

Dissociation and Being-in-the-World

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A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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February 2022

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Abstract

The concept of “dissociation” describes a variety of phenomena that involve a divided or disunified experience, ranging from everyday experiences such as daydreaming to the fascinating and controversial phenomenon of dissociative identity disorder (DID)—formerly called multiple personality disorder. Because of the wide assortment of phenomena, theoretical unity has been difficult to achieve, and there is no received consensus of what dissociation *is*, with many arguing the concept is imprecise, confusing and/or ambiguous. The aim of the thesis is to use resources from Heidegger’s existential-hermeneutic phenomenology to articulate core structures of dissociative experiences. In pursuing this aim, I identify three problems that any satisfactory theory of dissociation must confront: the *motleyness problem*, the *ontological problem*, and the *normative problem*. Before developing the Heideggerian account, I first track the development of these three problems over a two-part philosophical history of dissociation. After identifying consciousness as one of the ontological commitments that run through the history of consciousness, I then situate dissociation within the philosophy of mind by critically evaluating Tim Bayne’s unity of consciousness thesis with reference to whether it can satisfactorily accommodate dissociative phenomena. After showing that the three problems remain a significant challenge to theorizing dissociative phenomena, I move to articulate dissociative experiences using the Heideggerian ontological structures of *Jemeinigkeit* (“mineness”) and *Unheimlichkeit* (“uncanniness”). I conclude by evaluating this Heideggerian account of dissociation against the three problems.

Acknowledgments

First and foremost, I owe a special appreciation to Prof. Wayne Martin for his ongoing guidance and mentorship throughout the years. He has helped me become a better thinker, writer, and clinician. Without him, this project would not have been possible. I am honored to join him as a “trans-Atlantic academic.”

I am also grateful for the feedback I received from Prof. Béatrice Han-Pile, Prof. Irene McMullin, Dr. Ellisif Wasmuth, Dr. Matt Burch, Dr. Marie Guillot, and Dr. Steven Gormley. They have all individually contributed to my intellectual growth.

I would like to extend appreciation for Indian River State College’s tuition reimbursement program for funding my PhD endeavor.

My parents and sister deserve a special thanks for always taking an interest in and supporting my pursuits. Much love goes to them.

Finally, my heartfelt gratitude to my love and partner, Giovanna, for all the encouragement.

Abbreviations

APA	American Psychiatric Association
BP	Heidegger, <i>Basic Problems of Phenomenology</i>
BT	Heidegger, <i>Being and Time</i>
DID	Dissociative Identity Disorder
DSM-5	Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 5th ed.
DSM-IV-TR	Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th ed., Text Revision
DSM-IV	Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th ed.
DSM-III	Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 3rd ed.
DSM-II	Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 2nd ed.
DSM-I	Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. 1st ed.
ISSTD	International Society for the Study of Trauma and Dissociation
ZS	Heidegger, <i>Zollikon Seminars</i>

General Introduction

In the fields of clinical psychology and psychiatry, the term “dissociation” describes a diverse field of phenomena that involve a *disunified* experience, ranging from the relatively common experiences of daydreaming to the fascinating and controversial phenomenon of dissociative identity disorder (DID)—formerly called multiple personality disorder. Dissociation also includes depersonalization, derealization, psychogenic amnesia, and fugue (i.e., flight) states. Yet it is not clear how these distinct phenomena relate to one another. For example, how do the phenomena such as DID relate to daydreaming or even derealization? Given the wide range of phenomena that fall under the term “dissociation,” conceptual unity has been difficult to achieve. There is no received consensus of what dissociation *is*—with many charging the term with being imprecise, confusing, and/or ambiguous (Cardeña, 1994; Frankel, 1994; Spitzer, Barnow, Freyberger & Grabe, 2006; Dell, 2009). There is, however, little disagreement on the importance dissociation plays in human experience, particularly as a trauma reaction (Erdelyi, 2005). Dissociation also raises questions about the very nature of *unity* in human experience. So, what, if anything, do dissociative phenomena have in common, and what marks the limits of this broad category?

The aim of the thesis is to use resources from existential-hermeneutic phenomenology to articulate core structures of dissociative experiences. In pursuing that aim, I address three subsidiary *problems* that any satisfactory theory of dissociation must confront. I call these problems the *motley problem*, *the ontological problem*, and *the normative problem*. The main objective of this general introduction is to explain these three problems.

§0. Three Problems of Dissociation

On its face, the concept of dissociation implies some kind of divided or disunified experience, but this disunity can take a wide variety of different forms. For example, the phenomenology of daydreaming, which typically involves fantasizing or one's mind wandering, is markedly distinct from the phenomenology of identity fragmentation found in DID, which includes amnesia and the experience of discontinuity in the sense of agency. Even within kinds or types of dissociation, we find sub-varieties. One classic example of this variation is depersonalization, which in some cases can manifest itself in the form of "out-of-body" experiences where there appears to be an experiential separation of "mind" and "body." In contrast, others involve seemingly problematic experiences of thoughts or body parts as being "mine" but also "not mine."¹

The motley problem is perhaps best introduced with reference to the long history of fascination with dissociative phenomena. Dissociation, specifically the *dissociation of consciousness*, is most notably associated with the French psychologist-philosopher Pierre Janet, who considered it the primary feature of the clinical presentation of hysteria.² According to Janet, the division or dissociation of consciousness resulted in the formation of a *conscious* stream and a *subconscious* stream. The subconscious stream formed around what Janet called an

¹ We might consider depersonalization as the "genus" for different "species" of phenomena, such as out-of-body experiences, self-alienation, emotional numbing, etc. I will engage these experiences in much greater detail later in the thesis.

² Hysteria is a broad (and admittedly sexist) medical term with a long and controversial history that stretches back to ancient Greek Medicine and was a popular diagnosis in 19th and early 20th century Europe and the United States, especially in women. It is typically represented as some combination of a diverse range of symptoms, including, but not limited to, unstable or highly reactive emotionality, anxiety, irritability, convulsions, depression, mania and catalepsy. In the current clinical discourse and nosology (specifically the DSM-5), so-called hysteria would span many different clinical presentations, including dissociative disorders, somatoform disorders, trauma-related stress disorders (e.g., posttraumatic stress disorder), anxiety disorders, depressive disorders, and some personality disorders (e.g., borderline personality disorder, histrionic personality disorder, etc.).

idée fixe, or “*fixed idea*,” which typically occurred in response to a highly stressful or traumatic event. The traumatic experience, which became the fixed idea, was not integrated into consciousness and formed a subconscious stream that took on various levels of complexity.³ According to Janet, dissociation reflects the *failure to integrate* the experience into consciousness, resulting in the formation of the subconscious. Janet and his contemporaries conceptualized the phenomena of somnambulisms (i.e., sleepwalking) and automatisms (e.g., automatic writing) within the framework of the hysteria paradigm.

By the late 20th century, dissociative phenomena had been de-linked from the antiquated diagnoses of hysteria and somnambulism and conceptualized as forms of experiential or phenomenological disconnection. The range of phenomena included under this heading had been expanded to include a diverse array of experiences, including multiple personality and dissociative amnesia as well as daydreaming, trance/hypnotic states, and “spacing-out.” The expansion of what is considered dissociation was primarily a result of renewed interest in hypnosis, multiple personality presentations in clinical and pop-culture contexts, and explorations into various altered states of consciousness.⁴ The inclusion of nonpathological or everyday forms of dissociation was one of the main driving forces towards a continuum model, where dissociation spanned from ordinary daydreaming to the pathological identity fragmentation, with experiences of depersonalization and derealization falling somewhere between (Spitzer, Barnow, Freyberger & Grabe, 2006).

³ Additional ideas form from these or associated experiences may also coalesce around the initial dissociated fixed idea, resulting in more complex presentations. I will go into more detail about these kinds of presentations when I discuss Janet’s dissociation theory in chapter I.

⁴ The renewed interest in hypnosis was especially relevant in experimental settings. For more on this topic please see Hilgard (1977).

However, expanding the range of dissociative phenomena has not been without its critics. Opponents of this expanded view of dissociation, such as Onno van der Hart and Martin Dorahy (2009), charge this move with “conceptual drift” that renders dissociation as “ill-defined,” with “almost any psychologically derived breakdown in integrated functioning” being considered dissociation (p. 19). They add that a more inclusive definition muddies a cohesive conceptual model of what dissociation is and how it develops, further contributing to the ambiguity of the concept. Hence, many clinicians and researchers talk about it being vague and imprecise, with some suggesting abandoning the term altogether (Holmes, Brown, Mansell, Fearon, Hunter Fasquillo & Oakley, 2005). I will call the problem of cohesively categorizing the complexity and diversity of dissociative phenomena the *motleyness* problem. The motleyness problem poses the question of whether or not there is a unifying feature of all dissociative phenomena.

The motleyness problem pertains to the wide variety of different kinds of phenomena that have come to be grouped under the heading of dissociation. The ontological problem, however, emerges directly from the concept of “dissociation,” as *implying* some kind of division, detachment, or disconnection of *something*. If dissociation is some kind of division or disunity, then what is it, *exactly*, that gets divided or disunified? A satisfactory resolution of the ontological problem would need to address two related questions. First, what is the *entity* or *thing* that is characterized by division or disunity?⁵ And secondly, what is the *mode of being* of that entity or thing?

The third and final problem is what I shall call the *normative problem*. Although the concept of dissociation was initially wrought from and continues to have a considerable stake in

⁵ In a way, an immediate answer to this question might be “dissociable beings;” that is, the entity or being subject to dissociation. However, this answer is *trivially* true, and I am after more *substantive* candidates. Nevertheless, I will use “dissociable beings” as a placeholder term throughout the thesis.

pathological psychology, many writers—both historical and contemporary—have identified nonpathological varieties of dissociation that form part of the fabric of everyday life (Prince, 1905; Butler, 2006). The physician Morton Prince was a pioneer in identifying a nonpathological variety of dissociation in the form of “absentmindedness” or “abstraction.” Prince (1905), unlike Janet, viewed “dissociation and automatism” as “principles of *normal* mental life” (p. 120, my emphasis).⁶ Prince uses the term “normal” to refer to nonpathological or everyday experiences of dissociation. Experiences of absentmindedness or abstraction, as Prince described them, seem to be roughly equivalent to ordinary, everyday experiences of daydreaming, fantasizing, and “spacing out.” Prince (1905) also thought that some hypnotic states could be a form of nonpathological dissociation.⁷

Although pathological and nonpathological forms of dissociation provide two poles of the normative frame of dissociative phenomena in human experience, a third role can also be identified: *adaptive* or *therapeutic* dissociation. What is meant here is that dissociation takes on a therapeutic role in at least two kinds of ways. The first is most apparent in the form of an adaptive/protective response to psychological trauma (Bowins, 2012). The second involves using hypnosis, or hypnotic-like strategies—which many consider a kind of dissociative phenomena—as a therapeutic strategy to treat psychological disorders (Myerson & Konichezy, 2009). I will label the problem of sorting out which dissociative experiences are pathological, nonpathological, and therapeutic the *normative* problem of dissociation.

⁶ Indeed, contemporaries of both Janet and Prince, such as William James and Frederic W.H. Myers also contributed to expanding the nonpathological and therapeutic range of dissociative phenomena.

⁷ Prince (1905) noted that some forms of hypnosis were also “artifacts” of an “artificial dissociation” and “not a state of normal life” (p. 131). For Prince’s nuanced view on hypnosis, including pathological and nonpathological variants, please see Prince (1905).

The purpose of articulating these three problems is to provide a standard against which theoretical approaches to dissociation can be measured. Thus, of any particular approach, one could ask: Does it have a way of defining or delimiting the range of dissociative experiences, and explain what unites the diverse phenomena that are included under this heading? Does it provide a clear account of what it is that is dissociated in dissociative experience? Finally, does it provide meaningful guidance in distinguishing among the pathological, nonpathological, and therapeutic/adaptive forms of dissociation?

An extensive body of theoretical and scientific literature speaks to dissociation, and this work may help address these problems. This history may still be valuable to sift through. Are any of the historically or currently available theories part of a solution, or do they exacerbate the problems? Yet, as noted earlier, there is no consensus on how these three problems can or should be solved. I hypothesize that the current theories will fall short, and we will have to find a new theory and ontological commitments to deal with these problems properly.

§I. Chapter Summaries

The thesis as a whole comprises two main Parts, each of which are divided into three and two chapters, respectively. The majority of Part I is given over to a two-part history of dissociation, undertaken from a distinctive point of view. In the introduction to Part I, I propose a methodology for investigating the history of dissociation—a method which I shall refer to as the “onto-mereological method.” In brief, an onto-mereological history of dissociation interrogates different theories of dissociation with an eye towards extracting the ontologies they presuppose and the various “parts” at play in dissociative phenomena. Chapter I applies this method to three pioneering figures in what I consider an early history of dissociation. Chapter II applies the

method to the ongoing contemporary history of dissociation, as reflected in the five editions of the DSM.⁸

In Chapter III, I situate dissociation within philosophy of mind, with specific reference to what is known amongst philosophers of mind as the *unity of consciousness* thesis. One of the prevailing ontological commitments consistent throughout the history of dissociation is *consciousness*. The view that consciousness is unified was a central theme of many prominent philosophers, including Descartes, Kant, Leibniz, Reid, and James—to name a few. However, the discovery of dissociative phenomena poses a strong challenge to this tradition, raising the possibility that consciousness is *disunified*. A recent continuation of the unified consciousness tradition can be found in Tim Bayne’s unity of consciousness thesis. In Chapter III, I critically examine Bayne’s unity of consciousness thesis, specifically with reference to the question of whether it adequately accommodates dissociative phenomena.

In Part II, I undertake the project of providing a phenomenologically grounded ontology for dissociative phenomena, drawing of the writings of Martin Heidegger. However, Heidegger’s work is extensive and dense, and it is not immediately clear which Heideggerian concepts are most relevant. Thus, in the Introduction to Part II, I survey some of the available resources in Heidegger’s existential analytic of Dasein and consider which might prove helpful in articulating the structure of dissociation phenomena. The two substantive chapters of Part II then each take up a relevant Heideggerian structure and puts it to work in interrogating dissociative phenomena.

Chapter IV marks the first steps towards employing Heideggerian resources to articulate dissociative phenomena. To determine what might be helpful, I begin by introducing a phenomenological description of the case of “Greg” sourced from Simeon and Abugel (2006). In

⁸ It is worth mentioning that while there are five editions of the DSM (DSM-I, DSM-II, DSM-III, DSM-IV, and DSM-5, respectively), I also engage the text-revision (TR) of the DSM-IV, thus DSM-IV-TR.

working through Greg's phenomenology, I note that a striking feature of Greg's experience is disruptions in what is considered "*mine*" and "*not mine*." The disruptions in what is considered "mine" seem to be central to Greg's phenomenology. This experience also forms a common feature of *depersonalization*. This quality of Greg's phenomenology motivates my turn to Heidegger's concept of *Jemeinigkeit*, often translated as "mineness," as a potentially fruitful resource. After working out a satisfactory understanding of mineness by engaging with the work of Heidegger and four prominent scholars, I demonstrate how mineness, and its central feature of ownership, can help to articulate the phenomenology of depersonalization. In Chapter V, I introduce derealization and the Heideggerian structure of *Unheimlichkeit*, or "uncanniness." I show how Heidegger's concept of uncanniness captures the special quality of the simultaneous "familiarity and unfamiliarity" and "feelings of unreality" that are part and parcel of derealization (and depersonalization). I then move to address the ambiguous depersonalization/derealization relationship found in the clinical literature, drawing on the combined resources of *Jemeinigkeit* (mineness) and *Unheimlichkeit* (uncanniness). I conclude that Heidegger's concepts of mineness and uncanniness succeed in supplying the necessary resources for a rich, faithful phenomenological articulation of dissociative experiences, and in pointing toward a unified ontology for dissociation.

Part I: A History and Challenge of Dissociation

§0. The Onto-mereological Method of Investigation

With the three problems of dissociation in mind, I now turn to formulate a methodology to use in the historical part of this project. Central to my aim in interrogating the history of dissociation theory will be to clarify the *ontology* that theorists of ontology have either explicitly or implicitly relied upon. My use of ontology might, in this sense, be described as *methodological*. In this historical part of the project, I am not aiming to determine what the *correct* ontology is (if indeed there is such a thing), nor what ontological framework is best suited to articulate dissociative phenomena. Rather, my aim is to excavate the *ontological commitments* of dissociation theories.¹ What are the entities, categories, modes of being, relationships, and so on that are presupposed in the history of attempts to articulate and explain dissociative phenomena?

In thinking about *what exactly* dissociation *is*, we are immediately pulled into getting clear on what is being dissociated. The term “dissociation” suggests a division or disconnection of *something*, and our methodology aims to identify *what* that something *is*. These are the *ontological* commitments, or the entity or thing subject to dissociation. Here, to get a sense of the scale of the ontological problem, we need first to identify the ontological commitments of dissociable beings.

But identifying the ontological commitments of dissociable beings does not cover the entire story of dissociative experiences. We cannot overlook that the very nature of dissociation strikes a formidable challenge to unity in human experience. For example, Janet’s discovery of the “division of consciousness” to the formation of conscious and subconscious parts suggests a

¹ My way of using ontology here may be classified as roughly Quinean insofar as I am interested in identifying ontological commitments. Other than this similarity, I have no stake in Quine or any of his conclusions.

disunity in consciousness. More recently, the DSM-5 (2013) informs us that dissociation is “a *disruption* of and/or *discontinuity* in the normal *integration* of consciousness, memory, identity, emotion, perception, body representation, motor control, and behavior” (p. 291, my emphasis). In other words, dissociation implies the disunity of these various modes of being. Since the possibility of dissociable beings puts pressure on the assumption that the experiences of such a being are unified, this *disunity* implies different *parts* configure in such a way to make a unity or whole *possible* (and in the case of the DSM-5, a *normal* whole—a point that will be taken up Chapter II in the thesis). The reality that dissociation implies something is being divided or separated brings up another kind of question: What are the configurations of *unity* or *wholeness*, and what *disunity* or *parts* does dissociation reveal? Thus, a way to increase the specificity of the ontological method is also to identify the part/whole relationships of these modes of being. We can call these configurations of disunity/unity or parts/wholes the *mereological* commitments. Therefore, throughout the history of theorizing dissociative phenomena, we are also interested in the *mereological* feature of these ontological commitments. Bringing to light the parts of the wholes and the relationships of dissociable beings in the history of dissociation is what I will call the *mereological* question.

In identifying *the entity or thing* being dissociated, we also reveal modes of unity or wholeness and the configurations of these part/whole relationships. Taken together, the *onto-mereological method* is a strategy to help determine “what” is being dissociated and thereby the modes of unity or wholeness of dissociable beings and the particular configurations of these part/whole relationships.

§I. Approaching a History of Dissociation

One worry that emerges is how to approach the vast amount of historical and ongoing literature associated with dissociation with this method, as it could undoubtedly become unwieldy and unfocused. However, while there is undoubtedly merit in chronicling how dissociation was discovered and developed into what it is currently, these histories have been written; therefore, the task here is not to recreate them.² Instead, we want to deploy the ontomereological method to examine the historical record anew. In service of making the history of dissociable beings manageable while also providing depth, one solution is to use the historical record as a reference point. Studies in dissociation enjoyed significant attention in the late 19th and early 20th century, led by Janet and his contemporaries but declined shortly thereafter, only for interest to be reignited again in the late 20th century to today codified in the dissociative disorders of the DSM-5.³ From that historical frame, we can construct *two* periods in the history of dissociation: an “early” history and a more recent “ongoing” history. Therefore, I will dedicate a chapter to both these times periods to form a two-part onto-mereological history of dissociation. Although this strategy is still too general, I will need to narrow the scope of each historical period to focus the onto-mereological investigation.

In constructing this two-part history, where shall we begin? Suppose we begin with the birth of the clinical term “dissociation” with Janet in the late 19th century. In that case, a

² More traditional histories of dissociation are chronicled by Henri Ellenberger (1970) in *The Discovery of the Unconscious*, Adam Crabtree (1993) in *From Mesmer to Freud*, and Michael Cotsell (2005) in the opening chapter of *The Theater of Trauma: American Modernism Drama and the Psychological Struggle for the American Mind, 1900-1930*.

³ Scholars have contributed a number of factors to the lull in dissociation research during this time. Most noteworthy are the rise in popularity of the psychological schools of psychoanalysis and behaviorism. On the one hand, psychoanalysis provided an alternative model to Janet’s *dissociation* and *subconscious* in the form of Freud’s *repression* and the *unconscious*. On the other, behaviorism largely omitted the study of consciousness (and thereby the *division* of consciousness) from its purview. For a more detailed studies on the decline of dissociation research in the early-to-mid 20th century, please see Hilgard (1977), van der Hart & Dorahy (2009), and Cotsell (2005).

preliminary analysis of the clinical literature may have us tempted to adopt consciousness as the ontological commitment for dissociable beings or the *thing* or *entity* that is being dissociated.

This point is due to recognizing Janet, and many of his contemporaries, theorizing dissociation as a division or separation in consciousness. However, we must also consider a whole host of other ontological commitments used to describe the thing or entity being dissociated—Janet himself also endorsed “personality,” “ego” and “system of ideas.” Indeed, Janet (1925a) himself referenced the pioneering work of Puységur in his discovery of “magnetic somnambulism” in the late 18th century as a precursor to his own concept of dissociation. Fast forward to current times, and we observe the DSM-5 (2013) definition lists at least seven different commitments, including consciousness, memory, identity, emotion, perception, body representation, motor control, and behavior. If the goal is to excavate the ontological commitments of dissociation, why not begin with this comprehensive list? What is the value of providing such a history?

One value of taking a historical approach is to rediscover forgotten terms and insights that are associated with the phenomena in question, especially considering Janet's remarks on the important influence of magnetic somnambulism on his work. Moreover, we may also notice what terms show up repeatedly and those that might fall out of favor, along with the reasons for either of these trends. The goal then becomes tracking over time how these onto-mereologies of dissociative phenomena become crystalized into the commitments of what is being dissociated that we currently have today. In this sense, we are interested in a history of the onto-mereological commitments or *identifying the ontological commitments and modes of unity and disunity of dissociable beings*. Therefore, at least in this project's two-part history (chapters I and II), the task is to craft an onto-mereological history that identifies and catalogs the commitments and

assumptions of the mode(s) of unity of dissociable beings. I will take up the specific topics of both these historical accounts in their respective chapters (Chapters I and II).

In constructing this onto-mereological history of dissociation and specifically examining the details of these two historical periods, related questions may be identified to help enrich the accounts. In determining the parts/whole relationship of the dissociative phenomena, a relevant subject to keep in mind is that the early reports of dissociative phenomena arose from pathology, with one particular source, which is historically and currently significant, being psychological trauma. That is to say, traumatic experiences often play a central role in the formation of disunities or divisions in the particular being of dissociable beings. With getting a clearer sense of the ontological and mereological commitments of these dissociation theories, understanding the impact and role trauma plays in the formation of these configurations is important. Therefore, alongside identifying the particular configurations and commitments of dissociable beings in relation to the history of dissociation, this additional set of questions, which consist of differentiation from the nonpathological and pathological and the part trauma plays in dissociation, is included as supplementary lenses to examine the history over the following two chapters.

With this onto-mereological method as our investigative strategy, we can examine the historical record of dissociation with a specific purpose: to reveal the ontological and mereological commitments and configurations of dissociable beings. Again, the onto-mereological method is not intended to solve any of the problems identified earlier, as that is the aim of the entire project. Instead, the focus of the onto-mereological method is to identify and describe the various ontological and mereological commitments that underscore these problems.

Therefore, the motley problem, ontological problem, and normative problem take shape through the onto-mereological history of dissociation.

Chapter I: A History of the Founding Pioneers of Dissociation

§0. Introduction

In this chapter, I will discuss an early history of dissociation; however, the question arises of where to start this history. One reasonable starting place is the work of Pierre Janet because the concept of dissociation is most notably tied to him (Hilgard, 1977; Crabtree, 1993; van der Hart & Dorahy, 2009). Yet, Janet (1925a) identifies a major precursor to dissociation in the French animal magnetist the Marquis de Puységur's treatment of Victor Race and discovery of "magnetic somnambulism" in the late 18th century. According to Janet, after Puységur "magnetized" Victor instead of convulsing and entering into the usual "magnetic crisis," Victor seemingly fell asleep yet spontaneously walked around and spoke to Puységur in a sophisticated manner.¹ Upon awakening, Victor returned to his usual state with no recollection of what occurred. Janet recognizes Puységur's work as holding a foundational place in the early history of dissociation.² In his famous Harvard lectures given in 1906, later published as the *The Major Symptoms of Hysteria*, Janet (1907) mentioned the importance of the American neurologist Morton Prince's "development of pathological psychology" (p. 85). Janet references Prince's famous case of "Miss Beauchamp," who exhibited "multiplex personality" as a depiction of one of the more complex pathological varieties of dissociation identified (p. 85).³ Moreover, Prince

¹ According to Puységur (1784), Victor speaking in a sophisticated manner was unprecedented as he was considered by Puységur to be a simple farmhand who barely spoke at all. More on this important event in the next section of this chapter.

² Janet (1925a) wrote that while Puységur may have been the first magnetist to *describe* what could be called the "proto-dissociative" feature of magnetic somnambulism many of Mesmer's followers may have been the first to *observe* this kind of somnambulism. Regardless, Janet (*ibid*) concludes that "the occurrence of a phenomenon is not the same as its discovery; those who are present when it happens must notice it, describe it, and, above all, understand its importance" (p. 33). Here we can see the significance Janet places on Puységur's discovery and description.

³ Janet (1907) recognized Prince as a physician interested in increasing complex variations of pathological dissociation such as "multiplex" or multiple personality (p. 85). However, Janet also indicated that these

broke from Janet's thought that dissociation was strictly a pathological phenomenon and discussed nonpathological or everyday varieties, such as absentmindedness and hypnosis. With Janet's reference points to frame the early history, I will begin with Puységur's discovery of magnetic somnambulism, continue to Janet's work on dissociation, and finish with Morton Prince's expansion of dissociative phenomena.

In this chapter, I aim to form an early history of dissociation by interrogating the work of Puységur, Janet, and Prince with the onto-mereological method. Alongside revealing the ontological and mereological commitments of these three pioneers, I will also show the origins of the ontological, motley, and normative problems. In the first section, I engage Puységur's discovery of "magnetic somnambulism" with his treatment of Victor. I then move on to Janet's conception of dissociation, specifically with the discovery of the subconscious using two different case examples. In the third section, I introduce Morton Prince and his work on expanding the range of dissociative experiences, notably along pathological lines in his well-known case of Miss Beauchamp and nonpathological lines with hypnotic suggestion and absentmindedness. In each section, I will also recognize the nonpathological, pathological, and therapeutic viewpoints made by these pioneers. The chapter concludes with a clearer picture of the ontological commitments and the formation of the three problems of dissociation. I also propose a broader narrative of two "meta-schemas" of how the dissociative phenomena were

complex cases are "but various combinations and forms of the two simple forms we have studied," that is, of the two simple forms of somnambulisms. Intriguingly, Janet was alive to the possibility that the observer may influence the development of multiple personality, which would be what he called an "artificial complication" of simpler somnambulisms. His skeptical position on multiple personality, in a way, anticipated the "real versus fake" debate over multiple personality disorder that would arise roughly three-quarters of a century later. Be that as it may, Janet also "adds the study of these cases to the two simple forms" of somnambulisms, thereby extending Prince's work to the dissociation theory canon (p. 86). Please see Janet (1907), pp. 85-86 for more. For contemporary views on the topic please consider Kluft and Fine (Eds.) (1993) and Rieber (2006).

theorized—that of “harmony” and “unity”—and the implications of the shift from harmony to unity. The primary objective of this chapter is to track the formation and worsening of these three problems through the pioneering work of these three figures.

§I. Marques de Puységur and the “Magnetic” State

Puységur’s discovery of and pioneering work with magnetic somnambulism significantly influenced the modern investigation of dissociative phenomena—over a century before the term “dissociation” came into common usage. In what follows, I introduce Puységur’s discovery of magnetic somnambulism with his treatment of Victor Race with the aim of identifying the ontological and mereological commitments.

Puységur (1784) described a fascinating event when he applied Mesmer’s magnetizing technique to his farmhand Victor Race to treat a respiratory problem: instead of the usual convulsing “beneficial crisis,” Puységur noticed that Victor had seemingly *fallen asleep*.⁴ Except Puységur disclosed that this sleep was no ordinary sleep, as Victor continued to speak and move about *as if he were awake*. Puységur claimed to discover a *new* kind of crisis that significantly differed from the beneficial crisis customary to Mesmer’s treatment. Puységur called this new magnetic state “magnetic somnambulism,” due to the involvement of the magnetic method and

⁴ Animal magnetism or mesmerism is tied to Franz Anton Mesmer. In short it was a technique to restore balance of the so-called universal magnetic fluid which permeated all things. For Mesmer, magnetizing meant moving the fluid through the patient to facilitate the natural flow again and restoring harmony. Mesmer (1779) often reported that this increased movement would trigger spasms and convulsions and conclude with the patient fainting. This dramatic response to being magnetized was known to Mesmer as the “beneficial crisis.” The spasms and convulsions that were part of the beneficial crisis were not viewed as *symptoms*, but actually part of the *cure*. As mentioned in this section, Puységur observed a drastically different occurrence with Victor, which led to his discovery. My concern here is not to provide a history of animal magnetism or to make a claim on its veracity, as those aims are not relevant for this project. I include it here as a brief description to help orient the reader historically and contextually, as well as for its role in this early history of dissociation. A curious reader may engage Mesmer (1779) for more on his theory and practice of animal magnetism. For a more contemporary assessment of animal magnetism, please see Ellenberger (1970) and Crabtree (1993).

the apparent, albeit tenuous, resemblance to sleep. Intriguingly, while in magnetic somnambulism, Puységur wrote that Victor behaved and spoke in a completely different manner, one that was much more sophisticated and articulate, which was uncharacteristic of him, as Puységur described him as being simple-minded and even slow-witted, basically mute. Furthermore, while in this state, his emotions intensified, and he spoke negatively of his sister—both of which were entirely uncharacteristic of him. Upon “awakening” from magnetic somnambulism, Victor was entirely amnesic for any aspect of the experience and reverted to his previous simple and unexpressive nature.

Puységur (1784) was admittedly surprised by what he observed with Victor, proclaiming that:

“Quand il est dans l’état magnetique, ce n’est plus un paysan niais, sachant a peine repondre a une phrase, c’est un être que je ne fais pas nommer” (p. 29).⁵

Which I translate to the following:

“When he is in the magnetic state, he is no longer a simple-minded peasant, hardly able to answer a sentence, he is a being that I do not name” (p. 29)

Puységur’s usage of the term “*un être*” as a noun, which translates to “*a being*” or “*an existence*,” is rather intriguing. Victor, while in the throes of magnetic somnambulism, was described by Puységur as a being [*un être*] utterly unfamiliar to him, which is odd because Puységur was well acquainted with Victor (he lived and worked for years as a farmhand on Puységur’s estate). Even though the character of Victor differed to such an extent that he appeared to be a different being, the commitment is not to the manifestation of an unknown entity that took the place of Victor—he was not possessed by a demon, spirit, or anything of the sort. After all, Puységur’s reference to the so-called “nameless being” was *Victor himself*,

⁵ I have decided to preserve the original French here to show the origin of my translation.

specifically the *whole being* of Victor. On the one hand, it makes sense that Puységur's reference to "a being" [*un être*] points to the possibility that Puységur lacked the language to express Victor's condition—as this certainly was not included in his training with Mesmer. But the use of that term also points to the significant change in *who* Victor had become at that moment. This nameless being or existence *was still* Victor. However, a new part of Victor's being emerged, consisting of a distinctly different phenomenal constellation of thoughts and emotions of which Victor himself was unaware of when he returned to his "waking" state. The whole of Victor is no longer indivisible with the discovery of this new part of his being. For Puységur, the ontological commitment is that of existence or being (*un être*), but what are the parts?

Puységur refers to two distinct parts of Victor's existence: Victor in the magnetic, somnambulatory state, and Victor in the waking, everyday state, with amnesia in the waking state for what occurred during the magnetic state. According to Puységur, the magnetic state is considered a special species of somnambulism induced by the magnetic method. What does Puységur mean by the magnetic state of somnambulism? According to the theory of animal magnetism, is it not the case that we are always under the influence of this magnetic fluid because of its universal effect on all bodies? What would make this magnetic state unique? Quite intriguingly, Puységur, while trained by Mesmer in both theory and method, came to doubt the existence and influence of the universal magnetic fluid (see Puységur [1784] pp. 49-52). Indeed, Puységur later referred to this special state as just the "state of somnambulism" (*l'état de somnambulisme*). What made this somnambulatory state so unique is how distinct it was from the ordinary, waking state. Moreover, the French magnetist Joseph-Phillippe-François Deleuze (1813) wrote that the somnambulist would only have access to the parts that are "not in a natural state and which disturb the general harmony of the whole" (p. 137). Given Deleuze's point, the

somnambolic state is not itself pathological. Still, the existence of the somnambolic state reveals that Victor is not in harmony with *his* whole, and this disharmony results in the pathological division between these two parts. Puységur discovered a new kind of disharmony with his work with Victor, specifically disharmony that resulted from the schism between the two parts of Victor. A striking feature that emerges in Puységur's discovery of the "magnetically induced" somnambolic state is an interest in what perhaps can be considered the internal character of the somnambulists, and the harmony of this character. Puységur's discovery resulted in a dialectical shift from the externalist fluidic disharmony to an internalist psychological disharmony.

But can we say more about the parts of the disharmonious *whole* of Victor? In examining Puységur's work with Victor, the somnambolic part and the ordinary, waking part are each made up of distinct configurations of emotion and cognition/intellect.

Puységur observed that when Victor entered into the somnambolic state, he became depressed and appeared humiliated. Puységur (1784) writes that:

this man has inner grief [*chagrin*], the grief is caused by his sister with whom he lives with, who contested a deed [to the house] left to him by his mother. The sister is the most wicked woman in all the town, and she angers [*enrager*] him from morning to night (p. 29-30).

Remember that Victor was emotionally unexpressive and spoke very little in his usual waking state. His experience of being annoyed or angered by his sister appeared, at least in his everyday life, seemed as if it did not affect him. But it clearly caused him disharmony, as the grief he experienced at the hands of his sister was concealed and could only be expressed through his somnambolic state. Victor was emotionally *expressive* in the somnambolic state, while remaining emotionally *nonexpressive* in the ordinary, waking state.

Similarly, while in the somnambolic state, Victor exhibited increased cognitive and mental acuity. From the first session forward, Puységur observed Victor increased ability to articulate himself proficiently, and in the aristocratic style French—not his regional dialect. The contrast between the ordinary, waking part and the somnambolic part of Victor was stark. Puységur described the former as slow-witted and “simple-minded, hardly able to answer a sentence” (p. 29), and the latter being “more profound, more prudent, and more clairvoyant”⁶ (p. 27) than anyone else he knew—a rare sentiment about a peasant farmhand coming from an aristocrat.

In terms of our normative problem, the sheer fact that Victor experienced magnetic somnambulism was a marker for disharmony and, therefore, disorder. Still, the *state itself* was not pathological, *per se*, but rather a sign or symptom of pathology. If we briefly recall Mesmer’s view, the crisis was curative, and Puységur followed the same line of thought with magnetic somnambulism. Puységur (1807) confirms “a man [*sic*] is in health when all his parts of his being are in a state to fulfill all the functions for which they are destined, and this state is called harmony. Disease exists when harmony is disturbed” (pp. 132-133). A person is healthy, according to Puységur, when all the parts are configured and functioning as they are intended or “destined” to do—this state is what he calls “harmony.” We would not expect to see a somnambolic state with someone who is healthy or in “harmony.” Thereby, magnetic somnambulism reveals a particular disharmony in the configuration of parts. If magnetic

⁶ The issue of clairvoyance is a fascinating one to be sure. Many magnetists believed that the techniques of animal magnetism could facilitate clairvoyance in both the magnetist and patient. I do not have a formed stance on the veracity of this claim, nor do I seek to make one here (if interested in contemporary commentary about this topic please see Crabtree [1993]). However, I do want to point out that whatever was happening with the patient from the descriptions could be considered a form of increased mental acuity or ability that was *distinct* from the previous state, and again supports the marked division between both the “magnetic, somnambolic state” and “ordinary, waking state.”

somnambulism emerges from disharmony, then the therapeutic goal is to *restore* harmony. The therapeutic strategy for Puységur was the application of the magnetizing technique to induce the magnetic state as an attempt to resolve the disharmony. The idea was that the magnetic state brought out the part that was in disharmony, which was unavailable to the ordinary, waking state. For Puységur, the magnetizer's positive intentions, belief in improvement, and rapport provided a soothing situation to bring out and resolve the problem and restore harmony. In this sense, the magnetic state was an indicator of pathology but was itself therapeutic (so long as the magnetizer brought out the magnetic state)

As we have seen, harmony holds a central organizing meta-schema in the maintenance of health. What does excavating the meta-schema of harmony offer us? Harmony, at least insofar as Puységur and others considered it, indicated a kind of balance of parts. The word “harmony” comes from the Latin *harmonia*, which means “joint, union, agreement, or concord of sounds.” In this way, the whole of Victor was not in agreement and concord, which resulted in the formation of the two discordant parts, with the emergence of the somnambulatory state indicating the *disharmony*. Another way of thinking about disharmony is dissonance. There appears to be a dissonance in Victor’s being, resulting in the formation of the somnambulatory part distinct from the ordinary, waking part. Harmony provides the organizing meta-schema to bring distinct parts into agreement or concord with one another. I will revisit the meta-schema of harmony in the conclusion of this chapter after identifying the meta-schema endorsed by Janet and Prince.

Puységur’s rejection of the existence or influence on the external magnetic fluid with his observation and work with Victor’s somnambulatory state had him theorize a psychological explanation centering on the influence of belief and rapport with the person. Puységur’s shift away from the magnetic fluid theory gained enough popularity to the point that he attracted his

own followers (Deleuze, 1816).⁷ Puységur was not the only one to doubt the effect was due to the universal magnetic fluid that flowed through all things and shift towards a more psychologically-oriented understanding. To this point, the rise of the Scottish physician James Braid's (1843) "neurypnology," otherwise known as "hypnotism" (later adapted as "hypnosis") largely replaced animal magnetism, mostly because Braid was able to recast the phenomena of animal magnetism (and magnetic somnambulism) using psychological and physiological terminology, without the need of a "mystical universal fluid." Braid's challenge to animal magnetism rested on shifting the dialectic from an external universal fluid to the internalism of alterations in the psychophysiology processes of the eyes and brain.⁸ Along with refuting animal magnetism, Braid's hypnotism facilitated the submerging of the organizing meta-schema of harmony, as hypnotism supported the idea of psychological unity. Of note, hypnotism became a core part of both Janet's therapeutic work with somnambulism and hysteria and Prince's therapeutic work with multiple personality.

This section covered Puységur's discovery of magnetic somnambulism or the somnambolic state in his treatment of Victor Race. His discovery of this distinct state set in motion future investigations of what would eventually be known as dissociative phenomena. Puységur endorsed the ontological commitment of existence or being (*un entre*), which was

⁷ Puységur's move away from Mesmer's magnetic fluidic theory split the animal magnetism tradition into two, each attracting their own followings. Mesmer's tradition retained the universal fluidic theory, while Puységur's tradition investigated more psychologically oriented understanding of its healing effect. For a time period perspective of this split, see Deleuze (1816), For a more contemporary assessment, see Ellenberger (1970) and Crabtree (1993).

⁸ Braid was an eye surgeon and demonstrated that the so-called magnetic somnambulism and other magnetic phenomena did not require the use of magnetized objects like metal rods and series of special hand passes to move the fluid. Instead, "magnetic" somnambulism could be explained as a psychophysiological process brought about by transfixing the person's eyes on a particular object for a duration of time which would cause a shift in a state of consciousness. For more on Braid's development of hypnotism, a curious reader may reference Braid (1843).

composed of two parts, an ordinary, waking state, and the somnambulatory state, both of which were made up of cognitive and emotional parts. Puységur understood the division to be the result of the disharmony in Victor's being. Consequently, the presence of the somnambulatory state was a sign of a lack of health or pathology. Now that we have an articulation of Puységur's theory, let us turn to Pierre Janet and the emergence and formulation of the clinical term "dissociation."

§II. Pierre Janet and the Subconscious

If we examine Janet's clinical writings on dissociation, we bear witness to a rich and complex body of work centering on hysteria, somnambulism, and the discovery of the subconscious. While hysteria was a rather complicated, ambiguous—even problematic—clinical presentation, Janet (1907) viewed hysteria to be a more complicated or complex version of somnambulism. He confidently asserted that "if one understands somnambulism well, one is, I believe, capable of understanding all hysterical phases that are more or less constructed on the same model" (p. 23). In this way, for Janet, once one understands somnambulism, one could conceptualize hysteria regardless of how complex or heterogeneous the manifestation. But what is this basic model of somnambulism? Simply put, Janet's core proposal was that somnambulism involved the "dissociation of an idea, that has emancipated itself from the ensemble of consciousness" (p. 173). With this definition in mind, an initial configuration becomes clear: a specific "idea" has somehow separated itself from the rest of consciousness. Here we can see an ontological commitment straightaway: consciousness. But is it *just* an "idea" that can be separated from consciousness? To be sure, we must investigate Janet's clinical writings to ensure the proper configuration of this disunity in consciousness.

This section aims to deliver an onto-merological history of Janet's conceptualization of dissociation along with the emergence of the three problems. To accomplish this task, I will first

clarify Janet's view of dissociation by examining two of his most well-known cases that represent his view of dissociation; that of Irène and Lucie, respectively. This investigation includes Janet's discovery of the subconscious and its role as applied in both cases. After revealing Janet's onto-mereological commitments, I then move to discuss his view of dissociation as a pathological phenomenon and his therapeutic goal of unity.

Janet began clinically treating Irène while she was hospitalized at the Salpêtrière. After treating her, Janet (1907) declared Irène as "one of the most splendid cases of somnambulism" he had ever observed (p. 30). Her case conceptualization became the early prototype for dissociation, which he would use in many of his clinical teaching seminars. According to Janet (1901/1892, 1907), Irène had witnessed her mother die of tuberculosis in a rather intense and traumatic way.⁹ Irène did not believe her mother was dead and was confused by the entire situation. However, several days per week, Janet indicated that Irène would fall into a spontaneous somnambulant state, lasting for hours or even days, where she would relive, in detail, the death of her mother in a highly panicked and distressed manner. She was eventually admitted to the Salpêtrière and diagnosed with hysteria. Janet (1901/1892) noted the following:

although in her delirium she had a precise memory of her mother's last moments, of her death, and of the events which immediately followed—for she kept on repeating her account of them, and dramatically rehearsed the scenes with full details—in her normal life she appeared to have completely forgotten the occurrence. She seemed to have given up thinking about her mother, whom she had so fondly loved and whom she had nursed with such devotion. Apparently she had lost the power of calling up her mother's personality in imagination. She accepted the idea of her mother's death with indifference, and without conviction, for she had no conscious memory of what happened (p. 813).¹⁰

⁹ Janet (1907) reported that Irène was responsible for her mother's caretaking while she was ill, which requires around the clock, attentive care. Janet describes Irène's experience as follows: for hours after her mother's death, Irène attempted to revive, provide medications, and speak to the corpse. At one point, her mother's corpse fell on the floor, which prompted Irène to prop the corpse back up and continue administering care. Finally, a relative intervened by stopping Irène's behaviors (pp. 29-30).

¹⁰ Janet appears to be using the term "normal" to mean "everyday" or "ordinary" life in this context. His meaning of the term is important to mention and understand, as it arises in other quotes throughout this section.

When Irène shifted out of her somnambolic state and back into her everyday state, she possessed no memory of what had transpired while in that state, and subsequently presented in an emotionless way, even when explicitly discussing her mother's death. Initially, she had no memory of the event of her mother's death, and only came to learn and remember it because her relatives repeatedly informed her of it, alongside her noticing her mother was no longer around. She, however, was amnesic about the circumstance and events leading up to her mother's death. In this sense, she *knew* (perhaps learned) her mother had died but *felt* no emotional reaction to it. Janet theorized that Irène's emotion, and the idea it was associated with, were separated from consciousness.

Thus, for Janet (1907), "the idea of one's mother's death is a well-defined system which can be suppressed clearly or develop separately" (p. 65). For Janet, these ideas are associated with experiences, but what does he mean by "ideas" as a "well-defined system?" Janet considers emotions as a lower form of experience, although they are always associated with ideas. In fact, his clinical term for Irène's presentation is "monoideic somnambulism"—somnambulism of a single idea.

The idea that Irène maintained of her mother's death was dissociated in the form of what Janet (1889) called an *idée fixe*, which translates to "fixed idea." The central theme to Janet's concept of dissociation is the failure of an idea to synthesize or integrate into consciousness. According to Janet, the main capacity of consciousness is the synthesis of psychological experiences. Consciousness, according to Janet, has an integrative capacity to it, and in the case of dissociation, that integrative capacity is lost or diminished.¹¹ For dissociation of an idea to

¹¹ The synthetic characteristic of consciousness has a Kantian theme to it. Central to Kant's work is the synthetic unity of consciousness. Intriguingly however, with Janet (1889, 1907), the synthetic unity can be disrupted resulting in disunification found in pathological conditions such as hysteria. For more on

occur and not be synthesized, the experience must be traumatic or highly stressful. The traumatic event causes (in the case of Irène, it was witnessing her mother's death) the integrative capacity of consciousness to fail, resulting in the dissociation of the idea. A specific traumatic experience—in Irène's case, her idea of the death of her mother—is *kept apart* or isolated from the main conscious stream, forming a fixed idea. Janet (1907) writes that *dissociation* is the:

development of an idea, or a feeling, of a psychological state, in a word, of a system of thoughts which takes place outside the memory and the normal consciousness. This dissociation of a psychological system is manifested not only by the preceding development, but also by amnesia, in remarkable cases, on the whole of the idea and of the feeling (p. 318)

Elsewhere in the same text, Janet (1907) adds that the idea:

ceased to be part of the personal consciousness and no longer existed but in another grouping of psychological phenomena which constituted the sub-conscious or sometimes the second consciousness of the somnambulisms or of the medianimic writings” (p. xiv-xv).

Janet thinks that an idea and feeling, which he calls a “system of thought,” occurs outside normal consciousness. He develops a special name for the psychological phenomenon that forms outside of the normal consciousness: the *subconscious*.

Janet's dissociation theory is a structural theory with the formation of two distinct parts or streams of consciousness: the *personal consciousness* and the *subconscious*. Dissociation is the formation of a *subconscious*, fixed idea that has separated from consciousness. Emotions and behaviors are associated with these subconscious, fixed ideas. In fact, according to Janet, these emotions and behaviors are signs of the existence of the subconscious fixed idea (consider the idea itself is not observable). In one sense, Janet talks about the subconscious being *outside* of

Kant's synthetic unity of consciousness, one could obviously engage his book *Critique of Pure Reason* (Kant, 1998). For a more contemporary assessment, please read Engstrom (2013).

consciousness, and in other places, he talks about it being *part* of a kind of specification of consciousness. Janet (1889) writes that “calling these acts subconscious facts, having a *consciousness* below normal consciousness” (p. 265, my emphasis). From what Janet is saying, the subconscious becomes separated from the normal or personal consciousness but still maintains some level of consciousness. Hence the reason Janet specifies or qualifies a *personal* or *normal* consciousness and the need for the term “*subconscious*” to describe the phenomena as opposed to using terms such as “*nonconscious*” or “*unconscious*.”¹²

There are some clues to what Janet meant by this process in terms he used prior to “dissociation” Janet’s previous terms include, “*dédoublement*” and “*désagrégation*” (in his publications from 1887 through 1889, he often uses both terms, “*désagrégation*” and “*dissociation*” interchangeably), but preferred *désagrégation* until settling on dissociation. Although a common translation of *désagrégation* to English is “disintegration,” if we break down the French word, we may discern Janet’s intentions. The French prefix “*dés*” is similar to meaning as the English prefix “dis-,” meaning “apart from” or “without.” The French root “*agrégat*” is similar to the English “aggregate,” which means “to bring together” to form a whole. Taken together, we see it means something like “apart from” or “without bringing together to form a whole.” Janet’s use of *désagrégation* gives us a clearer sense of what he means more generally by dissociation.

The information we gathered from the case of Irène helped elucidate Janet’s dissociation theory, namely, with the discovery of the subconscious. Returning to Irène, while it is true that in her everyday conscious experience, the idea/memory of the event of her mother’s death had been

¹² Janet’s uses the subconscious to contrast with other, similar terms such as the unconscious or nonconscious. More precisely, Janet thought of the subconscious as different than the Freudian unconsciousness. For a more contemporary review and discussion of the different between Janet’s subconscious and Freud’s unconscious, a curious reader may review Ellenberger (1970) and Kelly (1994).

dissociated, ties to the dissociated idea was an intense *emotion*. The emotional response, along with the idea of her mother *dying*, was dissociated. From the phenomenological perspective of Irène, the event of Irène's mother's death triggered ongoing, repetitive, panic-stricken *emotional* reenactments. Nevertheless, we see the parts, and their relationship to the whole, that is, how the emotional experience and the idea of her mother's death were not synthesized into consciousness. Let us now turn to Janet's second case, which will continue to flesh out the ontological modes of dissociable beings of his dissociation theory.

In 1886, Janet reported on the case of "Lucie," whom he had treated at the Le Havre Hospital. According to Janet, Lucie suffered from daily hysterical attacks where she would raise her arms, become cataleptic¹³ and appear terrified. Janet stated she would then proceed to stare at the window for hours. Eventually, she came out of these hysterical attacks, she had no recollection of what happened. Janet reported that while Lucie was in a hypnotic state (that he induced), he would make suggestions for her to perform certain tasks during her waking state (non-somnambolic or "normal" state). Interestingly, Janet indicated that Lucie executed these tasks while in her waking state but had no memory of being told to do so. During an exercise of automatic writing while under hypnosis, while Lucie was speaking to others and paying no attention to him, Janet disclosed that he asked her a series of questions. She responded in writing, and the "executor" of the automatic writing signed the name "Adrienne." Based on this discovery, Janet (1886) conclusively wrote, "we could no longer say that there was in [Lucie] absence of consciousness [in automatic writing], but two consciousness [*deux consciences*]" (p.

¹³ Catalepsy is represented by a loss of motor functioning and sensation accompanied by rigid limbs and body. The limbs will often have what is known as "waxy flexibility," meaning they can be moved to different positions and will stay in that position for some time.

588).¹⁴ Lucie was amnesic to Adrienne, but Adrienne was “conscious” of Lucie’s experiences. Janet had tapped into a part of Lucie that she was not aware of—a part that was capable of responding autonomously. In addition to identifying “two consciousness,” Janet (1889) refers to Adrienne as “the second simultaneous personality [*la seconde personnalité simultanée*]” (p. 318). Here we come across another ontological commitment: *personality*.

But how did Janet determine that the “Adrienne” subconscious could be considered a personality? Janet (1907) writes that hysterical reactions are “*characterized by the retraction of the field of personal consciousness and a tendency to the dissociation and emancipation of the systems of ideas and functions that constitute personality*” (p. 332, emphasis in original).¹⁵ Here, we see that the emancipated “systems of ideas and functions” *constitute* personality. That is, personality is made up of systems of ideas and functions. As a side note, we see yet another ontological commitment in this “systems of ideas and functions,” although considering Janet thinks that ideas are the central organizing phenomenon, in all likelihood, these functions are associated with an idea (still I remain open to the possibility they are two separate commitments). Returning to Janet’s conception of personality, are there any other features that differentiate it from being just a system of ideas (and functions). Elsewhere Janet (1889) clarifies:

¹⁴ The absence of consciousness or unconsciousness was a reference to the popular belief in medicine and physiology stretching back to the early 19th century that somnambulant states in “double consciousness,” (like Lucie’s), were a result of unconscious processes or “unconscious cerebration,” most notably held by British physicians William Benjamin Carpenter and James Cowles Prichard. An offshoot of this idea was also held by a contemporary of Janet’s, the French physiologist Prosper Despine (1880), who, more specifically argued that somnambulism was a “psychological automatism,” a reflective unconscious so to speak equivalent to the physiological kind (e.g., knee-jerk reflex). Janet’s observations and cataloging of another stream of consciousness (subconscious) challenged this conception. For more information on the various ways the subconscious was understood, please review Ellenberger (1970).

¹⁵ I will explain what Janet means by this “retraction of the field of personal consciousness” later in this section.

What is, in fact, the essential sign of the existence of a perception? It is the unification of these various phenomena and the notion of the personality which is expressed by the word: 'I' or 'me.' However this subconscious writing uses at all times the word: 'I,' it is the manifestation of a person, exactly like the subject's normal speech. There is not only the secondary perception, there is a secondary personality, 'secondary self,' as some English authors used to say, discussing the automatic writing experiences I had formally published (p. 317)

For Janet, if the system of ideas becomes complex enough to warrant the application of the pronouns "I" and "me," in other words, acquires the feature or quality of self-referentiality, then the system of ideas achieves personality status. This work by Janet demonstrated that *another* conscious system—a subconscious system—was at work outside of everyday consciousness. Yet this clinical presentation of Lucie was more complex than the simpler subconscious idea with Irène—to which the system of ideas with Lucie formed another personality (Adrienne). Taken together, Janet's ontological commitments were not only to consciousness (subconsciousness), but also to systems of ideas and functions and personality.

However, the commitments do not end there. Speaking again to Lucie's case, Janet (1886) writes:

Certainly, we see here a splitting of the ego [*dédoublement de la moi*], the simultaneous presence of two series of parallel and independent ideas, of two centers of action or, if you like, of two legal persons juxtaposed in the same brain, each has a work (p 587).

So not only does Janet commit to *dédoublement de la personnalité* or "splitting of the personality" but also the *dédoublement de la moi* or "splitting of the *moi*" and "legal persons." If we examine the French, *moi* typically refers to the first-person object pronoun "me;" however, there seems to be a trend of scholars translating "*moi*" to "ego" when the word is used in a psychological context. Still, perhaps it may be helpful to translate this word as a "me," that is, the splitting off of "me." Translating *moi* in that way is associated with the characterological

aspect it evokes, as Janet views the *moi* as being a series of ideas, actions, and moral traits.¹⁶

From this, we see a part-system emerge from a whole *personality*, and in this case, what Janet calls a “secondary personality.” two sets of personality subsystems (Lucie and Adrienne, respectively), consisting of their own parts that are organized in their own right, that make up a single personality.

Janet (1907) also endorses another ontological commitment in the form of “double existences,” specifically in more complicated cases similar to Lucie’s. For example, Janet discusses these more complex cases of somnambulism/hysteria:

The somnambulism which we consider as the essential phenomena of hysteria are apt to present a new metamorphosis, whose scientific interest is very great, when they are so protracted and complicated to give rise to what is called double *existences*, double personalities (p. 66, my emphasis).

Curiously, notice that Janet writes “double existences, double personalities.” Janet does not elaborate a difference between “existences” and “personalities,” and perhaps he is using these terms interchangeably. However, despite writing the terms next to each other, I cannot be sure they mean the *exact* same thing. Therefore, I will list them as separate commitments. As we have observed so far, we have the formation of a complex set of commitments of the *entities* or *things* that are being divided or dissociated. These include consciousness, personality, ego, existences, and system of ideas and functions.

Janet’s delineation between the nonpathological and pathological is quite evident in his clinical writings. Dissociation is understood as disunity in these ontological modes, which is a

¹⁶ A nuanced difference between ego and personality might be gleaned from Janet’s early writings. For Janet, *moi* was a kind of a narrower action-oriented series of ideas, while *personnalité* was understood as a collection of traits, characteristics, memories, emotions, etc. In his later writings, Janet appears to have abandoned *moi* for *personnalité*.

clear sign of pathology. In ordinary, everyday life, the ontological commitments are unified.

Janet (1901) wrote:

Psychological life not only consists of a succession of phenomena coming one after the other, and forming a long series in one direction, but each of these successive states is in reality a complex state: it contains a multitude of more elementary facts and owes its apparent unity to synthesis along, to the systematization of all these elements. We have proposed to call '*field of consciousness*, or maximum extension of consciousness,' the largest number of simple, or relatively simple phenomena, which might be gathered at every moment, which might be simultaneously connected with our personality in one and the same personal perception. (p. 501, italics in original).

Janet differentiates two features of consciousness: the *synchronic* field of consciousness and the *diachronic* stream of consciousness. The stream or “succession of phenomena coming one after the other and forming a long series in one direction,” as noted before, is unified in normal, everyday life through its capacity to synthesize or assimilate experiences over time (Janet, 1901, p. 501). In pathology, two streams are formed; the personal consciousness and subconscious, and these streams run parallel to each other. The field of consciousness, to Janet (1901, 1907), is defined as all the “elementary sensations” or “elementary facts” that form the “complex state” in consciousness that can be synthesized at one time. Janet (1901) suggests that one of the defining features of pathologies such as hysteria is that the field of consciousness is small or restricted compared to nonpathological people. How does the field of consciousness become smaller in Janet’s view?

Janet (1889) understood that traumatic experiences are often at the root of dissociative states, but he also recognized the psychological impact of chronic stressors. Let us again take up the case of Irène to understand how this all plays out. There are at least three features of Irène that contextualize the set of circumstances. First, Irène was described as anxious, which Janet reported resulted from her mother being neurotic and her father being a drunkard. Second, she

had a strong attachment to her mother. Finally, she cared for her mother round the clock for two months straight, which resulted in her being “exhausted.” In this way, Janet thought that Irène was already psychologically vulnerable, which left her with a “weakened synthesizing ability” and a retracted field of consciousness. According to Janet (1901), when a person is under prolonged stress and/or is chronically anxious—what Janet calls “exhaustion”—a person’s ability to synthesize experiences into consciousness reduces which “retracts” the field of consciousness (hence retraction in the field of consciousness mentioned earlier). In this state, a person has a decreased ability to assimilate or integrate experiences. This state, coupled with a traumatic event, is the formula for an “idea” of the experienced traumatic event to be dissociated. In the case of Irène, she was already in an exhausted state (due to the stress of caregiving), which weakened her synthesizing ability. This vulnerability, in conjunction with the intense, traumatic quality of her mother’s death, resulted in the dissociative experience.

From a treatment standpoint, Irène’s dissociated idea and emotion needed to be assimilated or integrated with personal consciousness. However, this could not occur with its because it acquired maintained a traumatic quality. Janet (1923a) wrote:

after much labour I was able to make her reconstruct the verbal memory of her mother’s death. From that moment I succeeded in doing this, she could talk about the mother’s death without succumbing to crisis or being afflicted with hallucinations; the assimilated happening had ceased to be traumatic (p. 680-681)

Janet treated Irène through what he called “liquidation” and “assimilation.” The liquidation was about bringing out features of the traumatic memory to conscious experience in the present. This intervention was accomplished by repeatedly accessing the traumatic memory through hypnosis. After the emotional memory can be experienced in consciousness in the present, it may begin to lose its intensity. If the traumatic quality of the memory can be “shed” in a sense, it becomes less

emotionally laden and can be integrated or assimilated. In this sense, a new idea/memory is experienced and integrated or synthesized into personal consciousness.

Janet's ontological commitments are clear: the *entity* or *thing* subject to dissociation is consciousness. The parts include the subconscious, which further consists of a fixed idea (or ideas) and emotions. However, what becomes clear is Janet's theorization of dissociation carries further ontological commitments, which include personality, ego, existence, and systems of ideas and functions. Considering that Janet talks about the dissociation of an idea, it is unclear if systems of *ideas* and *functions* are to be considered one or two since the functions are, in a way, *part of the ideas*. Moreover, Janet (1907) acknowledges the word "'consciousness'...is an extremely vague word, which means many different things" (p. 303). The central claim of Janet's dissociation theory is that the basis of dissociation is the formation of a subconscious from a fixed idea. Thus, the subconscious fixed idea is the basis for the secondary personality, consciousness, and existence. Here, Janet commits to the further interiorization of psychological structures and focuses on the unity in these structures. As Janet noted, consciousness and the subconscious are internal structures, considering they are not outwardly visible. Thus, Janet's commitments privilege inner psychological structures—consciousness, personality, ego, systems of ideas and functions—with the therapeutic goal of assimilation or unity.

§III. Morton Prince and the Expansion of the Motley Problem

The final pioneer in the early history of dissociation has us travel across the Atlantic Ocean to examine the contributions of the Morton Prince, with the particular aim of reviewing the ontological commitments alongside elucidating how he expanded the *range* of dissociative phenomena. That is to say, Prince's work contributed to the expansion of dissociation into

pathological and nonpathological domains, thereby contributing to the motley problem.¹⁷ In what follows, I will first investigate Prince's case of multiple personality found in his 1906 monograph *The Dissociation of a Personality* as an expansion of the more pathological range of dissociative phenomena.¹⁸ While describing this case, I will draw out the ontological commitments and the mereological configurations. I then shift to tackle Prince's account of nonpathological dissociative phenomena, specifically how he differentiates his understanding from Janet's.

Morton Prince's multi-year treatment of Christine Beauchamp, known as "Miss Beauchamp," began in the early part of 1898. In *Dissociation of a Personality*, Prince recounts in exquisite detail the story of Miss Beauchamp, who over the course of the treatment, developed and maintained four different "personalities."¹⁹ The story of Miss Beauchamp is quite lengthy and complex. It would be impossible to recreate it in its entirety; however, my focus is to excavate the relevant details of the phenomena described by Prince to draw out his ontomereological commitments. With this aim, the title itself provides us straight away with the first ontological commitment: *personality*. To be clear, although Prince describes "multiple personalities," "secondary personality," or "multiple personality," in many places of the work, he

¹⁷ Prince was not the only dissociationist at this time to suggest a nonpathological variant. Other notable included Frederic W. H. Myers and William James.

¹⁸ The veracity and treatment method of this case is a point of contention, notably the suspicion that the development of the "personalities" was *iatrogenic* (Please see Greaves [1993] and Rieber [2006] for contemporary commentary on this topic). However, since this case is regarded in clinical psychology as a classic reference (virtually all histories of dissociation document this case) the focus here is not to question its veracity, but to include it as a representative piece in the onto-mereological history of dissociation. Morton's work will be treated as cannon in dissociation theory to trace the conceptual progression of dissociation. The main point is that his terminologies and conceptual framework for the phenomena of multiple personality are carried forward to present day. Therefore, the excavation is about the onto-mereological history of dissociation.

¹⁹ Some discrepancy exists in the literature on whether there were four or three "personalities." I will speak briefly about this topic later in this section.

argued that a more accurate term for Miss Beauchamp's (and similar cases) is "disintegrated personality." Prince (1906) emphasized that:

[c]ases of this kind are commonly known as 'double' or 'multiple personality', according to the number of persons represented, but a more current term is *disintegrated* personality, for each secondary personality if part only of a normal whole self. No one secondary personality preserves the whole psychical life of the individual (p. 3, emphasis in original)

These secondary or multiple "personalities," according to Prince, make up a whole self. From what can be gathered here, a person will have *one* whole self, but may maintain multiple personalities. We also find another ontological commitment here, the "self" or "whole self." In a sense, Prince creates an ontological hierarchy involving one whole self, which may comprise several personalities in pathological cases like Miss Beauchamp. These personalities may also be considered mereologically as parts of the whole self. Let us see how Prince defines a personality and the parts that comprise one.

What marks a so-called "personality" as distinct—to the point where there is more than one—rather than simply a cluster of subconscious ideas? According to Prince (1906), personality consists of character traits, trains of thought, emotions, beliefs, temperament, and experiences. From a mereological standpoint, we notice the part components of a personality, but is there a quality that allows these personality parts to be considered a distinct "personality?" Elsewhere, Prince (1905) proposes that the most important quality of personality is that of the synthetic pronoun "I," represented in statements like "I felt this" or "I saw that" (p.136). At least one necessary criterion for a personality would be the ability to ascribe the pronoun "I." If the pronoun "I" could not be applied to a grouping or cluster of thoughts, emotions, or sensations, it was not a personality.²⁰ Another feature he mentions is amnesia between these "I's," although

²⁰ As we may have noticed, Prince's view of personality is very similar to Janet's.

that is not always the case, as we will see later in this section. To illustrate this distinction, let us turn to Prince's descriptions of how he understood the parts of Miss Beauchamp.

Prince (1906) held that three parts of Miss Beauchamp qualified as distinct "personalities." To keep track of them, he labeled them BI, BIII, and BIV (BII, as we will see, turned out, per Prince, to be a hypnotic state of BI), in which the Roman numerals signify the order in which they appeared. Miss Beauchamp, who presented initially to Prince for a nervous condition, was described as well educated, meek, dependent, and reserved; she became known as "BI." BI was amnesic to any other personality. Prince (ibid) named the second personality, BIII, "Chris," but later, the personality revealed herself to be "Sally" when she began gaining more autonomy and presence (p. 16). Prince described Sally as less educated, careless, irresponsible, child-like, and a trickster. Sally was also "aware of" and existed alongside the other personalities. The third personality, BIV, who "emerged" sometime in the summer of 1899, was described by Prince (1920) as "strong, resolute, self-reliant, sudden and quick to quarrel" (p. 68). She was assertive, bordering on aggressive, and did not like to be undermined—she was what Prince considered the "antithesis" of BI. BIV also remained amnesic to the other personalities. Prince noted that one of the core features distinguishing between personalities is the stark contrast between, and the absence of, shared emotions. For example, he described Sally as lacking fear, being "without the fear-reaction in so many situations, physical and moral, which would originally arouse fear in the average person" (p. 71). In contrast, Miss Beauchamp (BI) was easily started and quite fearful. Notably, one aspect of the distinctness was the inflexibility and narrowness in the character these different "personalities" displayed, specifically how they might form around a thematic emotional experience, for example, such as *fearlessness* (in the case of BIII or Sally) and *fearfulness* (in the case of BI).

Now, BII was, at one time, considered a personality, but later was revealed to be a hypnotic state. How did Prince determine this difference? Prince observed that BII was the only part that did not spontaneously emerge; BII *only* emerged in hypnosis. Moreover, BII had all the memories of BI, but also had access to ones that BI did not have access to or remember. Prince (1906) remarked that when Miss Beauchamp (BI) was hypnotized, the hypnotic state would allow access to the subconscious ideas of the other parts. In this way, the hypnotic state acted as a way of accessing other aspects of her whole personality.

Bringing up subconscious ideas taps another ontological commitment of dissociable beings in Prince's work. Despite the central role of personality, subconscious fixed ideas played a central role in Prince's clinical work. Prince had accepted and adopted Janet's theory of subconscious fixed ideas as the basic model for dissociation. Though, Prince (1906) added that consciousness could be "disintegrated in such a way as to produce a double or rather multiplication of consciousness and to form two, three, or more groups of subconscious states, which at times are capable of considerable activity" (p. 18). In other words, *multiple* more or less independent subconscious idea clusters could form separated from the main or personal consciousness. However, Prince went on to differentiate between clusters of subconscious ideas that were intermittently or sporadically accessed through hypnosis and the more complex and enduring constellation of subconscious clusters (that might even constitute a "personality," according to Prince's criteria) that form a continuous, concurrent subconsciousness—another concurrent stream. "Coconsciousness" was the term he coined to specify this *simultaneous* subconsciousness and consciousness over time, in which there was either no amnesia or one-way amnesia. Sally (BIII) was one example, as she could coconsciously exist with the main consciousness.

As mentioned earlier, Prince (1906) wrote about the “normal whole self” (p. 3). For Prince, a “self” was considered to be “whole” or “unified,” but in certain conditions, a subconscious self, or selves could form. Prince (ibid) wrote:

by a subconscious self I mean simply a limited second, coexisting, extra series of “thoughts,” feelings, sensations, etc., which are (largely) differentiated from those of the normal waking mind of the individual. In abnormal conditions these secondary “thoughts” may be sufficiently organized to have a perception of personality, in which case they may be regarded as constituting a second self. Such a second self is not known to the waking self, which is not even conscious of its existence (excepting of course by inference from acts) (p. 18)

Prince defines “self” similarly to “personality,” as both seem to reference what we might call personal identity. In the same way there could be more than one “personality,” there could be more than one “self.” Perhaps Prince is using these terms as synonyms, but that calls into question why evoke these different ontological commitments if they mean the same thing, especially considering that each term has different meanings across their histories of use. Prince might be mixing and muddling his ontological commitments. One can observe the way in which Prince handles the ontologies as a representation of inherited terms from his field and difficulty in describing the complicated phenomena he studied. Yet Prince (ibid) does mention that the term “subconscious” is problematic as “the word is used by writers in general with a great deal of looseness, and too frequently its use indicates a lack of precision of thought and often a vagueness of knowledge” (p. 529). Prince wanted to use the term subconscious *specifically* for coexisting activity, hence why he preferred the more precise term “co-conscious,” but he was not always consistent in this usage.

From a treatment standpoint, like Janet, Prince’s goal was to synthesize or assimilate the disintegrated personality. Intriguingly though, Prince often wrote about looking for the “real” Miss Beauchamp, in a sense attempting to locate her amongst the existing “personalities.” The

treatment for Miss Beauchamp was based in hypnosis and suggestion and addressing a particularly shocking event that occurred with a man named “William Jones” in 1893. Throughout *Dissociation of a Personality*, Prince vacillates between BI and BIV as being the “original” or “real” Miss Beauchamp. However, more specifically, Prince’s treatment involved integrating both BI and BIV together, and “to get rid” of Sally altogether because she is a “nuisance” (p. 454). In fact, Prince proclaimed that “the resurrection of the Real Miss Beauchamp is through the death of Sally (p. 524). Therefore, Prince’s goal was not *fully* integrating Miss Beauchamp, but rather *certain* parts of her.²¹

Prince (1906) wrote something extremely interesting in one of his sessions: “The person who appeared to me this time was neither BI nor BIV, but seemed to be a *harmonious* combination of the two” (p. 516, my emphasis). Prince’s use of “harmonious” here is fascinating, as it harkens back to Puysegur’s treatment of Victor, and appears to deviate from the Janetian view of integration. However, we must be careful not to make too much out of his use of the term. Elsewhere in the same text, he references “harmonious integration,” but he does not differentiate the meanings, and I cannot be sure what he *exactly* means here (p. 234). Therefore, despite his use of the term “harmonious,” Prince does describe his treatment strategy using the hypnotic, *synthesizing* treatment of BI and BIV, leading to their fusion or unification.

One of the questions that Prince investigated is whether or not dissociation—and by some extent multiplicity—is an ordinary, nonpathological phenomenon. In fact, Prince (1906) emphasized that “the question of what part subconscious [dissociated] states play in normal minds is one of the most pressing problems of psychology” (p. 18). Generally speaking, Prince

²¹ While Prince’s case of Miss Beauchamp was considered the “prototypical” case up until the 1970’s (Greaves, 1993), it is critically important to mention that according to the ISSTD (2011) guidelines for the treatment of DID, determining an identity as more “real” than others, or “playing favorites” is countertherapeutic.

had a place for nonpathological dissociative experiences and identified two forms: hypnosis and absentmindedness. It is relevant to note that within the realm of nonpathological dissociation, he discusses it almost exclusively in terms of *consciousness*, and the role of the subconscious, as though if subconscious states became organized enough to form a personality, it would be a sign of pathology.

Curiously, Prince (1929) claims straight away that dissociation occurs in ordinary, everyday circumstances, without pathology playing a role. Prince (*ibid*) writes:

The problems of abnormal psychology become, then, very largely problems of dissociation, weakened synthesis and automatism; and if the laws which govern these processes can be determined, we shall be able to correlate most, if not all, abnormal psychological states. As dissociation and automatism are also principles of normal mental life, as for example, the phenomena of absentmindedness and the artifacts of suggestion, in these same laws we may find a correlation of abnormal psychology with normal psychology (p. 120).

Unlike Janet, Prince thought that dissociation was found in ordinary, everyday experiences such as absentmindedness and hypnotic suggestion. In the context of his experiments with hypnosis, Prince discussed how post-hypnotic suggestions could create momentary or even lingering sets of subconscious ideas, which are *artifacts*—artifacts, here, meaning “artificial” ideas created through suggestion. While the person was hypnotized, Prince would suggest an action to occur *after* the person emerged from the hypnotic state. The person would then engage in the act and have no memory or understanding of why. Therefore, for Prince, it may be the ability, in so-called normal people, for subconscious ideas to be artificially, and temporarily, created through hypnosis, as evidenced by the carrying out of a post-hypnotic suggestion. The disunity of consciousness may be evoked artificially, but this disunity would not maintain permanently as the subconscious “artifact” would be reintegrated into the everyday personal consciousness after executing the post-hypnotic suggestion.

According to Prince, dissociation also occurs in experiences of “absentmindedness,” or “abstraction.” Defining *exactly* what Prince meant regarding “absentmindedness” is difficult, but what can be discerned from his writings is that it is an experience similar to “spacing out,” losing focus, or even absorption in thought. Moreover, forgetting, or brief lost awareness, typically accompanies the experience. Prince (1929) tells us that:

absentmindedness phenomena are manifestations of the temporary disintegration of the personal self, and doubling of consciousness, but not evidence of the persistence during the ordinary waking life of subconscious states, it does not follow that on waking from reverie complete synthesis does not take place (p. 132).

Prince (1929) continued:

when awake the subject is conscious of some thoughts and not of others, both kinds keep running into one another and therefore the conscious and the subconscious are constantly uniting, disuniting and interchanging (p. 136).

Prince widens the range of dissociation through his understanding of the subconscious, that during everyday experience, various sensations, emotions, thoughts, and the like may flow in out of conscious awareness. Prince tells us that these phenomena are subconscious yet have the quality of being accessed by consciousness and integrated and synthesized. He concluded that “*there is no hard and fast line between the conscious and the subconscious, for at times what belongs to one passes into the other and vice versa*” (p. 136, emphasis in original). According to Prince, the existence of the subconscious through experiences of absentmindedness and hypnotic suggestion, unlike Janet, does not necessitate pathology. Indeed, Prince’s view of the relationship between consciousness and subconsciousness is far more fluid than Janet’s view. In this sense, Prince upholds Janet’s theory of consciousness and subconsciousness, which differs from Janet in that Prince proposes the possibility of nonpathological dissociative experiences.

This section covered a portion of Prince's work, namely his famous case of Miss Beauchamp and his understanding of nonpathological dissociation. In *Dissociation of a Personality*, Prince commits straightaway to personality as an ontological commitment of dissociable beings. Although, within the first few pages, others emerge, including consciousness and self. In certain respects, Prince as a clinician *appears* to use different terms to capture specific clinical phenomena. After all, why commit to ontologies of dissociable beings, like consciousness, personality, or self, when there is no clear-cut distinction in definitions on what they mean and what they are to be used? In one paper, Prince (1905) wrote something that obscures his strivings for specificity on terminology: "there may be a certain number of elementary conscious states...which coexist with the habitual waking *consciousness* which we term *ourselves*, or our own *personality*" (p. 126, my emphasis). From his own words, Prince seems to be using the terms "consciousness," "personality," and "self" interchangeably. Indeed, throughout his corpus, including *Dissociation of a Personality*, there are many instances where it is difficult to tell if there are any meaningful differences between these terms. Like Janet, Prince inherited terminology from an already established, albeit fledgling, discipline of psychiatry. Given the difficulty of Miss Beauchamp's case, is it possible that the ontological commitments became more confusing than helpful in elucidating the phenomena? Regardless of Prince's muddled use of terminology, he expanded the motley problem through his clinical work with multiple personality (namely, Miss Beauchamp) and contributed to creating the normative problem by introducing nonpathological varieties (e.g., absentmindedness). Prince remains a prominent pioneer to the development of understanding dissociation, both in his account of the pathological with the case of Miss Beauchamp (and others) and extending the range of dissociation nonpathological varieties.

§IV. Concluding Remarks

After excavating this early history of dissociation with the onto-mereological method, what are the lessons learned about dissociation? Were we able to get a clearer sense of the *things* or *entities* being dissociated in this early history of the dissociation pioneers? In other words, were we able to identify the more precise ontological commitments of dissociable beings (ontology) and the configuration of the parts to the whole or unity (mereology) in this history?

As we have seen, Puységur's magnetic somnambulism can be considered a historical predecessor to Janet's hysterical somnambulism, which is the phenomenon Janet uses to craft the basic model of dissociation. Janet (1907) defined somnambulism as the "dissociation of an idea, that has emancipated itself from the ensemble of consciousness" (p. 173). In this case, dissociation literally means disconnection, separation, or detachment of an idea from consciousness, which results in the formation of a *subconsciousness*, and, ultimately, the *division of consciousness*. Prince's view in many ways follows the same basic model; although, he did expand upon it in the context of "multiple personality." Janet and Prince would proceed to make other commitments, including ego (*moi*), existence, self, and system of ideas and functions.

Puységur viewed the somnambulic state as a kind of *disharmony* with one's being or existence. Janet and Prince both endorsed *unity*, with an assortment of ontological commitments. What is the importance of identifying the harmony and unity meta-schemas? In one sense, harmony and unity are used as synonyms; however, examining the etymologies of these terms reveals differences that could be relevant to this interesting turn in theorizing psychological phenomena in the history of dissociation. Earlier in the section on Puységur, I sketched the etymology of harmony to understand the word better. In short, I wrote that harmony can be traced back to *harmonia*, which meant "joint, union, agreement, or concord of sounds." Think, for example, of harmony in music where different notes are played jointly to form a unique,

textured sound. At first glance, harmony appears to support the joining of diverse or different parts. The word “unity” comes from the Latin *ūnus*, which means “one,” “single,” or “alone.” Here, focusing on “oneness” or “single” has a sense of indivisibility. From an etymological point of view, harmony appears to offer the possibility of joining diverse parts in an accord or agreement, while unity appears to focus on an indivisible oneness. However, I must mention that I am wary about making too much out of this based on the word etymologies. At the same time, I find the change in terminology associated with shifting theoretical views of dissociation phenomena intriguing.

Perhaps one way of thinking about harmony and unity is that they might not be mutually exclusive terms. In practice, unity is used to capture different kinds of “whole” configurations. For example, the *United* States of America is considered a *unity* (hence, *United* States of America), but it is also made up of discrete states that operate fairly autonomously. The states are *united* federally under a single identity. A different example is found in how distinct water droplets unify to form a larger pool of water that is indivisible. Yet another example is how an earth excavator is comprised of distinct parts, such as gears, tread, wheels, hinges, bucket, cab, etc., but is *unified* in its purpose. With this diverse set of ways unity is applied to real-world examples, *perhaps harmony can be viewed as a form of unity*. So, a “harmonious unity” may be one that maintains a distinctness in its part and still has a unifying element to it (to try and make sense of Prince’s previous usage). For example, the parts of the earth excavator can be identified individually and uniquely for their role, such as the tread and wheels, and bucket and cab, but come together for a unified purpose of digging into the earth. Thinking of harmony as a form of unity allows for separate parts to come together and form a unified whole, *while still retaining*

their distinctness. This understanding of harmony and unity could have useful therapeutic applications with dissociative experiences, especially as they pertain to personal identity.

One common theme of these three pioneers was that dissociation experiences were largely considered pathological, with Puységur's account centering on disharmony, while both Janet's and Prince's accounts cast it as disunity. However, Prince expanded dissociation into the nonpathological realm through the phenomena of absentmindedness and hypnosis. Prince's work increases the *range* of dissociative experiences to not only include somnambulists (e.g., Puységur's Victor) or those affected by trauma or shock (e.g., Janet's Irène and Prince's Miss Beauchamp), but also affect those who experience hypnosis or absentmindedness.²² Prince differentiated the pathological from nonpathological version by identifying specific phenomena that he considered nonpathological, adding that the disunity of consciousness occurs briefly before it is reunified. Looking ahead, the next step involves completing an onto-mereological history of dissociation dedicated to the *present*; that is, of the ongoing contemporary view of dissociation.

²² The current debate of dissociation occurring on continuum from nonpathological to pathological to being strictly pathological—which was briefly discussed earlier in this chapter and becomes the main differentials of the next—may have its origins in the difference between Prince's and Janet's view of dissociation.

Chapter II: A History of the DSM and Dissociation

§0. Introduction

The lull in research on dissociation during the early to mid-part of the 20th century is well documented by scholars (Hilgard, 1977; van der Hart & Dorahy, 2009). However, in the latter part of the 20th century, there was a reinvigorated interest in dissociative phenomena, most notably due to intrigue with altered states of consciousness, hypnosis, and multiple personality disorder.¹ This chapter engages specifically with the reemergence of dissociation in the clinical literature from the mid-20th century forward—which I dub the “ongoing history” of dissociation—with the specific purpose of applying the onto-mereological method to this period. Considering this chapter deals with a relatively robust ongoing history that spans over half a century, this history of dissociation could get quite unwieldy. Therefore, selecting a more focused, yet representative account of dissociation to investigate is critical.

Probably the most widely accessible literature on dissociation, known by clinicians and researchers alike, that also happens to span mid-20th century to today, is written within the many editions and pages of the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders*, generically referred to as the *DSM*.² The DSM operates with an *ontology* of psychological disorders and

¹ Ernest Hilgard, in his book *Divided Consciousness*, published in 1977, discussed the dissociative aspect of experimental hypnosis. Dissociation enjoyed an increase in prominence and popularity in the scientific community because of its role in repeatable, controlled experiments in hypnosis. Indeed, hypnosis itself received renewed credibility as it moved beyond the therapy room and into the scientific laboratory. In popular culture, the books *The Bird's Nest* (1954) *Three Faces of Eve* (1992/1957) and *Sybil* (1973) captured a more sensationalized and controversial version of dissociation in the form of multiple personality disorder. These books were later adapted to film versions that hold a place in the problematic portrayal of this aforementioned clinical presentation in popular culture.

² I have chosen the DSM series to focus on for this thesis recognizing that a natural alternative would be the International Classification of Diseases (ICD) series. One reason for choosing the DSM is because of my familiarity with the DSM as a practitioner in the United States. A second reason is due to the interesting progression of how dissociative experiences/disorders are classified that would likely not be the case with the ICD.

establishes an authoritative taxonomy of psychological disorders. In other words, it sets the frame for what psychological disorders are said to exist and functions as a standardized system for classification and categorizing. In this capacity, the DSM serves a *normative* purpose in psychiatry and clinical psychology, with its criteria for setting the difference between the pathological and non-pathological. Dissociation is one of the phenomena included in the story the DSM series tells.

Given that each edition of the DSM deals with dissociation in some form and these documents speak to both ontology and normativity, the DSM series becomes a fruitful focus for investigating the ontological and normative status of dissociative phenomena. Here, the onto-mereological method is a valuable tool to examine the ontological commitments of what is being dissociated alongside what parts make up the whole made by the DSM. The aim is to see how the DSM contributes to and copes with the three problems of dissociation—the ontological problem, the motleness problem, and the normative problem.

My aim for this chapter is threefold. I begin by working through the handful of volumes of the DSM literature using the onto-mereological method with the focus of tracking possible answers to the three problems of dissociation. In doing this, I show that the ontological commitments increase substantially from the DSM-I to the current DSM-5. While the ontological and motleness problems appear to *worsen* throughout the publications of the DSMs, I also point out that a *reasonable* solution to the normative problem is established starting with the DSM-III but becomes more explicit (and fully established) in the DSM-IV and forward. Moreover, I note that beginning with the DSM-III (1980), dissociation is defined as “temporary alteration in the *normally integrative* functions of consciousness, identity, or motor behavior” (p. 253, my emphasis) with this “normally integrative” aspect worth further investigation. Thus, in

the second section, I interrogate this idea of normal integration and argue that the DSM only answers through *negation*—that is, instead of defining what normative integration *is*, the DSM instead describes what normative integration is *not*. While investigating the diagnostic criteria, I reveal the theorization of detachment as a significant way of understanding dissociative phenomenology. Consequently, I address this detachment framework in the third section and introduce a worry about its accuracy in describing dissociative experiences. In depicting the diagnostic phenomenology from the DSM-III to the DSM-5, the DSM happens upon another problem: conundrums. These conundrums are most prominent in the descriptions of depersonalization and derealization and play a significant role in dissociative identity disorder (DID). I use the second half of the third section to explicitly name the two conundrums that emerge from the descriptions of the diagnostic phenomenology. This chapter concludes a historical story arc of dissociation that demonstrates the current shortcomings in addressing the three problems (although we might say that the DSM-5 has an adequate answer to the normative problem). I finish by plotting a course to engage these new issues and the original three problems.

§I. The DSM and the Ontological, Motlyness, and Normative Problems

Since the first edition was published in 1952, the DSM has been a text that deals with the *ontology* of psychological disorders. Beginning with the DSM-I, which carried a modest 132 pages to the current DSM-5 swelling to almost 1000 pages, disorders have come and gone as well as been defined and redefined. In a sense, dissociative phenomena are a representative example of this trend, shifting from being sparsely mentioned to commanding its own chapter. This section aims to interrogate the status of dissociation documented throughout the DSM corpus using the onto-mereological method to reveal how the DSMs answer the ontological problem, the motlyness problem, and the normative problem.

The references to dissociation in the DSM-I took the form of “dissociative reactions,” which were considered part of the “psychoneurotic disorders.” Accordingly, the authors of the DSM-I wrote, “this reaction represents a type of gross personality disorganization, the basis of which is a neurotic disturbance, although the diffuse dissociation seen in some cases may occasionally appear psychotic” (APA [1952], p. 32). As part of the DSM-I’s diagnostic system, dissociation was a symptomatic expression or *reaction* that represents a disorganized personality.

The DSM-I’s authors continue:

The personality disorganization may result in aimless running or ‘freezing’. The repressed impulse giving rise to the anxiety may be discharged by, or deflected into, various symptomatic expressions, such as depersonalization, dissociated personality, stupor, fugue, amnesia, dream state, somnambulism, etc. The diagnosis will specify symptomatic manifestations (APA [1952], p. 32)

These words are the extent to which the DSM-I describes dissociation. Nevertheless, we see the first ontological commitment, *personality*. Dissociation, here, is characterized by a disorganized personality. Although, intriguingly enough, the “gross personality disorganization” was represented by the dissociative reaction that may result in a *dissociated personality*. One way that the dissociative reaction manifests is through a disorganized personality, and one way a personality can be disorganized is as a dissociated personality. How should we understand this dissociative personality? What, if any, are the parts, and what role do they play in relation to the whole in this dissociative experience?

In sorting out an answer, a reasonable starting place is seeing how DSM-I first defines personality to grasp a sense of what it then looks like to have a disorganized or dissociated personality. Surprisingly, though, the DSM-I does not supply us with an explicit definition of personality. Nevertheless, the authors do leave us with a clue: “‘anxiety’ in psychoneurotic disorders is a danger signal felt and perceived by the *conscious* portion of the personality” (APA,

1952, p. 31, my emphasis). So, at least here, we can identify that the personality has a conscious portion, and perhaps an unconscious, subconscious, or nonconscious part can be implied.

However, there is no specification beyond the “conscious portion.”³ Consciousness or being conscious is only mentioned a handful of times and seems equated chiefly to something like awareness, but this is also not entirely clear. This ambiguity or lack of clarity in what is meant by “conscious part” and seemingly un/sub/non-conscious part limits determining the mereological configuration of personality.

Be that as it may, we can identify one ontological commitment: *personality*, with only the conscious portion mentioned as a *part* of the personality (and the un/sub/non-conscious part implied). Dissociation represents a disorganized personality, and the motley problem rears up in the form of disparate kinds of symptoms and behavioral manifestations. In other words, there is not just one particular way in which a dissociative reaction is expressed from a disorganized personality, but a variety of different ways—including “depersonalization, dissociated personality, stupor, fugue, amnesia, dream state, somnambulism, etc.” (APA [1952], p. 32). Dissociation occurs as an interiorized psychological process that involves the disorganization of personality consequent to an external, worldly stressor. In other words, disorganization happens *to* the personality *and results in* psychological symptom manifestations. The only lead to understanding this internal mechanism the DSM-I mentions is the “repressed impulse,” although there are no further details on precisely what the authors mean by repressed.⁴

³ The DSM-I makes reference to the unconscious in two places, specifically in regard to defense mechanisms and internal conflicts with no mention of subconscious or nonconscious by name. Given this point, it may be reasonable to speculate that the answer to the portion of the personality that is not conscious is the unconscious. However, I stand that the ambiguity leaves room for interpretation and I cannot comfortably interpret or conclude what the DSM-I authors meant.

⁴ The differences and similarities between dissociation and repression is a tale as old as modern psychiatry itself, which likely has its origins in the theoretical schism between Freud and Janet. Both dissociation and repression, generally speaking, can be considered defenses against severe stressors, such as

Here we see the “internal” dissociative defense results in a variety of psychological/symptomatic manifestations.

Regarding the normative problem, dissociation in the DSM-I serves a *defensive function* in response to some anxiety, stressor, or trauma. What we do observe are the experiential or symptomatic consequences of the dissociative defense mechanism, which take the form of many different kinds of experiences (depersonalization, dissociated personality, stupor, fugue, amnesia, dream state, somnambulism, etc.). However, the DSM-I only mentions these terms but does not define what they are or describe their main features.

The DSM-II, published in 1962—a decade after the DSM-I—retained the defensive/reactive or adaptive/therapeutic role of dissociation. In the dissociative type of hysterical neurosis, “alterations may occur in the patient’s state of *consciousness* or in his [*sic*] *identity*, to produce such symptoms as amnesia, somnambulism, fugue, and multiple personality.”⁵ Here, we notice that the dissociative type of hysterical neurosis affects *consciousness*, which is an ontological commitment added by the DSM-II.⁶ How does the DSM-II define consciousness? The DSM-II is light on its mentioning of conscious or consciousness, specifically using it in the context of a behavior or thought “done consciously” and when “a

traumas—however the mechanisms are different. Differentiating dissociation and repression is certainly interesting, but beyond the scope of this work. The point here is that the DSM-I uses repression in the description of the dissociation reaction and fails to specify what this means beyond the standard generalized understanding of it as a defense against trauma. Please see Kelly (1994) for a contemporary take on this topic.

⁵ DSM II, APA, 1962, p. 40, my emphasis. Authors of DSM-I wrote about dissociative reactions in psychoneurotic disorders, while the DSM-II called it a hysterical neurosis. Sorting out the difference between psychoneurosis and hysterical neurosis is not relevant to our pursuits. The main point is that dissociation was cast as a type of *reaction* to these main categories of psychological disorders at that time.

⁶ I find it difficult to believe that consciousness only enters in as an ontological commitment in the DSM-II and that the authors of the DSM-I did not think of dissociation in terms of a defensive reaction to consciousness, especially given the historical precedent of Janet and his contemporaries. However, consciousness does not show up in the DSM-I in the section defining dissociation, and only appears, as mentioned earlier, as a *part* of personality.

patient consciously recognizes” something (APA [1962], p. 40). Given this limited depiction, consciousness seems akin to something like awareness in the DSM-II, similar to what we noted in DSM-I. Although, we cannot be entirely sure that is the only way the framers of the DSM-II meant to use consciousness.

Unlike the DSM-I, the DSM-II supplies us with the definition of depersonalization. Depersonalization neurosis is characterized by “a feeling of unreality and of estrangement from self, body and surroundings” (APA [1962], p. 41). Here we see more ontological commitments enter the fray, including the “self,” “body,” and the “surroundings.” As depicted in the DSM-I, depersonalization is one of the ways the dissociative reaction can manifest. As such, I would see no reason why this would not also carry over to the DSM-II, as it appears that the DSM-II is expanding the definitions of dissociative experiences (e.g., depersonalization).

Another ontological commitment introduced by the DSM-II is *identity*: “alterations may occur in the patient’s state of consciousness or in his *identity*.” Yet, identity is only mentioned twice in the DSM-II and remains yet another ambiguous term.⁷ The DSM-I appears to focus on personality, while the DSM-II slots personality in a seemingly “part role” to the main ontological commitments of consciousness and identity. The DSM-II continues the psychological interiorization of dissociation that many of the early dissociationists started but leaves out the “repressed impulse” piece.

To recap so far, the ontological commitments of the DSM I and II have grown to include consciousness, personality, identity, self, body, and surroundings. Intriguingly, the DSM-II informs us that the alterations in either consciousness or identity *produce* the symptoms of amnesia, somnambulism, or multiple personality. Of note, these forms of alterations include

⁷ Perhaps identity is used as a co-term for personality, as they both are concerned with character traits. However, I cannot be entirely sure of this due to the lack of explicit definitions in the DSM-II.

personality—perhaps suggesting that personality (and in this case, many *personalities*) is part of consciousness and identity. Moreover, including the DSM-II’s definition of depersonalization to add to the language in the DSM-I, perhaps we might venture to say that not only personality but also self, body, and surroundings are tied to or associated with ways consciousness and identity can be dissociated. One way of organizing the DSM-I and DSM-II is with a two-tiered ontology, where consciousness and identity are higher-order ontological commitments, and personality, self, body, and surroundings are lower-order ontological commitments. In this way, we can think of the lower-tiered commitments *mereologically* insofar as they are parts of consciousness and identity. While we observe references to the self, body, consciousness, and personality, there is no clarity or specificity on how they all come together or their relationship to one another.

With the DSM-I and DSM-II, dissociation is categorized as a defensive reaction to a “psychoneurosis” or “hysterical neurosis”—both of which have anxiety at the core. In other words, dissociation is a specific way of reacting to anxiety, usually a result of a severe stressor or trauma. In both the DSM-I and DSM-II, dissociation is categorized as a defense and takes on a therapeutic/adaptive function that may or may not be pathological. On the one hand, mentioning phenomena like somnambulism, fugue, multiple personality, etc., in a diagnostic document perhaps already assumes these are pathological experiences. However, on the other hand, the DSM-II *does* introduce the brevity exclusion caveat: “a brief experience of depersonalization is not necessarily a symptom of illness” (APA [1962], p. 41). Here, determining pathological versus non-pathological is a matter of *brevity*. Still, the text in the DSM-II does not detail a time length for “brief.” Moreover, the brevity piece is not mentioned in the dissociative reaction, so it is unclear if a brief reaction could be considered normative or nonpathological.

Beginning with the DSM-III and continuing to the present, a sea change occurred in how dissociation is categorized. Indeed, the DSM-III marked a revolutionary shift in the classification of psychological disorders, shifting away from a psychoanalytic or psychodynamic framework of psychological defenses to a more phenomenologically based one encompassing cognitive, behavioral, and affective domains.⁸ The DSM-III makes a greater effort to operationalize symptoms and experiences. This more extensive recalibration marks two noteworthy changes in dissociative phenomena. The first change is the ontological establishment of dissociative phenomena commanding their own section of the DSM-II, populated by several varieties, rather than strictly a reaction tacked on to another disorder (e.g., psychoneurosis/hysterical neurosis). As a result, for the DSM-III and forward, there is a substantive increase in the number of explanations and examples of dissociative phenomena, as well as the introduction of the normative integration piece—which will be discussed at further length in the forthcoming paragraphs. Nevertheless, dissociation continues to be adaptive/therapeutic as a symptom or reaction in clinical presentations of Panic Disorder and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder. The second change involves *clearer* criteria for pathological dissociation. The DSM-III mentions “impairment” and “psychosocial distress.” But it was not until the DSM-IV that standardized criteria for experiences to qualify as a disorder, specifically, the symptoms must “cause clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning” (APA [1994], p. 481).⁹ This change will have significant implications on the

⁸ A curious reader desiring a more in-depth review of this paradigm shift and the associated debates in the classification and categorization of disorders from the DSM-I/DSM-II to the DSM-III and on may reference recent papers published by Blashfield, Keeley, Flannigan & Miles (2014) and Suris, Holiday, & North (2016). For a paper capturing that moment in psychiatric history, please read Spitzer, Williams, & Skodol (1980).

⁹ The criteria of causing significant distress and/or impairment of functioning carries through to all disorders in the DSM-IV and forward.

normative question, as it provides more explicit criteria for an experience to meet—rather than the “brevity” time duration explicated in a previous version.

One of the most striking changes in theorizing dissociation in the DSM-III centers on the concept of *normative integration*, or more precisely, the disruption of this normative integration. Notably, the focus on the lack of integration is a more explicit callback to Janet and his contemporaries. Consider the following:

The essential feature is a sudden, temporary alteration in the *normally integrative* functions of consciousness, identity, or motor behavior. If the alteration occurs in consciousness, important personal events cannot be recalled. If it occurs in identity either the individual’s customary identity is temporarily forgotten and a new identity is assumed, or the customary feeling of one’s own reality is lost and replaced by the feeling of unreality. If the alteration occurs in motor behavior, there is also a concurrent disturbance in consciousness or identity, as in the wandering that occurs during a Psychogenic Fugue (DSM-III [1980], p. 253, my emphasis).

In other words, the DSM-III defines dissociation as the breakdown of *normative integration of functions*. Initially, we observed two important clues that warrant further investigation. First, sorting out what normative integration means, and secondly, how to understand the use of “functions” to qualify consciousness, identity, and motor behavior. Interestingly, in the description, we see the term “alteration” in conjunction with the lack of integration: “alteration in the normally integrated functions of...” Considering past DSMs have used alteration, in this version, the DSM spells out what the alteration implicates, that is, the normal integration of the functions of consciousness, identity, or motor behavior. Although motor behavior may involve either consciousness or identity (or perhaps both), it retains its own ontological status, considering it is named separate from consciousness and identity.

This normative piece is fascinating as it seems to suggest there must be some standard to which beings like us are normatively integrated. The alteration or lack of integration is not just a primary or predominant dissociation feature but also an *essential* feature. Perhaps the authors of

the DSM did not intend to stir up metaphysical debates about the nature of essences, yet the implications of such a statement are critical to consider. To say that something has an *essential* feature is to say that it cannot exist without the existence or presence of a said feature. Therefore, the “sudden, temporary alteration in the normally integrative functions of consciousness, identity, or motor behavior” is *necessary* for a phenomenon to be considered dissociation.

By definition, dissociation involves some kind of sundering, division, or disconnection, and it would follow that dissociation violates that normative integration framework. The DSM-III does make explicit three ontological commitments: consciousness, identity, and motor behavior. Moreover, it claims that consciousness, identity, and motor behavior must be integrated to function normally. A new question emerges: what does it look like for these commitments to be “normally integrated?” What tools do the authors of the DSM supply us with to make a proper distinction between the normally integrated and the pathologically disintegrated?¹⁰ Framing this work with the arc of the thesis, the DSM-III appears to address the mereological configurations of dissociation alongside the normative one more explicitly. I will take up the questions about dissociation and normative integration in the next section, leaving the rest of this section to deal with the ontological and mereological commitments.

Proceeding to more recent versions of the DSM, we noticed an ever-expanding number of ontological commitments. The authors of DSM-IV tell us: “The essential feature of the dissociative disorders is a disruption in the usually integrated functions of consciousness, memory, identity, or perception of the environment” (APA [1994], p. 477). Here, we add “memory” and “perception of the environment” to consciousness and identity, but motor behavior was left out. The most recent DSM, the DSM-5, increases the commitments even more:

¹⁰ In a sense evoking the notion of integration understood in this way is a continuation of the grander pursuit from the founding pioneers of unity as discussed in Chapter I.

The dissociative disorders are characterized by a disruption of and/or discontinuity in the normal integration of consciousness, memory, identity, emotion, perception, body representation, motor control, and behavior (APA [2013], p. 291)

Just as we saw in the last chapter, there is an increase in ontological commitments. We see emotion, perception, body representation, motor control, and behavior now included as ontological commitments. If we combine these with the language associated with depersonalization, we discover that “mind” and “self” are also endorsed (p. 291). Thus, the entity or thing that is divided or dissociated is not just of consciousness, identity, or personality, but expands to memory, body/body representation, sensations, and the like. Moreover, we also notice that the “functions of” feature present in the DSM-III and DSM-IV has dropped off. This change is rather interesting, and the DSM-5 does not specify why the “functions of” language was removed. However, we must remind ourselves that the DSM-5 still relies on functionality (or dysfunctionality, to be more precise) as well as “causes clinically significant distress” as the differentiating criteria to parse out the normal from the pathological.

What we notice here is the development of a motley grouping of ontological commitments. Is this second kind of motley grouping a worry or problem? On the one hand, these specified ontological commitments supply a diverse set of things to work with from a clinical point of view. For example, a clinician might be interested in targeting thoughts, emotions, or behavior in particular ways. On the other hand, some of them (e.g., consciousness, personality, identity) are ambiguous or underdefined and, therefore, may be challenging to address clinically (especially if the goal is integration). Consequently, I am reluctant to call this secondary motley grouping a problem—especially compared to the motley grouping problem that runs throughout this project.

Of note, the commitments of consciousness, identity, and personality have remained and run throughout the DSMs (In fact, these particular commitments can be traced back to Janet and Prince, and in that sense, run through the entire history). The commitments have expanded from consciousness and personality to an assortment of other aspects. How do we organize these ontological commitments into a unifying framework? How do they all go together to help us understand dissociable beings? By the time we reach the DSM-5, there appears to be more interest in *functionality* and no interest in grander conceptual or theoretical continuity. Recall that even though the “functions of” qualifier was present in the DSM-III and DSM-IV, and dropped off with the DSM-5, all three still have functional impairment or dysfunction as a requirement for the pathological.

Speaking to the motley problem, in the DSM-I and DSM-II, this problem took the form of different symptomatic/behavioral manifestations. In other words, there were a variety of different kinds of phenomena that could result from a dissociative reaction. As we move to the DSM-III, we notice the establishment of the *dissociative disorders*, which include Psychogenic Amnesia, Psychogenic Fugue, Multiple Personality, Depersonalization Disorder, and Atypical Dissociative Disorder. Similar to how the symptomatic/behavioral manifestations were quite different from one another, the dissociative disorders are quite disparate as well. For example, how does an out-of-body experience relate to the experience of two or more personality states? Even within the same disorder (e.g., depersonalization/derealization disorder), an out-of-body experience is phenomenologically very different from the experience of emotional numbing, or even feeling like your surroundings are unreal.

With the publication of the DSM-IV, the disorders are retained, except many of their names change. For example, multiple personality disorder becomes dissociative identity

disorder. This change reflected that the person did not maintain separate personalities but rather experienced fragmented personality states that contributed to the person's identity. Moreover, psychogenic amnesia and fugue become dissociative amnesia and fugue, likely to reflect better the specific dissociative nature of the experience rather than being "psychogenic" (a more generalized term). Notably, the number of dissociation disorders from the DSM-III to the DSM-5 stays about the same. Therefore, while there is a diversity of phenomena of dissociative disorders, the motley problem remains relatively consistent from the DSM-III to the DSM-5.¹¹

In pursuit of the normative problem, before the DSM-III, it was likely inferred that the symptomatic consequences of dissociation reactions were strictly pathological, with the noteworthy exception, in the DSM-II: "A brief experience of depersonalization is not necessarily a symptom of illness" (APA [1962], p. 41). While the DSM-III mentions "impairment to social and occupation function" (in regards to Depersonalization Disorder) (APA [1980], p. 260), and "psychosocial distress" (in regards to Multiple Personality) (APA [1980], p.257), it is not until the DSM-IV (and forward) that the answer to differentiating the pathological from the nonpathological takes the form of a *standardized* criterion across all disorders (including dissociative disorders): "the symptoms cause clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning" (APA [1994], p. 481). Thus, the solution to the normative problem of what determines pathological dissociation rests on the designation of *clinically significant distress or functional impairment* in everyday life. The inclusion of "or" suggests that for dissociative experiences (as detailed by the phenomenological

¹¹ There are some instances of "lumping," or more precisely, lumping disorders or features of disorders together. For example, dissociative fugue appears as its own diagnosis in the DSM-IV but disappears as a standalone diagnosis in the DSM-5, ultimately getting "lumped in" with dissociative amnesia as a specifier.

criteria), adding either distress *or* functional impairment is necessary and sufficient for pathology.

The DSM-5 adopts the same language as the DSM-IV in determining pathology from nonpathology. Because of the specific distress or functional impairment criterion, the authors of the DSM-5 recognize the *possibility* of dissociative phenomena presenting as nonpathological. In other words, the DSM-5 allows room for people to have dissociative experiences, such as depersonalization, derealization, or even dissociative identities, so long as it does not cause “clinically significant” distress or impairment to daily function. In that case, no diagnosis nor pathology need apply. This experience still qualifies as dissociation, just not pathological dissociation. However, there are some caveats. For example, in the DSM-5, criterion D of the DID criteria specifies you can diagnose the disorder if the person’s reported symptoms or “disturbance is not a part of a broadly accepted cultural or religious practice” (APA [2013], p. 292). If the “disturbance” is part of a person’s cultural belief system (let us say, for example, channeling ancestral voices or pagan deities), the diagnosis of DID is not applicable. In this sense, the experience *could* cause some distress, but the DSM criteria give the leeway not to diagnose if it is part of cultural practice.

Moreover, adaptive/therapeutic dissociation can be considered a variant nonpathological and pathological dissociative experiences. As Barlow and Freyd (2009) remind us, adaptive or therapeutic dissociation is a way of “not knowing” an overwhelming or stressful experience, seen often as a response to trauma. That is to say, a dissociative reaction might be adaptive insofar as it is a way to cope with the intense stress of a situation or trauma but could also be pathological or normative, with the difference being that the pathological checks the box of either clinically significant distress or functional impairment while the normative technically does not. We see

room for this in the DSM-5 with the diagnosis of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). The DSM-5 version of PTSD includes a dissociative specifier, where a person can experience dissociative symptoms in response to a traumatic event, or various triggers that remind the person of said trauma event (e.g., flashbacks). Another example of the adaptive/therapeutic variety of dissociation found in the DSM-III and on is Panic Disorder. With regards to Panic Disorder, “feelings of unreality” (derealization) are found in the DSM-III as criterion B, symptom number 6 (APA [1980], p. 231), and as “derealization (feelings of unreality) or depersonalization (feeling detached from oneself)” in both the DSM-IV-TR (APA [2000]; as symptom number 9; p. 432) and the DSM-5 (APA [2013]; as symptom number 11; p. 208).

The bottom line is that the ontological commitments have increased from the span of the DSM-I to the DSM-5 to include “consciousness, memory, identity, emotion, perception, body representation, motor control, and behavior” (DSM-5, APA [2013], p. 291). The progression of DSM exacerbates the ontological and motley grouping. However, the normative problem is answered through the criterion of clinically significant distress or functional impairment (dysfunction). In terms of dissociation, so-called normalcy is reduced to functional aspects of how parts come (or perhaps do not) together. Let us now take a closer look at dissociation as a disruption of normative integration.

§II. Dissociation as Disruption of Normal Integration

The premise that the *essential* feature of dissociative disorders is a disruption of normal integration presumes a certain kind of integration. Hence, while dissociative experiences—and disorders for that matter—take on different forms, the common thread according to the DSM-III to the present DSM-5 is that they *all* involve a disruption in normal integration. Taking this reality of the DSM into account, our current position has us focus on sorting out what this normal integration actually looks like. The point here is that chief to the DSM’s definition of

dissociation is this lack of integration, assuming that integration is *normal*. Straight away, we are taking up the normative problem of dissociation, with the reality that dissociation, with its baked-in assumption of division or separation of some aspect of dissociable beings, seems to be an objection to this normative integration already. If one is dissociated, then one cannot be integrated.

Being familiar with the list of ontological commitments spelled out in the previous section, the question now becomes what does the normal integration of those different ontological commitments supposed to look like? For example, what does an integrated “consciousness,” “identity,” or “body representation” mean? What framework does the DSM give us to make such a determination? In this section, I will attempt to draw out the answers the DSM provides for these questions. Considering all the DSMs from the DSM-III to the current DSM-5 embrace the view of “normal integration,” for ease of operation, I will engage the most recent version, the DSM-5, unless otherwise specified. By investigating the breakdown of this *integrated* unity and wholeness through two case examples, DID and depersonalization/derealization disorder, I argue that the DSM answers the *negative* question of integration, that is, what it is *not*, and leaves the positive account of normative unity lacking.

Before interrogating the DSM-5 for possible answers, let us first examine the etymology of the word “integration” to perhaps formulate a better question to ask. The word “integration” and its verb form “integrate” are derived from the Latin “integer,” which means “whole or complete.” Utilizing this framework, an entity or thing that is “integrated” is something that is whole or complete, and “to integrate” is to make an entity or thing whole or complete. Here, we can observe a crucial feature of this integration in the formation of a whole. In this way, the etymology of integration and how it is used is an important part of the definitional form of

dissociation (which connects to the onto-mereological method employed in Chapter I and the previous section); thus, the question becomes: What kind of wholeness or unity pertains to dissociable beings?

Implicit to the question of what kind of wholeness or unity pertains to dissociable beings is a particular onto-mereological model. Said differently, we are confronted, in the very definition of dissociation with the part/whole configuration of dissociable beings. The DSM provides us with some candidates for this wholeness or unity as well as parts. But the DSM is unclear about the exact configuration of these parts to the wholes. Factoring in the normative piece, the new question becomes: what does this normative wholeness or unity look like for beings like us. This normative unity standard is vital to understand for us to grasp how dissociation disrupts it.¹²

The DSM presumes that the normal state of dissociable beings (that are not yet subject to dissociation) is integrated or “whole.” Part of the question of the things or entities of this unity has already been answered in the previous section. However, we are reminded that the normative question has an answer since at least the publication of the DSM-III, and most explicitly appearing since the DSM-IV; that is, dissociative experiences are pathological if they cause clinically significant distress or functional impairment. A so-called normal, non-dissociative person would not have any non-integrated parts. Therefore, a kind of unity or wholeness seems to be presumed of a normal, non-dissociated being. However, a person can meet *some* criteria yet not be distressed or impaired. Therefore, a (dissociated) being can present as not integrated and not normal (whatever this means), yet also not pathological.

¹² The unity view has existed since at least Janet’s conception of dissociation and the shift away from the “harmony” theorization found in the animal magnetism—which was investigated in chapter I. The publication of the DSM-III explicitly mentions *integration* with the conception of *unity* becoming part of the diagnostic nomenclature in a way that was not present in previous versions of the DSM.

From what we observed in the previous section, the DSM does not provide a *positive* model of normal unity. The DSM *does not* tell us what normative integration or unity is. However, the DSM *does* provide the normative question of integration through *negation*.

Perhaps we can reverse engineer the negative answer to construct a positive one. Let us take a closer look at two dissociative disorders, that of DID and Depersonalization/Derealization disorder. The criteria for the DID includes “a disruption of identity characterized by two or more personality states” and the “discontinuity in the sense of self and sense of agency, accompanied by related alterations in affect, behavior, consciousness, memory, perception, cognition, and/or sensory-motor functioning.” The disruption of integration or unity pertains to a discontinuity in experience. But how should we understand this *discontinuity*? Discontinuity in experience may refer to time (breaks in the experience of sequential time) or space (breaks in spatial relations). What clarity does the DSM provide on this matter? The DSM-5 describes this discontinuity in the sense of self or agency. Consider the following from the DSM-5: “Strong emotions, impulses, and even speech or other actions may suddenly emerge, without a sense of personal ownership or control (sense of agency)” (APA [2013], p. 293). In one way, there is an implication of time made here, a disruption in the sense of self over time—what can be considered the diachronic self. The implication is that there was a sense of self at one point and a *different* sense of self at another point in time—hence the discontinuity.

Disruption of identity with two or more personality states is articulated phenomenologically as the discontinuity in the sense of self and agency. Moreover, an interesting feature of the discontinuity the DSM describes is the people who experience DID are “depersonalized observers of their ‘own’ speech and actions, which they feel powerless to stop (sense of self)” (DSM-5, APA, [2013], p. 293). Framed in such a way, depersonalization is part

of a DID presentation.¹³ Thus “depersonalized observers of their own speech and actions” is an intriguing experience. The speech and actions are their “own,” as they presumably generate it—yet they are not in control. The following detail in the diagnostic phenomenology provides even more insight:

Alterations in a sense of self and loss of personal agency may be accompanied by a feeling that these attitudes, emotions, and behaviors—even one’s body—are ‘not mine’ and/or are ‘nor under my control’ (APA [2013], p. 293).

A core feature of DID phenomenology is the loss of personal ownership and/or agency. The disruption of normative unity is the experience of a schism between what is experienced as “mine” and “not mine.” On the face of it, cashing out this loss of integration as a depersonalization of experience taking the form of lost personal ownership and agency that takes a puzzling form: personal experiences that are simultaneously “mine” and “not mine.” The phenomenological description is critical for understanding how people experience DID.

The DSM-5 notably defines these depersonalization experiences as *detachment*. Detachment is a major model in theorizing dissociative phenomena. What about normative integration in terms of depersonalization and derealization? Depersonalization involves “experiences of unreality or *detachment* from one’s mind, self or body,” and derealization includes “experiences of unreality of *detachment* from one’s surroundings (APA [2013], p. 291, my emphasis). In this sense, one of the main ways the breakdown of normative integration is experienced with depersonalization is detachment. For example, the DSM-5 shares that “the

¹³ We can make sense of this if we examine the term “depersonalization.” The prefix “de-“ functions in English to undo, reverse, or do the opposite of the word it precedes. Considering this word is *personalization*, further simplified to *personal* or *person*, we can see that it pertains to an individual, human being in a privative sense. Thus, we may conclude that “de-personal-ization” has to do with the undoing or doing the opposite of the individual. In context, something personalized pertains to the individual person, while something de-personalized, does not.

individual may feel detached from his or her entire being” or “feel subjectively detached from aspects of self” (APA [2013], p. 302). Here we run up against what it means to be “detached from one’s being” or “subjective detached.” Many clinicians and researchers have endorsed the reality detachment, or detachment dissociation, as a way of categorizing dissociative experiences (Dell, 2009; Holmes, Brown, Mansell, Fearon, Hunter, Frasilho & Oakley, 2005) Spitzer, Barnow, Freyberger & Grabe, 2006; Brown, 2006; Allen, 200). I will put this to the side for now and return to it in the next section.

Let us return to the DSM-5 establishing a unified (via integration) sense of self and agency, one in which all feelings, attitudes, emotions, and behaviors are unified. Consider the following sample situation: A person acts and behaves in a particular fashion, let us say, yells at a loved one about the dishwasher not being loaded correctly. Later that day, the *same* person who previously yelled now apologizes for yelling, saying something like, “I don’t know what had gotten into me—you know that’s *not* me!” The idea is that there exists some form of cohesion, enough for it still to be the same person, yet there seems to be a disunification in the sense of what this person considers “me.” In that example, we might delineate the distinct experiences of “me” and “not me” (as a variation of the “mine” and “not mine” experience depicted earlier). Furthermore, if the person describes their experience as “not me,” would that not suggest a lack of integration with what they consider “me.” Indeed, the view that dissociation is a normal psychological phenomenon, rendering our experience less than unified, is a common view in the field (Erdyll, 1994). My point here is not to argue definitively for a kind of normative multiplicity, as arguing for such a perspective is beyond the scope of this chapter. Instead, my point is to show that the DSM provides no model for how this normative unity is supposed to be

configured. The DSM does deliver a negative account—that is, what normative unity is *not* by describing the various aspects of experiences of detachment.

The unity in psychological experience enjoys a long-standing philosophical tradition. From a historical-philosophical lens, many renowned and heavy-hitting Western philosophers, such as Descartes, Kant, Reid, and many others, held the idea of the unity of *consciousness*. Probably the most well-known contemporary champion of this view is Tim Bayne with what he calls the *unity thesis*. In fact, Bayne (2010) makes the strong assertion that “we *never* have a disunified experience” (p. 17, emphasis in original). Said differently, Bayne thinks that consciousness is *always* unified. Yet, even with the DSM’s claim of normative unity, it still accepts and even describes the conditions in which consciousness is disunified. Bayne’s claim is an intriguing one in light of dissociative phenomena, especially considering disunified consciousness exists, codified in a medical document (DSM-5). The question of whether Bayne’s unity thesis can withstand the pressure of dissociative phenomena will be the focus of the next chapter.

So, where are we left with understanding dissociation as the disruption of normal integration? The authors of the DSM-5 provide some framework for a negative account of normative integration but do not provide a positive one. What is the normal integration of consciousness, memory, identity, etc., but also, what is the proper integration of consciousness or identity *itself*? Here we see the DSM is rather thin in providing what normal integration/unity looks like with any of these ontological commitments. While the answer might fall short, during our investigation, we come across another possible issue—a conundrum of “mine” and “not mine” arose from an investigation of the diagnostic phenomenology (of which I will address in the next section). Finally, I noted some reasons for us to be skeptical of this normative unity.

At this point, we have completed our journey through the DSMs in this chapter and the much greater history of dissociation story arc when combined with Chapter I. We have arrived at the present with the DSM-5. In a sense, the work I have done here is cumulative, and now we transition to the yield of excavating this history. I will not summarize the onto-mereological yield here and will pick up that summary in this chapter's concluding remarks section. Instead, in the next section, I want to review the dissociative phenomenology of the DSM-5 again to point out two worries I have about certain features of these descriptions.

§III. Dissociation Phenomenology as Detachment and Conundrum

In this final section, I will review the phenomenological descriptions of dissociative experiences available in the DSM-5 to extract and further elaborate on two general features that may be cause for worry and need further investigation. The first worry pertains to the common metaphor of “detachment” being used to theorize dissociative phenomena. In fact, phenomenological detachment is one significant model for how the lack of integration and disunity occurs (DSM-5; Holmes, Brown, Mansell, Fearon, Hunter, Frasquilho & Oakley, 2005).¹⁴ The second worry is about the puzzling experiences that emerge from these depictions, which I call “conundrums.” In the spirit of this worry, I will distill the two conundrums that arise from the diagnostic phenomenology and investigate if the DSM-5 equips us with any tools to navigate these conundrums.

The DSM-5 authors further illustrate this conception of detachment dissociation in further detail:

¹⁴ Theorizing dissociative experiences as “detachment” appears most prominently in the descriptions of depersonalization and derealization, but can also be found in other forms of dissociation, including daydreaming or “spacing-out.”

the individual may feel detached from his or her entire being (e.g., ‘I am no one,’ ‘I have no self’). He or she may also feel subjectively detached from aspects of self including feelings (e.g., hypoemotionality: ‘I know I have feelings but I don’t feel them’), thoughts (e.g., ‘My thoughts don’t feel like my own,’ ‘head filled with cotton’), whole body or body parts, or sensations (e.g., touch, proprioception, hunger, thirst, libido) (APA [2013], p. 302-303).

Here, the DSM-5 lays out seven different possibilities of detachment in depersonalization. These can be distilled from the previous paragraph as follows:

- 1). The individual is detached from his or her [sic] being.
- 2). The individual is detached from self.
- 3). The individual is detached from feelings.
- 4). The individual is detached from thoughts.
- 5). The individual is detached from the body.
- 6). The individual is detached from body parts.
- 7). The individual is detached from body sensations.

As a note, the DSM-5 is not clear on how the “individual” differs from the “self.” Moreover, even though numbers 3-7 are listed separately, the authors of the DSM-5 consider them aspects of the self. This account continues with derealization, which is “characterized by a feeling of unreality or detachment from, or unfamiliarity with the world, be it individuals, inanimate objects, or all surroundings” (APA [2013], p. 303). Here we can distill three more from the previous sentence that encompasses the parts of the world:

- 8). The individual is detached from individuals.
- 9). The individual is detached from inanimate objects.
- 10). The individual is detached from the surroundings.

The basic formula is the same: there is an individual with the relationship of detachment from something else.

Yet, some ontological confusion emerges in the sense of *what* or *who* the “individual” is being detached from the self? Presumably, the subject might be obvious and could be you or I or anyone else, but this brings about further worries from a phenomenological viewpoint. One

worry is how one individual can be detached from their existence? For example, if I am detached from my being, do I not cease to be? How are we to understand being separated or detached from our very being? Another example is in the case of an out-of-body experience, where individuals may describe being detached from their body or parts of the body. Is this meant to mean physical detachment from the body or some form of metaphysical detachment? The authors of the DSM-5 likely do not mean physical, spatial detachment of the body and are probably not taking a stand on a metaphysical position. Given this point, what is *actually* meant by way of detachment phenomenology?

If we take a closer look at the diagnostic phenomenology, the examples also depict the “unfamiliarity” and “unreality” features. To capture this point, let us look at a paradigmatic case of detachment phenomenology from Maurice Sierra’s book *Depersonalization* that would surely fit the diagnostic criteria for the DSM-5’s Depersonalization/Derealization Disorder:

I look at them [familiar objects], but they just don’t seem real, they don’t look the same and they don’t look familiar any more, even though I know deep down they are, I’m seeing things differently from how I used to, almost like I’m looking at something I know, but it doesn’t feel like I know it anymore (2009, p. 27).

Notice how familiar objects do not seem familiar anymore and how they “don’t seem real.” What is interesting about this description is that, in a sense, the person is *familiar* with the objects—but is simultaneously experiencing an odd, even unreal, unfamiliarity as well. Here we see a strange experience emerge: How can something be familiar *and* unfamiliar? A worry remains whether describing the experience as a *detachment* from objects is helpful in capturing this familiarity and unfamiliarity quality adequately. I will bookmark this worry to investigate in a future chapter (Chapter V).

In articulating dissociation as detachment, we seem to acquire some worries about its accuracy. Despite these worries, detachment has become the received wisdom to theorize

dissociative experiences, particularly that of depersonalization and derealization.¹⁵ Straightaway, we notice some *apparent* problems with the phenomenology of detachment in dissociation, specifically with the ability to capture these experiences accurately. Yet, these need to be tested more thoroughly before claiming the inadequacy of detachment dissociation. Therefore, as a continuation of this work, I challenge the phenomenological accuracy and usefulness of detachment dissociation in Chapter V. I will now turn to naming and elaborating on what I call two conundrums that have emerged from analyzing these descriptions of dissociation.

The first conundrum pertains to experiences that are both experiences as “mine” and “not mine.” The alterations in the sense of self take the form of the individual, on the one hand experiencing emotions, behaviors, and body, yet on the other also feeling like these aspects or parts of the experience as “not mine.” How can “my emotions” or “my body” be both “mine” and “not mine?” The DSM-5 does not equip clinicians to resolve or navigate this conundrum. After revealing the puzzling and problematic phenomenological experience, the DSM leaves us wanting some guidance.

The second conundrum is illustrated in experiences of depersonalization and derealization. Let us take a closer look at the definition found in the DSM-5. According to the DSM-5, Depersonalization is “characterized by a feeling of unreality or detachment from, or unfamiliarity with, one’s whole self or aspects of the self,” and derealization is “characterized by

¹⁵ Probably most prominent in this view is Holmes and colleagues (2005) conception of detachment dissociation. Seemingly carrying the torch from the DSM, Holmes and colleagues (*ibid*) write:

In each case, the subject experiences an altered state of consciousness characterized by a sense of separation (or ‘detachment’) from certain aspects of everyday experience, be it their body (as in out-of-body experiences), their sense of self (as in depersonalization), or the external world (as in derealization) (p. 5).

Again, Holmes and colleagues appear to use the same structure, that is a conscious subject detached from body, self, or world. They simplify some of the ontological commitments that the DSM-5 endorses but retain the same formula.

a feeling of unreality or detachment from, or unfamiliarity with, the world, be it individuals, inanimate objects, or all surroundings” (APA [2013], p. 303). The part of the experience that I am interested in is the *unfamiliarity* with the world, people, objects, and surroundings. If a person reported unfamiliarity with any of these, it would follow that there would be no problem (other than any typical issues we might expect when coming across something unfamiliar). I would even *expect* a person to experience unfamiliarity if confronted with an object that the person had never encountered before—but included in the description is the experience of unreality. Something about the experience feels odd or strange. Often the person will disclose that the object, person, or environment should be *familiar* (Recall the earlier report in Sierra [2009]: “I look at them [familiar objects], but they just don’t seem real, they don’t look the same and they don’t look familiar anymore, even though I know deep down they are...” p. 27). How can something familiar also be unfamiliar at the same moment? Beyond mentioning the unfamiliarity, alongside the unreality that texturizes these experiences, the DSM remains silent on how to navigate the conundrum.

With the “detachment” dissociation and the two conundrums in our purview, we gain perspective on how people often find describing their symptoms challenging and may think or believe they are “crazy” or “going crazy” (DSM-5, APA [2013], p. 303). Is depicting people’s experience as detachment from self or objects accurate to their lived experience in cases of depersonalization and derealization? Does the DSM equip us with any tools to navigate these conundrums it has revealed? While the DSM describes the phenomenology, it does not provide us with any tools to navigate the conundrums. However, in the DSM’s defense, it is not supposed to be a treatment manual, and presumably, navigating these conundrums is left to the therapeutic endeavors of clinicians. Be that as it may, we are left with “detachment” and these two

conundrums that emerge from the *language* used to describe the phenomena. These ways of describing dissociative experiences are likely confusing and potentially problematic for the people who experience them. Perhaps we could benefit from different language to theorize and navigate these experiences more accurately.

§IV. Concluding Remarks

The onto-mereological method was an excavating tool to reveal the current solutions to the three problems of dissociation identified at the start of the thesis. In this chapter, I have demonstrated that the use of “normal integration” as an *essential* property of dissociation, which was introduced in the DSM-III. However, what is particularly fascinating is that despite this presumption for unity, the DSM presents a variety of ontological commitments with no clear picture of how they are integrated into a unity. Instead, as I have shown, the ontological commitments have become a motley grouping. Thus, along with a diverse assortment of experiences that fall under the label “dissociation,” by the time we reach the DSM-5, we can identify a second kind of motley issue in the sheer number of ontological commitments endorsed, which include “consciousness, memory, identity, emotion, perception, body representation, motor control, and behavior” (APA [2013] p. 291) as well as “thoughts, feelings, sensations, body, or actions” (APA [2013], p. 303). However, as discussed earlier, this second kind of motley issue may not be a problem.

Pursuant to the normative problem, the DSM, *specifically* from the DSM-IV onward, appears to present a *reasonable* solution to sorting out the pathological from the nonpathological. Accordingly, pathological dissociation must involve “clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning.” Without this criterion met, the dissociative experience is not considered pathological (and even if it is, in the case of culturally sanctioned spiritual experiences such as possession, even if it causes distress, pathology need not

be applicable). This criterion appears to be a reasonable solution to the normative problem. Moreover, more recent DSMs retain the notion that dissociation has an adaptive/therapeutic possibility, and determining whether or not it is pathological again rests on the aforementioned distress or functionality criterion.

In reviewing the phenomenology offered by the DSM-5, I also pointed out some worries about the phenomenology. The first had to do with some initial concerns with conceptualizing dissociation as detachment. However, this will be further investigated in a later chapter. Secondly, I pointed out the existence of two conundrums. The DSM-5 does not supply the tools to navigate these conundrums, so we are left with problems of how to understand what it means for something to be mine and not mine or familiarity and unfamiliarity at the same time.

This chapter closes out the story arc of an onto-mereological history of dissociation in two parts. Taking in this entire history, I would like to make two final points. The first point is throughout the entire history, I was able to establish one or two major ontological commitments, those being consciousness or personality, that are consistent throughout the editions. This trend is observed in the work of Janet and the early dissociationists in the late 19th century as well as the DSM-I in the mid-20th century. However, by the time we reach the DSM-5, the ontological commitments have grown substantially. The second point is the focus on unity—whether it was through Janet or from the DSM-III to the DSM-5. Moreover, none of the DSMs deliver a clear model of how unity ought to be understood or configured. This contemporary situation is a far cry from the models of consciousness and personality of in the earlier history of dissociation.

So, where does this leave us? While the DSM-5 endorses normative unity, it also supports the possibility for that unity to be divided or dissociated. The view of this disunity, and more specifically the existence of dissociative experiences, at least in principle, poses a

challenge to the longstanding philosophical idea of the unity of consciousness. In the next chapter, I depart from the onto-mereological method and interrogate Tim Bayne's claim of unified consciousness and whether or not such a claim can be defended in light of these dissociative experiences. Regardless of whether or not a conception of a unified consciousness is tenable under the charge of dissociative phenomena, we are still left with questions about the phenomenological fidelity of detachment dissociation (i.e., is detachment the *best* way to capture the lived experience accurately?), along with questions on how to navigate at least two conundrums that have clinical and therapeutic implications. These questions form a collection of issues addressed throughout the remaining chapters of this project.

Chapter III: The Unity of Consciousness and the Dissociative Challenge

§0. Introduction

The view that consciousness is unified was a central theme of several prominent philosophers during the early modern period of Western history. For example, René Descartes (1641) wrote that “when I consider the mind, that is to say, myself inasmuch as I am only a thinking thing, I cannot distinguish in myself any parts, but apprehend myself to be clearly one and entire” (p. 172). While these words are in service to his mind-body dualism, he is quite clear that consciousness is experienced as a unified whole. Immanuel Kant (1781/1998), in connection with his transcendental unity of apperception thesis, described the many representations in an object, noting that “the unity that the object makes necessary can be nothing other than the formal unity of the consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations” (A105; p. 231). Kant recognizes that the experience of an object of consciousness is a result of a kind of unity, or synthesis, of its representations. The fact that we experience an object as unified representations necessitate a unity in conscious experience itself. Descartes and Kant are not the only philosophers to support the tradition of unified consciousness.¹ My focus for this chapter, however, is not the grander philosophical theories of Descartes, Kant, or any other philosopher’s work that follows from the tradition of unified consciousness, and I want to put aside the positions and arguments that stem from that theme. My interest, instead, is in the strength of the unified consciousness thesis under empirical and phenomenological scrutiny.

One particular stress test for the unity of consciousness thesis pertains to the phenomena of dissociation, which garnered considerable attention in late 19th-century psychiatry, most notably from the pioneering clinical research of Pierre Janet. In his *Major Symptoms of Hysteria*,

¹ The unified consciousness theme also figures in the works of Gottfried Leibniz, Thomas Reid, and William James, just to name a few.

Janet (1907) interpreted distinctive patterns of experiences exhibited by his patients as well as in the clinical descriptions provided by notable figures such as Jean-Martin Charcot, Charles Richet, Alfred Binet, Josef Breuer, Sigmund Freud, and Morton Prince as manifestations of a breakdown in the unity of consciousness. To this point, Janet (*ibid*) remarked:

if you read their books again, you will see that, whatever the matter is, ‘Maladies de la Mémoire’, ‘Maladies de la Volonté’, ‘Maladies de la Personnalité’, they all always speak of localized amnesias, of alternating memory, which in reality are only to be met among hysterical somnambulism ; of irresistible suggestions, hypnotic catalepsias, which are, as I will try to prove to you, nothing but hysterical phenomena; of total modifications of the personality divided into two successive or simultaneous persons, which is again the dissociation of consciousness in the hysteric (p. 4).

Janet theorized the central theme of these clinical descriptions of hysteria involved both the division of personality into successive and simultaneous persons *and* the dissociation of consciousness. Interestingly, Janet’s words: “which is again, the dissociation of consciousness” points to disunified personality *and* disunified consciousness as two different descriptions of what he considers the same phenomenon. Therefore, while Janet refers to double and even multiple personality, he conceptualizes dissociation *as* the division of consciousness. Janet’s observations have been understood, not only by Janet himself, to amount to the discovery of a distinctive form of *disunified* consciousness—one that comprises a personal consciousness and a subconsciousness. Indeed, these disunities and breakdowns in consciousness position dissociation as not only an important topic for psychiatry and clinical psychology but one that demands attention in the philosophy of mind.

Despite its relevance to an important issue in philosophy of mind, serious engagement with dissociative phenomena has been rare among philosophers. The most important exception to date is Tim Bayne.² Bayne’s work in the unity of consciousness, which belongs to the tradition

² There are a few more worth mentioning here: Ian Hacking’s *Rewriting the Soul* discusses severe dissociative phenomena, such as DID, but this work deals more with memory politics. Another is the

of unified consciousness championed by Descartes and Kant, is challenged by the Janetian tradition of dissociation. That is to say, the disunities of consciousness in dissociative phenomena present as a stress test that Bayne's theory of unified consciousness, which he names the *unity thesis*, must pass. Correctly recognizing this challenge, Bayne, in his 2010 book aptly entitled *The Unity of Consciousness*, defends his unity thesis against three different dissociative phenomena. Bayne's position is that consciousness remains unified even in dissociative phenomena, thereby pushing back against the challenge levied by the disunity of consciousness theorized by Janet and others. But in this challenge, he must confront the positions of psychologists and psychiatrists whose clinical experiences with psychological disorders and other anomalous psychological experiences since Janet suggests that forms of fundamental disunity characterize consciousness.

My goal for this chapter is fourfold. I first set out to reconstruct Bayne's distinctive version of the unity of consciousness thesis. I then turn my focus to his engagement with three dissociative phenomena: depersonalization, Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID), and "hidden observer" pain phenomenon. Each of these pose potential threats to his unity thesis, which he argues can be disarmed. I argue that distinct issues arise with each strategy Bayne uses to disarm the threats. In the case of depersonalization, it turns out his unity thesis survives the challenge, but his description of the phenomenology of depersonalization is conflated with another pathological presentation. In the case of DID, his disarming strategy requires a generic phenomenology of DID that is problematic in distinguishing between pathological and non-pathological phenomena. In the case of "hidden observer" pain phenomena, he defends his unity

opening chapters in Jennifer Radden's *Divided Minds and Successive Selves*. Daniel Dennett makes mention of dissociation in the form of DID in *Consciousness Explained*, but only for a handful pages. The most extensive treatment is likely Stephen Braude's *First Person Plural*, which is the source Bayne draws from to defend his unity thesis.

thesis at the cost of falsifying the phenomenology of pain. Importantly, in both DID and hidden observer phenomena, Bayne references the “stream of consciousness” without properly theorizing it. I then move to develop a model for the stream of consciousness with the help of Barry Dainton’s work. Taken together, I shall argue that in order for Bayne’s defense of his unity thesis to succeed, he needs to characterize the dissociative phenomena he engages in specific ways. His strategy incurs significant theoretical costs, leaving open the question of whether his characterization is the *best* way of understanding the phenomena. More specifically, I point out that in Bayne’s characterizations of these dissociative phenomena, he moves beyond the consciousness model, supporting the idea that the model of consciousness alone may be insufficient at fully capturing the richness and complexity of dissociation.

§I. Bayne and the Unity of Consciousness

Bayne’s goal is to articulate and defend a robust and substantive thesis about the unity of consciousness. In what follows, I resketch my understanding of Bayne’s unity of consciousness thesis. The first step is to identify the appropriate conception of the unity of consciousness, and out of this conception, take the second step in crafting a unity thesis. In coming to terms with finding the appropriate conception of the unity of consciousness, Bayne maps out three potential candidates, and along with them, three different unity theses. Upon his review, it turns out that the first candidate ends up being trivially true, while the second candidate ends up being substantially false. The third, however, he maintains is substantial and is the foundation for his unity thesis.

The first candidate for the unity of consciousness that Bayne (2010) considers is what he calls “subject unity” (p. 9). Bayne writes that “we can describe conscious states that are had by or belong to the same subject of experience as *subject unified*” (p. 9, emphasis in original). To say that the experience of conscious states is subject unified is to ascribe them all to the same

being. For example, my experience of seeing the book and thinking about Bayne's thesis is subject unified because I can identify both experiences as my own. Subject unity is about having the experience *and* identifying it as one's own. The worry that Bayne and David Chalmers (2013) have with subject unity is that it may be *trivially* true. What they mean by this is if a particular subject maintains a conscious state and identifies that they are experiencing said state, then subject unity obtains. Even if we consider a challenging case such as thought insertion, where a person experiences a voice from a foreign agent, subject unity is still maintained. This is because the person having the experience identifies said experience as their own—even though the voice is of foreign origin. Ultimately, Bayne devotes little more than a few paragraphs to subject unity in the entirety of his book, dismissing its candidacy for the unity thesis just about as soon as he mentions it.

A second way consciousness can be unified is when conscious states cohere as representations of objects of experience. This form of conscious unity is what Bayne names "representation unity." According to Bayne (2010), "representational unity involves multiple layers of structure: features are bound together into objects, and objects are bound together into scenes" (p. 10). For example, when writing on this laptop, there is the perceptual experience of the black keys, the glowing screen, the silver color of the chassis, and its rectangular shape. The way these aspects or features come together to form the experience of an object or scene involves a process Bayne refers to as "feature-binding." Thus, the silvery color of the chassis, black keys, and rectangular shape are integrated and unified to form the experience of the object "laptop." Moreover, representational unity is not limited to perceptions of objects or scenes in the world but is also present in thoughts. In this sense, a set of thoughts that are associated with one another come together to form cognitive schemas or themes. The main issue regarding representational

unity is that it can readily be shown to be substantively false (Bayne & Chalmers, 2003). There is significant variability in representational unity and disunity in our conscious experience as some perceptions are representationally unified, while others are not. Considering there are layers to representational unity (e.g., objects, scenes, etc.), disunity typically comes in the form of an inconsistency in the content of experience. For example, if I am lying in bed and notice a “shadow” dart across the room from the window, I may initially experience the shadow as another person in the room. However, I also know that there is no one else in the room and that when the air conditioner turns on, it shifts the curtains in front of the moonlit window, casting a shadow on the wall. My experience of the shadow illusion is one of representational disunity about the state of affairs in the world at that moment. Since representational disunity is readily shown to be part and parcel to our experience, Bayne disqualifies it as a candidate for the unity thesis.

Having set aside these two conceptions of the unity of consciousness, along with their respective unity theses, we come to the conception that figures centrally to Bayne’s position, that of the phenomenal unity of consciousness. While I can identify the experience of the silvery laptop (representational) as my own (subject) conscious experience, there is also a certain quality of what it is like to *have* this kind of experience. Phenomenal consciousness is considered the subjective quality that is intimately bound to our conscious experience. Let us first get a clearer sense of what he means by phenomenal consciousness, then move to understand its unity.

Thomas Nagel (1974) wrote that “an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something it is like to *be* that organism—something it is like *for* the organism” (p. 436, emphasis in original). According to Nagel, a conscious organism, such as a conscious human organism, has a special subjective character of experience. In this sense, there is a certain *quality*

of having an experience that you could not get, for instance, from someone describing all the features to you. For example, someone could describe to you—even in painstaking detail—all the characteristics of drinking a cup of coffee, but “there is something it is like” to taste the coffee for yourself and have that specific experience. Bayne’s notion of phenomenal consciousness has ancestry in the Nagelian position that “there is something it is like” to have a conscious mental state. In fact, Bayne’s *entire* position of the phenomenal unity of consciousness is founded on this assumption.

Having identified the appropriate conception of the phenomenal unity of consciousness, Bayne recognizes the phenomenological complexity of consciousness in that we are often conscious of *several* different phenomena at once. Bayne wants to take the phenomenal character of conscious experience and expand it to capture the phenomenal unity of consciousness. We might consider, for example, my experience of drinking a cup of coffee and listening to a live post-rock band as two *separate* conscious experiences or events. How does Bayne account for these two distinct sets of experiences, complete with their own mental contents and sensations, in terms of unified phenomenal consciousness?

To account for the way in which we might have several distinct conscious experiences, Bayne adopts a *mereological* approach in terms of thinking about how the parts of conscious experiences contribute to the whole. In the spirit of a mereological framework, Bayne views phenomenal unity of consciousness as maintaining “conjoint experiential character;” that is to say, there is something it is like for two or more conscious states to be experienced *together*. Thus, this conjoint experiential character—the “togetherness” of these experiences—can be understood as a way conscious states hang together to form a more complex conscious experience. For example, while there is something it is like to enjoy a live post-rock band or a

cup of coffee, there is also something it is like to enjoy a live post-rock performance *while* sipping a cup of coffee. With this mereological framework, these experiences are ‘subsumed’ into a single, unified conscious state.

With this foundation, Bayne (2010)’s unity thesis can be understood as the following: Necessarily, for any conscious subject of experience (*S*) and any time (*t*), the simultaneous conscious states that *S* has at *t* will be subsumed by a single conscious state—the subject’s total conscious state (p. xx).³ Alongside the subsumption of conscious states into a single superordinate “total conscious state,” an important feature built into Bayne’s unity thesis is that an experience (*S*) can occur at any point of time (*t*), and this experience will be the total conscious state at a time. Conscious experience is focused at a specific moment in time, which signals the *synchronic* unity of consciousness.

Although Bayne’s unity thesis is based on synchronic unity, curiously, he does readily use the “stream of consciousness” metaphor throughout much of his writings, which indicates diachronic consciousness, or consciousness over time. These references to diachronic consciousness, as we will see, become increasingly prevalent in his discussions of DID and the hidden observer pain phenomenon. A worry emerges of how Bayne’s synchronic unity thesis can account for diachronic consciousness, and whether or not it is possible to construct a conception of diachronic consciousness out of Bayne’s notion of synchronic unity of consciousness. However, worries about the diachronic feature of consciousness and Bayne’s unity thesis will be tabled for now and addressed at the end of the chapter.

Bayne’s unity thesis can be considered a kind of phenomenal “moment” unity, as it includes a conscious, unified experience at one time. From this depiction, Bayne’s conception of

³ The necessity claim is an interesting feature of Bayne’s unity thesis, and certainly deserves attention. However, examining the specific modality of this claim is not necessary for my current project.

the unity of consciousness can be said to be focused, albeit narrow. In fact, Bayne’s specialized focus on the unity of phenomenal consciousness, it seems, gives him license to claim that “we *never* have a disunified experience” (2010, p. 17). Such a bold claim is certain to attract potential counterexamples, with dissociative phenomena being a potentially strong one.

§II. The Challenge of Depersonalization

One dissociative phenomenon Bayne is concerned with is depersonalization. Bayne (2010) understands depersonalization through a slightly modified definition drawn from the DSM-IV-TR (2000):

Alteration in the perception or experience of self, so that one feels detached from, and as if one is an outside observer of one’s mental processes or body (p. 258).⁴

Here, depersonalization is described as a break-down or disunity of bodily self-consciousness, which Bayne considers a variety of representational unity/disunity. One of the classic examples of depersonalization depicted in this definition, and the one that Bayne addresses explicitly, is the “out-of-body” experience.⁵ Bayne’s worry here is the relationship bodily self-consciousness has to phenomenal unity. Taking his lead from William James’s remark about how the unity of consciousness might be grounded in the “warm animal feeling” of bodily self-consciousness, he identifies the *embodiment constraint*, the principle that phenomenal unity is limited—or constrained by—bodily self-consciousness. This embodiment constraint would intimately bind phenomenal unity with bodily unity, meaning that a break-down in bodily self-consciousness would also mean a break-down in phenomenal unity of consciousness. Bayne (2010) states that

⁴ At the time Bayne wrote his book, the DSM-IV-TR was the current version. Since then, the DSM-V has been published, and I would venture to say that Bayne would have used that version given the timeframe. Most importantly, however, the DSM-V’s definition of depersonalization remained consistent to the DSM-IV-TR and to Bayne’s modified version.

⁵ In this section, I will use depersonalization interchangeably with the narrower out-of-body experiences unless otherwise specified.

“the fragmentation of bodily experience must bring with it a corresponding fragmentation of phenomenal unity” (p. 257). Therefore, depersonalization challenges the unity thesis by violating the embodiment constraint.

Interestingly, Bayne ends up rejecting the embodiment constraint on what I take to be his claim that there are phenomenal experiences that do not involve the body. Bayne (2010) tells us that conscious thought, such as recalling a telephone number, “does not bring with it the sense a sense of oneself as an embodied being, not even implicitly” (p. 251). He concludes that “if some kinds of conscious states have no bodily content then bodily self-consciousness cannot provide us with a *fully general* account of the unity of consciousness” (pp. 251-252, emphasis in original). However, while bodily self-consciousness is not necessary and sufficient for the unity of consciousness, Bayne still believes it can play an important role. In conscious states that do involve the body, the body would need to be represented as a single, integrated object to be phenomenally unified. However, my worry here is not on Bayne’s account of the embodiment constraint and its relationship to the unity of consciousness, and I will put this issue to one side. Instead, I am concerned about Bayne’s handling of the *phenomenology* of depersonalization, specifically out-of-body experiences, and if his unity thesis is up to the task of handling the phenomenon accurately.

Bayne (2010) acknowledges that experiencers of out-of-body events “appear to have lost the unity of bodily self-consciousness;” however, he steadfastly maintains that “there is no reason to doubt that their experiences are subsumed by a single phenomenal state” (p. 259). To make good on this claim, Bayne argues that the loss of bodily self-consciousness in depersonalization is limited to what he calls the loss of “affective identification” with the body. Bayne does not devote much room to elaborating what he means by this “affective

identification;” although, based on what he does provide I will attempt to sort it out. Let us start by clarifying what is meant by “affective.” Affect is defined in psychology as an “emotion or subjectively experienced feeling” (Coleman [2015], p. 16), and is typically used to describe the way it is facially or bodily comported or displayed. For example, a person feeling angry accompanied with a clenched jaw, downed eyebrows, and glaring eyes would be described as having “angry affect.” Affect, here, is understood as the bodily expression or comportment of a feeling or emotion. Bayne (2010) seems to have a somewhat different meaning:

rather than experiencing themselves as being ‘at one’ with their body—as ‘embodied’ in it—patients appear to experience themselves as lodged within it ‘as a sailor might be lodged within his ship’, to appropriate Descartes’s memorable phrase (p. 259).

From the above passage, Bayne seems to refer to affect as an emotional or feeling-based *connection* to or within the body, that is, the feeling of being embodied. Therefore, the loss of “affective identification” with the body would mean the loss of the feeling of being embodied.

This break-down would render the experience of the body as another object in the world.

The core worry for Bayne (2010) is “whether the link between the unity of bodily awareness and the unity of consciousness requires affective identification with one’s own body” (p. 260).

People experiencing depersonalization, Bayne (ibid) argues, experience the “borders and structure of the phenomenal body depart from those of the objective body” but do not “appear to lose the sense of their body as a single integrated object in which their bodily sensations are located and around which their perceptual experiences are structured” (p. 260) Bayne’s position is likely summarized in the following: People with depersonalization still *know* they are integrated even though they do not *feel* that this is the case. The loss of affective identification with the body occurs without the disunity of phenomenal consciousness. In other words, there is

something it is like to not feel subjectively unified, but still recognize you are objectively embodied.

One point to press further is how well the loss of affective identification captures the phenomenon of depersonalization. Taking an excerpt from the case of “Greg” depicted in Daphne Simeon’s and Jeffrey Abugel’s (2006) work *Feeling Unreal*, we can tap into the phenomenology of depersonalization. Greg described several different experiences that tap into different features of depersonalization, but the following two sentences focus on the disconnection between consciousness and the body that represents Bayne’s worry. According to Simeon and Abugel (2006), Greg reported:

I feel like I’m not here, I’m floating around. A separate part of me is aware of all my movements; it’s like I’ve left my body. Even when I’m talking I don’t feel like it is my words...My mind and my body are somehow not connected, it’s like my body is doing one thing and my mind is saying another. Like my mind is somewhere off to the back, not inside my body (p. 9).

In this description, there is a sense that the different parts, in this case the body and mind, are having distinct experiences; however, the identification of the body and mind as “mine” is not fully lost, as we see “my body” and “my mind” still clearly identified. An interesting point is the vacillation between disconnection to the body in the *strong* sense, such as “I’m floating around” and “my mind and my body are somehow not connected,” and separation in a *weak* sense, such as “it’s *like* I’ve left my body” or “it’s *like* my body is doing one thing...” The preposition “like” used signals a similarity to, but not exactly that. For example, a person can “act *like* a clown,” but this does not mean they *are* a clown. Analogously, the “it’s like I’ve left my body” is not the same as actually leaving the body. Because this is about the subjective feeling of separating, it appears that Bayne is correct in identifying affective identification as an important phenomenological feature of the disconnection in depersonalization.

However, if an accurate account of depersonalization involves the loss of affective identification with the body, is this characteristic enough to describe and differentiate it from other phenomena adequately? In a fascinating study, the psychiatrist Giovanni Stanghellini and colleagues (2012) found that people diagnosed with eating disorders reported marked difficulties in phenomenologically identifying with their bodies. Many of these experiencers endorsed items such as “feeling oneself through the gaze of the other” and “feeling extraneous from one’s own body” (p. 149). One of the major themes of these questionnaire items centered on *cenesthesia*, which is usually defined as the sensation of being one’s own body. Stanghellini and colleagues (ibid) conclude that experiencers of eating disorders have disturbances “in lived corporeality, namely experiencing one’s own body first and foremost as an object being looked at by another (rather than cenesthetically and from a first-person perspective)” (p. 156). Given the reported results of this study, the loss of affective identification with the body or bodily alienation is not unique to depersonalization, as it is also at work in the phenomenology of eating disorders.

Interestingly, we might consider the bodily alienation in eating disorders as a form of depersonalization. However, while these individuals may experience a form of depersonalization, they do not experience the “out-of-body” phenomenon that is part and parcel to the present kind of depersonalization that Bayne is working with. Bayne’s account of depersonalization may capture a *part* of the phenomenology of depersonalization, but it does not provide the specificity to differentiate the out-of-body experiences from the bodily alienation of eating disorders. Here we can see that Bayne is working with an incomplete phenomenology of depersonalization—one that does not differentiate it from other pathological phenomena. This issue calls into question the adequacy of his account of depersonalization to test against his unity thesis.

Returning to the case example from Simeon and Abugel (2006), Greg reported: “a separate part of me is aware of all my movements; it’s like I’ve left my body” (p. 9), which reveals a part of Greg’s experience that is seemingly separately aware of bodily movements from the main conscious experience. Moreover, Greg indicated that “my mind and my body are somehow not connected, it’s like my body is doing one thing and my mind is saying another,” (p. 9). This report of Greg’s seems suspicious, as he appears to describe two separate and simultaneous phenomenal experiences. Although there are often issues surrounding the loss of agency and ownership, and even the appearance of separate, mind/body experiences in depersonalization (as in the case of Greg), a key feature in the phenomenology of depersonalization is the ability of the person to describe the loss of connection from a superordinate observational standpoint. The philosopher Shogo Tanaka tells us that (2018) “the observing experience itself is still occurring as ‘my experience’, accompanied by a sense of mineness” (p. 249). Therefore, these reports require a superordinate phenomenal experience: “there is something it is” to, for example, report that “my body is doing one thing and my mind is saying another” (Simeon & Abugel (2006), p. 9). Consequently, Bayne’s unity thesis appears to remain intact despite being challenged by depersonalization.

Bayne’s strategy of conceptualizing depersonalization, and specifically out of body experiences, in terms of a “loss of affective identification” does at first glance capture a part of the phenomenology. However, I demonstrated that the loss of affective identification with the body also presents itself in eating disorders. While Bayne gets part of the phenomenology of out-of-body experiences correct, it is nevertheless an incomplete account, as he failed to provide the tools to distinguish between two *pathological* phenomena. Despite this issue, Bayne’s unity thesis appears to survive the challenge of depersonalization in the form of out-of-body

experiences, although his handling of the phenomenology should have us wary, especially for future descriptions of dissociative phenomena.

§III. The Challenge of Dissociative Identity Disorder

Bayne (2010) identifies the clinical phenomenon of DID as another challenge to his unity thesis, stating that “the most direct threat involves taking alters to have (or perhaps be) distinct streams of consciousness that might be ‘out’ at one and the same time” (p. 163). To address this threat, Bayne engages Stephen Braude’s conception of DID in *First Person Plural*. Braude (1995) argues that “alternate personalities differ not only with respect to the different sets of behavioral regularities in virtue of which we consider them different personalities. They also seem to have quite distinct centers, not just of consciousness, but of self-awareness” (p. 70). For Braude, alternate personalities or “alters” have their *own* conscious experiences and have the possibility to be present *at the same time*.⁶ The stakes are high for Bayne, because if Braude’s characterization is accurate, then the phenomenal *disunity* of consciousness would be true, and Bayne’s thesis would be false. Bayne’s strategy to deal with this threat is to challenge Braude’s characterization of alters. To this end, Bayne recognizes four arguments that Braude uses to support the phenomenal disunity of consciousness with the goal of disarming each of Braude’s arguments to pacify the threat he poses.

The first argument deals directly with Braude’s conception that alters enjoy their own distinct centers of consciousness, with each center complete with beliefs, desires, goals, and

⁶ The term “alter” does not come without its own controversy or baggage. Briefly, “alter” is clinical shorthand for *alternate* identities, personalities, consciousnesses, etc. While there are a whole host of terms used to describe the specific dissociative part, I will use the term ‘alter’ for the sake of convenience and to remain somewhat consistent with Bayne. Moreover, this reminds us of a central theme of our study of dissociation (not just with DID), specifically the variety of terms used to describe what is being dissociated, and with it, the ontological commitments to the kinds of beings we are to which these terms imply.

other intentional states. Bayne calls this “the argument from intentional disunity.” Bayne (2010) responds by writing, “in my view the urge to reify alters in this way should be resisted. Alters ought to be regarded as personality ‘states’ or ‘files’ rather than bona fide subjects of experience” (p. 164). What does Bayne mean by *reifying alters*? The word “reify” means to take something abstract and make it real and concrete. What Bayne appears to mean by reifying alters follows suit to Braude’s statement of alters experiencing themselves as “distinct persons (and not merely personalities)” (p. 67). Bayne suggests that by granting alters the status of enjoying their own centers of consciousness, as Braude wants to do, it follows that they are also being granted personhood. Bayne is warning against granting alters personhood by considering each of them as their own centers of consciousness. Instead, Bayne favors viewing alters as “personality states or files;” although elsewhere, he commits to describing alters as “psychological schemas,” which he further defines as “semi-autonomous clusters of behavioural traits, dispositions, beliefs, memories, and other intentional clusters” (p. 171). In this sense, for Bayne, an alter should be considered either a personality state or psychological schema, and despite the different terminology he does not specify the distinction.

Moreover, Bayne suggests that self-deception likely plays a role in alters’ experiences of being distinct entities. In fact, Bayne (2010), borrowing inspiration from Heil (1994), outright states that “perhaps multiples are simply massively self-deceived.” Bayne clarifies this self-deception: “By this I do not mean that multiples are deceived *by* themselves (although this may be true), but rather that they are deceived *about* themselves” (p. 164).⁷ The experience alters have of being distinct entities is a result of self-deception.

⁷ Bayne is not the only philosopher that holds this position. In fact, Jennifer Raddon (1996) also supports the position that sufferers of DID are self-deceived.

The second argument deals with switching between alters, and how each alter may struggle for executive control of the multiple's body. Braude describes how alters fighting for control will often display noticeable shifts in facial or bodily expression. Bayne (2010) challenges this view by considering it "merely an 'exaggerated' struggle for emotional control with which many of us are familiar" (p. 165). Here, Bayne suggests the experience of alters struggling over control of the body is an inflated version of emotion and cognitive control, no different than the emotional struggle between anger and self-restraint a person might experience if they were insulted.

Bayne identifies the third argument as the *purpose* of this switching, which typically centers on coping with intense emotional or physical states, like pain, anger, and depression. Braude (1995) argued that "switching personalities enables a multiple to cope with exhaustion, pain or other impairments to normal or optimal functioning" (p. 45). The reason for this switching is based on the etiology of DID, specifically the horrific abuse histories that sufferers often endure. Bayne (2010) captures Braude's position by stating the abuse survivor "deals with the pain by creating other personalities to whom it can be transferred" (p. 166). Bayne is skeptical about this notion of transferring pain from one subject of experience to another, arguing that "I can *cause* you to be in pain, but I cannot give you my pain in the way I can give you my sandwiches, my shoes, or even the shirt off my back" (p. 166, emphasis in original). Instead, the way this "transferral" can be accounted for is by thinking of alters as behavioral schemas and how intentional states shift from situation to situation. He provides an example of how a teacher takes on a "pedagogical persona upon entering the classroom" but is able to switch to another mood "in order to cope more effectively with a challenging situation" (p. 167). Bayne suggests that "what it is for one alter to 'transfer' its pain to another is just for the multiple to switch from one

schema state to another” (p. 167). Accordingly, the emotional or physical state transfer occurs “in the context of distinct behavioral schemas,” (p. 167), not from a center of one consciousness to another.

The fourth argument, and perhaps the most challenging to the unity thesis, has to do with alters being aware of, or present *alongside*, each other. Inter-alter access, or co-consciousness,⁸ is often—but not always—asymmetrical, meaning that alters would be aware of the mental state of the other, but the reverse may not be the case. Thus, the alter that is present at a specific time will have access to his or her mental contents *and* have access to the mental contents of another co-conscious or co-present alter.

Bayne accounts for inter-alter access in three ways, which include hallucinations, the ownership of conscious experience, and intrusive thoughts. Bayne (2010) argues that inter-alter access might be the result of confabulations or hallucinations of mental states. Therefore, while introspecting, the mental state may be experienced as “real,” but it actually is “a figment of the multiple’s imagination” (p. 168), and therefore a hallucination of a mental state. The second way Bayne accounts for inter-alter access is that while alters may experience genuine mental states, “these states are their own rather than those of some other subject of experience” (p. 169). The third way of accounting for inter-alter access is through viewing them as intrusive thoughts. In some cases, the inter-alter access will be partial, in the sense that thought from one alter may “leak into” another. In other words, a thought or belief intrudes upon consciousness and is identified as alien, foreign, or “not-me,” attributing to the “someone else” of another alter. Bayne

⁸ Bayne points out that in the philosophical literature, phenomenal unity is typically referred to as “co-consciousness.” However, as Bayne notes, and we have already seen in this thesis, co-consciousness has another meaning in the clinical psychology and psychiatry literature, that of the co-occurrence or co-presence of more than one conscious state at a time. I will use the term “inter-alter” access to avoid confusion henceforth.

provides a comparison to the relatively commonplace example of intrusive thoughts, where random thoughts may pop into your consciousness that seemingly have nothing to do with the current situation.

Bayne (2010) recognizes that DID poses a strong challenge to his unity thesis, but concludes:

It is more plausible to suppose that the agentive disunity seen in multiplicity is *best accounted* for in terms of a single stream of consciousness that is successively informed by a variety of psychological schemas, rather than by appeal to parallel streams of consciousness (p.172, my emphasis).

Therefore, the “switching between schemas may produce the *appearance* of phenomenal disunity,” but “this appearance masks an underlying phenomenal unity (p. 172, emphasis in original). Bayne’s response to Braude’s characterization of alters utilizes a deflationary strategy marked by themes of exaggeration (alters are actually psychological states/files/schemas that are exaggerated), self-deception (DID sufferers are deceived about themselves), and delusion/hallucination (alters are delusional about the degree of separateness and mental states may be hallucinated). Moreover, the psychological schemas are *successively* accounted for in one stream of consciousness, not simultaneous conscious streams. Bayne’s claim that his account is reasonably the “best way” to understand the phenomenon as well as his leaning on a diachronic conception of consciousness are interesting points that deserve further attention. While Bayne’s account is a compelling alternative, I will spend the remaining part of this section focusing on the adequacy of Bayne’s theorizing of alters in DID, postponing talk about a model of diachronic consciousness until later in the chapter.

Bayne is arguing that the alters found in DID are simply exaggerated, and reified, versions of normal psychological experiences. In this view, he appears to construct an either/or dichotomy for the characterization of alters in DID cases; that is to say, in conceptualizing alters,

either their phenomenal character is to be considered as distinct subjects, individual loci of consciousness, and therefore reified (Braude’s position) *or* as simply psychological states or schemas (Bayne’s position). With this considered, Bayne clearly favors classifying alters as psychological schemas or states, along the lines of, and not much different from, the psychological or personality state changes a person might experience, for example, from transitioning from the workplace to the pub. The other side of the dichotomy, the reification, needs to be taken seriously. In this sense, according to Bayne, it would mean to concretize and grant the status of personhood to alters. While I am sensitive to, and agree with, resisting the reification of alters—as I do not want to intensify, further develop, or crystallize the division of these alters—my worry is that the deflationary alternative Bayne turns to may fail to capture the phenomenology of the dissociative alter and conflate it with other phenomena.

Braude’s view of alters experiencing themselves as distinct persons (and therefore reified) is one that Braude himself does not actually hold—at least in the way Bayne interprets it. Braude (1995) defines alters as “distinct apperceptive centers of a single human being” (p. 216). These “apperceptive centers” are the loci or centers of consciousness that were previously discussed. Braude introduces an interesting distinction in two senses of personhood: *organismic* and *dispositional*. The *organismic* sense of personhood follows the one-to-one body/person correlation—one body per person. This organismic conception of personhood is the one typically evoked when thinking about the topic and appears to be the way that Bayne thinks of personhood, at least insofar as his unity thesis is concerned.⁹

⁹ To support my claim, Bayne (2010) writes:

for the majority of this project I will employ an organismic (or biological) conception of the self, according to which the self is nothing other than an organism—in our case, the human animal. Adopting his conception of the self provides a particularly useful framework in which to explore questions related to the unity of consciousness (p. 9).

Regarding the *dispositional* sense of personhood, Braude (1995) teaches us that:

one is a person if one is a continuing subject of mental and physical states, and also if one has enough functional complexity and versatility (mental and physical) to participate in social processes, have both rights and responsibilities, incur obligations, deserve praise or blame for one's actions, etc. (p. 199).

Expanding the concept of personhood allows more flexibility in capturing the phenomenology of alters. While this understanding of personhood is likely to raise some concerns, he selects an interesting point in which the dispositional understanding makes sense in other cultures and contexts. Braude (1995) writes:

many cultures and subcultures in which the possibility of spirit possession, mediumship, or discarnate survival is taken seriously, and of course (and perhaps closer to home), situations which tempt us to regard multiples as more than one agent whom we can develop distinctive relationships (p. 199).

In the above example, as well as in cases of DID, alters may qualify for the *dispositional* sense of personhood, without endorsing *organismic* personhood. More to the point, in the treatment guidelines for DID issued by the International Society for the Study of Trauma and Dissociation (ISSTD), which was written by many world-class clinicians and researchers in the field, holds that “clinicians must accept that successful treatment of DID almost always requires interacting and communicating in some way with these alternate identities” (p. 140). Built into this statement is the recognition of the veracity of the subjective experience of alters. Thereby “ignoring alternate identities or reflexively telling identities to ‘go back inside’ is frankly countertherapeutic” (p. 140). The same can be said for devaluing or invalidating the significance they have in the multiple's phenomenal experience. In this way, it is helpful for the clinician to employ the language used by the multiple. Speaking further to this point, the psychologist Margo Rivera (1996) tells us that:

to the degree that we deny individuals who speak the language of multiple personality the right to talk their language, to the degree that we refuse to listen to them respectfully, we are unlikely to catch a glimpse of them as they are creating themselves (p. 61).

In this sense, Rivera wants to support the authority of what might be considered a multi-voiced subjectivity, and the way in which this leads to understanding the subjective realities of the person.

The lesson learned here is that addressing the subjective realities presented in these alters does not necessitate reification. Even though it may seem as though the use of certain language has the potential to reify—suggest or further entrench alters a distinct people—the therapeutic point is not to embellish or exaggerate, especially when “certain terms would reinforce a belief that the alternate identities, *are separate people or persons rather than a single human being with subjectively divided self-aspects*” (ISSTD, p. 121, my emphasis). Being able to differentiate between organismic and dispositional senses of personhood provides additional resources to better understand this complexity. Thus, the ISSTD treatment recommendations, along with many clinicians, support the concept of the organismic whole person—one body per person—but the difference is how the whole person is put together *dispositionally*, specifically what the mode of being of the whole person is, and the kind of relations between the whole person’s dissociable parts.

Returning to Bayne’s either/or position, it might be more helpful to instead approach multiplicity much more flexibly, characterizing the complexity in the identity fragmentation associated with DID—amongst other dissociative presentations—on a spectrum with several iterations between the simple “schema states” and the “reified alters or subjects” poles, with the latter extreme actually considering alters as separate people. With this framework, the possibility arises to recognize the distinctness and relevancy of alters as sources of subjective experience

without fully reifying them; that is, recognizing them as different dispositional *people*. These poles represent conceptual possibilities, and the dimensional framework allows for flexibility in the construction and phenomenological understanding of what can be termed human subjectivity and personality.

Nevertheless, what comes into focus is a reiteration of the controversy of how to theorize the multiplicity in DID accurately, and we have reached an impasse. While I may present a compelling argument, supported by current experts in the clinical field, Bayne may just double down on his deflationary view that alters are exaggerated personality states or psychological schemas.¹⁰ If the alters of DID are best understood as something like an exaggerated psychological schema, then what is the marker for pathology for it to be considered DID? In other words, does Bayne's conception of alters differ from the various psychological states or schemas that constitute what we may consider "normal" people? We can take a closer look at Bayne's view of pathological multiplicity to see the utility in his description of the clinical phenomena. Bayne writes that what signifies multiplicity as pathological is that the sufferers':

schemas are abnormally insulated from each other, and also the fact that the multiple's schemas frequently contain delusional content. The multiple often deals with her environment by taking on a schema that misrepresents her true identity (p. 176).

The criteria that Bayne sets here is that these schemas are "abnormally insulated" alongside exhibiting "delusional content." The delusional content piece is qualified by a "frequently," meaning that alters may not necessarily maintain delusional content all the time. While I take issue with calling alters delusional, I will save this issue for another time and place.

Understanding schemas as being "abnormally insulated from each other" (p. 76) is a relevant

¹⁰ However, Bayne (2010) recognizes that Braude's account of a disunified consciousness in DID is a "cumulative one" and "it is certainly possible that although none of [Braude's] arguments is individually convincing his overall case is" (p.171). Bayne ultimately defers to his "readers to judge for themselves" whether or not Braude's account is more convincing than his (p. 171).

criterion to be sure, and one that certainly makes sense considering the amnesia that diagnostically and phenomenological fits DID sufferers. Is there any issue with the abnormally insulated criterion, that is, does it accurately and uniquely describe the pathological multiplicity of DID?

Let us take, for example, a person who is living what we might call a “double life.” In one life, he resides in the suburbs with his family, which includes a spouse and two children. He is a well-known attorney, a supportive parent, and spends time volunteering in his local community. Let us call this life “L₁.” In his other life, taking on an alias, he engages in distinctly different behaviors in a more urban locale, including speaking differently and participating in a variety of unlawful and antisocial acts. Let us call this life “L₂.” Indeed, his behavioral schemas, thought processes, and physical appearance are starkly different in L₁ as opposed to L₂. Moreover, a concerted effort is made to keep L₁ and L₂ separate, and as a result, a kind of “insulation” occurs. In this sense, L₁ and L₂ have distinct, and rather entrenched, schemas. We could consider the “schemas” or L₁ and L₂ as being “abnormally insulated” from each other, as the people involved, alongside the person’s behaviors, speech, and attire are substantially different. Due to anticipated consequences, there may be good reason to devote much time and resources to ensure that L₁ and L₂ remain isolated from one another.

According to Bayne’s conception of alters, it would follow that living a double life would fall under his understanding of dissociative alters in DID. By theorizing alters as insulated schemas, his deflationary strategy comes at the cost of conflating the account of DID with another phenomenon (e.g., living a double life). Bayne’s account lacks the granularity to differentiate these phenomena. Moreover, we are reminded that DID is considered pathological, while living a double life is not necessarily pathological (Consider someone, for example,

employed as a spy). Here, Bayne appears to fail at providing the tools to distinguish between the pathological and non-pathological. For these reasons, along with the availability of an alternative conceptualization (as previously articulated in this section), I might suggest that it is *unlikely* his model is the best way to account for the phenomenology of alters DID.

However, Bayne might respond by claiming that the people living a double life would *know* about their other lives, while people with DID would have *little to no knowledge* of the other experiences (recall amnesia being part of DID diagnostic criteria). To be clear, as mentioned earlier, there are cases of inter-alter access that do involve epistemic access between personality states. However, some form of epistemic barrier does occur in cases of DID considering is part of the DSM-5 criteria for diagnosis. The DSM-5 (2013) criterion B reads that DID involves: “recurrent gaps in the recall of everyday events, important personal information, and/or trauma events that are inconsistent with ordinary forgetting” (p. 292). Here DSM-5 criterion B would effectively distinguish between people with a double life and those with DID. If Bayne were to accept this strategy of distinction, his unity thesis would still stand; however, we again see the move into an area where diachronic unity is at play. This is due to the fact that in order to establish an epistemic barrier between alters or “recurrent gaps” in conscious experiences “inconsistent with ordinary forgetting” requires the passage of time. In testing the dissociative phenomenon of DID, we can clearly see that a model of synchronic unity cannot do all the work, and a model of diachronic consciousness is needed to fill out the conception.

The current section examined Bayne’s arguments supporting his unity thesis against Braude’s conceptualization of alters in DID. Firstly, in considering Criterion B of the DSM-5 DID diagnosis, Bayne’s model of synchronic unity is unable to do all the work, and a diachronic model of unity is needed to account for pathology. Secondly, in order for Bayne to theorize DID

and alters in the way he needs to for it to fit his unity thesis, he must employ terms beyond consciousness, such as personality and psychological schemas. In testing the challenge of DID, the score is far from settled, and as mentioned before, Bayne's unity thesis *can* hold in cases of DID, especially if theorized the deflationary way Bayne does. However, I remain skeptical at how well his model conceptualizes the phenomenological if DID. Be that as it may, this section brought to light two other important issues that need to be addressed: the need for a diachronic model of unity and the need for more ontological commitments beyond consciousness to capture the phenomena adequately.

§IV. The Challenge from the “Hidden Observer”

Bayne identifies the “hidden observer” pain phenomenon found in the experimental hypnosis literature as another challenger to his unity thesis.¹¹ Bayne rightly points out that the general hidden observer paradigm can be traced back to the late 19th century in the work of Pierre Janet, Morton Prince, William James, and others associated with the discovery and elaboration of the division between consciousness and the subconscious. In contemporary literature, the hidden observer research paradigm is most notably associated with psychologist Ernest Hilgard, whom Bayne selects to challenge. Bayne outlines two models that conceptualize hidden observer phenomenon, namely the two-streams model and zombie model, until turning to a third alternative he calls the “switch” model.

One of the most well-known and cited experimental protocols in the hidden observer paradigm is the cold pressor pain experiment.¹² In one of the foundational studies of the

¹¹ The name “hidden observer” is a rather curious one. As Hilgard (1977) writes, it is to be considered a metaphor for conscious, experiential, intelligent activity occurring in a hypnotic context, not a “homunculus” operating behind the scenes.

¹² The cold pressor pain tests can be traced back to the work of Hines and Brown (1936) to study cardiovascular reactivity under stress. In the experimental hypnosis literature, the test was appropriated as a method to assess the existence and nature of divided consciousness.

paradigm, Hilgard (1973) described an experiment that involved submerging a hypnotized participant's hand and forearm in circulating ice water for 45 seconds with a tourniquet on the upper arm of the same arm to restrict blood flow. With the other arm, the hypnotized participant is instructed to record the level of pain on a scale from 1-10 (1 representing no pain, 10 representing the most pain) through "automatic writing" by writing the number in cursive or pressing numbered keys on a reporting system.¹³ The participant first participated in a hypnotic without analgesia and her verbal accounts of pain matched the report given by her hand. When she was hypnotized and given the analgesia instruction (that is, they would feel no pain), they were also given a prompt that when the experimenter touched their shoulder, a 'hidden part' of them would report experiences that they "may be unaware of." This prompt was the key part of the hidden observer experiments.

Hilgard (1973) describes the experience of the woman:

In the normal nonhypnotic state, she found the experience of the circulating ice water very painful and distressing. In the hypnotic analgesic state, she reported no pain and was totally unaware of her hand and arm in the ice water; she was calm throughout. All the while that she was insisting verbally that she felt no pain in hypnotic analgesia, the dissociated part of herself was reporting through automatic writing that *she felt the pain just as in the normal nonhypnotic state* (p. 398, emphasis in original).

Moreover, these results were replicated with several other participants, and in several subsequent studies. The hallmark feature of hidden observer reports, according to Hilgard, is the existence of two conscious streams: one overt central consciousness reporting no pain, and one covert, subconscious reporting the pain. In other words, the subject maintains two separate streams that simultaneously report pain and no pain. Bayne (2007) summarizes his understanding of the two-streams model of the hidden observer phenomenon:

¹³ All participants selected for these experiments were shown to be highly hypnotizable and capable of automatic writing. Hilgard (1973) reported that in his experiments these participants even "represented the upper 1-2%" of those tested to be hypnotically susceptible (p. 397).

hypnotics subject manifesting a hidden observer enjoy two streams of consciousness at once—a ‘central’ stream and a ‘hidden observer’ stream. The subject’s overt reports are guided by conscious states in their central stream of consciousness, while their hidden observer reports are guided by those conscious states in their hidden observer stream” (p. 94).

Consequently, the two-streams model demonstrates what seems to be a definitive disunity in phenomenal consciousness.

Nevertheless, the two-streams model is not the only way to explain what is going on in these hidden observer experiments. Another model Bayne discusses is the zombie model, which conceptualizes the second conscious stream as actually an *unconscious process*. The main problem with the zombie model, according to Bayne, is the fact that hidden observer experiments involve reporting the experience of pain sensations, and pain is considered a phenomenal experience—there is something it is like to experience pain. While pain certainly involves the physiological firing of nociceptors, which can be considered “unconscious”—or at least nonconscious—the experience of pain involves a subjective interpretation, and we can say that experiences of pain may vary from person to person. For example, while you and I may experience the same type of pain, such as, from submerging our arms in a tub of ice water, the intensity in which you experience the pain will differ from mine. In the case of the hidden observer experiments, there is a subjective, evaluative feature to the pain being reported simultaneously with another evaluative report of “no pain”. Bayne (2010) tells us that “in light of the fact that that hidden-observer content is available to high-level consuming systems—systems implicated in introspective report and personal-level agency...we should conclude that the balance of evidence is against the zombie model” (p. 179). Consequently, Bayne is doubtful that the zombie model has the resources to properly conceptualize the hidden observer experiments.

If the zombie model is inadequate, then the two-stream model gains traction as the most viable model.

Bayne concedes that the evidence does suggest two streams are at play—no doubt a curious position for him, as this point certainly threatens his unity thesis. Nevertheless, Bayne proposes a solution in the form of the “switch model” which purports the existence of two streams, although only one is brought to consciousness *at a time*. Bayne (2010), in articulating his switch model, maintains that there are “two streams of unconscious processing, with the contents of the consciousness drawing sequentially on each of the two streams” (p.184). The hidden observer prompt acts as a kind of “alarm bell” that, as Bayne (2010) notes, causes the participant “to become aware of stimuli that they had represented only unconsciously” (p. 184). Therefore, there are two features for Bayne’s switch model solution: 1) two streams of unconscious processing (that consciousness draws from); and, 2) the sequential nature of consciousness. Consciousness remains unified because only one conscious stream is active at one time.

Not so fast. One challenging point is getting clear on what Bayne means by *unconscious* processing, and specifically unconscious processing that produces, at the least in this case, the subjective experience of reporting pain intensity. However, Bayne (2010) also writes:

we can account for the hidden observer data by supposing that the subject’s stream of consciousness switches back and forth between two streams of *mental processing*, an ‘overt’ stream whose contents are manifest only in the subject’s hidden observer reports and behaviour, and a ‘covert’ stream, whose contents are manifest only in the subject’s hidden observer reports (p. 187, my emphasis).¹⁴

¹⁴ The hidden observer literature makes the rather presumptive designation of “overt” and “covert” reports, whereas the “overt” refers to the verbal report, and the “covert” refers to the manual report of automatic writing or key-pressing. One issue is that there is nothing covert about a manual arm movement recording a number as this is seemingly just as overt as a verbal report! At any rate, I have preserved the language used in the literature while attempting to clarify it where I could.

Bayne uses both “unconscious processing” and “mental processing” throughout his account of the switch model. If Bayne means this to be *unconscious* mental processing—which is how he describes it in several places—then this deflation of the pain reporting hidden observer becomes problematic to capture the phenomenology of pain adequately. If he does not, then it follows that both streams would be considered *conscious* (the main overt [verbal] consciousness and covert [manual] subconsciousness) due to the phenomenological quality of experiencing pain, which would end us right back on the two streams model.

Nonetheless, Bayne’s main point is on the *successive*, not *simultaneous* feature of these streams. Bayne (2010) tells us that “from an external point of view these switches might generate the appearance of distinct streams of consciousness running in parallel—as the two-streams model has it—but that appearance would be an illusion” (p. 188). To support this claim, Bayne cites Spanos and Hewitt (1980), who, in replicating Hilgard’s experiments, attempted to determine if the manual and verbal reports were given simultaneously or successively, with the criterion determining successive being if the reports were separated by at least .5 second. This task was accomplished by recording the amount of time between the participants’ “verbal, ‘overt’ report and a key-pressed ‘hidden’ report” (p. 1207). They concluded that the majority of cases, the participant called out the “overt” verbal report, followed by the “covert” manual key-pressed report, with the delay being .5 second. Taking the results of the study into consideration, Bayne (2010) suggests that .5 second is “certainly long enough for the subject’s attention—and with it their stream of consciousness—to switch from one stream of processing to another” (p. 186). However, interestingly, in that very same study, Spanos and Hewitt (1980) also reported that “one subject consistently gave ‘overt’ and hidden’ reports simultaneously” (p. 1210), which strips away some of the power of Bayne’s claim.

But even with this evidence, I am skeptical of this .5 second switching between no pain and pain, especially if we are interested in pain as a *phenomenal* experience. Firstly, while Bayne insists on the oscillation between reports of no pain and pain, there were no phenomenological reports from the subjects of this oscillation. Indeed, Hilgard (1977) writes that the subjects, when queried, were amnesic to giving covert or manual reports of pain. Secondly, if we consider the phenomenology of pain, it seems odd to argue that pain can simply be switched “off.” In an admittedly oversimplified neurophysiology of pain, we can recognize nociceptors as firing and not firing, and perhaps that could be an analog to switching on and off. Still, this does not capture the *phenomenology* of pain. Pain, at least the kind that I am familiar with, reverberates in one’s experience—it lingers, pulsates, and can increase or decrease in intensity over time. For example, carelessly hitting my knee on the edge of my desk while sitting down produces an intense pain that lingers and may take several minutes to hours to dissipate. In fact, there may be some forms of pain, such as debilitating back pain after a motor vehicle accident, that may reverberate for the rest of a person’s life.

Bayne could argue that exceptional cases of abrupt pain cessation do exist. For example, a person may be in such excruciating pain that they faint, and thereby ceases to report the experience the pain. Another example is a person taking a powerful sedative, which may quickly stop the pain (although, this experience may be more like *dissipating* the pain—even if the pain dissipates quickly). From the looks of it, Bayne’s unity thesis would hold. Still, we must consider that in cases of the cessation of pain due to fainting, pain reports abruptly cease because the person is *no longer conscious*. Indeed, if a person takes a powerful enough sedative, that person may also no longer be conscious. Regardless, these examples are fundamentally different phenomena than what is being described in the hidden observer pain reports, and this point is

crucial to consider. Therefore, while exceptional phenomena can be identified, the focus here is the unique phenomenon of hidden observer pain reports, and specifically how pain is switched off in these cases.

Bayne's strategy of accounting for hidden observer phenomenon using his switch model is an interesting and promising alternative to the two-stream model. However, I argued that one of the main problems with the switch model for hidden observer pain experiments is the implausibility that the experience of pain can simply be switched "off;" therefore, violating the phenomenology of pain experience. While exceptional examples such as fainting could represent examples of pain switching off, I point out that these are fundamentally different phenomena than what is going on with the hidden observer pain reports. We see a different kind of problem emerge here than with Bayne's handling of DID, specifically that in hidden observer pain phenomenon Bayne's switch model falsifies the phenomenology of pain, and therefore fails to be a viable alternative to the two-streams model. Over the course of evaluating Bayne's unity thesis against both dissociative phenomena we have observed increasing debt to a diachronic theory of consciousness, which Bayne does not provide.

§V. Stream of Consciousness

As previously noted in this chapter, Bayne helps himself to the notion of a stream of consciousness to defend his unity thesis without a clear account of what it looks like—at least not in the detail he devotes to his unity thesis.¹⁵ He does, however, provide some leads for a starting point. Bayne (2010) understands a stream of consciousness to be "a period of consciousness between one state of unconsciousness and the next" (p. 25) with this period of

¹⁵ Throughout the work of Dainton and Bayne, the terms "stream of consciousness" and "continuity of consciousness" appear to be used with little distinction between them. Consequently, I will use the terms in this section interchangeably.

consciousness maintaining a “what it is likeness” but it is not a phenomenal event itself. He continues: “this ‘what it is likeness’ is spread out—distributed across a number of distinct conscious states” (p. 25). In a paper co-authored with Barry Dainton, Dainton and Bayne (2005) define a stream of consciousness as “simply any collection of experiences whose simultaneous members are related by synchronic phenomenal connectedness, and whose non-simultaneous members are related by phenomenal continuity” (p. 554). These distinct, synchronic, conscious states or “phenomenal connectedness” would need to be connected in some way to form a continuous, diachronic stream. While the stream of consciousness is not considered a single phenomenal event itself, the stream is seemingly made up of a series of phenomenal events; however, Bayne leaves us wanting a model of how the stream is constructed. We do find in the work of Dainton, specifically in his fittingly named book, *The Stream of Consciousness* a model for the “stream of consciousness.” Indeed, Bayne himself provides a review of Dainton’s book, with a section dedicated to Dainton’s stream of consciousness model. In his section, I have two tasks. First, I will take Dainton’s model with Bayne’s review to get a clearer picture of how to understand the stream of consciousness. I will then test this model by examining the resources it has to handle dissociative phenomena, specifically the hidden observer phenomenon since Bayne’s most abundant use of the stream of consciousness is found there.

Dainton’s model for a stream of consciousness begins with the phenomenal unity of consciousness, that is, the unity of conscious events at one time. Dainton (2000) writes:

diachronic unity of experience is no different, in essentials, from the synchronic: both are the product of co-consciousness. Just as simultaneous experiences, such as thought, a bodily sensation and a visual experience, can be experienced together, so can successive experiences, experiences occurring at different (but not distant) times (p. 113).

This “diachronic co-consciousness,” as Dainton calls it, is still a short-term phenomenon, lasting only as long as what he calls a “specious present.” The notion of a ‘specious present’ has its

roots, most notably, in the work of William James (1890) and Edmund Husserl (1964), respectively.¹⁶ Dainton (2000) tells us that a specious present is relatively brief, estimating one to last “roughly a half second or less” (p. 171). Yet, this specious present by itself does not account for, as Dainton writes, the possible longer durations of successive experiences that many, if not most, of us, enjoy all the time—streams that can last from minutes to hours. According to Bayne (2001), Dainton constructs a model for the continuity of consciousness in two steps; the first being the description of what the specious present is, and the second being the development of the “overlap model,” which accounts for how successive specious presents overlap to form a continuous stream of conscious experience.

For Dainton, the specious present is the total, unified experience at a specific moment—nearly identical to Bayne’s (2010) “total conscious state” at a given time (p. xx). The specious present is not simply an instantaneous phenomenon, but itself can be considered a temporally extended, albeit brief, phenomenal event. The specious present is shortest unit that may be considered a so-called single “stream.” But what are the parameters for carving out a single specious present? While the total conscious experience will have, let us say, for example, simultaneous auditory and visual events, a single specious present is only as long as the shortest conscious event in that unified experience. Therefore, if we have visual experience of a dog and the auditory experience of her barking, the specious present lasts as long as the visual and auditory experience overlap—in this case the visual event would continue longer than the auditory bark. One clear problem that emerges is how these specious presents can be experienced together across *extended* time, that is, beyond the half second or so that Dainton estimates one to last. After a sophisticated and detailed analysis, Dainton’s solution takes the form of the “overlap

¹⁶ William James (1890) credits E.R. Clay with the term “specious present” (p. 609).

model.” The central idea of this model is that specious presents “overlap” with one another to form the extended continuity of conscious experience. Dainton describes his overlap model through the example of how we might experience the musical phrase *Do-Re-Mi*: *Do* flows into the *Re*, which flows into the *Mi*. For this to work, Dainton assumes that each immediate experience (specious present) is two notes long (p. 170). The specious present is constructed as *Do-Re* and *Re-Mi*. *Do-Re* are co-conscious, and *Re-Mi* are also co-conscious; however, *Do* and *Mi* are not. Since *Do* and *Mi* both share *Re*, they are linked through *Re*. In this way, we may think of these individual links through the metaphor of chain links. Each link in the chain connects to the next one with overlap. Indeed, Dainton (2000) suggests such a metaphor: “each link in a chain only passes through the links either side of it, but this does not undermine the chain’s integrity” (p. 113).

Bayne (2001) has an objection to the overlap model on the grounds of duplication, arguing that *Re* occupies two different token experiences because they are part of two distinct specious presents. Thus, the sequence presents as *Do-Re₁* and *Re₂-Mi*, with the two separate *Re* experiences cause a break in the sequence. Bayne provides a solution for this objection, telling us that “any experience that is concurrent (and co-subjective) with experiences that belong to the same specious present itself belongs to that specious present” (p. 88). In other words, the *Re* notes occupy the same phenomenal space at the same time rendering them virtually indistinguishable in conscious experience. As a result, the link is maintained. If we were to return to the definition of a stream of consciousness provided earlier by Dainton and Bayne (2005), we can see how the “simultaneous members are related by synchronic phenomenal connectedness” is supplied by the temporal extension of the experiences in the “specious present” and the “non-

simultaneous members...related by phenomenal continuity” is supplied by the overlap model (p. 554).

However, Bayne would likely not support that diachronic unity is *always* unified, as he readily points out that a stream occurs between states of unconsciousness. So, for Bayne, dreamless sleep, comas, and fainting, are examples of phenomena that he would support the disunity of diachronic consciousness. Bayne may also recognize that the unity and disunity of diachronic consciousness is likely to occur in dissociative phenomena. Therefore, Bayne (2010) would not extend his position that “we never have a disunified experience” to diachronic consciousness (p. 17).

How might we assess the unity (and disunity) of diachronic consciousness in dissociative phenomena? Let us return to the hidden observer phenomenon. How do we connect or ‘overlap’ the experiences of no pain and pain to account for the hidden observer phenomenon? To construct a specious present, let the verbal (overt) report of no pain be represented by “*np*” and manual (covert) report of pain be represented by “*p*.” Recall Bayne’s switch model where the conscious stream successively switches from *np* to *p* and back to *np*. Following Dainton’s model, constructing specious presents suitable for the overlap model would require the construction of a specious present that included both *np* and *p*, or *np-p*. It seems phenomenologically inaccurate to construct such a specious present, as, for example, pain is either present or absent from the experience at a moment. To be sure, the possibility does exist for my knee to be in pain from hitting my desk and my arm *not* to be in pain, but my response to someone inquiring about my experience is, “ouch, *I’m* in pain!” This model *appears* to fail to create the link between the experiences of no pain and pain, which would suggest a discontinuity of consciousness.

However, contradictory experiences occupying the same specious present may not actually be incompatible. Take, for example, the experience of a needle stick during routine bloodwork. Prior to the needle stick, there is the experience of np . When the nurse sticks the needle into your vein, a sudden onset of p is triggered. Here, the anticipation of p , joined with the higher-order context of getting bloodwork done, provides us the possibility to conceptualize the *turn* from np - p within the same specious present. Dainton's overlap model does have the resources to capture seemingly contradictory phenomena in the same specious present.

But does this work in the other direction? That is, can we construct the specious moment p - np ? Recall we dealt with the same issue with Bayne. If our task is to understand the phenomenology of p over time accurately, then it seems problematic to think that p can be simply switched "off." Again, p increases and decreases in intensity over time. So, while we may be able to accurately capture the phenomenology of the sudden onset of p from a state of np , switching p off to remain on the same stream in hidden observer phenomenon is untenable. Here, the issue is not the veracity of the overlap model, but the misrepresentation of the phenomenon of p .

What about unity and disunity of diachronic consciousness in cases of DID? Let us recall that Bayne (2010) argued that "agentive disunity seen in multiplicity is best accounted for in terms of a *single stream of consciousness* that is *successively* informed by a variety of psychological schemas" (p. 172, my emphasis). It very well may be that, given Bayne's strategy of theorizing dissociative alters in DID, that diachronic conscious can be unified for a moment, or perhaps even an "extended moment." There may even be cases to argue where there is a non-simultaneous continuity in the experience of switching alters. Still, if we summon the DSM-5 (2013) criterion B once again, that is the "recurrent gaps in the recall of everyday events,

important personal information, and/or trauma events that are inconsistent with ordinary forgetting” (p. 292), we see the notion of temporal disunity baked into the diagnostic criteria itself. What might be most plausible is Bayne concession to the idea of diachronic disunity in cases of DID, as this would not jeopardize his unity thesis.

The unity of consciousness tradition maintains the unity of consciousness in two forms: synchronic and diachronic. Using the work of Dainton to supplement Bayne, I was able to reconstruct a model of the diachronic unity of consciousness out of synchronic unity. Dainton called this the “overlap” model. With a completed picture of diachronic unity in view, I suggested that Bayne would likely hold the view that both the unity and disunity of diachronic consciousness occurs in dissociative phenomena. In reviewing dissociative phenomena, specifically the hidden observer pain phenomenon, I argued that Dainton’s overlap model, while being able to conceptualize the turn from no pain to pain within the specious present, falls victim to the same critique found in Bayne’s switch model. With DID, I pointed out the possibility of perhaps an extended moment of diachronic unity, but that temporal disunity is part of the DSM-5 criteria for DID.

§VI. Concluding Remarks

The modern tradition of unified consciousness has contemporary stakeholders, most notably Bayne with his unity thesis. Bayne correctly identifies that a significant challenge to his unity thesis is dissociation, which is understood starting from the work of Janet onward as the division or disunity of consciousness. In this chapter, I reconstructed Bayne’s unity thesis, which described the unity of consciousness at one time, or synchronic unity. I then evaluated Bayne’s engagement with three dissociative phenomena, including depersonalization, DID, and hidden

observer pain phenomenon.¹⁷ Through Bayne's work, a second form of conscious unity was identified, that of unity of consciousness over time or diachronic unity. Indeed, Bayne helps himself to the notion of conscious unity over time without giving an account. In order to fill out this picture, I supplemented Bayne's unity thesis with Dainton's overlap model. As a result, through Bayne and Dainton, a clear picture came into view of the two forms of unified consciousness. The focus of this chapter was to test Bayne's unity thesis against several dissociative phenomena (recall Bayne engaged these phenomena directly as threats to his unity thesis). How did Bayne's unity thesis hold up against dissociative phenomena?

In short, the results were mixed; Bayne's unity thesis was compatible with certain dissociative phenomena, namely depersonalization, and was problematic in others, such as DID

¹⁷ These three examples are certainly not exhaustive of what is often described as dissociation. For example, the phenomenon of "highway hypnosis," or "driving without awareness," as it is sometimes called, is often considered a common example of dissociation in everyday life and could have easily been a fourth example of dissociation Bayne could tackle. Highway hypnosis was first described by the psychologist Griffith Williams in 1963, highway hypnosis is the phenomenon where a person drives, often great distances, responds to road stimuli, obeys traffic rules, arrives safely, and has no conscious awareness of having done so. What is interesting is that while experiencing highway hypnosis, the person's conscious experience is not on driving, yet the person arrives at his or her destination without recall of the experience of driving. For example, we can set out on our daily drive to work and during this drive we might find ourselves diverting our conscious stream on thinking through a philosophical problem of the nature of consciousness, working through various permutations, examples, and the like. When we arrive at work, we may not recall any details of the drive, while simultaneously coming to terms with the fact that we must have navigated the traffic and road conditions since we arrived safely and without incident. In highway hypnosis, there appears to be two simultaneous mental processes occurring.

In a study of highway hypnosis by Samuel Charlton and Nicola Starkey (2011), they propose a two-track model that consisted of an operating process and monitoring process. The operating process involves "conscious, intentional level engagement" while the monitoring process involves "unconscious error monitoring system" (p. 469). The operating process would be engaged during unfamiliar driving routes, and something like a person's daily drive to work would shift to the monitoring system, presuming leaving conscious attention to focus on the philosophical question of consciousness (as per our example). If a novel road hazard occurred, a switch from monitoring to operating processes would occur. This model likely supports Bayne's switch model, that is, an unconscious mode of processing that becomes conscious when needed. This would mean that driving would involve an unconscious process. But perhaps it is reasonable to suspect that a very low level of consciousness or subconscious is active while driving. What would be needed to demonstrate this point is empirical literature on a threshold for conscious activities. Here we can see just one more of many examples of dissociative phenomena that could provide a continuous stream of challenges to Bayne's unity thesis.

and the hidden observer. Despite the phenomena Bayne's unity thesis captures accurately, I argued that Bayne employed two different strategies to distort or misrepresent DID and hidden observer pain phenomenon, respectively. With DID, I argued that Bayne's deflationary strategy, that is, his understanding of dissociative alters as simply exaggerated "insulated schemas" incurs a cost of conflation with other nonpathological phenomena, such as living a double life. In this way, he fails to distinguish the pathological from the nonpathological. With hidden observer pain phenomenon, I argued Bayne's switch model falsifies the phenomenology of pain, as his model implies that pain can be shut "off." I also recognized Bayne's general deflationary strategy to characterize dissociative phenomena to support his unity thesis. Constructing the phenomena to fit the theory leaves open the question of whether or not Bayne's characterization is the best way to understand the phenomenology of these dissociative experiences. We also clearly saw the need for a diachronic theory of consciousness in order to grasp the phenomena accurately. While temporal extension may be maintained in certain dissociative phenomena, it is highly likely that Bayne would not defend its unity "all the time" like he does with synchronic unity. Ultimately, Bayne's successes in defending his unity thesis is a product of the way he characterizes dissociative phenomena, alongside his model focusing on *only* synchronic unity.

Nevertheless, the larger upshot of this chapter is the need to go beyond consciousness as the sole ontological commitment in theorizing dissociative phenomena. This move takes place in both the dissociative phenomena that Bayne was able to successfully defend against along with the ones that he misdescribed or falsified. For example, in the case of depersonalization, Bayne (2010) evokes the "unity of bodily awareness" (p. 260). In describing DID, Bayne argues that alters should be regarded as "personality 'states' or 'files'" (p. 171) alongside talk about "psychological schemas," which are organized clusters of "behavioural traits, dispositions,

beliefs, memories, and other intentional states” (p. 171). And in the case of hidden observer pain phenomenon, he talks about “streams of mental processing” (p. 187). Bayne, throughout his descriptions of dissociative phenomena, readily moves beyond consciousness to employ a variety of other ontological commitments and modes of unity for dissociable beings, which is critical for his success in defending his unity thesis. The ontological problem of dissociation again presents itself, this time in the philosophical literature.

From a speculative perspective, at least two important themes ran consistently through the dissociative phenomena analyzed in this chapter. First, the discussion of bodily relations and unity, as well as conscious and unconscious streams/chains suggest the possible need for a conceptualization of spatiality, perhaps a model for the unity of spatiality. Second, in the descriptions of depersonalization, DID, and hidden observer pain phenomenon, the theme of owning or disowning conscious experience, personality, or bodily states kept coming up. Thus, a model of “mineness” insofar as it pertains to ownership may be relevant.

The theme of evoking several different ontological commitments when handling dissociative phenomena in human psychology comes to no surprise, as we clearly observed this theme in the previous two chapters. Therefore, we could likely predict from the start of Bayne’s account that consciousness alone is not sufficient to capture the richness and complexity of dissociative phenomena adequately. Perhaps this ontological problem, repeating itself through the history of dissociation as well as appearing in current clinical and philosophical discourse, can motivate an investigation into alternate ways for unifying the phenomena without sacrificing phenomenal fidelity and richness through deflationary strategies.

Part II: An Existential Phenomenology of Dissociative Experiences

§0. Introduction

In Part I, I provided a history of dissociation in two chapters: one on the pioneering work of Puysegur, Janet, and Prince, and one examining the definitions in the many volumes of the DSM. Moreover, Chapter II left us with a few conundrums that further obscure the phenomenology in clinical reports. I finished Part I by showcasing how dissociation still remains a suitable challenge to the unity of consciousness paradigm, even after a valiant and well-argued defense mounted by Tim Bayne. One of the main points revealed in this history, and even used by Bayne in defense of his unity thesis, is the need for a variety of ontological commitments beyond consciousness to articulate the phenomena. The result is an assortment of ontological commitments. With commitments like consciousness, personality, system of functions—to name a few—we cannot be clear about how all these terms form a cohesive frame for conceptualizing and analyzing the phenomenology of dissociative experiences. With these worries in mind, it follows that a new ontological frame is needed to address these problems. Such an ontology should help and provide a unifying framework to conceptualize dissociative phenomena, thus addressing the motley problem and the ontological problem. Secondly, such an ontology would need the resources to remain faithful to the phenomenological descriptions of dissociation, specifically by helping navigate the conundrums that appear in the clinical reports.

The culmination of this work motivates us to examine Martin Heidegger's corpus as a potential solution for a unifying ontological framework. Heidegger is well known for an ontology that rejects the older terms such as consciousness and personality that contributed to the creation of the motley problem and ontological problems. Moreover, Heidegger's focus on phenomenology may provide resources to navigate the conundrums. However, Heidegger's work is extensive and dense, and it is not immediately clear which Heideggerian concepts are most

relevant. As such, my aim becomes identifying “which Heidegger” to use to help us in these pursuits

§1. Which Heidegger?

One of the most important questions Heidegger pursued was the meaning of Being. Heidegger tells us, “it is fitting that we should raise anew *the question of the meaning of Being*” (BT 1, italics in original) because “this question has today been forgotten” (BT 2). The traditional questions that have dominated ontology, which include determining what there is, how to categorize it appropriately, the relationship between universals and particulars, physical versus mental substances, free will versus determinism, the existence of God, and the like, pertain specifically to the status of *entities*. Ontology has, therefore, according to Heidegger, been the question of the *being of entities*, and because these questions deal with entities, they are what he calls “ontic” questions. Heidegger’s understanding of “ontic” contrasts with his use of “ontological,” which is the study of the Being of those entities, and notably the meaning of Being. What makes a question ontological, for Heidegger, is if it engages the question of the meaning of Being. The differentiation between the ontic (i.e., concerning entities) and ontological (i.e., concerning Being) is known to Heidegger as the “ontological difference.” Therefore, the reformulation of ontology as the question of the meaning of Being is what Heidegger called *Fundamental* ontology.

The pursuit of Heidegger’s fundamental ontology, while an enthralling task, likely will not yield the needed resources for this project—a phenomenological articulation of dissociative experiences. However, in Heidegger’s investigation of fundamental ontology, he gives us a clue: To work out the question of the meaning of Being properly, we must put at the center of the inquiry an entity in which Being is an issue for it. That is to say, an entity that has the ability to

ask the question about the meaning of Being itself. Heidegger tells us that “this entity which each of us is himself [*sic*] and which includes inquiring as one of the possibilities of its Being, we shall denote the term ‘Dasein’” (BT 7). Heidegger’s concept of Dasein is a promising lead. In *Basic Problems* (BP), Heidegger determines that “Dasein,” translated as “being-there” or “there-being,” is the term he uses for each of us. Heidegger tells us:

For us, in contrast, the word ‘Dasein’ does not designate, as it does for Kant, the way of being of natural things. It does not designate a way of being at all, but rather a specific being which we ourselves are, the *human Dasein*. We are at every moment Dasein (BP 28, italics in original).

So, Dasein is a term for each of us. We are each a human Dasein.

Heidegger continues, “[t]his being, the Dasein, like every other being, has a specific way of being. To this way of the Dasein’s being we assign the term ‘Existenz’, ‘existence’” (BP 28). Dasein understands and interprets itself through its *Existenz*, or existence. Existence is, for Dasein, its understanding of possibilities for itself, a way of self-interpretation. Dasein’s existential way of being contrasts with existence as a natural thing or physical object, a claim that Heidegger ascribes to Kant and Husserl. But how does Heidegger understand Dasein’s existence as something different from the existence of a physical object? Heidegger also introduces *Being-in-the-world* as the activity of Dasein’s existence, or, in other words, Being-in-the-world is the structure that reveals Dasein’s activity of existing in the world. Dasein thus understands itself as Being-in-the-world by way of the world it finds itself already *in*. Being-in-the-world, according to Heidegger, is to be understood as “a unitary phenomenon” that “must be seen as a whole” (BT 53). While Heidegger describes Being-in-the-world as a unitary and holistic concept, he also states that there are constitutive aspects of its structure, which helps render the term far more manageable to discuss and articulate in a useful way.

At this point, I admit that Dasein and Being-in-the-world remain underdeveloped, although the initial query about “which Heidegger?” comes clearer into focus. I am interested in Heidegger’s concepts of Dasein and Being-in-the-world as the resources for a phenomenology of dissociative experiences. We have a unifying ontological structure in Dasein and Being-in-the-world, yet these resources are still not precise enough to accomplish the task. We also need criteria of success for this alternative ontology. How do we determine if Heidegger’s analytic of Dasein is any better at articulating the phenomenology of dissociation than the previous models? One criterion is what can be called *phenomenological fidelity*, that is, if the concepts and terms used to describe the experiences remain faithful to phenomenological experience or if they obscure or complicate them. One challenge that dissociative phenomena present is the *conundrums* that appear in the phenomenological descriptions. In other words, the descriptions of dissociative experiences that people provide are problematic insofar as they do not make sense. Two of these conundrums were discussed in Chapter II. Recall, for example, one of the conundrums in Greg’s report of depersonalization from Simeon and Abugel (2006): “Even when I’m talking I don’t feel like it is my words” (p. 9). Here, we observe the conundrum appears in being *mine* and *not mine*. The second conundrum emerges from a feature of the mineness and not mineness; that is, the strangeness or oddness in something being familiar, yet simultaneously not familiar. Therefore, finding Heideggerian resources that can help navigate these conundrums while maintaining phenomenological fidelity would be helpful.

Chapter IV: Dissociation and Mineness

§0. Introduction

The dissociative phenomenon of depersonalization is intriguing as it is “characterized by a feeling of unreality or detachment from, or unfamiliarity with, one’s whole self or from aspects of self” (DSM-5, p. 302).¹ The puzzling feature of depersonalization is how to best understand how one feels unreal, detached, unfamiliar with oneself. In other words, how does this experience make sense? To get a clearer understanding of how this experience manifests, let us turn to Greg’s description from the Simeon and Abugel (2006) text:

Even when I’m talking I don’t feel like it is my words...My mind and my body are somehow not connected, it’s like my body is doing one thing and my mind is saying another. Like my mind is somewhere off to the back, not inside my body (p. 9)

One striking feature of Greg’s experience is the disruptions in what is considered “*mine*.” Greg recognizes that he is talking, yet he is aware that something is strange about his talking experience—he does not feel like the words he speaks are *his* words. What lies bare in the description is a *conundrum*; that is, one part of the experience he recognizes as being his (e.g., I’m talking) yet another part as not his (e.g., I don’t feel like it is my words). An important feature of the conundrum is the “as if” or “like” condition active in the description. Mauricio Sierra (2009) tells us that “the use of ‘as if’ or ‘like’ expressions is more likely to be intended as a critique regarding the adequacy of the description used, rather than as a critique of the reality of the experience itself” (p. 25). In other words, Sierra seems to suggest that people lack the language to communicate their experiences accurately, and as a result, the descriptions end up

¹ This experience may also be present in cases of DID. According to the DSM-5 “individuals with dissociative identity disorder may report the feeling they have suddenly become depersonalized observers of their ‘own’ speech and actions, which they may feel powerless to stop (sense of self)” (APA, [2013], p. 293). While the majority of this analysis engages case examples of non-DID depersonalization, I discuss the relevancy this account with DID later in this chapter.

sounding strange. Of course, this point does not take away the reality that people reporting experiences of depersonalization still feel that *something* anomalous or strange is happening. Under the current language scheme, there is no clear path to navigate or resolve the tension of the conundrum, obscuring the phenomenology of depersonalization. Therefore, to navigate the “mine” and “not mine” conundrum present in these depersonalization experiences, we require new terminology.

At first glance, Heidegger’s concept of *Jemeinigkeit*, standardly translated as “mineness,” appears to be promising for our purposes. Mineness appears as early as the second sentence of §9 *BT*, where Heidegger writes, “the Being of any such entity *is in each case mine*” (*BT*, 41/42, emphasis in original). A few paragraphs later, he specifies that “because Dasein has *in each case mineness [Jemeinigkeit]*, one must always use a personal pronoun when one addresses it: ‘I am,’ ‘you are’” (*BT*, 42, emphasis in original). Heidegger begins his characterization of Dasein with the first-person, singular, *possessive* pronoun “mine.” An interesting feature baked into the pronoun “mine” is a sense of *possession* or *ownership*. This ownership feature of Dasein appears to be a critical part of accurately grasping Heidegger’s concept of mineness. In the opening example, Greg’s report, “I’m talking I don’t feel like it is my words,” appears to reveal a disruption in the *ownership* of his words. Perhaps Heidegger’s structure of mineness could be useful in articulating depersonalization experiences like Greg’s.

Although mineness occupies a place at the vanguard of Heidegger’s Analytic of Dasein in §9, he devotes only a few paragraphs to it.² Moreover, few scholars have extensively engaged the concept of mineness, with the majority acknowledging that Dasein must be referred to by the pronoun *mine*, only to move on to other terms, such as Being-in-the world, authenticity,

² Other references to mineness are peppered sparsely throughout *Being and Time*, mostly to reiterate the formulations he supplied in §9.

temporality, and the like. Intriguingly, Heidegger tells us that two consequences follow from *Jemeinigkeit*; that is, the priority of Dasein's existence over essence and that Dasein is in each case mine. Heidegger's starting place of the first person, singular *possessive* pronoun *mine*, is critical because it contrasts with the first-person singular *personal* pronoun of the *ego* or *I*, present in the Cartesian and Kantian traditions. Therefore, two critical questions emerge in properly understanding the significance of *Jemeinigkeit* or mineness: Firstly, why does Heidegger feel entitled to these two consequences; and secondly, what is the best way to make sense of this philosophical difference in personal pronoun starting places in the Heideggerian and Cartesian and Kantian traditions? Here, we identified a *philosophical* motivation to understand mineness to pair with the *practical* one of using it to more robustly articulate dissociative experiences.

But how would we know if a Heideggerian account is successful? First, such an account would need to have the resources to navigate the conundrum. If mineness is unable to navigate the conundrum, then we are no better off than with the existing terminology. Second, such an account would need to remain faithful to the phenomena by preserving internal consistency with the reporter's experience. In other words, mineness cannot distort or obscure the phenomenology of depersonalization. Therefore, a minimally successful articulation of depersonalization would need to navigate the "mine" and "not mine" conundrum while maintaining phenomenological fidelity.

My aim for this chapter is fourfold. The first section outlines different meanings of ownership in preparation for how Heidegger uses ownership as a feature of mineness. The second section focuses on developing Heidegger's concept of mineness, specifically by identifying what mineness is and its relationship to Dasein. To this end, I will first show that

Heidegger's account in *Being and Time* resists a single, clear definition—to which I turn to and review what Heideggerian scholars have said about mineness. After organizing these scholars' interpretations, one clear theme is the lack of unanimity. I then return to Heidegger's words to re-engage mineness, notably the two consequences Heidegger claims in the opening part of §9 and how to make sense of his divergence from the Cartesian/Kantian tradition. I conclude the section recognizing the ontological and ontical flexibility in Heidegger's account and suggest that different scholars' interpretations may be appropriate for specific purposes. In the third section, I revisit Greg's case, along with several others, to deliver a rich articulation of these dissociative phenomena through different configurations of ownership and disownership, most specifically through a lacking or loss of agentic control. I argue that Heidegger's structure of mineness successfully navigates the conundrum while maintaining phenomenological fidelity. I conclude the chapter by addressing two worries, including the relation mineness has to authenticity and the issue of un-mineness, the prospective therapeutic benefit of this work, marking out the limitations, and plotting a course for the following chapter.

§I. The Ownership in “Mine”

Ownership appears to be an unavoidable feature of the possessive pronoun “mine.” Ownership comes into play in many aspects of everyday life, from *owning* property to going one's *own* way in life. In everyday language, ownership typically evokes a *relationship*. This relationship involves at least two distinct entities with one owning the other, such that x *owns* y . Probably the most immediate way we think about this ownership relation is by a person (x) owning a material object (y). For example, I can say to my friend “that jazz record is mine.” Here we have two distinct entities, the “jazz record” and “me” with me claiming ownership of the material object known as the jazz record—the jazz record is my property. Ownership, understood as ownership *relations*, is interpreted as specifying two distinct entities.

Yet, ownership relations become more complicated. Let us expand on the previous example: I own the physical jazz record and decide to play that record at an art event I am DJing, which happens to charge a cover fee. Would my status as owner of the record be sufficient for this arrangement? This situation is one example of where *ownership* becomes more complicated. In many places, I would not be legally allowed to play the record I “own” in public for financial gain because I *do not own* the *rights* to the music. In this case, the exact same record is involved, and the exact same me, yet the ownership status changes and becomes even more nuanced depending on purpose and location. Moreover, one could own the rights to music without owning the physical record! Here, a set of legal relations or rights emerge with my relationship to the jazz record. There is no shortage of examples, as different sets of socio-legal relations also play out in home and vehicle ownership. From what has been gleaned thus far, ownership consists of different configurations of socio-legal relations. As Jeremy Waldron (1988) confirms, ownership is “not a simple relationship between a person and a thing,” but “involves a complex bundle of relations, which differ considerably in their character and effect” (p. 28).

Still, there are examples used in everyday expressions or experiences that further complicate the picture, such as “going my own way in life” or “owning up to myself.” Here, these examples surely depict a form of ownership, notably *self-ownership*. Let us examine “going my own way in life” or perhaps to use a quote from a song Frank Sinatra sang to which many of us can relate, “I did it my way.” What did Sinatra mean when he sang this lyric? We see the indication of ownership of the “way” through “my way.” Here, Sinatra is likely not referring to a physical path he owns. This “my way” points to a whole host of different behaviors, methods, strategies, that is, agency and self-determination. Although, the case becomes even more complicated because Sinatra tells us that he “did *it* my way”—what is the referent of the

“it?” What exactly is the “it” Sinatra is referring to when he sings to us, “I did *it* my way?” The “it” remains unclear and can represent any number of projects, tasks, goals, or objectives. Here we see the complexity laid out: The ownership of the “way” (“my way”), which, again, could mean any number of behaviors or actions *and* the mysterious referent of the “it” that was done “my way.” On the one hand, Sinatra’s message to us is immediately intelligible, yet, on the other, we notice the obscurity in the specifics of what is being owned. In this example, ownership is roughly characterized by an existential self-determination or agency over one’s behaviors, goals, projects, or life trajectory.

In the example of “owning up to myself,” what is striking is that the accusative is *my self*. In this case, x owns x , as both x ’s are *selfsame*. Moreover, conceptions of self-ownership that involve the physical body, such as references to “my body,” open up debates about whether or not “I” and “my body” are the *same*. These formulations of self-ownership open us up to the *possibility* of a non-relational kind of ownership. Nevertheless, the point here is not to definitively establish self-ownership as relational or non-relational, but to draw out the themes of responsibility and agency in ownership. Taken together, we can map these forms of self-ownership (including the Sinatra example in the previous paragraph) onto an existential-authenticity theme, as they deal with conceptions of self-determination, agency, and responsibility with the particulars of what these terms mean remaining vague and obscure.

As we have seen, the ways we understand ownership involves complex socio-legal relations and existential-authenticity themes. While this section merely sketches two general ways ownership is used, bringing to light this framework will help us clarify the way Heidegger intends to use the ownership feature of *Jemeinigkeit*. This work, in turn, will pay off when applying ownership to dissociative phenomena.

§II. Heideggerian Mineness

Heidegger's engagement with *Jemeinigkeit*, or mineness, is rather intriguing, as it is one of the *first* characteristics of Dasein he acquaints us with—yet he is neither consistent nor clear on what it means. While Heidegger begins §9 of *Being and Time* with Dasein's mineness, he only devotes a handful of paragraphs to explain it, in which he presents four different formulations. Moreover, he lays claim to two consequences that follow from Dasein and mineness, although it is unclear exactly how these consequences follow from mineness. Despite this unclarity, mineness stands to be an important structure in Heidegger's work. Indeed, François Raffoul (1998) recognizes the importance of mineness in Heidegger's project when he claims that “*all* determinations of Dasein, primarily and ultimately, are inscribed in the fundamental determination of being-mine” (p. 208, emphasis in original). If Raffoul is correct, then pinning down the proper understanding of mineness is critical because Heidegger's entire *BT* project is founded on it.

In the second paragraph of §9, Heidegger opens with his first formulation of mineness: “The Being of any such entity is *in each case mine* [*je meines*]” (BT, 41/42). Considering this is the beginning of the Analytic of Dasein, the entity he is referring to here is, of course, “Dasein”—the term he uses to refer to each of us. Therefore, what he means is the being of Dasein, or the being of each of us as a: “being-there,” is in each case *mine*. Heidegger goes on to tell us that “Dasein has in each case Mineness [*Jemeinigkeit*]” (BT 42). In this sense, Dasein possesses the characteristic of mineness. Still, another way Heidegger puts it is that “mineness belongs to any existent Dasein” (BT 53). Here, mineness seems to be part of each Dasein. Finally, Heidegger writes: “in each case Dasein *is* mine to be in one way or another” (BT 42, my emphasis). The final example may sound like Dasein is a feature of each of us entities that are concerned with being; however, we must remember that each of us, according to Heidegger, *is*

Dasein. Although each of these four formulations of mineness differs, an ownership or possessive quality emerges as a central theme across formulations. If our goal is understanding mineness, then getting a handle on what Heidegger means by ownership is a reasonable place to start. How does Heidegger interpret the ownership quality of mineness?

Heidegger sheds light on the ownership quality of mineness by writing that “[i]n each case Dasein *is* its possibility, and it ‘has’ this possibility, but not just as a property [*Eigenschaftlich*], as something present-at-hand would.” (BT 42). For Heidegger, the ownership quality is not the same as having a property, such as a *physical* property of matter like length, width, density, and the like (although he does not entirely rule this out). Instead, Dasein’s mineness lies in its possibility of choosing its *own* way of being mine. Heidegger writes: “Dasein has always made some sort of decision as to the way in which it is in each case mine [*je meines*] (BT 42). The condition Dasein has of always having to make a decision carries with it existential implications. Dasein’s decisions or choices are fundamentally based on Dasein being an issue for itself. *Dasein chooses its own being because it is an issue for itself*. Thus, a proper interpretation of Dasein must involve an account of mineness that diverges from the strictly objective understanding of ownership as a physical property of itself. This step is vital because if Heidegger’s concept of mineness cannot be differentiated from a Cartesian conception of consciousness or a Kantian view of personality or egoism, then it resigns itself as another term that stands with these others and provides no viable alternative in conceptualizing dissociative phenomena. Nevertheless, Heidegger offers us with four different formulations of mineness: Being is mine, Dasein has mineness, mineness belongs to Dasein, and Dasein is mine (as a possibility to be or ‘own’ itself one way or another). While we might initially arrive at a broad

idea of the ownership feature of mineness involving an existential theme, these four different formulations of mineness still leave open more specific interpretations.

One worry about the *ownership* feature of mineness is the risk of being drawn into the issues and controversies surrounding the proper understanding of *authenticity* and *inauthenticity*. Heidegger uses the term “*Eigentlichkeit*,” which is typically translated as “authenticity” in the Heideggerian scholarship. Although, Heidegger actually uses the German word “*eigentlich*” in *Being and Time*, which translates to something like “actual” or “real,” with the root word “*eigen*,” meaning “own.” Taken together, a more literal translation of *Eigentlichkeit* might be “ownedness.” In one sense, evoking authenticity while engaging mineness seems unavoidable. However, Heidegger thinks that mineness is at work at a level *prior* to any talk about authenticity or inauthenticity. He tells us that:

Dasein is in each case essentially its own possibility, it can, in its very Being, ‘choose’ itself and win itself; it *can* also lose itself and never win itself; or only ‘seem’ to do so. But only in so far as it is essentially something which can be authentic—that is, something of its own—can it have lost itself and not yet won itself. As modes of Being, *authenticity* and *inauthenticity* (these expressions have been chosen terminologically in the strict sense) are both grounded in the fact that any Dasein whatsoever is characterized by mineness (BT, 42-43, emphasis in original).

Elsewhere, Heidegger confirms this point:

Mineness belongs to any existent Dasein, and belongs to it as the condition which makes authenticity and inauthenticity possible. In each case Dasein exists in one of the other of these two modes, or else it is modally undifferentiated (BT, 53).

Therefore, mineness, according to Heidegger, is the *grounding* for the very *possibility* of the three modes of authenticity, inauthenticity, and the undifferentiated mode—in whatever forms they take in human life.

We may recast the formulation as the following: mineness already carries with it an assumption of ownership, and because of this foundational structure, authenticity and

inauthenticity are possibilities of Dasein. Taking Heidegger's lead, the concept of mineness is working at a level *prior* to distinguishing between what is authentic and inauthentic. In this way, one could talk about this ownership or possession of oneself as a fundamental characteristic of Dasein while remaining neutral to what it means to be an authentic (or inauthentic) Dasein. Consequently, I can safely put to one side (for now) the debates about authentic Daseins and focus attention on coming to terms with a pure interpretation of mineness, and how this potential for ownership (and disownership) play out in specific dissociative phenomena. I will revisit this topic in the conclusion once a fuller understanding of Heideggerian mineness, and its feature of ownership, is grasped to ensure this worry is satisfactorily put to rest.

Given that Heidegger offers four different formulations of mineness, a reasonable move would be to look at how Heidegger scholars have interpreted the concept. But before turning to the secondary interpretations of mineness, developing an organizational system—a strategy of containment—might be helpful. While a precise sense of what Heidegger means by mineness may be lacking, we can use what Heidegger is clear about to structure these scholars' interpretations. Thus, two general themes can be distilled from Heidegger's writings on mineness. The first theme is one that we are already well acquainted with, that is, the feature of *ownership*. In other words, the possessive quality Heidegger gives to Dasein being in each case “:mine.” Because this ownership feature is closely related to authenticity, the first theme spans the *authenticity-neutral* to *authenticity-emphasizing* dimension of mineness. The second theme can be drawn out when Heidegger tells us that “the Being of any such entity is in each case mine” (BT 42). Here, we see an *ontological* dimension to mineness, with his designation of this *being* as *mine*. With the ontological dimension in mind, Heidegger also emphasizes the use of the personal pronoun “mine” to address Dasein's mineness. To this point, Heidegger also speaks to

“the ontical obviousness of the fact that Dasein is in each case mine” (BT 116). Given these claims made by Heidegger, we can draw out an ontic, or experiential dimension of mineness. Thus, the second theme spans the *ontological* to *ontical* dimension of mineness.

With both the authenticity-emphasizing/authenticity-neutral and ontological/ontic dimensions mapped out, we can plot the forthcoming definitions onto a four-quadrant coordinate plane. The x-axis represents from left to right authenticity-neutral to authenticity-emphasizing, and the y-axis from top to bottom represents the ontological to ontic. In this sense, this strategy offers a helpful way of plotting the different scholars' accounts of mineness to observe similarities and differences. Let us now shift to cataloging these four scholars' interpretations of mineness with this organizational system.

Herbert Dreyfus presents his view of *Jemeinigkeit* in his well-known *Being and Time* commentary, *Being-in-the-World*. Although, before Dreyfus (1991) reveals his interpretation of mineness, he expresses worry with viewing mineness as a “private world of experience” (p. 25), as in *my* inner, isolated, individuated experience separate from an external world. Dreyfus tells us that when Heidegger uses the term “mineness,” it “cannot be like my private feelings such as my headache, the kinesthetic feeling of moving my body, or some private sense of who I am” (p.26). Instead, Dreyfus writes that “Dasein’s mineness is the public stand it takes on itself—on what it is to be this Dasein—by way of its comportment” (p. 26). Dreyfus’ definition maintains an ontological rather than an ontic focus due to his attention to Dasein’s comportment to the kind of being it *is*, while also pointing out that mineness cannot be the “private experience,” such as the moving of my body or a particular, individualized feeling. Moreover, his claim that mineness *is the public stand* Dasein takes for itself implies an imperative to a specific kind of comportment to its being. Following Dreyfus, a *demand* is placed on Dasein to take a stand on its being—in

one way or another. Moreover, the publicness of this demanded stand, alongside Dreyfus' focus of "what it is to be *this* Dasein," appears to lean towards emphasizing-authenticity (p. 26, my emphasis). Therefore, Dreyfus's account of mineness focuses on the ontological and leans toward authenticity-emphasizing.

Taylor Carman, in his book *Heidegger's Analytic*, shares a different take on mineness than Dreyfus. Carman (2003) writes that "Dasein is *particular* by being neither conventionally nor objectively individuated but having 'mineness' (*Jemeinigkeit*), that is, by always having a reflexive understanding of itself, however unthematic, in its understanding of the world" (p 36, emphasis in original). Following Heidegger, Carman understands that Dasein's particularity or individuality is not meant to be conceived in 'conventional' nor 'objective' ways.³ Instead, Dasein's mineness is the "reflective understanding of itself, however unthematic, in its understanding of the world" (Carman, p. 36). Later in the text, Carman shares that Dasein's mineness is "its *concrete* particularity as such, and its expressive response or responsiveness to that particularity" (p. 294, my emphasis). Contrary to Dreyfus's account, Carman focuses more on the ontic or experiential rather than the ontological through the emphasis on interpreting or understanding oneself *concretely* in the world. In other words, a person goes about living and functioning in their day-to-day experience in the world. Carman's emphasis on an unthematic, reflexive mode of experience seems to favor a more authenticity-neutral interpretation than Dreyfus' focus on the imperative of having to take a stand. If anything, Carman leans to Dasein's

³ While it is not clear what Carman means by "conventional" or "objective" these terms likely deal with Heidegger's project of shifting away from the typical Cartesian construction of subject/object distinction. If this is correct, I take "conventionally" to mean how we usually view ourselves in an individuated, locus of subjectivity. That is to say, the way in which "I" have the experience of typing on the laptop or what it is like for "me" to walk down the street—what is usually meant regarding subjective activity. Moreover, the "objective" individuation likely captures the physical, organismic conception, that is a physical body.

default way of being in its participation with *das Man*, a diffused sense of self and world in everyday life before any “stand”—let alone a “*public stand*”—is, or might be, taken.

Nevertheless, in a different text, Carman provides us with another interpretation of mineness. In his chapter that primarily engages with Heidegger’s thought on inauthenticity, Carman (2000) pens:

What [mineness] means is that human existence exhibits an essential concrete reflexivity, for I must make sense not just of the being of entities at large, but of my own being. This irreducible dimension of particularity inherent in the structure of existence ground all self-interpretation, authentic and inauthentic alike (p. 18).

Here we see a clear *ontological* shift in this explanation from his previous *ontic* one. Although, crucially, he still maintains an authenticity-neutral position, explicitly stating that authentic and inauthentic ways of life are only *possible* through the structure of mineness. Taken together, we can map Carman’s view as spanning across both the ontological and ontic dimensions while being anchored in authenticity-neutrality.

A third account comes from Irene McMullin in her book *Time and the Shared World*, where she devotes several parts of one chapter to the topic of mineness.⁴ McMullin (2013) writes:

The ‘substance’ of human existing is one’s way of being as a ‘having to be’—as a commitment to one’s existence and the standards that allow one to judge one’s success in meeting this responsibility. This mattering that makes my experiences be experienced *as mine* is what Heidegger designates *Jemeinigkeit*, or ‘mineness’ (p. 51, emphasis in original).

McMullin thinks of mineness as a special kind of mattering that makes *my* experience *mine*. But what does this “mattering” mean? Indeed, earlier in her chapter, she explains that

the self is always and most fundamentally present to itself as care for its own being. This committed, caring ‘mineness’ constitutes the first-person presence to self; a self-presence

⁴ McMullin’s project in this chapter engages mineness in the service of more fully grasping the first-person perspective.

that is inherent in every intentional act that one undertakes, regardless of how steeped in averageness (p. 40).

What is striking in McMullin's interpretation of mineness is that the mattering is about one's existence, explicitly evoking Heidegger's concept of "care." McMullin (2013) defines "care" as "the term that Heidegger uses to designate this specifically human way of existing as a being that understands itself from the context of activities and meanings through which it plays out the possibilities that matter to it" (p. 17). Mineness, according to McMullin, involves Dasein's care for its own being, that is, the way in which Dasein understands itself through its meaningful engagement in its world.

Because McMullin evokes the idea that mineness involves the "care" for Dasein's *own* existence, she seems to favor a more ontological interpretation of mineness. Yet, she also tells us that "Dasein is given to itself in an everyday way through the first-personal *mineness* that characterizes all of its lived experiences" (p. 40). What we see here is her nod towards the possibility of an ontic dimension to mineness. For McMullin, mineness appears to be both the ontological possibility of having to be one way or another and the ontic experience of the first-person, lived experience. Furthermore, she writes that "the mineness of existence—the fact that each of us is entrusted with the responsibility of her existing—rests upon the same existential structures underlying the possibility of authenticity" (p. 53). Her interpretation that mineness is an "entrusted responsibility for existing" does appear to lean to authenticity-emphasizing, but perhaps not to the extent that Dreyfus *requires* a "public stand." Altogether, McMullin's account stretches across the ontological and ontic dimensions, similar to Carman's (while also tying in Heidegger's concept of "care") and leans towards authenticity-emphasizing, but not to the degree we observed in Dreyfus' interpretation.

Finally, we arrive at François Raffoul's interpretation. In his book *Heidegger and the Subject*, he devotes the bulk of two chapters to mineness, which is one of the most extensive treatments of the concept in the Heidegger scholarship. Raffoul (1998) writes, "[m]ineness is not the ontic individuality, the worldless self, or a self-consciousness that is closed upon its *cogitationes*, but instead to be understood in the meaning of its Being, as the meaning of Being" (p. 210-211). He continues: "Mineness designates the phenomenon of being delivered over to oneself as existence" (p. 343). In a sense, he shares Dreyfus' worry about casting mineness as a term that depicts an individual, worldless subject, and is quick to dispel this position. For Raffoul, mineness is squarely an ontological concept, which certainly has "ontic determinations," that is, experiences made possible by mineness. Moreover, Raffoul reminds us that:

Heidegger introduces authentic and inauthentic modes of Being, he makes explicit their dependency in mineness as the proper possibility of *Being-one's-own*. This, then, is why neutral mineness appears as the *origin* or *possibility* of factual existence and of its authentic and inauthentic modes" (p. 246, emphasis in original).

Given his point here, Raffoul's interpretation is also authenticity-neutral, similar to Carman's view. Raffoul's account of mineness can be plotted as strictly ontological and authenticity-neutral.

Reviewing these four scholars' accounts of mineness has yielded a diverse set of interpretations. While they follow similar themes (insofar as they can be mapped onto the four quadrants), there is no clear unanimity. Should mineness, similar to Dreyfus or even McMullin's accounts, have an emphasis that leans toward authenticity? Or, like Carman and Raffoul, should mineness center on an authenticity-neutral point? Is mineness meant to be a strictly ontological structure, as found in Raffoul, or are there ontic expressions of mineness, as Carman suggests? Thereby, returning to Heidegger's words is a productive next step to pin down a more specific

understanding of mineness. In recounting Heidegger's words, we must also keep in mind how he positions mineness within his overall project in *Being and Time*, specifically his entitlement to claim of mineness' "double consequence" in the introduction of §9, alongside how his project differs from the Cartesian and Kantian tradition. These questions help us grapple with the larger purpose of such a structure in order to craft a proper definition. Let us start by reiterating the two consequences Heidegger initially flags.

The first consequence marks the centrality of Dasein's essence and existence. Heidegger writes, "[t]he 'essence' of this entity lies in its to-be [Zu-sein]" or "*The 'essence' of Dasein lies in its existence*" (BT 42, emphasis in original). Heidegger's framing of the consequence presents two formulations; that Dasein's essence lies in to-be, and Dasein's existence precedes its essence. The "to-be" is not a ground-breaking discovery, as claiming the essence of something lies in its "to-be" is not uncommon in traditional ontologies, even spanning back to the ancient Greeks, especially if the "to-be" means something like its teleology.⁵ Notably, however, Heidegger presents the term "essence" in quotes in both formulations, which signals to us his intention of using the term in a unique way. This point raises the question of Heidegger's view of the traditional usage of the terms "essence" and "existence" and what novel ways he wants to apprehend them. Therefore, to understand the relationships between the first consequence and mineness, we must be clear on what Heidegger means by essence and existence, both in terms of his interpretation of the traditional way, and his new way.

In the second consequence, Heidegger directly states that Dasein's being is in each case mine: "that being which is an issue for this entity in its very Being, is in each case mine" (BT 42/67). Moreover, he also designates the use of the personal pronoun, which is the usual part

⁵ This "to-be" is probably most easily recognized through Aristotelian teleology in the classic example of the essence of an acorn's "to-be" as an oak tree.

Heideggerian scholars quote when engaging mineness: “Dasein has in each case mineness [*Jemeinigkeit*], one must always use a personal pronoun when one addressed it: ‘I am,’ ‘you are’” (BT 42). For Heidegger, Dasein is “in each case” a particular being that must be referred to as “I am” or “you are.” In this way, mineness coincides with the familiar and quite practical self- and other-referential ability that we all engage. For example, “I” can refer to myself, and “you” can refer to yourself; you and I are each particular beings. Dasein is not only a *particular* being but also a *particular, self-referential* one.

One immediate issue that arises with the second consequence is its triviality. Because Heidegger designates Dasein to stand for beings like us, is it not a trivial consequence that he would refer to each of us as Dasein by way of a personal pronoun? This move merely satisfies a trivial, practical purpose. Heidegger could have just provided us the self-referential pronoun and moved along to other topics like authenticity and inauthenticity, but he does not do that. Why does Heidegger insist—especially as early as the second sentence of the Analytic of Dasein in *Being and Time* (§9)—for the need for such a commitment that Dasein's being is “in each case” mine?

Indeed, one clue may be found in a “third consequence” that can be identified in the opening of §9. Heidegger reveals that “Dasein can choose itself and win itself; it can lose itself and never win itself; or only seem to do so” (BT, 42). The ownership feature of mineness includes the modal possibilities of being authentic, inauthentic, or undifferentiated. In a sense, these are the specific possibilities of comportment or “activity” of Dasein *to be a particular one*. Although Heidegger does not acknowledge this “third consequence,” my aim is to bookmark this point for now and substantiate this claim later in this section.

In gaining leverage on Heidegger's conception of mineness, a helpful approach is to ask ourselves: What must mineness be if indeed it is to have these three immediate consequences?

Let us begin with the first consequence, specifically how "*the 'essence' of Dasein lies in its existence*" (BT 42, emphasis in original). According to Heidegger, Dasein understands and interprets itself through its *Existenz*, or existence. Heidegger indicates:

That Being towards which Dasein can comport itself in one way or another, and always comport itself somehow, we call 'existence' [*Existenz*]. And because we cannot define Dasein's essence by citing a 'what' of the kind that pertains to a subject-matter [eins sachhaltigen Was], because its essence lies rather in the fact that in each case it has its Being to be, and has it as its *own* (BT 12, my emphasis).

There is much to unpack in this passage, and to accomplish this task, we will turn to Heidegger's lecture course, published as *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* (*BP*). In *BP*, we receive Heidegger's "general terminological observation," which includes how he differentiates his use of "existence" contra the traditional usages by Kant and the Scholastics. Heidegger tells us that:

The concept of existence, Dasein, corresponds in Kant to the Scholastic term existential. Kant therefore often uses the expression 'Existenz', 'actuality' [*Wirklichkeit*'], instead of 'Dasein'. In contrast our own terminological usage is a different one, which as will appear, is grounded in the nature of the case. For what Kant calls existence, using either Dasein or *Existenz*, and what scholasticism calls existential, we employ the terms '*Vorhandensein*', 'being-extent', 'being-at-hand', or '*Vorhandenheit*', 'extantness' These are all names for the way of being of natural things in the broadest sense (BP 28).⁶

According to Heidegger, in the traditional usage from the Scholastics to Kant, the term "existence" coincides with "actuality" and refers to natural entities that can be described by objective facts or properties. Indeed, Heidegger captures this point in the German term

⁶ In Hofstadter's English translation of *Basic Problems*, he translates the German *Vorhanden*, *Vorhandensein*, and *Vorhandenheit* as "extent," "being-extent" and "extentness," respectively, which are awkward translations. A more agreed upon translation renders *Vorhanden* as "present-at-hand," *Vorhandensein* as "being-at-hand," and *Vorhandenheit* as "present-at-handness"—all approximating to the being of entities as categorized by their physical, objective properties.

“*Vorhandensein*,” that is, a being-at-hand. For example, the being-at-hand of a “hammer” would have one describe it by its wooden handle and metal claw or the being-at-hand of a “cup” by its ceramic container-body and the number of ounces of coffee it can hold, and so on. The being of Dasein, Heidegger believes, cannot be properly understood by merely physical descriptors or quantitative measures. Heidegger continues:

[T]he word ‘Dasein’ does not designate, as it does for Kant the way of being of natural things. It does not designate a way of being at all, but rather a specific being which we ourselves are, the *human Dasein*. This being, the Dasein, like every other being, has a specific way of being. To this way of the Dasein’s being we assign the term ‘*Existenz*’, ‘existence’; and it should be noted here that existence of the expression ‘the Dasein exists’ is not the sole determination of the mode of being belonging to us (BP 28, emphasis in original).

According to Heidegger, Dasein has a “specific” mode of being that differs entirely from *Vorhandenheit*; that is, the present-at-handness that characterizes physical entities. With this insight, the first consequence's reformulation reads: The “essence” of Dasein lies in the specific mode of the being of Dasein. This formulation brings about a trivialness because, of course, the essence of Dasein lies in its being! What is this “special” mode of Dasein’s existence that is different from that of a physical object? Returning to *BT*, Heidegger indicates that, “Dasein’s being takes on a definite character, and they must be seen and understood *a priori* as grounded upon that state of Being which we have called ‘*Being-in-the-world*’” (BT, 53). Here, Heidegger determines that the mode of being of Dasein’s existence is grounded in Being-in-the-world. Roughly speaking, Being-in-the-world is the structure that reveals Dasein’s activity or ways of existing in the world. Being-in-the-world, to be sure, is a complex concept itself that deserves a proper interpretation. Nevertheless, the formulation of the first consequence becomes: the “essence” of Dasein lies in its *Being-in-the-world*. But this is only half the story, as what is meant by “essence” in the traditional and Heideggerian sense?

Heidegger views the “essence” as a term that denotes the “what” of a being, corresponding to the “reality” of it (cf. BP 119). For Heidegger, *essentia*, or essence, refers to the “whatness” or “thingness” of an entity. What a thing is—its essence—refers to the objective or abstract properties that fundamentally make it what it *really* is. Heidegger claims the “basic concept of *essentia*, whatness, first becomes really problematic in the face of what we call Dasein” (BP 120). But why is this the case? Heidegger answers:

Dasein cannot at all be *interrogated* as such by the question: *What* is this? We gain access to this being only if we ask: *Who* is it? The Dasein is not constituted by whatness but—if we may coin the expression—by *whoness*. The answer does not give a thing but an I, you, we (BP 120, emphasis in original).

What is so unique about Dasein that Heidegger asserts it needs a special designation of being a “who” rather than a “what?” The answer lies in that Dasein is an entity concerned about its own being. Heidegger writes that “Dasein is an entity which does not just occur among other entities. Rather it is ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its very Being, that Being is an *issue* for it” (BT 12). Dasein is the particular kind of being that is concerned about “who” it is in its Being-in-the-world. Altogether, the first consequence may be reformulated as follows: The “who” of Dasein lies in its Being-in-the-world.

Dasein is the “who” that has the special possibility of concern for its own being. Still, we must also recognize that several prominent philosophers of these traditional ontologies—including Descartes and Kant—also investigated a “who,” taking the form of the “I” or “ego.” This point is quite clear in Descartes’ famous “I think; therefore, I am” and Kant’s employ of “I think” along with the “transcendental ego.” In other words, they start with the first-person singular *personal* pronoun. Recall that Heidegger adamantly claims that “the being of any such entity *is in each case mine*” (BT 41, emphasis in original). To his point, the “who” that is being interrogated, Dasein, *already* has a possessive characteristic of not only *itself* but with its *being*,

that is, a “who” that *has its own being*. Heidegger begins with the first-person singular *possessive* pronoun, which is part of his divergence from Descartes and Kant's traditional ontologies. We can now add this insight to the first consequence; the “who” of Dasein lies in its *own* Being-in-the-world.

Interpreting mineness in this self-referential, possessive way also offers further weight to the “third consequence” bookmarked earlier, that is, “Dasein can choose itself and win itself; it can lose itself and never win itself; or only seem to do so” (BT, 42). The possessive quality of mineness allows Dasein to be a particular self-referential one and a particular self-referential one that has the possibility of owning or disowning (or undifferentiating) itself. Heidegger writes, “as modes of being, *authenticity* and *inauthenticity* (these expressions have been chosen terminologically in a strict sense) are both grounded in the fact that any Dasein whatsoever is characterized by mineness (BT 43, emphasis in original). Given this point, unlike Heidegger’s talk of *Uneigentlichkeit*, or inauthenticity throughout *Being and Time*, he does not recognize such a concept as “*Un-Jemeinigkeit*” or “un-mineness” likely because such a term would result in the negation of one of the most (if not the most) fundamental characteristics that make Dasein what it *is* (alongside undermine Heidegger’s entire project). Heidegger seems to think that mineness is *always* present. Even the experience of “losing oneself” is likely a matter of inauthenticity (because presumably, having “lost oneself” is a common statement made by those who are inauthentic). No one ever “*fully*” loses oneself because a *residue* of mineness remains. In cases of inauthenticity where Dasein is not itself or has lost itself, a residue of mineness remains. But what do we mean by *residue*? This residue is based on the fact that Dasein can, at any point, take hold of its *own* being, own itself—no matter how or in what way Dasein was inauthentic. However, despite Heidegger’s position on this, we must be alive to the possibility

that in some expressions of dissociation, mineness may *not* be intact. In other words, certain dissociative phenomena may amount to what might be considered “un-mineness.” This possibility will be revisited in the concluding remarks of this chapter.

At this point, I recognize that it is not completely clear why the first consequence, reformulated from “*the ‘essence’ of Dasein lies in its existence*” (BT 42, emphasis in original) to the “who” of Dasein lies in its *own* Being-in-the-world, follows from mineness. The understanding of this consequence is contingent on an adequate interpretation of this “who-ness” of Dasein along with Being-in-the-world. Developing an interpretation of Dasein’s Being-in-the-world here would considerably lengthen the chapter and perhaps divert us from the main task of delivering a phenomenological articulation of dissociative experiences with mineness. I will delve into interpreting Being-in-the-world in the next chapter, along with clarifying the first consequence.

What comes more clearly into focus with the present account of mineness is the divergence in philosophical traditions. With Heidegger’s use of the singular possessive pronoun *mine*—which has the feature of ownership baked into it—instead of beginning with the “I” or “ego” of self-reference that belong to the Cartesian and Kantian traditions, he starts with this mineness and self-ownership. Crucially, Heidegger is not starting with the assumption of the *unity* of the “I” or “ego” as seen in the traditions of Descartes and Kant, but from the possibility of Dasein’s *ownership*—and *disownership*—of itself. The structure of *Jemeinigkeit* (mineness) is necessary to enable his entire project of *Being and Time*, most importantly because the characteristic of Dasein’s mineness is the foundation for its Being-in-the-world and the possibility of authenticity/inauthenticity. In summation, Heidegger shifts away from the traditional ontology of understanding our being as a thing in the world with objective properties

to the understanding of our being as the self-ownership of being, characterized by Being-in-the-world.

In thinking about the centrality of ownership in mineness, we need to clarify what this ownership involves, specifically what it means for Dasein to own itself and own its being as Heidegger claims—self-ownership. How does Heidegger navigate the typical ownership relations between two entities with *self-ownership*? Can we consider self-ownership to be a relationship when the being Dasein owns is indeed *itself*, which are not distinct entities? And if so, what kind of relationship is it? To address this issue, Heidegger tells us:

[T]his being that we ourselves are and that exists for the sake of its own self is, as this being, *in each case mine*. The Dasein is not only, like every being in general, identical with itself in a formal-ontological sense—every thing is identical with itself—and it is also not merely, in distinction from a natural thing, conscious of this selfsameness. (*BP* 170, emphasis in original).

There is no surprise that Heidegger recognizes the way Dasein is identical to itself.

If there is a relational self-ownership, it does not involve objects or things. Is it the case that Dasein's self-ownership is *non-relational*? Let us, again, return to Heidegger:

Dasein gives itself over immediately and passionately to the world itself, its *own* self is reflected to it from things. This is not mysticism and does not presuppose the assigning of souls to things. It is only a reference to an elementary phenomenological fact of existence, which must be seen prior to all talk, no matter how acute, about the subject-object relation...it is surely remarkable fact that we encounter ourselves, primarily and daily, for the most part by way of things and are disclosed to ourselves in this manner in our *own* self (*BP* 159-160, my emphasis)

Interestingly, Heidegger tells us that Dasein encounters itself, and thereby understands itself, its *own* self “for the most part” through *things*. With this point, we cannot be so quick to dismiss a relational kind of self-ownership, or at least some kind of mode of it. How might we approach this understanding of our own self through our relations to things?

In *BP*, Heidegger provides the example of the shoemaker in his workshop with his various tools. He tells us:

[T]he shoemaker is not the shoe, not the hammer, not the leather and not the thread, not the awl and not the nail. How should he find himself in and among these things? How should he understand *himself*, starting out from them? Certainly the shoemaker is not the shoe, and nevertheless he understands *himself* from these things, *himself*, his own self (*BP*, 160, emphasis in original).

Therefore, one mode of Dasein's self-ownership is found in its relation to things in the world. But, as noted earlier, this self-ownership cannot be conceived just as a world of things as physical objects. Dasein does not own itself as it would own physical property, such as how someone owns a shoe or hammer (or how I own a coffee cup). Remember, Dasein, in its existence, has a distinctive mode of Being-in-the-world. This reminder, again, has us return to the mode of Dasein's existence, and that Dasein is "not 'in' the things," but must be *with* things (*BP*, 161). The distinctive mode of being that allows for meaningful engagement with things in the world is categorized by Dasein's Being-in-the-world. Dasein's being, characterized by Being-in-the-world, is the reformulation that provides a structure in which this kind of self-understanding or self-ownership has the possibility of taking place. Dasein's ownership of itself is *relational* insofar as Dasein's being is understood as Being-in-the-world. Dasein may certainly be identical with itself, but one-way Dasein owns itself is through its contextual embeddedness in its Being-in-the-world. Dasein thus understands and owns itself as Being-in-the-world by way of the world it finds itself already *in*.⁷

We may also dream up another kind of self-ownership, perhaps Dasein's understanding of itself through its relations with *others*, that is, other Daseins. Heidegger writes, "in

⁷ Heidegger's concept of Being-in-the-world has been mentioned several times in this chapter, and the interpretation provided here is admittedly rather thin and in need of further development. Therefore, Being-in-the-world is the focus of the next chapter, along with its relevancy to dissociative phenomena.

characterizing the encountering of Others, one is again still oriented by that Dasein which is in each case one's own" (BT 118). Heidegger continues:

Being-with is in every case a characteristic of one's own Dasein; Dasein-with characterizes the Dasein of Others to the extent that it is freed by its world for a Being-with. Only so far as one's own Dasein had the essential structure of Being-with, is it Dasein-with as encounterable for Others" (BT 121).

Heidegger explicitly tells us that this Being-with of others characterizes Dasein's self-ownership. In other words, Being-with is a structure that represents the possibilities made available by living in a human world. Therefore, Heidegger recognizes that Dasein does own itself, although it understands its self-ownership by pressing into possibilities made available by living in a human world.

Given what we have investigated so far, we might be able to navigate the complexity in Dasein's ownership of itself. Taken as a matter of apparent fact, Dasein is *selfsame*, and self-ownership would be non-relational. However, according to Heidegger, taken as an ontological and phenomenological fact, Dasein's self-ownership is relational insofar as Dasein understands itself through both its Being-in-the-world and Being-with others.

At this point, we have worked towards a clearer understanding of mineness and the critical role it plays in Heidegger's *Being and Time* project through four scholars' interpretations along with Heidegger's words. In taking stock of mineness so far, we have observed both ontological and ontic interpretations. The ontological feature of mineness is abundantly clear, and one that all four of the scholars reviewed agreed on. Two of the scholars, Carman and McMullin, respectively, included an ontic dimension of mineness. One question to reckon with is if there is enough support for an ontic dimension to mineness. Is the designation of the personal pronoun enough to warrant an ontic dimension, or is it the case that such ontic designations only

follow from a strictly ontological mineness? Intriguingly, in *The Zollikon Seminars (ZS)*,

Heidegger tells us:

The body is in each case 'my body.' This belongs to the phenomenon of the body. The 'my' refers to myself. By 'my', I refer to me. Is the body in the 'I' or is the 'I' in the body? In any case, the body is not a thing, nor is it a corporeal thing, but each body, that is, the body as body, is in each case my body (ZS 86).

What Heidegger is saying here is that the body is *phenomenologically* mine. That is to say, the experience *I* have with *myself* is not just *with* a body, but *as* a phenomenal body, which perhaps supports an ontical dimension of mineness.⁸ Consequently, there appears to be evidence to support both ontological and ontic dimensions to mineness, and both are necessary for a robust account of mineness in human life.

After reviewing the four scholars' accounts of mineness and examining Heidegger's words in detail, one may be tempted to suggest which scholar arrived at the *correct* interpretation. Determining the *correct* interpretation or final word of a (or any) Heideggerian concept is a daunting task, and almost impossible to settle. At least in the context of my project, there is an advantage in remaining neutral on judging the accounts in this fashion. Indeed, my task here is deciphering an accurate depiction of mineness based on Heidegger's words and the secondary literature, with the target of putting relevant aspects of it to work in characterizing dissociative phenomena. With this focused vision, coupled with the desire to remain neutral, I propose that different scholars' interpretations could help tackle particular issues. For example, an issue that pertains to authenticity may benefit from an interpreter that understands mineness as more authenticity-emphasizing (e.g., Dreyfus or McMullin). Or, if an issue deals with mineness on an ontic level, Carman's account may be better suited. Which interpretation might be

⁸ In *ZS*, Heidegger makes a distinction between the phenomenal or lived body, *Leib*, and the body as a physical object, *Körper*. In the sense of this passage, Heidegger is referring to the body as *Leib*.

appropriate for our use in articulating dissociative phenomena, and precisely the conundrum of an experience being “mine” and “not mine?”

Disruptions in *ownership* seem to be at the heart of the “mine” and “not mine” conundrum we want to navigate. To that end, I find that an interpretation of mineness that is most helpful in our pursuit involves the central feature of ownership. Moreover, earlier in the chapter I determined that authenticity need not come into play because mineness is operating on the level prior to the authenticity and inauthenticity determination. While I remain alive to the authenticity implications of ownership, I think that an authenticity-neutral position serves our purposes best because it avoids judging whether or not dissociative experiences pertain to authentic or inauthentic Daseins.⁹

But where does the ontic/ontological dimension fit in? In turning to examine dissociative phenomena, it would seem that we are in the ontic, experiential domain. If this is the case, then employing mineness to enrich our understanding of dissociation would only apply in the *strictly* ontic sense. While there are practical applications in the ontic dimension, limiting the conceptualization in this way misses out on the depth Heidegger offers with his conception of mineness. This consideration rouses the question: Are dissociative experiences strictly ontic?

To answer this question, let us revisit Greg’s report from the Simeon and Abugel (2006) text: “I feel like I’m not here, I’m floating around. A separate part of me is aware of all my movements; it’s like I’ve left my body.” (pp. 8-9). While we can learn something in an ontic way, something else appears to be going on here when “I’m not *here*” is reported. The lack of

⁹ This point is especially relevant as some dissociative experiences may be adaptive, psychologically motivated responses to stressful or traumatic events. I would be uncomfortable describing an out-of-body experience triggered by a traumatic event as inauthentic. Therefore, the authenticity-neutrality stance also leans closer to Heidegger’s position of mineness as being prior to the determination of authenticity and inauthenticity.

presence shown here points us towards a disruption in the experience of what is “mine.” In other words, the presence is not mine. Yet, to grasp what is meant by this presence (or lacking) in mineness, we must be clear on the meaning of the *Da* of Dasein – the unity of the *there*.¹⁰ Therefore, mineness provides a structure for an *ontological* domain of conceptualizing dissociative phenomena. With this point in mind, an interpretation of mineness for our purposes also spans both ontic and ontological domains.

To bring this section together, I began by engaging Heidegger's concept of mineness, with the intention to clarify it. After reviewing and categorizing the interpretations of mineness from four Heidegger scholars (Dreyfus, Carman, McMullin, and Raffoul), what is clear is that while their accounts followed similar themes, there was no unanimity. I then returned to Heidegger, specifically his claim that mineness has a “double consequence” and how his project of mineness differs from the Cartesian and Kantian tradition. Heidegger’s beginning with the possibility of Dasein’s ownership through his designation of the singular, possessive pronoun *mine*, and the who of Dasein lies in its own Being-in-the-world. I determined that the most appropriate interpretation of mineness for richly articulating dissociative experiences is one that involves the ownership feature of mineness, maintains authenticity-neutrality, and includes both ontic and ontological domains. Let us now put mineness to work.

§III. Mineness and Dissociative Phenomena

The feature of ownership in mineness appears to be a potentially promising structure for conceptualizing certain dissociative phenomena, specifically depersonalization. One particularly intriguing feeling of unreality is the experience of something being “mine” and “not mine,” such

¹⁰ The topic of getting a clear(er) picture of the meaning of the *Da* or the “there” brings up an investigation into *spatiality*. I will address this important topic in the conclusion of the thesis.

as “my thoughts don’t feel like my own” or “this hand does not feel like mine.”¹¹ These puzzling experiences not only sound odd, but the experiencer will often describe an accompanying feeling of strangeness or confusion. Our goal is to deliver a phenomenological articulation of these depersonalization experiences using Heidegger’s structure of mineness with two criteria of success: navigate the conundrum alongside remaining faithful to the phenomenology of the dissociative experience.

Moreover, some depersonalization experiences do not involve this conundrum. In these cases, a person reports *disownership* of the part or aspect of self, body, action, or thought. In the clinical literature, these cases are classified as either organically based neurological conditions (e.g., somatoparaphrenia) or so-called psychotic disorders (e.g., schizophrenia), as both sets of conditions violate the DSM-5 (2013) “reality testing remains intact” criterion for Depersonalization/Derealization Disorder (p. 302).¹² Nevertheless, we are reminded that *phenomenologically* depersonalization is defined as the experience of feeling detached from or unfamiliarity with one’s actions, mental processes/thoughts, body, or sense of self, which certainly can be said to be central in some neurological or psychotic conditions. In this way, I am

¹¹ In the example of “this hand does not feel like mine,” the hand that the person is referring to would be the one that is attached to that person’s body.

¹² The DSM-5 (2013) criterion referred to here is Criterion B of Depersonalization/Derealization Disorder, which reads: “During the depersonalization or derealization experiences, reality testing remains intact (p. 302). Reality testing remaining intact means that the person experiences the internal conundrum, for example, reporting that “my thoughts don’t feel like my own,” but also recognizing that the thoughts belong to no one else (p. 303). Depersonalization can occur as a primary issue (such as in Depersonalization/Derealization Disorder [DSM-5]), and also present as symptoms in a variety of other psychological and neurological conditions (Sierra, Lopera, Lambert, Phillips & David, 2002). Regarding other psychological diagnoses, the DSM-5 lists depersonalization as either symptoms of or associated features of schizophrenia, panic disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder, and dissociative amnesia, to name a few.

interested in the *phenomenology* of depersonalization, whether its etiology is neurological or psychological.¹³

My overarching goal of this section is to deliver an account of dissociative phenomena using Heidegger's structure of mineness. In what follows, I argue we can successfully navigate the "mine" and "not mine" conundrum in depersonalization by articulating different configurations of ownership. This new language will reveal a clearer and more accurate phenomenological structure, which also answers Sierra's concern about the inadequacy in the current language to describe these experiences accurately. Moreover, I will also address some depersonalization examples that do not include this conundrum—where outright disownership is the core component. This account's limitations will be outlined later in this chapter, which will motivate us to turn to other Heideggerian structures, notably Being-in-the-world, to build a more robust phenomenological articulation of dissociative phenomena.

For the first case of depersonalization, let us return to and reexamine the experience of "Greg" in the Simeon and Abugel's (2006) text. Greg reported:

I feel like I'm not here, I'm floating around. A separate part of me is aware of all my movements; it's like I've left my body. Even when I'm talking I don't feel like it is my words...My mind and my body are somehow not connected, it's like my body is doing one thing and my mind is saying another. Like my mind is somewhere off to the back, not inside my body (p. 9)

With Greg's use of the possessive "my," we observe a major theme of mineness, notably ownership, and disruptions thereof, running through the description. Taking Greg's report of "even when I'm talking I don't feel like it is my words," for example, is one such place we can find a clear disruption in ownership and the notable internal conundrum of the words being

¹³ Moreover, Lambert, Sierra, Phillips and David (2002) assert that differentiating psychological and organic causes of depersonalization is difficult, mostly because of the high comorbidity. In a way, one could argue *all* depersonalization phenomena are organic *and* psychological.

spoken by him yet not feeling like they are his. What would be the best strategy in identifying the configurations of ownership, specifically where ownership is maintained and where it might be lacking (or perhaps outright disowned)? One way to approach analyzing the phenomenology is by constructing a set of questions to draw out these different configurations of ownership with the aim to help navigate this conundrum.

The first question is identifying the *accusative* or *object* of the experience. Recalling Greg's report of "even when I'm talking I don't feel like it is my words," the accusative of the disrupted ownership is his *words*. Considering the conundrum that emerges from his depiction, "even when I'm talking I don't feel like it is my words," here, he recognizes he is the one talking, yet he does not feel like the words are his. A follow-up question is determining *who* owns the words. If Greg does not own them, who does? We could imagine Greg reading someone else's words aloud, say from a book or speech, but this is not what Greg tells us. Greg owns the words insofar as he is both the author (not ascribed to another author) and producer (they are coming from his mouth). Ownership is maintained in these specific relations. How are we to understand the disruption of ownership and navigate the conundrum?

In the barest form, Greg lacks ownership in agentic control of the words in that they do not feel like his. With this lack of agency, is the act of producing and providing these words being done to him? We could imagine lacking agency when someone is pushed by another force or is having his or her arms manipulated by another person. Greg may not feel like he has complete control of the words, but he does not claim to disown them. If lacking agentic control is the way to understand the disruption of ownership, how are we to understand this lacking? There is a sense that he typically feels like he is in control, therefore feeling like he does not have control of the words he produces signals a lacking or *negative* feature. In other words, Greg lacks

something he normally has—agentic control over the words he produces. Yet, in this lacking, a *positive* feature of the lacking agency also emerges—the lack of agentic control *plus* some factor. More precisely, a positive feature in the form of an identifiable *strange* quality about Greg’s experience that should not be present, notably his experience of the words not belonging to and not being produced by another person, yet simultaneously not being his. The *strangeness* in the form of incongruence with the word production, authorship, and agentic control. Greg’s ownership of the words is maintained in his authorship and production of the words but disrupted by lacking agency over them. This disrupted agency takes on both negative and positive features. Thus, the words can *be his* insofar as he owns (produces and authors) them with the quality of not feeling like they are his. The conundrum can be successfully navigated with different configurations of ownership through the disrupted agency of his words.

Moving on to another part of Greg’s stated experience, he shares his “disconnection” of mind and body by reporting “my body doing one thing and my mind saying another.” In this example, we are not navigating a conundrum, but we are concerned with articulating the phenomenological structure. Nevertheless, Greg seems to be disclosing something anomalous or strange in his report. Do the experiential disconnections of Greg’s mind and body amount to a different configuration of ownership? Here we identify two accusatives with the possessive “*my*,” specifically “*my body*” and “*my mind*,” explicitly recognizing his ownership of both his body and mind, respectively, but a disruption in ownership in being a unified mind *and* body. Greg is clear that no other person or thing owns his mind and body. Is there someone in the background manipulating Greg’s mind and body like a marionette? Can we attribute the activity of his mind and body to someone or something else? Greg is not depicting a scenario in which someone else is moving his body or controlling his mind. Yet, there is also a sense that his

agency is lacking, notably as a kind of passive quality to his agentic control as a unified mind and body.

In a way, Greg's experience may not be so strange because the description could represent a relatively mundane, perhaps even nondissociative, experience. Think of the classic example described by Donald Davidson (1974) of sitting with crossed legs with one raised foot gently bobbing with one's heartbeat. You could think of anything else while your leg is involved in the action of bobbing up and down. But Greg seems to refer to a different quality of the motion in his experience that cannot be understood through the involuntary movements caused by his heart pumping blood. Crucially, there is a sense of his agency is lacking, where it once was not lacking—which can be considered a negative feature of the ownership relations. Moreover, a positive feature can be recognized when Greg's experience takes on a unique quality described in his *mind and body's dis-integrated agency* or lack of unified sense of agentic control and a passive quality. In this way, the lacking agency helps to understand Greg's dis-integrated experience. Again, this experience does not have to be strange nor odd. But since Greg notices it, along with the passivity in the experience, a sense of strangeness emerges because he should have control of these parts of him—even to move them independently. In other words, his experience of his unified mind and body would go unnoticed and is only noticeable when disunified. While mineness helps articulate the lack of agency in his experience, it also falls short here—we need a structure to understand the strangeness feature in Greg's experience.

Incidentally, a further point of clarity is the domain specificity of the agentic control (or lack thereof). That is to say, not all agentic control is the same. Therefore, the agency one would come to expect with speaking is different than the agency of and seamlessly operating mind and body. The lack of agentic control varies on what kind of thing is lacking it. What determines the

agentic control is the accusative and the level of agency that is usual or expected within that particular domain.¹⁴

In a second case, Simeon and Abugel (2006) reported a patient who disclosed the following experience:

Words come out of my mouth, but they don't seem directed by me. They just come out, and sometimes I become flustered and begin to stammer or slur. My arms and legs don't feel like they're mine. How do I control them? What makes them move? (p. 80).

Here we have two distinct accusatives that appear to challenge the ownership feature of mineness: the first being *words* and the second being *limbs* (specifically arms and legs).

Moreover, the patient discloses two separate statements where the conundrum is present. These statements are, "words come out of my mouth, but they don't seem directed by me" and "my arms and legs don't feel like they're mine." Let us begin with the first one.

By reporting "*my* mouth," the patient is claiming mouth ownership and is not denying ownership of the production of the words. Like Greg's description, there is no claim that another person or entity is authoring the words. There is no indication the words are being recited from a book or other source (where the words would have another author that could claim ownership). The words remain owned by the patient in this sense yet do not seem to be *directed* by the patient. Again, the disruption in ownership appears to center on the experience of a lack of ownership of the agentic control over the words. The lack of agency over directing the words signals a negative feature of the experience. Again, we observe ownership of word production and authorship (not being attributed to anyone else), but the lack of agentic control in that they are not directed or controlled by the patient. Indeed, this lack of agentic control seems to cause

¹⁴ To avoid being bogged down by different sociocultural nuances in the experiences of agency, this perspective I am developing allows for a phenomenological appreciation for the person's experience and sociocultural framework.

the patient some level of distress, as evidenced by the following: “they just come out, and sometimes I become flustered and begin to stammer or slur.” Given this report, the positive feature is an identifiable distressing quality of the experience of lacking ownership over directing the words. This quality is sometimes marked by the distress of the described “flustered” feeling and other times by recognizing the strange, anomalous nature of the experience itself.

In the second accusative, the limbs, the patient reports that “my arms and legs don’t feel like mine.” Firstly, the patient uses the possessive “my,” notably in “my arms and legs,” which suggests the patient recognizes ownership. The patient then follows up by claiming these limbs “don’t feel like they’re mine,” again confronting us with the conundrum. How do we navigate the patient’s experience? One clue comes from the patient’s next two questions: “how do I control them? What makes them move?” The issue of lacking ownership in agentic control emerges again—the patient questions how to control their limbs and does not attribute control to another person or entity. Even here, there is a sense of ownership of the movement, but confusion over the process or mechanism. Again, a positive feature of the experience can be identified, notably with what it is like to recognize ownership of the limbs yet not know how they are controlled. There is a sense that they typically have control over the limbs, and it is noticeable when that is absent. The quality is also marked by a kind of confusion and puzzlement about what makes the limbs move.

In the third and final example of the first set of cases, Mauricio Sierra (2009), in his book *Depersonalization*, reported the following person’s experience:

I can sit looking at my foot or hand and not feel like they are mine. This can happen when I am writing, my hand is just writing, but I’m not telling it to. It almost feels like I have died, but no one has thought to tell me. So, I’m left living in a self I don’t recognize (p. 27).

In this example, the accusatives are the person's foot and hand, explicitly represented as "my foot and hand" (my emphasis). Here, again, the conundrum presents itself through the statement, "I can sit looking at my foot or hand and not feel like they are mine." Does the foot and hand belong to anyone else? There is no indication that these parts belong to another person or entity, and in fact, the person uses the possessive pronoun "my" to describe the relation to the hand. The description is further qualified in the activity of writing: "When I am writing, my hand is just writing, but I'm not telling it to." The issue is in the agency over the writing activity. The person recounted not directing ("telling") the hand (specifically, "my hand," which the person owns) to write, yet the writing activity is not being reported as being controlled or manipulated by another person or entity. How again shall we navigate this contradiction of agentic control? The negative feature of the experience in the loss or lack of the usual control the person would have on writing. In this sense, the agency of writing is *lacking* because while the person owns the hand and the activity of writing, there is no control of what is being written when the person usually has control. Moreover, a positive feature is also present in there is a certain quality of strangeness or uncanniness of still reporting owning the hand (e.g., "my hand") and agency (e.g., "when I am writing) yet not maintaining a unified sense of control over writing (e.g., I'm not telling it to"). There seems to be a sense of communication to the hand when writing something that may not be noticeable when present, but certainly noticeable when absent. That, along with the unique experience of writing something without control, is where the strangeness or unusualness emerges.

The last part of the quoted description, "I'm left living with a self I don't recognize," is

worth further investigation.¹⁵ The context of the quote is critically important to grasp what is going on, which the person shared earlier in the vignette: “Looking in the mirror proves to be difficult as I don’t always recognize the person looking back at me” (p. 27). What is the accusative here? Identifying the accusative in this example is tricky because we may want to say the person’s self, but it is actually the *reflected image* of the person’s self. Mirror image phenomenologies are fascinating and complicated because the body representation is mediated by the mirror, giving the viewer a third-person perspective versus the typical first-person. The activity of the “person looking back at me” suggests that even though the person is looking at the mirror image, and accepts ownership of the activity, there is a loss of the ownership of the “person looking back at me.” The report is not about literally a different person looking back—the person looking back is the *same* as the person looking in the mirror. In a sense, there might be a loss of control of the representation in the mirror, specifically a lack of agentic control over the “person looking back at me.” Because the experience is transient (“I don’t *always* recognize the person looking back at me”), there is a negative feature in the loss of the usually seamless experience of identifying one’s self in the mirror. Indeed, there is also a positive feature of the example, too, in that there is a strange or uncanny quality of not recognizing the mirror image, and not controlling that mirror image. However, the third-person perspective provided by the mirror image evokes the concept of space and spatiality. Therefore, here again, while the ownership feature of mineness is relevant to describe *part* of the phenomena, we find ourselves needing another structure—spatiality—to enrich the phenomenological articulation further.

¹⁵ The disclosure of not recognizing oneself is not uncommon. On the one hand, unless someone has gone through drastic physical changes, this experience would seem strange. However, the relevancy of this point is something about it in the existential-authenticity sense. I hope to pin down some of the features of what they mean by not recognizing themselves in this section.

The “mine” and “not mine” conundrum present in these cases is navigated through different ownership configurations through a lack of agentic control. This account takes up the existential theme of ownership relations outlined in the first section of this chapter (as opposed to the socio-legal theme). More precisely, the people in the previous examples recognize that the body part or thought, or whatever the accusative, is *theirs*. They own the accusative insofar as they acknowledge it is part of who they are, yet this ownership does not extend to agentic control of the accusative. The lacking ownership comes in the form of disrupted agency over that accusative. To bring back Greg’s case, he recognizes the words as his (“I’m talking”)—he owns them. Yet he experiences an absence or the lack of agentic control (“I don’t feel like it is my words”), which takes on a negative quality (the lack of agency where it should be present) and a positive quality (marked by the strangeness in the experience).

While the ownership feature of mineness provides us with a resource to navigate the “mine” and “not mine” conundrum, how might we understand a case example where the ownership of the accusative is outright denied? The second set of cases differ significantly from the ones already discussed because they do not present with the internal contradiction. Instead, people who disclose these kinds of depersonalizing experiences *disown* the accusative. One particular phenomenon where disownership often occurs is somatoparaphrenia, which is characterized by the denial of ownership of a limb or side of the body.¹⁶ The challenge with these cases shifts to understanding this mode of disownership properly.

One fascinating study by Alena Rahmanovic and colleagues (2012) demonstrated hypnotically induced somatoparaphrenia. The somatoparaphrenia occurred only during the hypnotic state, and the subjects returned to their non-somatoparaphrenia state after the

¹⁶ A similar example is alien hand syndrome.

experiment. In what follows, I will present two reports from the study to showcase the hallmark component—explicit disownership of the accusative.

In an exchange with one of the subjects, Rahmanovic and colleagues (2012) recorded the following regarding the subject's arm:

Subject: Is that mine?
 Hypnotist: Do you think it's yours?
 Subject: It looks a bit different.
 Hypnotist: In what way does it look different?
 Subject: Longer fingers
 Hypnotist: So whose arm do you think it is?
 Subject: Not mine! (p. 51)

In this example, the accusative is the arm (including the hand). The subject seems first to question the ownership of the arm, and then when asked by the hypnotist who owns the arm, the subject responded that the arm was “not mine.” There is no reported internal contradiction. In this example, the subject is not presenting with a lack of ownership, but rather disownership. It is also unclear who the arm belongs to, but it is clear that the arm does not belong to the subject (per report). What is the way to understand this disownership relation? One way of organizing the experience is by elucidating the negative and positive features. The negative feature of the disownership experience is the disownership of the arm because the subject should be able to identify it as his or her own (the subject can experience the embodied arm pre-hypnotically). A positive feature can be identified in the quality of the experience of non-familiarity of the “longer fingers,” which contributes to the subject's determination of arm disownership.

Let us take another example from the Rahmanovic and colleagues (2012) study, but with an example where the disowned accusative is attributed to *another* person:

Hypnotist: Can you tell me about this arm?
 Subject: It's old (subject scrunches up her face in disgust as she looks at the arm).
 Hypnotist: Whose arm is it?

Subject: It's an old man's (maintains strong expression of disgust as she continues to look at the arm).

Hypnotist: What do you see in the mirror?

Subject: It's old, and it's got knuckles, and it's all fingers. (p. 53)

Again, the accusative of the example is the arm. The importance of this case is that the subject not only disowns the arm but attributes ownership to “an old man,” which is interestingly not the gender of the subject. What are the distinguishing features of this disownership relation? The negative feature of this relation is the absence of something typically present—the ability to identify ownership of the arm. The positive feature of the disownership is marked by the disgusted facial expression *and* the accompanying statement of attributing the ownership of the arm to “an old man.” The subject’s report pairs the stated disownership with attributing the ownership to another (the “old man”).

In reviewing these cases, we are confronted with the situation that although the subjects *claim* disownership of their arm, an outside observer sees the arm connected to the subject’s body. The observer would likely remark that the subject is mistaken, as the arm *belongs* to the subject—and the observer would undoubtedly have a point. This situation seems puzzling and even nonsensical. These cases bring to light a worry in doing second-person phenomenologies of judging first-person reports' veracity when they become nonsensical. The phenomenology is treasured but not infallible. Therefore, we can only strive for the best overall interpretation. One strategy is to target the nonsensical or puzzling aspect of the experience and attempt to navigate it. The disownership of the arm is the disownership of a physical property of the body—this is also what we have a tough time making sense of from the outside perspective. Although, what can help this experience make more sense is disownership in terms of agency and responsibility along the existential-authenticity theme. In this way, the arm is not part of the *agentic who* of the subject. In other words, the arm is not part of “the who” the subject has control or agency over.

While these descriptions of disownership are puzzling, we cannot ignore that the subjects are still *having* the experience of disowning the arm. These subjects may *disown* their arms, but the experience of disowning the arm is still *theirs*. The phenomenological reality is that the experience is still theirs, and therefore, mineness remains intact. Perhaps these specific examples show phenomenological support for Heidegger's point that mineness is *always* present. *The residue of mineness remains insofar as the experience of disownership belongs to the subjects.*

Intriguingly, disownership experiences appear in many classic Schneiderian “first-rank symptoms,” such as thought insertion and auditory hallucinations.¹⁷ These first-rank symptoms play a prominent role in psychiatry and clinical psychology, as their presence is considered sufficient in diagnosing schizophrenia.¹⁸ Although this position is controversial, recent research of these so-called first-rank symptoms may not be diagnostic of schizophrenia due to their reported presence in nonschizophrenic conditions (Nordgaard, Arnfred, Handest, & Parnas, 2008). There exists a growing body of qualitative and quantitative literature that views auditory hallucinations or voice hearing as dissociative (Moskowitz & Corstens, 2007; Ross, 2009; Anketell, Dorahy, & Curran, 2011; Vogel, Braungardt, Grabe, Schneider & Klauer, 2013). Consequently, my interest here is to examine the phenomena of thought insertion and voice hearing (auditory hallucinations)—regardless of the symptomatic or diagnostic label—through the modes of ownership and disownership and demonstrate the phenomenological commonalities they have to dissociative phenomena.

Thought insertion involves the belief that the thoughts a person is experiencing belong to another person. Thoughts are *inserted* or intrude into the mind of one person from another. Clive

¹⁷ Kurt Schneider (1959; hence “Schneiderian”) listed his first-rank symptoms of schizophrenia, which included auditory hallucinations, somatic hallucinations, thought withdrawal, thought insertion, thought broadcasting, feelings or actions made by external agents, and delusional perceptions.

¹⁸ Within the parameters of the DSM-5 and almost all previous versions.

S. Mellor, in his classic and oft-cited paper outlining clinical examples of first-rank symptoms of schizophrenia, reported what is regarded as a standard case thought insertion. According to

Mellor (1970), a patient said:

I look out of the window and I think the garden looks nice and the grass looks cool, but the thoughts of Eamonn Andrews come into my mind. There are no other thoughts there, only his...He treats my mind like a screen and flashes his thoughts on to it like you flash a picture (p. 17).

The accusative in this example is the *thoughts*. Here, the woman disowns the thoughts, although she recognizes that these thoughts are occurring in “my mind.” She owns her mind but disowns the thoughts, attributing the thoughts to Eamonn Andrews.¹⁹ At the start of the account, she experienced and owned her thoughts (“I think the garden looks nice and the grass looks cool”), but then Mr. Andrews’ thoughts seemingly intrude and take over. In fact, she seemingly disowns *all* thoughts at that point in the descriptions. She also reported lacking agency over Mr. Andrews’ thoughts.

The patient’s disownership of all thoughts and attributing them to Mr. Andrews is exciting and perplexing. She recognizes and experiences being a kind of host of his thoughts. But does her disownership claim also extend to the thought she *has* that has her acknowledge that all the thoughts belong to Mr. Andrews’? Seemingly, even the thought she experiences that attributes all the thoughts to Mr. Andrews is still *hers*. The disownership thought is a thought that *belongs* to her. Moreover, her mind is still hers as well, even with the intrusion of Mr. Andrews’ thoughts. This case is a fascinating example of what *appears* to be a full-fledged disownership.

¹⁹ Eamonn Andrews was a popular Irish radio and television personality who aired in the UK from the 1950’s to the 1980’s.

Yet, as we have noticed, the residue of mineness remains through the experience of disownership still being *hers*.²⁰

She reports owning her mind (“he treats *my* mind”) and also owns the experience of having the thoughts but disowns the thoughts as hers because she lacks control of them (and attributes them to Mr. Andrews). The lacking agency over the thoughts appears to be a core feature of the description and a way to understand the disownership. In this description, we also see a temporal dimension of the configuration emerge; that is, the intrusion of Mr. Andrews’ thoughts into her mind. The negative aspect of disownership is her inability to experience her own thoughts (although she has *at least one* thought that she owns, that being the recognition of the thoughts belonging to Mr. Andrews’), and the lack of agency over the thoughts she attributes to Mr. Andrews. The positive feature of disownership is assigning the thoughts to another person (Eamonn Andrews) and the way he is treating her mind as a kind of screen to project these thoughts. Here we see the disownership of the production, authorship, and agency of thoughts, although, critically, at least one thought is produced, authored, and controlled by her—the one that attributes them all to Mr. Andrews. Therefore, we can consider this a highly *diminished* ability to experience her own thoughts (rather than inability). Her disownership experience can be navigated by parsing out the negative and positive features along the existential theme of agency and responsibility.

Let us now turn to the final example from the second set of phenomena, auditory verbal hallucinations. The following excerpt comes from Janice Jordan, who published her experience of schizophrenia as part of the First Person Accounts series in the journal *Schizophrenia Bulletin*.

²⁰ Perhaps the disruption or distress that often accompany cases where the residue of mineness is identified can provide a clue for what makes an experience pathological. This point will be revisited in the conclusion of the entire project.

Jordan (1995) describes hearing and reacting to the voice of who she calls the ‘Controller.’ In one particularly alarming disclosure, she writes:

the Controller started demanding all my time and energy. He would punish me if I did something he didn’t like. He spent a lot of time yelling at me and making me feel wicked. I didn’t know how to stop him from screaming at me and ruling my existence (p. 502).

The accusative is the *voice*. Jordan attributes this voice she hears to the Controller, indicating that it is not hers. Notably, the Controller’s voice is of a different gender. Jordan discloses ownership to herself through several references to “me” and ownership of her existence through writing “my existence.” She also describes lacking agency over the voice. This lacking agency is a key part of the description because she reports owning herself (although this is ontologically obscure) but disowns the voice because she lacks control of it. She reveals that the voice is attempting to control her existence (“ruling my existence”), likely trying to take over any autonomy she still maintains over her “existence.” Here again, we see a diminished ability for her to produce, author, and control her thoughts. The negative feature of disownership is the fleeting feeling of the control she has over herself and her “existence.” The positive feature of disownership is represented by the ascription of the voice to the “Controller,” along with the accompanying distress it causes.

As a side note, Colin Ross (2009) suggests that examples like Jordan’s case represent core features of dissociative identity disorder (DID). In Jordan’s case, the “Controller” functions in much of the same way as a dissociative alter. Indeed roughly 80-90% of those experiencing DID report hearing voices (Loewenstein, 1991; Ross, Miller, Reagor, Bjornson, Fraser & Anderson, 1990; Şar, Yargıç & Tutkun, 1996). There is a growing body of empirical support over the years for considering auditory verbal hallucinations as dissociative (Longden, Moskowitz, Dorahy, Perona-Garcelán, 2019). We see here that the possibility that the auditory

verbal hallucinations, which are part and parcel of psychotic presentations or schizophrenia, are not distinct from the dissociative voices in DID. Given this point of connection, configurations of ownership and disownership may be relevant in articulating the complex dissociative experience of “identity fragmentation” found in DID.

As we observed in the final two examples, experiences of thought insertion and auditory verbal hallucinations bear striking similarities to dissociative phenomena of depersonalization. Again, as mentioned earlier, the conceptualization of auditory verbal hallucinations or voice hearing as dissociative is a view with a growing body of support. Moreover, I also suggested that depersonalization is at play in experiences of thought insertion. What does this phenomenological evidence mean for the status of these phenomena?

The main take away here is that experiences such as thought insertion and auditory verbal hallucinations, which are classically categorized as “psychotic” symptoms associated with schizophrenia, share striking similarities to dissociative experiences. What implications does this have for the field? Moskowitz and colleagues (2009) suggest reconceptualizing and recategorizing the so-called psychotic experiences of thought insertion and auditory verbal hallucinations within a dissociative framework. Moreover, Ross (2009) has proposed creating a *dissociative subtype* of schizophrenia.²¹ Ross’ proposal shares some conceptual and empirical support (Vogel, Braungardt, Grabe, Schneider & Klauer, 2013).²² My main point here is there

²¹ According to Ross (2019) the dissociative subtype would include at least three of the following symptoms; dissociative amnesia, depersonalization, the presence of two or more distinct identities or personality states, auditory hallucinations, extensive comorbidity, and/or severe childhood trauma (p. 325). One of the most fascinating aspects of Ross’s proposal is that treatment implications shift from a primarily pharmacological model to a psychotherapeutic. For more on this topic, please see Ross (2009; 2019).

²² Schizophrenia is not without its controversies, as many have questioned its diagnostic validity over the years (Bentall, Jackson, & Pilgrim, 1988; Read, 2004; Allsopp, Read, Corcoran & Kinderman, 2019). As a historical note, Eugene Bleuler (1924), who is responsible for coining the term ‘schizophrenia’ wrote: “*incoherence and dissociation*, which often designate confused processes of thought apply most correctly

seems to be a common phenomenal thread understood as disruptions of ownership and agentic control, which is the quality of *dissociability* amongst these phenomena—whether currently categorized as a bona fide dissociative experience (e.g., depersonalization) or voice hearing (e.g., verbal hallucinations) or thought insertion (e.g., delusions).

Heidegger’s existential structure of *Jemeinigkeit*, or mineness, holds a central place in the project of *Being and Time*. In this chapter, I engaged Heidegger’s concept of mineness with the overall goal of using it as a resource to conceptualize dissociative phenomena. After reviewing four scholars’ interpretations of mineness, I concluded that, while they followed similar themes, there was no clear unanimous interpretation. Returning to Heidegger’s work in both *Being and Time* and *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* revealed the significance of mineness in his work. Heidegger’s emphasis of starting the Analytic of Dasein with the first-person, possessive pronoun ‘*mine*’ and the understanding of our being as the *self-ownership* of being, characterized by the “whoness” of Dasein and Being-in-the-world is a major shift from the traditional Cartesian and Kantian understanding of our being as the singular “I” or “ego” that is a thing in the world with objective properties.

The feature of *ownership* appears to have yielded a productive account of navigating the simultaneous “mine” and “not-mine” description of the conundrum found in the first set of depersonalization experiences. What helped navigate the conundrum found in the first set of depersonalization phenomena was the *lack of ownership* with a common theme of the lack of agentic control. I also included an analysis of the second set of phenomena, which included hypnotically-induced somatoparaphrenia, thought insertion, and verbal auditory hallucinations,

to schizophrenic disturbances of association” (p. 86, emphasis in original). Bleuler himself recognized there were dissociative processes at play in schizophrenia. Nevertheless, determining the status of schizophrenia in the coming years is far beyond the scope of this project.

where *disownership* was the key feature. This analysis included my thoughts on considering thought insertion and auditory hallucinations, which are classic symptoms of schizophrenia or “psychosis,” as examples of dissociation, and some implications this evidence has on the diagnosis of schizophrenia.

§IV. Concluding Remarks

In this chapter, I provided a successful phenomenological articulation of depersonalization using Heidegger’s structure of *Jemeinigkeit*, or mineness. Such an articulation is successful because it was able to navigate the “mine” and “not mine” conundrum in a phenomenologically faithful way. To conclude this chapter and prepare for the next one, I will address two topics. Firstly, I will revisit the earlier worries on how depersonalization and mineness engage with Heideggerian authenticity and the possibility that depersonalization reveals un-mineness. Secondly, I will bring forth the limitations of mineness. However, these limitations lead us to consider other Heideggerian resources, which, in turn, help chart the course for the next chapter.

Any foray into theorizing Heideggerian mineness—most notably the feature of *self-ownership*—inevitably confronts the concepts of authenticity and inauthenticity. Heidegger tells us that mineness is the foundation for authenticity and inauthenticity:

Dasein can choose itself on purpose and determine its existence primarily and chiefly starting from that choice; that is, it can exist authentically. However, it can also let itself be determined in its being by others and thus exist inauthentically by existing primarily in forgetfulness of its own self. (BP 170, emphasis in original).

Heidegger is clear to tell us that the possibility of choosing and losing oneself results in the modes of authenticity and inauthenticity. However, is it the case that dissociative phenomena can be understood as a kind of losing oneself, resulting in inauthenticity? Are we, therefore,

comfortable describing dissociative phenomena as inauthentic? How can we come to terms with the relationship between mineness, authenticity, and dissociative phenomena?

Heidegger's conception of authenticity and inauthenticity does involve Dasein's ownership and disownership of itself. However, throughout developing our current understanding of Heidegger's structure of mineness, one feature that emerged was the focus on Dasein's characterization with the possessive pronoun "mine," and the implication of ownership, particularly self-ownership. Mineness is already at work prior to the criteria and qualifications for either authenticity or inauthenticity. Therefore, while admittedly treading close to the heavy and heated debates on what constitutes Heideggerian authenticity, given my previous analysis of mineness, there is room to navigate mineness strictly through conceptions of configurations of ownership and disownership. Indeed, if the phenomenological analysis of depersonalization with different configurations of ownership (and disownership) completed earlier in this section is any testament, then the feature of ownership in mineness can do the work without evoking authentic or inauthentic determinations. In this sense, the criteria for making Dasein authentic or inauthentic do not come into play and are beyond the scope of the present analysis.

Returning to the second earlier worry, was dissociative phenomena able to pressure the integrity of mineness to the point of its absence or "un-mineness?" In the first set of depersonalization phenomena with the conundrum of "mine" and "not mine," ownership, and therefore mineness, was shown to remain intact. Even in the example of the person who reported, "looking in the mirror proves to be difficult as I don't always recognize the person looking back at me" (Rahmanovic et al., 2012, p. 27), the ability to say "I don't always recognize..." notably the 'I' part, suggests the presence of mineness. This point illustrates what I mean when I say a *residue* of mineness remains.

But what about the second set of hypnotically-induced somatoparaphrenia, thought insertion, and verbal auditory hallucination subjects that claimed disownership? While the somatoparaphrenia subjects claimed disownership, mineness remained intact since the accusative of the disownership was only a particular body part (arm), and it was likely the case mineness was maintained with respect to other aspects of their body and experience. The case of thought insertion seemed to put the most stress on the idea that mineness is always present because all thoughts were reportedly disowned. As I noted earlier, the patient was still able to report the experiences as not being hers, meaning that the thought of disownership is still a thought that *belongs* to her—she owns at least that one thought. That is, even if a person wants to disown all experiences, having the disownership experience itself demonstrates that mineness remains intact at a basic or fundamental level. Again, a residue of mineness remains. While the case examples of disownership put pressure on mineness, Heidegger appears to be correct in that mineness is always present.

Nevertheless, the limitations are critically important, as mineness cannot cover the full range of dissociative experiences. To be clear, mineness was never meant to be an exhaustive account, but one structure to help articulate one feature of dissociative phenomena (e.g., depersonalization). Although, throughout articulating the phenomenology of dissociative experiences with mineness, the limitations of mineness brought to the fore some fascinating leads for further exploration. Let us return to Greg's case to summarize these leads concisely. In Greg's report of "even when I'm talking I don't feel like it is my words," we noticed that the description just sounds strange or odd. Additionally, his stated experience of "my body is doing one thing and my mind is saying another" does not have to be strange as we can think of quite common examples where this happens. However, the point of the description is to disclose that

something anomalous or strange is happening. The quality of strangeness is a clue that Heidegger's structure of *Unheimlichkeit*, often translated as uncanniness, might be relevant to help articulate the quality of the experience. I will take up this structure in the next chapter.

The chapter's main focus was to showcase how mineness—specifically different configurations of ownership—could provide a rich and nuanced articulation of dissociative phenomena, most notably forms of depersonalization. While mineness could not do all the work, it led us to another Heideggerian structure that contributes to the further enrichment of the account. Although the current analysis focused on forms of depersonalization (which is one of many dissociative phenomena), the framework of identifying ownership relations of mineness is a useful resource to use alongside other Heideggerian structures to conceptualize other complex dissociative phenomena, such as identity issues with DID.

Chapter V: Dissociation, Detachment, and Uncanniness

§0. Introduction

The previous chapter focused on articulating the dissociative experience of depersonalization as disruptions of *Jemeinigkeit*, or mineness, through different configurations of ownership to help navigate the “mine” and “not mine” conundrum. However, mineness articulated a specific aspect of depersonalization phenomenology. We noticed that while it helped reveal a negative feature of the lacking agency in what is experienced of “not mine,” it lacked the resources to fill out the quality of the positive feature, that is, the unreality, strangeness, or anomalous nature of the experience. Therefore, to fill out this picture and account for this strangeness feature of these dissociative experiences, we need more resources.

Moreover, another dissociative experience that often accompanies depersonalization is *derealization*, which is defined as “experiences of unreality or detachment with respect to surroundings” (APA, 2013, p. 302). As we can see from the definition, derealization also has an element of unreality that accompanies the experience. Many scholars and clinicians think depersonalization and derealization are closely related, citing the high rate of co-occurrence, although pinning down this relationship's exact nature remains a challenge (Simeon and Abugel, 2006; Simeon, 2009; Sierra, 2009). Although there is no consensus, the leading view theorizes depersonalization and derealization within a broader category of *detachment* dissociation (DSM-5, 2013; Dell, 2009; Spitzer, Barnow, Freyberger & Grabe, 2006; Brown, 2006; Allen, 2001).¹

¹ The detachment dimension of dissociation has been supported in a number of factor analytic studies. Factor analysis is a statistical method that groups underlying or latent factors or dimensions of a measured phenomenon. However, the topic of the appropriate factor structure of dissociation is still debated and is far from settled and deserves its own extensive treatment. My point here, though, is that a “detachment” factor or dimension of dissociation is considered the “received view” by the majority of scholars and clinicians in the field.

Probably the most well-known champions of this detachment dissociation view are Holmes and colleagues (2005).² In describing detachment dissociation, they write:

In each case, the subject experiences an altered state of consciousness characterized by a sense of separation (or ‘detachment’) from certain aspects of everyday experience, be it their body (as in out-of-body experiences), their sense of self (as in depersonalization), or the external world (as in derealization) (p. 5).

Here, this sense of detachment takes the form of out-of-body experiences, sense of self (both are considered forms of depersonalization), and the external world. A question arises: does detachment make sense on the case description level? Let us return to Greg’s experience of depersonalization:

A separate part of me is aware of all my movements; it’s like I’ve left my body. Even when I’m talking I don’t feel like it is my words...My mind and my body are somehow not connected, it’s like my body is doing one thing and my mind is saying another. Like my mind is somewhere off to the back, not inside my body (p. 9)

Following Holmes and colleagues’ view, Greg’s report of “my mind and my body are somehow not connected,” would be understood as Greg’s mind being *detached* from his body. On the one hand, we can see how Greg’s depiction of “not connected” fits the detachment framework. Yet, on the other, we may become suspicious of how adequate detachment captures depersonalization phenomenology. For example, when he says, “it’s like I left my body,” we might ask the question: how or in what way did he leave or become detached from his body? Does he mean physical detachment or metaphysical detachment? Aside from how alarming physical detachment is and getting mired in metaphysical debates, an important feature of the “detachment” phenomenology is the strangeness or unreality that accompanies his experience.

² Holmes and Colleagues recognize a lineage of the detachment framework for depersonalization and derealization going back to the work of Allen (2001) and Cardeña (1994). For example, Cardeña defined a category of detachment dissociation as “alterations in phenomenal experience that are related to a disconnection or disengagement regarding self and/or the environment (p. 23). Depersonalization and derealization are exemplars of this category of dissociation.

Indeed, Greg's entire experience is stricken with a sense of strangeness or unreality in the sense that it violates or deviates from his typical, everyday experience. Let us bookmark this point for a moment and take a look at detachment in derealization.

The phenomenology of detachment and unreality also appears in experiences of derealization. Consider Cheryl's case example from the Simeon and Abugel (2006) text:

My thoughts seem separate from my body. At times, the most common, familiar objects can seem foreign, as if I am looking at them for the first time. An American flag, for instance. It's instantly recognizable, and immediately means something to everyone. But if I look at it for more than a moment, I just see colors and shapes on a piece of cloth. It's as if I've forgotten ever seeing the flag before, even though I'm still aware of what my 'normal' reaction should be (p. 7).

In Cheryl's encounter with the American flag, does it make sense to say she is *detached* from the flag? On the one hand, sure, we could say she *is* detached from the flag, but this does not seem to capture her phenomenological accurately. In a sense, she is attempting to communicate something strange happening with her experience with the flag. More specifically, an intriguing quality of her experience emerges: the flag is *familiar, yet also unfamiliar*. Another conundrum arises, that is, how something (in this case, an American flag) can be familiar and unfamiliar at the same time.

A cursory look at these case descriptions conjures suspicion about detachment's accuracy in articulating the phenomenal structure of depersonalization and derealization. What we find is that detachment may be complicating the phenomenology, especially with the unreality feature. Take note of Greg saying, "it's *like* I've left my body," and Cheryl telling us, "it's *as if* I've forgotten seeing the flag before." We are reminded of Sierra's (2009) words: "the use of 'as if' or 'like' expressions is more likely to be intended as a critique regarding the adequacy of the description used, rather than as a critique of the reality of the experience itself" p. 25). That is to

say, there is a sense of strangeness in the reported lived experience and the language being used to describe it. Again, perhaps we need new terminology to more accurately capture the phenomenology (without contributing to the unreality) that also helps resolve the familiarity and unfamiliarity conundrum.

In the previous chapter, the Heideggerian structure of *Jemeinigkeit*, translated as mineness, was deployed as a useful way of capturing the phenomenology of depersonalization. In keeping with the Heideggerian theme, is there a structure that could do the same kind of work with derealization? Considering a prominent feature of depersonalization and derealization is an experience of unreality or unfamiliarity, a candidate structure within Heidegger's work is *Unheimlichkeit*, often translated as "uncanniness." In *Being and Time*, Heidegger writes, "anxiety brings Dasein face to face with its ownmost Being-thrown and reveals the uncanniness of everyday familiar Being-in-the-world" (BT 342). Quite a rich statement that deserves unpacking, but at least from the surface, uncanniness could offer a phenomenological articulation of the unreality experienced in depersonalization and derealization. If uncanniness is successful, then it joins mineness as an alternative phenomenological framework to detachment dissociation. Moreover, given both structures are taken from Heidegger's work, this could give us a strategy of understanding the co-occurrence of depersonalization and derealization. The task of delivering a viable solution to the challenge requires a proper understanding of how these Heideggerian structures fit together and this framework's ability to account for the high rate of co-occurrence.

My aim for this chapter is five-fold. I begin the first section by challenging the phenomenological adequacy of Holmes and colleagues' detachment model that understands depersonalization and derealization as detachment dissociation. I conclude the section by proposing a turn to Heidegger's structure of *Unheimlichkeit*, or "uncanniness," as a potential

solution for a more faithful articulation of the phenomenological structure. The second section focuses on developing a proper understanding of Heidegger's concept of uncanniness. To this end, I will show how uncanniness is a mode of Dasein's Being-in, or the meaningful orientation to entities in the world, where the entities of the world are drained of their significance, rendering them unfamiliar. The third section applies my understanding of Heidegger's uncanniness structure to one case of depersonalization and three cases of derealization, delivering an alternative to detachment with uncanniness. As I will show, uncanniness helps articulate the unreality or strangeness feature of depersonalization and derealization alongside helping to navigate the familiarity and unfamiliarity conundrum in derealization. I demonstrate the navigation of the conundrum by drawing out the negative feature, or the *loss* of familiarity, alongside a positive feature, or the accompanying quality of strangeness in the experience. Considering mineness and uncanniness are part of Heidegger's ontological framework, in the fourth section, I propose it as a solution to understanding the co-occurrence of depersonalization and derealization (other than by "detachment"). After working out how mineness and uncanniness (as a mode of Being-in) fit together, I then demonstrate that the depersonalization-derealization relationship can be understood within the Heideggerian framework. The chapter will finish by drawing out the broader implications and future directions.

§1. A Phenomenological Critique of Detachment Dissociation

Holmes and colleagues (2005) designate detachment as one of the two major dimensions of dissociation.³ Let us revisit their description of detachment dissociation in order to construct a testable formula:

³ The other dimension or factor according to Holmes and colleagues (2005) is "compartmentalization," which is defined as a partial or complete inability to recall information about experience that is typically

In each case, the subject experiences an altered state of consciousness characterized by a sense of separation (or ‘detachment’) from certain aspects of everyday experience, be it their body (as in out-of-body experiences), their sense of self (as in depersonalization), or the external world (as in derealization) (p. 5).

The basic formula is that *a* has a relationship from *b*; thus, *a R b*. The relationship is *detachment*.

Two immediate questions to investigate is detachment of *what* (*a*) and *from what* (*b*)? In other words, *a* is detached from *b*. In the Holmes formulation, while he evokes “consciousness,” it appears that the *a* represents “the subject” which is detached from *b*. There are three candidates for *b*, which include body, self, and world. Hence, three formulations:

- 1). The subject is detached from the body (depersonalization)
- 2). The subject is detached from self (depersonalization)
- 3). The subject is detached from the world (derealization)

Although these formulations are meant to categorize depersonalization and derealization together as detachment dissociation, instead, they seem to stir up more questions. What or who is considered the *subject*? How can this subject be detached from *itself* or from the body? What does it mean for this subject to be detached from the world?

One way to test the formula is to return to the phenomena as depicted in first-person case examples. Recall Cheryl’s case from the Simeon and Abugel (2006) text:

My thoughts seem separate from my body. At times, the most common, familiar objects can seem foreign, as if I am looking at them for the first time. An American flag, for instance. It’s instantly recognizable, and immediately means something to everyone. But if I look at it for more than a moment, I just see colors and shapes on a piece of cloth. It’s as if I’ve forgotten ever seeing the flag before, even though I’m still aware of what my ‘normal’ reaction should be (p. 7).

readily available. Compartmentalization provides the conceptual framework for dissociative amnesia or dissociative identity disorder.

We will take Cheryl as the subject, but in the first sentence, the “subject” is Cheryl’s *thoughts*. Applying the Holmes and colleagues’ formula, Cheryl’s thoughts are detached from her body, with her body representing the “from what” (b). What does it mean for someone’s thoughts to be separate from one’s body? In one sense, Cheryl saying “my thoughts are separate from my body” is not necessarily a strange thing to say. Do we expect that thoughts should be attached to the body? Cheryl’s statement is meant to indicate that something strange or unusual is occurring. Recall a similar experience with Greg when he says, “my mind and my body are somehow not connected, it’s like my body is doing one thing and my mind is saying another” (p. 9). Again, his experience could be rather pedestrian, yet that is not what is likely *meant*—something strange is happening. Therefore, the use of detachment as a phenomenological tool to articulate the experience appears to miss what is probably the most crucial and meaningful part: the odd or strange feeling that textures the experience.

Cheryl also describes *derealization* in her encounter with an American flag. She recognizes the flag, and in a sense, it is familiar—yet, she says, “I just see colors and shapes on a piece of cloth. It’s as if I’ve forgotten ever seeing the flag before.” The “forgetting ever seeing the flag before” part indicates a kind of *unfamiliarity*. If we apply this example of derealization to the formula, the American flag is a specific object of the world (b), Cheryl, as the subject (a), is detached from the American flag. Does the formula capture the phenomenological flavor of Cheryl’s report? In a rather obvious way, we might say that, of course, Cheryl is detached from the flag, as it is not connected to her. However, this point is likely not what Cheryl means, and the spatial metaphor for detachment falls short of accurately capturing Cheryl’s experience.

Moreover, besides the challenges of applying Holmes and colleagues’ detachment formula to the phenomenological description, there is something just odd about some of the

reports people make. Take Cheryl's first statement, "my thoughts are separate from my body." There does not have to be anything *strange* about what she says, especially within a Cartesian ontology.⁴ The strangeness is present in what Cheryl is *experiencing* but not indicated in the language used to describe the experience. In another sense, other statements are just *strange*: Take, for example, a case reported by Sierra (2009):

I look at them [familiar objects], but they just don't seem real, they don't look the same and they don't look familiar any more, even though I know deep down they are, I'm seeing things differently from how I used to, almost like I'm looking at something I know, but it doesn't feel like I know it anymore. It feels like I'm looking through someone's eyes (p. 27)

What is most peculiar or strange about the experience is the feeling of looking through someone's eyes. Barring eye transplantation, which in all likelihood would still render the first-person perspective, there is a challenge to know what the experience would even be like to look through someone else's eyes. Furthermore, the phrase of looking through someone else's eyes is often used as a metaphor for taking on another person's perspective on a matter, for the purpose of empathic understanding, for example. Yet, this meaning is not what the person is communicating here. The dialectic tension of familiarity and unfamiliarity captured in the feeling of looking through someone else's eyes just sounds odd. Disclosing the experience using the existing language may unintentionally mystify and obscure it, resulting in further obscuring the phenomenon.

The more significant point I want to make here is that understanding depersonalization and derealization as *detachment* dissociation appears to, at best, miss the mark in capturing important aspects of the lived phenomenal experience, and at worst, the language used to describe such experiences can sound strange and further mystify the experience. The problem

⁴ We might even *expect* thoughts to be separate from the body in a Cartesian-inspired ontology.

seems to lie in the phenomenological limitations in a language system based on Cartesian ontology. In other words, the dissociative depictions based on spatial metaphors of detachment (e.g., thoughts separate from the body) seem to contaminate the phenomenology. Interestingly, Holmes and colleagues (2005) actually endorsed detachment to provide a common language to categorize and describe dissociative experiences in clearer ways. While I certainly agree with the need for a common language for dissociative experiences, this language must be as phenomenally faithful to the lived experience as possible, and I have presented evidence to indicate that detachment falls short in this area. Therefore, we are motivated to find an alternative language (and model) to describe depersonalization and derealization more accurately.

In the previous chapter, I developed Heidegger's account of *Jemeinigkeit*, or mineness, to serve as a way to articulate the phenomenology of depersonalization. Although mineness provided a phenomenological understanding of disruptions in ownership and agentic control, it could not do all the work to conceptualize dissociative phenomena. We are left in need of tools to articulate the unfamiliarity and strangeness in depersonalization and derealization.

In keeping with the core thesis, we are looking for a Heideggerian structure to provide a rich articulation of the dissociative phenomenon of derealization. Considering derealization is understood as unfamiliarity and strangeness with the *world* and things *in the world*, Being-in-the-world is a relevant structure. Although concerning the magnitude of Heidegger's account of Being-in-the-world, this structure may not be precise enough to do the job effectively.⁵ What might be helpful here is focusing on a specific mode of Being-in-the-world. Because

⁵ Heidegger devotes the majority of part I of *Being and Time*, namely chapters II-IV, to describing being-in-the-world. Needless to say, delivering a satisfactory account on being-in-the-world, along with all of its modes, is prohibitive given the space limitations and focus of this chapter.

derealization pertains to the strangeness or unfamiliarity of the world, the Heideggerian structure of *Unheimlichkeit*, often translated as “*uncanniness*,” could be a candidate. At least from a superficial level, uncanniness might have something to say about derealization. My interest here is to develop a refined understanding of Heidegger’s structure of uncanniness and ascertain its usefulness in articulating a phenomenological articulation of derealization.

§II. Uncanniness in Heidegger

In Heidegger’s discussion of the mood of Anxiety (*Angst*) in §40 of *Being and Time*, he presents his conception of *Unheimlich*, often translated as “uncanniness.” Heidegger writes: “in anxiety one feels ‘uncanny’” (BT 188).⁶ Later, in Division II of *BT*, Heidegger shares an expansion of this idea: “anxiety brings Dasein face to face with its ownmost Being-thrown and reveals the uncanniness of everyday familiar Being-in-the-world” (BT 342). In these two sentences, we can already map out three features of uncanniness that may guide an appropriate interpretation of it. The first feature is that “in anxiety one feels ‘uncanny’” (BT 188). A second feature is the role anxiety has in *revealing* uncanniness. The third feature is the connection uncanniness has to Dasein’s everyday familiar Being-in-the-world. In other words, the way Dasein’s *uncanniness* affects its *familiar* way of Being-in-the-world. Taken together, uncanniness includes the way one feels when anxious, is revealed by anxiety, and it affects our everyday, familiar Being-in-the-world. From these features of uncanniness, Katherine Withy (2015) writes that Heidegger seems to recognize a dual mode of uncanniness, that is, “an uncanniness we feel and an uncanniness we are” (p. 47). Yet, she also warns us against this *doubling* of uncanniness in Heidegger. In other

⁶ For Heidegger, anxiety as a mood, is not the psychological state of worry or nervousness that many find themselves experiencing day-to-day. Instead, Heidegger views anxiety as the basic way Dasein is affected or attuned to the world. This point is what Heidegger means when he refers to anxiety as a basic mood.

words, she thinks that Heidegger does not intend for uncanniness to be both a feeling and what we are. What could she mean by this?

Let us take a closer look at the statement: “in anxiety one feels ‘uncanny’” (BT 188), which is the standard translation in both the Macquarrie and Robinson and Stambaugh editions of *Being and Time*. Reading Heidegger’s original statement in German, “in der Angst ist einem »*unheimlich*«,” leads us to be a bit wary of labeling uncanniness as a feeling, at least in the way that we typically come to understand feelings or emotions in a purely psychological way. The first clue lies in the German word “einem,” which is an impersonal reflective pronoun, such that “ist einem” can translate to “is for one.” But this is certainly not enough and is frankly an awkward translation in English—especially when put with the rest of the sentence. In order to understand where Heidegger is coming from, we need to grasp the context, which was shared earlier in his chapter. Heidegger uses the phrase “wie einem ist und wird” (BT 134), which Macquarrie and Robinson translate as “how one is, how one is fairing,” which literally can be translated as “how one is and one becomes.” For Heidegger, a mood (*Stimmung*) is a way one finds out how one is and how one is fairing in a particular context. Returning to the original statement, “in der Angst ist einem *unheimlich*” can be retranslated as “in Anxiety, is for one uncanny.” Again, that translation might be hard to digest in English, but what Heidegger seems to mean is that in the mood of anxiety, *one is and is fairing uncanny*. Interpreting the sentence in this way aligns it with Heidegger’s other passage, that is, anxiety’s role of revealing uncanniness. Therefore, uncanniness is a way one is and is fairing in the mood of anxiety; uncanniness is a mode of being. This point is what Withy means when she says that Heidegger endorses no doubling of uncanniness.

Deserving of equal attention is the popular translation of the original German word “unheimlich” to “uncanny.”⁷ A notable exception to this trend is Dreyfus (1991), who translates *unheimlich* to “unsettled.” While these translations are acceptable, several scholars suggest taking a more literal approach to translating *unheimlich* may help us arrive closer to what Heidegger meant. The German word “*heim*” translates to “home,” and when combined with the prefix “*un-*” renders the translation as “un-home” or “not-home.” The suffix “-lich” approximates closest to the English “-ly.” Taken together, “*unheimlich*” can also be translated as “un-home-ly” or “not-home-ly.” Heidegger gives credibility to this interpretation when he writes, “‘uncanniness’” also means “‘not-being-at-home’ [das Nicht-zuhause-sein].” (BT 188). If *unheimlich* can be understood as “not-home-ly,” then what does Heidegger mean when he tells us that anxiety reveals “the not-home-ly-ness [*unheimlichkeit*] of everyday familiar Being-in-the-world” (BT 342)?

This being not-home-ly is to be lacking in our *familiar* Being-in-the-world. In order to get clearer on Heidegger’s point, we must sort out what he means by our *familiar* Being-in-the-world. Heidegger devotes the majority of part I of *Being and Time*, specifically chapters II-IV, to describing being-in-the-world. To be sure, Being-in-the-world is undoubtedly deserving of a lengthy exegesis; however, my aim here is to elucidate Being-in-the-world in the context of understanding uncanniness.

Heidegger tells us that “the compound expression ‘Being-in-the-world’ indicates in the very way we have coined it, that it stands for a *unitary* phenomenon. This primary datum must be seen as a whole” (BT 53, emphasis in original). Although Heidegger describes Being-in-the-

⁷ This rendering of *unheimlich* appears in both the Maquarrie and Robinson and Stambaugh translations of *Being and Time*. Maquarrie and Robinson do recognize in a footnote that ‘unhomelike’ is closest to a literal translation (p. 233). Still, the suffix ‘-lich’ in German is closer to the English ‘-ly,’ which I note in the above text in order to render the most precise, literal translation: un-home-ly.

world as a unitary and holistic phenomenon, one that “cannot be broken up into contents which may be pieced together,” he also writes that this unity “does not prevent it from having several constitutive items in its structure” (BT 53). To his point, Heidegger identifies three constitutive items or features that form the unity of Being-in-the-world, two of which come into immediate view, as they combine to form the hyphenated word itself: these include “*Being-in*” and “*in-the-world*” or “*worldliness*.” A third feature is also recognized by Heidegger, which is:

that *entity*, which in every case has Being-in-the-world as the way in which it is. Here we are seeking that which one inquires into when one asks the question ‘Who?’ By a phenomenological demonstration we shall determine who is in the mode of Dasein’s everydayness (BT 53, emphasis in original).

In other words, the third constitutive feature of Being-in-the-world is the “who” Dasein is in its everyday being. One immediate question that arises is why Heidegger identifies Dasein’s “who-ness” as the third feature of Being-in-the-world, considering the other two features join to form the term itself. The importance of Dasein’s “who-ness” in the familiar Being-in-the-world will be revealed in a moment.

Returning to understanding this familiar Being-in-the-world, Heidegger writes:

this character of Being-in was then brought to view more concretely through the everyday publicness of ‘the they’, which brings tranquilized self-assurance—‘Being-at-home’, with all its obviousness—into the average everydayness of Dasein” (BT 188-189).

Heidegger marks off this “character of Being-in” and argues for what he calls an *existential* way of understanding our Being-in instead of the *categorical* way. What Heidegger means by the categorical way of Being-in lines up with the typical “spatial model” of entities *physically* located *in* the world, which centers on the theorization that we (as subjective entities) interact with an objective world populated by physical objects.⁸ In contrast, Heidegger’s

⁸ In fact, Heidegger aligns the *categorical* way of Being-in with the traditional way of understanding ‘being *in* something,’ as in:

existential way of Being-in introduces a basic structure that characterizes Dasein's Being-in as a way of being *towards* the world. The centerpiece of his existential way of Being-in is what he calls "*Besorgen*," translated as "concern." Heidegger writes, "because Being-in-the-world belongs essentially to Dasein, its being towards the world [Sein zur Welt] is essentially *concern*" (BT 57, my emphasis). Heidegger uses concern as an ontological term to signify the ever-present possibility of our relational and purposeful activity as the being that is "in," "towards," or "engaged," hence "Being-in," the world.⁹ The character of Being-in is the meaningful and practical orientation to the world—the way the world matters to us, the fundamental *concern* for things in-the-world.

Heidegger presses further by telling us this character of Being-in comes into view more concretely through *das Man*.¹⁰ Das Man is the average everyday being of Dasein; the mode of our everyday familiarity that allows us to feel at-home. "The 'who' is not this one, not that one, not oneself [man selbst], not some people [einige], and not the sum of them all. The 'who' is the

the kind of Being which an entity has when it is 'in' another one, as the water is 'in' the glass, or the garment is 'in' the cupboard. By this 'in' we mean the relationship of Being which two entities extended 'in' space have to each other with regard to their location in that space (BT 54).

He adds that this categorical way has obscured the *existential* way Being-in. Here, I will only briefly mention the categorical account just to contrast it with the existential one, which is more germane to the aim of the section.

⁹ Concern takes the ontical form "to carry out something" or "to get it done [erledigen]" and "to provide oneself with something" (BT 57). Heidegger goes on to list several ways concern characterizes Being-in: having to do with something, producing something, attending to something and looking after it, making use of something, giving something up and letting it go, undertaking, accomplishing, evincing, interrogating, considering, discussing, determining (BT 57).

The list, of course, is not exhaustive but gives us an idea of what Heidegger means.

¹⁰ In both the Macquarrie and Robinson and Stambaugh translations of *Being and Time*, the German *das Man* is translated as "the *they*." However, both Carman and Dreyfus prefer translating *das Man* as "The one." Carman (2003) writes "the *they*" "gives the appearance of referring exclusively to others, whereas Heidegger clearly means [*das Man*] to include ourselves, both collectively and individually. The word 'one' is therefore preferable" (p. 138fn). Dreyfus (1991) prefers "the one" because it retains "a feel for the appeal to normativity in statements about what one does and does not do" (p. 152). Other than my examples that use both "one" and "they" for effect, I leave the word in the original German.

neuter, *the ‘they’ [das Man]*” (BT 126). But what makes the character of Being-in—the one of *das Man*—so familiar to us? According to Heidegger, *das Man*, as a structural feature of the “who” of Dasein’s everyday being, is the normative sociocultural framework that governs day-to-day activities. In other words, we are familiar with our routines, know what things are for, and so on. Taken together, Dasein finds familiarity in the meaningful way of orienting to (Being-in) the routines and social practices prescribed by *das Man*.

Understanding Dasein’s Being-in with Being-at-home as a kind of familiarity with social practices is only part of Heidegger’s structure of Being-in-the-world. For Heidegger, Being-in is woven into the world; that is, Being-in is a part of the being of worldly entities.¹¹ If we are to think about a familiar practice, let us say, for example, coffee-making, we have a working knowledge of how that activity or practice comes together towards an end or goal of procuring a coffee ready for consumption. This practice involves opening the coffee tin, scooping the ground coffee into the pot, all whilst heating the water to a boil, and so on. We have a kind of practical working knowledge of how these worldly things, such as the coffee tin, scoop, coffee pot, and the like—what Heidegger calls “equipment”—function seamlessly together as a totality or whole to the point you may not even *think* about them as individual, isolated things.¹²

Heidegger’s special term for this practical involvement in the totality of equipment is *Zuhandenheit*, translated as “ready-to-handness.” *Zuhandenheit* characterizes the existential way

¹¹ Heidegger outlines four different ways that the term “*world*” is understood. The first two map onto the *categorical* ways of understanding the world and form the ontic and ontological basis for the present-at-handness of things that are physical objects spatially located. The final two map onto the *existential* ways of understanding the world, with Heidegger signaling the fourth way as the existential-ontological term that combines with being-in to form being-in-the-world proper. I am most concerned with the last way Heidegger depicts world.

¹²Equipment, in a sense, always belongs to other equipment. Heidegger clarifies: “there ‘is’ no such thing as *an* equipment. To the being of any equipment there always belongs an equipmental whole, in which it can be this equipment that it is” (BT 68). In other words, equipment are functionally contextual and are always referring to other equipment in this functioning in the world.

of understanding the world as opposed to the categorical way. Heidegger contrasts *Zuhandenheit* with *Vorhandenheit*, or present-to-handness, which is his term for recognizing objects in spatial relations to each other, such as the quantity of water needed to fit in the pot properly. Even in cases where we look at the coffee pot as an object amongst other objects, rendering it as present-to-hand (*Vorhanden*), there is nothing unfamiliar about it: We know it to be a coffee pot *used to make coffee*. Indeed, we can quickly “put it to work” in the activity of coffee-making. Crucially, our everyday familiarity does not lie in the equipment themselves, that is, not in the coffee pot or coffee tin. Instead, the familiarity lies in our understanding of how it all works together for a particular purpose. Heidegger calls this characteristic of the world *significance* (*Bedeutsamkeit*)—the condition that allows for things, or equipment, to hang together in this referential totality in-the-world, which is “constitutive for worldliness” (BT 88). Being-in-the-world is the concerned or meaningful orientation to entities (Being-in) made available through an intelligible and familiar structure of ready-to-hand totality of equipment (world). Thus, our familiarity lies in the significance of things in-the-world. How and where does uncanniness enter into the picture of Dasein’s everyday familiar Being-in-the-world?

As previously said, anxiety does the job of revealing our mode of uncanniness. Anxiety, if we recall, is not the same thing as uncanniness, as uncanniness is not a mood. Heidegger adds:

anxiety brings [Dasein] back from its absorption in the ‘world’. Everyday familiarity collapses. Dasein has been individualized, but individualized as Being-in-the-world. Being-in enters into the existential ‘mode’ of the ‘not-at-home’. Nothing else is meant by our talk about ‘uncanniness’ (BT, 189).

Anxiety has the role of ripping Dasein from its absorption in the world. Heidegger tells us when Dasein is anxious, “the totality of involvements of the ready-to-hand and the present-at-hand discovered within-the-world, is, as such, of no consequence; it collapses into itself; the world has

the character of completely lacking significance” (BT 186). Dreyfus (1991) writes “in revealing itself as insignificant the world does not cease to be a referential whole,” but instead, “the world collapses away from the anxious Dasein; it *withdraws*” (p. 179). Dreyfus calls this a world-collapse, and perhaps that is one way of interpreting Heidegger’s depiction of the anxious Dasein. However, Dreyfus’ metaphor of withdrawal may be more helpful in describing what is happening. What Dreyfus means here is a withdrawal of *significance* from the world. For Heidegger, when the world, and the things in it, become unfamiliar, *significance withdraws*. Thus, a central defining characteristic of this unfamiliarity captured in uncanniness is the withdrawal of *significance*. For things in-the-world to lose their significance is for things to be drained of their meaning (or at least how they were meaningful). Critically, talk of world withdrawal is better understood as the withdrawal of significance from the world, as Dasein is *never* without a world. The world does not withdraw completely, as if this were the case, Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, would cease to exist. As Heidegger says, Dasein is individualized *as* Being-in-the-world. With Dasein’s Being-in as a mode of uncanniness, the result is a collapse or withdrawal of everyday familiarity from the world.

Unlike Freudian uncanniness, which is a description of a thing or a set of ambiguous beliefs (simultaneously familiar and unfamiliar) and repressed or unconscious developmental fears about a thing, Heideggerian uncanniness is a mode of being oriented to the world.¹³

Heideggerian uncanniness does not lie in the objects or things in the world or beliefs about the

¹³ Freud (1919/2001), in his paper “The ‘Uncanny’” details that what makes something uncanny is not solely in the object, but the way in which the object is viewed based on a particular belief system. He ties these belief systems to revived beliefs in animism. Thus, a doll can be uncanny when we know it is not real, yet because of these revived beliefs in animism, it can *possibly* become animated. From this determination, uncanniness seems to be reserved to things that have an “alive” or “animated” appearance, but are known to be inanimate (e.g., a doll). Freud also delivers a psychoanalytic origin story to the uncanny, by way of repressed infantile complexes (i.e., repressed and unresolved developmental fears) along with the revived primitive belief systems.

objects or things, but is a mode of Being-in where significance is withdrawn. Uncanniness is the mode of Being-in in which we find ourselves unfamiliar or unsettled with the world.

For Heidegger, uncanniness is an ontological structure because it is a mode of Dasein's Being-in. As Iain Thomson (2013) summarizes, the uncanniness or not-being-at-home in the world is "the fundamental lack of fit between our underlying existential projecting and the specific existentiell (or everyday) worldly projects in terms of which we each flesh out our existence and so give shape to our worlds" (p. 270). From the ontological loss of significance in our uncanniness, the ontical consequences manifest, revealing a world that not only appears unfamiliar and strange but fundamentally *is* unfamiliar and strange. Our goals, projects, and routines that involve things in the world *no longer* fulfill their roles, although we are aware that they did previously. This point is why we may be able to recognize things and even know what they are used for, although they do not retain the same meaning to us. If we return to the coffee-making example, when we encounter this while in the uncanny mode of Being-in, we could recognize the ground coffee, know how to prepare, and even make the coffee—yet the significance of it the task would be lost to us. There would be something odd and even alien to coffee-making, regardless of the seamlessly hundreds of times we accomplished the task of coffee-making. Crucially, uncanniness lies in the way we are oriented toward the world and how we find ourselves in it, not in the things or equipment in coffee-making. In uncanniness, we move from a world once drenched in layers of familiarity to one drained of it, with a residue of the familiar still lingering. Now that we have a more definite sense of Heidegger's concept of *Unheimlichkeit*, we can now put it to work.

§III. Uncanniness and Dissociation

The uncanniness mode in Dasein's Being-in-the-world appears to be a potentially promising structure for articulating dissociative phenomena. First, uncanniness may help to further flesh out the positive feature of lacking agency identified in cases of depersonalization examined in the previous chapter. That is to say, while *Jemeinigkeit*, or mineness, was able to navigate the "mine" and "not mine" conundrum, it was not able to describe the strangeness that was part and parcel to the case descriptions. Second, uncanniness may help us better understand the phenomenal structure of derealization. A core feature of derealization is the object, environment, or person is both *familiar* and *unfamiliar* at the same time. In other words, people experiencing derealization are aware that the objects or people in the world were at one time familiar, yet they feel like they are no longer familiar. How can something be familiar and unfamiliar at the same time? This feature is the presence of a conundrum. Accuracy in elucidating the phenomenal structure and navigating the conundrum are important criteria for a minimally successful account.

Moreover, in the previous section, we observed the Holmes and colleagues' formula with detachment filled in failed to capture the phenomenology accurately. The basic formula, if we recall, is as follows: *a* has a relationship from *b*; thus, $a R b$. For our purposes, the formula was filled in as the subject (*a*) is detached (*R*) from the body, self, or world (*b*). The part of the formula that failed was conceptualizing the relationship as "detachment." One strategy to rehabilitate the formula is replacing "detachment" with Heidegger's structure of *Unheimlichkeit* or uncanniness, although using the literal translation of "not-home-ly-ness" or "not-at-home-ly-ness," simplified as "not-at-home" may be more revealing of the structure of the phenomenal experience.

In what follows, I will argue that uncanniness can help provide a more phenomenologically accurate alternative to depersonalization and derealization than detachment dissociation. Accomplishing this task requires taking Holmes and colleagues' formula and replacing the "detachment" relationship with "not-being-home." I will begin with a case of depersonalization, also suggesting that uncanniness can provide resources to articulate the strangeness or unreality feature. I will then put uncanniness to work in three cases of derealization to navigate the familiarity and unfamiliarity conundrum. Let us now return to Greg's description of depersonalization.

I feel like I'm not here, I'm floating around. A separate part of me is aware of all my movements; it's like I've left my body. Even when I'm talking I don't feel like it is my words...My mind and my body are somehow not connected, it's like my body is doing one thing and my mind is saying another. Like my mind is somewhere off to the back, not inside my body (p. 9)

Employing the Holmes and colleagues' formula gives us a set of questions to analyze the experience. The first step is to get clear on the subject, which is Greg. To maintain consistency with Heidegger's framework, the subject is Dasein, but considering Dasein is his term for each of us (roughly speaking, human beings), we will safely assume that Greg is a Dasein and can use his name for the subject. The accusative, or object of experience, is his words. Instead of "Greg is detached from [his] words," which admittedly sounds strange itself, the revised formula would be filled in as the following: "Greg" is "uncanny" or "not-at-home" with "[his] words." Does this help further develop the positive feature of the lack of agentic control discussed in the previous chapter?

In this case, the conditions for the words to be meaningfully *his* has been drained, leaving him with the experience of knowing the words do not belong to and are not produced by anyone else yet not experienced meaningfully as his. What is meant is he no longer feels that he is

seamlessly part of his word expression; his relationship with the words has been disrupted, rendering them to feel unfamiliar. The words may *mean* the same thing, but he no longer has the same meaningful relationship to them and how they affect his world.” Greg’s uncanniness with his words is understood as a breakdown in his meaningful relationship with them. Therefore, Greg is “detached” from his words insofar as he experiences a breakdown in his meaningful relationship to them. The *positive* feature of disrupted mineness is filled out by this uncanniness or “not-at-home-ness” capturing a more accurate phenomenological structure.

How might we understand Greg telling us, “my mind and my body are somehow not connected, it’s like my body is doing one thing and my mind is saying another?” Using the Holmes and colleagues’ formula has the “self detached from the body,” but since there are two accusatives (mind and body), we can also see how Greg might be detached from his self (although we cannot be sure from what he said). The closest approximation might be Greg’s mind is detached from his body and thus reformulated as Greg’s mind is “not-at-home” with his body. Still, perhaps a better way of recasting the experience is Greg is “not-at-home” with his mind and body. For Greg to be “not-at-home” with his mind and body means there is a breakdown in his mind and body seamlessly functioning in the world. The positive feature emerges from this disturbance in that a particular odd feeling about the mind and body doing two different things aligning with the diminishing the experience of agency.

Here we have thickened the phenomenology of depersonalization with mineness *and* uncanniness. Let us now turn to derealization and investigate the ability of uncanniness to help us navigate the familiarity and unfamiliarity conundrum. For the first case of derealization, as well as for the sake of continuity, we will take another look at Cheryl’s case example from the Simeon and Abugel (2006) text. Cheryl reported:

At times, the most common, familiar objects can seem foreign, as if I am looking at them for the first time. An American flag, for instance. It's instantly recognizable, and immediately means something to everyone. But if I look at it for more than a moment, I just see colors and shapes on a piece of cloth. It's as if I've forgotten ever seeing the flag before, even though I'm still aware of what my 'normal' reaction should be. (p. 7)

In many ways, Cheryl's experience is a classic representation of derealization. The flag is familiar to her, and easily recognizes it; however, she also shares that there is something off or strange about it. The conundrum is captured beautifully in her statement "the most common, *familiar* objects can seem *foreign*." Has the flag been physically altered to render it foreign? There is no evidence in Cheryl's depiction that the flag was physically altered to change its appearance—anyone, including herself, should recognize it for what it is.

The first step is to get clear on the subject, which is Cheryl. The second question is identifying the accusative or object of the experience. Recalling Cheryl's words, she provides "an American flag" as an example in her description. The revised formula would be filled in as the following: "Cheryl" is "uncanny" or "not-at-home" with "the American flag." In order to receive the impact of this reformulation, we must key into Heidegger's emphasis that the significance or meaning of the flag has been withdrawn. Thus, for Cheryl to be not-at-home with the flag means that conditions for the flag to be meaningful in a familiar way have been drained from her experience. The object has not changed—it is not like it was ripped, stained, or altered in some drastic way. Instead, the meaningful relationship has changed, which allows the object—in this case, a flag—to be recognizable, yet also lose its previous meaning.

Accompanying the experience of uncanniness is the loss of significance. In this way, there is a *negative* feature to the loss of significance as we observed Cheryl *lacking* the ability to see the flag in its familiar way. However, is there not a distinct quality to her experience? In another way, a *positive* feature manifests in having the rather unique experience of viewing the

flag as “just colors and shapes on a piece of cloth” while also being aware of what it *should* be. Using this conceptualization not only aids navigating the conundrum, particularly by drawing out the negative and positive qualities of the experience, but is closer to describing the actual phenomenon as it is lived by the person describing it—the articulation is more phenomenologically faithful.

Now let us shift to another case example reported by Simeon and Abugel (2006):

Familiar things look strange and foreign. I feel like an anthropologist from another planet, studying the human species. I look at things that once meant a lot to me, and I don’t understand what I saw in them that made me love them. They’re just shapes, objects, things, with no personal connection to me. My old coffee mug looks no more familiar than a baby with two heads” (p. 81).

Straight away, this person discloses the familiar/unfamiliar conundrum with a number of things but identifies “my old coffee mug” as one specific example. The subject is the person making the report, and accusative in is the coffee mug. Moreover, there is no evidence that the mug has been physically altered or swapped with a different one. In fact, the person adds that the mug “looks no more familiar than a baby with two heads,” indicating a profound strangeness—even a bizarre quality—to the experience.

We see a similar formula to Cheryl’s case emerge: “The person” is “uncanny” or “not-at-home” with “the mug.” Notably, the person claimed ownership of the mug, so we can likely presume an intimate familiarity, in contrast to it being someone else’s mug (for example, a mug I am familiar with, not because it is *mine*, but because it *belongs* to a co-worker). Interestingly, the statement “they’re just shapes, objects, things, with no *personal connection* to me” (p. 81, my emphasis) gives credibility to the framework that the familiar mug is now unfamiliar due to losing its significance; that is, the way it was meaningful to the person. The critical statement here is “my own coffee mug,” which signifies there was a personal connection through the

ownership of the mug. Therefore, the person can be *unfamiliar* with the *familiar* because the significance or meaning is drained from the mug, rendering the person not-at-home or uncanny with the mug. The significance *should* be there, but it is no longer—even though no changes occurred to the mug. This lack of significant meaning exemplifies the negative quality of the account. Still, a positive feature is also present; that is, for the mug to be recognizable as “my mug” *and* “no more familiar than a baby with two heads.” In other words, the unique quality of the experience that *is* there of recognizing (and reporting ownership) while it also takes on a bizarre quality (“no more familiar than a baby with two heads”)—an experience that is there that should not be. These negative and positive features further flesh out the phenomenological character of uncanniness in derealization experiences.

Derealization is not limited to unfamiliarity with objects in the world and can also include people. The third and final example, taken from Marlene Steinberg and Maxine Schnall’s book *The Stranger in the Mirror*, is of the case of Libby, who discloses an experience of derealization with her mother:

I’ll be driving in the car with her, and after she has viciously attacked me, criticizing everything I’ve ever done...I’ll sneak a sidelong glance at her, and she looks like a stranger to me, and I’ll hear myself thinking, ‘who is this person? She’s not my mother. *This person is not my mother*’ (p. 74, emphasis in original).

In this example, the subject is Libby, and the accusative is Libby’s mother. Although this description is tricky, the conundrum is present. While Libby exclaims, “she’s not my mother. *This person is not my mother*,” which seems to communicate *no* familiarity, Libby also tells us, “she looks like a stranger to me.” Libby appears to have the ability to recognize the person is her mother when Libby uses the pronoun “she” to reference her mother: “*she* looks like a stranger to me.” A relevant clue is Libby saying, “she *looks* like a stranger to me.” In other words, Libby

seems to suggest something about her mother's appearance that has been altered. While the possibility exists that Libby's mother's appearance had changed in that short about of time, that possibility does not seem to fit with the description. Again, Libby tells us that her mother "looks like a *stranger* to me," without indicating any physical differences. The formula cashes out as follows: "Libby" is "not-at-home" with "her mother." As we have already considered, Libby does not claim a physical change in her mother's appearance. Something else is going on here. How do we accurately understand the strangeness of Libby's reported experience?

Perhaps the strangeness could be a result of a marked shift in the quality of the relationship. But what is this quality? One hypothesis is that Libby's mother is behaving out of character, which is prompting the response. However, we cannot be clear on this matter because Libby does not disclose that her mother's behavior is atypical. Nevertheless, something has changed in the personal *connection* Libby has with her mother. In this sense, the *meaning* of the personalized relationship has drained away, while still leaving a residue that the person is indeed her mother. We can understand "connection" as the *meaning of the relationship*. Given this perspective, the negative feature of the report is that someone who should be familiar, that is, Libby's mother, is no longer familiar. The positive aspect of the experience is the quality it takes on with Libby recognizing that the familiar person sitting next to her is now a stranger. This quality is also accompanied by a strong emotional response, given the context of the situation, and Libby's last statement being italicized.

The focal point of this section was to apply our understanding of Heidegger's structure of uncanniness to derealization. Instead of using "detachment" as the relationship in Holmes and colleagues' formula to conceptualize derealization (i.e., the subject (a) is *detached from* the world (b)), uncanniness or the literal "not-being-at-home" was applied instead. After applying it

to three case examples that included both objects and a person, the structure of Heideggerian uncanniness, that is, the withdrawal of significance or the draining away of meaning was able to stay more faithful to the phenomenology of derealization than detachment. Furthermore, uncanniness also helped navigate the familiarity and unfamiliarity conundrum through negative and positive features of the experience. In sum, Heidegger's structure of uncanniness in Dasein's Being-in-the-world proves to be a productive framework for articulating the phenomenology of the strangeness quality to depersonalization and the familiarity and unfamiliarity conundrum in derealization.

§IV. The Depersonalization-Derealization Relationship as Mineness and Being-in

Building on the results of the last chapter and the findings of the current one, we find ourselves with two Heideggerian structures, mineness and uncanniness (as a mode of Being-in), that articulate a rich understanding of two prominent dissociative experiences. In service of one of the questions brought up earlier in this chapter, do these Heideggerian structures provide a helpful framework to conceptualize the depersonalization-derealization relationship? Again, the prevailing view is to theorize the relationship with the broader category of *detachment* (DSM-5, 2013; Dell, 2009; Spitzer, Barnow, Freyberger & Grabe, 2006; Brown, 2006; Holmes, Brown, Mansell, Fearon, Hunter, Fasquillo & Oakley, 2005; Allen, 2001). However, I critiqued detachment as a way of theorizing the relationship in §1, pointing out that it not only misses out on capturing features of the lived experience, but the language used to describe these experiences just sounds strange, potentially obscuring the phenomena. To find out if these Heideggerian structures can do the work, the first step requires us to grasp the relationship between mineness and Being-in, which was an unanswered question from the previous chapter. With that ontological framework clarified, we may then move to conceptualize the depersonalization-

derealization relationship and see if it can satisfy the minimal requirement, that is, theorize how they are related and so frequently co-occur.

To understand how mineness and Being-in fit together in Heidegger's work, let us return to §9 of *BT*, specifically the first consequence of mineness, which is "*the 'essence' of Dasein lies in its existence*" (BT 42, emphasis in original). From the previous chapter (chapter 4), we know that Dasein's particular way of *existence* is Being-in-the-world; therefore, we can recast the consequence as Dasein's "essence" lies in Being-in-the-world. "Essence" typically refers to "what" a thing is, in terms of objective or abstract properties. We also observed that essence could not mean the objective or abstract *whatness* of Dasein, as this would violate Heidegger's project. Again, Heidegger strongly emphasizes:

Dasein cannot at all be *interrogated* as such by the question: *What* is this? We gain access to this being only if we ask: *Who* is it? The Dasein is not constituted by whatness but—if we may coin the expression—by *whoness*. The answer does not give a thing but an I, you, we (BP 120, emphasis in original)

As we might have anticipated, Dasein is understood as a "who" not a "what." Dasein's "essence" is reformulated from Dasein's "what-ness" to "who-ness." Therefore, the first consequence of Dasein's mineness is the "who" of Dasein lies in its Being-in-the-world.

Heidegger's strategy embeds Dasein's essence—"who" it is—in its Being-in-the-world. As noted earlier, *das Man*, or "the they" is the "who" of Dasein and constitutes one of the three-part structure of Being-in-the-world. This strategy is how each individual Dasein is already being constituted by the routines and sociocultural practices prescribed by *das Man*. In this way, our Being-in or our concerned orientation to making sense of the world is revealed by the possibilities of *das Man*.

Moreover, by *starting* with mineness (with its feature of ownership, specifically self-ownership), and by having Dasein's essence ("who") and existence (Being-in-the-world) be a

consequence of mineness, Dasein can always choose—or not choose—its *own* existence from the possibilities laid before it as Being-in-the-world. In other words, while who Dasein is emerges from the possibilities of Being-in-the-world, that is, the practical possibilities of a world drenched in human meanings, these possibilities are always “mine” to be owned in one way or another—or not at all. This framework helps to see how a phrase like “I have lost myself” can make sense, where one does not experience life as one’s own as it has been diffused with the sociocultural practices of *das Man*. Even in Dasein’s everyday mode of *das Man*, by starting with mineness, there always remains at least the *residue* of mineness through its central feature of ownership. My being is always mine to own, even if it belongs to *das Man*. No one else can own it for me because it is an issue for me. Dasein’s Being-in is intimately tied to the revealing of entities in the world. Hence why, to Heidegger, *Being-in* is always *in-the-world*. Heidegger supplies us with a robust, unifying ontological framework to understand human beings (Daseins) and how they are in their own world.

With clarity on how these Heideggerian structures fold into each other, we can acquire a fresh perspective on the relationship between depersonalization and derealization. Instead of understanding depersonalization and derealization as detachment phenomena, they can be recast within the framework of mineness (as an integral aspect of Dasein) and uncanniness (as a mode of Being-in). More precisely, depersonalization is articulated as disruptions in ownership configurations of mineness. And uncanniness, as a mode of Being-in, texturizes the strangeness quality in depersonalization and “familiarity” and “unfamiliarity” experiences present in derealization. Disruptions in mineness would almost be expected to have a bearing on one’s *Being-in-the-world*, or the way we practically participate and make sense of the world in context.

One way this ontological framework is ontically cashed out is in disruptions in the way one meaningfully experiences oneself and the world.

Thinking of depersonalization and derealization in this way allows for a relatively straightforward understanding of their co-occurrence. As we have seen, mineness, and its central feature of ownership, is embedded in Being-in-the-world. If a person experiences a disruption in mineness, we might expect accompanying disturbances with modes of Being-in and with entities in-the-world. More specifically, different configurations of ownership, such as the lack of agentic control found in depersonalization (mineness), would play a role in one's practical orientation to the world (Being-in), with one way being the rendering of things in the world as unfamiliar (that might also be familiar, as we saw in examples in the previous section).

The Heideggerian structures of mineness and uncanniness (as a mode of Being-in) offer a phenomenologically dynamic way of articulating depersonalization and derealization. Because these structures fit within Heidegger's unifying ontological framework of Dasein and Being-in-the-world, we can enjoy a framework that depicts how they are intimately woven into each other and have resources to capture their phenomenological diversity and distinctness accurately. Thinking in the Heideggerian sense, we move from trying to make sense of how they fit together to seeing how they are embedded in each other. Given this perspective, one would almost *expect* them to present together.

§V. Concluding Remarks

The work in this chapter provides another Heideggerian structure for articulating dissociative phenomena, specifically the strangeness and unreality feature of depersonalization and derealization alongside a new theoretical framework to understand the depersonalization-derealization relationship. I began this chapter by introducing derealization, which frequently co-occurs with depersonalization. I mentioned that detachment dissociation was the prevailing

theory to understanding the phenomenology of depersonalization and derealization, but also a way to theorize how they are related. In the first section, I demonstrated that detachment dissociation turned out to be problematic from a phenomenological standpoint, as it did not remain faithful to the phenomenology of derealization and likely obscures the phenomena due to the spatially-based language. Incentivized by the success of articulating depersonalization phenomenology with *Jemeinigkeit*, or “mineness,” from the previous chapter, I turned to the Heideggerian structure of *Unheimlichkeit*, or “uncanniness.” Uncanniness, understood as the withdrawal of significance or the draining away of meaning, turned out to be a helpful resource in conceptualizing the unreality feature of depersonalization and derealization. That is, I showed that it was able to stay more faithful to the phenomenological structure of depersonalization and derealization than detachment. Moreover, I also demonstrated the resources uncanniness provides helps navigate the “familiarity” and “unfamiliarity” conundrum.

I also took up understanding the depersonalization and derealization relationship through the structures of mineness of Dasein and uncanniness and Being-in instead of through detachment. To accomplish this task, I returned to answer a question leftover from chapter four, that of the reformulated first consequence of Dasein’s mineness: from “*the ‘essence’ of Dasein lies in its existence*” (BT 42, emphasis in original), which became the “who” of Dasein lies in its *own* Being-in-the-world. Dasein is embedded in its own Being-in-the-world, and since I interpreted Being-in as one’s practical orientation to the world, we can work out that disruptions in the ownership relations of mineness (depersonalization) would also render entities in-the-world as uncanny (derealization)—whereas uncanniness is a mode of Being-in.

One final point worth mentioning is that while the *Jemeinigkeit* (mineness) of Dasein and *Unheimlichkeit* (uncanniness) as a mode of Being-in were successful in articulating a richer and

more faithful phenomenology of dissociative experiences, they could not do all the work.

Throughout chapters four and five, several spatial references were made, notably dissociative descriptions such as “I’m not here” (recall Greg’s report). Here, we find ourselves motivated to elucidate the *spatiality* in Heidegger in the form of the *in-the-world* part of the Being-in-the-world structure but also the “*Da*” or “there” feature of *Dasein*. I will speak more to this pursuit in the conclusion.

Conclusion

My aim of the thesis is to use resources from Heidegger's existential-hermeneutic phenomenology to articulate core structures of dissociative experiences. To this end, I identified and applied the Heideggerian structures of *Jemeinigkiet* or mineness and *Unheimlichkeit*, or uncanniness, to the dissociative experiences of depersonalization and derealization. I formulated three problems, the motley problem, the ontological problem, and the normative problem—all of which grew out of the history of dissociation. My aim for this conclusion is to evaluate the Heideggerian account I developed against the three problems. How did the Heideggerian account of dissociative phenomena fare?

To start, the application of Heideggerian ontology *solves* the ontological problem by providing a unifying ontology of Dasein and Being-in-the-world. More specifically, Dasein and Being-in-the-world are the ontological regions that can be unpacked hermeneutically with the structures of (Dasein's) mineness and uncanniness (as a mode of Being-in). Indeed, I was able to show that the resources these structures supplied helped articulate the phenomenology more accurately and helped navigate the two conundrums. The use of Heideggerian ontology allows us to shift theorizing dissociation as the division of consciousness, personality, etc., to the disruption of mineness, specifically through alterations in ownership and agentic control, and uncanniness, as an alteration in the way we are meaningfully orienting towards entities in the world. Considering these structures are features of Dasein and Being-in-the-world, I may hypothesize that dissociation is an alteration in Dasein and Being-in-the-world.

What about the motley problem? In chapter 5, I suggested absorbing the experiences of thought insertion and voice hearing into a dissociative phenomenology of mineness, which actually *worsens* the motley problem. Despite the broadening of what can be considered

dissociation, the upshot is that this approach stays more faithful to the phenomena itself, particularly articulating the disownership feature. Heidegger's concept of mineness can bear the burden of the additional phenomena and turns out to be a helpful tool in theorizing the unity and divergence in depersonalization. Thus, theorizing cases of depersonalization with mineness, specifically the themes of ownership and disownership, offers a unifying, ontological theme. In the first set of depersonalization phenomena, the unifying theme is the lack of ownership centered on disruptions in agentic control accompanied by both negative and positive features. In analyzing the second set of cases, specifically the hypnotically induced somatoparaphrenia, thought insertion, and voice hearing, we observed a divergence from the first set of configurations of *lacking ownership* to forms of *disownership*. Moreover, disruptions in agentic control also factored into the second set. As demonstrated, the structure of mineness supplies a resource that unifies the phenomena (or a significant feature of it) and accounts for the divergence (or distinctions that separate them). Moreover, engaging depersonalization with the structure of mineness *helps* the ontological problem. If we recall, the ontological problem pertains to *what* is being dissociated, that is, the mode of being and the mode of unity that makes dissociation possible. The application of mineness to dissociative phenomena through theorizing the different configurations of ownership and disownership does provide a cohesive framework.

Perhaps it is the case that the motley problem is only a problem because scholars and clinicians have not been able to identify the one thing in common with *all* dissociative phenomena. Detachment (and disconnection, for that matter) probably came closest, but I argued that theorizing dissociation using detachment inadequately captures the lived experience and possibly mystifies it (see Chapter V). In a sense, the Heideggerian ontology of mineness and uncanniness supply a set of structures that are not only useful in articulating the dissociative

phenomenology more faithfully but offer overlapping similarities that dissociative phenomena share. For example, *mineness* did well by articulating features of ownership and disownership relations in depersonalization but did next to nothing to help formulate derealization. However, uncanniness addressed derealization adequately through navigating the conundrum of “familiarity” and “unfamiliarity” *and* the strangeness feature of depersonalization. Uncanniness, in this way, is the overlapping structure of depersonalization and derealization.

With this in mind, Ludwig Wittgenstein’s (1953) concept of “family resemblances” may be a way to think about the relationship between and among dissociative phenomena.

Wittgenstein’s classic example pertains to games. After he brings up several examples of different kinds of games, including board games, ball games, card games, etc., he offers that there is no common feature to *all* games. Instead, they are all considered games because they have sets of similarities that overlap, not much different than how different resemblances overlap among family members (hence family resemblance). Comparatively, viewing dissociation as a set of overlapping Heideggerian structures or features, instead of a unifying commonality, demonstrates Wittgenstein’s point and is a useful way to resolve the motley problem.

While we may be content with the Wittgensteinian solution, I propose that one hypothesis is that the unifying structure could be found in the further investigation of Dasein as Being-in-the-world. *Jemeinigkeit* (mineness) and *Unheimlichkeit* (uncanniness) are only two features of Dasein and Being-in-the-world, and there are other structures worth investigating. Further work would involve pursuing two tasks: The first task would be to identify and elucidate other Heideggerian structures that could contribute to a richer and more robust phenomenology of dissociative experiences. The second task involves revealing the unifying feature of dissociative experiences. Answering the second question would surely depend on the first. Over the course of

Part II of the thesis, I noted at least one case example of dissociation in need of further analysis and articulation.

This example can be found in Greg's depiction of "I feel like I'm not here, I'm floating around. A separate part of me is aware of all my movements; it's like I've left my body" is phenomenological rich, and mineness fell short in articulating the fullness of the experience. In Greg's description, I can identify another *conundrum* that needs to be navigated. This *third* conundrum is more implicit than the other two and can be described as a person feeling both "here" and "not here" at the same time. This experience often manifests in the form of being in fog-like or dream-like states or feeling "detached" from being (e.g., "I am no one," "I have no self") alongside other experiences of unreality or strangeness. The sense is that a person "knows" that they are "here" but does not experience that "here-ness," either partially or completely. Furthermore, a person is observed as physically here, yet unresponsive, and will report that they were off somewhere else.¹⁴ This example, again, points to the use of *spatiality*, although can we conclude that the problem is spatial? In other words, the person's physical presence remains, yet the experience is of being "not here." Utilizing the strictly spatial meaning of "here" and "not here" proves problematic. Can Heideggerian ontology help?

To make sense of the "I'm not here," we would have to know first what is meant by "here." This here-ness and not-here-ness conjures a sense of *spatiality*. The "here" and "not here" conundrum motivates us to consider the Heideggerian structure of the "*Da*," translated as "there" of *Dasein*. Gaining clarity on the meaning of *Dasein* as "Being-there" may help understand what the "here" means. Moreover, the "I'm floating around. A separate part of me is aware of my

¹⁴ These types of experiences may vary significantly, such as spacing out or daydreaming during a lecture or in cases of horrifying traumatic event such as a physical assault where a person might "freeze" and no longer "be present," resulting in little to no recollection of the tragic event.

movements; it's like I've left my body" appears to evoke another sense of spatiality. Given the description of leaving the body, Heidegger's distinction between *Körper*, the body as a physical object, and *Leib*, the phenomenal or lived body, may be helpful. Therefore, Heideggerian spatiality, specifically the *Da*-structure and *Körper/Leib* may contribute to further filling out the phenomenal articulation of dissociative phenomena and potentially finding a unifying structure.

Concerning the normative problem, we observed some amount of discomfort or distress accompany several case examples of depersonalization and derealization. Sorting out the boundary amongst nonpathological, pathological, and therapeutic dissociation is challenging, and the structures of mineness and uncanniness did not offer an immediate solution. However, I want the phenomenological recasting of dissociative experiences using Heideggerian resources to stay neutral in terms of the normative problem. Be that as it may, I do find the DSM-5's criteria of determining pathology to be an adequate one. Considering the Heideggerian account of depersonalization and derealization captures the phenomenological more faithfully, using a Heideggerian phenomenological analysis of dissociation in tandem with the DSM-5 criteria may provide some basis to *build* in a possibility of determining the nonpathological and therapeutic from the pathological.

From a therapeutic perspective, revealing different configurations of ownership (mineness) through sorting out production, authorship, and agentic control (or lack thereof) helps identify what is being dissociated and provides a structure to make sense of the experience. Although recognizing the conundrum is not new or surprising, navigating it by constructing the *negative* features (what is not present and should be) and *positive* features (what is present and should not be) in ownership relations is new. Because of the disturbing and strange experiences of depersonalization, psychoeducation and understanding these symptoms are critical therapeutic

steps (Simeon & Abugel, 2006; Sierra, 2009). Here, navigating the conundrum with mineness provides a useful way of understanding the experience. Moreover, Simeon and Abugel (2006) speak to the importance of addressing where control or agency does exist. Therefore, mapping out configurations of ownership and agency could aid in emphasizing where these features are present and identifying where they are lacking to guide clinical work. We can see how the Heideggerian phenomenological articulation might be helpful within a clinical context.

Furthermore, employing *Unheimlichkeit* as uncanniness to articulate the strangeness quality in depersonalization and navigating the “familiarity” and “unfamiliarity” conundrum in derealization provides a structure to help make sense of the experience better than detachment. *Unheimlichkeit*, and its literal translation of “not-at-home-ly-ness,” simplified to “not-at-home,” means the breakdown or withdrawal of significance from the world. In other words, the previous meaningful way of orienting to the world has been drained away. Regarding depersonalization, I showed how uncanniness accounts for the unique quality of the *positive* feature of the experience of strangeness. Similar to navigating the “mine” and “not mine” conundrum, I demonstrated that the unfamiliarity and familiarity conundrum could also be navigated with uncanniness through *negative* features (what is not present and should be), such as a familiar object losing its significance or meaning, and *positive* features (what is present and should not be), such as the unique or strange quality of said familiar object being unfamiliar. The therapeutic relevance is important to consider because instead of “reattaching” oneself to oneself (depersonalization) or the objects/world (derealization)—which just sounds strange or odd to suggest—the therapeutic task would be to become “at-home” with yourself or objects/world again. In other words, the goal would be to help the person regain, rediscover, or fill back in the previous significance or

meaning that was lost. The upshot is that these dissociative experiences need not be *as* strange if the focus shifts to rediscovering significance or meaning with entities in the world.

Moreover, this work may also contribute to the understanding and treatment of some cases of auditory or verbal hallucinations. Ross (2009) tells us that typical treatment plans for auditory hallucinations often rely on suppressing or eradicating the experiences, which may have adverse effects. Theorizing relevant so-called psychotic symptoms such as verbal auditory hallucinations from a dissociative framework, notably from the phenomenological configurations of ownership and disownership, may help validate these experiences as part of a complex, multifaceted person rather than experiences that need to be quelled or vanquished.

My project of providing a Heideggerian phenomenological articulation of dissociative experiences is not complete. With regard to the three problems, I claim that a Heideggerian phenomenology of dissociation was a partial success, with the potential to be more successful. For one, a Heideggerian ontology was able to solve the ontological problem. While it did not solve the normative problem, I mentioned the phenomenological articulation was not *meant* to, but instead provided more resources to aid in determining the boundaries amongst the nonpathological, pathological, and therapeutic. As for the motley problem, a Heideggerian analysis remains *promising* as I proposed a unifying structure that all dissociative experiences share may be revealed with future phenomenological work, which I have already started mapping out.

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