

# 1           **What is the risk of acquiring SARS-CoV-2 from the use of public toilets?**

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## 18 19 20   **Highlights**

- 21       • Public toilets may act as a contact hub point for SARS-CoV-2 transmission.
- 22       • All accepted transmission mechanisms for SARS-CoV-2 co-exist in a public toilet.
- 23       • Faecal and urinary derived aerosols contain viable SARS-CoV-2 virus.
- 24       • Issues over space, ventilation, frequency of use, cleaning and maintenance compound the  
25       transmission risk.
- 26       • Actions to prevent COVID-19 infection are offered in lieu of supportive scientific evidence.

28 **ABSTRACT**

29 Public toilets and bathrooms may act as a contact hub point where community transmission of SARS-  
30 CoV-2 occurs between users. The mechanism of spread would arise through three mechanisms:  
31 inhalation of faecal and/or urinary aerosol from an individual shedding SARS-CoV-2; airborne  
32 transmission of respiratory aerosols between users face-to-face or during short periods after use; or from  
33 fomite transmission via frequent touch sites such as door handles, sink taps, lota or toilet roll dispenser.  
34 In this respect toilets could present a risk comparable with other high throughput enclosed spaces such  
35 as public transport and food retail outlets. They are often compact, inadequately ventilated, heavily used  
36 and subject to maintenance and cleaning issues. Factors such as these would compound the risks  
37 generated by toilet users incubating or symptomatic with SARS-CoV-2. Furthermore, toilets are  
38 important public infrastructure since they are vital for the maintenance of accessible, sustainable and  
39 comfortable urban spaces. Given the lack of studies on transmission through use of public toilets,  
40 comprehensive risk assessment relies upon the compilation of evidence gathered from parallel studies,  
41 including work performed in hospitals and prior work on related viruses. This narrative review  
42 examines the evidence suggestive of transmission risk through use of public toilets and concludes that  
43 such a risk cannot be lightly disregarded. A range of mitigating actions are suggested for both users of  
44 public toilets and those that are responsible for their design, maintenance and management.

45

46 *Keywords:* COVID-19; SARS-CoV-2; communal washroom; aerosol transmission, public health risk

47

48 **1. Introduction**

49 Bathrooms accommodating toilet facilities provide a route for all known transmission pathways  
50 of SARS-CoV-2 through exposure to air and surfaces. It is not unusual for public toilets to ‘contain the  
51 highest density of people within the smallest amount of real estate’ (Poland, 2020). Toilets in theatres,  
52 schools, restaurants, bars, shopping centres and sports facilities, in particular, may experience short  
53 periods of very heavy use. These facilities are considered important public infrastructure since they are  
54 vital for the maintenance of accessible, sustainable and comfortable urban spaces (Greed et al., 2004).  
55 Contamination through heavy use of toilets could present a far greater risk than indoor transmission in

56 a public venue because there are additional risks from the production of urinary and faecal aerosol.  
57 Toilets illustrate a point in the sewage system at which the load of infective virus from faeces and urine  
58 are at their highest. It has already been established that coronaviruses can persist for long periods in  
59 water and sewage (Ahmed et al., 2020; Casanova et al., 2009) and contaminated water could be a  
60 potential vehicle for human exposure, particularly if aerosols are generated (Ahmed et al., 2020;  
61 Johnson et al., 2013). Indeed, monitoring wastewater for SARS-CoV-2 has already been explored to  
62 provide an early warning tool for community transmission (Cao and Francis, 2021; Foladori et al., 2020;  
63 Lodder and de Roda Husman, 2020; Medema et al., 2020).

64         Since few, if any, real life studies have yet been conducted on the SARS-CoV-2 transmission  
65 risk from public toilets, the possibility that these facilities could act as a transmission hub can only be  
66 explored by examining evidence for discrete statements relevant to toilet use (Fitzgerald et al., 2021).  
67 These encompass the usual sequence of stages for a toilet visit conditioned by human behaviour,  
68 alongside evidence for physical parameters such as viral RNA, survival, infectivity, people-traffic, room  
69 size, hand hygiene resources, cleaning practices and ventilation status. Infection risks from toilets have  
70 previously been determined using bacterial and viral markers, with prior epidemiological studies on  
71 other viruses strongly linked with contaminated excreta (Carling et al., 2009; Verani et al., 2014).

72         Tracing the source and mode of viral infections is notoriously difficult. In the case of common  
73 enteric (non-respiratory) viruses, such as norovirus, the faecal-oral and vomit-oral routes represent the  
74 primary infection pathways (Chan et al., 2006). However, the exact mode of transmission (e.g. aerosol  
75 vs. fomite) and person-to-person chain of infection for enteric viruses remains poorly understood in  
76 most disease outbreaks (Uchino et al., 2006; Xiao et al., 2017; Xiao et al., 2018). In the case of SARS-  
77 CoV-2, the potential to identify the mode of infection is made even harder due to possible simultaneous  
78 respiratory, faecal and urinary release of the virus. It is therefore virtually impossible to distinguish  
79 between faecal-oral and oral-oral routes of infection in a public toilet setting. In addition, unlike other  
80 viruses, SARS-CoV-2 infection may also occur via the ocular route (Qu et al., 2021), providing multiple  
81 infection points.

82         Despite the difficulty in tracking infections, there is preliminary evidence supporting the  
83 possibility of SARS-CoV-2 transmission through toilet use (Yun Chen et al., 2020; Gu et al., 2020; He

84 et al., 2020; Wang W et al., 2020; Xiao et al., 2020a; Zhang et al., 2020a). Two studies have shown that  
85 the toilet was among the most contaminated areas in indoor settings (Ding et al., 2020; Ma et al., 2020):  
86 in one of these, a patient whose toilet air sample was positive had a negative exhaled breath sample,  
87 intimating that airborne SARS-CoV-2 in toilets could originate from faeces rather than air (Zhang and  
88 Duchaine, 2020). On June 29, 2020, the government of Beijing municipality reported two cases where  
89 two individuals were probably infected with SARS-CoV-2 after using a community public toilet (Sun  
90 and Han, 2020). Risks from faecal and urinary aerosol have been hypothesised based on virus presence  
91 and evidence from previous SARS outbreaks (Amirian, 2020; Bwire et al., 2020; Yifei Chen et al.,  
92 2020; Gupta et al., 2020; Jones D et al., 2020; Kang et al., 2020; Li et al., 2020; Liu et al., 2020;  
93 McDermott et al., 2020; Meng et al., 2020; Patel, 2020; Santos et al., 2020; Sun J et al., 2020; Wang W  
94 et al., 2020; Wong et al., 2020; Wu Y et al., 2020; Xu D et al., 2005; Xu Y et al., 2020). Using rRT-  
95 PCR testing, the overall prevalence of SARS-CoV-2 in faecal samples from patients with confirmed  
96 Covid-19 is 40% (Wong et al., 2020), with higher rates reported for patients presenting with  
97 gastrointestinal symptoms and patients with more severe disease (Wong et al., 2020; Zhang Y et al.,  
98 2020a). A systematic review found that rectal swabs were more likely to be positive for SARS-CoV-2  
99 than sputum specimens (87.8% vs 68.1%) (Bwire et al., 2020).

100         These reports do not necessarily prove that infectious virions are present in faeces or that the  
101 virus has spread through faecal transmission (Amirion, 2020). However, viable virus has been isolated  
102 and confirmed from patient stool and urinary samples (Jeong et al., 2020; Jones D et al., 2020; Wong  
103 et al., 2020; Wang W et al., 2020; Xiao et al., 2020a; Xiao et al., 2020b; Zhang H et al., 2020; Zhang Y  
104 et al., 2020a; Zhang Y et al., 2020b). The ability of the virus to spread through faecal transmission is  
105 contingent on the amount of viable virus surviving in faeces and urine (Foladori et al., 2020; Guo et al.,  
106 2021; Jones D et al., 2020).

107         Given these findings, it seems timely to examine the risk of SARS-CoV-2 transmission from  
108 public toilets in more detail. This article summarises potential risks for acquiring SARS-CoV-2 during  
109 a visit to a public toilet and offers some suggestions for mitigating this risk.

110

111

112 **2. How could public toilet users acquire SARS-CoV-2?**

113 Acquisition of SARS-CoV-2 occurs following exposure to contaminated air and/or surfaces.  
114 There are several possible transmission pathways apparent between an individual and air or surfaces in  
115 a public toilet (Figure 1).

116

117 *2.1. Air*

118 We should first consider the risks from contaminated air. A recent systematic review assessed the degree  
119 of air contamination by SARS-CoV-2 in hospitals and found that 24% air samples from toilets were  
120 positive, with average viral RNA concentrations per m<sup>3</sup> air higher than for any other area sampled  
121 (Birgand et al., 2020). There are additional studies confirming survival and infectivity in air (Lednicky  
122 et al., 2020; van Doremalen et al., 2020). Long-range aerosolization due to toilet flushing occurred  
123 during an outbreak of SARS-CoV-1 (Amoy Gardens outbreak; Yu et al., 2004) and has been implicated  
124 in a SARS-CoV-2 outbreak involving a high-rise building in China, where nine cases lived in three  
125 vertically aligned flats connected by drainage pipes between the master bathrooms (Kang et al., 2020).

126 It is likely that the main risk for airborne transmission comes from inhaling infectious aerosol  
127 from a prior user colonised or infected with Covid-19 who is actively shedding virus in expired air  
128 (Birgand et al., 2020; Ma et al., 2020). Breathing in aerosolized faecal/urinary material during or after  
129 flushing offers an additional risk. This would affect anyone in the bathroom at the time or who enters  
130 the cubicle or toilet afterwards within a time interval dependent on particle settling (Birgand et al., 2020;  
131 Brönimann et al., 2020; Gerba et al., 1975; Jones D et al., 2020; Knowlton et al., 2018; Lai et al., 2018;  
132 Li et al., 2020; Liu et al., 2020; Ma et al., 2020; McDermott et al., 2020; Sassi et al., 2018; Shi et al.,  
133 2021; Patel, 2020; Wang J et al., 2020). Bioaerosols may be produced from toilets that are flushed  
134 containing no waste, which suggests that the virus could remain in the toilet following prior use  
135 (Knowlton et al., 2018; Johnson et al., 2017). The air may also be contaminated by (re)-aerosolized  
136 waste water from sewage outlets (Hu et al., 2020), via drains (Shi et al., 2021), spillages, leaks (Yuan  
137 et al., 2020; Kang et al., 2020) etc, or incorrectly installed plumbing (Gormley et al., 2021).

138

139

140 2.2. Surfaces: Wash basins

141 Hand washbasins offer additional sites for release of infectious aerosols in a public toilet  
142 (Figure 2). Both surfaces and strainers in washbasins may be contaminated by nasal mucus, saliva  
143 and/or sputum due to hand and face washing, and spitting into the sink by users (D'Accolti et al., 2020;  
144 Gautret et al., 2020; Wu D et al., 2019). When the next person uses the washbasin, the faucet water jet  
145 impinges on the bottom of the basin, which could aerosolise waste secretions. Recent work shows how  
146 the faucet aerator design influences the aerosol size distribution from faucet water flows (Benoit et al.,  
147 2021). Two elegant experimental studies have revealed how a pathogen is dispersed by handwashing-  
148 produced droplets using green fluorescent protein (GFP)-expressing *Escherichia coli* (GFP-*E. coli*),  
149 while no dispersal was observed “without or in between faucet events” (Kotay et al., 2017; Kotay et al.,  
150 2019). Oral rinsing and spitting means that splashed droplets can re-deposit on surrounding sink  
151 surfaces and mirror if present.

152

153 2.3. Water sprays and lota

154 While performing istinja in Islamic community toilets, the use of sprays and lota may also  
155 generate droplets (Abdul Rahim, 2005). To date, however, there have been insufficient studies on the  
156 potential role of this practice in disease transmission to critically evaluate the risk, particularly when  
157 combined with other self-cleansing practices (Mirza, 2009; Nasir and Hamza, 2020).

158

159 2.4. Hand hygiene

160 Poor compliance with hand hygiene facilitates survival and persistence of virus on hands for  
161 onward transmission to self or additional surfaces (Cheung M et al., 2020). Even if hands are washed,  
162 they may not necessarily be properly dried and wet hands may acquire microbes from the next surface  
163 touched (Marcenac et al., 2021). There is also the possibility of (re)-aerosolization of viral particles  
164 during or after use of automated hand driers (Huang et al., 2012; Margas et al., 2013). Recent work  
165 suggests that hands are more likely to remain contaminated after using a hot air drier rather than paper  
166 towels (Moura et al., 2021).

167

168 *2.5. Bathroom surfaces*

169 SARS-CoV-2 survives on a range of indoor environmental surfaces, such as plastic, stainless  
170 steel, glass, ceramics, wood, latex gloves, and surgical masks (van Doremalen et al., 2020; Liu et al.,  
171 2021). The virus remains viable for several hours in faeces and 3-4 days in urine (Liu et al., 2021). Such  
172 studies uphold sufficient surface longevity of the virus for onward transmission. Risks from bathroom  
173 and toilet surfaces would include direct contact with surface splashes of excreta on toilet seats, toilet  
174 bowl or other surfaces in near proximity (Figure 2). These present a sequential transmission risk for  
175 users if they then touch contaminated skin/surfaces and transfer sufficient viable virus to mucous  
176 membranes prior to hand hygiene (Brönimann et al., 2020; Chia et al., 2020; Ding et al., 2020; Döhla  
177 et al., 2020; Hu et al., 2020; Ong et al., 2020). Furthermore, fomite contamination offers a host of  
178 possible transmission pathways via hand touch surfaces after toilet flushing or direct touch from  
179 contaminated hands (e.g. toilet door handles: Cheng et al., 2020; Moore et al., 2020; sink: D'accolti et  
180 al., 2020; Döhla et al., 2020; Gautret et al., 2020; Ge et al., 2021; taps, paper towel dispenser, hand  
181 dryers, bathroom door handles, etc, Cheung et al., 2020; Verani et al., 2014; Wan et al., 2021; toilet  
182 flush: Ge et al., 2021; and toilet paper dispenser: Sassi et al., 2018). These may be contaminated with  
183 infective excreta, saliva and/or nasopharyngeal fluids unless sites are cleaned regularly (Chia et al.,  
184 2020; Ding et al., 2020; Ong et al., 2020).

185

186 **3. Can we mitigate the risk of acquiring SARS-CoV-2 in public toilets?**

187 It is not desirable or, indeed, ethically permissible to close toilets in public venues open for  
188 business. This means that any toilet facility used outside the home should be subjected to a risk  
189 assessment. The literature offers some evidence-based suggestions for safety mitigation in public toilets  
190 but others rely on nothing more than common sense. Published recommendations and the authors' own  
191 views are categorised for users, managers, bathroom designers and governing bodies. It is hoped that  
192 these will stimulate discussion and original research in order to better assess the risk for SARS-Cov-2  
193 acquisition in toilets:

194

195

196 3.1. Advice for users of public toilets (Table)

197 *3.1.1. Support for face coverings (mask) before entering a public toilet:* The primary aim is to limit the  
198 release of respiratory aerosol and droplets from an infected individual (Chu et al., 2020; Tang et al.,  
199 2021).

200

201 *3.1.2. Closing the toilet lid (if present):* It is likely that there is a large upward transport of viral particles  
202 after flushing, which could be wholly or partially contained by closing the toilet lid (Gerba et al., 1975;  
203 Gormley et al., 2021; Li et al., 2020; McDermott et al., 2020; Patel, 2020; Verani et al., 2014).  
204 Modelling suggests 40-60% viral particles generated by flushing will rise above the toilet seat (Li et al.,  
205 2020) before settling under the influence of air currents and gravity. Public toilets rarely have lids to  
206 contain aerosol and limit pathogen spread.

207

208 *3.1.3. Hand hygiene:* Hands should be washed with running water and soap (if available) and dried well  
209 with disposable paper towels (Marcenac et al., 2021). Hand sanitisers may also be used although  
210 detergent products are known to inactivate SARS-CoV-2 and do less damage to the environment (Salido  
211 et al., 2020; Mahmood et al., 2020). Users should not return to the toilet cubicle for toilet paper to dry  
212 hands.

213

214 *3.1.4. Appropriate use of the washbasin:* Masks should also be worn when using a washbasin as well  
215 as for toilet use. Discharging nasal or oral secretions directly into the sink is not advised. Paper tissues  
216 may be used for expectorating or spitting, followed by safe disposal in a waste bin and followed by  
217 handwashing.

218

219 *3.1.5. Use of mobile devices:* There is strong evidence for the role of mobile phones and similar  
220 technology as both vectors and reservoirs for infectious agents (Banawas et al., 2018; Bhoonderowa et  
221 al., 2014; Sailo et al., 2019; Cheng et al., 2020). Their use in toilet settings should therefore be  
222 discouraged.

223



224 3.2. Advice for managers of public toilets

225 3.2.1. *Addition of disinfectant into toilet bowl:* Deposition of virus-containing droplets on surfaces after  
226 flushing infectious waste is significantly reduced if waste is treated with disinfectants (Edmunds et al.,  
227 2016; Sassi et al., 2018). This is because organisms can remain in toilets even after several flushes  
228 (Johnson et al., 2017). It is appreciated that disinfectants are NOT equal and the choice veers towards  
229 products that remain active in the presence of organic waste (Chen C et al., 2006).

230

231 3.2.2. *Encourage hand-hygiene:* Practising good hand-hygiene depends on accessible and functioning  
232 sinks; provision of clean water; soap (liquid not bar); clean towels, preferably disposable; or alcohol  
233 gel dispenser or comparable hand sanitizer (Amirian, 2020; Cheung M et al., 2020). Waste-bins can be  
234 protected by replaceable bags, which should be secured before timely removal. Recent evidence  
235 suggests that disposable paper towels are superior to hot air dryers for limiting further spread of  
236 pathogens in bathrooms or even outside (Huang et al., 2012; Margas et al., 2013; Moura et al., 2021).  
237 Dryers may exacerbate particle settling or perhaps even re-aerosolize deposited respiratory particles on  
238 surfaces.

239

240 3.2.3. *Restricting people-traffic and lengthening the time period between users:* Bathroom air is likely  
241 to be filled with aerosols generated by multiple toilet flushes within a short time window (Shi et al.,  
242 2021). This means that the concentration of airborne virus would be significantly higher if large  
243 numbers of carriers converge on the bathroom (Fitzgerald et al., 2021). Limiting people-traffic would  
244 help to reduce transmission of larger particles by allowing infectious droplets to settle, though is  
245 unlikely to affect risks from smaller particle (aerosol) transmission (Tang et al, 2021). Settling times  
246 are dependent upon a number of physicochemical factors such as size, content, temperature, humidity,  
247 air turbulence, flush mechanism and pressure, etc. Controlling entrance could be instigated by indicator  
248 lights or notices on the outer door. The former is routine in hospital radiology departments and has been  
249 adopted by shops to control occupancy during the pandemic.

250

251 3.2.4. *Restrict urinal choice in gents' toilets:* With little or no supporting evidence, this suggestion aims  
252 to increase physical distance between men while urinating in order to limit exposure to urinary aerosol.  
253

254 3.2.5 *Increase ventilation:* The ability to implement this varies between toilet facilities. Some will be  
255 mechanically ventilated and others rely on natural sources (open windows) (Meng et al., 2020; Liu et  
256 al., 2020). If windows can be opened, subject to thermal comfort and security, then risks from aerosol  
257 transmission are reduced, particularly if prevailing air flow moves directly from inlet to outlet without  
258 circulation (Morawska et al., 2020). Toilets for daily use could leave windows open overnight or at  
259 weekends, although this depends upon security and factors such as temperature, weather, people-traffic  
260 and pollution. Open windows would not necessarily alleviate risk during periods of heavy usage.  
261 Facilities which employ mechanical ventilation should review the system *in situ* and consider increasing  
262 air changes per hour or replacing a mixed or recirculating air system with one that uses only fresh air  
263 (Morawska et al., 2020). There are air filtration units and high level air disinfection strategies available  
264 for facilities at specific risk although these may entail major refurbishment and extra cost.

265  
266 3.2.6 *Increase cleaning frequency:* Cleaning and decontamination are critical but while the methods  
267 remain fairly standard, the frequency depends upon people-traffic and this is unlikely to be monitored  
268 (Amirian, 2020; Shimabukuro et al., 2020; Fitzgerald et al., 2021). Most public toilets are cleaned just  
269 once per day; this is not sufficient to protect users in areas reporting rising transmission rates (Carling  
270 et al., 2009). There is little evidence to support cleaning frequencies for any indoor surfaces, including  
271 hospitals. Cleaning has only recently been accepted as an evidence-based science (Dancer, 1999). The  
272 World Health Organisation (WHO, 2020) specifies workplaces for 'jobs at medium risk' should receive  
273 twice daily cleaning and disinfection of objects and surfaces that are frequently touched, in shared  
274 rooms, bathrooms, and changing rooms. The products used should be effective against enveloped  
275 viruses along with other common surface pathogens. Most guidance supports detergent for preliminary  
276 removal of surface soil followed by disinfectant at a dilution of 1,000 parts per million available chlorine  
277 (ppm av. cl.). Cleaning guidance is available for trained cleaning staff, with check lists and time sheets  
278 for all facilities (Scottish Government, 2020).

279

280 *3.2.7. Maintenance and functional monitoring:* The maintenance and monitoring of toilet function and  
281 sinks are also of critical importance, given the implications from a blocked or leaking toilet, defective  
282 plumbing or malfunctioning sink (Gormley et al., 2017; Gormley et al., 2021; Kang et al., 2020; Kotay  
283 et al., 2017; Meng et al., 2020; Del Bruto et al., 2020a).

284

285 3.3. Advice for bathroom designers

286 *3.3.1. Use all available space:* Toilets should be designed to maximise space as far as possible. This  
287 suggestion aims to encourage dilution of airborne microorganisms and reduce transmission risk.

288

289 *3.3.2. Bathroom location:* Consideration should be given to bathroom location in a public facility; this  
290 would include ease of access (including disabled access) and presence of windows and doors to permit  
291 ingress of fresh air and sunlight if possible (Panek et al., 2005).

292

293 *3.3.3. Choice of surface materials:* Given the risk from surface survival of pathogens including SARS-  
294 CoV-2, it is best to use durable materials that can withstand disinfectants, demonstrate longevity and  
295 are easy to clean (Dancer, 2014). Some materials repel pathogen adhesion whereas others may attract  
296 organic soil including microbes (Inkinen et al., 2017). This includes fixtures and fittings, such as toilet  
297 flush, toilet paper holder, sink surround and automated dryers if present.

298

299 *3.3.4. Choice of flush mechanism:* Flushing systems that minimise production of aerosol are advocated  
300 (Johnson et al., 2013) The cistern tank design has been reported to be the preferred toilet flushing option  
301 due to minimal generation of potentially infectious small aerosols (Lai et al., 2018).

302

303 *3.3.5. High throughput ventilation:* Achieving this depends upon the choice between mechanical  
304 ventilation systems and natural ventilation (open windows) (Liu et al., 2020; Meng et al., 2020;  
305 Morawska et al., 2020;). In mechanically ventilated public toilets, the required minimum ventilation  
306 rates are 35 L/s per water closet and/or urinal for theatres, schools, and sports facilities where heavy use

307 may occur; and 25 L/s in other toilets (ASHRAE, 2019). Hence if ventilation in public toilets is properly  
308 designed and operated, the ventilation conditions should be entirely adequate. Risk of airborne infection  
309 is more likely in toilets with poor ventilation or for short-range transmission when using washbasins  
310 since people tend to lean towards the sink when using it.

311

312 *3.3.6. Hand drying resources:* As already mentioned, disposable paper towels are superior to hot air  
313 dryers for limiting further spread of pathogens in bathrooms or even outside (Huang et al., 2012; Margas  
314 et al., 2013; Moura et al., 2021). Dryers may exacerbate particle settling or perhaps even re-aerosolize  
315 deposited respiratory particles on surfaces. Automatic paper feed dispensers are an alternative choice.

316

317 *3.3.7. Access for all:* Bathroom design needs to ensure that all segments of the population (including  
318 physically and mentally disabled individuals, elderly, blind and children) are able to follow good  
319 hygiene practices (Panek et al., 2005). This dictates signage, door, tap and handle placement, space for  
320 wheelchairs, accessible towel dispensers, contactless (sensor) flush and taps, revolving or automatic  
321 access doors and electronic hand hygiene reminders if possible. Toilets frequented by children and/or  
322 the elderly should be subject to additional design strategies, given that these persons are either going to  
323 be more vulnerable to Covid-19, or more likely to be shedding the virus.

324

325 *3.3.8. Increase natural daylight:* Given the virucidal effect of UV light, it would be helpful to encourage  
326 ingress of sunlight into toilet facilities (Ratnesar-Shumate et al., 2020; Ren et al., 2020). While this is  
327 clearly dependant on window opening and position, climate and season, there are options for  
328 introducing artificial ultraviolet light into contained indoor environments (Morawska et al., 2020;  
329 Rodríguez et al., 2021).

330

331 *3.3.8. Next-generation toilets:* There are many design modifications to toilets and cubicles that could  
332 be made to reduce the number of contact surfaces and reduce aerosolization. Examples of this include  
333 the use of vacuum toilets with non-stick bowls commonly used on aircraft, lid activated UV-light for  
334 disinfection, no toilet-paper-cleansing (*in situ* bidet function), hands-free taps, and automatic soap

335 dispensers and door latches. There may be a role for futuristic antimicrobial surfaces such as copper or  
336 silver for common touch-points (Dancer, 2014; Inkinen et al., 2017). Further work is required to  
337 quantify the importance of these features in reducing transmission risk.

338

### 339 3.4. Advice for governing bodies

340 *3.4.1. Public education campaigns:* The potential risk associated with toilet use should be promoted  
341 using social media, newspapers, television and radio; this would help to highlight potential risks from  
342 public toilet use and the need to maintain good personal hygiene (Okello et al., 2019; Wu et al., 2019).  
343 Many countries would benefit from educational campaigns given the studies showing poor compliance  
344 with hand hygiene and other practices in public toilets (Hateley and Jumaa, 1999; Wu et al., 2019).

345

346 *3.4.2. Public opinion:* Improving public opinion would help to focus local and national government on  
347 safe management of public toilets, for those that use them and those that design, engineer, clean or  
348 maintain them. Hospital patients frequently speak out about facilities that they consider to be dirty  
349 (Edgcumbe, 2009).

350

351 It should be noted that many of the interventions highlighted above are likely to reduce the spread and  
352 subsequent infections from other enteric and respiratory viruses.

353

## 354 **4. Discussion**

355 Current evidence suggest that public toilets constitute a risk for transmission of SARS-CoV-2 (Wong  
356 et al., 2020). This is because all the key transmission pathways involving surfaces and air converge in  
357 an area likely to be heavily contaminated and frequently used (Meyerowitz et al., 2020). Poorly  
358 ventilated indoor toilets encourage inhalation of airborne particles containing SARS-CoV-2 shed from  
359 prior users. Toilet access, use, and hand hygiene require direct and indirect handling of common hand-  
360 touch sites in bathrooms, which are likely to be contaminated by users. These sites include door  
361 handles/lock, taps, toilet flush, grab handles, switches, paper towel dispenser, toilet roll holder and toilet

362 seat. It is difficult to use a toilet without touching any or several of these surfaces. The propensity for  
363 contamination is directly proportional to the frequency of touch (Adams et al., 2017). Viral transmission  
364 in bathrooms becomes even more pertinent when it is apparent that viral shedding from faeces continues  
365 even after respiratory samples become negative (Yifei Chen et al., 2020).

366 Public toilets also pose a risk to people who are employed to clean, maintain, inspect, service  
367 or repair them. Plumbers, cleaners, bathroom managers and sanitation inspectors are at risk of acquiring  
368 the virus through direct or indirect contact or inhalation of aerosols in toilet areas. While sewage  
369 workers are provided with respirators and other personal protective equipment, the same is not usually  
370 true for sanitary plumbers or cleaners (Amirian, 2020). As yet, there is no evidence for occupational  
371 acquisition of SARS-CoV-2 among sewage workers.

372 Studies of SARS-CoV-2 in toilets have so far been conducted in healthcare environments,  
373 which have higher frequency of, and more thorough, cleaning regimens than public toilets (Birgand et  
374 al., 2020; Cheng et al., 2020; Chia et al., 2020; D'Accolti et al., 2020; Jiang et al., 2020; Razzini et al.,  
375 2020; Santarpia et al., 2020; Shimabukuro et al., 2020; Wan et al., 2021; Ye et al., 2020). Despite this,  
376 faecal-derived aerosols in patients' toilets contained most of the detected SARS-CoV-2 in one hospital  
377 (Ding et al., 2020). Outside hospitals, two linked studies investigated use of open latrines (no flushing  
378 system) and identified a cluster of seropositive Covid-19 patients associated with use of shared latrines  
379 (Del Bruto et al., 2020a; Del Bruto et al., 2020b). A widely neglected aspect of virus containment is  
380 that a major part of the population in developing regions do not have access to private, clean sanitary  
381 facilities (Mallory et al., 2020; Sun S et al., 2020). It is possible that open defaecation and use of squat  
382 toilets are additional risk factors in these communities. At least 20 countries reporting more than 10,000  
383 confirmed infections have 5-26% of their population practicing open defaecation. This is particularly  
384 notable in rural India, where over half of the population do not use Western-type lavatories (Novotný  
385 et al, 2018). This country has been severely affected by Covid-19. Poor hand hygiene, contaminated  
386 shoes and objects, mechanical vectors, and outdoor human activities could all contribute to faecal  
387 transmission. Other risk factors include squat pans with lidless designs and open flushing mechanisms,  
388 open waste bins in the cubicle and lack of water-sealing U-traps in squat toilets (Sun S et al., 2020).

389           There has been little sampling or epidemiological data on viral prevalence or transmission from  
390 public toilets as they have generally been closed during the lock-down (Global Times, 2020). However,  
391 there is evidence for the potential role of domestic toilets as a significant risk for viral acquisition. In  
392 2003, there was a large community outbreak of SARS in Hong Kong, affecting more than 300 residents  
393 in Amoy Gardens. This was presumed to be related to faecal–oral transmission (Hong Kong  
394 Government, 2003) and most likely faecal-aerosol transmission (Yu et al., 2004). A SARS patient with  
395 diarrhoea visited the Amoy Gardens building and used the toilet; subsequently, 321 cases of SARS were  
396 located in clusters within this building. More recently, faecal–aerosol transmission might have caused  
397 the community outbreak of COVID-19 in a high-rise building in Guangzhou, China (Kang et al., 2020).  
398 Nine patients from three families lived in vertically aligned flats connected by drainage pipes in the  
399 master bathrooms. The first family to become symptomatic had visited Wuhan in January 2020, whilst  
400 the other two families lacked any travel history and became ill in February 2020. There was no evidence  
401 that transmission had occurred through communal access points, including the elevator. Both the timing  
402 of infections and the location of positive environmental samples supported vertical spread of virus-  
403 laden aerosols via stacks and vents (Kang et al., 2020).

404           One of the major concerns with Ebola virus infectious waste was the high concentration of viral  
405 particles shed in stool ( $10^7$ /mL) (Bibby et al., 2015). This can be compared against the median faecal  
406 viral load of  $10^5$ /mL for SARS-CoV-2 in patients with diarrhoea (Cheung K et al., 2020). In some cases,  
407 the viral load of SARS-CoV-2 in faeces reaches  $10^7$  copies/g, which is higher than that in pharyngeal  
408 swabs (Wolfel et al., 2020). Recommendations on critical control points, including toilets, and  
409 containment for Ebola virus waste have been outlined by WHO (Edmunds et al., 2016).

410           If toilets are a hub for infection transmission, then it is reasonable to consider COVID-19  
411 infection rates among workers in relevant occupations. People who clean or maintain toilets or supervise  
412 others using them might demonstrate higher rates of infection. A study of work-related COVID-19  
413 infection patterns in Asia rated the top five jobs for infection risk as healthcare workers (HCWs), drivers  
414 and transport workers, sales workers, cleaning and domestic workers, and public safety workers (Lan  
415 et al., 2020). According to the UK’s Office for National Statistics (ONS, 2020), there were two major  
416 groups of occupations found to have high rates of death involving COVID-19. The first was

417 construction workers and cleaners, and the second included occupations such as nursing assistants and  
418 care workers. WHO themselves define occupations with high exposure risk as domestic workers, social  
419 care workers and home repair technicians (plumbers, electricians) who provide services in the homes  
420 of people with COVID-19 (WHO, 2020). Given the proclivity of occupations with toilet-related jobs,  
421 domestic and maintenance staff should be offered training and personal protective equipment as a safety  
422 measure subject to further evidence.

423         Almost everyone requires regular access to a toilet (Stanwell-Smith, 2010). Relaxation of lock  
424 down in the UK during summer 2020 allowed people to explore the seaside, countryside and towns and  
425 cities. Whether a beach or a bar, adjoining toilets are always needed and will be heavily used (Fitzgerald  
426 et al., 2021). Careful and detailed epidemiological studies are required to link toilet use with infection  
427 incidence. This has been done for norovirus, during air and boat travel, and restaurant visits, where  
428 confirmed cases using the bathroom/toilet were linked with norovirus acquisition (Boxman et al., 2009;  
429 Carling et al., 2009; Chimonas et al., 2008; Ho et al., 1989; Jones E et al., 2007; Leone et al., 2016;  
430 Widdowson et al., 2005). Other pathogenic viruses have been associated with toilets in offices and  
431 hospital, with the most contaminated surfaces reported as bathroom door handles (66%), flushing  
432 buttons (62%), toilet seats (59%), and toilet covers (52%) (Verani et al., 2014). One recent study  
433 examined transmission risk from different venues in China without specifying toilet use (Zhao et al.,  
434 2020). The study found that while most clusters occurred in the home, there was strong evidence for  
435 case clustering in public buildings. The question should be asked as to whether public building access  
436 also included use of toilets (Cai et al., 2020).

437

## 438 **5. Conclusion**

439         The evidence presented here indicates that transmission of SARS-CoV-2 within public toilets  
440 is a potential risk, requiring further research, particularly around airborne or contact-transmitted  
441 minimum infectious doses generated from excreta. Without such evidence, toilet-related SARS-CoV-2  
442 transmission risk will not receive the attention it deserves from toilet user, cleaner, manager or designer  
443 viewpoints. In particular, cleaners who are regularly exposed to such contaminated environments, and



444 who are low paid with low status, yet are crucial for reducing infection in hospitals and communities,  
445 have only relatively recently come to the attention of facilities managers. The next step, in the context  
446 of COVID-19, is to ensure adequate ventilation for toilets, and indeed, all indoor venues.

447

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453

#### 454 **CRedit authorship contribution statement**

455 Conceptualization: SJD; Data curation: SJD, AH, YL, JWT, DLJ; Formal analysis: SJD, YL; Literature  
456 search: SJD, YL, AH, JWT, DLJ; Additional material: AH; Figures: YL, SJD; Original draft: SJD;  
457 Review & editing: SJD, YL, AH, JWT, DLJ.

458

#### 459 **Declarations of Interest**

460 No relevant declarations of interest for any author

461

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