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Reemployment Services and Eligibility Assessments (RESEA) in Maryland— Formative Evaluation, Program Year 2019

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**Reemployment Services and Eligibility Assessments (RESEA) in Maryland—
Formative Evaluation, Program Year 2019**

Abstract

Unemployment insurance (UI) exists to provide temporary partial wage replacement during periods of involuntary unemployment while beneficiaries are actively seeking reemployment. The reemployment effort required of UI beneficiaries, which balances the work disincentive of income replacement, ensures that UI is social insurance rather than social welfare.

In 2017, Congress appropriated funding to provide reemployment services and eligibility assessments (RESEA) to UI beneficiaries. The legislation also required that states receiving RESEA conduct annual evaluations to produce causal evidence that reemployment services and eligibility assessments are effective.

In this formative evaluation, we produce the first causal effect estimates of the Maryland RESEA program for participants in program year 2019. Using a comparison-group design and administrative microdata, we find that participation in RESEA, relative to participation in Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services (WPRS), reduces UI benefit year compensation by 0.62 weeks, reduces the probability of UI benefit exhaustion by 3.1 percentage points, and decreases the proportion of benefits received by 2.3 percentage points. We also find that RESEA increases the probability of employment in the quarter following the benefit year begin date by 1.9 percentage points but does not affect medium-run employment and earnings outcomes. Results suggest that Maryland's RESEA program successfully met its stated goal of reducing UI duration by increasing employment rates in the short term, but the program does not seem to offer a longer-term solution to improving UI beneficiaries' labor market outcomes.

Our evaluation design was driven by the available data, which include indicators of program participation but no information on referral to reemployment services programs. As in all states, Maryland assigns WPRS profiling scores, which measure the probability of UI benefit exhaustion, to all beneficiaries who are required to engage in an active search for reemployment. That is, UI beneficiaries who are neither union hiring hall members nor awaiting employer recall. Then, within each county, Maryland refers the 50 percent of UI beneficiaries determined most likely to exhaust their benefits to RESEA and the remainder to WPRS. We show, however, that distributions of profiling scores do not differ between RESEA and WPRS participants, and that observed proportions of UI benefits received are uncorrelated with profiling scores. In light of this, as a basis for this formative evaluation, we assume that assignment to RESEA or WPRS is as good as random, conditional on observable characteristics. We test the robustness of results to alternative specifications and matching models. We also estimate associations between particular UI services and UI and labor market outcomes, but selection into services received precludes causal impact estimates.

This formative evaluation sets a benchmark for Maryland RESEA program impact estimates. Together with our process analysis report, we have provided guidance for more complete and consistent recording of data on RESEA referrals, participation, and services as a basis for future

evaluations. In future years, we expect to produce increasingly informative evidence on the RESEA program, RESEA services, and efforts to improve participation by UI beneficiaries referred to RESEA.

Table of Contents

List of Figures

List of Tables

v

**Reemployment Services and Eligibility Assessments (RESEA) in Maryland—
Formative Evaluation, Program Year 2019**

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Overview of the RESEA Program

The Reemployment Services and Eligibility Assessments (RESEA) program provides unemployment insurance (UI) eligibility assessments and reemployment services to UI beneficiaries. The RESEA program has four main purposes:

1) Reduce UI duration through improved employment outcomes.
2) Strengthen UI program integrity (reduce improper payments).
3) Align with objectives of the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act (WIOA).
4) Establish RESEA as an entry point to other workforce system partners.

In 2018, Public Law 115-123 amended the Social Security Act (SSA) to establish permanent authorization for the RESEA program, enacting Section 306 of the SSA. The new SSA section requires a tiered-evidence approach for RESEA to encourage states to use evidence-based strategies, and to conduct evaluations and build evidence for other interventions and service delivery strategies.

Interventions and strategies not backed by evidence (moderate or high causal evidence rating) must be under evaluation if used as part of RESEA. About RESEA customers:

- States may develop their own methods to target groups of UI claimants for RESEA.
- RESEA is no longer limited to UI beneficiaries identified as most likely to exhaust benefits by the state Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services (WPRS) model.
- RESEA now has the flexibility to target claimants from a variety of backgrounds or lengths of time receiving UI benefits.
- However, targeted claimant populations must be supported by local labor market information, economic trends, and other available data.

RESEA must include the following services:

- UI eligibility assessment, including review of work search activities, and referral to adjudication if an issue or potential issue is identified.
- Provision of labor market and career information, customized for the claimant.
- Enrollment in Wagner-Peyser Act-funded employment services.
- Support in the development of individual reemployment plan.
- Provide information and access to reemployment services at American Job Centers (AJCs) and referrals to reemployment services and training.

The state RESEA must assure due process for UI beneficiaries:

- Procedures must be in place to provide claimants with proper notifications, including consequences of not attending.
- RESEA must reasonably reschedule services when UI beneficiaries have bona fide conflicts.
- The main outcomes measuring RESEA success are:
  - UI duration (weeks), UI cost (dollars), and UI exhaustion rate.
  - Reemployment and earnings (measured with quarterly UI wage records).

States are encouraged to propose additional outcomes that could provide early indications that the RESEA program is working as intended. Examples of outcomes that states might consider include increased participation in or completion of the RESEA program activities, or the time to reemployment following the start of RESEA interventions.

1.2 Purpose of Formative Evaluation

The U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL) stipulates in Unemployment Insurance Program Letter (UIPL) 1-20 that:

- "In carrying out a State program of reemployment services and eligibility assessments using grant funds awarded to the State under this section, a State shall use such funds only for interventions demonstrated to reduce the number of weeks for which program participants receive unemployment compensation by improving employment outcomes for program participants." (Pallasch 2019, p. 2)

- "Any intervention without a high or moderate causal evidence rating used by a State in carrying out a State program or reemployment services and eligibility assessments under this section shall be under evaluation at the time of use." (Pallasch 2019, p. 3)

In other words, a RESEA intervention (i.e., service) must have an empirically demonstrated track record of improving employment outcomes; if not—such as a novel or otherwise unproven intervention—it must be evaluated as it is delivered, including the recording of appropriate qualitative and quantitative data regarding the intervention and its beneficiaries. In conjunction with the process analysis report, this formative evaluation of RESEA in Maryland will assess its overall effectiveness, including estimating the causal effects of RESEA services, and make recommendations for improvements in data collection and service delivery as they relate to RESEA's primary objectives: UI duration, cost, and exhaustion rate, as well as reemployment and earnings.

1.3 Policy Background

1.3.1 The UI Program, RESEA, and WPRS

Foundations for the federal-state UI program were set in the Social Security Act of 1935. The main purpose of UI is to provide temporary partial income replacement during involuntary unemployment while beneficiaries are actively seeking reemployment. By 1938, all states were providing UI benefits through state programs in conformity with federal requirements.

Reemployment services to support return to work by UI beneficiaries were originally provided only by the Employment Service established under the Wagner-Peyser Act of 1933, which is funded by the federal unemployment tax. Appropriations for Wagner-Peyser employment service programs have remained flat in nominal terms since 1983, when the federal taxable wage base was last increased (Balducchi and O'Leary 2018). In real terms, Wagner-Peyser funding has fallen by more than half since that time.

The WPRS program was established in 1993 but was an unfunded mandate. Under WPRS, states offered services by using funds provided to local areas through federal job training programs (Job Training Partnership Act, Workforce Investment Act, and Workforce Innovation and Opportunities Act). The federal Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 provided statutory funding for reemployment services to UI beneficiaries through RESEA.

In 2005, USDOL offered grants to states to operate Reemployment Eligibility Assessments. Grants went to a dozen states, and USDOL supported evaluations of program effectiveness. The success of Reemployment Eligibility Assessments led to legislation establishing RESEA.

1.3.2 Interaction of RESEA with other programs

This section presents essential guidelines issued by USDOL in UIPL 8-20 (Pallasch 2020) as "Operating Guidance for Unemployment Insurance (UI) Reemployment Services and Eligibility Assessments (RESEA)" and UIPL 7-19 (Conway 2019).

The Maryland RESEA program is operated in coordination with the Maryland WPRS program. The WPRS system was established nationwide following the 1993 enactment of Public Law 103-152, which authorized WPRS under Section 303(j) of the SSA. The law requires state employment security agencies to establish and operate a system of profiling all new claimants for regular UI benefits. Profiling is designed to identify UI claimants who are most likely to exhaust their regular benefits so that they may be provided reemployment services early in their unemployment spells and make faster transitions to new employment.

States now have significant flexibility in program design and targeting UI claimants for participation. The permanently authorized RESEA program promotes and rewards new and innovative service delivery strategies and interventions. In the context of these changes and the program's potential growth in future years, states are strongly encouraged to revisit their service delivery designs, how they staff the program, and how to achieve RESEA goals most effectively. State workforce and UI agencies implementing RESEA also are encouraged to engage their State Workforce Boards to support these aims, especially in the furtherance of integrating the RESEA program into AJC service delivery and WIOA state plans.

- The WPRS system remains separate from RESEA. It is a stand-alone program authorized under Section 303(j) of the SSA.
- Historically, states operating RESEA were exempt from WPRS because participants in the two programs were the same.
- States not using the WPRS model to select customers for RESEA still must operate the WPRS program separately.

1.3.3 Maryland RESEA program and review of related research

To maintain continuous UI benefit receipt while unemployed, participation in two groups of activities is required of all RESEA-selected UI beneficiaries in Maryland. First, all RESEA-selected UI beneficiaries must participate in a group RESEA orientation session followed by two additional reemployment services from an approved list within two weeks. The other activity is a UI eligibility assessment conducted individually at the end of the group RESEA orientation. The orientation normally includes labor market information, a staff-assisted informal skills assessment, and development of an individual employment plan. For the additional services, Maryland RESEA participants may choose from résumé preparation, job interviews, referral to training, job fair participation, job search workshops, job finding clubs, adult literacy programs, reemployment skills (networking, MS Office suite), or pre-apprenticeship activities.

Many of the above services fall into the Clearinghouse for Labor Evaluation and Research category of "job search assistance services found to have favorable impacts on all outcomes." The main references on effectiveness of service bundles are Klerman et al. (2019), who examined multistate administrative data, and Michaelides and Mueser (2018), who studied random trials in Nevada.

Causal evidence of effectiveness for job search assistance in the forms of labor market information (Maryland Workforce Exchange code 107), staff-assisted assessment (108), individual employment plan (142), and résumé preparation assistance (115) was provided by Corson, Long, and Nicholson (1985) and Almandsmith, Adams, and Bos (2006). These two field experiments conducted in Charleston, South Carolina, and throughout Wisconsin involved random trials showing that reconnecting Wagner-Peyser (and workforce agency) employment services to UI beneficiaries promotes return to work and shortens durations of UI benefit receipt. Similar causal evidence is provided from another field experiment on job search assistance by Manoli, Michaelides, and Patel (2018) and from random trials in Texas by Bloom (1990). Job search assistance targeted by profiling-type models was found to be effective by Decker et al. (2000) in DC and Florida and by Dickinson et al. (1999) in a six-state study.

Causal evidence of effectiveness for individual employment plans (142) was found in Nevada, Idaho, Illinois, and Florida by Michaelides et al. (2012). Causal evidence of the effectiveness of reemployment and eligibility assessments was reported by Poe-Yamagata et al. (2011). Causal evidence of the effectiveness of reemployment workshops and job search workshops was found in the New Jersey reemployment experiment (Corson et al. 1989; Anderson, Corson, and Decker 1991; Corson and Haimson 1996). Postsecondary productivity training in Maryland is short-term job skill training, mainly in computer software like Microsoft Excel and Word. In the course of learning to use these software programs, participants also draft and improve personal résumés. Causal evidence that such short-term skill development is effective was provided in the gold-standard Workforce Investment Act evaluation (McConnell et al. 2015).

1.4 Organization of the Report

This introduction summarized the current laws governing RESEA and the evaluation mandate and provided a brief background on the UI program, the conditions that led to the establishment of RESEA, and the interactions of RESEA with other employment programs. The second section

discusses the data that were available for our analyses. It concludes with a discussion of how Maryland's WPRS profiling model—used to assign UI beneficiaries to either RESEA or WPRS—was intended to refer claimants likely to exhaust their UI benefits to RESEA but effectively functioned as a random assignment mechanism.[1] The third section discusses results from the comparison-group design evaluation, including effects of RESEA and individual services. The fourth section concludes.

2 DATA AVAILABLE FOR ANALYSIS

Our causal analysis is based primarily on Maryland program administrative data records, including UI wage records and Maryland Workforce Exchange (MWE) registration information. These administrative records contain information about UI claimants' gender, age, race, educational attainment, number of dependents, wages, UI compensation, RESEA and WPRS services received, and AJC location by county. Table 1 shows the number of UI beneficiaries in our sample, with the bottom row representing the scope of our analysis. After excluding UI beneficiaries who were monetarily ineligible, had a weekly benefit amount of 0, and who lived outside of Maryland, the administrative records yielded a total sample of 119,204 UI beneficiaries comprised of 12,932 RESEA participants, 11,925 WPRS participants, 18,093 who participated in neither program but received a profiling score, and 76,254 who did not receive a profiling score.

Table 1 Number of UI Beneficiaries, by Profiling Status and Program Participation

	RESEA	WPRS	Neither	Not profiled	Total
Full sample	13,305	12,247	18,688	102,231	146,471
Drop if monetary ineligibility	13,166	12,101	18,488	91,081	134,836
Drop if $0 WBA	13,166	12,101	18,488	91,067	134,822
Drop if outside MD county	12,932	11,925	18,093	76,254	119,204

NOTE: Number of UI beneficiaries with benefit begin dates from 5/1/18-6/30/19. "RESEA" indicates participation in RESEA, "WPRS" indicates participation in WPRS, "Neither" indicates profiled UI beneficiaries who participated in neither program, and "Not profiled" indicates UI beneficiaries who were not assigned profiling scores.
SOURCE: Authors' calculations using administrative microdata.

Table 2 displays summary statistics for UI beneficiaries. The demographic groups with the largest shares of RESEA participants were female (54 percent), Black (45 percent), and with a high school or less education (48 percent). The same attributes were the most common among WPRS participants, with 54 percent female, 51 percent Black, and 51 percent with a high school or less education. The mean age for both RESEA and WPRS participants was approximately 44 years. For those who received a profiling score but participated in neither program, the demographics were different in some respects. Male (51 percent), slightly younger (mean age of 42 years), Black (50 percent) and those with a high school education or less (57 percent) represented their most common demographics.

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[1] In Maryland, WPRS is referred to as the Reemployment Opportunity Workshop (ROW).

Table 2 Summary Statistics by Profiling Status and Program Participation

	RESEA	WPRS	t-statistic	Neither	t-statistic	Not profiled	t-statistic
Female	0.535	0.544	1.568	0.489	−7.879	0.481	−11.379
	[0.499]	[0.498]	{0.117}	[0.500]	{0.000}	[0.500]	{0.000}
Age	43.68	44.60	5.348	41.56	−13.362	40.63	−23.002
	[14.00]	[13.20]	{0.000}	[13.58]	{0.000}	[13.93]	{0.000}
White	0.426	0.390	−5.762	0.386	−7.185	0.406	−4.307
	[0.495]	[0.488]	{0.000}	[0.487]	{0.000}	[0.491]	{0.000}
Black	0.449	0.511	9.815	0.495	7.996	0.476	5.797
	[0.497]	[0.500]	{0.000}	[0.500]	{0.000}	[0.499]	{0.000}
Hispanic	0.0518	0.0319	−7.783	0.0554	1.373	0.0600	3.649
	[0.222]	[0.176]	{0.000}	[0.229]	{0.170}	[0.237]	{0.000}
<High school	0.0769	0.0781	0.356	0.0966	6.045	0.112	11.961
	[0.266]	[0.268]	{0.722}	[0.295]	{0.000}	[0.315]	{0.000}
High school	0.403	0.426	3.669	0.465	10.936	0.520	24.704
	[0.490]	[0.494]	{0.000}	[0.499]	{0.000}	[0.500]	{0.000}
Some college	0.241	0.253	2.287	0.232	−1.725	0.214	−6.642
	[0.427]	[0.435]	{0.022}	[0.422]	{0.085}	[0.410]	{0.000}
College	0.280	0.243	−6.561	0.206	−15.085	0.152	−35.937
	[0.449]	[0.429]	{0.000}	[0.404]	{0.000}	[0.359]	{0.000}
Number of dependents	0.215	0.243	3.480	0.233	2.425	0.114	−21.558
	[0.623]	[0.664]	{0.001}	[0.652]	{0.015}	[0.470]	{0.000}
Base period wage	41,966.6	40,362.5	−3.483	38043.9	−9.455	34,600.5	−24.036
	[36,790.7]	[35,715.3]	{0.001}	[35,476.1]	{0.000}	[31,385.6]	{0.000}
N	12,932	11,925		18,093		76,254	

NOTE: All t-statistics are on differences from the RESEA group. Standard deviations in square brackets. Probability values on t-tests in braces. Summary statistics of UI beneficiaries with benefit begin dates from 5/1/2018–6/30/2019. "RESEA" indicates participation in RESEA, "WPRS" indicates participation in WPRS, "Neither" indicates profiled UI beneficiaries who participated in neither program, and "Not profiled" indicates UI beneficiaries who were not assigned profiling scores. t-statistics compare characteristics of RESEA participants and UI beneficiaries in each of the other groups.
SOURCE: Authors' calculations using administrative microdata.

2.1 Observations from Data on Program Referral and Services Received

2.1.1 Lessons from process analysis for evaluation design

One of the most significant lessons from the process analysis report for this project (O'Leary et al. 2021) related to data collection and recording procedures. There were several significant limitations that impeded the ability to estimate the causal impacts of Maryland's RESEA interventions. The initial referral of a UI claimant to either RESEA or WPRS should be recorded for evaluation purposes, and their profiling score should be recorded in the MWE system. In addition, there appeared to be inconsistent record keeping across Maryland's counties. Maryland should take steps to ensure its AJC employees are aware of the importance of keeping accurate records, as well as ensure that the recording process is not cumbersome for those who have that responsibility.

2.1.2 RESEA required and additional services

As noted in Section 1.3.3, UI claimants who are referred to RESEA must attend an initial orientation session at a Maryland AJC consisting of a group orientation followed by an individual eligibility assessment. At this initial session, they receive four services: Labor Market Information (MWE code 107), Staff-Assisted Assessment (108), Individual Employment Plan (142), and RESEA Orientation (193). In addition, they are given a RESEA referral (194). Within 45 days of the orientation, they must complete two additional RESEA services of their choice from the list of approved services. If they do not complete the two additional services, they may face benefit interruption. Table 3 shows the services received by UI beneficiaries in 2019.[2] It shows that 94 percent of RESEA participants attended the orientation, 90 percent received the Individual Employment Plan, and 87 percent received Labor Market Information. The most popular additional services were Job Search Workshop (29 percent), along with Job Fair Participation (23 percent) and Résumé Preparation (20 percent).

2.1.3 WPRS required services

WPRS has three required services: Labor Market Information (107), Job Search Workshop (21, 37, 104, 132, 160, 215), and Reemployment Services (138). Only one of these—Labor Market Information—is also compulsory for RESEA participants, although Job Search Workshop was one of the most popular additional RESEA services. Table 3 shows that 95 percent of WPRS participants received Labor Market Information, 92 percent participated in a Job Search Workshop, and 96 percent received Reemployment Services. Other popular services among WPRS participants were Résumé Preparation (66 percent) and Job Search Activity (17 percent).

We note that participation was generally higher in WPRS for both compulsory and elective services, with the caveat that there appear to be some inconsistencies in the recording of services, which we discuss in the following subsection.

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[2]In conversations with us, local AJC staff explained that some UI beneficiaries who are not profiled and are not referred to RESEA or WPRS receive reemployment services. Unfortunately, services received by individuals without profiling scores were not recorded in the administrative microdata.

Table 3 Services Received, by Profiling Status and Program Participation

	RESEA	WPRS	Neither
RESEA orientation	0.944	0.000168	0.00696
	[0.231]	[0.0129]	[0.0832]
Staff-assisted assessment	0.934	0.102	0.0117
	[0.249]	[0.303]	[0.107]
Individual employment plan	0.902	0.000335	0.0158
	[0.297]	[0.0183]	[0.125]
Labor market information	0.874	0.947	0.0247
	[0.331]	[0.225]	[0.155]
Job search workshop	0.288	0.919	0.0381
	[0.453]	[0.272]	[0.191]
Résumé preparation	0.202	0.659	0.0403
	[0.401]	[0.474]	[0.197]
Job search activity	0.138	0.169	0.0171
	[0.345]	[0.375]	[0.130]
Reemployment services	0.138	0.962	0.0230
	[0.345]	[0.192]	[0.150]
Job fair participation	0.0232	0.0136	0.00768
	[0.151]	[0.116]	[0.0873]
Job finding club	0.00711	0.00176	0.000663
	[0.0840]	[0.0419]	[0.0257]
N	12,932	11,925	18,093

NOTE: Summary statistics of UI beneficiaries with benefit begin dates from 5/1/2018–6/30/2019. "RESEA" indicates participation in RESEA, "WPRS" indicates participation in WPRS, and "Neither" indicates profiled UI beneficiaries who participated in neither program. Standard deviations are listed in brackets.
SOURCE: Authors' calculations using administrative microdata.

2.1.4 Differences across counties in recording services

The county-level data for RESEA and WPRS in Maryland reflect the diverse socioeconomics within the state. There are large urban areas (e.g., Baltimore City), highly rural areas (e.g., Western Maryland, the Eastern Shore), and suburban areas (e.g., Montgomery County). As a result, there are some large disparities among counties in the demographics of the UI beneficiaries served in 2019. There are also large differences in population sizes across these areas and, consequently, large differences in the number of UI beneficiaries served. Maryland's standard practice is to assign participants with above-median profiling scores within their local AJCs to RESEA. This ensures that each AJC has a roughly even split of RESEA and WPRS referrals.

Some of the most pronounced differences among Maryland's counties were on an urban and rural divide. For instance, RESEA participants in Baltimore City (n = 2,110)—an urban area— were 77 percent Black and 54 percent female, and 62 percent had a high school or less education. Their mean base period wage was $31,000. Similarly, WPRS participants in Baltimore City (n = 2,360) were 81 percent Black and 56 percent female, and 65 percent had a high school or less education. Their mean base period wage was $29,634. In rural Carroll County, 4 percent of RESEA participants (n = 247) were Black, 52 percent were female, 44 percent had a high school or less education, and the mean base period wage was $58,000. For WPRS in Carroll County (n = 217), 6 percent of participants were Black, 51 percent were female, 42 percent had a high school or less education, and the mean base period wage was $52,800.

The recording of RESEA and WPRS data at the various AJCs throughout Maryland appears to have been, at best, inconsistent, which hampers the assessment process. There were some counties with abnormally low RESEA orientation completion rates coupled with abnormally high completion rates for the services that are mandatory at RESEA orientation. Furthermore, despite the requirement that RESEA participants complete two additional services within 45 days of orientation, the average number of completed services per RESEA participant was less than one. It is likely that some of these anomalies are due to the incomplete or erroneous recording of services and participation. For WPRS, the MWE system shows high participation rates for all three of its compulsory services, while participation rates for the additional services were much lower.

2.1.5 The case for random assignment between RESEA and WPRS

As discussed in the process analysis report (O'Leary et al. 2021), Maryland's WPRS profiling model and referral process used to assign UI claimants to either RESEA or WPRS was ineffective. First, the profiling model generated a very small range of profiling scores within the program year 2019 data: the minimum probability of exhausting benefits was 40 percent, and the maximum was 56 percent, with a very low standard deviation (0.0251). When Maryland tested the model in 2017, they documented a much larger range of profiling scores (2–79 percent) and a higher standard deviation (0.1429), and stated that if these qualities were not present, the model likely was not working properly. Furthermore, Figure 1 shows that there essentially is no correlation between profiling scores and the proportion of benefits withdrawn in the program year 2019 data; RESEA and WPRS participants from across the profiling score distribution

Figure 1 Correlations between Profiling Score Rank and Potential Benefits Withdrawn

NOTE: Correlations between profiling score percentile rank and proportion of total potential UI benefits withdrawn among UI beneficiaries who were assigned profiling scores with benefit begin dates from 5/1/2018–6/30/2019, by RESEA participation, WPRS participation, or participation in neither program.
SOURCE: Authors' calculations using administrative microdata.

withdrew approximately 75 percent of their maximum allowed benefits. When Maryland tested the profiling model in 2017, however, there was a strong correlation between profiling scores and UI benefit exhaustion. By 2019, Maryland's WPRS profiling model did not function correctly in any way.

Due to the malfunction of the model or other factors, the referral process Maryland used to assign beneficiaries to RESEA and WPRS proved ineffective. Although we do not observe the program to which UI beneficiaries were referred unless they attended RESEA or WPRS orientation, and despite the very narrow range of profiling scores generated by the model, we expect to observe higher profiling scores among RESEA participants relative to WPRS participants, given Maryland's referral methodology. This is not the case. As shown in Figure 2, the two groups' distributions of profiling scores are almost identical. Furthermore, the distributions of profiling scores among RESEA and WPRS participants are quite similar to those of UI beneficiaries who were profiled but attended neither program. Figure 2, however, shows that this "Neither" group drew a significantly smaller proportion of their UI benefits, likely due to benefit suspension following failure to attend their assigned workshop.[3]

Figure 2 Distribution of Profiling Scores among Profiled UI Beneficiaries

NOTE: Distributions of profiling scores among UI beneficiaries who were assigned profiling scores with benefit begin dates from 5/1/2018–6/30/2019, by RESEA participation, WPRS participation, or participation in neither program.
SOURCE: Authors' calculations using administrative microdata.

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[3] While results suggest that benefit suspension (or the threat thereof) leads to shorter UI benefit durations among beneficiaries who attend neither RESEA nor WPRS (Black et al. 2003), we are unable to study this directly, as we do not have information on scheduled orientation dates for those who did not attend either reemployment services program. We also do not observe eligibility assessment determinations among those who attended their assigned program.

3 FORMATIVE EVALUATION

3.1 Logic Model

We conduct a comparison-group design evaluation of the RESEA program to produce causal estimates of program effects on outcomes of interest. The following are essential elements of the logic model leading to our evaluation design:

- **Inputs.** Acquisition of qualitative and quantitative data on RESEA procedures, participants, potential comparison observations, and factors affecting design possibilities.
- **Activities.** Administration of a survey instrument about RESEA and WPRS to central office and local AJC staff who run RESEA and WPRS, meetings with data system experts within the Maryland UI agency and software contractors on the MWE to get the necessary administrative records and to transfer and receive administrative data files for analysis.
- **Outcomes of interest.** We use program administrative data to measure causal impact estimates on near-term program outcomes, including benefit year program outcomes and quarterly measures of reemployment and earnings: 1) dollars of UI compensation received, 2) weeks of UI received, 3) proportion exhausting UI benefit entitlement, 4) proportion of UI benefit entitlement received, 5) employment in the quarter following the benefit year begin date, 6) employment in any of the four quarters following the benefit year begin date, 7) average earnings in the four quarters following the benefit year begin date, 8) employment in the fourth quarter following the benefit year begin date, and 9) earnings in the fourth quarter following the benefit year begin date. Long-term outcome measurement should be possible in subsequent annual RESEA evaluations if the universe of UI benefit and wage record data are provided.

The ideal evaluation design to estimate causal impacts of the RESEA program would involve an experimental design and randomized controlled trials. This is not an option, although we apply similar principles in a comparison-group design evaluation. Our formative evaluation involves a retrospective assessment based on observational data. We implement a quasi-experimental design evaluation guided by principles of causal inference. Our efforts are hampered by the lack of ex ante records on program assignment and a high nonparticipation rate.

Our review of the Maryland WPRS profiling model performance in the process analysis report suggests no systematic differences in profiling scores between those attending RESEA and WPRS orientations. Furthermore, before controlling for services receipt, there is no correlation between profiling scores and the proportion of the UI benefit entitlement drawn in the benefit year. Consequently, we assume that RESEA and WPRS attendees were as good as randomly assigned to their respective programs.

We have no record of RESEA or WPRS referral for profiled UI beneficiaries who attended neither program. Therefore, we cannot simulate referrals for nonparticipants using profiling scores because there is no correlation between scores and the program in which beneficiaries participated. For this reason, a Heckman-type selection-bias correction is impossible, as probit

models estimated on participants and nonparticipants are unlikely to reliably predict program assignment. We discuss the logic model in detail in the following subsections.

3.1.1 Model assumptions

To estimate impacts of RESEA participation on UI program and employment outcomes, we assume that, conditional on observable characteristics, assignment to either RESEA or WPRS is as good as random. This assumption likely holds because 1) the observed proportion of UI benefits received is uncorrelated with the profiling score, 2) distributions of profiling scores do not differ between RESEA and WPRS participants, and 3) demographic characteristics are not appreciably different between RESEA and WPRS participants. We allow self-selection to drive participation decisions.

3.1.2 Impact estimators

We study differences in outcomes of RESEA and WPRS participants, conditional on observable characteristics prior to program participation, using an ordinary least squares (OLS) framework. Specifically, we use the combined sample of RESEA and WPRS participants and estimate OLS models of program impacts, controlling for observable characteristics, prior (UI base period) earnings, and fixed effects for county, calendar quarter, and NAICS code at benefit year begin date. Assuming random assignment to RESEA or WPRS, conditional on control variables, allows us to define the comparison group for each program as participants in the other program. The main RESEA impact model takes the following form:

$$(1) \quad Y_{ic} = \beta RESEA_i + X_i C + \alpha_c + \alpha_q + \alpha_m + u_{icqm},$$

where Y_{ic} is the outcome of interest for individual i in county c whose benefits began in quarter q and whose previous industry of employment is represented by NAICS code m. $RESEA_i$ equals 1 for participants and 0 otherwise. X_i is a matrix of demographics and prior earnings. α_c, α_q, and α_m represent county, quarter, and industry NAICS code fixed effects, respectively. u_{icqm} is the random error term. We estimate Equation (1) using standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity.[4]

β is the parameter of interest and measures the effect of RESEA participation, relative to that of WPRS participation, on the outcomes of interest: 1) benefit year UI compensation, 2) benefit year weeks of UI receipt, 3) proportion exhausting UI benefit entitlement (at least 90 percent of benefits drawn), 4) proportion of UI benefits received, 5) employment in the quarter following the benefit year begin date, 6) employment in any of the four quarters following the benefit year begin date, 7) average earnings in the four quarters following the benefit year begin date, 8) employment in the fourth quarter following the benefit year begin date, and 9) earnings in the fourth quarter following the benefit year begin date.

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[4] Estimates from limited dependent variable models are similar.

3.2 Results

3.2.1 Effects of RESEA

Table 4 presents our main estimates of RESEA program effects on the outcomes of interest. The table shows that, on average, participation in RESEA reduces weeks of UI receipt and dollars of benefits received in the benefit year. Specifically, compared to WPRS participation, RESEA participation reduces UI benefit year compensation by a statistically significant $177 and reduces UI durations by a statistically significant 0.62 weeks on average, ceteris paribus. Furthermore, we find statistically significant effects of RESEA participation on UI benefit exhaustion rates and the proportion of benefits withdrawn: RESEA reduces the probability of UI exhaustion by 3.1 percentage points and the proportion of benefits received by 2.3 percentage points on average.

Turning to employment and earnings outcomes, results from Table 4 suggest that consistent with shorter UI benefit durations, RESEA participation leads UI beneficiaries to return to work slightly faster. We find that relative to WPRS, RESEA increases the probability of employment in the quarter following the benefit year begin date by a statistically significant 1.9 percentage points on average. RESEA participation, however, does not significantly affect the probability of employment in the fourth quarter following the benefit year begin date or employment in any of the four quarters following the benefit year begin date. A slightly faster return to work does not seem to result in lower earnings levels, as estimated effects of RESEA on earnings are small and statistically insignificant.

Table 4 Effects of RESEA Relative to WPRS on UI and Labor Market Outcomes

VARIABLES	(1) Compensation	(2) Weeks	(3) Exhaust	(4) Proportion	(5) Employed (Q after BYB)	(6) Employed (any of 4Qs after BYB)	(7) Average earnings (4Q following BYB)	(8) Employed (4th Q following BYB)	(9) Earnings (4th Q following BYB)
RESEA	−176.879***	−0.617***	−0.031***	−0.023***	0.019***	−0.004	53.665	−0.008	−127.928
	(46.616)	(0.116)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(88.504)	(0.008)	(123.413)
Female	69.232	0.461***	0.030***	0.014***	0.020**	0.015*	−355.583***	0.004	−508.524***
	(51.565)	(0.128)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(103.232)	(0.009)	(141.573)
Age	115.227***	0.031	0.003*	0.001	0.001	0.002	130.133***	0.004**	231.341***
	(11.027)	(0.028)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(18.071)	(0.002)	(25.397)
Age squared	−1.037***	0.000*	0.000	0.000*	−0.000**	−0.000***	−1.851***	−0.000***	−3.192***
	(0.120)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.199)	(0.000)	(0.280)
Black	−31.813	0.045	0.014	−0.000	0.030***	0.038***	−238.688**	0.022**	−332.314**
	(56.509)	(0.140)	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(103.021)	(0.010)	(144.253)
Hispanic	108.196	−0.449	−0.026	−0.018	0.008	0.015	25.706	0.037*	321.731
	(124.691)	(0.300)	(0.019)	(0.011)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(235.777)	(0.022)	(329.912)
<High school	−151.414*	0.092	−0.001	0.008	−0.027**	−0.003	12.763	0.006	13.079
	(85.959)	(0.223)	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(114.340)	(0.016)	(166.646)
Some college	276.266***	0.001	−0.016*	−0.002	−0.012	−0.030***	218.499**	−0.016	347.883**
	(60.311)	(0.150)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(94.095)	(0.011)	(136.037)
College	78.554	−0.497***	−0.057***	−0.022***	0.025**	−0.015	1,094.613***	−0.014	1,283.583***
	(70.565)	(0.168)	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(139.297)	(0.012)	(200.848)
Number of dependents	31.753	0.818***	0.019***	0.024***	0.010*	−0.001	−124.180***	−0.008	−209.380***
	(34.498)	(0.090)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(47.277)	(0.006)	(67.807)
Base period wage	0.019***	−0.000***	−0.000***	−0.000***	0.000***	0.000	0.057***	0.000	0.071***
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.004)	(0.000)	(0.006)
Constant	−3,516.282***	0.135	−0.076	0.002	0.942***	0.977***	2,045.770***	0.946***	−5,581.081***
	(344.565)	(0.891)	(0.055)	(0.033)	(0.055)	(0.056)	(517.627)	(0.065)	(753.663)
Observations	21,053	21,053	21,053	21,053	21,053	13,918	13,918	13,918	13,918
R-squared	0.164	0.068	0.067	0.064	0.065	0.098	0.232	0.098	0.214

NOTE: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Effects of participation in RESEA, relative to those of participation in WPRS, on (1) UI compensation, (2) weeks on UI, (3) estimated UI benefit exhaustion, (4) estimated proportion of UI benefits withdrawn, (5) employment in the quarter following the benefit begin date, (6) employment in any of the four quarters following the benefit begin date, (7) average earnings in the four quarters following the benefit begin date, (8) employment in the fourth quarter following the benefit begin date, and (9) earnings in the fourth quarter following the benefit begin date. Models include fixed effects for county and NAICS code at UI registration.

SOURCE: Authors' calculations using administrative microdata.

3.2.2 Associations between particular reemployment services and UI and labor market outcomes

Next, we estimate associations between particular reemployment services that RESEA and WPRS participants receive and UI and labor market outcomes. This is possible because there is some overlap in reemployment services received by participants in the two programs. Nonetheless, estimated associations are not asserted to be causal impact estimates for two main sets of reasons:

1) RESEA and WPRS participants are supposed to receive separate bundles of compulsory services. The very high participation rates for a number of reemployment services documented in Table 3 provide evidence that, in practice, RESEA and WPRS participants often receive their compulsory service bundles. Hence, we rely on RESEA and WPRS participants who receive some but not all compulsory services to identify associations between particular services and outcomes. Individuals who do not receive all compulsory services likely exhibit different unobservable characteristics than other RESEA and WPRS participants, and, therefore, results probably are not generalizable. Additionally, if differences in beneficiaries' unobservable characteristics help to explain whether they receive some or all compulsory services, then any estimated effects of particular services would be endogenous. Furthermore, this discussion presumes recording of services received is complete and accurate for all participants and consistent across all 25 Maryland workforce areas.

2) In addition to their compulsory services, each RESEA participant, together with an AJC staff member, selects two additional services to receive at follow-up appointments. There almost certainly is self-selection into additional services received, based both on the selection process and the UI beneficiary's decision about whether to attend the follow-up appointments at the AJC.

Considering these limitations, we believe that the estimated effects of the RESEA program discussed in Section 3.2.1 are considerably more useful in evaluating the program, compared to estimated associations between particular reemployment services and outcomes. Still, we estimate the following model of reemployment services and UI program and employment and earnings outcomes and report results in Appendix Table A1. Impacts of employment services are estimated in models of the general form:

(2) $Y_{ic} = \beta_1 Service1_i + \beta_2 Service2_i + \ldots + \beta_{10} Service10_i + X_i C + \alpha_c + \alpha_q + \alpha_m + v_{icqm}$,

where the $Service1_i$ equals 1 if individual i in county c with previous industry in NAICS code m received that particular reemployment service; the remaining services variables are similar. v_{icqm} is the error term. The rest of the variables are the same as those in Equation (1). Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.

$\beta_1, \beta_2, \ldots, \beta_{10}$ are the coefficients of interest and measure associations between particular reemployment services and outcomes, conditional on observable characteristics. We also

estimate the following equation that allows effects of services to differ between the RESEA and WPRS programs:

(3) $Y_{ic} = \lambda_1 Service1_i + \lambda_2 Service2_i + \ldots + \lambda_{10} Service10_i + \delta_1(WPRS_i * Service1_i)$
$\delta_2(WPRS_i * Service2_i) + \ldots + \delta_{10}(WPRS_i * Service10_i) + X_iC + \alpha_c + \alpha_q + \alpha_m + \varepsilon_{icqm},$

where $WPRS_i$ equals 1 if individual i participated in WPRS and 0 otherwise. ε_{icqm} is the error term. The remaining variables are the same as those in Equation (2). Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.

In Equation (3), $\lambda_1, \lambda_2, \ldots, \lambda_{10}$ are the coefficients of interest and measure associations between particular reemployment services and outcomes conditional on observable characteristics among RESEA participants. Adding corresponding coefficients on the services variables and their interactions (e.g., $\lambda_1 + \delta_1$) yields similar associations for WPRS participants.

Estimates from Equations (2) and (3) imply that providing RESEA and WPRS participants with labor market information is associated with decreased durations of UI benefit receipt and lower proportions of potential benefits received. Completing a job search activity, which is not a compulsory service in either program, also is associated with shorter UI benefit durations and lower proportions of benefits withdrawn. Additionally, the association between completing a job search activity and UI benefit year compensation from Equation (3) is a statistically significant −$276.

3.3 Robustness

We test the robustness of results to alternative specifications and include results in Appendix B. First, we expand our estimation sample by including UI beneficiaries who were assigned a profiling score (and presumably were referred to either RESEA or WPRS) but did not participate in either program. We then estimate the following equation on that expanded sample:

(4) $Y_{ic} = \gamma_1 RESEA_i + \gamma_2 WPRS_i + X_iC + \alpha_c + \alpha_q + \alpha_m + w_{icqm},$

where $RESEA_i$ equals 1 if individual i participated in RESEA and 0 otherwise. Similarly, $WPRS_i$ equals 1 if individual i participated in WPRS and 0 otherwise. w_{icqm} is the error term. The remaining variables are the same as those listed in Equation (1). Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.

While nonparticipants likely are not well-suited as a counterfactual for RESEA or WPRS participants, who are significantly different on nearly all observable characteristics, we are reassured that estimates of $\gamma_1 - \gamma_2$ from Equation (4) (Table B1) are similar to those of β from Equation (1). For instance, the estimated effect of RESEA participation, relative to that of WPRS participation, on UI benefit compensation is −$177 in Table 4. This is quite similar to the estimated difference of −$186 from Equation (4). Similarly, we estimate alternative specifications of Equations (2) and (3) on the sample of all profiled UI beneficiaries. Results from these analyses generally are consistent with those that include RESEA and WPRS participants only.

In our process analysis for this project (O'Leary et al. 2021), we documented that a number of UI beneficiaries from Caroline, Dorchester, Kent, Queen Anne's, and Talbot counties were coded as having not participated in RESEA, though they received all compulsory RESEA services. As a robustness check, we recode these individuals as RESEA participants and reestimate Equation (1). Results from this analysis (Table B2) are nearly identical to those listed in Table 4. The estimated effect of RESEA on UI benefit year compensation (−$175, s.e. = 46.544) remains virtually unchanged across analyses.

As another robustness check, to assess if observable characteristics of RESEA and WPRS participants appear to play any role in explaining results from Equation (1), we reestimate the model without including control variables and fixed effects. As shown in Appendix B (Table B3), parameter estimates are similar results to those in Table 4, though estimated effects on UI program outcomes tend to be slightly larger in magnitude.

Additionally, we estimate specifications in which we add controls for program-county interactions to Equation (1). This substantially increases standard errors and results in statistically insignificant estimates of nearly all parameters (Table B4). Nonetheless, the signs and magnitudes of parameter estimates are in line with those from the main analysis.

Finally, we use propensity score matching models to compare RESEA participants' outcomes to those of UI beneficiaries with similar characteristics, including gender, age, race, education, and prior earnings, who did not attend RESEA or WPRS. Results from matching models (Table B5) differ substantially from those in Table 4. Given the stability of results across other robustness checks, RESEA participants likely exhibit different unobservable characteristics than nonprofiled UI beneficiaries and profiled UI beneficiaries who did not participate in reemployment services.

4 SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

In this formative evaluation, we produced causal effect estimates of the Maryland RESEA program using administrative microdata, on UI benefit payments, reemployment services, and UI wage records on RESEA and WPRS participants, during program year 2019. Applying an evaluation logic model and comparison-group design we produce causal estimates of program effects. We find that participation in RESEA, relative to participation in WPRS, shortens UI durations, reduces UI benefits received, and leads UI beneficiaries to return to work slightly faster without impacts on reemployment earnings. Specifically, on average, RESEA

- decreased UI benefit year dollars by $177
- decreased UI benefit year weeks by 0.62
- decreased UI benefit exhaustion by 3.1 percentage points
- increased employment rates in the quarter following the benefit year begin date by 1.9 percentage points
- did not affect employment rates or earnings four quarters after the benefit year begin date

Our results are broadly consistent with those of existing studies that estimate causal impacts of reemployment services. In particular, effects on UI benefit year weeks are in line with estimates from Klerman et al. (2019), who found that Reemployment Eligibility Assessments that took place in Indiana, New York, Washington, and Wisconsin decreased benefit year weeks by between 0.52 and 1.68. As in our study, they find an employment increase of "approximately two percentage points" within one quarter of participating in the program but show that impacts "fall rapidly thereafter." Our results also are in line with those of Poe-Yamagata et al. (2011), who studied effects of Reemployment Eligibility Assessments in Florida, Idaho, Illinois, and Nevada, where the program decreased UI benefit year weeks by 0.43 to 1.80 and UI benefit year dollars by $97 to $526. Michaelides and Mueser (2018) find slightly larger effects of reemployment services in Nevada. Nonetheless, as in all of the other studies, the authors document short-term employment effects that diminish over time.

The fact that our findings are consistent with other studies is notable, given that all profiled UI beneficiaries in Maryland are referred to reemployment services, half of them to RESEA. This contrasts with most other states that provide reemployment services to relatively few UI beneficiaries who are deemed most likely to exhaust benefits. Hence, the fact that Maryland's RESEA program successfully met its stated goal of reducing UI duration through improved employment outcomes, even among beneficiaries who may have better reemployment prospects, suggests that policymakers in other states should consider expanding the scope of their reemployment services to cover larger UI beneficiary populations. Nonetheless, we show that RESEA did not increase employment rates or average earnings in the medium run. Future research may address whether other active labor market policies can exert more lasting impacts on UI beneficiaries' labor market outcomes.

Additionally, our study reveals some important lessons on data collection and recording procedures. For example, we note that the initial referral and related profiling score of a UI claimant to either RESEA or WPRS should be recorded in the MWE for evaluation purposes. Our related process analysis showed that Maryland's WPRS profiling model does not accurately predict UI benefit exhaustion and therefore needs to be revised. Improvements in data recording and data available for the evaluation will allow us to estimate causal impacts under relaxed identification assumptions in future evaluations. For example, in this evaluation, the lack of ex ante records on program assignment compelled us to rely on the assumption that conditional on observable characteristics, assignment to RESEA or WPRS is as good as random. More complete data will allow us to relax this assumption and obtain more reliable causal impacts in future evaluations.

Our formative evaluation of RESEA is just that—formative. We have established a baseline against which we will measure the future effectiveness of RESEA for the reemployment and labor market success of UI beneficiaries. In future evaluations, we plan to use more complete data that will allow us to better model UI beneficiaries' program participation decisions and estimate program impacts. Additionally, our program year 2020 evaluation presents a unique opportunity to analyze several UI program parameters that changed during the COVID-19 pandemic, including customer inflows, RESEA procedures, and UI benefit amounts and work requirements. We plan to estimate causal effects of as many of these factors as available program administrative data permit.

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Appendix A

Particular Reemployment Services

Table A1 Associations between Particular Reemployment Services and UI and Labor Market Outcomes

Variables	Compensation	Weeks	Exhaust	Proportion	Employed (Q following BYB)	Employed (any of 4Qs following BYB)	Average earnings (4Q following BYB)	Employed (4th Q following BYB)	Earnings (4th Q following BYB)
RESEA orientation	67.294	−0.401	−0.019	−0.017*	0.027*	0.031*	564.536***	0.063***	790.097***
	(106.983)	(0.264)	(0.016)	(0.010)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(196.818)	(0.020)	(275.054)
Staff-assisted assessment	−96.245	−0.274	−0.016	−0.010	−0.004	−0.023*	−389.708***	−0.044***	−688.007***
	(82.326)	(0.201)	(0.013)	(0.008)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(145.352)	(0.016)	(209.375)
Individual employment plan	69.585	0.458*	0.018	0.020**	−0.031*	−0.016	−218.729	−0.009	5.057
	(104.569)	(0.264)	(0.016)	(0.010)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(168.739)	(0.019)	(234.563)
Labor market information	−429.613***	−1.145***	−0.040***	−0.044***	0.029**	0.009	487.656***	0.007	407.074**
	(84.314)	(0.208)	(0.013)	(0.008)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(143.056)	(0.015)	(198.682)
Job search workshop	231.597***	0.578***	0.021**	0.023***	−0.035***	−0.006	−154.465	0.006	61.979
	(64.580)	(0.158)	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(123.325)	(0.012)	(175.095)
Resume preparation	367.498***	0.940***	0.044***	0.034***	−0.038***	−0.020**	−219.348**	−0.006	−23.396
	(57.452)	(0.141)	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(103.111)	(0.010)	(149.439)
Job search activity	−294.201***	−0.687***	−0.031**	−0.027***	0.038***	0.015	129.453	−0.000	−78.166
	(79.516)	(0.199)	(0.012)	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(139.583)	(0.014)	(195.413)
Reemployment services	−17.399	−0.224	−0.012	−0.008	0.014	0.010	94.351	0.023	249.225
	(85.580)	(0.213)	(0.013)	(0.008)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(147.776)	(0.015)	(208.493)
Job fair	484.023***	1.057***	0.018	0.035**	−0.009	0.040	−20.704	0.084***	609.096
	(160.382)	(0.398)	(0.026)	(0.015)	(0.026)	(0.024)	(274.013)	(0.029)	(437.144)
Job finding club	388.565	0.705	0.062	0.026	−0.080	0.040	−125.528	0.012	260.379
	(371.958)	(0.875)	(0.052)	(0.032)	(0.053)	(0.048)	(580.343)	(0.060)	(828.535)
Female	54.403	0.425***	0.029***	0.013***	0.021***	0.015*	−344.304***	0.003	−514.345***
	(51.487)	(0.127)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(103.219)	(0.009)	(141.623)
Age	112.392***	0.023	0.003	0.000	0.001	0.003	135.158***	0.004**	235.616***
	(11.010)	(0.028)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(18.087)	(0.002)	(25.430)
Age squared	−1.016***	0.001*	0.000	0.000**	−0.000**	−0.000***	−1.903***	−0.000***	−3.242***
	(0.120)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.199)	(0.000)	(0.280)
Black	−30.487	0.050	0.014*	0.000	0.030***	0.037***	−244.388**	0.022**	−340.699**
	(56.407)	(0.140)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(102.952)	(0.010)	(144.181)
Hispanic	133.010	−0.386	−0.023	−0.015	0.005	0.013	−28.144	0.036	277.727
	(124.566)	(0.300)	(0.019)	(0.011)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(236.687)	(0.022)	(330.922)
<High school	−145.220*	0.103	−0.001	0.008	−0.028**	−0.002	8.316	0.006	10.396
	(85.779)	(0.222)	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(114.584)	(0.016)	(166.899)
Some college	267.252***	−0.022	−0.017*	−0.003	−0.011	−0.030***	227.171**	−0.016	351.162***
	(60.177)	(0.149)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(93.938)	(0.011)	(136.001)

Table A1 (Continued)

Variables	Compensation	Weeks	Exhaust	Proportion	Employed (Q following BYB)	Employed (any of 4Qs following BYB)	Average earnings (4Q following BYB)	Employed (4th Q following BYB)	Earnings (4th Q following BYB)
College	56.396	−0.554***	−0.059***	−0.024***	0.027***	−0.014	1,110.753***	−0.015	1,280.340***
	(70.497)	(0.168)	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(139.329)	(0.012)	(200.924)
Number of dependents	30.804	0.818***	0.018***	0.024***	0.010*	−0.000	−125.400***	−0.008	−213.131***
	(34.455)	(0.090)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(47.276)	(0.007)	(67.987)
Base period wage	0.019***	−0.000***	−0.000***	−0.000***	0.000***	0.000	0.057***	0.000	0.071***
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.004)	(0.000)	(0.006)
Constant	−3,585.974***	0.220	−0.079	0.006	0.966***	0.986***	1,866.529***	0.926***	−6,133.358***
	(368.995)	(0.946)	(0.059)	(0.035)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(560.311)	(0.069)	(815.675)
Observations	21,053	21,053	21,053	21,053	21,053	13,918	13,918	13,918	13,918
R-squared	0.168	0.074	0.069	0.069	0.067	0.099	0.233	0.100	0.215

NOTE: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$. Associations between participation in particular reemployment services and (1) UI compensation, (2) weeks on UI, (3) estimated UI benefit exhaustion, (4) estimated proportion of UI benefits withdrawn, (5) employment in the quarter following the benefit begin date, (6) employment in any of the four quarters following the benefit begin date, (7) average earnings in the four quarters following the benefit begin date, (8) employment in the fourth quarter following the benefit begin date, and (9) earnings in the fourth quarter following the benefit begin date among RESEA and WPRS participants. Models include fixed effects for county, quarter, and NAICS code at UI registration.
SOURCE: Authors' calculations using administrative microdata.

Appendix B

Robustness

Table B1 Associations between RESEA and WPRS and Labor Market Outcomes

Variables	Compensation	Weeks	Exhaust	Proportion	Employed (Q following BYB)	Employed (any of 4Qs following BYB)	Average earnings (4Q following BYB)	Employed (4th Q following BYB)	Earnings (4th Q following BYB)
RESEA	3,225.867***	8.609***	0.294***	0.333***	−0.259***	−0.096***	−2,419.593***	−0.097***	−1,658.667***
	(43.596)	(0.115)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(89.308)	(0.007)	(113.764)
WPRS	3,411.879***	9.253***	0.328***	0.356***	−0.281***	−0.094***	−2,463.884***	−0.092***	−1,532.168***
	(44.075)	(0.115)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(90.377)	(0.008)	(118.645)
Female	45.770	0.378***	0.020***	0.010***	0.023***	0.015***	−322.180***	0.013*	−370.576***
	(39.599)	(0.103)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(84.084)	(0.007)	(112.858)
Age	97.135***	0.039*	0.001	0.001	0.003***	0.002*	159.691***	0.004***	229.951***
	(8.221)	(0.022)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(14.885)	(0.001)	(19.815)
Age squared	−0.822***	0.000*	0.000**	0.000**	−0.000***	−0.000***	−2.082***	−0.000***	−3.056***
	(0.091)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.164)	(0.000)	(0.219)
Black	30.127	0.262**	0.016***	0.008**	0.017***	0.027***	−283.467***	0.020***	−305.762***
	(43.572)	(0.114)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(86.436)	(0.008)	(115.445)
Hispanic	21.628	−0.541**	−0.032***	−0.023***	0.017	0.010	201.003	0.044***	412.822*
	(91.060)	(0.236)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(179.827)	(0.016)	(237.155)
<High school	−8.100	0.372**	0.008	0.015**	−0.019**	−0.004	−139.740	−0.000	−204.077*
	(63.957)	(0.178)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(91.020)	(0.011)	(121.691)
Some college	224.872***	−0.023	−0.013**	−0.002	−0.008	−0.024***	234.501***	−0.023***	347.800***
	(46.239)	(0.121)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(79.808)	(0.008)	(107.296)
College	195.861***	−0.173	−0.037***	−0.009*	0.006	−0.020***	1,124.234***	−0.019**	1,397.535***
	(56.447)	(0.140)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(124.439)	(0.009)	(167.359)
Number of dependents	113.875***	0.987***	0.022***	0.031***	0.003	0.001	−120.859***	−0.007	−166.938***
	(26.654)	(0.075)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(39.392)	(0.005)	(52.901)
Base period wage	0.013***	−0.000***	−0.000***	−0.000***	0.000***	0.000	0.069***	0.000	0.080***
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.004)	(0.000)	(0.005)
Constant	−6,718.401***	−10.859***	−0.428***	−0.416***	1.204***	1.079***	3,458.926***	1.009***	−4,460.357***
	(260.805)	(0.732)	(0.037)	(0.026)	(0.039)	(0.038)	(430.428)	(0.048)	(580.913)
Observations	36,845	36,845	36,845	36,845	36,845	22,458	22,458	22,458	22,458
R-squared	0.283	0.251	0.152	0.258	0.125	0.092	0.289	0.087	0.242

NOTE: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Associations between participation in RESEA and WPRS, relative to those of no participation in a reemployment services program, and (1) UI compensation, (2) weeks on UI, (3) estimated UI benefit exhaustion, (4) estimated proportion of UI benefits withdrawn, (5) employment in the quarter following the benefit begin date, (6) employment in any of the four quarters following the benefit begin date, (7) average earnings in the four quarters following the benefit begin date, (8) employment in the fourth quarter following the benefit begin date, and (9) earnings in the fourth quarter following the benefit begin date. Models include fixed effects for county, quarter, and NAICS code at UI registration.
SOURCE: Authors' calculations using administrative microdata.

Table B2 Effects of RESEA on UI and Labor Market Outcomes with Reassigned Probable RESEA Observations

Variables	Compensation	Weeks	Exhaust	Proportion	Employed (Q following BYB)	Employed (any of 4Qs following BYB)	Average earnings (4Q following BYB)	Employed (4th Q following BYB)	Earnings (4th Q following BYB)
RESEA	−175.089***	−0.608***	−0.030***	−0.022***	0.019***	−0.004	51.829	−0.007	−127.102
	(46.544)	(0.115)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(88.180)	(0.008)	(122.974)
Female	71.125	0.476***	0.031***	0.015***	0.019**	0.016**	−356.122***	0.004	−506.868***
	(51.455)	(0.127)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(102.817)	(0.009)	(141.029)
Age	115.587***	0.032	0.003*	0.001	0.001	0.002	130.305***	0.004**	231.626***
	(11.003)	(0.028)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(18.012)	(0.002)	(25.316)
Age squared	−1.041***	0.000*	0.000	0.000*	−0.000**	−0.000***	−1.855***	−0.000***	−3.197***
	(0.120)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.198)	(0.000)	(0.279)
Black	−32.961	0.054	0.015*	0.000	0.030***	0.036***	−241.216**	0.021**	−335.359**
	(56.386)	(0.140)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(102.637)	(0.010)	(143.683)
Hispanic	92.507	−0.493	−0.028	−0.019*	0.009	0.013	28.753	0.035	313.322
	(124.639)	(0.300)	(0.018)	(0.011)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(234.660)	(0.022)	(328.438)
<High school	−158.984*	0.069	−0.001	0.006	−0.028**	−0.004	4.142	0.004	−1.837
	(85.668)	(0.223)	(0.013)	(0.008)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(113.288)	(0.016)	(165.117)
Some college	278.162***	0.009	−0.016*	−0.002	−0.012	−0.030***	218.074**	−0.016	351.531***
	(60.173)	(0.149)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(93.783)	(0.011)	(135.564)
College	80.561	−0.491***	−0.056***	−0.022***	0.025**	−0.014	1,093.710***	−0.014	1,277.792***
	(70.484)	(0.168)	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(138.986)	(0.012)	(200.433)
Number of dependents	29.666	0.812***	0.018***	0.024***	0.010*	−0.000	−124.765***	−0.007	−205.183***
	(34.415)	(0.090)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(47.136)	(0.006)	(67.579)
Base period wage	0.019***	−0.000***	−0.000***	−0.000***	0.000***	0.000	0.057***	0.000	0.072***
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.004)	(0.000)	(0.006)
Constant	−3,520.468***	0.131	−0.076	0.002	0.940***	0.976***	2,041.559***	0.941***	−5,600.629***
	(344.180)	(0.890)	(0.055)	(0.033)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(516.606)	(0.065)	(752.312)
Observations	21,123	21,123	21,123	21,123	21,123	13,982	13,982	13,982	13,982
R-squared	0.164	0.069	0.067	0.065	0.065	0.099	0.232	0.099	0.214

NOTE: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Effects of participation in RESEA, relative to those of participation in WPRS, on (1) UI compensation, (2) weeks on UI, (3) estimated UI benefit exhaustion, (4) estimated proportion of UI benefits withdrawn, (5) employment in the quarter following the benefit begin date, (6) employment in any of the four quarters following the benefit begin date, (7) average earnings in the four quarters following the benefit begin date, (8) employment in the fourth quarter following the benefit begin date, and (9) earnings in the fourth quarter following the benefit begin date. Models include fixed effects for county and NAICS code at UI registration.

SOURCE: Authors' calculations using administrative microdata.

Table B3 Effects of RESEA on UI and Labor Market Outcomes without Controls

Variables	Compensation	Weeks	Exhaust	Proportion	Employed (Q following BYB)	Employed (any of 4Qs following BYB)	Average earnings (4Q following BYB)	Employed (4th Q following BYB)	Earnings (4th Q following BYB)
RESEA	−180.317***	−0.758***	−0.043***	−0.027***	0.014**	−0.004	193.933**	−0.007	73.991
	(44.380)	(0.103)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(84.606)	(0.008)	(117.905)
Constant	7,152.341***	20.501***	0.562***	0.771***	0.418***	0.762***	3,962.567***	0.631***	5,476.287***
	(31.761)	(0.073)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(60.503)	(0.005)	(86.184)
Observations	24,857	24,857	24,857	24,857	24,857	16,308	16,308	16,308	16,308
R-squared	0.001	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

NOTE: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Effects of participation in RESEA, relative to those of participation in WPRS, on (1) UI compensation, (2) weeks on UI, (3) estimated UI benefit exhaustion, (4) estimated proportion of UI benefits withdrawn, (5) employment in the quarter following the benefit begin date, (6) employment in any of the four quarters following the benefit begin date, (7) average earnings in the four quarters following the benefit begin date, (8) employment in the fourth quarter following the benefit begin date, and (9) earnings in the fourth quarter following the benefit begin date. Models include fixed effects for county and NAICS code at UI registration.
SOURCE: Authors' calculations using administrative microdata.

Table B4 Effects of RESEA on UI and Labor Market Outcomes with Program-County Interactions

Variables	Compensation	Weeks	Exhaust	Proportion	Employed (Q following BYB)	Employed (any of 4Qs following BYB)	Average earnings (4Q following BYB)	Employed (4th Q following BYB)	Earnings (4th Q following BYB)
RESEA	80.948	−0.492	−0.102	−0.028	0.124**	0.115*	333.417	0.025	714.233
	(369.478)	(1.017)	(0.064)	(0.036)	(0.063)	(0.067)	(473.320)	(0.077)	(667.069)
Female	66.261	0.452***	0.030***	0.014***	0.020**	0.015*	−348.921***	0.004	−507.428***
	(51.578)	(0.128)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(103.146)	(0.009)	(141.528)
Age	116.381***	0.033	0.003*	0.001	0.001	0.002	130.696***	0.004**	232.716***
	(11.055)	(0.028)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(18.121)	(0.002)	(25.452)
Age squared	−1.049***	0.000	0.000	0.000*	−0.000**	−0.000***	−1.857***	−0.000***	−3.206***
	(0.120)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.200)	(0.000)	(0.280)
Black	−30.220	0.048	0.014	0.000	0.030***	0.038***	−230.933**	0.023**	−317.930**
	(56.528)	(0.140)	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(103.217)	(0.010)	(144.486)
Hispanic	128.065	−0.395	−0.023	−0.016	0.008	0.016	37.955	0.039*	354.861
	(124.671)	(0.300)	(0.019)	(0.011)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(236.552)	(0.022)	(331.185)
<High school	−147.078*	0.105	−0.001	0.008	−0.027**	−0.003	15.331	0.005	24.157
	(86.104)	(0.223)	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(114.677)	(0.016)	(166.646)
Some college	272.314***	−0.001	−0.016*	−0.002	−0.012	−0.031***	217.530**	−0.016	344.983**
	(60.329)	(0.150)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(94.292)	(0.011)	(136.422)
College	77.159	−0.502***	−0.057***	−0.022***	0.026**	−0.015	1,095.126***	−0.013	1,284.450***
	(70.611)	(0.168)	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(139.385)	(0.012)	(200.519)
Number of dependents	33.813	0.824***	0.019***	0.024***	0.010*	−0.001	−125.528***	−0.007	−208.317***
	(34.502)	(0.090)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(47.459)	(0.006)	(68.127)
Base period wage	0.019***	−0.000***	−0.000***	−0.000***	0.000***	0.000	0.057***	0.000	0.071***
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.004)	(0.000)	(0.006)
Constant	−3,690.241***	0.236	−0.014	0.013	0.901***	0.913***	2,071.762***	0.904***	−6,262.003***
	(430.214)	(1.132)	(0.070)	(0.041)	(0.069)	(0.073)	(655.261)	(0.081)	(948.123)
Observations	21,053	21,053	21,053	21,053	21,053	13,918	13,918	13,918	13,918
R-squared	0.165	0.070	0.068	0.066	0.066	0.100	0.233	0.100	0.215

NOTE: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Effects of participation in RESEA, relative to those of participation in WPRS, on (1) UI compensation, (2) weeks on UI, (3) estimated UI benefit exhaustion, (4) estimated proportion of UI benefits withdrawn, (5) employment in the quarter following the benefit begin date, (6) employment in any of the four quarters following the benefit begin date, (7) average earnings in the four quarters following the benefit begin date, (8) employment in the fourth quarter following the benefit begin date, and (9) earnings in the fourth quarter following the benefit begin date. Models include fixed effects for county and NAICS code at UI registration, as well as program-county interactions.
SOURCE: Authors' calculations using administrative microdata.

Table B5 Estimates from Propensity Score Matching Models

Variables	Compensation	Weeks	Exhaust	Proportion	Employed (Q following BYB)	Employed (any of 4Qs following BYB)	Average earnings (4Q following BYB)	Employed (4th Q following BYB)	Earnings (4th Q following BYB)
RESEA vs. Neither	4,642.303***	13.362***	0.414***	0.509***	0.435***	0.772***	3,705.354***	0.641***	4,973.411***
	(41.611)	(0.104)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(55.423)	(0.007)	(76.728)
Observations	89,186	89,186	89,186	89,186	89,186	52,459	52,459	52,459	52,459
RESEA vs. Not profiled	3,079.963***	8.197***	0.290***	0.318***	−0.244***	−0.090***	−2,314.926***	−0.095***	−1,509.198***
	(47.336)	(0.122)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(97.628)	(0.008)	(124.582)
Observations	31,025	31,025	31,025	31,025	31,025	18,236	18,236	18,236	18,236

NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Results from propensity score matching model of UI and labor market outcomes of RESEA participants, relative to those of profiled UI beneficiaries who did not participate in RESEA or WPRS and nonprofiled UI beneficiaries. Individuals are matched on gender, age, race, education, number of dependents, and base period wage.
SOURCE: Authors' calculations using administrative microdata.