PUBLIC AND PRIVATE WELFARE IN MODERN EUROPE

PRODUCTIVE ENTANGLEMENTS

Edited by
Fabio Giomi, Célia Keren, and Morgane Labbé

cost
EUROPEAN COOPERATION
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ROUTLEDGE

Public and Private Welfare in Modern Europe

Since the 1980s, neoliberals have openly contested the idea that the state should protect the socio-economic well-being of its citizens, making 'privatization' their mantra. Yet, as historians and social scientists have shown, welfare has always been a 'mixed economy', wherein private and public actors dynamically interacted, collaborating or competing with each other in the provision of welfare services. This book will be of interest to students, scholars and practitioners of welfare by developing three innovative approaches. Firstly, it illuminates the productive nature of public/private entanglements. Far from amounting to a zero-sum game, the interactions between the two sectors have changed over time what welfare encompasses, its contents and targets, often engendering the creation of new fields of intervention. Secondly, this book departs from a well-established tradition of comparison between Western nation-states by using and mixing various scales of analysis (local, national, international and global) and by covering case studies from Spain to Poland and France to Greece in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Thirdly, this book goes beyond state centrism in welfare studies by bringing back a host of public and private actors, from municipalities to international organizations, from older charities to modern NGOs.

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Productive entanglements

The dynamics of public–private interactions in the history of social protection[1]

Fabio Giomi, Célia Keren and Morgane Labbé

Thinking productiveness

The formidable, multifaceted challenge to the post-war welfare state was undoubtedly one of the major phenomena that shaped the political life of the protean 1980s. In Western Europe and in the United States, neoliberal state policies openly contested the idea that the state should protect the socio-economic well-being of its citizens and actively promote a more equitable distribution of wealth. A growing cohort of social policy experts of different political leanings gave their support to policies of 'privatization' – one of the buzzwords of the decade – arguing for a transfer of the production of goods and services from the public to the private sector. The rightness of the dismantling of the welfare state in the West seemed to be corroborated by the collapse of socialist regimes in Eastern Europe and the rapid shift of half of the continent from centrally planned to market economies. It was in this context of a general withdrawal of the state that social scientists started to debate the idea that welfare provision should involve not only the state but also a multitude of private actors including voluntary associations, religious institutions and, of course, companies.

In such a political climate, many historians aptly remarked that arguing for a 'mixed economy of welfare' was, in a certain way, reinventing the wheel. Building on many different national and local case studies, they demonstrated that the establishment of the welfare state was not solely to be understood as a response to the post-1945 national and international context. Instead, they showed how welfare policies had been slowly forming since the last quarter of the nineteenth century 'through the central state's gradual adoption and expansion of private local initiatives'.[2] Focusing on interactions and exchanges between the state and private organizations, this scholarship not only contributed to the writing of a longer history of welfare in the West but also demonstrated that that history is *constantly* 'a complex mix of public/private provision'.[3] This body of research also showed that, even after 1945, the ideal of an all-encompassing, universal system of state welfare never entirely excluded private action. Quoting a well-known speech delivered by Lord Beveridge in the House of Lords in 1949, many historians referred to the

line between public and private as a 'moving frontier',[4] never fixed once and for all and constantly renegotiated, even in those countries where welfare is considered to belong fundamentally to either the public (Germany, France) or private (United States) realm. In the following decades, this new way of looking at the history of welfare continued to be fruitful. Indeed, the same reasoning has since been applied to international relief and philanthropy, suggesting the idea of a 'mixed political economy of giving'[5] as a way to understand the close partnership between private philanthropy and the state in the United States since the end of the eighteenth century. Other research, focused on the British context, demonstrates how the state's consistent intervention and funding of private humanitarian action overseas since the 1920s engendered a 'mixed economy of relief'[6] based on the continued dependence of the private sector upon public funds and support.

In what is now a rich body of scholarship, public-private connections in the field of social protection are usually analysed through three main questions. The first deals with the respective *proportions* of public and private provisions in the 'welfare mix' and how these proportions evolved over time. This is the key theme of a wealth of historical studies published from the 1990s onwards, whose objective has been to recognize the role of private actors in the 'welfare mix'. For example, researching the case of Britain, Geoffrey Finlayson has shown that 'between the years 1911 and 1949, while the frontiers of the state expanded, they did not expand to the extent that they left no room for the activity of voluntarism'.[7] This statement is furthered by pinpointing which parts of the voluntary sector 'declined', which 'remained strong', and which 'could not coexist with a universalist welfare state'. Other scholars – as Bernard Harris and Paul Bridgen have pointed out – have even attempted to quantitatively assess the respective weight of voluntary and statutory contributions to the mixed economy of welfare in various countries.[8]

It is often observed that public and private actors themselves played a crucial role in working to increase their respective shares. This leads us to a second key question in the history of the welfare mix, namely, that of *power.* The financial and regulatory dependence of private organizations upon public authorities often lies at the heart of this line of enquiry as well as the shifting relationships of collaboration, rivalry, and competition between private and public welfare initiatives. For example, in his innovative work on the history of old-age pensions in Switzerland, Matthieu Leimgruber has shown that the famous Swiss three-pillar pension system was the result of ongoing 'struggles over the boundaries of state and private providers'.[9] His book analyses how private companies, which had set up occupational pension schemes since the First World War, defended their 'territory' against attempts by the political elites to establish a statutory and universal old-age insurance scheme. Interestingly, Leimgruber repeatedly uses the metaphor of 'containment' to describe how private insurers successfully prevented public social insurance from encroaching on their 'turf' and safeguarded their 'preserve'. At the same time, because corporate schemes have remained a key component of the old-age

welfare mix in Switzerland, their regulation by public authorities, whether cantonal or federal, was a constant matter of conflict during the twentieth century.[10] Similarly, in his important book on philanthropy in America, Olivier Zunz has underscored that state and federal tax laws, in particular tax exemptions, have played a key role in enabling philanthropic foundations. Yet, these laws also offered the federal state a tool to 'regulate charity' by circumscribing what fell within its scope (e.g., education) and what did not (advocacy), thereby effectively influencing the activities and campaigns that philanthropic institutions could or could not engage in.[11]

Taking note of the density of relations between public and private social welfare providers, scholars have developed a third line of enquiry when examining the welfare mix: that of the very *nature and thickness of the divide* between private and public realms. In an interlocking field of social protection in which people, money, practices, policies, and sometimes whole infrastructures circulate between the public and private sectors, it is sometimes very hard to draw a line between the two. As Zunz and others have shown, philanthropic institutions in the United States have developed an organic bond with state and federal social agencies over the years. For example, President Johnson's Great Society was based on 'an original fusion of private and public funds to deliver social services to the poor, many of which emerged from philanthropic pilot programs'.[12] During these years, the federal state became the primary funder for privately managed social programmes, carried out according to the priorities set out by the state.[13] The blurring of the lines between public and private social action is not specific to the history of the United States and can also be found in continental Europe. Writing on the situation in Austria during the First World War, Tara Zahra has underlined that the newly created Ministry for Social Welfare 'harness[ed] the private […] child welfare system to achieve its own goals' and chose to 'expand an infrastructure that nationalist activists […] had already created from the bottom up'.[14] In carrying out its assistance programs, the Austrian state relied heavily on these private, nationalist groups, who were able to raise large sums of money.[15] Eventually, such close collaboration resulted in the creation of 'hybrid welfare structures in which the lines between public and private were far from clear'.[16]

These three questions remain crucial to any historical account of social protection, but the objective of this book is to explore yet another fundamental dimension of the history of the welfare mix, namely, its *productive* nature. This question is not completely absent from the aforementioned works, but it is never at their centre. What do interactions between public and private actors produce? How do they impact on the social protection effectively provided – its scope, its content, its underlying ideology? How do they change what social protection even covers? Indeed, the interaction between the public and private sectors does not amount to a zero-sum game, that is, a situation in which each party's gain or loss is balanced by the losses or gains of the other party. Though straight transfers of policies from the public to

the private realm (and vice versa) do happen, more often than not the inter-action between the two sectors changes what these policies encompass, their contents and targets. As Pat Thane recently observed with regard to the case of the UK, 'far from the "Big State" growing *at the expense* of a vibrant "Big Society", they have worked and changed together, often in *creative* tension, *constructing* and sustaining the "mixed economy of welfare"'.[17] These critical views also echoed works on the history of the state in France that substitute quantitative approaches – that is, those that measure a greater or lesser degree of involvement of the state – with approaches focused on the various forms of the relationship of the state to society.[18] Moreover, recent research ad-dressing transnational schemes of social protection has demonstrated how the interaction of public and private actors engenders the creation of new fields of intervention, including the domains of the protection of children[19] and of migrants,[20] respectively, at the global level. In these cases, private–public interactions even managed to generate new organizations and new areas for both public and private action.[21]

The remainder of this introduction develops this new perspective. The next section lays out the organization of the book and sums up each of the eight chapters. After this, we discuss two historiographical and methodo-logical lessons yielded by our approach and case studies. First, our choice to devote equal analytical consideration to a wealth of public and private actors allows us to set aside for good the historiographical state-centrism that has previously been found in the history of welfare. Second, a close look at the way public-private interactions work at the micro-level leads us to shed new light on those individuals whose professional and activist careers straddle the two realms, thereby playing a crucial role in fostering the productiveness of public-private interactions.

Scaling and unpacking the public–private divide

In order to explore the different ways in which public-private entanglements can be productive in the field of social protection, we have chosen to organ-ize the eight case studies of this book by scales of analysis, starting from the local level and ending with the international and global level. By varying the scales of analysis – instead of sticking to only one such scale, for example, the national one – this organization allows us to look at public-private en-tanglements from different viewpoints and shows us multiple versions of the same reality. Inspired by the work of micro-historians, we argue that there is no value hierarchy between the scales: they all have something relevant to say, and the change of focal length itself is particularly useful for exploring the complexity of social phenomena.[22] This means in particular that this collec-tion, contrary to most works in the field of social protection, does not take the primacy of the national level for granted and deliberately moves away from methodological nationalism. This starting point allows the contributions in this book to unpack the categories of 'public' and 'private' by focusing on the

plurality of collective actors that populate the environment straddling the two realms. The 'public' is therefore not limited to the state and includes local or regional authorities or at the international level, intergovernmental organizations. Similarly, 'private' does not refer only to voluntary associations but also to political parties, trade unions, churches and companies.

The first two chapters of the book subvert methodological nationalism either by breaking the national level down into its constituent parts – in the case of federal Switzerland – or by using city-level comparisons between France and Germany, respectively. In her chapter on the policies towards illegitimate children in Switzerland in the twentieth century, Joëlle Droux focuses on the cantonal level in French-speaking Switzerland. Through a detailed analysis of exchanges between the public (cantonal and federal institutions) and the private (charities), she explores the specific possibilities for social protection provided by the organization of the Swiss Federation, which make it possible to set up specific organizations devoted to each sector of intervention. This specific institutional architecture created what Droux calls 'an ecosystem of close-knit relationships between the public and private sector', in which new social protection schemes could emerge, especially in the domain of child adoption. In the next chapter, Catherine Maurer compares French and German poor relief in the late nineteenth century at municipal level. Through the study of 15 cities on both sides of the Rhine, Maurer shows how the private (institutes and associations administered by Catholic orders and laity) and the public (city councils) never ceased to exist and cohabit in a peaceful, often virtuous way, even in two historical contexts that were apparently dominated by harsh opposition between the two, namely, the French Third Republic and the German Kulturkampf. This change in scale thus allows the author to reveal – especially for the French case – a rather unexpected 'philanthropic consensus'[23] at municipal level, far from the conflictual relationship between Church and state observed at the national level. In their texts, Maurer and Droux explore not only organizational dynamics but also the outputs that this organizational interdependence at different scales had with regard to the actual provision of social protection on the ground.

Following a well-established practice in the scholarship of social protection, the next three contributions in this book assign a major role to the national scale. In so doing, they not only construct a detailed chronology of public-private interactions, highlighting the dynamic tensions that shaped and reshaped them in the different spaces and time periods in question, but they also tackle case studies that are in some way unexpected or focus on spaces that have been neglected in the scholarship on the mixed economy of welfare. Axelle Brodiez-Dolino's chapter focuses on late twentieth-century France, a period conventionally described as being characterized by the retrenchment of the welfare state and parallel expansion of private agencies. Challenging this dominant narrative, the author argues for an analysis through the prism of the mixed economy of welfare – a concept largely

overlooked by the French research works on this topic and which makes it possible to emphasize the concomitant growth of, and harmonious relations between public and private welfare. She shows that in the early 1980s, the French state tackled rising levels of poverty by massively subsidizing private charitable associations – a new practice, considering a century-old history dominated by conflict and separation between the two domains. Similarly, the new public employment schemes of the 1990s were strongly supported by private associations, who had in fact been the drivers behind this policy and had tested it at the local level before it was given a statutory, national scope.

The next two chapters pursue the same goal of extending the concept of the mixed economy of welfare beyond the areas where it is more commonly applied, by addressing national cases from Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. First, Morgane Labbé's chapter, focused on interwar Poland, explores the creative tension between a private organization (the Institute of Social Economics, a voluntary association dominated by socialist activists) and a public agency (the official Central Statistical Office, gathering experts restricted by an ethical code of neutrality with regard to public service) in carrying out scientific studies to investigate the conditions of the working class. The text demonstrates how the complex interactions between these two expert organizations, ranging from mistrust to competition and collaboration, fostered a dynamic environment for carrying out surveys that produced expert knowledge and thereby led to the construction of a more reliable cost-of-living index. Second, Efi Avdela's contribution draws attention further South, with a focus on the network of voluntary associations offering social provision to various vulnerable groups in twentieth-century Greece. Avdela's text, examining the interwar years, the Second World War and the post-war period, in turn, explores how actors in the public (the members of the governmental administration) and private realms (activists in voluntary associations) produced new geographies of interactions and, in so doing, managed to extend the borders of social protection in various ways. Labbé and Avdela's findings not only contribute to the 'missing history'[24] of social protection in a region usually considered as constituting the periphery of Europe and whose nation-states are viewed as latecomers in a space dominated by continental empires, but they also call into question the predominant view that these are weak states that have failed in providing social protection to their citizens. With this critical attention, both authors challenge the assumptions of a prevailing historiography on Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, which are founded on the features of the Western welfare states.[25]

The last three chapters in this book address the welfare mix at the international scale, a perspective that is rarely considered despite the fact that there are significant relationships linking an array of collective actors at this level. Célia Keren's chapter focuses on the evacuation scheme set up in order to bring children from the short-lived Spanish Republic to France in the late 1930s. By reassessing the respective roles played by the public (the Spanish government) and the private realm (foreign private committees in France),

this chapter shows that the child evacuation programme was in fact inspired, promoted, created and widely run by activist groups outside Spain. At the same time, Keren argues that this private activism contributed in no small part to the gradual building of a complex, albeit short-lived, Spanish welfare state. Linda Guerry's contribution on the first few years of activities of the International Conference of Private Organizations for the Protection of Migrants focuses on the interactions between this private umbrella organization and an international agency whose mandate is to advance social and economic justice through setting international labour standards, the International Labour Organization. The chapter demonstrates that international public and private organizations that were deprived of the power to enact laws were mutually dependent and required mutual support, learning from and imitating each other in order to put pressure on the member-states. Echoing Labbé, Guerry shows that the ILO, which did not have access to grassroots information on the living conditions of migrant populations, had to rely on data produced by private organizations. In the last chapter of this book, Auriane Guilbaud analyses the interactions between a private, for-profit organization, the US pharmaceutical giant Merck, and a public international institution, the World Health Organization, between 1975 and 2000. Focusing on the joint efforts of these two bodies in the fight against a tropical disease, the chapter highlights how the relationship between the two resulted in the creation of a seminal drug donation programme in 1987, the Mectizan Donation Program, which became a model for other similar schemes implemented later. Guilbaud demonstrates how the interactions between public and private resulted in changes not only in the two actors themselves but also in the field of medical relief, thereby redefining the scope and nature of the fight against onchocerciasis.

Taken together, this polyphonic, empirically grounded collection demonstrates that organizations and policies do not simply shift from private to public and back, and indeed that the respective perimeters of the public and private sectors may grow and shrink together, changing the extent and borders of the field of social protection as a whole. In so doing, and through their interactions, both sectors constantly reshape, expand or shrink the field of social protection and the organizations that operate within that field at the local, national and international scale.

Going beyond historiographical state-centrism

As mentioned above, well-established historiographical narratives on social welfare are still very much centred on the state as the dominant actor. Although this position sometimes remains implicit, the welfare state is still held to be the gold standard of social protection, serving as the basis for comparison. Even recent literature on the crisis of the welfare state still largely focuses on the state.[26] As shown by the two chapters of this book dealing with France, the reluctance to think about private action is the result of a complex

interplay between political and historiographical cultures. Catherine Maurer, referring to the French case in particular, remarks that 'the new ideological and political significance of welfare issues, and the conflicts that were sparked at the end of the nineteenth century', made it impossible, over a long period, to conceive of a constructive relationship between the state and the Catholic Church. Axelle Brodiez-Dolino, again writing on France but focusing on a period one century later, comes to a similar conclusion when she states that a supposed long-term conflict between the Catholic Church and the state made public-private entanglements seem 'improbable', or even 'inadmissible', both in French public discourse and in historiography. Several contributions of this book therefore suggest that the border between national political cultures and social sciences is anything but impermeable. Other chapters in this book go a step further, tackling state initiatives that positively aim to render their private counterparts invisible. This is the case, for instance, of Célia Keren's text, which shows how, as early as 1937, the Spanish Ministry of Education publicized the ongoing evacuation scheme as a state policy only, thereby hiding the crucial role that foreign humanitarian committees had played in it and continued to play. In this case, the project to make private action invisible reflected a precise political agenda of the nation-state, aimed at reasserting – at least on paper – its monopoly over 'its' children.

As a whole, this book questions an established historiography that identifies the emergence of the welfare state with the extension of civil rights to include social rights. This historiography entails a sequential view of the history of welfare centred around the successive figures of the state[27] – the welfare state being considered inseparable from the liberal and democratic state. This view is reinforced by most of the theoretical works in sociology and political science on welfare state regimes, which are themselves based on the political history of Western European states. Their typologies attribute a central role to the state and to the instituted and legal forms of protection and assume a founding association between the advent of capitalist liberalism and the emergence of the welfare state, whereby the latter was intended to correct the effects of the former.[28] These models, with their ideal-typical historical references, such as the 'Beveridgian' and the 'Bismarckian' welfare states, have held significant appeal because they help to classify the diversity of systems that exist across time and space and to make comparisons between welfare regimes and between the public policies adopted within these regimes. Historians have often criticized how these systemic analyses make an oversimplified use of historical temporalities, thereby obscuring the heterogeneity of social welfare provisions that have existed since the end of the nineteenth century.[29] In this book, we argue that these founding and characteristic features of the welfare state, which are taken up in these macro-comparative syntheses, marginalize or exclude other forms of social welfare that developed in Eastern or Southern countries and under various political regimes or at the international level.

The attempt in this book to overcome historiographical state-centrism has three main consequences. First, and contrary to most collections on the

mixed economy of welfare in several countries, this book is not concerned with comparing various national welfare 'systems' – which, in practice, are usually limited to Britain, Germany, the United States and the Nordic countries, with the occasional addition of France. We are interested instead in the mechanisms that foster public-private interactions and their productiveness, everywhere in Europe and at all levels. Second, once historians look past this Leviathan, they find a plethora of nonprofit and for-profit actors such as associations, corporations, municipalities, religious orders, international organizations and NGOs which, with competing agendas in mind, made a significant contribution to the expansion of social protection in Europe. In this sense, this book aims to contribute to a growing body of scholarship that challenges the well-established sociological view that civil society organizations, for-profit and nonprofit alike, must be considered to be independent and clearly separate from the state. On the contrary, the chapters in this book explore the grey area between public policies and voluntary action, showing that 'their borders were porous, shifting and subject to constant negotiation'.[30] Third, moving beyond state-centrism allows the historian to shift their attention from national governmental decision-making to other public actors, such as municipalities (as is the case in Catherine Maurer's study) or international organizations (as in Linda Guerry's chapter). Once we free ourselves from the state-centred teleology, the resulting picture of the field of social protection becomes multipolar, relational and populated by many different kinds of actors. This is why one may ultimately wish to follow Efi Avdela's suggestion, who proposes to abandon the term 'welfare state', which always entails a kind of 'dichotomous conceptualisation of "civil society" as the opposite of the "state"', and instead to approach these phenomena as the 'mode of production of collective action in the field of social provision'.

Public-private interactions from below: focusing on brokers

Several chapters in this book focus not only on structures and institutions but also on individuals and more precisely on those middlemen and middle-women who managed to manoeuvre between careers in public institutions and private organizations.[31] As has sometimes been observed,[32] scholarship on social protection has often failed to take account of these kinds of figures. First, they have often been perceived as being peripheral to both worlds, and as a result, they have often occupied only a liminal place, or no place at all, in conventional narratives on welfare. Second, and moreover, even when these figures do hold central positions in both public institutions and private organizations, they are usually remembered for only one of these roles. The goal here is not only to produce a new narrative that takes account of the scattered pieces of an individual experience but also rather to demonstrate how their very ability to navigate between the public and the private

can engender an expansion of social provision. This book therefore assigns crucial importance to brokers, notably inspired by the rich interdisciplinary scholarship on brokerage.[33] In other words, the focus on brokers' careers allows us to see 'productive entanglements' at their smallest, and in a sense primordial, scale.

Overall, the texts in this collection present a varied range of trajectories of people moving from one sphere to the other. Efi Avdela's chapter on social provision in twentieth-century Greece follows the story of different sorts of 'public agents… acting in a private capacity, [who] were able to instigate the creation of, participate in or create for themselves voluntary associations', thereby 'extend[ing] the field of social protection'. These individuals are therefore examples of public agents who decided also to engage in associational culture, in a way that blurred the border between the two. This strategy turns out to be particularly creative in Greece, especially in moments of greater political instability, upheavals and military conflicts; Avdela observes that 'public employees and civil servants acting as private actors together with volunteers' were so effective that they ended up substituting and 'performing the state' in several domains of social action. But the movement between public and private domains does not flow in only one direction. Axelle Brodiez-Dolino, for instance, detects the opposite movement as well from the private to the public. Analysing the public-private entanglement in social provision in late twentieth-century France, she remarks that 'several humanitarian figures have also gone in the opposite direction, holding ministerial offices', thus further complicating the picture. According to Brodiez-Dolino, the proximity between 'advocates defending the "cause of the poor" and "elites of the Social State"' is a permanent feature of the French case, which peaked in the 1980s, such that one could even speak of a "revolving door" between public and private welfare'. However, focusing too much on the different possible directions of movement could be misleading. Indeed, the chapters in this book stress the importance of actors being *simultaneously* engaged on both sides of the public-private divide. This is particularly true, for instance, in the chapter by Joëlle Droux. In her case study, brokers are simultaneously active on both sides of the public-private divide, establishing a relatively stable 'symbiotic relationship', which, in the context of Francophone Switzerland on which her chapter focuses, was at the very origin of new mechanisms of social protection for illegitimate children. Multipositioning, in both its diachronic and synchronic dimensions, therefore appears to be key in making brokerages possible and in allowing public-private entanglements to be productive.

The chapters in this book testify to a vast array of circumstances in which brokers have met, developed skills and knowledge and, in this way, contributed to the transformation of existing schemes of social protection. For example, in her study on interwar Poland, Morgane Labbé draws attention to the 'creation of joint study commissions' between the Central Statistical Office and the Institute of Social Economics. In other words, Labbé's case

study stresses how public–private interactions often took place in ad hoc in-stitutional frameworks where people coming from both sides of the divide competed and cooperated. This institutionalized cooperation was, in this case, productive: as well as generating 'a better measurement of the real liv-ing standards of workers', the commission gave an 'impetus to the implemen-tation of statistical studies and surveys'. A similar stress on the institutional dimension of the public–private entanglement is found in Auriane Guilbaud's study: in this case, the WHO and the pharmaceutical company Merck, after a period of mutual mistrust, established a set of bodies (including the Secretar-iat of the Mectizan Donation Program and the Mectizan Expert Committee) which became the forum where the different parties could gather, negoti-ate and design a programme against onchocerciasis. Important though they might seem, these formalized, institutionalized loci are not the only ones that deserve to be taken into account. The foundations for public–private entan-glements in social protection were built not only in official meetings, plenary sessions, commissions and so on but also, and sometimes very significantly, in the world of informal interactions. The vast array of practices subsumed un-der the term 'associational sociability'[34] appears to be important for building trust and familiarity between different actors. As remarked by Efi Avdela for the Greek case, a

> growing number of men and also women, of varied professional and social backgrounds… as well as numerous state officials… encountered each other in numerous voluntary associations and in social networking, enhanced by political affinities, social sensitivities and the increasing, even if uneven, institutionalization of social provision.

Voluntary associations thus appear to be a space of encounter for individuals operating on both sides of the public–private divide and the starting point for the opening of a 'new common space of collective action'.

Through their focus on a range of different times and places, the chapters in this book present to the reader a rich array of brokers' careers. Even without mobilizing the Bourdieusian notion of 'capital', it appears abundantly clear that circulation across the public–private divide allowed brokers to build dif-ferent sorts of cultural and relational assets and sometimes even to strengthen their professional position. This is the case, for instance, in Auriane Guilbaud's study, which shows that brokers may be able to navigate between different cultural systems and speak different languages – that is, those of the adminis-tration and of voluntary action, respectively. The ability of intermediaries to stand at the crossroad of different regimes of legitimacy is particularly clear in her text: the fact that several key figures from Merck had formerly worked with the World Health Organization played a crucial role in building recip-rocal trust between private and public and helped both parties to realize the benefits of collaboration, which were not otherwise self-evident. Yet, mobi-lizing and exchanging different cultural and relational assets do not seem to

come without a price. Linda Guerry's chapter in particular shows how gender affected the possibilities for such a 'capital conversion', especially in the case of movement from the private to the public sector of social protection. Focusing on the case of women social workers leading the international movement for the protection of migrant women, this text demonstrates clearly that there is a price – in Bourdieusian terms, a 'conversion rate'[35] – for moving from one field to another. Focusing on brokers – a concept that has spread from politics to social sciences, and in particular to science studies – thus leads us to look at the history of welfare from a wider range of disciplinary perspectives, beyond social policy studies, and allows us to look at this history from below.

<div align="center">★★★</div>

The eight texts that make up this book are the result of a joint effort to bear witness to the enduring presence of public-private interactions in social protection in a wide range of political formations – the centralized or federal state, nation or empire, municipality, international organizations and others. They draw conceptual inspiration from critical works on the established historiography of the welfare state, mainly from leading British historians. These attempts to investigate social welfare through the lens of the mixed economy of welfare have proven to be fruitful: the book demonstrates the primordial role of both institutions and individuals in expanding the domain of social protection and thereby contributes to the enrichment of this theoretical framework. One further goal of this book is to develop this framework for a comparative and transnational approach to social protection in order to provide the foundation for future studies in global welfare, including the history of non-European worlds and colonial experiences.

Notes

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1 A quintessential mixed economy?

The issue of illegitimacy as a testing ground for creative collaboration between public and private actors in French–speaking Switzerland, 1890–1960

Joëlle Droux

Introduction

In 1941, the state of Geneva considered integrating into its public services an educational facility for delinquent teenagers, founded four years earlier by a private association, and that was running a huge deficit.[1] The director of the facility was strongly opposed to the idea:

> we must fight this decision because it would be the ruin of [our facility] forevermore and would drag it down into the depths of materialism. […] We will only be able to play our social role if we remain outside all officialdom which kills the Spirit and place our organization above parties, influences, and labels.[2]

These words were uttered at a time when the state was increasingly intervening in matters of economy and welfare in connection with the mobilization (e.g., organizing a system of loss–of–income allowances for the families of called–up troops and creating the Wahlen Plan aimed at ensuring the country's agricultural self–sufficiency). Great Britain's Beveridge Plan would soon be published, fuelling debates in Switzerland about the future of welfare policy and prompting the charitable sector to question its role following this extension of state action. Like the director quoted above, many actors responded defensively, claiming to be championing Christian values in the face of what they considered the public sector's rampant materialism. However, they also sometimes took a more pugnacious stance, arguing that they had greater latitude and could therefore be more creative in how they tackled contemporary social issues.

This chapter examines these claims about the place and role of private charity in dealing with issues of welfare in the Swiss context. It does so by focusing on a specific area, namely the protection of illegitimate children.

Now that equality between children has been established irrespective of their parents' marital status, this issue has been forgotten, but for a long time it remained sensitive. Many countries began tackling it at the end of the nineteenth century, seeing this stigmatized group's vulnerability as a justification for state intervention.[3] Switzerland was no exception and the issue was debated there from the 1890s onwards, in connection with plans to unify the country's Civil Code.[4]

Studying these questions in the Swiss context is particularly productive given the country's federal structure. By focusing on the interactions between private and public actors in debates and institutional creations relating to illegitimacy, this chapter shows, first, the pivotal role played by private actors in connecting the different levels at which public policy was organized (local, cantonal, regional – reflecting the different linguistic blocks – and federal). Second, it offers an understanding of the processes that allowed policy to evolve through an interplay between private and public actors managing, disseminating, testing and negotiating systems for care provision, whilst ensuring the reproduction of the dominant system of values.

These issues are examined here over a 70-year span, starting with the preliminary discussions on the draft Civil Code, which set out a general framework that would remain in place until legal reforms in the 1970s normalized the status of children born out of wedlock. Looking closely at the actors on the ground in French-speaking Switzerland, the chapter identifies the various positions taken by private initiatives, compared to public action, and does so in five parts. In the first part, the relevant provisions of the draft Code are discussed showing how its underlying principles were received by public opinion and especially among private actors. Private initiatives in care provision are examined in the second part, showing that these fell in line with the main principles of the Civil Code even before it had been adopted. In the third part, particular attention is given to the mechanisms which were put in place in the strongly decentralized Swiss context to help spread and promote both models of action and their underlying principles, looking at the role played by the Pro Juventute association, at the intersection of state welfare and private charity. Focusing on the local level, the fourth part shows that during the interwar years, there were particularly involved interactions between networks of private actors and public services, resulting in a division of labour when it came to managing the populations in question. Far from remaining limited to applying the federal framework alone, this ecosystem created by private-public collaboration even led to new and unprecedented forms of care provision. The fifth part concentrates on one particular example: the practice of adopting illegitimate children, which was based on one of the provisions of the Civil Code, albeit diverted from its original purpose when applied to the issue of illegitimacy. The implementation of this solution gave rise, in turn, to new mechanisms for intervention and regulation, lending legitimacy to the expertise of private actors in setting national welfare policy in this area.

Illegitimate children and their mothers: the era of legal reforms

From the Ancien Régime onwards, situations of illegitimacy posed legal, economic and moral problems for state authorities. The existence of 'bastards' called into question the sacred institution of marriage and led to delicate situations when it came to transmitting family wealth and determining who was responsible for providing for these children.[5] A multitude of regulations determined how illegitimacy was handled, resulting in extremely diverse local practices as evidenced by the Swiss case.[6] Certain cantons tended to force fathers to support their illegitimate children financially by allowing paternity searches. This procedure was intended to allow mothers to demand maintenance from the supposed fathers. Other cantons, however, did not go down this path. These discrepancies led to complicated legal conflicts when the parents of the child came from regions that regulated illegitimacy differently.[7] For a while, a more unified approach was established in the revolutionary era, with all the territories attached to France at that time adopting the French Civil Code (1804). This Code prohibited paternity searches and, when illegitimate children were not recognized by their fathers, rendered the mother solely responsible for providing for them.[8] Most French-speaking cantons retained these provisions after the Restoration. As for the German-speaking cantons, they returned to their legal tradition that allowed for paternity proceedings. These diverse regimes for establishing filiation continued until the end of the nineteenth century.

Throughout the nineteenth century, illegitimate births – a phenomenon viewed as one variant of the social question – attracted the attention of moral and political authorities in various countries. At the very time when illegitimacy was in fact beginning to decline, its demographic and social effects became the focus of concern.[9] In Switzerland, as elsewhere, a child welfare movement brought together a range of social actors, whether to ensure better legal protection for children in danger (abandoned or delinquent) or to fight against their mortality.[10] In this regard, the revelation of mortality rates for children born outside of marriage caused a genuine wave of shock.[11] Some doctors sounded the alarm publicly: whereas illegitimate births only made up 5% of the country's births, the mortality rate in the first year of life was 28% for these children against 18% for their legitimate counterparts.[12] What's more, these statistics did not take into account infanticide, abortion or the abandonment of children resulting from pregnancies out of wedlock. The growing awareness of these indirect effects of illegitimacy caused important changes in social attitudes to gather pace in a number of countries: the judges and juries charged with sanctioning these crimes and offences increasingly shied away from applying the full force of the law to mothers who had either killed their children or tried to abort them, when they were persuaded that these mothers had been deceived and abandoned by the father.[13]

Many women's associations analysed the situation in similar terms, protesting against the effects of the double moral standard that tolerated men's indiscretions but repudiated their 'victims' (women they seduced and children they abandoned).[14]

Under the influence of these contestations, many countries were gripped by debates about the situation of illegitimate children.[15] As discussions evolved, different proposals were produced to reduce the legal, social or health consequences of illegitimacy (e.g. regimes for establishing filiation, systems for providing support to single mothers and/or their illegitimate children, inheritance rights). These proposals were often inspired by reforms implemented in other national contexts, prompting a form of international harmonization in social responses to this issue. Thus, the reforms enacted in Sweden, Norway and Switzerland were influenced by German legislation.[16] In the Swiss case, the question of illegitimate children drew the attention of the public sphere when the first unified Civil Code was being drawn up between 1896 and 1907.[17] The initial draft, written by the professor of law Eugen Huber (1849–1923), contained several proposals for reforms in this regard.[18] He suggested, in particular, making paternity searches mandatory for children born out of wedlock, for the whole country (they were already well established in German-speaking Switzerland but almost unheard of in the French-speaking part of the country). So as not to leave single mothers to deal with this weighty procedure on their own, the Swiss draft law provided for the mandatory declaration of all illegitimate births followed by a *curatelle* measure.[19] The *curateur* appointed by the guardianship authorities had to start a paternity search within three months[20]: the aim was to identify the father and then attempt to exact from him either legitimacy for the child by marriage[21] or legal recognition of that child and a commitment to contribute to the cost of his or her upbringing.

Civil society was favourably disposed to this new system. Throughout the debates in parliament, the measures relating to illegitimacy were reported in numerous French-language press articles and were fairly positively received, for example by those jurists who welcomed them in the name of 'the equity [that] requires considerable improvements in the condition of natural children, the poorest of the poor'.[22] The same satisfaction was expressed by women's movements, who hailed the fact that

> paternity searches were petitioned for by the state before the competent tribunal without the *fille-mère*[23] [unwed mother] needing to apply, that is to say automatically and if necessary against her wishes.[24]

This provision was seen as limiting the risk of fathers avoiding their obligations by taking advantage of the mothers' weakness. Politicians were also in agreement, including figures as conservative as the Fribourg *Conseiller d'Etat* (State councillor), catholic Georges Python (1856–1927), who saw it as 'a very equitable reform'.[25]

All these different people conceived of this issue in the same way, reducing the situation of single mothers to that of *filles-mères* abandoned by the men who had seduced them. It lent further credence to the idea that the only way of supporting both mother and child was to place them under the guardianship of an authority with sufficient power to extract contributions from neglectful fathers. However, the impoverished situation of many single mothers was in fact far more varied. In Switzerland, as elsewhere, single mothers were not all young, inexperienced or naïve.[26] Some lived in consensual unions [*concubinage*] as they were unable to marry their partner either because it was too expensive or because it was impossible (e.g. when one or other was still married and had not divorced, a procedure that was also costly). Births outside marriage were thus not necessarily the reflection of sexual exploitation; they were often testament to the numerous difficulties that could prevent a legitimate union.[27] Whatever the reality of these contrasting situations, at the time, pregnancy out of wedlock continued to be analysed in terms of a stereotypical profile of female vulnerability, that is to say the young girl who had been deceived and abandoned, victim of male selfishness. The *tutelle* provisions laid out in the draft of the Swiss Civil Code therefore only responded to this specific situation. The system was designed to support those mothers and, by extension their children, left dealing with the financial consequences of a lack of paternal support. For the main part, then, this was a solution that shored up the gender roles inherent to the dominant patriarchal family model. By forcing fathers to take up their role as the financial providers of the household, this solution remained deeply anchored in this traditional framework.

However, such a support did have its limits. For example, when a Genevan liberal parliamentarian suggested allowing fathers legally to recognize the children of adultery or incest, in the name of treating all offspring equally, this was rejected by a majority of the conservatives, in the manner of Python who saw it as a form of 'destruction of the family'.[28] The same refusal was given to the suggestion made by certain representatives of the workers' movement calling for the removal of the provisions in the Code that prohibited paternal recognition for children whose mothers had allegedly had several sexual relations at the time of conception.[29] In the view of a majority of lawmakers, the law's support could only be provided to women who were the victims of male immorality and not those who had had several sexual partners and were henceforth considered to have deliberately transgressed traditional social roles. In cases where the defendant could convince the judges that this was the situation of the woman pursuing him, the Code provided for the proceedings to be dropped entirely.

Ultimately, the provisions of the Code relating to illegitimacy were broadly supported by a range of actors (reforming jurists, women's movements, philanthropists) as well by all the bourgeois parties. On this specific point of legislation, the Civil Code therefore enabled a process of legal and cultural

unification that was nevertheless compatible with the maintenance of certain cantonal idiosyncrasies, dear to the Catholic cantons. By making substantial concessions to the pre-eminence of the legitimate family, the final legal text made a selection from the possible measures put forward by the variegated proponents of reform for illegitimate children, resulting in real innovation when it came to providing care. For example, paternity searches mediated by a *curateur* were supposed to guarantee their effectiveness. The Code also gave illegitimate children the right to demand maintenance from their birth father, even if he already had legitimate children, although only the latter could inherit from him. Swiss society was therefore ready to reform, although not at any cost. The path chosen was that of *improving* the situation of illegitimate children and not of *ensuring equality* of legal status. On the contrary, with this new framework, the law confirmed their radical inequality in legal terms. The new Civil Code, passed by parliament in 1907 and implemented in 1912,[30] was nevertheless hailed as one of the most advanced of its time in terms of child protection.[31]

The early mobilization of civil society

These debates had an impact on how private charities approached the question of illegitimate children, as illustrated by the case study of the canton of Geneva, an area particularly affected by out-of-wedlock pregnancies. The region was one of the most urbanized in Switzerland: the small canton (280 km^2 for 127,000 inhabitants in 1899) was essentially made up of the urban core of the city of Geneva itself (approximately 97,000 inhabitants) encircled by a very narrow strip of countryside. As in most of the country's urban centres,[32] it had a fairly high illegitimacy rate (approximately 10% of recorded births in 1900, against 4.6% for the country as a whole). The canton of Geneva was quite welcoming towards single mothers: for example, the Maternity hospital, a cantonal public institution, accepted them readily, as learning material for students. Most of the women who gave birth there were either destitute or *filles-mères*, often from other cantons, drawn there by the free, anonymous care provision. This remained true throughout the first half of the twentieth century.[33]

In order to provide for this population of lone women in precarious situations, a range of private initiatives began to introduce new methods of care provision, such as maternal asylums and *pouponnières* (residential nurseries), even before the new Civil Code was adopted. The prevailing assessment of the women's needs was based on the conviction that they were the victims of a double moral standard, so these establishments only catered to a subset of single mothers: those who were not in a stable conjugal relationship, abandoned by their community and their partners. The initiatives shared the aim of the Civil Code under discussion, in focusing on the protection of vulnerable unmarried mothers. The movement began with local committees

heavily influenced by the protestant elite close to abolitionist circles (who, for this reason, were particularly aware of the differential effects of the double moral standard relative to 'fallen' women). At the beginning of the twentieth century, they founded a shelter, La Miséricorde [Mercy], based on an Alsatian model (although Anglo-Saxon countries are known to have also introduced this sort of system at the same period).[34] La Miséricode was not necessarily accepted by everyone and its management acknowledged that it had been accused by the 'pious people of Geneva […] of encouraging vice'.[35] It never-theless persevered, changing name in 1908 in favour of the deliberately less stigmatizing 'La Retraite, œuvre de relèvement' [The Retreat Rehabilitation Charity]. The intention was to offer a dozen of single mothers a discreet alternative to being hospitalized in public maternity wards. First and fore-most, the intention was to avoid these women abandoning their children or resorting to infanticide in the short or medium term. The length of their stay, first set at six weeks, was progressively extended to six months with a view to creating the necessary conditions for forming an attachment to the baby. The mothers were, however, subjected to strict rules: the aim was to provide them not only with material assistance but also with moral oversight given that, in the founders' eyes, their 'sin' was a sign of weak character. The women were kept under a strict regime (visits and correspondence were monitored) and required to complete household chores to pay for the cost of their stay (laun-dry, sewing, etc.) The establishment also had an educational mission, which was to teach the women to look after their babies.

The intention was to save these children by helping their mothers. The founders of La Retraite were well informed about the comparatively high death rate affecting illegitimate children and wished to close this gap, thanks to the mothers' efforts, made possible by the support given to them.[36] For this reason, as soon as they were able to return to work, the establishment offered to look after their children for a modest sum for a period ranging from one year (in 1908) to three years (as of 1911). During this time, the children re-mained under close medical supervision. The model was copied in Fribourg in 1908 and in the canton of Vaud in 1912. While these initiatives remained lim-ited in number, they nevertheless reflected a change in the position adopted by the elites towards this social issue, across the confessional divide.

Another variant of this model was the *pouponnière*. The first of these in-stitutions was founded in Geneva in 1906 by Dr Marguerite Champendal (1870–1928), the first Swiss woman to obtain a medical degree. This veritable healthcare entrepreneur, who maintained close ties with bourgeois feminist circles, devoted her entire career to infant care.[37] In 1901, drawing on the financial and material collaboration of women in the local elite, Champ-endal adapted the French *Gouttes de lait* model to Geneva.[38] The aim was to provide sterilized milk to mothers who could not breastfeed in order to fight the infant mortality linked to traditional artificial feeding practices. However, Champendal realized that many of these mothers did not have

the means to treat their babies' illnesses owing to their destitution or their need to work. She therefore founded a small clinic to hospitalize these babies called La Pouponnière (1906) and attached a training school for nurses to it: the student nurses were responsible for the follow-up care of babies and their mothers in their homes, providing help and advice at a time when techniques related to the quality, handling and preparation of baby nutrition were un-heard of among the working classes. Champendal's example spread: three similar establishments were created in the canton (Petite Maisonnée, 1914; Pouponnière des Amies de l'Enfance, 1918; Providence de Versoix, 1922).[39] The last two were supported by Catholic circles, offering further proof both of the confessional consensus emerging around this issue and of how dynamic Catholic charities were at the time.[40] These establishments worked in the same way, pairing an infant care institution with a training centre. Many unmarried mothers benefited from these facilities, which offered them an alternative to mercenary wet-nursing.[41] Moreover, these institutions could often draw on the expertise of renowned paediatricians for whom they con-stituted a rich source of practical experience. Pouponnières were funded by collections and donations and by a new form of 'business patronage', particu-larly from the milk industry (Guigoz, Nestlé) that saw an opportunity to test innovative products (such as baby cereal and powdered milk).[42] The boarding house for student nurses provided working capital for the *pouponnières*, which became training centres and employment opportunities for these new profes-sions on the healthcare market.[43]

When discussions of the Civil Code began, private initiatives had thus already seized the opportunity to express support, by means of these inno-vations, for a protective model of care provision for children. The intention was to break with the past and the stigmatization of unmarried mothers and their offspring. While these initiatives were originally mainly present in ur-ban Protestant settings, they soon became more diverse, testifying to the elites' increasing interest in the reforms set in motion by the law. They appear to have met with the same approval in public opinion, as evidenced by the numerous individual 'micro-donations' of a few francs per year received by these institutions, recorded in their financial accounts. The goal of saving children's lives by means of medicalized care provision focused on newborn babies no doubt played a crucial role in creating this consensus around the re-forming measures being put in place. By targeting that particular age group, most at risk of death, this objective managed in part to obviate the risk that the system would be perceived as encouraging immorality by making life too 'easy' for *filles-mères*.[44] On such a highly sensitive topic as family policy and the regulation of sexual conduct, the private charities described here served as a testing ground among the working class and elite charitable populations but also a 'laboratory for state policy.'[45] After these initial local experiments, which demonstrated the model's viability, public authorities then built upon this overall assent to disseminate the model further.

Unification in decentralization: Pro Juventute and the propagation of charitable works to help single mothers

The federal authorities did not remain entirely inactive in the face of these early initiatives, but their scope for action was limited. Unlike a centralized state, the Confederation's jurisdiction over the cantons was strictly limited by the Constitution, especially in matters related to health. In this regard, federal statistics for the early twentieth century revealed considerable disparities between cantons: while urban cantons saw clear progress in their fight against infant mortality, the more rural ones (especially Fribourg and Valais) lagged behind.[46] The federal authorities were aware of the need to raise the level of services related to this cause and therefore, as had been their custom since the mid-nineteenth century, made use of the charitable sector as a regulating tool to compensate the weaknesses of their own infrastructures.[47] In 1912, the Federal Council drew on the *Société Suisse d'utilité publique* – a national welfare policy think tank – to create the Pro Juventute Foundation, which thus became the child protection umbrella organization (*organisation faîtière*).[48] This foundation was supposed to promote child welfare activities nationwide, acting as a centre for advice and advocacy in this regard. Pro Juventute created district secretariats covering the whole country in order to decentralize its work of encouraging private initiatives and channelling them into certain types of action. To achieve this goal, the foundation defined each year a priority theme and encouraged local initiatives to create specific actions and works related to it. The 'Protecting mother and child' theme focused in particular on fighting infant mortality, and saving illegitimate children was a prominent feature. In its monthly journal, in the three national languages, Pro Juventute published many articles praising the work of the *pouponnières* and maternal asylums and prompting emulation across the cantons. By expressing its support for existing private endeavours to help single mothers, the foundation reinforced the depoliticizing of illegitimacy, thereby encouraging its acceptance by public opinion. Through its activities, Pro Juventute indeed intended to exert 'a moral (and not a moralizing) influence on mothers, whose individual situation should be given sympathetic and tactful consideration'.[49] Pro Juventute thus incited private initiatives to develop these innovative models, which it also strived to promote via financial help.

Indeed, Pro Juventute was also a platform for the redistribution of federal funding, with the central state using this means to circumvent constitutional barriers to direct action on its part. Between 1912 and 1934, the foundation awarded grants of more than 3 million francs to charitable organizations helping pre-school children, and particularly those 'created above all for illegitimate children and their mothers'.[50] For charities, this influx of public money made up the rest of their budget alongside private donations and locally awarded grants (from cantons or municipalities). Using financial incentives as a soft means of unification, the Pro Juventute Foundation was in fact following in a different way the intention of the law as set out in the Civil Code. This collaborative dynamic allowed the network providing care for single mothers and illegitimate children to maintain its activities and

extend its coverage: if the country only had 16 *pouponnières* in 1920 for over 3,200 births outside marriage[51], this number rose to 24 in 1928. More than 120 baby clinics (*consultations de nourrissons*) were also founded, including *pouponnières*, mostly emanated from privative initiative: 41 were created by Pro Juventute or in collaboration with the foundation, allowing the rural and primarily Catholic cantons to catch up with the comparative lead established by the more urbanized regions.[52]

Institutions, such as the maternity shelters and *pouponnières*, gave concrete form to the general ambitions laid out by the Civil Code by creating establishments capable of tempering the effects of the patriarchal system: they offered an institutional alternative to vulnerable unmarried women in order to help them to normalize their situations. The interlacing of public and private sector funding clearly illustrates a converging effort to co-construct this area of provision. The process was rooted in a shared conception of what this provision should be, that is to say a way of compensating socially for the fundamental inequalities of status between legitimate and illegitimate children rather than erasing the inequalities altogether. Pro Juventute's work in fact reinforced these unequal foundations insofar as it contributed to the propagation of the institutions that embodied them and to the coordination and merging of their methods without being seen to pose a challenge to the basic principles of federalism.

It is important, however, to remain cautious as far as the effects of this mobilization are concerned. While Switzerland undeniably recorded a substantial decrease in infant mortality (from 134 per thousand between 1901 and 1905 to 54 per thousand between 1926 and 1930), it is also true that the difference in mortality rates between legitimate and illegitimate children increased. A contemporary medical study thus highlighted that between 1876 and 1943, the mortality of illegitimate children 'was around 50% higher than that of legitimate children; today [in 1943] it is almost double that'.[53] One cannot deny that *pouponnières* produced positive results for mothers who were able to benefit from their support: thanks to their wide range of high quality care (artificial feeding, vaccinations, early screening and treatment for nutritional deficiencies), their mortality rate was lower than the national average.[54] However, these women undoubtedly represented a minority, given the small number of this category of institutions throughout Switzerland. Besides, their activities only offered a limited haven of protection to unmarried mothers, whose social and healthcare situations remained persistently precarious despite the public–private sector collaboration enabled by the Civil Code, as the example of Geneva will show.

The symbiotic relationship between private initiatives and public services, between continuity and discontinuity

Private and public actors did not only collaborate when it came to providing material help to unmarried mothers and their children. They also

co-managed the legal *curatelle/tutelle* system, under which all illegitimate children were to be placed according to the provisions of the new Swiss Civil Code. The legal text required the cantons to set up such a *tutelle* system, based on the idea that single mothers were generally too weak to defend the rights of their future children against fathers who would potentially prove recalcitrant in paternity proceedings, but also to take good care of their babies. In Geneva, the laws determining how the Civil Code would be implemented outlined a procedure that continued to be followed almost unchanged for the first three quarters of the twentieth century.[55] Any unmarried woman who was pregnant or had given birth was appointed a *curateur* by the guardianship court. Until 1932, the *tuteur* was a private individual, often a lawyer. From 1932 onwards, a public service (*tuteur général* or public guardian) was given responsibility for the *tutelles* and *curatelles* of illegitimate children.

Numerous guardianship files kept in the archives of the canton of Geneva provide an understanding of how the procedures relating to the education and protection of illegitimate children unfolded.[56] In the majority of cases, mothers were identified and notified to the authorities in question in the hospital where they gave birth. Many of them, such as Dora T., a 27-year-old hotel employee, chose La Retraite. Dora arrived there in March 1935 and gave birth to her son in May, informing the *curateur* that the father was 'Marco O., Italian, mechanic, married, living in Geneva'.[57] Very few mothers, however, identified themselves to the guardianship court before giving birth since the appointment of a *curateur* produced a highly intrusive intervention in the private sphere, whereas the reflex of secrecy generally tended to prevail for mothers confronted with an unwanted pregnancy. Regardless of their reticence, the *curateur* had to determine the father's identity (a complicated task if the latter lived outside the canton or had run away to avoid his responsibilities) and then convince him to recognize the child legally and legitimize him or her through marriage (a third of children born out of wedlock were thus legitimized in the decade during which the Civil Code was implemented, against 24.2% in the period 1901–1910).[58] Failing this, the *curateur*'s mission was to force fathers to sign agreements determining maintenance for their children, in theory until they reached adulthood. In many cases, this manoeuvre sufficiently intimidated the men in question for them to sign the proposed agreement. This was the case, for example, for Pierre K., a 39-year-old employee in Geneva, who signed in March 1929 the following document:

> without wishing hereby to recognize that I am the father of the child [Thérèse, born in November 1928], which I in fact dispute being, I nevertheless undertake, in the interests of the mother and the child, to contribute to the maintenance of the little girl (50 francs a month until she reaches the age of 18).[59]

Very often, however, none of these solutions were successful and the *curateur* had to help single mothers with paternity proceedings to force fathers to face

up to their responsibilities by finding proof of the filiation (investigations with witnesses, correspondences, etc.).

At the end of the proceedings, the guardianship court would make a decision, either establishing paternity or not, and if necessary mandating that the father pay maintenance. A study focusing on 156 paternity proceedings judged in Lausanne in 1930 estimated that 60% resulted in this outcome.[60] The Civil Justice system then had to decide upon whom to confer paternal authority: the father, if he consented, the mother, if she were deemed apt, or, when neither seemed capable of taking on this responsibility, a *tuteur*. The *tuteur* could be a member of the family but was most often in fact the *curateur* who had followed the child's case since birth (from 1932 onwards, this was therefore the *tuteur général*). Under the pretext of protecting children, mothers were thus placed under a very strict and infantilizing form of supervision – despite the fact that almost 70% were not young girls but rather women aged between 21 and 30.[61]

As soon as the code's dispositions were put into practice, these new decision-making bodies developed links with the local network of private institutions. At Geneva's La Retraite, collaborative relationships with court-appointed *tuteurs* and *curateurs* were mentioned as early as 1913. During long paternity proceedings, it was in the *curateur*'s interests to direct mothers and their babies to these charities, especially when they were alone or abandoned, in order to insure that children received the appropriate level of care. Such was the case of a woman named Pierrette F., a servant who had given birth to her illegitimate daughter Sylvia in January 1929. Because the child's father did not regularly pay the maintenance to which he had agreed, the guardianship authorities prevailed upon the mother to place her daughter in a *pouponnière* where she was still to be found in January 1931.[62] Thus relieved of any immediate concern for the child's survival, the *curateur* was able to focus instead on pursuing the legal and administrative aspects of the case. This was also what happened to a child named Noé N., born in November 1932 at Geneva's Maternité, illegitimate child of a divorced unemployed father and a 26-year-old homeless and destitute mother from Bern. Before organizing the return of the child back to his home canton in March 1933, the *curateur* placed him in La Petite Maisonnée.[63]

There was therefore a division of labour between the *curateur* acting for the judicial authorities and the private charities providing for newborn babies and their mothers. The former was responsible for finding the funding to provide for the children housed in the *pouponnière*; meanwhile, the latter ensured continuity of care, even when payments were not made for quite a long period, leaving the *curateur* the time to find a solution from private or public aid (no such flexibility would have been found in a family placement). In 1929, the length of children's stays in La Petite Maisonnée *pouponnière* ranged from 12 days to two and a half years.[64] More often than not, these longer-term placements reflected the difficulties facing the mothers rather than a

deliberate choice on their part. This was the case, for example, for Françoise B., a 31-year-old worker in the textile industry, who, after giving birth to her daughter Noémie in January 1930, lived in La Providence *pouponnière* in the Geneva suburbs. Her child's father was an employee from Vaud who legally recognized the child under pressure from the *curateur*, but only committed to paying 30 francs per month towards his daughter's upkeep, as he was 'currently unemployed'. Appointing a *tuteur* for the child immediately after her birth did not resolve anything given that in December 1931, the father had six months maintenance payments in arrears. In February 1932, he was pursued through the courts by the *tuteur* for abandoning his family but could not pay his debt due to his continued unemployment. As for the mother, she stated: 'I would not ask him for anything to bring up my child if I earned enough, but this is impossible for me as I have to support my elderly mother'. In October 1932, the child was still in the *pouponnière*, where her mother visited her regularly, and the maintenance arrears were continuing to mount up.[65]

This symbiotic relationship benefited to the public and private actors alike. For the guardianship authorities, the local network of *pouponnières* offered a reservoir of services for mothers, children, and *tuteurs* alike. As for the charities, they were sure that a flow of clients would be directed towards them, thus ensuring their continued existence. Or at least this was the plan. In reality, many *pouponnières* complained about the irregular payment of pensions due for the child support during its institutional placement by mothers or fathers and their continuing deficits. Just like the mothers, these institutions housing illegitimate children were the victims of a legal system that had refused to tackle the root of the problem (inequality of status) and had simply addressed its effects in order to avoid giving too many advantages to children born out of wedlock to the detriment of those born from conjugal unions. As it was, when the fathers did not wish or were unable to pay for their children's upkeep, both the mothers and the charities were powerless – the former were forced to place their children in a home and the latter had to appeal for grants and private donations. The symbiotic relationship based on a shared view of single mothers as so many minors in need of supervision and control certainly facilitated private-public collaboration in how the Civil Code's provisions were applied on the ground. It did, however, contribute to a collective inability to conceive of other forms of support such as allowances for single mothers, which already existed or were being discussed in other countries.[66] In the end, the implementation of the Swiss Civil Code turned out to be disappointing: based on a conservative vision of society shared by private and public actors, ultimately, it only marginally improved the daily life of single mothers and their children, and this because of the lack of capacity and will to question the privileged status of marriage and the traditional family. Nevertheless, this collaboration would also prove instrumental in the construction of new types of care provision.

An ecosystem of relationships conducive to innovation: reinventing adoption, for better (or for worse…)

This ecosystem of close-knit relationships between the public and private sector triggered a new mechanism, namely adoption. As the preparatory debates for the Civil Code had unfolded, lawmakers had extended the possibility of adoption to the whole of Switzerland, whereas previously, it had only existed in a very small number of cantons.[67] The idea was to allow people who wished to help abandoned or orphaned children to adopt them. The system was therefore designed in the interests of the child rather than the adopters. Furthermore, the form of adoption championed by the Code was very restrictive: so-called simple adoption did not entirely detach adoptees from their birth families and limited their rights to inherit from their adoptive families; adopters had to be aged 40 or over and have no legitimate children; the birth family had to consent to the adoption; the adoption remained revocable.

By their own admission, lawmakers did not expect the mechanism to be used very frequently. In Switzerland, as elsewhere, they had only introduced adoption, which created a family perceived as artificial, with considerable reticence.[68] However, the result was in fact the exact opposite: adoption proved very popular. Lawmakers had apparently not taken into account the fact that, at the same time, there was high demand for children 'on the market'. This phenomenon, apparent in other countries during the nineteenth century, only appeared in Switzerland in the 1890s, testifying to a 'hunger' for parenthood especially on the part of infertile couples.[69] Indeed, countless offers of, and requests for, adoption appeared regularly in the Swiss press.[70]

The demand for adoptable children contributed to changing the principles and practices of private and public actors working to protect illegitimate children. In French-speaking Switzerland, the case files of illegitimate children placed under *tutelle* show that, from the 1920s to 1930s onwards, the *pouponnières* and *tuteurs* began to turn to adoption as a means of caring for these infants. This evolution was not linked to any official encouragement or incitement, as the provisions of the Civil Code relating to adoption were not intended to be applied to illegitimate children.[71] This is nevertheless what happened to many of them, for example, Jean O., an illegitimate boy born in November 1925, placed in a *pouponnière* by his *tuteur* shortly after his birth because his mother, Marie O., did not have the necessary means to keep him. The paternity search having failed to identify a father, the *curateur* and the *pouponnière* found themselves in a delicate situation when it came to determining who would pay for the child's stay. The *curateur* found the solution in a Genevan family that wished to adopt the boy. With the mother's agreement, the child was placed with Mr and Mrs T. as soon as he left the *pouponnière*, under the supervision of the lawyer who had, in the meantime, been appointed

the child's *tuteur*. In February 1934, the latter authorized Mr and Mrs T. to adopt Jean on the grounds that he

> had found with them the affection of real parents and that they provided all the guarantees one could hope for that they would give him a good upbringing. Given that the child has been abandoned by his mother and was not recognized by his father, it is to the highest degree and in every way in his interests that he be adopted by Mr and Mrs T.[72]

While public and private actors had initially agreed on using *pouponnières* to create a strong bond between mother and child, adoption offered a new solution. Making use of the demand from couples wishing to adopt, institutions and tutelary authorities thus crafted a new way of dealing with illegitimacy, diverting the Civil Code's adoption provisions for this purpose. Evidence from *tutelle* files tend to demonstrate that they turned to adoption to ensure the protection of their wards because the *other* tools offered by the Civil Code to support single mothers had already proved relatively ineffectual. In the face of the financial difficulties plaguing both private and public child protection organizations, and the increasingly lengthy periods of time for which children were housed in institutions, adoption offered an adequate solution to all parties: couples wishing to adopt were satisfied; single mothers were freed from the burden of unwanted children; *tuteurs* were dispensed with the need for never-ending legal proceedings against fathers overdue with their payments; and, finally, children were provided with the stable families of which they had thus far been deprived. Together, these advantages made adoption desirable in the eyes of both the private and public-sector actors involved.

So much so that sometimes guardianship authorities did not hesitate to use their office to override the mothers' opposition to adoption proposals: the case of Ada G., a servant of German origin who had an illegitimate daughter in 1913 with a Genevan man, is a prime example of such a situation.[73] The paternity proceedings had sentenced the father to paying maintenance for little Ada-Maria, but her mother, in too precarious a situation, had failed to be granted paternal authority. The child was therefore placed under the *tutelle* of a lawyer, who had to consult the guardianship court for every important decision regarding his ward. The mother found another job as a servant in June 1913 and was therefore unable to keep her child. The *tuteur* placed Ada-Maria with Mr and Mrs R., shopkeepers in Geneva. In September 1915, the *tuteur* informed the court that the mother had left Geneva to live in a consensual union with her lover and concluded: 'she is not capable of bringing up the child, who will no doubt be entirely brought up by Mr and Mrs R. who would already like to adopt her'. However, in November 1917, the mother returned to Geneva and asked for her daughter back; the *tuteur*, who had paternal authority, refused on the grounds that her 'situation was not stable enough'. Despite protracted proceedings by the mother, the *tuteur* refused to give way, especially since 'Mrs R. does a lot for her [the child] and is bringing

her up well'. In the end, the mother signed an agreement with the adopters in July 1918, consenting to an adoption, before leaving Geneva to return to Germany. The *tuteur* authorized Mr and Mrs R. to adopt Ada-Maria in November 1927. The final letter in the voluminous case file was written in June 1929 by the girl's birth mother. Suffering from an incurable illness, she stated that she 'would like her daughter to be brought to her, so she could see her again at least for a few days'. The *tuteur* suspected that this was another trick and so began an investigation, which revealed that the mother was indeed terminally ill. There is no way of knowing whether or not the final meeting took place. But the case file certainly testifies to the fact that the mother never forgot a daughter (whom she had significantly named after herself) and that while she did eventually 'consent' to the adoption, she did so under some duress.

Recourse to adoption to resolve the problem posed by illegitimate children subsequently spread in Switzerland, even though this mechanism was not initially intended for this population. Indeed, an initial nationwide study showed that, in 1943, 70% of adopted children were illegitimate.[74] Early infant care institutions played an active role here: in the Catholic canton of Valais, for example, the Pouponnière de Sion, founded in 1931, had organized 300 adoptions by the 1970s, mainly of illegitimate children.[75] This option was nevertheless taken in a minority of cases when compared to other solutions (e.g. legitimizing the children by marriage or leaving them under the paternal authority of either their mother or father). Only 3% of illegitimate children in the canton of Vaud were adopted in 1954 and only 6% of those in the canton of Geneva between 1935 and 1939.[76] In total, the country only recorded 6,000 adoptions between 1912 and 1943 (a third of which apparently took place within the original family), proving that the legislation was not an incitement.[77] Nevertheless, within the ecosystem of relationships in the field of child protection, public and private partners 'cobbled together' a new social engineering technique independently from any official incitement. They implemented it pragmatically in order to resolve the difficulties of placing some of their illegitimate charges, whilst also responding to the rising demand for children to adopt. This unexpected evolution contributed to legitimating this new method for dealing with the social issue posed by illegitimate children and subsequently paved the way for new means of regulating this practice.

From the interwar period onwards indeed, private charities began proactively to regulate this new market by creating adoption offices, thereby demonstrating their relatively early interest in this solution in Switzerland compared to other countries.[78] As early as 1921, the Société d'Utilité Publique des Femmes suisses (Swiss women's society for public utility, a non-profit association), founded its own 'service for the free placement of children chosen for adoption' in Räpperswil) (canton of St Gall). The aim was to create an intermediary organization responsible for mediating between the 'demand' of families seeking to adopt and the circles handling the 'supply' of adoptable

children, 'the vast majority of whom [were] children of illegitimate birth'.[79] The intervention by this kind of organization was supposed to formalize and ensure the safety of a process for which, at that point, no regulation existed beyond the brief articles in the Swiss Civil Code. This model of regulatory body was progressively imitated by several private associations: the religious community of L'Œuvre séraphique de charité in Fribourg (Seraphic charity work) in 1926; the Service social de justice (Social justice service) in 1933 in Lausanne; the Pro Familia foundation's adoption office in Geneva in 1947.[80] In the absence of a private body, public services took up this role, modelling their initiatives on those of their private counterparts, as was the case in the Neuchatel and Valais cantons. Whether private or public, this type of organization was run by rising numbers of social workers graduating from an increasing number of social services training schools.[81] The adoption offices based their expertise on the methods of social work and developed a range of procedures and mechanisms to regulate adoptions (listing the available children and families seeking to adopt, filing administrative procedures with the guardianship authorities, making enquiries into the adopters and birth families, formulating requests for medical reports and providing a follow-up service).

Adoption bureaus were supposed to limit direct adoption practices, whether via newspaper announcements or institutions housing babies born out of wedlock. As we saw above, in Geneva, a certain number of legal criteria had to be fulfilled before an adoption authorization was provided allowing a *pouponnière* to 'deliver' children to their new families. However, this was not the case everywhere, as evidenced by enquiries that revealed less scrupulous practices according to the social workers who looked into these procedures:

> unhappily, there are still many women directors of institutions, in certain cantons, who rely on their personal judgement alone to entrust children to people they find congenial. The modern techniques of social enquiry require that the personal preferences of a social worker be supported by more objective information.[82]

The adoption offices argued in favour of a professionalized approach to the issue, which at that point, they were the only ones to provide. They also did not hesitate to denounce the pressure placed on certain single mothers to abandon their children, particularly by the institutions where their children were placed (especially the *pouponnières*); but also, indirectly, by the guardianship authorities that 'covered for' or tolerated such practices, arguing, for example, that 'the young mother should be given longer than a month to make her decision about the future of her child'.[83] Although they emerged from the private sector, the adoption offices therefore aimed to monitor and oversee these procedures and appeared suspicious of the public–private alliances that had, so far, taken them in hand. When necessary, they served as whistle-blowers regarding some of the methods employed, determining and assessing 'good practice' according to their own principles.

These overarching ambitions seemed to be reasonably well accepted by public child protection services, who were happy to hand over regulation to these new self-proclaimed governors of the adoption market. In Geneva, according to a 1956 enquiry,

> before the [Pro Familia] adoption office was founded, the *tuteur* had a list of children to place and a list of families and the placements were more or less decided by order of enrolment rather than by compatibility, due to a lack of human resources and time.[84]

Similarly, in the canton of Vaud: 'by tacit agreement, the vast majority of adoption cases which went through the official channels were subsequently taken forward by the "Service de justice" [a private office], better equipped for this sort of work'.[85] All the time and energy of these public services were taken up with the heavy management bureaucracy linked to care provision for unadoptable minors under *tutelle*, and they were considerably hindered in these tasks by a lack of human resources. They were therefore no doubt more than happy to rely on the interventions of private bodies. Especially given that, from the 1940s onwards, these private offices spontaneously worked together to harmonize their evaluation criteria[86] in order to guarantee parity of treatment for the families concerned, but also perhaps to resist more effectively those adoptive parents, birth mothers or institutions who might seek to elude their supervisory role by appealing to another cantonal body. This testifies to the fact that in Switzerland, as elsewhere, the emergence of these actors on a market that had not previously been regulated was not necessarily well-received by the families.[87] These bodies did claim to be working to make their procedures more safe, setting themselves up as the guarantors and arbiters of a respect for the rights of all parties (the right of adoptive parents to receive a child compatible with their preferences; the right of unmarried mothers to make choices freely and without undue influence; the right of children to acquire a new, economically and psychologically stable family). However, a high number of adoptions continued to be arranged without their involvement, particularly through interpersonal agreements ensuring absolute discretion of procedures, serving as testament to the persistent appeal of the 'free' market of adoption.[88]

Conclusion

Public services and private charities created a symbiotic relationship in providing solutions to the social issue of illegitimacy. The fact that they shared the same view of the populations in question made them all the more willing to share the responsibilities created by the Civil Code for public services in this area. Breaking with the prior tradition of blaming the unmarried women and disregarding the fate of their children, the Swiss Civil Code established a new way of analysing the situation of both mother and child: due to their weakness,

they were henceforth viewed as victims of a double moral standard and therefore in need of assistance and support from supposedly impartial guardianship authorities (particularly when it came to pursuing paternity proceedings). Building out from the same premise, the private sector developed a network of charities providing this assistance (helping to rehabilitate mothers, providing health care and food to ensure their babies' survival) and contributed to introducing a more tolerant attitude towards these populations. These converging interests, and the shared viewpoints underpinning them, led the federal authorities to create a powerful umbrella organization – the Pro Juventute Foundation – responsible for organizing and unifying endeavours in this field. The implementation of the Civil Code at cantonal level was modelled on this burgeoning private provision, prompting tightly knit forms of collaboration with newly created public services – not only applying the legal provisions but also, as we have seen in the case of adoption, co-producing new ones. Private initiatives drew on a sizeable reservoir of trust with local authorities to the extent that they were able to take upon themselves the role of providing expertise, oversight and coordination to both public services and private charities.

This ecosystem of relationships thus produced its own regulation, without requiring the federal authorities to legislate on the matter. However, the implementation of this quintessential mixed economy of welfare also had heavy consequences for the populations that relied upon it. Delegating regulation to the private sector removed all control from the federal state when it came to the transactions with the main parties involved (the mothers and children), thus leaving them without any protection in the face of potential coercion particularly when this was concerted. The examples cited earlier testify to the intersecting pressure that this ecosystem of relationships could exercise over vulnerable mothers when it came to adoption. The result was not necessarily better for adopted children, when they were adopted under conditions where such a constraint had been exercised by private and public actors so that the biological mother cedes her rights over her child. More in-depth research should be carried out on adoption files to find out what effects such procedures may have generated for these children when and if they discovered what had happened and with what consequences on their life course.

As it produced its own critique of these coercive procedures, the private sector did take up the task of finding solutions by providing new procedures for oversight and regulation in this field, carving out sufficient margin of manoeuvre to act within the bounds of permissible actions set by the federal framework. However, this had its own pernicious effects: these private actors, closely linked to the implementation of systems for managing illegitimacy, were not well-placed to articulate criticism of these systems. Unlike the charity actors in the United Kingdom who served as whistle-blowers denouncing the failings of existing systems of care provision and became active policy advocates in this area, the Swiss private sector remained muted in its critique.[89] It was only in the early 1960s that Pro Juventute publicly expressed criticisms and demands for reform of the legal adoption framework in Switzerland.[90]

Yet, from quite an early stage, dissertations written by students in social work following internships in public services or private organizations dedicated to the protection of illegitimate children had emphasized the failings of the Civil Code in this area. However, this never resulted in any lobbying force coming together to voice its concerns openly in the public arena. Instead, they took action quietly in the background and on the ground by setting up systems aimed at establishing new forms of care provision, in collaboration with and in response to the needs of the public services. In the 1960s, in Geneva, this produced changes in how illegitimacy was managed which affected both public services and private provision. The guardianship court was aware that many women were now deciding to take responsibility for their pregnancies on their own and therefore decided to ascribe paternity authority on principle to all single mothers. At the same time, the private sector was creating a new form of care provision for these mothers with 'maternity hotels' receiving comfortable levels of state funding: these establishments fell more in line with these women's desire for autonomy and with their emancipation and aimed to provide concrete help to the young mothers who had until then been 'ostracized by society'.[91] The hotels offered low cost housing to mothers and children, whilst organizing an onsite childcare service for their newborn babies. This was noteworthy progress indeed, but it remained limited as it was only available for approximately 20 mothers.

The study of the relationships between public services and private charities in the field of welfare policies for illegitimate children would deserve to be extended beyond the 1960s, particularly given that these years led to a series of reforms in Swiss federal law concerning filiation and adoption. This protracted parliamentary process, starting in 1957, certainly involved the private sector closely, whose positions were conveyed by its umbrella organizations (especially Pro Juventute, Pro Familia and the Alliance des sociétés féminines suisses – Alliance of Swiss women's societies).[92] The role then played by private charities, alongside public actors, in the process leading to (or resisting against) the modernization of welfare policy and the disappearance of the very notion of illegitimacy, still needs to be closely documented.

Notes

1 I am most grateful to Fabio Gomi, Célia Keren and Morgane Labbé who tirelessly assisted during the conception and writing of this chapter in so many ways.
2 Archives d'Etat de Genève (subsequently AEG), *Archives de la Fondation officielle de l'enfance*, DIP 1985 va 5.3.505, the director of Les Ormeaux [the facility in question] to the head of the public education department, February 1941. All translations from archival sources and secondary literature are my own.
3 G. Brunet, *Aux Marges de la Famille et de la Société: Filles-mères et enfants assistés à Lyon au XIXe siècle* (Paris, 2008); R.G. Fuchs, *Contested Paternity. Constructing families in modern France* (Baltimore, MD, 2008); L. Gordon, *Pitied but not Entitled. Single mothers and the history of welfare* (New York, 1994); P. Laslett, K. Oosterveen, and R.M. Smith (eds), *Bastardy and Its Comparative History. Studies in the history of illegitimacy and marital non-conformism in Britain, France, Germany, Sweden,*

North America, Jamaica and Japan (Cambridge, MA, 1980); M. Quine, *Italy's Social Revolution: Charity and welfare from liberalism to fascism* (London, 2002); S. Swain, and R. Howe, *Single Mothers and Their Children: Disposal, punishment and survival in Australia* (Cambridge, 1995); P. Thane, and T. Evans, *Sinners? Scroungers? Saints? Unmarried motherhood in twentieth-century England* (Oxford, 2012).

4 J. Droux, and V. Czaka, 'Gefährdete kinder, beschützte kinder? Der fall der illegitimen kinder in der romandie (1900–1960)', in B. Ziegler, G. Hauss, and M. Lengwiler (eds), *Zwischen Erinnerung und Aufarbeitung. Fürsorgerische Zwangsmassnahmen an Minderjährigen in der Schweiz im 20. Jahrhundert* (Zürich, 2018), 47–67.

5 L. Chappuis, 'Enquêter, baptiser, réprimer: Le contrôle de la bâtardise à Genève au XVIIIe siècle (1750–1770)', *Crime, Histoire et Sociétés*, 18, 1 (2014), 57–79.

6 G. Heim, *La Condition de l'Enfant Naturel dans le Code Civil Suisse* (Montpellier, 1924).

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8 Except in the case of abduction or rape.

9 P. Laslett, 'Introduction: Comparing illegitimacy over time and between cultures', in P. Laslett, K. Oosterveen, and R.M. Smith (eds), *op. cit.*, 1–68.

10 V. Fildes, L. Marks, and H. Marland (eds), *Women and Children First. International maternal and infant welfare, 1870–1945* (London, 1992); J.L. Halpérin, *Histoire des Droits en Europe de 1750 à nos Jours* (Paris, 2004), 164–171; H. Hendricks, *Child Welfare, England, 1872–1989* (London/New-York, 1994).

11 L. Chambers, *Misconceptions. Unmarried motherhood and the Ontario children of unmarried parents Act, 1921 to 1969* (Toronto, 2007).

12 P.L. Ladame, *Des Enfants Illégitimes en Suisse* (n.p., 1886).

13 K.A. Lynch, 'Infant mortality, child neglect, and child abandonment in European history: A comparative analysis', in T. Bengtsson, and O. Saito (eds), *Population and Economy: From hunger to modern economic growth* (Oxford, 2000).

14 N. Le Bouteillec, 'Parenté et illégitimité: Réformes du droit de la filiation et de la famille en Suède au début du 20ᵉ siècle', *Annales de Démographie Historique*, 125, 1 (2013), 69–97; G. Frost, *Illegitimacy in English Law and Society, 1860–1930* (Manchester, 2016), 146–148; Fuchs, *op. cit.*, 146–151.

15 Particularly in Europe. In France, see Fuchs, *op. cit.*; in Italy, see Quine, *op. cit.*; in Germany, see E.R. Dickinson, *The Politics of German Child Welfare from the Empire to the Federal Republic* (Cambridge, MA, 1996); in Great Britain, see Frost, *Illegitimacy, op. cit.*

16 Le Bouteillec, *op. cit.*, 82; L.H. Robert, *De la Condition Juridique de l'Enfant Naturel dans le Code Civil Suisse et le Code Civil Allemand* (Geneva, 1912).

17 A constitutional amendment in 1898 gave the Confederation the right to unify civil law.

18 Droux and Czaka, *Gefährdete Kinder, op. cit.*

19 A *curatelle* measure involved the guardianship authorities appointing a *curateur* to look after the interests of the illegitimate child for a set period of time (until the end of the paternity proceedings). This mandate did not infringe upon the mother's civil rights. A *tutelle* measure, on the other hand, involved appointing a *tuteur* to take responsibility for the child when the guardianship authorities had decided to restrict the parents' rights either by taking legal guardianship away from them altogether or by removing 'paternal authority'. The authorities very often appointed the same person to these positions in succession.

20 Guardianship authorities could be judicial (as in the canton of Geneva, which had a guardianship court) or civil (as in the canton of Valais, where the municipal office for wards [*chambres pupillaires communales*] took up this function).

21 Legitimacy could not be conferred by marriage if the father already had a wife.
22 'La recherche en paternité', *Le Confédéré*, 2 August 1905 (conférence d'E. Huber).
23 The French term *fille-mère*, used frequently in the sources consulted, is more specific than 'unwed mother' insofar as it suggests that the mother in question is a young girl (fille) rather than an adult woman.
24 *Le Confédéré*, 12 April 1896.
25 *La Liberté*, 23 November 1897.
26 I. Dubert, 'Trends and internal dynamics of illegitimacy in north-west Spain: Rural Galicia, 1570–1899', *Continuity and Change*, 33, 1 (2018), 87–116; T. Evans, 'The meanings and experiences of single mothers in 19th century Sidney, Australia', *Annales de Démographie Historique*, 127 (2014), 73–96.
27 G. Frost, *Living in Sin: Cohabiting as husband and wife in nineteenth-century England* (Manchester, 2008).
28 'Chronique des Chambres', *La Liberté*, 10 December 1905.
29 'La recherche en paternité', *La Sentinelle*, 8 July 1905.
30 The main measures relating to children born out of wedlock can be found in the seventh section of the Code: 'De l'établissement de la filiation' (Art. 252 to Art. 269).
31 C. Ott, *La Puissance Paternelle du Code Civil Suisse* (Neuchâtel, 1910).
32 P. Bairoch, J. Batou, and J.-P. Bovee, *Annuaire Statistique Rétrospectif de Genève* (Geneva, 1986), 34; 'Les naissances illégitimes par canton, 1900–1912', *Annuaire Fédéral Suisse* (Bern, 1913), 36; F. Walter, *La Suisse Urbaine (1750–1950)* (Geneva, 1994), 288.
33 P. Rieder, and J. Droux (eds), *À l'Orée de la Vie: Cent ans de gynécologie et d'obstétrique à la maternité de Genève* (Geneva, 2007).
34 S. Broder, *Tramps, Unfit Mothers and Neglected Children. Negotiating the family in late 19th century Philadelphia* (Philadelphia, PA, 2002), 125–155; Swain and Howe, *op. cit.*, 74–80.
35 AEG, Archives privées 196.2.1, *Maison D'accueil Pour Mères Célibataires La Retraite*, Report 1908.
36 *Ibid*.
37 J. Droux, 'Marguerite Champendal: Entrepreneure en santé et pionnière de l'éducation des femmes à l'hygiène', in F. Laot, and C. Solar (eds), *Pionnières de l'Éducation des Adultes: Perspectives internationales* (Paris, 2018).
38 On this model: C. Rollet-Echallier, *La Politique à l'Egard de la Petite Enfance sous la IIIe République* (Paris, 1990).
39 *Les Amies de l'enfance*, May 1927.
40 H.U. Jost, 'Sociabilité, faits associatifs et vie politique en Suisse au 19ème siècle', in H.U. Jost, and A. Tanner (eds), *Sociabilité et Faits Associatifs* (Zurich, 1991), 7–29.
41 In the Geneva Petite Maisonnée in the mid-1920s, illegitimate children made up 70% of the babies admitted. See Frost, *Illegitimacy*, *op. cit.*, 210–216 on the risks associated with the placement of illegitimate children.
42 See A. Gueslin, *Les Gens de Rien: Une histoire de la grande pauvreté dans la France du XXe siècle* (Paris, 2004), 41 on the innovative qualities of business patronage between the wars.
43 J. Droux, 'Pour le bonheur des dames? Le rôle des écoles d'infirmières dans la diffusion de nouvelles normes d'hygiène maternelle et infantile en Suisse (1890–1940)', in O. Faure, and P. Bourdelais (eds). *Les Nouvelles Pratiques de Santé XVIIIe-XXe Siècles: Acteurs, objets, logiques sociales* (Paris, 2005).
44 P. Gautier, and A. Thévenod, *La Lutte Contre la Mortalité des Nourrissons en Suisse* (n.p., 1928): the main cause of death was 'congenital debility', in connection with poor maternal health at the time of birth, particularly prevalent among single mothers.

45 '*Expérimentateur de la politique d'Etat*'. Expression borrowed from Gueslin, *op. cit.*, 41.

46 A. Bosson, 'La lutte contre la mortalité des nourrissons en Suisse: Enjeux et mesures de prévention (1876–1930)', *Cahiers d'Histoire*, 47 (2002), 93–125.

47 Jost, *op. cit.*

48 On the *Société Suisse d'utilité publique*, see B. Schumacher (ed), *Un Devoir Librement Consenti: L'idée et l'action philanthropiques en Suisse de 1800 à nos jours* (Zurich, 2010). In Switzerland, an *organisation faîtière* [umbrella organization] refers to a federative association grouping together collective actors in a given sector on a voluntary basis without actually forcing them to merge: as a body, its role is to represent, promote discussion and to communicate information.

49 J.H. Graz, 'Protection de la mère et de son enfant', *Pro Juventute, Revue Suisse Pour la Protection de la Jeunesse* (subsequently *PJ*), 4–9 (1923), 48–52.

50 O. Binder, *25 Années Pro Juventute. Coup d'œil sur l'origine, l'organisation et l'activité de la fondation suisse Pro Juventute, 1912*–1937 (Zurich, 1938), 56. Every year, the foundation received a grant from the federal authorities as well as the profits from the sale of stamps bearing the Pro Juventute emblem.

51 A. D'Espine, and T. Reh, 'L'hygiène infantile en Suisse au point de vue social', *Association des Pédiatres de Langue Française, 2ᵉ Congrès,* (Lyon, 1922), 415; 'Naissances illégitimes', *Annuaire Statistique de la Suisse*, 1920, 21.

52 A.M. Stahel-Frey, 'Les consultations de nourrissons en Suisse', *PJ*, 1934, 34–38.

53 L. Hersch, 'La baisse de la mortalité infantile en Suisse', *Médecine et Hygiène* (1943), 1–14.

54 V. Oulevey, 'Protection des nourrissons dans le canton de Vaud', *PJ*, 1936, 36: The mortality rate in the *pouponnières* in the canton of Vaud was only 1%, whereas the general rate was 5%.

55 Droux and Czaka, *Gefährdete Kinder, op. cit.*

56 The present research is based on a qualitative analysis of around 100 files related to situations of illegitimacy: it certainly does not allow us to affirm that this study is representative, but the recurrence of certain situations observed allows us to affirm that they do not only reflect specific situations. A number of studies collected in the professional literature, in particular, the year-end dissertations of Social work's students who had access to large amounts of data, have made it possible to quantify certain of the situations cited.

57 AEG, DJP, 1986 va 23/7.8, *Établissement de Curateurs aux Enfants Illégitimes, 1934–1947*, folder 10. All family names are fictional.

58 'Légitimations 1901–1930', *Annuaire Statistique Suisse*, 1930, 65.

59 AEG, DJP, 1986 va 23/24.118, *Tutelle des Mineurs*, dossier 1604.

60 M.L. Cornaz, *La Situation des Enfants Illégitimes à Lausanne* (n.p., 1930).

61 *Ibid.*

62 AEG, DJP, 1986 va 23/24.118, *Tutelle des Mineurs*, folder 1611.

63 AEG, DJP, 1986 va 23/24.135, *Tutelle des Mineurs*, folder 1897.

64 *Rapport Annuel de la Petite Maisonnée* (Geneva, 1929).

65 AEG, DJP, 1986 va 23/24.118, *Tutelle des Mineurs*, folder 1609.

66 On this assistance already provided to *filles-mères* in France in the nineteenth century, see Brunet, *op. cit.*, 113–121. In the USA, single mothers were often not eligible for mothers' grants, however; see K. Lindenmeyer, *'A Right to Childhood': The children's Bureau and child welfare, 1912–1946* (Chicago, IL, 1997), 152–160. On the British case, see: S. Pedersen, *Family, Dependence and the Origins of the Welfare State: Britain and France* (Cambridge, 1993), 150–151.

67 J. Droux, and V. Czaka, 'Désir d'enfants, illégitimité et adoption sous le régime du Code civil suisse (Suisse romande, 1910–1960)', *Annales de Démographie Historique*, 141 (2022), 2.

68 This reticence was probably stronger in English-speaking countries than in France: J.-P. Gutton, *Histoire de l'Adoption en France* (Paris, 1993); B. Melosh, *Strangers and Kin: The American way of adoption* (Cambridge, MA, 2002); S. Sales, *Adoption, Family and the Paradox of Origins* (Basingstoke, 2012).

69 S. Swain, 'Market forces: Defining the adoptable child, 1860–1940', *Social Policy & Society*, 11, 3 (2012), 399–414.

70 M.-B. Schoenenberger, *Histoire du Droit de l'Adoption de la Fin de l'Ancien Régime au Code Civil Suisse* (Freiburg, 1995), 265.

71 Droux and Czaka, 'Désir d'enfants', *op. cit.*; same point for the USA, see Melosh, *op. cit.*, 20–21.

72 AEG, 1986 va 23.24.79.

73 AEG, 1986 va 23.24.18, *Tutelle des Mineurs*, folder 225.

74 C. Monnard, *L'Adoption dans la Pratique Juridique Suisse* (Lausanne, 1943), 16.

75 M.-F. Vouilloz Burnier, 'Les secours aux mères célibataires et à leurs enfants au XXe siècle', *Annales Valaisannes* (2017), 89–104.

76 Droux and Czaka, *Gefährdete Kinder, op. cit.*

77 Adoption by the grandparents or the mother's partner (M. Pidoux, *Faut-il Encourager l'Adoption? Enquête sur l'adoption dans le canton de Vaud* (Zurich, 1944), 31; Monnard, *op. cit.*, 13–16.

78 See Melosh, *op. cit.* on the lack of enthusiasm for adoption shown by US social workers until the 1930s.

79 K. Ris, *Le Placement et l'Adoption des Enfants en Suisse et à l'Etranger* (Geneva, 1938).

80 Founded in 1942, Pro Famila is the umbrella organization grouping together the various associations working to support family life.

81 E. Jovelin (ed), *Histoire du Travail Social en Europe* (Paris, 2008).

82 L. Traber, *Étude sur 28 Cas d'Adoption Ayant Donné Lieu à des Difficultés: Enquête sur 28 enfants adoptés en séjour au pavillon d'observation 'le Bercail' à Lausanne de 1938 à 1955* (Geneva, 1956), 36.

83 Traber, *op. cit.*, 24.

84 A. Lefkia, *Étude Comparée sur l'Adoption en France, en Suisse et en Grèce* (Geneva, 1956), 19.

85 Traber, *op. cit.*, 12.

86 Droux and Czaka, 'Désir d'enfants', *op. cit.*

87 Sales, *op. cit.*, 43–57.

88 Droux and Czaka, 'Désir d'enfants', *op. cit.*: according to a study conducted in the canton of Vaud in 1956, only 6 procedures out of the 31 taken into account were overseen by an adoption office; at the same time in the canton of Fribourg, this was only the case for 19 out of the 53 adoptions examined in a similar study.

89 Frost, *Illegitimacy, op. cit*, 146–178; Thane and Evans, *op. cit.*

90 'Vœux Pro Juventute pour l'enfant adoptif', *PJ*, 1960, 692–696.

91 AEG, 1986 va 5.2.14.5, *Archives de l'Office de la jeunesse*, Rapport sur les Hôtels maternels, May 1964.

92 'Message du conseil fédéral à l'Assemblée fédérale concernant la révision du code civil suisse (du 12 mai 1971)', *Feuille Fédérale*, (1971) 1222–1293.

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2 The co-constitution of public and private actors

Building the field of social protection in German and French cities at the end of the nineteenth century

Catherine Maurer

Introduction

Among the various areas in which municipal powers and private, specifically denominational, actors have interacted in Western Europe, welfare and health care practices hold centre stage, owing to the long-standing commitment of Christians in that field but also to the early intervention of urban governments. This contribution focuses on such practices, using research that was conducted on the place and role of Catholics in health care and social action in French and German cities in the nineteenth century. The research is based on a corpus of 16 cities – eight French cities (Angers, Elbeuf, Lyon, Nancy, Neuilly, Orléans, Rouen and Saint-Etienne), seven German cities (Berlin, Bochum, Breslau, Cologne, Frankfurt, Königsberg and Würzburg) and the 'Franco-German' city of Strasbourg – chosen on the basis of surveys of charity works published between 1880 and 1906.[1] The 16 cases under study were thus quite randomly chosen, on the basis of the availability of surveys, but they nevertheless make it possible to consider very different situations in terms of demography (Elbeuf in Seine-Inférieure has a population of 20,000 inhabitants, compared to Berlin, with 2 million inhabitants); in terms of urban activities (Strasbourg or Cologne have ancient service sectors, unlike 'boom towns' founded on industrial development like Saint-Etienne or Bochum); finally, in terms of religion (some cities are almost exclusively 'single-faith' like Catholic Angers or Protestant Königsberg, whereas others welcome different religious faiths like Strasbourg or Breslau).

This paper will not dwell on the specifics of nineteenth-century Catholic 'works of charity' but will focus on the relationships between Catholic action and municipal welfare policies, which were at the end of the nineteenth century undergoing major changes in order to investigate the co-constitution of public and private actors. It will show that, although they both unquestionably did much to regulate tensions within the city and reduce 'urban pathologies', they still entertained complex relationships in the two countries under study.[2]

A tradition of cooperation between public welfare services and private charity work

After the upheaval caused by the Reformation, private charitable organizations and municipal public welfare services established pacified relationships of cooperation in the interest of both parties. First, municipal institutions, especially in France, employed staff openly identifying as Catholic: this was the case in hospitals, both before and after the radical break of the French Revolution,[3] but also in infant schools or orphanages in Elbeuf, Nancy, Neuilly, Saint-Etienne, Strasbourg (where the statutes of the orphanage gave equal importance to Protestant and Catholic denominations), Würzburg[4] or Angers, which all resorted to the services of sisters from congregations. Although most of the staff came from congregations, lay members of the church could also work with municipal bodies, as in Frankfurt, where members of the St. Elizabeth association (a female equivalent for the St. Vincent de Paul conferences) provided the municipal employment office with their help.[5] Yet, the most revealing example of cooperation, and even partnership between private and public sectors, was that of the French 'charity bureaus' (*bureaux de charité*): set up by the law of 1796, they were placed under the supervision of the mayor, who acted as chairman, and managed by an administrative board made up of five members appointed by the prefect, but, as much regarding funding as practical work, they *de jure* and *de facto* relied on private, especially denominational, initiatives.[6] This ambivalent situation was even more evident in multi-denominational cities where the composition of the administrative board was meant to reflect the respective influence of each religion present in the city. In Strasbourg, for instance, under French rule, and even more patently from 1831 on, the board included Catholics as well as Protestants, and a Catholic member was normally replaced by a Catholic, as was the rule for Protestants.[7] There was also a Jewish member, but only from 1907 on.[8] In Nancy, the principle of denominational plurality was applied to the volunteer organizations which were supervised by the charity bureau and were in charge of the distribution of relief in different neighbourhoods: as early as 1846 relief committees were organized in the Catholic parishes of the city, as were a Protestant and an 'Israelite' committee.[9] The essential role played by these denominational initiatives in daily welfare work was thus largely recognized.

   Moreover, the charity bureaus, which could only function thanks to volunteer work, very often relied on female congregations to carry out the tasks that needed to be fulfilled, providing in-home relief and care for the poor. In Angers, from the middle of the century on, a sister from one of the many communities of the city assisted the 'charity lady' acting on behalf of the charity bureau in each district, and 'eight sisters from the congregation Saint-Charles are in charge, under the supervision of the chemist, of preparing the medicine which they deliver to the poor, in the two dispensaries of the Bureau'.[10] In Nancy, the Sisters of Mercy of St. Borromeo and the Sisters

of Charity of Strasbourg also provided relief on behalf of the charity bureau, such as 'in-home care to the sick, free primary instruction for the poor children of the district and visits and care to poor young mothers'.[11] Similar practices could be observed in Elbeuf, Neuilly, Rouen, Saint-Etienne and many other French cities, whether the sisters worked alone or with lay members of the Church. Actual contracts could even be set up between the charity bureau and the congregations.[12]

German cities were not organized in the same way because, although their in-home relief programs also relied on volunteer work, the work was accomplished by *Bürger* employed in the service of the city rather than by clerics or lay members acting for denominational motives. This was the case in the system devised in Hamburg at the end of the eighteenth century or in the Elberfeld system which was adopted by many big German cities in the second half of the nineteenth century.[13] Still, public services could be devolved to private denominational initiatives: in Breslau, for instance, 13 out of the 15 denominational infant schools, 8 of which were managed by sisters, were placed under the supervision of what could be considered as a municipal department of education.[14]

More simply, cooperation could also take the form of financial links. For instance, some German cities like Frankfurt went on managing foundations for the needy that had been set up by Catholics for Catholics. Most of all, in both France and Germany, cities granted direct and indirect subsidies to all types of initiatives. To associations for example: in Strasbourg, Jules Maillet, the chairman of the central council of the St. Vincent de Paul conferences,[15] thus wrote in 1863: 'The charity bureau is very favorable to us […] With very limited resources, we nevertheless give much and obtain easily, either from the charity bureau or the prefecture, what is lacking from our treasurers's funds'[16]; in Rouen, the Society of St. John Francis Regis was granted subsidies from the city council.[17] The same was true for the institutions founded by congregations, like the St. Hedwig 'rescue house' (*Rettungshaus*) in Breslau, led by the Sisters of St. Hedwig, or the Little Sisters of the Poor homes in Strasbourg and Rouen. The congregation of the Little Sisters of the Poor had settled in Strasbourg in 1856 and as early as 1857, it contracted an agreement with the municipality: the city vowed to pay a subsidy if the sisters of the congregation accepted to care for the people that were sent to them.[18] In Rouen, funds came both from the city administration and from the charity bureau. Other religious institutions also received grants: a day nursery in Rouen, an infant school in Bochum, the St. Hedwig hospital in Berlin[19] or specialized institutes for the deaf and mute in Nancy and Strasbourg all benefited from them. To this financial help could be added other contributions from the department, the region or the province, from the State or the ruling sovereign, or even from his wife.

The granting of funds was not always entirely 'free' and could go along with an attempt at gaining control over private, especially Catholic, charitable organizations, as their representatives particularly feared. Were there

actual grounds for such fears? Was this long tradition of cooperation in danger of being challenged as health care and social action increasingly appeared as major ideological and political issues for the cities?

A challenged tradition in the second half of the nineteenth century?

The German situation must be distinguished here from the French one: certainly, there were conflicts beyond the Vosges due to diverging interpretations of health care and social action depending on ideological positions, but these interpretations did not spring quite from the same ideological background and did not lead to the same practices. In Germany, antagonistic relationships undeniably existed between Protestants (or liberal Protestants) and Catholics, and they had an impact on the way welfare was organized; national issues also sparked tensions, and the *Kulturkampf* constituted an unfavourable context for denominational initiatives; yet, there was no real secular offensive as was the case in France.

  This does not mean that there were no problems, and new issues were in fact raised by what some historians have described as the 'second confessionalization' and by the integration of national minorities.[20] The two cities of Berlin and (German) Strasbourg may best illustrate those points. In Berlin, the outcry caused by the foundation of a house of the (Catholic) Good Shepherd (for 'stray' or 'endangered' young women) in Charlottenburg revealed that the Prussian authorities favoured Protestant initiatives, whereas Catholic institutions appeared to them as a threat, regardless of their social utility.[21] The idea of creating the place was launched in 1856 and instantly sparked protests in some Protestant newspapers against the 'Catholic convent of Charlottenburg'. The head of the province of Brandeburg, Eduard von Flottwell, asked the Catholic episcopal delegate, Leopold Pelldram, who was promoting the foundation of the house, for more information. The answer was that it would be useful next to so big a city as Berlin and that a similar Protestant institution had opened there a few years before. Von Flottwell then gave his approval and vowed to support Pelldram, provided the place that had originally been marked out should be altered: 'such an institution should not be located next to the royal castle, there is already nearby an evangelical church whose heads would consider as a provocation the proximity of a Catholic institution, associated to a public chapel'. Things moved ahead only one year later: the church council of the Catholic parish of St. Hedwig was then allowed to erect the building, provided it was 'surrounded by a 15-foot wall', in order to conceal it from the eyes of passersby. The charitable institution had to face other administrative and legal hassles, before, during and after the *Kulturkampf* and even had to undergo lawsuits and police searches, although it managed to carry on its activities. The house of the Good Shepherd was one of the main targets of Prussian authorities, owing to its size and visibility, but it was by no means the only institution to be affected by their denominational biases, which also weighed in on orphan care and youth clubs.

In Strasbourg, the peculiar situation of Alsace, which had been annexed in 1871 to the German Empire – the national question, in short, was the crux of the matter. This was reflected in a dispute involving one the main purveyors of Catholic charity, the Society of St. Vincent de Paul, who, in such exceptional circumstances, suffered from the drawbacks of having originated in France, in Paris, and above all of having maintained its links to the Parisian capital. Between 1873 and 1875, its activities in Alsace were therefore closely monitored, and it was enjoined to break its relationships with the Parisian motherhouse.[22] The heads of the Society in Alsace officially announced that they had complied, but the German authorities estimated that the break 'might only be apparent or temporary'.[23] Their misgivings were quite justified as the archives of the Society of St. Vincent de Paul show that, albeit with some caution, the epistolary relationships between Alsace and Paris were maintained through go-betweens or thanks to the trips made to the capital by members of the Society.[24]

In the French cities, the secular assault against Catholic influence on health care and social action became obvious from the beginning of the 1880s and the republicanization of national, local and municipal bodies.[25] The simplest and quickest move was financial: subsidies were directly or indirectly suppressed and access to certain resources impeded. In Angers, the four Catholic nurseries used to benefit from a yearly grant from the ministry of home affairs and from a lottery organized every year with the authorization of the prefect. In 1880, both grant and authorization were cancelled. The justification for the suppression of the lottery was that 'this institution [the nursery] must earn its own resources to ensure its existence, without resorting every year, in a quasi-permanent way, to charity, in the form of a lottery'.[26] In Nancy, the lottery that provided the funds for the Apprentice house was not authorized by the prefect from the middle of the 1880s; in Rouen, in 1888, the Little Sisters of the Poor lost the 'bread relief' provided by the municipality.[27]

The offensive could also take more radical forms, such as the undermining of the role that several people had played until then in the cooperation between municipal institutions and private initiatives. This was the case, at least partly and temporarily, in some hospitals.[28] In the field of infant education, the creation of *écoles maternelles* (infant school) in 1881 by the Third Republic and the secularization of the teaching staff of French public institutions starting in 1886 made it theoretically impossible to employ members of congregations in municipal institutions. In Neuilly, the St. Cecilia asylum was even forced to close down, and the Daughters of Charity of St. Vincent de Paul were discharged from managing the municipal orphanage.[29] Charity bureaus were also impacted. In Angers, Léon Cosnier underlined that as early as 1880, the makeup of the administrative board of the charity bureau had been modified and the republican influence strengthened.[30] He added:

> This is not all: after the men, the women were also dismissed. Hence the enforcement of a measure so generally blamed and so detrimental to the interests of the poor, the substitution of secular agents for the Sisters of charity, in order to distribute relief on behalf of the charity Bureau.[31]

Cosnier lamented the measure for evident ideological reasons, but also be-
cause of the little availability of the people chosen to replace the sisters, who
were 'honorable people' but already very busy since, as he explained, 'the
spouses of public servants had to be recruited, especially the heads of infant
schools or women teachers'.[32]

Regarding charity bureaus, Nancy can be considered as an extreme case
because of the measures taken by the vice-president of the charity bureau,
Léopold Lallement, from 1891 onwards.[33] This Protestant republican and
advocate of the solidarism developed by Léon Bourgeois wanted to reform
Nancy's charity bureau by applying there his personal ideas about public wel-
fare. This meant strengthening the role of the administrative board to the
detriment of the relief committees set up by Catholic, Protestant and Jewish
volunteers, which he thought were causing fragmentation and inefficiency.
He did not wish volunteers to be totally pushed aside, but wanted them to be
deprived of decision-making power and to become mere auxiliaries. The ul-
terior motive of enforcing secularization was also part of this 'rationalization'
scheme, which started being implemented in 1894, as shows the breaking of
the contract between the charity bureau and the congregation of the Sisters
of Mercy of St. Borromeo the same year. In Rouen[34] or Lyon,[35] there were
similar attempts at secularizing the administrative boards and staff employed
by the charity bureaus.

As for the Catholics themselves, they were not always favourable to coop-
erating with public welfare services, especially in Germany. In the middle
of the nineteenth century, during the *Katholikentage* (Catholic assemblies) of
1849 and 1857, the St Vincent de Paul conferences were advised not to work
with municipal welfare services,[36] and the priests were asked not to accept
the function of *Armenpfleger* (curator of the poor) laid out in the Elberfeld
system. Some Catholics firmly believed that, even in the cities where they
were a majority, care should be carried out under the aegis of Catholics so-
cieties of either lay members or clerics rather than by public services. At the
end of the 1890s, when Bernhard Wuermeling, who was a member of one
of the St Vincent de Paul conferences as well as the former deputy mayor of
the city of Münster (Westphalia), made the case for a single board gathering
together private charity and public welfare representatives in order to lay
the ground for truly cooperative work, he faced the opposition of his core-
ligionists.[37] True, at the same time, in Cologne, a Catholic city but with
a liberal city council, the members of the St Vincent de Paul conferences
were still in open conflict with the managers of public welfare who had ac-
cused them of trying to define criteria for the attribution of relief, based on
a specific conception of what 'good' moral or religious behaviour the poor
should evince.[38] In a similar way, in Munich, until the First World War,
the conferences kept as much distance as possible from municipal welfare
services.[39] In this case, the reason for the tensions was the conferences' ab-
solutist Catholic position, according to which Catholics should be in charge

of all social problems and fight to the end in order not to be deprived of responsibility, especially by liberals.

However, the new ideological and political significance of welfare issues and the conflicts that sparked at the end of the nineteenth century should not lead us to think that cooperation between public and private sectors had become very complicated or even impossible. On both sides of the Rhine, discussion groups, associations such as the *Deutscher Verein für Armenpflege und Wohltätigkeit*, national and international conferences on public welfare and private charity were striving to rethink this relationship.[40] Cities did not all similarly experience disputes and conflicts, and the strategies of the different actors were not always consistent. Finally, new forms of cooperation progressively emerged.

Working together after all

In almost all of the cities under study, there does not seem to have been any instance of a permanent and merciless war between municipal welfare services and private, especially Catholic, charity. The disputes and conflicts previously mentioned may themselves be qualified. In Berlin, for instance, the preference given to Protestant charities by the Prussian authorities was tempered by the benevolence that Queen Augusta, though Protestant, showed towards Catholic congregations, especially the Sisters of the Good Shepherd and the Grey Nuns. Wilhelm I's wife paid several visits to these congregations, offered them precious gifts or money and went so far as to welcome ailing sisters in her castle in Potsdam and to kiss those who were bedridden.[41] She was a sponsor who was sometimes able to attenuate the measures taken or considered against the communities.[42] Apart from this particular case, once the turmoil of the *Kulturkampf* was over, some institutions reopened or were sent residents by public authorities: in 1888, the Brothers of the Poor of St. Francis were thus allowed to reopen the orphanage of Berlin-Moabit that had been closed in 1876 and even to create a school there in 1891, which was an important conciliatory gesture as Prussian authorities had always been very suspicious of the teaching provided by congregations.[43] In other parts of Prussia, in the diocese of Warmia, the regional parliament decided for the first time in 1899 to grant financial help to the Catholic hospital of Braunsberg, whereas it had so far only sponsored Protestant institutions.[44] In Strasbourg, after the unrest felt at the beginning of the 1870s, things quieted down for the St Vincent de Paul conferences. In 1880, Eugène Petiti, chairman of the superior council of Alsace, wrote to Paris:

> As for the rest, we are going on peacefully and most of all without fear of power, which has become quite benevolent since the marshal of Manteuffel was appointed governor (…) As for our conferences in Alsace, we are corresponding with them in all freedom.[45]

They were allowed to pursue their activity without any further trouble, to celebrate with great pomp the fiftieth anniversary of the Strasbourg conferences in 1891[46] and to maintain their links with Paris.

Even in French cities, the secular attack was not always coherent or followed through. To take up the case of Angers, which was well documented by Léon Cosnier despite his prejudiced views, we can see that although the sisters were discharged from providing in-home relief, they yet kept on working at the hospital and at the municipal orphanage. In the last case, they were upheld thanks to a landslide vote of the city council, which occurred in 1887 after attacks from an anticlerical councilor.[47] In Neuilly, the infant school, city orphanage and 'house of the elderly' had to do without congregations, but congregations still managed in-door relief and care on behalf of the charity bureau.[48] The nursery and deaf–mute institute in Rouen, the institute for the young blind in Nancy kept their subsidies. Even in Paris, where the city administration was known for its staunch anticlerical stance, there was no univocal way of dealing with Catholic charitable institutions: in the 1880s, for instance, the city council kept on paying subsidies to the nursing home of the Brothers of St. John of God and to the *Oeuvre de l'Hospitalité du travail* (an association helping people unable to work).[49]

These examples suggest that the two partners, public welfare services and private charitable associations, often needed each other too much to engage in a face-off, all the more so as they were now opposed on an even more contested ground, education, in France as in Germany. In some German cities, the awareness of their mutual interests led to more than the sporadic actions, which have just been mentioned, and prompted new forms of cooperation. In the city of Münster, there had been since the beginning of the nineteenth century a powerful tradition of cooperation between Catholic charity and municipal welfare, as shown, in particular, by the strong presence of clerics in the *Armenkommission*, the equivalent to the administrative board of the French charity bureaus.[50] This practice remained unbroken when a version of the Elberfeld system, which gave a preponderant role to volunteer work, was introduced in 1894, all the more as the fervently Catholic Bernhard Wuermeling, who was elected 'second *Bürgermeister*' in 1899, was also the chairman of the *Armenkommission*.[51] Besides, officially, the system did not refer to the Elberfeld model, but rather to the St Vincent de Paul conferences, which had been very active in the city since 1849. When the reform was enforced, 11.3% of the *Armenpfleger* registered by the municipal services were members of the St Vincent de Paul conferences; between 1894 and 1913, 9.6% of the *Armenpfleger* were clerics. The conferences also acted as go-betweens in order to make city councilors accept a reform that was costly in terms of public spending.

In Strasbourg, the overhaul of in-home relief that was launched by Rudolf Schwander, who became the mayor of Strasbourg in 1906, also included close cooperation with private charitable organizations, be they

Catholic or Protestant. A first sign was the appointment in 1902 in the administrative board of the charity bureau of Paul Müller-Simonis, a Catholic priest, who became the first Catholic cleric in this body since 1826.[52] In 1905, in the well-argued report he produced to promote his reform plans, Schwander devoted a whole section to the description of the 'relationships between public welfare and private charity'. According to him, public welfare was needed in the most distressing cases and when the life of the individual was endangered, while private charity was to focus on less dramatic situations, in which the aim was to avoid downfall. Schwander therefore called for the 'sharing' of care duties between public welfare and private charity and, like Bernhard Wuermeling, advocated the creation of 'a kind of central board of charity in which important questions about public welfare and private charity would be debated, in which common institutions would be discussed on common bases'.[53] The reform defended by Schwander was implemented in 1906 and the representatives of the different denominations were very much involved in the new system, which has often been said to have led to growing professionalization of municipal welfare workers, but which was most of all characterized by close association between volunteer workers, endowed with decision-making power, and salaried workers, whose number was increased. Catholics made up a large part of the volunteers in charge of distributing relief, and Paul Müller-Simonis held regular conferences in the training courses that were organized for these auxiliaries to public welfare.[54] But another Catholic much involved in charity work, Joseph Weydmann, also became one the main public welfare officers of the city, when he was appointed head of the municipal welfare service in 1906, and entrusted with the task of enforcing the reform of in-home relief.[55] The case of Strasbourg is particularly interesting because the 'system of Strasbourg' which was applied from 1906 on became a model for Germany as a whole, instead of the Elberfeld system. In fact, regarding Catholics' involvement in in-home municipal care work, it can be noticed that before the First World War, Wuermeling managed to make his views become more widely accepted and that, even in Cologne, the St Vincent de Paul conferences were taking a more active part in municipal welfare work as such.[56]

In the beginning of the twentieth century, a well-accepted 'philanthropic consensus'[57] thus seems to have prevailed in some German cities, whereas in many French cities, it was often officially rejected while being unofficially tolerated. The growing complexity of the relationships between public welfare and private charity, and the difficulty of coming up with a univocal definition, revealed that health care and social action had become, at the end of the nineteenth century, an ideological and political issue for cities, leading to confrontation as well as cooperation between two modes of regulation, which were both time-honoured and yet both undergoing deep mutations.

Notes

1 This research was conducted during the process of writing my habilitation thesis, which was published under the title *La Ville Charitable. Les œuvres sociales catholiques en France et en Allemagne au XIXe siècle* (Paris, 2012). On the French side, I used the following surveys: L. Cosnier, *La Charité à Angers* (Angers, 1889–1890); M. Du Camp, *La Charité Privée à Paris* (Paris, 1885); V. Duval, *La Charité à Rouen. Les œuvres catholiques* (Rouen, 1895); J-S. Girard, *La Charité à Nancy* (Nancy, 1890); A. Legrand, *Neuilly Charitable, Petit Manuel des Oeuvres Paroissiales de la Ville de Neuilly* (Paris, 1905); *Manuel des Œuvres et des Institutions Catholiques pour la Ville de Saint-Etienne (Saint-Etienne, 1880); Manuel des Œuvres. Institutions religieuses et charitables de Paris et principaux établissements des départements pouvant recevoir des orphelins, des indigents et des malades de Paris (Paris, 1891); Manuel des Œuvres Orléanaises (Orléans, 1890); A. Vachet, Lyon et ses Œuvres (Lyon, 1900); Ville d'Elbeuf: œuvres de bienfaisance et de moralisation fondées et entretenues par la charité privée des catholiques (Elbeuf, 1896). On the German side: M. Brandts, Die Katholischen Wohltätigkeits-Anstalten und Vereine Sowie das Katholisch-sociale Vereinswesen Insbesondere in der Erzdiözese Köln (Cologne, 1895); H. Fournelle, Die Katholische Caritas in Berlin (Berlin, 1900); W. Liese, Die Katholischen Wohltätigkeitsanstalten und Sozialen Vereine in der Diözese Paderborn (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1906); G. Matern, Die Katholischen Wohltätigkeits-Anstalten und Vereine Sowie das Katholisch-soziale Vereinsleben in der Diöcese Ermland (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1900); P. Müller-Simonis, Die kath. Wohltätigkeits-Anstalten u. Vereine sowie das kath.-soziale Vereinswesen in der Diözese Strassburg. Hrsg v. Kath. Charitas-Sekretariate zu Straßburg (Strasbourg, 1899); H. Pesch, Die Wohltätigkeitsanstalten der Christlichen Barmherzigkeit in Wien (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1891); A. Saltzgeber, Die Katholischen Wohltätigkeits-Anstalten u. – Vereine Sowie das Katholisch-soziale Vereinswesen in der Diözese Breslau Preuss. Anteils, einschl. des Delegaturbezirks (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1904); J. Strieth, Die katholischen Wohltätigkeits-Anstalten und Vereine sowie das kath.-soziale Vereinsleben in der Diözese Limburg (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1903); A. Winterstein, Die katholischen Wohltätigkeitsanstalten und Vereine sowie das katholisch-sociale Vereinswesen in der Diözese Würzburg (Würzburg, 1897).* In the following pages, the surveys will be referenced by name of author, the first word of the title in case there is no mention of any author, and the name of the relevant city or diocese. I also consulted some archival sources.

2 Y. Marec (ed), *Villes en Crise? Les politiques municipales face aux pathologies urbaines (fin XVIIIe-fin XXe siècle)* (Paris, 2005).

3 C. Maurer, 'Hôpital et catholicité dans la ville du XIXe siècle: Essai de comparaison franco–allemande', in J. Lalouette (ed), *L'Hôpital entre Religions et Laïcité du Moyen-Age à nos Jours* (Paris, 2006), 261–275.

4 In this case, the orphanage was in fact a state institution: Winterstein, *Würzburg, op. cit.*, 20.

5 Strieth, *Limburg, op. cit.*, 86.

6 On charity bureaus, see A. Gueslin, *Gens Pauvres, Pauvres Gens Dans la France du XIXe Siècle* (Paris, 1998), 265–277.

7 Strasbourg Municipal Archives (subsequently AMS), 71 MW 24: Members [of the charity bureau] 1800–1870, documents regarding the renewal of one-fifth of the members. Between 1831 and 1853, the members of the administrative board included three Catholics and two Protestants. In 1872, there were two Catholics and three Protestants.

8 AMS, 71 MW 26, *Akta betr. Armenratsmitglieder von 1904–1924*, minutes of the meeting of the charity bureau of 22 June 1907.

9 Girard, *Nancy, op. cit.*, 454. But in Rouen, in the 1830s, the mayor opposed the creation of the fifteenth bureau that would have been dedicated to the Protestant

poor. Y. Marec, *Bienfaisance Communale et Protection Sociale à Rouen (1796–1927)* (Paris, 2002), vol. 1, 107.

10 Cosnier, *Angers*, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, 329–330.

11 Girard, *Nancy*, *op. cit*, 456–457.

12 Gueslin, *op. cit.*, 274.

13 The 'system' that was put in place in 1853 in the industrial town of Elberfeld consisted of in-home relief entirely provided by male volunteer citizens. The town was divided up into districts comprising a maximum of four families under the protection of a volunteer *Armenpfleger* (curator of the poor). Municipal welfare services merely controlled the system. For all these aspects, see C. Sachsse, and F. Tennstedt, *Geschichte der Armenfürsorge in Deutschland* (Stuttgart, 1980–1998), vol. 1: *Vom Spätmittelalter bis zum 1. Weltkrieg*. For a description of the Elberfeld system in French, see C. Maurer, *Le Modèle Allemand de la charité: La Caritas de Guillaume II à Hitler* (Strasbourg, 1999), 27–28. For a list of the main cities in which the Elberfeld system was introduced, see G. Steinmetz, *Regulating the Social. The welfare state and local politics in imperial Germany* (Princeton, NJ, 1993), 159. The cities relevant to this study are Berlin, Breslau (in 1893/95), Frankfurt am Main (in 1883) and Königsberg.

14 Saltzgeber, *Breslau*, *op. cit.*, 12–13. Similar cases of cooperation in French cities, particularly in Lyon and Strasbourg, are mentioned in J.N. Luc, *L'Invention du Jeune Enfant au XIXe siècle. De la salle d'asile à l'école maternelle* (Paris, 1997), 211–212.

15 On the Society and the Conferences of St. Vincent de Paul in France, see especially M. Brejon de Lavergnée, *La Société de Saint-Vincent-de-Paul au XIXe Siècle. Un fleuron du catholicisme social* (Paris, 2008).

16 Centre national des archives de l'Église de France (National Centre of the Archives of the Church of France, subsequently CNAEF), *Archives de la Société de Saint-Vincent-de-Paul (Archives of the Society of St. Vincent de Paul, subsequently ASSVP),* files concerning the relations with the conferences of Alsace, 33 LA 385, letter of J. Maillet to the president of the SSVP, 29 January 1863.

17 Duval, *Rouen*, *op. cit.*, 460.

18 AMS, 71 MW 41, *Protokoll-Buch der Sitzungen des Armenrats*, meeting of 20 November 1909.

19 The city of Berlin in fact granted a loan with a low interest rate to fund the new hospital: Fournelle, *Berlin*, *op. cit.*, 239.

20 On the 'second confessionnalization', see O. Blaschke, 'Das 19. Jahrhundert: Ein zweites konfessionelles Zeitalter', *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, 26 (2000), 38–75; O. Blaschke (ed), *Konfessionen im Konflikt. Deutschland zwischen 1800 und 1970: Ein zweites konfessionelles Zeitalter* (Göttingen, 2002).

21 Fournelle, *Berlin*, *op. cit.*, 186–213.

22 See especially Archives of the Bas-Rhin Department (subsequently ADBR), D 98 449, *Religiöse Genossenschaften und die Heils-Armee 1873–1918*, circular letter of 5 April and complementary instructions of 22 April 1873.

23 ADBR, D 98 449, summary of the answers of the *Kreisdirektoren* established by the services of the *Bezirkspräsidium*, 24 March 1875, and circular letter of the *Oberpräsident*, 17 April 1875.

24 See, for instance, CNAEF, *ASSVP*, 33 LA 385, Letters of J. Maillet (4 and 20 February 1875) and of chemist J. Beno (8 February 1875).

25 For an overview, see M. Agulhon, 'Les citadins et la politique', in M. Agulhon (ed), *La Ville de l'Âge Industriel. Histoire de la France urbaine (Paris, 1998), 626–652*.

26 Letter of mayor J. Guitton dated from 1 December 1880, quoted in Cosnier, *Angers*, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, 32–33.

27 Duval, *Rouen*, *op. cit.*, 560–561.

28 See Maurer, 'L'hôpital entre religions et laïcité', *op. cit.* In Paris, the hospital staff was completely secularized. This was not the case elsewhere.

29 Legrand, *Neuilly*, *op. cit.*, 16. A very republican, and even radical, municipal government had indeed come to power in Neuilly at the end of the 1870s: see C. Echalier, 'Une commune de banlieue au XIXe siècle: Neuilly' (Master's thesis, Paris, 1966), 145–149.

30 Cosnier, *Angers*, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, 326 and 332.

31 *Ibid.*, 332.

32 *Ibid.*, 335.

33 He is now well-known, thanks to the work of P. Quincy-Lefebvre: see 'Léopold Lallement, un nouveau départ pour le bureau de bienfaisance de Nancy', *Annales de l'Est*, 40, 1 (1988), 11–25, and 'Naissance et affirmation d'un service public dans le monde de la charité. L'exemple du bureau de bienfaisance de Nancy 1850–1914', in A. Gueslin, and P. Guillaume (eds), *De la Charité Médiévale à la Sécurité Sociale* (Paris, 1992), 91–96.

34 Marec, *Bienfaisance*, *op. cit.*, vol.1, partie III. Duval does not mention the subject, however, probably because at the time he was writing, it was still too early for the effects of the changes described by Marec to be fully observed.

35 In Lyon, attacks against the charity bureau by the municipal council, which was dominated by anticlerical republicans, were especially fierce between 1875 and the early 1890s: T.B. Smith, 'Republicans, Catholics and social reform: Lyon (1870–1920)', *French History*, 12 (1998), 246–275, 252–253.

36 E. Frie, 'Katholische Wohlfahrtskultur im Wilhelminischen Reich: Der "Charitasverband für das katholische Deutschland", die Vinzenzvereine und der "kommunale Sozialliberalismus"', in J.-C. Kaiser, and W. Loth (eds), *Soziale Reform im Kaiserreich. Protestantismus, katholizismus und sozialpolitik* (Stuttgart, 1997), 184–201, 195.

37 *Ibid.*, 195–196.

38 *Ibid.*, 196–197.

39 W. Rudloff, *Die Wohlfahrtsstadt. Kommunale Ernährungs-, Fürsorge und Wohnungspolitik am Beispiel Münchens 1910–1933* (Göttingen, 1998), vol. 1, 549. As in most big German cities under the *Kaiserreich*, the municipal administration in Munich was under the influence of liberals, even if they only became interested in welfare issues at the beginning of the twentieth century.

40 These questions have already been dealt with in the books by Sachsse and Tennstedt for Germany and by Marec for France and will not be developed here.

41 Fournelle, *Berlin*, *op. cit.*, 265–266.

42 For the Sisters of the Good Shepherd, see *ibid.*, 193.

43 See *ibid.* and the article by M. Borutta, 'Enemies at the gate; the Moabit *Klostersturm* and the *Kulturkampf*: Germany', in C. Clark and W. Kaiser (eds), *Culture Wars. Secular-Catholic conflict in nineteenth-century Europe* (Cambridge, 2003), 227–254.

44 Matern, *Ermland*, *op. cit.*, 2.

45 CNAEF, *ASSVP*, 33 LA 385, Letter of 20 November 1880.

46 See *Jubilé de la Société de Saint-Vincent-de-Paul de Strasbourg 1840–1890* (Strasbourg, 1892).

47 Cosnier, *Angers*, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, 179–180.

48 Legrand, *Neuilly*, *op. cit.*, 37.

49 Du Camp, *Paris*, *op. cit.*, 122.

50 See the article by T. Küster, 'Bürgertum und städtische Armut. Gesellschaftlicher Wandel im Urbanisierungsprozeß am Beispiel der kommunalen Armenfürsorge in Münster', *Westfälische Forschungen*, 43 (1993), 58–80.

51 Frie, 'Katholische Wohlfahrtskultur', 195 and E. Frie, '"Da nun die städtische Armenpflege der Armenpflege des St. Vincenz-Josefs-Verein gleichen soll …" – Offene Armenfürsorge der Stadt Münster um die Jahrhundertwende', in F.-J.

Jacobi (ed), *Stadtgesellschaft im Wandel. Untersuchungen zur Sozialgeschichte Münsters im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (Münster, 1995), 13–59, especially 25–35, 37, 46–48.

52 On Paul Müller-Simonis, see C. Maurer, 'Priester als Gründer Sozialeinrichtungen. Der Fall Paul Müller-Simonis (1862–1930)', *Römische Quartalschrift für Christliche Altertumskunde und Kirchengeschichte*, 104 (2009), 247–256.

53 R. Schwander, *Bericht über die Neuordnung der Hausarmenpflege* (Strasbourg, 1905), 42–43.

54 For example, in 1910: *Blätter für das Straßburger Armenwesen*, III (December 1909 and January 1910), 37–39.

55 AMS, 71 MW 39, meeting of 29 January 1906. On Joseph Weydmann, see also C. Baechler, 'Joseph Weydmann', in B. Vogler (ed), *L'Alsace, Dictionnaire du Monde Religieux dans la France Contemporaine* (Paris, 1987), 460–461.

56 Report mentioned in Frie, 'Katholische Wohlfahrtskultur', *op. cit.*, 198.

57 This notion is developed in C. Bec, *Assistance et République. La recherche d'un nouveau contrat social sous la IIIe République* (Paris, 1994).

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3   A "mixed economy of welfare" model

The complementary and mutual growth of public and private welfare in France (1970s–2000s)

Axelle Brodiez-Dolino

Introduction

The relationship between philanthropic organisations and the public authorities is often thought of as a zero-sum game: either the welfare state grows, by implementing laws and public measures, and takes a bite out of the space occupied by private associations by implementing laws and public services… or it withdraws (or even, as was the case in the nineteenth century, is barely present) and leaves it up to charitable aid to fill the gaps. The first case can be attributed to periods of expansion in welfare when the "right to aid" appears to take precedence over "charitable duty"[1] – always unpredictable and often patronising. The latter case is par excellence a description of the Keynesian model's waning fortunes since the late 1970s and the subsequent rise of neoliberalism – leading, especially but not uniquely in the United Kingdom and the United States, to a reduction in public spending and the retrenchment of the welfare state.[2]

On closer inspection, however, the French welfare model does not appear to fit the scenario described above, and this is what we will be exploring in this chapter. In France, there appears instead to have been phases of mutual growth between public and private welfare during periods of economic crisis and pressing societal need, followed by a subsiding of these interventions, or stagnation, or slower growth, when the need is felt to be less pressing. Thus, the relationship between the public and private spheres should be understood as a 'mixed economy of welfare',[3] a largely neglected concept in current French research, where the growth of one does not limit, but instead stimulates the growth of the other. From this perspective, the relationship between the public authorities and philanthropic organisations is worth revisiting. Certainly, it has been one of a carefully maintained 'opposition'[4] and has long been shaped by a secular/religious opposition, with associations taking on a 'tribunician role'[5] and publicly voicing their discontent (one example is the celebrated French priest abbé Pierre, famous for his public 'tirades'[6]) – however, it is also a largely complementary relationship. The lasting nature of this relationship, cast from a religious mould in a highly secularised France, and

the considerable *métissage* between charity and solidarism[7] can only be understood through the lens of mutual acceptance and increasing cooperation between public and private welfare over a period of decades.

It is important to remember that this mutual construction and growth between public and private welfare were not simply a product of the crisis of the 1970s–1980s, but has deeper roots. At first, however, this relationship was not explicitly expressed and was even by nature inadmissible. Indeed, the 1880s–1910s, the first phase, saw the prevailing idea of a conflict between Church and State, religion and secular Republic, charity and solidarism. Yet, it is also during this period that the foundations for this relationship were laid; like in the United Kingdom, the early nineteenth century saw a multiplication of private actions in response to the growing 'social question' in a context of industrialisation and urbanisation. The local councils (*municipalités*) born out of the Third Republic then attempted to vie with private aid, in a context of rising secularism and competition with religious structures, by taking back control of the municipal charity offices (*bureaux de bienfaisance*) and by developing a number of social initiatives for the elderly, the disabled, the temporarily unemployed, etc. Finally, similarly to the chronology of the United Kingdom, the State began to intervene in the 1890s: with the 15 July 1893 law guaranteeing free medical assistance for those 'deprived of resources', the 26 July 1904 law on children in care, the 14 July 1905 law on 'obligatory aid for the elderly, disabled and incurable' and the June and July 1913 law in favour of expecting mothers and large families. Weakened by these new developments and competing on their own terrain, the charities did not however disappear because the legal fabric remained in fact extremely patchy and slow to implement, because the aid allocated was small and poorly adjusted and because there still remained significant need. Thus, private welfare remained active both filling the gaps and as a complement to public measures.

The two world wars are often described as veritable laboratories for the social healthcare sector.[8] In the case of France however, these two important events seem more to have been a sort of parentheses for the welfare sector. During the First World War, the majority of charity aid was just ticking over, or even ground to a halt, because of the draft and because no important or durable welfare measure ended up being put in place. As for the Second World War, the welfare system implemented by the Vichy regime did not survive. The second important era of mutual growth in France can therefore be more found concentrated between the Liberation of Paris and the late 1950s. Indeed, far from putting an end to social assistance, as one might expect, a social insurance approach (with the social security as its crowning jewel) developed in parallel to a new generation of large-scale (and often Catholic)[9] charity actions on the one hand and the fresh expansion of measures and aid budgets on the other.[10] After all, the elderly, immigrant workers, successive generations of the 'fourth-world' poor and the physically and mentally handicapped in particular still faced challenging living conditions.

However, during this period, the associations fighting poverty and precarity remained poorly subsidised, suggesting that their development was more in parallel to the welfare state than intertwined with it.

The 1970s–2000, which form the heart of this chapter, should thus be read as the *third* great period of expansion of French welfare. A few figures provide us with a telling picture: for a poverty rate of 60% of the median revenue, subject to variation but relatively stable over the long term (14.2% of the population was living under the poverty line in 1979, 14.1% in 2010 and 14.1% in 2017[11]), the number of welfare beneficiaries and the sums allocated to welfare in proportion to GDP doubled overall: in 2015, there were 4.15 million beneficiaries of various basic allowances compared to 1.9 million in 1975. In other words, 6.2% of the population received some form of welfare aid in 2015, compared to 3.6% in 1975, and 1.3% of GDP was spent on welfare compared to 0.6% in 1975. Alongside this, the growth of associative aid has been just as spectacular: since the 1990s, the budgets of the largest organisations have expanded to tens of thousands of euros and a portfolio of donators in the thousands.

What then is the chronology of this final phase of double inflation in public and private welfare action, how can it be explained and what forms did it take? What kind of relationships did these two actors form? Was this period unprecedented, taken against the ones that came before it? What impacts (or lack thereof) did this have on the redefinition of welfare? Is it possible to speak of a uniquely French model? To answer these questions, this study draws on a number of historical studies of associations – some already published (about *Emmaüs* and the Secours populaire [French Popular Relief], but also protestant aid), but mostly still being written (about the homeless shelter *Le Foyer Notre-Dame des sans-abri* in Lyon[12] and the association ATD Fourth World[13]) – as well as the analysis of national reports, laws and measures undertaken by the public authorities over a period running between the 1970s and today.

If this period is relatively uniform both in terms of the economic and social hardships that characterise it and the renewed mutual growth between public and private welfare, it can nevertheless be divided up into two principal phases, shaped by two different rationales, and these form the two sections of this chapter. Between the late 1970s and 1988, mutual growth was spurred by the urgent need for new welfare safety nets, roping in public authorities and associations alike – even if, ultimately, such efforts were unable to stem the rising unemployment and job instability that marked this period. Since 1988, however, the need was felt for a more curative system to fill the gaps in welfare aid, based on employment schemes' [*insertion*] and labour laws – accompanied, paradoxically, by the new (and impressive) growth of emergency aid.

1970s–1987: an urgent need for new welfare safety nets

After a quarter of a century of sustained economic growth and low unemployment and the progressive disappearance of the housing crisis and of

poverty amongst the elderly ('les Trente glorieuses'[14] [the Glorious Thirty] was coined to describe this period, although historians have since sought to nuance the term[15]), the trend reversed progressively in France from the very end of the 1960s. Ten years later, the social emergency had become strikingly visible, sparking renewed activity from both the public authorities and associations.

The slow reframing of a 'public issue'[16]

The great historical paradox is that initial reactions to the economic and social crisis that hit the West in the 1970s sought to respond to poverty issues of the 'Golden Thirty', even while the West was slipping – unbeknownst to it – into the 'Pitiful Thirty'.[17]

   Indeed, in December 1972, the Commission of the European Communities signed a contract with an important French association, ATD Fourth World, to determine 'a methodology for identifying and quantifying Fourth World households' in Europe. Founded in 1956 by a priest, Joseph Wresinski, in the heart of the Noisy-le-Grand slum, and after splitting from Emmaüs, ATD has since 1964 been chaired by the niece of General de Gaulle, Geneviève Anthonioz de Gaulle, with the Dutch diplomat Alwine de Vos van Steenwijk holding an equally central role – the latter having dedicated much of his time, skills and network to the association since the 1960s. ATD found two invaluable allies at the Commission of the European Communities: Robert Pendville (member of the Directorate-General for Information, which would gradually turn its services into an 'information source on the fourth world') and Léo Crijns (Director of the Directorate-General for Social Affairs, which would later set up the pilot program against poverty).[18] In 1975, still at the initiative of ATD, the study took a new turn, with the launch in Europe of a first program of 20 pilot projects spanning several years and destined to fund and develop innovative action for fighting poverty. If the Commission of the European Communities proved in practice to be far ahead regarding a still barely visible economic and social deterioration – with new swathes of European programs funded from 1980 – it was in fact far behind the United States, which had already begun a 'war against poverty' over ten years previously.[19]

   Indeed, an increasing number of national alerts were being sounded. In France, the first alarm-bells went off in the mid-1960s, when ATD Fourth World published several studies on the persistence of widespread poverty in the heart of prosperous societies.[20] At the same time, Paul-Marie de la Gorce published *La France pauvre* (1965) [France in Poverty]. This was followed by the decision to choose this subject as the theme for the 1970 edition of the yearly very Christian event 'Semaines sociales'[21] and by René Lenoir's highly commented publications[22] (he became State Secretary of Social Affairs that same year) as well as those of Lionel Stoléru[23] (economist and councillor to the President of the Republic Valéry Giscard d'Estaing). Until the late 1970s,

however, in France and in Belgium,[24] poverty was still a subject that escaped large-scale statistical studies.[25]

Aside from the deteriorating economic climate, the evolution of interpretative approaches in sociopolitics contributed to a growing awareness of the issue. Indeed, it was the decline of Marxist analyses (in terms of exploitation, domination and the class struggle) that brought a renewal in social concepts starting in the 1950s–1960s, making way for analyses in terms of 'marginalism', 'asociality' and 'social maladjustment' that called for a 'readaptive' approach to social aid. These analyses were in turn rejected by the post-1968 movement and the works of Michel Foucault, which stigmatised the 'social control' of the most needy. Finally, in the 1980s, media attention was given to the 'nouveau poor', a concept presented less under moral than in strictly economic terms.

It is in this triple context (of a growing awareness in Europe, of evolutions in interpretative approaches and of economic deterioration) that the Economic and Social Council (ESC)[26] – a non-decision-making assembly which nevertheless had a political advisory role – was the first public authority in France to sit down and address the question and to attempt a 'critical review of all measures undertaken or proposed to eradicate manifestations of poverty'.[27] Henri Péquignot,[28] medical professor and member of the ESC, was entrusted in December 1974 with writing the report, and it was adopted in September 1978. No official statement or program, however, was adopted by the government, due to a lack of consensus within the ESC and the refusal to emit recommendations on a question considered very (too) 'political'. The absence of charity association representatives in this assembly doubtless also had a negative impact on analysis; and indeed, pushed by ATD Fourth World, President Giscard d'Estaing would remedy this situation the following year, in 1979, by nominating the president and founder of the association, Father Wresinski, into the ESC. Thus, for the first time, an associative actor involved in the fight against poverty joined the assembly.

After the Commission of the European Communities, then the ESC, it was the turn of the French government to rally around with the commissioning of several reports, at the turn of the 1970s–1980s. The first of these, entrusted to Councillor of State Gabriel Oheix, was submitted in March 1981; the report, which identified a number of shortcomings in social protection safety nets, also put forward 'sixty proposals'.[29] The second, requested of France (and of each of the member states) by the Commission of the European Communities, was entrusted to an association, the Fondation pour la recherche sociale [The Social Research Foundation][30]; entitled 'Poverty and the fight against poverty' ['La pauvreté et la lutte contre la pauvreté'], it provided a descriptive rather than a prescriptive approach to public and private welfare. The election of the Socialist François Mitterrand as President and the shift of the political majority quickly buried these reports in favour of others of a more targeted nature – notably, from September 1981 that of the continuing/

further education specialist Bertrand Schwartz on youth professional and employment schemes.

A 'tidal wave of poverty'

The victory of the left coincided with a brutal exacerbation of economic woes, observed by the French charitable associations in the field. In the different Emmaüs communities (financially independent structures centred around employment through recycling activities), which provided lodgings and work for people facing serious social hardship,[31] this was felt just before the elections, in 1980: for the first time, the journeymen who left for the wine harvest were unable to find employment upon their return. The Catholic Relief, the principal Catholic charity organisation in France, having recorded a rise in numbers at reception centres just after the elections, in 1982, decided to publish an annual statistical report. Its communist homologue the Popular Relief (which since had become depoliticised) was also overwhelmed by a flood of demands:

> I think in some ways we were taken off guard…. The Popular Relief expanded suddenly, but why did it happen? Because people needed the Popular Relief. Not because there was a particular plan for us to expand, but because there was such great need that we had to help. We just had to! A lady walks in and says: 'I don't have nappies for my kid, I don't have anything to feed him'; and so we have to set up something for sourcing nappies and sourcing milk, we had to help. I think there was something pushing us, something that said: 'We can't just send people away with empty hands'. That was the basic idea, really. Impossible? We still had to try…. And then we had to make do; we had to find people, and find the cash.[32]

At a more local level, at the Foyer Notre-Dame des Sans-Abri (FNDSA) in Lyon (the principal emergency lodging structure in the county), the change was felt in 1984: some evenings more than 250 people were piled together, on folding beds and mattresses hastily laid in the corridors, and the homeless stayed longer and longer: from 12 nights on average in 1969, their stays increased to 17 in 1981, then 28 in 1987. Like in the Emmaüs communities, for lack of a better solution, people were staying longer and longer, where before there had been a greater turnover.

Under this quantitative increase in demand, a general impression of 'drowning' was felt by the associations: in 1984, the FNDSA described a 'flood of the homeless' of 'uprecedented proportions', while the Popular Relief spoke of a 'tidal wave of poverty'. Qualitatively speaking, however, it was also the very nature of poverty that had changed, resuscitating two recurring historic figures: the 'nouveau poor' and the homeless. A re-evaluation of

analyses and field responses was thus felt to be necessary: since this period (and still today), the principal poor are now the unemployed, single-parent families (a large majority of them women), young people excluded from a contracting job market, over-50s made redundant for economic reasons and who feed the expanding figures of long-term unemployment and people of immigrant origin (first and second generations). The poor was no longer made up of the non-working (the elderly, the handicapped, etc.), as in the previous period, but of the active heart of society.

A first decisive contribution by the government did not come until 1983, just before the neoliberal turning-point of 'austerity'. However, it only implied indirect involvement by the public authorities: in reality, plans for the 'fight against poverty and precarity' consisted in allocating large subsidies to the principal charity associations, dedicated to emergency aid (creating emergency centres, assistance for the unemployed without benefits, etc.).[33] This aid would be renewed annually throughout the 1980s. The associations were required to comply to predefined priority actions; however, they remained free to act as they wished on the ground – to the extent that ATD Fourth World, a strong critic of emergency policies that resolved none of the underlying issues, used them for a radically different objective: the local experimentation of a minimum guaranteed revenue.

This decision to delegate the issue to the associations, which seems improbable considering a century of history until then dominated by conflict and then compartmentalisation, was facilitated by the increasing proximity between association 'advocates' defending the 'cause of the poor' and 'elites of the Social State'.[34] This kind of multi-positioning was not new: in the nineteenth century, the well-to-do (*notables*) had been, in a secular sense, philanthropists (*hommes d'oeuvres*), through Christian charity, but also through networks of power, coopting and the gated élite.[35] However, now it touched the highest echelons of the Social State, with several high-ranking officials passing through a 'revolving door'[36] between public and private welfare. Thus, there is the case of François Bloch-Lainé, Treasurer (1947) and then Director of the investment arm of the French State, la Caisse des dépôts et consignations (1952–1967), who upon his retirement became President of the largest federation of health and social associations in France, UNIOPSS.[37] Or of René Lenoir, Director-General of Social Action at the Ministry of Public Health and Social Security (1970–1974), Minister of Social Affairs (1974–1978) but also administrator of an independent philanthropic network founded by the state in 1969, la Fondation de France (1971–1974) and a fervent defender of charity and volunteer associations, who on his retirement replaced François Bloch-Lainé as President of UNIOPSS (1992–1998). There is also Geneviève de Gaulle Anthonioz, niece of General de Gaulle (the latter was French President from 1958 to 1969) and daughter of a senior official: from 1959, she left the Ministry of Culture and dedicated herself to ATD Fourth World, which she chaired from 1964 to 1998.

The porosity between the associations and political circles created by the following generation was no longer diachronic, but synchronic. For example, Jean-Michel Belorgey, senior official, Socialist deputy from 1981 to 1993 and one of the most influential figures in the Assembly on the Revenu minimum d'insertion (RMI) law ('minimum income', cf. *infra*), was involved in parallel in a number of associative causes from the cause against homophobic and anti-immigrant discrimination to the fight against poverty; he chaired, in particular, the French National Housing Union for Young Workers [Union nationale des foyers de jeunes travailleurs] (1976–1981) and was member of the Central Committee for the Human Rights League. Belorgey subsequently chaired the French Social Action Fund for Immigrant Workers and their Families [Fonds d'action sociale pour les travailleurs immigrés et leurs familles] (1993–1996), then in the late 2000s joined the board of directors of ATD Fourth World.

The burgeoning of local emergency aid

The financial windfall from the 'poverty and precarity plans' that the associations began to receive in 1983–1984, together with a civil desire to respond to the social deprivation and to the significant media coverage of it, led to a triple expansion of the private sector: the growth of the most dynamic associations (Catholic Relief, Popular Relief, Emmaüs, etc.), a new breath of life for declining structures (Protestant Mutual Aid [Entraides protestantes], The Protestant Welfare Centre [Centre d'action sociale protestant], the Saint-Vincent-de-Paul Movement, etc.) and the creation of new organisations. In 1984, food banks based on the American model were also founded – by Catholic Relief, Emmaüs, the Federation of Protestant Mutual Aid and the Salvation Army. The following year, the famous comedian Coluche founded another food distribution association, the Restaurants du cœur [Restaurants of the Heart], which grew exponentially and quickly became a leading association, thanks to significant media attention and support from the world of showbiz. There was also a medical response to the emergency: the medical consultations provided at the Jobseeker's Centre in Paris led in 1985 to the birth of the association Remede, and in 1986, the humanitarian organisation Doctors of the World also opened a health centre in France for the most needy, followed by another large emergency humanitarian organisation, Doctors Without Borders, the following year. In terms of housing, a swath of new social rehabilitation and emergency homeless shelters opened in permanent or temporary centres (by re-appropriating abandoned hospital wings, empty offices, etc.).

Local councils also began setting up emergency aid response. In Lyon, for example, a series of initiatives were approved as early as 1981: the creation of a housing benefit fund, the negotiation of a partnership with the French energy company EDF to avoid electricity cuts in case of unpaid bills, the distribution of food vouchers valid in municipal canteens for unemployed under-25s, etc.

Faced with a fresh wave of economic and social deterioration, a second set of measures was implemented in 1986: the creation of a 'subsistence fund' for the most needy, the allocation of meal vouchers for the unemployed without benefits, logistical and financial support for State food distribution, increased aid for rent payment, the financing of transportation tickets for jobseekers, aid to prevent homelessness and for paying heating, gas, water and electricity bills.[38]

This period thus saw the mobilisation both of the public powers, who demonstrated a new and strong support for associations, and of private initiatives, which caught the public financial windfall while at the same time resorting massively to private donations and volunteering. While, during the two previous phases, these two worlds remained fairly autonomous, as much financially as practically, the increasingly porous nature of their relationships meant that they became more and more interdependent. In this sense, the field of social aid was simply conforming to a pre-existing model that had already been operational for the last few decades in the field of social health-care[39]: from this point on, the State made associations fighting against poverty, the official operators of its social policies.

An era of employment schemes and labour laws? (since 1988)

The palliative measures introduced in the early 1980s had officially been taken in response to the direness of the situation, but in expectation of more preventative, curative and/or universalising policies. The temporary 'break' in reforms imposed in 1983 and then the change in government majority in 1986 slowed their implementation. However, with the left once again in government, 1988 saw a return to these policies with the adoption of the RMI (or Minimum Income Support).

'Insertion', *the new public policy watchword*

The idea of a minimum revenue was not a new one: it already existed in Denmark (1933), in the United Kingdom (1948), in the Federal Republic of Germany (1961), in Holland (1963), in Belgium (1974) and in Ireland (1977). The measure was for the most part promoted by the Socialist left[40] and the associations – with once again at its head ATD Fourth World, notably via the Wresinski report for the French ESC ('Chronic Poverty and Lack of Basic Security', February 1987), which had a strong reception in France and abroad. More broadly, critical of a patronising approach to aid, the report called for the development of a true policy on labour law and employment.[41]

If, for more than a century, France had refused to lay down a 'general principle for the right to aid for all of those in need',[42] the RMI can be seen as a definitive turning point. The RMI established a kind of 'right to income',[43] non-depreciative and unlimited, intended to cover millions of unemployed

people who without it would have had no benefits at all. Legally abolishing the secular dichotomy between the 'good' and the 'bad' poor, it implicitly confirmed the democratic acknowledgement, recognised (anew) since the late nineteenth century,[44] that modern unemployment is overwhelmingly not a choice but a condition. Its success was instantaneous: in 1989, almost 400,000 people received the RMI, 600,000 in 1991, 800,000 in 1993, then almost a million in 1996. In 2008, the RMI was replaced by the Revenu de solidarité active (RSA), which in 2014 was allocated to 2.3 million beneficiaries. In 2015, a new reform[45] instated the Prime d'activité (a salary supplement for low-income workers) which in June 2017 saw 2.57 million households as beneficiaries.

The RMI also opened the door to a proliferation in basic allowances of laws and measures seeking to achieve universal rights. And the 1990s saw the passing of several major laws: the Besson law on the right to housing (1990), the decriminalisation of vagrancy and begging (1992, effective in the 1994 New Penal Code), the law against social exclusion (1998), the creation of Universal Health Coverage (1999, guaranteeing healthcare and reimbursement for anyone permanently settled in France not covered by an obligatory Health Insurance scheme), then of State Medical Aid (2000, healthcare reimbursement for illegal immigrants on French soil). One could add to this list a multitude of local and employment aid policies.

The 2000s were just as busy, with no less than ten reforms of the different basic allowances between 2000 and 2015, the 2002-2 law reform on social and healthcare aid, or the 2007 vote on the enforceable right to housing. The legislative perimeter was indeed extended considerably in correlation with an increase in public welfare expenditure. If the growth of this aid was significant, however, the percentage dedicated to the fight against social exclusion in proportion to GDP remained small: between 1981 and 2014, it rose from 0.1% to 0.8%, to which should be added housing benefits (from 0.5 to 0.8%)[46] and diverse other allocations (linked to health, for the elderly, etc.). If it is true that France has become, in the words of some critics, 'European champion' – or even world champion – in terms of the percentage of its GDP dedicated to accumulated social benefits (32.1% in 2016, compared to a EU 28 average of 27.5%), the percentage actually dedicated to the fight against social exclusion has only ever been between 1.8 and 2.6%, depending on the allocations taken into account.[47]

A public policy shaped and implemented by the associations

If the associations became massively involved in this new era of employment schemes, it is because they had in fact been the motors behind it since the 1980s. One could cite two examples of initiatives created in the heart of the Emmaüs communities. In 1983, Strasbourg city council founded 'Envie' (Entreprises nouvelles vers une insertion économique [New Companies towards Economic Integration]) with the aim of helping young people into work; the

project helps to place candidates in two-year salaried contracts at minimum wage for recycling companies. Based on a growing number of Scandinavian projects begun in 1979, and which had given encouraging results, it was part of the genesis of the so-called 'intermediary'[48] companies, which, in 1983, were awarded a specific status in France. Envie revolves around the collection of electronic devices in Emmaüs communities, but also at rubbish sites and sales points and via agreements with the household appliances retailer giant Darty. Around the same time, after the success of the project of the Belgian-based Emmaüs-Namur, which managed to employ 104 members of staff in the space of four years, Emmaüs-Artois created the 'Relais', based on the selective collection and salvage of clothes. The Relais, launched in 1985, is today the largest textile collection and reuse operation in France.

These initiatives, experimental in the 1980s, soon multiplied what with the proliferation of dedicated public policies and funding. This first came in the form of spin-offs; in 1999, there were already 27 Envie associations representing some 400 subsidised jobs and 730 Le Relais jobs. Several Emmaüs communities founded companies specialised in employment through waste sorting, recycling and reuse, and they were not the only ones. Some proved to be highly flexible; the Bocage Workshops (*Ateliers du Bocage*) founded in 1992 as an employment scheme by Emmaüs-Peupins (Deux-Sèvres in central-western France), started out providing assistance to the handicapped. Despite its beginnings with classic pallet reuse, its sorting and recycling activities were quickly reshaped into an innovative new market: ink cartridges (1997), computer hardware and mobile phones (2003), etc. In addition, the Catholic Relief created a network in 2004, 'Spinning for Solidarity' (*Tissons la Solidarité*), which has, in recent years, created some 1900 employment contracts, of which 83% were for women.

Indeed, the kind of employment scheme described above is flexible in terms of resources and can be adapted to a diverse population. The Moyembrie Farm, for example – founded in 1990 and since 2009 part of Emmaüs – works towards helping young prisoners ending their sentence enter the job market; an organic vegetable and goat farm, its products are delivered to a local vegetable box association.[49] Emmaüs-Défi, founded in 2008 following the highly publicised creation of the Parisian homeless camp by the association Enfants de Don Quichotte, aimed to help the homeless and the long-term unemployed; in particular, the association invented 'per hour' contracts as an income supplement for homeless people, who often had difficulty finding contracts of more than 15 hours. Even today, employment schemes are often developed on an ad-hoc basis in the vast domain of the social economy.

The schemes set up by the associations were not just oriented towards employment: they also targeted access to rights, sports, culture and recreational activities; health and hygiene; adult literacy and after-school support, etc. From the 1980s, the fight against inadequate housing also saw renewed action, notably with the foundation of Lyon Housing and Humanism in 1985 by Bernard Devert, a housing professional who became a priest, or at the

national level, of the Foundation abbé Pierre for the housing of the Under-privileged in late 1987. The aim was to act, either independently or together, on the causes of poverty and precarity and to allow people to enter into an upwards spiral of occupational and social integration.

'A social emergency': the rise of public service delivery

An increase in associative action did not, however, imply a decrease in palliative action. On the contrary, food and clothing distribution, still the most popular choice at a local level,[50] saw exponential figures: at the Popular Relief, 15 million meals were distributed in 1990, 90 million in 1995 and 139 million in 2005; at the Restaurants du cœur, 25 million in 1988–1989, 103 million in 2008–2009 and 136 million in 2016–2017.[51]

Aid for the homeless is another example of this consolidation of emergency aid, almost always developed by associations and then commissioned as a public service. 'In reality, there was nothing in [this] public policy that wasn't initiated, invented or at least approved by associations… Public policy basically involves translating initiatives put in place by associations into regulatory measures'.[52] The (free) 'hotline' for the homeless, for example, was created by a group of Parisian associations, including Emmaüs, who joined forces in the winter of 1986–1987 to collectively keep tabs at all times on the number and location of available beds[53]; extended little by little to the rest of the region, it was simplified in September 1997 and became the national emergency number '115'.

Another example can be found in the municipal emergency service Paris Samusocial, founded in 1993 by Doctor Xavier Emmanuelli, and based on his experience with Doctors Without Borders and with the emergency ambulance services. Based on the double principle of immediate and unconditional aid for the homeless, the Samusocial was given institutional form in 1998 by the law against social exclusion. In 1993, the Paris Samusocial founded a parallel service with the very first 'emergency housing and healthcare centre', which became in 2006 the 'healthcare and nursing beds' public service. One could also cite the day shelters for the homeless, developed by a number of associations in the mid-1980s, which spread considerably in the 1990s and were institutionalised by the 1998 law: providing necessary services to the homeless (health and hygiene, help finding work, administrative and housing assistance, etc.), they were another strong success – the Association Emmaüs, which managed five centres in 2006 and 11 in 2014, saw 41,000 people walk through its doors in 1997, 145,000 in 2000 and 300,000 in 2007.

One could cite any number of examples in the field of emergency social aid that, taken together, demonstrate an impressive inflation in initiatives mutually constructed by public and private welfare – or to be precise, most often invented by private welfare, supported and extended by public welfare, to then be run by private welfare. The capacity to adapt to changing needs has even become a defining criteria for obtaining subsidies; in Lyon,

for example, the FNDSA was asked in 2012 by the President of the Rhône Regional Council to demonstrate their 'imaginativeness' in order to ensure renewed funding the following year.[54]

The mutual construction of social rights

Built out of numerous exchanges, the relationship between associations and the public authorities has not been without conflict – indeed, the 'tribunician role' of the associations even seems to have intensified since the 1990s. These were the actions on behalf of undocumented immigrants and the homeless led by Droit au logement (DAL, Housing Rights) and by abbé Pierre between 1990 and 1994[55]; the gains made for emergency housing rights in 2007 after actions led by the Enfants de Don Quichotte[56]; the 'Night of solidarity for lodging' in 2008, 2009 and 2015 organised in Paris by a collective of associations; and actions in response to the inhuman treatment of migrants camping near Calais in the hopes of reaching England – to cite just a few examples.

These same associations, violent detractors of public policies on radio talk shows and social networks, orchestrating vast collective actions, attribute just as much importance to securing their place in the higher reaches of institutional boardrooms, a complementary role that allows them to weigh in on legislation. The associations have not only become essential operators of social policy but also mainstay figures through the weight of their reports and their ability to mobilise media attention. Present in the French Economic, Social and Environment Council,[57] they can also be found, since the 1990s, in the National Council for Policies to Fight Poverty and Social Exclusion,[58] at the National Observatory of Poverty and Social Exclusion,[59] the High Committee on Housing for the Disadvantaged,[60] the National Consultative Commission on Human Rights[61] and in ministerial and parliamentary expert consultation committees. Today, the legitimacy of these associations' expertise is taken as a given[62]; indeed, the annual reports of the Catholic Relief since 1983 or of the Fondation abbé Pierre since 1996 have become veritable barometers and are based on the work of hired specialists (sociologists, statisticians, etc.).

Thus, not a single significant law touching on social aid issues has been voted since the 1990s without consultation from the principal associations and federations. What is more, these laws are by now often elaborated *at the instigation* of associations. It is again ATD Fourth World that has marked itself out with its precocious and efficient political lobbying. Following some more minor legislative victories in the 1970s, it had a hand in the establishment of the RMI and became, after a long struggle throughout the 1990s, the principal instigator of the law determining the fight against social exclusion (1998).[63] ATD Fourth World was also responsible for instigating the law on the enforceable right to housing (2007), thanks to its President Paul Bouchet (1998–2002),[64] a lawyer, Councillor of State and president of the National Consultative Commission on Human Rights (1989–1996). The association

campaigned for the legal recognition of social vulnerability as the 21st criterion of discrimination (2016) and can also be found at the initiative of the long-term project 'County of Zero Long-Term Unemployment',[65] which is currently being piloted (since 2016) in six French local councils of varying profiles. The latter project involves transferring basic unemployment benefits to an employing company to provide a job and a stable contract for the unemployed, while at the same time responding to unmet needs in the local area. Indeed, ATD Fourth World is far from a uniquely national organisation; the success of the association is also clear at an international level, with its participation in the founding of the World Day for Overcoming Poverty with the UN in 1992.

The rise of the public–private 'intermediary'

If the associations succeeded in gaining recognition as legitimate intermediaries and in weighing in on the public debate, it is also thanks to an increasing number of 'middlemen' between the associative sector and the higher echelons of political or civil service.

As we saw earlier, for ATD Fourth World, this was the case for the important presidencies of Geneviève Anthonioz de Gaulle and then Paul Bouchet. The current president of the Catholic Relief-Caritas France is Véronique Fayet: first, a member of ATD Fourth World, she has also built a political career in parallel working for the City of Bordeaux and the greater region as well as the Aquitaine Regional Council.[66] Between 2002 and 2007, the president of Emmaüs France was Martin Hirsch, a well-known French political figure: in between his positions as Councillor of State, Managing Director of the French Food Health and Safety Agency (1999–2005) and Managing Director of the French public health institution Assistance publique-Hôpitaux de Paris (since 2013), he has had various political posts (director in 1997 of Bernard Kouchner's cabinet for the State Secretary for Health and Social Action, High Commissioner of Active Solidarity against Poverty from 2007 to 2010, president of the National Agency for Civic Service from 2010 to 2013) and also became the founder, in 2006, of the New Agency of Active Solidarity, which helps implement local initiatives to fight poverty in partnership with local councils and companies. The powerful Federation of Actors of Solidarity (ex-FNARS) is presided by Louis Gallois: as a senior official, in the 1980s, he held various ministerial offices, then in the 1990s–2000s was president of different public enterprises (Aérospatiale, the national SNCF rail company, EADS, Airbus) and he also became the president of the 'County of Zero Long-Term Unemployment' Experimental Fund in 2016.

Several humanitarian figures have also gone in the opposite direction, holding ministerial offices. This is the case for Claude Malhuret, president of Doctors Without Borders (1978–1986), then Secretary of State for Human Rights (1986–1988). Similarly, Bernard Kouchner, cofounder of Doctors Without Borders (1971) and Doctors of the World (1981), was present in

almost every single Socialist government between 1988 and 2002 (notably several times Secretary of State for Humanitarian Action, then Minister of Health in 1992 and in 2001–2002), then Minister of Foreign Affairs between 2007 and 2010. Dr Xavier Emmanuelli, mentioned above, recruited early to the emergency ambulance service, was cofounder of Doctors Without Borders and then founded the Samusocial in 1993, followed by Samusocial International (1998); close to the City of Paris and then to President Jacques Chirac, he became Secretary of State for Emergency Humanitarian Action (1995–1997), president of the High Committee on Housing for the Disadvantaged (1997–2015) and member of the National Consultative Commission on Human Rights (since 2015).[67]

If the move to limit the growth of palliative aid was in some ways motivated by good intentions (it does not resolve underlying issues), there were also bad ones (curb excessive spending on the poor, for political or even populist reasons). Contrary to expectations, and to what appears to have happened in other Western countries (such as the United Kingdom or the United States), budget cuts and the negative press given to 'handouts' have not actually implied a reduction in the perimeter of social aid in France both public and private. On the contrary, the desire both to provide assistance for those in need and to improve labour laws has remained strong, and in an increasingly moribund social and economic context (indeed, severely deteriorated by the big 2008 financial crisis) public spending and associative reports have seen new growth as well as curative and palliative aid.

Conclusion

We know that in Germany a complementary relationship between public and private welfare was set up in the interwar period, based on the subsidiarity principle, and that it has since reached a certain level of complexity.[68] In the United States, 'mass philanthropy'[69] has been practiced for the last two centuries. The French case is yet a different model; the centralising State has remained strong; however, in the long term this has not prevented a close-knit relationship from forming with private initiatives nor has it limited their importance.

After a first formative phase (1880s–1910s), a certain complementarity was achieved, although private welfare still remained weakly connected to funding and political decision-making (1945–1960s). In contrast, the years of social and economic hardship that began in the mid-1970s saw the forging of important subsidisation and contractual relationships and even of public service delivery by associations, a situation that has turned out to be in the interests of both parties. For the public authorities, it is a solution that allows them to keep a hand in and keep tabs on the initiatives they fund, while at the same time being implemented at little cost by associations familiar with the terrain. To private initiatives, the solution represents access to subsidies and

the upper political echelons, at the cost of sometimes losing a certain amount of freedom of action and expression.

A different relationship between French public and private welfare can be observed in each of the three phases. In the first phase, spurred by the Great Depression of the 1870s–1890s and the establishment of the Republican State, private action was the driving force behind welfare initiatives, which then found itself competing with local public initiatives, then national ones, without however being completely excluded. In the second, with fresh challenges immediately after the war, and when it was still believed that social security protection would eventually do away with the need for insurance measures, a new generation of associations appeared, filling the numerous gaps in a public aid system under increasing financial pressure. In the final phase, the associations, still innovative and increasingly outspoken, constantly pushed the public authorities into action; the latter responded with an unprecedented increase in measures and basic allowances of different kinds (often instigated by the associations themselves) and by an equally unprecedented degree of subsidisation and contracting.

Thus, in this timeline of a 'mixed economy of welfare', far from being a case of 'communicating vessels' where a loss on one side equals a gain on the other, both parties saw an expansion of their perimeter of action in each phase. For at least the last three decades, however, there has been an increase in *aid* protection, incurring a loss both for social security protection (as studies have shown for France[70] and Belgium[71]) and for the fight against inequality[72] – and here indeed is where the 'communicating vessels' metaphor seems more appropriate. This is a key factor in understanding why social aid, despite its continuous growth, is not capable alone of ending poverty: if nothing is done to lower job insecurity, unemployment and inequality, social aid will only ever be a quick fix solution.

Notes

1 J. Juéry, *L'Assistance aux Vieillards, Infirmes et Incurables et la Loi du 14 Juillet 1905* (Paris, 1906).
2 See, among many others, M.B. Katz, *The Undeserving Poor. From the war on poverty to the war on welfare* (New York, 1989); M.B. Katz, *In the Shadow of the Poorhouse. A social history of welfare in America* (New York, 1989); O. Zunz, *Philanthropy in America. A history,* (Princeton, NJ, 2012); A. Kessler-Harris, and M. Vaudagna (eds), *Democracy and the Welfare State: The two wests in the age of Austerity* (New York, 2017).
3 S.B. Kamerman, 'The new mixed economy of welfare: Public and private', *Social Work*, 28, 1 (1983), 5–10; B. Harris, and P. Bridgen, 'The mixed economy of welfare and the historiography of welfare provision', in B. Harris, and P. Bridgen (eds), *Charity and Mutual Aid in Europe and North America since 1800* (New York and London, 2007), 1–18.
4 N. Duvoux, 'Introduction' to the special issue on 'Philanthropies et prestige d'État en France, XIXe-XXe siècle', *Genèses. Sciences Sociales et Histoire*, 109 (2017), 3–8, 4.

5 G. Lavau, *À Quoi Sert le Parti Communiste Français?* (Paris, 1981).

6 A. Brodiez–Dolino, *Emmaüs and the Abbé Pierre. An alternative model of enterprise, charity and society* (Paris, 2013) and '1954. Toward a new humanitarism', in P. Boucheron (ed), *France in the World: A new global history* (New York, 2019).

7 On this point, see A. Brodiez–Dolino, 'La sécularisation des valeurs de l'action sociale: du principe de charité au principe de solidarité', *Informations Sociales*, 196–197 (2018), 28–36. As much in response to liberalism as to socialism, solidarism is a philosophical and political doctrine theorised in 1896 by Léon Bourgeois, which highlights the interdependency between different members of a social body; it is at the heart of early welfare in France (see M.C. Blais, *La Solidarité. Histoire d'une idée* (Paris, 2007)).

8 See, for example, G. Finlayson, 'A moving frontier: Voluntarism and the state in British social welfare, 1911–1949', *Twentieth Century British History*, 2, 1 (1990), 183–206; P. Thane, 'The Ben Pimlott memorial lecture 2011. The "big society" and the "big state": Creative tension or crowding out?', *Twentieth Century British History,* 23, 3–1 (2012), 408–429; A. Rasmussen, 'Protéger la société de la guerre: De l'assistance aux droits sur la nation', *Revue d'Histoire de la Protection Sociale*, 9 (2016), 9–24; C.-A. Wanecq, 'Sauver, protéger et soigner. Une histoire des secours d'urgence en France (années 1920-années 1980)' (D.Phil., Paris, 2018); M. Chauvière, *Enfance Inadaptée. L'héritage de Vichy* (Paris, 2009).

9 Secours catholique (Caritas-France), Petits frères des Pauvres, UNIOPSS, Emmaüs, ATD Quart Monde, etc.

10 Between the 1950s and 1980s, the number of people receiving social security benefits decreased only slowly (medical aid in hospitals and at home) or even continued to increase (aid for the handicapped or the elderly), while in 1953–1954, the role of local councils in social aid reform was strengthened.

11 Most recent available figures. Source: French National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE).

12 Study under press, due 2020.

13 Unpublished professorial thesis.

14 J. Fourastié, *Les Trente Glorieuses, ou la Révolution Invisible de 1946 à 1975* (Paris, 1979).

15 R. Pawin, 'Retour sur les "Trente Glorieuses" et la périodisation du second XXᵉ siècle', *Revue d'Histoire Moderne & Contemporaine*, 60, 1 (2013), 155–175.

16 There is an abundant political science literature on this 'public issue'.

17 This expression was coined as a counterpoint by N. Baverez, *Les Trente Piteuses* (Paris, 1998).

18 International Centre Joseph-Wresinski, *ATD fourth world archives*, 1974 National Report, Chapter on 'The Movement's International Activities' ['La dynamique internationale du Mouvement'].

19 D. Zarefsky, *President Johnson's War on Poverty: Rhetoric and history* (Birmingham, 1986); Katz, *The Undeserving Poor, op. cit.*; E. Berkowitz, *America's Welfare State: From Roosevelt to Reagan* (Baltimore, MD, 1991); B. Coll, *Safety Net: Welfare and social security 1929–1979* (New Brunswick, NJ, 1995); R. Huret, *The Experts' War on Poverty. Social research and the welfare agenda in post-war America* (Ithaca, NY, 2018).

20 J. Klanfer, *L'Exclusion Sociale. Étude de la marginalité dans les sociétés occidentales* (Paris, 1965); J. Labbens, *op. cit.*

21 Semaines sociales de France, *Les Pauvres dans les Sociétés Riches* (1970).

22 R. Lenoir, *Les Exclus. Un Français sur dix* (Paris, 1974).

23 L. Stoléru, *Vaincre la Pauvreté dans les Pays Riches* (Paris, 1974).

24 D. Zamora Vargas, *De l'Égalité à la Pauvreté. Une socio-histoire de l'assistance en Belgique (1895–2015)* (Bruxelles, 2017).

25 The first was published by the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE), and indeed at the instigation and with the cooperation of ATD Fourth World: M. Debonneuil, 'Les familles pauvres d'une ville moyenne', *Économie et Statistique*, 105 (1978).

26 Founded in 1946, but a successor of the National Economic Council founded in 1925, this constitutional assembly was made up of social representatives: employers, unions, and associations.

27 H. Péquignot, 'La lutte contre la pauvreté', Report by the Social and Economical Council (20 September 1978).

28 Professor of medecine at the Université de Paris, Henri Péquignot is considered to be 'the authority in gerontology' and is the author of a number of works on hospital organisation; particularly interested in medical statistics, he notably contributed to the development of the Credoc medical team (Centre de Recherche pour l'Étude et l'Observation des Conditions de Vie, a prestigious French research and pedagogical institution).

29 G. Oheix, 'Contre la pauvreté et la précarité. 60 propositions', Report by the Ministry of Health and Social Security (1981).

30 Association founded in 1965 by associative figures close to social Catholicism, which carried out studies and provided counselling for State services, local councils, and associative networks (sociological studies, evaluations of public action, etc.). Its principal domains of expertise, since the beginning, have been urban policy, the family, and poverty.

31 Emmaüs, which today is present in 37 countries, has been based in the United Kingdom since the mid-1980s. See https://emmaus.org.uk/, accessed 27 October 2021.

32 Interview with Patricia Le Corvic, Federal Secretary of the Marne SPF Federation, August 2003.

33 N. Mariller, 'Le plan gouvernemental français contre la pauvreté et la précarité', in A. Fracassi, M.F. Marques, and J. Walter (eds), *La Pauvreté. Une approche plurielle* (Paris, 1985), 88–103.

34 F. Viguier, 'La Cause des Pauvres: mobilisations humanitaires et transformations de l'État social en France (1945–2010)' (D.Phil, Paris, 2010).

35 See, for example, M. Brejon de Lavergnée, *La Société Saint-Vincent-de-Paul au XIXe siècle* (Paris, 2008); N. Mitsushima, 'Élites "Reconnues d'Utilité Publique"', Philanthropie réformatrice et revendications capacitaires autour de la réforme pénale (1815–1851), (D.Phil, Paris, 2014) and 'Aménager, subvertir et contester l'ordre électoral. Philanthropie et politique sous la Restauration (1819–1830)', *Genèses. Sciences Sociales et Histoire*, 109, 4 (2017), 32–56.

36 Viguier, *op. cit.*, 204.

37 The National Interfederal Union of Private Health and Social Initiatives [Union nationale interfédérale des œuvres privées sanitaires et sociales], founded in 1947.

38 Lyon City Archives, *Lyon City Council Archives*, 1921 W 003, minutes of the Social Affairs Commission.

39 R. Lafore, 'Le rôle des associations dans la mise en œuvre des politiques d'action sociale', *Informations Sociales*, 162, 6 (2010), 68.

40 J.-M. Belorgey, *La Gauche et les Pauvres* (Paris, 1988).

41 J. Wresinski, 'Grande pauvreté et précarité économique et sociale', Report by the Social and Economical Council (*Journal Officiel de la République Française*, 28 February 1987).

42 Juéry, *op. cit.*, 6–7.

43 B. Fragonard, 'Préface', in M. Lelièvre, and E. Nauze-Fichet (eds), *RMI, l'état des lieux (1988–2008)* (Paris, 2008), 9.

44 C. Topalov, *Naissance du Chômeur, 1880–1910* (Paris, 1994).

45 Fusion between the 'activity' side of the RSA and another, similar measure, the Prime pour l'emploi (employment bonus).

46 Direction de la recherche, des études, de l'évaluation et des statistiques (DREES), 'Les prestations sociales de 1981 à 2014: Trois décennies de maîtrise des dépenses de santé et de vieillesse', *Études et Résultats*, 949 (2016).

47 DREES, *La Protection Sociale en France et en Europe. Les chiffres clés* (Paris, 2016).

48 That is, companies principally involved in employment schemes tied to construction, catering, green area construction, etc.

49 The 'Amap', or community-supported agriculture associations, are groups of farmers who sell their products to consumers through local food networks.

50 See, for example, J.-N. Retière, and J.-P. Le Crom, *Une Solidarité en Miettes. Socio-histoire de l'aide alimentaire des années 1930 à nos jours* (Rennes, 2018).

51 Source: activity reports for the two associations.

52 P. Noblet, *Pourquoi les SDF Restent dans la Rue* (La Tour d'Aigues, 2010), 50.

53 Emmaüs-Solidarité Paris Headquarters, *Emmaüs-Solidarité Archives*, 31/03/1987 board meeting.

54 Foyer Notre-Dame des Sans-Abri Lyon Headquarters, *Foyer Notre-Dame des Sans-Abri Archives*, 4 September 2012 board meeting.

55 C. Péchu, *Droit au Logement. Genèse et sociologie d'une mobilisation* (Paris, 2006).

56 D. Cefaï et É. Gardella, *L'Urgence Sociale en Action. Ethnographie du Samusocial de Paris* (Paris, 2011); É. Gardella, 'L'Urgence Sociale comme Chronopolitique. Temporalités et justice sociale de l'assistance aux personnes sans-abri en France depuis les années 1980' (D.Phil, Cachan, 2014).

57 Former *Conseil économique et social* (Economical and Social Council).

58 The *Conseil national des politiques de lutte contre la pauvreté et l'exclusion sociale*, founded in 1988 in concert with the law establishing the RMI.

59 The *Observatoire national de la pauvreté et de l'exclusion sociale*, founded in 1998 with the law against social exclusion.

60 The *Haut comité pour le logement des défavorisés*, founded at the request of abbé Pierre.

61 The *Commission nationale consultative des droits de l'Homme*, founded in 1984 to consult the government on Human Rights issues in the world and in France.

62 Y. Lochard, and M. Simonet-Cusset (eds) *L'Expert Associatif, le Savant et le Politique* (Paris, 2003).

63 F. Néau-Dufour, *Geneviève de Gaulle-Anthonioz. L'autre de Gaulle* (Paris, 2005).

64 P.-É. Weill, *Sans Toit ni Loi? Genèse et conditions de mise en œuvre de la loi DALO* (Rennes, 2017).

65 Launched in 1995 by Patrick Valentin (an associative figure in the field of handicap and long-term unemployment issues), the first pilot in cooperation with the mayor of the small local council of Seiches-sur-le-Loir (Loire region) demonstrated that 'there are more potential jobs than people in long-term unemployment', and that anyone could be employable 'as long as the work is adapted to the person and the situation is reversed' (Interview with Patrick Valentin, *Revue Quart Monde*, 161 (1997)). In the 1990s, P. Valentin approached ATD Fourth World, which decided to give his project the necessary support to expand it to other local councils and indeed demonstrated in 2013 that the macro-economic cost of long-term unemployment for a single person (around €15,000 per year) was enough to create a full-time job for them at minimum wage.

66 Alongside Jacques Chaban-Delmas and then Alain Juppé (Republican right). She was also part of the national executive bureau of the Modem party (centre-right).

67 Cefaï and Gardella, *op. cit.*

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69 Zunz, *op. cit.*

70 Duvoux, *op. cit.*

71 Zamora Vargas, *op. cit.*

72 T. Piketty, *Capital in the Twenty-first Century* (Paris, 2014).

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4 Social movement and economic statistics in interwar Poland

Building an alternative expert knowledge on the condition of the working class

Morgane Labbé

Introduction

As early as 1918, the new Central European states that emerged at the end of the First World War set up ambitious social protection systems in order to meet the considerable expectations and needs of populations who had been left impoverished by their recent experiences. They also had to provide the Allies and international organizations with evidence that 'social peace' in Eastern Europe would stabilize the disputed territories within reach of Soviet Russia. These new states, at the margins of the Western economies and their scientific centres, also intended to demonstrate their ability to develop a statistical information system that would guide the recovery of their devastated economies. As part of this call for modernity, socially committed academics and intellectuals were invited to work in new government institutes, conducting surveys and studies.[1] All of these changes were to be found in Poland, which in 1918 established a Ministry of Social Protection, a Statistical Office, and various research institutes. However, in a context marked by a lack of improvement in living conditions, unstable governments, and repeated currency crises, social protests and demands continued and even became more widespread. Yet, these social movements, which in the early 1920s shook the whole of Central Europe, gave rise in Poland to valuable surveys and social studies, on the initiative of activist associations that were independent of the state.

This chapter focuses on the interactions between the Central Statistical Office of the Polish state (*Główny Urząd Statystyczny*, GUS) and one of these activist organizations, the Institute of Social Economics (*Instytut Gospodarstwa Społecznego*, IGS), which became an important organization with the capacity to cooperate and compete with public actors in statistics (and the Statistical Office in particular). The IGS included members of educated elites – sociologists, economists, and statisticians – of a socialist political leaning, and in some cases even Marxist, all of whom, by the end of the war, had experienced the harshness of political reality under the occupying regimes as well

as the hardships of war, repression, and exile. The activism of the IGS and its founders was deeply rooted in the history of the Polish territories attached to Tsarist Russia. It dated back to the period of liberalization following the 1905 Revolution, which had led to the rise of social–reformist associations, including the Society for the Social Work (*Towarzystwo Pracy Społecznej*), from which the IGS emerged after the war. Under this Russian regime and then that of the German occupation, the association was consolidated and professionalized with a view to compensating for the absence of a social protection policy, and in this way, it anticipated the institutions of the new state. It then managed to coexist with them and even compete with them.

Within this long historical context, this chapter deals with the relations between the IGS and the GUS, which were marked by both cooperation and competition, and centred around the implementation of social surveys and the calculation of social indices. First, it looks back at the successive transformations of the Society for the Social Work under the different political regimes that existed prior to the creation of an independent Poland, leading up to its re-establishment as the IGS. The strength of the new institute became apparent in the immediate post-war period, when, in the context of the inflationary crisis and a sharp fall in living standards, it pre-empted the GUS in producing studies that quantified this decline, calculated on the basis of wage demands. The chapter goes on to describe how the IGS, building on this earlier success, was recognized by the International Labour Organization (ILO) when it came to address the challenge of measuring wage variation and the cost-of-living index, which had been a cause of unrest in many other countries. The IGS was then invited to cooperate with the GUS on the project of a major national survey of the budgets of workers' families, which would make it possible to calculate the official cost-of-living index. From that survey, however, the two institutions drew different proposals and values with regard to this new index. Nonetheless, at the end of these ten years of close rivalry, they had constructed a specialized field of economic statistics, relating to wages, prices, and living conditions, on which the new economic theories and policies of regulation would be based.[2]

Social surveys and associations in Poland in the imperial period

In the second half of the nineteenth century, in the territory of the former Poland divided between the Prussian, Austrian, and Russian states, members of reformist, Catholic, or socialist movements, often drawn from the small pool of local intelligentsia, initiated investigations into the living conditions of workers employed in the factories of the nascent industry or the large agrarian farms. The authors of these studies used the model of Le Play's family monographs or of the surveys conducted by the famous German society, the *Verein für Socialpolitik*, as a basis for their observations.[3] In the absence of official Polish institutions, these works, which are often described as

precursors of empirical sociology, were carried out in various settings on the initiative of Catholic circles, philanthropic associations, and learned societies. Some of these associations continued to operate and had a legacy in the public and private institutions of the new Polish state after 1918. This was the case for the Society for the Social Work.

The Society was founded in 1907 in Warsaw, then located in the Kingdom of Poland, a territory annexed by Russia. It benefited from the context of political liberalization ushered in by the 1905 Revolution, with the legalization of associations in 1906. It was in this reforming spirit that the Society's founders set themselves the mission of promoting and supporting 'social work'. In 1910, the new Society established a 'Board of Social Work' (*Biuro Pracy Społecznej*), which was the active organ of the Society, devoted to conducting studies on social and economic issues. Its activities were still constrained by the legal, administrative, and political framework of imperial Russia. Nevertheless, its projects bore witness to its ambition as an institution, which gave it a pivotal role in lobbying the tsarist administration with ideas of social reform.

The aim of the founders of the Board of Social Work was to provide documentation on social and national causes in the life of the Kingdom, causes that would then be defended by Polish deputies in the new Russian assembly, the Duma. As well as proposals for greater cultural and linguistic autonomy, others concerned working conditions, and thereby echoed the demands made by the demonstrations and strikes of 1905 and 1906, which broke out in Poland as in the rest of Russia.[4] To this end, the surveys undertaken by the Board of Social Work reported on public health, women's work, accident insurance, and so on. The Bureau had a statistical division, but a lack of resources prevented it from conducting its own surveys, and most of its data came from external sources.

Ten years later, the First World War overturned the political order in which Poles, having been excluded from public spaces, had built their own institutions. However, the war on the Eastern Front was particularly destructive, leaving territories and economies devastated, with poverty and epidemics on the rise.[5] In the first months, Citizens' Civic Committees were set up in the main towns to manage and coordinate the relief effort. In Russian Poland, in particular, these voluntary institutions continued, on a larger scale, the activities through which charitable and philanthropic organizations had formerly compensated for the imperial government's lack of interest in social policy.[6]

Like other civil society organizations, the Board of Social Work strengthened and expanded its activities during the years of war and occupation. It developed substantially from 1916 onwards under the German administration, adopting an ambitious organizational structure divided into sections devoted to legal questions, economics, education, and so on and then further subdivided into some 30 commissions.[7] This rapid expansion was due to the deterioration of living standards and working conditions under the occupation regime; workers were badly hit by inflation, falling wages, and rising

unemployment. The Board of Social Work was all the more sensitive to this situation as many of those who had joined it since that time came from socialist circles. Their investigations then ran in parallel to strikes and demonstrations. The agenda of the Board of Social Work covered every aspect of the social question – labour regulations, social insurance, women's work, and so on – and a 'Commission on workers' questions' was created. The goal of gathering information remained a priority, and the collection of data of all kinds – legal, economic, and statistical – fed into studies whose results were disseminated, for lack of other means, in small brochures. Nonetheless, these publications did, however, lead to proposals for the reform of public institutions.

By the end of the war, the activity of the Board of Social Work had reached its peak, but in 1918 it was weakened by the fact that the Polish state gained its independence. A Ministry of Social Welfare was established, which offered official positions to several of the Bureau's members. The same movement from the private to the public sphere took place in the field of social studies and statistical expertise following the establishment of the GUS. The opening of positions in the administration of the Kingdom became, for Polish patriotic elites, an opportunity to enter the workings of a new Polish state, ready to be built and appropriated from within. They also hoped to establish a system of social protection, as charities and philanthropic associations were no longer able to meet the needs of the civilian population.

In this new situation, it seemed likely that public institutions would assimilate this world of reforming associations. Yet, this turned out not to be the case. The Board of Social Work was disbanded and reborn under a new name, but in the new political context it was divided by the simmering tensions between members of the two political currents who claimed to speak for the cause of the Polish 'people' – socialists and supporters of National Democracy, respectively. In 1920, the socialist branch joined the Society of Polish Economists and Statisticians,[8] where it formed an autonomous section under the name of the Institute of Social Economics, which became an independent institute in 1926. The new institute continued to pursue the social and political project of the Board of Social Work, with the involvement of several of its former members. It also fulfilled one of the Bureau's wishes: to conduct its own social and statistical surveys. However, this new mission could not be taken for granted, since in the new Polish state, the IGS found itself in competition with public institutions and especially the GUS.

The rivalry between the Central Statistical Office and the Institute of Social Economics in measuring workers' cost of living

The mission of the IGS was to 'to develop activities to support the social economy in Poland on a scientific basis'.[9] In this vast field of economic and social issues, the condition of workers remained the central theme of the IGS's

investigations, as shown by the publication of a collection entitled 'Workers' Issues'. This commitment to the cause of workers is at first sight surprising in a country where the peasantry was more abundant. It was, however, characteristic of the socialist, and in some cases Marxist, intellectuals and activists attached to the IGS, who prioritized workers and the urban working classes when addressing the 'modernization' of Poland, which Polish elites saw as the major challenge facing the new state.

The major theme that preoccupied the IGS in the early 1920s was the continuing decline in workers' living standards as a result of the inflationary pressures caused by the world economic crisis of 1920–1921, which was exacerbated in Poland by the expense of the war with Soviet Russia.[10] Not only was the new Polish state faced with the challenge of rebuilding a devastated country and a ruined economy, but, as in most Eastern European countries, its own currency crisis was more severe and more lasting than in Western Europe. This crisis was followed by a phase of hyperinflation, which led to a further drastic and tragic fall in living standards.[11] It was only in 1924 that Poland emerged from these crises with a thorough reform of its monetary and fiscal system. This reform immediately brought about wage stabilization.[12]

The IGS's earliest studies were carried out in this economic and social context. Throughout the world, the monetary crises of the immediate post-war period took a large, direct toll on the growth and generalization of wage-labour that had been under way in the capitalist economies, as part of a transformation of the world of work.[13] Inflation lowered the monetary value of wages and tragically reduced the lowest incomes, those of manual workers. Since the end of the nineteenth century, this extremely close dependence of the standard of living of families on the vicissitudes of currency values had been the source of conflicts which alarmed both industrialists and rulers. From the end of the war, in all countries, the effect of price rises in addition to the existing deprivation fuelled discontent and demonstrations, which threatened to destabilise a fragile domestic political situation.

In Eastern Europe, the leaders of the new Polish state were also worried because, in the newly united territories, echoes of the Bolshevik movements and promises of national prosperity were spreading among impoverished populations eager for a better world. As early as 1916, under the German occupation, demonstrations and strikes demanding wage increases had begun in Warsaw and Łódź, the two main cities and centres of Polish industry, as well as in the coal-mining areas of Silesia. The end of the war and of the German occupation brought about a short period of respite. In 1919, owing to the rise in inflation, workers resumed their strikes in pursuit of wage increases, this time directing their demands to the new Polish government. The government gave in to some of their demands, but not all, owing to the high level of inflation and the reluctance of industrialists. The same pattern repeated over the following years, with high inflation continuing to worsen employees' living conditions, and strikes, which were now coordinated by

the unions, became more frequent. The government's compensatory measures were insufficient to dispel from public opinion the impression that the government was incapable of containing inflation, and was guilty of passing fiscal measures deemed to be unfair, on the grounds that they only served the interests of industrialists.

While the protests continued and spread in reaction to the Polish government's erratic response to inflation, a new economic and statistical expertise was developed that transformed the terms of the demands and negotiations. It provided both a scientific framework for economic policy and a language that codified inflation as a global monetary phenomenon. On this basis, it was possible to derive standards that could regulate wage policy. No official institution held a monopoly over this expertise, as it was practised by public and private institutes alike: the GUS, municipal statistical offices, and once again, the IGS. The ILO was also closely involved in this work. In view of the political importance of the monetary crisis and its social consequences for the economic recovery of Europe, the ILO had a decisive influence on the standardization of economic and statistical data.

At different times, these organizations acted either in parallel, in cooperation or in opposition; their relations gave rise to a particular dynamic between the public and private sectors, which can be reconstructed by observing the role of the IGS in this context. The creation of joint study commissions also favoured this dynamic.

The construction of an official cost–of–living index

In the long history of surveys and calculations of prices and wages, the immediate post-war period can be seen as a brief moment that, owing its political urgency, saw the emergence of a new way of empirically describing the economic instability caused by currency fluctuations. It was a matter of concern for old and new states alike, and one particular step indicated their recognition of the social and political impact of the inflationary crisis: the creation of commissions to study the cost of living. In Poland, in 1920, a 'Commission on the Cost of Living of family workers in industry and commerce' was set up by government decree.[14] Like the commissions in other countries,[15] the Polish commission, attached to the GUS, was official, but it was composed of stakeholders from different domains: in addition to the director of the statistical administration, it included representatives of several ministries, employers, and trade unions; outside experts were also sometimes involved in its work. Its mission was to calculate the cost-of-living index, which, when combined with the level of net wages, could be used to estimate their 'real' value or in other words 'purchasing power'. The validity of this new index would depend on its being regularly updated, so it was calculated every month and published together with reports on prices and wages by the GUS in the *Monthly Statistics Review*.

The Cost of Living Commission also had to specify the method used for calculating the index, a method which was supposedly simple and well known, but which, as will be seen, was actually widely debated, both in its principles and its implementation. The method adopted by the Commission consisted of finding the average of price increases in a series of items deemed to be representative of the 'budget' – that is, the needs – of a typical worker's family, consisting of four people: two adults and two children. The Commission established a list of some 30 items, of specified quantities, which was supposed to correspond to the family's daily consumption. The list began with food: 1.23 kg of rye bread per day, 1.15 kg of potatoes, then barley gruel, dried beans, meat, bacon, sugar, salt, and so on. In addition, the list included other items such as housing and fuel costs, water consumption and finally some minor expenses on leisure activities: one newspaper per day and two theatre tickets per month. The daily quantities of food were set according to the calories deemed necessary for subsistence, a physiological standard set by the biological and nutritional sciences. The use of these pre-established standards of workers' needs meant that this method was based on a so-called 'theoretical' budget. This was distinguished from a method of calculation based on real consumption, which would be supported by critics of the official index, notably by the IGS, as will be explained below.

Its data on prices, however, were gathered in situ, as municipal authorities were required to transmit these data to the GUS within a narrow time frame. Unlike its figures for consumption, which were based on physiological needs, the collection of retail prices confronted the Commission and the GUS with the *real* world and minute detail of shops and markets. Prices were firmly rooted in local practices, and so the newly created commissions in major cities took on direct responsibility for recording and calculating the indices. In this way, the authorities could demonstrate their traditional competence in municipal price policy. The Central Commission provided a framework for these practices. The government Ordinance had stipulated that 'with the permission of the Central Statistical Office's Committee, local committees can be established in certain larger cities, operating on the basis of an agreed–upon settlement'.[16] This provision was further elaborated by an ordinance in January 1921 requiring the mayors of major cities to follow the instructions of the GUS in producing their monthly price statements and to complete a pre-determined table.[17] The ordinance also required the municipal administration to set up its own commission by gathering representatives of trade unions, workers, industry, trade, and agriculture.

In the barely unified country of Poland in 1920, which was plagued by social unrest that threatened its internal and external political stability, the government therefore attempted to centralize and control information on prices and to promote joint resolutions through the use of commissions. In this, it followed practices in other states and, above all, the recommendations of the ILO.

From data to strikes

The GUS centralized municipal data, calculated indices, and published them monthly. However, the municipal scale remained the dominant one: the tables listed the indices of price increases for individual Polish cities, but did not give any index for Poland as a whole. Had the state failed in attaining a 'common language of prices'? The cost-of-living index had local or regional validity, but at the level of the whole Polish state it had less significance. In its commentary, the GUS acknowledged that the municipal commissions had used different methods of calculation and that, as a result, the raw figures for price increases were not comparable, only the relative changes. The price index was, as elsewhere, a black box maintained by delicate compromises.

It is also the practical usefulness of the index that explains why it remained a local index, for two reasons. On the one hand, the index was used to adjust wages in line with the rate of inflation, which still varied significantly by location. On the other hand, in Poland, as in other countries, workers demanded that this adjustment should be automatic. The principle of indexing wages to inflation had to be enshrined in collective agreements signed at the level of individual businesses, that is, as close as possible to actual working conditions. This was one of the major demands put forward by trade unions on behalf of workers throughout Europe. In Poland, it became a frequent reason for strikes in industries that were reluctant to adopt this automatic adjustment. Strikes were also called when collective agreements set the index too low or provided for only partial wage increases. The question of measuring the cost of living was therefore central to power and class relations, became highly politicized, and manifested itself in successive conflicts.

Although the language of indices is often seen as the expression of a tendency towards objectivization that triumphed in the nation states of the twentieth century, during this interwar period, consensus regarding the price index always remained fragile. Two institutions, independent of public authorities, tried to give it a solid basis, one favouring a social foundation and the other a statistical one: whereas the IGS calculated an alternative index to the official one, with the aim of benefiting workers, the ILO claimed to be improving the method and accuracy of measurement. The two modes of calculation used by the IGS and ILO involved different epistemologies, but as we shall show, the exchanges between their respective exponents led to a better measurement of the *real* living standards of workers.

The IGS: wage statistics in the service of the class struggle

The IGS, which focused its studies on workers' issues, naturally devoted its earliest works to the defence of their wages and working conditions. In the political context of the 1920s, it presented itself as the mouthpiece of workers, alongside the trade unions, who also happened to be among the institute's members. Independently of the GUS, the IGS developed its own expertise

on the measurement of the cost of living and the change in wages and pub-
lished several studies on the subject.[18] Its aim was not only to contribute to
the debate but also to provide technical arguments in support of the demands
of employees seeking to maintain their standard of living. It also documented
the mobilization of workers by producing statistics on strikes, even before of-
ficial data on this subject existed, through the collection of information from
various 'field' sources to which it had access: strike committees, the workers'
press, notes from journalists, information from factories, and so on.

As early as 1922, one of the founding economists of the IGS, Tadeusz
Szturm de Sztrem, published a book entitled *The Struggle for Wages*, in which
he provided a statistical analysis of the impact of inflation on wages. The
study was limited to Warsaw owing to the lack of complete data at that time,
but the author nonetheless managed to reconstruct statistical series on the
prices of basic foodstuffs and workers' wages since 1914, which indicates that
he had access to unofficial sources, notably through trade unions. His ambi-
tion was to grasp, in the chronic fluctuations of currency, what he believed
was a new structural trend in the capitalist economy leading inevitably to a
decrease in the value of wages. The six-month percentage changes in food
prices, when compared to real wages, revealed a remarkable increase in the
divergence between these data series under the effect of inflation.

The salient point of his analysis was to compare these two statistical series
with data on strikes, in order to show that wage increases, even if they were
insufficient to compensate for their erosion by inflation, were the result of
workers' mobilizations. Although strikes had occurred only sporadically un-
der the German occupation, they subsequently increased substantially – in
Warsaw, there were 42 in 1918, rising to 67 in 1919, and 72 in 1920. The
author emphasized that the creation of the Polish state in 1918 had not put an
end to this movement, and that, on the contrary, the number of strikes had
increased. He pointed out that strikes were increasingly coordinated by trade
unions, stressing in particular the major role of the Trade Union Associations
(*Związek Stowarzyszeń Zawodowych*), which was closely connected with so-
cialistic circles and which, since 1920, had brought together several federa-
tions. He also credited unions with signing collective agreements, creating a
wage scale, and demanding other social benefits (paid leave, social insurance,
medical assistance, and so on). The conclusion of the study, supported by
voluminous statistical annexes worthy of a yearbook, was explicitly political
since it considered that the injustice created by inflation, which was 'a factor
conducive to the strengthening of Polish industry', was also 'a source of ex-
perience for the working class, and a source of necessity that constitute[d] the
basis for the maturing of contemporary forms of class struggle in Poland'.[19] In
this respect, the study corresponded to the mission of the IGS, which aimed
its work and publications at a broad public, including trade unionists.

This short text, with a limited scope, situated the recent gains of the work-
ers' movement in a longer history, which was objectivized by the figures and
their trends. The author's intention was also to the demonstrate the ability

to carry out an ambitious study independently of the new Polish state, which was then setting up its own institutions of expertise. He thereby showed that he was surpassing the GUS not only in the analysis of data series but also in the collection of data since he combined the official figures with his own sources of data.

The IGS also knew how to coordinate its work with the international references that were authoritative in this field. One organization that wielded this international authority was the ILO, whose recommendations extended beyond labour legislation to the methods for transcribing information on working conditions, covering processes such as maintaining reports, conducting surveys or calculating indices. However, the ILO also appeared as a unique forum on the international stage, owing to its tripartite structure involving governments, employers' representatives, and trade unions.[20] It was therefore a source of legitimacy for private work and expertise on social issues, particularly in the countries of Central Europe.[21]

The ILO and the politics of indices: international recognition of the IGS's expertise

The early and rapid mobilization of the IGS in the field of wage statistics and price indices was a successful strategy, if not for the workers' cause, then at least for the international recognition of its expertise. Indeed, two years after the publication of his book, Sztrum de Sztrem published an article on 'Wage problems in Poland during and after the War' in the ILO's journal, *International Labour Review*.[22] This article, written in English, took up the theme of the earlier book, written in Polish, and adapted it to an international context, which required toning down provocative political positions in order to achieve the neutral tone of technical analysis. It gave a prominent role to the work of the IGS in its presentation of an increasingly established division of statistical labour: on the one hand, the GUS and the Warsaw Statistical Service carried out price surveys and the calculation of the cost-of-living index, and on the other hand, the IGS gathered together data – which were still scattered and not yet unified in an official framework – on the wages of workers in a few industrial establishments. Although official statistical work gradually extended and encroached on the IGS's specialist field of social economy, the IGS maintained its dominance in the analysis of wage trends in this turbulent period. It again linked this development to the abundance of strikes, which had increased in Warsaw from 59 in 1921, to 115 in 1922, and 131 in 1923, the year of the inflationary crisis. Stressing again the importance of these mobilizations for wage increases, the author states that 'It was only as the result of fairly numerous strikes that the workers first secured increases in wages… to meet the rise in the cost of living'.[23] The author emphasized the importance of introducing into collective agreements the principle of the automatic adjustment of wages to the cost of living, also known as the sliding scale principle, which was in line with the ILO's recommendations. As requested

by the review, he reported on the growth of this practice in each industrial sector, which was slow in the first year and more sustained and promising from 1921.[24] In the following years, in 1921 and 1922, the principle became widely established, with about 20 new conventions appearing every six months. Szturm de Sztrem also reported the resistance of some companies to these measures, and the dissatisfaction of workers with a process of wage increases that could no longer keep pace with inflation. In this editorial space provided by the ILO, Szturm de Sztrem nonetheless had to depart from his role as the mouthpiece of the workers and respond in a different way to the objections raised by workers with regard to the supposed errors in calculating the index: 'the reason for the depreciation of real wages should be sought in certain defects in the methods used for adjusting wages to the cost of living'.[25] His numerical arguments, which, in Poland, provided a justification for workers' demands, were transformed for the ILO into economic variables in statistical equations relating to the comparative effects of increases in wages and supplementary payments on the costs of production. He entered into the discussions of economists, particularly those in neighbouring Germany and Austria, who were facing a similar situation and who feared that an inflationary spiral could be triggered by the automatic indexing of wages demanded by workers.

How did Sztrum de Sztrem, an economist and statistician from the private activist organization IGS, gain access to the ILO's journal, which was intended to disseminate notes and articles on the social situations in different countries to an international audience? An exchange of letters between the ILO and its Polish correspondent in Warsaw, Adam Rose, sheds a partial but nevertheless revealing light on the path that led to this event.

In September 1922, Rose had proposed an article on 'the automatic adjustment of workers' wages in Poland according to changes in the cost of living by a commission attached to the Central Statistical Office'.[26] It had attracted the attention of the ILO Research Division which, in December of the same year, specified that the article should address

> the conditions that led to the establishment of a cost-of-living commission, as well as the methods that were adopted for arriving at the cost-of-living index number and for deciding on the adjustment to workers' wages on the basis of fluctuations in the cost-of-living index. It would also be desirable to give a full presentation of the results of this procedure, as well as any objections that may have been raised to its application.[27]

However, the article was not signed by Rose, but by Szturm de Sztrem, to whom the former seems to have entrusted the task of writing it, presumably because he had published a book for the IGS on precisely this subject. The article on Poland appeared after others on the same subject, with a focus on Austria and Germany respectively, but these other articles had been written by members of ministerial administrations. The IGS, as a private institute,

therefore had access to the ILO's editorial space on an equal footing with the official institutions of other European countries.

The publications of the ILO were closely connected to the agitated social situation of the first half of the 1920s in Eastern Europe, where the continuous decrease in workers' purchasing power in a context of constant inflation was the source of demonstrations which hampered the recovery of an already badly damaged industrial fabric, and created, at the gates of Bolshevik Russia, a political instability feared by governments, even in their social-reformist ranks. It was in this context that the ILO devoted one of its first special issues to the question of real wage and inflation, so that it could be examined by its experts from a statistical point of view.

The ILO and the authority of its method

In the ILO's centralized documentation, statistics played a key role in describing social conditions in different states, synthesizing the information, and then producing a ranking on the scale of social progress. This ranking was intended to encourage those states deemed to be lagging behind to catch up. The ILO, however, had no more power to decree how statistics should be collected than it did to affect national social legislation. It did not produce statistics itself but collected those of the member states. As a result, it was faced with the problem of the comparability of data and indices, which depended upstream on the variable conditions of their production, according to rules and recording practices that remained diverse. In the nineteenth century, under the impetus of the earliest International Statistical Congress, and supported by the rise of the first statistical offices, the process of standardization had advanced, but some economic elements, including wages and prices, remained difficult to standardize. Progress was often made in response to crises and their social consequences, notably poverty and unemployment; the First World War and its impact on the disorganization of societies and economies was one such moment.

The ILO had created its own statistics section, whose members were renowned statisticians from official institutes in their countries. The question of measuring real wages and the cost-of-living index was on their agenda as early as 1923 and was the main theme of the Second International Conference of Labour Statisticians held in 1925. Wage statistics would be addressed there from a methodological point of view only. To this end, in preparation for the conference, the ILO published a voluminous report, *Methods of Compiling Cost of Living Index Numbers*.[28] As noted in the title, the issue of wages and prices was now subsumed under the issue of calculating the index, which, in the terminology of statistical economists, fell into the category of index numbers. But however technical this question it might be, the cost-of-living index had already been politicized by workers' demands and government commissions, so the question of method was inextricably linked to this burning political issue. The report did not hide this, stressing that 'The

necessity for the adoption of satisfactory methods is manifest if the object of securing wage agreements with the minimum of friction is to be attained'.[29] The statisticians attached to the ILO believed that the objectivizing power of statistics was capable of reducing social protests as long as it could establish sufficient confidence in the method of calculating the index.[30] This was the task to which they devoted their conference as well as the 'Resolutions' that emerged from it.[31]

The 'ILO method' for statistics, in principle, was based on that of the international congresses of the nineteenth century, which consisted, on the one hand, of issuing recommendations for producing figures and indices, and, on the other hand, of gathering information on the actual practices followed by the various states.[32] These practices provided the ILO with examples to be encouraged or, on the contrary, to be avoided. This centralization of information resulted in the voluminous annexes to the documentary collections, which catalogued in detail the survey and calculation practices in different countries around the world from South Africa to Czechoslovakia, Great Britain, and Lithuania. In these pages, the ILO listed the diversity of national practices, but also documented their dynamism at local and private levels, adding that 'Mention is, however, also made of other costs of living statistics, including those published by certain municipal authorities, or by private organisations or individuals'.[33] Although the ILO addressed its recommendations to public statistical administrations and only thought of inciting centralized states to standardize their statistical practices, it recognized the plurality of private initiatives and their capacity to provide impetus to statistical work. This concerned in particular municipal authorities, such as those in Germany, where a dozen or so cities were assessed with their own cost-of-living indices, but also trade unions, and even individuals, notably economists. While the ILO implemented its founding principle of tripartism in conducting its deliberations on policies and legislation, as far as technical knowledge in economics and statistics was concerned, it defended a unitary and centralized view.

With regard to index numbers, the discussions were not only of a technical nature. Beyond the scope of the ILO, they involved an epistemology on how to summarize the change in figures, the meaning attributed to the average that is supposed to summarize that change, and as always in statistics, the question of the representativeness of the results. Statisticians initially provided strict definitions to replace what they considered to be a mess of terms and figures: 'an index number of the prices of a number of commodities is an average of their price relatives', wrote the American economist Irving Fisher in his seminal book, *The Making of Index Numbers*.[34] The index was therefore relative, it did not measure the cost of living itself, but rather changes in the cost of living, and the cost of living was not equivalent to the standard of living. It was necessary, then, to ensure that changes in the cost of living resulted only from currency fluctuations, or in other words, that they related to fixed quantities and qualities of items. However, the epistemological

standards expounded by these statisticians – established figures with university chairs or administrative directorates, such as Irving Fisher, Lucien March or Karl Pribam, all proponents of empiricism against probabilistic conjecture – remained far removed from local realities.

Municipal authorities also compared the prices of items, but their temporality was that of the daily life of families. For example, in the first half of the 1920s, the municipality of the industrial town of Łódź in Poland monitored between 50 and 60 prices, including nine types of flour and semolina, and different types of bread, which varied according to the percentage of wheat flour.[35] One of the ILO's recommendations for maintaining the principle of goods being comparable in time and space was to calculate the cost-of-living index based on a selection of items considered representative of a family's basic needs. It refrained from specifying this list of basic necessities, however, as it varied across countries, regions, and time periods. It is therefore clear that the projects of international standardization and comparability undertaken by the ILO and statistical offices had to adapt to an irreducibly heterogeneous local world, that of markets and family consumption, and therefore had to work with local representatives. In 1928, the same city of Łódź filled out a monthly questionnaire, sent by the GUS, on the prices of everyday consumer items. At first glance, the use of this form suggests that the municipal authority of Łódź had adopted the official terminology, but a detailed reading of the list makes it clear that the GUS had taken into account the diversity of consumption: the list was still as long as that of 1920, with about 40 items, and mentioned five types of bread and seven types of flour and semolina.[36] National administrations did not wish to restrict local rules and habits any more than this and would proceed, on the model of a census, to code items into certain categories. In doing so, they would produce price indices that were 'black boxes', and which trade unions would challenge in periods of inflation on the grounds that the items selected were not representative of employees' consumption.

Challenges to the indices also related to another component of their calculation, that of the varying importance attributed to different items, or categories of items, within family consumption. Their relative importance certainly reflected personal preferences, but was above all a function of income. In order to take this into account in the calculation of the index, different weights were assigned to the prices of the selected items. Experts at the ILO had considered how to determine these relative weights. Two methods in particular attracted their attention: first, the 'Theoretical Budget Method', which determined the proportions of such consumption according to the nutritional and physiological needs of a typical family. It was recommended and applied in the absence of other reliable sources. This, it will be recalled, was the principle applied by the Polish Cost of Living Commission in its early days. The other method, known as the 'Standard Budget Method', was based on the results of budget surveys, a type of survey examining family spending and consumption patterns, which had been in existence for a long time. It

proved to be a unique source of information for estimating the proportion of items in the index, as ILO statisticians recognized:

> in a large number of countries the weights used in the compilation of the cost of living index numbers are based on budget enquiries into the consumption of working class families as a whole, or of those living in industrial areas[37]

The advantage of this method was the possibility of extracting information relating to representative families, particularly from an occupational group, if, for example, it was a question of indexing miners' wages or of distinguishing between categories according to income or qualification.

Statisticians pointed out that it was not necessary to conduct large surveys – which would then have been unnecessarily costly – to estimate the weights of a selection of consumer items. The reality already exceeded the ILO recommendations, as most budget surveys were conducted at the level of a city (e.g., Berlin, Hamburg, Vienna, all of which served as models for this sort of work) or a category of workers, and they were already a valuable source for calculating cost-of-living indices. It was this method of direct family surveys, sanctioned by actual practice, that was endorsed by the ILO's statistics section, although the approach based on biological and physiological needs still had its supporters.[38]

Although the ILO explicitly considered the role only of public administrations for the production of statistics, its resolutions brought an unexpected legitimization to all the private surveys that had been conducted until then. It even gave them a new impetus, since, in the mid-1920s, most countries continued to rely on pre-war budget surveys to estimate the weights needed to calculate the cost-of-living index. In this case, the calculation was made based on data from 1914. The ILO recommended that new surveys be conducted to update these weights and that data should be gathered from the shared date of 1928 in order to establish 1930 as the new baseline for the index.[39] To hasten these resolutions, the topic of family budget surveys was put on the agenda of the next Conference of Labour Statisticians in 1926.[40]

In Poland, the IGS had not waited for these international recommendations to envisage, as early as 1922, and before the GUS, a survey of the budgets of workers' families. For both representatives of workers' interests and supporters of social reform, this type of survey was one of the tools available for investigating the condition of workers. For the economists and sociologists of the IGS, the major survey of the German metalworkers' union carried out in 1907 already occupied an important place in the annals of workers' surveys, as did the 1912 survey carried out by the Vienna Labour Office.[41] The establishment of the Cost of Living Commission in Warsaw in 1920 provided the IGS with a major incentive to collect data on the consumption of workers' families.

The budgets of workers' families in Poland: three institutes and one survey

From its inception, the IGS aimed to carry out a survey of the budgets of workers' families and, using the results, to challenge the wage statistics and the official cost-of-living index calculated by the GUS since 1920. In order to calculate this index according to the guidelines of the new Commission, the GUS used the principle of standard nutritional norms for family consumption. However, despite the ILO's recognition of this so-called theoretical method, the IGS considered the process to be far removed from the actual consumption of households and argued that it underestimated the real fall in incomes.[42] This was the reason for the survey on the budgets of workers' families, which it launched in 1922. The aim was both to offer workers a tool for their wage demands and to demonstrate the competence of the IGS on this statistical question.

Budget surveys in the long history of workers' surveys in Europe

This statistical project did not emerge from a vacuum. Questions related to measuring the cost of living were debated in the international framework of the ILO, and surveys on workers' budgets inherited a long tradition of social surveys. These had been undertaken from the middle of the nineteenth century onwards, starting in Western Europe in the wake of industrialization, and subsequently became more frequent and widespread in other countries. Budget surveys were initially conceived as a means of maintaining knowledge and control of workers, but they later became a tool supporting the demands made by the workers' movement and social reformers, for whom it provided factual and quantified arguments.[43]

In the second half of the nineteenth century, surveys of family budgets attracted the attention of economists, who were then taking a new interest in consumption. This was the case of Ernst Engel at the head of the Statistical Office of the Kingdom of Saxony. He found himself in one of the most industrialized regions of Europe, witnessing the poverty of workers, the earliest revolts, and the hopes raised by the Revolutions of 1848. He joined the ranks of the reformers and did not see solutions to the 'social question' in the work of philanthropists and the writings of social observers, but instead believed in the potential for solutions drawn from the empirical equations of statistics and economics. His work was part of both theoretical and practical reflections on the setting of a minimum wage based on an evaluation of 'The Cost of Man'.[44] He gave his name to the famous 'Engel's Law' on the structure of consumption, which describes how the proportion of expenditure devoted to food varies inversely with income, and he created rules on data collection and the classification of items and family types. Through his roles at the head of the Statistical Office of Saxony, and later that of Prussia, he helped to establish family budget surveys as part of the collection of official statistics.

The importance of these surveys and their use continued to grow from that point on.[45]

The members of the IGS were familiar with these early surveys and the theoretical and methodological debates they had generated, as well as with recent surveys, including the English survey conducted by the Board of Trade and those of German and Austrian cities. There were favourable conditions for the circulation of knowledge of these surveys, owing to the wide dissemination of these works in European reformist and socialist circles and also as a result of the movement of Polish political activists between the territories of the former kingdom of Poland or of those going into exile. The ILO then accelerated this circulation through its intensive programme of publishing inventories.

The process of the budget survey seemed relatively simple: it consisted of recording the expenditure and income of families over a certain period of time. Among the various methods experimented with, that of distributing account books to families was recommended and adopted in the majority of cases. These regular records, which at first glance seemed to be straightforward, actually raised many problems, starting with the misunderstandings and omissions on the part of workers' families. These difficulties, despite the use of repeated instructions and checks, often led families to abandon their participation in the survey. This reduced the number of usable questionnaires and compromised the representativeness of the results, thereby increasing the cost of the survey. This was the impasse that the IGS reached with the survey it launched in 1923 in Warsaw, which collected an insufficient number of completed booklets. Owing to the crisis at that time, it lacked the necessary funds for extending the scope of the survey and had no choice but to suspend it. The survey was finally successfully accomplished in 1926, but in the context of a new collaboration with public bodies.

The Polish survey of workers' budgets and cooperation between private and public institutes

The IGS sought additional funding to carry out the survey of workers' budgets that it had begun earlier on and secured help from several public bodies. Three of these bodies gave rise to new collaborations: the Health Insurance Fund, the Statistical Department of the Warsaw City Council, and the GUS. The GUS, which found itself caught between its mission for the Cost of Living Commission, the instructions of the ILO, and this approach from the IGS, was also planning a survey of the budgets of workers' families. According to the report of the IGS, the decision of the GUS to participate in the collaboration was taken under pressure from the trade union organizations whose delegations were involved in the Cost of Living Commission.[46] The GUS was planning a large-scale survey, covering the main urban and industrial centres in Poland – that is, the two main cities, Warsaw and Łódź – as well as two coalfields in Silesia. Again, according to the IGS, it appears that

this project was undertaken at the insistence of the trade unions, who 'from that moment on, in the Committee on the Cost of Living, started to systematically demand that surveys be conducted on household budgets'.[47]

The survey would collect the data needed to calculate the cost-of-living index but would also provide more information on the living conditions of workers. The GUS created a commission to coordinate the survey, and from 1926 onwards, a series of preparatory meetings brought together the three organising institutes. The collaboration with these new partners brought about a change in the IGS's way of working, as it now had to consult with them on the organization and methodology of the survey. The management of the survey and its use were overseen by the GUS, which had the most appropriate logistics for this process, and also conferred official legitimacy. The IGS was recognized for its close relationship with workers' circles and trade unions, and it was therefore given responsibility for implementing the survey in the field.

Conducting a survey on domestic budgets on this new national scale was a methodological challenge. The process began by constituting of a sample of typical families, that is, families that were representative of different occupations, income categories, and industries. The organizers relied on the trade unions to select the families. Once this phase was completed, the distribution of the notebooks could begin, involving a network of trained and paid instructors, and here again, the mediation of trade unions proved indispensable. The survey was entrusted to the municipalities of the different areas in question. The municipalities of Warsaw and Łódź, both major urban centres, carried this out without difficulty, but in the small mining and steelmaking towns of Silesia, there was some reluctance to cooperate. It was decided to send a delegation from the GUS and the IGS to travel from town to town, to present the survey and convince the authorities to provide the necessary material and personnel support. These efforts were not always successful, as the IGS reports:

> The work was not too promising in Upper Silesia. The Central Statistical Office decided to entrust the survey to the provincial administrative unit. Silesia's Vice-Voivode in turn entrusted the task to the head of the Province's Department of Industry and Work without providing him any assistance. The attempts to base the surveys on the cooperation of the workers' representation did not bear any fruit, even though there was a representative of metal workers on the committee, who before the War had conducted similar surveys on behalf of the Central Association of Metalworkers in Stuttgart.[48]

It is quite remarkable to discover, in this paragraph on the local organization of the survey, a reference to the major survey carried out in 1907 by the German trade union IG Metall[49] and to the contacts maintained between the German and Polish organizations.

The survey itself was supposed to document the expenses of 1250 families over 12 months in 1926 and 1927, but, owing to the number of participating families dropping out, it was extended in 1928 and 1929 with new families. In the end, the number of filled and usable notebooks was low, barely 220 across the whole of Poland. This low level of participation was observed in all countries, as these surveys required regular participation and constant attention on the part of the families. The continued presence of instructors to guide and correct the surveys and the commitment of trade unions to convincing the families of the usefulness of the survey for the improvement of their condition were therefore indispensable.

The GUS reported to the Interior Ministry and its activity was scrutinized by the government, but scientifically, the authority of international organizations such as the ILO took precedence. The two international conferences on indices and budget surveys of 1925 and 1926 created volumes of recommendations, addressing the smallest details, which had become the main guides for the profession from which statistical offices drew instructions and recognition. For example, in its first article on the budget survey, which was devoted to methodological issues alone, the GUS made numerous references to ILO recommendations.[50] The ILO itself had gradually reduced the scope of its inventory of surveys to include only those conducted by public bodies: 'the notes are further limited generally to investigations undertaken by a department of the central Government or a local administrative authority. Thus no account is given of…the considerable number of enquiries conducted by private individuals or organisations'.[51]

The autonomy of the IGS with respect to the GUS and the latter's management of the survey was manifested in the IGS's initiative to carry out an additional survey in order to deepen its knowledge of workers' living conditions. This survey was conducted among the same families and was based on a new questionnaire, which added more qualitative questions in addition to the earlier questions on material resources: questions regarding associative, cultural, and religious practices, the use of their time, meals, clothing, and also questions of a psychological nature and regarding their views on job satisfaction and their future projects. Through this qualitative component, the IGS aimed to distinguish its approach and to connect it to the monographic and statistical type of surveys. It was inspired by the survey of the Austrian economist and statistician Walter Schiff, which was carried out for the Labour Statistics Office of the City of Vienna, and whose questionnaire served as a model for the IGS.[52] The IGS highlighted the innovative and unique nature of its study, 'This work is the first detailed monograph on workers' life conditions, based on extensive data', and contrasted it with previous surveys which 'concerned a small number of families and were based on very limited data'.[53]

The three institutions involved in conducting the survey – the GUS, the Warsaw Statistical Department, and the IGS – disseminated the results in separate publications. The IGS published a work in 1929 under the title *The Working Class's Living Conditions in Warsaw, Łódź and the Dąbrowa Basin Based*

on the 1927 Surveys.[54] The following year, the GUS published the results of the general survey that it had coordinated, with a slightly different title: *Workers' Family Budgets. Results of Surveys Conducted in Warsaw, Łódź, the Dąbrowa Basin, and Upper Silesia*.[55] In 1932, the Warsaw Statistical Department published another volume with detailed results for the city.[56] The GUS emphasized the new significance of large-scale surveys, 'statistical surveys carried out by the statistical authorities mainly with public funds'.[57]

   The publications of the three institutions included numerous tables, which presented the data according to the standard statistical form of a budget survey: types of families, units of consumption, detailed list of items, income. Faced with this mass of figures that had been collected, checked, and corrected, the statisticians were able to calculate a single index of the standard of living, the Engel coefficient, which measures the proportion of expenditure on food within the overall budget. The advantage of this index was that it was recognized and calculated in all countries, thereby allowing easy comparisons to be made and commented on. With this figure, Polish statisticians had a tool to objectivize the poverty of Polish workers' families on a European scale and even beyond. In their publications, the IGS and the Warsaw Statistical Service produced tables comparing the distributions of spending by Polish families with the results of surveys conducted in other cities or countries, in Vienna, Hamburg, Germany, Czechoslovakia, and even Russia. They unanimously concluded that 'Polish working-class families' low standard of living, compared to those of European families, [was] evident in the high percentage of expenses allocated to food'.[58] In fact, the results showed that expenditure on food represented about 61% of the workers' budget in Poland compared with 55% in Vienna, 44% in Russia, and 41% in Germany. They added that 'Engel's Law appears everywhere with perfect regularity'.[59] They even estimated and compared the nutritional value of this food, and the differences confirmed the disadvantaged living conditions of Polish workers' families:

> The disadvantageous chemical composition and low caloric value of food in the surveyed workers' families in Warsaw is striking in comparison with the food of German and Austrian workers. It is not difficult to imagine what might have appeared in a comparison with an English, Dutch or American worker.[60]

All these measures were evidence of their extreme poverty. The IGS, adopting a more militant approach, estimated that workers' living standards had improved in most of these countries, but not in Poland: 'Poland is first in terms of indicators related to food expenses. The working class' standard of living and salaries in Poland are among the lowest in Europe'.[61]

   Unlike the GUS and the municipality of Warsaw, the IGS was free to develop a militant discourse on the basis of the survey results. It had acted

early on to bring about a budget survey in order to review the way in which the price index was calculated. Its later participation in a nationwide survey provided it with further opportunities to criticize official indices and statistics. This was the case with respect to wage statistics, and here again the IGS's argument was based on the reality of workers' working conditions:

> Labour statistics are usually based on wage rate data, not on overall income… However, the remuneration of the workers depends not only on the wage rate but also on the number of working days or the work performed. This is subject to large fluctuations, as shown in our study on family budgets… Part-time work or total unemployment are the rule, not the exception in the lives of workers.[62]

The IGS's criticism was directed at both the GUS and the ILO, which made wage comparison one of the axes of their labour statistics. However, the IGS argued that 'the Family Budget statistics provide a much better measure for comparing the standard of living of workers in different countries than the wage statistics'.[63]

The three institutions acted in collaboration in organizing the survey, but they once again became independent and separate in their use and publication of the data. However, their positions converged once again with regard to the interpretation of the results, and the need to use them to calculate a new cost-of-living index that would more accurately reflect workers' living conditions. Nonetheless, the GUS and the IGS embarked on their own calculation of this index.

Public and private calculations of a new cost–of–living index

The first reason for the survey was related to the activities of the Cost of Living Commission and the insistent demand by trade unions, supported by the IGS, to the GUS to change the way the index was calculated. As soon as the first results were available, statisticians at the GUS produced simulations of the cost-of-living index and published the results.[64] The approach for this simulation was experimental because it was based on a small number of budgets, barely 40, which described the consumption of workers' families in Warsaw between 1927 and 1929. From the total amount of expenditure recorded each month, a group of minimum and maximum budgets was formed respectively. In each of these, the records of daily expenditure and the quantities of items purchased made it possible to estimate norms of consumption, taking into account the composition of the families. The three monthly data series, relating to prices, quantities, and expenditure, were sufficient to estimate the weights needed for calculating the new cost-of-living index. The values were then reconciled with the Commission's index in order to identify any discrepancies. The article published by the GUS emphasized the limitations

of the results obtained because of the small number of observations and con-
cluded that the rationale for the demonstration was as follows:

> Only with sufficiently abundant materials…will we be able to discover
> the threshold at which the basic needs of this group are met. All other
> means, such as using standards set by physiologists or hygienists, can only
> give suppositions that may be more or less close to the truth – they do
> not, however, answer the questions that statisticians deal with.[65]

With this article, the GUS therefore rejected the Commission's method with-
out, however, providing concrete solutions.

The IGS, again through the voice of Szturm de Sztrem, proposed an al-
ternative method for calculating the cost-of-living index, which Szturm de
Sztrem set out the following year in the GUS's journal *Statystyka Cen* (*Statis-
tics of Prices*).[66] The GUS and the IGS agreed on the need for a new method
of calculation based on observed, rather than theoretical, data; Szturm de
Sztrem therefore proposed an alternative index, while asserting, in this way,
the technical expertise that he and his institute possessed on this subject.

His approach arose from the same desire to distinguish between work-
ers according to their income, which could vary according to qualifications
and sectors of activity. However, his method was different in that the IGS
used a source external to the budget survey, that of the 'Commission for In-
vestigations in the Conditions and Costs of Production and Exchange'.[67] In
1927–1928, this official and joint commission had coordinated an important
survey of production, following the model of foreign surveys.[68] Within this
framework, at the request of the trade unions, precise data had also been col-
lected on the working conditions and remuneration of workers in industry
according to sector of activity, qualifications, and working hours. Szturm de
Sztrem had been invited, together with another member of the IGS, to take
part in the survey as an economic expert, and through this involvement he
had access to the information that was collected.[69]

From the data on workers' pay, he determined their distribution among
four income groups and then identified which families in the budget survey
these levels corresponded to, and from this, which norms of consumption
they corresponded to. By linking the two sources, he intended to weigh
the different structures of consumption observed according to income levels,
more than 60% of which were found to be at the lowest levels. In this way, he
made the cost-of-living index more representative of the living conditions of
workers than the budget survey was.

A graph represented the monthly change in index values between 1927
and 1931 according to both methods. Szturm de Sztrem pointed out that 'the
most important change consists in the increase of the amount spent on food
at the expense of other kinds of spending'.[70] Based on the new method of cal-
culation, this figure rose from 51% to 68.4% over the period, which reflected
the large proportion of budgets with low incomes. Similarly, the nutritional

value of consumption decreased in the new index, which was a consequence of taking into account the lower proportion of well-off workers' families. Finally, he pointed out that the new index was more sensitive to changes in market prices due to the high proportion of food items, thereby revealing the vulnerability of the poorest families in the face of these price fluctuations. Szturm de Sztrem concluded in these objective and factual terms, but it must have been evident that the new method was fairer and justified workers' criticisms of the index that had been used until then.

Conclusion

In Poland, as in other countries, social studies and surveys had their roots in the social movements of the nineteenth century. Until 1918, under the imperial regimes governing these Polish territories, there were no state institutions supporting such studies and organizing large-scale surveys. In their place, associations provided the framework for this process of professionalization and made a strong connection between that research and their demands relating to social and national questions. These surveys were therefore carried out with a view to both gaining knowledge and making social demands. In the new Polish state, this close and lasting link between surveys and social activism continued throughout the interwar period. It characterized the work of the IGS, one of the most active and productive independent organizations in the field of studies and surveys of workers' living conditions.

This chapter focused on a field of study that was then undergoing major expansion, that of social and economic statistics. This field accompanied the transformation of economies and the resolution of their crises, but it was also a language that objectivized workers' working conditions in order to condemn those conditions. However, the production of numerical data and the implementation of statistical surveys – activities normally undertaken by the administration of the state – occurred relatively late in Poland, owing to its role in the history of European empires. As a result, the GUS, created at the same time as the Polish state, had to cooperate and compete with private institutions, including the IGS. The chapter focused on the relations between these institutions in the context of a social matter which had become a political issue for most governments at the head of capitalist economies: the question raised in the interwar period by the impact of the inflationary crises on the wages and living standards of workers and the need to create a price index capable of automatically determining the size of wage increases.

The interaction between the two institutions – one public and one private – gave impetus to the implementation of statistical studies and surveys and particularly the large-scale survey of the budgets of workers' families, which was unprecedented in Poland. By examining the organization of the survey in this chapter, it has been possible to specify the form of this cooperation. In line with the ILO's recommendations, which conferred international recognition on the project, the practical implementation of the survey involved

the coordination of a complex network that actually included many private and public partners ranging from the level of national government to that of municipalities and trade unions. The conduct of the survey also highlighted the fragility of an asymmetrical relationship of cooperation, due to the institutions' unequal access to financial and symbolic resources, which developed into a hierarchical division of labour. Although the IGS found itself reduced to the task of mediating between the GUS and trade unions, it ultimately undertook its own survey, from which it derived indices that competed with the official ones. The two indices published in a GUS journal endorsed the validity of the IGS's work. Although it was a private institute, it was a recognized actor in social policy. Subsequently, wage and price statistics became a regular feature of the work of the GUS, and the IGS no longer acted in this area. At the beginning of the 1930s, the IGS was confronted with the need to study another problem arising from economic crises, that of mass unemployment, and launched a new type of survey.

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5 Performing the state?

Public and private actors in the field of social provision in twentieth-century Greece

Efi Avdela

Introduction

Recent historical research referring to various European countries has proposed new insights in respect to the relation between voluntary associations and the state. Many studies have repeatedly shown that these relations have been steady and polymorphous, if not mutually co-constitutive, and continually reconfigured not only for the twentieth but also for a large part of the nineteenth century. Thus, the old assumption about a gradual substitution of charitable organizations by state institutions has been undermined. In her 2012 article on 'The "Big Society" and the "Big State"', Pat Thane has argued that 'throughout the history of the British welfare state, institutions of civil society worked closely with the state, that they reinforced and complemented each other, if sometimes in tension and with continually shifting boundaries'.[1] Many studies have corroborated this thesis for Britain as well as for many other European countries.[2] It is maintained that instead of a welfare state, it is more appropriate to talk about a 'mixed economy of welfare' involving public and private action.[3] However, all national historical cases are not identical. I argue that it is not enough to acknowledge the complementarity of the two sectors. It is equally important to assess the specific forms that this complementarity took in particular historical circumstances, the types of relationships developed and – last but not the least – the part that individual or collective initiatives took.[4] In other words, it is necessary to understand the relations between voluntary associations and the state as historic, contextual and specific. If the British state appeared as a strong and reliable, even if not always accommodating, partner of the voluntary sector, this was not necessarily the case elsewhere.

Greece has been mostly absent from the international historiography regarding twentieth-century social provision. Most research has focused on the state, while the role of the voluntary sector in the field of social provision during this period has only recently started to be studied.[5] It has often been argued, mainly by political scientists, that social provision in Greece has been systematically inadequate due to the persistence of a weak civil society, a poor state and 'clientelist' relations.[6] However, I follow here recent research

'challenging the idea of a singularity of associational culture that emerged in Western Europe and the Atlantic World and then spread to the rest of the globe, and against which all other social contexts are measured'.[7] In order to explore the specific forms that the interaction between private and public actors in the field of social protection took in Greece, I will turn my attention from the state to voluntary associations, focusing on those directly dedicated to offering social provision to various vulnerable groups; that is associations working 'for the good of others'.[8]

My contention is that in the period from the 1920s to the 1970s, voluntary associations dedicated to the good of others became the locus for the inter-action between public and private, individual and collective actors in the field of social provision, while their form and content changed considerably. Focusing on Athens and Thessaloniki, the two biggest urban centres of the country, I will examine cases where public agents – meaning various types of public employees and civil servants – acting in a private capacity in the above-mentioned field, were able to instigate the creation of, participate in or create for themselves voluntary associations that extended the field of social protection in various ways. This was possible because during the period un-der investigation, membership in voluntary associations was limited only for-mally by age and nationality: anyone, private citizen or public employee, man or woman, provided that she was adult and a Greek national, could become a member of a voluntary association. Thus, these public agents, together with a multitude of volunteers of various sorts created networks[9] that undertook through voluntary associations, the social protection of vulnerable groups. However, the character of these networks changed over time in accordance to the social and political circumstances of each historical period: from mul-tiple and extending, placed at the social and political centre of power during the interwar years, they became more locally circumscribed at the level of city districts during the 1940s, and much more fragmented, diversified pro-fessionally bounded and politically peripheral in the post-war period. Their ideological transformations were also considerable. The desire for modern-ization and reform that private volunteers and active state officials evoked for their initiatives in assisting vulnerable others in the 1920s turned into religious humanitarianism and fierce social and political conservatism in the 1950s–1970s. I argue that the close interaction of public and private agents in the above-mentioned networks covered important needs in social provision, accentuated by the repeated extraordinary socio-economic conditions that the country faced throughout the twentieth century as a result of political and military upheavals – the Balkan Wars (1912–1913), the Greco-Turkish War and the ensuing Asia Minor Catastrophe (1919–1922), the Second World War and the ensuing tripartite Occupation (1940–1944), Civil War (1946–1949) and also two dictatorships, Metaxas 1936–1940 and the military Junta of 1967–1974.[10]

In what follows, I will sketch first how during the interwar years so-cial protection became a central political issue, attracting around a host of

voluntary associations a large network of individual and collective public and private agents and how this network broke up and diversified in the following decades. Then I will present three cases, from the interwar, the war and the post-war years, of initiatives undertaken by state agents acting as private members of associations dedicated to the field of social provision: (a) when in the interwar years public officials used their social networks in order to induce private collective actors to undertake the social protection of vulnerable groups; (b) when during the German, Italian and Bulgarian Occupation (1941–1944), public and private agents collaborated in founding voluntary associations that substituted for the state, which was unable to meet urgent social needs; (c) when in the post-war years state officials performed the role of private actors organizing voluntary associations for themselves in order to better provide social protection to vulnerable individuals in their care.

I argue that these examples allow us to attest to the importance of individual action in fostering social provision initiatives and consequently to follow the transformations in the meaning of 'social protection' from a reformist plan of state building to the struggle for conserving social and political power. The initiatives, in which the state is 'substituted' and 'performed' by public employees and civil servants acting as private actors together with volunteers, constitute the particularly idiosyncratic version of the Greek social and political space of social provision throughout the century, which has still not been systematically recorded. This is a first attempt.

Volunteering and networking

Throughout the nineteenth century after the formation of the Greek state in the 1830s, philanthropic and self-help associations abounded, while state intervention in the field of social provision remained rudimentary. As historical research has shown, the state assigned to municipalities and varied charities the provision for specific groups – for instance, destitute families and beggars. The main goal of philanthropic intervention was the moralizing of the poor. Through countless associations, Greek philanthropists undertook action against poverty, creating institutions such as hospitals, orphanages, Sunday or technical schools. While they regularly received state funding, they repeatedly criticized the state for indifference. In fact, their own concern was to prevent state intervention that would burden middle-class incomes. Historians consider the virulent irredentism characterizing the last decades of the nineteenth century – known as *Megali Idea* (*Μεγάλη Ιδέα* – the Great Idea) – the continuous economic difficulties and the widespread clientelism as the main reasons for restricted state social provision.[11]

The legal status of voluntary associations changed with law 281 of 1914 on associations.[12] The law stipulated the voluntary participation of their members, the distinction between members and non-members, formal self-government, independence from the state and explicitly non-profit character. The existing associations had to adapt to the new legal framework that

fostered the rapid expansion of associations in numbers as well as in aims and scope, especially in respect to workers' and professional unions. As elsewhere, collective voluntarism remained an important part of the associational sector throughout the twentieth century, although in Greece, most of the relevant collectivities were small in membership and finances and either were short-lived or often changed their names.

Be that as it may, the rise in power of Liberal Eleftherios Venizelos and the Liberal party (1910–1920, 1928–1932), the decade of war (1912–1922) and the advent of almost a million and a half refugees after the defeat of Greece in the Greco-Turkish War of 1919–1922, changed things dramatically. Social provision became one of the main targets of state reform, while new social concerns emerged.[13] Scientists and scholars criticizing philanthropy and promoting social work played an important role during the interwar period in developing the field of collective voluntarism.[14] So did a growing number of men and also women, of varied professional and social backgrounds, who became active in associational activities and volunteer work as well as numerous state officials – most with legal or medical formation, favourable to the modernizing efforts of the Liberal Party (*Κόμμα Φιλελευθέρων – Komma Fileleftheron*) – who, anxious to promote reform plans in the field of social provision, operated as mediators between private and public actors. They all encountered each other in numerous voluntary associations and in social networking, enhanced by political affinities, social sensitivities and the increasing, even if uneven, institutionalization of social provision. The constantly acute social problems, exacerbated by recurrent political and national tragedies, made the necessity of reform more pressing. The relevant activity created a social and political space of public sociality that allowed educated individuals to develop initiatives, acquire social capital and build careers moving between voluntary associations and public institutions in the name of easing social needs.[15] Private citizens interacted actively – most often as members of the same association – with public employees, civil servants and state officials anxious to extend the field of social provision but unable to do so through formal procedures. However, as we shall see, the character of these collective interventions changed dramatically over the years in tune with the general political climate.

Educated women became significantly more visible in the associational field of social provision: the care of others was considered by all, themselves included, as compatible with their 'feminine nature'. As the century progressed, there were fewer and fewer charitable individuals or family members of politicians; those who were professionals of various specializations – social workers, probation officers, teachers, nurses, jurists – though often without a stable job and coming from the lower middle classes, increased with time. Timidly in the interwar years, more explicitly after the war, they became an important component of the associative action related to social provision, where they could demonstrate their skills, gain social recognition and even aspire to paid work. Although a small number reached executive positions

in the boards of mixed associations, some had succeeded in asserting their influence through their long active presence in this field. By their constant presence, their networks and their interactions with state officials, some acquired considerable power and became public figures.

The case of Evanthia Guinopoulou is revealing and also characteristic of its time. Coming from a family of provincial politicians, married and widowed young, without much education, E. Guinopoulou became an early and active member of the League for Women's Rights (*Σύνδεσμος για τα Δικαιώματα της Γυναίκας – Syndesmos gia ta Dikaiomata tis Gynaikas*) during the interwar years – the most important feminist organization of its time – developed intense associational work for the provision of various vulnerable others and dedicated her life to the protection of poor and delinquent children and adolescents. A leading figure in the campaign for the establishment of Juvenile Courts, she became the President of the Society for the Protection of Minors (*Εταιρεία Προστασίας Ανηλίκων – Etaireia Prostasias Anilikon*, henceforth SPM) from its inception in 1924 until 1957, long after SPM ceased to be a voluntary association and became a public entity, administered and operated by volunteers and supervised by the Ministry of Justice. She remained its honorary president until her death in 1959. Her continuous presence and persistent activities in this field brought her the social and symbolic capital that allowed her to go through the upheavals of Greek political life of the period while remaining at the centre of the associational action regarding juvenile delinquency: a feminist close to the liberal reformers in the 1920s and the early 1930s, she rallied to the dictatorial regime of Metaxas from 1936, collaborated closely with state officials during the Occupation and integrated into the conservatives after the war to become one of the pillars of the moralizing and anti-communist campaigns of the 1950s. Thus, she remained for more than 30 years at the head of most associations and services dedicated to the social protection of juvenile delinquents, those convicted, gone astray, destitute or in 'moral danger' and acquired considerable power in this area. She lived to see her work rewarded first by the Academy of Athens and then by the King himself. E. Guinopoulou remained a 'professional volunteer' at a time when those who volunteered in social work, mainly women but also men, systematically tried to make it a professional and paid activity.[16]

Many other women throughout the period demonstrated outstanding skills for fundraising, administration and organization of collective actions through associational work in the field of social provision. Together with a growing number of public agents – judges, state officials, academics, physicians or lower civil servants – and 'professional' philanthropists – politicians, businessmen, jurists or clergymen – they embodied the shifting but constant, even if complex and contradictory, continuum between the voluntary sector and the state in the extensive field of social provision. The considerable transformations of this continuous space in form, content and ideology will be illustrated by the three cases presented below.

Instigating

The first example of interaction between public and private agents in the field of social provision concerns state officials instigating the foundation of voluntary associations in order to extend social protection to vulnerable groups that were recently becoming visible.

The end of the First World War and Greece's defeat in the Greco-Turkish War of 1919–1922 produced a wave of a million and 300 thousand Greek Orthodox refugees from Eastern Thrace and Asia Minor into a country of 5 million inhabitants at the time and gave rise to important economic and social problems.[17] Among them, a new public anxiety emerged concerning destitute children and delinquent youth. Many reformers followed attentively the methods, practices and policies applied in respect to the 'new' social issue in other European countries, such as France and Germany but also the USA, and especially those regarding the establishment of juvenile justice. They aspired to see them applied in Greece. In order to promote this goal, a network of jurists, physicians, public administrators, reformers and feminists in favour of the above reforms founded voluntary associations, joined with pressure groups and developed various forms of collective action. Their aim was threefold: to press politicians to establish juvenile courts, to sensitize public opinion to the necessity for them and to provide for the urgent needs of imprisoned minors.[18]

A common trait of these efforts concerned the close collaboration between private collectivities and state structures through individuals participating in the above-mentioned network. In the following years, the members of this network crossed each other in a multitude of associations, which constantly changed names and statutes in order to adapt to the successive regulations in respect of the penal and social provision management of minors. Most importantly, a number of public administrators proved very imaginative and active in their efforts to expand the field of social protection.

The case of Panagiotis Skouriotis is telling. Serving as prefect – regional governor – of Herakleio in Crete since 1915, P. Skouriotis was a high-ranking state official under the successive Liberal governments throughout the interwar years. Director of the Correctional Department in the Ministry of Justice and representative of Greece on the *Commission Internationale Pénale et Pénitentiaire* in the 1920s and early 1930s, member of the Committee of Savings (*Επιτροπή Οικονομιών – Epitropi Oikonomion*, a parliamentary group assigned by the government of the Liberal Alexandros Papanastasiou to the sanitation of national finances) in 1924, he founded the Prison of Tyrintha – the first agricultural prison in the country – in 1925. His traces disappear after the Metaxas dictatorship on 1936.

Amidst the complex political context and the encumbered state apparatus following the 'refugee crisis' of 1922, in June 1924 Skouriotis appealed to the 'ladies' of the two main feminist organizations of the interwar years, the League for Women's Rights and the National Council

of Greek Women (*Εθνικό Συμβούλιο Ελληνίδων – Ethniko Symvoulio Ellinidon*), prompting them to contribute to creating an association for the protection of imprisoned women and minors. The timing was not accidental. For the two previous years, several members of the two feminist organizations had participated actively in the public debate regarding the prospect of founding courts for minors in Greece – or 'children's courts' as they were called.[19]

In fact, interwar feminists were especially interested in this prospect for various reasons. On the one hand, they perceived juvenile justice as a new domain of potential paid activities for educated women. On the other hand, this issue opened up a new field for these women's public interventions and one where their organizing and administrative skills as well as their experience in working collectively could be acknowledged. So they accepted willingly Skouriotis's call to create promptly an association aiming at the 'moral and economic assistance of women and minors, however imprisoned, irrespective of religion or nationality'.[20] As the first administrative board of the new association shows, they were joined by jurists and other civil servants such as the Public Prosecutor of the Appeal Court Judges, A. Riganakos, very active in the associational and reforming activities of these years.[21] The first goal of the Association for the Protection of Imprisoned Women and Minors (*Σύλλογος προς προστασίαν κρατουμένων γυναικών και ανηλίκων – Syllogos pros prostasian kratoumenon gynaikon kai anilikon*) was to offer free juridical assistance to women and minors in trouble with the law.[22]

There are indications that Skouriotis sought to see similar associations founded in urban centres other than Athens. For example, an association with the same name – Association for the Protection of Imprisoned Women and Minors (*Σύλλογος προς προστασίαν κρατουμένων γυναικών και ανηλίκων – Syllogos pros prostasian kratoumenon gynaikon kai anilikon*) – was created in 1925 in Hermoupolis, the urban centre of the island of Syros.[23] Presumably, it was part of a more or less orchestrated effort. It is my contention that the case of Panagiotis Skouriotis shows that in those years, personalities enjoying authority and crucial positions in the state institutions seemed to take initiatives supported by a double aspiration: to follow the new international trends in social protection in an organized, thematic and scientific way and to extend the field of social provision to new areas. In order to recruit those interested to participate in and to finance these projects, they often leaned on private collectivities.

For example, it seems that the protection of imprisoned women and children was not Skouriotis's only project. It is said that he was also the instigator of the creation of the General Society for the Protection of Childhood and Adolescence (*Γενική Εταιρεία προς Προστασίαν της Παιδικής και Εφηβικής Ηλικίας – Geniki Etaireia pros Prostasian tis Paidikis kai Efivikis Ilikias*), founded in 1924 with the aim of promoting all issues regarding social provision for children. A member of the International Save the Children Union (*Union Internationale de secours aux enfants – UISE*), founded in 1920

and based in Geneva, the association would later change its name to SPM.[24] Many state officials can be traced among its members, while Evanthia Guinopoulou was one of its founding members.

In other words, a new common space of collective action and public sociality was formed during the interwar years, where various intersecting networks – liberal, professional and philanthropic – of private individuals, voluntary associations and civil servants were able, in the name of novel scientific knowledge and innovative reform, to extend the field of social provision to wayward and destitute minors or to children and minors in general. The same individuals participated in more than one association dedicated to the good of others.[25] These initiatives bore the marks of the 1920s, namely the desire to reform the state, the persistent invocation of scientific methodologies and the reality of the acute social problems. In the following years, the networks in question broke up and many of their members made considerable political and ideological shifts according to the ups and downs of the country's political life. Several disappeared from the public domain, such as Panagiotis Skouriotis. Others, who were initially mobilized in the midst of the reforming movement of the Liberal Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos, were not embarrassed to become engaged with the dictatorial regime of Ioannis Metaxas from 1936 on, or to rally to the conservative anti-communist state in the post-war years, as was the case for Evanthia Guinopoulou and many others. What remained stable were the close interconnections between volunteers and public employees and the constant movement of the latter from one position to the other.

Substituting

The second example concerns the concerted actions of apparently both public and private actors through the creation of voluntary associations aiming to confront the famine inflicted on Athens by the Axis Occupation and provides for the most vulnerable groups of the population.

Greece was under the tripartite occupation of German, Italian and Bulgarian armed forces from April 1941 to October 1944, following a year of fierce war. The German army invaded Athens on 27 April 1941. Soon, and especially during the winter of 1941–1942, the capital endured a severe famine, with large numbers of inhabitants dying from starvation or illnesses related to insufficient nutrition, especially from the lower social strata as well as ex-soldiers unable to reach their native region. While data on the deaths due to the famine in the area of Athens and Piraeus in 1941–1942 are very dubious and estimates are risky, most studies concur that they consist of several tens of thousands, probably up to 100,000 deaths, both declared and non-declared.[26] The famine was the result of multiple causes, but mainly the pillage of the country's resources by the German army, the decrease of agricultural production, the disintegration of the state public assistance services and the blockade applied by the British navy. As insufficient food came into the capital, large

parts of the population struggled against starvation or succumbed to it, especially children. After an international outcry, the belligerents concluded an agreement in spring 1942 that allowed for international food aid, managed by the Swiss and the Swedish on behalf of the International Red Cross. The mechanism for its distribution was put in place during the summer of 1942.[27]

During the famine and in the months following it, from the beginning of 1942 and throughout 1943, at least 27 voluntary associations were founded in Athens, each one corresponding to a district of the capital, mostly the working-class ones.[28] All associations aimed at providing assistance to those inhabitants of the districts that had been affected by the special circumstances of the Occupation. The founding members signing the respective statutes were all men, apparently residents of the same neighbourhood.

These associations can be divided into two groups. The first group comprises eight associations, most of which were founded in the midst of the famine, in the early months of 1942, but some also in the first months of the following year. Their titles present some variations, but all refer to the Police Department covering the specific neighbourhood. For example: Treasury of Social Provision of the District of the 5th Police Department of Athens (founded 8.1.1942), Association of Social Welfare and Provision of the District of the 14th Police Department of Athens Amperokipon (18.2.1942), Brotherhood of Social Welfare and Provision of the District of the 7th Police Department of Athens (Quarter of Kypseli, Agias Zonis) (1.3.1942) or Social Provision of the District of the 8th Police Department of Athens (19.3.1942) and others.[29] Their statutes were also more or less identical. Their common objective stated in their statutes was to provide relief to 'those living in the district whom the exceptional circumstances make unable to provide themselves with the essential needs of life' or to 'provid[e] any possible kind of mental, spiritual and material assistance to those who need it and especially to those stricken by the extraordinary circumstances under which the Greek fatherland finds itself'. The means stipulated were also almost identical: the support could derive from the association's own resources, from services provided by individuals 'appropriate and willing', by cooperation with compatible state agencies, bodies and organizations.[30] All the statutes stipulated that the acting Director of the relevant Police Department was an ex officio member of each association's administrative council. It was also stipulated that in case of dissolution, their property was to be handed over to the Greek Red Cross or the National Organization of Christian Solidarity (*Εθνικός Οργανισμός Χριστιανικής Αλληλεγγύης – Ethnikos Organismos Christianikis Allileggyis*, henceforth NOCS), created by the Archdiocese of Athens in December 1941.[31]

It should be noted that most of these associations were established before the setting up of the international humanitarian intervention to save the population of Athens from the famine, deployed in August 1942. The slight variations of their titles as well as their more or less identical statutes testify that they represented some kind of concerted action, most probably uniting

both public and private actors in order to face extraordinary circumstances and facilitate the distribution at the local level of whatever humanitarian aid was being secured – soup kitchens especially for destitute children, medical care and other.

Another 19 voluntary associations, all named Care Fund (*Ταμείον Περιθάλψεως* – *Tameion Perithalpseos*) in different districts of Athens, were created in the course of 1943, one or two in almost every month of that year. For example: Care Fund of Kallithea (14.1.1943); Care Fund for those Destitute of Aigaleo (31.1.1943); Care Fund of Social Provision of Chalandri (11.2.1943); Care Fund of Vyronas (12.5.1943) and others.[32] In large part, their statutes duplicate those of the first group, especially in respect to their aim: to 'provid[e] aid in kind or money to those whom the exceptional circumstances make unable to provide themselves with the essential needs of life'. However, there are also notable differences. For instance, while the means by which the objectives were to be achieved remained the same as for the first group, there is no mention of the police, the Greek Red Cross or the NOCS. This time it is stipulated that the local Station for Social Provision (*Σταθμός Κοινωνικής Αντιλήψεως* – *Stathmos Koinonikis Antilipseos*) would indicate those eligible to receive aid and that the collaboration between the local Station and the respective association should be close. In all statutes of this group of associations, it was stipulated that the local General Provider (referred to in the female grammatical gender) was to attend the meetings of the administrative council, but without the right to vote. Nothing is known up to now about these Stations for Social Provision or the female General Provider. The term social provision (*κοινωνική αντίληψις* – *koinoniki antilipsis*) was often used by different actors that offered help to individuals in need.

Everything indicates that these associations were the revised model of the first group, conceived and set up before and after the mechanisms of international aid were put in place. However, this is the limit of our current knowledge about these associations. With no mention of them in the existing historiography of the period, but with concrete evidence that some of them at least were active, I will limit myself here to working hypotheses only.[33]

Based on their identical character and their references to public authorities, it is my contention that the associations in both groups were the product of concerted initiatives deriving from an extended network of public and private actors placed in crucial posts. We do not know whether and how these voluntary associations were related to the soup kitchens that the government, the Orthodox Church, the Red Cross and other institutions organized during the same period in order to feed the starving population. The references to the female General Provider might indicate a connection with the Greek Red Cross, but it is impossible for the moment to confirm this hypothesis. Also, it is not possible to know whether the otherwise unknown individuals signing the statutes as founding members had any prior involvement in the field of social provision.

Be that as it may, many studies have shown that from the first months of the Occupation, a strong collective action took place in the form of associations (*σύλλογοι – syllogoi*) and cooperatives (*συνεταιρισμοί – synaiterismoi*). Cooperatives have attracted the attention of historians more fully. They were established early on by various professional groups and trade unions in order to secure funds for common meals or food rationing at the place of work. We also know that the Police of Athens were involved in the dispensing of soup kitchens. However, in fact, little is known about similar efforts – or other aspects of everyday life, for that matter – in the capital's neighbourhoods or the multiple actors who undertook action during this first non-heroic year, that is before the resistance movement made its public appearance.[34] We only have fragmented information especially from written and oral testimonies.

For instance, we know that in many districts of the capital, the famine of winter 1941–1942 mobilized a multitude of forces in formal and informal initiatives. Members of various charities, public employees, local dignitaries – municipal officials, representatives of the Church and the local Police Department as well as 'reputable citizens' – representatives of national and international philanthropic organizations, middle-class volunteers and increasingly members of the left-wing National Liberation Front (*Εθνικό Απελευθερωτικό Μέτωπο – Ethniko Apeleftehrotiko Metopo*) and National Solidarity (*Εθνική Αλληλεγγύη – Ethniki Allileggyi*), both founded in the second half of 1941, collaborated closely during this first year.[35] At first, in the informal Popular Committees that were established in various districts of the capital in order to facilitate the distribution of food and other essentials in place of the paralysed state mechanism, and later probably in local associations such as those presented above.[36] We do not know much about where the central planning regarding the creation of these committees and associations came from. At any rate, everything indicates that the close collaboration between local agents, state officials and the Church increased their credibility and their effectiveness in their efforts in claiming goods and securing services such as food supplies for the soup kitchens, feeding bulletins, accommodation, medical care, etc. Members of the Popular Committees undertook to make representations to ministries and state services, organized collective trips to the countryside in order to locate food supplies and gathered clothes and medicines. Various foreign charities also financed programmes providing soup kitchens in the districts of Athens, until the supply of food and its distribution to the capital's districts were undertaken by foreign humanitarian aid.

We still know little about the exact connections between all these actors, private and public as well as with the voluntary associations presented here, but the above material gives us some indications that have to be pursued. I contend that the associations presented here were part and parcel of the general collective action characterizing this period. They represented an organized joint intervention of public and private actors in order to face dire circumstances. In other words, once the collaborationist state proved to be incapable of safeguarding the lives of its citizens, in circumstances of violence

and destitution, but also of looming social mobilization – the year 1943 was marked by massive demonstrations in the streets of Athens and violent confrontations between the growing resistance and the occupying forces all over the country[37] – the coordinated collective action of public employees, private citizens and various collectivities substituted for the absent state – absent in this field, but otherwise oppressive and brutal.

Performing

The last example concerns public employees acting like volunteers; and specifically, the employees of the Juvenile Probation Office and the judiciary of the Court of Minors of Thessaloniki, the co-capital of Greece, who during the 1960s created a voluntary association in order to cover urgent needs for social protection arising in their everyday work but impossible to meet in their work context. Here is the story.

In 1966, the voluntary association Care for Minors in Moral Danger the Good Samaritan (*Μέριμνα των εις ηθικόν κίνδυνον ευρισκομένων ανηλίκων ο Καλός Σαμαρείτης – Merimna ton eis ithikon kindynon evriskomenon anilikon o Kalos Samareitis*, henceforth The Good Samaritan) was founded in Thessaloniki. A few years later, in 1969, the association, with the same founding members and statute, was renamed Care for Minors in Moral Danger: The Good Shepherd (*Μέριμνα των εις ηθικόν κίνδυνον ευρισκομένων ανηλίκων ο Καλός Ποιμήν – Merimna ton is ithikon kindynon evriskomenon anilikon o Kalos Poimin*, henceforth The Good Shepherd).[38] Its 21 founding members, all residents of Thessaloniki, were men and some women, mostly lawyers, but also doctors and retired civil servants. According to its status, its objective was 'the provision of shelter, sustenance, care and protection in general to minors in danger of moral corruption' because they were orphans or had an unsuitable family environment and because they had been recently released from penitentiaries or were on their way to one.[39] The statute, apart from the usual stipulations regarding the activities and the membership of the association, also described in detail the operation of the future shelter: the conditions of admission, the obligations and rights of the inmates, its administration and personnel and its structure.[40]

What was peculiar about this association was the fact that the initiative for its creation came from the Juvenile Judge of Thessaloniki and chief of the Juvenile Probation Officers' Service, Dimitrios Karymbalis, in cooperation with employees of this service – probation officers.[41] Its administrative council comprised lawyers and other respectable citizens of the city, men and women, while the probation officers were members of the association and the Juvenile Judge supervised its activities.

Juvenile courts began operating in Greece in 1940. At first, juvenile probation was assigned to the semi-official SPM – legal entities governed by public law that received a restricted state subsidiary and operated gathering private funds and recruiting volunteers – and their volunteers.[42] The Juvenile

Probation Officers' Service (*Υπηρεσία Επιμελητών Ανηλίκων* – *Ipiresia Epimeliton Anilikon*, henceforth JPOS) was only established in 1954, with the aim of rendering juvenile probation rational, organized and professional. A state service attached to the juvenile court and supervised by the Ministry of Justice, its staff comprised university graduates who at first offered voluntary unpaid work and from 1958 undertook paid work. They were recruited following a special examination and short-term training. An important number of volunteers continued to participate in the operation of the JPOS. Those employed were not proper civil servants until 1976; their salaries were paid by the Royal Welfare Foundation (*Βασιλικό Ίδρυμα Πρόνοιας* – *Vassiliko Idryma Pronoias*) – a controversial semi-private institution created by the Queen during the Civil War and funded by donations and (unofficially) the state. JPOS had branches in the main cities of the country. That in Thessaloniki was one of the most active.[43]

The lack of provisional shelters for wayward or released minors was a constant concern for all probation officers throughout the country. The Ministry of Justice declared repeatedly that it was unable to establish them due to resource shortages. In Athens and Piraeus, they were created during the 1960s – after laborious efforts of many years – by the local SPMs. It is probable that the SPM of Thessaloniki, extremely active during the previous period, had other priorities, especially after the establishment of the JPOS.[44]

However, it seems that some provisional solutions were devised early on. According to an oral testimony by a former juvenile probation officer, a so-called first shelter for adolescent girls operated in Thessaloniki for a short period at the beginning of the 1960s. It was an apartment in the basement of a central residential building, bestowed by an affluent local lady, member of the SPM of Thessaloniki, to a poor family from the working-class district of Toumba. In exchange, they had to clean the stairs of the apartment building and host wayward or released girls for short periods of time. The family received money for feeding the girls – one to five at a time – and covering their own expenses. The apartment was constantly locked, and the mother had the key around her neck. The family consisted of the parents and three siblings – girls of 7, 16 and 19. The elder, later a juvenile probation officer herself, remembered this period as the worst in her life. The family lived in one room and the inmates – usually charged with 'moral misconduct' – in the others.[45]

It was in this context that in 1966, the Juvenile Judge and the probation officers, together with other volunteers, took the matter into their own hands and founded the association Care for Minors in Moral Danger the Good Samaritan, renamed Good Shepherd in 1969. The reason for this change of name was apparently related to the foundation of the Shelter for the Daytime Residence of Female Minors, the Good Shepherd (*Στέγη ημιελευθέρας διαβιώσεως θηλέων ανηλίκων ο Καλός Ποιμήν* – *Stegi imieleftheras diavioseos thileon anilikon o Kalos Pimin*, henceforth Shelter), in 1970. It seems that its founding members had realized that the Ministry of Justice was not ready to attend to their constant request for funding. The Residence had 20 inmates,

mainly from Northern Greece, orphans or from destitute or 'unsuitable' families, awaiting trial, on their way to the juvenile reform school or recently released from it. They were provided with shelter and nutrition, footwear and clothing, medical care and education, while attempts were made to secure them paid work. The Shelter was directed by an administrative council, headed by the Director of the JPOS of the city and supervised by the Juvenile Judge.[46] From the beginning, the members of the Good Shepherd started to campaign in order to gather funds that would secure the operation of the Shelter.[47]

Everything indicates that the heart and soul of the whole enterprise was Mitsa Nikolaou. An active lawyer – at the time, it was not incompatible to be an active lawyer and at the same time a paid probation officer –, she passed the first examination for recruiting probation officers held in 1958 in Thessaloniki. Soon she became the head of the local JPOS and retained her position until her retirement in 1979. She also became treasurer of the local SPM. At the same time, she handled all the legal matters of the Good Shepherd as well as its correspondence.[48] Once the Residence was created, she also chaired its administrative council. Working in a public service under the supervision of the judicial system, but employed as a private employee, bestowed with state authority over troublesome juveniles while working as a lawyer on her own account, Nikolaou exemplifies the constant movement between the public and private that characterized social provision in post-war Greece.

There is no indication that the dictatorial regime of the time (the military Junta was imposed in 1967 and abolished in 1974) showed any inclination to support the initiative financially. The resources for the Residence came from fees and various contributions. The volunteers of the Good Shepherd – mostly women, private citizens together with probation officers and the Judge – organized banquets, musical events and other gatherings to raise funds. Perennially lacking financial resources, they conducted a systematic correspondence with various public bodies asking for their aid in kind, services or money, but to no great effect.[49] Finally, its directors, unable to sustain the operation of the Residence further, started negotiations with the local SPM and its president, Konstandinos Vougioukas. Vougioukas had a long history of working with juvenile delinquency: he was for many years the close assistant of the controversial first head of the SPM of Thessaloniki, Dimitrios Karanikas, whom he succeeded there and also at the chair of Penal Law at the Faculty of Law at the University of Thessaloniki. Finally, four years later, in 1975, the SPM agreed to host the Residence using its state subsidy.[50] The Shelter closed down in the 1980s, following a law that abolished all similar private or semi-private institutions – without, however, creating public ones in their place. This was the only grievance that M. Nikolaou, devoted to her work with the juvenile delinquents, had in her old age.

In fact, in creating the Residence the members of the Good Shepherd performed as if they were the state, the same way that the probation officers operated as if they were civil servants. Although this is the only known example

of its kind, it is very possible that it was not unique. This move between the status of public employee and private volunteer allowed the juvenile probation Officers and the Juvenile Judge – but also probably other public agents – the flexibility necessary in order to overcome bureaucratic obstacles and fundraising limitations in their efforts to fulfil the requirements of their public posts. At the same time, their initiative offered them the chance to gain visibility and distinction for their work in social provision, both public and private.

Conclusion

These examples can be multiplied. There were more ways over the years by which public agents became engaged in voluntary action in the field of social provision. The dramatic political and social transformations characterizing the period under consideration and beyond left their marks, changing the forms that the interaction between private and public agents through voluntary associations in the field of social provision took in twentieth-century Greece.

Such is the case, for instance, of the Patriotic Foundation for the Protection of the Child (*Πατριωτικό Ίδρυμα Προστασίας του Παιδιού* – *Patriotiko Idryma Prostasias tou Paidiou*), founded in 1914 as a typical women's philanthropic association that in the interwar period underwent a series of transformations of its character and status, very much the product of political changes, and ended by the post-war period as the Patriotic Foundation of Social Provision (*Πατριωτικό Ίδρυμα Κοινωνικής Πρόνοιας* – *Patriotiko Idryma Koinonikis Pronoias*), a legal entity governed by public law. Women constituted the majority of its active volunteers throughout the period. They worked together with physicians, nurses and other experts on issues of maternal and child health, most of them public employees.[51]

However, by the end of the period under investigation, we discern more often the opposite movement: members of voluntary associations irrespective of their professional status – some undoubtedly civil servants – urging authorities to get engaged in the specific field of social protection in which they specialized. Such is, for example, the case of the Pan-Hellenic Union of Parents and Guardians of Unadjusted Children (*Πανελλήνια Ένωσις Γονέων και Κηδεμόνων Απροσαρμόστων Παίδων* – *Panellinia Enossis Goneon kai Kidemonon Aprosarmoston Paidon,* henceforth Pan-Hellenic Union), an association created in 1950 by parents of children with what was then called 'mental retardation'. In their search for solutions to their problems, its members contributed to the gradual transformation of 'mental retardation' from a private, family problem to a public, social and political issue, in the name of the human rights of their children.[52] It seems that with the re-establishment of democracy after 1974 and the modernization of social welfare, the production of collective action in the field of social provision that characterized the previous period gave place to a variety of collective initiatives from below, competing for public recognition of their special plight.

In these cases and many others, state officials, civil servants or public employees together with private volunteers, men and women of various specializations and expertise, undertook in different historical moments a wide range of concerted initiatives. Together, they formed the successive administrative boards of the many voluntary associations of this period dedicated to the good of others that were constantly reproduced and multiplied. Their actions changed and forged professional, gender and class identities, at the same time expanding the very field of social protection. The specific ways in which public and private actors acting together replaced, produced, invoked, at times resisted or interconnected with state institutions went far beyond clientism, the dominant explanatory model of Greek political relations.[53] At the same time, they refute the repeated laments about the supposedly weak civil society in this country.[54] They also testify that, as recent research in respect to other countries shows, these examples are not particularly Greek nor are they the result of an 'inadequate' state. They rather

> testify to the social proximity of philanthropic and governmental circles and the multiple roles of individual actors, who not infrequently hold posts in different fields and institutions, in state, civil society and the private realm, while being engaged in networks that span different milieux and interest groups.[55]

Finally, they show how problematic is the dominant dichotomous conceptualization of 'civil society' as the opposite of the 'state' and indicate that it would be fruitful to study the mode of production of collective action in the field of social provision in its varied historical forms.[56]

Notes

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29 *Ibid.* Respectively: *Ταμείον Κοινωνικής Αντιλήψεως Περιφερείας 5ου Αστυνομικού Τμήματος Αθηνών* (*Tameion Koinonikis Antilipseos Perifereias 5ou Astynomikou Tmimatos Athinon*); *Σωματείον Κοινωνικής Προνοίας και Αντιλήψεως Περιφερείας ΙΔ´ Αστυνομικού Τμήματος Αθηνών Αμπελοκήπων* (*Somateion Koinonikis Pronoias kai Antilispeos Peirfereias 14ou Astynomikou Tmimatos Athninon Ampelokipon*); *Αδελφότης Κοινωνικής Αντιλήψεως και Προνοίας (ΑΚΑΠ) Περιφερείας 7ου Αστυνομικού Τμήματος Αθηνών (Συνοικίες Κυψέλης, Αγίας Ζώνης)* (*Adelfotis Koinonikis Antilispeos kai Pronoias (AKAP) Perifereias 7ou Astynomikou Tmimatos Athinon (Synoikies Kypselis, Agias Zonis)*); *Κοινωνική Αντίληψις Περιφερείας Η´ Αστυνομ. Τμήματος Αθηνών* (*Koinoniki Antilipsis Perifereias 8ou Astynomikou Tmimatos Athinon*).

30 Statutes in *ibid.*

31 On the Red Cross in Greece during the 1940s, see V. Hionidou, *Famine and Death in Occupied Greece, op. cit.;* T. Vervenioti, *Αναπαραστάσεις της ιστορίας. Η δεκαετία του 1940 μέσα από τα αρχεία του Διεθνούς Ερυθρού Σταυρού* [Representations of History. The 1940s seen from the archives of the International Red Cross] (Athens, 2009). On the NOCS see V.N. Makrides, 'The Greek Orthodox Church and social welfare during the Second World War', in Clogg (ed), *Bearing Gifts to Greeks, op. cit.*; M. Zacharakis, 'Η *συμβολή της ορθόδοξης εκκλησίας στην Ελλάδα όσον αφορά το επισιτιστικό ζήτημα κατά την Γερμανική Κατοχή – Ο ρόλος και η δράση του Εθνικού Οργανισμού Χριστιανικής Αλληλεγγύης* (ΕΟΧΑ)' [The Contribution of the Church in Greece in Respect to the Food Issue during the German Occupation – the role and action of the National Organization of Christian Solidarity] (Masters' thesis, Patras, 2017).

32 Respectively: *Ταμείον Περιθάλψεως Καλλιθέας* (*Tameion Perithalpseos Kallitheas*); *Ταμείον Περιθάλψεως Απόρων Αιγαλέω* (*Tameion Perithalpseos Aporon Aigaleo*); *Ταμείον Περιθάλψεως Κοινωνικής Αντιλήψεως Χαλανδρίου* (*Tameion Perithalpseos Koinonikis Antilipseos Chalandriou*); *Ταμείον Περιθάλψεως Βύρωνος* (*Tameion Perithalpseos Vyronos*). Database on Voluntary Associations, *op. cit.*

33 See the letter by the Treasury of Social Provision of the District of the fifth Police Department of Athens to the Ministry of Social Provision, in 19 July 1942, requesting that they were granted a deserted building where, in collaboration with the local bureau of the NOCS, they would create a communal laundry. Library of the University of Crete, *Archive of the Ministry of National Provision, Closed Collections*, file 11, P, 1942, 14/B, 25000–50000, 3, 'Treasury of Social Provision – NOCS'.

34 G. Margaritis, *Προαγγελία θυελλωδών ανέμων… Ο πόλεμος στην Αλβανία και η πρώτη περίοδος της Κατοχής* [Proclamation of Stormy Winds…The war in Albania and the first period of the Occupation] (Athens, 2009), 239–265.

35 M. Charalampidis, *Η εμπειρία της Κατοχής και της Αντίστασης στην Αθήνα* [The Experience of Occupation and Resistance in Athens] (Athens, 2012), 100–103, 210–214; V. Hionidou, 'Relief and politics in occupied Greece, 1941–1944', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 48/4 (2013), 761–783; H. Fleischer, *Στέμμα και σβάστικα. Η Ελλάδα της Κατοχής και της Αντίστασης, 1941–1944* [Crown and Swastika. Greece in the occupation and the resistance, 1941–1944] (Athens, 1995), 11–13; Mazower, *op. cit.*; Hionidou, *Famine and Death in Occupied Greece, op. cit.*

36 A. Stratakis, 'Κοινωνική πολιτική στην Ελλάδα κατά τη δεκαετία του 1940: Η κοινωνική πρόνοια και το Υπουργείο Εθνικής / Κοινωνικής Προνοίας' [Social Policy in Greece during the 1940s: state provision and the Ministry of National/ Social Provision] (Masters' thesis, Rethymno, 2003); Charalampidis, *Η εμπειρία της Κατοχής, op. cit.*, 210–214; K. Anastasiadis, responsible for the popular common meals for the district Harokopou – Kallithea, oral testimony in 'The Chronicle of National Resistance', episode 4: 'The great famine', National Radio and Television Station (ERT) 1985, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v= jzZJUNXP-RI&index=4&list=PLD4A8sYoLfVdj7-ZZnhEh772HQ_jcxvXL (accessed 29 April 2019). I thank Dimitra Lambropoulou for the citation.

37 Margaritis, *Προαγγελία θυελλωδών ανέμων, op. cit.*, 352.

38 Archive of Care for Minors in Moral Danger the Good Shepherd (henceforth Good Shepherd), file 1: Minutes of the Foundation of the Association, 10.1.1966, in my possession; n. 242 judgment of the Court of First Instance of Thessaloniki, 19.1.1966; published 21.1.1966; for the rename: Minutes of the Foundation of an Association, 14.5.1969.

39 Court of First Instance of Thessaloniki, *Archive of the Court of First Instance of Thessaloniki*, Status 1966, article 2, 1.

40 *Ibid.*, 2–14.

41 Good Shepherd, file 2/f, Correspondence: Letter to the Society for the Protection of Minors of Thessaloniki, 7.11.1975, unsigned manuscript; also file 2/b: newspaper clipping, 4.2.1969.

42 See here above ('Inciting'). For the SPM of Athens, Avdela and Vassiliadou, 'Sauver l'enfant dévoyé', *op. cit.*

43 Avdela, 'Between voluntary workers and public servants', *op. cit.*

44 E. Avdela, '"Corrupting and uncontrollable activities": Moral panic about youth in post-Civil-War Greece', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 43, 1 (2008), 25–44 and *idem*, *'Νέοι εν κινδύνω', op. cit.*, 146–147, 170.

45 Interview with AZ, 25 May 2006; Avdela, *'Νέοι εν κινδύνω', op. cit.*

46 Good Shepherd, file 1.

47 Good Shepherd, file 2, passim; especially, 2/D and E: Correspondence, and 2/F: Report of Mitsa Nikolaou, Head of the Administrative Council of the Shelter to the Juvenile Judge of Thessaloniki and to the Administrative Council of the Association Care for Minors in Moral Danger the Good Shepherd, 2.12.1975, manuscript.

48 Interview with Mitsa Nikolaou, 24 May 2006; Avdela, 'Between voluntary workers and public servants', *op. cit.*

49 Good Shepherd, file 2/D and E: Correspondence, and file 3, where the repeated efforts to make ends meet and the constant refusals of funding are clearly documented.

50 Good Shepherd, file 2/F: Correspondence with the SPM of Thessaloniki [1975–1979], passim.

51 Theodorou, 'La Fondation patriotique', *op. cit.* Also K.G. Tziaras, 'Τα λαϊκά στρώματα στη Θεσσαλονίκη του μεσοπολέμου (1922–1940): κοινωνική και πολιτική διάσταση της φτώχειας' [The popular classes of interwar Thessaloniki (1922–1940): Social and political dimension of poverty] (D.Phil, Thessaloniki, 2017).

52 D. Kritsotaki, 'Turning private concerns into public issues: Mental retardation and the parents' movement in post-war Greece, c. 1950–80', *Journal of Social History*, 49, 4 (2016), 982–998; also Avdela and Vassiliadou, 'Sauver l'enfant dévoyé', *op. cit.*

53 E. Papataxiarchis, 'Εισαγωγή: Πολιτική και αγροτικός σχηματισμός στη νεοελληνική κοινωνία' [Introduction: Politics and agricultural formation in modern Greek society], in M. Komninou, and E. Papataxiarchis (eds), Κοινότητα, κοινωνία και ιδεολογία. Ο Κωνσταντίνος Καραβίδας και η προβληματική των κοινωνικών επιστημών [Community, Society and Ideology. Konstantinos Karavidas and the reasoning of social sciences] (Athens, 1990); D.A. Sotiropoulos, 'Πελατειακές σχέσεις και νέες μορφές πολιτικής συμμετοχής: μια δύσκολη συμβίωση' [Clientelist relations and new forms of political participation: A difficult cohabitation], in Rozakou and Gkara (eds), *Ελληνικά παράδοξα*, *op. cit.*, 145–172, and *idem*, *Η κορυφή του πελατειακού κράτους*, *op. cit.*

54 Mouzelis and Pagoulatos, 'Κοινωνία πολιτών', *op. cit.*; K. Rozakou, 'Κοινωνικότητα και "κοινωνία αλληλεγγύης" στην περίπτωση ενός εθελοντικού σωματείου' [Sociality and 'solidary society' in the case of a voluntary association], *Ελληνική Επιθεώρηση Πολιτικής Επιστήμης* [Greek Review of Political Science], 32 (2008), 95–120; C. Lyrintzis, and E. Papataxiarchis, '(Ανα)θεωρήσεις του πολιτικού. Συγκλίσεις και αποκλίσεις στην ανθρωπολογία και την πολιτική επιστήμη' [(Re)considerations of the political. Convergences and divergences in anthropology and political sciences], in Rozakou and Gkara (eds), *Ελληνικά παράδοξα*, *op. cit.*, 93–94.

55 Matter, Ruoss and Studer, 'Introduction', *op. cit.*, 2.

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6   From international aid to state policy

The cross-border trajectory of the Spanish child evacuation scheme, 1936–1939

Célia Keren

Introduction

On 20 and 21 November 1937, an international conference for aid to Spanish children was convened in Paris – a year and four months since the July 1936 military coup had developed into a civil war in Spain. The war pitted the Republican state, governed by a Popular Front coalition, against a right-wing military junta led by General Francisco Franco. The military aid received by the latter from Nazi Germany and fascist Italy soon brought the war onto the international scene and generated a worldwide wave of left-wing solidarity with the Spanish Republic. The November 1937 conference for aid to Spanish children was one of the numerous manifestations of this global movement. It was attended by 200 delegates, representing aid committees and left-wing organizations from 21 countries as well as a 20-strong Spanish Republican delegation. For two days, humanitarian workers, political activists and Spanish government officials discussed how to save the children of Republican Spain.[1]

For the conference, the Spanish Ministry of Education had prepared 10,000 copies of a 30-page booklet laying out its policy on homes for child evacuees (referred to as 'colonies').[2] Indeed, since the Francoist army's siege of Madrid in late October 1936, tens of thousands of children had been evacuated from the war zones to the safer eastern provinces.[3] In late November 1936, groups of children started being sent abroad, first to Belgium, then France, followed by the USSR, Mexico, Great Britain and Denmark. Published in both French and English, the booklet *Children's Colonies* was written purely for foreign consumption. Featuring photographs of happy, healthy Spanish children brushing their teeth, performing morning gymnastics or 'having classes out of doors' on sunny days, it contributed to one of the chief goals of the Spanish Ministry of Education at the November 1937 conference: to elicit additional financial support from foreign aid committees for its children's colonies programme.[4]

The booklet was less about painting children's colonies in glowing terms, however, than about making the Ministry's policy on the matter clear to

the attendees, especially foreign aid committees. The document's foreword enumerated the official bodies responsible for the children's colonies. This was followed by a full translation of the ministerial order of 24 August 1937, providing for the creation of the National Council for Evacuated Children (*Consejo nacional de la infancia evacuada*, CNIE). According to this text, the CNIE was entirely in charge of 'the organisation, direction, scholastic curriculum and material support of all institutions for evacuated children in Spain as well as abroad'.[5] The next 25 pages of the booklet thus detailed the 'administrative and pedagogical regulations … dictated' by the CNIE, from menus, schedules and activities to costs and accounting rules.[6]

If, in November 1937, the Ministry of Education presented these colonies for evacuated children as a well-thought-out, rationalized and centralized public policy, this had not always been the case. In Spain, non-governmental bodies, both Spanish and foreign, had been instrumental in ensuring the evacuation of children from Madrid. The role of foreign activist groups, especially the French, was even more crucial in the transfer of Spanish children out of Spain. It was only after they had campaigned for months for Spanish children to be sent to France that the Spanish Republican government followed up on the idea. A private French Reception Committee for Spanish Children then ran the scheme with a high degree of autonomy, selecting host families for the children in France and setting up and operating children's homes through its own network, all with its own personnel and, perhaps most importantly, its own funds. The task of converting a project of this kind into a national, state-run policy was anything but straightforward, and certainly did not happen overnight or without conflict.

This chapter will thus seek to illuminate the process by which the evacuation of Spanish children abroad, specifically to France, transformed from a foreign, humanitarian relief programme into national public policy in Spain. By identifying the actors of this process, their motivations and their means, and the consequences of these changes for the orientation of the programme itself, my intention is not only to uncover a rather neglected aspect of the history of child evacuations during the Spanish Civil War.[7] I also hope to contribute to a growing body of research on the role of private humanitarian action in the development of state welfare policies in Europe in the first half of the twentieth century. Indeed, if interactions between public and private actors, whether collaborative or competitive, have often led to the emergence of new fields of social protection generally speaking, in the context of humanitarian intervention, this productive process takes on a very specific aspect.[8]

The transformation of a humanitarian scheme into state public policy was not unheard-of in interwar Europe, especially in the field of child welfare. In fact, it was typical of American humanitarian imperialism in Europe after the First World War. In her groundbreaking study of the American Red Cross (ARC), Julia Irwin showed that American humanitarians came to Europe in 1919 with a sense of mission not only to heal the suffering of war-torn

societies but also to 'rehabilitate' them.[9] Persuaded that distributing food and medical supplies would not solve Europe's problems in the long run, they sought to introduce more effective – in other words, American – institutions and practices. This mix of benevolence, paternalism and imperialism was not unique to the ARC. Historians have argued that Herbert Hoover's American Relief Administration (ARA) effectively 'shaped' the newly independent Polish state in the early 1920s.[10] The ARA European Children's Fund advised central governments on governance structures, promoting, for example, the creation of 'national "child-welfare commission(s)", modelled on the United States Child Welfare Bureau in the Department of Labour'.[11]

The Spanish child evacuation scheme becomes all the more interesting when we situate it within this larger historiography of humanitarian state-building because, in this specific case, the transformation of a foreign aid programme into public policy was not driven by an imperialist sense of mission. As I have argued elsewhere, the French activists who first advocated sending Spanish children to France did not come to war-torn Spain convinced of the superiority of their methods and bent on forcing these upon the Spanish government.[12] They were not interested in reforming Spanish institutions. Their ambition was to aid, not 'rehabilitate' Republican Spain. And yet, while French activists did not behave like the ARC or ARA, it seems at first sight that their intervention had a similar effect: it led to the creation, within the Spanish state, of new child welfare public policies. The aim of this chapter is to elucidate this apparent paradox. In the absence of a deliberate, imperialist attempt to 'shape' Spanish child welfare institutions on the part of foreign activists, why and how was the child evacuation scheme transformed into a public policy of the Spanish Republican state? Who was the motor behind this transformation and under what conditions was it achieved? And what consequences did this have on the direction and content of the programme itself?

This chapter retraces the transformation of the Spanish child evacuation scheme in four sections. The first section examines initial attempts to bring Spanish children to France and connects this to a long-standing tradition of workers' solidarity without the state. The second section, which deals with the actual launch of the child evacuations to France, describes how, even if this project was immediately claimed by a state actor in Spain – the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare – it was still run on an ad hoc, public/private basis, with a low level of institutionalization. The third section describes the centralization and bureaucratization of the scheme under the Ministry of Education during the summer of 1937, emphasizing the ideological nationalist underpinnings of this process and the previous administrative and pedagogical experiences from which it drew. Yet, as the fourth section will show, this transformation was both contested, and incomplete. At the end of the day, there was an aporia at the heart of the Spanish government's ambition: it was trying to run a national, state policy outside of Spanish borders, but it remained dependent upon the support of foreign, private aid committees.

The children's exodus: workers' solidarity without the state

Almost as soon as the war broke out, private activist groups based outside of Spain began campaigning for Spanish Republican children to be sent abroad. Though the earliest projects did not come to fruition, their relevance for this study is twofold. First, their consideration indicates that this idea was embedded in a long-standing, transnational custom of left-wing solidarity beyond state welfare. Second, their failure underlines the fact that, when they implied crossing national borders, such initiatives were rarely possible without the consent of the national authorities.

On 3 August 1936, two weeks after the war began, a proposal to place Spanish child victims of the war with French host families was put forward by a small, newly created Communist-controlled organization in France: The National Association for the Support of Children (*Association nationale du soutien de l'enfance*, ANSE).[13] This proposal quickly became one of the top four priorities of the Popular Front's Solidarity Commission for the Aid of the Spanish People, whose role was to coordinate all initiatives in solidarity with the Spanish Republic coming from the parties, unions and associations that had adhered to the French Popular Front movement.[14] The ANSE rapidly created a committee to centralize offers from volunteer host families, who were by then already coming forward in large numbers.[15] On 14 August, a French delegation left Paris for Spain. Made up of two Communist and two Socialist local officials from the Paris region, and headed by ANSE secretary-general Michel Onof, their aim was to liaise with Spanish organizations and, hopefully, come back with a first group of children to be cared for in France.[16] On their way to Spain, they secured transitory lodgings for 500 Spanish children in a summer camp in Perpignan near the border. In less than a month, the ANSE had thus laid the groundwork for the transfer of hundreds of Spanish children to France.

If the ANSE was able to act so swiftly, it was because this was not the first time they had arranged this kind of child transport. Admittedly, the ANSE had been founded barely eight months earlier, in December 1935. In reality, however, it was the heir of the much older Secours ouvrier international (SOI), the French section of the Workers' International Relief created in 1921 in Berlin.[17] In late 1935, after it was disbanded by the Comintern, the SOI became the ANSE, with the same figures – Communists Michel Onof and Alice Duchêne – at its head.[18]

As it turns out, the 'children's exodus' was a privileged course of action for the SOI, and one that Michel Onof and Alice Duchêne had already organized many times. This expression had been used since the beginning of the twentieth century in left-wing circles to refer to the temporary displacement of the children of striking workers during long strikes and their placement with other working-class families.[19] The practice was taken up by the Workers' International Relief after 1920 and extended to cases of political persecution.

Only in 1934 and 1935, the SOI organized about half a dozen 'children's exoduses', for example, bringing children of left-wing activists from the Saar to France, when this region under League of Nations Mandate joined Nazi Germany by plebiscite.[20]

On 5 September 1936, however, the French delegation returned from Spain to Paris empty-handed. The Spanish Republican authorities had turned down their offer and refused to allow Spanish children to leave the country. ANSE secretary-general Michel Onof reported that the children were already at the centre of such attention that their transfer to France proved unnecessary. Every day, he was told during his stay in Madrid, a new day nursery or children's home was opened.[21] He was given the grand tour of the Fifth Regiment Home by left socialist and Red Aid activist Margarita Nelken, who described it as a 'model children's home'.[22] Though there may be other reasons for the project's failure at that juncture, it does indeed seem that the idea of sending children abroad contradicted the impetus that was developing at that time in Republican Spain, and especially in Madrid, towards reforming child welfare and education *within Spain*.

It is unclear, however, *which* Spanish authorities rejected the August 1936 children's exodus project. At first sight, this type of decision would have fallen within the purview of the government, but in the early days of the revolution, in Madrid, the real power lay with working-class organizations, which had both formed militias to fight the rebels and seized control of economic, social and cultural institutions. Much has been written in Spanish Civil War scholarship on the sudden collapse of the state in the summer of 1936 and the proliferation in its place of a wealth of local committees run by left-wing political parties and trade unions. But what has most caught the attention of historians is how those committees seized and exercised the monopoly of legitimate violence lost by the state both on the frontlines and behind them.[23] However, child welfare and education also occupied an important place within the social transformation projects of Spanish revolutionaries. The weakening of the state and the church, previously the principal actors of the field, opened a window of opportunity for left-wing activists to finally implement their childcare and education projects on a large scale. The government's only role in this was to facilitate or sanction their initiatives after the fact. In this sense, in education as in many other matters, the public/private divide was blurred. Tellingly, in the account he gave to ANSE supporters upon returning from Madrid, Michel Onof did not once mention the state authorities. He explained that, at first, 'A deliberation by the National Committee of the Frente Popular concluded in favour of the children's exodus' but that, 'after new discussions with Pasionaria, Margarita Nelken and Victoria Kent from the Communist, Socialist and Left Republican Parties, we had to face the facts and give up on our projects for the time being'.[24] Thus, according to ANSE sources, decision-making in Republican Spain at that time lay with political figures (especially women, who were always associated with care activities) and with a Popular Front committee in which

all left-wing parties and unions were represented; that is, not with the official centre-left government of José Giral.

An ad hoc, public–private transnational child welfare scheme

In mid-November 1936, another child evacuation scheme was presented, this time to the official Spanish government. The latter immediately accepted and became fully involved in the programme. As this section shows, however, state intervention did not translate into a fully fledged public policy. Though the newly appointed Minister of Health and Social Welfare included the overseeing of child evacuations abroad into her efforts to expand the limited scope of her Ministry, this remained an ad hoc project, implemented through partnerships with French private actors, with little to no bureaucracy or administrative follow-up.

In late October 1936, a series of discussions took place in Paris between the leaderships of three organizations: The French trade union centre (*Confédération générale du travail*, CGT), the French Human Rights League (*Ligue des droits de l'homme*, LDH) and its Spanish counterpart (*Liga española de derechos humanos*, LEDH). The latter's three top officials, Luis Rodríguez Guerra, Amós Sabrás and Alberto Lumbreras, had travelled to Paris to discuss ideas to aid Republican Spain. It was they who suggested setting up a scheme dedicated to hosting Spanish children in France. Of course, the French leaderships of the CGT and LDH were well aware of the ANSE's three-month-long efforts to launch a similar scheme, but they decided to pilot the project themselves.

As I have shown elsewhere, this move from the LDH and CGT was mostly aimed at tackling domestic political issues.[25] The policy of non-intervention, by which the French government had put an embargo on all arms sales and shipments to either side of the Spanish Civil War, was arousing increasing conflicts within the ranks of the CGT, and the non-Communist left more generally. Some sectors of the left approved of it, believing it was the only way to avoid escalation into a global war, while others condemned it as a betrayal of antifascist solidarity. In this context, the CGT leadership were looking for a consensual way of helping Republican Spain. They were also looking for a way to mobilize further the French non-Communist left, so as to offset the growing Communist hold on the Aid Spain movement in France. Because child aid could appear as both a pro-Republican and a humanitarian, neutral endeavour and could not possibly drag France into an international conflict, it became the perfect cause through which to achieve those goals. This explains for the most part why, when the Reception Committee for Spanish Children (*Comité d'accueil aux enfants d'Espagne*, CAEE) was officially launched in Paris on 7 November 1936 at a small meeting at the CGT headquarters, only delegates from non-Communist left-wing and labour organizations attended. Only two of them had any knowledge in child

welfare and education, a representative of the teachers' union and the head of the cooperative movement's child welfare organization. This Committee was thus created and populated, not by child relief professionals with firm ideas on how to aid children and families but instead by left-wing and labour activists. The joint presidency of the CAEE was entrusted to the founding president of the LDH, Victor Basch, and the secretary-general of the CGT, Léon Jouhaux – two of the most prominent leaders of the French left. As for executive responsibilities within the CAEE, CGT deputy secretary Georges Buisson was appointed Secretary-General of the CAEE, and CGT treasurer Félix Dupont took on the same function at the CAEE.

A few days after the CAEE's creation, its co-president Victor Basch took advantage of Spanish Foreign Minister Julio Álvarez del Vayo's invitation to tour Spain for ten days to advocate for the CAEE's project. By this time, the Spanish government, under the new prime minister Francisco Largo Caballero, a left socialist and trade union leader, had already made some progress in its long-term effort to take back state powers from the committees who had ruled Republican Spain since the summer.[26] It took Basch only a few hours to secure Largo Caballero's consent. The Spanish press, in a dispatch dated 12 November 1936, announced that 30,000 children would soon be welcomed in France.[27] No doubt, Basch's rapid success had to do with the crisis sparked by the Francoist attack on Madrid. After a string of Republican defeats earlier that month, many believed that the besieged capital would fall within a matter of days. On 6 November 1936, the government left Madrid and re-located to Valencia on the East Coast. The atmosphere in Republican Spain, and within government and activist circles, was thus very different from that which Michel Onof and his comrades had encountered three months earlier: the only priority was the military defence of the city. Now was not the time to open 'model' children's homes. Civilians, and especially children, had to be urgently evacuated from Madrid. In this context, as Basch summarily explained it upon his return to France, Francisco Largo Caballero's consent was prompted by his 'failure to consider that there was no organization able to care for and feed the children' in Catalonia and on the East Coast of Spain, where they were being evacuated en masse.[28]

Soon after the CAEE's offer was accepted, the responsibility for the pro-gram on the Spanish side was claimed by the freshly appointed Minister of Health and Social Welfare: anarchist high-profile writer and activist Federica Montseny. Her wish to run the child evacuations fit into her wider efforts to flesh out her ministerial portfolio and build a public social welfare system. Her entry into government on 4 November 1936, along with three other (male) leaders from the National Confederation of Labour trade union centre (*Confederación nacional del trabajo*, CNT), had been decided by Francisco Largo Caballero to broaden his coalition and strengthen popular support for his government. In order to make room for the four new members of govern-ment, some portfolios had to be split in two, and others were put together 'with bits and pieces'.[29] This was the case for Health. Montseny suspected that

the objective of this reshuffle 'was to allow the CNT to enter government and, within the government, do as little as possible'. Unwilling to conform to this state of affairs, within two weeks, she had had her portfolio extended to 'Social Welfare' (*Asistencia Social*). What this covered in practice was yet to be 'delineated', but in principle it included 'what until now fell under *official, private and public* charity' as well as 'those activities of social welfare that are currently overseen by other ministries'.[30] This statement of principle was quickly given substance with a series of decrees. One disbanded and requisitioned the possessions of all private charitable institutions.[31] Another snatched maternal and child protection from the remit of the Ministry of Justice's High Council for the Protection of Minors (*Consejo Superior de Protección de Menores*).[32] A third dissolved the National Committee on Refugees (*Comité national de refugiados*).[33] Piece by piece, Federica Montseny unwaveringly appropriated from various entities what would eventually form a coherent perimeter of state intervention, with an emphasis on child welfare and assistance for refugees. All these new missions were entrusted to the newly created National Council for Social Welfare.

Coming from an anarchist ideologist, such commitment to defending her Ministry's authority, and more generally state power, may come as a surprise. Until then, Federica Montseny had been a staunch defender of the CNT's 'purist' antistate revolutionary doctrine.[34] Yet, early in the war, a section within the CNT leadership expressed its support for maintaining the lawful Republican state – and what's more, a desire to collaborate with it. From the beginning, Montseny was part of that small but increasingly influential group.[35] When she finally joined the government in November 1936, she pursued a 'reformist' agenda that, she claimed, 'other capitalist countries had already achieved' and that consisted in 'destroying private charity' in order to create a public system of 'social welfare'.[36]

Though Montseny's claim that capitalist countries had 'destroyed private charity' was an overstatement, as the introduction to this book makes clear, the idea that Spain was lagging behind in terms of public welfare had been pervasive since the end of the nineteenth century and has remained shared among many historians until now.[37] However, other studies have qualified this cliché and shown that Spanish reforms in the field of welfare were, in fact, in tune with those adopted in most other Western countries, precisely because, since the 1880s, Spanish reformists had been looking to countries such as France, Belgium or Switzerland, among others, for models.[38] For this reason, by 1936, the Spanish state was already intervening in a number of social issues, including child welfare.[39] Despite her anarchist creed, Montseny shared with other European and Spanish reformists the belief that transferring private charity to the state was the way to go. In this sense, she not only participated in Francisco Largo Caballero's efforts to reassert government control and recover management from local grassroots powers, she also expanded the reach of the state to fields it did not cover before the war.

However, if child transports abroad had become a matter of state intervention, they did not at this time become a fully fledged public policy. First of all, they were not regulated by legislation or even official Ministry rules but by a contractual agreement negotiated with the CAEE. On 19 December 1936, Under-Secretary Mercedes Maestre travelled to Paris to meet with CAEE leaders at the CGT headquarters, where the CAEE was based.[40] The result of the talks was a nine-point document written in French that covered both the transports and the children's stay in France.[41] For example, children were supposed to travel in groups of 100 with two teachers and one cook. They were first to stay in a transit camp for observation, before being placed with French families. More importantly, for the argument of this chapter, according to Article 7, the CAEE was 'responsible for all matters and [would] bear all costs related to the children as soon as they arrive[d] on French soil'.

This means that once the Spanish government had conveyed the children to the border, it was up to the CAEE, not the Spanish administration, to carry out the bulk of the work: opening and running transit camps for the initial reception of the children, recruiting foster families, transporting the children around France, following up on their living conditions and schooling, investigating into complaints, relocating the children when necessary, etc. This also means that the CAEE bore a large proportion of the costs of the scheme. At the end of Federica Montseny's tenure, its total expenses amounted to 1,650,000 francs, which were covered by a French national collection.[42] Of course, in Spain, conveying thousands of children to the border, which often included housing and feeding them on the way, was not cheap. Moreover, the Ministry also had to pay the salaries and expenses for some staff based in France. Still, the CAEE's bill was much higher than the Ministry's.

If the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare was indeed responsible for bringing the children to the border, it *oversaw* more than it actually *organized* the transports. Admittedly, parents wishing to send children to France could register them at the Ministry's headquarters in Valencia.[43] But there were no instructions for the families who lived elsewhere because the newly created Social Welfare Ministry actually had no reach outside of Valencia.[44] And whatever the official gazette said, a number of child welfare institutions continued to be run by other public and private institutions. Federica Montseny thus had to rely on other organizations to register children and assemble and then convey them at least as far as Valencia. In Madrid, she mostly collaborated with the city's Defence Council who, in turn, worked with other local, political organizations. At the national level, the High Council for the Protection of Minors, who oversaw the network of orphanages and reform schools in Spain, organized four child transports to France from February to April 1937. In March 1937, Montseny also 'gladly authorized' the autonomous Basque government to send over 400 children from Bilbao to France under the care of the CAEE.[45]

Because most of the work was not actually carried out by the services of the Ministry, the child transport scheme did not generate the dedicated

administration and bureaucracy that usually go with the implementation of public policies. Though the Ministry's offices in Valencia supposedly held an information card for each child sent to France and received updated cards when the children left the transit camps for their permanent placement, it seems that no one was using this material to follow up on the children or produce statistics. Federica Montseny always turned to her team in Paris when she needed to know the location of a specific child or when she wanted data on the geographical distribution of the children in France.

In fact, the only Ministry officials who worked full time on running the Spanish children abroad programme were based in Paris. However, their status was ambiguous. On the one hand, they were ministry civil servants and together they formed the official Ministry's Delegation for Social Welfare in Paris. On the other hand, they were full members of the CAEE and, though they had an address at the consulate, they 'lived daily with the French Committee'.[46] Moreover, three of the four men forming the Delegation were none other than the three LEDH officials whose visit to France had been at the origins of the whole scheme, independently from any governmental representation. For this reason, their involvement in the organisation of the evacuations and their comradeship with the CAEE went far beyond their recent appointments as Ministry of Health and Social Welfare delegates.

There was however a shift towards increased administrative formalism and greater state intervention from March 1937. For example, the Ministry started requesting updated statistics on the children living in France and enquired about the exact functions and salaries of the Paris delegation staff.[47] Moreover, while the head of the delegation, Amós Sabrás, had been reporting directly either to the Minister herself or the Councillor for Social Welfare until March 1937, from that point onwards the delegation was placed under the responsibility of the Central Office for Evacuation and Refugee Relief (*Oficina Central de Evacuación y Asistencia a Refugiados*), created in late February.[48]

The measure that had the most impact, however, was the decision to stop placing Spanish children with foster families and to group them instead in children's colonies. Though it is unclear whether Montseny herself or other members of the government were behind this shift, it was her responsibility to impose it on the CAEE.[49] This new policy was costly and stressful for the CAEE, which was then faced with the task and costs of setting up and running the new colonies. Moreover, they may have disagreed on the very substance of this decision. At the November 1937 international conference for aid to Spanish children, and in a context of open conflict between the CAEE and the Spanish government, as we will see in the next section, the copresident of the CAEE, Victor Basch, vocally defended the benefits of family placement compared to collective life in children's colonies.[50] Yet, there are no traces of such a conflict between the Ministry and the CAEE on this issue when it was first brought up in March 1937. At the time, the CAEE quietly gave in to the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare's demands, even though

they may have disagreed with them, and they immediately started looking for premises and funding for setting up colonies.[51] This may be because they accepted the Spanish government's preeminence when it came to dealing with Spanish children.[52] But it was also, no doubt, because the CAEE was run by left-wing activists and not by educationalists or child welfare professionals. They may have had their own ideas on how to best accommodate the Spanish children in France, but this was not a deal-breaker for them.

Federica Montseny's tenure abruptly ended on 17 May 1937, collateral damage in the aftermath of the Barcelona May Days. It is impossible to know how the child evacuations abroad would have evolved under her leadership, though there are signs that they would have been increasingly controlled from Valencia and run as a regular public policy. The installation of a new government in May 1937 and the reassignment of portfolios after the anarchist ministers' departure greatly accelerated this process and substantially changed the nature of the child evacuation scheme.

Building a state public policy: the nationalist turn of child evacuations

On 17 May 1937, right socialist Juan Negrín formed a new cabinet. Now under the responsibility of the Minister of Education, Communist Jesús Hernández, the matter of child evacuations became fully integrated into the policy apparatus of his Ministry. This move was driven by a nationalist sentiment that Spanish children belonged to Spain. What made it possible, however, was the fact that within the Ministry, there was a pre-existing bureaucratic apparatus dedicated to the education of Spanish children abroad and expert pedagogical knowledge on children's colonies.

Hernández became Minister of Education on 4 September 1936, but he only turned to the child evacuations several months later. On 25 February 1937, he created a new body, the Central Delegation for Colonies (*Delegación central de colonias escolares*), charged with caring for school-aged children who had been evacuated 'within Republican Spain'.[53] Theoretically, this specification guaranteed against his Ministry encroaching on Federica Montseny's turf; in practice, however, after its creation, the Central Delegation for Colonies immediately began planning child evacuations abroad.[54] Still, until May 1937, the transports it organized to the USSR, Mexico and France were overseen by the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare.[55] When in May 1937, CNT ministers were ousted from cabinet, Federica Montseny's Ministry was cut in two, with Health being attached to Education and Social Welfare to Labour. Despite the fact that child evacuations had previously been connected to Social Welfare and not Health, Hernández took advantage of this opportunity to obtain a new 'delimitation of functions' between the two ministries.[56] A presidential decree of 28 June 1937 gave him 'exclusive authority' over all child welfare activities and institutions previously under Federica Montseny's charge.

Under the Ministry of Education – an administration much older and stronger than the short-lived Ministry of Health and Social Welfare had been – a fully fledged public policy was soon built around child evacuations abroad. First of all, the latter were now regulated by a series of decrees and orders published in the official gazette during the summer of 1937.[57] Contrary to what had happened in late 1936, when Under-Secretary Mercedes Maestre had met with the CAEE in Paris to fine-tune the organization of the transports, at no point were any foreign aid committees consulted about these legislative and regulatory changes. Second, there was now a substantial administration that dealt with child evacuees living both in Spain and abroad, and it was fully integrated within the hierarchical structure of the Ministry. The National Council for Evacuated Children (CNIE) replaced the earlier, slimmer Central Delegation for Colonies.[58] In Paris, the CNIE was represented by the Spanish Delegation for Evacuated Children (*Delegación española para la Infancia Evacuada*, DEIE).[59] Contrary to the Delegation for Social Welfare headed by Amós Sabrás, this was not a Spanish outpost nested within the CAEE. The DEIE had its own headquarters in the eighth district of Paris and was staffed with seasoned Ministry of Education civil servants charged with implementing the Ministry's policy abroad. By April 1938, seven Ministry officials were working in the central Paris offices, and 86 headteachers, teachers, nurses and cooks were working in 40 colonies throughout France.[60]

Within this new legal and administrative framework, the DEIE became the '*sole* body responsible for *everything* connected to the installation, organization, education and inspection of groups of Spanish children staying abroad, regardless of the organism that may have intervened in their evacuation, or contributed to their support'.[61] This represented a fundamental shift from the previous philosophy of the evacuations: Hernández had not only taken over Federica Montseny's former responsibilities but he was also claiming those of the CAEE and of any other private child aid committee whether Spanish or foreign. In this new configuration, the different private, foreign structures working with child refugees were placed under the DEIE.

The first head of the DEIE, Juan Comas, was intent on exercising the full range of his powers. His very first act on taking up his duties in late August 1937 was to send '[Spanish DEIE] civil servants under his authority' to the new CAEE transit camp that had been set up in a suburb of Paris. From among the thousands of child evacuees that had arrived from Santander in the previous weeks and who were awaiting permanent placement, Comas' envoys were supposed to select a number of children to be sent to colonies in Belgium and the USSR.[62] But to Comas' indignant surprise, the French director of the transit camp refused to recognize the DEIE's authority and said he only answered to the CAEE. The following day, Comas himself was refused access to the camp, even though he carried an official letter from the Spanish Ambassador. Comas deemed this situation 'unacceptable'. On 3 September 1937, he met for the first time with CAEE secretary-general Georges Buisson and summed up their talks in a 12-point document. It stipulated that the

CAEE should 'acknowledge the DEIE as the sole official organism in charge' of the child evacuation scheme, that the DEIE should be free 'to visit at any time... all children's colonies in France, regardless of the organization supporting them', and had the 'right to intervene' in their daily schedule, study plans and collective organization (including menus, staff, etc.), which in any case had to be approved beforehand and could be freely amended by the DEIE.[63] The remaining provisions went along the same lines. The document claimed that, forthwith, everything the CAEE did was under the control of the DEIE.

No doubt, these efforts to further centralize the child evacuation policy had to do with the wider political evolution of Republican Spain and the rebuilding of the Spanish state after its virtual collapse in the summer of 1936. They echoed the push for centralizing power in government that was characteristic of Juan Negrín's term after May 1937.[64] As Spanish Civil War historians have shown, the Spanish Communist Party had been at the forefront of this push since the fall of 1936, and it is clear that it valued hierarchy and obedience much more than did the decentralized and horizontal CNT.[65] It is therefore tempting to interpret the centralization of the child evacuation policy as a result of the transfer of responsibility from Anarchist Federica Montseny to Communist Jesús Hernández. Though this change may have played a part, the importance of political labels is difficult to assess and should not be overstated here for at least three reasons. First of all, there is a strong, misleading tendency in Spanish Civil War history to 'essentialize' political groups and use 'political acronyms to explain what the actors of the drama thought and did'.[66] Second, after the Ministry of Education was once more assigned to a CNT Minister, Segundo Blanco, in April 1938, the centralization policy was in fact reinforced, and previous legislation and guidelines remained in force.[67] Finally, no Spanish or French source connects the centralization policy implemented under Hernández with his Communist affiliations.

What the sources do underline, however, is that the Ministry of Education's policy was fuelled by a nationalist view of children as key to the future and salvation of Spain. The representation of children as the future of the nation was not limited to Spain; in fact, it was pervasive across Europe, North America and East Asia at the time.[68] This new vision of the national value of children usually entailed two kinds of policies. First, in Spain as elsewhere, social reformers, physicians and eugenicists developed medical and social policies against child mortality and morbidity in order to 'reinvigorate the race', as emphasized by the High Council for the Protection of Minors in 1922.[69] Second, governments and educationalists were also careful to cultivate children's national loyalties, mainly through school programs, curricular and extracurricular activities, military training and children's literature.[70] In Spanish political and pedagogical thought, the idea that education was both the cause of the nation's failures and the principal tool for its 'regeneration' had grown deep roots since Spain's defeat in the 1898 war against the United States and the loss of Spain's last colonies.

Evacuations were a double-edged initiative in this regard. On the one hand, they were intended to save (at least some) Spanish children from the hardships of war, thus safeguarding the biological future of Spain. Yet, on the other hand, many Spanish officials feared that the children would integrate too well in their new national environment and thus be lost to Spain. As an Education Ministry official would recall in August 1938, 'in early 1937, [it was feared that] the departure of children to foreign countries could amount to their denationalization'.[71] These fears echoed those voiced about earlier displacements of children caused by war. In the early 1920s, white Russian émigré organizations in Constantinople feared that the thousands of children forced to leave the motherland were losing 'their native language and cultural identity'.[72] They considered those children as 'true Russia', 'the most precious of our national property', and believed that the only way to safeguard this treasure was to educate these refugee children in special Russian schools.[73] Similar concerns and solutions were developed regarding child survivors of the Armenian genocide in the same years.[74] After the Second World War, with hundreds of thousands of children living as refugees across Europe, and thousands more having been forcibly 'Germanized', fears about the denationalization of European children became global, as Tara Zahra has shown.[75] However, in all these cases, international organizations, states, nationalist activists and humanitarians were trying to *repair* the damage created by forced and often violent child displacements. The Spanish case is different, in that the evacuations were planned by the Republican state itself. Spanish officials thus had the opportunity to try to *prevent* denationalization from happening at all.

The Spanish government developed two countermeasures to ward off the denationalization of Spanish children. The first was to claim Spain's natural guardianship over them. This is the rationale behind the legislation passed during the summer of 1937 and behind the DEIE's mission statement. And indeed, in his dealings with the CAEE, the delegate Juan Comas often emphasized this. For example, the fact that he, 'a delegate of the [Spanish] Government', was denied access to the CAEE transit camp was deemed 'unacceptable in a *Spanish* children's colony, regardless of the organization that supports it'.[76] Two weeks later, he was infuriated that the CAEE seemed to 'deny *Spain* the right to dispose of *its* children'.[77] To Juan Comas, whatever the CAEE and the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare may have negotiated in the fall of 1936, Spain as a nation, and as a state (which he represented), was the primary guardian of Spanish children abroad.

The second counter-measure to the feared denationalization of child evacuees involved replacing the individual placement of Spanish children with French foster families – the initial solution – with their collective placement in colonies under the care of Spanish civil servant teachers, or failing this, their placement with Spanish immigrant families. The objective was that the Spanish children living in France would remain as much as possible in a Spanish environment. In fact, this decision pre-dated the Ministry of

Education takeover of child evacuations; as mentioned above, in mid–March 1937, Federica Montseny had already begun enforcing it, underlining that this new placement method was a government decision from higher up. The government decree granting the Ministry of Education full responsibility over Spanish child evacuees further specified that:

> children evacuated abroad… should all receive, as much as possible, ed–ucation and instruction under the direction of Spanish school teachers so that… they do not lose what unites them to Spanish culture nor, above all, their native tongue.[78]

According to the Ministry of Education, 'anything less would mean the aban–donment by the Government of the Republic of its inescapable duty to keep the culture, language and history of the fatherland alive in those who repre–sent the generation of the future'.[79]

The Education Ministry regulations as regards child evacuees in the sum–mer of 1937 underline the fact that even for the most advanced, republican, and even Communist educationalists, the 'culture, history and language of the fatherland' were still the main building blocks of Spanish identity.[80] Since 1931, the Second Republic had officially promoted a more 'civic' and less 'ethnic' brand of nationalism, which sought to make Spain a 'community of democratic citizens' who valued the rule of law, freedom and equality.[81] It is possible that, on the ground, such 'civic' nationalism was actually taught by Spanish schoolteachers appointed to colonies in France, but this does not appear in the legal texts and official instructions. Because the children were living abroad and ran the risk of being denationalized, emphasis was placed on the most basic and crucial elements of national identity.

This nationalist turn of the child evacuation policy was facilitated by the heritage of previous schooling policies on Spanish child immigrants, which had aimed to 'prevent them from losing their connection to their country of origin'.[82] Since the early 1920s, the Foreign Ministry, through its Council for Cultural Relations (*Junta de Relaciones Culturales*), had been trying to open Spanish schools abroad in areas with a large Spanish immigrant population such as Toulouse, Bordeaux and Oran. Eventually, in 1932, the Council ne–gotiated the creation of 21 Spanish after-school classes in metropolitan France and Algeria and 15 more in 1933. Instructors were recruited from among Spanish public schoolteachers through a competitive examination organized by the Ministry of Education. They taught Spanish language, history, geog–raphy and civic education. They were also required to celebrate important national holidays, 'become the propagandists of their country and of the Re–publican regime' and, in short, 'foster the national sentiment in the children of Spanish emigrants'.[83] When the DEIE was created in August 1937, it built on, and merged with, the Council – and indeed, the latter had been officially dissolved by the end of the year.[84]

The DEIE, far from being created ex nihilo, thus took over the Council for Cultural Relations' pedagogical goals and its staff. At the DEIE Paris

headquarters, all workers were public schoolteachers formerly employed by the Council.[85] For example, Alejandro Tarragó, appointed in 1932 to teach in the Paris suburb of Aubervilliers, became Comas' right-hand man, while Juan Alonso Coll, appointed in 1933 to Pau in the South-West, became responsible for the census and statistical surveys of child evacuees.[86] The best example by far, however, was Comas himself. In parallel with his functions as provincial inspector for Segovia, he was recruited in 1933 by the Council for Cultural Relations to inspect Spanish classes and schools abroad every year.[87] Significantly, within the first three weeks of his appointment as DEIE, he left Paris for a two-day 'inspection tour' of Spanish children's colonies in France.[88] Comas went about his tasks at the DEIE, acting as a school inspector – inspecting, evaluating and correcting.

The Ministry's new policy towards child evacuees, and especially the new focus on collective housing, also benefited from the pedagogical expertise of Ministry officials. Spanish educationalists participated actively in international debates about summer camps and other welfare institutions for working-class children. As in other countries, summer camps were initially a philanthropic initiative with mostly health-related objectives for poor children from the cities. However, whereas Swiss or French summer camps were first organized by Catholic or Protestant charities at the end of the nineteenth century, in Spain, they were always promoted by educationalists and seen as a complement to schooling. Significantly, they were called '*school* holiday camps' (*colonias escolares de vacaciones*). From the 1910s, the Ministry of Education was increasingly involved in financing, developing and regulating them.[89] The DEIE inherited both this tradition of state intervention in the operation of children's colonies and the long-standing involvement of Spanish schoolteachers and educationalists in the matter. For example, Comas himself had co-authored a booklet on *Children's Cantines and Colonies* in 1935. The same guidelines he advocated then could be found again, two years later, in the booklet *Children's Colonies* published by the CNIE for the Paris Aid Conference.[90] One example demonstrates the extent to which Comas leant on his pre-existing educational baggage in the execution of his duties as delegate for evacuated children. When he was finally allowed into the CAEE transit camp, he noted that 'three different meals were served there: one for Spanish children and adults, one for the French staff and one for the French management team'. CNIE guidelines, he remarked, insisted that the same menus be served to children and adults alike, with differences only in quantities.[91] In his 1935 booklet, he had made the exact same recommendation. Even when it came to the finer details, Education Ministry officials relied on pre-existing beliefs and attitudes when dealing with the wartime child transports.

A thwarted transformation: the challenges and costs of running a state policy

By the fall of 1937, by all appearances, the Spanish child evacuations abroad had fully transformed into a national public policy, designed within the

Ministry of Education and dutifully carried out by its civil servants on the ground. However, this transformation was contested from the start and would never be fully achieved.

First of all, the Ministry of Education's claim to be the sole official body responsible for evacuated children was challenged by other Spanish government officials. Amós Sabrás, the Social Welfare delegate, refused to abandon his post. After the government reshuffle of May 1937, he remained in France, now under the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare, and collaborated with the CAEE and Basque government delegates to assist with the massive arrival of evacuated children from Bilbao. With the support of Labour Minister Jaime Aguadé, he successfully argued that the Ministry of Education was only responsible for school-aged children living in collective housing. In contrast, Social Welfare, which he represented, was still responsible for children under 8 and above 14 years old as well as children individually placed with families – who still represented, and would remain, the majority of Spanish child evacuees in France.[92] The relationship between the two delegates was notoriously acrimonious, as they constantly competed to place children either in collective colonies or with French foster parents. What's more, the Basque government was dealing with child evacuations from Bilbao in an increasingly autonomous manner, developing a network of colonies where children of Basque nationalists could receive a Basque (and Catholic) education. When, upon his arrival in France, Comas asked the head of the Basque Department of Culture, Jesús María Leizaola, to hand over to him the list of teaching staff in Basque children's colonies in France, the latter simply answered that he 'disagreed with the decree giving [Comas] the power to ask what he was asking, since in his opinion this would lessen the powers granted to the Basque Country by the Statute [of Autonomy]'.[93] The Education Ministry's push for centralization failed, even within the Spanish context.

Second, the CAEE, which had until then been the Spanish government's principal partner in France, also protested the Ministry of Education's centralization policy. As I have argued elsewhere, the real deal-breaker for the CAEE was not the substance of the Education Ministry's decisions regarding Spanish children in France, but the fact that they sought to take them unilaterally, without any consultation or negotiation mechanism with the CAEE.[94] After weeks of mounting tension, the CAEE purely and simply refused the DEIE's claim to be 'the sole official organism in charge' of child evacuees in France.[95] Ironically, they turned the Ministry of Education's argument back on it, agreeing that the centralization of powers was indeed necessary, but should lie with them. Moreover, given that all Spanish children previously entrusted to their care were now placed, the CAEE's collaboration in the event of new transports was suspended, unless satisfying terms of agreement could be found.[96]

The setbacks encountered by the Ministry of Education's delegate in France had two major consequences. First, child evacuations abroad were indeed interrupted from late September 1937. They would only resume in June

1938, when a new Minister of Education, Segundo Blanco, and a new team at the CNIE deemed that the advantages of life abroad, in countries where foodstuffs and other necessary items were not missing as badly as in Republican Spain, now far outweighed the 'risks of denationalization' to which the children were exposed when sent beyond the government's reach.[97] Second, as regards those thousands of children who were already living in France, and despite the repeated support of Minister Hernández himself, Comas had no real choice but to implicitly accept the CAEE's terms.[98] This amounted to an admission that, in practice, the new Spanish legislation adopted during the summer of 1937 could not be fully implemented on the ground.

The third, and last, element that thwarted the realization of the Ministry of Education's policy was money. Running colonies in France was extremely costly – too costly, as it turned out, to move the thousands of children living with foster families and place them in collective settings or to open a colony for every incoming group, especially if children were to continue to arrive as they had been each month by the hundreds, and sometimes thousands since January 1937. In order to cover these costs, Comas' initial strategy had been to diversify the colonies' sources of funding. In many countries, aid committees for Spanish children had been formed, but had been unable to convince their governments to open their borders to Spanish child evacuees. The DEIE thus encouraged them to finance children's colonies elsewhere, especially in Spain and in France. As soon as he arrived in France, Comas strove to arrange meetings with Swedish, Dutch and Czechoslovakian child relief committees, which he prioritized over CAEE meetings.[99] By 21 September 1937, he had come to an agreement with the Swedish committee to provide for the opening of three children's homes around Paris, where 170 school-aged children could be housed.[100] By April 1938, according to Juan Comas' successor – who was no other than his wife, Regina Lago, and the former head of the education section of the CNIE – the Swedish committee had become the sponsor of the largest group of children living in colonies in France (except of course, for the CAEE), supporting 350 children distributed across nine different colonies in the South-West and around Paris.[101]

Sponsorship from foreign aid committees was far from enough, however. Initially, the Spanish government had pledged to cover expenses if foreign funds were lacking; this was stated in the ministerial order creating the DEIE and that is what Comas was told when he was appointed. On 15 October 1937, he was promised a credit of 200,000 francs and asked for a further 4 million, but they never came, despite his desperate and repeated pleas.[102] In November 1937, funds were lacking to the point that he could not pay the shipping costs for sending 50 Spanish schoolbooks to one of the CAEE colonies.[103] In the end, there was simply no money to implement the public policy envisioned by the Ministry. As the Spanish Deputy-Ambassador reluctantly recognized in June 1938, 'Our wish would be to keep all the children under our direct care and custody, but that is impossible, for lack of funds'.[104]

Conclusion

Initially conceived as a solidarity project organized between activists of the French and Spanish left without the need for state intervention, within a year, child evacuations had become a centralized public policy, designed in ministerial offices and implemented by seasoned civil servants. In this particular case, this transformation was not imposed by foreign aid providers, simply because the CAEE was not an organization specialized in child aid but rather an offshoot of the French left and labour movement. Its members may have had an opinion on how best to care for the Spanish children in France, and they may have, at times, disagreed with Spanish officials on the issue, but their goal was not to reform Spanish child welfare institutions. In this context, three elements played a key role in turning child evacuations into public policy. First of all, Spanish state officials wanted to reinforce and modernize Spanish child welfare and educational institutions. Second, the fear that Spanish children might lose what connected them to the 'fatherland' – their language, culture and history – was very present within state and educationalist circles. This explains their desire to centralize all decision-making within the government regarding child evacuees and to place the children in collective settings that could constitute pockets of Spanishness abroad. Third, this project could not have been achieved had Spanish officials not been able to begin from a pre-existing foundation. Far from simply appropriating the CAEE's aid scheme, they built upon their own previous experiences in running school holiday camps and pre-existing policies designed to preserve a sense of national identity in the children of Spanish migrant workers.

The transformation of child evacuations abroad into public policy may be read, less as an example of humanitarian imperialism, as one chapter in the wider history of the reconstruction of the Spanish Republican state during the civil war. In the end, the government's attempt to nationalize the child transport relief scheme was a partial failure. No doubt, it suffered from the persistent weaknesses of the Republican state at war – a lack of political consensus within government and competition from autonomous, local and regional powers. However, there were also intrinsic weaknesses to the project; as it turned out, international aid could not be turned into state policy without the necessary funds.

This case study also points to a question that may not have been sufficiently explored by historians who research the imperialist component of humanitarian interventions, namely, the agency of recipient countries in these interactions, and the ways in which they appropriate international aid programs and adapt them to suit their needs. Undoubtedly, after the First World War, American humanitarians seeking to rehabilitate Europe deliberately engaged in humanitarian state-building, hoping to transfer American expertise and institutions across the Atlantic. However, European national authorities may well have actively participated in this transfer. What's more, they may have done so, paradoxically, to further the nationalist agenda of modernizing and consolidating their states.

Notes

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2 Archivo General de la Administración (subsequently AGA), *Educación*, 31/1347, Invoices from the printing house La Coopérative in Paris. Five thousand copies of the French edition and 5,000 copies of the English edition were ordered on 10 November 1937.

3 C. Keren, 'Sur les routes. Exilés et réfugiés de la guerre d'Espagne', in J. Canal and V. Duclert (eds), *La Guerre d'Espagne: Un conflit qui a façonné l'Europe* (Paris, 2016); S. Sheridan Breakwell, '"Knowing how to be a mother": Parenting, emotion and evacuation propaganda during the Spanish Civil War (1936–39)', in C. Siebrecht, and H. Barron (eds), *Parenting and the State in Britain and Europe, c. 1870–1950. Raising the nation* (Basingstoke, 2017); J. Aróstegui Sánchez, and J.A. Martínez, *La Junta de Defensa de Madrid: Noviembre 1936-abril 1937* (Madrid, 1984), 171–188.

4 National Council for Evacuated Children, *Children's Colonies* (Spanish Republic. Ministry of Public Education, Paris, 1937).

5 *Ibid.*, 1.

6 *Ibid.*, 'Foreword'.

7 In Spain, the 1936–1939 child evacuations abroad were 'rediscovered' in the mid-1980s, in the context of the 50th anniversary of the Civil War. The incentive for historical research into this subject came from activist groups of former child evacuees, spurred by the more general 'recovery of historical memory' movement of the 1990s and 2000s. The resulting body of historical work has concentrated much more on the experiences and memories of the children themselves (often using oral testimony) than on the political history of the adult activists and officials who initiated and ran the evacuations. See, among others, J.J. Alonso Carballés, *1937: los niños Vascos Evacuados a Francia y Bélgica: historia y memoria de un éxodo infantil, 1936–1940* (Bilbao, 1998); A. Alted Vigil, R. González Martell, and M.J. Millán (eds), *El exilio de los Niños* (Madrid, 2003); V. Sierra Blas, *Palabras Huérfanas: los niños y la Guerra Civil* (Madrid, 2009); S. Castillo, *Mis Años en la Escuela Soviética: El discurso autobiográfico de los niños españoles en la URSS* (Madrid, 2009); I. Colomina Limonero, *Dos Patrias, Tres Mil Destinos: vida y exilio de los niños de la guerra de España refugiados en la Unión Soviética* (Madrid, 2010); A. Pozo-Gutierrez, *'Here, Look After Him': Voices of Basque evacuee children of the Spanish Civil War* (Southampton, 2012). The political aspects of the evacuations have mostly been studied in the case of Britain and France: T. Buchanan, 'The role of the British labour movement in the origins and work of the Basque Children's Committee, 1937–9', *European History Quarterly*, 18, 2 (1988), 155–174; A. Bell, *Only for Three Months. The Basque children in exile* (Norwich, 1996).

8 On the productive interaction between public and private actors in the field of social protection, see the introduction to this book.

9 J. Irwin, *Making the World Safe: The American Red Cross and a nation's humanitarian awakening* (New York, 2013).

10 D. Rodogno, F. Piana, and S. Gautier, 'Shaping Poland: Relief and rehabilitation programmes undertaken by foreign organizations, 1918–1922', in D. Rodogno, B. Struck, and J. Vogel (eds), *Shaping the Transnational Sphere: Experts, networks and issues from the 1840s to the 1930s* (New York, 2014).

11 *Ibid.*, 267.

12 C. Keren, 'When the CGT did humanitarian work: Spanish children evacuated to France (1936–1939)', *Le Mouvement Social*, 264, 3 (2018). Available on Cairn

international. https://www.cairn-int.info/abstract-E_LMS_264_0015--when-the-cgt-did-humanitarian-work.htm?contenu=article (accessed 28 October 2021); C. Keren, 'Négocier l'aide humanitaire: Les évacuations d'enfants espagnols vers la France pendant la guerre civile (1936–1939)', *Revue d'Histoire de l'Enfance 'Irrégulière'*, 15 (2013), 167–183.

13 ANSE Central Committee, 'Il faut épargner aux enfants d'Espagne les conséquences de la Guerre civile', *Tribune de l'Enfance. Organe mensuel de l'Association nationale de soutien de l'enfance* (subsequently *Tribune de l'Enfance*), 1, 7 (July–August 1936), 1.

14 'Vite le deuxième million!', *L'Humanité. Organe central du Parti Communiste (SFIC)* (subsequently *L'Humanité*), 13761 (20 August 1936), 7.

15 'Il faut assurer le gîte et la nourriture aux petits enfants d'Espagne! Constituez partout des comités locaux d'hébergement!', *L'Humanité*, 13763 (22 August 1936), 7.

16 M. Onof, 'Mes impressions de délégation', *Tribune de l'Enfance*, 1, 8 (1936), 4.

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18 L. Mercier, 'Le Secours ouvrier international en France', in J. Gotovitch, and A. Morelli (eds), *Les Solidarités Internationales: histoire et perspectives* (Bruxelles, 2003), 47. Both SOI/ANSE leaders feature in the now online biographical dictionary *Maitron en Ligne: dictionnaire biographique, mouvement ouvrier, mouvement social*, at https://maitron.fr/ (accessed 1 September 2020).

19 M. Leroy, *La Coutume Ouvrière: Syndicats, bourses du travail, fédérations professionnelles, coopératives, doctrines et institutions* (Paris, 1913), 680–684.

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22 M. Nelken, *Niños de Hoy, hombres de Mañana* (Madrid, 1937).

23 H. Graham, *The Spanish Republic at War, 1936–1939* (Cambridge, 2002), 79–131; J.L. Ledesma Vera, 'Una retaguardia al rojo: las violencias en la zona republicana', in F. Espinosa Maestre (ed), *Violencia Roja y Azul: España, 1936–1950* (Barcelona, 2010).

24 Onof, 'Mes impressions', *op. cit.* 'Frente popular' appears in Spanish in the original French text.

25 Keren, 'When the CGT did humanitarian work', *op. cit.*

26 J. Aróstegui, *Largo Caballero: el tesón y la quimera* (Barcelona, 2013), 515–544.

27 Febus Agency dispatch, 'Francia se propone recoger a treinta mil niños españoles', *ABC. Diario republicano de izquierdas*, Madrid edition (subsequently *ABC de Madrid*) (13 November 1936), 12.

28 French National Archives (subsequently AN), *Archive of the Commission d'aide aux enfants espagnols réfugiés en France*, 20010225/1, f. 1–7, Meeting minutes of the French Popular Front National Committee, 7 January 1937.

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40 Febus Agency dispatch, 'La evacuación de niños a Francia', *ABC de Madrid* (19 December 1936), 6.

41 'Indications pour la venue en France des enfants d'Espagne', *La Voix du Peuple* [internal CGT Bulletin] (December 1936), 793.

42 CGT Archives, *CAEE Papers*, 97 CFD 46/1, f. 104ss. Statement of expenses of the CAEE.

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46 *Ibid.*, f. 18, Letter from Amós Sabrás to Federica Montseny, Paris, 17 March 1937.

47 *Ibid.*

48 Ministerial Orders of 17 and 23 February 1937. *Gaceta de la República*, 49 (18 February 1937), 871, and 57 (26 February 1937), 982–983.

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50 AGA, *Asuntos exteriores*, 54/11044, Report from Victoria Kent and Bernardino Valle, Spanish Embassy delegates at the November 1937 international conference for aid to Spanish children in Paris, 20 November 1937.

51 AN, *Archive of the Commission d'aide aux enfants espagnols réfugiés en France*, 20010221/9, inventory 2, folder 3, f. 181–186, Letter from Georges Buisson to the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, undated [31 March 1937].

52 On this issue, see Keren, 'Négocier l'aide humanitaire', *op. cit.*

53 Ministerial Order of 25 February 1937. *Gaceta de la República*, 60 (1 March 1937), 1021.

54 AGA, *Educación*, 31/1347, Meeting minutes of the Central Delegation for Colonies, 26 February 1937.

55 *Ibid.*, Meeting minutes of the Central Delegation for Colonies, 4 April 1937.

56 Presidential Decree of 28 June, *Gaceta de la República*, 180 (29 June 1937), 1405–1406.

57 Besides the Presidential Decree cited in *ibid.*, the most important were the Presidential Decree of 6 August 1937, the Ministerial Order of 10 August 1937 and

the Ministerial Order of 24 August 1937. They were, respectively, published in the *Gaceta de la República*, 219 (7 August 1937), 510–511; 228 (16 August 1937) and 671–672; 240 (28 August 1937), 827.

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67 Ministerial Order of 4 July 1938, *Gaceta de la República*, 190 (9 July 1938), 107. I thank Alba Padrós for pointing this out to me.

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76 AN, *Archive of the Commission d'aide aux enfants espagnols réfugiés en France*, 20010221/9, inventory 2, folder 2, f. 101–102, Letter from Juan Comas to the CAEE, Paris, 1 September 1937.

77 *Ibid.*, f. 116–119, Letter from Juan Comas to Georges Buisson, Paris, 17 September 1937.

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83 *Ibid.*, 528.

84 AGA, *Presidencia*, 54/11675, Letter from Wenceslao Roces, Under-Secretary for Education, to Ángel Ossorio y Gallardo, Spanish Ambassador to France, Barcelona, 2 December 1937.

85 *Ibid.*, 51/21120, Letter from the delegate Regina Lago de Comas to the foreign relations section of the CNIE, Paris, 23 April 1938.

86 These appointments can be found in the Ministerial Orders of 18 November 1932 and 21 November 1933, respectively, published in *Gaceta de la República*, 324 (19 November 1932), 1235–1236; and 335 (1 December 1937), 1417.

87 Junta de Relaciones Culturales, *Memoria correspondiente a los años 1931 a 1933* (Ministerio de Estado, Madrid, 1934), 14.

88 AN, *Archive of the Commission d'aide aux enfants espagnols réfugiés en France*, 20010221/9, inventory 2, folder 2, f. 125, Letter from Alejandro Tarragó to Georges Buisson, Paris, 7 September 1937.

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92 According to Spanish official counts, in November 1937, 2,683 Spanish children were living in colonies, and 4,143 in families, for a total of 6,826 Spanish children evacuated to France. Report of the DEIE at the international conference for aid to Spanish children, Paris, November 1937. AN, *Archive of the Commission d'aide aux enfants espagnols réfugiés en France*, 20010221/9, inventory 2, folder 2, f. 48–76.

93 Letter from Juan Comas to Spanish Ambassador Angel Ossorio y Gallardo, Paris, 17 September 1937. *Ibid*. The October 1936 Statute of Autonomy did include education and culture in Article 4.

94 Keren, 'Négocier l'aide humanitaire', *op. cit.*

95 AN, *Archive of the Commission d'aide aux enfants espagnols réfugiés en France*, 20010221/9, inventory 2, folder 2, f. 105–106, see the 'Points fondamentaux d'accord préalable', attached to the letter from Juan Comas to Georges Buisson, Paris, 3 September 1937.

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97 International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam, *CNT Papers*, 66E. 2, Report by Secretary Enrique Alaiz on the current state of the CNIE, Barcelona, 1 August 1938.

98 AN, *Archive of the Commission d'aide aux enfants espagnols réfugiés en France*, 20010221/9, inventory 2, folder 2, f. 145–146, and 148–149, Official communication from Jesús Hernández to Juan Comas, for the CAEE, 15 October 1937; and Note from the DEIE to the CAEE, Paris, 25 October 1937.

99 *Ibid.*, f. 103, Letter from Juan Comas to Georges Buisson, Paris, 2 September 1937.

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102 AGA, *Asuntos exteriores*, 82/02666, folder 182, Telegram from Spanish Ambassador Ángel Ossorio y Gallardo to Foreign Minister José Giral, Paris, 23 October 1937.
103 CGT Archives, *CAEE Papers*, 97 CFD 46/3, Letter from Émile Baynac, director of Lamothe castle colony, to Georges Buisson, Villeneuve-sur-Lot, 13 November 1937.
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7   Dividing international work on social protection of migrants

The International Labour Office and private organizations (1921–1935)[1]

Linda Guerry

Introduction

Immediately after World War I, the idea of regulations about international migration integrating the concept of migrant protection was raised for the first time by an international organization: the newly formed International Labour Organization (ILO),[2] whose goal was to build 'a universal system of protection providing minimum guarantees to all emigrants.'[3] Its permanent secretariat, the International Labour Office, tried to find a stance that could satisfy the often divergent interests of its different members by leaning in particular on non-governmental organizations, which were referred to at the time as 'private organizations.' Above and beyond an assessment of the unequal influence of the various players involved, this chapter aims to show how that inequality led to establishing a division of labour[4] that would contribute to the internationalization of the question of social protection for migrants.

The ILO, an organization tied to the League of Nations, was created by the Versailles Peace Treaty of 1919. Its purpose was to employ international law to create social justice in the interest of peace. In its early years, the organization, with its unique three-party structure (comprised representatives of governments, workers and employers), had to impose itself on the international scene. Its permanent secretariat, the International Labour Office, the organization's central hub, worked hard to establish its legitimacy, negotiating with representatives of governments asserting their sovereignty in a context of tension and economic crisis. The Office's project of adopting international labour standards, known as Conventions and Recommendations, was an extension of the social-policy reform work already being done by private organizations before the First World War.[5] Those reformers – some of whom, including the first director, the Socialist Reformist and former French Minister of Armament Albert Thomas (1878–1932), went on to join the Office – supported the idea of impartial, coordinated management of migration flows in order to regulate the labour market at the international level, while increasing migrants' social protection at the same time.[6] Their goal was also to use migration as a lever to help spread the rights recently won by nationals in order to create universal labour rights.[7]

The need for consensus among the different parties led the Office both to develop ties and to collaborate discreetly with private migrant-protection associations. Most of them had been founded by religious organizations, often in the late nineteenth century, as migration flows had been increasing to several countries, primarily in Europe, the British Empire and North America. As recent historiography has shown, the Office, whose director hoped to turn it into a centre for social expertise, used private groups as resources for information as well as for networking in different fields.[8] Studies of the 'transnational sphere,'[9] which focus on the connections between and circulation amongst players in and on the fringes of international organizations during the interwar period, have revealed the role of non-state actors. With ties to various movements, such as Social Christianity, humanitarian aid and the feminist movement, they participated in getting certain issues onto the international agenda, and in drafting new international standards, particularly by providing expert information to various advisory bodies.[10] This chapter will focus on actors who have seldom been studied in the history of migration policies and who were key players in the early stages of international migration governance.[11] While research on the ILO has increased in recent years on the occasion of the centenary of the organization,[12] little attention has been paid to the organization's migration work in the 1920s and 1930s.[13] The analysis I propose is in a similar vein to recent research focussing on key collective and individual players and policy-makers and on their discourse and practices in constructing and internationalizing public issues. From that point of view, the interactions between private and international organizations in constructing the issue of social protection for migrants have not been studied in depth.[14] This chapter will focus on the relationships between the Office and the migrant-protection groups that banded together into an umbrella organization: the Permanent Conference for the Protection of Migrants (CPPM). The history of the construction of those relationships, the factors that led to those organizations uniting and the division of labour put into place by the Office and its consequences on how the issue of migrant protection was shaped remain to be written. Research for the chapter drew largely on the archives of the Office and the League, which included minutes of meetings, records of decisions, reports and publications as well as correspondence and internal memos. The latter sources shed light on issues that would not necessarily appear in texts meant to be made public. The research focussed on the players present, their material and symbolic resources, their practices and relationships, and both the constraints imposed and the opportunities provided by institutional frameworks and international events. This chapter will successively analyse the relationship established between migrant-protection organizations and the Office in 1921, the process that led to migrant-protection groups coming together under the banner of the CPPM, and that collective organization's status and role within the framework of the division of labour devised by the Office. It will also explore what the CPPM produced as well as what caused it to disappear.

Establishing ties between the office and migrant–protection organizations: The International Emigration Commission

The first bonds between migrant-protection organizations and Office officials were woven at a meeting of an advisory board on the question of migrations that had been established to define the ILO's stance on that issue. In accordance with a decision approved in a resolution on unemployment that was adopted at the first session of the International Labour Conference (held in Washington DC, in November, 1919), the Governing Body[15] of the ILO established the International Emigration Commission (IEC), which would meet in Geneva from 2 to 11 August 1921. The tripartite commission included 18 representatives of governments, employers and workers (nine European and nine non-European countries were represented). The IEC, which had no permanent mandate, adopted 29 resolutions covering a broad programme: 'to find remedies for the various abuses to which emigrants are subject' while respecting 'the sovereign right of each state.'[16] Among the resolutions adopted were: information-gathering (legislation and migration statistics), creating a permanent emigration commission, state supervision of emigration agents, insuring emigrants during the voyage, examining emigrants before embarkation and protecting emigrants in ports and at borders. On the margins of national-sovereignty issues, or else reinforcing government control of migratory paths, the resolutions addressed subjects to which governments did not raise objections. Alongside representatives of governments, workers and employers, the Commission also heard both from representatives of British steamship companies – who defended 'a policy of free play of emigration and immigration' and from 'the representatives of certain international associations whose object is to improve the conditions of emigrants.'[17] 'Several delegates, both men and women, came from America,' and their organizations and associations provided the commission with 'special enquiries.'[18]

Louis Varlez (1868–1930), a Belgian who was a close associate of Albert Thomas, was appointed to be secretary of the IEC. A lawyer who taught at the University of Ghent, Varlez was instrumental in building bonds between the Office and the private organizations. In 1900, he founded a system of assistance to unemployed people in the city of Ghent that involved both public authorities (the municipal government) and unions; it would go on to be applied in many other cities. Having cofounded the International Association on Unemployment (IAU) in 1910, he used it as a pulpit for defending the public system of assistance to the unemployed.[19] The IAU's role was to coordinate the efforts to limit unemployment being made in various countries. They used a range of different means to achieve this: organizing conferences, subsidizing and publishing research, and soliciting both private and public institutions. The association was close to both Socialist and labour-union circles and particularly with Albert Thomas; in the 1920s, several high-ranking

officials and experts at the Office came from the IAU.[20] In 1920, Varlez was appointed to run one of the Office's technical departments,[21] the Unemployment Section, which was renamed the Emigration and Unemployment Section (or Service) in 1921.[22] In 1928, having reached mandatory retirement age, he was replaced by his Belgian colleague Henri Fuss (1882–1964).[23] From 1921 on, thanks to a meeting with the IEC, Varlez began to develop ties with the Young Women's Christian Association (YWCA), which he saw as a resource for useful information for the Office. This umbrella movement of protestant women's organizations was founded in England in the mid-nineteenth century and then spread to North America, where aiding female immigrants became the principle focus of its work.[24] It eventually developed enormous expertise and experience in a social approach to migrations on an international scale. Varlez had this to say about them:

> The many international charitable organizations, such as the YMCA [Young Men's Christian Association] and the YWCA, and national ones, such as the countless groups and institutions of emigrants in the countries of immigration, should be seen as agents of information in terms of the abuses they are aware of – ardently impassioned agents, granted, but ones whose information could be effectively verified.[25]

Varlez also grabbed at the chance to build ties with the United States, at a time when the country was closing its borders and expressing hostility to the idea of the Office handling migratory issues (it had not sent a delegation to the IEC). Varlez followed the advice of Ernest Greenwood, the Office's representative in Washington DC, who suggested that Thomas accept American organizations' requests for invitations to attend the IEC:

> It would be a matter of good policy, [would help us] make friends and give us some most desirable publicity […] the more interest which is taken by organizations such as these in the work of the International Labour Office, the easier it will be to deal with the administration.[26]

On their end, YWCA members reached out to the freshly minted international organizations, offering to help enlarge their networks and develop their resources. They used their ability to provide information and to investigate situations to gain access on the Genevan international scene. In April 1921, the young American social worker Mary E. Hurlbutt[27] met with Thomas and Varlez to present a report-in-progress based on what social workers had gleaned about the hardship and abuse suffered by migrants in their countries of origin (Poland and Czechoslovakia), transit (France, Switzerland, Germany, Belgium and Turkey) and destination (United States and Canada). At that time, Hurlbutt was working for the first international organization specifically dedicated to social work with migrants, the International Migration Service (IMS),[28] which had been founded in London just a month earlier, in

March 1921, and which had replaced the Migration Committee of the World YWCA (WYWCA).[29]

Subsequent correspondence between Varlez and Hurlbutt nonetheless allowed the Office to limit the scope of cooperation between the international organization and the private ones; it also shows the influence of the government-level players whose demands Thomas had to meet. Hurlbutt asked Varlez for the Office's support (an official letter of cooperation) for an investigation she was conducting, *The Welfare of Migrants*, that she was presenting as a contribution to the work of the IEC, which would be convening a few months later.[30] Varlez refused; the Office could not commission an investigation from a private organization without running the risk of provoking governmental ire, particularly in the immigration nations, which were resisting the idea of letting the international organization address migration. A questionnaire made for the purposes of the investigation, which implied that it was being conducted under the Office's aegis, led to a complaint being filed by the High Commissioner of the Dominion of New Zealand. The situation angered Thomas, who remembered, 'the little lady's visit' and insisted that Varlez clarify their respective positions: the YWCA's work had to remain 'unofficial.' The Office, as an official agency, could not provide patronage for such a survey, 'which would not please the various governments.'[31]

Although the Office had to insist that the IMS's work was 'unofficial,' it was nonetheless helpful to Thomas, who could take advantage of the information found through its investigations. He also maintained ties with its members and counted on their presence at the IEC. Hurlbutt's report, which was printed a month before the IEC was held, was sent by Elizabeth Clark, co-founder of the IMS, to Thomas before the Commission was convened. A few days later, Thomas urged Varlez to write Clark a 'warm and polite letter in response,' letting her know that he hoped she would be able to 'attend the commission as an auditor', adding that she 'was worth the trouble.'[32] The summer of 1921 saw the beginning of a steady stream of correspondence between the women of the IMS and Varlez. In July, Clark (IMS) and Ruth Crawford (a member of the American branch of the YWCA) met with Varlez in Geneva, where they were able to audit the IEC meeting. In their correspondence, Clark presents her organization as a key international player and criticizes other organizations' amateurism. She flaunts her international capital,[33] mentioning, among other things, her organization's ties to parliamentarians and its ability to mobilize people in numerous countries on the issue:

> Just returned from a long trip in Scandinavia, the Baltic states and Germany, doing preliminary work to arouse interest in the welfare of women migrants. It is an extremely easy subject on which to arouse enthusiasm, and I had an opportunity of leaving a definite impression on about 3,000 people, both within and without our organisation.[34]

More than once, Clark ordered copies of the Office's publications in order to distribute them, including 2,000 copies in several languages of the *International Labour Review*'s article about the IEC,[35] which pleased Thomas and Varlez; the latter offered to send her copies of other documents for distribution.[36] For that reason, he asked Clark for the addresses of the national YWCAs as well as the list of European organizations they were in contact with.[37]

American organizations that were active in other countries tried to establish a place for themselves in international organizations as early as 1921 at the IEC meeting in Geneva. That meeting offered them opportunities both to become better known internationally and to develop their European network. From the Office's point of view, the organizations represented special relationships: although the Office had to maintain a certain distance from them, it also needed to build ties for two key reasons: both because it was in the Office's interest to become better known and to build a network in the United States, which had not joined the ILO (until 1934) despite playing a crucial role in the era's migration policy; and because the organizations in question possessed knowledge and produced information that would be useful for the Office's future programme on the migration question.

Uniting migrant–protection organizations

In order to increase migrant–protection groups' influence, three competing initiatives aiming to bring them together under an umbrella organization emerged in the early 1920s.[38] This eventually led to the founding of the CPPM. The first was initiated by the Office, which needed those groups to support its actions. That initiative illustrates how Varlez, a key player, used his experience and multi–positionality to implement it. As early as March 1921, Varlez discussed the project of an umbrella organization with Clark,[39] broaching the idea of the 'possibility of an agreement on principles, and co-operation in action, with the chief international associations interested in migration problems'[40] at the General Assembly of the IAU held in Luxembourg on 1 September 1923.

The IAU, which was the forerunner of the ILO to a certain extent,[41] was meeting again after having gone into dormancy during World War I; it established an emigration and colonization commission as a remedy to unemployment, a subject it had already begun to address in 1913.[42] Varlez already had considerable experience in international umbrella organizations for private organizations. He had played an important role in organizing the International Conference on Unemployment that was held in Paris in 1910 (before the founding of the IAU to which he also participated), an umbrella organization with hundreds of members from 27 countries, which had been conceived 'as a means for institutionalizing a new sector of reform.'[43] That experience, as well as Varlez's deep ties to the voluntary sector, made it possible for the Office to launch the umbrella organization it needed. Thomas,

a founding member of the French section of the AIU attended the 1923 assembly in Luxembourg, where he gave a speech emphasizing

> the importance of the freedom that major international social-policy groups can contribute to the work of the Office [which] is obligated to respect a certain reserve. It is up to them to act as stimuli for the official bodies themselves.[44]

The second initiative had been launched by an Englishman called Lucien Wolf, a journalist, minority-rights activist, key member of the Joint Foreign Committee – a civil-rights organization for British Jews – and a member of the Jewish Colonisation Association (JCA), which was founded in 1891 in London by Baron de Hirsch, a philanthropist who supported emigration to South America for Eastern European Jews.[45] In 1921, seeking support from international organizations, Wolf contacted the Office to make sure that the IEC would take into account the Jewish emigration that his organization was implementing in agricultural colonies that had both economic and humanitarian objectives. Wolf wrote to Thomas to suggest an advisory board of migrant-protection organizations attached to the Office, modelled on the Advisory Board of Private Organizations created by Albert Thomas's friend Fridtjof Nansen, from the League's High Commission for Refugees, where Wolf had represented the JCA.[46] Created in 1921, the League advisory board's mandate was to coordinate private migrant-assistance actions with those taken by governing bodies in countries that had accepted refugees. Wolf's initiative emerged in September 1923, and Thomas, Wolf and Varlez discussed it more than once. The Office was 'particularly interested in it'[47] because Thomas saw Wolf as an influential 'liaison between the Office and private organizations' (particularly British ones).[48] It would also seem that Office officials may have been hoping that the JCA would finance an umbrella organization of migrant-protection groups, as Thomas and Varlez referred to 'Baron Hirsch's millions' as a possible resource.[49]

In the context of a certain competition between emigration nations (Italy first among them), which sought to organize protection for their own emigrants, and the Office's programme that had been adopted by the IEC in 1921, the third initiative had Thomas worried.[50] In May 1924, the Italian government's High Commissioner for Emigration, Giuseppe De Michelis,[51] organized an inter-governmental meeting in Rome: the International Conference on Immigration and Emigration.[52] Preparations for the conference fuelled tension between Thomas and De Michelis: the latter, having accused the Office of failing to implement the IEC's 1921 programme, originally intended not to involve the Office in the organization of the Conference.[53] The Italian commissioner planned to start by using the Conference to assemble all the private organizations involved in emigrant protection – many of which were controlled by the Italian government – in order to draw up their own programme.[54] Protests from the immigration nations participating in

the Conference obliged De Michelis to abandon that idea.[55] In the end, in response to those governments' distrust, the private organizations' resolutions were marginalized: they were debated during a special session towards the end of the Conference and distributed to delegates without any official action being taken.[56]

As preparations for the Rome Conference were underway, Thomas and Varlez took advantage of that competing initiative to bring migrant-protection groups together, blending Varlez's initiative with 'the Wolf committee's' and getting them to work on a common programme of resolutions to present at the Conference. On 5 March 1924, two months before the Conference was scheduled to begin, Varlez, in the name of the IAU, summoned the international protection organizations in attendance in Luxembourg six months earlier: Catholic groups, like the International Catholic Association of Charities Protecting Young Women, and Saint Raphael Societies for the Protection of Emigrants; Protestant ones, like the YMCA and the YWCA; and Jewish ones, like the JCA, the Unified Committee for Jewish Emigration and the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society.[57] Over a dozen organizations were represented as well as delegates from the labour movement.[58] Together, they created an ad hoc international committee of emigrant-protection organizations in order to draft resolutions.[59] Varlez was appointed to preside that committee. The organizations that gathered on 5 March decided to reconvene on 23 April, two weeks before the conference in Rome. At that time, 63 resolutions to present in Rome were adopted and sorted into categories: 'emigrant transport,' 'hygiene and sanitary services,' 'collaboration between emigration and immigration service in various countries,' 'charities providing assistance to emigrants in their countries of embarkation, to candidates for immigration in ports of debarkation and to immigrants – including special assistance to women and children,' 'emigrants' adaptation to immigration countries' labour needs and means for achieving that end,' 'developing cooperation, provident societies and mutuality among emigrants' and a 'list of principles to which emigration treaties must conform,' which echoed the 'principles established in the texts adopted by the International Labour Conference.'[60]

The Office's winning strategy was to take advantage of the private organization's distrust of governments to federate them and convince them to accept the Office's patronage at the Rome Conference. The approach enabled the Office to reinforce its legitimacy, which had been weakened by the organization of the inter-governmental conference, by flaunting the private organizations' faith in it.[61] Those organizations had requested that the Office be their intermediary, handing their resolutions to the secretary of the Rome Conference. The members of the ad hoc International Committee of Emigrant Protection Organizations that Varlez, an Office official, had managed to convene through his organization, adopted a resolution asking Albert Thomas to 'please inform them of the conditions in which the present ad hoc committee could be allowed to collaborate with the Office in an advisory-committee status.'[62]

What was the point of the umbrella organization?

Discussions about the International Committee of Private Organisations for the Protection of Emigrants' status and purpose took up a good portion of their first few meetings. There was much internal debate and negotiating about obtaining official recognition. The Office steered the committee towards unofficial work, defining an independent status that could advance the cause of migrant protection unfettered by official constraints, while enabling international organizations to consult with them on certain topics.

In September 1924, the third committee meeting involved almost a dozen delegates from different groups. Varlez came with two colleagues from the Office's Emigration and Unemployment Section, who attended in their roles as members of the IAU: Henri Fuss and Imre Ferenczi (1884–1945), a Hungarian.[63] Different points of view were aired at that meeting. Wolf expressed concern that without official recognition as an advisory board to the Office, the committee's role would be too limited, and it would lack funding. Defending the Office's objective, Varlez, Fuss and Ferenczi encouraged them to continue their work, emphasizing the committee's specific nature: it could act "where official bodies are regretfully obliged to abstain," conducting investigations that would be "unofficial, but from an international standpoint." Whereas Zevi Aberson, who was representing several different Jewish organizations, and Olivier H. Mc Cowen, from the World YMCA Executive Committee, advocated for the idea of coordinating private associations via a 'liaison committee' in order to bring 'emigration issues into the scope of international humanitarian action.' Wolf wound up being persuaded by Thomas, who spoke at the meeting, steering the committee towards a role as experts for the Office's official advisory board, which was then being formed.[64]

In order to develop its legislative work as well as its capacity for investigation and documentation, the Office needed knowledgeable external partners. To that end, it began creating advisory boards of different types, composed of recognized experts in their fields, such as the Permanent Migration Committee (PMC), an advisory board preparing conventions on the subject of migration to propose at the ILO's annual conference that was founded by the Governing Body in January 1925.[65] The idea of creating a permanent advisory board on the subject of migrations had been proposed by the IEC as far back as 1921. Various obstacles – not only immigration and emigration countries' differing interests, but also pressure from steamship companies who opposed to having migration regulated – had delayed its implementation. The Rome Conference's resolutions enabled the Office to speed up the process of creating that board. Convened at the Governing Body's request (it met only five times: in 1925, 1926, 1930, 1934 and 1936), the advisory board respected the ILO's tripartite rule: it had just three members, the president of the Governing Body and both of his vice-presidents,[66] who could request expert studies on specific issues. A list of nearly 100 approved experts, 13 of whom belonged to private organizations (including 11 from the ad hoc

international committee of migrant-protection organizations),[67] was drawn up and adopted by the Governing Body.[68] Composing the list had been no easy matter, particularly, 'the idea of private emigrant-protection organizations' representation.'[69] Thomas had to emphasize the 'strictly technical and non-representative capacity' of members of emigrant-protection groups, who had to join in their own name rather than their organizations'.[70] Once the experts had been named, Wolf and Ruth Larned, the IMS's International Director, concluded that the ad hoc international committee of migrant-protection organizations' work was done, insofar as it had achieved their initial goal: official consultation of its members by the Office. Other members, however, insisted that 'the committee's most important task is propaganda' and that 'representatives of private associations' influence […] will be increased by periodic meetings where resolutions will be adopted, goals stated, and actions potentially organized.'[71] Their stance carried the day, as the ad hoc committee became an established organization in February 1925,[72] adopting statutes six months later, at their first session,[73] which was attended by delegates from 48 different organizations.[74]

What was by then the Permanent Conference for the Protection of Migrants – referred to in both French and English by its French acronym, CPPM – included an eight-member board of directors that Larned, Varlez and Wolf were elected to[75] and that met two to five times a year; a secretariat; and an annual conference held every September right before the League assembly, as some CPPM members were also on other committees connected to the League. Several Office officials attended as representatives of member organizations. A 1927 article in the IMS's in-house newsletter mentioned that the board of directors was composed of 'the usual International Labour Office crowd.'[76] Etienne Clouzot, head administrator for the International Committee of the Red Cross, was elected president, a position he held until 1930.[77] The CPPM's funding came from annual fees paid by member associations. The Office supplied material assistance, providing its meeting rooms, interpreters and stenographers free of charge for CPPM conferences.[78] The IMS, which played an important role in the CPPM, provided both a room in its Geneva office and a mailing address for the CPPM's administration, which had just one part-time employee, occasionally assisted by volunteers.

Despite the appointment of experts to the migration advisory board, which was insufficient in some people's eyes, official recognition of the CPPM by the Office appeared on the agenda of its first three sessions (1925, 1926 and 1927). During the discussion in 1926, Georg Timpe, the delegate from the Saint Raphael Association of Hamburg, felt 'obliged to call the Conference's attention to the often illusory nature of consultations with experts' singling out the CPPM's usefulness for the Office and asserting that the latter 'had obligations towards the conference' and 'would be entirely mistaken if it believed that it needed the Private Organisations' support less than the aforementioned organisations needed its collaboration' in a context in which its action 'on the

issue of migrations was encountering obstacles, particularly from the British Empire and the United States.'[79] In response to those rebukes, the Office made some effort to build CPPM members' trust, proposing solutions. In 1926, Albert Thomas, who made a point of making an appearance at most of the CPPM's annual conferences, establishing it as a 'tradition,'[80] said he would be willing to look into what legal status an institution would have to have in order for the ILO's Constitution to allow it to be officially recognized.[81] At the 1927 conference, Varlez presented different possible options for international recognition. Various legal statuses were considered or conceived of: an international status comparable to the Red Cross's, recognition by the International Labour Conference or some other conference and becoming an agency under the aegis of the League. He raised the idea of putting the issue of official recognition on the agenda of the International Conference on Emigration and Immigration at Havana, which was scheduled for 1928 (making it the second international and inter-governmental conference, after the one in Rome) in order to 'win public opinion over to the idea of legal recognition' and perhaps obtain a 'stated goal' on the issue. Proposed by Belgium (perhaps thanks to Varlez's connections in government circles in his native country), the proposed goal appeared on the agenda at the Cuban conference, which adopted a resolution requesting that 'the CPPM be consulted as frequently as possible by competent official international bodies on issues related to the practical execution of migrant protection.'[82] Empowered by the resolution adopted by the inter-governmental conference, the CPPM demanded effective representation in the League and ILO's commissions and conferences that dealt with the subject of migrations.

Influencing international migration regulation: morality and expertise

An analysis of the CPPM's productions (reports and adopted resolutions) shows how the Office unofficially used the member organizations' work to buttress its point of view within the advisory board on migration that was preparing futures conventions as well as the organizations' desire to be involved in migration policy in their capacity as suppliers of social services. To begin with, the CPPM would be asked to produce a report supporting the work of the ILO's advisory board on migration (PMC), which was preparing a convention to 'simplify inspection procedures for emigrants on board steamships.'[83] When the three members of the committee met in Brussels in December 1925, along with Thomas, Varlez and Phelan (head of the diplomatic division[84]) to compose the list of experts, Thomas proposed counter-balancing the steamship companies' many experts with ones from the protection organizations, who 'defend the migrants' interests' and who 'just examined the issue at a special conference.' He chose Larned, Louis Oungre (a Belgian associate of Wolf's and the head of the Paris JCA) and Clouzot.[85] Informed of

the Office's intentions, the CPPM had indeed just concluded a major report on the topic and had had it approved at its December 1925 conference.[86] A cover letter for a questionnaire sent to member associations made what was expected of them perfectly clear:

> What our conference hopes to get from you is a report about the results of your practical experience and the experience of reliable persons whom you know. Concrete facts are more valuable than opinions. We would appreciate it if you could refer to specific cases.[87]

The contents of the report make the co-production process clear,[88] the ultimate aim being to provide support for projects sponsored by the Office.

The groups were also trying to influence migration regulations, but the nationalization of migration policy – as countries wrenched control from the steamship companies – hampered the recognition of private organizations. Among the general recommendations in the report on the on-board inspection of emigrants, the CPPM focussed on training for the inspectors, both men and women (particularly social workers) and the importance of their independence from the steamship companies. It also offered the services of private migrant-protection organizations. The draft of the convention mentioned the fact that it was essential for inspectors to be neither directly nor indirectly connected to the steamship companies or in any way dependent on them. That point constitutes Article 4 of the Convention that wound up being adopted in 1926.[89] On the other hand, the suggestion about female inspectors coming from emigrant-protection societies or institutions, which the Office had picked up, was not included by the International Labour Conference[90] which only adopted a recommendation about women on that score.[91]

The CPPM's productions[92] and resolutions also show a certain distancing from politics through an approach that was at once moral (due to the groups' religious backgrounds) and technical, and which focused on individuals and families. For example, at the 1925 session, American groups, which had produced a large number of studies and surveys on the subject, raised the question of family separations. The issue was presented as a consequence of the United States' restrictive immigration policy, but it was addressed from an essentially moral angle, alongside a scientific approach analysing both the causes and the effects of separation.[93] Medical examination of Polish emigrants at the American consulate in Warsaw is another example. The topic was raised by Lucie Kipa (delegate from the Polish Emigration Society) in 1927, and it appears on the agenda for four years in a row, with several reports presented based on cases of wives whose emigration to the United States was refused because they had failed mental tests. This subject, which mobilized both the organizations and the American press, put the groups in an awkward position. So Larned proposed that the CPPM take a stand on the social and moral consequences of the tests rather than on their legitimacy (which is what

Kipa had at first attempted, with a scientific approach) in order not to challenge America's selective policy.[94] A 1927 article about the CPPM published in the IMS's in-house newsletter justifies that choice:

> These examinations are, of course, not above criticism, but the question was how far a conference of private organizations could go in criticizing a legislative procedure which is, after all, part of the sovereign power of a state. It was finally decided that the enquiry should be considered only as part of a wider enquiry into methods of examination before departure, so as to avoid the appearance of criticism of any one government, an attitude which is much more satisfactory to us.[95]

Along with the Great Depression of the 1930s, which exacerbated the hardships migrants suffered, the idea of migrants' rights correlated with a stronger criticism of governmental policies showed up. Although the notion was never inscribed in any resolutions, a nine-point "common declaration" about 'migrants' rights' such as 'Migrants should not be seen as commercial goods,' 'Due to the unique hardships they encounter, migrants should receive particular solicitude; they should be informed of and in a position to exercise their rights' and 'Migrants must be carefully and disinterestedly informed and warned at various stages in their journey' was written.[96] In the end, the declaration was not adopted; yet, it does bear witness to the emergence of a migrants'-rights cause and shows how the associations were asserting the role they intended to play in that cause.

After the stated goal at the 1928 Havana conference, ties between the CPPM and the League were reinforced. The League was also working on the legal and diplomatic aspects of migrations. Representatives of the League's Social and Transit sections attended conferences, requesting the CPPM's expertise on a range of different subjects. The Office also asked for reports from the CPPM in order to reply to demands from the League on some dossiers. In 1931, for example, in order to help prepare their own contribution, the Office asked the CPPM for a report on seasonal foreign child labour for the Child Welfare Committee (CWC), a League advisory board composed of government delegates and advisors representing the private organizations.[97] The CWC also invited CPPM delegates as observers or advisors for certain points on the agenda. For instance, they were asked for a report about alimony and child support payments in families separated by migration.[98] At the European conference in 1929, the CPPM also worked with the League on the issue of transit cards and helped Wolf and Hurlbutt 'enter into private negotiations' with steamship companies, particularly Major Bustard, for the North Atlantic conference (an umbrella organization representing German, French, British and Dutch companies).[99] The increase in collaborations, plus the attendant need to produce reports on a wide range of subjects, considerably increased the CPPM's work load.

A lack of both human and financial resources

Only a few of the several dozen member associations of the CPPM – essentially IMS members who could take advantage of that organization's experience of social work on an international level – were involved in investigating and writing reports. Therefore, a large portion of the administrative, treasury and coordination work was done by Office officials who were also CPPM members. The CPPM's human-resource pool was too small to cope with the development of its activity; the problem was exacerbated by the lack of financial resources in the context of the Great Depression of the 1930s.

In the late 1920s, the intensification of labour required in the framework of its activities led the CPPM to consider 'a programme of rationalization of the Conference's work' with an administration up to the task so as to enable the Office and the League to depend on the CPPM's 'technical skills.' Since the Conference 'had acquired authority […] how could its activity be used most efficiently?,' the IMS delegate enquired at the 1929 session.[100] In order to save time, the following session was divided into three commissions held simultaneously that reported back to the whole conference the following day. The reorganization project rekindled debate about the CPPM's role. The growing rapprochement with the Office and the League fuelled criticism from those who decried 'the subordination of the interests of the migrants to some unexplained political preoccupations.' Wolf took issue with that, insisting that collaboration with the Office 'alone can give a legal basis to the just interests of the migrants.'[101] Dr Kreutz, delegate from the German organization Caritas (from Fribourg im Breisgau), suggested envisaging reducing the activities of the CPPM, turning it into a tribune for statements and debates, without getting involved in politics or research.[102] To rise above the rift, Jacques Legouis (from the Office),[103] who was in charge of the CPPM's administrative work, suggested that Varlez create, alongside the Conference, an action committee for the protection of migrants that would be open to organizations willing to share in expenses and to commit to collaborating on 'enforcing clear-cut decisions made in common.'[104]

The CPPM's financial situation went rapidly downhill from 1928 onwards; collaborating – without means – with international organizations was costing more than the contributions received: for an annual budget of approximately 10,000 Swiss francs in 1931, the deficit was FS5000. The constantly increasing research work led to new expenses (translating, correspondence, typing, etc.)[105] that the CPPM's limited funds could not handle. 'In fact, for 7 years now, our conference has been suspended in a provisional state, and living hand to mouth,' Legouis wrote in a letter to Varlez in 1929.[106] In his personal notes about the financial reorganization, Varlez, who was then treasurer, acknowledged the flip side of the independence the Office had insisted on for the CPPM: 'In order to increase this meagre budget, we can reach out neither to governments, nor to trade or financial organizations that would soon demolish the very independence that is so crucial to the conference's work.'[107] In an attempt to resolve their financial woes, Varlez, who was no longer

working for the Office, but who happened to be traveling in North America in 1929, went to New York and Toronto to present the CPPM's work to try to drum up financial support from affiliated American organizations. Despite an enthusiastic reception, his efforts failed.[108]

Upon the death in 1930 of both Wolf and Varlez, two pillars of the CPPM, a reorganization of the administration was decided in order to maintain and develop the Conference's activities.[109] Forced to acknowledge that most member organizations were neither very active nor even paying their membership fees, the idea of 'decentralizing' the work of the CPPM, which until then had been done by just a handful of organizations, was raised.[110] To that effect, several steps were taken to encourage cooperation: a tri-lingual (French, English, German) newsletter was launched in 1931 to 'kindle shared interests' and to help create ties between organizations; a brochure, which had originally been created in English as a fund-raising tool, was eventually translated into both French and German and distributed to members; the CPPM's directory, which had been distributed in the 1920s for publicity purposes, was updated and republished in 1931, for member organizations' use as well as consulates and public officials.[111]

In order to be able to hire administrative staff, the bureau looked towards the member organizations, hoping that they would become more financially supportive. They decided to increase the annual membership fee from 100 to 150 Swiss Francs, and exceptionally, to appeal for additional donations. Only those organizations that were already heavily involved (the IMS and JCA) made significant ones. The appeal failed, betraying member organizations' growing indifference in the context of economic crisis. At the 1931 conference, Fuss, representing the Office, reminded attendees that the Office could not subsidize the CPPM on its own. He offered to pay member organizations to produce certain reports as well to use his influence to help get funding from the Carnegie and Rockefeller Foundations to make up the difference.[112] Those efforts also failed, however.[113] The Office's lack of financial support irked several CPPM members, leading Fuss to remind them about the Office's material support and assistance, which they preferred 'not to publicize.'[114]

A note from the Office dated 1934 mentions that the CPPM's board of directors was considering dissolution after unfruitful trips to Paris and Brussels in search of private funding. The Office and a few members opposed dissolution and Dr Kreutz suggested soliciting funds from governments who had not previously been contacted.[115] Fuss informed the director of the Office that the CPPM was considering organizing a meeting towards that end:

> We could invite delegates from a few governments to a small evening gathering that would be held during the [International Labour] Conference [...] to inform them about the work of the Conference of Private Organizations and to get them to help us obtain low-level funding quickly. We are talking about 10 000 francs, total.

For the situation had in fact been getting worse: the general secretary, the social worker Helene Hoffmann-Von Sokolowskaja, the CPPM's only paid staff member, had been let go after four years of service, although she was considering continuing to work 'on a more or less volunteer basis.' Fuss pointed out at the end of his letter: 'I am trying to help keep the Conference afloat. The initiative came from here (Albert Thomas and Varlez), and it would be a shame to see the results of ten years of effort go up in smoke.'[116] The sources consulted do not provide information about what happened to the CPPM next or the precise year of its dissolution. The Office's notes from the summer of 1934 specify only that the Conference had been forced to leave the office space loaned by the IMS, that for lack of available space, the Office had refused to store the 17 boxes, 2 tables and 4 chairs, and that Hoffman had gone back to Freiburg 'as the Conference's coffers were empty.'[117]

Conclusion

Created to support the Office's activity by enabling labour to be divided into the 'official' and the 'unofficial,' the CPPM received frequent encouragement from Thomas, who paid 'careful attention' to it in order to 'maintain and develop the sympathy quotient it [the Office] needs.'[118] As Fuss said at the CPPM's 1932 session, the collaboration with the Office was 'actually an exchange of services more than anything else.'[119] Indeed, the CPPM allowed organizations to obtain resources – although ones that were more symbolic than concrete: a network and recognition of their skills and knowledge by major migration-policy players, legitimacy through expertise, and tribunes at both the national and international levels. For the Office, the migrant-protection umbrella organization that it initiated represented an opportunity to obtain and circulate information that was helpful to its international regulation of migrations project that the official framework of its activity prevented it from obtaining more directly.

The migrant-protection organizations' religious roots allowed them to address the question from a moral and disinterested standpoint and to flaunt their 'practical and technical knowledge.' When dealing with reluctant nations, that admittedly depoliticized stance was reinforced by its moral status. At the request, generally, of the Office or the League, the CPPM conducted studies and investigations in the margins of national sovereignty, in places that highlighted international migration policies. It created new fields of expertise, adopting an approach in which the international and individual scales were cross-referenced in order to observe the obstacles and risks inherent to migratory journeys both in places of transit and in migrants' more private spaces such as the domestic sphere. Taking nations' key role in migration policy into consideration, the CPPM's resolutions tended to focus on the policies' social and moral consequences without challenging the policies themselves.

Among the factors that contributed to enabling the creation of the CPPM, an analysis shows the multi-positionality of Office officials in both official

and more private capacities as well as the importance of commissions and conferences as opportunities for making connections and uniting into umbrella organizations – moments of 'coalescence'[120] between the different players in the internationalization of the migration question. As a discreet, unheralded creation of the Office, the CPPM was constantly seeking both official recognition and financing for its actions. Its members worked with different migration-policy players in order to influence migration regulations. The umbrella organization also contributed to shaping the migration-protection cause, an impact that showed up in the following years both in legal and social norms[121] and in the increasing recognition as experts that international bodies granted to non-governmental organizations specialized in migration.

Notes

1 This work benefitted from the financial support of the French Collaborative Institute on Migration, coordinated by the CNRS under the reference ANR-17-CONV-0001.
2 To avoid confusion, in this chapter, the International Labour Organization will be referred to as the ILO and the International Labour Office as the Office.
3 'The International Emigration Commission', *International Labour Review*, IV, 3 (1921), 85–110.
4 About the division of labour in international organizations, see J. Siméant, V. Lickert and F. Pouponneau, 'Échelles, récifs, bureaux – Terrains du politique à l'international', in J. Siméant (ed), *Guide de l'Enquête Globale en Sciences Sociales* (Paris, 2015).
5 S. Kott, 'From transnational reformist network to international organization: The International Association for Labour Legislation and the International Labour Organization, 1900–1930s', in D. Rodogno, B. Struck and J. Vogel (eds), *Shaping the Transnational Sphere: Experts, networks and issues from the 1840s to the 1930s* (New York and Oxford, 2015).
6 'Albert Thomas on the international control of migration', *Population and Development Review*, 9, 4 (1983), 703–711. Text of speech given at the 1927 World Population Conference in Geneva.
7 P.-A. Rosental, 'Géopolitique et État-providence. Le BIT et la politique mondiale des migrations dans l'entre-deux-guerres', *Annales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales*, 61, 1 (2006), 99–134.
8 For example: P.-Y. Saunier. 'Borderline work: ILO explorations onto the housing scene until 1940', in J. Van Daele, M. Rodríguez García, G. Van Goethem and M. Van der Linden (eds), *ILO Histories. Essays on the International Labour Organization and its impact on the world during the twentieth century* (Bern, 2010).
9 Rodogno, Struck and Vogel, *op. cit.*
10 S. Kott and J. Droux (eds), *Globalizing Social Rights. The International Labour Organization and beyond* (Basingstoke and Geneva, 2013); D. Laqua (ed), *Internationalism Reconfigured. Transnational ideas and movements between the world wars* (London, 2011); F. Thébaud, 'Difficult inroads, unexpected results: The correspondence committee on women's work in the 1930s', in E. Boris, D. Hoehtker and S. Zimmermann (eds), *Women's ILO: Transnational networks, global labour standards and gender equity, 1919 to present* (Leiden and Boston, MA, 2018), 50–74.
11 M. Schrover, T. Vosters and I. Glynn, 'NGOs and west European migration governance (1860s until present). Introduction to a special issue', *Journal of Migration History*, 5, 2 (2019), 189–217.

12 D. Maul, *The International Labour Organization. 100 years of global social policy* (Berlin and Geneva, 2019).

13 Except for Rosental's article, *op. cit.*, and D. Kévonian's work on the Office and refugees: D. Kévonian, 'Enjeux de catégorisations et migrations internationales', *Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales*, 21, 3 (2005), 95–124; D. Kévonian, *Réfugiés et Diplomatie Humanitaire: Les acteurs européens et la scène proche-orientale pendant l'entre-deux-guerres* (Paris, 2004); on the refugees issue, see also C. Skran, *Refugees in Interwar Europe: The emergence of a regime* (Oxford, 1995), and P. Gatrell, *The Making of the Modern Refugee* (Oxford, 2013) (Chapter 2 on Interwar Europe).

14 Only Paul-André Rosental has described it briefly in an article: Rosental, *op. cit.*

15 The International Labour Conference and the Governing Body, which are both tripartite, are the ILO's representative and policy-making bodies.

16 This addendum, made during the preparatory stages, is a response to the countries of immigration's resistance to the idea of letting the Office be put in charge of protecting foreign workers: International Labour Office, *International Labour Office Archives* (subsequently ILOA) E101/000, L. Varlez's report on creating an Emigration Commission, 16 February 1920.

17 The organizations represented were: The World Young Women's Christian Association and the American YWCA (Ruth Crawford and Elizabeth Clark), the National Catholic War Council, a Jewish society and 'one other person representing no organization, but making a semi-official report in an official quarter', ILOA E100/25, E. Clark, 'The international emigration commission at Geneva', *News of the Young Women's Christian Association throughout the World* (1921), p. i.

18 'The International Emigration Commission', *op.cit.*, 85–110.

19 J. Van Daele, *Van Gent tot Genève. Louis Varlez. Een biografie* (Gand, 2002).

20 I. Lespinet-Moret and I. Liebeskind-Sauthier, 'Albert Thomas, le BIT et le chômage: Expertise, catégorisation et action politique internationale', *Les Cahiers Irice*, 2, 2 (2008), 157–179.

21 The technical departments were concerned with subjects the Office considered priorities.

22 This section was created shortly after the 1919 Conference in Washington and tasked with gathering documentation and information and publishing studies, reports and articles.

23 Fuss, a Belgian anarchist, moved to Paris in 1910 and became involved in the fight against unemployment. He went on to become the secretary of the IAU. After the war, he became a civil servant in Belgium (Employment Office and Unemployment Fund inspector). In 1920, Louis Varlez invited him to Geneva; he was hired by the Emigration and Unemployment Section, which he led after Varlez's retirement. He resigned from the Office in 1936, when the Belgium government appointed him 'Royal Commissioner for the Unemployment Problem.' K. Vleminckx, 'Henri Fuss (1882–1964): la sécurité sociale comme instrument de paix et de justice sociale', *Revue de la Sécurité Sociale*, 1, 51 (2009), 79–96.

24 The movement followed the Social Gospel, which advocated women working together for social reform. Based on a moral approach and to encourage autonomy, member organizations provided housing, job training and various other resources to female migrants arriving in cities.

25 International Labour Office Archives (subsequently ILOA), E101/100, Notes on proposals to submit to the Emigration Commission bureau's session of 4 April 1921.

26 ILOA, E 100/25, cable from Greenwood to Thomas, 22 June 1921 and letter from Greenwood to Thomas, 24 June 1921.

27 A doctor's daughter, Mary Emerson Hurlbutt (1888–1980) belonged to the generation of female graduates from the New York School of Social Work who adopted an international approach to working with migrants.

28 L. Guerry, 'Mobilisations transnationales. Le cas de l'International Migration Service, 1921–1939', *Monde(s), Histoire, Espaces, Relations*, 5, (2014), 219–237.

29 In 1894, the various national YWCA's organized a united World YWCA.

30 ILOA, E 100/25, Note from Varlez to Thomas, 27 April 1921.

31 *Ibid.*, Note from Thomas to Varlez, 28 April 1921 and undated letter from Varlez to Hurlbutt.

32 *Ibid.*, Letter from Varlez to Clark, 2 February 1922.

33 A. C. Wagner and B. Réau, 'Le capital international: un outil d'analyse de la reconfiguration des rapports de domination', in Siméant, *op. cit.*

34 ILOA, E100/25, Letter from Clark to Varlez, 10 March 1922.

35 *Ibid.*, Letter from Clark to Varlez, 22 December 1921.

36 *Ibid.*, Letter from Mildred Hughes to Ferenszi, 5 May 1922 and letter from Varlez to Clark, 2 February 1922.

37 *Ibid.*, Letter from Varlez to Clark, 21 March 1921.

38 *Ibid.*, Note from Thomas à Varlez, 2 November 1923.

39 *Ibid.*, Letter from Clark to Varlez, 10 March 1922.

40 'MIGRATION. Conferences and Congresses', *International Labour Review*, VIII, 5 (1923), 716.

41 Lespinet-Moret and Liebeskind-Sauthier, *op. cit.*

42 I. Ferenczi, *Unemployment and the International Migration of Workers*, report for IAU, 1913.

43 C. Topalov, *Naissance du Chômeur* (Paris, 1994), 84.

44 'MIGRATION, Conferences and Congresses', *op. cit.*

45 D. Frischer, 'Le baron Maurice de Hirsch et les Juifs de Russie. Entre philanthropie et utopie', *Archives Juives*, 44, 1 (2011), 70–82.

46 For more about this commission, see Kévonian, *Réfugiés et Diplomatie Humanitaire*, *op. cit.*, 343–353.

47 ILOA, E100/0, Note from Thomas to Varlez, 2 November 1923.

48 ILOA, E 100/0/1, Letter from Oungre to Varlez, 24 December 1923.

49 *ibid.*, Notes from 7 and 8 September 1923.

50 ILOA, E100/0, Note from Thomas to Varlez, 2 November 1923.

51 De Michelis was a member of the ILO's Governing Body; for more about the Italian High Commissioner for emigration, see C. Douki, 'The liberal Italian state and mass emigration, 1860–1914', in N. Green and F. Weil (eds), *Citizenship and Those Who Leave. The politics of emigration and expatriation* (Urbana and Chicago, IL, 2007).

52 Rosental, *op. cit.*

53 ILOA, E118/1, Memo about the Permanent Migration Committee meeting in Brussels on 15 December 1925.

54 ILOA, E111/0/1, Note from Varlez to Thomas, 1 November 1923.

55 *Ibid.*, n°2, Note from Albert Thomas, 7 March 1924.

56 United Nations Library & Archives, *League of Nations Archives* (subsequently LONA), R1220, Minutes of the third meeting of the International Committee of Private Organisations for the Protection of Emigrants, 10 September 1924; *Chroniques Mensuelles des Migrations* (1924), 75.

57 ILOA, E111/0/1, n°2, Letter from Varlez to Thomas, 2 February 1924.

58 Naum Reichesberg, of the International Association for Labour Legislation attended that meeting, as did Léon Jouhaux, as a representative of the International Federation of Trade Unions. ILOA, 111/0/1, Letter from Varlez to Thomas, 25 April 1924.

59 *Chronique Mensuelle des Migrations, op. cit.*, 527–28.

60 ILOA, E111/0/1 n°2, International Committee of Private Organisations for the Protection of Emigrants, Resolutions presented at the International Conference on Emigration and Immigration, Rome 1924, Geneva, March–April 1924.

61 *Ibid.*, Excerpt from provisional minutes for the meeting of 23 April 1924.

62 ILOA, E111/1/7, Letter from Butler to the head of the Washington office, 9 May 1924 and E111/0/1, Resolution adopted at the meeting of 23 April 1924.

63 A municipal-housing expert, Imre Ferenszi taught social policy at the University of Budapest before becoming an advisor to the Budapest municipal government. He represented the Hungarian section of the IAU, for whom he wrote a 1913 report entitled *Unemployment and the International Migration of Workers.* He joined the Office's Emigration and Unemployment section in 1921. He authored *Migration Movement 1920–1923* and contributed to a volume edited by Walter F. Wilcox, an American, *International Migrations*, published by the Office in 1928 and 1929. Reid, Ira De Augustine, 1901–1968. Memorandum on Dr. Imre Ferenczi, ca. February 13, 1941. University of Massachusetts Amherst Libraries, *Special Collections and University Archives, W. E. B. Du Bois Papers*, MS 312.

64 LONA, R1220, Minutes from the third meeting of the International Committee of Private Organisations for the Protection of Emigrants, 10 September 1924.

65 The PMC was first called the Permanent Emigration Committee and then the Migration Committee.

66 Arthur Fontaine, the governmental delegate; Jules Carlier, the employers' delegate; and Jan Oudegeest, the workers' delegate.

67 Ms. Edith Abbott, Messrs. Aberson★ and Clouzot,★ Ms. LB Mitchell, Messrs. Golden★ and Bascom Johnson,★ Ms. Larned,★ Messrs. McCowen,★ Oungre,★ Reichesberg,★ Santoliquido,★ Timpe (replacing Hoffman at the German government's request),★ and Wolfe.★ (★ from the ad hoc committee).

68 ILOA, E118/000, Minutes from the meeting of the ad hoc bureau of the Conference of Private Organisations for the Protection of Emigrants held in Geneva on 19 June 1925.

69 *Ibid.*, Draft of a letter from Ferenczi to McCowen, 30 April 1925.

70 *Ibid.*

71 ILOA, E118/000, Note from Ferenczi to Phelan and Thomas, 22 June 1925.

72 The first bureau was composed of Wolf (JCA), Timpe (St Raphaels-Verein), McCowen (YMCA), Aberson (Association juive unifiée), Reichesberg (International Association for Labour Legislation) and Varlez (IAU). Larned did not attend that first meeting.

73 The first articles:

    Article 1: A Permanent International Conference of Private Organizations for Protecting and Improving the Well-Being of Migrants is hereby constituted. Article 2: The Conference encourages international cooperation in terms of protecting migrants' well-being. Article 3: The Conference will meet at least once a year.

74 LONA, R1220, Minutes of the first session of the International Conference of Private Organisations for the Protection of Migrants, 8 and 9 September 1925.

75 The following were elected for two years at the first session: Ms. Hoffman, Ms. Larned, Mr. McCowen, and Mr. Varlez (with 40 votes each); as well as Ms. Bromer: 34 votes; Mr. Reichesberg, 32 votes; Mr. Wolf: 29 votes; and Mr. Cohen: 28 votes.

76 Departmental archives of the Bouches du Rhône, 'Social services for emigrants collection (1928–1932), 128J1', *The Whisper*, 1, 5 (1927), 12.

77 He would later be replaced by Varlez, interim president, then by S. Cohen, vice-president of the Jewish Association for the Protection of Girls and Women, London.

78 LONA, R3573, Minutes of the 7th session of the CPPM, 11–12 September 1930.

79 ILOA, E118/001, CPPP, 3rd session, 7–8 September 1926, Resolution n°1.

80 LONA, R3573, Minutes of the 6th session of the CPPM, 5–6 September 1929.

81 LONA, R1220, CPPM, Third session, 6–7 September 1926. Minutes.

82 *Ibid.*, Committee for the International Conference on Migration and Immigration, Proposal Commission, Annex 2.

83 On this issue, addressed by Italy in the early twentieth century: C. Douki, 'Protection sociale et mobilité transatlantique: Les migrants italiens au début du XXe siècle', *Annales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales*, 66, 2 (2011), 375–410.

84 The diplomatic division handled relations with governments and diplomatic instruments developed by the International Labour Conference.

85 ILOA, E/118/1, Meeting of the Permanent Migration Committee (without experts) in Brussels, 15 December 1925.

86 ILOA, E118/000, CPPM report: On-board Inspection of Emigrants. Committee report and Conference Resolution, 10–11 December 1925, Geneva, 1926.

87 ILOA, E100/0/6, Letter from the CPPM to affiliated organizations, 1 October 1925.

88 V. Gayon, 'Un atelier d'écriture internationale: l'OCDE au travail. Éléments de sociologie de la forme "rapport"', *Sociologie du Travail*, 51, 3 (2009), 324–342.

89 Convention n°21 on the inspection of emigrants, 1926, effective 1927.

90 LONA, R1220, CPPM, Third session, 6–7 September 1926. Minutes.

91 Recommendation n°26 about the protection of emigrant women aboard, 1926, 5 June 1926.

92 An article about the CPPM written production is underway.

93 ILOA, E1/08, Reports and Resolutions. Separation of Families of Migrants, CPPM, 1926.

94 LONA, R3573, Minutes of the 7th session of the CPPM, 11–12 September 1930.

95 Departmental archives of the Bouches du Rhône, 'Social services for emigrants collection (1928–1932), 128J1', *op.cit.*, 13.

96 ILOA, E1/08, n°2, Example of a common statement that the Conference could adopt, 31 May 1930.

97 For more about the CWC, see J. Droux, 'La tectonique des causes humanitaires: concurrences et collaborations autour du Comité de protection de l'enfance de la Société des Nations (1880–1940)', *Relations Internationales*, 151 (2012), 77–90, and J. Droux, 'A league of its own? The League of Nations' child welfare committee (1919–1936) and international monitoring of child welfare policies', in M. Rodriguez Garcia, D. Rodogno, and L. Kozma (eds), *The League of Nations' Work on Social Issues: Visions, endeavours and experiments* (Genève, 2016).

98 LONA, R3573, Minutes of the 7th session of the CPPM, 11–12 September 1930.

99 *Ibid.*, Minutes of the 6th session of the CPPM, 5–6 September 929.

100 *Ibid.*

101 ILOA, E 1/08, n°2, Reorganisation of the CPPM. Supplementary Memorandum submitted by the JCA, 8 February 1930.

102 *Ibid.*, Undated notes from Legouis.

103 Jacques Legouis, born in Lyon in 1895, son of Emile Legouis (who taught English language and literature at the Sorbonne) worked as a copywriter/editor for the Office.

104 ILOA, E 1/08, n°2, Letter from Legouis to Varlez, 1929.
105 *Ibid*., Treasurer's note about the financial reorganisation of the Conference, written by Varlez, 15 July 1930.
106 *Ibid*., Letter from Legouis to Varlez, 4 July 1930.
107 *Ibid*., Varlez's personal notes, 1 March 1929.
108 *Ibid*., various notes and letters by Varlez about his travels.
109 *Ibid*., CPPM, memo to member organizations, 26 January 1931.
110 *Ibid*., Reorganizing the conference; the administrative issue, 31 May 1930.
111 LONA, R3573, Minutes of the 8th session of the CPPM, 7 and 8 September 1931.
112 *Ibid*.
113 LONA, R3573, Minutes of the 9th session of the CPPM, 27–28 September 1932.
114 LONA, R3573, Minutes of the 8th session of the CPPM, 7 and 8 September 1931.
115 ILOA, E1/08, Various notes.
116 *Ibid*., Letter from Henri Fuss to the head of the Office, 16 May 1934.
117 *Ibid*., Various notes.
118 ILOA, E118/000, Note to all departments from Albert Thomas, 15 September 1925.
119 LONA, R3573, Minutes of the 9th session of the CPPM, 27–28 September 1932.
120 Siméant, *op. cit*., 23.
121 For example, Convention n°66 about migrant workers (adopted by the International Labour Conference on 28 June 1939) includes a provision related to preventing abandoning families and mentions an information and assistance service to emigrants and immigrants performed by private organizations that were 'recognized […] and controlled by public authorities.' The convention was never ratified, but it inspired other conventions that were adopted during the post-war period.

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8 Big Pharma, the World Health Organization, and the co-constitution of international policies against river blindness

Auriane Guilbaud

Introduction

For seven consecutive years from 1987 to 1993, the US-based pharmaceutical company Merck earned the title of 'most admired business' awarded by *Fortune* magazine – a highly recognized distinction in the business world. It rewarded the company for its rising profits (from 1985 to 1989 sales almost doubled[1]), but also for setting up the Mectizan Donation Program (MDP) in 1987, a drug donation program against river blindness.[2] Also known under its scientific name *onchocerciasis*, it was until then a neglected tropical disease without adequate treatment. Caused by a parasite, it provokes dermatological and ocular infections that can lead to complete blindness. It affects mainly people in sub-Saharan Africa (90% of cases), Yemen and Latin America. In the late 1970s, it was estimated that 18 million people were infected with the parasite and that 100 million were at risk of infection.

However, Merck is not the only organization claiming a key role in the fight against river blindness. In front of the World Health Organization (WHO) headquarters in Geneva stands a statue depicting an African child guiding a blind man.[3] As explained on the accompanying plaque, it symbolizes the 'success' of the fight against river blindness, a 'unique public health action' conducted thanks to several WHO-led programs, 'which also fostered socio–economic development'.[4] A close look at the plaque reveals that the statue was built, thanks to the donations of several philanthropic organizations and NGOs,[5] the World Bank, but also Merck and the MDP.

Although it is not obvious from the above-mentioned awards and symbols, which put emphasis only on one actor's role, the fight against onchocerciasis/river blindness is actually a cooperative one, and there is a rich and long history of interactions among different actors to study.

The international fight against the disease started during the later years of first half of the twentieth century. Onchocerciasis, caused by the parasite *onchocerca volvulus*, which is transmitted to humans through the bite of an intermediate host (or vector), a *simulium* black fly, was one of the last tropical diseases to be discovered, its symptoms being first attributed to other causes (trachoma, infection, nutrition deficiencies…). The complete transmission

cycle of the disease was only fully described in 1925.[6] The first programs to fight the disease were implemented after WWII and were based on the spraying of an insecticide, DDT, to kill the vector. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, onchocerciasis gained some visibility on the international scene as it became seen as one of the main obstacles to the development of West Africa, attracting the attention (and the funding) of the World Bank and the United States. Nevertheless, it remained a neglected tropical disease because medical treatment was inadequate (the known molecules active against the disease were toxic to humans), and the pharmaceutical industry did not invest in research to change this situation because of a lack of economic incentives (the affected population being poor and unable to pay for drugs). In 1975, the WHO set up a disease control program in Africa, the Onchocerciasis Control Program (OCP). It focused on weekly sprayings of an insecticide to kill larvae (Temephos, which replaced DDT after its ban) in eight West African countries. That same year, in 1975, the WHO also launched a Special Program for Research and Training in Tropical Diseases (TDR), which was especially needed after the failure of the global malaria eradication program in the late 1960s (cf. *infra*). The goal of the TDR Program was to incentivize pharmaceutical corporations to build capacity and do research on eight tropical diseases, including onchocerciasis.

In 1977, a scientific discovery was made that would eventually deeply transform the fight against onchocerciasis: a molecule, ivermectin, developed by the US pharmaceutical company Merck, was proven to be an efficient drug, well tolerated by humans. In 1987, Merck made the decision to donate the drug to affected populations and set up a drug donation program, the MDP, with the cooperation of the WHO. The introduction of Mectizan (the brand name of ivermectin) deeply reshaped the fight against the disease in terms of strategy and practices on the ground and in terms of the role of actors involved. The WHO especially had to adapt: it designed a new program, which better fitted the challenges of Mectizan donation and enabled WHO to take back the lead in the strategic design of the fight against the disease.

There is a long history of cooperation between public and private actors in the domain of international health since the times of imperial and colonial medicine.[7] However, beyond mere cooperation, this chapter will show how international policies to fight river blindness were shaped through co-constitution dynamics between a public actor, the WHO, an international intergovernmental organization which, according to its founding treaty, should be 'the leading authority in public health', and a private one, Merck, a US pharmaceutical giant and for-profit corporation. By co-constitution dynamics, we mean, in this chapter, the process of interactions, whereby actors impact each other, become entangled/intertwined, strengthen interdependencies and influence their environment. How did a collaborative relationship between two powerful actors with distinct or even opposite, goals (public interest vs. profit) emerge? To what extent were they able to influence each other? Did the partnership have a lasting impact on the fight

against onchocerciasis and neglected tropical diseases? In particular, the chapter demonstrates how cooperation between the two contributed not only to establishing the MDP but also to creating a new model for international health policies which was applied to several other neglected diseases in the following years.

The MDP is still active today, but the chapter mainly focuses on the years 1975–1998, that is, from WHO's outreach to pharmaceutical companies to fight neglected diseases, thanks to its TDR Program to the extension of the MDP 23 years later to include the elimination of lymphatic filariasis, another neglected tropical disease. These are the years when co-constitution dynamics took shape and were the most salient. Not only did both actors impacted each other (by trying to act on each other's preferences, prompting reorganizations or the design of new programs, etc.), their increased interdependence transformed the field of the fight against onchocerciasis itself. It changed it in terms of policy content since a drug, donated for free and intended for human consumption, now provided an alternative to vector control programs. During those same years, this public/private interdependence also changed the whole institutional set-up of the fight against onchocerciasis by creating new structures and involving new actors in the fight against the disease – experts from the MDP, communities, NGOs, etc. However, especially in the last part of the chapter and the conclusion, I also draw some parallels with current trends in global politics because the case of the fight against river-blindness and the issue of the cooperation between the WHO and Merck prefigured contemporary debates on the increased participation of non-state actors (corporations, business associations, NGOs, philanthropic foundations, etc.) in international governmental organizations and in the design of global public policies – with, for instance, the current Sustainable Development Goals adopted by the United Nations in 2015 requiring 'a global partnership' for sustainable development between governments, the private sector and civil society.

This chapter adopts a socio-historical approach in order to illuminate and conceptualize bigger trends in the co-constitution of international policies, thanks to the 'thick description'[8] of a single case study and the reconstitution/tracking of institutional processes and social interactions. Methodologically, it is based on cross-fertilization between academic literature and several primary sources. First, archive documents from the WHO archives, primary documents from Merck (such as Annual Reports in particular), and from the Novartis archives (a Swiss-based pharmaceutical company, where I found material shedding light on WHO pharmaceutical companies relationships during the TDR program). Second, interviews conducted with relevant actors (employees from Merck, the WHO, the MDP, etc. – references to the interviewees were anonymized). Third, texts (esp. letters, articles) and memoirs published by actors.

The chapter is organized chronologically, in order to describe interaction processes, while trying to show how they created interdependencies between Merck and the WHO, contributing to the reshaping of the fight against

onchocerciasis and, more broadly, neglected tropical diseases. The first part (1975–1987) retraces the progressive building of interdependencies between Merck and the WHO during the phase of drug development, until the decision to donate Mectizan. The second part (1987–1995) focuses on the challenges that arose from the co-involvement of Merck and the WHO in the MDP. The third part (1996-present) deals with the aftermath of what was deemed a success, with the expansion of donation programs and the institutionalization of corporate participation in international organizations (IOs). Thus, the chapter will highlight co-constitution processes between two powerful actors and their effects on their field of intervention, with emphasis on institutional forms of cooperation and the content and intensity of relationships and actions. In particular, we will see that the benefits of cooperation were not self-evident, that they had to be constructed, especially thanks to the role of a number of brokers, actors who act as 'intermediaries between two other actors that are not directly linked'.[9] We will interrogate the nature of the policy space that was co-constituted, which could appear a 'para-political space' of global policies outside of the market.[10]

The progressive building of interdependencies (1975–1987)

Fostering collaboration through network creation

In 1975, WHO, hoping to achieve a new international health order that would take into account the needs of developing countries, launched the TDR, a Special Program for Research and Training in Tropical Diseases, whose actions included, among others, the development of new collaborations with private pharmaceutical companies. It was in line with larger demands made by the Non-Aligned Movement and Third-World countries at the United Nations General Assembly in 1974 to build a 'New International Economic Order' that would be fair, based on equality among States, and would enable developing countries to benefit from international economic growth and social progress. TDR was co-sponsored (i.e. co-funded) by the World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and then UNICEF, but WHO was the executive, and thus leading, agency. The program was hosted at the WHO headquarters in Geneva, which meant that the WHO provided administrative support, that TDR personal was recruited on WHO terms and was integrated among WHO departments, etc. TDR's aim was, and still is, to encourage research on eight neglected tropical diseases, among which onchocerciasis/river blindness.[11] Treatments for these diseases were unavailable or inadequate, and the pharmaceutical industry did not exploit recent technological developments that could change this situation, arguing that economic incentives were too low. In addition, in the late 1960s, WHO had seen the failure of its flagship Malaria Eradication Program and was thus

looking for funds and seeking to develop new approaches to control diseases affecting developing countries.

At the core of TDR's strategy lay the establishment of collaborative relationships between academic institutions and pharmaceutical companies through the creation of a network of researchers and organizations and thanks to the use of WHO's capacities and resources.[12] Pharmaceutical corporations could be part of the network by participating in the administrative structure of the program: they could send their researchers to the scientific working groups that defined TDR's research directions for each of the neglected diseases. They also had the possibility to share resources and to use shared resources: for instance, TDR made available a network of centers to perform clinical tests and of screening centers for compounds in order to avoid the disuse/disregard of molecules potentially active against tropical diseases and owned by pharmaceutical companies.[13] TDR thus appeared to be a network in the sense of 'a cluster or complex of organizations connected to each other by resource dependencies'.[14]

However, the creation of such a network was not easy and took place progressively. TDR had first to make pharmaceutical companies aware of the existence of 'resource dependencies' among actors (meaning that the WHO, research institutes and pharmaceutical companies possess different resources – compounds, screening capacities, access to populations, etc. – that should be put in common) in order to overcome the corporate unwillingness to engage in such an initiative. To this end, a specific communication strategy, through a system of visits of TDR/WHO people to pharmaceutical companies, was put in place. For instance, in 1976–1977, three TDR scientists, Dr. Goodwin, Lämmler and Duke, visited several pharmaceutical companies that had in the past shown an interest in tropical diseases or that still maintained some minimal activities in this field. They informed them of the existence of screening centers that were ready to receive the compounds that pharmaceutical companies would send them.[15] Such visits aimed to promote TDR activities and to put pressure on companies to engage in the network. According to a Ciba-Geigy (a major Swiss pharmaceutical company) executive, M. Kuhn, it was an opportunity for firms to 'demonstrate goodwill'[16] and to improve relationships with the WHO, at a time when tensions had arisen between the public health organization and private actors. Indeed, during the late 1970s, there were conflicts between WHO and several pharmaceutical corporations when the public health organization tried to take on a regulatory role, especially when the WHO established guidelines regarding the commercialization of breastmilk substitutes[17] and published a list of 'essential medicines', which determined which drugs should be bought in priority in a context of financial constraints for national health systems.[18] These conflicts took place within a broader context of debates in the 1970s on the consequences of decolonization and the key role the private sector had played in colonialism. Some media coverage, especially in the press, was also effective to raise the

profile of the TDR program. For example, a Hoffman La Roche biologist, Dr. Ian Skinner, said that it was after reading a press article on TDR, that he thought it would be a good idea for his research institute to screen compounds for parasitic diseases.[19]

In 1981, five years after its inception, TDR connected 2300 scientists from 118 countries in a network organized around resource dependencies-based relationships.[20] By 1985, it managed to double the total amount of research expenditure on tropical diseases in the world.[21] However, this network remained weakly institutionalized, and the participation of companies depended on their goodwill. They could easily either refuse to participate or get out without much cost. TDR was based on a strategy of soft influence, targeted at specific individuals from the private sector, whose advice was sought, who were asked to participate in TDR working groups, etc. It tried to influence corporate preferences indirectly, focusing on the involvement of individuals in order to act on their scientific *ethos*, thanks to the multiplication of scientific contacts, information dissemination, so that maybe, eventually, they might bring their company and its resources into the network (cf. *infra*). This is why it would be misleading to describe TDR as the ancestor of public-private partnerships (PPPs), which would develop in the 2000s as we will see in the last part of this chapter. Nevertheless, in view of the absence of other initiatives in the field of neglected tropical diseases, TDR's strategy paid off. It was especially the case with the discovery of an effective molecule against onchocerciasis/river blindness, ivermectin, and then its development by the US pharmaceutical group Merck. In 1977, TDR employees had met with staff of 16 pharmaceutical companies to assess the status of the research, but none of them worked on onchocerciasis.[22] Merck was part of TDR; for instance, it used screening centers of the network,[23] but the discovery of the molecule and development of the drug would require a new phase in the Merck–WHO relationship, with new social interactions and new institutional processes.

From ivermectin to Mectizan: highs and lows in the WHO–Merck collaboration

Ivermectin is a broad-spectrum antiparasitic agent developed in the mid–1970s for animal use by the US firm Merck, thanks to the cooperation with a Japanese research institute, the Kitasato Institute in Tokyo, which supplied the US company with soil microorganisms. The veterinary market of industrialized countries represented a very important financial windfall for the pharmaceutical industry. But Merck researchers then discovered that the molecule was active against the *onchocerca cervicalis* parasite, which infects horses, and is very close to *onchocerca volvulus*, which infects humans and causes onchocerciasis/river blindness. They then hypothesized that ivermectin may have an effect on onchocerciasis in humans.[24]

The Director of Merck Research Laboratories, Dr. William Campbell, and his team decided to send the promising molecule for screening to an Australian institute that was part of the TDR network. WHO's solicitation of pharmaceutical companies and the participation of Dr. William Campbell in the Scientific Task Force on Filariasis established by TDR in 1977 played a crucial role in this decision.[25] Because of his involvement in the Task Force, he was aware of the existence of TDR screening facilities (cf. *supra*). Dr. William Campbell was a passionate and dedicated parasitologist, and though at first, at the end of his doctoral studies in the late 1950s, he had 'considerable misgiving' about working for the pharmaceutical industry, he found there a fruitful work environment.[26] In the 1960s, he had already worked on developing human applications of the veterinary drug thiabendazole.[27] On 9 May 1977, Dr. Campbell wrote to his superiors at Merck suggesting that ivermectin might also treat human diseases.[28]

His role in the discovery of ivermectin co-earned him the Nobel Prize in medicine in 2015, with Satoshi Ōmura a Japanese microbiologist at the Kitasato Institute in Tokyo who took the lead in isolating the microorganism that was sent to Merck. In his biographical note written for the Nobel Prize, Dr. Campbell remembers that at Merck, he became convinced that

> at least in the near term, the probability of finding a drug by empirical screening (for which there was much historical precedent) was higher than the probability of finding one through research on the biochemical processes of parasites (for which there was no precedent).[29]

Thus, in July 1978, ivermectin was sent to a TDR screening facility in Australia. Results were positive, and the question was raised of whether Merck would pursue the development of a drug for humans.[30]

Merck decided to move in this direction both because the financial risk for the company was low since there was a veterinary market anyway and because some researchers strongly supported the project. This was the case of Dr. Mohammed Aziz, senior director clinical research at Merck, the most knowledgeable researcher on onchocerciasis in the company because he had previously been employed by the WHO in sub-Saharan Africa, as a coordinator in Serra-Leone.[31] Born in 1930[32] in what would become Bangladesh, Dr. Aziz obtained his medical degree in Dacca, a PhD in clinical pathology in Minnesota and was also trained at the Johns Hopkins School of Hygiene and Public Health and at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, two of the most respected public health institutions in the world.[33] He joined Merck in 1976, when research on ivermectin and onchocerciasis was rapidly developing.[34] Dr. Aziz took the lead in conducting clinical studies of ivermectin in West-African countries. Especially, he conducted the pilot study on ivermectin in Senegal in 1981 on 32 patients. WHO did not participate in the study, trials were fully organized and funded by Merck,[35] but Dr. Aziz made use of his WHO and country contacts to organize the studies.[36] Like

Dr. Williman C. Campbell, Dr. Aziz acted as a broker between Merck and the WHO, acting as intermediaries between the world of public health and the one of private research and development by a for-profit company. Within Merck, research on the molecule was seen as very promising. Ivermectin had an exceptional status, was described as 'powerful', 'incredible' and was the subject of a strong 'emotional investment', which made it difficult to stop the development process – it would have demotivated employees.[37]

The collaboration between Merck and WHO went on smoothly until 1981, especially because it was limited to the use of TDR infrastructure. But strong tensions emerged in 1981–1982, when concertation between Merck and WHO resumed, once the first results of the study conducted by Dr. Aziz were known. These tensions ensued from a divergent appreciation of the possibilities offered by the molecule. The WHO analyzed with great caution the tests carried out in Senegal: it criticized the study for being too limited, carried out on very few patients and with a high probability of discovering significant side effects later on. Its reluctance was summarized in a letter published in the *Lancet* journal[38] by Dr. André Rougemont, a physician attached to the WHO OCP, which greatly minimized the progress of the compound developed by Merck.[39] This letter did not represent the official position of WHO, but it reiterated a number of arguments presented during a visit of WHO at Merck. The 'lack of enthusiasm' of the WHO was already acutely felt at that time.[40] Dr. Aziz and his colleagues responded to Dr. Rougemont in the *Lancet* a few weeks later, defending their study and its potential.[41]

WHO's reluctance, which may appear paradoxical at first, was due to its orientation in terms of public health, which made it very attentive to the possibilities of large-scale use of a drug. This meant that there should be very few side effects because they would become impossible to manage if they were too numerous. There was also a divergence of approach: TDR favored the search for a macrofilaricide killing the adult worm responsible for onchocerciasis, while ivermectin is a microfilaricide, killing only the larvae that cause dermatological and ocular lesions. This treatment must therefore be renewed regularly during the lifetime of the adult worm in the human body – about 15 years. Finally, it was also clear that that the WHO wanted to defend its own OCP program by legitimizing its approach to the elimination of the vector (larvae) by an action on the environment (spraying of larvicide). Merck nevertheless continued the development of ivermectin for human use and chose as commercial name Mectizan.

Starting in 1982, collaboration between WHO and the pharmaceutical group resumed under better auspices. Merck needed the WHO to conduct large-scale clinical trials, whereas the international health organization eventually became interested in a molecule whose properties seemed to be confirmed. In 1982, clinical trials were launched in Guatemala, Liberia, Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Senegal and Togo to determine dosage, tolerance and precise effects on disease transmission.[42] WHO, the World Bank, TDR, Merck and OCP worked together to implement these large-scale studies. In

1986, the American corporation considered the results sufficient to request an authorization to commercialize Mectizan with the French authorities, which was granted in 1987. It was requested in France because some cases of onchocerciasis were recorded there in West-African immigrants who could participate in clinical trials. Furthermore, it was a good entry point to the Francophone West African market, where onchocerciasis was most prevalent. WHO also conducted further trials: 13 new studies were conducted by OCP and TDR between 1987 and 1989 to refine the guidelines for drug distribution and to ensure a safe widespread use.

If tensions around scientific collaboration to develop the drug had ceased (competition for research strategies had stopped, some coordination was even necessary to conduct clinical trials), the same cannot be said of the commercialization process of Mectizan. The WHO was worried about the price that Merck wanted to fix and kept stressing that it had to be low. This position was unfavorably perceived by the company, which considered that the international health organization should simply set up the distribution channels and not interfere in pricing[43] – a common position endorsed by all pharmaceutical corporations, supported by some governments such as the United States, especially at a time of heated debates on the issue of 'essential medicines' (cf. *supra*). But the issue of Mectizan commercialization took a new turn when Merck announced on 21 October 1987, right after it had obtained the French authorization to commercialize Mectizan, that it was going to give the drug 'for free' and to take charge of the donation by creating a specific program.

Merck's decision to donate Mectizan in a context of interdependencies

Donation of the treatment had not been the first envisioned option. Merck tried to sell Mectizan. However, it was rapidly clear that, since affected population were poor, the price set would have to be low. The WHO strongly insisted on this: 'any price charged for the drug should not be beyond the limited financial capabilities of the endemic countries'.[44] Furthermore, the press had made public the progress on the development of the drug in 1982[45] – a publicity facilitated by the cooperation with WHO, a public organization. As Roy Vagelos, Merck CEO, recalled:

> The *New York Times* picked up the story. The magazine section had river blindness on the cover, and the story mentioned that Merck had a drug that was almost miraculous – and what was Merck going to do with it? So the pressure was on.[46]

In July 1985, Merck published a statement saying that it would 'make appropriate arrangements' to supply the drug.[47] Merck began to explore the option of a price at cost which would be affordable to developing countries through development aid. Merck contacted several organizations, including the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and the US Department

of State, to check whether any of them would agree to pay for the purchase of the drug and then make the donation under development assistance programs.[48] Confronted with negative answers, the possibility of giving the drug (at first for a very limited period of time) began to be studied.[49]

Donations of medicines are an old tool available to pharmaceutical companies, which they use in three cases: donations known as inventories, that is, of products soon outdated or over-produced, the most frequent case; donations of products that the company commercializes otherwise for profit, and which are donated to meet the demand of an organization in the case of a humanitarian catastrophe or as part of a development program; and donations for which the company produces specifically – a rare case. The Mectizan donation fits in this latter category.[50] All these donation practices are recognized: in most countries, companies can obtain tax exemptions. In the United States, for instance, a company can deduct donations from its annual taxable income up to a maximum of 10%.

Merck was familiar with drug donations. The Merck Foundation had been managing the Merck Medical Outreach Program since 1958, which made available to selected US NGOs medicines for their humanitarian programs in developing countries. Other factors favored the option of a donation such as the absence of financial risk. The 1980s were a period of significant growth for Merck, whose sales doubled between 1985 and 1989, thanks to many 'blockbuster drugs' (such as the anti-inflammatory drug Vioox) and to ivermectin, marketed as a veterinary pest control product since 1981. In 1987, ivermectin was the second best-selling Merck product and contributed to the company revenue at about US\$ 100 million per year, which was 'a first for a veterinary product'.[51] This context allowed managers to focus on secondary objectives such as the image of the company: 'While Mectizan will not contribute to sales, our decision has contributed a great deal to public regard for the Company'.[52]

However, within Merck and the pharmaceutical industry, voices worried about the precedent that it would set, which would most probably open the door to other drug donation requests. These worries were expressed in particular through the powerful American association of pharmaceutical producers, the PhRMA.[53] Those concerns were counterbalanced by the fact that, according to a Merck forecast, a MDP was likely to be a success: the drug was considered a 'miracle treatment',[54] simple to use (an annual dose is sufficient) and without known-side effects at the time (problems in regions where the disease *loa loa* is co-endemic were not yet known). Thus, it would be possible to quickly set up an effective program, it was 'an achievable target', which was essential because, as a former top-level employee at Merck would point out in an interview, companies are very pragmatic, and the key element in the decision to give Mectizan was this belief in the possibility of a successful program with immediate results.[55]

The decision to donate the drug was the result of an internal corporate process, but it took place in a context of interdependencies. As documents

from the WHO Archives show, meetings and discussion between Merck and the WHO continued. Merck's researchers such as Dr. Campbell and Dr. Aziz, who played a key role at the beginning of Mectizan's development, were still very much engaged in the process. They attended meetings with the WHO – for instance, Drs. Campbell and Aziz attended a meeting on April 30, 1987 with WHO; Dr. Aziz was part of a working group that met in September–October 1986 to discuss the use of ivermectin by the OCP.[56]

At first, some at WHO were also perplexed by the perspective of a donation. They were concerned that pharmaceutical companies, for fear of having to set up a donation program every time they made a major discovery on a tropical disease, would renounce their slight but emerging commitment to do research in this area. Moreover, the design and management of such a donation program remained a puzzle. Nevertheless, the idea of a donation took hold. Summaries of meetings between Merck and the WHO on the distribution of ivermectin in late September/early October 1987 show, for instance, that when Merck offered to make ivermectin available free of charge for two years, WHO explained this was not enough, and that five or six years would be more consistent.[57]

On 21 October 1987, Roy Vagelos, Merck CEO (Chief Executive Officer), announced to the press Merck's commitment to give as much Mectizan as necessary for an unlimited period of time. This came partly as a surprise, as discussions were still ongoing with WHO, but the granting of the authorization to commercialize Mectizan by the French authorities seemed to have triggered the announcement. Named CEO of Merck two years before, in 1985, Roy Vagelos had the final authority to make these kinds of decisions. As political scientist Philip Cerny notes, the impact of the leader on the decision-making process depends on the rules that give him power and also on the capabilities of the individual: his know-how, his charisma, his ability to surround himself – what Cerny calls 'the personal equation'.[58] A scientist and physician by training (he was a lipid biochemist and a cardiologist), Vagelos joined Merck in 1975 as Senior Vice-President for Research. He had previously worked as a scientist at the National Institute of Health in Bethesda, near Washington D.C. (one of the world's most renowned medical research center) and then was chair of the Biochemistry Department and of the Division of Biology and Biomedical Sciences at Washington University in St. Louis, Missouri. At Merck, he was involved in the decision to continue the development of ivermectin for human use. Especially, he encouraged Dr. Campbell's early efforts to explore the possibility of human use for ivermectin.[59] In his own words, this stance 'reflected the fact that I was so new to the business world that I still thought of myself as a physician first, scientist second, and president of an industrial laboratory third'.[60] Thus, he was receptive to the scientific interest and arguments of the researchers working on the project. But, in 1987, when the decision to give Mectizan was taken, Vagelos found himself in a different position: 'I would have to become a business leader and would have to rearrange my priorities: I would have to become a corporate

leader first, a medical scientist promoting innovation second, and a physician concerned about healing third'.[61] This led to a new understanding of his 'personal equation', which made him especially sensitive to the internal need of cohesion of the company, the opportunity that the donation represented for Merck in terms of image, but also for himself. In the words of one of his collaborators, 'the company's image was incredibly important to Vagelos'.[62] We may see in his actions a willingness to leave his mark, his legacy – this is reflected in the fact that he has written a lot, particularly on his philanthropic commitment, thus helping to highlight his actions at the head of Merck. He also legitimized the decision to donate Mectizan by highlighting that it was in line with the company history and the vision of George W. Merck, emblematic president of Merck from 1925 to 1950, who gave the company its motto: 'We try never to forget that medicine is for the people. It is not for the profits. The profits follow, and if we have remembered that, they have never failed to appear'. Furthermore, as 'a corporate leader first', Roy Vagelos was well aware that it was important for internal reasons – the motivation and loyalty of employees – to find a way for Mectizan to be distributed. Fran Hawthorne relates that Vagelos, when asked why he made the decision to donate the drug 'did not mention the patients suffering from river blindness. He spoke about "the people at Merck. The research people and how disappointed they would be if the drug never reached the people that would benefit"'.[63]

Although the donation decision was ultimately made and announced by Merck CEO, it was clear that it did not stem from the vision of a providential leader, but was the result of several factors (the favorable business situation of Merck; its historical use of donations; the high cost of going backward and the risk to employee motivation; etc.), the involvement of several actors (we especially underlined the contributions of brokers such as Drs. Campbell and Aziz) and of the continued relationship with WHO. Even if the IO did not ask directly for an unlimited donation, it constrained the decision by highlighting the crucial issue of cost, the inadequacy of a short-term donation, and by cajoling Merck and emphasizing 'the public spiritedness' of the company and 'its desire to do what is best for the public good'.[64] This web of interdependencies gave rise to new challenges in the organizational design of the program to distribute Mectizan. Such a cooperation for the implementation of a large-scale health program was unprecedented: the MDP can thus be seen as the forerunner of a movement of renewal in development policies, co-produced in partnership.

The challenges of Merck and WHO's co-involvement in the Mectizan Donation Program (1987–1995)

A difficult balance between independence and control

When Merck took the decision to donate Mectizan, executives were aware that the company could not assume the distribution of the drug on its own.

During the clinical trial phases, Merck teams had already understood the numerous obstacles to overcome to get access to affected populations.[65] Developing a large-scale donation program was going to be a challenge. In view of the established relationship with WHO over the past decade and the input the global health institution had already provided, it had to be included in the distribution program.

For Merck as for the WHO, the first necessity was to set up an institutional mechanism that guaranteed their respective independence. Neither the pharmaceutical company nor the intergovernmental organization wished to be bogged down in a program that would prove ineffective and detrimental to their image. At the same time, both organizations needed to retain control over their participation. Their constraints and demands explain the final institutional design of the MDP.

In order for Merck to get image benefits from the drug donation, the program had to have measurable outcomes and be without harmful consequences. Since risks arose mainly from the possible side effects of Mectizan, the establishment of an effective monitoring mechanism to ensure that these effects were reported and dealt with was crucial. Otherwise, they could damage the reputation of ivermectin, including on the very lucrative veterinary market. Moreover, Merck was concerned with avoiding the drug's appearance on the black market or even on the clandestine veterinary market, which meant that distribution channels had to be strictly framed.[66] In order to prevent these two outcomes, the American giant wanted to closely monitor the program. At the same time, an invasive commitment by the pharmaceutical firm could weaken its commercial position in recipient countries, for example, if a donation of Mectizan was refused to a government because of shortcomings in the distribution project. In order not to jeopardize future commercial relations, the company wanted to stay clear of the evaluation of donation requests.

WHO was also in an ambiguous position. It is an international *intergovernmental* organization, owned by Member-States. Though its Constitution (article 71) acknowledges that it may 'make suitable arrangements for consultation and cooperation with non-governmental international organizations', it is far from authorizing the organization to jointly lead a committee with a for-profit company – without mentioning the political controversy that would arise. The debate on how far WHO could go in institutionalizing its relationship with non-state actors, and in particular for-profit ones, would continue in the following decades, especially at the end of the 1990s, when WHO became engaged in several public-private partnerships (cf. *infra*). In accordance with its Constitution and previous actions, in 1987, WHO envisioned two possibilities: either to keep to an advisory role, counseling Merck and recipient countries, or to be the only final decision-making body for parties eligible for donations. However, neither of these options seemed satisfactory enough. In the first case, WHO would be confined to a secondary role; in the second one, it would be the only one to face critics and bear

responsibility in case of a problem with a donation (and it was not sure Merck would accept such a solution anyway). Thus, WHO proposed an alternative: a tripartite consultation mechanism between Merck, WHO and governments of recipient countries.[67] But Merck rejected a process that would involve the company directly and came up with a counter-proposal: a committee of independent experts that would neither be under the jurisdiction of the WHO nor of the pharmaceutical group.

In order to set up this independent committee, the US company contacted an organization specialized in the management of health programs, the Task Force for Child Survival. It was established in 1984 by WHO, UNICEF, the World Bank, UNDP and the Rockefeller Foundation to revitalize the Expanded Program on Immunization, which had been tasked since 1974 with vaccinating all children against diphtheria, tetanus, tuberculosis, pertussis, poliomyelitis and measles.[68] The use of the Task Force for Child Survival, an experienced actor in the health field, although on a different issue, to take over the management of the MDP, reflected both the importance of networks in global health and the Task Force's desire to expand its visibility within the international health community. The Director of the Task Force, Dr. William Foege, was the former Director of the Center for Disease Control in the United States and a well-known and respected personality. The enlargement strategy of the Task Force would eventually lead to a name change (it subsequently became the Task Force for Global Health) and a broader reach. The organization is now involved in various health programs and manages several public-private partnerships.

The Task Force, located in Georgia (USA), has hosted the Secretariat of the MDP since its inception. It has acted as a third-party, an intermediary, between all parties to the donation program (Merck, WHO, the Mectizan Expert Committee, recipient countries). The Mectizan Expert Committee (MEC) has been the other central organ of the MDP, the decision-making body that meets once or twice per year to evaluate applications from organizations wishing to distribute Mectizan. Organizations authorized to distribute it (NGOs, foundations, health ministries, WHO's OCP program, etc.) take a commitment for a minimum period of five years. An annual evaluation authorizes them to continue distribution or not.[69]

From the very beginning, the independence of the MEC was very important for all stakeholders, as it guaranteed the credibility and smooth running of the donation program.[70] Nevertheless, even if Merck made a point of not intervening in the committee's deliberations and even if the MDP secretariat functioned independently from the pharmaceutical company, the latter maintained significant control over the MDP structure.

Merck's control mechanisms

The MEC was composed of seven experts, recognized as public health specialists. They should not be employed by Merck during their three-year term

on the MEC, but they are appointed by the US group upon recommendation from the WHO and the Task Force for Global Health.[71] The MEC also includes three non-voting members representing Merck, WHO and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. The pharmaceutical group financed the administrative functioning of the committee, especially personnel costs – the main task of the staff is to prepare the files of donation requests to be evaluated by MEC members.[72] Members of the expert committee receive a daily allowance during the sessions, and their transport and accommodation costs are covered by Merck. The company also regularly conducts audits to assess the committee's activity.

The MEC evaluates applications submitted by organizations wishing to distribute Mectizan and makes the decision whether or not to accept them. But other actors intervene in the donation decision and in the distribution processes. The MDP secretariat, that is, staff members of the Task Force for Global Health, carries out field work: information gathering, verification of data provided by organizations, coordination with WHO, verification of the distribution process, etc. The final distribution to patients is provided by recipient organizations: NGOs, foundations, health ministries, etc. However, Merck remains fully in charge of the delivery of medicines, a key step in the Mectizan distribution chain. Once the MEC has selected recipient organizations and the quantities of Mectizan to be supplied, these data are transmitted to Merck Corporate Contributions, which triggers the shipment of the drug from the pharmaceutical group's export department in Riom (France).[73] Merck Corporate Contributions monitors the process until the Mectizan has arrived at its destination. The firm manages this step unilaterally, despite demands in the 1990s that Mectizan be stored in recipient countries in order to give local organizations and governments more room to maneuver, especially to decide on the precise timing of drug distribution.[74]

National governments were sometimes worried about a distribution program that bypasses their structures and over which they have no control. The control of organizations authorized to distribute Mectizan was a frequent source of concern. Health ministries, in particular, would like to take care of storage and supervise the delivery to NGOs. The Ministry of Health of Sierra Leone, for instance, requested to be informed, through Merck Director of Operations in Africa, of any treatment request made to the MDP.[75] This is why, in 1989, the MEC issued new guidelines for the submission of donation requests: except in the case of the OCP (WHO's program), all applications now had to be approved by the Ministry of Health of the country where the donation would take place.[76] Nevertheless, Merck continued to supply Mectizan directly to the applicant organization and not to the health ministries. The company's goal was to accommodate some of the governments' wishes to monitor the donation without losing control of its program.

Merck also closely oversees scientific surveillance of Mectizan and the analysis of medical data collected in the field. In the early 1990s, severe and sometimes lethal side effects were observed in the case of a co-infection of

onchocerciasis with loa loa, a rare parasitic disease. Since 1995, guidelines have been developed to identify populations affected by loa loa in central and western Africa, and the MEC takes this new criterion into account in the allocation of donations.

WHO takes back the strategic lead

The role of WHO is mainly to provide advice and expertise to the MDP. It produces data and analysis, is regularly consulted by the Task Force for Global Health, and assists organizations and countries wishing to apply for a donation. It may also be a candidate for a donation through its OCP. The role of the OCP was greatly affected by the creation of the MDP, which took the forefront in the fight against onchocerciasis and forced the program to redesign its operations. The OCP expressed a wish to play a coordinating and centralizing role in the distribution of Mectizan. It suggested, for instance, that Mectizan donations to NGOs transit through its structures, which Merck refused.[77]

But from the mid-1990s onward, the WHO developed a new health strategy that transformed the distribution of Mectizan, forcing the pharmaceutical company to adapt. This strategy allowed WHO to reclaim a concept – the donation program – which it did not initiate and to re-take the lead in the fight against onchocerciasis. Until then, the distribution model was based on mobile teams, made up of professional health workers. In 1995, WHO proposed that Mectizan distribution would now be carried out through community-based programs, in line with a more general trend in development policies which aimed at involving local actors. This implied the strengthening of local health systems and the training of local health workers. With this approach, the WHO reverted to the primary health care principles of the Alma Ata Declaration of 1978.[78] This role of communities was possible because the drug is easy to use, relatively safe, and can therefore be administered with 'minimal supervision'.[79] The aim was also to make the distribution of Mectizan sustainable by reducing the costs and extending coverage since the drug must be distributed once or twice a year for 15 years and mobile teams were expensive and did not cover large areas.

Merck was far from delighted by this change of approach, which saw the distribution of Mectizan entrusted to non-medical personnel selected by communities.[80] It was a departure from the traditional interlocutors of the pharmaceutical industry (physicians, nurses, health ministries, etc.) with which companies were used to interact and which were potential contacts for the distribution of other treatments. This new orientation promoted by WHO was part of a movement to strengthen the role of national actors in development aid policies and to increase the involvement of populations so that they were not only passive recipients. Merck finally decided to support this community-based approach for several reasons. First, Mectizan had proven to be extremely safe (except in the case of co-infection with loa loa), very

simple to administer, and WHO offered to put in place training programs for workers chosen by the communities. Second, MEC members supported this approach. Merck could not afford to undermine the authority of the committee because its independence was the cornerstone of the MDP. Finally, Merck realized that without this change in distribution procedures, the program might not be sustainable over time or expand – and the change in approach actually doubled coverage. WHO launched a new program, the African Program for Onchocerciasis Control (APOC), established in 1995 in 19 African countries, to implement this 'community-directed treatment' strategy. One of the main architects of APOC was Dr. Uche Amazigo. A Nigerian biologist trained in public health, she had been collaborating with the TDR Program since 1978 and she was a firm believer in the necessity of working with communities.[81] This program connected old and new actors of onchocerciasis control to ensure ivermectin distribution for several years. Ultimately, WHO succeeded in re-taking the upper hand by a recourse to its normative role (the design of health policies) as a public actor, beyond the mere assistance role that the OCP had been relegated to.

In the post-development phase of Mectizan, cooperation between Merck and the WHO continued to ensure distribution of the drug and gave rise to more sustained and institutionalized interactions as the MDP was established. Its creation was the combination of each actor's preferences to preserve their interests and/or mandate and of their interactions (e.g., when a compromise had to be reached when Merck refused to take responsibility for selecting recipient organizations). The set-up of the MDP modified the role of WHO's OCP, which became a recipient of donations, but WHO was able to ultimately reshape the donation program by proposing a new 'community-directed treatment' strategy in line with its general primary healthcare policy. The field of the fight against onchocerciasis was deeply transformed by the MDP. In terms of content, a further change in strategy took place: a drug, which replaced vector control programs, was donated through specific channels. In terms of institutional shape, new structures were created (such as the MDP and APOC) and new actors were now involved in the fight against the disease (such as experts, communities, NGOs and the Task Force).

The aftermath of a successful program (1996–present)

A lasting impact on the fight against neglected tropical diseases: the expansion of donation programs

From the beginning, the MDP was considered a success. It brought Merck not only benefits in terms of image and reputation, including in the business world, as the *Fortune* magazine 'most-admired business' award shows, but it also gained a very good integration within public health networks, regular contacts with the WHO and a certain familiarity with the Task Force and NGOs involved in onchocerciasis control. The company thus significantly

improved its status in global health. Moreover, in terms of scientific fame, Dr. W.C. Campbell's role in the discovery of ivermectin co-earned him the Nobel Prize in medicine in 2015 (with Dr. Satuchi Omura of the Japan-based Kitasano Institute who took the lead in isolating the microorganism). As for the WHO, it was able to revamp the fight against tropical diseases affecting poor population which had stalled since the 1960s and the failure of malaria eradication. The development of Mectizan can also be seen as a success for WHO's TDR program and the distribution of the drug emphasized WHO's capacity to build programs and design strategies. The intergovernmental organization also gained experience in cooperating with non-state actors.

This success led to an expansion of the MDP. In 1997, it was discovered that the combination of two molecules, albendazole and ivermectin, was effective in fighting lymphatic filariasis (also known as elephantiasis), a parasitic disease that affects 120 million people in regions where onchocerciasis is also present. Merck was ready to expand the donation of Mectizan to include treatment of lymphatic filariasis. WHO contacted the producer of albendazole, the British pharmaceutical company SmithKline Beecham (now GSK), which agreed in 1998 to give the molecule. Like ivermectin, albendazole is an antiparasitic drug originally developed for the veterinary market. The joint donation of Mectizan and albendazole is complex to implement, as the two drugs are to be distributed at the same time, but following different company procedures. The donation of albendazole by GSK is made through WHO and its Global Program for the Eradication of Lymphatic Filariasis, which also coordinates the delivery of the two drugs.

Following the success of Mectizan, new donation programs were created in the following decades. One example is the donation of Zithromax by the US pharma giant Pfizer to fight trachoma, an ocular infection caused by a bacterium (Chlamydia trachomatis) transmitted by flies or human contact. It can lead to blindness and affects 41 million people worldwide. The donation initiative came from the American foundation Edna McConnell Clark. It had a research program on tropical diseases, in particular, schistosomiasis, onchocerciasis and trachoma, for which it collaborated with the WHO and TDR. The Clark foundation convinced Pfizer that a donation on the model of Mectizan would be in its interest.[82] In 1998, the Zithromax Donation Program was institutionalized through the formation of the International Trachoma Initiative, whose mechanisms closely resemble those of the MDP (with the establishment of a Trachoma Expert Committee, for example). In 2009, the Task Force for Global Health also took over the management of the International Trachoma Initiative, in line with the expansion of the Task Force's portfolio. But other donation programs followed a different organizational model. For instance, in 1989, Ciba-Geigy launched a leprosy control program in India. The company gives the necessary treatment, but it is an 'in-house' program, managed by its foundation.

Many saw the Mectizan donation as a program that 'awakened' other companies, opening their eyes to the opportunities offered by donations in terms

of reputations and contacts in global health.[83] Nevertheless, it took more than a decade for cooperative donation programs to multiply, and the initiative to create them stemmed mainly from private foundations, such as in the case of the Zithromax donation, or from the WHO, which embraced donations as a way to fight neglected tropical diseases. On top of the Mectizan, albendazole and Zithromax donations already mentioned, the WHO is involved in a Novartis donation against leprosy (1999), a GSK donation against malaria (1999), a Sanofi and Bayer drug donation against African trypanosomiasis (2001), a Bayer donation against Chagas disease (2004), a GSK and Johnson&-Johnson donation against helminthiases (2005), a Merck KGaA (a German company, not the American Merck&Co.) donation against schistosomiasis (2007), a Novartis donation against fasciolosis (2007), a GILEAD donation against leishmaniosis (2012), an Eisai Co. donation against lymphatic filariasis (2013) and a new EMS (a Brazilian firm) donation against yaws (2018).[84] These donations did not necessarily lead to the establishment of programs as institutionalized as the MDP or the International Trachoma Initiative, but they show that WHO has been able to take advantage of the new policy tool of donations.

However, the time-lag between the creation of the MDP and the multiplication of other donation programs (when not explained by scientific constraints/drug availability) and the fact that they often did not assume an institutional shape as developed as the MDP highlight the importance of the long history of interactions and co-constitution processes between Merck and the WHO. The depth of cooperation between the two actors for 10 years before the set-up of the MDP seems to be an important factor in explaining why it worked in this case and why, in other cases, when there was no such history of in-depth interactions between the WHO and a pharmaceutical company, a cooperative relationship might be forged so that a specific drug is donated, but only on an *ad hoc* basis.

The limits of public–private co-constitution

Whether the relationship with WHO is institutionalized or *ad hoc*, thanks to donation programs pharmaceutical corporations have taken the role of a co-producer of international health action. In their discourses, donations are presented as an act of charity belonging to a different sphere of activity than the for-profit one. However, this perception is misleading.

First, donations are in line with the market logic to which firms respond because the existence of market mechanisms is a condition for their implementation. The production of ivermectin for instance responds to the incentives of the veterinary market, and the decision to produce Mectizan was made in the hope of gaining a competitive advantage over other companies in the sector, in particular because it allowed the company better knowledge of and good contacts with health ministries.

Second, donations of medicines also fulfill a function of market protection. By providing a charitable mechanism intended to soften health inequalities, they aim at avoiding the questioning of inequalities that result from the very structure of the pharmaceutical market. As anthropologist Marcel Hénaff points out, with the evolution of societies, gift-giving has undergone a process of moralization: it is now an obligation for the rich to give back to society in order to correct inequalities that threaten to break it up.[85] This analysis underpins a large part of the literature analyzing the development of philanthropy. In the case of Mectizan, the donation was made by Merck as the company gained unprecedented profits and strengthened its position in the pharmaceutical market. In addition, the principle of a donation is to suppress the price, which is a constitutive part of a market exchange. By eliminating this barrier to access to medicines, firms avoid the questioning of the mechanisms by which they otherwise determine prices. This ensures the protection of other components of the pharmaceutical market such as intellectual property rights.[86] For companies, the establishment of intellectual property rights makes it possible to monetize innovation. In the case of drugs, companies argue that without a patent, there would be no investment in research, no innovation and therefore no progress in the health field. Jeffrey L. Sturchio, former Vice President of Merck, very explicitly links the existence of strong intellectual property rights to the possibility of a philanthropic action such as the MDP:

> Doing well is a precondition to doing good: an enabling policy environment (including, for instance, adequate TRIPS[87]-compliant intellectual property protection standards) is a prerequisite for a company to have the wherewithal to mount a major philanthropic program like the Merck MECTIZAN Donation Program.[88]

Thus, the effects of the reshaping of the fight against neglected tropical diseases created by the drug donation programs should not be overestimated. They do not imply a change in the core goals and views of the pharmaceutical industry. It could be argued that the co-constitution of social protection processes only applies outside the market, when Merck seems to act as a 'moral corporation', even if this disconnection between the market and non-market spheres is artificial, as the very existence of drug donations depends on the perpetuation of market mechanisms.

Debates on the 'para-political' institutionalization of corporate participation

The questioning of this link between the market and non-market spheres is especially relevant in a context of institutionalization of corporate participation in IOs. Since the 1990s, the end of the Cold War and the rise of a global governance era, there has been an increased participation of non-state

actors (NGOs, philanthropic foundations, corporations, etc.) in international intergovernmental organizations and in the design of global public policies. For instance, in 1992, so-called 'Major groups' were introduced at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (also known as the Rio Conference or the Earth Summit): the participation of several parts of society (Indigenous Peoples, NGOs, Women, Children and Youth, Farmers, etc.), including Business and Industry, was recognized and facilitated. In 2000, the UN created the Global Compact, an initiative to foster the cooperation between UN agencies and business. Since the turn of the twenty-first century, global health initiatives or public-private partnerships have multiplied, and the WHO has actively engaged in them.[89] This way of engaging in public policy, of providing public services, has long existed at the national or local level, where there has always been a 'mixed economy of welfare'.[90] Laura Lee Downs speaks, for instance, of a 'para-political space of social protection' that

> straddled the gap between public and private. In this space, public functions, […] were assured by private or semi-public […] actors working under the benevolent, […], eye of a state that had long recognized the social protection of vulnerable populations as falling within its brief, but lacked the means to organize and operate a full range of such institutions.[91]

However, this intensified and institutionalized cooperation between public and private actors, for-profit and not-for profit, has sparked a debate on representativeness and legitimacy. In particular, the issue of the 'undue' influence on public policy by for-profit actors has been controversial. For instance, some NGOs have denounced the UN Global Compact as a 'blue-washing' initiative (corporations using the Global Compact to enhance their legitimacy as 'partners' while in reality continuing to act contrary to UN principles and conventions). The issue of how to identify and manage conflicts of interest has also become prominent, and in 2017, the UN Joint Inspection Unit recommended that heads of UN agencies take measures in that regard before the end of 2019.[92] This 'para-political space' is thus very politicized, traversed by political debates and antagonisms.[93]

Conclusion

The Merck-WHO collaboration and the MDP are historically contextualized developments, but they prefigure these contemporary debates, although the answers provided at the time might differ from those of today. How to incentivize corporations to contribute to the common good and to public policy? The TDR Program was an attempt to do so through the creation of a scientific network and embedding of individuals based on their scientific ethos. The publicization around the MDP and the subsequent benefits it brought Merck in terms of image was another means to this end.

Are there conditions in order for collaboration to lead to a more structured cooperation and an institutionalization? We were able to distinguish several stages of interaction, during which we have seen dynamics of interaction seeking/refusal, cooperation and competition. This case study emphasizes the importance of the building of interdependencies between actors and the role of individual brokers (such as Merck's scientists which were also involved with WHO), which are key elements of co-constitution processes. The depth of cooperation between Merck and the WHO for 10 years before the set-up of the donation program seems to be an important factor to explain its characteristics and sustainability, especially when compared to other programs which were designed differently, on an *ad hoc*, less comprehensive, basis.

How far can for-profit actors' preferences be influenced? While co-constitution processes took place and the WHO was able to frame some of Merck's actions (e.g. to insist on a long-term donation and to design community-led distribution strategies), their effects should not be overestimated as donation programs remain in line with core corporate for-profit goals and market mechanisms. However, we can notice that some issues which are now crucial were not raised at the time, such as the prevention of conflicts of interest to safeguard the legitimacy of an international program.

Thus, this chapter highlights the importance to map the history of interactions between public and private actors. Current debates on global governance and IOs dealing with non-state actors should not obscure past relationships. In this regard, a socio-historical approach and a thick description of case studies to track institutional processes and social interactions can be fruitful.

Notes

1 Merck & Co. Inc., *Annual Report – 1988*, America's Corporate Foundation, 1987, ProQuest Historical Annual Reports, 39; Merck & Co. Inc., *Annual Report – 1989*, America's Corporate Foundation, 1988, ProQuest Historical Annual Reports, 2.
2 F. Hawthorne, *The Merck Druggernaut. The inside story of a pharmaceutical giant* (Hoboken, NJ. 2003), 12.
3 The same statue stands also in front of the World Bank in Washington DC and in front of the Carter Center in Decatur, Georgia, USA.
4 Fieldwork observation, Geneva, 2010, 2016.
5 The Carter Center, Interchurch Medical Assistance Inc., Interconex Inc., Fondation internationale pour les yeux, Organisation pour la prévention de la cécité, Rebecca & John Moores, Sight Savers International.
6 For more details, see J. Bump, 'The Lion's Gaze: African river blindness from tropical curiosity to international development' (D.Phil, Johns Hopkins, 2004), 102.
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10 On the notion of para–political space, see: L.L. Downs, '"And so we transform a people": Women's social action and the reconfiguration of politics on the French right, 1934–1947', *Past and Present*, 225 (2014), 187–225.

11 The seven other diseases part of the program in 1975 are: African trypanosomiasis, Chagas disease, leishmaniasis, leprosy, lymphatic filariasis, malaria and schistosomiasis. Since 2000, the TDR portfolio has extended to tuberculosis and dengue.

12 TDR, *Report of the first external review committee*, Final report TDR/JCB(5)/82.6, 30 June 1982, 51.

13 Pharmaceutical companies often possess property rights on biological compounds or molecules, but do not necessarily test them to see if they might be useful to develop a treatment against diseases they are not interested in. In order that these compounds do not stay 'on a shelf', TDR incentivizes companies to send their compounds for testing somewhere else by setting up the necessary research capacities, such as screening centers. In the case of lymphatic filariasis and onchocerciasis for instance, TDR counts three primary screening centers (in the United States, Japan and Great Britain), two secondary centers (in Greece and Germany) and two tertiary centers (in Australia and Malaysia). Pharmaceutical companies such as Bayer, Ciba-Geigy, Hoechst, Hoffmann La Roche, Janssen, Merck, Parke-Davis Warner-Lambert, Rhône Poulenc, and Tanabe Chemical used at some point one of these screening centers. In: TDR, 'Outline of the TDR Filariasis SWG Activities since 1976 in the search for improved chemotherapy for onchocerciasis' (December 1981), 7; WHO Headquarters, *WHO Archives*, File CDS1-NTD-OCP Fol 135/A0FF-0836 on the Mectizan donation program/OCP – Onchocerciasis Control Program.

14 K. Benson, quoted in T.A. Börzel, 'Organizing Babylon. On the different conception of policy networks', *Public Administration*, 76, 2 (1998), 257.

15 TDR, 'Outline of the TDR Filariasis SWG Activities since 1976 in the search for improved chemotherapy for onchocerciasis' (1981), 7; WHO Headquarters, *WHO Archives*, File CDS1-NTD-OCP Fol 135/A0FF-0836.

16 Novartis Archives, *Firmenarchiv Ciba-Geigy*, KL 4 (Novartis is the pharmaceutical company that absorbed Ciba-Geigy).

17 Some pharmaceutical companies, such as Abbott Laboratories, produce them.

18 Pharmaceutical corporations and their business association, the International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturer Association, backed by a few powerful governments such as the United States, strongly opposed these regulations which impacted their commercial activities. For more details see A. Guilbaud, *Business Partners. Firmes privées et gouvernance mondiale de la santé* (Paris, 2015), 45–56.

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28 *Ibid*., 103.
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75 WHO Headquarters, *WHO Archives*, File CDS1-NTD-OCP Fol 136/A0FF-0836.
76 *Ibid.*
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