SOCIAL METAPHYSICS, SITUATED KNOWLEDGE, AND DEMOCRACY

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Abstract

This thesis provides three core arguments. The first core argument is a criticism of 'identity' views of metaphysics, in particular Haslangerian social constructivist metaphysics. Having made this criticism, I argue in favour of using the notion of 'habitus' from Bourdieu to account for the functional signature traditionally associated with identity, and apply this way of thinking about social metaphysics to social class.

The second core argument applies social constructivist metaphysics to the issue of situated knowledge. I argue that we can conceive of much of situated knowledge as being knowledge-how, rather than propositional knowledge. I do this by arguing that only knowledge-how can justify the social epistemic norms that are ascribed to situated knowledge.

The third core argument applies this view of situated knowledge to political philosophy. I argue against the interpretation of my previous arguments as supporting epistocracy, and in doing so combine Thomas Christiano's instrumentalist argument for democracy with the demographic argument against epistocracy, creating a new 'demographic instrumentalist' argument for democracy.

The sum of these three core arguments is an argument for the importance of maintaining a diverse set of decision-makers in political decision making.

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Introduction

At the core of this thesis is an argument for the view that we should consider situated knowledge - the species of special knowledge that epistemic agents have in virtue of their social position - as consisting as knowledge-how, rather than propositional knowledge.

However, this thesis does not consist of this argument alone. Methodologically, I am committed to the view that any social epistemology should be supported by social metaphysics. As such, any view that talks about knowledge conferred to agents on the grounds of being a member of a certain social group should be supported by a metaphysical view of what it means to be a member of that group. I have a further methodological commitment that social epistemology should support political philosophy. Due to this the latter section of this thesis is dedicated to exploring one application of my epistemology and metaphysics. I give a political argument following my epistemological argument, arguing for the position that my view provides an argument for supporting deliberative democratic practices, rather than supporting epistocratic regimes - regimes in which those with insufficient political knowledge are disenfranchised. This latter argument provides an example of how my methodology, metaphysics, and epistemology can be combined to provide fruitful applications in other areas of philosophy.

A second core claim of this thesis is this: political philosophy, epistemology, and metaphysics should inform, guide, and restrain one another. Particularly for the purposes of this thesis, political philosophy relies on a set of assumptions about behaviour and knowledge that are contested ground in

epistemology, and epistemology, particularly social epistemology, relies on a set of assumptions about the social world. Similarly, so much of epistemology and metaphysics is political, and as a result we must undertake metaphysics and epistemology with our knowledge of political philosophy in mind.

With this in mind, this thesis has three sections. In the first section, I give an account of social metaphysics. This section responds mostly to social metaphysical views that follow Sally Haslanger's social metaphysics. I begin in chapter one by giving an overview of Haslangerian metaphysics, and of Katharine Jenkins' modified Haslangerian view. I then offer a critique of Jenkins' modified view, arguing that views that stress the importance of identity suffer from an internal contradiction, and are unsatisfactory for the purposes of this project and all projects that aim to give an epistemic account of social kind membership. In doing this, I introduce my methodological commitments - that metaphysical views of subordinating kinds should track what I call the 'moral stakes', and I use Iris Marion Young's 'Five Faces of Oppression' model in order to provide an example of how to give an account of these moral stakes.

Having criticised identity views for being contradictory, I then offer in chapter two an argument that we can use Pierre Bourdieu's notion of 'habitus' and the cultural field in order to explain the causal role that identity views give to identity. Aside from providing the benefit of linking analytic social metaphysics to the literature following Bourdieu, I argue that adopting a 'habitus' view allows us to account for the phenomena that identity views to explain, whilst enjoying the benefit of explaining these phenomena in a way that closely ties them to material concerns and oppression.

In chapter four, I then turn to Bourdieu once more, this time to give an account of social class kinds that can run alongside views of gender and race. This application of Bourdieu to analytic metaphysics

provides the benefit of explaining class oppression in a way that is compatible with feminist views of sex, gender, and race.

In the second section, I make my epistemological arguments. Chapter five is dedicated to giving an overview of the various kinds of knowledge, including situated knowledge, that are found within the literature. With the metaphysical constraints laid out in the first section of thesis in mind, in chapter six I argue that situated knowledge cannot consist merely of simple propositional knowledge, and that it instead has knowledge-how as a major component alongside complex sets of propositional knowledge. Although the view that situated knowledge consists in knowledge-how is not novel itself, the argument that I provide is novel. I argue that the kinds of political claims that situated knowledge is supposed to justify cannot be grounded by a view of situated knowledge such that situated knowledge is simple propositional knowledge.

In the third and last section, I provide an example of how my epistemology can be interpreted politically, using the example of democracy. This section consists entirely of chapter seven, and has two related parts. In the first part, I give an instrumental argument for the right to a democratic say. As my epistemology emphasises the importance of knowledge, it could be taken as an argument for epistocratic regimes. I endorse Thomas Christiano's argument for the right to a democratic say, which provides an argument for not interpreting my epistemology as supporting epistocracy. By doing this, I demonstrate the way that my prior arguments can combine with, and inform arguments elsewhere in philosophy, and particularly in political philosophy. In the second part, I give an argument for the practical interpretation of my prior arguments, exploring the relationship between descriptive representation in democracies and policy outcomes, and arguing in favour of increasing descriptive representation in representative democracies.

This thesis has been written with the virtue of modularity in mind. The sections are designed such that the metaphysical arguments and the epistemological arguments in this thesis can be endorsed and understood individually, but when combined contribute to the thesis as a whole. Each of the first two sections is designed to stand on its own, whilst at the same time playing a part in the wider structure of the thesis.

Lastly, I will highlight a feature of this thesis which marks it as unusual. This thesis spans across three major areas of philosophy, in that it covers metaphysics, epistemology, and political philosophy. Further, it spans across differences of methodology and discipline - in particular in its treatment of analytic and continental philosophy, and in how it responds to and incorporates insights from sociology and social theory. This approach has posed methodological and definitional challenges, but in responding to these challenges generates and justifies more substantial and robust claims. As such, another important virtue of this thesis is that it shows that these methodologies and disciplines can indeed be combined fruitfully, and provides an example of how to do this.

Section 1: Race, Class, Gender and Habitus

Introduction

This section sets out a metaphysical picture of race, gender, and social class. It begins by providing an overview of the literature on gender and race in social metaphysics. I conclude this overview by

endorsing the 'social constructivist' metaphysics popularised by Sally Haslanger, which holds race and gender to be contingent, socially constructed, and rooted in injustice (Haslanger, 2012). On Haslanger's view of race, race has two constituent parts, race as a kind of social class imposed upon an individual in society, and race as a kind of identity constituted by the 'internal map' that a person has for their life. Jenkins' modification to Haslanger's view of gender is to apply this bifurcated class and identity structure to gender also. I endorse the social construction view of both gender and race, but argue it is incompatible with running a concurrent view of gender and race as identity, as in the Haslanger/Jenkins model. Accordingly, an important part of departure from the Haslangerian literature is in my disambiguation of the concept of identity, as I offer a disambiguation schema that removes identity-language from the discussion and denies that self-identification is enough for someone to be gendered, raced, and as I will argue, classed.

I introduce this metaphysics in the context of an ameliorative inquiry that uses Iris Marion-Young's five faces of oppression model as its ameliorative base. I introduce this methodological base by offering a critique of the view of identity put forward by Katharine Jenkins, arguing that Jenkins' view of gender identity is inconsistent in the way that it relates identity to class. I then argue in favour of a view that more closely ties identity - and the harms related to it - to social-kinds-as-class.

I then move onto providing solutions to two problems with this social constructivist view. The first problem with Haslangerian style social constructivist metaphysics is that although the metaphor of the 'internal map' is intuitive, and has been influential in the social metaphysics literature, the metaphor of the 'internal map' is ambiguous and hard to operationalise. Haslanger and those responding to her view have offered a description of the functional role of the 'internal map', but little has been said about its metaphysical nature. Having a detailed metaphysical picture of the 'internal map' is good

within itself, but also without this picture we cannot carry out empirical research on its nature and function. In addition, especially as it is modified by Jenkins to work for gender, the Haslanger view of identity as an internal map is incompatible with and undermines the class account. To solve this problem I turn to Bourdieu arguing that we can conceive of the 'internal map' as being the entity that Bourdieu and the literature following Bourdieu call 'habitus', that is to say that it is a set of internalised dispositions inculcated in the individual through socialisation. The result of this argument is a view of social metaphysics that can account for the elements of social kinds that Haslangerian social metaphysics uses identity to describe, but in a way that does not undermine the role of social-kinds-as-class. Further, this view is also more compatible with empirical work on social kinds and subordination.

The second problem is that despite the importance of social class both in the world and in the literature on injustice, the social metaphysics literature surrounding Haslangerian social metaphysics does not provide a detailed and robust account of social class. I provide a way to incorporate Pierre Bourdieu's (2008) ontology of class that holds class to be constituted by economic, social, and cultural capital. I show that it is possible to conceive of Bourdieu's ontology of class as being the same sort of unjust, class-based hierarchy that Haslanger describes in her view of gender and race as class. The result of this work is a social constructivist picture of race, gender, and social class that is compatible and conversant with the literature on social metaphysics in analytic philosophy, but also with the wealth of empirical work on social class form within the social sciences, and the significant body of work of social theory influenced by Bourdieu.

The result of this set of arguments is a social constructivist view of social kinds that contains a number of novel elements: it is able to account for social class whilst also providing the benefits that other views turn to identity for, it is methodologically compatible with traditional analytic philosophy,

and it is easier to apply to, and learn from empirical work. These arguments provide a grounding for the epistemic and political arguments in the later sections of this thesis, which apply social constructivist metaphysics to situated knowledge concerns and descriptive representation in representative democracies.

Chapter 1: Haslangerian Metaphysics

1.1 Introduction

This section of the thesis is dedicated to social metaphysics. I endorse a broadly Haslangerian (or *social constructionist*) account of social kinds. That is to say that I defend the position that social kinds like race and gender are socially constructed and the product of subordinating relations. The literature following Haslanger discusses two elements of Haslangerian social kinds - the element I call kind-as-class, which is the way an individual or group is labelled, subordinated and treated *as* a member of that group, and the element that is ordinarily called 'identity', but which for disambiguation purposes I term the 'internal map'.

Gender as class is given a specific and well discussed definition in the literature, as Haslanger (2012) provides this definition in the paper in which this understanding of social kinds is introduced. Gender as identity has seen less analysis, and although its importance has been advocated for (notably in Jenkins aforementioned (2016) application of this work to gender), this metaphor of the 'internal map' has not received much attention.

In this chapter I will provide a more in depth exploration of the metaphor of the 'internal map'. The structure of the chapter is as follows: firstly I will give an overview of the relevant literature both by and responding to Haslanger on social kinds as identity. I will then highlight the similarities between

the bifurcated class/kind understanding of social kinds and the Bourdieuan understanding of 'objective social class' and 'habitus' (2008), drawing a parallel between 'habitus' and social-kinds-as-identity. In this way I will be able to apply the wealth of research on 'habitus' to the metaphor of the 'internal map', providing an account that allows Haslangerian social kind theorists to move past the ambiguity that comes along with using the metaphor as-is.

As well as contributing to the literature on social kinds, this chapter also plays an important part in the structure of this thesis. A central claim in this thesis is that knowers have an imperfectly interpersonally accessible kind of knowledge that they are uniquely placed to have in virtue of their social position. For Bourdieu and the theorists that endorse his view, habitus has a distinctly epistemic quality. As such, by incorporating insights from the literature on habitus, I will be able to provide a fuller picture of the nature of this situated knowledge. Later on in this thesis I will make this move in reverse, and by applying Haslangerian metaphysics to Bourdieuan social class, develop a view that has the rich descriptiveness of Bourdieuan social kinds, and the intuitiveness and flexibility of application of Haslangerian social kinds

At this juncture in the thesis it is important to provide another piece of disambiguation and clarification. Many views of identity, such as Jenkins' original view[1], aim to give a view such that we can speak of identity in some way *qualifying* or *making* an individual as a member of a given group. In the next chapter I argue that these qualificatory issues are best approached with the 'moral stakes' in mind - so someone qualifies as a member of a group in an individual case just in the case that they are subject to the relevant kind-related harm. Often other views of identity aim to somehow prioritise identity such that identity takes precedence over kind-as-class, or a view of harm is given such that identity plays an important role in harm tracking. Instead, I argue that the causal role in subordination

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[1] I discuss this view in more detail later in this thesis.

often associated with identity is better described by habitus - which is much less extricable from social-kinds-as-class, and in so far as it can be distinguished from social-kinds-as-class, plays a much-reduced causal role in subordination.

1.2 An Overview of the Relevant Literature

1.2.1 Social Constructivist Social Kinds

I will begin this section by giving a more detailed picture of the framework of social constructivist social kinds. Haslanger introduces her account in *'Gender and Race (What) Are They? (What) Do We Want Them to Be?'* (2012). This paper offers a conceptual analysis of gender and race, before putting forward the view that is now known in the literature as social kinds 'as class' (Jenkins, 2016). This paper aims to be both descriptive and revisionary (Haslanger, 2012), offering an account that not only tries to capture our ordinary day-to-day usage of gender and race terms and categories, but also be 'ameliorative' (Ibid.) by providing an account that helps us reduce the moral harms caused by gender and race oppression.

The aims of the Haslangerian project are given as follows:

> "At the most general level, the task is to develop accounts of gender and race that will be effective tools in the fight against injustice. The broad project is guided by four concerns:

(i) The need to identify and explain persistent inequalities between females and males, and between people of different "colors"; this includes the (p.227) concern to identify how social forces, often under the guise of biological forces, work to perpetuate such inequalities.

(ii) The need for a framework that will be sensitive to both the similarities and differences among males and females, and the similarities and differences among individuals in groups demarcated by "color"; this includes the concern to identify the effects of interlocking oppressions, for example, the intersectionality of race, class, and gender (Crenshaw 1993).

(iii) The need for an account that will track how gender and race are implicated in a broad range of social phenomena extending beyond those that obviously concern sexual or racial difference, for example, whether art, religion, philosophy, science, or law might be "gendered" and/or "racialized."

(iv) The need for accounts of gender and race that take seriously the agency of women and people of color of both genders, and within which we can develop an understanding of agency that will aid feminist and antiracist efforts to empower critical social agents."

<div align="right">(Haslanger, 2012)</div>

The first three criteria provide a descriptive rationale for the project, and the last criterion provides an ameliorative rationale. Put simply, Haslanger aims to provide an account of social kinds that is descriptively apt and morally useful. The account that is then given is one in which the primary sense

of gender and race is constituted by the way an individual is recognised and treated by other members of society.

This account is tripartite. I will use gender as an example.

For the first part - at the core of being recognised as a member of a certain gender group is what role an individual's body is considered to play in sexual reproduction. This perception does not have to be veridical - if you have a body that is capable of insemination, but are perceived to have a body that is capable of carrying a child, then you have been (on this account, but not all accounts, wrongly) recognised as being a woman, and as such are classed as a woman on this account. Secondly - being considered to have these bodily features normatively places an individual as occupying a subordinate or privileged social position, according to the norms of their society. And thirdly - that the individual is in fact subordinated given the prior two points.

To quote the application of this structure to the category of 'woman' from the paper itself:

> *"S is a woman iff*
>
> *(i) S is regularly and for the most part observed or imagined to have certain bodily features presumed to be evidence of a female's biological role in reproduction;*
>
> *(ii) that S has these features marks S within the dominant ideology of S's society as someone who ought to occupy certain kinds of social position that are in fact subordinate (and so motivates and justifies S's occupying such a position); and*

(iii) the fact that S satisfies (i) and (ii) plays a role in S's systematic subordination, that

is, along some dimension, S's social position is oppressive, and S's satisfying (i) and (ii)

plays a role in that dimension of subordination."

(Haslanger, 2012)

It is important to highlight some features of the above view here. The first is that nowhere in the above view is the thought that an individual's mental states, experiences, feelings, thoughts or beliefs factors into whether the individual counts as a member of a social group. On the above view, nothing internal to the categorised individual impacts what group they are categorised into - the view is purely external.

The second is that the above view holds oppression as being inextricable from gender and race itself. For example, imagine a world in which individuals often met the first criterion - that they were regularly recognised as having reproductively relevant bodily features, but that in this society, no social roles or expectations were attached to this biological role. According to the social constructivist picture of gender, in this imaginary society gender would not exist as no individual would meet the second or third criteria. On top of this, even if the imaginary society did in fact have social roles attached to individuals' perceived biological role, but these social roles were not organised in a structure of privilege and subordination, then these social roles would not count as genders[2].

1.2.2 Bifurcated Accounts

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[2] Of course on some plausible understandings of human behaviour and social kinds it might be impossible in principle for the following two things to be true: a) people have social roles connected to reproductive function and b) these roles are free from relations of subordination and privilege. I use the example above only to explain the social constructivist view, not to hypothesise about the possibility of the example itself.

I will now explain the two-pronged nature of social-constructivist social kinds. I wish to avoid repetition, as I have outlined this in the previous section, so in this section I will focus on the particular salient features of this view that are relevant to this chapter. We can consider the above picture the standard social constructivist view of gender. This view can be taken as an independent and sufficient account of gender on its own. Similarly for race, a picture with the above structure can be an independent and sufficient account. However, when it comes to race, Haslanger offers another sense of race that is supposed to function alongside the view of race as class. On this bifurcated account, as well as being classed as a member of a certain racial group an individual also has a racial identity.

Haslanger introduces this bifurcated notion by considering the cases of mixed-race people, and people in mixed-race families. The previously discussed social constructionist account of race as class considers someone to be racialised in a certain context in the case that they are (veridically or non veridically) recognised as being a member of a certain racial group. But when considering mixed-race people and other similar cases, she argues that this account is insufficient at capturing the ways in which race impacts an individual's life.

One way of highlighting this is to consider the phenomenon of 'passing'. Ethnic and racial groups are extraordinarily diverse. A light-skinned African-American person could have light skin, straight hair, blue eyes, and facial features stereotypically associated with European ancestry. If an African-American person did share these features, it is likely that in the course of their day-to-day life the people that they interacted with would not think that this person was African-American parentage. Or in ordinary parlance, this person 'passes' as White, despite being black. Given that on the previous account being a member of a racial group depends on being read as having a certain sort of ancestry, this person would not qualify as African-American, or Black.

Considering the 'passing' person to not be Black seems strange. There are people that 'pass', but are born to two Black parents, raised in a Black family, identify with and participate in Black culture, attend Historically Black Colleges and Universities, and so on. It seems that in some important sense people that 'pass' are still Black. On this view, it might even be a moral harm to deny someone's racial identity on these grounds - especially considering that as a social constructionist account, this view acknowledges its role in not just reporting but in creating reality, and as an ameliorative account, this view aims to create a reality that is morally superior than our own. This highlights the inadequacies of taking the previous 'race-as-class' view to be a sufficient and whole picture of race. Given cases like the above, Haslanger argues that we need a picture of race that allows us to allow for individuals that 'pass' to still count in some way as being a member of a racial group (Haslanger, 2012).

So what is it that the 'race-as-class' view is failing to account for here? The 'race-as-class' view is good at explaining the relations of subordination, categorisation and domination that constitute so much of the phenomena that we are attempting to account for. But there is more to race than merely being recognised as having a certain ancestry. The element of race that the 'passing' individual has, even in the face of being mistakenly treated as a White person is their racial identity. The first account of racial identity that Haslanger considers is Kwame Anthony Appiah's account of racial identity:

> *"... a label R, associated with ascriptions by most people (where ascription involves descriptive criteria for applying the label); and identifications by those who fall under it (where identification implies a shaping role for the label in the intentional acts of the possessors, so that they sometimes act as an R), where there is a history of associating possessors of (p.284) the label with an inherited racial essence (even if some who use the*

label no longer believe in racial essences). (Appiah and Gutmann 1996, 83–84, quoted in

Haslanger, 2012)"

For Appiah, race has an element similar to the above social constructionist account - part of the picture is ascriptions from other people, and these ascriptions have a causal historical relationship to the notion of an inherited racial essence. But this picture has another element - racial identification. Racial identification 'implies a shaping role...in the intentional acts of the possessors' (Ibid.). This racial identification is internal to the agent, and consciously shapes the way an agent interacts with the world.[3]

Haslanger rejects the specifics of this theory of racial identity on the grounds that it is guilty of 'hyper-cognitivism' and 'intentionalism' (Haslanger, 2012). She argues that so much of racial identity is subconscious and somatic, and that a view that places such importance on the way race consciously shapes an individual's actions is implausible on these grounds. However, Haslanger does borrow both the bifurcated structure of Appiah's view, and its notion of racial identity. The two elements of race are thus the first account we discussed, 'race-as-class', and the notion of racial identity we have just introduced, which we can call 'race-as-identity'.

The elements of racial identity that Haslanger wants to capture are as follows:

"• unconscious somatic (routine behaviors, skills, and "know-hows")

• unconscious imaginary (unconscious self-image/somatic image)

• tacit cognitive (tacit understandings, tacit evaluations)

• perceptual (perceptional selectivity, recognitional capacities)

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[3] Appiah's account is notably different from Haslanger's account, however. Appiah is an eliminativist about race kinds, arguing that we should cease to use race terms and concepts, and Haslanger is a constructionist, who thinks that we must use race terms and concepts in order to correct the injustice that these concepts are used to cause.

• conscious cognitive (fear, apprehension, attraction, sense of community)

• normative (aesthetic judgments, judgments of suitability or appropriateness, internalized or not?)"

(Ibid.)

We can see in the above the distinction between the Appiah account and the Haslanger account. On this structure, the Appiah account focuses on the latter two points - the conscious cognitive and the normative, whereas the Haslangerian account aims to capture something more complex and multifaceted.

Instead of expounding upon this list of elements, Haslanger instead turns to metaphor to provide her canonical explanation of what racial identity is. She aims to capture the above listed elements by using the metaphor of an 'internal map' (Ibid.). Maps act to guide us through situations. Internal maps are the parts of ourselves that serve a guiding function. So the second prong of the bifurcated account of race is quoted as follows: "[O]ne has an X racial identity just in case their map is formed to guide someone marked as X through the social and material realities that are (in that context) characteristic of Xs as a group" (Ibid.). It is possible in principle and in practice to be classed as a member of one group, but have your internal map - your identity - configured as a member of another group.

This account of race allows for contextual differences, both being classed in a certain way and identifying in a certain way can change depending on the context, and it does not need to be the case that when these classes and identifications do switch in different contexts, that they switch in the same way or at the same time. An identity that switches depending on different contexts is categorised as 'fragmented', and these fragmented identities provide a way to account for mixed-race identities and other identities that change depending on contexts:

"X has a racially "mixed" identity just in case (and to the extent that) X's internal map is substantially fragmented, that is, is formed to guide, in some contexts and along some dimensions, someone marked as of one race, and in other contexts and other dimensions, a person marked as of a different race." (Ibid.)

This racially mixed identity account is supposed to cover not just those of mixed parentage, but also the identities of people that exist in different racialised cultural concepts. So for example, Richard T. Greener - the first Black student at Harvard University, admitted in 1870 - might have developed a fragmented identity given that he had to navigate his life prior to Harvard growing up in a Black family, and then navigating a university in which he was the only Black student. And at the same time, a person of mixed Indian and English parentage could have an internal map that guides them through Christmas as someone marked as White, and Diwali as someone marked as Asian.

1.2.3 Universalising the Bifurcated Picture

In this subsection I will briefly outline the features of social constructivist views of identity - in particular Katharine Jenkins' view - that are relevant to my discussion of identity, which is found later in this chapter.

Jenkins highlights the asymmetrical picture of race and gender that Haslanger provides, arguing that although gender identity is not given an account in Haslanger's work, that Haslanger has provided the philosophical structure to provide a full account of gender identity. Borrowing directly from the bifurcated picture of race, Jenkins uses the metaphor of an 'internal map' to give a picture of gender identity:

"S has a gender identity of X iff S's internal 'map' is formed to guide someone classed as a member of X gender through the social or material realities that are, in that context, characteristic of Xs as a class" (Jenkins, 2016)

It is easy to see that this picture is directly analogous to the social constructivist picture of race. The argument being made here is that gender and race are sufficiently similar that gender identity is much like race identity:

"...[H]aving a female gender identity means having an internal 'map' that is formed to guide someone who is subordinated on the basis of having actual or imagined bodily features that are presumed to be evidence of a female's role in biological reproduction through the social or material realities characteristic of a person who is so subordinated" (Ibid.)

The debate that Jenkins' paper is aimed at is the debate over which individuals count as members of which gender groups. The main point of contention is that - given that social constructionist accounts aim to both create reality, and for this reality to be morally superior - a non-bifurcated view of gender unfairly excludes transwomen from the category of 'women'. Jenkins argues that her picture better includes transgender people. Given the ameliorative nature of both Haslanger and Jenkins' inquiries, the disagreement is over which picture of gender is more just.

1.3 Disambiguation

In this section of the thesis I will disambiguate my usage of the term 'identity'. In the previous parts of this thesis I have been discussing Sally Haslanger, Katharine Jenkins, Talia Bettcher, and Mari Mikkola's views on identity. Each of the aforementioned thinkers has a different view of what identity

is, and this leads to differences in the implications of that view for the extension of the term 'identity'. In order to disambiguate these senses, and to provide more guidance on term usage, I will distinguish here between the following senses of the term 'identity': firstly, self-identification, which is a kind of personal endorsement of group membership, secondly the 'internal map', which is the Haslangerian way of accounting for the ways group membership shapes a person, and thirdly a sense of identity as simple *group membership*, in which someone has identity x simply in the case that they *are* x.

I need to distinguish between these terms to avoid equivocation and confusion. Explicitly distinguishing between these senses also allows us to better understand views in this space - for example we can understand Jenkins' former view of gender identity to be the view that the 'internal map' confers group membership, part of Haslanger's view of racial identity to be that group membership confers the 'internal map', and Talia Mae Bettcher's view of gender to be that self-identification, and self-identification alone, confers group membership. Further, disambiguating in this way allows me to make my own view clearer. Specifically, it helps me make clearer that the 'internal map' does not confer group membership, and that the view of group membership I endorse - an oppression-based, harm-tracking view, will relegate concerns about the 'internal map' and self-identification to being of secondary importance when compared to class harms, which are harms that individuals and groups suffer regardless of what their internal map is like, and regardless of how they identify.

In this subsection I will cover these differing senses of identity in more detail. One way to talk about identity is to say that someone 'identifies *as*' a certain kind of person. For example, you might identify as black, or identify as a woman. Another way to talk about identity is to talk about 'identifying *other* people as' a certain kind of person. For example, a police officer might identify a subject as being a white male. These first two senses relate to membership of kind groups. In the first

kind of identity-talk, a person is expressing that they are a certain kind of person. In the second kind of identity-talk, a person is marking another person as being a certain kind of person. But there is another sense of the term 'identity' that stretches beyond kind-membership alone. Another way to talk about identity is to say that you *have* a certain identity. For example, a mixed race person might say that they have more of a White identity than a Korean identity, because they grew up mostly around White people.

Because of these differing senses, claims about identity governing group membership are often deploying multiple senses of identity at once. For example, Katharine Jenkins' initial paper about identity can be taken as saying that identity in the sense of *having* a certain identity confers identity in the sense of *being* a certain kind of person. It is even possible to use the same locution to refer to different senses of identity - someone saying 'I am Black' might mean to communicate firstly that they thought of themselves as a Black person, secondly that others treated them as if they were Black, and thirdly that their conception of themselves was informed by their experience as a Black person.

Because not all speakers disambiguate when using some senses but not the others, and this is the case even in philosophical treatments of the subject, it is important to be clear when talking about identity. I will now give a detailed disambiguation of these different senses of identity, and use these disambiguated terms in the rest of this thesis.

The first sense of identity is sometimes called self-identification. I will use the term 'self-ascription' rather than 'self-identification', in order to remove ambiguous identity-language from my disambiguated terms. Self-ascription is a simple and thin concept - someone self-ascribes as a member of a kind group in the case that they say that they are a member of that kind group. On most views of

social kind groups[4] self-ascription need not be veridical. In 2015, there was a furore in the news about an anti-racist activist called Rachel Dolezal, who had told everyone in her life that she was Black. The furore came about when it became publicly known that Dolezal had two white parents.

In this case, there was debate about the degree of the truth, accuracy, and sincerity of Dolezal's claimed Black identity (McGreal, 2015), but what cannot be disputed is that Dolezal self-ascribed as Black. This is because to self-ascribe as Black one must simply tell others that they are Black. And it is this act, it's veridicality aside, which caused the uproar in the first place. It is possible to generate many cases of self-ascription that are not veridical - often the act of fraud involves self-ascribing as something that you are not, such as a doctor or businessman. Dolezal was accused of this kind of fraud (Ibid.). It is also possible to non-veridically self-ascribe as something whilst being unaware that you are making a mistake. We can imagine case where a person was brought up by Black parents, genuinely believing herself to have Black ancestry, and might self-ascribe as black on those grounds[5].

The second kind of identity is the kind that means *being identified* as having a certain property, or being a member of a certain kind group, by others. To get a sense of what this kind of identity means we can turn back to Sally Haslanger's view of gender. For Haslanger, what makes a person a woman is for others in society to identify - however veridically - that person as having certain bodily features, for these bodily features to mark them as being a member of a subordinated group, and then to be subordinated on the grounds of being marked in that way. Notice that on this view, a person's self-ascription has no bearing on whether they are a woman or not. Instead, the person is being identified as a woman by others. As with self-ascription, this identification by others can run

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[4] The notable exception being views following Talia Mae Bettcher's (2007) view on gender, which holds *being* a woman to be identical with self-ascribing as a woman, with no further qualities required for qualification.
[5] It is possible to think that there might be other facts about this hypothetical person that would make true this self-ascription claim, such as the other kinds of identity that are in the following discussion, but just for the purposes of this example we can assume that there are not.

alongside other things that we use identity-language to refer to. Others treating you as a Black person is compatible with you telling other people that you are Black, of course. In philosophical discussions, identity-language is rarely used to describe this identification-by-others, and often theories of identity are contrasted against kind membership by identification-by-others[6]. However these discussions do not adopt a single term to refer to identification-by-others. As with self-ascription, I will adopt a term that does not refer to identity language in order to refer to identification-by-others, and in the following parts of this thesis I will refer to it as being *classed* as a member of the given kind group, and describe the kind groups that arise out of this classing as being kinds-as-class. For example, the group of people that are marked as Black, and subordinated as Black people, are classed as being black, and the relevant racial grouping in this case I will call race-as-class.

The third phenomena that identity-language is commonly used to refer to is often used in combination with the verb 'to have'. I give a detailed treatment of this kind of identity later in this thesis, but ordinarily we use this kind of identity-talk to refer to features internal to, or embodied by, an agent. Consider the headline of the Dolezal piece referenced above - "I wasn't identifying as black to upset people. I was being me", says Dolezal (McGreal, 2015). Dolezal "denies she lied to anyone" (Ibid.). She goes on to say "how I feel is more powerful than how I was born" (Ibid.). This use of the verb 'feel' reveals the nature of this sort of identity. Dolezal claims that it was permissible for her to self-ascribe as black[7] because she really *felt* that she was Black, and that this feeling persisted prior to the scandal, in which she was classed as Black by others, and persists still now, even though everyone is now classing her as White. And this feeling stretches beyond mere self-ascription. It isn't that she merely tells people that she is Black, it's that when she tells people that she is Black she means to communicate something about her *self*- her beliefs, thoughts, desires, and feelings. This kind of identity - how you feel - is perhaps the most contentious view of identity. What it is constituted by

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[6] For example, (Jenkins, 2016; Bettcher, 2007; Haslanger, 2012; Haslanger and Witt, 2005; Mikkola, 2019)
[7] And as mentioned above, whether she self-ascribed as Black is not in doubt

metaphysically, and the role it should play in grounding normative claims about gender, race, and social class, are both disputed in the literature and in this thesis. In a later chapter in this thesis, I argue that we can best consist of this kind of identity as being the thing that Bourdieu and the literature following him describe as *habitus*. In the social metaphysics literature responding to the social constructivist views of Sally Haslanger, this form of identity is described as a person's 'internal map' (Haslanger and Witt, 2005; Haslanger, 2012; Jenkins, 2016). I argue that this 'internal map' simply *is* habitus, and as a result in the following discussion I refer to this kind of identity as the 'internal map' or as 'habitus', given that a substantial portion of the following argumentation aims to make this link.

This disambiguation schema allows the following work to talk about all of the relevant things that we use identity-language to refer to, without falling into the unhelpful ambiguity that using the term 'identity', and the terms that use identity-language creates. This is important because much of the following argumentation refers to, and makes arguments about the normative claims that kind-membership can ground, and these arguments will be incoherent or ambiguous without this disambiguation.

Chapter 2 - Haslangerian Metaphysics - A Critique

2.1 Introduction

This chapter is a response to, and critique of Sally Haslanger's 'social constructivist' social

metaphysics (2012), and of other views following Haslanger. In particular I respond to views that

adapt Haslangerian social metaphysics to emphasise or increase the importance of identity, in

particular those of Katharine Jenkins' (2016). This view is an attempt to reconcile Haslangerian

metaphysics with the 'inclusion problem'. Jenkins accuses Haslanger's view of suffering from an

'inclusion problem' (Jenkins, 2016), on which some people for which we have good moral reasons to

include in the category of 'woman' are excluded from this category. Because Haslanger's project is

'ameliorative' in nature, an important desiderata for developing her metaphysical view is that the view

is morally useful - that it helps in some way to fight against injustice. Jenkins argues that the solution

to the inclusion problem is to develop a view of gender such that Haslanger's original analysis of

gender is only one half of gender, and that the other half is gender identity, which is 'equally

significant' and 'equally necessary' (Ibid.). To use the disambiguation schema I have adopted above -

Haslanger and Jenkins use identity-language mostly to refer to the 'internal map', and indeed we owe

the 'internal map' term to Haslanger and Jenkins.

In this chapter I argue against these views of gender identity. I do this by arguing for two major

positions. The first position that I argue for is that analyses - and particularly explicitly ameliorative

analyses - of subordinating relations such as gender already provide the resources for the kinds of

cases of contested application that Jenkins describes. This is because, regardless of how explicitly the ameliorative methodology of the project is, accounts of subordinating relations are in effect accounts that aim to describe the harm caused by these subordinating relations. As such, we can develop norms governing cases of contested application by appealing to these harms. I argue that the best account of a social kind such as 'woman' or 'Black' is the account that best tracks these harms.

I argue that Haslanger's and Jenkins' social metaphysics is insufficiently harm-focused, and that it is this lack of attention paid to harm that leaves these views particularly vulnerable to criticisms of contested application. A more detailed picture of the subordination that plays the key constitutive role in Haslanger's pictures of social kinds would be more action guiding in cases of contested application. I argue that a better understanding of harms would be particularly useful in discussions of gender identity. In order to operationalise and measure subordination, I employ Iris Marion Young's (Young et al., 2011) 'five faces of oppression' model as one way to do this. This model is useful because these five faces - exploitation, marginalisation, powerlessness, cultural imperialism, and violence - are measurable.

Using this model of subordination helps us to more accurately describe the social kinds generated by subordination. These five faces are the harms caused by the subordinating relations that we are aiming to give an account of. As such, an ameliorative social metaphysics is obliged to construct social kind categories that track these harms. Due to this, those people that suffer these harms are included in the category of 'woman', and those that do not are not. I argue that in many significant cases, these harms are suffered by people subordinated on the grounds of their sex, or their presumed sex, regardless of their 'internal map' or self-ascription. As such, a harm-tracking ameliorative view in these cases should be concerned with sex-based, race-based, and social-class-based subordination, rather than identity-based subordination - however one conceives of identity.

Later on in this thesis, I will make another related criticism of Jenkins' view, and other views that share her view of gender identity. I will do this by arguing that the 'internal map' metaphor is underspecified, and that the concept of 'habitus' from Bourdieu and the literature following him is a better candidate for fulfilling the functional role that the 'internal map' is supposed to play. A result of this latter argument is that identity-as-habitus is more firmly grounded in the objective than identity-as-map. The result of this is two arguments against the conception of gender identity found in Jenkins' work - the first argument criticising its inconsistency, and the second argument criticising its assumption that the functional role of gender identity can only be played by the subjective.

2.2 Haslangerian Gender

In this section I will briefly outline Haslanger's account of gender. Haslanger's account locates gender in 'a broad structure of subordination and privilege' (Haslanger, 2012). Specifically, a person counts as a woman if and only if:

> "(i) S is regularly and for the most part observed or imagined to have certain bodily features presumed to be evidence of a female's biological role in reproduction

> (ii) that S has these features marks S within the dominant ideology of S's society as someone who ought to occupy certain kinds of social position that are in fact subordinate (and so motivates and justifies S's occupying such a position); and

(iii) the fact that S satisfies (i) and (ii) plays a role in S's systematic subordination, that is, *along some dimension*, S's social position is oppressive, and S's satisfying (i) and (ii) plays a role in that dimension of subordination."

And a person counts as a man if and only if:

"(i) S is regularly and for the most part observed or imagined to have certain bodily features presumed to be evidence of a male's biological role in reproduction;

(ii) that S has these features marks S within the dominant ideology of S's society as someone who ought to occupy certain kinds of social position that are in fact privileged (and so motivates and justifies S's occupying such a position); and

(iii) the fact that S satisfies (i) and (ii) plays a role in S's systematic privilege, that is, *along some dimension*, S's social position is privileged, and S's satisfying (i) and (ii) plays a role in that dimension of privilege."

So, for Haslanger, being a woman is an oppressive social position that comes about as a result of being observed or imagined to have certain bodily features. The bodily features relevant to this social position are the markers of an individual's sex. This is to say that what it means to be gendered as a woman is for people to assume that you are of the female sex, and then to oppress you on the grounds of this assumption.

I will now highlight the features of this view that are relevant to my arguments. The first feature that I will highlight is that this view only indirectly relates to sex. Sex is only relevant for determining gender in so far as others in society assume the given person's sex. So this view does not hold that all female humans are women. Instead, women are the subordinated class of people that are *assumed* to be female. Secondly, this is an anti-realist, or debunking view of gender. This view aims to demonstrate that many of the properties that are often associated with sex, and thus grounded in something mind-independent, are in fact grounded in mind-dependent subordination.

2.3 Identity

In this section I will give a more detailed overview of Katharine Jenkins' criticism of Haslanger's work, as it is Jenkins' notion of identity that I will criticise in the following arguments. I have mentioned that Jenkins introduces the notion of gender identity to Haslangerian metaphysics. This is because Jenkins argues that Haslanger's metaphysics is vulnerable to an 'inclusion problem' (Jenkins, 2016, p.394), because it fails to include some people in the category of 'women' that we have good moral reason to believe should be included in this category. Specifically Jenkins' argues that our metaphysical view of gender should include all those who self-ascribe as women, and that Haslanger's view fails to do this. Because Haslanger's view only counts someone as a woman in the case that they are subordinated based on presumed gendered features of their body, it follows that someone does not count as a woman in the case that others in society do not take this to be a woman.

Jenkins argues that this is a problem because she defends the view that gender identity should play an important determinant role in developing and using gender categories. Jenkins argues that not all people who self-ascribe as women are assumed to be, taken to be, or treated as women by others in society. She uses four related cases to make her argument. Firstly, a person who identifies as a woman

but does not publicly present as so. Secondly, a person who identifies as a woman, publicly presents as such, but is still not considered to be a woman by others in society. Thirdly, a person who identifies as a woman and is not biologically female, but either is assumed to be biologically female, or taken to be a woman on the grounds of having undergone a medical transition. Fourth and last is a case in which a person is not biologically female, that this is known by others, but others still consider this person to be a woman.

Jenkins writes "So trans women will be categorized as women by Haslanger's account only if they find themselves in [the third kind of case] most of the time. Some trans women will never find themselves in scenario 3, and many trans women will find themselves in that scenario only some of the time. Therefore, many trans women will not be categorized as women according to Haslanger's definition." (Jenkins, 2016, p.401)

This is a moral criticism of Haslanger's view - a claim that some people are *unfairly* excluded from the category 'woman', rather than a more metaphysical claim that Haslanger's concept of 'woman' doesn't pick out the kind in the world with the functional role that Haslanger says, or that it is underspecified or incoherent. This act of failing to categorise someone in the gender category that they self-identify with is called misgendering - Jenkins argues that Haslanger's account misgenders many people that identify as women. A metaphysical project that was carried out without moral concerns in mind would not be vulnerable to this kind of criticism. But Haslanger's project is explicitly ameliorative, and it has as one of its key aims the goal of producing a theory of gender that works well at describing and dismantling injustice.

Jenkins takes the "proposition that trans gender identities are entirely valid - that trans women are women and trans men are men" (Ibid., p.396) to be a "foundational premise" (Ibid.) of her argument, and does not offer arguments in support of this proposition.

Haslanger's account of the gender category of 'woman' includes only one way to be a woman. Jenkins argues that in order to avoid excluding people that we are morally obliged to include into the category of women, Haslanger's ameliorative account of gender must be modified. The specific modification that Jenkins recommends is to borrow the concept of 'identity' from Haslanger's account of racial identity. To briefly reconstruct this view, which is previously described in this thesis, Haslanger's account of race differs from Haslanger's account of gender in that Haslangerian race has what I call a 'bifurcated' structure - it is split into two. On Haslanger's account of race, a person can qualify as a member of a racial group either from being taken to be a member of that group by others in society, or by having a racial identity. The picture of racial identity that Haslanger gives is a metaphor - one has a racial identity as a member of a group in the case that their 'internal map' is configured to guide them through life as a member of that group (Haslanger, 2012; Jenkins, 2016, p.409). Jenkins argues that one qualifies as a woman in the case that their 'internal map' is 'formed to guide someone classed as a member of X gender through the social or material realities that are, in that context, characteristic of Xs as a gender' (Jenkins, 2016, p.410). This is the second way to qualify as a woman.

2.4 Critique

I offer a criticism of Jenkins' view of identity. Jenkins' view of identity explicitly aims to provide an account that includes transgender identities, but I argue that Jenkins' view is inadequate at achieving this aim. Jenkins argues that transgender people have a gender identity formed to guide them as a

member of a gender other than the one they were assigned at birth (Ibid.), but I note here that this account of gender identity makes reference to the concept of gender itself.

In the aforementioned paper, beyond appealing to the 'internal map' metaphor, Jenkins does not provide an account of how gender identity comes about, or give a detailed picture of how gender identity relates to gender-as-class[8]. There are two ways of making sense of this self-referential account of gender identity. The first is to conceive of gender identity as having a direct relationship with gender-as-class[9]. On this understanding, gender identity comes about through a life lived being classed as a certain gender. So, a woman's internal map is formed to guide them through a life in which they are classed as being a woman *simply because* that woman has lived a life being classed as being a woman. The internal map thus becomes the sort of thing that is developed through lived experience. However, there are troubles with applying this view of gender identity to Jenkins' proposed aims. Because Jenkins' aim is to provide a view of gender identity that includes transgender people, this view of gender identity cannot - or at least cannot alone - achieve this aim.

Transgender people definitionally are those people that have a gender identity that does not match with the gender they were assigned at birth. An account that holds that gender identity comes about through having lived being classed as a certain gender cannot include transgender people as having the gender identity that they self-ascribe as. This is because transgender people are only classed as being a member of the gender that they self-ascribe as in the case that they have transitioned and are taken to be a member of that gender by others in society. Prior to the point at which they are successfully taken to be a member of their self-ascribed gender they do not have first-personal life

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[8] Later in this section I discuss the view that Jenkins gives in the subsequently published paper 'Toward an Account of Gender Identity' (Jenkins, 2018)

[9] This is the approach that I give in the chapter of this thesis titled 'Habitus and Internal Maps'.

experience of being classed as that gender. So if gender identity comes about through this first-personal life experience, then transgender people in many cases will not have it.

This is a problem for Jenkins' proposed aims because on her view, what it means to be transgender is to have a gender identity that is not the same as one's gender-as-class. Only including transwomen as women in the case that they are taken as women by others in society is the exact 'inclusion problem' that Jenkins' identifies and aims to solve.

We can see here the motivation for the disambiguation schema I have developed. There are four notions of gender at play in this argument. The first is gender as class, and the other three are distinct notions of identity. The next sense is the 'internal map' - the kind of identity that is subjective or internal. We also have self-ascription - the kind of identity that people have in the case that they are a certain kind of person. The last sense is the narrow metaphysical sense of identity - the question as to which entities qualify as a member of a set of entities, or the question of which set of entities a given term should 'pick out', or denote, in the universe.

Jenkins criticises Haslanger's view of the kind 'woman' for excluding transwomen from the group of 'women'. Her proposed solution aims to solve this problem by instead saying that we should use the term 'woman' to pick out those with woman-like 'internal maps'. Talia Mae Bettcher (PEA Soup: Ethics Discussions at PEA Soup: Katharine Jenkins' "Amelioration and Inclusion: Gender Identity and the Concept of Woman," with précis by Talia Bettcher, n.d.) and Mari Mikkola make arguments criticising Jenkins for making the same error that Jenkins accuses Haslanger of making - arguing that it wrongfully excludes some transwomen from the category of 'woman', because on Jenkins' view some people that *self-ascribe* as women are excluded from the category of 'woman'.

This cascading series of objections to Haslanger comes about as a result of ambiguity about what it means to have a certain gender identity. Both Jenkins and Bettcher are motivated by the thought that it is axiomatically true that we are morally obliged to include all transwomen in the category of woman - but when a person qualifies as transgender in the case that they have a gender identity other than the one they are assigned at birth, different sets of people qualify as transgender (and thus, on Jenkins' and Bettcher's view, as women) depending on which notion of gender identity is at play.

I want to clarify here the nature of this objection to Jenkins. I am not arguing that this is a categorical objection to 'internal map' views of identity. It is possible to think of Jenkins' conception of identity and gender qualification not causing a particular problem for a view of the metaphysics of gender, so long as one rejects Jenkins' formulation of the 'inclusion problem' or finds another unrelated way for transwomen to qualify as women. Given that Jenkins does neither, conceiving of identity in this way is not on the table.

The second way to conceive of Jenkins' view is to reject the thought that gender identity comes about as a result of lived experience. This would sever the tie between gender identity and gender-as-class on Jenkins' view. However, this is not an appealing solution either. There are two avenues of approach for this response.

The first is to tie gender identity to something other than gender-as-class. So, for example, transgender people could have a gender identity tied to sex rather than gender. Or another kind of gender could be posited to tie gender identity to. However, this approach is rejected by many gender identity theorists.

For example, Talia Mae Bettcher - whose work plays a crucial justificatory role for Jenkins' view - takes a roughly eliminativist position on sex. Bettcher argues that sex is practically undefinable and underdescriptive of womens' roles in society (Shrage, 2009, p.103). Bettcher herself expresses a strong pessimism about the project of locating gender identity in anything epistemic at all. To quote:

> "If believing one is a woman replaces genital status as sole determinant of membership, there are difficulties concerning an account of what it is to believe one is a woman. Is it to believe one possesses the special feature making one a woman? If so, to believe one is a woman is to believe one is a woman. And now we seem to have some problem of circularity or regress. In practice this means that the criterion is virtually unintelligible." (Ibid., p396)

Bettcher brings this circularity problem in sharp relief. If gender identity is not anchored to gender-as-class, it is hard to see a non-circular way of linking it to anything. In fact, Bettcher is so pessimistic about this task that she divorces gender identity from the epistemic world altogether, arguing instead that we are morally obliged to consider transwomen to be women simply because people have a first-personal *moral* authority over how they should be treated as it relates to gender (Ibid.). TThat is to say that Bettcher argues that we have the obligation to include transwomen in the category 'women' regardless of what the underlying epistemic picture is[10], and removes discussion of the internal map from the question altogether, instead taking only self-ascription to be important. And this is the case for Bettcher, regardless of what grounds the self-ascription.

It is possible now to state clearly one of the major sources of problems for Jenkins' view. Jenkins treats having an 'internal map' configured in a certain way, and self-ascribing as a member of a given gender group to be the same thing. Bettcher's arguments make the distinction between gender

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[10] Taking the proposition "Transgender women are women" to be axiomatic is common in the literature. As well as Betcher, it is shared by, for example, (Diaz-Leon, 2016; Ahmed, 2016; Kapusta, 2016)

self-ascription and having a certain 'internal map'. Jenkins' picture of gender identity is fundamentally epistemic and mental. Someone has a certain gender identity in the case that their thoughts and mind are configured in a certain way - on Jenkins' view in the case that they have an internal map configured in the right way. Self-ascription is different - self-ascription as a member of a given gender group is simply claiming to be a member of the group, or having the simple propositional belief[11] that one is a member of that group. Self-ascription is thinner, and less complicated than identity. Self-ascription in the sense of simply claiming to be a member of a group does not necessarily have to be internal or mental at all. This distinction is particularly relevant as Jenkins discusses cases where self-ascription and gender identity do not necessarily match in a given individual.

This move that Bettcher makes - to argue that the moral obligation to treat gender identity in the prescribed way does not depend on anything epistemic - is open to Jenkins in the sense that it can function as a motivating reason for her epistemic view, or in the sense that it can run alongside her epistemic view. But the circularity problem persists regardless of whether we have the moral obligation to include transwomen into the category 'woman' for the reason Bettcher says.

So Jenkins can either locate gender identity as arising from gender-as-class, and thus fail to solve the inclusion problem. Or locate it somewhere else, which runs a high risk of circularity or regress.

2.5 Toward an Account of Gender Identity

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[11] Of course on Betcher's view of first-personal authority, all beliefs about one's gender identity are true, and thus likely qualify not just as belief but as knowledge.

In part motivated by the kinds of concerns I have discussed above, Jenkins has published a further paper containing a more detailed account of gender identity. In this paper, she fills out the metaphor of the internal map by giving what she calls a 'norm-relevancy' account of gender identity (Jenkins, 2018). On this account, to have a gender identity is to experience "the norms associated with that gender in one's cultural context as relevant to one." (Ibid.). So this account combines the functional picture of identity provided by the metaphor of the internal map - that it has an orienting and guiding function - with a more descriptive and constitutive picture of norm-relevancy. Experiencing the norms of a given gender as being relevant to oneself is supposed to fulfill the orienting functions that the metaphor of the internal map describes.

I will now describe some features of this norm-relevancy account that distinguish it from other related theories of gender identity. Firstly, experiencing norms as relevant to oneself is distinct from endorsing, consenting or assenting to, complying with, or enjoying these norms. Jenkins uses the example of a woman who does not remove body hair from her legs, and is critical of the norm that women should have hairless legs, but nevertheless recognises that that norm applies to her and experiences that norm as relevant to her experience.

Secondly, this view does not endorse a monolithic or homogeneous group of gender norms that all have to be experienced as relevant at the same time. Jenkins uses the example of some transgender people desiring surgery to alter their bodies because they experience norms about gendered bodies as relevant to themselves, but other transgender people feeling that these norms are not relevant to themselves. So for example, some people might desire to change their bodies so as to comply with gendered norms about how their bodies should look, but other people might not (Ibid.). It follows from this that on Jenkins' view it is not a necessary condition for being transgender that a given

person desires surgery to change the gendered features of their bodies, but at the same time this view can account for the experiences of transgender people that *do* desire this kind of surgery.

Thirdly, although this norm-relevancy account is more detailed than Jenkins' initial map-metaphor view, its epistemic character is not specified. Norm-relevancy aims to be a total account of gender identity - which is to say that all that it means to have a gender identity *f* is to experience the norms relating to *f*-ness in a given society as relevant to your behaviour. There are a number of ways to conceive of this experiencing-as-relevant phenomena. For example, it might be a preference, an emotional reaction, or a disposition. It might be voluntary or involuntary, it might arise through socialisation, coercion, or autonomy. Jenkins does not give an account of any of these things. As a result we do not have an account of how gender identity comes about.

Lastly, and most importantly, this norm-relevancy account is designed with the norm of 'first person authority', or 'FPA', in mind. FPA is the position advocated by Talia Bettcher as discussed above - the view that "a person should be treated as the final and decisive authority on their own gender identity" (Ibid.). Jenkins makes the distinction between two norms of FPA. The first is the proposed ethical norm endorsed by Talia Bettcher - which is that we are morally obliged to take a person's gender self-identification as entirely authoritative (Bettcher, 2007; Jenkins, 2018). The second is epistemic FPA, which is the position that - epistemically speaking - a person has a "serious epistemic advantage" (Jenkins, 2018) about their own gender identity. It is important to make the distinction between these two forms of FPA. Ethical FPA does not depend on anything epistemic whatsoever. If ethical FPA is true, then we are obliged to take gender self-identification claims as authoritative regardless of how probable, objectively or subjectively, gender self-identification claims are to be true.

2.6 The Norm Relevancy Account and Epistemology

Jenkins' initial argument (Jenkins, 2016) is made with the 'inclusion problem' in mind. In the latter paper (Jenkins, 2018) Jenkins endorses Mari Mikkola's (Mikkola, 2016) argument that the inclusion problem can and should be deflated for methodological reasons. Mikkola argues that it is possible for feminists to talk about gendered oppression without needing to give a "thick articulation" (Ibid.) of the term 'woman' such that the content of woman-ness is described. Instead, Mikkola argues that we can focus on the extension and use of the term 'woman' and that doing so is good enough for feminist purposes.

Adjudicating on Mikkola's argument itself is beyond the scope of this thesis, but it is necessary to mention it for two reasons. Firstly, because Jenkins revises her thesis in light of Mikkola's arguments, and as a result the revised norm-relevancy account of gender identity *does* exclude by being incompatible with epistemic FPA. On Jenkins' view, the following kind of case is possible: a person is gendered as a man at birth, develops the internal map of a man due to being socialised as a man, but self-identifies as a woman nonetheless. As a result, this view implies that this person does not have a woman's gender identity, even though they may transition and later develop one. On Jenkins' previous commitment that epistemic FPA is true, this would be an unacceptable implication as it would result in the conclusion that the person in this case is a man, despite self-identifying as a woman. But Jenkins' revised view denies the importance of this inclusion problem - instead it just aims to give a picture of gender identity without aiming for this picture of identity to sort people into 'women' and 'not-women'.

Secondly, and relatedly, although adopting Mikkola's methodology to sidestep the inclusion problem may [12] work for Jenkins, it will not work for my project. Jenkins focuses on the ethical FPA and disregards the epistemic FPA in order to avoid the inclusion problem. In this project I aim to give an account of situated knowledge. This is a necessarily epistemic endeavour. The target of this thesis is in fact that special epistemic states that members of minority groups have access to in virtue of their subordination position. In some respects this puts me in a similar position to Jenkins - her notion of gender identity is epistemic too. However, Jenkins endorses the view that in all cases and contexts we should take self-ascription to be the determinant of gender kind membership. She argues that we should cease using the term 'woman' to refer to any group other than the group of people that self-identify as women - instead using terms like 'classed as a woman' to refer to other groups of people that are commonly referred to with this term, such as the group of people subordinated in a certain way, the group of people with certain kinds of bodies, and so on.

This move to relegate epistemic factors to irrelevance is unavailable to me for two reasons. Firstly, this project explores the epistemic reasons we have to diversify our political decision-making groups and practices. Bettcher and Jenkins (2007; 2018) argue that we have a dominating countervailing reason to include self-identifiers in every context, regardless of any epistemic reasons we have. But an epistemic analysis of subordination and social kind groups cannot take this political prescription and assume on the grounds of it that self-identification groupings are the only epistemically important or relevant groups. Regardless of which category is the true heir to terms like 'woman', an epistemic analysis must proceed on its own terms. Later in this thesis, I argue that epistemically speaking, groups based on subordination - so groups with the kind of structure proposed Haslanger's original account of gender - have distinctive and important situated knowledge.

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[12] Once more, I do not aim to adjudicate on the success of Mikkola's arguments here, as this broader methodological adjudication is beyond the scope of this thesis.

This first reason relates to the second reason, which is that this epistemic analysis aims to justify real political interventions. Many of these changes will require selecting specific persons as beneficiaries, subjects, or targets of a given policy intervention. This process of selection will involve including some people and excluding others. Given that I argue that politically important situated knowledge is generated through experience of being subordinated in a group, it follows that our epistemic reasons support interventions that select participants on the grounds of group-membership-as-class, rather than identity groupings[13].

2.7 Moral Stakes and Amelioration

In this section I will set out my own methodological commitments for the metaphysics in this project. In the previous sections I have discussed the move that scholars like Jenkins make to sidestep giving a thick articulation of gender identity, and I have mentioned that side-stepping move is unavailable to me, because developing policy interventions requires selecting target groups of people, and giving a picture of metaphysics that relates to epistemology requires considering which epistemic features are conferred on the grounds of identity, and which features are conferred on the grounds of class.

Policy interventions - such as quotas in representative democracies or education programmes for minorities - have two features that I argue are relevant and necessary in guiding metaphysical projects. The first relevant and necessary feature is that these interventions *do* require a somewhat essentialist picture of the relevant social kind. That is to say that these interventions require some sorting of group members from non-group members. For example, a policy that aims to increase womens' representation in science and technology must have some way of sorting women from

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[13] I give this argument in more detail later in this thesis.

not-women, and a policy that aims to combat redlining by providing credit directly to African Americans must have a way of sorting African Americans from non-African Americans.

The sorting function of an individual policy need not directly track a metaphysical distinction that cleaves nature at the joints, but in order for this sorting function to ameliorate the harm that it seeks to ameliorate, it must at least be *informed* by the relevant metaphysical distinctions. And as such, metaphysical distinctions that expressly reject the project of distinction-making will be inadequate for policy intervention.

The second relevant and necessary feature of these policy interventions is that they aim to solve a moral problem - specifically the problem of oppression. Gender quota systems in representative democracies aim to ameliorate the problem of patriarchal oppression. It is not the mere fact that women are underrepresented in representative chambers that motivates the policy intervention, but that this underrepresentation is the result of a wider oppression. This is why we consider it a problem that, for example, women are underrepresented, but we do not consider it a problem that jugglers, Toby Jug collectors, or swing dancers are underrepresented. This fact - that the policy interventions aim to ameliorate this oppression, and that successful interventions in this space are developed with oppression in mind, should guide our metaphysical picture. That is to say that our metaphysical picture should be meaningfully action-guiding - that it should make possible acts that aim to ameliorate or end oppression.

Here I would like to ward off a worry about circularity. I have just said that being applicable to policy interventions is a virtue that we should have in mind when developing metaphysical pictures of social kinds. The worry about circularity is this - if we are using policy interventions to guide our metaphysics, and metaphysics to guide our policy interventions, then there is a risk of circularity.

I argue that to conceive of this relationship as one of conceptual circularity is a misunderstanding. This is because policy interventions are a tool that we can use to learn more about metaphysical kinds, and the oppressive structures that underpin them. We have a working theory of a kind like gender, or race. These working theories contain falsifiable claims - for example, gender oppression manifests itself partially in lowered rates of labour participation. We can then look to improve labour participation by policy that makes childcare easier to access, lowers the risk of sexual harassment, and so on. The results of this policy rightfully tell us something about our belief that gender oppression manifests itself in this way.

So I draw an analogy between scientific theories and experiments on the one hand, and metaphysical views and policy interventions on the other. Much as scientific theories for which we cannot collect experimental data are inadequate, so are metaphysical views of social kinds that we cannot learn about by effecting social change. The kind of social change I have been discussing in this section is the kind of policy interventions, but to be clear, my view includes other, non-policy kinds of interventions as legitimate in this case also. Policy interventions are particularly relevant in this case, however, as they often require some sort of selection criteria that partitions the set of people such that some are included in a group, and others are not.

2.8 A View of Oppression

In this subsection I will outline my view of oppression. This view of oppression grounds the social constructivist metaphysics that I endorse, and I argue that it also provides a way to sort groups of people in a way that makes policy interventions possible. Specifically, I will use Iris Marion Young's

'Five Faces of Oppression' as an example of one possible view of oppression that can be action-guiding in cases of inclusion (Young et al., 2011). So, a view of social kinds that cannot inform selection processes for policy interventions is undesirable. And given that I am engaged in an epistemic project, it is necessary to develop a view that can ground an epistemic project.

I will now turn back to the definition of the subordinated category of 'woman' that Sally Haslanger uses. For Haslanger, to be a woman is to be subordinated on the grounds of a presumed reproductive role. Specifically, a person counts as a woman if:

> "(i) S is regularly and for the most part observed or imagined to have certain bodily features presumed to be evidence of a female's biological role in reproduction
>
> (ii) that S has these features marks S within the dominant ideology of S's society as someone who ought to occupy certain kinds of social position that are in fact subordinate (and so motivates and justifies S's occupying such a position); and
>
> (iii) the fact that S satisfies (i) and (ii) plays a role in S's systematic subordination, that is, *along some dimension*, S's social position is oppressive, and S's satisfying (i) and (ii) plays a role in that dimension of subordination."

(Haslanger, 2012)

The putative inclusion problem that Jenkins discusses (2016), and later takes as justification for disregarding epistemic pictures of gender altogether (Jenkins, 2018), is motivated by a worry about excluding transwomen from the category of 'women'. This worry itself is motivated by a

methodological and moral commitment to the view that excluding transwomen from the category of women is impermissible in any context, at any time. This view is not argued for, and following Betcher (Bettcher, 2007), Jenkins holds the view that it is immoral to make arguments for or against it (Jenkins, 2018).

I argue that by appealing to a more sophisticated notion of oppression, we find compelling countervailing arguments for developing more exclusive notions of gender, race, and social class. For example, using Iris Marion Young's multifaceted, multidimensional analysis of oppression we can more clearly track the group of people that are harmed by a given norm or act. This more sophisticated way of conceiving of oppression allows us to analyse the ways in which people and groups are harmed by subordination without necessarily categorically excluding people from subordination altogether. That is to say that this way of conceiving of oppression allows us to say that a group of people is not oppressed in a certain way, or is less oppressed in a certain way, whilst still doing justice to the fact that that group is the victim of injustice in other ways. In turn, these groups that we can identify with this way of thinking about oppression can be used to inform social change and policy intervention, without having to address the categorical question of group membership in every case.

Marion-Young highlights five kinds of oppression: exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural imperialism, and violence (Young et al., 2011). I will now briefly give an overview of these 'faces' of oppression. The first face of oppression is exploitation. Marion-Young writes that the "central insight expressed in the concept of exploitation, then, is that this oppression occurs through a steady process of the transfer of the results of the labor of one social group to benefit another." (Ibid.). Exploitation has a number of meanings across different contexts, but Marion-Young uses the term to refer specifically to this transfer of the fruits of labour. This

includes economic exploitation as traditionally construed, for example the way that the fruits of the labour of a worker are transferred to the capitalist in a capitalist economy,

The second face of oppression is marginalization. Marginals, for Marion-Young are people "the system of labour cannot or will not use" (Ibid.). This marginalisation in the labour market creates a kind of social marginalisation, because in capitalist societies a person's social status is tied to their role in labour (Ibid.). She writes that marginalization is "perhaps the most dangerous form of oppression" because labour marginalization creates political disenfranchisement that can lead to, in the worst case, extermination (Ibid.).

The third face of oppression is powerlessness. For this face of oppression, Marion-Young uses a notion of power that is influenced by Marxist analyses of power. Specifically, the condition that characterises powerlessness is that "the powerless have little or no work autonomy, exercise little creativity or judgment in their work, have no technical expertise or authority, express themselves awkwardly, especially in public or bureaucratic settings, and do not command respect". Powerless then, is the ability to direct your own life - particularly but not exclusively in the context of work, but also the poor treatment that you receive on the grounds of this powerlessness, and the inhibition "in the development of one's own capacities" (Ibid.).

The fourth face of oppression is cultural imperialism. Unlike the prior three forms of oppression - which all relate to a group or person's place in the context of labour - cultural imperialism is oppression that manifests in ideas and culture. This includes othering - the process by which an in-group is privileged as normal in the context of dominant norms, and an out-group is characterised as deviant and distinct (Ibid.).

The fifth and last face of oppression is violence. Marion-Young writes that groups such as "Blacks, Asians, Arabs, gay men, and lesbians" live under the threat of systematic violence, and that women face the threat of systematic sexual and non-sexual violence (Ibid.). She emphasises that oppression is manifested not just by the violence itself, but by the social context that makes the acts of violence possible, and its existence as not just random acts of violence but as a social practice (Ibid.).

2.9 The Five Faces Model

The five faces of oppression model is a useful model for my project, although other accounts of oppression, subordination or structural injustice might also be applicable, for four reasons. First, this model endorses a structural view of oppression, rather than an individualistic one; second, this model is conceptually rich and detailed, which provides resources for assessing the relative position of minority groups; third, this model emphasises the importance of material oppression and labour, but also has the resources to discuss matters of identity without denying their existence; and lastly that this view's multifaceted approach to oppression provides the ability to better describe the complexity in which oppression manifests.

The benefit of a structural view of oppression is that it can account for the existence of oppression even in cases where it is difficult to identify agents that are acting with oppression in mind. So, for example, it is possible to account for how a woman might be discriminated against in the labour market even in the case that she is applying for jobs at employers that claim anti-sexist principles. This lack of reliance on specific bad actors also means that this view of oppression can more easily account for manifestations of oppression for which the responsibility for that oppression is extremely spread out or nebulous. For example, the set of relevant agents that have a role in explaining the

oppression that Black students face in school is extraordinarily large and diverse. Further, structural oppression is better equipped to handle cases that involve the Abilene Problem - cases of oppression where an oppressive act is carried out despite the lack of desire for oppression on behalf of the actors.

I also emphasise the benefit of the detail and specificity that this model of oppression has. The 'inclusion problem' that has powered much of the recent debate on the metaphysics of gender is motivated by the thought that transwomen are particularly badly oppressed, as compared to ciswomen. In particular, this claim about the relative oppression of transwomen is grounded in the level of violence that transwomen experience (Jenkins, 2016; Bettcher, 2007, p.44). Adopting this more detailed view of oppression allows us to assess this relative oppression claim in more detail, and with more clarity, but without having to deny or downplay the level of violence that transwomen face [14]. This detail also gives us a more sophisticated way to talk about race and ethnicity - as Young mentions herself, not all ethnic groups or races are oppressed to the same degree, or in the same way (Young, 1990, p.40). In both the cases of race and gender, adopting this view of oppression lets us discuss the differing ways two groups are oppressed without having to deny the existence of the oppression of either group. Later in this thesis I will also argue that this applies to social class, as well as to race and gender.

This added detail also provides much more action-guidance for policy interventions and activism. The varying ways in which oppression manifests require varying interventions. Later in this thesis I discuss two particular areas in which this added detail bears fruit. Firstly, later in this chapter I will discuss the way this added detail better equips us to answer questions about identity - especially its importance and how it relates to class and materiality. Secondly, this detail better equips us to assess

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[14] It is of course possible to argue that grounding these claims in relative oppression is mistaken in the first place. I do not take a position on this, except to say that adopting a more sophisticated view of oppression allows us to analyse the relative oppression claims more rigorously.

which groups need intervention in the case of amendments to our democratic systems, and which interventions are best posed to help.

Lastly, I endorse this view because of its treatment of materiality, class, and identity. The five faces of oppression model recognises the existence of identity without having to ground material class concerns, or concerns about labour, in identity. I will discuss this in more detail later in this chapter.

2.10 Moral Stakes Revisited

Now that I have outlined my commitment to Marion-Young's view of oppression, I can give a clearer picture of what I mean when I say that this philosophical project is at all times carried out with the moral stakes in mind. When we give a metaphysical account of a subordinated group or a subordinating power relation, all that we are doing is describing subordination and oppression. Subordination and oppression are necessarily concepts that have a moral element - they are moral harms. And a detailed view of oppression allows us to better describe these moral harms, and in doing so to better describe the moral stakes of our work.

Consider the oft-discussed case of female genital mutilation, or FGM. It is necessary that our concept of 'woman' tracks the harms caused by this particular form of violence towards women. This is a particularly clear case that demonstrates the capability of the five-faces model to track the moral harms caused by subordination. The first relevant feature of this case is that FGM is - in the cultural context of the cultures that practice it - a practice that is carried out on those considered to be women. This is as opposed to being carried out on the group of people that consider themselves to be women, this practice is carried out on those marked as 'woman' by others in society. The second relevant

feature of this case is that it is a case of extreme sexualised violence - which is itself one of the faces of oppression. The third relevant feature of this case is that FGM is often, and sometimes only carried out by other women (Almroth et al., 2001). This is where the structural element of the five-faces model shows its benefits - the harm is caused even despite the fact that the majority of men in some FGM-practicing communities disapprove of the practice (Ibid.). Although in patriarchal societies there is in fact an oppressing group, and an oppressed group, the structural element in this case allows us to explain how this practice manifests despite the preferences of the oppressed group that it not happen.

Because FGM is an extreme harm carried out towards women, in virtue of them being women, it is necessary that a metaphysics that tracks the moral stakes of gender can accurately capture FGM. This harm is carried out not because they identify as women, but because they are marked and classed as women. Identity in this case does not come into play in deciding whether the act is carried out. A view that aims to track the moral stakes of the subordinating gender relation thus needs to be capable of accounting for this harm. The same reasoning about FGM can be extended to sexual violence towards women in general. It is for this reason that I argue in favour of Haslanger's original view of 'woman', and reject views of the category 'woman' that foreground identity and do away with class and materiality.

I use the example of FGM to demonstrate my point - but this is not the only example I will use to emphasise and explain the role of moral stakes in my project. Throughout this thesis I will return to the question of moral stakes in order to explain the motivation behind the metaphysical picture that I defend.

In this chapter I have argued that the view of gender identity as originally construed by Jenkins' cannot serve the ameliorative goals of Jenkins' project. I have argued that it is vulnerable to a problem of circularity, and that the solutions to the circularity are either to ground gender identity in gender-as-class, or to abandon an epistemic view of gender identity altogether. I have argued that although Jenkins has, in later work, adopted the latter strategy, that this approach closes off epistemic analyses of social kinds, and does not produce a view of gender that can give a causal picture of subordinating harms. As such, I endorse the former approach of grounding the 'internal map' in social-kinds-as-class. In the next chapter, I will fill out this 'internal map' metaphor by identifying it with Bourdieu's concept of 'habitus'.

Chapter 3: Habitus and Internal Maps

3.1 Introduction

This section of the thesis is dedicated to the notion of social-kinds-as-identity. I endorse a broadly Haslangerian (or *social constructionist*) account of social kinds. That is to say that I defend the position that social kinds like race and gender are socially constructed and the product of subordinating relations. The literature following Haslanger discusses two elements of Haslangerian social kinds - the element I call kind-as-class, which is the way an individual or group is labelled, subordinated and treated *as* a member of that group, and the element that is ordinarily called 'identity', but which for disambiguation purposes I have been calling the 'internal map'.

Gender as class is given a specific and well discussed definition in the literature, as Haslanger (2012) provides this definition in the paper in which this understanding of social kinds is introduced. Gender as identity has seen less analysis, and although its importance has been advocated for (notably in Jenkins aforementioned (2016) application of this work to gender), this metaphor of the 'internal map' has not received much attention.

In this chapter I will provide a more in depth exploration of the metaphor of the 'internal map'. The structure of the chapter is as follows: firstly I will give an overview of the relevant literature both by and responding to Haslanger on social kinds as identity. I will then highlight the similarities between the bifurcated class/kind understanding of social kinds and the Bourdieuan understanding of

'objective social class' and 'habitus' (Bourdieu, 2008), drawing a parallel between 'habitus' and social kinds as identity. In this way I will be able to apply the wealth of research on 'habitus' to the metaphor of the 'internal map', providing an account that allows Haslangerian social kind theorists to move past the ambiguity that comes along with using the metaphor as-is.

As well as contributing to the literature on social kinds, this chapter also plays an important part in the structure of this thesis. A central claim in this thesis is that knowers have an imperfectly interpersonally accessible kind of knowledge that they are uniquely placed to have in virtue of their social position. For Bourdieu and the theorists that endorse his view, habitus has a distinctly epistemic quality. As such, by incorporating insights from the literature on habitus, I will be able to provide a fuller picture of the nature of this situated knowledge. Later on in this thesis I will make this move in reverse, and by applying Haslangerian metaphysics to Bourdieuan social class, develop a view that combines the descriptive aptness of Bourdieuan social kinds with the clarity of sturcture and flexibility of application of Haslangerian social kinds

At this juncture in the thesis it is important to provide another piece of disambiguation and clarification. Many views of identity, such as Jenkins' original view, aim to give a view such that we can speak of identity in some way *qualifying* or *making* an individual as a member of a given group. In the previous chapter I argue that these qualificatory issues are best approached with the 'moral stakes' in mind - so someone qualifies as a member of a group in an individual case just in the case that they are subject to the relevant kind-related harm. Often other views of identity aim to somehow prioritise identity such that identity takes precedence over kind-as-class, or a view of harm is given such that identity plays an important role in harm tracking.

In this chapter my view does not aim to either prioritise identity over kind-as-class, nor does it aim to argue that identity plays an important causal role in subordinating harms, in most cases. Rather, the view of identity I give in this chapter aims to describe the subjective, embodied, or internal manifestations of subordinating kinds - not because these manifestations are more important than harms caused by kind-as-class, but rather because they do exist, and that by describing them we can firstly develop a better understanding of subordinating harms, and secondly develop an understanding of how the epistemic elements of social kinds come about.

3.2 Revisiting the Bifurcated Picture

In the prior sections of this thesis I have given an overview of the bifurcated picture of social kinds that is characteristic of Haslangerian metaphysics. In this chapter I give my own view of social kinds, and offer a critique of this bifurcated view. Because I have given a detailed overview of these metaphysical views earlier in this thesis, I will not reconstruct these views again in detail here.

The relevant features of this view that I will discuss in the following parts of this chapter are that Haslangerian social constructivist metaphysics splits social kinds into two - social-kinds-as-class and social-kinds-as-identity. On the traditional Haslangerian view, and that view modified by Jenkins, these two kinds are held to be distinct entities. On Jenkins' view, identity is said to be equally as important, morally and causally speaking, as class. The motivation for splitting social kinds into these two camps is in part an aim to give a causal picture of subordination, and for some Haslangerian metaphysicists there is an explicit aim to affirm claims of gender self-ascription.

3.3 Identity and Habitus

3.3.1 Introduction

I have provided an overview of the status quo pictures of race and gender. In the earlier chapters of this thesis, I have explained the bifurcated social constructionist account of race from Haslanger, and the broadly Haslangerian modified bifurcated account of gender from Jenkins. I have endorsed the part of these views that holds that there *is* an objective and a subjective component of social kinds, *without* endorsing the thought that these subjective elements are as important as the objective elements. I have done this by arguing for a picture of social kinds that aims to track harms, as opposed to starting out with a bifurcated picture in mind and disambiguating social kinds on this schema ex-post-facto.

In this section of the thesis I will apply insights from sociology and continental philosophy to the social constructivist pictures of gender and race from analytic philosophy. Specifically, in this section I will draw insights from Pierre Bourdieu and the literature responding to him in order to fill in the metaphor of the 'internal map'. This filling out will fulfil two roles - firstly it will clarify *why* I say that objective concerns dominate the 'moral stakes' when compared to subjective concerns, and secondly it will fill out my view of social kinds in such a way that I can account for situated knowledge and the ways that social kind membership influences the self.

The metaphor of the 'internal map' is apt and intuitive. It captures well the list of attributes that Haslanger aims to capture by using it. However, using the metaphor alone prevents us from being very specific about what elements of a person's being and life we are referring to when talking about

their identity. For example - are aesthetic preferences part of someone's internal map? Are memories part of the map? What about preferences about one's own path in life? Are those parts of the map, or coordinates we look for on the map? On top of this, we might want to understand the genesis and causal history of the map better. How is the map formed? Is it given to us, or do we create it? Do we consciously create it, or do we have no impact over it? I argue that thinking of identity as habitus can help us answer these questions.

These queries about the nature of the map are not just academic, abstract questions, but factor importantly into questions ordinary agents encounter in their day to day lives. People often disagree about what kinds of identities are legitimate or authentic. In an increasingly globalised, increasingly urbanised world, more people than ever are living in multicultural environments and interacting with diverse cultures and people. Progress on a public critical consciousness of gender oppression and gender roles is slow, but present. A better picture of racial and gender identity would be useful in navigating this globalised world.

3.3.2 Identity In Other Fields

In this subsection I will discuss the notion of identity as it has been discussed outside of analytic philosophy. The above social constructivist account of race and gender places a focus on identity. Alongside the suggested ameliorative value of social constructivist metaphysics, the descriptive benefits of this account are that it can provide an intuitive account of mixed-raceness, blended families, and transgender identities. More traditional accounts of race and gender struggle to account for these things without including cases that we might want to exclude into our categories, or excluding categories that we want to include. This flexibility and aptness in these cases is derived from the way that social kinds as classes and social kinds as identities run alongside one another.

Although - as previously mentioned - what it means to be *classed* in a certain way is well defined in the literature on this topic, what it means to have a certain *identity* is described briefly and using the metaphor of the 'internal map'.

This recent area of research in Anglophone Analytic philosophy is not the only area of research that has concerned itself with identity. Identity is a central concept in many areas of sociology, education, and continental philosophy. Despite this shared interest, there is yet to be work that specifically applies work on identity from these fields to the 'internal map' notion of identity found in social constructivist accounts of social kinds. One reason for this might be a perception that these areas - particularly continental philosophy and the empirical researchers informed by this tradition - are methodologically incompatible with the research project of analytic philosophy. I disagree strongly with this notion, and in the rest of this chapter I will develop an account of social identity that highlights the similarities between the work on identity as found in Pierre Bourdieu's work on habitus and social field (and the research influenced by it), and the notion of identity as an 'internal map'. Although I do not see any methodological incompatibility between the varied areas of research that I will discuss, I will develop an account that is entirely compatible with the social constructivist picture of social kinds, a naturalised epistemology[15], and the norms of analytic philosophy more broadly.

The academic context in which Bourdieu developed his social theory is one in which there was a conflict between objectivism and subjectivism. In this context, objectivist theories about societal phenomena emphasise the role and impact of the 'objective' elements of society. In analytic philosophy, these elements are what we might call those features of societal interactions and events that are external to an agent - institutions, economic forces, the built environment and so on. On the other side of the coin, subjectivist theories emphasise 'subjective' elements - or what we might call

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[15] By 'naturalized epistemology', I mean an epistemology that aims to maintain a firm distinction between facts and values. This is the sense of this term used in most feminist philosophy, for example (Anderson, 2020).

those features of societal interactions and events that are internal to an agent[16]. These features include beliefs, preferences, habits, desires and so on. This distinction was considered to be important philosophically as objectivists and subjectivists were making metaphysical claims about what sorts of social entities existed and how to draw up causal pictures of human action, but was also considered to be important methodologically as it influenced what researchers took to be good evidence of empirical claims. Bourdieu aimed to introduce a sociological and philosophical theory that reconciled or reduced this distinction, arguing that both objective and subjective features of society were important (Bourdieu, 2008, p.25).

The three relevant, low-level concepts that constitute Bourdieu's theory of identity are field, habitus, and capital. Bourdieu invokes these concepts in order to develop an explanation of how people are influenced by the society in which they exist, how people influence society, and how hierarchies are constructed as a result of, and constituted by these things. In the section of this thesis on social class, I give a detailed discussion of capital. As such, for the purpose of this section on habitus, I will explain cultural fields and habitus, and refer to capital with the understanding that the reader will be able to refer to my discussion of capital in that section.

3.3.3 Cultural Fields

In this subsection I will outline the Bourdieuan notion of a 'cultural field'. A cultural field is the social setting in which human interaction takes place. So, it is the "institutions, rules, rituals, conventions, categories, designations, appointments and titles which constitute an objective hierarchy, and which produce and authorise certain discourses and activities" (Webb et al., 2002).

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[16] I will note here that these terms have other meanings in other contexts and debates, but in the following text I will use these terms in the way I have described them.

For example, in the cultural field of the University of Birmingham, the core institution is of course the University of Birmingham. There are lots of rules to follow in this field - students must submit papers on time, academics must mark them on time. There are rituals - going to the student union club night on Saturday, eating fried chicken in Selly Oak afterwards, not walking underneath the clock tower when it chimes. There are conventions - undergraduates dress in a certain way, according to local fashion. There are categories - there are undergraduates, postgraduates, academic staff, non-academic staff. There are designations - the building north of the clock tower is the Law building, immediately south is the Great Hall. There are appointments - there is a Chancellor, Vice-Chancellor and so on. And finally there are titles - Professor and Doctor being notable examples. The cultural field of the University of Birmingham is made up of these things.

Fields are heterogeneous and exist in hierarchical relation to one another (Abrutyn, 2016). By heterogenous I mean that cultural fields can be very different from one another: the rules, rituals and conventions of a Dominican Bachata bar are going to be very different from the rules, rituals and conventions of a medium-sized office supplies company in Hokkaido, for example. By hierarchical I mean both that some fields exist in subordination or domination to other fields, and also that fields are internally hierarchical in that participants in the field exist in subordination or domination to other participations.

For an example of the first kind of hierarchy, the field of child labour in Victorian London was subordinate to the field of wealthy capitalists that employed and lived alongside them. This relation was derived from economic and class hierarchies, and as such the norms, preferences and institutions of wealthy capitalists had considerable influence over the norms, preferences and institutions of chimney-sweeps. In this example we can also see how different social fields interact with one another

- the capitalists employed the chimney-sweeps, and how social fields can contain one-another - both the field of the capitalists and the chimney-sweeps were a part of the field of Victorian London.

For an example of the second kind of hierarchy, within the field of American football, the quarterback is the dominant player in a team's offense. The quarterback makes executive decisions on whether to run or throw the ball, where to throw it, where to run, and so on. It is the job of the offensive linemen to protect the quarterback, and as such their position is subordinate. The quarterback is himself subordinate to the coaches such as offensive coordinator of the team, and the offensive coordinator is subordinate to the head coach. As such, both directly and by the transitive property, the offensive lineman is subordinate to the head coach.

I mentioned earlier the historical distinction between objectivists and subjectivists in social theory. Speaking broadly, the social field contains many of the sorts of things that objectivists take to be central to understanding society. Institutions, social and economic pressures and rules influence human behaviour. Bourdieu disagrees with the objectivist epistemologically in that he argues that there is more to understanding society than merely these factors, and disagrees with the objectivist metaphysically in that he takes social fields to be constituted partly (but not exclusively) but factors internal to agents.

3.3.4 Habitus

In this subsection I will outline the Bourdieuan notion of 'habitus'. The previous discussion on cultural fields locates itself outside of any particular agent. If the cultural field is the social setting that

interactions exist within, then habitus is the set of properties of agents that have been shaped by social interaction. Bourdieu's treatment of habitus arises out of the long standing debate between objectivists and subjectivists in social theory. Earlier in this chapter I described objectivist and subjectivist theories of societal phenomena, with objectivist theories emphasising factors external to agents, and subjectivist theories emphasising factors internal to agents. This distinction results in a difference in the view of the psychology of agents. In the context of social theory, subjectivists view agents as being in control of their thoughts, desires, beliefs, preferences and actions, and objectivists view agents such that their thoughts, desires, beliefs, preferences and actions are the product of cultural and social structures, and that agents do not have control over these things (Webb et al., 2002, p.23)[17].

It is important not to create caricatures of these positions. Most social theorists accept that agents have some degree of agency, and that this agency is in some way compromised or shaped by factors external to the agents. In discussions of objectivism and subjectivism, what is typically being debated is the degree to which agents have agency, and the way in which this agency is compromised. Bourdieu leans towards objectivism (Ibid., p34), and as such habitus is his attempt to explain the ways in which agents are shaped by the world.

Bourdieu's work on the cultural field provides a description of the social world that shapes agents. The word that he uses to describe this shaping is 'conditioning' (Bourdieu, 2008, p.53). He writes:

> "The conditionings associated with a particular class of conditions of existence produce habitus, systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and organize practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a

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[17] This distinction is simplified here for the sake of brevity - it is possible to be an objectivist about some things and a subjectivist about others.

conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary in order to attain them. Objectively 'regulated' and 'regular' without being in any way the product of obedience to rules, they can be collectively orchestrated without being the product of the organizing action of a conductor." (Bourdieu, 2007, p.53)

This paragraph requires some explanation. The 'particular class of conditions' Bourdieu mentions are the social context that an agent exists in. This includes the cultural field, the economy, the built environment and other material manifestations of society. He goes on to say that these things produce habitus, which is a set of 'systems of durable, transposable dispositions'. This description of habitus as a set of dispositions is crucial not only to understanding Bourdieu's work and position on the objectivism versus subjectivism debate, but also is crucial to my application of habitus in this section of the thesis.

For the purpose of philosophy, it is of vital importance to note that dispositions do not necessarily imply anything close to intentional mental states, nor do dispositions imply conscious reflection, thought or decision making[18]. Much as we can say that salt has the disposition of dissolving in water without thinking that salt has a mind that chooses to dissolve in water, we can say that a person has a disposition to behave in a certain way without thinking that that person chooses to do so, or even has a mind that *can* choose to do so. We can see how this conception of habitus as disposition, as opposed to a more explicitly intentional and voluntary mental state, is compatible with an objectivist way of thinking about agents in society.

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[18] Of course it is possible to conceive of all mental states as being just dispositions, as functionalists in the philosophy of mind do (Levin, 2018). Nevertheless, to conceive of something as a disposition is not to imply anything about the intentionality, accessibility, or phenomenal nature of that thing.

The next part contains some explanation from Bourdieu himself, when he describes habitus as "structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and organize practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary in order to attain them". We can better understand this passage by looking at an example of habitus. Consider the social practice of going to church - numerous dispositions come into play when an agent goes to church.

In order to go to church, the agent must put on clothes, physically move themselves to the church at a given time, stand in a certain place, sit in a certain place, stand up at the right time, sit down at the right time, talk at the right time and say the right things in unison with the other churchgoers. An agent may have a disposition to go to church wearing their Sunday best clothes, they may arrive at church early enough so as to see and be seen by other churchgoers, but not so early to cause an inconvenience, and so on. All of this is habitus - the dispositions, habits, and skills required to engage in the practice of going to church. These dispositions, habits and skills are structured, in that they are the same each time, and relate to one another in an ordered way. They are structuring, in that they guide the agent's actions and the actions of the church and society as a whole. They are adaptable to both other occasions and other ends - habits to dress a certain way are adapted against social contexts. There are other occasions where one must wear Sunday best, such as weddings.

It is possible to have all of this church-going habitus without for a second pondering about the purpose of these structures. One does not have to know why one must wear Sunday best to church, or stand up and sit down at a certain time, in order to do these things. In fact, it is probable that many people have this habitus without being conscious of the purpose or ends of these practices - if only

because children do these things too and that the reasoning for these behaviours and practices are so rarely explained to children.

So, we can draw up a list of the features of habitus. Firstly, habitus is dispositional in nature - it is only constituted in conditions that call for it, rather than being a consistently manifested and persistent feature of a person (Webb et al., 2002, p.38). Secondly, it is inculcated in persons through simply living in society. That is to say that we acquire these habitus dispositions through interacting with societal structures, as opposed to through mere introspection, and without necessarily having to be explicitly taught. Thirdly, habitus is not necessarily conscious, and is often unconscious. Fourthly, habitus is the result of societal structures, but also plays a structuring role in an individual's social life - it informs the agent's actions, and their status.

Bourdieu has described these qualities of habitus as coming together to make habitus a 'feel for the game' of everyday life (Bourdieu, 2008). This compares habitus with the feel for the game that an athlete has for their sport. Consider a skilled athlete engaging in their sport, such as Mike Trout - center fielder for the Los Angeles Angels of Anaheim - swinging the bat at a fastball.

We can look at our list of qualities to see what it means to have a feel for a game. Mike Trout has the dispositional ability to hit baseballs. It is only manifested when he is standing at the plate and someone is throwing one at him. Part of this feel for the game was inculcated in him through merely playing the sport. Trout learned how to do this through a mixture of explicit instruction such as baseball camps and coaching, and through simply just playing a lot of baseball. It would have been impossible for Trout to have gotten a feel for the game without having played a lot of it. Part of Trout's ability to hit the baseball is unconscious. Trout does not go through a list of all the tenets of hitting the ball whilst he is swinging the bat. It is likely that he is not thinking very much at all. He

might keep in mind that a certain breaking pitch deceives the eye in a certain way, or that it is important to follow through with your swing, but part of incorporating these pieces of wisdom into his swing is through practicing until he does not have to think about them. Lastly, his feel for the game structures his activity - he knows where to walk, where to stand, when to swing, when to run, and so on. The rules of baseball eventually build into his feel for the game, until these rules structure his activity without him having to think about them.

So how might someone have a 'feel for the game' of everyday life? After all, life has many more rules and much more variety than baseball. Consider the habitus of academics. Firstly, academics have many dispositions that are relevant to their roles as academics. Some dispositions are dispositions of skill - to be able to accurately explain or communicate a complex idea. Some are more ordinary dispositions - to fall silent whilst a visiting speaker is speaking, or to talk to a student in a certain way. These dispositions do not manifest themselves in every area of an academic's life - you may not be able to tell that someone is an academic if you see them at the supermarket with their children, or out at dinner with friends. Secondly, much of being an academic is learned through experience rather than through explicit instruction. The norms of academic networking are not taught during a PhD programme - graduate students learn this through experience. Similarly, norms of academic dress are learned through experience too - tweed jackets are not handed out during the first week of graduate school. Thirdly, parts of being an academic are unconscious. For example, academics do not think about the particular tone of voice they use to ask a question in a seminar, but nevertheless this tone of voice is learned and distinctive. Lastly, all of this structures the academic's professional and social life. These dispositions are action-guiding, they tell the academic to stand at the front of the class when teaching, to go to the conference dinner and speak to a certain person in a certain way, and so on.

In this subsection I have given an overview of Bourdieu's notion of habitus, explaining habitus and the cultural field. For the purposes of this chapter, this will allow me to apply this notion to Haslangerian identity.

3.4 Applying Habitus to Social Constructivism

In this subsection I will apply Bourdieu's notion of 'habitus' to the notion of internal map[19] in Haslangerian social metaphysics. Firstly, I will compare 'identity' in the Haslangerian literature to 'habitus' from Bourdieu. Secondly, I will provide a conception of 'identity' as being habitus. Lastly, I will explain the benefits of viewing 'identity' as habitus.

To begin, I will return to Katharine Jenkins' arguments about identity. Here is Jenkins' treatment of the metaphor of the 'internal map', and the philosophical and moral motivation for her account:

"...[H]aving a female gender identity means having an internal 'map' that is formed to guide someone who is subordinated on the basis of having actual or imagined bodily features that are presumed to be evidence of a female's role in biological reproduction through the social or material realities characteristic of a person who is so subordinated" (Jenkins, 2016)

We can see here how Jenkins squares the ameliorative nature of social constructivist social metaphysics with her descriptive account of gender identity. She writes that identifying as a woman is

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[19] Jenkins and Haslanger refer to this as 'identity', but this chapter is critical of conceiving of identity in this way, and as such here I call it 'the internal map' so as not to endorse this view of identity.

to have an internal map formed such as to guide someone who occupies the subordinate role that women are forced into on the grounds of their role in biological reproduction.

There is a benefit to this approach - it ties gender identity to the Haslangerian understanding of gender as class. It does this by stating that when someone identifies as a woman, they are identifying as someone who is subordinated. This is necessary, given the structure of Jenkins' notion of gender identity, as for Haslanger all that it means to be a woman is to be subordinated on the grounds of a presumed role in biological reproduction.

However, this benefit also creates problems for the approach. The first is that it links gender identity so closely to subordination without explaining how someone who is not subordinated along this dimension would form a map like this in the first place. The subordination of women in society is socially constructed, and this is the core claim of social constructivism. As such, in order to explain how gender identity arises within people, someone endorsing Jenkins' view is committed to the view that transgender women develop an internal map that guides a subordinated woman, despite being raised as a subordinating man.

Of course, gender is much more than mere subordination, and neither Jenkins nor Haslanger deny this. But on Jenkins' view of gender identity, the sole decider of whether someone identifies as a woman or not is whether their internal map guides them through life as a woman[20]. So although gender is more than subordination, Jenkins' view of gender identity is not. If internal maps are created through experience, then Jenkins' view cannot explain transgender identity. If internal maps are internal to agents and exist prior to socialisation, then Jenkins' view explicitly denies this. If internal

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[20] It is also the case that on this view what it means to be classed as a woman is to be subordinated in a certain way, but it is not made explicit whether this means that on this view to identify in a certain way is to somehow have an internal map that guides you as being subordinated in a way that you are not, in fact, subordinated.

maps are internal to agents and exist *despite* socialisation, then someone endorsing this view of gender identity has to be able to explain how this gender identity comes about. Given that a core claim is that gender is socially constructed, the social constructivist is not at liberty to claim that we are born with our gender identity.

One response that the social constructivist may leverage in response to this criticism is that gender identity is not having an internal map such that it guides a person through life as a subordinated person, but instead is having an internal map such that it guides a person through life being gendered more generally. That is to say that the identity is not identifying as being subordinated, but instead identifying as having the other parts of gender other than subordination. But this is a tall task, and Jenkins' parsimonious approach, and the use of the metaphor of the internal map more generally is designed to avoid having to give a treatment of these thicker, more complex parts of gender.

3.4.1 You Mixed?

I will now turn back to the introduction of the 'internal map' metaphor in Haslanger's paper, 'You Mixed?' (Haslanger, 2012). Haslanger is trying to give an account of race on which for some mixed race people that do not 'pass' as a member of a given racial group, they still count as a member of that racial group in at least one sense. The purpose of giving this kind of account is to make claims such as 'John is black' true, even if the people around John assume that he is white, and treat him as such, even though John has one black parent and one white parent. It is also an attempt to give an account of race that does justice to the way that the psychology adoptive parents who have adopted children of another racial group changes post-adoption.

The reasoning of this Haslangerian 'internal map' metaphor is that despite being treated as a white person, still some important features of John are racialised. Due to being part of a black family, John may have an insider's view of black culture, consider himself black, and manoeuvre through life with his blackness in mind as he makes decisions.

Haslanger writes that these maps do the followings: 'they function to guide the body', 'they are a basis for exercising know-how', and 'they provide information on the basis of which we can form intentions and act', and that it is 'conscious and unconscious' (Haslanger, 2012, p90).

3.4.2 Habitus

This list of qualities of the map, and the orienteering role that the map is supposed to play draws obvious parallels with Bourdieu's notion of 'habitus'. Habitus is action-guiding and plays an orienteering function, it is conscious and unconscious, it is the structure that guides exercising know-how, and it does provide information on the basis of which we can form intentions and act. I argue that the parts of human life that Haslanger's 'internal map' metaphor aims to describe, and the parts of human life that 'habitus' aims to describe are one and the same thing.

We can compare the internal map metaphor to habitus by referring to Bourdieu's description of habitus. When describing habitus' relation to history, Bourdieu writes the following:

> "The habitus, a product of history, produces individual and collective practices - more history - in accordance with the schemes generated by history. It ensures the active presence of past experiences, which, deposited in each organism in the form of schemes of perception, thought

and action, tend to guarantee the 'correctness' of practices and their constancy of time, more reliably than all formal rules and explicit norms. This system of dispositions - a present past that tends to perpetuate itself into the future by reactivation in similarly structured practices, an internal law through which the law of external necessities, irreducible to immediate constraints, is constantly exerted - is the principle of the continuity and regularity which objectivism sees in social practices without being able to account for it; and also of the regulated transformations that cannot be explained either by the extrinsic, instantaneous determinisms of mechanistic sociologism, or by the purely internal but equally instantaneous determination of spontaneist subjectivism." (Bourdieu, 2008, p54)

This is a dense quote, but by unpacking it the similarities between the internal map metaphor and habitus will become clear. The first similarity is the relationship between history and the self that Bourdieu describes - habitus is created by history, which is the world around the agent as it exists diachronically. This history gets 'deposited' (Ibid.) into the agent, which is to say that the external becomes internal, and manifests within the self. We can compare this to Haslanger's original described motivation for the metaphor of the internal map - a desire to account for how identity is "not just an idea acted upon or acted with, but is deeply embodied" (Haslanger and Witt, 2005, p277). Further, Haslanger writes that "[racial] identity is formed in navigating the social and material impact of one's race" (Ibid., p285). In both cases we have the same relationship between the external and the internal, in so far as both scholars acknowledge and endorse this distinction.

The second part of this quote that I will highlight is the role that habitus plays in an agent's life. The past experiences "tend to guarantee the 'correctness' of practices and their constancy of time, more reliably than all formal rules and explicit norms" (Bourdieu, 2008, p54). This section of the quote demonstrates two similarities between habitus and the internal map metaphor. The first is that habitus

has an action-guiding role in an agent's life - it guides their practices. One of the major purposes of choosing the metaphor of the internal map is that Haslanger wishes to provide a view of identity that has this action-guiding property - a view of identity that explains how identity impacts our actions. Haslanger writes that maps "function to guide the body: they are a basis for exercising 'know-how', they provide information on the basis of which we can form intentions and act" (Haslanger and Witt, 2005, p283). So both habitus and the internal map provide this guiding function.

The second way in which this quote highlights a similarity is in the way that an agent is guided. Both habitus and the internal map guide an agent's behaviour according to their social position. In habitus' case, this guiding function is explicitly distinguished from formal rules and explicit norms - which serves to shield habitus from accusations of determinism or hyper-cognitivism. These worries about determinism and hyper-cognitivism are also a motivating reason for Haslanger's development of the metaphor of the internal map, with Haslanger stating that although the internal map is partly cognitive, maps are "sometimes tacit and unconscious, sometimes more explicit and conscious" (Haslanger and Witt, 2005, p283).

Lastly, Bourdieu writes of "regulated transformations that cannot be explained either by the extrinsic, instantaneous determinisms of mechanistic sociologism, or by the purely internal but equally instantaneous determination of spontaneist subjectivism" (Bourdieu, 2008, p54). In this, Bourdieu expresses a worry about the determinism of objectivist sociology and social theory, and the different but similar determinism of subjectivist sociology and social theory. This is to say that he is guided by the thought that crude objectivist views of social norms and rules imply that agents have no agency to resist, and as a result cannot explain resistance. And he is also guided by the thought that crude subjectivist views struggle to account for how there are oppressive structures, norms, and rules that constrain human thought and behaviour in the first place. Haslanger also describes a worry about

determinism - in her discussion of her decision to use the 'map' metaphor instead of a metaphor of a 'program' (as in, computer program, or program of behaviour), she states that the program metaphor can "invoke the specter of determinism" (Haslanger and Witt, 2005, p283).

I argue that because of these similarities both in guiding principles and in description, we can conceive of habitus and the internal map metaphor as being extraordinarily similar. In the next subsection I give an explanation of my motivation for highlighting this similarity, and for the benefits that incorporating habitus into my metaphysical view will provide.

3.4.2.1 Habitus and Harms

I have described the similarities between habitus views and the internal map metaphor view. And in Haslanger's application of the internal map metaphor, Haslanger writes as if the internal map is a direct result of a person's actual social position - that is to say that although we can say that a mixed race person has an identity that persists despite their racial class not persisting diachronically or across contexts, this mixed race identity comes about through the reality of living as a mixed race person. Similarly, she relates her experience of having adopted Black children, and how this makes her identity more Black, but does not go as far to say that this somehow changes the way that she is classed in any important sense.

However, in previous parts of this thesis I have argued against Jenkins' view that identity governs kind group membership, and argued against the view that identity is particularly morally important. In this subsection I will briefly revisit this. Much of the present debate around social metaphysics hinges

on the moral importance of identity. Views holding identity to be particularly important rely on a strict metaphysical distinction between identity and class. I want to highlight here that maintaining this strict distinction is not possible when we think of habitus playing the role that identity plays. One of the guiding principles of Bourdieu's theory of society was to resist strict distinctions between the internal and the external, or the self and the environment, and the subjective and the objective. So, viewing the functional signature of identity as being carried out by habitus precludes thinking that identity can be meaningfully separated from class. This is to say that although habitus views can account for habitus having a causal mechanism in serious moral harms, this causal mechanism will always involve the corresponding class harms too. As such, serious identity harms existing in a case without the corresponding class harms are unlikely to exist.

3.4.3 The Benefits of the Combined View

3.4.3.1 A Wealth of Literature

We can consider the potential benefits of my view. The first is that habitus is a much more widely researched concept than the internal map. There is decades of research exploring habitus within the concept of gender alone, but there is also a wealth of research exploring habitus in many other contexts[21]. This benefit works in the other direction too. The bifurcated Haslangerian metaphysics of social kinds is perhaps the most prominent metaphysical view of social kinds in contemporary analytic philosophy. As such, if habitus and the internal map are the same thing, much of the research into habitus will more easily square with contemporary notions of race and gender.

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[21] For some of the many examples of research on habitus, see (Noble and Watkins, 2003; Crossley, 2003; McNay, 1999; Adams, 2006; Dumais, 2002)

3.4.3.2 A Constitutive Picture

The second benefit is that we can use the literature on habitus to develop a more filled out picture of the internal map. Whereas the 'internal map' is typically described in terms of its functional role, Bourdieu, and theorists following Bourdieu give a constitutive picture of habitus. As discussed above, habitus is a composite entity consisting of dispositions, habits, skills and preferences. This is entirely compatible with the metaphor of the internal map, as the internal map metaphor describes a functional role rather than describing constitutive parts. We can thus say that habitus functions, in some or all contexts, as an internal map.

In order to make this move we must make sure that we are capturing the spirit of the metaphor of the internal map. Let's look back at the case of being mixed race. I will use my own Irish/Indo-Mauritian mixed-raceness so as to not make assumptions or declarations about other identities. By Haslangerian metaphysics, I am classed as a white person in some contexts, because I 'pass' as white in some contexts, and as Asian in other contexts, when I do not. But my internal map is not tied to whether I am passing or not. My internal map is still structured so as to guide me as Mauritian in some contexts, and as Irish in others, but this does not necessarily correspond with my passing. Haslanger describes this as a 'fragmented' identity (Haslanger, 2012, p.293), because my identity guides me in different ways at different times.

We thus have two litmus tests for our theory that combines habitus and the metaphor of the internal map. The first test is 'Does habitus play the role that my internal map does in the context of race?', and the second is 'Can habitus be 'fragmented' in the way that my map is fragmented?'. I will address these tests in turn.

I argue that habitus can and does do the work that my internal map is supposed to be doing. Consider what racial identity and the internal map is supposed to do. When my internal map is guiding me as an Asian person, it is providing the guiding role that allows me to felicitously function as an Asian person in a racialised society. It may guide me to talk in a certain way, to have certain body language, to wear certain clothes. I might curse in Kreol, or to wear a sherwani to a wedding. It may guide me to go to certain places, and what times to go to these places. So it might guide me to a dhol puri shack when I'm hungry at the beach. It may also - when combined with introspection - guide me to have certain beliefs or feelings about myself, and to give me a sense of my status. So I may think of myself as the descendent of indentured labourers, or as a natural cook, or a good dancer. All of these things are part of the 'feel for the game' that habitus aims to describe. To talk in a certain way in a certain context is a disposition. To do a certain thing in a certain context is a habit. To *be able* to do something non-trivial is a skill. To choose to do one thing instead of another thing is a preference. Habitus is made up of dispositions, habits, skills, and preferences. So our view passes the first litmus test.

The second litmus test is whether habitus can give an account of fragmented identities. We can apply this once more to my own identity. In the paragraph above I gave examples of how a sense of Mauritian identity may guide me in life. But I am also half-Irish, and in some contexts my identity guides me as an Irish person. I am well-versed in Catholic modes of thought and ritualistic norms. I have a good sense of Irish humour, of Irish music, and dress. In some contexts, like writing philosophy papers about race, my internal map is formed so as to guide me as both an Irish person and a Mauritian person at the same time. In other contexts, I might function mostly or solely as one or the other. In Mauritius, I mostly am playing the role of a Mauritian person, and the same is true on

Diwali, or at a family wedding. When I am talking to my grandmother, who is Irish, my internal map mostly guides me as an Irish person.

The handy thing about habitus in contexts such as this is that because of its focus on *dispositional* qualities, it is perfectly suited to describing fragmented identities. A fragmented identity is an identity with a dispositional nature - it is to identify in a certain way in one context, and in another way in another context. Similarly, habits, skills and preferences are dispositional in nature too. One might have the habit of going out on the weekend, the skill of being funny on stage, or the preference to eat saag paneer when at a curry house. So, combining habitus and the internal map passes our second litmus test.

3.4.3.3 A Theory of Genesis

Lastly, another benefit of this view is that the literature on habitus provides a fleshed out story of how habitus comes to be in an individual. Recall the above discussion of internal maps and gender. On the Haslangerian picture, identity is socially constructed, and gender kinds are not natural kinds. The Haslangerian picture of gender as social class tells a simple and compelling story about how people are gendered by other people - other people in society look at an individual's physical features, make an assumption about that individual's role in biological reproduction, and then sort the individual into a gender kind group on the grounds of that assumption. However, when it comes to giving an account of how internal maps come to be, there is no such simple story.

3.4.3.3.1 Habitus and Race

In this subsection I will discuss the implication of conceiving of racial identity as habitus. Squaring racial and ethnic identity, and habitus is an easier task than squaring identity and gender. This is because whereas gender identity and being transgender is considered to be immutable in individuals, in the case of race and ethnicity there is no such tension. The consensus view is that race and ethnicity are socially constructed, and as such that racial and ethnic identities are socially constructed too. The public circus surrounding the Dolezal case aside, there is no group of people claiming to be transracial or transethnic. In the case of Haslanger herself, she suggests that as a result of adopting Black children as a White mother, her racial identity shifted (Haslanger and Witt, 2005). This is because she is treated differently by others when she is with her children. We are more comfortable talking about the mutability of racial and ethnic identity. As with transracial adoption, there are also cases of immigrants. In each case, an individual's racial or ethnic identity is fragmented, but we do not have to worry about what this may mean for our view of race, identity or social construction, given the absence of real transracial people.

3.4.3.3.2 Habitus, Gender and Inculcation

In this subsection I will discuss the implications of conceiving of gender identity as habitus. On the typical picture of habitus, habitus is inculcated through socialisation. Through a mix of exposure to material reality, social structures, and explicit instruction, people are socialised, starting from birth. Richard Harker describes this process as follows: "we have a set of objective conditions in the material world which tend to have a structuring effect on family socialisation practices which durably

install in individuals principles which govern the generation of practice (what people do and think they are doing)" (Harker, 1984, p.121).

This mix of materiality, exposure to social structures, and explicit instruction provides a solid basis for explaining how gender comes about. As soon as a baby is born, and sometimes even before, society prepares to inculcate a gender identity in the baby. Rooms might be painted blue or pink, toys may be bought. Once born, a baby being socialised as a woman will receive explicit instruction. Particularly gendered parenting may tell girls not to play in the mud, tell boys to be aggressive, and so on. Social structures will become apparent in the child's life - gendered bathrooms, gendered clothing, folk beliefs about the shared qualities of women and men. Material reality will become apparent too - there will be spaces in which girls are not safe, but in which boys may be safe, and the gendered economic structure of society will impact the child's gender identity.

All of this tells an easy story about how *conforming* gender identity comes about. A child being gendered as a boy might enjoy playing with trucks, playing sports, taking on gendered expectations about prestige, status, and economic role. But not all children being gendered find it so easy. The kinds of gender identity that motivate Jenkins' usage of the internal map metaphor are cases of non-conforming gender identity. Bourdieu has been criticised for having too rigid of a view - one in which individuals have no agency, and are shaped by society entirely with no room for resistance or change (McNay, 1999). If gender identity is habitus, and habitus is inculcated in this way, then we must be able to explain how gender identities come about that resist social structures - identities that do not conform. Transgender gender identities do not conform.

So how can we explain this lack of conformity in individuals, given the relatively rigid social determinism of Bourdieu's theory of habitus and field? There are two avenues that are open to us. The

first avenue is to suggest that non-conforming identities in the case of an unorthodox subfield. For example, sociologists following Bourdieu have suggested that criminal deviance exists as a result of a sub-field - a local social context - that enforces norms that differ from the wider norms of society (Shammas and Sandberg, 2016). This is not a compelling view of gender conformity - transgender people are found in all social groups, ethnicities and classes. Firstly, there is no subcultural field in which transgender people find their common genesis. Secondly, many transgender people live in communities that are extraordinarily hostile towards gender non-conforming and transgender people, and as such it is difficult to locate subfields in those communities that endorse or promote being transgender[22].

The second avenue of approach is to explain gender identity as habitus by focusing on the individual themselves. Socialisation has varying degrees of success across populations. Consider the 'stiff upper lip' that some people take to be a part of British culture. This is a norm such that displaying emotion - particularly during times of adversity - is to be avoided and criticised. It is true that there are cultural norms around the display of emotion in British society, and that British people undergo socialisation to discourage the display of emotion. Despite these norms and this socialisation, it is not the case that every British person has a 'stiff upper lip'. Many British people are happy to display emotion, to cry during hard times, and to suffer publicly. The socialisation is more successful for some individuals than it is for others. Some British people explicitly and vocally resist the norm of the 'stiff upper lip', but this explicit, conscious resistance is not necessary for the socialisation to fail to inculcate this quality in an individual. One may fail or succeed to be inculcated into the norm of having a stiff upper lip without even thinking about the norm itself.

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[22] This is of course changing, as the public conversation on gender identity is shifting.

It is this latter approach of unsuccessful gender socialisation that I am arguing is the best explanation of non-conforming gender identities. Gender socialisation is constant and all encompassing. It is likely that a given individual will be subjected to gendered expectations on every day of their life. Developing habitus is the process by which the structures and norms of society shape an agent. In the case of non-conforming gender identities, the dominant form of gender socialisation is unsuccessful. In order for socialisation to be successful, the individual must firstly have the properties necessary for socialisation to happen. It is my contention that in the case of non-conforming gender identities, gender socialisation is unsuccessful as a result of the individual not having the necessary qualities to make gender socialisation successful[23].

The motivation for this part of the view is to avoid being committed to the view that being trangender is merely a simple personal choice, in the sense that a person chooses to support Manchester United or Manchester city. The view that being transgender is not a choice could be said to be at tension with the view that gender is socially constructed. If gender is socially constructed, it is not the case that any person can be born to be a certain gender. On the other hand, given that gender is socially constructed, how can we square the view that gender is not a choice. My view is that socially constructed features (like gender) hook onto non-socially constructed features of persons. If these features do not exist in an individual, these socially constructed features like gender cannot come about.

To phrase this in the language of habitus - socialisation creates habitus, and socialisation can only be successful if the individual has the qualities necessary for the socialisation to be successful. In the case of transgender people, these qualities are not present. The benefits of this view are as follows:

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[23] Of course there are different ways to be gender non-conforming. My account is an account of cases of gender socialisation failing. Giving an account of the various kinds of gender nonconformity, and how each of them comes to be is outside of the scope of this thesis.

1. It is compatible with the view that gender identity is not a choice.

2. It is compatible with the view that gender is socially constructed.

3. Habitus has the same functional role that the 'internal map' is suggested to have

4. This functional role is compatible with the functional role that gender has

Resolving the tension between the social construction of gender and the immutability of gender identity is a benefit of my view that other views on gender often either sidestep, or bite the bullet and deny one of the two. There is one benefit I have not included in the above list - a practical one rather than a philosophical one - which is that on my view we can apply the decades of sociological research into habitus to our philosophical analyses of gender.

3.5 Combining Literatures

One of the aims of this chapter and thesis is to show the virtues of drawing on research from outside of the tradition of analytic philosophy. Despite the methodological differences that Bourdieu's work - and the literature that responds to it - has with many projects in analytic philosophy, in the case of identity the notion of habitus provides new and useful perspectives. This combination of literatures provides value in two ways - firstly, the picture of habitus is descriptively valuable in itself, but secondly, the philosophy that adopts habitus as part of their metaphysics is now able to respond to and build on the wealth of work on habitus from other fields.

3.6 The Moral Picture

Most contemporary views of identity aim to give a picture of identity that can inform moral pictures of subordination. Mikkola, Jenkins, and Bettcher, for example, aim to give a view that makes sure that

transgender people are counted as being members of the group that they self-ascribe as. Haslanger's original picture of racial identity aims to give a picture that better understands how people's lives are impacted by racial subordination. I argue that conceiving of identity as habitus provides its own contribution to our moral understanding of identity.

One thing that marks this view as distinct from traditional identity views is that this habitus view much more closely ties the harms that arise from habitus to the harms that arise from kind-as-class. Habitus is generated through moving through the world as a certain kind of person, and so on this view, all identity-harms are tied to class-harms. For example, a woman might be excluded from a board-room meeting for failing to relate to the conversation in the same way that a man would - the woman might have been socialised to be less assertive, or to have different beliefs and preferences and be excluded for these things. In this case, the woman is being excluded because of some features internal to herself, but these internal features are part of who she is because of gendered socialisation. Of course in similar cases in the real world, it is also likely that more brute subordination is going on, and that she would be being discriminated against merely in virtue of being a woman. So habitus-harms ride alongside class-harms, both in the sense that they often happen together, but also in the sense that habitus-harms are the product of being socialised by being classed.

To restate this point - we cannot separate the harms caused by subordination on the grounds of habitus from the harms caused by subordination on the grounds of mere class. And in fact, it is often hard to distinguish metaphysically between these habitus-harms and the class-harms. This trouble of metaphysical distinguishing is one of the motivating reasons for Bourdieu's development of the concept of habitus in the first place.

3.7 Conclusion

In this chapter I have given an account of bifurcated Haslangerian social constructivist social kinds. I have explained the motivating reasons for views of this kind, and endorsed them. I have then argued that Haslangerian social identity can be thought of as the same thing as habitus, which is a term introduced by Bourdieu. This has the benefit of incorporating Haslangerian social metaphysics into the wider body of sociological work on socialisation. Combining these two views requires giving a treatment of gender such that the socially-constructedness of gender is compatible with the view that being transgender is not a choice. I have provided an argument such that viewing this through the lens of socialisation and habitus provides a view of gender identity that solves this problem.

Chapter 4: A Social Constructivist Account of Social Class

4.1 Introduction

In this section I offer a new account of social class, that combines Bourdieu's (2008) account of social capital with Haslanger's (2012) social constructivist account of social kinds. This new account has the descriptive and ameliorative power of Bourdieu's original account, whilst being able to account for complex personal identities in the same way that Haslangerian analyses can.

Haslangerian social constructivism has produced great results when applied to race and gender. The approach makes it easy to see how social kinds are socially constructed, provides a good explanation for how agents can reliably distinguish between members of different social groups, and crucially manages to do these things without committing itself to the notion that agents are picking out real[24] features of the universe. Partially for geographical reasons, but also due to right-wing arguments that society is 'post-class' having been quite successful, the notion of social class - in a sense often but not

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[24] Again, 'real' here means mind-independent.

exclusively used by Marxist scholars - has fallen out of fashion in analytic philosophy. The 'post-class' argument holds that class distinctions are merely economic distinctions, and that it is possible to climb through social classes by bettering one's economic position.

Much like race, the way that social class manifests itself differs depending on cultural context. Although this chapter uses examples from the British class system to describe social class, this social constructivist account of class is - mutatis mutandis - capable of describing social class systems in other cultures. The British class system has a hereditary nobility, and classes which are mutable. Some societies - like the United States - have only mutable classes, and it is possible to apply this chapter to those systems whilst simply ignoring the latter portion of the argument that focuses on nobility systems. Similarly, for a society that had no mutable class system but only an immutable nobility or caste system, it would be possible to apply only the latter portion of this chapter and not the mutable social capital account of class in the prior section. That is of course, if such a society is even possible.

I begin by discussing the particular challenges that arise when considering social class. I then outline the Bourdieuan conception of social class as consisting of capital. I then combine this view of class as capital with a Haslangerian bifurcated metaphysical picture of social kind groupings. After this, I discuss how to account for hereditary social class statuses, such as those found in the United Kingdom, and argue in favour of considering these hereditary class statuses as being constituted by capital also.

4.2 Problems With Talking About Class

In this subsection I will discuss the challenges of drawing up a metaphysical picture of social class, as it compares to that of race or gender. Trying to write about social class is difficult. At first glance, doesn't seem to be similar to race at all. We can see this by thinking about race not from an academic perspective, but from the perspective of someone trying to use race and class categories to navigate their life in a totally quotidian context. If you ask someone how you can tell what race someone is, they will be able to tell you what features of bodies they use in making that decision, even if they're often mistaken or struggle to actually tell you, out of awkwardness or fear of breaking social norms.

Now, if you asked this person to tell you what *class* their office mates were, they would likely have a much more difficult time. Putting aside the social taboos surrounding discussing class in British society, they might find the task epistemically difficult. Unlike race, they certainly wouldn't be able to reliably sort people into categories without speaking to each office-mate first. Even after speaking to their office-mates, they might still struggle to identify where each person falls on the class hierarchy. Where do we place someone who is wealthy but doesn't have a degree? Where do we place someone who isn't wealthy but is the most well-read person in the office? Where do we place someone who has none of the things previously mentioned, but who is well-connected and has a direct line to the mayor? Where do we place someone that was born in abject poverty, but now has all of the things previously mentioned? Where do we place someone who was born into extreme wealth, but now has none of them? In reality, each person is going to have each of these things in different ways and different quantities.

The class terms we use in the UK split people up into three broad categories - working class, middle class, and upper class. Within these categories people often make further distinctions, someone can felicitously describe themselves as lower-middle class, upper-middle class, 'proper' working class, and so on. People often use richer terms, for example Mike Skinner - leader of the musical project

The Streets - once described his own background as "Barratt class: suburban estates, not poor but not much money about, really boring" (BBC NEWS | Entertainment | Music | Mike Skinner: Voice of The Streets, n.d.). This description refers to Barratt Developments, a property development company responsible for many recent new-build, privately owned housing estates, sold at relatively affordable prices[25], typically to young families outside of the traditional professional middle classes. I mention this to express how complex class can be, Skinner uses a hyper-specific and particularly evocative expression, partially out of dissatisfaction with the way traditional class terminology fails to respect the subtle differences between the socioeconomic positions of British people.

What generates this difficulty of expression is that class terms attempt to reduce a number of different attributes of someone's life into a single position on a scale. It's hard to know how to weight each area of someone's life, and each case seems incredibly fact specific. It is not uncommon for people to express that they're not sure what class they're a member of. Social class tracks social opportunity, and as such people are reluctant to diminish their own accomplishments by overstating their class, or overstate the amount of adversity they've faced by understating their class. We must now ask ourselves, what are these attributes, and how do they relate to one another?

4.3 Bourdieu on Class

In this subsection I will introduce Pierre Bourdieu's conception of social class as consisting of social, cultural, and economic capital. A great deal has been written on social class, the overwhelming majority of it falling outside the analytic tradition. Marxist writers have provided great insight into class, deviating from the traditional Marxist understanding of class - grounded in ownership of the

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[25] Or at least were sold at relatively affordable prices before the current housing crisis.

means of production - in varying ways. Writers working in the structuralist tradition, such as Pierre Bourdieu have developed class ontologies separate from traditional Marxist classifications. For the purposes of this chapter I am going to argue that Pierre Bourdieu's account of the Forms[26] of Capital is the best way that we should understand what it means to be working and middle class in modern Britain.

Bourdieu describes three forms of capital that together make up social class. The first kind of capital that Bourdieu describes, and the most simple is economic capital. Economic capital is wealth, such as money, property or stakes in companies. For example, a lottery winner winning the Euromillions jackpot of tens of millions of pounds will very swiftly see themselves move upwards on this axis of class. Often in the media - particularly but not exclusively in an American context - you will see people deny that social class really exists, and that differences in economic capital are what people are really seeing when they think they are seeing class distinction. Typically, people defending right-wing economic policy will go further than this and state that given that social class can be reduced to economic capital, and that markets apportion economic capital broadly fairly, and so that the existence if inequality isn't a problem in and of itself.

In order to see how sufficient economic capital is as a total explanation of class we can follow this argument further using a real example case. In 2002, 19-year-old part-time binman Michael Carroll won £9,736,131 in the National Lottery (King of the Chavs - the neighbour from hell or a polite and popular charity worker?, 2005). This placed him very comfortably in the top 1% of people in the United Kingdom by net worth. Michael was immediately branded a 'Lotto lout' by the media, referring to his low social status and history of petty criminality (Ibid.). If wealth was sufficient to launch Michael into the upper classes, it would be hard to explain this. Michael was branded a lout

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[26] Sometimes, rather than 'forms of capital', this term is rendered as 'species of capital'.

because - despite his wealth - he acted differently to upper class people in other ways. He chose not to change the way he dressed or spoke, and himself didn't see his change in wealth as having changed his social class - he even called himself the 'King of Chavs' and had the slogan printed on the side of his van. There was never any question in the media as to whether Michael had become middle or upper class or not, it was taken as a given that he remained working class despite his wealth.

Michael could easily afford many of the trappings of upper class life, some of which he did indulge in, such as a large house and champagne, but others that he didn't indulge in, such as box seats at the opera or sending his children to elite private schools. But nevertheless the media were confident that he remained working class. This suggests that class is more than economic capital - that it matters not only to have wealth, but also what you do with that wealth, and other things that are only tangentially related to economic capital. These things that Michael could have done to change his class position form the substance of Bourdieu's other two forms of capital.

The second form of capital that Bourdieu discusses is what he calls *cultural* capital. Cultural capital exists in what Bourdieu calls the habitus of a person - their dispositions, and their field - which is their social position in relation to the other people that they interact with. Someone with a lot of cultural capital acts in such a way that is associated with highly positioned people in society. For example, Jacob Rees-Mogg is the MP for North East Somerset, and is a good example of someone with a lot of cultural capital. One particularly notable feature of Rees-Mogg is his accent - he speaks with a strong received pronunciation accent, which is the prestige dialect in the United Kingdom. Such a strong received pronunciation accent as Rees-Mogg has would be taken as evidence of high social standing in the United Kingdom. Accents are a good example to explain how cultural capital exists and is replicated. One of the reasons Rees-Mogg speaks in the way that he does is because of his education. He attended Eton College, an elite private school that costs upwards of £35,000 a year in fees, and

then attended Oxford University, an elite university where privately-educated pupils are strongly overrepresented.

Speaking in received pronunciation, even the high style of Rees-Mogg's accent is technically free. It's common for parents from all backgrounds in the United Kingdom to encourage their children to speak in received pronunciation - the hierarchy of accents is so strongly ingrained in British society such that this encouragement is often expressed as a command to 'speak properly'. Despite the fact that changing ones' accent need not cost any money, it remains a signifier of social class. This is because in environments like Eton College, received pronunciation doesn't have to be taught to resistant students with their own regional accents, and parents with less-prestige dialects, but instead it is the natural mode of speaking. Students at Eton College speak natively, and without having to consciously learn the dialect and alter their own speech. These students don't have to code-switch between RP and their native accent in different contexts in their lives. Sending your child to Eton allows them to speak in the way that displays high status, and thus confers privileges, without having to think about it. It's important to note here that this accent-as-class-signifier norm - although not peculiar to the British context - is particularly strong within it.

But of course it's not just accents that constitute cultural capital. Students at elite schools receive an education in so called 'high culture', culture that is prized by politically powerful and wealthy groups in society. It is these pieces of cultural knowledge and dispositions that are sought after by the powerful that confers cultural capital on the owner of them. One notable element of cultural capital in the United Kingdom is that children at elite schools learn Latin and Greek, and thus are familiar with the great works of the Western canon from a young age. Knowledge of the works of Shakespeare, of classical music, of French food all confer cultural capital upon the knower.

Again, we can note here that, as with accents, in most cases technically these things do not march in lockstep with economic capital. Thanks to the internet, there are free resources to learn about high culture, and anyone with an internet connection can do so. But nevertheless, these innovations are recent - the oldest children who grew up with Khan Academy and informative YouTube videos on the theory of Mozart's music are undergraduates now - and the requisite knowledge to understand these resources is more likely to be held by those with more privilege in society. And of course, anyone much older than these children will have grown up in a world where in order to learn these things one would have had to have gone to a good school or been a particularly dedicated autodidact with a library card.

Cultural capital constitutes class but also plays a role in signifying it. By moving the conversation towards high culture and judging the response of an interlocutor, it is possible to judge their class. In contexts where class matters, this provides a way for higher class people to filter out lower class people without committing the social taboo of directly asking them which class category they fall into. We can now see how cultural capital relates directly back to economic capital - discussions of high culture come up in interviews for prestigious universities, business meetings, social club meetings, and general socialising. These conversations are opportunities to gain more economic capital by being accepted onto a prestigious degree course, or making a business deal, getting a job, or making important business contacts. In this way, having more cultural capital provides you with many opportunities to increase your economic capital. Similarly, having more economic capital provides you with opportunities to increase your cultural capital - although the internet has somewhat eroded the relationship between wealth and high culture, some things, like tickets to the opera, or dinner at a French restaurant, remain the domain of the wealthy.

This social aspect of cultural capital brings us onto the third kind of capital Bourdieu discusses, *social* capital. Social capital consists of the social connections that an individual has in society. To take an example of someone with a lot of social capital, we can consider David Cameron, the former Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. David Cameron in a lot of ways is a lot like Rees-Mogg. They both went to Eton and then onto Oxford, but Cameron differs from Rees-Mogg in that - if you can imagine it - Cameron has more social capital. Immediately following Cameron's first job interview at Conservative HQ, a call was placed from Buckingham Palace recommending Cameron for the job. David Cameron has these connections to Buckingham Palace as his family are well-connected, in fact, his mother is a member of the minor aristocracy. At Oxford, Cameron was a member of the Bullingdon Club, a social club for wealthy, young, well-connected men. At the Bullingdon Club, Cameron made friends with George Osborne, who he later made Chancellor of the Exchequer. Social capital is an important way in which economic capital multiplies and reinforces itself - rather than opportunities being distributed by meritocratic means, instead these opportunities are given by and to the already well-connected. Social capital also relates to cultural capital - as an example, as I was writing this chapter a friend messaged me a question about Wittgenstein, and I sent back an answer. If my friend had been preparing for a job interview with a Wittgenstein fan, or schmoozing someone with a copy of 'Wittgenstein's Mistress' on their bookshelf, this piece of cultural capital would help them gain more social capital. And they used their social capital - knowing a philosopher well enough to send them a casual message - in order to increase their cultural capital - knowing things about 'high culture' like Wittgenstein.

These are extreme, but real, examples, Cameron's Buckingham palace phone call and Osborne's appointment to the second-most important political position in the country, but social capital doesn't just exist at the extremes. In small towns, the professional middle classes are more likely to socialise within their group as opposed to outside it. Local politicians and businessmen are other examples of

people who socialise and network within their own groups. There are Mason Halls, Rotary Clubs, business associations all over the country where people meet up, not just to socialise but to network. For Bourdieu, these social groups where people network function as a tacit pool of potential resources, to facilitate cooperation between ingroup members and multiply economic and cultural capital.

4.4 Class as Class

In this section I will introduce the first element of my bifurcated picture of social class - this is social class as the same kind of class grouping as the kinds I have described as 'race as class' and 'gender as class' earlier in this thesis. Following the previous arguments in this chapter, we can see now how class groupings function. It's important to note here our departure from a classic Haslangerian analysis. In analysing race and gender, there is an element of error on behalf of people using race and gender categories in an ordinary sense. A person who forces black people to use separate water fountains from white people is doubly wrong - firstly in the sense that discriminating in this way is a grievous *moral* error, but more saliently also wrong in the sense that - in their use of a concept of race that treats race as natural - they are treating 'blackness' as meaningful in a way that it is not[27]. On naive accounts, race categories aren't simply shorthand for some other features of individuals that are relevant for discriminatory purposes, they are taken to have status in and of themselves.

This is the crucial difference between usage of class categories on my account, and usage of race and gender categories on a standard Haslangerian analysis. The racist water fountain administrator means

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[27] I will note here that it is possible to treat race as being socially constructed entirely, and still mistreat others in a racist way. Nevertheless, ordinarily, racist action is tied to racist ideology that treats race as natural.

not to discriminate against people simply based on the colour of their skin, but rather to discriminate against *Black* people. According to Haslanger, racism works by discriminating against those on the basis of a presumed ancestral link to a certain geographical region (Haslanger, 2012, p.308), and it is this presumption of an ancestral link that grounds racial judgements, rather than any negative stereotyped qualities that are associated with this link.

Racists might ascribe badmaking qualities to black people, but black people that demonstrably possess none of these qualities are discriminated against nevertheless. Class discrimination doesn't work in the same way. Class really does reduce to the forms of capital in a way that race doesn't reduce to biological features. Class discriminators - at least ordinarily - really do mean to discriminate against people on the grounds of lacking this capital and not because people that lack this capital fall into the wrong group. The grouping in this case isn't conceptually prior to its constituents.

We can highlight this difference by constructing a definition of social class that has the same structure as a social constructivist account of race and gender. If social class was just like social constructivist understandings of race and gender, the definition of social class would be something like this:

A group is classed if its members are socially positioned as subordinate or privileged along some dimension and this group is marked as a target for this treatment by perceived dispositions or actions presumed to be evidence of a lack of economic, social, or cultural capital.

This understanding of class isn't false, but it does fail to offer an accurate picture of what class is. This account of class can explain some class discrimination interactions - in the case of pubs that have a sign on the door banning Burberry baseball caps, or trainers with a bubble in the heel (clothing items considered to be signifiers of working class-ness in the UK), our description above does describe what

is happening. The landlord of the pub perceives the action of wearing a Burberry baseball cap to be evidence of a lack of economic, social and cultural capital, sorts the cap-wearer into the lowest possible social class category, and decides to ban the cap-wearer from the premises on the grounds of this lack of status.

But even in this case, the differences are clear and important. The landlord doesn't bar the cap-wearer on the grounds of being 'working-class', but on the grounds of not having enough capital. It's not membership of the wrong group that denies access, as it is with race. What's actually happening here - unlike race and gender - is that the lack or presence of capital is itself constitutive of being classed. That the best schools require an extortionate fee to attend doesn't aim to discriminate against working class people on the grounds of working-classness itself, it discriminates against people who can't afford it - people who don't have enough economic capital. That it's easier to get a good job if you know someone who can recommend you doesn't rely on people thinking about class at all, it's just a system by which people with more social capital have more opportunities. Discrimination on the grounds of economic and social capital doesn't seem to relate to class in this way.

The above example only mentioned social and economic capital. Discrimination on the grounds of cultural capital does function in the above way. Although, as I said, the landlord might not explicitly bar patrons on the grounds of working-classness, a class judgement is being made in the decision to bar the cap-wearer. Discriminators see class signifiers and take these signifiers to be evidence of the quality or worthwhileness of an individual. The putative rationale for the Burberry cap ban is often said to be preventing violence in the pub. Landlords make the inference that people classed as working or underclass are more likely to be violent. If you have a cockney accent and are applying for a job at a prestigious law firm, the interviewer may take your cockney accent - and the

working-classness it signifies - as evidence of a poor education, of not being fit for the job. This is why the above Haslangerian definition - although incomplete - is not false.

In this way, social class resists a pithy definition. That there are mechanisms in society for conferring privileges on the grounds of having sufficient economic and social capital constitutes class. On top of this, we have a system of discrimination by which people take signifiers of cultural capital to be evidence of having other undesirable traits, like lacking capital, criminality, unintelligence and so on, and then confer lower social status upon those who lack this cultural capital. What makes this social class system worthy of moral concern is that we know that these forms of capital, and these cultural judgements are unjust. Capital is not distributed fairly, and thus judgements and conferments based on this distribution are not fair.

4.5 Class Habitus

In this subsection I will introduce the second element of social class in my bifurcated view - habitus. I have established half of my account of social class, explaining how class discrimination works in society. Earlier in this chapter I mentioned that people find it difficult to place themselves and others on the class hierarchy. A classic example of someone who is hard to place might be someone who is the first generation of their family to go to university, grew up in a council house, but then went to Oxford and got a high paying job. Someone in this position might find it hard to tell you what social class they are a member of. To refer to the disambiguation schema I adopted earlier in this thesis - people often find it hard to self-ascribe when it comes to class.

On the one hand, they might want to do justice to the difficulties they faced growing up working class, and not want to understate this by saying that they were straightforwardly middle class. Furthermore, much of their personal life might involve working class culture - they might go to the same pubs, enjoy the same music, keep the same company as before they went to university. On the other hand, they might also want to avoid overstating the extent to which this working class background affects them now. They might have a high paying job, plenty of influential friends, go to the theatre, and exist relatively easily in very middle class spaces.

Because class is not stable diachronically - because it can change over time - the way that class impacts our selfhood does not always correspond with our social position in a particular point in time. This is where the power of a social constructivist analysis can really help our account. In Haslanger's account of race and gender, she offers two understandings of race and gender. The first is race and gender as class, which is the kind of category we have been discussing until now in this chapter. You're raced, for example, in the case that someone takes you to be a member of a marginalised racial grouping, and treats you in a certain sort of way on those grounds. But there's also race as the internal map - you have a raced internal map in the case that your understanding of yourself is informed in a certain sort of way by race. In the previous chapter argued that this 'internal map' is simply habitus.

I contend that - like race and gender - there are two kinds of social class. Class as class, and class as habitus, and although we can talk of habitus as in some way distinct from class as class, these two kinds of class are intrinsically causally linked. You have a class habitus in the case that your internal map is formed to guide you as a member of that class.

Habitus consists of the unconscious and conscious parts of ourselves that provide us with direction when we're trying to navigate situations. This is what makes habitus like a map. A working class person might have a map formed such that they know how to navigate a working men's club on a Friday night, or it might point them towards their relationship with their local football team. A middle class person might have a map that helps them navigate purchasing fine wine, or a dinner party[28]. Maps also influence us on lower levels - they might impact the way we assess new people we meet, influence our preferences in making new friends, influence the way we assess the beauty of others and so on.

I want to emphasise this understanding of class as habitus as I argue that - particularly in a British context - it might explain some of the difficulties British people have when attempting to describe their own class grouping. This is because unlike race, it's very much possible to change one's class-as-class within one's lifetime. I will always be Mauritian, but I wasn't born middle class. On the other hand, thanks to dedicated parenting, an internet connection, the whims of the Catholic education system, and forgiving university admissions staff and tutors, I've collected a lot of cultural capital, and a fair amount of social capital too. Regardless of the economic capital that may or not be coming in my future, I'm middle-class now. But significant parts of my habitus were formed before I had all of this capital. Haslanger introduces this notion of race-as-identity in order to help us explain why mixed-race people have a fragmented sense of race. It's my contention that appealing to this understanding of class habitus allows us to explain why so many people feel such a fragmented sense of class - because they've gained various forms of capital as adolescents and adults, but had portions of their internal map formed prior to this.

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[28] These are of course stereotypical examples

The clearest case of this change in circumstances leading to fragmented habitus is likely the case of grammar school pupils from working-class backgrounds. Grammar schools accepted a small number of talented students from working-class backgrounds, and then provided them with an education akin to that of a private education. The other students that these working-class grammar school students socialised with would have been middle class, so these students were exposed to working-class culture and inculcation at home, and then middle-class culture and inculcation at school. These students then tended to go onto selective universities, by which time it would've been hard to tell for the outside observer that these students were not raised in middle class homes. These students then perhaps married middle class partners, and had middle class children. These students will have part of their internal map that guides them as a working-class person, and part of their map that guides them as a middle-class person. These social-climbing style cases aren't reliant on grammar schools, as there are many mechanisms by which working-class people can secure a foothold in middle-class spaces, and as a result fragmented class habitus is incredibly common.

Social climbing is not the only source of fragmented class habitus. Take, for example, the children of immigrant doctors. Doctors earn a much higher than average wage, giving these students more than average economic capital. But immigrant doctors often lack cultural and social capital - these students are less likely to grow up in homes where Mozart and Homer are dinner table conversation, and their parents are less likely to be well connected in the local community, being recent immigrants. Even in cases where these doctors come from middle-class backgrounds in their own countries, this cultural and social capital does not always translate when they become immigrants, and many doctors are from working class backgrounds in their own countries anyway. As a result, these students may go to private schools, but have less cultural capital than their peers, meaning that their internal map is fragmented between that of an immigrant habitus that doesn't fit neatly into the social class system, and their middle class experience at school.

What causes this fragmentation is that people have different forms of capital in different amounts. The experience of an impoverished person with a lot of cultural and social capital isn't the same as the name-brand, fully paid up middle class person with lots of all three kinds of capital. Each deviation from the norm for each class category fragments the habitus. It might even be the case that non-fragmented habitus' are exceedingly uncommon.

In thinking about class in this way, we can understand better the complicated business of self-ascription in social class in the United Kingdom. People often self-ascribe as a member of a certain class group that corresponds to the class background that they were raised in as a child, as opposed to the class background that they exist in as an adult. I argue that this is because people self-ascribe with reference to their habitus, rather than what Bourdieu would call their objective social position. By thinking about these self-ascriptions as referring to habitus, we can understand how these self-ascriptions are not mere fiction, entirely unrelated from material conditions. But we can also, by highlighting how moral harms ordinarily track class as class rather than habitus, understand how someone might be truly middle class whilst having a class habitus informed by a working class upbringing, for example. This understanding of class justifies interventions that track real deprivation, as it can justify targeting interventions based on class-as-class.

4.6 Hereditary Class

In this subsection I will apply my picture of class to hereditary class kinds. So far, I have given an account of two kinds of class. Class as class, which is constituted by how much capital an individual has, and class as habitus which is constituted by the internal maps that individuals have to guide them through life. This is a powerful account, as it is able to explain how and why class discrimination

affects people in society, and also how people might struggle to identify or explain their own class background, given how a person's social networks and possession of capital can change so greatly in the course of one lifetime, and particularly during the critical period of personal development that is getting an education. It might be tempting to say that this is sufficient, but given the nature of social class, I must also discuss hereditariness, and hereditary nobility systems.

Earlier in this chapter I mentioned that cultural capital is inculcated within children through education. Parents make sure that their children have a 'good education', by which they mean not only an education that allows them to understand the world, but an education that contains the right sort of cultural knowledge, that allows children to become adults that can talk about the right books and music. This cultural capital knowledge is taught rather than inherited - it's physically impossible for you to, for example, inherit your mother's knowledge of Chaucer. Similarly, ordinary people can't inherit social capital - your father might be able to introduce you to his connections, and he might be able to use his economic capital to send you to a school where you'll make the right connections, but there's no legal system by which your father's connections are obliged to offer his children favours.

Economic capital is not so. On top of the fact that almost without exception, wealthy parents raise their children in wealthy households - these children can afford good nutrition, a private education, luxury goods and so on - you can also inherit your parent's wealth directly. Wealth passes on by law through generations. When your parents pass away - assuming that they haven't explicitly chosen not to do so - you inherit their wealth.

This is interesting for two reasons - the first is that given that economic capital is a constituent of social class, and that economic capital is heritable, necessarily a certain element of social class is heritable. The second is that economic capital is particularly easy to translate into other forms of

capital, given that it is possible to pay for a private education (and thus 'buy' cultural capital) and that having money makes it easier to get into spaces where you meet influential people (and thus 'buy' social capital). So social class is both mutable and not directly heritable, it does tend to pass on through generations for this reason. Given the way private education works, even the trustees of wealthy orphans with trust funds will be able to use economic capital to ensure the child has sufficient social and cultural capital.

A discussion of heredity here is not just warranted for its own sake, however. In societies like the UK, we have an added complication to our class system in that we have a royalty and a nobility. Members of nobility systems have a special, higher class status that is strictly heritable - you do not gain this status indirectly, your parents do not have to inculcate this status within you or buy it for you, it is granted to you merely on the grounds of your lineage. If your father is a Lord, and you are his first born son, you inherit his Lordship, with all the rights and privileges that come along with that. In fact, if you inherit a Lordship in the UK, you inherit the right to be elected to the House of Lords by the other Lords. This is analogous to if a portion of the constituencies in the House of Commons could be represented only by a small number of people who had inherited the right to stand in that seat.

So what should we make of these strange hereditary positions under our analysis? There are two positions that it is possible to take here. The first is that in societies with a nobility system, there are two related but separate class systems - a non-hereditary system for 'commoners', and a hereditary system for the nobility. The second is that there is a single system, and societies in which there is a nobility are societies in which it is possible to inherit not only economic capital, but certain kinds of social capital as well.

I endorse the latter position, but in order to provide motivation for it I would like to begin by discussing why the former position is undesirable. The former picture is motivated by looking at cases where it seems that someone has inherited only a nobility status, but is also lacking in one or more of these forms of capital.

Examples of this are cases of so-called 'impoverished aristocrats', members of the upper class who have fallen upon hard times financially, or had little wealth in the first place. Arup Kumar Sinha - a hereditary peer better known as Baron Sinha - did not inherit any family wealth, and was recently working in an ordinary middle class job as a travel agent. The benefits that normally accrue to people high on the economic axis of middle-classness only accrue to Baron Sinha in virtue of his job as a travel agent, rather than his status as a Baron. Similarly, it is possible to imagine hereditary peers with a relative lack of cultural capital - some hereditary peers send their children to state school.

In the above case it looks as though Baron Sinha's nobility status is totally separate from his levels of capital. It looks like him being a Lord has nothing to do with his job, his social network or his cultural knowledge. This separation provides motivation for thinking that a nobility system is not related to the rest of the class system by way of capital.

However, this position has its own problems. If you think that being a member of the nobility is a separate system to being working or middle class, then the intuitive thought is that it would be sensible to say that Baron Sinha is both upper class AND middle class. And that saying this wouldn't be making a claim about his murky identity, but rather a claim about how he is classed as class - it would be a claim about his position in society and not a claim about how he views himself. This would be wildly unorthodox - hard to account for philosophically and also likely to be rejected as felicitous in an everyday context.

Further, given that this view separates nobility from non-nobility in a strict sense, and then holds nobility status to be superior to non-nobility status, the view also implies that every member of the nobility has a higher social status than non-nobility members, which is undesirable. It leaves you vulnerable to the argument that there are many non-noble people that have a higher social status than Baron Sinha. As a result, Baron Sinha has children, the view would imply that these children would have higher social status than Jacob Rees Mogg's children, for example, and it's unclear that everyday people engaging in the practice of class discrimination would take this to be true.

Given the problems with this view then, it's good that we can take the latter view - the view that nobility status is just a form of social capital that firstly confers high (but not necessarily superior) social status, and secondly is strictly appointed or heritable - that is to say that you can inherit it, and the only way of getting it is to inherit it or be appointed to this status by the sovereign. We can understand this by drawing a comparison between economic and social capital. In the UK, for example, children inherit their parent's wealth by default. If your parent passes away and has an estate, the state will tax the estate and then divide what's left equally between all children, unless otherwise instructed to do so by the deceased.

This does not happen through a necessary law of nature, however. There's no law of physics such that wealth is automatically transferred from a deceased parent to their child. Ownership, after all, is socially constructed, as are the norms and laws that govern it. There's a set of rules, laid out by statute that decide who owns what, and these rules are made 'real' by common acceptance and the use of force by the sovereign. By this I mean that there are commonly accepted ways by which to come to legitimately own something, and if you try to own something that you are not entitled to, the state may send people to physically force you to relinquish that thing.

In societies without a nobility system, wealth is the only thing you can inherit. Property is the only thing that the state understands is passed from parent to child. But in societies *with* a nobility system, there's a special set of rules for passing on social capital on top of economic capital. You are apportioned a certain level of social capital - which can manifest itself as high esteem in the weakest sense, and legislative power in the strongest sense - merely in virtue of your birth. And not only does the law respect this inheritance, but other people in society do too, which is what confers the high esteem in the first place.

In the UK for example, one family inherits a massive amount of high esteem, and the right to rule the country. This is the royal family. This right is respected by the law, and also by many people that live here. This is an extreme form of inherited social capital - it's a whole lot of social influence and connections. This capital is not earned, but inherited. We also have a larger number of families that inherit a lesser, but still large amount of high esteem, and also the right to sit in the House of Lords. This is the nobility. In societies that still have a nobility but no legal status given to it, the only thing that is inherited is the high esteem and the social influence that comes with it. What keeps the nobility in place in these communities is a combination of acceptance by all members of the society, but more importantly acceptance by those that possess a concentration of capital (and thus influence). Societies like the UK have our body of law reinforcing the nobility on top of this.

Thus, economic and social capital can be inherited. Almost all societies allow for inheritance of economic capital. Some societies, like the UK, allow for inheritance of social capital in the same sort of way as economic capital, but the overwhelming majority of people do not possess the kind of social capital that can be inherited in this way. In societies that have what are commonly called *caste* systems, it may be the case that these *castes* are just systems of inherited social capital too - the

difference being that in this case it would be possible to inherit both low AND high status, and that instead of a minority of people possessing a form of hereditary social capital, the overwhelming majority or all people would possess it.

4.7 Combining Literatures

In the previous chapter I mentioned that incorporating insights from the Bourdieuan literature - and insights from other fields more generally - into analytic philosophy can be fruitful. In this chapter I have shown another way in which this approach confers benefits. The lack of attention paid to social class in normative analytic philosophy has meant that approaches to injustice have often failed to track the important harms caused by class oppression. Further, this approach bears descriptive benefits as it is better able to account for the differences in the lives between members of a given minority group, whilst still being attentive to the injustices faced by members of that group. It is necessary for a view of race in a society like the United Kingdom to be able to account for the differences between ethnic minority pupils at Harrow and ethnic minority pupils at state schools. These experiences are not the same, and I aim to have provided a way to account for this.

4.8 Conclusion

In conclusion, in this chapter I have combined Bourdieu's account of the forms of capital with an Haslangerian understanding of social kinds. This account offers both a good description of how social class functions in society, whilst being able to also account for people's complex understandings of their own social class. I have then gone on to argue that societies with nobility systems are societies where it is possible to inherit both economic and social capital in the same

sort of way.

Section 2: Situated Knowledge and Accessibility

Introduction

This section of the thesis argues in favour of a particular view of a kind of knowledge known in epistemology as 'situated knowledge'. Situated knowledge - sometimes called 'standpoint knowledge' - is a special kind knowledge that epistemic agents have in virtue of their social position. Although much attention in the literature has been paid to the political implications of situated knowledge views, relatively little attention has been paid to the issue of placing situated knowledge within the literature on traditional epistemology. In traditional epistemology there are debates about the different kinds of knowledge, and their metaphysical nature. This section takes on the task of placing situated knowledge within these debates on the different kinds of knowledge, arguing in favour of the view that situated knowledge consists at least mostly in 'knowledge-how', as opposed to 'knowledge-that'.

I make my argument by appealing to a key feature of situated knowledge views - that situated knowledge is in some way 'inaccessible from the point of view of the dominant center' (Kukla, 2006a, p.81). I argue that this feature is a key criteria for assessing candidate theories of situated knowledge, calling it the 'inaccessibility criteria'.

This thesis has a tripartite structure, with a section on metaphysics, epistemology, and politics. The methodology of the thesis is such that the metaphysical views given guide and constrain the epistemological view that I give, and later, the epistemological views given in this section will guide and constrain the political prescriptions that I provide.

With this theme of guidance and constraint in mind, this chapter begins by outlining the constraints that my social constructivist view of gender, race, and class places on accounts of situated knowledge. I apply this social constructivist picture to accounts of situated knowledge from the literature, and develop a view of situated knowledge that is compatible with social constructivism.

Having developed a view of situated knowledge, I then apply this view to the literature from traditional epistemology on the different kinds of knowledge. I then argue that theories of situated knowledge that locate situated knowledge in kinds of knowledge other than knowledge-how fail to meet this criteria, highlighting the failures of propositional knowledge and self-knowledge to do so.

The result of this argumentation is a view of situated knowledge that is compatible with both so-called 'naturalised epistemologies' (Kukla, 2006a), such as those endorsed by the majority of analytic epistemologists, and the methodological approaches of standpoint and situated knowledge theorists. As such, this argument can be taken as a methodological bridge between these two literatures, which were heretofore mostly methodologically divided.

Further, this view of situated knowledge provides this thesis with the necessary grounding to make arguments in favour of increasing descriptive representation in representative democracies, which is the project of the following and last section of this thesis.

Chapter 5: Kinds of Knowledge

5.1 Introduction

This chapter provides a literature review and lays the groundwork for the epistemic arguments I will give in chapter six. Specifically, it gives an overview of the literature on situated knowledge from within feminist philosophy, and the literature from traditional epistemology on self-knowledge and knowledge-how, which I will treat as candidate theories for situated knowledge in chapter six. On top of this, this chapter lays out the 'Inaccessibility Criteria', which is a feature of situated knowledge that I argue is necessary in order to justify the political claims that situated knowledge theory is supposed to ground.

5.2 Feminist Epistemology

I will now give a brief overview of what 'feminist philosophy' has been taken to mean, as this chapter involves responding to, and building upon ideas from feminist philosophy. Feminist philosophy is

interested in the subordination of women. Feminist epistemology gives analyses of practices of knowledge that subordinate women. Anderson gives a list of the various kinds of views espoused by feminist epistemologists:

"Various practitioners of feminist epistemology and philosophy of science argue that dominant knowledge practices disadvantage women by

(1) excluding them from inquiry,

(2) denying them epistemic authority,

(3) denigrating their "feminine" cognitive styles and modes of knowledge,

(4) producing theories of women that represent them as inferior, deviant, or significant only in the ways they serve male interests,

(5) producing theories of social phenomena that render women's activities and interests, or gendered power relations, invisible, and

(6) producing knowledge (science and technology) that is not useful for people in subordinate positions, or that reinforces gender and other social hierarchies." (Anderson, 2020).

We can see here some distinction between analysing norms of knowledge communication, and giving a metaphysical analysis of knowledge. Consider the first kind of feminist argument that Anderson gives - it is possible (but not necessarily wise) to give a full account of the way that women are excluded from inquiry without having to develop a specifically feminist metaphysical analysis of knowledge. This is true of all of these kinds of arguments, except for the third, "denigrating their "feminine" cognitive styles and modes of knowledge".

The difference between this third kind of argument and the others is that this kind of argument proposes that there are either specifically feminine modes of knowledge, or cognitive styles. This kind

of claim is what I am interested in for the purposes of the thesis. Often these claims that there is a specifically feminine mode of knowledge are part of a wider set of arguments, but regardless, to claim that there is a specifically feminine mode or kind of knowledge is to make a specific metaphysical claim. This claim is that something about being a woman results in a specific knowledge mental state (or a metaphysical alloy containing a mental state (McGlynn, 2014)). Further, the majority of feminist epistemologists are also anti-essentialists about womanhood, making it so that their claim is that this knowledge mental state or alloy comes about as a result of some contingent feature of the lives of women.

5.3 Constraints and Guidance

I will now outline what it means for a view to be a situated knowledge view, before giving an overview of prominent situated knowledge views from the literature on feminist philosophy. In order to discuss these different views of situated knowledge, it is necessary to provide a succinct account of what situated knowledge views have in common with one another. Rebecca Kukla characterises the core claims of standpoint epistemology as follows, for which she argues that the first claim is ubiquitous amongst standpoint epistemologists, and the latter two claims are just very common:

1. "Some inquirers have contingent properties that give them access to kinds of knowledge that are not available to others" (Kukla, 2006a, p.81).
2. "Some contingent features of knowers can give them not only different, but better, more objective knowledge than others have" (Kukla, 2006a, p.81).

3. The social positions of marginalization and structural disadvantage, such as those inhabited by women African-Americans, or the working class, yield epistemological advantages, giving those who occupy them the potential to see truths that are inaccessible from the point of view of the dominant center (Kukla, 2006a, p.81).

Feminist scholars give a variety of justifications for, and descriptions of these claims. In the following section, I will provide examples and explanations of some of these views. These views are typically mutually compatible, and in some cases such as Hill Collins (2009) are all endorsed by the same scholar in the same text.

Kukla's picture of situated knowledge views provides a good starting point for characterising my own situated knowledge view. It also provides constraints that render certain views of situated knowledge impermissible or inconsistent. I will now discuss the constraints that bind my view of situated knowledge. These constraints come from two places. Firstly, it is necessary that my view of situated knowledge counts as a situated knowledge view according to Kukla's criteria, so that my arguments about situated knowledge count as addressing situated knowledge and not some other kind of knowledge. Secondly, it is necessary that my view of situated knowledge is compatible with the metaphysical picture of social kinds that I gave earlier in this thesis, and that my view is suitable for making the sorts of political prescriptions that situated knowledge views are intended to make.

5.3.1 Constraint #1 - Social Construction

The first constraint is that my view of situated knowledge must be compatible with a view of the metaphysics of social kinds that holds social kinds to be socially constructed. As I have discussed in the previous section on metaphysics, realism about gender is an unpopular view in the literature. Nevertheless, exploring the relation between situated knowledge and gender realism will be helpful in order to understand the constraints on situated knowledge views.

In the previous section I referenced Mikkola's (2019) discussion of the 18th century biologists Geddes and Thompson, who put forward a crude realist theory of gender. According to Geddes and Thomson, all differences between men and women could be explained entirely in biological terms (and of course on this view, sex and gender are entirely conflated). So, for example, on Geddes and Thomson's view, the reason for differences between mens' and womens' employment, choice of dress, subordinate and subordinating positions in society and so on can all be explained by the biological differences between men and women (Mikkola, 2019).

We can see how a view such as this could lead to a view that shares superficial similarities with a situated knowledge view. A gender realist can endorse the view that men and women are different sorts of knowers, and explain this difference by appealing to biological differences between the brains and sensory systems of men and women. So, according to gender realists, presented with the same set of evidence, men and women may be 'set up' differently to come to know different things on the basis of that evidence.

The previous section of the thesis provides an argument in favour of seeing gender, race, and social class as being socially constructed. As a result, situated knowledge views that rely on these kinds of differences between genders, races, or social class groups are impermissible for this project. The dominance of social constructivist views about gender is such that this constraint will not in itself

disallow any popular view of situated knowledge found in the literature. In fact, views that hold gender to be socially constructed are sufficiently ubiquitous within the situated knowledge literature that Kukla's list of criteria holds situated knowledge views to be focused on 'contingent' views of knowers (Kukla, 2006a, p.81).

5.3.2 Constraint #2 - The Inaccessibility Criteria

The second half of Kukla's first criteria, mentions that situated knowledge views hold that certain kinds of knowledge are "not available" to others (Kukla, 2006a, p.81). This position, which I call the 'Inaccessibility Criteria', plays a crucial role in the argumentation in the last part of this section. This inaccessibility criteria means that it is not enough for a situated knowledge view to grant that a person has special knowledge in light of their social position. A situated knowledge view must also hold that there is something about that special knowledge which means that it is not available to those in significantly different social positions.

So, for example, Nancy Hartsock holds that men and women have different perspectives that lead them to know different things. I will discuss these views in more detail later in this section, but for our purposes all that it is necessary to note is that on Hartsock's view, society is structured in such a way that women are placed into a subordinate social position, and as a result have to carry out different social functions and types of work (Hartsock, 1983, p.291).

This different social position grants women a different perspective for knowing. Because this knowledge is gained through a lifetime of living - and importantly *working* - in a gendered society, it is not possible for men to gain this knowledge. Or to use Kukla's language, because men, who are in

the dominant center, do not have the necessary social position to learn this situated knowledge, and as such this knowledge is inaccessible.

5.3.3 Constraint #3 - Superiority

Kukla's second condition (Kukla, 2006a, p.81) provides us with another constraint for our view. The last chapter of this thesis provides an argument for diversifying representative democracies, and the justification for this diversification is that different sorts of people have different sorts of knowledge. A key element of this argument is that in many political contexts, some knowledge is better than others. A paradigmatic example would be that when discussing introducing policy on abortion, situated knowledge theorists are likely to hold that women have special, situated knowledge about their bodily autonomy that means that we should privilege their perspective in this context.

As a result, my view of situated knowledge needs to be able to justify the privileging of one knower over another in certain contexts. This means that the kind of knowledge that my view of situated knowledge describes needs to be both politically relevant, and important.

5.3.4 Constraint #4 - Applicability

The last constraint is brief, but important. The purview of this thesis extends to race, gender, and social class. Much of the literature on situated knowledge focuses on gender alone, but the view of situated knowledge that I develop must be able to be applied to race and social class also.

5.3.5 Existing Views

I will now discuss existing views in the literature on situated knowledge. This will serve to situate my own view within the literature, and provide examples of views that are suitable for the arguments I provide in chapter six. I will begin by discussing the work of Donna Haraway. Haraway's work introduces the term 'situated knowledge', and demonstrates the location of situated knowledge views as often originating within the philosophy of science. I will then discuss Nancy Hartsock's 'standpoint feminism', which provides a more concrete and specific view of situated knowledge and has influenced much of the consequent literature. I will then discuss the work of Patricia Hill Collins, who provides a discussion of situated knowledge as it relates to both race and gender.

5.3.5.1 Haraway and the Motivation for Standpoint Feminism

I will firstly discuss Donna Haraway's view. Much of the literature surrounding situated knowledge and standpoint feminism arises from discussions of the philosophy of science. Feminists that argue that there is something epistemically important about the perspective of the epistemic agent have been accused of violating the scientific norm of objectivity. Often, a defense of standpoint feminism is an argument for how adopting a concern about epistemic perspective does not make inquiry any less rational. These arguments also provide a good source for the motivation of standpoint feminism and situated knowledge theory.

One of the earliest and most influential defenses of this kind is given by Donna Haraway (Haraway, 1988). Despite the varying methodologies endorsed by different situated knowledge theorists, the core

insights of the theory of situated knowledge that Haraway provides are seen in the work of the majority of consequent situated knowledge theorists. As such, I will use Haraway's work in order to explain the motivation and nature of situated knowledge views. For the sake of brevity, I will paraphrase rather than quote Haraway's detailed arguments.

Haraway argues that minist analysis has characterised science as a social practice that claims to describe 'objective' facts about the universe, but fails to do so (Haraway, 1988, p.575). Further, these feminist analyses of science and 'objective epistemologies' characterise science as not only failing to achieve its goal, but of committing a moral failing by perpetuating and reinforcing oppressive features of society (particularly misogyny, but it is easy to see how you can apply these analyses mutatis mutandis to racism, homophobia, and so on). Some feminist writers claim that these analyses show that what the position we should endorse in light of these analyses is in a kind of skeptical subjectivist epistemology where nobody can claim to know objective facts about the universe (Haraway, 1988, p.576).

On the other hand, feminist analysis itself aims to make substantive claims about the universe - feminists aim not to merely express opinions about how they feel about social structures, but to describe social structures and label them as oppressive. Being able to do this is incompatible with adopting the kind of subjectivism I have discussed below. As such, the task of the feminist epistemologist is to figure out an epistemology that roughly coheres with these feminist analyses of science and epistemology, whilst retaining an ability to speak meaningfully about oppressive structures, and the universe more generally. This description of being torn between looming subjectivism on the one hand and inaccurate scientism on the other is not dissimilar from the problem Antony discusses in 'Quine as Feminist' (Antony, 2018), which I will discuss later in this chapter.

Haraway argues that the way to retain an epistemology that has both of these features is to think of epistemology in terms of situatedness. She does this by relating human sensory capacity - particularly vision - to both the concept of the male gaze from feminist art history, and to the different sensory experiences of animals with sensory systems very different to our own (Haraway, 1988, p.581).

The male gaze is a concept that describes the subjectivity and masculinity of the world as presented in art. Criticism of the male gaze states that art is often composed in such a way that women subjects are presented as erotic objects, as if they do not have agency and without concern for how they appear to women viewers. This criticism is often made with reference to some very contentious claims that are reliant on psychoanalytic thought, but there is little reason to think that it cannot be made sense of without psychoanalysis (Carroll, 1990, p.354). This relates to Haraway's argument as although art - or at least a large proportion of art - purports to present an objective or true view of reality, art reifies the subjective perspective intended by the artist. At the same time though, the piece of art is still a reflection of reality, for example a painting of the Eiffel Tower doesn't represent the Tower objectively, but represents it more than an arbitrary string of data does.

The discussion of animals with different sensory capacities further reinforces Haraway's argument that our sense-perception does not produce an objective viewpoint of reality. Dogs have different eyes, a smaller portion of the brain dedicated to processing visual data, and a larger portion of the brain dedicated to processing olfactory data compared to humans. Haraway argues that we have little reason to believe that the human sense-experience of the world is objectively epistemically superior to the dog sense-experience of the world regardless of context (Haraway, 1988, p.583).

Given that we can no longer appeal to any notion of objective positioning (or as Haraway calls it, the 'god trick')(Haraway, 1988, p.584), we must reorder our epistemology such that rather than trying to

make our viewpoints more objective, we should focus on interpreting the many positions of all knowers in such a way that is rational and just. It's important to be clear here that she does not mean that we should fetishise the viewpoint of the oppressed - she is not arguing that oppressed people have a more objective position than non-oppressed groups, but rather that apportioning epistemic consideration justly would involve firstly acknowledging that members of oppressed groups are appropriately situated such that they have knowledge of oppression, but also not disregarding their epistemic point of view in pursuit of a more objective epistemic standpoint (Haraway, 1988, p.587).

In order to explain this point she offers a dichotomous chart of the vices of 'objective' epistemologies on the left and some virtues of the kind of epistemology she is advocating for on the right, reproduced below:

universal rationality	heteroglossia
common language	deconstruction
new organon	oppositional positioning
unified field theory	local knowledges
world system	webbed accounts
master theory	
ethnophilosophies	

(Haraway, 1988, p.588)

She then concludes the portion of the paper regarding situated knowledge with a passage arguing that the project of epistemology thus becomes the project of interpreting a conversation between knowers rationally and justly (Haraway, 1988, p.598). She does not provide an

action-guiding explanation of what 'rationally' might mean in this context, but the list of virtues provided above give us some idea of what rationality means for Haraway. Later in this section I will discuss theorists who give standpoint or situated knowledge views that give a richer picture of the role perspective plays in inquiry.

5.3.5.2 Hartsock and Marxist Standpoint Theory

I will now discuss Nancy Hartsock's view. One prominent, early view of this kind is known as Marxist standpoint theory. Hartsock argues that society is structured such that there is a sexual division of labour, enforced and reinforced by compulsory heterosexuality (Hartsock, 1983, p.291). First and foremost amongst the labour that women are forced to do is childbirth and child-rearing. She argues that the labour carried out by women differs from that carried out by men in the following ways - women work more than men, a greater proportion of their work creates use-value (as opposed to creating things that are valuable as mere commodities), and women's work is more repetitive than men's work. She uses the example of cleaning toilets. Cleaning toilets is repetitive, you have to do it frequently, and it creates use-value. We can compare this to something like investment banking, which is less repetitive than cleaning toilets, requires less active work than cleaning, and does not create any use-value.

As a Marxist, Hartsock privileges use-value. Marxist epistemologists argue that the proletariat have a superior epistemic position because it is the proletariat who are directly involved in work that creates use-value. For Marxists, the business-owner or managerial worker merely organises labour, but does not partake in it. On the Marxist view, the proletariat's labour is useful and the capitalist does not carry out labour at all. Hartsock draws an analogy between

women and the proletariat. Because women are more connected to use-value through their repetitive and frequent work, women are staring material reality in the face all day, every day. The roles that men play in society remove them from material reality, and distract them with less meaningful activities. This is where the feminist standpoint arises - women have superior insight into the material structure of society because their enforced role means that they interact with material reality more.

On top of this, Hartsock argues that women's role in motherhood also provides them with a privileged epistemic position. Aside from being directly involved in creating other human beings (who, beyond having use-value, are the entities to which use-value is meaningful) (Ibid., p293) She argues that the experience of motherhood allows women to more easily see metaphysically complex relations, as pregnancy and motherhood pushes at the boundary of the individual, and of the self (Ibid., p294). She also argues that girls are socialised via the concrete example of the mother, whereas boys are socialised in relation to abstract cultural ideals, making femininity concrete and masculinity abstract (Ibid.).

It is important to bear in mind here that situated knowledge claims are typically essentialist. The situated knowledge theorist tends to hold that there is a specific kind of knowledge that a social group has, that only this social group has, and as such non-members of the group do not have. We can understand Hartsock as making two sorts of claims about the distinct epistemic standpoint of women. The first is a strongly essentialist claim - the psychoanalytic claims about the way that girls are socialised and the relational aspects of motherhood are taken to be universal experiences of womanhood. The second is weaker but still essentialist. She makes claims arising from the sexual division of labour and the work women are expected to do in the

workplace and at home. These claims can be experienced in varying degrees, and indeed it is possible to be a woman on Hartsock's view and not experience this.

These essentialist claims give us two ways in which women may have situated knowledge. The first way is through socialisation as a child. The thought here is that girls are trained (explicitly and implicitly) to think about the world in a certain way, and that the way that girls are trained to think about the world is more conducive to producing true beliefs about the world than the way boys are trained to think. The second way is through life experience. On this view, the position that women are subordinated into in society allows them to see truths that are obscured or hidden from the male perspective. So in this way it is the social position of women that gives them privileged knowledge instead of any training or socialisation.

Hartsock's talk of biology also falls into this latter kind of situated knowledge. The position of being a motherhood gives women an experience that confers special knowledge. We can imagine a third kind of situated knowledge here. Hartsock is biologically essentialist about womanhood, but what she is not arguing is that there is a biological difference in women's minds that makes them more intelligent or more adept at gaining knowledge. She is not making the sort of claim that scientific racists make about the brains of white people, nor is she making a mystical claim about feminine essence. She is instead making the claim that women's bodies allow them to have an experience that men cannot, and that this experience grants important knowledge and modes of thinking.

5.3.5.3 Hill Collins and Black Feminist Thought

In this section I will discuss Patricia Hill Collins' view. This relation of experience to situated knowledge is the most typical foundation for theories of situated knowledge. We can turn to the work of Patricia Hill Collins (2009) to see another theory of situated knowledge that uses experience as its guiding principle. Hill Collins makes the distinction between knowledge and wisdom (Hill Collins, 2009, p.257). In the context of Hill Collins' work, both of these terms have a specific technical meaning. Two agents that are exposed to the same evidence are not guaranteed to learn the same things from that evidence. For Hill Collins, knowledge is a minimal kind of understanding, and wisdom is a maximal kind of understanding that occurs when an agent combines their knowledge with interpretation and skill of noticing.

Lived Experience

Hill Collins argues that due to the unique subjugated position of black women in American society, black women have been forced to develop the skills required for gaining wisdom (Ibid., p257). For Hill Collins, black women as a group have needed to develop this mode of thought as a matter of survival. Part of this shared wisdom is a focus on lived experience as opposed to de-individualised statistical reasoning (Ibid., 2009, p258). On this view, abstract reasoning and the removed epistemic perspective of the scientist have been used as tools of subjugation towards black women, and that as a result black women have developed a skepticism towards these methodologies. In this there is some similarity to Hartsock's view. Hartsock holds that women are subjugated in such a way that forces them to do certain kinds of labour, and this proximity to certain kinds of labour allows women to better see the truths about society, whereas men are more likely to entertain abstract and less useful thoughts (Hartsock, 1983). Hill Collins argues that the reality of black women's lives does not give them the time to stand

back and reason abstractly about the world, and that this is one of the reasons black women focus on lived experience as a way of knowing (Hill Collins, 2009, p.259).

Dialogue

Another characteristic element of black women's knowledge, according to Hill Collins, is the use of dialogue as a way of knowing. Hill Collins points to a tradition of dialogue as reasoning that comes from the African roots of Black Americans. She contrasts dialogue with firstly an adversarial mode of reasoning, and secondly with the notion of knowledge abstracted from the position of any individual epistemic agent. For Hill Collins, dialogue involves a collaborative process of shared experience, whereas adversarial argument is competitive and aims to privilege one agent over another. Furthermore, dialogue focuses on the lived experience of the people engaging in the practice, linking back to her prior point about lived experience versus de-individualised knowledge (Ibid., 1983, p262).

Ethics of Caring

Hill Collins then moves onto another mode of black women's knowledge. She argues that the ethics of caring play an important role in the epistemic lives of black women, and conceives this ethics of care of being made up of multiple parts. The first is the emphasis of the individuality of each person. This section is not given a detailed treatment, but Hill Collins considers Black American culture to hold individualism as a deep rooted value (Ibid., p263). The second is placing a high value on the role of emotions in reasoning. Hill Collins critiques White European culture as irrationally separating the two, and venerating reason over emotion.

The third component is related to the second, and is the development of empathy. Hill Collins argues that black women have a distinct culture of developing a sense of empathy.

Unlike the prior kind of situated knowledge that Hill Collins discusses, she does not think that the ethics of caring is exclusively the domain of black women. She does argue that the way that black women approach the ethics of caring is distinct in character, and that black women have more reasons to adopt the ethics of caring, and that it is more probable that black women have done so (Ibid., p265).

This way of thinking about situated knowledge and standpoint feminism is very different to the prior discussed ways.

Hierarchies

One crucial way in which Hill Collins' account of situated knowledge differs from accounts such as Hartsock's is that Hill Collins' does not endorse the view that the subjugated perspective is objectively superior at perceiving the truth than the subjugating perspective. Hartsock and Marxist epistemologists argue that the subjugated perspective of women or the proletariat allow themselves to see a better picture than that of men and the bourgeoisie. For Hartsock, the metaphor of the standpoint is that women are standing on a high hill, and have a panoptic view of everything. Hill Collins' is suggesting a more complicated topography of the world, in which it is impossible to understand the parts of society that black women live in without standing in their shoes.

Hill Collins' makes this argument to resist what she describes as an 'additive' view of oppression (Ibid., p270), on which the misogyny and racism that black women suffer is fungible with and comparable to the misogyny that white women suffer, and the racism that black men suffer. Hill Collins does not think that these oppressions add onto one another in that way, and she does not think that they can be compared or put into competition with one another.

Despite this argument, Hill Collins does think that taking seriously a Black feminist epistemology does impact the status of claims made by the dominant epistemology. She argues that if we have good reason to take a Black feminist epistemology seriously, then we have reason to doubt other epistemologies. The dominant epistemology presents itself as the only rational mode of thinking, and given that we have reason to believe that this isn't true, Hill Collins argues that we have reason to doubt all claims made by the dominant epistemology (Ibid., p271).

To refer to the above taxonomy, it is clear that Hill Collins' arguments are multivarious. Some of her arguments fall under the cultural values view, some of her arguments fall under the cognitive styles view, and some of her arguments fall under a restricted variant of the superior viewpoint view, under which black women do not have an objectively superior global perspective, but instead have a superior viewpoint over those matters closest to them.

5.4 Application

Hartsock and Hill Collins provide two good examples of situated knowledge views. I will now apply the four constraints to each view. Both Hartsock and Hill Collins' views are compatible with socially constructivist views of race, gender, and social class. Both rely on the contingent

social position of women within society, rather than any biological feature of womanhood. Both views also meet the inaccessibility criteria, as they hold that the situated knowledge is gained through living life as a woman, which is not replicable by men. Both views are explicit about the superiority of women's knowledge in certain contexts, and as such it meets the third constraint.

The last constraint, applicability, is more complicated. Hartsock does not offer a specific treatment of race, and as such adaptation is necessary in order to apply her view of situated knowledge to race. However, she does explicitly argue that social class leads to situated knowledge, arguing that the positions of the proletariat and women are comparable and related (Hartsock, 1983, p.291). Hill Collins gives a treatment of both race and gender, but not of social class directly. However, it is important to remember that a common feature of situated knowledge views is that a single situated knowledge view is not exclusive. It is consistent to believe Hartsock and Hill Collins at the same time, and in doing so develop a picture of situated knowledge that covers race, gender, and social class at the same time.

Having given an overview of the relevant literature on situated knowledge, I will now give an overview of the other contested epistemological debates that are relevant to my argumentation. Specifically, I will give an overview of two debates from within traditional epistemology - specifically the debates on self-knowledge, and knowledge-how. I will begin by discussing knowledge-how.

5.5 Knowledge How

5.5.1 Introduction

In the following section of this thesis, I will argue that the best candidate kind of knowledge for situated knowledge in a political context is knowledge-how. Knowledge-how is a contentious topic in epistemology, as philosophers disagree about what knowledge-how consists in. My argument will run regardless of the broad position one takes on knowledge-how, but as I am talking about knowledge-how, and the descriptive accounts of knowledge-how are written in the context of this contentious debate, I will give a brief summary of the positions in this debate. This will provide an explanation of the different accounts of knowledge-how.

Positions on the nature of knowledge-how can be split into two camps. The first camp is known as intellectualism. Intellectualists hold that knowledge-how is dependent on, or a species of knowledge-that. Knowledge-that is also known as propositional knowledge. The second camp is anti-intellectualism. Anti-intellectualists hold that knowledge-how is something other than knowledge-that (Fantl, 2017).

5.5.2 Anti-Intellectualism

5.5.2.1 Ryle's Negative Argument

I will now discuss one of Ryle's arguments, which is known as the negative argument. Much of

the work on knowledge-how is either a response to the work of Gilbert Ryle, or a response to

one of these responses. Ryle argues in favour of the anti-intellectualist position, using a

negative argument and a positive argument. He makes his negative argument via a reductio of

the intellectualist position, showing a purported infinite regress in the intellectualist position.

He sketches the intellectualist proposition thusly: intellectualism holds that knowing how to do

something is merely knowing a set of propositions about that thing. Ryle then moves onto

applying this intellectualist theory to the practice of knowing something, arguing that if

intellectualism is true, then each time an agent carries out an act, they must contemplate the

relevant propositions prior to carrying out the act (Ryle, 2009, p.20). But, given that

contemplating and planning is itself something you know how to do, then in order to know how

to contemplate and plan, one must contemplate and plan contemplation and planning. And then

one must contemplate and plan the contemplation and planning of contemplation of planning.

This is the infinite regress. In the following section on intellectualism I will discuss this in more

detail, providing Stanley and Williamson's (2001) response to this argument.

5.5.2.2 Ryle's Positive Argument

5.5.2.2.1 The Ability Account

I will now discuss Ryle's other argument - known as the positive argument. Ryle argues that

knowledge-how consists in 'second natures or acquired dispositions' (Ryle, 2009, p.30). The

specific interpretation of what this means differs across respondents to Ryle's work. Stanley

and Williamson take Ryle to be holding the position that to know how to Φ is to simply have

the ability to Φ (Stanley and Williamson, 2001). So, to say 'Imran knows how to cook' is

simply to say 'Imran has the ability to cook'. The test for whether you know how to do something is then simply to see if you can do it or not, rather than interrogating any of your beliefs or attitudes.

What's notable about this account of knowledge-how as ability is that it makes no reference to propositional knowledge whatsoever. In fact, Stanley and Williamson's reconstruction of Ryle makes no reference to mental states at all. We can see how this account of knowledge-how sidesteps the regress that Ryle was worried about - there is no contemplative step necessary for knowing how to do something, and as such the first step of the regress is never reached.

However, respondents to Ryler are not univocal in endorsing this reconstruction. The positive account that Stanley and Williamson give is so weak that they provide fatal counterexamples to it in the same paragraph that they introduce the account. They highlight that, for example, "a master pianist who loses both of her arms in a tragic car accident still knows how to play the piano. But she has lost her ability to do so" (Stanley and Williamson, 2001, p416).

5.5.2.2.2 The Dispositional Account

Another way to make sense of Ryle's positive account is to think of knowing how to do something as having certain dispositions or capacities (Fantl, 2017). We can distinguish the dispositional account from the ability account by looking back to our prior examples. Let's think about knowing how to cook. If we say 'Imran knows how to cook', on this account, we are saying 'Imran has a set of dispositions such that he can follow the rules of cooking'. Fantl quotes the following passage from Ryle - "Knowing how, then, is a disposition, but not a

single-track disposition like a reflex or a habit. Its exercises are observances of rules or canons or the applications of criteria" (Ibid.).

We can turn this dispositional account towards the examples that Stanley and Williamson used to defeat the ability account. The pianist who loses her arms still knows how to play the piano, despite not being able to anymore. This is because she still understands the norms and rules of piano playing, she can consider and apply the appropriate things to do when sat at the piano in order to make music.

This severing of disposition and ability provides another benefit when applied in the opposite way. On this dispositional account it is possible to be able to do something without knowing how to do it. Hornsby (2012) uses the example of someone attempting to access a computer system for which they do not know the password. In this example, there is a temporary security failure under which for a short period of time the system will accept any password. Due to this, the person enters in an arbitrary string and gains access to the system. In this case, the person is able to access the computer system, but doesn't know how to access the system. Their access is explained by luck, rather than knowledge.

As such, this view of knowledge-how is stronger and more versatile than the ability view. On top of this, it avoids the regress that Ryle cautions against. Contemplation of propositional knowledge is not necessary on this account to know how to do something. Contemplation can be part of knowing how to do something - in order to know how to do philosophy, one must know how to contemplate - but it is not a necessary step in knowing know to do all things.

5.5.3 Intellectualism

5.5.3.1 Stanley and Williamson Contra Ryle

The most prominent defenders of the intellectualist position are Timothy Williamson and Jason Stanley, and I will now discuss their view. Beginning in their 2001 paper 'Knowing How', they provide arguments against Ryle's anti-intellectualism. The intellectualist position is that knowing-how is merely and only a species of knowing-that. That is to say that knowing-how is a form of propositional knowledge. It is important here to make clear the strength of the intellectualist claim. The intellectualist is not just claiming that propositional knowledge plays a role in knowing-how. Anti-intellectualists would be happy to agree that propositional knowledge plays some role in knowing-how, and further would endorse the view that in some cases of knowing-how, propositional knowledge plays an important role. Contrary to the anti-intellectualist, the intellectualist claims that in all cases of knowing-how, know-how consists of propositional knowledge and nothing else.

So how do intellectualists respond to Ryle's arguments? Stanley and Williamson first attack Ryle's negative argument. Ryle thinks that intellectualism is vulnerable to a regress - that the intellectualist picture implies an infinite regress of contemplation about contemplation. Stanley and Williamson do not think that this regress is an implication of the intellectualist view. Having reconstructed Ryle's argument formally, they argue that in order for the argument to demonstrate a regress, extra premises are required (Stanley and Williamson, 2001, p414).

The first flaw in Ryle's regress argument, according to Stanley and Williamson, is to do with the way Ryle suggests contemplating steps multiply. Consider contemplating a proposition p, as the first step of the regress. Ryle thinks that if intellectualism is true, we must also contemplate contemplating p, which would be step two. Step three would be contemplating contemplating contemplating p. Stanley and Williamson argue that contemplating steps only multiply in this way if each act being contemplated maps onto a distinct proposition (Stanley and Williamson, 2001, p414). If multiple acts can be mapped onto the same proposition, it is not necessarily the case then that as acts multiply, contemplating steps will multiply.

The second assumed premise, according to Stanley and Williamson, is that Ryle assumes that each contemplating step is in fact distinct. It could be the case that contemplating phi, and contemplating contemplating phi are in fact the same act, and that this sameness carries on up the chain of contemplating steps. If Stanley and Williamson are right about either of these two assumed premises being wrong, Ryle's regress argument does not run.

5.5.3.2 Stanley and Williamson's Positive Argument

Having provided a number of arguments against Ryle, Stanley and Williamson then move onto providing their positive argument for an intellectualist conception of knowledge-how. They do this by turning to the language used in describing knowledge-how claims. Their argument comes in two parts - firstly they argue that knowledge-how language shares a syntactical similarity with knowledge-that language, and secondly they argue that the language used to refer to the two forms of knowledge also has a semantical similarity. They argue that the typical

way of describing a knowledge-how claim in English has the structure of the following

sentence:

"Hannah knows how to ride a bicycle." (Ibid., p417)

This kind of sentence construction has an embedded question. Stanley and Williamson argue

that many sentences we use to describe propositional knowledge ascriptions also contain

embedded questions, and as such the below propositional knowledge claims have the same

structure as the knowledge-how claim:

"(a) Hannah knows where to find a nickel.

(b) Hannah knows whom to call for help in a fire.

(c) Hannah knows which prize to look for.

(d) Hannah knows why to vote for Gore." (Ibid., p418)

This structural similarity forms the core of the argument in favour of intellectualism. They

unpack the semantics of the above propositional claims in the following way. When we say that

'Hannah knows where to find a nickel', we are saying that there is some place that Hannah

knows of where a nickel is. When we say that 'Hannah knows whom to call for help in a fire',

we are saying that there is some person that is the right person to call for help to in a fire, and

that Hannah knows this person (Fantl, 2017) (Stanley and Williamson, 2001, p419).

Given the similarities between knowledge-how sentences, and these knowledge-that sentences,

Stanley and Williamson argue that knowledge-how sentences have similar semantics. The

specific semantics of a know-how sentence, for Stanley and Williamson, are that when we say

that someone knows how to do something we are saying that there is some way that they know how to do that thing. So to turn back to the sentence "Hannah knows how to ride a bicycle", what we are saying in this sentence is that "Hannah knows some way to ride a bicycle" (Ibid., p425). They argue that these 'ways' of doing things are lists of propositions. Given that these 'ways' are lists of propositions, knowing the 'way' to do something is just knowing propositions, and as such, knowing how to do something is just knowing propositions. Because propositional knowledge is the same as knowledge-that, and knowing propositions is definitionally propositional knowledge, knowledge-how is thus a species of knowledge-that.

So, to recap Stanley and Williamson: knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that. We have reason to believe that this is the case because when we look at the syntax and semantics of knowledge-how claims, they are the same as knowledge-that claims. What's notable about this argument is the way that it focuses on the language we use to refer to knowledge-that claims, rather than the suggested phenomenological or practical differences between knowledge-that and knowledge-how that anti-intellectualists argue for. Nevertheless, for Stanley and Williamson, the syntactical and semantical hurdles are the biggest problems for intellectualism, and they argue that their conception of knowledge-how overcomes them.

5.5.3.3 Savoir Faire

I will now discuss a prominent objection to Stanley and Williamson's view, as given by Ian Rumfitt. Stanley and Williamson use sentences in the English language to make their case. Ian Rumfitt argues that the Stanley and Williamson argument does not run as well in other languages. Their argument relies on the syntactical similarity between knowledge-how claims

and knowledge-that claims in English. These claims are similar because of the embedded questions found within them.

Stanley and Williamson's argument uses a linguistic argument to make a metaphysical claim. The linguistic argument is that sentences in English contain an embedded question, and that the semantics of embedded questions imply propositional knowledge. This argument is turned towards metaphysics with the claim that because the semantics of the language we use to refer to knowledge-how implies propositional knowledge, then we must really be referring to propositional knowledge.

Rumfitt's argument works by pointing out that although it is true that the language we use to refer to knowledge-how in English has this structure, sentences in other languages do not. Rumfitt points out that in French, the analogous sentence to 'She knows how to ride a bicycle' would be 'Elle sait monter á velo' (Rumfitt, 2003, p.161). This sentence uses the bare infinitive for knowledge, 'sait', instead of the embedded question found in 'knows how to phi'. Rumfitt then works through other similar sentences, appealing to French and Russian in order to demonstrate that Stanley and Williamson's argument does not work in every language.

Stanley and Williamson are arguing that the way sentences are constructed in English can tell us something about the epistemological metaphysics of knowledge. Rumfitt's argument forces Stanley and Williamson into a corner. If they stick by their methodology, they are forced to endorse the view that knowledge-how is propositional knowledge for English speakers, but that we don't have the same reason to believe this is the case for French speakers. Although it is possible to endorse this conclusion, it makes Stanley and Williamson's position less appealing.

5.5.4 Conclusion

Rumfitt's argument provides a compelling case against propositional-knowledge accounts of knowledge-how. In doing so it advocates maintaining a firm distinction between knowledge-how and propositional knowledge. This firm distinction will be useful in making the arguments surrounding situated knowledge in the last part of this chapter. Having gone over the debates on knowledge-how, I will now turn to the debates surrounding so-called 'self knowledge', which is also from traditional epistemology.

5.6 Self-Knowledge

5.6.1 Introduction

I will now discuss the body of literature on 'self-knowledge'. So far, I have given an overview of the literature surrounding two putative kinds of knowledge - situated knowledge, and knowledge-how. I have been talking about kinds of knowledge, but what I have really been talking about is bodies of literature. The body of literature on situated knowledge is almost entirely separate from the body of literature on knowing-how. Despite this, both bodies of literature are engaged in the same project of making sense of our epistemic lives. I mention this because one of the main goals of this thesis is to show that these bodies of literature are often talking about the same sort of thing. The third body of literature is on what is often called 'Self-Knowledge' (Gertler, 2020).

The literature on self-knowledge attempts to explain the distinctiveness of knowledge that we have about our own interior lives and personal experience. Gertler gives four qualities that self-knowledge has that other kinds of knowledge does not seem to have:

1. "Self-knowledge is especially secure, epistemically.

2. Self-knowledge is (sometimes) acquired by use of an exclusively first-personal method.

3. Self-knowledge is special because of the distinctive agential relation one bears to one's own mental states.

4. One's pronouncements about one's own mental states carry a special authority or presumption of truth."

(Gertler, 2020)

Consider an ordinary piece of propositional knowledge like "Praia is the capital of Cape Verde". Nothing makes this piece of knowledge especially secure. You might know this, but it's not implausible that this is the sort of knowledge you could be wrong about. There's no way that you could come to know what the capital of Cape Verde is through introspection, and so you could not come to know this through use of a first-personal method exclusively. You bear no special agential relation to this piece of knowledge - nothing marks your having this knowledge as special merely in virtue of you being you. And finally, in ordinary contexts, you would have no special authority in communicating this fact to others.

Contrast this piece of knowledge about Praia with the following knowledge: "Kenan knows how he feels right now." Unlike knowing what the capital of a country is, it would be strange for us to believe that Kenan was mistaken about his own feelings. There are a number of ways to make sense of this security. One way of thinking about this is that Kenan is infallible about

this piece of knowledge. Another way of thinking about this is that Kenan simply is just more secure in this piece of knowledge than he would be with the Praia example. Either way, the intuition is that it is much harder for Kenan to be wrong about this piece of knowledge than in the Praia case.

Secondly, all Kenan needs to do to know how he feels is to introspect about it. There's no evidence in the outside world that Kenan needs to turn to in order to know how he feels. To learn the capital of a country, you would turn to Google or an Atlas. To know what the weather is like, you must go out of the window. Most knowledge requires something other than a first-personal method to acquire it, but in this case a first-personal method is all Kenan needs.

Thirdly, there is something special about Kenan's relation to this piece of knowledge. It is reflexive knowledge - something that Kenan knows about himself. This feeling is not just something Kenan knows about the world, but instead it is part of who he is. The distinction between knowledge and agent cannot be made so cleanly in cases such as this.

Lastly, if Kenan were to tell you how he feels, he would carry a special authority in doing this. If Kenan were to tell us that he felt a certain way, it would be unusual for someone else in the room to disagree with him. To do so would be considered at best patronising, but more likely epistemically mistaken. The intuitive thought is that only Kenan knows how he feels, and that others have no real way of knowing. Another way to say this is that we grant a special authority for people reporting knowledge about themselves.

We can see how if we want to affirm that the above four characteristics of self-knowledge are true, then we have to be able to give an epistemological argument for them. Similarly to the

way that intellectualist accounts of knowledge-how are partially motivated by the simplicity and parsimony of a view that boils everything down to propositional knowledge, accounts of self-knowledge attempt to balance the phenomenological and authoritative character of self-knowledge with giving a metaphysical picture that is simple and elegant.

5.6.2 The Knowledge Argument

Because it relates very closely to self-knowledge, I will now discuss Jackson's knowledge argument, which is an argument against materialist views of the mind. Self-knowledge comes into play in many debates on the philosophy of the mind. The nature of the subjective experience of being is a key issue for those interested in defending or refuting materialist theories about the mind. Qualia is the term used to refer to this internal phenomenal experience (Tye, 2018), and one of the major challenges taken up by materialist philosophers in the 20th Century was to give an account of qualia that was compatible with a materialist metaphysics of the mind. These materialist attempts to give an account of qualia typically take the form of descriptions of qualia as ordinary epistemic states.

Frank Jackson (Jackson, 1982), offering an argument against materialism, uses a thought experiment to demonstrate his case:

"Mary is a brilliant scientist who is, for whatever reason, forced to investigate the world from a black and white room via a black and white television monitor. She specialises in the neurophysiology of vision and acquires, let us suppose, all the physical information there is to obtain about what goes on when we see ripe tomatoes, or the sky, and use terms like 'red', 'blue',

and so on. She discovers, for example, just which wave-length combinations from the sky stimulate the retina, and exactly how this produces via the central nervous system the contraction of the vocal chords and expulsion of air from the lungs that results in the uttering of the sentence 'The sky is blue'. (It can hardly be denied that it is in principle possible to obtain all this physical information from black and white television, otherwise the Open University would of necessity need to use colour television.)" (Ibid., p130).

In making the knowledge argument, Jackson is trying to lead the reader's intuition towards a view that non-physical facts must exist. The thought experiment works by constructing a case in which Mary is privy to all of the kinds of information and knowledge that the materialists would ordinarily use to describe phenomenal experience, but nevertheless one in which we have the intuition that Mary is missing some important information. Specifically, in this case, we are supposed to think that Mary is missing the knowledge of *what it is like* to see colour.

The materialist here is obliged to take one of the following positions on Jackson's thought experiment. Firstly, the materialist can argue that the thought experiment is constructed such that Mary is still missing something that can be accounted for in purely materialist terms. Secondly, the materialist can argue that Jackson has somehow rigged the thought experiment such that it is misleading. Lastly, the materialist can bite the bullet and argue that Mary does not learn anything new at the point at which she finally sees colour.

5.6.3 David Lewis and the HPI

I will now discuss David Lewis' (1990) arguments surrounding self knowledge. I include Lewis' view here in part because of his importance to the literature in this topic, but also because his conception of self-knowledge as consisting in an ability is similar to my conception of situated knowledge as knowledge-how, which I give in the next chapter. takes the first approach of arguing for a materialist metaphysics of mind by giving an account of what Mary is missing that is materialism-compatible. Despite being a materialist, Lewis takes the Knowledge argument very seriously, perceiving it as a real threat to materialism. He constructs the knowledge argument as making a claim that materialism is incompatible with what he calls the Hypothesis of Phenomenal Information. The Hypothesis of Phenomenal Information (hereafter HPI) is the hypothesis that "besides physical information there is an irreducibly different kind of information to be had: phenomenal information" (Lewis, 1999, p.270).

For Lewis, the knowledge argument leverages the HPI against materialism by highlighting the core claim of materialism - that there can be no change in mental properties without a change in material properties. Another way of phrasing this is that two worlds that are alike in all their physical properties will also be alike in their mental properties. Lewis then turns to the role that phenomenal experience plays in reasoning. For Lewis, if HPI is true:

"Two possible cases might be exactly alike physically, yet differ phenomenally. When we get physical information we narrow down the physical possibilities, and perhaps we narrow them down all 7 the way to one, but we leave open a range of phenomenal possibilities. When we have an experience, on the other hand, we acquire phenomenal information; possibilities previously open are eliminated; and that is what it is to learn what the experience is like" (Lewis, 1999, p.271).

Here Lewis highlights the role that information plays in reasoning - it narrows down possibilities. Consider two cases of reasoning. In the first case, you are reasoning about my whereabouts. You know that I am in Birmingham city centre, and that I went out to eat lunch. You can immediately imagine some possibilities - if you were local you could probably name twenty restaurants that I might be at. It is trivial, with ordinary reasoning, using ordinary information, to imagine possibilities for information that you do not yet have. This imagination of possibilities is crucial for Lewis' argument.

The next feature of propositional information is that once you have imagined possibilities, you can narrow them down. In the case of figuring out where I'm eating lunch, you could have some information at hand. You have the information that I was wearing a t-shirt and jeans, which lets you narrow down some possibilities - in this case all of the restaurants that have a dress code. You know that I never order seafood, which lets you narrow down the possibilities by excluding oyster bars and shrimp shacks. Let's imagine that you get some really good information. Let's say that you use a device to track my phone, and see that I am sitting in a noodle bar in Chinatown. This information narrows down the possibilities to a single possibility. Lewis takes this narrowing down property of information to be a necessary feature of propositional information (and thus, propositional knowledge) (Lewis, 1999, p.280).

Lewis argues that phenomenal information does not allow for imagination and then narrowing down possibilities in this way. David Lewis uses the example of imagining what it is like to taste the Australian savoury spread 'Vegemite'. He argues that prior to tasting Vegemite, you have no powers of imagination as to what it might taste like. There is no way to draw up a list of possibilities in the same way as you could draw up a list of possibilities for where I might be. He concedes that one way you might try to go about doing this is to imagine that Vegemite

tastes like some things that you *have* tried, to imagine that the phenomenal experience is similar to one that you have already had, but argues that even if some cases of phenomenal imagination are like this, that it's easy to imagine a case where you have been authoritatively told that the experience you are trying to imagine is dissimilar to all your prior experiences (Lewis, 1999, p.282).

Lewis argues that if phenomenal information and ordinary information were the same sort of entity, then there wouldn't be this asymmetry between them when it comes to imagination and narrowing down possibilities. Given this asymmetry, for Lewis, phenomenal information must be different to ordinary information.

If HPI is true, phenomenal information and physical information are different and crucially, independent from one another. Learning physical information narrows down physical possibilities without narrowing down phenomenal possibilities, and learning phenomenal information narrows down neither phenomenal possibilities nor physical possibilities.

If materialism is true, Lewis argues, then two possibilities cannot be alike physically and not also be alike simpliciter. If HPI is true, then necessarily, two possibilities can be the same physically, but different phenomenally, and as such not alike simpliciter. Lewis takes the Knowledge Argument to be giving a case such that Mary has all of the physical information that someone living outside of the closed room has, but cannot narrow down the same phenomenal possibilities that the person outside the room can (Lewis, 1999, p.271).

Lewis takes this argument to be so strong that the materialist is forced to make a choice: reject the HPI, or reject materialism altogether by becoming an epiphenomenalist about mental states

- someone that thinks that mental states are non-physical, but play no causal role in the physical world. Lewis finds epiphenomenalism to be unpalatable, and as such is forced to reject HPI.

5.6.4 The Ability Hypothesis

I will now discuss Lewis' Ability Hypothesis, which aims to resolve the puzzle discussed in the immediately previous subsection. Lewis argues that the materialist can reject the HPI whilst still being able to tell a plausibly intuitive story about what's happening to Mary. He does this by arguing in favour of a position he calls the Ability Hypothesis. The Ability Hypothesis holds that to have a new experience is to gain the abilities to remember and imagine that experience. This argument shows strong similarities to the anti-intellectualist argument I discussed previously.

In a similar way to the way anti-intellectualists about knowledge-how reject the view that knowledge-how consists in propositional knowledge, Lewis rejects the view that the change Mary undergoes once she has the experience of seeing colour consists in propositional knowledge. The benefit of locating this change in something other than propositional knowledge is that the HPI is only incompatible with materialism in the case that the phenomenal information is propositional in nature.

He does this by arguing that, rather than gaining propositional knowledge in response to phenomenal information, we instead gain abilities. To render this explicitly, Lewis states "It isn't knowing-that. It's knowing-how" (Lewis, 1999, p.288). But it is not enough to merely locate this issue in knowledge-how. Lewis provides a positive account of the kinds of knowledge-how that are gained when an agent has a new phenomenal experience.

Lewis argues that there are three major abilities that are gained when you have a new phenomenal experience. You gain the ability to remember that experience, you gain the ability to imagine that experience, and you gain the ability to recognise that experience if you come across it in the future (Ibid. 288). He uses the example of Vegemite once more. Once you have had the experience of tasting vegemite, you gain the ability to remember what it tastes like. Even if you cannot recreate the phenomenal experience of tasting Vegemite using your mind alone, you can still remember the taste in a way that can inform decisions about whether to eat Vegemite in the future. You also gain the ability to imagine tasting Vegemite in the future - both in a direct sense, so if you have tasted Vegemite on toast you can imagine what it would be like to taste Vegemite on toast in the future, but also in the sense of imagining Vegemite in a different context, such as what Vegemite ice cream might taste like (Ibid. 289). Further, you gain the ability to recognise Vegemite if you were to come across it again. So if I had secretly slipped Vegemite into your food, you would be able to not only tell that your food had been altered, but also tell the way in which your food had been altered.

Lewis is careful here not to elide the difference between knowledge-how and ability. He highlights that knowledge-how isn't sufficient for ability. You can know how to do something but be unable to do it. You may know how to lift a car off of a trapped pedestrian, or know how to organise a healthcare system in which people do not die for lack of income, but be unable to do so for physical or political reasons, for example. So instead of knowledge-how being identical to ability, instead, knowledge-how is a prerequisite for having the ability to do certain things. We can see the analogy here between Lewis' thoughts on these matters and Stanley and Williamson's remarks about the pianist. In both cases the aim is to sever knowledge-how and ability.

So in Lewis, we find an attempt to explain a kind of knowledge that seems not to function like ordinary propositional knowledge. In order to explain this difference (and avoid scuppering materialism), Lewis turns to locating phenomenal knowledge in knowledge-how. Later on in this section we will see Rebecca Kukla, and myself, make a similar move in order to avoid a separate but related philosophical problem.

5.6.5 Conclusion

Self-knowledge is a contentious form of knowledge that is hard to place in the literature. Nevertheless, Lewis' arguments provide this chapter with the detail necessary to consider whether situated knowledge may be self knowledge in the way that Lewis characterises it, and provides an example of another area of philosophy locating a contested entity in knowledge-how in order to resolve a philosophical puzzle.

Chapter 6: Situated Knowledge as Perceptual Skill

6.1 Introduction

In the previous section I described a number of different ways of thinking about situated knowledge. It is possible to think of situated knowledge theorists as endorsing the view that minorities have a superior epistemic view point, that they have superior cognitive styles, or superior cultural values, or any combination of these things. Despite providing useful insight into the political implications of epistemological injustice, the epistemologists I have discussed so far do not provide a description of situated knowledge that uses the language of traditional epistemology.

In this section of the thesis, I will describe and provide a solution for a puzzle that arises when we think about situated knowledge - and its political prescriptions - through the lens of traditional epistemology and philosophy of mind. What creates this puzzle is the notion that situated knowledge theorists are advocating that we diversify decision-making groups. When Hartsock makes her argument about the feminist standpoint, she is making an argument about how we structure decision making groups. She is arguing that we are currently unjustly and irrationally putting too much emphasis on the perspectives of men, and as a result of this, we are ignoring the perspectives of women. The prescription that arises from this thought is that we should listen to women more - that we should diversify our decision making groups.

Collins' prescription is similar - that we are ignoring the perspectives of black women, and that we should listen to black people and women. Every situated knowledge theorist writes with this sort of political prescription in mind.

As a result of this, an epistemological understanding of situated knowledge has to be able to justify this diversifying prescription. And an epistemological understanding of situated knowledge that can justify diversifying groups must be able to show how non-minorities cannot have access to this knowledge. I will assess the different kinds of knowledge - propositional knowledge, self-knowledge, and knowledge-how, in order to show how simple propositional knowledge and self-knowledge fail to justify this diversifying prescription. I will then argue that there are two viable candidate knowledge kinds that can meet the inaccessibility criteria, and thus justify these prescriptions. Firstly, I will argue that knowledge-how is a good candidate for the kind of knowledge that situated knowledge consists in, following Rebecca Kukla's work aiming to solve a related but separate puzzle. Secondly, I will argue that complex sets of propositional knowledge are a good candidate for this kind of knowledge. Lastly, I will argue that although each candidate kind of knowledge can justify these norms on its own, it is a consistent and plausible view that situated knowledge is constituted by *both* knowledge-how and complex sets of propositional knowledge.

The upshot of this argument will be an epistemological argument that supports the view that demographically diverse decision-making groups are epistemologically superior to non-diverse decision-making groups. This will be applicable to all decision-making groups, but political groups - such as parliament, grass-roots political groups, and activist groups are the kind of groups that situated knowledge theories tend to target, so I will highlight them here.

6.2 Laying the Groundwork

I will now explain the motivation for my conception of situated knowledge, and situated knowledge views more generally. The locution "You don't know what it's like" is an incredibly common feature of political discourse. Concerns about minority representation in organisations are grounded not only in moral concern but also epistemic concern. Organisations want not only to be just, but also to make sure they are forming a full understanding of all the desiderata when they are making decisions. Criticism of the overwhelming number of Old Etonians in the House of Commons are not only criticisms about political injustice, but also criticisms about how such an unrepresentative government has difficulty understanding the lives of ordinary people. All of these concerns are profoundly perspectivalist - they are concerns about decision-makers or interlocutors not having the right kind of epistemic perspective to have good access to the truth. Put simply, we want representative decision-making groups not only for moral reasons, but for epistemic reasons also.

The term 'situated knowledge' comes from feminist philosophers of science, who were arguing that science's aperspectivalism - its claim to have an objective epistemic perspective - lead to science being epistemically and morally deficient (Haraway, 1988). In response to this, these philosophers argued that the epistemic perspective of epistemic agents, particularly women and other oppressed groups, was not only ignored by social institutions like science and the government, but was also *superior* in certain contexts. In the literature, this theory is called *perspectivalism* or *situated knowledge,* or sometimes (and particularly by Marxist theorists) as a key component of *standpoint theory*. Once more I will use Kukla's characterisation of situated knowledge views, which I have reproduced again below:

1. *Some inquirers have contingent properties that give them access to kinds of knowledge that are not available to others* (Kukla, 2006a, p.81).

2. *Some contingent features of knowers can give them not only different, but better, more objective knowledge than others have* (Ibid., p. 81).

3. *The social positions of marginalization and structural disadvantage, such as those inhabited by women African-Americans, or the working class, yield epistemological advantages, giving those who occupy them the potential to see truths that are inaccessible from the point of view of the dominant center* (Ibid., p.81).

This characterisation is a good one, and I will use it in this chapter. My project differs from Kukla in that Kukla aims only to defend the first claim in her paper (although she endorses the latter two). Assuming that the social positions described in claim three are contingent, we can understand the third claim as entailing the first and second claim. I do take these social positions to be contingent in nature, in accordance with the social metaphysics I have described earlier in this thesis. As such, in this paper I am defending the third claim, and in doing so I am defending all three claims.

On top of containing the first two claims, the third claim has two extra elements. Firstly it specifies a group of knowers who have contingent properties that give them better knowledge than others - in this case members of political minorities like women and ethnic minorities. You could very well endorse claims one and two but hold that political *majorities* are the group that have more objective knowledge (and indeed many non-philosophers do this). You could also endorse claims one and two and hold that some arbitrary groups like bird-watchers, ladder

repairers, people born on the third of July and so on are the group with better or more objective

knowledge (and perhaps in some cases be justified in doing so).

The second extra element of the third claim is the claim that the truths that the aforementioned

groups have access to are 'inaccessible from the point of view of the dominant center' (Ibid.,

81). As I have mentioned above, I call this the inaccessibility criterion. If the inaccessibility

criterion is true, then something about situated knowledge must be non-transferable to other

knowers. This precludes knowledge that non-members of the group can come to know by

sense-experience or simple testimony, for example ordinary propositions like "The cat is on the

mat" which can be learned by looking at the mat or listening to the testimony of a reliable

testifier. Situated knowledge cannot be so easy to learn, otherwise it would be accessible from

the point of view of the dominant center.

You can understand the inaccessibility criterion in two ways: firstly that these known truths are

in principle or *by their nature* inaccessible to non-members of the epistemically privileged

group. If this condition is true, there is simply no way that non-members of the group can

access this knowledge. This is because non-members of the group are never in the right

position to experience the appropriate evidence, and something about the knowledge is

ineffable or impossible to transfer to another agent through testimony or otherwise. Call this the

strong inaccessibility criterion. Another way to understand the criterion is that rather than it

being impossible for non-members of the group to access this knowledge, it is instead just very

difficult for non-members of the group to know, and as a result it is rare for non-members of the

group to come to know it. It might be transferable, but not through mere testimony, or

transferable in rare circumstances. Call this the **weak inaccessibility criterion**.

If we are to have good epistemic reasons for diversifying decision-making groups, one of the inaccessibility criteria has to be true. If neither of them are true, then ordinary non-members of minority groups can come to an easy understanding of society through testimony, with ordinary effort and attention. As such, people who 'don't know what it's like' are guilty of being poor listeners, or blinded by ideology, or guilty of some other epistemic or moral vice that makes them unusually poor at gaining knowledge.

On the other hand, if the strong accessibility criterion is true, then we have an incredibly strong epistemic reason to diversify our decision-making groups, at least in politically relevant decision-making groups. Although I have not mentioned it above, another claim that situated knowledge theorists hold is that the knowledge that members of minority groups have special access to is important knowledge, rather than trivia or esoteric knowledge. As such, if the strong criterion is true, any politically relevant decision making body that does not have members of minority groups on board is fundamentally epistemically compromised, as it is lacking important knowledge that is relevant to the decision that it is making.

If the weak accessibility criterion is true, we have a similar state of affairs. If this is the case, then there is a strong probabilistic argument that socially unrepresentative decision-making bodies are epistemically flawed. Although it's the case that in principle unrepresentative groups might have access to all the relevant knowledge, it's very unlikely given how difficult it is for non-members of minority groups to access this knowledge. This is of course assuming that it's less difficult to just have social minorities in our decision-making groups than it is to teach unrepresentative groups the relevant knowledge[29]. This is less strong than the deductive

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[29] I am grateful to Ema Sullivan-Bissett for her helpful comments highlighting this implication of my view.

argument that follows from the strong criterion, but it's still strong enough to guide our actions towards diversifying our groups.

So, we can now analyse different kinds of knowledge as candidates for the constituents of situated knowledge. A good theory of situated knowledge is going to endorse the three claims Kukla mentions, plus the fourth claim about the knowledge that situated knowers have being good knowledge. I will assess phenomenological knowledge, propositional knowledge, and knowledge-how in this light.

6.3 Situated Knowledge as Self-Knowledge

One kind of knowledge that meets the strong inaccessibility criterion is self-knowledge - knowledge about one's own phenomenological states. Members of minority groups have experience that is unique to being a member of that minority group. This is knowledge about *what it is like* to be a member of a minority group. This knowledge includes knowledge about literal perceptual states - what things look like, what things sound like and so on - but also knowledge about how it feels to be a certain person or kind of person. Mental states such as these are not transferable to other agents in the same way that the mental state of knowing that the proposition "Paris is the capital of France" is transferable (Nagel, 1974, p435). This is the 'special agential relation' that Gertler mentions in his description of self-knowledge (Gertler, 2020). Despite this non-transferability, we still often need to use this kind of knowledge in decision making - political decision-making is often about making sure people are happy, especially in democracies.

Self-knowledge is worth discussing as a candidate for situated knowledge as it is the only kind

of knowledge that meets the strong inaccessibility criterion. The strong inaccessibility of

self-knowledge knowledge as situated knowledge is intriguing as typically situated knowledge

as propositional knowledge theorists hold that it's not merely that members of majority groups

don't *currently* know the special facts that members of minority groups have access to, but that

members of majority groups *cannot ever* know, or sometimes more weakly that it is highly

improbable that a member of a majority group could come to know these facts. We can see now

why self-knowledge has some appeal as a theory of situated knowledge. The special agential

relation that an agent has to their self-knowledge guarantees that the strong inaccessibility

criteria is true for self-knowledge. Cases of imagining what it might be like for someone in an

incredibly different social position to you may just be fundamentally similar to 'What is it like

to be a bat?'(Nagel, 1974, p.435) cases. Under accounts that hold that it is categorically

impossible to imagine what it is like to be someone else, or accounts that hold that the lives of

majority and minority groups are sufficiently different enough to introduce this imaginative

capability gap, ordinary inquirers who are not members of a minority group never have access

to these situated truths.

The situation in which it is most obvious we use knowledge about qualia in our decision

making processes is in moral decision making. Many moral decisions are such that the only

moral stakes are somebody else's feelings. For example let's imagine that you're in the

unfortunate position of having to break bad news to someone. You know that you have to tell

them, and you're trying to decide whether to break the news directly and bluntly, or whether to

cushion the blow by working to the point slowly. These sorts of decisions are really difficult,

and they're difficult because you're trying to imagine what it is like to be someone else. Even

knowing the proposition "Harry would rather I break the news bluntly" is not the same kind of

knowledge as knowing how it feels to be Harry in that situation. For example, you could

imagine a news-breaking creature that can know things but is incapable of emotion. This

creature could come to learn Harry's preference on news-breaking without ever coming close to

understanding what it is like to be Harry, simply by looking back to his prior responses to

receiving news.

This difficulty in using self-knowledge to make moral decisions reflects a difficulty in using

self-knowledge to make decisions more generally. Recall the unusual properties of

self-knowledge that David Lewis discusses in the argument covered earlier in this section.

Despite aiming to solve a different problem - the problem of phenomenal information - Lewis

provides us with an argument that we can use to bolster our own case against self-knowledge as

situated knowledge. For Lewis, a key property of propositional knowledge is the role that it can

play in reasoning. Specifically, propositional knowledge allows us firstly to imagine a set of

possible options, and then reason about these options in order to narrow down the set to the

most plausible option (Lewis, 1999). Lewis argues that phenomenal information - the kind of

information that we are calling self-knowledge in this chapter - does not and cannot play this

role in reasoning. As previously discussed, he does this by highlighting the difficulties of

imagination. He uses the example of how having tasted things similar to vegemite does not

really give you a good picture of what vegemite tastes like. Each phenomenal experience is

singular in that way. In order to use phenomenal information - self knowledge - to reason, we

would need to be able to do imaginative reasoning, but we cannot.

So Lewis argues that self-knowledge cannot be propositional knowledge, and that the reason

that it cannot be propositional knowledge is because it cannot and does not play the role in

reasoning that propositional knowledge does. He does this in order to save materialist theories

of mind from the threat of dualism. But in making this argument, he also provides a good argument *against* situated knowledge being self-knowledge. Situated knowledge needs to play an important role in decision-making. Situated knowledge theorists write their epistemology with a political purpose in mind - the foregrounding of minority experiences has the aim of incorporating minority perspectives into political reality. In order for situated knowledge to play this role, it has to be able to play a role in reasoning. It needs to not just be able to play a role in agential decision-making, but also to be able to play a role in *group* decision making. It's not enough that the upshot of situated knowledge is that members of minority groups better understand their own subordinated position in life - situated knowledge is supposed to be a tool that we can use to end subordination, and we can only do this by changing the way that we think as a group.

We can now apply this analysis to the conditions that our good theory of situated knowledge should have. One minor problem with this view is that it is not supported by the literature at all. Although authors endorse the strong inaccessibility criterion, and self-knowledge is the only kind of knowledge that is so strongly inaccessible, this does not mean that authors endorse self-knowledge as situated knowledge. As I will discuss later in this chapter, although the literature on situated knowledge and standpoint theory does not typically speak in the language of traditional epistemology, charitable readings that are supported by the text suggest that most authors advocating theories of situated knowledge support something like propositional knowledge being the constituent knowledge kind of situated knowledge.

This account has more serious problems, on top of not being representative of the literature. The *self-knowledge account* in isolation confines the subject matter of knowledge granted by the contingent features of inquirers to knowledge about their own mental states. It does not hold

that having the contingent feature of being a member of any minority group grants the inquirer special access to truths about the outside world. The situated knowledge thesis is more than merely the claim that being a member of a minority group grants an inquirer access to more truths - any truths - than those in majority groups. It holds that members of minority groups have special access to a certain kind of truth, specifically and typically truths about social institutions and systems of oppression - and it needs to hold this in order for situated knowledge to be politically useful. Situated truths have to be more than just truths about ones' own mental states. Some situated knowledge theorists go further and argue (as I will, later in this paper) that being a member of a minority group may grant easier access to truths that are not directly related to the political experience of being a minority (Anderson, 1995).

If we are to maintain the strong accessibility criterion we are now in a difficult position. We can either sacrifice the notion that situated knowledge is politically useful knowledge, undermining the project of situated knowledge in the process, or we can posit another strongly inaccessible kind of knowledge, something novel. This would be ad-hoc, and we would have no reason to adopt this view given the position in the paper I am about to discuss.

6.4 Situated Knowledge as Propositional Knowledge

The next way to understand situated knowledge is to understand it as simple propositional knowledge. This is the account which is best supported by readings of the historic literature

(Anderson, 1995, p.27). Under this account, what gives members of minority groups privileged access to truths that are inaccessible to majority groups is simply being in the right position to perceive them. You sometimes see situated knowledge described as 'standpoint theory', and the term 'standpoint' here is only partially a metaphor. If situated knowledge is propositional knowledge, members of minority groups stand in a similar relation to truths about society that people standing at the top of the Eiffel Tower do to facts about the street layout of Paris. The notion here is that members of minority groups by experiencing oppression are constantly in the correct position to observe oppression, and that by observing society's oppressive mechanisms we can learn facts about the world that are otherwise hidden or hard to see. As such, members of majority groups might empathise, or have experiences that are superficially similar to oppression, but this empathy or similar experience does not provide the same standpoint as the one that oppressed groups have.

There are two quite different ways to understand this line of thought. Under the first understanding merely being a member of an oppressed group is sufficient to grant an inquirer privileged access to situated truths. For example, under this understanding all women would be in the right position to see truths about patriarchal oppression. This understanding has a clear problem. Not all women acknowledge the tenets of feminism. Many women argue that gender relations in societies that feminists take to be deeply patriarchal are in fact just. Under the crude understanding of situated knowledge that I have just described, we would have to argue that these women were not just wrong about the facts, but somehow deceived. If all it takes to see facts about oppression is being in the right position, then these women are in a terrible epistemic position indeed (Ibid., p27).

Situated knowledge theorists do not want to hold that women that do not endorse feminist claims are so epistemically compromised. Holding that the majority of women are in such a poor epistemic position is a claim that would create significant baggage for any theory. This brings us to the second understanding of situated knowledge as propositional knowledge. Under this understanding, being in the right position is necessary to see situated truths, but not sufficient. A combination of being in the right position and some form of other awareness is necessary. This awareness is typically awareness of how situated truths, and truths about society more generally relate to one another. For example, for Marxist standpoint theorists, this awareness is class consciousness - an understanding of class relations according to Marxist analysis, and a directed understanding of what it means to be a member of the proletariat (Ibid., p27). Marxist standpoint theorists think that women have privileged access to standpoint truths, but only if they also are aware of the role they play in the capitalist system according to Marxist theory. A combination of access to situated truths and this understanding of capitalism puts workers in the optimal position to understand society. We are not to think that Marxist standpoint theorists hold the understanding of capitalism to be a situated truth, after all, Marx himself was not a member of the proletariat. But in order to have the full picture, the fullest knowledge of society, they argue that it is important to have both this non-first-personal understanding of society combined with the first-personal situated knowledge.

Other kinds of situated-knowledge theorists hold similar views. Non-Marxist situated-knowledge theorists hold that women have privileged access to situated truths about oppression, but cannot fully understand oppression without also understanding feminist analyses of the patriarchy. To use an analogy, a shipbuilder's assistant might have access to a lot of truths about the building of ships, but merely being present during shipbuilding is not sufficient. The master shipbuilder however has understanding of how all the parts of the ship

hang together, which parts do which job, the engineering knowledge requisite to make sure the ship is seaworthy and so on. However, the shipbuilder's assistant has access to knowledge that someone who has merely read a very detailed book about ship building does not. Some truths about shipbuilding are easier to understand once you've seen a ship being built, and truths about shipbuilding might be impossible to properly understand without seeing a ship being built.

Situated-knowledge as p-knowledge theorists think that only members of oppressed groups have both this first-personal knowledge of situated truths *and* these other structural truths about society that don't require first personal experience. It is easy to see then, how s-knowledge as p-knowledge theorists can understand political disagreement amongst members of minority groups. In cases where an inquirer has access to situated truths (which must support feminist analyses of society), but the inquirer does not accept feminist analyses of society, it is the case that the inquirer has beliefs about the structural truths of society that provide in interpretation of situated truths that is misleading. For example, a feminist can accept that a conservative Christian woman has access to the same situated truths as feminists, but that their political and religious beliefs cause them to interpret injustice as justice. In this way they can account for why some people who have access to situated truths do not accept feminist theories.

So, with this understanding of the p-knowledge account, we can now see how this account better fits our understanding of what a theory of situated knowledge is. We can do this by holding it up against Kukla's characterisation of the typical claims of perspectivalist theories. The s-knowledge as p-knowledge account definitely upholds the first claim Kukla mentions - it is definitely the case that this theory holds that there are contingent features of knowers that grant them privileged access to truths about society. What's more, unlike the phenomenological

account, the complex combination of first-personal situated truths and structural truths are politically relevant in a way that phenomenological knowledge is not. Now onto the second claim Kukla provides: does this account grant that the kinds of knowledge members of minority groups have special access to is not only different but in certain contexts superior? The s-knowledge as p-knowledge account meets this condition. Under either the orthodox marxist or the traditional feminist interpretation, the kinds of truths that members of minority groups have access to are helpful to understanding the nature of society. Unlike the phenomenological account, if we accept the propositional knowledge account, we are accepting that members of minority groups are in a better position to understand society, not that they merely have access to truths that have limited relevance beyond their own lives. The propositional knowledge account then easily meets the third claim, the claim that the groups that have contingent features that grant them a superior epistemic position are women, members of ethnic minorities and other disadvantaged social groups.

As such, the propositional knowledge account does indeed fit our understanding of what a theory of situated knowledge is. Now we can move onto our other two points of assessment. The second point of assessment is whether this account provides us with good *epistemic* reasons to diversify our decision-making groups. This account meets this condition better than the phenomenological account, for sure. This is because whilst the phenomenological account only grants that inquirers have special knowledge about their own experience, the propositional knowledge account holds that women and other minorities have special access to knowledge about the outside world. This account holds that these people have better knowledge about society. So from here it's easy to see why we might have good epistemic reasons to have members of minority groups in our decision-making groups - they're privy to information that

we are not. The more information we have access to as a group, the better informed our decisions will be.

That said, these epistemic reasons are not as safe as we might hope. We can consider this by asking which accessibility criterion the propositional knowledge account suits. In the language of traditional epistemology, we can understand the propositional knowledge account as endorsing something like the following: members of minority groups have access to special evidence that provides them with good justification for a special, politically relevant set of true beliefs about society. For the Marxist, women or members of the proletariat are able to observe capitalist society from a unique viewpoint, and capitalism when viewed from this viewpoint exposes certain elements of itself that are not observable from the viewpoint of the oppressor. These exposed elements provide justification for beliefs about the oppressive forces of capitalism, which can be combined with other more easily accessible knowledge about Marxist theory, in order to provide a full understanding of society. These specially justified true beliefs are not just knowledge, but politically relevant knowledge.

We can see now how this causes problems if we want to maintain either of our inaccessibility criteria. This is because we don't ordinarily think of propositional knowledge as the sort of thing that is so hard to transfer. For p-knowledge theorists, members of minority groups come to know truths about society by virtue of their privileged access to the evidence for those truths. But in other domains there are other ways to come to know things, and we wouldn't think that inquirers who don't have access to first-hand experience as evidence for their beliefs don't have well-justified beliefs at all. For example, it is possible and common to develop a good understanding of nuclear physics without ever having seen a nuclear reaction in person.

So the propositional-knowledge theorist can very well say that situated knowledge is knowledge of a different sort to knowledge about nuclear reactions, but in doing so they face a dilemma.

The first choice is that the propositional-knowledge theorist could abandon the inaccessibility criteria, and just state that situated knowers simply have access to a number of facts that are otherwise hard to directly experience. This is a consistent and mostly descriptively apt view, but if situated knowledge is ordinary propositional knowledge, then it's harder to find epistemic reasons to justify diversifying decision-making groups. Ordinary propositional knowledge is sufficiently easy to transfer that a decision-making body on abortion, staffed entirely with men, would be roughly epistemically as good as having women in the group, that is assuming that the men had asked women about abortion prior to making their decisions. As such, under this account situated truths are so easy to access that the account doesn't even qualify for the weak inaccessibility criterion. Of course there's still a weak epistemic reason to have women in the group here, as pragmatically women have the advantage of not having to canvas in order to know these special epistemic facts. This is akin to the probabilistic argument involved in the weak accessibility criterion, but with the probability values so skewed as to make the probabilistic argument moot.

The second choice is that the propositional knowledge (or p-knowledge) theorist could claim that situated knowledge is still p-knowledge but of a special kind that is hard to transfer. This gives them two unappealing options. The first is to claim that situated knowledge is phenomenological propositional knowledge. This would just be the view discussed above, with all the problems that that entails. The second is to claim that situated knowledge is p-knowledge of a special kind, that is still propositional but hard to transfer. Similarly to this

response to the problems with the phenomenological case, this would be ad-hoc. There are then two remaining options. One is to locate situated knowledge in *sets* of propositional knowledge atoms as opposed to individually, and to argue that the inaccessibility is created by the complexity that lies within large sets of atoms of knowledge that bear complex relations to one another. The other is to abandon the notion that s-knowledge is simple p-knowledge, and locate it in a pre-existing, non-transferable, non-ad-hoc mental state. I will now discuss and advocate for both of these latter positions.

6.5 Situated Knowledge as Knowledge-How

I will now discuss conceiving of situated knowledge as knowledge-how. Given the arguments preceding this point, what is necessary for a view of situated knowledge is the following: A plausible description of an epistemically relevant mental state that is inculcated by experiencing being a member of a minority group, and that can make an inquirer better at decision-making in politically relevant contexts. Fortunately, Rebecca Kukla offers just such a thing in the paper 'Objectivity and Perspective in Empirical Knowledge' (Kukla, 2006c). Kukla's project is different, but related to the project in this chapter. She provides a defense of perspectivalism by defending only the first claim of the claims she attributes to standpoint theories, the claim that 'Some inquirers have contingent properties that give them access to kinds of knowledge that are not available to others' (Ibid., 81). In this chapter I am defending Kukla's position against all three claims, particularly by assessing other standpoint theories in light of the two inaccessibility criteria.

Kukla makes her case by arguing for a Sellarsian account of perception, arguing that individual

inquirers can have a kind of perceptual skill that makes them better suited to reasoning in

certain contexts than other inquirers, even when presented with the same evidence, and having

the same non-perceptual reasoning skills.

Sellarsian accounts of perception hold that perception is not the mere intake of data into the

mind, but also involves conceptual structure. Sellars argues that in order to perceive that x is F,

we have to understand what it means for something to be F. We need to know the conditions for

F-ness, and understand whether the objects that we perceive are F or are merely appearing to be

F (Ibid., p86). This ability to distinguish between objects that are F and objects that merely

appear to be F is crucial - if we could not do this, then we would not be able to use our

perception to inform our beliefs about reality.

For specific objects, the ability to distinguish between F and F-appearing objects cannot be

simply a universal and inherent capacity within all humans. Kukla does not provide an example

to explain this point, so I shall provide my own. Tomatoes and fruits of the bittersweet

nightshade plant are closely related, and as such look incredibly similar, to the extent that when

tomatoes were introduced to Europe, people refused to eat them as they believed that they were

poisonous. It is not the case that we are born with the ability to distinguish between tomato fruit

and the bittersweet nightshade fruit. Those people who refused to eat tomatoes were privy to

the same sensory information as those who could see the difference between tomatoes and

bittersweet nightshade, but the tomato-eaters were able to see tomatoes as what they were.

This ability to perceive tomatoes as merely nightshade appearing, rather than perceiving them

as nightshade itself, is not an ability that people are born with. The recognitional concepts of

nightshade fruit and tomatoes were learned by Europeans through having the right sort of history - through a history of observing and experiencing (Ibid., p86).

Thus it is easy to see how, on the Sellarsian picture of experience, two agents are entitled to different warrants even in the case that they are experiencing the same sense data. The tomato-knower is able to perceive the differences in shape and size that distinguish a tomato fruit from a nightshade fruit, and as such has access to different warrants that make them capable of identifying the fruit correctly. Despite being privy to the same sense data, the two agents are not in the same perceptual state. They're not seeing the same thing. The tomato-knower sees a tomato, whereas the tomato-ignorant does not see it. As a result, two agents faced with the same evidence are epistemically very different - from the same sense data, they have different warrant for belief.

As you can see, this perception happens *prior* to making reasoned judgements about the objects of perception. The tomato-knower doesn't first see a red object, assess its size, colour, texture and shape, then take a second to compare that information to a list of objects, before coming across their knowledge of a tomato object, and deciding that that is the best fit for the sense data. The tomato-knower just sees a tomato. For the Sellarsian at least, seeing is epistemically prior to deliberative reasoning.

At the same time as this, inquirers aren't born with the knowledge of what a tomato is and how to identify one by sight. Noticing things is a kind of second-nature, or skill, that is inculcated by tuition and practice (Ibid., p80). Initially as children, identifying a tomato really *is* like the protracted and difficult process that I have just described. Once we've seen enough tomatoes we don't have to reason about our sense-data of them, but initially we do. In fact, it's likely the

case that if I were cooking *sousou* or some other obscure vegetable and asked you to run to the market to get some for me, you would have to quickly pull out your phone, Google for pictures of it, and compare the pictures of it to the various fruit and vegetables at all the stalls, trying to identify it, just like the difficult case above. That is of course unless you'd grown up eating *sousou* yourself.

It is precisely this inculcation that provides us with our justification for the inaccessibility criteria. Inculcated skills are transferable but not through mere testimony. It would take mere seconds and a quick Google for an adult to learn how to identify tomatoes or sousou, but not all perceptual ability is so easy to inculcate. Take for example the case of fishermen and women. There are some fish that are good eating and also legal to catch. Good fishermen throw the rest back. Identifying them is not as easy as identifying fruit - there are more kinds of them and they look more similar. If I'm teaching you how to be good at commercial fishing, I will teach you how to identify these good fish from the fish you have to throw back. This task is certainly possible, and indeed is successfully accomplished frequently by fishing industry professionals. But if you are an inattentive student, or we don't have access to all the different kinds of fish so I can show you how they're different, or if I'm a poor teacher, you might never learn properly. Further, if you're an attentive student and have access to the different kinds of fish to look at, you might never need a tutor. We don't even have to (and indeed shouldn't) speak about natural aptitude in order to generate cases where inculcation might be unsuccessful. Thus, knowledge-how is weakly inaccessible - it can't be passed on as easily as ordinary propositional knowledge. It is important to note here that for the purposes of this chapter I am not taking a stand on the anti-intellectualism vs intellectualism debate with regards to knowledge-how - on both intellectualist and anti-intellectualist approaches knowledge-how meets the weak inaccessibility condition.

We have established the following: agents can have contingent features that provide them with superior knowledge in certain contexts, and also that knowledge-how fits the weak inaccessibility criteria. In order for us to apply this to a complete theory of situated knowledge, we need to also establish that members of political minority groups have this knowledge-how, and that this know-how is politically relevant and important. If we can now find a plausible skill or set of skills that situated knowledge might consist in, then we will be able to complete the argument for situated knowledge consisting partly in knowledge-how. I will do this later in this chapter.

6.6 Compounds of Knowledge

In this subsection I will clarify and make explicit the position that I am arguing for. I am arguing that situated knowledge consists in part of knowledge-how. However this does not commit me to the view - and I do not wish to argue for the view - that situated knowledge *solely* consists of knowledge-how. In this subsection I will make clear the view that situated knowledge partly, but not entirely consists of knowledge-how. In the previous sections of this chapter, I have focused on pieces of knowledge taken in isolation. That is to say that I have been focusing on specific units of knowledge, like individual propositions or skills. However, for most tasks that require epistemic expertise, the requisites for success are not single units of knowledge, but instead multiple units of knowledge. On top of this, what is often required of epistemic agents is something like understanding - not just knowing things, but knowing how things relate to one another, understanding causal mechanisms, and so on.

In the section on propositional knowledge, I discussed single units of propositional knowledge. I argued that single units of propositional knowledge do not meet the inaccessibility criteria,

and as a result they cannot - when taken alone - justify the political claims that situated knowledge theories aim to justify. However, I argue that sets of units of knowledge, regardless of their constituent knowledge types *can* meet the inaccessibility criteria.

To make my argument I will go back to an example of simple propositional knowledge that I have used earlier in this section. It is simple to communicate the proposition "Paris is the capital of France" to another person with successful uptake. There are other propositions about Paris that are similarly simple to communicate, such as "Paris is south of Amiens", and "Paris is famous for its cuisine". It is possible to generate an arbitrarily long list of true propositions about Paris. Despite these propositions being simple to communicate when taken individually, as the list grows, communicating the entire set of propositions with successful uptake becomes more difficult.

Large sets of propositions are difficult to communicate with successful uptake. We could construct an exam on facts about Paris, and make the list of questions long enough that a majority of people would fail, even if they had time to study. We can now see how this might relate to situated knowledge. Although individual units of knowledge about life from a subordinated position may be easy to communicate, the list of things one knows about one's own life experience is so long that communicating all of it to others is difficult. In a political context this difficulty is multiplied by the sheer number of relevant actors for any given political problem.

However, this simple analysis only describes one way in which situated knowledge as multiple units of knowledge creates hurdles for communication. This is because people do not merely know things about their own experience and how society functions from their perspective as a

list of propositions. People also have *understanding* about these things. That is to say that - even in the case that situated knowledge is simply propositional knowledge - people not only know long lists of facts about the world as viewed from their social position, but they know how these facts relate to one another, and in this way have an understanding. Units of knowledge bear specific relations to one another, and these relations are hard to communicate themselves. So on top of the difficulty in communication created by the sheer number of units of situated knowledge, there is a further difficulty created by the necessity to understand how these units relate to one-another.

As a result of this, although I argue that conceiving of situated knowledge as knowledge-how is compelling, we have the epistemic justification for the political prescriptions associated with situated knowledge in the case that situated knowledge is simply propositional knowledge. So this chapter provides two arguments - one argument supporting the political prescriptions on the grounds that situated knowledge is knowledge how, and one argument supporting the political prescriptions on the grounds that situated knowledge is comprised of complicated, related, and large sets of propositional knowledge.

However, the position that I wish to defend fully in this chapter is a third argument that combines the two aforementioned arguments. I argue that situated knowledge consists of simple propositional knowledge, the complex related sets of understood knowledge that these simple propositions create when combined, and knowledge-how. That is to say that situated knowledge primarily consists of two kinds of knowledge that are both hard to communicate in their own way.

6.7 The Specifics of Situated Knowledge

6.7.1 Introduction

So far we have made an argument for situated knowledge being knowledge-how, rather than propositional knowledge or self-knowledge. Another way of phrasing this is that situated knowledge is a set of skills that members of minority groups acquire directly because of their membership of minority groups. The aim of this thesis is not to give a detailed and exhaustive list of the skills that situated knowledge consists in, but I will turn some attention to this question in order to give a fuller picture of my argument. Many situated knowledge theorists already use language that implies a 'knowledge-how' conception of situated knowledge, and in the following section I will use the work of these theorists to highlight some of the skills that may constitute situated knowledge.

6.7.2 Challenges and Demands

The account of situated knowledge that I give here has some hurdles to overcome. In the previous section, there were a number of demands for a theory of situated knowledge that each kind of knowledge had to be able to meet. Firstly, it had to meet either one of the accessibility criteria. Secondly, it had to be useful in reasoning. And thirdly, it had to be politically useful. Given that we are locating situated knowledge in knowledge-how, and that all knowledge-how meets the weak inaccessibility criteria, we don't need to worry about whether each individual skill discussed in this section meets the criteria or not. We do need to be able to provide a plausible story as to how any specific skill is developed in an individual, given that many of the

skills that situated knowledge consists in are going to be inculcated through experience and experimentation, rather than through explicit instruction.

The second and third conditions are related. If I argued, for example, that situated knowledge consists in the skill of being able to juggle, I would fail to meet the second condition. Except in extremely unusual cases, being able to juggle doesn't give you superior reasoning abilities. This condition relates to the third condition because in order for a skill to be useful in political decision-making, it must first be the kind of skill that is useful in decision-making more generally. Some skills are more general - the skill of noticing patterns is a useful skill in making many kinds of important decisions, political decisions included. Some skills are more specific - knowing how to spot the specific way that white supremacy functions in the American South, is directly politically specific, politically useful, and geographically specific. For example, someone well versed in the ways of spotting American racism would not necessarily have the same skill in noticing racism in India, or the United Kingdom. I will elaborate more on this relation between geography and situated knowledge later in this section.

There is another condition that our theory of situated knowledge needs to meet, given its place in this wider project. Our theory of situated knowledge has to be compatible with the socially constructivist picture of metaphysics that ground this thesis. This condition is worth mentioning because ascribing cognitive skills to genders, races and social classes on a picture of metaphysics that treats these groupings as natural kinds has a specific and harmful history. The aim here is not to - for example - argue that women are born with different brains to men, and that these brains are smarter. It does not aim to make any claim that holds that the difference between men and women, white people and black people, or working class and upper class people, is natural in any way. The aim of this argument is instead to understand how the

epistemic position of members of minority groups is impacted by their subordination, but a key claim of the thesis is that this subordination has its roots in socially constructed, non-natural kinds.

6.7.3 Specific Skills

6.7.3.1 Noticing

The first skill that situated knowledge can consist in is the skill of noticing. We can use ordinary cases to show that noticing is a skill. The skill of noticing is such that two agents that receive the same sensory information can come to know different things on the grounds of that same sense data. Imagine a botanist and an artist going on a walk through nature, and pausing to stand on a bluff that provides a view of the plains below. Although the botanist and the artist have the same perspective, we can see intuitively how the botanist and the artist may notice different things. The botanist might notice the identity of the plants on the plains, notice that they thrive in poor soil, and in doing so come to know that the rocks beneath the soil have a low organic content. The artist might notice that the lighting and vista would particularly suit painting en plein air, that the view is reminiscent of a Turner painting, and so on. Presented with the same sensory experience, each agent comes to know different things.

The explanation for how each agent comes to know these different things is simple. Through training and experience, the botanist has come to develop a skill of noticing botanically relevant features of the world, and through training and experience the artist has come to noticing artistically relevant features of the world. This argument has wider ranging implications for feminist epistemology, notably Kukla (2006) takes this skill of noticing to

demonstrate that any notion of objectivity that takes objective knowledge to be perfectly transferable between arbitrarily dissimilar agents is flawed. That is to say that although I am focusing my argument on the nature of situated knowledge and its benefits, it would also be possible to use this line of reasoning to argue that *all* knowledge is situated, and that the received view of objective knowledge is deeply mistaken.

The core of this line of reasoning is that two people can respond to the same sensory experience by noticing different things within it. The example with the botanist and the artist demonstrates this thought in principle. To apply this to the sorts of situated knowledge that this thesis focuses on, it is necessary to show which skills of noticing are specifically relevant to subordinated groups in society.

One feature of public discussions of race relations is the questioning of the extent to which racial prejudice is 'real' and causes real harms to members of ethnic minorities. Although this debate is mostly settled within the academy, outside of it there are often appeals to the notion of a 'post-racial' society. For example, White students have been found to perceive vastly lower levels of ethnic conflict on university campuses than non-White students (Ancis et al., 2000). This perception stretches beyond just students' own emotional reactions to perceiving being oppressed, also covering beliefs about how other students relate to one another, the atmosphere in university halls, and the behaviour of faculty. The majority of the White students in this study had a manifestly false belief about race relations on campus, whereas Black and Latinx students were more likely to form a true belief.

We have to be able to explain this difference. One possible explanation is that members of ethnic minority groups are causing the negative racial atmosphere by being irrationally

discontent, and that they are perceiving falsely the racialized behaviour of other students and staff. Given that racial discrimination on college campuses is common, and that the students are claiming to perceive it, there is little reason to believe that the students are deceived in this case.

Another possible explanation is that students are in a better position to perceive race relations on campus - you might say that they are better *situated*. Students are able to appeal to their phenomenological knowledge about how they feel about race relations on campus, but this is not all they have access to. We can also make sense of this in terms of simple propositional knowledge - the Black and Latinx students see a side of campus that the White students are much less likely to see constituent members of the university acting in prejudiced ways, and so have better evidence for forming true beliefs about prejudice on campus. But we can go further, as there is evidence that even when faced with the same evidence, members of ethnic minority groups are more likely to perceive bias (Operario and Fiske, 2016). In this study, students were presented with what they believed was a fellow student, but was really an actor intentionally and repeatedly expressing racial bias, both in subtle and less ambiguous cases. Students of ethnic minority backgrounds were more accurate at perceiving the racial bias than white students. Given that they were presented with the same evidence as White students, and that the racial bias was definitely present as it was intentionally created by the psychologists, the only explanation is that the students of ethnic minority backgrounds had a better perceptual skill of perceiving racial bias than the non-minority background students.

It's important to note here that these students weren't reporting about their feelings, they were reporting on the acts of another person in one study, and the campus climate more generally. These beliefs aren't confined to the self, as with phenomenological beliefs, but are instead

politically useful beliefs about society. As such there is evidence to suggest that members of minority groups can develop perceptual skill that causes them to be better at forming true beliefs in certain contexts, and our full picture of situated knowledge as perceptual skill is complete.

A benefit of conceiving of this skill of noticing as a kind of situated knowledge is that it is supported by the literature on situated knowledge. Patricia Hill Collins argues that this skill of noticing is a key component of the situated knowledge of Black women, when she appeals to the distinction between 'knowledge' and 'wisdom' (Hill Collins, 2009, p.257). She begins the section on knowledge and wisdom by quoting Carolyn Chase, saying "My aunt used to say, 'A heap see, but a few know'" (Ibid., p.257). Here we can see the argument that two agents can receive the same sensory experience (and thus 'see'), but come to know different things on the grounds of this experience. The right sensory experience, combined with a skill of noticing, gives Black women access to knowledge that would otherwise be hard to know.

Hill Collins also provides an argument for how Black women come to develop this skill of noticing. She argues that it is necessary to develop this skill because Black women need to deal with '"educated fools" who would "take a shotgun to a roach"' (Hill Collins, 2009, p.257). By this, she means that Black women need to deal with those who wish to subordinate, and even kill them. In this way, the skill of noticing is develops as a kind of survival mechanism. This way of thinking about situated knowledge squares nicely with the socially constructed picture of gender, race and social class that is defended by this thesis. The upshot is that this skill of noticing is a feature of the particular subordinated position of Black women, and that it would arise in any group if they suffered from the same sort of subordination.

We can apply this line of thought to the example of the college students I used above. White students and students of colour at the same university hold different beliefs about the levels of racial conflict on their college campus. One simple explanation of this is that students of colour are the ones that are suffering from racism, and so they are more likely to see racism. We can think of this toy view as a kind of 'superior viewpoint' view from the taxonomy of situated knowledge views earlier in this chapter. The view that situated knowledge is perceptual skill does not deny the existence of these viewpoints - I do not deny that in some sense, students of colour are better equipped to notice racism merely because they are more likely to be in the position to see it. However, my view emphasises that having access to this viewpoint - and the pragmatic stakes that are tied to it - develops a skill of noticing oppression that can extend beyond obvious examples of injustice.

For example, let's posit a case of a university campus where there is in fact a serious culture of racism, and where students of colour do indeed suffer from racism. Further, let's imagine that despite the culture of racism, instances of overt and obvious racism are relatively rare and relatively private. In cases such as these, students of colour are the targets of racism, and White students are unlikely to see it. Students of colour are likely to come to campus with previous experiences of racism, and due to prior experiences of subordination, have already developed some skill of noticing oppression already. In cases such as these, students of colour are more likely to notice the less overt, less obvious evidence for the culture of racism on campus. Oppression can be overt and obvious, but it can also be insidious. A student that has developed the skill of noticing racism may, for example, notice the racial make-up of students invited for career progression opportunities by academic staff, notice the racial make-up of social groups on campus, or notice how different students are treated by educators.

It is possible to view each of these things as separate from, or unrelated to race, and without noticing oppression, students are likely to view these things as benign or non-problematic. Noticing the link between these things, and then linking that to racial oppression is a skill of noticing. It is well evidenced that students that consider race to be more central to their identity are more likely to report that they have suffered from racial discrimination (Sellers et al., 2003; Yip et al., 2008). This can be taken as evidence for one of two views - either that students are seeing racism that is not present, or that students that have a more central racial identity are better at spotting racism when they see it. In that case that you believe that racism really is a serious problem on university campuses, the intuitive position to take is the latter position - that students with a more central racial identity are better at spotting racism. This evidence suggests a disparity within the group of people of colour when it comes to noticing and reporting racism. Some people notice more racism than others. This is consistent with the view that noticing racism is a skill.

6.7.3.2 Interpretation

I have argued - following Collins, Kukla, and other situated knowledge theorists - that part of situated knowledge is a skill of noticing. However, this is not the only skill that makes up situated knowledge. Let's look back at Patricia Hill-Collins' description of the elements of black womens' knowledge (Hill Collins, 2009, p.259). Hill-Collins writes that black women have developed the skill of interpreting knowledge claims in a particular way. Specifically, she writes that black women have learned to interpret first-personal knowledge, or lived experience, in such a way that it is prioritised over third-personal knowledge in some cases.

This is because third-personal knowledge, such as knowledge that claims to measure things objectively, often fails to capture important details or relations.

I argue that this is a good candidate for situated knowledge as knowledge-how. Weighing up first-personal knowledge claims against third-personal knowledge claims is not easy, particularly when there is a possibility that the two kinds of claims contradict each other. This tension between richer, but harder to interpret first-personal information and easier to communicate and tabulate third-personal information is sufficiently difficult that it powers the distinction between interpretivism and positivism in social science. Knowing how to navigate this difficult terrain is a skill.

We can see why black women particularly would have life experience that draws into sharp focus the importance of first-personal knowledge. For a long period of time in the United States, the personhood of black people was denied. Many White Americans, including those in power, claimed that the internal lives of Black people were less complicated, that they did not feel pain, that their emotions were less strong, and so on. For example, Dr J Marion Sims - often called the father of gynaecology - pioneered many surgical treatments by experimenting on slave women. He did this without anaesthesia, despite recent medical developments that would have been applicable in these operations. He was able to conduct these dangerous medical experiments because Black women were not given the right to refuse in the American society in which he lived (Ojanuga, 1993).

The case of Dr Marion Sims is a good example of the history of the role of first-personal knowledge in the context of black womens' experience. An appeal to the first-personal knowledge of the women that had been experimented on would have easily gotten to the truth

about these surgeries - that the women were in pain, that they were worried about their health, and that they would have liked the right to make their own choices. In the deeply racist and sexist social context of the time, the first-personal knowledge of black women was entirely discarded. In the pursuit of putatively objective scientific knowledge, first-personal knowledge was rejected entirely, leading to the incredible suffering of the enslaved women. The medical science of the time, influenced by racist beliefs and norms, disregarded the evidence of the humanity of black people. So in this case, the third-personal knowledge systems of the time failed black women, and the first-personal knowledge systems had the opportunity to do them justice.

This is a particularly acute case, but oppression takes this shame in many cases. Part of being oppressed is to have your perspective disregarded, and indeed sometimes to have your humanity disregarded. This teaches you about the importance of first-personal knowledge. Further, because it may be the case that you cannot trust knowledge that claims to be objective, you must learn to develop a new way of knowledge interpretation that prioritises first-personal knowledge in the right cases. The case of Dr Marion Sims demonstrates this. The racist science of the time totally failed in accurately capturing the lives of black women, and so they had to develop new ways of interpreting social knowledge to make sense of the world.

6.7.3.3 Ontological Understanding

Lastly, I will discuss the skill of ontological understanding. Hill-Collins provides another good example of a specific skill. Hill-Collins writes about the different ways that different oppressed people see oppression (Hill Collins, 2009, p.270). As previously mentioned, this line of

argument is deployed in order to resist the additive view of oppression. On the additive view of oppression, women are oppressed, black people are oppressed, and in order to understand how black women are oppressed you just add the oppression they face through sexism and add it to the oppression they face through racism. Hill-Collins argues that the perspective of black women allows them to see how oppressions do not relate to one another in this way. For black women, racism and sexism are not extricable from one-another.

This experience in understanding their own lives inculcates the skill of noticing the complex interaction between oppressions elsewhere. The ability to be sensitive to complex interactions between subjugations is a skill. There are situations in which this skill may be relevant directly to the lives of black women. For example, Abramowitz (2006) uses the example of welfare reform, highlighting the way in which both welfare reform and the attitudes surrounding it are racialised and gendered. When drawing up welfare reform, the skill of understanding how these complex factors of race and gender interact with one-another is important.

This skill can also apply outside of the context of one's own oppression. First-personal knowledge of the ontological complexity of one's own life makes a person more open to understanding ontological complexity elsewhere. This skill is of course not the kind of skill that can only be inculcated through personal experience. It may be likely that social scientists, particularly politically sensitive people, or any other kind of person may come to develop a keen eye for ontological complexity. But living a life in which subjugations interact with one another constantly means that it is necessary to develop this skill in order to make sense of your own experience. So on top of this extra incentive to develop this skill, there are more opportunities to train this skill, and you don't have to go looking for them.

Hartsock argues that this skill is developed particularly in women because of the nature of pregnancy. That being pregnant allows a person to contain another person inside them, that it constitutes a creating relation between mother and child, that the child's life is dependent on the mother, all of this gives women a sense of metaphysical complexity, according to Hartsock (Hartsock, 1983).

6.8 Combining Literatures

As in the previous sections of this thesis, the argumentation in this section has involved stretching across methodological distinctions and subfields of philosophy. The account of situated knowledge that I have given is informed by the metaphysical picture I have given in the first section of this thesis. Firstly, it is a view of situated knowledge that is compatible with the view that social kinds like gender, race, and social class are socially constructed. And secondly, it is applicable to race, gender, and social class alike.

The arguments in this epistemological section are not alone in their aim to reconcile the goals and methodology of feminist philosophy with those of traditional, analytic philosophy. Kukla (2006b) and Anderson (1995) provide important work to bridge this gap. I aim to have continued in this tradition.

6.9 Conclusion

In this chapter I have attempted two tasks. Firstly I have argued that two candidate accounts of situated knowledge cannot be successful on their own. I have argued that the situated knowledge as self-knowledge account cannot account for members of minority groups having politically useful situated knowledge. I have then argued that the situated knowledge as ordinary propositional knowledge account does not meet either of the inaccessibility conditions, and as such does not provide us with epistemic reasons for diversifying decision-making groups. I then argued in favour of Kukla's situated knowledge as perceptual skill account, filling out the picture with reference to real studies, arguing that members of ethnic minority groups do in fact have the perceptual skill necessary to form politically relevant useful beliefs, and that the perceptual skill account meets a sufficiently strong inaccessibility condition as to provide us with epistemic reasons for diversifying our decision-making groups. Lastly, I argued that large, complex sets of propositional knowledge do meet the inaccessibility criteria, and that as such the most plausible view is that situated knowledge consists in a composite of knowledge-how *and* complex sets of propositional knowledge.

Section 3: Democracy and Descriptive Representation

Chapter 7: Epistocracy and Democracy

7.1 Introduction

This chapter of the thesis has two parts, and these two parts make up the entire third section of this thesis. In the first part, I argue against interpreting my epistemological arguments in an epistocratic way. In the second part, I explore the options that are left when rejecting epistocracy but embracing the arguments I give in the previous parts of this thesis. In these sections of this thesis I emphasised the importance of situated knowledge. Situated knowledge, according to my argument, is politically useful and important, and we can and should make better political decisions by incorporating it into our democratic processes.

The term used in political philosophy, when talking about political knowledge in democratic systems is 'voter knowledge'[30]. In this section of this thesis, I will argue that differences in voter knowledge between voters in democracies do not justify changing our democratic processes so as to disenfranchise those with less knowledge. Theorists who endorse changing

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[30] See for example (Somin, 2010; Dancey and Sheagley, 2013; Qvortrup, 2007)

our democratic systems in order to maximise the power of those with more knowledge are called *epistocrats* (Brennan, 2016a). Epistocracy is a system in which having good voter knowledge and moral character are required in order to have a democratic say. The upshot of this is that those who are judged to have insufficient voter knowledge are disenfranchised.

Given that I have made an argument for the importance of voter knowledge, it would be possible to read my project in an epistocratic way. I will argue against epistocracy, by arguing that the disenfranchisement that epistocratic theorists endorse violates the fundamental human right to a democratic say.

After rejecting epistocratic disenfranchisement, I then explore alterations to our democratic systems that show promise for better incorporating situated knowledge into decision-making, and thus making better decisions.

7.2 Arguments for Democracy

In this chapter I will argue in favour of the right to a democratic say. The purpose of making this argument is in order to situate my own voter knowledge argument within the wider body of voter knowledge arguments. By adopting Thomas Christiano's instrumental right to a democratic say (Christiano, 2011), I will be able to characterise my own argument as a democratic argument. Without an argument for the right to a democratic say, or an argument against this right, it would be possible to read my argument as endorsing anti-democratic 'epistocratic' political theory, or democracy-pessimistic libertarian political theory, which are views I outline and respond to in this section.

The structure of this sub-section is as follows: firstly, I will give an overview of the space of possible views on voter knowledge and democracy. I will then reconstruct Christiano's instrumentalist argument for the right to a democratic say. Following this, I will adapt Christiano's instrumentalist argument to create my own instrumentalist argument against epistocracy, mounting a new version of an objection known as the 'demographic objection' to democracy.

7.2.1 Contextualising Voter Knowledge

I will now provide some context and disambiguation for the views on voter knowledge. As mentioned previously, it is possible to categorise the arguments of this thesis as being a treatment of voter knowledge. The literature on voter knowledge aims to account for how our views of democracy should change in light of the vast differences in voter knowledge between different voters in democracies.

Voter knowledge arguments consider political decision making to be a species of ordinary decision-making. In ordinary decision-making, it is possible to have good knowledge of the decision you are making, or poor knowledge of the decision you are making. Having better knowledge leads to making better decisions. I will use an example to highlight this line of argument.

A doctor has a wealth of knowledge about medicine that enables them to make better decisions when diagnosing disease, compared to someone of equivalent intelligence but with no medical training. Many political decisions require technical knowledge of politics, international

relations and economics that are similar in technicality to the knowledge challenges faced by a doctor diagnosing diseases. The amount of knowledge required to diagnose diseases leads us to adopt a policy of delegating medical decisions only to those with medical training - doctors and other medical professionals - this is because we know that those without this training are likely to be unable to make good decisions, particularly in something so high stakes as medicine.

If political decision-making is like medical decision-making, then a lack of political knowledge will lead to poor political decision-making, which will lead to bad political outcomes. As such, many of those writing on the issue of voter knowledge argue in favour of the position that voters should not have to make as many - or any - political decisions. We can characterise these decision-reducing theorists into two camps. The first camp, notably represented by Ilya Somin[31] , argue that we should reduce the number of decisions that voters have to make by reducing the number of decisions that the government makes simpliciter. In Somin's words, "Limiting and decentralizing government power can mitigate the problem of political ignorance" (Somin, 2013, p.155) A core claim of Somin's is that "Political ignorance is rational because an individual voter has virtually no chance of influencing the outcome of an election" (Ibid., p63), and the opportunity cost of gaining voter knowledge is high when compared to other useful things that a person can do (Ibid., p69), because "the acquisition of political information in any significant quantity is a vastly more difficult and time-consuming enterprise than voting itself" (Ibid., p68). Another way to phrase this is that Somin argues that political ignorance is rational. Somin argues that we should make the government 'smaller' in the libertarian sense, by reducing the functions that government carries out and allowing the private sector to step in to provide functions previously carried out by the government (Ibid, p120). The second camp, which is represented by a larger number of theorists, notably Jason Brennan (2016) and

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[31] Bryan Caplan is another notable proponent of this kind of view (Caplan, 2008)

Thomas Christiano (1996)[32], argue that we should reduce the number of decisions that voters have to make by reducing in some way voters' ability to effect political change. Brennan and Christiano's approaches are characteristic of two ways to approach this reduction in political suffrage. Brennan argues that we should remove the ability to vote from people that cannot pass a test of political knowledge (Brennan, 2016), and Christiano argues that we should maintain universal suffrage but restrict the scope of democratic voting to voting only on political ends, such as full employment, instead of both ends and means, such as the policies a government might take up to increase employment (Christiano, 1996).

Each of the two camps - the Somin camp of small government theorists, and the Brennan and Christiano camp that argue we should change our voting systems - have their own label. Those advocating for a reduction in the size of government are ordinary libertarians[33], just with an unorthodox argument for libertarianism. Those arguing for a change in our democratic systems on the grounds of voter knowledge are known as 'epistocrats'[34]. So we can characterise Somin's prescriptions of restricting the scope of government as libertarian in nature, and characterise the modifications to democratic processes suggested by Brennan and Christiano as being more distinctly epistocratic. It is important to note here that both approaches and the scholars advocating these approaches can be both libertarian and epistocratic, in the case that they are advocating for both a reduction in the size of government and epistocratic modifications to our democratic processes. Nevertheless, due to the differences between these two positions, counterarguments directed towards each position are necessarily different. This section of the thesis is directed towards the latter camp, the epistocrats, and the focus of the

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[32] Other examples of views of this kind are (Mulligan, 2018; Bell, 2015)

[33] Libertarians often prefer to characterise their position as being defined by its commitment to personal freedom, and view their arguments for a reduction in the scope of government action to be a consequence of this commitment. For an overview of this characterisation, see (van der Vossen, 2019)

[34] In Jason Brennan's words, "A system is said to be epistocratic to the extent that the system formally allocates political power on the basis of knowledge or political competence." (Brennan, 2016b)

entirety of the following argumentation addresses epistocratic arguments specifically, rather than libertarian arguments.

7.2.2 Against Epistocracy

I will now argue against epistocracy. I will begin by providing an explanation of what makes a view epistocratic. Epistocrats, like many political philosophers, argue that we should change the way that democracies work. The defining feature of an epistocratic position is the concern about voter knowledge alone, but rather the suggested remedy to the perceived voter knowledge problem. We can conceive of epistocracy as three related positions:

1. Citizens in democracies have insufficient knowledge to make good political decisions
2. It is a problem that citizens in democracies have insufficient knowledge to make good political decisions
3. The remedy to 1 and 2 is to restrict suffrage

It is this third position, the belief in restricting suffrage in some way that distinguishes epistocrats from other theorists. Deliberative democracy theorists[35] are likely to agree with points one and two, as are more traditional democratic theorists, and also fascists, and communists, and so on. What distinguishes different epistocratic positions from one-another is the specific kind of restricted suffrage that is advocated for. In the following sections I will make an argument against these ways of restricting suffrage. In part 7.3, I will focus on Guerrero's (2014) suggested regime, which uses a lottery to select voters, and then in part 7.4

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[35] Deliberative democracy is the view that "global politics can be democratized by pursuing deliberation—the give and take of non-coercive and reasoned arguments—in various formal and informal sites" (Kuyper, 2016). A prominent deliberative democrat covered in this chapter is Thomas Christiano (1996)

of this chapter move beyond responding to Guerrero in order to build a counter argument against epistocratic regimes more generally.

7.2.2.1 Guerrero's Lottocracy

7.2.2.1.1 The Problem

I will now use Alexander A. Guerrero's (2014) 'lottocratic' form of epistocracy as an example to show how epistocratic positions work. Guerrero starts by highlighting two features of contemporary democratic governments that he views as problems. The first is a lack of 'responsiveness', and the second is a lack of 'good governance' (Ibid., p136). Responsiveness, for Guerrero, is the way that the policy of a democracy reflects the beliefs or values of the citizens within it. So a democracy that quickly and accurately enacts policy in line with the policy preferences of its citizens is very responsive. Good governance is how well the democracy performs according to measures of success that Guerrero believes are objective. (Guerrero, 2014, p.136). Guerrero is not specific about what these measures are, but writes "Goodness might be connected to average individual welfare, or how well off the worst off are, or some other index of welfare. It might be connected to some notion of autonomy, rather than—or in addition to—welfare, so that one outcome is better than another if it yields greater autonomy (for each individual, on average, and so on). Or goodness might be intrinsically

connected to some objective ideal of justice, so that an outcome is good to the extent that it comports with justice." (Ibid., p137).

Guerrero argues that in order for a government to be responsive to its citizens, these citizens must be "capable of engaging in informed monitoring and evaluation of the decisions of their representatives" (Guerrero, 2014, p.140). He goes on to argue that the ability to monitor the decisions of one's representatives is dependent on the ability to be knowledgeable about the specifics of a political issue, and to be able to evaluate whether a decision is good or bad in general or good or bad for oneself. If citizens are unable to do this, politicians - now left unmonitored - will have no incentive to make policy that represents the desires of their constituents, and as a result will not make representative policy. He also argues that politicians working in this unresponsive way are likely to make policy that results in poor outcomes, thus ensuring a lack of good governance.

So, having laid out his worries about political ignorance, Guerrero then makes an argument that much policy is 'information intensive' (2014, p.146), meaning that it is hard to understand (and thus evaluate) without spending large amounts of time learning about it, or having prior knowledge. Because this policy is information intensive, and ordinary citizens in democracies do not typically have the time or education to understand information intensive policy, then they are ignorant about a large proportion of policy. Because they are ignorant, they cannot meaningfully monitor their representatives, and because these representatives are now unmonitored, they will make unrepresentative policy that creates poor outcomes.

7.2.2.1.2 The Solution

I will now discuss Guerrero's prescription for remedying the putative problem that he identifies. Guerrero thinks that good policy outcomes are impossible under a democracy. This naturally leads to the thought that we must change the way that we make political decisions. The specific prescription that Guerrero makes is to enact a system that he describes as a 'lottocracy' (Ibid., p.154). A lottocracy is a system with the following features:

1. "that the legislative function is fulfilled by many different single-issue legislatures (each one focusing just on, for example, Agriculture or Health Care), rather than by a single, generalist legislature;

2. that the members of these single-issue legislatures are chosen by lottery from the relevant political jurisdiction; and

3. that the members of the single-issue legislatures hear from a variety of experts on the relevant topic at the beginning of each legislative session." (Guerrero, 2014, p.155)

We can unpack the ways in which this system differs from our own. Firstly, Guerrero is suggesting a move away from multiple issue legislatures towards single issue legislatures. In the UK for example, the Parliament has the responsibility of legislating on multiple areas of policy responsibility. The same politicians in charge of legislating on the NHS are responsible for legislating on foreign policy, schools, infrastructure and so on. Guerrero argues that each of these areas of policy responsibility should have their own, entirely separate legislature. The aim of this change is to ward against political ignorance by reducing the scope of decisions that representatives have to make.

The second change is that instead of having voters select their representatives in a democratic way, representatives are instead selected from the adult population through a lottery. So, in this system, either you are chosen as a representative by random chance, or you have no suffrage at all. The reason behind this change is so as to keep the size of the representative chambers manageable - Guerrero suggests 300 representatives per chamber - whilst ensuring that vested interests cannot influence decision-making in these chambers through selectivity in representative choice. It is worth mentioning here that Guerrero argues that democratic elections are not fair or representative under current democratic systems (Guerrero, 2014).

The third change is that prior to deliberating and voting, experts present to the group of representatives. This is another intended safeguard against political ignorance, with the idea being that the experts can provide the representatives with the technical information and requisite background knowledge to make informed decisions.

The upshot of these changes is that the ordinary method of voting in a democracy is removed, and that the democratic system is replaced by one in which ordinary citizens have reduced suffrage. Guerrero argues that democracies do not work because voters have poor political knowledge, problematizes this, and the remedy that he offers is to restrict suffrage. We can see here how Guerrero's lottocracy is paradigmatically epistocratic - it meets all three of the criteria listed above for epistocracy.

7.2.2.2 Countering Epistocracy

Now that I have explained how epistocratic thinking works, it is now possible to see how one might argue against epistocracy. Arguments against epistocracy can take issue with any or all three of the characteristic features of democracy. So the first kind of counterargument to epistocracy would be to argue that voters actually have good political knowledge. The second kind of counter-argument would be to accept that voters have poor political knowledge, but to deny that this causes a significant problem for democracy. And the third kind of counterargument to epistocracy would be to argue that the epistocratic move to restrict suffrage is unacceptable, regardless of how compelling the epistocrat's arguments on voter knowledge are. Of course in practice, it is likely that a critic of epistocracy will object to more than one of these features, but nevertheless we can characterise responses to epistocracy in this way.

7.3 A Democratic Objection to Epistocracy

7.3.1 Epistocracies and Suffrage

In the previous section I explained how there are three points of attack that are possible when criticising epistocracy. Firstly, it is possible to deny that citizens in democracies have insufficient knowledge to make political decisions, secondly it is possible to affirm the claim about insufficient knowledge but deny that it is a problem, and lastly it is possible to deny that the remedy to these first and second points should be to restrict suffrage. The rest of this chapter will focus on the third point of attack - criticising the restricted suffrage claims of epistocrats.[36]

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[36] It is important to note here that I do not mean to suggest that the first two points are unimportant or true, but rather that my arguments work equally well against the epistocrat regardless of whether the first two claims are true or not. As a result interrogating the truth of these claims is irrelevant for my argument.

There are two major benefits to this approach. Firstly, criticising the restricted suffrage claims of epistocrats situates the disagreement within the wider and longer-running debate between defenders of democracy and critics of democracy, allowing critics of epistocracy such as myself to converse with the compelling literature defending democracy. Secondly, taking this approach allows me to avoid making contentious empirical claims about the levels of political knowledge that real citizens in real democracies have. For example, making a case that argued that citizens in well-functioning democracies did in fact have good political knowledge would require me to rest my argument upon a contentious and ever-changing empirical literature on voter knowledge[37]. Further, it would require me to set a standard of voter knowledge below which democracies fail, which is a separate but equally contentious empirical claim[38].

Making an argument defending universal-suffrage democracies more generally, and characterising epistocracies as similar in kind to non-democracies, avoids these hurdles. That said, further specification and clarification is needed at this point. There are two kinds of arguments for the right to a democratic say. Firstly, there are instrumentalist arguments for the right to a democratic say. Instrumentalist arguments for the right to a democratic say argue that democracies produce better results than other forms of government. The better results in this case may be higher individual welfare, better personal safety, a better functioning economy, or any result that is desirable (Christiano, 2018). Secondly, there are non-instrumentalist

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[37] Epistocrats such as Somin (Somin, 2013, p.22) and Brennan (Brennan, 2016a, p.22) cite empirics showing incorrect responses to policy knowledge surveys to demonstrate low levels of voter knowledge, but there is evidence that respondents that answer these questions correctly are using heuristics rather than demonstrating political knowledge, for example in Dancey and Sheagley (2013). This casts doubt on this method of measuring voter knowledge. Further, many surveys of voter knowledge are not peer reviewed - Brennan cites Newsweek and PR Newswire to make his case (Brennan, 2016a, p.248).
[38] This claim is empirical in nature, but would require either finding a real case of a democracy that failed due to low levels of policy knowledge amongst the electorate, or speculating about hypothetical societies that do not exist.

arguments for the right to a democratic say. Non-instrumentalist arguments hold that democratic systems are desirable within themselves, "independent of the consequences" (Christiano, 2018)[39].

It is my contention that a sufficiently strong instrumentalist defence of the right to a democratic say will be sufficient to provide the grounds for endorsing universal suffrage over epistocracy, and in doing so will be sufficient justification for interpreting my prior arguments as arguments for reconfiguring existing democratic processes, rather than instituting a situated knowledge based epistocracy. As such, I will be endorsing Thomas Christiano's (2011) instrumentalist argument for democracy, and then developing my own instrumentalist argument against epistocracy that mounts a new form of what is called the 'demographic objection' to epistocracy.

7.3.2 Christiano's Instrumentalist Argument

I will now discuss Christiano's instrumentalist argument for democracy, as it forms one of the arguments I combine to make my own instrumentalist demographic argument. One of the most prominent instrumentalist arguments for democracy comes from Thomas Christiano (Christiano, 2011). Christiano's argument argues that firstly, "democracies are normally reliable protectors of certain very urgent and widely accepted rights", and secondly that "nondemocracies and partial democracies reliably fail to protect these rights" (Christiano, 2011, p.143). So, this instrumentalist argument works by presuming no fundamental right to a democratic say, but argues instead that democracies are the only system that protects other

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[39] For other prominent democratic instrumentalists, see Sen (2001), Arneson (2009), and Mill (2009)

rights that are more widely agreed upon. One element of this argument that is particularly relevant for our purposes is the claim about partial democracies failing to protect these important rights - many epistocratic systems are *partially* democratic, rather than wholly democratic, and as such if Christiano's instrumental argument is successful against partial democracies, Christiano's argument will cause trouble for epistocrats.

Christiano's argument works by setting up three concepts, the first is a notion of what a right is. For Christiano, the "two jointly sufficient formal conditions for a human right to *X* are (1) a strong moral justification for any state to establish, respect, protect, and promote a legal or conventional right to *X* (or a set of legal and conventional rights that can be usefully summarised as a right to *X*) and (2) a moral justification for the international community to respect, protect, and promote this legal or conventional right to *X* in all persons" (Christiano, 2011, p144). The notion of a legal right to something and a moral right to something is contentious within the literature, so in the above quoted section Christiano makes clear that for the purposes of his argument, the term 'right' refers to the legal rights that states have a moral obligation to establish, respect, protect and promote.

The next concept is the identity of the "very urgent and widely accepted rights" (Christiano, 2011, p.143) mentioned in the argument are. This topic is particularly contentious, and as is evidenced by the existence of the paper, there is no consensus on the specifics of which rights exist. Christiano sidesteps this contentiousness by appealing to particularly widely accepted rights, namely "the right not to be tortured, the right not to be arbitrarily imprisoned, and the rights not to be murdered or disappeared by the state" (Ibid., p.145). This allows Christiano to avoid counterarguments about broader, or more contentious rights, such as the right to free speech.

The last concept is that of a "minimally egalitarian democracy" (Christiano, 2011, p.146). This concept aims to be able to define a set of democratic states, without imposing highly idealised conditions for democracy such that no actual state qualifies. In order to do this, Christiano lays out three conditions for being a minimally egalitarian democracy. The first condition is that "Persons have formally equal votes that are effective in the aggregate in determining who is in power, the normal result of which is a high level of participation of the populace in the electoral process"(Ibid., p.146), the second condition is "Persons have equal opportunities to run for office, to determine the agenda of decision making, and to influence the processes of deliberation"(Ibid.), and the last is "[That the society] acts in accordance with the rule of law and supports an independent judiciary that acts as a check on executive power" (Christiano, 2011, p.146). In the case that a society meets these conditions, it counts as a minimally egalitarian democracy. Following this, Christiano argues that to live in a society in which these conditions are met satisfies the human right to democracy. Another way of phrasing this is that the right to democracy is simply the right that the society you live in should be a minimally egalitarian democracy.

Having laid the groundwork, Christiano then moves on to making his argument. The argument comes in three parts. There are two primary arguments, which are the domestic peace argument and the international significance argument, and then a third argument designed to fend off potential criticisms of the primary arguments. All three of these arguments are empirical in nature - they focus on studies about the relationship between political systems and political outcomes in the real world.

7.3.2.1 The Domestic Peace Argument

The domestic peace argument uses empirical studies to argue that democracies protect human rights, and that non-democracies and partial democracies do not.This argument comes in four stages. Christiano argues that there is a strong correlation between a society being a democracy and personal rights being protected in that society, that we can identify democracy as an independent variable when we look at studies on this topic across societies, that we have evidence that once societies become democracies they begin to protect human rights more, and lastly he gives an explanatory model for why the data is this way (Christiano, 2011, p.148).

7.3.2.1.1 Step One

The first step of the argument - the correlation step - works by comparing societies across two metrics. The first is the Polity IV data set, which measures the strength of democratic institutions in a society, and the second is the Political Terror Scale, which measures the frequency of events such as political imprisonment and murders[40]. Christiano characterises the Polity IV data set as a measure of how democratic a society is, and the Political Terror Scale as a measure of the frequency of human rights violations.

By comparing the data on the strength of democratic institutions and on human rights violations, Christiano highlights two potential interpretations. He points towards earlier analyses of this data that show a negative linear relationship between the strength of democratic

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[40] The Polity IV Data Set is authored by the Systemic Peace Foundation, an NGO. It measures the success and democraticness of states, awarding scores based on executive recruitment, executive constraints and political participation. It has been superseded by the more recent Polity V data set (The Systemic Peace Foundation, n.d.). The Political Terror Scale is an academic-led project that collates human rights reports from Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the U.S State Department (The Political Terror Scale, n.d.)

institutions and the frequency of human rights violations. That is to say that on these analyses, the more democratic a society, the less likely they are to show human rights violations. This analysis works in Christiano's favour, showing the kind of relationship between democracy and human rights violations that is necessary to make his instrumental argument. The second interpretation looks at more recent analyses of this relationship, showing that the relationship is more sophisticated than a linear negative correlation. Instead, these more recent analyses[41] suggest that there is a threshold of democratic institutional strength, below which there is not much of a relationship between the strength of democratic institutions and human rights violations, but above which there is a strong correlation.

This latter interpretation suits Christiano's argument even more. The existence of a threshold suggests that once a certain level of democratic institutional strength is met, human rights violations sharply decrease. This is evidence for Christiano's argument - he suggests that once the minimal conditions for democracy are in place, human rights violations will decrease sharply. This is because democratic institutions are supposed to guard against human rights violations.

7.3.2.1.2 Step Two

The second step of the argument is short, and it works by looking at the details of the aforementioned studies to show how these studies control for other factors, such as population size, international politics, and war (Christiano, 2011, p.153). This combines with the previous step to show that the studies suggest a relationship between democracy and the reduction of

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[41] These more recent studies that Christiano cites are as follows (Davenport, 2007; Davenport and Armstrong, 2004; De Mesquita et al., 2005), cited in (Christiano, 2011)

political terror that extends beyond mere correlation, and towards democracy having a causal role in the reduction of political terror.

7.3.2.1.3 State Repression and The Domestic Democratic Peace

Christiano does not go into detail as to how this causal relationship is established, instead simply citing the aforementioned empirics. However in order to strengthen my own argument, and for clarity's sake, I will provide an explanation of how the empirics support this claim about the causal role of democracy in preventing political terror. The clearest example of the demonstration of a causal role here is found in Davenport (2007)[42]. This work consists of an analysis across multiple democracies across the globe, and measures the relationship between two elements of democracy and political terror. The first element of democracy Davenport calls 'voice' (Ibid., p.13). Voice is composed of two elements, firstly, citizen's of democracies have a 'voice' in the sense that they have suffrage (Ibid., p.116). That is to say that they are able to vote and thus remove offending rulers from office in the case that the populace is dissatisfied with the ruler. The second element of voice Davenport calls "competition/participation" (Ibid., p.116), and is the feature of democracies that rulers face competition from other political actors, and that diverse interests are represented in political life (Ibid., p.53). The second element of democracy is what Davenport calls 'veto', and these are "checks and balances, executive constraints, and veto points/players" (Ibid., p.13). As with voice, veto is broken down into two elements. The first is "veto players"(Ibid.), which are other political actors or institutions that can 'veto' the power of the executive (Ibid., p.57), and the second is "executive constraints" (Ibid.), which are the institutional constraints that limit the scope of the executive's power (Ibid., p.109) So 'veto' is the resistance a ruler might face from other institutions, rather than

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[42] As mentioned previously, this is not the only source of empirical data on this topic, with (Davenport and Armstrong, 2004; De Mesquita et al., 2005) providing further data.

the 'voice' which is resistance a ruler might face from the populace. For example, a constitutional court can overrule an elected leader, and thus 'veto' the ruler's action.

In order to measure state repression, Davenport uses two metrics. Firstly, restrictions on political behaviour, which are measured by Freedom House's civil liberties index (Ibid., p.77), and secondly violence, using the Political Terror Scale (Ibid., p.79). He then combines these metrics to create a numerical score system, with a score of 1 marking the "least repressive" (Ibid., p80) regimes and a score of 9 marking the most repressive (Ibid.).

By comparing large numbers of societies in this way, Davenport demonstrates the relationship between voice, veto, and state repression. Suffrage, ceteris paribus, is positively correlated with lower levels of state repression, but there is not a particularly strong relationship between suffrage and state repression (Ibid., p.113-114). However, the variable of competition/participation shows an effect six times as strong as that of suffrage (Ibid., p.118). So, an increase in competition and mass participation strongly decreases the probability that state repression will exist in a given society. Davenport uses the example of South Africa in the transition out of apartheid to demonstrate this - in South Africa, state repression of black people ended not when black South Africans were given the vote, but when black interests were represented through political parties and mass participation (Ibid.).

The second feature of democracies, that of the veto, decreases the probability of state repression twice as much as that of suffrage, but less than half of that of mass participation (Ibid., p.121). Specifically, the measure of executive constraints is the second most strongly correlated variable, stronger than suffrage and veto players, but weaker than competition/participation (Ibid., p.123).

When these variables are analysed competitively, only competition/participation and executive constraints show a statistically significant negative relationship with state repression (Ibid., p.30). And within these two significant variables, competition/participation is "by far the most important aspect of democracy in decreasing the state's lethal repressive activity" (Ibid., p.131).

So this set of empirical data provides good evidence for the view that some features of democracies have a causal role in preventing state repression - or as Christiano calls it, terror. Specifically it provides evidence for the view that the existence of competition in politics, mass political participation, and to a lesser extent institutional limits on executive power have this causal role. This claim provides grounding for Christiano's claim that only minimally egalitarian democracies, rather than all democracies, prevent political terror. To quote Christiano once more, minimally egalitarian democracies ensure that "persons are able to participate as equals in the collective decision-making of their society" (Christiano, 2011, p.146) - which is a feature that requires not just suffrage but mass participation also.

7.3.2.1.4 Step Three

For the third step, Christiano moves towards the sequencing step of the argument, pointing towards studies of countries that transition from non-democratic or less democratic forms of governance towards more democratic forms of government, and highlighting that these studies reliably show a reduction in political terror within five years of a country transitioning to a democracy (Christiano, 2011, p.154).

7.3.2.1.5 Step Four

The last, and one of the most important sections of the argument is Christiano's explanatory model. The previous stages of the argument show that we have good empirical data that suggests that democracies are the only political systems that reduce political terror. Christiano explains these studies by posing an explanatory model that makes some simple assumptions about voter and ruler behaviour. Christiano assumes that politicians "are tempted to use repression to quiet dissent and ensure their tenures in office"(Ibid., p.158), that people "very strongly do not want to be tortured" (Ibid.), and that most people disapprove of the torture of others, and that a subset of this latter group strongly disapprove of the torture of others (Ibid.).

From there, the argument moves to analysing the interaction of these assumed behaviours. Under a democracy, people have freedom of association, including the subset of people that feel particularly strongly about human rights abuses. Because these people have freedom of association, they can band together to investigate and share knowledge of human rights abuses. Further, under a democracy, these motivated groups have the right to disseminate information about these human rights abuses, and the right to organise in order to attempt to stop the human rights abuses. This organised action against human rights abuses creates a pressure that - because of free elections - can end the tenure of an elected politician. As previously stated, politicians are tempted to enact human rights abuses to repress dissent, and as such they have an incentive to commit human rights abuses. But in the presence of effective organisation against human rights abuses, and the threat of being unseated in an election, this incentive is removed.

Under non-democracies, there is no mechanism of action such that citizens can force the government to stop human rights abuses, and in many non-democracies it is harder to come to know about these rights abuses due to a lack of freedom of the press and freedom of speech,

and it is harder to organise against them because of a lack of freedom of association. The temptation and tendency for crushing dissent with political violence is left unchecked. This is Christiano's explanatory theory - that in democracies, it is easier to learn about, organise against, and stop human rights abuses because of rights of free expression, association, elections, and so by committing human rights abuses in democracies, politicians risk their political power, rather than protect it. (Christiano, 2011)

7.3.2.2 Application

Christiano's argument is compelling. His argument is applicable to any theorist who views political terror in a negative light - which is to say almost every political theorist. Further, the scope of the argument applies not just to tyrannical dictatorships, but also to non-democracies of other kinds, such as epistocracies. In the following sections of this chapter, I will show how that in order to respond to Christiano's argument, the defender of a non-democracy is forced to either show how their proposed system is dissimilar to all previous non-democratic systems, or argue that non-democratic systems do not have the flaw that Christiano highlights, despite the empirical data supporting that view. Neither option is particularly appealing, and considerable work will have to be done by the defender of the non-democracy so as to avoid making ad hoc argumentation.

Having reconstructed Christiano's argument and shown its strength, I will now use Christiano's argument to develop a new form of the demographic objection to epistocracy.

7.4 An Instrumentalist Demographic Objection to Epistocracy

7.4.1 Introduction

In this section I will give my own version of the demographic objection to epistocracy, combining Christiano's (2011) instrumentalist argument for a right to a democratic say with David Estlund's (2007) formulation of the demographic objection to democracy. The structure of this sub-section is as follows: firstly I will reconstruct Estlund's demographic objection itself, and then I will explain how Estlund's concern about the badmaking epistemic features of educated people relates to Christiano's concern about non-democracies tending towards political terror. I will then combine these concerns in order to make my own instrumentalist demographic objection.

7.4.2 The Demographic Objection to Epistocracy

In this subsection I will discuss the demographic objection to epistocracy, as it is the other argument that I combine with Christiano's instrumentalist argument in order to form my own instrumentalist demographic argument against epistocracy. The demographic objection to epistocracy holds that "[t]he educated portion of the populace may disproportionately have epistemically damaging features that countervail the admitted epistemic benefits of education" (Estlund, 2007, p.215). This objection expresses a worry about the position that an education *only* confers benefits when it comes to political decision-making.

Estlund accepts that an education can make someone better equipped to make good political decisions. He shows how it is possible to make the case for education improving political decision-making by highlighting relatively trivial cases of education. For example, he states that it is "absurd to deny that a populace would tend to rule more wisely if more of its members were literate" (Estlund, 2007, p.217). However, Estlund makes these arguments in order to demonstrate that making this sort of objection to epistocracy does not require denying the benefits of an education simpliciter.

The demographic objection thus holds that the educated portion of a society may have badmaking epistemic features that are greater than the goodmaking features of an education. Estlund uses the example of literacy tests in the American South prior to the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (Estlund, 2007, p.215). At this time, in order to be able to vote it was necessary to pass a literacy test. On top of this, educational access was stratified along racial lines. White people were much more likely to have had a full education than Black people, and as such were more likely to pass the tests and thus be able to vote. Estlund argues that although it is true that being able to read is a benefit when it comes to making political decisions, that in this case there were negative epistemic effects to the literacy test policy. Because the tests meant that black people were excluded from voting, the portion of the populace that was best able to understand racial injustice were excluded from voting. Despite the fact that White voters in this time and place had the benefit of being able to read, their disproportionate literacy was the product of a power relation that made it harder for them to see, and thus desire the political outcome of racial justice (Estlund, 2007, p.215).

In this case, it was no coincidence that White people were both more likely to be able to pass a literacy test and also more likely to vote for racist policy. The better education of White people

in this time and place was directly linked to racism. Schools were racially segregated and White schools were better funded than Black schools. Another way of phrasing this is that the higher rates of education for White people and racist attitudes expressed through voting had the same cause. Because education is conferred through societal institutions such as government, charity, and private industry, education will be conferred with the same biases and blind spots that these institutions have. This is how the educated portion of a populace can come to have the badmaking epistemic features that Estlund argues can countervail the goodmaking epistemic features that an education can provide.

Estlund highlights two further issues with the mode of thinking that inspires epistocracy of the educated. The first issue comes about when considering a possible counterargument to his argument. A common response to the demographic objection is to adopt a form of epistocracy that contains a corrective measure for demographic overrepresentation amongst qualifying voters (Brennan, 2018). Estlund sees two problems with this response.

Firstly, it is difficult to know which societal groups need to be corrected for and in which way, because it is not just our example of race that would need to be corrected for, but gender, income, religion and so on. Identifying members of these groups is relatively simple, empirically speaking, but identifying which groups we need to correct for is less simple (Estlund, 2007, p.215). The second problem is related to the first but more subtle and complicating for the epistocrat. It is not just the case that we need to worry about overrepresentation of groups that are easy to empirically measure the membership of. Estlund uses the example of the counterargument that there are too many racists or sexists represented amongst those chosen to be politically wise by the epistocratic selection system (Estlund, 2007, p.215). He argues that we have no reason to disqualify an argument of this kind. By Estlund's

standards, if worries of this kind are not "beyond the pale" (Estlund, 2007, p.217) for a given political system, then that political system is unacceptable. Due to this, Estlund concludes that epistocracies of the educated are unacceptable.

7.4.2.1 The Instrumentalist Demographic Objection

I will now make my own argument, combining Estlund's demographic objection to epistocracy with Christiano's instrumentalist argument for democracy, creating a new demographic instrumentalist argument for democracy. Recall the nature of Christiano's argument: all of our empirical information supports the view that only democracies have been successful at preventing political terror. Specifically, Christiano argues that the empirical information we have shows that only minimally egalitarian democracies have been successful at preventing political terror. One of the qualifications for being a minimally egalitarian democracy is for citizens to have "formally equal votes" (Christiano, 2011, p.146).

We can already see the tension between the epistocratic prescription that those judged to be wise will have more voting power than those judged to be not wise, with some epistocratic systems even going so far as to deny suffrage entirely to the majority of the electorate (Brennan, 2016). In this sense, it is possible to read Christiano's argument as constituting an argument against epistocracy without having to reference the demographic objection at all. The argument runs like this:

1. Only societies with formally equal votes have been shown to prevent political terror
2. Epistocrats argue for formally unequal votes

3. It is very probable that epistocracies would result in increased political terror

If you accept Christiano's argument, then it is true that this argument alone would give you reason alone to consider epistocracy to be unacceptable. However this argument phrased as simply as it is rendered above does not provide a mechanism of action for how epistocracies would lead to an increase in political terror. I argue that we can use the demographic objection to provide a mechanism of action for why epistocracies would be likely to result in an increase in political terror, which strengthens both Christiano's instrumentalist argument by providing a specific application to the case of epistocracies, and strengthens Estlund's demographic objection argument by increasing the stakes of the argument. To clarify on the latter point, Estlund argues that epistocracies are likely to result in poor political outcomes due to the promotion of voters with badmaking epistemic features, but he does not make clear the specific bad political outcomes that may arise. My argument shows that the stakes of the poor political outcomes generated by epistocratic systems are likely to be the highest political stakes of all - political terror. So by combining the two arguments, each is strengthened.

The next task then is to apply Christiano's argument to epistocracies. Although Christiano has discussed epistocracies in his other work, in the explanation of his instrumentalist argument for the right to a democratic say he does not discuss epistocracies specifically. Thus, in order to apply Christiano's argument, it is necessary to characterise epistocracies in a way that corresponds to the Polity IV data set, and thus Christiano's argument more generally. I will do this by characterising epistocracies as a kind of 'consultation hierarchy', which is a class of systems that Christiano does direct his argument towards.

7.4.2.2 Consultation Hierarchies

In the previous section outlining Christiano's argument, I mentioned that Christiano directs his argument not only towards classical non-democracies like tyrannical dictatorships and oligarchies, but also towards other kinds of non-democracies. The specific group of non-democracies that Christiano targets in this section are what he describes as 'consultation hierarchies', which are hypothetical systems proposed by contemporary political philosophers.

Consultation hierarchies are a concept introduced by John Rawls[43]. Consultation hierarchies are similar to democracies - Christiano describes four features of a consultation hierarchy: firstly, rulers "make decisions in a way that is accountable to all members of society in the sense that the rules must *consult* with the representatives of the members in society", secondly, "everyone has the right to object to possible or actual decisions of the rulers", thirdly, "the rulers are committed to giving public reasons for their decisions in terms of a widely shared common good conception of justice". The last feature that Christiano describes is that the way that rulers come to power is "never made clear" (Christiano, 2011, p.156).

We can find Rawls' hypothetical example of a consultation hierarchy in his book on International relations, "The Law Of Peoples" (Rawls, 2003, p.75). In this work, Rawls is attempting to give an account of international relations that provides a set of norms for liberal societies that Rawls views as structured well and acting relatively morally, and less liberal societies that violate the norms that Rawls prescribes for how to organise a society. To make his case, Rawls appeals to the notion of a 'decent' society that is a hierarchical non-democracy,

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[43] Specifically, in "The Law of Peoples" (2003)

rather than an egalitarian democracy. He aims to draw up a space between the "reasonable" egalitarian democracies and the paradigmatically "unreasonable" tyrannical dictatorships, in order to specify a class of societies with which the egalitarian democracies can have diplomatic relations that are prudential and moral (Rawls, 2003, p.75)

To do this draws up the hypothetical nation of Kazanistan. Kazanistan is an "idealized Islamic people" (Rawls, 2003, p.75). There are a number of features that make Kazanistan different from Rawls' idealised egalitarian society. Firstly, Kazanistan does not respect the separation of church and state (Ibid., p.75), being an Islamic theocracy. Non-Muslims are not allowed to reach the "upper positions of political authority and influence the government's main decisions and policies" (Ibid., p.75). However, Kazanistan does not oppress other religions in the same way that, for example, the Kings of England oppressed Jewish people. Members of other religions are treated well, and are allowed to practice their religion freely, but are just not allowed significant amounts of political capital. The rulers of Kazanistan endorse a liberal form of Islam, possess no desire for imperialist conquest, and have a distaste for religion or ethnic oppression.

However, Kazanistan is not an egalitarian democracy. It is a consultation hierarchy. The rulers of Kazanistan are not subject to being voted out of power if their decisions become unpopular. Instead, each citizen of Kazanistan is represented by a group that consults with the rulers, but has no power to force a decision by the ruler. The rulers engage with these consultation practices sincerely, but there is no legal or practical mechanism forcing them to do so. When citizens of any faith dissent, the government is expected to respond to this dissent by explaining their reasoning (Ibid., p.78).

We can see how Kazanistan is the paradigm on which Christiano's description of consultation hierarchies is built. The rulers are accountable, they give reasons for their decisions, and people are allowed to dissent. We can also see why Christiano mentions that the mechanism for which rulers are selected is unclear. Although Rawls tells us that Kazanistan is a "decent" society (Ibid., p78), he does not mention the selection process for Kazanistani leaders. It is possible to speculate by comparing Kazanistan to regimes that are hierarchical and officially Islamic in nature. Oman and Brunei are monarchies, for example. If Kazanistan (and thus the prototypical consultation hierarchy) is similar to Oman and Brunei, then there is no democratic or quasi-democratic selection process for leaders, and we should assume that a society can qualify as a consultation hierarchy regardless of its leader selection procedure. This is because monarchies are amongst the least egalitarian and democratic leader selection processes for regimes.

To make clear what distinguishes a democracy from a consultation hierarchy is the relationship between the popular will and the distribution of political power. In a democracy, rulers are accountable to citizens, citizens have the right to object to ruler decisions, and rulers are committed to giving public reasons for their decisions. The crucial difference is that in a democracy, if citizens are sufficiently dissatisfied with the decisions of the ruler, there is an explicit mechanism by which citizens can remove the ruler from power (and thus undo, cease, or change the decisions being made by that ruler). Alternatively, in a direct democracy, citizens can simply choose to make whichever decisions they like, and as such do not even have to remove a ruler from power. In a consultation hierarchy, there is no process by which citizens can remove the ruler from power. The ruler is merely obliged to 'consult' with representatives before making decisions, but these representatives have no power to oust the ruler.

Christiano argues that according to the Polity IV data set would characterise such a regime as an "incoherent regime" (Christiano, 2011, p.156). Incoherent regimes do not show the same statistical relation to political terror as democracies. This issue is complicated by the fact that it is not likely that any real regime on Earth counts as a consultation hierarchy, as the concept is - like the epistocratic systems - has never been enacted in the real world, existing only in the arguments of political philosophers.

To be clear, Christiano argues that the mechanism to remove a leader through democracy with legal suffrage is necessary in order to prevent political terror. This is because the threat of removal is the sole strong incentive that leaders have not to commit political terror. Rawls tells us that the rulers of Kazanistan are wise and kind, but if Kazanistan is a monarchy, there is no reason to believe that the rules of Kazanistan will always be wise and kind. In Kazanistan, citizens are able to criticise the leader, and we are told that the leader responds to criticisms by giving public reasons for their actions that appeal to a public conception of the common good (Rawls, 2003, p.75).

However, there is nothing about Rawls' description of this hypothetical state that tells us that the leaders of Kazanistan are forced to listen to criticism and respond to it justly. If the citizens of Kazanistan had the bad luck to have an evil monarch ascend to the throne, then what would stop this monarch from committing political terror? If we grant that this hypothetical evil monarch preserves the right to assembly, right to a free press, the representative - but not binding - political organisations, and all the freedoms that consultation hierarchies allow, there is still nothing that stops an oppressive monarch from committing political terror. In this case,

the monarch would not be the first leader to allow open criticism of political terror, and then commit it anyway.

The closest real regime to a consultation hierarchy, according to Christiano, is Oman (Christiano, 2011, p.157), which is a monarchy in which the monarch has total executive power and is informed by representatives of the will of the people. He can choose to listen to them, but does not have to do so. At the time of publishing, Christiano wrote that Oman had a good human rights record, but that the prior monarch was extremely repressive. As such, Oman's good human rights record is only a feature of the monarch's whim, and is liable to change as the ruler changes. This system does not have the safeguards against political terror that a democracy has (Christiano, 2011, p.157). Since the time of publishing of Christiano's arguments, evidence has arisen showing that human rights abuses are happening in Oman. The 2017/18 Amnesty International report on Oman reports that the government of Oman have responded to recent protests with political repression and arbitrary detention of activists (Amnesty International, 2018). This shows that Christiano's skepticism about the fragility of Oman's human rights record was justified. Further, at the time of writing this thesis, Oman is currently in a period of regime change as the monarch has recently passed. This increases the likelihood of further instability and of political terror in the future.

7.4.2.3 Consultation Hierarchies and Epistocracies

If epistocracies are consultation hierarchies, then we can see how Christiano's argument will apply to epistocracies. In this subsection of this chapter, I will make an argument for conceiving of epistocracies as consultation hierarchies. I will do this by using Guerrero's lottocratic

epistocracy as an example to make my case. I will reconstruct two readings of Guerrero's

lottocracy - one with an unelected central government, and one with a central government via

single-issue legislature. I will show how the first form of lottocracy is vulnerable to

Christiano's argument directly, and then show how the second form of lottocracy is vulnerable

to my own instrumentalist version of the demographic argument against epistocracies.

Having done this, I will then use Estlund's demographic argument to show the mechanism of

action for epistocracies increasing the likelihood of political terror, and then apply this

mechanism of action argument to extant examples of other suggested epistocratic regimes in

order to show how this argument works against the real systems that epistocrats are promoting.

I will do this by comparing and characterising each form of epistocracy as being relevantly

similar to the two kinds of lottocracy I reconstruct from Guerrero.

As mentioned previously, a consultation hierarchy has four elements. Firstly, rulers are only

accountable to the *entire* populace through consultation. Secondly, the populace does not have

their free speech restricted such that they are unable to voice objection to the decisions of the

rulers. Thirdly, that rulers must give reasons to the public for their decisions according to a

common conception of justice. And lastly, the way that rulers come to power is not made clear

(Christiano, 2011, p.156).

Let's look back at Guerrero's lottocratic epistocracy. Guerrero's lottocracy is not a democracy.

Traditional democratic representatives are done away with. What replaces them is a system by

which decentralised, single issue legislatures take the place of generalist legislatures like

Congress or the Houses of Parliament. Instead of voting for the members of these legislatures,

citizens are selected by lottery, and can be removed from the legislature for 'bad behaviour'

(Guerrero, 2014, p.167). Prior to deliberation and voting, members of these single issue legislatures are educated on the issue by a panel of experts.

I argue that we can conceive of Guerrero's lottocracy as a consultation hierarchy. However, in order to do this it will be necessary to show how Guerrero's attempts to shore up his view against the risk of tyranny fail. In order to be successful against Christiano's instrumentalist argument, Guerrero's view will have to provide mechanisms to prevent political terror that are so successful that they are likely to succeed even though there is no way for citizens to remove a ruler that is committing political terror. This can only be possible either by providing some other way for leaders to be removed in the case of political terror, or by removing the power that makes it possible to commit political terror in the first place.

Guerrero's lottocracy has two in-built mechanisms to prevent political terror of the kind that Christiano argues is likely to happen in consultation hierarchies. The first mechanism is the fixed term limits and lottery system. This mechanism attempts to provide another way in which a leader that commits political terror can be removed. Let's imagine that one of, or all of, the legislatures developed the desire to commit political terror. The thought here is that even if they were successful at carrying out political terror, at the end of their term they would be replaced by new legislators. The system is designed such that political careers have a fixed length with no way to extend them - there are supposed to be no professional politicians under a lottocracy. So one way to respond to the instrumentalist argument for Guerrero is to argue that the fixed term lengths of lottocracy carry out the same function as democratic removal does for democracies.

The second is decentralisation. In a typical political system, all decisions are made by, or under the auspices of, a central government. So, the education policy might be drawn up by those that specialise in education, but the policy is subject to the control of a central government that makes decisions on all issues. In Guerrero's system there is supposed to be no central legislature that has final say over all policy issues. So it is possible for the lottocrat to argue along these lines by saying that under lottocracy the sort of political power that terrorising politicians abuse never exists under lottocracy. Instead of a single despot trying to protect their power over the realm, there are instead hundreds of people with a tiny fraction of the despot's power, each of them not having enough power to abuse.

I will argue against lottocracy by tackling both of these potential responses. I will argue that the decentralisation of Guerrero's view does not protect from tyranny, assessing two potential formulations of decentralisation. On the first formulation, the functions of government currently delegated to our centralised executive government are delegated to unelected civil servants. I will argue that this formulation is directly vulnerable to Christiano's instrumentalist argument for the right to a democratic say. I will do this by showing that these civil servants will have the incentive and means to commit political tyranny. On the second formulation, the functions of government are delegated to a single-issue legislature that has executive power over the other legislatures. I will argue that this formulation fails to achieve the decentralisation necessary in order to provide the epistemic benefits that Guerrero argues that decentralisation has, as it creates a legislature of non-experts with effective veto power over the legislatures of single-issue experts.

It is true that epistocracies such as Guerrero's are dissimilar to classically tyrannical dictatorships. We can ask ourselves what features Guerrero's lottocracy has that distinguishes it

from a dictatorship. The lottocracy has a free press, the government is committed to giving public reasons for its actions, it is obliged to consult with citizens prior to making decisions. However, one feature that Guerrero's lottocracy has in common with tyrannical dictatorships is that citizens have no mechanism of action by which they can remove a leader that is committing, or aims to commit political terror (Guerrero, 2014, p.167). It is perfectly possible for a lottocratic society to have a government that rules for years whilst being highly unpopular.

Christiano's instrumentalist argument for the right to a democratic say works by arguing that in the absence of a formal and explicit mechanism to remove terrorising leaders, the incentive structure that is an inherent part of ruling will lead to political terror (Christiano, 2011). This is because political terror is an effective way of consolidating and maintaining power, and thus leaders are strongly incentivised to commit political terror as doing so maintains their position of power. The argument works appealing to empirical data that shows that these incentive structures lead to terror in every case except in societies where the threat of democratic removal creates a stronger disincentive on political terror than the inherent incentive.

Epistocratic systems tend to be designed with in-built mechanisms to try and ameliorate worries about tyranny. The aim of epistocracy is to have all of the best features of a democracy whilst avoiding the bad policy outcomes that epistocrats think that democracy generates. In the case of Guerrero's lottocracy, the single-issue legislative bodies are supposed to represent the will of the people, or at least represent an idealised view of what the people would desire if they were politically enlightened. This is supposed to prevent lottocracy from creating bad outcomes such as political terror as the lottocratic legislative bodies are supposed to represent the will of the people. If we are to believe Guerrero, then if the officials of the lottocratic government were committing political terror, then the single-issue legislative body responsible

for national security, or policing, or whichever government body was committing the terror would vote to stop the terrorising actions.

It is easy to see that under lottocracy, ordinary citizens do not have this right to democratically remove a terrorising leader. One complicating factor in our analysis is that political terror is typically carried out through executive action, rather than through explicit and detailed policy. Guerrero does not provide a detailed explanation of the nature of executive power under a lottocracy. One feature of the multi-issue chambers found in real democracies is that the leader, or leaders, of the primary chamber hold executive power. The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom has authority over all government functions, such as military action, policing, education and so on. As a result of this, where differing sections of the government disagree or need mediation, there is a mechanism by which to solve or mediate these issues. The leader or leaders decide which policy priority is more important, when it comes to funding or conflicting interests.

Guerrero makes no mention of an executive that has a final say coordinating all government functions. One way to read Guerrero is to take this as meaning that there is no centralised executive government. Each single-issue legislature can only vote on the policy areas relevant to them, but there is no leader coordinating anything above the single-issue legislature level. As such, it may be possible for a lottocrat to argue that political terror is unlikely to happen in the absence of an elected government. If there is no leader above the single-issue legislature level, then there is no incentive - in theory - to committing political terror, as there is no executive power in the first place. A society cannot have their leader commit political terror if there is no leader in the first place.

However, I doubt that this is an appealing avenue of argument for the lottocrat. The practicalities of government require that there be some organisational body that coordinates between the different legislatures. There are too many decisions that need to be made for there to be no coordination. For example, the decision as to which issues qualify for a single-issue legislature must be made. Decisions about the national economy as a whole must be made - if the education single-issue legislature requires a raise in teacher salaries, then taxation must be changed in order to pay for it. It is not clear in Guerrero's argument as to how these decisions would be made.

There are two potential responses to this argument that the lottocrat can make. The first is to claim that the central organisational governmental body is not elected but instead consists of unelected civil servants, and the second is to delegate this central organisational decision-making to its own single-issue legislature. I will address these responses in turn.

The first option delegates central organisational governmental functions to unelected civil servants. This is unfortunate because it is clear that the central organisational body would hold a lot of power. In order to avoid Christiano's argument using this strategy, the lottocrat must be able to either remove the kind of political power that would incentivise political terror entirely, or make that political power subject to democratic removal. If the central organisational governmental functions are carried out by unelected civil servants, then powerful functions of government would be delegated to entirely unelected rulers. If the lottocratic society had the bad luck of having civil servants appointed that had bad intentions and became unpopular, then the lack of a democratic mechanism for removing these civil servants would likely result in political terror. We can see how this lottocracy-with-unelected-central-government qualifies as the sort of consultation hierarchy that is vulnerable to Christiano's argument.

The second option is to create a single-issue legislature for the purposes of overseeing the actions of the other legislatures. So for example, in the case that the education single-issue legislature proposed a policy that was incompatible with the taxation single-issue legislature, then this issue would be passed to a third legislature that specialised in adjudicating on these sorts of incompatibilities. Similarly, decisions on whether to create a new legislature for a given issue, or which legislature to assign an issue to would be made by this special legislature. We can see how this option causes problems for Guerrero. As in the above case of the unelected civil servants, this adjudicating legislature would have power over the other legislatures. Guerrero's single-issue legislatures are designed to decentralise power and prevent powerful groups from engaging in regulatory capture and other bad policy outcomes. But in this case, simply being able to exert control over, or pressure upon this adjudicatory legislature would be sufficient to have power over all of the other legislatures.

In other words, the adjudicatory single-issue legislature would be a *de facto*, if not a *de jure* central government. The entire structure of Guerrero's lottocracy is designed in order to provide epistemic benefits. Because the single-issue legislatures are smaller in scope, legislators gain more expertise and have more time to deliberate. This superior decision-making process is supposed to create better political outcomes. But if each decision made by the single-issue legislatures is vulnerable to veto power by the central adjudicatory legislature, then these epistemic benefits are negated. The final decision on each piece of policy is made by legislators in the same poor epistemic position that Guerrero criticises in the first place.

This formulation of Guerrero's view is also directly vulnerable to Christiano's argument. I have argued above that we can conceive of lottocracies as consultation hierarchies. Although

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lottocracy shares many features in kind with democracies, citizens in a lottocracy have no way of removing terrorising leaders from office.

In order for Christiano's argument to work, rulers must be in a position to be able to extend their own rule through political terror. In the case of the unelected civil servants it is easy to see how the civil servant would have the incentive to do this. But in the case of this adjudicatory single-issue legislature, rulers have no easy mechanism for extending their rule or widening their power. Members are selected through a lottery and have a fixed term. Short of severe constitutional change, it is not possible for members of this admittedly powerful adjudicatory legislature to extend their terms.

So, on one formulation of Guerrero's argument - the unelected adjudicators formulation - Guerrero is directly vulnerable to Christiano's instrumentalist argument. And on another formulation - the adjudicatory legislature formulation - the epistemic benefits of lottocracy are negated. However, there are other forms of lottocracy that require a different sort of counter-argument. In the next section I will show that other forms of epistocracy are vulnerable to a different kind of counter-argument, which is my own instrumentalist version of the demographic objection to epistocracies.

7.4.2.4 Other Epistocracies

In this section I will discuss other forms of epistocracy, and show how although they are not vulnerable to Christiano's instrumentalist argument directly, they are vulnerable to the argument that I develop below - the instrumentalist demographic objection to epistocracies.

Guerrero's lottocracy is unusual in that it uses random chance to bestow suffrage upon people. This element of random chance is replaced in most epistocratic theories by selection of rulers on the grounds of perceived knowledge (Brennan, 2018).

The instrumentalist demographic objection to epistocracy combines Christiano's instrumentalist argument for the right to a democratic say with the demographic objection to epistocracy. The argument moves in steps as follows:

1. Epistocratic selection criteria for rulers will result in a demographically unrepresentative set of rulers.

2. This demographically unrepresentative set of rulers will create policy outcomes that favour the represented groups over the unrepresented groups.

3. Unrepresented groups will have no recourse against these policy outcomes, as they are denied suffrage under epistocracy.

4. Without the threat of democratic removal, the rulers of this regime will have no incentive not to terrorise the unrepresented or under-represented groups.

5. Without the incentive not to commit political terror, the epistocratic rulers will commit political terror.

Jason Brennan gives a taxonomy of both different forms of epistocracy and different forms of the demographic objection (Brennan, 2018, p.63). In doing this, he distinguishes between what he calls the "Unfairness Version" of the demographic objection, and the "Bad Results Version" of the demographic objection. The Unfairness Version of the demographic objection holds that it is unfair within itself to give power to some people or groups and not other people or groups (Brennan, 2018, p.60). The Bad Results Version of the demographic objection holds that the

demographic unrepresentativeness of epistocracy is likely to or will necessarily create bad policy outcomes (Brennan, 2018, p.63).

On this taxonomy, I categorise my instrumentalist demographic objection as being a Bad Results Version of the demographic objection. The specific bad policy outcome that my argument is targeted towards is that of political terror. I argue that the unrepresentativeness of epistocracy creates this bad policy outcome in combination with the removal of universal suffrage that epistocrats call for.

Despite the problems with Guerrero's view that I discuss above, it does provide safeguards against this instrumentalist demographic objection. The lottery system and fixed-term lengths make some formulations of Guerrero's lottocracy invulnerable to this objection, as although citizens have no way of democratically removing a ruler, power is structured under this regime such that rulers have no constitutional way of extending their power's scope or tenure. Other epistocratic regimes do not make these alterations to the distribution of power, and select rulers in a different way. In the section below I will discuss other forms of epistocracy to show how they are vulnerable to the instrumentalist demographic objection I have constructed.

If Guerrero's lottocracy sits at one end of the spectrum of ruler selection in epistocracy, Jason Brennan's restricted suffrage regime sits at the other end of the spectrum. Restricted suffrage is a simple regime to explain. Under restricted suffrage, citizens must pass a "voter exam" in order to vote (Brennan, 2011, p.714). If you do not pass the test, you cannot vote. Brennan's view is a take on John Stuart Mill's epistocratic plural voting regime, in which more educated people receive more votes than less educated people, although on Mill's view we should not entirely deny the franchise to uneducated people. I will use Mill's plural voting regime as a

model for the many epistocratic regimes that require some sort of competence test for voting. By running my argument against Mill's plural voting I will demonstrate a flaw that exists more generally in competence-test requiring regimes. What Brennan, Mill, and other test-to-vote regimes share in common is their belief in the necessity of some kind of test of epistemic suitability to vote. Whereas Guerrero tries to inculcate expertise in the lottocratic rulers only at the point of governance, and through the governance itself, views following Mill are trying to select for goodmaking epistemic features that already exist within the population.

Although Mill is confident in the idea of plural voting, he resists giving a full endorsement to any sort of specific test. He states that some tests are plainly unsuitable, arguing that giving more votes to property owners would not work well as a competency test as property ownership does not correlate very well with intelligence (Mill, 2009, p.202), and expresses more confidence in giving more votes to those with university degrees (Mill, 2009, p.204). It is worth noting here that at the time in which Mill was writing, a much smaller proportion of the population attended university, and there were fewer degree-granting institutions in the first place. Other epistocrats of this kind have suggested instituting a government-designed voter competence test in the same way that there is a government-designed driving competency test (Brennan, 2011, p.1).

Mill, writing in the 19th Century, writes that plural voting is "unlikely to be soon or willingly adopted" by Parliament. But it is worth noting here that the United Kingdom did have a limited form of plural voting until 1948. Until the Representation of the People Act 1948, universities had their own constituencies, and voters affiliated with a university could cast one vote for an MP in their home constituency, and another vote for an MP for their university constituency. Further, owning property in a given constituency allowed the property owner to vote in that

constituency (Representation of the People Act, 1948). So, for example, an Oxford graduate who owned two properties in different constituencies would be awarded three votes - one for each property and one for the University of Oxford constituency.

That said, there is a difference between the relatively mild form of plural voting extant in the United Kingdom until 1948, and the kind of plural voting suggested by Mill and other test-to-vote epistocrats. Mill advocates for a simpler kind of plural voting in which votes are doubled for the educated, regardless of constituency or means (Mill, 2009, p.212). This latter kind of plural voting would have greater effects on the outcome of elections. On the system prior to 1948, the impact increased suffrage granted on the grounds of education was given a maximal limit by the distribution of extra votes to a small number of separate university constituencies. So even though an uneducated person's vote counted for less than an educated person's vote when it came to the make-up of parliament, there was no case in which the uneducated person's vote for their own constituency MP was competing with plural votes from educated people in that constituency.

Mill argues for removing this limit, meaning that plural votes would have an impact in every constituency. And of course, under Brennan's restricted suffrage system, uneducated people would have zero votes. So we can see here that plural voting and other test-to-vote systems would introduce a significant change in the make-up of representative bodies.

7.4.2.5 The Demographic Instrumentalist Objection

Having explained the nature of test-to-vote systems such as Mill's plural voting regime and Brennan's restricted suffrage regime, I will now apply the demographic instrumentalist objection against them, using Mill's plural voting regime as the model case.

Test-to-vote systems are motivated by a belief that being better educated, whether it is through traditional education or otherwise, means that people vote for better policy outcomes. Mill does not provide a detailed argument as to why more educated people would be better at making political decisions. Brennan highlights data which he claims shows that most voters are motivated by political "fandom" rather than concern for the good (Brennan, 2016, p.41), and that their political beliefs are not evidence-sensitive or that they are prone to systematic irrationality and cognitive biases (Ibid., p44).

Political knowledge, and education more generally, has two relevant kinds of correlations. The first kind of correlation that political knowledge and education has is with political preferences, and the second kind of correlation is with demographics. That is to say that - on some measures of political knowledge - having more political knowledge correlates with having certain policy preferences. For example, Brennan states that on the knowledge metric that he endorses, having more political knowledge positively correlates with supporting the Republican party (Brennan, 2016, p.44). It is also to say that - again on some measures of political knowledge - having more political knowledge correlates with membership of certain demographic groups. So, for example, Brennan states that political knowledge is positively correlated with living in the Western United States, being male, and having a high income (Ibid.).

The demographic objection works by arguing that in trying to maximise for political knowledge in voter selection, a system will necessarily also maximise for both the demographic groups

and political preferences that correlate with whichever political knowledge metric that the epistocratic regime uses. The correlation between measured-knowledge and policy preference is in fact the motivation for this form of epistocracy, but the correlation between measured-knowledge and demographics is not the motivation at all. The next step in the demographic objection is to argue that this unintended maximisation of demographics will result in bad policy outcomes that privilege the maximised demographic groups over the minimised demographic groups.

7.4.2.6 Education and Policy Knowledge in Democracies

I will now make the argument that demographic unrepresentativeness in democracies results in policy outcomes that privilege represented groups over underrepresented groups. This section will come in two stages.

In the first stage I will appeal to empirical literature on the relationship between demographic representativeness and policy outcomes. The epistocratic response to this line of argument can take two forms. Firstly, the epistocrat might argue that epistocracy and unrepresentative democracy are different in that selecting for good political knowledge will result in voters or representatives that are more fair and less tribal. Secondly, the epistocrat may introduce some kind of demographic weighting function to their regime such that demographic imbalances are corrected for through demographically minded vote weighting.

The second stage of my argument will respond to this potential counter-argument by appealing to empirical data that shows that being educated or having high political knowledge does not

guarantee that voters or rulers will vote in the just and competent way that the epistocrat assumes. I will then briefly discuss the pitfalls of the vote weighting response.

7.4.2.7 Demographic Representativeness and Policy Outcomes

I argue that the demographic unrepresentativeness created by epistocracy is likely to create poor policy outcomes for minority groups. This is the claim of the demographic objection, and by combining it with Christiano's instrumentalist argument, I argue that these poor policy outcomes are likely to be political terror.

I will now disambiguate the key concepts at play in my argument. The first concept to disambiguate is what it means for a policy outcome to be 'poor'. I will distinguish two ways of conceiving policy outcomes to be poor for minority groups. The first is to conceive of poor policy outcomes as being those outcomes that negatively impact the wellbeing of members of minority groups. The second is to conceive of poor policy outcomes as being those outcomes that members of minority groups do not endorse or support.

Demographic arguments against epistocracy work by appealing to both senses of these poor policy outcomes for members of minority groups. They argue firstly that the demographic imbalance inherent to the epistocracy is likely to result in minority's policy preferences being disregarded, which appeals to the latter sense of poor policy outcomes being those that members of minority groups do not support. This lack of a democratic voice then creates poor

policy outcomes in the former sense - policy outcomes that negatively impact the wellbeing of members of minority groups[44].

So in this way, the ability of members of minority groups to enact the policies that they prefer has a role in preventing the enactment of policies that negatively impact the wellbeing of members of minority groups.

The second concept to disambiguate is that of 'representation'. The empirical literature on representation typically appeals to two kinds of representation. The first kind of representation is called 'descriptive representation'. A group of people is considered to be descriptively represented in the case that their representatives in a representative democracy share the relevant descriptive feature with them that marks them as a group. So, women are descriptively represented in Parliament by the MPs that are women (Wängnerud, 2009), and black people are descriptively represented in Congress by black Congressmen[45].

Griffin and Newman provide an overview of the literature on the relationship between descriptive representation and substantive representation in the context of the United States House of Congress, stating that the balance of evidence is that descriptive representation "promotes minorities' interests" (Griffin and Newman, 2008, p.145). As evidence for this view they state that Black and Latino representatives vote more liberally than White representatives,

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[44] To be clear, I am not arguing that in *every* case, a policy that a given group supports is going to be a policy that improves their wellbeing. Rather, I am arguing that members of minority groups tend to support policy that improves their welfare, and that majority groups often support policy that negatively impacts minority welfare. For examples of empirical studies showing this relationship between improved descriptive representation and better policy outcomes for minorities, see (Baker and Cook, 2005; Celis, 2006; Filindra and Pearson-Merkowitz, 2013; Bratton and Haynie, 1999; Haider-Markel et al., 2000; Preuhs, 2007), with the aforementioned Preuhs studies demonstrating this effect even in the case of an anti-minority 'backlash' response to increased descriptive representation.
[45] The concepts of 'descriptive' and 'substantive' representation come from Pitkin (1967) and - as demonstrated by the studies on representation cited in this chapter - are the standard concepts of representation used in empirical research on this topic.

and that their votes closer match the policy preferences of Black and Latino voters (Ibid.). However, they point to a potential problem in interpreting this data too generously - White voters in districts that elect ethnic minority representatives are more likely to be more liberal than other White voters, and as such share policy priorities with Black and Latino voters. As such, they suggest that most of the time, an ethnic minority representative in a district liberal enough to elect an ethnic minority representative would support a liberal policy agenda that Black and Latino voters would support, even if that representative only cared about the opinions of White voters in that district (Ibid.).

Nevertheless, the Griffin and Newman study supports the view that ethnic minority voters are more likely to have their policy preferences respected by their congressperson in the event that their congressperson is also a member of an ethnic minority (Ibid., p.153). Conversely, this means that ethnic minority voters are *less* likely to have their policy preferences respected by a White congressperson. The conclusion is that descriptive representation is a good and reliable way to improve the substantive representation of ethnic minority citizens, and particularly black Americans (Griffin and Newman, 2008, p.153).

We can now apply this empirical data to our own instrumentalist demographic argument. It follows from the data that one of the causes of poor policy outcomes for political minorities is the descriptive unrepresentativeness in representative democracies. Epistocratic regimes delegate power to various kinds of rulers, and in most epistocratic regimes this is done in a demographic-blind way. As I have mentioned above, Brennan (2016) himself concedes that most epistocratic regimes would result in power disproportionately being delegated towards wealthy white men. Looking at the data provided by Griffin and Newman, we can expect a

decrease in demographic representation created by epistocracy to result in a decrease in substantive representation and thus a decrease in the wellbeing of political minorities.

So a system in which minorities face a lack of descriptive representation is likely to result in lower minority welfare. As Christiano argues, under a democracy, elected representatives have an incentive - absent voter suppression - not to enact policies that decrease the welfare of any minority group that is sufficiently numerous such as to be able to either impact the outcome of an election, or act in coalition with other minority or interest groups to impact the outcome of an election (Christiano, 2011, p.158). A decrease in welfare for a given group increases the likelihood that that group is going to vocalise and enact opposition to the politician or politicians that have caused that decrease in welfare.

This relationship between group welfare and political opposition is what creates the incentive for rulers to enact political terror. The idea is that political terror is a way to suppress political opposition without having to remove the policy that is being opposed. Under a democracy, opposing voters can remove a ruler from office if they are sufficiently dissatisfied with that ruler, which creates a disincentive to enact political terror that countervails the incentive to commit.

I argue that epistocracies are likely to result in political terror as this balance between the incentive to commit political terror and the countervailing disincentive not to commit terror is upset. Under an epistocracy, suffrage is either denied entirely to the general population or distributed such that minorities are likely to suffer from a lack of descriptive representation. As the data shows above, descriptive representation increases substantive representation, and

substantive representation increases minority welfare, and conversely a decrease in descriptive representation results in a decrease in minority welfare[46].

As such, the decrease in descriptive representation is likely to result in policy that privileges the represented demographic groups over underrepresented demographic groups. Following Christiano, this decrease in welfare will create a political opposition to the unrepresentative epistocratic rulers, and this political opposition will create the incentive for the epistocratic rulers to commit political terror so as to suppress this opposition, prolonging their reign. Recall that Christiano states that the evidence supports the view that only 'minimally egalitarian democracies' reliably resist political terror, and that one necessary feature of a minimally egalitarian democracy is universal suffrage (Christiano, 2011, p.158), which is the single feature of democracies that epistocrats are unanimously opposed to.

So the epistocratic ruler or voter selection procedure creates a demographically unrepresentative decision-making group, and political oppression from the under-represented minorities follows. Because epistocracies do not have universal suffrage, the safety valve of democratic removal is not present, and rulers have the incentive to suppress this opposition through political terror without the disincentive of democratic removal. This relationship between demographic representativeness and political opposition is what distinguishes my instrumentalist demographic objection from the two arguments that it combines. The demographic unrepresentativeness creates a set of circumstances where the incentive to commit political terror is more likely to arise.

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[46] Again, the empirical studies in support of this claim are (Preuhs, 2007; Haider-Markel et al., 2000; Bratton and Haynie, 1999; Baker and Cook, 2005; Celis, 2006; Filindra and Pearson-Merkowitz, 2013)

7.4.2.8 Epistocratic Responses

I will now address two potential counterarguments to my view. The first potential response is to attempt to distinguish epistocratic rulers or voters from despotic dictators, and the second potential response is to introduce a ruler or voter selection mechanism that preserves descriptive representation. I will address these counterarguments in turn.

For the first counter-argument that epistocratic rulers are unlike despotic dictators - an epistocrat might argue that their voter or ruler selection process is designed such as to only allow *good* rulers who would not commit political terror to ascend to power. We can be extremely charitable and allow for the sake of argument that an epistocrat could devise a ruler selection procedure that did indeed select for political competency. I argue that for an epistocrat to take this approach in responding to my own argument (or the demographic argument itself) would be a mistake. The data that Christiano's argument relies upon in order to make its claim shows that *only* minimally egalitarian democracies manage to prevent political terror It would be ad hoc for the epistocrat to claim that the rulers that commit political terror do so out of a lack of competence, or any other competency that an epistocratic selection procedure could select for.

Christiano's argument suggests that rulers will commit political terror when presented with the same incentive and disincentive structure *regardless* of their political competency. In order to argue against this point it would be necessary to argue that all rulers that commit political terror are incompetent in a way that rulers of democracies are not. Given that Davenport (2004) and Christiano's (2011) empirical arguments show such a strong relationship between political

incentives and political terror, an argument that argues that instead this data is explained by some feature internal to leaders, and that the data is best explained by luck is implausible.

The second counterargument is more complicated. My argument states that epistocracies are likely to result in demographically unrepresentative rulers, with all of the negative consequences that follow from that. As such, an epistocrat can respond by drawing up an epistocratic system in which minorities will be guaranteed descriptive representation. Jason Brennan's 'government by simulated oracle' system aims to guarantee descriptive representation for minorities (Brennan, 2016, p.222).

Government by simulated oracle works as follows:

> "Every citizen is allowed to vote to express their political preferences. As citizens vote, we collect their anonymously coded demographic information. While expressing their opinions, they must also take a publicly approved exam on objective political knowledge, basic history, and social sciences. All these data will be made public, so that any news source or policy center can analyze it. We can then—on the basis of publicly available data and methods that any social scientist can check—simulate what the voting public would want if it were fully informed" (Brennan, 2016, p.222).

What is important about this system is that it can be demographically weighted such that the preferences of minorities that pass the exam are given extra weighting for every member of that minority that does not pass the exam. If Brennan is to be believed, this will preserve demographic representation whilst retaining the suggested goodmaking features of epistocracy.

The blunt response to this counter-argument is that even Brennan's demographically weighted government by simulated oracle fails to meet the conditions of being a minimally egalitarian democracy, and as such it is likely to result in political terror. That is to say that Brennan's oracle regime is likely to be vulnerable to Christiano's instrumentalist argument alone, without having to make reference to demographics. However, the object of my combining the demographic objection with the instrumentalist argument is to strengthen both.

As such, the task is to provide an argument for why substantive representation through weighted voting is not the same as descriptive representation through voting and elected representatives. On the oracle regime, voters are selected on the grounds of being able to pass a test. In order to shore up the oracle regime from the demographic objection, voter preferences are weighted based on demographics. On the simpler version of the instrumentalist demographic objection, this seems to provide the defence that Brennan needs. However, I will now argue that Brennan's regime - and any regime that attempts to make up for demographic imbalances through weighting - is vulnerable to demographic argument concerns.

In the case of the oracle regime and similar regimes, whilst the demographic weighting provides an attempt at providing substantive representation without descriptive representation, the number of decision-makers is greatly reduced. In order to convince us of the poor political knowledge of the decision-making public, Brennan appeals to an ANES survey on political knowledge about policy positions (Brennan, 2016, p.33). He states that 73 percent of Americans do not know what the Cold War was about, that 40 percent of Americans do not know who America fought against in World War Two, and that they generally do not know which party controls Congress (Brennan, 2016, p.25).

We can assume that in an epistocratic regime, the test for political participation would be drawn up by an epistocrat. Brennan has above given us a list of pieces of political knowledge that he finds important along with the proportion of people that fail to express this knowledge in a survey. The figures that Brennan gives are so stark that - assuming that the test is similar to the list of important political knowledge that he gives - it may be the case that less than half of those citizens currently eligible to vote would be able to vote. It may even be the case that the proportion of the public granted the ability to vote or participate in politics would be greatly less than that.

So in any case we are looking at a stark reduction in voter numbers, and a stark reduction in cognitive diversity as a result. We can charitably grant that Brennan's demographic weighting would indeed preserve substantive representation by ensuring that the policy preferences - or at least the enlightened preferences - of demographic minorities would be preserved through this weighting. However it is not the case that the cognitive diversity of the de-selected group of voters would be preserved. The selection process itself proposed by epistocrats selects for a more cognitively homogenous group than a random sample of people[47]. This is because passing a test or gaining specific educational qualifications selects for a certain kind of cognitive skill-set.

We can use the example of a specific demographic to make our case. Let's imagine that the epistocratic weighting functions such that on the initial selection of voters, African Americans are vastly underrepresented. The oracle regime attempts to correct for this by weighting the preferences of those African Americans to match the proportion of African Americans in

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[47] This kind of argument has been made in Landemore (2012), in which she draws upon the literature on the 'wisdom of crowds' (Ibid., p1). I argue for the same position here, but the mode of argumentation is distinct - my arguments do not rely on the specific empirics that Landemore appeals to.

America. The upshot of this is that the preference of a single African American test-passing

voter is worth more than the preference of a single White American test-passing voter.

However, using weighting to correct racial representation does not guarantee or make likely

that the epistemic diversity of the group will be preserved. This is because minority groups

such as racial groups are not epistemically or demographically monolithic, and selection

criteria are likely to select an unrepresentative group *within* minority groups. Brennan does not

give a concrete example of a selection criteria, and as such it is not possible to scrutinise the

specifics of the oracle regime selection process.

That said, if the selection criteria favours those with college degrees, for example, only 22.5%

of Black Americans would be selected to vote or rule. We should not expect this 22.5% of

degree-holding Black Americans to be demographically representative of the wider body of

Black Americans. We know that the likelihood of attaining a college degree rises with parental

income (Taubman, 1989), and that the likelihood of attaining a prestigious or selective

university also rises with parental income (Hoxby and Avery, 2012). We also know that people

who grew up in an urban environment are more likely to attain a college degree than those who

grew up in rural environments (Byun et al., 2012). On top of this, we can expect differences in

the type and sector of employment, gender differences, and those elements of class that do not

track with income.

Given the heterogeneity of minority groups, those developing an oracle regime selection

system are faced with a choice. The first choice is to add additional weighting measures beyond

the obvious measures of race, gender, and class. Perhaps the oracle regime would introduce

weighting for rurality, job type, education levels, and geographic location. However, this is not

an appealing option for the oracle regime defender. The point of introducing this form of epistocracy in the first place is to develop a government that is only sensitive to the enlightened preferences of the populace, rather than all the preferences of the populace. Enlightened preferences are preferences that an agent would have in the case that they had all of the relevant information and were functioning according to sensible epistemic norms (Brennan, 2016, p.43).

Believers in enlightened preferences are using counterfactual reasoning in order to imagine hypothetical preferences that do not actually exist. As such, acting on enlightened preferences requires the use of a heuristic. The heuristic that epistocrats use in order to get closer to the enlightened preference is the voting test or the use of educational attainment. The more weighting functions that are introduced, the closer the set of preferences gets to a demographically representative set of enlightened preferences. However, it is also likely to be the case that the more weighting functions that are introduced, the closer the set of preferences gets to a non-weighted set of preferences. That is to say that the more representative the oracle regime gets through weighting, the more similar the preferences selected by the regime get to the preferences that are already expressed through ordinary democracy.

This is a problem for the epistocrat. The benefit of epistocratic approaches is that they are supposed to produce substantively different - and thus better - political outcomes. The closer the weighting function gets to producing a set of preferences like the general set of preferences, the less different - and thus less better according to the epistocrat - this set of preferences will become.

The second choice for the defender of the oracle regime is to use a less sophisticated weighting system, only controlling for race, gender and class, or similar. This approach would result in a

set of preferences that - despite being more 'enlightened' - are also less representative. Epistocracy is supposed to be a good alternative to both tyranny and democracy. Introducing a selection system that is insufficiently representative of the preferences of the populace swings the pendulum of epistocracy away from democracy. This approach risks developing a regime that does not have the features of democracy that epistocrats ordinarily wish to preserve, as the attempts to provide a representative government are inadequate.

7.4.2.9 Objections and Implications

At this point I will address one major objection to situated-knowledge views, and progressivism in general. This objection is that views about increasing representation through affirmative action or progressive policy in general are merely suggesting that we replace the hierarchy that we have at present with another hierarchy - this time a hierarchy of the formerly subaltern. To be clear, this is not an implication of my view. The instrumentalist demographic argument emphasises the importance of diversity in decision-making, and in particular the importance of giving minorities a seat at the table with real political power. However it does not follow from this that the views of minorities are categorically superior.

The first way of showing that this conclusion does not follow my argument is to consider the prescriptions of the argument in a diachronic context. At present, real minority groups include women, African-Americans in America, Black British people, British Pakistanis, and so on. And it is true that the implications of my research are that we need to increase the political representation of these groups. But it does not confer any special status to these groups beyond that of their current minority status. And although I argue that it may be the case that being in the social position that these groups are in will produce superior decision-making, it only does so *in certain contexts, for certain decisions, and only for so long as this group really is a*

minority. The special knowledge that people in these groups have is in virtue of their social position, and as such changes with their social position. If White British people, White Americans, or men became a subordinated minority, situated knowledge would follow for these groups also. And in the case of ethnicities particularly, as ethnicities become subsumed into the subordinating group - as with Irish Americans or Italian Americans - the minority epistemic position will disappear as the group moves towards the position of the dominant centre.

The next objection relates to the objection that I have just discussed. I give a strong pragmatic argument that a lack of minority representation is likely to lead to political terror. This is a non-idealised argument. I will now clarify as to whether my position implies that if we could put these pragmatic concerns aside, then it would be prudent to put minorities in charge to rule as a benevolent minority oligarchy, because of the superior decision-making abilities of minorities. Again I wish to emphasise the importance of the part of my argument that states that situated knowledge is conferred in virtue of an epistemic agent's social position. Members of minority groups' superior decision-making capabilities are only contextual, and privileging their epistemic perspective across all contexts would result in a similar blind spot to the political blind spot that we have at present. So it is not an implication of my view that the only thing preventing us from the prescription that we should privilege minority voices in all contexts is the pragmatic concern of terror. I argue that the concern of terror is good enough to dissuade us from creating a democratic system in which majority voices are shut out, but I also argue that my view of situated knowledge doesn't imply that shutting out these voices would be a good thing in the first place.

Lastly, I use the example of gender, race, and social class in this thesis when talking about situated knowledge. And I do argue that being a member of minority gender, race, and social

class groups confers particular sorts of knowledge that can be particularly useful in some contexts. But what I have not argued for is the position that *only* gender, race, and social class can confer useful situated or political knowledge. Political injustice and marginalisation often happens along axes that are culturally specific and situated, novel, or apparently arbitrary. These axes often do not map cleanly onto our preconceived notions of gender, race, and social class. Political injustice, subordination, and democratic marginalisation will not always predominate along these axes, across cultures and across histories. As such, we will not always, and perhaps never, have an understanding of which groups are shut out and marginalised at any given time, never mind an understanding that we have enough consensus on to work into our institutions. And so it is for this reason also that this thesis does not argue for a hierarchy of knowers, with women, ethnic minorities, and the working class acting as epistemically superior rulers. We can ward against this lack of knowledge by making sure to maintain decision-making groups that are diverse in multiple ways, thinking locally and geographically, and across the axes of subordination that we are aware of, without falling victim to the misconception that we have a perfect understanding of injustice.

7.4.2.10 Adjudication

I have argued that epistocracies are likely to lead to political terror, and that one major mechanism by which this is likely to happen is through a lack of demographic representativeness. This is the demographic instrumentalist argument. I have then responded to epistocratic regimes such as the oracle regime that attempt to solve this problem through a series of weighting, arguing that these weighting responses are likely to either fail to be representative or fair to produce substantively different results to ordinary democracy.

This provides solid grounding to reject an epistocratic interpretation of my argument. Given that an epistocratic regime that aims to increase the role that situated knowledge plays in political life is off the table, it is now necessary to make an argument for how to better incorporate situated knowledge in ordinary democracy.

The preceding argument in this chapter goes some of the way to making this argument. I will now complete this work by arguing that my epistemic and metaphysical arguments support making democracies more diverse demographically through the use of a quota system in representative democracies.

7.5 Representation and Democracy

I have argued that epistocratic interpretations of my prior epistemological arguments are unacceptable. I have done this by showing that political regimes that aim to restrict suffrage on the grounds of knowledge. However, one of the aims of this project is to provide political prescriptions, and in this section I will argue that whilst epistocratic prescriptions are off the table, this thesis does provide an argument for increasing descriptive representation in both electoral politics and particularly in so-called 'bureaucratic representation', which is descriptive representation in the realms of government that are non-elected and work directly with citizens. As such, I will now explore some alterations to our democratic systems that aim to increase this representation, specifically through the use of quotas and other similar systems.[48]

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[48] I will note here that the merit of applying these specific measures in a given real-world democracy would need to be assessed and monitored empirically.

7.5.1 Zero Sum Politics

In the arguments given in the above section, worries about epistocracy were expressed using zero sum terminology. By this I mean that I spoke about an undesirable increase in the representation of the educated few, and the requisite decrease in representation of minorities that would follow. This is because political representation understood this way is 'zero sum', which is to say that given a finite amount of representation, an increase in representation for one party or person necessarily causes a reduction in representation for another party or person.

The reason that political representation - which is a relatively abstract concept - can be zero sum is because representation manifests itself in the provision of public goods and services (Nicholson-Crotty et al., 2011), and also in the provision of governmental attention, which is harder to measure but certainly not infinite. For example, when the government is drawing up its budget, one pound allocated to education is a pound not allocated to policing. To use an example that more closely splits demographic groups up, one dollar in the American budget assigned to public healthcare, which benefits the poor, is a dollar not assigned to corporate tax cuts, which benefit the rich.

The zero-sum nature of political representation comes into play in the above arguments about epistocracy. The increase in representation for the test-passing, epistocrat-approved citizens necessarily results in a decrease in representation for the test-failing citizens. Specifically, this redistribution is so extreme that political representation is denied to test-failing citizens. It is this extreme and total redistribution of political representation that causes the problems that

make epistocracy vulnerable to the demographic objection, the instrumentalist objection, and my own demographic instrumentalist objection.

As such, any political prescriptions that I make have to avoid such an extreme redistribution of political representation, so as to avoid making my own prescriptions vulnerable to the arguments against epistocracy that I have made. My epistemological arguments hold that members of subordinated groups have specific and important political knowledge that is important for political decision-making. In the case that I prescribed better utilising this political knowledge by disenfranchising subordinating groups, then my prescription would just be epistocracy.

So the task is to provide prescriptions for changes to our democratic regimes that better incorporate situated knowledge into our political decision-making, but do so without disenfranchising anyone - even members of subordinating groups. This is so my prescriptions manage to alter political decision-making in such a way as to retain the regime in question's status as a minimally egalitarian democracy, thus retaining its security against Christiano's instrumentalist argument.

I argue that the way that we can better incorporate situated knowledge into political decision-making in democracies is through better descriptive representation, both in democratic representatives and also in bureaucratic representation. By placing power and resources into the hands of people with this relevant situated knowledge, we will enable them to use this situated knowledge to improve substantive representation and minority welfare. I will also argue that this movement of power into the hands of those possessing situated knowledge will improve welfare for non-minorities. That is to say that an increase in descriptive representation for

members of minority groups will lead to an increase in welfare for everyone, minorities and non-minorities alike.

7.5.2 Political Representation

I argue in favour of increasing descriptive representation in representative democracies. I will begin by explaining the simple way in which increased descriptive representation in representative democracies leads to an increase in situated knowledge amongst political decision-makers. I will then use empirical studies on the relationship between descriptive representation in representative democracies and substantive representation and welfare.

An increase in descriptive representation for minorities in a representative democracy results in an increase in situated knowledge amongst political decision-makers directly. This is because a group is descriptively represented in the case that they have members of their group as elected officials, and a group is more descriptively represented in the case that they have more members of the group as elected officials. On my view of situated knowledge, situated knowledge is gained simply through living a life as a member of a minority group.

So, for example, black people gain situated knowledge through living their lives as black people. The social position of being a black person in society necessitates the development of skills and other forms of situated knowledge. To use an example from my earlier argumentation, Operario and Fisk provide empirical data that shows that members of minority groups are more likely to perceive bias (Operario and Fiske, 2016). This study shows that

particularly in cases of subtle bias, members of ethnic minority groups were more likely to perceive the bias, whereas white subjects were less likely to notice the bias.

Following my previous argument, it is easy to understand why this difference between the two studied groups comes about. Members of minority groups live in such a way that they have a greater pragmatic incentive to notice bias. This is because they are the victims of this bias, and as such noticing bias when it is directed towards them makes them more likely to be able to respond to and counteract the effects of this bias. Noticing bias is a skill, rather than a set of pieces of propositional knowledge.

We can use the example of the skill of noticing bias to demonstrate the relationship between situated knowledge as skill and descriptive representation. It is important for political decision-makers to be able to spot bias in policy decision-making. It is particularly important for political decision-makers to be able to spot this bias in cases where the bias is subtle or obscured. For example, consider the issue of 'stop and search' policing in the United Kingdom. Stop and search policing is a policing method that allows police officers to temporarily detain people, and physically search their bodies for weapons or other illegal items. What distinguishes stop and search policing from ordinary policing methods is that it allows officers to do this without exercising their powers of arrest, and as such they are able to stop and search people without requiring the legal justification or oversight that is required to arrest someone (Bowling and Phillips, 2007, p.937).

The explicit wording of stop and search policies does mention race, but explicitly states that race, taken alone or in combination with other factors, cannot be a reason to stop and search someone (Ibid.). However, there is a wealth of evidence that stop and search powers are used

by police to disproportionately stop and search black people. Further, there is good evidence to suggest that the reason that police stop and search black people is due to racist attitudes held by a large number of police officers, including senior police officers (Ibid, p.960).

So stop and search policing is a policy for which there is good evidence that it has a disproportionate negative effect on the lives of members of a minority group. Its efficacy is also questionable, with little evidence to suggest that it works at reducing crime (Ibid., p.959). On top of the empirical evidence published in academic journals, there has long been criticism directed at the policy coming from the black community in the United Kingdom, with stop and search policing being a major cause of the Brixton riots in 1981 (Jefferson, 2012).

Given these features of stop and search policing, it may be surprising that the UK government continues to support stop and search policing, and that stop and search policing has in fact increased in recent years (Liberty, 2019). Given this information, there are two ways of understanding policy-maker's support for this method of policing. On one understanding, policy-makers are acting out of the same racial bias that motivates the police to misuse stop and search powers. On the other understanding, policy-makers are mistaken about the nature of stop and search policing - they are failing to understand its discriminatory execution and effects.

Given that, as I have mentioned above, members of minority groups are more likely to be able to perceive bias (Operario and Fiske, 2016), it is likely that a policy-maker who is a member of a minority group is going to be more likely to perceive bias in policy. Assuming that policy-makers are acting in good faith, they are failing to perceive the bias in stop and search policing. Following my epistemic arguments, it is likely that one of the major roadblocks to understanding the nature of stop and search policing is due to a lack of this skill of noticing

bias, and that a major way in which a person develops this skill is through experiencing bias themselves. As such, it is likely that an increase in the number of black policy-makers with powers to influence policing methods would result in a decrease or a cessation of stop and search policing.

It is important to note here that I am sympathetic to arguments that many policy-makers do support stop and search for explicitly racist reasons, or in order to gain support of explicitly racist voters. But on this reading of the issue it also follows that an increase in black policy-makers would reduce support for this racist policy, given that black policy-makers are less likely to believe, or act on nativist or white nationalist political sentiment.

There is empirical evidence to suggest that shared experience plays this causal role in improving substantive representation. Sobolewska et al. give empirical data supporting this causal role, pointing to three methods of action. The first is through what the authors call 'linked fate', stating "Linked fate accounts for more than a sense of group solidarity or identity and is the understanding that individual opportunities and life chances are intrinsically linked to the group as a whole...It involves a sense of acute awareness that what happens to the group is also something that affects the individual within the group" (Sobolewska et al., 2018, p.1239). Note that Sobolewska et al. explicitly choose this notion of linked fate because it is easier to empirically measure. It is easier to empirically measure because a sense of linked fate is an individual's perception of shared experience, whereas the objective notion of shared experience, however true it may be, is much harder to operationalise in an empirical concept.

The second mechanism of action proposed by Sobolewska et al. is 'willingness to represent' (Ibid., p1241). Willingness to represent is simply the willingness that a minority representative

has to advocate for the interests of members of their own minority group. So whereas shared experience is an understanding, willingness to represent is motivational in nature. This willingness to represent may come about as a result of a feeling of a moral duty or a special responsibility to represent other members of their minority group (Ibid., p1242).

The last mechanism of action proposed by Sobolewska et al. is 'party ideology as motivator' (Ibid., p1243). Party ideology as motivator is a mechanism by which minority representatives are more likely to substantively represent minority interests because minority representatives are more likely to be members of parties that hold an ideology that better substantively represents minorities. For example, in the United Kingdom, the Labour party have historically been much more popular with ethnic minority voters in the United Kingdom, and their ideology is associated with representing ethnic minority interests (Ibid., p1243). The line of thought here is that all Labour MPs are more likely to substantively represent ethnic minorities, including White Labour MPs.

Of course it is important to note here that it is perfectly possible for these mechanisms of action to run alongside one another in an individual representative, and for them to function independently in the case of other representatives. Diane Abbott is a Labour MP that has been vocal about race relations in the United Kingdom for decades, and nothing about Sobolewska et al.'s analysis suggests that she could not be motivated by all three mechanisms of action, shared experience, motivation to represent, and party ideology.

7.5.3 Democratic Alterations

In the previous sub-section I outlined the empirical evidence for the view that we can improve substantive representation through improving descriptive representation in representative democracies. It follows then, that a prescription for improving descriptive representation would be supported by the argumentation in this thesis. However, the arguments made earlier in this chapter against epistocracy will also serve as a restraint and guide for the kinds of prescriptions that are permissible to make.

In my arguments against epistocracy, I argued that preserving the status of a democracy as a minimally egalitarian democracy is of paramount importance. As such, it would be inconsistent to make political prescriptions here that violate the norms of minimally egalitarian democracy. So, for example, introducing restrictions on who can run for office or vote is likely to violate these norms. It will be necessary to exclude prescriptions that improve representation by restricting democratic freedoms.

As such, in the following section of this chapter, I will discuss two possible alterations to our democratic systems, both of which have been successfully implemented in real democracies. The first possible alteration I will discuss is to introduce a quota system by changing our single-member district style system to a party list proportional representation style system. The second alteration is to modify our single-member district style system to include a quota system. To restate the aim of this section: I discuss these modifications to democratic processes in order to explore changes that show promise, but it is beyond the scope of this thesis to make a recommendation for a particular alteration.

It is important to note here that the overwhelming majority of empirical literature on the relationship between democratic systems and descriptive representation focuses on descriptive

representation for gender or sex. The scope of this thesis is wider than sex and gender, and focuses on class and race also. So although the following section mostly references the literature on sex or gender, I will mention the Mauritian parliamentary system which is notable for is reservations for ethnicity.

In the United Kingdom, the United States, and many other similar democracies, voters vote for representatives for their geographical area. For example, in the United Kingdom voters do not directly elect the prime minister, nor the government. Instead, voters vote for an MP that represents their local area constituency. In the United States, the selection process for the president is more direct, but Senators are elected through geographically-specific elections in each state, and Congresspeople are elected by even smaller geographic areas. Candidates for election are selected by either the political parties that they represent, or are self-selected in the case of independent candidates. his system of representation is called a 'single member district' system (Matland and Studlar, 1996).

There is a perception that single-member district systems are particularly hard systems in which to introduce quotas (Christensen and Bardall, 2014, p.9).. This perception arises from the fact that in single member district systems (henceforth "SMD's") voters vote for specific candidates, only voting for a political party indirectly. This introduces a complication because in the case that the government obliges a political party to have a certain percentage of candidates be members of a given minority group, necessarily this policy is going to affect some constituencies but not others.

So, to use the example of the United Kingdom, if the political parties were told to make a given percentage of their candidate lists women or members of an ethnic minority, then the effect of

this change would be distributed unevenly. The set of incumbent MPs skews white and male, and as a result political parties would have to choose between ousting successful incumbent MPs or disproportionately placing minority MPs in marginal or hopeless constituencies. Voters in constituencies with a popular incumbent, pushed out by a quota system may feel that the minority MP that replaced their incumbent is illegitimate. Minority MPs may be set up to fail by being chosen for seats in which it is impossible to win - meaning that a diverse candidate list would not result in a diverse set of MPs.

Public knowledge that candidate lists are filled via quota in some-but-not-all constituencies, and the knowledge more generally that some politicians were selected via quota has resulted in legitimacy problems for women elected under a quota system in two well-publicised cases - Pakistan and Tanzania (Ibid., p12).

These complications do not hold for proportional representation style systems, and in fact it has been suggested by numerous scholars that "the difference between party-list proportional representation and single-member district, simple plurality systems, is the most important variable affecting women's share of legislative seats" (Matland and Studlar, 1996, p.708).

7.5.3.1 Party List Proportional Representation

In party-list proportional representation regimes, instead of voting solely for a specific candidate, voters instead vote for a political party. The number of seats allocated to each party is dictated by the proportion of *all* votes that that party receives, and then candidates are assigned to seats through a process in which candidates for each party are ordered from highest

to lowest priority. In so-called closed list regimes, the make-up and order of the list of candidates for each party is dictated entirely separately from the voting process, and in so-called open-list regimes, voters can express a preference for candidate order in some way (Freidenvall and Dahlerup, 2013).

In a party-list proportional representation system, quotas can be introduced on the list of candidates itself. Because there isn't as close of a direct relationship between constituency and candidate, introducing a quota is simpler. It is possible to introduce a quota onto the party list, without reducing candidate choice unevenly across differing constituencies. It is for this reason that proportional representation systems have a reputation for being easier to implement quotas in, and it is true that proportional representation systems on average have better descriptive representation for women, with the majority of democratic systems with high proportions of women representatives being proportional representation systems (Freidenvall and Dahlerup, 2013, p.9).

So one policy option to improve descriptive representation in representative democracies is to introduce a proportional representation system, and then introduce a quota system on the candidate lists. In one sense this is a more parsimonious prescription, because although it is suggesting a larger change to the overall system when applied to systems that are currently SMD's, the system that replaces the SMD system is simpler. However, changing a SMD style system to a PR style system is a large undertaking. Voting system changes are a tall order for democratic systems, with change happening rarely, and usually only in response to the desires of older, more established political parties to maintain power in times of political change (Boix, 1999). As a result, a campaign to change voting system on the grounds of a single policy preference, particularly a contentious one such as the gender, race or class balance of a

legislature is unlikely to succeed, and could potentially result in a backlash that harms the cause rather than helping it (Christensen and Bardall, 2014).

So it may be the case that if we were designing a system from scratch, the correct prescription would be to introduce a system of party list proportional representation. However, the aim of this thesis is to generate and justify prescriptions that can be implemented in real democracies, including the SMD systems of the United Kingdom and the United States. Introducing a PR system in one of these SMD systems involves navigating considerable institutional inertia, and risking political capital. As such, in the next section I will discuss possible alterations that are possible within the context of a SMD system, and that do not involve switching from an SMD system to a PR system. As I have said above, I aim not to prescribe a single course of alteration for a given democracy, but instead discuss options that have been trialled in order to show that there are policy interventions that can be made to increase descriptive representation.

7.5.3.2 SMD Alterations

Another possible option is to alter our SMD system in order to include a quota for gender, race, class, or all three. I will now discuss a number of ways to introduce quotas in SMD's, as enumerated and explained by Christensen and Berdall (2014).

The first way to introduce a quota in an SMD system is to introduce the quota on the candidate list that each party nominates (Ibid.). A benefit to this approach is that it requires only a very small change to the logistics of elections in a SMD system, however because candidate quotas can only be enforced on candidates, rather than elected representatives, instituting a quota does not guarantee an increase in descriptive representation (Ibid.).

A second potential amendment to a SMD is to introduce a 'PR-Tier' system, in which new seats are created and added onto the existing SMD, constituency based seats. The new seats created in a PR-Tier system are not tied to a constituency or elected through the typical SMD process, but are instead elected through an election following the rules of proportional representation. Because these extra seats are elected via a PR election, it is possible to introduce quotas on the candidate lists given by the relevant political parties. So in effect, in a PR-Tier system, there are two concurrent election systems, a SMD system and a PR system. The SMD system remains unchanged, and a quota is applied to the new PR seats.

The third potential alteration is instituting nomination quotas. Nomination quotas are another proposed way to increase descriptive representation for members of minority groups. Nomination quotas are quotas that only apply to the candidate nomination lists put forward by political parties, but not to the number of representatives that actually get elected (Ibid., p20). So for example, a nomination quota might oblige the Labour Party to have 50% of the candidates standing for election be women, but it would not penalise the Labour party in the case that the majority of female candidates lost their election, and as a result there ended up being more male Labour MPs than female Labour MPs.

A fourth potential way of improving descriptive representation is through super districts. Super districts are similar to the PR-Tier system, in that they create a set of reserved seats for minorities that are elected separately from other candidates. However they differ in that although they are filled in a separate election, they are not filled through proportional representation. Instead they are elected through the same voting method as other representatives (Ibid., p22).

A fifth potential way of improving descriptive representation is instituting a rotating seats system. In rotating seats systems, a subset of the total ordinary seats in a representative democracy is reserved for minorities. This subset changes with each election, thus imposing a quota on a 'rotating' set of seats. This system has been implemented in India, in which each election one third of seats are reserved for women (Ibid., p23). So each seat has the quota imposed in one in every three elections, and each election only one third of seats have the quota imposed. No new seats are created for women, instead the quota is imposed on existing seats. Further, no changes to the voting process are made, and the women are elected through the normal process.

The final remedy discussed by Christensen and Bardall is alternate threshold systems. In alternate threshold systems, the election in a SMD system proceeds as normal, and then after the election there is a supplemental process in which new representatives are given seats. The process by which these new representatives are given seats is that *losing* minority candidates from the election are assigned newly created seats, until the gender balance of the democratic chamber is reached.

All of the prior systems mentioned in this list of remedies have only been implemented in the case of gender. The alternate thresholds system has been implemented not only for gender, but also has been implemented for ethnicity in Mauritius (Ibid., 24). Mauritius is a multi-ethnic democracy, and has this threshold system built into its constitution, so that each ethnic group feels as if they are represented in parliament, reducing the likelihood of communal tension.

To restate the goal of this section of the chapter once more - I mention the above alterations to democratic procedure in order to provide examples of ways to improve descriptive

representation. Assessing the success of these measures in practice is an empirical question that is beyond the scope of this thesis, and it is not necessarily the case that because a given measure is the most effective measure of increasing representation, then all societies should adopt this measure. The purpose of this thesis is not to prescribe a one-size-fits-all prescription that suits all democracies. Rather, my epistemological arguments emphasised the importance of demographic diversity in decision-making, particularly but not exclusively in contexts in which understanding and tackling justice is a goal of this decision-making. Some democracies are likely to be less tolerant of substantive change to democratic procedures - states in which there are pre-existing problems with perceptions of democratic legitimacy, or those in which election processes are harder to change for logistical, political, or legal reasons - may have good reason to prefer smaller, less effective change than others.

7.6 Conclusion

The earlier parts of this thesis provided an epistemological argument for the superiority of demographically diverse political decision-making groups. The earlier section of this chapter then argued against interpreting this argument as supporting an epistocratic point of view. The aim of this section has been to show that feminist concerns about situated knowledge do not oblige the concerned party to endorse epistocratic restrictions on democracy. In this most recent section I have argued in favour of increasing descriptive representation in democracies in ways that do not violate the minimally egalitarian status of a democracy. I have provided the example systems of candidate list quotas, PR-tier systems, nomination quotas, super districts, rotating seats and alternate thresholds.

I will now conclude by offering some clarification on the specificity of the prescriptions that I have made, and I will also clarify where these arguments should sit within a wider movement for justice.

Many of the quota measures above have been introduced out of a moral concern for the rights of women or ethnic minority candidates, rather than directly motivated by epistemic concerns. So, for example out of a concern that if a woman does not have the option to run for office, then that woman, or women as a group are morally wronged. However, it should be clear that epistemic concerns run alongside these moral concerns. It can be true that we have good moral reasons to introduce these measures whilst also having good epistemic reasons to do so also.

It is not the purpose of this project to adjudicate on which of these systems is best for all democracies, nor is it the purpose of this project to adjudicate on which system is best for a particular democracy. In this sense the project is robustly non-ideal. What works for Mauritius - a society that has been multi-ethnic since its inception, and one in which racial politics were developed in a colonial and post colonial context, might not work as well for the United Kingdom - a country with a demographically and politically dominant 'native' ethnic group.

Similarly, what works best for gender may not be the best system for race or class. On my view of class, given in the metaphysical section of this thesis, one constitutive element of social class is economic capital. Unlike the other axes of injustice of race and changes, the government is at liberty to directly alter this element of social class through economic redistribution, and in fact most governments do in fact do this, although most often it is in a very limited way. As such, with regards to social class, one way of increasing descriptive representation for working class

people would be to redistribute wealth such that the wealth-based barriers to political participation disappear.

There are also logistical hurdles to introducing alterations to the democratic process. Some changes will be simpler to implement in one system than another. The relative ease with which pre-existing PR systems can implement gender quotas is a good example of this. A system that has a long history of representatives being permitted to serve indefinitely may struggle with a rotating seats system that introduces term limits, and a system in a society with wider public support for the goals of feminist, anti-racist, or class justice based thinking may have a wider set of options when considering these changes.

Some of these logistical hurdles may be ameliorated by the fact that it is possible to introduce these measures temporarily. In fact, Christensen and Berdall describe all of the above measures as 'temporary special measures' in their work, highlighting that in almost all of the real cases in which these measures have been implemented, the intention has been to reduce or remove them once an adequate level of descriptive representation has been achieved. This is important to keep in mind as injustice is not a natural phenomena, and as a result it is socially and historically situated. The section of this thesis on metaphysics emphasises this socially constructed nature of injustice. As a result it is intuitive that temporary measures are a reasonable response to temporary injustices. Similarly we should expect new injustices to arise in the future, in response to changes in ideology and the material world, and as a result it is likely that the concerns about descriptive representation in this thesis will apply to groups for which the injustice they suffer does not yet have a name or exist.

On top of this, the measures described in the most recent section are not the only thing that governments can or should do to increase descriptive representation in democracies. I have just mentioned that one way to increase descriptive representation for working class people would be to reduce economic inequality. For the non-economic constituents of class, and for race and gender more generally, reducing injustice on these grounds outside of the realm of changes to the democratic process will lead to an increase in descriptive representation. Better policy on educational inequality, childhood nutrition, labour rights, domestic violence, amongst other things is likely to improve the functioning of a democracy. Improving the lot of women, ethnic minorities, and working class people in general will lead to increased representation itself.

And of course, the point of this section is that there is a direct relation between descriptive representation and minority welfare. An increase in minority welfare is likely to lead to an increase in descriptive representation, and an increase in descriptive representation is likely to lead to an increase in minority welfare, and welfare more generally.

The purpose of this section has been to highlight that there are possible, plausible and small alterations to our existing democratic systems that could be tried in order to increase descriptive representation. The previous arguments in this thesis support the view that this would lead to our democracies making better decisions for everyone.

Conclusion

This thesis puts forth three core views. In this conclusion, I will highlight the contributions I have sought to make to the debates that I have participated in, and then move on to make general conclusions about the thesis as a whole..

The first view is the modified social constructivist social metaphysics given in the first section. This is the argument that we should reject identity views, as their putative causal role is better explained by Bourdieu's notion of 'habitus'. This metaphysical view has two major benefits. Firstly, it is not vulnerable to the contradictions found within identity views. The nature and role of identity in metaphysics is a particularly current and important question in contemporary philosophy and politics. Traditional Haslangerian social metaphysics relies on the metaphor of the 'internal map' to give a descriptive picture of identity, but I have argued that this metaphor is not descriptive enough, that its lack of specificity makes it hard to operationalise, and most importantly that it is contradictory in the way that it approaches the relationship between social-kinds-as-class and identity. Because my view of habitus is more descriptive, it has the ability to be more action guiding. This is especially the case given that the notion of habitus has been operationalised successfully for years in sociology and social theory. This more descriptive picture also provides more clarity to the contentious metaphysical debate on the nature of identity, as it consists of specific claims about habitus that can be assessed individually.

Secondly, it offers a picture of social class. The view of social class as consisting in social, economic, and cultural capital captures injustice that is not captured by metaphysical views that focus on race and gender alone. This kind of social class is incredibly underexplored in analytic philosophy, and at the point of writing has almost exclusively been discussed within Marxist philosophy. By introducing this notion of social class to Haslangerian metaphysics - and thus analytic social metaphysics more generally - my work provides a view of metaphysics that is more intersectional and better at tracking the harms of injustice. There is injustice that happens beyond and alongside the axes of race and gender. If our metaphysics is to capture injustice, then it must be able to capture the difference between the lives of upper class members or ethnic minorities and working class members of ethnic minorities, and it must be able to capture the difference between the lives of women of differing social classes. It is not enough to offer a metaphysics that can only describe ethnic minority students at Harrow and members of ethnic minorities living on council estates as the same. It is not enough to flatten an axis of injustice by failing to understand that the lives of women differ across class boundaries. This is particularly the case for social metaphysics that has the ameliorative aim to develop metaphysical pictures that serve the ends of justice. I offer a metaphysics that aims to be able to do this.

The second view is presented in the section of the thesis containing my epistemological arguments. There are two major benefits to my view. Firstly it provides a view of situated knowledge that is compatible with the epistemic and metaphysical commitments typical of analytic philosophy. In doing this, it provides a more robust description of what, epistemically speaking, situated knowledge consists in. I have shown that situated knowledge should be taken seriously, even by scholars that reject the commitments of more traditional situated knowledge

theorists. I have argued that the insights of situated knowledge theory are entirely compatible with the methodological and metaphysical commitments of analytic philosophy. As a result, I have shown that claiming an adherence to the norms of analytic philosophy is not an excuse to disregard feminist epistemology.

Secondly, the epistemological arguments I make highlight an important and under-discussed feature of situated knowledge - namely that situated knowledge arguments can be used to ground political claims about testimony and deference. By taking these political claims and working backwards from them, I provide an epistemological picture that gives good grounding for the politics of justice, and provides grounding and a justificatory resource for political philosophers working on these issues.

The third view put forward in the thesis provides an argument for how epistemological arguments about expertise could be used by those interested in justice, and is contained in the thesis' third section. I combine two arguments for democracy - the instrumentalist argument, and the demographic argument - and show their similar underpinnings. I demonstrate how these arguments are stronger when combined. This provides those committed to democracy with a way to reject epistocratic arguments against democracy. In order to bolster this democratic position further, I then provide a number of ways to increase descriptive representation - and thus increase the diversity of knowledge in political decision-making - without rejecting democracy.

The result of this work is a thesis that draws on various sub-disciplines of philosophy to provide a strong argument for making democracies more descriptively representative, and in doing so provides a novel metaphysical picture of social kinds, and a novel way of

understanding situated knowledge. I will conclude this conclusion by discussing a methodological and philosophical principle that has underpinned this entire thesis - the goal of bridging philosophical gaps, making philosophical connections, and doing philosophy differently.

Much of the argumentation in this thesis achieves its goal by bridging pre-existing literature, for example bridging the literature on Haslangerian social kinds and the work of Pierre Bourdieu. Similarly, I bridge the feminist literature on situated knowledge with the epistemological literature from analytic philosophy. I aim to have shown that disparate literatures are not as separate as they may seem, and that we can combine disparate literatures to challenge and improve our views. I hope that I have shown that just because two bodies of literature are yet to be connected, that it does not mean that they cannot be combined fruitfully.

The second kind of bridging that I have aimed to achieve is between metaphysics, epistemology, and politics. In epistemology, we know that good belief sets are consistent. We should also bear in mind that our views about the differing areas of philosophy should be consistent too. I have shown what that may look like. The metaphysical and epistemological arguments in this thesis can each be understood alone, but together they strengthen each other and gain descriptive power over and above their individual abilities.

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