



**Britain and the Falklands: International Perspectives 1982-1990**

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## **Thesis Abstract**

The Falklands dispute revolved around a group of small islands, the sovereignty of which was claimed by two nations. However, once conflict broke in April 1982, the dispute took an international dimension. States were drawn in by their relationships with Britain and Argentina. This thesis seeks to examine to what extent there was an international reaction to the crisis and offer a comparison between the international reactions to the dispute, seeking to draw common themes, and thus offers a comparative history of international reactions to the conflict. Although, the Falklands conflict has been covered in depth in both academic and other text, the historiography lacks a detailed survey of the international response. In presenting a comparative study of international reactions to the dispute, this thesis contributes to understanding to what extent the ‘Falklands Factor’, the phenomenon in Britain that boosted support for the Conservative government, was a shared phenomenon elsewhere in the world.

This study examines nations in a number of different international organisations and assesses the influencing factors behind their reaction to the crisis. Although these organisations held much power and influence, their ability to wield such influence was limited in how the situation was viewed by the individual member states. The groups examined in this thesis were all formed out of individual nations that at some point held a shared ethos or goal which encouraged them to come together in the form of governmental coalition. However, in a bipolar world, the individual components that made up the collective, often prioritised their own objectives over those of the organisation. The conflict and subsequent debates highlighted how this phenomenon not only affected international response to the Falklands crisis but how it could also influence relations between states. Although the conflict has been covered in detail, it has in the main been looked at in a national and exceptionalist context. This work offers a transnational perspective through comparison between different reactions in states, offering a contribution to our understanding of the crisis’ impact.

## **Acknowledgements**

I would first like to thank my project supervisor Dr Martin Farr. To say that I would not have been able to do this without him would be an understatement. His assistance and guidance with this thesis has been vital in its final production. In addition, his words of advice in the PhD process have been vital to getting me through and I offer my sincerest thanks to him for everything he has done. In addition, I would also like to thank my second supervisor Dr Sarah Campbell for all her help and advice in the final years of thesis production. I have been truly blessed to have such supportive and helpful supervisors.

I offer my sincerest thanks to the Masonic Charitable Fund for their sponsorship not just through my postgraduate years but throughout my university career. The Fund continue to provide valuable support to students like myself who otherwise would not be able to stay in education.

I thank my partner Jess and all my family and friends for their continued support and encouragement particularly during the difficult times of this thesis.

Finally, I would like to dedicate the completion of this thesis to my mother and grandparents who passed away during my studies but always continued to encourage me to work hard and achieve my dream of completing a PhD. Although neither are here to witness the finish of this project, I know you would all be proud.

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### 3. List of Abbreviations

<b>Abbreviation</b>	<b>Full Title</b>
CAP	Common Agricultural Policy
CCD	Commonwealth Co-ordination Department in the FCO
CHOG	Commonwealth Heads of Government
CHOGM	Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting
EC	European Community
EEC	European Economic Community
EPC	European Political Cooperation
FCO	British Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FICZ	Falkland Islands Conservation Zone
FID	Falkland Islands Department in the FCO
HMG	Her Majesty's Government (UK)
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NSC	United States National Security Council
OAS	Organisation of American States
TEZ	Total Exclusion Zone
TOHOTFC	<i>The Official History of the Falklands Campaign</i>
UKE	Embassy of the United Kingdom
UKMIS	United Kingdom Mission to the United Nations
UN	United Nations
UND	United Nations Department in the FCO
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution

#### **4. List of Appendices**

Appendix 1: Voting on the Falkland Crisis within the United Nations Security Council, 1982

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Appendix 12: Political Biography

## 5. Preface

Thirty years after the surrender of Argentine forces on the islands, Argentine President Cristina Kirchner addressed the United Nations General Assembly regarding her nation's claim to the British held territory of the Falkland Islands:

When I saw the flag of what they call the Falkland Islands flying today at No 10 Downing Street, I felt embarrassed, Mr. Chairman, because nobody should celebrate nor commemorate wars. Do you know why? Because the war cost many lives: 649 dead on the Argentine side, 255 on the British side; and 449 Argentines and 264 British killed themselves later. Mr. Chairman, what would the German people or Mrs. Merkel think if on 8 May, the date of the unconditional surrender of Germany on 8 May 1945, the German flag was flying beneath the British flag at 10 Downing Street? What would Japan think if on 15 August, the President of the United States had the United States flag flying on the White House with the Japanese flag underneath?<sup>1</sup>

At the time I was student at Oxford University studying, among other things, the history of the Third Reich. What struck me about Kirchner's remarks was her comparison of the Falklands conflict with the Second World War. The difference in scale was enormous and I struggled to comprehend how a conflict over a collection of small islands, populated by only 1800 islanders could lead a politician to stir the same feeling as the Second World War, a conflict that engaged almost the entire globe. I had a number of uncles who had served in the military and had been involved in the defence of the islands after the end of the conflict. I spoke to older family members, who recalled stories of the national fervour that greeted the conflict and the anticipation they had for each daily update on the news. I was informed of how many of the family had deliberately avoided purchasing groceries imported from Argentina to give the sense that they were 'doing their bit'. This invoked a sense of the home front during the Second World War with the nation as a whole involved in a war effort.

After completing my studies at Oxford, I moved to Edinburgh to undertake my Masters. The stories I had heard on the Falklands conflict stayed with me and I devoted a

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<sup>1</sup> Kristina Fernandez, "Session of the decolonisation committee of the United Nations" New York, United States 14 June 2012, accessed 06 January 2015, available at: <http://www.staff.city.ac.uk/p.willetts/SAC/UN/CF14612E.HTM>.

large part of my studies to research on this area. I completed a short dissertation evaluating how the conflict was reported in the British press. During the research for this paper I began to become inspired to look at the international reaction to the conflict. It was clear that the conflict had provoked a strong reaction in Britain but the nature of the international response to the conflict remained unclear. I further began to track the dispute through the 1980s to understand whether the conflict had any lasting legacy in policy formation. I discovered that the international response to Britain and the Falklands crisis was an under researched area. The conflict had attracted much scholarly attention but I hoped to add to that by completing a detailed study of the international interpretation which would allow me to assess to what extent the Falklands crisis was a global issue.

This thesis uses a number of different terms which it is important to differentiate. In the official history, Lawrence Freedman used the term ‘the Falklands campaign’ to title his work. In doing so he refers to both the military and diplomatic efforts that were made to reclaim the islands from Argentine occupation.<sup>2</sup> However, that terminology is not appropriate for this study as it does not devote any research to the military campaign and also covers a longer diplomatic period than Freedman did. ‘The Falklands conflict’ will refer to the period of military engagement between Argentina and Britain between 2 April and 14 June 1982. ‘The Falklands dispute’ refers to the sovereignty issue and other disagreements revolving the administration of the islands both before and after the conflict period. Another term which will be used in this thesis is ‘the Falklands crisis’. For the purpose of this work, this term refers to period which can be considered a crisis for the British government, the period stemming from late March 1982, when news first reached the UK of an impending Argentine invasion through to the restoration of British administration over the islands. This term encompasses all the military, political and diplomatic efforts that were made by all parties during this period. As the period after 1982 saw the peaceful administration of the islands, it would be inappropriate to use the term ‘crisis’ to refer to this time. Rather, this thesis has opted not to allocate a single term for this period, but instead uses the other terms to reference which aspect of the history of the Falkland Islands is being reflected on when the work discusses the period of negotiation that took place after the conflict.

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<sup>2</sup> Lawrence Freedman, *TOHOTFC Volume I: The Origins of the Falklands War* (London: Routledge, 2005) and *TOHOTFC Volume II: War and Diplomacy* (London: Routledge, 2005).

This thesis has been written for an academic reader. It is to be submitted for examination as part of the qualifications for the Doctorate of Philosophy at Newcastle University.

*John Bagnall*

*Newcastle University, 2021*

## 1. Introduction

Much was at stake: what we were fighting for eight thousand miles away in the South Atlantic was not only the territory and the people of the Falklands, important though they were. We were defending our honour as a nation, and principles of fundamental importance to the whole world – above all that aggressors should never succeed and that international law should prevail over the use of force.<sup>1</sup>

The 'Thatcher narrative' of the Falklands conflict, one that became dominant in Britain, was that it was a matter of inherent importance, both nationally and internationally. Margaret Thatcher said in a speech on 3 July 1982, shortly after British victory, '[w]e have ceased to be a nation in a retreat. We have instead a newfound confidence – born in the economic battles at home and tested and found true 8000 miles away.'<sup>2</sup> Thatcher was arguing that the conflict carried a particular importance given Britain's history, but she also maintained that the outcome had resonating effects on the settlement of disputes globally: Britain had fought for principles which were 'of fundamental importance to the whole world.'<sup>3</sup> The conflict, sovereignty dispute and reaction of other states were certainly important to Britain and to some extent remained so. Although 1990 saw the restoration of diplomatic relations between Britain and Argentina, both nations still dispute the sovereignty of the islands. As recently as 2017, British media reports expressed the government's disappointment at the US administrations' attitude to the dispute. This highlighted the dispute, and how it is viewed by other nations, is still held to some importance among government officials.<sup>4</sup> This thesis considers the extent to which the view of the conflict espoused in the Thatcher narrative was shared globally by examining international perspectives to the conflict and subsequent dispute.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Margaret Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years* (London: Harper Press, 1993), 173.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid*, 235.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid*, 173.

<sup>4</sup> *The Independent*, 11 October 2017.

<sup>5</sup> Although this thesis refers to Thatcher's role in the diplomacy of the Falklands crisis, the central focus of the work is on international perception of Britain as a whole and the crisis and dispute. When the thesis refers to Thatcher, it refers to her individually and her individual role. However, when the thesis refers to HMG or the UK government, it is discussing all the departments that make up the UK government and their collective efforts or opinion.



This thesis is based on the primary research question of what the international perspectives to the conflict and sovereignty dispute were after 1982 as experienced by governments of countries not involved in the fighting, law makers and different publics from around the world. This thesis looks at a number of different areas of the world chosen for their links to either Britain, Argentina or the sovereignty dispute. Each chapter examines the different reactions experienced within countries in those areas of the world and examines the nature of those reactions. The research is primarily focussed on the reactions of governments, however, other groups also explored where source material allows include parliaments, law makers, media, and public reactions. In doing so, the thesis aims to address a number of different subsidiary research questions. The first of these is to what extent was there an international reaction to the conflict and subsequent dispute? Undoubtedly the dispute was of importance to Britain and Argentina, but other nations struggled to understand why the matter was of such importance that two countries in the western sphere would be willing to engage in a military conflict over a collection of relatively economically insignificant islands. As such, this thesis examines how much of an international response was provoked by the conflict and how much was provoked by the subsequent debates around the sovereignty issue. Further this thesis explores the questions of what the motivations were of those who publicly expressed support for either Britain or Argentina and examines whether there were any common factors linking the different international reactions to the conflict. It is true that a number of governments expressed support for the position of Britain or Argentina, however, that support was limited and was motivated by each government's own policy objectives. In evaluating the motivations behind the different expressed positions of the conflict, this thesis is able to offer a more accurate interpretation of international perspectives and views on the conflict and dispute.

Each chapter of the work is primarily focussed on a form of international organisation. Actors within these organisations attempted to galvanise a sense of among its members to motivate support for either Britain or Argentina. The present work discusses how member states engaged with the different international organisations and responded to requests to follow a coherent policy with respect to the crisis. For many states discussed in this work, there was often a conflict between the organisational policy and the individual policy interests. The current work analyses how states balanced conflicting policy interests and to what extent actors were successful in using international organisations to motivate communal support for Britain and Argentina. In doing so, this thesis highlights that in the

most part, the needs and priorities of the individual nations took precedence over the interests and needs of the collective when it came to the policy formation of individual states. Countries would follow the policy line requested by the international organisations if it fitted with their wider policy interests but with regards to the Falklands Islands, individual nations regularly ignored organisational requests and instead pursued policy that best suited their own interests even if it were to the detriment of those of other member states. In evaluating upon these trends, this thesis is able to offer an insight into the workings and ultimate failings of international organisations in dealing with the crisis.

As the Thatcher narrative of the Falklands conflict is that Britain fought to defend principles of ‘fundamental importance to the world’, an understanding of global perspectives of the conflict and dispute provides an important contribution to the historiography of the crisis and dispute.<sup>6</sup> It was primarily to question the importance of the conflict on a global scale why this topic was chosen. The topic was chosen to be the focus of this thesis as an extensive comparative history of the international perspectives on the conflict is required to thoroughly examine the assumptions of the conflict and dispute’s importance in the Thatcher narrative. The conflict and the history of the dispute prior to 1982 has been covered in great detail with extensive literature on the military, political, diplomatic, and social histories.<sup>7</sup> However, although studies on the experiences of individual nations during the conflict exist, an extensive comparative history on the perspectives and views of multiple nations is still lacking. Further a thorough examination of how different nations viewed the dispute after the conflict is still missing in the historiography. It was, and remains, the popular impression that the crisis was a key event in British contemporary history, a perception reinforced by reporting and commentary of the period.<sup>8</sup> However, a comparative history of the international responses is required to assess how important the crisis was to countries other than the principles and ultimately question the assertion of the conflict’s and dispute’s place in the Thatcher narrative. Further, whether Britain had defended principles of ‘fundamental importance to the whole world’ can only be appropriately judged if an examination is taken of how different countries viewed the sovereignty dispute after the conflict as this highlights whether they ultimately supported the basis on which Britain defended its actions during the

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<sup>6</sup> Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years*, 173.

<sup>7</sup> This will be discussed in greater detail in the literature review, 18.

<sup>8</sup> For example, see Charles Moore, *Margaret Thatcher: The Authorized Biography, Volume I: Not For Turning* (London: Allen Lane, 2013).

conflict. This thesis takes advantage of extensive source material made available to researchers after the thirty-year anniversary of the conflict in 2012 and the changing of the Public Records Act in 2013. In doing so, the present work is able to build on work already produced on the international perspectives of Britain and the crisis and present that comparative history. Through comparing the responses of the different nations, this thesis concludes that for nations other than Britain or Argentina, the Falklands dispute only assumed importance when it had the potential to directly affect nations' own policy interests. Although the issue of decolonisation and self-determination were regularly discussed in the Argentine and British rhetoric respectively, for other nations, those principles only mattered if there was something to gain or lose by supporting them.

### **1.1. The Falklands Conflict**

The Falklands conflict was fought in two realms: the diplomatic and the military. Although this work is not primarily concerned with questions surrounding why the conflict took the course it did, a brief history of the dispute and conflict is important to appropriately contextualise the international reactions discussed in this thesis. This section will outline a brief history of the sovereignty of the islands before outlining the conflict and aims to offer some limited comment on why the conflict took the course it did. Importantly, this section will also provide a timeline to contextualise the events discussed in the main chapters of this thesis. The course of the conflict often directly affected how different nations engaged with the principal parties in the dispute. As such, an understanding of the course of the conflict serves as an important reference point for discussion surrounding the international reactions to the conflict.

There were five key issues that were discussed internationally through the duration of the crisis and the ensuing debates and this section serves as an overview of how the conflict affected those five issues. The first of these regarded the sovereignty dispute and the matter of decolonisation. This is intrinsically linked with the second key issue which was the matter of self-determination. Since 1961, when the sovereignty dispute was first brought before the UN, Argentina had argued that the islands were illegally taken in a colonial power grab by Britain in 1833 and as such, their claim to sovereignty of the islands should be supported by other countries as part of the United Nations' commitment to decolonisation. However, conversely Britain argued that the islanders had a right to choose their own

administration, a right which was protected by the United Nation's support for self-determination. These issues formed the basis of Argentine and British rhetoric through the conflict and other countries were asked to form their opinions on the Falklands dispute around these points. The third and fourth issues concerned the Argentine and British use of force, especially the sinking of the ARA *General Belgrano* on 2 May. The *Belgrano* was sunk outside of the exclusion zone and was the first incident in the conflict that led to significant loss of life. Argentina used the incident to argue that Britain was the aggressor, whereas Britain had to justify its actions as necessary in the attainment of their goals. The final issue that was discussed concerned the Cold War and the effects the dispute could potentially have on the balance of global influence between East and West. At the time of the conflict, the United States was attempting to strengthen ties with Argentina in the hopes of weakening the influence of the Soviet Union in Latin America. As such, Britain, as a key western partner, engaging in a conflict Argentina posed a risk to that policy and to what the United States saw as the wider western interest. Through the conflict, these key issues were at the heart of international discussion and as the conflict developed so did views on whether the loss of life was ultimately worth the prize of the islands.

Although the islands were of no importance to countries other than Britain and Argentina prior to 1982, they had often been at the centre of Anglo-Argentine relations since the formation of Argentina in 1816. Possession of the islands had changed hands multiple times in their history. They had often been the subject of territorial disputes between the great European colonial powers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. By 1982, the islands had remained under peaceful British administration for around 150 years and remained a small remnant of the British Empire which had eroded in the wake of the Second World War. The islands were of negligible economic significance and Britain had also made moves towards limiting its own connection with the islands.<sup>9</sup> The United Nations had established the Special Committee on Decolonisation (C-24) in 1961 to facilitate the resolution of sovereignty disputes originating from nations colonial past. The issue of the Falkland Islands had featured regularly on C-24's agenda and a series of resolutions from the committee encouraged negotiation between Britain and Argentina to find a permanent solution to the dispute but had never formally intervened. As late as 1981, the British government had shown a willingness to formally hand over the islands to Argentine

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<sup>9</sup> Nicholas Ridley and the leaseback option are discussed in further detail later in this section.

sovereignty even against the islanders' expressed wishes.<sup>10</sup> Yet on 2 April 1982, Argentina launched a military solution to assert its claim over the islands and Britain responded in kind by dispatching the largest British fleet to set sail in anger since the Suez Crisis of 1956. A dispute that had remained confined to discussion and peaceful negotiation suddenly exploded into armed conflict and other states were asked to form an opinion of a dispute that had hitherto been of no importance.

### ***1.1.1. The history of the dispute***

The Falkland Islands had been the subject of a sovereignty dispute since the first settlement was established there in 1765 with multiple nations attempting to settle the islands in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Sovereignty of the islands had been held by multiple parties including Great Britain and the United Provinces of River Plate (which would later become Argentina). In their history, possession of the islands had changed between Britain, Spain and, for a short period, France however, come 1982, it was only Britain and Argentina that still claimed sovereignty over the islands. The British claim derived from their first founding of the islands in 1690 by British Captain John Strong and the first British settlement on the islands in 1765 established by Commodore John Byron, who laid claim to the islands in the name of King George III. The Argentine claim was based on *uti possidetis juris*, a principle in international law which states that a newly formed independent state occupies the borders in which the antecedent province resided prior to sovereignty. The Spanish Government had laid claim to the islands and ordered the British settlement to leave in 1770. When a new government was formed in Buenos Aires in 1810, they laid claim to all Spanish possessions in the area, including the Falkland Islands. The British government had come to an agreement with Spain over the islands which had allowed the British settlement to remain on the islands after 1771. However, in 1774, the British settlement withdrew leaving behind a plaque claiming the territory as property of the King of England. Although the islands were left uninhabited, the plaque was left as evidence that Britain had not relinquished its sovereignty claims. In spite of this, the newly formed United Provinces of River Plate laid claim to the islands in 1820 and Luis Vernet was installed as the first

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<sup>10</sup> Freedman, *TOHOTFC Volume I*, 124-132.

Argentine Governor of the islands in 1828. However, as Britain had never formally relinquished its claim to the islands, the matter of sovereignty was disputed.

By the twentieth century, much of the dispute centred on how the British had taken possession of the islands from the United Provinces of River Plate and whether or not such action was legal. A dispute over sealing rights had led to the United States of America dispatching a war ship to the islands following Vernet's seizure of American fishing vessels and goods in 1831. Vernet abandoned the Argentine settlement and the United States declared the land free from any government rule. Subsequently, the United Provinces attempted to resettle the islands, but their attempts were unsuccessful. In January 1833, the British reasserted their claim to the islands and sent a task force to re-establish British administration on the islands. The details of how British administration was established are still disputed but it is generally agreed that the British requested that the Argentine administration leave, which they complied with without resorting to violence.<sup>11</sup> How the British then treated the remaining Argentine settlers has been an issue of dispute between the two governments, however, both British and Latin-American historians have agreed that the British encouraged the Argentinians to remain.<sup>12</sup> The islands have remained continuously British from then and were in peaceful administration until the Falklands conflict. Argentine governments never relented on their claim to the islands and have always asserted that British retaking of the islands in 1833 was an illegal occupation. This included in the times Argentina was under military rule and as a democracy.<sup>13</sup> In 1982, the Junta defending their own landings in 1982 not as an invasion but as reoccupation of illegally taken territory.<sup>14</sup> Although the economic value of the islands is minimal, the Argentine population have generally supported the idea that the islands belong to Argentina and the dispute has become a matter of national pride.

Although Britain had resisted repeated calls from Argentina to hand over the sovereignty of the islands, by the time of the first Thatcher administration, the importance

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<sup>11</sup> Mary Cawkell, *The History of the Falkland Islands* (London: Anthony Nelson, 2001).

<sup>12</sup> For example, Lowell S. Gustafson, *The Sovereignty Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988) or Mary Cawkell, *The Falklands Story 1592 – 1982* (London: Anthony Nelson, 1983).

<sup>13</sup> Since 1982, Argentina has been in its fourth period of democracy. The previous periods covered 1912–1930, 1946–1955, and 1973–1976.

<sup>14</sup> Documentation cited in Jimmy Burns, *The Land That Lost Its Heroes* (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 1987) 57.

of the islands had waned, and the newly elected government displayed a willingness to cede sovereignty. When the Conservatives came to office in 1979, Nicholas Ridley was the FCO minister charged with finding a solution to the dispute. In historiography since, Ridley has been the subject of much criticism for his handling of the matter with Patrick Cosgrave commenting that he did not acquit himself well and ‘seriously misread the intentions of the Argentinian government’.<sup>15</sup> Ridley first visited the islands in July 1979 and suggested the only way for Britain to hold on to the islands permanently would be a military build-up on the islands, an idea which he mockingly titled ‘Fortress Falklands’. This called for the establishment of permanent military force on the islands, large enough to deter any potential invasion. This was rejected out of hand due to the cost of such a military installation, an outcome that Ridley was aware would come.<sup>16</sup> Following this, Ridley pursued a leaseback option and in September 1980 met secretly with Carlos Cavandoli, the Argentine Foreign Office official charged with finding a suitable resolution to the dispute. The meeting took place just outside Geneva, Switzerland using the guise of a holiday for Ridley and his wife. This was done to avoid Parliamentary and media scrutiny as it was expected that the idea of a leaseback would be unpopular with the islanders and therefore also Parliament.<sup>17</sup> Both sides agreed in rough terms of a solution which would have seen the sovereignty of the islands transferred to Argentina but with the retention of British Administration for a fixed number of years, until the final handover. This would also have seen joint cooperation on the islands’ economic development and sharing of resources.<sup>18</sup> Ridley returned to the Falklands in November 1980 in an attempt to persuade the islanders that the leaseback was the best solution for resolving the dispute. The islanders were outraged and as he left, they

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<sup>15</sup> Patrick Cosgrave, ‘Obituary: Lord Ridley of Liddesdale,’ *The Independent*, 6 March 1993

<sup>16</sup> See ALW 040/325/1 Part B. Documents released to the Margaret Thatcher Foundation per FOI Request 0181-12 available at <http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/121827> (accessed 12/07/15).

<sup>17</sup> Lawrence Freedman, *TOHOTFC Volume II: War and Diplomacy* (London: Routledge, 2005), 113-123. The Conservative Government attempted to keep this meeting secret for the subsequent years after the conflict. When the plan failed, the issue was mentioned in Parliament only indirectly: “There has been one round of talks on the Falkland Islands dispute with the Argentine Government in April 1980. In addition, in the frequent contacts which we have with the Argentine Government over the whole range of Anglo-Argentine relations many possible approaches to the solution of the Falkland Island dispute have been mentioned informally.” 123.

<sup>18</sup> Rex Hunt, Governor of the Falkland Islands in 1980, claimed that he was never informed of any discussions over a leaseback option and was not made aware of the agreed terms. See Rex Hunt, *My Falkland Days* (London: David and Charles, 1992), 76-77.

shouted abuse at him while playing *Rule, Britannia!*.<sup>19</sup> In addition, in the debates that followed, MPs were against the proposals and first made reference to importance of the principle of self-determination with opposition members arguing that British citizens should not be transferred to a fascist government with a record of multiple human rights violations.<sup>20</sup> This forced the Conservative government to reiterate that the wishes of the islanders would be ‘paramount’ in any agreement. It was here that the issue of self-determination first became the centre of the dispute. Parliament asserted that the islanders should be able to choose their own future, but the government seemed willing to explore alternative options and then attempt to persuade the islanders of the benefits at a later point. This is an indication that when the Conservatives justified the military response to the Argentine seizure of the islands, something that Ridley had predicted would happen, there were issues that influenced British decision making other than the self-determination of the islanders. Although Ridley was unsuccessful in persuading either the islanders or Parliament to accept the leaseback option, a willingness had been displayed to Buenos Aires on the part of the government to consider a possible relinquishing of sovereignty and that Britain’s commitment to the islands may have been waning.

Ridley’s mission was not the only ambiguous signal as to HMG’s commitment. The 1981 British Nationality Act would have deprived many of the islanders of full British Citizenship. In addition, the announcement in October 1981 of the withdrawal of HMS *Endurance* from patrol duty around the islands; the cancelling of plans to rebuild the Royal Marine barracks at Moody Brook; and the 1981 proposed closure of the British Antarctic Survey base at Grytviken on South Georgia all served as signs of Britain’s lessening interest in the islands. It is undoubted that before 1982, Britain was actively seeking to reduce the islands economic dependence on the mainland UK. Although the leaseback solution did have some supporters within government, most notably Ridley, to mitigate against potential criticism, the government ensured that the frontbench politicians actively spoke against the transfer of sovereignty when it was against the islanders’ wishes.<sup>21</sup> British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington rejected Ridley’s proposal of attempting to educate the islanders on the benefits of the leaseback on the basis that the Falklanders should not be seen to be pressured

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<sup>19</sup> Freedman, *TOHOTFC Vol I*, 124-132.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>21</sup> Tam Dalyell, ‘Obituary: Lord Ridley of Liddesdale,’ the *Independent*, 6 March 1993.



into accepting a resolution they did not want.<sup>22</sup> This way the government maintained its duty of protecting the islanders and representing their wishes in any negotiations while simultaneously exploring alternatives. Although there were economic benefits to be gained in the leaseback solution, the failure of the Ridley proposal highlighted the importance of the principle of self-determination that dominated the diplomatic negotiations at the beginning of the conflict. Britain could not proceed with any solution without properly representing the islanders' expressed wishes. In subsequent times when the British administration did meet with Argentine officials with an offer, such as in February 1981, it was done so with the consultation of the Falklanders.

Ridley's mission had made it common knowledge that Britain were willing to explore the possibility of surrendering sovereignty. Other countries were well aware that Britain was not steadfast into holding onto the islands and there were circumstances in which it would have ceded its position. Following the end of the conflict, Britain was asked to justify to other states why it had changed its position pre-1982 stance on sovereignty; it highlighted how HMG had asserted the islander's right to self-determination throughout any negotiations with Argentina.<sup>23</sup> Upholding the right of the islanders to determine how they wanted to be governed gained some sympathy from other governments and allowed the Thatcher administration to show some consistency in its policy towards the islands whilst also arguing that the Argentine seizure of the islands was justification to no longer negotiate with the government in Buenos Aires. However, the fact that Britain had explored the leaseback option would cause problems in gaining support from other countries.

### ***1.1.2. The beginning of the conflict***

The advent of a new military dictatorship in Argentina in December 1981 acted as the catalyst for the move towards conflict. Argentina has been in the midst of devastating economic stagnation which had led to large scale civil unrest and protest directed towards the military Junta which had ruled in Buenos Aires since 1976. In December 1981, a new Junta headed by General Leopoldo Galtieri succeeded to power. The other principle members of the new regime were Brigadier Lami Dozo, head of the Argentine Air Force,

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<sup>22</sup> Freedman, *TOHOTFC Vol I*, 137.

<sup>23</sup> This will be explored in greater depth in the chapters of this thesis as they discuss British rhetoric surrounding the conflict.

and Admiral Jorge Anaya, head of the Argentine Navy. Anaya, in particular, was an ardent supporter of a military solution to the sovereignty dispute.<sup>24</sup> Jimmy Burns has shown that the new Junta had been planning an invasion of the islands prior to their succession to power. Anaya and Galtieri discussed a possible military action on 9 December 1981 where Galtieri hoped that a successful occupation of the islands would turn public opinion in favour of his regime.<sup>25</sup> Following this, Anaya informed Vice Admiral Juan Lombardo to prepare an invasion of the islands. Lombardo has since confirmed that Anaya told him to prepare a plan to ‘take them [the islands] but not necessarily to keep them’.<sup>26</sup> Given that Anaya had already expressed to Galtieri that he did not believe that the British would respond militarily, the directions given to Lombardo are likely indicative that the Junta did not believe there would be a need to prepare a military defence of the islands. Detailed planning for the military action began in January 1982, with plans for the occupation and then the removal of the British administration and military stationed. The invasion of the islands was a key component of the new Junta’s strategy to assert control in Buenos Aires. The possible public favour that could be gained from a successful operation would have distracted the Argentine population from the ongoing economic issues facing the country. As such, it is unlikely any military action over the islands would have taken place in 1982 had it not been for the succession to power of Galtieri’s regime.

From the outset of the Argentine military action, the British government considered only action that would see the removal of Argentine soldiers from the islands; the re-establishment of British administration on the islands and the maintaining of Britain’s commitment to the islanders. In doing so, HMG affirmed the islanders’ right to self-determination and justified their actions in defence of that principle. On 19 March 1982, a party of Argentine scrap metal workers landed on the British held island of South Georgia. The party broke agreed protocol by failing to inform the British Antarctic Survey (BAS) team stationed on the island of their intention to land. Rather, the party of scrap metal workers included Argentine marines who proceeded to establish a base, raise the Argentine flag, defaced British signs, and broke into the BAS hut to steal rations.<sup>27</sup> Although the party

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<sup>24</sup> Oscar Kirchbaum, Roger Van Der Kooy, Eduardo Cardoso, *Malvinas: La Trama Secreta* (Buenos Aires; Sudamericana Planeta, 1983).

<sup>25</sup> Burns, *The Land That Lost its Heroes*, 57.

<sup>26</sup> Lombardo interview to Martin Middlebrook, cited in Martin Middlebrook, *The Fight for La Malvinas: The Argentine Forces in the Falklands War* (London: Viking, 1989), 120.

<sup>27</sup> BBC, 19 March 1982.

later responded to British requests to lower the Argentine flag, they refused to report to the British administrator of the South Georgia and were reinforced on 24 March by members of Argentine Special Forces. At this point, Carrington sent a telegram to Thatcher outlining that Britain may face the prospect ‘of an early confrontation with Argentina.’ Carrington also advised that Britain’s minimal terms on which to engage in negotiation would likely be unacceptable to Argentina and that ‘negotiation may now be at an end and that the Argentines will turn to other forms of pressure.’ In the note he also advocated military contingencies be made.<sup>28</sup> Importantly, at no time did Carrington suggest that Britain alter its stance in negotiation to appease Argentina and avoid a military confrontation. Rather he iterated the public backlash that Britain would receive should it back down.<sup>29</sup> Moreover, the focus remained clearly on maintaining Britain’s commitments to the islanders in addition to retaining British sovereignty over the islands. Carrington’s note indicated that the British government did not feel it could cede to Argentina’s demands given the backlash they would face from the British public in doing so. Over the days that followed, further discussions among British officials expressed doubt over the effect of US intervention and by 1 April, the British government pressed ahead with its own military and diplomatic preparations aware of the impending Argentine invasion. The British government felt that the only courses of action available to them were the ones that would assert British sovereignty and control over the islands.

The Argentine occupation of the Falkland Islands on 2 April ultimately forced both sides into aims that they could not deviate from: Argentina to use military means to force Britain into ceding sovereignty of the islands and Britain in asserting its sovereignty and re-establishing British administration of the islands. The British had begun military preparations in advance of 2 April. In the days prior, RFA *Fort Austin* and HMS *Endurance* along with the submarines HMS *Splendid* and HMS *Spartan* had all been dispatched to the South Atlantic. In late March, Admiral Henry Leach, Chief of the Naval Staff, had already begun circulating orders for the Royal Navy to prepare to sail south.<sup>30</sup> Following the Argentine occupation, the British military preparations were accelerated. The British operation to retake the islands was given the codename Operation Corporate and following an emergency meeting of the House of Commons, on 2 April, approval was formally given

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<sup>28</sup> Carrington minute to Thatcher, 24 March 1982, PREM 19/657 f68.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>30</sup> Minutes of Defence and Oversea Policy Committee, 1 April 1982, CAB 148/205 f34.

to Leach to assemble a task force with the intention of retaking the islands by force if necessary.<sup>31</sup> On 7 April, the first war cabinet was summoned to oversee the political and military developments in the conflict. Although an FCO document warned that unless the islanders were subject to inhumane treatment by the Argentinians ‘it would be hard to persuade people that the game was worth the candle’, Britain was steadfast in its determination to see the Argentine forces removed from the islands.<sup>32</sup>

In the early weeks of the crisis, whilst the task force travelled to the South Atlantic, there was a rush of diplomatic activity that took place both at the UN and involving the United States, all aimed at avoiding conflict.<sup>33</sup> The focus of the diplomacy was over the matter of self-determination. In justifying the response to the occupation, the British argued that the Argentinians had usurped the islander’s right to decide their own form of administration. Conversely, the Argentine argument was that the right to self-determination did not apply to the islanders as they were not a native population. Such rhetoric dominated diplomatic discussions as both sides framed their arguments around self-determination in attempting to gain support for their actions in the crisis. During this period of activity the British administration made clear that it could not accept a resolution that saw Argentine forces remain on the islands. Conversely, the Argentine administration made clear that they could not accept a resolution that did not include an agreement from Britain to relinquish sovereignty. For Britain, the Argentine occupation of the islands was a humiliation. There had already been calls in the British press for Thatcher and other senior ministers to resign.<sup>34</sup> From the early stage of the conflict, the government was aware of the need to defend itself from accusations of incompetence with regards to its ill-preparedness. Carrington wrote to the UK Embassy in Buenos Aires requesting assistance in the government’s efforts to protect its reputation in this regard.<sup>35</sup> If the government had succumbed to Argentine demands following the occupation of the islands, the effects on domestic opinion could have been catastrophic. Similarly, the Junta had launched Operation Rosario to gain public favour. Eventual defeat and strengthening of the British position on the islands would have had

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<sup>31</sup> Minutes of MOD Chiefs of Staff Committee, 3 April 1982, FCO 7/4472.

<sup>32</sup> FCO letter to No. 10, 2 April 1982, PREM 19/614 f209.

<sup>33</sup> This is discussed in greater detail in chapters one, 44, and two, 85.

<sup>34</sup> *Daily Mirror*, 4 April 1982.

<sup>35</sup> FCO to UKE Buenos Aires, FCO 7/4490 f54, 5 April 1982.

devastating effects for the solidity of the Junta's hold on power in Buenos Aires. In this respect, there was little room for negotiation from either side.

### *1.1.3. Escalation of conflict*

The escalation of the conflict in late April made it increasingly difficult for either side to negotiate on their ultimate aims and made the prospect of a peaceful settlement increasingly unlikely. On 25 April, British forces recaptured South Georgia and this caused an evident boost of confidence among British officials that the military action Britain was taking was justified. Thatcher appeared before journalists in Downing Street that evening and told them to 'rejoice' at the news.<sup>36</sup> An FCO document regarding how the matter should be handled in the press detailed the need not to 'overplay' the matter on the risk of looking absurd but to remind the world that '[t]here is not simply principle, but the greatly increased risk of similar and perhaps much more dangerous aggression elsewhere, if this one is not absolutely (and ruthlessly) nipped in the bud.'<sup>37</sup> This highlighted that HMG's media strategy aimed to stress that the task force was not just fighting for a British cause but a global one aimed at highlighting that aggression to assert territorial ambitions was wrong and could not be allowed to succeed. The recapture of South Georgia showed that Britain was willing and able to press their aims in the crisis by military means if necessary. Following the success, there was an evident confidence in the British government that their venture to retake the islands would be successful. Contrastingly the Argentine government had suffered its first defeat in the crisis. To compromise on the matter of the Falkland Islands after losing South Georgia would have been an embarrassing climb down for a military Junta. Following the recapture of South Georgia, Argentina became increasingly intransigent towards the peace negotiations conducted by the US Secretary of State, Alexander Haig. The American officials engaging with the Junta felt that loss of South Georgia rendered the Argentines 'difficult on negotiations, at least until they can gauge the extent of Latin American support.'<sup>38</sup> The public support boost that the Junta received from taking the islands was based on military success leading to the fulfilment of a longstanding national objective.

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<sup>36</sup> *BBC News*, 25 May 1982.

<sup>37</sup> Hoskyns minute to Ingham, 26 April 1982, THCR 2/6/2/135 Part 2 f45.

<sup>38</sup> US Embassy in Buenos Aires to State Department, 27 April 1982, Thatcher Foundation Archive, accessed 17 March 2015, available at <https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/143250>.

Military failure led to a deterioration of support, and any further failure to hold onto the claimed lands would have seen the Junta's support base and hold on power eroded meaning the Junta had to become more resistant to removing their forces from the islands. As the crisis developed into conflict, the prospect of a negotiated settlement reduced.

The fighting in early May saw both sides committing themselves to engaging in a conflict to settle the dispute and the British sinking of the ARA *Belgrano* became the focus of discussion both in the media and among diplomats eager to avoid further conflict. From this point on, the military defeat of one party was the only feasible outcome of the crisis which posed problems for the US who wished to further assimilate Argentina into western politics and weaken Soviet influence in South America.<sup>39</sup> The Task Force arrived on 30 April and were tasked with enforcing the 200 mile exclusion zone around the islands. On the same day Haig abandoned his peace mission and the US formally sided with Britain with a public declaration that the US administration would respond favourably to British requests for military assistance. Sandy Woodward, Commander of the Task Force, wanted to establish air and naval superiority before attempting an amphibious landing on the islands.<sup>40</sup> If successful, this strategy would have placed Britain in a strong position in the conflict, making a landing of substantial forces on the islands inevitable. On 1 May, Sea Harriers began engaging with the Argentine Mirage and Skyhawk aircraft over the islands and the Black Buck raids were launched which aimed to use Vulcan bombers to target the airfield in Stanley. Meanwhile, the Argentine Navy attempted to catch the Task Force in a pincer movement. One half of the pincer was the ARA *General Belgrano*. The *Belgrano* was shadowed by the British submarine HMS *Conqueror* which had originally been searching for the sole Argentine aircraft carrier in the region.<sup>41</sup> On 2 May, the *Belgrano* was outside of the exclusion zone and heading away from the islands. However, the British were concerned on the potential of the ship to change course to form part of the anticipated pincer movement. As such, *Conqueror* was ordered to launch a torpedo attack against the *Belgrano*, successfully hitting and sinking the ship. 320 members of the *Belgrano*'s crew died in the attack. On 4 May, Argentine Mirage aircraft launched an Exocet missile attack against HMS *Sheffield*, killing twenty. James Rentschler, Director of West European Affairs on the US

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<sup>39</sup> This will be discussed in greater depth in chapter 2.

<sup>40</sup> Sandy Woodward, *One Hundred Days* (London: Harper Press, 2012).

<sup>41</sup> Lawrence Freedman, 'The Falklands War Explained,' accessed 25 April 2015, available at <https://www.historyextra.com/period/20th-century/falklands-war-history-facts-what-happened/>.

National Security Council, commented that the *Belgrano-Sheffield* exchange meant that '[t]he stance of these two disputants increasingly resembles that of a couple of staggering streetfighters, spastically-swinging at each other while blinded into fury by the flow of their own blood.' Rentschler highlighted his view that as the two sides suffered more in the conflict, there was an increased likelihood that both would become focussed only on the full restoration of their sovereignty over the islands and the defeat of the other. Rentschler further commented that '[c]ontrary to British hopes, tightening the screws on Argentina will not make them more amenable to negotiations. On the contrary, Galtieri is a high-stakes gambler who will keep putting chips on the table as long as he has them, hoping for the lucky strike to bail him out.'<sup>42</sup>

For the United States diplomats tasked with finding a peaceful resolution, the escalation following the 2 May severely damaged their hopes of avoiding conflict between two allies in the context of the Cold War. Latin America was one cornerstone of US Cold War policy and successive presidential administrations of the 1970s and 1980s had sought to assimilate Argentina with western politics to reduce the influence of the Soviet Union on the American continent. Any defeat for Argentina had the potential repercussion of Buenos Aires seeking support from the Soviet Union. The Argentine resolve over the islands was staunch and there was a recognition amongst the American administration that the Argentinians would not relent on their demands as the British had hoped. Similarly, although the British administration engaged with efforts to find a peaceful resolution after the sinking of the *Belgrano*, it was made clear to international partners that Britain would not back down on its stance on the matter of sovereignty. Thatcher wrote, '[i]t is our hope that the Argentine government will respond equally positively to the Secretary-General...and genuine negotiations to resolve the Falklands issue can get underway. But if they do not respond, they should be in no doubt of our resolve.'<sup>43</sup> The Argentine government would not back down and as such neither would the British. Unless the former would agree to remove their forces from the islands, the latter emphasised its determination to remove the Argentine military by force.

Following the failure to find a peaceful resolution to the conflict following the sinking of HMS *Sheffield*, military engagement in the South Atlantic escalated and it became

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<sup>42</sup> Jim Rentschler diary, 4 May 1982, accessed 08/11/207, available at <https://www.margarethatcher.org/document/114348>.

<sup>43</sup> Thatcher to President Joao Figueiredo of Brazil, 11 May 1982, FCO 7/4123 f46.

apparent that the resolution would be the military defeat of one side. After weeks of air and sea battles, further British forces arrived, and the British began landing their troops on the islands on 21 May. The UN Secretary-General informed both parties that he would be abandoning his efforts to find a peaceful solution.<sup>44</sup> Once British troops had landed on the islands; the British were in an almost unassailable position. By this point the US government had accepted that their interests would be best served by allowing the conflict to reach its natural conclusion and attempt to repair damage done to their own policy interests after the conclusion of the conflict.<sup>45</sup> On 27 May, 2 Para began an assault on the towns of Darwin and Goose Green. After almost two days of fighting, 2 Para took the towns and the news spurred jingoistic responses from the popular press in the UK.<sup>46</sup> The Bluff Cove disaster of 1 June, where British ships were attacked while unloading more troops onto the islands, did spur some heads of government from other nations to write to Thatcher to urge her to find a swift response to the conflict but these letters had little effect.<sup>47</sup> Despite the disaster, it was still evident that Britain were close to victory and there was a focus from HMG on ensuring that the push towards victory was not hindered by diplomacy including the passing of UNSCR 505 on 4 June.<sup>48</sup> The British assault on Port Stanley began on 11 June and on 14 June the final Argentine forces on the islands surrendered when Argentine General Mario Menéndez signed the formal declaration of surrender to Major General Jeremy Moore. Despite the best efforts of a number of international actors, the conflict ended with the capitulation of the Argentine forces on the islands. The escalation of fighting had entrenched both sides in the need to find a military victory to justify their decisions to engage in conflict over the sovereignty of a collection of small islands.

Ultimately, the path of the conflict was determined by the need for both parties to protect their public image. The Argentine Junta gained a significant boost in public support; failure would have likely resulted in public attention in focussing again on the economic and social failings of the Junta's time in power. In Britain, the Conservative government had suffered a great embarrassment after the Argentine seizure of the islands and there were calls for key ministers to resign, including the Prime Minister. Failure to see the removal of

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<sup>44</sup> FCO Sitrep, 21 May 1982, PREM19/629 f46.

<sup>45</sup> This will be discussed in greater depth in chapter 2.

<sup>46</sup> *Sun*, 29 May 1982.

<sup>47</sup> President Turbay of Colombia to Thatcher, 2 June 1982, PREM19/633 f140.

<sup>48</sup> Thatcher to Parsons, 5 June 1982, PREM19/633 f10. UN Resolution 505 called on both governments to find a peaceful solution.



Argentine forces from the islands would have likely led to a significant loss of public and parliamentary support, which in turn could have led to the end of the Thatcher premiership. Backing down in the face of conflict would have been catastrophic for a military Junta and would have been a further embarrassment for the British government after the initial loss of the islands. Once the conflict began, there was then a need for both sides to justify the use of force, a pressure felt particularly in Britain as there was significant parliamentary pressure against the government in the wake of the loss of British lives. As such, it was always highly unlikely that any peace initiative would succeed. After 2 April, the only way for the crisis to end was for one side to see the assertion of the sovereignty claim over the islands and neither side was going to achieve that through negotiation.

## 1.2. Literature Review

Almost all elements of the conflict have been extensively covered in published works but one omission remains: a comparative study of the international reactions to the conflict and dispute, which this thesis aims to provide. Much of the published work was released in the few years immediately following the conflict, leading to what Lawrence Freedman has described as a ‘publication race’ as publishers and authors sought to profit on public interest in the topic.<sup>49</sup> This initial literature can be split into four main categories: autobiographical accounts;<sup>50</sup> overviews of the background to and course of the conflict;<sup>51</sup> technical and legal appraisals acting as an overview of the problem;<sup>52</sup> and enquiries into the conflict.<sup>53</sup> In the

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<sup>49</sup> Lawrence Freedman, *TOHOTFC Volume II*, xxvii.

<sup>50</sup> Such as political scientist Carlos Turolo in *Malvinas, Testimonio de su Gobernador* (ed.) Carlos Truolo (Buenos Aires: Sudamericana, 1983).

<sup>51</sup> By far the most widely published including such notable works as journalists Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, *The Battle for the Falklands* (London: Michael Joseph, 1983); political scientist Peter Calvert, *The Falklands Crisis: The Rights and Wrongs* (London: Frances Peter, 1982); historians Oscar Cardoso, Rosa Kirschbaum and Eduardo Van Der Koov, *Malvinas: La Trama Secreta* (Buenos Aires: Sudamericana, 1983); and political enquiries from The *Sunday Times Insight Team*, *The Falklands War: The Full Story* (London: Sphere, 1982); and the Latin American Bureau, *Falklands, Malvinas: Whose Crisis* (London: LAB, 1982).

<sup>52</sup> Economist Edward Shackleton, *Falkland Islands: Economic Study 1982* (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1982); international law scholar Julius Goebel, *The Struggle for the Falklands Islands* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982); and Third Report from the Defence Committee, *The Future Defence of the Falkland Islands* (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1982).

<sup>53</sup> Report of a Committee of Privy Councillors, *Falkland Islands Review*.

mid-1980s, fewer dedicated studies of the crisis were published as public interest waned.<sup>54</sup> The number of publications examining the conflict increased following the restoration of diplomatic relations between Britain and Argentina. In this period, Freedman produced a two substantial histories on the conflict, establishing himself as one of the leading scholars on the crisis.<sup>55</sup> The conflict also became a central part of the proliferating histories of the Thatcher years, with a particular focus on the transformative effect the conflict had on her premiership.<sup>56</sup> Anniversaries of the conflict and the death of Thatcher in 2013 led to further evaluation of the crisis and the Thatcher premiership, through political and military histories as well as documentaries and televised dramas. The most prominent study released during this time was Freedman's two-volume official history and Charles Moore's official biography of Thatcher.<sup>57</sup> They remain the most extensive studies of their topics. However, despite the depth of the literature on the conflict, there remains no detailed international comparative history of the crisis. Those that have studied the crisis have focussed on the areas where the conflict had most impact, focussing their work on the period of the conflict

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<sup>54</sup> Some texts were published during this period that focussed on more niche aspects of the crisis similar to how other crisis of modern British history had been studied. Valerie Adams, *The Media and the Falklands Campaign* (London: Macmillan, 1986) built on the study by Harris in Robert Harris, *GOTCHA! The Media, the Government and the Falklands Crisis* (London: Faber and Faber, 1986) in analysing the role of the media during the conflict and particularly the tension that developed with government. Jean Carr, *Another Story: Women and the Falklands War* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1984) examined the lives of women whose partners or children were involved in the fighting in the South Atlantic, highlighting the wider academic interest that the conflict generated similar to much larger scale conflicts of the twentieth century.

<sup>55</sup> Lawrence Freedman, *Britain and the Falklands War* (Oxford: Blackwells, 1982). This was the first substantial history Freedman produced on the conflict and focussed particularly on the impact the crisis had in Britain in 1982 especially on the British political scene. This was followed by Lawrence Freedman, *Signals of War: The Falklands Conflict of 1982* (London: Faber and Faber, 1990) which had a wider focus and examined the build-up to the conflict assessing the role of the British government in the conflict itself.

<sup>56</sup> Studies of Thatcher's first term in office focus heavily on the Falklands conflict as a defining moment in the legacy of her first government. An example of this is Martin Holmes, *The First Thatcher Government, 1979-1983: Contemporary Conservatism and Economic Change* (Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books, 1985). However, studies coming at the end of the Thatcher premiership have focussed more on other events in the Thatcher's premiership. An example is Peter Clarke 'Margaret Thatcher's Leadership in Historical Perspective,' *Parliamentary Affairs* 45, no. 1 (January 1992): 1-17.

<sup>57</sup> Freedman, *TOHOTFC Volume I* and Charles Moore, *Margaret Thatcher: The Authorized Biography, Volume 1: Not For Turning* (London: Allen Lane, 2013).

itself. Although there have been many contributions to the literature, ultimately the crisis in an international perspective remains under-researched.

The Franks Report, as the only parliamentary investigation, was the most comprehensive review of the crisis released in the six months after the conflict. The Franks committee's inquiry aimed to establish the role of the government and parliament in the outbreak of the conflict and was given access to all official documentation. Franks' final summary was that 'we conclude that we would not be justified in attaching any criticism or blame to the present government'. Franks defended his conclusions by comparing the Thatcher government's actions with the policy of governments before 1979. The committee maintained that errors committed by British governments in relation to the islands were consequences of the need to balance long-term foreign and defence policy objectives with 'doing the honourable thing'.<sup>58</sup> Franks cited the role of a parliamentary lobby, and a press, which put pressure on the government to not cede sovereignty, '[i]n view of the Parliamentary and press reaction, the Government decided at a Cabinet meeting on 11 December not to continue to attempt to reach a settlement on the basis of the Memorandum of Understanding.'<sup>59</sup> Comparison may be drawn here with the case of Diego Garcia, where a less significant a parliamentary lobby made it easier for the government to agree to the establishment of a joint UK-US military base on the British Indian Ocean Territory. In the case of the Falkland Islands, a substantial parliamentary lobby existed which resisted any attempt to see the islands handed over to Argentina.<sup>60</sup> Franks gave reference to the unintentional signals given by British officials that HMG was not committed to protecting the islands and the miscalculations made by the British government in assessing the intentions of the Argentine government. For its defence of the government, Franks' report attracted significant levels of criticism from the Labour left. Former Prime Minister James Callaghan said, 'for 338 paragraphs he painted a splendid picture, delineated the light and the shade, and the glowing colours in it, and when Franks got to paragraph 339 he got fed up with the canvas he was painting, and chucked a bucket of whitewash over it.'<sup>61</sup> Although the Labour criticisms of the report were likely motivated by politics, criticism also came

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<sup>58</sup> *Ibid*, 297.

<sup>59</sup> Lord Franks, *Falkland Islands Review: Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1983), 121.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>61</sup> House of Commons intervention, Hansard HC Deb, vol.35 cols.809-16, 23 June 1983, accessed 15 March 2015, available at <https://www.parliament.uk>.

from many commentators on the crisis with journalists, historians, and international relations scholars all questioning the committee's conclusions and its under-stressing of several key aspects of the government's role in the conflict with Walter Little particularly critical citing numerous inaccuracies in the report.<sup>62</sup>

Of the books published immediately after the conflict, the commentary of the conflict of Hastings and Jenkins was the highest-profile and most widely-read.<sup>63</sup> Such was the confidence in the quality of their work, that when the Franks report was published shortly after, Hastings and Jenkins put out a press release pointing out the gaps in the Franks' report which their *The Battle for the Falklands* filled.<sup>64</sup> Further, when it was republished in 1997, the authors added a new introduction which stated 'the account of the war that we wrote immediately as it was over has not been superseded in any important respect since its publication'.<sup>65</sup> Guillermo Makin, Andrew Gamble-Yooll, Malcom Deas and Jimmy Burns all provided inputs into the work through interviews and research. Hastings and Jenkins interviewed as many participants of the conflict as possible while their memories were still fresh. This was an advantage over Robert Fox, another journalist, who relied solely on his own experience of the conflict, and limited documentary evidence.<sup>66</sup> Fox chose to focus his work on the individual experience of conflict whereas Hastings and Jenkins chose to take on a wider study, encompassing the political as well as military aspects of the conflict. *The Battle for the Falklands* also had the advantage of incorporating testimonies of Argentine officials and their interpretations of negotiations with Britain, giving more of an international aspect than did other books. However, Hastings and Jenkins described their work as 'primarily an account of British political decision-making or naval and military operations. It is not a study of the problem of the Falkland Islands and their inhabitants, nor ... does it purport to show the war from Argentina's point of view.'<sup>67</sup> Hastings and Jenkins attached more blame to the government than had Franks concluding that, 'the culture of the

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<sup>62</sup> For example, see Little, 'The Falklands Affair'; Freedman, *the Signals of War*; Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, *The Battle for the Falklands* (London: Pan, 2010).

<sup>63</sup> Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, *The Battle for the Falklands* (London: Pan, 1983)

<sup>64</sup> See Lawrence Freedman, 'Bridgehead Revisited: the literature of the Falklands,' *International Affairs* 59, no. 3 (1983): 448.

<sup>65</sup> Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, *The Battle for the Falklands* (London: Pan Books, 1997), xvii.

<sup>66</sup> Robert Fox, *Eyewitness Falklands: A Personal Account of the Falklands Campaign* (London: Methuen, 1982).

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid*, xvii-xviii.

Thatcher government at the time was hostile to defence and overseas affairs, and even more so to spending money on them (apart from nuclear weapons). Such attitudes, above all else, gave comfort to a prospective enemy and supplied the essential precondition for the war.<sup>68</sup> They ultimately conclude that the conflict was ‘a political war, a war of pride, a war to save the government’s skin’.<sup>69</sup> Hastings and Jenkins contributed to wider debates surrounding the British motivation in the conflict and founded their arguments in a large range of evidence. Hastings and Jenkins considered the Argentinian perspective on the conflict more than others whilst still remaining focussed on the British experience.

Historians and political scientists who have written on international responses to the conflict have tended to focus on individual countries or areas. The most comprehensive of these is Stelios Stavridis and Christopher Hill’s collection of essays which sought to examine western European reactions to the conflict.<sup>70</sup> The volume is one of only a few works that examine the post-1982 period. Although this collection offers great detail on the conflict, its primary focus was an analysis of the strength of political cohesion among the member states of the European Community using the Falklands dispute as a case study. Hill summed up the research aims:

[T]o illuminate further the Falklands crisis as an historical event by looking more widely into Britain’s relations with the rest of the European Community; to examine the nature and variability of domestic constraints on national foreign policy by examining the circumstances of sovereign states of a similar types which are confronting similar problems; and to provide a detailed empirical investigation, through the case study method, of the ability of the member states of the European Community to product and maintain coherent foreign policy positions.<sup>71</sup>

The study was primarily a focus on the foreign policy-making mechanisms of the states which made up the EEC. Contributors were asked to do so by describing ‘the positions taken by the country in question on the main issues involved in the crisis ... and then to explain

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<sup>68</sup> *Ibid*, xv.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid*, xvi.

<sup>70</sup> Stelios Stavridis and Christopher Hill (eds.) *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy: Western European Reactions to the Falklands Conflict* (Oxford: Berg, 1996).

<sup>71</sup> Stavridis and Hill, *Domestic Sources*, 2.

why the state either diverged or conformed [to joint EC policy in relation to the crisis]'.<sup>72</sup> Although the major conclusions of the work focus on the foreign policy making, Hill offered some insight into the European perspective on the conflict: '[c]learly once the war was over the Falklands was a major issue only for Britain among the twelve (from 1986) member states, but it remained a delicate test of diplomacy for others who sought to balance loyalty to a partner-state against diverse national interests and pressures, domestic and external.'<sup>73</sup> The contributors to this collection were political scientists, each with a focus on a different government. The present thesis aims to build upon this work looking at many of the sources from a historical perspective, examining and comparing the different reactions from European governments.

Irish reaction to the crisis has been the focus of more recent studies. This topic attracts interest from historians of Anglo-Irish relations given that the conflict took place in the context of the Northern Ireland Troubles.<sup>74</sup> The consensus is that Irish policy towards the crisis was motivated by Charles Haughey's opinion on British governance in Northern Ireland. Stephen Kelly argues that 'Haughey's *modus operandi* during the Falkland War was motivated by a blend of political opportunism and cynical Anglophobia' and that the Taoiseach's denial that he knew of Ireland's decision to support sanctions against Argentina is symptomatic of 'the opportunistic, indeed cunning, nature of his character.'<sup>75</sup> Gregg O'Neill has written that the Irish government 'threw together a policy that was incoherent, unclear, counterproductive and conceivably dangerous.'<sup>76</sup> These studies examine the Irish response to the conflict in isolation and focus on the effect Irish policy towards the conflict had on Anglo-Irish relations over the issue of Northern Ireland. Similarly, Lorenzo Mechi and Andrea Chiampan's study of the Italian reaction to conflict, which examines the difficulty Italy had in balancing its interests in Europe with those in Latin America.<sup>77</sup> This thesis aims to compare the responses of Ireland and Italy with those of other states and

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<sup>72</sup> *Ibid*, 4.

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid*, 4-5.

<sup>74</sup> This is discussed in more detail in section 11.5.1.

<sup>75</sup> Stephen Kelly, 'An Opportunistic Anglophobe: Charles J. Haughey, the Irish Government and the Falklands War, 1982,' *Contemporary British History* 30, no. 4 (March 2016): 1.

<sup>76</sup> Gregg O'Neill, 'A Failure of Statesmanship and an Abdication of Political Responsibility': Irish Foreign Policy during the Falklands Crisis, April to June, 1982,' *The History Review* 16 (2006) UCD School of History and Archives, 179.

<sup>77</sup> Lorenzo Mechi and Andrea Chiampan, 'Des intérêts difficilement conciliables: l'Italie, l'Europe et la crise des Falkland' *Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporains* 1, no. 245 (June 2012): 115-132.

highlight the common themes that emerged in how different governments balanced their Falklands policy against wider foreign policy objectives. As such, this thesis aims to examine to what extent the responses of Italy or Ireland were unique.

Lawrence Freedman's two-volume official history provides the most authoritative and comprehensive account of the Falklands campaign completed. Freedman had access to classified documents, the majority of which did not become available to other researchers until they were thirty years old, under the 1967 amendment to the Public Records Act 1958. Freedman combined his archival documentation with many interviews with the key participants in the conflict. In 1982, Freedman had written about the problems of using the testimonies of individuals involved when writing the history of a politically sensitive issue.<sup>78</sup> 23 years later, his access to documentation meant he could corroborate the interview testimonies with other primary source material, something previous scholars of the conflict were not able to do. Freedman's work is likely to stand as the most detailed and reliable account of the Falklands campaign.

An official history commissioned by Parliament, Freedman's work was given a strict research focus, '[m]y task was to explain British policy and decisions and not those of Argentina (or the US or France) except to the extent where it was necessary, as was often the case, for purposes of context and evaluation.' He then added that '[m]y focus was to be on the way the Government as a whole addressed the developing dispute with Argentina, and then how it responded to the sudden Argentine occupation of the sovereign territory.'<sup>79</sup> As such, Freedman's work does focus on the experience of the British government through the campaign. Freedman chose to focus his writing on the diplomacy of the crisis, often in minute detail: 'I am more at home discussing policy-making and diplomacy than military operations and I lacked the material to improve on much of the first-hand accounts of the land battles.'<sup>80</sup> However, Freedman does not devote much of the book to the international reaction to the conflict. Rather his work is British focussed and analyses the experience of the British government and military through the period of April to June 1982. Although he was not particularly concerned with international perspectives on the crisis in writing the official history, Freedman does comment that, '[t]he Prime Minister's files had numerous

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<sup>78</sup> Freedman, 'Bridgehead Revisited' (1983). This will be discussed in greater detail in the methodology section.

<sup>79</sup> Freedman, *TOHOTFC Vol. II*, xxvi.

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid*, xxvii.

reports from embassies about the problems of convincing governments of the rightness of the British cause – or at least on why armed force was being used in the name of this cause – and very little on how armed force might be used.<sup>81</sup> Freedman hints at a general impression from other nations that they did not think the sovereignty of the islands was an issue worth fighting over, especially given the wider foreign policy objectives of Britain and its western allies. The work Freedman does do on international opinion focuses on the European Economic Community and the US. With regard to these, Freedman writes, ‘London’s increasingly robust stance was apt to cause discomfort amongst its allies who felt that they were likely to suffer the consequences.’<sup>82</sup> He later concludes, ‘[t]he problem therefore was not that Britain was seriously jeopardising wider western interests in Latin America by pushing so strongly its national interests, but that it was widely perceived by its allies to be doing so.’<sup>83</sup> Freedman underlined that, with regards to international opinion on the crisis, it was not so important what was happening but what different nations interpreted to be happening. There remained scope for a wider history examining how different nations interpreted the crisis and how those differing interpretations were manifested in government policy.

The crisis features prominently in Moore’s life of Thatcher, both as a bridge between the first two volumes, and as aspect of legacy in the third and final.<sup>84</sup> Moore was granted access to Thatcher’s personal papers as well as early access to the government papers from her time in office. He also interviewed Thatcher and many members of her government. To militate against the risk of the biographer's subject attempting to influence the biography’s content, both agreed that his work was not to be published until after her death. Though, Moore comments in the preface to the second volume that Thatcher’s death ‘probably affects the way I have written’. He also noted that he was not paid by Thatcher for the work nor did she attempt to interfere in his writing at any point.<sup>85</sup> Moore’s research into the crisis was necessarily focussed Thatcher. This is also true of the description of the conflict given in the biographies of Thatcher written by Jonathan Aitken, Clare Beckett, Graham Goodlad, John

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<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid*, 495.

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid*, 513.

<sup>84</sup> Charles Moore, *Margaret Thatcher: The Authorized Biography Volume I: Not For Turning*, (London: Allen Lane, 2013) and Charles Moore, *Margaret Thatcher: The Authorized Biography Volume II: Everything She Wants*, (London: Allen Lane, 2015).

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid*, xvi.



Campbell, and Ewan Green, who all focus on Thatcher's personal experience of the crisis.<sup>86</sup> Moore's choice of the crisis as the point with which to end his first volume reflects his view of the conflict as a moment of great significance for Thatcher, '[t]he Falklands War established Mrs Thatcher's personal mastery of the political scene and convinced people of her special gifts of leadership.'<sup>87</sup> This is in contrast to Ben Jackson and Robert Saunders' commentary on the Thatcher premiership which omits the conflict.<sup>88</sup> When discussing international response to the crisis, Moore does so with reference to Thatcher's relationships with other leaders, particularly her personal accord with President Ronald Reagan. In terms of international opinion, Moore's research scope means that he writes predominantly on Thatcher's opinion of the support offered to Britain by other nations, referencing her particular affection for the reaction of French President, François Mitterrand, as well as the support offered by the Commonwealth.

Given the role taken by the Reagan administration in attempting to reach a peaceful resolution to the conflict, after that of the British, the American response to the crisis has attracted the most interest. Davide Borsani has written extensively on the impact the crisis had on the relationship between the UK and the US.<sup>89</sup> He has argued that US interests in both Europe and Latin America led the State Department on a strategy to avoid conflict which ultimately failed and put any good relations the White House had with either Britain or Argentina in danger, '[t]he Reagan administration tried to reconcile two regional interests at a time when a compromise was impossible and, above all, it did not elaborate a consistent strategy. The outcome was that diplomatic relations were put under strains.'<sup>90</sup> Sally-Anne Treharne devoted a chapter to the conflict in her book on Latin America and Anglo-

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<sup>86</sup> Jonathan Aitken, *Margaret Thatcher: Power and Personality* (London: Bloomsbury, 2013). Clare Beckett, *Margaret Thatcher* (London: Haus Publishing, 2006). Graham Goodlad, *Thatcher* (London: Routledge, 2016). John Campbell, *Margaret Thatcher Volume II: The Iron Lady* (London: Pimlico, 2003). Ewan Henry Harvey Green, *Thatcher* (London: Hodder Arnold, 2006).

<sup>87</sup> Moore, *Margaret Thatcher Volume I*, 364.

<sup>88</sup> Ben Jackson and Robert Saunders (eds.) *Making Thatcher's Britain* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

<sup>89</sup> Davide Borsani, *La "Special Relationship" Anglo-Americana e la Guerra delle Falkland* (Firenze: La Lettere, 2016) and 'Imperial Legacy and Cold War Rationale: The Anglo-American Diplomacy and the Falklands War in 1982' in *Empires and Nations from the Eighteenth to the Twentieth Century: Volume II* (eds.) Antonello Biagini and Giovanna Motta (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars, 2014).

<sup>90</sup> Borsani, 'Imperial Legacy and Cold War Rationale,' 516.

American relations in the post war period.<sup>91</sup> She referred to the crisis as ‘a test of US commitment to its ally, the UK’ and ultimately ‘tensions invariably strained the development of transatlantic relations.’<sup>92</sup> Treharne combined study of documentary evidence available in archives in the UK and US with interview testimony from officials who held prominent positions in Thatcher’s government during the crisis. Treharne combined oral history and discourse testimonies with a study of archival material in her research.

Latin Americanists have written on the perspectives of South American nations. Peter Calvert has commented the effects of the crisis on relations between the US and Latin America, and concludes that the American position taken during the conflict damaged the reputation of the US in the OAS but ultimately, in the years after the conflict, the US worked to repair any strains in their relationship with the South American continent.<sup>93</sup> Gordon Connell-Smith has studied the response of the Organisation of American States (OAS) and in particular the decision making process behind OAS policy during the conflict. He argued that the conflict was an embarrassing moment for the OAS as it highlighted the fragility of the unity between the American states.<sup>94</sup> Alejandro Luis Corbacho and Guillermo Makin both examined the restoration of relations between Britain and Argentina in the aftermath of the conflict.<sup>95</sup> Felipe Sanfuentes has examined the reaction of the Chilean government to the conflict.<sup>96</sup> There has, until now, been no synthesis of these different perspectives.

The role and experience of the British government in the crisis have already been widely studied with topics examining the nature of diplomacy during the conflict as well as assessing motivations in engaging in an armed conflict to assert sovereignty. This plays an important role in assessing international perspectives on the crisis as governments had to assess whether British motivations in the conflict were justified. Philip Windsor studied ‘one

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<sup>91</sup> Sally-Ann Treharne, *Reagan and Thatcher’s Special Relationship: Latin America and Anglo-American Relations* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015).

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid*, 40-41.

<sup>93</sup> Peter Calvert, ‘Latin America and the United States during and after the Falkland Crisis,’ *Millennium* 12, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 69-78.

<sup>94</sup> Gordon Connell-Smith, ‘The OAS and the Falklands conflict,’ *The World Today* 38, No. 9 (Sep 1982): 340-347.

<sup>95</sup> Alejandro Luis Corbacho, ‘Pre-negotiation and Mediation: Anglo-Argentine Diplomacy After the Falklands/Malvinas War, 1983–1989,’ *International Negotiation* 33, no. 3 (2008): 311-339, and Guillermo Makin, ‘The Nature of Anglo-Argentine Diplomacy 1980-1990’ in *International Perspectives on the Falklands Conflict* (ed.) Alex Danchev (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1992) 224-236.

<sup>96</sup> Felipe Sanfuentes, ‘The Chilean Falklands Factor’ in *International Perspectives*, 67-83.

of the very few wars in history in which one nation had no real intention of invading, and the other fought for territory which it had spent twenty years saying that it did not really want.<sup>97</sup> Michael Charlton examined British aims and motivation in their negotiations with other nations during the conflict itself.<sup>98</sup> Opponents of the conflict have also published their own views on the government's motivation in engaging in conflict, Anthony Barnett and Tam Dalyell arguing that the conflict was a reversion to the ways of empire.<sup>99</sup> However, Barnett and Dalyell write from a political partisan perspective with a focus on undermining the Thatcher government. Their assessments fail to address the fact that the conflict was as much willed by parliament as by the government, with the Labour front bench playing a key role in the use of the Task Force.<sup>100</sup> However, the publications of Bennet and Dalyell have become popular studies of the conflict and as such, it was important that this thesis address them. In 1990, Douglas Kinney dealt extensively with the questions surrounding whether the conflict was in British national interest concluding,

‘[t]he parties to the Falklands crisis contested not only National Interests in possession and exclusive use of the territory in question, but centuries of what they perceived to be a zero-sum game for National Honor [sic]. Their actions and even their negotiating strategies tended to exacerbate rather than ameliorate the problem. They each invoked, and indeed created, domestic political opinion in support of their cause, and in turn became its prisoners at crucial junctures.’<sup>101</sup>

More recently, this topic has been revisited by Helen Parr, who has argued that international and domestic have to be brought together, with Thatcher's position within her cabinet and the Conservative party playing a vital role in explaining why events took the course they

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<sup>97</sup> Philip Windsor, ‘Diplomatic dimensions of the Falklands crisis,’ *Millennium* 12, no. 1 (Spring 1983): 88.

<sup>98</sup> Michael Charlton, *The Little Platoon: Diplomacy and the Falklands Dispute* (Oxford: Blackwells, 1993).

<sup>99</sup> Anthony Barnett, *Iron Britannia* (London: Allison & Busby, 1982); and Tam Dalyell, *One Man's Falklands*. (London: Cecil Wolf, 1982). Another left critique published before the conflict's end is Anthony Arblaster, *The Falklands: Thatcher's War, Labour's Guilt* (London: Socialist Society, 1982).

<sup>100</sup> Freedman, ‘Bridgehead Revisited,’ 450.

<sup>101</sup> Douglas Kinney, *National Interest/National Honor: The Diplomacy of the Falklands Crisis* (London: Praeger, 1990).

did.<sup>102</sup> How other governments, law makers, press and publics interpreted British motivations in the conflict can explain much about how they responded to the crisis.

In 2019, historian Ezekiel Mercau contributed an ‘imperial history’: what the conflict shows about British ‘imperial atavism’ and the concept of ‘Greater Britain’. He argued ‘the Falklands War, and its aftermath, constituted an event pregnant with rhetoric and symbolism. It was presented to people in Britain either as a moment of national revival or as an anachronistic throwback to imperial times.’<sup>103</sup> In his study, Mercau discusses the importance of a transnational ‘British world’ of which the Falklanders were part. As a result, he engages with the early debates on the imperialistic nature of Britain’s decision to fight for the islands and concludes ‘only by looking at the Falklands conflict through the transnational lens of the British world can we move away from the diametrically entrenched views of the imperial ‘atavists’ and their opponents, and gain a better appreciation of the deeper dynamics driving the Falklands dispute over the decades.’<sup>104</sup> In doing so, Mercau does offer some comment on the international aspect of the conflict. However, Mercau focuses much more on the social aspects of the conflict as opposed to the political, with a particular emphasis on the notions of Britishness outside of the mainland of the UK. In doing so, he adds to an already extensive literature on the social history of the conflict which includes studies on the experience of women, soldiers, and families.<sup>105</sup> The present thesis differs from Mercau’s work in its broader focus of multiple nations, analysing the international response.

There is still room for further research. Freedman has noted ‘it is inevitable that some issues have only come to light afterwards’. In this respect the passing of the thirtieth anniversary of the conflict, coupled with the change in the Public Records Act in 2013 which released more documentation, and digitisation which provides for a fuller understanding of

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<sup>102</sup> Helen Parr, ‘The National Interest and the Falklands War’ in *British Foreign Policy and the National Interest: Identity, Strategy and Security* (eds.) Timothy Edmunds, Jamie Gaskarth and Robin Porter (London: Springer, 2014), 66-82.

<sup>103</sup> Ezekiel Mercau, *The Falklands War: An Imperial History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 17.

<sup>104</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>105</sup> For example see Jean Carr, *Another Story: Women and the Falklands War* (London: Hamish Hamilton Ltd, 1984); Daniel Kon and Los Chicos de la Guerra, *The Argentine conscripts' own moving accounts of their Falklands War* (London: New English Library, 1983); and Helen Parr, *Our Boys: The Story of a Paratrooper* (Milton Keynes: Allen Lane, 2018).

foreign reactions, allows for this thesis to fill a gap in the historiography by providing of a comparative history of the international reactions to the crisis and examining the dispute over a wider period and across a greater geographical area.

### **1.3. Sources and Methodology**

This study utilises a combination of published and unpublished material to consider the similarities and differences in international perceptions of the crisis. This study has benefitted from material released since 2013 at the National Archives hitherto available only to official historians and authorised biographers.<sup>106</sup> The present work has focussed on UK central government sources, supplemented with materials available in other archives located in countries of interest. Due to language and resource constraints, the thesis was unable to make extensive use of non-English language material or sources not held either in the UK or online and as such, has not used Argentine based source; instead, is reliant on material accessible from the UK. The work has made use of oral history accounts of the crisis through re-reading of published interviews conducted by other scholars of the period; however, the author has opted not to conduct further interviews for the purpose of this thesis. Given the breadth of coverage in this study, any sufficient oral history approach would have required detailed interviews with many diplomats who are no longer able to provide oral testimony. As such, the methodology used focussed more on archival and other printed material.

Given its reliance on UK and English-language based resources, this thesis has had to consider the limitations of what can be drawn on international perspectives from British accounts of those perspectives. This work would have benefitted from greater use of material found in Argentina and other archives; language, time and resource limitations of the author meant that this was not possible. The conclusions and analysis contained in the present thesis have been tapered to take into account the limitations of its source base. In the realms of diplomacy, the dialogue that takes place between governments represent the conclusions of conversations within governments that decide upon diplomatic strategy and policy to achieve foreign policy goals. Knowledge of those conversations that take place within governments can provide important context to diplomatic negotiations. Particularly, they

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<sup>106</sup> The 2013 amendment to the Public Records Act allowed documents to be released to the National Archives twenty years after their creation. Prior to this, documents were released thirty years after their creation.

unveil the differing opinions and debate which take place between government officials and thus give further detail into the perspectives on an event. In an event such as the Falklands crisis, more can be obtained from a detailed evaluation of how international governments interacted with both sides. As this thesis was unable to consult many Argentine sources, it has not been able to do this in detail. As a result, there is a recognition that the source based used is often a HMG interpretation of international perceptions. However, given the thesis' focus on international responses to Britain and the Falklands crisis, through the use of UK-based archives and sources the thesis is still able to offer valuable contributions to the historiography. During the crisis and subsequent disputes around sovereignty of the islands, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) became a hub of diplomatic activity with UK officials engaging extensively with officials from the countries discussed in this thesis. Through this, an enormous amount of material is available which outlines governments' conversations with British officials and their expressed positions on different aspects of the conflict. The FCO had to ensure that records on other nations' perceptions were accurate so best policy practice could be made and as such, this thesis benefits from the source material having a higher degree of accuracy and reliability. Further evaluation is done through placing FCO records in context of different countries, other interests and previous records on the sovereignty dispute over the islands, this thesis is able to offer detailed insight into different international reactions on Britain, the conflict, and subsequent disputes. It is for this reason, that the thesis spends time outlining different countries' record on the Falklands dispute in the years before 1982 as well as after. Further, detailed FCO records were also kept on the opinion of law makers, the public and media in different countries giving further contextualisation to the ongoing discussions between the UK and other countries. How different countries interacted with Britain placed in context of how they acted and spoke about the crisis in international forums allows the author to comment on the goals and aims of different governments in the crisis and as such, the international reactions. Although the author not being able to consult archives not accessible from the UK places natural limitations on what can be deduced about international reactions to the crisis, the work's focus on reactions to Britain and the Falklands crisis and dispute alongside appropriate tapering of conclusions means this work is still able to provide valuable insight into international reactions.

With its focus on international responses, the papers from the FCO available at the National Archives have been critical. The FCO was the department of the UK government

that led the majority of discussions with other states regarding the crisis with its workload between April and June 1982 dominated by communication surrounding the conflict, lessening the focus of the FCO on other international matters. Through the period examined by this thesis, the FCO monitored the position of different governments on the dispute, and British officials also kept records of discussions and negotiations that took place with different delegations in the UNGA and other governments regarding voting on Falklands resolutions in the years after the conflict. It was the FCO into which the majority of formal communications from other governments came. The information was then fed back to other departments of government. Records of these discussions feature heavily in this thesis. There was difficulty in interpreting some information from these files given that the records of conversation were often incomplete or did not provide sufficient detail regarding positions held by delegates from other countries. For an appropriate understanding of international responses to the crisis, it was vital to know exactly who was being referred to in the document, which positions other government officials held and which department of government they were representing. The online directory of British diplomats compiled by FCO historians proved a valuable tool in overcoming these issues.<sup>107</sup> Files from the Prime Minister's Office also provided important evidence detailing communications with other heads of government. However, since Thatcher did not take an active role in discussions with every government, files from the Prime Minister's Office do not cover all the states this thesis examines. Thatcher took a strong interest and prominent role in negotiations with the US as well as in the discussions surrounding the restoration of relations with Argentina. The files from the Prime Minister's Office which detail these discussions feature prominently in chapters two and five. Cabinet Office papers only contained summaries of details that were contained in the Foreign Office papers and, as such, do not feature much in this work. Files from the Ministry of Defence contained some limited detail on the intelligence and military assistance that had been given to the UK from Chile and the US, however, due to the sensitivity of this information, much of it had been redacted under the Official Secrets Act often making interpretation difficult.

The Thatcher Foundation and the Thatcher Archive at Churchill College Cambridge contained material relating to Thatcher's discussions with other world leaders. This was a

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<sup>107</sup> British Diplomats Directory, accessed 15 March 2016, available at [https://issuu.com/fcohistorians/docs/bdd\\_part\\_1\\_with\\_covers/242](https://issuu.com/fcohistorians/docs/bdd_part_1_with_covers/242) (part one) and [https://issuu.com/fcohistorians/docs/bdd\\_part\\_2\\_with\\_covers/212](https://issuu.com/fcohistorians/docs/bdd_part_2_with_covers/212) (part two).

particularly valuable source for studying the conflict period and for studying Thatcher's role in generating international support for the British cause; her personal correspondence with other heads of government were particularly enlightening. However, similar to the papers from the Prime Minister's office, these archives did not contain a great amount on non-Anglospheric governments. Many heads of government wrote to Thatcher at the outbreak of the conflict to offer their opinion or assistance. This was helpful in indicating initial government standpoints on the conflict but there was little follow-up communication, and these archives also contained very little on the dispute after 1982. As such, in its discussion of the crisis in the years after the conflict, this work became more reliant on the information contained in the FCO files. The Conservative Party papers at the Bodleian Library in Oxford contained material outlining Conservative dispositions towards the dispute and different stand points from varying party members but little on international response, except occasionally to criticise the lack of support for the British cause from other states.

Although the majority of the research is focussed on sources from UK-based archives this was also supplemented by some material from archives abroad. The Reagan Library was of particular use in chapter three as it contained much on Reagan's relationship with Thatcher including sources detailing discussions between the two surrounding the US position on the crisis. The US State Department was also useful for uncovering evidence on its attempt at negotiating peace and uncovering the opinions of State Department officials on both parties in the crisis. Files from this archive also hinted at some of the opinions of other departments of the US government including US Ambassador to the UN Jeanne Kirkpatrick, the Latin American groups in the State Department itself and the US Department of Defense. Government archives in other nations contained only limited source material covering the conflict and dispute but the legislatures of New Zealand, Australia and Ireland have all provided material used in this thesis. Further, the most valuable material was available in archives based in the UK and online. Since it was not possible to travel to other nations, more resources have been devoted to a thorough examination of the government material based in Britain, US and online.<sup>108</sup>

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<sup>108</sup> The Congressional Record and EU Parliament debates are not referenced in detail in this thesis. Rather, the study has focussed on the discussion among and experience of diplomats, which influenced how governments formed and pursued policy in relation to the dispute. In the United States, although the matter was discussed by Congress, ultimately Falklands policy was formed through the Presidency and the State Department. In Europe, the



When studying such political discourse, the author took into account several of the themes detailed by Paul Chilton, who wrote that ‘humans using language politically seem to feel a strong pressure to justify their actions ... [a]t the heart of what we call ‘politics’ is the attempt to get others to ‘share a common view’ about what is useful-harmful, good-evil, just-unjust.’<sup>109</sup> This is a point reinforced by William Connolly in his work on analysing political discourse.<sup>110</sup> This is particularly true of a subject as politically emotive as the Falklands conflict and especially important when the author was using British based sources to interpret other nations’ perceptions of the crisis. It was important when studying documents from the conflict period to consider the intentions of the author of the source, and monitor the logical and rhetorical aspects of the communication to fully understand their impressions of Britain and the crisis. The author had to consider what the other nations were attempting to get the British government to do and how they may have altered their language to achieve a specific aim. As such, it was crucial to place the negotiations over the crisis into context of other policy aims and world affairs to appropriately evaluate the nature of diplomatic discussions. This was particularly important during the conflict, as many of the nations discussed in this thesis attempted to balance their interactions with both Britain and Argentina to protect their interests in Europe and South America. After the conflict, political actors appeared more open in their opinions on the crisis, particularly in their criticism of Britain for refusing to negotiate. This was perhaps due to governments believing there were no grave consequences in supporting one side over the other, and the relative importance attributed to finding a permanent and peaceful resolution to the dispute. However, the study still had to take into account how governments formed diplomatic policy and the other influences on their negotiations with Britain. Chilton notes, ‘[p]olitical actors need to guess what their rivals are up to...[h]uman individuals have to decouple the representations of the world that they have stored as ‘true’ or ‘real’ from those that they reckon other people have.’<sup>111</sup> British officials charged with gathering support both during the conflict and in the years after had to interpret the position of those they were negotiating with. This interpretation played a large part in informing the direction the negotiations took. As such,

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discussion of this thesis centres on the individual governments of the EEC to highlight the differing perception of the crisis among nations.

<sup>109</sup> Paul Chilton, *Analysing Political Discourse: Theory and Practice* (London: Routledge, 2004), 199.

<sup>110</sup> William L Connolly, *The Terms of Political Discourse* (Oxford: Blackwell’s, 1993).

<sup>111</sup> *Ibid.*

this work had to be aware of such theory when analysing the political discourse used in this thesis.

This thesis has also made use of the relevant memoirs and autobiographies. The problems of using such material have been studied by scholars such as Stephen Hopkins and John Naylor and their findings have informed the methodology behind how such sources have been used in this work.<sup>112</sup> Memoirs are often used to portray the truth that the author experienced which differs between different recollections of the same event. For Hopkins, '[t]he politics of interpreting these narratives therefore resides in their blurring of boundaries, whether between autobiography and biography, or history and memory. Ultimately, of course, the potential for the blurring of fact and fiction is yet another critical aspect of this field of enquiry.'<sup>113</sup> Memory of the Falklands conflict is suspect to these failings and any student of memoirs concerning the crisis must take this into consideration. Further there are also problems concerning the memory of those writing memoirs and autobiographies. Time may cause a divergence in different people's recollections of the same event and personal ideology may inform on how an event is remembered. Such problems led Richard Crossman to comment in the introduction to his own diaries, '[m]emory is a terrible improver – even with a diary to check the tendency. And it is this which makes a politician's autobiography (even when he claims his rights and uses the official Cabinet papers) so wildly unreliable.'<sup>114</sup> Further, the memory of an event like the crisis is shaped by one's own experience of it. This is particularly problematic when looking at the memory of an individual who was part of one aspect of the conflict but was not fully assimilated with the full international reaction. One example of this in the history of the conflict is where, in her own memoir, Thatcher commented that she 'never forgot the debt we [Britain] owed him [Mitterrand] for his personal support on this occasion and throughout the Falklands crisis' but the FCO papers show several points of tension between the French and British governments through the crisis, in much of which Mitterrand played a prominent role.<sup>115</sup> The problems of the political memoirs of the conflict have already been studied by

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<sup>112</sup> Stephen Hopkins, *The Politics of Memoir and the Northern Ireland Conflict* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2013) and John Naylor, 'British Memoirs and Official Secrecy: From Crossman to Thatcher' in *Political Memoir: Essays on the Politics of Memoir* (ed.) George Egerton (London: Frank Cass, 1994) 330-341.

<sup>113</sup> Hopkins, *Politics of Memoir*, 9.

<sup>114</sup> Richard Crossman, *the Diaries of a Cabinet Minister* (London: Hamilton, 1977), 12-13.

<sup>115</sup> Margaret Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years* (London: Harper Collins, 1993), 182.

Christopher Hewer and Klaus Dodds.<sup>116</sup> Both have addressed the issues of how Thatcher; those in her government in 1982; and opposition politicians have sought to portray the conflict with a particular focus on its effect on Britain's standing in the world. As the present work has framed the memoirs of Thatcher within her own experience of the conflict, this thesis has consulted the diaries and memoirs of figures such as Tony Benn, James Callaghan, Noel Dorr, and Clive Ponting but has framed what can be taken from these accounts with the individuals' predisposed political positions and well-publicised opposition to Britain's handling of the conflict.<sup>117</sup> Nevertheless, life writing is an essential source: given that this research examines perceptions to the crisis, prominent individuals matter. It highlights how the conflict was viewed and treated by political actors, providing an indication to some of the factors that would have informed their decision making. Thatcher's recollection could be indicative that she wanted the conflict to be a period remembered for Britain's strong relationship with France. This aspect of memoir study has been particularly important in dealing with the various figures of the US administration dealt with in chapter two.

This work has made use of newspaper reporting, in particular in chapter three. Newspapers have been particularly useful for studying the remarks made by political actors and for establishing positions that different governments and legislators wished to present to their electorates. It is important to note that newspapers often have political leanings which can affect the way in which news stories are reported but for this study, like memoirs, such leanings further highlight different dispositions. This study has researched the background of these newspapers to interpret the editorials and what they can show about press opinion. Italian newspapers, particularly, had strong political connections which influenced their editorial lines and as such it was important that this thesis evaluated upon those before drawing conclusions on the response of the Italian media. Although extensive British newspaper archives are available online this thesis has not commented much on this

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<sup>116</sup> Christopher Hewer. 'The Falkland/Malvinas Dispute: a Contemporary Battle between History and Memory,' *Global Discourse: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Current Affairs and Applied Contemporary Thought* 3, no. 1 (June 2013): 144-150; and Klaus Dodds. 'War Stories: British Elite Narratives of the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War,' *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 11, no. 6 (December 1993): 619-640.

<sup>117</sup> Tony Benn, *End of an Era: The Diaries, 1980-1990* (London: Arrow, 1994); James Callaghan, *Time and Chance*. (London: Politico Publishing Ltd., 2006); Noel Dorr, *A Small State at the Top Table: Memories of Ireland on the UN Security Council, 1981-82* (Dublin: Institute of Public Administration, 2011); and Clive Ponting, *The Right to Know: The Inside Story of the Belgrano Affair* (London: Sphere Books, 1985).

source given the present work focusses mainly on non-British reflections on the crisis. Some British media has been referenced for its coverage of the international reaction to the conflict, but after 1982, international opinion on the dispute was not covered in any great depth by the British media. Where possible, this thesis has attempted to evaluate the original media publications on the crisis, as opposed to relying on BBC Monitoring reports or those from the Foreign Broadcast Information Service in the US. This allows the present work to provide an analysis of the media reaction that has not already been affected by a third party interpretation. However, due to the breadth covered by this work, some government summaries on international opinion have been included for nations where online archives were not available.

This work also aimed to uncover different public perceptions on the crisis. This proved a difficult task since, although regular opinion polls regarding the crisis were conducted in Argentina and Britain, they were not in other countries. In some nations in Europe, opinion polls were carried out in the conflict period and these have been included in chapter three. However, past that, this research was not able to locate similar polls in other nations. Although the appearance of reports on the crisis in the newspapers can be seen as an indication of public interest in the conflict, it is difficult to be confident about public opinion without polling data.

Ultimately, this thesis has incorporated a number of different methodologies to achieve its research aims. The reliability and usefulness of the available sources have been tested and the most valid conclusions drawn. The bulk of this research is based on discourse analysis of source material available from the UK government held in the National Archives, the limitations of such have been discussed and appropriately accounted for in the conclusions. However, this has been complemented by a range of other discourse sources from both the UK and abroad. Research techniques developed by scholars of linguistics have been of importance in examining these sources. Problems were identified during the research process but solutions were found and conclusions tapered appropriately, resulting in a solid evidence base for this work to be built upon.

#### **1.4. Structure**

This thesis aims to provide a comparative history of the international perceptions of the crisis by taking a detailed study of the responses of the countries to which the affair mattered most.

Through examining their perspectives on the crisis, this thesis will highlight common themes between them. The perspectives from all nations are tracked from the conflict period through to the restoration of diplomatic relations between Britain and Argentina in 1990. Perspectives are explained with reference to developing events in the crisis, highlighting the important aspects relevant to each nation being studied.<sup>118</sup> This thesis, for most of the chapters, splits the discussion into attitudes before, during and after the conflict. In this manner, the development of opinions as the dispute developed can be best highlighted. The exception to this is the chapter on Europe. Due to the similar themes between different groups of nations, it was more appropriate to discuss the attitudes of nations based on similar factors involved in influencing each policy. As a result, that chapter is structured to look at the development of opinion of groups of nations together as opposed to the EEC or the continent of Europe as a whole. This way, the common themes in the nature of European reaction are more clearly drawn out and better evaluated.

Chapter one explores how the crisis was received in the UN a crucial area to discuss given its role as the largest international organisation of the 1980s. The dispute of the islands sovereignty had been debated in the UNGA since the formation of the UN in 1945. Following the Argentine invasion, Britain brought the dispute before the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and following the end of the conflict, resolutions concerning the islands were debated every autumn in the UNGA until 1988. As a result, the UN became the arena in which governments expressed their positions on the crisis and issues such as self-determination were debated. This chapter analyses the wording of the different resolutions regarding the crisis that were tabled in both the UNSC and UNGA. It explores how important the wording of each resolution was as different nations placed different emphasis on the importance of the islanders' wishes and the issue of any negotiations having a predetermined outcome. It was in these debates which delegations most plainly expressed their frustration over the lack of negotiations. Through this, it is shown that nations that had supported Britain during the conflict became increasingly frustrated with what was seen as British intransigence hindering negotiation. The chapter then discusses the results of the voting and what this shows about the overall opinion of the member states of the UN towards the crisis and sovereignty dispute. This chapter forms a basis on which further discussion is built, as

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<sup>118</sup> Despite the similarities between the Falklands dispute and the status of Hong Kong, Asia is not covered by this thesis. This is because of the language restrictions of the author and the availability of source material written in English.

proceeding chapters reference the UN debates and look closer at the decision making behind the votes of other nations.

From there, the thesis moves onto a discussion of the responses to the crisis from the US given the prominent role played by the Americans in attempting to find a peaceful resolution to the crisis. The United States was Britain's most prominent ally in 1982 and held prominent influence among western nations. With Britain and Argentina both forming cornerstones of US Cold War foreign policy in 1982, the Falklands conflict posed a significant threat to wider US interests. Given both the potential impact of the conflict on wider US interests and the prominent role the US played in peace negotiations, a study of US perceptions on the crisis is crucial to any study on international perceptions on Britain and the crisis. Freedman has commented that the crisis was the worst time for Anglo-American relations since the Suez crisis as it highlighted a conflict in US and British global interests.<sup>119</sup> The importance of both Britain and Latin America to United States' wider foreign policy interest meant that the State Department and White House were keen to avoid conflict. American government officials believed that a conflict could lead to the collapse of the government in either Britain or Argentina, leaving a power vacuum that could be filled by either the Communist Party in Argentina or an anti-nuclear Labour Party in Britain. Neither of those prospects was favourable to the United States' Cold War policy aims. This encouraged Secretary of State Alexander Haig to undertake a mission of shuttle diplomacy in an attempt to find a peaceful resolution to the dispute. Only when conflict was inevitable did the United States formally side with Britain, but this was not to the satisfaction of all US government officials. Most notably the US ambassador to the UN, Jeane Kirkpatrick, advocated for the Argentine position on sovereignty. Once the conflict was over, the US focussed on repairing its relations with Latin America by supporting Argentina in the UNGA. This chapter explores the decision-making process in the United States government whilst also tracking the developing opinion of the American public during the crisis. This chapter explores, how in Washington, the dispute was weighed against other policy objectives and how this affected US perception of the crisis.

Alongside the US, Europe represented another important area for Britain to gain support given the strong interest Britain had in Europe through the EEC and Cold War policy. Nations such as Ireland and Spain were involved in territorial disputes with Britain.

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<sup>119</sup> Freedman, *TOHOTFC Volume II*, 495.

Spain and Italy had close cultural links to Argentina. As such, European perspectives represent another important international block for this thesis to study and is explored in chapter three. This chapter treats European states individually rather than the EEC together, highlighting that ultimately each state had their own policy interests and response to the Falklands conflict was balanced against those individual interests. The chapter considers Thatcher's assertion that Mitterrand was an excellent ally through the crisis by examining the perspectives of the French president as well as other departments in the French government. The work then explores German responses to the crisis as West Germany was the state which pushed for European Political Cooperation (EPC). This work examines how the crisis fitted into the EPC framework and whether German desire for a strong EPC affected their response to the conflict. Other nations considered in this chapter include Ireland given the resonance of the Falklands crisis with the troubles in Northern Ireland: an intensely loyal but isolated British community facing a neighbour keen to reunite its territory. The chapter also examines Italian and Spanish responses to the crisis given the close cultural links between Italy, Spain, and Argentina. The crisis was particularly relevant to Spain given Spanish claims to the British-held territory of Gibraltar. Although this chapter does examine the discussions of the crisis within the EC, it is crucial that each European nation is also considered separately so European responses to the crisis can be better understood.<sup>120</sup>

The Commonwealth of Nations included many states who had recently gained independence following sovereignty disputes with Britain and remained a reminder of the struggles of states to free themselves from the British Empire. As Argentina attempted to portray the conflict as a matter of colonialism, Commonwealth perspectives were important in asserting what the key issues at stake were in the conflict: decolonisation or self-determination. As such, Commonwealth perspectives are explored in chapter 4. Argentine strategy in the UN was to present British sovereignty as colonialist. This was particularly relevant to the Commonwealth as many of the member states were former British colonies. Many of these states were also members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), an organisation committed to ending colonialism.<sup>121</sup> This chapter explores whether the member

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<sup>120</sup> The reaction of the USSR and eastern Europe is not covered in much depth. There were few English language sources, and they did not reveal anything remarkable that was not available through study of other sources. This is discussed further in chapter 3.

<sup>121</sup> The NAM is also discussed in chapter five.

states of the Commonwealth agreed with the Argentine assertion that the sovereignty dispute over the Falkland Islands was a matter of colonialism. It explores which issues in the crisis were most important for states in the Commonwealth focussing on the notion of self-determination and the peaceful resolution of disputes. In her memoirs, Thatcher praised the members of the 'old Commonwealth' for showing continued support to the British cause.<sup>122</sup> This chapter tests whether Commonwealth support was stronger than other nations by examining the attitudes of the Commonwealth states both during the conflict and after. In doing so, the work highlights a definitive shift in the opinions of such governments towards the Falklands crisis in the years after 1982. An evaluation of Commonwealth attitudes in the debates surrounding the UNGA resolutions on the Falklands is key for understanding how the matters of decolonisation and self-determination were viewed in international organisations.

The Organisation of American States (OAS) had traditionally supported Argentina's claim to the islands, and many other members of the organisation were involved in similar sovereignty disputes themselves. Whereas the other organisations discussed in this thesis had traditionally good relations with Britain, HMG had regularly been in dispute with Latin America over the islands and as a result, the OAS represents a final important bloc of nations for this thesis to consider which is done in chapter five. The Argentine government expected strong support from Latin America, and it was in this area of the world that the dispute had been of most relevance prior to 1982. Unlike other areas examined in this thesis, Latin American nations had been vocal in their support for the Argentine claim to sovereignty prior to 1982. The OAS regularly noted its support for the Argentina and Latin American nations had repeatedly supported Argentina in debates on the islands in the UN. However, the dispute was one of many sovereignty debates in Latin America at that time, and the conflict had the potential to establish precedents. Further, many Latin American states had other policy interests with strong links to the UK and the US. These factors were important influences in shaping Latin American response to the crisis. Nations were not unanimous in their support for Argentina noting other policy issues as being more important. This chapter explores how Latino governments formed their Falklands policies and how far they were willing to support Argentina's actions. In exploring the years after the conflict, this thesis

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<sup>122</sup> Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years*, 182. The 'old Commonwealth' is a term used by Thatcher to refer to nations such as Australia, Canada and New Zealand.



also examines the effectiveness of British attempts to manage relations with Latin America and the effect this had on Latin American opinion of the Falklands crisis.

The countries covered in this thesis had links to the crisis through their relationship to Britain and Argentina, or through wider sovereignty debates. By examining the period after 1982, something few other students of the crisis have done, this work is able to assess international perspectives on the crisis. It explores the nature of different responses and the issues in the crisis that were most important for different nations, and thereby provide a detailed comparative history of international perceptions of the Falklands crisis.

## 2. Chapter One: The Conflict in the UN

Moreover, the Islanders' right to self-determination is no less inalienable than that of other peoples. No-one, not Argentina, not the General Assembly, can take it away from them.<sup>1</sup>

### 2.1. Chapter Abstract

Since its formation in 1945, the United Nations General Assembly had been the arena in which the Falklands dispute was debated between Governments. From 1960 until 1976, it was annually reviewed by the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.<sup>2</sup> Between 1960 and 1982, the dispute between Argentina and the United Kingdom over the sovereignty of the islands had been subject to four resolutions. The last resolution, of 1976, had been put forward by the Argentine delegation with the support of other Latin American nations. Its wording clearly blamed subsequent British governments for the failure in finding a resolution to the on-going disagreement over who rightfully should hold sovereignty over the islands, and it passed with a landslide majority. However, the Argentine use of force to assert their claim to the islands complicated the situation. As this work considers an international dispute, the United Nations is central. This chapter aims to address how the dispute developed in both the General Assembly and Security Council as well as evaluate the role played by the Office of the Secretary-General of the UN in seeking to bring about a resolution to the conflict. During the conflict period, a dispute that had been of hitherto marginal importance became the prime focus of diplomacy in the United Nations.

The focus of the discussion in the United Nations was less about bringing about a permanent conclusion to the sovereignty dispute than a swift and peaceful resolution to hostilities. For the few months of conflict between April-June 1982, the dispute assumed importance in the UN for its potential effects on other areas of international order, especially important in the context of the Cold War. However, subsequently, the dispute was quickly superseded by other issues, pre-eminently in the Middle East, and did not feature heavily in

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<sup>1</sup> Andrew Palmer to David Thomas: Verbatim of Geoffrey Howe's speech to the United Nations General Assembly, 29 October 1984, FCO 7/5957 f791.

<sup>2</sup> Also known as 'the Special Committee of 24'.

subsequent UN debates. Despite previous Argentine resolutions calling for the situation to be evaluated, the sovereignty of the islands was never substantively discussed in the General Assembly and resolutions tabled by numerous parties only ever called on the governments of the United Kingdom and Argentina to find a resolution, whatever that may be. The present work addresses the question of the nature of the international response to the Falklands crisis and dispute as shown in the UN and the relative importance of the issue of self-determination. This chapter aims to highlight the nature of UN deliberation on the dispute as well as highlight how different delegations approached the issue in the General Assembly. In doing so, it also evaluates that the real question of sovereignty over the islands mattered little so long as peace could be maintained.

## **2.2. Introduction**

The UN was the place where the issues concerning the Falklands crisis were most frequently debated between nations.<sup>3</sup> Although the sovereignty dispute had been debated in the UN since 1960, the prospect of conflict was only first brought to the attention of the Security Council on 1 April 1982, when the UK mission in New York was first appraised of the impending Argentine invasion of the islands.<sup>4</sup> Prior to 1982, the issue had not often featured in the UN but following the conflict the dispute was debated annually until 1988 as other national blocs, such as the Commonwealth, advised that the General Assembly was the most appropriate arena for the matter to be discussed.<sup>5</sup> Debates in the UN provided both sides in the conflict with the opportunity to legitimise their actions not just in 1982 but also through the years immediately after the conflict. The UN charter, in addition to prior General Assembly resolutions concerning decolonisation and the right to self-defence, provided the legislative framework within which the matter was debated and as such was seen as the most appropriate place for the matter to be discussed. Whilst some blocs more favourable to the Argentine cause, such as the Non-Aligned Movement and the Organisation of American States, formed their own organisational policy on the crisis, it was within the realms of the

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<sup>3</sup> The General Assembly resolutions concerning the Falkland Islands after the end of the conflict were all titled ‘the Question of the Falklands Islands (Malvinas)’.

<sup>4</sup> UKMIS New York to FCO, 1 April 1982, document released to the Margaret Thatcher Foundation through FOI request, accessed 17 March 2016, available at <https://www.margarethatcher.org/document/118433>.

<sup>5</sup> A brief history of the dispute in the United Nations is given later in this chapter.

UN that the UK interacted with these states over the Falklands. It was the UN's role here that underlines its importance in any study of the crisis.

For this chapter it is first important to understand the structure of the UN. The United Nations has six main organs. Three of those did not take a prominent role in the Falklands crisis and so are not discussed in this chapter: The Economic and Social Council; the Trusteeship Council; and the International Court of Justice. The General Assembly is the main deliberative and policy making organ of the UN. All member states of the UN have delegations in the General Assembly. Each year in autumn, all members meet for the General Assembly Session and general debate. The general debate features questions on peace and security and following the end of the conflict was the arena where debates on the sovereignty dispute were discussed. The Security Council has primary responsibility, under the UN charter, for the maintenance of international peace and security. It has 15 members, five permanent and ten elected, with each member having one vote. The Security Council takes the lead in determining the existence of a threat to the peace emanating from an act of aggression. During the Falklands conflict, the member states of the Security Council were the five permanent members (China, France, UK, USA and the Soviet Union) alongside Guyana, Ireland, Jordan, Japan, Panama, Poland, Spain, Togo, Uganda and Zaire. The final organ of the UN that was important during the Falklands crisis was the Secretariat. The head of the Secretariat is the Secretary-General who is the chief administrative officer of the Organization, appointed by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Security Council for a five-year, renewable term. During the Falklands conflict, the post of Secretary-General was held by Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, a former Peruvian diplomat who served in embassies in Latin America and Europe before being appointed Peru's permanent representative to the UN in 1971 and Secretary-General in January 1982.

This chapter aims to provide an overview of how the issue was debated in the UN and how the mechanisms of this international organisation operated in an attempt to bring about peace. This chapter will show how the arguments of both the UK and Argentina were viewed in the UN. This present work analyses how member nations presented their response to the annual resolutions and discusses how important the principles of self-determination and the settling of disputes through peaceful means were to all member states within the United Nations when contrasted with any state's individual interest in the crisis. This chapter is not a history of the United Nations as an organisation nor does it provide any analysis on the processes of either the General Assembly or the Security Council. The conflict caused

problems for the UN as it was forced to balance a number of competing principles outlined through its own charter. As an organisation established to maintain peace and security, the UN would always prefer peace over conflict. However, it was also an organisation that had traditionally supported decolonisation yet permitted Britain to respond to the Argentine action militarily under the right to self-defence. Additionally, the Security Council voted to support the British argument that Argentina had violated international law. Nations were forced to balance these competing arguments and principles to form their own positions on a matter that had prior been of no importance. This chapter explores how the UN perspectives on Britain, the crisis and sovereignty debate to highlight that the overarching concern in the UN was to prevent the conflict from affecting wider foreign policy issues for the individual member states.

### **2.2.1. Literature review**

Despite its importance, the role of the UN in the crisis does not have much focussed literature. Although almost all histories of the conflict devote significant time to the UN's role during the period of fighting, there has been no study that analyses the formation of the six resolutions after June 1982. Anthony Parsons produced a short memoir of the crisis in the United Nations covering his time as the British Ambassador to the UN, however, this focusses on his personal experience of the debates, often centralising his role in garnering support for the British position.<sup>6</sup> Further, as previously mentioned, such a memoir also has the risk that it may have been written to highlight the importance of Parsons' own role in the negotiations in the UN whilst not focussing on the role of other important figures at the UN. Since 1982, Parsons' has also deflected any blame for the conflict on the part of the British government which is in direct contrast to the conclusions drawn by many scholars of the causes of the conflict.<sup>7</sup> Such testimony highlights the importance of cross-referencing Parsons' account with other source material. In 1985, international relations professor John

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<sup>6</sup> Anthony Parsons, 'The Falklands Crisis in the United Nations, 31 March – 14 June 1982,' *International Affairs* 59, no. 2 (Spring 1983): 169-178.

<sup>7</sup> Anthony Parsons Interview with James Sutterlin (Yale University Oral History Project), 19 April 1991, accessed 17 September 2016, available at <http://dag.un.org/handle/11176/89711>.

Spence wrote a chapter on the crisis as part of a collection of work on diplomacy at the UN.<sup>8</sup> Spence analysed the effectiveness of the UN as an international organisation through the crisis concluding that ‘the UN revealed itself as more than simply the sum of its parts, aspiring, though not always succeeding, to play the role of an independent actor whose authority, status and resulting political influence could not be ignored.’<sup>9</sup> Spence focuses specifically on the conflict and attempts to build on the work that had already been published in the few years after 1982 and does not discuss the wider foreign policy interests of the member states of the UN. This present thesis argues against Spence’s conclusion through taking a more detailed examination of the archival evidence on the UN’s reaction and placing it into the wider context of the UN’s role in the dispute. Parson’s memoir and Spence’s study remain the only focussed works on the UN’s role in the dispute. This is in large part due to the period after 1982 remaining an understudied area of the history of the dispute.

After Parsons’ account the most significant study is the *Official History of the Falklands Campaign* authored by Lawrence Freedman which analyses in great depth the diplomacy at the UN but again this is limited to the period of the conflict itself.<sup>10</sup> This current work utilises some of the same sources as Freedman in its analysis of the conflict period but also aims to evaluate upon the role of the UN in the dispute after the conflict through using source material released since the thirty year anniversary of the conflict in 2012. Incidentally, it was during the conflict period that the UN played its smallest role in the dispute as US Secretary of State Alexander Haig and Peruvian President Fernando Belaúnde pursued their own peace initiatives. It was only after the failure of these two missions that the UN came to the fore as the General Secretary made his own attempt at a peace mission. This chapter makes use of documentation released through the National Archives, evaluating the build-up to each of the Falklands resolutions voted on in the autumn from 1982-1988. This present work also analyses the UK government’s interaction with the various states in the General Assembly, evaluating how the United Kingdom presented their arguments in contrast to the Argentine views. The present work discusses how other states responded to each of the different issues at stake to present an accurate interpretation of the

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<sup>8</sup> John Edward Spence, ‘The UN and the Falklands Crisis’ in *Diplomacy at the UN* (eds.) A. Jennings and G.R. Berridge (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1985), 59-72.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid*, 59.

<sup>10</sup> Freedman, *TOHOTFC Volume I*.

international opinion of Britain, the crisis and the dispute as seen in the United Nations as each nation sought to protect its foreign policy interests.

## **2.3. The Dispute before the Conflict**

### ***2.3.1. The dispute first appears in the UN***

The dispute first appeared in the UNGA in 1960 when the ‘Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples’ (which became known as ‘the Declaration on Decolonisation’) Resolution 1514 (XV) was passed on the 14 December. This formed the backdrop to the dispute and launched a debate within the United Nations on the status of the Falkland Islands. The British government maintained that the right to self-determination applied to the islanders and as such they were free to choose their own political status. However, the Argentine government argued that the statement in operative paragraph six – “[a]ny attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations”<sup>11</sup> – superseded the right to self-determination as the Falkland islanders of 1960 were not an indigenous population but descendants of settlers planted there after the British seizure of the islands in 1833.<sup>12</sup> The General Assembly then established a special committee on the implementation of Resolution 1514 (XV) in 1961 which first considered the case of the islands in 1964, and has done so every year since, but were unable to bring a resolution to the dispute before 1982. The first resolution passed with specific reference to the islands was Resolution 2065 (XX) which passed on 16 December 1965. Argentine governments have since claimed that this resolution highlights the General Assembly’s support for their claim to sovereignty but the wording of the text does little more than promote negotiation towards finding a peaceful settlement, which explains why the UK did

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<sup>11</sup> General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) *Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples*, 14 December 1960, accessed 19 March 2015, available at <http://www.staff.city.ac.uk/p.willetts/SAC/UN/RES1514.HTM>.

<sup>12</sup> The islands had changed hands several times over the years prior to 1933. For a full dissection on the origins of the dispute, see *The Disputed Islands: The Falkland crisis: a history & background* (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1982).

not vote against it.<sup>13</sup> The strongest point in support of the Argentine claim to sovereignty is that the text refers to the ‘interests of the population’ which could have implied setting aside the principle of self-determination but without any definite terminology, one cannot argue that this substantiates support for any claim to sovereignty over the islands. Resolution 2625 (XXV), passed on 24 October 1970, amended the principle of self-determination to allow “the emergence in any other political status freely determined by people,” opening the possibility for shared or distributed sovereignty between the UK and Argentina over the islands.<sup>14</sup> However, Argentina was campaigning for a full transfer of sovereignty so this did little in the way of progress towards a settlement.

### ***2.3.2. The final debates leading to conflict***

Although, a number of resolutions called for Britain to engage in negotiations with Argentina over the sovereignty issue, the UN did not have a prominent role in persuading Britain to explore options of ceding sovereignty in the years leading to the conflict. In September 1973, Argentina joined the Non-Aligned Movement and in turn gained the support of the majority of the NAM governments in its claim to sovereignty. The NAM was an organisation that opposed colonisation and as such was hostile to Britain’s retention of, what Argentina deemed to be, a colony. Argentina returned to the General Assembly in December 1973, claiming that negotiations had been paralysed by Britain’s refusal to discuss sovereignty. That month a resolution was passed, Resolution 3160 (XXVIII), which was very similar to Resolution 2065 except that it implicitly placed pressure on the British government by referring to the “need to accelerate negotiations”, an addition supported by the members of the NAM who gave their support to Argentina in protest at what was seen as Britain holding onto a remnant of its former empire.<sup>15</sup> At the Non-Aligned Conference of Foreign Ministers in August 1975, the NAM gave its full backing to Argentina over its

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<sup>13</sup> General Assembly Resolution 2065 (XX) *Question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas)*, 16 December 1965, accessed 15 March 2015, available at <http://www.staff.city.ac.uk/p.willetts/SAC/UN/RES2065.PDF>.

<sup>14</sup> General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV) the *Declaration on the Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations*, 24 October 1970, accessed 15 March 2015, available at <http://www.staff.city.ac.uk/p.willetts/SAC/UN/RES-2625.PDF>.

<sup>15</sup> General Assembly Resolution 3160 (XXVIII) *Question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas)*, 14 December 1973, accessed 15 March 2015, available at <http://www.staff.city.ac.uk/p.willetts/SAC/UN/RES3160.PDF>.



sovereignty claim and did so again at the Fifth Summit of the NAM in August 1976. The weight of this backing led to Resolution 31/49 being passed in the UNGA on 1 December 1976. The language used in the text explicitly placed blame on the United Kingdom for holding up negotiations whilst also endorsing the two declarations from the NAM. It noted that the General Assembly '[e]xpresses its gratitude for the continuous efforts made by the Government of Argentina, in accordance with the relevant decisions of the General Assembly to facilitate the process of decolonisation and to promote the well-being of the population of the islands.'<sup>16</sup> Again the weight of support for Argentina among the NAM saw a more explicit reference made to Britain being at fault for the hold up in finding a solution. It did not make reference to the principle of self-determination and the endorsement of the NAM declarations with reference to the 'well-being of the population' both indicated a general support for the Argentine position on the dispute. Further, this resolution explicitly stated the issue was one of decolonisation, a point which the UK government would repeatedly try to deny in the years after the conflict. Resolution 31/49 was the first General Assembly resolution on the dispute that the UK voted against but it was the only country to do so. The resolution passed with an overwhelming majority of 102 in favour and only 32 abstentions, highlighting the weight of international opinion.

The 1974-79 period of negotiation between Britain and Argentina has been covered by historian Aaron Donaghy. He argues that the Labour government were always aware of the threat of military action from the Argentines after the British ship *RSS Shackleton* was fired on by an Argentine military vessel in the South Atlantic on 4 February 1976. Donaghy surmised that the Labour government maintained peace with a policy where 'the priority was to avoid conflict by demonstrating a willingness to negotiate while at the same time making preparations for the islands' defence.'<sup>17</sup> However, although there was outrage in the British Parliament at the Shackleton incident, this did not strengthen the resolve of the British government to hold onto the islands.<sup>18</sup> Rather, following the incident, first the Labour governments of Wilson and Callaghan and then the first Thatcher administration made

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<sup>16</sup> General Assembly Resolution 31/49 *Question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas)*, 1 December 1976, accessed 15 March 2015, available at <http://www.staff.city.ac.uk/p.willetts/SAC/UN/AR-31-49.PDF>.

<sup>17</sup> Aaron Donaghy, *The British Government and the Falkland Islands, 1974-1979* (London: Palgrave, 2014), 95.

<sup>18</sup> Hansard HC Deb, vol. 621 cols 1414-1417, 5 February 1976, accessed 15 March 2015, available at <https://www.parliament.uk>.

moves which indicated they were willing to cede sovereignty to some degree. Although following the Shackleton incident, the Secretary of Defence, Lord Mason, did agree to keep HMS *Endurance* in the waters around the islands, he only did so for a further year and continued to express concerns at the expenditure of the required defence.<sup>19</sup> When the Thatcher administration came into office in 1979, they began negotiation with the Argentines. Nicholas Ridley, FCO minister with responsibility for the islands, met with his Argentine counterparts in New York on a number of occasions to discuss the possibility of a leaseback option. He also travelled to the islands in November 1980 to discuss all options available with the islanders' government representatives.<sup>20</sup> That being said, there is no evidence that these moves by Britain were due in any part to increased pressure from the United Nations but rather out of government concern over the cost of British commitment to the islands. It was at the time when the British appeared most willing to hand over sovereignty, that the Junta pursued its military solution to the dispute. This further indicates there were ulterior motives for the military action taken by the Junta discussed in the introduction to this thesis. There was no change in the actions of the United Nations or strengthening of British resolve to hold on to the islands prior to April 1982. Given the increased negotiation between Britain and Argentina, there was little reason for the United Nations to think that a conflict was coming. Further the years between 1976 and 1982 saw UN attention on Argentina focus on the accusations of human rights abuses committed by the Junta. As such, in these years, the sovereignty of the islands was not the subject of prominent debate in the UNGA and member states appeared unconcerned with the situation.

The years of the crisis in the UN would be dominated by continuous debate over what sort of issue the islands presented. Although the rise of the Junta and human rights issues in Argentina after 1976 caused some distraction from the issue in the General Assembly, there had been a definite sense that the sovereignty of the islands was a matter of decolonisation and that Britain had been responsible for holding up negotiation and the finding of a peaceful settlement. Resolution 31/49 importantly also requested both countries

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<sup>19</sup> Mason to Callaghan, 12 February 1976, FCO 7/3816 f14.

<sup>20</sup> Nicholas Ridley minute to Ure: Comments on options for future policy, 14 May 1979, ALW 040/325/1 Part B; FCO to UKE Buenos Aires, 3 October 1979, ALW 040/325/12; Nicholas Ridley message to FCO, 29 April 1980, ALW 040/325/2 Part C; FCO record of Nick Ridley's visit to the Falkland Islands, 24 November 1980, ALW 040/325/12. Nicholas Ridley met with Carlos Cavandoli, the Argentinian minister tasked with finding a resolution to the sovereignty dispute, in 1979, 1980 and 1981 and discussed the possibility of leaseback.

to “to refrain from taking decisions that would imply introducing unilateral modifications in the situation”.<sup>21</sup> The Argentine invasion of the islands was in breach of this part of the resolution and the UK argued that the invasion constituted a need for a change of position. However, the various representatives of the UK government who discussed the matter in the UN found increasing difficulty in persuading other nations that the invasion had changed anything. That being said, just as prior to 1982 nations in the UN were happy to agree with principles proposed by the government of Argentina yet remained unconcerned by Britain’s lack of engagement in negotiation so too were they happy with this situation after 1982. The conflict was an abhorrent deviation in the diplomatic history of the islands that threatened wider policy interests at the UN but in periods where conflict was not an issue, there was no great concern in the UN that a permanent resolution was not found so long as peace was maintained. In this context, whether the conflict was a matter of decolonisation or self-determination was not a central issue of the dispute in the UN.

## **2.4. The Conflict and the UN**

### ***2.4.1. Justifying the action***

Despite the previous debates, the conflict, when it came, was unexpected. There is little evidence to suggest that more than a few of the delegations in the General Assembly knew about the conversations that had taken place between British Minister of State Richard Luce and Argentine Foreign Minister Enrique Ros in February 1982 regarding the islands.<sup>22</sup> The General Assembly and the Security Council were preoccupied with the situation in the Middle East, between Lebanon and the West Bank, as well as the Nicaraguan complaint regarding US aggression in Central America. However, when the crisis first broke it attracted ‘more public attention than the most long-serving members of the UN secretariat could remember being generated in the history of the Organisation’, a point substantiated by

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<sup>21</sup> General Assembly Resolution 31/49 *Question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas)* 1 December 1976, accessed 15 March 2015, available at <http://www.staff.city.ac.uk/p.willetts/SAC/UN/AR-31-49.PDF>.

<sup>22</sup> Record of meetings between delegates of Britain and Argentina regarding the Falkland Islands in 1982 available in FCO 7/4887.

histories of the media coverage of the conflict.<sup>23</sup> Global media focussed in on the United Nations building in New York. Parsons summarised his personal experience of this sensation in his memoir:

We must have given hundreds of press, TV and radio interviews. It reached the stage when I was being buttonholed by total strangers in the streets of New York and told by visitors from Africa, Eastern Europe and as far away as East Asia that we, the principal actors in the Falklands drama in New York, were appearing on their television screens more frequently than their own political leaders!<sup>24</sup>

The prospect of Britain, a former imperial power, going to war with Argentina to protect a group of small islands some 8,000 miles away from British shores was subject that garnered a lot of media interest and the decision making processes of the United Nations were scrutinised intensely as long as the public fascination remained. Throughout the conflict period, there was a lot of diplomatic activity as the UK looked to gain support for its campaign to retake the islands. Given the public attention on the crisis, it was important to many countries that they presented seemingly justifiable positions on the conflict, positioning their views in reference to Britain's call for the rejection of violence and the principle of self-determination to be upheld. Britain was aided in this period by the readiness of many nations to condemn aggression as a means to settle international disputes. However, those countries that supported the Argentine stance on sovereignty sought to distract attention from the Argentine transgressions and focus the debate more on the consequence of refusing to negotiate or resolve issues of decolonisation.

Following the landing of Argentine scrap metal workers on South Georgia in March 1982, the Argentine Permanent Representative to the UN, Eduardo Roca, approached his US counterpart, Jeanne Kirkpatrick, regarding the possibility of bringing the question of South Georgia to the Security Council.<sup>25</sup> In response, Kirkpatrick arranged a meeting between Roca and Parsons for 1 April. The meeting never took place as the British diplomats

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<sup>23</sup> Parsons, 'Falklands at the UN,' 170 and Harris, *GOTCHA! The Media, the Government and the Falklands Crisis*.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>25</sup> UKE Washington to FCO, 7 April 1982, PREM 19/615 f92.

did not want to negotiate directly with the Argentines following the 'invasion'.<sup>26</sup> Roca had sent a letter to the Council members setting out the Argentine position on South Georgia. Initially the Security Council did not respond with much conviction to this, highlighting how far down the dispute was on their list of priorities.<sup>27</sup> However, a much more active response was provoked from the Security Council later the same day when reports broke of a likely Argentine invasion of the islands. The UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar summoned both Parsons and Roca to his office that morning to urge both governments to show restraint in a late attempt to avoid any military confrontation.<sup>28</sup> That afternoon, on instruction from the FCO, Parsons requested an emergency meeting of the Security Council. He first spoke to Ambassador Kamanda of Zaire, the president of the Security Council for April, and pressed on him to show favour to Britain in the dispute. Britain had developed some close links with Zaire in the years leading up to 1982, including making some significant aid donations to the Zaire government. It was hoped that Zaire would as such return favour to the UK by voting with HMG in the votes to come.<sup>29</sup> The reaction of Zaire is the first indication of how the crisis could be used to influence relationships with Britain in other areas. Zaire had always traditionally supported the Argentine claim to sovereignty over the islands as part of its wider support of decolonisation. However, Britain came to depend on Zaire as a valuable partner in the Security Council during the conflict. It could lean on Zaire to show favour to Britain in return for the support Britain had shown the African nation following years of civil war and domestic unrest in the build up to 1982. These points were stressed by the UK in discussions with Zaire. The Zaire government responded favourably to UK requests alongside questioning how British support for Zaire could be affected by the Zaire position on the crisis.<sup>30</sup> Such questioning is a strong indication that the Zaire government was concerned about the effects any support for Argentina during the crisis may have on its other policy positions.

When the council met late that afternoon, there was an evident lack of understanding of the dispute from the other members of the Security Council. Parsons writes that his announcement of the 'invasion' was met with stunned silence and indicates this was due to

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<sup>26</sup> UKE Washington to FCO, 6 April 1982, PREM 19/615 f93.

<sup>27</sup> See Falkland Islands: Action at the United Nations 1982, FCO 7/4888.

<sup>28</sup> Parsons, 'Falklands at the UN,' 170.

<sup>29</sup> Cranley Onslow's lunch with the Zairean Ambassador, 10 June 1982, FCO 106/692 f110.

<sup>30</sup> Zaire and the Falklands, FCO 106/692.

the shock of UNSC members that Argentina would launch such armed aggression.<sup>31</sup> In writing such, Parsons was attempting to give the impression that the members were united in shock and condemnation of Argentina's action. However, given that the members asked for more clarification on the nature of the dispute, the silence is more indicative of the fact that the other members knew very little about the sovereignty issue or the fact that there had been such a deterioration in relations over the matter that Argentina had resorted to a military solution. Although there were few who knew of negotiations over the sovereignty of the islands that had taken place in the months prior to the invasion, there were even fewer who thought the issue was at the stage where one side would have considered armed aggression as a method of pursuing its claim to sovereignty.<sup>32</sup> Parsons, under instructions from London, requested that the Security Council meet to adopt a presidential statement which urged both sides to show restraint. Initially there were some requests from other council members for more time. It is important to note this as in many debates Britain focussed its arguments on the rejection of violence as a means to settle disputes and pressed that other General Assembly and Security Council members should share in their instant condemnation of the Argentine actions. This hesitant response from the Security Council highlights that they were not so principled to respond to Britain's question without a full consideration of the facts. It was not as straight forward a question as rejecting the Argentine use of violence with other issues at stake. This is not to say that the British expected unwavering support from the whole council, as HMG knew it was in its interests for a vote to be taken quickly, but it does highlight something of the nature of the initial international reaction to the crisis.<sup>33</sup> Parsons has noted that Argentine Ambassador Roca remained silent as the vote on the presidential statement was taken, and that Roca appeared to be taken by surprise at these developments, although there is no further evidence to indicate that Argentines expected their actions to be supported by the UN.<sup>34</sup> Although Parsons was most probably highlighting this to show the incompetence of the Argentine delegation, Roca's surprise was likely a result that Argentina had been led to believe by Jeanne Kirkpatrick that Britain would not be able to bring the matter before the Security Council and were perhaps waiting on other

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<sup>31</sup> Parsons, 'Falklands at the UN,' 170.

<sup>32</sup> See footnote 10.

<sup>33</sup> Parsons letter to the FCO, 1 April 1982, FCO 106/692 f52.

<sup>34</sup> Parsons, 'Falklands at the UN,' 170.

countries to speak up in defence of Argentina without Roca needing to.<sup>35</sup> The United States were one of the few countries who were aware that talks had taken place between Britain and Argentina as recently as February and were perhaps the most up to date on the latest developments over the dispute. Yet, the United States' most senior delegate at the UN still felt that the matter would not stir enough feeling that it would be brought to the Security Council. The issue of decolonisation was still a contentious issue and Argentina's assertion that the islands were part of its sovereign territory was an issue that Kirkpatrick may have felt would carry some weight in the Security Council given her own expressed sympathy with the Argentine position.<sup>36</sup> Whether this was naïve or not, it still highlights that some international opinion at the start of the crisis did not side with the British.

Following the Argentine seizure of the islands on 2 April both sides presented their arguments to the UN and attempted to portray different principles as being at stake. The British delegation had pre-empted the invasion and had already begun preparation on the text that would become Security Council Resolution 502.<sup>37</sup> It was at this point that the British decided the main thrust of their arguments would be based on opposition to 'the illegitimate use of force to settle a long standing political problem' and to act quickly to avoid becoming entrenched in political negotiation.<sup>38</sup> In doing so, the British avoided the initial debate becoming entrenched around the differing opinions on decolonisation and self-determination. Rather, the British focussed on an argument they knew the majority of the Security Council would not reject. To this end, the UK bypassed the customary stages of circulating a working paper which would have led to a preliminary draft, but instead went straight to submitting its final draft and insisting on a vote within twenty-four hours.<sup>39</sup> On 3 April, Argentine Foreign Minister Costa Mendez spoke to the Security Council in advance of the vote. His talk focussed on the historical nature of the problem, noting irony in the British calling the Argentine actions illegitimate given the Argentine argument that the British had taken the islands through an act of force in 1833. In doing so, he emphasised that

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<sup>35</sup> Sally-Ann Treharne, *Reagan and Thatcher's Special Relationship: Latin America and Anglo-American Relations* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015), 50.

<sup>36</sup> Jeanne Kirkpatrick, *Dictadura y Contradicción* (Buenos Aires: Sudamericana, 1984).

<sup>37</sup> Text of which outlined in Appendix 3.

<sup>38</sup> FCO to UKMIS New York, 2 April 1983, FCO 7/4888 f21.

<sup>39</sup> The initial strategy was to insist on a vote on the same day but with Argentine Foreign Minister Dr Costa Mendez on his way to New York to explain the Argentine position to the UN, the British were forced to accept a vote on 3 April.

the matter was an issue of decolonisation in contrast to Britain's arguments around the legality of Argentina's actions.<sup>40</sup> This was significant given that the United Nations had traditionally opposed colonisation and had urged nations to form their response to previous resolutions on that basis.<sup>41</sup> As such, Roca was attempting to offer some justification to the Argentine actions. The Argentine government was aiming to gain support from those nations who were former colonies. Arguing the dispute was one of decolonisation was the justification Panama, the only Latin American member of the Security Council, used when supporting Argentina. The Organisation of American States, of which both Argentina and Panama were members, had traditionally supported the Argentine claim to sovereignty. The OAS had criticised Britain for not progressing negotiations despite the numerous United Nations resolutions of the past. As a result, for both Panama and Argentina, the act of aggression could be justified as being a necessary act to assert Argentina's legitimate claim over the islands. In addition, Panama also had historical interest in removing western military influence in the southern hemisphere and so the removal of the British garrison on the islands supported wider Panamanian policy.<sup>42</sup>

In the debate that followed, it became clear that the principles were not so important to the member states as the potential effect the conflict may have on wider foreign policy issues. Rather the principles were used to frame justifications for supporting one side or the other which was mainly motivated by nations' other policy goals. Panama stressed the questionable legality of Britain's rule over the islands, whilst the USSR, Poland and Spain all stressed the lack of negotiation that had taken place over recent decades.<sup>43</sup> The latter three countries' actions at this stage can also be tied into wider foreign policy concerns. Spain had close cultural links with Argentina and was also involved in a similar sovereignty dispute with Britain over Gibraltar.<sup>44</sup> It would have been likely that Poland and the USSR would not vote with Britain on the matter given the context of the Cold War as the USSR was attempting to gain influence in Latin America and Poland followed Moscow's lead as

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<sup>40</sup> FCO Record of Debate, UN Security Council, 2 April 1982, *Margaret Thatcher Archive*, accessed 15 March 2015, available at <https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/118438>.

<sup>41</sup> This was the motivation behind the formation of the Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

<sup>42</sup> This is discussed further in Chapter 5.

<sup>43</sup> UKMIS New York to FCO, 3 April 1982, FCO 7/4888 f93.

<sup>44</sup> This will be further evaluated in Chapter 4.



another communist state.<sup>45</sup> The votes of Spain, Panama and Poland were all ‘to be expected’ by the British as commented by Parsons.<sup>46</sup> This shows an awareness from HMG of how the sovereignty dispute was viewed internationally. The British considered it a success that the USSR did not exercise its right to veto which would have prevented SCR502 from being passed, making it difficult for Britain to legitimise its campaign to force the withdrawal of Argentine forces from the islands.<sup>47</sup> The USSR perhaps avoided using their veto out of consideration of the need to garner support for its position in Afghanistan.<sup>48</sup> The realisation of what could be achieved in the vote on SCR502 shows that although Britain argued that there were several important principles at stake, there was a realisation that international response to the crisis would be shaped by its potential influence on matters seen as more important by other states. This was in spite of the United Nations declared views on the use of force to settle international disputes or decolonisation.

Evidence from the debate in the Security Council which led up to the vote on Resolution 502 reinforces the importance of other considerations on international response to the crisis. Panama remained Argentina’s strongest supporters in the Security Council throughout the debate. Panamanian Foreign Minister, Jorge Illucea, proposed a delay so that the text of an alternative resolution, being put forward by Panama, could be considered. The procedural vote on this was only narrowly defeated, with seven in favour, three against and four abstentions, thus failing to secure the necessary nine votes for the matter to be passed.<sup>49</sup> The sovereignty dispute was an issue that most delegations knew very little about and so avoiding a delay would force delegations to vote based on the facts they heard in the debate as opposed to going back to review their government’s entrenched positions on the dispute. This was to the benefit of Britain as it allowed Parsons and the other British delegates to emphasise the Argentine violation of international law but also ultimately forced the delegations to choose between voting in opposition to either settlement of disputes through violent means or decolonisation. Having more time to consider the matter would have done little to alter the principles at stake but would have given other delegations the opportunity to consider their vote in line with their government’s wider policy concerns. Given the relative importance of the crisis compared with the struggle between East and West for

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<sup>45</sup> See Falklands Action at the UN 1982, FCO 7/4889.

<sup>46</sup> UKMIS New York to FCO, 3 April 1982, FCO 7/4888 f92.

<sup>47</sup> Falklands Action at the UN 1982, FCO 7/4889.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>49</sup> Parsons, ‘Falklands at the UN,’ 171.

influence in South America, Britain may not have gained many votes had more time been given for delegations to consider their position.

Although the vote was defeated, the majority did vote in favour for more time, showing that there was a desire to consider the dispute within its full context and not to vote solely based on the issues presented in the debate. In addition, there was also a question of whether the UK should be allowed to vote on the resolution. Illucea, again supporting the traditional stance of the OAS in support of Argentine sovereignty, claimed that under Article 27(3) of the Charter ‘in decisions under Chapter VI (Pacific settlement of disputes), a party of the dispute – in this case the United Kingdom – shall abstain from voting.’<sup>50</sup> Further, Costa Mendez argued that the articles of the UN Charter which referred to peaceful settlement of disputes only applied to disputes which had arisen since the Charter had come in to effect in 1945. Britain responded that both these propositions ‘set a dangerous precedent’.<sup>51</sup> Parsons added that resolution 502 had been drafted with Chapter VII (action with respects to threats to peace) of the Charter in mind meaning that Article 27(3) did not apply, and Britain could vote. These arguments generally received the support of those in the Security Council, including Spain, whose permanent representative was a recognised expert on UN procedures.<sup>52</sup> However, it must be remembered that for countries like Spain, involved in similar sovereignty disputes of their own, this would have had the potential for denying them a vote on matters they wished to raise to the UN in the future. In supporting Britain on this point, they were again protecting their own interests, an idea that was evident among other delegations on the Security Council.<sup>53</sup>

Ultimately, the vote on SCR502 was a success for the British. They had secured support from a range of nations and the legal justification for its stance on the removal of Argentine forces from the islands. However, Parsons’ assertion that this support was ‘firm’ misrepresents the true nature of international reaction to the crisis. As conflict looked increasingly likely, the UN were not as supportive of the Task Force as the British delegation hoped for, with antipathy towards the use of force directed towards all parties. Following

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<sup>50</sup> *Charter of the United Nations*, Chapter V, Article 27 (3), accessed 20 June 2015, available at <https://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-v/index.html>.

<sup>51</sup> UKMIS New York to FCO (“Falkland Islands”), 2 April 1982, document released to the Margaret Thatcher Foundation per FOI request 0181-12, accessed 20 June 2015, available at <https://www.margarethatatcher.org/document/118435>.

<sup>52</sup> Parsons, ‘Falklands in the UN,’ 171.

<sup>53</sup> Falklands: Action at the UN, 3 April 1982, FCO 7/4888.

the vote on resolution 502, most media attention switched to US Secretary of State, Alexander Haig and his shuttle diplomacy.<sup>54</sup> However, there was still a lot of action that took place in the UN, particularly from the British, whilst Argentina focussed on mobilising support in the OAS and the NAM. The Secretary-General was particularly anxious that conflict should be avoided and on 8 April established a UN team led by Under-Secretary-General Rafeeuddin Ahmed to work on contingency plans should Haig's mission fail to bring about a peaceful resolution to the conflict.<sup>55</sup> This was followed on the 19 April when Pérez de Cuéllar handed a list to the UK, Argentine and US delegations detailing the ways the UN could be of assistance in bringing about a peaceful resolution to the dispute. This clear preference from the UN for a peaceful solution led to both sides in the dispute feeling the need to attempt to justify the military moves they were making. Britain focussed its justification for the military preparations on Article 51 of the UN Charter which allowed its member states to exercise military options in self-defence. The notes circulated among the Security Council from the British delegation made HMG's position clear, although it would prefer the peaceful removal of Argentine forces from the islands, as detailed in SCR502, it would not 'allow anything to inhibit us [Britain] from exercising our inherent right to self-defence'.<sup>56</sup> Although the British felt their position was soundly justified within the legislation of the UN charter and SCR502, the clear anxiety displayed by the United Nations to avoid conflict highlights that ultimately the UN desired a peaceful resolution to the dispute, no matter what that may be regardless of any stance on the legality of Argentina's initial military response or decolonisation.

As the Task Force advanced throughout April and Britain recaptured South Georgia on 25 April, conflict looked increasingly inevitable and the voices within the United Nations calling for peace grew stronger and the principles with which each side was justifying their actions became less important the UN. The crisis was not following the patterns seen in other situations that the Security Council had faced in the years before 1982 such as the Middle East, Afghanistan and South East Asia – where an act of armed aggression that had changed the status quo had been followed by some form of negotiation which ultimately had left the altered situation unredressed. However, it was now clear that Britain was willing to, if necessary; fight the Argentine forces to retake the lost territories in the South Atlantic. As

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<sup>54</sup> This is further explored in Chapter 3.

<sup>55</sup> UKMIS New York to FCO, 8 April 1982, FCO 7/4888.

<sup>56</sup> Parsons, 'Falklands at the UN,' 171.

such, the various delegations, particularly those in the NAM, began calling for a return to the Security Council, military restraint to be shown by both sides and a return to negotiation.<sup>57</sup> The office of Security-General had maintained that the UN should do nothing which may damage Haig's peace mission but the British retaking of South Georgia (25 April); the announcement of the Total Exclusion Zone (28 April) and the British Task force arriving at the exclusion zone coupled with Haig's announcements that his peace initiatives had failed (30 April) led the Secretary-General to launch a peace mission of his own.<sup>58</sup>

The sinking of the *Belgrano* on 2 May led to fervent diplomacy within the UN and confirmed for the Secretary-General that a peace initiative was necessary. On the day of the *Belgrano*'s sinking, Francis Pym, the new British Foreign Secretary, was in New York to assist the British delegation. He met with the Secretary-General who gave Pym a 'set of ideas' for a negotiated settlement.<sup>59</sup> These included a mutual withdrawal of forces; a return to diplomatic negotiation to find a peaceful and permanent resolution to the dispute; the lifting of all sanctions and the exclusion zone; and arrangements for the interim administration of the islands whilst a negotiated settlement was sought between the parties. Again, the Secretary-General had placed a clear emphasis on finding a peaceful resolution above all else. These ideas were also communicated with the Argentine delegation. This process was interrupted by a formal request from the Irish delegation for negotiations to return to the Security Council but this was rejected.<sup>60</sup> Parsons has since recalled that this was due to British support within the Security Council attempting to highlight a shared feeling among members that Britain's actions were just, however, there is little evidence to support this statement and more likely this was due to delegates not wishing to hinder the Secretary-General's own peace efforts.<sup>61</sup> Britain's response to this request was to reaffirm that it was not to halt its military actions whilst the Argentine forces remained on the islands. This response was not met with enthusiasm or understanding from the UNSC.<sup>62</sup> The council did not support Ireland's request mainly because council members did not want to hinder the peace initiatives of the Secretary-General which may have become 'delayed through the

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<sup>57</sup> UKMIS New York to FCO, 21 April 1982, FCO 7/4888 f97.

<sup>58</sup> UKMIS New York to FCO, 30 April 1982, FCO 7/4888 f87.

<sup>59</sup> Parsons, 'Falklands at the UN,' 172.

<sup>60</sup> The motivations behind this are explored more in Chapter 4.

<sup>61</sup> Parsons, 'Falklands at the UN,' 172.

<sup>62</sup> UKMIS New York to FCO, 3 May 1982, FCO 7/4888 f103.

public debate that would have ensued' had the issue been returned to the Security Council.<sup>63</sup> This is a point that even Parsons does give reference to in his recollection of the event.<sup>64</sup>

On 5 and 6 May, following the losses of the *Belgrano* and HMS *Sheffield* both the Argentine and British governments indicated that they would be willing to proceed on the basis of the Secretary-General's ideas. This led to a series of intense negotiations which stretched to the 19 May. During this process, the Secretary-General met with the British and Argentine delegations every day including weekends in an ardent attempt to bring about a peaceful resolution. The main thrust of these negotiations was that the UN would facilitate a negotiation between the parties whilst placing the islands and associated territories under a temporary UN administration. Hopes for a peaceful settlement were raised further on 11 May when the Argentines appeared to agree that the outcome of the negotiations did not have to be a predetermined transfer of sovereignty to Argentina.<sup>65</sup> The UN's support for this move highlights that the matter of decolonisation did not take precedent in any peace attempts. Argentina had appeared to back down from their assertion that sovereignty had to eventually be ceded and the UN were happy to support this to bring an end to the conflict. The remaining major obstacle to a settlement remained whether the democratic institutions on the islands would be revived during the administration process, a point linked to the issue of self-determination of the islanders.<sup>66</sup> From the Argentine position, any agreement which included the self-determination of the islanders was paramount to entering into negotiation with a predetermined outcome. This would become a point that led to a decline in support for Britain in the years after the conflict.<sup>67</sup> Ultimately, this obstacle was too great to overcome. The British presented their proposals to the Secretary-General on 17 May but these were rejected by the Argentine delegation the following day. On 19 May, the Secretary-General spoke personally with both Thatcher and Galtieri in a final attempt to rescue his failed mission and sent both sides an *aide-memoire* containing his full thoughts on the idea of an interim administration and diplomatic negotiations. Britain's responded by saying they would need to see the Argentine reaction to the suggestions before revealing their own but ultimately Argentina did not respond and Pérez de Cuéllar's initiative failed.

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<sup>63</sup> See UKMIS New York, 4 May 1982, FCO 7/4888, f104.

<sup>64</sup> Parsons, 'Falklands at the UN,' 172.

<sup>65</sup> UKMIS New York to FCO, 11 May 1982. FCO 7/4889 f2.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>67</sup> This is further explored later on this chapter.

It is important to note that at no point in this negotiation process did Pérez de Cuéllar offer a view on the sovereignty dispute either to the media or in debates on the conflict. His focus remained on getting a negotiated settlement that was suitable to both parties and would ultimately avoid conflict. UN representatives that took an active role in the dispute ultimately were not concerned with the sovereignty of the islands. There were a number of principles at stake that the UN traditionally supported such as decolonisation, rejection of the use of violence and self-determination but in the case of the crisis, these principles conflicted with one another. It was a matter too difficult to judge for the Secretary-General and ultimately one that was insignificant when compared to obtaining peace. Given the number of other sovereignty disputes that were occurring around the world in 1982, it is unsurprising that the United Nations did not want to set a precedent that such issues could be settled through military means. This in turn played somewhat in the favour of Argentina, the government which sought to avoid a lengthy conflict but miscalculated Britain's ability and will to respond to the invasion.<sup>68</sup> However, Argentina could not agree to withdrawal without some form of guarantee that the British would be willing to discuss the sovereignty issue as this would have likely lead to further protest in Argentina against the Junta's rule.<sup>69</sup> In attempting to bring the two sides together, the General-Secretary embodied the UN response to the crisis through displaying the paramount importance of finding a peaceful resolution.

On 20 May, the Secretary-General relayed the failure of his peace initiative to the President of the Security-Council. At the request of Panama, the Security Council met the following day for an open debate surrounding the crisis that lasted five days. However, 21 May was also the day British troops began landing on the islands and HMG had become more confident of victory. Member states emphasised the importance of decolonisation and the rejection of violence but ultimately the majority of delegations at the meeting were united by the desire to see a peaceful settlement. The Secretary-General opened the debate by giving his own reflections on the most recent failed negotiations. Pérez de Cuéllar placed emphasis on the issues he felt the sides in the conflict disagreed most on: the time frame in which negotiations should be completed; the related duration of the interim administration; aspects of the mutual withdrawal of forces from the islands; and the geographic area to be

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<sup>68</sup> David Rock, *Argentina, 1516–1987: From Spanish Colonisation to Alfonsín* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 220-221.

<sup>69</sup> This will be explored further in Chapter 6.

covered by the interim administration.<sup>70</sup> He wrote to the British government on 20 May stating, 'in my judgement substantial progress has been made over the past two weeks ... I have suggested certain ideas which overcome the remaining points of difference. The cost of failure in terms of human life and suffering is too high to permit us to give up our efforts.'<sup>71</sup> This was followed by a reserved response from Ros who emphasised Argentina's willingness to negotiate on the basis of SCR502 even though they were not entirely satisfied with its contents and criticised the British for not showing flexibility during the Secretary-General's peace initiatives.<sup>72</sup> Parsons responded at length criticising the general conduct of the Argentine government during the negotiations as well as highlighting what the British felt to be 'wholly unreasonable' demands made by the Argentinians.<sup>73</sup> The British resistance to these proposals was likely strengthened due to the fact that British troops were now on the islands and advancing out of San Carlos Bay. In total, over 50 delegations spoke in the debate that followed. Most of the Latin-American delegations spoke in favour of the Argentine position, the exception being Chile, whereas the English-speaking nations, supported by some delegations from Africa and the ECC, spoke in favour of the British. However, it is important to highlight the manner in which these nations spoke. Very few nations did so with any particular passion regarding the sovereignty or self-determination issue. Most spoke in well balanced language with reference to these particular points and with the emphasis very much being on bringing an end to hostilities.<sup>74</sup> This debate showed that although most delegations had formed an opinion on which party had acted legitimately in the crisis, ultimately this was of little importance when compared with the desire to maintain peace. This is further supported by the fact that de Cuéllar could not have conducted the negotiations the manner he did if he was not certain that no matter what the

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<sup>70</sup> British forces had begun landing on the islands the day before

<sup>71</sup> UKMIS New York to FCO, 20 May 1982, PREM 19/648 f61.

<sup>72</sup> Copy of Ros response to UN Secretary General, 21 May 1982, PREM 19/648 f67.

<sup>73</sup> UKMIS New York to FCO 21 May 1982 FCO 7/4888. Parsons further criticised Argentina for demanding that the sovereignty claims to the Falklands, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands all be treated as one issue when the latter two territories were 1000 miles away from the Falklands. This was in addition to further criticism for Argentina not wanting the democratic institutions on the islands to be revived under the interim administration and Argentine demands over the demographic of the group of islanders who would have served as advisors to any interim administration.

<sup>74</sup> See FCO 7/4888 for documents concerning this debate 20-25 May 1982. Only Venezuela and Panama were particularly fierce in their criticism of the British for displaying 'outdated' imperialist attitudes.

outcome of the negotiation was, it would be considered a success by both the General Assembly and the Security Council if it involved an end to hostilities.

The desire for peace was reaffirmed at the end of the debate with the unanimous passing of resolution 505 on 26 May 1982. The motion was designed to bring about an end to the hostilities through requesting the Secretary-General to undertake a renewed 'mission of good offices'. The British had informed all parties that terms of the original resolution put forward by Ireland would be unacceptable and they would have to oppose. Further the British were preparing to launch attacks on Goose Green further strengthening their position in any negotiation. This encouraged members of the NAM, an organisation which was traditionally an ardent supporter of the Argentine sovereignty over the islands, to alter the language of the text so that it could be accepted by the British.<sup>75</sup> David Rock has argued that such a move was done to support that Argentine strategy of avoiding a lengthy conflict as well as removing the British administration on the islands.<sup>76</sup> However, the resolution did not make reference to any previous UN resolution regarding the islands other than 502, nor did it make reference to the sovereignty dispute. In a way, this resolution was more pro-British than it was pro-Argentine as it reinforced SCR502 which had been drafted by the British. The fact that the NAM had been willing to alter the text of the resolution to its final contents only indicates that despite existing sympathies with the Argentine stance in the crisis, at this point in the conflict, even the NAM desired to see the restoration of peace.

#### ***2.4.2. Attaining peace***

The Secretary-General's attempts to negotiate a peace following the vote on SCR505 failed which prompted the Panama and Spanish delegation to table a resolution of their own on 5 June, by which point British victory seemed inevitable. This would have seen a cease-fire called but, despite several amendments, the resolution did not satisfy the British delegation. Parsons described the resolution as, 'the precise effect we [Britain] refused to contemplate' that being a cease fire that left the Argentine forces entrenched on the islands.<sup>77</sup> However, the resolution still managed to obtain the necessary nine votes required for it to pass, ultimately it was the UK and USA vetoes which prevented the resolution from being

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<sup>75</sup> See Appendix 4 for full text of SCR505

<sup>76</sup> Rock, *Argentina 1516 – 1987*, 201.

<sup>77</sup> Parsons, 'Falklands at the UN,' 176.



adopted.<sup>78</sup> Shortly after the vote, Jeanne Kirkpatrick announced that were the vote to have taken place again, the USA would have abstained as opposed to voting against. Although this could be read into as support for negotiation, this change in opinion is difficult to assess as there is a lot of confusion surrounding why Kirkpatrick made this announcement given President Reagan denied he had been aware of any change in policy.<sup>79</sup> However, it is clear that the Panamanian-Spanish resolution and SCR505 were both popular among the Security Council despite the fact they were quite different in tone. The only common theme in both is the expressed desire to see an end to the military action and a return to negotiation. The delegations that abstained on the vote commented that they did not want to force Britain into any negotiation the British were not satisfied with but in not voting for the proposal, still displayed their support for negotiation as a way to resolve the conflict, even at such a late stage when British victory seemed inevitable.<sup>80</sup> The likely explanation for this was that those who voted in favour wanted to protect their interests in Argentina. As British victory appeared inevitable, British interests with regards to the islands were protected. This gave other delegations more freedom in how they would vote as any vote against Britain would not likely hinder relations with the British. As such, nations could seek to protect their interests with Argentina by supporting a pro-Argentine proposal. This is also the likely explanation for the change of US policy in the vote expressed by Kirkpatrick.<sup>81</sup>

This debate was the last concerning the crisis that took place at the United Nations whilst the conflict was on going. By the time the islands were retaken by the British on 14 June and the South Sandwich Islands on 24 June, the attention of the Security Council had turned to the Lebanon War and the General Assembly was in its second special session on disarmament. In his summarisation of this time, Anthony Parsons has suggested that delegations at the United Nations supported Britain's resistance to the use of force to settle disputes and that he 'like[s] to believe that many non-aligned countries may have felt reassured to know that Britain is still capable and willing to act firmly when important national interests and internationally accepted principles are at stake'.<sup>82</sup> Although the evidence suggests that the various delegations at the United Nations did not support Argentina's resort to armed aggression to pursue its claim, Parsons' assertion misrepresents

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<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>79</sup> This will be further explored in Chapter 3.

<sup>80</sup> UKMIS New York to FCO, 3 June 1982, FCO 7/4888 f94.

<sup>81</sup> This is explored further in chapter 2.

<sup>82</sup> Parsons, 'Falklands at the UN,' 178.

the true response of the UN to the conflict. Ultimately, both the Security Council and the General Assembly wanted to see the return to negotiation and the maintenance of peace. The principles which both sides claimed to defend were all principles which the UN had traditionally supported. Given that in the case of the crisis, these principles contrasted each other, it would have been impossible for the UN to support all the principles at stake. Rather the UN turned its focus to obtaining peace. At no point did any UN institution encourage the UK to resort to a military solution should Argentina not withdraw from the islands and there is little evidence which implies that the Security Council would have been opposed to a settlement that would have seen Argentina retain possession of the islands should such a settlement have been reached peacefully.

A more likely explanation for the abstentions in the final vote in the Security Council would be that the resolution would not have passed anyway given the UK veto and the conflict was nearing its conclusion. To put pressure on Britain to agree to peace when it was so close to victory had the potential to do more harm than good in the situation. The issues of self-determination and decolonisation that dominated the debate in the years before and after 1982 were mentioned relatively little during the conflict. The only principle seen to be at stake was the maintenance of peace. Once peace had been achieved, the focus of United Nations turned to ensuring that peace lasted.

## **2.5. Defending the ‘inalienable right’<sup>83</sup>**

After the conclusion of the conflict, the dispute was still debated in the United Nations. Although its importance had diminished when compared with the developing situations in the Middle East, the ‘Question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas)’ was brought back to the UNGA with a new resolution tabled only a few months after British forces had recaptured the islands.<sup>84</sup> This was the first of seven Falklands resolutions which would be adopted by the General Assembly in the 1980s, one annually until 1988. Although later chapters of this work undertake more focussed study on the voting, this section introduces the resolutions, providing an evaluation of the language used in each alongside a discussion of the debate which took place within the UNGA in the build-up to each vote. In doing so it highlights

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<sup>83</sup> Geoffrey Howe Speech to the UNGA, 28 September 1983, FCO 7/5486 f505.

<sup>84</sup> All the Falklands Resolutions adopted after the conflict were titled ‘Question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas).’

that Britain found itself somewhat isolated in its passionate defence of the islanders' right to self-determination. Although this section is limited in its conclusions due to the fact that the work is unable to consult source material from all the countries voting, the present research applies analytical techniques of placing the records of the debates within the wider context of known policy aims of the countries voting and makes conclusions on the will of the General Assembly as a whole as opposed to deducing detailed reasoning behind individual countries' voting. Ultimately, other states, including some of Britain's closest allies, saw the conflict as the direct result of failure of Britain to negotiate with Argentina and became openly receptive of the idea of further negotiation of all the issues involved in the dispute to ensure that armed conflict did not break out again regardless of the outcome of those negotiations.

### ***2.5.1. Back to non-negotiation***

The first resolution after the conflict was 37/9, co-sponsored by twenty Latin-American nations which looked to bring the dispute back to its pre-1982 agenda, focussed on the issue of decolonisation. Despite British claims that the Argentine invasion of the islands had changed the situation, the idea of returning to the point of negotiation pre-conflict proved a popular one among the majority of members within the UNGA. Latin American nations had always been vocal supporters of Argentina's claim to sovereignty and the speed with which they brought this resolution to the General Assembly reaffirmed that they had not deviated from their support for the Argentine claim to sovereignty. Further, the support for the resolution was also an opportunity to build a rapport with the new Argentine government and strengthen ties that may have been weakened as a result of the conflict. The language of the resolution itself was very forceful in asserting the Argentine sovereignty.<sup>85</sup> It made explicit reference to all other prior United Nations resolutions on the issue, particularly 3160 (XXVIII) and 31/49 which both expressed gratitude to Argentina for its continued efforts to find a resolution to the dispute, indirectly blaming Britain for the delay in reaching a settlement. In doing so, the new resolution brought the dispute back to its pre-conflict agenda, a notion which would come to characterise the post-conflict debates. It did also 'recall' both Security Council resolutions 502 and 505 but did so in tone that endorsed further negotiation over the issue itself. The anti-British tone of the resolution was further

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<sup>85</sup> The full text of resolution 37/9 is available in Appendix 5.

reinforced by the explicit reference to the dispute as one of decolonisation. The wording ‘aware that the maintenance of colonial situations is incompatible with the United Nations ideal of universal peace’ implied that the conflict had been a result of Britain’s maintenance of a colonial rule in the South Atlantic. Further, to the anger of the British, the resolution only made reference to the ‘interests’ of the islanders without any specific mention to their right of self-determination and as such, allowed for a settlement which was not based on the islanders’ expressed wishes.<sup>86</sup> In whole, it was very similar to Resolution 31/49 which was the last resolution to be adopted before the conflict. Thus, it represented a general attempt by the Latin American nations to rally the General Assembly into accepting that the conflict had changed nothing over the UN stance towards the decolonisation of the islands and return the debate to its pre-1982 agenda.

More than anything, this resolution highlighted that to the majority of the member states of the United Nations, the conflict was of very little consequence. The matters of self-determination and rejection of violence, which had so regularly been debated during the conflict, were swiftly dropped from the conversation. This resolution represented an almost immediate shift in focus away from the conflict and onto negotiation. Where the conflict was mentioned in the resolution, it was done so as a warning of the possible consequences of failure to negotiate. The text of the resolution mentioned only in passing the conflict when it said the members were ‘taking into account the de facto cessation of hostilities’ between Argentina and Britain.<sup>87</sup> Yet still, the resolution passed with a resounding majority. The speed with which the General Assembly seemed to return to the pre-1982 position on the dispute highlights how much difference there was in the weight of importance applied to the conflict by British and other nations.

When canvassing for support over their rejection of resolution 37/9, the British delegation found itself having to justify why there should not be a return to the pre-conflict stance on the dispute, when Britain had shown some willingness to negotiate over sovereignty. This matter had not been helped by the fact that during Pérez de Cuéllar’s peace negotiations, Parsons had stated that the British government had been willing to return to *status quo ante*, a point that many within the General Assembly did not feel should be

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<sup>86</sup> Falklands Action at the UN 1982, FCO 7/4892.

<sup>87</sup> Text of General Assembly Resolution 37/9 ‘Question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas)’ (adopted 28 October 1982).

changed by the end of the conflict.<sup>88</sup> Britain pursued the point that it should not be asked to enter into negotiations with Argentina after the Argentinians had attempted to assert their claim over the islands through armed aggression. The Latin American delegations could counter this argument through stating that the UN had seen the sovereignty dispute as an issue of decolonisation prior to 1982 and there was no practical reason to suggest that the conflict should have altered that stance. Further for many other delegations in the General Assembly, there were no practical reasons why negotiation should not continue as it was the best way to avoid further conflict.<sup>89</sup> States which had supported Britain during the conflict such as Ghana and Tanzania showed their support for negotiation in immediately supporting the Argentine resolution, highlighting a preference for negotiations.<sup>90</sup> Britain's principled stance on the issue of self-determination did not resonate widely except where it benefitted countries' own wider interests. Rather, in reference to the Falkland Islands, the issues of decolonisation and self-determination were in direct contrast with each other and it was impossible to support both. Instead, the focus of the UN was on ensuring that the peace was maintained and the best way to do that was to pursue negotiation.

Given the relatively short time frame between the end of the conflict and resolution 37/9, Britain counted on the continued support of its closest allies so it could focus its campaign for further support in other areas, however, in this regard they were let down. The USA, which was seen as Britain's most important ally in the conflict, swiftly began working closely with the Argentine government to rebuild any damaged relations. It was also hoped that this would improve the United States' relationships with other Latin American governments.<sup>91</sup> The US government not only worked to alter the text of the resolution to a point at which it could be accepted by the US administration but also canvassed for support for the resolution among other non-committed states. This was provoked an angry response from Britain and Thatcher wrote to Reagan to express her disappointment at his government's decision.<sup>92</sup> This was also picked up by elements of the British media which referred to the vote as a 'betrayal of trust'.<sup>93</sup> The USA voting in favour of the resolution

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<sup>88</sup> Parsons, 'Falklands at the UN,' 174.

<sup>89</sup> Falklands Action at the UN 1982, FCO 7/4892 f107.

<sup>90</sup> Summary of delegations likely voting stance on the Falklands, October 1982, FCO 7/4888.

<sup>91</sup> This is explored in more detail in Chapter 3.

<sup>92</sup> See Sally-Ann Treharne, *Reagan and Thatcher's Special Relationship: Latin America and Anglo American Relations* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015), 80.

<sup>93</sup> *Sun*, 29 November 1982.

meant many other states, particularly those in the Caribbean, felt more comfortable in voting for the resolution and Britain lost its main ally in the OAS over the issue.<sup>94</sup> Notably, this was not referenced much in the US media despite the fact that news of the conflict had appeared frequently in Times magazine and other US publications.<sup>95</sup> This indicated that even so soon after the conflict, interest in the dispute among the public outside of the UK had waned. Britain faced similar problems with the governments of Europe. There was particular concern that the French may support the Argentine resolution setting an example for many of the Francophone African nations to support the process of decolonisation.<sup>96</sup> France had strong business interests in Argentina and was keen to resume trade, particularly the sale of military equipment.<sup>97</sup> For states such as the USA and France repairing relations with Latin America was vital for other areas. It was also unlikely that any relations with Britain would be severely damaged by supporting Argentina in the UN and, as such, governments felt comfortable in voting in favour of resolution 37/9 or resuming trade with Latin America. This highlighted the sovereignty dispute was of little consequence to Britain's allies.

It is important to note that Britain did retain some support for its position on the dispute and its arguments for the self-determination of the islanders did resonate with many smaller states, especially those who had suffered from the transgressions of larger states in the past. Once the final vote was taken there were 90 votes in favour of the resolution, 12 votes against and 52 abstentions. Those that had not voted in favour of the resolution stressed that they felt it was too strong in tone over the issue of sovereignty and did not take sufficient account of the islanders' right to self-determination.<sup>98</sup> Speaking after the vote, delegation representatives from Australia and Norway commented that it was right that the islanders be consulted on their future and that the resolution did not go far enough in its condemnation of the settlement of disputes through conflict.<sup>99</sup> However, those same nations still stressed their support for the negotiation process, the point that many underlined in voting in favour of the resolution. Whilst there was still no democratically elected government in place in Argentina, and with the resolution coming so close to the conflict, Britain maintained an

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<sup>94</sup> Falklands Action at the UN 1982, FCO 7/4892 f111.

<sup>95</sup> See *Times* magazine, 10 May 1982.

<sup>96</sup> UKMIS New York to FCO, 17 October 1982, FCO 7/5487 f73.

<sup>97</sup> This is explored in more detail in Chapter 4.

<sup>98</sup> UKMIS New York to FCO, 30 November 1982, FCO 7/5487 f12.

<sup>99</sup> Verbatim record of the 1239th meeting of the *Special Committee On The Situation With Regard To The Implementation Of The Declaration On The Granting Of Independence To Colonial Countries And Peoples*, 1 September 1983, FCO 7/5486 f492.

element of support for not entering into negotiation immediately. That being said, the large number of abstentions compared to ‘no’ votes was evidence of the overwhelming support for negotiation to take place in some form. Countries such as Australia and New Zealand did not give the impression they were against negotiation and their abstentions were more in recognition of what they deemed to be inadequate phrasing of the resolution itself.

### ***2.5.2. Continued calls for negotiation***

Many of these themes carried over into resolution, 38/12, which was voted on in the UNGA in November 1983. The language of the resolution was very similar to that of 37/9 with some notable additions which, in tone were again critical of the British attitude towards negotiations.<sup>100</sup> Resolution 37/9 was added to the list of resolutions that were being recalled along with an expression of regret at the lack of progress that had been made since it had been adopted. An additional section was added that recognised the ‘interest of the international community’ in the resumption of negotiations to settle the dispute. The resolution as a whole was no softer in tone than that of 37/9 and still argued the issue was one of decolonisation. In the debates that led up to the vote on 38/12, the focus of the British and the Argentinians was on the principles. In a speech to the General Assembly on 29 September 1983, Geoffrey Howe declared that Britain, ‘will continue to defend the right – the inalienable right – of the people of the Falkland Islands to self-determination, a right to which they are no less entitled to than any other small island peoples, and we will carry forward economic and constitutional development in close consultation with the islanders.’<sup>101</sup> In response Argentine Foreign Minister, Juan Lanari, commented that:

Argentina’s policy had “unsettled” the British authorities who were “anachronistically determined to halt the course of history”. Not surprisingly you had omitted all mention of events since June 1982 such as GA Resolution 37/9, whose non-fulfilment implied ignorance of one of the most basic principles of the charter. This failure was all the more glaring because of Britain’s permanent membership of the Security Council. You had also ignored the OAS resolution, the NAM declaration and the resolution of the Committee of 24 ... It was not just Argentina but Latin America as a whole that was disturbed by the grave build up in the South Atlantic. The UK posed as a champion of self-determination but her attitudes to

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<sup>100</sup> The full text of Resolution 38/12 is in Appendix 6.

<sup>101</sup> Geoffrey Howe’s speech to the UNGA, 29 September 1983, FCO 7/5487 f590.

peoples on whom British colonialism was imposed was well known. In the case of the Malvinas, the GA had ruled out the implementation of the right of self-determination.<sup>102</sup>

It is important to note that Lanari was likely trying to show that there was a great support for Argentina's stance on decolonisation as it best suited his government's objectives, however, the actual strength of feeling on decolonisation was likely much weaker. The support among Latin American nations was not as resolute as Lanari portrayed.<sup>103</sup> That being said, Lanari's words do highlight how each side framed their arguments in the debate. The Argentine position was that self-determination did not apply to the islanders as they were descendants of settlers, as opposed to an indigenous population, and this was a notion that could be supported by the majority within the UNGA. This was recognised by the UK Permanent Representative to the UN, John Thomson, who wrote to the FCO on 17 October, 'the great majority of the General Assembly have already voted that the dispute is only about sovereignty. It is explicitly part of the Argentine argument that self-determination does not apply to the Falklands and on occasion the NAM and, indirectly, the General Assembly have explicitly endorsed this.'<sup>104</sup> This point was seen to be true at a meeting of the Special Committee of 24 in September 1983 where many delegations present had concluded that the need for negotiation was paramount over the principle of self-determination being afforded to the islanders.<sup>105</sup>

As a result, Thomson recommended that Britain should prevent the text from being altered any further as a softer tone would only be met with more support in the General Assembly and result in a heavier defeat. This shows an awareness of the situation facing Britain and HMG was forced to attempt to diplomatically limit the damage knowing it would not engage with Argentina over sovereignty. British policy had avoided including a statement on self-determination in any resolution in case it was defeated but it was clear by October 1983 that Britain was facing heavy defeat anyway. Thomson did suggest attempting to get a UK ally, such as the US, to suggest the Argentines include a more explicit reference to self-determination in the hope that a likely rejection from Argentina of this proposal, 'might provide the rationale for the United States and others to abstain.' Thomson also

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<sup>102</sup> UKMIS New York to FCO, 29 September 1983, FCO 7/5486 f508.

<sup>103</sup> This is discussed further in chapter 5.

<sup>104</sup> UKMIS New York to FCO, 17 October 1983, FCO 7/5487 f619.

<sup>105</sup> UKMIS New York to FCO, 29 September 1983, FCO 7/5486 f508.



commented that Britain ran the risk of Argentina accepting the amendment and thus the resolution would pass with an overwhelming majority but that he ‘must warn that this is anyway the prospect we face on the existing text in the next two or three years.’<sup>106</sup> When Pakistan suggested that Britain hold a referendum in the islands on sovereignty, Britain declined stating that all nations already knew the outcome and it would just be seen as ‘a propaganda stunt’.<sup>107</sup> There was a realisation from the British that the argument in favour of self-determination was not persuading nations’ to support HMG and instead they needed to get the best result possible. This was seen to be ensuring that the Argentinians stuck to the harsh tone of the resolution in the hope that there would be some understanding when the British did not negotiate.

Although the British decided it was best not to offer amendments to the resolution, this decision did not aid their defence against claims of intransigence. When canvassing for support, Britain was faced with many questions regarding whether it would be offering amendments to the Argentine resolution or offering their own draft resolution. Both Tanzania and Pakistan offered to work with Britain on amendments to the text or producing another draft resolution.<sup>108</sup> Britain rejected these proposals arguing that any change in tone would not alter the central thesis of the proposal which Britain was voting against.<sup>109</sup> Although this may have produced some short term benefits to the British in not causing any further loss of support in the 1983 vote, it led some nations to wonder if Britain was being deliberately difficult to avoid negotiating with Argentina.<sup>110</sup> Thomson summed up:

Our distaste for putting forward our own resolution or for amending the Argentine text is seen by some as a cloak for refusing to negotiate with the Argentines at all. Those who accept it is too soon to negotiate nevertheless want us to indicate that we will negotiate on the main issues at some point in the future. In short there is a good deal less sympathy for us than last year. As a result we are losing ground against the Argentine peace offensive.<sup>111</sup>

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<sup>106</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>107</sup> UKE Islamabad to FCO, 14 October 1983, FCO 7/5487 f588.

<sup>108</sup> FCO to UKE Dar Es Salaam, 17 October 1983, FCO 7/5487 f616; and UKE Islamabad to FCO, 14 October 1983, FCO 7/5487 f588.

<sup>109</sup> FCO to UKE Islamabad, 15 October 1983, FCO 7/5487 f587.

<sup>110</sup> The resolution was adopted with 87 votes in favour, 9 against and 54 abstentions.

<sup>111</sup> UKMIS New York to FCO, 17 October 1983, FCO 7/5487 f618.

Increasingly, Britain was seen as the party that was being obstructive. Interestingly although Thomson does not explicitly say so, the reality is that Britain likely had no intention of negotiating with the Argentines and were attempting to soften inevitable criticism that would come from that. Thomson likely does not explicitly say this as he would openly be admitting Britain intended to ignore a General Assembly Resolution. However, his words are an indication that the British delegation felt a weight of expectation to negotiate regardless of whether there would be any consequences of not doing so. The ultimate priority of the UNGA concerning the islands was to avoid another conflict and in continually refusing to negotiate or offer acceptable terms on which they would negotiate, Britain was seen to be risking the crisis descending into further conflict without any significant justification. These feelings were further compounded by the British government seeming to want to move the crisis out of the United Nations. At a press conference on 30 September 1983 given outside of the UN building in New York, Howe was asked if he saw a role for the UN in the UK seeking a more normal relationship with Argentina:

No. The search that we have been conducting has been undertaken within the ordinary relationship that should exist between countries, as chairman of the interim committee of the IMF last autumn, I was closely involved in the IMF programme for the Argentines. We have an interest, as does the whole world, in restoring the balance of the Argentinian economy. We have been seeking to restore normal relations in that way but so far have not had a very encouraging response.<sup>112</sup>

Howe was arguing that the way forward for Britain and Argentina was to re-establish normal relations between countries without the need for intervention from protecting powers or international bodies like the UN. However, his phrasing, that he did not see a role for the UN in the dispute, led to accusations that Britain was trying to distance itself from the resolutions and thus the need to negotiate.<sup>113</sup> Whereas Argentina had presented itself as ready to follow the various General Assembly resolutions, Britain had continually ignored them.

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<sup>112</sup> Verbatim of Geoffrey Howe's Press Conference on Argentina in New York, 30 September 1983, FCO 7/5487 f595.

<sup>113</sup> UKMIS New York to FCO, 1 October 1983, FCO 7/5487.

The text of resolution 39/6 adopted in November 1984 was again very similar to the two resolutions on the sovereignty question that had come before, however, it made reference to the failed bilateral talks that had taken place between Britain and Argentina in Berne from 10-12 July 1984.<sup>114</sup> The debate surrounding resolution 39/6 was dominated by Britain defending its role in the breakdown of the Berne talks. The communiqué released by the governments of Brazil and Switzerland, Argentina and Britain's respective protecting powers, indicated that Britain's refusal to discuss sovereignty had ultimately been the cause of the breakdown of talks. The Argentine newspaper *Clarín* claimed that Britain had broken the agreed protocol leading to the cessation of discussions.<sup>115</sup> The British delegation gave a different interpretation of events but, ultimately, it had been clear that talks had broken down over a refusal to discuss the issue of sovereignty. This only served to heighten the accusations of British intransigence. British awareness of this was confirmed when Andrew Palmer, from the Falklands Islands Department in the FCO, wrote advising that the UK should not make any further comment regarding its willingness to discuss the sovereignty dispute along the same lines as had been agreed at Berne and said that any suggestion to the contrary would be 'a glaring misjudgement'.<sup>116</sup> Increasingly, governments were requesting guarantees from the British that HMG would be amenable to negotiation over sovereignty in the future in return for abstentions on the resolution. One example of this was the government of Zaire which requested a guarantee that Britain would negotiate 'and seek peace' before ensuring that it would abstain on the vote.<sup>117</sup> As Zaire had been particularly supportive of Britain during the conflict, this was a clear indication that their support for Britain was not grounded in the principle of self-determination. This was not something that the British were prepared to guarantee and in turn they emphasised that there could be no negotiation until there was a normalisation of relations between Argentina and Britain and hoped 'that those who wish to see closer relationships develop between Britain and Argentina will recognise that this objective will not be helped by insisting on negotiations of sovereignty, or by encouraging the Government of Argentina to set unattainable objectives and to live on false hopes'.<sup>118</sup> The wording of this text is strong and was likely

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<sup>114</sup> Full text of the resolution is included in Appendix 7.

<sup>115</sup> Guillermo Makin, 'The Nature of Anglo-Argentine Diplomacy, 1980-1990' in *International Perspectives*, 229. Explored in more detail in chapter 5.

<sup>116</sup> Andrew Palmer to David Thomas, 29 October 1984, FCO 7/5957 f791.

<sup>117</sup> UK Embassy Kinshasa to FCO, 30 October 1984, FCO 7/5957 f793.

<sup>118</sup> 'Draft speech for Secretary of State', Andrew Palmer to David Thomas, 29 October 1984, FCO 7/5957 f791.

chosen to portray the strength of feeling from the British government on the matter of negotiation. However, this did little to alter the stance of other governments which saw Britain's refusal to negotiate on sovereignty as being the main obstacle to the normalisation of relations.

The election of Raúl Alfonsín and a democratic government in Argentina in July 1983, also led to sympathy growing for Argentina among other members of the General Assembly. Alfonsín had been critical of the Argentine invasion of the islands and generally distanced his own government from the actions of the Junta. This was received well by the General Assembly which in turn distanced the new Argentine government from the conflict. The British reacted with dismay when Alfonsín made no mention of the events of 1982 in his speech to the General Assembly in September 1984 and was not pushed on the matter by any delegation.<sup>119</sup> Worse for the British was that delegations which had traditionally voted with Britain sided with Argentina in the vote citing desire to support Argentine democracy. France and New Zealand were the two most notable as they had been Britain's strongest supporters during the conflict meaning that their change of vote was unexpected and not something that Britain was prepared for.<sup>120</sup> Britain tried again, in vain, to place emphasis on the importance of self-determination but the return of democracy to Argentina made it easier for many delegations to look at the issue as it had been prior to 1982 where the General Assembly had been hesitant to say that self-determination applied to the islanders. Two Falkland Island councillors made a presentation before the General Assembly arguing the will of the islanders was in favour of British sovereignty and although they presented their case well, it did little to sway opinion of the delegations not disposed to the self-determination argument.<sup>121</sup> Britain also attempted to attack Argentina's account of the history of the islands and claimed that there was no indigenous population and rejected that the islands were taken by British force in 1833. Howe spoke passionately comparing the islanders to the Palestinians, the Afghans, the Namibians, the Kampuchians, the New Caledonians, the South Africans and others concluding that, 'the Islanders' right to self-determination is no less inalienable than that of other peoples. No-one, not Argentina, not

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<sup>119</sup> FCO to Tel Aviv for Secretary of State's Party: Revised version of draft statement, 29 October 1984, FCO 7/5957 f790.

<sup>120</sup> UKMIS in New York to FCO: Results of last minute lobbying in capitals, 31 October 1984, FCO 7/5957 f806.

<sup>121</sup> UKMIS New York to FCO, Record of the Fourth Committee, 30 October 1984, FCO 7/5957 f808.

the General Assembly, can take it away from them.’<sup>122</sup> However, although there were some nations, like Sweden, that did still maintain the Falklanders had a right to self-determination, there were no delegations who were persuaded to change their vote to be in line with Britain. Rather the focus of the General Assembly was on encouraging negotiation to find a permanent solution to the dispute that would maintain peace no matter what that may be.

Despite the setbacks, Britain had managed to maintain a consistent result in the votes on the 1982, 1983 and 1984 resolutions with the last vote resulting in 89 votes in favour, 9 votes against and 54 abstentions. However, the 1985 vote produced the strongest show of support for the call for negotiations. Resolution 40/21 which was put before the General Assembly in November 1985 was not sponsored by Argentina nor was it co-sponsored by the large number of Latin American countries previous resolutions had. This time it was sponsored by nations such as Ghana and India and represented the general desire of the UNGA to see negotiations take place without any predetermined outcome and a peaceful settlement reached. The resolution was much softer in tone. The text made no reference to previous resolutions or the time elapsed since the matter was first brought before the General Assembly. The resolution made no reference to the sovereignty issue or the issue of self-determination but only stated that both sides had expressed a desire to normalise relations and the UNGA was convinced this would be facilitated through negotiation.<sup>123</sup> 40/21 gained the overwhelming support of the General Assembly. Britain tried to stress all that it had done in the years since the conflict in an attempt to normalise relations with Argentina but the Argentines had not been open to Britain’s attempts. However, this did nothing to persuade other delegations that Britain should not be asked to negotiate.<sup>124</sup> Britain’s argument that the resolution was ‘Argentine’ in nature and deliberately deceptive was met with anger by the delegations who had co-sponsored the resolution. The representative from Ghana commented:

However, with the greatest of respect to the United Kingdom delegation, we find its attitude obstructive in the present instance not only because it confuses self-determination for decolonisation but also because the principle is a precondition which it should more appropriately raise directly with

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<sup>122</sup> Andrew Palmer to David Thomas: Verbatim of Geoffrey Howe’s speech to the United Nations General Assembly, 29 October 1984, FCO 7/5957 f791.

<sup>123</sup> Full text of the resolution attached in Appendix 8.

<sup>124</sup> Martin Reid, British High Commissioner for Jamaica, to Adrian Beamish, 29 November 1985, FCO 7/6377 f752.

Argentina around a negotiating table. The Argentinian delegation has agreed not to raise its insistence on transfer of sovereignty in the Assembly and rather take it up at the negotiating table. Why can the UK delegation not make a similar undertaking?<sup>125</sup>

As Britain canvassed for support, it increasingly found itself isolated in its view on the crisis. Repeated states responded identifying that they could not vote against a resolution that called for unbiased negotiation. Caribbean states in particular changed their vote to support the resolution where they had previously been supporters of Britain's refusal to negotiate at that time.<sup>126</sup>

Britain's argument for the self-determination of the islanders to be included in any negotiation process was openly criticised as being an attempt to precondition the negotiation. In an attempt to attain some concessions, the British proposed two amendments to the resolution. The first would have seen a preambular paragraph added making reference to the UN charter and its endorsement of self-determination, and the second, an amendment to the first operative paragraph adding 'and the right there under of peoples to self-determination.'<sup>127</sup> However, the representative of Ghana again summed up the general opinion of the assembly on these amendments when he stated, 'the amendments proposed by the United Kingdom are on the surface reasonable but they are tantamount to a precondition in effect. The United Kingdom delegation is attached to the principle of self-determination but so is Argentina attached to the principle of the transfer of sovereignty.'<sup>128</sup> This sentiment was endorsed by other members of the General Assembly in the later debate and both amendments were defeated.<sup>129</sup> Although these votes were closer than the votes on the resolutions themselves, it highlighted that for the majority of nations in the General Assembly, self-determination was not important enough to hinder negotiation and progress

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<sup>125</sup> Statement by H.E MR J.V. Gbeho (Ghana) at the 40th session of the General Assembly, 27 November 1985, FCO 7/6377 f755.

<sup>126</sup> Summary of views expressed in debate on the Falklands resolution, 3 December 1985, FCO 7/6377 f751; and British High Commission Belmopan to FCO, 4 December 1985, FCO 7/6377 f757.

<sup>127</sup> Proposed amendments to Falklands resolution, 30 November 1985, FCO 7/6377.

<sup>128</sup> Statement by H.E MR J.V. Gbeho (Ghana) at the 40th session of the General Assembly, 27 November 1985, FCO 7/6377 f755.

<sup>129</sup> UKMIS in New York to FCO: Summary of speeches made in the Falklands debate 4 Dec 1985. The first amendment was defeated with 30 for, 60 against and 43 abstentions. The second was defeated 36 for, 57 against and 47 abstentions.

towards a peaceful settlement. Resolution 40/21 was adopted with 107 votes in favour, four votes against and 41 abstentions highlighting that even Britain's closest allies did not share the UK's view on the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands.

The resolutions of 1986, 1987 and 1988 were all identical to 40/21 except for some minor alterations to dates and meeting numbers and they all resulted in heavy defeats for the British delegation.<sup>130</sup> The years immediately after 1982 had shown that increasingly, the Falklands crisis in the UN was not so much about decolonisation or self-determination. It was about the maintenance of peace in the western hemisphere between two democratic nations. Britain's attempt to repeatedly bring the debate back to the principle of sovereignty was interpreted as intransigence and deliberately obtrusive to the peace process. As states increasingly criticised Britain's position in the General Assembly, it became evermore clear, that for many, sovereignty over the islands was of little consequence so long as any settlement was achieved peacefully.

## **2.6. Conclusions**

The Argentine invasion of the islands led to more media scrutiny of the UN than the longest-serving members of the Secretariat could remember.<sup>131</sup> During the conflict, there was intense public scrutiny of debates and the world's media reported daily updates from inside the Security Council. Even in the years after the conflict, some attention was still given to the developments on the crisis through reporting on the various resolutions that came in the mid to late 1980s. Yet the most distinctive feature of the Falklands at the UN is how the developments in both the General Assembly and the Security Council highlighted that for the majority of states, with the exception of Latin America, the Falklands had very little to do with the principles of self-determination and decolonisation. The debates and canvassing from the UN highlight that international response to the crisis was more shaped by arguments in favour of avoiding conflict than arguments centred on the principles of self-determination or decolonisation.

The dispute had featured regularly on the agenda of the UNGA from 1948. Resolutions had been passed that indirectly supported the Argentine claim to sovereignty

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<sup>130</sup> Full text of these resolution attached in Appendix 9-11.

<sup>131</sup> Parsons, 'Falklands at the UN,' 169.

but little had been done to press the UK into negotiation. When compared with other disputes going on in the world, the Falklands dispute was of relative little importance. When the crisis broke, the focus of the Security Council was set not on seeing either side establish sovereignty over the islands or even framing the crisis within international law to decide which government was right or wrong. The ultimate priority was finding a scenario in which conflict could be avoided and peace could be resumed in line with the Security Council remit of maintaining peace and security. The various peace initiatives undertaken by the Secretary-General of the UN had no end goal other than seeing the end of the fighting and there is little evidence to suggest that the Secretary-General would not have accepted a peace that saw the islands remain in either party's possession so long as the conflict had ended. Rather, the UN traditionally supported both the principles of decolonisation and self-determination but with regards to the Falkland Islands, the principles were incompatible. As such, the UN placed an emphasis of on securing peace and then encouraging negotiation for both sides to find a settlement they could agree to.

In his memoir of the conflict, Anthony Parsons made some bold claims regarding the nature of support given to Britain, arguing that many delegations were supportive of Britain's willingness to fight Argentina in defence of the principles the Junta had broken. However, his opinions were focussed solely on his first-hand experience of the United Nations in 1982 and perhaps written to bolster his own standing and that of the UK in the UN. When the 1982 debates are analysed in context of the debates that come before and after, it is seen that the evidence suggests something quite contradictory to Parsons own conclusions. Even Britain's closest allies tried repeatedly to persuade HMG to halt the Task Force and return to negotiation. Britain's determination to remove the Argentinians from the islands by force caused as much frustration for the Secretary-General as Argentina's refusal to leave the islands peacefully. No resolution of the Security Council endorsed the use of British military force and all resolutions stressed the need to find a diplomatic solution.

The years after the conflict saw a difference in opinion between Britain and the UN on what the conflict meant. For Britain, the conflict caused a change in its pre-1982 position on the dispute in that Argentina had forfeited its right to engage in negotiation over sovereignty of the islands. However, for the UN, Britain had offered little evidence to support any idea that the substance of the sovereignty issue had changed or that negotiation was not in the best interests of the UN as a whole. The conflict represented only the consequences of failing to negotiate settlements to disputes. The conflict had not affected



the factors that had influenced the sovereignty dispute prior to 1982. This feeling was only strengthened with the rise of a new democratic government in Argentina who had not endorsed the military action taken by the Junta. Britain's continued insistence that the conflict and the dispute remained linked only led to further accusations of intransigence. The UK representatives to the UN recognised this as a problem and switched their attention to mitigating the effects of the defeats on the Falklands resolutions. However, as the language of the resolutions became softer, Britain struggled to justify their maintenance of the self-determination principle. After 1982, the UN was not overly concerned with the matters of decolonisation or self-determination when it came to the Falkland Islands. Instead the focus was always on finding a permanent, peaceful settlement and, by continuing to focus on the philosophical principles involved in the dispute, the UK were hindering that progress.

The lack of consequence for Britain over its continued ignorance of the resolutions further highlighted that the debate was not of any great importance to the UN. The Security Council and General Assembly both desired a peaceful resolution to the conflict; yet, they failed to prevent Britain from launching a military offensive to recapture the islands. In the years after the conflict, the General Assembly repeatedly attempted to place pressure on the British government to enter into negotiation with the Argentine government. Yet when HMG ignored repeated resolutions of the General Assembly, the UN failed to offer any reprimand on the United Kingdom. The numerous mediation efforts all failed to reach their objectives and yet, the UN was unwilling to do more than act in a role of mediation to influence the outcome or direction of the conflict or sovereignty dispute. The effectiveness of the UN was reliant upon its component government's willingness to engage with a coherent policy but in the case of the Falklands dispute, Britain and Argentina had greatly differing policy objectives. The UN predominantly acted as an observer unwilling to enforce its will through any policy other than negotiation. After the conflict, British administration had been restored and the dispute in the UN returned to its pre-1982 position. The crisis of the Falkland Islands had been that the dispute had devolved into conflict. The UN attempted to ensure that peace was restored and once it was restored were happy for debate without definitive action to continue.

Ultimately, the international response to the Falklands crisis in the UN was categorised by debate, frustration and incomprehension. Although it is somewhat unremarkable to conclude that the UN preferred peace over conflict, what is noteworthy is that this preference was more prominent than the principles that Argentina and Britain

declared were at stake. The UN had supported both decolonisation and self-determination in its history and both principles were enshrined in the UN charter. Yet the crisis represented a case where those principles were incompatible with each other. Yet this was not an issue for the delegations at the UN. More important was that peace was obtained and a negotiated permanent resolution to the dispute was found no matter who ultimately held sovereignty over the islands. The response to Britain was best summed up by the permanent representative of Ghana who concluded, ‘this attitude [of the United Kingdom], if you will pardon the analogy, is comparable to a man who refuses to listen or even consider his wife’s side of the case in a domestic disagreement because he claims to arbitrators that she has always been evil.’<sup>132</sup>

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<sup>132</sup> Statement by H.E MR J.V. Gbeho (Ghana) at the 40th session of the General Assembly, 27 November 1985, FCO 7/6377 f755.

### **3. Chapter Two: the Special Relationship Strained, the USA and the Falklands Crisis**

But I think what the Secretary was saying is, we must remember that the aggression was on the part of Argentina in this dispute over the sovereignty of that little ice-cold bunch of land down there, and they finally just resorted to armed aggression, and there was bloodshed. And I think the principle that all of us must abide by is, armed aggression of that kind must not be allowed to succeed.<sup>1</sup>

#### **3.1. Chapter Abstract**

The Falklands conflict was a military engagement between two nations which formed cornerstones of US foreign policy. There was a generalised expectation on the part of the public and a specific expectation on the part of the private in both Buenos Aires and London that the US would support their side. Neither the public nor private were wholly satisfied. The evidence available for establishing the US position on the dispute prior to 1982 is from the voting patterns on the 1960-1982 UN resolutions concerning the islands. However, there is nothing to suggest that it was a policy area of any great significance for any government in Washington, including that of the Reagan administration. That being said, the outbreak of the conflict posed a dilemma for the United States, as Argentina and Britain were both important elements of US foreign policy, playing pivotal roles in different hemispheres in Washington's Cold War diplomatic strategy. It was not only the prospect of choosing between two close allies that was problematic for the United States, but the potential alternative governments should either Thatcher or Galtieri be ousted from power as a result of defeat in the conflict. Both Argentina and the UK had right wing governments which were preferred by the right wing Reagan administration to the obvious alternatives. As the US was Britain's closest ally, the hesitation with which Washington supported Britain in the dispute caused frustration in London but the decision making process behind Washington's policy towards the crisis can be explained in a number of factors which this chapter evaluates.

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<sup>1</sup> Ronald Reagan, Presidential Remarks on the Falklands (extract from Q&A with Mid-Western editors and broadcasters), accessed 15 February 2018, available at <http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1982/43082b.htm>.

This chapter examines the question of how the context of the Cold War influenced the US policy towards the crisis and dispute. It highlights the motivations behind the United States assuming a formal mediation role in the conflict, pushing strongly for a swift resolution which would allow both governments to remain in power. In doing so, the chapter also addresses how important the sovereignty question was to the US government, particularly in the years after the conflict when Washington seemed to shift its support towards Argentina. Although individual members of the American administration had differing opinions on how the US policy should proceed, the United States never showed a particular preference on the sovereignty dispute but was often swayed by proposals from either side that offered a chance at a peaceful resolution. The primary concern for the United States was not to allow communism to take hold in Argentina. As such, peace was preferable to conflict and should conflict be unavoidable, there was a necessity for the US that the conflict should be as short as possible. As such, any proposal which sought to shorten the conflict was one that was favourable to the United States. The flexibility of US policy on the dispute gives an indication of the importance of the UK in wider US foreign policy which this chapter explores. An attempt to find a permanent resolution to the sovereignty question was not the primary focus of the US in its mediation efforts and illuminated the real issues of the conflict for the Reagan administration.

### **3.2. Introduction**

From the moment it became clear that Argentina was willing to use force to assert its claim to the Falkland Islands, the UK government turned to that of the USA for assistance in both mediating and pressing the British view of the crisis to both the Argentine government and the rest of the world. In Britain, the conflict became an emotive issue. The UK government and military claimed to be working tirelessly to protect the islanders' right to self-determination; to live under a government of their choosing. The US government, however, handled the issue with reference to the effect the crisis had on other American foreign policy objectives. Varying departments placed the crisis in the context of the Cold War and came to differing conclusions over how to protect foreign policy concerns in Latin America and Europe. President Reagan's description of the islands as 'ice-cold bunch of land' was indicative of the American approach to the conflict.<sup>2</sup> American government opinion

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<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

struggled to comprehend why the interests of a tiny population and islands of little economic significance would be enough to risk peace and cooperation in the western hemisphere. Although the British argued that it was important in the context of the Cold War that Argentina not be allowed to succeed for fear of encouraging enemies of the west to engage in other military conflicts, this was not an argument that the United States agreed with. Rather the primary concern of the US was to ensure that the conflict did not leave a power vacuum in Argentina that could be filled by communism or in Britain by the left leaning Labour Party. This chapter analyses the strain the crisis put on Anglo-American relations by evaluating American opinion and reactions to how HMG handled the crisis and dispute. It gives a brief overview of the strategic importance of both the UK and Argentina to American foreign policy before providing a detailed assessment of the diplomatic wrangling that went on behind the scenes between the US and UK officials prior to, during and after the conflict. The work thus seeks to analyse the nature of the reaction in the USA to Britain and the dispute.

The heavy American involvement in the crisis resulted in a wealth of archival material which this study exploits. The Haig mediation efforts as well as Reagan's Five Point Peace Plan were only a part of the diplomatic process. This chapter examines the discussions and personal opinions of the ministers involved in these negotiations. Thatcher herself was heavily involved in the attempts to gain American support. She met frequently with Haig during his shuttle diplomacy and remained in regular contact with Reagan, attempting to use her personal affinity and shared world view with him to place pressure on the President to come out in support of Britain. The content of these conversations reveal a lot about White House opinion on Britain. Although there was evident respect between many government officials on both sides, the practical considerations of the Reagan Doctrine's aims in Latin America meant that USA could not be as staunch in its support for Britain as HMG may have hoped for. As far as US foreign policy was concerned, both nations were equally important as each other, something that angered British government officials in their dealings with the Americans.

The chapter also analyses the diplomatic movements by the USA in relation to the dispute after the conflict ended and evidence from here highlights that the United States did not have strong feelings on the sovereignty issue. The discussion in the UNGA on the issue until 1988 meant there were continued deliberations between the UK and USA where the British attempted in vain to persuade the Americans to take a more pro-British stance in the

UN. This chapter analyses these archival records to highlight American perceptions of British intransigence and the placing of the crisis within 'general western interest'.<sup>3</sup> The FCO kept files which logged US opinion on the dispute as well as the continuous efforts that Britain made to persuade the American administration to stop voting in favour of pro-Argentine resolutions. It is these sources on which this study is based in conjunction with memoirs and diary entries from government officials involved in the process. The reluctance of the US to fulfil British requests for support in the years after the conflict only further highlights the nature of American opinion on the crisis. The American government did not have any particular strong opinion on the sovereignty issue, although individual members of the administration made passing comment on their own opinions.<sup>4</sup> The United States acted only out of the practical implications the conflict had on its wider foreign policy considerations, one with particular reference to the Cold War. The US preference was always peace over conflict and if conflict was unavoidable, the conflict had to be over quickly. As such, the primary consideration for the United States was to obtain peace and to protect its interests in Latin American and Europe. That is not to say that Britain did not hold an important place within those considerations but it was no more so than the importance placed on Latin America in preventing the spread of communism.

Further, this chapter also looks at the success of the United States as an international organisation. The size and structure of the US government shares many characteristics of an international organisation such as the UN. During the conflict, there were a number of departments in the American administration with competing interests.<sup>5</sup> The State Department, Department of Defence, and the US delegation at the UN were headed by individuals with different views on the conflict and this influenced the approach the United States took to the conflict. President Reagan ultimately had to manage these competing views and decide on a policy that satisfied the individual components of the government he led, not too dissimilar to the UN Secretary-General. As such, this chapter adds to the wider

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<sup>3</sup> Oliver Wright to Antony Acland, 2 December 1985, FCO 7/6366 f43.

<sup>4</sup> Jeanne Kirkpatrick did make reference that she sympathised more with the Argentine position than the British one. This is further expanded later in this chapter.

<sup>5</sup> This will be explored in further detail later in this chapter. Thatcher and Reagan's letters to one another discuss the 'close' relationship between the two states but the term 'special relationship' was not used. In addition, Reagan also referred to Argentina as a 'close ally' of the United States. See Reagan letter to Thatcher, 15 April 1982, THCR 3/1/20 f79.

discussion on how effectively the Reagan administration operated during the crisis and its ability to implement a policy in spite of competing interests of its component parts.

### **3.2.1. Literature review**

It is in its focus on the years after the conflict that this study differs from other work on the American role in the crisis. Davide Borsani, Sally-Ann Treharne and Richard Thornton have all studied the role of the conflict in the wider history and discussion of the ‘special relationship’ between the UK and USA, a term that was not used by British or US officials when discussing the crisis.<sup>6</sup> The overwhelming opinion of the current historiography is that the conflict highlights strains in relations between the two governments and particularly underlines difficulties of the Reagan-Thatcher relationship. Rather, Borsani has used the conflict to evidence that there was nothing particularly ‘special’ or unique about the Reagan-Thatcher relationship, at least to the point that Britain was treated no differently to any other US ally at this time.<sup>7</sup> These scholars have produced detailed studies of the conflict period and placed it within the context of post-Second World War Anglo-American relations. Although there is some overlap in the source material used between this work and that of Treharne particularly, these historians have neglected the period after 1982. This work exploits source material released in the UK that was not available to these authors at the time they were writing. In doing so, this work contributes to the existing historiography in providing new evidence to underline the difficulties faced in assimilating policy objectives by the Reagan and Thatcher administrations. While Treharne and Thornton’s works are concerned with the effect of the conflict on the Anglo-American relations, this work focuses primarily on American views on Britain and the crisis. The challenges brought to the relationship through all debates surrounding the future of the islands after 1982, highlights the difference in how the governments viewed the dispute. Whereas the British argued that there could be no further discussion on sovereignty after the Argentine invasion of the

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<sup>6</sup> See Davide Borsani, ‘Imperial Legacy and Cold War Rationale: The Anglo-American Diplomacy and the Falklands War in 1982’ in *Empires and Nations from the Eighteenth to the Twentieth Century: Volume II* edited by Antonello Biagini and Giovanna Motta (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars, 2014); Richard C. Thornton, *The Falklands Sting: Reagan, Thatcher and Argentina’s Bomb* (London: Brassey’s, 1998); or Sally-Ann Treharne, *Reagan and Thatcher’s Special Relationship: Latin America and Anglo-American Relations* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015).

<sup>7</sup> Borsani, ‘Imperial Legacy,’ 112.

islands, the Americans became frustrated at what they perceived to be Britain's refusal to see the practical benefits of supporting the democratic Alfonsín government.

A common theme among the historiography of the US and the conflict is the agreement that there was no real doubt that eventually the US would side with Britain when conflict was inevitable. The preparations to do so began in early April, despite the ongoing Haig peace mission.<sup>8</sup> This is something that is also covered in the Christoph Bluth's chapter on Anglo-American relations during the conflict. Bluth highlights how the US faced a difficult situation where it was forced to find a balance between its interests in Latin America in Europe in the midst of a conflict between two important allies in the United States' wider foreign policy objectives.<sup>9</sup> This subject is also covered in great detail by Charles Moore in the first volume of his biography of Thatcher. Moore writes in great detail about Anglo-American diplomacy in the days leading to the invasion as Britain sought the assistance of the United States in discouraging Argentina from launching a military solution to the dispute. Moore concedes that ultimately the United States had to attempt to find peace but there was no real doubt that when conflict came, the US would formally side with Britain.<sup>10</sup> This is also the conclusion of Andrew Hurrell who, writing in 1983, argued that the US' main concern was a long drawn out war between two allies with no obvious conclusion.<sup>11</sup> Although this present work agrees with these conclusions it adds to the historiography by commenting what this shows about the US opinion on the self-determination of the islanders. This work uses the diplomatic material to highlight that given the United States' overarching concerns in the conflict, it ultimately would not have rejected any proposal that brought a swift end to the fighting, even one that denied the islanders a right to self-determination.

The current historiography does not account for the effect that the Alfonsín government had on American responses to the dispute after the conflict. As the US administration became increasingly impressed by the efforts Alfonsín was making to amend for Argentina's past transgressions, both against its own people and other governments, American government and public opinion became less sympathetic to the British stance on

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<sup>8</sup> State Department to US Mission to UN, 16 April 1982, Thatcher Digital Archive (per US State Department).

<sup>9</sup> Christoph Bluth, 'Anglo-American Relations and the Falklands Conflict' in *International Perspectives*, 203-223.

<sup>10</sup> Moore, *Margaret Thatcher Volume I*, 225

<sup>11</sup> Andrew Hurrell, 'The politics of South Atlantic security: a survey of proposals for a South Atlantic Treaty Organization,' *International Affairs* 59, no. 2 (Spring 1983): 179-193.



the islands, accusing HMG of holding Alfonsín to account for the sins of the Junta.<sup>12</sup> This study evaluates how as a result of this, the American government distanced itself from the concerns of the British and instead focussed on building good relations with the Argentine government. When the UK called for support in upholding its rights in the South Atlantic, the Americans saw a British stubbornness that placed at risk the opportunity to gain an important ally in the fight against communism. Where other work has focussed on the relationship between President and Prime Minister, this work expands that study to other departments of government in both countries and focusses particularly on American opinion of Britain and the dispute. It is through doing so that this study indicates that although Reagan and Thatcher may have shared a personal respect for one another, their governments held very different interpretations of the dispute.

### **3.3. Relations during the conflict**

#### ***3.3.1. 'Stay out of El Salvador and Poland too'*<sup>13</sup>**

American involvement in the crisis has to be contextualised in the Cold War, given that restricting the spread of communism was the overarching foreign policy objective of US administrations after the Second World War. America had been alarmed by the Soviet advance in the late 1970s and upon taking office in 1980, Reagan responded by implementing a tough rhetoric, military build-up, and confrontational policies on arms control and regional conflict.<sup>14</sup> His own doctrine had two key areas of focus, Europe and Latin America. Their importance was summarised by the President at White House reception in June 1981, “roses are red, violets are blue, [the USSR must] stay out of El Salvador and Poland too”.<sup>15</sup> Argentina had an important role to play in this new strategy. The administration believed ‘a close and cooperative relationship with Argentina was an

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<sup>12</sup> Oliver Wright to Antony Acland, 2 December 1985, FCO 7/6366 f43.

<sup>13</sup> Reagan, Ronald, 12 June 1981, Remarks at a White House Reception for the Republican National Committee, Washington D.C. cited in Borsani, ‘Imperial Legacy,’ 507.

<sup>14</sup> Beth A. Fischer, ‘US foreign policy under Reagan and Bush’ in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War: Volume III* (Endings), (eds.) Melvin P. Leffler and Westad A. Odd (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 269.

<sup>15</sup> See footnote 12.

essential precondition for the success of the American strategy'.<sup>16</sup> The first years of Reagan's presidency had seen ties with Buenos Aires strengthen and Argentina had offered practical support in helping the CIA train anti-Sandinista counter-revolutionaries in Nicaragua.<sup>17</sup> Reagan enjoyed a good relationship with Argentine President Videla and saw Argentina as a valuable ally.<sup>18</sup> Reagan had lifted the arms embargo that the Carter administration had placed on Argentina and had sent many high ranking US officials, such as US Ambassador at Large General Vernon Walters and Ambassador to the UN, Jeanne Kirkpatrick, to Argentina to further improve relations. A report of the White House Interagency Group from February 1981 showed that the US planned on including Argentina in high level nuclear consultation as well as offering Videla's government a consultation role in the security of the South Atlantic.<sup>19</sup>

In Europe, Britain also had an important role to play in Reagan's foreign policy. Upon the assumption of their respective offices, Reagan and Thatcher embodied the relationship between the United States and the UK that Winston Churchill had defined in 1946, 'the fraternal association of the English-speaking people,' characterized by a 'growing friendship and mutual understanding between our two vast but kindred systems of society ... [and] the continuance of the intimate relations between our military advisers, leading to common study of potential dangers.'<sup>20</sup> Britain and America shared strong military ties: a common command and full integration of planning and logistics in NATO and active sharing of personnel, equipment and intelligence. Where they differed was on how they each saw Britain's relative importance to the US. Whereas Britain argued in any conflict with Argentina the USA should naturally support HMG, the American administration had a differing perspective. Given Reagan's strategy for tackling communism, by 1982, Latin

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<sup>16</sup> Thornton, *The Falklands Sting*, 62.

<sup>17</sup> Also known as 'contras'. For a more detailed study of this see Chapter 5 of Treharne, *Reagan and Thatcher's Special Relationship*.

<sup>18</sup> Louise Richardson, *When Allies Differ: Anglo-American Relations During the Suez and Falklands Crises* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1996), 114.

<sup>19</sup> Haig to Reagan, 13 March 1981, p. 1, file: (03/17/1981) President Viola Argentina (2), box 90125, Roger W. Fontaine Files, Ronald Reagan Library. Cited in Treharne, *Reagan and Thatcher's Special Relationship*, 44-45.

<sup>20</sup> Winston Churchill, *Sinews of Peace (Iron Curtain Speech)*, Westminster College, Fulton, 5 March 1946, accessed 17 April 2017, available at <https://winstonchurchill.org/resources/speeches/1946-1963-elder-statesman/the-sinews-of-peace/>.

America was just as important as Europe and the practical implications of offering support to a European partner over a Latin American ally had to be considered.

From the outset of the crisis, the USA faced a dilemma. Although Britain was an important ally, US objectives in Latin America always meant that avoiding a conflict that could lead to the collapse of the Junta was the preferable aim and as such, it was natural for the US to intervene in an attempt to find peace. The hardening of Argentine attitudes towards the dispute under the Galtieri government led to Britain turning to the USA to help mediate. In early 1982, Carrington contacted US Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Thomas O. Enders, to enlist his help. At this stage, this was purely precautionary given British intelligence had determined an imminent Argentine invasion of the islands was unlikely.<sup>21</sup> Enders facilitated the talks between UK and Argentine officials that took place in New York from 26-27 February 1982. The talks resulted in an agreement by both parties to reaffirm their resolve to find a negotiated settlement to the dispute to the general satisfaction of the Americans.<sup>22</sup> However, the situation deteriorated following the raising of the Argentine flag on 19 March by the Argentine military vessel *Bahía Paraíso* followed by a landing at Leith, South Georgia, on 25 March by Argentine marines. British anxieties about the possibility of an armed invasion of the islands increased and prompted the government to take precautionary measures. Thatcher personally intervened authorising the dispatch of nuclear submarine *HMS Conqueror* to the area the following day. Thatcher later wrote: ‘my instinct was that the time had come to show the Argentines that we meant business.’<sup>23</sup> This increased American concerns over the prospect of conflict between its two allies. On 28 March, US Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, contacted US Ambassador to Argentina, Harry Schlaudeman, to urge Argentina to show restraint and not aggravate the situation further. The following day, British Ambassador to the USA, Nicholas Henderson, contacted Deputy Secretary of State, Walter Stoessel, to canvas for American support of the British position. Henderson interpreted the US position as, ‘the USA did not wish to take sides between the UK and Argentina. They [the US government] merely wished to counsel

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<sup>21</sup> Peter Carrington, *Reflect on Things Past: The Memoirs of Lord Carrington* (London: William Collins, 1988), 362.

<sup>22</sup> FCO background brief ‘Militarism and Repression in Argentina,’ 17 April 1982, FCO 973/231.

<sup>23</sup> Thatcher, *Thatcher’s War*, 9–10.

patience on both parties.<sup>24</sup> The impression that was given to Henderson is representative of US strategy being primarily focussed on avoiding conflict. In response, Carrington sent a message to US Deputy Chief of Mission in the American embassy in London, Edward J. Streator, stating that the US was appearing to treat the Argentines and the British as equal partners.<sup>25</sup> Throughout these early diplomatic exchanges, it was clear that the US' primary concern was to avoid conflict if at all possible. The even-handed approach was taken in attempt to encourage both sides to exercise patience and to avoid taking action which could lead to conflict. At this stage, in its dealings with both countries, the US did not express any opinion on the sovereignty dispute or the use of force by Argentina. It was an aspect of American involvement in the conflict that Carrington later referred to as 'exceedingly annoying' and 'disgraceful'.<sup>26</sup> On 30 March, the US sent messages directly to the Argentine Junta and the Argentine Ambassador to the US, Esteban Takacs, warning of the potential damage that any further provocation may have on US-Argentine relations, but this warning did not make reference to the sovereignty issue which meant that the US avoided placing itself on either side of the dispute.

Argentina was too important an ally in South America for the United States to admonish in favour of traditional ties of friendship with Britain. In deciding on its policy approach to the conflict, the US administration had to consider the potential consequence of supporting one side over the other. On 31 March at a meeting between Thatcher, Richard Luce, Permanent Under-Secretary of State at the FCO Antony Acland and Lord Privy Seal Humphrey Atkins, a message was drafted from Thatcher to Reagan calling for his direct assistance in intervening with Galtieri.<sup>27</sup> Here, the British government talked about the importance of resisting any Argentine aggression in the context of the Cold War. Whether HMG truly believed that the Argentine aggression could encourage communist regimes to attack western interests is unknown. More importantly, this rhetoric was likely chosen given the British knew that the primary foreign policy aims of the United States were tied into the Cold War and the British aimed to stir sympathies within the Reagan administration for its

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<sup>24</sup> Nicholas Henderson, *Mandarin: the Diaries of an Ambassador, 1969-1982*. (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1995), 447.

<sup>25</sup> Lord Franks, *Falkland Islands Review*, 63.

<sup>26</sup> Carrington interview with Sally-Ann Treharne cited in Treharne, *Reagan and Thatcher's Special Relationship*, 45.

<sup>27</sup> Thatcher, *Thatcher's War*, 11; Robin Renwick, *A Journey with Margaret Thatcher: Foreign Policy under the Iron Lady* (London: Biteback, 2013), 42.

cause by pursuing this line. However, the US administration generally had a different view on the conflict in the context of the Cold War. Rather, a conflict between two allies posed a significant risk to western interests in South America. The UK underestimated the strategic importance of Argentina to American foreign policy. In talks between governments, US officials told their British counterparts that ‘the United States wished to do everything possible to strengthen the British Government in this hour of trial’ but this was said more out of diplomatic necessity to persuade Britain to hold off from exacerbating the situation whilst the US attempted to find a peace agreement both parties could agree to.<sup>28</sup> Reports from the US government showed a more balanced consideration of the effect conflict may have had on US interests and suggested ‘we [the Haig peace mission] would rather spread the burden around’ by suggesting a non-British and non-Argentine administration of the islands.<sup>29</sup> The Reagan administration was clear that the practical implications on their own policy objectives were of paramount importance in dictating US government response to the crisis. As such, expressed British thoughts on the effect of the conflict on the Cold War and self-determination did not stir support from US officials.

### ***3.3.2. Engendering a hundred years of animosity***

The initial even-handed approach the US took towards the conflict and initial peace efforts was to be expected given the concern within Washington for US interests in Latin America. The distinctive pro-Latin American faction was led by Kirkpatrick and Enders. Both were keen to ensure that the US did not immediately side with Britain in the conflict out of fear that any American assistance for the UK would confirm Latin American suspicions that the US would favour European interests over its continental neighbours.<sup>30</sup> Kirkpatrick was the real champion of the Argentine cause in the White House. She warned both Reagan and US National Security Director, William P. Clark, that supporting the UK would ‘engender a

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<sup>28</sup> No. 10 record of conversation, Margaret Thatcher and Alexander Haig, 8 April 1982, PREM19/615 f31.

<sup>29</sup> Haig telegram to Vernon Walters, 8 April 1982, Thatcher digital archive, per State Department website. Also available on Thatcher Foundation archive, accessed 17 March 2017, available at <https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/142988>.

<sup>30</sup> Lawrence D. Freedman, ‘The special relationship, then and now,’ *Foreign Affairs* 85, no. 3 (May/June 2006): 65.

hundred years of animosity in Latin America.’<sup>31</sup> Kirkpatrick argued that the United States was justified in supporting authoritarian regimes around the world so long as those governments supported Washington’s aims. She felt that ‘authoritarian’ regimes could be led to democracy by example arguing that, ‘traditional authoritarian governments are less repressive than revolutionary autocracies.’<sup>32</sup> Kirkpatrick had used her role as ambassador to the United Nations in 1981-1982 to strengthen the US’ relationships with such regimes in Latin America.<sup>33</sup> The United States government formally siding with Britain in the conflict threatened to undermine her work. Kirkpatrick’s role in the crisis infuriated British officials with Henderson later commenting to historian Treharne that while Enders was ‘more fascist than fool’, Kirkpatrick was more ‘fool than fascist’ emphasising that he felt Kirkpatrick’s position was based on an ill-informed view of authoritarian governments as opposed to any shared political ideology.<sup>34</sup> Britain did have advocates in the American government. Secretary of Defence, Caspar Weinberger, and Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Lawrence Eagleburger, were both strong supporters of the British cause. However, this was not down to any particular affiliation with the British government, or the ‘special relationship’, but more the extent to which both US officials valued America’s NATO responsibilities.<sup>35</sup> The division within the American administration is indicative of how the USA approached the whole conflict. For the US there were competing objectives at stake in the conflict and the US had to find a way to balance them. This was the impression given to some politicians in the UK. Former Labour leader Neil Kinnock criticised the US government for not wanting to draw unwelcome attention to its policies in Latin-America:

[The US] got their jersey caught on the barbed wire over the Contras and other CIA operations in Central and Latin America. That was generating antagonism even in fairly right-wing political circles in the continent and they just didn’t want the bother of it. That was the reason for being much more sotto

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<sup>31</sup> William M. LeoGrande, *Our Own Backyard: The United States in Central America, 1977-1992* (London: University of North Carolina Press, 2000).

<sup>32</sup> Jeanne Kirkpatrick writing in *The Jerusalem Post*, 14 December 2006.

<sup>33</sup> Kirkpatrick’s position became known as the ‘Kirkpatrick Doctrine’ in US political circles between 1981 and 1985 and was influential in the United States supporting anti-Communist, militaristic governments in Guatemala (1985), the Philippines (1986) and Argentina (1983).

<sup>34</sup> Henderson valedictory despatch, 27 July 1982, PREM 19/652 f12.

<sup>35</sup> Treharne, *Reagan and Thatcher’s Special Relationship*, 46.

voce than they should (in my view) have been with the Argentines.<sup>36</sup>

Kinnock comments highlight a growing awareness in Britain that Argentina was too important a country to the US for them to immediately openly side with Britain. It is reasonable to conclude therefore that the United States did not want to risk antagonising South American governments by offering immediate support to Britain in the conflict. This was a view shared by Adrian Beamish, the former head of the Falkland Islands Department in the FCO. He has argued that the USA desired to prevent world attention becoming focussed on the United States' Latin America policies, highlighting some recognition of wider US interests from the FCO. To this end, the USA needed to distance itself from accusations it was supporting British 'colonial' ambition in the South Atlantic. Beamish commented that:

The hemisphere was not only the US backyard but also a sort of *chasse gardée*. And that meant that non-US initiatives, however well meaning, were not much appreciated. For the British to be starting a war in the *chasse gardée* was deeply unwelcome and required a lot of hasty readjustment on the part of the State Department policy works. This was a factor in the tensions between the US and the UK that Reagan and Thatcher had to work to overcome. In principle, the US is anti-colonial hence its agnosticism on the question of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands ... As the Falklands crisis deepened, the UK needed US support but the US did not need to be seen to be in bed with the British.<sup>37</sup>

The divided view within the American government made the neutrality with which they approached the conflict inevitable. By 1982, the USA had too much invested in Latin America to risk openly siding with the British. As such, any British assumptions that the Reagan administration would unreservedly support their cause did not accurately consider the importance of Latin America to wider US foreign policy.

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<sup>36</sup> Kinnock interview with Sally-Ann Treharne in Treharne, *Thatcher and Reagan's Special Relationship*, 49.

<sup>37</sup> Adrian Beamish interview with Sally-Ann Treharne in Treharne, *Thatcher and Reagan's Special Relationship*, 49.

There was concern from British officials that the attitude of Kirkpatrick may have played a role in encouraging the Argentines to invade. Nicholas Henderson has expanded his comments on Kirkpatrick by giving credit to claims that the US ambassador to the UN gave unofficial guarantees to Argentina that the US supported Argentine claims to the islands, 'it has also been related to the usual factional struggles here within the administration, with Mrs Kirkpatrick and Enders espousing a pro-Argentine line.'<sup>38</sup> Kirkpatrick's involvement in encouraging the Argentines to invade the islands is further advocated for by military historian, Michael Desch, who cites that Kirkpatrick was attending a dinner at the Argentine embassy at the time of the invasion.<sup>39</sup> Although the alleged guarantees given to the Argentine delegation by Kirkpatrick have never been proved, it is known that she spoke with the Argentine ambassador at the UN, Eduardo Roca, to say that she thought it would be impossible for Britain to bring the issue before the Security Council.<sup>40</sup> Haig was forced to defend Kirkpatrick's behaviour when Henderson accused her of attempting to negotiate a deal with the Junta where by Kirkpatrick offered not to criticise Argentina in return for continued Argentine support for US actions in Nicaragua. These were accusations that Haig denied.<sup>41</sup> However, the fact that such accusations were prominent showed the distrust that existed between British and US officials. Britain was not confident that certain departments of the US administration were not working to help Argentina achieve its aims. Kirkpatrick represented those that valued US-Argentine relations too much to let, as she saw it, British pride interfere with American foreign policy objectives commenting, 'it is not as though the Argentine government had attacked the British Embassy in Buenos Aries and seized the inhabitants as prisoners.' She even controversially stated in a newspaper interview in the Times that, 'if the Argentines own the islands, then moving troops into them is not armed aggression.'<sup>42</sup> Comments such as this highlighted that Kirkpatrick did not believe the Argentine aggression towards the islands was of great

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<sup>38</sup> UKE Washington to FCO, 7 April 1982, PREM 19/615 f92.

<sup>39</sup> See Michael C. Desch, *Power and Military Effectiveness: The Fallacy of Democratic Triumphalism* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2008), 145.

<sup>40</sup> Kirkpatrick's meeting with Ambassador Roca is discussed in Richard C. Thornton, *The Reagan Revolution II: Rebuilding the Western Alliance* (Oxford: Trafford Publishing, 2004), 67; Thornton, *The Falklands Sting*, 126–7.

<sup>41</sup> Alexander Haig, *Caveat: Realism, Reagan and Foreign Policy* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1984) 269.

<sup>42</sup> State Department to US Mission to UN, 16 April 1982, Thatcher Digital Archive (per US State Department).



consequence. She embodied the view that the principles such as self-determination were of relative little importance when compared with wider US interests in Latin America.

Caught somewhat in the middle of the two factions were Reagan and Haig who, concerned with achieving an outcome that protected US interests in both Latin America and Europe, placed US efforts in finding a peaceful resolution to crisis. Although both men had leanings towards the British, they were aware of the need to consider America's interests in Latin America. Thatcher tried to use her personal relationship with Reagan to influence the President. Reagan responded to her request for aid on 31 March and assured Thatcher that attempts to contact Galtieri were underway and that the USA would 'do what we can to assist you' to the aim of maintaining peace.<sup>43</sup> Thatcher was encouraged by this as she thought Reagan's personal intervention was vital in dissuading Argentina from pursuing a military solution to force their claims.<sup>44</sup> It was on the same day that Haig became more actively involved in the crisis. He met with Henderson but Enders was also present at the meeting and reminded the room that Argentina had been helpful to the US in El Salvador, serving a gentle reminder to the British of the strategic importance of Argentina to the USA.<sup>45</sup> Haig met Tackas on 1 April and warned that the relations between the US and Argentina may return 'to the worst days' should Argentina invade.<sup>46</sup> Given the known strategic importance of Argentina to the USA and US actions after the conflict, this was clearly not a threat that carried much weight. However, it does show that the Americans were exploring diplomatic options open to them to prevent a conflict. Reagan managed to speak to Galtieri on 2 April, the day of the Argentine invasion of the islands, and offered to send US Vice President, George H. Bush to Buenos Aires to discuss the issue with Galtieri in person. Galtieri refused the President's offer, informing him that 'time had run out' for the British.<sup>47</sup> Reagan wrote to Thatcher to convey his conversation with Galtieri. In the letter he commented that, 'while we have a policy of neutrality on the sovereignty issue, we will not be neutral on the issue

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<sup>43</sup> Reagan to Thatcher, 1 April 1982, file: United Kingdom PM Thatcher (8202120–8205267), box 35, Executive Secretariat NSC Head of State Files, Ronald Reagan Library.

<sup>44</sup> UKE Washington to FCO, 1 April 1982, accessed 17 July 2015, available at <https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/118436>.

<sup>45</sup> Henderson, *Mandarin*, 448.

<sup>46</sup> Department of State to US embassy in Buenos Aires, 2 April 1982, accessed 17 May 2015, available at: [www.margaretthatcher.org/document/114267](http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/114267).

<sup>47</sup> Department of State to US embassy in Buenos Aires, 2 April 1982, accessed 17 May 2015, available at: [www.margaretthatcher.org/document/114266](http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/114266).

involving Argentine use of military force.’<sup>48</sup> Although this was welcome news to the British, its significance should not be overstated. The US could condemn the use of force as it was a blatant violation of international law and in condemning Argentina, the US would also be joining a large number of other countries which were doing the same. As it was such an open violation of international law, it is possible that not condemning the use of force would draw more attention to the United States’ Latin American policy. Had the Reagan administration sided with Argentina, the US would have also risked alienating more of its western European partners who were expected to condemn the Junta’s invasion of the islands. However, highlighting the more balanced approach the US took, the Reagan administration had also failed to exert financial pressure on Argentina which Britain had hoped for. Further, Reagan’s words regarding sovereignty were also of importance. He highlighted that the US had no opinion on sovereignty and did not support one sides’ claim over the other. Ultimately, who held sovereignty over the islands was of little consequence to the United States so long as any sovereignty was obtained alongside the US interests in Latin America being protected. Practical considerations had strongly influenced US decision making over Falklands policy to the point where even in the face of a blatant violation of international law, Reagan had to formulate a response that could protect US interests with both Britain and Argentina.

When conflict broke out, US support for Britain was inevitable, however, as peace was always the preferable outcome for the US, it was also inevitable that Haig used the weeks before the Task Force arrived at the islands to engage in efforts to find a solution without having to resort to conflict. When Argentina took South Georgia on 4 April, Britain again sought assistance. It requested that the US condemn the invasion, recall their ambassador from Buenos Aires, place an embargo on arms sales to Argentina and take the issue to the Organisation of American States. However, Reagan advised Thatcher that it was not best for the US to take such measures.<sup>49</sup> As such, the UK embassy attempted to garner sympathy among the US public for the British position in the crisis with Henderson making numerous appearances on popular US television and radio shows. The UK hoped that gaining the sympathy of the US public would place pressure on the US government to offer

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<sup>48</sup> Reagan to Thatcher, 2 April 1982, accessed 18 May 2015, available at: [www.margaretthatcher.org/document/109401](http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/109401).

<sup>49</sup> Haig, *Caveat*, 266; and Richardson, *When Allies Differ*, 118.

support to Britain.<sup>50</sup> Thatcher contacted Reagan again on 6 April to ask that the US place economic sanctions on Argentina. The US agreed to place an arms embargo on Argentina but not trade embargo as the British had hoped again underlying the need for the US to protect its interests in South America. Thatcher felt at this point ‘the Americans were anxious to achieve a settlement that would prevent them having to choose between Britain, their natural ally, and their interests in Latin America.’<sup>51</sup> Haig wrote to Reagan on the same day to say that the US should mediate now in the dispute before it found itself ‘in an untenable position of having to compromise our impartiality if we are to be responsive to escalating British requests for assistance.’ Haig foreshadowed the eventual US support for Britain while recognising this was ‘a high risk mission’ but one the US ‘must take if we are not to suffer a major setback to our policies in this hemisphere.’<sup>52</sup> These quotes foreshadowed Haig’s shuttle diplomacy and underlined that the only outcome that protect US interests was a peaceful one. Haig wanted a solution where Argentina would withdraw from the islands but Galtieri could still save face.<sup>53</sup> Before leaving for London for the first time, Haig met with Henderson and discussed the establishment of an OAS led international commission to remove the Argentine forces from the islands. Henderson immediately rejected the decision. Henderson did not have much confidence in Haig’s negotiating abilities, ‘Haig is not firmly in the saddle: he does not have the President’s trust in the way that Weinberger does, and is actively distrusted by Reagan’s closest White House advisers . . . He has also proved a consistent own-goal scorer.’<sup>54</sup> The fact that Haig would even suggest such a solution to the crisis shows his ultimate consideration was ensuring that both sides could save face. Whatever sympathies Haig may have had for the British position, he was aware of the need not to strain relations with Argentina.

When Haig arrived in London on 8 April, he met with Thatcher who emphasised that the UK was prepared to retake the islands by military force if necessary and expressed concern at America’s reluctance to formally side with Britain.<sup>55</sup> Haig attempted to assure Thatcher that the President did sympathise with the British position and warned that once

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<sup>50</sup> UKE Washington to FCO, 7 April 1982, PREM 19/615 f92.

<sup>51</sup> Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years*, 187–8.

<sup>52</sup> Haig to Reagan, 6 April 1982, file: Falklands Crisis 1982, RAC box 5, Dennis C. Blair Files, Ronald Reagan Library.

<sup>53</sup> Treharne, *Reagan and Thatcher’s Special Relationship*, 55

<sup>54</sup> Henderson to FCO, 11 July 1981, PREM 19/1152.

<sup>55</sup> US embassy in London to State Department, 8 April 1982, accessed 5 April 2015, available at: [www.margaretthatcher.org/document/114333](http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/114333).

the first shots were fired it would be ‘an increasingly difficult burden to protect principle’. However, he found the Prime Minister resolute about British sovereignty.<sup>56</sup> This is not to say that Haig was overly concerned with principles involved but he was responding to the British stance on matters such as self-determination and the importance of resisting Argentine aggression in an attempt to dissuade Britain from pursuing a military solution to the crisis. Thatcher rejected another proposal of an interim administration on the islands, led by officials from different countries neutral in the conflict. Such attitudes unnerved the Americans and Reagan wrote to Haig, ‘[t]he report of your discussions in London makes clear how difficult it will be to foster a compromise that gives Maggie enough to carry on and at the same time meets the test of “equity” with our Latin neighbours.’<sup>57</sup> In doing so, Haig again underlined the US’ desire to find a balanced approach that protected its relations with both Britain and Argentina. However, Haig attempted to keep British faith in his efforts by repeatedly offering assurances that the US ‘would not let its ally down as Washington had done over the Suez Crisis’.<sup>58</sup> Through this first phase of the shuttle diplomacy, it became evident that although Haig may have had sympathy for Britain over the way Argentina had taken the islands, his primary concern was attempting to dissuade either side from engaging in conflict.

When Haig informed Galtieri of Thatcher’s demand that the Argentines withdraw the US Secretary of State said, ‘I told her [Thatcher] I was sure you could not accept this – and frankly I don’t believe you should. The British position is tantamount to an ultimatum.’<sup>59</sup> Haig indicated to Argentina that the US sympathised with its position. Given that Haig had offered the same sympathies to Thatcher, it is unlikely that he was genuinely sympathetic to the Argentine cause. More likely he was hoping to use diplomacy to make the Junta more amenable to US intervention in the crisis. This point is underlined by the fact that Haig’s next set of compromises included the withdrawal of Argentine troops from the islands. Haig returned to the UK on 12 April with another proposal which would have seen the Argentinian troops withdraw, an agreement for no future military forces to be introduced on

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<sup>56</sup> Cited in Treharne, *Reagan and Thatcher’s Special Relationship*, 56.

<sup>57</sup> Reagan to Haig 9 April 1982, file: Falklands War, Box 91365, Executive Secretariat NSC Country Files, Falklands War, Ronald Reagan Library.

<sup>58</sup> 8 April 1982, Henderson, *Mandarin*, 444.

<sup>59</sup> Document titled ‘Talking Points: Galtieri’, n.d. (the document was located in a file detailing correspondence from 1 March to 30 April 1982), file: United Kingdom 1982 (03/01/1982–04/30/1982), RAC box 6, Dennis C. Blair Files, Ronald Reagan Library.

the islands; the establishment of a special commission; the lifting of all sanctions against Argentina; and a continuation of negotiations under the auspices of the UN charter to be completed by the end of 1982. This caused further tension between Thatcher and Haig over halting the advance of the Task Force before the Argentine withdrawal. Haig found an ally in the British administration in Francis Pym who was also keen to find an urgent resolution to the crisis. Pym suggested that the implementation of an exclusion zone should be delayed until after US mediation efforts but this was met with dismay by his colleagues, particularly Defence Secretary John Nott.<sup>60</sup> The British determination to push ahead with the military solution while negotiations were on-going only hastened Haig's attempts to get a negotiated settlement. America would be placed in an uncompromising position if two of its closest allies came to conflict with a risk of alienating at least one of the parties.

In the days that followed, it became clearer that America and Britain had differing thoughts on how the crisis should be approached. Haig wrote to Reagan on 14 April, stating that he believed Thatcher did want to avoid conflict.<sup>61</sup> Reagan then contacted Galtieri to warn him again of the possible reprisals on US-Argentine relations should the Junta not display some more 'flexibility and restraint' in the negotiations to find a peaceful settlement.<sup>62</sup> After this conversation, Reagan wrote to Thatcher thanking her for being receptive to American attempts to find a negotiated peace referring to the UK as 'our closest ally' and to Argentina as a nation 'with whom we would like to be able to cooperate in advancing specific interests in the hemisphere.'<sup>63</sup> For the first time, Reagan admitted to Thatcher that the US had significant interests in Latin America it did not want to damage but did so in a manner aimed at persuading Thatcher to weaken her stance on compromises so that US interests could be protected. Thatcher responded by reaffirming that Britain still wished to avoid conflict but ended her message with a veiled warning 'it is essential that America, our closest friend and ally, should share with us a common perception of the

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<sup>60</sup> Nott saw this as an 'absurd suggestion' especially to come from a UK minister. He said to delay the implementation of the exclusion zone 'would have been disastrous because it was vital that we [the UK] showed determination from the outset to take the islands back'. John Nott interview with Sally-Ann Treharne cited in Treharne, *Reagan and Thatcher's Special Relationship*, 57.

<sup>61</sup> Haig to Reagan, 14 April 1982, file: United Kingdom (4/1/82–7/31/82) (3/6), box 20, Executive Secretariat NSC Country Files, Europe and the Soviet Union, Ronald Reagan Library.

<sup>62</sup> Memcon. of Reagan–Galtieri discussion, 15 April 1982, file: Falklands Crisis 1982, RAC box 5, Dennis C. Blair Files, Ronald Reagan Library.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid* Reagan to Thatcher, 15 April 1982.

fundamental issues of democracy and freedom which are at stake.’<sup>64</sup> Such language was used as justification by the British for their actions but there is no evidence to suggest that ‘principles at stake’ were of any great importance to the Americans given that the US had continually explored solutions that compromised both sides view of the principles at stake. William P. Clark expressed concern to Henderson that British opinion was critical that the United States had not come out in support of the UK. Clark explained that ‘America was helping in all sorts of ways but had to remain neutral in public while the talks were going on’.<sup>65</sup> Clark expressed frustration that Britain did not seem to understand that the US had to protect its Latin-American interests and in doing so highlighted that the principles that Britain claimed to be defending were not a prominent issue for the US. Whilst Washington accepted that Argentina had been in the wrong in invading the islands, the view of many American officials was that Britain had to see the practical risks to wider western interests should America have imposed further sanctions or given material support to the British in the early stages of the crisis. Ultimately, the United States’ response to the conflict was framed in wider policy concerns.

On 19 April, Haig made another attempt at a peace proposal where he acknowledged the matter of self-determination but argued that ‘the rights of the inhabitants refer only to individual rights and not a “collective” right of self-determination’.<sup>66</sup> Britain’s rejection of this made conflict seem inevitable and as such began the tilting of the US towards the British. The British rejected the proposal out of hand as the entire justification for Britain’s use of the task force was built on defending the islander’s right to self-determination. Therefore, it was not an issue the British could negotiate over. Seeing how upset the proposal had made the British, Reagan confided, ‘I don’t think Margaret Thatcher should be asked to concede anymore.’<sup>67</sup> National Security Council Official, James ‘Jim’ Rentschler, a member of Haig’s negotiation team, wrote to Clark the following day saying that the US should now back the UK for reasons that ‘transcend the already compelling ties of history, language, and formal alliance. Our strategic imperatives in the East–West context and the stakes we have in

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<sup>64</sup> Thatcher to Reagan, 16 April 1982, accessed 18 April 2016, available at: [www.margaretthatcher.org/document/122860](http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/122860).

<sup>65</sup> Henderson to FCO, 17 April 1982, accessed 18 April 2016, available at: [www.margaretthatcher.org/document/123057](http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/123057).

<sup>66</sup> Haig to Pym, 19 April 1982, file: Falklands War, box 91365, Executive Secretariat NSC Country Files, Falklands War, Ronald Reagan Library.

<sup>67</sup> Ronald Reagan, 20 April 1982, in *The Reagan Diaries* ed. Douglas Brinkley (New York: Harper Collins, 2007), 93.

asserting the primacy of our western leadership require it.’<sup>68</sup> Although Rentschler does mention historical ties, he highlighted that the US now needed to side with Britain because it was the best way to protect US interests in the Cold War context. This was also coupled with growing support for the British cause in the US senate. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan drafted a resolution for the Senate which called for a US trade embargo on Argentina despite calls from the OAS for America to not offer Britain any practical aid.<sup>69</sup> However despite American officials’ evident sympathy for the British cause, at this time there was no alteration in the American stance of neutrality. America still continued to pursue peace proposals despite the increasing remonstrations of the British administration. The support for a tilt towards Britain was built on individuals’ opinions that it was the best way to protect US interests in the Cold War.

Tension built between the US and Britain when Haig proposed informing Argentina of the British plan to retake South Georgia. Haig was told about it on 21 April and Britain’s Head of Chancery in Washington, Robin Renwick, later wrote that it took some ‘violent remonstrance’ to prevent Haig from informing Buenos Aires.<sup>70</sup> Although no definitive proof has been found that Haig did inform the Argentinians, many within the British administration believed that he had.<sup>71</sup> Some evidence to support this suggestion is found in Haig’s message to William Clark following a telephone conversation discussing the planned British attack. Haig said, ‘I called you on open line with clear recognition that Argentines would monitor. In order to break impossible impasse this morning on force withdrawal modalities, I created impression [*sic*] that British military action was about to take place.’<sup>72</sup> Whether Haig did leak the information to the Argentines or not, the fact that he proposed to do so showed that the US gave such importance to its interests in both Latin America and Europe, he was willing to give intelligence assistance to Argentina whilst also continuing to express sympathy with Britain.

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<sup>68</sup> Rentschler to Clark, 20 April 1982, file: United Kingdom 1982 (03/01/1982–04/30/1982), RAC box 6, Dennis C. Blair Files, Ronald Reagan Library.

<sup>69</sup> See Treharne, *Reagan and Thatcher’s Special Relationship*, 58.

<sup>70</sup> Renwick, *Journey with Margaret Thatcher*, 59.

<sup>71</sup> Treharne, *Reagan and Thatcher’s Special Relationship*, 59.

<sup>72</sup> Haig to Clark, 18 April 1982, file: (Cables 09013, 09100, 091154, 091640, 181715, 91650, 181715, 191754, 192115), box 30, Executive Secretariat NSC Country Files, Latin America, Falklands War, Grenada, Ronald Reagan Library.

### 3.3.3. *End of mediation*

When conflict became inevitable at the end of April, the US formally sided with the UK. This was always to be expected as once conflict broke out it clearly better served US interests to side with Britain. Not doing so risked alienating Europe and also drawing unwanted attention to the US' support of authoritarian regimes in Latin America. However, if conflict could not be avoided, it was in the best interests of the US that any conflict should be a short one and so the US continued in its efforts to find a compromised solution to the conflict. Haig invited Pym to Washington to present a final peace proposal on 22-23 April. This proposal suggested a trusteeship of the islands by the US for a period of five years. However, the British negotiators present indicated that this would be unacceptable to the Prime Minister.<sup>73</sup> As such, Haig asked Pym to take an amended set of proposals back to the UK and present them to Thatcher's cabinet. These proposals included the possibility of a transfer of sovereignty whilst affording the islanders the right to choose with which country they could associate, an attempt to placate both Argentina's claim to sovereignty of the land and the islanders' right to self-determination.<sup>74</sup> Whilst the US was preparing to support the UK in public, Haig still offered a proposal which asked Britain to compromise on the sovereignty issue. This is a further indication that the US would have considered any agreement which avoided conflict a success regardless of who held sovereignty. Despite the proposals being endorsed by Pym as 'the best chance of a peaceful solution', the draft peace agreement angered Thatcher, for whom the issues of sovereignty and self-determination were one in the same. She noted that the US seemed intent to 'defend the Argentinians even if they put the same administration on the Falkland Islands as they run in Argentina.'<sup>75</sup> Although the Americans knew that this proposal may anger the British, it is further indication that the US was willing to explore any agreement which would secure peace regardless of the contents of that agreement. Thatcher requested that the proposals first be put to Argentina for acceptance stating that 'knowledge of their [the Junta's] stance will be important to the British cabinet's consideration of your ideas'.<sup>76</sup> However, the cabinet felt that it would serve British interests better should the Argentinian's be the first to reject the proposals.<sup>77</sup> Haig

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<sup>73</sup> Pym memorandum circulated to OD(SA) Committee - OD(SA)(82), 24 and 25 April 1982, CAB 148/212 f17.

<sup>74</sup> US draft of peace agreement (as of 23rd April), 24 April 1982, PREM 19/621 f252.

<sup>75</sup> Thatcher hand written note on draft peace agreement, 24 April 1982, PREM 19/621 f252.

<sup>76</sup> Thatcher message to Haig, 24 April 1982, PREM19/621 f136.

<sup>77</sup> Henderson, *Mandarin*, 454.



presented the proposals to the Argentine government on 27 April but the Argentinians rejected them. Thatcher then wrote to Reagan on 29 April, 'I cannot conceal from you how deeply let down I and my colleagues would feel if under these circumstances the US were not now to give us its full support.'<sup>78</sup> Reagan responded by stating the US would give its 'support for you and the principles of international law and order you are defending. You can count on that support in whatever forum this issue is debated. You can also count on our sympathetic consideration of requests for assistance.'<sup>79</sup> Reagan qualified this by emphasising that he still hoped a peaceful resolution could be reached in the conflict.

Several circumstances had influenced the change in approach from the United States. Most importantly, by 30 April conflict seemed inevitable and the US could no longer take an even handed approach. The Reagan administration faced increasing pressure from home and abroad to come out in support of the UK as sympathy for Britain's cause grew amongst the American public. American media outlets had begun to criticise the Argentine Junta as well as question the policy pursued by the State department.<sup>80</sup> On 30 April, the National Security Council met to discuss the next steps on the Falklands crisis. Top of the consideration list was how the US could respond to increasing pressure to support the UK whilst also mitigating the effects of US assistance to Britain on American-Argentine relations especially given that armed conflict seemed inevitable.<sup>81</sup> The meeting was followed by a press conference where Haig announced US support for the UK and the end of his mediation efforts and allowed for US material support to formally be offered to the UK. By supporting Britain, the US did not alienate its European allies and protected its position as a leading nation among western nations in NATO, important in the context of the Cold War. Further it did not draw attention to US support for authoritarian regimes. However, there was still a desire from the US government to protect its interests in Latin America. The best outcome for the United State now was a short conflict which avoided a humiliating defeat for either side. As such, the US continued its peace efforts even after the outbreak of hostilities.

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<sup>78</sup> Thatcher to Reagan, 29 April 1982, Margaret Thatcher Foundation, accessed 22 February 2018, [www.margaretthatcher.org/document/122861](http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/122861).

<sup>79</sup> Reagan to Thatcher, 29 April 1982, THCR 1/20/3/12 f25.

<sup>80</sup> The *New York Times*, 29 April 1982 and the *Washington Post*, 29 April 1982.

<sup>81</sup> NSC meeting minutes, 30 April 1982, file: Meeting File, box 91284, Executive Secretariat NSC Meeting Files, Ronald Reagan Library.

Although somewhat of a turning point in Anglo-American relations during the crisis, the US tilt towards Britain did not mark a big change in US policy on the conflict. The American government was still acting out of wider policy concerns and there was still an appreciation that the US needed to protect its interests in Latin America. The Argentine rejection of the final peace proposal coupled with increasing sympathy for the British cause from the American public and media influenced the US administration to ultimately side with the British. Further, the European Economic Community had already pledged support to Britain in the form of sanctions. As such, a continuation of the even-handed approach the State department had taken in the conflict risked adversely affecting American-European relations. As Argentina had rejected the final proposal, any further request for the UK to concede could have been seen as effective support for the Argentine desire to retain sovereignty over the islands. Throughout the Haig mediation process, the American administration had acted out of its wider political aims with little concern for any principles involved in the conflict. Other factors were considered when the decision to support the UK cause was made. The House Foreign Affairs Committee had adopted a resolution, sponsored by Congressman Stephan J. Solarz, which called for an Argentine withdrawal of troops from the islands alongside full diplomatic US support for the UK.<sup>82</sup> Michael Heseltine later commented that his impression was that public opinion in America ‘became very much supportive of Britain’s position and that persuaded President Reagan to move his initial scepticism.’<sup>83</sup> Although this may have been an attempt to champion the UK position on the dispute, it is unlikely the US would have altered its position without an element of sympathy for the British among the American public. Treharne has also noted the fear in the US on the possible repercussions on the Thatcher government should the Argentines have remained on the islands. This would have possibly allowed the Labour party to come into power which did not agree with the Reagan administration on many of the most important foreign policy considerations, particularly on the issue of nuclear weapons.<sup>84</sup> Thatcher certainly had a role to play in persuading the US to come out in support of Britain as she continually leant on the President. Reagan later wrote that ‘the depth of this special relationship made it impossible for us to remain neutral during Britain’s war with Argentina over the Falkland

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<sup>82</sup> UKE Washington to FCO, 5 May 1982, PREM 19/624 f601.

<sup>83</sup> Michael Heseltine interview with Sally-Ann Treharne cited in Treharne, *Reagan and Thatcher’s Special Relationship*, 63.

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*

Islands in 1982, although it was a conflict in which I had to walk a fine line'.<sup>85</sup> Despite differing factions within the administration championing the British and Argentine causes, the main American actors during the crisis, Reagan and Haig, were aware of the importance of finding a solution that appeased both parties to ensure that the US' wider foreign policy objectives were not damaged through their policy surrounding the crisis. The Americans were not taken by Britain's arguments on Argentina's aggression tipping the balance away from the west in the Cold War nor were they persuaded either by the importance of self-determination. The primary concern of the administration throughout the conflict was on maintaining peace. When it was evident that the US could no longer remain neutral, the National Security Council took a calculated decision to support Britain, a decision they took aware that it could likely mitigate any lasting effect on relations with Latin-American allies.<sup>86</sup> It is unlikely that the Reagan administration would have supported the UK if there had been an alternative which would have prevented a conflict taking place at all. They did not abandon all hope of reaching a peaceful settlement and their approach to the crisis after Haig's failed mediation only further highlighted the strong US desire to ensure that links with Latin-America were not damaged any further.

#### **3.4. The Peruvian and UN Peace Proposals**

The USA continued to play a role in peace initiatives after its tilt towards Britain. Such endeavours highlighted the strong desire in the USA to avoid an Argentine humiliation that would threaten its ties with any government in Buenos Aires or push Argentina towards the Soviet Union. It was for these reasons that when President Fernando Belaúnde Terry approached Haig on 2 May with a new peace proposal, the American Secretary of State was more than happy to assist. This peace initiative immediately encountered difficulty given the sinking of the *General Belgrano* on the same day as Belaúnde had contacted Haig. The sinking of the *Belgrano* entrenched the Argentinians in their refusal to back down to the British out of fear of humiliation. Galtieri remained stubborn in his refusal to relinquish the islands and the Argentine sinking of the British ship *HMS Sheffield* on the 4 May only made Haig and Belaúnde's task more difficult with Rentschler confiding 'the stance of these two disputants increasingly resembles that of a couple of staggering street fighters, spastically-

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<sup>85</sup> Ronald Reagan, *An American Life* (London: Hutchinson, 1990), 357.

<sup>86</sup> This is discussed further later in the chapter.

swinging at each other while blinded into fury by the flow of their own blood.’<sup>87</sup> Rentschler was indicating his view that Britain and Argentina were not able to see the practical benefits of peace as they had been infuriated by violence. However, the sinking of the *Belgrano* and *Sheffield* also brought with it more support for peace among other countries, particularly in Europe, who were dismayed at the escalation of the fighting and placed increased pressure on Britain to find a peaceful solution. Britain put forward their own proposals to Haig on 5 May but the inclusion of the need for the islanders’ rights to be respected meant Haig refused to put forward the proposals to Peru. This emphasised that the Americans were not concerned with the self-determination of the islanders but more concerned with finding a proposal which Argentina could accept and would prevent a humiliating climb down for the Junta. Britain always underlined the point that it was fighting to defend the islanders’ right of self-determination, but in forcing the point, the American feeling was that Britain was being intransigent, knowing that inclusion of such terminology would make any peace proposal unacceptable to the Argentinians.<sup>88</sup> Thatcher had written to Reagan on 4 May in the aftermath of the sinking of the *Belgrano* stating that ‘with so many young lives at risk – both British and Argentinian - I feel that we must make a supreme effort to avoid a military clash.’<sup>89</sup> Such comments added to the frustration of the Americans that the British would not move on the issue of self-determination and Reagan responded to Thatcher pleading her to ‘seize the chance for a peaceful settlement before more lives are lost’.<sup>90</sup> Haig eventually espoused an altered proposal which included a cessation of hostilities alongside ‘an acknowledgement of the islanders’ aspirations and interests’ with administration of the islands temporarily overseen by a group of interim officials from various different Latin American and European governments.<sup>91</sup> Reagan again wrote to Thatcher imploring her to accept the proposals. Thatcher tentatively agreed on the condition that the interim administration be required to consult with elected island officials, ‘I too want a peaceful settlement and an end to the mounting loss of life in the South Atlantic. I also believe that the friendship between Britain and the United States matters very much to the future of the

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<sup>87</sup> James Rentschler, *Jim Rentschler Diaries*, 4 May 1982, accessed 23 May 2018, <https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/114348>.

<sup>88</sup> Henderson to FCO, 5 May 1982, accessed 23 February 2017, [www.margaretthatcher.org/document/123062](http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/123062).

<sup>89</sup> Thatcher to Reagan, 4 May 1982, PREM 19/624 f50.

<sup>90</sup> Reagan to Thatcher, 5 May 1982, PREM 19/624 f118.

<sup>91</sup> Henderson to FCO, 5 May 1982, accessed 28 March 2016, available at: [www.margaretthatcher.org/document/123063](http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/123063).

free world. That is why...we are ready with whatever misgivings, to go along with your latest proposals.’<sup>92</sup> Haig agreed to incorporate Thatcher’s request that the interim administration consult with the islanders was put into the proposal but it was immediately rejected by the Argentinians. The Americans were able to use the mounting loss of life at the beginning of May 1982 to pressure the British into accepting a compromised settlement. As the US argued for Britain to back down over self-determination and were freely willing to adapt the language of the text around the self-determination issue underlines that it was not a principle of any importance to the Americans. Moreover, it was an obstacle to be overcome so that both sides could agree to a proposal that would see the conflict end. This settlement would have seen the Americans achieve a result which would have allowed both sides to maintain some face and protect US interests in Latin America and Europe. This had been the aim of American mediation all along and highlights the US’ ultimate objective in the conflict had little to do with self-determination or sovereignty.

The Argentine rejection of the peace proposals did not deter US efforts to help find a peaceful resolution. As the fighting escalated US officials worked with officials from the UN to find a solution which would avoid either side coming out of the conflict looking humiliated.<sup>93</sup> Following the sinking of the *Atlantic Conveyor* and *HMS Coventry* on 25 May, concerns grew in the US administration that the UK would not offer any concessions to Argentina. Haig wrote to Reagan on 26 May stating that he did not believe that UK was interested in a negotiated settlement to the crisis.<sup>94</sup> On 31 May, Reagan telephoned Thatcher and implored her to strike a deal with the Junta based on a proposal offered by Junta member Lami Dozo. It was during their conversation that Reagan highlighted his concern that the Junta may fall and the possible problems that may cause for western interests in Latin America.<sup>95</sup> In doing so, he again highlighted the difference of opinion on what western interests were in the conflict. Whereas Britain had argued that it was important that Britain

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<sup>92</sup> Thatcher to Reagan, 5 May 1982, accessed 28 March 2016, available at: [www.margaretthatcher.org/document/122864](http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/122864).

<sup>93</sup> On 14 May, Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 34, ‘US Actions in the South Atlantic Crisis’ which suspended all US military exports to Argentina and withheld new Export–Import Bank credits, insurance and guarantees to Argentina.

<sup>94</sup> Haig to Reagan, 26 May 1982, file: Falklands Crisis 1982, RAC box 5, Dennis C. Blair Files, Ronald Reagan Library. This was the same day as the UN Security Council adopted UNSCR 505 which called for a cessation of hostilities and for the UN Secretary General to undertake a new peace initiative.

<sup>95</sup> Telcon. of Reagan and Thatcher discussion, 31 May 1982, file: United Kingdom (4/1/82–7/31/82), box 20, Executive Secretariat NSC Country Files, Ronald Reagan Library.

defeated Argentina to display that the west was willing to fight for its territory and dissuade the east from engaging in military conflicts against the west, the Americans saw the conflict as potentially opening the door for Soviet influence to expand to Latin America. The US was not persuaded by the British arguments in this regard. There were rumours that at the G7 summit in Versailles that Reagan was going to present his own peace proposal to Thatcher. There has been no proof that any proposals were made although the two leaders did talk about the conflict at a private meeting at the US embassy in Paris on 4 June.<sup>96</sup> From a military perspective, it would have made little sense for the UK to seek a compromised deal with Argentina. By the beginning of June, British forces were advancing across the islands and approaching Port Stanley, the final Argentine stronghold. Britain did not need to strike a deal as a military victory was near. This fact that was not lost on the US. American requests to implore the British to offer the Junta some sort of concession only reaffirmed US desire to prevent a left-leaning Peronist government from coming to power in Buenos Aires. The US administration had its own considerations in line with its perceptions of how the conflict influenced wider Cold War policy and attempted to sway the British into having the same view.

The Americans again displayed their concerns over an Argentine humiliation when in the UN Security Council on 4 June Kirkpatrick announced that had a vote been taken again, the US would not have voted with Britain.<sup>97</sup> From a British perspective, the US was effectively withdrawing its support in the final days of battle.<sup>98</sup> Enders had been contacted by Enrique Ros, the Argentine deputy Foreign Minister, prior to the vote. Ros argued that the USA should abstain from the vote to protect US-Argentine relations and Haig had succumbed to this pressure.<sup>99</sup> However, a note from the UK delegation to the FCO said ‘her [Kirkpatrick’s] deputy told the press that Haig had given the order too late for the vote in the council’. However, of particular frustration for the British was that ‘Mrs Kirkpatrick stated in the council that she had been asked by her Government to say that if it were possible to change a vote once cast, the United States would like to change its vote from a veto to an

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<sup>96</sup> See Treharne, *Reagan and Thatcher’s Special Relationship*, 75-76 for a study of the rumoured Reagan Peace proposal.

<sup>97</sup> UKMIS New York to FCO, 4 June 1982, PREM 19/633 f61.

<sup>98</sup> David Lewis Feldman, ‘The United States role in the Malvinas crisis, 1982: misguidance and misperception in Argentina’s decision to go to war,’ *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 27, no. 2 (Summer 1985): 1–22.

<sup>99</sup> Treharne, *Reagan and Thatcher’s Special Relationship*, 75.

abstention'.<sup>100</sup> This served as a clear indication to the world that the US was not fully supporting Britain at this point and was offering some limited support to Argentina. Alan Walters, Economic advisor to the British Prime Minister, noted British perceptions of this move when he confided that this decision by the US was 'stupid' and embarrassing for Haig.<sup>101</sup> The US President refused to comment on the issue when pressed by journalists in Versailles. It took some shrewd diplomatic moves by his entourage in Europe to repair some of the damage done.<sup>102</sup> The confusion was likely the result of the structure of American government as well as Reagan not being contactable to make a decision. As a result, the final decision fell to Haig who had always been anxious to find a solution that protected the US' interests in both Latin America and Europe. The fact that the conflict was almost won and Thatcher's position in the UK was secure meant America's interests in Britain were also secured. The US could now look towards mending the damage that had been done with its relations with Argentina. The objective now was to ensure an Argentine government was in place that was receptive to assistance from the USA and which would support American ambitions in South America.

### 3.5. 'A Just War Requires a Just Peace'<sup>103</sup>

On the final surrender of the Argentine forces on the islands, American attention in the South Atlantic immediately focussed on ensuring the issue would not hamper US foreign policy interests. Reagan offered his congratulations to Thatcher in a letter on June 18 and offered further US assistance in the negotiations to come on the islands, '[a] just war requires a just peace. We look forward to consulting with you and to assisting in building such a peace.'<sup>104</sup> Reagan was keen to speak with Thatcher about the future of the islands during the Prime

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<sup>100</sup> FCO Sitrep (0700, 5 June) [UN Security Council], 5 June 1982, PREM 19/633 f13.

<sup>101</sup> Alan Walters' Diary, 4 June 1982, Margaret Thatcher Foundation, accessed 12 June 2017, <https://www.margarethatcher.org/document/144294>.

<sup>102</sup> During a speech to both the Houses of Parliament in London during an official visit on 8 June, Reagan commented on the efforts of the British soldiers fighting for the 'belief that armed aggression must not be allowed to succeed'. Address to British Members of the British Parliament (MPs), 8 June 1982, the Public Papers of President Ronald W. Reagan, Ronald Reagan Library, accessed 4 June 2016, [www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1982/60882](http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1982/60882)

<sup>103</sup> Reagan to Thatcher, 18 June 1982, file: United Kingdom PM Thatcher Cables (1/4), box 34, Executive Secretariat NSC Head of State Files, Ronald Reagan Library.

<sup>104</sup> *Ibid.*

Minister's pre-arranged official visit to the United States on 23 June. The President wanted 'to lay down a marker' that continued US support for the British relied upon there being a move towards a negotiated settlement with Argentina.<sup>105</sup> In the immediate aftermath of the conflict, the President was keen to ensure that Britain would not pursue a policy that would distance Argentina from the west and push Buenos Aires closer to the Soviet Union. Thatcher did not answer the President's request in the manner Reagan had hoped and only reminded him of the sacrifices that Britain had made to retake the islands. However, the President saw the importance of American involvement to protect his administration's wider interests and pressed the issue further. He wrote to Thatcher again on 24 June, 'I look forward to working with you on a lasting solution to the situation there [the Falkland Islands]'.<sup>106</sup>

Anglo-American cooperation on the issue was jeopardised when Argentina renewed its calls for negotiations over the territory late in the summer of 1982 as the USA disregarded the issue of self-determination to support Argentina. Galtieri had resigned as president on 18 June and was eventually succeeded by General Reynaldo Benito Bignone on 1 July. Bignone, recognising the importance of the sovereignty dispute in uniting the Argentine people in supporting his government, called for further negotiations on the sovereignty issue to take place in the UN. The American administration was keen to aid Argentina in its requests in the hope of fostering strong links between Washington and Buenos Aires, as there had been in the time of Galtieri's Junta. The Argentine proposals were discussed in a meeting between Edward Streator and the Political Director at the FCO, Julian Bullard. Bullard informed Streator that the British were wholly against the idea of future negotiations and intended to 'stonewall' Argentine efforts at the UN.<sup>107</sup> Following the tabling of the draft resolution at the UN in late October 1982, Thatcher contacted Reagan to canvas support for the British position.<sup>108</sup> Reagan responded on 1 November outlining the importance that the US attached to negotiations over the future of the islands and outlined that the US would be

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<sup>105</sup> Treharne, *Reagan and Thatcher's Special Relationship*, 78.

<sup>106</sup> Reagan to Thatcher, 24 June 1982, file: United Kingdom PM Thatcher Cables (1/4), box 34, Executive Secretariat NSC Head of State Files, Ronald Reagan Library.

<sup>107</sup> Streator to Shultz, 17 August 1982, file: United Kingdom 1982 (08/01/1982–10/03/1982), RAC box 6, Dennis C. Blair Files, Ronald Reagan Library. Cited in Treharne, *Reagan and Thatcher's Special Relationship*, 79.

<sup>108</sup> Thatcher to Reagan, 25 October 1982, Margaret Thatcher Foundation Archive, accessed 23 June 2015, <https://www.margarethatcher.org/document/109322>.



voting in favour of the Argentine resolution.<sup>109</sup> He followed this the next day with a personally signed letter in which he said that the US would put on record that they objected to force ever being used again to settle the dispute but the US remained committed to the idea of a negotiated settlement. Reagan finished this letter by saying, ‘I am truly sorry that we disagree on this matter and for my part will do everything in my power to make sure this resolution is not abused.’<sup>110</sup> Thatcher responded that she was ‘utterly dismayed’ by the American vote in favour of the resolution.<sup>111</sup> It served American interests to reject any future use of force to settle the dispute as the US had sought to avoid conflict taking place in the first place. However, the Americans supported the Argentinians without any mention of the self-determination of the islanders. They disregarded the principles that Britain had claimed to be defending and instead called for negotiation. The American position on the dispute had always aimed to protect its interests globally, and as such it is unsurprising that the US desired to support the new Argentine government.

The American position on the crisis was made clearer when it was revealed that the US discussed the proposal with the Bignone government to ensure that the terms would make it easy for the US to vote in favour. The US also canvassed other nations, including EEC members to gather support for the resolution.<sup>112</sup> In doing so, the government in Washington had effectively turned its support away from Britain and towards the Argentine cause. There was an attempt to placate the British when United States Deputy Ambassador to the UN, Kenneth Adelman, added a closing statement which referred to the US’ ‘closest relationship of friendship with Great Britain’.<sup>113</sup> However, there was still no mention of self-determination which frustrated the British. Reagan attempted to explain the US position to Thatcher again on 4 November 1982, ‘I can assure you, Margaret, that the United States did not make a decision to support Argentina against Britain. Neither did we abandon the principle of self-determination.’ He underlined their ‘shared faith in the Anglo-American relationship’ and their ‘shared commitment to the same fundamental principles and values’

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<sup>109</sup> Reagan to Thatcher, 1 November 1982, PREM 19/642 f270.

<sup>110</sup> Reagan to Thatcher, 2 November 1982, file: United Kingdom PM Thatcher Cables (1/4), box 34, Executive Secretariat NSC Head of State Files, Ronald Reagan Library.

<sup>111</sup> Thatcher to Reagan, 2 November 1982, PREM19/642 f271.

<sup>112</sup> US at the UN 1983, FCO 82/1364.

<sup>113</sup> USMIS New York to Secretary of State in Washington, 5 November 1982, file: United Kingdom 1982 (11/03/1982–12/16/1982), RAC box 6, Dennis C. Blair Files, Ronald Reagan Library.

in a bid to restore improved bilateral relations'.<sup>114</sup> However, considering that the US had worked with the Argentinians on the proposal and voted in favour without any mention of self-determination, it is likely that Reagan's words were designed to placate the Prime Minister. Rather, the US did not abandon the principle of self-determination only because it had not stood with it in the first place. British objections to the US vote were put to new Secretary of State, George Shultz, in a meeting with new UK Ambassador to the USA, Oliver Wright, in a meeting that Shultz later referred to as 'stormy'.<sup>115</sup> In a meeting with Thatcher on 16 December, Shultz openly stated that the US viewpoint of the crisis was that 'while the US was right to support the UK during the Falklands War, the time had come to repair the damage this support had done to US interests in South America.'<sup>116</sup> In doing so, Schultz openly stated that the US' primary concern was not the issue of self-determination but its own interest in the South Atlantic. The years that followed only served to reinforce the notion that, for the USA, the crisis represented a prospective hindrance to the wider policy concerns of the Reagan doctrine. This was in contrast to the British view, that the two issues were intrinsically linked and ultimately led to the deterioration of Anglo-American relations in reference to the Falkland Islands.

1983 marked a decisive year for US involvement given the rise to power of Raúl Alfonsín in Argentina. Alfonsín represented the right wing Radical Party and was much more the American preference for the presidency than the left wing opponent in the elections, the Peronists. The USA immediately set out a programme to support the implementation of democracy in Argentina. A major part of this was lifting the arms embargo placed on Argentina by the Carter administration, a prospect the British government were very much opposed to. British officials attempted to press the Reagan administration that 'Argentine attitudes to the Falklands remain menacing. Leading politicians have given no indication that they would be prepared to renounce the use of force.'<sup>117</sup> They also underlined that the British view that a new government in Argentina did not mean that the human rights violations of the Junta could so easily be forgotten. HMG

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<sup>114</sup> Reagan to Thatcher, 4 November 1982, file: Falklands War (UN/Kirkpatrick/Haig 06/06/1982–11/04/1982), box 3, William P. Clark Files, Ronald Reagan Library.

<sup>115</sup> George P. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State*, (New York: Charles Scribner's, 1988), 152–3.

<sup>116</sup> Treharne, *Reagan and Thatcher's Special Relationship*, 80.

<sup>117</sup> Visit to the UK by Mr M Deaver, Deputy White House Chief of Staff: Points to Make, 18 October 1983, FCO 82/1364 f5.

argued that arms sales to Argentina would dramatically increase the threat to the islands and would damage British public opinion of the United States.<sup>118</sup> This was not a concern that the United States government shared. In response to British concerns, the US underlined the need to build strong relations with Alfonsín's government out of fear that they may turn to the Soviet Union for arms if the USA did not supply them. This was outlined in a message to Thatcher from the US Embassy in London, '[c]ertification now also will strengthen our influence with the new government of Argentina, thus enabling us to work more effectively to assure regional stability and prevent a recurrence of conflict in South America.'<sup>119</sup> On 9 December 1983, Reagan announced the certification of the Argentine government to receive US made arms, the day before Alfonsín's inauguration, promising to consult Britain on which arms would be supplied to the Argentine government.<sup>120</sup> In doing so, the administration maintained its view that Argentina needed to be placated to promote solidarity in the hemisphere while US interests in Europe were more secure.

Given the messages from the USA regarding its relationship with the Alfonsín government, the FCO needed to ensure that the US would not serve as a lead for other nations to vote in favour with a pro-Argentine resolution on the dispute. Permanent Under Secretary of State, Anthony Acland, wrote to the UK Ambassador in Washington, Oliver Wright, 'we have little chance of dissuading the Americans from voting in favour for the present draft resolution. But we are anxious to ensure that they keep the lowest possible profile and do nothing from encouraging the Europeans to vote in favour.'<sup>121</sup> This was a recognition from the FCO that they could not persuade America to attach any greater importance to the issue of self-determination as US interests in Latin America far outweighed British feelings over the Falkland Islands in terms of importance for the USA. The British approached this issue by playing up the one aspect that had got them concession in the past, how 'hurt' HMG had felt by the actions of the US. Mike Deaver, the Deputy White House Chief of Staff, visited the UK in October. The FCO hoped to use Deaver's close position to Reagan to help persuade him to aid the British cause to reduce support for the Argentine position on the dispute. This was summed up in Wright's reply to Acland:

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<sup>118</sup> A. E. Palmer of the Falkland Islands Department to 'Mr Gifford', 24 October 1983, FCO 82/1364 f8.

<sup>119</sup> Price to Thatcher, 3 December 1983, PREM 19/953 f107.

<sup>120</sup> Oliver Wright, UK ambassador to the USA to Sir Antony Acland, Permanent Under Secretary of State, 7 October 1983, FCO 82/1364 f1.

<sup>121</sup> Acland to Wright, 7 October 1983, FCO 82/1364 f1.

What we need to aim at is for Deaver to report back to the President how deeply hurt he found the British friends and allies about the American vote; how we simply could not comprehend how they could vote with a country like Argentina against a friend like us.<sup>122</sup>

The FCO and the British embassy in Washington recognised that the American administration saw the crisis as an emotional issue in Britain. Wright and the FCO then used this view in negotiations with the US government, opting not to try and alter American understanding of the British position in the dispute. It was hoped that the British could persuade the USA not to canvass support for Argentina among other nations. This approach had some success as the US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Lawrence Eagleburger informed Wright that the US would not advocate the Argentine resolution with other nations.<sup>123</sup>

By 1984, US sympathy for the British position had decreased dramatically. The impression given to the Oliver Wright was that this was through a combination of the British response to the US invasion of Grenada the year before and general perceived intransigence on the part of the British:

US impatience with our attitude towards Argentina and the Falklands perhaps boils down to an irritation that we cannot agree to revert immediately to the status quo prevailing before the Falklands conflict by sitting down to discuss with, what is now a democratically elected Argentine government with a positive attitude towards human rights, the question of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands. They will regard this as unhelpful towards the promotion of democracy in Latin America and perhaps offering scope for Cubans and the East Europeans to make mischief and worse ... The Americans find it difficult to understand our insistence that the wishes of 1800 people should be of such overwhelming importance.<sup>124</sup>

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<sup>122</sup> Wright to Acland, 7 October 1983, FCO 82/1364 f1.

<sup>123</sup> Wright to British delegation in Washington 'The Falklands: UNGA Debate and US Arms certification,' 16 October 1983, FCO 82/1364 f6.

<sup>124</sup> FID points to make in meeting with Michael Armacost, 5 September 1984, FCO 7/5939 f48.

The US emphasised the notion that the Alfonsín government had not committed the offences which Britain were still holding against Argentina. American political opinion also could not understand the weight of importance the British were attributing to the wishes of the islanders when compared against the interests of the rest of the western world. David Thomas, Assistant Under Secretary for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, tried to counter these arguments by saying that the issue could not be forgotten until the new Argentine government had renounced the use of force to settle the dispute.<sup>125</sup> These notions did little to revive the British case within the American administration. The breakdown of the Berne talks had not played well for the UK in Washington. Despite attempts by the FCO to blame the breakdown of the talks on the Argentine government, reports from Switzerland again claimed British intransigence was at fault. This was something that Raymond Seitz, Executive Assistant to the US Secretary of State, commented had not been received well in American bureaucratic circles, ‘Mr Thomas underlined Mr Seitz’ message about the danger that misunderstanding on the Falklands could spill over into other areas and Mr Seitz’ belief that our position was not understood ... in Washington where we are regarded as intransigent.’<sup>126</sup> The question of self-determination was not something the Americans felt that Britain should hold fast to. Rather, it was something the US argued that Britain should step back from to facilitate negotiation. For the US, the principles at stake in the dispute were of no importance. The only thing that mattered was preventing communism from gaining influence in Argentina.

There was an acceptance amongst British diplomatic circles that it would be futile to attempt to push the British case in Washington any further and instead the best solution would be to prevent disagreements over the Falklands dispute from spilling into other areas. Derek Thomas, an FCO Minister responsible for the USA, warned Seitz that, ‘the more our allies said to pressure us into discussing sovereignty, the more obstinate we would be likely to become.’ The only way forward for Britain was for Argentina to accept a normalisation of relations and an eventual re-establishment of confidence. Seitz accepted this but warned that it was difficult to see how ‘a young and weak’ democratic Argentine government could be expected to accept but agreed that the USA and Britain should focus on not letting their

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<sup>125</sup> Andrew E Palmer, Head of Falkland Islands Department, FCO to Mr Derek Thomas, 23 August 1984, FCO 7/5939 f66.

<sup>126</sup> Noel Marshall, Head of North American Department, FCO, to Palmer, 23 August 1984, FCO 7/5939 f58.

disagreements spill over into other affairs.<sup>127</sup> By the November 1984 UNGA vote on the Falklands, Britain had given up trying to persuade the Americans to change their voting pattern. Instead, the focus continued on how to limit the effect the American vote may have on persuading other nations to vote in favour of the resolution.<sup>128</sup>

By the end of 1985, almost no sympathy remained within the American administration for the British position. American political circles had become increasingly impressed by the work Alfonsín had done in allowing Argentina to move on from the period of military dictatorship. His foreign minister, Dante Caputo, had also impressed on several trips to the USA.<sup>129</sup> The US became increasingly confident in the ability of the new Argentine government to play an important role in advocating and supporting western philosophies in Central America, where the USA had prominent policy objectives in Nicaragua and El Salvador. There is no evidence to suggest that the Falkland Islands were of interest to the American public or to Congress and the result of the November 1985 UNGA resolution on the dispute was not reported in any major press in the USA.<sup>130</sup> The USA had also become increasingly frustrated at repeated attempts from Britain to delay US arms sales to Argentina through continued complaints and insistence that HMG was consulted before any arms were sold to the Alfonsín regime. The American administration did not feel that the British position was in the wider western interest, with Acland stating that Argentina was going to buy military equipment anyhow and 'it would be better for it to come from countries who were actively encouraging restraint.'<sup>131</sup> In a meeting with Michael Armacost, the US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, on 18 December 1985, Oliver Wright was informed that out of respect for the British, America had proceeded with arms sales slowly but it was now a matter of 'when and not if' the Americans responded positively to specific requests from Argentina for arms. Armacost reiterated that America was very keen to see Alfonsín succeed and the arms sales was a major part of that.<sup>132</sup> Armacost was emphasising that the UK's concerns over the intentions of the Argentine regime were not shared by the United States and indicated how the sovereignty of the islands

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<sup>127</sup> Derek Thomas to Marshall, 23 August 1984, FCO 7/5939 f57.

<sup>128</sup> FCO Falkland/Argentina: Tactics for the 1984 UN General Assembly, FCO 7/5939 f62.

<sup>129</sup> Adrian Beamish, Head of Falkland Islands Department, to Lamont; Situation in Argentina, 28 October 1985, FCO 7/6366 f39.

<sup>130</sup> Wright to Acland, 2 December 1985, FCO 7/6366 f43.

<sup>131</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>132</sup> Wright to FCO Argentina/Falklands, 18 December 1985, FCO 7/6366 f48.

was held in little regard when compared with other policy interests. On 16 April, Wright suggested that the FCO should consider a change in policy on the islands and offer to discuss the sovereignty issue if Argentina agreed to discuss the 'principle of consent' with the British. He argued that this would be impossible for Argentina to turn down and would focus the issue on the islanders instead of the land. He argued Britain should build on the success of their handling of similar issues over Gibraltar and Hong Kong with Spain and China.<sup>133</sup> This was rejected out of hand and met with widespread condemnation from the FCO. Geoffrey Howe, UK Foreign Secretary, responded by pointing out the difference between the Falklands and Gibraltar/Hong Kong, stating that there was nothing to discuss regarding consent and the British view point was clear, the only way forward was the normalisation of relations; the Argentine government denouncing the use aggression to solve the dispute; and for the right of self-determination of the islanders to be respected.<sup>134</sup> It was this refusal to compromise on the key issues that prevented the USA from continuing its support for Britain. Not only did the United States vote in favour of the 1985 resolution but it also abstained in the vote on two amendments offered by Britain which would have guaranteed the wishes of the islanders would have remained paramount. The US informed Britain that although it supported the 'principle embodied' in the amendments, the Americans attached too much importance to building a new security relationship with Argentina to vote in favour.<sup>135</sup>

The American position did not change for the rest of the 1980s. The US administration acted out of their wider foreign policy objectives of which the success of the Alfonsín government was a crucial part. In the years after the conflict, the US desired to see a return to the pre-conflict situation, where Argentina played a vital role in helping to guarantee the security of Latin America. The US viewed Britain as being too focussed on the issue of self-determination and the actions of a government no longer in power. For the Reagan administration, weighed against the wider interests of the western hemisphere, the desires of 1800 Falkland Islanders was of little importance. Ensuring that democracy succeeded in Argentina meant that America had a strong ally in pursuing its objectives in Nicaragua and El Salvador. The British could be placated through the consultative role it

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<sup>133</sup> Palmer to Derek Thomas: The Principle of Consent and the Falkland Islands, 16 April 1985, FCO 7/6366 f13.

<sup>134</sup> Howe to Wright, 1 May 1985, FCO 7/6366 f15.

<sup>135</sup> Beamish to Lamont; Situation in Argentina, 28 October 1985, FCO 7/6366 f39.

was offered over arms sales to Argentina and the US refraining from canvassing for support for the UNGA resolutions. Offering these things to Britain was of little importance to America as it still allowed the US government to pursue its own foreign policy goals with relative freedom. Almost as quickly as the Falklands dispute became an issue for the American government, it returned to obscurity.

### **3.6. Conclusions**

The crisis coming at a time when the USA was seeking to extend its influence in Latin America presented a problem for the Reagan administration as it faced the dilemma of a conflict between two of its closest allies. Supporting Britain risked alienating Argentina at a time when America was strengthening ties with the Junta, which in turn was proving an asset to American foreign policy in Latin America. To support Argentina meant openly supporting a regime that had committed a blatant violation of international law, impinged on the rights of 1800 citizens of a western ally and risked weakening the Conservative party's position in Britain which had the potential to be filled by a left leaning party, a prospect that was not favourable to the USA. Peace was always preferable over conflict as it was the only way that all US interests could be protected. As such, the peace initiatives that the US engaged in were inevitable. However, that is not to say it was shocking when the US formally sided with Britain when conflict became inevitable. Eventual American support for Britain was expected but the US had to attempt to find a peace first. When the US did side with Britain it was again done so to protect its own interests by avoiding drawing attention to its support for authoritarian regimes and also protecting its position as a leading nation in NATO. The principles that either side claimed to be defending were of little consequence to the US as displayed by the US's flexibility on these matters when attempting to find a peace. Throughout the conflict and the years after, the government in Washington had to take a pragmatic approach to the issues at hand, striking a balance between appeasing both sides and ensuring that its interests in both Latin America and Europe remained strong.

During the early months of the crisis, the USA showed a clear desire for a peaceful settlement that would allow both sides to maintain face. The prospect of conflict would mean that one side would face embarrassment. It was for this reason that Reagan and Haig took prominent roles in the negotiation process. Differing factions did emerge within the administration over who the US should support but ultimately protecting American foreign



policy interests always remained paramount. Although Reagan and Haig may have had some sympathy for the British position, it was not strong enough to risk damaging the valuable cooperation that Argentina had offered the United States in Central America. Who held sovereignty over the islands was of little consequence and the USA never took a formal position in the sovereignty debate. It was only when the situation altered that it was in the best interests of US foreign policy that the Reagan administration openly supported Britain. As soon as it was evident that Thatcher's position was secure, the US government immediately focussed its attention on attempting to stabilise the government in Argentina. This was an objective that the Americans repeatedly emphasised and were open with the British about, focussing on the need to repair the damage that had been done to US-Argentine relations. The attempts to placate British, such as commenting on the value of the Anglo-American relationship after advocating for the Argentine resolution, were offered to the FCO more out of diplomatic etiquette than any importance the US attached to Britain's claims to the islands.<sup>136</sup>

It was in the years immediately after the conflict that Anglo-American relations were strained most by the Falklands dispute, as the USA and Britain clashed over the importance of self-determination. During the conflict, the Americans had shown little regard for this principle and had continually displayed flexibility on the matter when trying to reach an agreement that both sides could accept. After the conflict, the US became increasingly critical that Britain was holding fast to the principle and refusing to consider any negotiation that did not protect the islanders' right to self-determination. While the Americans were keen to resume working with the Argentine government on other initiatives, the British appeared unwilling to compromise on negotiation over the islands for the benefit of other policy initiatives. Britain's refusal to revert to a pre-1982 relationship with Argentina was met with incomprehension in the United States government and interpreted only as intransigence on the part of the British. US officials did not agree that the desires of 1800 islanders should outweigh the importance of maintaining Argentina as a western ally. In the years after 1982, interest in the crisis among the American public was tempering, which removed a lot of pressure on State Department to continue to offer Britain support. Instead, American officials were free to pursue the objectives they felt were of most practical benefit to the US' foreign policy. Although British public opinion turned against the Reagan administration as

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<sup>136</sup> Reagan to Thatcher, 4 November 1982, file: Falklands War (UN/Kirkpatrick/Haig 06/06/1982–11/04/1982), box 3, William P. Clark Files, Ronald Reagan Library.

the US continued to vote against Britain in the UNGA as well as pursue arms sales to Argentina, American government officials knew that this was little threat to US policy objectives that relied on British support.<sup>137</sup> Anglo-American ties on other policy interests were strong enough that disagreements over the islands would not negatively impact other areas of Anglo-American cooperation. By 1985, even the Falkland Islands Department in the FCO had come to accept the American position would not change. For the US, the conflict had been an abhorrence that risked significant US interests. Britain holding fast to the point of self-determination posed another risk to those American interests. Self-determination was a principled issue that bore no cost if it was not upheld in the case of the Falkland Islands when enormous practical gains could be made by supporting Argentina. For this reason, the USA had little consideration for self-determination and rather were happy for it to be set aside completely. America had seen British objections to its support for the new democratic government in Argentina as a nuisance and US patience had worn thin.

The structure of the government in the United States often means that, to some extent, different departments can pursue different policy objectives leading to tension, characteristics not too dissimilar to quarrelling delegations in the UN. This was certainly the case during the crisis. Whereas the Department of Defence took an Anglophile approach, Kirkpatrick and the US delegation advised that US interests in Latin America should take priority. In addition, Haig advocated a more even handed approach. These competing views had the potential to hinder the policy line Reagan desired to take and the President had to engage directly with Thatcher to ensure that Kirkpatrick's actions did not offend the British. In this instance, during the crisis, the State Department and Presidency were able to take control of policy and mitigate any detrimental effects on US-Latin American relations while supporting Britain in the conflict. After the conflict, the different departments of government in the US were more united in their belief that the United States was best served establishing connections with the new democratic government in Buenos Aires. However, the difficulty caused by Kirkpatrick's open support of Argentina during the conflict highlighted the potential problems for the USA operating as a leading nation in the western world.

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<sup>137</sup> Letter from Thatcher to Mr L Burgess, a constituent regarding the possible 'softening' of Britain's approach to Argentina, 8 Nov 1984, FCO 7/5939.

Oliver Wright best summed up the American views on the crisis in a letter to Antony Acland on the 2 December 1985.

‘The first thing to be said from Washington is that the United States official policy on the Falklands problem has been consistent throughout. It is this. They have no view, one way or the other, on sovereignty. They do not consider self-determination an absolute: as Shultz pointed out to me three years ago, they fought a civil war about it. They regard the problem as mainly one for solution between Britain and Argentina. Meanwhile they consider themselves free to pursue what they regard as the United States and wider Western interest vis-à-vis Argentina, bearing in mind their obligations to us as their closest ally but not granting us a veto over their actions.’<sup>138</sup>

Reagan and Thatcher may indeed have shared a strong affiliation that espoused the ‘special relationship’ but the crisis was an aberration of the coherency the two shared over other policy areas. The United States’ main goal was ensuring that Argentina could continue to play an important role in achieving wider policy interests in South America. When Britain did not agree with this, the US government was willing to risk condemnation from its British counterparts given the relative value it placed on upholding the Alfonsín government. Upholding the wishes of 1800 islanders mattered little when compared with the wider interests of the western hemisphere.

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<sup>138</sup> Wright to Acland, 2 December 1985, FCO 7/6366 f43.

#### **4. Chapter Three: ‘Staunchest of Our Friends’ Europe and the Falklands Crisis**

I should like to tell you how deeply grateful I am to you for the part you played in helping to secure common action by the ten in response to Argentina’s seizure of the Falkland Islands. The speed with which this action was taken during a holiday period was an impressive example of community cooperation at its best.<sup>1</sup>

##### **4.1. Chapter Abstract**

Before 1982, the Falklands dispute was not a matter of importance to any government in Europe other than to that of the United Kingdom. There had been a general continuous decline in colonisation since the time of Simon Bolivar in the late eighteenth century and since then governments of Europe had refrained – or been prevented – from making overt attempts to influence the domestic affairs of Latin America. Through the 1970s, Europe was looking inwards, and using economic integration as the foundation for political integration. The outbreak of the conflict came at a time when further European integration was at the forefront of discussion in the European Economic Community (EEC) and the Thatcher government was seeking to strengthen its global influence by strengthening relations with all international partners. This led to a sense of detachment between Britain and the EEC with differences on key policy issues also hindering HMG’s relationship with Brussels. Britain was at odds with the EEC over its own contribution to the common budget as well as Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). This relationship between Britain and the EEC was generally considered as reflective of Britain’s widely-perceived post-war relative decline. This is a debate to which the conflict plays an important role. In turning to Europe for support, Britain requested a display of solidarity from the EEC at a time when the governments of the EEC members demanded that Britain show similar solidarity over other issues. As a member state of the EEC, Britain held close relations with others, with shared policies on economics and security. Yet still, when it requested assistance over the dispute, assistance was not readily given.

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<sup>1</sup> Margaret Thatcher message to European Community leaders, 13 April 1982, FCO 33/5754 f51.

This chapter evaluates how Britain's on-going disputes with the EEC and other European governments influenced the extent of reciprocity over the Falklands dispute. This chapter not only discusses the issues of European integration and political cooperation but also evaluates the factors that individual governments had particular interest in. Spain had an on-going sovereignty dispute with Britain over Gibraltar, while Ireland could sympathise with Argentina given the situation in Northern Ireland, and Italy held strong cultural links with Argentina which had direct practical implications on Italian elections. All these factors played roles in influencing how these governments responded to the conflict. In addressing such issues, this chapter leads to further discussion on how the crisis contributes to wider discussions of Britain's post-war decline. Although politicians who supported the notion of solidarity amongst EEC states argued in favour of pro-British sanctions, governments of the EEC tapered their reaction to the crisis and their support for Britain in line with their own considerations.

#### **4.2. Introduction**

After the USA, Europe was the next most important arena for Britain to gain support.<sup>2</sup> The reactions of the European states to the crisis were important for a number of reasons. Britain needed European support in the United Nations on votes on the Falkland Islands up to 1988. This was not just governments in the EEC but also European states outside of the EEC such as Spain and the Scandinavian nations. European votes in the General Assembly often provided a lead for other nations on how to vote. Additionally, during the conflict, important for Britain was a coherent decision from members of the EEC on sanctions to increase diplomatic pressure on Argentina and also the USA, to come out in support of Britain. In addition, finding a mutual decision on the crisis would make solving other intra-EEC issues, such as CAP price caps and Britain's budget contribution, much easier. Britain's attempts to see sanctions implemented by Europe against Argentina were boosted by the fact the crisis came at a time when leading members of the EEC were calling for greater European Political Cooperation (EPC), where by the ten member states sought to coordinate their foreign policy

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<sup>2</sup> This thesis uses the word Europe to refer to the nations on the European continent stretching from the United Kingdom in the west to Russia/USSR in the east. This also includes Scandinavia.

to achieve mutually beneficial outcomes.<sup>3</sup> However, not all the governments in the EEC desired to support Britain in the crisis. Rather, many of the governments in the community had competing policy objectives which the crisis had the potential to hinder. This led to a disagreement between the member states over whether sanctions should be implemented at a communal level or at a governmental level. Further European governments outside of the EEC also had policy goals which the conflict had the potential to affect. The crisis resonated with the issues in Northern Ireland and Gibraltar as well as threatened wider European interests in Latin America. All these issues influenced European reaction to the conflict and meant ultimately, the sovereignty of the islands themselves and the issue of self-determination was not of great importance for European nations.

This chapter first seeks to consider the EEC reaction to the crisis evaluating the factors that motivated each government in formulating their policy in the crisis and the dispute. As a result of this analysis, the work offers a conclusion on how the dispute assumed importance in the EEC in 1982 as each member state sought to use the crisis to further its own agenda. This chapter also comments on the European position on the dispute after the conflict and seeks to highlight what this shows about the nature of the European perception of the dispute as a whole. As previously noted, the crisis came at a time when the West German government, in particular, hoped to use the EPC mechanism to increase the influence of Europe on global issues.<sup>4</sup> Yet for this to occur, any member state of the EEC had to be able to place the interests of the community above its own, which in the case of the dispute, some member states showed a reluctance to do. As such this chapter offers an insight into how the effectiveness of the EEC was limited in that the component parts prioritised their own outlook over that of the collective.

Further this chapter also seeks to analyse wider European reaction to the crisis, examining how states on the continent outside of the EEC sought to use the crisis to further their own aims. In doing so, the thesis comments on the relative importance of issues like self-determination. European reactions to the crisis are contextualised in the Cold War. In 1982, western European governments sought to prevent the spread of Russia's influence whilst eastern European governments sought to strengthen relations with Moscow. Other nations on the continent such as Greece, wanted to use the crisis to strengthen relations with

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<sup>3</sup> Geoffrey Edwards, 'The European Community and the Falkland Islands Crisis,' *Journal of Common Market Studies* 22, no. 4 (1984): 295.

<sup>4</sup> Page 139.

the west while Scandinavian nations sought to protect their own interests without getting drawn further into the Cold War. This chapter evaluates the crisis and Europe outside of the EEC and the nature any reaction took, thus offering comment on the wider European reaction to the crisis. Spain, Scandinavia and eastern European states all reacted to the crisis in a manner framed by their wider foreign policy goals which influenced their own comments on such matters like self-determination. So although the reactions were different, there were similarities in the nature and influence of the reaction, continent wide. As such, this chapter is structured differently to the others in this thesis. As opposed to evaluating the whole European response through the crisis, this chapter evaluates the development of the reaction of individual nations and draws out similarities in the nature between each nations' response. Although government papers are the main source material used in this chapter, this present work also evaluates media sources to offer further perspectives on the European reaction. As such, the current chapter is able to comment more on the media and public perceptions of the crisis than previous chapters. As such, the conclusions are also able to comment on wider effects of the European receptions of the dispute and discuss some of the influence the media had on government policy.

#### ***4.2.1. Literature review***

Western European reaction to the conflict has been covered by a range of published works. The first was released in the immediate aftermath of the conflict in 1982 by Ross Mackay.<sup>5</sup> Mackay was very critical of the European response to the conflict and especially those nations who did not support sanctions against Argentina. Mackay's work is based mainly on information that was in the public domain and was written mainly to support the British claim to sovereignty and denounce any justification for the Argentine actions. As a result, the conclusions offered by Mackay are not well substantiated in evidence and are framed by a predetermined political standpoint. Political scientist Geoffrey Edwards produced the first comprehensive study on Europe and what he termed the 'Falkland Island Crisis' in 1984. He used the affair as a case study for evaluating the effectiveness of EPC and the use of sanctions as a coordinated foreign policy instrument.<sup>6</sup> His work was built on through

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<sup>5</sup> Ross Mackay, *Fairweather Friends: Europe and the Falklands War* (London: Supporters of the Falklands, 1982).

<sup>6</sup> Geoffrey Edwards, 'The European Community and the Falkland Islands Crisis,' 295.

chapters evaluating the decision making process and influence of domestic policy in Europe on the conflict. These works were published together in a book edited by political scientist Stelios Stavridis and historian Christopher Hill. This work used European reaction to the conflict as a case study to evaluate the effect of domestic politics on foreign policy decision making. As such, it focussed its analysis of European foreign policy mechanisms opposed to the reactions to the crisis and the issues involved such as self-determination, decolonisation or the use of violence to settle international disputes.<sup>7</sup> Although this study uses some of the same source material as those works now published over 23 years ago, it has a very different focus. Where Stavridis and Hill sought to evaluate the influence of the domestic on foreign policy, this chapter is concerned with assessing the nature of European perceptions to the crisis and dispute, understanding how governments managed the crisis within the framework of their own policy objectives. This work does evaluate the response of the EEC but does so by evaluating individual governments in their voting on issues such as sanctions. It discusses the weighting states placed on the need to maintain a coherent EEC policy against other motivations such as trade agreements. Examining the dispute in the years after 1982, it becomes clear that states acted much more as individuals as opposed to prioritising the idea of EPC in their response to the Britain's calls for support.

More recently, there have been a number of studies examining the reaction of individual European states to the conflict. Stephen Kelly and Gregg O'Neill have both examined the Irish policy. They have argued that Irish policy was framed by Charles Haughey's personal dislike for the British and this often led to incoherency and an ill-informed Irish policy.<sup>8</sup> In its section on Ireland, this chapter builds on the work by Kelly and O'Neill examining the wider influence of other Irish politicians as well as the issue of Northern Ireland on Irish policy. Further the present work discusses how the election of Garret FitzGerald as Taoiseach influenced Irish attitudes towards the dispute after the conflict. Lorenzo Mechi and Andrea Chiampan have written about the difficulty the Italian government had on balancing its policy objectives with regards to both Britain and

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<sup>7</sup> Stelios Stavridis and Christopher Hill (eds.), *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy: Western European Reactions to the Falklands Conflict* (Oxford: Berg, 1996).

<sup>8</sup> Stephen Kelly, 'An Opportunistic Anglophobe: Charles J. Haughey, the Irish Government and the Falklands War, 1982,' *Contemporary British History* 30, no. 4 (March 2016): 1. Gregg O'Neill, 'A Failure of Statesmanship and an Abdication of Political Responsibility': Irish Foreign Policy during the Falklands Crisis, April to June, 1982,' *The History Review* 16 (2006), UCD School of History and Archives, 179.



Argentina.<sup>9</sup> This chapter expands on this by comparing the Italian response with the response of other states to draw themes in the European reaction to the dispute as a whole, offering a transnational perspective. In doing so, the present work discusses how the Italian push for community sanctions was influenced by the Italian government's own desire not to be seen to be unilaterally imposing sanctions on Argentina whilst at the same time supporting Britain. However, when other nations among the ten began asking breaking away from the community decision on sanctions, the Italian government felt compelled to do so also to protect their interests among Italian voters resident in Argentina. The present work also expands the discussion on Italian policy towards the dispute after the conflict period, something that has not been seen in other studies. This work also makes use of source material unavailable to other authors given its later release. As such, this work is able, for the first time, to take a closer examination of communications between governments.

### **4.3. 'Community Cooperation at its Best'**

It is first important to contextualise Britain's relationship with Europe in 1982. In the immediate build up to the conflict, Britain was arguing with other EEC states on two fronts: CAP agricultural pricing, and its contribution to the community budget. The CAP pricing was issue of particular importance to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, Claude Cheysson.<sup>10</sup> This would be problematic for Britain during the conflict as for Cheysson there was no divisibility between solidarity shown during the conflict and that over other internal EEC issues. It was thus no surprise that Britain was drawn into accepting compromises on these issues during the crisis in order to maintain sanctions. On 18 May the other countries decided to press ahead with price increases, ignoring Britain's right to veto on the grounds that it was contrary to vital national interests. On 25 May, Francis Pym accepted a budget rebate of \$875m when Britain had originally been requesting \$1.1bn.<sup>11</sup> Further to these disagreements, Britain's image among the public in Europe had been affected by the Maze Prison Hunger Strikes in Northern Ireland. The French Secretary General of the Presidency,

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<sup>9</sup> Lorenzo Mechi and Andrea Chiampan, 'Des intérêts difficilement conciliables : l'Italie, l'Europe et la crise des Falkland,' *Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporains* 1, no. 245 (June 2012): 115-132.

<sup>10</sup> This issue will be discussed later in this chapter.

<sup>11</sup> Cited in Freedman, *TOHOTFC Volume II*, 503.

Pierre Bérégovoy, referred to the hunger strikes as ‘embarrassing’ and commented that the issue made it difficult for the French to be seen to be working with Britain<sup>12</sup>.

That being said, upon the outbreak of the conflict, the community did move with unusual speed in response to Britain’s call for sanctions although this was not done out of any particular support for Britain’s sovereignty over the islands. The speed with which sanctions were implemented was perhaps aided by the fact that the Political Directors of all the ten member states were in Brussels on 2 April discussing, among other things, the option of extending political cooperation to include security issues as outlined in the Genscher-Colombo initiative.<sup>13</sup> All the member states were swift to condemn the Argentine invasion with some leaders contacting Thatcher directly to express their views.<sup>14</sup> This was followed by an agreement on an arms embargo. This was of particular importance to the UK given the volume of arms that were supplied to Argentina from the EEC states. Individually, each member state imposed an arms embargo within the first week of the conflict. A community wide agreement on an import embargo for Argentine goods then followed. The Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) met on 6 and 7 April; the Political Directors met on 9 April, followed by two further meetings of COREPER on the same day and the following morning. The imposition of a month-long embargo was then announced by foreign ministers with the precise texts agreed on 14 April and the embargo being enforced two days later. The speed with which sanctions were agreed against Argentina was indicative of the readiness of the EEC to support Britain in the conflict. However, it is important to note that each state had differing reasons for wanting to support Britain at this stage and the desire to implement sanctions was not unanimous among all member states, as this thesis will explore later in this chapter. Rather in the pre-1982 votes in the UN on the Falkland Islands, European nations had almost unanimously voted against Britain, expressing a support for negotiation to find a permanent solution to the sovereignty issue and done so

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<sup>12</sup> Armstrong record of conversation (Armstrong-Secretary General to the Presidency of the Republic of France, Bérégovoy), 10 September 1981, PREM 19/470 f37.

<sup>13</sup> German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher and his Italian counterpart, Emilio Colombo proposed to weaken the veto power and make a stronger political cooperation for the EU in 1981. For further discussions of this see G. Bonvicini, ‘The Genscher-Colombo Plan and the “Solemn Declaration on European Union” (1981-3)’ in *The Dynamics of European Union* (ed.) Roy Pryce (London: Croom Helm, 1987), 174-87.

<sup>14</sup> For example, Record of telephone conversation between Thatcher and Mitterrand, 3 April 1982, PREM 19/614 f120. Numerous letters from other heads of state are contained within the same file.

without expressing any preference on the outcome of negotiation. Thus in condemning armed aggression that had forgone the stage of negotiation, the EEC was continuing a policy line it had shown prior to 1982 and with that was still not expressing a preference on the sovereignty issue.

When offering support to Britain, the terms used by European states highlighted that they did not support either sides claim for sovereignty. Many European states emphasised that their support was limited only to condemnation of the Argentine aggression and encouraged the British to seek a peaceful resolution. This was made clear in a letter Pym sent to the UK Embassy in Paris saying that French and German officials had made clear that ‘the time to end hostilities was before a great battle and not after it.’<sup>15</sup> The 2 April declaration by the EEC member states included a reference to the call from the UN Secretary General for restraint to be shown on both sides and for negotiations on the future of the islands to resume.<sup>16</sup> Of particular importance to the EEC was the line included in UNSCR 502 which urged both sides to seek ‘a diplomatic solution to their differences and to respect fully the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.’<sup>17</sup> The limitations of EEC support was emphasised again when diplomatic negotiation gave way to conflict, particularly after the sinking of the *Belgrano* on 2 May, and the consensus that had been shown by the ten member states was broken with many withdrawing their sanctions against Argentina.<sup>18</sup> The reaction of other European states outside the EEC was similar with other governments expressing concern at the British use of the Task Force. Once the Task Force began to show its willingness to attack Argentine vessels when the *Belgrano* was sunk, support for Britain in the EEC began to erode.<sup>19</sup> In real terms, the waning of support for sanctions can be seen in the voting records of the European Parliament. The 22 April vote was passed in favour of sanctions 203 to 28 whereas the 14 May vote saw that margin reduced to only 132 to 79. That is not to say that all member states of the EEC were staunch in their support for Britain prior to the sinking of the *Belgrano* but rather, as will be shown in the later sections of this chapter, those that did not want to support Britain felt more able

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<sup>15</sup> FCO to UKE Paris, 2 June 1982, THCR 1/20/3/18 f4.

<sup>16</sup> Lisa Martin, ‘Institutions and Cooperation: Sanctions during the Falkland Islands Conflict,’ *International Security* 16, no. 4 (Spring 1992): 144.

<sup>17</sup> Text of UNSCR 502 Falklands/Malvinas, accessed 15 January 2015, available at <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/502>.

<sup>18</sup> This will be further explored in the sections about individual nations later in this chapter.

<sup>19</sup> This will be evaluated upon later in this chapter.

to vote against sanctions. After the conflict, the role of the UN remained of considerable influence on the stance of many European states with regards to the conflict. It was within the realm of the United Nations General Assembly that European states publicly aired their position on the dispute after 1982. Like that of the USA, governments in Europe had their own considerations and foreign policy objectives to pursue in their policy regarding the conflict and the dispute. For many the position on the sovereignty of the islands mattered very little, but votes and support were indicative of the perceived effect the crisis and dispute had on other more important policy goals.

Although the British government had secured the support of all EEC states at the beginning of the conflict, given the wider policy objectives of Italy and Ireland, it was difficult to maintain that support. Thatcher's expression of gratitude in her autobiographies was likely indicative that she desired to give the impression that there was European support for Britain's position in the conflict and dispute rather than solely having to address the lack of support that came from nations such as Ireland.<sup>20</sup> The speed with which the EEC imposed sanctions on Argentina was remarkable, however, this must be looked at in the wider context of other foreign policy goals the individual governments were pursuing at the time. Once the military conflict was over, the EEC's role in the dispute quickly evaporated and its individual members returned to attempting to repair the damage done in relations with Latin America during the conflict. Similarly to the USA, they were keen to support Argentine democracy and in October 1984 President Alfonsín spoke at the European Parliament. This chapter will evaluate European response to the crisis separately but one common factor among all European nations in their perspectives of Britain and the crisis was that the issue of self-determination mattered little when compared with wider European interests.

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<sup>20</sup> See reference 1 of this chapter.

#### 4.4. 'Staunchest of our friends'<sup>21</sup>

##### 4.4.1. *France*

When examining the reactions of individual European states, it is first important to consider the reaction of those states who initially displayed ardent support for the British cause. Not least of these was France, with President François Mitterrand being the only leader of the conflict period named and thanked by Thatcher in her memoirs, showing that Thatcher herself desired to highlight the French contribution to Britain during the crisis.<sup>22</sup> The crisis held some importance to France due to the potential impact it could have had on the remaining French colonies. Decolonisation had preceded the establishment of the Fifth Republic and the difficult independence process of Algeria in 1962 was still relatively fresh in the memory of many senior French politicians.<sup>23</sup> Before winning the 1981 presidential and legislative elections, the French Socialist Party had been highly critical of French foreign policy, especially with its regards to arms sales and its support for military regimes, particularly in Latin America. This could have invoked a natural sympathy for Britain as the victim of an act of aggression from a Right Wing Junta, however, the French government's left leanings had also caused problems with the west in the context of the Cold War. Although divided on some issues, overall the party emphasised the need to implement more socialist principles in French policy.<sup>24</sup> In this context, the White House's more vociferous anti-communist approach in US foreign policy did not resonate in the Elysee. The early months of the Mitterrand presidency were marred by a number of problems in relations between Paris and Washington particularly in relation to on-going US involvement in Central American conflicts.<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years*, 189.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>23</sup> See Stelios Stavridis, 'The Converging National Reactions (I): The Big States' in *Domestic Sources*, 59.

<sup>24</sup> See M.C. Smouts, 'The External Policy of François Mitterrand,' *International Affairs* 59, no. 2 (1983): 158-166.

<sup>25</sup> A more pro-American view did start to permeate in French politics after 1983. See F. de La Serre, 'La Politique Européenne de la France: New Look ou New Deal,' *Politique Etrangère* 47, no. 1 (1982): 125-37, or D. Moïsi, 'Mitterrand's Foreign Policy: The Limits of Continuity,' *Foreign Affairs* 60, no. 2 (1981): 347-357.

In this context, Argentina had hoped to persuade France to side against Britain on the basis that British retention of the islands was a remnant of colonialism, a practice socialists were traditionally against. The Argentinians expressed their shock in a letter that Gerardo Schamis, the Argentine ambassador in Paris, wrote and was published in *Le Monde*. Schamis called on 'socialist France' to hinder British efforts to retake the islands.<sup>26</sup> The publication of the letter in *Le Monde* was indicative of Argentine efforts to stir popular support for its position on sovereignty among a left leaning population. From an Argentine perspective, it did not follow that a socialist administration should support a conservative government on a matter of decolonisation. However, it is important to note that the stance of the French government was one of condemnation for the Argentinian act of aggression, and it did not at any point suggest support for the British claim to sovereignty. Rather, French government officials refrained from making a stance on the sovereignty issue altogether, underlining that it was not, for them, a central issue in the conflict. The disintegration of the French empire in the twentieth century meant that France no longer had any vested interest in the issue of colonialism. France did have vested interests in the EEC, however, which influenced its decision to support Britain. In not making a statement on the issue of sovereignty, the socialist government was protecting its traditional stance of being against colonialism but also allowing itself to pursue other policy goals. In doing so, it underlined that it would prioritise goals surrounding the EEC and the western alliance over issues such as colonialism or self-determination.

By offering support for Britain early in the crisis, France was able to pursue a policy of building a closer relationship with Britain as well as attempting to show itself as a valuable partner in the western alliance against the advancing influence of the Soviet Union. France first declared its support for Britain through the UN, with its ambassador in the General Assembly, Luc de las Barre de Nanteuil, declaring, 'the Argentine action is condemnable and should be condemned.'<sup>27</sup> This was followed on 3 April by the Political Director in the French Foreign Ministry, Jacques Andreani, expressing France's support for Britain who had been hurt in its 'pride and honour'. The terms 'honour' and 'pride' were then used again by French Foreign Minister, Claude Cheysson, in the French Assembly on 8 April and French Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy expressed 'dismay' at this 'act of war'.<sup>28</sup> The use of

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<sup>26</sup> Gerardo Schamis, *Le Monde*, 9 April 1982.

<sup>27</sup> Cited in Stavridis, 'The Converging National Reactions (I),' 61.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*

'pride' and 'honour' were particularly useful for Britain as it meant that the ethical arguments against Argentina's actions were placed at the centre of the debate without Britain having to bring the matter into discussion. It is important to note that there is little evidence to suggest that the French ministers were really concerned with Britain's 'pride' or 'honour' but this was more likely a ploy to try and negotiate a closer relationship between Britain and France, a policy particularly important to President Mitterrand. Despite Freedman commenting that Mitterrand did appear to be genuinely grateful for Britain's aid during the Second World War, as evidenced through his career with the French resistance during the war and in his political career after, there were more practical motives behind the move to support Britain during the conflict. Mitterrand's government was keen to highlight its solidarity with its western neighbours despite its socialist leanings.<sup>29</sup> Establishing an important role for France in western political cooperation was an important issue for Mitterrand and a key part of his campaign to be president. The conflict presented an opportunity to demonstrate the value of France as an ally to NATO as he sought to foster a closer relationship with the organisation and lead France back into NATO's military command structure. Establishing closer relations with the west was a key component of Mitterrand's foreign policy as his government distanced themselves from supporting policies of the USSR stating, 'so long as Soviet troops are in Afghanistan, you can't expect there to be normal relations between France and the USSR.'<sup>30</sup> In addition, Mitterrand supported NATO rearmament in Europe stating in the German magazine *Stern*, 'the Soviet ss-20 and Backfire Bomber are upsetting the balance in Europe. I cannot accept this and I grant that there must be a rearmament to catch up and restore balance.'<sup>31</sup> The crisis presented an opportunity for France to further demonstrate its support for NATO. However, while in public France stated that Britain had 'the right to re-establish [its] former position on sovereignty,' this view would always be caveated with 'a need for positive UK moves towards a negotiated settlement.' Mitterrand displayed that he was thinking strategically when planning French policy towards the conflict when he commented that 'this war must

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<sup>29</sup> Freedman, *TOHOTFC Volume II*, 503.

<sup>30</sup> Francois Mitterrand on a visit to Washington, 6 June 1981, accessed 12 March 2016, available at <https://newleftreview.org/issues/I146/articles/diana-johnstone-how-the-french-left-learned-to-love-the-bomb.pdf>.

<sup>31</sup> Francois Mitterrand, *Stern*, 8 July 1981.

not turn into a war of revenge. There are limits to this conflict which I fully intend to make known at the right time.’<sup>32</sup>

In the first week of the conflict, France showed its willingness to support the UK economically but this was not without benefit to France and not without protecting French interests in Latin America. It agreed to the EEC wide sanctions and stopped the supply of arms to Argentina. Given that France was the largest single supplier of military equipment to Argentina in the five years preceding the conflict, this was significant.<sup>33</sup> This decision was also taken a time when export controls and other restrictions were going to be introduced in French domestic economic policies and the sanctions would have a noted impact on the French economy. France delayed the sale of Exocet missiles to Peru appeasing the British government who had concerns that they may be sold on to Argentina and sent experts to advise the British on how to establish an effective defence against the Exocet system.<sup>34</sup> However, there were also other benefits that the French enjoyed from this area of the crisis. Although France had made an economic sacrifice to support the UK, the use of French made weapons in the conflict did spark interest in French arms in other areas of the world. This was something that French Minister for External Commerce, Michel Jobert, commented on during a visit to South East Asia in May 1982.<sup>35</sup> Mitterrand also stressed the need to ‘prepare for the future’ and repair the damages that had been done in European and Latin American relations.<sup>36</sup> In a meeting with Thatcher on 17 May, Mitterrand commented that ‘when the balance of forces had been changed, it would be important to undertake very active diplomacy’ and ‘that what worried him was the situation that may follow the use of force.’<sup>37</sup> Almost as soon as the conflict was over, the sanctions were lifted and France resumed its delivery of military equipment to Latin America as well as the other areas of the world who

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<sup>32</sup> FCO note circulated to the Official OD Sub-Committee on the South Atlantic and the Falkland Islands, 10 June 1982, CAB 148/218 f262.

<sup>33</sup> Estimated to be \$575m out of \$1.8bn in E. Kolodziej, *Making and Marketing Arms: the French Experience and its Implications for the International System* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 387. This incidentally was also over the years of the Junta’s dirty war against its own citizens.

<sup>34</sup> Thatcher to Mitterrand, 30 May 1982, THCR 3/1/21 f98.

<sup>35</sup> *Le Monde*, 29 May 1982.

<sup>36</sup> Said this at a press conference during his African tour in late May 1982 and again at a press conference in Paris on 9 June 1982. Cheysson had repeated the same line in the Senate on 18 May 1982, *Journal Officiel Débats Parlementaires Sénat*, 1982, no. 44S, 19 May 1982: 2113.

<sup>37</sup> Note of conversation between Thatcher and Mitterrand, 17 May 1982, PREM 19/1240 f243.



had become interested in French made weaponry after the conflict.<sup>38</sup> This was in spite of ongoing British concerns about how the arms would be used. Even at the early stage of the conflict, when publicly France was still supporting the UK, the French government was preparing for how France could protect its interests in Latin America after the conflict was over. The French government was balancing its support for Britain against its economic interests in South America. Once the conflict was over, France did not place much weight in British concerns over the potential for French made arms to be used by Argentina in future military operations against the islands. Rather, for France the primary concern returned to being the economic gains that could be made from arms sales to Latin America. Evident from this is that practical considerations were always at the forefront of French thought in relation to its policy towards the crisis. Support offered to Britain was done so out of a desire to foster closer relations with the UK but once the conflict was over, France was keen to reap the economic benefits of arms trade with Latin America. Ultimately France was not succumbing to British requests to support self-determination or UK sovereignty over the islands highlighting that the French government was not concerned with the issues both sides used to underline their respective claims to the islands.<sup>39</sup>

Although the French government as a whole desired to act in the best interests of France, there were divisions over how best to proceed with the presidency's desire to foster a closer relationship with France often conflicting with other governmental officials' ideas on how to protect French interests in Latin America. While Mitterrand argued that France should support its ally, Cheysson became dismayed at how the crisis had been handled in London, the potential implications on French interests in Latin America and the increasing lack of evidence that Britain was committed to finding a peaceful resolution to the conflict emphasising 'there must be some way of avoiding threats, avoiding force.'<sup>40</sup> It is notable that Thatcher chose not to praise the French government as a whole in her memoirs, as she did for Commonwealth nations likely as a result of some criticisms of Britain from members of the French government.<sup>41</sup> The difference in views from the French Foreign Ministry caused tension through the Dorin Note Affair. The incident was named after the Director for the Americas at the Quai D'Orsay, Bernard Dorin, and referred to two notes that were leaked

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<sup>38</sup> UKE Paris to FCO, 15 July 1982, PREM 19/690 f74.

<sup>39</sup> UKE Paris to FCO, 15 July 1982, PREM 19/690 f74.

<sup>40</sup> UKE Paris to FCO, 9 April 1982, THCR 1/20/3/5 f26.

<sup>41</sup> Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years*, 182-83.

to *Le Figaro* and later reprinted in British press. The first note was produced by Dorin himself while the second was a cover note completed by Cheysson. Cheysson's use of "*rastaquouères*" to describe British attitudes towards Argentina suggested racism on the part of the British.<sup>42</sup> Dorin's note was critical of how the crisis had been handled by both the British and the Americans. The note suggested that the crisis had given the USSR new opportunities in Latin America and accused the British of showing profound contempt for the Latin American people.<sup>43</sup> Cheysson used interviews with French and American press outlets to repeatedly stress that France did not support Britain's claim to sovereignty over the islands, only condemned the Argentine action. Cheysson had always taken a more 'Third-Worldist' stance on international affairs and was unsympathetic to Britain's claims that the Task Force could be used in self-defence.<sup>44</sup> Cheysson summed up his view on Mitterrand's handling of the crisis:

...on the issues in which François Mitterrand showed a personal interest, the opinion of his ministers was secondary. Me, I did not want such an agreement with Margaret Thatcher, of course! We had to condemn the Argentinian attitude, but from there to go to war! This did not seem correct to me. But on the subjects François Mitterrand took personally, I repeat, the opinions of others were not important.<sup>45</sup>

Although there was clear division between Mitterrand and Cheysson on how to handle the crisis, it is important to note that both were not primarily concerned with the principles of self-determination or decolonisation. Although Cheysson did take a 'Third-Worldist' view on global politics, there is no evidence to suggest that he was actively supporting Argentine sovereignty over the islands during the crisis. Rather, he saw a risk to France's interest in Latin America through the continued support of Britain when the British had shown clear resolve to retake the islands by force. His primary focus was protecting French interests.

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<sup>42</sup> Bernard Dorin, 22 April 1982, *Malouines: les leçons d'un fiasco*, Extrait, Ambassade de France au Canada, AN-AG/5(4)/RD/43. This can be loosely translated into English as someone (particularly from a Mediterranean or Latin American country) who is regarded as a social interloper and frequently considered to be excessively ostentatious in the way they dress.

<sup>43</sup> For a fuller discussion of the Dorin Note affair see Stavridis, 'The Converging National Reactions (I),' 63-4.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>45</sup> Claude Cheysson, 27 April 1982, *Réflexions sur la Malouines*, Ministère des relations des extérieures, AG/5(4)/RD/43.

This is further emphasised by the Dorin Note Affair during which it was shown, in Cheysson's private words, that he was concerned that the conflict was providing new opportunities for the Soviet Union. This was also a concern for Mitterrand, who was keen to establish France as a leading ally to the west in its goal to prevent the spread of communism. As such, the presidency and the foreign ministry held shared goals but different views on how to best achieve those goals.

One of most pressing aspects of the conflict for the French government was what it perceived to be the lack of 'mutual solidarity' shown by Britain with regards to the settling of CAP price increases and the British contribution to the community budget. Cheysson was particularly vocal in his anger on this, even suggesting that Britain was blatantly violating European law in its attempts to block the other EEC member states from agreeing a deal on CAP price increases.<sup>46</sup> This was a strong accusation to make considering Britain were stating that Argentina had violated international law in their invasion of the Falkland Islands. In numerous newspaper interviews, Cheysson made clear that for him, the problem was also representative of the wider issue of British commitment to the European ideal, notions that were reinforced by Mitterrand in his meeting with the German Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt on 14 May 1982.<sup>47</sup> Cheysson later described the atmosphere at the G7 meeting in Versailles 4 to 6 June 1982 as 'sinister' and stated that the word 'negotiation' was not forthcoming from the British.<sup>48</sup> The French then justified their part in the refusal to accept the British veto over the agricultural price caps on 18 May, afforded to any member of the Ten under the Luxembourg Compromise, by stating that Britain had misused the term 'vital interest' in its justification for the veto.<sup>49</sup>

The notion that Britain was not reciprocating the solidarity it had asked for from the EEC became an issue again when Britain returned captured Argentine naval officer Captain Alfredo Astiz to Argentina in a prisoner of war exchange. This was despite objections from both France and Sweden where Astiz was wanted for questioning in relation to the murder

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<sup>46</sup> No. 10 record of conversation ("Third plenary session") Versailles Economic Summit, 6 June 1982, PREM 19/725 f20.

<sup>47</sup> *Le Monde* 29 April, 16 May, and 20 May 1982.

<sup>48</sup> *Le Monde*, 7 June 1982.

<sup>49</sup> Record of conversation between Howe and West German Federal Minister of Economics Count Lambsdorf, 21 May 1982, PREM 19/1244 f320. The Luxembourg Compromise was an agreement reached amongst the members of the European Economic Community which gave a de facto veto power to any member state on topics that were deemed to be 'very important national interests'.

of two French nuns and a Swedish girl in December 1977.<sup>50</sup> No member of the French government made any public comments on Astiz' situation given that under international law there are certain protocols which dictate the treatment of prisoners of war. However, in 1994 Cheysson commented that he thought British attitude over the affair was 'not correct' although he did not clarify his exact meaning.<sup>51</sup> What is clear from this comment however is that Cheysson believed that the UK should have acted differently over the Astiz affair. Most likely he felt Britain should have allowed European nations to question Astiz before his return to Argentina. It is clear throughout that the French government expected Britain to be more amenable to their requests in return for the support that France was offering in the crisis. When these concessions were not forthcoming, the French reacted angrily. This behaviour characterised the French reception of the crisis and would continue towards the end of the conflict and in the years after when other foreign policy concerns would take precedence.

Initially, French desire to be part of an EEC consensus prevented frustrations with Britain leading to a withdrawal of sanctions from Argentina, however, alternate parties in France sought to use the crisis to criticise Mitterrand's foreign policy although not to a great extent. Throughout the conflict, the French government reiterated that it condemned the Argentine invasion and when another resolution was proposed to the Security Council on 4 June 1982 when Britain was close to securing a military victory on the islands, France abstained citing that it did not make any mention of an Argentine withdrawal from the islands, a key part of the EEC declarations in early April.<sup>52</sup> That being said, the French did still urge both sides to return to negotiation. The British landings on South Georgia on 20 April led to a spokesman from the French Foreign Ministry to call for 'urgent negotiations' and Minister for European Affairs, André Chandernagor, 'deplored' the developments while Cheysson continued his campaign stressing that Britain was not reciprocating solidarity.<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>50</sup> FCO letter to No. 10 Downing Street, 20 May 1982, PREM 19/648 f20. The British had originally made Astiz available for questioning by French and Swedish authorities but when Argentina made veiled threats against the security of three British journalists held by Argentine authorities on espionage charges, Britain decided to exchange. Astiz was later tried *in absentia* and sentenced to life imprisonment by a French Assize court for his role in the disappearance of the nuns.

<sup>51</sup> Cheysson interview with Regelsberger in Elfriede Regelsberger, 'The Converging National Reactions (I)' in *Domestic Sources*, 65.

<sup>52</sup> South Atlantic Presentation Unit paper –SAPU (82), 7 June 1982, THCR 2/6/2163.

<sup>53</sup> *Le Monde*, 4, 11 and, 16-17 May 1982.

However, the conflict did provide a context for political parties in France to critique the foreign policy of the Mitterrand's Socialist government. The left supported the government's handling of the crisis although Socialist Party First Secretary, Lionel Jospin, cautioned against the possibility of 'humiliating' the Argentinians.<sup>54</sup> The right was critical of a perceived lack of consistency with socialist ideals but did not launch into any scathing criticism of the government whereas Jacques Chirac, leader of the RPR, only said that it would have been better for France to enter into a joint initiative with the other Latin European states.<sup>55</sup> There was no particular criticism towards Britain from political parties outside of the Socialist Party. However, this stance was aided by the fact that the conflict also came at a very busy time in French foreign policy. The continuation of the Iran-Iraq War; the assassination of the French ambassador in Beirut on 25 May; and the Israeli invasion of Southern Lebanon all dominated the attentions of French politicians. However, a linking factor among all the opinions of alternative parties in France was again that the matters of self-determination and decolonisation were not prominent issues except where they could be used to attack opposing parties. The nature of being a political party outside of government is that opportunities are sought to attack the policy of the party in power. Where possible, opposition parties did use the conflict to attack the government but not to any great extent. This is indicative that opposition parties did not feel that the crisis was a pressing issue for France or one that was garnering much public attention. As opposition parties did criticise the government over not upholding socialist principles, there is evidence that they felt France's support of Britain went against socialist principles. However, since this did not attract much attention from opposition parties, it is likely that they did not feel the issues of self-determination or decolonisation were of great consequence to the French electorate.

It is unlikely that the French government would have been able to pursue a policy that supported Britain had the French public opinion been set against Britain's actions in the South Atlantic. However, it is difficult to assess general public opinion in France on the conflict given the lack of polls covering the topic. The crisis was featured regularly in *Le Monde* but the newspaper rarely offered any real opinion on the issues at stake. Generally the French media emphasised the 'ludicrous dimension of the conflict' and 'the spiral of

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<sup>54</sup> *Le Monde*, 11 May 1982.

<sup>55</sup> *Le Monde*, 3 June 1982.

events that had led to the military phase'.<sup>56</sup> In Paris, some solidarity movements with the Argentine people emerged but these were more out of anti-Junta feeling as opposed to sympathy for the Argentine claim to the islands.<sup>57</sup> The French public gave very little attention to the conflict which benefitted the government as there was no added pressure to pursue any particular policy line. As such, the French government sought to keep public attention away from the South Atlantic and it is likely this reasoning contributed to the decision to cancel the French national rugby team's tour of Argentina in May 1982.<sup>58</sup> This too emphasised that the Elysée did not hold a strong opinion on any principles involved in the crisis. Any public debate on the dispute would have centred on the legitimacy of both sides claim to sovereignty as well as the importance of the violation of international law. Keeping these issues as the centre of policy reference would have limited the French government's ability to base their response to the conflict on wider French foreign policy interests.

The French government's position on the dispute remained consistent throughout the 1980s but the UNGA resolution on the dispute in 1985 saw a change in French voting policy as it better served French interests to do so. Here, the French administration abandoned its traditional position of abstaining and voted in favour of the pro-Argentine resolution. This was particularly frustrating for the British Foreign Office as it acted as a trigger for other European nations, notably Italy and Greece, also to vote in favour. Further, despite claiming that France remained committed to the principle of self-determination, the French delegation abstained on the British amendments which would have seen the islanders' right of self-determination recognised. The French explained this view in the UN through their Permanent Representative, Claude de Kémoularia, who argued that the self-determination of the islanders was not relevant in this issue.<sup>59</sup> However, an examination of French involvement in Latin America highlights the wider interests at stake in the 1985 vote. The French government was keen to ensure that it could swiftly rebuild any damaged relationships with Latin America after the conclusion of the conflict and had become immediately involved in several initiatives to aid that. French arms sales to Argentina had

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<sup>56</sup> Stavridis, 'The Converging National Reactions (I),' 67.

<sup>57</sup> Stella Paresa Krepp, 'Between the Cold War and the Global South: Argentina and Third World Solidarity in the Falkland/Malvinas Crisis,' *Estudios Históricos* 30, no. 60 (Jan/April 2017): 162.

<sup>58</sup> Stavridis, 'The Converging National Reactions (I),' 67.

<sup>59</sup> Anglo-French talks on Latin America, 6 December 1985, FCO 7/6363 f177.

resumed in July 1982, which represented a significant proportion of the French exports. France also became involved with the Contadora Group, aiming to bring resolution to the various conflicts that were on-going in Central America. The French government was keen to support the Alfonsín regime, with Alfonsín visiting France in April 1985, speaking to the European Parliament in Strasbourg.<sup>60</sup> French diplomats had also been impressed with the efforts of Dr Caputo, who was seen as much easier to work with than his predecessors in the Junta.<sup>61</sup> In the years after the conflict, France had gained significant interests in Latin America which would be aided by maintaining good relations with the government of Argentina. By 1985, the Alfonsín regime was established in Buenos Aires and had begun the process of prosecuting individuals involved in the crimes committed by the Junta. The government that was in Buenos Aires was far removed from the Junta that had seized the islands illegally in April 1982 and so there were no consequences for France offering support for the principle of negotiation with Alfonsín's regime. Additionally, France's involvement in the Contadora Group meant it could be portrayed as natural for the French government to support negotiation to solve a longstanding sovereignty dispute in Latin America. The French vote against the British amendments served as a clear indication that for France the matter of self-determination was not significant. Rather, the expressed desires of 1800 islanders was of no importance when weighted against France's other interests in the area.

In turn, France viewed Britain as unnecessarily hindering the development of good relations with the new democratic government in Argentina. The islands did not rank on the list of French foreign policy considerations and the Elysée did not agree with Britain that other policy interests should be risked for the sake of the islands. Similarly to the case of the USA, there was a belief among French government officials that given the fall of the Junta, Britain should be ready to resume the negotiations in the same vein as it had done prior to the 1982 conflict in support of wider interests. Britain had to again justify why the conflict meant there should be a change in the pre-1982 position on sovereignty. This was a point that had been made clear to Mitterrand in his bilateral talks with Thatcher in October 1984.<sup>62</sup> British officials made concerted efforts to show their French counterparts that it was

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<sup>60</sup> Lady Young's visit to Paris: Points to Make, 3 December 1985, FCO 7/6363 f176.

<sup>61</sup> Record of Anglo-French Consultations on Latin America, 5 November 1985, FCO 7/6363 f88.

<sup>62</sup> Thatcher's bilateral meeting with Mitterrand, 27 October 1984, FCO 7/6360 f76.

Argentine intransigence that was prohibiting the establishment of normal relations.<sup>63</sup> During the French president's visit to Britain in March 1984, FCO officials emphasised to Mitterrand that Britain would not consider any future of the islands that did not take into consideration the democratic rights of the islanders and it would be unrealistic to expect Britain to do so.<sup>64</sup> The following year, the FCO emphasised that Argentina had not reciprocated Britain's unilateral lifting of sanctions in April 1985, attempting to show that HMG had made efforts to build fruitful relationships with the Alfonsín regime but the Argentinians had refused to reciprocate.<sup>65</sup> The French responded by stating that it had been a tough decision but they had remained neutral for as long as possible and needed to 'ensure that all lines of communication remained open' emphasising that the self-determination of the islanders was not of great significance.<sup>66</sup> France was responding to a lack of progress on the part of the British in negotiations and underlying French support for a negotiated settlement no matter what that may be. Similar issues Britain had with securing American support in the UN after the conflict became an issue again in securing French support in 1985. The failure of the Berne talks and the perceived need to support Alfonsín's democratic government meant that Britain was seen to be making unrealistic requests in asking the Argentinians to give up their calls for negotiations on sovereignty, an issue that France felt would put at risk the long term future of Alfonsín's position.<sup>67</sup> Incidentally, supporting Argentina in the 1985 vote on the dispute also meant that France secured an Argentine abstention on the New Caledonia vote only one month later. Although France lost the support of Britain in this issue, perhaps through some payback for their voting on the Falkland Islands resolution, a small number of non-aligned countries followed Argentina which meant the result was not as devastating for the French as it could have been.<sup>68</sup> Although it had served French interests to offer support to Britain during the conflict, after

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<sup>63</sup> Thatcher's bilateral meeting with Mitterrand: Points to make, 2-4 May 1985, FCO 7/6360 f78.

<sup>64</sup> No. 10 minute for Thatcher, 29 February 1984, PREM 19/1240 f4.

<sup>65</sup> Lady Young's meeting and lunch with French Parliamentarians, 15 May 1985, FCO 7/6360 f77.

<sup>66</sup> Lady Young's visit to Paris to meet with M. Baylet, State Secretary at the Quai d'Orsay, 5 December 1985, FCO7/6363 f187.

<sup>67</sup> Draft record of meeting between Geoffrey Howe and the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs Herr Leopold Gratz, 17 May 1985, FCO 7/6360 f79.

<sup>68</sup> New Zealand and Australia brought French rule of New Caledonia to the UN after French agents attacked and sank the Greenpeace flagship *Rainbow Warrior* in a New Zealand port in July 1985. See Ramesh Thakur, 'A Dispute of Many Colours: France, New Zealand and the Rainbow Warrior Affair,' *The World Today* 42, no. 12 (December 1986): 209-214.



the conflict, it better served French interests to support Argentine calls for negotiation. France desired to maintain its influence in the Contadora Group whilst also establishing strong relations with the Alfonsín regime. As such, the matter of self-determination was not held in any great value and rather the French government was comfortable to vote in favour of a resolution that openly circumvented the expressed desires of the islanders.

#### **4.4.2. West Germany**

The reaction of West Germany (FRG) to the crisis, in many aspects, mirrored the themes highlighted in the French reaction with support for Britain also supporting wider West German interests. However, what must be underlined in any discussion regarding the Federal Republic's support of Britain is that it was highly visible but rather limited in its scope.<sup>69</sup> Given the FRG's border with the east and on-going security concerns surrounding West Berlin, the government in Bonn was keen to see that Argentina's invasion of the islands did not succeed out of concerns that it may set 'a dangerous precedent'.<sup>70</sup> Although there was no great concern that the USSR may resort to a military invasion of West Berlin, there was some limited shared desire among some west European governments to show the effectiveness of European solidarity in addressing security threats. The FRG was the foremost of these nations having been highly influential in the formation of the European Economic Community and the European Economic Area. The West German government held a strong belief in the importance of a united Europe for its value in preventing the USSR from fulfilling its expansionist ambitions. As such, European solidarity was an issue of great concern for West Germany. At the outset of the crisis, during meetings of EEC ambassadors, FRG diplomats convincingly argued that solidarity had been created by the EPC and that should be extended to support Britain. This was particularly important in securing European sanctions against Argentina. The efforts of Julian Bullard were also of particular influence as he convincingly argued this point to his colleagues in the EEC Political Committee.<sup>71</sup> Further, early in the conflict, the argument that a pro-British stance would damage West Germany's interests in Latin America was not a particularly convincing one.<sup>72</sup> From an

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<sup>69</sup> Regelsberger, 'The Converging National Reactions (I),' 72.

<sup>70</sup> Western European Attitudes to the Falkland Islands crisis: Including briefing for European Community member states, 7 April 1982, FCO 33/5467 f18.

<sup>71</sup> FCO telegram to UKE Brussels, 9 April 1982, FCO 7/4590 f23.

<sup>72</sup> Falklands Islands Crisis: Publicity in Europe 1982, FCO 26/2428.

economic standpoint, solidarity with the UK also came at a relatively low cost to the FRG and was very much second when compared to other political considerations.<sup>73</sup> Although it seemed significant in that 30% of EEC trade with Argentina went through Germany, only 0.4-0.5% of Germany's overall trade was made with Argentina.<sup>74</sup> As such, West German support for Britain came at a relatively low cost. Further this support for Britain came a time when it was hoped that a peaceful solution to the crisis could be found. The initial West German reaction came out of condemnation of the Argentine aggression and sanctions were aimed at forcing the withdrawal of Argentine troops through non-violent means. As such, British willingness to engage in conflict to recapture the islands caused problems for West Germany. Further, like France, after the conflict, the dispute's effects on West German interests changed. The establishment of a government in Buenos Aires that could be closely aligned to the west encouraged the West German government to seek strong relations with Argentina. This in turn, led to a weakening of support for Britain in the dispute. Although in public the FRG continued to express support for the principle of self-determination, West German actions showed that other policy interests were considered far more important than the expressed wishes of the islanders.

Immediately following the Argentine seizure of the islands, West Germany, alongside France, remained a supporter of the UK: however, as the conflict wore on representatives of the West German government expressed concern at how far Britain was willing to go to recapture the islands. In doing so, these individuals highlighted that fundamentally, during the conflict, it was the avoidance of conflict which mattered most to West Germany over any other issue. The avoidance of conflict best served FRG interests with regards to its own security issues. At the outset, West Germany had hoped to avoid further military confrontation between the UK and Argentina. Although the FRG voiced its approval of the NATO declaration of support for Britain, Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher spoke with the Brazilian government, whilst accompanying President Karl Carstens on a state visit to Rio de Janeiro in April 1982, in an attempt to persuade them to intervene with the Argentinians, even offering to go to Buenos Aires himself.<sup>75</sup> In doing so, Genscher was attempting to invoke a West German initiative, in addition to Hague's shuttle diplomacy, aimed at finding a peaceful resolution to the conflict. Unlike the USA, at this

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<sup>73</sup> *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 13 April 1982.

<sup>74</sup> Figures quoted in Regelsberger, 'The Converging National Reactions (I),' 72.

<sup>75</sup> Freedman, *TOHOTFC Volume II*, 498.

stage of the conflict, West German peace initiatives were focussed on persuading Argentina to yield in the negotiations whilst still publicly supporting Britain. Displaying European solidarity was still important to the FRG and so it was important to continue to display support for Britain's cause, ultimately being the removal of Argentine forces from the islands. Had such an initiative succeeded, West Germany would have been able to claim that European support had led to a successful resolution to a security issue for a member state of the EEC. West Germany was focussed on finding a solution that ultimately would be successful for Britain but was also peaceful, avoiding the need to resort to conflict and protecting western interests in the context of the Cold War.

The sinking of the *Belgrano* on 4 May created difficulty for West Germany in continuing to support Britain as the British had been the first nation in the crisis to engage in military action that led to significant loss of life and FRG policy had been focussed on avoiding conflict. The British tried to ensure that they retained German support by involving the FRG more actively in the peace process. Pym invited Genscher for a meeting on 6 May where Genscher suggested the possibility of a 48-hour ceasefire but was dismayed when Britain rejected the idea pushing the case that the political and moral stakes justified the military investment.<sup>76</sup> Thatcher too remained in constant contact with Chancellor Schmidt throughout the process relaying British diplomatic efforts and updates.<sup>77</sup> FRG government officials and elements of the German press called on Britain to use its power proportionately whilst Schmidt also expressed his 'greatest reservations' about the escalation of the fighting.<sup>78</sup> There was a growing disillusionment in Bonn at the British attitude towards the conflict and continued stubbornness on the part of British officials to listen to the advice of European partners. Further the business sector, which held a lot of influence on the government in the FRG, was becoming concerned about the potential damage to its interests in Latin America.<sup>79</sup> Given German security concerns around West Berlin, the FRG

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<sup>76</sup> Record of Pym meeting with Genscher, FCO 33/5467 f27.

<sup>77</sup> For example No.10 record of telephone conversation (MT-Chancellor Schmidt), 7 April 1982, PREM 19/615 f122. There has since been evidence to suggest that this perceived 'constant pressure' from the British Prime Minister actually annoyed Schmidt. See Helmut Schmidt, *Men and Powers: A Political Retrospective* trans. Ruth Hein (London: Random House, 1989).

<sup>78</sup> See *Europäische Zeitung*, June 1982; *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 26 May 1982; and Bulletin d'informations, 26 May 1982.

<sup>79</sup> See Regelsberger, 'The Converging National Reactions (I),' 76-77 for a fuller discussion on the lobbying ability of the German industrial sector and its effect on FRG decision making during the crisis.

government had supported the use of negotiation to settle longstanding disputes and seek the fulfilment of policy goals. Following the sinking of the *Belgrano*, Britain's actions appeared to be in direct contrast to FRG policy aims. Despite West Germany agreeing with the extension of sanctions in the European Parliament in May 1982, the German Economic Minister, Otto Graf Lambsdorff, stated that nobody would be satisfied with the prolonging of the sanctions, warning Britain that European support would not be indefinite.<sup>80</sup> In order to improve relations between Germany and South America, Minister of State at the *Auswärtiges Amt*, Peter Corterier, was sent on a ten day journey to the region to 'explain and promote the German position' in late May when fighting between Argentina and Britain was at its most intense.<sup>81</sup> As the conflict came to an end, it was clear that there were increasing frustrations in the FRG at the manner with which Britain had handled the crisis. It was difficult to support a state that had seen its international rights violated by force when that same country seemed unwilling to pursue peaceful means of conflict resolution.

After the conflict, although the FRG maintained a habit of abstaining in the UNGA votes on the islands, there was significant evidence that the government in Bonn felt many of the same frustrations with the British as the French had and were also keen to support European initiatives in Latin America. Business interests meant that the German cabinet agreed to lift sanctions in September 1982 and German media applauded the government's progressive stance on the lifting of the embargo.<sup>82</sup> Although the supply of arms was delayed, this was due to the continued importance of European considerations which were still paramount in West German politics and the government awaited approval from Foreign Ministers consultations in EPC on 20 December before making deliveries. Genscher became involved in several initiatives designed to aid political development in Latin America and the San José dialogue, which began in 1984, was particularly attributed to his success.<sup>83</sup> One focus of the dialogue was to put an end to armed conflict in Central America and to promote negotiation as a method of dispute resolution. Britain's refusal to engage in negotiation with Argentina was thus not in line with the principles of the dialogue and caused frustration for

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<sup>80</sup> *Vereinigte Wirtschaftsdienste Deutschland*, 26 May 1982.

<sup>81</sup> *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 29 May 1982.

<sup>82</sup> *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 22 June 1982.

<sup>83</sup> The San José Dialogue was an agreement on multilateral relations between the EEC and several Central American states.

Genscher who was supposed to be representing the whole of the EEC in the dialogue, Britain included.<sup>84</sup>

Helmut Kohl succeeded Schmidt as Chancellor of the FRG in October 1982 and was keen to support the Alfonsín government.<sup>85</sup> Kohl built contacts between the FRG and Argentina and arranged a state visit by Alfonsín to the FRG originally scheduled for September 1985.<sup>86</sup> European solidarity was still of clear importance to the Germans and they continued to consult with the British on a number of issues including the sale of SUT torpedoes to Argentina in the autumn of 1985. That being said, there was an evident keenness on the part of the West German government to support the Alfonsín government and build closer relations with Argentina. British resistance to this objective caused frustration among the government in Bonn. In the same discussions around the sale of torpedoes to Argentina, German officials continued to urge Britain to seek a resolution to the dispute, one which would allow for bilateral consular relations between Argentina and Britain to resume, even suggesting a possible creation of an independent Falkland Islands.<sup>87</sup> In return, Britain found itself having to make the same defences as it had to France; that Britain could not be expected to just return to a pre-1982 status on the islands. In the build-up to the 1985 General Assembly vote on the dispute, the German Foreign Ministry warned Britain that it was becoming increasingly difficult to support the British in the UN and gave pre-warnings to the change in voting pattern of a number of other European states, urging the British that it would be 'in everybody's interest to see dialogue resume'. In using these words, the West German government was attempting to convey to the British the importance of EEC foreign policy over that of Britain's individual policy objectives.<sup>88</sup> In this atmosphere, the British even prepared themselves for the possibility of a change in voting strategy of the FRG.<sup>89</sup> In this, it is clear that even Britain's strongest supporters in Europe had concerns with the British handling of the dispute. German reaction to the conflict was

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<sup>84</sup> UKE Bonn to FCO, 23 October 1984, PREM 19/1169 f53.

<sup>85</sup> Record of call on Lady Young by Herr Volker Ruehe, deputy chairman of the CDU/CSU parliamentary party, 3 June 1985, FCO 7/6360 f8.

<sup>86</sup> This was later cancelled by the Argentine President due to concerns over the internal situation in Argentina.

<sup>87</sup> David Thomas talks held with Dr Kullack-Ublick, FRG Director for Latin America, 3 April 1985, FCO 7/6360 f75.

<sup>88</sup> Kohl to Thatcher, 5 December 1984, FCO 7/6359 f10.

<sup>89</sup> David Reddaway (Falkland Islands Department) to Miss Bailes, Planning Staff, Planning Paper on the UK/French/FRG relationship, 14 June 1985, FCO 7/6360 f85.

ultimately framed within the desire to maintain European solidarity and enabled by the relatively low cost to the German economy of siding with Britain. However, as the conflict escalated and Britain seemed to be opposed to the possibility of a peaceful solution, this was at odds with wider EEC policy. As a result, German support was difficult to maintain and opinion shifted to the need to maintain a positive image of the FRG in Latin America followed by a period after the conflict where West Germany sought to foster closer relations between the EEC and Latin America.

Throughout, West German perspectives on the crisis and dispute were framed by the FRG's own security concerns in the context of the Cold War. That is not to say there was any great concern about the possibility of a USSR invasion of West Berlin should Argentina be successful in keeping the islands. Rather, West Germany desired to show the effectiveness of European Political Cooperation and the benefits of negotiation. As such, at the outset of the crisis, West Germany had been keen to show how the EPC mechanism could lead to a successful conclusion in an emergency security concern for a member of the EEC. That being said, the desire for a peaceful resolution to the crisis had always underpinned FRG support for sanctions and as such support for Britain was limited to the rejection of the Argentine aggression. In this regard, the FRG had always supported negotiation to find a permanent resolution. This was in line with West Germany's own security concerns around West Berlin: negotiate to find a permanent solution to the issue whilst avoiding conflict. Britain's willingness to engage in conflict was in direct contrast to this. This caused difficulty for West Germany after the sinking of the *Belgrano* and explains the continued push from FRG diplomats to encourage Britain to exercise restraint and engage in negotiation. The desire to support a fellow EEC member meant that West Germany abstained in the UN votes after the conflict but FRG government officials continued to encourage Britain to engage in negotiation. There was little discussion of sovereignty or self-determination from West German officials as it was not important. Much more pressing was that both sides engaged in negotiation and avoided the outbreak of further conflict.

#### **4.4.3. *Smaller States***

Many of the reactions of the smaller European states which supported Britain during the conflict match the themes of the larger states, with the dispute assuming importance for its

effect on wider policy goals for each individual nation. In April 1982, Belgium held the Presidency of the European Council and as such chaired EEC and EPC meetings. For Belgium, particularly its Foreign Minister, Leo Tindemans, the conflict presented the opportunity to advance the international influence the EEC had. Tindemans was aware that Belgium's influence on the international scene would be much greater as part of an international framework and so any advancement in the global influence of the EEC was an opportunity to advance Belgium's own influence.<sup>90</sup> In his role as chairman of the Council, Tindemans thus attempted to advance a community position with regards to the crisis. In addition, the fact that Belgium did not have any major interests in Argentina allowed Tindemans to act free from compromise to national interest. He rejected the Danish proposal that sanctions be imposed through action by individual member states, highlighting the weight of importance the Belgians placed on united European action. Tindemans also worked to ensure that sanctions were renewed in late May 1982 despite the reservations of several member states of the EEC.<sup>91</sup> Belgium recalled its ambassador from Buenos Aires and halted arms imports, mirroring steps taken by France and Germany, and again underlying the desire to show a joint European effort which would advance Belgium's own influence on global affairs.<sup>92</sup> There was little public engagement with the crisis in Belgium. Although most newspapers reported updates daily, public attention remained on the on-going economic situation.<sup>93</sup> The same was also true of the Belgian national government. There was some question of Belgium's support of British 'aggression' following the escalation of violence in the South Atlantic in May 1982 but this was quickly subdued.<sup>94</sup> As such, the Belgium government was able to act in a manner it best felt would advance Belgium's own position in global affairs without heavy public scrutiny on the rights or wrongs of the principles in the conflict. In the votes in the UNGA on the sovereignty dispute, Belgium abstained each year from 1982-88 following the majority line of the EEC. It was Belgium's preoccupation with European solidarity that framed its support for the British cause. Generally speaking the crisis and dispute were used only by Belgium to advance the

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<sup>90</sup> *Annales Parlementaires*, séance du vendredi, 23 April 1982, 1418.

<sup>91</sup> UKE Brussels to FCO, 24 June 1982, PREM 19/751 f84.

<sup>92</sup> Minutes of meeting of the Information Group on the Falklands, 10 May 1982, CAB 164/1622 f28.

<sup>93</sup> Sophie Vanhoonacker, 'The Converging National Reactions (II): The Smaller States – Belgium, the Netherlands and Greece' in *Domestic Sources*, 84.

<sup>94</sup> *Annales Parlementaires*, Chambre des Représentants, séance du mercredi, 12 May 1982, 1608; and *Annales Parlementaires*, Sénat, séance du jeudi, 13 May 1982, 1020-1.

notion that Europe was stronger when it acted together which had the benefit of advancing Belgium's own influence on world affairs. .

Assessing the Dutch reaction to the crisis is difficult given the multitude of different interest groups in the Netherlands. At a government level, the Netherlands was happy to follow the EEC line and supported the actions of the United Nations without having any real policy of its own. This is indicative of a lack of strength of feeling from the government on the issue. Without any great interest in the dispute, the Dutch government was happy to follow the EEC line, an arena where the government in Amsterdam had much more vested interest. In the Dutch Parliament, there was a variety of opinion but most seemed to absolve the British of blame.<sup>95</sup> The Liberal Party focussed condemnation on the Argentine aggression that had started the crisis whilst the Socialist Party, although not convinced about Britain's claim to sovereignty, did recognise the right to self-determination of the islanders.<sup>96</sup> However, again, neither party attempted to place great pressure on the Dutch government to pursue a particular policy line. This is indicative that, just as the government, there was a no strong feeling on the principles involved in the conflict from the Dutch Parliament, who were confident that Britain would succeed in its aims and were satisfied with the government's policy of following general EEC guidance on the issue. The EEC was an arena where the Netherlands had much more substantial interest and so showing itself to be a valuable partner on an issue such as the crisis was of more value to supporting either Britain or Argentina's particular stance in the conflict.

A study carried out by the Netherlands Institute of Public Opinion makes it possible, to some extent, to assess the general reception of the conflict amongst the Dutch public. The study showed overwhelming support for the withdrawal of Argentine troops from the islands and the right to self-determination of the islanders but also highlighted a majority were against the British use of force.<sup>97</sup> This evidence is reinforced by the fact that the Dutch Inter-Church Peace Council attempted to use some of its public attention to push its own message for an end to hostilities.<sup>98</sup> The general reception of the Dutch public is unsurprising given that it would be expected that the majority would reject violence if it was thought a peaceful

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<sup>95</sup> FCO briefing for Thatcher, 2 December 1982, PREM 19/1924 f2.

<sup>96</sup> Falkland Islands: Publicity in Europe 1982, FCO 26/2429.

<sup>97</sup> Netherlands Institute for Public Opinion and Marketing Research, Report no. 2187, 2 June 1982, cited in Vanhoonacker, 'The Converging National Reactions (II): The Smaller States – Belgium, the Netherlands and Greece,' 76.

<sup>98</sup> Falkland Islands: Publicity in Europe 1982, FCO 26/2431.



solution could be found. However, it is notable that, other than the Church Peace Council, there were no significant peace movements in the Netherlands. Further there was no evident public pressure on the Dutch government to act in any particular way. Although polls garner opinion, they often do not show strength of feeling on the issue. The lack of activity among the Dutch public in spite of a majority in favour of peace highlights a lack of interest among the Dutch public in the affair.

Dutch media also supported the British position but again offered no pressure on the government to act in a particular manner. One editorial emphasised Britain's role in preventing the will of militia dictating international security, comparing the situation in the South Atlantic with the potential occupation of the Dutch island of Aruba by Venezuelan forces.<sup>99</sup> This is particularly important as it highlights the external interests that the Netherlands had in the crisis. Similar to the Falkland Islands, Aruba had been the focus of a sovereignty dispute between the Netherlands and Venezuela, with the Venezuelan claim to the island similar to the Argentine claim to the Falklands. Had the Argentine venture been allowed to succeed, the editorial emphasised the potential that such claims to sovereignty could become justified and encourage the Venezuelans to pursue their own claims to Aruba through invasion. This matched the concerns of other nations which were worried that Argentine victory in the conflict would set a dangerous precedent for other sovereignty disputes. It is notable that the countries who took a strong interest in the crisis were often involved in similar sovereignty disputes. However, the concern regarding the security of Aruba was not widespread and not something that was mentioned by the government, perhaps due to their confidence that Britain would succeed in reclaiming the islands. The national daily, *De Volkskrant* placed the blame for the conflict with the Argentine government.<sup>100</sup> There was some criticism of British action as well as their long term commitment to the islands but this was minimal.<sup>101</sup> *NRC Handelsblad* speculated whether the crisis would see a change in the British stance on the EEC which only underlined the notion that for most, the question of European solidarity was most pertinent.<sup>102</sup> Although expressing opinion, there was no call for action by the Dutch media. There was no widespread condemnation or praise for the action the Dutch government had taken. The

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<sup>99</sup> *Elsevier*, 10 April 1982.

<sup>100</sup> *De Volkskrant*, 22 May 1982.

<sup>101</sup> For a full discussion of criticism of British action by Dutch media, see Sophie Vanhoonacker, 'The Converging National Reactions (II),' 107.

<sup>102</sup> *NRC Handelsblad*, 25 June 1982.

media would comment on the conflict as it was international news and as such was writing on current affairs. However, that is not to say that there was any particular strong feeling about conflict among Dutch media further allowing the government to act with freedom.

At the UN, the Netherlands abstained from the votes regarding the Falklands until 1986 when it changed strategy and voted in favour of the resolution calling for negotiation. This was perhaps in response to the signing of a bilateral agreement with Argentina regarding the large natural gas project that was run by a Dutch firm in Argentina.<sup>103</sup> However, there had also been an increasing frustration that Britain had refused to negotiate with Argentina, and that the crisis had still not been resolved.<sup>104</sup> There had always been a sense within the Dutch government and parliament that Britain was not acting towards a greater European benefit in its policy surrounding the dispute and after four years of little progress on the issue, the Dutch were attempting to force the British hand.<sup>105</sup> In doing so, the Dutch echoed the sentiments of West Germany, by expressing a clear preference for negotiation. The Netherlands had also been involved in the San José dialogues and while holding the sovereignty of Aruba, had a vested interest in maintaining good relations with Latin America alongside its strong interest in the EEC. The interest in the EEC and Aruba were potent issues for the Dutch government and as such, it was natural for the Dutch government to support Britain during the conflict but also support negotiation after it.

Greece's support for Britain at the beginning of the conflict was surprising given its problems with the EEC in early 1982 and its traditional anti-colonial stance. In March 1982, the new Greek government had submitted a memorandum which outlined a range of demands to the EEC. Supplementary community aid and the retention of tariffs from other EEC countries on certain products were among the demands which the government in Greece argued were necessary to reverse the adverse effects membership of the EEC had on the Greek economy. As such, British requests for further restrictions on the Greek economy in terms of trade embargos may not have been welcome in Athens. However, when viewed in the context of wider Greek foreign policy concerns, Greek support for Britain is easier to understand. Paramount was the issue of Cyprus and from the outset Greek authorities drew

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<sup>103</sup> Emile van Lennep, *The World-Economy: Memories of an International Dutchman* (Leiden: Stenfert Kroese, 1991), 290-302.

<sup>104</sup> Record of discussion between the Secretary of State and the Netherland's Foreign Minister Van den Broeck at the Dutch MFA, 29 November 1985, FCO 7/6363 f189.

<sup>105</sup> See *The Economist*, 19 June 1982, for summary of Dutch attitude towards Britain and the crisis at the end of the conflict.

comparisons between the situation in the South Atlantic and the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974.<sup>106</sup> Following the Cyprus crisis, the Greeks had protested vociferously about the armed invasion and seizing of sovereign territory and Argentina's actions in the South Atlantic drew sympathies from Greece. Further, the British line on the dispute lent credence to the Greek argument that geographical proximity is of little relevance in determining the sovereignty of islands, especially when it runs counter to the principle of self-determination. This is a point that Greece had made regularly in the sovereignty debate on Cyprus.<sup>107</sup> In this regard, it is unsurprising that they would not condone armed aggression and argue that it should not be allowed to succeed as well as support the British arguments around sovereignty. As Geoffrey Edwards has surmised, the Greek reaction to the crisis was framed with Athens' concerns for 'its scattered and vulnerable islands and, of course, by Cyprus.'<sup>108</sup> In addition, Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou shared a particularly good relationship with Thatcher.<sup>109</sup> Thatcher's battles with the 'wets' was similar to Papandreou's attempt to tackle political establishments in Greece. In addition they both shared similar views on the EEC, both sceptical of the EEC institutions and opposed to any infringement on national sovereignty.<sup>110</sup> On 3 April 1982, Greece supported Resolution 502 and thus underlined its commitment that never 'should a military invasion be condoned.'<sup>111</sup> When other EEC countries declared a ban on arms sales to Argentina, Greece went one step further and announced a ban on all imports. Then on 14 April, the Greek Foreign Minister, Ioannis Charalambopoulos, endorsed the list of trade sanctions against Buenos Aires that had been drawn up by the British government.<sup>112</sup> In spite of Greece's problems with the EEC, Greek considerations around Cyprus and shared affinity between Papandreou and Thatcher meant the Greece would support Britain given that doing so aided its own foreign policy objectives.

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<sup>106</sup> Edwards, 'Europe and The Falkland Islands Crisis,' 303.

<sup>107</sup> See for example, UN General Assembly, Ninth Session, General Assembly, Official Records A/9/PV750, 14 December 1954, paragraphs 67-8 and 105-7.

<sup>108</sup> Edwards, 'Europe and The Falkland Islands Crisis,' 303.

<sup>109</sup> See Papandreou to Thatcher, 16 April 1982, THCR 3/1/20 f76.

<sup>110</sup> For example, on 30 March 1982 Papandreou declared that 'we have no obligation to stay in the EEC should a solution [to the Greek problems listed on the memorandum of the same month] not be found. We do not accept, for the sake of Community solidarity, decisions which [may be] harmful to Greek interests.' *Kathimerini*, 1 April 1982.

<sup>111</sup> *UN Doc. S/PV 2364*, 24 May 1982.

<sup>112</sup> *Kathimerini*, 14 April 1982.

However, key in all this was Greece's commitment 'to the peaceful settlement of difference.'<sup>113</sup> Britain responding militarily to Argentina's invasion gave credit to the notion that Greece should have responded militarily to the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974. This was not a policy the Greek government was willing to pursue given the potential detrimental effects on the Greek economy and the remaining part of Cyprus under Greek control. This meant that when the conflict escalated it became difficult for Greece to maintain its support for the UK. Following the sinking of the *Belgrano* and *HMS Sheffield*, Greece called on all parties to call a cease fire and renew attempts for a 'peaceful resolution to the problem, as the continuation of the undeclared war might have caused great suffering and unpredictable international complications.'<sup>114</sup> Greece also had significant interests in the Non-Aligned Movement which had generally supported the Argentine cause.<sup>115</sup> The NAM was dismayed at Britain's handling of the crisis and 22 members tabled the November 1982 resolution at the UNGA calling for both Argentina and Britain to return to negotiations. Greece was the only European country that voted in favour of the resolution as it attempted to assimilate itself with the other NAM nations.<sup>116</sup> Although Greece shifted its vote to be in line with most other EEC countries in 1983 and 1984 in abstaining, the years after highlighted the importance of Cyprus on Greece's thinking regarding the Falklands dispute. Following the fall of the Junta, there was a growing sympathy in Greece for the Argentine people. The conflict became to be seen 'as in the case of Cyprus in 1974, as the folly of an unpopular regime for which the civilian population had paid a high price.'<sup>117</sup> These years saw an improvement in relations between Greece and Argentina which saw the Greeks distance themselves from the British position on the sovereignty of the islands.<sup>118</sup> Towards the end of 1984, Greece began working with Argentina in the 'Initiative of Six', an attempt by six NAM prime ministers to ease east-west tensions. This working relationship meant that Greece no longer supported the British in the dispute and took the lead from France in voting for the 1985 UNGA resolution calling for negotiations over the sovereignty of the

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<sup>113</sup> *To Vema*, 7 April 1982.

<sup>114</sup> *Kathimerini*, 7 May 1982.

<sup>115</sup> On 14 May 1982, Fidel Castro wrote to all the members of the NAM encouraging them to support Argentina in the crisis, '[t]his was a colonial war about to reach its most painful and criminal stage... which the imperialist powers are trying to turn into a lesson for all third world countries.' Fidel Castro to the NAM, 14 May 1982, FCO 99/1108.

<sup>116</sup> FCO communication on Greece and the Falklands, 19 Feb 1985, FCO 7/6359.

<sup>117</sup> Tsakaloyannis and Bourantonis, 'The Converging National Reactions (II): The Smaller States – Belgium, the Netherlands and Greece', 96

<sup>118</sup> FCO communication on Greece and the Falklands, 19 Feb 1985, FCO 7/6359.

islands.<sup>119</sup> As with the other countries addressed in this section, Greek support for Britain during the conflict was motivated by its own foreign policy goals. After the conflict, the effect of the dispute on Greek's policy aims changed and as such so did the nature of Greek support for Britain. Such was the change that despite the fact that Greece had supported Britain on self-determination in 1982, by 1984, the Greek government sought to distance itself from the principle of self-determination with regard to the Falkland islanders.

The governments analysed in this section all offered some support to Britain during the crisis yet the nature of that support had limits. As such, when the similar themes evident in the responses of these countries are discussed it becomes clear that neither the islands themselves, nor the issue of self-determination, were of real importance. Each had its own wider foreign policy considerations at heart. For some, displaying EEC solidarity was of prime importance. It was a chance to display the effectiveness of EPC whilst also advancing their own influence in global affairs. British reluctance to reciprocate that solidarity did more damage in gaining support for British policy on the sovereignty issue amongst EEC nations than any other factor. However, there were also individual national considerations at play. Nations used the dispute as a leverage to grow close to Britain or Latin America at different points throughout the crisis and when nations perceived it better to be support Argentina, Britain was accused of being intransigent and acting outside of EEC interest. Further, when nations had more vested interests in Latin America or Argentina, they were happy to distance themselves from the British stance on the sovereignty dispute. Although a fellow EEC member had been offended in act of aggression by a non-community member, individual nations' primary objective in the dispute was always to protect their own interests even at the expense of Britain's position in the dispute.

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<sup>119</sup> *Ibid.*

#### 4.5. 'We must not let new problems crowd our anxiety about old ones'<sup>120</sup>

Not every European country supported Britain diplomatically through the conflict but often the themes in the receptions of the crisis among nations who did not support Britain mirrored the themes in the receptions of those that had supported Britain. Ultimately, the issues of self-determination or decolonisation mattered little unless it had a direct impact on the individual policy goals of nations.

##### 4.5.1. Ireland

It was Ireland, the closest country, which caused most difficulty for the British in their attempts to gain support for their stance on the crisis. A number of factors within the political context shaped Ireland's reaction to the crisis. Charles Haughey had returned to the office of Taoiseach in March 1982, replacing Garret FitzGerald. Whereas FitzGerald had been more open to dialogue with London, Haughey had built his political career on strong rhetoric opposed to British rule in Northern Ireland and was anti-British in his outlook. This had often led him into difficulties with his British counterparts. Despite a brief thawing of tension in Anglo-Irish relations after the December 1980 Anglo-Irish summit, the republican prisoner hunger strikes in March 1981 saw relations between the two islands deteriorate again. In April 1982, Haughey criticised the British government's plan to establish a new constituent assembly for Northern Ireland.<sup>121</sup> Thus at the outbreak of the conflict, relations between Britain and Ireland were most likely at their lowest point for ten years.<sup>122</sup> In addition, since the Second World War, Ireland had maintained a neutral stance in global conflict. Neutrality was in part an affirmation of Irish independence from the United Kingdom.<sup>123</sup> This caused some difficulty for Ireland in becoming a member of NATO and fully integrating into the western alliance.<sup>124</sup> NATO had been formed in the most part to protect western interests from Soviet influence and was a military alliance firmly grounded in its opposition to communist ideals. A neutral standpoint seemed contrasting to this union. Further, historically, Ireland had good relations with Argentina with the only Irish embassy

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<sup>120</sup> Margaret Thatcher letter to Lord Lowry, 16 April 1982, THCR 3/2/88 f69.

<sup>121</sup> Robert Armstrong to FCO, 6 April 1982, PREM 19/1070 f273.

<sup>122</sup> Ben Tonra, 'The Internal Dissenter (II): Ireland,' *Domestic Sources*, 135.

<sup>123</sup> *Ibid*, 136.

<sup>124</sup> See Ronan Fanning, 'The United States and Irish Participation in NATO: The debate of 1950,' *Irish Studies in International Affairs* 1, no. 1 (1979): 38-48.

in Latin America in Buenos Aires. Through the 1960s, the Irish government had maintained a stance that was in favour of negotiation over the sovereignty of the islands voting in favour of the sovereignty negotiations in 1965.<sup>125</sup> Although the Irish government had distanced itself from support for the Junta as a result of its poor human rights record, the crisis came at a time when relations between the UK and Ireland were strained and importantly at a time when Ireland was engaged in its own sovereignty dispute with Britain.<sup>126</sup> These factors proved crucial in shaping Irish policy towards the crisis.

At the outbreak of the crisis, as Ireland held a seat on the Security Council, Irish opposition would have proved highly problematic for Britain, however, the need to condemn the use of violence by Argentina meant that Irish opposition to Britain was limited. On 2 April 1982, Ireland's ambassador to the UN, Noel Dorr, condemned the Argentine use of force but stressed that Ireland took no stance on the sovereignty issue.<sup>127</sup> This was unsurprising given that support either for self-determination or military solutions to ongoing sovereignty disputes would be problematic to Ireland's ongoing disputes over Northern Ireland. Foreign Minister Gerry Collins when contributing to the joint statement issued by the Ten, also condemned Argentina's action.<sup>128</sup> However, despite minimal economic interest in Argentina, Ireland were hesitant to support sanctions. The *Irish Times* reported that many ministers in Dublin felt that the measures would be counter-productive and stated that Haughey was 'in particular' opposed to sanctions.<sup>129</sup> This was followed by rumours that Dorr had condemned Argentina's actions without the authority of the Department of Foreign Affairs. An editorial in the *Sunday Independent* felt '[t]he Taoiseach considers that by Mr Dorr's ready support of the British claim to overlordship of the Falklands the Irish government may in future be inhibited in their dealings with the British in their government to government drive for Irish unity.'<sup>130</sup> It is difficult to ascertain the accuracy of the *Sunday Independent's* source for this statement and as the paper had printed several anti-British editorials before over the issue of Northern Ireland, it is unsurprising that the paper would print an editorial criticising Britain on a sovereignty issue. However, the hesitancy of Ireland's support for sanctions when so many other EEC nations had supported sanctions,

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<sup>125</sup> UN Resolution 2065, 16 December 1965.

<sup>126</sup> Ben Tonra, 'The Internal Dissenter (II),' 138.

<sup>127</sup> Parsons, 'Falklands at the UN,' 171.

<sup>128</sup> FCO Telegram to UKE Brussels, 9 April 1982, FCO 7/4590.

<sup>129</sup> *Irish Times*, 7 April; and 14 April 1982.

<sup>130</sup> *Sunday Independent*, 11 April 1982.

alongside the known anti-British stance of Haughey, indicates that there was likely motivation among the Irish government to undermine Britain whilst protecting their own aims in Northern Ireland. It was for this incoherency between Irish politicians that O'Neill has labelled Irish Falklands policy as 'counter-productive and conceivably dangerous'.<sup>131</sup> Such inconsistency in the statements from different Irish government officials had the potential to weaken Ireland's position in the EEC as it meant it was difficult for other nations to trust the word of Ireland's EEC representatives. The Department of Foreign Affairs later denied the claims that the Taoiseach was not aware of Dorr's actions, however, such articles displayed that elements of the popular press in Ireland drew similarities between the British presence in the Falklands to British rule in Northern Ireland.<sup>132</sup> The use of the term 'overlordship' was particularly pertinent in this article. Such terminology shows how the Falkland Islands and Northern Ireland issues were linked in the Irish media response to the outbreak of the crisis and is an important element in Kelly's determination that Haughey was motivated by his 'anglophobia' in directing Ireland's policy towards the crisis.<sup>133</sup> As a small British territory with a majority population that wished to remain British, next to a hostile neighbour, those links between the Falklands and Northern Ireland were evident. Any British success in the Falklands crisis could have potentially led to a strengthening of British resolve in Northern Ireland, a prospect not favourable to Dublin's wider policy objectives.<sup>134</sup>

Similar to France, Ireland too took the opportunity to press the claim that support shown by EEC nations for Britain with regards to the crisis should be reciprocated by Britain compromising on CAP price increases an important element of the Irish economy. The two issues were linked extensively by Haughey and the Irish press.<sup>135</sup> Britain's reluctance to agree to a compromise on CAP price increases was followed by a marked reduction in Irish support for sanctions seen during the 14 May vote to renew sanctions in the European Parliament.<sup>136</sup> Irish MEP Thomas Maher commented on his 'amazement at the meekness of the Irish government' in agreeing to sanctions in early April without any guarantee from Britain over the farm price increase.<sup>137</sup> Throughout the period of the conflict, this is evidence

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<sup>131</sup> O'Neill, 'A Failure of Statesmanship,' 179.

<sup>132</sup> A full retraction was published in the *Irish Independent*, 18 April 1982.

<sup>133</sup> Kelly, 'An Opportunistic Anglophobe,' 1.

<sup>134</sup> Falklands/Northern Ireland: Pattison minute for Coles, 5 April 1982, PREM 19/815 f45.

<sup>135</sup> For example 'Hopes of Farm Deal as we back British' *Irish Independent*, 21 April 1982: and Haughey interview published in *The Irish Times*, 14 May 1982.

<sup>136</sup> *The Official Journal of the European Communities*, C149, 14 June 1982.

<sup>137</sup> Cited in Tonra, 'The Internal Dissenter (II),' 138.



that Ireland was balancing its commitment to the EEC with its own policy objectives but giving precedence to its immediate policy goals which were directed towards gaining a firmer say in the rule of Northern Ireland and settling the CAP farm price increase problem. Ireland's reluctance to continue sanctions was detrimental to British objectives in the crisis and created difficulty for HMG in ensuring that the EEC was able to place pressure on Argentina economically as well as the USA to come out in support of the UK. Where other European governments had perhaps placed more emphasis on the importance of European solidarity in their support for Britain, the Irish government and press were much more vocal in the link between the crisis and other issues, ensuring that any Irish policy on the crisis protected Ireland's wider policy interests.

The importance of Ireland's own policy goals was made clearer when the diplomatic crisis turned into a full-blown conflict with the sinking of the *Belgrano* sparking a more overt anti-British stance from Irish ministers. On 23 April, Irish MEP Síle de Valera commented that 'the influence of Britain and her supporters among the other member states [of the EEC] has affected our [Ireland's] objectivity in the Falklands matter and eroded our neutral stance' highlighting a growing dissatisfaction on continued EEC support for Britain.<sup>138</sup> The UK action to retake South Georgia on 25-26 April, only strengthened these feelings with Haughey commenting in the Irish Parliament that the escalation of the crisis meant that 'Ireland would seek the withdrawal of sanctions against Argentina.'<sup>139</sup> This was despite the fact that South Georgia was retaken with minimal military engagement and no loss of life. Yet Haughey was attempting to use this early opportunity to show Britain as an aggressor in the conflict and the withdrawal of Irish support. The Irish press supported Haughey's statement by commenting that this UK action meant that a change of policy from Ireland was required.<sup>140</sup> This is again unsurprising given that the Irish press had traditionally opposed Britain on the matter of Northern Ireland and so would not seek to support the UK on another matter of sovereignty such as the Falkland Islands. This was followed by a government statement on 2 May 1982: 'from the outset of the Falklands crisis the policy of the Irish government, both at the United Nations and within the EEC, has been directed at preventing a wider conflict and promoting a negotiated honourable settlement by diplomatic means ... The government wish to reaffirm Ireland's traditional role of neutrality in relation

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<sup>138</sup> *The Irish Times*, 23 April 1982.

<sup>139</sup> UKE Dublin to FCO, 4 May 1982, PREM 19/624 f181.

<sup>140</sup> *Irish Independent*, 26 April 1982; the *Irish Times*, 30 April 1982.

to armed conflicts.’<sup>141</sup> When news broke of the UK attack on the *Belgrano* later that evening, the Irish government further limited its support for Britain in the conflict whilst taking the opportunity to promote their own position in Northern Ireland. Minister of Defence, Paddy Power, created tension between Dublin and London when he spoke within hours of the news breaking of the *Belgrano*’s sinking. He claimed that Britain was ‘now very much the aggressor’ acting like a ‘hit and run driver’ at sea, citing that only two weeks prior, the British Ambassador in Dublin had admitted that a Royal Navy submarine had sunk a Irish fishing trawler. Power also assured that Ireland would look to formally assert its neutrality. Power’s remarks were widely reported in both Ireland and the UK on 4 May just before the news of the sinking of HMS *Sheffield* became widely known.<sup>142</sup> The UK Ambassador to Ireland, Leonard Figg, thought this somewhat coincidental timing was detrimental to Anglo-Irish relations.<sup>143</sup> Although Haughey tried to distance the formal Irish stance on the issue from Power’s comments, it did little to dampen British anger.<sup>144</sup> Power’s comments undermined the British position in the crisis which always asserted that the UK was acting out of self-defence. The defence minister of a fellow EEC member had claimed Britain was now the aggressor in the conflict when the notion that the Argentinians were the aggressors was the justification for the British military response. It is likely that Power would have known the implications of his comments and so highlights that Power was acting in pursuit of individual policy objectives. Another Irish government statement was issued on 4 May calling for an ‘immediate cessation of hostilities’ without any mention of an Argentine withdrawal from the islands, again giving a very anti-British sentiment to the Irish position. It was not just in Britain where Irish attitudes caused frustration but also at the UN where it was felt Ireland’s demands for an immediate meeting of the Security Council may scupper the latest peace attempts. Many other EEC member states saw Ireland as breaking with EPC and European solidarity especially as no Irish ministers had consulted with the EEC before the statement was released.<sup>145</sup> Under pressure from both opposition parties and the UN, Haughey backtracked on much of the May 4 statement but it was already clear that domestic and Falklands policy was linked for the Irish government.

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<sup>141</sup> UKE Dublin despatch, 4 May 1982, PREM 19/624 f181.

<sup>142</sup> *Irish Press*, 4 May 1982.

<sup>143</sup> UKE Dublin despatch, 22 June 1982, PREM 19/815.

<sup>144</sup> *The Irish Times*, 2 June 1982.

<sup>145</sup> UKE Dublin despatch, 22 June 1982, PREM 19/815.

The debates on the crisis conducted in the Dáil also asserted that the Irish parliament desired to assert Ireland's neutral stance in politics to protect its wider policy interests. Irish MPs were concerned that Ireland's support for sanctions broke neutrality and were keen to hear how the Irish government would ensure that neutrality was maintained. In a debate on the crisis on 11 May, Haughey referenced the importance of neutrality and recommended that the EEC adopt a similar stance, '[t]he Community has no role in the military sphere, and it would be better for European unity and solidarity if it were not seen to take actions supportive of or complimentary to military action.'<sup>146</sup> Pressing for the EEC to take no role in the military sphere also aided Ireland's interests in Northern Ireland indicating that the EEC should not support a member using military force to assert control over a region such as Ireland had argued Britain was doing in Northern Ireland. Among Ireland's major newspapers pressing Irish neutrality was popular. The *Sunday Independent* commented '[p]articipation in the embargo has seriously compromised our neutrality and thankfully Mr Haughey has recognized that danger. His remarks on the matter ... must be supported by all ... so too should our peace efforts and the United Nations.'<sup>147</sup> This continued the position the media had taken in the Northern Irish troubles, asserting that Ireland should remain neutral on the matter of violence, and undermined Britain's position in the dispute over sovereignty in Northern Ireland. The neutral stance was also welcomed by the peace group Irish Sovereignty movement, which had been vocal in its opposition to EPC. This played well into the hands of Haughey, who was seen by the British to be in control of Irish foreign policy.<sup>148</sup> The matter was further complicated by opinion polls suggesting that the current Irish government was unpopular among the Irish electorate.<sup>149</sup> Haughey's administration faced an uncertain future. Portraying the issue as British military action to forcibly restore colonial control resonated well with the Northern Ireland conflict and had the side benefit of distracting the Irish population from the worsening Irish economy.<sup>150</sup> In this sense, Haughey's ultimate aim was not to assert Ireland's neutrality but to undermine the British position on the conflict to press Ireland's own policy with regards to Northern Ireland, with the ultimate benefit of improving his own position in power.

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<sup>146</sup> *Dáil Reports* 334, 798-819, 11 May 1982.

<sup>147</sup> *Sunday Independent*, 9 May 1982.

<sup>148</sup> UKE Dublin despatch, 22 June 1982, PREM 19/815.

<sup>149</sup> Ben Tonra, 'The Internal Dissenter (II),' 140.

<sup>150</sup> UKE Dublin telegram to FCO, 26 May 1982, PREM 19/1070 f268.

Although, Haughey went to great lengths to deny any anti-British sentiment in Irish policy, the actions of his administration in the final few weeks of the conflict only served to worsen Anglo-Irish relations. Although Ireland maintained EEC sanctions until the renewal date, it, along with Italy, opted out of renewing sanctions any further and lifted sanctions against Argentina on 17 May. Following the failure of the UN Secretary General's peace attempts on the day British forces landed on the Falklands, Ireland renewed its call for an urgent meeting of the Security Council and also worked with the NAM members of the council to produce a new initiative. The first draft of this initiative called for a 72 hour ceasefire and for the UN Secretary General to take up a new mission to find a peaceful conclusion to the conflict. A 'senior British official' was quoted in the *New York Times* calling this draft 'a wolf in sheep's clothing' and the 'unacceptable consequences of the sloppiest thinking around here in a long time.'<sup>151</sup> There was a definitive stance in Britain that the policy had been made to undermine Britain's position in the conflict and such comments by British officials in newspapers highlights that they desired to convince other governments of the same in the hope of reducing support for the Irish draft resolution. Eventually a final draft was tabled which dropped the call for a ceasefire and was unanimously accepted by the Security Council members.<sup>152</sup> However, the Irish government made a statement through Dorr which questioned the likely effectiveness of this resolution without a ceasefire and questioned Britain's commitment finding a peaceful solution by saying 'if they want to fight to a finish, so be it ... Ireland will continue to believe that it was at least right to have tried.'<sup>153</sup> Although Ireland had eventually accepted the adopted resolution, the Irish government still desired to highlight wrongdoing on the part of the British in not displaying willingness to bring the conflict to a swift conclusion. Ireland continued to highlight Britain's supposed 'desire' to use violence and as such attempt to undermine support for Britain in the UN and EEC.

Ireland's policy regarding the conflict had not been well received by opposing parties in the Dáil and these views led to a change of policy when Garret FitzGerald replaced Haughey as Taoiseach in December 1982. FitzGerald had been particularly vocal about how nationalist views had too much influence on policy during the conflict which had led to the

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<sup>151</sup> *New York Times*, 25 May 1982 – the source was later identified to be the British Deputy Ambassador to the UN.

<sup>152</sup> UNSCR 505 was adopted on 25 May 1982.

<sup>153</sup> *Irish Times*, 26 May 1982.

‘ham-fisted handling of the affair motivated by a desire to achieve temporary popularity at home, at the expense of our [Ireland’s] international credibility.’<sup>154</sup> The British had made the Irish government aware of the damage that the period had done to Anglo-Irish relations and FitzGerald sought to repair that.<sup>155</sup> In this way, his administration used Ireland’s traditional commitment to neutrality to abstain on the subsequent UNGA resolutions on the islands. In such, he avoided any further conflict with Britain over the issue as well as showed Ireland’s reliability as a partner in EPC. This was something that the British government were aware of and actually kept confidence in Ireland maintaining its abstention, meaning the UK could focus its efforts on gathering support for its position on the dispute among other EEC nations.<sup>156</sup> However, in this sense, Irish policy on the conflict was still dictated by external considerations. The islands or the sovereignty issue were of no great consequence to the Irish government, rather it was how the issue could be used to pursue other domestic and foreign policy considerations. The change in policy from the FitzGerald government was dictated by a differing perspective on how best to assert Ireland’s influence globally and as such succeed in obtaining its policy aims. It was not motivated by any differing views on the issues involved in the crisis which were of little importance to both the Haughey and FitzGerald administrations.

#### **4.5.2. Spain**

The Spanish response to the conflict is important to consider as Spain was a place where the issue of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands was of some importance given its possible implications on Spanish claims to Gibraltar. The Spanish government made decolonisation the central issue in its response to the outbreak of the conflict. On 2 April, the Spanish Council of Ministers issued an official note supporting Argentina’s territorial claims to the islands and cited the fact that the dispute ‘had gone unresolved for so long’ had led to the outbreak of violence, echoing frustration Spain had with Britain over the ongoing dispute over Gibraltar.<sup>157</sup> This was then reinforced at the UN by the Spanish representative, Jaime

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<sup>154</sup> *Dáil Reports* 334, 1424-34, 18 May 1982.

<sup>155</sup> UKE Dublin despatch, 22 June 1982, PREM 19/815.

<sup>156</sup> FitzGerald to Thatcher, 22 October 1984, THCR 3/1/41, f55.

<sup>157</sup> UKE Madrid telegram to FCO, 23 April 1982, PREM 19/1976 f200.

de Piniés, who abstained from the vote on UNSCR 502.<sup>158</sup> Spain's foreign minister, José Pedro Pérez-Llorca, refused to participate in the European embargo on 14 April 1982 claiming 'it was a serious error of the Community not to have sufficiently assessed the full depth of Argentina's national claims'.<sup>159</sup> In doing so Pérez-Llorca was urging the EEC to evaluate claims to the territory before deciding any on any action. This supported Spain's policy aims over Gibraltar as it would have forced EEC nations to consider Britain's retention of other territories and perhaps boost support for Spain's claim to Gibraltar. Prime Minister Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo took the opportunity of Spain's membership of NATO to make reference to Spain's Latin American persuasion and the rift that the crisis was creating.<sup>160</sup> However, throughout, Spain underlined their commitment to no further escalation of the conflict, an important aspect of the Spanish position on the crisis given the potential implications on its own claims to Gibraltar. Spain wanted to press international consideration of Britain's retention of overseas territories but at the same time did not want to increase the pressure on Spain to seek a military solution to assert its claim over Gibraltar.

In this atmosphere, there were some limited concerns in the British government that the crisis may encourage similar Spanish action over the on-going territorial dispute regarding Gibraltar.<sup>161</sup> As Argentine public opinion was sensitive to the issue of the sovereignty of the Falklands, so too was Spanish public opinion over the sovereignty of Gibraltar. However, in this arena, Spanish policy was also heavily influenced by a number of other external factors, the main one being that there had been positive progression on a resolution with Britain over Gibraltar earlier in 1982. At a meeting that January, Thatcher and Calvo-Sotelo had agreed to begin negotiations on April 20 regarding Gibraltar. In an attempt to save these negotiations, Calvo-Sotelo attempted on 3 April to separate the issues of Gibraltar and the Falkland Islands.<sup>162</sup> On 9 April, Spain requested that these talks be delayed, recognising that it was not the best time to broach the subject of sovereignty with the British. This was particularly potent given that the Argentine military action had seen Britain become much less amenable to the prospect of negotiation with Argentina. Spain

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<sup>158</sup> Pablo Antonio Fernández Sánchez, 'La crisis de las Malvinas ante las Naciones Unidas,' *Revista de Estudios Internacionales* 5, no. 4 (1984) 933.

<sup>159</sup> José Pedro Pérez-Llorca, 'Intervención del Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores ante la Comisión de Asuntos Exteriores del Congreso sobre el problema de las Malvinas,' 126.

<sup>160</sup> Pym minute to Thatcher, 5 June 1982, PREM 19/770 f130.

<sup>161</sup> FCO letter to No. 10, 8 April 1982, PREM 19/770 f154.

<sup>162</sup> D.S. Morris and R.H. Haigh, *Britain, Spain and Gibraltar 1945-90: The Eternal Triangle* (London: Routledge, 1992), 110.

desired to protect the current position it had with Britain over Gibraltar and ensure that Britain would engage in negotiation. Further, the Argentine aggression had seen sympathy erode for the Junta regarding the Falklands dispute. Spain wished to maintain the sympathy it had on the Gibraltar issue by displaying itself as strongly pushing for the handover of sovereignty of Gibraltar but only doing so through legal and peaceful means. Following the escalation of the conflict in May, Spain sought to integrate itself into the peace process. This included offering itself as a mediator on behalf of the Argentinians to the British, as well as supporting the numerous other peace initiatives attempted by other nations including co-sponsoring a draft resolution forwarded by Panama on 2 June calling for a ceasefire.<sup>163</sup> Pérez Llorca explained Spain's position during the conflict as being 'to a large extent ... the avoidance of a tragic break in relations between its European and Latin American links.'<sup>164</sup> This was very similar to the US position as both nations were attempting to protect their interests in Latin America as well as Europe. There were significant political gains to be made by Spain. A successful and peaceful resolution in the Falklands dispute could facilitate a similar solution to the Gibraltar issue. Spain would also be able to display itself as a valuable link between Europe and Latin America which would increase Spain's value to NATO and the EEC. This was important as at the time of the crisis as Spain was launching bids to join both. This was a view shared by other political parties in Spain which criticised the government's initial response supporting the Argentine claim to the islands as being potentially detrimental to wider Spanish policy objectives. The Spanish Socialist Party, for example, advocated an 'equidistant' position between both sides in the crisis. This was the view shared by much of the Spanish press that whilst rejoicing in Argentina's reclaim of the Falklands simultaneously opposed similar action over Gibraltar encouraging the government to continue with the negotiations with Britain on the matter.<sup>165</sup>

After 1982, Spanish policy towards the Falklands was influenced by Spain's application to join the EEC. Whilst it was evident that Spain needed British support in joining the EEC given the reservations of other member states, the crisis had also displayed Spain's inability to act as a bridge between Europe and Latin America. As previously noted, the Spanish government had hoped to use the crisis to show its value to the EEC as a link to

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<sup>163</sup> UKE Washington to FCO, 3 May 1982, PREM 19/624. The draft resolution was vetoed by the UK.

<sup>164</sup> Pérez Llorca, 'Intervención del Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores ante la Comisión de Asuntos Exteriores del Congreso sobre el problema de las Malvinas', 129.

<sup>165</sup> See Esther Barbé, 'The External Dissenter: Spain' in *Domestic Sources*, 158-162.

Latin America. As such, the years 1982-84 saw Spain foster a closer relationship with Argentina whilst also attempting to maintain a close relationship with Britain. Statements by new Spanish Foreign Minister, Fernando Morán, in the UNGA in 1983-1984 made reference to the decolonisation of the islands but the Hispano-Argentine joint declaration signed in June 1984 during President Alfonsín's visit to Madrid ratified the position of the two countries:

Spain and Argentina, victims of an anachronic colonial situation, support their respective claims of sovereignty on the Falkland Islands and Gibraltar in order to restore the integrity of their national territories through peaceful means, conforming with the pertinent resolutions of the United Nations.<sup>166</sup>

This statement aided Spanish policy in that it gained the support of Argentina on the issue of Gibraltar whilst simultaneously asserting that the country would only seek that objective through peaceful means ensuring that sympathy for their position was maintained. Galician President Fernando González struck a good accord with Alfonsín which resulted in several trips to Latin America. However, the links between Falkland Islands and Gibraltar issues in Spanish rhetoric decreased following the signing of the Brussels Agreement between Spain and the UK in December 1984.<sup>167</sup> In doing so, Spain secured Britain's support for its application to join the EEC which was successfully obtained in 1986.<sup>168</sup> Spain did not change its stance on the decolonisation of the islands and continued to vote in favour of the UNGA resolutions from 1982 to 1988 as decolonisation still formed the basis of Spain's claim to Gibraltar. The decolonisation issue was particularly important to King Juan Carlos I who gave the issue a lot of importance on his visit to Argentina in 1985 but for Spain the separation of Gibraltar and the Falklands disputes after 1985 meant the crisis 'became a symbolic gesture at the United Nations.'<sup>169</sup> Spain continued to represent Argentina's interest in Europe and in this role voiced its disapproval to Britain establishing a 150 mile exclusion

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<sup>166</sup> *Ibid*, 166.

<sup>167</sup> Under this agreement Spain and the UK agreed to hold talks over Gibraltar including over the issue of sovereignty and saw the establishment of the free movements of persons, vehicles and goods between Spain and Gibraltar as well as the provision of equality and reciprocity of rights for Spaniards in Gibraltar and Gibraltarians in Spain.

<sup>168</sup> Policy towards Gibraltar: discussions with Spanish under Lisbon and Brussels Agreements, 6 April 1984 – 24 Oct 1985, PREM 19/1766.

<sup>169</sup> Esther Barbé, 'The External Dissenter,' 166.



zone around the islands in 1986 but did not follow this with any action nor did it raise any objection when the UK began issuing fishing licences for the South Atlantic. After 1986, Spain's diplomatic objectives regards to the Falklands dispute had been achieved and so there was no further need to pursue the issue. This highlighted that although Spain shared objections with Argentina over Britain's rule of overseas territories, the matter of the Falkland Islands only assumed importance for the Spanish given its direct implication on a policy aim. Spain avoided mention of the issue of self-determination almost entirely knowing that support for the issue would be detrimental to its claims to Gibraltar. However, openly rejecting the notion of self-determination would have risked negotiations with Britain over Gibraltar where positive progress had been made as well as threatened Spain's application to join the EEC through being in opposition to an EEC member. As such, even for a nation who had similarly been offended by British sovereignty of an overseas territory, the Falkland crisis only took on an assumed importance with limitations to how far Spain would go to condemn Britain.

#### 4.5.3. *Italy*

The Italian reaction to the crisis was embedded in the unstable nature of Italian politics meaning that the party in power in Rome was dependent upon the large Italian voting population resident in Argentina. Italy had strong cultural links with Argentina fostered through large levels of Italian migration to South America but more important was the approximate 1.3m Italian citizens who lived in Argentina and were eligible to vote in Italian elections. Italy also had significant economic interest in Argentina with US\$341m invested in Argentina by the turn of 1982, second only to the United States. This had partly been down to a cooperation agreement between the two countries that had launched in 1977 mainly through Argentine associates of leading Italian businesses.<sup>170</sup> In contrast, Anglo-Italian relations had been sour since the end of the Second World War with Britain questioning the reliability of Italy in a western alliance. In the immediate aftermath of 1945, the British had wanted 'to teach Italy a lesson' by reducing its role in the Mediterranean and pressuring Italy to support British policies over those of Italian interests.<sup>171</sup> With the

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<sup>170</sup> Figures quoted in Domitillia Savignoni, 'The Internal Dissenter (I): Italy,' in *Domestic Sources*, 118.

<sup>171</sup> *Ibid*, 119.

formation of the Atlantic Alliance and the Atlantic pact, it was France that strove to bring in Italy so as to broaden the Alliance to the Mediterranean. Britain opposed Italy's membership.<sup>172</sup> In July 1981, the British FCO had offended their Italian counterparts in excluding them from talks on a European solution to the Afghanistan crisis.<sup>173</sup> Given the unstable nature of Italian politics, it was important to the government in Rome that the interests of the significant group of Italian voters in Argentina was considered and that it was seen to be asserting influence in Europe. That being said, there was also an awareness from elements within the Italian government that gaining the acceptance of Britain was important to assimilate Italy further into the EEC and the western alliance. As such, the Italian government could not outright undermine British efforts in the crisis but had to balance the need to support Britain with its significant interests in Argentina. Although, ultimately, interests in Argentina saw Italian support for sanctions erode, the need to support Britain tapered the Italian reactions to the crisis.

The five-party coalition that governed Italy from June 1981 to December 1982 was divided in its views on the conflict which made the position of pro-European Prime Minister Giovanni Spadolini difficult. At the outset of the crisis, Spadolini had supported the joint European sanctions against Argentina. In doing so, he was able to further assimilate Italy into the EEC whilst simultaneously highlighting to Argentina based Italian voters that the sanctions were European based and not unilaterally imposed by Italy. Whereas publicly, Spadolini spoke with sympathy for Argentina, he continued to convey Italian support for European initiatives to fellow EEC members as he attempted to balance the two competing interests of Italian foreign policy.<sup>174</sup> The Christian Democrats and the Socialist Party were both against what they perceived to be Britain's exaggerated reaction to the crisis and the Socialist Party threatened to leave the coalition and bring down the government if sanctions were renewed beyond 16 May 1982. They emphasised the 'absurd character' of this war of 'false pride, anachronistic national passion, and cultural intolerance.'<sup>175</sup> These views were reinforced by the Communist Party, the largest party in opposition, which referred to the

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<sup>172</sup> For a fuller discussion on Anglo-Italian relations after the Second World War see Martin Folly, 'Britain and the Issue of Italian Membership of NATO, 1948-49,' *Review of International Studies* 13, no. 3 (July 1987): 177-196.

<sup>173</sup> Domitilla Savignoni, 'The Internal Dissenter (I),' 119.

<sup>174</sup> UKE Rome to FCO, 7 April 1982, FCO7/4590 f83.

<sup>175</sup> A. Labriola, *Atti Parlamentari*, Camera, 'Resoconti', 11 May 1982, 56.

‘Tory bloody-mindedness’ of the UK government in its actions.<sup>176</sup> Although these viewpoints may seem based on views on the use of force, there was significant political gain to be made from undermining Spadolini. The leftist parties in Italy had strong connections with the Soviet Union and were not in favour of Italy being part of a western European alliance. The upcoming June 1983 parliamentary elections added significance to the Italian voters living in Argentina, with parties vying for the support of voters in an attempt to gain primacy within the coalition. Under this increasing domestic pressure, Italian Foreign Minister Emilio Colombo informed his European counterparts that Italy could not renew sanctions on 16 May 1982, invoking the Luxembourg principle to allow Italy to reopen full trade with Argentina. However, he did emphasise that the Italian government still stood in condemnation of Argentina’s armed aggression of the islands attempting to highlight that Italy still stood with other European countries on some of the issues emanating from the crisis.<sup>177</sup> Although there were competing views from within the Italian coalition government, it is clear still that none of the countries placed great importance to either sides’ sovereignty claim or the matter of self-determination. Rather, the competing views on policy towards the crisis emanated from each sides attempts to win over voters ahead of the Italian elections. Whereas Spadolini desired to protect Italy’s interests in Europe, competing parties wished to undermine the government and win favour among Argentina-based voters and Italian businesses with strong links to Argentina.

Despite the difficulties that the Italian government faced in its domestic situation, it looked to take an active role in the peace process both during and after the conflict highlighting the importance to Italian ministers of advancing Italy’s influence among the western nations. The majority of the Italian press, although questioning the validity of Britain’s sovereignty claim, did agree with the condemnation of the Argentine attack. This gave backing to Colombo to pursue initiatives that would give Italy a predominant role in reconciling the two sides in the conflict. Colombo offered his support to both Haig’s and the UN’s peace efforts even suggesting that both sides freeze the sovereignty question to allow for the withdrawal of military forces.<sup>178</sup> When the conflict reached its conclusion, Colombo sought to display to Britain the value of Italy in a western union by attempting to facilitate

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<sup>176</sup> Cited in Domitillia Savignoni, ‘The Internal Dissenter (I),’ 123.

<sup>177</sup> No.10 record of telephone conversation (Thatcher-Italian Foreign Minister Colombo), 16 May 1982, PREM 19/628 f19.

<sup>178</sup> E. Colombo, *Atti Parlamentari*, Camera, ‘Resoconti’, 11 May 1982, 8-11.

the rebuilding of relations between Britain and Argentina. He travelled to Buenos Aires in August 1982 to advocate the possibility of a compromise between the new Argentine government and the UK.<sup>179</sup> In the UNGA resolutions on the Falkland Islands, Italy remained neutral, abstaining until 1985. In 1985, they voted in favour citing how the resolution pointed towards a ‘global’ solution to the issue and encouraged negotiation.<sup>180</sup> By emphasising the importance of a global solution, Colombo reinforced the idea that there was potential for other nations to play a role in finding a permanent solution to the dispute. This furthered previous initiatives where Italy had offered to play a role in re-establishing relations between Britain and Argentina. In January 1984, Italy had offered to act as a formal mediator in the dispute but this was turned down as Thatcher referred to the issue as a ‘British problem’.<sup>181</sup> Colombo used the dispute after 1982 to advance the notion that Italy could act as a bridge between Europe and Latin America, which would also advance Italian influence among western nations. This was the pre-eminent example of how the Italian government sought to use the dispute for its own political gain, regardless of either sides’ claims to sovereignty or feelings regarding self-determination. Italian reaction to the crisis and dispute was framed by other political considerations. The need to stabilise the domestic political situation took precedence but there were also considerations of fostering better relationships with European partners and protecting Italian business interests.

#### ***4.5.4. The Eastern Bloc***

The area of Europe this chapter has not covered is the eastern block of nations. This is due to a lack of English Language source covering the region as well as the sources that are available uncovering little remarkable about the response from eastern Europe. The Soviet Union and the other Communist states were almost entirely opposed to Britain’s action during the crisis and supported the Argentine claim to sovereignty over the islands. However, this was more in the hope that the conflict may undermine the strength of the western alliance and given the context of global politics in the 1980s is unsurprising. The Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko, predicted to the Yugoslavs that the Falklands

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<sup>179</sup> Colombo to Pym, 17 August 1982, FCO 33/5756 f53.

<sup>180</sup> Visit of Italian Prime Minister Background Brief on Bilateral Relations, 14 Feb 1985, FCO 7/6359 f32.

<sup>181</sup> UKE Rome to FCO, 26 January 1984, PREM 19/1295 f73.

would lead to a crisis of confidence in NATO.<sup>182</sup> It was known that the Soviets had hoped to use the conflict to gain headway in Latin America and made contact with the Argentines in attempts to undermine Haig's peace efforts and encouraged the OAS to exclude Canada and the USA from its talks, promising to use its veto at the UN to help Argentina.<sup>183</sup> However, the fact that the Soviet Union did not use its veto is indicative that the feeling in Moscow was that the crisis was of little relative importance to other issues and using the veto would have hurt Soviet interests elsewhere. The crisis did present the Warsaw Pact with significant propaganda opportunities. Not only could the issue be displayed as an imperialist power attempting to forcibly maintain control of its colonies, it also highlighted weaknesses in NATO. Thus, the Falkland Islands and who held sovereignty over them were of no concern to the east but the crisis' potential to undermine the western foothold in Latin America was considerable and so eastern bloc countries acted accordingly.

The reactions of those European nations that opposed Britain's actions during the conflict underline the same themes that were evident in the reactions of the countries which supported Britain. The islands themselves along with the issues of sovereignty and self-determination were all of little consideration. These governments acted in relation to wider political considerations that underlined their overall foreign policy objectives. In many of these instances, the Falklands dispute was used as an opportunity for governments to seek concessions from Britain or Argentina on other policy matters. Whereas some states did offer opinion on the principles and morals involved in Britain's response to the Argentine seizing of the islands, ultimately these were not of much consideration. Their relevance came from how the principles could influence other policy objectives. For Ireland and Spain these were their own claims in Northern Ireland and Gibraltar respectively whereas Italy had to protect its internal political situation. For these nations, the importance of the dispute came from how it could be used to advance more pertinent policy objectives.

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<sup>182</sup> Freedman, *TOHOTFC Volume II*, 499.

<sup>183</sup> *Ibid*, 512.

#### 4.6. Conclusions

The quote which opened this chapter was taken from the very first days of the conflict. Three years later, the UK government complained bitterly when the 1985 vote UN on the Falklands resolution resulted in a large number of EEC states turning against the British.<sup>184</sup> In her memoirs, Thatcher was rather dismissive of the European role, being highly critical of the Irish for making her job at the UN ever more difficult.<sup>185</sup> In the TV interviews that accompanied the publication of her memoirs, she was even more dismissive of her fellow European heads of government with the comment ‘appeasement is wrong’.<sup>186</sup> Thatcher did not feel governments of Europe were as supportive as they should have been particularly when compared with the actions taken by Commonwealth nations. This evolution of European reactions to the crisis between the years 1982 and 1990 highlights that there was no united European stance, whether that be through EPC or any other means. Rather, each nation’s reception of the crisis was undeniably affected by its domestic political climate and the need to pursue more pressing diplomatic concerns. These issues always took precedent over the wider interests of the community or the need to display European solidarity for those whose primary interests were not represented in European Political Cooperation. In addition, it highlighted the complex nature of inter-state European diplomacy; how one issue of little importance to one state could be manipulated to extract concessions from other governments.

For governments such as those of France and Germany, joint action by the governments of the EEC was a fundamental policy objective. The crisis presented a chance to highlight the effectiveness of a united European response to conflict at a time when governments of both nations were attempting to press the importance of EPC and advance European influence on global issues especially in the context of the security concerns presented by West Berlin. However, their other policy objectives countered their commitment to Britain. Mitterrand’s desire to form a close relationship with the Thatcher government was overshadowed by the desire of his foreign ministry to see Britain reciprocate the favour shown in the crisis by agreeing to compromise on disagreements in the EEC. When Britain refused, French sympathy for the British over the dispute decreased. Then following the end of the conflict, the government in Paris began to pursue a policy

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<sup>184</sup> Anglo/French talks on Latin America, 6 December 1985, FCO 7/6363 f177.

<sup>185</sup> Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years*, 191; 216-231.

<sup>186</sup> Interview on *BBC1*, 27 October 1993.

which protected French interests in Latin America as this better suited French policy objectives. Similarly Germany, once the conflict had concluded, almost immediately turned to rebuilding its reputation in South America and fostered a closer relationship with a democratic Argentina. It only maintained its abstention on votes in the UN out of the importance the federal government attached to displaying European solidarity. In this sense, support for Britain was superficial and the FRG placed pressure on Britain to enter negotiation with Argentina. Support for Britain was offered when it was of benefit to the most powerful European nations but when it was more beneficial to turn against Britain, there was little hesitation in doing so. This included when Britain sought to create a triangular alliance with France and West Germany in 1985. The Falklands dispute was included in these discussions as an area over which Britain could show some commitment to Europe by relenting on its stance on sovereignty. This way a partnership between Argentina and the EEC could come to fruition. Britain's unilateral lifting of sanctions against Argentina was partly due to pressure in this area.<sup>187</sup> Such an example highlights the nature of support offered to Britain during the conflict. It was only done so because it best suited French and West German interests to do so with little regard for the issue of self-determination of the islanders. When it better suited those nations to support Argentina, the pressure was placed on Britain to return the sentiment of European solidarity.

Similar themes are evident in the reactions of those nations that were more obstructive to Britain during the conflict. Although the principles and morals of the use of force were discussed, the most important issue for all of these states was how the crisis could be used to achieve more important policy goals. It was in Ireland and Spain that the conflict provoked the most passionate public response given its similarity to the then on-going disputes over Northern Ireland and Gibraltar. In terms of Gibraltar, the Spanish did request that European governments evaluate the Argentine claim to sovereignty before deciding on sanctions, displaying sympathy for the Argentine position. However, this was done while simultaneously rejecting the notion that a military solution could be used to solve the dispute over Gibraltar. Spain placed focus on British retention of overseas territories whilst also protecting the positive progress that had been made with Britain over Gibraltar. In Ireland, Charles Haughey had attempted to place focus on the British aggression in the South Atlantic, rejecting military force like that used by the British in Northern Ireland to subdue

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<sup>187</sup> FCO Planning paper on the UK/French/FRG relationship, 29 May 1985, F7/6363 f86.

republicans. Although the election of the FitzGerald administration saw a less anti-British tone from Ireland on the dispute this was only done as Fitzgerald believed it was more likely to make the British more amenable to negotiation over Northern Ireland. Both Spain and Ireland pursued policy lines that they felt would use the crisis to improve their domestic position and gain concessions on other issues. The fact the dispute was completely dropped from Spanish rhetoric, including in discussion on Gibraltar, after the signing of the Brussels Agreement is testament to this. The way the governments adapted their Falklands policy extensively in the period 1982-1990 to match on-going political need in their relations with Britain and Europe is further evidence that the matters of self-determination of the islands or who held sovereignty over the islands were of little consequence.

At the outset of the crisis, there was recognition from HMG that British officials would have to work to maintain European support. However, there was an expectation that the need to condemn the Argentine act of aggression and the desire to display the effectiveness of EPC would see the EEC nations continually side with Britain in the dispute. Unfortunately for the British, this was not the case. Rather, the crisis had the potential to affect many policy objectives of the individual nations. It was an opportunity to exploit British need for assistance to pursue wider policy goals. For many European governments, it was an opportunity they did not let slip by.



## 5. Chapter Four: The Plant of Patriotism? The Commonwealth and the Falklands

The response of the people of this country, and of the Commonwealth, especially in New Zealand, has convinced me that patriotism is a strong plant, not a weed, and that its flowers will indeed bloom even when peace is restored.<sup>1</sup>

### 5.1. Chapter Abstract

The Commonwealth of Nations was a group of states largely with historical connections to Britain through the British Empire. Many had only relatively recently gained independence from Britain. Britain's motivation in supporting the formation of the group had been to maintain close connections and influence over its former colonies. However, by the outbreak of the conflict, many of the nations had lessened Britain's influence on their own policies and HMG had found itself particularly at odds with many member states over its handling, separately, of Rhodesia and South Africa. The dispute resonated with members of the Commonwealth as the Argentine government knowingly argued that the sovereignty dispute was a matter of decolonisation and the conflict was as such a colonial war. The Commonwealth was a link with Britain's colonial past and as such was an important bloc for both sides in the dispute to gain the support of. As a group of states, many of which that had fought wars over the question of sovereignty, with close links to Britain, Commonwealth reaction provides a clear indication of how important sovereignty as a concept is in international politics and what influence Britain had with nations where history and values were deemed to be shared. How they responded individually and collectively to Britain's call for support also contributed to the debate surrounding British decline given the difficulties Britain had in maintaining good and meaningful relations with an assemblage it had once dominated.

This chapter aims to evaluate how the Commonwealth states reacted to the outbreak of hostilities between Britain and Argentina, and how the position of the Commonwealth on the dispute altered through the years after the conflict. It doing so, this chapter highlights the key difference between Argentina's claim to the islands and many Commonwealth

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<sup>1</sup> Thatcher to Muldoon, Prime Minister of New Zealand, 11 June 1982, THCR 3/1/22 Part 1.

countries' prior claims to independence: the wishes of the inhabitants of the disputed territory. When Argentina claimed the dispute was one of decolonisation, the response from the office of the General Secretary of the Commonwealth Secretariat was that the issue was one of self-determination: so long as the islanders desired to remain under the administration of Britain, it was right that the islands remained under British sovereignty. In this, the Secretariat represented the expressed view of the Commonwealth nations. However, in the years after the conflict, the Commonwealth placed pressure on Britain to negotiate. This chapter evaluates the issues that affected this change, particularly the accusations of British intransigence over negotiations and how that matched similar accusations towards the British government in its dealings with the issue of apartheid in South Africa. Although the Commonwealth was an organisation with limited influence compared to the others discussed in this thesis, it reflects the same themes in the response of its member states to the crisis: despite a desire amongst individual politicians for a show of solidarity, the reception of the crisis was still heavily influenced by its effects – actual and envisaged – on other policy matters.

## **5.2. Introduction**

In her memoirs, Thatcher referred to the leaders of the so-called white commonwealth nations as the 'staunchest of our friends'. She even drew a comparison with the leaders of Europe, another political union of sorts to which the UK was party, to show how much more resolute she felt her European peers could have been in aiding Britain throughout the nine weeks of conflict.<sup>2</sup> Such language gives the impression that Commonwealth governments and publics were steadfast in their support for Britain during the crisis, with Thatcher desiring to show unity between Britain and the Commonwealth, perhaps motivated by accusations of racism that came over the issues of South Africa. To some extent, Thatcher's assertion that the Commonwealth supported Britain is true. However, a close examination of the evidence highlights the issue as more complex and unveils that much of the Commonwealth shared the same concerns and reservations over Britain's actions as did many other foreign governments. In highlighting these aspects, this chapter seeks to give a better understanding of how Commonwealth nations reflected upon the crisis. As most Commonwealth nations were former colonies of Britain, the chapter seeks to illuminate

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<sup>2</sup> Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years*.

whether or not the Commonwealth viewed the conflict as a matter of decolonisation and the effect, if any, the imperial aspect of the conflict had on Commonwealth reaction. As part of this discussion, the chapter also examines the relative importance of the issue of self-determination and how views on self-determination reflected the Commonwealth interpretation of decolonisation. This work will not only examine how the Commonwealth governments reacted to the outbreak of fighting in 1982 but the relevance of the dispute for Commonwealth governments after the end of the conflict and how they responded to the various votes on the issue in the United Nations General Assembly until 1988. As a consequence of this debate, the chapter also examines the reaction of individual Commonwealth nations as well as the union as whole. As such, this chapter also comments on how effectively the Commonwealth acted as international organisation through the crisis.

The Commonwealth is included in this study for a variety of reasons. Firstly, as the majority of the member states were once colonies in the British Empire, gaining the support of these nations was important to British arguments that the crisis was not a matter of decolonisation or at least, moral arguments over decolonisation did not justify Argentina's actions. Argentine rhetoric attempted to portray the crisis as an issue of colonialism with the government in Buenos Aires linking the issue to the independence struggles many Commonwealth nations had experienced, 'it is the same fleet that in 1833 demolished Latin American rights over the Malvinas islands ... The same that maintained the Opium War, that colonized the Caribbean and backed all of the aggressions and destructions that were committed by England against Latin America, Asia and Africa.'<sup>3</sup> Gaining the support of the Commonwealth would have aided the United Kingdom in portraying the issue as a matter of self-determination and a rejection of violence. Further, a number of the Commonwealth states were also members of other international organisations which made up large parts of the United Nations. The Caribbean Commonwealth states were also part of the OAS. Alongside African Commonwealth nations, the Caribbean states also made up a large proportion of the NAM. Both the OAS and NAM had leading figures who were advocating support for Argentina.<sup>4</sup> Britain relied on the Commonwealth nations in these organisations to limit the efforts of both the NAM and OAS in supporting Argentina so that pro-British resolutions in the UN were passed and Britain was able to press its policy to retake the

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<sup>3</sup> *El Dia*, 27 April 1982.

<sup>4</sup> The role of Cuban president, Fidel Castro, in the NAM will be discussed later in this chapter and the OAS is discussed in detail in chapter 5.

islands unhindered by those who disagreed with its position on sovereignty. As such, the Commonwealth of Nations represents an important bloc to fully understand international perspectives of the crisis and dispute.

As previously noted, this chapter will discuss Commonwealth attitudes towards self-determination. This was an issue that in the Commonwealth was intrinsically linked with the idea of decolonisation. In the African states that had gained independence from Britain, there were significant majorities that desired independence. This was not the case in the Falkland Islands. Since it was the islanders who populated the Falklands, not the Argentines, for the Commonwealth it was then the islanders who determined whether the crisis was a matter of decolonisation. This view of the crisis made it an easy task for the member states to condemn the Argentine aggression. Additionally, the Commonwealth advocated the settlement of disputes by peaceful means and negotiation. In all of the independence movements of the post war period, the Commonwealth, as an organisation, had always deplored the use of violence. This had caused tension between some member states and South Africa when the government in Pretoria was willing to use violent means to quell non-violent protests.<sup>5</sup> As such, the Argentine invasion of the islands created natural sympathy from the Commonwealth for the British position. That being said, the British aggression in the conflict and particularly the sinking of the *Belgrano* caused difficulties for many Commonwealth nations in continuing to support Britain against Argentina. The rejection of violence was also coupled with the desire to see a negotiated permanent resolution to the dispute. This proved important in the years after the conflict, when Commonwealth nations supported calls for Britain to return to negotiation with Argentina in spite of the repeated refusal from Britain to do so.

During the conflict, General Secretary of the Commonwealth, Shridath Ramphal, emphasised how important it was that the Argentine aggression not be allowed to succeed given the prospect that it would set a dangerous precedent.<sup>6</sup> This was a particular concern for the Commonwealth given the number of other territorial disputes some of the member states were involved in.<sup>7</sup> Representing the interests of the Commonwealth as a whole,

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<sup>5</sup> Saul Dubow, 'The Commonwealth and South Africa: From Smuts to Mandela,' *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 45, no. 2 (2017): 284-314.

<sup>6</sup> Ramphal to Thatcher, 5 April 1982, THCR 3/1/20 f27.

<sup>7</sup> Most pertinent of these was that Guatemala claimed sovereignty over Belize and had threatened to use military means to assert its claim.

Ramphal regularly insisted that there was a risk that other nations would be encouraged to resort to military solutions to their own disputes should Argentina be allowed to succeed. A number of Commonwealth nations had suffered from long and violent campaigns waged in the name of sovereignty and so the avoidance of further conflict was particularly important to Ramphal. However, again this was inseparably linked the Commonwealth commitment to the settlement of disputes through negotiation. As the conflict wore on, several member states expressed reservations at Britain's seeming determination to fight to a conclusion whilst not fully engaging with opportunities for peace. In the years after the conflict, many Commonwealth states supported the Argentine call for negotiations on the dispute and the British unwillingness to do so was criticised. This chapter will explore Commonwealth reflections on the dispute through the 1980s and evaluate upon how interpretations of Britain's motivations in the dispute altered as the conflict wore on.

The crisis suffered in terms of relative importance to other key issues which came to dominate the focus of the Commonwealth in the years after 1982. Subsequently Grenada and South Africa occupied the majority of the Commonwealth's attention. In its study on the Commonwealth as a political organisation, this chapter examines how reflections on the Commonwealth were affected by these other developing international situations and in particular evident comparisons between Britain's deteriorating relationship with its Commonwealth partners during Thatcher's time as Prime Minister and voting patterns on the dispute in the United Nations. Much has been made of the legacy of the conflict in Britain and the notion of the 'Falklands Factor' on British politics in the 1980s; however, in the Commonwealth at least, the crisis did not create any form of legacy. When compared with the struggles in South Africa, particularly, the Falklands crisis was considered of little importance. This formed the key element of the Commonwealth reflections on Britain and the dispute as it was rapidly relegated to an additional paragraph in the Commonwealth communiqué.<sup>8</sup> Pertinent also was that this meant that Ramphal's attention was diverted away from the crisis as he worked solely on the issues that were considered more important. This had the effect of removing pressure from the office of the General Secretariat of Commonwealth nations to support Britain in the conflict. Rather nations were left to discuss the issue in the United Nations where membership of other organisations, such as the OAS and the NAM, had more influence on how nations voted in line with individual nations own

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<sup>8</sup> See the final paragraph on the dispute in the 1983 New Delhi Communique, THCR 1/10/64.

policy goals. As such, a combination of factors meant that the growth in importance of the Grenada and South Africa issues led to a growth in the number of votes against Britain on Falklands resolutions in the UN.

As well as considering the reaction of the Commonwealth as a political union, this chapter also examines the importance of the reactions of the individual nations that made up the Commonwealth. In this aspect, Britain's relations with the Commonwealth over the crisis mirror many of the same problems that Britain had in garnering support from the EEC. Thatcher's assertion of Commonwealth support can be explained as she held good relationships with the government leaders of the nations that were particularly staunch in their support of Britain. Thatcher worked closely with Robert Muldoon of New Zealand, Malcolm Fraser of Australia and Pierre Trudeau of Canada. It is from a communication between Thatcher and Muldoon that the quotation which opens this chapter is taken from.<sup>9</sup> All three leaders displayed strong support for Britain and offered practical aid in bringing about a conclusion to the conflict that would be a success for the British government. However, Thatcher's use of personal diplomacy with regards to Commonwealth was limited to her Anglospheric counterparts. As such, her experiences of Commonwealth reaction to the crisis are not reflective of all Commonwealth nations. This chapter will also evaluate the communications of other nations in Africa and the Caribbean to highlight the reservations that many of those governments had regarding the British policy line. For much of the crisis, Britain's efforts to garner support from the Commonwealth went through the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and in particular, the Commonwealth Coordination Department (CCD). It is documented evidence from these offices that make clear not all nations were as comfortable with the British determination to take the islands by force, particularly after the sinking of the *Belgrano*. Rather many other states had expressed concern over the dispatch of the Task Force and Britain's commitment to finding a peaceful solution to the crisis.<sup>10</sup> Furthermore, when one examines the reaction of the Anglospheric nations in the years after the conflict, the degree to which the Commonwealth moved its support away from Britain

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<sup>9</sup> Thatcher to Muldoon, Prime Minister of New Zealand, 11 June 1982, THCR 3/1/22 Part 1.

<sup>10</sup> In addition to the shuttle diplomacy employed by US Secretary of State Alexander Haig, additional peace proposals were offered by a Peruvian delegation at the UN as well as a final call from UN secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar both of which captured the attention of the Commonwealth in May 1982. This will be discussed further later in this chapter.

is shown to be ever more drastic, as the UK found itself isolated within the General Assembly over the issue of sovereignty of the islands.

Thatcher's use of the word 'patriotism' to Muldoon conveys that she felt, or at least wanted to give a sense, there was a communal support for Britain in the conflict from the Commonwealth member states. However, the reflections of the Commonwealth on the crisis are complex and to be properly understood, there must be separation between the Commonwealth as an international organisation and its individual members. As an international organisation, it was driven by Ramphal, a committed 'Commonwealth Man'.<sup>11</sup> Ramphal was committed to upholding the principles and ideals which the Commonwealth stood for, democracy and the self-determination of peoples being two vital elements of that. With that came his commitment to coherent policy action from Commonwealth states. He believed that the Commonwealth was strongest when its members worked together towards common goals and ambitions and part of that was the swift offering of communal support when one member was threatened by an external power. However, on the other hand, as influential as Ramphal was, the other members of the Commonwealth too had to think of other considerations. Many had ties and commitments that took precedence to Britain's problems in the South Atlantic. They had their own objectives and ideals and could not offer the swift and resolute support that the British government may have liked them too and, by 1982, the Commonwealth was well on the way to moving away from a British centric organisation, no longer looking to HMG for leadership. These factors together show the true nature of the Commonwealth reflections on the crisis. Rather it was not a patriotic feeling that motivated Commonwealth reactions, but each individual nation's interpretations of the issues represented in the crisis.

### ***5.2.1. Literature review***

Given the other issues that dominated the Commonwealth during the Cold War period, there has been no specific study on the Commonwealth and the crisis. Histories of the Commonwealth in the 1980s have instead focussed on the racial issues in southern Africa which were much more pertinent for the member states. That being said, given the overlap on membership between the Commonwealth and other organisations, the reaction of

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<sup>11</sup> Derek Ingram, 'Thatcher and Ramphal: A Long and Turbulent Relationship,' *The Round Table* 97, no. 398 (2008): 781-790.

member states has been mentioned in other histories of the dispute. Historian Stella Paresa Krepp has written about the Argentine attempt, during the crisis, to assimilate itself with the 'Third World'. In her writing, she talks briefly about the reaction of African and Commonwealth Caribbean countries to Argentina's rhetoric on the dispute.<sup>12</sup> However, her work focuses predominantly on the reception of Argentine calls for support, the NAM and the influence of Cuba in attempting to galvanise support for Argentina among ex-colonies. This chapter differs in that its predominant focus is the reaction of these nations to Britain and the Falklands crisis, examining the ideals that shaped the Commonwealth response to Britain's call for support and how the crisis was viewed in Commonwealth nations.

Furthermore, this chapter comments on the how the individual policy concerns of nations affected the ability of the Commonwealth as an international organisation during the crisis. The thesis evaluates the role of Ramphal in generating and maintaining support for Britain as well as seeking to answer the question of the nature of Commonwealth support for Britain. This is something that has not been seen as of yet in the wider historiography of the crisis. Furthermore, this chapter uses the significant amount of source material available through the National Archives to evaluate Commonwealth opinion on the crisis. Krepp used some documentary evidence from the National Archives to examine role of Fidel Castro but this chapter examines the files in greater depth and looks at the government records that monitored Commonwealth reaction to Britain and the strategies HMG employed to influence Commonwealth voting at the UN. The thesis employs the extensive files held in the National Archives on Commonwealth reaction and opinion on the crisis as well as the detailing of diplomatic efforts made by the FCO to build and maintain support for Britain during the crisis. The nature of using the National Archives files is that the source base used in this chapter predominantly originates from Britain and, as discussed in the introduction to this thesis, there are limitations on what can be understood about Commonwealth reaction from British based sources. Due to time and resource restraints, this chapter was unable to consult archives in Commonwealth countries that would have detailed the conversations that took place within governments about the crisis. However, the present work takes the extensive source material available in Britain and places it into context of the wider issues facing the Commonwealth, alongside the actions and public declarations that Commonwealth countries made on the crisis, to draw out themes across Commonwealth

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<sup>12</sup> Krepp, 'Between the Cold War and the Global South,' 141-160.



perceptions of the dispute. In doing so, this chapter highlights that, unlike other blocs discussed in this thesis, the matter of self-determination was important for the Commonwealth which aided Britain in gaining support during the conflict.<sup>13</sup> However, in the years after the conflict, the maintenance of peace alongside the importance of negotiation and compromise took precedence and Commonwealth nations began arguing against Britain in the UNGA debates on the dispute.

### **5.3. Before the Conflict - An ‘International Organisation’ not a ‘British’ one <sup>14</sup>**

The relationship between Britain and its former colonies had changed since the foundation of the Commonwealth of Nations in 1946. At its beginning, the Commonwealth was a British-led organisation formed through ex-colonies wishing to maintain links with the British Government.<sup>15</sup> However it is also important to note that as much as ex-colonies had wished to maintain links with Britain, Britain held a strong desire to maintain influence over the new independent states as this brought benefits of trade and ensured Britain maintained some influence in global affairs.<sup>16</sup> By the time of the Conservative election victory in 1979, however, the emphasis had changed, and the Commonwealth as an organisation regularly clashed with the British government over issues of independence and racial equality, particularly those in Southern Africa.

The former colonies presented a series of problems for a series of British governments, with many nationalist politicians in Africa wishing to see the removal of British influence from newly independent states. Unlike the other great ex-colonial power in Europe, France, Britain had not foreseen the importance of maintaining strong links with its colonies before their independence which meant the British struggled to assert influence in nations which now had new nationalist leaders many of whom had suffered under British rule.<sup>17</sup> Britain’s desire to build the Commonwealth membership meant that a number of these nations were able to attach conditions onto their membership. The withdrawal of South

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<sup>13</sup> This is a point that will be evaluated later in this chapter. The principle of self-determination would come to form part of the Commonwealth Charter adopted in December 2012.

<sup>14</sup> Stephen Chan, ‘The Commonwealth as an International Organisation: Constitutionalism, Britain and South Africa,’ *The Round Table* 78, no. 312 (1989): 393-412.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid* 397-399.

<sup>16</sup> Ingram, ‘Thatcher and Ramphal,’ 785.

<sup>17</sup> Chan, ‘The Commonwealth as an International Organisation,’ 394.

Africa in 1961 from the Commonwealth was a result of the desire to encourage membership from African nations strongly opposed to Apartheid. Julius Nyerere, President of Tanganyika, commented in 1961 that his country could not join any association 'which includes a State deliberately and ruthlessly pursuing a racialist policy line.'<sup>18</sup> The British government in 1961 held good relations with South Africa and the South African withdrawal from the Commonwealth highlights how Britain had to relent on its policy in other areas in an attempt to build good relations with the new independent states.<sup>19</sup> British support for the Apartheid government had led to bitterness towards Britain to grow as nations became suspicious of British intentions in Southern Africa. As such, in 1982 Britain faced the task of persuading the Commonwealth to support its efforts concerning the crisis at a time when HMG had not shown the Commonwealth support over South Africa.

In the years between 1961 and 1982, Britain was forced to weigh the importance of the Commonwealth against its wider foreign policy objectives, most pertinently, the relationships Britain held with the USA and Europe. Despite the failed Plan G proposals, Britain had shown its willingness to compromise the Commonwealth's position as Britain's number one trading partner to integrate the UK with the Free Trade Zone being proposed by many of Britain's western European partners.<sup>20</sup> In addition, the UK had displayed a preference for including the USA and Europe on matters which were primarily Commonwealth affairs. Writing in 1983, James Barber had commented that, '[t]he British Government now sees itself as part of a Western Team, which by working together in Southern Africa, gives each member more influence and more protection. A major priority for Britain must be to work in harness with its Western Allies.'<sup>21</sup> By the early 1980s, it was increasingly evident that Britain had different policy objectives in the Commonwealth than the other member states and had used its relationship with the USA and Europe to pursue its own goals in Africa. Many Commonwealth states supported joint Anglo-American initiatives to bring about resolutions to disputes in Southern Africa as their primary objective

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<sup>18</sup> Julius Nyerere, *The Observer*, 21 March 1961.

<sup>19</sup> See Stephen Chan, 'The Commonwealth as an International Organisation' for a fuller study of Britain's integration into the Commonwealth and South Africa's withdrawal.

<sup>20</sup> See James Ellison, 'Perfidious Albion? Britain, Plan G and European Integration, 1955-56,' *Contemporary British History* 10, no. 4, (1998): 1-34 for a fuller analysis of the 'Plan G' proposals, an attempt to manage integration with Europe and the free trade zone whilst maintaining the Commonwealth's favoured status as a trading partner for the UK.

<sup>21</sup> James P. Barber, *The Uneasy Relationship: Britain and South Africa* (London: Heinemann for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1983), 97.

was to see these situations resolved peacefully but Britain's preference of working with the USA and Europe was significant evidence of its weakening commitment to the Commonwealth.<sup>22</sup> Although the western initiatives to solve the problems in Southern Africa were supported, Britain used the Commonwealth to work towards its own foreign policy goals built on, 'a paranoid fear of Soviet expansionism and ... a desire to strengthen its share of the South African market' whereas the African Commonwealth states were more concerned with bringing about racial equality on their continent.<sup>23</sup>

By 1982, the issues of South Africa and Rhodesia had strained relations between Britain and the Commonwealth. In the mid-1960s Britain was seen to be throwing 'all her weight and influence within its councils behind those who stand for genuine racial equality' but the policies of the first Thatcher government did not appear committed to bringing about the end of apartheid or Rhodesian independence.<sup>24</sup> Stephen Chan has commented that, at the time of South African withdrawal (1961), 'even idealistic views of a future Commonwealth world role were expressed in terms of a British-centric power grouping. Britain in alliance with the Commonwealth, could project her power more effectively than with the USA or Europe.'<sup>25</sup> However the lack of progression on the South Africa and Rhodesia issues lead to a change at the 1964 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM). Julius Nyerere summed up the new attitudes in the Commonwealth; 'millions are represented by the Commonwealth and not all of them see problems with the same view as the Western world ... change must come'.<sup>26</sup> It was at the 1964 summit that the formation of the office of Commonwealth Secretariat was agreed with Arnold Smith its first incumbent.<sup>27</sup> The Office

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<sup>22</sup> It was hoped that a joint Anglo-American initiative may be able to reach a resolution on the matter of Rhodesia and in particular the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI), which came in November 1965, with the removal of Smith from power although the Commonwealth Heads of Government (CHOGs) were doubtful 'about the prospects...of success.' See Commonwealth Heads of Government, *The London Communique June 1977* (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 1977), para 14.

<sup>23</sup> Geoffrey Berridge, 'Britain and southern Africa' in *Southern Africa in the 1980s*, edited by Olajide Aluko and Timothy M. Shaw (London: Allen & Unwin, 1985), 166-167.

<sup>24</sup> Quote taken from John Strachey, *The End of Empire* (Delhi: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1962), 309. This was in reference to Britain prioritising the membership of nations such as Ghana over that of the white supremacist government of South Africa.

<sup>25</sup> Chan, 'Commonwealth as an International Organisation,' 397.

<sup>26</sup> Quoted in Ali A. Mazrui, *The Anglo-African Commonwealth: Political Friction and Cultural Fusion* (Oxford: Pergamon, 1967), 40.

<sup>27</sup> Stephen Chan argues that this was done in specific opposition to the British-centric nature of the Commonwealth in the hope of forcing the Britain to act with more conviction over the issues in Southern Africa.

of Secretariat was tasked with pursuing the agreed goals of all Commonwealth nations which limited Britain's ability to pursue its own policy on Commonwealth affairs. Within the first decade of the Secretariat, the Commonwealth increasingly became more involved in international economic relations and the development of the Third World. By the time Shridath Ramphal was appointed General Secretary in 1975, there was clear scope for the Commonwealth to intervene more practically in the issues most important to its member nations. British influence in Southern African issues was not removed altogether but the Commonwealth now had a central office that could form a coherent strategy, accounting for the opinions of all Commonwealth nations, and apply pressure onto the British. By 1982, if Britain was to gain the support of the Commonwealth on its Falklands policy, it would have to obtain a general consensus among all the member states so that the office of the General Secretariat would then begin using its influence to aid HMG.

Despite the importance attributed to relations with the USA and Europe, the Commonwealth of Nations was an organisation Thatcher valued. It was a union in which she aimed to have an important role and she enjoyed positive personal relationships with many of the white Commonwealth states.<sup>28</sup> However there were difficulties with her relations with other CHOGs when she was seen to be reluctant to compromise. Derek Ingram surmises this:

Thatcher attended every CHOGM during her 11 years in office. She never threatened to boycott or walk out but stood her corner, always with plenty to say and rarely missing a session. She was not afraid if almost everyone in the room disagreed with her, as they usually did. As she once told a TV reporter: "If I were the odd one out and I were right that would not matter, would it?" In that sense, Thatcher was not really much in tune with the Commonwealth way of working – consensus. She never liked what she often referred to as a "fudge". Yet usually in the end, after a long fight, she did accept a compromise.<sup>29</sup>

From her first CHOGM in Lusaka in 1979, Thatcher displayed a determination to pursue her own policy line. On the key issue of Rhodesia, Thatcher knew that she had few sympathisers among other Commonwealth Heads of Government. Even Malcolm Fraser,

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<sup>28</sup> Moore, *Margaret Thatcher Volume II*, 225.

<sup>29</sup> Ingram, 'Thatcher and Ramphal,' 785.

Prime Minister of Australia, who shared much of the same Conservative philosophy as Thatcher, had warned that he would not support her if she continued to advocate for the Ian Smith-Bishop Abel Muzorewa Government in Rhodesia.<sup>30</sup> Such was the level of anger directed towards her from the African continent, on her arrival in Lusaka she commented that, “I am absolutely certain that when I land ... they [natives] are going to throw acid in my face.”<sup>31</sup> Certain elements of the African press had accused her of being racist and compared her unfavourably to the Queen who was held as a champion of the Commonwealth.<sup>32</sup> When Thatcher compromised on the Rhodesia issue and performed a ‘U Turn’, her relations with the other leaders were further strained when the details of the Lancaster House Agreement were leaked before she had a chance to address the UK Parliament. Owen Harries, advisor to Malcolm Fraser, described years later how Thatcher had ‘broke down in tears’ over the leak.<sup>33</sup>

Further issues developed at the Melbourne CHOGM in 1981 over South Africa. Although Thatcher was happy to condemn apartheid, she would always stop short of supporting the imposition of sanctions. This would prove rather ironic in the years to come as South African troops moved into neighbouring territories, reminiscent of Argentine troops landing on the Falkland Islands. Thatcher’s opposition to sanctions would also often bring her into direct disagreement with Ramphal. The General Secretary would always reflect the majority view of the Commonwealth member states and warned that the Commonwealth of Nations “has no option but to be the vanguard of the final push against apartheid”.<sup>34</sup> Speaking ahead of the 1981 CHOGM, Ramphal also referenced Thatcher’s seeming support for the South African Government in a speech made in London, where he stated, “it is not possible to be an ally of South Africa and a friend of Africa. No one must then be surprised if South Africa chooses other friends.”<sup>35</sup> When negotiations on Rhodesian UDI progressed, there were evident tensions between the Commonwealth and FCO. Ken

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<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.* Fraser had previously been an ardent supporter of Thatcher having sent his own party advisors to aid with the Conservative election campaign in 1979.

<sup>31</sup> Peter Carrington, *Reflect on Things Past: Memoirs of Lord Carrington* (London: Collins, 1988).

<sup>32</sup> Quoted from the *Zambian Daily Mail* and reference in Ingram, ‘Thatcher and Ramphal,’ 782.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 783

<sup>34</sup> Ramphal writing in 1985 and referred to in Shridath Ramphal, *Glimpses of a Global Life*, (Hertford: Hansib, 2014), 426.

<sup>35</sup> Ramphal speaking in 1981 and referred to in Ramphal, *Glimpses of a Global Life*, 420.

Salisbury, Director of Intelligence at Salisbury, noted in his diary that ‘it [The Lancaster House Agreement] was exactly what I warned them, in London last May, would happen if they were ill-advised enough to try and get a fair settlement of the Rhodesia problem with Nyerere in on the act.’<sup>36</sup> Carrington and Ramphal had clashed over the how the Rhodesian elections would be observed.<sup>37</sup> Ramphal was critical of the British for having a clear agenda that was not “within the letter or spirit of the Lusaka agreement.”<sup>38</sup> Carrington responded publicly by disagreeing with Ramphal’s comments, despite the General Secretary’s concerns being legitimised by letters from Nyerere and Kaunda, president of Zambia. In his memoirs, Carrington was dismissive of Ramphal, claiming that he had ‘no credibility as an impartial observer’ whilst also championing his own role in the negotiations.<sup>39</sup> As such, when Argentina invaded the islands, the relations between Britain and the Commonwealth were strained. The FCO had great difficulty working with the Commonwealth Secretariat and yet British officials had to work with staff from the Commonwealth Secretariat to maintain support for the UK’s Falklands policy in the UN.

Although there were many difficulties in the relationship between Britain and the Commonwealth, it must also be noted that there were some factors which would go some way to explaining why the Commonwealth would offer support to Britain when the crisis broke. The first of these factors was the respect that Thatcher and Ramphal held for one another. Ramphal always saw Thatcher as ‘someone who would argue frequently but would also listen’.<sup>40</sup> Thatcher always attended as many meetings and discussions with the Commonwealth as possible and listened with attentiveness. In turn, Thatcher always respected the work Ramphal had done within the Commonwealth and did respect him as an excellent General Secretary. At the New Delhi CHOGM in 1983, despite all of their differences, Thatcher supported Ramphal’s re-election and opposed the notion that he should only be elected to a half-length term.<sup>41</sup> In addition, the Rhodesian problem had shown that Thatcher would be willing to compromise. Her speech at the opening of the 1979

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<sup>36</sup> Ken Flowers, *Serving Secretly - An Intelligence Chief on Record: Rhodesia into Zimbabwe, 1964-81* (London: John Murray, 1987), 202.

<sup>37</sup> Zimbabwe and the Lancaster House Agreement, 1983, FCO 106/1006. Carrington wanted individual groups from different countries whereas Ramphal wanted one single group made up of different representatives from the Commonwealth nations.

<sup>38</sup> Ramphal, *Glimpses of a Global Life*, 302.

<sup>39</sup> Carrington, *Reflect on Things Past*, 202.

<sup>40</sup> Ramphal, *Glimpses of a Global Life*, 303.

<sup>41</sup> Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, 1983, THCR487/596.

meeting in Lusaka was much more constructive than had been expected and feared amongst the other Heads of Government. In fact, that speech laid out the plans which would see the Rhodesian issue settled within a year.<sup>42</sup> Although her 'U-turn' may have provided negative press at home, it did much for her relations with her Commonwealth peers.

Thatcher also enjoyed excellent personal relationships with key political figures in the Commonwealth. Her strong affiliation with Trudeau, Muldoon and Fraser was well known, however, Thatcher had also begun to build a rapport with those leaders who were not part of the western sphere. At the Lusaka summit she had struck a good accord with Kenneth Kaunda, President of Zambia, which continued through to the Melbourne summit of 1981. At the end of the Lusaka summit, Thatcher and Kaunda shared a dance together and Kaunda often referred to Thatcher as his 'dancing partner' in all the years that followed.<sup>43</sup> He also described Thatcher as the 'beautiful blonde who came and conquered all men'.<sup>44</sup> Further Thatcher built a good relationship with Eugenia Charles of Dominica, who she found natural common ground as female heads of government in a male dominated group. Building such good relations with leaders in Africa and the Caribbean was important for Thatcher as it gave the impression that she respected the ideas and wishes of former colonies. This ultimately went some way to enhancing the respect for Britain among Commonwealth nations whilst mitigating against the damage done to Britain's reputation through the arguments over South Africa and Rhodesia.

Although Britain could not exert as much influence on other Commonwealth states as its government may have liked, it was of benefit to HMG that other Commonwealth figures valued coherency in Commonwealth decision making. The Commonwealth became committed to consensus especially within its public declarations. Stephen Chan summed up the importance of consensus when he wrote:

Its policy of consensus meant that it avoided the monolithic and confrontationalist blocs of UNCTAD; it could be a grouping of nations that became the international exemplar of carefully planned investment and development programmes -

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<sup>42</sup> Margaret Thatcher, *Speech at Opening of Lusaka Commonwealth Meeting*, House of Commons Library Press, released 1 August 1979.

<sup>43</sup> Ingram, 'Thatcher and Ramphal,' 783.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid*, 785.

an exemplar of a positive North-South dialogue before that term had even been coined.<sup>45</sup>

Although there has been debate around how much each nation was committed to ‘the policy of consensus’, it was important particularly to the office of Commonwealth Secretariat.<sup>46</sup> Ramphal was committed to expressing the view of the Commonwealth majority but importantly always expressed in public the decision of the Commonwealth as unanimous. As an equal partner within that union, Britain could expect that consensus to be extended to include its reaction to its own territory being invaded by a foreign power.

The formation of the office of Commonwealth Secretariat in 1964 brought with it a desire for a coherent policy line that was committed towards the protection of smaller states and majority rule in Africa. At CHOGMs, Thatcher fought for her Government’s own agenda within the Commonwealth discussions but found that she could not demand or expect others to conform has had been apparent at the Commonwealth’s founding as former colonies looked to maintain salient relationships with the UK. By 1982, the Commonwealth was dedicated to new objectives and pressure mounted on Britain to ‘toe-the-line’ and aid more fully in the movement towards majority rule in Southern Africa.<sup>47</sup> However, Thatcher was a respected leader, with who the Commonwealth knew they could negotiate and someone who would listen. For Ramphal and some of the African Heads of Government, the Commonwealth was a union, and it was important that it acted reflecting a view all of its member states could support. They believed that the influence of the Commonwealth was strongest when the nations all acted together. The commitment to supporting one another and working together would lead to the support the Commonwealth would offer Britain during the crisis. However, Britain’s position within the Commonwealth meant that support was not as resolute as the memoirs of Thatcher read.

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<sup>45</sup> Chan, ‘The Commonwealth as an International Organisation’: 399.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid, 400.

<sup>47</sup> Ingram, ‘Thatcher and Ramphal,’ 783.



## 5.4. The Commonwealth During the Conflict

### 5.4.1. *The Commonwealth man – Shridath ‘Sonny’ Ramphal*

When news broke of the Argentine invasion of the islands, the response from Commonwealth governments was swift. Ramphal proved of paramount importance in ensuring the Commonwealth publicly backed Britain in the immediate aftermath of the crisis outbreak. Ramphal had worked as a barrister in London before returning to Guyana, the country of his birth and working in several government positions. During his governmental career, Ramphal had worked as a Minister of State in the Ministry of External Affairs (1967-1972) and as a Minister of Foreign Affairs (1972). During this time, Ramphal had worked on the sovereignty dispute over the parts of Guyana claimed by Venezuela and as such had a natural sympathy for Britain when the Falkland Islands were seized by force by Argentina. This too inspired his motivation to see the Commonwealth become more involved in the protection of smaller states when he was appointed General Secretary in 1975 but it was his commitment to the Commonwealth ideals that made him a popular choice as General Secretary.<sup>48</sup> He was committed to the Commonwealth as an organisation and believed whole heartedly in its effectiveness and importance as an international political body.<sup>49</sup> Ramphal’s popularity was strengthened by the success of the Lancaster House talks.<sup>50</sup> Without Ramphal, it is likely that the talks would have collapsed as Mugabe and Nkomo repeatedly threatened to walk out as they always perceived the British had an underlying agenda to keep Mugabe out of power.<sup>51</sup> Ramphal’s dedication to the Commonwealth furthered his popularity among the member states. He very rarely appeared to push his own agenda but always sought to represent the majority view of the nations that made up the Commonwealth, which was seen by the member nations as the primary role of the office of Secretariat. Baroness Barbara Ward commented Ramphal saw the Commonwealth as ‘a quiet influence for the common good’ reflecting the desire of member states through ‘raising

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<sup>48</sup> Richard Bourne, *Shridath Ramphal: The Commonwealth and the World* (London: Hansib, 2009), 172.

<sup>49</sup> Emeka Anyaoku, *The Inside Story of the Modern Commonwealth* (Ibadan: Evans Brothers, 2004), 24.

<sup>50</sup> Carrington, *Reflect on Things Past*, 204; and Anyaoku, *Inside Story*, 25.

<sup>51</sup> See Ingram, ‘Thatcher and Ramphal’ for a fuller discussion of Ramphal’s popularity among the Commonwealth.

aspiration to ethos and turning ethos into action.’ As such ‘the Commonwealth cannot negotiate for the world; but it can help the world to negotiate’.<sup>52</sup> As Secretary General he gave ‘leadership and direction to the Secretariat’ and acted ‘as the major connecting link among member governments’.<sup>53</sup> Ramphal desired not just to see the betterment of the people of the Commonwealth but also to use the Commonwealth for the betterment of the world, and sought to bring together often opposing interests amongst the member states and worked to increase the level of consensus and measurable achievement.<sup>54</sup> The way he combatted British interests in Southern Africa in hopes of achieving majority rule was testament to these beliefs and served as evidence of his determination to prevent any individual member from dominating Commonwealth affairs.

It was his beliefs in the importance of consensus among Commonwealth nations and the belief in the Commonwealth ethos that explained why the Secretary General was so swift to put his support behind Britain on the outbreak the crisis. Integral parts of the ethos that the Commonwealth had come to represent were the self-determination of peoples as well as the rejection of the use of force to settle political disputes. Representing the Commonwealth and its ethos meant it was natural for Ramphal to condemn the seizure of the islands by Argentine forces. Ramphal was away in the Caribbean when news first reached him of the Argentine invasion. He wrote to Thatcher on 5 April offering his support and assistance in any way that may be deemed ‘helpful and desirable’. In it, he commented, ‘[w]e have already had in our time too many acts of aggression by those who calculate on getting away with it ... Argentina’s action requires, from the whole international community, a stand for the maintenance of law and order worldwide.’<sup>55</sup> Ramphal’s experience in the government of Guyana, another Commonwealth member, too meant he was familiar with the claims of Venezuela to Guyanese territory and the risks of encouraging dictatorships to seek military solutions to sovereignty claims should Argentina be allowed to succeed. His commitment to the idea of coherency among the Commonwealth member states as well as his rejection of violence as a whole is evident here. Contrastingly to other politicians discussed in this thesis,

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<sup>52</sup> Barbara Ward in Shridath Ramphal, *One World to Share: Selected Speeches of the Commonwealth Secretary-general, 1975-9* (London: Hutchinson Benham, 1979), 1.

<sup>53</sup> Margaret Doxey, ‘Shridath Ramphal, One World to Share: Selected Speeches of the Commonwealth Secretary-general, 1975-9. Hutchinson Benham: Review,’ *Third World Quarterly* 2, no. 2 (1980): 347.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid*, 348.

<sup>55</sup> Commonwealth Secretary-General, Ramphal to Thatcher, 5 April 1982, THCR 3/1/20.

he did not attempt to use Britain's position in the South Atlantic as a negotiating tactic over any other issue Britain was opposing him on but instead offered immediate support in a manner consistent with the ethos of the Commonwealth.

Further evidence of this is found in the fact that Ramphal wrote to all CHOGs urging them to condemn the Argentine attack and offer whatever assistance they could to aid the British in the crisis, on the same day as he wrote to Thatcher. In this letter he commented to the heads of government:

I am sure you will agree that in the face of such unprovoked aggression, there is need for Commonwealth countries to stand by Britain in this matter, consistent with your support for the principles of territorial integrity, the right of self-determination, and the rejection of the use of force to unsettle long established boundaries – principles for which the Commonwealth has persistently stood.<sup>56</sup>

Key here is the emphasis on which principles of the Commonwealth Argentina had violated by attacking the islands. The Commonwealth had previously aided the process of decolonisation through its involvement in the independence movements of many of its own member states. As such, it was important that the Commonwealth clarified its view of the crisis when governments such as that of Cuba, had discussed the issue as one of ancient colonial powers trying to cling onto illegally taken lands. In highlighting that the Commonwealth should be focussed on support for self-determination, Ramphal worked to ensure that the focus of the Commonwealth was very much on Britain's side. His support was not only limited to spoken word but he also worked to gain practical assistance for Britain where he could. In his letter to Thatcher on the 5 April, he outlined how he would encourage the other Commonwealth leaders to come out in support of Britain and he followed through with this promise.<sup>57</sup> He continually encouraged Commonwealth members to vote favourably for Britain in the United Nations while he spoke personally with the governments of Guyana, a member of the UN Security Council, as well as Uganda which aided Britain in gaining necessary votes from nations within the Non-Aligned Movement to ensure Britain succeeded within the United Nations.<sup>58</sup> Ramphal even went so far as to lean

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<sup>56</sup> Ramphal to Commonwealth Heads of Government, 5 April 1982, THCR 3/1/20.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>58</sup> Ramphal to Milton Obote, President of Uganda, 5 April 1982, THCR 3/1/20.

on the government of the Dominican Republic to remain committed to the joint Commonwealth rejection of Argentina's invasion despite also being a member of the Organisation of American States (OAS).<sup>59</sup> Such influence was important as it offered practical assistance in the formation and passing of Security Council Resolution 502 which called for the withdrawal of Argentine troops from the islands as well as preventing direct international intervention in Britain's dispatching of the Task Force. Notably Ramphal did not mention the use of the Task Force in his letters. He did urge Commonwealth nations to work to ensure a 'de-escalation' of the matter but this was as close to mentioning the Task Force as Ramphal came at the early stage of the crisis.<sup>60</sup> Ramphal could not directly support the dispatch of the Royal Navy as it would have been in contradiction to his 'rejection of violence' to settle disputes but in refraining from mentioning it, he allowed the British Government to take what course it felt appropriate without question from the Secretariat of the Commonwealth.<sup>61</sup> Ramphal's work in the early days of the crisis served to boost Britain's support as it ensured Commonwealth countries remained focussed on the matter of self-determination and were not swayed by arguments of other international blocs of which they were part.

The Commonwealth Coordination Department of the FCO (CCD), led by Cranley Onslow and Roger Barltrop, was responsible for obtaining Commonwealth support for Britain's position in the crisis. Its efforts were aided by Francis Pym who replaced Carrington as Foreign Secretary following the latter's resignation in April 1982. Pym enjoyed a much better relationship with Ramphal than Carrington had. Pym had not been involved with the disputes between the Commonwealth and British Government over the issues in Southern Africa. In fact, he did not have much experience in dealing with Commonwealth affairs at all. He had served as Shadow Foreign Secretary during his time in opposition from 1978-79 where he had some contact with the Commonwealth but no direct involvement in negotiation. As such, Pym had not been party to the souring of the relationship between Carrington and Ramphal and was able to foster a friendlier relationship with the General Secretary. Pym and Ramphal struck up a positive relationship with one another and exchanged several letters throughout the conflict with Ramphal taking a keen

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<sup>59</sup> Ramphal to Antonio Guzmán Fernández, President of the Dominican Republic, 10 April 1982, THCR 3/1/20.

<sup>60</sup> Ramphal to Thatcher, 5 April 1982, THCR 3/1/20.

<sup>61</sup> Ramphal to Commonwealth Heads of Government, 5 April 1982, THCR 3/1/20.

interest in how he could best aid British efforts and Pym involving Ramphal in negotiations on how best to secure Commonwealth support.<sup>62</sup> Where Carrington had been reluctant to seek aid from the Commonwealth on matters he considered to be British problems, Pym welcomed the interventions of the General Secretary seeing value in Ramphal's influence among the other Commonwealth nations. This allowed for a much better working relationship between the FCO and the office of the General Secretariat which made it easier for Ramphal to garner support for Britain among member nations. Ramphal went above any other non-British politician in his efforts to aid's Britain's cause. This was a fact not lost on the Foreign Secretary, 'thank you for the magnificent help you have given us in recent weeks over the crisis. Your efforts to rally commonwealth support, at the United Nations and elsewhere have been invaluable; and I have been greatly heartened by the references you have made to the crisis in your speeches.'<sup>63</sup>

Despite this, one must be careful of placing too much emphasis on the relationship between Pym and Ramphal having influenced the Secretary General's desire to aid the British. Ramphal was swift to offer his support to Britain even before Carrington's resignation and his motivations for helping Britain were unaffected by Pym even if Ramphal found it easier to work with the British following Pym's appointment. In his letters to Pym, he continually outlined the importance of the principles for which Britain were fighting. He underlined the issues of self-determination and rejection of violence as being of paramount importance throughout the conflict. In his letter to Pym on 15 June 1982, congratulating the Foreign Secretary on Britain's victory, he outlined this point clearly stating, '[w]hat has triumphed...are the principles for which you stood steadfast on behalf of a wider international community.' He finished the letter saying in reference, 'as you look to the future, I believe you can continue to count on that spirit of support and solidarity. Certainly, be assured of my personal commitment to helping in all the ways I can in there [UN] and other respects.'<sup>64</sup> Ramphal emphasised the principles were the underlying factor in his offering of support. He believed Britain's cause was one that echoed the Commonwealth's own ethos. The Commonwealth was opposed to colonisation but of paramount importance was the issue of self-determination. There is no reason to believe that Ramphal was simply trying to appease Pym here. It is highly unlikely that Britain would have relented on their

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<sup>62</sup> Many of these letters are held on record in the National Archives with the file FCO 7/4574.

<sup>63</sup> Pym to Ramphal, 16 June 1982, FCO 7/4574 f21.

<sup>64</sup> Ramphal to Pym, 15 June 1982, FCO 7/4574 f22.

stance over South Africa and Ramphal was not an individual who had shown previous for trying to appease individual Commonwealth members in his role as General Secretary. Britain's defence of the islanders' right to choose their own future echoed the independence movements in Africa in the post Second World War era. This was a principle that Ramphal had defended over the issue of Rhodesia and so it was natural for him to do the same over the Falkland Islands. Carrington's resignation may have meant that Ramphal found it easier to work with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, but it is unlikely to have influenced any of his thoughts on assisting Britain.

Ramphal continued to emphasise the importance of these same issues when speaking in public. His first public appearance during the conflict came when he gave an interview to the *Today* programme on 28 April. During the discussion he reaffirmed his support for the joint Commonwealth backing that was offered to Britain as well as commenting that the islanders desire to remain British meant that natural sympathy had to lie with HMG.<sup>65</sup> He also addressed a query of whether Dominica would continue to stand with the Commonwealth as it was also a member of the Organisation of American States. Ramphal answered confidently that he believed the Dominican government would continue to support Britain again underlying that the principles for which the Commonwealth stood were shared by the Caribbean island's own government. Ramphal invoked these points again when speaking after the Argentine surrender. He gave a speech given to the Commonwealth Press Union in London on 15 June which became known as 'Not Britain's Cause Alone'. In it he commended the British for their efforts in retaking the islands and called it not just a victory for Britain 'but for the cause for which she stood steadfast – a cause let us remember above all else which was not Britain's alone.' Further he affirmed why the international community should rejoice in Britain's victory and what he felt had been gained through the conflict:

But I would like to speak to you not on these matters but of another from which I believe the Commonwealth will ultimately draw even greater strength, the crisis in the Falklands which tested both Britain and the Commonwealth but in which each has triumphed on the side of principle...

There are many countries in the world, a large number in the Commonwealth ... who were not taken in by so unlikely a crusader waving the anti-colonial banner. They may have had no ships to contribute, no trade to forgo, no loans to embargo

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<sup>65</sup> Ramphal on the BBC *Today* programme, 28 April 1982. A transcript of the interview can be found in FCO 7/4574 Part B f36.

but they did not hesitate to stand up and be counted against Argentina's resort to force by invasion of the islands ... All the more therefore, had Britain's response in this instance been a service to the world community which condemned the invader but lacked the means to deny him the fruits of aggression, which demanded his withdrawal but was powerless to enforce its demand.<sup>66</sup>

Such language and action from the General Secretary even led to calls from within the House of Lords for the government to consider requesting Commonwealth assistance in the future security of the islands along the same lines as the Zimbabwe Monitoring Force.<sup>67</sup> Ramphal certainly impressed the FCO with his support but that support was not out of any feeling of duty he felt towards Britain, as Thatcher's use of the word 'patriotism' may suggest. Ramphal continually emphasised the role of a principle in the conflict and underlined that it was of insurmountable importance for the Commonwealth nations. He believed in the solidarity of the member states of the Commonwealth and Britain's membership of the union meant establishing lines of communication and offering of assistance were made easier but the fact that Britain specifically had been offended by Argentina's invasion was not the most important reason for Ramphal's support. The Secretary-General believed that Argentina had violated decency and international law in invading the islands and it was defence of these principles for which he placed his and the Commonwealth's support firmly on the side of Britain. Supporting self-determination was a continuation of Commonwealth policy and was an issue that the office of Secretariat had supported since its inception. Therefore Ramphal's support for Britain was the natural progression of this policy.

#### ***5.4.2. A union of individual nations***

The words of the General Secretary certainly gave some credence to Thatcher's recollection of Commonwealth support; however, when considering the reactions from the Commonwealth to the outbreak of the crisis, one must also look at how the individual

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<sup>66</sup> Extracts from Shridath Ramphal 'Not Britain's Cause Alone' speech made to the Commonwealth Press Union, 15 June 1982.

<sup>67</sup> 'Commonwealth Interest in Falklands,' Letter to the Editor from Lord Dudley, the *Times*, 22 June 1982.

members responded.<sup>68</sup> In doing so, the influence of other factors on Commonwealth reactions to the crisis and dispute is understood; and the same factors that were prevalent in European reflections on the crisis become evident again. Ramphal was a committed ‘Commonwealth man’, whose job was upholding the Commonwealth ethos and to represent the general opinion of all Commonwealth states.<sup>69</sup> However, governments of the member nations each held individual policy interests which shaped their own reaction to the crisis. They were not solely committed to the ethos of the Commonwealth and the nations with interests in Latin America sought answers as to how Britain was preventing further escalation of the crisis.<sup>70</sup> These outside influences and considerations meant that many of Britain’s Commonwealth partners could not go much further in their support of Britain than the initial condemnation of the Argentine attack. Rather, they required Britain to keep them fully informed of developments on peace proposals as well as British intentions regarding how the Task Force was to be used as well as refraining from outright support when the British deployed military force. In their response to the attack, the nations of the Commonwealth were not motivated by a strong affiliation with Britain as a fellow Commonwealth member but had many considerations that they had to account for when forming their policy towards the crisis.

At the outbreak of the conflict, most Commonwealth nations highlighted their commitment to self-determination and the settlement of disputes through peaceful means as they condemned the Argentine invasion. Several leaders wrote courteous letters to Thatcher which outlined such. However, in addition to their affirmation for these principles, they did also highlight that they desired the situation to be resolved through peaceful means. Prime Minister Price of Belize wrote, ‘[p]lease accept assurances that Belize strongly supports the principle of self-determination and the settlement of disputes by peaceful means and deplores and condemns armed invasion and the use of coercion as policy.’<sup>71</sup> President Burnham of Guyana stated that his government ‘called for an urgent return to negotiations for a peaceful solution’<sup>72</sup> and Trudeau, a leader who had developed close relations to

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<sup>68</sup> Thatcher’s recall of the Commonwealth support being steadfast. Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years*, 220.

<sup>69</sup> Barbara Ward, *One World to Share*, 1.

<sup>70</sup> The Commonwealth Caribbean states were also members of the OAS and were particularly concerned with the escalation of fighting. This is discussed in more detail later in this chapter.

<sup>71</sup> Prime Minister Price of Belize to Thatcher, 5 April 1982, THCR 3/1/20 f21.

<sup>72</sup> President Burnham of Guyana to Thatcher, 8 April 1982, THCR 3/1/20 f44.



Thatcher, stated that his government stood, 'ready to assist in any other efforts which could lead to an acceptable and peaceful resolution of the crisis.'<sup>73</sup> In the same sentence these leaders coupled their support for self-determination which Britain defended with immediate calls to seek a peaceful resolution to the crisis. Argentina had blatantly and deliberately violated international law and also ignored the democratic wish of the islands' inhabitants. As such, it was easy for the Commonwealth states to condemn these actions. However, in turn, Britain's willingness to risk open conflict to retake the islands threatened peace in the region. Commonwealth nations such as Belize and Canada were also members of the OAS. An open conflict threatened the interests of these nations on their own continent. As such, it is unsurprising that these nations emphasised their preference for a peaceful settlement on the crisis.

Only a few nations offered further practical assistance, and these were the nations who had closer relationships with Britain fostered through relations in other areas such as trade. The Australian government donated \$750,000 raised through a national appeal to the families of the victims as well as openly allowed Britain to delay the sale of HMS *Invincible* to Australia, and recalled its Ambassador from Buenos Aires.<sup>74</sup> The Canadian government recalled its ambassador from Argentina and placed a ban on the sale of military equipment to Argentina in addition to banning import and export credits. Trudeau also wrote to Galtieri personally condemning the actions of the Argentine Government.<sup>75</sup> The New Zealand government broke off diplomatic relations with Argentina as well as banning all trade, supply of arms and military material and export credits with Argentina.<sup>76</sup> The government acted in such a way when much of New Zealand popular opinion was against this. Calls were made in the New Zealand press for the government to be wary of supporting the British without a full appreciation of the nature and origins of the conflict as well as ensuring Britain would not escalate the crisis.

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<sup>73</sup> Prime Minister Trudeau of Canada to Thatcher, 8 April 1982, THCR 3/1/20 f52.

<sup>74</sup> Details of Australian National Appeal, FCO 107/510.

<sup>75</sup> Summary of Commonwealth Reactions to the Falklands Crisis - Canada, FCO7/4573 f22.

<sup>76</sup>. Summary of Commonwealth Reactions to the Falklands Crisis – New Zealand, FCO7/4573 f22.



Figure 1: 'Falklands War Cartoon', the New Zealand Truth, April 1982

Moore has suggested that Muldoon was hoping to secure more favourable trade agreements with the UK. This is further indication of the underlying motives behind Commonwealth support of Britain during the conflict. It was significant that Muldoon offered support to Britain in a military conflict when much of his own public opinion was against it, however, it was not done out of any strong feeling towards the crisis but rather to gain concessions from Britain in other areas.<sup>77</sup> It is from a letter written by Thatcher to Muldoon when the British Prime Minister used the word patriotism in relation to the Commonwealth support of Britain during the crisis.<sup>78</sup> Thatcher had best relations, of all the Commonwealth nations, with the leaders of Australia, Canada and New Zealand and it was with those that she had most interaction during the conflict. This goes some way to explaining her assertion of the Commonwealth's 'patriotism' for Britain. However, 'patriotic' is not a term that can be used to describe Anglospheric support for Britain during the crisis. The support of the so-called white Commonwealth nations was very limited. Australia and Canada both returned their ambassadors to Argentina after only a few weeks when it became apparent that military conflict was likely and both refrained from making public statements of support of British

<sup>77</sup> Charles Moore, *Margaret Thatcher Volume II*, 227.

<sup>78</sup> Thatcher to Muldoon, 11 June 1982, THCR 3/1/22 Part I.

military action.<sup>79</sup> Only New Zealand offered any support for the British military campaign when Muldoon offered to release the frigate HMNZS *Canterbury* to take over some of the NATO obligations of the Royal Navy to free up more ships for use in the South Atlantic.<sup>80</sup> Similar to other nations, Australia and Canada could condemn the aggression shown by Argentina and support efforts to find peaceful resolution. However, despite their close ties to Britain, the governments in Canberra and Ottawa did not take sides in the military conflict to settle a sovereignty dispute. When considering the support initially offered to Britain by the Anglospheric Commonwealth nations, it is important to note the context this was offered in. There had not been any military engagement between Britain and Argentina and efforts were on-going to find a diplomatic solution to the crisis. When hostilities in the South Atlantic escalated to conflict, Australia and Canada refrained from offering further support to the British. This implies that their support for Britain was motivated by other interests. Any commitment the Australian or Canadian governments felt to support Britain was surpassed by their desire for a peaceful solution which best protected their interests. As such, to apply the term ‘patriotism’ to the Commonwealth during the crisis misrepresents the nature of their reactions.<sup>81</sup>

Throughout the conflict, the CCD kept detailed summaries of the different country’s responses to the conflict.<sup>82</sup> These files highlight the fact that not every Commonwealth nation was fully supportive of the UK action during the conflict. India outright refused to condemn the Argentine actions much to the aggravation of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The Indian government balanced both its rejection of violence with its own anti-colonialist principles. Although many of the African members of the Commonwealth rejected the idea that the conflict revolved the issue of colonialism, the colonial history of the islands was still an issue of importance in other areas of the world.<sup>83</sup> Even further than that, other than the release of HMNZ *Canterbury* by New Zealand, no country offered open

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<sup>79</sup> The Canadian ambassador returned on 21 April and the Australian ambassador returned on 28 April.

<sup>80</sup> New Zealand were the only nation in the Commonwealth to offer any form of practical support for the Task Force.

<sup>81</sup> Summary of the reactions of the Commonwealth, FCO 7/4573.

<sup>82</sup> These were done fortnightly throughout the conflict and held on record at FCO 7/4573 and FCO 7/4574.

<sup>83</sup> R.N. Dales of the South Asian Department to Mr T. David of the CCD highlights that the High Commissioner for India had been requested to push Mrs Gandhi (Indian Prime Minister) for a proper response to on India’s position on the conflict, FCO 7/4573 f61.

and forthright support for the British military efforts to retake the islands. Rather a large number of governments released statements in which they rejected the use of force as a means to settle the dispute namely Bahamas, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Nigeria, Seychelles, Sri Lanka and Swaziland.<sup>84</sup> Jamaica had urged ‘both Governments to exercise restraint’ and Singapore and Sierra Leone had expressed hopes that nothing would be done to further aggravate the situation.<sup>85</sup> This caused an awkward situation for the British government when, on 19 April at PMQs, a Conservative backbencher asked the Prime Minister what assistance had actually been offered by Commonwealth nations.<sup>86</sup> The question resulted in a discussion within the FCO about how to answer and the decision was taken to deflect when only three Commonwealth countries had actually introduced practical measures in an attempt to force the Argentine withdrawal.<sup>87</sup> There was certainly awareness in the FCO that the support from the Commonwealth had not been robust. On the sinking of the *Belgrano* on 2 May, the scene of the first loss of life in the conflict, no Commonwealth government made a public statement. It was difficult for either Ramphal or any individual Commonwealth nation to condemn Argentina’s actions when Britain had responded in kind and remained steadfast in their resolution not to negotiate on the key issue of sovereignty. The lack of support for the British military effort to retake the islands highlights that Commonwealth support for Britain during the conflict had limitations and was rather reserved to the rejection of violence as a means to settle disputes.

Further evidence for the concerns of the Commonwealth can be seen in the regular meetings between Commonwealth High Commissioners in London, two of which were held during the conflict. Some nations such as Kenya continued to offer support by rejecting claims that this was a colonial issue but many High Commissioners often put forward concerns about the outbreak of fighting as well as the developments of peace proposals in the hope that a non-violent resolution to the conflict could be reached. At these meetings, Pym echoed the sentiments that Ramphal had used trying to invoke the spirit of the Commonwealth and that the issue in the South Atlantic was ‘not only a British one but an

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<sup>84</sup> Summaries of Commonwealth responses to the Falklands Conflict, FCO 7/4573 f49.

<sup>85</sup> Summaries of Commonwealth responses to the Falklands Conflict, FCO 7/4573 f50.

<sup>86</sup> Harvey Proctor’s submission for Prime Minister’s Questions, 19 April 1982, FCO 7/4573 f61.

<sup>87</sup> Barltrop to Onslow on Mr Harvey Proctor’s submission to Prime Minister’s Questions, 19 April 1982, FCO 7/4573 f62.

international one as well.<sup>88</sup> However, he found himself having to answer questions about the developments of peace proposals as well as reaffirming Britain's stand on the principle of self-determination amongst the very real concern at the escalation of the crisis. This is crucial when considering Commonwealth response to the conflict as it indicates a concern among some nations that Britain was using self-determination as a justification for the conflict to mask Britain's ulterior motivations. Additionally, it highlights a concern over how far Britain was going in defence of self-determination forgoing peace efforts. When asked by the High Commissioner of the Bahamas about whether the islands would ever be ceded to Argentina, the Secretary of State responded by saying although not likely, it was possible 'should the Falklanders ever desire it'.<sup>89</sup> In responding in this way, Pym was reaffirming that Britain was not determined to hold the islands under any circumstance but was defending the islanders' rights to choose their own future. Pym was attempting to maintain the focus of the conversation on the principles which the Commonwealth supported as opposed allowing the conversation to divert onto Britain's refusal to negotiate. The support offered to the UK was clearly based on principles which the UK was defending. The military conflict in which Britain was engaged complicated matters. Letters exchanged at the resolution of the conflict underpin this as many of those who did write offered thanks that the violence was over as opposed to congratulating Britain on any military victory won. The letters congratulated Britain for achieving success on the principles it defended rather than the means used to defend them, 'the creation of a stable international community lies in adherence to certain international principles including the right of self-determination and the peaceful settlement of disputes.'<sup>90</sup>

#### ***5.4.3. The Non-Aligned Movement and the Organisation of American States***

Many of the Commonwealth nations were also part of the Non-Aligned Movement and the Organisation of American States. The Caribbean Commonwealth nations were part of the OAS along with Canada and many of the African members of the Commonwealth were part

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<sup>88</sup> Record of Secretary of State's meeting with Commonwealth High Commissioners, 5 May 1982, FCO 7/4573 f71.

<sup>89</sup> Record of Secretary of State's meeting with Commonwealth High Commissioners (continued), 5 May 1982, FCO 7/4573 f72.

<sup>90</sup> Example Prime Minister Adams of Barbados to Thatcher, 16 June 1982, THCR 3/1/22 Part 2 f6.

of the NAM. Chapter Five of this thesis discusses the reactions of the Latin American nations of the OAS in greater depth. However, at this stage, it is important to discuss how the Commonwealth nations acted in the meetings of these organisations. Argentina focussed their diplomatic efforts in the OAS and NAM and the Commonwealth reaction to Buenos Aires' call for assistance reinforces the themes in the Commonwealth reaction to British requests for support.

The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) was a group of states that were not formally aligned with or against any major power bloc. In the Havana declaration of 1979, Fidel Castro outlined the purpose of the movement as ensuring 'the national independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and security of non-aligned countries' in their 'struggle against imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, racism and all forms of foreign aggression, occupation, domination, interference or hegemony as well as against great power and bloc politics.'<sup>91</sup> By 1982, the movement had 95 members and made up just under two thirds of the United Nations General Assembly. Castro championed the Argentine position in the dispute in the NAM. On 14 May 1982, he wrote to all the heads of government of NAM members pressing that the conflict was a, 'colonial war ... about to reach its most painful and criminal stage' which 'the imperial powers are trying to turn into a lesson for all third world countries.'<sup>92</sup> Castro was attempting to invoke a sense of commonality between former colonies and Argentina. This sentiment was echoed in the Argentine press, '[c]olonialism is dead, and Great Britain has accepted the fact, except in the case of Argentina's southern Atlantic islands.'<sup>93</sup> However, the relationship between Argentina and the African nations in the NAM had been soured through Argentina's support for the South African government. As recently as 1981, Argentina had held discussions with South Africa over the formation of a South Atlantic Pact and in January 1982, Costa Mendez had attempted to distance Argentina from association with 'third world' nations by proclaiming that Argentinians were 'white and Christian.'<sup>94</sup> As such, Argentina looked to make 'a first

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<sup>91</sup> Fidel Castro, 6th Summit Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement, 9 September 1979, accessed 16 January 2017, available at [http://cns.miis.edu/nam/documents/Official\\_Document/6th\\_Summit\\_FD\\_Havana\\_Declaration\\_1979\\_Whole.pdf](http://cns.miis.edu/nam/documents/Official_Document/6th_Summit_FD_Havana_Declaration_1979_Whole.pdf).

<sup>92</sup> Castro to Heads of Government of NAM, 14 May 1982, FCO 99/1108.

<sup>93</sup> *La Prensa*, 2 April 1982.

<sup>94</sup> *Der Malwinen/Falkland Konflikt im Spiegel der lateinamerikanischen Presse* (Hamburg: Institut für Iberoamerikakunde), x.

class ally of countries it had fought nationally and internationally, in political terms.<sup>95</sup> When Costa Mendez spoke to the representatives of the NAM members on 4 June, he spoke of the continued fight of the South African people against apartheid. His comments were 'greeted with laughter by some African representatives who recalled that Argentina had never previously supported the efforts against South Africa.'<sup>96</sup> The Argentine portrayal of the conflict as similar to the independence struggles in Africa did not galvanise much support. Argentina had been an ardent supporter of the South African government until the outbreak of the Falklands crisis, and this had caused deterioration in relations between Buenos Aires and African governments. Additionally, the key difference between the Argentine claim to the Falkland Islands and the independence struggles of African nations was that in the case of African nations, independence had been the expressed will of the majority of the population. The expressed will of the Falkland Islanders was to remain British and this further weakened sympathy for Argentina among African nations. As such, the Argentine rhetoric in the NAM did little to persuade the members outside Latin America that the dispute was a colonial struggle.

In the OAS, the British Caribbean states were distrusting of the relationship between Argentina and Cuba. The English-speaking nations in the Caribbean had distrusted Cuba's close relationship with the USSR and countries such as Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago only joined the OAS in the early 1970s on the condition they were not to be bound by the resolutions regarding Cuba.<sup>97</sup> Cuba had risen to prominence in the OAS during the 1960s with Fidel Castro becoming an influential figure in the organisation. Castro attempted to motivate Latin American governments to place OAS support firmly behind Argentina.<sup>98</sup> He also attempted to persuade the nations of the Caribbean to do the same, referring to the USA as 'the enemy of all Latin American and Caribbean peoples' when the Reagan administration placed its support behind Britain.<sup>99</sup> However, the Caribbean Commonwealth nations were wary that Castro had a goal to create tension between the USA and Latin America with the governments of Jamaica, Guyana and Grenada particularly concerned with the growing influence of the USSR on the American continent.<sup>100</sup> As such, the British Caribbean states

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<sup>95</sup> 'Insólitas alianzas', *Uno más Uno*, 3 May 1982.

<sup>96</sup> Summary of meeting of NAM, 4 June 1982, FCO 99/1108.

<sup>97</sup> Krepp, 'Between the Cold War and the Global South,' 151.

<sup>98</sup> *Ibid*, 152.

<sup>99</sup> Cuban Government Statement on the Falklands Conflict, 1 May 1982, FCO 99/1108.

<sup>100</sup> Krepp, 'Between the Cold War and the Global South,' 155.

engaged in ‘bitter disputes’ with their Latin American counterparts in the OAS over the resolutions supporting Argentina. Eventually, the Latin American nations won the disputes and OAS resolutions championed the Argentine stance on sovereignty as they typically had but the British Caribbean states displayed a preference for the Commonwealth position on the conflict. Rather the Commonwealth states again were influenced by their wider policy interests, suspect of the growing influence of Cuba in the region, echoing themes seen in the Commonwealth support for Britain.

### **5.5. The Conflict’s legacy within the Commonwealth**

To understand the reflections of the Commonwealth, one must evaluate the legacy the crisis left in the Commonwealth. The links created between the Commonwealth and Britain during the conflict were forgotten as new issues and tension emerged in the years immediately following 1982. The Commonwealth became dominated by the issues of apartheid and the US invasion of Grenada, with only fleeting mention of the Falklands crisis at any of the subsequent CHOGMs. One could speculate that the British assumed Commonwealth support would remain so long as the focus of the dispute was on self-determination as after June 1982 there is very little recorded discussion between the Commonwealth and the FCO or Prime Minister’s Office concerning the islands. After 1982, Britain focussed its diplomatic efforts regarding the dispute to the UNGA and the Commonwealth seemed happy for all discussion relating to sovereignty of the islands to take place in that realm. Further, there appears to be no documented evidence of the British attempting to rally Commonwealth support for the Falklands resolutions that were voted on annually in the UN. The subsequent voting and actions of the member states of the Commonwealth only highlighted their desire to avoid another armed conflict over the issue. They began to implore Britain to negotiate with Argentina and rejected any idea that Argentina had forfeited the right to any further talks on the sovereignty issue through their action. The election of a democratic government in Buenos Aires and British unwillingness to negotiate led to the Commonwealth nations abandoning solidarity with Britain over the islands.

Even before the US invasion of Grenada, the plans for the agenda for the 1983 CHOGM in New Delhi show that there would have been only fleeting discussion of the conflict or dispute. Thatcher commented to Ramphal that ‘perhaps it would be useful’ for



her to update her peers on Britain's plans for the islands.<sup>101</sup> In the communiqué released at the end of the meeting, the Falklands dispute was only given a small paragraph which simply stated that the leaders had the opportunity to debate the matter in the UNGA and that they reaffirmed their support for the principle of self-determination and 'for the people of the Falkland Islands to live in freedom and security.'<sup>102</sup> For both the British and the other member states, the Commonwealth was no longer the best arena for the dispute to be discussed. It was in the UNGA that further votes or resolutions on the matter would be passed and there was no member state that would not have the ability to express its view in the UN. That is not to say that the Commonwealth would not have any more impact on the dispute but its removal from the CHOGM agendas was representative of the fact that the crisis did not alter Britain's position in the Commonwealth nor did it have any direct impact on the other issues that became the focal point of Commonwealth attention after the conflict. The Commonwealth responded to the Argentine invasion as one would expect it to given the Commonwealth ethos that had become ever more important during Ramphal's tenure as Secretary General. That ethos also influenced the reflections of the Commonwealth's member states on the sovereignty dispute after the conflict.

At this point, it is worth briefly comparing the reaction of the Commonwealth to the crisis with its reaction to the US invasion of Grenada given the similarities of the two situations. Grenada was a member of the Commonwealth with Queen Elizabeth II as its head of state. Following internal strife, on 19 October 1983, Prime Minister Maurice Bishop was executed and a far-left government, titled the Revolutionary Military Council, was formed under the leadership of Hudson Austin. On 25 October, United States military forces invaded the island to force the removal of Hudson. This was met with widespread condemnation in the UN, with a particularly strong reaction from the Commonwealth. On 2 November, a resolution passed in the UNGA by a vote of 108 to 9 which condemned the US invasion as 'a flagrant violation of international law', echoing similar sentiments expressed over Argentina's invasion of the Falklands, with all Commonwealth states, but the UK, voting in favour. The invasion was the focus of the discussion at the 1983 CHOGM at New Delhi and the communiqué released at the end of the summit requested the Secretary General 'to

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<sup>101</sup> Thatcher to Ramphal (Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting) [agenda], 23 September 1983, PREM 19/969 f21.

<sup>102</sup> Acland minute to Coles ("The Communiqué") [progress report on drafting of communique for New Delhi Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting], 23 October 1983, THCR 1/10/64.

undertake a study ... of the special needs of such states [as Grenada] consonant with the right to sovereignty and territorial integrity that they shared with all nations.’<sup>103</sup>

The results of this report were detailed in the communiqué after the 1985 CHOGM. The Commonwealth committed itself to defending the rights of small states which ‘did not have the means to defend themselves’ and also called on the United Nations to ‘safeguard the security of vulnerable states, and that the United Nations Secretary General should play a more active role ... in responding to requests from a state feeling itself under military threat.’<sup>104</sup> This was a strong response especially considering how the Commonwealth had reacted to the Argentine invasion. However, the notable difference is that Britain had the means to defend its territory from Argentine transgressions. British victory in the conflict had re-established the accepted wish of the islanders and ultimately the situation was resolved. The Grenadians were unable to do that themselves and the United States had been able to enforce its own will on a foreign people. Although the USA claimed that they had received requests for assistance from elements of the Grenadian population, the Commonwealth reaction to the invasion gave a sense that the US were usurping, through violent means, the Grenadians right to self-determination.<sup>105</sup> In doing so, the Commonwealth echoed its reaction to the Falklands crisis, placing the focus of any such dispute and the wishes and desires of the inhabitants of the affected islands. The Commonwealth was still defending the right of self-determination and in the 1983 and 1985 communiqués asserted that the self-determination of the populations was paramount. Further, the US action had the potential to set a precedent for other large nations to enforce their will over smaller ones, a concern expressed by Britain as justification for the military operations to retake the Falklands in 1982. Of particular concern to the Commonwealth was Guatemala’s claim to Belize, and South Africa’s aggression towards smaller land-locked states in southern Africa. The Commonwealth was continuing its policy of encouraging the settlement of disputes through peaceful means. There was no deviation from Commonwealth policy between the Falkland Islands and Grenada but rather the differing

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<sup>103</sup> Ramphal note to Heads of Delegation (Revised drafts of communique paragraphs on Grenada), 26 November 1983, THCR1/10/65 f54.

<sup>104</sup> CHOGM Statement: The Nassau Communiqué, 22 October 1985, PREM 19/1688 f73.

<sup>105</sup> Ramphal note to Heads of Delegation (Revised drafts of communique paragraphs on Grenada), 26 November 1983, THCR1/10/65 f54.

capabilities of the British and Grenadian governments meant that a stronger Commonwealth reaction was required.

At further meetings held during the 1980s, the Falkland Islands were not mentioned at all but disagreements between Britain and the Commonwealth matched voting patterns in the UNGA.<sup>106</sup> By the time of 1983 summit, Thatcher was at odds with almost all other Heads of Government over the issue of South Africa and by the time of the 1985 summit in Nassau, relations had reached a low as consensus among Commonwealth members in the communiqué was broken by Britain. The communiqué released afterwards included the phrase ‘with the exception of Britain’ and never before had a member state insisted its disagreement with a clause be noted.<sup>107</sup> As Britain argued with the Commonwealth over the effectiveness of sanctions, the feeling of irony was not lost on the other member states given how strongly Britain had pushed its international partners for sanctions against Argentina. In the UNGA, the annual November vote on the islands turned sour for the FCO. In 1984, many of its Commonwealth partners in the Caribbean and Africa voted for the pro-Argentine resolution calling for Britain to return to negotiation on sovereignty and without including any reference to self-determination of the islanders.<sup>108</sup> They highlighted that they rejected the use of violence and wanted to take the course most likely to avoid any further armed conflict which was negotiation, reflecting Commonwealth calls for Britain to negotiate and compromise over the issue of South Africa. It is surprising that Commonwealth nations rejected the addition of the self-determination cause. However, the effect of adding a self-determination cause would have been minimal, given the already well-known desire of the islanders and the options presented may not have fully co-operated with the islanders wishes so the extent to which they would be ‘self-determining’ their own future was debateable. Rather the focus of the resolution and Commonwealth voting was on Britain to negotiate. The resolution represented a desire for a maintenance of peace and order which seemed more likely given a democratic government held office in Argentina. In 1985, India accused Britain of returning to colonial attitudes with Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi commenting ‘[t]hese are the sort of reasons Britain gave to all the countries for not giving them independence when we were under British rule. It’s better for you, they said. You’re not

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<sup>106</sup> See Ingram, ‘Thatcher and Ramphal’ for a summary of the Communiqués released after CHOGMs in 1985, 1987 and 1989.

<sup>107</sup> CHOGM Statement: The Nassau Communiqué, 22 October 1985, PREM 19/1688 f73.

<sup>108</sup> Falklands action at the United Nations 1984, FCO 7/5487.

capable of doing it.’<sup>109</sup> As Britain had seemingly ignored the UNGA Resolution of 1984 concerning the Falkland Islands by not engaging in negotiation with the Argentine government, the comments of the Indian government became representative of wider Commonwealth feeling on the dispute. In 1985, Canada voted for another pro-Argentine resolution again calling for Britain to return to the negotiating table. This vote came as a shock to the British and Thatcher intervened personally to press her case to Trudeau, as well as the FCO writing to its Canadian counterpart to express the unwelcome nature of the vote.<sup>110</sup> As such, by 1985, Britain found itself isolated even from its closest allies in the Commonwealth as the other member states pushed for Britain to negotiate on the South Africa issue and Falklands dispute.

Commonwealth reactions to the dispute after the conflict highlight that the support offered in 1982 was based on principles which the Commonwealth already stood for but also were tied into a number of other factors. Britain did not have an outright leadership of the Commonwealth nor the ability to expect support from its peers within the union. Britain’s determination to resist negotiation with Argentina as well as its refusal to accept the several UN resolutions on the future of the islands were in direct contradiction with the Commonwealth’s respect for maintenance of international peace and order. By the time of the 1987 CHOGM in Vancouver, relations between Britain and the Commonwealth were at an all-time low and consensus was broken again. Within the UNGA on the matter of the Falkland Islands, Britain had been abandoned by all but a few of its Commonwealth partners.

## **5.6. Conclusion**

The Commonwealth support for Britain during the crisis matched themes discussed in the reaction of European nations. As a political organisation, it certainly sympathised with the British position and condemned the Argentine invasion. The role played by Ramphal was an important one and proved of great aid to the British efforts, however, this was certainly not out of any feeling of commonality with a fellow member state. Indeed, the support could be expected but this was because Argentina had broken two key principles around which the Commonwealth was formed: the right to self-determination and the rejection of violence.

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<sup>109</sup> Ingram, ‘Thatcher and Ramphal,’ 786

<sup>110</sup> Notes for bilateral meeting with Canadian foreign Minister, Falkland Islands Department, 4 December 1985, FCO 7/6377 f14.

These were two key aspects of the Commonwealth ethos and as such, Argentina's obvious rejection of international law meant it was natural for the Commonwealth to put its support on the British side during the conflict. Further, the true believers in the importance of the Commonwealth believed in consensus among its nations, standing together when they saw violation of what they deemed to be morally right. The importance of principle was never doubted by the Commonwealth and for those such as Ramphal, Britain stood in defence of the principles that maintained peace and defended the democratic right of people. The Commonwealth's support of Britain reflected these aspects.

To a large extent, it was also the importance of principle that led to Commonwealth nations being selective in which elements of the British cause they supported. They refrained from outright support of the use of the Task Force and regularly offered opinion that Britain should seek a peaceful resolution. In all their communications with the British Government over the issue, the member states underlined their support for the self-determination of people with a strongly expressed desire for a peaceful resolution to the conflict. Just as they condemned the Argentine invasion of the islands, they implored the British government to exercise restraint. There was no separation between the violence being used on either side, just a mutual expression of regret that the situation had ended in open conflict. Given the growing importance of the Commonwealth ethos, nothing was unexpected or particularly extraordinary about how the member states responded. The crisis left no lasting legacy on the Commonwealth which would give Thatcher any sort of leverage in the debates to come. As Britain argued with its Commonwealth colleagues, the member states moved their support away from Britain in crucial votes within the UN. The crisis represented a period where the Commonwealth and Britain shared a principle that had been threatened. The years after the conflict, represented a period where those principles diverged, and Britain found itself alienated from the Commonwealth members. Rather, the Commonwealth nations pushed their desire to see peaceful negotiation reach a permanent solution to the dispute, a stand with which Britain disagreed.

Unlike the other areas discussed in this thesis, when judged against its own aims and ambitions, the evidence suggests that during the Falklands crisis, the Commonwealth worked effectively as an international organisation with a coherent policy and approach maintained through all its member states fostered through a shared ethos. Ultimately, crisis threatened affected the interests of each member state in a manner that prompted a coherent response among most the member states. Since the appointment of Ramphal as General

Secretary, the Commonwealth had focussed predominantly on the economic development of the Third World and the introduction of racial equality across all of Africa. The Falkland dispute did not threaten these objectives and as such, the significance of the crisis to the Commonwealth was symbolic. In this, the focus of the Commonwealth was to portray the conflict as a threat to self-determination and as such sought to support Britain in restoring the islanders' right to choose their own governance. Ramphal was able to persuade the member nations of the Commonwealth to support Britain in this initiative and although many states had concerns on the escalation of the diplomatic dispute into open conflict, publicly, Commonwealth support was maintained throughout the conflict as it best suited the member states to see Britain succeed. The member states who were also part of the OAS and the NAM continued this support into those other organisations, frustrating Argentine efforts to assimilate Argentina with the 'Third World'. Instead, Commonwealth states remained in support of self-determination of the islanders. It was only after the conflict, that there were public displays of a reduction Commonwealth support for Britain on the issue of the islands. However, even then, the Commonwealth - as an organisation - had pressed its support for the settlement of disputes through peaceful means. All its member nations, with the exception of Britain which refused to negotiate with Argentina, were supportive of this initiative. It was this shared ethos that meant there was a common response among the majority of Commonwealth member states.

Throughout the crisis, the Commonwealth support always remained in favour of the self-determination of the islanders but also for peaceful means to the settlement of disputes. During the years of conflict, this meant that its sympathy lay with Britain's cause, not its action and in the years after, it supported the means most likely to maintain peace. Some nations, such as New Zealand, did offer more practical support but this was in the minority and was also encouraged by other motivations such as fostering stronger links with the British Government. For the member states, after the islanders' desire for the removal of Argentine administration had been fulfilled, support for Britain had to be placed in the wider context of foreign policy interests alongside support for negotiation. Although Thatcher pondered that Commonwealth support was born out of a sense of commonality and loyalty to the British, the reality was that throughout the crisis the Commonwealth remained bound by the principles on which the organisation was founded. Certainly, self-determination was important to Shridath Ramphal and many of the recently independent member states of the Commonwealth. However, so too were the principles of peace and negotiation, principles

which Britain risked compromising through HMG's determination to restore British sovereignty over the islands by any means and in the British refusal to engage with new Argentine governments on the issue of sovereignty in the years after 1982.

## **6. Chapter Five: Support Only in the Appropriate Manner – The OAS and the Falklands Dispute**

As you will see, there is a very considerable gap in perceptions of the Madrid meeting between us and the Argentinians.<sup>1</sup>

### **6.1. Chapter Abstract**

Upon the signing of the Charter of the Organisation of American States in 1948 all signees were united in their agreement that Britain should formally recognise Argentine sovereignty over the Falkland Islands with Buenos Aires' claim outlined in a specific clause in the charter. Although the signees included the USA, Argentine sovereignty over the Falklands was an issue of particular importance for the Latin American nations. The OAS had a long history of attempting to remove European influence from the Latin American region and Britain's retention of the islands was a reminder of colonialism in South America. The United States' commitment to preventing the spread of communism had led successive administrations in Washington to attempt to extend US influence in the Latin American region. As such, Pan-Americanism became entrenched in South America as an ideal to allow governments of the region to operate free from the influence of any nation. However, Argentina was embroiled in many disputes with other Latin American states which influenced other governments' decision-making in reference to the dispute. As such, although traditionally the OAS member states had mostly supported the sovereignty claims of Latin American nations in votes at the UN, when Argentina requested support in 1982, many were hesitant.

This chapter first provides a discussion on Latin American attitudes to Britain and the Falklands before the conflict as well as touching on Argentina's relationship with its neighbouring states. This allows for a fuller discussion on the comparisons that can be drawn between the OAS response and that of the blocs discussed in this thesis. Other on-going disputes of sovereignty, trade and security all shaped how the OAS responded to the conflict and dispute. Further, this chapter touches on the importance of Britain's relationship with nations such as Chile and Peru, discussing what influence British aid to these countries held in the decision of their respective governments. As with Britain and the EEC, Argentina had

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<sup>1</sup> Charles Powell to Thatcher, 3 October 1989, PREM 19/2585 f1.



to resolve other disputes with Latin American states, encouraging members of the OAS to offer more support for the Argentine position in the sovereignty dispute.

The OAS had much capability to support Argentina over the crisis. It could have encouraged member states to offer military support in the way of intelligence, or to enact sanctions against not only Britain but those countries that had enacted sanctions against Argentina. However, the OAS did none of those things. This is a clear indication of the relevant importance of the dispute compared to other interests affecting Latin America in the 1980s. This highlighted that even to an organisation committed to the settlement of sovereignty disputes, the crisis did little in the way of provoking an effective response and neither Argentina nor Britain held enough influence to maintain support for a sustained period.

## **6.2. Introduction**

Unsurprisingly, the crisis provoked the strongest reaction internationally in Latin America. This was not only because of the obvious repercussions the dispute had in Argentina but also it touched on other diplomatic issues that were affecting South American governments.<sup>2</sup> Notwithstanding that Chile, Guatemala and Belize were all involved in similar territorial disputes; the OAS did not generate a shared support for Argentina among its members as the organisation's charter outlined it would. The Argentinians had hoped that the enshrinement of OAS support for Argentine sovereignty over the islands would generate support for its military action in taking the islands but these hopes went unfulfilled. In addition to the fact that Argentina was involved in several political disputes with its Latin American neighbours, the crisis' potential effect on wider political issues in South America meant that support for Argentina among Latin American governments was not strong. Although Panama argued for the Argentine cause during its spell in the UNSC, and Peru attempted to take a central role in the peace negotiations, it would be inaccurate to say that those states were motivated particularly by their support for Argentina's claim to sovereignty

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<sup>2</sup> For the purpose of this chapter the term 'South American' refers to all states on the American continent south of the USA. The term 'Latin America' refers particularly to the states that were prior colonies of Spain and Portugal and where the dominant languages are Spanish or Portuguese.

over the islands.<sup>3</sup> Moreover, the actions of several Latin American governments showed that solidarity among member states of the OAS on colonial issues was ineffective in encouraging support and assistance to the Argentine position in the dispute. The crisis provoked a strong pro-Argentine response among the Hispanic states where the dispute had no effect on other policy, but, just as in other parts of the world, the response of other governments was framed by their wider interests and other policy goals.<sup>4</sup> This was true even of Argentina itself, where a changing domestic situation forced a relaxation of Falklands policy towards the end of the 1980s. This present work analyses the influences of the south-western hemisphere governments in their response to the crisis. In doing so it argues, that for nations such as Chile, the notion of Pan-Americanism – the idea that nations on the American continent should support each other to form a stronger opposition to European influence – was balanced with its own territorial disputes and used as a negotiation tool in other policy areas. For other nations, the Argentine position served as the example to reference throughout the years after the conflict. The crisis put a strain not only on Anglo-Argentine relations but also on European-Latin American relations. Previous chapters have considered the efforts made from European governments to repair these relations and, similarly, Latin American governments were keen to see relations improve. As such, although Pan-Americanism was important, trade benefits that could be achieved through a more definitive resolution to the Falklands dispute led the majority of the OAS to support the 1990 Madrid accords.

### ***6.2.1. Literature review***

Relative to other areas, Latin American reactions to the conflict have attracted significant interest from a range of scholars. Indeed, discussion on Anglo-Argentine relations and the Madrid Accords has dominated much of the historiographical study of the Falklands diplomacy. Peter Calvert and Guillermo Makin have analysed specifics about the

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<sup>3</sup> Argentine strategy aimed to avoid further military conflict with Britain. Operation Rosario counted on the British not responding, whether through will or capability. Countries, such as Peru, that aimed to prevent the British Task Force from retaking the islands by force thus played into this Argentine policy. For further discussion of this see David Rock, *Argentina, 1516–1987: From Spanish Colonisation to Alfonsín* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 156-221.

<sup>4</sup> For the purposes of this present work, the word Hispanic refers to the Spanish-speaking states in South America in addition to Brazil.

relationship between Britain and Argentina in the context of the Falklands with Makin specifically looking at the period between 1980 and 1990.<sup>5</sup> Klaus Dodds has also written on Anglo-Argentine relations in the thirty year period after 1982 inspired by the political change that took place in Buenos Aires in the immediate aftermath of the conflict and the resurgence of the dispute in 2012 when Argentina again publicly pressed its claims for sovereignty over the islands.<sup>6</sup> These works were unable to take advantage of the source base that this study has and have not examined the reaction in a transnational context. FCO files on the Latin American opinions on the dispute have heavily informed the discussion in this present work allowing it to question and substantiate conclusions made in earlier works. As noted previously, this work is limited in its reliance on source material accessible from the UK, however, the sources have been contextualised to appropriately taper the conclusions to highlight features of Latin-American perceptions previously under studied. This includes placing into context what Latin American governments were communicating with the British government and its allies with how the Latin American governments acted and their wider known policy interests. In doing so, the thesis presents a comparative study between differing Latin American perceptions of the crisis and dispute drawing on the similarities evident across the perceptions of different nations.

Alejandro Corbacho has analysed the resumption of diplomatic relations between Britain and Argentina in 1989.<sup>7</sup> However, his work uses primarily Argentine-based sources and uses the discussions that took place between Britain and Argentina as a case study for wider analysis of international negotiation theory. Although there is some similarity in sources used, this present study is different in its focus and offers comparison with the effect of these discussions on other Latin American nations in the context of their own reflections on the crisis and dispute. Felipe Sanfuentes has written of the Chilean reaction to the dispute given its similarity to the Beagle Channel Islands sovereignty debate between Argentina and

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<sup>5</sup> Peter Calvert, 'The Malvinas as a Factor in Argentine Politics' and Guillermo Makin, 'The Nature of Anglo-Argentine Diplomacy,' in *International Perspectives on the Falklands Conflict: a Matter of Life and Death* edited by Alex Danchev (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1992), 210.

<sup>6</sup> Klaus Dodds, 'Stormy Waters: Britain, the Falkland Islands and UK-Argentine Relations' *International Affairs* 88, no. 4, (July 2012): 683-700.

<sup>7</sup> Alejandro Luis Corbacho, 'Pre-negotiation and Mediation: Anglo-Argentine Diplomacy After the Falklands/Malvinas War, 1983–1989' *International Negotiation* 33, no. 3 (2008): 311-339.

Chile in the 1980s.<sup>8</sup> However, whereas Sanfuentes focuses solely on Chile, this study compares the Chilean reaction with other nations in Latin America to highlight its uniqueness and the importance of external factors on Chilean attitudes towards the crisis. It evaluates how Chile's relationship with Britain developed relative to the Falklands dispute with the closeness of the right and the development of a mutually beneficial relationship between Thatcher and Pinochet, a notion suggested by Grace Livingstone, Andy Beckett and Sally-Anne Treharne.<sup>9</sup> The Latin American Bureau, an independent charitable organisation based in the US, offers some transnational perspective in its work on Thatcher and the heads of state in South America, however, this work is limited in its use of sources evaluated with limited recognition of the facts and therefore its conclusions are not well founded in evidence.<sup>10</sup>

Through offering a comparative approach between the governments of Latin America, the present thesis does something that previous histories of the dispute have not. The histories discussed in this section are all written of a national context. In their focus on one actor, they do not show themes in the international reaction to the crisis. By using source material hitherto unavailable, this work highlights that although the dispute was an important issue in Latin America prior to 1982, even these nations tapered their response with reference to wider policy interests. The comparative approach allows this chapter to highlight the common problems both Britain and Argentina faced in gaining support both in South American and in other regions of the world.

Although not as critical as relations with Europe and the US, maintaining good relations with Latin America was important to the British government. In chapter two, this study noted how Latin America was an important sphere of influence for the west and, for the United States, was an area that provided a cornerstone of Cold War foreign policy. Latin America also provided valuable trade to the EEC, holding close ties to Spain and Portugal fostered during the dictatorships of Franco and Salazar in the 1960s and 1970s. Britain came under pressure from its allies to rebuild its relationship with the Latin American region as a

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<sup>8</sup> Felipe Sanfuentes, 'The Chilean Falklands Factor,' 67-83.

<sup>9</sup> Grace Livingstone, *Britain and the Dictatorships of Argentina and Chile, 1973-1982: Foreign Policy, Corporations and Social Movements* (London: Springer, 2018); Andy Beckett, *Pinochet in Piccadilly: Britain and Chile's Hidden History* (London: Faber and Faber, 2002); Sally-Anne Treharne, *Reagan and Thatcher's Special Relationship*, 110.

<sup>10</sup> James Ferguson and Jenny Pearce, *The Thatcher years: Britain and Latin America* (London: Latin American Bureau, 1988).

whole. The importance of South America was not lost on British governments since the end of the Second World War, all of which had shared strong links with several Latin American nations, Argentina included, prior to the conflict. Latin America had purchased a large proportion of British-made military equipment and as such it was beneficial to the British economy for such trade negotiations to resume as soon as was practically possible after the conflict. Further, throughout the Thatcher premiership, the Cold War was a strong factor which influenced British foreign policy. Britain shared the US desire to prevent Soviet influence in South America and keep those nations as valuable allies against communism.

In Latin America, the crisis only assumed importance when it had the potential to affect other policy areas and this framed the international reaction to the conflict. OAS solidarity did little to motivate countries to support Argentina. As an international organisation, the OAS had the potential to place some economic pressure on Britain through the imposition of sanctions as well as diplomatic pressure through distancing itself from Europe and the USA, the UK's principal diplomatic and trade partners. However, other policy interests far outweighed the crisis in relative importance which primarily affected OAS response to the crisis.

### **6.3. Attitudes Before the Conflict**

#### ***6.3.1. American protection from European expansion***

The origins of the OAS can be traced back to US President James Monroe, whose Doctrine of 1823 advocated the formation of an 'American system' free from the influence of the European powers. Gordon Connell-Smith summarised that it declared that the United States 'would regard as a threat to its own peace and security an extension of the European political system to any part of the western hemisphere' whilst also guaranteeing that the US would not interfere in any existing European colonies in the region.<sup>11</sup> The doctrine gave birth to the notion of Pan-Americanism: the principle of political, commercial and cultural cooperation among all countries of North and South America. As the wording of the Monroe Doctrine implied, the basis of Pan-Americanism was the notion that the states on the

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<sup>11</sup> Gordon Connell-Smith, 'The OAS and the Falklands conflict,' *The World Today*, Vol. 38, No. 9 (Sep 1982): 340.

American continent could operate independently of European influence and their common interests were best served working together. Through the nineteenth century, the United States promoted the idea of Pan-Americanism. In 1890, the International Union of American Republics was formed, with a permanent office in London. Its purpose was to protect the American continent from European interference and to promote such sovereignty claims as Argentina's over the Falkland Islands.<sup>12</sup> However, when Britain took possession of the islands in 1832, the United States gave an indication that it had significant interest in maintaining good relations with both Britain and Latin America by offering a more balanced response than the Monroe Doctrine suggested.<sup>13</sup> In doing so, the US pre-empted its reaction to the invasion of the islands in 1982. This created tension between the United States and Latin America which lasted to the dispute in the twentieth century as the USA showed increasing favour for Europe in its foreign policy. Even as early as the nineteenth century, solidarity among American states was reliant on the relevant importance of policy considerations outside of the American continent. Although Monroe had proposed the formation of an organisation such as the OAS, it was clear that the US would not necessarily always prioritise its Latin American interests over its European ones.

Through the twentieth century, the United States became increasingly involved in world affairs which in turn led to a distancing of relations between the US and Latin American nations. Following the end of the Second World War, Latin American nations joined the UN but also opted to enshrine the inter-American system in a treaty and a collective security pact. On 30 April 1948 in Bogota, the Charter of the Organisation of American States was signed, followed by the Rio treaty of mutual assistance eight months later. The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance of 1947 was designed to be in line with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations which recognised the right of the individual or group to self-defence should a member of the group be the victim of attack. The British South Atlantic territories lay in the region covered by the treaty. On signing the treaty, Argentina made a statement which reiterated its claim to the islands to which the United States responded by stating '[s]tates recorded its [*sic*] position that the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro has no effect upon the sovereignty, national or international status of any of the

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<sup>12</sup> For a history of the inter-American system and the OAS, see Gordon Connell-Smith, *The Inter-American System* (London: Oxford University Press, 1966).

<sup>13</sup> The Monroe Doctrine had implied that the United States would intervene militarily to such an action by the British government. Instead, the US government made known their disapproval of the action but did nothing to attempt to force the retreat of the British settlers.

territories included in the region.<sup>14</sup> As signees to the charter, the members of the OAS affirmed their support for the Argentine claim to sovereignty of the islands, however, at this stage, there was no prospect of armed conflict to force the issue and the US made clear that the treaty did not affect the international status of the Falkland Islands. Argentina was not the only nation to claim sovereignty over territories then under British sovereignty. Since 1821, Guatemala laid claim to British Honduras (now Belize) and in 1966 Venezuela laid claim to most of the territory adjacent to British Guyana and as such, there were evident benefits for these states in supporting the Argentine claim to sovereignty. Thirty-four years before the Falklands conflict, there was evident dissatisfaction at British presence in the South Atlantic, highlighting a momentum for anti-colonialist feeling in the region. This united many Latin American nations which all had continuing sovereignty disputes with the British. These issues were continually raised at meetings of the OAS in the years before 1982 but this was a time when many Latin American states' interest in Britain and European affairs was tied up in sovereignty disputes. This being said, it was also evident that prior to 1982, nations with claims over British territory were content to press their claims through diplomatic rhetoric with no prospect of conflict or even sanctions to press the issue further. In this case, it was easy for nations to support each other's sovereignty claims in rhetoric.

The divergence in interests between Latin America and the USA after the Second World War served to heighten the creation of a Latin American identity built against the seemingly stronger relationship that was growing between Europe and North America. In the early years of the Cold War, Latin America was a low-priority region for American governments. Latin American members of the OAS complained that their interests were being neglected in favour of Europe as no military alliance had been built in line with the Rio treaty and the vast majority of US aid went to other parts of the globe. Latin American nations felt the US should honour the Monroe Doctrine and give more aid and attention to South America. However, when US administrations did take an interest in Latin American affairs, they were accused of meddling and interfering.<sup>15</sup> Under the Kennedy administration, the US government pressed aggressive policies against Latin American governments it deemed to be communist. This drew comparisons between the European governments of the nineteenth century and the US. The United States' involvement with the OAS led Latin

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<sup>14</sup> Connell-Smith, 'The OAS and the Falklands Conflict,' 341.

<sup>15</sup> Abraham Lowenthal, *Exporting Democracy: the United States and Latin America, Case Studies* (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1991), 234-261.

American governments frequently to take disputes regarding North American interference in their internal affairs to the United Nations, causing jurisdiction issues between the UN and OAS. Despite US attempts to keep intercontinental disputes in the OAS, continued anger at the failure of US aid and unfavourable trade terms led to Latin American countries to expand their international relationships outside of America.<sup>16</sup> More Latin American nations began to identify themselves with the 'Third World'. The on-going sovereignty disputes in Latin America were resonant of the troubles Britain had with former colonies as shown with India in 1947, Egypt in 1956, and Rhodesia in 1965. The period 1961-1963 saw many Latin American nations join the Non-Aligned Movement, an organisation which in its foundation, in 1961, made a commitment to oppose colonisation, and as such, displayed shared concern over continued imperialistic presence in their own geographical regions.<sup>17</sup> A strong contributing factor for this was undoubtedly the increasing frustration from Latin America towards the US and Western Europe. In years before the Falklands conflict, there was a growing dissatisfaction at the US, and by extensions its European allies, meddling in Latin America affairs with a growing desire among Latin American nations to see such influence from the USA removed. In 1975, the dissatisfaction with the United States manifested itself with the formation of the Latin America Economic System (SELA) which included Cuba in its membership.<sup>18</sup> SELA set out its objective to transform its relationship with developed nations as by 1975 the OAS was no longer representative of a 'special relationship' between the USA and Latin America; Monroe's Pan-Americanism.<sup>19</sup>

### **6.3.2. A multitude of nations**

The large number of Hispanic states in the membership of the OAS further contributed to the creation of a Latin American identity, often subverting the opinion of the English-

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<sup>16</sup> President Kennedy launched the 'Alliance for Progress' programme in 1961 aimed at social and economic development for Latin America. However, its failure led to more calls to form an effective Latin American grouping that excluded the US.

<sup>17</sup> It was former Argentine president, Juan Péron, who is credited with pioneering the 'third position' in world politics between 1946 and 1955. See Loris Zanatta, 'The Rise and Fall of the Third Position: Bolivia, Péron and the Cold War, 1943-1954,' *Desarrollo Económico* 1, no. 1 (June 2005): 1-27.

<sup>18</sup> The Cuban missile crisis in 1963 led to Cuba withdrawing from the OAS. The years between 1963 and 1982 had seen the United States attempt to promote anti-Cuban policies among the other American nations.

<sup>19</sup> Connell-Smith, 'The OAS and the Falklands Conflict,' 342.



speaking nations in the organisation. However, this Latin American identity did not create a coherent policy in foreign affairs among South American governments. Trinidad and Tobago, Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Suriname all became members after 1967. Thirteen members of the OAS were also members of the Commonwealth.<sup>20</sup> The inclusion of such a large number of nations with close links to Britain and Europe caused division with member states from Latin America and led to a period where 'Pan America was in crisis', as said by political scientist William Manger.<sup>21</sup> The OAS had been established to prevent European intervention in American affairs part of which included the promotion of the sovereignty claims of American states over European held territories. Latin American nations with longstanding sovereignty disputes with Britain no longer felt that their interests would be well represented by these new member states and led to a further turning away from the OAS. Suspicion and distrust of developed western nations' intentions for the American continent remained as did the desire to keep powers such as Britain and America from interfering in Latin American affairs.

However, it is important to note that some Latin American nations also held deep distrust with each other and during this period built stronger relations with Europe. The Chilean government historically did not have good relations with Argentine governments. The period 1976-82 had seen heavy military build ups along the border between the two countries on both sides as the Junta wished to display strength and Chile was concerned about the prospect of Argentine invasion. Guatemala still claimed sovereignty over Belize which had led to Belize retaining strong links with the British after its independence in 1981 in order to protect Belizean territory from Guatemalan ambitions. The Falklands dispute had a direct effect on both these disputes given its similarity and so countries such as Chile and Belize would not be so keen to throw their support behind an Argentine attempt to assert its claim over the Falkland Islands.<sup>22</sup> This was important as Latin American nations had to balance their response to the crisis against their own policy objectives. That being said, when

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<sup>20</sup> Antigua and Barbuda; Barbados; Belize; Canada; Dominica; Grenada; Guyana; Jamaica; Saint Kitts and Nevis; Saint Lucia; Saint Vincent and the Grenadines; The Bahamas and Trinidad and Tobago.

<sup>21</sup> William Manger, *Pan America in Crisis: The Future of the OAS – Volume IV* (Public Affairs Press: Washington DC, 1961) 12.

<sup>22</sup> Sanfuentes, 'The Chilean Falklands Factor,' 67.

the conflict broke, Argentina thought it could still rely, from the majority of Latin American nations, on contemporary manifestation of historical objection to European colonialism.

## 6.4. The Conflict

### 6.4.1. *The reoccupation of Las Malvinas*

The FCO files contain extensive documentation on the efforts British officials made to garner support for their Falklands policy among nations around the world. However, there are very few files documenting communication with Latin American nations in this regard. This suggests that HMG made little attempt to gain the support of Latin American governments during the conflict. This deduction is further validated by the fact that no British official or student of the period has ever claimed there were any substantial efforts made by the British government to garner support among the Latin American nations. Instead, Britain relied on the United States and Caribbean nations to use their influence with Hispanic governments to taper the support for Argentina among the countries in South America. The strength of the anti-colonialist feeling in Latin America at that time meant that it would have been futile for Britain to attempt to gain support for its position in the sovereignty dispute. That being said, prior to the conflict the Thatcher government held good relationships with several Latin American nations including Argentina.<sup>23</sup> In the years 1979-1981 Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, and Ecuador had all been beneficiaries of increased levels of aid from Britain and HMG had fostered close relations with the right-wing governments in those countries. This was a policy encouraged by Thatcher's close relationship with Ronald Reagan. Although almost all countries in South America received some level of aid from Britain during these years, Thatcher found a close affiliation with the Heads of Government in those countries with right wing administrations.<sup>24</sup> This aided her desire to show how crucial an ally Britain could be to the United States in the context of the Cold War, as she ensured those countries remained close to the west in a time when Latin America was a cornerstone of US foreign policy, a point noted by Ferguson and Pearce.<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> Chapter 1 outlines some of the military cooperation that had been taking place between Argentina and Britain prior to the Falklands conflict.

<sup>24</sup> Those countries with Communist regimes did not receive aid, such as Cuba.

<sup>25</sup> Ferguson and Pearce, *The Thatcher Years*, 61.

Britain had even held fruitful discussion with the government of Argentina as recent as 1980 regarding the possibility of handing sovereignty of the Falklands to the Argentines, something the labour governments before 1979 had not entertained.<sup>26</sup> These discussions included the possibility of a lease back to Argentina and was the option favoured by Nicholas Ridley, the FCO minister with responsibility for the Falkland Islands, who talked of the need to ‘persuade the islanders of the benefits of a leaseback’.<sup>27</sup> These talks are evidence that the islands were no great obstacle to British-Latin American relations before the conflict and both sides had been able to discuss the sovereignty issue. Rather, both Britain and Latin America had been able to put aside disagreements over the islands and build positive relations in other areas. Although, most Latin American states had signed up to the Charter of the OAS, and thereby supported Argentina’s sovereignty claim, there was no great desire to press the issue at the expense of other matters and there was no particular reaction to Britain’s continued ignorance of the UN resolutions on the islands. In signing the charter of the OAS, the Latin American states served their foreign policy interests in promoting unity between themselves but also maintained strong relations with Britain and Europe: proving that even in 1948, Falklands policy served wider policy interests.

Following the Argentine seizure of the islands, despite generally positive relations, Britain knew that its sovereignty claim and the use of force to retake them would not be supported by the majority of Latin American states. Parsons simply referred to the Latin American support for Argentina in the UN as ‘expected’ and when further debates took place in the years after the conflict, similar language was used to describe the Latin American position in favour of Argentina.<sup>28</sup> This gives clear indications that opinion on the dispute in the Latin American region had not changed since the signing of the Rio treaty in 1948, and Argentina initiating hostilities had not altered the fact that those countries would support Argentina’s sovereignty claim. For those countries which supported the Argentine actions, Argentina could not invade territory that was already its own but was rather reoccupying

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<sup>26</sup> Falkland Islands: Negotiations with Argentina, HO 213/2605, details the discussions held between British and Argentine officials in Berne. Although initially these discussions were supposed to be secret, they became well documented in the debates that would come after the conflict. As noted in Chapter 1, Britain had difficulty in persuading other nations that the conflict warranted an alteration from the pre-1982 position.

<sup>27</sup> Nicholas Ridley message to the FCO, 29 April 1980, ALW 040/325/2 Part C (143-199).

<sup>28</sup> Parsons, ‘Falklands at the UN,’ 170; and as an example, ‘as expected it was not just Argentina but Latin America as a whole that was disturbed by the grave build up in the South Atlantic.’ UKMIS in New York to FCO, 29 September 1983 f508.

land that had been illegally seized from it.<sup>29</sup> These nations were very vocal in their support for Argentina and were among the most active participants in the debates that took place in the United Nations and other organisations in the early months of the crisis. However, it is important to note that at this time, the focus of nations supporting Argentina was to prevent the outbreak of further conflict by hindering Britain's efforts to justify a military response. Although Argentina had used a military offensive to take the islands, very few lives had been lost in the action but any longer, more extensive conflict resulting from a British response had much more potential costs to Latin America in terms of trade and relations with Europe. For the pro-Argentine contingent in Latin America, these early debates were an attempt to prevent that. It is through study of these debates and Latin American governments' interaction with one another that the first characteristics of their response to the crisis can be understood.

Panama was the first Latin American state to attempt to disrupt British policy towards the crisis following the Argentine seizure of the islands. Panama had the means of playing an important role in the Argentine UN strategy given it was the only Latin American member of the Security Council. Argentina found itself relying on Panama to frustrate British attempts to force an Argentine withdrawal from the islands and preventing the UN legitimising any military response from the UK. Panama had already shown its desire of wanting to remove western military powers from the South Atlantic. The Panamanian military had shown its inclination to interfere with domestic politics through a series of coups in the 1960s and held considerable influence over the office of president. The Panamanian military had been angered by continued US military presence in Panama as well as US control of the Panama Canal. In 1977, Panama concluded the Torrijos-Carter treaties which agreed to the transfer of all US military bases and the Panama Canal to the control of the Panamanian government by 1999.<sup>30</sup> British bases in the South Atlantic seemed similar to the US military presence in Panama and for a country with a historical distrust of colonialism, support for the Argentine military government's position could have been expected. When Argentine Foreign Minister, Costa Mendez, addressed the Security Council on 3 April, he focussed his speech on Argentina's historical claims to the islands iterating

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<sup>29</sup> Paraphrase of Jeanne Kirkpatrick in Haig to Schultz, 04 April 1982, file: Falklands War, box 91365, Executive Secretariat NSC Country Files, Falklands War, Ronald Reagan Library.

<sup>30</sup> For a full history see Robert Harding, *A History of Panama* (Santa Barbara: Greenwood Press, 2006).

that Argentina had ‘done nothing more than recover national territory that had been seized by the British by an illegitimate act of force in 1833’.<sup>31</sup> This resonated well with Panama’s attempts to retake military bases from the US. The Panamanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jorge Illucea, gave support to Argentina when he attempted to delay the passing of the British draft resolution that had been tabled on 2 April 1982. Parsons told London that Illucea spoke in ‘vitriolic terms’ in support of Mendez’s statement before proposing a delay of a few hours when the text of an alternative draft could be considered.<sup>32</sup> Although this proposition was defeated, it did still require a vote and delayed the debate on the British draft, much to the frustration of the British officials.<sup>33</sup> This was indicative of the role the Panamanian government would play through the conflict. As noted by David Rock, the Argentine strategy in retaking the islands had always been to avoid a conflict with any substantial British forces but crucially miscalculated Britain’s capacity to respond to the invasion of the islands.<sup>34</sup> In continually delaying and frustrating Britain’s efforts to have the use of the Task Force justified, Panama supported this Argentine strategy. Panama’s traditional distrust of US and European interference in Latin America meant that it was natural for Panama to support Argentina diplomatically for what Panama saw as recovery of Argentina’s sovereign territory.

During the further debate on 4 April regarding the resolution, Panama continued its policy of disruption by attempting to prevent the United Kingdom from voting. Illucea attempted to claim under Article 27(3) of the Charter ‘in decisions under Chapter VI [Pacific Settlement of Disputes] ... a party to a dispute – in this case the United Kingdom – shall abstain from voting.’<sup>35</sup> The British countered by asserting that the provisions of Article 27 (3) did not apply given that the resolution had been written in relation to a breach of peace with Chapter VII of the Charter (Actions with Respect to Threats to the Peace). Surprisingly, it was the Spanish representative, a recognised expert in UN law, who highlighted that the appropriate procedure would be to allow Britain to vote.<sup>36</sup> The comparison between the positions of Spain and Panama here is noteworthy. Spain, like Panama, supported the

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<sup>31</sup> Parsons, ‘The Falklands Crisis in the United Nations,’ 170.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>33</sup> Parsons to FCO, 3 April 1982, FCO 58/2840 f73.

<sup>34</sup> David Rock, *Argentina, 1516–1987: From Spanish Colonisation to Alfonsín* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 220-221.

<sup>35</sup> The Charter of the United Nations, Article 27(3).

<sup>36</sup> Parsons, ‘The Falklands Crisis at the United Nations,’ 171.

historic Argentine claim to sovereignty over the islands and as noted by Parsons ‘could not be expected to support a draft resolution tabled by the United Kingdom’ given their own sovereignty dispute with the UK over Gibraltar.<sup>37</sup> Given that resolutions had been passed with reference to both Chapter VI and VII in the past, it is likely that Panama knew the response that would be given to their call.<sup>38</sup> This implies that Panama had a different motivation and was again actively supporting Argentine policy in this area. Spain, although it supported the Argentine claim to sovereignty, was not willing to bypass proper UN procedure to aid the Argentinians and risk denying itself a vote should the Gibraltar dispute ever be brought before the UN. Contrastingly, Panama was focussed on disrupting Britain’s efforts on the time. Another possible motive for the Panamanian actions at this point is that if a resolution was passed with reference to Chapter VI of the Charter, then it was generally accepted that the resolution was not legally enforceable and therefore could not be forcefully imposed on the Argentinians.<sup>39</sup> In this regard, it was vital that Britain had Resolution 502 passed with reference to Chapter VII which would legitimise its use of force to remove the Argentine forces from the islands and equally as vital for the Argentina that it was not.<sup>40</sup> In pressing for an acceptance by the Security Council that the resolution was being passed with reference to Chapter VI, the Panamanian representative was again actively pursuing Argentine strategic goals in the UN. Panama had a vested interest in ensuring that Argentina retained possession of the islands with the removal of a British presence from its neighbouring territories. Its actions in the opening debate at the United Nations showed how that diplomatically speaking, Panama was able to do all it could to aid Argentina in the UN.

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<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>38</sup> Resolution 242 was passed in 1967 with reference to Chapter VI which was adopted after the Six Day War and called for Israel and their Arab neighbours to enter into negotiation. UNSC Resolution 82 was passed on 25 June 1950 in reference to Chapter VII which called on North Korea withdraw their troops from South Korea.

<sup>39</sup> See Hans Köchler, *The Concept of Humanitarian Intervention in the Context of Modern Power*, International Progress Organisation, published online 2001, accessed 25 August 2016, available at <http://www.i-p-o.org/koechler-humanitarian-intervention.pdf>; and Ken Matthews, *The Gulf Conflict and International Relations* (London: Routledge, 1993) for fuller explanations of how different resolutions are enforced by the UNSC.

<sup>40</sup> Given how vital this was to the British policy, it is revealing that Parsons did not make more of this in his memoir of the dispute in the UN or in his reporting of the debates to the FCO (Parsons to FCO, 3 April 1982, FCO 58/2840 f73). Given that this is not discussed between the UKMIS New York and the FCO, it is indicative that this was never in any doubt for them, and the resolution was always to be proposed with reference to Chapter VII of the UN charter. As such, this further highlights that Panama had other motives for making such a request.

Many other Latin American states offered their support to the Argentina during this opening debate, but each had their own reasons for doing so tied to their other interests. Venezuela was ‘particularly vociferous’ in its support of Argentina, but this was ‘not surprising in view of its own claim against Guyana’.<sup>41</sup> Had Argentina successfully retained the Falkland Islands, it would have provided context for Venezuela to assert its claim to Guyana through validating the proposal that nations could reclaim territories taken from them by old colonial powers despite the wishes of the inhabitants. Therefore, it was also of no surprise that Guyana spoke in support of the British cause who saw them as playing a ‘valuable role in their own sovereignty disputes’ and voted in favour of Resolution 502.<sup>42</sup> There was show of strong support for Argentina from Peru, whose military shared close connections with that of Argentina. The military had a significant influence on government in Peru and as such the Peruvian representative did not condemn the Argentine use of force although Peru would later urge a truce when Britain dispatched the Task Force.<sup>43</sup> In these early days of the conflict, Argentina gained advantage from the close political connections and shared ideology among the Latin American nations. Peter Calvert has written that ‘those on both the left and right were prepared to over-look the breach of international law and the Charter of the United Nations involving the use of force.’<sup>44</sup> However, this conclusion focuses solely on the support offered to Argentina without examining the nature of that support. When done so, the external factors that framed Latin American support for Argentina becomes clear. It is relatively simple to offer words of support to a nation but quite another prospect to offer practical support and this was something the vast majority of Latin American nations refrained from doing.

Although the majority of Latin American states spoke in favour of the Argentine case, others did express reservations at the manner with which the Argentine Junta had forced its claim. A substantial amount of British overseas aid went to Latin America as well as military trade. It was then unsurprising that Mexico spoke in favour of the British at the

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<sup>41</sup> Parsons to the FCO, 2 April 1982, accessed 17 April 2015, available at <https://www.margarethatcher.org/document/118435>. The document was derived from the private files of Lord Carrington, as prepared for submission to the Franks enquiry.

<sup>42</sup> Relations between the UK and Latin America with reference to the Falklands Crisis, 7 April 1982, FCO 260/2485 f77. Also mentioned in Connell-Smith ‘The OAS and the Falklands Conflict,’ 344.

<sup>43</sup> UKE Lima to FCO, 11 April 1982, PREM 19/616 f7.

<sup>44</sup> Peter Calvert, ‘Latin America and the United States during and after the Falklands Crisis,’ *Journal of International Studies* 12, no. 1 (1983): 1-17.

debate on April 3. The importance of the maintenance of good relations between Britain and nations in Latin America was noted in the MoD's 1982 decision to withdraw HMS *Endurance* from service in the South Atlantic. In justifying the decision, the MoD noted that other South American nations may view its continued presence around the islands as 'a provocation. If so, we would also have to bear in mind the possibility that whichever HM's ships were to carry out this duty [Falklands protection] might, under Argentine pressure, be denied access to Montevideo and other South American ports.'<sup>45</sup> The José Lopez Portillo government in Mexico had spent considerable effort in establishing strong relations with the British from 1976 and continued this diplomatic strategy with the Thatcher government; securing significant financial aid which contributed to the Mexican economy.<sup>46</sup> The effect of any conflict between Britain and Argentina was noted by Lopez when he told Thatcher that '[a] bellicose confrontation between Britain and Argentina could have deep consequences for the harmony between our countries'.<sup>47</sup> This quote was reflective of the difficult situation Mexico was in given that it had to balance its interests in Latin America against the value of its relationship with Britain. Although traditionally supportive of the Argentine claim to sovereignty, in 1982 Mexico was suffering from a severe debt crisis and a sovereign default. Mexico had received an increased amount of aid from Britain since 1979. Britain had expressed objection to countries it suspected may have been offering practical support to Argentina and threatened to cut aid to these countries during this time.<sup>48</sup> Had Britain decided to cut off aid to Latin America during or following the conflict, this would have had a detrimental effect on the Mexican economy.<sup>49</sup>

Brazil, along with Colombia, also had concerns which affected its own position. There was concern in the Brazilian government over the power vacuum that may be left in Argentina should a conflict result in an Argentine defeat and the affects that 'may have on

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<sup>45</sup> Fearn minute to Day and Nicholas Ridley, 12 June 1981, "the Defence Review: HMS *Endurance*", ALW 076/1 Part A 1-50. The evidence does still indicate that the overwhelming argument for the withdrawal of HMS *Endurance* from the region was the cost of its maintenance.

<sup>46</sup> No. 10 record of conversation between Lopez and Thatcher, 21 October 1981, PREM 19/9699 f189.

<sup>47</sup> Lopez Portillo to Thatcher, 20 April 1982, THCR 3/120 f96.

<sup>48</sup> UKE Lima to FCO, 2 April 1982, PREM 19/616 f2.

<sup>49</sup> British aid to Latin America is discussed in more detail later in this chapter. This was an issue the British FCO was aware of and discussed as seen in Relations between the UK and Latin America with reference to the Falklands Crisis, 7 April 1982, FCO 260/2485 f77.



the balance of power in Latin America.<sup>50</sup> Brazil was a strong advocate of Pan-Americanism, but prior to 1982, it had a 'longstanding rivalry' with Argentina for political dominance among the Hispanic states. This contributed to the 'lukewarm' support offered to Argentina during the conflict as an Argentine victory would have been a statement of the Junta's ability to press Latin American interests in global politics.<sup>51</sup> Other nations too had pre-1982 interests which transcended the importance of Latin American solidarity and influenced reaction to the conflict in the South American region. There were concerns from Colombian politicians about the effects of the crisis on Nicaragua's historic claim to Colombian-held territory in the San Andrés and the Providencia archipelago. This issue had been revived by the Nicaraguan Provisional Government in 1980 and led President Turbay of Colombia to reinforce the garrisons in the San Andrés.<sup>52</sup> Chile had reason to be concerned given its ongoing dispute with the Argentine government over the Beagle Channel Islands.<sup>53</sup> The concern over the effect the conflict may have on encouraging Argentine ambition in the Beagle Channel heavily influenced Chilean policy with regards to the conflict.<sup>54</sup> Even at this very early stage of the crisis, Latin American support for Argentina was shown to be reliant on the individual and broader policy objectives of each state. Although Pan-Americanism was important, it was not the prominent factor for all Latin American governments.

On 13 April, the Permanent Council of the OAS adopted a resolution formally outlining the organisation's position on the conflict.<sup>55</sup> This saw the first formal involvement of the OAS in the conflict and it was clear that its response was tapered by the Caribbean and those Latin American states with reservations regarding the Argentine use of force. The resolution of 13 April offered its 'friendly cooperation' to both Britain and Argentina to reach a peaceful resolution to their dispute, contrary to the vociferous support for the Argentine position from some Latin American nations during the UN debates.<sup>56</sup> The emphasis of the resolution remained on maintaining peace in the hemisphere which satisfied the intentions of all Latin American states. The resolution supported both Argentine policy and the desire of nations with reservations about the show of aggression from Argentina,

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<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>51</sup> Parsons to the FCO, 8 June 1982, CAB 164/1622 f67.

<sup>52</sup> *Latin America World Report*, January 1980.

<sup>53</sup> Connell-Smith, 'The OAS and the Falklands Conflict,' 344.

<sup>54</sup> See section on Chile and the Beagle Channel islands on page 242.

<sup>55</sup> The Permanent Council of the OAS is made up of an ambassador from each member state.

<sup>56</sup> Text of OAS Permanent Council Resolution 359, 13 April 1982.

both of which sought to avoid further conflict. At this stage the council did reject an amendment proposed by the Commonwealth members to ask both nations to abide by UNSC Resolution 502. This highlighted Latin American leanings towards the Argentine claim to sovereignty. However, at this stage of the conflict, the Haig peace mission was still on-going and there remained evident doubts about the British capability to retake the islands.<sup>57</sup> However, by the time the Council met again, on 20 April, the situation had changed.

By 20 April, the Task Force was much nearer the islands and the possibility of confrontation had greatly increased. Argentina requested a special meeting of the OAS Permanent Council to consider sanctions against Britain (similar to the EEC sanctions introduced against Argentina) and possibly invoke the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. Of the eighteen council members, fifteen voted to summon a Consultative Meeting of Foreign Ministers to take place six days later. The United States, Colombia and Trinidad and Tobago abstained with the Colombian representative even arguing that the Rio treaty did not apply to the conflict.<sup>58</sup> The meeting opened on 26 April, the day after the British had retaken South Georgia. That action meant that the ministers were now aware that Britain not only had the capability to launch a military offensive but also the willingness. Calvert again concludes that the resolution adopted at the end of the meeting acts as proof of unwavering Latin American support for Argentina.<sup>59</sup> However, he omits discussion of the debate before the vote which properly contextualises the resolution. Argentina never attempted to invoke the Inter-American treaty of mutual assistance, but it was made clear that military assistance could not be expected. Costa-Mendez was made aware of the reservations of some member states at Argentina's acts of aggression and thus it was likely that the Argentine delegation did not want to risk the display of Latin American unity by pushing this issue. As such Costa Mendez declared early in the debate that Argentina 'did not attend formally to request either economic sanctions or military assistance against Britain.'<sup>60</sup> During the debate itself, Mexico and Colombia argued that the matter should be deliberated in the UN, an attempt to distance the OAS and its charter from the conflict.<sup>61</sup> The text of the resolution that was adopted at

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<sup>57</sup> See Calvert, 'Latin America and the United States,' 73 for a full explanation of the intentions of the Latin American perceptions on Britain's military capability.

<sup>58</sup> Minutes of the Second Plenary Session, OAS Doc. OEA/ser. F./II.20 doc. 33/82 6-7 (1982).

<sup>59</sup> Calvert, 'Latin America and the United States,' 72.

<sup>60</sup> *Times* 26, 27 and 28 April 1982.

<sup>61</sup> Minutes of the Fourth Meeting of the General Committee, OAS Doc. OEA/ ser. F./II.20 doc. 67/82 34 (1982).

the end of the meeting originated from a joint Brazilian-Peruvian draft. It urged ‘the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland immediately to cease the hostilities that it is carrying on within the security region defined by Article 4 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, and also to refrain from any act that may affect inter-American peace and security’ but also implored ‘the Government of the Republic of Argentina likewise to refrain from taking any action that may exacerbate the situation’. It also asked both countries immediately to ‘call a truce that will make it possible to resume and proceed normally with the negotiation aimed at a peaceful settlement of the conflict, taking into account the rights of sovereignty of the Republic of Argentina over the Malvinas (Falkland) Islands and the interest of the islanders.’<sup>62</sup> Although conclusions drawn from the resolution take into account the number of Commonwealth states involved in the debate, the minutes of the meeting highlight that even the Latin American nations offered only qualified support to the Argentinians. The words in the resolution supporting the Argentine claim to sovereignty is not surprising given that the OAS had always supported that claim through its reference in the charter. More remarkable was that the resolution recognised the Argentine role in the escalation of the conflict and placed equal responsibility on Argentina and Britain to reach a peaceful resolution. Further the resolution also did not ask Britain to withdraw its fleet from the South Atlantic which Argentina had requested.<sup>63</sup> At this still early stage in the crisis, the OAS did not take the same view on the conflict as Argentina. Although its prime motivation was to avoid any further escalation, its failure to implement all of Argentina’s requests highlight that it was not willing to risk damaging the relationship between Latin America and Britain further than had already been done.

#### ***6.4.2. The intensification of the conflict***

Following the next meeting of OAS foreign ministers on 29 April there had were a number of significant developments. First, Haig had given up his peace mission, blaming Argentina for the breakdown in negotiations, and the US formally sided with Britain. This move by the United States received criticism from governments in Latin America which saw the US as breaking with the Charter of the OAS and indicated the State Department valued relations

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<sup>62</sup> Text of OAS Resolution 360, 29 April 1982.

<sup>63</sup> Minutes of the Fourth Meeting of the General Committee, OAS Doc. OEA/ ser. F./II.20 doc. 67/82 34 (1982).

with Europe over those in its own continent. However, as noted previously this was a traditional criticism of the United States from Latin American members of the OAS and not surprising. Kirkpatrick warned that this decision ‘would engender a hundred years of animosity in Latin America’ as it was a clear deviation from the Monroe doctrine, pre-empting the dissatisfaction from the Latin American nations, however, her concerns were not enough to persuade the President that the cost of siding with Britain outweighed the cost of not doing so.<sup>64</sup> This signalled that not all in the US administration were as convinced on the strength of feeling in Latin America over the dispute as Kirkpatrick portrayed. Additionally, there were also failed peace initiatives by both the Peruvian government and the UN Secretary-General which meant a more extensive conflict was inevitable.<sup>65</sup> Most importantly, however, hostilities had intensified and the British sinking of the *ARA General Belgrano* on 2 May allowed Argentina to portray Britain as the antagonist. As the *Belgrano*’s sinking had come during the Peruvian peace proposals, the effect was to intensify feeling in Latin America. The UK delegation at the UN received much criticism from the Latin American nations who told London that the general view was that ‘Britain were now the aggressors, set against reaching a peaceful conclusion to the conflict.’<sup>66</sup> However, although somewhat naturally there was an intensification of rhetoric against the British action there was still no show of practical aid offered to Argentina to help in its defence of the islands. It was in this context that the OAS Foreign Ministers met again on 27 May at the request of Argentina to consider implementing sanctions against the British.

Calvert has suggested that this presented a marked ‘radicalisation of anti-British feeling’ among the Latin-American members, inferring that anti-British feeling was intensified and the Hispanic states sought a new escalation of efforts to frustrate Britain’s campaign to retake the islands.<sup>67</sup> This is not true as although the Latin American states voiced their frustration with Britain, the evidence indicates that there was no significant alteration in the positions of their governments.<sup>68</sup> The 27 May meeting of OAS foreign ministers opened with a statement by Costa Mendez in which he berated the United States for supporting ‘the criminal colonialist, warlike adventure’ of the United Kingdom. It was

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<sup>64</sup> Kirkpatrick to Clark cited in LeoGrande, *Our Own Backyard*, 293.

<sup>65</sup> Further discussed in Chapters 1 and 2.

<sup>66</sup> UKMIS in NY to immediate FCO, 4 May 1982, FCO 260/2485 f82.

<sup>67</sup> Calvert, ‘Latin America and the United States during and after the Falklands Crisis,’ 73.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid*, 75.

then reported that this was met with a standing ovation.<sup>69</sup> Haig responded that since Argentina had been first to resort to armed aggression in the conflict, there were ‘no grounds for taking collective action under the Rio Treaty’.<sup>70</sup> This point was supported by the representatives from the governments of Brazil and Mexico who advised the meeting not to link support for Argentina with the Rio Treaty, and again reiterated, that in pursuit of a ‘peaceful resolution’ to the conflict, the United Nations was the best place for the matter to be debated. In supporting Haig’s claim, the Brazilian and the Mexican delegations were again displaying a desire to distance the OAS, and its charter’s commitment to the Argentine claim on sovereignty, from the conflict. On 29 May, a new OAS resolution ‘condemned most vigorously the unjustified and disproportionate attack perpetrated by the United Kingdom’ but crucially did not ask countries to introduce any sanctions such as those that had been imposed on Argentina by the EEC. It did request that the United States lift its own sanctions against Argentina and also halt military assistance to the UK but only requested that each member of the OAS support Argentina ‘in the manner that each considers appropriate’.<sup>71</sup> In this sense, the resolution allowed each member state to pursue its own policy without seeking to place external pressure on governments to go beyond the measures they had already taken to support the Argentine government in the conflict. The resolution passed with 17 votes in favour and four abstentions which were the United States, Chile, Colombia and Trinidad and Tobago, an identical result to resolution 360, passed on the 26 April. There was no marked change in policy pursued by any government. This feeling was matched by the debate in the United Nations concerning the passing of resolution 505. Panama, a supporter of the Argentine position, introduced the resolution to the floor asking that the Security Council formally request a cessation of hostilities. However, although ‘[a]lmost every member of the Latin American group took the floor in support of Argentina ... [m]any Latin American delegates expressed their support in relatively restrained terms: only Venezuela and Panama were nakedly hostile and abusive.’<sup>72</sup> A last attempt by Panama to bring about a ceasefire, on 4 June, which ended in failure, only represented the policy it had implemented throughout the conflict; to disrupt British objectives and bring about an

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<sup>69</sup> *Times*, 29 May 1982.

<sup>70</sup> Haig to OAS Foreign Ministers, 27 May 1982, cited in Connell-Smith, ‘OAS and the Falklands Conflict,’ 34.

<sup>71</sup> Text of OAS Resolution 361, 29 May 1982, OAS Doc. OEA/ser. F./II.20 doc. 24/82 rev. 3 corr. 1 1 (1982).

<sup>72</sup> Parsons, ‘The Falklands Conflict in the United Nations,’ 175.

end to the conflict which did not result in Argentine defeat. The lack of assistance Panama received in this initiative from other Latin American governments further highlighted there was no shared view among the Hispanic states towards the crisis, but rather a number of nations attempting to protect their own interests.

It is clear the support that the Latin American governments deemed appropriate for Argentina was extremely limited. Venezuela postponed negotiations for the acquisition of British aircraft and Brazil lent Argentina some reconnaissance planes as a gesture of support, but material or sanction support did not go beyond that. Even Peru, historically one of Argentina's allies and one of the most vocal supporters of the Argentine action in the conflict, later denied that it had sent Mirage aircraft to assist the Argentine military campaign, although it is known that they had sent ten aircraft to Argentina during the conflict.<sup>73</sup> Other governments such as those of Mexico and Colombia publicly acknowledged their inability to assist Buenos Aires either militarily or economically.<sup>74</sup> Since the crisis involved a European state, it was difficult to apply policy outlined in the OAS charter given no European state was a member. Some argument could be made for including the Falkland Islands dispute under the OAS jurisdiction as all members had been former colonies and Argentina portrayed the crisis as a matter of decolonisation. However, many Latin American governments showed that they were not willing to risk relations in other areas by stretching the OAS' jurisdiction to cover matters involving a non-member state.<sup>75</sup> Despite the rhetoric used by foreign ministers at the consultative meetings in April and May, the fact that Argentina had been the first to attack complicated the issue for other countries who had previously been supporters of the Argentine action. In addition, it meant that the United States was unable to offer any form of support to Argentina which, given the weight of importance many South American governments placed on relations with the US, in turn led to a diminishing of support from some of the leading Latin American governments. Chile and Colombia followed the United States in abstaining in the votes on the resolution, whilst Brazil and Mexico raised doubts over the applicability of the Rio treaty to the situation.

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<sup>73</sup> Hugh Thomas letter to Thatcher, 17 May 1982. PREM 7/447 f26.

<sup>74</sup> FCO document recording Latin American attitudes to the crisis, 12 January 1983, FCO 260/2485 f103. Also cited in Connell-Smith, 'The OAS and the Falklands Conflict,' 346.

<sup>75</sup> The debate over whether the OAS had the jurisdiction to cover matters involving a European power.

Crucially, Argentina was not widely popular with its Latin American neighbours before the conflict and Argentine defeat was not wholly regretted after the conflict.<sup>76</sup> Argentina's relations with Brazil had soured over its fight for economic and political superiority on the continent. Argentine relations with Chile were strained over on-going sovereignty dispute surrounding the Beagle Channel Islands.<sup>77</sup> Attempting to display solidarity among Latin American states over a long-standing sovereignty dispute with a European state was difficult in these circumstances. Only two weeks after the OAS foreign ministers passed their second resolution of the conflict, Argentine troops surrendered to British forces and the islands were restored to British control. Although this did come as a shock to many, most governments were pleased to see the back of what had been an embarrassing episode for the OAS. The conflict had shown the ineffectiveness of the organisation to support its own charter and as such, brought into question the reliability and usefulness of the organisation as whole. Rather, the OAS was reliant on the willingness of each of its member states' governments to prioritise the interests of America as a whole, which in the case of the conflict, they were not.

## **6.5. Attitudes After the Conflict**

### ***6.5.1. The insensitive fibres of five hundred million Latin Americans***

On 7 October 1982, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Panama City contacted the British embassy in protest against plans by the City of London to hold a parade on 12 October saluting the Task Force. This coincided with the Latin American holiday, Día de la Raza, which celebrates the 'discovery' of the American continent by Christopher Columbus. In the letter it stated that the parade 'wounds the pride not only of the Argentine people but also offends the most sensitive fibres of the feelings of five hundred million Latin Americans.' It added:

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs consider that acts such as that planned only lead to the deepening of the wound caused by the

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<sup>76</sup> *Ibid*, 347.

<sup>77</sup> See Grace Livingstone, *Britain and the Dictatorships of Argentina and Chile, 1973-82: Foreign Policy, Corporations and Social Movements (Security, Conflict and Cooperation in the Contemporary World)* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 1-34 for a more detailed discussion on the history of the strained relations between Argentina and Chile.

warlike action taken by the United Kingdom in the face of the Argentine nation's just aspirations to sovereignty. The effects of these wounds continue to be reflected in the unanimous feeling of the Latin American nations, who cannot allow past actions to become the subject of mockery and disrespect to the deep feelings of historic nationalism which have united us.<sup>78</sup>

The Panamanian government had indicated that the dispute was an issue that every Latin American felt deeply about and a display of celebration of British victory on a Latin American holiday was a deep insult to the nations of South America. Although the UK government was conscious of the fact that the coincidence in dates may be used as a propaganda tool by the Argentinians, the fact that the UK government only received complaints about the parade from a small number of South American states, showed that the issue was not of great importance to Latin American governments.<sup>79</sup> Rather, post conflict policy towards the islands from Latin American nations was a balance between traditional support for Argentine sovereignty and individual state policy considerations. Paramount among these was the effect the conflict may have had on the several other sovereignty disputes along with the downturn in economic conditions which many South American governments were facing in the period between 1982 and 1990. The relevance of this was underlined when on 1 July 1982, only two weeks after the conflict had ended, the Guatemalan government denounced Belizean independence. Guatemala's claim to Belize was a dispute very similar to the Falkland Islands in that it originated with Britain's sovereignty over the region before the granting of independence to Belize in 1981.<sup>80</sup> Guatemala's claim to Belize originates from its former status as a colony of Spain. It was considerations in these areas which influenced how Latin American opinion towards the conflict was formed as opposed to particular strength of feeling around Argentina's claim to the islands.

On the whole, the Latin American response in the UN debate on the Falkland Islands in autumn of 1982 unfolded as one would expect given how the countries had acted during

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<sup>78</sup> Letter from the government of Panama to the UK Embassy in Panama City, 7 October 1982, FCO 99/985 f94.

<sup>79</sup> Formal complaints were received by embassies in Quito, Montevideo, Panama City, Lima and Caracas but from no other countries. Reactions to the Task Force Salute, 15 October 1982, FCO 99/985 f99.

<sup>80</sup> *Times*, 2 July 1982.



the conflict. However, Chile voting in favour of the pro-Argentine resolution 37/9 is worthy of discussion. Duncan Campbell, an investigative journalist who covered the development of the dispute in the UN in the 1980s, described Chile's involvement in the conflict as 'the most sensitive subject of the war'.<sup>81</sup> During the conflict, Chile provided limited but significant intelligence assistance to the Task Force alongside the use of the Punta Arenas naval base. This was in addition to arguing against the implementation of sanctions against Britain by the OAS.<sup>82</sup> As the Pinochet regime had been subject to claims of human rights abuses, Chilean support for Britain during the conflict led to the Thatcher government receiving much criticism from the Latin American Bureau for a supposed 'human rights trade off' whereby Britain overlooked human rights abuses perpetrated by the Chilean government in exchange for Chilean support both in the conflict and in the pursuit of other British interests in Latin America.<sup>83</sup> Thatcher had also fostered a close relationship with Pinochet during the 1970s; based on shared ideals of conservatism.<sup>84</sup> So close was the relationship, that Thatcher was criticised for being a 'terrorist sympathiser' and a 'friend of dictators'.<sup>85</sup> As such, it came as a surprise to the British government when Chile in favour of further negotiation over sovereignty.<sup>86</sup> However, looking at the wider context of the vote, the reasoning behind Chile's decision becomes clear. Chile's dispute with Argentina over the Beagle Channel Islands was similar to that of Britain's dispute with Argentina over the Falkland Islands. Relations between Chile and Argentina had deteriorated considerably during the 1970s and had brought the countries to the brink of war in 1978. Only Vatican intervention and the fortification of Chilean military bases along the border prevented a conflict breaking out.<sup>87</sup> Argentina had justified Operation Rosario by arguing that after a number of years of failed negotiation the islands had not been returned to Argentina and as such, they had exhausted all peaceful paths of diplomacy available to them. The Junta used

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<sup>81</sup> Duncan Campbell, 'The Chilean Connection,' *New Statesman* 1, no. 1 (January 1985): 8-10.

<sup>82</sup> Falklands Conflict: Co-operation with Chile, 26 June 1982, AIR 8/3091.

<sup>83</sup> Ferguson and Pearce, *The Thatcher Years*, 58-65.

<sup>84</sup> See Livingstone, *Argentina and Chile*, ch 1-3 for a full discussion of this.

<sup>85</sup> Some examples of this are Simon Gardner, 'Tories have forgotten that Thatcher wasn't just a terrorist sympathiser but good friends with one,' *Independent*, 22 September 2015; and Guardian Staff, 'Thatcher visits her old friend Pinochet,' *Guardian*, 26 March 1999.

<sup>86</sup> Assistants in Certain Departments, Falklands Vote: Message of Thanks, 8 November 1982, FCO 99/985 f107.

<sup>87</sup> Sanfuentes, 'The Chilean Falklands Factor,' 71.

the same reasoning for justifying its military build-up along the Chilean border in 1978.<sup>88</sup> As such, for the Chileans, it was reasonable to expect that Argentine success in the conflict would have led to the Junta gaining confidence and turning its attention again towards the Beagle Channel Islands. This was something that the British were aware of and spoke to in their communications with Chile during the conflict itself and had been noted as a concern by the Chilean government.<sup>89</sup> Former Junta member Lami Dozo later said that ‘[f]ollowing the Malvinas, they [the Junta] had plans to attack Chile.’<sup>90</sup> During the conflict, Chile needed to protect its borders and its own sovereign territory. The principal link between the Falkland Islands and the Beagle Channel Islands led Chile to support Britain as at this time, as negotiation with Argentina had failed.

By the time of the October 1982 UN General Assembly vote on the Falkland Islands, the situation between Chile and Argentina had changed considerably. Most importantly, the fall in the military government in Argentina had increased the chances of successful negotiation on the Beagle Channel Island dispute. Argentina was still facing economic turmoil and so was in a weak negotiating position. The country had suffered from conflict and was hostile to the prospect of any further conflict. In turn, Chile too was suffering from an economic downturn and a successful negotiation would also allow them to feel secure in the Beagle Channel without the need to maintain heavily fortified military bases along the border with Argentina.<sup>91</sup> In this sense, the Pinochet regime in Chile would benefit from promoting negotiation as a means of settling disputes and as such, it is understandable that it voted in favour of the Argentine resolution. During the debate leading up to the vote on the resolution, the Chilean representative supported the prospect of negotiation but was one of only two Latin American delegates to ‘fail to uphold Argentine sovereignty over the islands’.<sup>92</sup> In not supporting the Argentine claim for sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, the Chilean delegation was advancing its nation’s position in any future negotiation of the

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<sup>88</sup> *Ibid*, 70.

<sup>89</sup> UKE Santiago to FCO, 4 April 1982, FCO 99/985 f45.

<sup>90</sup> Throughout the interview, Dozo spoke in third person when referring to the Junta to highlight his disagreement with Galtieri and Anaya over policy towards Chile. Dozo commented ‘Galtieri said: “[Chile] have to know that what we are doing now, because they will be the next in turn...’ ‘Después de Malvinas, iban a atacar a Chile,’ *Perfil*, 22 November 2009.

<sup>91</sup> Matthew Mirrow, *International Law and Religion in Latin America: The Beagle Channel Dispute* (Ipswich: Transnat'l L. Rev Hein Online, 2004).

<sup>92</sup> UKMIS New York to FCO, 25 October 1982, FCO 99/985 f104.

Beagle Channel Islands. The UK delegation also acknowledged the importance of negotiation to Chile in the Beagle dispute, commenting that it was a likely explanation for the Chilean vote in favour.<sup>93</sup>

Further, since 1979 Chile had built strong relations with the UK in other areas and given the importance of these relationships to both the Chilean government and the UK, it was unlikely that any Chilean vote in favour of the resolution would affect the strong relationship built between the two nations. Chile purchased military equipment from Britain and used British officials to train Chilean pilots. In September 1982, Trade Minister Peter Reece travelled to Santiago with a trade delegation and commented how Chile was ‘a moderate and stabilising force in South America’ and Britain looked to ‘deepening and strengthening political relations’ with the Chilean government.<sup>94</sup> At the same time, the head of the Chilean nuclear agency, General Juan Brady, visited the UK Atomic Energy Authority to facilitate nuclear collaboration between the two nations and to negotiate the purchase of a magnox nuclear reactor from the UK. Later in the year, forty enriched uranium fuel rods were sent to Chile for work in a research reactor.<sup>95</sup> The UK also abstained on a UN resolution in 1983 which addressed human rights abuses perpetrated by the Pinochet government.<sup>96</sup> The crisis was low on the list of priorities between Britain and Chile when compared to strengthening relations in other areas. As such, the Chilean government used Falklands policy to protect its own interests in the Beagle Channel. This had always been the intention of Chile and explains its actions both during and after the conflict.

During the UN Falklands debates, the other Latin American states acted in ways that were consistent with their pre-conflict stances. During the autumn 1982 UN debate on the sovereignty of the islands, Brazil called for negotiations and the implementation of SCR 502; Venezuela and Bolivia denounced colonisation in reference to their own sovereignty claims over former European colonies; Peru called for negotiations within the Secretary-General’s good offices and referred to the relevant UN, NAM and OAS declarations; Uruguay condemned the use of force and advocated a negotiated settlement and Ecuador favoured international administration for the islands.<sup>97</sup> Even Colombia’s vote, which was

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<sup>93</sup> UKMIS New York to FCO, 26 October 1982, FCO 99/985 f107.

<sup>94</sup> *El Mercurio*, 8 September 1982.

<sup>95</sup> Walters minute to Thatcher, 17 January 1983, PREM 19/0999 f321.

<sup>96</sup> Campbell, ‘The Chilean Connection,’ 7.

<sup>97</sup> UKMIS New York to FCO, 25 October 1982, FCO 99/985 f104.

always in favour of the resolutions despite having reservations over Argentina's use of force, could be explained by its application to join the Non-Aligned Movement, an organisation which supported negotiation to settle disputes and had traditionally supported Argentina's claim to the Falkland Islands and denounced Britain's failure to negotiate. Each individual state continued the policy line which they had pursued during the conflict which was to avoid any further fighting over the islands and pursue negotiation as a means to settle the dispute. This continued through the further debates concerning the dispute that took place in the UN during the 1980s. In this regard, Latin American governments appeared to be acting in unison. Writing in 1985, Duncan Campbell noted that 'Latin American countries continue the line that the amendments prejudge the outcome of negotiation and praise Argentina for softening the text and sacrificing their 'unalienable right to sovereignty' to ensure that negotiation could take place.'<sup>98</sup> However, this is more reflective of the fact that this was seen as a continuation of the rhetoric used by Latin American nations before the conflict. For the majority, the dispute returned to the same importance it held before 1982; low down on the priority list with most Latin American countries content to allow Britain to ignore a series of calls from the UN to negotiate with Argentina. When the debates are analysed closely it is clear to see that each state did have preferences over how negotiation would take place to reach a settlement that best protected their own national interest.<sup>99</sup> Latin American governments also did not allow the dispute to affect other areas of policy such as ensuring a healthy economic relationship between Latin America and Europe.

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<sup>98</sup> UKMIS New York to FCO: Summary of speeches made in the Falklands debate, 4 Dec 1985, FCO 7/6377 f750.

<sup>99</sup> As seen in the breakdown of Latin American opinion in the October 1982 debate. UKMIS New York to FCO, 25 October 1982, FCO 99/985 f104.

<b>British Aid to Latin America, 1979-1986 (£ thousands)</b>								
	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
Argentina	5	30	2	2	0	0	0	0
Belize	7172	4219	4781	2885	6098	5971	5706	3179
Bolivia	888	1158	1052	988	1199	1182	1421	1953
Brazil	888	1022	632	9960	5574	7780	4014	880
Chile	2131	2021	1452	675	442	257	334	373
Colombia	1242	848	765	617	635	460	838	1018
Costa Rica	623	606	570	486	1836	1666	12685	11538
Dom. Rep.	77	144	139	139	176	61	24	42
Ecuador	1897	945	762	1046	783	916	909	836
El Salvador	448	265	41	13	0	205	103	239
Guatemala	14	35	15	4	0	0	7	10
Haiti	5	24	4	1	19	8	3	331
Honduras	230	335	5002	2272	6670	3446	3653	1258
Mexico	1186	1577	1464	34334	2827	517	773	803
Nicaragua	246	127	91	49	64	9	116	86
Panama	63	94	102	62	43	49	67	70
Paraguay	267	270	219	3263	1281	207	51	221
Peru	882	950	973	676	4427	476	928	1214
Uruguay	35	37	9	11	16	14	7	13
Venezuela	0	0	0	2	3	0	1	10
<b>Total</b>	<b>18299</b>	<b>14707</b>	<b>18075</b>	<b>57485</b>	<b>32093</b>	<b>23224</b>	<b>31640</b>	<b>24074</b>

Figure 2: British aid to Latin America 1979-1986




Figure 3 Total British Aid to Latin America 1979-1986

As figures 2 and 3 show there was no apparent negative impact of the Falklands conflict on aid sent from Britain to Latin America. In fact, there was a significant peak in 1982 perhaps as the British government attempted to secure strong ties with the region in the immediate aftermath of the conflict.<sup>100</sup> In addition, Britain sold military equipment to Belize, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Guyana and Mexico in the months immediately after the conflict despite having opposed the sale of Exocet missiles to Peru by the French government.<sup>101</sup> The desire of Britain and Europe to prevent the crisis from damaging relations with Latin America more broadly allowed the South American governments to return to their pre-conflict positions on the dispute whilst also building and maintaining strong relationships with Britain. In this respect, the crisis had very little negative impact on Latin American relations with Britain but rather in some aspects opened the door for new relationships to be formed. While Britain maintained control of the islands and Latin America offered their support in principle for the Argentine sovereignty claim, both HMG and the governments of South America benefitted from trade and aid relationships.

#### **6.5.2. *The crisis comes to an end***

As in the other countries discussed in this present work, in Argentina, Falklands policy was dependent on domestic factors. Previous chapters have considered the Argentine actions during and after the conflict, examining Argentine interactions with different governments and international organisations, but it is vital that this study examines the re-establishment of relations between the UK and Argentina in the years 1982 to 1989.<sup>102</sup> Evaluating the Argentine reaction to the crisis further highlights the relative importance of the dispute to other policy areas and completes the picture of Latin American understandings as a whole. Changing domestic circumstance ultimately forced the Argentine government to compromise to reach a form of settlement, where although it did not drop its claim to sovereignty, the islands remained a British overseas territory.

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<sup>100</sup> Numbers taken from the Overseas Development Administration, *British Aid Statistics*, 1979-1980, 1981-1985 and 1982-86 and cited in Ferguson and Pearce, *The Thatcher Years*, 82. These figures include technical co-operation (personnel overseas, education and training, research and training, surveys, consultancies, equipment and supplies, pensions and compensation, and grants to voluntary organisations).

<sup>101</sup> Phil Evans, *British Arms Sales to Central America* (London: Mimeo, 1987).

<sup>102</sup> See chapters 1 and 2.

In the immediacy after the conflict continued importance of the sovereignty dispute to the Argentine government and people was highlighted when one of President Alfonsín's first acts in office was to reaffirm his commitment to see the islands handed over to Argentine control and governance. At his inauguration in December 1983 he stated '[i]n the case of the Malvinas, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, it is and it will always be, our unrelinquished objective, the recovery of and to definitively secure the right to our nation's sovereign territorial integrity.'<sup>103</sup> In outlining this at his inauguration, Alfonsín was indicating that this would be a central component to his government's foreign policy objectives. The British government had hoped that Alfonsín's government would declare a formal cessation of hostilities between Argentina and the UK but in response to that, Alfonsín declared that Britain must first reduce the exclusion zone around the islands and stop the building of the new airport at Port Stanley.<sup>104</sup> In doing so, the Argentine president recognised that opinion in Argentina was still very much in favour of the recovery of the islands. Nothing had altered in that respect as a result of the conflict. The sovereignty of the islands had been an issue of importance to much of the Argentine public long before 1982, with the dispute's origins stretching back to 1832.<sup>105</sup> However, as Walter Little notes, this created an impasse in that 'the British were willing to discuss everything except the only thing that Argentina wanted. On the other hand, Argentina was mainly interested in discussing the only topic that the British had declared not to be willing to talk about.'<sup>106</sup> That being said, the fact that the issue remained important for the Argentine electorate meant that should Alfonsín be able to find an amenable solution to the crisis, it would go a long way to securing his government's position in the early years of democracy in Argentina. As a result of this, Alfonsín proposed a new initiative on 2 January 1984: a formal cessation of hostilities in return for several concessions from the British including a reduction in the size of the garrison on the islands.<sup>107</sup> After several exchanges of ideas, progress appeared to be made with each side becoming more amenable to the prospect of negotiation. After

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<sup>103</sup> *Clarín*, 12 December 1983.

<sup>104</sup> Corbacho, 'Pre-negotiation and Mediation,' 5; Thatcher letter to Alfonsín, 9 December 1983, THCR 3/1/35 f30.

<sup>105</sup> See Great Britain, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, *Britain and Latin America: Historical Links* (London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 1982) for a full discussion of the dispute and its importance to the Argentine population in the years 1832-1982.

<sup>106</sup> Walter Little, 'Las relaciones anglo-argentinas y la cuestión de la administración de las Falkland desde 1982' in *Malvinas hoy: herencia de un conflicto*, eds. Atilio Borón and Julio Faúndez (Buenos Aires: Puntosur, 1989), 56-76.

<sup>107</sup> *Ibid.*, 60-61.

mediation by Swiss Deputy Foreign Secretary, Eduard Brunner, and the Brazilian ambassador to Switzerland, Gerard Silos, both governments agreed to send representatives to meet in Berne on 18-19 July 1984 for discussions.<sup>108</sup> Alfonsín made the Falklands dispute an early priority area because of the political benefits that could be achieved in other areas. With democracy still in the early stages of reintroduction, Alfonsín's government was not secure. Even though only briefly, the occupation of the islands in 1982 had united the Argentine people behind the Junta and so if Alfonsín could negotiate a more permanent solution, his popularity would benefit.

The failure of the Berne talks in 1984 and the subsequent breakdown of negotiations between Britain and Argentina further highlighted how Falklands policy was heavily influenced by public and domestic considerations. Despite positive overtures from both the governments of Britain and Argentina concerning the negotiation over the islands, the issue that had not been properly resolved was the main one: sovereignty. The Swiss mediators had hoped to overcome this issue through utilising the ambiguous Spanish translation of the phrase 'not prepared'. Jorge Sábato, the Secretary for External Affairs in the Swiss Foreign Ministry, suggested that when the Argentines raised the issue of sovereignty, the British could respond that they were 'not prepared' to discuss it. The Argentinians could then interpret this as the British were not prepared to discuss the topic at that time but would later.<sup>109</sup> The accounts of what exactly happened at the meeting on 18 July differ between British and Argentine sources.<sup>110</sup> The common element in both accounts is that the issue of sovereignty was of sole importance in the discussions. Despite progressive discussions prior to the meeting on areas such as military and economic coordination, nothing could move forward without some form of agreement on the sovereignty of the islands. At this stage of negotiation, to the Argentine representatives, building a better relationship with the United Kingdom was less important than the electoral boost for the government that would be

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<sup>108</sup> Maria Olivia, *Toma de decisiones en política exterior argentina sobre Malvinas durante el gobierno de Alfonsín*, Master Thesis FLASCO, Buenos Aires (1991), 47.

<sup>109</sup> Corbacho, 'Pre-negotiation and Mediation,' 9.

<sup>110</sup> British sources claim that they stuck to the pre-agreed protocol and the Argentine delegation were insistent that sovereignty had to be discussed and thus left the meeting. This is outlined by Sir John Thomson in his speech to the UNGA in November of 1984. Argentine sources have claimed that Britain broke the protocol and used official translators who then clarified that Britain would never be willing to discuss sovereignty. This was outlined by Marcelo Delpech in an interview with Maria Olivia cited in Olivia, *toma de decisiones en política exterior argentina sobre Malvinas durante el gobierno de Alfonsín*, 58.



achieved through a successful conclusion on the question of sovereignty. Had the Argentine negotiators even extracted a promise from the British that the sovereignty question would be discussed at some time in the future, this would have been progress they could have used. Without anything in this regard, it was less beneficial to the Argentinians in proceeding with negotiation which goes some way to explaining why they left the meeting. These were the last government to government talks that were held between Britain and Argentina until 1989 in Spain at the Madrid Accords. Argentina reverted to placing pressure on the British through the United Nations and other international organisations to return to negotiation over sovereignty. In addition, Argentina attempted to engage with the British opposition and public in an attempt to generate support for their sovereignty claim within Britain itself. However, these attempts proved futile and Britain's stance on the islands' sovereignty remained unchanged.<sup>111</sup>

A more protectionist policy towards the Falkland Islands from the UK and a change in domestic situations eventually encouraged the Argentine government to relent on its stance over the sovereignty issue. In October 1986, the UK government announced that it would be implementing a Falkland Islands Interim Conservation and Administration Zone (FICZ) which would be superimposed into the Falkland Island Protection Zone which had been in place around the islands since the end of the conflict. The FICZ would require any vessel wishing to enter the zone to buy a licence from the British and Argentine vessels would only be allowed to enter with prior authorisation from Britain.<sup>112</sup> The Argentine economy was facing a downturn which led to mass inflation and the country was suffering from a series of strikes as a result of wage freezes. Argentina had already sold fishing licences to companies in the USSR and Bulgaria in the first half of 1986 for the waters surrounding the islands. Losing this source of revenue was something the Argentine economy could not afford. Between October 1986 and June 1987, the Argentinians with help from the US State Department attempted to negotiate a joint conservation zone with the British which would allow for joint fishing rights to the waters, legitimising the fishing licences that the Argentines had already sold. However, the British remained resolute in their

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<sup>111</sup> This involved senior members of the Argentine government meeting with senior members of the Labour party both in Argentina and Europe. Argentine Foreign Minister Dante Caputo also appeared on British radio programmes *Brass Tacks* and gave interviews to the *Times* in 1985. Guillermo Makin discusses this more extensively in 'The Nature of Anglo-Argentine Diplomacy 1980-1990,' 224-236.

<sup>112</sup> Imposition of FICZ, 30 October 1986, PREM 19/2016 f45.

refusal to negotiate on the FICZ citing that a joint conversation zone did not recognise that Britain retained sole sovereignty of the islands.<sup>113</sup> On 25 June 1987, Dante Caputo responded with a new Argentine white paper in which he first suggested the umbrella sovereignty resolution. This aimed to ‘reach an agreement on the conservation, prevent incidents and see an improvement in the relations between both countries’ while protecting both sides claim to sovereignty over the islands.<sup>114</sup> With the Argentine economy facing downturn, the government in Buenos Aires had to relent on sovereignty to protect economic interests in the South Atlantic. Gaining a resolution on sovereignty was no longer of paramount importance. The change in domestic situation had caused a shift in focus for the Argentine government which made it more willing to negotiate. However, the British recognised the weaker Argentine position and held fast over the issue of lifting the protection zone around the islands. There was awareness in the FCO that this may cause the collapse of the negotiations as it had been the one issue the Argentina was insistent it could not compromise on.<sup>115</sup> However, the Argentine economy was in such a position that the government in Buenos Aires could no longer be resolute on such issues. Such was the desperation of the Argentine position that the government in Buenos Aires had to continue to negotiate despite the Fire Focus military manoeuvres carried out by the British in February of 1988. The fact that the British would risk the negotiations at such a late stage angered even the American mediators. Robert Gelbard, the US Ambassador to Bolivia commented to Argentine media:

We are very angry with the way they [the British] acted like in the case of the declaration of the Area of Conservation. We, in these last months have expressed to them our concern for the sale of weapons to Chile. They are destabilizing the hemisphere. It is OUR hemisphere, not theirs. We are worried about what can happen.<sup>116</sup>

However in this late stage, the Alfonsín regime was in such a perilous position that it could not afford to risk the negotiation. This was perhaps something that Britain was aware of and at the very least, the Fire Focus manoeuvres were a display that Britain was ready and able to defend the islands again, in turn offering a public declaration of their commitment to

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<sup>113</sup> Summary of the FICZ negotiations, 1 June 1987, PREM 19/206 f66.

<sup>114</sup> UKMIS New York to FCO, 25 June 1987, PREM 19/206 f71.

<sup>115</sup> Charles Powell to Thatcher, 3 October 1989, PREM 19/2585.

<sup>116</sup> *La Nación*, 21 February 1988. Cited in Corbacho, ‘Pre-negotiation and Mediation,’ 18.

holding onto sovereignty. The fact that these manoeuvres did not negatively affect Britain's negotiating position is a clear indication of how much the Argentinians were willing to relent to secure the revenue from fishing licences in the waters around the islands

Following public and political unrest at the political situation, Alfonsín resigned and was replaced by Carlos Menem on 8 July 1989. Menem, too, had recognised the importance of reaching an agreement with the British and had already prepared for taking over the negotiation before he assumed office.<sup>117</sup> Menem resumed negotiation along the same lines of the umbrella sovereignty as originally suggested by Caputo. This led to the governments agreeing to meet in Madrid in October 1989. Following two days of discussion there, the governments released a joint communiqué which outlined the umbrella sovereignty which said that neither had changed its stance on sovereignty but each had agreed to proceed on negotiations at improving bilateral relations. Positive discussion between these parties acted as the basis for the resumption of diplomatic relations in June 1990.<sup>118</sup> The umbrella sovereignty solution was a formal agreement almost identical to the proposed solution which led to the collapse of the Berne talks in 1984. This highlights that the change in domestic situation was more important than the principles at stake in the dispute. When weighed against the Argentine economy, the government in Buenos Aires could no longer afford to hold steadfast over the sovereignty issue. They were also aided by a shift in public opinion towards negotiation and a weakening in the resolution of the Argentine public to see the government continue to demand the return of the islands at the cost of other policy objectives.<sup>119</sup>

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<sup>117</sup> See Makin, 'The Nature of Anglo-Argentine Diplomacy, 1980-1990' 224-337 for a full discussion of Menem and the Umbrella Sovereignty resolution.

<sup>118</sup> Text of joint Britain-Argentina communiqué, 19 October 1989, accessed 17 September 2017, available at <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/20693486.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A48e557a0e930906beaee791dfd9e50a1>

<sup>119</sup> Felipe Noguera and Peter Willens, 'Public Attitudes and the Future' in *International Perspectives*, 258.

<i>What do you think Argentina Should do Concerning the Malvinas?</i>						
	Dec-84	Jun-85	Aug-85	Oct-85	Apr-86	Mar-90
Negotiate	37	43	47	52	56	58
Demand the islands' return	46	40	41	35	31	30
Pursue the conflict	5	6	5	4	4	1
Don't know/no answer	12	12	7	8	10	10

Figure 4: Argentine public opinion on what government policy should be on the Falklands dispute

The economic situation had caused public attention to turn away from the sovereignty dispute. This allowed the government to take a softer tone with Britain which ultimately concluded in the Madrid accords. Argentina was no different from the other states in Latin America inasmuch as although the principle of sovereignty of the islands was an important issue to the electorate and the government felt strongly about it, when weighed against other policy considerations, its importance was relatively minimal and as such even Argentine Falklands policy was dependent on domestic politics.

## 6.6. Conclusions

Given the location of the islands, it was natural that the crisis gained most attention from governments and publics in Latin America. The matter of European interference in Latin American affairs had been an issue for centuries. It had led to growth of support for Pan-Americanism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and then the eventual formation of the OAS in 1948. The British retention of the islands remained a symbol of a colonialist past which Latin American identity had been built against. However, by the time of the conflict, the islands were no more than that symbol. They carried minimal economic or military significance, other than the fishing rights in the South Atlantic (shared between Britain and Argentina anyway). There was a prospect that there may have been a future discovery of oil and minerals in the waters around the islands but the Conservative government in the UK had assessed these potential economic gains to be less than the cost of the continued administration of the islands.<sup>120</sup> It was of no practical benefit to Latin American

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<sup>120</sup> Berril letter to Howell, 27 September 1979, PREM 19/612 f53; Howell letter to Carrington, 5 February 1980, PREM 19/612 f51; Howell minute to Thatcher, 28 February 1980, PREM 19/612 f50.

governments for them to be handed over to Argentina. The response of Latin America reflected that position. Prior to the conflict, the majority of Latin American governments had supported the UN resolutions that recognised Argentine sovereignty and aimed to put pressure on the British government to negotiate. However, this support cost the governments very little and was a measure that would be expected given their membership of the OAS. Argentina's occupation of the islands complicated the matter for the many governments in South America. The Latin American response to the conflict highlighted the divisions between different states and although it did not weaken the OAS, it did highlight the organisation's limitations. The inter-American system historically has been ineffective at solving territorial disputes between even its own members and has failed on multiple occasions to meet challenges from outside its own hemisphere. Each state looked inward on how the policy would affect its own national interest, which led to states such as Chile, Colombia and Mexico to offer support to the British and hinder any OAS initiative to aid Argentina's cause. Although many historians have focussed on the damage done to the relationship between the US and Latin America from the crisis, the most damage was done to the reality of Latin American solidarity.

This was even clearer after the conflict as the crisis was debated in the United Nations General Assembly. As quickly as the dispute had become a matter of great importance in April 1982, the islands reverted to their pre-conflict status as a symbol of Europe's colonial history in the region. The majority of Latin America returned to its prior conflict position of voting in favour of pro-Argentine resolutions and occasionally used rhetoric about how the islands were an abhorrent remnant of colonialism. However, while denouncing Britain's retention of the islands in statements, these governments were content to allow the UK to ignore a series of UNGA resolutions calling on them to return to negotiation. There was no consideration of further sanctions from the Latin American states as a result of Britain's supposed intransigence, but rather other states built good relationships with HMG in the aftermath of the conflict. Britain continued to supply aid to the majority of countries in Latin America through a variety of means as well as establishing trade relationships both individually and through the EEC. The governments of Latin America were not willing to offer support to Argentina at any cost to themselves. The sovereignty dispute as an issue was not important enough. Ultimately, Argentina itself succumbed to the same reality when its domestic situation meant it could no longer afford the costs of refusing to negotiate over sovereignty. The islands remained a symbol of tension between Britain and

Latin America but during the 1980s, they were a symbol of little consequence and eventually Britain and Argentina came to terms with coexisting in the South Atlantic despite fundamentally unresolved issues. More so, the OAS was almost a passive observer to the dispute. The formation of the organisation was in part to support its member states' sovereignty claims over lands held by European powers but the crisis unveiled how far each member state was willing to go in support of those sovereignty claims. One member state sought to press its claim for sovereignty, the organisations' other members hesitated and argued against practical support out of concern for its potential effect on other areas. Although the dispute did not greatly affect relations between the Hispanic states, it damaged any notion of Latin American unity more than it ever damaged relations between Britain and South America.

## 7. Conclusions

### 7.1. Introduction

Writing in his 2005 official history of the Falklands campaign, Lawrence Freedman noted ‘Britain’s allies could applaud the same sort of stubbornness in the British character which many had been grateful for 40 years earlier, which led to taking on dictatorships and challenging aggression.’<sup>1</sup> This thesis set out to establish whether the international community applauded. It built on the existing historiography on the Falklands conflict and dispute to examine the international responses to the crisis. In examining them, the thesis did not just focus on the conflict but tracked the dispute through to the restoration of diplomatic relations between Britain and Argentina in 1990. It has sought not only to analyse the response of governments but also those of law makers, press, and public. In doing so, the thesis aimed to illuminate what influenced the different responses, priorities, and motivations of different international sectors and highlight common trends. It did so through making use of source material previously unavailable: the thirtieth anniversary of the conflict along with the change in the Public Records Act, resulted in a large volume of documentation being opened. This study was also able to make use of existing research to build on the conclusions of historians and look at evidence in new ways, comparing policy objectives and motives of different states.

The crisis was peculiar in many different senses. The islands were populated by only 1800 people and yet the interests and rights of this small group of British citizens dominated the rhetoric justifying each side’s actions. Although the sovereignty dispute over the islands had lasted decades, the islands themselves were of little economic or political significance. Prior to 1982, the sovereignty issue was only prominent in the Latin American region where it had remained a symbol of European colonialism in an area of the world that had historically tried to free itself from intervention from western powers. However, it was one of many sovereignty disputes in the region, a result of the decline of European empires and the rise of young, ambitious states. As such, when Argentina attacked in the islands, the flurry of diplomatic activity that ensued was to an extent out of surprise. Many countries found themselves receiving requests for support over a dispute they knew very little about.

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<sup>1</sup> Freedman, *TOHOTFC Volume II*, 728.

More peculiar still was that two large nations were engaged in a conflict which cost the lives of almost 900 servicemen and civilians, accounting for nearly half the population of those relatively insignificant islands. However, it was precisely the insignificance of the crisis that characterised most of the international response. The peculiarity of the conflict led to it garnering significant press attention in 1982. As it was so unexpected, many governments had not been able to prepare such that they could mitigate the consequences of the conflict on other policy areas. However, almost as sudden as its prominence, following the end of the conflict, the crisis and its causes receded as issues for most governments, its relevance dependent on what could be gained through showing support to one side or the other.

It is important first to look at the problems created when the Argentine forces invaded the islands in 1982. In this regard, it is important to ask if the crisis constituted much of a challenge for countries other than Britain. For this, one must look at the wider context in which the crisis occurred. The outbreak of the conflict in 1982 coincided with a global economic downturn, disputes within the EEC, and the tension between the USSR and the United States in which the American president talked about ‘the evil empire’.<sup>2</sup> The conflict occurred in a volatile global environment, which required a swift response from states for which any conflict had the potential to have direct implications on other policy objectives. The significance of the islands for other nations has been assessed through the case studies which make up the chapters of this thesis. However, this does not mean that the crisis was a greatly significant event for nations other than the principals. This was a security and national crisis for the UK, but it was a challenge for other states as it forced them to think about cost and benefits of their reactions. This led to a number of states following what Stelios Stavridis has termed ‘national foreign policies’.<sup>3</sup>

## **7.2. Findings**

International reactions to the crisis ultimately were heavily influenced by a shared desire to limit and manage the effects the conflict and subsequent dispute had on other policy areas. It is unsurprising that peace was preferred to war, and diplomacy preferred to armed conflict but in the case of the crisis there was not great condemnation of Britain’s action. Rather,

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<sup>2</sup> For more information on the global context in which the Falklands Crisis occurred see Fred Halliday, *The Making of the Second Cold War* (London: Verso, 1983).

<sup>3</sup> Stavridis and Hill, *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy*, 179.



there was a recognition that once Argentina had taken the islands, Britain had a right to defend them. As such, the assembly and dispatch of the Task Force was not met with objection from Britain's allies. That being said, the crisis also came at a critical time in global politics. The battle between east and west for global supremacy meant that the need to maintain good relations between nations was of paramount importance for many states' policy and Britain's fight against Argentina had the potential to detrimentally affect relations between states. The context of the Cold War was important but not wholly for the reasons that Thatcher asserted. Thatcher insisted that it could weaken the west if Britain did not to react as it would set a precedent that states could grab land without fear of consequences.<sup>4</sup> This was not an assertion that many agreed with although it was a point that Shridath Ramphal give credit to when outlining his support for Britain's action. Rather, the Cold War context was crucial as it meant Britain's allies were particularly concerned about maintaining good relations with Argentina and Latin America more widely, to prevent the spread of Soviet influence. Conversely, it was also a strong influencing factor for many nations who supported Britain in the hope of establishing or maintaining strong relations with Britain.

It was for the desire to maintain good links with Latin America that Britain's attack on the ARA *Belgrano* on 2 May presented a moment of great difficulty for the international community. As the ship was outside of the exclusion zone and sailing away from the islands, it could be seen that Britain was escalating the conflict and risking Argentina further distancing itself from Britain and its allies. This was of particular concern for Britain's allies in Europe and the USA. It was also the primary reason why Britain's allies moved to support Argentina in the UN after the conflict had ended. Of course, there were other underlying factors that affected countries' support or opposition to Britain particularly the array of other ongoing sovereignty disputes globally. However, the commonality among all these different factors was that individual policy concerns affected each nations' response to the conflict. The specific matter of the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands mattered very little.

Other than Argentina and Britain, the USA was the nation most involved in the crisis. Ultimately, the United States only got involved as much as it did as a result of its wider Cold War policy concerns. However, as noted, it was not convinced by Thatcher's suggestion that Britain not reacting would damage the Cold War west. The swiftness with which the US

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<sup>4</sup> Thatcher message to world leaders, 6 April 1982, PREM 19/615 f184.

urged the British to exercise restraint and consider peace options which would not have restored British sovereignty over the islands is evidence that the US did not believe western interests would be damaged by Britain not responding. Rather, the primary American concern was that the conflict would allow for the advance of the USSR's global influence. The Reagan administration had made Europe and Latin America two of its cornerstones in the fight against communism. It had worked well with both the governments of Britain and Argentina in this regard and the conflict posed a risk to that. An embarrassing result for either would have likely led to the collapse of that country's government and, in the latter at least, a potential power vacuum. The most likely alternatives were leftist administrations with anti-nuclear tendencies. This was not a scenario that the US could risk. The United States did eventually come out in support of Britain, and rather this was somewhat inevitable given preparations to do so had begun long before the formal announcement on 30 April. However, to protect its interests, the United States had to be seen to be acting even-handedly. In doing so, the Reagan administration hoped that it would be able to protect its relations with both the UK and Argentina. It only formally chose a side when conflict was inevitable, and it would have been more detrimental to US interests in Europe to not do so. It was for this reason that *Belgrano* affair caused difficulties for US support of Britain. The sinking of the *Belgrano* angered the Argentinians and as the US had sided with Britain, risked deepening divides between the United States and Argentina. Throughout its mediation efforts, the US offered a range of different peace proposals centred on the future sovereignty of the islands and as such, there was no reason to suggest that the US would not have accepted any peaceful resolution that protected the positions of both the governments in Buenos Aires and London, regardless of what happened to the islands. Throughout the conflict, the USA was primarily concerned with protecting its own interests and questions of sovereignty mattered little.

There were a number of countries whose position in the conflict was primarily motivated by their own sovereignty disputes. This was particularly an issue in Latin America. In this sense, the question of sovereignty of territories like the Falkland Islands held some importance but different countries still moulded their interpretation of the sovereignty question to suit their own territorial ambitions. Venezuela and Guatemala both had territorial claims similar to those of Argentina, whereas Guyana and Belize sought to protect their own sovereignty from larger countries with territorial ambitions. Venezuela and Guatemala hoped a peaceful resolution that saw Argentina retain possession of the islands

would strengthen their own claims to territory. Belize and Guyana simultaneously hoped for a resolution that would see Britain retake control of the islands to discourage larger nations with territorial ambitions from seeking similar methods to that of Argentina to assert claims of sovereignty. Further, Chile's position in the conflict was primarily based around concerns of Argentine ambition towards Chilean territory in the Beagle Channel. The common factor in all of these countries' views on the conflict was that violence should be discouraged as a means of settling such sovereignty disputes. This is another reason why instances like the *Belgrano* affair caused such problems for Britain as it was seen to be escalating the conflict at a time when peace initiatives were underway. The sovereignty question did matter for these countries as the conflict would have gone some way to setting a precedent for sovereignty debates elsewhere in the world, yet still, the specific debate surrounding the Falkland and the islanders was not of great concern to the international community.

The maintenance of relations also explained how these countries pursued their Falklands policy after the conflict. Those that had offered support to the British during the conflict, such as Chile and the USA, were quick to vote in favour of pro-Argentine UN resolutions. Although many of these countries cited the founding of a democratic government as being important in their decision making, the reality was quite different. Those governments' interactions with the Argentine government were focussed on the benefits that the Alfonsín regime could bring to their own policy concerns. The USA was keen to improve relations with Argentina to prevent Buenos Aires from turning to Moscow for aid. The EEC wanted to ensure that relations with Latin America as a region were improved so that trade deals were not affected.<sup>5</sup> To this end, Britain was asked to soften its stance on the sovereignty question. The international community saw the government in London as being more secure than its counterpart in Buenos Aires, and, as such, in a better position to relent. Chile entered into negotiation with the Alfonsín regime and managed to reach a settlement over the islands in the Beagle Channel. As such, it suited Chilean policy to vote in favour of the Argentine resolutions at the UN and support negotiation as a means of settling disputes. In Argentina, defeat in the conflict had done nothing to desensitise the public over the issue. Britain's campaign to retake the islands was seen as a colonial

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<sup>5</sup> Reagan to Thatcher, 24 June 1982, file: United Kingdom PM Thatcher Cables (1/4), box 34, Executive Secretariat NSC Head of State Files, Ronald Reagan Library and UKE Paris to FCO, 15 July 1982, PREM 19/690 f74.

expedition and had restored the abhorrence of imperialism in the South Atlantic.<sup>6</sup> Alfonsín's government thus needed to be seen to be pursuing sovereignty as vigorously as Argentine administrations had prior to the junta. Thus, states were able to use the sovereignty dispute as a way to gain favour with the Argentine government. The position of the government in Britain was more secure following the re-establishment of sovereignty and other nations' view on the dispute was unlikely to affect their relations with Britain. It was more useful for the states to use the dispute as a means to improve relations with Argentina. The flexibility of states in their Falklands policy highlighted that the sovereignty dispute was of little consequence to them. Much more important was how the issue could be used to protect those states' own interests.

The view of the international community towards the crisis was highlighted in how the support offered to Britain was limited to condemnation of the Argentine aggression and peaceful attempts to pressure the Argentines to withdraw from the islands. This was true of both the Commonwealth and the EEC, where statements made by heads of government focussed on condemnation of the attack and the calling of 'an urgent return to negotiations for a peaceful solution'.<sup>7</sup> When Britain was seen to be escalating the conflict, such as in the case of the *Belgrano* affair, it caused problems for Britain's allies. It was difficult for them to continue to support Britain as a victim of unprovoked aggression when the British seemed intent on responding in kind. As seen following the *Belgrano* sinking Commonwealth nations echoed calls from European governments for the British to 'exercise restraint in their use of the Task Force'.<sup>8</sup> In Europe, much of the press began to turn against Britain's seeming intent to use military force especially after the sinking of the *Belgrano* when it appeared that Britain was no longer disposed to finding a peaceful solution. Press in France, Germany, Belgium and even New Zealand criticised the British for the handling of the crisis and called on their own governments to reconsider their support for the British cause. This also caused problems for the different departments of governments in these countries. In Paris the Quai D'Orsay was particularly concerned about the level of support the presidency was offering the British despite their being no significant plays from the UK to find a peaceful resolution.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> *Clarín*, 16, 17 and 18 June 1982.

<sup>7</sup> Falkland Islands: Publicity in Europe, 1982, FCO 26/2429 and President Burnham of Guyana message to Margaret Thatcher, 8 April 1982, THCR 3/1/20 f44.

<sup>8</sup> Summaries of Commonwealth responses to the Falklands Conflict, FCO 7/4573 f50.

<sup>9</sup> *Le Monde* 4, 11 and 16-17 May 1982.

In Germany, the economics minister, Lambsdorff, suggested that West Germany withdraw its support for sanctions and the German foreign ministry sent officials to Latin America to promote the German position.<sup>10</sup> Although these nations sympathised with Britain in terms of having its sovereign territory seized and agreed that Britain had a right to defend itself, they also stood for negotiated settlements. Like the US, the EEC had relationships and interests with Latin America that it desired to protect and Britain's intent to assert its control over the islands by any means necessary risked furthering tension between the two countries. The Commonwealth had a number of nations which had suffered from brutal independence campaigns and had heads of state who strongly advocated negotiation and the maintenance of peace. Britain escalating the conflict caused problems for such governments which did not want to be seen to be advocating conflict as a means of settling diplomatic disputes. This emphasises the point that the crisis for these countries was conflict itself. It was not a matter of sovereignty or the fact that an ally had been attacked, it was that the dispute had not been resolved peacefully and the potential effects this would have on interests elsewhere. A possible exception to this was Caspar Weinberger, whose support for the British appeared to be genuinely motivated by his own affiliation for NATO unity but this was very much the exception to the norm.<sup>11</sup> The conflict between Britain and Argentina had a real possibility of damaging the interests of other nations in the South Atlantic and these countries had to balance their links with Britain with their other interests.

There are very similar themes evident in government departments that offered support to Argentina. Jeanne Kirkpatrick advocated the Argentine claim to sovereignty. Her primary concern, along with the other Latin Americanists in the US government such as Thomas Enders, was US interests in Latin America. These officials had spent many years of their diplomatic careers building strong relationships with governments in South America such that these governments would aid in the US led combat against communism on the American continent. This was shown by Kirkpatrick's focus on the possible consequences of US support for Britain 'engendering a hundred years of animosity in Latin America' as opposed to suggesting any legal justification for the Argentine actions.<sup>12</sup> That was also the reason for Enders' support of the Junta's actions. He saw the benefits of keeping the fascist Argentine government on side for the views they shared with the United States on

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<sup>10</sup> *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 29 May 1982.

<sup>11</sup> Treharne, *Reagan and Thatcher's Special Relationship*, 46.

<sup>12</sup> LeoGrande, *Our Own Backyard*.

communism.<sup>13</sup> However, the fact that Argentina was the nation that committed the first act of aggression caused complications for the US. The State Department's peace efforts were focussed mainly on preventing conflict and preventing an embarrassing conclusion for either government. There is little suggestion that the State Department would not have accepted any peace agreement that would ultimately have prevented either side from claiming sovereignty over the islands whilst securing the governments' positions in both nations. Nor is there any evidence to suggest that anyone in the US administration genuinely believed that the Cold War west would be weakened if Britain did not react. This was ultimately Thatcher's own argument attempting to place a global significance on Britain's campaign to retake the islands. The Cold War context was important to the US in that it wanted to protect the positions of two governments it considered important allies in its opposition to the growing influence of the USSR. Simultaneously, Latin American support for Argentina was limited due to concerns over the effects on Latin American links with the US and Europe. As detailed in chapter five, Argentina encountered problems in gaining concessions from the OAS because other nations were concerned about the effects on the relations between themselves, the United States and the UK. Further, the Argentine act of aggression had caused problems for some of the Latin American states which were concerned about the consequences of conflict in the South Atlantic. There were elements of genuine support for the Argentine position on sovereignty and support for policy through countries such as Panama which attempted to disrupt British efforts in the UN and attempted to motivate continental support for Argentina. However, even here, the focus of these states was to avoid conflict to remove British administration from the South Atlantic.<sup>14</sup> Support for Argentina was characterised by external motivations and most potently bringing the crisis to swift conclusion and limiting its effect as much as possible.

This also carried over into how individual states responded to calls from international organisations to show solidarity. In this sense, similarities can be drawn across the EEC, OAS and the Commonwealth. For advocates of the strength of international organisations, the crisis was an opportunity to show the benefits of such collections of governments acting in unison. This is why Shridath Ramphal and Hans-Dietrich Genscher worked to motivate members of the Commonwealth and EEC, respectively, to support Britain. However, governments in those organisations were more concerned with the benefits that could be

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<sup>13</sup> Henderson valedictory despatch, 27 July 1982, PREM 19/652 f12.

<sup>14</sup> Rock, *Argentina, 1516–1987*, 225.

achieved for their own policy objectives much more than showing unity within the organisation. In the EEC, there was a multitude of different opinions on the crisis and each state pursued its own policy objectives in this area. This was mirrored within the Commonwealth where members of the 'old commonwealth' were more inclined to show practical support to Britain in the crisis than the newer member states.<sup>15</sup> In both these organisations in the years prior to the conflict, nations had struggled to come to agreements with Britain on a number of important policies and individual states wanted to see Britain relent on some in return for support in the crisis and dispute. The French foreign ministry wanted to see Britain agree on CAP price increases within EEC and after the conflict so-called black member states of the Commonwealth wanted to see Britain take a stronger stance against issues of racism in South Africa. Argentina suffered similar problems in generating support within the OAS. Individual Latin American states were not willing to risk policy goals in other areas to aid Argentina during the crisis. This is an area that Connell-Smith has commented on discussing the end of the conflict:

But whatever the future prospects of the OAS, those for an effective Latin American grouping which might replace it must have been greatly diminished by the crisis, which has heightened divisions among the Latin American countries. The concept of Latin American solidarity has suffered an even greater set-back than has that of the special relationship between the two Americas.<sup>16</sup>

That was in a region of the world where the sovereignty dispute had historically carried most weight. Yet Argentina was unable to get hemispheric sanctions implemented against Britain. Rather, the conflict highlighted the divisions between the different Latin American countries. The support that Argentina was offered by other South American governments was very limited and did little in the way of aiding their effort to retain possession of the islands. Even when placed against the argument that nations' global influence was furthered when they acted in unison, the Falklands dispute did not carry enough weight to warrant any significant policy change from individual states. Chile, Colombia, Ireland, Italy, and India pursued a different policy lines to those requested by their respective organisations and

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<sup>15</sup> The Old Commonwealth was a phrase Thatcher used as a collective noun for Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.

<sup>16</sup> Connell-Smith, 'The OAS and the Falklands Conflict,' 347.

worked to taper any organisational declarations so they would not be tied to support either side in the dispute. This was in stark contrast to other issues of the late twentieth century such as the US invasion of Grenada or combatting apartheid in South Africa where it was more beneficial for governments to work together with organisations as it helped their own policy objectives. When compared to the other issues that dominated these organisations during the 1980s, the Falklands dispute did not carry the same importance. States operated with freedom on Falklands policy and did so as might be expected with regard to the significance of the dispute for their own states.

Ultimately, even in Argentina, the dispute was eventually overtaken by other issues in terms of importance. Although military defeat in 1982 forced Argentina to hand sovereignty back to Britain, the Alfonsín regime vigorously pursued regaining sovereignty using diplomacy as its primary weapon. However, eventually Argentina's Falklands policy succumbed to domestic pressures. By 1988, the worsening Argentine economy, and civil unrest, forced Argentina to sacrifice its demand that the sovereignty of the islands be discussed before any restoration of relations, and reach an agreement with Britain to restore diplomatic relations whilst setting aside the disagreements over sovereignty. Noteworthy, was that Argentina had refused to set aside the sovereignty question at Berne in 1984, yet it was the Argentinians who suggested the framework of the umbrella sovereignty resolution to the dispute which allowed for the restoration of diplomatic relations between Britain and Argentina at the Madrid Accords signed in 1990. From the British perspective nothing changed in the negotiating position between 1984 and 1990 and there was very little difference between the suggested possibility of setting aside the sovereignty issue at Berne in 1984 and the umbrella sovereignty solution in 1990. This was a point that was noted by Makin:

Away from the shades of meaning perceived only by some specialists, the fact remains that the difference between an open agenda, coupled with some kind of agreement to deal eventually with sovereignty and a sovereignty umbrella is slight.<sup>17</sup>

It was only the deteriorating Argentine economy mixed with the implementation of the FICZ meant that the Argentine government had to weigh the importance of sovereignty as against

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<sup>17</sup> Makin, 'That Nature of Anglo-Argentine Diplomacy 1980-1990,' 242.



other policy considerations. That Argentina, the nation which felt most passionately about the dispute, eventually forwent the one issue at the heart of the debate highlighted the significance of the sovereignty of the islands to the wider issues facing nations in the 1980s.

Of course, governmental response was influenced in some regard by public opinion. The peak of public interest in the crisis was during the conflict itself. During this phase, many states tapered their policy in line with their own electorates' feeling on the conflict. This strongly influenced the Falklands policy of Spain and Italy. Both had strong cultural ties with Argentina and the similarity between the islands and Gibraltar, an issue which the Spanish electorate felt strongly about, heavily influenced opinion in Spain. This was important as it meant that neither country could implement sanctions against Argentina in line with EEC states and also meant that Italy was denied the opportunity to act as a mediator in the dispute after the conflict, which would have been of great benefit to Italy in terms of its goals within the EEC. Similarly, the US government found it easier to side with Britain at the end of April 1982 because American public opinion was sympathetic to the British cause. In Argentina, in the years immediately after the conflict public opinion was such that the Argentine government continued to pursue negotiation but part of the reason why they were able to eventually relent on the sovereignty issue was a shift in public opinion towards negotiation in the later part of the 1980s.<sup>18</sup> However, a more common linking factor among the states was that public feeling towards the crisis was not very strong at all. This allowed governments to act more freely in terms of policy. After the conflict itself, it was not a subject that many public opinion organisations around the world kept records of and the Falklands dispute was not well reported in the international press. The politics of sovereignty was not a subject that generated public interest as much as the conflict had. This feeling was heightened by the knowledge that the chances of another conflict were very slim. In contrast to Britain, where interest in the conflict was retained and, in many respects, victory had become a symbol of national pride, even jingoism, it was not a feeling that resonated more widely.

The notion that the crisis was understood differently by other states was further highlighted with the growing frustration with Britain over its refusal to negotiate with Argentina over sovereignty. Especially after 1984, many of Britain's allies in Europe and

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<sup>18</sup> Felipe Noguera and Peter Willets completed a full analysis of the public attitudes towards the crisis in Argentina in Noguera and Willets, 'Public Attitudes and the Future of the Islands,' 238-267.

the Commonwealth voted for the pro-Argentine resolutions calling for negotiation on sovereignty. This ignited debates between Britain and these nations over whether the conflict should have constituted a change in stance from the pre-1982 position on sovereignty. For most nations represented in the UNGA, the fall of the Junta and its replacement with a democratic government meant that Britain should return to the position before the conflict where it showed willingness to negotiate on sovereignty. The UK, in 1980, had opened negotiations with Argentina about the prospect of transferring sovereignty, which the British government knew at that time would be against the islanders wishes. For most states, there was then no conceivable reason why Britain would not agree to returning to those negotiations after the conflict. This thesis is not concerned with the legitimacy of either side's claims to sovereignty nor is it concerned with whether Britain was right to refuse to negotiate. What is important for this research though is that this frustration from states highlighted that this was a different sort of crisis for the rest of the world than it was for Britain. The crisis of the dispute had been that failed negotiation had resulted in armed conflict which put other more important policy objectives in jeopardy. This resulted in Britain coming into debate with Canada, Australia, and the USA which all saw Britain as acting in a manner that was obstructive to wider foreign policy objectives of western nations. So although in April 1982 there was sympathy for Britain that its territory had been subject of an attack and there was a recognition that Britain had a right to respond, there was certainly very little concern regarding who held sovereignty over the islands. For Britain allies, if support for negotiation placated Argentina enough to support other policy measure, then that was the policy that was pursued. There was no real cost in doing so and no evident concern for the wishes of the islanders. The opinion of the much of the international community was that the crisis did not concern the islands themselves and who held sovereignty over the islands did not matter so much when compared to other policy objectives.

It is important at this point to consider what this study has added to the historiography of the crisis. Ultimately, this study has presented a comparative history of the international perceptions of the Falklands crisis and dispute. As referenced throughout this study, many historians have examined the conflict period in great depth with the responses of Latin America and the United States attracting much scholarly attention. However, much of this writing was done in the immediate aftermath of the conflict. This study has added to the

conclusions reached by these historians by analysing developing opinion on the Falklands dispute in the years after the conflict until the restoration of relations between Argentina and Britain. More recent histories of the crisis have still limited their scope of the crisis to the conflict period, and many have often used the conflict as a case study in wider histories of either the 'special relationship' or foreign policy formation in a number of states. It is true that the diplomacy surrounding Madrid accords had already attracted a lot of interest from scholars in the Latin America, but they had not compared the Argentine change in stance to perceptions from other nations. This study has considered it. In doing so, it has been able to highlight common themes between the different international reactions to the studied period. This present work has also benefitted from access to source material under-researched by or unavailable to other historians. This source material was crucial to this study being able to look at the period beyond 1982. The thesis has uncovered aspects of the international view on the crisis that previous historians have been unable to do so through comparing different reactions and placing them in the wider context of global politics in the 1980s. This source material has allowed the diplomatic activity that occurred in the immediate aftermath of Argentine invasion to be placed in its true context. In doing so it has presented a history of international attitudes and reactions to the outbreak of hostilities. Through that, this thesis has attempted to make some novel observations and deepen understanding of how the crisis was perceived. Most potently this work has been able to appropriately comment on what extent the crisis was a global issue, highlighting how Falklands policy was very much dependent on how it played into the wider policy objectives of other states rather than being important in its own right.

### **7.3. Limitations**

As discussed in the introduction, this thesis is limited by the source material it has used. Due to time, resources and language restraints, the thesis has focussed on source material accessible from the UK and, to a large extent, in the English language although some foreign language material has been used at times. The most used source material for this thesis has been UK government archival material. Although the UK archives were extensive and contained a wealth of information regarding foreign perceptions, the thesis has not been able to do deep dives into the foreign policy decision making apparatus of many of the nations discussed as this would have required more extensive research in the government archives in those countries. This thesis has been able to offer comment on the international receptions

of the crisis and dispute through appropriate contextualisation and interpretation of the source material used. The UK archives included extensive material covering the communications between governments as well as second-hand reports on nations' views of the crisis and the extensive FCO coverage on the monitoring of international opinion on the dispute. All presented insight into international perceptions of the crisis and dispute but this thesis had to use appropriate analytical methodology to ensure the accurate conclusions were drawn from this evidence base. This has included comparing comments made between governments with the actions of governments in the wider context of their known policy interests. Particularly important to this was applying analysis to the terminology used and the words chosen in official communications to make comment on what this said about different nations' receptions of the crisis. This government archives were complemented by memoirs, diaries, and newspaper archives to aid in the analysis and discussion. These sources gave insight into the public perception of the crisis and how different political actors desired that their perceptions of the crisis were portrayed to the public and remembered after they left office. This then provided further insight into international perceptions which this thesis was able to pass comment on. Resultantly, although the thesis was not able to present deep dives into the decision-making apparatus and processes of the different nations discussed, the thesis was still able to offer some new understanding of the international perceptions of the crisis and dispute.

One international actor not considered in this thesis is Britain. That is because of the large volume of literature already concerned with the British reaction to the crisis. However, this work has built on much of the work already completed on the international response to Britain's own position and presented extensive discussion around British strategy to garner international approval and support for their position in the crisis and dispute thereafter. As noted in many of the chapters, the British government complained when allies voted against them in the votes on the sovereignty issue in the UN. This was most notable in the 1985 vote when, along with Canada, many of EEC member states voted in favour of the resolution, following which Thatcher complained to her fellow heads of government. She made reference to the lack of warning EEC states gave to Britain regarding their vote and also that it brought into question the validity of EEC unity which many other heads of state in Europe had championed in the years prior to the conflict.<sup>19</sup> In her memoirs, too, Thatcher was rather

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<sup>19</sup> Discussed more fully in Chapter 3. Thatcher's bilateral meeting with Mitterrand, 2-4 May 1985, Points to make, 4 May 1982, FCO 7/6360 f78.

dismissive of the international response, mentioning only in passing her gratitude to François Mitterrand and the leaders of the old Commonwealth.<sup>20</sup> In an interview with the BBC accompanying the publication of her memoirs, she gave very short and vague answers to question regarding the support offered by Britain's allies during the crisis.<sup>21</sup> Thatcher's memoirs suggest that she wanted the period to be remembered as a time when Britain's allies offered support, yet the period has been written by other historians that Britain's relations with its closest allies, most notably the United States, were put under great strain. The fact that Thatcher does not offer much defence against these allegations suggests that this was true, but Thatcher would rather her premiership be remembered for the positive relationship she had with President Reagan. The conflict, both then and since, was portrayed as a defining moment in Thatcher's premiership and as such, it is natural that Thatcher would want to emphasise the period as a moment of success and significant triumph. The reality was more that countries sympathised with Britain that its territory had been subject of attack and, for the most part, also recognised Britain had a right to respond but at the same time urged caution and restraint in the hopes of protecting interests elsewhere. After the conflict, Britain retained sovereignty despite repeated UN resolutions to negotiate the issue. The countries that voted with Argentina in the UN did so out of general support for negotiation and in the hope of maintaining some favour with the Argentine government. The actual sovereignty of the islands mattered very little.

The historiography on the crisis in Britain has often suggested this as a turning point in the history of Thatcher's tenure as Prime Minister. In the quote that opened this thesis, Charles Moore commented that this was when Thatcher completed her 'mastery of the political scene'.<sup>22</sup> The scope of this thesis means it is unable to comment to what extent that is true as it has not analysed the effect of the conflict in Britain. The 'Falklands Factor' is a theme that has been mentioned frequently in discussion of the 1983 general election. Victory in the conflict had a resounding effect on the British journalese but in terms of Britain's relations with its international partners, it changed very little. In the years after the conflict, British efforts proved futile in preventing allies from turning their support towards the Argentine push for negotiation. However, before the conflict, there was almost unanimous support for the negotiation on sovereignty with the 1976 UNGA resolution placing pressure

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<sup>20</sup> Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years*, 227.

<sup>21</sup> Thatcher interview with BBC One, 27 October 1993.

<sup>22</sup> Moore, *Margaret Thatcher Volume II*, 364.

on the British to resume negotiations over the islands' sovereignty. In this respect the reaction of the international community was to revert to its pre-conflict stance. However, as before the conflict, Britain continued its relationship with all nations which voted in favour of the Argentine resolutions in the United Nations, unhindered by any position on the sovereignty of the islands. For the most part, Britain did not need to concern itself with the UNGA resolution votes as despite a series of votes going against them, no further pressure was placed on HMG to resume negotiations with Argentina. It was not until negotiations could be made on their own terms that Britain entered into formal discussions with the Argentine government. Even from a British perspective, the sovereignty dispute was a low priority. The crisis was a difficult time for the British government in terms of its relations with its allies, but it was not an issue that would last long. In the years after the conflict, HMG was content to note criticism in the General Assembly without any real pressure to act on it.

Although part of the introduction of this thesis covered a brief history of the dispute, it has not made any judgement on the legality of either side's claim to sovereignty, as it is not relevant for its remit. Much more important for this study was the fact that dispute resulted in conflict and the international reaction to that. As the present work included study of the dispute after the conflict, this thesis has not judged on whether the conflict changed Britain's relationship with other states. As previously mentioned, it was the peculiarity of the dispute that characterised the international response to the conflict. It is for this reason that this thesis also did not cover any substantial history of international opinion on the sovereignty dispute before 1982. The conflict caused a drastic deterioration of the dispute into a crisis. The Argentine act of aggression caused complications even for the Junta's closest allies. It was the conflict's suddenness that provoked the international reaction and gave the reaction a uniqueness in terms of the history of the islands itself. In its focus on the period after the conflict, this work has been able to highlight the remarkable nature of the dispute and uncover the true nature of international response to Britain and the crisis.

Although this study has made much of the potential effects of the crisis to several states, it has not been able to undertake an effective analysis of any potential consequences to states of supporting or opposing Britain in the conflict. The actual costs were of little consequence to international actors; much more important was what these states suspected the consequences could be as it was those beliefs that influenced the international reactions. To this extent, it was not relevant for this study to analyse how state actors or others arrived

at their conclusions of the potential costs. The source material was clear in the importance these states placed on the sovereignty disputes and where it ranked in their wider policy objectives. As such, this study was able to effectively judge international reaction on this basis. However, it is important to clarify that this study should not be used as a judgement on the potential wider effects of the crisis as this was not the author's intention.

#### **7.4. Final Conclusions**

Prior to 1982, the sovereignty dispute between Argentina and Britain over the Falklands attracted little international attention. Few states outside of Latin America would have claimed any particularly strong feeling. The Argentine attack changed that. Governments around the world were sent requests from the governments of Argentina and Britain asking for support. Members of the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly were invited to give their opinion on the issue and vote on resolutions that justified Argentina's initial seizure of the islands in 1982 and Britain's subsequent response. Below the government level, the conflict attracted world attention as a P5 member engaged in armed conflict, claiming the defence of a hand full of civilians as justification. In this sense, the relative scale of the crisis was enormous. Over 14000 were sent to fight over lands populated by 1800. It was the unusual and surprise nature of the conflict that generated such international reaction. However, once the conflict was over, for the majority, the dispute ceased being an issue. For governments, it was the potential that the conflict may have had knock-on effects on their own interests; after the conflict, for these governments it was no longer realistic that the crisis would impair any other policy objectives. It became little more than a symbol in an on-going narrative that negotiation was the best policy to solve any international dispute.

In reaching these conclusions, this study has sought to contribute to the historiography of the crisis. It has built on existing work by highlighting the real importance of the dispute over the islands as displayed in international reactions to the crisis as a whole. In looking at the dispute until the year of 1990, it has been able to give a more complete understanding of the dispute as countries continued to be invited to contribute to the various debates that took place in the UNGA in the years after the conflict. In doing so, this study has placed the crisis in context. Much of the historiography has focussed on the reaction in Britain, where it did indeed provoke a strong emotional response and where the conflict had

a lasting effect on policy towards the islands for a number of years. This study has contributed to the current understanding of the history of the dispute by showing its relative importance to the international community. Further, this study has the potential to contribute to wider understandings of global reactions to small scale conflicts. As noted in chapter four, the US invasion of Grenada in 1983 prompted a strong reaction from the Commonwealth which was not seen in 1982. Further research could compare the international response to the Falklands crisis to other conflicts such as Grenada or Cyprus and assess the motivations of state actors in forming policy towards such conflicts. This would have the potential to provide a valuable study for assessing the potential impact of governments engaging in future conflicts as well as assessing the future international reaction as the US and UK withdraw from conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

It is a truism that states prefer peace to war and negotiation to conflict but in the case of the Falklands dispute, it is precisely this that highlights that the question of sovereignty was of minimal importance to the international community in the 1980s. In its conclusion, this thesis has assessed what constitutes a crisis. For the British government it was a security and defence issue: sovereign territory had been invaded by a foreign power which had sought to subvert the rights of British citizens but by extension it was also a moment where Britain felt it had to show its capability to act and continue to have a prominent role in global politics. As a result, the issue extended beyond 1982, where it ceased to be a crisis and reverted to a dispute, as the British government continued to defend the British right to hold sovereignty over the islands, in part to justify its action to retake them, in spite of Argentine claims. However, the crisis of the Falklands for the international community was quite different. It was that this dispute, that was of little importance to the international community, had descended into violence. It was a crisis in the sense that the wishes and desires of 1800 islanders could affect Cold War globally. The conflict had the possibility to set a dangerous precedent for other states with territorial ambitions but also had the prospect of damaging foreign policy interests for a number of states. It was this that characterised the international response to Britain and the crisis. The conflict was extraordinary in that two states as sophisticated as Argentina and the UK would fight over islands of such little significance. Yet it was precisely this peculiarity where the conflict and dispute assumed its importance in 1982 for the international community. Its suddenness threatened the policy interests of governments around the world and the principals involved meant the conflict had the potential to set a precedent for similar disputes. It was with constant reference to the



potential effects the conflict may have had in other areas that helped shape international reaction. However, the importance of the sovereignty question itself was very little. This was shown clearly after the conflict. States used votes in the UN to bargain favour with Britain and Argentina or to protect their policy interests elsewhere. Often, such as in the case of the USA and Chile, these votes were contradictory to who the states had supported during the conflict. This showed how flexible policy towards the dispute was. During the conflict, nations supported Britain in the hope of limiting the effects of the crisis; after the conflict international interests were in ensuring that the dispute would not threaten peace and cooperation again. Britain justified its role in the conflict in defence of sovereignty and principles it argued the ‘whole world should stand for’ echoing Ramphal’s comment that this was ‘not Britain’s cause alone’.<sup>23</sup> However, for the international community, who held sovereignty over the islands and their population mattered little when weighed against the need to maintain favour in the Cold War world. In its passionate defence of the islanders’ right to self-determination, Britain stood alone.

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<sup>23</sup> Ramphal on the BBC Today programme, 28 April 1982. A transcript of the interview can be found in FCO 7/4574 Part B.

## 8. Appendices

### 8.1. Appendix A: Voting on the Falkland Crisis within the United Nations Security Council, 1982

<u>Country</u>	<u>Resolution</u>	
	<u>S/RES/502</u> <u>03/04/1982</u>	<u>S/RES/505</u> <u>26/05/1982</u>
China	A	Y
France	Y	Y
Guyana	Y	Y
Ireland	Y	Y
Japan	Y	Y
Jordan	Y	Y
Panama	N	Y
Poland	A	Y
Spain	A	Y
Togo	Y	Y
Uganda	Y	Y
USSR	A	Y
United Kingdom	Y	Y
United States	Y	Y
Democratic Republic of Congo	Y	Y

<b>Summary</b>		
Yes (Y)	10	15
No (N)	1	0
Abstain (A)	4	0
<i>Total</i>	15	15

**8.2. Appendix B: Record of Voting on the Falkland Islands in the United Nations  
General Assembly 1982-1989**

<u>Country</u>	<u>Resolution</u>						
	<u>28/10/ 1982 A/RE/ 37/9</u>	<u>16/11/ 1983 A/RES/ 38/12</u>	<u>01/11/ 1984 A/RE/ 39/6</u>	<u>27/11/ 1985 A/RES 40/21</u>	<u>25/11/ 1986 A/RES 41/40</u>	<u>17/11/ 1987 A/RES/ 42/19</u>	<u>17/11/ 1988 A/RES/ 43/25</u>
Afghanistan	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Albania	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Algeria	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Angola	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Antigua and Barbuda	N	DNV	A	Y	A	A	A
Argentina	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Australia	A	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y
Austria	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Bahamas	A	A	A	A	Y	Y	Y
Bahrain	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Bangladesh	A	A	A	A	Y	Y	DNV
Barbados	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Belgium	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Belize	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Benin	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Bhutan	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Bolivia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Botswana	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Brazil	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Brunei Darussalam			A	A	Y	A	A
Bulgaria	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Burma/Myanmar	A	A	A	A	A	A	Y
Burundi	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Byelorussian SSR/Belarus	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Canada	A	A	A	Y	Y	A	Y
Cape Verde	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Central African Republic	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Chad	A	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y
Chile	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
China	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Colombia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Comoros	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Congo	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Costa Rica	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Cuba	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Cyprus	Y	DNV	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Czechoslovakia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Democratic Kampuchea/ Cambodia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Democratic Yemen	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Denmark	A	A	A	A	Y	A	A
Djibouti	DNV	DNV	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Dominica	N	N	N	DNV	DNV	DNV	A
Dominican Republic	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Ecuador	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Egypt	A	Y	A	A	Y	Y	Y
El Salvador	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Equatorial Guinea	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	DNV
Ethiopia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Fiji	N	A	A	A	Y	Y	A
Finland	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
France	A	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y
Gabon	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Gambia	N	N	DNV	Y	A	N	N

German Democratic Republic	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Germany, Federal Republic Of	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Ghana	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Greece	Y	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y
Grenada	Y	DNV	N	A	A	A	A
Guatemala	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Guinea	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Guinea-Bissau	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Guyana	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Haiti	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Honduras	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Hungary	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Iceland	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
India	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Indonesia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Iran (Islamic Republic Of)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Iraq	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Ireland	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Israel	Y	A	A	A	A	A	A

Italy	A	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y
Ivory Coast	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Jamaica	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Japan	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Jordan	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Kenya	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Kuwait	A	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y
Lao (People's Democratic Republic of)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Lebanon	A	A	A	A	Y	Y	Y
Lesotho	A	A	A	Y	A	A	A
Liberia	Y	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Luxembourg	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Madagascar	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Malawi	N	N	N	A	A	A	Y
Malaysia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Maldives	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Mali	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Malta	Y	Y	Y	A	A	A	A

Mauritania	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Mauritius	A	A	A	Y	Y	DNV	DNV
Mexico	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Mongolia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Morocco	Y	Y	Y	DNV	Y	Y	DNV
Mozambique	Y	DNV	DNV	DNV	DNV	DNV	DNV
Nepal	A	A	A	A	A	A	Y
Netherlands	A	A	A	A	Y	Y	Y
New Zealand	N	N	N	A	A	A	A
Nicaragua	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Niger	A	A	DNV	Y	Y	Y	Y
Nigeria	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Norway	A	A	A	A	Y	Y	Y
Oman	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Pakistan	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Panama	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Papua New Guinea	N	Y	A	A	Y	A	A
Paraguay	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Peru	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Philippines	Y	Y	Y	DNV	Y	Y	Y
Poland	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y



Portugal	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Qatar	A	A	A	A	A	A	DNV
Romania	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Rwanda	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Saint Kitts and Nevis		A	DNV	A	A	A	A
Saint Lucia	A	A	A	A	DNV	A	A
Saint Vincent and Grenadines	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Samoa	A	A	A	Y	Y	Y	DNV
Sao Tome and Principe	Y	DNV	DNV	DNV	DNV	Y	Y
Saudi Arabia	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Senegal	A	A	A	Y	Y	Y	A
Seychelles	DNV	DNV	DNV	Y	Y	Y	Y
Sierra Leone	A	A	A	A	Y	Y	Y
Singapore	A	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y
Solomon Islands	N	N	N	N	A	A	A
Somalia	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
South Africa	DNV	DNV	DNV	DNV	DNV	DNV	DNV
Spain	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Sri Lanka	N	N	N	A	N	N	N

Sudan	A	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y
Suriname	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Swaziland	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Sweden	A	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y
Syrian Arab Republic	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Thailand	A	A	A	A	Y	A	A
Togo	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Trinidad and Tobago	A	A	A	Y	Y	Y	A
Tunisia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Turkey	A	A	A	Y	A	A	A
Uganda	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Ukrainian SSR	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
USSR	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
United Arab Emirates	Y	A	A	A	A	A	A
United Kingdom	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
(United Republic of) Cameroon	A	Y	A	A	A	A	Y
United Republic of Tanzania	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

United States of America	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Upper Volta/Burkina Faso	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Uruguay	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Vanuatu	A	A	A	DNV	Y	Y	A
Venezuela	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Viet Nam	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Yemen	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Yugoslavia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Zaire/Democratic Republic of Congo	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Zambia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Zimbabwe	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

<b>Summary</b>	<b>1982</b>	<b>1983</b>	<b>1984</b>	<b>1985</b>	<b>1986</b>	<b>1987</b>	<b>1988</b>
Yes (Y)	90	87	89	107	116	114	109
No (N)	12	9	9	4	4	5	5
Abstain (A)	52	54	54	41	34	36	37
Did Not Vote (DNV)	3	8	7	7	5	4	8
Total Voting Membership	157	158	159	159	159	159	159

### **8.3. Appendix C: Text of Security Council Resolution 502 (adopted 03/05/1982)**

*The Security Council,*

*Recalling* the statement made by the President of the Security Council at the 2345<sup>th</sup> meeting of the Council on the 1 April 1982<sup>59</sup> calling on the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to refrain from the use or threat of force in the region of the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas).

*Deeply disturbed* at reports of invasion on 2 April 1982 by armed forces of Argentina.

*Determining* that there exists a breach of the peace in the region of the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas),

1. *Demands* an immediate cessation of hostilities;
2. *Demands* and immediate withdrawal of all Argentine forces from the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas);
3. *Calls* on the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to seek a diplomatic solution to their differences and to respect fully the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

#### **8.4. Appendix D: Text of Security Council Resolution 505 (adopted 26/05/1982)**

*The Security Council,*

*Noting with deepest concern* that the situation in the region of the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) has seriously deteriorated.

*Having heard* the statement made by the Secretary-General at its 2360<sup>th</sup> meeting, on 21 May, 1982, as well as the statements made in the debate by the representatives of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,

*Concerned* to achieve, as a matter of the greatest urgency, a cessation of hostilities and an end to the present conflict between the armed forces of Argentina and the United Kingdom.

1. *Expresses appreciation* to the Secretary-General for the efforts that he has already made to bring about an agreement between the parties, to ensure the implementation of resolution 502 (1982) and thereby to restore peace in the region;
2. *Requests* the Secretary-General, on the basis of the present resolution, to undertake a renewed mission of good offices, bearing in mind resolution 502 (1982) and the approach outlined in his statement of 21 May 1982;
3. *Urges* the parties to the conflict to co-operate fully with the Secretary-General in his mission with a view to ending the present hostilities in and around the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas);
4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to enter into contact immediately with the parties with a view to negotiating mutually acceptable terms for a cease-fire, including, if necessary, arrangements for the dispatch of United Nations observers to monitor compliance with the terms of the cease-fire;
5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit an interim report to the Security Council as soon as possible and, in any case, not later than seven days after the adoption of the present resolution.

**8.5. Appendix E: Text of General Assembly Resolution 37/9 ‘Question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas)’ (adopted 28 October 1982)**

(Co-sponsored by Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela)

*The General Assembly,*

*Having considered* the question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas),

*Aware* that the maintenance of colonial situations is incompatible with the United Nations ideal of universal peace,

*Recalling* its resolutions 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, 2065 (XX) of 16 December 1965, 3160 (XXVIII) of 14 December 1973 and 31/49 of 1 December 1976,

*Recalling also* Security Council Resolutions 502 (1982) of 3 April 1982 and 505 (1982) of 26 May 1982,

*Taking into account* the existence of a *de facto* cessation of hostilities in the South Atlantic and the expressed intention of the parties not to renew them,

*Reaffirming* the need for the parties to take due account of the interests of the population of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) in accordance with the provisions of General Assembly resolutions 2065 (XX) and 3160 (XXVIII),

*Reaffirming also,* the principles of the Charter of the United Nations on the non-use of force or the threat of force in international relations and the peaceful settlement of international disputes,

1. *Requests* the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to resume negotiations in order to find as soon as possible a peaceful solution to the sovereignty dispute relating to the question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas);
2. *Requests* the Secretary-General, on the basis of the present resolution, to undertake a renewed mission of good offices in order to assist the parties in complying with the request made in paragraph 1 above, and to take the necessary measures to that end;
3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session on the progress made on implementation of the present resolution;

4. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-eighth session the item entitled “Question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas)”



**8.6. Appendix F: Text of the General Assembly Resolution 38/12 ‘Question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas)’ (adopted 16 November 1983)**

(Co-sponsored by Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela)

*The General Assembly,*

*Having considered* the question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas).

*Aware* that the maintenance of colonial situations is incompatible with the United Nations ideal of universal peace.

*Recalling* its resolutions 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, 2065 (XX) of 16 December 1965, 3160 (XXVIII) of 14 December 1973 and 31/49 of 1 December 1976.

*Recalling also* Security Council Resolutions 502 (1982) of 3 April 1982 and 505 (1982) of 26 May 1982.

*Having received* the report of the Secretary-General on his mission of good offices.

*Regretting* the lack of progress in the implementation of Resolution 37/9.

*Aware* of the interest of the international community in the resumption by the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of their negotiations in order to find as soon as possible a peaceful and just solution to the sovereignty dispute relating to the question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas).

*Taking in account* the existence of a *de facto* cessation of hostilities in the South Atlantic and the expressed interests of parties not to renew them.

*Reaffirming* the need for the parties to take due account of the interests of the population of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) in accordance with the provisions of General Assembly resolutions 2065 (XX), 3160 (XXVIII) and 37/9

*Reaffirming also*, the principles of the Charter of the United Nations on the non-use of force or the threat of force in international relations and the peaceful settlement of international disputes,

1. *Reiterates* its requests to the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to resume negotiations in order to find as soon as

possible a peaceful solution to the sovereignty dispute relating to the question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas);

2. *Takes note* of the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of General Assembly resolution 37/9;
3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue his renewed mission of good offices in order to assist the parties in complying with the request made in paragraph 1 above, and to take the necessary measures to that end;
4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit a report to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session on the progress made on the implementation of the present resolution;
5. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-ninth session the item entitled “Question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas)”.

**8.7. Appendix G: Text of General Assembly Resolution 39/6 ‘Question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas)’ (adopted 01 November 1984)**

(Co-sponsored by Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela)

*The General Assembly,*

*Having considered* the question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) and having received the report of the Secretary-General,

*Recalling* its resolutions 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, 2065 (XX) of 16 December 1965, 3160 (XXVIII) of 14 December 1973, 31/49 of 1 December 1976, 37/9 of 4 November 1982 and 38/12 of 16 November 1983, together with Security Council resolutions 502 (1982) of 3 April 1982 and 505 (1982) of 26 May 1982,

*Reaffirming* the principles of the Charter of the United Nations on the non-use of force or the threat of force in international relations and the obligation of States to settle their international disputes by peaceful means and recalling that, in this respect, the General Assembly has repeatedly requested the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to resume negotiations in order to find as soon as possible a peaceful, just and definitive solution to the question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas),

*Observing with concern* that, in spite, of the time which has elapsed since the adoption of resolution 2065 (XX), the prolonged dispute has still not been resolved,

*Aware* of the interest of the international community in the settlement by the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of all their differences, in accordance with the United Nations ideals of peace and friendship among peoples,

*Taking note* of the communiqué issued by the representatives of the Government of Switzerland and the Government of Brazil at Berne on 20 July 1984,

*Reaffirming* the need for the parties to take due account of the interests of the population of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) in accordance with the provisions of General Assembly resolutions 2065 (XX), 3160 (XXVIII), 37/9 and 38/12,

1. *Reiterates its request* to the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to resume negotiations in order to find as soon as

possible a peaceful solution to the sovereignty dispute and their remaining differences in relation to the question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas);

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue his renewed mission of good offices in order to assist the parties in complying with the request made in paragraph 1 above, and to take necessary measures to that end;
3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its fortieth session a report on the progress made in the implementation of the present resolution;
4. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fortieth session the item entitled “Question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas).”

**8.8. Appendix H: Text of General Assembly Resolution 40/21 ‘Question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas)’ (adopted 27 November 1985)**

(Co-sponsored Algeria, Brazil, Ghana, India, Mexico, Uruguay and Yugoslavia)

*The General Assembly,*

*Having considered* the question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) and having received the report of the Secretary-General,

*Aware* of the interest of the international community in the peaceful and definitive settlement by the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of all their differences, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,

*Taking note* of the interest repeatedly expressed by both parties in normalizing their relations,

*Convinced* that such purpose would be facilitated by a global negotiation between both Governments that will allow them to rebuild mutual confidence on a solid basis and resolve the pending problems, including all aspects on the future of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas),

1. *Requests* the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to initiate negotiations with a view to finding the means to resolve peacefully and definitively the pending problems between both countries, including all aspects on the future of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas), in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;
2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue his renewed mission of good offices in order to assist the parties in complying with the request made in paragraph 1 above, and to take necessary measures to that end;
3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its forty-first session a report on the progress made in the implementation of the present resolution;
4. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-first session the item entitled “Question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas).”

**8.9. Appendix I: Text of General Assembly Resolution 41/40 ‘Question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas)’ (adopted 25 November 1986)**

(Co-sponsored Algeria, Brazil, Ghana, India, Mexico, Uruguay and Yugoslavia)

*The General Assembly,*

*Having considered* the question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) and having received the report of the Secretary-General,

*Aware* of the interest of the international community in the peaceful and definitive settlement by the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of all their differences, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,

*Taking note* of the interest repeatedly expressed by both parties in normalizing their relations,

*Convinced* that such purpose would be facilitated by a global negotiation between both Governments that will allow them to rebuild mutual confidence on a solid basis and resolve the pending problems, including all aspects on the future of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas),

1. *Reiterates its request* to the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to initiate negotiations with a view to finding the means to resolve peacefully and definitively the problems pending between both countries, including all aspects on the future of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas), in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;
2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue his renewed mission of good offices in order to assist the parties in complying with the request made in paragraph 1 above, and to take necessary measures to that end;
3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its forty-second session a report on the progress made in the implementation of the present resolution;
4. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-second session the item entitled “Question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas).”

**8.10. Appendix J: Text of General Assembly Resolution 42/19 ‘Question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas)’ (adopted 17 November 1987)**

(Co-sponsored Algeria, Brazil, Ghana, India, Mexico, Uruguay and Yugoslavia)

*The General Assembly,*

*Having considered* the question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) and having received the report of the Secretary-General,

*Aware* of the interest of the international community in the peaceful and definitive settlement by the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of all their differences, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,

*Taking note* of the interest repeatedly expressed by both parties in normalizing their relations,

*Convinced* that such purpose would be facilitated by a global negotiation between both Governments that will allow them to rebuild mutual confidence on a solid basis and resolve the pending problems, including all aspects on the future of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas),

1. *Reiterates its request* to the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to initiate negotiations with a view to finding the means to resolve peacefully and definitively the problems pending between both countries, including all aspects on the future of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas), in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;
2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue his renewed mission of good offices in order to assist the parties in complying with the request made in paragraph 1 above, and to take necessary measures to that end;
3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its forty-third session a report on the progress made in the implementation of the present resolution;
4. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-third session the item entitled “Question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas).”

**8.11. Appendix K: Text of the General Assembly Resolution 43/25 ‘The Question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas)’ (adopted 17 November 1988)**

(Co-sponsored Algeria, Brazil, Ghana, India, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay and Yugoslavia)

*The General Assembly,*

*Having considered* the question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) and having received the report of the Secretary-General,

*Aware* of the interest of the international community in the peaceful and definitive settlement by the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of all their differences, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,

*Taking note* of the interest repeatedly expressed by both parties in normalizing their relations,

*Convinced* that such purpose would be facilitated by a global negotiation between both Governments that will allow them to rebuild mutual confidence on a solid basis and resolve the pending problems, including all aspects on the future of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas),

1. *Reiterates its request* to the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to initiate negotiations with a view to finding the means to resolve peacefully and definitively the problems pending between both countries, including all aspects on the future of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas), in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;
2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue his renewed mission of good offices in order to assist the parties in complying with the request made in paragraph 1 above, and to take necessary measures to that end;
3. *Also Requests* the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its forty-fourth session a report on the progress made in the implementation of the present resolution;
4. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fourth session the item entitled “Question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas).”



## 8.12. Appendix L: Political Biography

Acland, Antony	<i>Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 1982-1986</i> <i>British Ambassador to the United States, 1986-1991</i>
Adelman, Kenneth	<i>US Deputy Ambassador to the UN, 1981-1983</i>
Ahmed, Rafeeuddin	<i>UN Under Secretary General for Political Affairs, Trusteeship and Decolonisation, 1973-1994</i>
Alfonsín, Raul	<i>President of Argentina, 1983-1989</i>
Andreani, Jacques	<i>Political Director in the French Foreign Ministry, 1981-1984</i>
Armacost, Michael	<i>US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, 1984-1989</i>
Atkins, Humphrey	<i>British Lord Privy Seal, 1981-1982</i>
Austin, Hudson	<i>Chairman of the Revolutionary Council, Grenada, 1983</i>
Barltrop, Roger	<i>Head of Commonwealth Coordination Department, FCO, 1977-1982</i>
Beamish, Adrian	<i>Head of Falkland Islands Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 1985-1987</i>
Beamish, Adrian	<i>Head of the Falkland Islands Department, FCO, 1985-1987</i>
Bérégovoy, Pierre	<i>Secretary General of the French Presidency, 1981-1982</i>
Bignone, Renaldo	<i>President of Argentina, 1982-1983</i>
Bishop, Maurice	<i>Prime Minister of Grenada, 1979-1983</i>
Brunner, Edouard	<i>Swiss Deputy Foreign Secretary, 1984-1989</i>
Bullard, Julian	<i>Senior Deputy and Political Director, United Kingdom, 1982-1984</i> <i>UK Deputy Under Secretary for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Europe and Political Director), 1979-1984</i>

Burdess, Christopher	<i>Deputy British High Commissioner to Trinidad and Tobago, 1984-1987</i>
Burnham, Forbes	<i>Prime Minister of Guyana, 1964-1985</i>
Bush, George H.	<i>Vice President of the USA, 1981-1989</i>
Calvo-Sotelo, Leopoldo	<i>Spanish Prime Minister, 1981-1982</i>
Caputo, Dante	<i>Argentine Minister of Foreign Relations, 1983-1989</i>
Carrington, Peter	<i>British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 1979-1982</i>
Carstens, Karl	<i>President of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1979-1984</i>
Chandernagor, André	<i>French Minister for European Affairs, 1981-1983</i>
Charalambopoulos, Ioannis	<i>Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs, 1981-1985</i>
Cheysson, Claude	<i>French Foreign Minister, 1981-1984</i>
Chirac, Jacques	<i>President of Rally for the Republic, 1976-1994</i>
Clark Jr, William	<i>US National Security Director, 1982-1983</i>
Collins, Gerry	<i>Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs, 1982</i>
Colombo, Emilio	<i>Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1980-1983</i>
Cortier, Peter	<i>Minister of State at the Auswärtiges Amt, 1981-1982</i>
Costa Mendez, Nicanor	<i>Argentine Minister of External Affairs, 1981-1982</i>
Crosby, John	<i>British High Commissioner to Belize, 1984-1987</i>
de Kémoularia, Claude	<i>French Permanent Representative to the UN, 1985-1987</i>
de la Barre de Nanteuil, Luc	<i>French Ambassador to the UN, 1981-1984</i>
De Piniés, Jaime	<i>Spanish Permanent Representative to the UN, 1973-1985</i>
De Valera, Síle	<i>Member of European Parliament for Dublin 1979-1984</i>
Deaver, Mike	<i>White House Deputy Chief of Staff, 1981-1985</i>
Delpech, Marcelo	<i>Argentine Representative in the UN Offices, Geneva, 1984</i>
Dorin, Bernard	<i>Director for the Americas, Quai D'Orsay, 1981-1984</i>
Dorr, Noel	<i>Irish Permanent Representative to the UN, 1980-1983</i>

Dozo, Lami	<i>Commander in Chief of the Argentine Air Force, 1982</i>
Eagleburger, Lawrence	<i>US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs 1982-1984</i>
Enders, Thomas	<i>US Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs 1981-1983</i>
Flower, Ken	<i>Director of Intelligence in Salisbury, 1964-1981</i>
Fraser, Malcolm	<i>Prime Minister of Australia, 1975-1983</i>
Gandhi, Rajiv	<i>Prime Minister of India, 1984-1989</i>
Robert, Gelbard	<i>US Ambassador to Bolivia, 1988-1991</i>
Genscher, Hans Dietrich	<i>West German Minister for Foreign Affairs, 1974-1992</i>
Gandhi, Indira	<i>Prime Minister of India, 1980-1984</i>
González, Fernando	<i>President of the Regional Government of Galicia, 1987-1990</i>
Haig, Alexander	<i>USA Secretary of State, 1981-1982</i>
Harding, William	<i>British Ambassador to Brazil, 1981-1984</i>
	<i>Deputy Under Secretary for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Asia and Americas) 1984-1986</i>
Harries, Owen	<i>Senior Advisor to Malcolm Fraser, 1976-1983</i>
Henderson, Nicholas	<i>British Ambassador to USA, 1979-1982</i>
Heseltine, Michael	<i>British Secretary of State for the Environment, 1976-1983</i>
	<i>British Secretary of State for Defence, 1983-1986</i>
Howe, Geoffrey	<i>British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs 1983-1989</i>
Illucea, Jorge	<i>Panamanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1981-1982</i>
Jobert, Michel	<i>French Minister for External Commerce, 1981-1983</i>
Jospin, Lionel	<i>First Secretary of the French Socialist Party, 1979-1988</i>
Kaunda, Kenneth	<i>President of Zambia, 1964-1991</i>
Kinnock, Neil	<i>Leader of the Labour Party, 1983-1992</i>
Kirkpatrick, Jeanne	<i>USA Permanent Representative to the UN, 1981-1985</i>

Kohl, Helmut	<i>Federal Chancellor of Germany, 1982-1988</i>
Kulak-Ublick, Horst	<i>FRG Director for Latin America, 1979-1986</i>
Lambsdorff, Otto Graf	<i>German Federal Minister of Economics, 1977-1982</i>
Lanari, Juan	<i>Argentine Minister of External Affairs, 1982-1983</i>
Lewin, Terrence	<i>Admiral of the Fleet, 1979-1982</i>
Luce, Richard	<i>British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, 1981-1982</i>
Machel, Samora	<i>President of Mozambique, 1975-1986</i>
Mahabir, Errol	<i>Minister for External Affairs, Trinidad and Tobago, 1985-1986</i>
Maher, Thomas	<i>Member of European Parliament for Munster, 1979-1994</i>
Marshall, Noel	<i>Head of North American Department, FCO, 1982-1985</i>
Mauroy, Pierre	<i>French Prime Minister, 1981-1984</i>
McLean, Philip	<i>Head of South America Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 1985-1987</i>
Mitterrand, François	<i>President of France, 1981-1995</i>
Morán, Fernando	<i>Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1982-1985</i>
Mugabe, Robert	<i>Prime Minister of Zimbabwe, 1980-1987</i> <i>President of Zimbabwe, 1987-2017</i>
Muldoon, Robert	<i>Prime Minister of New Zealand, 1975-1984</i>
Muzorewa, Abel	<i>Prime Minister of Rhodesia, 1979-1980</i>
Nkomo, Joshua	<i>Zimbabwean Minister of Home Affairs, 1980-1982</i> <i>Vice President of Zimbabwe, 1987-1999</i>
Nott, John	<i>British Secretary of State for Defence, 1981-1983</i>
Nyerere, Julius	<i>President of Tanzania, 1964-1985</i>
Onslow, Cranley	<i>Minister of State at Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 1982-1984</i>

Palmer, Andrew	<i>Head of Falkland Islands Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 1982-1985</i>
Parsons, Anthony	<i>British Permanent Representative to the United Nations 1979-1982</i>
Pérez de Cuéllar, Javier	<i>Secretary-General of the United Nations, 1982-1991</i>
Pérez-Llorca, José Pedro	<i>Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1980-1982</i>
Pinochet, Augusto	<i>President of Chile, 1973-1990</i>
Power, Paddy (Patrick)	<i>Irish Minister for Defence, 1982</i>
Price, George	<i>Prime Minister of Belize, 1961-1984</i>
Proctor, Harvey	<i>MP for Basildon, 1979-1983</i>
Pym, Francis	<i>British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 1982-1983</i>
Ramphal, Shridath	<i>General Secretary of the Commonwealth Secretariat, 1975-1990</i>
Rentschler, James	<i>US National Security Official for Europe, 1982</i>
Renwick, Robin	<i>Head of Chancery, Washington, 1981-1984</i> <i>Assistant Under Secretary of State, 1984-1986</i>
Roca, Eduardo	<i>Argentine Permanent Representative to the UN, 1982</i>
Ros, Enrique	<i>Vice Minister of the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1981-1982</i>
Sábato, Jorge	<i>Secretary for External Affairs in the Argentine Foreign Minister 1984</i>
Schamis, Gerardo	<i>Argentine Ambassador to Paris, 1981-1983</i>
Schmidt, Helmut	<i>Federal Chancellor of Germany, 1974-1982</i>
Seitz, Raymond	<i>Executive Assistant to the US Secretary of State, 1982-1985</i>
Schlaudeman, Harry	<i>United States Ambassador to Argentina, 1980-1983</i>
Shultz, George	<i>US Secretary of State, 1982-1989</i>

Silos, Gerard	<i>Brazilian Ambassador to Switzerland, 1984</i>
Smith, Arnold	<i>General Secretary of the Commonwealth Secretariat 1965-1975</i>
Smith, Ian	<i>Prime Minister of Rhodesia, 1964-1979</i>
Spadolini, Giovanni	<i>Prime Minister of Italy, 1981-1982</i>
Stoessel, Walter	<i>USA Deputy Secretary of State, 1982</i>
Streator, Edward	<i>US Deputy Chief of Mission in the American Embassy, London 1977-1984</i>
Tackas, Esteban	<i>Argentine Ambassador to the United States, 1982</i>
Terry, Fernando Belaúnde	<i>President of Peru, 1980-1985</i>
Thomas, David	<i>Assistant Under Secretary for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Americas), 1984-1986</i>
Thomas, Derek	<i>FCO Minister responsible for the USA, 1982-1984</i>  <i>Deputy Under Secretary for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Europe and Political Director), 1984-1987</i>
Thomson, John	<i>UK Permanent Representative to the UN, 1982-1987</i>
Tindemans, Leo	<i>Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1981-1989</i>
Trudeau, Pierre	<i>Prime Minister of Canada, 1980-1984</i>
van den Broeck, Hans	<i>Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1982-1993</i>
Videla, Jorge	<i>President of Argentina, 1976-1981</i>
Walters, Vernon	<i>USA Permanent Representative to the UN, 1985-1989</i>
Weinberger, Caspar	<i>US Secretary of Defence, 1981-1987</i>
Wright, Oliver	<i>British Ambassador to the United States, 1982-1986</i>
Young, Janet	<i>Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office 1983-1987</i>

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British Peace Committee papers

George Washington Library, George Washington University, Washington DC, USA.

Hathi Trust, Digital Library, online archive.

Houses of the Oireachtas, online archive.

International Newspaper Archive, LexisNexis Online.

The National Archives, Kew, United Kingdom.

Prime Ministers Papers

Cabinet Office Papers

Foreign and Commonwealth Office Papers

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National Archives of France, Pierrefitte-sur-Seine, France.

National Archives of Ireland, Dublin, Ireland.

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The Thatcher Foundation.

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The Thatcher Record, London, UK.

US State Department Archive, US State Department, Washington DC, USA.

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