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REVALUATIONS OF THE TIMES OF PANDEMICS. ON THE INTERFERENCE OF THE PANDEMIC IN THE WORLD OF HUMAN VALUES

"[...] the problem of values is, according to Ingarden, a key element in understanding man and the world in which man lives".

Andrzej Półtawski (*Wartości a ontologia Ingardena [Values and Ingarden's Ontology]*, "Sztuka i Filozofia" [„Art And Philosophy”] 1994 (8), p. 6)

"Ingarden gave at once a method – and not only a method of philosophical work, but also the possibility of interpreting the experiences I encountered every day."

Józef Tischner (*Spotkanie. Z ks. Józefem Tischnerem rozmawia Anna Karoń-Ostrowska [An Encounter. Father Józef Tischner interviewed Anna Karoń-Ostrowska]* Wydawnictwo Znak, Kraków 2008, p. 54).

ABSTRACT

Experiencing the destructive effects of a pandemic as a realistic view of currently unfolding events, one reads Roman Ingarden's conundrums from his analyses of human nature: "As the spiritual power of man weakens or disappears, the layer of Human Reality in the world seems to obliterate and fade away." In contrast to the concepts of values, which postulate their "eternal permanence," Ingarden realistically draws attention to the fragility of the world of values and the dependence of existence on man's active concern to learn and realize them. Experiencing the destructive effects of a pandemic, one also experiences a re-evaluation in the world of human values taking place at an accelerated pace: what is valued and what is preferred in actions as something particularly valuable, something more important than something else. It is a characteristic of pandemic times that what seemed certain, stable and even unchangeable - also in economic and political activity with its long-range goals - becomes at once highly questionable or no longer valid; and that which was considered valuable from the axiological point of view turns out to be very fragile and susceptible to annihilation. In this way, we experience, for many, the pandemic's intrusion into the world of human values, which is unexpected and beyond the horizon of imagination. It is an intervention which also generates and intensifies conflicts of values, between

which one has to make an unrepeatable choice: either one chooses this good or that good, at the cost of losing other goods; either one gives up this good or that good, or one has to give up on some particular good, because one cannot preserve them simultaneously (one does not have the necessary forces or means), and the decisions which have been made are not reversible in time. In the situation of struggling with the advancing pandemic, when in various areas of human activity one experiences increased and disturbing cognitive disorientation, when one feels painfully aware of the lack of reliable knowledge about what is really happening (what are the causes, how to accurately recognize the actual threats, how to effectively counteract what threatens health and life in various ways) and how it can probably further develop, the more necessary in the reliable practice of science is - highly valued by Ingarden - "attacking matters that have so far been settled with hackneyed platitudes, realizing that one actually understands nothing", because in practice one bears horrendous costs of only seemingly settling matters (of great importance) with "hackneyed platitudes" and of seemingly understanding phenomena. Effective recognition of the sources and multiple effects of a pandemic (and ways to counteract it) requires interdisciplinary discussions, transcending the artificial barriers of institutionalized science and involving representatives of various scientific fields in the debate, including philosophy, logic, and ethics.

Keywords: values, reevaluation, pandemic time, fragility, the spiritual power of man. Roman Ingarden

INTRODUCTION: The fragility of the world of values: "the shadow of reality" and "the semblance of existence"

Experiencing the destructive effects of the pandemic as a realistic – and even "painfully" naturalistic – record of a direct witness with a view of the events currently unfolding, one reads Roman Ingarden's observations from his analyses of human nature: "When man's spiritual power weakens or fades, the layer of Human Reality in the world seems to blur and disappear, and man discovers the original face of Nature – the element in the world around him, and even in himself, and then feels abandoned in a world alien and terrible to himself."¹ This insightful and succinct statement from the reflections on human nature is contained in *A book about a man* can be read as a statement of a "touching to the living" experience. Ingarden also in this

¹ Roman Ingarden, *O naturze ludzkiej* [*On human nature*], in: Roman Ingarden, *Książeczka o człowieku* [*A book about a man*], Wydawnictwo Literackie, Kraków 1987, p. 25. See Maciej Smolak, *Filozofia człowieka u Romana Ingardena* [*Roman Ingarden's Philosophy of Man*], Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego Kraków 2003.

case provides, as Józef Tischner put it in the opinion chosen as the motto here, "the possibility of interpreting the experiences we encounter every day".

In contrast to many conceptions of values, which more or less strongly postulate their – one might say – "eternal permanence," Ingarden realistically draws attention to the – definitely exposed by him – the fragility of the world of values and the existence dependence on the active concern of man for their proper cognition and realization:

"Man-made cultural creations are nothing more than a kind of shadow of reality, being only purely intentional creations. They bear only the semblance of existence, which characterizes all spiritual works of man, such as works of art or various other products of human culture, whether they are works of an individual man or the whole human community"².

After drawing attention to the ontic (weak and fragile) status of values as "purely intentional" creations, Ingarden outlines the primary conditions for the emergence of values in the environment of human activity:

"They are constituted on the substratum of things and processes of the natural world, adapted to this by man, and their properties transcend the emplacement of material things, covering them with a new layer of meaning and new phenomena. By transcending these things, they lose the fullness and autonomy of existence and do not possess the power of a reality independent of man and his spiritual acts."³

The existence of values depends on human involvement in their appearance and preservation in the environment of human activity. The necessity of constant "spiritual (creative) activity" and the causal power of the human "will to transcend" come to the fore:

"They can satisfy man's aspirations for a life elevated above nature only on the condition of his extraordinary spiritual activity, and they fall back into complete non-existence as soon as a man loses the will to transcend his simple natural nature and renounces his creative activity of consciousness."⁴

² Roman Ingarden, *Człowiek i Przyroda [Man and Nature]*, in: Roman Ingarden, *Książeczka o człowieku...*, pp. 16-17.

³ Ibid, p. 17. Ingarden adds: "But man's creative power is limited. It is incapable of creating works autonomous in their existence and independent of our consciousness. It is too weak to actually transform primordial nature into human reality. This reality is only a layer intentionally created and, as it were, superimposed on the substratum of real nature, and it is never so opaque and impenetrable that the real aspect of Nature can never again shine through it and reveal its astonishing and cruel face to us. The works of human spiritual culture never find in material things a support so sure that they can exist without the help of human action and consciousness". (Roman Ingarden, *O naturze ludzkiej...* [*On Human Nature*], pp. 24-25). As for the problems with the various understandings of value, Andrzej Póltawski's remarks are apt: "'Value' is a term used today in a very wide range. Neither the range of its designations and their subdivision into subgroups, nor the exact content of this concept are, however, the subject of common agreement; [...] difficulties are raised in determining what kind of objects we deal with in the case of value - what is the ontological place of these designations. Even the very use of the concept of values is criticized" (Andrzej Póltawski, *Wartości a osoby. Wartości – podstawowa kategoria bytu czy wyraz ontologicznej bezradności?* [*Values and people. Values – the basic category of being or the expression of ontological helplessness*], "Ethos" 2004, 1-2, p. 74).

⁴ Ibid, p. 17. See Ryszard Wiśniewski, *Filozoficzna analiza doświadczenia i słabości woli [A philosophical analysis of experience and weakness of the will]* "Filozofia Chrześcijańska", 2013, vol. 10, pp. 7-21.

This creative cognitive and practical activity, in which the human will to transcend, is the prime mover, which allows the world of values to transform the environment of human existence into the world of culture. This dramatic tension is a constant call to man and does not allow him to be a passive consumer of the welfare of values.

In an article that appeared in 1946 in "Twórczość" (No. 2), in a section written during World War II, Ingarden asked: "What am I that hides somewhere 'outside' my experiences, and yet in them I 'live,' in them I discharge myself, I achieve the clarity of my being, in them, I come to build myself? What am I, not this piece of flesh and bones, but I, growing out of my flesh and bones, an active man?"⁵. And in answering, he presented the power of genuinely human existence as that peculiar force which, in the constant struggle for freedom, at the same time puts itself at the service of values:

"I am the force that stands firm in adversity when it feels and knows that with its free act, it will bring out of non-existence what remains of it when it has already burned itself in the struggle. I am a force that wants to be free. And even sacrifice my existence for freedom. I am a force that wants to be free that wants to sacrifice even its freedom, but under the pressure of the forces of others, it finds a remedy in itself, if it relaxes, if it neglects its efforts. And it will lose its freedom if it becomes attached to itself. It can remain and be free only when it voluntarily gives itself over to the production of good, beauty, and truth. Only then does it exist"⁶

Man's existence turns out to be fundamentally intertwined with the existence of values, which, however, can very quickly disappear because they do not have the strength of their own to endure and resist various dangers; they are as if only a shadow a semblance of existence. In the situation of a pandemic, man can see all the more clearly that human existence, which transcends the order of Nature, requires voluntary surrender (sacrifice) for the sake of producing and maintaining values, to preserve the human world in the face of the invading hostile forces of nature (which are destroying it).

ROMAN INGARDEN AND THE SITUATION OF OUR TIME

One time a volume of dissertations was entitled "Roman Ingarden and the Philosophy of Our Time" (a book from a session in 1993 on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of the

⁵ Roman Ingarden, *Człowiek i czas [The man and time]*, in: Roman Ingarden, *Książeczka o człowieku*, p. 68. See Marek Rembierz, *The person and the human individual*, in: *Political ethics*. Piotr Świercz (ed.), Ignatianum University Press, Krakow 2021, pp. 123-143.

⁶ Ibid, pp. 68-69. See Marek Rembierz, *Hope - humanity - society: questions concerning hope and the inspirations of critical realism*. In: *The Relational Theory Of Society*. "Archerian Studies" vol. 2. (eds.) Krzysztof Wielecki, Klaudia Śledzińska, Peter Lang, Berlin 2020. pp. 159-176.

Philosopher's birth), the consideration of his thought in the situation of a pandemic state can also be carried out under the motto "Roman Ingarden and the Situation of Our Time." The year 2020, celebrated in Poland as the Year of Roman Ingarden, turns out to be the period in human history when a pandemic has broken out again and is occurring on a global scale, when the spreading and deadly virus causes⁷, on a massive scale, "the layer of Human Reality in the world seems to blur and disappear, and man discovers the original face of Nature". While experiencing the destructive effects of a pandemic, one also experiences an accelerated re-evaluation in the world of human values: what is valued and what is preferred in action as something particularly precious, something more important than something else. It is a characteristic of pandemic times that what has hitherto seemed inevitable, stable, and almost unchangeable – also in economic and political activity with its long-term goals – becomes at once highly questionable, highly unstable, or no longer exists⁸. In this way, one experiences – for many surprising, unexpected, and beyond the hitherto horizon of imagination – a radical interference of the pandemic in the world of human values, arousing anxiety, fear, and apprehension. It is an intervention which also generates and intensifies fundamental and sharply defined conflicts of values⁹, between which an irreversible choice must be made: either this good must be chosen, or that suitable must be chosen, at the cost of the loss of other goods; either this good must be given up, or that good must be given up; action in favor of a particular good must be abandoned, since it is impossible to preserve them simultaneously (the necessary forces and means are not available), and the decisions which have been made are not reversible in time¹⁰.

⁷ See Elżbieta Szczot, *Death in Times of SARS-CoV-2 Pandemic. Legal Regulations of the Burial of the COVID-19 Deceased in Poland*, „Review of European and Comparative Law”, (47) 4 (2021), pp. 135-156. „The outbreak of the SARS-CoV-2 virus pandemic at the end of 2019, which started in the Chinese city of Wuhan, presented mankind with new challenges. The COVID-19 pandemic revived questions about dignified death, dying, access to the sick, contact with family members dying in hospitals and care facilities, as well as manners and forms of burial” (Ibid, p. 136).

⁸Ryszard Wiśniewski argues: "The ideals of good are abstract, while evil is the concrete content of life, present in us constantly and affecting us constantly, even though we try to limit it. Traditional ethics functions as if across human experience, offering ideals that are not sufficiently effective levers of morality" – Ryszard Wiśniewski, *Aksjologia zła. W sprawie zmiany perspektywy filozofii wartości [Axiology of Evil. On the change of perspective of the philosophy of values]*, in: C. Gorzka, R. Jadczyk (eds.), *Studia z filozofii i logiki. Księga pamiątkowa w darze Profesorowi Leonowi Gumańskiemu [Studies in philosophy and logic. A memorial book as a gift to Professor Leon Gumański]*, Publishing House of the Nicolaus Copernicus University, Toruń 1997, p. 150.

⁹ See Adam Węgrzecki, *O konflikcie wartości [On the Conflict of Values]*, „Zeszyty Naukowe. Akademia Ekonomiczna w Krakowie”, 2006 vol. 722, pp. 5-21.

¹⁰ See Marek Rembierz, *Stan pandemii jako ćwiczenie duchowe. O uczeniu się i oswojaniu siebie w stanie pandemicznej zapaści i dezorientacji witalnej [The pandemic state as a spiritual exercise. On learning and taming oneself in the state of pandemic collapse and vital disorientation]*. In: Wiesław Gumuła (ed.) *Dzienniki stanu pandemii (Czytane z perspektywy socjologii codzienności) [Diaries of a State of Pandemic (Read from the perspective of the sociology of everyday life)]*, Zakład Wydawniczy NOMOS, Kraków 2021, pp. 223-245.

REVALUATIONS AND CONFLICTS OF VALUES VS. LACK OF REFLECTION AND WEAKNESS OF IMAGINATION

An intensified and dramatic conflict of values is particularly evident when, in a state of massive threat to human life and the resulting inefficiency of emergency services, which have only limited resources at their disposal (especially in terms of time, personnel and equipment), a tragically torn situation arises in which one has to choose whose life to give up to be able, with the resources thus saved, to begin saving the life of another person. This situation occurs, and in a way that can even be taken as a model (although as a model always simplified and requiring restraint in extrapolating), if, with several seriously ill patients in urgent need of a ventilator, medical services have only one ventilator at their disposal. Doctors may have the correct moral sense and a properly formed conscience, but they do not have the necessary ventilator, and with the best will to help, they will not connect the patient to their conscience to save his life. How can we understand the "necessity of choice" as the necessity of elimination when the "fatal coincidence" absolutely imposes the need of elimination, and the possibility of choice was previously taken away because the technical means were not secured? The order of moral values inherent in the ethos of medicine is disintegrating. It cannot be replaced by a dangerous dummy of the order of moral values, which is being replaced by administrative selection instructions for medical services, which determine who is not worth saving and who should not be saved, and who is worth trying to save. In these conditions, it is not the doctors who decide "who not to save." Still, it is also the people of science, humanists and ethicists who are responsible for this decision, because through their – at least – carelessness they allowed such a situation to happen; it is the lack of imagination of the people of science (not to mention the lack of imagination of the people in power who have the means) that made the patients and doctors involuntarily hostages to the "no way out" situation in which it is impossible to make good choices. In this situation, doctors cannot be dismissed with high-flown generalities and lofty laments about their difficult situation, in which they themselves must – ultimately – manage somehow, at the cost of patients' lives and the destruction of their ethos¹¹. The duty to

Wiesław Gumuła, *Niecodzienna codzienność. Świat społeczny w stanie pandemii* [Un-everyday Everyday Life: The Social World in the Time of the Pandemic] In: Wiesław Gumuła (ed.) *Dzienniki stanu pandemii (Czytane z perspektywy socjologii codzienności)* [Diaries of a State of Pandemic (Read from the perspective of the sociology of everyday life)], Zakład Wydawniczy NOMOS, Kraków 2021, pp. 333-345.

¹¹ See Ryszard Wiśniewski, *Wina jako węzeł moralności* [Guilt as a knot of morality], "Filozofia Chrześcijańska" 2012, 9, pp. 7-21.

indicate to the emergency services a decision which, for whatever reason, is possible lies especially with those who, not so long ago, abandoned honest reflection on what the "original face of Nature" really is, what the face of that element in which man in the situation of a pandemic discovers, as it were, anew "in the world around him, and even in himself, and feels abandoned in a world alien and terrible to himself."

By quoting the observation that "the layer of Human Reality in the world seems to fade and disappear, and man discovers the original face of Nature" in the situation of struggling with a pandemic, it is in no way meant to awaken panic, fear further and strengthen the feeling of hopelessness, as in horror films showing "raging" pandemics annihilating (almost) all of humanity or in some exaggerated media messages, but to stimulate – in the perspective of Ingarden's anthropological-axiological investigations – reflection focused on recognizing the extent of the current pandemic's interference in the world of human values. According to the clear message of Ingarden's anthropological-axiological investigations, this reflection is also an expression of man's spiritual power. It is to strengthen his spiritual power when it weakens or disappears when overwhelmed by the forces of Nature. Can the spiritual power of man struggling with the experience of a pandemic, with its many direct and indirect decidedly adverse effects, which becomes at the same time the experience of the accelerated disappearance of a relatively thin "layer of Human Reality in the world," improve itself in this struggle, so that man, despite failures and disasters, strengthens (develops) himself morally and intellectually? Is this power doomed only to undergo further destruction and degeneration? After all, Ingarden places his hope in the spiritual power of man, that it can – despite the ever-increasing adversities – save humanity, creating a world of human values.

REFLECTION AS "ATTACKING MATTERS HITHERTO SETTLED WITH TRITE PLATITUDES"

Following Ingarden's anthropological-axiological inquiries in reflecting on the reevaluations of the pandemic times, it is necessary to take into account the essential qualities indicated by Ingarden of Edmund Husserl's way of teaching philosophy, as at the same time the model and pattern of the desired method of doing philosophical reflection are revealed: "[...] he did not refer to or discuss other people's views, he did not even teach his views: he taught live co-thinking, co-investigating, co-seeing of the things of which he spoke. This ability to think

on one's own - albeit with the help of a professor – to attack matters that had been settled so far with trite platitudes, to realize that one does not understand anything and that one must, with one's effort, extricate oneself from purely conceptual thinking and gain direct cognitive contact with a reality that is definitively given to us – made it possible to learn from Husserl not so much a ready-made philosophy in its various systems and schools, as to practice it live, again, create it anew”¹².

In the situation of struggling with the advancing pandemic, when in various areas of human activity one experiences an increased and disturbing cognitive disorientation, when one feels painfully aware of the lack of reliable knowledge about what is really happening (what are the causes, how to accurately recognize the actual threats, how to effectively counteract what threatens health and life in various ways) and how it can probably further develop, the more necessary in the reliable practice of science is – highly valued by Ingarden – "attacking matters that have so far been settled by hackneyed platitudes, realizing that one actually does not understand anything and that one has to get out of purely conceptual thinking by one's own efforts", because at present one bears in practice horrendous costs of only seemingly settling matters (of great importance) by "hackneyed platitudes" and of pretending to understand phenomena from which in fact one wholly or almost "does not understand anything". At the same time, however, one should be aware of an additional, severe difficulty in reliable reflection on reality, since, in the present situation, one does not really, or even to a minimal extent, have a chance to "acquire direct cognitive contact with a certain reality which is ultimately given to us." The available contact is mediated in many ways: in the case of science, it is mediated by the research and findings of other scientists. In the public sphere, it is mediated by the media, which means that often we have to do mainly or even exclusively with artifacts that are already a particular interpretation of the facts or - what is worse - their manipulation to hide something and throw a false trail. It is, therefore, all the more worthwhile and necessary, in an independent and reliable reflection, to consistently strive for "direct cognitive contact with reality" while maintaining constant criticism and self-criticism so as not to allow oneself to be seduced by the illusion that one has "gained" direct contact with reality as it is. Or at least one should strive to distinguish between facts and artifacts that transform them - according to someone else's idea and for someone else's use – so as not to lose the cognitive contact with reality in favor of

¹² Roman Ingarden, *Filozofia Edmunda Husserla. Zarys encyklopedyczny* [*The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl. An encyclopedic outline*]. In: *Fenomenologia Romana Ingardena* [*Phenomenology by Roman Ingarden*] ("Studia Filozoficzne". Special Edition), Warsaw 1972, p. 8.

succumbing to constant indoctrination that imprints and perpetuates specifically deformed images of reality, at the same time passing them off as reality itself (as such).

If, in shaping the intellectual skills necessary for the development of cognitive independence, Husserl – as Ingarden puts it – "taught live co-thinking, co-investigating, co-seeing things," then it is very important here to take into account the role of the scientific community in the in-depth examination and viewing of analyzed matters. This is because it is not the "epistemic monad" that investigates alone and is closed in on itself that is the most desirable form of intellectual independence. But this independence is effectively developed by those who are able, together with others, to gain cognitively valuable contact with reality through intellectual cooperation.

REEVALUATION OF THE WAYS OF DOING SCIENCE AND EVALUATING ITS ACHIEVEMENTS

Supposing from the beginning of the pandemic one can rightly point out the severe negligence of science (sciences) in accurately identifying various pandemic threats. In that case, one of the reasons for this dramatically evident intellectual weakness (or even collapse) of the world of science¹³, bringing disastrous consequences in practice, is the lack of fruitful knowledge-generating discussion, whose necessity and main principles and ethos were convincingly characterized by Ingarden. A discussion that serves cognitive purposes should "[...] stem from a solid internal need of all those taking part in it, and be conducted with their internal freedom preserved. This inner freedom arises from absolute reliability of thinking, from honesty towards oneself and from unconstrained by any circumstances striving to obtain an explanation of matters which have not been explained, and sometimes dogmatically accepted based on faith or authority"¹⁴.

If we follow the statements of some scientists, including epidemiologists, and it is also about professors holding responsible and leading management and advisory positions in central state institutions (primarily reports from December 2019 to early March 2020, but also later, which are available on the Internet resources), we can assume that the opinions expressed,

¹³ See Agnieszka Lekka-Kowalik, *Uniwersytet jako firma usługowa – szansa czy klęska? [The University as a service company – opportunity or failure?]*, "Ethos", 2009, (1-2), p. 52-69. Marek Rembierz, *The Current Dispute on the Status of the University. The Anthropological and Axiological Aspects of the Problem*, "Ethos", 2019, (4), pp. 340-357.

¹⁴ Roman Ingarden, *O dyskusji owocnej słowa kilka [A few words on the fruitful discussion]*, in: Roman Ingarden, *Książeczka o człowieku*, p. 173.

unfortunately, are not always the result of "absolute reliability of thinking; it even gives the impression that they belong to the theses "dogmatically accepted on faith or based on authority" (about the questionable quality of apodictic statements regarding the pandemic formulated by confused politicians and, what is worse, statements confusing millions of people, I will not mention here). Then, it is impossible to have a serious discussion with them, which is so "urgently" needed in this period – a discussion that allows developing a reliable view of the situation and its accurate analysis, thanks to which human life and the world of human values can be saved.

Effective recognition of the sources and multiple consequences of the pandemic (and ways to counteract it) requires interdisciplinary discussions, transcending the artificial barriers of institutionalized science, and engaging in the debate representatives of various scientific fields, including philosophy, logic, and ethics. However, for such discussions – necessary nowadays – to develop fruitfully, their participants must develop the ability – postulated by Ingarden – to "free ourselves from our intellectual habits, [...] free ourselves from the automatism of our language, our conceptual apparatus. This is, in fact, a necessary precursor to the attempt and effort (sometimes considerable) to understand other people's language and conceptual apparatus"¹⁵. Supposing one does not go beyond one's linguistic schemes. In that case, the phenomena constituting new cognitive and practical challenges are, as it were, forcefully "tightened" to the hitherto too poor resources of language, thus omitting the essential properties of these new phenomena and falsifying their image presented in an inappropriate linguistic presentation. To be able to "free oneself from one's intellectual habits" and "free oneself from the automatism of one's language," one needs an adequately formed logical and methodological culture and ethical attitude. At the same time, the terrorization and incapacitation of institutional science by the system of grants (planned, long-term) does not allow for intellectual understanding, for quick reaction in the face of what the reality itself suggests as urgent problems, which at the same time requires going beyond the cognitive and linguistic patterns, also metrified by the system of grants.

To describe the situation of science, in which "man's spiritual power weakens or disappears," Ingarden's statements quoted here also seem appropriate: "When man's spiritual power weakens or fades, the layer of Human Reality in the world seems to blur and disappear, and man discovers the original face of Nature – the element in the world around him, and even in himself, and then feels abandoned in a world alien and terrible to himself." The sluggishness,

¹⁵ Ibid.

sluggishness, and laziness of the present institutional science, especially when contrasted with the vivacity of virologists of the beginning and the first half of the 20th century, contributes significantly to the fact that – contrary to the false promises of scientific ideologies, This science (as a whole of sciences) has abandoned man at least in the sense that it has left beyond the horizon of the dominant imagination a rapidly spreading and "disobedient to science" pandemic. At the same time, however, science as one of the leading manifestations of man's creative spiritual power, should now regain its vigor and integrity, and with cognitive passion, oppose the force of the destructive element. This is one of the urgently needed reevaluations of pandemic times.

CONCLUSIONS

In reference to many axiological concepts which assume the permanence of values, Jan Woleński's warning that "the heralds of great axiology are dominant, convincing the masses of their values as "the only ones", i.e. better than any others, is correct. When they win, they arrange closed societies. This may not be the case, but it is. This is enough to [...] distrust axiologists acting in the guise of politicians or reformers, resolving age-old philosophical disputes by religious dogma or legal decree. They are dangerous cases. It is ironic that a dyed-in-the-wool axiologist, to use St. J. Lec's accurate thought, behaves according to the principle "whoever has values still in his mouth, has them also in his nearby nose"¹⁶. Ingarden's interpretation of the experience of the fragility of values strongly opposes the deceptive promises and claims of various types of "grand axiology" that show and impose a false image of the world of values. Ingarden's interpretation, which takes into account the possibility of the disappearance of fragile values, allows one to realistically recognize and analyze the experience of the revaluation taking place in pandemic times. It is a current challenge and a task, which will have to be faced both cognitively and practically, without succumbing to the illusions (promises without cover) of the "great axiology"¹⁷.

¹⁶ Jan Woleński, *Wartości: między filozofią a doświadczeniem potocznym* [*Values: between philosophy and everyday experience*], <http://www.humanizm.net.pl/wolenski2.htm>

¹⁷ Działania badawcze wsparte ze środków przyznanych w ramach programu Inicjatywa Doskonałości Badawczej Uniwersytetu Śląskiego w Katowicach: „Horyzont Postcovidowy”. The research activities co-financed by the funds granted under the Research Excellence Initiative of the University of Silesia in Katowice.

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