Wartime Experiences and Popular Support for Peace Agreements: Comparative Evidence from Three Cases

Karin Dyrstad

Department of Sociology and Political Science, Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU)

Karin.dyrstad@ntnu.no

Web: www.karindyrstad.com

ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0545-1532

Helga M. Binningsbø

Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO)

Twitter: @HBinningsb

ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3976-2067

Kristin M. Bakke

Department of Political Science, University College London (UCL) & Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO)

Twitter: @KristinMBakke

Web: www.kristinbakke.com

ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5115-0151

Abstract: Peace agreements are negotiated and signed by representatives of the government and the rebels, often after many years of violent conflict, but their ability to transform a war-torn society hinges on the approval of ordinary people. Yet we have little systematic knowledge of what ordinary people think of peace agreements in the long run. This study begins to fill that gap, drawing on a set of comparative public opinion surveys from Guatemala, Nepal, and Northern Ireland, three cases where long civil wars were ended by peace agreements. The peace agreements in these countries have strong popular support, though there is variation across specific provisions. Across these cases, our findings suggest that legacies of violence are not generally associated with long-term support for peace agreements across. However, when we look at provisions that grant concessions to the rebels, there is some evidence of lasting legacies.

Introduction

This study examines public support for peace agreements in three post-conflict contexts, ten to twenty years after the agreements were signed. Though peace agreements are often ambitious documents offering prospects of fundamental restructuring of society through specific reforms, they rarely represent ideal solutions or roadmaps for future development—and many break down (e.g., Bell and Badanjak 2019) or are not implemented in full (e.g., Walter 2002; Derouen, Lea, and Wallensteen 2009; Joshi, Quinn, and Regan 2015). Peace agreements are negotiated and signed by political elites—typically the result of lengthy bargaining processes between warring parties who will not sign unless they believe they have more to gain from collaborating than from continued fighting—sometimes with civil society involvement (e.g., Nilsson 2012). The ability of these elite-level agreements to transform a war-torn society hinges also on what *ordinary people* think of the agreement (c.f. Nilsson and González Marín 2020)—ordinary people who may have endured years of violence. We argue that wartime experiences have long-term implications for what people think about peace agreements. Indeed, peace agreements represent pivotal historical moments, bringing hope about a peaceful future, but they often remain contentious *long* after they are signed (c.f. Morgan-Jones, Stefanovic, and Loizides 2021).

A growing number of studies investigate what people think about peace processes and peace agreements, but most examine the immediate post-signing period (e.g., Hayes and McAllister 2001; Ringdal, Simkus, and Listhaug 2007; Dyrstad et al. 2011) or people's perceptions in the midst of peace negotiations (e.g., Tellez 2019; Liendo and Braithwaite 2018; Matanock and Garbiras-Díaz 2018, Loizides et al. in this Special Feature).[1] While people in conflict-affected societies may show support for efforts to end violence when these efforts are fresh, particularly if they have experienced violence, our study asks if conflict legacies also drive people's perceptions of peace agreements in the *long term*? This research question situates us within the lower right quadrant of this Special Feature's conceptual framework (see Introduction in this Special Feature), in which peace processes have long-lasting effects on citizens' perceptions and behaviors. We pay special attention to provisions that give concessions to the opposition—the 'rebels'. Such concessions may be necessary, even crucial, to end the conflict, but may be particularly controversial as they may be seen as rewarding violence. To the degree that peace agreements often entail a shift in power relations in favor of the rebels, we expect support for provisions granting them concessions to follow wartime cleavages. That is, we expect that the 'side' on which people participated, or the 'side' by which they were victimized by, will color their views on the peace agreement.

Employing a most different case approach, we examine public support for peace agreements in three post-conflict contexts—Guatemala, Nepal, and Northern Ireland—ten to twenty years after the agreements were signed. The comparative Post-Conflict Attitudes for Peace (PAP) survey was conducted between January and July 2016. Our analysis reveals that overall, the peace agreements in these countries enjoy strong popular support even many years after they were signed, though there is significant variation across provisions. We find that experiences of wartime violence are not generally associated with support (or lack thereof) for peace agreements in the long run, but wartime cleavages, in the sense of which 'side' people fought on or were victimized by, shape their views on concessions given to the rebels. The most

---

[1] There is also a growing body of research examining cases without a negotiated end to the conflict (e.g., Fabbe, Hazlett, and Sınmazdemir 2019; Grossman, Manekin, and Miodownik 2015; Canetti et al. 2015; Kardov 2007). See Carey, Gonzalez, and Gläßel in this Special Feature for the long-term legacies of the military victory in Sri Lanka.

consistent finding is that compared to non-victims, victims of government-sponsored violence are more in favor of such concessions. Overall, our analysis shows substantial variation from one context to the next, which serves as a warning against drawing general conclusions from single-case studies.

Argument: The long-term legacies of wartime violence

A long-standing body of research has shown that experiences of violence shape people's political behavior and attitudes even long after a conflict ends (e.g., Dyrstad et al. 2011; Brounéus 2014; Gilligan, Pasquale, and Samii 2014; Nussio and Oppenheim 2014; Hall et al. 2018; Hong and Kang 2017; De Juan and Pierskalla 2016)—even across generations (e.g., Balcells 2012; Lupu and Peisakhin 2017; Rozenas and Zhukov 2019; Costalli and Ruggeri 2019; Villamil 2020).[2] Warfare is likely to generate both psychological and material grievances: trauma or disability from one's own experiences of violence (either as a victim or perpetrator or both), the loss and victimization of loved ones, and loss of one's home and income (e.g., Justino 2009; Gates et al. 2012). Though there is growing debate about the conditions under which experiences of violence may have positive effects on certain postwar political behaviors, such as participation in politics and social capital (e.g., Blattman 2009; Bellows and Miguel 2009; Voors et al. 2012; Bauer et al. 2016), research (and practice) on conflict reconciliation has long highlighted the detrimental legacies of violence on people's identities and attitudes, particularly perceptions of the 'outgroup' (e.g., Bar-Tal 2000; Kelman 2008). We argue that experiences of violence are likely to have long-term implications for people's perceptions of the very initiatives aimed at bringing the conflict to an end (and preventing its recurrence). This is due both to the nature of peace agreements and the lasting legacies of violence.

Peace agreements represent pivotal historical moments, bringing hopes for a peaceful future, and they remain salient long after they are signed. They are typically the result of drawn-out bargaining processes in which the warring parties attempt to 'correct' the 'wrongs' of both the pre-conflict period and conflict itself, laying out a blueprint for the future. They promise peace, reconciliation, and economic reconstruction to people affected by years of violence, suspicion, and neglect. Peace agreements are, however, also the result of political compromises, with the possibility of dissatisfaction both among those party to the negotiations and those left out, which can create spoiler dynamics that impede implementation (e.g., Stedman 1997; Greenhill and Major 2007; Pearlman 2009). Indeed, many peace agreements are not implemented—or implemented slowly or only partially. Consider the slow implementation of the peace agreement in Nepal, of which Human Rights Watch noted, ten years after the agreement was signed: "[T]he promises of accountability for abuses and the resolution of thousands of disappearances have been broken by Nepal's main political parties, all of which have taken turns at leading the government in the last decade" (Human Rights Watch 2016). According to the Peace Accord Matrix (Joshi, Quinn, and Regan 2015), which compares the implementation of individual provisions in 34 comprehensive peace agreements signed between 1989 and 2012, the average implementation record ten years after signing is 49 percent. Evidently, peace agreements may be contentious political issues—certainly salient—long after they are signed.

Peace agreements are particularly salient for individuals who experienced violence firsthand, as such experiences leave enduring legacies. Indeed, both wartime victimhood and

---

[2] To capture people's experiences of wartime violence, some studies rely on self-reports from public opinion surveys, while others rely on multigenerational surveys or geographic data capturing wartime violence within an individual or her ancestor's area.

participation are likely to shape how individuals view peace agreements in the long term. First, although victims of violence may be skeptical of political authorities and, by extension, elite-level bargains,[3] and may find it difficult to forgive perpetrators of violence (Bakke, O'Loughlin, and Ward 2009), victims are also acutely aware of the high costs of violence (Tellez 2019)—and, indeed, are likely to experience war-related stress long after the fighting ends (Ringdal, Ringdal, and Simkus 2008). Hence victims of violence may be more likely than the general population to favor any agreement that puts an end to the war, even years after the violence ceased—and perhaps particularly in hindsight, when they have experienced peace.

H1a: Compared to non-victims, victims of wartime violence are more likely to display support of the peace agreement.

Second, just like victims of the war may be relieved it is over, so may armed participants, who bore the costs of combat. As such, they may be likely to hold a positive view of any agreement that brought an end to the fighting, also as time passes.[4] Alternatively, participants may have entrenched interests in continued warfare, as they enjoy benefits such as status in their community (c.f. Jankowski 1991; Kostelnik and Skarbek 2013 on gangs) and access to wartime selective incentives (c.f. Lichbach 1994), or combat may have hardened their attitudes towards their rivals and to compromise (Grossman, Manekin, and Miodownik 2015). Even if that is the case, former participants not only bore the costs of combat but are also members of or affiliated with the very organizations that negotiated and signed the peace agreement(s), and as such, they may be more likely to approve of the agreement than the overall population who, generally, have less of a say in designing the agreement. To the degree that the elites signing the agreement support it *and* former participants follow their leaders in the calculus that their 'side' had more to gain from a peace agreement than from continued fighting (c.f. Greenhill and Major 2007)—which may be a tall assumption—we would expect armed participants to be supportive of the agreement. Thus, while recognizing that the literature suggests expectations that go in different directions, we propose the following hypothesis:

H1b: Compared to non-participants, former participants in armed conflict are more likely to display support of the peace agreement.

The political compromises in peace agreements often involve granting concessions to the opposition—the 'rebels'. At an aggregate level, research suggests that such concessions are crucial in ensuring an end to fighting and preventing that armed conflict resumes (e.g., Derouen, Lea, and Wallensteen 2009; Hartzell and Hoddie 2007; Jarstad and Nilsson 2008; Ottmann and Vüllers 2015). These concessions represent a shift in power relations between the government and the rebels, by which the government loses some authority and the rebel gains some, for example through power sharing (Svensson 2007). By conceding to some of the rebels' claims, peace agreements redress grievances that presumably fueled the conflict in the first place and address the opposition's concerns about their post-war access to power—and grant them a certain level of legitimacy. In Nepal, for example, the Maoist party became the

---

[3] For example, victims of war-related violence may be less likely to have confidence in the state as it either failed to protect them from harm or was directly responsible for their suffering. Several studies—including Grosjean (2014), De Juan and Pierskalla (2016), and Hong and Kang (2017)—have shown that violence has a negative effect on political trust.

[4] This is particularly likely to be the case when recruitment to combat was not entirely voluntary (as, for example, in Guatemala's Civil Defense Patrols). But even when recruitment is voluntary, the boundary between victim and combatant is not clear-cut, as manifest, for example, in ongoing debates about victim compensation in Northern Ireland.

largest party in the first postwar election (Pokharel and Rana 2013). In essence, the civil war and ensuing peace agreement in Nepal allowed the Maoist party to move from a marginal to a large political party. In Northern Ireland, the Good Friday Agreement gave representatives of both 'sides' a seat at the negotiation table and entailed reforms that sought to redress the 'Nationalist' side's sense of long-term marginalization and discrimination of the Catholic community (e.g., Wolff 2001), though there were elements on both sides who rejected the agreement—'Nationalists' who thought it did not go far enough towards creating a united Ireland and 'Unionists' thinking it granted too many concessions to the Nationalists. In Guatemala, in comparison, it is clear that the peace agreement did little to improve the political influence of the insurgent groups, nor the people they claimed to represent, the indigenous rural poor, as URNG, the political party established by the rebels, has experienced limited electoral success.[5]

While wartime experiences may make individuals supportive of any peace agreement that ends violence—as H1a and H1b above state—they may view the specific provisions in these agreements differently, pending on their wartime 'side'.[6] Granting concessions to rebels especially, may have a different standing among civilians who sympathized with their cause compared to those who were harmed by their violence. As such concessions are often crucial for ending conflict and maintaining peace, it is particularly important to understand how people evaluate them.

Recent studies from Colombia reach diverging conclusions. Matanock and Garbiras-Díaz (2018), relying on an endorsement survey experiment, find that Colombians in general were skeptical towards provisions seen as granting concessions to the FARC—especially if they viewed the FARC negatively—even if they supported the peace process overall. In contrast, Tellez (2019) finds that people in conflict-affected areas in the country were more likely to support both the peace process and the granting of concessions to the FARC. Tellez (2019), like Kreiman and Masullo (2020), argues that people are 'safety-seekers' who support peace initiatives and provisions they consider to be most suited to ensure their current and future security.[7] While these studies from Colombia examine people's perceptions either when the armed conflict was still ongoing or immediately after the 2016 peace agreement, we do not know if people weigh these issues in the same way when the armed conflict has turned into a more distant memory.

As noted earlier, research on the long-term legacies of political violence show that these experiences influence people's opinions long after the violence ended, even across generations (e.g., Lupu and Peisakhin 2017; Rozenas and Zhukov 2019). Examining the long-term effects of the Spanish civil war, Balcells (2012) finds that the wartime victimization of an individual's family members led the individual to reject the perpetrator's political identity in terms of

---

[5] IFES, http://www.electionguide.org/countries/id/90/, accessed 26 August 2021.

[6] We recognize that assessment of 'sides' in any wartime struggle is complicated and that both the government and the opposition may consist of numerous factions, with implications for the dynamics of violence, including ingroup targeting (e.g., Cunningham, Bakke, and Seymour 2012). That is, victims of violence may be victims of violence conducted by factions fighting in their name (on their 'side'). A conflict's 'master cleavage' masks the numerous struggles going on (Kalyvas 2003). Nonetheless, because peace agreements typically address only the 'master cleavage', it is reasonable to assume that both victims and participants do care about concessions given to the 'other side'.

[7] Kreiman and Masullo (2020) argue that civilians' support for peace agreements may be conditioned by whether the agreement was negotiated by those who perpetrated violence against them: they are more likely to support the agreement if the faction that victimized them is at the negotiation table.

present-day political cleavages. Hong and Kang (2017) find that violence committed by South Korean forces and their allies during the 1950–53 Korean War made people skeptical towards the South Korean government and military more than fifty years later.

These studies do not examine concessions to rebels, but they speak to our assumption that *who or which 'side'* committed the violence an individual experienced during conflict—even a long time ago—shapes how s/he views these actors today. With respect to people's views on concessions given to the rebels, we believe that while fear of renewed violence may make people willing to accept such concessions to ensuring safety in the immediate post-conflict period, this fear diminishes over time such that deep-rooted grudges towards perpetrators will dominate in forming people's opinions.

In line with this, we expect that the identity of the perceived perpetrators is important for understanding how experiences of wartime violence affects people's perceptions of specific peace agreement provisions, particularly provisions that are seen as clear concessions to the rebels. Victims of violence at the hands of the rebels may be skeptical of peace agreement provisions that in principle grant concessions to their (or their family's) perpetrator(s). Following the same side-taking dynamics, victims of government violence may be more inclined to support provisions that reduce the wartime government's formal power by granting concessions to rebels. Therefore, we propose the following hypotheses:

H2a: Compared to non-victims, individuals who were victimized by rebels are less likely to favor provisions that give concessions to the rebels.

H2b: Compared to non-victims, individuals who were victimized by the government are more likely to favor provisions that give concessions to rebels.

Similarly, we expect support for provisions that give concessions to rebels to be colored not only by the experience of former participation in general but the 'side' on which people participated. We expect former participants on the rebel side to be largely in favor of provisions giving concessions to the rebels, while former participants on the government side, including pro-government militias, are more likely to be opposed to such provisions, which are seen to empower the rebels.

H2c: Compared to non-participants, individuals who participated on the rebel side are more likely to favor provisions that give concessions to rebels.

H2d: Compared to non-participants, individuals who participated on the government side are less likely to favor provisions that give concessions to rebels.

We test these propositions about the long-term legacies of violence across three post-conflict cases where relative peace has prevailed for several years after the signing of a peace agreement: Guatemala, Nepal, and Northern Ireland.

Case selection

Our case selection follows a most different case approach (e.g., Seawright and Gerring 2008). The logic of this design implies that if a similar pattern is found across the three cases, despite differing on a range of characteristics, this pattern should not be contingent on any of these

characteristics, and the findings may apply to other cases within the same population. The subsections below describe the population and the criteria for selecting cases within this population and provide some details about the three cases.

Population and selection criteria

When designing the study, we defined our population as post-conflict electoral democracies that have experienced an internal armed conflict ending through a comprehensive peace agreement and with no resumption of violence. As peace agreements are more common in the post-Cold War period (e.g., Kreutz 2010), we focus on agreements signed after 1990.[8]

To maximize variation, we selected cases from Asia, Europe, and Latin America (*geography*), including cases of different levels of *economic development*. They also differ on key *conflict characteristics* (type and duration), and on types of *peacebuilding strategies* implemented after the violence ended (see Table 1 and online supplemental material A).

Table 1. Key case characteristics at the time the survey was conducted (2016)

Dimension	Characteristic	Guatemala	Nepal	Northern Ireland
Conflict	Ethnic conflict	Yes	No	Yes
	Duration of conflict (# of years)	36	10	28
	Year of peace agreement	1996	2006	1998
Peace-building strategies	Inclusiveness: Power sharing	No	Yes	Yes
	Inclusiveness: Type of elections	PR	Mixed	PR (STV)
	Inclusiveness: Rebel integration in army	No	Yes	No
	TJ: Amnesty	No	No	No*
	TJ: TRC report	1999	In process	No**
	TJ: Tribunal	No	No	No
	Security sector: Army reduction	Yes	No	Yes
	Security sector: Police reform	Yes	No	Yes

Notes: PR = proportional representation; STV = single transferable vote; TJ = transitional justice; TRC = truth and reconciliation commission; * a release of political prisoners; ** a commission on a specific incident, Bloody Sunday (30 January 1972), has released a report, but no full TRC report has been called for. *Sources*: Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al. 2001); UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset (Harbom et al. 2006); US Institute of Peace.

Hence, similar findings across the three cases should not be contingent on any of these characteristics.

For a more detailed discussion of the conflicts, see Dyrstad et al. (2021), but we note here that in all three cases, group inequalities played an important role in fueling the conflict in the first place. In Guatemala and Nepal, the rebels enjoyed support from marginalized groups, including rural indigenous people, lower castes, and ethnic minorities—and, indeed, Guatemala's rural indigenous population was heavily targeted (Commission for Historical Clarification 1999). In the territorial conflict of Northern Ireland, the dominant cleavage was between those preferring to remain within the United Kingdom (on the political side known as 'Unionists', while the paramilitary groups tend to be referred to as 'Loyalist'), predominantly from the Protestant community, and those preferring to join Ireland (on the political side known as 'Nationalists', while the paramilitary groups are known as 'Republicans'), predominantly from the Catholic community, though central to the conflict was economic discrimination of Catholics.

---

[8] See Howard and Stark (2017) on changing norms for conflict termination after September 11, 2011, and the ensuing 'war on terror'.

The peace agreements

The Guatemalan *Agreement of Firm and Durable Peace* (1996) ended 36 years of internal armed conflict between a coalition of left-wing guerrilla groups (the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity, URNG) and the state, which led to more than 200,000 civilian deaths. The state was responsible for most of the violence, which has been characterized as genocidal (Commission for Historical Clarification 1999). The peace agreement—which consists of 11 different agreements—was ambitious and included the formal recognition of indigenous people and their rights, the promise of a land reform, and several other measures to reduce inequalities and expand political and economic rights (Caumartin and Sánchez-Ancochea 2011). However, the implementation has been slow, and economic and political power remains in the hands of a small elite.

The *Comprehensive Peace Agreement* (2006) in Nepal was signed after 10 years of intense conflict between Maoist insurgents and the state, a conflict that claimed more than 13,000 lives. A key aspect of the agreement was to hold elections for a Constituent Assembly to draft a new constitution. The agreement also abolished the monarchy, established that Nepal would be a federal state, and called for socioeconomic restructuring, improved minority rights, and the end of gender and caste discrimination.

In Northern Ireland, the *Good Friday Agreement* (1998) put an end to 30 years of armed conflict. While protracted, the conflict was less intense than in Guatemala and Nepal, with about 3,700 people killed. The agreement restored a devolved Northern Ireland legislative assembly within the United Kingdom and included provisions for executive power sharing between parties representing the Protestant and Catholic communities—though the implementation of power sharing has been hampered by political deadlock. A highly contentious issue in the agreement was policing, with the Catholic/'Nationalist' community considering the Royal Ulster Constabulary to be a symbol of a sectarian state, partial to the Protestants/'Unionists'.

Data and methods

We designed the PAP survey to map and compare citizens' perceptions of peace agreements, post-war developments, and experiences of violence. The questionnaire is unique for this project, but to facilitate comparative research, we drew on previous post-conflict surveys (in particular, Humphreys and Weinstein 2004, Simkus 2007, and O'Loughlin, Kolossov, and Toal 2014). Table 2 summarizes key aspects of the data collection. As we relied on local practices and recommendations for conducting surveys, the sampling procedure varied from case to case. A closer description of the sampling and the questionnaire can be found in the online supplemental material B.

Table 2. Key characteristics of the PAP survey

What	Guatemala	Nepal	Northern Ireland
Number of respondents	1,216	1,200	813
Time of survey	Jan. 2016	March-April 2016	May-July 2016
Representativeness	Nationally	Nationally	Nationally
Sampling frame	2015 electoral roll	2011 Census	Postcode Address File
Sampling design	*1.* PSUs* = 120 segments within 99 (of 340) municipalities *2.* Households drawn at random *3.* Respondents selected based on 'last birthday' rule	*1.* PSUs = 60 wards from 45 (of 77) districts *2.* Households drawn at random *3.* Respondents selected with Kish grid	*1.* Households drawn at random from national sampling frame *2.* Respondents selected based on 'first birthday' rule
Mode	Face-to-face, tablet-assisted	Face-to-face, smartphone-assisted	Face-to-face, tablet-assisted

* PSU: Primary sampling unit. In Nepal, the survey was conducted before the federal state was fully implemented and new administrative units were established.

We note that during the fieldwork, current events made the armed conflicts, which in each case ended more than a decade ago, salient in different ways. In Guatemala, just before the survey was launched, fourteen former military officers were arrested, accused of crimes against humanity. Nepal experienced continued contention related to the implementation of a federal, secular state, while in Northern Ireland, the Brexit referendum—with its potential implications for the Northern Ireland border—took place during the fieldwork.

All models are estimated using ordinary least square regression (OLS), with standard errors adjusted to account for the stratified sampling in Guatemala and Nepal.[9]

Dependent variables

The outcomes of interest in this paper are (1) *overall* support for the peace agreement (corresponding to H1a-b) and (2) support for *provisions giving concessions* to former rebels (H2a-d).

Table 3 below shows descriptive statistics for all the peace agreement provisions included in the survey, as well as composite measures of support for each agreement (1 = strong disapproval; 5 = strong approval).[10] Provisions that grant concessions to former rebels are highlighted in grey in the table. We use a conservative measure for concessions to the rebels, examining only provisions that clearly grant concessions to armed actors. In Guatemala, we

---

[9] Standard errors are adjusted with the 'svy' prefix in Stata, using standard Taylor linearization, to account for the stratified, multistage sampling (see Table 2 and online supplemental material B).

[10] Principal component factor analysis of the items supports a one-dimensional solution in all three samples. The scalability of the items is poorer in Nepal than in Guatemala, and particularly high in Northern Ireland, which is partly explained by the fact that the questionnaire contained two more items here than in the other two cases. (Guatemala: KMO = 0.78, Cronbach's α = 0.68; Nepal: KMO = 0.59, Cronbach's α = 0.55; Northern Ireland: KMO = 0.76, Cronbach's α = 0.73).

measure concession to a rebel group by a question asking people about their views on the transformation of the former rebel coalition URNG into a political party. In Nepal, we rely on two questions about views on the political and military integration of the Maoist rebels. In Northern Ireland, we rely on a question about the early release of paramilitary prisoners.[11] For the complete wording of the items, see online supplemental material C.

Table 3. Support for the main provisions in peace agreements in Guatemala, Nepal, and Northern Ireland

Peace agreement / provision	Mean	St. dev	N
Guatemala: The Agreement of Firm and Durable Peace (1996)	*3.739*	*0.721*	*962*
URNG to political party	2.936	1.451	1,115
Recognition of indigenous people	4.328	1.022	1,147
Establishment of TRC	3.981	1.165	1,104
Land reform	3.774	1.222	1,048
Civilian control over army	3.894	1.184	1,104
Security sector reform	2.55	1.35	1,101
Police reform	2.3	1.25	1,137
Nepal: Comprehensive Peace Agreement (2006)	*3.691*	*0.622*	*787*
Abolishment of monarchy	3.003	1.526	1,198
New Constitution	4.137	0.828	1,135
Military integration	3.707	1.128	1,185
Establishment of TRC	4.219	0.621	804
Power sharing government	3.908	0.941	1,175
Federal state	2.963	1.414	1,132
Northern Ireland: The Good Friday Agreement (1998)	*3.961*	*0.552*	*713*
Devolved assembly	4.059	0.864	767
Power sharing executive	3.986	0.907	772
Decommissioning of arms	4.431	0.772	784
Troop reductions	4.239	0.867	778
Police reform	4.042	0.982	771
Early release of prisoners	2.621	1.275	759
Reducing unemployment differences	4.263	0.806	777
Remain part of UK	4.1	0.968	771
Overall	*3.788*	*0.654*	*2,462*

Note: All answer categories follow a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 indicates a strong disapproval of the provision, and 5 indicates strong approval/support. Provisions that grant concessions to former rebels in grey.

Independent variables

A set of dichotomous variables capture wartime experiences, honing in on both participation and victimization. To test H1a, we measure victimization as a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if a respondent reports to have experienced any type of war-related violence.[12]

---

[11] Though Loyalists paramilitaries, too, were imprisoned during the Troubles, the issue of paramilitary prisoners was most salient for the Republican/Nationalist community during the conflict itself, with several prisoners engaging in (and dying from) hunger strikes in their quest for 'political' prisoner status.

[12] Victimization is based on a series of questions about distinct types of exposure to violence, including the experiences of family members and witnessing violence. Hence, we do not distinguish between direct and indirect victimization.

About 41 percent (1,328 respondents) report to have experienced one or several types of war-related violence. Similarly, to test H1b, participation equals 1 for respondents who reports to have participated in the armed conflict; otherwise 0. About six percent (208 respondents) reported to have participated.

To test H2a-d, we disaggregate participation and victimization based on the 'sides' in the conflict. Wartime victimization is measured based on whether self-reported victims recognized the perpetrators of the acts of violence they had experienced. The answers were grouped into four mutually exclusive groups: non-victims; victims of government-sponsored violence—including pro-government militias or paramilitary groups; victims of rebel violence; and 'others', i.e. victims of violence from both sides, other actors including family members, criminal groups, or others, and cases in which the identity of the perpetrator(s) is unknown.[13] Our measure of wartime participation distinguishes between participation on the government or pro-government paramilitary side;[14] the rebel side; or both sides, unknown or other side(s). As we do not know the exact nature of participation, we refer to the groups as, for example, 'participants on the rebel side' rather than 'rebels'. Ideally, we would have used a more disaggregate measure, for instance distinguishing between participants on the government side or in pro-government-militias, but this would have yielded categories with very few observations.

For descriptive statistics of variables measuring wartime experiences, see online supplemental material D.

We control for sociodemographic characteristics, including age (measured in years), gender, poverty, and level of education.[15] In the pooled sample, we also control for case, using a set of dummy variables with Guatemala as the reference category. This ensures that findings are driven by within-country variation and not due to an uneven distribution of individual-level characteristics.

Finally, as wartime experiences may overlap with other, pre-existing grievances and group identities that contribute to the conflict in the first place (e.g., Horowitz 1985; Gurr 2000; Stewart 2002; Østby 2008; Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013) and may be associated with different views on the peace agreement, we control for group-based grievances and salient group identities. To control for group-based grievances, we rely on a dichotomous variable of self-reported discrimination due to one's belonging to an identity group (such as ethnicity, caste, language, or religion). We also use case-specific measures of group identity, reflecting the most salient identity markers in each context: indigenous identity in Guatemala, caste in Nepal, and community background in Northern Ireland.[16]

---

[13] Due to a routing error in the administration of the survey in Guatemala, some respondents were not given the appropriate follow-up questions about who had committed the violence, so they could not be assigned to one side or the other. Therefore, the group of 'other' perpetrators is particularly large in Guatemala.

[14] In Northern Ireland, this category includes Loyalist groups.

[15] For simplicity we treat education as a continuous variable, but our main findings hold also when using a set of dummy variables instead.

[16] Indigenous identity is measured as speaking an indigenous language at home, while caste is measured with a set of ten dummy variables: Hill Chhetri (the most prevalent group; reference category), Hill Brahmin, Hill Janajati, Hill Dalit, Terai Brahmin or Chhetri, Terai Dalit, Terai Janajati, other Terai caste, and Muslim). Community background is measured through a question about which community the respondent was brought up in: Protestant, Catholic, or 'other' (Hindu, Jewish, Muslim, none, other, and refusal).

Analysis

The empirical analysis is structured as follows: The first part describes levels of support for peace agreements overall, across cases, and across provisions, paying particular attention to the provisions that give concessions to the rebels. In the second part we test our hypotheses, overall and by country.

Descriptive statistics: Support for peace agreements across cases

Despite the elite-led nature of the creation of most peace agreements, the PAP survey documents strong popular support for the agreements in Guatemala, Nepal, and Northern Ireland (Figure 1). The mean score of about 3.8 translates into "approving" of all the peace agreement provisions included in the survey.[17] Overall, the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland enjoys stronger support than the other agreements. While the difference is statistically significant, it is small. There is greater diversity of opinion in Guatemala than in the other cases. The survey questions about the provisions are not directly comparable, as they were designed to reflect the key content of three different peace agreements, and conclusions should be drawn with some caution. In sum, however, our surveys indicate that the peace agreements following these three protracted conflict contexts enjoy widespread support. Provided that our most different case approach gives some inferential leverage beyond the three cases examined here, peace agreements may enjoy substantial support among individuals in post-conflict societies.

Figure 1: Distribution of overall support for the peace agreements, by country

Note: Dotted line represents total mean; light grey bars represent country mean

---

[17] The median value in the three samples is 3.86 (Guatemala), 3.66 (Nepal), and 4.0 (Northern Ireland), respectively.

Breaking down overall support into support for specific key provisions, Figure 2 shows that while most provisions are popular, there is substantial variation. In Guatemala and Northern Ireland, the provisions giving concessions to the former rebel groups—the transformation of URNG into a political party and the early release of paramilitary prisoners—are the most controversial. Indeed, the early release of paramilitary prisoners remains the single most controversial of all the provisions across the three cases, which is striking given that the Good Friday Agreement overall is somewhat more popular than the agreements in Guatemala and Nepal. In contrast, in Nepal, provisions giving concessions to the Maoists through political and military integration seem to be more broadly accepted. Here, the institutional reform that the country has been going through remains both the most popular (new constitution) and the most disputed element (federal structure; new regime) of the agreement. In the other two cases, institutional reform and social redress seem less disputed.

Figure 2: Support for PA provisions, by country

A possible explanation for the difference in people's views on concessions in Guatemala and Northern Ireland on one hand and Nepal on the other, is the relative longevity of peace in the former two cases. As we suggest above, when the memory of the armed conflict becomes more distant and the fear of renewed violence diminishes, people's assessments of the peace agreement may be more based on principles and moral judgements, and less based on fear and safety-seeking (c.f. Tellez 2019; Kreiman and Masullo 2020).

In the next section, we turn to statistical analyses to test our hypotheses, starting with overall support for the peace agreements before turning to the provisions that gave concessions to the rebel group(s).

Legacies of violence and popular support for peace agreements

According to H1, war experiences—whether as a victim (H1a) or a former participant (H1b) —are associated with stronger support for peace agreements.

Figure 3 shows estimated marginal effects from the statistical models (with and without control variables) for the pooled sample and the country subsamples. The full statistical models are reported in Table E in the online supplemental material. According to Figure 3, only in Nepal are former participants consistently more in favor of the peace agreement than non-participants. Victims of wartime violence seem more in favor of the peace agreement in Northern Ireland, but this association is not robust to the inclusion of the control variables.

Figure 3: Estimated marginal effects of OLS regression of wartime experiences on support for peace agreements, pooled sample and by country

Taken together, these results indicate that wartime experience *per se* is not a key determinant of attitudes to peace agreements. This probably reflects that there are, as discussed in H1 above, competing mechanism going in a different direction than our hypotheses. While, as we would expect, war-weariness and safety-seeking may lead to endorsement of the peace agreement— or, indeed, any agreement on the table—it also plausible that those with experiences of violence have low political trust that leads them to reject the peace agreement, and former combatants may come out of the war with hardened attitudes to compromise. We also recognize that we cannot rule out the possibility that initial differences between the most war-affected individuals and the overall population may have been higher at the time the agreements were signed.

Turning to the control variables (online supplemental material Table E), sociodemographic characteristics are only weakly associated with assessment of the peace agreement, and the associations vary from one context to another. We note that, while group-based cleavages played a role in all three conflicts, perceived group-based discrimination is not associated with support for peace agreements in any of the three samples.

These findings are robust to several alternative model specifications. Because a few questions about specific provisions have a low N, and we use listwise deletion for the measure of overall support,[18] the number of valid observations for the dependent variable is quite low. Replacing our dependent variable with one without listwise deletion (but controlling for missingness on one or more items using a dummy variable) yields similar results (online supplemental material H1).

Replacing this variable with a measure of mean support using all available information yields similar results (see online supplemental material H1) but provides some additional evidence in favor of H1b in the case of Guatemala. The findings also hold when replacing perceived group-based discrimination with a measure of membership in a marginalized group (see H2 in online supplemental material).

Legacies of violence and support for concessions to rebels

The second part of our analysis is dedicated to investigating the correlates of support for provisions that provide concessions to former rebels. In Guatemala, this is the provision allowing the URNG to transform into a political party; in Nepal, the provisions about political and military integration of the Maoists; and in Northern Ireland, the provision about the early release of paramilitary prisoners. Results for victimization and participation disaggregated by 'sides' in the conflicts are shown in Figures 4a-b, while the full analyses are reported in the online supplemental material F.

According to our hypotheses, support for these provisions follow the main wartime cleavages. We expect individuals victimized by the rebel side to be less in favor of provisions that give concessions to the rebels (H2a) and individuals victimized by the government side to be more in favor (H2b). The findings vary across provisions and cases (Figure 4a). In Guatemala, victims who identify their perpetrator(s) as someone from the insurgent side are *not* significantly more opposed to allowing URNG to form a political party, contradicting H2a. However, individuals who identify their perpetrator(s) as someone from the government side, including pro-government militias (PGM), are more in favor of concessions to the insurgents in the full model, suggesting some evidence in favor of H2b.

In Northern Ireland, the response pattern is in line with both H2a and H2b, with victims of government violence more in favor, and victims of rebel violence more opposed to the early release of paramilitary prisoners. The substantial effects are quite strong, with a predicted difference between a victim of Republican violence and government/Loyalist violence is about 0.8 on a variable ranging from 1 to 5. In Nepal, victims of government violence are significantly more in favor of integrating Maoist fighters into the government army, but not of the political integration through a power sharing government, so the evidence remains inconclusive. Victims of rebel violence, in contrast, are *not* more opposed to concessions to their former perpetrators.

---

[18] The item with the clearly lowest valid number of observations is the provision about a truth and reconciliation commission (TRC) in Nepal, where about 33% of the respondents answered 'don't know'. We interpret this as a 'true' do not know rather than refusal to answer (which was also an option). At the time of the survey, two different TRCs were being set up, and people may not have had a chance to form an opinion about them yet.

Turning to the legacy of wartime participation, we expected that, compared to non-participants, former participants on the rebel side were more in favor (H2c) and former participants on the government side, including pro-government militias, were less in favor (H2d) of concessions to rebels. Figure 4b provides some evidence for these hypotheses, but again, the results are not consistent across provisions or cases. In Guatemala, both H2c and H2d are rejected. Contrary to expectations in H2d, in Nepal, former participants on the government side are not less supportive of concessions to their former enemies, but former rebels are significantly more in favor of political power sharing, so H2c finds some support. Finally, turning to Northern Ireland, the pattern of support for the early release of paramilitary prisoners is in line with both H2c and H2d, i.e., former participants on the government side are significantly less in favor of this provision, while former participants on the rebel side are significantly more supportive of the early release, and the substantive effect is strong (about 1.6 on a five-point scale).

Figure 4a: Estimated marginal effects of OLS regression of victimization by different groups of perpetrators on support for concessions, with and without control variables


Figure 4b: Estimated marginal effects of OLS regression of participation in different sides on support for concessions, with and without control variables

In sum, the most consistent pattern of wartime cleavages cemented into enduring postwar identities is found in Northern Ireland. This is where the 'master narrative' of the conflict (Kalyvas 2003) most closely followed pre-existing social identities, as it pitted the Catholic and Protestant communities against each other. It is worth noting that these findings are robust to the inclusion of community background, i.e., these patterns come in addition to the main cleavage between Protestants and Catholics.

Finally, turning to the sociodemographic control variables, reported in supplemental material F, the substantial effects of these variables are weak and inconsistent, adding little explanatory power to the models.

Summary

Taken together, our analysis provides mixed evidence. Table 4 provides a summary of hypotheses and findings. Across our cases, wartime experiences are not generally associated with support for peace agreements in the long run (H1a and b). The exception here is Nepal, where, at the time of the survey, political turmoil about the implementation of the peace agreement was prevalent (International Crisis Group 2016), and where the more recent conflict experience may, among former combatants, have heightened risk aversion and safety-seeking preferences.

We observe more evidence of legacies of the war when we look at support for provisions that grant concessions to the rebels and disaggregate wartime experiences into the different 'sides' (H2a-d). In Northern Ireland, we find a clear pattern of side-taking dynamics: while victims of government violence and former participants on the rebel side display stronger support of concessions to the rebel side, victims of rebel violence and former participants on the government are more strongly opposed to such concessions. Note that the fault lines in the conflict in Northern Ireland largely followed pre-existing cleavages, and community background remains an important predictor of support for the peace agreement. Yet, our analysis shows that wartime experiences, both in the shape of participation and victimization, seem to create additional cleavages that help explain post-conflict attitudes long after the conflict ended.

Table 4. Summary of hypotheses and findings

Hypothesis	Overall	Guatemala	Nepal	N. Ireland
H1a. Victims $\xrightarrow{+}$ PA	Rejected	Rejected	Rejected	Rejected
H1a. Participants $\xrightarrow{+}$ PA	Rejected	Rejected	Supported	Rejected
H2a. Victims of insurgents $\xrightarrow{-}$ concessions	-	Rejected	Mixed	Supported
H2b. Victims of gov't $\xrightarrow{+}$ concessions	-	Supported	Mixed	Supported
H2c. Insurgent participants $\xrightarrow{+}$ concessions	-	Rejected	Mixed	Supported
H2d. Pro-gov't participant $\xrightarrow{-}$ concessions	-	Rejected	Rejected	Supported

In contrast, the findings in Nepal are mixed, depending on type of experience but also type of concession—military or political integration of the former Maoists. In Guatemala, all but one hypothesis are rejected, the exception being that victims of government violence are more in favor of concessions to the rebels.

Our findings are robust to the inclusion of case-specific identity markers, such as indigenous language (Guatemala), caste (Nepal), and community background (Northern Ireland). These are identity markers that overlap with the side-taking dynamics during the conflicts (see online supplemental material H3-H4) and, thus, goes some way towards trying to single out the role that experiences of violence play. That said, an alternative explanation is that victims were different than non-victims prior to their victimization and were targeted because of this difference, i.e., they were targeted because they had a different ideology or identity than their perpetrator, which signaled (presumed) closer ties to the 'other side'—thus victims of government violence may have leaned positively towards (concessions to) the rebel group even prior to victimization. We cannot empirically rule this out in our analysis. We do note, though, that, as argued by Kalyvas (2003, 487)—and with examples from both Guatemala and Northern Ireland—the 'master narrative' of a conflict is often created after a war has ended to "simplify, streamline, and cover up the war's ambiguities and contractions." The targets of violence are not always a result of this master narrative.

To shed light on these highly divergent findings, we estimated the same models reported in Figure 4a-b on overall support for the peace agreements as well as the support for all the specific provisions we have information about (shown in Figure 2 above). The results are reported in online supplemental material G. The findings are mixed, and caution is warranted against drawing strong conclusions. Yet, our interpretation of these findings is that side-taking dynamics due to wartime experiences seem to be associated with enduring ideological positions that follow the conflicting sides. For example, in line with the 'official' positions of the conflicting parties in Nepal, former participants on the insurgent side are more in favor of institutional reform, including the abolishment of monarchy and the establishment of a federal state, while former participants on the government side express significantly lower support for the provision about a new federal structure.[19] Similarly, insurgent participants in Guatemala are more in favor of the recognition of indigenous people and their rights. In Northern Ireland, victims of government-sponsored violence are more likely to favor of troop reductions and measures against unemployment differences.

Conclusion

The 2016 referendum in Colombia, in which people rejected the proposed peace agreement with a very small margin, illustrates that popular support for peace agreements should not be taken for granted. As described in this paper, people's wartime experiences of violence may be associated with their approval of the means to end the war even long after a peace agreement is signed. If peace negotiators fail to consider these experiences among ordinary people, elite compromises may have a hard time enabling enduring peace. In Colombia, the negotiators had to return to the table, searching for more acceptable bargains. The seemingly successful peace agreements in Guatemala, Nepal, and Northern Ireland have had 10–20 years to gain wider acceptance, and initial skepticism may have been much higher. The relationship between popular support for peace agreements and durable peace has yet to be properly analyzed by the larger research community. It is possible that agreements are popular when they succeed in

---

[19] These findings can help shed light on why in 2015, a year before our survey was conducted, the passing of the new constitution led to turmoil and protests against the proposed borders of the new federal provinces (International Crisis Group 2016): While there is widespread agreement that Nepal needed a new constitution, the content of the constitution and particularly the new federal structure, remains a provision for which the war's side-taking dynamics still shape people's views.

ending conflict. However, one might also posit that agreements are able to secure durable peace precisely when and if a large majority of the population supports them.

While these issues remain speculations, our study shows that 'mature' peace agreements enjoy widespread popular support across three very different cases, indicating that this may also be the case for other peace agreements. This overall high level of support may help explain why none of the three conflicts has seen major spoiler problems, though none of these post-conflict societies are without postwar challenges—high criminal violence in Guatemala, political protests and turbulence in Nepal, and paramilitary groups exercising social control in certain areas of Northern Ireland. Nonetheless, these are 'successful' post-war societies in the sense that the war has not resumed. As Greenhill and Major (2007) note, the most significant determinant of spoiler behavior is the expected utility of continued fighting. Facing an apparently acceptable peace agreement, the incentives to continue or resume a costly war across all three of our cases may be low. As the Colombian referendum showed, popular support for peace agreements delimits the available space for compromise among negotiating elites: a durable peace agreement must give sufficient concessions to eliminate spoiler problems, yet still be palatable to the broader populations (see also Introduction to this Special Feature section).

That said, the overall high support for the peace agreement in our three cases conceals substantial variation among different provisions. In two of our cases of more 'mature' peace, Guatemala and Northern Ireland, we observe that provisions giving concessions to former rebel groups remain controversial. In particular, the early release of paramilitary prisoners in Northern Ireland remains the single most controversial provision of all the 21 provisions included in the PAP survey. In Nepal, in contrast, provisions giving concessions to the Maoists rebels are relatively more popular.

We began this paper with an expectation that wartime experience would lead to greater overall support for peace agreements. However, we find little evidence that war exposure—either as a victim or participant—by itself is associated with different views of the peace agreements overall. What we *do* find is that when we look at specific provisions and disaggregate victimization and participation into the different wartime 'sides', in some cases and under certain circumstances, wartime experiences appear to leave long-lasting legacies. Specifically, looking at peace agreement provisions that grant concessions to rebel groups reveals that wartime cleavages, in the sense of which 'side' people fought on or were victimized by, can contribute to shaping people's views on concessions given to the rebels and on the peace agreements overall. However, our findings can also be read as a warning against drawing sweeping conclusions from single case studies. As our diverging results illustrate, findings from one context may not always travel far.

More generally, our findings contribute to the emerging research agenda on perceptions of peace agreements (e.g., Tellez 2019; Matanock and Garbiras-Díaz 2018; Kreiman and Masullo 2020), adding a long-term perspective. In so doing, this study draws on and adds support to studies that have shown that wartime cleavages may have long-term implications for political preferences in the post-war era (e.g., Balcells 2012). Bracketed in our study—and a fruitful avenue for further research—is how past violence may be used by present-day political elites (c.f. Villamil 2020). Indeed, a follow-up to our study would be to delve into each of these cases to examine whether and how, over time, wartime victimization and participation have been memorialized and politicized and with what effect on popular perceptions, including views on peace agreements.

References

Aguilar, Paloma, Laia Balcells, and Héctor Cebolla-Boado. 2011. "Determinants of Attitudes Toward Transitional Justice: An Empirical Analysis of the Spanish Case." *Comparative Political Studies* 44 (10): 1397–1430.

Bakke, Kristin M., John O'Loughlin, and Michael Ward. 2009. "Multilevel Modeling of Individual and Contextual Factors in the North Caucasus of Russia." *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 99 (5): 1012-21.

Balcells, Laia. 2012. "The Consequences of Victimization on Political Identities: Evidence from Spain." *Politics & Society* 40 (3): 311–47. https://doi.org/10.1177/0032329211424721.

Bar-Tal, Daniel. 2000. "From Intractable Conflict Through Conflict Resolution To Reconciliation: Psychological Analysis." *Political Psychology* 21 (2): 351–65. https://doi.org/10.1111/0162-895X.00192.

Bauer, Michal, Christopher Blattman, Julie Chytilová, Joseph Henrich, Edward Miguel, and Tamar Mitts. 2016. "Can War Foster Cooperation?" *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 30 (3): 249–74. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.30.3.249.

Bell, Christine, and Sanja Badanjak. 2019. "Introducing PA-X: A New Peace Agreement Database and Dataset." *Journal of Peace Research* 56 (3): 452–66. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343318819123.

Bellows, John, and Edward Miguel. 2009. "War and Local Collective Action in Sierra Leone." *Journal of Public Economics* 93 (11–12): 1144–57. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2009.07.012.

Blattman, Christopher. 2009. "From Violence to Voting: War and Political Participation in Uganda." *American Political Science Review* 103 (02): 231–47. https://doi.org/doi:10.1017/S0003055409090212.

Brounéus, Karen. 2014. "The Women and Peace Hypothesis in Peacebuilding Settings: Attitudes of Women in the Wake of the Rwandan Genocide." *Signs* 40 (1): 125–51.

Canetti, Daphna, Julia Elad-Strenger, Iris Lavi, Dana Guy, and Daniel Bar-Tal. 2017. "Exposure to Violence, Ethos of Conflict, and Support for Compromise: Surveys in Israel, East Jerusalem, West Bank, and Gaza." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 61 (1): 84–113. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002715569771.

Caumartin, Corinne, and Diego Sánchez-Ancochea. 2011. "Explaining a Contradictory Record: The Case of Guatemala." In *Horizontal Inequalities and Post-Conflict Development*, edited by Arnim Langer, Frances Stewart, and Rajesh Venugopal. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Halvard Buhaug. 2013. *Inequality, Grievances and Civil War*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Commission for Historical Clarification. 1999. "Guatemala: Memory of Silence," 13–87.

Costalli, Stefano, and Andrea Ruggeri. 2019. "The Long-Term Electoral Legacies of Civil War in Young Democracies: Italy, 1946-1968." *Comparative Political Studies* 52 (6): 927–61. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414018784057.

De Juan, Alexander, and Jan Henryk Pierskalla. 2016. "Civil War Violence and Political Trust: Microlevel Evidence from Nepal." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 33 (1): 67–88. https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894214544612.

Derouen, Karl Jr., Jenna Lea, and Peter Wallensteen. 2009. "The Duration of Civil War Peace Agreements." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 26 (4): 367–87. https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894209106481.

Dyrstad, Karin, Kristin M. Bakke, Helga M. Binningsbø. 2021. Perceptions of peace agreements and political trust in post-war Guatemala, Nepal, and Northern Ireland.

International Peacekeeping, 28(4), 606-631.

Dyrstad, Karin, Halvard Buhaug, Kristen Ringdal, Albert Simkus, and Ola Listhaug. 2011. "Microfoundations of Civil Conflict Reconciliation: Ethnicity and Context." *International Interactions* 37 (February 2013): 363–87. https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2011.622627.

Fabbe, Kristin, Chad Hazlett, and Tolga Sınmazdemir. 2019. "A Persuasive Peace: Syrian Refugees' Attitudes towards Compromise and Civil War Termination." *Journal of Peace Research* 56 (1): 103–17. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343318814114.

Fortna, Virginia Page. 2004. "Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace After Civil War." *International Studies Quarterly* 48 (2): 269–92. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0020-8833.2004.00301.x.

Gates, Scott, Håvard Hegre, Håvard M Nygard, and Håvard Strand. 2012. "Development Consequences of Armed Conflict." *World Development* 40 (9): 1713–22. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2012.04.031.

Gilligan, Michael J, Benjamin J Pasquale, and Cyrus Samii. 2014. "Civil War and Social Cohesion: Lab-in-the-Field Evidence from Nepal." *American Journal of Political Science* 58 (3): 604–19.

Greenhill, Kelly M, and Solomon Major. 2007. "The Perils of Profiling. Civil War Spoilers and the Collapse of Intrastate Peace Accords" *International Security* 31 (3): 7–40.

Grodsky, Brian. 2009. "International Prosecutions and Domestic Politics: The Use of Truth Commissions as Compromise Justice in Serbia and Croatia." *International Studies Review* 11 (4): 687–706.

Grossman, Guy, Devorah Manekin, and Dan Miodownik. 2015. "The Political Legacies of Combat: Attitudes Toward War and Peace Among Israeli Ex-Combatants." *International Organization* 69 (4): 981–1009. https://doi.org/10.1017/S002081831500020X.

Gurr, Ted Robert. 2000. *Peoples versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.

Hall, Jonathan, Iosif Kovras, Djordje Stefanovic, and Neophytos Loizides. 2018. "Exposure to Violence and Attitudes Towards Transitional Justice." *Political Psychology* 39 (2): 345–63. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12412.

Hartzell, Caroline A, and Matthew Hoddie. 2007. *Crafting Peace: Power-Sharing Institutions and the Negotiated Settlement of Civil Wars*. University Park: Pennsylvania state university press.

Hayes, Bernadette C, and Ian McAllister. 2001. "Sowing Dragon's Teeth: Public Support for Political Violence and Paramilitarism in Northern Ireland." *Political Studies* 49 (5): 901–22. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.00346.

Hong, Ji Yeon, and Woo Chang Kang. 2017. "Trauma and Stigma: The Long-Term Effects of Wartime Violence on Political Attitudes." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 34 (4): 264–86. https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894215593683.

Horowitz, Donald L. 1985. *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. 2nd ed. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Howard, Lise Morjé, and Alexandra Stark. 2017. "How Civil Wars End: The International System, Norms, and the Role of External Actors." *International Security* 42 (3): 127–71. https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC.

Human Rights Watch. 2016. "Nepal: Decade after Peace, Scant Progress on Justice."

International Crisis Group. 2016. "Nepal's Divisive New Constitution: An Existential Crisis."

Jankowski, Martin Sanchez. 1991. *Islands in the Street: Gangs and American Urban Society*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Jarstad, Anna K, and Desiree Nilsson. 2008. "From Words to Deeds: The Implementation of Power-Sharing Pacts in Peace Accords." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 25 (3):

206–23. https://doi.org/10.1080/07388940802218945.

Joshi, Madhav, Jason Michael Quinn, and Patrick M Regan. 2015. "Annualized Implementation Data on Comprehensive Intrastate Peace Accords, 1989–2012." *Journal of Peace Research*. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343314567486.

Justino, Patricia. 2009. "Poverty and Violent Conflict: A Micro-Level Perspective on the Causes and Duration of Warfare." *Journal of Peace Research* 46 (3): 315–33. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343309102655.

Kalyvas, Stathis N. 2003. "The Ontology of 'Political Violence': Action and Identity in Civil Wars." *Perspectives on Politics* 1 (3): 475–94. https://doi.org/10.2307/3688707.

Kardov, Kruno. 2007. "Remember Vukovar." In *Democratic Transition in Croatia: Value Transformation, Education & Media*, edited by Sabrina P Ramet and Davorka Matić, 63–89. College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press.

Kelman, Herbert C. 2008. "Reconciliation from a Social-Psychological Perspective." In *Social Psychology of Intergroup Reconciliation*, edited by Arie Nadler, Thomas E Malloy, and Jeffrey D Fisher, 15–32. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.

Kostelnik, James, and David Skarbek. 2013. "The Governance Institutions of a Drug Trafficking Organization." *Public Choice* 156 (1–2): 95–103. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-012-0050-x.

Kreiman, Guillermo, and Juan Masullo. 2020. "Who Shot the Bullets? Exposure to Violence and Attitudes towards Peace: Evidence from the 2016 Colombian Referendum." *Latin American Politics and Society* 62 (4): 24–49.

Kreutz, Joakim. 2010. "How and When Armed Conflicts End: Introducing the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset." *Journal of Peace Research* 47 (2): 243–50. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343309353108.

Lichbach, Mark I. 1994. "What Makes Rational Peasants Revolutionary? Dilemma, Paradox, and Irony in Peasant Collective Action." *World Politics* 46 (3): 383–418.

Liendo, Nicolás, and Jessica Maves Braithwaite. 2018. "Determinants of Colombian Attitudes toward the Peace Process." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 35 (6): 622–36. https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894218787783.

Lupu, Noam, and Leonid Peisakhin. 2017. "The Legacy of Political Violence across Generations." *American Journal of Political Science* 61 (4): 836–51. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12327.

Matanock, Aila M., and Natalia Garbiras-Díaz. 2018. "Considering Concessions: A Survey Experiment on the Colombian Peace Process." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 35 (6): 637–55. https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894218787784.

Nilsson, Desirée. 2012. "Anchoring the Peace: Civil Society Actors in Peace Accords and Durable Peace." *International Interactions* 38 (2): 243–66. https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2012.659139.

Nilsson, Manuela, and Lucía González Marín. 2020. "Violent Peace: Local Perceptions of Threat and Insecurity in Post-Conflict Colombia." *International Peacekeeping* 27 (2): 238–62. https://doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2019.1677159.

Nussio, Enzo, and Ben Oppenheim. 2014. "Anti-Social Capital in Former Members of Non-State Armed Groups: A Case Study of Colombia." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 37 (12): 999–1023.

ODHAG [The Archbishop's Human Rights Office in Guatemala]. 2015. "Violencia En Guatemala. Panorama de La Violencia Delincuencial En La Post-Guerra y Factores de Riesgo En Estudio de Victimización [Violence in Guatemala. Panorama of Postwar Criminal Violence and Risk Factors of Victimization]." Vol. 1. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107415324.004.

Olsen, Tricia D., Leigh a. Payne, and Andrew G. Reiter. 2010. "The Justice Balance: When

Transitional Justice Improves Human Rights and Democracy." *Human Rights Quarterly* 32 (4): 980–1007. https://doi.org/10.1353/hrq.2010.0021.

Østby, Gudrun. 2008. "Polarization, Horizontal Inequalities and Violent Civil Conflict." *Journal of Peace Research* 45 (2): 143–62. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343307087169.

John O'Loughlin, Vladimir Kolossov, and Gerard Toal. 2014. "Inside the post-Soviet De Facto States: A Comparison of Attitudes in Abkhazia, Nagorny Karabakh, South Ossetia and Transnistria." *Eurasian Geography and Economics* 55 (5): 423–56

Ottmann, Martin, and Johannes Vüllers. 2015. "The Power-Sharing Event Dataset (PSED): A New Dataset on the Promises and Practices of Power-Sharing in Post-Conflict Countries." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 32 (3): 327–50. https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894214542753.

Pearlman, Wendy. 2009. "Spoiling Inside and Out." *International Security* 33 (3): 79–109.

Pokharel, Bhojraj, and Shrishti Rana. 2013. *Nepal Votes for Peace*. Delhi: Cambridge University Press India Pvt. Ltd.

Ringdal, Kristen, Albert Simkus, and Ola Listhaug. 2007. "Disaggregating Public Opinion on the Ethnic Conflict in Macedonia." *International Journal of Sociology* 37 (3): 75–95.

Ringdal, Gerd Inger, Kristen Ringdal, and Albert Simkus. 2008. "War Experiences and War-related Distress in Bosnia and Herzegovina Eight Years after War." *Croatian Medical Journal* 49 (1): 75–86.

Rozenas, Arturas, and Yuri M. Zhukov. 2019. "Mass Repression and Political Loyalty: Evidence from Stalin's 'Terror by Hunger.'" *American Political Science Review* 113 (2): 569–83. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055419000066.

Seawright, Jason, and John Gerring. 2008. "Case Selection Techniques in A Menu of Qualitative and Quantitative Options." *Political Research Quarterly* 61 (2): 294–308. https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912907313077.

Stedman, Stephen John. 1997. "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes." *International Security* 22 (2): 5–53. https://doi.org/10.1097/EDE.0b013e3181.

Stewart, Frances. 2002. "Horizontal Inequalities: A Neglected Dimension of Development." *QEH Working Paper Series* 81 (81): 1–40. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230501850_5.

Svensson, Isak. 2007. "Bargaining, Bias and Peace Brokers: How Rebels Commit to Peace." *Journal of Peace Research* 44 (2): 177–94. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343307075121.

Tellez, Juan Fernando. 2019. "Worlds Apart: Conflict Exposure and Preferences for Peace." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 63 (4): 1053–76. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002718775825.

Villamil, Francisco. 2020. "Mobilizing Memories: The Social Conditions of the Long-Term Impact of Victimization." *Journal of Peace Research*, 1–18. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343320912816.

Voors, Maarten J., Eleonora E M Nillesen, Philip Verwimp, Erwin H Bulte, Robert Lensink, and Daan P Van Soest. 2012. "Violent Conflict and Behavior: A Field Experiment in Burundi." *American Economic Review* 102 (2): 941–64. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.102.2.941.

Walter, Barbara F. 2002. *Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Wolff, Stefan. 2001. "The Road to Peace: The Good Friday Agreement and the Conflict in Northern Ireland." *World Affairs* 163 (4): 163–70.

Online supplemental material for

Wartime Experiences and Popular Support for Peace Agreements: Comparative Evidence from Three Cases

Karin Dyrstad, Helga M. Binningsbø, and Kristin M. Bakke, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*

A. Case selection

According to the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset version 2-2015,[20] 31 conflict episodes ended with peace agreements between 1990 and 2013, of which 18 were the last signed agreement in their respective country.

A1. Peace agreements 1990–2013

	Country (year of peace agreement)	Not fulfilling selection criteria
1	Angola (2002)	No electoral democracy
2	Bosnia (1995)	
3	Burundi (2008)	Resumed violence 2015
4	CAR (2006)	Resumed violence 2009
5	Croatia (1995)	
6	DR Congo (Zaire) (2008)	Resumed violence 2011
7	Djibouti (1999)	Interstate violence 2008
8	El Salvador (1991)	
9	**Guatemala (1995)**	
10	Indonesia (2005)	
11	Ivory Coast (2004)	Resumed violence 2011
12	Liberia (2003)	
13	Macedonia, FYR (2001)	
14	**Nepal (2006)**	
15	Senegal (2003)	Resumed violence 2011
16	Serbia (Yugoslavia) (1999)	
17	Sierra Leone (2001)	
18	**United Kingdom (1998)**	

Of these 18 peace agreements, seven did not fit all selection criteria. The remaining 11 were screened to maximize variation on key characteristics, as described in the main document.

B. The Post-Conflict Attitudes for Peace (PAP) Survey

The interviews took, on average, 40–50 minutes to complete. To ensure informed consent, potential respondents were informed about the nature of the survey and asked if they would be willing to participate. The interviewers explained to potential respondents that the survey was conducted for academic purposes and that all answers would be confidential. Potential participants could opt not to participate. Once they had agreed to participate, they could end the interview at any time and opt not to answer questions if they so wished.

B1. Questionnaire

The PAP questionnaire was developed as a part of the research project *Attitudes for peace: Post-conflict public opinion*, funded by the Research Council of Norway (grant no. 240446). In addition to standard questions about politics, it includes questions about conflict experiences and views on the post-conflict political institutions. The questionnaire was piloted and revised in collaboration with national survey teams. The project group also conducted a series of expert

---

[20] Kreutz, Joakim. 2010. 'How and When Armed Conflicts End: Introducing the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset'. *Journal of Peace Research* 47 (2): 243–50. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343309353108.

interviews to help refining some questions and ensure that they were appropriate in the given context.

B2. Sampling

The three samples are representative on the national level. However, relying on local sampling practices and -frames, the sampling procedures varied somewhat between cases. In Guatemala and Nepal, a three-stage sampling design was employed: *1.* The primary sampling unit (PSU) was drawn in the first stage of sampling (Guatemala: 120 segments within municipalities; Nepal: 60 wards), based on a national sampling frame (Guatemala: the 2015 electoral roll; Nepal: the 2011 census). *2.* Within the PSUs, households were drawn randomly. *3.* Within the households, respondents were selected based on the 'last birthday' rule (Guatemala) or the Kish grid[21] method (Nepal). In Northern Ireland, the Postcode Address File provided the sampling frame, from which households were drawn at random. Respondents were selected within the household based on the 'next birthday' rule. In Guatemala and Nepal, the samples were drawn to include an equal number of men and women, stratified by urban-rural areas, while the Northern Irish sampling was modified to avoid an overrepresentation of older respondents.

---

[21] Leslie Kish, 'A Procedure for Objective Respondent Selection within the Household,' *Journal of the American Statistical Association* 44(247) (1949): 380–387.

C. Complete wording of questions on peace agreement provision and the corresponding shorthand label used in tables and figures.

"We will now mention some of the central elements of the peace agreements that were signed between the [country] government and the [insurgent group(s)]. This is not a question about whether you think this has been implemented, but rather, for each aspect, we would like to know how much you support it. [Answer categories: Like it very much, like it, neutral, dislike it, dislike it very much]:

Peace agreement / provision	Label in main document
Guatemala:	
Allowing the URNG to transform into a political party	URNG to political party
The formal recognition of the indigenous peoples and their rights	Recognition of indigenous people
The establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)	Establishment of TRC
The agreement to have a land reform	Land reform
The strengthening of civilian and democratic control over the army	Civilian control over army
Removing internal security as an area of responsibility for the Guatemalan army	Security sector reform
Transforming the National Police into the National Civil Police	Police reform
Nepal:	
The abolishment of the monarchy	Abolishment of monarchy
The agreement to make a new constitution	New Constitution
The integration of Maoist combatants in the Nepali Army	Military integration
The establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)	Establishment of TRC
The inclusion of the Maoists in the interim power sharing government	Power sharing government
The restructuring Nepal into a federal state	Federal state
Northern Ireland:	
The establishment of a devolved, democratically elected NI Assembly	Devolved Assembly
The establishment of a power sharing NI Executive	Power sharing Executive
The decommissioning of arms by paramilitary groups	Decommissioning of arms
The normalisation of security arrangements/ troop reductions	Troop reductions
The reform of the police to address the underrepresentation of Catholics	Police reform
The early release of paramilitary prisoners	Early release of prisoners
Measures aimed at combating unemployment and elimination differences in employment between the two communities	Reducing unemployment differences
The declaration that NI remains part of the United Kingdom if the majority of the population so wishes	Remain part of UK

D. Distribution of independent variables

D1. Wartime victimization and non-victimization, including perceived perpetrator

Victimization, by perpetrator(s)	Guatemala	Nepal	N. Ireland	Overall
Gov't/PGM	92	61	88	241
Insurgent	29	224	98	351
Both/other/unknown	417	195	132	744
Sum victims	538 (44.2%)	472 (40.0%)	318 (39.1%)	1,336 (41.4%)
Non-victims	678 (55.8%)	720 (60.0%)	495 (60.9%)	1,893 (58.6%)
N	1,216	1,200	813	3,229

D2. Wartime participation and non-participation, including reported side

	Guatemala	Nepal	N. Ireland	Overall
Participation, by side				
Gov't/PGM	46	10	34	90
Insurgent	6	41	6	53
Other/unknown	10	46	9	65
Sum participants	62 (5.1%)	97 (8.1%)	49 (6.1%)	208 (6.5%)
No participation	1,149 (94.9%)	1,102 (91.9%)	760 (94.9%)	2919 (93.5%)
N	1,200	1,199	809	3,127

E. Determinants of overall support for peace agreements; pooled and by country

Testing H1a and H1b without and with control variables, pooled and by sub-samples

	Pooled		Guatemala		Nepal		Northern Ireland	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Participant	0.111	0.090	0.154	0.199	0.177	0.160	-0.052	-0.050
	(2.33)**	(1.76)	(1.63)	(1.82)	(2.44)*	(2.31)*	(0.71)	(0.66)
Victim	0.036	0.030	0.022	0.006	-0.004	0.003	0.101	0.068
	(1.14)	(0.90)	(0.45)	(0.12)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(2.34)*	(1.51)
Nepal	-0.053	-0.027						
	(1.01)	(0.43)						
N. Ireland	0.223	0.215						
	(7.07)***	(6.04)**						
Male		0.091		0.197		0.152		-0.009
		(3.19)**		(3.85)**		(3.17)**		(0.23)
Age		0.000		-0.003		-0.006		0.006
		(0.32)		(1.54)		(3.31)**		(5.24)**
Poverty		-0.002		-0.031		0.087		-0.002
		(0.72)		(1.17)		(2.08)*		(0.75)
Education		0.023		0.036		-0.064		0.090
		(1.55)		(2.01)*		(2.77)**		(5.73)**
Discriminated		-0.017		-0.001		-0.034		-0.036
		(0.48)		(0.01)		(0.63)		(0.54)
Constant	3.718	3.577	3.722	3.673	3.673	3.808	3.924	3.272
	(127.84)***	(40.68)***	(105.97)***	(22.93)***	(55.26)***	(29.54)***	(141.46)***	(32.36)***
R^2	0.03	0.04	0.00	0.04	0.01	0.06	0.01	0.07
N	2,455	2,437	959	943	786	786	710	708

* $p<0.10$; ** $p<0.05$; *** $p<0.01$; standard errors clustered by primary sampling unit and adjusted for stratification.

F. Concessions to rebels

Testing H2a-d, as reported in Figure 4.

	Guatemala: URNG to political party		Nepal: Military integration		Nepal: Political integration		NI: early release of prisoners	
	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
Victimization by								
Gov't/PGM	0.340	0.447	0.307	0.322	0.078	0.107	0.378	0.364
	(2.04)**	(2.66)**	(1.95)	(2.08)*	(0.58)	(0.82)	(2.24)*	(2.11)*
Insurgents	-0.447	-0.394	0.136	0.147	0.000	0.028	-0.439	-0.437
	(1.28)	(1.11)	(1.36)	(1.53)	(0.00)	(0.35)	(3.03)**	(2.92)**
Others	-0.094	-0.129	0.045	0.037	-0.064	-0.066	0.002	-0.014
	(1.05)	(1.41)	(0.48)	(0.40)	(0.67)	(0.75)	(0.02)	(0.11)
Participated								
Gov't/PGM	0.151	0.272	-0.358	-0.318	0.223	0.158	-0.481	-0.507
	(0.64)	(1.13)	(1.06)	(0.94)	(0.87)	(0.59)	(2.04)*	(2.12)*
Insurgents	0.860	0.893	0.337	0.297	0.391	0.337	1.155	1.118
	(1.57)	(1.67)	(1.86)	(1.63)	(2.70)**	(2.26)*	(2.32)*	(2.34)*
Others	-0.189	0.082	-0.106	-0.063	0.238	0.197	1.088	1.027
	(0.56)	(0.25)	(0.55)	(0.32)	(1.56)	(1.29)	(2.68)**	(2.57)*
Male		0.308		0.016		0.111		0.190
		(2.73)**		(0.23)		(2.16)*		(2.06)*
Age		-0.015		-0.003		0.000		-0.001
		(4.11)**		(1.08)		(0.13)		(0.40)
Poverty		-0.033		0.114		0.110		-0.001
		(0.64)		(2.40)*		(2.61)*		(0.13)
Education		0.018		-0.048		-0.016		-0.004
		(0.59)		(1.23)		(0.43)		(0.11)
Discriminated		-0.096		-0.116		-0.216		0.046
		(0.97)		(1.38)		(3.14)**		(0.31)
Constant	2.945	3.341	3.654	3.652	3.890	3.672	2.625	2.598
	(55.27)** *	(12.91)* *	(46.46)* *	(18.33)* *	(69.13)* *	(22.76)* *	(46.67)* *	(10.75)* *
R^2	0.01	0.05	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.06	0.06
N	1,115	1,092	1,185	1,185	1,175	1,175	759	757

* $p<0.10$; ** $p<0.05$; *** $p<0.01$; standard errors clustered by primary sampling unit and adjusted for stratification.

G. Support for other provisions, by country

G1. Determinants of overall support for the peace agreement and for specific provisions, Guatemala. Provision granting concession highlighted.

	Overall	URNG to political party	Recognition of indigenous people	Establishment of TRC	Land reform	Civilian control over army	Security sector reform	Police reform
Victimization by								
Gov't/PGM	-0.042	0.447	0.082	-0.044	-0.108	-0.266	-0.267	-0.076
	(0.38)	(2.66)**	(0.63)	-0.29	(0.65)	(1.74)	(1.53)	(0.47)
Insurgents	-0.167	-0.394	0.101	-0.047	0.234	-0.442	-0.217	-0.767
	(1.53)	(1.11)	(0.67)	(0.27)	(1.22)	(1.61)	(0.81)	(2.10)*
Others	0.021	-0.129	0.111	0.101	0.164	0.036	0.021	-0.025
	(0.41)	(1.41)	(1.82)	(1.10)	(1.89)	(0.39)	(0.23)	(0.35)
Participated								
Gov't/PGM	0.135	0.272	0.280	0.464	0.353	0.306	-0.324	-0.206
	(1.05)	(1.13)	(1.72)	(2.54)*	(1.81)	(1.52)	(1.28)	(0.89)
Insurgents	0.452	0.893	0.356	0.696	0.351	0.176	0.276	0.630
	(2.67)**	(1.67)	(2.44)*	(3.00)**	(0.95)	(0.30)	(0.40)	(1.64)
Others	0.410	0.082	-0.020	0.318	0.918	0.657	0.218	0.762
	(1.90)	(0.25)	(0.07)	(1.22)	(6.24)**	(2.13)*	(0.57)	(2.43)*
Male	0.203	0.308	0.171	0.109	0.287	0.172	0.264	0.101
	(3.88)**	(2.73)**	(2.32)*	(1.61)	(3.69)**	(2.36)*	(3.06)**	(1.39)
Age	-0.003	-0.015	-0.001	0.003	0.003	-0.000	-0.010	-0.009
	(1.34)	(4.11)**	(0.51)	(1.04)	(0.83)	(0.00)	(3.01)**	(2.74)**
Poverty	-0.029	-0.033	-0.031	-0.060	-0.009	-0.027	-0.059	0.030
	(1.09)	(0.64)	(0.82)	(1.52)	(0.24)	(0.64)	(1.27)	(0.70)
Education	0.037	0.018	0.053	0.077	0.123	0.025	-0.048	-0.024
	(2.05)*	(0.59)	(2.63)**	(2.80)**	(4.94)**	(1.09)	(1.90)	(0.79)
Discriminated	-0.001	-0.096	-0.048	0.000	0.031	-0.154	-0.131	0.104
	(0.01)	(0.97)	(0.62)	(0.01)	(0.31)	(1.53)	(1.21)	(1.10)
Constant	3.651	3.341	4.122	3.622	2.973	3.813	4.065	3.992
	(22.67)***	(12.91)***	(21.28)**	(16.03)**	(14.62)***	(20.10)***	(19.11)***	(15.08)***
R^2	0.05	0.05	0.03	0.03	0.06	0.02	0.03	0.03
N	946	1,092	1,124	1,086	1,030	1,084	1,081	1,114

* $p<0.10$; ** $p<0.05$; *** $p<0.01$; standard errors clustered by primary sampling unit and adjusted for stratification.

G2. Determinants of overall support for the peace agreement and for specific provisions, Nepal. Provisions granting concession highlighted.

	Overall	Abolishment of monar-chy	New Constitution	Military integration	Establishment of TRC	Power sharing government	Federal state
Victimization by							
Gov't/PGM	0.074	0.398	0.059	0.322	-0.247	0.107	-0.080
	(0.57)	(1.87)	(0.50)	(2.08)*	(1.81)	(0.82)	(0.45)
Insurgents	-0.052	-0.130	0.034	0.147	-0.031	0.028	-0.189
	(0.76)	(0.95)	(0.58)	(1.53)	(0.46)	(0.35)	(1.25)
Others	0.045	0.133	0.003	0.037	0.177	-0.066	-0.240
	(0.59)	(0.81)	(0.04)	(0.40)	(2.81)**	(0.75)	(1.52)
Participated							
Gov't/PGM	-0.143	-0.389	-0.509	-0.318	0.064	0.158	-0.850
	(1.91)	(0.82)	(1.24)	(0.94)	(0.45)	(0.59)	(2.65)*
Insurgents	0.306	1.147	0.109	0.297	-0.166	0.337	0.460
	(3.22)**	(5.28)**	(0.87)	(1.63)	(1.10)	(2.26)*	(2.19)*
Others	0.079	0.174	0.305	-0.063	0.259	0.197	-0.302
	(0.66)	(0.68)	(2.47)*	(0.32)	(2.64)*	(1.29)	(1.10)
Male	0.157	0.344	0.052	0.016	0.007	0.111	0.344
	(3.24)**	(4.43)**	(0.94)	(0.23)	(0.16)	(2.16)*	(3.79)**
Age	-0.006	-0.009	0.000	-0.003	0.003	0.000	-0.012
	(3.10)**	(2.11)*	(0.06)	(1.08)	(1.20)	(0.13)	(2.51)*
Poverty	0.079	0.120	0.106	0.114	-0.023	0.110	0.124
	(1.90)	(1.61)	(2.54)*	(2.40)*	(0.78)	(2.61)*	(1.64)
Education	-0.063	-0.018	0.038	-0.048	0.066	-0.016	-0.157
	(2.59)*	(0.32)	(1.40)	(1.23)	(3.39)**	(0.43)	(2.44)*
Discriminated	-0.041	0.157	-0.210	-0.116	-0.139	-0.216	0.094
	(0.78)	(1.33)	(3.69)**	(1.38)	(2.48)*	(3.14)**	(0.70)
Constant	3.814	2.869	3.806	3.652	3.999	3.672	3.452
	(30.47)**	(8.46)**	(19.97)**	(18.33)**	(27.56)**	(22.76)**	(10.73)**
R^2	0.07	0.06	0.03	0.02	0.08	0.03	0.06
N	787	1,198	1,135	1,185	804	1,175	1,132

* $p<0.10$; ** $p<0.05$; *** $p<0.01$; standard errors clustered by primary sampling unit and adjusted for stratification.

G3. *Determinants of overall support for the peace agreement and for specific provisions, Northern Ireland. Provision granting concession highlighted.*

	Overall	Devolved Assembly	Power sharing Executive	Decommissioning of arms	Troop reductions	Police reform	Prisoner release	Unemployment[a]	Remain part of UK
Victimization by									
Gov't/PGM	0.231	0.174	0.086	0.096	0.257	0.483	0.364	0.391	-0.162
	(3.28)**	(1.64)	(0.74)	(1.08)	(2.72)**	(4.69)**	(2.11)*	(4.83)**	(1.21)
Insurgents	-0.067	-0.132	-0.163	0.039	-0.047	-0.279	-0.437	0.033	0.340
	(1.07)	(1.35)	(1.58)	(0.44)	(0.44)	(2.24)*	(2.92)**	(0.36)	(3.47)**
Others	0.075	-0.105	-0.106	0.041	0.148	0.177	-0.014	0.210	-0.056
	(1.34)	(1.07)	(1.05)	(0.55)	(1.66)	(1.81)	(0.11)	(2.56)*	(0.57)
Participated									
Gov't/PGM	-0.051	0.218	0.263	0.194	-0.141	-0.473	-0.507	-0.038	0.286
	(0.58)	(1.67)	(1.92)	(1.66)	(0.77)	(2.51)*	(2.12)*	(0.24)	(1.92)
Insurgents	-0.190	-0.442	-0.260	-0.904	0.177	-0.067	1.118	-0.556	-0.629
	(1.97)*	(0.90)	(0.54)	(1.81)	(0.71)	(0.17)	(2.34)*	(1.60)	(1.26)
Others	-0.136	-0.469	0.208	-0.615	-0.311	-0.095	1.027	-0.035	-0.556
	(0.85)	(1.68)	(0.91)	(1.90)	(1.06)	(0.39)	(2.57)*	(0.13)	(1.36)
Male	-0.009	-0.043	-0.116	-0.065	-0.001	-0.030	0.190	-0.001	0.024
	(0.21)	(0.70)	(1.75)	(1.21)	(0.02)	(0.43)	(2.06)*	(0.02)	(0.34)
Age	0.006	0.007	0.005	0.008	0.010	0.008	-0.001	0.004	0.009
	(5.52)**	(3.93)**	(2.80)**	(4.85)**	(5.55)**	(3.93)**	(0.40)	(2.17)*	(4.41)**
Poverty	-0.002	-0.006	0.000	-0.005	-0.004	-0.004	-0.001	0.004	-0.000
	(0.70)	(1.13)	(0.10)	(0.96)	(0.60)	(0.55)	(0.13)	(1.10)	(0.01)
Education	0.093	0.110	0.112	0.107	0.112	0.141	-0.004	0.090	0.049
	(5.88)**	(4.51)**	(4.41)**	(5.14)**	(4.44)**	(5.36)**	(0.11)	(3.95)**	(1.82)
Discriminated	-0.069	-0.125	-0.224	-0.035	0.010	-0.130	0.046	0.102	0.081
	(1.02)	(1.16)	(1.95)	(0.40)	(0.10)	(1.03)	(0.31)	(1.15)	(0.73)
Constant	3.249	3.326	3.350	3.651	3.269	3.090	2.598	3.608	3.455

|	(31.97)**	(21.05)**	(20.50)**	(26.69)**	(20.54)**	(18.12)**	(10.75)**	(26.11)**	(20.51)**
R^2	0.09	0.06	0.05	0.09	0.07	0.08	0.06	0.05	0.06
N	711	765	770	782	776	769	757	775	769

[a] Reducing unemployment differences; * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; standard errors clustered by primary sampling unit and adjusted for stratification.

H. Sensitivity analysis
## H1. Testing H1 with alternative dependent variable without listwise deletion

H2. Testing H1 controlling for country-specific identity groups

H3. Testing H2a-b controlling for country-specific identity groups

H4. Testing H2c-d controlling for country-specific identity groups