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Transitioning to **GENDER EQUALITY**

Christa Binswanger and Andrea Zimmermann (Eds.)

Transitioning to **Gender Equality**

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Transitioning to Gender Equality

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About the Editors

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Dr. Andrea Zimmermann (she/her) is Senior Researcher at the Center for Gender Studies, University of Basel. She received her PhD from the University of Zurich. Since January 2017 she has coordinated the inter-university PhD program, Gender Studies CH, of the Universities of Basel, Bern and Zurich. Andrea Zimmermann is project manager of the literature study ‘Gender Equality Measures in Academia’ on behalf of the Gender Equality Commission of the SNSF, and project manager of the cooperation project “Gender & Science. Analysing and transforming Gender Structures in the NCCR MSE”. Furthermore, her research analyses gender relations in the Swiss cultural sector. Together with Dominique Grisard she founded “Art of Intervention”—a platform for research and collaboration with cultural institutions to foster the dialogue between art and academia. Her research and teaching focuses on gender theory, queer feminist critique, affect studies, diversity and inclusion, masculinity(s), postcolonial theory and psychoanalysis.

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Abstracts

Interview with Margo Okazawa-Rey: Politics of Difference as Politics of Connection by Andrea Zimmermann

Margo Okazawa-Rey, a founding member of the Combahee River Collective and a world-renowned activist and scholar, talks to Andrea Zimmermann about challenges for a transnational feminist politics of difference. Okazawa-Rey reflects on feminist genealogies and intersectionality from the perspective of personal experience and points out the importance of analyzing the complex individual relations between power regimes and difference. As feminist politics of identity have not managed to change power dynamics fundamentally, but rather reworked them along categories of difference, she strongly advocates coalitions of transnational feminism. These coalitions need to take differences and contexts into account. It is in this vein that Okazawa-Rey proposes the reimagination of politics of difference as politics of connection.

Policing Difference, Feminist Oblivions and the (Im-) Possibilities of Intersectional Abolition by Vanessa E. Thompson

Intensive policing and the expansion of the carceral condition are some of the most flagrant expressions of the current phase of gendered racial capitalism. Through the regulation and illegalization of migration, anti-terror legislation, the punishment of poverty and the war on crime, black and other negatively racialized subjects and groups are particularly vulnerable to state sanctioned forms of premature death across the Global North and South. In many contexts of continental Europe, mobilizations against racist policing (racial profiling) led by human rights and community organizations and initiatives have addressed this condition in the recent years. What often remains at the margins, however, are the intersectional modalities and dimensions of racist policing and punishment. Likewise, the issue of racist policing and the expansion of the punitive condition is seldomly discussed within European gender studies and broader feminist movements in continental Europe. As the title suggests, this article challenges one-dimensional readings of racist policing and engages with the silences around intersectional modalities of

police violence. It further addresses the reproduction of carceral feminisms within gender studies and feminist approaches in continental Europe. Departing from current debates and my scholar activist work on racial profiling in the contexts of continental Europe (mainly Germany, Switzerland and France) and by applying a black feminist framework, I interrogate modalities of intersectional structural, slow and silent violence engendered by policing. In a second step, I discuss the implications of carceral feminisms and problematize the broad silences within gender studies and feminist movements around intersectional modalities of police violence. Finally, possibilities and horizons of intersectional abolition are sketched out.

Who Intervenes? Thoughts from the Perspective of Arts and Culture Activism

by Rahel El-Maawi and Sarah Owens

The following text is a transcription and translation of a conversation between Rahel El-Maawi and Sarah Owens, which took place as part of the 2018 lecture series “The Art of Intervention.”. Their dialogue touches upon topics such as Blackness, in/visibility, community, culture, art and criticism. Using their own voluntary work and Black-/queer-feminist literature as a starting point, El-Maawi and Owens talk about their motivations for, as well as possibilities and consequences of, intersectional activism in arts and culture. Through this, the point of view shifts from the art of intervention to the question of who intervenes and how this intervention is supported or restricted by sociopolitical conditions.

Gender Roles and Empowerment in Women’s Islamic Activism

by Sherine Hafez

The success and longevity of women’s Islamic social activist work across Muslim majority countries has gained much attention from feminist scholars who focus their work on gender empowerment and women’s status in Muslim majority societies. While some studies applauded the positive impact Islamic activism has had on women in these societies, others remained skeptical about the extent of empowerment women might enjoy in Arab Muslim countries. Essentialized as misogynist and patriarchal in the extreme, Muslim majority countries are often depicted as hostile to women’s empowerment, which leads some to represent Islamic women activists as women who “buy into the very discourses which subjugate

them.” Further noting that women who join Islamic movements and organizations parrot their male leaders, others maintain that Muslim activist women have access to leadership only under male supervision and command. The following chapter questions the theoretical assumptions on which these conflicting views rest, to consider forms of empowerment other than those informed by mainstream liberal principles. Drawing on feminist literature on power, the discussion is based on what empowerment entails for Islamic women activists thus offering an Islamic alternative.

Men and Masculinities: What Have They Got to Do with Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment?

by Jeff Hearn

This chapter addresses how men and masculinities are relevant for the positive promotion of gender equality, in the context of the persistence of gender inequality in society and policy development that impedes the achievement of SDG5 and other SDGs. This concerns both how gender regimes can and do change men, and how men can be and are involved in changing gender regimes. In particular, I address challenges in terms of organizing with and by men, and strategies for changing men and masculinities, including action against violence, and transnational approaches.

Transitioning Gender Equality to the Equality of Sexgender Diversity

by Persson Perry Baumgartinger

In this article, I will show that achieving sustainable “gender equality” is possible only when sexgender is seen as a whole, that is, when human rights are extended to those who are intersex, trans, and sexgender non-conforming. This transformation is shown in the 2006 Yogyakarta Principles (YP) and the 2017 addition to them, the Yogyakarta Principles Plus 10 (YP+10), in their extension of Human Rights Law in the years 2006 and 2017, based on sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression and sex characteristics (SOGIESC). To do so, I will take the word transition literally in the sense of trans-ness, and will use the concept of “trans-” as an intersectional approach to sexgender diversity. I will also use the neologism “sexgender” as an umbrella term to include the diverse spectrum of sexes and genders. Furthermore, data gathered on the situation of sexgender-diverse people worldwide, as well as claims made by intersex, trans and sexgender

non-conforming activists, will support my conclusion that the SDG 5 must adopt a broader understanding of sexes and genders in order to do justice to intersex, trans, and sexgender non-conforming children and adults.

Interview with Kathy Davis: Transitioning to Gender Equality with Regard to Sexuality by Christa Binswanger

This interview opens up the chapter on transitioning to gender equality, exploring sexuality and sexual agency. It aims at addressing possible changes towards more equal sexual relations among all sexes. Within the field of Feminist and Gender Studies, sexuality and sexual encounters are contested topics and riddled with tensions regarding gender relations. These tensions have provoked many debates or even “wars” within the field of Feminist and Gender Studies. In the interview with Kathy Davis, Christa Binswanger takes up feminist discussions dealing with inequality within sexual relations in order to lay out the field. In the interview Davis and Binswanger discuss some problematic aspects of the feminist movement in the 1970s, like, for example, the assumption of a single notion of female sexuality. More recently, work on transnational feminism has also been helpful for thinking about sexuality and gender and for fostering a self-critical and open dialogue about the complexity of sexual practices and desires. Davis points to the importance of listening to what women in different parts of the world have to say about their own problems and struggles. As such, notions of gender equality and sexual freedom always need to be kept in perspective, as one version of feminism, but never the only one.

Comprehensive Sexuality Education as a Tool towards Gender Equality by 'Mathabo Khau

The attainment of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) by 2030 is a global imperative. In order to achieve the goal of gender equality, there is a growing realization that respecting everyone's rights to sexual and reproductive health is of paramount importance. This foregrounds the importance of comprehensive sexuality education (CSE) towards the attainment of universal sexual and reproductive health. Thus, this chapter focuses on the need for sexuality education to drive the agenda for sustainable communities and the achievement of the SDGs.

It highlights the current challenges towards sexuality education in schools and how these can be overcome. It also brings forth the need for changed laws supporting the rights of women and girls to sexual and reproductive health. Finally, it discusses how communities that embrace CSE can be enabled to reach a state of equitable treatment of all.

The Political Economy of Violence: Gender, Sexuality and SDGs by Suruchi Thapar-Björkert and Ruchika Ranwa

In this paper, we explore the theoretical framework of the violence(s) of development through the empirical convergence of two seemingly disparate local realities—the skewed child sex ratio in rural North India and bride trafficking. We approach the idea of violence of development through a political economy perspective which enables us to understand how social institutions of caste, class and gender intersect in rural India, together with political structures, to create contexts of inclusion and exclusion. We suggest that development is inherently paradoxical; while development envisions the elimination of social inequalities, it inadvertently also recreates them. When the state does not adequately respond to its agenda of development and social justice, the vulnerability of marginalised social groups is enhanced. The Sustainable Development Goals which aim to achieve gender equality and counter gender-based discrimination need to acknowledge these complex but nonetheless skewed gendered realities that shape the lives of many in India.

Queering Gender Equality: UN SDG 5 beyond the Sex_Gender Binary by Antke Antek Engel

With the aim of introducing a queer perspective to the UN SDG 5, the article explores tensions between gender equality politics and gender diversity politics within different strands of the United Nations (UN). It asks if there is indeed an irresolvable dilemma concerning gender equality and LGBTI+ diversity politics. Analyzing programmatic material found online on websites of UN bodies focusing on gender equality or LGBTI+ rights, the article concludes that the shift towards the SOGIEC (sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression and sex characteristics) approach in Human Rights law (see Yogyakarta principles), provides a decisive step towards resolving the dilemma. In looking at current reforms in German Civil Status Law, the article moves from critically considering the newly established sex-gender registration 'diverse' towards queersiversity, which

is offered as a modification of diversity politics. The principle of queerversity is meant to function as a political corrective, an ethical attitude and an aesthetic strategy. As such it combines the avowal of multiplicity, ambiguity and alterity with struggles against discrimination, social inequalities and the intersectional complexity of regimes of domination. Consequently, the article proposes the principle of queerversity as an overarching perspective of intersectional justice.

Interview With Shahra Razavi: Global Trends, Challenges and Controversies in the Areas of Care, Work and Family Relations by Kristina Lanz

This interview opens up the chapter on Care, Work and Family. It analyzes international trends in women's paid and unpaid work. Kristina Lanz and Shahra Razavi also discuss why—despite the increasing visibility of “women's economic empowerment” on the international policy agenda—gender inequalities in the work place and at home persist and how they can be overcome. The interview also picks up important discussions on the role of men and masculinity in these debates, on the intersectional and globalized dimensions of work and care (i.e., care chains), and on the challenges of adopting a non-binary lens, when analyzing and assessing progress in gender equality, in the areas of care, work and the family.

Care and Work Matter: A Social Sustainability Approach by Charlotta Niemistö, Jeff Hearn and Carolyn Kehn

The intersections of work, family, and life relations are a fundamental component of gender research and the pursuit of the United Nations' Social Development Goal 5: Gender Equality. This chapter takes a social sustainability approach to exploring the diversity of these realities for men, women and further genders worldwide. Both societal and policy-focused solutions are necessary to correct the historical inequalities in gendered care and unpaid labor.

Ideas of Family and Work—Their Impact on the Careers of Young Men* and Women*

by Diana Baumgarten and Andrea Maihofer

The article deals with the question “How do ideas of family and work impact the careers of young men* and women*?” The first hypothesis is the ideas of a future family and one’s own occupational activities reciprocally influence each other and, secondly, that it is precisely this interrelationship that causes occupational gender segregation. Our analyses show the interconnections of institutional and individual perspectives.

Gender and Intersectional Climate Justice

by Sybille Bauriedl

Climate change basically affects all people—but to varying degrees. Apart from regional differences, this is mainly due to social structures. Being affected by the consequences of climate change also depends to a relevant extent on gender-conform behaviour and gender-unjust distribution of resources. Women and men are affected differently by the effects of climate change. A central reason for this is their social understanding of their roles and role behaviour and the social and economic inequality associated with them. Thus, climate change-induced problems and responses are deeply connected to gender justice.



Transitioning to Gender Equality

Andrea Zimmermann and Christa Binswanger

1. Introduction

Gender equality is the fifth UN Sustainable Development Goal (SDG 5). It aims to eliminate all forms of discrimination against women and girls. To this end, SDG 5 addresses all forms of violence based on sex or gender, unequally distributed unpaid and unacknowledged care and domestic work, unequal access to resources, as well as the need for equal opportunities for leadership at all levels of decision-making in political, economic and public life. Thus, the areas in which changes with regard to gender equality on a global scale are needed are very broad. In this volume we focus on three areas of inquiry that are especially pertinent with regard to SDG 5: “politics of difference”, “sexuality”, and “care, work and family”. These areas have been core feminist topics since the 1970s and have proven to be of high importance in societies’ aim of transitioning to gender equality. Each thematic field is introduced by an interview that explores the subject area with regard to important genealogies, theoretic developments, and current challenges in general terms. The format of the dialogue allows for the contextualization of the interviewed experts, their personal approach to the thematic field, as well as to their theoretical, methodological and practical knowledge and experience.

Some theories and methods we deem necessary in the process of transitioning to gender equality are transversal themes of this volume: first, an intersectional perspective, linking gender to further categories of difference; second, the contestations of binary notions of gender constitutive for inequality regimes; third, the difficulties of measuring, controlling and portraying progress with regard to gender equality; and, finally, the need for multi-, inter- and transdisciplinary perspectives for understanding the diversity of gender, and to avoid simplifications of complex power regimes.

The volume combines various approaches of critique and, therefore, is to be considered an assemblage of perspectives, methodologies, theoretical concepts and contexts of research. In particular, the configuration of approaches that focus on the impact of hegemonic regimes of gender inequality with those that focus on marginalized communities enables us to gain access to underlying mechanisms of discrimination and othering that grease the wheels of gender inequality. At the same time, calling into question seemingly universal categories and mechanisms

contributes to a rethinking of epistemological and methodological approaches, and a reconceptualization of theoretical instruments to foster further steps on the way to gender equality.

2. Politics of Difference

The volume opens with a look at “politics of difference”, the first thematic field. In this section, theories, methodologies, and practices of intersectionality are of high importance. Intersectionality allows for reflection on gender inequality with regard to different experiences of structural discrimination and power hierarchies. The complexity of power regimes in different contexts, and the need for translation, challenges not only the analysis of difference but, also, practical work aiming at coalition and cooperation, be it local or transnational. Reflections on questions and concepts of difference have a long-standing tradition in feminist theory and have contributed to many theoretical debates within and outside social movements to this day. These movements criticize power regimes that are organized along conditions of recognition and that are at work in manifold mechanisms of the othering of those who are placed and perceived as beyond these norms. Recognizing difference and the challenging of normative settings are important steps towards gender equality, as well as regarding legal systems and the distribution of resources and access to positions of power and authority. At the same time, politics of difference can also lead to new normative exclusions if power is reorganized alongside “new” established identities. Thus, if concepts are transferred to other contexts, they always need to be translated and adapted. A constant reflection about who is included and who is not is, therefore, urgently needed. As the first dialogue by Andrea Zimmermann with Margo Okazawa-Rey suggests, the contextualization of difference is best performed in transnational coalitions. They enable constant translation work and contribute to an ongoing self-reflection on their own premises and a collaborative development of concepts. This first interview is followed by five contributions that focus on the current challenges of politics of difference. Every contribution has its own starting point, its own set of interests, and is situated in different empirical, geographical and theoretical contexts. The different standpoints and topics presented in the following chapters do not form a coherent and easy-to-understand picture. They shed light on specific questions and problems in the context that they analyze. Thereby, they reveal paradoxes, ambivalences and current empirical and theoretical challenges for concepts and policies of gender equality, which require further research.

Margo Okazawa-Rey, a former member of the Combahee River Collective and a world-renowned activist and scholar, talks to Andrea Zimmermann about

challenges for a transnational feminist politics of difference. Reflecting on feminist genealogies and intersectional feminism, Okazawa-Rey points out the importance of questioning and analyzing the complex individual relations between power regimes and differences. As the feminist politics of identity have not managed to change power dynamics fundamentally, but rather reworked them along categories of difference, she strongly advocates coalitions of transnational feminism. These coalitions need to take differences and contexts into account, emphasizing the power of cooperation and mutual exchange at the same time. It is in this vein that Okazawa-Rey proposes the reimagination of politics of difference as politics of connection.

In her chapter on policing, Vanessa Thompson challenges the feminist silence around racist practices and intersectional modalities of police violence. This contribution proves the urgency of the #BlackLivesMatter movement once more. By applying a black feminist framework, Thompson reflects on current debates and her work as an activist scholar on racial profiling. The concept of slow violence, which also takes mental and psychic vulnerabilities, and the long-term effects of everyday racism, into account, forms the cornerstone of her argument. Thereupon, Thompson conceptualizes policing as a multidimensional institutionalized practice and aims at a complex intersectional analysis. Furthermore, Thompson criticizes the entanglement of feminist antiviolence campaigns with the criminal justice system and the acceptance of intersectional state violence by certain feminists. Referring to a term by Elizabeth Bernstein, Thompson calls this stream of the feminist movement “carceral feminism”, an important concept for problematizing the complex relation between feminism and the state’s violence exercised by the criminal justice system. Finally, Thompson advocates for an intersectional and interventional concept of abolition that not only transforms individuals and communities but gender politics as such.

The dialogue between Rahel El-Maawi and Sarah Owens, both members of Bla*sh—the Swiss Network Black She—also considers questions surrounding the recognition of difference and reflections on the importance of networks and communities. The conversation originally took place in 2018 as part of the event series, “The Art of Intervention”, at the Kunstmuseum Gegenwart in Basel, Switzerland.¹ During the exhibition, “War Games”, which staged artwork by Martha

¹ <https://theartofintervention.blog/programm/> (accessed on 5 August 2021).

Rosler and Hito Steyerl,² El-Maawi and Owens, were invited to reflect on motivations and consequences of intersectional activism in arts and culture. As starting points for their conversation, they take quotes from Black women and women of Color that critically intervene in the hegemonic, and very often white, canon of thinkers who are usually quoted. As such, their conversation is not only a dialogue with each other but a dialogue with a genealogy of Black feminism. This format goes hand in hand with their emphasis on the importance of networks and communities as sources of strength. Their dialogue leaves room for different perspectives and individual answers to the everyday challenges of structural discrimination. Finally, art may serve as a space in which hypervisibility/invisibility, everyday racism, experiences of sexualization and exoticization can be negotiated and reflected upon. Here humans can rest from academic or political work and alternative perspectives can be offered and articulated: places for empowerment.

In her chapter about Islamic women activists, Sherin Hafez highlights the need to adapt concepts that have emerged in Western feminist contexts to her field of inquiry. In order to understand Islamic women activists in Egypt, the Western notion of empowerment needs to be revised. The work of these women and their self-perception is deeply embedded in Islamic understandings, including the acceptance of a gender order, which is considered unequal in Western contexts. Nevertheless, their activities create a space for agency, including the power to decide and act, embedded in the values of their religious community. Hafez highlights the need for a consideration of agency and empowerment of activist subjects as created by social relations and not as autonomous from them. Hafez' contribution challenges the often implicit dominance of Western theoretical concepts. She advocates a careful translation, or revision, if applied to differing contexts. Without such a contextualization, these concepts are at risk of failing to question dominant power regimes and systems of exclusion.

The next part of this first section is dedicated to work on men and masculinities. As Jeff Hearn argues, "men" should be recognized as a policy area. There is an urgent need for explicitly men-related politics and policy, even if these are still relatively rare phenomena. Investigating masculinities critically and developing gender strategies for change contribute to the transformation of the hegemonic gender order, to gender equality, and to women's empowerment. Hearn's contribution refutes the argument of antifeminist suggestions that greater gender equality harms men. On the contrary:

² <https://kunstmuseumbasel.ch/de/ausstellungen/2018/rosler-steyerl> (accessed on 5 August 2021).

Findings point to better health, reduced threats of violence and better wellbeing for both men and women, if feminist politics gain importance. Engaging critically in the study of men and masculinities thus opens up possibilities for societal change not yet considered well enough by politics and policies.

Finally, this section is completed with a chapter by Persson Perry Baumgartinger, who discusses the notion of gender in the wording of SDG 5. SDG 5 claims gender equality for “women and girls”. Thus, gender difference is reduced to a gender dualism, consisting of “men and boys” versus “women and girls”. Baumgartinger suggests introducing the term *sexgender*, which includes inter-, trans-, and *sexgender* nonconforming people, thus enlarging a dualistic understanding of gender to a multiplicity of *sexgenders*. Taking the title of the volume literally, *Transitioning* should enable an intersectional approach to *sexgender* diversity. This broader understanding of sexes and genders is needed in order to do inter-, trans-, and *sexgender* nonconforming children and adults justice, and to contribute to the fight against the discriminatory practices that many face on an everyday basis. As such, *sexgender* equality aims to overcome discrimination for all sexes and genders.

This assemblage of articles on “Politics of Difference”, with specific sets of interest and empirical findings, reveals several challenges for theoretical, methodological and practical work on transnational progress towards gender equality. As the contributions by Thompson, Owens, El-Maawi and Hafez suggest, intersectional analysis in different contexts needs to consider the complexity of persistent inequalities and structural discrimination that are shaped by the current hegemonic gender order in a given context. Everyday sexism and racism, as well as other forms of structural discrimination, work along the binary mechanism of othering, of inclusion and exclusion. In order to critique these mechanisms, it is important to point to the exclusionary and privileging effects of binary systems. This is also the starting point for Hearn’s contribution. He explicitly refers to the binary gender order and insists on the necessity of focusing not only on femininities but on masculinities, too. The articles by Thompson and Baumgartinger emphasize that gender equality does not only mean including those who have been excluded so far. The way power is organized in relation to identity has to be fundamentally questioned, e.g., by opening up the categories of gender or race beyond essentialism and binary categorization. Moreover, Margo Okazawa-Rey points out that every new organization of power along identity categories relies on the mechanism of new exclusions. Transnational coalitions are needed for ongoing mutual and intersectional critiques of newly established structures and power mechanisms. In sum, the contributions in this section offer space for different perspectives and the recognition

of different fields of interest and research, and open up a frame for new collaborative answers across disciplines and contexts.

3. Sexuality

The second part of this volume focuses on gendered challenges in the field of sexuality. Pleasure, self-determined and/or consensual sexuality, and reproductive rights are discussed in this section from the viewpoint of gender equality, advocating the right for sexual agency. In many societies at many historical moments, female bodies and pleasures were—and still are—controlled by patriarchy, based on unequal gender orders, and, sometimes, seriously violated. Nevertheless, specific contexts always need to be taken into consideration. Similarly, as in the first section on politics of difference, it is important for a feminist intersectional analysis of sexuality that transnationally oriented feminists look for mutually respectful and helpful alliances. Acknowledging differences among women leads to multiple, individual understandings of how to gain self-determined access to sexuality. Thus, as in the first section, the notion of gender needs to be conceptualized beyond a binary understanding of gender in order to address the whole range of gendered and sexed human beings and claim sexual rights for all genders.

The opening interview by Christa Binswanger with Kathy Davis explores sexuality and sexual agency. The conversation aims to address possible changes towards more equal sexual relations among all sexes. Taking up feminist discussions dealing with inequality within sexual relations since the 1970s, Davis states, self-critically, that the feminist movement that she was part of in the 1970s was too judgmental about what constitutes sexual pleasure. She regards the so-called sex wars in the 1980s as a necessary corrective to such limitations of the movement. Inspired by her research in the feminist self-help book, “Our Bodies, Ourselves”, Davis highlights three aspects of sexuality in view of “feminist” politics: first, to encourage women to explore their bodies and discover what gives them pleasure; second, to encourage an intersectional perspective, as women embody sexuality differently; and finally, to recognize that sexuality is deeply shaped by cultural and societal context. As such, there is no one feminist perspective on sexuality, but manifold and context-sensitive feminist perspectives. For current times, Davis points to the importance of transnational feminism, reflecting on power differences among women and looking for mutually beneficial alliances. Additionally, there is a need to understand sexuality as fluid and complex. As such, sexuality is not bound to sexed or gendered identities but is located in complex configurations of power and difference.

Mathabo Khau's research focuses on the South African context. She highlights that comprehensive sexuality education (CSE) is an important component in the attainment of universal sexual and reproductive health. She points to sexuality education as a driver for the agenda for sustainable communities and the achievement of the SDG 5. Her approach points to the need to overcome current challenges in sexuality education in schools in South Africa. In order to support women and girls' sexual and reproductive health rights, from the perspective of CSE, legal conditions need to be adapted. In addition, the taboo nature of sex talk hinders young women and girls when it comes to talking about their questions and needs, as well as their looking for support. Furthermore, health centers (called *Family Planning Centers*) providing contraceptives are only accessible to married women. Khau discusses how critical and sex-positive sexuality education can help communities move away from the taboo nature of sexuality and support sexual self-understanding. As such, CSE can make young people knowledgeable about the legitimacy to live their sexualities in explorative and different ways. With CSE, this employs participatory pedagogical strategies, and there is hope for addressing harmful norms and stereotypes, and thus contributing to an improvement of gender equality within sexual relationships.

Suruchi Thapar-Björkert and Ruchika Ranwa explore the theoretical framework of the "violence(s) of development". Making use of this framework, they analyze how social institutions of caste, class and gender intersect in rural India, together with political structures, and create contexts of inclusion and exclusion. Their findings on interdependence of son-preference, bride-shortages and bride trafficking are based on empirical research in the state of Haryana in North India. The convergence of two seemingly disparate local realities—the skewed child sex ratio in rural North India and bride trafficking—shows that "development" is inherently paradoxical and, therefore, violent in India: while development envisions the elimination of social inequalities, it inadvertently also recreates them. Instead of questioning patriarchal dominance in bride selection, the present Modi government tacitly supports bride-trafficking and, thus, violent crimes against women. As such, the tacit support of perpetrators persists. Far from eliminating social inequalities regarding these women, they are tolerated against the backdrop of larger development-oriented and women-centric agendas advocated by the government. Calling upon the discourse of gender equality but simultaneously adhering to a discourse of security of Hindu women, and thus the nation, the government violently regulates and disciplines women.

Antke A. Engel's contribution to this chapter focuses on the problematic, exclusionary, binary distinction of sexes throughout SDG 5 and advocates a

fundamental reconceptualization of sexgender in UN politics (also see the chapter by Baumgartinger). Such a reconceptualization has to allow for addressing existing patterns of structural inequality and violence, on the one hand, and must not be discriminatory against nonbinary genders and sexes, on the other. Engel suggests the principle of “queerversity” as a starting point for an alternative mode of conceptualization diversity in light of intersectional justice. Criticizing the binary logic and the implicated hierarchy in binary systems, as well as the mechanisms of othering that come along with binary understandings, Engel turns to the work of Black and Queer scholars of Color. Multiplicity, ambiguity and alterity are important elements of questioning normalcy and allow for a sociocultural order that finds pleasure in complexity, polysemy and subversion. As Engel shows, queerversity is not only ethical and political but an aesthetical strategy for fighting epistemic and structural violence.

In the contributions of this section on sexuality, there are some common problems raised. Binary notions of gender are deeply inscribed in sexual politics, as the sexed and sexualized female body not only stands for the individual but often counts as part of the body of the nation. In many contexts, this body is secured and disciplined by patriarchal politics. Taking up queer–feminist approaches enables one to pay critical attention to the rhetoric of development in which the female body represents the body of the nation. They often conceal structural violence that leads to paradoxical outcomes for marginalized bodies, such as female or queer sexgenders. Sexuality, as discussed in this section, is located in complex configurations of power and difference, depending on the cultural context. Even if this makes it difficult to talk about gender equality and sexuality in general terms, transnational feminist alliances can encourage women to explore their bodies and discover what gives them pleasure by acknowledging the many different ways in which sexualities are lived and experienced in various contexts. Simultaneously, feminist alliances can hopefully contribute to fighting sexual violence, still often persistent in patriarchal contexts.

4. Care, Work and Family

The volume’s third section discusses research on care, work and family. This research field is particularly important for SDG 5 and problematizes the gendered settings of unpaid care work, the gender pay gap, and its connection with concepts of mothering and fathering in relation to hegemonic gender norms.

The gendered spheres of private and public life, normative gender roles and the still dominant role of hegemonic masculinity characterized by relations of exploitation towards the self and others have a tremendous impact on gendered

configurations of work and family. The feminist critique of gendered separations and its consequences has a long-standing tradition: for decades, feminists have worked on alternative models for distribution and—also material—acknowledgement of reproductive work, building on the powerful critique of the bourgeois separation of the private and public sphere.

Currently, global care chains gain more attention. It is a truism that the rising number of women in Western societies who managed to enter the world of work often relied on the work of female migrants. Thus, the ongoing transformation does not change the gender order in the first place. Rather, this transformation relies on postcolonial and more recent class and race specific modes of othering creating new precarious subjectivities.

Another topic that has gained more and more attraction in current theory is social sustainability. This concept takes up the critique of hegemonic masculinity and aims for new understandings of subjectivity. Social sustainability pleads for a notion of the subject that does not rely on the mechanisms of exploitation of the self and others and, rather, cares for sustainable concepts of reproduction. This theoretical approach allows one to rethink the field of work organization and poses current challenges for research on gender, diversity and inclusion. From this perspective, much more research is needed, as gender relations are strongly interconnected with context-shaped logics and systems of politics, labor, markets and education. In parallel, in recent years, the interconnectedness of gender inequality and the exploitation of natural resources has become evident, as both are dependent on economic interests. In order to challenge these complex connections, local, as well as international levels need to be addressed. To a certain degree, family work might be transformed on a national level and the accessibility of professions might improve for all genders due to local affirmative action and the promotion of equal opportunities in the field of education. However, other problems, such as ongoing climate change due to exploitation and powerful interests of international markets, and the dominant perception of care work as being unproductive—as in neoclassical economic understanding—can only be solved in transnational coalitions and collaboration.

These are the themes taken on by the third section of this volume: In the opening interview, Kristina Lanz discusses with Sarah Razavi some of the global challenges related to women's access to paid work. Razavi is Director of the Social Protection Department at the International Labor Organisation (ILO) and former Chief of Data and Research at UN Women. The interview makes clear that data collection is important and highly political: unpaid care and domestic work is

difficult to monitor internationally. Razavi points towards a “lack of gender data”, especially data that allow for trend analysis, a diagnosis that pledges national and international research policies to provide sufficient resources for this field of research. Missing data make it difficult to establish a ground for policies on gender equality. However, as Razavi outlines, there are strong indicators that discrimination based on sex and gender remains an important factor in these fields. Extreme poverty, financial dependency, unpaid care work and experiences of physical and sexual violence are burdens that women* in particular have to carry. However, there are also positive trends to mention, e.g., greater visibility of women* in the field of politics and better education of women* that levels the ground for more women* in powerful positions. As the perspective of human rights as common ground for international action towards gender equality is highly important to Razavi, she also considers strong social protection systems crucial for global progress. Another important aspect on the way to transformation is her critique of heteronormativity, which is still very influential with regard to family rights, tax systems and the mechanisms of gendered labor division. Razavi also points to the need for the transformation of dominant masculinities and femininities, which brings along a challenge for the current systems of statistics and monitoring of data, as well as rhetoric and policies; opening up towards nonbinary organized gender identities puts many feminists “outside of their comfort zones”. The perspective of human rights and the critique of underlying mechanisms of in- and exclusion is a relevant baseline for further feminist politics, as well as for the development of policies in general.

Charlotta Niemistö, Jeff Hearn and Carolyn Kehn discuss care and work in the light of SDG 5. They use a social sustainability approach in order to focus on work–family–life relations. Unpaid care and domestic work are unequally distributed all over the globe and women are especially strongly represented in informal work. A social sustainability approach allows for discussions of the entanglement of gender, work and sustainability, even if the social dimension of sustainability has been described as the least clear of the three aspects of sustainable development. The context of state and corporate policies is an important element in the social relations of care and work, and thus of social sustainability. In the Anglophone world, the development of family-friendly policies has been largely corporate-led, whereas in the Nordic countries, development has been state-led. Comparing empirical data from different parts of the world, the authors take Sweden as an example that demonstrates the highest parity between the genders with regard to time spent in paid and unpaid work. As care is gendered, the distribution of care affects women’s situations, in households and in labor markets, at any given time over

the life course. Currently, one of the major characteristics of knowledge work is the strong blurring of the boundaries between work and “life”, or “nonwork”, or “family-time”. Relatively little is known about the effects of the blurring boundaries on individuals, organizations and societies. Even if some steps are taken towards gender equality, many unequal structures remain. Furthermore, without necessary policy development, care work will remain the domain of the marginalized.

Diana Baumgarten and Andrea Maihofer focus on the horizontal gender-specific segregation of the labor market in the context of Switzerland. In their research on young adults aged around 30 who find themselves before the phase of family formation, they show strong and complex interconnectedness between subjects, institutions and gender-normative factors. Baumgarten and Maihofer illustrate the impact of expectations on future family life, work–life balance and models of work and family on the further career of the interviewees. Regarding fatherhood, there is a shift towards fathering based on being emotionally involved and being present as a father for the child from birth onwards. Many young men* reflect critically upon their workload and look for possibilities to reduce their work time—but, at the same time, they still cling to the idea of being the main breadwinner. Young women* continue to consider motherhood a central part of their envisioned future. They anticipate a great shift in their emotional priorities towards the family as soon as the first child is born. In parallel, work is an important part of women*’s identity, but it is instead framed as an important addition to everyday family life. The future the female interviewees anticipate is that of motherhood and part-time employment. They see themselves as the main responsible caregiver for the future child, knowing that they will likely face professional disadvantages. Young adults, the authors conclude, still perceive partnership as a complimentary construct between female and male qualities, which are strongly linked to gender norms and orders. Dualistic stereotypes are still very powerful, even if, at the same time, they are contested and transformed by individual solutions managing the work–life balance. In the Swiss context, the notion of individualized responsibility impacts heavily on employees. This prevents many young mothers and fathers from building alliances or coalitions to step in for their needs and to challenge institutional structures and conditions at their workplaces.

In the last chapter of this volume, Sybille Bauriedl points out the interconnectedness of gender inequality and mechanisms of exploitation of natural resources—a field of research with a sizeable lack of data and detailed analysis. The answer to the question “who is affected most by the effects of climate change?”, indicates a high relevance of gender stereotypes, gender-conforming behavior and the

unjust distribution of resources in relation to the gender order. The relevance of gender-specific vulnerability, which is not limited to developing countries alone, becomes ever more obvious. Those with the least power and the fewest resources are the worst impacted, and factors such as gender, sexuality, race, class, age, dis/ability and legal status influence the possibilities to deal with current challenges. Unequal mortality rate might be the most obvious factor here but, of course, many more subtle effects can be observed, as Bauriedl points out. In addition, migration due to climate change needs to be considered. Mobility restrictions and limited access to the public sphere regulated by norms of masculinity and femininity are of high relevance to this field of research. Clinging to national interests prevents further progress on the way to overcoming gender inequalities in this context. In summation, the author steps in, not only for a strong intersectional approach but, also, for transnational cooperation and the involvement of grassroots perspectives and actors.

5. Closing Remarks

The assemblage of approaches and fields of research on the topic in this volume analyzing possible transitions to gender equality shed light on a variety of problems that still need to be worked on in order to progress. To conclude, we sum up some communalities and key findings of this volume:

The necessity of contextualizing the various perspectives and different research topics is a major challenge for knowledge production on gender equality. It can build on strong queer-feminist traditions of situated knowledge that stand for self-reflective and context-sensitive academic and public work, questioning one's own interests and opposing the assumption of universal and value-free objectivities. In order to approach the claim to "eliminate all forms of discrimination towards women and girls" adequately, there is a need for a situated analysis of the interconnectedness of power regimes, structural or institutional settings, individual perspectives, subjectivities, and gendered norms. In order to develop suitable concepts and approaches to gender (in-)equalities, the entanglement of these aspects needs to be taken into consideration. Taking different contexts and conditions into account is challenging, as the dimension of the tasks tends to provoke a search for pragmatic solutions. To avoid simplifications of methodological, theoretical and practical answers, a combination of empirical analysis and experience-based knowledge of communities might offer—among others—a suitable ground from which to start. In summation, many of the contributions highlight transnational coalitions and policies that are needed in order to address complex context-specific questions.

As editors, we agree with many of the authors that more research funding and more exchange of knowledge are needed to eliminate the currently weak data basis. Only in-depth research allows for adequate engagement with intersectionality, the unequal distribution of goods and resources, and access to power and knowledge. Furthermore, we highlight some of the core challenges named by the contributors: The reinforcing impact of specific gender norms on regimes of gender inequality is apparent. The connection between hegemonic masculinity and its attributes of exploitation of resources of the self, others and nature needs to be analyzed and reflected on. Critical research on men and masculinity is needed to understand and transform the hegemonic gender order, with its mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion, to pave the way for alternative modes of becoming.

The critique of underlying principles of binarity, dichotomy and dualism that allows for the powerful system of self-affirmation and othering needs to be developed further. Several authors point to the need for further commitment to transnational perspectives that also draw on postcolonial and decolonial knowledge production. Occidental mechanisms of othering are constituted by gender norms as well as being driven by and resulting in racism, classism and ableism. Here too, precise intersectional analysis is needed, not only to understand but also to transform the given situation of gender inequality, and to avoid the simplification of complex power regimes.

Self-criticism of hegemonic positions, but also critiques originating in marginalized spaces, need to interact and be combined. The manifold ways in which coalitions can work towards politics of difference that allow for recognition and for effective solidarities are of game-changing importance. Academic work and reflection need to find ways to deal with ambivalences and ambiguities, with differences and differentiation in a way that allows for diversity and inclusion. The elimination of all forms of discrimination of those who are excluded and, therefore, face the violent consequences of othering will only succeed in such a manner. To make a difference, the current power regimes and their inherent cultures of self-affirmation and homosocial reproduction need to be transformed in sustainable ways. Activist, cultural and academic work needs to seek alliances aiming for gender—or sexgender—equality, as outlined in the following chapters.

As editors, we are very grateful to all contributors to this volume for their interesting and inspiring work and to the reviewer for valuable comments and suggestions.

Part 1: Politics of Difference

Interview with Margo Okazawa-Rey: Politics of Difference as Politics of Connection

Andrea Zimmermann

1. Introduction

In her conversation with Andrea Zimmermann Margo Okazawa-Rey addresses genealogies and challenges of transnational feminist politics of difference. As a founding member of the Combahee River Collective and activist scholar, she reflects on intersectionality from the perspective of personal experience. The starting point is the question how being different becomes a problem only in power regimes that organize social inequality according to differences. Difference as part of power regimes then affects structural and interpersonal relations. Furthermore, Margo Okazawa-Rey stresses the need for a special awareness for the analytical category of the nation in order to elaborate on a revised idea of collectivity. As a thinker, teacher and committed activist, Margo Okazawa-Rey highlights the necessity to build strong coalitions of transnational feminism nowadays beyond politics of identity and struggles of classification. These coalitions should give attention to the following question: to whom are we responsible and accountable?

Margo Okazawa-Rey is a feminist activist scholar working on issues of intersectionality, armed conflict, militarism and violence against women and she has published extensively on these topics. She teaches in various contexts worldwide and is a regular visiting scholar in the PhD program Gender Studies CH. As part of her academic work, Margo Okazawa-Rey is also strongly committed to activism in South Korea and Palestine. She is Professor Emerita at San Francisco State University.

2. Interview with Margo Okazawa-Rey

AZ: When we look back to the feminist movement of the 1970s, ‘Politics of Difference’—as it’s the title of our chapter—were a big issue. Could you describe which experiences or which topics or events were important to you?

MOR: Politics of difference: I think what’s important about that framing is that difference didn’t make a difference until there were inequalities structured around the difference. Difference simply meant, for example, “apples” and

“oranges.” Then the colonizers originally but later dominant powers decided apples are better than oranges and imbued them institutionally with special access, power, status, and so forth That’s where the politics is—it’s about power and structural and interpersonal relations that are affected by the structural parts of difference.

If we say you’re this person and you’re that person and you’re somebody else without all the structural and cultural pieces connected to regimes of power it wouldn’t be a problem obviously.

So, on the one hand, differences are made a problem and become a justification for discrimination and inequality, because of cultural and structural meanings that are given to them. Not because humans are being different from each other.

On the other hand, being made different as less-than—minoritized, racialized, and so on—required us to start with those identities as basis on which we could reframe our existence as valuable, beautiful beings then to organize. In this sense, it was important to embrace difference as a starting place, in a specific historical moment. Since then, identities have become both starting and ending points. Forty years later that is depressing, because what it’s gotten to is just politics based on identities and struggles around classification and inclusion. Those are political questions, questions about societal and interpersonal power, but not very inspiring questions. Questions about the socially constructed, categorical identities do not help us excavate and understand the foundational forces threatening the existence of human and natural life on our planet. They point to specific groups’ experiences (and there always will be new identity groups emerging as human consciousness develops) but not necessarily the whole ecology of life on this planet. Where things are in the world right now with the Corona pandemic, which is demonstrating “ultimate contingency as human beings,” and the global uprisings sparked by the US-based Movement for Black Lives, which is inspiring other marginalized peoples to re-examine their own conditions, demands that we think more deeply, especially questioning previous assumptions and to imagine more audaciously about possibilities.

Identity politics, like wars and armed conflicts, is also fundamentally a struggle about resources, material for sure. Within the academy and within wider society, the struggle is material. I think it’s also a struggle about what’s understood or experienced as not enough attention: struggle over attention and recognition. So we end up with “I’m more oppressed or my group is more oppressed than” or “my group doesn’t have any voice and you know the

only place the voice can come from is this other group who we're horizontally situated in very similar locations". So the question now is: How do we think about organizing ourselves in such a way that is really more fundamentally about vision, about what we're trying to create? How will we need to understand and address "difference" in that creative process? For example, we are engaging in creating our vision of a new world. As we are doing so, differences emerge, such as race and gender, political perspectives, differences in culture, differences in worldview. Because we are trying collectively to create a vision of a new world, there's a real context for the struggle and real need for it. In a sense we would be practicing core values of the new world: inclusion, diversity, principled struggle, for instance. It's not just "my group" who is needing and wanting attention. We would be sharing personal and collective histories and stories; we would be asking, what do we need to think about and to do, so as not to recreate what we are trying to change?

AZ: Is this what you mean when you say we should not start with "difference" but rather with more fundamental questions of existence?

MOR: Yes. If we start with creating a vision as a starting point, and we work out the differences in that context,—I don't know this for sure because it doesn't happen too often—I can imagine us in very real ways dealing with differences and as we're doing it we're coming up with a truly liberatory vision because we are working out old struggles based on bodies and understanding and moving through the struggle in new ways.

That's what I envision, that's what I hope for at this historic moment 2020. Remember too that we're not at 1970 where recognizing differences mattered in some ways much more, because we then really had much of a politics around that. I think if we don't move away from just starting with politics of difference, we'll always have people who will say, "well my group is not recognized, is marginalized, is invisible" because there are always new identities emerging as people's consciousnesses develop.

For example, 10 years ago transgender was an emerging concept and category, and only beginning in some places. Now the trans movement is becoming a really important force. An aspect of the current transgender people's struggle is emerging in the same way as other group's struggles: exclusion by dominant group, in this case genders. So trans-people are saying (as people before, we want our identities to be recognized and acknowledged; we want to have our say and practice self-determination. Creating the vision and addressing

differences will be intertwined, interdependent processes that I believe could more likely result in a vision grounded in principles and values that will create very inviting boundaries. In that way, newly emerging groups can enter easily and, once there, we collectively can think about how to improve our situations together. And have openings for new emerging groups to join together. We will be able consistently to re-conceptualize the “we” and hold firm on our values simultaneously.

AZ: When you think about the concept of collectivity of the 1970s and the related struggles then, and you think about the current conditions, what does collectivity mean to you?

MOR: The 1970s in the US was a very interesting time because many groups were talking about collectives, you know there were even car-repair collectives. So this idea of collectivization and becoming a collective was really important, very exciting. This is revolutionary in the US where individualism is *the* underlying value. The collectivism I remember was a difficult practice to be honest. Many groups who called themselves “collective” were not a real collective. It was a term that we used but there were real clear markers and distributions of power that were not collective. The idea of collective is even more important now than it was then. It’s the less used term—I think we need to reclaim that term and this time actually really understand what it means to be a collective and how to live collective values and ethics and relational practices, not just a collective structure.

AZ: Let’s look back to the experience that you had in the Combahee River Collective. Since those days, you have been playing a very active role in current feminist discussions and debates. How do those past experiences shape your current politics? What have you kept and what have you let go? What of those experiences, and formative experiences we all have, do you think needs to stay with us? Why is it important to reflect on this genealogy of feminist work and feminist theory and theory of intersectionality?

MOR: I think that’s a really wonderful question and it’s a complex question, because the answer is both/and: So you’re asking, what are the important political, theoretical, and methodological strands that are the continuities, that can, and perhaps in some ways must, be carried forward. Then the follow-up question is, how can that strand(s) inspire us to deal creatively and imaginatively with what we are facing now? I would say the continuity absolutely has to do with our analyses and practices being framed by and rooted in feminisms.

The Combahee River Collective started with a small group of African American women living in the Boston area in the mid-1970s. We were feminists and part of the larger Boston women's liberation movement. Around the same time, there was a notional gathering of Black feminists in Chicago organized by the National Black Feminist Organization. Several of us who had attended that meeting were deeply disappointed by the liberal perspective and the agenda, homophobia, and classism embedded in that convening. When those sisters returned from the conference they started meeting more intentionally and purposefully to articulate a more radical understanding of Black feminism. This perspective was articulated in 'A Black Feminist Statement', which has become an essential reading to understand both the genealogy of Black feminism and intersectional feminism. We stated then, as Black and intersectional feminists, we have to understand that the conditions we face are global and international, that it transcends nation-states. The conditions—therefore, the struggles—are worldwide. Also, we know that it's very much connected to our struggles with our respective states, the states that govern our various people. The feminisms that need to be carried through, and I think the new, additional part of this is that we, specifically feminists in the Global North, need to take much more seriously the analytic category of nation and come to understand more deeply what it means to be connected to these states and corporations that are *leaders* of the world, many times said to be leading in our name: in the name of German people or Swiss people or American people, etcetera. We can't simply ignore this. Even though we consider ourselves radical and we're not agreeing to state policies, we still have to *own* that we are a part of that state and we structurally benefit. Even though we are distancing ourselves from it.

So one of the questions right now is: What's our struggle as feminists with the state that addresses not just domestic issues, but connecting the domestic with the foreign issues. How do we think about domestic policies and foreign policies as really going together, the interlinkages? As feminists, how do we need to think about these questions when we consider the centrality of gender that is all classed, raced, ethnicized, and so on, because all nation-states are patriarchal, heterosexist, and racialized/ethnicized.

And related to that is a really critical question for us. In that context of challenging our states and recognizing our dominance even in global feminist politics, to whom are we responsible and accountable? And for what?

AZ: How does this play into your vision of being an activist scholar that you have been teaching in all the different contexts? I think there is a strong link to this concept of yours. Would you explain maybe concisely how being an activist scholar in these times could make a difference?

MOR: Yes, something about the way I've been operating the last 25 years is really trying to be in more places, trying to be in more than one place. So obviously I'm rooted in the US and I've tried very deliberately, purposefully to maintain my relationships with feminists in South Korea in particular for the last 26 years and, more recently the last 15, 16 years, in Palestine. So those are the two places where I really dedicated my energies, my commitment, time and everything. What that has meant as an activist scholar is teaching about those places and what is happening there and particularly the roles the US state and corporations play in both places: buttressing the Israeli occupation in Palestine, and the US military occupying South Korea and dominating the entire Pacific region (not to mention globally). So one action is teaching about it. My teaching of US-based students and writing about those places is very much informed by my relationships to the people there alongside my relationship to the issues of militarism or Zionism or Zionist occupation. I focus on what I'm learning about everyday life in both places: what are the people, to whom I am deeply connected and who are directly experiencing impacts and forces of occupation, saying about *their* experiences about the phenomenon of what I'm trying to write about? How do *they* talk about it? How do they themselves get to speak about it? So the task is not how I will speak/write/represent their experiences. The most important, and the trickiest part, is their voices. And how to put those up front in a particular way and at particular moments and where my voice should kind of be amplified. It is a fundamental question of amplification of voices. The third point is: I can't just be an armchair activist, just sit at my desk or in front of a class and talk about this. I have to have my feet planted somewhere in South Korea and in Palestine. How do I do that except through relationships that are deeply binding? Where I get to travel with my comrades/families/friends in both locations and where I am learning from them all the time. What I am learning is not just about the struggle and not just about the political analysis of the situation, but what it means to live under those conditions, how everyday life is both interrupted by and carried on regardless of what's happening—the thing about “life goes on no matter how bad things are”. I have been thinking about both things, how to tell both stories. I'm right now leaning more towards telling and writing

short stories about Palestine, especially about everyday life as it's affected by the occupation and militarism and also about how people carry on: How the weddings are celebrated, how the people who have died are remembered and honored, graduations, going to the supermarket, just the granular daily life—and putting those stories in a political context somehow. People who know at all, know a lot about Palestine in some ways, but they only know the political analysis, that's what they mostly know. I am committed not only to know but also to understand contours and textures and meanings of daily life. The same with South Korea: what is daily life like around the US military bases, for example?

The activist scholarship I am committed to practicing, is fundamentally deepening relationships and putting to use not just my own analytic frameworks but “local” or “daily” “lived” analytic frameworks, how people analyze and theorize. Here I'm talking even about my 12-year-old teacher Yasmin: trying to document how she understands the world, not just the other academics. Or Anas, who just started his first year at university. I want to help put out into the world their theorizing and understandings.

AZ: Could we name what you've been describing as a transnational feminist practice of transformation then? A transnational feminist practice that both recognizes differences and takes into account the everyday practices and feelings. Learning from each other and the contexts people live in and, as a researcher and activists, whatever one's role, both to be transformed by and to transform. Then sharing multiple stories of the learnings, observations, and processes with people in the wider world?

MOR: Yes. And, because I'm connected to the US state, being specifically mindful of that social location and asking always and consistently the question, to whom I am accountable and for what I am responsible? The questions are always there and impel me to be much more mindful of my social location, therefore my responsibilities. I am firmly committed to being part of the work to hold the US government accountable, specifically the US military, for damages it is causing in South Korea, for example. It is also my responsibility to teach “my people” about what they do not see about global impacts. Third, I want to be among feminist activist/scholars in the North collectively deepening our knowledge and understanding about the global impacts of our countries on peoples of the South.

AZ: There is another aspect that plays an important role in your teaching: being an activist scholar also means thinking about care, self-care and even collective self-care. Could you please briefly explain, why this is important to you and to the work you are doing?

MOR: I've been thinking about this notion of "self-care" a lot lately because it's become such a ubiquitous term that's used everywhere I go. One thing about the concept is, that we need to think through deeply this notion of self so it's not only, or even primarily, an individual particular self. Instead, when we talk about "self", going back to your question about collectivity, internalizing that there is a collective formation of self. This means that we are taking care of one another because our lives matter to other folks and our lives are both our own and not our own at the same time. It also means self-care needs to be the way we do "the work"—not just something apart from what we do. We often work intensively for a period—could be days, weeks, months—then "okay I'm going to do some self-care" This often means stepping out and stopping for a while. And I think that's important some time. But at the same time, I'm wondering though if we can think about self-care as something we also do along the way, so here is a really mundane example. Can we think about singing together and cooking together and giving each other massages, meditating together or just sitting quietly with candles—can we think about those as collective self-care as part of our meetings or as part of our retreats? And another strand of the self-care is: How do we actually practice kindness and compassion as we're organizing or as we're writing together, for example, so that the self-care—and maybe turn this English word into a verb and not a noun—self-caring or collective caring—so that's an ongoing commitment, that we are committing ourselves to as part of the work. Both caring outside of work and as part of how we work are true.

AZ: Coming back to the transnational work you are doing, you are present in so many projects all around the world. Out of your experience, if we want to bring forward gender equality, what are the big challenges that we have to face now? How can we bring forward gender equality when we take differences and complexities of contexts into account in this transnational scale?

MOR: I think there are two things: First, given, what's happening politically right now, there's the resistance part right where we have to push back against all the violence in so many forms that is coming at us. We do have to resist that. We also need to think transnationally about what principles, values, beliefs that are connected to a vision could and will bind us as a movement and that we're

willing to commit to, for the long haul. Equality certainly is one thing. Although we need that, it is so basic. We also need and deserve something grander, more visionary, moving toward utopia: What's a transnational feminist vision of genuine peace and security, for example? How do we value differences and conflicts specifically as powerful opportunities to imagine possibilities, to think about alternatives? By peace I'm talking in a very big way, not just the absence of conflicts. We often think about conflicts and difference as things that pull us apart. Let's think about difference and conflicts as spaces that we're inhabiting. In this case, we can use that space not just in the usual ways but also think about the space of opportunity and that the politics of difference absolutely can lead to the politics of hope and possibility and creativity. What I think we need the most now are hope, creativity, and imagination, a politics of possibility, a "politics of life" as my friend Vanessa Thompson says. In some ways many movements have been operating with limited imagination, because everybody is so under pressure and unabating violence coming at us. How do we form collectives where we can just really be open hearted as well as open in so many other ways so that we can think together and imagine together? Otherwise we're always attached, tied to the oppressor and oppression to the old paradigm. I think what's actually happening now is the struggle over paradigms. It's not just who's leading which country and who's struggling over what resources, and all that . . .

AZ: So we might come back to the beginning of the interview—making difference the starting point of the vision of feminism again?

MOR: Yes, but only a politics of difference fundamentally intertwined with a politics of connection. Only when we combine the two—difference and connection—can we reach a politics of generativity and a politics of life. We're then committing to recognizing and dealing with and valuing differences and committing to staying connected so we can *all* be transformed and liberated. My vision of a politics of life and generativity can only be crafted collectively. We—feminists who truly love life—must embrace the Native American value that all beings are connected and referred to as relatives, "all our relations". A foundational belief embedded in that notion is "ubuntu"—I am me because you are you—and *inlak'esch*, a Mayan belief that "I am you, and you are me". What I am really trying to articulate is a feminism of interconnectedness, of embracing the idea that all life is sacred, that we—all life forms—are relatives, of shared common destiny. That none of us is free or can thrive unless we all are free and thriving.

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Policing Difference, Feminist Oblivions and the (Im-) Possibilities of Intersectional Abolition

Vanessa E. Thompson

1. Introduction

Intensive policing and the expansion of the carceral condition are some of the most flagrant expressions of the current phase of gendered racial capitalism. Through the regulation and illegalization of migration, anti-terror legislation, the punishment of poverty and the war on crime, black and other negatively racialized subjects and groups are particularly vulnerable to state sanctioned forms of premature death across the Global North and South. In many contexts of continental Europe, mobilizations against racist policing (racial profiling) led by human rights and community organizations and initiatives have addressed this condition in recent years. What remains often at the margins, however, are the intersectional modalities and dimensions of racist policing and punishment. Likewise, the issue of racist policing and the expansion of the punitive condition is seldom discussed within European gender studies and broader feminist movements in continental Europe. As the title suggests, this article challenges one-dimensional readings of racist policing and engages with the silences around intersectional modalities of police violence. It further addresses the reproduction of carceral feminisms within gender studies and feminist approaches in continental Europe. Departing from current debates and my scholarly activist work on racial profiling in the context of continental Europe (mainly Germany, Switzerland and France) and by applying a black feminist framework, I interrogate modalities of intersectional structural, slow and silent violence engendered by policing. In a second step, I discuss the implications of carceral feminisms and problematize the broad silences within gender studies and feminist movements around intersectional modalities of police violence. Finally, possibilities and horizons of intersectional abolition are sketched out.

2. Policing Race in Continental Europe

In many postcolonial contexts of continental Europe, such as Germany, Switzerland and France, race is hegemonically not considered a category of

structural dehumanization, exclusion, inequality and subordination. However, racism is nevertheless institutionalized and pervasive (El-Tayeb 2011; Goldberg 2006; Lentin 2008; Wekker 2016; Purtschert 2019; Michel 2015; Wa Baile et al. 2019) and impacts practices, legal regulations and norms of policing (Belina 2016; Bruce-Jones 2015, 2016; Cremer 2013; Fassin 2013; Thompson 2018). In the last years, the issue of racist policing has gained more public attention in the above mentioned contexts due to black, migrant and people of color organizing (Belina 2016; Kollaborative Forschungsgruppe Racial Profiling 2019; Keaton 2013; Kampagne für Opfer Rassistischer Polizeigewalt 2016; Thompson 2018; Wa Baile et al. 2019). In all three contexts, the legal discursive framework that defines conditions of police controls can be, despite important historical and socio-political differences, relationally discussed. There are police, federal and state laws that not only allow, but rather foster and re-produce, racial profiling and racist policing through codes of criminal procedure that declare that they combat (a) illegalized migration, (b) terrorism and (c) crime and risk to public order. These codes of criminal procedure such as *verdachts-und ereignisunabhängige Personenkontrollen* in Germany (carried out under § 22 Abs. 1a BPolG and § 23 Abs. 1 Nr. 3 BPolG of the Federal Police Act), *les contrôles au faciès* in France (carried out mainly under Article 78-2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure) and *Personenkontrollen* in Switzerland (carried out under Article 215 StPO and cantonal laws) enable law enforcement to conduct stop and search controls without “evidence” at border areas, in and around train and railway stations, and on international sites such as freeways and airports. The relation between space and policing, in which race is concealed but nevertheless operates through the racialization of the analytics of migration and mobility as well as crime and deviance, is already striking here. It is even more explicit within police laws that enable state police to assign certain districts as “districts of danger”. These districts are thereby declared to be a spatial zone where police can stop and search “anyone” without basing these checks on “suspicious” behavior (Belina 2016, 2017). Often, these are districts where large proportions of racialized poor people work and/or dwell at the intersection of the criminalization of migration/sex work/mental health issues, homelessness and/or informal economies (Belina 2017; Keitzel).

Although the above mentioned legal regulations do not explicitly operate with references to race, institutional racism is perpetuated and fostered through the racialization of migration and mobility (i.e., who is constructed as a stranger/migrant in relation to the citizen), crime (which bodies are constructed as criminal or deviant or pushed into illegalized economies) and space (which places are constructed as safe in relation to the bodies that dwell in and inhabit these spaces) (Belina

2017; Hall et al. 1978; Camp and Heatherton 2016; Thompson 2018; Wa Baile et al. 2019). In countries in which the dominant national narrative, also historicized by its colonial implications, constructs its population as white (Ahmed 2000; Goldberg 2006; El-Tayeb 2011; Keaton et al. 2012; Lentin 2008; Michel 2015; Purtschert 2019; Wekker 2016), non-white people and especially poor black people, Roma and people read as Muslim are severely exposed to racial profiling under these legal regulations (Human Rights Watch 2012).

Racist policing, however, unfolds deeply intersectional with regard to the subjects and bodies it addresses/interpellates, the institutional dimensions and the forms of violence it enacts (Dankwa et al. 2019; Kollaborative Forschungsgruppe Racial Profiling 2019; Ritchie 2017; Thompson 2018). In the following, I delve into the intersectional modalities of violence enacted by racist policing. Based upon the lived experiences and archives of situated knowledges of racialized and multi-marginalized subjects in European contexts, I show that an intersectional critique contributes to a more thorough understanding of racial profiling and its gendered implications. This also challenges discussions on gender equality and within anti-racist as well as feminist struggles.

3. Intersectional Modalities of Violence

Racial profiling entails, but is not limited to, identity checks, pat downs and physical searches, which often have severe psychological and physical consequences (Ahmed 2006; Kampagne für Opfer Rassistischer Polizeigewalt 2016; Kollaborative Forschungsgruppe Racial Profiling 2019; Thompson 2018, Wa Baile et al. 2019). As a multi-dimensional violent institutionalized practice, racial profiling extends the actual control in time, space and embodiment.¹ Beyond the actual control, racialized policing “takes time”, as George Lipsitz writes (Lipsitz 2016, p. 126). Rob Nixon’s thoughts on slow violence (Nixon 2011; Vorbrugg 2019) are useful here as he describes a form of violence that does not speak to spectacular events but rather to mundane articulations. I bring this conception into conversation with an intersectional framework (Crenshaw 1989): as a tool, that does not only allow one (a) to engage with the policing of those multi-marginalized subjects, which often fall through the cracks in discussions on police brutality and violence, and (b) to analyze how racism operates alongside other relevant vectors of criminalization and punishment within racial gendered capitalism such as class, gender, sexuality, migrant status, dis/ability, etc., but further, it allows one (c) to

¹ I have discussed parts of this argument in Thompson (2018) and El-Tayeb and Thompson (2019).

investigate how racist policing as an institutionalized practice does not only operate within and through the institution of the police (Fassin 2013; Thompson 2018), but rather in juncture with other institutions such as juridical institutions, medical institutions, welfare institutions and the media.

Various NGOs, anti-racist organizations and initiatives have argued that racial profiling causes anxiety and have documented how policed subjects face stress and anxiety from policing. From the physical and psychological violence it enacts, depression, fear of prosecution and panic attacks can develop (Basu 2016; Louw 2016). Thus, everyday policing makes mental vulnerabilities worse. At the same time, mental vulnerabilities are a crucial condition upon which policing draws, as racialized people with mental disabilities are particularly vulnerable to policing (Bruce-Jones 2015; Nelson 2016; Thompson).

Further, the violence of racialized policing is extended on the basis of the lack of independent complaint offices and structures as policed subjects are further isolated instead of receiving psychosocial, public, juridical and financial support. Moreover, and this points to the effects of societal racism through racial profiling, witnesses rarely speak on behalf of the victims of racial profiling or seldomly intervene because racist policing confirms already established popular and everyday racisms (Basu 2016; Thompson 2018). Lawyers are also difficult to find based on their lack of knowledge on racism and the structural discouragement of thematizing racism during court cases (Naguib 2019). Like this, the criminalization of people of color is re-produced beyond the actual policing control and beyond the institution of police, as it works through various intersecting mechanisms, through which racialized folks are constructed as problems instead of victims of structural police violence. Victims of racist policing who manage (and have the resources) to engage in or have access to legal strategies and file complaints are often confronted with contraindications by more than one police officer.

The case of Wilson A. from Switzerland demonstrates this. Wilson A., who was stopped and searched by the police on 10 October 2009 in a tram after he came from a meeting with a friend and asked why the police only checked on him and his friend, explains that he was aggressively pushed out of the tram and then beaten. Wilson A. narrates that he told the police that he just had heart surgery, but the police continued and even insulted him with racist slurs. As stated in the many reports of support groups and his own testimony, Wilson A. could barely breathe.²

² Breathing refers to physical as well as to social breathing here. I approach these experiences through a Fanonian framework and follow, amongst others, the crucial and material motif of *un-breathing*, a motif

Wilson A. filed charges, the police officers filed charges too (“violence against state officials”) and after nine years, the three police officers were acquitted. The case is in revision.

The psychological, physical and financial constraints that come with such a process are part of the slow violence of and through policing. Black and other racialized subjects are not perceived as victims in the hegemonic economies of perception and recognition, even if they were the ones who called the police. The case of Derege Wevelsiep from Frankfurt am Main, Germany demonstrates this. After a racist ticket control in a metro in October 2012, he called the police for support and explains that he was then beaten by the police he called for in front of his partner and 3-year-old son. Ousman Sey, who died after being held in a police cell in Dortmund on 7 July 2012, first called the ambulance because of stomach cramps, and instead of receiving medical care, he was arrested. I refer to these cases as racist policing, though no control without suspicion took place in a direct sense, as I draw on a broader understanding of racial profiling and racist policing that includes racist representations as well as the institutional criminalization and brutalization of race and blackness, which not only shape policing practices but furthermore court arrangements, media discourses and societal dimensions (El-Tayeb and Thompson 2019).

The slow violence of racial profiling also works through the ways in which family members and friends of police victims are treated by the authorities and institutions. Through the closing of procedures or procedures that extend over years, and through racism during investigations or hearings, as in the case of the terrorist murder series by the so called National Socialist Underground (where the families of the victims killed by the NSU first were accused of being involved in the killings), family members and friends thus experience a continuation of anti-black and racialized violence, especially when they are poor, which not only extends the

which sticks to the policing of race, especially of blackness, through time and space. Fanon wrote that the colonial condition is characterized by “combat breathing” (Fanon 1965). Combat breathing epitomizes the pant for breath, the gasp of air, the compression of air supply, the panic attack. The continuity of this material motif becomes apparent when thinking of the death of Eric Garner, who died in a police chokehold on 17 July 2014 in New York. His last words were “I can’t breathe”. The condition of un-breathing or of combat breathing travels in a transnational and transtemporal sense (See El-Tayeb and Thompson 2019 and Thompson). Think of the death of Samuel Dolphyne in Finland and of his friend who stated: “He was shouting and calling my name; Ofori, Ofori they are killing me. I can’t breathe” (<http://ghdiaspora.com/update-austrian-based-ghanaian-dies-in-the-hands-of-police-in-finland/>). The black refugee activist Sista Mimi, who was engaged in the refugee protests at the Oranienplatz and the Gerhart-Hauptmann School in Berlin, died on 11 December 2014. During her long term self-organized refugee activism, she argued that the repression by police absorbs her breath.

actual control but also goes beyond the subject towards which it was directed. Assa Traoré, the sister of Adama Traoré, who died in police custody in a suburb of Paris on 19 July 2016, constantly faces charges while she is engaged in the struggle for justice for her brother and other victims of racist policing (Traoré and Lagasnerie 2019). Racial profiling and the policing of blackness and race unfolds alongside the transnational, transtemporal and transsubjective.³

What is nevertheless undertheorized and further often marginalized in anti-racist movements and organizing is the intersectional dimension of racist policing, which does not solely draw on race and masculinity but rather on intersectional dimensions of criminalization (Bruce-Jones 2015; Dankwa et al. 2019; Kollaborative Forschungsgruppe Racial Profiling 2019; Ritchie 2017; Thompson 2018,). Black people and people of color who live at the intersections of oppressions are particularly vulnerable to (murderous) policing: Black women and women of color, queer and especially trans and non-binary black people and people of color, black people and people of color with dis/abilities, black working class and poor people and people of color, black people and people of color rendered refugees and asylum seekers, illegalized sex workers, etc.

In the German context, one can think of Christy Schwundek, who was fatally shot in a job center in Frankfurt am Main on 19 May in 2011 while enquiring about her unemployment benefits. The case of N'deye Mareame Sarr, who was shot by police on 14 July in 2001 in the house of her white ex-partner, is a further crucial manifestation that reveals how racism, gender relations, migrant status, social class and dis/ability intersect in policing (Bruce-Jones 2015). In both cases two or more police or security officers as well as one more person were present, and Christy Schwundek and N'deye Mareame Sarr were the only black women in these respective situations. Both were in a situation of crisis. Christy Schwundek was without money since 1 May as her unemployment benefits had not arrived. N'deye Mareame Sarr wanted to pick up her two-year-old child from her white husband, from which she had separated. The child was supposed to stay there over the weekend. However, he had brought the child to his parents and applied for sole child custody without

³ The sudden death of Oury Jalloh's mother, Mariama Djambo Diallo, after she came to Germany a second time during the trial, is part of this form of slow violence. In the US context, one can think of Erica Garner, Eric Garner's daughter, who, after her father was killed, became even more engaged in struggles for black lives. She died at 27 because of a heart attack related to her asthma disease. That Erica Garner couldn't breathe, the condition of un-breathing, was already scripted symbolically before her death as she carried the last words of her father "I can't breathe" into the protest on multiple levels.

letting her know. Both shots were fired shortly after police arrived. Mareame Sarr was one of the persons who was shot by the new PEP (*Polizei-Einsatz-Patrone*) (<https://jungle.world/artikel/2001/36/bei-ankunft-todesschuss>), a special bullet with a mushroom effect and created to gun down very “violent attackers”, a label that sticks with blackness and poverty. In both cases, public prosecutors closed the case on the grounds of self-defense, as Schwundeck and Mareame Sarr were supposed to have threatened police officers with kitchen knives, although there were numerous contradictions and inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies.

Police reports as well as media representations described Schwundeck and Mareame Sarr in highly anti-black terms, as hyper-aggressive and physically dominating. Anti-black representations of the “angry black woman” (Collins 1990)—in the case of Christy Schwundeck, she was also doomed as a “mad” woman (Bruce-Jones 2015, p. 43)—were strongly at play in these descriptions. They foster a gendered animalization and bestialization, which places black women and black non-binary folks outside of the realm of care and protection and constructs them as uncontrollable (alongside the representations of black masculinities).

On an everyday level, black women and women of color, queers and non-binary folks are further exposed to forms of police violence, which often go unnoticed. For the US context, Andrea Ritchie has engaged with the intersecting forms of police violence experienced by multi-marginalized subjects:

While it is in fact the case that fewer women are killed, brutalized by police or incarcerated, a focus on police killings and more egregious uses of physical force elides women’s more frequent experiences of less lethal violations, like sexual harassment and assault, which go undocumented . . . Police contact with women also tends to take place in locations away from public view—and cameras—such as homes, clinics and public hospitals, welfare offices, public housing. The combination of these factors and more makes police interactions with women less visible, not only in the numbers but also in the public eye. (Ritchie 2017, p. 234)

The contexts at stake here indeed differ from the US context. However, the cases of Christy Schwundeck and N’deye Mareame Sarr (as well as others) demonstrate that an intersectional perspective on racist policing is necessary to not only analyze the ways in which policing as a method of gendered racial capitalism draws on intersecting modes of oppression, but further to account for the specific forms of policing (and their spaces) that multi-marginalized gendered subjects and groups are exposed to. First explorative studies as well as the accounts of support groups and initiatives show that black women/women of color, queers and non-binary folks

are criminalized as sex workers and are exposed to identity checks and searches (Belina 2017; El-Tayeb and Thompson 2019; Plümecke and Wilopo 2019). Black women/women of color, queers and non-binary folks who work in the sex industry are particularly vulnerable to racist policing and its gendered implications, as they are controlled more often than their white colleagues and are under suspicion of working as illegalized sex workers (Dankwa et al. 2019). A higher frequency of controls can have severe impacts on their lives, also in terms of, for instance, child custody regulations. More controls and police raids moreover further render vulnerable migrant sex workers who are illegalized (Hydra 2017).

Black and racialized mothers and non-binary parents are often constructed as “bad mothers/parents” and over policed. This is also important with regard to the cases of Christy Schwundek and N’deye Mareame Sarr, as their children were implicitly or explicitly involved in both cases (in the case of Schwundek, she was struggling to get her child out of foster care, which also fed into her depression). A detailed, historicized and contextualized critique of the gendered policing of race and blackness, or gendered racial profiling (Ritchie 2017, p. 145), alongside migrant status, disability and socio-economic deprivation, thus must interrogate the interdependency of systems of policing and punishment, regimes of welfare and social services, foster care and their implicit orders.

Whereas multi-marginalized subjects and groups are particularly vulnerable to policing practices in their various and intersectional forms, *in-action* of police (when black and racialized subjects are in danger and/or go missing) is also a modality which I define as part of racist policing (see also (Melter 2017)). This modality shows that racialized subjects, multi-marginalized subjects in particular, are not only constructed as perpetrators and violent offenders, but furthermore fall through the cracks of perceptions and regimes of security and safety. The active *in-action* by police in the case of the black female asylum seeker Rita Awour Ojunge demonstrates this. Ojunge was missing since 7 April 2019. Her body parts were found in the forest near the Lager of Hohenleipisch in Brandenburg in mid-June 2019 (<https://iwspace.de/2019/07/unsere-freundin-rita-awour-ojunge-wurde-in-brandenburg-tot-aufgefunden/>). It took police more than two months until they found her remains in the nearby forest, though friends and her family continuously pressed that she had been missing since 7 April. She had repeatedly reported sexual harassment in the camp before. In addition, her son had repeatedly told his father and police that someone had violently beaten her before he brought her away from the camp on 7 April. Not only was Rita Awour Ojunge’s son not believed, her reports on sexual harassment were further ignored, which points to

the effects of s/exoticization of black women and queer folks (Santos Pinto 2018) as well as to the intersectional violence within the lager and detention system. She was further implicitly criminalized as a “bad mother” who would leave her children by themselves without letting anyone know.

4. Between Feminist Oblivion and Carceral (Queer-) Feminism

State violence, prisons and practices of policing, the expansion of the carceral condition (Gilmore 2007; Fassin 2016)—and this includes the lager system—produce intersectional vulnerabilities that are seldomly considered within European gender studies and wider feminist movements. This produces troubling gaps as the feminization of punishment that works alongside the feminization of poverty (Sudbury 2005) is either ignored or actively perpetuated through carceral (queer-) feminist discourses.

The term carceral feminism is instructive here. Coined by Elisabeth Bernstein, it describes feminist movements’ orientation towards the criminal justice system and carceral logics and away from social justice discourses. Bernstein developed the term and concept in the context of her ethnographic study on interventions against women trafficking and sex work in the US as well as debates on trafficking within the UN. She observed a shift away from the strengthening of human and labor rights towards the control and punishment of crime (Bernstein 2010, 2012, 2019). With the concept, she attunes to concepts of black women/women of color, who have long argued that neoliberal state formations further perpetuate racist logics and criminalize or abandon intersectionally vulnerable groups, and interrogates “the significance of feminism’s own widening embrace of the neoliberal carceral state” (Bernstein 2012, p. 241). Carceral feminism is thereby defined as “a cultural and political formation in which previous generations’ justice and liberation struggles are recast in carceral terms” (Bernstein 2019, p. 21).

Against the backdrop of a carceral turn (Fassin 2016), which is enhanced through the withdrawal of the welfare state on the one hand and the expansion of carceral and punitive measures and policies, military compartmentalization and the further criminalization of migration on the other, intersectional critiques of carceral feminisms thus analyze the entanglements of feminist anti-violence campaigns with the criminal justice system. What matters here is thus not only the analysis and critique of racist implications perpetuated by feminist discourses that draw on penal regulations (Hark and Villa 2017) but moreover the interrogation of punitive interpellations by liberal feminist movements and their acceptance of the carceral state and its enactment of intersectional violence.

In the German context, the restriction of asylum laws in the aftermath of the events of gendered and sexual violence in Cologne and other German cities on New Year's eve 2015/2016 and the massive use of racial profiling on New Year's eve 2016/2017 are striking examples of the articulations of carceral feminism. Furthermore, the reforms of the German Criminal Code of Sexual Offenses and the so called German Prostitution Protection Act, which includes obligatory identification and thus drives illegalized sex workers further into vulnerability, drew on carceral feminist discourses (Brazzell 2017; Hydra 2017).

Queer and queer of color theories and analyses have further shown how hate crime discourses not only draw on racist representations and discourses of the "homo- and queerphobic migrant male subject" but render multi-marginalized queer subjects further invisible and disposable (Haritaworn 2015; Fütty Tamas 2019). Tracing hate crime discourses and policies in Germany, Jin Haritaworn shows how homo- and queer nationalist discourses merge with neoliberal and urban securitization and gentrification in the city of Berlin and thereby draw on racialized and post-colonial rationalities. Enhanced by this logic, queers of color are further exposed to state violence as well as to urban displacement (Haritaworn 2015). Tamás Jules Fütty also argues that discourses on "transphobic hate crime" individualize violence and merge with racist and culturalist rationalities as violence against trans and non-binary people is externalized and scripted onto black, brown and especially Muslim bodies. Simultaneously, normative and state violence against trans and non-binary people (ranging from legal and medical regulations, on the job and housing market and regarding health and social services) is further normalized and rendered structurally invisible. Haritaworn and Fütty do not only expose the current entanglements between feminism/queer-feminism and racism as well as the mobilization of gender and sexuality discourses for necropolitical/biopolitical regimes of securitization and exclusion. They further lay bare the queer-feminist complicity in criminal justice discourses.

5. Horizons of Intersectional Abolition

If multi-marginalized subjects are particularly vulnerable to policing and punitive measures, as well as fall through the cracks of state protection and are even brutalized through queer-feminist formations and interpellations of securitization, then it takes alternatives of safety and security which count as method as well as goal to end various forms of violence (Brazzell 2017). With regard to the case of policing, various organizations and initiatives document racist policing, educate parts of society on the implications and forms of violence enacted by policing and encourage

them to intervene, organize campaigns and conduct research. These practices of democratization work alongside a discourse on “watching out for each other” and engaging civil society against state violence (Loick 2016; Thompson 2018).

However, multi-marginalized subjects and groups in particular have developed methods and practices also by going beyond liberal reformism which not only tackle state violence but further call upon community accountability and transformative justice to end intra-personal violence within communities and civil society formations (Brazzell 2017; Critical Resistance 2008; LesMigras 2011). Placed at the intersection of not only policing and forms of state violence (either through active forms of securitization or through forms of abandonment) but further inter-personal and gendered modes of harm and violence, illegalized women and queers of color, as well as trans and non-binary people of color have developed methods and practices that go beyond the struggles against state violence. They thereby have addressed the oblivions of mainstream feminist movements who interpellate state violence through carceral feminisms on the one hand and those of anti-racist movements that concentrate on state and carceral violence, often at the expense of addressing inter-personal harm and violence, on the other. Intersectional violence is thus not only countered by calling upon communities and civil society to intervene in cases of intersectional state violence but also to struggle against inter-personal and gendered harm and violence such as domestic and partner violence. Methods such as community accountability and transformative justice are crucial for this intersectional approach. Community accountability aims at activating community structures (whereby community is understood in a very broad sense; this could mean your neighborhood, your workplace, political networks, marginalized communities, etc.) to provide safety and support for each other, especially for the person who had to experience harm (this includes accepting and centering their self-determination). Community values and strategies are developed to de-individualize inter-personal violence. As harm and violence is not individualized according to these approaches, community structures are also activated to develop sustainable strategies to address community members’ abusive and violent behavior and to engage with them in a process of accountability and possible transformation. Further, community accountability aims at transforming the political conditions that reproduce violence and harm and foster forms of inter-personal violence (see the resource hub TransformHarm.org). The focus on structural forms of oppression without leaving behind the inter-personal dimensions, links community accountability to transformative justice, which takes all levels of violence and the necessity for transformation into account. Although the terms of

these methods were coined by black women, femmes and trans folks and women, femmes and trans folks of color in the US, the methods also have a history in various European contexts, as well as in the Global South. One example would be the intersectional organizing of refugee self-organized women against gendered violence within the lager system and against the lager system and border system itself, where they have developed support strategies against gendered violence and enhanced community accountability processes with the support of heterogenous self-organized refugee groups and allies. Another examples is the StoP (*Stadtteile ohne Partnergewalt*, districts without partner violence) project in Hamburg (and further cities), Germany (see Brazzell (2017)). The district work project, which cooperates with an anti-violence program in Boston, is based upon a community activating and awareness raising process, which includes prevention, support structures for subjects who experience partner or domestic violence, as well as methods of accountability for the person with abusive and violent behavior and strategy building for the broader community to transform structural inequality.

6. Concluding Note

Engaging in methods that withdraw from state interpellations on the one hand and mobilize community accountability and transformative justice on the other (instead of recreating and reproducing mass and intimate punishments) promises to not only transition to gender equality. These approaches of intersectional abolition moreover promise to transform gender politics which rather draw on criminalization and punishment than on care and intersectional racial justice and societal transformation.

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Who Intervenes? Thoughts from the Perspective of Arts and Culture Activism

Rahel El-Maawi and Sarah Owens

The following text is a transcription and translation¹ of a conversation between Rahel El-Maawi and Sarah Owens, which took place as part of the 2018 lecture series “The Art of Intervention”. Their dialogue touches upon topics such as Blackness, in/visibility, community, culture, art and criticism. Using their own voluntary work and Black-/queer-feminist literature as a starting point, El-Maawi and Owens talk about their motivations for, as well as the possibilities and consequences of, intersectional activism in arts and culture. Through this, the point of view shifts from the art of intervention to the question of who intervenes and how this intervention is supported or restricted by sociopolitical conditions.

Rahel El-Maawi: We met at Bla*Sh, a network for Black womxn. Here, we will, however, not talk as Bla*Sh specifically, but from a personal perspective. Still, Bla*Sh was essential for us to meet. This is why I will quickly introduce the network.

Bla*Sh presents itself as follows: “Bla*Sh is a network of Black womxn in the German speaking part of Switzerland. We live straight or queer, with or without children. Some of us have grown up in Europe, others have lived on several continents. We are connected through our experience of being perceived as Black, and through the Afro-hyphen. We are ‘of African descent’ in the widest sense and aim at social, cultural and political empowerment.”

Bla*Sh exists because of the desire we had to come together as a group and to exchange and generate other forms of knowledge.

One of the first activities bringing us together was to talk about female authors: Black female authors, writers, also Western ones, who enabled us to learn with them. Bla*Sh also refers back to an intervention by Audre Lorde, who repeatedly asked: Where are the Black women? She did not want to speak only to white feminists in the audience. She also asked this question in Zurich, at the end of the 1980s. Following this, different initiatives were formed by Black women, such as the network “Women

¹ The conversation was deliberately held in German in order to bring the discourse they participate in to the German-speaking part of Switzerland.

of Black Heritage” and later the “Treffpunkt Schwarze Frauen”. Later, a book was published highlighting the work of the initiatives, and a few young Black women were invited to contribute.

In the same year, Audre Lorde’s legacy was celebrated with a podium, to which several Black women were invited. At this podium, we decided that we needed a new network for us Black womxn. Our first meeting was a brunch at a kitchen table, which I find quite telling. We brought along books, learnt together and from each other, and were able to contribute different realities. Since 2013, a few of us have been meeting, and since 2016, many more have joined. Today, we are very active and repeatedly intervene—culturally, socially, and politically—with the latter based on the notion that “the private is also political”.

Sarah Owens: For this conversation, we defined a few topics in advance we wanted to address. These are community, role-making, having to justify one’s presence, visibility, and self-care. We chose quotes by Black female authors or journalists as points of departure, and, in the following, we use them as support for explaining our stance toward these topics, why they are important to us, and how we negotiate them within our work.

Rahel El-Maawi: In a world structured according to white, male, and capitalist principles, it is essential for survival to hear voices other than those continuously (re)cited and taught. For us, engaging with thinkers who name our realities and speak them out loud is *care*. Words can help when you need strength (see Ahmed (2017, p. 240)). This is why we chose to structure our conversation with quotes by Black womxn and Womxn of Color.

Without community, there is no liberation [. . .]. But community must not mean a shedding of our differences, nor the pathetic pretense that these differences do not exist. Lorde (2007, p. 112)

Rahel El-Maawi: Community allows me to find a language for what happens to me; it is a way of carrying each other. It allows me to name and relocate experiences we make as Black womxn, and to promote mutual learning. This is something I had been looking for and found in Bla*Sh. My goal was to not be alone with these experiences, which I could not make sense of by myself, since I did not know: am I the only one experiencing this or are these situations created by society? Through our exchange, I can place my situation in a societal context and therefore de-individualize it.

Sarah Owens: I feel similar about this. I grew up in a predominantly white society and did speak to others about some of the experiences I had had but could not reflect on these experiences because I could not make sense of them. Now, upon looking

back, my aim is not to put a label on them and declare: “This was clearly racist.” It is more about speaking with others who might have had similar experiences, or to enter into a dialog with those who have not had these experiences but who wants to listen. Most importantly, my goal is to listen more carefully to others. These types of conversations require a trust in each other and a “safe space”.

Rahel El-Maawi: Yes, I also appreciate the way that we treat each other and that there is this place that lets us care for one another, know about each other, and develop a practice together to be active and to be able to intervene: A collective self-empowerment. Community, for me, also became a space for the transformation of grief and anger. It lets me transition from experience into action, into practice.

Sarah Owens: I agree—there is, on the one hand, the discovery of a mutual language that lets us contextualize these experiences and speak about them. On the other hand, we find support for action in everyday life: “Next time, if something like this happens, how can I or how do I want to act? When do I want to spring into action and possibly be regarded as difficult, when do I want to be silent?” I think Bla*Sh reflects this in a twofold way: One is a gaze that is directed towards the inside, the way in which we care for each other. The other one is directed outwards in the form of interventions or statements.

Oppressed groups are frequently placed in the situation of being listened to only if we frame our ideas in the language that is familiar to and comfortable for a dominant group. This requirement often changes the meaning of our ideas and works to elevate the ideas of dominant groups. Hill Collins (2000, p. vii)

So institutionalized is the ignorance of our history, our culture, our everyday existence that, often, we do not even know ourselves. Njeri (1991, p. 7)

Sarah Owens: Role-making is an issue that concerns mainly our efforts directed outwards, since through these we often are confronted with expectations or find ourselves in roles we have not intended for ourselves.

Rahel El-Maawi: What I find interesting is how the topic of community links to the question of how we became addressable all of a sudden. Also, the questions arising therefrom: how do I want to be addressed, how do I want to appear in public? In short, actively taking matters into one’s hands. I find this very important, in order to make myself aware of the way in which I want to frame myself to avoid getting into stigmatizing spheres, where I have the feeling that a twist might happen easily.

This connects to the question of the norm—where and when am I addressed as a Black woman? Is it only when I fulfil a certain normative expectation that is legible to mainstream society? Even though I have been socialized in a very Swiss way, I do stand out and get ascribed a specific role. I am also often invited as a “token”. This is why active self-framing is central to me. I view it as my contribution to participate in order to shift the norm and to expose such demands.

Sarah Owens: Bla*Sh defines itself as a network and thereby emphasizes that we are all Black womxn but that we are also different. This is to avoid the misunderstanding that Bla*Sh has a single, homogenous perspective and opinion. It is understandable that in the context of today’s society, which likes issues to be as quickly and easily digestible as possible, we are expected to demonstrate a certain uniformity. Thus, I find it even more important not to hastily try to meet this expectation, but instead to consciously show difference and divergence—all in the sense of the aforementioned quote by Audre Lorde.

Rahel El-Maawi: Because difference is also fed by our direct realities, by our being confronted with being womxn in this society, mothers, aunts, who also suffer from this unjust system. For me, this is an important incentive to counter these circumstances with something exciting. Still, there exists a sadness when we deal with certain topics in small groups, for it is often very moving and devastating at the same time. Speaking with others helps me gather my forces, so that I can articulate myself towards the outside and define and claim my position and role. I want to do something that empowers us, something that empowers women, People of Color, Womxn of Color, Black womxn and all of society.

Sarah Owens: We recently organized a reading session for children’s books, as some of us are mothers, aunts, or godmothers. I very much enjoy reading to my daughter but was always a bit dissatisfied with German children’s books that are available in stores, as the children in these stories are usually blond, with a blond mother and brunette father. The mother is at home, the father works. Usually there are two children, a girl and a boy, and their grandparents are often still alive and physically active. We once spoke about this at a Bla*Sh meeting: “Do you know any books I can read or give as a gift that diverts from this norm? Where there are other types of family, and different experiences, and in which the protagonists are of color?” We then began to look for such stories, a search with quite a steep learning curve! The idea for a reading session emerged out of our inquiry—it was to give children of color the opportunity to encounter stories in which they can recognize themselves. Also, we wanted to share the knowledge we had acquired during our research with the adults who came to the session.

To continue our commitment even after the event, we thought ahead: “Let’s write a children’s book, let’s translate non-German books into German, let’s write to publishers.” Surely, such an endeavor also requires that we think about how to manage it once it gets going: on the one hand, it is fantastic if projects continue, on the other hand, they require a significant amount of time and resources.

Rahel El-Maarwi: Yes indeed, this means hundreds of hours of volunteer work! The example of the children’s books also illustrates that we have not been able to intervene very deeply on a structural level. The project took effect on an individual level—those who participated are now likely more attentive. It is also an example for how we are addressed: Many people approach us, are interested in our activities, but have not thought about these issues before. And it means that we have to go further. A friend of mine wanted to order the children’s books we had selected for a school library, but only two of the twelve books were available in the library catalogue. This small example already shows how many obstacles there are. I find this telling also in that it illustrates how white our knowledge is. I also grew up with white knowledge. With the children’s book project, we aim to make Black knowledge accessible here in Europe, in Switzerland, which requires a lot of commitment and effort. I always find it surprising how much this depends on private initiative, how little support there is, and how much community is needed for us to be able to do this together.

Whiteness—or, you know, white people—exists as the basic template. And that template covers all human experience, by the way: the ability to be special or ordinary, handsome or ugly, tall or short, interesting or dull as ditchwater. On the other hand, our presence in popular culture (as well as in non-stereotypical ‘issue’ roles) must always be justified. [. . .] Does that black woman deserve to be on that show? Give the exact reason that Chinese-British man is in this scene.
Adewunmi (2016, p. 209)

Sarah Owens: This quote is from an essay in which Bim Adewunmi questions whether certain forms of popular culture, such as film and television, are as diverse as they claim to be. A point well made by Bim Adewunmi is that whenever the wish for representation is fulfilled, this is in turn tied to certain demands. Casting a Black actress for the leading role in a film is therefore not a matter of course, but needs to be explained: “But she is a wonderful actress, she has what it takes, and she has even worked with producer xyz . . . ” The main assumption apparently is that the decision to give the role to a Black actress rather than a white actress is based on

extraordinary circumstances and reasons. I often have the feeling that we need to explain our presence in a predominantly white society. This starts with the question: “Where are you from?” and continues into other areas. We are granted that we can talk about our experiences as Black womxn. But when we speak about experiences or topics others do not ascribe to us, there is an implicit expectation of an explanation or justification.

Rahel El-Maawi: I experience this in a similar way. There is a continuous stigmatization and thereby exclusion, a “making of non-belonging”. Black citizens being wiped away from history. To have to justify ourselves over and over again costs a lot of energy. I think it is also a kind of wariness: I hope I am not promoting a certain stereotype, nor cliché, as a woman or Black woman. Where is the line? When do I have to be careful, in order to not be pigeonholed? How can I talk about experiences I consider discriminatory, without having them denied? How can I ask people not to use certain words (actually not use them at all but surely not in my presence)? And yet I am thereby regularly called into question and discredited as being whiny, not important, not conducive to a conversation, although the conversation could be heading into a different direction because the issue of racism is in the room. I find it difficult to explain this, over and over again. Also, I realize that I depend on having people who support me, who are advocates, as I do not feel like explaining myself all the time.

Sarah Owens: I notice that the continuous expectation that we explain ourselves unfolds not only in volunteer work or job-related spaces, but also in daily routine. It reacts to implicit questions posed towards us, such as: “Why are you standing here, why are you claiming space, why do you think you may contradict me?” For us, this permeates all spheres of life.

Rahel El-Maawi: This reminds me of Adrian Piper, who did an intervention with business cards. She handed them to people sitting next to her on a bench: “Please do not approach me, I am just sitting here and would like to eat my sandwich.” These types of everyday situations rapidly show experiences of sexualized discrimination. I experience this over and over again; it is something in between sexualization and exoticization that requires me to continuously explain: “No, I am just here, I am just moving.” The same thing counts for the need for explaining myself, I also see this at work. There is lack of awareness that there are Black Swiss womxn, that we live in a post-migrant Switzerland. This seems to have not been incorporated in education. So many people in Switzerland are not being seen, their story is not being perceived. It always requires double or multiple times the effort.

In white supremacist society, white people can ‘safely’ imagine that they are invisible to black people since the power they have historically asserted, and even now collectively assert over black people, accorded them the right to control the black gaze. [. . .] Since most white people do not have to ‘see’ black people (constantly appearing on billboards, television, movies, in magazines, etc.) and they do not need to be ever on guard nor to observe black people to be safe, they can live as though black people are invisible, and they can imagine that they are also invisible to blacks. [. . .] They think they are seen by black folks only as they want to appear. hooks (2015, pp. 168–69)

Sarah Owens: bell hooks describes American society in view of the history of slavery. Fundamentally, she also reminds us that a gaze may be returned and that we cannot assume that a gaze works only in one direction.

We could take an example from visual arts. We could imagine an exhibition taking place in Switzerland with photographic portraits of non-white individuals. However, whereas the white (i.e., dominant) gaze is considered in the exhibition planning and is publicly addressed in the media, less consideration is given to the fact that there are also non-white people in Switzerland who will visit this exhibition and whose gaze differs from the white (i.e., dominant) gaze. With regard to Bla*Sh, I am especially interested in the conditions and consequences of visibility. Our work makes us more visible and adds new voices to the public discourse. But it also makes us “hyper-visible” in that we are always already visible, albeit in a certain way: We are perceived as foreign, exotic, just “different”, or even as dangerous, as in airport security checks (see Browne (2015)).

I realize that in the course of time I have developed a certain protection mechanism in order to push away the implications of this visibility. I feel invisible, even though I am not. At the same time, it is important to me that Black womxn are seen and their voices are respected.

Rahel El-Maawi: This visibility, or perceived visibility, is also part of my experience. But then, again comes a rejection or the experience of not being perceived. Though now is a time in which Black womxn are increasingly heard and sought out, in which they become addressable, also because of the network we have founded, the fact that we have a name and the way in which we are increasingly asked for advice and opinion. And still, there remains the question of tokenism: Nowadays, we just need a Black woman on the podium, a Black lecturer at the academic institution . . . but apart from that, we are usually not wanted, except in the group I co-organize myself. And even as Bla*Sh, we are on the one hand welcomed into a feminist scene,

where there is a lot of resonance, but on the other side, I feel, we are not really seen. Possibly because we culturally match, which makes it easier to overlook various racialized positions. I allow myself to speak of a “we” here in this space—maybe this “we” exists, maybe not. But there is a certain activist group attitude and most fit in quite well into its DNA. This attitude, however, largely excludes experiences of racism, which harbors the risk that our topics are again nonexistent in the discourse.

In/visibility is quite ambivalent. The aim is to be seen in a non-limiting way. To be seen with all one’s facets. One of our Bla*Sh formats is called “polyphonic reading”, and I think this is very fitting. It must be polyphonic rather than aiming to create a new mainstream.

Sarah Owens: We share common interests that of course influence Bla*Sh. Many of us are interested in dance, literature, film, art, music, or work in these fields. Therefore, it makes sense for us to intervene in cultural formats alongside socio-political discussions. We are, however, also aware of whom we exclude or fail to reach through such interventions.

I have come to believe over and over again that what is most important to me must be spoken, made verbal and shared, even at the risk of having it bruised or misunderstood. (Lorde 2017, p. 1)

With self-care, we don’t mean self-indulgence [. . .] when we’re talking about self-care, we’re talking about actively pushing against systems that try to break us down, and against institutional ways of not being cared for. Jenna Wortham (Wortham and Morris 2017)

Rahel El-Maawi: In our preliminary discussion, you said something really beautiful, Sarah, that our activism is not just art, it is struggle.

Sarah Owens: Yes, with this I tried to express that our commitment involves many different areas: from everyday life to work life, from individual relationships to the Bla*Sh network and a larger community. It is important and very rewarding to do cultural events in order to reach others, and, for me, the boundaries between this work and my job and private life are permeable. A children’s book reading, for example, is primarily a cultural event, but the books we present there are books I read to my daughter that affect my relationship with her and, in turn, affect my daughter in how she comes to perceive herself. Topics of exclusion, in/visibility, or the need for explaining oneself are not only topics we encounter in one sphere, they are always present. It is hard work to put yourself out there every day and say: “I don’t think this is okay, I don’t agree with this.” Whether on the bus, when you hear a dumb comment, or at work, when you are ignored or patronized. It takes a

lot of courage and effort to counteract and be “difficult”. This makes self-care so important. As Wortham says, the idea of “self-care” in this sense does not indicate a spa treatment, but that we attend to ourselves and do not lose sight of our self-respect.

Rahel El-Maawi: I once heard Patricia Hill Collins introduce Kimberlé Crenshaw, saying that she was deeply impressed that Kimberlé had been meditating regularly since the seventies, which for a long time she found funny, but now understands. This resonated with me: I may and must look after myself in order to be able to stay active, as an agentive Black woman. I do not want to position this within a neoliberal discourse of performance, but rather find a connection with myself, in order not to harden in response to the everyday racism that you mentioned and Philomena Essed writes about (Essed 2013). Racist experiences let my shell grow and harden; it becomes metallic. I need something to create an antipole. And there again we have a link to community as a space for mutual strengthening and nourishing. It might also be a more sensual way of doing politics than I have done previously. And that is exactly what I feel is the revolutionary thing: Not to spend too much energy on something, and instead concentrate on what empowers me and, at the same time, others. For instance, through making Black literature accessible through polyphonic readings, and therefore being able to contribute to a history of female thought leaders. Not being alone. This is a big part of self-care which I find important.

Sarah Owens: That we are so involved in the arts is also connected to the fact that these are spaces of reflection, for which we can assume that other forms of knowing and reflecting—or of pausing—are possible, in contrast to a dominant academic or political enterprise. Artistic formats allow alternative perspectives to become visible. Here, these perspectives are welcomed and are seen.

Rahel El-Maawi: And that which inscribes itself into our bodies can be expressed and find a language.

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Gender Roles and Empowerment in Women's Islamic Activism

Sherine Hafez

1. Introduction

The success and longevity of women's Islamic social activist work across Muslim-majority countries have gained much attention from feminist scholars who focus their work on gender empowerment and women's status in Muslim-majority societies (Ahmed 2011; Ali 2014; Badran 2010; Mahmood 2005). While some studies applauded the positive impact Islamic activism has had on women in these societies, others remained skeptical about the extent of empowerment women might enjoy in Arab and Middle Eastern Muslim countries (Moghissi 1999, 2011; Mojab 2001; Shahidian 2002). Essentialized as misogynist and patriarchal to the extreme, Muslim-majority countries are often depicted as hostile to women's empowerment, which leads some to represent Islamic women activists as women who internalize their own oppression (Papanek 1994). Further noting that women who join Islamic movements and organizations parrot their male leaders, others maintain that Muslim activist women have access to leadership only under male supervision and command.¹ The following chapter questions the theoretical assumptions on which these conflicting views rest, in order to consider forms of empowerment other than those informed by mainstream liberal principles. Even early feminist writing, for example, the scholarship of Louis Lamphere (1993), Cynthia Nelson (1974) and Rosalind Rosenberg (1982), has long questioned Western universalist perspectives in assessing feminism and empowerment for women in non-Western contexts. Despite the legacy of this critical work reflecting decentering trends in Western feminist discourse which has grown since then, liberal assumptions remain trenchant in mainstream feminist discourses. As I point out above, this is not simply a Western phenomenon but liberalism is often a theoretical filter even among local scholars who examine emancipation and equality for women in Muslim-majority societies and in the Middle East from a liberal view. Recently, feminist historian Joan Scott (2017) argued against the predominance of liberal and secular notions in certain

¹ For a review of these perspectives, see Metcalf (1998).

strands of feminism in the West as well. She maintains that neither liberalism nor its offshoot, secularism, was ever intended as emancipatory gender discourse. Scott refutes the claim that secularism automatically brings about sexual liberation and, consequently, she maintains the question would remain a moot point for women who espouse the Islamic faith and its values. This chapter agrees with Scott and presents a glimpse into the lived experience of Muslim women who do not seek liberal emancipation but instead forge a trajectory that is relevant to them and to their societies. Drawing on feminist literature on power in Middle Eastern contexts, the following discussion will develop an understanding of what empowerment means to Islamic women activists. In many cases, Islamic women embody forms of empowerment that provide an Islamic alternative to general conceptions of empowerment in international development literature that often rely on universalist modern liberal norms. Women engaged in Islamically reforming their societies operate from within structures of authority which privilege men, paradoxically (and often unintentionally) finding themselves in positions of power by acting in accordance with prevalent norms of ideal female Muslim behavior. While women's roles shift to reflect their activism, they inadvertently begin to assume privileges and statutes in society that can be assumed to be empowerment in a liberal modern sense. However, I argue these shifts in roles and status are more complex and multi-layered when viewed from the perspective of the women themselves. Taking the perspective of Islamic activist women as a point of departure for this analysis allows for a more nuanced reading of the nature of their engagements with Islamic practice and how they often redraw the limits of normative gender roles. More importantly, we can also see how concepts of empowerment predicated upon universalist assumptions do not fully capture the impact of Islamic activism nor women's engagement with movements recognizing faith as an organizing principal.

Fieldwork data collected over a period of seven years from 2000 to 2003, then from 2005 to 2008 and then again in 2014, centering on women's Islamic activist movements in Cairo, Egypt, provide a perspective into these activists' own frames of reference and how they themselves make sense of the role Islamic teachings play in their lives and in their community.² Islamic activism appeared to redefine not only women's but also men's physical as well as discursive space. Muslim women activists became more visible in society. Their work brought a fresh new

² The present chapter draws on fieldwork notes, interviews and publications produced during this time period.

perspective to social reform and eradication of poverty, and they began to assume positions of respect and authority in their communities previously only enjoyed by men. As women became more active religiously and men's monopoly over the public religious domain began to be challenged, this produced conflict and tensions between women's and men's groups. These challenges were not interpreted as gender struggles, and the successes or failures the women experienced were not viewed as "power" issues but were viewed as part of the struggle for piety and Islamic social reform leading to God's blessing. In some cases, I have observed in my fieldwork the activist women's high levels of religious piety and social respectability have compelled—even obligated—male leaders to publicly endorse women's Islamic activism and to cede some control over religious spaces and activities. Through the various forms of activism and social work that they conduct, acquiring a good grasp of Islamic teachings and conducting their Islamic practices and rituals accordingly, Islamic women activists asserted their claims on this newly found space. Those claims intersect with socially acceptable gender norms, social values placed on age, education and the endorsement of government institutions, further their sense of self and enable their pious work. These interventions do not, however, in and of themselves, act as indicators or goals of empowerment for the Islamic activist women. In other words, assuming positions of power or acquiring control over space and resources does not appear to be a goal pursued by activist women but is, first and foremost, a means to gaining piety and religious fulfillment.

2. Islamic Women's Activism in Cairo

For decades now, since the 1990s, Islamic women have led an activist movement for social reform in Egypt centered in the capital, Cairo.³ They preach in mosques to other women, they teach classes on Islamic theology and law, lead philanthropic activities and often organize large-scale fundraising events that enable them to carry out their activism and provide support to those in need. Educated Muslim women taking the lead in preaching are called *da'iyat*.⁴ They have attracted much media attention and are considered authorities on issues dealing with Islam and

³ Islamic women activists established hundreds of organizations catering to the needs of women and their families. This came in the wake of a surge in Islamic organizations in the country. According to Bayat (2002), one third of all private voluntary organizations (PVOs) in the late 1980s were Islamic as well as half the number of welfare associations. Following Kandil (1998, pp. 145–46), Bayat mentions that at least 15 million people in the 1990s benefitted from Islamic welfare.

⁴ *Da'iyat* is plural of *da'iyah*, meaning a woman preacher, lit. one who invites people to the Islamic faith.

gender, the family and social Islamic ethics. While many activist women preach informally, most of the well-known preachers are certified to preach from the Ministry of Religious Endowments (*wizarat al awqaf*). They attract thousands of city women around them to hear their sermons. Many of these women *da'iyat* do not adopt feminism in their outlook, nor do they have a particular interest in addressing issues of gender equality. Their discourse is primarily aimed at perfecting the self through enhancing its relationship to God. Unlike their male counterparts who are employed by the Ministry of al Awqaf and therefore operate within the confines of the official government agenda, women's sermons focus on the daily needs of the modern Muslim woman. These needs include, but are not restricted to, raising children Islamically, conducting oneself according to Islamic teachings and the various challenges of being Muslim in a globalizing and Westernizing world. Their non-official capacity enables them to somewhat freely address the issues that are relevant to them and to their audience, creating a powerful impact and impetus for change.

These endeavors have created a momentum in society that has reversed some of the stereotypes about Islamic women being passive and oppressed—representations which often marginalized them and denied them a role in the religious, social and political aspects of government. With the growing trends in Islamism in Egypt before the revolution of 2011⁵ and then again after the Muslim Brotherhood became the ruling party, Islamic women became more publicly engaged than ever before. Although the activist women on whom this study is based are not part of the Muslim Brotherhood, the brief period during which the party were in control acted as a catalyst for some of the activism that was started prior to the revolution. They began conducting forums of dialogue to create awareness and to allow for exchanging ideas and organized training sessions, carried out community projects and taught hundreds of under-privileged women skills necessary for employment and economic gain.

3. Empowerment in Development Discourse

Empowerment has become a commonly used term to refer to the ability of an individual to be *enabled*, i.e., to be free, to exercise their power in decision making

⁵ Egypt experienced a series of uprisings, beginning on 25 January 2011, that sought to terminate the 30-year-old presidency of Hosni Mubarak and to usher in a new era of social justice, dignity and democracy. The revolution was steered into a different direction when Egypt's Islamist group, the Muslim Brotherhood, won the presidential elections. The short-lived presidency of Muhamed Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood's candidate, temporarily centered Islamic traditions as social practice.

and in making choices which shape their future. Despite the universality of the term, few attempts have been made towards developing a definition of empowerment. Often viewed as problematic and ambiguous, the word “empowerment” is not easily translated because it does not exist in most languages. In the Arabic language, the term “*temkin*” refers to the state of being empowered, yet it does not fully capture the notion of power and points instead to a state of being enabled. *Temkin* is employed in technical development language and is seldom, if ever, used in Arabic colloquial language. Social understanding of *temkin* or power as *meykanah* has some negative associations with tyrannical power, and *temakon*, which is the verb, implies the ability to dominate.

One study by Oxaal and Baden provides an extensive survey of development organizations and NGOs that aims at an understanding of the term’s usage, implications and indicators (Oxaal and Baden 1997). According to Oxaal and Baden, the notion of empowerment is derived from the birth of the idea of Western individualism (*ibid.*, p. 4). The roots of empowerment lie in longstanding concerns in development literature with power. “Power” itself, however, comes in diverse forms:

Power *over*—relations of domination/subordination are implicated here. It is based on socially sanctioned intimidation and invites active and passive resistance.

Power *to*—a creative and enabling power which is related to decision-making authority.

Power *with*—centers around the organization of people to achieve collective good.

Power *within*—refers to self-confidence, awareness and assertiveness. It is concerned with the way individuals can recognize power dynamics in their lives and learn to influence and change them. (Oxaal and Baden 1997, p. 4)

When development projects seek to “empower women,” they address specific criteria mainly derived from these standards or a combination of them. Criteria for women’s development include participation in decision-making processes, and the creation of an awareness among women that they may be entitled to occupy a decision-making space in the public sphere, to make choices and to be able to shape their environment. Power is generally articulated as a “possession” and determines whether individuals are dominant or oppressed. The Report of the UN Fourth World Conference on Women, which called its Platform for Action “an agenda for women’s empowerment,” maintained that “the principles of shared power and responsibility

should be established between women and men at home, in the workplace and in the wider national and international communities" (ibid., p. 4).

As a common paradigm, "Empowerment corresponds to women challenging existing power structures which subordinate women" (ibid., p. 4).

Central to this vision of empowerment, which has gained impetus in development discourse, is the notion that power belongs to the individual rather than the collective. Entrepreneurship and individual self-reliance are emphasized over co-operation as means of challenging power structures, which are seen as subordinating to women. This view, Oxaal and Baden point out, is derived from a belief in the entrepreneurial market capitalism as a rescue measure for ailing economies and the retreating state subsidy of social welfare, employment, health and educational services. Many of these assumptions regarding empowerment emerge from the modern liberal conception of the individual which are often inapplicable to community-based societies.

4. Selfhood: Boundless Possibilities

The notion of the "self" as a universalist assumption often distorts how this self may be empowered in multiple cultural and social contexts.⁶ Discourse grounded in an uncritical view of the unitary Western notion of the individual can be of little or no help in understanding unbounded selfhood or experiences of empowerment that are contextually different. Women in Western societies have struggled to find a place for themselves in a social world where power was not only defined in masculine terms but also identified with autonomy, independence and rights to freely construct legal relationships (Pateman 1988). Claiming a hegemonic discursive authority, in practice, however, this historically contingent concept of selfhood by no means included women—though political systems continued to presume the equality of men and women. Gendered, culturally specific and historical, the liberal view of the individual does not capture the nuances of selfhood in societies where concepts

⁶ In scholarship on Middle Eastern and Muslim cultures, a critical trend of the notion of the individual began with the work of Suad Joseph (1993). As she points out, various constructs of the self exist across cultures because selfhood is mediated by gender, race, class, ethnicity, religion and the state. In her work on Lebanon, Joseph maintains that, to a large part, a relational notion of the individual prevails (unbounded), one which develops through connective relations with significant others. This is in contrast to a singular notion of bounded selfhood in the liberal Western sense which can be described as unitary, independent, autonomous. This, however, does not mean that bounded and unbounded selves exist as binaries because they also parallel, intersect and fluidly evolve even in the same societies. The problem is when scholarship assumes that all selves are homogenous and are bounded since that pathologizes the unbounded self and obscures the complexity of its existence.

of the individual may develop from alternative historical and cultural processes. It is necessary, therefore, to consider the complexity of relationships that mediate the construction of the self in any given part of the world and at specific points in time. Suad Joseph (1994) points out that not only do various constructs of the self exist across cultures but they may exist even within a single cultural setting. This is because she sees selfhood as mediated by gender, race, class, ethnicity, religion and the state. In her work on Lebanon, Joseph maintains that, to a large part, a relational notion of the individual prevails, one which develops through connective relations with significant others. This directly opposes a singular notion of bounded selfhood in the liberal Western sense and urges us to ponder the possibilities in the constructiveness of selfhood and, consequently, its sociopolitical manifestations. By understanding the self as a fluid and contextual notion, studies of empowerment may be able to consider boundless possibilities for understanding its multiple manifestations.

5. Whose Empowerment? Islamic Activist Women in Cairo

In contrast to the liberal modern reading of empowerment prevalent in development discourse, the Islamic women activists that I worked with in Cairo, Egypt, find an empowerment from “within” such relations of power (Hafez 2011). They subscribe to Muslim feminine ideals, demonstrating that women are not merely subjugated in relations of power, but are also empowered as a result of the dynamics in these relationships. Islamic women preach modesty and obedience and emphasize feminine roles that often appear in contradiction to what liberal theorists call, namely, independence, and freedom against oppressive traditions, sexual liberty and freedom from gender discrimination. These Muslim women were concerned with an entirely different project. Theirs was the project that began with the self as a site for social development. To these women, activism as a service to others lies at the heart of this process.

Most development theories and schools of feminist thought define strategies as resistance and contesting male authority as paths for women’s empowerment. While these are paths that are not entirely absent from the experiences of the women I worked with, resistance, autonomy and independence in themselves were often necessary means to attaining the larger goal of social change. In fact, the tensions between the pursuit of a religious ideal that women define as being closer to their God often intersected with such liberal feminist ideals. These tensions and negotiations between what are often perceived as conflicting traditions are far more complex and complimentary than they are dichotomous. The various forms of empowerment that Islamic activist women experience in their movements are born out of these creative

tensions and intersections. While Islamic activism occasionally places women in positions that challenge male authority, such as competition over resources or public spaces where they preach or social reform projects that male religious leaders may have led in the past, the general consensus is that this is acceptable as long as these efforts are for the general good. The gender ideology that informs this general consensus is based on an Islamic model that emphasizes the complementarity of the different roles of women and men rather than their absolute equality. They are, in other words, equal but different. The goal is to affect harmony and balance in society with the belief in the justice of God, as the ultimate judge of all things in this world. The Islamic egalitarian view of gender roles seeks to create balance in society while guaranteeing women's rights as decreed by Islam. However, in the event that there is conflict between the genders, Yvonne Haddad and Jane Smith maintain that issues of obedience to male authority are of a more complex nature (Haddad and Smith 1996). The notion of *shura* (consultation), which is the basic form of Islamic decision making, prevails even in the home, with the husband acting as arbiter if consensus is not reached. Islamists, claim Haddad and Smith, see a need for leadership for all social units and as women carry the burden of childbirth, men are obliged to take on their own role as well.

However, many of the women interviewed who worked in Islamic social reform organizations saw empowerment in remaking themselves as ideal Muslim women. For instance, Salma, one of the leaders at an Islamic center for women, recounts that empowerment is related to her sense of success at self-enhancement. She spoke about how she undertakes a strict disciplinary attitude towards her sense of religiosity. Islam acts as a constant frame of reference for her in every action of the day. Salma explained how she sets high standards for herself because she is a *da'iyah* (preacher). She was reluctant to talk about her empowerment as we discussed the various manifestations of the concept in her opinion. After some minutes into our discussion, Salma said,

You know if it weren't for the fact that this concept is so important to you, I would never mention this to anyone. Saying that I am empowered is in direct contradiction to what I represent as a *da'iyah*. My duty is to be modest and unassuming. It is true that my religious role gives me a sense of power and achievement compared to those who involve themselves in trivialities, but talking about it should just not be done. It is against the spirit of Islam.

I had similar discussions with other activists such as Maha, a wife and mother in her 40s. Maha was a high achiever; she graduated at the top of her class and worked

as an assistant professor for a short while before moving on to banking. She now dedicates her time to Islamic activist work and has single-handedly improved many people's lives. Maha was the epitome of patience and care—even when faced with the most challenging situations. Attempting to understand what activism meant to her, I asked her how she would feel if she were to stop her activist work. Startled by the question, she stared back as if the thought never crossed her mind till this moment, and then she said,

It will affect my relationship to God. If I do not perform these acts of kindness, it will sever a strong link to God. I cannot see my life without this. This (activism) is a reward that God has sent me. I would feel deprived from a privilege that I tremendously enjoy to help others and to attend to their needs.

Maha interprets the satisfaction she gets from Islamic activism as a divinely given privilege. In this, her views seemed to parallel the rest of the Islamic activist women I spoke with. To them, Islamic activist work is a gift from their God and a path to piety. Activism is not a conscious pursuit for fame or social recognition, far from it. In fact, this work was about placing their will and agency in the hands of God. Any empowerment, therefore, which emanates from these activities is not understood in this rationale as a direct consequence of the action, but rather as borne out of the religious experience. Using the word in English, I asked Maha what it meant to her and how she would define "empowerment." Her response deflected from any possible confusion that I might have about conflating empowerment with autonomy or agency. She continued to explain that Islamic activist women enjoy positions of authority, such as the director of the organization, *Doctora Zeinab*, and famous Muslim preacher, Shereen Fathy, and others, but that these situations develop as these women succeed in achieving high levels of religious knowledge and as they themselves become role models to others who respect them and admire them. However, Maha here is using "empowerment" to mean power over others in an authority sense. Salma used empowerment to mean a higher level of self confidence and assurance. However, neither of them see empowerment as a goal of their Islamic activism. Rather, they see it both as a natural outcome of religious duty and of activism. Maha explains, "These women do not covet power. What they seek is a religious perfection which will bring them closer to God." This image of religious perfection is, however, defined and articulated by discourses which rest on patriarchal sources of Islamism.

6. A Theoretical Conundrum?

There are two main theoretical problems that Islamic women activists pose to liberal modern assumptions on empowerment. First, they belong to a “tradition”—Islam—which is perceived as being oppressive to women. With Islam generally interpreted as a patriarchal religion, which favors males over females, they fit into generalized feminist criteria of oppressed women. Secondly, Islamic women activists endorse a gender ideology that is not predicated upon a universal feminist view of gender equality as a means for women’s empowerment. Instead, they emphasize in their daily activities their religious zeal, virtue and high levels of moral ideals as prescribed means to self-enhancement.

Some feminists caution against emphasizing gender differences, since this will inhibit an analysis of power, as power can be masked in arguments over “difference” (Flax 1987). Meanwhile, the Islamic women I interviewed posit varying viewpoints about gender relations, and many even do not consider the matter of gender difference as an issue in Islam. The majority of these women see that their God created the female and male to complement one another, to fulfill different roles in society, which are outlined in the Quran (holy scripture). Islamic women *da’iyat* (preachers) do not converge on the issue, but they are clear on the fact that men and women are different. They view the relationship between wife and husband to be based on responsibilities as well as obligations, which are clearly outlined in the Quran so that a harmonious and equitable relationship prevails in the family and both partners enjoy the rights which Islam has decreed for them. Islamic women scholars, however, elaborate on the issue of roles in that many of them maintain that the Quran never restricted roles based on gender. These scholars argue that motherhood, though most certainly an honored position in the Quran, was never presented as a sole option for women (Muhsin 1992). Egyptian Islamic women intellectuals include Heba Raouf Ezzat and Omaila Abou Bakr, who, among others, have developed new inroads into the Islamic debate on women’s issues. Ezzat and Abou Bakr, who are both university professors, are an authority in the public debate on women and their position in the Muslim Middle East. These women scholars participate in the dominant discourses in their society, thus challenging male exclusivity on the religious forum based on their knowledge of the Islamic texts. In their view, gender complementarity, not gender equality, is the true path to women’s liberation, a path that is already provided by Islam for both men and women. Ezzat and Abou Bakr perceive Western models of liberation as not only irrelevant to their societies but also as potentially harmful and demeaning for women. Despite their interest in seeing women gain their rights

in Muslim society, the term “Islamist Feminist” does not sit comfortably with either of them. Omaima Abou Bakr phrases this as follows:

I don't have to subscribe to any foreign/Western agenda or discourse on feminism and gender Some of these are simply irrelevant However, one can define one's own context and paradigms for a gender-sensitive perspective. (Abou-Bakr 2000, p. 1)

To Abou Bakr, a well-respected scholar and Islamic activist, the idea that gender scholarship on Muslim-majority societies must contend with topics relevant to Western audiences in order to gain credibility in academia seems misplaced. To her, gender issues in Muslim-majority societies should be defined by contextual and gender-sensitive paradigms. To pious women who have committed themselves to a life-long dedication to self-amelioration, perfection of religious ritual and service to their faith, contributing to Islamically reform society takes priority over seeking self-realization. Our scholarly epistemologies need to be sensitive to these nuances in individual aspirations because, while sharing many parallels with other women contending with patriarchy and gender injustice around the world, Islamic women activists may only indirectly engage with the challenges of patriarchy rather than address them as a goal.

7. Conclusions

The vigorous involvement of Islamic women in the public sphere to Islamically reform society in Muslim-majority countries such as Egypt could be generalized as an act of feminist empowerment which would obscure the nuances and complexities of pious activism undertaken by women. As discussed in what preceded, although women's Islamic activism has shifted their position in society and has redrawn the boundaries for gender roles in ways typically identified with feminist outcomes, this interpretation glosses over the women's desires and aspirations for pious fulfillment and religious service. This, however, does not mean that empowerment is altogether absent from these women's lives or thoughts, nor should we assume that Islamic engagement leads to the polar opposite of empowerment in a liberal modern sense. It is important to consider, though, that liberal modernist criteria for empowerment that advocate for independence and autonomy as markers of the modern individual who is free to choose an identity and lifestyle regardless of the social fabric in which they live cannot adequately critically analyze an empowerment for women whose world view is not consistent with this type of ethos. Clearly, a consideration of empowerment which regards its subject as created by social relations and not as autonomous from them will provide a more lucid understanding of the impact of

Islamic activism on women's empowerment and provide a better understanding of empowerment for future development projects.

As Islamic women's groups vary in their scope, orientation and activism, their empowerment also reflects varying degrees of social, psychological and political forms. There is the sort of empowerment contingent upon relinquishing the forms of power that derive from overt resistance and relies instead on socially cogent notions of perseverance, cooperation and the attainment of higher levels of religiosity. In fact, the women I have studied defined a condition of empowerment concerned with attempting higher goals that are consistently spiritual as well as material. Working both inwards to hone their pious selves as well as outwards in their communities to reform them Islamically, activist Muslim women see these efforts as inseparable from their faith and worship. Despite what these experiences bring to their own lives, neither the sense of pride in what they do nor the acquired confidence from working on social reform is in itself their coveted reward. This is because their pursuit of self-enhancement towards the Islamic notion of the ideal woman is deeply committed to Islamic teachings and the attainment of higher levels of piety.

These conceptions of religiosity and self-awareness intertwine with social aspirations for what the activist women perceive as a better, brighter future for a society that upholds Islamic teaching. Although the Islamic agenda that they envision for their community is shaped by a patriarchal tradition—one that demands of women a specific attitude and comportment—it also allows them a measure of mobility and action. The patriarchal values that inform women's Islamic activism in contemporary Egypt should not be perceived as a return to a traditional past. This is because the women's activism engages with modern and contemporary issues and does not discount the global world in which the women and their families live and contribute to. Can we hasten to tell whether Islamic activism is going to actually empower women in the future? We cannot begin to tackle this question adequately without revisiting our own normative conceptions of empowerment necessary for understanding women across various historical and cultural contexts.

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Men and Masculinities: What Have They Got to Do with Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment?

Jeff Hearn

1. Introduction

When people mention the words, “gender” and “gender equality”, the conversation often soon turns to women and girls. There are both good and bad reasons why this is so. On one hand, women and women’s voices have long been, and continue to be, marginalized and subordinated, especially across various public realms; on the other hand, to limit work, policy development and politics on gender and for gender equality and women’s empowerment as a task only women need to be concerned with may easily let men off the hook, and even suggest that it is women who have to change rather than men.

The UN Social Development Goal 5 is the SDG that specifically addresses gender equality, ending all forms of discrimination against all women and girls everywhere, and eliminating all forms of violence against all women and girls in the public and private spheres, including trafficking and sexual and other types of exploitation. At the same time, gender equality and women’s empowerment are central to the fulfilment of all SDGs. This point is still often forgotten, as if gender equality can be siloed off to a separate arena of policy and politics.

SDG 5 aims to: eliminate harmful practices, such as forced marriage; value unpaid care and domestic work through the provision of public services, infrastructure and social protection; promote shared responsibility within households and families; ensure women’s full and effective participation and equal opportunities for leadership at all levels of decision-making in public life; ensure universal access to sexual and reproductive health and reproductive rights; grant women equal rights to economic resources, and access to ownership and control over land, property, finance, and natural resources; enhance use of technology to promote women’s empowerment; and adopt and strengthen policies and legislation for the promotion of gender equality and women’s and girls’ empowerment. So, which of these questions has to do with men and masculinities? The answer is: all of them.

Working for gender equality means changing repressive structures that oppress and hinder women from thriving. Working for such changes is not only the

responsibility for women. How, indeed, can gender equality and stopping discrimination and violence against women be achieved if men and masculinities do not change? Achieving gender equality means changing and making demands on men. The emergence of men as such a target for action stems not only from women's struggles, but also from other movements, such as those for labor reform and occupational safety, gay, queer and transgender (LGBTIQA+) rights, and ethnic, racial, and post/decolonial justice—and, in some cases, from some men's resistance to those progressive movements. Men are key actors in both local and societal gender regimes (Connell 1987; Walby 2009), and specifically the struggles for greater gender equality, and the development of gender equality policy itself. Different local, societal and transnational gender regimes vary in the extent of their engagement of men and masculinities in gender equality and SDG policy processes (Hearn 2011).

Different traditions in gender and SDG policy have definite implications for men's practices, for example, in men's relations to home and work, different constructions of men as breadwinners, prioritization or neglect of anti-violence work. As such, this chapter addresses what might be called the "man problem" in the promotion of gender equality, in the context of the persistence of gender inequality in society and policy development that impedes the achievement of SDG5 and other SDGs. This concerns both how gender regimes can and do change men, and how men can be and are involved in changing gender regimes (Hearn 2011). In particular, I address challenges in terms of organizing with and by men, and strategies for changing men and masculinities, including transnational approaches. Thus, two sets of interrelations can be recognized: between gender regimes that construct men and masculinities, and men as actors and foci of policy within gender regimes; and between local, national and transnational gender regimes.

2. Changing Men and Masculinities

In the long story of addressing men, masculinities and gender equality, and building on much long-term preparatory action, the 1995 Platform for Action adopted at the Fourth World Conference on Women was a crucial step. It read:

The advancement of women and the achievement of equality between women and men are a matter of human rights and a condition for social justice and should not be seen in isolation as a women's issue. . . . The Platform for Action emphasises that women share common concerns that can be addressed only by working together and in partnership with men towards the common goal of gender equality around the world. (United Nations 1995, sec. 3, 41)

Since 1995, these issues have been increasingly taken up in the UN (United Nations) and other transgovernmental political and policy discussions. In 2003, the UN's Division for the Advancement of Women organized a worldwide online discussion forum and expert group meeting in Brasilia, on the role of men and boys in achieving gender equality as part of its preparation for the 48th session of the Commission on the Status of Women, with the following comments:

Over the last decade, there has been a growing interest in the role of men in promoting gender equality, in particular as the achievement of gender equality is now clearly seen as a societal responsibility that concerns and should fully engage men as well as women. (Division for the Advancement of Women, United Nations 2003, sec. II)

Engaging men in gender equality activities can be understood and located within these developing historical contexts. Targeting men through gender equality and other politics, policies and actions means working with agendas at different levels and with different scopes and ranges, and it also needs both immediate urgent action and a long-term process of change, as discussed below. However, which men should be targeted? It may be tempting to focus on those who are explicitly sexist or dominant, but it should involve all men. Different men have variable relations to gender (in)equality, politics and policy change, and are involved and implicated in a wide variety of ways, as: family members, friends, community members and leaders, workers, service users, professionals, practitioners, political and social activists, (non-)citizens, policy-makers, members of organizations, NGOs (non-governmental organizations), the state, business leaders and managers, and so on. Gender equality work has to become normal and normalized for boys as well as men: in kindergartens, schools, workplaces, governments, business, sport, religion, in families, households, friendship, intimacy, and sexual relations.

Men are not just individuals, but operate collectively, as in public politics, social movements, organizations, management, trade unions, the state, capitalism, religion, science and technology, and so on. Indeed, many mainstream (or malestream) organizations, for example, in government and business, are places of men's organizing, often, in effect, 'men's organizations', with a variety of unnoticed and unnamed 'men's groups' of different sizes and powers. It is towards such organizations that women's individual and collective demands for greater gender equality are often necessarily directed, and it is also in those settings that men are likely to respond, often predominantly negatively, and without explicitly naming or thinking of those responses as 'men's responses' (Hearn 2015b, p. 145). Recognizing "men" as a policy area, and indeed, developing specifically and explicitly men-related

politics and policy, still seem to be relatively rare phenomena. States, governments, NGOs, businesses, community structures and policy institutions are part of both the “man problem” and the solution. The “man problem” remains obscure, partly because so much policy is about and for men, and yet is not recognized as such, and partly because explicit policy on men and masculinities is at uneven stages of formulation—sometimes as part of gender equality or social justice projects, but sometimes as a means of furthering men’s interests (Hearn 2015b, p. 148). In recent years, many countries have undertaken some form of initiative focused on supporting men’s greater participation in promoting gender equality. There have been various initiatives at the international and supranational levels focused on men, boys and gender equality since the mid-1990s, for example, the EU (European Union) study on the Role of Men in Gender Equality (Scambor et al. 2013) drew on expertise from all EU member states and beyond. Such initiatives must continue, and must not be hijacked by men trying to argue that they are really the ones suffering most from discrimination (see Hearn 2015a, p. 24). Yet, it is amazing how the mass of national, international and supranational policies and reports on gender equality and resources devoted to gender equality hardly mention men or the need to change men and masculinities, and make no demands at all for them to change. They are still all too often treated as the unspoken norm, presented as gender-neutral “policy-makers”, “stakeholders”, and so on.

3. Costs, Difference, and Privilege

Organizing and policy development on and by men also need to be contextualized in the larger context of patriarchal social relations—transnational, national, local. At each level, there is a continuum from ‘gender-non-conscious’ to ‘gender-conscious’ forms of organizing (Egeberg Holmgren and Hearn 2009). For example, much transnational organizing, by, say, transnational business corporations or within international inter-governmental relations, is done mainly by men, arguably for men and men’s interests, and in a ‘non-gender-conscious’ way. In contrast, there are also various forms of men’s transnational gender-conscious organizing for or against women’s reproductive rights, or for or against (pro)feminism.

Men’s national and local organizing ‘gender consciousness’ varies from reproducing and advancing men’s privilege, for example, men’s rights organizing, fathers’ rights, and misogynist, anti-women, anti-feminist or ‘postfeminist’ politics, to opposing such privilege, for example, profeminist organizing, men assisting in the promotion of women’s greater equality and working against violence, to emphasizing

men's differences from each other, for example, organizing around gay rights, racialization of men, men with caring responsibilities, men in non-traditional work. These local and national forms of organizing are increasingly subject to transnational influences, as we discuss later in this chapter.

Within these local, national and transnational contexts, there are many gender-conscious reasons why men can become positively interested in, or indeed can resist, gender equality. Positive orientations include: to highlight and redress the costs of 'being a man'; to tackle differences amongst men; and to end male privileges (Messner 1997). These generally, though not always, positive motives are not necessarily in conflict, but they may become so if taken to their logical conclusion, for example, when only costs are emphasized and privilege is forgotten.

First, the costs: These might include costs to some men's health and life expectancy (see Lohan (2007) for a critical review), risks from occupational hazards and lower educational achievements. These are especially important when coupled with disadvantages of class, ethnicity and other inequalities. Being a patriarchal man is probably not good for your health, though the effects may be offset by more resources. There are also effects of violence and sexual violence towards men and boys by other men and older boys. There is a strong case for men to become more involved in gender equality on these grounds.

Next, differences: The motivation for engagement here comes from differences amongst men: age, ethnicity, gender identity, migration status, sexuality, and much more, as well as composite interests of, for example, black gay men or white older men. Policies for men are developed in various areas, including fatherhood and health and anti-violence programs, but these may not recognize differences between them. The very question of 'what is a man?' is becoming problematic, not least because of increasing numbers of older and old men living lives that are a very long way from the stereotypes of their masculine youth (Jackson 2015).

From the perspective of ending male privileges, men's involvement in gender equality means acting against oppression, injustice and violations of gender systems, and seeking a better life for all. It suggests a need for profeminist, (pro)gay strategies across all policy areas. Rather than seeking to change only those men defined as 'problems' or excluded, the focus may shift to men in positions with the power to exclude and control. For example, anti-violence interventions could be directed to ending men's silence on these issues. Even among men who oppose privileging one gender over another, there are totally different notions of the aims of gender equality in the long term, never mind among those who are anti-gender equality. To paraphrase Judith Lorber (2005): Is the key feminist task to introduce reforms and

abolish gender imbalances between women and men, as in reform feminism, or to resist and abolish patriarchy as a general gender system, as in resistance feminism, or to be rebellious and abolish gender categories, as in rebellious feminism? Do we aim to celebrate, transform or abolish 'men' as a category of gender power? These different feminisms suggest different reasons for involving men in gender equality, different possible motivations for men to become involved in gender equality, and indeed very different gendered futures for all.

These three motivations—around costs, differences, and privileges—may come from different directions, but they are not mutually exclusive. There is much to be done to bring them together. A good example here concerns what needs to be done in moving from war to peace. This entails recognizing the vulnerabilities of, and damage to, some men in and after war, as well as the real differences between different groups of men in war and peace. This is obviously not to suggest that only men are involved in war, less still to essentialize men (Hearn 2012), but it does highlight men's historical responsibility for, and propensity to instigate, many wars, as well as carrying out most of the killing and threats of war.

More broadly still, according to research by Øystein Gullvåg Holter (Holter 2014), greater gender equality is likely to bring greater happiness, less depression, and better well-being for both women and men, through better health and reduced threat of violence from other men. This refutes the argument of anti-feminist men who suggest that greater gender equality harms men. Other benefits for men from greater equality may include, at the more immediate level, the positive impacts of increased love and care for and from other men, and, at the more macro level, less likelihood of war, armed conflict, nuclear annihilation, and profound ecological damage and disaster (Hearn 1987; Enarson and Pease 2016).

4. Strategies for Changing Men and Masculinities

The emergence of men as 'gendered subjects' has partly been articulated in relation to women's and feminist struggles, but is also partly in relation to other forms of affiliation and organizing, such as racial justice, labor struggles, and gay and other non-normative gender and sexuality civil and legal rights. Spaces and opportunities for profeminist, (pro)queer gender work with men exist within civil society and social movements. The mobilization and politicizing of the social status and social power of 'men' and 'masculinity', so as to advance a broader justice agenda, are necessary. Strategies for changing men and masculinities take several forms: working on obviously gendered areas; acting against the persistence problem of violence; intersectional strategies; gendering the non-gendered; and transnational approaches.

4.1. Working on Clearly Gendered Areas

There are many obviously gendered areas for changing men and masculinities, whether we are talking at the interpersonal, local community or broader levels of analysis and practice. This involves profeminist, (pro)queer strategies in what are obviously gendered policy areas, such as work and the gender division of labor, health and welfare, family relations, sexuality, education, and interpersonal violence. In all these arenas, grassroots organizing, activism and educational work with men and boys, in collaboration with feminist organizing, is necessary. Changing to, or at least towards, egalitarian practices at home, at work and in the community and civil society are key here. Moreover, although national and regional laws, policies and explicitly gendered interventions with men may seem relatively rare, there are a number of areas where explicit state policy and action on men is often developed, if unevenly, including:

- men as workers/breadwinners/heads of family and household;
- fatherhood and paternity, including legal rights and obligations of fathers;
- fatherhood, husband and other family statuses in immigration and nationality;
- gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex, queer, non-binary and agender (LGBTIQA+) issues;
- crimes of sexual violence;
- programs on men who have been violent to women and children;
- military conscription;
- men's health education programs;
- reproductive technology and reproductive rights.

In addition, there are multiple policies and practices in schooling, education and elsewhere that are specifically designed on and for boys. These may either reinforce or subvert dominant gender power relations.

4.2. Acting against the Persistent Problem of Violence

An absolutely central aspect of changing men and masculinities which deserves special mention and attention is the reduction and stopping of violence. Ending violence and the threat of violence is a fundamental motivation for, and a necessary means to, ending gender inequality and achieving the aims of SDG5 and other SDGs. Violence here includes violence against women, domestic violence, intimate partner violence, gender-based violence, sexual violence, violence by men against men, human trafficking, violence to non-humans, misogyny, hate speech, and many further forms of violence and abuse.

These all need direct and effective action and intervention by men, both to prevent violence and also to counter the predominant perpetration by men (Edström et al. 2015; Jewkes et al. 2015; Flood 2019). Having said that, rather than seeking to change only those men defined as ‘problems’ or excluded, the focus can be shifted to powerful men in positions with power to exclude and control. Similarly, anti-violence intervention can be directed to non-violent men, not just men using violence; the silence of non-violent men partly maintains men’s violence (Pease 2008). Such strategies also appeal to the reduction of threat of violence between men.

In their book *Societies at Peace*, Howell and Willis (1990) posed the question: what can we learn from peaceful societies? In societies where men were permitted to acknowledge fear, levels of violence were lower; in those where masculine bravado, repression and the denial of fear were defined as masculinity, violence was likely to be higher. In societies where bravado was prescribed for men, definitions of masculinity and femininity were often highly differentiated. The less the gender differentiation between women and men, the more men were nurturing and caring, and the more women were seen as capable, rational and competent in the public sphere, and men’s violence was less likely. The more recent IMAGES (International Men and Gender Equality Survey) project has found that predictors of men’s more gender-equal attitudes include: own education; mother’s education; men’s reports of father’s domestic participation; family background of mother, alone or joint decision-making parents; not witnessing violence to mother. Self-reported attitudes in turn predict men’s gender-equal practices, more domestic participation and childcare, more satisfaction with primary relationship, less interpersonal violence (Levtov et al. (2014); also see El Feki et al. (2017)). While gender policy against gender-based, ‘domestic’ and interpersonal violence is well recognized, as in anti-violence programs, this is less the case for civil disorder, terrorism, racist violence, riots, state violence, militarism and war.

... men in different parts of the world are spending vast amounts of money trying to kill each other, whilst a large proportion of the world’s population (mostly, but not exclusively women and children) are allowed to starve to death. ... Male violence, sexual or otherwise, is not the unusual behaviour of a few “odd” individuals, neither is it an expression of overwhelming biological urges: it is a product of the social world in which we live. (Cowburn et al. 1992, pp. 281–82)

Thus, to address men’s violence necessarily means addressing collective violence and militarism; to do otherwise is to place militarism outside of violence, and, even if unwittingly, condone violence. Military activity is one of the most clearly gendered

and clearest examples of the hegemony of men, with or without conscription. Militaries are part of the state and organized in association with political, economic, administrative power in the highest reaches of the state, including policing, security services, foreign policy, and economic interests. They are concerned with both national offence and defense. They are specifically geared to the ability, actual and potential, to inflict extensive and severe violence and harm. At the structural level, men's domination of labor force participation links with the greater likelihood of societal internal violent conflict (Caprioli 2005), whilst women's well-being tends to link with societal peacefulness (Hudson et al. 2012). Indeed, the most gender unequal and homophobic countries are also those with the highest level of societal violence and most at risk of armed conflict in their own territory (Ekvall 2019), and there seem to be close associations between misogyny and terrorism (Díaz and Valji 2019). On the other hand, and interestingly, societies with the most positive attitudes to (male) homosexuality, including from men, are also those most likely to be arms exporters (Ekvall 2019), which indeed are likely to be used in armed conflicts in more explicitly homophobic countries. Changing this contradictory set of relations requires joined-up policy and politics that bring together sexuality politics, feminist and profeminist politics, peace politics, and last, but by no means least, politics around trade, industry and innovation. What is needed more generally is the promotion of positive peace (Galtung 1969, 1990; Farmer 2001; Murray 2014), that is, not just the absence of war, armed conflict, direct and interpersonal violence, but the absence of structural violence and injustice, and transformations to more healthy, non-violent masculinities and gender relations (Ratele 2012; Hearn et al. 2021). Arms exporting to other parts of the world is clearly not countering structural violence and not promoting positive peace.

4.3. Intersectional Strategies

Another important way forward is through intersectional strategies. Men are not only men; boys are not only boys; boys and men are constructed intersectionally. So, how are men's relations to gender equality and inequality gender discrimination to be understood? There may be cases of discrimination against men by women, but these are more likely driven by power relations other than gender, such as class or racialization; much more common are men's negative treatment of other men for being gay, black, old, young, unmanly, and so on. The disadvantages experienced by some men and boys largely results from domination by other men. Poorer outcomes for some men and boys are not the same as gender discrimination. Most inequalities that affect men and boys do not result from domination by women.

Lower educational performance by some boys, for example, results largely from poverty, class, migration status and attitudes towards masculinity that are not conducive (or are even antagonistic) to education (Hearn 2015a, p. 26).

Unequal social divisions—by class, race, religion, and many further divisions—all have an impact on men. Gender equality policies have to be pro-equality and anti-hierarchy more generally. Though, in one sense, some forms of ‘gender equality’ can co-exist alongside power hierarchies and inequalities; reducing wider inequalities generally promotes more thorough-going gender equality. This means opposing the intensification of neoliberal capitalism, with its increasing inequalities and hierarchies, opposing heteronormativity and structural domination, and it extends to inequalities between societies. Addressing inequalities generally can stimulate men’s positive engagement with gender equality, with a focus on social exclusion and inclusion. Many white people and white men support anti-racism, but men rarely identify themselves as supporting anti-sexism. Anti-racism and anti-classism necessarily involve anti-sexism (Hearn 2015a, pp. 26–27).

In pursuing these agendas, a powerful way to proceed is through intersectional strategies that link men, gender relations and other forms of social inequality, such as ethnicity. While intersectional approaches remain relatively undeveloped in most law and policy, there are, for example, high correlations between poor health and the social disadvantages of class, ethnicity and other inequalities. Addressing these can stimulate men’s positive engagement with gender equality and (pro)feminism, with critical attention to men’s practices in both social exclusion and inclusion. Another arena for positive intersectional change is the linkage between men as parents and careers, and men as violent partners or violent parents. In many countries, fatherhood and men’s violence are generally treated as separate policy issues. There may be the enthusiastic promotion of fatherhood and then, quite separately, policy to tackle men’s violence against women and children. This gap needs to be bridged (Eriksson 2002). In developing effective political and policy responses, splits between ‘problems which some men experience’ and ‘problems which some men create’ need to be overcome. Joining what might seem to be disparate policy areas is essential, if rather rarely adopted (Hearn et al. 2006).

4.4. Gendering the ‘Non-Gendered’

Mainstream organizing, politics and policymaking are typically presented as gender-neutral, however much they remain forms of men’s organizing. Both the “man problem” and differences amongst men may easily remain obscured, partly

because so much policy is about men, but not recognized as such, partly because explicit policies are at uneven stages of development.

The notion of policy can easily appear at first as gender-neutral. Yet not only is much policy and policy development constructed by and through assumptions about gender, but also much policy and policy development can be understood as policy on and about gender and gender relations. Gender constructs policy, as policy constructs gender. (Hearn and McKie 2008, p. 75)

Gendered policy on men and masculinities are mostly framed within a form of nation-based welfarism. However, strategies for change are needed beyond the policy areas mentioned thus far—at all levels and in all forums. This means thinking of gender agendas, not only in terms of those seen as ‘gender issues’, or so-called ‘men’s issues’, but rather beyond the more obvious and explicit gender policies, as with, say, local economies, microfinance, capitalist production, finance, energy, transport, and environment, which also tend to be transnational in form. There is the gradually increasing recognition of the central place of men and masculinities, in what are usually seen as ‘non-gendered’ policy arenas: foreign, trade, security, militarism and war, and sustainable and just development and aid (Cornwall et al. 2011). This approach, gendering the ‘non-gendered’, ties in with strategies of change with men leaders and men who are not defined as the problem, as well as changing the institutional and societal structures that often remain dominated by men. This is not only a matter for individual and collective actors but applies also to social structures and structural arenas of international (capitalist) economy, international politics and relations, and sustainability in its various forms more generally.

Recent economic crises have highlighted significant gender biases in policy development and implementation. Finance ministers, financial boards, economists and banks, both nationally and transnationally, have generally maintained a ‘strategic silence’ on gender, even though their policies have an uneven impact on men and women. Deflationary policies, policies based on assumptions of male breadwinners and public spending cuts (rather than higher taxes) tend to affect men less than women. Economic crisis may initially have a stronger impact on men’s employment, but later more on women (Young et al. 2011). Policies designed to boost economic growth without considering the overall impact tend to benefit men more than women overall, not least in terms of resources allocated by governments, investments and priorities. The promotion of economic growth without consideration of its effects tends to benefit men more than women, not least in resources allocated by government expenditures and investments, and R&D. Men tend to work in the

capitalist sector more than women, and to identify more closely with narrowly economic ideologies and less with welfare values.

4.5. Transnational Approaches

Political and policy debates on men and masculinities have largely been framed in terms of a given society; yet, global transformations and regional restructurings are changing the form of the hegemony of men. All of the issues already noted need to be placed into transnational contexts, raising the need for transnational strategies. Gender policies that are directed explicitly and specifically at men have been developed most fully when they address issues, such as men's health and 'domestic' violence, that may appear as immediate and close to the individual, mostly within nation-state welfarism, rather than in relation to transnational capitalism, global finance, or ecological frameworks. However, increasingly, local and national struggles in politics and policy, whether for or against gender equality, are transnational in character, as strategies tried, lessons learnt, and information gained in one location are transferred for use elsewhere. This is no more obvious than in the online activity of men's anti-feminist and far right movements.

Many transnational agencies now address, at least rhetorically: the place of men in moving towards gender equality; the links between masculinity, nationalism and racism; and risks of failing to act. Men's violence to women and children is receiving greater attention from the EU, the Council of Europe, OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe) (Seftaoui 2011), UNICEF (The United Nations Children's Fund), UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization), and other transnational organizations. Taking transnational action to foster change is essential, not least to counter transnational neoliberal hegemonies and transnational patriarchies (Hearn 2015b). The insights of postcolonial and decolonial theory and practice are vital here (Shefer et al. 2007; Ratele 2014, 2016; Izugbara 2015). It is likely that the process of considering the policy implications for changing men's practices transnationally will increase. A further key transnational issue concerns the impact of new bio- and socio-technologies, information and communication technologies (ICTs) and artificial intelligence (AI) in both reinforcing and contesting hegemony. They create potential for extensions and reinforcements of the hegemony of men, yet make some men and women dispensable. ICTs have been hugely 'successful' in promoting online violence and abuse, pornography, trafficking and sexual exploitation of women, as in supplying encyclopedic information on prostitution and the global sex trade (Hearn and Parkin 2001; Dines 2010).

On the other hand, there are also many transnational campaigns, projects and actions for changing men and masculinities, many in the Global South (Jones 2006; van der Gaag 2014), with a transnational, internationalist orientation, such as: Promundo, Sonke Gender Justice, One Man Can (South Africa, Sudan), MenCare, Men's Action for Stopping Violence Against Women (India), and CariMAN (Caribbean Men's Action Network). The umbrella organization, MenEngage, has over 700, mainly group, members, with national networks in Africa (22), the Caribbean (9), Europe (23), Latin America (11), North America (2), and South Asia (5). The 2014 2nd MenEngage Alliance Global Symposium in New Delhi attracted over 1200 people and 400 abstracts from 94 and 63 countries, respectively, and produced the 'Delhi Declaration and Call to Action', setting out aspirations for global change of men, boys and masculinities. The 3rd Symposium, Ubuntu, was held as a hybrid global event, beginning in Rwanda in November 2020 and continuing until July 2021.

5. Concluding Comments

In this chapter, a range of challenges in organizing with and by men in relation to SDG5, and how men can contribute to gender equality and women's empowerment, have been addressed. Most fundamentally, there is the need to gender men and masculinities explicitly and critically, and develop gender strategies for changing men and masculinities that contribute to gender equality and women's empowerment. One way to approach these challenges is by recognizing the costs, differences and privileges that accrue to men with patriarchal relations, and how the tensions and overlaps between these three positionings can be related to different feminist agendas: problematizing, and even abolishing, gender inequality, patriarchal systems, and current gender categories, respectively.

More specifically, men and masculinities can be transformed through: working critically on what are clearly gendered issues, including the persistent problem of violence, in its fullest meaning; adopting intersectional strategies; working on the gendering of what are typically seen as 'non-gendered' areas of policy and politics; and developing positive transnational approaches and linkages, that are both positively proactive and reactive against anti-feminist policy and politics.

Moreover, it is important to recognize that different men, both individual and collective, can have complex, even contradictory, relations to gender equality and other forms of equality. Engaging men in gender equality means dealing with many contradictions, between: the power and privileges of some men, and marginalization of others; explicit naming of men as men, and questioning and deconstructing the *very*

category of 'men'; seeing gender in terms of binaries, such as masculinity/femininity, and as a continuum; and fostering changes in attitudes among men and boys to become more gender equal, while supporting those who are suffering.

The relationship between men and gender equality is neither a zero-sum game, nor a win-win situation. In other words, greater gender equality does not mean that if women gain, men necessarily or automatically lose; and neither does it mean that women's gains are necessarily or automatically also beneficial for men, at least not so in the short term. In the processes of women's empowerment, men, different intersectionally positioned men, as individuals, groups and collectivities, are likely to face reduced formal power and domination over resources, but, at the same time, may unevenly gain, not least in reductions of violence, war, armed conflict and ecological damage, and destruction.

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Transitioning Gender Equality to the Equality of Sexgender Diversity

Persson Perry Baumgartinger

1. Introduction

The Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 5 “Gender Equality” is one of 17 goals aiming to change global inequalities until 2030. Contrary to the prior Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the SDGs not only target the Global South and East, but also make the Global North and West accountable for the global inequalities.

SDG 5 “Gender Equality”, however, uses the term “gender” as a binary concept that includes only men and women considered healthy, and counts only specific women and girls as relevant: “Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls”. In this article, I argue that this is far too short a connotation of a phenomenon I call “sexgender”. Not only does it erase this notion of sexgender, a colonial concept, a multiplicity of diverse sexes and genders, which is deeply entangled in Western ideologies on sexual orientation and economy; it also leaves out large parts of the worldwide population, particularly intersex, trans, and sexgender non-conforming people¹ (ITGNC) (EATHAN 2018, p. 3), who face human rights violations in many areas, such as education, employment, housing, access to health sectors, detention, migration, media representation, as well as oppressive norms shaped by societal and religiously informed prejudices, just to name a few. Furthermore, the term “sexgender” includes Rubin’s “sex/gender system” (Rubin 1975, p. 195) and explicitly refers to a patriarchal, heteronormative, binary societal structure of power relations.

In this article, I show that the goal “gender equality” can only be sustainably achieved if we understand sexgender holistically; that means if the human rights of intersex, trans, and sexgender non-conforming people are included. The Yogyakarta Principles (YP 2006) and their additional Yogyakarta Principles Plus 10 (YP+10 2017) provide an example of how such a necessary transformation can be achieved with

¹ While EATHAN uses the term “gender non-conforming”, I extended it to “sexgender non-conforming” (see Section 2 in this article).

their extension of the Human Rights Law on the grounds of sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression and sex characteristics (SOGIESC).²

To do so, I take the term transition literally in the sense of trans-ness, and use the concept of trans- (Stryker et al. 2008) as an intersectional approach to sexgender diversity; I also draw on the neologism “sexgender” as an umbrella term to include different aspects of the diversity of sexes and genders. By including data on the situation of sexgender-diverse people worldwide and referencing the claims of intersex, trans and sexgender non-conforming activists, I arrive at the conclusion that the SDG 5 requires a broader understanding of sexes and genders to do intersex, trans, and sexgender non-conforming children and adults justice—as well as men and women who fall outside their respective societal and cultural norms.

2. Transition(ing), Trans- and Sexgender Diversity

Transition or transitioning constitutes an important concept for trans and sexgender-diverse people. It refers to a process in which people

live and socialize as the gender with which [a person] wants to identify, rather than the gender they were assigned at birth, which often includes changing one’s first name (for some) and dressing and grooming differently. Transition may or may not also include medical and legal aspects, including taking hormones, having [consent] surgery, or changing identity documents (e.g., driver’s licence, passport or other identity documents) to reflect one’s gender identity. (EATHAN 2018, p. 1)

As a trans studies scholar reading the title of the book series “Transitioning to . . . ”, I think of transitioning as an ongoing process of changes, that entails sexgender diversity. The term trans- includes the trans studies concept of “transing”, first described by Stryker, Currah and Moore (Stryker et al. 2008), who put their emphasis on the hyphen—as a symbol for a connecting link between different societal systems: “Trans: -gender, -national, -racial, -generational, -genic, -species. The list could (and does) go on” (p. 11). In this concept, sexgender is not seen as a uniquely defined, fixed category, but instead as an ongoing process. Therefore, Stryker et al. suggest not to think of fixed sexgender categories, like man or woman, but to focus on the discriminatory regimes that intersect and intertwine. This requires us to holistically

² The acronym SOGIESC stands for sexual orientation (SO), gender identity (GI), gender expression (E) and sex characteristics (SC). Although this article does not focus on sexual orientation, it cannot be separated from sexgender diversity, especially in pre-colonial and non-western concepts.

think of sexgender diversity and to extend its meaning beyond the binary phenomena of “man” or “woman”.

The term “sexgender diversity” refers to all the multiple forms of gender identities, gender expressions and sex characteristics, and also notions of sexual orientation (SOGIESC) that people are born with, explore, express and transform during their lives. Sexgender has been used in different ways, like sex/gender or gender/sex, introduced in 1975 by Rubin as a broader alternative to patriarchy (Rubin 1975, p. 195) and later by Unger and Crawford in 1993 because “sex and gender are neither dichotomous nor independent of each other” (Fausto-Sterling 2019, p. 532). I agree, and this is the reason why I—unlike Rubin, Unger and Crawford, and Fausto-Sterling—do not use a solidus between the two connected concepts: sexgender. I suggest sexgender as an umbrella term, because it includes Western terms (unlike the often criticized acronym LGBTIQ+), while leaving room for all the many sexes and genders that have been and are lived worldwide, such as Fa’afafine, Feminielli, Burrneshia, Travesti, Muxhes, Omeguid and many others.³

As this short introduction regarding the use of my terms shows, defining sexgender as an exclusive idea of man or woman is insufficient. The aim of Stryker, Currah and Moore’s concept trans- “was not to identify, consolidate, or stabilize a category or class of people, things, or phenomena that could be nominated ‘trans’, as if certain concrete somethings could be characterized as ‘crossers’, while everything else could be characterized by boundedness and fixity” (Stryker et al. 2008, p. 11). Instead, the term points to oppressive regimes that correlate, interlock, and rely on each other on the intersection of sexgender, with its respective societal, cultural, scientific, and medical norms (cf. Baumgartinger 2019). Such an approach asks for a new perspective. In the context of SDG 5, this means to question the concept of women and girls, and their implications: Where are the limits of those two terms? Do they, e.g., include female sex workers, divorced women, or young pregnant women? Do those terms also mean trans and intersex women and girls, or sexual and sexgender diverse identities and ways of living? Do they convey pre-colonial meanings and practices of sexgender? What about sexgender non-conforming men and boys? Are they part of the SDG’s “gender equality”? Stryker et al. (2008) suggest the term “transing” for such processes of de-conceptualizing concepts that appear as “natural” all too easily.

³ See, e.g., Independent Lense 2015. Available online: http://www.pbs.org/independentlens/content/two-spirits_map-html (accessed on 3 April 2020).

3. The Situation of Sexgender-diverse People in the World

Little (but increasing) research means that we lack sufficient data to adequately describe and assess the situation of sexgender-diverse people worldwide. Due to global community networks, it can be assumed that sexgender-diverse people face a range of discriminations, including increased likelihood of poverty, higher drop-out rates in education systems and lowered chances in the labor market than people conforming to binary notions of sexgender. Additionally, they are often rejected or badly treated in their respective health systems.

What we do know is that trans and sexgender-diverse people are murdered because of who they are. This affects especially people of color, indigenous people and migrants, most notably in the Global South. Within one year, between 1 October 2018 and 30 September 2019, a total of 331 trans and gender-diverse people, or people perceived as such, were murdered, adding up to a total of 3314 reported cases in 74 countries worldwide since 1 January 2008, as far as the Trans Murder Monitoring research project (TMM) could confirm the homicides.⁴ The majority of the murders in 2018–2019 occurred in the Americas (130 in Brazil, 63 in Mexico, and 30 in the United States). Most of the victims were sex workers (61%), in cases where the occupation could be determined. In the United States, the majority of trans people reported murdered were trans women of color and/or Indigenous trans women (90%). Overall, 65% of the reported murder victims in European countries, to which most trans and gender-diverse people from Africa and Central and South America migrate (France, Italy, Portugal, and Spain), were migrant trans women (TvT 2019).

Those numbers alone show that stigma and discrimination against trans and sexgender-diverse people are real and profound around the globe. Although we cannot know specific numbers about murders of other sexgender-diverse people, like intersex people or people with a variation of sex characteristics,⁵ we must assume that they, as well as sexgender non-conforming people, are part of this structural

⁴ The Trans Murder Monitoring (TMM) research project monitors, collects, and analyzes reports of homicides on trans and gender-diverse people worldwide. See *Transrespect vs Transphobia (TvT)*. Available online: <https://tgeu.org/our-work/our-global-work/tvt/> (accessed on 3 April 2020); data on murdered sexgender-diverse people are not systematically produced, and it is impossible to estimate the actual number of homicides. There are, for example, no additional data available on murders of intersex and sex-diverse people, which may or may not be part of the counts above.

⁵ The umbrella term intersex stands “for the spectrum of variations of sex characteristics that naturally occur within the human species”. Intersex individuals are born with sexual anatomy, reproductive organs, hormonal structure and/or levels and/or chromosomal patterns (sex characteristics) falling outside the common definitions of male or female (Ghattas 2019, p. 9; see also EATHAN 2018, p. 1).

and ongoing circle of oppression that keeps sexgender-diverse children and adults deprived of their basic rights, just because most societies are structured along the supposedly binary concept of sexgender. Such a system makes all sexgender-diverse people particularly vulnerable to violations of their human rights in many societal areas, such as harassment, bullying at school and in their job life, or violence in medical settings. To illustrate the (discriminatory) situation of sexgender-diverse people, I discuss three topics: the right to the bodily autonomy of intersex, trans and sexgender-nonconforming people in general; access to the labor market for trans men and trans women in South-East Asian countries; and intersectional dimensions of discriminatory structures for sexgender-diverse people seeking health care in East Africa.

The right to bodily autonomy is constantly violated on the basis of sex characteristics worldwide, although “[b]odily autonomy is a fundamental human right, repeatedly enshrined throughout myriad human rights instruments globally. Each of us holds this right individually. However, it is not equally protected nor enforced for everyone” (Ghattas 2019, p. 6). Intersex activists fight against non-consensual pre-natal interventions, medical interventions on healthy bodies, and intersex genital mutilation (IGM), still often performed on infants and children (Ghattas 2019). Intersex genital mutilations share commonalities with female genital mutilations in terms of social acceptability or their negative impact on an individual’s life and health (cf. Ghattas 2019, p. 12). Yet, trans and gender non-conforming individuals simultaneously have to fight, on the one hand, for consensual medical procedures such as hormonal treatment or sex affirmation surgery, as well as against forced sterilization, other involuntary medical treatments and pathologization.

The study “Denied Work” to trans men and women seeking a job in the South-East Asian countries Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam showed that “trans people are overall significantly less likely than cisgender people to receive a positive response to a job application” (Winter et al. 2018, p. 13). In terms of numbers, cis applicants received, on average, 50.6 percent more positive responses and were 54.6 percent more likely to be invited to an interview than trans applicants (Winter et al. 2018, p. 13).

Violence against trans and sexgender-diverse people frequently overlaps with other axes of oppression, such as racism, sexism, xenophobia, or ableism. The East Africa Trans Health and Advocacy Network shows, in their study “Nilinde Nisife”, focusing on the health situation of intersex, trans and gender non-conforming people in the East African countries Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda and Tanzania, a direct correlation between

- low levels of education;
- slow and retrogressive socio-cultural development stages of each country in East Africa;
- poor state of housing,
- status of economic engagement;
- poor quality of healthcare service provision for sexgender-diverse individuals, which leads to an increased engagement in unmonitored hormonal therapy;
- extremely high costs and lack of expertise in gender reaffirming surgery;
- lack of access to sexual health resources and contraction of HIV within the ITGNC community (EATHAN 2018, p. 29).

Those intersections are relevant to keep in mind, when we talk about sexgender equality in general, but especially in the context of sexgender-diverse people. The situation of intersex, trans and sexgender-diverse individuals is alarming, as the community report of Transrespect versus Transphobia (TvT 2019) on global trans perspectives on health and wellbeing shows. Focusing on Global South and East in their study, they identify a lack of access to healthcare coexisting with oppressive medicalized requirements. Regarding discrimination and violence, they describe 2982 reported murders in less than ten years. They additionally have a lack of legal protection and call the social and economic situations of sexgender-diverse individuals in the Global South and East “alarming”.

Hence, intersex, trans and sexgender non-conforming people face varied forms of discrimination and human rights violations in different areas of their lives, such as bodily integrity, employment and healthcare, among others.

4. Activism and Action

Diverse activists all over the world have been demanding their human rights for a long time now. They raise awareness in their communities and demand increased media coverage. They build up support structures. They conduct studies. They go to court and to human rights bodies of the United Nations. In Brazil, for example, the program “Transcidadania” (trans civil rights), a pilot project conducted between 2012 and 2016 in Sao Paolo, aims to support travestis and transsexuals—who face poverty, low or no formal education and therefore little access to primary labor market—in achieving their secondary education certificate (cf. Garcia et al. 2019; Larrat 2019). The conference on “Health and Quality of Life of transgender people in Central Asia: achievements, barriers and perspectives” in Kyrgyzstan in September 2019 is another example. It was organized by activists representing Alma-TQ (Kazakhstan), Labrys

(Kyrgyzstan), and LighT (Tajikistan). Such activism is not new, but is increasingly recognized by (social) media and official representatives.

The number of support and activist groups all over the globe is increasing. The Asia Pacific Transgender Network (APTN), Associação Brasileira de Gays, Lésbicas e Transgêneros (ABGLT), East Africa Trans Health and Advocacy Network (EATHAN), GATE – Trans, Gender Diverse and Intersex Advocacy in Action, Organization Intersex International (OII) with local groups in Africa, the Americas, Asia-Pacific, and Europe, Samoa Fa’afafine Association, Transgender Europe (TGEU), Transgender Intersex in Action (TIA), TransAction Pakistan, Transgender and Intersex Africa, are just a few of many examples.

Due to increased pressure from activists, the United Nations Treaty Bodies have called on Member States to stop human rights violations against intersex people 49 times since 2009. The Council of European Member States has received 26 UN Treaty Body recommendations, 15 of these in the past two years alone (Ghattas 2019).

In 2006, the Yogyakarta Principles (YP) were intended to apply the Human Rights Law to sexual orientation and gender identity. The YP consisted of 29 principles, accompanied by detailed recommendations to governments, and several additional recommendations to institutions like the United Nations, the World Health Organisation, courts, humanitarian organizations and so on. Eleven years later, in 2017, the Yogyakarta Principles Plus 10 (YP+10) expanded the initial principles and state obligations in relation to gender expression and sex characteristics. Nine principles (30–38) were added and the state obligations were enhanced, including the rights to state protection, to bodily and mental integrity, as well as access to sanitation.

The Yogyakarta Principles Plus 10 show explicitly, that anti-discrimination is an ongoing process, and that they “rely on the current state of international human rights law and will require revision on a regular basis in order to take account of developments in that law and its application to the particular lives and experiences of persons of diverse sexual orientations and gender identities over time and in diverse regions and countries”. This is similarly the case for the SDGs, and I hope to have shown that it is time to transform the notion of “gender equality” to equality of sexgender diversity.

5. Conclusions

“Achieving equality of sexgender diversity and empowering all women, girls, trans, intersex and sexgender non-conforming children and adults”.

If the sustainable development goals are to be achieved in general and in terms of Human Rights, we need a broader understanding—a critical, intersectional approach,

i.e., a post-colonial, sexgender-diverse, de-pathologizing, class-critical, non-binary, global understanding of what is commonly named gender. If human rights are to be taken seriously, our notions of “SDG 5 Gender Equality” have to be transitioned into “SDG 5 Equality of Sexgender Diversity”. It starts with the title and goes much further—supporting and affirming an entire group of people who are discriminated against based on gender identity, gender expression and sex characteristics, and whose human rights are violated on a daily basis, namely intersex, trans, and gender non-conforming, as well as sexgender-diverse people.

As the studies above have illustrated, there is still a lot to do. Some issues intersect with women’s rights or worker’s rights, others with the rights to adequate housing or healthy food, still others intersect with the rights to good health and well-being, safe childhood and the right to quality education, but especially the right to self-determination and bodily autonomy.

Hence, when we talk about the Sustainable Development Goal 5 “Gender Equality”, and since we know that the concepts “sex” and “gender” are not only about specific notions of man and woman, but that sexgender is a much more heterogeneous, processual and complex phenomenon, and if we take the Human Rights of intersex, trans, and sexgender non-conforming, as well as sexgender-diverse people into account, the definition of gender equality has to be extended and include intersex, trans and gender non-conforming at all the intersectional levels. Furthermore, trans-ing “gender equality” means to question the respective cultural, societal, scientific and medical notions of “man” and “woman” and to broaden them, so that sexgender-diverse people are no longer the “deviant crossers” and man/woman are no longer the “natural fixities”. Instead, the discriminatory binary sexgender system needs to be dismantled and decolonized. This is an ongoing process.

As a first step, we need to make the world a safer place, not only for women and girls, but also for trans, intersex and sexgender non-conforming children and adults. For the Sustainable Development Goal 5 “Gender Equality”, this means to both alter the shorter word or phrase that identifies each goal from “Gender Equality” to “*Sexgender Equality*”, and to rephrase the exact sentence wording of the goal to: “Achieve *sexgender* equality and empower all *women, girls, intersex, trans, and gender non-conforming children and adults*”. In further steps, this process entails revising the addressees bearing the diversity of sexes and genders in mind, as well as the human rights of sexgender-diverse people, including their worldwide violations, to do the goal justice. Doing so may ultimately lead us to the phrase “Achieving equality of *sexgender diversity* and empowering all *women, girls, intersex, trans, and sexgender*”

non-conforming children and adults”, with the suffix “ing” making the procedural character of transing even more visible.

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Part 2: Sexuality

Interview with Kathy Davis: Transitioning to Gender Equality with Regard to Sexuality

Christa Binswanger

1. Introduction

This interview opens up the chapter on transitioning to gender equality, exploring sexuality and sexual agency. It aims at addressing possible changes towards more equal sexual relations among all sexes.

Within the field of Feminist and Gender Studies, sexuality and sexual encounters are contested topics and riddled with tensions regarding gender relations. First, sexual intercourse is taken as the basis for human reproduction and, as such, is entangled with hierarchical practices and politics in contemporary societies. This entanglement with power dynamics can be the cause for subordinating female sexuality to male sexuality, as long as systems are in place in which male dominance is taken for granted. Second, sexuality is a field in which relations of oppression are still very prevalent and lived out on a daily basis all over the globe. #Metoo and the many hostile reactions to it have recently proven that this phenomenon counts equally for Western societies where sexual harassment is often entangled with professional relationships. Third, and equally important, sexuality is considered as a potentially ecstatic experience framed by joy, intensity and/or consensual dialogue. Perceptions of sexuality within the field of Feminist and Gender Studies reach from “sex positivity”, including, e.g., SM and BDSM (Sadomasochism and Bondage, Discipline, Sadism and Masochism) as variations of joyfully lived out sexuality, to “sex negativity”, which treats sexuality as potentially harmful for women. These tensions have provoked many debates or even “wars” within the field of Feminist and Gender Studies.

In this interview with Kathy Davis, Christa Binswanger takes up feminist discussions dealing with inequality within sexual relations since the 1970s in order to lay out and make sense of the field.

2. Interview with Kathy Davis

2.1. *First Set of Questions: Looking Back to the 1970s*

CB: I would first like to go back to the second half of the 20th century, especially the women's movement in the 1970s. Looking at the movement from an intersectional perspective: who were the participants? What were their claims and what changes did they aim for?

KD: The standard take is that the women's movement of the 1970's, both in the US and in Europe, consisted primarily of white, middle-class, educated, heterosexual women. Yet the fault lines were already emerging around sexuality and race, with lesbians and women of colour demanding that their voices be heard. I don't think the movement was nearly as monolithic or unaware of differences among women as it is sometimes portrayed. I was in the US at the time and I remember the welfare women's movement, Black feminism, First Nation women's movements, and lesbian feminism as all part of the feminist landscape. There was a wide spectrum of political orientations, from more liberal feminists who wanted equality in the workforce to socialist feminists who wanted an encompassing transformation of society to radical feminists who directed their energies against male supremacy in all its forms. While there was certainly a tendency to think in terms of 'we women'—something that has since been heavily criticized—even back in the seventies the notion of a unified feminist subject was already being undermined by feminist activist scholars like the Combahee River Collective, bell hooks, Adrienne Rich, Audre Lorde, and many others. I think part of the problem in thinking about differences among women has been in getting past the 'add and stir' approach—that is, in order to teach or investigate differences in power among women, one just needed to add a class on 'women of colour' to a feminist theory course or a chapter on lesbian sexuality to an anthology on women's studies. This is where intersectionality made such an important contribution. The term 'intersectionality' was coined in 1989 by the US legal scholar Kimberlé Crenshaw (1989), but, as a perspective, it was already being used by feminists of colour and Third World women. It was important because it allowed us to think about identity in a more complex way. It marked the end of the naïve belief that you could even talk about gender without considering 'race', class, and sexuality. But, even more important, it provided the beginnings of a methodology for investigating how different constellations of power actually interact and are mutually constitutive in specific contexts and how these interactions shape

people's opportunities and possibilities for action. The work facing feminist scholars who are interested in seventies feminism is to re-read this history through an intersectional lens—that is, to show how intersecting differences generated particular concerns or mobilized individuals in specific ways or produced different strategies for change at specific moments in history. I think our article (Binswanger and Davis 2012) on shifts in feminist debates on sexuality in which we analysed two feminist classic texts from different eras, Verena Stefan's *Häutungen* (Stefan 1975) and Charlotte Roche's *Feuchtgebiete* (Roche 2008) is an example of this kind of historiography. We showed how these texts reflected both similarities and differences in feminist thinking about gender and sexuality, but also about race and class.

CB: As you have mentioned our article, I would like to add a question about it: What are the main "claims"—in a feminist sense—since *Häutungen*, if we look at *Wetlands/Feuchtgebiete* by Charlotte Roche? We have discerned some common grounds of critique in both texts with regard to the commodification of a perfect female body, which should hide its smells and fluids. But, at the same time, there is a clear distancing articulated in Roche's text from "the bad old days of feminism". Could you comment on Roche's so called postfeminist critique with regard to female sexuality?

KD: Roche reacted against what she saw as an overly restrictive feminist sexual morality. Some of what she wrote struck a chord among young women who liked her brazen defiance of all norms and her off-the-wall humour and this accounts for the popularity of *Wetlands/Feuchtgebiete*. Roche has been criticized for assuming that women can be totally autonomous subjects when it comes to sexuality. I don't believe in the kind of autonomy she proposes. We are all embedded in the social worlds we inhabit. Even when we rebel against constraints, we are, at the same time, attending to them. She likes to shock and many of her depictions of sexuality are an example of this. I don't think she has much to say about sexual pleasure as an experience, let alone as an important issue for feminist and other progressive social movements.

CB: There has been a strong "sex positivity movement". What were the main concerns or claims made by this movement? Can you think of any examples drawing on your own experiences?

KD: There is an erroneous assumption that feminism in the seventies was all about sexual oppression and that the concept of 'sex positivity' is of a much more recent vintage. I remember endless conversations in the early days of second

wave feminism in which we talked about sexuality, sexual pleasure, and desire. Most of us came of age during the so-called 'sexual revolution' and were aware that it had been something of a mixed bag for women. On the one hand, we enjoyed the freedom to have sex outside marriage and without fear of getting pregnant, unlike many of our mothers. On the other hand, we were subjected to the pressure of always being up for having sex (something that has, if anything, increased in this postfeminist era) and our male partners were not necessarily attentive to our sexual needs and desires. Verena Stefan has written beautifully about this in *Häutungen*. We had to figure out what we wanted from sexuality and how to negotiate sexual encounters. I recall talking about what we liked and didn't like in our sexual experiences with partners, both male and female. We were open to experimenting. For example, we shared our masturbation experiences and tried out each other's methods. We all purchased vibrators from the newly emerging feminist sex shops. We discussed our sexual fantasies and sexual feelings at great length. Influenced by Anne Koedt's (Koedt [1970] 1996) 'The Myth of the Vaginal Orgasm' and Carla Lonzi's (Lonzi 1975) important essay on female desire¹, we generally took a critical stance toward penetration (as we called it) and saw clitoral stimulation as the only acceptable avenue toward sexual pleasure. Looking back on it, I would say we were too judgemental about what constitutes sexual pleasure (for example, we did not discuss BDSM as potentially pleasurable and were dogmatic in our rejection of pornography as invariably being bad for women). In this sense, the 'sex wars' in the eighties were a necessary corrective and opened our eyes to the vast varieties of sexual pleasure and the impossibility of ever establishing a politically correct feminist sexuality.

2.2. *Second Set of Questions: Our Bodies, Ourselves (OBOS)—A Travelling Book*

CB: You have investigated the self-help book *Our Bodies, Ourselves*, originally written in the 1970s. You analysed, how it has travelled and how body politics and understandings of sexuality vary around the globe. What have you learned about sexuality through this research? What other categories of difference have proven to be powerful with regard to sexual oppression, as well as with regard to sexual fulfilment?

¹ See, a roundtable discussion of Lonzi's work in the *European Journal of Women's Studies* (2014) 21, 3.

KD: Sexuality was, of course, always a central concern in *Our Bodies, Ourselves*. You can trace the changes in feminist thinking on sexuality through the editions of OBOS. For example, the first issue treated sexuality as the same for all women. By the mid-seventies, lesbian sexuality had become a topic. Later, sexuality was interrogated through the lens of race and disability. By the beginning of the 21st century, the whole notion of gender had been deconstructed with attention paid to transgender and gender fluidity. There were three things that I particularly appreciated in the OBOS approach to sexuality. First, OBOS was always oriented toward pleasure and in the early days of feminism it was unique in this respect. From the first edition, readers were encouraged to explore their bodies and discover what gave them pleasure. The chapter on masturbation was classic and I spoke with many women who remember reading the text instructing them how to masturbate ('Just try it!') and how it encouraged them to find out what felt good to them. In fact, I remember reading this passage aloud in a gender studies class many years later, assuming that this would be old hat for my sexually savvy students. But, in fact, they were just as surprised and enthralled as I had been when I first read the text. Second, OBOS adopted an intersectional approach (without using that word) by having differently situated groups critically read each and every chapter of the book as part of the authors' collective process of revision. For example, women with disabilities were asked to comment on the sexuality chapter, thereby ensuring that its treatment of sexuality included differently embodied women. These groups of differently situated readers were specifically chosen for the critical work they could do in opening up new ways of looking at a particular topic. Third, when OBOS was translated into different languages, it was the chapter on sexuality that invariably had to be adapted in order to meet the needs of women living in different cultural contexts. This sometimes meant adding information that was absent in the US text (for example, the Egyptian adaptation of OBOS included a discussion of female circumcision and arranged marriages). While the US authors of OBOS initially had a policy that all of the controversial topics (lesbian sexuality, masturbation, and abortion) needed to be included in the translations, they gradually became more flexible about this, leaving the decision to the local feminist groups who were responsible for translating and adapting the book in their own cultural contexts. The most important lesson that I took away from OBOS and its various translations and adaptations is that there is no one feminist perspective on sexuality (see Davis, 2007). More important is that we find ways to generate debates across our

individual, cultural and geo-political differences about what our sexual desires, practices, and political aspirations are.

2.3. *Third Set of Questions: Contemporary Sexualities*

CB: What can we learn from the feminist movement since the 1970s? Can sexuality ever be freed? How is sexuality entangled in power dynamics among the sexes as well as other hierarchical societal structures, institutions and relationships?

KD: I find the notion of ‘free sexuality’ problematic. It reminds me of the old sexual revolution talk which tended to obfuscate the ways women were being pressured into having sex and not necessarily enjoying it. Sexuality—like any social practice—is always enmeshed in relations of power, meaning that it will have to be negotiated. Young people have to discover what they like and don’t like, a process which usually involves some insecurity and stumbling around in the dark. There will always be some grey areas, something which tends to get left out in the #MeToo discussions today.² If there is anything we can learn from the feminist movement of the 1970s, it is that women should be encouraged to explore their bodies and find out what they like and don’t like when it comes to sexuality. With respect to sexual harassment, for example, I would like to see more emphasis on women’s agency and less on establishing rules and restrictions for managing every situation. I also think that sexual desire is enormously complex and that we need to find ways to explore the contradictions and tensions between our discursively held feminist beliefs (what we used to call ideology) and our—often unruly—desires and practices.

CB: The UN is regularly investigating the progress of the SDGs. Unfortunately, concerning SDG 5, female sexual self-determination is still not a given in many contexts. The UN reports in 2019, “In 51 countries with data on the subject, only 57 per cent of women aged 15 to 49, married or in union, make their own decisions about sexual relations and the use of contraceptives and health services” (<https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg5>). So, I would like to come back to the 1970s with regard to these results. Would you agree that fifty years ago, the—maybe utopian—idea was considered possible that female sexual and marital oppression could be conquered on a global scale? So, how would you comment on the 43% of women, who cannot make their

² See Zarkov and Davis (2018) where we talk about some of these ‘grey areas’.

own decisions nowadays? And how can we keep up certain feminist beliefs, but still not contribute to a mainstream Western perception of these women as victims?

KD: I don't think that feminists in the 1970s assumed that female sexual and marital oppression could be 'conquered on a global scale'. The assumption was that gender oppression exists overall and everywhere and that feminism in some form or another was, therefore, necessary and desirable. The emphasis was on struggle as an ongoing process. While there were some utopian-minded thinkers around (Shulamith Firestone comes to mind), most activists in my memory were engaged in practical projects that would change women's everyday lives in ways that were beneficial to them. What was problematic in the 1970s was the notion of global feminism as a one-size-fits-all model. US Third World women and women from the Global South have criticized this model as representing the needs, perceptions, and struggles of white, affluent women from the Global North. It has been imposed as a kind of cultural imperialism upon women from different contexts and with very different histories of struggle. Part of this critique was that so-called Third World women have been reduced to victims in need of rescue by their more emancipated 'sisters' in the West. I think more recent work on transnational feminism has been helpful for thinking about this. This perspective takes differences between women as a given, reflects upon power differences among women, and looks for mutually beneficial alliances. This means listening to what women in different parts of the world have to say about their own problems and being attentive to the kinds of struggles that already exist. There is a lot of activism outside the Global North, activism that may or may not appear under the banner of feminism, which should be given much more serious attention. This would help feminists in the Global North to keep their own notions of gender equality and sexual freedom in perspective, as one version of feminism, but not the only one.

CB: So, how can we address gender issues, which are related to male, female, trans, same-sex, non-binary sexuality—is it possible to talk about "female sexuality" any longer? And how can feminists handle differences in understandings and practices of sexuality (due to sexual identity, religion, age, etc.) and still find ways to "affective solidarity" as grounds for political transformation towards joyfully lived out female sexuality?

KD: I have always been in favour of talking about 'sexuality' without putting a label on it; i.e., 'female sexuality'. Sexuality is extremely fluid and complex

and I don't find it realistic or helpful to limit a particular sexual practice to an identity. There have been many productive approaches to understanding different sexualities. With regard to LGBTQI activism, intersectionality has inspired activists, particularly across Latin America, to unite under its banner as an antidote to identity politics. I would like to see more of this in Europe and the US. After all, no individual can be reduced to their sexuality; we are all located in complex configurations of power and difference. By calling themselves 'intersectional', these 'intersectional activists' are envisioning a new way to interact with one another—neither as an encompassing 'we' as second wave feminists used to propose, nor as a circumscribed identity, but as an complicated and ever changing panorama of differently located individuals. 'Affective solidarity' is an interesting concept developed by Hemmings (2012). I have used it myself with regard to bodily practices that feminists sometimes find problematic—for example, genital cutting, cosmetic surgery, sadomasochism. Central to this concept is the importance of reflexivity and engaging with one's own 'gut level' feelings of disgust or shame, but also of desire or attachment because this opens up the possibility for dialogue across differences. Given the enormous complexities of sexual desires and practices, a self-critical and open-ended dialogue seems to be the best we as feminists can hope for.

CB: As you just mentioned, genital cutting is a difficult topic for feminists. What would it mean to keep up the idea of "affective solidarity" with regard to genital cutting?

KD: Whether we like it or not, women across the globe engage in dangerous, painful, and oppressive bodily practices, often ones that they themselves fervently desire and defend. Genital cutting is not limited to certain regions of Africa but it is also done, albeit for different reasons, in the so-called West (cosmetic labiaplasty, intersex surgery). It is a practice, which feminists often find problematic and I think they are right to do so. However, the only way to have a dialogue with 'affective solidarity' is to listen to what the other has to say, reflect critically on one's own cultural biases, and be prepared to engage in a conversation without falling into the more comfortable space of discursive critique. In an earlier paper (Davis 2018), I have argued that many Western feminists, myself included, have felt comfortable chastising other feminists for reproducing Eurocentric and colonialist sentiments in anti-female-mutilation discourse, while ignoring their own embodied unease concerning the practice itself. Here, I see the task of feminist scholarship less in encouraging women

in how to engage with their bodies in more self-determined ways than in being willing to confront the broad panoply of feelings—from disgust, anger and shame, to attraction, sympathy, and compassion—that bodily practices can evoke. Affect should become an opportunity and resource for feminist scholarship that is critical, reflexive, and—above all—open to the messy contradictions of women’s lives as well as feminist politics.

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Comprehensive Sexuality Education as a Tool towards Gender Equality

Mathabo Khau

1. Introduction

The 25th anniversary of the 1994 Cairo International Conference on Population and Development (2019) was celebrated in Nairobi in 2019. At the Cairo conference, governments of the world pledged to recognize gender equality, reproductive health and women's empowerment as pathways to sustainable development. There is a growing realization that women's universal attainment of reproductive health rights is fundamental to achieving all the global development goals.

According to the United Nations¹, more women than men live in extreme poverty globally. This report also argues that sub-Saharan Africa hosts the majority of people living below the poverty line. In agreement with this sentiment, Maluleke (2014) highlighted that "the reality in South Africa is that poverty bears a feminine face . . . poverty patterns are influenced by gender and this is the result of the past, where women were unable to access the same economic resources and opportunities as men . . ." (p. 99).

South African society is among the world's most unequal societies due to its apartheid past. The apartheid regime thrived on the promotion of inequality in every sphere of life including access to education, economic empowerment, land, health, sports and recreation, as well as freedom of movement for Black people (Goldblatt and McLean 2011). White men enjoyed superiority over all other groupings in society. Black men were separated from their families to work in the mines and cities, thus creating a breakdown in family structures and the promotion of a militarized masculinity for Black men who were fighting the apartheid regime (Christopher 1988).

The advent of democracy in 1994 for South Africa heralded a call to redress apartheid inequalities. Towards this goal, the country adopted several structures and policies with the assistance of the international community (Ikejiaku 2009). While

¹ United Nations. Available online: <https://www.un.org/en/global-issues/ending-poverty> (accessed on 5 December 2019).

South Africa adopted its National Development Plan (NDP) in 2012 prior to the United Nations' adoption of the 2030 Agenda and the African Union's Agenda 2063, the South African NDP has 74% convergence with the SDGs (United Nations n.d.), highlighting South Africa's commitment to the United Nations 2030 Agenda (South Africa VRR 2019). The achievement of the United Nations 2030 Agenda is therefore of paramount importance to South Africa.

Despite the progress South Africa has made in its developmental journey since the 1994 democratic elections, there is still a lot to be done in terms of addressing past injustices such as the violent masculinities that were created by the apartheid regime which emasculated Black men and rendered Black women economically dependent on men. During the apartheid era, the top-salary and high-skill jobs were reserved for White men, while Black men worked in the mines and cities. White and Black women were relegated to service industries and the domestic workforce, respectively. While some White women worked as supervisors in government offices and some Black women held clerical jobs, their work sphere generally was in the background, supporting jobs held by White men. For those Black women who remained in homelands and rural areas, their job was within sustenance agriculture. As argued by MacKinnon's (2006) work in developing contexts, "women have historically been relegated to and identified with the private, excluded from, when present, subordinated in public" (p. 4). This system perpetuated the patriarchal hegemony of the masculine provider and female dependent.

Black men who worked in White households were called "boys" irrespective of how old they were. When men's culturally constructed masculinity is threatened, they perform the inscrutable masculinity, which, according to Morrell (1998), renders them unable to express their fears and emotions and causes them to enact violent outbursts of such suppressed emotions. Khau (2007, p. 60) posits that "men whose masculine identity and sense of self is predicated on exerting dominance and control over others express these characteristics even in their sexual interactions." This is not only true to South Africa but also many countries in the Global South, where STIs, HIV and AIDS remain high due to the violations of the reproductive health rights of women and girls (cf. Khau 2010; Piot and Bartos 2002; Simpson 2007; O'Donoghue 2002). Women are disproportionately affected by HIV in South Africa, where 4,700,000 of the 7,500,000 adults living with HIV (62.67%) were women in 2018 (UNAIDS 2019). However, UNAIDS (2019) claims that between 2010 and 2018, there has been a global reduction of 25% in young women newly infected with HIV. This reduction could be an indication of the effectiveness of school-based country initiatives to provide comprehensive sexuality education. The main challenge according to the UNAIDS

(2019) report is that women and girls are still deprived of their rights to sexual and reproductive health. Basile (2002) and Bergen (2007) have attested to the fact that some violations of women's and girls' rights are perpetuated by their intimate partners, thus making them extremely vulnerable in a context of total dependence on their partners economically.

Another causal factor to feminine poverty in many developing contexts is the number of adolescent and unwanted pregnancies. This does not bode well for young mothers and their children because of the challenges associated with adolescent pregnancies (Panday et al. 2009). While some African countries have laws permitting school attendance for girls during and after pregnancy, challenges still persist in reintegrating such girls due to stigma associated with teen pregnancy (Varga 2003). According to Kirby (2007), teenage pregnancy leads to the perpetuation of poverty through teen mothers dropping out of school and being unable to secure jobs to sustain their children's education. He argues that children born of teen mothers tend to have poor school attendance and performance and eventually drop out of school.

In order to address the injustices posed by patriarchy globally and apartheid in South Africa, UNESCO (2009) produced technical guidelines to help countries in implementing school-based comprehensive sexuality education to address adolescent pregnancies and STIs. While there is evidence of the effectiveness of school-based interventions in preventing early sexual debut (White and Warner 2015), there are still challenges in terms of implementing such interventions in schools.

In South African communities where comprehensive sexuality education (CSE) is implemented, access to reproductive health services is not inclusive of young people. This means that while young people may have knowledge of how to protect themselves, they cannot access contraceptives and condoms which are mostly available in clinics labeled as Family Planning Centers. In the context of South Africa and its neighboring countries, Family Planning Centers are seen as places for assisting married couples in spacing their families. As such, the staff in such centers are not trained to provide youth-friendly services, thus denying young unmarried people, most of whom are female, the resources they desperately need (Uugwanga 2016). This is because pre-marital sex is still seen as problematic and adolescent pregnancy is frowned upon. Hence, other services such as safe abortions are still illegal in many countries where pro-life groups, most of which are religion-based, mobilize governments to challenge women's rights to safe abortions (Ngwena 2004). In such situations, school-based sexuality education falls short in providing protection for young women.

On the plus side, South Africa legalized abortion for up to twelve weeks of pregnancy for any woman without question in 1997. However, this service is not free in medical clinics where women can get safe abortion services, and many health care workers and midwives refuse to offer such services due to religious reasons or lack of training. Thus, many poor women resort to so-called “backstreet” abortions which are cheaper but not safe, resulting in many deaths and future barrenness (Mhlanga 2003). For fear of such outcomes, some young women carry unwanted pregnancies to term, thus jeopardizing their educational and occupational prospects. This, according to Kirby (2007), creates perpetual poverty and gender inequality.

This chapter aims to discuss why comprehensive sexuality education is necessary in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals. This will be conducted by discussing what CSE is and why it is necessary within countries in the Global South including South Africa. I will also discuss studies identifying some of the challenges towards CSE in communities, followed by studies that address ways in which these challenges can be addressed. Finally, I will discuss the need for CSE in achieving the SDGs.

2. What Is Comprehensive Sexuality Education?

Weeks (2003) defines sexuality education as a lifelong program of acquiring information regarding one’s identity and relationships. He posits that this type of education includes affection, body image, gender roles and sexual development within a human rights framework.

According to UNESCO (2009), good sexuality education develops learners holistically and equips them with skills to negotiate their relationships with others. On the other hand, Janssen (2009) argues that for sexuality education to be good, it should critique norms and address all sexualities positively. This would allow for schools and communities to challenge oppressive and negative sexuality norms that privilege certain sexualities over others, hence creating safe spaces for learners to construct their sexual identities without prejudice.

UNESCO (2009) also defines CSE as a subject in which children are taught about all the aspects of sexuality to enable them to make informed decisions regarding their sexualities. Unfortunately, this is not how CSE is seen by religious bodies and some government leaders who position it as a way of encouraging young people to engage in casual, permissive sexual behavior and premarital sex (Jakobsen and Pellegrini 2008; Lesko 2010).

Despite these definitions of CSE, UNAIDS (2019) highlights that global consensus has not been reached regarding its definition and teaching strategies. UNAIDS (2019) also argues that the different names given to school-based CSE in different countries

create an opportunity for teachers to gloss over some important content areas of the subject which they feel uncomfortable with.

The “rights-based” framework required for effective CSE creates controversy within communities regarding its content and pedagogy (Kirby 2008). In South Africa, the controversy of CSE surrounds the ages at which children should be introduced to certain content such as same-sex families and multiple gender identities (Baxen 2010). In a study conducted by Samelius and Wägberg (2005) in developing countries, it was found that some South African participants had misconceptions regarding homosexuality and pedophilia, where there was no separation between the two. These authors also found that some church leaders openly condemned homosexuality and promoted negative views against it. The fact that CSE teaches about homosexuality and LGBTIQ places it in the center of debates regarding its fit for children in South African schools.

Despite the negative attitudes towards CSE discussed in this section, it is important to understand why there is a need for it in schools. The next section discusses the need for CSE in relation to HIV infections, especially among young people.

2.1. CSE in Relation to HIV Infections

The advent of HIV in Southern Africa more than thirty years ago heralded the need for research that explores the linkages between sexuality education and behavior change (UNAIDS 2010). With HIV infecting young and old people alike, there was a need for education-focused solutions to reducing new infections among the youth. Morrell’s (2003) and Pattman’s (2006) studies focused on the power dynamics within heterosexual relationships and how these enabled coercive and unsafe sexual practices among the youth. On the other hand, Buthelezi (2004) and Simpson (2007) explored some of the cultural practices which perpetuate the taboo nature of sex talk within communities and how such practices are implicated in the increasing numbers of new HIV infections.

Additionally, Piot and Bartos (2002) highlighted how HIV ravages the education sector in many developing communities. They discussed how HIV impacts the demand for education and negatively affects young girls who drop out of school to take care of sick relatives and other family responsibilities. HIV also depletes household resources and incomes through death and lack of employment, hence creating challenges for children’s schooling. This group of young people end up not having access to school-based interventions such as CSE and thus become vulnerable to the virus.

To address the ravages of HIV, UNAIDS initiated youth-centered programs as a way of providing sexual and reproductive health education (UNAIDS 2010). These programs were rolled out in different countries to ensure universal sexuality education coverage and prevention of new infections. UNAIDS (2010) argued that success in preventing new HIV infections could be achieved through sexuality education and youth-focused HIV prevention efforts. It also argued that countries needed to reduce youth's HIV vulnerability by ensuring equitable access to education and employment and enabling legal environments.

Kirby's (2008) study highlighted the effectiveness of school-based sexuality education based on the reduction in youth-related HIV infections globally. According to UNAIDS (2019), global numbers of new HIV infections have dropped, indicating that the pandemic could be halted by 2030. To achieve this milestone, there is need for concerted efforts to sustain CSE and other youth-centered programs that provide youth friendly reproductive health services and information. Kelly (2002) has also highlighted the need for discussions that unpack harmful sexual practices and norms.

The next sections discuss these arguments by focusing on challenges to effective sexuality education in some African countries (South Africa, Uganda, Lesotho) and pedagogical strategies that were found to be effective for CSE.

2.2. Challenges to Effective CSE

Mitchell et al.'s (2004) study in South Africa investigated the construction of young people as unskilled in making decisions regarding their sexuality, which makes them vulnerable to HIV. They argue that the politics of innocence embedded in youth and childhood discourses within South African communities deny young people the agency to seek protective measures against sexual violence, STIs and HIV. In agreement with the above sentiments, Parikh (2005) reported that issues of morality played a huge role in community responses towards sexuality education in Uganda. Parents argued that such an education would lead young people to experimenting with sex and becoming promiscuous.

In a study conducted in Lesotho with women science teachers, Khau (2010) found that women teachers were uncomfortable with teaching sexuality education due to their positioning as mothers within communities. They argued that if they teach about sexuality, they are seen as leading children astray and corrupting their innocence, while some argued that they felt uncomfortable talking about sex across the age divide. Thus, teacher identities impacted on their confidence in teaching sexuality education (see also Baxen 2010). However, despite these challenges, teachers were aware of the need for sexuality education and were willing to be equipped with strategies to

overcome their discomforts. In Khau's (2010) study, it was found that teachers lacked the necessary training to address CSE, and hence this challenge was countered by offering training on strategies that enabled teachers to use learner-centered methods of teaching which made the learners producers of knowledge.

Epstein et al. (2003) argued that school-based sexuality education was the only subject requiring parental consent because of its sensitivity and the fact that it was seen as corrupting young children. Believing that children should be sexually unknowing makes it difficult to teach them about their sexuality. According to Epstein et al. (2003) and Paechter (2004), such a belief constructs children as sexually innocent and not needing to know about sexuality.

In another study, Khau (2012) found that past traditional practices and societal values impeded effective school-based sexuality education. Religious beliefs were the dominant driving factor in parents being opposed to comprehensive sexuality education, arguing that it would destroy the innocence of children and lead them astray. They advocated for abstinence-only education. In the same study, Khau also found that CSE was a direct contradiction to traditional Basotho practices in relation to sexuality and rites of passage. This created a rift between communities and schools in terms of implementing CSE in schools.

Young girls in some countries of the Global South including Lesotho, Zimbabwe and Mozambique practice inner labia elongation as a rite of passage. Khau (2012) found that the people of Lesotho practiced inner labia elongation as a way of reducing young women's sexual excitability and pleasure. This was used as a contraceptive measure. However, in CSE, learners are taught about other forms of contraception, and that sex is meant to be pleasurable for both partners. This goes against the traditional teaching that a woman who enjoyed sex was a bad woman (see Fine 1988). In such situations, Khau (2012) found that it was important for teachers to acknowledge indigenous ways of teaching sexuality education and incorporate these into CSE such that harmful practices, myths and misconceptions could be addressed and alternatives provided.

2.3. Effective Strategies in Teaching CSE

In a study conducted in 2002, O'Donoghue found that school programs on HIV and AIDS required participatory pedagogies and life skills training. He claimed that all education stakeholders needed to be skilled in such participatory techniques. In agreement, Yego (2017) conducted a study with secondary school teachers in Kenya exploring the teaching of sexuality education using participatory and visual methods. She used drawings, collages, songs and a participatory video. The teachers

argued that using participatory and visual methods made the teaching of sexuality education less stressful to them because the children became the producers of the knowledge. This allowed for free and open discussions in class which did not leave teachers feeling like they were leading children astray.

In another study in Zimbabwe, Gudyanga (2017) explored with women teachers the effectiveness of using participatory methods in teaching sexuality education to address teachers' challenges in this subject matter. He found out that the teachers felt relieved with the use of participatory methods because they used children's prior knowledge to produce artefacts and talk about them in class. This allowed for addressing sensitive cultural practices that teachers would have felt uncomfortable with in a normal lecture.

While these studies proved the effectiveness of participatory methodologies in teaching CSE, Uugwanga (2016) found out that understanding what young people needed to know was most effective in teaching sexuality education. She explored young people's needs using letters to an *agony aunt*, vignettes and drawings. She argued that most curricula are based on what adults think young people need to know and do not address the issues facing young people in their daily lives. In Uugwanga's (2016) study, young people were curious about non-normative sexualities and identities which were not covered in the Namibian curriculum, and these were issues they were grappling with in their own lives. All learners wanted to know more about LGBTIQ+ identities, different ways of engaging in sexual intercourse and the necessary protective measures. Uugwanga (2016) argued that a curriculum that addresses these issues would be beneficial for young people and would warrant teachers being trained on how to teach about such.

Having discussed what sexuality education is, the need for sexuality education, the challenges it faces and effective strategies in teaching, I now provide a summary that links sexuality education with the attainment of the SDGs.

3. Summary

There is growing evidence of the need for CSE in communities to address economic and social challenges faced by young girls and women. With the challenges faced by young people in getting sexual and reproductive health services, Uugwanga (2016) argued that health service providers should be trained to serve the needs of young people. She also pointed out that there is a need for a positive change of attitude in service providers when young people seek help, instead of stigmatizing them as promiscuous. Thus, there is a need for youth-friendly service providers who are not necessarily labeled as Family Planning, where young people can feel free to

access sexual and reproductive health services. This can greatly reduce the numbers of adolescent and unwanted pregnancies, STIs and HIV infections, thus allowing young people to contribute meaningfully to their economies.

Women and girls find themselves resorting to unsafe abortions or carrying unwanted pregnancies to term, increasing the burden on family resources and time that could be used for economic pursuits and self-actualization due to unfavorable abortion laws. With such laws in place, the face of poverty will remain that of a woman (Maluleke 2014). This means that there will be no gender equality in terms of equal access to education, access to jobs and housing or other resources. Thus, the attainment of many of the SDGs will not happen.

Access to CSE is an important stepping stone towards achieving gender equality and empowering all women and girls. It would ensure that communities and service providers become cognizant of the many challenges faced by young people and find strategies of how best to help them. As argued by UNESCO (2009), the rights-based approach taken to CSE is necessary in equipping youth with skills and the agency to choose life as they negotiate their sexual identities. Norm-critical and sex-positive sexuality education can help many communities to move away from the taboo nature of sex talk. This would create communities that acknowledge different ways of being and respect women's and girls' rights to sexual and reproductive health (Khau 2012). With CSE that employs participatory pedagogical strategies, there is hope for addressing harmful norms and stereotypes. This could lead to reducing the numbers of intimate partner violence perpetuated against women and girls, thus ensuring their safety such that they can achieve their full capabilities like their male counterparts (Basile 2002).

Communities that are open to talking about sexuality are necessary in a bid to attain gender equality. This would lead to young people having correct information to protect themselves against disease and unwanted pregnancies and knowing where to find resources such as condoms and contraceptives. Thus, these young people would become a productive workforce for their countries. Another advantage would be in addressing all forms of sexual violence, including gender-based violence, perpetuated against women and girls, and sexual minorities (Bergen 2007). While the burden of disease, poverty and illiteracy is negatively skewed against women and girls, it will be difficult to reach a state of equitable treatment of all (Khau 2010).

Unless investments are made to empower women and girls in promoting equal rights for all regarding sexual and reproductive health, it might be impossible to reach the Sustainable Development Goals by 2030.

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The Political Economy of Violence: Gender, Sexuality and SDGs

Suruchi Thapar-Björkert and Ruchika Ranwa

1. Introduction

Consider two seemingly disparate quotes:

What is more important is how we view and value the girl child in our society. (Manmohan Singh, Ex-Prime Minister of India, commenting on declining Child Sex-Ratio as a national shame 2011)¹

Premila lived in a rural area of Bihar. Her parents lived in extreme poverty. Desperate to escape their plight she was sold to a man in Punjab. There was no marriage ceremony and her body was used and abused by her 'husband' and his other male relatives. She was then sold to a prostitution ring in New Delhi. (Kapoor 2012)

These two quotes speak to different gendered realities, but drawing on their interconnections is the central thrust of our paper, delineated through two interdependent ideas: first, sex determination policies and the widely prevalent culture of son preference contributes to the skewed sex ratio, particularly in North India. Second, this abysmal gender imbalance results in bride shortages and a crisis in the institution of marriage in itself, which is not confined to North India but affects neighbouring states, creating channels for new forms of practices such as bride trafficking, slavery and prostitution. This paper draws attention to the skewed sex ratio and rampant bride trafficking in India as possible fallouts of uneven development, with specific reference to the state in Haryana in North India.

The right-wing political regime in India represented by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) under the Prime Ministership of Narendra Modi, came to power in 2014 with its giant promises of development and a corruption-free India.² Its political

¹ <https://www.oneindia.com/2008/04/28/declining-sex-ratio-national-shame-all-must-work-to-save-girls-1209389687.html> (accessed on 19 February 2020).

² The leading party of right-wing coalition National Democratic Alliance (NDA) which was formed in 1998.

ideology has been dominated by the idea of an all-inclusive development with its main motto of “*sabka saath sabka vikas*” (together will all, development for all). Women-centred schemes and programmes such as *Beti Bachao Beti Padhao* (save the girl child, educate the girl child) attempt to build a level-playing field for women in all spheres of development,³ to correct skewed sex ratios and to promote education for girls⁴ while the *Ujjawala Scheme* aims to eliminate trafficking of girl children in India, a country which has “emerged as a source, destination and transit for both in-country and cross border trafficking of women and children for commercial sexual exploitation” (Government of India 2019, p. 2). These positive government-led and funded initiatives appear seemingly consistent with the basic premises of gender equality, the fifth of the seventeen Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) adopted by all the United Nations Member States in 2015, and at the core of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.⁵ Furthermore, the government has set the country on the path of economic development evident through a volley of schemes tailor-made and with overlapping agendas, to boost economic growth through entrepreneurship (Start-up India), micro enterprises (Mudra scheme), manufacturing (Make in India campaign) and industrial skill training (Skill India).⁶ Significantly, women are referred to as “nation builders”⁷ in political articulations and financial benefits have been introduced to encourage parents to not discriminate against girls.

Nonetheless, this neo-liberal vision of development, primarily along economic parameters is inherently conservative, disabling the Indian state from translating economic gains into sustainable human development (Tharamangalam 2016). While it brings women out in the public sites of capitalist production it simultaneously monitors and morally polices them through a discourse of protection (Purewal 2018). As Coleman argues, “the violent imposition of neo-liberal capitalism [. . .] is made possible and legitimised through a production of space that relies upon the mobilisation of gendered discourses” (Coleman 2007, p. 204). The disturbing trends of mob lynching by cow vigilantes; propagation of ideas like “Ghar Wapsi”

³ <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/finance/budget-alllocation-to-womens-schemes-hiked-4-to-rs-1-21l-cr/articleshow/62745352.cms> (accessed on 19 February 2020).

⁴ India ranks 108th among 149 countries on the World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap Index 2018 (accessed on 28 February 2020).

⁵ <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg> (accessed on 20 February 2020).

⁶ For Start-up India, see <https://www.startupindia.gov.in/>; Make in India; https://www.pmindia.gov.in/en/major_initiatives/make-in-india/; Mudra Scheme; <https://www.mudra.org.in/AboutUs/Vis ion>; Skill India mission, <https://skillindia.nsdcindia.org/> (accessed on 21 February 2020).

⁷ https://www.business-standard.com/article/politics/need-to-see-women-as-nation-builders-mo-di-114011900300_1.html (accessed on 20 February 2020).

(Katju 2015); “anti- Romeo” squads (Sharma 2017) and “Love Jihad” (Punwani 2014) signals the unholy alliance between cultural ideologies and patriarchal forces, supported through a nexus of control by the family, the state and Hindutva organizations. The steady politicization of Love Jihad by the Hindu Right highlights the failure of the enabling legal provision in the Special Marriage Act 1954, permitting interfaith marriages between consenting individuals in India. In projecting the Muslim “other” as the ultimate threat to unsuspecting and “innocent” Hindu women, who are lured into marriage for the purpose of converting them, the Hindu Right is able to position itself as the patriarchal guardian of Hindu women whose purity (read: purity of the Hindu nation) needs to be protected from defilement by the Muslims (Graff et al. 2019). Furthermore, in evoking the symbolic idea of “mothers of the nation”, the nationalist (read: Hindu) woman stands as an embodiment of the nation: as a nurturer, reproducer and defender of the motherland. The protection of the Hindu nationalist woman together with her valorisation through the symbolism of *Bharat Mata*, accords legitimacy to the divisive rhetoric on religious conversion and the politicisation of intimate/domestic and secular spaces.

These gendered political discourses have been coupled with incidences of gendered violence, often supported by state functionaries that threaten life in all its plurality and diversity. Sunder Rajan (1993, p. 6) argues that state functionaries, such as politicians and police officers, who are meant to be “guarantors of rights to its citizens, have invariably emerged instead as major perpetrators of injustices”. For example, in the Unnao rape case (2017) of Uttar Pradesh, the BJP Member of Legislative Assembly (MLA), Kuldeep Sengar, as the main accused was convicted only after three years in 2020, after repeated nationwide public outrage (Sharma 2019a). Another conspicuous example is Asifa’s rape case in Kathua district in Jammu and Kashmir, wherein an eight-year-old Muslim girl was gang raped by Hindu men in a temple. Despite the brutality of the act, the accused were supported by some BJP MLAs of Jammu and Kashmir (Ahmad 2018). As we write this piece, India is once again torn and outraged by the gang rape and killing of a 27-year-old female veterinary doctor in Hyderabad on 27 November, 2019, and more recently the gang rape of a 19-year-old Dalit girl by upper-caste men in Hathras, Uttar Pradesh on the 19 September, 2020. Bearing insidious similarities with the Delhi gang rape case of December, 2012, these cases point towards gendered inequalities, devaluation of women and restricting women’s mobility in the urban public sphere (a space claimed largely by men), whereby any encroachments are seen as transgressions which have to be punished. These violent crimes against women and the tacit support

to their perpetrators occur against a backdrop of larger development-oriented and women-centric agendas advocated by the government.

In this paper, we conceptualise these paradoxes through the framework of “violence[s] of development” which refers to processes that can lead to either the denial of access to the benefits of development or an exclusion from development in itself- thus undermining the transformatory potential of development. Market liberalisation and economic globalisation that underpin rapid economic growth, carried out in the name of development, tend to accelerate processes which ingrain existing inequalities even further (Kothari and Harcourt 2004). Escobar (2004) argues that violence is not only endemic but also *constitutive* of development. By this, he means that the level of violence created by “development” is not a short-term, small feature or side effect, but is actually persistent, normalised and depoliticised. Yet, too often, the relationship between development and violence is overlooked because violence and suffering have traditionally been conveyed factually or quantitatively, which fails to fully take into account how “suffering is structured by historically given (and often economically driven) processes and forces that conspire [. . .] to constrain agency” (Farmer 1996, p. 263). Explicating further the “close relationship” between development and violence, Nandy argues that those who are seen as impeding the process of development are seen as retrogressive and, “deserve to be thrown into the dustbin of history” (Nandy and Kothari 2004, p. 9). Thus, the dislocation and suffering they undergo is often seen as brought upon by themselves. In fact, post-development imagining has prompted scholars to search for “alternatives to development” rather than “development alternatives” (Escobar 1992, p. 27).

We would like to make two additive clarifications. First, we are not suggesting that all aspects of development are violent or that the Indian state only governs through violence, as might come across when Escobar (2004) argues that development is inherently violent. Nonetheless, we would like to highlight the possibilities of violence(s) when (a) the state as the main architect of development programmes forms close alliances with entrenched power interests; supports local powerful players or chooses to remain silent; (b) when poverty reduction interventions for the marginalised (for example, social protection schemes such as MNREGA) reinforces traditionally entrenched social hierarchies; or when (c) the state, driven by the logic of the market, pursues its neo-liberal agenda over and above those whose livelihoods are fragile and exploitable. Second, the current development trajectory in India, we will argue, is inherently paradoxical. While the Indian government has initiated several schemes for the empowerment of women, these progressive processes are

often accompanied by escalating violence against women, which cannot be abstracted from cultural configurations of gendered practices and socio-economic contexts in Northern India. In an earlier work, Kapadia (2002) highlights the increased state investment in women's education and employment opportunities as pointers of growing female autonomy in India. Arguably, while this has created economic opportunities, it has simultaneously heightened other forms of inequalities and vulnerabilities. For instance, women still remain largely bracketed in the unregulated informal economy together with the prevalence of gender bias and devaluation of women.

To reflect upon the paradoxical nature of development, together with the context, causes, trends and implications of gendered inequalities in India, the paper focuses on critically assessing the all-inclusive idea of development. It delineates the paradox by juxtaposing government-led women-centric development discourses with prevalent gendered practices of son preference and bride trafficking. These practices are buttressed by extra-constitutional yet politically influential bodies like Khaps, which enjoy tacit political patronage in North India.

2. Declining Sex Ratio

The historic 1974 *Report of the Committee of the Status of Women in India* brought the dismal status of women in the country to centre stage (Government of India 1974). As compared to pre-independent India in 1901 when the sex ratio (SR: number of females per 1000 of males) was 972 to 946 in 1951, and 933 in 2001, in 2011 it was 940 (Government of India 2011; Anderson and Ray 2012; also see Navaneetham and Dharmalingam 2011). One particular state, which has shown a decreasing trend in the population of women and is a cause of concern, is Haryana (Usha et al. 2007). It has the lowest sex ratio in India and the figure shows 879 (though higher than 861 as recorded in 2001) females to that of 1000 males in 2011.⁸ Despite the slight overall improvement in the SR, the Child Sex Ratio (CSR—child population in the age group 0–6) in India as a whole has declined significantly—from 945 in 1991 to 927 in 2001 to 914 in 2011. Punjab and Haryana—part of the “Bermuda triangle” for missing females—have buckled the trend. However, despite an improvement between 2001 and 2011, these states still had the lowest child sex ratios in 2011 (Rao and Oommen 2013). The worsening of the CSR points to a further widening of the gender mortality gap—that is, continuing anti-female rates of infant and child

⁸ <https://www.census2011.co.in/sexratio.php> (accessed on 19 March 2020).

mortality as well as a decrease in the sex ratio at birth (SRB). The main explanation of these missing numbers resides in sex-selective abortions (SSA), neglect of young girls during infancy and to some degree female infanticide (made illegal through the Infanticide Act of 1870) (Arnold et al. 2002). The high preference for male children rather than female children, is often encapsulated in the Sanskrit saying, “may you be the mother of a hundred sons” and offered as a blessing to newlywed Hindu brides. Robitaille and Chatterjee (2018) suggest that within individual households’ parents rely on “sex selective neglect” and infanticide to obtain their desired sex ratio among their children. Thus, in households where only the mother has a stated son preference, they, as primary caregivers, are able to eliminate unwanted daughters through medical or nutritional neglect. These small neglects which go unnoticed also contribute to sex selective infant mortality (Robitaille and Chatterjee 2018, p. 48).

In India, determining and communicating the sex of the foetus is illegal, legislated through the *Prenatal Diagnosis Techniques Act* of 1994 and the *Pre-conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Technique Act* (PCPNDT), 2003. Nonetheless, in May 2019, the All India Democratic Women’s Association (AIDWA) condemned the stance taken by Dr. Santanu Sen, President, Indian Medical Association (IMA), seeking “comprehensive review, repeal and re-conception” of the PCPNDT Act and deplored the fact that the President and the General Secretary of the highest medical body in India considers it a “harassment” for doctors to maintain transparency of their practice by complying with the rules and regulations of the act. As AIDWA commented, “the problem of son-preference is no doubt a social problem, but obviously identification of sex of the unborn child and elimination of the female foetus would be impossible without the intervention of a section of people inside the medical profession. Hence, people in the medical profession cannot shake off their responsibility to stand up against this social evil and ensure that son-preference is not further reinforced through their own stand. A powerful body like the IMA is duty-bound to generate awareness against son-preference at all levels instead of pushing the burden of such measures on the Government alone”.⁹ As is evident from this recent intervention, national bodies are themselves implicated in shifting medical norms unfavourably towards the girl child. This devaluation, neglect and annihilation of the girl child, arguably, is also buttressed by the extra-constitutional/-judicial structures of caste-based panchayats—the Khaps.

⁹ ‘AIDWA condemns attack on the PCPNDT Act’, Press Release, 10 May, 2019, *All India Democratic Women’s Association*, New Delhi; see, <http://pndt.gov.in/> (accessed on 10 January 2020).

3. Khaps

The word “Khap”, a Sanskrit derivative of “kashtrap” meaning domain, is an institution, which claims sovereignty over a particular area, “either in the name of the clan or the gotra which is dominant in that area or by the name of geographical area” (Singh 2010, p. 17). Though Khap panchayats are believed to be multi-caste (*sarv jatiya*) bodies, in states such as Haryana, Rajasthan and Western Uttar Pradesh, they have come to be dominated by Jats, who have used constitutional protections to expand their political and economic influence (Gupta 2000). This upwardly mobile “backward” caste has come to exercise considerable influence (Bharadwaj 2012; Thapar-Björkert 2006) demographically (on the basis of its population), economically (through extensive farm holdings) and politically (through dominance in local administration and politics). Emphasising caste and gotra identity as well as territorial rigidity, these patriarchal male-dominated Khaps uphold *aikya* (unity), *izzat* (honour), *biraderi* (community) and *bhaichara* (brotherhood) (Chowdhry 1997, 2004a, 2014b; Kumar 2012). Furthermore, they override any notion of gender equality or gender empowerment that the Indian constitution endeavoured to provide women at the grass-roots level through Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs). In fact, Khaps do not even see women as citizens (Khairwal 2017). Khaps act as agencies of social control, which are involved in resolving local disputes in accordance with customs and traditional values while upholding patriliney, caste endogamy and village exogamy.¹⁰ These contexts of local power enable forms of normative violence against women to continue with impunity.

In proclaiming the primacy of male heirs, Khaps in Haryana have worsened the problem of declining sex ratio. For example, in 2004, the Tevatia Khap while deliberating on a property dispute in Duleypur decreed that families with fewer than two sons were not eligible to approach the Khap about property disputes as these “unfortunate” families had “lesser scope” towards carrying forward the father’s name or increasing family assets. They simply “deserved less”, the Khap said. This has had devastating effects as families desperate for the “required” two sons have tried to avoid female births and even resorted to killing baby girls. It was observed that after this pro-male Khap diktat, sex ratio in Ballabhgarh block in Faridabad, governed by the Tevatia Khap, fell from 683 in 2004 to 370 in 2008 (Dixit 2009). Furthermore, this statement by the Tevatia Khap in 2004 offers a revealing

¹⁰ See also, <https://www.hindustantimes.com/chandigarh/khaps-against-lowering-of-age-of-sexual-consent/story-2671qdgQYafmuXYSB6dZwK.html> (accessed on 21 March 2020).

explanation for the shockingly adverse sex ratio. Kanta Singh, member of the Tevatia Khap and father with a daughter older than his three sons, stated that “Sons are a man’s assets. My sons will take my name forward and expand my farms. They will earn money to pay for this girl’s dowry and marriage”. When asked where his sons will find brides, considering the scarcity of girls, he answered rather arrogantly, “they will earn enough not to have to worry about that” (Dixit 2009; Thapar-Björkert and Sanghera 2014).

Furthermore, Khaps derive their legitimacy from political patronage in India. They have been influential in informing political choices of many and thus political parties have repeatedly approached them for strengthening their vote bank. Even though all political parties have benefitted from their support to the Khaps, the recent BJP regime has been more explicit in their support. Narendra Modi, during one of his political rallies in Haryana in October 2014,¹¹ made a statement addressing the Khaps and stated: “I respect your authority” which stands, paradoxically, in contrast with his pre-election statement made on another occasion in 2013, when addressing the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) ladies organisation, he spoke of “inequality”, “gender insensitivity” and the practice of “female foeticide” as hindering the empowerment of women in India.¹² It was for the first time that a political leader, more so a Prime Minister, publicly made a statement in support of Khap Panchayats, who are widely known for their atrocities against women. In a similar vein, the current BJP chief minister of Haryana, Manohar Lal Khattar, during a felicitation function organized by two Khaps in the Jind district of Haryana in 2015, praised Khaps for being “custodians of social customs”. He also appreciated Khaps for their role in the implementation of *Beti Bachao Beti Padhao* scheme, which stands in contradiction to the ideological premises of Khaps, though no further details were forwarded on this subject.¹³ Jagmati Sangwan, ex-General Secretary of AIDWA, highlights the important role played by Khaps in BJP’s success in forming central government in India after winning the 2014 Lok Sabha elections. She is of the view that Khaps influence the voting choice of people

¹¹ See also, <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/three-firsts-in-haryanas-history/articleshow/44882599.cms> (accessed on 19 February 2020).

¹² Bharat Mata-loving Narendra Modi makes a point about empowerment in his FICCI speech, April 9th 2013: <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/bharat-mata-loving-narendra-modi-makes-a-point-about-empowerment-in-his-ficci-speech/articleshow/19450687.cms> (accessed on 19 February 2020).

¹³ See also, <https://www.firstpost.com/india/haryana-cm-khattar-praises-khap-panchayats-calls-custodian-social-customs-2260210.html> (accessed on 12 February 2020).

in villages under their control by announcing their support for a particular political party (Khairwal 2017). The political party, in turn, support Khaps in maintaining their control and even nominate Khap leaders during assembly elections, which enhance the chances of Khap leaders to officially enter the domain of political power (Moudgil and Rahar 2019).

The influence of Khaps and their support for son preference, as Kaur (2010, p. 15) argues, have greatly reduced the pool of marriageable women, leading to a “marriage squeeze” (too many men chasing too few brides). Furthermore, to protect the shrinking “pool” of marriageable women, Khap councils have resorted to issuing diktats to punish young couples accused of having transgressed customary norms through disapproved marriage and thus overriding Khap diktats of caste endogamy and *gotra* and village exogamy. Khap panchayat imposes its writ through social boycotts and fines, which includes brutally murdering young couples in full view of the village community or forcing them to commit suicide (Gupta and Seth 2007; Sangwan 2010).¹⁴ The state of Haryana has seen the most extreme cases of these so called “honour” killings, though other states such as Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan and Punjab have also witnessed similar incidents.

These unlawful killings by Khaps together with SSA, and to a small extent female infanticide, have contributed to demographic anxieties of “surplus” men and “scarce” women which subsequently feeds into practices of bride sale, bride shortage-related marriage migration and trafficking. This is arguably rooted in “patriarchies of oppression that reduce women to commodities available for men’s entitled purchase” (Schwarz et al. 2017, p. 4). The excess bachelors referred to as *malang* (aloof and loopy) in Haryana and *chhara* (a derogatory term for unmarried men) in Punjab is a newly emerging social problem in India.¹⁵ These practices are not confined to India but extend to demographically similar countries such as China where, like India, the imbalance in sex ratio has led to the abduction, sale and prostitution of women (Edlund et al. 2007).

Khaps do not see “bride trafficking” as a problem either. For instance, even in the context of re-selling the already bought women to other brothers in the same family, a Khap leader named Om Prakash Dhankar in Dhakla village of Haryana said, “what is

¹⁴ See also, <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/opinion/et-editorial/grisly-tradition-the-fight-in-haryana-is-as-much-against-khaps-as-against-rape/articleshow/16791718.cms?from=mdr> (accessed on 15 March 2020).

¹⁵ <https://www.economist.com/asia/2015/04/18/bare-branches-redundant-males?fsrc=scn/tw/te/pe/ed/barebranchesredundantmales> (accessed on 15 March 2020).

wrong with that, even Draupadi had five husbands” (Bose 2018).¹⁶ In another Khap panchayat meeting, which was attended by a BJP Member of Parliament, Brijendra Mishra, one of the leaders of the Kandela Khap panchayat named Hoshiyar Singh justified the practice of bride trafficking by commenting that “*Ladkiyan kam hain ji, ab ye bechaare kya karenge*” (There are few girls in this region, what should these poor men do) (Singh 2019). Nonetheless, Khaps and their authoritative interventions in relation to marriage has often been questioned and seen as illegal by the Supreme Court of India recently (Sinha 2018).

Bringing our discussion together on Khaps, declining sex ratio and bride trafficking, the question that arises is how do Khaps, which endorse caste endogamy reconcile with brides from unknown, lower or different castes? Arguably, rules of hypergamy, caste endogamy, *gotra* and territorial exogamy are often negotiated primarily among the Jat communities, who are known for their conservatism. In this context, Hoshiyar Singh, Chief of Kandela Khap panchayat, had also commented, “*Agar ladka jat hai to jatni ban jati hai, harijan hai to harijan*” (if the boy is a Jat, the girl becomes Jatni, if he is a Harijan, she also becomes one) (Singh 2019). This statement reveals how Khaps find ways to accommodate the practice of bringing brides from other castes, which would otherwise be counted as serious transgressions. Nonetheless, there are other cultural adjustments (learning a new language, dietary adaptations, gender-specific social norms) that are expected from brides who are “extracted from their local and cultural context” (Kaur 2004, p. 2601).

4. Bride Trafficking

Bride shortage related marriage migration is a social phenomenon emerging due to the demographic imbalance in India. Over the last decade, numerous reports on “bride trafficking” have been highlighted by the national and global media which have referred to it as “the business of brides”, “*paro pratha*” and “bride-buying” (Chatterji 2018; Gierstorfer 2014; Singh 2019). The trafficked brides are referred to as “slave brides”, “cows and goats”, “commodities that can be recycled and resold” and “cheaper than cattle” (Jolley and Gooch 2016; Raza 2014). According to a 2016 report by the National Crime Records Bureau in India, 33,796 females were abducted for marriage purposes (NCRB 2016).

¹⁶ The Indian epic, Mahabharata depicts Draupadi being married to five brothers, the only instance of polyandry in Hindu mythology, which is adapted by Manish Jha in his controversial debut feature film *Matrubhoomi: A Nation Without Women* (2003) to depict the consequences of gender imbalance in India.

A field study report cited in United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC 2013) revealed the effects of sex ratio on marriage patterns. The study was conducted by *Drishti Stree Adhyayan Prabodhan Kendra* NGO covering over 10,000 households, across 92 villages in Haryana. It unveiled that more than 9000 married women in Haryana were bought from economically impoverished villages of Assam, Andhra Pradesh, West Bengal, Jharkhand, Bihar and Odisha (East and North East India) and from neighbouring countries such as Nepal and Bangladesh. The report further states that, “most [women] are untraceable or exploited or duplicated as domestic servants by the agents or men who marry/buy them” and “there are also instances of girls being resold to other persons after living a married life for a few years” (UNODC 2013, p. 11). The main receiving states in North India such as Haryana but also Punjab and Rajasthan have significantly low sex ratios (Kaur 2004; Blanchet 2005; Ahlawat 2009; Mishra 2013).

The process of bride trafficking is executed through well-structured networks facilitated through “dalals” or agents who negotiate the purchase of brides. These girls, more than often, from poor families, are either sold by their own parents to men in Haryana and Punjab for between ten thousand to two lakhs Indian rupees or on many occasions abducted. Poverty exposes these women to the “violences of everyday life” - the routinization and anonymity of suffering- which dehumanises and threatens their lives in all its plurality and diversity (Kleinman 2000, p. 227). An agent in the Jind district of Haryana states that “Brides are being bought from Uttarakhand, Bihar, West Bengal and Jharkhand with the assurance of their parents that they will not get a case registered. The girl’s photo is shown to the prospective buyer-cum-husband through WhatsApp and later a place is fixed where he and his family are shown an album. The girls are mostly below 18 years of age and are not well-educated” (Bajwa 2019; also see Kapoor 2012). Disturbingly, the district of Jind in Haryana has even witnessed the formation of *randa* or *kunwara* unions comprising of unmarried men who unionised their vote bank before Lok Sabha elections of 2014 with their demand “*bahu dilao, vote pao*” (*Get us brides, get our votes*) (Siwach 2014; Singh 2019).

The practice of bride trafficking arguably has roots in socio-cultural norms prevailing in Haryana. The historic practice (observed in early twentieth century by British administrators) of *karewa* (the marrying of young widows to the brother of the deceased husband) soon became a right and, though still present in Haryana, the older “*karewa* of panchali system” is being replaced by the buying of women from other regions of the state (Khan 2013, p. 45). This is a shock to women who are brought from a social milieu where polyandry is unknown. Furthermore, these brides

experience isolation due to their unfamiliarity with the language and associated cultural alienation (Bose 2018; Kaur 2004). These brides, whose status is lower than the local brides in the villages, are referred to as “paro” or “molki” or “mol-ki-bahu” (a purchased bride) or Jugaad (arrangement), a familiar vocabulary in Haryana, Punjab, western Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan. The experiences of these brides vividly show their plight as they are forced to do tedious fieldwork, sexually used and abused by husbands and their male relatives, often beaten up by husbands’ families and resold further. They are subjected to sexual slavery and according to 2013 UN Office on Drug and Crime Report, girls trafficked for marriage are “exploited, denied basic rights, duplicated as maids and eventually abandoned” (Estal 2018). Saeeda, one of such brides in Mewat district of Haryana, shared the following narrative: “I was beaten by my husband and his family. They wanted me to obey them, and if I objected they always had the same words for me- we own you because we bought you” (Estal 2018). These trafficked brides do not have their families or any relatives to support them. Saeeda does not even know where she is from as she was bought twenty years ago and has never seen her family since then. Some of these brides are abandoned after the demise of their husbands. Babita, a 55-year-old trafficked bride, shared a horrifying experience of her brother in law trying to run her over in order to kill her so that he could claim the property she inherited from her husband after his demise (Sharma 2019b).

Women who can escape or were rescued from such oppressive circumstances are also not accepted back in their natal homes. Sujana, a 15-year-old rescued bride from Haryana, revealed that she was pregnant when she was brought back to her home in Assam. She now lives with her grandparents and her nine-month-old son. Sujana is aware of the stigma associated with her as a woman raising her child without the presence of a “husband” but she wants to focus on her son and his upbringing. Tahmina, another rescued bride from Haryana, lives with her grandmother in Assam because her parents did not accept her and moved out of their village due to shame (Estal 2018).

India does not have any laws which directly tackle the issue of bride trafficking. The Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act (ITPA), 1956¹⁷ (subject to a amendments in 1986) and Trafficking of Persons (Prevention, Protection and Rehabilitation) Bill, 2016 (Government of India 2016), have been implemented but they have failed to specifically address the practice of bride trafficking due to inadequate

¹⁷ <https://legislative.gov.in/sites/default/files/A1956-104.pdf> (accessed on 14 April 2020).

conceptualisation of the varied meanings and practices of trafficking. Of the sections (370, 372, 373 and 366) in the Indian Penal Code (IPC) that deal with the problem of trafficking in general, section 366 is the only one to have focused more on bride trafficking by sanctioning punishment for abducting or forcing women for marriage¹⁸. Section 375 IPC also criminalizes sex with minors, which can be seen as a hindrance to the practice of bride trafficking because traffickers have used marriage with minor girls as a pretext for sexual violence and prostitution (Anjickal 2018). Besides this temporary respite in the form of indirect initiatives, more explicit and efficient laws and policies are required to execute a crackdown on the peril of bride trafficking.

Besides government initiatives, there are non-governmental organizations like *Justice and Care*, *Shakti Vahini* and *Empower People* who work towards uprooting the problem of trafficking. Largely self-funded with some support from corporate partners, these organizations often work in collaboration with the government bodies, local administration, police, other non-government organizations and the media. They also work with community-based organizations to identify victims of trafficking, rescuing and empowering them through skill and business training, with the aim of making them self-sufficient. *Justice and Care* state their objectives as “shar[ing] our expertise with governments to shape legislations” and “work[ing] with community-based organizations to prevent trafficking, with government and privately run shelter homes and with educational institutions in regards to research”.¹⁹ *Shakti Vahini* conducts sensitisation programmes to train professionals like police, judges and community leaders on the issue of trafficking and rights of its survivors. Working alongside the police, it has also brought perpetrators to justice through their conviction.²⁰ Similarly, *Empower People* facilitates the education and counselling of the trafficked victims and also connects them with the police and administration. The organization forms village communes at the local level that are spearheaded by trafficked brides. The children of trafficked brides are also taken care of since they run the risk of being discriminated against in the society.²¹ As a result of these sensitization and awareness raising programmes, there are reported efforts taken by the locals themselves to support these *paro* women in the Mewat district of Haryana to regain a sense of dignity. In 2014, a door-to-door survey conducted by *Empower People* revealed 1352 trafficked wives in 85 villages of North India

¹⁸ <https://legislative.gov.in/sites/default/files/A1860-45.pdf> (accessed on 19 February 2020).

¹⁹ <https://www.justiceandcare.org/faqs/> (accessed on 30 April 2020).

²⁰ <https://shaktivahini.org/> (accessed on 30 April 2020).

²¹ <http://www.empowerpeople.org.in/> (accessed on 25 April 2020).

(Parthsaarathy 2018). Similarly, in order to identify trafficked cases, the organization has also carried out demonstrations against bride trafficking which have spread awareness about the gravity of the menace at the same time.

5. Conclusions

The fifth SDG goal to achieve gender equality and empowerment has placed women at the centre stage for achieving economic growth and a sustainable future. Modi's government in India has made a targeted effort to incorporate women within its agenda of economic development through various women-centred schemes. In the recent Delhi assembly elections of February 2020 in India, yet again, all the competing political parties, such as BJP, Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) and Indian National Congress (INC), substantially focused on issues of women education, their skill development and safety in their respective political manifestos. There were a slew of schemes offering subsidies and rewards for girls to encourage them towards education—from primary schooling until graduation, and a helpline for women's safety (Dutta 2020). In parallel with these progressive women-oriented development schemes, the current Modi government also attempts to reconstitute secular India as a Hindu state together with the incorporation of women into the Hindutva ideological project. It calls upon the discourse of gender equality but, in adhering to a discourse of security of Hindu women and thus the nation, it also violently regulates and disciplines women.

We argue in this paper that development is inherently paradoxical which we conceptualise through the framework of "violence[s] of development", that relates to processes where the transformatory potential of development is undermined. While development envisions the elimination of gender inequalities through economic development, it also recreates them by not responding adequately to these disparities. The northern state of Haryana is exemplary of the paradoxical framework of Indian development. It is second in the country in relation to high per capita income but lowest in relation to gender equality and sex ratio. The devaluation, neglect and annihilation of the girl child and the widely prevalent culture of son preference have exacerbated gender inequality in the form of skewed sex ratios. These practices have been buttressed by the extra-constitutional/judicial structures of caste-based panchayats—the Khaps and contributed to the menace of bride trafficking, rampant in Haryana. These skewed gendered realities, as possible fallouts of uneven development, de-politicise the processes of empowerment set in motion by the SDGs.

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Queering Gender Equality: UN SDG 5 Beyond the Sex_Gender Binary

Antke Antek Engel

1. Introduction

Equality and difference have long been decisive political challenges. Yet, convincing answers on how to respect difference while striving for equality are still lacking. At the moment, the United Nations (UN), like other transnational organizations, corporations and state actors, seem to face an irresolvable dilemma between gender equality politics, holding on to a binary sexual difference and gender diversity politics, creating an ever-increasing list of gender and sexual minorities in need for protection. On one hand, one refers to the empowerment of women and girls as the promising remedy against inequality and violence, and on the other hand, self-determination is the key to the universality of human rights. On both sides, the fight against discrimination is a driving force, though for gender equality politics the focus is on structural discrimination along the axis of male versus female, while gender and sexual diversity concerns individual and group discrimination, underlining the exclusionary effects of the binary distinction. From this perspective the insistence on a clear-cut and exclusionary sexual difference of women and men is in itself discriminatory against non-binary genders and sexes. The individualizing argument, however, with its focus on personality rights and self-determination tends to overlook or underestimate the ongoing effects of structural discrimination with regard to the male/female distinction or other categorizing differences.

Thus, there is a need to reconceptualize sex_gender in UN politics in a way that neither simply diversifies the existing categories from within while upholding the binary distinction nor proposes a potentially endless diversification that loses the capacity to address patterns of structural inequality and violence.¹ Once inter*,

¹ I use the term sex_gender (in German, simply *Geschlecht*) in order to signify an integral simultaneity rather than a distinction between its two elements: There is no social subjectivity, which is not always also embodied, and there is no embodiment, which does not carry socio-historical, epistemic, discursive and biographical traces.

trans*, non-binary* or third* sexes_genders speak up,² gain public attention and state or legal recognition as those who do not fit the binary order of sex and gender difference, it will no longer be convincing to state that women and men each form half of humanity. Yet, is there indeed an irresolvable dilemma concerning gender equality and diversity politics? Or are we facing a false alternative between only two options? My thesis is that queer theory and the principle of queersiversity may instead provide an overarching perspective of intersectional justice,³ one that does not overcome all tensions, but allows conflicts over diverging opinions, values or resources to be addressed in transparent and productive ways.

What does a queer perspective in UN politics mean? I will argue that it differs from merely taking on issues of LGBTI+ subjectivities and communities. A more thorough understanding of queerness and queering refers to an analytical and transformative intersectional approach that is not adding to but questioning the binary order of sexual difference that underlies the UN gender equality goal (SDG 3). This article begins with a critical consideration of programmatic material found online on websites of UN bodies concerned with gender equality or LGBTI+ rights and recognition (SDG 2). This includes reference to the Yogyakarta Principles, which promote the application of international human rights law in relation to sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression and sex characteristics (SOGIEC). In order to propose a queer reconceptualization of UN politics, I will discuss the potential of SOGIEC offering abstract criteria rather than minority rights (SDG 2.2), and consider this in reference to recent reforms of German Civil Status law (SDG 4). My conclusion builds on queersiversity, a principle that fosters difference, but fights inequalities (SDG 5).

² The asterisk (*) functions as an equivocating and denaturalizing marker, inserted either at the end or within a word that names an embodied classification (or a phenomenon whose status as nature and/or culture is contested). It indicates genderings not reducible to the binary (e.g., women*, or *Freund*innen* = friends, of any gender) or also, e.g., racializations such as white*ness/white*, or abilities, e.g., deaf*ness/deaf*. For English usage, see (Halberstam 2018). Furthermore, I use LGBTI+ in order to refer to lobby politics with an extendable clientele.

³ The concept of intersectional justice was proposed by Emilia Roig, who, in close collaboration with Kimberley Crenshaw, founded the Center for Intersectional Justice (cij) in Berlin. Available online: <https://www.intersectionaljustice.org/> (accessed on 20 December 2019).

2. Gender Equality and Gender Diversity in UN Politics

2.1. Politics of Representation and Figuration

“Human Rights belong to everyone, no matter who you are or whom you love”.⁴ This is a slogan from UN Free & Equal, an online platform, which was launched in 2013 by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in order to foster global public information aimed at promoting the equal rights and fair treatment of LGBTI people. It has initiated various campaigns, addressing general publics and multipliers in widely accessible modes.⁵ UN Free & Equal promotes a Human Rights (HRs) approach that combines the protection of minorities with a declaration of the universal reach of HRs: “no one will be free before all are free” (cf. f.n. 3). Already in its first year, Free & Equal launched a public relations campaign in order to raise intersex awareness, plus another one with a focus on the courage it takes to live a transgender life.⁶

Both topics, inter* and trans* rights/lives, are clearly relevant for gender politics; they propound indispensable material about discrimination and violence on the basis of gender. However, the Free & Equal campaigns as well as the work of the “Independent expert on sexual orientation and gender identity” do (to date) not provide a significant reference point for UN gender equality politics or the SDG 5, which work on the basis of a binary distinction of female and male, women and men.^{7,8} In fact, the demands for gender equality and those for LGBTI+ equality

⁴ United Nations. Free & Equal. Available online: <https://www.unfe.org/freedom/> (accessed on 18 December 2019).

⁵ According to its own website, in 2017, UN Free & Equal reached 2.4 billion social media feeds around the world. It is accessible, because it provides material in graphic and video formats as well as in plain language, making use of photography, animation, and personal stories, involving also VIP artists, actors, and musicians; cf. <https://www.unfe.org/about/> (accessed on 18 December 2019).

⁶ United Nations. Free & Equal, Intersex Awareness. Available online: <https://www.unfe.org/intersex-awareness/> and <https://www.unfe.org/transvisibility/> (accessed 18 December 2019).

⁷ An “independent expert” is a mandate holder, who works for the UN independently of governments and without compensation. The “Independent expert on sexual orientation and gender identity” has been Victor Madrigal-Borloz since January 2018, and from August 2016 to October 2017, it was Vítit Muntarhorn.

⁸ For example, the page on violence against women, last updated in November 2019, does not capture violence against lbt women in its thirteen detailed paragraphs on “Various forms of violence”. There is one single mention of “non-heterosexual women (those who identified their sexual orientation as lesbian, bisexual or other” in reference to a particular study explicitly limited to the European Union; Facts and figures: Ending violence against women. Available online: <https://www.unwomen.org/en/what-we-do/ending-violence-against-women/facts-and-figures> (accessed 18 December 2019). Additionally, “The Gender Snapshot 2019”, a 24-page brochure about progress on SDG, does not mention sexual orientation as a reason of discrimination, or lbt women, not even concerning access to

coexist without any intentional systematic links (apart from article 1 of the UDHR). UN Women very rarely references on its website the discrimination of women on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity or points out the criminalization of same-sex relationships.⁹ If there is any mention of non-normative genders or sexualities, this is usually presented as extending the understanding of gender, but keeping binary sexual difference intact.

One notable exception is that UN Women signed the joint statement of eleven UN bodies for “Ending Violence and Discrimination Against Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Intersex People” of 2015.¹⁰ A more wide-ranging formulation can be found on the November 2019 page against rape culture, which problematizes “restrictive definitions of gender and sexuality that limit a person’s right to define or express themselves” and asks its readers to “promote acceptance of all gender identities and sexualities”.¹¹ Nevertheless, the overall impression is that UN Women puts much effort into maintaining the image of heterosexual cis-genders being meant when the terms women and girls are used in statements by UN Women or, for that matter, concerning the SDG 5.

One might come up with various pragmatic, historical or strategic arguments for the omission of non-normative sexual orientations, gender identities and embodiments. A well-meaning view would, maybe, point out that UN Women, similar to its intersectional gender equality goals, successfully differentiates the category/ies of women (and men) from within, and as such covers a heterogeneity of factors leading to disadvantages or privileges. However, such internal differentiations of the two sex_gender categories can never acknowledge as free and equal those who

health care or education; Progress on the Sustainable Development Goals: The gender snapshot 2019. Available online: <https://www.unwomen.org/en/digital-library/publications/2019/09/progress-on-the-sustainable-development-goals-the-gender-snapshot-2019> (accessed 18 December 2019).

⁹ Infographic: Human Rights of Women. Available online: <https://www.unwomen.org/en/digital-library/multimedia/2019/12/infographic-human-rights> (accessed on 13 December 2019). When searching “lesbian” on the UN Women, one current 2019 news compilation appears: <https://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2019/5/compilation-lgbti-activists-to-know> (accessed on 13 December 2019), plus one more recent article, indicating the appointment of a LGBTIQ+ Policy Specialist at UN Women in 2020, an important step that took place after my article had been finalized: <https://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2020/6/take-five-sophie-browne-pride-2020> (accessed 19 April 2021).

¹⁰ Joint UN statement on Ending violence and discrimination against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex people. Available online: <https://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2015/10/lgbt-joint-statement> (accessed on 13 December 2019).

¹¹ Cf. point 7. and 9. of “16 ways you can stand up against rape culture”. Available online: <https://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2019/11/compilation-ways-you-can-stand-against-rape-culture> (accessed 18 December 2019).

do not fit the binary order. Yet, since the term “women” is integral to UN gender equality politics, written into the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), adopted in 1979, and situated under the auspices of the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW), established in 1946, how would one proceed from herstory to theirstory? How can this take place without losing sight of the fact that the binary sex_gender axis is a powerful structuring moment of social and global inequalities?

The fact that structural inequalities, discrimination and violence keep taking shape along the binary sex_gender axis also points to the limits of LGBTI+ minority politics. The latter usually avoids addressing this problem, which not only indicates a lack of solidarity with feminist politics but fails to acknowledge how LGBTI+ people are themselves perceived within and thus affected by the binary sex_gender order. Since such ignorance may lead to the reproduction of masculinist privileges and hierarchies within its own constituencies, one might even like to formulate a wider critique: any kind of politics that argues in favor of individualized differences or single issue antidiscrimination measures runs the risk of losing sight of intersectional structural inequalities.¹² In contrast, the work of UN Women has focused, since the adoption of CEDAW by the UN General Assembly in 1979, on abolishing the powerful social and cultural factors that produce inequalities. In understanding inequalities as being the outcome of processes of discrimination, oppression and violence, it clearly stands for politics and policies that counter the naturalization of womanhood. The concepts of gender and “gender equality goals” introduced by the 1995 Beijing conference underline such a social constructivist epistemology.

Underlying the critique of socio-sexual and gender hierarchies is, however, an unquestioned sex/gender distinction, which states a universal sexual difference built on an exclusionary opposition of either male or female embodiment (sex). In order to overcome its inherent cis- and heteronormative assumptions, it is important to understand that the universal sexual difference is not adequately captured as a biological one. Rather, it is a naturalization colluding with a hierarchical symbolic order that installs a norm and its others.¹³ The decisive challenge lies in unpacking the complex relations of power, domination and desire that invest sexual difference—or,

¹² A limited understanding of personal or group-based rather than structural discrimination can be found in the Free & Equal appeals to business companies as agents of change, whose role is simply seen in respecting the human rights of their LGBTI staff and clients. Standards of Conduct for Business. Available online: <https://www.unfe.org/standards/> (accessed 18 December 2019).

¹³ On the controversial understandings of the terms gender and sexual difference in the context of the UN Beijing conference see Judith Butler’s essay “The end of sexual difference” in Butler 2004.

for that matter, sexual and gender diversity—with normativity and processes of exclusion or normalization.

2.2. *The SOGIESC Approach*

A promising advance that avoids categorizing identities lies in the introduction of the abstract, universalizing criteria of sexual orientation, gender identity and expression and sex characteristics (SOGIESC). SOGIESC are features of all human beings, thus universal, integral to human rights, and allowing us to formulate an inclusive reach of sexual and gender justice rather than minority protection. If UN Secretary General António Guterres says we need “... to build a world where no one has to be afraid because of their sexual orientation or their gender identity”,¹⁴ this clearly also implies women’s, or rather women*’s rights and empowerment. The 2006 Yogyakarta Principles and their 2017 supplement make use of SOGIESC’s universal reach and formulate state obligations for implementing them into constitutional laws and securing their value for personal dignity.¹⁵

Instead of criticizing discrimination through pointing out vulnerable groups (LGBTI+) and accepting the risk of re-stigmatizing them, the SOGIESC approach shifts the focus towards the criteria that are employed in installing or legitimizing discrimination or privileges. In reference to these criteria, the processes of normative exclusions, normalization and hierarchization can be analyzed, without their effects being presumed due to group membership. Instead, actual (socio-economic, cultural and geo-political) conditions or intersectional specificity/distinctiveness can and need to be considered. While the Yogyakarta Principles are constricted to the legal sphere, disregarding social and cultural politics, a wider UN equality framework carries the potential of applying the SOGIESC approach of inclusive protection also to, e.g., education, the medical field, security and military politics and economic sustainability. This allows for structural analysis, examining legislation, public discourses, socio-economic conditions or cultural imagery and habits, which either explicitly carry discriminating moments or raise the probability of its occurrence.

Except for these potentials, however, within the UN framework, the SOGIESC criteria often seem to be reserved to special interest groups and thus reaffirm minority politics (Free & Equal), or as in the case of UN Women, are subsumed as secondary differences under the more general and overarching category of women.

¹⁴ Mission statement. Available online: <https://www.unfe.org/about/> (accessed on 13 December 2019).

¹⁵ The Yogyakarta Principles. Available online: <https://yogyakartaprinciples.org/> (accessed on 13 December 2019).

Thus, in order to capture SOGIESC's abstract, non-identitarian, yet universalizing potential, intersectional queer theory is required: "Queer", in order to consider political practices that focus on processes of normalization, hierarchization and exclusion (Engel 2002, 2013); "intersectional", in order to consider the interplay with other distinguishing criteria. Here, the interest lies in avoiding the prioritization or isolation of sex, gender and sexuality as categories of analysis and critique, overlooking, for example, their inevitable racialization (Cohen 1997; Ferguson 2004), but also in avoiding an understanding of queer theory as a critique of identity in general or any kind of normativity or normality, respectively (Weber 2016). Concerning both aspects, critique has been articulated by Black and Queer of Color scholars as well as other minoritized subjects within the global queer movements, who insist on recognizing the importance of coloniality (Ruvalcaba 2016; Castro Varela and Dhawan 2016; Xiang 2018), racism (Puar 2007; Ferguson 2004; Haritaworn 2015), capitalist exploitation (Manalansan and Cruz 2002) and compulsory ablebodiedness (McRuer 2018) as structuring queer people's lives. This delegitimizes a queer theoretical analysis, which would limit itself to a homo versus hetero or straight versus queer opposition (Cohen 1997).

3. Intersectional Queerness and Queering in Theory and Politics

3.1. Queer Intersectional

Concerning the analytics of power and domination, queer intersectional approaches take into account how classification and hierarchization work together in particular contexts. A current discussion asks whether heteronormativity and intersectionality should be treated as two different approaches, which have their own ways of problematizing the exclusionary and hierarchizing effects of identity logic, binary thinking and additive diversity. While some scholars are suggesting that heteronormativity and intersectionality may function as a mutual corrective for each other (Haschemi Yekani et al. 2011), others insist on an integral understanding that would or should lay out the critique of heteronormativity as a mode of intersectional thinking (Mesquita 2016). In any case, it should be considered that diversities or extendable, individualized differences can very well be hierarchized without referencing a single dominant norm. Furthermore, any dominant norm might take on a complex, multidimensional form (e.g., the idealized combination of white, cis, able bodied, affluent, heterosexual and Christian). It becomes necessary to rethink how the notion of heteronormativity fosters particular constellations of sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression and sex characteristics, and disavows others.

The term heteronormativity was originally coined as the mutual constitution of compulsory heterosexuality and a rigid binary gender order, as well as its flipside, the abjection or at least marginalization of all identities and desires that do not fit the norm (Warner 1993; Jagose 1996). However, within an intersectional frame, one needs to consider how heteronormativity also undergoes historical transformation and takes on particular socio-geo-political forms. Questioning the current formations of SOGIESC allows us to acknowledge changes—for example, the decriminalization of homosexuality; the legal recognition of same-sex partnerships; the opening of the marriage institute to all genders; egalitarian civil status for cis*, trans*, and inter* persons. These are clearly contested developments, but they have become social realities of the 21st century in different countries of different continents around the world. Envisioning fights for intersectional justice only becomes possible when queer theory addresses complex relations of power and domination, and acknowledges that an additive diversification does not fundamentally question but simply renews the privileging and idealization of certain forms of hetero- or homosexuality and cis-binary sexes_genders, supplementing it with forms of homonormativity (Duggan 2002) and homonationalism (Puar 2007).

Therefore, I argue that the focus of queer theory is not on gender and sexuality per se, but how they are involved in (are the product of, are upholding or are transforming) power, domination, exploitation and violence—including social relations, e.g., capitalist economy, individual rights, asylum systems, artistic and cultural production—which at first sight might seem to be beyond a heteronormative structuring (Carver and Chambers 2008). Queer theory as an analytics and a critique of macropolitical and global relations of power and domination asks the following question: what is the role of sex, gender, sexuality, and desire in upholding the complexity of current and historical, geo-politically and culturally differentiated relations of power and regimes of domination? (Weber 2016; Richter-Montpetit 2018).

3.2. *Queering: Thinking Difference Differently*

The view on queer theory and politics that I promote combines an analytical with a transformative approach; that is, a critique of heteronormativity with a desire for intersectional justice.¹⁶ The latter articulates itself in practices of queering current regimes of normalcy, and the exclusions, normalizations, hierarchies and forms of violence that go along with it. In this sense, queer politics is not primarily concerned

¹⁶ See f.n. 3, and for a comparable use of queering, (El-Tayeb 2011).

with fighting homo- and transphobia, or demanding the legal equality of lesbians, gays, bisexuals, transgender and intersex people. Rather, the focus is on dismantling a hierarchical binary order and fighting the violence that goes along with regimes of normality in all their complexity. In other words, queer theory is looking for ways of thinking difference differently than according to the logic of categorization (Probyn 1996). For this matter, I suggest the “queer strategy of equivocation” or “undisambiguation” (*VerUneindeutigung*) as an alternative to proliferating or abolishing the sex_gender binary (Engel 2002, 2013). Where a clear-cut identity, meaning or norm is installed, naturalized or made unquestionable, the strategy of equivocation renders it ambiguous. Equivocation is a procedural measure that does not pursue a specific ideal of organizing relations of gender, sexuality and desire. Instead, it aims to disrupt concrete and historically changing norms in a flexible and context-specific way. Equivocation employs representations and practices that resist being pinned down to a single meaning, yet are not arbitrary but oriented along the criteria of dehierarchizing, denormalizing and non-violence.

In a similar way, Xiang (2018) proposes to think below rather than beyond the either/or model in order to not repeat the same exclusionary gesture one is criticizing. Xiang introduces the notion of “transdualism”, which is not meant to overcome masculine and feminine genders but to involve them in dynamic processes of becoming. In a decolonial queer mode, Xiang employs the “illegitimate pairing ‘either ... and’” (p. 437), which simultaneously combines “difference” (either) and a capacity of “transing” (and). Mergings, diversions, crossings or passages may turn both sides of a duality from one into the other; they may allow for neutral spaces, or lead to formerly unexpected directions: “dissenting and *transing* queerly at any given moment of fixity that would become an orthodoxy, naturalized or essentialized” (p. 437). Since for Xiang, in any process of change, there are moments of distinguishing, yet the distinctions undergo a continuous change, I would add that transdualism means inhabiting a “paradoxical tension”: a simultaneity of “as well as” and “neither/nor” (female as well as male while simultaneously neither female nor male) (Engel 2013).

Weber (2016), queering international relations, calls this a plural logoi, which she explains as upholding the simultaneity of and/or (rather than either/or) in thinking difference. This means understanding social/global realities as social/global complexities. Gender, for example, does not necessarily follow the pattern of either female or male, but might be articulated as female and/or male. You might like to call this transgender; yet, if you prefer to avoid another label (which would, anyway, only return to an either/logic—either female or male or trans), you would instead

claim undecidable simultaneity: “both *either* one thing *or* another or possibly another while ... simultaneously ... one thing *and* another *and* possibly another” (Weber 2016, p. 196). Transdualism, plural logoi, and the strategy of equivocation consider the powerful (and sometimes violent) effects of dual thinking, but insist that they do not need to lead into an exclusionary and hierarchical A/non-A logic. They may dissolve as multiplicities or manifest themselves in processes of becoming that attend to nuances and transitions, avoiding categorical thinking in favor of non-hierarchical differences and singularities, or, as Catherine Keller puts it, being “resistant to any fixed difference as well as to any indifference to difference” (Keller 2003, p. 166; cf. Xiang 2018, p. 432).

How does this kind of queering translate from an epistemological project into politics? Obviously, it does not cohere with the longing for a minority status, which would risk further stigmatization or normalizing integration according to the dominant order, nor would it support a pluralizing of sexes and genders that corresponds to more differentiated hierarchies. Does it fit with demands for self-determination? Or would this presume a free choice that overlooks how structural inequalities and normative violence but also relationships of care and dependency predetermine any agency? Let us further examine this by considering a concrete example.

4. How Queer Is “Diverse” in German Civil Status Law?

In December 2018, a new paragraph was introduced into German Civil Status Law (PStG §45 b),¹⁷ which opens the option of registering as “diverse”, as well as possibilities of deleting or changing the sex registration of the birth certificate. Long-lasting struggles of inter* movements, queer activism and a groundbreaking decision by the Constitutional Court made this possible. Despite breaking the monopoly of the binary sex_gender order, the reform is still critiqued as halfhearted: the process is bound to a doctor’s certificate confirming a “variation in sex development”, a condition not further defined, but still inserting a moment of pathologization or at least medicalization. Furthermore, the current reform maintains legal inequality, because the so-called Transsexual Law with its complicated and

¹⁷ Official German version, no translation available. Available online: https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/pstg/_45b.html (accessed 18 December 2019). For an introduction to the legal argumentation behind the new paragraph, see the press release of the German Constitutional court from 2017. Available online: https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/EN/2017/bvg17-095.html;jsessionid=5419390A194C3385C23D3034F27D300F.1_cid370 (accessed 18 December 2019).

expensive court procedures, exists parallel to and claims cognizance in regulating sex changes. Concerning the administrative application of § 45 b, a controversy has developed whether it is meant exclusively for intersex* or open to trans* and non-binary* people, or whoever desires its use. Conservative forces try to limit its reach and secure cis-gender privileges. However, notably, the wording of the paragraph as well as legal reasoning avoids delineating minorities; instead of installing a special law, it follows an egalitarian approach that defends personality rights and sex_gender self-determination.¹⁸ Yet, also within activist contexts or among liberal reformers, no consensus exists as to whether “diverse” provides for a promising political step: Is it convincing as a catchall term open to interpretation? Or is it a pathetic notion that no one identifies with and that creates a subordinated “deviant other”?

Answers depend, among others, on whether people read “diverse” as indicating a “third sex” (as most of the media coverage suggested), thus naturalizing it as “the other of the norm” (biological), as a third option of classification (linguistic) or simply of registering (juridical-administrative). It is only the latter interpretation that reduces the risk of stigmatization and could, as a positive side-effect, also lead to acknowledging the variability and multifariousness of “female” and “male”. After all, it is by no means clear whether those who register as female or male self-identify as trans*, inter* or cis*. While it would have been a more radical step to abolish sex registration altogether, the existing law nevertheless undermines the exclusionary status of male and female as the only state-recognized sexes, and forces administration as well as the civil public to question and/or extend the binary sex_gender order.

I see queer potential in the entry “diverse”, precisely because it is a vague notion and hardly used by anyone for self-description or identification. The third option is neither a third gender nor a clearly defined category, but a designation of multiplicity and processuality. It shows that a non-identitarian, non-binary and polysemic expression, such as “diverse”, can articulate a “positive” understanding of difference. As soon as no doctor’s certificate claims authority, but individuals themselves decide whether they want to be registered as female, male, a variation of sex_gender development (diverse) or no gender registration at all (x), the latter

¹⁸ A recent legal opinion commissioned by the Federal Government states that any distinguishing of groups non-/eligible to the law violates the equality principle, and up-to-date biological and medical research does not allow for a definition of sex other than based on self-identification (Mangold et al. 2019)—a position explicitly contradicting current pronouncements of the Ministry of the Interior, but important for grounding further reform steps.

two entries become statements that explicitly denounce the exclusivity of the binary sex_gender order.

Since estimating the queer potential of the law would be a longer discussion, I will limit myself here to some comments on its relevance for gender equality politics: Once a third option is available, affirmative action, empowerment and antidiscrimination measures become more complicated, because discrimination on the basis of gender turns multidimensional. Thus, what is needed in order to avoid a competition unfolding between cis* women and girls and inter* and trans* persons of various genders? Proposals are made that, rather than identifying vulnerable groups, one should focus on the question as to whether discrimination occurs, which form it takes and what conditions its probability (Baer 2010). In order to avoid using identity categories, one could instead talk about socially structured biographical starting positions and ongoing experiences of discrimination. An intersectional understanding of gender equality insists on not only acknowledging trans*, inter* and non-binary* positions but to assess particularities.

I see the debate about the PStG § 45 b as a controversy that is at the core of queer politics. It signals towards the following question of strategy: Should we ground the fight for equality on arguments that denaturalize the binary, but naturalize variety, or build on politicizing the binary (or any other way of conceptualizing difference)? The latter would draw attention to the functions that “difference” takes on in organizing social relations and institutions. Instead of looking for one single or final answer, what is needed is the (self-)critical discussion whether certain measures reduce or reinforce inequalities and violence, and whether they have repressive or liberating, empowering or discriminatory effects (and on whom).

Such critical reflection points out a second challenge taken on by queer theory and politics, namely, the desire to recognize differences that resist classification and acknowledge their political relevance. Accordingly, struggles over the distribution of resources (in the case discussed: who gains the privilege of an acknowledged sex registration, or even a self-defined sex registration?) should be seen as connected to conflicts over those dimensions of difference that escape definition, remain unintelligible or provide confusion. This is when queerversity comes into play as a principle of orienting queer theory and politics towards the “the aporia of difference”: fighting difference as inequality, but fostering difference as particularity and uniqueness—a tension that should be upheld rather than solved.

5. The Principle of Queerversity

Queerversity is meant to provide a modification of diversity politics, which is criticized for either building on classification or on a neoliberal paradigm that depoliticizes and individualizes social differences (Ahmed 2012; Castro Varela and Dhawan 2016). In contrast, queerversity, in recognizing differences that resist classification or even escape intelligibility, embraces ambiguity, doubt and confusion as politically relevant, namely, as a means of disrupting common regimes of normality. Queerversity is not a description of a given reality, but a principle that directs political practice towards an ongoing process of reducing violence (including the symbolic and epistemic violence of “the normal”) and increasing intersectional justice.

Thus, confronted with structural discrimination and violence, queerversity aims at dehierarchizing social inequalities and denormalizing rigid categories simultaneously. In accordance with a non-additive intersectional framework, it shifts the focus from diversity to the question as to how dynamics of power, desire and belonging (Probyn 1996; Yuval-Davis 2011) entangle different relations of domination in complex ways. As such, queerversity necessarily demands a historically and geo-politically specific analysis of relations of power and domination. Differences are to be examined as always framed, if not constituted, by contingent social conditions, which become the objects of contestation. Whereas neoliberal diversity approaches embrace differences according to their utility, queerversity addresses the power inequalities of social differences in order to face the conflicts that correspond to social heterogeneity—conflicts over opinions, values and desires, but also over limited resources, diverging interests, the will to power and the readiness for violence.

As a political corrective, an ethical attitude and an aesthetic strategy, the principle of queerversity combines the avowal of multiplicity, ambiguity and alterity with struggles against discrimination, social inequalities and the intersectional complexity of regimes of domination. Queerversity as a political corrective criticizes the exclusions, normalizations and hierarchizations that correspond to particular measures and institutional formations built on categorization. As an ethical attitude in social relationships, queerversity invites multiple perspectives as well as a readiness for confusion resulting from encounters with the other, or the Other of the Other (Butler 2004) that cannot be contained in any category. The aesthetic strategy of queerversity draws attention to the sonic and visual modes of articulating difference differently to the logic of categorization or the binary oppositions deriving from that. Sounds, colors and shape-shifting forms function as models of difference, which allow for nuances, oscillation, fluidity and liminality. Literary and poetic writing creates ambiguities, ambivalences and absurdities; seeks polysemy; and accepts paradoxes.

Hence, what is particular about queerversity is its capacity to acknowledge and articulate differences as simultaneously conflictual heterogeneity, internal multiplicity and irreducible alterity: Queerversity introduces “the difference of the different” into diversity. Let me provide a clarification of the terms: Multiplicity draws attention to the uncountable—whenever one proposes a category, a whole range of differences unfolds from within, which can neither be contained nor excluded. Ambiguity points out that there are (at least) two sides to each phenomenon, each meaning and each feeling. Therefore, it becomes impossible to stick to a single truth—at least not if one allows for standpoints, contexts and different perspectives. Alterity is a positive expression for what in a rigid identitarian order is excluded as the abject that is not allowed to claim reality, is called “unintelligible”, is suppressed or disavowed—that which upholds the norm, as long as it functions as its constitutive other. Combining these three elements puts a socio-cultural order on the horizon, which disregards the illusion of homogeneity and finds pleasure in complexity and confusion.

However, what makes queerversity politically interesting is that it does not follow the either/or logic but installs an ongoing tension, a conflictual interplay between social heterogeneity (built on identity categories and classifications) with multiplicity, ambiguity, and alterity. This combination will never settle into harmony, because multiplicity, ambiguity, and the abject rub against each other while together carrying the potential of interrupting classifications and binaries. Yet, this is exactly what secures the political as an open potentiality. My proposal is to understand desire, or rather the tensions inherent to desire, or the contingent dynamics of power and desire, as what is mobilizing queerversity. While desire may, of course, also have most conservative effects, providing the libidinal investment that upholds binary, heteronormative, racist and ableist orders, queer reconceptualizations and rearrangements of desire allow for drawing new and unexpected connections (Engel 2011).¹⁹ These are not limited to intimate relations but unfold in the social and the global context (Spivak [2012] 2013; Dhawan et al. 2015). Queering desire/desire as queering not only challenges the heterosexual norm built on the premise of binary sex_gender difference but undermines the hierarchical divide of “subject” and “object” that invests desire with the power of producing relations of appropriation, domination

¹⁹ Queer theories of desire are various and incompatible, but generally challenge the hierarchical pattern of subject-desires-object while focusing instead on the relationality of desire, its readiness to engage with a multiplicity of identifications as well as disidentifications, the way it is bound to and may evolve from fantasy and may be lived in shared fantasy scenarios. For an overview, see (Dhawan et al. 2015).

and submission. The principle of queersity translates desire's queer/ing potential into politics.

Questioning normalcy has become almost a routine in queer politics fighting normative, epistemic and structural violence. However, the redistribution of power and resources remains another crucial task, if non-categorizable difference or alterity are seen as contributing to the rearrangements of power, desire and belonging, without being defined by or reproducing social and global hierarchies and inequalities. Politics built on queersity aim at extending the chances of social, cultural and political participation further than what is already acknowledged as social heterogeneity. Accordingly, dehierarchizing differences and fighting social inequalities are vital—for (gender) equality as much as for (gender) diversity politics. Therefore, I argue that queersity may function as an operationalization of queer theory for state and international politics. Claiming more than the position of critical reflection, but functioning as a principle guiding political practice, it introduces the queer critique of identity categories into consultancy and political decision making.²⁰ Equality as well as antidiscrimination measures may build on the complex, dynamic and conflictual understanding of differences as ongoing processes or becoming. Thus, queersity undermines the idea of an unmarked norm and its others, but instead makes everyone accountable for the relations of power and desire pervading social and global heterogeneity, creating the possibility of non-hierarchical differences and singularities.

6. Conclusions

We are, historically, at a point where it is possible to develop a queer-intersectional understanding of equality, which overcomes the existing tension between single axis equality politics and complex diversity and antidiscrimination politics. This, however, is by no means a politics without tension, but open to contradictions and competitions over opinions, values, resources and desires. Thus, UN Women's focus on gender equality based on sexual difference may remain on the agenda and inspire the search for convincing measures of extending rights, fostering equality and freedom, fighting violence and empowering populations who have been disenfranchised and disadvantaged due to being perceived and designated as

²⁰ I started using the term and developing the concept in 2010 with a group of colleagues working at the Gender Competence Center in Berlin, an organization which at that time did consultancy work for ministries and state administration on gender and diversity mainstreaming and antidiscrimination politics.

female. This, however, demands that the meaning of "female" is openly contested and its extension into female* is not limited to a symbolic gesture but designates a notion of sex_gender which immediately politicizes the binary, e.g., through the principle of queerversity. Politicizing the binary means being transparent about and problematizing a framework that subsumes the vast array of differences of its constituency called "half of humanity" on the basis of a second-order status, while essentializing the distinction between "women" and "men". Furthermore, politicizing the binary means underlining its constructed character and its functionality for upholding heteronormativity and intersectional dimensions of power and domination. Working with a politicized rather than an essentialized binary indicates its limits and the fact that it does not cover the entirety of lived or potentially livable and desired sexes_genders and sexualities. Transdualism undermines its exclusionary either/or logic.

As such, the sex_gender binary can be activated for the analysis and critique of a given system of power and domination, but it cannot function as its cure. Positive measures, subsidies and gender equality or empowerment programs can no longer be awarded on the criteria that someone "is a woman". An in-between step one could say is when someone is "discriminated as a woman". However, the more precise formulation from a queer intersectional perspective would be when someone is discriminated against "due to their gender", or simply is discriminated against. This acknowledges that it is very often unclear whether a person is discriminated against as a woman, or a trans or an inter person, or a man, because discrimination may occur due to an entanglement of racism, capitalism, ableism, coloniality and heteronormativity. Any of these dimensions has particular effects on living a sexed, gendered, or sexual life; yet, it is impossible to disentangle their complex interplay.

Rather, there is a need for spaces of self-naming, solidarity and collective organizing from which political demands can be defined, negotiated, issued, re-negotiated and re-defined. It might very well be the case that persons designated as, among other things, "masculine" make a claim for and gain support under a gender equality framework. Under the headline "empowering women and girls", this would be impossible, because it is built on the premise of an overarching structural disadvantage of women compared to men. Yet, on the one hand, it is necessary to acknowledge that there are persons designated as women who are so privileged (and, possibly, in powerful positions, and/or positions from where they can enact violence) that no social equality framework would justify reinforcing their privilege through affirmative action. On the other hand, it is as important to recognize that there are masculinities (or people whose masculinity is put into question) that are

vulnerable to all kinds of discrimination and violence. While facing this might seem discomfiting and arduous, it brings us closer to the realization of intersectional justice. Queerversity—as a political corrective, an ethical attitude and an aesthetic strategy—is the principle needed to live the aporia of difference, that is, to respect difference while striving for equality.

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Part 3: Care, Work and Family

Interview With Shahra Razavi: Global Trends, Challenges and Controversies in the Areas of Care, Work and Family Relations

Kristina Lanz

1. Introduction

This interview opens the chapter on transitioning to gender equality in the areas of care, work and the family. In the interview, Kristina Lanz discusses some of the global challenges and controversies related to women's access to work and the distribution of paid and unpaid work inside and outside the household with Shahra Razavi. Shahra Razavi is Director of the Social Protection Department at the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and former Chief of Data and Research at UN Women. She is a well-known gender expert and long-term advocate for gender equality.

The interview takes a closer look at the data that are and, more importantly, also at the data that are not, available, when it comes to monitoring progress on SDG 5, in particular in the areas of paid and unpaid work. It highlights that, despite a huge lack of globally comparable data, there are strong indications that gender inequality remains most persistent in the area of unpaid work, with women globally spending about three times more time than men on unpaid care and domestic work. Not surprisingly, this has vast knock-on effects on other areas as well and, notably, negatively affects the quality and quantity of paid employment available to women.

Thus, despite the fact that "women's economic empowerment" is high on the policy agenda of diverse public and corporate actors, women are still less likely to be gainfully employed than men, the gender wage gap is still huge, and the majority of women's employment remains informal, with little or no social protection. In the interview, Shahra Razavi repeatedly highlights the importance of adopting a human rights perspective, not least when assessing claims of "economic empowerment". She also makes clear that, in order to achieve greater gender equality in the distribution of paid and unpaid work and for men and women to be able to realize their rights, social protection systems are crucial.

The interview also picks up important discussions on the role of men and masculinity in these debates, on the intersectional and globalized dimensions of work and care (i.e., care chains), and on the challenges of adopting a non-binary lens, when

analyzing and assessing progress in gender equality, in the areas of care, work and the family.

2. Interview with Shahra Razavi

KL: How do you evaluate global progress towards SDG 5—to achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls? Which targets are on track of being achieved and which are lagging? Why?

SR: This is a good starting point for reminding ourselves how unequipped we are when it comes to assessing trends in the achievement of gender equality. Although gender equality is a prominent and cross-cutting feature of the 2030 Agenda, and in the SDG indicator framework a total of 53 indicators are gender-specific, a lack of gender data, and the absence of gender-specific indicators across all goals, especially the environmental ones, makes it difficult to establish gender equality baselines. Trend data, which are essential for assessing the direction and pace of progress—which is what you are asking—are also lacking. As the 2018 UN Women report, *Turning Promises into Action*, showed, only 24% of the data needed to monitor the gender-specific indicators is recent, that is, from 2010 or later. Additionally, even more worrying is that only 17% of it is available for two or more points in time—allowing for a trend analysis. Without timely and reliable information about gender equality and the status of women, it is impossible to know whether measures taken to address gender inequality have the desired effect, and whether women and girls are benefiting from the broader measures taken to address the economic, social and environmental targets set out in the 2030 Agenda.

However, with the limited data that is available, we can see a number of positive trends. There are increasing numbers of women in parliament, more girls have completed secondary education, and more women have access to contraception. However, overall, efforts to advance gender equality and women’s human rights have stalled, and gender inequality remains stubbornly in place in many domains.

For example, women and girls around the world are 4% more likely on average to live in extreme poverty than men and boys, and the risk rises to 25% for women in their peak reproductive years (i.e., 25–34 years) (UN Women 2018). Intimate partner violence remains pervasive around the world, with nearly one in every five women and girls in the 15–49 age group reporting physical and/or sexual violence by an intimate partner over the past 12 months. Globally, the

labor force participation rate (LFPR) for women aged 25–54 actually decreased from 64% in 1998 to 63% in 2018. At the same time, women spend nearly three times the amount of time that men spend on unpaid care and domestic work. Based on data for 61 developing countries, in 80% of households without access to water on the premises, women and girls are responsible for water collection. While nearly 39% of employed women globally are working in agriculture, forestry and fisheries, only 14% of all landholders are women.

These are global averages, and we need to dig deeper to see where the gender gaps are at their widest. For example, when it comes to the prevalence of intimate partner violence, Oceania (excluding Australia and New Zealand) has the highest prevalence rate (34.7%), while rates in Central and Southern Asia (23.0%) and Sub-Saharan Africa (21.5%) are also above the global average (of 18%). In terms of LFPR among women, the highest rate in 2018 was in Europe and Northern America (80%), while the lowest was in Northern Africa and Western Asia (33%). Not surprisingly, the gender gap in unpaid care and domestic work is also at its widest in the Northern Africa and Western Asia region, where the median female-to-male ratio is almost six.

With progress slowing down, or even reversing in some areas, the picture of gender equality across the globe is far from where it needs to be, and at the current pace, most SDG targets will not be met by 2030. Too many women remain without access to decent work. Long and arduous unpaid care and domestic workloads continue to limit women’s enjoyment of human rights in several areas. Violence against women and girls in diverse forms persists. Levels of maternal mortality remain unacceptably high, particularly in situations of conflict and crisis. Women continue to be excluded from decision-making at many levels.

- KL: One of the most resistant areas to change seems to be in the area of care work, which is still disproportionately in the hands of women. Which are the main factors contributing to the persistence of the unequal distribution of care?
- SR: Yes, the limited data that we have from time use surveys confirm your point about the persistent inequalities in the area of unpaid care and domestic work—an important target under Goal 5. This work, as we know, is what sustains individuals and families from day to day, and from one generation to the next. It “produces” people and sets the foundation for all other economic activities. Yet, as you correctly point out, women shoulder the bulk of this work around the world. The performance of unpaid domestic tasks is particularly

arduous in contexts where even basic infrastructure, such as water on tap or clean energy, is not available, accessible and affordable to help reduce the drudgery of having to fetch water and fuel, grind food ingredients and prepare meals. Additionally, caring for a sick child or elderly parent can be extremely time-consuming and difficult where quality and affordable health services are not within reach, and time and money has to be spent accompanying those who are sick to medical facilities that are far away. This means that less time is available for other activities, such as earning an income, pursuing education or training, political and community affairs, as well as rest and leisure.

Gender inequalities in the division of unpaid care and domestic work are driven by multiple factors. For a start, dominant social and cultural norms that define care work as women's work constitute a significant barrier to the re-negotiation and redistribution of this work between women and men within families. At the same time, the gendered structure of the paid economy, evident in the gender-based segregation of labor markets with persistent gender pay gaps, as well as property regimes that favor men, also reward men as breadwinners and reinforce women's "specialization" in care work. In contexts where the work culture and/or low wages/earnings demand long hours of paid work, and where childcare services are inaccessible and/or unaffordable, couples are effectively incentivized to replicate a traditional division of labor for the care and reproduction of their families, especially if they have young children. For single-parent families, the majority single mothers, it means having to juggle some form of paid work with unpaid care work, sometimes with support from other family members.

Based on data from 40 high and upper middle-income countries with harmonized data, lone mother households with young children have higher rates of poverty when compared to dual parent households with young children across every country (UN Women 2019). The rates and magnitude of this difference in poverty rates varies substantially: Luxemburg stands out with the largest percentage point difference (50.4), followed by Czechia (42.4), Canada (40.0) and the United States (37.2).

KL: How can these differences be explained?

SR: Single parents lack the additional resources of a partner who lives in the same household. At the same time, they also do not have the additional in-kind support of a partner in the form of unpaid care time. This puts them and their children in a difficult bind. The generosity of social protection systems,

and in particular parental leave policies when they are paid, and the availability of affordable childcare services, are two important factors that contribute to the cross-national variation in single-parent poverty. As Nieuwenhuis and Maldonado (2018) show, by facilitating single parents' employment, parental leave—if it is paid—can help reduce the poverty risks of single parents. Generous child benefits and other forms of support, for example with housing costs and childcare expenses, can also make a significant difference in the incidence of poverty, by increasing single parents' disposable income.

KL: What is the role of men in the care debate? What is hindering men from taking on a larger share of care giving and how can this be changed?

SR: Moving towards gender equality in the care domain demands major changes in men's working lives: women have increasingly taken on paid work in addition to unpaid care and domestic work, but there has been little movement in the opposite direction, i.e. men taking on more of the care work. I think, again, there are two sides to men's resistance to change: cultural/normative, as well as material/economic. The strong association of masculinity with being a breadwinner and provider discourages men from taking on what is perceived as feminine roles, bathing children or cleaning the home. These cultural constructions are often reinforced through discriminatory economic patterns, where, for example, men's earnings are higher than women's, making it easier for a heterosexual couple to adopt a traditional gender division of labor, especially if one person has to cut back on paid work in order to care for a young child or elderly parent. Paradoxically, in contexts where men's identity as the breadwinner is under threat, due to high rates of structural unemployment and difficulties in finding paid work, they may be even more resistant to taking on what are perceived as feminine roles.

However, policies do matter and can make a difference, even if the pace of change is slow. Much has been said about the "daddy quotas" that countries like Sweden have adopted, which mandate a portion of parental leave for fathers on a "use it or lose it" basis. Beyond encouraging men to bond with their young children, policies of this sort also send a powerful message that disrupts dominant masculinities and femininities. Unfortunately, these kinds of policies have little purchase in developing countries, where labor markets are extensively informal and few people have entitlement to any form of leave.

KL: Are there specific national or regional differences that are noticeable in the area of care work, for example regarding the amount of time spent on unpaid

domestic and care work done by women and men? How can these be explained? Moreover, is there enough data to compare different regions?

SR: Globally, as already mentioned, women do three times as much unpaid care and domestic work as men do, though gender inequalities vary across countries and are particularly stark in developing country contexts. The gender gap in unpaid care and domestic work is at its widest in the Northern Africa and Western Asia region, where the median female-to-male ratio is almost six. The gender inequalities do not disappear in high-income countries, but they are not as glaring. What explains the relatively smaller gender gaps in unpaid care and domestic work in high-income countries? Detailed research in countries like Australia and the United States shows that the narrowing of gender gaps is largely due to the reduction of routine domestic work that has been typically performed by women, by using domestic technology, out-sourcing the work, or simply leaving it undone, while it has been much more difficult to renegotiate the gender division of care work.

Data from Australia and the United States show that women have decreased their housework as their earnings have increased, along the lines predicted by household bargaining models. However, while women do use their income-based bargaining power to reduce their own unpaid work, they either cannot, or “don’t try to use it to increase their husband’s housework.” Instead, they either replace their own time with purchased services, outsourcing some of the work to other women, or leave housework undone. Even when women and men are both in full-time employment and contribute equally to household income, women still do more unpaid care and domestic work than men. The power of social norms is especially evident where women’s earning capacity exceeds that of their husbands: in this case, the evidence suggests that women still tend to do more housework than their husbands, as if to “neutralize” the “deviance” of their husband’s financial dependence (Bittman et al. 2003).

UN Women, like other international organizations, has, in its various reports, compared data from time use surveys from around the world—but with a big warning sign, since time use surveys are not harmonized. This is a major impediment to rigorous comparative analysis, and there is an urgent need for the better harmonization of time use data and the better alignment of survey methodologies. The other problem in this area is that there are not many countries, especially developing ones, with more than one time-use survey to allow trend analysis; and in some instances where countries have multiple

surveys, they are not comparable, due to changing methodologies. These lacunas point to the need for more harmonization across surveys.

KL: Care work is generally seen as “unproductive”, as it does not contribute to economic growth, which under our current neoliberal development paradigm, is the main measure of development and progress. How can this perception of care work as non-productive be challenged, and how can the real value of care be adequately measured and rewarded?

SR: You are right about unpaid care work being perceived by some dominant schools of thought, most notably neoclassical economics, as “unproductive”. In the international System of National Accounts (SNA), which is used to calculate Gross Domestic Product—or GDP—the “gold standard” for measuring economic performance, services for self-provisioning such as cooking, cleaning and caring for household members without any monetary exchange, were excluded from SNA, and hence, were not counted as part of a country’s GDP. The same oversight is reflected in social security systems that provide paid leave or old age pension to individuals based on their labor market contributions—but not unpaid contributions in the form of time spent caring for others. So, those who have spent a lifetime caring for others can end up with little or no income security in their old age, unless they are “lucky” enough to be counted as a “dependent” of a breadwinner.

However, I do think that this dominant paradigm is facing some serious questioning, most notably by feminist economics, which has been very effective in showing the importance of the “invisible” economy of care and social reproduction, through both analytical/theoretical as well as empirical work. The idea that unpaid care work reproduces labor—a key factor of production—and thereby creates the foundation of all other economic activities, has had significant resonance within both the economics discipline, as well as in the policy world. Using time use data and “valuation exercises”, including satellite accounts,¹ feminist economists have shown the significance and sheer volume of unpaid work compared to other parts of the economy. At the same time, under the auspices of the ILO, the nineteenth International Conference of Labour Statisticians in 2013 adopted a resolution concerning statistics of work,

¹ A satellite account measures unpaid activities including childcare, adult care, household services and volunteering services, each of which is an important aspect of people’s lives and well-being, but is largely missing from regular economic statistics such as the gross domestic product (GDP).

employment and labor underutilization, which redefined “work activities” to include all forms of work, including unpaid domestic and care work. That resolution, along with renewed efforts at the international and national level, to undertake time use surveys should give further impetus to time use data collection and availability, enabling a more complete picture of work, and of the economy necessary for better policy-making and greater accountability to women.

I think both the arguments and the evidence have made a difference, however small: for example, many countries now include “care credits” in their pension systems for time taken out of paid work to care for a young child. In some countries, concerns about low fertility, due to the incompatibility of paid work with having children, has compelled governments to put in place social policies to support families, for example, through the provision of childcare services. However, I think that we still have a long way to go before policy-makers, whether in national governments or international financial institutions, fully understand that the social infrastructure is as important as the physical infrastructure like bridges and dams, and to re-orient their spending priorities along these lines. Today’s dominant austerity mindset, which is eroding the social infrastructure and working at cross-purposes with the 2030 Agenda, is blind to this understanding.

KL: Women’s economic empowerment is currently very high on the agenda of the World Bank, various companies (such as Coca Cola, Nike and Goldman Sachs), private foundations (such as the Clinton and Gates foundations), and private sector associations (such as the World Economic Forum), who have all made gender equality and women’s empowerment a priority. Some see this as a major success of bringing gender equality onto the agenda; others, however, criticize this trend as a highly problematic appropriation of feminist ideas in order to create “new markets and sources of profit for capital.”² How do you evaluate this trend, and where does it lead to?

SR: Yes, you are right, in recent years, a wide range of actors—bilateral and multilateral donor agencies, governments, civil society organizations and the private sector—have embraced the goal of women’s economic empowerment.

² See Roberts (2012). “Financial Crisis, Financial Firms . . . And Financial Feminism? The Rise of ‘Transnational Business Feminism’ and the Necessity of Marxist-Feminist IPE.” *Socialist Studies/Études Socialistes* 8: 85–108, p. 85).

The change in discourse is a significant achievement of the women's movement, which has been able to catapult a concept that was developed in feminist research and advocacy networks (empowerment) into the mainstream of policy debate. However, as in the case of other concepts that have gained widespread traction (e.g. participation, good governance and so on), up-take by powerful actors and institutions often means that the concepts are reinterpreted and used in ways that fit the predispositions of those who use them. In the process, they lose their original clarity and edge, and often become fuzzy and ambiguous.

This is quite clear in the way that "empowerment" is being used these days. Some see in women a largely untapped market of consumers (good for boosting profits), while others talk about unleashing women's economic power and potential as a means to solve the lingering problems caused by the global financial crisis and stalled growth (good for growth). No one would deny the importance of nurturing synergies between women's economic empowerment and wider prosperity. Women's participation in the workforce, for example, contributes to economic dynamism, by bringing more income into the household, boosting aggregate demand, and expanding the tax base (and hence the revenues available for public expenditure). A fundamental question, however, that we need to ask is whether these presumed win-win scenarios stand up to scrutiny, and what is in it for women? Does it expand women's practical enjoyment of their rights? Or does it simply harness their time, knowledge and resourcefulness to serve development ends, with little or no benefit to women themselves?

This is where a strong anchoring within a human rights framework becomes essential. Without a monitoring framework that squarely focuses on women's rights, it is difficult to know what lies behind the lofty claims of "empowering women". Going beyond the headline figures on women's labor force participation or the number of jobs created, we need to ask if women's participation in the workforce translates into concrete outcomes, in terms of their right to a safe and healthy working environment, fair and adequate earnings and access to a pension for their elderly years, and whether they are able to reduce and redistribute their unpaid care work. These are exactly the kinds of questions that we asked in *Progress of the World's Women 2015–2016, Transforming Economies, Realizing Rights*. The report showed that the world's women are a long way away from enjoying their economic and social rights. Not only is women's labor force participation lagging behind men's, there is a significant global gender wage gap (on average, 24%) that has changed very little over the past decade; the bulk of women's employment (75% or more in some

developing regions) remains informal, and with little or no social protection, and women around the world spend considerably more time on unpaid care and domestic work compared to men.

However, now that we have women's economic empowerment on the agenda of such diverse, and powerful, actors as the development agencies and banks and the United Nations, we need to be more probing, to make sure that the right laws, policies, resources and social norms are in place, to make meaningful changes in women's concrete enjoyment of their rights. As Gita Sen (2004) has argued, the struggle of getting women's rights on the policy agenda "is not a once-and-for-all event . . . winning the struggle over discourse is only the first step".

In moving forward, those advocating for women's economic empowerment would do well to keep their eyes on the ground, to scrutinize the extent to which women are able to enjoy not only their equal right to work, but also their rights at work—to decent work with social protection, equal and adequate earnings, safe and healthy working conditions, and access to quality child care services. Women's economic empowerment cannot mean factories that collapse on their workers, casual work in global value chains that comes with low wages, no right to social protection, and work that leads to "burn out" in a short time. Nor can it mean an extended "double shift" made up of paid work added to an unchanged load of unpaid care work.

KL: Yet, proponents of this neoliberal agenda of "women's empowerment" will point out how women's access to paid work is increasing, and highlight how even women working under terrible conditions, for example in the Bangladeshi clothing industry, feel empowered, as their job helped them to escape patriarchal structures in their home villages. How can one counter these claims?

SR: I think it is important to reiterate that having the right to work and an income of one's own is important for gender equality: it gives women greater power and a voice within their families and intimate relationships, a leg to stand on, and an exit option when those relationships break down, for example, in cases of domestic violence. It is an important source of socioeconomic security for women themselves, apart from any contribution it makes to the well-being of their families. However, we often use blunt indicators to measure progress in this area—for example comparing male and female employment rates, which says nothing about the quality of work (rights at work), the extent

of gender-based segregation, the gender pay gap, or the social rights that come with work.

However, even when we look at such a blunt indicator, there are reasons to be concerned. Not only are gender gaps in employment still significant in many parts of the world, progress in closing gender gaps has stalled over the past couple of decades, except in Latin America and Western Europe. Additionally, this is despite significant improvements in female education. In some regions, such as South Asia, the gender gap in labor force participation has actually grown.

Moreover, despite the gains in female education, there is little evidence of women moving out of traditional, female-dominated activities and diversifying the paid work that they do. Nor have we seen a movement in the opposite direction, i.e. men diversifying their paid work and moving into female-dominated occupations. A number of studies in developing countries, in fact, show that from 1980 to 2011, labor market segregation by gender has grown in more countries than where it has fallen. Gender-based labor market segregation underpins the persistence of the gender pay gap.

- KL: The increased entry of women into the labor force also leads to a shifting of care responsibilities –while richer households often import care and domestic workers from poorer countries, such as the Philippines or Indonesia, these in turn often have to leave their own children in the care of relatives in order to work abroad. How do you evaluate this phenomenon?
- SR: The concept of a global care chain, which was first coined by Arlie Hochschild (2000), is very powerful, because it makes power inequalities very visible in the way care is organized, not only nationally, but transnationally. Both historically and to this day, women and girls from the poor rural hinterland, and from marginalized racial and ethnic communities, have been the quintessential care-providers for the better-off social groups, even when women from the dominant groups were not seeking paid work. In fact, having a nanny or a domestic worker who would take care of all housekeeping responsibilities and childcare was a sign of the affluence of the “leisure class”. In the context of globalization, those relationships have been globalized—it is no longer only migrant women from the rural hinterland who provide domestic and care work for affluent families in London, New York or Buenos Aires, but also migrant women from across borders, for example, the Philippines, El Salvador or Peru. Additionally, in many instances, the care work is delegated to them, as

women from more affluent households seek paid work outside the home. To say that 21st century realities point to “care going global” is not to suggest that care labor migration and its social and familial consequences are historically unprecedented. It is well known, for example, that the great bulk of immigrants from Ireland to the United States, before, during and after the Irish famine of the 1850s were young, unmarried and impoverished women and men seeking wage work; large numbers of the women worked in domestic service, much like their counterparts in Europe (Donato and Gabaccia 2015). Perhaps what is new, is that those who migrate to work as domestic and care workers are married women who leave their own children behind to be cared for by a female relative or migrant woman from the rural hinterland.

Equally important, as you say, and as reports such as those by McKinsey do not say, is that in the case of women in low-income households who cannot afford to out-source their unpaid care and domestic work to others lower down the class/racial/global hierarchy, an increase in paid work often means a “double shift” that leaves them depleted and/or compels them to reduce the time they allocate to care (for themselves and others). As informal women workers interviewed in a WIEGO study by Laura Alfes put it, “our children do not get the attention they deserve” (Alfes 2016). In the absence of affordable care services, and men’s reluctance to take on more of the unpaid work, women in poor households have to make harsh choices between earning an income and caring for their dependents and themselves. Likewise, commenting on the challenges of parenting in the Caribbean region, Rhoda Reddock (2009) describes how poor women in Trinidad and Tobago, some of whom work as janitors and security guards to support their families, complain of their inability to monitor their children’s behavior, or pay others to do so.

- KL: What role should the state play in encouraging a fairer distribution of care work, not only between women and men and the younger and the older generation, but also between richer and poorer households and nations?
- SR: One of the lessons that has been learnt from Europe, and particularly so from the Nordic countries as “late developers”, is that social policy is not a drag on economic development (fiscal cost), but if democratically designed and managed, it can be an enabler of both human rights and economic dynamism—what the Malawian-Swedish political economist, Thandika Mkandawire (2001), calls developmental social policy.

To enhance women's economic autonomy, in addition to much-needed investments in basic infrastructure like water on tap—to reduce the drudgery of unpaid domestic work—the key priority must be to invest in care systems, as in the case of Uruguay, which has become “best practice” in the region. Starting in 2007, the Government of Uruguay engaged in extensive civil society consultations in order to redesign its social protection framework. Women's rights advocates actively participated in this process, placing care squarely onto the government agenda. The ensuing National Care System is explicitly framed around gender equality and the human rights of caregivers, both paid and unpaid, as well as care receivers, including children, older people and people with disabilities. In developing countries, investments in early childhood education and care services (ECEC) are particularly urgent. This is because of the very large gap between the supply of childcare services and the need for such services, owing to the relatively small childcare workforce and the high proportion of young children in the population.

Yet, social policy, like economic policy, can look over (or over-look) gender equality, as Mary Daly (2011) puts it, when it is oriented to other objectives, for example, investing in children's human capital or school readiness. Gender equality and the rights of adult women—whether as unpaid family caregivers or childcare workers staffing ECEC programs—are all too often an afterthought. While the availability, affordability and quality of childcare services, including their location and opening hours, are pivotal for women's ability to access paid work, ECEC services are not often designed with women's needs and aspirations in mind. However, there are examples to show that both objectives can be achieved.

Apart from Nordic countries where children's rights and development have been center stage along with strong public support to promote gender equality, there are also a handful of developing countries where efforts are being made to gradually transform ECEC provision in ways that respond to women's rights. In both Chile and Ecuador, for example, service quality has been up-graded and adjustments have been made to the schedules of childcare centers to better respond to the needs of working parents, and to improve the employment conditions and wages of their predominantly female staff.

Furthermore, when the conditions of employment are good, investments in care services can also generate “decent work”. Using a simulation exercise, we looked at what it would cost to extend *free* childcare services for children under

the age of five in two countries: Uruguay and South Africa (UN Women 2018). In South Africa, for example, making these services universally available for all children under five would take a gross annual investment of 3.2% of GDP. This represents a significant fiscal outlay, but the potential returns are also high. The expansion could create 2–3 million new jobs, for example, and raise female employment rates by 10 percentage points. Additionally, the new tax and social security revenue from these jobs would help recover more than a third of the initial fiscal outlay.

KL: There has been increasing acknowledgement of intersectional forms of discrimination in the work place, in the family and beyond, i.e. The fact that the way women experience particular forms of injustice and discrimination is determined by various factors, such as their age, ethnicity, economic position etc. Less attention has been paid to the fact that men's relative advantages are also determined by these factors, and that, under certain circumstances, some men may be more vulnerable than (certain) women. Do you think more needs to be done to highlight the different status positions of men?

SR: I think it is a truism that men do not form a homogeneous category, in the same way that women do not, even if men share certain common privileges by virtue of their masculine identity. Whether we look at educational outcomes, wealth ownership, or political representation, in most societies, we can identify groups of men who are worse-off on all these dimensions compared to certain groups of women. Feminist analysis would recognize how intersecting hierarchies of gender, race, class and migration status can produce such outcomes. The "Davos man", in the words of Lourdes Beneria (1999), stands in a very different space in the globalized economy compared to the superfluous man of the industrial rustbelt, whether in the US, China or Nigeria, whose labor is no longer needed. So, in response to your question, yes, under certain circumstances some men may be more vulnerable than some women. When unable to provide economically, it is not easy for men, or women, to see fathering in any other way.

I think on the whole, feminists have been attentive to "difference", i.e., recognizing that women are not a homogeneous social group, and that their experiences of injustice and discrimination are shaped by other dimensions of their identities, especially those of race and class. This perspective in fact grew as a result of feminist contestations and praxis, even before the term intersectionality was coined. Socialist feminists, for example, understood that subordination was differently experienced by women who occupied different places in class and racial hierarchies. There were lively, and sometimes bitter, debates in the

context of international women's conferences about North/South and East/West hierarchies, when feminists from the South and East (the "Communist bloc") argued that white Western feminists could not speak for all women. Differences in sexual identity were another source of debate, with lesbian women claiming their own place in women's movements and exposing the heteronormative presumptions of some feminists.

KL: Nevertheless, little attention has been paid to the position of individuals identifying as non-binary in debates around work, care and family. Do you think it is important to open up the notion of gender to not only include men and women in all their complexity, but to also include non-binary notions of gender? If not, why not? If yes, how can we measure and portray progress towards gender equality in an inclusive way that does not reinforce binary notions of gender and includes intersecting categories of discrimination? Moreover, what does this mean from a policy perspective?

SR: In the debates on work, care and family, there is a small but growing literature exploring the division of unpaid care and domestic work among same-sex couples, showing that it can be more egalitarian than among opposite-sex couples, given that they do not follow a set "gender script" in the way that heterosexual couples do. Systematic survey data are generally too scarce to allow proper exploration, but some countries such as Australia are beginning to produce it. Interestingly, as we show in the *Progress of the World's Women*, unpaid domestic work in Australia, such as cooking, laundry and gardening, was more equally shared between same-sex couples compared to opposite-sex couples (based on 2016 data). However, we should also bear in mind that not all same-sex couples may feel comfortable declaring their identity to survey enumerators, so there may be a bias in the sample towards more professional, urban, higher educated couples—characteristics that often correlate with a more egalitarian division of unpaid domestic work among heterosexual couples too.

The need to open up gender identities beyond the male/female binary is an important on-going debate, again, at times, highly contentious, which is putting many (perhaps especially older) feminists (like myself) outside of their comfort zones. From a human rights perspective, categories that put people in a straitjacket are stigmatizing and discriminatory, and hence need to be disrupted, though I am not sure where that will take us in terms of measurement/statistics. At the very least, as is happening in some countries, individuals can be given the option of choosing a gender identity that is neither

male nor female in national ID cards and vital registration systems. It should also be possible for household surveys to do the same.

In policy terms, the issues can be clearer. As we show in the 2019–2020 Progress of the World’s Women Report, older LGBTI people, for example, can experience specific hurdles in accessing care as they age, because they are more likely than their cisgender, heterosexual counterparts to live alone, to be single, to not have children and to not be in touch with their biological families. For example, in the United Kingdom, just over a quarter of gay and bisexual men over the age of 55 and half of lesbian and bisexual women over 55 have children, compared to nearly 9 in 10 heterosexual people of the same age. This means that their care needs may be left unaddressed. With smaller family support networks, many older LGBTI people may rely on non-familial care services to meet their care needs as they age, as well as on friends and community members who may form a self-defined “family of choice”. Reliance on external care providers can come with particular anxieties for older LGBTI people. They may worry about experiencing stigma and discrimination by care providers, or feel concern that their same-sex partner or “family of choice” will not be recognized as next-of-kin for medical decision-making. They may also worry that their LGBTI identity may be “eroded” in care settings. For example, carers may overlook medical issues related to the sex that transgender older people were assigned at birth, such as osteoporosis or prostate cancer. Hence, countries that rely heavily on families to meet long-term care needs will inadequately cover the needs of LGBTI populations.

KL: Which issues in the area of care, work and family do you think deserve more scrutiny and research in the coming decades?

SR: I will highlight two issues where I think we need to pay more attention and do more work. The first, an obvious one, is on the measurement of unpaid care work. We need better standardization of the methodologies of time use to make time use surveys comparable across countries. In doing so, we also need to make better use of modern technologies, to make it easier and cheaper to measure time use. Hopefully, this will also make it feasible to have more regular surveys, so that we can have trend data and be able to see the impact of certain policies on people’s time use. The second area where we need to pay greater attention to is in making the case for care policies, by showing the many direct and indirect benefits of investing in care systems. The example I gave you of the costing exercise we did for Uruguay and South Africa is just one example. However, we need more studies that can capture not only the costs of,

but also the benefits of, investing in care systems, both in terms of employment generation (which was done very well in the 2018 report on Care Work by the ILO) (ILO 2018), as well as its benefits in many other ways; for example, by having more inclusive societies and dynamic economies.

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Care and Work Matter: A Social Sustainability Approach

Charlotta Niemistö, Jeff Hearn and Carolyn Kehn

1. Introduction

While focusing primarily on gender equality, UN Social Development Goal (SDG) 5 is interlinked with, and has profound implications for, all SDG goals. As UN Women states:

Women and girls, everywhere, must have equal rights and opportunity, and be able to live free of violence and discrimination. Women's equality and empowerment is one of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals, but also integral to all dimensions of inclusive and sustainable development. In short, all the SDGs depend on the achievement of Goal 5. (UN Women 2020b)

According to the UN, reaching gender equality by 2030 requires urgent action to eliminate all the different kinds of discrimination that continue to restrain women's rights in both private and public spheres (UN Economic and Social Council 2019). These discriminations range from gender-based violence, child marriages, and restrictions in sexual and reproductive rights, to limited access to positions of power in political spheres and working life. Gender equality and women's empowerment are thus central to the fulfilment of all SDGs.

Furthermore, gender inequalities—as well as other types of discrimination—persist; moreover, they are often obscured by societal expectations related to gender, age, generation and care, in families and households, and paid work, employment and workplaces: in short, work–family life relations. In this way, many economic, social and political discriminations and inequalities are founded upon inequalities around gender, care and work. Importantly, the home, family and household are both a place of unpaid work and care—as in unpaid domestic activities, childcare, care for old people and dependents, and indeed agricultural, industrial and family business work—and for some a place of paid work and employment, as in home-based work for money. Additionally, for some social groupings, such as old people and people with disabilities supported with care services, their home becomes a workplace for professional carers and other workers, often not under their control. Care not only signifies *caring about* someone or something in a general sense, but also involves

caring for someone or something in a material and practical way (see Tronto 1993), and thus often involves work, as represented in the notion of *care work*, along with freedom from violence and the threat of violence.

Feminist scholarship has demonstrated how care is a central category for analysis of societies, states and welfare states (Tronto 1993; Pfau-Effinger 2005), with intersections between state, market, and family. Unpaid care and domestic work are unequally distributed: women on average do about 2.6 times these kinds of work than men do, in terms of time use (UN Economic and Social Council 2017). This hinders women's participation in working and political life, and restricts their economic independence at a given point in time, and cumulatively later in life. A more gender-equal, global re-distribution of work that addresses questions of work and care for men, women and further genders is undoubtedly needed (Littig and Griessler 2005, p. 72). Thus, this chapter examines these issues of care and work, in terms of the central importance of care itself, and the relations of care, work, family and life, through a social sustainability approach, which considers the ability of society to maintain its demands for production and reproduction given its current means, all of which presently are intensely gendered.

2. Social Sustainability

These questions of the relations of care, work, family and life are usefully approached through social sustainability, one of the three pillars of sustainability, along with environmental and economic sustainability (WCED 1987; UN 1992). Regarding analytical and theoretical underpinnings, the social dimension of sustainability has been described as the least clear of the three aspects of sustainable development (Lehtonen 2004; Littig and Griessler 2005). Social sustainability comprises both: (i) the sustainability of people in terms of health, knowledge, skills and motivation, sometimes referred to as 'human capital'; and (ii) the sustainability of institutions where 'human capital' can be maintained and developed (or not), also referred to as 'social capital' (Bourdieu 1986; Coleman 1988; Putnam 1995; Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998; Woolcock and Narayan 2000).

Social sustainability is further defined as a 'quality of societies', signifying different kinds of relations of nature and society mediated by work and gendered relations more generally within society (see Littig and Griessler 2005, p. 72). The social and the societal aspects of social sustainability are often blurred, incorporating political (institutions), cultural (cultural practices and social orders, moral concepts and religion) and local sustainability (Hearn 2014), including, for example, the quality of communal, family, household and marriage relations (Ahmed 2008). Separating

the economic from the social, and assuming economy can be detached from social context, have been critiqued (Lehtonen 2004), for example, in terms of the possibilities for and extent of poverty alleviation (Ahmed 2014). Work, paid or unpaid, and care are central to sustainable development in terms of production and reproduction (Littig and Griessler 2005).

3. Social Relations of Care and Work in Diverse Contexts

The gendered social relations of care and work are one of the central questions in the intersections of working life, changing family and household forms, technological development and innovation, and demographic change. There is clearly a vast array of different family and household forms across the globe (Blofeld and Filgueira 2018). In some parts of the world, the supposedly traditional nuclear family of two heterosexual parents and children living together is in fact far from the norm, whether through the persistence of extended and communal family forms, the growth of single-person households, the level of separations and divorce, and of reconstituted and rainbow (LGBTIQ+) families, and the impacts of shorter- or longer-term migrations, such as when parents work elsewhere and send remittances, whilst grandparents, family members and neighbours care for children and each other. Global care chains are key parts of transnational relations of care and work (Yeates 2009; Orozco 2010), simultaneously enabling what may appear to be a more liberating and egalitarian situation for some, and yet reproducing inequalities for others.

Similarly, in terms of what is understood as work, there is a large spectrum of diversity across paid and unpaid work; for example, in some countries, work includes the daily drawing water from a well, whereas in others it might largely concern childcare or production line work. According to UN Women (2020a), women are especially strongly represented in informal work, making up as much as 95 percent in South Asia and 89 percent in Sub-Saharan Africa of those doing such informal work as street vendors, subsistence farmers, seasonal workers, domestic workers. As the International Labour Organization (ILO) explains:

In the world of paid work there is a continuum that runs from employed to underemployed to unemployed to discouraged workers. On another axis, we can distinguish workers by status of employment such as employer, employee (salaried and waged worker), own account, causal/temporary/informal, and unpaid family worker; there is yet another distinction in terms of the place of work between street, home-based, or formal place of work. In the world of unpaid work, there exist differences

between the type of activity (subsistence production, direct care, indirect care, procurement of intermediate inputs) and location (home, private or common lands, public buildings) where the activity is performed, as well as who the direct individual beneficiaries are (household members, communities, institutions). (Antonopoulos 2009, p. 11)

In many parts of the world, (post-)industrial working life is intensifying, with the 24/7 economy, impacts of information and communication technologies (ICTs), and polarization between high unemployment for some and overwork for others. In many Western and post-industrial societies, there have been trends towards increasing labour market participation of women, more dual-career relationships, and demographic change through ageing and an ageing workforce. Some regions have seen de-development and emiseration of large populations, often concentrated in urban locations and megacities. Major aged, gendered emigrations have affected some areas, for example, parts of Central and East Europe, with severe implications for gendered, ethnicized/racialized care and the care economy in locations both with and without net immigration.

The prevailing strong emphasis on employed work in many societies, perhaps especially in post-industrial societies but also elsewhere, has brought increasing discussions around the sustainability of these changing working life patterns. Even between Western countries, there are significant differences in care ideologies with different levels of more familialistic and de-familialistic contexts. This means different welfare state models and societal views on who should provide care: the family, the state or the market? Different regimes of care can be distinguished, in terms of public and private care regimes (cf. Strell and Duncan 2001; Pfau-Effinger 2005). Previous research has shown connections between different welfare state models, gender contracts and expectations for policies for reconciling work with care responsibilities (Lewis and Smithson 2001) or their existence (Lyness and Kropf 2005; den Dulk 2001), with observed differences depending on socio-political contexts. In societies with more equal gender contracts and/or strong welfare state models, women are likely to participate more fully and more equally in the labour market and, at the same time, these employed women are more likely to feel more entitled to flexible policies to reconcile work with care responsibilities. It has also been shown that having more female superiors in organizations tends to enhance the organizational culture in terms of reconciling work with care responsibilities (Lyness and Kropf 2005). Furthermore, young adults in different welfare state contexts accustomed to different gender contracts probably have different expectations regarding divisions of labour at work and at home. Likewise, knowing about other contexts, for example,

more egalitarian contexts, may also affect the expectations of young adults in these respects (Lewis and Smithson 2001).

The context of state and corporate policies is certainly an important element in the social relations of care and work, and thus of social sustainability. The primary influences on the development of state and corporate level policies for reconciling work with care responsibilities for children include the national legal and cultural context, the level of the state influence in the family sphere, the level of female employment, and the gendered form of the social divisions of care (cf. Esping-Andersen 1990; den Dulk 2001; Lewis and Smithson 2001; Lyness and Kropf 2005). Gender-egalitarian policies on work and care may include, or even converge with, family policies, as feminism is often associated with initiatives for shared responsibilities between spouses. For example, equality policies that aim to encourage greater participation of men in family life and caring responsibilities, and greater participation of women in employment, have been strong in the Nordic region and some other parts of Europe, in contrast to those societies where there is low state or communal support for more equality in care or where a 'housewife culture' has persisted. However, even where the political context broadly promotes equality, this by no means equates with more thoroughgoing realization of gender equality throughout society, and thus indeed social, or societal, sustainability.

In the Anglophone world, the development of family-friendly policies has been largely corporate led (Scheibl and Dex 1998), whereas in the Nordic countries, development has been state led. Even with state-level policies and initiatives towards gender equality and family-friendly work practices, birth rates have declined in many Western countries. Despite such policies, women do not necessarily feel that they can feasibly combine paid work and children (Hobson and Fahlén 2009). In most countries, there is greater reliance on organization-specific policies rather than national legislation. For example, in the United States there is no legal right to take paid leave for care work and maternity leave specifically is limited to a twelve-week period of unpaid leave, a provision largely inaccessible for lower-class women or those in unstable occupations (Berger and Waldfogel 2003). In this context, new policies such as the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2020, which recently provided all federal employees twelve weeks of paid parental leave following childbirth or adoption, are praised for their comprehensive coverage (National Defense 2020). While institutional requirements do improve the situation for a certain population, in this case approximately two million US federal workers, they lack the political empowerment or reliability of a national plan to compensate care work for the majority. The NDAA, similar to many organizational policies,

introduced a measure that would improve care work for its own employees. Yet, given the social and unequal nature of care work in modern society, it is clear that individual steps in the absence of a national standard have little effect on overall culture change.

Importantly, the societal organization of care, as in the private and public *mix* of care, has informed extensive debates and theorizations on gendered welfare (state) and care regime typologies (Anttonen and Sipilä 1996; Boje and Leira 2000). The concept of social care (Daly and Lewis 2000) engages with various complications, tensions and fragmentations in these relations between institutions and between domains that are sometimes dichotomized in the welfare regime literature, such as public and private, formal and informal, paid and unpaid, types of provision, cash and care services. Very often, care provisions are designed for non-migrant, heterosexual family forms; by having a broader focus on social care, many everyday situations of, for example, migrant and LGBTIQ+ families, are made more visible. This visibility, in turn, leads to more nuanced policies on behalf of federal governments and employers which provide greater equality and social sustainability for all workers.

Moreover, in some countries, institutional changes have brought significant shifts in the state of citizenship in relation to care:

The borders demarcating differences in care regimes have become less distinct in retrenched welfare states, as reflected in two processes signaling a weakening of social citizenship rights. First, the expansion of private markets in care services, sustained by low-waged migrant labor that has been occurring across welfare regime types (Hobson et al. 2018; Shire 2015; Williams 2017). The second is the shifting of care obligations back to family members (more often women), particularly for caring for the elderly (van den Broek and Dykstra 2016), generating a new concept in gendering of the welfare state lexicon, refamilialization (Saraceno and Keck 2011). (Hearn and Hobson 2020, p. 157)

Social care, seen as a broad approach to care, caring and care work, is one key building block of social sustainability, even with the complicating trends noted above. Importantly, the societal, and indeed transnational/trans-societal arrangement of social care needs to be considered as differentiated and intersectional, for both analytical and policy purposes. The diverse relations of individuals, families, groups and collectivities to, for example, citizenship, migration, location, and LGBTIQ+, and their associated rights or lack of rights, all relate to the general analytical concept of social sustainability, the development of just legal and policy processes and outcomes, and how these matters are experienced and enacted across time and space.

For example, LGBTIQ+ people may not have equal access to citizenship, migration possibilities, asylum, and thus in turn social care provisions. In addition, policy development and reform necessarily depend on both broad consistent governance frameworks, as well as how implementation works in detail on the ground.

4. Care, Time and Life Stages

Care is gendered (Tronto 1993; McKie et al. 2008). In many contexts, women are still seen as the primary caretakers (Acker 1990; Hochschild 1989, 1997), and globally women carry most care responsibilities in households. The differences between the time allocated by men and women in unpaid and paid work are indeed truly amazing, with huge policy and practical implications for gender equality (Swiebel 1999; Fälth and Blackden 2009). One way of representing this is by considering the amount of time, daily or annually in hours and minutes, spent by women and men on unpaid and paid work, where unpaid work is generally considered to comprise care work and household labour. Reliable data measurements on this are somewhat uneven across the world, for example in parts of what are sometimes referred to as the 'global South' or 'developing countries'. Estimates from UN Women (2020a) suggest that in 'developing countries' women complete an average of 5.09 hours paid work a day and 4.11 hours unpaid work, while the figures for men are 6.36 and 1.31, respectively. In so-called 'developed countries', comparable figures reported are 4.39 hours paid and 3.30 hours unpaid for women, and 5.42 and 1.54 for men, respectively. Table 1 reproduced the latest country figures for OECD countries, along with China, India and South Africa.

Even more telling is the ratio of time spent in *unpaid* to *paid* work for men and women (Table 2). For example, in Italy women report spending over twice as much time on unpaid work as paid work (2.30), whereas men report a quarter of that ratio (0.59), and while the Nordic countries are by no means totally egalitarian, the ratio for Sweden demonstrates the highest parity between the genders.

Table 1. Time spent in minutes daily in unpaid and paid work by women and men.
Source: (OECD 2020).

| Country | Time Spent in Unpaid Work | | Time Spent in Paid Work | |
|---------------------------------|---------------------------|-------|-------------------------|-------|
| | Men | Women | Men | Women |
| Australia | 171.6 | 311.0 | 304.1 | 172.0 |
| Austria | 135.3 | 269.2 | 364.8 | 248.8 |
| Belgium | 144.2 | 237.3 | 273.7 | 199.2 |
| Canada | 148.1 | 223.7 | 340.5 | 268.3 |
| Denmark | 186.1 | 242.8 | 260.1 | 194.6 |
| Estonia | 160.2 | 249.2 | 264.1 | 244.9 |
| Finland | 157.5 | 235.8 | 248.6 | 209.9 |
| France | 134.9 | 224.0 | 235.1 | 175.4 |
| Germany | 150.4 | 242.3 | 289.5 | 205.5 |
| Greece | 95.1 | 259.5 | 274.3 | 184.5 |
| Hungary | 162.3 | 293.8 | 272.7 | 202.5 |
| Ireland | 129.2 | 296.1 | 343.9 | 197.1 |
| Italy | 130.7 | 306.3 | 220.8 | 133.1 |
| Japan | 40.8 | 224.3 | 451.8 | 271.5 |
| Korea | 49.0 | 215.0 | 419.0 | 269.4 |
| Latvia | 129.7 | 253.3 | 376.9 | 288.5 |
| Lithuania | 151.6 | 292.0 | 354.3 | 279.3 |
| Luxembourg | 121.1 | 239.6 | 330.0 | 238.9 |
| Mexico | 136.7 | 383.3 | 485.9 | 250.1 |
| Netherlands | 145.4 | 224.9 | 284.9 | 201.4 |
| New Zealand | 141.0 | 264.0 | 338.0 | 205.0 |
| Norway | 168.5 | 227.4 | 277.4 | 200.0 |
| Poland | 158.8 | 295.0 | 314.8 | 203.2 |
| Portugal | 96.3 | 328.2 | 372.3 | 231.3 |
| Slovenia | 166.5 | 286.2 | 299.8 | 234.2 |
| Spain | 145.9 | 289.1 | 236.2 | 166.8 |
| Sweden | 171.0 | 220.2 | 313.0 | 275.2 |
| Turkey | 67.6 | 305.0 | 358.3 | 133.9 |
| United Kingdom | 140.1 | 248.6 | 308.6 | 216.2 |
| United States | 145.8 | 244.0 | 336.9 | 243.4 |
| OECD—Average | 136.0 | 264.4 | 318.3 | 218.1 |
| China (People’s Republic of) | 91.0 | 234.0 | 390.0 | 291.0 |
| <i>Non-OECD Economies</i> India | 51.8 | 351.9 | 390.6 | 184.7 |
| South Africa | 102.9 | 249.6 | 294.2 | 195.0 |

Table 2. Ratio of time spent in unpaid work to time spent in paid work by women and men. Source: (OECD 2020).

| Country | Men | Women |
|------------------------------|------|-------|
| Australia | 0.56 | 1.81 |
| Austria | 0.37 | 1.08 |
| Belgium | 0.53 | 1.19 |
| Canada | 0.43 | 0.83 |
| Denmark | 0.72 | 1.25 |
| Estonia | 0.61 | 1.02 |
| Finland | 0.63 | 1.12 |
| France | 0.57 | 1.28 |
| Germany | 0.52 | 1.18 |
| Greece | 0.35 | 1.41 |
| Hungary | 0.60 | 1.45 |
| Ireland | 0.38 | 1.50 |
| Italy | 0.59 | 2.30 |
| Japan | 0.09 | 0.83 |
| Korea | 0.12 | 0.80 |
| Latvia | 0.34 | 0.88 |
| Lithuania | 0.43 | 1.05 |
| Luxembourg | 0.37 | 1.00 |
| Mexico | 0.28 | 1.53 |
| Netherlands | 0.51 | 1.12 |
| New Zealand | 0.42 | 1.29 |
| Norway | 0.61 | 1.14 |
| Poland | 0.50 | 1.45 |
| Portugal | 0.26 | 1.42 |
| Slovenia | 0.56 | 1.22 |
| Spain | 0.62 | 1.73 |
| Sweden | 0.55 | 0.80 |
| Turkey | 0.19 | 2.28 |
| United Kingdom | 0.45 | 1.15 |
| United States | 0.43 | 1.00 |
| OECD—Average | 0.43 | 1.21 |
| China (People’s Republic of) | 0.23 | 0.80 |
| <i>Non-OECD Economies</i> | | |
| India | 0.13 | 1.91 |
| South Africa | 0.35 | 1.28 |

As care is gendered, the distribution of care affects women's situations both in households and in labour markets at any given time, both in the present and over the course of life. This is especially important in relation to not only the gender pay gap, but also the even larger gender pension (and older age income) gap (European Commission 2014). Intersections of age, class, (dis)ability, gender, generation, ethnicity/racialization, sexuality and care are significant in understanding shifting life situations and life stages. This means that the broad figures for time use on paid and unpaid work, as in the tables above, are likely to vary much in terms of such intersections, for example, of gender and ethnicity/racialization, as well as with the intersections of gender at different life stages. For example, many people in their adult and middle years are caring for both their children and their elderly parents. They are often referred to as "the sandwich generation" (cf. Burke and Calvano 2017). This phase of care is very much gendered. In the intersections of gender and age, shifts in gender contracts in different societal and organizational contexts are relevant and show the dynamic nature of these relations (Krekula 2007). Studies of age and generation, and intersections of age, care and life stages, remain relatively neglected in many studies of working life, despite the extensive research on 'work-life balance' or 'work-life relations'. These latter approaches do concern the division of work and care, though sometimes only implicitly so, as care for women often represents the dominant part of life outside of paid work. In short, debate and policy on 'work-life balance' is also very centrally about production and reproduction in societies.

5. 'Work-Life Balance': The Case of Care and Work in Post-Industrial Times

To illustrate the relation between work and non-work, including family life and care, the constructs of 'work-life balance' or 'work-family reconciliation' are often used, even if these constructs have been widely criticized (cf. Lewis 2003; Lewis et al. 2007; Pringle and Mallon 2003; Greenhaus and Powell 2006; Reiter 2007; Kalliath and Brough 2008). They continue to be used for scrutinising the relations of paid work and home, or non-work, as separable gendered domains in time and place, despite the blurring of boundaries across those interfaces (Clark 2000; Lewis 2003). Previous research has concluded the definitions of work and life to be "slippery and shifting" (Pringle and Mallon 2003). From a historical perspective, whereas the division of (two) separate domains was developed in the industrializing era (ibid.), in the present post-industrial 'knowledge work economy,' which increasingly provides flexible employment with regard to location and work hours, the traditional concept of a workday is slowly eroding (cf. Lewis 2003).

One of the major characteristics of knowledge work is a strong blurring of the boundaries between work and 'life', or 'non-work', or 'family-time' (Kossek and Lautsch 2012; McDonald et al. 2013; Moen et al. 2013; Lewis 2003; Ashforth et al. 2000). Relatively little is still known about the effects of the blurring boundaries on individuals, organizations and societies. With the blurring of boundaries, in many cases in dual career families, the core question of combining paid work with care responsibilities remains the same. Indeed, managing to combine paid work with care responsibilities does not necessarily mean that an adequate balance between them is found (Crompton and Lyonette 2006).

Previous research and critical commentary has concluded that the concept and policy framing of 'work-life balance' is itself a way of constructing the reality and acknowledging the widespread need to prevent paid work from invading too much into people's individual and family lives (Lewis et al. 2007). Yet, it is said to reproduce the deeply gendered debate about managing the combination of paid work and care responsibilities (Lewis 2003; Lewis et al. 2007). On the other hand, some research suggests that highly educated women are more prone to find the demands of (early) mothering unsettling but claim that this has more to do with demands targeted towards them from their work organizations, presented as historically masculine subjects not being especially interested in the reproductive function of their female employees (Hollway 2015).

Within neoliberal developments, knowledge-intensive work has become increasingly scattered and boundaryless (Roper et al. 2010; Pringle and Mallon 2003; Bailyn and Fletcher 2002). Yet the related work-life balance discourses are seemingly gender neutral, accepting the values of dominant neoliberal forms of capitalism, thus, ignoring structural, cultural and gendered constraints at workplaces and in societies more generally (Lewis et al. 2007). The 'long hours' working culture remains strong and often unchallenged, and the expectations of the 'ideal worker' today increasingly include both men and women. Thus, work may appear, superficially at least, more gender-neutral, even if it is not (Guillaume and Pochic 2009). In line with the neoliberal tendencies (Harvey 2005), employers seem to be scrutinized into non-gendered individuals as productive workers. Family still seems to have a greater impact on women's careers than on men's, as women more often accommodate their careers with family, whereas men have more freedom to prioritize work over family and care responsibilities (Hearn et al. 2016; Jyrkinen et al. 2017; Valcour and Tolbert 2003). Therefore, even if steps towards gender equality are taken in many societies, care in relation to work seems to be as downplayed as ever. This is despite the strong increase of women in the labour market in many societies, especially

in post-industrial societies. Post-industrial work is supposedly less burdensome, for example, through new technologies and automation, than work done during previous historical periods; yet, in its boundarylessness, post-industrial work invades private spheres and becomes burdening and stressful in other ways, which in turn takes away time and focus away from care and caring. To see reproduction and care as crucial parts of individual and collective long-term productivity is essential for social sustainability.

6. Concluding Comments: Towards Increased Social Sustainability?

The social relations of care and work, of reproduction and production, of social care and care work, represent some of the most fundamental aspects of gender relations in society (O'Brien 1981; Orloff 1993). They underpin many wider and intersectional inequalities and discriminations. This chapter has highlighted the central importance of care and care work, in individuals, families, communities and workplaces, and in relation to work and working life. Even if some steps are taken towards gender equality, many unequal structures remain. If care work, formal and informal, paid and unpaid, does not receive the recognition and respect it deserves, and if production and reproduction are not seen as more equally important, a deficit in willingness to engage in policy development around reproduction and care is likely to occur. Furthermore, without the necessary policy development, care work will remain the domain of the marginalized. It is important to emphasize that when this work is uncompensated, this marginalization is furthered by economic insecurity. These questions, though crucially dependent on local and national context, increasingly need to be understood transnationally, even whilst the actual delivery of care is immediate and embodied. More gender-equal, socially sustainable ways of distributing care and work—paid and unpaid work, formal and informal, and thus removing obstacles to education and entrance to working life, as well as career advancement for girls and women—are vitally important steps towards a socially sustainable, gender-equal future.

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Ideas of Family and Work—Their Impact on the Careers of Young Men* and Women* †

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† The present text largely corresponds to ZGS discussion paper Nr. 2 (Baumgarten et al. 2018). By using the gender asterisk, we want to emphasize the variety of masculinities and femininities. We do not depart from a sexual original, which understands “other” forms of gender as “included”, but rather we understand every gendered sexual existence as a variant.

1. Introduction

The division of the professional sphere into female- and male-dominated occupational areas is more pronounced in Switzerland than in other countries (Estévez-Abe 2005; Charles and Bradley 2009). While the educational levels of women* and men* have become largely even on a vertical scale (BfS 2009), horizontal, gender-specific segregation in the professional world remains widespread (Charles 2005; Leemann and Keck 2005). Thus, occupations with high percentages of women are characterized by comparably low salaries, fewer (financial) opportunities for advancement and worse work conditions (Levy et al. 1997; Buchmann and Kriesi 2009). In contrast, in occupational fields with high percentages of men, paused employment or working part-time is difficult to realize. This circumstance is, in part, responsible for the persistence of gender inequality. In this respect, the path to more gender equality can only be paved with a precise and complex understanding of the respective relationships (as specific simultaneity of change and persistence). For this purpose, context-specific studies such as this analysis are of great relevance.

Gender-atypical work interests often remain untracked, and young adults are usually not institutionally encouraged to pursue them (Maihofer et al. 2013). The one-sided focus on occupations that correspond to social gender stereotypes means that women and men can only make limited use of their talents and gifts. Switzerland thereby loses a great potential of skills and abilities. Furthermore, distinct segregation in the professional sphere contributes to an intensification of the shortage of skills in technical and social jobs.

The starting point for our project, “How do ideas of family and work impact the careers of young men* and women*?”, was the hypothesis that, first of all, the ideas of

a future family and one's own occupational activities reciprocally influence each other, and secondly, that it is precisely this interrelationship that causes occupational gender segregation.¹ Based on previous research projects (see (Maihofer et al. 2013; Schwiter et al. 2014; Wehner et al. 2012)), we looked not only for institutional factors, such as the absence of paternity leave and inadequate and expensive childcare provisions, but also for subjective positions and motives such as ideas of family and gender norms as an explanation for the persistence of occupational gender segregation.

We thus assumed a complex interaction of subjective, institutional and gender-normative factors, which we all understand as the structural elements of the dominating, heteronormative gender order. According to our findings, these ideas already influence career decisions at a point where the question of starting a family is not yet present for many. Therefore, we focused on adults of about 30 years of age. At this age, they have already gained some professional experience and have developed both professional and familial prospects for the future.

To answer our research question, we conducted 48 problem-centered interviews with thirty-year-old women* and men*, who work in gender-typical, gender-neutral and gender-atypical jobs.² We asked them about their perspectives regarding the possibility of starting a family,³ as well as asking about their further careers.

In the first step, we explain how the interviewed men* and women* conceptualize family and work, and what ideals, expectations and attributions form the basis of these positions. In the second step, we illustrate how these ideas of family and work impact their further careers.

2. Anticipated Fatherhood and Occupation

2.1. *Today, Being a Father Means Taking Time for Your Kids*

It has been widely proven that men* today want to be active and present fathers. We have described the currently predominant perspective in our Discussion Paper I (see (Maihofer et al. 2010)) as that of the emotionally involved, present,

¹ The project funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation was carried out at the Centre for Gender Studies at the University of Basel under the direction of Professor Andrea Maihofer (duration 2014–2016).

² A gender-typical profession is defined according to the fact that more than 70% of the professionals therein belong to one gender (e.g., dental assistants* or social workers* are female-typical professions, while train driver* is male-typical; the retail business is a gender-neutral occupation).

³ For most interviewees*, founding a family has not taken place yet. In a few cases, interviewees* were pregnant at the time of the interview.

breadwinner father. This shows a strongly changed attitude toward the norm of the single breadwinner. Thus, being an involved father means spending time with the child and building up a continual emotional relationship.

In the interviews, it was striking how important these ideas about relationships are for future fatherhood. The (yet childless) men* considered that it is of the utmost importance to consciously take the time with the child for oneself, but also to develop a father–child relationship. We understand this as a clear rejection of the “absent breadwinner-father”, who mostly sees his kids asleep or on the weekends (Maihofer et al. 2010; Wehner et al. 2010).

By now, men* also include the baby and toddler period in their notion of fatherhood. In the past, when fathers referred to their already grown children (see (Schwiter 2011)) in their reflections on fatherhood, our recent interviews showed how important their relationship with their child had been to them from birth. Watching their own children grow up means being there from the very beginning, as opposed to merely when the children are already a little older.

2.2. The Desire to Spend Time with the Child Changes the Relationship between Men and Full-Time Work; It No Longer Represents an Unquestioned Normality*

Due to the desire to have time together with the child, men* begin to think critically about their workload (see (Baumgarten et al. 2017a)). Consequently, they appraisingly deal with the question of if, in their profession, it is possible to reduce their work time in order to realize their ideals of fatherhood. The engagement with part-time work is not only based on the wishes of men* themselves. Increasingly, this is an external (normative) demand. The current change in the fatherhood ideal is also reflected in the fact that talking about fatherhood now includes addressing questions of how to spend more time with one’s children and if part-time work would be possible, at least temporarily.

This does not mean that all men* want to work part-time, but rather that their relationship to full-time work changes through altered expectations and the desire for an intense father–child relationship. Part-time work is increasingly considered as a possible component of a male employment biography, and working full-time is no longer an unquestioned normality.

When it comes to part-time work, most of the interviewed men* and women* understood an 80% workload. They talk about this extra day off, notwithstanding weekends and holidays, as “dad-day” (see (Schwiter and Baumgarten 2017)), where men* are solely responsible for taking care of the child. The rebuy, quality time with the child, where the mother is absent or uninvolved, has become a priority.

2.3. Industries Differ Strongly in the Practicability of Part-Time Work for Fathers

The wish of future fathers to spend time with their child and, therefore, the desire for part-time work are in contradiction with the (normative) demands of a full-time employment, as well as the possibilities for professional development and career opportunities. Regarding its realistic implementation, the industry and the respective job culture are of central importance. In some occupational fields (mostly in female-typical or gender-neutral jobs such as teaching), men* view themselves as being in a part-time-friendly work environment, where their requests are easily negotiable. In other, often male-typical professions, such as consulting, part-time work is difficult or even impossible. Here, possibilities are limited to all but those who become self-employed or find a different occupational field.

All in all, the interviewed men* hoped to find individual arrangements with their superiors and work teams but were insecure about whether they would manage to do so. The currently prevalent work culture is being perceived as extremely resistant. Interestingly, they often come to this conclusion without ever having taken an active interest in the company's internal policies regarding part-time work. The structural conditions of the professional world are predominantly seen as a given and, therefore, as unchangeable, and they do not address the possibility of campaigning in solidarity as employees for changes in the company.

2.4. The Idea of Professional Development Is a Central Part of the Male Understanding of Their Careers

According to men*, gainful work is, on the one hand, necessary for economic security. On the other hand, they also want to actualize their talents and affinities and take pleasure in their work: *"One has to like what one does"*. This is due to the amount of time they spend at work.

Apart from remuneration, the need for professional satisfaction is especially evident, i.e., when the interviewed men* saw how their efforts were making a difference. The importance of salary and content is evaluated pragmatically: *"I am not an idealist who says that the salary does not matter. (. . .) No, I want to have a job where I also receive some money and where I have the feeling that I am worth it"*. Therefore, gainful work is essential for societal inclusion and achieving broad recognition.

Beyond this, advancement orientation is not only a central part of the male understanding of a career; it is also part of their expectation of normality. After education and years of travel, professional consolidation naturally takes place which takes into account the commitment and diligence of the initial period. Medium-

and long-term career and development opportunities are very important to men. We found such an idea among women* only in exceptional cases.

2.5. Men Are Still Supposed and Want to Be the Main Breadwinners

Next to men's* desire to be present fathers, the demand that they are responsible for the financial subsistence of the family continues to exist. Taking responsibility for the financial stability of the family is not only demanded societally of men; often, women* also expect this, as much as men*. Admittedly, their work should correspond to their interests; yet, especially with regard to anticipating starting a family, it should also enable them to take on the role as the main breadwinner. The wish to spend more time with the children is contradictory to the workload they accept, willingly or otherwise. For men*, there is an increasing problem of reconciling what would be characterized as "good" or "desirable" fatherhood activities with the demands of gainful employment.

3. Anticipated Motherhood and Occupation

3.1. Gainful Work Is an Inherent Part of Female Identity, Which Is Why Women as Mothers Want to Be Steadily Employed*

The women* from our sample had, at the time of the interview, distinct professional confidence. After their education, all of them found their way into a job which suits them, with which they can identify and which gives them economic independence and self-reliance. All had been through advanced training and have evolved in their professions. However, in contrast to the interviewed men*, they talked about this without expressing desire for further, long-term career advancement.

Part of their professional understanding is the feeling of being needed, the possibility of participating meaningfully or the experience of a good and productive work atmosphere. Generally, for women*, gainful employment is as much a form of societal inclusion and recognition as it is a part of their identity.

For this reason, they want to remain employed after starting a family, even with a part-time work schedule: *"I do not want to do without being a part of the professional world—in any way"*. They were concerned about being out of touch with working life and *"hav(ing) a foothold in employment"*. With regard to starting a family, gainful work is an important addition and change from everyday family life, but it also enables women* to participate in a social environment beyond that of their family.

What is striking is that none of the women* mentioned financial necessity as a reason for seeking steady employment. Their earnings after starting a family were often considered as additional. Not being bound to sustaining a family with their

jobs and relying on their partners for economic security, therefore, form the basis of their attitudes towards their careers and their expectations of normality.

3.2. Motherhood Continues to Be a Central Part of Female Identity, about Which Women Want to Decide Autonomously*

The women* from our sample wishing to become pregnant demanded from themselves that they would spend a lot of time with their children. They identified as the “key carer” with a strong emotional tie with the child. *“That is the way it is: the Mom remains the Mom”*. They often mentioned their own mothers* as positive role models for shaping their motherhood. The reason for being the main parent is based on the biological abilities of giving birth and breastfeeding. The special proximity between woman* and child evolves. These preconditions suggested a gender-typical arrangement.

At the same time, the women* refused to view their biological characteristics fatalistically and emphasized their autonomy in the distribution of familial tasks, but also with regard to establishing a family. In accordance with this self-determination, there is a demand for them to decide for or against motherhood and to develop their own ideas of what form this should take. Thereby, the women* often understood family as being private in nature, i.e., where they are, in contrast to the workplace, their own bosses. Family life represented for them a counterpart to work, where the atmosphere is structured by competition and heteronomy. The decision to start a family was therefore not only understood as a self-determined withdrawal from full-time work but also as a form of autonomy in the familial sphere.

3.3. The Female Professional Understanding Stands in Tension with the Ideal of Motherhood

For most interviewees, family plans became more concrete when they were in their early thirties. At this point, the conflict between their professional understanding, which implies steady employment, and their ideas of motherhood increased ever more (see (Baumgarten et al. 2017b)).

Upon starting a family, women* anticipate a great shift in their emotional priorities towards the child and family: *“When I have kids, then I have the feeling that (my) priorities would lie more strongly with the kids and the family”*.

Such an adjustment of everyday life presents a major organizational and mental challenge: *“I just know that this could be something that would bother me”*. Through the (anticipated) focus on familial care work, they fear a loss of attractiveness, independence and a sense of belonging. At the same time, they assume that their employment could make it difficult for them to be adequately present in the family,

both emotionally and time-wise. This means that even before having children, women* are noticeably struggling to reconcile conflicting wishes and demands. In addition, they also believe that resolving these issues is their own responsibility. This means that the persistent expectation that women* are mainly responsible for the family and children leads to a nearly unsolvable dilemma. On the one hand, they have to justify their professional employment both to themselves and to others, and on the other hand, an exclusive focus on family can lead to being seen as backward and overly maternalistic. Anticipated motherhood already leads women to continuously reflect upon their (potential) behavior and to justify it against criticism or even hostility. According to the contradictory ideal of the “*emotionally involved, present breadwinner-father*” formulated for men* (vgl. (Maihofer et al. 2010)), for women*, the prevalent ideal of motherhood can be summarized as the “*part-time employed involved mother, who is the key carer of the child*”.

3.4. Industries Differ Strongly in the Practicability of Steady Employment for Mothers

In many industries, women* are confronted with a job market that is oriented toward the ideal of a male full-time employee; entailed therein are intense time requirements, undivided availability and a job history without interruptions. In opposition to this, women* wish to pursue their employment in a manageable manner with a high degree of flexibility. Employment is outlined as an addition to everyday family life with a part-time workload of between 20 and 40 percent, or in some cases, 60 percent. With regard to their ideas, which, as they know, differ from a normal employment relationship, they already anticipate professional disqualification and reduced career perspectives: “*One has to be aware of the fact that you cannot simply pick a fun job anymore. (. . .) that you, rather, will be doing periodical work as a clerk*”.

For the interviewed women*, the possibility of (part-time) employment is inherently dependent on a *concession* from the company. Knowing about the structural obstacles, they only introduce their want for employment in a defensive manner and formulate it cautiously: “*That I might be able to stay with a reduced workload*”.

As for men*, the choice of industry plays an important role with regard to opportunities for part-time work: In rather female-typical jobs such as care-givers* or psychologists*, part-time work is more attainable. The re, women* are more likely to be able to combine their professional aspirations with motherhood and are more flexible in terms of balancing out both realms. Even in this field of employment, women* do not anticipate promotion prospects for employed mothers.

3.5. *The Responsibility for Childcare Is Part of Self-Determined Motherhood, Which Should Ideally Be Passed on to the Private Sphere*

Apart from the few supportive structures in the professional sphere, the personality of the child also plays a central role in determining the extent to which the mother provides childcare or to which she is gainfully employed. Children are imagined as being very different in character, which is why it might be difficult to estimate how much presence and care they are going to need. Although the interviewed women* hoped to be able to plan their everyday lives more independently as their children grew older, they expected themselves to meet the children's needs first and foremost. The concept of self-determined motherhood includes a distinct amount of personal responsibility on the part of the woman* for taking care of and supporting the children: *"This is not the responsibility of the society. Just because you have children now, others do not need to care about it"*. This includes fathers. Women* expect very little responsibility for childcare from the fathers. If fathers take on childcare work, it is because they have expressed a wish to spend time with the child. The refore, it is not to be taken for granted that care work can be handed over to the father. The "dad-day" is thus more of a supplement, rather than a clearly demanded engagement.

Public support for childcare work was seldom anticipated by the interviewed women*. Daycare centers are mainly conceptualized as institutions for families—especially single mothers—who are unable to reduce their workloads. The opposite of the self-determined mother who is mainly responsible for the child is, therefore, the mother who is driven by financial struggle and restrictions, whose economic situation does not allow her to take over the care work herself. For their own children, they value daycare centers as places of exchange with other children. This should take place from one to three days per week. The y often explicitly rejected the idea of handing over a child to a daycare five days a week. In total, the interviewed women* imagined childcare to be privately organized. The intimate, small family was, in the minds of most of the interviewed women*, the first and most important form of childcare.

4. **Synopsis—Anticipated Parenthood and Familial Labor Division as a Couple**

Even though we did not interview any couples, the anticipated ideas of gendered labor division and the organization of everyday life among the interviewed men* and women* complemented each other astonishingly well.

Current ideas of (heterosexual) partnerships are still based on the complementarity of men* and women*.

For a successful partnership, it is important, according to our interviewees, to meet the needs of the partner and to value his/her respective accomplishments. However, this complementarity is not the traditional one. This is the basis upon which couples nowadays negotiate the division of care work and employment, and the individuality of partners* in a relationship must be catered to in such negotiations.

In this understanding of labor division as a collaboratively negotiated consensus, there is astonishingly little awareness of how gender-stereotypical the ideas of employment and family, and thus the foundation for this decision-making process, still are.

In this way, the mutually formulated regulation of the division of labor usually leads to a high level of male employment, i.e., with a workload of 80 to 100 percent, with one “dad-day” at most and a great responsibility of the mothers in terms of childcare, with supplementary employment of 20 to 40 percent, or, in a few cases, 50 or 60 percent. Even though men* and women* regard it as important that the father build an intense everyday relationship with their children and thus take on a “dad-day” if possible, the latter is not considered a non-negotiable part of the division of childcare, much less is it mentioned as a possibility for the woman’s* return to work after giving birth. Childcare provides relief and thus enables the woman* to pursue a career, while the private, predominantly female environment, i.e., the woman’s* parents or in-laws (including grandfathers), sisters, friends and godmothers, as well as other mothers in the close circle of friends, plays an especially central role.⁴

The accurate fit of the gender-specific attribution of responsibility for care work or gainful employment leads to a reciprocal complementarity (in terms of “complementing each other”).⁵ Even though we conducted individual interviews, the interviewed men* and women* drafted a congruent idea of a (heterosexual) partnership, for which the clear division of responsibilities implied a simultaneity

⁴ This can be explained with the specific conditions in Switzerland: the different cantons and communities are responsible for family-complementary childcare. The role of the federal state is subsidiary. Of all OECD countries, Switzerland invests the least in childcare, a 0.2% share of its BIP. Despite an impulse program initiated in 2003, in the context of which 370 million Swiss francs have been invested and almost 60,000 daycare places have been created, Switzerland exhibits a bland supply of family-complementing childcare and in most regions, there are large gaps in supplies. At the same time, the costs for external childcare in Switzerland are higher than in any other OECD country. A full-time space in a daycare can reach up to two thirds of the mean income.

⁵ Contrary to childcare and gainful employment, we did not ask about the division of housework in our interviews. Insofar, we cannot make any statements about the ideas of our interviewees in this regard. Housework, however, was not mentioned in any interviews as being important.

of change and persistence. On the one hand, the anticipated familial arrangements were clearly reminiscent of the bourgeois ideal of the family, but at the same time, there, momentous changes could be observed, not least the idea of an equal form of negotiation of the division of labor among the family. In this sense, both the work culture and society in general were perceived as being of little help. However, changes are also not demanded in such a decisive manner.

5. Conclusions for Current Gender Relations in Switzerland

In total, our analyses show the interconnections of institutional and individual perspectives. They show how the present socio-cultural living and working conditions may act as the basis for possible family arrangements (keyword: reconciliation). However, gender norms internalized through lifelong processes of socialization and cultural perceptions regarding the abilities of men* and women* have an equal impact on the way in which young adults imagine their familial and professional obligations, and how this influences the career perspectives of men* and women*.

First of all, with regard to gender relations, two things can be stated: Currently, for both genders, there are strong tensions between notions of work and family, between the requirements of masculinity and femininity and between ideas of fatherhood and motherhood.

For men*, fulltime gainful employment and an orientation towards a professional career continue to be an important part of their identity. At the same time, we find an increasing problematization of this one-sided orientation. They increasingly want to be fathers who are involved in everyday family life.

Due to this simultaneous juxtaposition of traditional demands toward masculinity and new ideas of fatherhood, men* have to deal with their role as the breadwinner and come up with ideas as to how they can engage in raising their children in an active and present way. Through the changed relationship of men with generativity, they increasingly formulate their own problem of reconciliation.

For women*, in contrast, the ideal of the mother who puts her needs after those of the child and the family, and who is carrying the main responsibility for domestic duties, continues to be the dominant orientation.

At the same time, it has by now become a part of their self-understanding to be gainfully employed and to have an identity as a working woman*. Therefore, there is an increasing tension for women* between the previous norm of motherhood and the new ideas of gainful employment and their intensified identification as an employed woman* or mother. Even though ideas of motherhood are beginning to

change, the problem of how to reconcile family and work is being yet intensified through the demand to be a flexible and constantly available (good) mother and the desire to hold continuous and close-to-fulltime employment.

All in all, both genders*—albeit in an inverted manner—are now struggling with the contradictions of traditional and new gender ideals and requirements. Through reflection and awareness of the old order (Woltersdorff 2013), both know much more clearly than before about the deficits of traditional gender concepts and practices, such as the lack of inclusion of fathers in the everyday lives of children, given their persistent responsibility for the family income, as well as the nonexistent personal and professional development perspective of the mother, given their domestic responsibilities.

Thus, men* and women* cannot fully exhaust important aspects of their identity, their abilities and their life plans. This is aggravated by the fact that neither gender can rely on new role models. Equitable ideas of work and family have to be laboriously tested and realized against professional and fiscal incentive structures, against the conditions and demands of the employment sphere (availability, flexibility, mobility) and against established and obsolete stereotypes in everyday life.

This does not make it easy for individual perspectives to be positively experiential beyond normative restrictions. Demanding and forcing through new ideas of work and family are thus often perceived as exhausting and energy-sapping.

Secondly, “traditional” gender norms have become more flexible and individual, but they are still very powerful for those involved.

In the interviews, most presented themselves as being open to alternative familial work arrangements, with the caveat that these have to fit the “type” of partner they have. Furthermore, the idea of a special relationship of a woman with her child—due to pregnancy and the possibility of breastfeeding—suggests a clearly modified, yet still “traditional” work division for most of the interviewed men* and women*. The reb, they clearly no longer understood biology as “imperative fate”, but rather as a foundation for pragmatic action according to physical constitutions. They were aware that, just as many women* have to learn how to take care of their children adequately, so do men*. In this combination, i.e., of an imagined division of work as a potential reality and the simultaneous restriction of the practicable validity of this notion to certain “types” of men* or women*, the current handling of gender norms becomes visible: These are no longer rigid but rather offer some leeway. At the same time, they are still very effectual; everyone is aware of what “deviation from the norm” consists of, and of which critiques and sanctions are threatening or which difficulties still exist vis-à-vis their structural implementation. If, for example,

work arrangements are defined as different, or if the caring behavior of fathers is equated with the idea that “*men want to be more involved nowadays*”, then notions of the “other”, “new” and “changed” clearly point to the extension of the norm or the emergence of new possibilities. Still, women* and men* try to conform to normative gendered expectations, e.g., when they see themselves confronted with the notion of being a “good mother” only when mainly focusing on the family, or of being a “proper man” only when working full-time. Who is doing which work in both the household and childcare and when they are doing it is no longer conventionally prescribed, yet it has always been defined qua gender. Even though social norms have become more flexible, this does not mean that deviations therefrom do not underlie a process of disciplining and normalization. Those who transgress central gender norms, such as when women* do not have kids or when men* would rather be “househusbands”, are, despite flexibilization, continuously confronted with critical questions.

The individual shaping of family lifestyles is still an arduous and by no means sanctionless process. The possibility for the realization of such is highly dependent on the specific context as well as the ability to act in a self-determined manner which corresponds to one’s own wants and skills, even if it does not match the dominant norms.

Simultaneously, we can state that, thirdly, the interviewed women* and men* assumed an equitable relationship between man* and women* in the family sphere. This assumption was seen as foundational for the current self-conception of men* and women* and their organization, and the shaping of everyday family life.

Thus, familial arrangements are understood as individual solutions between two equal people who do not have a hierarchical relationship (any longer). In their understanding, gender does have normative power, for instance, regarding some of their ideas of motherly or fatherly tasks, but it is a question of differentiation, not stratification.

Furthermore, an “equitable” division of gainful, household and childcare work does not mean a distribution in the sense of both parties doing 50 percent of each. Rather, both take over the part which corresponds to their preferences. Especially when viewing collaborative task divisions from a perspective of gender equality, gendered structuring seems unimportant or even individually desired. The reby, the interviewed women* and men* did not anticipate the way in which, within the context of starting a family and despite their assumptions regarding equity, a dynamic evolved, which leads them toward a nonequitable situation, and therefore one that is traditionally structured in terms of gender. The discourse of individual

uniqueness leads to a masking of persistent, or emerging and intensifying gender inequalities.

The previously described potency of gender norms leads to a situation where couples, in starting a family, establish a hierarchical relationship with each other. The imbalance resulting from the division of work, e.g., 100% (him) and 40% (her), is not always noticeable right away in relationships, but in the long term, its effects unfold through, e.g., the risk of a social decline for women* in the case of separation or inadequate pensions after retirement, or, in the case of men*, the pressure of (in future) bearing sole responsibility for the family, as well as the risk of becoming an "alimony-dad" with 14-day visiting rights with the children in case of a separation. Furthermore, like this, both parties cannot fully exhaust their abilities and desires with regard to employment and family.

Fourth, an individualized notion of cultural life and work forms could be observed in the ideas of the young adults interviewed.

Anticipated difficulties in the compatibility of work and family ideas were also perceived as a societal-structural problem. Following neoliberal logic, however, in the interviews, it was the responsibilities of the individual that were being talked about, i.e., to design a life plan independently of the surrounding living and work conditions, and to solve the tasks arising from starting a family as an individual (see (Schwiter 2016)).

Oftentimes, luck was mentioned, e.g., of having a good job, a tolerant boss* or an optimal workplace, so that the reconciliation of gainful employment and having a family can be lived according to one's own ideals. According to this, the failure of one's life plan was regarded as being the result of one's own unsuccessful planning. The interviewed individuals were not aware of the notion and thus did not claim that beyond their own responsibilities, there is also a responsibility of society as a whole for the implementation of equality in terms of the compatibility of family and work.

Socio-cultural life and work conditions were seldom mentioned in the interviews as either impeding or enhancing, and hopes or expectations were seldom formulated with regard to changing parameters. Political demands directed toward society or the professional sphere, or toward public institutions, and which would entail structural and material support or the recognition of parenthood were not expressed

by the interviewees.⁶ According to this evidence, changing current work and living conditions is rarely thought about or proposed.⁷

The attitude of self-responsibility and the growing freedom of decision making and choice, which has been strongly established within the framework of modern neoliberal processes of transformation, lead to a lack of critical reflection regarding persistent power relationships, as well as relationships of dependency and inequality. The reby, inequality is being individualized and privatized, which consequently intensifies the phenomenon whereby mutual decisions in the process of forming familial arrangements lead to inequity.

Finally, it has become clear that through individualized responsibility and privatized gender inequality, young women* and men* do not form alliances and do not formulate claims.

Our results show that the neoliberal rhetoric of self-responsibility intensifies the fact that, at present, there are hardly any ideas of governmental or societal responsibility for the concrete implementation of equality, and thus for the development of solutions to the current problems of the reconciliation of women* and men*. This makes it more difficult to uncover persistent gender discrimination and inequalities. Such connections only become clear through a thorough analysis of both the concrete structural living conditions and individual gender stereotypes. A simultaneous overview of both the structural and individual dimensions of gender norms is indispensable for achieving gender equality. By individualizing collective problems (e.g., of parents) and not regarding them as common, solutions cannot be found, and no claims for a new work culture or for necessary societal, legal or political and institutional changes can be made, even if individuals would profit from such (Schwiter 2016).

All of this is, however, indispensable, for, as paradoxical as it might sound, the more individualized that life plans and family arrangements become, the more they are dependent on socio-cultural frameworks (Maihofer 2016). The livability of the current life plans of women* and men* depend not only on the will of the

⁶ This stands in contrast to the French-speaking part of Switzerland, where there is a bigger demand for family-complementary care facilities, and where parents demand more governmental support.

⁷ An exception existed in the statements regarding paternal leave. This does not only represent a plausible demand among most people interviewed, but many also regard the current regulations as problematic or even scandalous. Paternal leave may be described as a legal reenactment of the described changed practices within which the parental roles remain unequally distributed—where parental care is not exclusively the role of the mothers and, thus, where fathers have the right to undertake (restricted) care time in the first year of their child's life.

individual and its consequences but also on the necessary societal and institutional living and work conditions. If these are not given, the gap between growing possibilities for individual ways of life and the withholding of the conditions needed for these is becoming ever more obvious. Consequently, people, without actually wanting it, have to decide against the life plan they prefer as an employed and involved father or employed and involved mother.

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Gender and Intersectional Climate Justice

Sybille Bauriedl

1. Introduction

Climate change affects all people, but to varying degrees. Apart from regional differences, this is mainly due to social structures. Being affected by the consequences of climate change also depends to a relevant extent on gender-conforming behaviour and a gender-unjust distribution of resources. Women and men are affected differently by the effects of climate change. A central reason for this is their social understanding of their roles and role behaviour and the social and economic inequality associated with them. Thus, climate change-induced problems and responses are deeply connected to gender justice.

2. Climate Change Meets Hierarchical Gender Relations

Sea-level rises and extreme weather events are the negative effects of man-made climate change. Loss and damage are the 'externality' of fossil fuels and other polluting industries visited upon the people and communities who have done the least to cause climate change. Tropical regions and especially arid and coastal areas are particularly affected by climate change impacts. There, we meet a large number of people who are particularly vulnerable due to their limited access to global prosperity. Those with the least power and the least resources are the worst impacted. This, of course, means that communities made vulnerable due to gender, sexuality, race, class, age, and legal status are in the worst position to deal with the impacts of climate change (Richards 2018, p. 2). Gender broadly refers to a collection of characteristics. They vary and change over time and context, and are shaped by their intersection with other types of social difference such as race and class, as sexism is entangled with other hierarchies.

When sudden extreme events such as floods, heat waves or hurricanes occur, more women regularly die than men. In a study by the London School of Economics, deaths due to extreme weather events were examined according to gender and social status. Between 1981 and 2002, 4605 catastrophes were recorded in 141 countries. The number of deaths of women after disasters was significantly higher in countries with particularly high inequality in social and economic status between women and men (Neumayer and Plümper 2007). There is no current study with a similar number

of cases. However, it can be assumed that this difference has tended to increase, as the gender-specific household and family-related workload of women increases in regions with strong climate change impacts.

In the Global South, the unequal mortality rate during climate-related natural disasters is more evident than in the Global North. However, gender-specific vulnerability is not a phenomenon limited to developing countries alone. The negative consequences of climate change, e.g., health burdens from heat waves, are also showing a gender-unequal trend in Europe. During the heat wave in southern Europe in the summer of 2003, extreme cardiovascular stress caused 70,000 additional deaths, so-called “heat deaths”, in the affected countries. The elderly and people with weakened health were particularly affected. Throughout the heatwave, the gender ratio of deaths was balanced, but on the hottest days, women were affected in 60 percent of cases (Robine et al. 2007). There are no reliable explanations for this striking phenomenon either. One relevant factor is probably that older women in particular are more likely to live in neighbourhoods with higher heat stress due to their income. They cannot afford more climate change-resistant residential areas with better ventilation, cooling architecture and lower building density, which are among the most expensive residential areas in all cities. On hot days with daytime temperatures above 30 °C, the temperature in densely built-up districts with heavy traffic is regularly 5 °C higher than, for example, in residential areas near a city park. In addition, old women much more frequently live alone and thus without rapid healthcare in acute heat stress (WEN 2010, p. 11f). The European Parliament has now recognised the relevance of the problem and stated, in a report on 16 January 2018, that “women are many times more likely to die in natural disasters than men” (EP 2017, p. 5).

Even consequences of climate change that are not directly life-threatening have an unequal impact on men and women. Diseases spread faster due to higher temperatures or floods. Since, in many societies, it is mainly women who provide nursing care, their (unpaid) workload increases. During prolonged heat waves in dry areas, it can be observed that women and girls have to cope with a much higher additional workload for the energy and water supply of their families and have to walk long distances to water points and firewood sources (Dankelmann 2010). In Africa, women produce more than 90 percent of the food supply. However, they often do not have the financial opportunity to react to climate change and adapt production to changing environmental conditions (EP 2017). Why women are more vulnerable to climate change than men has hardly been systematically researched. However, observations suggest the relevance of the gendered division of labour and

gender-unequal access to resources. Gender norms are, thus, a decisive vulnerability factor, as is the need to adapt to climate change. Women's empowerment at household and community levels is an excellent strategy for more effective and equitable disaster preparedness (Terry 2009, p. 170).

3. Men Adopt to Climate-Related Natural Disasters Differently Than Women

Migration is a form of adaptation to the consequences of climate change. However, not all people can benefit from this form of adaptation in the same way. When migration takes place in response to sudden climate change-induced extreme events, firstly, access to means of transport plays a major role, then, secondly, the consideration of the dangers during flight and, thirdly, the responsibility to care for relatives. All these aspects are very strongly gendered. For example, the particularly high death toll of women in flood disasters in Pakistan, India and Bangladesh is explained by the fact that women in these flood-prone countries have less mobility opportunities: they have neither learned to swim nor do they own motorised vehicles. They have less access to relevant risk information and they are responsible for protecting their children. Almost everywhere in the world, family care work is done more often by women than by men. As a result, women are more tied to persons in need of care and assistance in the household and are excluded from safety nets and information for coping with climate change. Thus, they are also less likely than men to succeed in fleeing as a result of suddenly occurring extreme events and to find a safe place. However, even refugee camps bear the risk of sexual violence and the struggle for limited food.

There are two crucial questions to explain climate vulnerability and climate change-induced migration: the first is the question of vulnerability due to caring responsibilities (Who is responsible for housekeeping, childcare, and the care of sick and elderly family members?). Secondly, there is the question of vulnerability due to mobility restrictions (Who has access to transport? Who can move around in public and in what manner?). As a rule, both questions affect women who live in gender-conforming families and on low incomes to a particularly high degree.

The gender-related studies on climate vulnerability and adaptation show a stereotypical gender representation. Women only become visible in their reproductive phase of life and in their function as mothers in household and childcare work. Men are depicted as absent from the family community. These gender representations eliminate gender diversity and transitions of gender norms, and non-gender-conforming or non-heteronormative role behaviour (Hawkins and Ojeda 2011, p. 241).

Furthermore, an over-reliance on the discourses of care, mothering, and subsistence labour can have negative strategic consequences. Feminist scholars take into account the cultural baggage of the ethics of care discourse. In “the context of a white male-dominated society that constructs and enforces women’s capacity to care, ecofeminism should not romanticize but politicize this capacity. Ecofeminist arguments that celebrate women’s caring for people and the planet without condemning its implication in oppressive political economic systems risk affirming sexist notions about women’s place in society” (MacGregor 2010a, p. 22).

4. Climate Change as an Amplifier of Existing Social Inequalities

The decisive factor for gender-specific climate vulnerability and migration opportunities is not biological gender, but social gender. Social gender expresses the socially determined understanding of gender roles and role behaviour that is associated with structural inequality, e.g., when women are seldom appointed to management positions or have more difficult access to financial resources due to the more passive, emotional behaviour attributed to them. Due to patriarchal gender norms in family and household care, an individual flight from extreme events seems less legitimate for women. These forms of structural inequality become even more evident in regions with frequent extreme events caused by climate change, since it is precisely there that the follow-up costs (e.g., care of the injured, family care under difficult conditions, the search for scarce food) are borne by women.

However, there is no mono-causal link between social gender and climate vulnerability—not all women are fundamentally more affected by climate change than men. Climate vulnerability is a multi-causal phenomenon. A lack of property rights, income poverty, a lack of school education and public healthcare and low social rights also play a role and affect other social groups. In studies on gender-specific climate vulnerability, for example, social differences within countries and regions remain unquestioned. However, it would be important to take this into account in order to be able to recognise the entanglement of gender relations with class relations and social relations based on racist hierarchies, which also regulate access to work, income, land ownership, technology, loans and political decision-making processes (Bauriedl and Hackfort 2016).

5. Gender (In)Justice in International Climate Policy

The different impacts of climate change on men and women are internationally recognised, but they are not a top issue in international climate policy. The international negotiations for climate agreements are conducted by the United

Nations—an intergovernmental organisation of 193 states with decisions by consensus and without legally binding force. As a result, the national economic interests of the participating countries (the parties of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change) mostly come first. Even though the United Nations Women’s Organisation (UN Women) stated as early as 2009 that the risks of climate change are not gender-neutral (UNWW 2009, p. 8), this has so far had no consequences for binding agreements or even gender-related financial compensation.

In 2005, the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) and Women’s Environment and Development Organization (WEDO) decided that a coordinated global strategy on the issue of gender and climate change was needed. IUCN and WEDO, together with the UN Development Programme and the UN Environment Programme and more than 25 other UN agencies and civil society institutions, co-founded, in 2007, the Global Gender and Climate Alliance (GGCA) at the UN Climate Summit in Bali and made the following demand: “No climate justice without gender justice”. The primary goal of the GGCA is to ensure that climate change policies, decision making, and initiatives at the global, regional and national levels are gender-responsive and that financing mechanisms on mitigation and adaptation address the needs of poor women and men equitably. The alliance considered the Lima Work Programme on Gender as outcome of the UN Climate Summit in 2014 (decision 18/CP.20) a great success. It called on all state parties of the UN Climate Programme to take gender aspects into account in their annual report on the implementation of national climate targets to ensure that climate actions are gender-responsive and promote women’s participation in decision making. However, as with all gender policy agreements of the UN contracting states, no sanctions are provided in the event of non-implementation of the programme. Its impact, therefore, remains limited (GenderCC 2019). At the UN Climate Summit in Marrakesh, 2016 (Conference of the Parties, COP22), a “Gender Action Plan” was agreed upon under the Lima Work Programme to bolster the role of women in climate action. The Gender Action Plan sets out activities that will help achieve this objective. “These range from increasing knowledge and capacities of women and men through workshops and information exchanges, so that they can systematically integrate gender considerations in all areas of their work, to pursuing the full, equal and meaningful participation of women in national delegations, including women from grassroots organisations, local and indigenous peoples and women from Small Island Developing States.” (UN Women 2017, p. 1). Delegations of international, feminist non-governmental organisations are also very present at public framework events of climate summits, such as the People’s Climate Summit in Bonn, 2017 (Figure 1).

This is about the representation and participation of women in negotiations, in order to support the implementation of gender-related decisions and mandates in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) process, following from the idea that the increasing participation of women promotes gender-responsive climate policy and the mainstreaming of a gender perspective (UNFCCC 2017). While the numbers of women on UNFCCC boards, bodies and government delegations have improved slightly in recent years, women continue to be underrepresented, particularly in high-level positions. In national delegations, nearly 30 percent were women at UN Climate Summit / Conference of the Parties (COP25) in Madrid in 2019, with 20 percent being heads of delegations (GenderCC 2019).



Figure 1. Gender justice protest group GenderCC at the climate summit in Bonn (COP23) on 4 November 2017. Credit: © S. Bauriedl.

Climate justice and gender justice have always been closely linked struggles of environmental movements in India, Brazil, Kenya, Germany and many other countries. At the alternative climate summits of the international climate movement and the accompanying demonstrations, there are always protests for gender justice. Furthermore, the young protest groups of the Fridays for Future movements were

led by women as speakers from the very beginning in order to make gender positionality visible.

6. Market-Based, Globalised Mitigation Strategies Are Deepening Gender Inequality

The valorisation of nature and the valorisation of women's labour are controlled by the same mechanisms. In climate policy, this valorisation can be observed in the mechanism of emission certificate trading. This trade is based on the idea of offsetting carbon emissions and was the focus of negotiations at the Climate Summit in 2019 in Madrid (COP25). The Secretariat of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) as well as other international development organisations and private companies in the voluntary emission certificate trade have also been using the unpaid reproductive work of women for several years by investing in the distribution of energy-efficient stoves in so-called developing countries (UNFCCC 2012). Since 2007, energy-efficient stoves have also been accepted as a measure in international emissions certificate trading (Clean Development Mechanism). These stoves reduce the use of fuel (wood and charcoal) and its emissions. For the use of an energy-efficient stove in a so-called developing country, a so-called industrialised country can be compensated by one ton of carbon emissions per year. The spread of efficient stoves has reached enormous proportions in East Africa and South Asia. The German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ) distributed 1.45 million energy-efficient stoves in Kenya alone between 2006 and 2014. This means that more than one million tons of carbon emissions have been offset for the national emissions budget of Germany by the unpaid reproductive work of Kenyans (which is almost exclusively done by women there). The emission certificates for the use of efficient stoves receive the additional certificate "Empowerment of Women".

As long as the use of efficient stoves is linked to gender stereotypical roles in reproductive work, the positive effect within patriarchal family structures is not automatically fulfilled. Stoves with less unhealthy smoke development are undoubtedly preferred, and, yes, it is a good idea to secure the energy supply at household level. However, why is the empowerment of women limited to access to pre-industrial technologies that reproduce and legitimise their role as unpaid care workers? Poor women in the Global South are obviously only meant to participate in the new world of green growth as unpaid care workers and with very modest production resources. Efficient stoves are, therefore, unsuitable for the structural empowerment of women.

A second example of the unpaid work of women for climate mitigation strategies is the growing agriculture bioeconomy. In the Paris Agreement of the UN Climate Summit 2015 (COP21), a long-term strategy for a prosperous and climate neutral economy, named a “bioeconomy”, is a key solution. The goal of a bioeconomy is to present a vision that can lead to achieving net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 through a fair and cost-efficient transition. At first glance, the term “bioeconomy” sounds marginally innovative, since the production of bio-based goods and the consumption of renewable resources has been practiced since the birth of agriculture. With this term, international chemical and agricultural corporations promise nothing less than food security and energy security with the simultaneous substitution of fossil resources at a global scale. Bioeconomy is about increasing production (in absolute terms) and increasing productivity (per area and per plant) through genetically optimised biomass production (also known as synthetic biology) to meet the forecasted, skyrocketing demand for food and post-fossil resources. The rapid expansion of biofuels and biomass production as resource for a decarbonised, so-called green economy creates gendered risks in food insecurity, pressure on resource access and biodiversity, and employment discrimination (Nelson and Stathers 2009, p. 82).

This modernisation of agriculture has massive second-order effects like green grabbing, the transformation of traditional farming in Africa (Newell and Paterson 2010), and gendered labour division in small farming. In particular, the spread of contract farming is associated with negative consequences for women in small farming areas in Africa. In the system of contract farming, farmers are provided with optimised seed if they commit themselves to producing a certain quantity of a crop. The purchase price of the yields is fixed by the agricultural enterprises just at the time of harvest. The risk of price fluctuations and crop failures, therefore, lies solely with the small farmer. Contractors are almost exclusively men. Women farmers are regarded merely as unpaid family helpers. Since, due to the expansion of large farms, less land is available for subsistence farming, farmers in many areas are dependent on income from contract farming and women no longer have the opportunity to secure basic needs through subsistence farming (De Schutter 2011).

The impacts of climate-mitigation activities are widely felt, but the empirical evidence is limited. The use of climate protection technologies already shows that the global and gendered division of labour is being used to place greater burdens on women in the Global South. United Nations forest protection programmes also often have a negative impact on the security of supply and food sovereignty for women, who are dependent on collecting roots and fruit on common land. Thus, if a forest area serves to reduce carbon in the atmosphere (carbon sink), it must

no longer be used for multiple purposes. In many regions, women in the Global South are more affected by the consequences of global climate protection than by climate change. Feminist critics warn against the privatisation and feminisation of environmental responsibility (MacGregor 2010b). The end-of-pipeline strategy (i.e., carbon sequestration from the atmosphere instead of reducing emissions from industrial production) of environmental politics usually represents more work for women since they are responsible for reproductive labour.

7. A Sustainable Planet Needs Intersectional Climate Justice

In 2019, millions of young people held demonstrations and global climate strikes all over the world. The so-called Fridays for Future protests “were the result of decades of mounting, tangible evidence of environmental collapse, strong scientific research and longstanding grassroots movement-building for just and sustainable alternatives by frontline communities.” (AWID 2019, p. 1). In the Anthropocene (the geological era of industrial mass production), the interrelation of the ongoing daily violence of state and corporate extraction, exploitation and colonisation became more and more obvious. However, young people, with young women at the forefront, are not only protesting for generational justice, but global justice. They collaborate with the movements of Black and People of Color, environmental and climate justice collectives and indigenous people, the formerly enslaved, and anti-colonial movements. They direct people’s attention to the conditions of the climate crisis.

“Forced resource extraction for profit [. . .] has led to our current climate crisis. [. . .] The climate crisis is caused and exacerbated by a capitalist model of development that prioritises [profit at the expense of people and the planet]” (AWID 2019). Movements like Fridays for Future are creating an intersectional climate movement and demanding a climate policy including decolonial, queer feminist and ecological perspectives. Social injustice and environmental degradation are both consequences of the same entangled structures of oppression and exploitation. Indigenous and black people, those living in the Global South and “racialised communities have continuously fought for land rights against large-scale deforestation and resource overexploitation, with [women at the forefront]” (AWID 2019).

As long as patriarchal and imperial lifestyles are not an international issue, the responsibility for climate change and the burden of climate protection will remain unequally distributed. Moreover, this inequality runs along (neo-)colonial boundaries, along normative gender roles and along economic power relations. Women are not naturally more concerned about the consequences of climate change, but their allocation and readiness for domestic and emotional care work is functionalised in the

climate policy debate. In order to be able to recognise this patriarchal practice more clearly, the feminist discussion on the connection between the imperial, patriarchal and heteronormative division of labour in capitalism should be taken seriously.

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