law that protects the indigenous peoples is, excuse the redundancy, quite protective. It allows them to do little. (…) It restricts several things, starting with the sale of land." (Policy manager 2-South).* Mapuche representatives are aware of this and put as an example the plan of the government to promote the fruit industry, explaining that *"these companies are already working on this region. I think what they're aiming for is just to work in peace. And this is because they want to engage Mapuche communities by saying 'we will support you to thrive by developing fruit growing in one hectare of soil'. But for us, if there's no land, there's no development" (Mapuche representative 3, ADI South).* This leader adds that land is not only necessary for the development, but also for life itself, as *"without land we could not have life. Without water there wouldn't be life. Without nature, life would be scarce of productive resources. (…) Because of the forest companies, water and many things that used to exist in this land have been disappearing (Mapuche Representative 3, ADI South).* From this perspective, 'the idea of 'Chilean land' seems to be in direct opposition to the Mapuche demands, and it reflects the colonial perspective that frames the experience of Mapuche communities.

c. *Development for being? who does define its meaning?*

Although there is a recognition of *"the state has started to take its responsibility for the effects of the Chileanisation and evangelisation, when our people were forced to neglect our traditions and culture" (Aymara representative 4, ADI North),* the formal bureaucratic framework of ADI is still weak in integrating the participation of indigenous peoples. This has effects not only in achieving outcomes, but moreover in the definition of what outcomes the

policy has to achieve and its consistency with the ways of life of communities. In this respect, an Aymara leader indicates that "*public policies of this country are not designed for indigenous people. (…) We have a tremendous depopulation because there are no public policies designed for this area. Policies are the same for all. The issue is that the cosmovision of life that each people have is not taken into account.*" **(Aymara representative 8, ADI North).** This representative saw the current living conditions in the territories as reflecting the state's lack of recognition of the particular needs and characteristics of indigenous communities. As well, it refers to the lack of participatory processes which enable their involvement in decision-making. According to this representative, even the recognition of the category of indigenous represents a standardised label that does not help to overcome the local problems.

As a consequence of the lack of inclusion of the Aymara perspective in the development of the territory, the possibilities that the ADI policy offers to Aymara people of 'being' and reproducing their lives are limited. In this sense, "*it's not the same when they need housing and I offer a workshop on how to organise a housing cooperative, rather than when what they need is not only housing, but it's indigenous housing, which is NOT the same. Their concept of housing is not the same as my concept, it's not just a house with a roof, right? Because of the weather conditions and the cultural dimension, they need a house where they can make a fire inside, where they can breed their animals, even better if it's an adobe house built with mud*" **(ADI Policy Manager 4, ADI North).**

In the focus group, where local residents participated, it was said that "*that's the problem, (…) sometimes projects are made without taking us into consideration, who are the ones that live here. They bring everything ready and the people, as the neighbour says, don't speak. They don't give their opinion, so they assume the projects are approved by us. (…) They do everything from their desks and then they bring it to us.* **(Focus group, ADI North)**.

A strategy that Mapuche has been implementing in order to distribute the power in the definition of the development is the use of their traditional social embedded institutions. This corresponds, in specific, to "*the trawun as a space of deliberation and decision. What do we discuss in the trawun? What Will be the centre of our economic development in the Nagche territory? Will it be the forest area? Whit their exotic pines and eucalyptus, and with*

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*the damage of the water, environment and Mapuche medicine? Or will we promote de development as a daily practice that allows us to achieve the food safety and diversity in the lands?* **(Mapuche representative 4, ADI South).** However, as was mentioned, local governmental authorities have hindered the implementation of the ADI policy, and the recognition of this community-based process as a valid and formal institution.

In this sense, ADI policy involves two levels of recognition of being. At one level, there is the recognition of the status of indigenous at an individual dimension, whereby someone with indigenous heritage has specific rights as a citizen. This is helpful, for example, in accessing to specific benefits implemented in the territory. However, the insufficient recognition of the local knowledge makes hard to access to public funds. This has consequences in being, as it is an expression of weak institutions in terms of promotion of participation of local communities in defining their own development.

### 6.3 Conclusions of the chapter

As has been shown throughout this chapter, the implementation of the ADI has followed an unstable route, mainly because of the barriers set by public services to implement the ADI policy as a space of distribution of power. From the decolonial theory, it is possible to conclude that the state plays a relevant role in reproducing the coloniality in its relationship with Aymara and Mapuche people who inhabit the ADI Alto Andino Arica y Parinacota and Puel Nahuelbuta territory. To achieve this continuation of the coloniality, formal and informal institutions have been used. Although the formal framework of the policy states the participation as an element to be considered in its implementation, the government has set limitations to translate this principle as a practice to promote the distribution of power among the actors involved. This is consistent with the path that the formal institutions have followed from the history of the Chilean-indigenous relationships. Consequently, ADI does not play a relevant role in decolonising the experiences of life of indigenous peoples who inhabit the territories where the policy is implemented.

In this context, the chapter showed how the power of shaping the ADI's institutions is concentrated in formal institutions dominated by the state. While in the North ADI plays a role of ADI plays a role of keep the dialogue between local actors, but without reconfiguring

the power relationships, in the South the status quo is safeguarded by the government by drifting (Streeck and Thelen 2005) the policy.

In particular, in the Northern territory two levels of the exercise of power has been developed. On the one hand, communities and the state have implemented the ADI policy as reliable space of communication, as its implementation is permanent during the time and it is validated among the actors, although it is weak in achieving outcomes related with the development of the territory and communities. On the other hand, Aymara communities decided to run their own ancestral institutions that organise social life in the territory, without any intervention of the state. These institutions do not have the formal recognition from the ADI, but they are strong rules for Aymara people, so they can be considered as social embedded institutions.

A second conclusion is about the lack of effectiveness of the strategy of shaping the policy, beyond the limits of power set by the same institutions of ADI. The weaknesses of the rules that frame this policy, the unavailability of resources to address the local demands, and the resistance from public services in promoting the policy implementation, are some factors. In this regard, although Mapuche leaders have started a deep process of participation with the communities and with local municipalities, there is a consensus among the participants of this research about the lack of outcomes of ADI policy. As well, ADIs are a coordination of policies, programmes and services, designed at the central level of the state. Since there is not any clear framework for local practitioners to implement the policy, it is hard for them to shape the policy beyond the current formal institutions. For example, there is not a budget to develop projects designed by the communities who live in the territories considered as ADIs. So, ADIs should fit within the general rules of projects and programmes, which were designed from a national rather than a local perspective. Thus, while some interviewees indicate that the spaces of decision-making are limited, some others have implemented actions grounded in their own initiatives.

Here, the lack of outcomes and its consequences in the conditions of life of local communities in both territories are not simply related with poverty or inequality in the distribution and management of local resources. Moreover, since these conditions affect the

reproduction of life of the indigenous peoples, can be considered a consequence of a coloniality of being.

From the perspective of policy managers, especially those who have closer interactions with communities, adapting the policy to the local contexts is a daily challenge. Here, a conclusion is the relevant role met by those who identify themselves as Mapuche. Informally, their knowledge about the Mapuche language, and social embedded arrangements, called protocols, that regulate Mapuche social life is a valuable resource to mediate between the policy and the communities. In this context, the data showed an assemblage of institutions, between the traditional indigenous rules and the new established by the Chilean state, conforming a hybrid institutional framework.

Finally, considering the theoretical framework, formality and informality in institutions are helpful categories in the analysis of the ADI policy. However, they have limitations in understanding the strength of ancestral rules that indigenous communities have been using until the present days. Although these rules are not usually written, are widely known and validated by the Aymara and Mapuche communitires, so they are efficient in mediating social interactions. Taking this into account, the differentiation of formal and informal institutions became insufficient to understand the complex function of the rules that emerge and operate among the indigenous peoples that participated in the research, it does not matter whether they are recognised or not in official documents. Firstly, indigenous traditions represent an institutionalised organisation of political life. They are stable along the time and able to be adapted to the instability scenarios of Latin-America. Secondly, for indigenous communities, which traditionally have used orality as a way of communication, informal rules do not need to be written to be efficient as a way of regulating individuals' behaviour. In the case of Aymara and Mapuche peoples, their original languages were not written before the colonisation and the subsequent attempts to encapsulate the language in the western alphabet. are relevant rules, constant along the time. Thirdly, formality and informality reveal not only the nature of the institution – if it is written and recognised or not by formal documents as laws. Moreover, the categories of formal and informal rules reveal the standpoint of the observer, in terms what it is being recognised by these concepts

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is the validation of the institutions by the bureaucratic perspective. Reconceptualise the idea of formality and informality is, then, a theoretical challenge.

# Chapter 7. Institutional framework and implications for participation in ADI policy

## 7.1 Introduction

Based on the analyses presented previously, this chapter aims to discuss the findings related to the participatory practices developed in the context of ADI policy in the two case studies: ADI Alto Andino Arica y Parinacota in the North of Chile, and ADI Puel Nahuelbuta in the South of the country.

This discussion is twofold: on the one hand, based on a new institutional perspective in conjunction with the decolonial perspective, this section examines the institutional process (Cleaver 2002; Lowndes and Pratchett 2006a; Lowndes and Roberts 2013a; Hall et al. 2014a) that emerges from the implementation of this policy, and how this is embedded in the coloniality of power between the bricoleurs involved (Quijano 2000b; Mignolo 2002; Dussel 2007; Mignolo 2007a; Rivera Cusicanqui 2010a; Santos 2010b; Mignolo and Escobar 2010; Dussel 2016). On the other hand, this section focuses on analysis at the micro level, conecting the new institutional framework and the context of coloniality, with the literature about participation presented in the theoretical framework (Arnstein 1969; Serrano 1998; Lowndes et al. 2006b; Lowndes and Pratchett 2006a; Cornwall 2008).

It is relevant to stress that while the institutional process was presented from the new institutional theory, and its critical decolonial analysis was based on the three central elements of the colonial matrix of power – power, knowledge and being – this chapter will not have a structure strictly based on one theoretical model. Moreover, the dicussion that will be presented aims to link the findings with the literature review about participation, stressing the scopes and limits to respond the research questions of this thesis.

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Therefore, the chapter presents three sections, each one correponding to one of the research questions, in order to advance towards conclusive analyses on how the institutional processes, placed in a context of coloniality, affect the participation of the indigenous groups that inhabit the territories where the ADI North and South are implemented.

## 7.2 Formal and informal institutional arrangements and their effects on the participatory processes in ADI policy.

This section examines the institutional framework and its relationship with participation, at the light of the research question 'what are the institutional arrangements – formal and informal – in participatory processes and practices in ADI policy?

### 7.2.1 Transforming formal participatory institutions into practices in ADIs

The new institutionalism has a very accurate perspective in identifying the key concepts of this thesis, in particular: participation as the role of bricoleurs in shaping the policy, power regarding the relationships among the actors and, of course, institutions as rules-in-use that frame the implementation of the policy (Lowndes 2001; Hall et al. 2014a; Cleaver and De Koning 2015). In this vein, new institutionalism emphasises on the analyses of the different arrangements that operate at each level of the ADI.

As mentioned, there is a layer that shows that the ADI is formally grounded in national and international rules that foster the participation and self-determination of indigenous communities (International Labour Organization 1989; Ministerio de Planificación y Cooperación 1993). From the conceptualization of participation offered by Arnstein (1969), this can be seen as a "citizen power" as it hints to progress in citizen control and decision-making. However, this aim is not supported by the facts. In the North, when the ADI Council works regularly, the lack of outcomes reflects the existence of some factors obstructing the effectiveness of the policy.

According to the new institutionalism, phenomena cannot be reduced to their formal expressions, but the informality is an essential element to understand institutions embedded in everyday practices. In the case of ADI, this leads the analysis of the translation of formal rules of participation into power of decision and actions for bricoleurs to shape the policy.

This opens the question about the second level, which is beyond the bureaucratic arrangements defined at the central level and refers to the ADI's arrangements in the territory. In this sense, from the critical institutionalism perspective, it is possible to see that institutions are constructed of different layers produced by actors in different moments and contexts (Cleaver and De Koning 2015). Therefore, the shaping of policy does not end with its design and enactment. In this regard, some inicitaives can be labelled as participative, however in the practice can lead to manipulation or hidden non-participation (Arnstein 1969; Fernández and Ordóñez 2007).

One element that the ADI policy actually considers for the participation of the local actors is the establishment a Directive Council of the ADI, as a space of dialogue between governmental actors – local elected representatives and public officials of social services – and indigenous communities – represented by ADI councillors elected by the people. As mentioned in previous chapters, this organisation of ADI is hierarchically organised from the top level of decision-making in the country, the President, represented by the Intendente. Considering this organisation, it would be valid to think that the ADI and the Directive Council provide a strong formal arrangement that allows local actors to make decisions and be supported by the highest levels of power in the state.

From the perspective of the CLEAR model (Lowndes and Pratchett 2006a), Aymara representatives play a significant role in designing and implementing the methodologies of "asking to", which means, inviting local communities to participate, connecting both formal and informal institutions of dialogue among the community and public services. The bricolage enables indigenous representatives to design strategies which reach local residents and to organise the meetings according to the local context. For instance, in some villages the representatives decided to substitute the meetings for local residents with door-knocking, as they knew that the long distances between people's homes and the meeting venues made it difficult for many to attend. This local process of institutional bricolage shows that the bureaucratic arrangements and the practices that they generate are based on the general framework of ADI policy, and at the same time, are adapted to respond to local characteristics. However, Aymara representatives do not have the power of shaping the ADI's institutions so as to "respond to" the local demands. Representatives can organise local

communities, identify needs, and communicate them in the formal spaces of ADI. However, ultimately the decision power is concentrated in the state. From the analytic matrix of participation (Serrano 1998), this can be labelled as an instrumental participation, as although it may be effective in satisfy some local needs, the influence of communties is minimal.

In the case of the South, even though the ADI is framed by the same bureaucratic arrangements, the flexibility of the local actors is radically different. The discretion here has resulted in the local government not implementing the policy, despite the decree that enacted it in the territory. This decision was not an outcome of a participatory process that included the communities. Instead, it was a centralised decision and, moreover, local government and social services have been actively defending it against the attempts and demands of local indigenous communities to implement the ADI. It should be emphasised that, as mentioned in Chapter 4 and 5, the relationship between the Chilean state and the indigenous communities has been conflictual. The main reasons for this relate back to indigenous communities' historical demands to recover lands which were taken from them during colonisation. This can be considered as an expression of political drift, which refers to the explicit or implicit action from some actors to ignore abandon certain policies, when these can attempt against their interests (Streeck and Thelen 2005).

Although the mentioned ADI's formal definitions, the power of action that local bricoleurs have is limited, as policies and services involved have been already set by the central government; hence, the participation in ADI is limited to manage specific elements of an already defined structure.

### 7.2.2 Transforming informal participatory practices into formal institutions: limits and scopes in the ADI context.

In the light of the data, it was demonstrated that non-written rules for Aymara and Mapuche peoples can be effective and successful in framing the individuals' actions, are broadly acknowledged and followed, and they are the results of a reflective and collective process that has been forged over time. As it was mentioned in the previous chapters, social embedded institutions for Aymara and Mapuche communities tend to promote the dialogue

and collective deliberation, achieving high levels of participation among the memebers. Examples of this are the management of water and local resources in the ADI North and the political organisation processes, in particular the *trawun*, carried out by communities in the ADI South. These traditional indigenous strategies of participation enable members of the community to exercise their power in the local area and to influence the spaces of decion-making by dialogical encounters. Although the complexities in the use of concepts of citizenship and empowerment to analyse traditional forms of political organisation, considering their relevance and current use among indigenous communities, is still possible to understand them from the matrix of participation analysis (Serrano 1998) and ladder of participation (Arnstein 1969). In particular, these strategies of participation achieve the citizen control and empowerment. On the contrary, rules that emerge outside the community, such as those discussed in the framework of the state without the participation of the communities, are only effective insofar as they are imposed through processes of coloniality, which can be followed or resisted, but generally not legitimated by the indigenous peoples.

The data shows a conflict between the ancestral indigenous institutions and the institutions produces by the state. Formal institutions highlight the principles of autonomy, participation, and development of territories, but at the same time they limit the expression of social embedded arrangements of indigenous communities. This is expressed in the language – all the dialogues and documents related to ADI implementation are in Spanish – and political organisation – the rules require the creation of new organisations and representatives, rejecting the validity of the ancestral ones. Consequently, these last ones can only work in the informality, as a strategy of decolonial resistance.

From the literature about participation, Cornwall (2008) proposes the distinction between 'invited spaces' and 'spaces from below'. The firsts are offered by organisations and policy makers in a top-down mode, and which can represent the ADI as a space dominated by the social services and public authorities. The seconds are participatory spaces created and managed by people, based in which this thesis can conceptualised as social embedded arrangements. These last ones can represent the ancestral indigenous spaces of participation, which have been relegated to the informality by the state. The limit if this is

related to the power relationships between the state and the communities. No matter how relevant are the arrangements that operate in the Mapuche and Aymara spaces of dialogue, ADI does not consider them as a valid institution of decision-making.

Considering the above, with bureaucratic arrangements that limit the possibilities of local actors – indigenous communities and policy managers – affecting the shape of the institutions, the actions to redistribute power come from outside the formal framework. In the North, cultural practices that are essential for the reproduction of the culture – such as festivities linked to religion and spirituality – are kept separate and protected from the influence of the state. Additionally, indigenous communities have held some demonstrations to ensure their demands are listened to. In the case of the South, Mapuche leaders decided to resist the unequal distribution of power by taking over control of the implementation of ADI policy in the territory. There are demands that cannot be responded to inside the boundaries of the current policies that form the ADI.

## 7.3 Institutional processes and the bricoleurs experiences about participation in ADIs

Along with the conceptual implications regarding to formality and informality in institutional analysis, it is also relevant to consider that according to the critical institutionalist perspective, far from being static representations of a set of formal rules, institutions are constructed through an interaction of rules and actors, who bring elements of everyday life, so as to respond to the needs and demands of the contexts where they operate (Cleaver, 2017). In this section, therefore, the bricoleurs' perspectives related to participation in ADI are examined, in order to address the research question 'How does institutional bricolage affect participatory processes and practices in ADI policy?'.

### 7.3.1 What can bricoleurs shape and how?

In this regard, the two cases of ADI policy studied show the limits and scopes that of the institutional framework of the policy to respond to the complexity of the local demands. According with the CLEAR model, the invitation to participate is linked with the category of "ask to". This category focuses on the statement of participatory process will be stronger and more effective when this is mobilized by the invitation of official bodies, especially when

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it comes from those who are responsible for the decision-making (Lowndes and Pratchett 2006b). In this sense, the element of 'ask to' from the CLEAR model becomes relevant, as the invitation to participate is strongly related to questions of the distribution of power and the possibilities of generating alliances among public organisations and indigenous leaders.

If the ADI of North Alto Andino Arica y Parinacota is analysed from the perspective of critical institutionalism, 'official bodies' typically refer to those which, considering the institutional bureaucratic arrangements, have the explicit power to call actors to participate of this ADI. Likewise, from this theory, institutions are also shaped by socially embedded arrangements, based on cultural, political and historical dimensions which shape the institutions and their interaction with the context in which they are located. According to this understanding, actors are not passive entities who follow the already defined rules. Rather, they are immersed in power relationships where their discretion, in terms of capacity of make decisions by using their own judgment beyond the formal rules, has the potential to influence and reshape the institutions. In particular, some of the policy managers and indigenous representatives recognise that in the promotion of participation, the formal framework of ADI policy provides some room for discretion.

This is the case in the health programme in the North, where, even before Convention 169 was enacted, the staff decided to promote an intercultural perspective, based on the interpretation of the formal rules of the health services at that time. As one health policy manager stated, *"we do not skip any of the health goals of any CESFAM [family health centres] in the country (...) The same model helps us to develop our goals* **(Associated policy manager 2, ADI North).** However, when policy managers associated to social services were asked about the impact of the ADI Alto Andino Arica y Parinacota and the ILO Convention 169 on their daily work, it was usual to listen that they are not really involved with these rules as *"something palpable. It's not something that I have as a reference or framework in the projects that we implement. It is not part our aims nor is it something that we have to consider in our reports"* **(Associated Policy Manager 10, ADI North).** Although this policy manager is responsible for the implementation of participatory projects for rural development, the vague knowledge of and links with other participatory spaces highlights the lack of impact of this formal framework in the daily decisions in the implementation of

programmes. In this context, this manager are not able to promote the rights that the formal framework is offering to the people and, consequently, promote the 'engagement' (Barrett and Brunton-Smith 2014) of communities, related to the knowledge and personal opinion about public issues.

In the case of the South, the formal framework of ADIs is weakly reflected in the relationship between the bricoleurs. In the process of trying to make contact with the people in charge of the ADI, only a few people in the local administration have some knowledge about the policy was a finding in itself. After knocking on several doors, it was possible to identify some managers that knew about the local processes led by the communities campaigning to activate the ADI. however, some of the managers did mention the relevance of developing participatory spaces when they help to access to information about how the local policies are operating, and to get feedback about how to improve their services. According to Arnstein (1969), to inform and to ask people are only "degrees of tokenism" in participation, as they are not attempting to distribute power. Additionally, some of the policy managers mentioned the importance of promoting interaction with individuals more than with groups of people, in order to learn about the perspectives of people who, for different reasons, do not express their opinions in the assemblies.

In both cases, it is possible to see, firstly, that the agency of the local managers in adapting the ADI has resulted in processes that do not aim for social change according to the demands of the indigenous communities. Rather, their actions are valid only as long as they are functional to the status quo, where the dominant vision of the country's development is defined by an elite and safeguarded by the state. Secondly, and from a colonial perspective, these bureaucratic arrangements are deployed in a context marked by a historical relationship of domination embodied in the actions of the state. These actions resulted, in the North, in the depopulation of the territory as a consequence of the lack of opportunities to live a dignified life, and in the South, in land dispossession.

### 7.3.2 Participation as actors' agency (or participation as actors' burden)

Despite the formal institutions and their ambiguity in promoting and limiting local participation, some policy managers declared to use specific strategies, not formally

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considered by the policy but relevant to the indigenous culture, to ask people to participate in meetings and consultations and to encourage their engagement with the policy.

In this regard, when interviewees were asked about which elements were helping to change this situation, it was frequently mentioned the 'political will', referring to the agency that actors have to push the higher levels of decision-making towards reshaping the formal framework and adapting it to local demands. However, the political will cannot trigger participatory practices without an institutional framework that enable the distribution of power. For indigenous leaders, political will is limited by the material conditions that they have to carry out their duties. They do not receive a salary – so they divide their time between the activities related to their role as representatives, their families and their jobs. Most of them work as shepherds or farmers, and they cannot access the basic resources needed to fulfil their responsibilities as representatives, such as public or private transport to visit the very isolated territories. So, they have to fulfil their role under precarious conditions and, consequently, their possibilities for participating in the institutional bricolage is more limited in comparison to the resources that the state has. From the 'can do' criteria (Lowndes and Pratchett 2006a), indigenous peoples do not access to the necessary resources to participate.

Similarly, political will is understood as a burden for policy managers, since responding to local demands depends on their own resources and initiative, without support or feedback from the institutional framework. On the one hand, this situation shows the possibility that they have of shaping policies in their local areas. On the other hand, it reflects that ADI policy is not a strong framework that they can use to promote these adaptations. But at the same time, policy managers as bricoleurs can, even in a very narrow range of action, consciously or unconsciously, according to the theory, obstruct participatory practices. In this regard, the perspective of different actors and the extent to which they can influence institutions express the relevance of turn the formality of the bureaucratic arrangements into actors' actions.

As stated by the participants of the thesis, individual agency can only be developed inside the boundaries of the bureaucratic framework. This is the example of people who, individually or collectively, have been awarded a specific budget to develop economic or

community development projects. In the case of the South, irrespective of the institutional arrangements (which resulted in the lethargic state of the ADI in that region), the local communities have taken action to guide the development of the territory through a self-determined process. Even though this represents an attempt at reconceptualising the ADI and its strategies for participation, the main achievements have been the allocation of a budget for growing fruit trees and other productive activity. Although these strategies have not changed the shape of the ADI, they are contributing to a change in the organisation among the local indigenous leaders.

From the analysis of the participation, the CLEAR model understands the resources and to what extent they are defined and managed by every actor involved respond to the category of "can do" (Lowndes and Pratchett 2006b). This considers efforts for achieving an equal distribution of these resources among participants and how this affects the material conditions to participate under the category of indigenous. In this regard, ADI has resources to implement the formal spaces of dialogue and interaction defined by the policy in this territory, i.e., pre-assemblies between local residents and ADI representatives, assemblies between local residents and the public services, and ADI Board meetings, with ADI representatives, public services and local authorities. However, the demands risen in these spaces of dialogue do not count with resources to be responded. In this context, ADI board does not assure citizens' influence and empowerment, according to Serrano (1998), but instrumental and, in some spaces, consultation and informing (Arnstein 1969)

The above is clear as well in the case of ADI South, whose implementation lies rests entirely on the role and work of Mapuche representatives and their possibilities of build networks with NGOs, local councils, and central government. As a consequence, indigenous leaders autonomously organised the election of representatives and meetings with the community, city councils and other formal actors. They want to revitalise the participatory and transformative dimension of the ADI. In this sense, Mapuche communities are leading the process of implementation of the policy, reconceptualising the idea of participation.

It should be noted that in this case, the use of the CLEAR model and other conceptual approaches was problematic. As the model indicates, participatory processes will be stronger and more effective when they are mobilised by invitation of official bodies,

especially when such invitations come from those who are responsible for decision-making. In opposition, in ADI Puel Nahuelbuta, the absence of official institutions inviting communities to participate motivated Mapuche representatives to assume control over the implementation of this policy. In this context, the data shows that the process of invitation to participate just does not fit under the CLEAR model. In addition, participation is presented by the model as a process originated from official bodies in charge of decision-making. This model does not accurately represent the conflicts in power relationships among the actors involved, when it was precisely those without decision-making power who were the agents that demanded the establishment or improvement of participatory strategies. In this sense, participation is not necessarily something that is offered strictly from official institutions. In the case of the ADI Puel Nahuelbuta, some official bodies are actually resisting the formal duty of inviting Mapuche communities to participate.

In this vein, although local communities play a key role in the implementation of the policy, to claim that this process represents a case of high level of participation can be misleading in the analysis and conclusions, if the role of the official bodies is not here related to "enabling to" or "asking to". On the contrary, the local services have neglected and obstructed the implementation of the ADI.

## 7.4 Given the decolonial context, to what extent does ADI policy promote equality of relationships between indigenous peoples and other actors?

Considering the above, the question then is who are the bricoleurs or, who defines the rules that frame the interactions between the actors involved in the ADI? The analysis of this section pursues to identify to what extent this participation is expressed in terms of power for indigenous communities to shape the policy and its institutions.

### 7.4.1 Historical pattern of coloniality and the asymmetric relationships between bricoleurs in their participation in ADI.

As mentioned in the previous sections of this chapter, the common elements of the two cases show that the institutional bricolage of the ADIs is produced in a very centralised and hierarchical structure. This bricolage process limits the power of actors in the ADI territories

to achieve structural changes to this policy. From a multilevel perspective, this is expressed in the limited possibilities that the local actors – policy managers and indigenous communities – have to make meaningful changes within the boundaries of the policy. The interviewees identify the centre of the country and the capital city of each region as the spaces where the policies are defined. In those spaces, the top-level bureaucrats and even the congress people make the decisions that will affect the territories where the ADI is implemented. In this regard, policy managers claim, in general, that their role has a narrow range of discretion and that they do not have the possibility to make formal adaptations in their actions, as they are strongly controlled by the top-level decision-makers. Consequently, at least in the ADI-Nort, policy managers can invite – or ask to (Lowndes and Pratchett 2006a)- local communities to participate, although the resources cannot be offered. In the case of the ADI South, 'enable to' is an interesting element to be considered. It refers to the promotion of collective participation and the enhancing of the local context of citizens' engagement, which is not promoted by local public services.

The current limitations for the indigenous self-determination imbricated in the ADI North and South are the expression of historical patterns that have layered (Van der Heijden 2011; Thelen and Conran 2016) the institutional process, adding elements that gradually transform the institutional framework, but at the same time, make it thick and dense. As a consequence, the institutional framework become hard to react to external factors of change.

The limits of indigenous peoples in achieving self-determination through the transformation of the rules imposed by the Chilean state is, certainly, not something new. In this sense, the ineffectiveness of the ADI policy is framed by the processes of colonisation, for example the Chileanisation of the northern territory and the militarisation of the territory South of the Bio Bio River, which still persist and coexist, albeit in conflict, with the ILO 169 Convention and the Indigenous Law.  In particular, the participation in the ADI is seen as a strategy of the state *"only to show they're doing something. As a result, we have less and less wise people, less yatiri, less coyiri [spiritual and health Aymara authorities]. In fact, once we said that all the elders who are living in the highlands should have better life conditions. Minimum things, such as water, such as sewage system, such as electricity. So that these people finally live*

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*with dignity" **(Aymara representative 8-ADI North).** The ADI is not, in this sense, meeting the criteria of 'can do' proposed by the CLEAR model, this means, is not allowing the local actors to access the resources and knowledge that the participatory processes require.

In this context, the recognition of participation of local Aymara communities is considered as *"a historical debt. After they rob us, they rejected us and so on, now they say 'ok, I recognise you'. This is only because of the Convention 169, which is an international convention. (…) The Chilean government obstructs this recognition with its laws"* **(Aymara representative 1 and camelid breeder, ADI North).** This limited participation can be described as a participatory performance (Clarke et al. 2015), with procedures that do not drive the social changes that indigenous communities expect. It functions to keep the status quo by relieving conflicts between the state and the local communities. This status quo is not an expression of a natural organisation, but, from a decolonial perspective, the status quo was built through a colonial process that defined the distribution of power among the conquerors and the dominated cultures. This affects the system of power, knowledge and being.

In addition, the fact that ADI's formal institutions do not foster the traditional Aymara organisations and traditions is linked with the category of "enable to" proposed by the CLEAR model. This refers to the local context of participation, including other actors and organizations. Enable to aims to analyse to what extent a policy promotes the collective participation and civic infrastructure reinforce and support the connections among different organisations of indigenous people in the territory. Under this category, it is possible to say that ADI North tends to divide the local organisations, as its formal institutions demand local leaders and organisations to unfold their actions in two levels.

It should be noted that from a decolonial perspective, the question of the distribution of power is closely linked to the constant struggle for recognition of indigenous peoples by the Chilean state (Gundermann Kroll et al. 2003; Bengoa 2008). This is consistent with the views of the interviewees, who claimed that historically there has been a cultural barrier between the Chilean state and indigenous communities, based on discrimination and non-recognition of indigenous knowledge and traditions. As an example, leaders point out that being recognised by public services for their leadership and knowledge is a constant struggle. They

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mention, for example, that they have been asked to educate themselves on issues related to public administration, because their traditional knowledge has not been considered sufficient validation according to government institutions.

A different phenomenon is when the communities break the formal institutional frame of participation by leading protests and demonstrations to collectively pressurise the state – or when they announce potential actions as a political tactic – in order to achieve demands, as a as a way of bypassing the institutional arrangements that may hinder their achievements.

The CLEAR model, specifically the category of 'like to', can be useful in this analysis. 'Like to' refers to the fact that people will be more engaged with the participation when they have sense of attachment and identity. In ADI, the formal incorporation of the indigenous communities was not implemented in consideration of the traditional Aymara organisations, but they were replaced by others created by the state. This created and overlapping in the traditional organisations and the bureaucratic institutional arrangements that the communities have to meet to keep their formal relationship with the state. In this context, local identity of Aymara communities can be freely expressed in an authentic way in the festivities and rituals. These are informal institutions that allow Aymara communities the production and reproduction of their identity and traditional organisation of life. Since the festivities are informal arrangements, they are valid as concrete practices, but they are not explicitly recognised by the ADI. Thus, the promotion of identity is a responsibility that have been taken by local communities informally, without direct support from the ADI.

### 7.4.2 Centralised and hierarchical shape of the ADIs: participation in a context of coloniality.

The centralisation of decision-making processes is a concrete factor that affects the insufficient influence of indigenous peoples in the institutional process of ADI policy. According to Delamaza (2011) the centralisation of the country is rooted in the origins of the Chilean society, which was built as part of the Spanish empire, in a process of conflict and war with the local inhabitants of the territory.

Consistently with this, until now formal institutions set limits for communities to reproduce the local subjectivity, as *"judges legislate according to their own criteria, the criteria of the white world, of the western world. (...) One issue that we have to resolve is the decriminalisation of the coca leaves, free transit between Bolivia, Peru, Chile. If today I bring three leaves of coca, I'll be punished and it's over. So, we are under the tutelage of the western world"* ***(Aymara representative 4, ADI North)****.* During the meetings related with ADI, the interaction is centralised on the bureaucratic perspective instead of being a space of expression of local identities. One policy manager mentioned that ADI was actually proposed as a response to the centralisation of decision-making, aimed at rebalancing the power: *"the original idea of ADI gave relevance and power to the communities, but they create programmes at the national level and are not able to regionalise the national programmes from here* [extreme North of Chile] *to Punta Arenas* [extreme south of Chile]*. (…) They should be formulating policies from their desks"* ***(Cornelio Chipana, Policy Manager, ADI-North).*** This quote highlights the tension of integrating different knowledges, not only those related to indigenous communities, but also those that come from local policy manager.

To understand this, this section will present the themes identified by the comparative analysis of the two cases, emphasising the patterns that represent similarities and differences between these two experiences. The **first theme refers to the structure of the ADI.** According to critical institutionalism, institutional processes operate at the intersection of actors' agency and the contexts that institutions face (Cleaver 2002). The two case studies show that the shape of the ADIs is represented by a strong centre of decision-making, framed by bureaucratic arrangements which limit the scope and subjects which can be discussed by those who participate in the local areas, where the policy managers and communities are located. This shape is consistent with a vertical colonial structure, where decisions are not discussed, but are imposed by the elites onto the communities. This policy shape leads to the **second theme,** which focuses on what social change is possible to achieve through ADI policy. Regardless of the existence of bureaucratic arrangements that mandate the participation of the communities in certain decisions, the interaction offered by these spaces for the actors involved is not effective in driving or affecting the social change process in the territories where ADI is implemented.

From an institutional view, the centralised shape of the ADI is a 'filter' of peoples'' demands, that usually excludes the demands for the recovery of lands and self-determination, which correspond to the manipulation level of the ladder of participation proposed by Arnstein (1969), as the spaces is framed as participatory, but it is used to validate the state's actions. Here, the ADI makes a difference, as it is based on a process of local participation in the territories, coordinating different local communities, municipalities and political actors. This enables the circulation of information between diverse spaces. However, this process primarily enables the flow of information rather than decision-making, so it does not affect the hegemonic spaces of power which remain controlled by the state. Also, in the case of the ADI Council, there are few attempts to work towards a unified body of demands, but rather it develops, according to the interviewees, as a space for discussion around specific problems in each locality and the possibilities that each service has, within the framework already structured, to respond to them. In this framework, the law and policies are not flexible, considering that it is a defined ADI territory. Likewise, there is not a prioritisation of the budget to address local factors such as climate, distance or population shortages that translates into a constant struggle for social profitability from the investment.

According to the analysis, the barriers to concrete decisions have been made within the participatory spaces, as the core of bureaucratic arrangements that frame these spaces conflict with the local demands of cultural recognition, self-determination, and access to the management and ownership of lands and natural resources. In this context, actions to achieve social change and the redistribution of power come from outside the formal framework. Considering this, it is important to pay attention to the demands raised by the communities, considering their specific condition as indigenous. In both cases, recovering dispossessed lands and managing local resources appear as the cornerstone of the communities' demands. At the same time, these demands are the hardest for the Chilean state to fulfil. Regarding the above, critical institutionalism pays special attention to the relationship between the dynamics of institutions, actors, natural resources and daily life, as management arrangements help to understand elements of social justice (Cleaver 2002; Cleaver and De Koning 2015).

Resources also refer to the knowledge that citizens need to access the spaces of participation. In this regard, ADI set formal institutions of participation to guarantee the democratic process and representation of communities' demands. These institutions are an expression of the representative democracy that frames the political process in Chile. In this sense, Aymara communities are required to adapt their traditional political organisation to this western approach. In this process, the traditional political knowledge of local communities is not recognised as a valid resource by ADI. As a consequence, leaders have to develop the knowledge that the ADI demands, so as to exercise their role. Likewise, communities have to learn the bureaucratic language so as to apply for public projects and to have resources to adapt themselves to formal institutions requirements. This is the case of the application for public projects, where "*who wasted her time to go to the meetings wins the grants every year. The same person. But the lady who can't come down from the highlands because she has to look after her animals just can't apply for the grants. She doesn't like to do paperwork, doesn't know how to do it, so she never awards the grants*". ***(Aymara representative VLM-North)***.

From the indigenous perspective, the encounter between the state and Aymara and Mapuche communities **does not promote social change**, as in both cases, the 'responded to' element has not been identified to identify outcomes that indicate a transformation of the institutional framework. From the critical institutional approach, this means that the process of participation limits communities' possibilities of reshaping the institutional framework in both the bureaucratic and the socially embedded arrangements. Something similar happens to actors who work for the state as policy managers. Formally, they are not invited, or 'asked to' transform the policy, according to their experience facing the local contexts. Informally, they actually can, in general, make some decisions in defining the strategies to promote the participation of indigenous communities. However, the scope of their decision-making power does not go further than the limits already defined by the bureaucratic arrangements. In this sense, playing by the formal rules – the law, the policy, attending the meetings – does not guarantee that local communities will be listened to.

In terms of participation, according to the CLEAR model, outcomes are the evidence of the consideration of citizens perspectives by the organisations involved. This is analysed under

the category of "responded to", which refers to the capacity of institutions to respond to the people's voice. In the implementation of ADI, these outcomes should be culturally relevant and coherent with the promotion of self-determination. However, an Aymara representative mentioned that the ADI policy has resulted in some actions being taken, "*there is no interest in evaluating these projects and seeing if they are good or not, or if they can be improved."* **(Indigenous Community Representative 8, ADI Alto Andino-North)**. In other words, there are no formal institutions to check if the ADI is responding to the local demands.

**7.5 Conclusions of the chapter**

Despite the fact that ADI policy operates under bureaucratic arrangements that aim for the development of indigenous territories and the participation of indigenous communities, its implementation is full of contradictions and challenges, especially in relation to the recognition of indigenous' self-determination.

Here, the agency of local actors can make changes in the territories, but only inside the boundaries structurally defined by the bureaucratic arrangements. From the Serrano's categories, indigenous communities can 'use the programme', rather than 'influence the programme'. In the case of the ADI South, using the programme involves as well managing the programme, albeit only in informal spaces, not recognised by the government. About the question 'what participation is for?, also part of the analytic matriz of partipation, it seems to be there is some consistency between the formal rules that promote self-determination of indigenous communities – corresponding to citizen control (Arnstein 1969) or empowerment participation (Serrano 1998 ) – with the goals of local communities. However, in the middle there are other bureaucratic arrangements obstructing these goals. Centralization in the use of power, lack of budget and even the rejection in implementing the policy are examples of this. As a result, levels of participation reach the tokenism (Arnstein 1969) or instrumental (Serrano 1998).

The role of the institutions and bricoleurs who are obstructing achieving high levels of participation were analysed from the CLEAR model, which indicated that ADI policy tends no to offer the resources – 'can do' criteria– to promote transformations in the implementation of local services, which impacts how the policy 'respond to' the communities demands. In

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the ADI North, local communities are 'asked to' participate by official bodies, in this case, CONADI. This helps to validate the ADI as a space of dialogue with the state. However, the lack of outcomes debilitates the engagement of local communities. In the ADI South, the invitation to participate comes directly from the Mapuche representatives, process that has been effective in engage communities – 'like to' criteria -. In this case, the lack of formal recognition of the process of implementation of the policy from the official bodies, is a factor that negatively impact the possibilities of access to the resources to implement wider participation, and to 'respond to' local demands.

Considering 'bricolage' is a concept that refers to the action of actors deploying strategies to shape policy, the fact that indigenous representatives have developed a role that combines elements from their cultural traditions with the requirements of local policies makes them bricoleurs at the local level. This unique representation of their role in the policy as well in their communities allows them to adapt the policy, and even to reconfigure the concept of participation, to the local contexts. However, the institutional process is strongly controlled by bureaucratic arrangements defined by the top level of decision-making. The thickness of these arrangements contrasts with the thinness of the arrangements that operate in the territory, which are permeable enough to integrate local dialogues into the ADI, at least in the North. At the same time, they are too weak to push the borders of the local layers, affecting the shape of the policy. In this sense, the incapacity of the ADI to offer a frame that enables local actors to make changes beyond the local level, makes this policy a strategy which reproduces colonial inequalities and asymmetric relationships between the indigenous communities and the Chilean state. These inequalities are expressed, according to the interviewees, in the lack of access to power in local decisions, the non-recognition by the policy of the indigenous political tradition as valid and, since social change is not achieved from an indigenous perspective, the conditions of life are still precarious in both territories. In this sense, power, knowledge and being are three factors that, drawing on the concept of the colonial matrix of power (Quijano 2000b), are essential to understanding the configuration and expression of current colonial relations. This is related to the research question about how, from the decolonial context, the participation that takes place in ADIs reconfigures the power relationships between the local actors involved.

# Chapter 8. Conclusions

This thesis has presented an analysis of the participatory processes of indigenous peoples in the ADI policy. In Chile, citizen participation in policies has been a long-term challenge for the state, particularly from the beginning of the 1990s, when the country re-stablished democracy after 17 years of dictatorship under the authoritarian government of Pinochet. Along with the election of the national political representatives, creating rules to frame and encourage the participation of communities and social organisations have been identified as clear legacies of authoritarian and centralised recent Chilean history. In the case of the inclusion of indigenous communities in the democratization post-dictatorship, an important outcome was Indigenous Law 19.253 enacted in 1993 and, as part of this law, the ADI policy. This policy aims to promote  development in conformity with the demographic of local identities, their specific characteristics, demands and expressions of indigenous organisation, so as to enhance the indigenous peoples' capacities and their self-management within strategies of development (Corporación Nacional de Desarrollo Indígena 2020).

How has this development impacted on the participation of indigenous communities and what other factors are affecting their participation? To respond to this, this thesis adopted an institutional perspective, founded on the new institutional and critical institutionalist angles, in order to integrate the interactions between institutions and the contexts in which they operate. This theory permitted to analyse the formal and informal rules that frame this policy and these effects in the participation of the local Aymara and Mapuche communities. From the critical institutionalist perspective, institutions are immersed in a dynamic called institutional bricolage, whereby actors at different stages – across time and territorially  – craft institutions by piecing together elements, adding, re-using, reworking or refashioning their components, relevant to their contexts (Koning 2011). This is not a rationally planned process. Instead, it is based on the day to day activities of the actors involved, referred to here as bricoleurs (Cleaver 2001; Cleaver and De Koning 2015). Who has the power to shape

the institutional framework of the ADI?, and in turn, what is the impact of the institutional framework in allowing some actors to be part of the institutional bricoleurs? These are questions that are brought into the discussion around participation in this thesis.

While in the North the ADI is following defined formal rules, in the South, as a consequence of the state's withdrawal from its role in the implementation of this policy, the indigenous communities are the actors who find themselves implementing it.

These differences are an expression of the contextual influence of local actors in the institutional bricolage. In this sense, institutions are not only the expression of their formal rules, likewise changes across the institutional process cannot be reduced to distortions that actors introduce to the starting plan, making it fail. Instead, from the critical institutionalist perspective it is possible to understand that institutions are, in fact, the conjuncture between social embedded arrangements – based on cultural, social and personal configurations – and bureaucratic arrangements – formal rules explicitly defined.

Thus, this standpoint was helpful for observing and analysing how bureaucratic and socially embedded arrangements – traditionally known as formal and informal institutions –impact of the participation of actors involved. Particularly, this analysis addresses the first two research questions: What are the institutional arrangements – formal and informal – in participatory processes and practices in ADI policy?; and how does institutional bricolage affect participatory processes and practices in ADI policy? From here, four main conclusions were drawn.

The first conclusion pertains to the inherent weakness of bureaucratic arrangements in achieving social change. As explained in Chapter 4, the implementation of the ADI in the North is framed by the ADI Council. This has been essential in the organisation of the local spaces of participation derived from this ADI. In this sense, the ADI has framed the encounters between different local actors – potentially bricoleurs – following the bureaucratic arrangements designed by the law but adapting them by including locally designed strategies according to specific needs. For instance, attending to the big distances between peoples' houses and between different villages, the ADI Council established other local spaces of dialogue for residents and their representatives – the pre-assemblies – and

also included meeting with the relevant social services according to specific demands identified – the assemblies. This speaks to an implementation process highly driven by bureaucratic arrangements explicitly defined by the policy and by the local rules.

Despite the above, the data show a notable imbalance between the demands of the communities and the outcomes achieved by the ADI policy. This is expressed by the continuing depopulation of the territory, as a consequence of a lack of work and educational opportunities and the harsh living conditions of life. In the South, the weakness of the bureaucratic arrangements is expressed in the lack of implementation of the policy by the responsible actors. In response of this, the communities reconceptualised their role as clients, starting a process of organisation in order to recover the policy and becoming themselves the main managers of the policy. However, the bureaucratic arrangements are, still, not sufficient to support this process.

With bureaucratic arrangements that are insufficient to achieve the local communities' demands and to implement process coherent with the participatory aims pursued by the Indigenous Law and Convention 169, the question that emerges is why have these arrangements not been adapted? The answer is brought by the second conclusion, related to the thickness of the institutional arrangements. From the critical institutionalist perspective, bricolage is a process whereby institutions are "blending, layering and piecing together" (Cleaver and De Koning 2015, p.7) in order to develop 'thickness', making them resistant over time. In this sense, the ADI policy may be seen as an expression of changes to the bureaucratic arrangements, which are increasingly oriented towards fostering participation and self-determination among indigenous peoples. However, as was mentioned, the lack of relevant outcomes evidences the fact that the inclusion of the new formal institutions that promote indigenous peoples' participation has not permeated the daily practices of policy makers involved in the ADI. There is, here, an incoherence between the formal arrangements that aim towards fostering participatory practices, and the informal ones, which persist in the exclusion of indigenous peoples in the decision-making process.

Interestingly, the 'layering' process has allowed indigenous communities to resist coloniality emanating from formal and informal institutions. In the light of historical institutionalism, it

is possible to say that the installation of the state in the current Chilean territory – around the year 1550 – occurred in a context of conquer and domination from the Spanish crown over indigenous people, by using violence and force (Dussel 1992). The structures of domination did not change, and moreover, were only deepened when the Chilean state was consolidated post-independence, developing a process of internal colonisation (Gutiérrez 2004; Tully 2008; Turner 2018), where new elites replaced the external ones, and they developed new expressions of asymmetries of power against indigenous peoples.  In this sense, the Chilean state has followed the historical pattern of oppressing the indigenous ancestral institutions which have framed political and social participation, by replacing them with the new ones. For instance, although Aymara and Mapuche communities have political authorities that have remained over the years, the formal institutions associated with the ADI required the election of new representatives, under rules set by the state. However, and although the old indigenous institutions have not been formalised under the bureaucratic arrangements, they have still endured. Moreover, indigenous leaders have played a role of putting together these old institutions with the newer ones established by the state. Here, the analysis based only on the structured side obscures the possibilities of bricoleurs having to achieve their interests at the daily life level of the institutions.

Given this thick institutional process in the ADI, which complicates making changes even when the weakness of the bureaucratic arrangements, the bricolage is made by actors – policy managers and indigenous representatives – who have the individual agency and interest in shaping the institutions. To achieve this, these actors went beyond their formal role, in order to interpret the bureaucratic arrangements and use them at the service of local interests. In this sense, the weakness of the bureaucratic arrangements framing the participation is clearly expressed once again, by the fact that they do not even consider addressing local initiatives. Regarding the above, in the ADI Alto Andino in the North of the country, as seen in chapter 4, this is exemplified by the actors involved in health services, who even before the enactment of Convention 169 and the definition of the territory as an ADI, were already promoting formal arrangements to incorporate indigenous health into their offer. To achieve this, some policy managers adapted the formal framework of that period to claim that part of their role was to provide services with cultural relevance. Another example here comes from one of the local councils, where since the mayor was part of the

indigenous population of the territory, the local decisions were made coherently with indigenous knowledge, to some degree, incorporated. In this case, as in the first one, the incorporation of the indigenous perspective hinges on individual will rather than with the prevailing bureaucratic arrangements. It is important to say that these two examples are held in the ADI territory, but they are not direct outcomes of this policy. In the case of ADI Puel Nahuelbuta in the South of the country, the ADI's arrangements were not implemented by local policy managers, who using their power, decided not to consider the ADI policy in their actions. In this context, the indigenous communities, through their representatives and by means of an autonomous decision, decided to implement the policy, beyond the bureaucratic arrangements that place the responsibility of implement the ADI. with the state

Primarily, the story so far has been told from the perspective of the institutionalism literature, specifically, the new and critical institutionalist strands. Despite the significance of the institutional perspective, to respond to the research question 'given the decolonial context, to what extent does ADI policy promote equality of relationships between indigenous peoples and other actors?', it was also necessary to re-tell the story from a different perspective. In particular, this thesis proposes a decolonial turn, which takes account of the colonial matrix of power. This has been conceptualised as an institutional arrangement that supported the domination of indigenous communities expressed in the colonisation of power, knowledge and being (Quijano 2000b; Mignolo 2007a).

It should be noted that this thesis does not pursue developing a dichotomic discussion between the new institutional and the decolonial, hence, the decolonial turn in the analysis did not replace or surpass the institutional one. Moreover, it was used as an anchor to link the general institutional analysis with the specific historical background that until the current days is affecting the relationship between indigenous communities and the states. According to Mignolo (2007a), the expressions of the colonial period in contemporary societies is referred to as coloniality and, together with Quijano (2000b), they propose that the current exclusion that affects the position of indigenous peoples in Latin-America have been broadly addressed by the decolonial perspectives. The colonisation process started during the XVI set the bases of the asymmetries between indigenous peoples and the State as a tool of

dominant people to keep their position of power (Quijano 2000b). Thus, democracies coexist with current expressions of colonisation.

In this context, in order to respond to the question about the distribution of power in the context of the implementation of the ADI, one of the main obstacles is the hierarchy of spaces for decision-making, which create problems in coordinating the different services and the weak formal framework which promote this coordination. The coordination is a weakness also between the spaces of participation implemented in the territories. Each one works on a very limited space – health, education, economic development, and others – without relevant dialogue between them.

Another factor that affects the distribution of power is the unresolved differentiation between the universal access to rights and the indigenous peoples as a specific group of the population, with particular demands. As Quijano states, the modern nation states homogenises the population, in order to exercise its power based on the democratic and shared participation of citizens (Quijano 2014). In principle, this allows citizens to access to equal rights, but at the same time, it dissolves the particularities and subjectivities (Santos 1991), which affects the specific demands of indigenous peoples. In this sense, for social services, the category of vulnerability and poverty tend to hide the category of Aymara or Mapuche and its particularities. Thirdly, the lack of a clear intercultural formal framework in the ADI has a negative impact on this process, as the indigenous perspectives are obscured by the perspective of the State. In this sense, indigenous policy managers are an informal factor in distributing power. Their knowledge of bureaucracy, social policy and the indigenous perspective is a bridge between the ADI and communities. Additionally, the historical relationship between the indigenous communities and the State as an institution is not attended to. In this regard, the current relationship between the communities involved in the ADI and the Chilean state has colonial origin, as the state was set up in the territory as part of the process of domination over the lands, the knowledge, the political organisation and the management of the resources.

A third conclusion is that since participation is conceptualised as the power to shape institutions that some actors may have, both cases show a loose institutional framework in the promotion of participation of indigenous communities. In this sense, the institutional

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process is highly concentrated at the top levels of decision-making spaces. The ADI is framed by institutional arrangements that, given the coloniality of the current relationships between indigenous communities and the state, are insufficient in promoting the distribution of power among the actors involved. In the two cases, the distribution of power is dominated by the Chilean state. This means, that the state is the organism that defines the borders and scope of the participatory practices. While the communities follow these rules, their achievements will be limited to operating within the current asymmetrical and coloniality influenced distribution of power. To redistribute power and get their demands considered, communities and policy managers use social embedded arrangements, which are based on their own agency.

Finally, it is possible to conclude that participation has a direction from the bottom to the top. In chapter six the metaphor of the Russian doll was used to illustrate the shape that participation in the ADI follows. At the centre, there are wider spaces for shaping the institutions. In the North, this shaping refers to the design of methodologies to reach people to collect and construct the local demands. In the South, participation is expressed by the process of shaping the structure of spaces for dialogue among Mapuche people, whose power hinges on the pressure of the community by using informal methods of protest. However, the centralisation of the processes of decision-making leaves the indigenous communities at the margins of the higher levels of power.

Along the previous lines it is also possible to summarise some of the general contributions of this research. Firstly, it takes into consideration the six key points to understand the new institutional perspective offered by Lowndes (2001, p.1958) – it has focussed on rules; integration of the informal dimension of institutions; conceptualisation of institutions as a dynamic rather than a static process, validation of value-critical analysis, the consideration of a disaggregated idea of institutions; and the relevance of developing embedded analysis. The incorporation of the decolonial turn specifically pertinent to Chile developed in this thesis contributes in two of those elements.

In particular, the author claims new institutionalism turns from the analysis of the formal conception of institutions to an informal one (Lowndes 2001, p.1958). This extended concept of the institutional phenomena is helpful in the study of the 'raw materials' from which

formal institutions are formed, as well as the institutions which coexist in harmony or tension, with the formal ones (Lowndes 2001). Likewise, Santos (2010a), in his proposal of the sociology of absences, states that the decolonial project is an attempt to recognise knowledge from the margins, which because of their conflict with the dominant western-centred knowledge, has been actively invisibilised, but not entirely exterminated. Therefore, the role of the sociology of these emergences is to bring back these bodies of knowledges so as to build an ecology of knowledge, where a plurality of perspectives is required. Complementarily, Mignolo (2002; 2007a) sustains that the colonial matrix of power set during the colonial period in Latin America, has been permanently reproduced until the current days and expressed as coloniality, refers to the displacement of one institutional system – the precolonial one, ancestrally embedded in the indigenous traditions – with a new one, oriented to reconfiguring power, knowledge and being, in the context of colonisation.

What this thesis has contributed is to link these both strands, the new institutionalist and decolonial perspective, so as to understand that those informal institutions which frame the Aymara and Mapuche communities, have been "informalised", as a product of the persistently colonial relationship with the Chilean state. The Chileanisation of the Northern territory, the prohibition of the use of traditional language and its replacement by Spanish, militarisation and even the drift (Streeck and Thelen 2005; Thelen and Conran 2016)or rejection of implementing the ADI policy in the South, are all examples of the active actions which aim to maintain at all costs the social embedded institutions of the indigenous communities outside the formal realm. Here, the relevance of new institutional theory here is to pay attention to this informal dimension of the institutional processes, as there are effective rules-in-use regulating the social life of indigenous communities. Moreover, the incorporation of decolonial theory permits an understanding of how the differentiation between formal and informal institutions has implications in the distribution of power between the actors, as some of them are in control of what can be expressed as a mandatory rule, and what can be left as a discretionary. That is the case of the participatory processes, where consideration of communities' demands is contingent upon the frequently mentioned political will of the state's bricoleurs.

In this respect, a second element of the new institutional theory which this thesis contributes to is the embeddedness of the analysis, which refers, according to Lowndes (2001), to the transition from abstract and unrooted analysis to a contextual and situated one. She argues that embeddedness can be addressed from different perspectives, such as path dependence for historical institutionalism, or nested institutions from the rational choice angle (Lowndes 2001, p.1960). In the case of this thesis, the embeddedness of institutional analysis is present in the concept of coloniality and the colonial matrix of power as an institutional expression. In this sense, the decolonial turn can be considered as a sub-category of historical institutionalism and, in particular, of embeddedness understood as a path dependence. However, the decolonial turn pursued by this thesis focuses not only on the structural level of analysis, in terms of finding persistent patterns along the time that permits to understand the current institutional configurations. Moreover, along with acknowledging the relevance of the historical background, the inclusion of decolonial theory in the institutional analysis through the use of the colonial matrix of power deepens the analysis of institutional processes in contexts marked by the colonial heritage.

In particular, the findings of this thesis highlight the expression of coloniality in the institutional framework of ADI in terms of power, knowledge and being. In terms of power, this refers to the participation that bricoleurs have in the process of shaping the institutional process of the ADI. Taking the idea of Chileanisation held in the northern territory at the beginning of the 20th, it is possible to talk about a Chileanisation, today in formal institutions of the ADI as an extension of that, as the invitation to participate, is but under rules set by the state. From the institutional perspective, this can be linked with the idea of "displacement" proposed by Streeck and Thelen (2005, p.19), which states that institutional change can be triggered by a literal invasion – and not only a metaphorical one – in the cases where indigenous institutions and practices are invaded and replaced by foreign powers.

In the case of the ADI, its formal rules reject the traditional exercise of power of the indigenous communities, whose traditional authorities are not recognised by the ADI as being valid voices. Instead, the communities have to elect westernised representatives – elected according to the democratic rules of western societies but neglecting the traditional requirements that the communities have validated – that replace the traditional leaders, to

convey their demands in the formal spaces of implementation of the policy. The duplication of authorities and the informalisation of the traditional political organisation of the communities is a demonstration of control of power by the state, throughout their civil servants. The concentration of power is not only in the state in general, but mostly at the top level of decision-making spaces of the policy, in particular, with the *Intendente* as a representative of the President of the Republic in the territory, and the head of the services, who make the decisions for the ADI territories, usually in the capital city of the country. In this context, the ADI is a space of dialogue in the North more than a real space for decision and policymaking. In the South, contrary to what is defined by the formal rules, the ADI is a space of contention, where the state and the communities continually dispute its control.

The coloniality of knowledge is the second element of the colonial matrix of power, that permits observation of the institutional effects of state dominance over the indigenous communities in the context of the ADI policy. The findings of this thesis demonstrate that coloniality is expressed in the need for indigenous representatives to learn the bureaucratic and technical language of the policy, so as to exercise their roles, as traditional knowledge is not valid in the design of policies and solutions. Therefore, dialogue is usually one-sided, expressed by the participants of the thesis who expressed that the services have always everything decided in advance, communities usually do not understand what the authorities are saying, or the need for ADI indigenous representatives to receive training in order to exercise their role correctly. This coloniality of knowledge has a historical background. It was frequently mentioned by the participants that the role of the Chilean state in giving continuity to and deepening the replacement of language, religion, land use, political and decision-making procedure, among other traditional knowledge of the Aymara and Mapuche institutional arrangements, by new institutions to regulate social life. As a consequence, the old traditional knowledge of the indigenous communities is deemed no longer valid as a resource for the institutional bricolage. Instead, the dominant knowledge based on the technique and, as a policy manager stated, on the Cartesian philosophy is used in the formal spaces of decision making related to the ADI. The indigenous knowledge has not disappeared but has been relegated to informal spaces.

Taking into account that embeddedness can be understood from a variety of perspectives (Lowndes 2001), it is possible to say that the theoretical development of decolonial institutionalism enriches the current new institutional perspectives, i.e sociological, historical, rational choice (Hall and Taylor 1996a) and even feminist institutionalism (Lowndes 2020), constituting a further line of research which arises from this research. In particular, at the light of the findings of this thesis, further develop of this framework need to consider at least these three elements:

- *Not the one and the other, but moreover, the power relationships involved in the interaction between formal and informal institutions:* Lowndes (2001) is clear in stating out that new institutionalism, as opposed to the vulgar, addresses both, the formal and the informal rules. For a decolonial institutionalist analysis, the interaction between formal and informal institutions, from the perspective of power relationships, permits to understand how the interaction of them allows certain actors can most effectively achieve their goals. As Helmke and Levitsky mention, "we must posit and test hypotheses about how informal rules shape formal institutional outcomes" (2004, p.734) since, the overlapping of formal and informal rules not only responds to a neutral evolving process but, moreover, to a power game between actors. For example, in the case of the indigenous communities that participated in this thesis, the lack of formal recognition of their old institutions can benefit the status quo regarding the dispossession of lands, making formally invalid the indigenous demands.

- *Relationship between the structural level of institutions and agency of actors:* how coloniality can be rooted in a formative moment and expressed on historical patterns, as well as it is shaped by specific bricoleurs. In this sense, formal and informal colonial institutions are embedded, reproduced and resisted in the daily life of policies, affecting the actors' behaviours. The dual focus on structure and agency is brought into dialogue with intersectional studies, where coloniality is expressed in the intersection of race, gender, class, and sexuality, as studied by Lugones (2011; 2016), Crenshaw (1989; 1991), among other scholars. This is relevant for further studies of the ADIs and other policies affecting the Chilean and indigenous interaction. Furthermore, the recognition of the coloniality in the different layers of the social life is relevant as well to understand other contexts apparently distant, from a geopolitical or temporal perspective, from historical colonial patterns, but

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which, nevertheless, can embrace a bricolage that has specific colonial expressions. This may be the case in urban contexts, as well as in the Global North, where coloniality is the product of more complex, deeper and harder to trace trajectories, than in the case of IDAs. Current topics that can be linked with the decolonial institutionalism are, for example, the case of Brexit and its colonial links (Koegler et al. 2020), the natural resource management processes (Nadasdy 2007), or the colonialism in the digital era (Goel 2021).

- *Not only what to understand, but also how to understand the rules of the coloniality:* The above points raise the challenge of incorporating colonial analysis not only in the object and subject of study, but also in the forms of production of valid knowledge, this means, the research methodologies. Understanding the informality of the frameworks that regulate social relations often involves exploring into the unsaid, especially when these institutions are, to use Helmke & Levitsky's categories (2004), in a relationship of divergence and even competition with formal rules. A decolonial institutionalist perspective should also raise challenges in developing research methodologies, as coloniality in social policies is an object of study, as well as representing a configuration of power defined by the superiority of western knowledge over "other" knowledge (Mignolo 2002; Santos 2010a; Santos 2011; Tuhiwai Smith 2012), such as the indigenous ways of understanding, which have been systematically marginalized and/or ignored.

From the decolonial perspective, along the chapters it was mentioned the relevance of using a specific theoretical approach to analyse the asymmetries in the power relationships that negatively affects the indigenous communities. In this sense, ADI, as a policy that affects indigenous peoples, not only define the object of study, but also the perspective from which the institutional analysis will be embedded. The decolonial project, as mentioned, pursues the validation of the knowledges from the margins, usually ignored or rejected by the dominant spaces of production of knowledges. In this context, to explore decolonial methodologies is a challenge for futures lines of research emerging from this thesis. An option to explore might be, for example, the sociology of the images developed by Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui (2005; 2010a; 2012), whose proposal stresses that, given the colonialism imbricated in the language and rhetoric, the interpretation of images and visual register permits to understand the colonialism and how communities live it and resist it.

Along with the contributions, looking back to the process of research, it is possible to recognize that this thesis also opens some new gaps or limitations that rise challenges for further studies. Among them, it seems relevant the inclusion of more central government actors linked to ADI. In light of the analysis, it was a consensus about the centralisation of the power in the central levels of the decision-making spaces, usually located in the capital city of the country. Having a closer approach to these actors would have been helpful in understanding the factors behind the concentration of power outside the territories where the ADI is implemented.

Methodological challenges are also relevant from the perspective of the new institutional theories. This perspective attempts to incorporate the informal dimension into studies of institutional processes. However, the thesis was conservative in terms of its methodological design. In further studies, exploring a decolonial institutionalism should be accompanied by a revision of the study methodologies. In this sense, it is not only about the perspective from which the phenomena are captured, but also about the means through which information is produced and analysed. In this vein, including an ethnographical approach can be helpful to disclose the informality and unspoken rules. Political ethnography, which focuses on the interpretation of politics in everyday life from the perspectives of bricoleurs, such as elites and street-level bureaucrats (Bevir and Rhodes 2015; Rhodes and Corbett 2020) can be a useful approach. Additionally, institutional ethnography (Smith 2003; Smith 2005; Prodinger and Turner 2013; Walby 2013) can be explored for further institutional analysis, as this is a methodology that through the analysis of mixed methods, such as interviews, observations and secondary data analysis, focuses on institutions as a living practice.

Another gap that this study has brought, is the study of the asymmetries in power relationships, resulting from colonial processes, which can be expanded to other contexts. ADI addresses the indigenous communities that inhabit some Chilean territories; however, it would be also relevant to study how policies of this country and other regions of the world associated to areas such as education, health, migration, gender and others, may also be intersected by the colonial dynamics that operate in the configuration of power relationships.

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Finally, it is relevant to mention that after an intense social uprising in Chile during October 2019, the country is in the middle of a process of re-writing the constitution to replace the one imposed by the civil-military dictatorship in 1980 (Benedikter et al. 2021; Escudero 2021). This process is being carried out by a constituent assembly composed of 155 members. Although the new constitution has not been finalised so far, some significant points can be highlighted with regards to indigenous issues. Firstly, in the election of representatives, along with the inclusion of gender parity, for the first time in a national democratic process in the country, ten seats for indigenous people were reserved (Senado 2020), and this constituent assembly is currently chaired by linguist and Mapuche activist woman, Elisa Loncón (Nugent 2021). Some of the debates include the constitutional recognition of indigenous people (Sanhueza 2021), and the definition of Chile as a plurinational country (Chacoff et al. 2021). It would be relevant to carry out further institutional analyses to understand to what extent this new process will bring a reconfiguration of power relationships that provides indigenous communities the possibility to shape the policies that affect them directly.

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# Appendices

## Appendix 1. Consent forms (English version)

### Consent form-focus group

To confirm your participation in this research, please tick the next statement and sign at the end of the page:

|    |    | YES | NO |
|----|----|-----|-----|
| 1. | I confirm that I have read and understood the Participant Information Sheet associated to the research Political participation in Indigenous Development Areas (IDAs) in Chile: understanding institutions in a post-colonial context. | ☐ | ☐ |
| 2. | I confirm that I have had the opportunity to ask questions about the project and if so, I have received satisfactory answers to all my questions. | ☐ | ☐ |
| 3. | I understand that my participation in the project is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw up to two months after the focus group/workshop have been undertaken, without giving reasons and without receiving any punishment. | ☐ | ☐ |
| 4. | I confirm that I was informed about the aims of the research, why I was selected as a potential participant and the use of the data. | ☐ | ☐ |
| 5. | I understand that any files containing information about me will be anonymised, will be treated as confidential and will be stored in University of Bristol password-protected computers. | ☐ | ☐ |
| 6. | I understand that the opinion that I can deliver in this collective space can be reproduced for some of the other participants. | ☐ | ☐ |
| 7. | I understand that the data that I will provide can be shared with other researchers, always assuring the confidentiality and anonymity. | ☐ | ☐ |
| 8. | I agree to provide the requested data. | ☐ | ☐ |
| 9. | I agree to participate in a focus group/workshop session. | ☐ | ☐ |

**Please sign and date here**

**Participant:**

_____    _____    _____
Name of Participant          Signature                      Date

**Researcher:**

_____    _____    _____
Name of Researcher          Signature                      Date

**If you have any questions, please call: 07414448361/ +44 (0) 117 954 5569 or email: vr16134@bristol.ac.uk**

**Consent form-Individual interview (English version)**

To confirm your participation in this research, please tick the next statement and sign at the end of the page:

|   |   | YES | NO |
|---|---|-----|-----|
| 1. | I confirm that I have read and understood the Participant Information Sheet associated to the research Political participation in Indigenous Development Areas (IDAs) in Chile: understanding institutions in a post-colonial context. | ☐ | ☐ |
| 2. | I confirm that I have had the opportunity to ask questions about the project and if so, I have received satisfactory answers to all my questions. | ☐ | ☐ |
| 3. | I understand that my participation in the project is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw up to two months after the interview has been undertaken, without giving reasons and without receiving any punishment. | ☐ | ☐ |
| 4. | I confirm that I was informed about the aims of the research, why I was selected as a potential participant and the use of the data. | ☐ | ☐ |
| 5. | I understand that any files containing information about me will be anonymised, will be treated as confidential and will be stored in University of Bristol password-protected computers. | ☐ | ☐ |
| 6. | I understand that the data that I will provide can be shared with other researchers, always assuring the confidentiality and anonymity. | ☐ | ☐ |
| 7. | I agree to provide the requested data. | ☐ | ☐ |
| 8. | I agree to participate in a interview session. | ☐ | ☐ |

**Please sign and date here**

**Participant:**

_____   _____   _____
Name of Participant          Signature                    Date

**Researcher:**

_____   _____   _____
Name of Researcher           Signature                    Date

**If you have any questions, please call: 07414448361/ +44 (0) 117 954 5569 or email: vr16134@bristol.ac.uk**

**Appendix 2 Participant information sheets- (English version)**

**Participant information sheet- Focus group**

**Political participation in Indigenous Development Areas (IDAs) in Chile: understanding institutions in a post-colonial context.**

I am a PhD student in the Social Policy Programme of the Faculty of Social Science and Law-University of Bristol, United Kingdom. My studies consist in undertaking a research, which I invite you to take part in. In this context, the present document provides essential information related to your potential participation, so as you can decide to be part or not.

**Introduction**

You are being invited to be part in the study Political participation in Indigenous Development Areas (IDAs) in Chile: understanding institutions in a post-colonial context.

The study considers three groups of people to be part in, implementers, indigenous communities and stakeholders. Specifically, as a _____ (implementer, indigenous, stakeholder), you were selected as a potential participant since your experience and link with the policy are relevant insights to understand the participatory practices.

Please, read this form so as to obtain the information that you need to decide if you agree to participate in this research. In case you have any question, please let me know to clarify any information that you can have.

**What is the purpose of the project?**

The central issue of this research is to understand the participatory practices that are developed in the implementation stage of IDAs. Thus, the overall objective of this research is to analyse the participatory practices that take place in the implementation of IDAs in Chile.

The results will be presented in a report to the University, specifically to the examiners team: supervisors and external examiners. Further publication can be done as well, such as academic papers, a book o chapter of a book, among other academic reports.

**What will happen if I take part?**

If you agree with participate in the study, you will be asked, in a group space, to answer some questions about your perspective of participation in the context of implementation of IDAs. It is expected that the focus group/workshop will take place between June and September 2018, and it will be undertaken in a single session that will lasts around two hours. The time and place where the focus group/workshop will be held should be coordinated, considering the availability and preferences of participants.

Abut confidentiality, the researcher will watch for the conditions of the place to assure that the opinions delivered during the focus group/workshop are kept among the participants. So as to assure a confident environment of discussion, I encourage you do not disclose the identities of the people if you comment the topics discussed outside the focus group/workshop. However, since this is a group session, it is not possible to guarantee this by the reseacher.

In order to assure the accuracy in the register of the information, the focus group/workshop will be recorder in a digital audio voice recorder. The recorder used will be encrypted in accordance with data protection. At the end of the process of data collection, they will be transcribed directly by the researcher. During the whole process, the audio and written files will be stored in a cloud – an on-line system to store information – provided by the University of Bristol. Only the researcher has the password to access to this on-line file.

In further documents or presentations, some of your ideas may be quoted. In these cases, your identity will be hidden to protect your identity.

**What are the benefits of taking part in the research?**

There are no explicit material benefit or payment associated to your participation in this research. Although, the outcomes reached in the process will contribute to the academic debate about participation In IDAs. Additionally, the researcher will send to the head of the

programme a specific report with the main findings associated to the participation in the local context.

**Are there any risks involved in taking part in the focus group/workshop?**

Your participation in the study does not implies physical or psychological risks. However, there may be risks associated to potential perceptions of to be pressured to answer the questions and using your valuable time to participate in the research even against your will. Also, because of the nature of the group discussion, there is the risk of the confidentiality can be infringed in case some participants disclose the topics discussed and the identity outside the focus group/workshop.

In these cases, it is important to emphasize that your participation in the research is voluntary and there will be no pressure on the part of the researcher to punish your decision of not to participate. In case you would like to express the existence of an external coax that limits the voluntary nature of your participation, feel free to share it with me and, thus, to end your participation in the study.

It should be noted that the Research Ethics Committee of the School for Social Policy – University of Bristol have approved the ethical standards of this study.

**What happens to the information I provide?**

The results of this research will be published in a document that will be read by the supervisors of the study and external examiners, all of them teachers associated to academic field. Additionally, the finding may be published in other scholar spaces, such as journals and presentations in congress. In these publications, the confidentiality will be assured, erasing any personal information that can allows your identification as an individual.

Specifically, all the transcriptions and reports will erase the name of the participants, using pseudonym instead. The documents that will be analysed will be stored separately to the storage of the data. Thus, if in the future, the data is shared with other researchers, the sensitive and personal information will still be being confidential and anonymous. and ensure that the storage of identifying 'codes' is done separately to the storage of the data.

At the end of the project data will be stored for 20 years in appropriate storage facilities.

Beside the above, it should be noted that the researcher cannot assure that other participants of the focus group/workshop may reproduce the contents discussed.

**What happens if I want to drop out of the project?**

Your consent and participation in the project are totally voluntary.

Thus, you are free to answer or not answer the questions and topics that you will be asked. You do not have to answer any question you do not want to answer.

You are free to stop your participation and withdraw of the research in any time and for any reason, up to two months after the focus group/workshop was undertaken. In any case, you will not receive any punishment associated to your decision to stop with your participation.

**Who do I contact if I want further information about the study and the focus group?**

If after this interview, you need or want to contact me for any question that you have, to inform that you do not want to participate in the study anymore, or if you consider you have had any complains associated to your participation in this research, you can write to me or directly to the main supervisor of this study.

Victoria Rivera Ugarte

PhD Student

E-mail: [vr16134@bristol.ac.uk](mailto:vr16134@bristol.ac.uk)

PhD David Sweeting

Teacher of School for Policy Studies

Supervisor of the research

E-mail: [david.sweeting@bristol.ac.uk](mailto:david.sweeting@bristol.ac.uk)

8 Priory Road,

Bristol, BS8 1TZ

**Participant information sheet- Individual interview**

I am a PhD student in the Social Policy Programme of the Faculty of Social Science and Law- University of Bristol, United Kingdom. My studies consist in undertaking a research, which I invite you to take part in. In this context, the present document provides essential information related to your potential participation, so as you can decide to be part or not.

**Introduction**

You are being invited to be part in the study Political participation in Indigenous Development Areas (IDAs) in Chile: understanding institutions in a post-colonial context.

The study considers three groups of people to be part in, implementers, indigenous communities and stakeholders. Specifically, as a _____ (implementer, indigenous, stakeholder), you were selected as a potential participant since your experience and link with the policy are relevant insights to understand the participatory practices.

Please, read this form so as to obtain the information that you need to decide if you agree to participate in this research. In case you have any question, please let me know to clarify any information that you can have.

**What is the purpose of the project?**

The central issue of this research is to understand the participatory practices that are developed in the implementation stage of IDAs. Thus, the overall objective of this research is to analyse the participatory practices that take place in the implementation of IDAs in Chile.

The results will be presented in a report to the University, specifically to the examiners team: supervisors and external examiners. Further publication can be done as well, such as academic papers, a book o chapter of a book, among other academic reports.

**What will happen if I take part?**

If you agree with participate in the study, you will be asked, in a individual space, to answer some questions about your perspective of participation in the context of implementation of IDAs. It is expected that the interview will take place between June and September 2018, and it will be undertaken in a single session that will lasts around two hours. The time and

place where the interview will be held should be coordinated, considering the availability and preferences of participants. The researcher will watch for the conditions of the place to assure the confidentiality.

Abut confidentiality, the researcher will watch for the conditions of the place to assure that the opinions delivered during the interview cannot be listened by any other person around.

In order to assure the accuracy in the register of the information, the interview will be recorder in a digital audio voice recorder. The recorder used will be encrypted in accordance with data protection. At the end of the process of data collection, they will be transcribed directly by the researcher. During the whole process, the audio and written files will be stored in a cloud – an on-line system to store information – provided by the University of Bristol. Only the researcher has the password to access to this on-line file.

In further documents or presentations, some of your ideas may be quoted. In these cases, your identity will be hidden to protect your identity.

**What are the benefits of taking part in the research?**

There are no explicit material benefit or payment associated to your participation in this research. Although, the outcomes reached in the process will contribute to the academic debate about participation In IDAs. Additionally, the researcher will send to the head of the programme a specific report with the main findings associated to the participation in the local context.

**Are there any risks involved in taking part in the interview?**

Your participation in the study does not implies physical or psychological risks. However, there may be risks associated to potential perceptions of to be pressured to answer the questions and using your valuable time to participate in the research even against your will.

In this case, it is important to emphasize that your participation in the research is voluntary and there will be no pressure on the part of the researcher to punish your decision of not to participate. In case you would like to express the existence of an external coax that limits the voluntary nature of your participation, feel free to share it with me and, thus, to end your participation in the study.

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It should be noted that the Research Ethics Committee of the School for Social Policy – University of Bristol have approved the ethical standards of this study.

**What happens to the information I provide?**

The results of this research will be published in a document that will be read by the supervisors of the study and external examiners, all of them teachers associated to academic field. Additionally, the finding may be published in other scholar spaces, such as journals and presentations in congress. In these publications, the confidentiality will be assured, erasing any personal information that can allows your identification as an individual.

Specifically, all the transcriptions and reports will erase the name of the participants, using pseudonym instead. The documents that will be analysed will be stored separately to the storage of the data. Thus, if in the future, the data is shared with other researchers, the sensitive and personal information will still be being confidential and anonymous.

At the end of the project data will be stored for 20 years in appropriate storage facilities.

**What happens if I want to drop out of the project?**

Your consent and participation in the project are totally voluntary.

Thus, you are free to answer or not answer the questions and topics that you will be asked. You do not have to answer any question you do not want to answer.

You are free to stop your participation and withdraw of the research in any time and for any reason, up to two months after the interview was undertaken. In any case, you will not receive any punishment associated to your decision to stop with your participation.

**Who do I contact if I want further information about the study and the interview?**

If after this interview, you need or want to contact me for any question that you have, to inform that you do not want to participate in the study anymore, or if you consider you have had any complains associated to your participation in this research, you can write to me or directly to the main supervisor of this study.

Victoria Rivera Ugarte

PhD Student

E-mail: vr16134@bristol.ac.uk


PhD David Sweeting

Teacher of School for Policy Studies

Supervisor of the research

E-mail: david.sweeting@bristol.ac.uk

8 Priory Road,

Bristol, BS8 1TZ

**Appendix 3: Interview guide (English version)**

**Research question 1: What are the interpretations, meanings, perceptions and objectives of participatory practices and processes that local actor have in the implementation of IDAs?**

What are the spaces of participation that IDA considers?

How can you describe the spaces of participation that IDA offer? How do they work?

What is the role that you as indigenous representative/implementer/collaborator have in these spaces?

What is the role of the other actors in these spaces?

How is the process used so as to invite people to participate in the IDA? What your opinion is about this?

Which criteria are considered in the decision-making processes related to the IDA?

Which criteria do you consider as relevant to guide your decisions as indigenous representative/implementer/collaborator, in the context of IDA?

In your opinion, how these spaces of participation should be like? Please describe the ideal space of participation that you can imagine as indigenous representative/implementer/collaborator.

What have been the main challenge in promoting participation, considering the formal framework of the policy?

Who are recognised as responsible for the decision-making process?

What to extent the traditional ways of participation of indigenous people are contributing to the implementation of IDA? Could you mention specific examples of this?

UOB Confidential

**Research question 2: From the perspectives of local actors, what factors affect the participation of indigenous people in processes of implementation of IDAs?**

What to extent formal rules, like international agreements, national law and local legislation, affect the participatory processes of actors involved in this policy?

Which other national factors affect the participatory processes of actors involved in this policy?

Which other local factors affect the participatory processes of actors involved in this policy?

How do these frameworks dialogue with the local knowledge of the indigenous people?

How the traditional political organisation of indigenous people affects the participatory processes and practices in IDA?

How the current characteristics of organisations of indigenous people affect the participatory processes and practices in IDA?

Which strategies are used to promote the collective action among indigenous organisations?

What are the resources that participation requires in this territory?

Do the resources used in the participatory processes consider the traditions of indigenous people?


**Research question 3: Given the post-colonial context, how does the participation that takes place in IDAs reconfigure the power relationships between the local actors involved?**

Which actions the indigenous people have undertaken so as to demand IDA incorporate their voices? How you as indigenous representative/implementer/collaborator faced those actions?

As indigenous representative/implementer/collaborator, how free do you think you are to introduce changes in the IDA?

How the formal rules contribute to have more or less power of decision in the context of IDA implementation?

Which actions and strategies have you been unfolded in order to overcome the institutional obstacles for participation?

Which actions have you undertaken so as to incorporate the people's voices in the policy-making process?

Which changes in IDA have been promoted by indigenous peoples?

How the national framework of IDAs faced the inclusion of these changes?

Which differences is possible to identify in the local implementation of the policies, in comparison to those that are implemented in other territories?

What are the challenge in the inclusion of indigenous people's participation in the IDA?

How do IDAs integrate the traditional ways of deliberation as valid resources for participation?

Which traditional elements of identity are considered and promoted in the participatory practices? Who are the actors that concentrate the most resources for participation?

Do you perceive feelings of exclusion or powerless by part of some groups of people in this policy? Please explain.

To what to extent the historical symbols of belonging and identity (leadership, community organization, rituals, etc.) are acknowledged by and in the IDA?

How is the selection of organisations that participate in the IDA? Are there some organisations that are not invited? Why?

What is the process of definition of roles and functions among the participants? What to extent does IDA promote the equal distribution of power among the participants? Which strategies are used to do achieve a more symmetrical participation?