



ifa Edition Culture and Foreign Policy

Realities, Challenges, Visions?

Towards a New Foreign Cultural and Educational Policy

WIKA Report (Volume 4)

Caroline Y. Robertson-von Trotha (ed.)

WIKI Report (Volume 4)

Realities, Challenges, Visions?

Towards a New Foreign Cultural and Educational Policy

WIKA Report (Volume 4)

ZAK | Zentrum für Angewandte Kulturwissenschaft und Studium Generale
Centre for Cultural and General Studies

Editor

Prof. Dr. Caroline Y. Robertson-von Trotha

Chairwoman of the Academic Council on Culture and Foreign Policy (WIKa)
and Founding Director of ZAK | Centre for Cultural and General Studies at the
Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT)

Rüppurrer Straße 1a, Haus B

D-76137 Karlsruhe

In cooperation with

ifa (Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen e.V.)

Charlottenplatz 17

D-70173 Stuttgart

Postfach 10 24 63

D-70020 Stuttgart

info@ifa.de

www.ifa.de

The WIKa Report is funded by ifa (Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen e.V.).



Realities, Challenges, Visions?

Towards a New Foreign Cultural and Educational Policy

edited by

Caroline Y. Robertson-von Trotha

in cooperation with

ifa (Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen)

Stuttgart and Berlin

Editing: Julia Stübe
Copy editing and translation: Dr. Kareem James Abu-Zeid
Proofreading: Christine Wölfle, Janina Hecht, Lilian Maier
Typesetting and design: Kristina Pruß
Cover image: Würfel; © Jochen Maier 2008

Die Inhalte der abgedruckten Texte geben nicht unbedingt die Meinung der Herausgeberin wieder. Die Rechte an Bildern und Texten liegen, sofern nicht anders angegeben, bei den jeweiligen Fotografinnen und Fotografen und bei den Autorinnen und Autoren.

Impressum



Karlsruher Institut für Technologie (KIT)
KIT Scientific Publishing
Straße am Forum 2
D-76131 Karlsruhe

KIT Scientific Publishing is a registered trademark
of Karlsruhe Institute of Technology.
Reprint using the book cover is not allowed.

www.ksp.kit.edu



This document – excluding parts marked otherwise, the cover, pictures and graphs – is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 International License (CC BY-SA 4.0): <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/deed.en>



The cover page is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-No Derivatives 4.0 International License (CC BY-ND 4.0): <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/deed.en>

Print on Demand 2022 – Gedruckt auf FSC-zertifiziertem Papier

ISBN 978-3-7315-1057-4

DOI 10.5445/KSP/1000125290

Contents

Words of Welcome Ulrich Raulff	I
Foreword Ronald Grätz	III
Introduction: Towards a New Foreign Cultural and Educational Policy Caroline Y. Robertson-von Trotha	1
What Role for Civil Society in Foreign Relations? Rupert Graf Strachwitz	9
The Challenge of Elusive Borders and Shifting Paradigms in the Context of Globalisation and Glocalisation Caroline Y. Robertson-von Trotha	25
A Tale of Two Europes. Non-Simultaneity in European Development Zaal Andronikashvili	43
Photographic Fragments as an Opener to a Long-Lasting Dialectic Relationship. A Brief Reflection Edita Štulcaitė	55
Photographs by Edita Štulcaitė	59
If Not for Democracy, for What? Civil Society Organisations in Non-Democratic Settings Annette Zimmer and Katharina Obuch	77
Democratisation through the Backdoor: The Political Impact of ‘Non-Political’ Culture Support Susann Worschech	93
Transcending Boundaries through Networks – Locally, Globally Egon Endres	105
Photographs by Christian Vögtle	119
German Schools Abroad as a Model of Future Cultural Relations? A Look Back on their Historical Development Dominik Herzner	135

The Role of Civil Society in Advancing Digital Literacy for Girls in Indonesia Michael P. Canares	147
The Potential of Academic Exchange within Foreign Cultural and Educational Policy: Focusing on the Development of Country Images Manuela Sato-Prinz	163
The Translation of Art in the Context of Foreign Cultural Policy Maria Sobotka	177
Rethinking Diplomacy: Youth, Multilateralism, and Multi-Optional Diplomacy in the Context of UN/SCR 2250 Burak Yusmak	193
The Festival that Dares to Believe. A Recollection of the Out Film Festival – East Africa’s First Queer Film Festival Kevin Mwachiro	211
How to Avoid Preaching Exclusively to the Choir: Extending the Scope of Civil Society Involvement in Cultural Relations Swenja Zaremba	219
Photographs by Jochen Maier	235
Culture Wars at Home and Abroad: Examples from the Goethe-Institut Mechtild Manus	249
Fake News – The Media between Enlightenment, Distortion, and Emotionality Jörg Armbruster	263
On the Photo Spreads: Realities, Challenges, and Visions through Photographers’ Eyes	275
The Academic Council on Culture and Foreign Policy (WIKa) Gudrun Czekalla	279

Words of Welcome

Global shifts in power, political and social upheavals, and growing nationalisms require a new orientation and visionary perspectives for international cultural relations. In order to meet the current challenges joint networks must be established and international cooperation strengthened.

The Academic Council on Culture and Foreign Policy (WIKA, i.e. Wissenschaftlicher Initiativkreis Kultur und Außenpolitik) deals with the theory and practice of international cultural exchange and organises scientific conferences and workshops on this subject. The aim is to provide academic support for Germany's foreign cultural and educational policy in its international relations, to develop concepts and plans, and to anchor the topic more firmly in research and teaching. Over the past few years, WIKA has dealt with a broad range of aspects and questions pertaining to international cultural and educational policy. In the process, it became increasingly clear that new ideas and concepts for a policy of global cultural relations must be developed.

Foreign cultural and educational policy is faced with the task of closely observing and critically analysing current realities, trends, challenges, and potentials. The present fourth volume of the WIKA Report provides important impulses for this task: The interdisciplinary and international contributions discuss concrete models and visions for a new policy of cultural relations between states that transcends geographical, political, and social barriers without losing sight of current challenges. The aim is to derive guidelines and recommendations for action for foreign cultural and educational policy from the observed realities and designed visions, so that this policy can contribute to a responsible shaping of our global future.

This publication places particular focus on civil society involvement. Because of their local embedding and their political influence, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) lend themselves as cooperation partners for state actors. But isn't their scope of action being increasingly restricted under non-democratic power structures? What forms of cooperation must be devised, what resources must be used, and what opportunities must be seized to involve civil society organisations (CSOs) in shaping a new foreign cultural and educational policy?

For me it is clear: Successful international cooperation needs networking. The current coronavirus pandemic in particular plainly demonstrates this. The interdependencies of supposedly independent positions are becoming visible; radicalised actors are seizing every opportunity to gain more space; and personal freedoms are being restricted – all of this puts the responsibility of the individual within democratic structures to the test.

Realities, challenges, visions – we encounter them in everyday life as well as in politics, and they demand a personal point of view. This publication can serve as a source of inspiration and open up new perspectives that can contribute to a comprehensive reorientation of foreign cultural and educational policy.

I am pleased to open this publication with a word of welcome, and I congratulate Caroline Y. Robertson-von Trotha and Ronald Grätz on another successful volume of the WIKA Report series.

Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Ulrich Raulff
President of ifa (Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen)

(Translated from the German by Kareem James Abu-Zeid)

Foreword

The present volume brings together contributions that are primarily from the 2019 WIKI Workshop, which tackled the question of the role of civil society in cultural relations under increasingly difficult conditions. More than a year has passed since the workshop, and it was a year that has once again focused on many of the issues addressed by the contributions.

The coronavirus has changed the world to a far greater extent than we suspected at the beginning of the pandemic. Many of the changes will remain, both the welcome ones and the less desired ones. It is not only increasingly virtual communication and the suppression of important topics from public discourse – such as refugees and migration, climate change, and the rise of authoritarian and dictatorial regimes – that are due to the virus, but also the changes in interpersonal contact and the loss of personal closeness, which are so important for us in cultural dialogue, but also in political discourse, projects, negotiations, conference breaks, and personal conversations.

Protests against the coronavirus measures as well as conspiracy theories, which can also be seen as a reflex to the unknown that is perceived as threatening, show, just as much as the high levels of psychological strain on families and businesses, how much we depend on human interaction, on coming together, on contact, and on the holistic perception of the other person. This substantially alters cultural exchange, because cultural exchange lives from such contact and produces its effects by connecting and bringing people together. People who are unable to move and meet each other tend to atrophy. This is one result of the pandemic, and of the fact that some of the world's autocrats have been erecting national borders.

We all hope that this is in vain and that globalisation shows us that civil society can counteract the pandemic of nationalism. The courageous and persistent protests against the rigged elections in Belarus, as well as the protests in Georgia and many other places are also protests against the fact that autocracies are forcibly accompanied by the restriction of freedom of expression, artistic freedom, and the freedom of science. It is civil society that plays a central role here as an important force for securing democracy and the rule of law and as a guarantor of peace. But it needs our help in the form of empowerment, i.e. the ability to demonstrate and stand up for equality and justice. Civil society does not see itself as state representation within the

framework of a state's foreign policy, but rather as a safeguarding of global justice that is guided by values. Civil society thus assumes responsibility toward those who are indifferent to the ways in which they secure their power.

The WIKA Workshop impressively demonstrated just how important successful practice is, and just how important our actions as an institution are, when it comes to protecting civil society and its actors.

Under these conditions, cultural policy can neither be organised nor thought of solely on a national level, because we must see ourselves as part of *international* networks, whether as part of the European Union, as part of the defenders of human rights, or as part of a globally networked society. Global networking has attained enormous dynamism through the coronavirus and has become, as an action of civil society, a counter-model to nation-state thinking.

The challenge we are facing here is to step out of nation-state categories and think in post-nation-state terms. Cultural dialogue takes place neither between states, nor between languages and cultures, nor between historical spaces, spaces of equal rules and rituals, or spaces of organised solidarity, but between people. We must also move away from concepts of a defined identity and instead understand identity as a dynamic process with strong changes.

Misunderstandings are the normal state of affairs, and if we agree that we not only generally misunderstand the other, but that we will also certainly *never* fully understand them, this does not necessarily have to lead to war with one another, for civil society dialogue is the greatest contribution to peace of all. The representation of the other whom I perhaps do not know and probably do not fully understand is what makes civil society so strong, what allows it to play its role, and is what we call cultural dialogue.

The ifa (Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen) sees itself as an institution that puts together forums where such questions of basic understanding, of concepts, and of strategies are discussed.

I would like to thank the contributors to this volume for their contributions, Caroline Y. Robertson-von Trotha and her team at ZAK | Centre for Cultural and General Studies at the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT) for their excellent work and their editing of the volume, my colleagues at ifa for organising the workshop, and, last but not least, you, dear readers, for your valued attention and interest in the present publication.

Ronald Grätz

Secretary General of ifa (Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen)

(Translated from the German by Kareem James Abu-Zeid)

Introduction: Towards a New Foreign Cultural and Educational Policy

We live in a globalised world full of complex interrelations and reciprocities, disruptions and conflicts, innovations and new beginnings. As a major cultural agent in ongoing processes of change, foreign cultural and educational policy has both reactive and formative roles. We are constantly reacting and adapting to changes in situative local framework conditions at the international, regional, and local levels. We simultaneously find ourselves in large-scale processes of transformation and deep change, which often go unnoticed over longer periods of time. In our world of highly interdependent connectivities and glocalities, we observe winners, losers, and new deeply disturbing inequalities. Climate change, the finiteness of natural resources, and the changing structures of geopolitical balance and imbalance in a highly competitive world of dependencies further aggravate the challenges ahead (cf. Ebert/Grätz 2018).¹

The understanding of the role and potential of foreign cultural and educational policy in Germany as the so-called ‘third pillar’ (*dritte Säule*) of German diplomacy has accordingly changed (cf. Maaß 2016). This encompasses the structural reorganisation of the Foreign Ministry, strengthening its resources and commitment in this field as a “fundament of our relations with the world” (Frank-Walter Steinmeier, cited in: Auswärtiges Amt 2008: n.p., own translation), the ongoing shift at many levels to co-productive formats, and the enhancement of inclusive citizen participation. New and well-researched ongoing questions are raised and discussed in changing contexts: Which pluralities prevail in enhancing our local and world heritage? How do new ‘cultural standards’ establish themselves on a temporary basis of ongoing adaptation and change or as more permanent witnesses of cultural plurality, and how do we enable and manage diversity? How can we counter neo-nationalist mobilisation, supremacist ideologies, and the unprecedented acceleration of conspiracy narratives, hate speech, and disinformation campaigns?

¹ See also the recent discussion in Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen e.V. (ifa) 2020.

The lack of transparency and the unpredictability of the consequences of change and global actions make people feel insecure. This offers room for stereotyped ascriptions, for one-sided interpretations, for populist manipulation, and for new and old racisms. We observe the increased emergence of authoritarian personalities and regimes that appear to have plebiscitary legitimacy. Cultural relations thus take place under complex changing conditions. Not only in the field of culture and the arts but also in science and technology or in urban planning, to name just a few, under the term ‘participatory turn’ major shifts of inclusive decision-making and co-productive formats are being developed, implemented, and assessed. With the striving for a democratic ‘participatory culture’ – a concept earlier discussed in media education (cf. Jenkins 2006), questions arise and must be addressed: How can we evoke interest, awareness, and engagement? Which actors participate with which (hidden) agendas? Have educational concepts evolved to face the challenges of transparency and reliable sources? Where do structures of policy-making and governance require reform, and in which contexts is this highly unlikely? As participation cuts across all societies, special attention should be paid both to clearly defined attributions of formal competence and nation-state organisation and to complex interacting informal transnational ‘elusive borders’. The central role of cultural education is often overlooked (cf. European Commission 2018).

We need to engage in forward-looking and future-oriented thinking and acting. In view of the present trends of renationalisation of foreign policy, which in many countries is coinciding with the ambitious expansion of geopolitical power politics, this is a major challenge. Post-nation-state concepts have proven to be vulnerable constructs.² Furthermore, we experience the strains of misinformation and manipulation in digitised ‘post-factual’ society.³ Cultural policy must, importantly, include informed educational policy and in particular capacity-building resources.

² On foreign cultural policy beyond national culture, see also Weigel 2019. Andreas Görgen (2017) delivered a plea for a post-nation-state foreign cultural policy in his speech in 2017.

³ For a recent discussion on the freedom and the restrictions of arts and culture in times of crisis, see Bernecker/Grätz 2021.

The present volume aims to contribute to raising awareness of the continual need to adapt to the new realities of non-linear cultural relations development. With our symbolic choice of book cover, we indicate what the present publication has to offer: A variety of individual blocks can be seen. It is noticeable that while they are the same in external form, they differ in colouration and are even unique in the individual grain of their wood. In a similar way, the contributions to our present volume deal with different subject areas and have each emerged from a very individual practical experience or topic of research. There are several blocks with variations of one colour, as well as elements that are less colour-related to the 'large colour fields' and confidently go their own way. This can be seen as emblematic for the approach of the present publication: It does not claim to present an elaborated 'new foreign cultural and educational policy'. Rather, selected impulses are collated and, together with the photographic 'caesuras', the compilation is intended to stimulate one's own conclusions.

The fourth volume of the WIKA Report series is a further collaboration project of ifa (Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen) and ZAK | Centre for Cultural and General Studies at the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT). The volume was preceded by the three WIKA Workshops on the topics of "Culture: Upheaval – Breakthrough – Reorientation" (2017), "Models of Future Cultural Relations: Realities, Challenges, Visions" (2018), and "The Role of Civil Society in Cultural Relations" (2019). Those past presentations, impulses, and debates inspired the present volume.

Opening up to the field of civil society and cultural relations, Rupert Graf Strachwitz reflects on the current state of the civic space in its global dimension and on the implications this may have on international cultural relations. Following on this work, I set out to explore new challenges for international cultural approaches by concentrating in particular on the phenomena of 'elusive borders' and the increasing influence of globalities and transnational interdependencies. The next contribution, by Zaal Andronikashvili, opens up the genealogy of the divide between Eastern and Western Europe. Is it possible to overcome the dilemma of the contested narratives concerning the historical past through cultural policy? Furthering our perceptions of Eastern Europe within the framework of cultural relations, the article by Edita Štulcaitė, one of the photographers of the publication's photo spreads, sets out to explore her very personal approach to Georgia as a foreign traveller, photographer, volunteer, extracurricular educator, and researcher.

In the next section, the question of how to integrate civil society and its organisations into governance arrangements, especially in non-democratic countries, is raised. Research in the field of civil society-government relations, presented by Annette Zimmer and Katharina Obuch, examines the development and scope of action of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in non-democratic settings. The next article, by Susann Worschech, analyses the role of the arts and culture sector in democratisation processes, based on empirical data on the German-Ukrainian cooperation patterns in democracy and cultural cooperation. In the following contribution, Egon Endres also focuses on cooperation processes, and demonstrates the increasing importance of networks in recent years, in addition to arguing that the networking of networks requires a new type of management.

Following on from that, Dominik Herzner investigates how German schools abroad can serve as a model of future cultural relations and reveals how the concept of these schools abroad – with their close exchanges between different nations, cultures, and languages – developed. The ensuing contributions also deal with educational processes. By providing the example of an Indonesian project in partnership with the Goethe-Institut Indonesien, Michael P. Canares shows the importance and potentials of digital education, especially for marginalised groups. In the next text, Manuela Sato-Prinz examines how study-abroad experiences may influence the formation of country images. Continuing this line of thought, another example of how ideas and images of countries are created is given by Maria Sobotka. She asks how the image of South Korea in the West today is shaped by the imagination and representation of traditional Korean art and culture.

The next contributions deal with the question of how target groups that have not been sufficiently considered so far can be included in cultural work and intercultural projects. The article by Burak Yusmak focuses on the alternative role of diplomacy in empowering youth through cross-disciplinary partnerships among intergovernmental organisations. Being a co-founder of the first LGBTQI film festival in East Africa, Kevin Mwachiro shows how obstacles can be overcome with courage, commitment, and the support of strong networks. Bundling the preceding individual examples, Swenja Zaremba summarises the challenges and new exemplary approaches in the fields of intercultural relations and collaboration. Which concepts from other sectors can be useful for reaching out to new target groups and how can these concepts be implemented?

In the last section, Mechtild Manus highlights the challenges posed by radical positions and interventions by state and non-state actors for cultural work at home and abroad, based on her experiences while working for various Goethe-Instituts. Connected with the increase of radicalisation and neo-nationalisms, the question of the extent of a 'politic of lies' is raised: Jörg Armbruster examines the consequences of so-called 'fake news' for democracy, especially in developing countries, but also in Germany.

With this publication we address reflections, paradigm shifts, and practical examples which are relevant to the search for possible new approaches in foreign cultural and educational policy in the light of accelerated challenges. The texts provide an interdisciplinary and diversified overview of topics of research on civil society and cultural relations, democracy, and international cooperation. Past, present, and future realities, challenges, visions, and bridge-building tools: The change of perspective, the awareness of multi-layered interests and constraints, the appreciation of 'good' and 'worse' practices, and the involvement of civil society are prerequisites for the critically constructive further development of international cultural relations. With a broad variety of contributions, we aim to foster the wide-ranging discussion of democratisation, education, and civil society participation processes. This book is not about mainstream discourse and cultural policy development, but rather reflects on the challenges facing foreign cultural and educational policy in times of changing constellations of (geo)political, cultural, and economic influence. The authors present us with insights, examples, and new questions for further development in research, practice, and advocacy.

I and many others owe particular thanks to ifa. The space provided to WIKA, as an interdisciplinary and intergenerational meeting place that brings young researchers and practitioners into contact with experienced researchers and policy-makers, is unique. My sincere thanks to all involved, in particular to Secretary General Ronald Grätz for his engaged commitment, his generous support, and his openness and involvement. Gudrun Czekalla, Head of the ifa Library, is responsible not only for the organisational management of our activities. She has also stood for the continuity and support of WIKA from its very beginning. Her academic knowledge and engaged commitment have greatly enhanced this project.

At ZAK | Centre for Cultural and General Studies at the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT) I owe special thanks to a supportive team. Foremost to Swenja Zaremba, who has been involved in the thematic and scientific coordination of the three WIKA Workshops on which this report is based. I would also like to thank Julia Stübe, Janina Hecht, and Lilian Maier from the ZAK editing team, who accompanied this volume in its creation, and Kareem James Abu-Zeid and Christine Wölflé. I thank our graphic artist Kristina Pruß for taking excellent care of the publication's design and outlay. Further thanks go to Brigitte Maier and Marion Schrieber from KIT Scientific Publishing for their support. Finally and most importantly, my sincere thanks to all authors for their contributions to this volume, as well as to Edita Štulcaitė, Christian Vögtle, and Jochen Maier, who agreed to enrich our publication with their photographic work.

Prof. Dr. Caroline Y. Robertson-von Trotha
Chairwoman of the Academic Council on Culture and Foreign Policy (WIKA) at ifa (Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen) and Founding Director of ZAK | Centre for Cultural and General Studies

References

- Auswärtiges Amt (2008): Nationalkultur im 21. Jahrhundert. Rede von Außenminister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, 24.04.2008; <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/de/newsroom/080424-bm-nationalkultur/218938> [01.02.2021].
- Bernecker, Roland/Grätz, Ronald (eds.) (2021): *Kultur und Freiheit. Beschreibung einer Krise*. Göttingen: Steidl.
- Ebert, Johannes/Grätz, Ronald (2018): Die Chancen der auswärtigen Kultur- und Bildungspolitik. In: Mair, Stefan/Messner, Dirk/Meyer, Lutz (eds.): *Deutschland und die Welt 2030. Was sich verändert und wie wir handeln müssen*. Berlin: Econ, pp. 355–364.
- European Commission (2018): *Building a Stronger Europe. The Role of Youth, Education and Culture Policies (COM/2018/268 final)*. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, 22.05.2018; <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52018DC0268> [01.02.2021].
- Görgen, Andreas (2017): Für eine post-nationalstaatliche Kulturpolitik; <https://menschenbewegen.jetzt/neuvermessung-der-welt-wettbewerb-der-narrative-wie-muss-die-auswaertige-kultur-und-bildungspolitik-in-2020-aufgestellt-sein-rede-dr-andreas-goergen> [21.05.2019].
- Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen e.V. (ifa) (2020): *Reset Europe. Time for Culture to Give Europe New Momentum? Culture Report Progress Europe 2020*. Göttingen: Steidl.
- Jenkins, Henry (2006): *Confronting the Challenges of Participatory Culture. Media Education for the 21st Century. An Occasional Paper on Digital Media and Learning (The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation Reports on Digital Media and Learning)*; https://www.macfound.org/media/article_pdfs/jenkins_white_paper.pdf [01.02.2021].
- Maaß, Kurt-Jürgen (2016): *The Third Pillar of Diplomacy*. Transl. by Jonathan Uhlener; <https://www.goethe.de/en/m/kul/ges/20723017.html> [01.02.2021].
- Weigel, Sigrid (2019): *Transnational Foreign Cultural Policy – Beyond National Culture. Prerequisites and Perspectives for the Intersection of Domestic and Foreign Policy (ifa Edition Culture and Foreign Policy)*. Stuttgart: ifa (Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen).

What Role for Civil Society in Foreign Relations?¹

Rupert Graf Strachwitz (Berlin)

What Role for Culture?

Gaius Cilnius Maecenas, advisor and sometime Chancellor to the Roman Emperor Augustus, was better known as patron of the arts. He supported Horace, Virgil, and other poets, while supporting the Emperor's politics by way of his patronage. Indeed, Virgil (Publius Vergilius Maro), in his epic the *Aeneid*, provided the founding myth for Rome as a world capital. No wonder that the Emperor thoroughly approved of the *Aeneid* and had it edited and published after Virgil's premature death. Maecenas, by supporting him, had been instrumental in furthering the poet's career, as well as that of Horace (Quintus Horatius Flaccus), to whom Maecenas gave a country house, still identifiable near Tivoli; while Ovid (Publius Ovidius Naso), who, for reasons not to be decrypted today was banished by Augustus to a remote province (today's Constanța in Romania), was never a member of Maecenas' circle. Thus, unlike what we may think of subservient court poets, great art and loyalty to a political regime do not necessarily never meet – but neither do they necessarily meet. Another case in point is Shakespeare, a strong advocate of the Elizabethan Tudor regime, as can be seen by the appallingly fake and disparaging picture he paints of the last Plantagenet king, Richard III. To name a German example, Heinrich von Kleist's dramas were intentionally designed to help boost the morale of the Prussian people in the country's fight against Napoleon. On the other hand, much as architecture commonly supports the ruling elites, as can readily be seen by looking at the palace of Versailles, which represents a whole theory of a world order derived from the person of the king, there are examples of architectural plans that may definitely be called revolutionary. Arguably the most famous are the designs by Étienne-Louis Boullée (1728–1799) and Claude-Nicolas Ledoux (1736–1806), made and published before (!) the French Revolution. And, to give two examples from the visual arts, Caspar David Friedrich's Romantic painting of two men looking out into the distance are donning what was

¹ The arguments presented here will also be used in chapters contributed to other forthcoming publications, e.g. Wieland, Josef/Baumann Montecinos, Julika (eds.) (forthcoming): *European Perspectives on Transcultural Leadership* (Transcultural Management Series Vol. 8). Marburg: Metropolis; Hoelscher, Michael et al. (eds.) (2021): *Taming Fuzzy Concepts: Civil Society, the Nonprofit Sector, and Culture*. New York: Springer; Glückler, Johannes (ed.) (2021): *Knowledge and Civil Society*. Wiesbaden: Springer.

called the ‘old German costume’ (*altdeutsche Tracht*), which was strictly banned by the government authorities at the time for smacking of civil disobedience. More obviously, pre-1914 artists, Pablo Picasso, Henri Matisse, and Wassily Kandinsky, to name but a few, blatantly depicted the disorder into which the world had fallen, and the quest for the new, as yet unrealised by the ruling elites.

All these examples of cultural expression under widely differing circumstances have one thing in common: They demonstrate the potential political spin and thrust of cultural action. In so doing, they underpin Charles de Gaulle’s famous quip that “politics is too serious a matter to be left to the politicians”, thus inherently disproving a leading German politician’s comment on the wave of support a 16-year-old Swedish girl, Greta Thunberg, was able to muster when she started the Fridays for Future movement: “You cannot expect children and teenagers to realise all the global implications, and grasp what makes sense technically and economically. That is for professionals to deal with” (Lindner 2019, own translation). In the real world, moving issues forward was never just for professionals. The stories of rulers and leaders in battle, of kings anointed and revolutionary heroes, should not distract from realising that history, more often than not, is written – and the direction of politics is determined – by citizens, artists, and others who express themselves most forcefully in support of or in opposition to what is happening around them, and who may well move public opinion and nudge decision makers in a certain direction.

This is arguably truer today than ever before in history. In an open and democratic society, it is up to everybody to engage in public affairs, and while knowing the ropes may in many cases win the day, disruptive innovation of the kind required is commonly kicked off by determined citizens rather than by professional politicians. Artists, equipped with a particularly fine feel for what may be in the offing, are often among the first to sense “the future’s in the air, I can feel it everywhere, blowing with the wind of change”.² Wolf Biermann, the East German singer, songwriter, and poet, comes to mind. He was one of the first to grasp what chances the 1975 Helsinki Final Act brought about, becoming so menacing to the East German regime in power that he was expatriated; but paving the way for what was to come. Václav Havel is perhaps the most striking example. A distinguished writer, he was to become one of Central

² *Wind of Change* is a ballad written and composed by Klaus Meine, recorded by the West German rock band Scorpions in 1990, and first released as a single in 1991.

Europe's leading dissidents and later a leader of what was described as the Velvet Revolution, ending his career as President of the Czech Republic. Graham Greene, who was always searching for interesting dissidents, met him as early as 1969.

These few examples highlight the political role the arts may play in shaping, developing, and transforming society. The role may be a supportive one as much as it may be one of retreat, or one of making oneself heard. In 1970, Albert Hirschman, the well-known American economist of German-Jewish origin, published a book that became famous by its title: *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty* (cf. Hirschman 1970). It describes three possible responses to decline in firms or polities. In Hirschman's terms, the arts, to Maecenas, were an expression of *loyalty* to what was emerging as a new order for what was becoming the Roman Empire, while Biermann's songs were *voice*.

Modern Civil Society

This approach to categorising organisations by the way they relate to the larger entities they are part of or are surrounded by has gained enormous importance as a legitimate and useful way of encompassing players who at first sight may be judged as hugely diverse and not really connected to one another at all, while providing a way of organising them in a rational and sensible fashion. Like art, civil society may appear to be loyal to the political system of the day, may withdraw from it voluntarily, by necessity, or by force, or may voice its concerns and in so doing herald social and political changes.

Beside Hirschman's classification, there exist today a number of other methods for classifying the plethora of organisations, large and small, old and new, that make up the heterogeneous, vibrant, exciting, and to some people mysterious arena of civil society. Over the past 30-odd years, *civil society* has become a much-used term, and has gained considerable coherence. However, there appears to be little consensus as to what civil society actually is. While a large majority worldwide would accept an analytic definition, some scholars and practitioners would differ, particularly in Germany, where modern civil society is sometimes confused with a notion advanced by the German philosopher Georg W.F. Hegel in the early 19th century. While Hegel's concept of "bürgerliche Gesellschaft" is commonly translated as 'civil society', this is actually a misnomer, indeed a faulty translation of

the term (Hegel 1817, 1818/1983: 316). What Hegel was referring to was the non-public sphere in its entirety, and should be termed 'bourgeois society' to distinguish it from the public sphere (cf. Pozzo 1990: 599 f.). Importantly, he contended that the former should be subservient to the latter.

Not being part of the governmental system, some artists and many other citizens operate within civil society, or, to introduce a rather broader term, in what is called the civic space, while not of course wishing to be seen as servants to the system. It was the existence of a civic space that Leonid Brezhnev had to concede in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe's (CSCE) Helsinki Final Act, in order for the West to acknowledge the inviolability of existing frontiers and the territorial integrity of states that he was so set on achieving, thus according Václav Havel, Lech Wałęsa, and many others a licence to operate. The civic space is open to any citizen wishing to enter the sphere of public affairs and is neither guarded by gatekeepers nor dependent on elections or appointments. It is made up largely, while not exclusively, of organised and non-organised civil society – the arena where civic engagement, i.e. volunteerism, is most prominently represented.

Given that German jurisprudence to this day is strongly influenced by Hegel's thoughts, it is little wonder that a modern definition of civil society, and most particularly the consequences for political theory and practical politics, have found it more difficult to gain influence and relevance in Germany than in other European and 'Western' democracies. Furthermore, conservative interpretations of Hegel's idea of the absolute supremacy and infallibility of the state, as proffered, for example, by Carl Schmitt (1888–1985), have remained highly influential, the fact that this train of thought ultimately led to Hitler's authoritarian dictatorship notwithstanding. Little wonder that governmental foreign relations based on the inclusion of non-state actors have not developed easily in Germany and to this day have not matured with respect to the inclusion of civil society. This goes for civil society in general, but certainly also includes its cultural subsector, especially as a particularly large part of cultural activities in Germany are organised by the state and funded by the taxpayer. Nevertheless, cultural expression and cultural organisations figure prominently in modern civil society. The umbrella organisation of German cultural organisations (the Deutscher Kulturrat) strongly upholds being a civil society organisation itself and that disseminating the concept of modern civil society is part of its mission.

This concept, widely accepted by scholars worldwide, is a descriptive, inclusive, and systematic one, and although a normative backdrop remains a necessary precondition, it does not in itself offer a normative framework. This civil society is not to be confused with what Leonardo Bruni meant in the 15th century, when translating the Greek word *polis* as used by Aristotle into the Latin *societas civilis* (Fein/Matzke 1997: 11), nor with what Adam Ferguson implied when writing about “the History of Civil Society” (Ferguson 1767)³ in the 18th century. It is closer to what Antonio Gramsci meant when talking about *la società civile* in his *Prison Notebooks* in the 1930s (cf. Gramsci 1929–1932/2011). Since the American economist Richard Cornuelle first spoke of an independent sector beyond the state and the market in 1965 (cf. Cornuelle 1965), the discussion about the overall function of this sector or arena has never stopped. Cornuelle argued that associations of volunteers could effectively solve social problems without recourse to heavy-handed bureaucracy. The civic space, on occasion but not always used as a synonym for ‘the space for civil society’, has seemingly grown considerably since then. Andrew Arato and Jean Cohen argued that “the concept of civil society is more than a mere slogan” (Arato/Cohen 1988: 40). Clearly, a notion of a civic space touches on the human and civil rights of individual citizens as much as it does on those of associative bodies and philanthropic institutions. As unclear as it may be, the definition demonstrates how much nearer the citizen is to civil society than to the modern state, notwithstanding the paradox that political theory defines liberal democracies as ruled by the people. It is reasonable to assume that civil society in many ways equates the civic space, provided spontaneous civic action and individual public-mindedness are counted in. If, contrary to Margaret Thatcher’s famous quip that “there is no such thing as society” (Thatcher 1987: n.p.), society is something that exists and is not synonymous with the state or the nation, then relevant collective action takes place in all of these three arenas, the term *arena* being preferable to them being described as *pillars*, as it denominates areas of movement, action, and change.

Civil society may be seen today as the arena of collective movements, organisations, and institutions, which are in many ways hugely diverse, but do bear some common traits that allow us to distinguish them from organisations and institutions that form part of the state or the private business sector. A highly important feature that

³ Irritatingly and wrongly translated into German as *Abhandlung über die Geschichte der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft*.

distinguishes them from other corporate actors is that they rely heavily on gifts (of empathy, time, know-how, and financial resources), rather than on exchange mechanisms or on the use of force (cf. Perroux 1960).

Civil society, and this is a second way of defining its players, may be described as the arena where citizens engage of their own free will, participate directly in affairs to do with the common good, and voice their concerns, ideas, criticism, and agreement. Lester M. Salamon's "Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project" (cf. Salamon et al. 1999) put forward a number of principles that may determine whether an activity, a movement, an organisation, an institution should be considered part of this arena: Access should be voluntary; the organisation should not be engaged in core government business; making a profit should not be a prime objective; any profits made may not be distributed to members or owners; and the governance structure should be autonomous.

Civil society organisations (CSOs) may be classified by their function. The distinction is particularly relevant given that even civil society players themselves tend to exclude other players with a different function from belonging to civil society at all. It is, however, quite clear that organisations can perform distinct functions – nearly always more than one – and yet all belong to the civil society arena (cf. Strachwitz et al. 2020). These functions are:

- service provisioning,
- advocacy,
- self-help,
- watchdog functions,
- intermediary functions,
- community building,
- political intervention, and
- supporting personal growth.

Also, it is helpful to classify civil society organisations by their relationship with the other arenas. Some are close to government, due to their being government contractors, depending on government grants, supporting government policies, and in some cases having been initiated by the government. Others may be close to the business sector, such as operating institutions with substantial turnover themselves (e.g. museums, hospitals), while others again are completely independent, relying

exclusively on voluntary donations and/or on their own endowments. Obviously, the latter are in a better position to raise their voice, while for those close to government, loyalty seems imperative in order not to risk losing the support they need. This divide is commonly described as pluralistic vs. corporatist (cf. Diamond 1999). Incidentally, it corresponds to an age-old cultural divide. Indeed, while the arts are certainly among the most important activities of civil society, in Germany artists are not seen as operating in the civic space as much as they are elsewhere, notably the United States and other countries with an Anglo-Saxon tradition. The relationship between the arts and the state has a long and very strong tradition. In one of his most famous poems, an extract from the *König-Friedrichston*, Walther von der Vogelweide (1170–1230) rejoiced over his government funding,⁴ whereas Shakespeare was notably a self-employed entrepreneur.

Modern non-governmental organisations (NGOs), the core of organised civil society, have been officially recognised as partners of sorts in world affairs since 1947, when, in accordance with Article 71 of the UN Charter, a small number of NGOs were granted consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). Many of these organisations, and a plethora of others, have much longer histories than that, and many have acquired a permanent place in the public sphere through their own activities and successes. Notable examples are the International Committee of the Red Cross, created in 1863 on the initiative of Henry Dunant, a private citizen, and the International Olympic Committee, created in 1894 by Pierre de Coubertin. Both these organisations undoubtedly operate and are extremely visible and influential in the public arena. Arguably, religious communities also continue to operate in the public sphere, and while some of these had a particularly close relationship with governments in general and the nation state in particular, most of them are not formally part of the constitutional structure of the state (cf. Strachwitz 2020). Considering that many Christian churches trace their origins back to the first years of the Common Era, and that Islam traces its origins to the 7th century CE, one may well contend that non-government has co-inhabited the public space for a longer period of history than the nation state.

⁴ “Ich hân mîn lêhen, al die werlt, ich hân mîn lêhen!” (“I have my fief! Listen, world, I have my fief!”, own translation).

What Role for Civil Society?

Civil society is by no means inherently good. Much as a special relationship marked by civility and respect might be wished for, in actual fact this is not always so. And just as there are governments good and bad, and honest traders and crooks in business, there exist, of course, CSOs we do not approve of fundamentally and those that hold different views to ours. In recent years, it has become more and more obvious that while most CSOs define their role as supporting an open society, deep respect for human and civil rights, gender equality, protection of minorities, a democratic governance system, and a multilateral, cosmopolitan, and liberal world order, this is certainly not true for all of them. Authoritarian governments are prone to creating and supporting their own loyal civil society,⁵ rather than suppressing it altogether, while continuously harassing independent civil society organisations, particularly if they fall under the aforementioned *voice* category.

Indeed, most governments would probably prefer to see associations and foundations supporting the government's work in a subservient fashion and neither questioning government decisions nor adopting any degree of independence. For that reason, service-providing and intermediary organisations are usually more popular with governments, while the self-help, personal growth, and community-building roles are habitually overlooked, and advocacy, watchdog, and political discourse roles are viewed with suspicion. Responding to pressure from citizens, advocacy has found its way into tax exemption, and the watchdog role has gained acceptance for watching over excesses in market behaviour. But Colin Crouch's insistence that, given parliaments' failure in fulfilling their watchdog roles, civil society's main task is to act as a watchdog in public affairs (cf. Crouch 2011) has not to date made government theorists and practitioners rethink the interplay between the various contributors to the development and execution of policy. On the contrary, the public sector, and, somewhat strangely, the media, tend to belittle the role of civil society and use arguments relating to the status of representative democracy to enhance their own role, while at the same time accepting the business sector as a driving and quite regularly decisive force in determining policy. In so doing, they regularly take recourse to what may rightly be termed "the dark side of civil society" (Strachwitz 2017: 7) for arguments that lend themselves to discriminate against civil society in general and to exclude

⁵ Often labelled as GONGOS = government-organised non-governmental organisations.

civil society from shaping policy. The Ku Klux Klan, the National Rifle Association of America, and, to name a German example, the ‘Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes’ (Pegida, i.e. Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the Occident), all doubtlessly CSOs, are examples frequently employed to argue that civil society is a liability rather than an asset to society. To this argument, alleged – and admittedly not altogether unfounded – shortcomings in terms of accountability, transparency, and legitimacy are added for good measure.

Yet, many of these arguments are advanced by societal actors who have come to fear the strength of the civic space. Civil society players – like artists – have become influencers (cf. Gillin 2007) in the (digital) public sphere who are continually nudging (cf. Thaler/Sunstein 2008) decision makers and challenging their assumed monopoly of power. They become what in other arenas is proving to be virtually impossible: change agents. Change agents and indeed all CSOs are never legitimised by size, nor by election procedures. They are legitimised by the quality of their proposals.

A fairly novel and increasingly important and attractive subsector of civil society has proven to be particularly well-suited to perform this role. It is what may be termed informal civil society, movements without much or even any structure. They convene around one issue, one thought, one philanthropic impulse. During the refugee wave that hit Germany in 2015 and 2016, it was individuals who assembled their friends, small groups of volunteers called up over social media, responsible citizens, who, in the light of a failing government bureaucracy, lived up to Angela Merkel’s famous “Wir schaffen das” – “We can do this”.⁶ They enabled Germany to cope with one million refugees in less than six months, and they will most probably be the most influential change agents, as the crisis of democracy, the crisis of capitalism, and the crisis of the nation state become ever more apparent in the wake of the COVID-19 crisis.

Presently, we are seeing that governments and international governmental organisations are developing a taste for citizen participation, open government partnerships, and otherwise labelled formats of direct contact between rulers and the ruled. While this may be a good way of overcoming the increasing divide between a ‘political class’

⁶ German Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel first used this phrase on 31 August 2015 at a press conference following a visit to a refugee camp near Dresden where local opponents of her refugee policy booed and heckled her.

and frustrated citizens, it should not be overlooked that it may easily be manipulated in order to be able to pretend openness and dialogue in public, while using events with uninformed citizens to keep those who have real knowledge on particular issues out of the debate. It remains to be seen whether this policy will ultimately succeed or whether the citizens concerned will undergo a gradual development and become an informal civil society movement and eventually a formalised civil society organisation.

Clearly, a new model for the public sphere is required that takes the talent, insight, civic engagement, and know-how of more than just the traditional contributors into account. Expertise of the highest degree is a resource that exists within very different members of society, and none of this should be left untapped. One of the many reasons for increasing gender equality always was that society could not afford to exclude half the citizens' mental and emotional resources. This argument may also serve to drive home the argument that neither the insight vested in the individual citizen, nor the insight collectively gathered in civil society – and for that matter in business – should be wasted if we are to be successful in meeting the challenges we face. Given these challenges, those who feel 'the wind of change' are urgently required to express their feelings.

In order to achieve this state of public affairs, adopting a more open approach is of the essence. Habermas' discourse theory may be useful here. He puts the political process of forming opinions and eventually a public will at the centre of a democratic society, and argues in favour of an institutionalised procedure and matching communicative conditions (cf. Habermas 1994: 362). These clearly do not exist at present. While any politician's views are widely publicised, other citizens' views are not. This is due to a persisting state orientation in the media that automatically assumes politicians' views to be more relevant and important, as well as to the immense amount of funding available to politicians to help spread their views. To change this, a basic shift in outlook on society is necessary. A few elements of this disruptive shift merit mention:

1. I would argue that we need to go well beyond ideas of an 'open government partnership', citizen participation, and corporatist models of civil society involvement in public affairs. In order to achieve this paradigm shift, "raising citizens" (Mounk 2018: 245) rather than specialists is the essential first step. Adapting educational curricula to include the knowledge base for performing in the public sphere is a precondition for changing attitudes (cf. D'Ambrosio 2018: 44).

2. Education alone will not suffice. Following education, participation and finally responsibility must evolve (cf. Alcide de Gasperi, quoted in: *ibid.*). All evidence shows that large public projects do not take longer to realise if an honest, transparent, and thorough process of stakeholder participation is organised from the very beginning. Big corporations have learned that this is the more effective and, in the last instance, cheaper way to get things done.
3. Given the crisis of democracy, i.e. the failures of constitutional arrangements and procedures after long periods of seemingly good or at least adequate functioning, there are people who are looking with interest at systems that combine a market economy with an authoritarian government. Little do they realise that a China-type political order will not favour those who believe they can exert more influence in such a system. But to avoid democracy drifting in that direction, it has to acquire a new licence to operate, a new lease on life.
4. The demise of the nation state will not be halted by slogans of 'taking back control', and even less so since the inventors of the slogan are waiting for their country to enter into new global alliances (cf. O'Toole 2018: 169). The sooner everybody is made to understand that multiple real-life identities and loyalties have replaced a mythical loyalty to only one nation, the complexities of a 21st-century public sphere will become apparent and be a subject of acclimatisation.
5. The notion of three arenas into which the individual may move according to his or her own free will to be part of whichever collectivity he or she wishes to belong to for a certain task or time, is worth taking up. It underpins the supremacy and unique dignity of the individual human being, while not forgetting each human being's responsibility toward the community he or she happens to belong to by fate or chooses to belong to by choice, and toward society as a whole. According civil society adequate and permanent representation seems therefore to be a logical step, all the more so as civil society actors bring gifts of empathy, ideas, know-how, reputation, time, and resources to the table. The state may well be expected to relinquish powers in favour of a level playing field that embraces non-governmental and non-business players.

6. Given the growth of the world's population, the global challenges, of which climate change is arguably the most pressing, global communication as the result of the communicative revolution, the global fight for commodities, a globalised economy, and a number of other new elements of a contemporary paradigm, it seems that a global world order is not to be avoided, even if many citizens feel terrified at the thought. However: "Globalization is almost always written about in terms of how it operates within the existing order, rather than how it creates a new order" (Khanna 2011: 48). In order to be acceptable and indeed workable, the new global world order will have to contain a massive measure of subsidiarity, to include a very careful assessment of cultural differences and traditions, and a clear view as to which problem needs to be discussed, decided upon, and solved at which level of a multi-tier and multi-arena societal order.

Only if civil society and the arts manage to convey to the public the message that civil society is about all of these, can the notion of civil society as the third public arena beside that of the state and that of the market become entrenched as a concept of the modern public space. The notion that civil society should have a permanent and undisputed seat at the table when matters of society at large are being debated is far from a universally accepted one, notwithstanding the lip service that is paid to the importance of civil society when it so pleases those in power – most commonly when these debates take place far from home. Habermas and others have argued the necessity of a "deliberative democracy" to explain the existence of an arena beyond the state and the market (Habermas 1994: 363, own translation). This arena's licence to operate is not that it is representative, which it can never be. Its legitimacy is derived from the very diversity of its players, from their active engagement as world citizens, and from the wide scope of ideas, know-how, and drive they bring to the table.

Inasmuch as we are sincere in valuing certain principles of a world order that we insist on being observed, hard power games will not suffice to render them part of our political reality, especially as the rules of these games frequently and deliberately violate these principles. In a European context, this is particularly true, given that the hard power the European nations are in a position to exert has dwindled and will never again become what it may have been in centuries past. All will depend on the soft power that Europe can muster; and in this game, cultural and civil society players hold the threads in their hands. Soft power will work in a multilateral global

environment provided all players operate on a level playing field. This goes for governments of countries large and small, as it does for the interplay between the state, business, and civil society.

It was Ralf Dahrendorf, then a minister in the German Federal Foreign Office, who coined the principle of a foreign policy of societies (cf. Dahrendorf 1969). Since then, half a century has passed without this having caught on, the fact that it has been used in other politicians' speeches notwithstanding. Today, with arguably the most profound crisis of the last three generations on our hands, this principle is as valid as it was then. It seems timely to remember and indeed adopt it.

References

- Arato, Andrew/Cohen, Jean (1988): *Civil Society and Social Theory*. In: *Thesis Eleven*. Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 40–64.
- Cornuelle, Richard C. (1965): *Reclaiming the American Dream. The Role of Private Individuals and Voluntary Associations*. New York: Random House.
- Crouch, Colin (2011): *The Strange Non-Death of Neoliberalism*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
- Dahrendorf, Ralf (1969): *Gesamtplan für die Auswärtige Kulturpolitik*. In: *Bulletin der Bundesregierung*. No. 142, 03.12.1969, pp. 1254–1256.
- D'Ambrosio, Rocco (2018): *Democrazia e politica: risvolti etici*. In: *ibid./Venturi, Carlotta (eds.): La democrazia: voci a confronto*. Rome: Gregorian and Biblical Press, pp. 25–46.
- Diamond, Larry J. (1999): *Developing Democracy. Toward Consolidation*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Fein, Elke/Matzke, Sven (1997): *Zivilgesellschaft – Konzept und Bedeutung für die Transformationen in Osteuropa* (Arbeitspapiere des Osteuropa-Instituts der Freien Universität Berlin, Arbeitsschwerpunkt Politik No. 7), 2nd ed. Berlin: Freie Universität Berlin.
- Ferguson, Adam (1767): *An Essay on the History of Civil Society*. Dublin: Boulter Grierson.
- Gillin, Paul (2007): *The New Influencers. A Marketer's Guide to the New Social Media*. Sanger: Quill Driver Books.
- Gramsci, Antonio (1929–1932/2011): *Prison Notebooks*, 3 Vols. Ed. and transl. by Joseph A. Buttigieg with Antonio Callari. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Habermas, Jürgen (1994): *Faktizität und Geltung. Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des demokratischen Rechtsstaats*, 4th ed. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

Hegel, Georg W.F. (1817, 1818/1983): *Die Philosophie des Rechts. Die Mitschriften Wannemann (Heidelberg 1817/18) und Homeyer (Berlin 1818/19)*. Ed. by Karl-Heinz Ilting. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta.

Hirschman, Albert O. (1970): *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty. Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Khanna, Parag (2011): *How to Run the World. Charting a Course to the Next Renaissance*. New York: Random House.

Lindner, Christian [c_lindner] (2019): Ich finde politisches Engagement von Schülerinnen und Schülern toll, 10.03.2019 [Tweet]; https://twitter.com/c_lindner/status/1104683096107114497 [01.02.2021].

Mouk, Yascha (2018): *The People vs. Democracy. Why Our Freedom Is in Danger & How to Save It*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

O'Toole, Fintan (2018): *Heroic Failure. Brexit and the Politics of Pain*. London: Head of Zeus.

Perroux, François (1960): *Économie et société. Contrainte – échange – don*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

Pozzo, Riccardo (1990): "Bourgeois" oder "citoyen"? – Zu Hegels Begriff der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft. In: Apel, Karl-Otto/ibid. (eds.): *Zur Rekonstruktion der praktischen Philosophie. Gedenkschrift für Karl-Heinz Ilting*. Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, pp. 580–600.

Salamon, Lester M./Anheier, Helmut K./List, Regina/Toepler, Stefan/Sokolowski, S. Wojciech (eds.) (1999): *Global Civil Society. Dimensions of the Nonprofit Sector*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Center for Civil Society Studies.

Strachwitz, Rupert Graf (2017): Shrinking or Changing? In: Alscher, Mareike/Priller, Eckhard/Ratka, Susanne/ibid. (eds.): *The Space for Civil Society: Shrinking? Growing? Changing?* (Opuscula No. 104). Berlin: Maecenata Institut für Philantropie und Zivilgesellschaft, pp. 5–10.

Strachwitz, Rupert Graf (2020): Whither Religious Communities? Are They or Are They Not Part of a Political System – and if They Are, What Part of It Do They Belong to? In: ibid. (ed.): *Religious Communities and Civil Society in Europe. Analyses and Perspectives on a Complex Interplay*. Vol. 2 (Maecenata Schriften No. 16). Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, pp. 325–356.

Strachwitz, Rupert Graf/Priller, Eckhard/Triebe, Benjamin (2020): *Handbuch Zivilgesellschaft* (Maecenata Schriften No. 18). Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter.

Thaler, Richard H./Sunstein, Cass R. (2008): *Nudge. Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Thatcher, Margaret (1987): Interview for Woman's Own ("No Such Thing as Society"), 23.09.1987; <https://www.margareththatcher.org/document/106689> [01.02.2021].

About the Author

Dr. Rupert Graf Strachwitz, a political scientist and historian, has been the Director of the Maecenata Institute for Philanthropy and Civil Society, an independent research and policy centre, since 1997, and CEO of the Maecenata Foundation since 2010. His previous posts included serving at the World Headquarters of the Sovereign Military Order of Malta and as Regional Director of the Order of Malta Relief Service. He was Vice-President of German Caritas, member (i.a.) of the German Federal Parliament Commission on Civic Action and of the board of the Fondazione Cariplo, Milan, and he chaired the European Policy Working Group of Europa Nostra. He has approximately 600 publications to his name, and teaches and lectures regularly at home and abroad.

Contact: [rs\[at\]maecenata.eu](mailto:rs[at]maecenata.eu); www.strachwitz.info

The Challenge of Elusive Borders and Shifting Paradigms in the Context of Globalisation and Glocalisation

Caroline Y. Robertson-von Trotha (Karlsruhe)

Societies and cultures, nations and regions, ethnic and religious group affiliations, social and global civic movements, to mention only a few: Territorial, social, political, cultural, and economic spaces are dynamic and complexly intertwined. Crossing borders, diminishing the effects of borders, but also the creation of new boundaries are ongoing processes in many senses. As many have suggested, generally we are witnesses of a transitional period of hitherto unknown dimensions, of deep change and long-term Grand Challenges. We don't have ready answers to emerging problems, many of which have the potential to threaten or destabilise whole societies. Our appreciation and understanding of cultural diversity in our own cities and societies and the dynamics of networking in a globalised world is fragmentary. Climate change issues and the coronavirus pandemic clearly indicate the dialectics of global interdependencies and the requirements for local action. The gradual process of globalised megatrends poses a major ongoing challenge. The speed and uneven effects of change require monitoring, appreciation, and advocacy for action on many levels. In this essay, I will concentrate on the effects of change on cultures and their identities, and in particular I will address the need to broaden our approaches to intercultural understanding.

Dialogue is a necessary tool and perhaps the backbone of all trans- and intercultural understanding; but as we are presently experiencing, dialogue in itself is not sufficient. Both individual and group interest and openness for dialogue as well as for organised and informal meeting spaces, are important prerequisites. The appreciation of differing societal contexts is central. Under which local circumstances does dialogue take place? Is the right of law and freedom of speech guaranteed? How is space for contradiction perceived? Clearly there are groups who see cultural change and cultural diversity as a threat and consequently wish to control in-group processes of communication.

Rising neo-nationalist and anti-immigration populist sentiment, in particular right-wing populism as observed in the white supremacist "Proud Boys" movement in the US, in the nationalist movements in the Visegrád States,¹ and in the "taking back

¹ The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia form the so-called 'Visegrád Group'.

control” sovereignty campaign that led to Brexit all lend themselves to identity politics and political mobilisation (cf. Robertson-Wensauer 1991). In Germany, the unexpected strength of the Pegida movement (Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the Occident) in Dresden and the formation of Pegida opposition in many cities, in particular in Leipzig, are examples of polarising effects within local space. “Cultural reconstruction”, to use Alain Touraine’s (2014: 45) term, is a project with highly frictional potential. And that applies to more than just possible modern stereotyped ascriptions, self-ascriptions, and interpretations of Islam. One of the keywords of the Pegida movement – *Lügenpresse* (lying press) – demonstrates that established media institutions find themselves in the midst of a politically charged struggle for credibility against diverse adversaries. Due to the accelerating effects of digitisation and social media, the technical digital revolution has made the challenges and vulnerabilities facing the development of cultural policies of education and exchange more obvious and more complex. Historical borders and divides conditioning the present are often unknown and unseen; their pasts have been forgotten, culturally relativised, and reinterpreted; new and shifting cultural, social, and aesthetic boundaries develop with potentials of inclusion and exclusion; cultural pluralities are selectively compounded within cultural identity politics.

Social and cultural sciences are confronted with paradoxes and dilemmas they cannot explain. Theoretical concepts and debates on othering,² on alterity, and on bordering³ address important aspects of the dynamic relationships of changing cultures, identities, and their meanings (cf. Ferguson/Mansbach 2012; Cooper/Tinning 2020; Weber et al. 2011). Making borders tangible and meaningful for the development of intercultural training toolkits and for the development and implementation of strategic cultural policy is ongoing (cf. De Beukelaer et al. 2015). We increasingly advocate for more communication between theoretical and applied science and between science and practice. And we recognise the need for international comparative research as well as for interdisciplinarity. In this sense as well, we have to learn to cross borders and to find ways and means of overcoming our language problems – language in a more comprehensive sense of the word, which is often an additional problem, entrenched as we are within our academic disciplines. Most importantly, we need a frank and

² The term *othering* describes the process of distancing oneself from other people or groups by defining them as ‘other(s)’.

³ Processes of *bordering* denote the everyday construction of borders, for example through stereotypes, media representations, or political discourses and institutions (cf. Kolossov/Scott 2013: 3).

open debate on the shortcomings of present interactions between theory and practice, including the tendencies of self-immunisation within academia against criticism. This is a debate we regularly return to within the wider contexts of paradigm shifts and the interactions between scientific, societal, and political debates. One important aspect is the use of language in the public science agora. It is, however, clear that cultural difference and intercultural exchange have many levels. For example, the popular toolbox models of the iceberg⁴ remind us of the following: When we do see cultural difference, we tend to see a very reduced version of what is, and we cannot really rationally and emotionally grasp what difference means to the other. Cultural difference necessarily constitutes multifaceted demarcation lines – borders with fuzzy edges which change over time: elusive borders.

I would like to formulate four general hypotheses, which my following reflections will be based on:

1. Civilisation was and is a story of borders. It is not possible to conceive of societies or cultures without them.
2. Borders remain a major structural instrument of geopolitical, cultural, socio-economic, and political interest.⁵
3. The more complex and mobile societies become in the digital age, the more elusive their borders are. Borders often become almost invisible, leading us to underestimate their potential strength, local impetus, and ongoing validity.
4. On account of the unforeseeable effects of globalisation and digitisation, an appreciation of the positive and negative effects of borders becomes a cultural challenge requiring closer scrutiny.

⁴ Since its development in theories of cultural communication, the 'iceberg' metaphor in its many variations can be used as an initial 'warning sign': It makes us aware that there are a multitude of blind spots to be taken into account in all inter- and transcultural debates. Cultural diversity can only be fully appreciated by appreciating its multi-layered complexity.

⁵ As the example of the COVID-19 pandemic within the European Union illustrates, national state borders can be partially revived by introducing regulatory obligations such as quarantines, which were not foreseen within the open border policy of the Schengen Agreement.

Implications and Consequences of Globalisation

When we talk about globalisation, internationalisation, world culture, world society, and so forth, we often overlook the fact that these terms cannot be used as synonyms – in practice, particularly in the media, they often are. Differentiation is not only of academic interest. It makes the understanding of the changing frameworks within which cultural practice takes place clearer. Effective policy, cultural diversity concepts, and cultural education can only be developed with knowledge of framework conditions. The fuzziness and problematics of the emerging use of synonyms is particularly evident with the vagueness of distinction between the terms *cultural diplomacy (CD)* and *international cultural relations (ICR)* (cf. Trobbiani/Pavón-Guinea 2019).

The present accelerated process of globalisation is commonly seen as starting sometime after the Second World War, and was initially understood as the process of economic internationalisation. An American economist of Jewish-German descent, Theodore Levitt, was probably the first to popularise the term in an essay from 1983 entitled “The Globalization of Markets”, which was aimed at business managers. His central insight remains relevant not only for business managers but also for cultural managers and analysts: “Preferences are constantly shaped and reshaped” (Levitt 1983: 102). He, of course, was referring to products and market commodities. But more generally, lifestyles, tastes, fashions, beliefs, personal priorities, values, and behaviour can also be seen from this perspective. Our preferences change and are constantly being reshaped by our social and cultural environments and through intercultural exchange, thus creating a dynamic framework within which cultural practice takes place. Depending on migrational flows over time, local space is more or less culturally diverse; cities celebrate their diversity as part of their changing local identity – or they contain difference in separate city quarters; at the same time, diversity can be regarded both as a potential and as a threat within the broader process of globalisation.

‘Liquid Modernity’

Societal change was never a simple linear process, as earlier development theorists sometimes postulated. This applies even more in a globalised world: Decisions are made and actions implemented without being able to foresee all possible consequences. Globalisation is the sum of complex international assimilative and

acculturative transfer processes and includes intentional and unintentional change. Within the framework of globalisation, we quite generally find ourselves confronted with a *conditio humana* which Zygmunt Bauman (2007) describes as ‘liquid times’ (see also Bauman 2000; 2016). In the past, we have often made ad hoc decisions and muddled through. But as Bauman and others have pointed out, there was a general consensus that modernity and the transformation of society through scientific, technological, economic, and cultural change would lead to a better quality of life for most. There was an – albeit diffuse – vision of what modernity should and could accomplish. Opinions on this differ, however.

Growth of Complexity

World society, global governance, the participatory turn, global citizens, and – of course – intercultural dialogue are just some of the constructs which come to mind when we discuss forward-thinking visions of the future. Are these realistic goals? Are they shared on a broad basis or only by few, and what can we contribute as advocates of diversity culture and heritage? Do we have a role as cultural brokers? What is the role of cultural management and where do responsibilities lie with respect to cultural literacy and education? Globalisation today is seen to be much more extensive than what was formerly understood under the narrower definition of economic globalisation. It includes diverse economic, political, cultural, and technological aspects which themselves are usually intertwined. Decisions we make as individuals, as enterprises, as institutions or non-governmental organisations (NGOs), as politicians, activists, artists, or as cultural managers are based on incomplete information. This would appear to be one of the most frustrating paradoxes of the globalised internet society: Due to the enormous accumulation of data and knowledge, coupled with the acceleration of change, we see ourselves confronted with an unknown growth of complexity. Decisions increasingly include elements of risk. An obvious example is the difficulties politicians encounter in policy-making: They make a change of policy in one area, thereby causing unforeseeable and unwanted effects in others. This is by no means new, but it is more complex, and also applies to cultural policy, both at local and international levels.

Increase of Dialectic Effects

Globalisation continues, and despite the legitimate and increasingly necessary criticisms of the effects of change, the shifts of power, the critical and long overdue acknowledgement of the oppression, exploitation, and injustices of colonial pasts, many aspects of globalisation can be seen in a positive light: Global standards in such diverse areas as health and hygiene, safety regulation and education, the growing international awareness of the common responsibilities for ecological sustainability, and the potential formation of a global knowledge society, are just some of the major areas of change. We should perhaps also recognise that the vision of future global governance on the basis of universally accepted human rights can only be accomplished with a minimum consensus on central ideas, values, and norms in globalising processes. The enormity of this challenge in present times is obvious.

At the same time, we can observe many negative developments, which range from anxiety about losing our national and regional cultural heritages and our collective and individual identities; losing our jobs due to the enormous pressure of economic and technological globalisation, migration, and shifts in demographic development; rising inequality in many societies; the offshore evasion of national laws and standards; and most of all the rise of cultural intolerance.⁶ Paradoxically, fundamentalist terror is one of the phenomena which take advantage of technological developments and modern communication systems. With the term *globalisation* we describe processes which, particularly at the macro-societal level, lead to a complex matrix of interdependencies. States increasingly lose their governance abilities and competences. Clear concepts of accountability also become more difficult: Local knowledge is often lacking, and the necessary international cooperation, which is needed in order to compensate for the negative effects of globalisation, is not always attainable. Here, we can see the increasing shortcomings and dysfunctionalities of international institutions, multilateral treaties, agreements of cooperation, and cultural diplomacy.

⁶ A detailed examination of the dialectics of globalisation is undertaken in Robertson-von Trotha 2009.

Globalities

One of the most significant differences between the present conditions of internationalisation and globalisation are the changing bases of power and jurisdiction. In international relations, two or more states come to agreement on common issues of interest and implement regulatory power on the basis of cooperative political agreement to achieve commonly identified goals. In democratic states, this necessarily includes parliamentary ratification at the nation-state level. States are – at least theoretically – in the position to modify and update the terms of agreement together with their international partners. This may be on the basis of new information and developments, making the need to adjust goals or means of reaching them necessary, or due to changed interests and political priorities at the national level.

Globalisation, on the other hand, cannot be negotiated, and withdrawal is not an option. The debate on globalisation, however, often fails to distinguish between *globalism*, which some see as an ideology fuelled by neoliberal thought, and *globalities*, which are the result of globalising processes. Globalities describe the inevitable condition and starting point of our actions.⁷ These states or conditions of being are themselves elusive: We don't see them evolving, and we don't understand them – or if we do, we don't always know how we can influence them through our actions. We therefore can't simply ignore the increasing existence of globalities, and at the same time we must be aware of falling into the trap of deterministic thinking. Globalities make large-scale international cooperation more necessary than ever.

Monopolised Communication

The dialectic effect of globalised internet communication as an intervening variable has become more obvious.⁸ On the one hand, interactive dialogue across cultures, often with common goals, is an observable fact. Open access, sharing, and following

⁷ The debate on distinctions between the drivers of processes of globalisation, their effects, and inevitabilities, is ongoing. In earlier works, Ulrich Beck (1983; 1997) and Anthony Giddens (1990; 1995; 1999) contributed significantly to the shift in focus to more interdisciplinary approaches on the one hand, addressing questions of possible means of influence and modification.

⁸ The existence of the internet can be regarded as a globality. It also continues to contribute to further globalisation. Digital culture offers exciting potentials and challenges both at the policy level and for cultural management.

are principles of digital culture in democratic countries. Social media research is still a young field, but studies show that the internet has also increased the transportation of closed system dogmas and ideologies (cf. Rieger et al. 2013; 2020). In particular, the dynamics of accelerating, sharing, and mobilising new and old conspiracy myths constitute a new challenge. The incubational and anonymous space which social media offers accommodates freedom of expression, but clearly also gives room for intolerance, polarisation, and radicalisation tendencies. The evolving structures of echo chambers, the unseen influence of algorithms, and the cultures of ‘click’ and influence act as filters undermining diversity and critical reflection. In the virtual net, we are faced with the competition for followers on the one hand and with what I have described as a new phenomenon of the “intransparency of transparency” (Robertson-von Trotha 2016: 60, own translation) on the other. Institutions and organisations lose track of their digital traces and are thereby facing a new dimension of orientation issues. This means that Niklas Luhmann’s thesis of the transparency of intransparency (cf. Luhmann 1987: 23) needs to be supplemented by the observation of the intransparency of transparency.

Touraine suggests that we are at a threshold leading us beyond the incapacity to act and are entering the first stages of cultural reconstruction:

“The first actors which appear clearly in the early stage of reconstruction are the most powerful – the communication elites of the mass media who are the producers of language, symbols and images. In the Information Age, those with the means to define society’s image of itself have the central power” (Touraine 2014: 46).

In this context we can also analyse the rise of populism, neo-nationalism, and ‘othering’. Often leading to extremism, these movements point to a highly disturbing development: the propaganda war of cultures on the internet with the aim of recruiting radical followers – racist, anti-Semitic, and Islamist, to mention only a few. An early example was the recruitment of young men and women for IS and Al-Qaeda, often, as examples from the UK and European countries show, from middle-class families. As Alexandra Borchartd remarked: “The discussion on Islamism and Pegida again clearly shows: The internet allows more freedom than is good for democracy” (Borchartd 2015: n.p., own translation). A recent example is the attack on the US Capitol. In the example of radical Islamists, those charged with the aim of establishing an Islamic State have a construct of belonging formed with religious and cultural borders in mind; in the case of the Capitol attack, we can observe a much more complex

combination of motivational factors. Both examples demonstrate that democratic societies require new regulatory borders to safeguard their own freedom. The role of social platforms and the 'tech-giants', and especially their responsibilities with regard to the development of standards in compliance with both the rights of freedom of expression and the adherence to the rule of law, has increasingly come into focus.

'Glocalisation', Cultural Education, and Diversity Management

The most elusive and complex transformation of intentional and unintentional borders can be traced to the ambivalent effects of globalisation. The term *glocalisation* was first used to describe a new phenomenon deriving from the globalisation process: the recognition that the selling of products and commodities is most successful when adapted to local circumstances. And again, as with the term *globalisation*, it was introduced by economists in the 1980s. Roland Robertson was the first sociologist to make use of and adapt the concept in 1992 (cf. Robertson 1992: 173). There is now a large body of literature in academia on the term – and also on its usefulness for cultural policy and advocacy, management, and leadership. The core of Robertson's definition can be given as follows: Glocalisation "means the simultaneity – the co-presence – of both universalizing and particularizing tendencies" (Robertson 1997: n.p.). That is the challenge we see ourselves faced with – as cultural scientists, as cultural educators, and as responsible advocates of cultural diversity. Robertson points out the following:

"It is essential to note that the themes of globalization and glocality have brought together ideas from various approaches, including geography, sociology, anthropology, business studies, and comparative literature. At its core, the idea of globalization involves the contention that all ideas are or can be diffused, but only under certain circumstances" (Robertson 2016: 25).

I could continue demonstrating the preliminary character of definitions, concepts, and the use of language. With regard to the current cancel culture debate and ongoing differences on the balance between political correctness and freedom of speech, again we see ourselves confronted with elusive borders: for example, the sometimes positively and sometimes negatively connotated terms integration, multicultural society, cosmopolitanism, modernity and tradition, and so on – all of which are viewed more critically today, both in science and in popular usage, and according to differing contexts.

From an academic point of view, the following example could be illustrative: Looking back at ten years of the *Global Civil Society Yearbook*, Helmut Anheier, Marlies Glasius, and Mary Kaldor recalled their original operational definition of global civil society as belonging to “the sphere of ideas, values, institutions, organisations, networks, and individuals located *between* the family, the state, and the market and operating *beyond* the confines of national societies, polities, and economies” (Anheier et al. 2001: 17; 2012: 2, emphasis in original).

They, however, point out that this definition would also theoretically fit the most uncivil act of 2011: the bombing of government buildings and the shooting of 69 persons, many of them teenagers, by Anders Behring Breivik in Norway (cf. Anheier et al. 2012: 14). On the one hand, this highlights the complex relationship between theory and practice; on the other hand, it confirms the importance of and need for an open, (self-)critical academic examination regarding this issue. In that respect, the Anna Lindh Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures, founded in 2005, deserves a special mention. Comprising all EU states, the Middle East, and North Africa – in total 42 countries – the foundation is a network of approximately 4,500 civil society organisations, including a wide range of small but also large civil society organisations from the arts, education, and science. The foundation’s programme is dedicated to the promotion of intercultural dialogue in the Mediterranean region. The so-called ‘4D’ strategy of a past phase of action (development, democracy, diversity, and dialogue) remains highly relevant both in the context of globalisation and glocalisation. The strengthening of the ‘4Ds’ is a normative universal project with the aim of supporting global civil society.

Influenced both by Zygmunt Bauman and Roland Robertson, I have suggested the German term *Zwischengesellschaft* – ‘in-between society’ – to describe the condition societies presently find themselves in. Bauman himself regards ‘liquid society’ as an interregnum. What will the condition of future societies be? Will it be more global and borderless? Will our student generation contribute to and experience a world society? Can we agree on universally accepted rules, which should not be confused with cultural assimilation? What are the roles and challenges for cultural education and management? What competencies does the cultural activist, educator, policy-maker, or manager require in order to be an effective broker across international borders? And how do we mediate within local spaces of multiculturalism and within

cross-cultural environments? In this respect, we can also raise a very central question: Is culture constrained by the role of the 'soft diplomat'? And what does this imply for intercultural education and communication?

The cultural broker first has to know that there is a tremendous amount of relevant situational and local knowledge which he or she doesn't know and very often can't know. I would like to state this as a quasi-law of intercultural relations. Due to globalisation, migration, and the persistent and urgent need to integrate refugees, we see ourselves confronted with very varied and rapidly changing cultural situations and constellations within local space.⁹ These can be harmonious and lead to the recognition of cultural diversity as a positive societal asset. In this case, we can postulate the conscious or unconscious recognition and acceptance of the condition of cultural diversity.¹⁰ Or cultural difference can be highly frictional and can be seen as a major threat to local traditions and identities – both of so-called 'host' communities and of incoming migrant groups. We therefore require a holistic approach of awareness. How do we recognise the beginnings of radicalisation? These beginnings can end in intolerant fundamentalisms, from political Islamism to Neo-Nazism.

The Dynamic of Cultures

As we can clearly observe: Cultures and their interpretations are dynamic. European history testifies to that fact and also raises questions. In an interview under the title "The 'End of History' 20 Years Later", Francis Fukuyama (2013) addresses one of the major ongoing issues in the world culture debate when he asks: Can questions of democracy, individualism, and human rights be regarded as universal, or, as Samuel Huntington (1996) in his renowned essay on the "Clash of Civilizations" postulated, are they deep reflections of a culture rooted in Western Christendom (cf. Fukuyama 2013: 32)? This is the debate which continues to fuel discussion on universalism and cultural relativism. Over time, how do cultures change, whether as a gradual process or as a bundle of processes, and make cultural and ideological borders less important? Significantly, if we look at a history of ideas and philosophy, in many

⁹ For the challenges and chances of diasporic networks, see Robertson-von Trotha 2019.

¹⁰ For an early appreciation of the importance of sharing diversity and comparative research on national approaches to intercultural dialogue, see European Institute for Comparative Cultural Research (ERICarts) 2008.

cases we can identify the loss of knowledge with regard to the origins of ideas – ideas that have had a profound impact on societal change worldwide. As Fukuyama has, for example, importantly argued, values which have their roots in Western Christendom have grown beyond their origins (cf. *ibid.*: 31). In the practice of everyday life, origins often simply don't matter. However, it is essential to appreciate the following: When they are attributed and associated with cultural, ethnic, and in particular with national identities, they can be mobilised, and are then very effective in drawing and strengthening borders. The clan, the group, the sect, the milieu, the football club, the city-quarter, and of course, as we are presently observing in Europe and in many other parts of the world, the renewed identification with national, regional, and separatist movements are gaining in momentum.

Partly due to the rightly criticised Eurocentric attitudes, the post-colonial debate in cultural science, and the centralisation of EU legislation with the accompanying loss of national and regional sovereignty, many people are no longer clear about what Europe stands for. Oskar Negt's (2012) plea *Gesellschaftsentwurf Europa. Plädoyer für ein gerechtes Gemeinwesen* reminds us: Europe stands for the social state, for humanisation of the workplace, for the security of pensions – without which our democracies would not be stable (see also Bekemans 2013). Growing inequality, and particularly the high unemployment rates of young people in many European countries, have the potential to upset that balance and can have serious effects on living together in diversity within our cities. In 2015 the demonstrations for freedom of the press after the attack on the satirical newspaper Charlie Hebdo in Paris showed in particular – perhaps indeed as never before – that European solidarity across cultures, including migrant populations, is possible. At the same time the images of demonstrations against the freedom of satirical expression remain, reminding us that solidarities, especially cross-cultural solidarities themselves, remain fragile constructs.

If we agree that, despite contrary developments of renationalisation and the simultaneous development of cosmopolitanism and cultural sectarianism, the world is becoming more intertwined and cultures are indeed meeting more often – also in the local arena – then there can be little doubt that intercultural understanding and behaviour have gained in importance. Ulrich Beck once very aptly remarked: “The cosmopolitisation of life situations and lifeworlds does not necessarily lead to a

cosmopolitan consciousness and way of thinking” (Beck 2012: 283, own translation¹¹). Therefore it is necessary to negotiate on the fine line between appreciation and respect for regional cultures with simultaneous consideration of cultural values of international validity – a task which cannot be undertaken only by individuals but will increasingly become an important mission for international institutions, educational facilities, and, most importantly, for actively engaged civil society organisations with their international networks and local knowledge.

Conclusion

I would like to conclude by returning to the present momentous challenges we are facing due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The fragilities, interconnectivities, and interdependencies of our global society are only beginning to be assessed in this context. It is already obvious that, even while experiencing engagement and action in the spirit of empathy and solidarity, we are also observing serious expressions of othering, of racist blame, and of neo-nationalist-oriented mobilisation in many countries. I am by no means a cultural pessimist. I think I am very much an optimist. As scientists, however, we have a responsibility to distinguish between our roles as scientists and our rights as citizens, who in democratic societies and within the framework of a democratic constitution can of course believe and support whatever they want within the frameworks of democratic order. In this respect, we ourselves as scientist citizens sometimes cross elusive borders: We may be tempted to interpret situations in the way that we would like them to be, rather than how they actually are; we may not sufficiently confront our own selective perceptions and choice of evidence. Pointing to contradictions and ugly realities, is not always our forte, although it is our responsibility. With my hypotheses at the beginning, I articulated my thoughts about the characteristics of borders and the necessity to overcome these borders. Certainly, borders remain; they are elusive and they are complex; and in developing as-yet unknown states of the global, we may see ourselves confronted with the necessity to create new borders and demarcation lines: red lines, for example, against the manipulation of research data with the aim of mobilising conspiracy myths and stories.

¹¹ In the German original, the two keywords used are *Lebenslagen* and *Lebenswelten*.

Due to globalisation, the questions of participation and worldwide exchange highlight the need for consensus on the basis of human values and behaviour. Minimum standards on the basis of human rights are of paramount importance and have gained in urgency. Today's cultural educators, policy-makers, and diversity managers require an ongoing globalised sensitivity to negotiate the balance between the sympathy for and promotion of colourful communities living together in diversity – and the limits of such communities, as set by cultural universals which importantly include freedom of expression. We ourselves have to become more active – as scientists, as cultural brokers, as responsible citizens, and as policy-makers. Even if the realisation presently appears utopic, the need for networked cultural organisations, educators, and NGOs to work together towards the further development of post-nation-state foreign cultural policies and their implementation has increased in urgency.

References

Anheier, Helmut/Glasius, Marlies/Kaldor, Mary (2001): *Introducing Global Civil Society*. In: *ibid.* (eds.): *Global Civil Society 2001*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, pp. 3–22.

Anheier, Helmut/Kaldor, Mary/Glasius, Marlies (2012): *The Global Civil Society Yearbook: Lessons and Insights 2001–2011*. In: Kaldor, Mary/Moore, Henrietta L./Selchow, Sabine (eds.): *Global Civil Society 2012. Ten Years of Critical Reflection*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 2–26.

Bauman, Zygmunt (2000): *Liquid Modernity*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.

Bauman, Zygmunt (2007): *Liquid Times. Living in an Age of Uncertainty*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.

Bauman, Zygmunt (2016): *Liquid Modernity Revisited*. In: Robertson-von Trotha, Caroline Y. (ed.): *Die Zwischengesellschaft. Aufbrüche zwischen Tradition und Moderne? (Kulturwissenschaft interdisziplinär 10)*. Baden-Baden: Nomos, pp. 11–22.

Beck, Ulrich (1983): *Jenseits von Klasse und Stand? Soziale Ungleichheit, gesellschaftliche Individualisierungsprozesse und die Entstehung neuer sozialer Formationen und Identitäten*. In: Kreckel, Reinhard (ed.): *Soziale Ungleichheiten (Soziale Welt, Sonderband 2)*. Göttingen: Schwartz, pp. 35–74.

Beck, Ulrich (1997): *Was ist Globalisierung? Irrtümer des Globalismus – Antworten auf Globalisierung*, 3rd ed. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

Beck, Ulrich (2012): *Globale Ungleichheit und Menschenrechte: Eine kosmopolitische Perspektive*. In: Beck, Gerald/Kropp, Cordula (eds.): *Gesellschaft innovativ. Wer sind die Akteure?* Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, pp. 273–295.

- Bekemans, Léonce (2013): *Globalisation vs Europeanisation. A Human-Centric Interaction*. Brussels: Peter Lang.
- Borhardt, Alexandra (2015): Zehn Thesen für ein demokratisches Internet. Weniger Freiheit, mehr Geheimnis. In: *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 15.01.2015; <https://www.sueddeutsche.de/digital/zehn-thesen-fuer-ein-demokratisches-internet-weniger-freiheit-mehr-geheimnis-1.2303638> [01.02.2021].
- Cooper, Anthony/Tinning, Søren (eds.) (2020): *Debating and Defining Borders: Philosophical and Theoretical Perspectives*. London/New York: Routledge.
- De Beukelaer, Christiaan/Pyykkönen, Miikka/Singh, J. P. (eds.) (2015): *Globalization, Culture, and Development. The UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- European Institute for Comparative Cultural Research (ERICarts) (2008): *Sharing Diversity. National Approaches to Intercultural Dialogue in Europe. Executive Summary of a Study Prepared for the European Commission by the European Institute for Comparative Cultural Research (ERICarts)*; <https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/d2ac59ce-55cf-43be-9468-8946a826e457> [01.02.2021].
- Ferguson, Yale H./Mansbach, Richard W. (2012): *Globalization: The Return of Borders to a Borderless World?* Abingdon: Routledge.
- Fukuyama, Francis (2013): The “End of History” 20 Years Later. Interview. In: *New Perspectives Quarterly (NPQ)*. Vol. 30, No. 4, pp. 31–39.
- Giddens, Anthony (1990): *The Consequences of Modernity*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Giddens, Anthony (1995): *Politics, Sociology and Social Theory: Encounters with Classical and Contemporary Social Thought*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
- Giddens, Anthony (1999): *Runaway World: How Globalization Is Reshaping our Lives*. London: Profile Books.
- Huntington, Samuel (1996): *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Kolossov, Vladimir/Scott, James (2013): Selected Conceptual Issues in Border Studies. Questions conceptuelles dans les recherches sur les frontières. In: *Belgeo. Revue Belge de Géographie*. Vol. 1, pp. 1–17; <http://journals.openedition.org/belgeo/10532> [01.02.2021].
- Levitt, Theodore (1983): The Globalization of Markets. In: *Harvard Business Review*. Vol. 61, No. 3, pp. 92–102.
- Luhmann, Niklas (1987): *Soziologische Aufklärung 4. Beiträge zur funktionalen Differenzierung der Gesellschaft*. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.

Negt, Oskar (2012): *Gesellschaftsentwurf Europa. Plädoyer für ein gerechtes Gemeinwesen*. Göttingen: Steidl.

Rieger, Diana/Frischlich, Lena/Bente, Gary (2013): *Propaganda 2.0. Psychological Effects of Right-Wing and Islamic Extremist Internet Videos (Polizei + Forschung 44)*. Cologne: Luchterhand.

Rieger, Diana/Frischlich, Lena/Rack, Stefanie/Bente, Gary (2020): *Digitaler Wandel, Radikalisierungsprozesse und Extremismusprävention im Internet*. In: Ben Slama, Brahim/Kemmesies, Uwe (eds.): *Handbuch Extremismusprävention. Gesamtgesellschaftlich. Phänomenübergreifend (Polizei + Forschung 54)*. Wiesbaden: Bundeskriminalamt, pp. 351–388.

Robertson, Roland (1992): *Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture*. London: SAGE.

Robertson, Roland (1997): *Comments on the “Global Triad” and “Glocalization”*. In: Inoue, Nobutaka (ed.): *Globalization and Indigenous Culture*. Tokyo: Institute for Japanese Culture and Classics; <http://www2.kokugakuin.ac.jp/ijcc/wp/global/15robertson.html> [01.02.2021].

Robertson, Roland (2016): *Glocality: Transcending the Modernity-Tradition Binary*. In: Robertson-von Trotha, Caroline Y. (ed.): *Die Zwischengesellschaft. Aufbrüche zwischen Tradition und Moderne? (Kulturwissenschaft interdisziplinär 10)*. Baden-Baden: Nomos, pp. 23–30.

Robertson-von Trotha, Caroline Y. (2009): *Dialektik der Globalisierung. Kulturelle Nivellierung bei gleichzeitiger Verstärkung kultureller Differenz*. Karlsruhe: Universitätsverlag.

Robertson-von Trotha, Caroline Y. (2016): *Die Zwischengesellschaft. Ein Orientierungsentwurf*. In: *ibid.* (ed.): *Die Zwischengesellschaft. Aufbrüche zwischen Tradition und Moderne? (Kulturwissenschaft interdisziplinär 10)*. Baden-Baden: Nomos, pp. 53–68.

Robertson-von Trotha, Caroline Y. (ed.) (2019): *Diaspora – Netzwerke globaler Gemeinschaften (WIKA-Report 3)*. Karlsruhe: KIT Scientific Publishing; <https://doi.org/10.5445/KSP/1000084128> [01.02.2021].

Robertson-Wensauer, Caroline Y. (1991): *Ethnische Identität und politische Mobilisation. Das Beispiel Schottland*. Baden-Baden: Nomos.

Touraine, Alain (2014): *Neo-Modern Ecology*. In: *New Perspectives Quarterly (NPQ)*. Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 43–47.

Trobbiani, Riccardo/Pavón-Guinea, Andrea (2019): *Culture in EU External Relations. Strategic Reflections and Future Scenarios*. EL-CSID Policy Brief 2019/16; <https://cris.unu.edu/culture-eu-external-relations-strategic-reflections-and-future-scenarios> [01.02.2021].

Weber, Barbara/Herb, Karlfriedrich/Marsal, Eva/Dobashi, Takara/Schweitzer, Petra (eds.) (2011): *Cultural Politics and Identity. The Public Space of Recognition (Political Philosophy and Anthropological Studies 2)*. Vienna/Münster: LIT.

About the Author

Prof. Dr. Caroline Y. Robertson-von Trotha is Founding Director of ZAK | Centre for Cultural and General Studies at the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT) in Germany and Professor of Sociology and Cultural Studies. Her research interests include cultural change and globalisation, internationalisation and integration, foreign cultural and educational policy, and the theory and practice of public science. She is coordinator of the German network of the Anna Lindh Foundation (ALF), chairwoman of the Academic Council on Culture and Foreign Policy (WIKA) at ifa (Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen), and member of its advisory board. She is also a member of the advisory council of the Institute for Cultural Policy of the Association of Cultural Policy (Bonn) and spokeswoman of the scientific committee (Kleiner Konvent) of the Schader Foundation (Darmstadt). From 2009 until 2020, she was member of the Culture Committee of the German UNESCO Commission, thereof vice-chair from 2009 until 2011. Caroline Y. Robertson-von Trotha is the editor of numerous academic books and publication series. She is initiator and scientific convenor of a large variety of innovative teaching formats and public science events. Contact: caroline.robertson[at]kit.edu

A Tale of Two Europes. Non-Simultaneity in European Development

Zaal Andronikashvili (Berlin)

Antonio Gramsci wrote in his *Prison Notebook* from 1930:

“Contemporary history provides a model for understanding Italy’s past. There is today a European cultural consciousness, and there exists a long list of public statements by intellectuals and politicians who maintain that a European Union is necessary. It is fair to say that the course of history is heading towards this union and that there are many material forces that will only be able to develop within this union. If this union were to come to existence in x years, the word ‘nationalism’ will have the same archaeological value as ‘municipalism’ has today” (Gramsci 1930–1932/2011: 60 f.).

It is important that Gramsci not only sets Europe in opposition to nationalism in this diary entry but also declares Europe to be of a higher order than the nation. Europe is something that abolishes nations (and nationalisms) in a union. In Gramsci’s philosophy of history, Europe relates to individual nations in the same way that various Italian states relate to unified Italy. Europe is the next, more progressive stage of development compared to nations. Considering this relation, the union Gramsci speaks of does not appear as a mechanical union of different European states, but requires a common European consciousness. A European Union would not function without a common (cultural) consciousness, just as the unity of Italy would not function without a common national consciousness.

Gramsci’s prognosis has come true, at least in part. There is a European Union, but it has not made nationalism obsolete. Not only does the nation state remain the leading paradigm of statehood, we are experiencing a worldwide renaissance of nationalism, in the definition of Miroslav Hroch, as “an absolute priority of the values of the nation over all other values and interests” (Hroch 1996: 36), not least in Europe.

But one can certainly ask with Gramsci: Why has the EU not been able to overcome nationalisms? Is there a common European cultural awareness? Is it perhaps weaker than the respective national consciousness, and if so, then why? I venture a thesis to answer the first question, which I will elaborate on in the following: Even though there may be a European cultural consciousness, this consciousness has a serious

problem. I see one reason for this – there may be several reasons – in the deep, predominantly cultural and politically far-too-little-reflected-upon division between Western and Eastern Europe.

Conceptions of the Nation

One popular opinion attributes the current crisis of the European Union to its Eastern enlargement. One often hears about the “division between East and West”, or reads that “countries have been brought into the EU that are not interested in European integration” (Münchau 2016: n.p., own translation) (I quote here a random article from the German magazine *Der Spiegel* from 2016, which represents just one among many similar opinions).

The scepticism towards the EU has long ceased to be a prerogative of Eastern European states. But why is Eastern Europe in particular to blame for the crisis in the EU? An answer to this question should also take into account the historical genesis of today’s Western and Eastern Europe, which is of central importance for the concept of post-national foreign and cultural policy.

An asymmetry between Western and Eastern Europe can be traced back to the Enlightenment. In his book *Inventing Eastern Europe. The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment*, the US-American historian Larry Wolff showed that the Enlightenment discourse of civilization excluded Eastern European countries from Europe and shifted them to Asia (cf. Wolff 1994: 4). The cultural or philosophical geography of the Enlightenment thus ‘demi-orientalised’ Eastern Europe, which could be described as ‘under-developed’, ‘backward’, and ‘barbaric’. The Western European view of Eastern Europe, even if not directly linked to political interests and claims, nevertheless remained “the gaze of intellectual mastery” (ibid.: 21), which simultaneously or retrospectively legitimised claims of political ownership. Most Western European states developed from empires or colonial states into nation states, while the Eastern European nation states (with the exception of Russia), on the contrary, emancipated themselves from the European empires. Therefore, a nation state already has different, if not conflicting semantics for a former empire and for its former parts.

It was and is partly assumed that nationalisms, especially ethnic nationalisms, characterise the Eastern European nations that emerged after World War I or after the collapse of the Soviet Union. By contrast, the Western European nations were either not affected or had overcome their various periods of nationalism after the Second World War at the latest.

This view is based on a number of assumptions that have already been questioned in historical and cultural research. The tension between cultural and political nationalism is by no means specific to Eastern Europe (cf. Zahra 2008).

For the question of nationalism, we must look back to the double – political and cultural – origins of the idea of the nation in the 18th century. In January 1789, a French writer and prominent figure of the French Revolution, Abbé Sieyès, wrote a pamphlet entitled “What Is the Third Estate?” (1789/1999). Sieyès’ pamphlet was a reflection on political organisation and the distribution of political rights among the three estates, and it played a key role in thinking about the nation as a new political form of sovereignty. Sieyès’ idea of the nation was social and political. For Sieyès, a nation was “a body of associates living under common laws and represented by the same legislative assembly, etc.” (ibid.: 495). Sieyès saw the rights of the first two estates not as rights but as privileges which allowed them to maintain an unequal and unjust share of the political rights. He founded his critique of the existing political order on three principles: 1) that the representatives of the Third Estate be chosen solely from among citizens who actually belong to the Third Estate; 2) that its deputies be equal in number to those of the two privileged orders, i.e. the First and Second Estate; 3) that the Estates General vote be held not by orders, but by heads. He excluded the representatives of the clergy and the nobility, i.e. of the First and Second Estates, from the nation, because they were not willing to abandon their privileges, and he instead equated the nation with the Third Estate. Sieyès’ ideas aimed at the constitution of a new state order, where the nation – which effectively meant the Third Estate – replaced the monarch as the sovereign.

The idea of the nation as a body of associates living under common laws and represented by the same legislative assembly imagines the nation as a homogeneous body with similar interests and a single national will. Sieyès achieved this homogeneity of the nation by excluding the privileged estates from the idea of the nation in a revolutionary moment of constitution. Imagining the homogeneity of the nation is a crucial

moment that blurs factual cultural differences of the members of the nation. Even if Sieyès imagined the citizens only as social and political – but not cultural – actors, cultural differences could not be entirely eliminated.

To explore the cultural implication of the nation, we should follow the German tradition that goes back to Johann Gottfried Herder. In contrast to Sieyès in his understanding of the nation, Herder focused on the *Volk*, the people, which he, according to Bernd Schönemann, equated with the nation in cultural terms (cf. Schönemann 1992: 316). If in the French tradition the expression of a nation's unity was its (political) will, for Herder the unity of a nation was manifested in its 'poetry'. Herder's concept of the nation was not entirely apolitical. "Even the apparently pre-political *Sprachnation*, also discovered around 1800, directly exercises a political function, directed against the French nation state, calling the German people, who do not yet exist, to unity" (Koselleck 1992: 148, own translation). In both the French and German traditions, a certain imagined pre-political unity is transformed into a political and legal body, which in the following stage becomes normative and formative.

The modern nation state stems from the double genealogy of a political nation of equal citizens and of a cultural nation. The first completely excludes culture as a relevant criterion for a nation and imagines political actors with equal rights, which are in fact neither culturally nor economically equal. The idea of a cultural nation, on the other hand, implies culturally and linguistically (and, implicitly, ethnically) homogeneous actors that constitute pre-political and extra-political nations.

This entanglement is problematic in many respects, because the understanding of a nation constantly oscillates between the cultural and political poles. These different poles of a nation were fixed in space and time in the European historical narrative.

Herder's concept of the linguistic and cultural nation was emancipatory and egalitarian – every nation was equal in its language and culture. Such an understanding of the nation awakened a whole series of national movements in Eastern Europe and elsewhere and thus contributed decisively to the formation of modern nations and nation states. Despite this emancipatory potential, the idea of the cultural nation had several not entirely unproblematic implications. The nation as a linguistic and cultural unity did not necessarily coincide with the idea of the nation as citizens with equal rights. This was a grave problem for the multiethnic empires of Austria

and Russia. The utter importance the national question acquired in the course of the 19th century proved that the idea of a cultural nation was able to generate political conflicts and even bring down empires. The problem of cultural vs. political nations was inherited by the national or federal successor states of empires. They had to solve the difficult problem of a formal equality vs. factual inequality of their citizens. On the one hand, every citizen was imagined as equal in rights; on the other, there was a majority and minority or minorities of people with different cultural, ethnical, linguistic, or religious backgrounds.

The constitutional equality of different groups was undermined by their cultural differences, where the minorities tried to defend their way of life, their language, and their religion, and the majority tried to homogenise the nation on its own terms. These attempts at homogenisation also had an extremely wide repertoire, starting with legal instruments, such as banishing other languages from the education system, and going on to include extra-legal, illegal, or criminal actions, and finally all the way up to ethnic cleansing or genocide. Furthermore, the struggle of minorities could lead to a number of additional possibilities, starting with the legalisation of language and religion, cultural and political autonomy, to insurgencies and the emergence of new states. We can see that factual divergence between a political nation and a cultural nation tends towards the convergence of both by means of homogenisation.

This problem affected all nation states, but in the European historical narrative it was seen as a specifically Eastern European problem: While the Western European nations were regarded as already formed nations, the Eastern European nations, which emerged after the collapse of the Tsarist Empire and Austro-Hungary, were regarded as nations in development. One sign of a developing nation, as Tara Zahra has shown in her article “The ‘Minority Problem’ and National Classification in the French and Czechoslovak Borderlands” (Zahra 2008), was its heterogeneity: The minority problem was seen as a specifically Eastern European problem. This had consequences for international law. Since the Western powers regarded minorities as a specifically Eastern European problem, they blocked a universal minority charter after World War I. This, in turn, allowed the Western powers to deal with their minorities – even on the European continent – in a discriminatory and assimilating manner, and even with racist and violent means.

The ideal of a homogeneous nation did not correspond to reality in any Western nation, neither in the sense of equal rights for all citizens, nor in the sense of cultural, linguistic, and ethnic homogeneity (i.e. neither in the sense of Sieyès nor in the sense of Herder). As Eugen Weber demonstrated in his seminal book *Peasants into Frenchmen. The Modernization of Rural France 1870–1914* (1976), France was transformed from a state in which many languages and local cultures still coexisted in the middle of the 19th century into a linguistically and culturally homogeneous nation only at the beginning of World War I, after the introduction of compulsory education, compulsory military service, and the expansion of the railroad network.

Eastern and Western Europe: Vectors of Development

In addition to the supposed and ideologically occupied differences between Eastern and Western Europe, historical differences must not be forgotten. I can only deal with different vectors of development in the last century in an extremely cursory manner: While in the West the idea of the nation state prevailed on the European continent, in Eastern Europe a project was attempted with the Soviet Union that, among other things, wanted to solve the national problem or national question in a non-discriminatory manner within a supranational integration project.

Although the Soviet Union can be described as an integrative supranational project, the nation played such an important role as a concept in the Soviet Union that the US-American historian Francine Hirsch described the Soviet Union as an empire of nations (cf. Hirsch 2005). The Soviet concept of the nation was a specific mixture between ethnic and cultural nationalism. The final narrowing of the nation to ethnicity only took place within Stalin's nationality politics and led to the outbreak of ethnic nationalism after the collapse of the USSR. But even for the post-Soviet period, ethnic nationalism was only a suggestion (albeit a catastrophic one) made by various political actors alongside other concepts like cultural nationalism, religious nationalism, and state nationalism. The struggles over the definition of the nation are still ongoing, despite the formal commitment to state nationalism.

The renaissance of the nation states in Eastern Europe can hardly be explained without referencing their genesis out of Stalin's nationality policy. The oppressed political nationalisms in Eastern Europe after 1922 and 1945 did not mean that there was no place for nationalism. In his early book entitled *Marxism and the National Question*,

Stalin (1913) already understood the nation as an ethnolinguistic or cultural territorial unit. Stalin's later version of national policy was based on the division into national form and socialist content. While the socialist content was politically related to the official state ideology, the national form was essentially reduced to the national language or culture, which was intended to express the general socialist content. In the Soviet Union, national feelings could not be articulated politically, so culture became their primary venue. Many conflicts that would later become political and military in nature, such as the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict or the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, were first fought in the Soviet Union by scholars (mostly historians).

Since cultural nationalism in the Soviet Union could not have any relation to either the present or the future outside the given ideological framework, it instead concentrated on the past. This past was imagined as isolated (without any reference to the present), and was often mythically transfigured and idealised. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Eastern European nationalisms inherited this historical image formed by Stalin's national and cultural policy and relied upon it – mostly completely without any criticism or reflection – as the starting point for domestic and foreign policy.

After Stalin, and especially since the 1960s, attempts were made to create a uniform, non-national Soviet culture. The failure of the integrative Soviet Union project led to the renaissance of ethnic and cultural nationalisms, which after the collapse of the USSR were available as more or less the only forms of political organisation (later supplemented by religious nationalisms) and came into conflict with the external forms of political organisation.

An important aspect relevant to the differences between Western and Eastern Europe concerns developments after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the simultaneous rise of the EU and its subsequent Eastern enlargement. While the member states of the EU tried to overcome their experiences with nationalism in the 20th century through the supranational project of the EU, the Eastern European states (especially the former republics of the Soviet Union) rediscovered their suppressed political nationalisms. A comparison between the Soviet Union and the EU is only possible in a very limited sense. Only their development vectors can be compared in any substantive way: While Western Europe developed from the individual nation states into an integrative project, Eastern Europe (despite all the differences in the political system and the involuntary integration mechanisms) developed in the opposite direction from a common state or bloc of states into individual nation states.

Eastern and Western Europe: Understanding the Differences

Are Western and Eastern Europe really so different, despite their divergent vectors of development? For about 40 years, the Europe-centric cultural model has been criticised. According to this model, Western Europe is responsible for modernity, innovation, development, while the European and non-European periphery is presented as a passive recipient of this development. Western Europe was seen as a model for Eastern Europe, which had to imitate the latter. Western Europe was something that Eastern Europe could have become if it had gone down the full path of development. For a long time in Western Europe, this model was not only a political but also a philosophical consensus – one that was founded by Hegel, Marx, and Engels, and that denied the historical existence of most Eastern European nations.

Do we have a model that helps us understand the differences between Western and Eastern European histories without falling into the outdated narrative of the progressive West and regressive East?

There is a non-simultaneity between Eastern and Western Europe, which dates back in particular to the post-war (WWII) period and the division into two opposing blocs. Georgian philosopher Merab Mamardashvili (2018) described this non-simultaneity as a difference between chronological and historical time. He did not understand the non-simultaneity in a judgmental manner. Western Europe was not ‘progressive’ and Eastern Europe was not ‘backward’, but similar historical developments took place at different chronological points in time. The different contexts of thought caused differences, which the Bulgarian scholar Miglena Nikolchina (2014) calls *heterotopian homonymies*: Key theoretical and political concepts (such as ‘the human’ or ‘humanism’) could be, and, in fact, were interpreted differently on the Western and Eastern sides of the Iron Curtain. In political theory, critical leftist thinking was developed in the West as a critique of capitalism and has tried, from Hannah Arendt to Étienne Balibar, to relate questions of social equality to questions of political freedom and vice versa. For many left-wing intellectuals, the Soviet Union remained (and to certain point still remains) an alternative to capitalism; they were not at all willing or ready to see the Soviet Union as “hell” (Mamardashvili 2018: 46), as something comparable to, if not equivalent to, National Socialism. In the ‘East’, questions of political freedom were of paramount importance. Eastern European intellectuals had to learn that (relative) social equality, which nevertheless led to an informal distribution of wealth, could not solve issues of political freedom. These

fundamentally different experiences led to disappointments in mutual expectations. According to Mamardashvili, Eastern and Western Europe had different chronologies and vectors, but similar problems that had to be and still have to be solved.

Nationalism (in its cultural and ethnic manifestations) is one such problem, which is becoming increasingly topical in Western Europe today. After the beginning of labour migration in the 1960s, and after mass migration in the 21st century, Western European states and societies have also increasingly been faced with the problem of ethnic, religious, linguistic, racial, and cultural heterogeneity. It turned out that problems that were once considered specific to Eastern Europe also affected Western Europe. Western European history was not linear in its progress, but rather was subjected to regressions. Right-wing populist movements have shown that even the democratic rule of law, the hallmark of the West, is not without its dangers. The responses to these challenges have been – if not always at the state level, then at least in the broad strata of society – rather conservative. They are based on the 19th-century model of the ethnically and culturally homogeneous nation and are hardly equipped to deal with the cultural and political heterogeneity of people today. Postnational discourse has been one attempt, if not to solve this problem, then at least to pose it. The concept of the postnational refers to the relationship of nation states to supranational structures such as the EU, and does not actually predict the disappearance of nation states. This term implies a space in which the ethnic, cultural, linguistic, religious, etc. structures of the postnational can be defined. This term also implies a space in which the ethnic, cultural, linguistic, religious, etc. plurality of contemporary societies is, or rather must be, renegotiated so that this process does not fall prey to mere resentment, and so that pure hatred does not become the only form of expression of national feeling (cf. Weigel 2019).

Current German debates about whether Islam belongs in Germany, the informal differentiation between *Passdeutsche* ('ID-Germans', i.e. German citizens of non-German origin) and *Biodeutsche* ('natural' or 'organic' Germans) demonstrates that the tension created by the divergence between the cultural and political understandings of a nation is still operational. Currently, there is a constant danger of falling back into pre-political and pre-legal cultural understandings of exclusive national unity. Nation and culture have been so closely linked since the 18th century that separating the two concepts can be interpreted as anti-national. In 2018 the Bavarian Minister President Markus Söder implemented his first government declaration by ordering crosses to be mandatory in all public offices in the southern state. Even if this was not

a law of constitutional value, and even if the move was a symbolic one, the law still reflects a logic of cultural exclusion – Söder was trying to stabilise increasing cultural heterogeneity through legal instruments.

The current right-wing movements in Western Europe are primarily concerned with returning to the old notion of the nation, imagined as culturally and ethnically homogeneous. The EU, on the other hand, is seen as a threat to this national and cultural sovereignty, i.e. more as a loss of the old and well-established than as a gain of the new.

At present, the development vectors between Eastern and Western Europe seem to be reversing. More precisely, the dividing lines no longer run between Western and Eastern Europe, but between the EU and Europe outside the EU. Strangely enough, countries on the periphery of Europe that are not yet members of the EU and whose membership is anything but certain (Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova, the Balkan states) are pleading for stronger integration than the EU states themselves (including those in Eastern Europe), which are now showing signs of integration fatigue. In the EU, it is often believed that the integration aspirations of its Eastern neighbours emerged out of purely economic motivations. But this opinion is incomplete: Despite all the EU's crises, it still offers a more attractive political model than those of its neighbours, i.e. Russia, Turkey, and Iran. The Eastern states that are seeking to join the EU do not see their integration aspirations as a weakening of national sovereignty and the nation state, but rather, such integration is associated with a strengthening of the nation state. The view from the periphery of Europe towards the EU is different and much more optimistic than the view from the centre of the EU towards its periphery. The former view must be taken seriously because it will have a role for both the EU's integration narrative and the future of Europe (which does not coincide with that of the EU).

The genealogies of nationalisms play an important role in the integration projects of the European Union, because they generate conflicts between future projects of the EU and images of the past of Eastern and recently also of Western European nations. The idea of European integration has been attacked, among other things, in the name of nationalisms and national sovereignties. The European idea is held responsible for the supposed loss of national cultures and of conditions that are presented as homogeneous, traditional, and, to a certain extent, unalterable.

It will be extremely difficult to build a common Europe without aggressively addressing the problem of understanding nations. The Eastern European experience will prove helpful in this respect.

In his lecture at the Martin Roth Symposium, Kurt Hübner complained about the loss of the European integration narrative. One could regard the 'integration narrative' as the blueprint for the future (cf. Hübner 2018).

I will not presume to venture a draft of the common European narrative. If we really want to speak to a common European consciousness, this will, in my opinion, hardly be possible as long as the idea of a 'better' Western Europe and a 'worse' Eastern Europe, of a 'core' Europe and a 'peripheral' Europe, persists. It would be more correct to speak of a Europe that does not consist of progressive and retrograde divisions. And it would be more effective to speak of Europe with different chronologies and vectors, but similar problems that had and still have to be solved together, according to common experience.

References

- Gramsci, Antonio (1930–1932/2011): *Prison Notebooks*, Vol. 3. Ed. and transl. by Joseph A. Buttigieg. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Hirsch, Francine (2005): *Empire of Nations. Ethnographic Knowledge and the Making of the Soviet Union (Culture and Society after Socialism)*. Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press.
- Hroch, Miroslav (1996): *Nationalism and National Movements. Comparing the Past and the Present of Central and Eastern Europe*. In: *Nations and Nationalism*. Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 35–44.
- Hübner, Kurt (2018): *The Return of Borders – Nationalism, Populism and the Project of European Integration*. Speech at the Martin Roth Symposium 2018 [Lecture]; <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7dbBiXz9RA8> [01.02.2021].
- Koselleck, Reinhart (1992): *Einleitung. Article Volk, Nation, Nationalismus, Masse*. In: Brunner, Otto/Conze, Werner/ibid. (eds.): *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland*. Vol. 7. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, pp. 142–151.
- Mamardashvili, Merab (2018): *Die Metaphysik Antonin Artauds*. Ed. by Zaal Andronikashvili. Berlin: Matthes & Seitz.
- Münchau, Wolfgang (2016): *Der Fehler der EU-Osterweiterung*. In: *Spiegel online*, 08.01.2016; <https://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/soziales/polen-der-fehler-der-eu-osterweiterung-kolumne-a-1071041.html> [01.02.2021].

Nikolchina, Miglena (2014): Inverted Forms and Heterotopian Homonymy: Althusser, Mamardashvili, and the Problem of 'Man'. In: *boundary 2*. Vol. 41, No. 1, pp. 79–100.

Schönemann, Bernd (1992): Vom Westfälischen Frieden bis zum Wiener Kongreß. Article Volk, Nation, Nationalismus, Masse. In: Brunner, Otto/Conze, Werner/Koselleck, Reinhart (eds.): *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland*. Vol. 7. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, pp. 302–337.

Sieyès, Emmanuel-Joseph (1789/1999): What Is the Third Estate? In: Williams, David (ed.): *The Enlightenment (Cambridge Readings in the History of Political Thought Vol. 1)*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, pp. 492–507.

Stalin, Josef (1913): *Marxism and the National Question*. In: Marxists Internet Archive; <https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1913/03.htm> [01.02.2021].

Weber, Eugen (1976): *Peasants into Frenchmen. The Modernization of Rural France 1870–1914*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Weigel, Sigrid (2019): *Transnational Foreign Cultural Policy – Beyond National Culture. Prerequisites and Perspectives for the Intersection of Domestic and Foreign Policy* (ifa Edition Culture and Foreign Policy). Stuttgart: ifa (Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen).

Wolff, Larry (1994): *Inventing Eastern Europe. The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Zahra, Tara (2008): The 'Minority Problem' and National Classification in the French and Czechoslovak Borderlands. In: *Contemporary European History*. Vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 137–165.

About the Author

Dr. Zaal Andronikashvili, born in 1973, is a research fellow at the Leibniz-Zentrum für Literatur- und Kulturforschung (ZfL) in Berlin and a Professor at Ilia State University in Tbilisi, Georgia. He studied history and philology in Tbilisi and Saarbrücken, and completed his PhD at the University of Göttingen (2005). His research interests include: narratology (theory of *sužet*); the metahistory of literature; small/minor literature(s); world literature; cultural semantics; political theology; the cultural history of Georgia, the Caucasus, and the Black Sea Region; and Soviet and post-Soviet cultural history. He is an author of three monographs: *Die Erzeugung des dramatischen Textes. Ein Beitrag zur Theorie des Sujets* (2008); *Landna(h)me Georgien. Studien zur kulturellen Semantik* (2018, with Emzar Jgerenaia and Franziska Thun-Hohenstein); and *Uzlurebis dideba. Politikuri teologia sakartveloši* (in print). He is currently working on a new book project: *Literature in Georgia. Between Small Literature and World Literature*. Contact: andronikashvili[at]zfl-berlin.org

Photographic Fragments as an Opener to a Long-Lasting Dialectic Relationship. A Brief Reflection

Edita Štulcaité (Berlin)

“The few judgments which I abide by – more in antipathy than in receptivity – are linked to my ignorance.” *Georges Bataille*

I learned the word შევხვედებიო years after my first stay in Georgia. Still, this one simple word describes my relationship to that country throughout the years well. In all its simplicity it says: We will meet. And so we did. Every year since 2013, with the exception of 2020.¹ The intensity of these meetings has varied with time, but the dialectic and resonant – to borrow Hartmut Rosa’s term – relationship remained.

I set out here to explore my personal approach to the country. This approach surely is dependent on my different, partly overlapping roles while returning to Georgia again and again. Each of the roles I have embraced during the time was context- and time-related and of constantly varying importance: a traveller, a self-taught photographer, a volunteer, an extracurricular educator, and finally a researcher in the field of social anthropology. These roles have admittedly at times been influenced by my deep desire to belong in Georgia or even to make it my second or third home.

Likewise, the experiences I have had were marked by a sometimes reoccurring, yet blatantly clear in those rare times, willingness and need to distance myself from the emotional vortex in order to prevent any kind of romanticisation in my perspectives. This dilemma is certainly not new among researchers in general, and anthropologists in particular, who are strongly involved in one region or another. Indeed, more often than not this dilemma offers ground for important reflections. I believe that it also plays a significant role in how openly – or sometimes not so openly – I have approached Georgia. Furthermore, this probably, to an extent, prevented me from developing any single fixed narrative or point of view, which foreign researchers or travellers tend to develop once they spend longer periods of time in one country. Thus, the inner dilemma might have effectively caused what I initially called a dialectic relationship.

¹ Indeed, even in 2020, a research trip with colleagues and students from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Germany was set to take place. Unfortunately, the project had to be cancelled due to the harsh pandemic situation.

I do not draw on any specific definition of *dialectics* in the following. Nevertheless, I certainly perceive dialectics as a process which enables oneself to transform phenomena from purely perceptible to graspable and intelligible, as mostly adopted in classical philosophy. In stating this, I by no means assume that at any point social phenomena may be grasped in a fixed and definite manner. The very concept of a dialectic relationship entails dealing with the fact that things and the perceptions of things are constantly changing and (re-)developing according to given conditions, and the inherent goal is thus to seek to move beyond ultimate narratives or categories and at the same time to never give up on the idea of reaching an ever higher – and simultaneously more concrete – level of comprehensiveness.

From Big Pictures to Fragments

I would like to develop the idea that the mostly unconscious aesthetic selection process of the cut-outs of reality in my photographs is nurtured by various approaches and roles I sought out while in Georgia. And conversely, that the approach of an aesthetically thrilled foreign traveller, capturing the tiny pieces of trivial everyday surroundings, has trained me and encouraged me in wanting to do what I actually feel really matters. That is, to focus on what is irritating, on what is behind the at times comical visual cut-outs of reality, or on what simply happens to get close to someone (myself) for – at least at first glance – no particular reason.

I first travelled to Georgia and Armenia in 2013. Just like many people from European countries in their early 20s, I had decided to apply for a placement in the framework of the European Voluntary Service (currently known as the European Solidarity Corps). It was rather accidentally that I started a voluntary service in Rustavi, Georgia. My only criterion back then was that I wanted to work in the field of education while living in one of the countries which had experienced the so-called ‘transition’ from being part of the Soviet Union to becoming an independent state. I applied for placements in Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia, and was finally selected for an NGO which mainly focused on youth education and international youth exchanges.

As someone who grew up in another country with a Soviet past, Lithuania, I was, of course, very keen to experience how Georgian society was adapting to the political, economic, and societal changes caused by the collapse of the Soviet Empire, although I had little idea about the actual realities in the South Caucasus back then. Yet I did have

a vague idea, a big and admittedly rather trivial picture of what I might discover and how I would spend my time: I wanted to get to know the region and to offer the youth of Rustavi useful extracurricular educational activities, whatever that actually meant.

It took time for me to realise that there is no one or best way to immerse oneself into a society one does not know yet. While trainings on intercultural communication and regional specifics might offer very welcome first-aid-kit-like support to more or less get by in new surroundings in the first place, they mostly do not help one go beyond predefined narratives, and they do little to encourage developing one's very own relationship to and stories about new places, people, and things. Neither can they offer an outline for developing and experiencing a dialectic relationship, which I previously described as seeking to move beyond ultimate narratives or categories and simultaneously trying to reach a more exact and grounded level of comprehensiveness. A fresh look at what surrounded me first of all required noticing and literally experiencing fragments. Perhaps this is how photography became my medium of reflection in my early encounters with the region.

From Fragments to Ethnographies

Most of the photographs in this volume were taken during my first stays in Georgia, between 2013 and 2016. While often overwhelmed by the beauty of the landscapes of the Caucasus, I rarely took photographs for purely aesthetic reasons. And if I did so, then those aesthetic photographs were not the ones that brought me to what I called 'experiencing fragments' or that led me to establish a personal relationship to my surroundings. Taking pictures was perhaps my way of saying farewell to the big pictures. And it was a way to embrace the unknowingness and to open up to an investigative-dialectic relationship with the country I ended up spending so much time in. By documenting reality through tiny cut-outs, I was paving the way for a questioning of the conflicting temporalities of societal changes, for instance, of contradictions between the speed of liberal economic developmental visions on the one hand and the development of varying identities and ideas for the society's future on the other.

Not surprisingly, at some point photography no longer satisfied me as my sole medium of reflection. While selecting pictures for the present publication, I realised that most of the photographs I had taken in Georgia came from the time before I started travelling to Georgia for research purposes. The fragmentary vision has surely

followed me ever since, because the ethnographic view is indeed more often than not about beginning with fragments and questioning what lies behind them. What is captured in a picture is thus perhaps a snapshot of fascination or irritation, and to move beyond these affects is to start asking about the unknown.

Thus, my further experiences in Georgia were very much marked by my research as a student of social anthropology. In the last couple of years, various smaller and larger research projects have brought me back to Georgia, ranging from the mapping of social movements and activism² in the South Caucasus to conducting ethnographic research in the Georgian mountain area of Tusheti.³ Before I have any new personal encounters in Georgia, however, I mainly hope, for now, for durable peace in the South Caucasus; and beyond the big pictures and narratives, I wish to seek for sincere dialectic resolutions.

References

Bataille, Georges (1988): *Inner Experience*. Transl. by Leslie Anne Boldt. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.

Rosa, Hartmut (2019): *Resonanz. Eine Soziologie der Weltbeziehung*. Berlin: Suhrkamp.

About the Author

Edita Štulcaitė was born in Klaipėda, Lithuania, in 1991. Upon her arrival in Germany in 2010, she studied political science and European ethnology (empirische Kulturwissenschaft) at the University of Tübingen. She then earned a master's degree in social and cultural anthropology in Marburg. For the past few years, Edita Štulcaitė has been conducting anthropological research on Georgia. She is based in Berlin and currently works in the field of non-formal education.

Contact: edita.stulcaite[at]posteo.de

² Thanks to, among others, the international student research projects "Caucasus Conflict Culture" (<https://caucasusconflict.wordpress.com/about> [01.02.2021]) initiated by Stéphane Voell.

³ An article on the outcomes may be found here: <http://balticworlds.com/reconstruction-of-a-village-in-tusheti> [01.02.2021].





























Coffee

Coffee

If Not for Democracy, for What? Civil Society Organisations in Non-Democratic Settings

Annette Zimmer and Katharina Obuch (Münster)

Introduction

In political science the topic of civil society and civil society organisations (CSOs) was once closely linked to research on democratic transitions. The third wave of democratisation (starting in the 1970s), as outlined by Samuel Huntington (1991), indicated a major shift in the global order. There were high hopes accompanying the breakdown of the Soviet Union, the end of dictatorship in many South American countries, and the trend towards democratic governance in Africa. Civil society was perceived to be both a driving force for the transition from authoritarian towards democratic rule (cf. O'Donnell et al. 1986) and at the same time a beneficiary of the transition towards democracy.

Today, about 40 years later, however, it seems that a de-coupling of the two trends has taken place. On the one hand, the enthusiasm about a worldwide proliferation of democracy (cf. Fukuyama 1989) has been replaced by a renaissance of authoritarianism, democratic backsliding, and shrinking spaces for civic action. On the other hand, empirical insights from non-democratic settings worldwide show that a growth in civil society organisations no longer automatically translates into an advancement and further deepening of democratic rule. Non-democratic settings, scholars have recently come to conclude, challenge the innate virtue of a civil society that is – despite its highly-praised and well-documented democratic-participatory functions – not necessarily linked to democratisation (cf. Toepler et al. 2020).

But, if we need to question the nexus between civil society and democratisation, what is the role and function of CSOs in the rising number of populist, illiberal, and often at least partly non-democratic regimes? This paper summarises the debate and the evolution of government-CSO relations over time to then focus on the examples of Poland and Nicaragua, two countries with very different traditions that, nevertheless, currently show striking similarities. The cases illustrate how CSOs faced with shrinking spaces for civic action risk becoming increasingly 'under the thumb' of the state. Against this background the following question is addressed: CSOs in non-democratic settings – if not for democracy, for what?

Democratisation (Studies): From the Third Wave till Today

When we compare the global state of democracy in 1977 with that of today, we easily see that Huntington (1991) was right: A big shift in favour of democratic rule has taken place since the start of the first democratic upheavals in Southern and Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Southeast Asia in the 1970s and the subsequent “transitions from authoritarian rule” (O’Donnell et al. 1986). Later labelled the ‘third wave of democratisation’ (cf. Huntington 1991), these developments revitalised transition research and were accompanied by new enthusiasm about a global triumph of democracy and the “universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government” (Fukuyama 1989: 1).

With the new century the “transition paradigm” (Carothers 2002) and the steady proliferation of democracy in the world came to a preliminary halt. Thomas Carothers, an expert on international support for democracy working for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, found that by then the reality of democratisation processes challenged the classic assumption that “any country moving *away* from dictatorial rule can be considered a country in transition *toward* democracy” (ibid.: 6). Instead, he envisioned a reversion of the worldwide trend towards democracy. Indeed, he indicated that processes of democratic transition have come to a halt, stagnated, or even moved backwards. This “Democratic Rollback” (Diamond 2008) was to become a starting point for a renewed interest on the part of scholars in authoritarianism and autocratic governance (cf. Frantz 2018).

A closer look at the map of 2017 (cf. PEW Research Center 2019) shows that in addition to the increase in democracies, today there are also many grey zones indicating unclear cases that stand in between democratic rule and autocracy. In practice, these ‘hybrid’ or ‘illiberal’ regimes tend to combine formal democratic structures with deficits regarding political and civic liberties or the rule of law (cf. Croissant/Merkel 2004; Kailitz/Köllner 2013). Typical characteristics are rather meaningless elections, a rule of law impaired by decrees, corruption, or politicisation, and an unequal balance of power marked by a *de facto* strong executive, weak institutions, and weak opposition parties (cf. Rüb 2002; Wigell 2008).

It is these new forms of non-democratic governance in particular, together with the rise of populism and a “decline of democratic efficacy, energy, and self-confidence in the West” (Diamond 2015: 251), that have become the focus of scholarly attention

(cf. Heitmeyer 2018; Rovira Kaltwasser et al. 2017; Frantz 2018). At the same time, these trends and the regime changes they initiated are of great interest in the current debate about shrinking and changing spaces for civil society.

Three Periods of Government-Civil Society Relations

While research on democratic transitions started to gain momentum in the 1980s, the same holds true for civil society research. Buoyed by the role of civil society in the democratic transitions taking place, the concept attracted scholarly attention (e.g. Cohen/Arato 1994; Foley/Edwards 1996; Putnam 1993) and also gained popularity among politicians such as Václav Havel, who would later become the President of Czechoslovakia and then of the Czech Republic, and Romano Prodi, who would become President of the EU Commission in the early 2000s.

Since then, civil society has been broadly defined as a sphere between the market, the state, and the private sector, and is characterised by charity, self-organisation, autonomy, openness, and pluralism (cf. Kocka 2004). The term CSO refers to the organisational level of civic activities. CSOs are active in many policy fields ranging from advocacy and interest representation to social service provisioning, leisure, and sports. They are organised as voluntary associations or clubs, charity foundations, trade unions, professional associations, or transnationally operating NGOs. In popular and scholarly discourse, CSOs were once widely praised for their democratic-participatory functions that enable them to depict and question non-democratic practices or setbacks, to raise awareness for rights and liberties, and to enhance civic engagement (cf. Keck/Sikkink 1998; Knodt/Finke 2005; Maloney/Deth 2008; Davies 2019).

Nonetheless, civil society's real strength and democratic potential is usually closely linked to the respective political regime and its – democratic or non-democratic – government. Against this backdrop and as a combination of the distinct perspectives of civil society studies and transition research, three periods of government-civil society relations might be identified: an oppositional stage (ca. 1970–1989), a liberal stage (ca. 1989–2000), and a time of shrinking and closing spaces (ca. 2000 until the present day).

The Oppositional Stage (ca. 1970–1989)

The oppositional stage goes back to government-civil society relations in the transition countries of the 1980s that started to move from autocracy to more liberal modes of governance. By that time, CSOs were thoroughly in opposition to the ruling non-democratic state and provided the primary alternatives vis-à-vis an unjust and authoritarian government (cf. Havel/Keane 1985; Szabó 2004). They organised as oppositional forces and called for more liberty and democratic participation.

A prominent example is the Polish trade union *Solidarność* that from the early 1980s on organised strikes across the whole country and had a considerable share in the success of the democratic revolution. At the Gdańsk Shipyard, the strikes were organised by Lech Wałęsa, who was to become the new President of Poland under democratic rule in 1990 (cf. Juros et al. 2004).

During these years, civil society gained its popular image as a driving force of democratisation and an agent of change, and the term became closely related to democratic political engagement and social movements (cf. e.g. Havel 1988; Diamond 1994).

The Liberal Stage (ca. 1989–2000)

With the downfall of the Soviet bloc, government-civil society relations entered into a so-called ‘liberal period’ in which civil society was perceived as a partner on the road towards a market economy and a pluralistic society.

This period was indeed a peak time for civil society worldwide. As the international “Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project” proved statistically (cf. Salamon et al. 1999), civil society organisations mushroomed and increasingly cooperated with the government, which led Lester M. Salamon to even speak about an “associational revolution” (Salamon 1994: 109) that took place across the world. Furthermore, governments in transitional countries and even those still under one-party rule began to acknowledge the existence of organisations belonging neither to the state nor to the market. The introduction of legal forms for nonprofit-organisations was an important step, and foreign donor funding for CSOs was widely accepted and helped build up a civil society/nonprofit sector in countries all over the world (cf. e.g. China: Heberer 2006; Zhang 2015; Teets 2014).

Against this background, the decade also marked the heyday of democracy promotion through CSOs, symbolised in the form of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that came to be known as veritable “fighters of freedom” (Ishkanian 2007: 58) and key vehicles for good governance, development, and democracy promotion. Scholars and politicians started dreaming of a world scenario based on multilateralism, liberal thinking, and a global exchange of goods and services. The work of the Soros Foundation in Eastern Europe and the foreign engagement of the German political foundations and other intermediaries such as the German Goethe-Institut are examples for both successful international cooperation and the global openness for these new initiatives at that time (cf. Davies 2019; Zimmer/Priller 2004).

However, the liberal stage was also a time with room for experiments, a situation similar to a laboratory setting and in which the outcome was as yet unclear. In retrospect, political scientists might have been too optimistic and too constrained by their own wishful thinking.

The Stage of Shrinking and Closing Spaces (ca. 2000 until the Present Day)

With the end of the transition paradigm and the global renaissance of authoritarian governance, government-civil society relations entered into a period that is currently discussed as a stage of ‘shrinking and closing spaces’ (cf. Alscher et al. 2017; Anheier et al. 2019).

The debate reflects a general trend among authoritarian rulers to restrict CSOs and activists in their democratic-participatory work and impact, in particular through legal and funding restrictions but also through defamation, intimidation, and threats. More specifically, the free articulation and representation of interests, information, and education about controversial topics, integrative work, and service provisioning for vulnerable people have come under threat.

A key tool of non-democratic leaders to gain control over the work and impact of CSOs is the regulation of funding. A government may legally constrain domestic CSOs from receiving international donations. Around the mid-2000s, Russia started to control foreign funding of CSOs working in the country. Soon other countries, e.g. China and Israel, followed suit. Since then, the control of so-called ‘foreign’ CSOs has been gradually stepped up through legal restrictions and other mechanisms.

Nowadays in many countries, e.g. Russia and China, foreign CSOs working in the country have to undergo special registration procedures. After the passing of the ‘Foreign Agents’ law of 2012 in Russia and the Overseas NGO Law of 2017 in China, working in these countries has become difficult and burdensome for CSOs from abroad; it has also become very difficult, if not impossible, for donors to transfer money from abroad to the community of domestic CSOs (cf. Rutzen 2015). However, policies towards the CSO community in many countries are Janus-headed (e.g. Jing 2015). There is rigid control of CSOs from abroad and also of CSOs working in some areas such as human rights. At the same time, governments set up special funds earmarked for those CSOs working in specific areas, such as social service provisioning, or those standing for a particular ideological or normative orientation. In a nutshell: Nowadays governments try to shape civil society sectors according to their ideas and concepts. Christian Fröhlich and Yulia Skokova, for example, found that the winners of the presidential grant competition (PGC), the biggest public funding programme for CSOs in Russia, for the most part work in the field of social services and, already in their applications, tend to relate to the state-led conservative narratives (cf. Fröhlich/Skokova 2020).

In addition to this, funding is an important instrument of control concerning the modes of registration for domestic CSOs. In many countries, registration procedures are cost-intensive and very time-consuming. In China, every CSO needs a partner within the government; furthermore, each CSO has to set-up a ‘party chapter’ within the organisations. In Nicaragua, for example, the process of registration for CSOs is time-consuming, involves many bureaucratic hurdles, and is also prone to manipulation as a legal entity has to be permitted by the National Assembly (parliament). In practice, this means that registration requires friends (in the parliament), time, and money (cf. Obuch 2017: 120). This leads to a high degree of informality and fluctuation within the Nicaraguan CSO sector, and means that a majority of organisations operate without a legal status (cf. Serra Vázquez 2011: 56, 63).

Finally, a tough and straightforward tool used by autocratic governments to control civil society is to declare that an organisation or persons affiliated with the organisation are operating illegally. This often involves the accusation of being a threat to national security and goes along with the search and closure of offices, unequal trials for staff, and, finally, the banning of the organisation. An example is the persecution

of domestic and foreign CSOs in Egypt between 2011 and 2013, including the expulsion from the country of the German Konrad Adenauer Foundation, which had been operating in Egypt for more than 30 years (cf. Wolff/Poppe 2015: 38).¹

Government-CSO Relations in Times of Shrinking Spaces: Insights from Poland and Nicaragua

To illustrate the transition of government-CSO relations over time outlined above, we will now briefly refer to the cases of Poland and Nicaragua. Both countries experienced a revolution in the 1980s where civil society stood out as a fighter against authoritarian rule, and later benefitted from large international donor support for their CSO sectors. Nonetheless, in the last decade, the space for civic engagement has become narrower since populist parties came to power. In a context of increasingly authoritarian governance, CSOs' traditional roles and impact are changing and civil society's democratic-participatory potential has come under threat.

Poland

In Poland, government-civil society relations entered the *oppositional stage* in the 1980s when a broad civic movement headed by the trade union Solidarność brought down the authoritarian communist regime in a peaceful revolution.

The *liberal stage*, which emerged with the post-communist transition in the 1990s, was marked by major support for civil society in the framework of international development assistance (first from the United States and later from the European Union) with a focus on human rights, civic engagement, and institutional reform (cf. Smith 2018: 6). As a consequence, the increasingly institutionalised and flourishing CSO sector turned into a “major institutional vehicle for virtually eliminating political inequality, advancing civic equality, and slowing down the growth of economic inequality” (Ekiert et al. 2017: 346).

¹ For an overview of the global restrictions for civil society, consult the CIVICUS (Global Civil Society Alliance) Monitor tracking civic space: Countries are rated in view of their respect for fundamental freedoms (association, peaceful assembly, and expression) and then defined on a five-category scale ranging from ‘open’ to ‘closed’ civic space. The world map shows how civil society is under attack in most countries today, while a diachronic comparison of the last years would illustrate the shrinking of civic spaces on a global scale, see <https://monitor.civics.org> [01.02.2021].

The *stage of shrinking and closing spaces* began with the electoral victory of the conservative-nationalist Law and Justice Party PiS in 2015, which implements policies that “infringe on the rule of law, restrict political and parliamentary processes, and limit freedom of assembly and speech, as well as enable an increasingly discriminatory environment” (Smith 2018: 2). As a consequence, Barbara Smith (*ibid.*: 12) concludes that the situation for CSOs is worsening on three levels: Access to fundraising and funding for CSOs has been politicised, symbolised in the creation of a new body (National Institute of Freedom – Center for Civil Society Development) which is mandated to oversee and determine the flow of public funds to CSOs; on a second level, we can observe a concrete decrease in public support for CSOs involved in advocacy activities; and, on a third level, we can see increasing “regulatory, political and social constraints on CSO operations and activities” (*ibid.*).

However, with the measures of control outlined above, the Polish government not only restricts civic space for (disagreeable) CSOs, but also supports those civic activities and organisations that serve to improve the regime’s performance and support its own nationalist legitimising discourse.

For example, the domain of culture is increasingly used as soft power with the goal of propelling patriotic, nationalistic, and patriarchal ideas. Supported by loyal organisations and activists, the government is promoting right-wing national-patriotic education, is attempting to turn public media into ‘national media’, is interfering in the staffing and artistic freedom of theatre programmes or (museum) exhibitions, and has launched an educational reform “suspicious of any ideas of equality and multicultural projects” (Zuk 2017: 1058). In this context, the PiS’ ‘love’ for organisations that are very close to the Catholic Church and its harsh control of organisations fighting for women’s liberty and equal rights have further divided the Polish civil society sector.

Nicaragua

In Nicaragua, the *oppositional stage* started with growing popular resistance against a 40-year-long dictatorship and led to the formation of a broad societal movement opposing the ruling Somoza dynasty in the 1970s. The large number of organisations and individual activists were able to bring down the dictator Anastasio Somoza Debayle with a military offensive in the Sandinista Revolution of 1979 (cf. Walker/Wade 2011: 40 ff.).

After the civil war and counter-revolution in the 1980s, the first democratic elections in 1990 initiated the *liberal stage* of CSO-government relations. The era was marked by the institutionalisation of democracy and neoliberal reforms pushed forward by international powers that fostered democratic and economic development primarily with the support of non-state actors. Foreign donor support led to a boom in – and to the quick institutionalisation of – CSOs with diverse fields of activity ranging from civic participation, democratic governance, and electoral observation to education, social welfare, and health and disaster relief. As a result, in the 1990s Nicaragua even became known as the ‘NGO world champion’ (cf. Kurz 2010: 62).

With the new millennium, growing tensions have started to challenge government-CSO relations, and civic and political liberties have gradually deteriorated, particularly since the start of the presidency of Daniel Ortega in 2007. Nonetheless, at second glance, and similarly to the case of Poland, civic space in Nicaragua seems to be changing rather than simply *shrinking* under the current authoritarian-leaning government. In practice, President Ortega carefully distinguishes between what he calls ‘bourgeois’ organisations monitored by foreign imperialist powers and ‘popular’ organisations that aim at promoting the country in close cooperation with the government. In its resulting endeavours to monitor the Nicaraguan CSO sector, the government on the one hand is repressing dissenting organisations through persecution, administrative harassment, the denial of access and information, and the control of money flows from international cooperation. On the other hand, it has shown that it is eager to build up a proper, regime-loyal CSO sector via the co-option of traditional organisations willing to share its normative worldview; the promotion of alibi organisations and counter-movements that compete with existing CSOs for funding, members, and public attention; and the substitution of existing spaces for CSOs through participation structures that are loyal to the ruling party (cf. Obuch 2017: 208 ff.).

Since then, repression has enforced a three-part division of the Nicaraguan CSO sector into a (neutralised) political opposition, service providers engaged in the field of health and social welfare, and satellite organisations loyal to the government that help diffuse the regime’s legitimising discourse (cf. Obuch 2017).

Conclusion: If Not for Democracy, for What?

Coming back to our initial question: If civic space is shrinking in these times of renewed authoritarianism and democratic backsliding, what is the role and impact of CSOs under these restrictive conditions? To be sure, a certain number of advocacy-oriented CSOs that are willing to make demands on the government and that are fighting for democracy and human rights may always manage to persist. Empirical research tells us, however, that in many countries led by increasingly authoritarian-leaning governments, there is no simple reduction of CSOs in numbers. On the contrary, in many non-democratic countries, such as in China, the foundation and boom of CSOs goes on and is even accelerating (cf. Hui 2019).

However, we can see that the CSOs' areas of activity are changing, the space for CSO action is becoming more limited, and the CSO sector in general is becoming less plural and less diverse. Studies of several countries confirm an increase in organisations working in the social domain even while far less are engaged in core, but often contested, civil society domains such as human rights, gender issues, or the protection of the environment (cf. Fröhlich/Skokova 2020; Obuch 2017; Salamon et al. 2015; Wang/Snape 2018). Accordingly, and in line with our two cases of Poland and Nicaragua, several authors have recently stated that the space for civil society is changing rather than merely shrinking or closing down worldwide (cf. Alscher et al. 2017; Anheier et al. 2019; Wolff/Poppe 2015). While spaces may be constricting for the politically active parts of civil society, they are expanding for those engaged in mere service provisioning and for those who are clearly and ideologically supportive of the regime.

All in all, we can see that CSOs, despite their innate democratic-participatory virtues, do not necessarily work on behalf of the advancement of democracy in contemporary non-democratic settings. Instead, they may be actively integrated to improve the regime's performance in social welfare and/or diffuse a government's own, often conservative and nationalist, legitimising discourse. In the near future, an important issue to follow will be whether and how donors and domestic CSOs deal with the restrictions of funding and operations, how they deal with co-optation, and how they are able to find ways to keep on working without losing sight of their mission. This will depend on whether the ideal nexus of democratisation and civil society is able to persist even in times when more and more countries seem to be falling in love with nationalism, populism, and non-democratic governance.

References

- Alscher, Mareike/Priller, Eckhard/Ratka, Susanne/Strachwitz, Rupert Graf (eds.) (2017): *The Space for Civil Society: Shrinking? Growing? Changing?* (Opuscula No. 104). Berlin: Maecenate Institut für Philanthropie und Zivilgesellschaft.
- Anheier, Helmut K./Lang, Markus/Toepler, Stefan (2019): *Civil Society in Times of Change: Shrinking, Changing and Expanding Spaces and the Need for New Regulatory Approaches*. In: *Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal*. Vol. 13, No. 8, pp. 1–27.
- Carothers, Thomas (2002): *The End of the Transition Paradigm*. In: *Journal of Democracy*. Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 5–21.
- Cohen, Jean L./Arato, Andrew (1994): *Civil Society and Political Theory*. Massachusetts et al.: MIT Press.
- Croissant, Aurel/Merkel, Wolfgang (2004): *Introduction: Democratization in the Early Twenty-First Century*. In: *Democratization*. Vol. 11, No. 5, pp. 1–9.
- Davies, Thomas (ed.) (2019): *Routledge Handbook of NGOs and International Relations*. New York/London: Routledge.
- Diamond, Larry J. (1994): *Rethinking Civil Society. Toward Democratic Consolidation*. In: *Journal of Democracy*. Vol. 5, No. 3, pp. 4–17.
- Diamond, Larry J. (2008): *The Democratic Rollback. The Resurgence of the Predatory State*. In: *Foreign Affairs*. Vol. 87, No. 2, pp. 36–48.
- Diamond, Larry J. (2015): *Facing Up to the Democratic Recession*. In: *Journal of Democracy*. Vol. 26, No. 1, pp. 141–155.
- Ekiert, Grzegorz/Kubik, Jan/Wenzel, Michal (2017): *Civil Society and Three Dimensions of Inequality in Post-1989 Poland*. In: *Comparative Politics*. Vol. 49, No. 3, pp. 331–350.
- Foley, Michael W./Edwards, Bob (1996): *The Paradox of Civil Society*. In: *Journal of Democracy*. Vol. 7, No. 3, pp. 38–52.
- Frantz, Erica (2018): *Authoritarianism. What Everyone Needs to Know*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Fröhlich, Christian/Skokova, Yulia (2020): *Two for One: Public Welfare and Regime Legitimacy through State Funding for CSOs in Russia*. In: *Voluntas. International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations*. Vol. 31, No. 4, pp. 698–709.
- Fukuyama, Francis (1989): *The End of History?* In: *The National Interest*. No. 16, pp. 3–18.
- Havel, Václav (1988): *Anti-Political Politics*. In: Keane, John (ed.): *Civil Society and the State. New European Perspectives*. New York/London: Verso, pp. 381–398.

Havel, Václav/Keane, John (eds.) (1985): *The Power of the Powerless: Citizens against the State in Central Eastern Europe*. New York: Routledge.

Heberer, Thomas (2006): *China – Entwicklung zur Zivilgesellschaft*. In: *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*. Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung. No 49, pp. 20–26.

Heitmeyer, Wilhelm (2018): *Autoritäre Versuchungen. Signaturen der Bedrohung I*. Berlin: Suhrkamp.

Hui, Fang (2019): *Measuring China's Nonprofit Sector*. In: *The Asia Foundation*, 22.05.2019; <https://asiafoundation.org/2019/05/22/measuring-chinas-nonprofit-sector> [01.02.2021].

Huntington, Samuel P. (1991): *Democracy's Third Wave*. In: *Journal of Democracy*. Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 12–34.

Ishkanian, Armine (2007): *Democracy, Promotion and Civil Society*. In: Albrow, Martin/Glasius, Marlies/Anheier, Helmut K./Kaldor, Mary (eds.): *Global Civil Society 2007/8: Communicative Power and Democracy*. London: SAGE, pp. 58–85.

Jing, Yijia (2015): *Between Control and Empowerment: Governmental Strategies towards the Development of the Non-Profit Sector in China*. In: *Asian Studies Review*. Vol. 39, No. 4, pp. 589–608.

Juros, Andrzej/Leś, Ewa/Nałęcz, Sławomir/Rybka, Izabela/Rymsza, Marek/Wygnański, Jan Jakub (2004): *From 'Solidarity' to Subsidiarity: The Nonprofit Sector in Poland*. In: Zimmer, Annette/Priller, Eckhard (eds.): *Future of Civil Society. Making Central European Nonprofit-Organizations Work*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, pp. 557–600.

Kailitz, Steffen/Köllner, Patrick (eds.) (2013): *Autokratien im Vergleich (PVS Sonderheft No. 47)*. Baden-Baden: Nomos.

Keck, Margaret E./Sikkink, Kathryn (1998): *Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics*. Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press.

Knodt, Michèle/Finke, Barbara (eds.) (2005): *Europäische Zivilgesellschaft. Konzepte, Akteure, Strategien*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag.

Kocka, Jürgen (2004): *Civil Society from a Historical Perspective*. In: *European Review*. Vol. 12, No. 1, pp. 65–79.

Kurz, Rudi (2010): *Wie heute solidarisch sein? In: Schnipkoweit, Ivo/Schützhofer, Timm (eds.): Der "neue Sandinismus" in Nicaragua. Autoritärer Selbstbedienungsstaat oder neues Entwicklungsmodell? In: OneWorld Perspectives. Working Papers. No. 2, pp. 61–67.*

Maloney, William A./Deth, Jan W. van (eds.) (2008): *Civil Society and Governance in Europe. From National to International Linkages*. Cheltenham/Northampton: Edward Elgar.

Obuch, Katharina (2017): *Civil Society Organizations in the Hybrid Regime of Nicaragua: Challenging or Maintaining the Status Quo?* Baden-Baden: Nomos.

- O'Donnell, Guillermo A./Schmitter, Phillippe C./Whitehead, Laurence (eds.) (1986): *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. Prospects for Democracy*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- PEW Research Center (2019): *Democracy Has Grown across the World over the Past Four Decades*; https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/05/14/more-than-half-of-countries-are-democratic/ft_17-11-10_demo_auto_map [01.02.2021].
- Putnam, Robert D. (1993): *Making Democracy Work. Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. With Robert Leonardi and Raffaella Y. Nanetti. Princeton/Oxford: Princeton University Press.
- Rovira Kaltwasser, Cristobal/Taggart, Paul/Ochoa Espejo, Paulina/Ostiguy, Pierre (eds.) (2017): *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Rüb, Friedbert W. (2002): *Hybride Regime – Politikwissenschaftliches Chamäleon oder neuer Regimetypus? Begriffliche und konzeptionelle Überlegungen zum neuen Pessimismus in der Transitologie*. In: Bendel, Petra/Croissant, Aurel/ibid. (eds.): *Zwischen Demokratie und Diktatur. Zur Konzeption und Empirie demokratischer Grauzonen*. Opladen: Leske + Budrich, pp. 99–118.
- Rutzen, Douglas (2015): *Civil Society under Assault*. In: *Journal of Democracy*. Vol. 26, No. 4, pp. 28–39.
- Salamon, Lester M. (1994): *The Rise of the Nonprofit Sector*. In: *Foreign Affairs*. Vol. 73, No. 4, pp. 109–122.
- Salamon, Lester M./Anheier, Helmut K./List, Regina/Toepler, Stefan/Sokolowski, S. Wojciech (eds.) (1999): *Global Civil Society. Dimensions of the Nonprofit Sector*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Center for Civil Society Studies.
- Salamon, Lester M./Benevolenski, Vladimir B./Jakobson, Lev I. (2015): *Penetrating the Dual Realities of Government–Nonprofit Relations in Russia*. In: *Voluntas. International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations*. Vol. 26, No. 6, pp. 2178–2214.
- Serra Vázquez, Luis (2011): *Civil Society Index for Nicaragua. Restrictions and the Politicisation of Civic Space: Challenges for Civil Society in Nicaragua*. RNDDL (Red Nicaraguense por la Democracia y el Desarrollo Local). CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation; http://www.civicus.org/images/stories/csi/csi_phase2/nicaragua%20%20acr.pdf [01.02.2021].
- Smith, Barbara (2018): *Polish Civil Society. Adapting to New Pressures. A Report of the CSIS Human Rights Initiative*. CSIS: Center for Strategic and International Studies; https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/181219_PolishCivilSociety.pdf [01.02.2021].
- Szabó, Máté (2004): *Civic Engagement in East-Central Europe*. In: Zimmer, Annette/Priller, Eckhard (eds.): *Future of Civil Society. Making Central European Nonprofit-Organizations Work*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, pp. 77–98.
- Teets, Jessica (2014): *Civil Society under Authoritarianism. The China Model*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Toepler, Stefan/Zimmer, Annette/Fröhlich, Christian/Obuch, Katharina (eds.) (2020): The Changing Space for NGOs: Civil Society in Authoritarian and Hybrid Regimes. Introduction to the Special Issue. In: *Voluntas. International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations*. Vol. 31, No. 4, pp. 649–662.

Walker, Thomas W./Wade, Christine J. (2011): *Nicaragua. Living in the Shadow of the Eagle*. Boulder: Westview Press.

Wang, Weinan/Snape, Holly (2018): Government Service Purchasing from Social Organizations in China: An Overview of the Development of a Powerful Trend. In: *Nonprofit Policy Forum*. Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 1–10.

Wigell, Mikael (2008): Mapping ‘Hybrid Regimes’: Regime Types and Concepts in Comparative Politics. In: *Democratization*. Vol. 15, No. 2, pp. 230–250.

Wolff, Jonas/Poppe, Annika E. (2015): From Closing Space to Contested Spaces. Re-Assessing Current Conflicts over International Civil Society Support (PRIF Report No. 137); <https://www.hsfk.de/en/publications/publication-search/publication/from-closing-space-to-contested-spaces> [01.02.2021].

Zhang, Yuanfeng (2015): Dependent Interdependence: The Complicated Dance of Government–Nonprofit Relations in China. In: *Voluntas. International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations*. Vol. 26, No. 6, pp. 2395–2423.

Zimmer, Annette/Priller, Eckhard (eds.) (2004): *Future of Civil Society. Making Central European Nonprofit-Organizations Work*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag.

Zuk, Piotr (2017): Nation, National Remembrance, and Education – Polish Schools as Factories of Nationalism and Prejudice. In: *Nationalities Papers*. Vol. 46, No. 6, pp. 1046–1062.

About the Authors

Prof. Dr. Annette Zimmer is Full Professor of Social Policy & Comparative Politics at the University of Münster, Germany. She was affiliated with the Program on Nonprofit-Organisations at Yale University, USA, and served as the DAAD Visiting Professor of German and European Studies at the Centre for International Studies of the University of Toronto, Canada, and as a Visiting Researcher at the American Institute for Contemporary Germany Studies in Washington, D.C. Her research focuses on civil society-government relationships and on the role and function of nonprofit-organisations in selected policy fields. She was the President of the International Society for Third Sector Research (ISTR), and she currently serves as a Board Member of select German grant-issuing nonprofit-organisations.

Contact: zimmean[at]uni-muenster.de

Dr. Katharina Obuch, born in 1983, is a research assistant at the Institute of Political Science (IfPol) at the University of Münster. During her PhD she held a scholarship from the Heinrich Böll Foundation and worked as a research assistant in a project on “Gender Relations in Authoritarian Regimes” (2013–2015) at the Centre for European Gender Studies (ZEUGS) and in the European research project “EFESEIIS – Enabling the Flourishing and Evolution of Social Entrepreneurship for Innovative and Inclusive Societies” (2015–2016). From 2016 to 2018 she was project manager of the European research project “FAB-MOVE – For a Better Tomorrow: Social Enterprises on the Move”. Her research interests include civil society and social entrepreneurship, gender relations, and democratisation, with a focus on Latin American countries.

Contact: k.obuch[at]uni-muenster.de

Democratisation through the Backdoor: The Political Impact of ‘Non-Political’ Culture Support

Susann Worschech (Frankfurt (Oder))

Introduction

In 2008, when a group of students and young researchers at Kyiv’s National Mohyla Academy founded a small film club and established an independent research group to combine intellectual and artistic activities, no one would have thought that only a few years later this group would become one of the most progressive and courageous advocates for democracy in Ukraine. Today, there is no doubt that the Visual Culture Research Center (VCRC) is one of the most relevant platforms in Ukraine for fostering democratisation and societal innovation, as well as for providing spaces for political education and critical thinking. Working at the crossroads of arts, research, and activism, the VCRC was a driving force during the Euromaidan Revolution of Dignity in 2013–2014 and later became the organiser of two biennials in Kyiv. In combining arts, philosophical and political thinking, exhibitions, events, and public debates, the VCRC continuously produces critical perspectives, dissent, and visions concerning Ukraine’s democratisation path. In its own perspective, the VCRC “is like radiation, freely covering all open zones of conflict and overcoming the perceived limits of situations” (Mishchenko 2015: 132).

With all due sympathy for an enthusiastically organised cultural centre, the effective contribution of art centres and actors like the VCRC to Ukraine’s democracy remains blurred, as in general the particular role of arts and culture in democratisation processes can still be considered as undertheorised. This stands in sharp contrast to the strong rise of activities and research literature alike on democratisation and its external support as a follow-up to the regime changes in socialist Europe 1989–1991 (cf. Carothers 1999; Burnell 2000; Pridham 2000; Dryzek/Holmes 2002). Based on these debates, there is at least a broad scholarly consensus that civil society – including the sphere of arts and culture – is a crucial actor for securing pluralism and consolidating the conviction that “democracy is the only game in town” (Przeworski 1991: 26; cf. Putnam 1993; Linz/Stepan 1996; Henderson 2002). Democratisation itself is often seen as referring first and foremost to institutions and processes, namely free and fair elections, a multi-party political system and parliamentary democracy, division of powers, effective power to govern, and the like. External democracy promotion

activities of Western states, the European Union, and international organisations have therefore focused for the most part on fostering institutional reforms and supporting civil society organisations campaigning for these reforms as well as for transparency, anti-corruption, and the like (cf. Raik 2006; Youngs 2008; Magen et al. 2009; Lavenex/Schimmelfennig 2011). Meanwhile, the support of arts and culture has remained somewhat separated from the ‘core political’ support (cf. Worschech 2018).

However, arts and culture need to be considered as equally crucial for democracy and democratisation, as the example of the VCRC demonstrates. The question is therefore in what ways and to which degree foreign cultural and educational policy, which is interpreted here as a particular form of external assistance to democratisation focusing on domestic arts and culture actors, can contribute to democratisation processes in transformative settings such as Ukraine and other post-Soviet countries. I will answer this question by exploring and systematising strategies and consequences of external democracy promotion towards civil society in general, and by explaining the particular outcome of arts and culture support in a long-term perspective. I will illustrate my argumentation with findings from arts and culture support in Ukraine. I argue that the huge democratisation potential of foreign cultural and educational policy lies in a particular cooperation mode that forgoes any fixed expectations on political outcomes.

Strategies of External Democracy Promotion & Civil Society Support

In order to find out how foreign education and culture support and, consequently, a vibrant arts and culture sector in a given country may contribute to democratisation processes, it is necessary to define the term *democratisation* itself. Generations of scholars were committed to finding and establishing encompassing definitions and descriptions of democratisation – however, there is no one-size-fits-all definition as democratisation is a continuous, ambivalent, and even non-teleological process (cf. Krastev/Holmes 2018). Opening and closure processes within society, institutions, administrations, and also culture, education, and arts do not follow a clear path, but are contingent, situational, and overlapping. There is at least a minimum definition of what the core features of a democratic system are: Following the concept of polyarchy established by Robert Dahl (1991), a democratic system comprises free, fair, and periodic elections of representatives who effectively exercise political decisions; it further comprises the active and passive right to vote among all adults; and finally, freedom of opinion, information, and assembly. The process of democratisation can

therefore be considered to be a movement towards these characteristics, although democracy is never a stable state but subject to negotiation and contention. Moreover, the very process of that negotiation and contention can be seen as the core of democracy. The American sociologist and historian Charles Tilly argued that “a regime is democratic to the degree that political relations between the state and its citizens feature broad, equal, protected and mutually binding consultation. Democratization means net movement toward broader, more equal, more protected, and more binding consultation” between citizens and the state (Tilly 2007: 13 f.).

Following Tilly, this movement consists of three kinds of processes that alter the relations between citizens and the state in a particular way: first, the integration of social trust networks that are established outside the political sphere into politics; second, the insulation of public politics from categorical inequalities such as race, class, and gender; and third, the transformation or even dissolution of influential though non-elected power networks in order to prevent state capture. These networks might consist of nonstate actors such as oligarchic power, and/or they refer to governmental agents' arbitrary power, for example secret police or military forces who threaten effective governance of elected officials. Consequently, any activity of foreign cultural and educational policy that aims at fostering these processes can be considered supportive of democratisation. In this perspective, external support of arts and culture goes beyond the rather narrow definition of external democracy promotion as “a set of actions of non-domestic actors who intentionally try to overcome authoritarian power by supporting domestic actors who share the same objective” (Beichelt 2012: 2).

Taken together, democratisation that includes arts and culture is about more than overcoming authoritarian power, although that is the crucial target of external democracy promotion. In order to understand how arts and culture support is an inherent part of external democracy promotion, and how both concepts of foreign policies are interlinked, it is necessary to distinguish three core strategies of democracy promotion (cf. Worschech 2018). These strategies differ in their intention towards the core political or rather societal issues as well as in their organisational and administrative approaches. Consequently, they also yield very different results with respect to the target groups, democratisation processes, and altered citizen-state relations.¹

¹ This typology of democratisation strategies is based on empirical work and qualitative typologisation. Data was collected in Ukraine, based on cooperation data from 2010 to 2012. For further information on methods, data, etc., see Worschech 2018.

External Democracy Promotion as Professionalisation

The strategy of professionalisation is an approach that tries to foster political advocacy and reform-oriented organisations that work in a professional manner. Most of these civic organisations are established NGOs, think tanks, and associations, whose core function is the defence of civil rights and freedoms. Most projects that are supported within this perspective focus directly on the political system. For instance, typical actions that are supported include writing draft laws, fighting corruption, analysing foreign policy options, and improving investigative journalism. The funding is usually based on highly competitive calls for applications – which can cause rivalry between civic organisations instead of fostering cooperation. The former is the more likely option, since typical budgets of donors who deploy this approach are rather high, and project periods usually exceed 12 months. Typical representatives of this strategy are international organisations, the EU, development agencies, and democratisation agencies from countries such as the US, Canada, Denmark, or Sweden.

The strategy of democracy promotion via NGO professionalisation is by far the most popular approach among donors to support civil society. It covers the largest part of democratisation activities of Western agencies in post-socialist countries in terms of numbers of supported NGOs and projects, budget and project volumes, and project duration. This large input needs, however, accountability on both the donors' and the receivers' sides, so that further professionalisation of NGOs with respect to book-keeping, project management, evaluation processes, and budget planning is fostered additionally.

External Democracy Promotion as Political Culture Promotion

This strategy usually supports barely-professionalised civic actors who tend to work at the local level. The supported projects and actions usually aim to build a pluralistic culture, foster local ownership, and strengthen democratic socialisation. The projects rarely concentrate on direct political issues. Typical measures within this support perspective are providing assistance for local citizens' initiatives, building civil society networks, and helping to implement local environmental protection projects and the like. Furthermore, the external support of art and culture events such as exhibitions, festivals, publications, hybrid forms of activism and arts, etc., can be located

within this strategy. External democracy promotion as culture support relies much less on competitions and calls, since target agreements, success criteria, and other measures of fixed outcomes are rare or non-existent in this context. While average project budgets in this strategy are rather low and project durations do not exceed 12 months, long-term stable cooperation partnerships between supporters and some civil society organisations beyond single projects are a remarkable feature of this strategy. This allows for the implementation of project series, long-term development of culture networks, and increasing political reflectivity within the culture and arts scene. Typical representatives of this strategy are culture and language institutions such as the British Council, the Goethe-Institut, German political foundations, and some embassies with their own democratisation programmes.

The main target group and the consequences of this strategy differ fundamentally from those of the first strategy, since the ideal type of cooperation partner in civil society would be a citizens' initiative, a group of activists, or other non-formalised actors. As this strategy works with far fewer conditions in terms of budgets and professional project planning, it does not imply 'professional' business relations but rather builds networks of activists, supporters, and organisations. Therefore, organisational and management requirements for grant receivers are lower, paving the way for unconventional and experimental projects without any strict evaluation criteria having to be met.

External Democracy Promotion as 'Public Diplomacy'

A third – and somewhat problematic – strategy of supporting civil society and democratisation can be called 'public diplomacy', since the targets, relevant cooperation partners, and understanding of civil society's role in democratisation processes are not well defined within this strategy. But this blurred approach appears to be systematic, since most representatives who deploy this strategy are no genuine democratisation agents, but embassies whose primary tasks are not to run small democratisation programmes. However, in the case of Ukraine, these programmes help them to improve their visibility and connectedness, as well as their country's image in Ukrainian society. For most civil society organisations, and in particular for art and culture groups, this strategy of support often constitutes a low-threshold opportunity to receive funding for smaller or single projects, as the application procedure is

often rather simple. One might argue that this strategy of democracy promotion via small-scale projects is not very sustainable, but for smaller initiatives this support might be the first step toward broader visibility – or an opportunity to implement innovative and unique ideas.

Given the experimental character of arts and culture, the second and third strategies aim predominantly at smaller or even single projects such as seminars, exhibitions, screenings, and other events. While the professionalisation strategy supports highly political projects of sophisticated NGOs who try to consult, influence, substantiate, and alter policies and political structures, the second and third strategies focus on actors and activities that can be located in the pre-political or intermediate sphere of societal negotiation, debate, education, and contention. Arts and culture activists are some of the core protagonists of this sphere.

Democratising Functions of Civil Society

From the perspective of external democracy promotion aiming to foster the development of democracy in Dahl's sense, it would be obvious to focus any support towards more 'political' actors such as NGOs and think tanks. These organisations engage directly in issues such as campaigning for free and fair elections, election monitoring, demanding transparency in order to secure efficient governance by elected representatives (not veto-players), and defending civil rights and liberties. In that perspective, civic activists mark the sphere of civil society that finds itself in a tradition of liberal thinkers going back to British Enlightenment philosophers such as John Locke: The democratising function of civil society is supposed to defend citizens' rights in the face of a potentially authoritarian state. Those civic actors who might be the core target group of the second and third strategies can be seen differently: Their democratising function does not primarily consist of defending certain rights, but rather of democratic negotiation, debate, and socialisation. This perspective dates back to the French philosopher Alexis de Tocqueville, who described civic associations, initiatives, and non-formalised groups such as neighbourhood actions as the core of a 'school of democracy'. In Tocqueville's tradition, Robert Putnam later asserted the relevance of social capital as the 'glue' of democratic societies in the case of ties and 'bridges' that are built among social groups and across (potential) cleavages. Obviously, the idea of negotiation, contention reflection, and a discourse of 'the political' within the arts and culture sphere is primarily linked to that second perspective. Consequently, foreign

cultural and educational policy as a part of democracy promotion may contribute to altering citizen-state relations by fostering dialogue and critical reflection. Arts, education, and culture therefore open up a space for broader and more equal consultation between those who govern and the governed, while civil society in the first (liberal) perspective focuses on ensuring that these consultations are protected and mutually binding.

Small Input, Big Impact?

The second and third strategies of civil society and democratisation support are based on a more cautious approach that implies working with smaller budgets, supporting less formalised and also more experimental or unconventional projects that are more exposed to the risk of failure, and using less rigid control and evaluation criteria. The style of these cooperation modes aims to form partnerships rather than asymmetric donor-recipient relations. Furthermore, most projects are located in societal 'niches': The support of societal rather than political issues focuses on non-mainstream topics such as environmental and ecological issues, minority rights, urbanism, and conflictive historical revision of the Soviet past, or is structured around community life and local development without any obvious impact on regional or national political or societal levels. The support of arts and culture falls within this strategy, as supported projects mainly thematise these 'niche topics' that are overlooked or even ignored by institutions and mainstream discourses, and projects often consist of individual events that shed light on particular 'niche' questions and problems. At the same time, these activities can be seen as platforms for progressive debates.

If the support of arts and culture and foreign cultural and educational policy are to be perceived as democracy promotion activities, they are forms of democratisation assistance that do not use the term *democratisation*. However, this approach should not be understood as following a 'hidden agenda' of democratisation; the latter is seen rather as a by-product of culture, and this is this strategy's core difference to more political approaches of democracy support. The remaining question here is how this 'by-product' emerges from arts, culture, and education. This process is of course non-linear, non-teleological, and non-predictable, which makes it risky as part of democratisation support. The example of Ukraine provides some illustration of how democratisation may emerge from culture, arts, and education policies.

The Political Relevance of Culture in Ukraine

The Euromaidan is considered a major turning point in the development of independent Ukraine – both politically and socially. Numerous publications and studies have emphasised that civil society in particular has become stronger, broader, and more independent since the major protests that eventually led to a turnaround in foreign policy and renewed domestic transformation (see, for example, the contributions in Shapovalova/Burlyuk 2018). In fact, it is precisely those progressive reform projects that helped Ukraine develop from an opaque, kleptocratic, authoritarian, post-Soviet state into a democratising and increasingly pluralistic transformation society, which is primarily called for and driven by an active civil society. Reform-oriented platforms such as the Reanimation Package of Reforms (RPR) or the NGO Anti-Corruption Action Centre are strong civil society actors that have been crucial in shaping the democratic transformation of Ukraine since the Euromaidan (cf. Worschech 2016). A diversifying arts and culture scene, which also understands itself even more politically than before the Euromaidan, has since critically accompanied the transformation process with increasing creative and political influence.

Euromaidan itself constitutes the place where numerous artistic groups, such as the Art Hundred group and the NGO Congress of Cultural Activists (CCA), have their roots and origins. But many artists and culture groups who are today perceived as very present in society, arts, and culture emerged in the period between the Orange Revolution and the Euromaidan. In particular, the increasingly authoritarian phase under President Yanukovych has to be understood in retrospect as an important founding period for critical artistic initiatives, and thus as a phase of increased politicisation of the arts. In the years 2008 to 2011, protests associated with street art and organised by activists, culture professionals, and young intellectuals took place in Kyiv and other cities in Ukraine.

One of the most important organisations that openly promoted a more political and socially critical orientation of art was the curatorial group Revolutionary Experimental Space (REP), founded in 2004. The artists of the group – Ksenia Hnylytska, Nikita Kadan, Volodymyr Kuznetsov, Zhanna Kadyrova, Lada Nakonechna, and Lesia Khomenko – organised a series of artistic critical events under the title *Interventions*, which took place in the public domain and focused on transformational

societal processes. From the REP, the interdisciplinary curatorial collective Hudrada emerged in 2008. Today, members of the REP, or rather of Hudrada, are among the most active and important artists of Ukraine, and are also present in the nation's political discourse.

The already mentioned Kyiv-based Visual Culture Research Center (VCRC) is another artistic initiative established before the Euromaidan. Founded in 2008 as a platform for artistic, intellectual, and political activism, the VCRC has been one of the central institutions for socially critical artistic events, exhibitions, and series of talks since the Euromaidan. It gained international recognition as a progressive artistic centre of post-Euromaidan Ukraine by being the organiser and implementation agency of the Kyiv Biennial 2015 (The School of Kyiv). The VCRC's executive director, the curator and cultural scholar Vasyl Cherepanyn, is considered one of the most important representatives of the young progressive and political culture scene in Ukraine. Furthermore, Cherepanyn and other artists from the VCRC were among the core activists in the Euromaidan protests.

But although civic activities and also external support are most visible in Kyiv, civic and cultural activism beyond the capital and in particular in Eastern Ukraine are vibrant and have become driving forces for change. Political democracy promotion might have been more difficult here before 2014, given the oligarchic structure and the influence of the Yanukovych clan up until Euromaidan. However, Donetsk happened to be the birthplace of one of today's best-known arts and culture NGOs – Izolyatsia. The organisation was founded in 2010 at a former insulation material factory with the objective of establishing a vibrant arts and culture scene that takes up the industrial heritage of the region. Izolyatsia worked very actively until May 2014, when paramilitaries from the so-called 'Donetsk People's Republic' forced them to flee. After the re-opening of a culture space in Kyiv, Izolyatsia became the most important 'culture institution in exile' and is still working on issues such as war, displacement, participation, and democracy in a variety of projects.

Similar stories can be found in other eastern cities: The Dnipro(petrovsk)-based NGO Kultura Medialna was established in 2005 as a platform for electronic music and culture. In 2013 they turned into an NGO and contributed to Dnipro's Euromaidan protests with audiovisual art. Since then, they have engaged not only in organising

parties, but also in performances, visual art, and urban culture. In Kharkiv, for example, an outstanding rich and vibrant arts and culture scene provided fruitful ground for the Euromaidan protests and helped to defend the city against pro-Russian paramilitary forces.

Since 2014, it can also be witnessed that culture initiatives and organisations have encouraged changes of local participation, culture, and administration. In formerly quite unknown or less noticed cities in Eastern Ukraine that were immediately affected by the war, cultural initiatives and centres were established. These initiatives, such as Platforma TIO in Mariupol, Teplytsia in Sloviansk, and Vilna Khata in Kramatorsk, have contributed to a processing of war and destruction experiences within society and to their potential transformation.

It is important to note that nearly all of these groups were cooperating in projects supported by numerous organisations involved in foreign cultural and educational policy as well as in democracy promotion. Political foundations, embassies, and agencies from Western European countries began supporting festivals, film screenings, exhibitions, public debates, and similar projects long before Euromaidan. It should be clear that this support is not suitable for fostering any kind of ‘regime change’ from without, but without doubt the critical basis that is necessary for striving for democratisation was laid – inter alia – in these projects.

Conclusion

In this article, I have argued that in the external support of arts and culture, democracy promotion should not be perceived as a ‘hidden agenda’; instead, the democratising power of supporting artists, culture projects, and education has become obvious. Democracy promotion that focuses on institutions, processes, free media and information may strengthen civic actors to directly influence politics. By contrast, the strategy of culture support and also the third strategy of building a ‘network of friends’ in a foreign country are expected to open spaces for public debate and critical thinking. As the example of Ukraine underlines, artists and culture activists can become ‘spokespersons’ within protest events without seeking to become part of the political system themselves.

Democracy promotion in this perspective might be problematic for donors and supporters because of the open-ended process of the support: Democracy as a 'result' will never tick any box in a project evaluation sheet. The somewhat untargeted support of arts and culture may set the stage for criticism, public debate, deliberative approaches to politics, and local responsibility or ownership – and thereby, external support may help build a democratic society from within.

References

- Beichelt, Timm (2012): The Research Field of Democracy Promotion. In: *Living Reviews in Democracy*. Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 1–13.
- Burnell, Peter (ed.) (2000): *Democracy Assistance. International Co-Operation for Democratization*. London: Frank Cass.
- Carothers, Thomas (1999): *Aiding Democracy Abroad. The Learning Curve*. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment.
- Dahl, Robert A. (1991): *Democracy and its Critics*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Dryzek, John S./Holmes, Leslie T. (2002): *Post-Communist Democratization. Political Discourses across Thirteen Countries (Theories of Institutional Design)*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Henderson, Sarah L. (2002): *Selling Civil Society. Western Aid and the Nongovernmental Organization Sector in Russia*. In: *Comparative Political Studies*. Vol. 35, No. 2, pp. 139–167.
- Krastev, Ivan/Holmes, Stephen (2018): *Explaining Eastern Europe. Imitation and its Discontents*. In: *Journal of Democracy*. Vol. 29, No. 3, pp. 117–128.
- Lavenex, Sandra/Schimmelfennig, Frank (2011): *EU Democracy Promotion in the Neighbourhood. From Leverage to Governance?* In: *Democratization*. Vol. 18, No. 4, pp. 885–909.
- Linz, Juan J./Stepan, Alfred (1996): *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Magen, Amichai A./Risse, Thomas/McFaul, Michael (eds.) (2009): *Promoting Democracy and the Rule of Law. American and European Strategies*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Mishchenko, Kateryna (ed.) (2015): *The Book of Kyiv. Київська книжка. A Project of the School of Kyiv. Kyiv Biennial 2015*. Kyiv: Medusa.
- Pridham, Geoffrey (2000): *The Dynamics of Democratization. A Comparative Approach*. London/New York: Continuum.

Przeworski, Adam (1991): *Democracy and the Market. Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America (Studies in Rationality and Social Change)*. Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press.

Putnam, Robert D. (1993): *Making Democracy Work. Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. With Robert Leonardi and Raffaella Y. Nanetti. Princeton/Oxford: Princeton University Press.

Raik, Kristi (2006): *Promoting Democracy in the Eastern Neighbourhood – The Limits and Potential of the ENP*. In: *The International Spectator*. Vol. 41, No. 3, pp. 31–45.

Shapovalova, Natalia/Burlyuk, Olga (eds.) (2018): *Civil Society in Post-Euromaidan Ukraine. From Revolution to Consolidation*. Stuttgart: ibidem.

Tilly, Charles (2007): *Democracy*. Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press.

Worschech, Susann (2016): *From Maidan to the Parliament, from Maidan to the Provinces. New Paths for Ukrainian Civil Society*. In: Segert, Dieter (ed.): *Civic Education and Democratisation in the Eastern Partnership Countries*. Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, pp. 98–101.

Worschech, Susann (2018): *Die Herstellung von Zivilgesellschaft. Strategien und Netzwerke der externen Demokratieförderung in der Ukraine*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag.

Youngs, Richard (2008): *Trends in Democracy Assistance. What Has Europe Been Doing?* In: *Journal of Democracy*. Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 160–169.

About the Author

Dr. Susann Worschech is a post-doctoral researcher at the European University Viadrina in Frankfurt (Oder), Germany. Her work focuses on political sociology in Europe, with a particular emphasis on post-socialist societies. She has received numerous awards for her academic work in research and teaching, most recently the 2019 Brandenburg Postdoc Award for outstanding research in the area of the humanities and social sciences.

Contact: [worschech\[at\]europa-uni.de](mailto:worschech[at]europa-uni.de)

Transcending Boundaries through Networks – Locally, Globally¹

Egon Endres (Munich)

Both in Germany and around the world, more and more people are of the impression that social cohesion is at risk and that society and, in a broader sense, the world as a whole are increasingly falling apart (cf. Zick et al. 2011). Even though the term *social cohesion* usually has positive connotations, it is important to keep in mind that increasing group cohesion bears the risk of closing oneself off to the outside: The conformation of norms, values, and models of work and life that is typical of cohesion also requires that a distinction be drawn with regard to others. Taken to an extreme, this can lead to exclusive and xenophobic movements. Cohesion and distinction are therefore two sides of the same coin.

In the Bertelsmann study *Sozialer Zusammenhalt in Deutschland 2017* (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2017), in addition to national solidarity and a focus on the common good, social relationships are also named as constitutive dimensions of a cohesive society (cf. Zick et al. 2011: 25). The sociologist Georg Simmel, a pioneer in network analysis, pointed out in 1890 that the close connection between the forms of communal life and the individuality of people can be represented as a relationship structure: “[...] as a regulative world principle, we have to assume that everything is in some kind of interactive relationship with everything else, that there are forces and reciprocal relationships between every point in the world and every other” (Simmel 1890: 13, translated from the German²). In his analyses of ‘social circles’, Simmel clearly described how networks develop in a multi-grade manner. In other words, network relationships develop on very different levels. Simmel differentiated ‘organic’ from ‘rational circles’ here. The individual is born into organic circles, which include the family and neighbourhoods. Rational circles, on the other hand, are selected and formed by the individual. Quilling et al. (2013: 14) further develop Simmel’s distinction by differentiating between primary, secondary, and tertiary networks. Primary networks refer to personal relationship structures in the circle of the family, the circle

¹ Translated from the German by Kareem James Abu-Zeid.

² “[...] als regulatives Weltprinzip müssen wir annehmen, daß Alles mit Allem in irgend einer Wechselwirkung steht, daß zwischen jedem Punkte der Welt und jedem andern Kräfte und hin- und hergehende Beziehungen bestehen”.

of friends, or the circle of colleagues. Secondary networks such as neighbourhood networks or interest groups are already somewhat organised, but remain largely informal in nature. Finally, tertiary networks are professional relationships between different organisations. They are highly organised and can pertain to social, political, legal, cultural, or economic domains, for example.

Both cultural and educational policy work necessitate exchanges with a large number of stakeholders or actors. The key to this increasingly lies in the establishment of networks, which is to be understood as the third form of organisation between 'hierarchy' (e.g. ministries or associations) and 'market' (e.g. companies) (see Fig. 1). All of these developments have been greatly multiplied by digitisation in both the local and global context.




Fig. 1: Networks as a Third Form of Organisation; source: <http://www.powertopersuade.org.au/blog/cross-sector-collaboration-and-working-how-much-time-do-we-have-to-do-things-right/3/4/2018> [01.02.2021].

The Valorisation of Networks

The importance of networks has increased significantly in recent years – both regionally and internationally. On the international level, there are a large number of networks that target sustainability or corporate social responsibility, for example (see United Nations Global Compact/Bertelsmann Stiftung 2012).

As the complexity and dynamics of markets increase, traditional political arenas and places of decision making are being partially overridden. It is clear that the boundaries between different organisations are gradually shifting or even dissolving. An essential feature of these new forms of organisation is that it is no longer possible to distinguish their inside from their outside. Traditional policy approaches are not yet prepared for these developments.

Effective networks are no magic formula, however; rather, structuring and maintaining them is very demanding. Network cohesion is largely based on dialogue, voluntariness, and consensus. Classic concepts of politics and leadership run up against their limits here. Strategic, regional, and global networks as well as project networks bring their own unpredictable forms of momentum with them. The impression is often given that the formation of cooperative strategic networks per se is a silver bullet that instantly leads to innovations. Here, too little attention is being paid to the amount of personal and organisational expense required to build and continuously maintain network relationships.

Weak Ties and Social Cohesion

Mark Granovetter's study *The Strength of Weak Ties* (1973) focused on the special quality of weak relationships. His classification of relationships as 'strong' or 'weak' is central to a better understanding of networks and the role of the actors therein. *Strong ties* are characterised by close connections, the similarity of the actors involved, and by strengthening through cohesion and identity. *Weak ties*, on the other hand, are based on weak connections, the dissimilarity of the actors involved, and easier access to external resources (see Fig. 2). Weak ties allow you to leave social circles at least temporarily in order to explore new strategies. The disintegration of social distances is often based on weak ties that allow new social relationships to emerge and that reduce prejudices. Gordon W. Allport (1954) described this phenomenon with the hypothesis of intergroup contact. Strong relationships, on the other hand, favour dependencies and can prevent circumscribed neighbourhoods from being abandoned and one's own living environment from being expanded. Despite all the vagueness, the distinction between the two terms – strong vs. weak relationships – provides important insights into social cohesion: Strong relationships support the formation

of communities, while weak relationships enable the cohesion of the overall network. The removal of weak relationships leads to a gradual disintegration of overall social systems, while the reduction of strong relationships only results in a decrease in the size of the network, but not in its breakdown (cf. Avenarius 2010: 107).




Fig. 2: Strong Ties vs. Weak Ties; source: <https://www.headresourcing.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/Weak-ties-visual.png> [14.05.2020].

The Bridging of Network Holes

Actors who enter into relationships with people who are not connected to each other have great importance here. Bridge builders, information brokers, etc. bridge so-called 'structural holes', which Ronald S. Burt (1992) has pointed out (see Fig. 3). Although structural holes are beyond direct measurability, they point to the special possibilities that emerge for those people who bridge them. For actors who are able to connect different social clusters, there are information gains, control benefits,

as well as alternative perspectives and courses of action. At the interorganisational level, the bridging of structural holes also has effective impacts in terms of learning, innovation, and creativity (cf. Scheidegger 2010: 146 ff.). Structural holes can be bridged through strong as well as weak relationships. It is not the degree of relationship strength that is decisive here, but rather the relationship's uniqueness or lack of redundancy. However, maintaining structural holes can also be beneficial for those people who would like to maintain dependencies.




Fig. 3: Structural Holes; source: Burt 1992: 27.

Digitisation and Social Cohesion

As early as 1993, before the extensive changes that took place over the course of digitisation, Robert Putnam spoke of the media as the culprit responsible for the loss of public spirit. But the relationship between digitisation and social cohesion is not that easy to grasp. Digital networking via social media has *increased* the number of social relationships for many people. “This connectivity, the number of followers and Facebook friends, is the new currency in which the popularity of the individual is measured” (Baringhorst 2017: 5, translated from the German). News, including fake news,

is spread quickly through real people and so-called ‘social bots’. Digital networks, in addition to enabling an increase in the possibilities of surveillance and social control, have also allowed solidarity and protest movements to proliferate. New platforms for exchange and networking have emerged on the internet, some of which also encourage civil society engagement. Internet-mediated communication is often accompanied by a withdrawal from analogue communication. New links between one’s real-world social life and one’s digital existence are emerging. All of this is likely having an effect on social cohesion processes. For example, Wallace et al. (2017) examined how information and communication technologies are changing social cohesion in rural communities in Northern Scotland. They demonstrated that the effects of digitisation are very different for different social and cultural groups. At the same time, they presented the great extent to which digitisation has become an integral part of the social relationships of the villages under examination. Khorshed Alam and Sophia Imran were able to establish that refugee migrants in Australia were better able to integrate into society if they had access to digital media. Conversely, a “digital divide” (Alam/Imran 2015) served to increase social inequality.

Successful Components of Network Building

Qualitative structured interviews were conducted with successful networkers from the world of business. These interviews focused on which subjectively relevant criteria of network building and the development of cooperation play a central role for the interviewees. The group of experts consisted of 20 representatives from small, medium-sized, and large companies. The interview partners were or are all active as networkers both in the field of corporate cooperation and in the socio-political arena. In the following, the key findings are summarised as seven successful components (see Endres 2012). To a large extent, the results correspond to the conditions that Hanleybrown et al. (2012), in their concept of *Collective Impact*, consider prerequisites for the interaction of different organisations.

a) Common Goals and Visions

The interview partners see the development of common goals and visions as a central prerequisite for the establishment of networks. The reason for this is that the respective cooperation partners first have to be clear about their own goals. This

initially requires considerable internal coordination within their own organisations. Furthermore, forums that facilitate identifying similarities in the respective goal orientations are necessary. The similarities can also lie in relating complementary knowledge bases or resources to one another.

The experts' analysis demonstrates that the formulation of common goal perspectives often requires support through third parties. One interview partner expressed it as follows: "Info-marketplaces are needed where you can learn something about the goals and competencies of others" (cited in: Endres 2012: 50).³ The respondents see the most far-reaching and most fundamental form of cooperation in the formulation of common future images of cooperation. However, a prerequisite for the joint development of visions is a high degree of strategic capability on the part of one's respective cooperation partner.

b) Willingness and Ability to Change Perspectives

For the experts who were interviewed, another key prerequisite for cooperation is the ability and willingness to take on the perspective of their cooperation partners: "The better you can adapt to others, the easier and more successful the cooperation becomes" (see *ibid.*). Short distances to and a strong presence with the cooperation partner play an important role here.

Perhaps the most important effect of a temporary change of perspective can be seen in becoming aware of the cultural pattern in which both one's own and other people's actions and knowledge are embedded. In order to recognise the systematic framework conditions and socio-cultural peculiarities through which knowledge bases take on a high degree of significance with regard to action, it is necessary not to individualise difficulties and misunderstandings, but to try to classify and understand them from the perspective of one's cooperation partner. This can, for example, relate to the question of which internal organisational problems and which strategic goal conflicts the cooperation partner has.

³ All citations from Endres 2012 are translated from the German.

c) Engaging in Something New

The outcomes and benefits of networks cannot be predicted and planned in detail. Yet this salient risk also harbours opportunities. Indeed, innovation potential in particular can be activated when actors who are, to some extent, from very different worlds cooperate with each other. Cooperation therefore requires the courage and the openness to engage in developments that are not fully defined. However, one should not ignore the danger that the resulting changes will not actually be desirable and therefore that new knowledge will come to be seen as a threat. An important personal cooperation factor comes to light when decisions are made that are intuitive and often not justifiable in rational terms; these decisions therefore go beyond the limits of the known. One interview partner gets to the heart of this matter: “Risk tolerance and a bit of craziness are part of it” (cited in: *ibid.*: 51). This willingness to take risks presupposes the ability to courageously engage in something new and to take action even if the consequences are not entirely foreseeable. The ability to react quickly in order to adapt to the changed situation and to benefit from the expanded possibilities the situation offers is also needed here. Several examples from the discussions with the experts made it clear that structural changes often go hand in hand with the establishment of new networks.

d) Mutual Trust

Successful cooperations are characterised by relationships of mutual trust, in the sense of mutual predictability: “You have to build trust with the other person to establish that you are the right partner” (cited in: *ibid.*). In order for the respective cooperation partners to be able to recognise each other’s resources as well as each other’s goals, critical areas have to be identified and sensitive doors opened, at least in part. There is definitely a risk here that doors that have been opened will be misused. The fears that come with this are some of the most significant obstacles in otherwise promising networks. A sensitive and careful approach by all parties involved is therefore an absolute prerequisite. A relationship of trust is not only necessary at the level of the cooperation partners involved, but also at the respective management level. Trust means less the establishment of an intensive personal relationship, and more that everyone can be sure that their own preliminary work will not be exploited by the other side.

e) There Can Only Be Winners

If one of the cooperation partners has the impression that their counterpart is primarily concerned with their own gain, that cooperation partner will withdraw, as the respondents reported. However, a mere win-win situation is not enough; it is also absolutely necessary for the gains or profits of the respective cooperation partners to be close to the same amount. The question of what gains are and how they should be valued primarily follows subjective and culturally influenced criteria ('culturally' includes organisational culture here). Recognising the respective understandings of the cooperation partners involved requires an intensive search process.

A culture of an exchange economy with transparent mutual benefits is necessary: "A business is only good if it is good for everyone" (cited in: *ibid.*: 52). This is not just about monetary gains; indeed, monetary gains could stand in the way of establishing long-term relationships. Gains can also include access to networks or an improved public image.

f) Reciprocal Communication

Cooperation requires a common language and direct channels of communication. This already identifies an important internal requirement: "Different languages are already spoken within the organisations" (cited in: *ibid.*). The success of network building is thus not least linked to whether it is possible to establish a process of reciprocal communication and understanding. That this is by no means self-evident is shown, among other things, by the fact that even the same terms could have subjectively different meanings. Deviations in meaning can therefore quickly lead to misunderstandings.

g) Regular Maintenance of Contacts

According to the interviewees, in successful networks existing contacts are continuously maintained beyond everyday issues. The fact that communication also exists outside of everyday work is essential for longer-term cooperation: Criticism is more likely to be accepted when it is removed from the everyday pressure to take action; this lower-pressure context also makes it easier to discover scope for possible changes.

Another function of maintaining personal contacts lies in the collection, selection, and conveyance of relevant information. In contrast to public information sources or the internet, networks offer pre-filtered information, which is therefore highly relevant to action, and which in turn saves time and increases efficiency in the utilisation of that information. Close contact with the operational level of one's respective network partners is also perceived as being particularly important: "You have to know both the clerk and the boss at the top" (cited in: *ibid.*). The importance of maintaining personal contacts is signalled as being particularly important in the initial phase of a cooperation; in the later phase, cooperation can also be guaranteed by telephone. Nonetheless, the need to continuously maintain contact remains: "After three to five months, you often have to refresh the contact, otherwise communication problems will gradually emerge" (cited in: *ibid.*).

The Need for Boundary-Transcending Competencies

It is obvious that the boundaries between the various social institutions are becoming more permeable or are gradually shifting. Charles Sabel already spoke, in this context, of a new form of meta-organisation in 1991, which he vividly described as the "Moebius-Strip Organization" (Sabel 1991). In this context, a new type of management or action has been emerging in various social areas for some time, which can be described as boundary-transcending (see Endres 2014). Boundary transcendents (*Grenzgänger*) continuously operate within and between different organisations and social networks and work in a process-oriented manner. This means that their tasks are initially defined primarily through *critical events*, for example in the form of concrete challenges (e.g. integrating refugee migrants into the job market). As a result, boundary transcendents cannot choose which problems are to be solved, but *can* choose the strategies and methods to deal with them, which are in turn always linked to specific cooperation or network partners. The opportunities available to boundary transcendents lie precisely in the fact that – in situations originating with a critical event – they seek out those actors who are most likely to support the finding of solutions. In this way, it is also possible to successfully cope with demanding situations for which there are as yet no formal structures of action in place.

Boundary transmitters can be empirically proven as a phenomenon in very different networks. Gerd Placke distinguishes between institutional and individual boundary transmitters and also points out that the competencies of boundary transmitters largely correspond to the concept of “leading beyond authority”, as formulated by Julia Middleton (cited in: Placke 2012: 216), the founder of Common Purpose. It is a matter of establishing action and taking responsibility beyond the boundaries of formal authority (cf. Middleton 2007: 3 ff.). It thus becomes clear that, at the level of the individual, boundary transmitters in particular have acquired the skills needed to shape relationships and change perspectives.

Conclusion

1. Successful network work goes hand in hand with the ‘management of tensions.’ This includes both interpersonal and interorganisational skills. In the domains of culture and education, it is always a matter of local and global communication processes and the development of common objectives. Networks are not silver bullets, but they offer considerable opportunities that are still far from exhausted in the landscape of cultural and educational policy.
2. The digital transformation is reaching cultural neighbourhoods at high speeds. Neighbourhood platforms such as www.nextdoor.com from San Francisco or www.betreut.de (an offshoot of the Google subsidiary www.care.com) are catching on quite strongly. The path from digital platforms to the utilisation of algorithms is only a very short one. Algorithms know no feelings and cannot become tired. That is both their advantage and their disadvantage.
3. Foreign cultural and educational policy is very networked. In light of the digital transformation, these networks, which have had a positive impact for many years, are running up against their limits. The existing networks need to form new strategic alliances. This could be achieved through cooperation with actors from other domains (e.g. start-ups). One starting point could also be the launching of innovation forums in which promoters of power, promoters of professions, and promoters of process all take part. A more far-reaching measure would be the establishment of intercultural entrepreneur networks that could try to tap innovation potential by bridging network holes.

4. Foreign cultural and educational policy unites a large pool of potential from various institutions and actors. This considerable potential should be harnessed so as not to leave digital transformation in the hands of Amazon, Google, and others.

5. The extensive experience and knowledge potential of intermediary institutions are great treasures that need to be brought together in line with a guarantee of quality. Although – unlike in business – there are no budgets for research and development, the digital transformation should be designed in accordance with an orientation toward the common good. This requires great efforts and strategic alliances on a hitherto unseen scale.

6. To once again get to the heart of the matter: Foreign cultural and educational policy is facing one of its greatest challenges. This requires not an increase in the number of networks, but rather targeted strategic networking and courage among those responsible, especially in politics.

References

Alam, Khorshed/Imran, Sophia (2015): The Digital Divide and Social Inclusion among Refugee Migrants. A Case in Regional Australia. In: *Information Technology & People*. Vol. 28, No. 2, pp. 344–365.

Allport, Gordon W. (1954): *The Nature of Prejudice*. Cambridge, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Avenarius, Christine B. (2010): Starke und schwache Beziehungen. In: Stegbauer, Christian/Häußling, Roger (eds.): *Handbuch Netzwerkforschung*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, pp. 99–111.

Baringhorst, Sigrid (2017): Netzaktivismus – neue Formen der Personalisierung und professionellen Bündelung zivilgesellschaftlichen Engagements. In: *fiph-Journal*. Forschungsinstitut für Philosophie Hannover. Autumn 2017, No. 30, pp. 4–7.

Bertelsmann Stiftung (2017): *Sozialer Zusammenhalt in Deutschland 2017*. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung; <https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/de/publikationen/publikation/did/sozialer-zusammenhalt-in-deutschland-2017> [01.02.2021].

Burt, Ronald S. (1992): *Structural Holes. The Social Structure of Competition*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.


Endres, Egon (2012): Erfolgsbausteine des Netzwerkmanagements. Wann gelingen Netzwerke? In: *Politische Studien*. Vol. 63, No. 445, pp. 48–59.


- Endres, Egon (2014): Von den Freiheiten eines Grenzgängers. In: Clases, Christoph/Dick, Michael/Manser, Tanja/Vollmer, Albert (eds.): Grenzgänge der Arbeitsforschung. Eine Festschrift für Theo Wehner. Lengerich: Pabst Science Publishers, pp. 145–157.
- Granovetter, Mark S. (1973): The Strength of Weak Ties. In: *American Journal of Sociology*. Vol. 78, No. 6, pp. 1360–1380.
- Hanleybrown, Fay/Kania, John/Kramer, Mark (2012): Channeling Change: Making Collective Impact Work. In: *Stanford Social Innovation Review*, pp. 1–8; https://ssir.org/pdf/Channeling_Change_PDF.pdf [01.02.2021].
- Middleton, Julia (2007): *Beyond Authority. Leadership in a Changing World*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Placke, Gerd (2012): “Grenzgänger” und Mittlerorganisationen. In: Wehner, Theo/Gentile, Gian-Claudio (eds.): *Corporate Volunteering. Unternehmen im Spannungsfeld von Effizienz und Ethik*. Wiesbaden: Springer, pp. 203–217.
- Putnam, Robert D. (1993): *Making Democracy Work. Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. With Robert Leonardi and Raffaella Y. Nanetti. Princeton/Oxford: Princeton University Press.
- Quilling, Eike/Nicolini, Hans J./Graf, Christine/Starke, Dagmar (2013): *Praxiswissen Netzwerkarbeit. Gemeinnützige Netzwerke erfolgreich gestalten*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag.
- Sabel, Charles (1991): Moebius-Strip Organizations and Open Labor Markets. Some Consequences of the Reintegration of Conception and Execution in a Volatile Economy. In: Bourdieu, Pierre/Coleman, James S. (eds.): *Social Theory for a Changing Society*. Boulder/New York: Westview Press/Russel Sage Foundation, pp. 23–54.
- Scheidegger, Noline (2010): Strukturelle Löcher. In: Stegbauer, Christian/Häußling, Roger (eds.): *Handbuch Netzwerkforschung*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, pp. 145–155.
- Simmel, Georg (1890): *Über sociale Differenzierung. Sociologische und psychologische Untersuchungen*. Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot.
- United Nations Global Compact/Bertelsmann Stiftung (2012): *A Strategy for the Commons. Business-Driven Networks for Collective Action and Policy Dialogue. The Example of Global Compact Local Networks*. New York/Gütersloh; https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/fileadmin/files/Projekte/ST-BS_A_Strategy_for_the_Commons_Bertelsmann_Stiftung_UNGC.pdf [01.02.2021].
- Wallace, Claire/Vincent, Kathryn/Luguzan, Cristian/Townsend, Leanne/Beel, David (2017): Information Technology and Social Cohesion: A Tale of Two Villages. In: *Journal of Rural Studies*. Vol. 54, pp. 426–434.
- Zick, Andreas/Küpper, Beate/Hövermann, Andreas (2011): *Die Abwertung der Anderen. Eine europäische Zustandsbeschreibung zu Intoleranz, Vorurteilen und Diskriminierung*. Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

About the Author

Prof. Dr. Egon Endres, born in 1960, is a social scientist at the Catholic University of Applied Sciences in Munich, where he also served as President of the University until 2014. Prior to this, Endres worked at the Hamburg-Harburg University of Technology in the field of ergonomics, as well as in organisational and personnel development. His research focuses on the dynamics that exist between different organisations and companies and how networking can be promoted in a targeted manner. To this end, he has carried out empirical studies in the automotive industry, mechanical engineering, and in the domain of not-for-profit organisations. Most recently, Egon Endres examined networks for integrating refugee migrants, including within the framework of a research residency at San Diego State University.


Contact: [egon.endres\[at\]ksh-m.de](mailto:egon.endres@ksh-m.de)





























German Schools Abroad as a Model of Future Cultural Relations? A Look Back on their Historical Development

Dominik Herzner (Hilpoltstein)

With the emergence of the nation-building process in the 19th century, Great Britain, France, and Germany sought to display their power and superiority over the rest of Europe and the world. In order to do so, they exported their language, their culture, and their habits to the rest of the world with the help of schools abroad. These institutions were places of encounter and exchange between different cultures, which had a great influence on both native civilisation and citizens living abroad (cf. Möller 2013). Compared to other countries, Germany has one of the best-organised school systems abroad, and its schools function as places of transnational education (cf. Herzner 2018).

According to the Bundesverwaltungsamt (Federal Office of Administration), Germany runs 142 schools worldwide with 82,000 pupils, 1,323 teachers, delegated by the federal states (*Bundesländer*), work abroad, partly following a German curriculum and applying their teaching methods and their ideals of education, which can sometimes be completely different from those of the school system of the host country. In this case, two different ideals of education come up against each other in a single place and mingle to form a conglomerate of knowledge.

Nowadays, the political efforts aimed at supporting such schools are enormous, which can be shown by a few illustrative examples: With 260 million euros in 2013, the budget for schools abroad was one third of the total budget for foreign cultural policy. And in 2015 the German Foreign Ministry spent almost 52 million euros on the new German school in Madrid, which was one of the largest investments in the history of schools abroad (cf. Schröter 2013). In recent years, the political position of the schools abroad as part of foreign cultural policy has been uncontested. Despite the high political and financial significance attributed to these schools by politics, conventional historiography pays very little attention to them, and very little is known about their history (cf. Kuchler 2016: 261).

The schools today are organised as so-called '*Begegnungsschulen*' (encounter schools). The idea behind this concept is a close encounter between different nations, cultures, and languages. Their objective is trans-educational contact. The teachers and pupils

are supposed to benefit from the multicultural setup of the schools. The cultural contact results from the structure of the schools, as they are embedded in the school system of the host country, as well as in the educational system of Germany. Both local children and children of Germans abroad attend classes together, learn together, and are expected to benefit from each other's culture. They can earn a bilingual degree, which allows them to study either in Germany or in the host country. The institutions are led by private associations, organised in line with the law of the host country, but they depend on state subsidies from Germany. Therefore, on the one hand, they always have to ensure good relations with local authorities, government, and society, but also with the administration in Germany.

But how did these schools become such spaces of cultural relations? In order to understand the actual structure, it is necessary to look back on their historical development. The idea to teach children from different nations in one class was always alive in schools abroad, but was interpreted very differently.

School history refers to the micro level of political and cultural relations and fits the idea of transnational contact in all areas (cf. Kaiser 2004). During their history, schools were centres and nodes of foreign colonies and provided information about ideas and environments in which humans became multiple subjects and developed dynamic-hybrid identities (cf. Penny 2016). That means that, for example, teachers were not only teachers. Their goals were not solely focussed on schooling. School staff were also important members of the German community and had to fulfil the political assignments of their home country. Throughout history, they were ambassadors of their nation's language, culture, and political ideas.

Altogether, this interesting historical setup raises the following questions: What was it like in the past? And how did the German schools abroad spread their ideas of education?

The explanations presented in this article are mainly based on German schools in Spain, as this country is one of the best examined in school history (cf. Herzner 2019). First, I will give a short overview of the historical development from the late 19th century until today, and will then conclude with an outlook on German schools abroad as a model of cultural relations.

History of German Schools Abroad

The actual emergence of schools abroad as we know them today took place in the middle of the 19th century, when Germans emigrated because of political, religious, or economic reasons and founded new colonies all around the world. In contrast to older German settlements, they wanted to protect their sense of ‘Germanness’ and founded sports associations, churches, communities, and schools to uphold their national identity. This feeling of ‘being German’ was mainly based on speaking German, but also on cultural stereotypes like beer, brass music, or typical Prussian attitudes such as discipline, order, and precision (cf. *ibid.*: 57). In order to continue to uphold these national sentiments and to pass them on to the next generation, it was necessary to found an educational space. The poor state of the educational system and the high rate of illiteracy in some host countries were further reasons for the German colonies to found their own schools. Since the middle of the 19th century, these institutions were mainly dominated by a Protestant bourgeoisie, as these types of private colleges were very often linked to the church. Pastors, who were sometimes the only academics in the community, were very often involved in their establishment (cf. Herzner 2017a). Moreover, other private associations were linked to the schools, for example the local German sports club. The schools had one thing in common: the protection of the German nation and German culture. For this reason, the German government recognised the political potential of schools abroad and started to support them. In 1878, Chancellor Otto von Bismarck established a special fund for them in the Foreign Ministry. Step by step, the schools became institutions aimed at preserving the national identity.

Up until 1914, almost 700 schools with 360,000 pupils sprung up around the world. Subsidies increased from 75,000 Goldmark in 1878 to 1.1 million in 1914. In addition to the already existing institutions and their adoption of national ideas, the state focussed on founding new schools that propagated German ‘superiority’, so that the struggle for world power was also taught and fostered in the schools (cf. Kuchler 2016: 267). One document that proves the propagandistic nature of these types of schools is the so-called ‘*Geheime Denkschrift*’ from 1914, in which an anonymous author described the structure and the objectives of schools abroad (cf. *ibid.*: 268). Competitive aims and feelings of superiority are clearly discernible in this document. The First World War put an end to the development of the schools, but it didn’t drive out the ideas of ‘Germanness’ and German superiority.

To call these schools backwards would be a mistake. Some schools followed modern pedagogical approaches during the Weimar period. There was a reform impetus that could be seen in *Wandertage* (day hikes for students), parent-teacher associations, and new teaching methods involving teamwork or the emergence of pupil councils, for example. Although one could describe the schools as modern, the protection of ‘Germanness’ and the glorification of German culture in all its aspects was still one of the most important goals for schools abroad (cf. Herzner 2017b).

With that conservative structure, schools were an ideal breeding ground for the National Socialist German Workers’ Party (NSDAP) and their ideas of education and politics. The promise of German superiority made by Hitler was a welcomed ideal in the daily life of many Germans living abroad. By 1934 at the latest, the new Foreign Ministry controlled the dispatch of teachers in a National Socialist sense. Only reliable teaching staff who believed in National Socialist values had the chance to obtain jobs in schools abroad. Some schools adopted the racist curriculum voluntarily, while others did so out of necessity. Jewish pupils were denied access to the schools. Also, books that did not fit the ideology were rejected, and many teachers became leaders of NS organisations abroad – such as the *Hitlerjugend* (Hitler Youth) or the *Bund Deutscher Mädel* (League of German Girls). Once again, institutions were converted into means of propaganda, which specifically targeted the higher society of the host countries, which were expected to be prepared for, and filled with enthusiasm for, the political concepts of Nazi Germany. The idea was to teach the NS ideology to children of influential people, thus prompting society to adopt National Socialist values. Until 1939, the spread of education in a National Socialist manner was carried out across the whole world.

After the end of the Second World War, many schools had to close for a few months after the capitulation. Only in Denmark, Spain, and Chile were they able to maintain their structures (cf. Kuchler 2016: 269). As a consequence of the lost war and the crimes of Nazi Germany, which were then being discovered step by step, schools tried very quickly to avoid any political relation from their host states. One example was the attempt to exclude former chairmen who were in contact with the National Socialist party, and who were now to be removed from the school organisation. But especially in Spain and Chile, the continuity of the personnel was obvious. As soon as new political structures evolved in Germany, the heads of the schools tried to get in contact with the new Foreign Ministry to maintain support and financial aid (cf. Herzner 2019: 177). As a result of this situation, many schools became places for

continuity and continuation. There was a conflict between old and new structures, and between continuity and denazification – not only on the level of the political administration in Germany, but also on the micro level of schools abroad, because staff, parents, structures, and teaching materials were still able to influence the education of the first years of the Federal Republic of Germany.

In 1965 there were 108 schools with more than 50,000 pupils, but there were no clear political strategies or policies pertaining to them (cf. Kuchler 2016: 270). This enormous number of schools caused a massive workload for the Foreign Ministry, and, with the wider political acceptance of the Federal Republic of Germany, the number of schools around the world increased, accompanied by an even greater administrative expense (cf. *ibid.*: 269). In 1968 the Zentralstelle für Auslandsschulwesen (ZfA, the Central Agency for German Schools Abroad) was opened as a branch of the Foreign Ministry to take care of the administration of schools and cultural policies. From the beginning, the ZfA demonstrated its position of power – for instance, when development funds were used to impose the aims of foreign policies and to convert the ZfA's plans into reality. Concomitant with the new department, innovative policies were developed, which exerted considerable influence on the discourse surrounding schools abroad.

After Willy Brandt, member of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), became Foreign Minister, a new idea was substantiated: the so-called '*Begegnungsschule*', where the main target was a more intense encounter between pupils from Germany and the host country. The objective of schools was now closer integration between different countries and no longer the idea of 'Propaganda' that was used in former times. Schools were expected to export the cultural habitus of Germany in all its facets, and, at the same time, school staff were expected to learn from the host nations' cultural environment. Furthermore, schools were supposed to open themselves to lower social classes, for example, by providing grants or reducing fees in order to increase the number of final exams taken by intelligent pupils from all kinds of backgrounds. A change in the social composition of the students was one of the main targets of the SPD government. Talent, not money, was now supposed to regulate access to schools. The children were supposed to not only receive both a bilingual and bicultural education, but also, for the first time since the Second World War, children from two different countries were to be taught in the same classroom. In comparison to the situation of schools over the last few decades, the *Begegnungsschule* was a new concept, one that included a new social, cultural, political, and educational philosophy.

This structural change was accompanied by many discussions between school associations and the Zentralstelle in Germany. Some schools had to close completely, while others had to change their admission rules if they wanted to maintain state subsidies. The government in Bonn wanted to limit access to secondary schools by selecting the most able Spanish students. If they were not gifted enough, they were not allowed to go to primary school anymore, because the Zentralstelle held the opinion that a diagnostic evaluation of their bilingual capacity was not appropriate at that young age. Therefore, selection was necessary. For the parents whose children failed, this structural change meant that they were not allowed to send their kids to the German school, and led to frustration. Some associations were also upset because they lost important clients; they therefore refused Bonn's orders. At the end of the 80s, only a few schools in the Iberian countries and in the Middle East carried on the original plans of the reform, while all others had to make adjustments and created various subgroups of this model. However, this new concept of education and its variations included the notion of closer cultural contact and exchange between children from different countries.

German Schools Abroad as a Model of Future Cultural Relations?

As already described, the idea of encounter (*Begegnung*) did not immediately work well. In some regions, this was because of space limitations. In Tokyo, for example, the school couldn't accept all registrations because the building could only take 400 pupils (cf. Günther 2016: 301). Japanese children or those with a different nationality could not matriculate for a while; an encounter in the meaning of national equality was not possible in places where only German students attended the schools.

Integration of children from a different culture was also a problem. Although they attended classes together, children very often stayed in their own social and national peer groups. In Lisbon, for example, the teachers complained about this limited aspect of encounter (cf. Frank 1995: 349). In Bonn, however, the enthusiasm for the new concept remained unbroken. For the first time in history, the ZfA was enforcing a clear policy to convert its political ideas into a fertile cultural programme. The German government increased its positive influence on the cultural and educational system abroad and used its position to strengthen transregional and global relations.

Students who once attended a German school were supposed to have a closer emotional connection to Germany, which was assumed to have a direct effect on politics, the economy, and cultural relations. Schools were expected not only to teach the language, but also to foster interaction and good relations between the pupils, as well as an emotional connection to Germany. But did this idea actually work in reality?

A survey from 2017 taken by the author with former students from the German school in Gran Canaria confirms this assumption. The majority of the 22 participants recalled that they had close contact with children from the other country. They reported very good relations with children from the other country, although the school did not enforce such relations. Three former students emphasised particularly that they gained a lot from the cultural exchange. The school was described as liberal, free, and modern. It was accepted in the Spanish society and was a model for other institutions. 100 per cent of the former students stated that they would visit the German school again. 96 per cent thought that they had learned the other language soundly. The same percentage said that they had built up strong connections with the other country as part of the cultural exchange. They named things like study, business, work, culture, friends, and family. Some people even found their spouse in these cultural exchanges.

It is remarkable that all of the participants of this small survey confirmed the idea of tolerance, which is included in the concept of the encounter. One said that he/she recognised people from other German schools around the world because they are all open-minded.

The following summary of chosen locations to study from former students of the German School in Las Palmas results in a similar impression. Between 32.5 per cent and 42.5 per cent began studying in Germany in any given school year. That proves a close connection to the country.

Year of School Exit Examination	1998	1999	2000	Year of School Exit Examination	1998	1999	2000
Number of High School Graduates	40	35	35		40	35	35
Study Locations				Courses			
Berlin	2	2	1	Architecture	2	0	1
Hamburg	1	0	2	Biology	3	1	1
Heidelberg	1	1	0	Computer Science	1	2	3
Karlsruhe	4	1	1	Engineering Sciences	10	8	5
Lübeck	0	1	0	Medicine	2	2	2
Munich	1	7	4	Physics	0	1	0
Münster/Madrid	1	3	0	Mathematics	0	0	1
Ravensburg	0	1	0	Veterinary Medicine	0	0	2
Reutlingen/Madrid	1	0	0	Nursing	0	0	1
Stuttgart	3	0	3	Physiotherapy	1	0	0
Cologne	0	0	1	Business Administration	10	8	6
Zurich	0	0	1	Interpreting	4	1	2
USA	0	0	1	German Studies	0	2	0
Barcelona	0	3	1	History Studies	0	1	1
Madrid	5	1	6	Journalism	2	0	1
Salamanca	1	0	0	Legal Studies	3	1	4
Zaragoza	0	1	0	Music	0	1	0
Pamplona	0	0	1	Pedagogy	0	1	1
La Laguna	1	1	1	Political Science	0	1	0
Las Palmas	18	11	10	Tourism Studies	0	5	2
Great Britain	0	1	1	Insurance Studies	2	0	1
Studies in Germany							
Of these, Spanish or German/Spanish Nationality	10	12	8				

Table 1: Summary of Chosen Locations to Study from Former Students of the German School in Las Palmas, Gran Canaria, Spain; source: Dominik Herzner.

This could, of course, merely represent the unique experience of a single school. However, the survey shows the potential of German schools abroad and their ideas of tolerance, cultural contact, and transnational education.

German schools abroad can be a future model of cultural exchange, as they guarantee transnational education and close contact between pupils and teachers from different countries. But a look back on the history shows that this should not be taken for granted. Important challenging circumstances, frictions, and conflicts impacted school history and can today reveal the influence of global historical events and political decisions on the micro level of a single institution located in a binational and bilingual setting. Schools abroad had to find their place in various diametric patterns. They were situated between denominational, political, national, and educational poles and had to define their own space. The discussion about the alleged ban of Christmas songs in the German School in Istanbul in winter 2016 is one recent example for a denominational pattern and shows the current significance of cultural contact (cf. Herzner 2019: 9). Because of their bipolar character, the schools had to position their point of view between the different cultures, nations, and educational systems. The schools are deeply connected to the nation-state paradigm and are places of cultural homogenisation, but they also face everyday problems of education like bilingualism or multilingualism in the context of social hierarchy (cf. Küppers et al. 2016: 17). German schools are representative of the social life of German communities living abroad, and they show their connection to other countries, regions, and social groups. They have developed from conservative strongholds of the former nation state into intercultural, innovative, and progressive educational settings.

But it is still necessary to take a critical look at the schools abroad. The idea of encounter as it is put into practise nowadays is a new one and is sometimes still one-dimensional. A recent study on German schools in Africa proved that the German culture is the dominant one there and that the intercultural contact is limited to the school's lessons (cf. Paulus 2011: 27). A historical look back might demonstrate that transnational education in German schools did not necessarily mean equal education in the sense of encounter as partnership. How this partnership is practised in today's reality could be an interesting field for further investigations.

References

Frank, Claus G. (1995): Schulreformen an deutschen Auslandsschulen. Dargestellt an der Einführung der neuen Sekundarstufe an der Deutschen Schule Lissabon (Sozialwissenschaftliche Studien zu internationalen Problemen No. 193). Saarbrücken: Breitenbach.

Günther, Sven (2016): Viele Lebenswelten, eine Schule? Die Deutsche Schule Tokyo Yokohama 1904–1991. In: *Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht*. Vol. 67, No. 5/6, pp. 295–303.

Herzner, Dominik (2017a): Kirchenmänner als Schulgründer. Die Entstehung Deutscher Auslandsschulen in Spanien und die Rolle der evangelischen Pastoren. In: *Zeitschrift für Religion und Geistesgeschichte*. Vol. 69, No. 3, pp. 285–289.

Herzner, Dominik (2017b): Zwischen Anspruch und Wirklichkeit. Die Umsetzung der Auswärtigen Kulturpolitik in den Deutschen Auslandsschulen in Spanien zwischen 1918 und 1933. In: Braune, Andreas/Dreyer, Michael (eds.): *Republikanischer Alltag. Die Weimarer Demokratie und die Suche nach Normalität*. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, pp. 321–333.

Herzner, Dominik (2018): A Historical Account of German Schools Abroad as Providers of Transnational Education. In: *Transnational Social Review. A Social Work Journal*. Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 139–154.

Herzner, Dominik (2019): Deutsche Auslandsschulen in Spanien. Auswärtige Kulturpolitik zwischen Konflikt und Kooperation (Historie No. 153). Bielefeld: transcript.

Kaiser, Wolfram (2004): Transnationale Weltgeschichte im Zeichen der Globalisierung. In: Conze, Eckart/Lappenküper, Ulrich/Müller, Guido (eds.): *Geschichte der internationalen Beziehungen. Erneuerung und Erweiterung einer historischen Disziplin*. Cologne: Böhlau, pp. 65–92.

Kuchler, Christian (2016): Deutsche Visitenkarten in der Welt. Geschichte des Auslandsschulwesens als Instrument auswärtiger Kulturpolitik. In: *Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht*. Vol. 67, No. 5/6, pp. 261–271.

Küppers, Almut/Pusch, Barbara/Uyan-Semerci, Pinar (2016): Mapping Out the Transnational Space Between Germany and Turkey. In: *ibid.* (eds.): *Bildung in transnationalen Räumen. Education in Transnational Spaces*. Wiesbaden: Springer, pp. 1–34.

Möller, Esther (2013): Lehrer als Träger der Zivilisierungsmission? Die französischen Schulen im Libanon 1909–1943 als transnationale Bildungsräume aus der Akteursperspektive. In: *ibid.*/ Wischmeyer, Johannes (eds.): *Transnationale Bildungsräume. Wissenstransfers im Schnittfeld von Kultur, Politik und Religion*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, pp. 171–188.

Paulus, Christiane (2011): “Begegnung findet eigentlich nicht statt”. Probleme von Begegnungsschulen im postkolonialen Kontext. In: *Zeitschrift für internationale Bildungsforschung und Entwicklungspädagogik*. Vol. 34, No. 2, pp. 24–29.

Penny, H. Glenn (2016): Knotenpunkte und Netzwerke. Auslandsschulen in Chile, 1880–1960. In: *Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht*. Vol. 67, No. 5/6, pp. 281–294.

Schröter, Karl M. (2013): Palabras de Bienvenida del Consejero de Educación y Cultura de la Embajada de la República Federal de Alemania. In: *Asociación Alexander von Humboldt de España: Relaciones científico-culturales hispano-alemanas*. Vol. 1, pp. 11–17.

About the Author

Dr. Dominik Herzner is a teacher of history and politics and is currently working at a *Gymnasium* in Bavaria, Germany. He studied at the University of Regensburg and received his PhD from the Rheinisch-Westfälische Technische Hochschule (RWTH) Aachen. His research focus is the history of German schools abroad and the didactic principles of teaching history. He also worked for several years as a teacher of German as a foreign language.

Contact: dominik_herzner[at]web.de

The Role of Civil Society in Advancing Digital Literacy for Girls in Indonesia¹

Michael P. Canares (City of Tagbilaran, Bohol, Philippines)

Introduction: Digital Education in Indonesia

Indonesia is not only one of the largest and most populous countries in the world, it is also the fastest-growing country in terms of internet use (cf. Rappler 2017). However, accessing, using, and benefitting from the web is not a privilege that everyone enjoys – women and marginalised sectors of the population have habitually been left behind.

The World Wide Web Foundation’s flagship report on “Women’s Rights Online” notes that the digital gender gap is very high in Indonesia (cf. World Wide Web Foundation 2016: 2). Only 20 per cent of women have access to the internet, though this percentage becomes higher in urban centres as Jakarta. Of those connected, only 26 per cent express their views online, and only 5 per cent find information on the web about their rights. Young women and girls are further disadvantaged, especially since only 52 per cent of the country’s secondary schools are connected to the web.

But instead of supporting early education of students in the field of information and communications technology (ICT), the Indonesian government removed IT education as part of school curricula in July 2013 (cf. Lukman 2014). This move divided several stakeholders in the country, but has nevertheless left the task of digital education to uncoordinated campaigns, programmes, and services (cf. Azali 2017: 11).

Education in Indonesia is generally the responsibility of the national government. The Ministry of Education and Culture (MEC) is mandated to develop, enact, and implement policies and regulations on early childhood education, elementary education, secondary education, and community education affairs. It is also tasked with developing, enacting, and implementing policies and regulations on learning systems

¹ This research was conducted during the time I was still working as Senior Research Manager at the World Wide Web Foundation’s Open Data Lab in Jakarta. I am grateful to the following persons for their contributions to this paper: Debora Irene Christine, Glenn Maail, Dinita Andriani Putri and Louis Susanty, and Nico Sandfuchs and Ekadewi Indrawidjaja of the Goethe-Institut Indonesien.

quality, human resources, education infrastructure, and accessibility of educational services. However, the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MoRA) is responsible for state Islamic schools and regulates religious education in the country. Roughly 16 per cent of the total primary and secondary schools in the country are under the MoRA's jurisdiction. In 2001 education policy and the management of basic education was transferred to district-level governments as part of decentralisation reforms. However, the development of national education policy is still under the purview of the MEC.

Basic education in Indonesia is comprised of primary (grades 1–6) and junior secondary (grades 7–9). Beyond these levels are senior secondary (grades 10–12), and higher education. Most of basic education is publicly funded, although the private sector also plays an important role, accounting for a little more than one-half of the funding of junior secondary levels. Private schools need to comply with the minimum requirements set by the MEC, but also enjoy the freedom to include other subjects. This is why private schools were able to continue teaching information and communications technology, even after the subject was scrapped from the national curriculum in 2013.

The Role of Civil Society Organisations in Promoting Digital Education and Literacy

Given this context, this paper asks the following questions:

1. What is the role of civil society organisations (CSOs) in filling the gap in digital education, particularly for women, in Indonesia?
2. What programmes have been implemented by CSOs to promote digital literacy,² and more specifically for women?
3. How can new digital literacy programmes be designed to address the inherent weaknesses of the current digital literacy programmes in Indonesia?

² Digital literacy is the “ability to use information and communication technologies to find, evaluate, create, and communicate information, requiring both cognitive and technical skills” (American Library Association 2020).

To provide a contextual background to these questions, it is important to discuss the role of civil society in Indonesia's development, and more particularly in advancing educational reform. While some scholars have pointed out that civil society is weak and fragmented in Indonesia (cf. Miichi 2015), its role in the country's reform and development cannot be discounted (cf. Tuijl 2019). This is especially true in the anti-corruption movement (cf. Setiyono/McLeod 2010), in civic participation and government monitoring (cf. Antlöv et al. 2010), in e-participation (cf. Ismail et al. 2017), and in policy-making (cf. Lay 2017), among other areas.

While Indonesian CSOs are not necessarily involved in basic education delivery, they nevertheless influence pro-poor educational policies in the country (cf. MacLaren et al. 2011), albeit sometimes with adverse results (cf. Rosser 2018). In recent years, especially in the area of digital education, civil society organisations have been at the forefront of promoting digital rights (cf. Jurriëns/Tapsell 2017), of advocating for specific issues via digital activism (cf. Suwana 2020), and of implementing digital literacy programmes (cf. Rahmah 2015).

To answer the research questions, an action research project was implemented, which consisted of three phases described in Fig. 1: Understand; Design and Test; and Learn and Reflect. The *Understand* phase gave us a grounded understanding of the relevant issues, actors, and activities in the data literacy³ space. An inventory of CSOs dealing with women's issues and concerns was compiled to map the existing digital literacy interventions in Indonesia. The results were presented in a workshop with select key stakeholders, where the primary issue highlighted was the lack of initiatives focusing on data literacy, especially for girls.

As a result of the *Understand* phase, I, as the researcher, designed a programme that would fit the needs of the context and answer the third research question (pertaining to programme design). With the support of the Goethe-Institut, I designed a programme on data literacy for girls involving schools within the PASCH network

³ Data literacy is the use of "an inquiry-based approach to using data to understand real world phenomena" (Wolff et al. 2016: 9).

(“Schools: Partners for the Future”). The programme was designed with an initial data literacy training for 22 students coming from seven schools across the Jakarta metropolitan area. The focus of the training, which was implemented in August 2018 (the *Design and Test* phase), was the creation of visual outputs using data by the student trainees. For the *Learn and Reflect* phase, a forum on and an exhibit of these outputs from the students were held to culminate the programme. A ‘lessons learned’ process was also conducted to harvest insights from the implementation.



Fig. 1: Action Research Framework; source: Denise Hazel Karunungan.

Mapping of Women’s Organisations

A mapping exercise of women’s organisations in Indonesia, which included the activities of those organisations, was conducted. While not exhaustive, the mapping exercise yielded three key findings.

First, a total of 100 women’s organisations throughout Indonesia, from the national to the grassroots level, were identified, although the list was not comprehensive. Most of the organisations are located in major cities of the country: 27 are in Jakarta, 14 in Yogyakarta, followed by other areas.




Fig. 2: Location of Women's Organisations in Indonesia; source: Debora Irene Christine.

This finding has significant implications. To begin with, it means that digital literacy programmes are mostly confined to key cities and urban centres, and do not necessarily exist in harder-to-reach rural areas. This impacts the ability of the CSOs to reach out to women and girls who need digital training, and conversely, the capacity of women and girls to access the programmes. Furthermore, this contextual reality exacerbates the already existing digital divide between urban and rural areas. It amplifies the differential access to information technology (IT) brought about by weaknesses in IT infrastructure.




Fig. 3: Women CSOs by Issue/Thematic Area; source: Debora Irene Christine.

The second key finding was that there are only very few organisations dealing with IT topics and themes. Organisations were classified according to the issue area they work on (e.g. economic empowerment, democracy, education, women and gender, health, children, etc.) and the types of activity they conduct (e.g. training, advocacy, counselling, research, networking, etc.). 99 of the organisations focus on women and gender issues and other topics such as children, health, and democracy and human rights. However, only five organisations focus on technology issues. In terms of activities, most of the organisations are engaged in advocacy as well as in counselling and training.

This means that digital literacy is an issue not covered by women's organisations, despite the country registering the highest amount of mobile phone usage and the largest number of social media accounts globally, including by women (cf. Burjorjee/Bin-Humam 2018). This explains why women, and especially teenage girls, are experiencing online harassment and threats to privacy in their use of social media accounts. They lack knowledge about their online rights and how to protect themselves from various threats while using the internet (cf. Canares 2018).

The third key finding was that for those few organisations conducting digital literacy programmes, the majority aim their training at women in general, and very few at young women in particular. This lack of digital training contributes to increased vulnerability for young women. While aware of the risks online, they feel powerless and uninformed as to what they can do to protect themselves (cf. *ibid.*).




Fig. 4: ICT Literacy Programs by Audience; source: Debora Irene Christine.

Analysis of ICT Literacy Activities

A review of ICT literacy activities was conducted for the period 2015–2018. Different ICT literacy activities were identified, ranging from shorter seminars to trainings lasting several days. Many of these programmes are location-specific and, echoing the previous finding on the distribution of CSOs focusing on women's issues, the majority of these activities are concentrated in urban centres like Jakarta, Yogyakarta, Surabaya, and Tangerang.




Fig. 5: ICT Literacy Programs 2015–2018; source: Debora Irene Christine.

People who we interviewed from the CSOs focusing on women's issues generally defined digital literacy as involving critical thinking skills and a process of cultural and social understanding, more than as a technical ability. However, several of the programmes mapped above (see Fig. 5) conceive digital literacy as a set of practical skills necessary for online engagement, including how to access information, how to produce content and how to be confident in voicing opinions online. While those skills are essential, empowering women – and men – to critically assess and responsibly create digital media content should not be of lesser importance.

However, it should be noted that several of the initiatives listed above were considered successful in raising the capacity of women with regard to using ICT for different purposes, including economic empowerment and human rights. But the success of community-driven and grassroots digital literacy initiatives in reaching rural areas and marginalised groups should not deflect attention from the government's responsibility to guarantee accessible advanced digital literacy education, especially for young people. Digital literacy education is a long-term activity which requires years of sustained teaching, beyond voluntary, incidental, and sporadic movements.

The “Starting Them Young” Project

Using the above findings, it was found necessary to test approaches in designing digital literacy programmes for female high school students. As indicated earlier, I, as the researcher, was working with World Wide Web Foundation’s Open Data Lab Jakarta during this time, and collaborated with the Goethe-Institut Indonesien to implement the “Starting Them Young” action research project.

A total of 21 students from seven schools across Jakarta and Bandung were targeted for the project. These students were selected by their school heads to participate in the training. To determine training needs, a pre-workshop assessment questionnaire was circulated among these students.

The questionnaire highlighted the need to focus on data literacy and skills, privacy, and the creation of private content as the most relevant knowledge and skills that the students wanted to acquire during the training. In terms of data skills, the students had mid-to-low levels of knowledge with regard to searching, accessing, downloading, and cleaning datasets. Their data visualisation skills also needed improvement, as did the skills involved in creating infographics and narratives based on data.

The training was designed to include the key topics that the students were interested in, and at the same time to focus on building the types of data skills they wanted to learn. Experts in the data science field with the proven ability to train beginners in data skills were invited, including: Mellyana Frederika of Pulse Lab Jakarta, who focused on digital content; Widuri of the Indonesian ICT Partnership (ICT Watch), who focused on data privacy and protection online; Pak Dhe of the provincial government of Aceh, who focused on data skills; and Moerat Sitompul, Manager of Tempo Media Laboratory, who focused on data visualisation.

The training, conducted in August 2018, was aimed at helping the students produce posters that tackled an issue of their choosing, using available data that they were able to gather from online portals and their research. The topics selected by the groups were: mental health; the use of libraries; the history of women’s empowerment in Indonesia; electronic government; violence against women; child labour; and unemployment among university graduates. Each student crafted their main message, researched the data needed, and created a visual infographic that would convey their message to wider audiences.

The process of creating the narrative and visualising the data was divided into two phases. The first phase was creating a dummy visualisation for review and comments from the mentors. Based on the comments, the students revised their initial outputs. Mentors went around the group to check on the progress of the students. During this second phase, mentors directly coached and provided feedback to the participants. Throughout this process, the students worked in groups based on their school affiliation. The following posters were the results of this process:



Fig. 6: Sample of Outputs from the Action Research Project “Starting Them Young”; source: own photographs.

A public forum on data literacy for girls was held at the Goethe-Institut Indonesien on the afternoon of the third day of the training, allowing the students to showcase their results to a broader public. At the same time, public participants discussed the future of data education for girls in Indonesia. Almost 100 participants attended, and key officials from the education and ICT departments of the Indonesian government spoke, in addition to a university professor. The forum emphasised the need for concrete actions to improve the public-school curricula to support digital literacy in Indonesia.

Immediate Results of the Project

There was a significant increase in the knowledge, skills, and attitudes of the students with regards to data literacy. Marked improvement was noted in the following areas:

1. Knowledge: understanding of women's issues; knowing the importance of positive content and how young people can contribute to content creation; and knowledge about privacy and online protection.
2. Skills: searching and locating data sets online; data validation; data cleaning; data processing; data analysis; data visualisation and infographics; and speaking in front of other people and convincing them about one's own ideas.
3. Attitudes: positive attitude towards other people; the capacity to adapt and work within a team; independence, diligence, and thoroughness; patience in looking for data and processing it to achieve quality outputs; discipline; and focus.

A post-training survey was conducted with the students to review their experience of the action research project. The students rated the training very highly in terms of the following areas: appropriateness and relevance of the training content; quality of speakers and moderators; learning methodologies; venue; and support provided by the organisers.

The training, along with the public forum that was held to culminate the training process, brought back into public discussion the importance of data and digital literacy, especially for young people in Indonesia. Forum participants realised that the Indonesian government should start investing in digital literacy for students while they are still quite young. If Indonesia is serious about achieving its ICT goals, then it has to invest in human resources. Other participants highlighted the point that the government should not forget that civil society organisations can only do so much, and that it needs to embrace its mandate in educating the workforce of the 21st century.

Media coverage (twitter and print) for the event was modest but served as a starting point for future discussions. The more significant challenge, now, lies in how to increase traction on the topic and create a significant demand for more extensive public discussion, including among relevant decision makers in the Ministries of Education and ICT in the country.

While the project has been widely considered successful – not only in terms of building the skills of the young girls involved but also in producing quality content on women, women’s issues, and women’s rights – it has faced problems of sustainability. While the government has recognised the need to build data literacy skills among young women and men, it has yet to develop a comprehensive strategy to do so.

Discussion of the Project’s Results

During the research implementation process, three critical points emerged that can help guide the direction of data and digital literacy training in Indonesia.

Firstly, the lack of knowledge and skills pertaining to data and digital literacy, including data protection and privacy, is pervasive, even among girls who are studying in expensive private high schools. There were few data skills among participants and little knowledge about data and the benefits it can deliver. Students were not aware of data protection and privacy issues, despite high social media engagement and the corresponding exposure to privacy risks. However, the girls were very eager to learn about these issues during the training, which for many participants was their first time hearing about the issues and their first opportunity to learn data literacy and online content creation skills. This eagerness on the part of the girls to learn these skills and to apply them was evident in the high quality of the work they produced in the workshop.

Secondly, despite substantial demand, there has been no systematic, strategic effort to address the needs of young women to become more data and digitally literate. While current educational guidelines require schools to incorporate digital literacy into mainstream subjects like math and science (cf. Lukman 2014), many schools have not done so due to a lack of resources. Digital literacy requires investments in infrastructure as well as in the skills of mentors and teachers.

When young girls acquire data skills, they are exposed to opportunities they may not have thought about, and they can also learn more about issues important to them. Before the training was implemented for the action research project, participants were interviewed about their future aspirations. Most pointed to occupations that are often culturally seen as female roles – teaching, pharmacy, nursing – or occupations they hear about from peers – for example, accounting, business, and human

resources. After taking the training and meeting women trainers with careers in technology fields, they began to consider work in data science, software engineering, and computer programming.

Finally, an intentionally designed programme geared towards producing a specific output is an effective strategy for improving digital literacy for girls. The training needs to be well-tailored to the skill levels of the participants. Programmes must also be geared towards producing a specific product on which students can apply the skills they learn. The training should also include incentives so that the process of learning new skills is fun and productive. In this case, because the posters were exhibited publicly, the girls had extra incentive to produce high-quality work. The choice of mentors is also critical – they should not only be experts in their field, but also competent and passionate about teaching young students.

Recommendations for Further Digital Education Training

While one-off training is good for increasing awareness, knowledge, and skills, post-training support is critical to ensure that the girls can continuously apply and improve upon what they learned. When a survey was conducted two months after the action research project, results showed that participants had difficulty carrying out their plans post-training. They had planned to share their knowledge with peers and to continue improving their digital literacy skills, particularly in the area of digital security. But a lack of support and resources precluded them from carrying out these plans. When digital literacy training is merely a one-off programme that is not embedded in formal education curricula, it can hardly be sustainable.

Schools could also play a more active role in building data and digital literacy among girls. The lack of support from schools, the absence of knowledgeable and skilled IT teachers, and the lack of equipment hinders girls from developing their interests and skills in the field. Without more support from schools, the girls will likely forget the knowledge and skills they acquired during the project. Again, without an educational policy mandating digital literacy as a core skill rather than as something taught alongside other subjects, students will not be adequately trained in the skills expected of the citizens of the future.

Firm education policy is critical to ensure that girls can build the digital skills they need to meet the demands and challenges of an information society. Ensuring the sustainability of digital education for girls and boys requires reforms to the country's education policy. While the Ministry of Information and Communication Technology recognises digital literacy as a core pillar in Indonesia's ambition to be a digital nation – and researchers have pointed out the need for changes – the reforms required have yet to take place. And while the government agencies we interacted with within this programme appreciated civil society organisations' efforts to meet digital literacy goals, various stakeholders understand this is not a task CSOs can do on their own. The job demands collaboration across various stakeholders that all support digital literacy.

Finally, this study points to the need for further research to help define future digital literacy interventions for girls in Indonesia. Future programmes should aim to support a revised educational policy that promotes female inclusion in digital and STEM subjects (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) and more digital and data literacy capacity-building programmes for women. The following questions are proposed for future research:

1. How have female and male students performed in data and digital literacy since the school curriculum was revised to include IT education?
2. What is the state of digital and data literacy education in public schools in Indonesia? Is it creating the environment necessary for digital education to thrive?
3. What factors can influence Indonesia's digital education policy to ensure that girls have access to quality digital education?

References

- American Library Association (2020): Digital Literacy; <https://literacy.ala.org/digital-literacy> [01.02.2021].
- Antlöv, Hans/Brinkerhoff, Derick W./Rapp, Elke (2010): Civil Society Capacity Building for Democratic Reform: Experience and Lessons from Indonesia. In: *Voluntas. International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations*. Vol. 21, No. 3, pp. 417–439.
- Azali, Kathleen (2017): Indonesia's Divided Digital Economy. In: *ISEAS Perspective*. No. 70, pp. 1–12; https://www.iseas.edu.sg/images/pdf/ISEAS_Perspective_2017_70.pdf [01.02.2021].
- Burjorjee, Deena M./Bin-Humam, Yasmin (2018): New Insights on Women's Mobile Phone Ownership. CGAP Working Papers; <https://www.cgap.org/sites/default/files/researches/documents/Working-Paper-New-Insights-on-Womens-Mobile-Phone-Ownership-Apr-2018.pdf> [01.02.2021].
- Canares, Michael (2018): Online Privacy: Will They Care? Teenagers Use of Social Media and their Understanding of Privacy Issues in Developing Countries. World Wide Web Foundation; https://webfoundation.org/docs/2018/08/WebFoundationSocialMediaPrivacyReport_Screen.pdf [01.02.2021].
- Indonesia Is Fastest Growing Country for Internet Use. In: *Rappler*, 26.01.2017; <https://rappler.com/world/asia-pacific/internet-social-media-statistics> [01.02.2021].
- Ismail, Ahmad/Hijjang, Pawennari/Munsi, Hardiyanti (2017): Online Social Movement: The Revival of Civil Society in Indonesia. In: *Advances in Social Science, Education and Humanities Research (ASSEHR)*. Vol. 143, pp. 98–100; <https://www.atlantispress.com/proceedings/uicosp-17/25883900> [01.02.2021].
- Jurriëns, Edwin/Tapsell, Ross (2017): Challenges and Opportunities of the Digital 'Revolution' in Indonesia. In: *ibid.* (eds.): *Digital Indonesia. Connectivity and Divergence*. Singapore: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, pp. 1–18.
- Lay, Cornelis (2017): The Emerging of New Democratic Space: CSOs and Parliament in Post-Soeharto Indonesia. In: *Power, Conflict and Democracy Journal*. Vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 1–24.
- Lukman, Enricko (2014): A Dilemma over Indonesia's Curriculum that "Removes" IT Studies in Schools. In: *Tech in Asia*, 19.03.2014; <https://www.techinasia.com/dilemma-indonesias-curriculum-removes-studies-schools> [01.02.2021].
- MacLaren, Laurel/Surya Putra, Alam/Rahman, Erman (2011): How Civil Society Organizations Work Politically to Promote Pro-Poor Policies in Decentralized Indonesian Cities. In: *The Asia Foundation. Occasional Paper No. 6*; <https://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/OccasionalPaperWorkingPoliticallyinIndonesiancitiesJune2011.pdf> [01.12.2020].
- Miichi, Ken (2015): Democratization and the Changing Role of Civil Society in Indonesia, 13.10.2015; <https://www.mei.edu/publications/democratization-and-changing-role-civil-society-indonesia> [01.02.2021].

Rahmah, Amalia (2015): Digital Literacy Learning System for Indonesian Citizen. In: Promedia Computer Science. Vol. 72, pp. 94–101.

Rosser, Andrew (2018): Beyond Access: Making Indonesia's Education System Work, 21.02.2018; <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/beyond-access-making-indonesia-s-education-system-work#sec34446> [01.02.2021].

Setiyono, Budi/McLeod, Ross H. (2010): Civil Society Organisations' Contribution to the Anti-Corruption Movement in Indonesia. In: Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies. Vol. 46, No. 3, pp. 347–370.

Suwana, Fiona (2020): What Motivates Digital Activism? The Case of the Save KPK Movement in Indonesia. In: Information, Communication & Society. Vol. 23, No. 9, pp. 1295–1310.

Tuijl, Peter van (2019): Indonesian Civil Society: Struggling to Survive. In: Peace Policy, 20.03.2019; <https://peacepolicy.nd.edu/2019/03/20/indonesian-civil-society-struggling-to-survive> [01.02.2021].

Wolff, Annika/Gooch, Daniel/Cavero Montaner, Jose J./Rashid, Umar/Kortuem, Gerd (2016): Creating an Understanding of Data Literacy for a Data-Driven Society. The Journal of Community Informatics. Vol. 12, No. 3, pp. 9–26.

World Wide Web Foundation (2016): Women's Rights Online. Report Card Indonesia. Measuring Progress, Driving Action; http://webfoundation.org/docs/2016/09/WF_GR_Indonesia.pdf [01.02.2021].

About the Author

Michael P. Canares has 23 years of experience in development work, primarily in research, results measurement, data for development, and adaptive management. He has proven expertise in developing and implementing research projects that use a combination of both quantitative and qualitative approaches and in developing robust monitoring and evaluation (M&E) frameworks and systems that document and analyse the results of development interventions. His recent work has been on designing data for development projects to achieve social, political, and economic outcomes. He is currently a strategy adviser with Step Up Consulting and is a consultant for various development organisations, including the GIZ, the United Nations Development Programme, and the Asian Development Bank.

Contact: [mikocanares\[at\]stepupconsultants.com](mailto:mikocanares@stepupconsultants.com)

The Potential of Academic Exchange within Foreign Cultural and Educational Policy: Focusing on the Development of Country Images

Manuela Sato-Prinz (Tokyo)

Introduction

This paper sheds light on the link between two core aspects of modern German foreign cultural and educational policy: academic exchange in terms of science diplomacy on the one hand, and country images on the other hand. After clarifying the term *country image* and its role within foreign cultural and educational policy, I try to show how study-abroad experiences may influence the formation of country images, based on the findings of a longitudinal research project surveying the images of Germany held by Japanese exchange students. Finally, I highlight some strategic measures that could facilitate the development of positive but realistic images of Germany during study-abroad experiences.

What Are Country Images and What Is Their Role within Foreign Cultural and Educational Policy?

A joint petition submitted by the CDU/CSU and the SPD parliamentary groups in January 2020, which was later approved by the German Federal Parliament, states that “conveying a future-oriented, cosmopolitan, and living image of Germany and its cultural and scientific landscape” (Brinkhaus et al. 2020: 1, translated from the German) is a traditional element of German foreign cultural and educational policy. The German Federal Government’s 2018 annual report on foreign cultural and educational policy goes a bit more into detail and describes images of Germany as an important pillar of the German Federal Foreign Office’s communication strategy (cf. Auswärtiges Amt 2018: 117). The objectives that lie behind the wish to convey a positive but “realistic” (ibid.: 30, translated from the German) image of Germany to the world are manifold: Images of Germany are supposed to raise interest in the country among persons abroad, to foster positive attitudes towards Germany that allow for international collaboration, to deepen trust in Germany’s political decisions, or to prevent the spread of fake news (cf. ibid.: 117).

When talking about “conveying” (Brinkhaus et al. 2020: 1, own translation), country images are examined from an active point of view which suggests that the way a country is perceived can actively be cultivated by the representatives of that country. Such kinds of activities have long been one of the main tasks of cultural mediator organisations like the Goethe-Institut, or image campaigns like “Research in Germany”, carried out by the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD). However, this is just one side of the term *country image*. Apart from the active side, there is also a passive, perceptive approach to country images that deals with the question of how individuals perceive a country and its people. From this perspective, country images are considered to be automatically evocative in people’s minds – regardless of whether or not they are influenced by cultural mediator organisations.

Country images can be described as patterns of intercultural perception. From a socio-psychological point of view, country images belong to the category of attitude. Apart from images, the term *attitude* comprises other categories of perception, like stereotypes and prejudices, as well. When using this term, one must also mention that the distinction between these sub-categories is not always clear (cf. Löschmann 1998: 21), and there is no commonly shared definition of either attitude (cf. Zhang 2019: 21 ff.) or country image (cf. Sato-Prinz 2017: 21 f.). In my research, I followed the definition of Martin Löschmann (1998: 21 f.), who defines country images as complex imaginations that consist of both individual components like emotions, assumptions, or personal experiences, and components commonly shared by a group of people, such as stereotypes. Hence, one can assume that country images behave, to some extent, like (national) stereotypes. Correll et al. (2010: 46) define stereotypes as “category-based generalizations that link category members to typical attributes”. They are not necessarily negative but rather neutral, since they fulfil important functions for human cognition and for groups in general. They help foster groups (not only those defined by nation) by assigning (usually) quite negative attributes to members of the outgroup and (usually) quite positive attributes to insiders (cf. Tajfel/Turner 1979; Schneider 2004: 264). Moreover, they operate like mental categories that help us filter our diverse perceptions, and that are handed down from generation to generation (cf. Allport 1966: 173; Schneider 2004: 170 f.). Still, due to their individual components, country images tend to be more flexible and can be modified more easily than national stereotypes themselves (cf. Löschmann 1998: 22). This makes them susceptible to efforts to influence the formation of the images held by individuals.

According to one of its most widely shared definitions in social psychology, attitude comprises three components (cf. Rosenberg/Hovland 1960), and there is reason to assume that the same components are available within country images as well (cf. Sato-Prinz 2017: 68 f., 242 f.; Grünewald et al. 2020: 688): cognition or content, affective-emotional evaluation, and behaviour or competencies. Cognition or content describes the proposition of a statement (e.g. “Germans are punctual”), while affective-emotional evaluation describes whether the respective content is perceived in a positive or negative way (e.g. being punctual can be regarded as a positive characteristic, but it can also be regarded as a negative aspect, especially if connected with the attribution *too* – too punctual), and the evaluation may even change within the same person depending on one’s mood, the circumstances, etc. (cf. Riehl 2000: 143; Schneider 2004: 316 f.). The behavioural component includes aspects like how people utter their images (e.g. a statement like “all Germans are punctual” would be rather overgeneralising, while “many Germans tend to be punctual” is a more differentiated way to express the same image), whether they start to re-categorise the groups the stereotypes originally referred to, or whether they even become aware of their automated stereotypical thinking.

To sum up, country images (here: images of Germany) and the attempt to influence them in a favourable way are important aspects of Germany’s foreign cultural and educational policy. Apart from being conveyed, country images exist in the individuals’ minds. In this sense, one can categorise country images as an attitude toward a country and its people. Country images consist both of elements shared by groups, like national stereotypes, and of individual aspects like experiences or emotions, and they should be analysed in terms of their content, by considering their affective-emotional components and the way they are communicated by individuals.

What Are the Links between Academic Exchange and Country Images?

Academic exchange is one of the most important measures within German science diplomacy (cf. Auswärtiges Amt 2018: 170), and student exchange programmes and other opportunities for study abroad have become a core component of educational policy. This is most obvious if one considers that organisations like the German

Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) spend millions to support both international students who wish to study in Germany and students in Germany who wish to study abroad (see e.g. DAAD 2020).

But what is the connection between academic exchange and country images? On the one hand, study-abroad programmes and the like, which allow people to go abroad for part of their education, are regarded as an opportunity to increase contacts and interactions with people from other countries. Contact, on the other hand, has been proven to have the potential to change attitudes and images that members of one group have about members of another group. This potential was described first in the so-called 'Intergroup Contact Hypothesis' by Gordon W. Allport in 1954, and it states that prejudices under certain conditions can be diminished through intergroup contact. Thomas F. Pettigrew (1998) re-defined Allport's hypothesis by explaining how intergroup contact ideally changes attitude through three stages: first, a state of de-categorisation in which the interacting persons recognise each other as individuals; second, a state of salient categorisation in which, after having had positive experiences, the individuals are reminded of their belonging to different groups. And finally, Pettigrew assumes that the interacting persons then transfer their positive emotions to the (cultural) group of the others, which marks the beginning of a third and final stage of re-categorisation in which a new sense of a unified group is established. Given these stages as well as the conditions mentioned by Allport, it appears that not every kind of contact has the potential to influence country images. The kind of contact that is actively sought by the individuals themselves, and which requires collaboration with members of the other group in order to reach a common objective, has the highest potential to mutually influence perceptions (cf. Allport 1966: 276). Academic exchange programmes in which students become part of the host universities for a few semesters are likely to enable such high-potential contact (cf. Koester 1985: 60).

There are a large number of scholarly studies available that explore how academic exchange can influence intercultural learning and the perceptions of one's host country (mostly focusing on students or researchers staying abroad). However, the results of such studies differ considerably: While some researchers could find no change to the host country images, others found that they became worse, and others still provided proof of changes for the better (cf. Sato-Prinz 2017: 37 ff.). Apart from several supposable intervening factors, two of the main reasons for the differing results could lie in the various research designs and in a lack of differentiation between the three components of country images (see above). In most cases, the three components

were not even reflected on, and therefore it is difficult to compare the various studies and their outcomes. This is why I launched a research project (Sato-Prinz 2017) that should (1) be sensitive to the three components of country images and (2) realise the research design that would seem to deliver the most significant results: a longitudinal study with a comparison group (cf. *ibid.*: 62). Addressing the points mentioned above, my research was guided by the question of whether Japanese exchange students' impressions of Germany change during an exchange study-abroad stay in Germany. I assumed that there would be changes in the content of, the handling of, and the attitudes related to the images. In order to provide a more differentiated and, thus, more comprehensive analysis of the images, these three aspects were examined separately. The study was conducted among 80 Japanese exchange students in Germany and a group of 30 fellow students back home in Japan. The students were surveyed three times during one year using questionnaires and structured interviews, while the first point of data collection was prior to their departure to Germany. The study delivered both qualitative and quantitative data that was analysed and triangulated (cf. *ibid.*: 73 ff.).

A look into the findings of my research project reveals that changes could be observed in all three components of country images; however, the changes did not necessarily correlate to each other. Looking at the content side of country images, we see that the main finding suggests that stereotypical components of one's country image remain in place, but individual components are added to these components. For instance, throughout the whole study, *beer* and *sausages* – two very stereotypical things – were associated with Germany the most. At the same time, during the stays abroad 80 per cent of all associations were individual associations named by only one person (cf. *ibid.*: 101). Furthermore, *punctual* and *serious*, which are very typical stereotypes of Germans held by Japanese persons, remained important adjectives mentioned throughout the whole stay abroad. However, 75 per cent of the other traits associated with Germans changed and renewed, and the exchange students even started questioning the suitability of the remaining 25 per cent of adjectives that were constantly mentioned (cf. *ibid.*: 178 f.). These results are in line with research findings based on association experiments, such as those performed in psychology or cognitive semantics. These experiments suggest that word associations contain both associations shared by a very large majority of persons and also individual associations. The shared associations remain in place, but personal experiences add individual connotations and, in this way, diversify the overall associations (cf. Ait Ramdan 2013). Student exchange offers the opportunity to add new and individual

components to one's country image, and by doing so it increases the likelihood that stereotypical components are less frequently evoked when talking about a certain country (cf. Ertelt-Vieth 2005: 171). However, stereotypical content is not erased. It remains available – even if it might not be actively used anymore – and its evaluation may change over time (cf. Zhang 2019: 311 f.; Grünewald et al. 2020: 686). Therefore, my research suggests that we should regard country images as dynamic patterns of thoughts that are constantly amended, rather than as static, stable images (cf. Sato-Prinz 2017: 231 ff.; see also Roche 2016: 161 f.). Depending on the context, various aspects of one's country image can be activated or suppressed at a certain point of time (see also Schneider 2004: 316 f.).

In terms of the affective-emotional component of country images, my research yielded the result that the very positive connotations which the Japanese exchange students had prior to their stays in Germany were neutralised by the experience abroad. Most interestingly, it was the case that positive emotions towards Germans slightly increased during their stay abroad; however, at the same time, negative emotions that had tended to be rejected before the students headed off to Germany became more and more acceptable (cf. Sato-Prinz 2017: 117). This appears to be in-line with various theories like the U-curve model by Sverre Lysgaard (1955), the Culture Shock Hypothesis by Kalervo Oberg (1960), or the stages of the Development Model of Intercultural Sensitivity by Milton J. Bennett (1993), which describe cultural adaption as a parabolic development that leads to negative attitudes before an improvement of the attitudes can happen. Though the attitudes became more negative, the qualitative data suggested that many students themselves tended to perceive this development as an enriching experience in the sense that they had encountered the *real* Germany, and that they had gained new, more realistic insights into their host country. Also, the wish to have further professional connections to Germany in the future rose significantly at the end of the study-abroad stay, despite the slight increase in negative emotions. However, there was also reason to assume that students who had not experienced any prior exposure to Germany, Germans, or the German language may have the tendency to return to their home country before their affective-emotional attitudes start to recover (cf. Sato-Prinz 2017: 217 ff.).

As for the behavioural aspects, I observed, following the concept of linguistic stereotypes (cf. Quasthoff 1973; Riehl 2000), how the exchange students talked about their host country. Surprisingly, the exchange students tended to utter their images less carefully at the end of their study-abroad experience than they had done before their

departure and after one semester abroad (cf. Sato-Prinz 2017: 122 ff.): While, on the one hand, students who marked their statements as limited in terms of suitability to all Germans amounted to more than 70 per cent during the stay abroad, this ratio dropped to approximately 50 per cent at the end of their stay, and the number of students who used the strategy to label their statements as their own opinions decreased from approximately 40 per cent during the stay abroad to less than 20 per cent prior to their return to Japan. Students using generalised statements, on the other hand, remained high at 80 per cent throughout the whole study. This finding gives reason to assume that the students may take their study-abroad experience as a legitimation to make 'true' statements about Germany and the Germans. Moreover, the interview study revealed that the exchange students started to question the validity of static group designations like *the Germans* and *the Japanese* because they appeared insufficient to describe German and Japanese people, and also their own identities (cf. *ibid.*: 203 ff.).

To conclude, my research provides evidence that country images are susceptible to change through a contact experience like student exchange in all three aspects of the three-components model. Study-abroad experiences can diversify existing images and add individual aspects, and, by doing so, broaden the perspectives on a host country like Germany, to the disadvantage of merely stereotypical images. Under certain conditions, students will return to their home countries with a stronger emotional relationship to Germany that is based on a more realistic view of their host country. However, there is the risk that students will overgeneralise their experiences and will reason that they can now make 'true' statements about Germany and Germans. It also became obvious that changes in the three components do not depend on each other, e.g. positive changes in terms of contents do not necessarily go in parallel with positive emotions or an improvement in how country images are handled.

How Can Cultural Mediator Organisations and Universities Support a Favourable Development of Country Images during Academic Exchange?

One of the motivations of my study was the question of how the development of country images held by students participating in a student exchange programme can be supported in such a way that the objective of the foreign cultural and educational policy – i.e. spreading positive but realistic images of Germany – is met. My research suggests three areas of activities:

- design of exchange programmes in terms of the length
- integration into the host institution
- offers for preparation, guidance, and wrap-up of student exchange experiences.

When seen from an international perspective, the trend within study exchange programmes is moving towards short-term programmes – some even as short as one week – and there are research findings showing that short-term programmes can result in positive intercultural learning effects (e.g. Ertelt-Vieth 2005). However, there is evidence that a stay of at least three months and up to 12 months is likely to be regarded as most effective by the sojourners (cf. Koester 1985: 60 f.; Sato-Prinz 2011: 196 ff.). My research project even suggests that a stay abroad should last more than one semester, for the reason that a longer stay may increase the possibility that students suffering from culture shock can recover from it before their return, which improves their host country images' affective-emotional components (cf. Sato-Prinz 2017: 181 ff.).

Various aspects of the participants' images of Germany in my project became more positive the more the students felt integrated into their host institutions. Above all, the perceived quality of the contacts with Germans was shown to be the key to good integration, a result which links up with the aforementioned Intergroup Contact Hypothesis. The better the quality of the human interactions, the more the students identified with their host institutions, and the more they were satisfied with their experiences abroad, and those three parameters significantly correlated to aspects of all three components of country images (cf. *ibid.*: 151 f.). At first it may sound quite easy to help students' images improve by getting them into good contact with locals. However, I believe this is one of the most challenging points, since intense contact or even friendship cannot be easily stimulated through a third party. One can observe this with the buddy programmes that have become very popular at host institutions, but if the interpersonal relationship does not match, the so-called 'buddies' may never become more than service providers who help the incoming exchange students to settle. I therefore argue that the activities of the host institutions should create opportunities to get to know people of diverse backgrounds and with diverse characteristics. Apart from socialising events, natural classroom interactions have a high potential to create fruitful intergroup contacts, e.g. if exchange students have to do group work with local students and therefore have a common objective to work on. Eventually, such kinds of interaction may become the starting points of private

contacts. Host institutions and mediator organisations like DAAD could actively incentivise professors and universities to create such kinds of opportunities in their classes and programmes.

Another key factor might be mentoring in the sense of offers for preparation, guidance, and wrap-up of a student's study-abroad experience. Most of all, such training offers should address students who have not been exposed to Germany, Germans, or the German language prior to their stays abroad, e.g. during their studies, and they could be realised even outside the classroom by mediator institutions operating in the home countries of the students. Students who did not know much about Germany before their exchange turned out to be more prone to develop negative affective-emotional images, or, in other words, to not recover from culture shock. I regard this as an important point, especially since the exchange of non-humanities students is highly appreciated and fostered by both the sending and the hosting institutions. Humanities students are more likely to deal with cultural aspects or the language of their prospective host countries during their studies, or they may even have been there before – which seems to have the potential to antedate some of the disillusioning experiences during the sojourn abroad. However, students from disciplines like the natural sciences may not have had similar experiences (or may have had them only to a far more limited degree) prior to their sojourn and may therefore undergo all facets of the intercultural experience in the host country.

In terms of preparation, one may think of intercultural trainings, which are in fact offered by many sending institutions for their designated outgoing exchange students. Yet trainings like these should not convey only dos and don'ts of the host country because such kinds of static information may fail to meet the challenges that students have to face in a globalised world, dealing with persons of various cultural backgrounds who are essentially individuals with individual traits. Therefore, intercultural trainings should follow a more general approach – which is not a new desideratum, however. In terms of the development of country images, I recommend raising students' awareness of phenomena of intercultural perception such as stereotypes: their existence, their functions, and possible ways of dealing with them in a competent and critical manner. However, such kinds of intercultural training should not be limited to the time prior to the student exchange programme. They should also accompany and guide the students through their exchange, as well as help them reintegrate at home after their stay abroad. Guidance during the sojourn is important considering the parabolic development of the students' attitudes, which seek different information at different

times. For instance, it could be far more effective if students had the chance to access information (and support) regarding culture shock when they are in the middle of it as well, rather than only several months beforehand. Deducing from comments made through my interview study, I have the impression that talking about one's experiences – as my interviewees did – could actually help students overcome and reflect critical phases of their studies as well. A mix of knowledge about intercultural perceptions and culture shock, and possibilities to consult with someone on intercultural issues, could be regarded as good ways to support students' experiences abroad and therefore the formation of their country images in a favourable manner. While guidance during an exchange programme is sometimes provided by the host universities, there are rarely any offerings available after students' return to their home countries. However, considering the behavioural development revealed in my study, I have reason to conclude that a kind of intercultural wrap-up would help reduce the risk of overgeneralised statements about the host country and its people, as was observed among some of the participants in my project. This would also help diminish the effects of a re-entry shock or reverse culture shock that may happen after coming home from a long-term stay abroad (cf. Gullahorn/Gullahorn 1963). I believe that digital tools could play an important role in this regard because they would allow for cultural knowledge *to go*, available on demand and over distance when needed. Providing the financial support and knowledge to create such content could be a very concrete measure to facilitate the establishment of the suggested service offers.

Conclusion

Both academic exchange and country images are important aspects of German foreign cultural and educational policy. My research provides evidence suggesting that exchange programmes can help fulfil the objective to spread positive but realistic images of Germany as a host country. Hence, I consider it important to further promote and finance academic exchange as one way to bring young international people into contact with Germans and a modern Germany, and by doing so, to allow them to modify their existing images of Germany. In my opinion, after reaching the desired numbers of exchange students, a new strategy of cultural mediator institutions and higher education institutions could be to focus on the question of how to improve the quality of academic exchange programmes by encouraging students to stay abroad for a longer period of time, by facilitating integration at the host institutions, and most of all by taking advantage of the potential of interculturally sensitive preparation,

guidance, and wrap-up. Positive and realistic country images may be evoked naturally; however, the chances of reaching this goal are far higher (and may even prevent an opposite development) if exchange students receive the appropriate support.

References

Ait Ramdan, Mohcine (2013): Wortassoziationen: Ein interkultureller Vergleich zwischen dem Deutschen, dem Arabischen und dem Französischen. In: Zeitschrift für Interkulturellen Fremdsprachenunterricht. Vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 35–61; <https://tujournals.ulb.tu-darmstadt.de/index.php/zif/article/view/67/63> [01.02.2021].

Allport, Gordon W. (1966): *The Nature of Prejudice*. Reading: Addison-Wesley.

Auswärtiges Amt (2018): 22. Bericht der Bundesregierung zur Auswärtigen Kultur- und Bildungspolitik für das Jahr 2018; <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/blob/2232572/0b260ad-27d3cb1619279a3355abe7e47/akbp-bericht2018-data.pdf> [01.02.2021].

Bennett, Milton J. (1993): Towards Ethnorelativism. A Developmental Model of Intercultural Sensitivity. In: Paige, R. Michael (ed.): *Education for the Intercultural Experience*. Yarmouth: Intercultural Press, pp. 21–71.

Brinkhaus, Ralph/Dobrindt, Alexander/Mützenich, Rolf (2020): Die Auswärtige Kultur- und Bildungspolitik im Wandel – Neue Bedingungen und Herausforderungen für zeitgemäßes Handeln. 28.01.2020; <https://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/19/168/1916834.pdf> [01.02.2021].

Correll, Joshua/Judd, Charles M./Park, Bernadette/Wittenbrink, Bernd (2010): Measuring Prejudice, Stereotypes and Discrimination. In: Dovidio, John F./Hewstone, Miles/Glick, Peter/Esses, Victoria M. (eds.): *The SAGE Handbook of Prejudice, Stereotyping and Discrimination*. Los Angeles: SAGE, pp. 45–62.

DAAD (2020): Jahresbericht 2019 – Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst; https://static.daad.de/media/daad_de/pdfs_nicht_barrierefrei/der-daad/daad_jahresbericht_2019.pdf [01.02.2021].

Ertelt-Vieth, Astrid (2005): *Interkulturelle Kommunikation und kultureller Wandel. Eine empirische Studie zum russisch-deutschen Schüleraustausch*. Tübingen: Narr.

Grünewald, Matthias/Sato-Prinz, Manuela/Zhang, Ningjie (2020): Was sagen uns Deutschlernende über ihre Deutschlandbilder? Potenziale und Perspektiven der Nationenbilderforschung für Forschung und Praxis am Beispiel dreier Studien im ostasiatischen Kontext. In: Zeitschrift für Interkulturellen Fremdsprachenunterricht. Vol. 25, No. 1, pp. 677–699; <https://tujournals.ulb.tu-darmstadt.de/index.php/zif/article/view/1029/1026> [01.02.2021].

Gullahorn, John T./Gullahorn Jeanne E. (1963): An Extension of the U-Curve Hypothesis. In: *Journal of Social Issues*. Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 33–47.

Koester, Jolene (1985): *A Profile of the U.S. Student Abroad*. New York: Council on International Educational Exchange.

Löschmann, Martin (1998): Stereotype, Stereotype und kein Ende. In: *ibid./Stroinska, Magda (eds.): Stereotype im Fremdsprachenunterricht (Deutsch als Fremdsprache in der Diskussion Vol. 4)*. Frankfurt am Main inter alia: Peter Lang, pp. 7–33.

Lysgaard, Sverre (1955): Adjustment in a Foreign Society. Norwegian Fulbright Grantees Visiting the United States. In: *International Social Science Bulletin*. Vol. 7, pp. 45–51.

Oberg, Kalervo (1960): Cultural Shock. Adjustment to New Cultural Environments. In: *Practical Anthropology*. Vol. 7, pp. 177–182.

Pettigrew, Thomas F. (1998): Intergroup Contact Theory. In: *Annual Review of Psychology*. Vol. 49, pp. 65–85.

Quasthoff, Uta M. (1973): *Soziales Vorurteil und Kommunikation – Eine sprachwissenschaftliche Analyse des Stereotyps. Ein interdisziplinärer Versuch im Bereich von Linguistik, Sozialwissenschaft und Psychologie*. Frankfurt am Main: Athenäum.

Riehl, Claudia M. (2000): Spracheinstellungen und Stereotype im Lichte diskursiver Praxis. In: Deminger, Szilvia/Fögen, Thorsten/Scharloth, Joachim/Zwickl, Simone (eds.): *Einstellungsforschung in der Soziolinguistik und Nachbardisziplinen – Studies in Language Attitudes (Variolingu. Nonstandard – Standard – Substandard Vol. 10)*. Frankfurt am Main inter alia: Peter Lang, pp. 141–160.

Roche, Jörg (2016): Zur Rolle von Stereotypisierungen bei Assimilations- und Akkommodationsprozessen. In: *Linguistik online*. Vol. 79, No. 5, pp. 149–164; <https://bop.unibe.ch/linguistik-online/article/view/3340/5111> [01.02.2021].

Rosenberg, Milton J./Hovland, Carl I. (1960): Cognitive, Affective and Behavioral Components of Attitudes. In: Rosenberg, Milton J./Hovland, Carl I./McGuire, William/Abelson, Robert P./Brehm, Jack W. (eds.): *Attitude Organization and Change: An Analysis of Consistency among Attitude Components*. New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 1–14.

Sato-Prinz, Manuela (2011): Zum Einfluss von Studienaustauscherfahrung auf das Deutschlandbild japanischer Studierender – Ergebnisse einer Querschnittstudie. In: *Zeitschrift für Interkulturellen Fremdsprachenunterricht*. Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 185–203; <https://tujournals.ulb.tu-darmstadt.de/index.php/zif/article/view/126/121> [01.02.2021].

Sato-Prinz, Manuela (2017): *Deutschlandbilder und Studienaustausch. Zur Veränderung von Nationenbildern im Rahmen von Studienaustauschaufenthalten am Beispiel japanischer Austauschstudierender in Deutschland*. Munich: Iudicium.

Schneider, David J. (2004): *The Psychology of Stereotyping*. New York: Guilford Press.

Tajfel, Henri/Turner, John C. (1979): An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict. In: Austin, William G./Worchel, Stephen (eds.): The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations. Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole, pp. 33–37.

Zhang, Ningjie (2019): Von Stereotypen zu Einstellungsprofilen. Eine empirische Untersuchung zur Entwicklung der Deutschlandbilder chinesischer Deutschstudierender in China. Tübingen: Narr.

About the Author

Dr. Manuela Sato-Prinz currently works as a DAAD Special Visiting Lecturer at the Department of German Literature at Keio University and the Regional Office of the DAAD (German Academic Exchange Service) in Tokyo, Japan. In the past, she has been a programme manager and department head at the TUM School of Management, in charge of international programmes and student affairs. She received her MA and doctoral degrees from Ludwig Maximilian University in Munich, where she studied German as a foreign language, Japanese studies, and intercultural communication. Contact: m.sato.prinz[at]gmail.com

The Translation of Art in the Context of Foreign Cultural Policy¹

Maria Sobotka (Berlin/Hamburg)

Introduction

This paper explores how the image of South Korea in the West nowadays is shaped by the imagination and representation of traditional Korean art and culture. How can art and culture from Korea be successfully ‘translated’ into a Western context? Based on an extensive visitor survey in the Gardens of the World and a detailed analysis of the Seouler Garten, I will not only address the predominant image of South Korean gardens in Germany today but also investigate whether this garden in Berlin can be seen as a successful ‘translation’ of a Neo-Confucian literati garden into a Western country.



Fig. 1: The Entrance Gate of the Seouler Garten in Berlin-Marzahn. Photo: Maria Sobotka.

¹ The content of this paper was presented at the Art, Materiality and Representation conference at the British Museum and SOAS in 2018.

On March 31st 2006 the Korean Garden (Fig. 1), called the Souler Garten (Seoul Garden), was opened in the Gardens of the World, a public park in Berlin. The garden was a gift from the city of Seoul to the city of Berlin as part of their city partnership agreement. It was handed over a few months after the end of Asia Pacific Week 2005, a biennial economic dialogue forum in Berlin, when South Korea was the country in focus. As one of only two Korean gardens in Germany,² the Souler Garten is one of the few places where South Korea officially presents itself in Germany.

The model for the garden in Berlin to a large extent is the Joseon-period (1392–1910) Dongnakdang, the ‘House of Solitary Enjoyment’, a 16th-century garden and the former retreat of Neo-Confucian philosopher and writer Yi Eon-jeok (1491–1553) (Fig. 2). It is located in Gyeongju, the Silla-era (57 BC – 935 AD) capital of Korea in the southeast of the peninsula. It can be classified in the category of ‘rural gardens’ (*byeolso-jeongwon*).³ These were private gardens, essentially a house or property with a green area, the majority built by former court officials – mostly Neo-Confucian scholars who were tired of politics – to enjoy after their official retirement. The complex construction and nested structure of the Dongnakdang garden are typical of Joseon-period upper-class estates and accentuate the characteristics of traditional Korean architecture. In contrast to Western architecture, where the focus is primarily on geometric forms, traditional Korean architecture strives for harmony between architectural elements and sensual experiences according to the principle of wholeness. These correspond with each other and form an aesthetic unit. It is not only about a purely visual experience, but also about an experience that can, if possible, be absorbed with all the senses. The sound of the leaves in the wind can be amplified by the echo of the walls surrounding an estate; pavilions are located above watercourses and invite people to linger while listening to the sound of the water. The outer form interacts with its environment, which characterises it; and, as in nature, the outer form is subordinated to a higher goal according to the doctrine of *pungsu* (geomancy).⁴

² The other Korean garden is located in the Grüneburgpark in Frankfurt am Main. The garden was a gift from South Korea to the city of Frankfurt am Main and was presented in 2005 at the Frankfurt Book Fair, where South Korea was the country of focus (see Stadt Frankfurt am Main n.d.).

³ For an overview and classification of traditional gardens of the Joseon period, see Korea National Arboretum 2012.

⁴ *Pungsu* is the Korean word for ‘geomancy’. It can be literally translated as ‘wind-water’. The Chinese word for geomancy is *fengshui*. Geomancy is practiced in different ways in East Asia. For this reason, the uniform use of the term *fengshui*, which is more common in Europe, can be misleading. Therefore, the neutral umbrella term *geomancy* or the word used in the respective country is preferred (see Yoon 2006: 3).

The space-time component also plays an important role here. Thus, the visitor does not reach the central buildings of the gardens and properties directly, but via nested paths and courtyards. The intention is to enable people to better absorb and enjoy the atmosphere created by architecture and to experience themselves in it (cf. Sobotka 2017a).



Fig. 2: The Entrance of the Garden Dongnakdang in Gyeongju and its Surroundings. South Korea.
Photo: Maria Sobotka.

The Dongnakdang has a large entrance gate, indicating the high social status of the former landlord. Behind the gate are various buildings, such as storage facilities, living rooms, bedrooms, and accommodation for the staff. Each of the buildings is connected to an open courtyard. The many winding narrow paths act as links for these individual areas. The heart of the complex is a pavilion on a rocky promontory at the back, from which you can see a small stream (Fig. 3). This pavilion was the study room of the scholar Yi Eon-jeok. It faces east, since an orientation to the east is considered the most pleasant in Korea. Here, it is neither too hot in summer nor too cold in winter.



Fig. 3: The Pavilion in the Garden Dongnagkdang and the River below. Photo: Maria Sobotka.

The division of traditional Korean properties and houses into several areas and buildings results from the Neo-Confucian socio-political hierarchical system. According to the strict Neo-Confucian ideology prevailing in Korea, men and women lived in separate residential areas.⁵ There was also a hierarchy within families, which distinguished between old and young as well as between deceased and living family members. In addition to the geomantic principles, the strictly hierarchical structure of society played an important role in the design of gardens and estates.⁶

At first glance, the Seouler Garten in Berlin seems to follow the structure and style of the Dongnagkdang, although on a smaller scale. The Seouler Garten can be reached via a striking gate in the entrance area, which looks quite similar to

⁵ The law of gender segregation prohibited direct and permanent contact between men and women in the strongly patriarchal society of the Joseon period (1392–1910). Women were only allowed to maintain contact with male relatives from the third degree of kinship onwards (see Park 2010: 67).

⁶ On the construction and structure of Joseon-era houses, see The Korean Institute of Traditional Landscape Architecture 2007.



Fig. 5: Back of the Pavilion in the Seouler Garten. Photo: Maria Sobotka.

Fig. 6: Clay Walls in the Seouler Garten. Photo: Maria Sobotka.

Besides the stylistic proximity, a similar concept in construction (Fig. 7a/b), and details⁸ in architecture and decoration as well as individual features in the garden that were moved in exact correspondence from Gyeongju to Berlin (Fig. 8), the Seouler Garten contains a number of elements that are neither typical for Joseon-period gardens nor present in the Dongnakdang. The most obvious examples of this are the many stone (Fig. 9) and wooden figures (Fig. 10) scattered across the garden. These guardian figures originate from Korean folk belief and in Korea are set up at the entrance and the end of villages, towns, or temples to protect people. In Berlin, these various figures are scattered across the garden, and grouped together in a category on the information boards.⁹ In addition, the Seouler Garten contains a large number of features from everyday life during the Joseon period, such as the hand mill, water tank, fountain, and *jangdokdae* (a place where fermented foods, such as kimchi, soy sauce, or soy paste were stored in large clay pots). There is also a *jangdokdae* in the Dongnakdang, which is used by the family living on the estate today, although it is

⁸ In particular, the pavilion, including its small details, was reconstructed almost one-to-one in Berlin, as seen in the parallels of the wooden railings with air holes in the form of abstract flowers (*punghyeol*) or the lotus flower-shaped supports (*hayeop*) attached to the ends of the railing's webs. Further details, such as the brick tiles (*sumaksae*) at the end of the clay walls or the entrance gate, or the choice of materials for the same, also prove to be faithful replicas.

⁹ For example, the National Folk Museum in Seoul and the Korea Stone Art Museum distinguish between at least three different categories of such figures as well as a multitude of subcategories (see Min 2000: 7).

unclear whether this was part of the original estate of Yi Eon-jeok. The Seouler Garten shows the visitor a series of religious objects, such as a fish-shaped wind chime hanging from one of the wooden doors, which in Korea is usually found in temples, and two stone pagodas.



Fig. 7a/b: Interior View of the Pavilion in the Dongnakdang (left), Interior View of the Berlin Pavilion in the Seouler Garten (right). Photos: Maria Sobotka.




Fig. 8: Individual Points of the Dongnakdang Are Positioned One-to-One in the Seouler Garten in Berlin-Marzahn; source: Planning Documents of the Seoul Metropolitan Government.



Fig. 9: Pair of Stone Figures in the Entrance Area of the Seouler Garten. Photo: Maria Sobotka.



Fig. 10: Wooden Figures in the Seouler Garten. Photo: Maria Sobotka.

The points described raise the question of which concept underlies the Souler Garten in Berlin and why the Seoul Metropolitan Government opted for this concept. During a research stay in Seoul in 2016, I had the opportunity to get to know the team of the Seoul Metropolitan Government that was responsible for planning the garden. They generously provided me with all the planning documents and contracts related to horticulture for my work. The facts listed below are based on my evaluation of these documents.

The Souler Garten is the result of two political agreements between the two former mayors of Seoul and Berlin, Lee Myung-bak and Klaus Wowereit. The first agreement was signed when Lee Myung-bak visited Berlin during Asia Pacific Week in the autumn of 2003. Initial ideas and suggestions for cultural exchange between South Korea and Germany were discussed. The second, more concrete, agreement dates from the spring of 2005, and concerns plans for the partnership and the implementation of a Korean garden in Berlin and a German square in Seoul. Both places, it is stated in the agreement, must bear the name of the other city in their name. Thus, the Korean garden in Berlin is named the Souler Garten, and the free space in the centre of Seoul designed by the city of Berlin is named Berliner Platz. In addition to original parts of the Berlin Wall, the Berliner Platz features a figure of the Berlin bear, the heraldic animal of the German capital, and a traditional German street lamp. The parts of the wall symbolise the reunification of Germany and the hope for a peaceful settlement of the conflict between North and South Korea. The construction of the Souler Garten therefore includes a cultural-political function that should not be underestimated.

The planning documents reveal the concept of the Souler Garten in Berlin as a meeting place for Germans and Koreans. The intention of the garden, nicknamed “Garden of Joy in Harmony with Nature”, is to convey Korean culture and values to German visitors with the aim of deepening the relationship between the two countries. The demarcation from other countries and their (garden) cultures, especially the demarcation from China and Japan, is a special concern. Indeed, for the Korean side, this is one of the most important points in the concept due to the Korean garden’s geographic proximity to the other gardens of the park. From the very beginning, the intention of the Seoul Metropolitan Government was to create a garden that was completely different from the Chinese and Japanese gardens in Berlin. The highest priority was to show the uniqueness of Korean culture through the Souler Garten. In a document by the Seoul Metropolitan Government, for example, the characteristics of Chinese, Japanese, and Korean gardens are compared in a table. According to

the latter, nature in China is generally presented as large and powerful, the Chinese garden being the reflection of a fantastic and monumental landscape in which the human being must integrate her- or himself. Japanese gardens, on the other hand, show nature in an abstract way, *en miniature*. In order to distinguish the Korean garden from the other two East Asian gardens, the Souler Garten in Berlin was to focus on the harmony between man and nature, emphasising the idea of a holistic approach and naturalness. Not only should contemplation be made possible, but the garden should also function as a space that can actually be experienced, representing the very ideals of Korean scholars. According to the table, in terms of visual attributes, the Chinese garden is symbolised by water and moon, and the Japanese garden by mountains and water. Smaller rocks with a watercourse were declared typical for Korean gardens.

Ultimately, the decision to choose the Dongnakdang garden as a model for the garden in Berlin was primarily due to the natural geographic conditions in Berlin – the effort required to construct a small artificial plateau for the pavilion on the flat property was relatively small compared to the other alternatives. The design of the garden takes into account Korean geomantic ideas, *pungsu*: The Souler Garten was designed with Berlin's Kienberg mountain in the background and the front of the garden facing south (Fig. 11). The pavilion faces east, and it is no coincidence that a river (the Wuhle) flows nearby. The idea is a holistic concept that is in harmony with nature and a space in which the visitor can retreat and enjoy nature. Cultural activities and events in the Souler Garten, such as Korean tea ceremonies, are also designed to follow this concept. Do these details correspond to the intention of the Seoul Metropolitan Government to opt for this very concept of a Korean garden in Berlin?




Fig. 11: Representation of the Souler Garten and its Surroundings from the Point of View of Korean Harmony *pungsu*; source: Planning Documents of the Seoul Metropolitan Government.

The Souler Garten is not a compact version of a Joseon-period scholar's garden, but a show garden, with the purpose of conveying a certain image of Korea in Germany. The focus is on actively distinguishing it from the other two East Asian gardens in the park. The main aim of the project is to achieve a demarcation by communicating the philosophical ideas peculiar to Korean culture and by presenting typical objects of Korean art, culture, and tradition. Both the concept and approach of the Seoul Metropolitan Government reflect many of the points that South Korea has been accused of in regards to its foreign cultural policy.

A study commissioned by the European Union on the strategies of South Korean foreign cultural policy was published in 2014 (cf. Fisher 2014). The study highlights the weaknesses of South Korean foreign cultural policy and underlines the fact that the image of South Korea abroad has changed little in recent years despite the efforts of the South Korean government. Since the 1990s, various government institutions such as the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism have been tasked with spreading a positive image of South Korea and reconciling the country's international reputation with its economic power. The problem, however, seems to be the pursuit of different, inconsistent strategies and objectives by the mandated institutions. The reasons for this include the competition between the institutions and the divergent priorities with regard to their cultural measures. In addition, there is decentralisation at a regional level, which since 1995 has given the cities and provinces of South Korea more responsibility and autonomy when making decisions. This decentralisation has resulted in individual efforts to promote cultural exchange at the local level. The study also suggests that the South Korean government is too busy conveying a positive image of its country to people in other countries, and is forgetting to check this image for inconsistencies. We need to consider whether these assertions also hold true with regard to the Souler Garten.

I conducted a survey of 300 visitors to the Souler Garten (cf. Sobotka 2017b), during which it became apparent that the concept of the Souler Garten as a modern image of a Joseon-period scholarly garden should be better explained to the visitors. The consideration of geomantic principles in planning should also be explained in more detail on the information boards, as the German observer typically does not know these. The aspect repeatedly emphasised in the planning documents, namely that the visitor in the Souler Garten should experience life in harmony with nature, is not recognisable to the uninitiated observer, and the associated ideals of Korean scholars are not discussed. The visitor can only explore the garden by following the given paths.

The heart of the complex, the Berlin Pavilion, is not accessible, and the garden as a whole thus falls short of expectations. In addition, the garden, with its abundance of stone and wooden figures as well as the many objects from everyday life and religion, can easily be misunderstood as overloaded. The results of my survey confirmed that the average German visitor knows little about South Korea in general or about Korean culture. After visiting the Seouler Garten in Berlin, the visitors could not say which elements they had perceived as typically Korean – despite the large number of traditional Korean objects – nor could they name actual differences between the Chinese, Japanese, and Korean gardens. Above all, the majority of visitors said that they would have liked more information about the exhibited objects and their context. These survey results suggest that the implementation of the concepts of this garden should be improved, in particular in the area of signage, with the aim of doing justice to these concepts and of conveying the messages to the German viewer, who is not trained in this respect.

In this context, I will consider the theoretical concept of *othering*¹⁰ and the associated emergence of the notion of cultural identity. *Othering*, mostly achieved through the negation of the ‘other’, takes place at different levels in the case of the Seouler Garten. The idea of cultural identity plays an important role, because cultural identity is a self-referential system in which people perceive others and themselves as members of specific categories.¹¹ The self-image that South Korea wants to convey with the Seouler Garten can be understood as a reaction to how South Korea believes it is perceived in the West and how it wishes to be perceived. This image is strongly connected with an awareness of tradition and is oriented to the standards of a high culture. It can be assumed that the South Korean state is actively trying to locate traditional Korean gardens as a central component of its cultural policy. This assumption is reasonable, since gardens are established in the canon of cultural diplomacy of South Korea’s two neighbouring countries and competitors, China and Japan. Indeed, China and Japan

¹⁰ The word *othering* is a creation that transforms the English noun or adjective ‘other’ by means of the suffix -ing. It is usually translated in German as *Veränderung* or *Fremdmachung* and describes the active distancing or differentiation of an individual or a group from other groups or individuals. The idea of *othering* can already be found in Hegel’s work, who deals with the question of how self-perception is connected with construction and differentiation from others. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak coined the term *othering* when examining discourses of power in colonial times and thus describes the process by which the colonial discourse creates otherness (see Popal 2009: 67).

¹¹ The definition is based on Robert Hauser, who uses the approaches of Carl F. Graumann and the cultural concept of Karl P. Hansen to specify the two concepts of identity and culture (see Hauser 2006).

have long been defined through traditional gardens. For instance, the Japanese studies professor Christian Tagsold discussed the staging of cultural identities through the examples of Japanese gardens. He examined how Japan's image in the West is shaped by Japanese gardens and the extent to which Japanese gardens in the West, which are considered authentic, are in fact shaped by "an active realisation of what Japan represents in the eyes of the West [...]" (Tagsold 2013: 186, own translation).

In summary, the Souler Garten shows that Korean culture has been exoticised not so much from a Western perspective, but rather through a targeted staging by the Koreans themselves and through an active cultural demarcation from its neighbours, China and Japan. The Souler Garten is presented here as a symbol of Korea. However, this is not consistently implemented according to a uniform garden concept, but through the somewhat random use of Korean cultural objects, above all the various stone and wooden figures and sculptures placed in the garden without sufficient explanations. At this point, one has to ask whether this fulfils the claim of the city of Berlin and the Gardens of the World to show "original examples of foreign garden culture" (Senatsverwaltung für Umwelt, Verkehr und Klimaschutz Berlin 2006, own translation). It should be considered how the intention of the Seoul City Hall could be better realised with this garden concept and its design. In order to convey an authentic Korean image to the Western audience, the cultural objects on display should be selected more specifically for the context of this garden. A more harmonious and meaningful integration between the material cultural evidence and the settings of a reproduced historical and traditional space would facilitate a clearer and more accurate representation of Korean identity.

References

Fisher, Rod (2014): South Korea Country Report. Preparatory Action 'Culture in the EU External Relations'; https://ec.europa.eu/assets/eac/culture/policy/international-cooperation/documents/country-reports/south-korea_en.pdf [01.02.2021].

Hauser, Robert (2006): Kulturelle Identität in einer globalisierten Welt? In: Metzner-Szigeth, Andreas/Ursua, Nicanor (eds.): *Netzbasierte Kommunikation, Identität und Gemeinschaft*. Berlin: Trafo, pp. 315–333.

Jhoo, Dong-chan (2015): Korea's Native Plants to Find New Names. In: *The Korea Times*, 11.08.2015; https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2015/08/116_184631.html [01.02.2021].

Korea National Arboretum (2012): Hangugui jeon-tongjeongwon. Joseonsidae daepyojeogin jeontongjeongwoneul jungsimeuro (Representative Gardens of the Joseon Period). Seoul: Gil-Job-le Media.

Min, Sang-ah (2000): Yeomweoni damgin dol, uriyetdolbangmulgwan. In: Hangukzheontongmunhwahagbo, 02.03.2000, pp. 20–35.

Park, Inwon (2010): Paradoxie des Begehrens. Liebesdiskurse in deutschsprachigen und koreanischen Prosatexten. Cologne: Böhlau.

Popal, Mariam (2009): Heine und *der Orient*? Zwischen Subjektivität und Veränderung oder wie *das Andere* nach Deutschland kam – sah – und – ? In: Jokisch, Benjamin/Rebstock, Ulrich/Conrad, Lawrence I. (eds.): Fremde, Feinde und Kurioses. Innen- und Außenansichten unseres muslimischen Nachbarn. Berlin: De Gruyter, pp. 67–114.

Senatsverwaltung für Umwelt, Verkehr und Klimaschutz (2006): Gärten der Welt – Koreanischer Garten (Seouler Garten). Ausgewählte Grünanlagen in Marzahn-Hellersdorf; http://www.berlin.de/senuvk/umwelt/stadtgruen/gruenanlagen/de/gruenanlagen_plaetze/marzahn/gaerten_der_welt/koreagarten.shtml [01.12.2020].

Sobotka, Maria (2017a): Schönheit im Einklang mit der Natur: Von Theorien zur koreanischen Ästhetik bis hin zu sozialwissenschaftlichen Aspekten des Themas Schönheit im modernen Südkorea. In: Knödel, Susanne/Schmelz, Bernd (eds.): Uri Korea. Kunsthistorische und ethnografische Beiträge zur Ausstellung (Mitteilungen des Museums für Völkerkunde Hamburg Vol. 50). Exhibition catalogue, pp. 110–131.

Sobotka, Maria (2017b): Der koreanische Garten in den Gärten der Welt. 'Re'-Präsentation eines koreanischen Gartens im Westen. Thesis for achieving the academic degree Master of Arts at the Freie Universität zu Berlin. Kunsthistorisches Institut, Department of East Asian Art History.

Stadt Frankfurt am Main (n.d.): Koreanischer Garten; <https://frankfurt.de/themen/umwelt-und-gruen/orte/gaerten/koreanischer-garten> [01.02.2021].

Tagsold, Christian (2013): Japanische Gärten als Räume des Anderen. In: Köhn, Stephan (ed.): Fremdbilder – Selbstbilder. Paradigmen japanisch-deutscher Wahrnehmung (1861–2011) (Kulturwissenschaftliche Japanstudien Vol. 6). Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, pp. 185–203.

The Korean Institute of Traditional Landscape Architecture (2007): Korean Traditional Landscape Architecture. New Jersey: Hollym.

Yoon, Hong-key (2006): The Culture of Fengshui in Korea. An Exploration of East Asian Geomancy. Plymouth, UK: Lexington Books.

About the Author

Maria Sobotka has completed undergraduate and graduate studies in art history and economics in Berlin, Beijing, and Frankfurt am Main. Currently, she is a doctoral candidate at the Freie Universität zu Berlin (“Korean Art in Museum Collections outside of Korea in the Mirror of Park Chung-hee’s Cultural Policy”). Her research focuses on art history in a global context and especially East Asian art, transcultural processes, the art market, economic strategies of artists and art museums, and current issues in cultural policy. As a curatorial fellow at the Museum für Kunst und Gewerbe Hamburg, she curated the exhibition *Made in China! Porcelain* (October 2020–April 2022).

Contact: [mariasobotka\[at\]web.de](mailto:mariasobotka[at]web.de)

Rethinking Diplomacy: Youth, Multilateralism, and Multi-Optional Diplomacy in the Context of UN/SCR 2250¹

Burak Yusmak (Bielefeld)

For many years, youth have been seen as the root of various problems rather than the root of potential solutions. Existing structural problems are leading to the exclusion and marginalisation of youth and are undermining their potential for being agents of change in solving the problems of today's world, such as conflicts, climate change, human rights violations, and a lack of peace-building and socio-economic empowerment initiatives. The United Nation Security Council Resolution 2250 (UN/SCR 2250) on Youth, Peace and Security² outlines the need for youth to be involved in decision-making processes, particularly with regard to peace and security. The resolution is a significant step at the highest international level to create a space for youth to exert more influence in the broader domain of peace and security. It aims to establish a more horizontal relationship between youth and decision makers. There are several organisations and NGOs that are already working on youth leadership, bringing youth into the landscape of international affairs.

The United Nations and African Union Envoys for Youth aim to empower youth by shedding light on youth matters at the global level.³ In fact, in our globalised and multipolar world, the rise of non-state actors is accelerating (cf. Risse-Kappen 2003; Rood/Dinnissen 2013), and increasing numbers of young people are emerging among these actors.

At the same time, new problems are emerging in international affairs, which demand new types of solutions. Diplomacy is seen as the key method to solve these problems, by ending conflicts and negotiating trade deals through non-violent communication (cf. Cooper et al. 2013).

¹ I would like to thank Zayn Hussain, Mai, and Amir for reviewing my article, and Yavuz Özgüner for the illustrations © OzgunerDesignWorks 2020.

² For more information, see [https://undocs.org/S/RES/2250\(2015\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/2250(2015)) [01.02.2021]. For the implementation of this resolution, see also <https://www.youth4peace.info/UNSCR2250/Introduction> [01.02.2021].

³ For more information about the UN Envoy for Youth, see <https://www.un.org/youthenvoy> [01.02.2021]. And for more information on the AU Youth Envoy in particular, see <https://auyouthenvoy.org> [01.02.2021].

Henry Kissinger (1995) would argue that diplomats should defend governments' interest in maintaining the status quo. However, the shift towards a more multipolar world demands more multilateralism, not only among states, but also among new actors on a horizontal level. Indeed, scholars such as G. John Ikenberry (2018: 9) and Nathalie Tocci (2020: 14) argue that new approaches to tackle multilateral diplomacy are needed for a rules-based international order, despite the fact that multilateralism itself is often contested (cf. Morse/Keohane 2014).

It is essential to adhere to the origins of multilateralism while adapting it to the demands of globalisation. On top of that, the global distribution of power is shifting from the global hegemon towards "multiple power centers" (Tocci 2020: 13; Ikenberry 2001), i.e. towards states and non-state actors (cf. Nye 2011).

In this era of globalisation, youth are also responding to the unequal distribution of power. They have been a leading force in mass movements such as the Arab Spring, Occupy Wall Street, Fridays for Future, and Black Lives Matter. Today's youth are tomorrow's generation and need to be more involved in the complex landscape of global diplomacy.

While there is scholarly work on youth in peace-building (cf. Özerdem/Podder 2015), there is nearly no literature concerning youth in diplomacy, which has led me to rethink multilateralism. I critically examine approaches to multilateralism that fail to identify problems or to construct relevant solutions, as this may sometimes turn into a superficial forum of diplomacy. The erosion of the rules-based international order makes applying multilateralism in the global context a more complex matter. Therefore, I propose a definition of a new method to improve and strengthen multi-lateral diplomacy, which I call 'multi-optional diplomacy', with the inclusion of new actors: the youth.⁴

This paper will outline the three steps of multi-optional diplomacy: intergenerational collaboration; balance of decision making; and diplomatic flexibility. This paper will argue that multi-optional diplomacy is a supplement to multilateralism, with the

⁴ For instance, the EU External Action Service has a similar approach on conflict prevention, peace-building, and mediation. For more information, see https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/security-defence-crisis-response/426/conflict-prevention-peace-building-and-mediation_en [01.02.2021].

inclusion of new actors: youth in diplomacy in the context of UN/SCR 2250. I consider youth as agents for change and as part of the solution to global issues through their integration into diplomacy and decision making.

Thus, this model is not an alternative to multilateralism, but rather a supplement and a tool to sustain multilateralism and restore the rules-based international order. Indeed, it does not deny the role of multilateralism, but instead meets the demand of the *zeitgeist* of diplomacy by opening a space for new actors at the negotiation table on a horizontal level (or eye level). Multi-optional diplomacy is a strategy to understand diplomacy holistically in the era of globalisation by empowering new actors with problem-solving orientations.

Firstly, I will define briefly the concepts of diplomacy and multilateralism. Secondly, I proceed to discuss the situation of youth in international affairs. Thirdly, I will conceptualise multi-optional diplomacy. And lastly, I will examine the case study of the 5+5 Dialogue's engagement with youth in Malta. My personal experience with Young Mediterranean Voices and engagements with high-level decision makers also prompted this research.

Diplomacy, Multilateralism, and the International Order

Diplomacy is the practice of negotiation and representation through communication among mutually recognised political groups or states and is “the ‘art’ of resolving negotiations peacefully” (Sending et al. 2011: 530). “Multilateralism”, as defined by Robert O. Keohane (1990: 731), is “the practice of co-ordinating national policies in groups of three or more states, through ad hoc arrangements or by means of institutions” (see Fig. 1).

Thus, multilateralism was best understood in the post-war reconstruction context, where the US and its partners formed the international order (cf. Ikenberry 2018: 9). The United Nations, the European Union, free market economies, liberal democracies, and multilateralism were some of the key outcomes of this order (cf. *ibid.*: 7; Tocci 2020: 12). Multilateralism was a key driver in upholding the rules-based international order. However, after seven decades, the liberal international order is now in “crisis” (Ikenberry 2018: 8) or, according to one academic, has even “ended” (Tocci 2020: 17).

Ikenberry (2018: 9) argues that “liberal internationalism will need to be rethought and reinvented.” That being said, there are some attempts, such as that of the Alliance of Multilateralism, a French-German led initiative, which are good examples of upholding and rethinking multilateralism and the rules-based international order, and which cover areas such as humanitarian assistance, climate, security, and lethal autonomous weapons, to mention just a few.⁵ The EU, as the most successful form of multilateralism, has to act accordingly to sustain the rules-based international order (cf. Tocci 2020: 14), and so do other states who are benefiting from multilateralism. Moreover, the distribution of power in international relations is shifting very quickly from the United States as the global hegemon towards “multiple power centers” (ibid.: 13; cf. Nye/Goldsmith 2011) such as BRIC countries like Russia, China, India, and Brazil (cf. Sidiropoulos 2018), but also towards non-state actors like NGOs and social movements (cf. Nye/Goldsmith 2011).

All in all, the challenges of this century are multifaceted, ranging from terrorism, migration, and artificial intelligence to public health, technology, and climate change, all of which transcend sovereign state boundaries. In fact, many problems are transnational and complex in nature, which requires wider and more deeply structured cooperation among various actors beyond states to find sustainable solutions. Thus, if Ikenberry’s and Tocci’s analyses are accurate, multilateralism also needs new actors to keep multilateralism alive beyond states and diplomats.

A New Actor: Youth in International Affairs

Having defined what is meant by multilateralism, this paper will now move forward to discuss youth and their situation in international affairs, then incorporate youth into the theory of multi-optional diplomacy.

Youth are defined by the UN as people between 15–24 years old, and the estimated population of youth worldwide is about 1.2 billion, which makes up 16 per cent of the global population (cf. UN/DESA 2019). There is also a definition ranging the age between 18–29 years old (cf. UNSC 2015). According to a report by the

⁵ For more information, see <https://multilateralism.org/initiatives> [01.12.2020].

Mo Ibrahim Foundation, Africa has the largest share of youth in the world and is the youngest continent, with 60 per cent of its entire population being under 25 years old in 2019 (cf. Mo Ibrahim Foundation 2019).

Today, youth in Asia, Africa, and Latin America are the main victims of war, conflict, and poverty; they are deprived of education and health care, and are sexually violated, orphaned, and abducted, leaving them physically and emotionally frayed (cf. UN/DESA 2013).

The demands of youth are often not heard by governments. This led to misunderstandings, undermining, and marginalisation during the Arab Spring in 2011, where youth were perceived as a threat rather than a solution.⁶ They suffered from unemployment, lack of education, and lack of representation. Indeed, youth have been mobilising and have become key actors with growing influence in global mass movements, such as the Arab Spring, the Fridays for Future protests, Occupy Wall Street, and Black Lives Matter. The interconnectedness among youth involved in these movements, the sharing of common aspirations, and the rejection of injustice have made youth emerging actors in the field of international relations.

Attempts have been made to include and empower youth by the Anna Lindh Foundation, together with the British Council, which launched the Young Arab Voices programme, a platform for Arab youth to express themselves through discussion and debate (cf. Knox/Donaldson 2016), and which aimed to combat radicalisation and fragmentation. Similar initiatives, such as the Kofi Annan Foundation,⁷ One Young World,⁸ and Search for Common Ground,⁹ covered a broad range of issues, from radicalisation to peace-building, and from climate change to economic inclusion.

⁶ This is from remarks by Aissam Benaissa at the Chatham House event “The Arab Youth Survey: Voices of a Generation” (cf. Chatham House 2017).

⁷ For more information, see <https://www.kofiannanfoundation.org/our-work/promoting-youth-leadership> [01.02.2021].

⁸ For more information, see <https://www.oneyoungworld.com> [01.02.2021].

⁹ For more information, see <https://www.sfcg.org> [01.02.2021].

These organisations aim to empower youth, improve their leadership skills, and provide them with platforms to raise their voices via international conferences and the media. They have included youth in a global network of decision makers, journalists, and youth leaders. These initiatives gradually shifted youth to shape public policy and influence narratives in decision-making processes through the efforts of NGOs.

Furthermore, it is a significant step in multilateral organisations such as the United Nations and the African Union to have a mandate of a Special Envoy on Youth at the highest political level, but this is not enough, as youth are still underrepresented in political institutions (cf. Inter-Parliamentary Union 2020). Moreover, according to a survey by the Global Shapers, 55.9 per cent disagreed with the statement: “In my country, young people’s views are considered before important decisions are taken” (Gray 2018: n.p.). Nowadays, with the coronavirus pandemic still raging, it will be today’s youth who will be facing the consequences of important decisions taken without them.

In 2015, under the leadership of Jordan, the UN/SCR 2250 on Youth, Peace and Security was implemented, which is the first kind of resolution to focus on the key role of youth in peace-building and security. This document is considered a legal document at the highest political level, and advocates for youth being taken into account in decision-making processes. Some of the primary drivers of this resolution were Search for Common Ground, the United Network of Young Peacebuilders (UNOY), and some UN agencies (cf. Berents/Preliis 2020). I will now move on to the next section, where I will analyse the theory and practice of multi-optional diplomacy, with youth as agents in diplomacy.

Towards a New Theory: Multi-Optional Diplomacy

Multi-optional diplomacy is a supplement to multilateralism that aims to strengthen it by empowering new actors such as youth in the diplomatic field. Multi-optional diplomacy enables both diplomats (including decision makers: elected and appointed officials) and youth to coexist and collaborate horizontally in a diplomatic context. It merges the globalising forces from above (governments) with the globalising forces from below (the youth), and brings the latter into the centre of diplomatic gravity.

To better understand multi-optional diplomacy, Sending et al. (2011: 528) argue that “both traditional and nontraditional diplomatic agents are part of an evolving configuration of social relations.” There is an “intriguing combination of the ‘gentlemanly diplomacy’ inherited from a state-centric world with various heterodox forms of political intercourse made possible by globalization.” Multi-optional diplomacy challenges superficial mainstream multilateral diplomatic forums.




Fig. 1: Multilateralism (+3 D); source: OzgunerDesignWorks 2020.

Fig. 2: Multi-Optional Diplomacy (+3 D + 3 Y); source: OzgunerDesignWorks 2020.

Multi-optional diplomacy is a method of transforming the energy and demands of youth into meaningful policy recommendations by including them in the diplomatic process (see Fig. 2), which also helps minimise youth radicalisation, marginalisation, and exclusion. Multi-optional diplomacy entails inclusive leadership, strengthening multilateralism, and addressing problems with the main people affected by those problems. It consolidates the ‘diffusion of power’ to sustain multilateralism for a rules-based international order. It aims to encompass the *zeitgeist* of diplomacy and the needs of globalisation, and to prevent reactionary and counterproductive mass movements by creating an institutional platform. Multi-optional diplomacy is a horizontal form of communication rather than a one-sided power dynamic. It is a strategy of winning the hearts and minds of youth through diplomacy, which, in turn, will revive diplomacy. It is the place where the experience of diplomats and the aspirations of youth come together.

Multilateralism can sometimes be problematic because of nepotism and a lack of meritocracy when it comes to decision makers (for instance, with diplomats from authoritarian countries). In fact, governments cannot choose their counterparts in diplomatic relations, since this is decided by the other parties' governments. This can result in dealing with unqualified or incompetent diplomats or policy-makers.

Thus, multi-optional diplomacy bridges the gap between meritocracy and potential youth leaders. Multi-optional diplomacy does not neglect multilateralism; it simply creates a new dimension to find alternative ways of tackling problems with solutions from the ground up. In other words, governments should not only consider other governments as partners, but instead should look for alternative/additional partners by listening to and engaging with youth and empowering them through platforms on which they can find constructive approaches to prevent rising problems.

Despite the limitations that have arisen during COVID-19, the possibility of youth involvement in international diplomacy has grown thanks to digital tools that enable virtual exchanges, and that are currently making multi-optional diplomacy a reality in certain spheres. For instance, in a high-level virtual dialogue, EU High Representative/Vice-President Josep Borrell Fontelles, European Parliament's Vice-President Fabio Massimo Castaldo, other decision makers, and young people discussed the impact of COVID-19 on youth with policy recommendations made by the youth for decision makers (cf. Anna Lindh Foundation 2020a). Another example of multi-optional diplomacy in action is the virtual dialogue that took place between H. E. Olof Skoog, the EU ambassador to the UN, Anne Gueguen, the Deputy Permanent Representative for France to the UN, Élisabeth Guigou, President of the Anna Lindh Foundation, and youth from 16 countries across the Euro-Mediterranean region, where Olof Skoog highlighted "the need to find digital ways to engage young people in decision-making" (cited in: Anna Lindh Foundation 2020b). This is a further example of multi-optional diplomacy in virtual exchange.

The structure and functions of multi-optional diplomacy can be explained in three steps: intergenerational collaboration; balance of decision making; and diplomatic flexibility.

a) Intergenerational Collaboration

This is the process of dialogue and collaboration between youth and diplomats (decision makers). Youth would be empowered through inclusive leadership in the diplomatic landscape. There would be mutual gain in this situation, because youth would learn from the experienced diplomats, and diplomats would be inspired by the aspiration of youth, which would increase the efficiency of negotiations. For instance, multilateral organisations such as the European Union and the African Union should not just address the challenges of youth (cf. Tocci 2020: 15), but also negotiate with youth about their own challenges. Intergenerational collaboration and dialogue break the barriers youth are facing to reach high-level forums. For instance, Aya Chebbi, the AU Youth Envoy, is a strong advocate of this approach (cf. AU Youth Envoy 2019). It comprises multifaceted collaborations such as: youth to youth; youth to decision makers; and decision makers to decision makers.

b) Balance of Decision Making

Generally speaking, decisions are made exclusively by diplomats (within the limitations of their government's interests). The UN/SCR 2250 on Youth, Peace and Security “[u]rges Member States to consider ways to increase inclusive representation of youth in decision-making at all levels in local, national, regional and international institutions [...]” (UNSC 2015: 3). In multi-optional diplomacy, the decision making would be a balance between the demand by youth and the interest of the decision makers. Because of the inclusive leadership of multi-optional diplomacy, the normal way of making a decision could vary because of reciprocal influence of both sides. This is the impact/means of “soft power”, as defined by Joseph S. Nye (2008: 95) as “getting others to want the outcomes that you want – [which] co-opts people rather than coerces them. Soft power rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others.” Youth could influence policy-makers with their recommendations and demand change, whereas policy-makers could also persuade youth to go in line with their interests. In multi-optional diplomacy, the means of ‘soft power’ is two-sided and interchangeable. This would push decision makers to shift the interest of the few to the interest of future generations. This could also extend the scope of policy-making beyond any pre-formulated agendas and would push governments to reconsider their policy interests.

c) Diplomatic Flexibility

Diplomats have certain codes of behaviour in diplomatic forums which help maintain bilateral or multilateral relations, but which sometimes also extend the time needed to reach an actual agreement. Diplomatic flexibility is the muscle-flexing of diplomacy; it combines the aspiration of youth with the diplomatic behaviours of decision makers. In fact, multi-optional diplomacy gives flexibility to bring new actors into the conversation. For instance, while diplomats have certain limits in expressing themselves, youth often do not feel tied to such constraints. Thus, diplomacy becomes stretched and inclusive of voices arising from outside the world of diplomacy. It also approaches norms, identities, and values in such a manner that these can be socially constructed (cf. Wendt 1992). Through diplomatic flexibility among youth and decision makers, power is socially constructed (cf. *ibid.*), and ranges from diplomatic agendas to suggestions from youth.

This chapter began by theorising multi-optional diplomacy and arguing that it is a tool to strengthen multilateralism with the integration of youth as agents in diplomacy. It followed a three-level methodology. The next part of this paper will apply multi-optional diplomacy in a case study of the 5+5 Dialogue's engagement with youth in Malta.

Multi-Optional Diplomacy: 5+5 and Young Mediterranean Voices

In January 2019, the so-called '5+5' ministerial meeting took place in Malta with countries from the Northern and Southern Mediterranean regions coming together to discuss issues such as migration, terrorism, peace, and security, as well as economic relations in the Mediterranean region. In the style of a classic multilateral diplomatic event, the foreign ministers of five Southern Mediterranean and five Northern Mediterranean countries met at the highest political level (cf. Gillespie 2019). However, this time, they did so with the slightly unique participation of new actors at the 5+5 meeting: members of the Anna Lindh Foundation's Young Mediterranean Voices programme, who were viewed as emerging diplomats from these ten Mediterranean countries (cf. Times of Malta 2019).

The Anna Lindh Foundation prioritised the de-securitisation of the youth and their re-engagement in problem solving through dialogue. Its first leadership seminar for young people in the Mediterranean region was organised in cooperation with MEDAC (Malta Diplomatic Academy) and the Club de Madrid, and was supported by the European Commission (cf. *ibid.*).

Prior to the meeting, the young people selected from the Mediterranean region received training from journalists in presentation skills and constructed policy recommendations in four key areas: migration, education, youth participation, and climate change. They delivered policy recommendations at the 5+5 meeting to the foreign ministers and EU High Representative Federica Mogherini (cf. *ibid.*). Many ministers were quite surprised by the potential of their own country's youth and, in the process, realised the importance of listening to youth voices (cf. Gillespie 2019).

The dialogue was in nature *intergenerational* and horizontal, so the youth leaders felt comfortable in expressing themselves. The way the policy recommendations were approached by policy-makers created a *balance of decision making*. The Algerian youth leader named Manal, for instance, explained that “youth represents around two-thirds of the population of the region, yet their presence in the process of decision-making is almost null. We [the youth] want to be involved in designing, implementing and monitoring policies related to our areas of concern” (cited in: *ibid.*). Mogherini, then the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs, said:

“I am very satisfied with what we have achieved so far with Young Mediterranean Voices, transforming ideas into practice. Through these dialogues, young people are not only having the opportunity to shape policy-making and decisions that affect their lives, but they are also building networks together across the two shores of the Mediterranean” (cited in: Maltese Ministry for Foreign and European Affairs 2019a).

Then Abdelkader Messahel, Algeria's Minister of Foreign Affairs, underlined the following: “It is essential that we listen to young people [...] and youth must be at the centre of this” (cited in: *ibid.*). It is evident that both of these diplomats' speeches have demonstrated *diplomatic flexibility*. Altogether, key functions of multi-optional diplomacy can clearly be seen. Youth are recognised as new actors in diplomacy and

make positive contributions in a multilateral setting. The aspirations and demands of youth met the experience of the foreign ministers at the negotiation table. The impact of youth in this high-level diplomatic setting pushed foreign ministers to reconsider their youth and invest more in youth leadership and inclusion in similar settings.




Fig. 3: Multi-Optional Diplomacy: E5 + 5 + 10Y; source: OzgunerDesignWorks 2020.

In a multipolar world with multipolar problems, we should consider re-thinking multilateral diplomacy with supportive approaches for *multi-optional* actors. The states tend to choose the ‘classical option’ when it comes to diplomacy, but there ought to be multiple options in order to bring about innovative solutions. At the Malta summit, high-level statesmen gave a voice to the youth who face the problems ‘on the ground’ and are often underrepresented and undermined (see Fig. 3).

In a globalised world, many problems are transnational and affect a wider range of countries, which, indeed, calls for more cooperation as well as alternative solutions, as mainstream approaches no longer provide sufficient solutions. For both regional and global problems, multilateralism has always been the key to creating common solutions negotiated by statesmen and top diplomats. But how can multilateralism work in a time of new transnational actors and multi-layered problems that affect

whole regions? Some states are, today, more fragile than others, and even face difficulties dealing with basic problems like domestic security. Oftentimes, solutions cannot be implemented because higher-level decision makers do not recognise the realities on the ground. Moreover, youth leaders who have potential are shunned and never have the opportunity to climb the ladder to reach key political positions. Corruption, nepotism, and a lack of transparency are just a few mechanisms that hinder the implementation of cooperative solutions, due to a lack of talent in politics.

The leadership seminar in Malta was the first of its kind to represent youth at a higher-level political summit where they were taken seriously, and where their recommendations were delivered directly to ministers. Without the bridging function of significant non-state actors such as the Anna Lindh Foundation, it would be impossible to bring together the youth and the ministers at this level. New partnerships are now on the table, and new means of diplomacy are therefore being considered. This is the meeting point of globalising forces from above, i.e. governments, and those from below, i.e. the youth, in a cross-cutting multi-optional dimension with the implementation of the UN/SCR 2250 on Youth, Peace and Security. The rise of new actors has already been recognised; multi-optional diplomacy is already taking place with youth; and the Maltese Foreign Ministry is a key supporter of them (cf. Maltese Ministry for Foreign and European Affairs 2019b).

Conclusion

The rapid increase of globalisation makes international affairs more complex to deal with, especially given the emergence of major transnational issues in international relations. Diplomacy needs more sophistication. Multilateralism needs a new strategy of dealing with these phenomena through the inclusion of new actors such as the primary victims or stakeholders affected the most by these issues.

This paper has argued that multilateralism needs to be reinvented and rethought by introducing youth as actors in international affairs. One significant finding to emerge from this study is an attempt to theorise multi-optional diplomacy to strengthen and complement multilateralism using the 5+5 Dialogue's engagement with youth in Malta as a case study.

I have argued that youth should be seen as drivers for change and integrated into the diplomatic landscape alongside decision makers. In this paper, my argument has been supported by the UN/SCR 2250 on Youth, Peace and Security, which urges states to consider youth in local, national, and international decision-making processes. Multi-optional diplomacy would empower future generations and prevent radicalisation and counterproductive mass movements. By connecting a network of youth to decision makers, multi-optional diplomacy would help decentralise decision-making processes.

I have shown that multi-optional diplomacy has worked on the practical level at the 5+5 Dialogue's engagement with youth, with the support of the Anna Lindh Foundation. This study lays the groundwork for future research into multi-optional diplomacy and non-state actors with reference to multilateralism. Further research might explore the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security in the context of multi-optional diplomacy. Furthermore, a greater focus on virtual exchange as a creative methodology could produce interesting findings that account more for multi-optional diplomacy in the digital space, especially given the impact of COVID-19.

Some Policy Recommendations

1. The EU should consider multi-optional diplomacy in multilateral settings dealing with partners in the Global South, and include youth leaders more strongly in diplomacy. For instance the EU-AU partnership is essential, as Africa has both the youngest and fastest growing youth population in the world.
2. The EU and its member states should consider creating a 'Special Envoy for Youth' or a Principal Advisor for Youth, Peace and Security (at the EU External Action Service and Foreign Ministries of EU members).
3. The EU and its member states should implement a foreign policy mechanism which includes a 'responsibility to protect' youth and children in conflict regions and civic participation of youth.

References

- Anna Lindh Foundation (2020a): EU High-Level Virtual Discussion on Youth with EU High Representative/Vice-President Josep Borrell on 16 June 2020. 19.06.2020; <https://www.annalindhfoundation.org/news/eu-high-level-virtual-discussion-youth-eu-high-representativevice-president-josep-borrell-16> [01.02.2021].
- Anna Lindh Foundation (2020b): Virtual Youth-Led Dialogue Leads to Recommendations for the UN Security Council Youth, Peace and Security Resolution, 28.04.2020; <https://www.annalindhfoundation.org/news/virtual-youth-led-dialogue-leads-recommendations-un-security-council-youth-peace-and-security> [01.02.2021].
- AU Youth Envoy (2019): Statement by Ms. Aya Chebbi, AU Youth Envoy, Delivered at the African Regional High-Level Conference on Counter-Terrorism and the Prevention of Violent Extremism Conducive to Terrorism. 10.06.2019; https://auyouthenvoy.org/statement_troy-istg_youth_envoy_-_nairobi_kenya_2019 [10.06.2020].
- Berents, Helen/Prelis, Saji (2020): More than a Milestone: The Road to UN Security Council Resolution 2250 on Youth, Peace and Security; <https://www.youth4peace.info/topic/more-milestone-road-unscr-2250-yyps> [20.01.2021].
- Chatham House (2017): The Arab Youth Survey: Voices of a Generation; <https://www.chathamhouse.org/event/arab-youth-survey-voices-generation> [20.06.2020].
- Cooper, Andrew F./Heine, Jorge/Thakur, Ramesh (eds.) (2013): *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Gillespie, Paul (2019): Mediterranean Youth Running Out of Patience with Elders. In: *The Irish Times*, 02.02.2019; <https://www.irishtimes.com/opinion/mediterranean-youth-running-out-of-patience-with-elders-1.3777861> [01.02.2021].
- Gray, Alex (2018): What You Need to Know about the World's Youth, in 7 Charts. In: *World Economic Forum*, 13.08.2018; <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/08/what-you-need-to-know-about-the-worlds-young-people-in-7-charts> [01.02.2021].
- Ikenberry, G. John (2001): American Power and the Empire of Capitalist Democracy. In: *Review of International Studies*. Vol. 27, No. 5, pp. 191–212.
- Ikenberry, G. John (2018): The End of Liberal International Order? In: *International Affairs*. Vol. 94, No. 1, pp. 7–23.
- Inter-Parliamentary Union (2020): Youth Participation; <https://www.ipu.org/our-impact/youth-empowerment/youth-participation> [01.02.2021].
- Keohane, Robert O. (1990): Multilateralism: An Agenda for Research. In: *International Journal*. Vol. 45, No. 4, pp. 731–764.
- Kissinger, Henry (1995): *Diplomacy*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Knox, David/Donaldson, Alasdair (2016): *Young Arab Voices*; <https://www.britishcouncil.org/research-policy-insight/insight-articles/young-arab-voices> [01.02.2021].

Malta Hosts First Regional Leadership Seminar for Young Med. Voices. In: *Times of Malta*, 03.02.2019; <https://timesofmalta.com/articles/view/malta-hosts-first-regional-leadership-seminar-for-young-med-voices.700912> [01.02.2021].

Maltese Ministry for Foreign and European Affairs (2019a): *5+5 Countries Put Young Mediterranean Voices at the Centre of Renewed Regional Cooperation*. 19.01.2019; <https://foreignandeu.gov.mt/mt/Government/Press%20Releases/Pages/5-5-countries-put-young-Mediterranean-voices-at-the-centre-of-renewed-regional-cooperation.aspx> [01.02.2021].

Maltese Ministry for Foreign and European Affairs (2019b): *Investing in a #Mediterranean-generation*. Malta Forum for the “Summit of the Two Shores”; <https://foreignandeu.gov.mt/en/government/events/s2r/documents/concept%20note%20mt%20forum.pdf> [01.02.2021].

Mo Ibrahim Foundation (2019): *Africa’s First Challenge: The Youth Bulge Stuck in ‘Waithood’*. 10.07.2019; <https://mo.ibrahim.foundation/news/2019/africas-first-challenge-youth-bulge-stuck-waithood> [01.02.2021].

Morse, Julia C./Keohane, Robert O. (2014): *Contested Multilateralism*. In: *The Review of International Organizations*. Vol. 9, No. 4, pp. 385–412.

Nye, Joseph S. (2008): *Public Diplomacy and Soft Power*. In: *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*. Vol. 616, No. 1, pp. 94–109.

Nye, Joseph S. (2011): *Power in the 21st Century*. In: *World Politics Review*, 22.03.2011; <https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/insights/8260/power-in-the-21st-century> [01.02.2021].

Nye, Joseph S./Goldsmith, Jack L. (2011): *The Future of Power*. In: *Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences*. Vol. 64, No. 3, pp. 45–52.

Özerdem, Alpaslan/Podder, Sukanya (2015): *Youth in Conflict and Peacebuilding. Mobilization, Reintegration and Reconciliation*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Risse-Kappen, Thomas (ed.) (2003): *Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions* (Cambridge Studies in International Relations No. 42), 2nd ed. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Rood, Jan/Dinnissen, Rosa (eds.) (2013): *An Uncertain World – Clingendael 2013 Strategic Monitor*. The Hague: Netherlands Institute for International Relations ‘Clingendael’; <https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/Strategic%20Monitor%202013.pdf> [01.02.2021].

Sending, Ole J./Pouliot, Vincent/Neumann, Iver B. (2011): *The Future of Diplomacy. Changing Practice, Evolving Relationships*. In: *International Journal*. Vol. 66, No. 3, pp. 527–542.

Sidiropoulos, Elizabeth (2018): *The BRICS in a Multipolar World*. In: *Project Syndicate*, 25.07.2018; <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/china-brics-south-africa-summit-by-elizabeth-sidiropoulos-2018-07> [01.02.2021].

Tocci, Nathalie (2020): The European Union. In: Stares, Paul B./Jia, Qingguo/ibid./Jaishankar, Dhruva/Kortunov, Andrey: Perspectives on a Changing World Order. Council on Foreign Relations, Center for Preventive Action (Discussion Paper Series on Managing Global Disorder No. 1), pp. 12–17; https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/discussion-paper-collection_stares-et-al_final-with-cover.pdf [01.02.2021].

United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN/DESA) (2013): Youth and Armed Conflict; <https://www.un.org/esa/socdev/documents/youth/fact-sheets/youth-armed-conflict.pdf> [01.02.2021].

United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN/DESA) (2019): International Youth Day, 12 August 2019. Ten Key Messages; https://www.un.org/development/desa/youth/wp-content/uploads/sites/21/2019/08/WYP2019_10-Key-Messages_GZ_8AUG19.pdf [01.02.2021].

United Nations Security Council (UNSC) (2015): Resolution 2250 (2015); [https://undocs.org/S/RES/2250\(2015\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/2250(2015)) [01.02.2021].

Wendt, Alexander (1992): Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics. In: *International Organization*. Vol. 46, No. 2, pp. 391–425.

About the Author

Burak Yusmak was born in 1990 and received an MA in International Studies and Diplomacy from the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. He was the co-founder of the Transnational Diplomacy Association at the same university, where he organised roundtable discussions and conferences. He initiated the “Diplomacy Dinners” with a thematic focus on gender and conflicting regions such as Japan, China, Taiwan, and South Asia, bringing youth and professionals together to create sustainable dialogue among future leaders through the use of diplomatic practices and the creation of transnational alliances, contributing to the long-term objective of preventing future conflicts in prospective regions through common values and ideas. He worked as a policy advisor in the European Parliament for a British MEP, and is currently working on a project with Libyan youth. He is a teamleader, ambassador, and trainer for the Erasmus+ Virtual Exchange programme, where his team won the Second Online Euro-Med Debate Competition. He is an alumnus of the Anna Lindh Foundation’s Young Mediterranean Voices programme. Contact: [burakyusmak\[at\]gmail.com](mailto:burakyusmak[at]gmail.com)

The Festival that Dares to Believe. A Recollection of the Out Film Festival – East Africa’s First Queer Film Festival

Kevin Mwachiro (Kilifi, Kenya)

Friday the 11th of November 2011 was not going to be an ordinary day for me or the Goethe-Institut in the Kenyan capital Nairobi. We were going to make history, for good reason, and possibly also for bad reason. The good reason was that we were about to host the first queer¹ film festival in the country. And the bad reason was the possibility of the festival being disrupted and cancelled by the authorities.

Homosexuality is not illegal in Kenya. But homosexual sex *is* illegal, following a colonial law² that we as a country have stubbornly refused to let go off. As organisers we knew we were not breaking the law. We had followed all the rules to the letter in putting this event together. However, there were still the clouds of doubt that hovered around the event at that time. In a country that likes to describe itself as conservative and religious, we, as the organisers, were also wary of potential disruption from religious moralists – mostly right-wing Christians – who had a habit of bulldozing their way into events that hosted discussions they deemed controversial. With this in mind, we had ensured that there were bouncers at the door to deal with any disruptors. Furthermore, we ensured the bouncers were briefed on the type of movies that were going to be screened and the diverse and perhaps even flamboyant nature of the audience. Homosexuality is perceived as a touchy subject within various circles of our society; however, currently, it causes less fidgeting in the seats.

The Out Film Festival (OFF) was out of the closet. We had not hidden this event from the public. There were posters; press-releases had been sent; and flyers had been distributed. As the curator and co-founder³ of the festival, I look back and only now

¹ According to the Merriam-Webster dictionary, “queer” is defined as relating to or characterised by sexual or romantic attraction that is not limited to people of a particular gender identity or sexual orientation. Queer and LGBTQI (Lesbian Gay Bisexual Transsexual Queer/Questioning and Intersex) are used interchangeably in this article.

² Sections 162 (a) – 165 (c) of the Penal Code of Kenya criminalise private consensual sexual conduct between two adults of the same sex.

³ The festival was organised in collaboration with Johannes Hossfeld, who was director of the Goethe-Institut in Nairobi at the time.

realise the magnitude of what the event was doing. The poster itself was dramatic but also very Kenyan. It had a male cross-dresser sitting on a bench at the city's main railway station. The event needed to demonstrate its Kenyaness and its blackness. This was deliberate, as it was a way of countering perceptions that homosexuality was an import from the West. It didn't matter that the event was being held within the four walls of a German institute, since the Goethe-Institut had established itself as a focal convening space for cultural activities within the city. The event wanted to position itself as a public event and not one that was being held in the shadows.

The Screenings

As organisers, we could not believe that we opened to a full-house! There were over 200 people in attendance and, unfortunately, we had to turn people away. I remember thinking at the time that even if we were shut down that evening, at least we had opened to a packed auditorium and had tried. Fortunately, that didn't happen and the show did go on!

The screenings took place over an evening and a day. I must acknowledge one of the pull factors to the event was the premiering of the film *Fluorescent Sin* by the Kenyan filmmaker Amirah Tajdin. This was a scoop, and it gave us the validation we needed to be taken seriously as a festival. *Fluorescent Sin* wasn't the only movie to premiere at the inaugural festival. The low-budget student film *Mine Only*, produced by the Kenya Institute of Mass Communication (KIMC), was the second movie to make its debut at the festival. Even though it portrayed a very cliché view of homosexuality, we agreed to screen the movie because it was a Kenyan production and was attempting to start a discussion about sexuality within a Kenyan context. That was very brave of the students, and I commend them for their work.

The variety of films attempted to represent the LGBTQI acronym and had a very multicultural tapestry. The festival wanted to allow its audience to see itself on the screen without any fear or shame. The event was not only meant to give the community visibility but also aimed to be a space that was political and for advocacy, not just for queer rights in Kenya but also in the region as a whole. It was around this time that we were beginning to hear, across the border in Uganda, the murmurings

of the short-lived Anti-Gay Act,⁴ which was in bill-form at the time. By screening the documentary *Kuchus of Uganda* by Swedish director Mathilda Piehl, the festival was reflecting the difficult reality of being queer in a homophobic region.

In a country where the queer community is mostly invisible, the film festival sought – and still seeks – to increase the community’s visibility, and to foreground the struggles, and the victories, of queer lives within and outside both the country and the African continent as a whole.

Personal Reflection

Looking back, I can’t believe how bold we organisers were, and I am grateful to Johannes Hossfeld, director of the Goethe-Institut in Nairobi at the time, for asking me to curate this first festival. I would also like to mention my ‘partner-in-crime’, Barbara Reich, who served as the centre’s cultural officer. Was I scared? Not really: I had the backing of the Goethe-Institut, and so I wasn’t alone. Was I scared for my safety? Yet again, not really, because we were not breaking any laws. All the movies had been cleared for rating by the country’s film rating body. The huge attendance at the opening was proof that there was a need for such an event and such a space. We just had to claim a space that was there. This first step had to be taken. Not that many members of the Nairobi LGBTQI community showed up, and this was likely due to fear of being recognised by the public or even stigma. But I do remember the overwhelming sense of achievement I felt as I sat in the darkened auditorium while we screened the movies. Some people did walk out when they realised that the movies were queer-themed. I remember the giggles and cheers whenever there was a sex scene or someone was dressed in drag. Remember, this was 2011 in a corner of Africa where the internet was not very accessible, and where the conversation around African sexuality was neither particularly advanced nor particularly vocal. Furthermore, the country’s queer activist movement was still trying to find its feet. There was a fear of the unknown. There were too many ‘what-ifs’ that held individuals back or prevented events from taking place.

⁴ The Anti-Gay Act was famously known as the ‘Kill the Gays Bill’. This law was deemed invalid by the Uganda Constitutional Court in August 2014, six months after it was enacted. The act would have broadened the criminalisation of same-sex relations in Uganda.

On a personal note, this was also the event that catapulted me into taking up a public profile as a gay man. My initial role had been to curate the festival. We had contacted another member of the community to be the emcee of the event. He already had a public profile and seemed to be the perfect fit for the role. Unfortunately, he cancelled at the very last minute. And so I was thrown into the spotlight. I made no reference to my sexuality, but by being the face of the festival, I outed myself.

I also remember sitting with Johannes outside the auditorium during one of the breaks, both of us astonished at what was unfolding in front of us. We had pulled off a remarkable feat. People were coming to the festival. These were people whom I had not seen in the clubs or other queer spaces – people who didn't mind being seen walking into a queer event. There had been no disruptions from the state or any other party. We had done what we needed to do to put it together, and we had managed to pull it off. And in that moment of reflection, we knew that we had to come back the following year.

A Place for Outsiders

It is now nine years since the festival opened its doors to the queer community in Nairobi, and it has strongly established itself as an event within the city's cinematic and cultural space. The attendance numbers have grown, and the programme has expanded to include panel discussions that touch not only on film but also on topics that are pertinent to queer life within the Kenyan context. The panels have become an important aspect of the festival and attract equally large numbers of people as the screenings.

Kenyan gay activist David Kuria states:

“An African only exists with the notion that he or she [add: *they*] belongs to his or her [add: *their*] society. Because of the traditional social context of poverty, life is shared and never lived individually. In that way, everything in society is socialised. Gays also feel the need to share their lives but they don't have a social structure in which to express that need” (Kuria 2010: 134).

OFF is not just a festival, it is a space. A space for expression, for belonging, for discussion, and for entertainment. This lack of a social structure has led the queer community to create or even claim spaces where they can belong. OFF has become one such space.

This space now has a younger audience, is more female, more trans, more eccentric, and more vocal. Furthermore, it not only offers space to the queer community, but to allies, to art-house movie lovers, and to those who see themselves as different. It has become home to the 'outsiders' of society, regardless of background, race, religion, orientation, or nationality.

Nairobi's character as a fast-paced, multicultural, manic, enterprising, dynamic, and unforgiving city means that it couldn't be a better host for such a festival. Events like OFF can be enveloped within the busyness of this metropolis. The city's arts centre has grown to also accommodate the diversity that OFF offers. However, how long the festival will be able to run unhindered is the question. The notoriety of the leadership at the Kenya Film Censorship Board, which has positioned itself as the moral policeman of Kenyan society, cannot be ignored. This, however, has not yet stopped the festival from expanding.

Out and About

In 2017 the festival made a bold move and took itself outside the Goethe-Institut, holding a special screening at the offices of the National Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission (NGLHRC). This was intended to bring the festival more directly to the community. Similar screenings have also been held at the offices of the Gay and Lesbian Coalition of Kenya (GALCK). This was well received by the community, as it offered individuals/audiences a window into the activism that is being done within the country.

In 2017 World Aids Day coincided with the festival dates. This coincidence was not lost on us organisers, and the festival invited ISHTAR MSM, a local activist group, to come and conduct HIV testing at the venue before the screenings commenced later that evening. There were also teams distributing condoms to members of the public.

The movie *The Normal Heart* by Ryan Murphy was deliberately programmed into the screenings to commemorate the day's significance. The festival was therefore able to commemorate a day that is of great importance to the community.

Partnering with local LGBTQI activists' groups has enabled the festival to entrench itself within the community, and has also allowed the Goethe-Institut be recognised as a key ally of the movement. The festival is a place for *artivism*, even though this is not explicitly stated. Unbeknown to itself at the beginning, in carrying out its work it has personified the character of an *artist*, as defined by Molefi K. Asante in his book *It's Bigger than Hip Hop*:

“The artist (artist + activist) uses her artistic talents to fight and struggle against injustice and oppression – by any medium necessary. The artist merges commitment to freedom and justice with the pen, the lens, the brush, the voice, the body, and the imagination” (Asante 2009: 39).

The Out Film Festival is not your ordinary LGBTQI film festival: not because it is held in a country that is homophobic, and not because it is supported by a non-Kenyan funding partner, but because it offers more than just cinematic expression; it offers a marginalised community the opportunity to express and believe in itself.

References

Asante, Molefi K. (2009): *It's Bigger than Hip-Hop. The Rise of the Post-Hip-Hop Generation*. New York: St. Martin's Griffin Press.

Kuria, David (2010): Urgent Goals of LGBTI Liberation. In: Dubel, Ireen/Hielkema, André (eds.): *Urgency Required. Gay and Lesbian Rights Are Human Rights*. The Hague: Humanist Institute for Cooperation with Developing Countries (Hivos), pp. 132–135.

About the Author

Kevin Mwachiro is a writer, broadcaster, podcaster, and queer activist. His first book is *Invisible – Stories from Kenya’s Queer Community*. He was part of the editorial team for *Boldly Queer – African Perspectives on Same-Sex Sexuality and Gender Diversity*. His first play, *Trashed*, was published in the anthology *Six in the City – 6 Short Plays on Nairobi*, and his poems have been published in the pan-African queer anthology *Walking the Tightrope*. His most recent work, *Number Sita*, was published in the anthology *Nairobi Noir*. Working in collaboration with the Goethe-Institut Nairobi, Kevin Mwachiro is a co-founder of the Out Film Festival, which is the first LGBTQI film festival in East Africa. Kevin Mwachiro currently serves on the boards of the Gay and Lesbian Coalition of Kenya (GALCK, an LGBTQ coalition), PEMA Kenya (a grassroots LGBTQI organisation), and Amnesty International – Kenya.

Contact: kmwachiro[at]yahoo.co.uk

How to Avoid Preaching Exclusively to the Choir: Extending the Scope of Civil Society Involvement in Cultural Relations

Swenja Zaremba (Karlsruhe)

Introduction

Reaching a broader range of citizens and collaborating with neighbouring sectors becomes more important in many initiatives in the realm of intercultural exchange and collaboration. For many actors who are active in the field of intercultural relations, it is of great importance (and, in some cases, even a genuine objective) to enable encounters with large sections of the population across cultural borders. They have access to a wide range of instruments to bridge differences, to bring heterogeneous groups of actors together, and to create common platforms. When it comes to reaching out to new target groups and fostering innovative approaches by involving a broader and more diverse range of society actors, it can be valuable and inspiring to look at concepts that originated in other sectors that aim for the same objective, such as ‘reaching the hard-to-reach’ (which originated in the health programmes of international aid organisations and in emergency management) and ‘co-creation’ (which has its origins in the private sector). These two approaches will be briefly presented in this essay, followed by concrete examples illustrating the implementation of these concepts in the field of intercultural relations, to reflect which lessons can be derived from this and then transferred and applied.

This article relates to activities and initiatives that are in general attributed to ‘cultural relations’ and involve partnership, collaboration, and dialogue in the field of culture and (informal) education – practices that are united “by the focus on interactions of people at the interface of cultures” (Young/Chi 2013: 134). They are hereinafter referred to as ‘intercultural relations’.¹ This definition intentionally does not distinguish between activities in the field of foreign cultural relations, which are driven by

¹ My article refers to the practices of intercultural relations, which should not be mistaken for a field of social science studies that is sometimes referred to as either ‘intercultural studies’ or ‘intercultural relations’.

state actors and public institutions on the national or international level or those that are led by third sector organisations such as private or political foundations, NGOs, or cultural organisations, or by individual artists and creative entrepreneurs.

The aim of reaching out to new target groups applies to activities embraced by the above definition, regardless of the main actors involved. Cultural activities are also increasingly characterised by the fact that they arise, work, and spread independently of location and therefore have an impact inside and outside the local and the national context. Today, intercultural relations are no longer just about intergovernmental connections at the macro level, such as those between national civilisations and major cultures that interact with one another. More than ever, networks are set up on the meso and micro level, i.e. it is civil society associations or even individuals that are primarily involved in shaping 'the cultures' in a multi-collective manner within a common framework.

This essay takes a reflective position and draws on discussions from the strategic working group on civil society of the Division for Culture and Communication of the German Federal Foreign Office as well as the debate on the results of this working group in the Workshop of the Academic Council on Culture and Foreign Policy (WIKa) at ifa in 2019. It aims at reflecting the transferability of selected approaches of other sectors such as 'reaching the hard-to-reach' and 'co-creation'. It concentrates on a thematic overlap of the lessons learned during and through the collaboration with civil society actors within the coordination of the German network of the Anna Lindh Foundation (ALF) (cf. Zaremba 2020), as well as on selected best practices and thus brings a specific perspective of practice into play.

While there is still a need for research exploring which target groups are included in projects in the field of intercultural relations and which are not, as well as for concrete recommendations and guidelines for communication and outreach practices about how to reach underserved audiences, there are already living practices in many programmes pertaining to the latter. Systematic research on this issue with a specific focus on projects in the field of (inter)cultural relations is a desideratum.

Putting Citizens at the Centre of Intercultural Relations

Intercultural relations can help enable access to culture and education beyond geographical, political, and social borders. They can contribute to the essential democratic objective of ensuring that the entire population is heard and involved, and can also contribute to citizens' participation in the public sphere, including in decision-making processes. Reaching beyond those who are already engaged and collaborating with neighbouring sectors becomes more important as a reaction to a diverse reality with regard to new challenges. Social cohesion needs to cope with the consequences of climate change and overcome social inequalities; the latter include increased migratory movements, societal divides, increasing populism, and the feeling of a loss of security in the face of future challenges. Strengthening intercultural relations can

“[...] decisively influence mutual understanding and common interests, which will counter radicalization processes in the long run. This dialogue, if embedded in a regional, sustainable and comprehensive form of cultural support, will also help countering increasing polarization within societies” (El Difraoui 2017: 2).

This presupposes a strong civil society and the acknowledgement of its key role in preparing political decision-making processes as crucial parts of the public sphere (cf. Strachwitz 2014; Lang 2012), in order to provide an alternative to the rise of populism. Participatory approaches that reach beyond certain parts of society can contribute to a more inclusive and diverse public discourse.

Civil society actors can achieve outstanding results thanks to their dynamism, agility, and innovative strength. Small local civil society actors can reflect the direct fears, worries, and expectations of the local population and can help define problems and solutions that are relevant to society. Considering advice from civil society organisations but also from individual citizens can help identify the burning local questions and can therefore contribute to the relevance and effectiveness of the programmes. Artists and creatives can act as “agents of change” even in authoritarian contexts (Crückeberg et al. 2018: 292); they can contribute to the development of a counter-public and critical awareness. Strengthening the cooperation between civil society across borders on a long-term basis also allows for civil society actors to stay in contact despite difficult environments, and enables the discussion of topics

absent from the political agenda. Networked individuals and groups, such as social movements within civil society, cultural and political activities by migrants and diaspora communities use cross-border cooperation as an empowering mode of work (cf. Sassen 2002: 217 ff.).

While globally active NGOs have their own strengths in terms of their networks, their professionalism, and access to the international political level, the increasing power of smaller local civil society organisations is to be found in their involvement on the grassroots level.

What Can Intercultural Relations Learn from the Concepts of Reaching the Hard-to-Reach and Co-Creation?

The need for new strategies to reach out to previously neglected sectors of society has become more obvious. Conventional modes of communication do not come close to reaching the full spectrum of society. In considering concrete practical initiatives, this section asks how intercultural relations can learn from the concepts of ‘reaching the hard-to-reach’ and ‘co-creation’.

Reaching the Hard-to-Reach

The so-called concept of ‘reaching the hard-to-reach’ was primarily used in health programmes of international aid organisations or in emergency management, fields in which access to all citizens can be a question of life and death. The term is debatable, as Vicki S. Friemuth and Wendy Mettger (1990) state, since it has a certain connotation that labels and misleadingly blames those who are not reached by traditional communication efforts. By acknowledging this objection and being aware of it, and thereby avoiding this risk of labelling, the term will nevertheless be used in this article to describe the fact that different strategies are needed to reach out to different parts of the population. Christian Humm and Philipp Schrögel (2020) suggest a typology of factors that exclude certain parts of society from science communication events, which might serve as an orientation for intercultural relation activities as well, though the transferability has yet to be proven. They differentiate between individual

factors such as age, educational background, income, and literacy; social factors such as gender, origin, and disabilities; and structural conditions that refer mainly to infra-structural location, distance, availability of supporting services, etc.

Apart from the increasing significance of protection programmes and shelter initiatives (for artists, human right activists, or researchers at risk) or of heritage emergencies, intercultural relations are rarely confronted with tackling emergencies. Nevertheless, they can learn lessons from this concept, since the challenges and solutions of reaching broad sections of the population are similar and comparable, and so as not to fall into the trap of functionalising arts and culture – as is well known, truth is not constitutive for culture, and the conveyance of information is not the declared aim of intercultural relations. However, in the process of intercultural encounters, participants can develop the ability to convey knowledge and insight, and can develop an understanding of and reflections on their own tolerance for ambiguity and the awareness that their own perception of the world is relative. Intercultural activities in the field of culture and education can help to encounter stereotypes, enable critical thinking; they can provide evidence-based knowledge to the public sphere and to the shaping of public opinion. It becomes obvious that reaching a broad range of citizens – even if it's not a question of immediate emergency – is still of high importance for any society as a whole on a longer term that respects these tangible experiences of democratic values. Freedom of the arts, research, and freedom of speech or the significance of a culture of open debates should be accessible to a broad range of citizens and, together with the evidence basis of information, are values that cannot be taken for granted.

John Froomjian and James L. Garnett (2013) draw lessons for governments – and public administrations in general – seeking to reach increasing numbers of citizens of diverse populations. They suggest that more effective strategies should include knowledge about the target group and the building of partnerships with agencies and individuals that interact with the target population. More diverse sections of the population can also be reached by including specifically selected media and by using simplified communication and feedback techniques.

Humm and Schrögel formulate recommendations for reaching and engaging underserved audiences of science communication activities. They not only suggest listening to and reducing the distance to underserved audiences, but also better illustrating the relevance of science for their daily lives. Moreover, they recommend going where

the target people are and cooperating with stakeholders and multipliers. Additionally, the authors point out the problem of too much openness and too many one-time activities. This might also include changes in the communication strategy, including promoting values in a more striking way, and adapting the language and sending clearer messages.

The initiative COLA TAXI OKAY² can serve as an example for the implementation of this approach within the field of intercultural relations: It was created in 2015 in Karlsruhe by a group of students, artists, and refugees, first and foremost as a café and an open ‘cultural space’ in which people meet at eye level and facilitate joint cultural events. The target groups are newly arrived refugees and long-established citizens of the city. The initiators do not pick out potential differences or conflicts as central themes for a discussion, but instead offer space to develop a dialogue and to reflect on conflicts together. Barriers are set as low as possible – people come together to drink a coffee, cook together. While the activities offer the medium of encounter, this happens subtly in individual everyday situations: while cooking, jamming, at a joint theatre performance, in writing, in an argument. The events are attended by refugees and locals alike. A communication strategy that builds on the networks of the involved migrants and refugees made this possible: The refugees shared the events in their Facebook groups (sometimes on request, but sometimes, which is of course even better, unsolicited). The refugees are of course much better multipliers than German volunteers, for example, and not only because of potential language barriers. In a conversation, Larissa Mantel, the founder of the initiative, mentioned trust among people who have gone through similar experiences as a further important success factor. She also noted the need for more practical knowledge about how to reach the target group: What messenger service do members of that group use? Do they read emails? Which social media platform(s) do they use for communication? It is obvious that a solid foundation of trust and credibility and the feeling of co-ownership are needed to make this happen: Half of the team consists of refugees, who are active participants; all partners are involved on the conceptual level from the very beginning, and that involvement is ongoing; and the autonomy of the partners as independent organisers of events lends the project credibility, which is indispensable for those partners’ willingness to spread the word among their peers, and which has helped make this project a true success story.

² For more information on this cultural meeting space, see <https://colataxiokay.com> [01.02.2021].

Another project that aims to reach migrants and refugees, and thereby focuses on making their own team more diverse, is “Multaka: Museum as Meeting Point – Refugees as Guides in Berlin Museums”³ While Syrian and Iraqi refugees are not only the target audiences of the involved museums, they are being trained to become museum guides so that these museum tours can in turn be offered to Arabic-speaking refugees in their mother tongue. *Multaka* (Arabic for ‘meeting point’) aims to form a bridge between the newcomers’ cultural heritage and their host societies. Stefan Weber, Director of the Museum für Islamische Kunst, Berlin, sums it up as follows:

“The programme’s approach of involving refugees as key players in the core of the project has proven successful. It not only allows us to reach out to newcomers for cultural participation by bridging language barriers, but also enables them to present cultural outputs from their home countries in a confident way to the public: They select their objects and stories and add new narratives.”⁴

The Goethe-Institut Johannesburg in partnership with Triggerfish Academy is carrying out a project that puts marginalised South African youth in touch with professionals from the animation industry and opens up paths for possible careers in creative industries. This project reaches out to the target group by combining objectives such as career guidance, capacity building, and employability with creative expression, and conveys means to bringing underrepresented voices into the global media eye. The project brings local youth together with a local actor in the creative industry – the Triggerfish Academy – to train skills that can be applied in many fields outside the traditional film industry, while fostering enduring relationships that will outlast the initiative.⁵

The “Alta Voz” project seeks to empower the Bolivian cultural sector to promote equality, gender equity, and sexual diversity and to strengthen its link to civil society organisations. It reaches out to rural areas where most of the activities take place. It has a multi-stakeholder approach, identifies and brings together local cross-sectoral actors, while also laying the groundwork for creating a sustainable network that

³ For more information on this collaboration between the Museum für Islamische Kunst, the Vorderasiatisches Museum, the Skulpturensammlung and Museum für Byzantinische Kunst, and the Deutsches Historisches Museum, see <https://multaka.de/en/project-2> [01.02.2021].

⁴ Personal conversation with Stefan Weber in 2020.

⁵ For more information on this project, see <https://www.goethe.de/ins/za/en/kul/sup/tfa.html> [01.02.2021].

can exist independently after the initiative. The initiators explicitly see themselves as supporters who help create spaces and networks for the local actors initiating the activities. The project also demonstrates the importance of finding the right media to reach the local community: In this case, traditional media (television and radio) were chosen for the audiovisual show, *Amazonía Alza la Voz*.⁶

The potential of an expanded outreach to formerly neglected participants shall be illustrated by transferring the idea to the potential extension of an existing project in the field of intercultural relations: The European Commission's pilot project Erasmus+ Virtual Exchange establishes encounters and intercultural exchange online (cf. Helm/Van der Velden 2020). The Anna Lindh Foundation, as a consortium partner in the programme, is in particular responsible for running intercultural online debate exchange activities. The trainings and exchanges, which use a 'virtual debates' methodology, aim at enabling participants to engage with people from diverse backgrounds in a secure dialogue space and at facilitating critical thinking in an intercultural context. Intercultural and leadership communication skills as well as collaborative problem solving are the target learning goals. The programme not only seeks to reach out to universities, but also targets youth organisations across the Mediterranean. Working with local organisations on the ground that can help by providing technical means and reducing psychological barriers proved to be a successful means of reaching people who had never been in touch with exchange programmes before. This is already a great achievement in and of itself, since it includes young women and men from some of Europe's neighbouring countries in the exchange who otherwise would be excluded from many exchange programmes due to visa restrictions or mobility costs.

Transferring the presented concept would mean extending the target group and making the programme accessible to parts of the populations that have not been reached yet, e.g. due to language barriers, a lack of information, or a lack of access to the necessary technical means. It seems to be valuable to focus on inhabitants in marginalised, rural areas on both shores of the Mediterranean. Besides the already tested

⁶ For more information on this first EUNIC Bolivia project, see <https://proyectoaltavozbolivia.com> [01.02.2021].

collaboration with local youth organisations, it is worth aiming at a cross-sectorial collaboration with, e.g. international aid organisations, private foundations, or companies that provide the needed technical infrastructure in marginalised areas.⁷

Co-Creation

An active form based on a participative approach which could be useful in extending the scope of involved citizens is that of co-creation. While strategies behind the catchphrase ‘reaching the hard-to-reach’ relate to communication, co-creation comes up with tried and tested methods for user-oriented project development. Derived from the private sector, co-creation describes the active involvement of end-users in different phases of the production process (cf. Prahalad/Ramaswamy 2000; Vargo/Lusch 2004). The concept has been transferred in various forms to the public sector (cf. Voorberg et al. 2014).

When it comes to collaboration in the field of intercultural relations, this approach means involving citizens in the design or implementation of projects from the very beginning. Some traditional approaches encourage those people who meet the expectations of a certain professionalism to write proposals for calls for projects, but these approaches simultaneously risk ignoring some of the most potentially impactful innovative ideas on the grassroots level by inadvertently limiting possible participants. If involved from the very beginning, citizens can help reach new actors on the ground who would otherwise be excluded from writing proposals for project calls due to their lack of capacity or their lack of the specific skills needed for sometimes very demanding project application processes; this therefore avoids the unintended effect of supporting only those people who are already the best suited to write such complex and demanding proposals (cf. Worschech 2019). Rather than having the agenda set by the person who owns the fund (see Hampel 2014) and who therefore decides on the outcomes in lines of funding, the involvement of local citizens in the first and fundamental part of designing the project can counteract the risk of failing to meet the local population’s needs.

⁷ A proposal for the extension of the programme to marginalised areas was submitted by Marjus Cevoli and Swenja Zaremba in the context of the “Summit of the two Shores” 2019: “Virtual Exchange Goes Rural: Empowering Youth Mediterranean Generation with Fewer Mobility Opportunities through Enabling VE in Marginalized Areas” (unpublished).

A cultural-political movement of people in different countries has made precisely this approach its guiding principle, and this movement understands that the needs of the citizens are a mandate. The “New Patrons” (in German: “Neue Auftraggeber”)⁸ is an international network that carries out artistic projects that arise on the initiative and behalf of citizens. Their first and most important principle is to listen to the needs of the local population. In different, mostly structurally disadvantaged regions, their team of more than 20 people, made up of mediators, coordinators, and employees, works together with citizens and well-known artists to address societally relevant issues using artistic methods.

The “Alhan Libiyya”⁹ project of the Candid Foundation (a member of the German ALF network) is based upon the principle of co-creation throughout the entire process. Since it is a format by Libyans for Libyans, the team in Berlin sees itself merely as a facilitator in this project. The social media activities, the design of the digital collaboration process, and the accompanying media outputs, such as a video and podcast series, were developed in close cooperation with Libyan talents, and it is through them that they become creative reality – the best way to create target-group-oriented attention and awareness. All musicians, producers, social media experts, and creative people involved in the project are part of “Alhan Libiyya”.

The international Nagoonbaatar Eco Art Festival,¹⁰ a cooperation between Mongolian, German, French, and Czech artists, and the inhabitants of the Yurts district in Ulaanbaatar has been set up with the aim of raising awareness through the arts. Its goal is to work with citizens on more environmentally friendly ways of living and to raise awareness about the dangers of air pollution and the means of preventing it. The festival’s main activities centre around community participation and co-creation: Mongolian and European artists (attendees of a residency programme) will explore the local context with the support of the local community. The programme follows a cross-sectoral approach bringing artists, air pollution experts, environmental

⁸ For more information on “The New Patrons”, see <https://neueauftraggeber.de/en/about-the-new-patrons-1> [01.02.2021].

⁹ For more information on this project, whose title can be translated as “Libyan Tunes”, see <https://alhanlibiyya.com> [01.02.2021].

¹⁰ For more information on this festival, organised and financed by EUNIC, with the cooperation of the Delegation of the European Union in Mongolia, the Embassy of the Czech Republic, the Alliance Française of Ulaanbaatar, the Goethe-Institut Mongolei, and local partners, see <https://eunicglobal.eu/projects/mongolia-nagoonbaatar-international-eco-art-festival> [01.02.2021].

educators, and representatives of the local community together to conceptualise art projects and education methodologies. The project is organised and financed by EUNIC, and its partners include local organisations such as Art Gallery 976, the Arts Council of Mongolia, and the University of Arts and Culture.

Another participative approach that exhibits elements of co-creation was chosen by the German network of the Anna Lindh Foundation to design the format “The Mediterranean on the Spot”¹¹: The nationwide series of events composed of different formats such as debates, trainings, and artistic performances brought together diverse perspectives from local communities on a shared subject. The topic was determined by the member organisations – as a thematic umbrella under which a majority of people could gather their local concepts. In 2015, the peak year of flight and migration movements, the focus topic was “New Neighbourhoods”. In this situation, many member organisations took over tasks of building bridges between newcomers and host communities, dealing with intercultural challenges for accommodating newcomers (whether refugees or migrants in general). Since the challenges differed greatly depending on the local conditions, concerning, e.g. the social and political need to provide help for people’s existential needs, the involvement of local actors from the very beginning allowed for each of the challenges to be tackled locally in a way that organisers on the ground considered appropriate. Within a core period of three months, more than 13 events were organised throughout Germany in cooperation with the member organisations. The series of events was able to contribute to both – sharing knowledge as well as tackling current societal challenges while taking local needs into consideration.

Conclusion

Both approaches – reaching the hard-to-reach and co-creation – not only offer exemplary solutions for initiating dialogue with new target groups which can be implemented in a concrete project, but also bear the potential of a sustainable, community-focused, needs-lead, and partnership-driven cooperation based on trust and innovative strength. Moreover, these approaches can reduce the risk of focusing

¹¹ For more information on this project, see <https://www.annalindhfoundation.org/resources/good-practices/mediterranean-spot-new-neighbourhoods> [01.02.2021].

solely on the fulfilment of short-term project-driven cooperation, which would probably fail to meet the actual needs of any given situation. It builds on the need for good knowledge of the local scene and the continuous expansion of the network to include (smaller) civil society actors. Close contact to a lively civil society enables actors in the field of intercultural relations to react to societal needs, since those actors are able to perceive social developments, trends, dissatisfaction, and demands in a timely manner. However, one should be aware that these approaches are very time-intensive with regards to their preparation.

The abovementioned examples show that methods of co-creation and strategies for how to reach the hard-to-reach are already being put into practice in different activities in intercultural relations. While systematic research that analyses the success factors of these approaches in intercultural relations is still needed, several recommendations can currently be drawn out of these promising and practice-proven approaches:

- *Target-group-oriented attention and awareness, clearly defined local needs*
Listen to your new target group to clearly define their needs. Involve your target group from the very beginning. Small, local civil society actors on the grassroots level can directly reflect the fears, worries, and expectations of the local population.
- *Peers as mediators, diverse teams*
Peers of the target group as members of the team can serve as intermediaries and bridge builders, particularly when it comes to communication, the choice of media, and choice of which language to address your target group in.
- *Go to where your audience is*
Lower the barriers by planning activities in places that are familiar to the participants you want to reach, since space and mobility play an important role. This might mean organising exhibitions in public places or debates in cafés, developing theatre plays with prisoners, or planning entire programmes in rural areas.
- *Active audience participation: target group as protagonists*
It is important for the initiators of participatory programmes to reflect on their roles, especially concerning the degree of the content's openness and accessibility, the approaches adopted, and the hierarchy of any decision-making processes. If the project's initiators see their role merely as facilitators, their task can be to provide space and bring people together, to offer capacity

buildings and trainings for the participants, and to moderate the participatory process. This definition of roles enables the target group to operate as active participants and protagonists of the project.

- *Identify and link cross-sectoral partners in order to create sustainable structures*
A multi-stakeholder approach fosters innovation and learning from one another, and also provides new perspectives and visibility by finding surprising and unexpected ways of addressing issues. Bringing actors from different sectors, backgrounds, and regions together can enhance innovation within the local context. These partnerships can also help create independent and sustainable structures that can continue to benefit the local sector long after the initiatives have ended. When it comes to trainings and capacity building, it is worth considering whether these are always sufficient objectives in and of themselves. On a longer-term level, the activities should contribute to creating structures in which these competences can be used, e.g. by helping to create sustainable relationships and networks that will endure after the initiatives have been completed.

However, it is crucial in any such policy and strategy to maintain the division and autonomy of all partners involved. Especially if public institutions are involved, the financier behind the initiatives needs to be transparent to avoid the risk that CSOs become perceived by those communities and localities as agents of the central authority. Public engagement with civil society always needs to respect the autonomy and self-action ability of all partners involved. It needs to be permanently aware of all possible risks in order to preclude illegitimate manipulation. Dialogue at eye level and transparency are therefore indispensable basic principles. Civil society needs to be dealt with as an arena of its own, which – despite cross-sectoral collaboration – has to be clearly distinguished from other spheres. Civil society networks therefore present a promising measure of interconnected and organised entities rather than an unconnected group of independent CSOs. Hence, collectivities of civil society organisations have a crucial role to play as moderators and as mechanisms to reach and represent a much larger segment of society and civil society organisations.

A participatory approach on the operative level corresponds internally to the implementation of the values that are represented externally and thus makes the implementation more credible. Bearing in mind those principles, initiatives of intercultural relations with an inclusive approach that are open towards new partnerships can expand their networks through lively exchanges with local actors on the ground and can therefore

provide relevant contributions to the public discourse. Involving a broader spectrum of the population (both within and outside the country) in intercultural relations can contribute to the essential democratic objective of a more diverse and open exchange at eye level, and this is reflected in intercultural encounters, which are becoming increasingly necessary to counteract cultural divides within and across societies.

References

- Crückeberg, Johannes/Lettau, Meike/Maier, David (2018): Kunst, Gesellschaft, Politik und internationale kulturelle Zusammenarbeit zeitgemäß erforschen. Überlegungen zu Perspektiven der Auswärtigen Kulturpolitik. In: Blumenreich, Ulrike/Dengel, Sabine/Hippe, Wolfgang/Sievers, Norbert (eds.): Jahrbuch für Kulturpolitik 2017/18. Bielefeld: transcript, pp. 291–300; <https://www.degruyter.com/transcript/view/book/9783839442524/10.14361/9783839442524-031.xml> [01.02.2021].
- El Difraoui, Asiem (2017): The Role of Culture in Preventing and Reducing Violent Extremism. In: More Europe – External Cultural Relations 2017, pp. 1–7; http://moreeurope.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/paper_role_of_culture_pve_more_europe_28.09.2017__0.pdf [01.02.2021].
- Friemuth, Vicki S./Mettger, Wendy (1990): Is There a Hard-to-Reach Audience? In: Public Health Reports. Vol. 105, No. 3, pp. 232–238; <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1580016> [01.02.2021].
- Froonjian, John/Garnett, James L. (2013): Reaching the Hard to Reach: Drawing Lessons from Research and Practice. In: International Journal of Public Administration. Vol. 36, No. 12, pp. 831–839.
- Hampel, Annika (2014): Fair Cooperation. Partnerschaftliche Zusammenarbeit in der Auswärtigen Kulturpolitik. Wiesbaden: Springer VS.
- Helm, Francesca/Van der Velden, Bart (2020): Erasmus+ Virtual Exchange. Intercultural Learning Experiences: 2019 Impact Report. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union; <https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/0ee233d5-cbc6-11ea-adf7-01aa75ed71a1> [01.02.2021].
- Humm, Christian/Schrögel, Philipp (2020): Science for All? Practical Recommendations on Reaching Underserved Audiences. In: Frontiers in Communication. Vol. 5, Art. 42, pp. 1–13; <https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fcomm.2020.00042/full> [01.02.2021].
- Lang, Sabine (2012): NGOs, Civil Society, and the Public Sphere. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Prahalad, Coimbatore K./Ramaswamy, Venkatram (2000): Co-Opting Customer Competence. In: Harvard Business Review. Vol. 78, No. 1, pp. 79–87; <https://hbr.org/2000/01/co-opting-customer-competence> [01.02.2021].

Sassen, Saskia (2002): Global Cities and Diasporic Networks. Microsites in Global Civil Society. In: Anheier, Helmut K./Glasius, Marlies/Kaldor, Mary (eds.): Global Civil Society 2002. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, pp. 217–238.

Strachwitz, Rupert Graf (2014): Achtung vor dem Bürger. Ein Plädoyer für die Stärkung der Zivilgesellschaft. Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder.

Vargo, Stephen L./Lusch, Robert F. (2004): Evolving to a New Dominant Logic for Marketing. In: Journal of Marketing. Vol. 68, No. 1, pp. 1–17; <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1509/jmkg.68.1.1.24036> [01.02.2021].

Voorberg, William/Bekkers, Victor J./Tummers, Lars (2014): A Systematic Review of Co-Creation and Co-Production: Embarking on the Social Innovation Journey. In: Public Management Review. Vol. 17, No. 9, pp. 1333–1357.

Worschech, Susann (2019): Democratisation through the Backdoor: The Political Impact of ‘Non-Political’ Culture Support. Presentation at the WIKA Workshop 2019 [Lecture]; <https://youtu.be/EvgoV2v89G4> [01.02.2021].

Young, Jonathan/Chi, Ruobing (2013): Intercultural Relations: A Bibliometric Survey. In: International Journal of Intercultural Relations. No. 37, pp. 133–145.

Zaremba, Swenja (2020): Lessons Learned – zur Zusammenarbeit mit zivilgesellschaftlichen Netzwerken. In: Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen e.V. (ifa): Weltweit 2019. Stuttgart: ifa (Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen), pp. 72–74; https://www.ifa.de/fileadmin/Content/docs/organisation/ifa_jahrbuch_2019.pdf [01.02.2021].

About the Author

Swenja Zaremba is a research associate in the field of Interculturality and Globalisation at ZAK | Centre for Cultural and General Studies at the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT) and co-coordinator of the German network of the Anna Lindh Foundation. She studied German literature, journalism, and communication science in Karlsruhe and Nancy, France. As part of her work at ZAK, she designs courses, workshops, and public science events and third-party funded projects in the fields of interculturality, internationalisation, and foreign cultural and educational policy. Her research interests are intercultural skills transfer, internationalisation at universities,


Euro-Mediterranean cultural relations, international cultural cooperation, and cultural relations and civil society. She is a member of the strategic working group Civil Society in Cultural Relations and Education Policy of the Division for Culture and Communication of the German Federal Foreign Office and a member of the Stiftung Wissensraum Europa – Mittelmeer (WEM) e.V.

Contact: [swenja.zaremba\[at\]kit.edu](mailto:swenja.zaremba[at]kit.edu)

























Culture Wars at Home and Abroad: Examples from the Goethe-Institut¹

Mechtild Manus (Schliersee)

The Turkish government bans an LGBTQI film festival; in Banská Bystrica, Slovakia, right-wing extremists disturb the reading of a Holocaust survivor; and at the Hannah Arendt Center in Annandale-on-Hudson, USA, Marc Jongen (Alternative for Germany, AfD) calls on the audience to leave the “spectres of Hitler” behind (Jongen 2017, Timecode 00:08:55).

German cultural work abroad is increasingly having to contend with radical positions and massive interventions by state and non-state actors. In the following, I would like to outline how the Goethe-Institut² reflects this development and with which instruments German foreign cultural and educational policy (Auswärtige Kultur- und Bildungspolitik, AKBP) could counteract it. In doing so, I am relying on a lecture I gave in November 2017 at the invitation of the Academic Council on Culture and Foreign Policy (WIKA, i.e. Wissenschaftlicher Initiativkreis Kultur und Außenpolitik) at the ifa (Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen) in Stuttgart. However, I also take into account current developments up to the time of writing this text in April 2020.

“We will hunt down Mrs. Merkel.” This statement by Alexander Gauland (AfD) after the federal elections on 24 September 2017 reveals a disinhibition of language and a verbal violence that frightened some.

Radicalisation is a process that leads to a form of violence, be it verbal violence in the form of hate speech, violence against things, or violence against people. Usually, radicalisation is triggered by two factors: perceived disparagement and the idea of an unfettered utopia. On the one hand the radicalised individual feels humiliated or wants to stand up for others; on the other hand s/he pursues an unfettered utopia whose realisation is not conceivable in the foreseeable future, for instance a global neo-caliphate, an international classless society, or an ethnonationalism in which every human being is assigned to a certain country (cf. Khosrokhavar 2016: 29–56).

¹ Translated from the German by Kareem James Abu-Zeid.

² The Goethe-Institut is the cultural institute of the Federal Republic of Germany with a global reach: www.goethe.de/en/index.html [01.02.2021].

In the process of radicalisation, the individual can certainly change his or her position: The journalist Jürgen Elsässer, for example, was once a member of the radical left-wing Communist League (KB) in Stuttgart, but today, as editor-in-chief of the radical right-wing magazine *Compact*, he expresses himself in homophobic, misogynist, xenophobic, and anti-Semitic terms.

Of all the current radical movements, the international new right is particularly relevant for German foreign cultural and educational policy. The international new right is against openness, liberality, critical reappraisal of the past, recognition of various forms of life and family – against values that are characteristic of the work of the Goethe-Institut and other actors of cultural exchange.

The international new right is a factor that should be taken seriously. The right-wing “Identity and Democracy” faction is the fifth strongest group in the European Parliament with 73 MEPs from nine countries. If you add the 26 MEPs from the Polish *Prawo i Sprawiedliwość* (PiS, Law and Justice Party) in the European Conservatives and Reformers group and the 13 Hungarian MEPs from *Fidesz* and the *Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt* (KDNP, Christian Democratic People’s Party) in the European People’s Party (whose membership has been temporarily suspended), it comes to over 100 seats for the extreme right.

Just how internationally networked right-wing extremists are became apparent when documents on the ongoing correspondence between the assassin from Christchurch (New Zealand), Brenton Tarrant, and the Austrian Identitarian Martin Sellner became public in May 2019 (cf. Mascolo et al. 2019).

Since the 2017 federal elections, the AfD has been systematically attempting, albeit unsuccessfully so far, to shape German cultural policy at home and abroad in line with its own ideas, both in public and through parliamentary committees, including the Committee on Culture and the Media and the Subcommittee on Cultural and Education Policy Abroad, and in federal state parliaments, district assemblies, and local assemblies. In Germany, only films that can be expected to be commercially successful are to be supported, no funding of any kind is to flow into international co-productions. The theatres should primarily run German classics such as Goethe’s *Faust*, Schiller’s *Wallenstein*, and Kleist’s *Hermannsschlacht*, demands Marc Jongen, cultural policy spokesman for the AfD parliamentary group in the Bundestag, in response to the *Financial Times* (cf. Jongen 2018b; Chazan 2018). Subsidies for Berlin

theatres such as the Maxim Gorki Theater, the Schaubühne, or the Deutsches Theater should be cut, and the Württemberg State Theatres in Stuttgart should disclose the nationalities of their ensemble members. Beatrix von Storch (Member of the Bundestag) has tried, so far unsuccessfully, to stop the performances of Falk Richter's *FEAR*, and an AfD party colleague of hers interrupted a performance by filming scenes from the play. Identitarians close to the AfD loudly disrupted a conversation that was being broadcast live on the radio from the Maxim Gorki Theater. Bianca Klose, managing director of the Mobile Beratung gegen Rechtsextremismus (Mobile Counselling against Right-Wing Extremism), lists further incidents, including hate mail, bomb threats, and death threats. In the meantime, the counselling of artists and cultural workers has become the main focus of the Berlin counselling centre, which has been in existence for 20 years now (cf. Laudenbach 2019).

According to Marc Jongen, the current cultural practice of theatre and film wants to “liquidate Germany and the German cultural nation” (Jongen 2018b: n.p.). He sees an “international leftist tendency” at work here, which he would like to overcome with his party. To come closer to this goal, the AfD is demanding that the Goethe-Institut “convey a positive image of Germany” and concentrate on “conveying German [...] culture abroad.” The right-wing party rejects the “financing of African museums as well as close cooperation with the French counterpart the Institut Français” (Alternative für Deutschland 2019: n.p., translated from the German).

The party is therefore developing the exact counter-model to the mission that the Goethe-Institut is carrying out in consultation with the German Federal Foreign Office. The Goethe-Institut's mission entails the following: conveying a realistic image of Germany, promoting international cooperation, forming joint institutes with the Institut Français, supporting African museums, and coming to terms with Germany's colonial past.

To underpin their praise of German colonialism and their rejection of any kind of restitution, Petr Bystron, Chairman of the AfD in the Subcommittee on Cultural and Education Policy Abroad, and Markus Frohnmaier, spokesman for development policy of the AfD parliamentary group, invited the controversial American historian Bruce Gilley to give a lecture on 11 December 2019. Over a glass of wine, these politicians of the new right discussed “why Germans do not have to apologise for the colonial era and certainly do not have to pay for it” (Georgi 2019: n.p., translated from the German).

The website of the Desiderius-Erasmus Foundation, the political foundation of the AfD, does not yet contain any references to events being organised abroad. However, the foundation is ready and willing “to represent German interests in the world” (Desiderius-Erasmus-Stiftung 2020: n.p., translated from the German). This sounds suspiciously like “Germany first” and is the exact opposite of what Johannes Ebert, Secretary General of the Goethe-Institut, postulated in the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*: “Particularly against the backdrop of German history, only such a cultural policy is credible that does not regard one’s own people as superior and that has a certain humility in its encounters with others” (Ebert 2018a: n.p., translated from the German). What he means by this can be illustrated with a few examples from the work of the Goethe-Institut.

Such humility can become a balancing act when radical discussion partners are involved, for example at the Goethe-Institut Brussels’ symposium “European Angst” in December 2016 (cf. European Movement International 2016; Goethe-Institut 2016). In addition to Nobel Prize winner Herta Müller, who bemoaned the apparent need of people in some European countries to be ordered about, and the Turkish author Elif Shafak, who advocated for multiple affiliations and warned against identity politics, a right-wing protagonist was also invited: Łukasz Warzecha from Poland. In a debate about conspiracy theories in the media, he attacked his interlocutor Sonia Seymour Mikich, editor-in-chief of WDR (West German Broadcasting) television, so viciously that the audience protested. Should the presenter have put Warzecha in his place early on? Was it right to let the debate escalate to a personal level? Or did precisely this escalation perhaps contribute to the unmasking of the right-wing speaker?

In countries where the majority represents radically different values than those of the Goethe-Institut, the Institut’s partnership-based work approach can become a challenge. Recently, the Goethe-Institut has identified increasing numbers of new civil society organisations in Germany and in its host countries that oppose radical tendencies. What is new here is that Goethe-Instituts and their partners are now networking with other Goethe-Instituts and their partners. For example, civil society organisations in Jordan and the Czech Republic or in Egypt and Lithuania are being brought together by the Goethe-Institut. After joint events at one location or the other, or at both locations, these organisations can continue their exchange – even without the involvement of the Goethe-Institut. “Carte Blanche” is the name of this series, which has brought together organisations from Central Eastern Europe and the Middle East (cf. Wiegmann 2017). For example, gay and lesbian activist groups

from Jordan and the Czech Republic jointly organised the event “Amman Same Sex Love” in Prague. The interest of the audience and the media was equally great and surprisingly positive, fear of contact was reduced, and the guests from Jordan were able to talk about their sexual orientation more openly than in their home country.

The symposium “Wettbewerb der Narrative” (Competing Narratives) in Berlin showed that listening is sometimes more revealing than speaking (cf. Goethe-Institut 2017). This symposium was about the global crisis of liberal narratives, and the Goethe-Institut explicitly strove for a discussion of alternative views. People were invited who were critical of the liberal narrative, but who were also curious and open to a productive exchange. The Hong Kong economist Chandran Nair saw in the liberal narrative a selfish agenda of the West aimed at solidifying global inequality, and the American professor of law Michele Goodwin lamented racist and sexist elements in it. The German literary scholar Albrecht Koschorke regretted that the liberal narrative had not fulfilled its promises of progress and participation, and the Chinese philosopher Tongdong Bai proposed a meritocratic alternative to liberal democracy. To sum up, a liberal narrative would also have to be socially just and ecologically sound to survive today. The audience came to this conclusion perhaps only because a podium for the organisers’ own position was dispensed with and instead a discussion space was opened for the positions of others.

The Goethe-Institut has similar experiences with the topic of decolonisation, where African positions are at the centre, because “[f]uture plans for Africa must be created in Africa” (Goethe-Institut 2019b: n.p.) – as Klaus-Dieter Lehmann, President of the Goethe-Institut, emphasised in Windhoek on 20 September 2019.

It is certainly a huge challenge to encourage civil society groups operating at least 1,000 kilometers apart from one another to work together. The “Freiraum” (Free Space) project (cf. Goethe-Institut 2019a) has succeeded in bringing together 52 Goethe-Instituts in 26 EU countries and a widely ramified network of civil society and state partners from the European cultural and educational landscape. The project was based on the idea that only through constant practice of empathy, i.e. the willingness to put oneself in the position of one’s counterpart, can sustainable and positive cohesion be achieved. Not only were capitals such as Brussels, Rome, and Copenhagen involved, but also other cities such as Dresden, Nancy, and the aforementioned Banská Bystrica in Slovakia. For example, the Copenhagen Architecture Festival and the NGO Kontrapunkt (Counterpoint), which promotes the independent cultural scene in

Skopje, worked together. Each organisation formulated a question on the state of freedom in its city, which the other partner then works on. Copenhagen, for example, wants to know the following about Skopje: How can a city become a space for diversity and coexistence? In a documentary film, Macedonian emigrants in turn describe their vision of living together in Denmark.

What can we learn from what has been presented so far for the work of the Goethe-Institut and other actors of German foreign cultural and educational policy? The radicalisation of state and non-state actors that we observe in Germany, in Europe, and worldwide has already been registered in German foreign cultural policy, but has not yet been sufficiently reflected therein. When the abovementioned LGBTQI film festival was banned in Turkey, the German ambassador in Ankara raised the rainbow flag, and intellectuals reacted to Marc Jongen's lecture with an open letter. Similar measures are now being taken in many parts of the world. However, they are rather accidental, and are beholden to the courage of individual personalities, rather than following any kind of clear strategy.

Perhaps it is helpful to recall what stood at the beginning of German foreign cultural and educational policy, and what it is today. Johannes Ebert has summarised it as follows:

“In light of the misuse of education, culture, and art in the ‘Third Reich’ for Nazi propaganda, in the young Federal Republic of Germany it was decided to withdraw international education and cultural cooperation from the direct grip of the government and to hand it over to independent organisations that view themselves as part of German civil society. The German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD), the Goethe-Institut, and numerous other actors work on behalf of the state, strategically coordinating with the state but largely independent in terms of content. The principles of freedom of opinion, freedom of culture, and freedom of science are central to this. [...]

Particularly in the external presentation of a pluralistic state with an active and broad-based civil society, the independence of the intermediary organisations abroad lends credibility and trust to foreign cultural and educational policy. [...]

Physical and digital free spaces are necessary to create a place of open and censorship-free dialogue for partners who are under pressure” (Ebert 2018b: 50 f., translated from the German).

If intermediary organisations involved in cultural relations work want to respond successfully to radicalisation, anti-liberalism, or an ethnically based tyranny of the majority, i.e. the idea of a supposedly autochthonous ethnonational native population, they must have a set of instruments at their disposal. In the following, I would like to propose some tools for use at home and abroad.

What to Do at Home?

1. Resist the right-wing *Kulturkampf* ('cultural struggle') (cf. Imam 2019). The actors in foreign cultural and educational policy should jointly oppose right-wing positions, form alliances in committees.

2. Do not offer the new right a stage: They use every opportunity to invade liberal media and institutions and instrumentalise them for their own purposes. "The smuggling of ideas into the centre of opinion power" is what Martin Sellner of the extreme right-wing Identitarian Movement of Austria calls this in an essay in the magazine *Sezession* (Sellner, cited in: Bednarz 2019: n.p., translated from the German). Formerly liberal intellectuals, the "salon nationalists", are now taking part in this 'smuggling of ideas', including Rüdiger Safranski, Uwe Tellkamp, Neo Rauch, Oskar Roehler, and many others (Fuchs/Middelhoff 2019: 186–191, translated from the German). Some make use – consciously or unconsciously – of the strategy that the new far-right publisher and journalist Götz Kubitschek called *Selbstverharmlosung* (self-harmlessness):

"It is the attempt to fend off the opponent's accusations by displaying one's own harmlessness and emphasising that none of what is being demanded falls short of civil society standards" (Kubitschek 2017: 28, translated from the German).

3. Train to talk to radicals, but remain realistic: Whoever wants to expose the racism of the AfD should bear in mind that many people choose this party not in spite of its racism, but because of it. In their playful, self-deprecating instruction manual *Mit Rechten reden* (Talking with Right-Wingers), the authors Per Leo, Maximilian Steinbeis, and Daniel-Pascal Zorn give very practical recommendations (cf. Leo et al. 2017):

- not to allow one's counterpart to oscillate between the role of disgust and the role of victim;
- 'civilised-polite right-wingers' should not immediately be defamed as Nazis, as this can provoke the solidarity of the audience;
- respond only to content, not to provocation;
- counter with arguments and follow-up questions.

Of course, this becomes difficult if the interlocutor only relinquishes the pose of self-harmlessness when there is no more time left for discussion. This is what happened in October 2019 at the Institute for Advanced Study in the Humanities (Kulturwissenschaftliches Institut, KWI) in Essen, when the professor emeritus of law Reinhard Merkel painted the warning sign of a "cultural genocide" (cited in: Heins 2020: n.p., translated from the German) by mass immigration on the wall.

And What to Do Abroad?

1. Continue to convey a comprehensive and critical image of Germany: This does not exclude radicalisations in Germany, but rather openly names them, for example right-wing discourses, even those of previously liberal-conservative intellectuals, right-wing rock, neo-folk, campaigns of Identitarians, subtle codes in diverse cultural products.

2. Expand the range of instruments when dealing with state repression: In the almost 70 years of its existence, the Goethe-Institut has been able to acquire skills in evading state repression in many parts of the world: in the Franco dictatorship in Spain, in the Salazar era in Portugal, and in military dictatorships in Greece, Brazil, and Chile. I myself gained some experience in Egypt and Indonesia in the 1990s: What should be negotiated in public, and what should be negotiated in internal workshops? What takes place in the capital under the eye of the authorities, and what takes place in a remote village under the protection of a religious community? Who can I make an accomplice? Where do I give up the label 'foreign cultural institute' in order not to attract attention? Today it is harder to stay under the radar. Nothing slips past the internet and its spies Twitter and Facebook. On top of that: In about 40 countries there are either already laws against foreign NGOs, or such laws are in the works. Whereas in the past

one could rely on the relatively liberal diplomats in the foreign ministries, repressive regimes today like to assign foreign cultural institutes to the ministry of the interior or the ministry of justice, where the hardliners tend to be.

3. Think about the distribution channels of digital media: Marc Jongen's uncut lecture on 13 October 2017 at the Hannah Arendt Center was distributed worldwide by Bard College (USA) via its digital channel. The result: Jongen celebrated his controversial appearance as "a big success [...] for our cause" (Jongen 2017: n.p., translated from the German).

4. Adapt to the event management: Are there lines that should not be crossed in terms of speakers, artists? Do guests have to register by name? Do you need additional security personnel? How will disruptive audience members be dealt with? What exit strategies may moderators resort to if the situation escalates? What legal steps are possible in the host country? Here is another example: The Goethe-Institut Bratislava threatened to sue a member of the extreme right-wing party ĽSNS (The People's Party – Our Slovakia) who had illegally recorded and posted a discussion for a conspiracy-theory website. As a result of the threat, the film was removed.

5. Weigh risks together with staff: the risks for themselves, for the speakers and artists, for the visitors, and also for the institution and its future work in the country. An open discussion can clarify any reservations about or bias toward content. All activities should be accompanied by self-reflective measures. An example: A local employee in North Africa feared reprisals against her own family because of the showing of a film that was considered pornographic due to moral standards that had become more restrictive in the country, although the film would have been accepted without any problems ten years earlier. It was agreed that the German director of the local Goethe-Institut would introduce the film.

6. Involve young people: Research has shown that political preferences are formed when people are still young. This is why this target group should be given more attention in cultural programme work abroad. It is also why radical tendencies should be made a topic of *Bildungskooperation Deutsch* (the Goethe-Institut's educational cooperation programme): Together with educational institutions in the host countries, one could, on the one hand, arouse young people's interest in Germany and, on the other hand, enable them to see through the strategies of the radicals in the 'immersive world' (cf. Glaser/Pfeiffer 2017) of music, videos, and campaigns.

Several organisations are active throughout Europe and could be won over for projects with young people: for example “Football against Racism”; “Schule ohne Rassismus” (School without Racism); the European Network against Racism; the organisation EXIT, which helps dropouts; “Salaam-Shalom”; “Die offene Gesellschaft” (The Open Society); the “Youth Initiative for Human Rights”; and many others.

7. Recognise and respond to radicalisation in one’s own organisation: The Goethe-Institut employs over 3,000 people at 160 institutes in 92 countries. The staff of the Goethe-Institut are not asked about their political views; that is a private matter. The decisive factors for employing someone are professional qualifications and loyalty to the Goethe-Institut and its values. However, if the political conditions in the host country change, this loyalty is sometimes put to the test.

Many people from the new right claim they have nothing to do with National Socialist and fascist ideas. Rather, they see themselves as conservatives who value a plurality of opinions. Christian Fuchs and Paul Middelhoff have convincingly described the mimicry behind this stance in their book *Das Netzwerk der Neuen Rechten. Wer sie lenkt, wer sie finanziert und wie sie die Gesellschaft verändern* (The Network of the New Right: Who Controls Them, Who Finances Them, and How They Are Changing Society; cf. Fuchs/Middelhoff 2019).

The political scientist Volker Heins diagnoses a “passive fascism” which exists around the world and which propagates more indifference towards all those “who do not belong to their own narrowly defined national collective” (Heins 2020: n.p., translated from the German). He points out that fascism as a language and ideology has been back for a while, albeit as a democratic, reformist, parliamentarised fascism.

Marc Jongen, who has already been mentioned several times, would like to tackle “the *Entsiffung* [cleansing] of the cultural industry” as part of the “Abteilung Attacke” (Section Attack) – something he announced on the occasion of his election as cultural policy spokesman for the AfD parliamentary party (Jongen 2018: n.p., translated from the German). *Versifft* (filthy) and *entsiffen* (to cleanse) have become popular topoi of the new right. According to Margarete Stokowski (2019), this choice of words brings an older author to mind who, even before the Second World War, had already written about the “Versyphilitisierung des Volkskörpers” (syphilisation of the body of the *Volk*) that had to be combatted. His name: Adolf Hitler.

References

- Alternative für Deutschland (2019): Bildung / Kultur; <https://www.afd.de/bildung-kultur> [01.12.2020].
- Bednarz, Liane (2019): Immer mehr Intellektuelle bauen Berührungängste zur Neuen Rechten ab. In: Focus online, 25.03.2019, first published in the HuffPost, 19.06.2017; https://www.focus.de/panorama/welt/panorama-immer-mehr-intellektuelle-bauen-beruehrungsangste-zur-neuen-rechten-ab_id_10500429.html [01.02.2021].
- Chazan, Guy (2018): Germany's Increasingly Bold Nationalists Spark a New Culture War. In: Financial Times, 27.07.2018; <https://www.ft.com/content/348a1bce-9000-11e8-b639-7680ce-dcc421> [01.02.2021].
- Desiderius-Erasmus-Stiftung e.V. (2020): Auslandsaktivitäten; <https://erasmus-stiftung.de/taetigkeitsbereiche/auslandsaktivitaeten> [01.02.2021].
- Ebert, Johannes (2018a): Was Deutschland zu erzählen hat. In: Süddeutsche online, 20.06.2018; <https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/aussenansicht-was-deutschland-zu-erzaehlen-hat-1.4023719> [01.02.2021].
- Ebert, Johannes (2018b): Unser bester Mann weltweit: Johann Wolfgang von Goethe. In: Politische Studien. Vol. 69, No. 482, pp. 48–57; https://www.hss.de/download/publications/PS_482_KULTUR_POLITIK.pdf [01.02.2021].
- European Movement International (2016): European Angst. Debate on Populism, Extremism and Euroscepticism in Contemporary European Societies; <https://europeanmovement.eu/event/european-angst-debate-on-populism-extremism-and-euroscepticism-in-contemporary-european-societies> [01.02.2021].
- Fuchs, Christian/Middelhoff, Paul (2019): Das Netzwerk der Neuen Rechten. Wer sie lenkt, wer sie finanziert und wie sie die Gesellschaft verändern. Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt Polaris.
- Georgi, Oliver (2019): AfD und deutsche Kolonialzeit. Danke für die Unterdrückung! In: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 28.11.2019; <https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/afd-und-deutsche-kolonialzeit-danke-fuer-die-unterdrueckung-16508136.html> [01.02.2021].
- Glaser, Stefan/Pfeiffer, Thomas (eds.) (2017): Erlebniswelt Rechtsextremismus. modern – subversiv – hasserfüllt. Hintergründe und Methoden für die Praxis der Prävention. Schwalbach/Taunus: Wochenschau Verlag.
- Goethe-Institut (2016): European Angst. A Conference on Populism, Extremism and Euroscepticism in Contemporary European Societies. Berlin: Frohmann; https://www.goethe.de/resources/files/pdf134/goethe-institut-ed._european-angst_free-pdf_berlin_frohmann_20170905.pdf [01.02.2021].
- Goethe-Institut (2017): Competing Narratives. On the Global Crisis of Liberal Narratives; <https://www.goethe.de/narratives> [01.02.2021].

Goethe-Institut (2019a): Freiraum; https://www.goethe.de/prj/fre/en/index.html?wt_sc=freiraum [01.02.2021].

Goethe-Institut (2019b): Museum Conversations 2019. Keynote durch den Präsidenten des Goethe-Instituts Prof. Dr. h.c. Klaus-Dieter Lehmann auf den Museum Conversations 2019 in Windhoek, Namibia, 20.09.2019; <https://www.goethe.de/de/uun/prs/int/prs/21667672.html> [01.02.2021].

Heins, Volker M. (2020): Droht ein neuer Faschismus? In: Blog des Kulturwissenschaftlichen Instituts Essen, Universität Duisburg-Essen, 04.05.2020; <https://blog.kulturwissenschaften.de/droht-ein-neuer-faschismus> [01.02.2021].

Imam, James (2019): Culture Wars Are Raging through the Arts in Germany. In: Financial Times, 26.08.2019; <https://www.ft.com/content/3188c2da-c007-11e9-9381-78bab8a70848> [01.02.2021].

Jongen, Marc (2017): “Does Democracy Need to Be More Populist?” Vortrag am Hannah Arendt Center, New York, 13.10.2017 [Lecture]; <https://marcjongen.de/vortrag-am-hannah-arendt-center-new-york> [01.02.2021].

Jongen, Marc (2018a): “AfD-Fraktion erhält Vorsitz in 3 Ausschüssen!”, 23.01.2018; <https://marcjongen.de/afd-fraktion-erhaelt-vorsitz-in-3-ausschuessen> [01.02.2021].

Jongen, Marc (2018b): ft.com: “Germany’s Increasingly Bold Nationalists Spark a New Culture War”, 27.07.2018; <https://marcjongen.de/ft-com-germanys-increasingly-bold-nationalists-spark-a-new-culture-war> [01.02.2021].

Khosrokhavar, Farhad (2016): Radikalisierung. Hamburg: CEP Europäische Verlagsanstalt.

Kubitschek, Götz (2017): Selbstverharmlosung. In: Sezession. Vol. 76, pp. 26–28.

Laudenbach, Peter (2019): Rechte Übergriffe auf Theater. “Sie wollen ein völkisch nationales Theater”. In: Süddeutsche online, 21.02.2019; <https://www.sueddeutsche.de/kultur/theater-rechtspopulismus-afd-1.4339876> [01.02.2021].

Leo, Per/Steinbeis, Maximilian/Zorn, Daniel-Pascal (2017): Mit Rechten reden. Ein Leitfaden. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta.

Mascolo, Georg/Pittelkow, Sebastian/Riedel, Katja (2019): Wie eng waren “Identitäre” und Christchurch-Attentäter? In: tagesschau.de, 15.05.2019; <https://www.tagesschau.de/investigativ/ndr-wdr/christchurch-spende-identitaere-103.html> [01.02.2021].

Stokowski, Margarete (2019): Rechte Sprache. Warum “linksgrün versifft”? In: Spiegel online, 12.02.2019; <https://www.spiegel.de/kultur/gesellschaft/rechte-sprache-warum-linksgruen-versifft-a-1252819.html> [01.02.2021].

Wiegmann, Katharina (2017): “Perhaps Everyone Is Struggling More with Themselves”; <https://www.goethe.de/en/uun/pub/akt/g17/20894436.html> [01.02.2021].

About the Author

Mechtild Manus, born in 1956, is a Germanist and theatre scholar. She worked for many years at Goethe-Instituts in Portugal, Egypt, Indonesia, Canada, Ireland, and South Africa as Director and Regional Head of Cultural Programmes among other roles. Her work focuses on projects in the fields of journalism, contemporary dance, urban development, climate change, and participation. While working in the field of education and discourse at the headquarters of the Goethe-Institut in Munich, she organised the worldwide series of events “Kritikmaschine” (Critique Machine) in 2016, the international symposium “Competing Narratives. On the Global Crisis of Liberal Narratives” in 2017, and the European conference “1968 und die Neuen Rechten” (1968 and the New Right) in 2018. Since March 2020 Mechtild Manus has been a freelance consultant for cultural institutions in Germany and abroad.

Contact: mechtild.manus[at]gmail.com

Fake News – The Media between Enlightenment, Distortion, and Emotionality¹

Jörg Armbruster (Stuttgart)

Mark Zuckerberg probably will not want to remember the year 2017. He, and indeed the entire senior management of Facebook, were living in a state of permanent tension and stress at the time. Everyone was extremely nervous, at least that's what the New York Times reported on 29 October 2017 (cf. Roose 2017). The reason: At that time, it became known that Facebook had been used by a third party in the election campaign battle between Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton to harm Clinton and bolster Trump. According to the accusation, Russia had manipulated the internet service with false messages and rumours, and Facebook failed to stop this abuse, to the detriment of the Democratic presidential candidate. These Russian abuses could not be definitively proven later. Nevertheless, the 'great power of the internet' promised improvement at the time, according to the New York Times. But this *mea culpa* only applied to the US. After all, in Facebook's home country such rumours could have a detrimental effect on the internet company, as well as on its good reputation as a patriot, but above all on its business.

In contrast, the senior management of Facebook was much less worried about fake news in the so-called 'Third World' being distributed via the company's own internet platform, because it would probably be less detrimental to its balance sheets, the New York Times continued in the same article; this happened in Myanmar, for example. In that specific case, the accusations go even further: According to the New York Times, that American internet company is partially responsible for the persecution, expulsion, and murder of the Rohingya. Lies, half-truths, disparaging rumours, and fake photos about the Muslim minority in Myanmar have been spread through government and military Facebook pages.

So can the senior management of Facebook in Menlo Park, California, be held partially responsible for spreading false news in former Burma and thus also for the expulsion of the Muslim minority there? The New York Times report speaks out in favour of that notion. In 2016 the US internet service partnered with Myanmar's state-owned

¹ Translated from the German by Kareem James Abu-Zeid.

telecom company MPT to build its social network throughout the ‘land of pagodas’ – nationwide, with the explicit approval of the military government. Facebook offered a free basic service to potential users. As a ‘gateway drug’, so to speak.

Through this free offer, the service spread rapidly throughout the country, rising from 2 million users in 2014 to 30 million users two years later (cf. Specia/Mozur 2017). Almost two-thirds of the people in Myanmar were thus reachable via Facebook. They could, of course, receive ‘real’ messages, but also false and manipulated texts, including hate messages against the Rohingya. These contained sentences like: “We must fight the Rohingya as Hitler did with the Jews” (Beuth 2018: n.p., translated from the German).

Since the press in Myanmar is also state-controlled, citizens there have barely any opportunity to check up on what they are being presented on Facebook. An easy game, therefore, for the propagandists of the military government. For them, Facebook has become a kind of ‘*Volksempfänger* [people’s receiver] of modernity’. Almost everyone has it because it’s cheap or free, everyone reads it, and something or other sticks with everyone who uses it.

One can therefore assume, with some justification, that the hate messages spread via this internet service have reached up to two-thirds of the people in Myanmar and therefore undoubtedly contributed to the military being able to attack and expel the Muslim minority of the Rohingya, who had been humiliated in this way, without the military having to fear any indignant outcry from the country’s Buddhist majority. Marzuki Darusman, the Chairperson of the UN’s Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar, confirms this. Speaking at the United Nations Human Rights Council on 12 March 2018, he described abuse of the media in Myanmar as follows: “Hate speech and incitement to violence on social media is rampant, especially on Facebook. To a large extent, it goes unchecked” (Darusman, quoted in: United Nations Human Rights Council 2018: n.p.). In other words, Facebook has provided crucial technical assistance in these crimes against humanity, even after the UN inquiry, although discrimination against the Rohingya is of course much older than Facebook itself. When the masters of this messenger service finally woke up and took countermeasures, the military and their propaganda experts switched to using fake pages on Facebook. They are continuing their smear campaigns, under different names.

“In a lot of these countries, Facebook is the de facto public square”, the New York Times quotes Cynthia Wong, an internet analyst with the organisation Human Rights Watch, as saying: “Because of that, it raises really strong questions about Facebook needing to take on more responsibility for the harms their platform has contributed to” (Roose 2017: n.p.).

This is particularly true in societies where controversy is not settled by debate, as is customary in open societies, or perhaps even by means of tangible dispute, but rather by violence. This violence can be verbal, such as defamation via the internet, or in the worst case physical.

Facebook, Twitter, and co. are now integral components of the information wars that precede military conflicts and then fuel them. The battle for hearts and minds is a *sine qua non* for legitimising a war. And this struggle works best in those regions where no independent investigative journalism exists and where people have no other means of checking up on information because the media (including the internet) are controlled by the state. Even freedom of the press does not always contribute to the solution. Well-informed media are expensive, so there is often no one to invest their capital, even when they are allowed to. In the absence of news services that keep tabs on the powerful, the door is open to the abuse of power.

This is not new. Napoleon already admitted that he feared three independent newspapers more than 100 bayonets. And Goebbels introduced the *Volksempfänger* so as to have direct access to the hearts and minds of Germans.

Neither is it new for lies to be used in politics. That facts are bent to their breaking point, and perhaps even beyond it, is not an invention of the internet age. Fake news used to be called lies, but that didn't make it any better. The Ems Dispatch of 1870 is an example of a lie that triggered a war. The 2003 Iraq War was preceded by a hitherto rarely experienced disinformation campaign conducted by the US government. President George W. Bush and his administration invented fakes; the people in the White House lied through their teeth. Uwe Barschel and his word of honour are another example. And with the freely invented Gulf of Tonkin Incident of 1964, the US government justified its war in Vietnam.

But today we have a very different situation. The internet is responsible for this. It's fast, global, and hard to control. Anyone who spreads a lie today on the so-called 'internet platforms' can be sure that people from Alaska to Zimbabwe, from the North Cape to Tasmania, will be able to read it. The only requirement is internet access.

Social media thus run the risk of being abused in a similar way to how the mass medium of the radio was abused during National Socialism. Through both, governments had and still have the opportunity to create a public sphere that is controlled in such a way that their interests are served. Whoever wants to manipulate things will attempt to control these platforms – in order to be able to use them to spread their false reports.

But what exactly are false reports, fake news, or 'alternative facts,' to quote the new formulation that the Trump administration was using to whitewash its own lies? Is it really only the right-wing populists who use fake news to create a mood, thereby trying to discredit their political opponents? Are we really living in a 'postfactual' age, and how can fake news be exposed?

So. What *is* fake news? An attempt at a definition: Fake news refers to deliberately and intentionally fake publications disguised as news. They are not the sad results of sloppy research or insufficient information, nor are they newspaper hoaxes, which do sometimes turn up in the papers, but rather deliberate acts of disinformation by means of misleading headlines, manipulated images, lies, and propaganda. Fake news disguises itself as real news and is therefore not always easy to see through.

When fake news is used politically, it is often an attempt to shake the credibility of one's political opponent; for example, by false claims, invented stories, and false insinuations, as happened in the election campaign between Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump in an almost unparalleled manner. This procedure is particularly dangerous in an election campaign, since cleverly formulated lies about one's competitors are difficult to refute at first. Often enough, they can only be refuted after the election is over, when it is too late.

Fake news reports are happy to pretend to enlighten the public by claiming to be in possession of information that is allegedly being deliberately concealed by the other media, the so-called *Altmedien*, or 'old media'. The false reports play on conspiracy

fears and claim to be in sole possession of the truth. They pass themselves off as taboo-breakers, whereas in reality there are no taboos or bans on speaking at all: “One is certainly still allowed to say ...”.

Germany is not immune to fake news either, and we have known this at the very latest since the arrival of the refugees in 2015, when the internet was used to spread the word that the Muslims who had just arrived were raping, stealing, slaughtering sheep, and drinking vast quantities of alcohol. All of these were fake stories that could quickly be disproved, but they were gratefully taken up by no small number of uninformed citizens, who had their prejudices confirmed: “I’ve always known that ...”. After all, not every village and not every city had a noble *Willkommenskultur* (culture of welcoming) at the time, otherwise the far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD, Alternative for Germany) party would not have experienced such a great upswing in support.

And there is something else that distinguishes Facebook, Twitter, and co. from high-circulation and high-ratings media. By sharing the news, hate messages can be made accessible to an almost unlimited public. Through sharing, any message, whether true or not, can be sent out in a snowballing manner to an almost infinite number of interested parties. In addition, this distribution technique has a double effect. If the pages are professionally designed, they suggest authenticity, and the users who forward the page reinforce its credibility through their own person. To a certain extent, they are the guarantors of the correctness of the contributions, especially if the users are influential and respected personalities.

In the case of refugees, rumours disguised as facts could, at least in some cases, be uncovered through research and exposed as false reports. But whether this new information reached all those who had been subjected to the false information is very questionable. And whether this new information changed those people’s minds is also uncertain. Something always sticks. Especially when refugees seemingly confirm such prejudices through their own behaviour, as happened on New Year’s Eve 2015/2016 in Cologne. Further examples can also be found in Freiburg and other places. Such unpleasant individual cases can easily be reinterpreted as group-specific characteristics. “All Arabs are potential rapists”, could be one such false conclusion. The agitators accuse the media, which report on such incidents in a differentiated and objective manner, of the systematic withholding of information, deliberate falsification, and intentional lying.

At this point, the keyword *Lügenpresse* (lying press) must be taken into account, as well as the AfD, the Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the Occident (Pegida), and similar groups.

The term *Lügenpresse* has been revived in the political party landscape to paint the so-called 'old media' as being untrustworthy. The fact that this is a National Socialist expression does not seem to bother the people who utter it very much at all. The concept originated as a battle cry during the National Socialist era and describes an allegedly intentional act of opinion-making that reflects only what governments think, that conceals everything that could harm the government, and that manipulates viewers, listeners, or readers on its behalf. After all, journalists are nothing more than the accomplices of the old political parties, say the representatives of the AfD. While one should not overvalue the term *Lügenpresse* as a kind of battle cry, the reproach should still be taken seriously and examined closely.

The digital revolution has eroded the importance not only of the large newspapers and radio stations, but of the mass media in general, as the media analyst Stefan Niggemeier already noted in 2006 (cf. Niggemeier 2006). Before this revolution, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, the Süddeutsche Zeitung, Der Spiegel, and the *Tagesschau* news programme on ARD (as well as *heute* on ZDF), to name but a few, existed as well-informed leading media.

Today, each of these leading media is facing serious competition from the internet. Information flies through the net almost in real time. Social media users are increasingly informing themselves online because information is cheap, fast, and to the point. Daily news and newspapers are losing acceptance. What many users don't realise, however, is that those who surrender themselves to the algorithms of the internet only get to read what they want to read. The internet is anything but a neutral research machine; it primarily provides the screen reader with the information that fits his or her worldview. And users are also often unable to answer the important question of how reliable this information actually is. Is it fake or real?

A normal information user today can hardly keep track of the huge flood of right and wrong information generated on the net by individuals, but also by organisations, let alone distinguish right from wrong in each case. It is just as difficult to clearly assign true or false information to political actors and sources. Information can seldom be traced back, and its degree of truthfulness be adequately checked, without a great

deal of effort. In the meantime, it has even become possible to generate fake news artificially through so-called ‘social bots’. Once set up, such computer programmes pretend to provide information or commentary, and even imitate human behaviour. This enables them to produce fake information on the figurative assembly line, while remaining virtually inscrutable to laypersons in the process.

How does this brave new media world affect the press and politics? In January 2020 Friedrich Merz answered this question in such an open and unvarnished fashion in front of people celebrating Carnival in Aachen that one almost has to be grateful to him: “Today you can reach an audience via your own social media channels, via YouTube, which the public media in part, and even the private institutionalised media, no longer reach” (quoted in: Niggemeier 2020: n.p., translated from the German). That is true, of course, and so is the following. Through these channels one has “a possibility of [...] looking after [one’s] own interests, [...] of retaining [one’s] own authority to interpret what [...] [one] has said [...] in a completely different form than we used to have” (quoted in: *ibid.*, translated from the German).

Both assertions can only be confirmed; but is this real progress? Are inquiring journalists and critical commentary, classification, or comparisons with other statements superfluous? Friedrich Merz’s statements in this stronghold of the so-called ‘fifth season’ (i.e. the time of Carnival) can be understood in this way. After sharp criticism from the German Journalists’ Association, the former CDU parliamentary party leader rowed back his comments: Attack the free press? That was not at all what he intended: “Anyone who knows me knows that I see freedom of the press as one of the basic prerequisites of an open and free society”, he posted on Twitter (quoted in: *ibid.*, translated from the German). Even if Friedrich Merz did not announce anything fundamentally new to the revellers at Aachen’s Carnival, there remains the faint aftertaste that someone might feel quite comfortable in this brave new media world – which is brave and beautiful because it is no longer burdened by journalism. If this is the case, i.e. if politicians like Friedrich Merz really see the renunciation of the traditional media as an option, then this could easily become a threat to democracy.

The tasks of the traditional media include checking every piece of information for accuracy, classifying them, and screening out fake news. This costs time and money; and to comprehensively check the news, both are often lacking. This is partly due to the fact that the media naturally strive to keep their reports as up-to-date as possible. They will hardly be able to keep up with the speed that information is disseminated on

the internet – but they also shouldn't have to, because thoroughness is more important than speed. The media are thus finding it increasingly difficult to fulfil their task of 'lie monitoring', i.e. of exposing lies as lies. Knowledgeable and sound reporting, even if it is expensive, must be the answer to these challenges.

But – and I readily admit it – demanding this is easy, because not only has the digital revolution described above taken something like exclusivity away from the traditional media, especially those of the private sector, it has also pulled the rug out from under them economically, burdening them with considerable losses in advertising revenue. It is therefore becoming increasingly difficult to finance high-quality journalism. The consequence: Press concentration, which leads to a decreasing number of newspapers. Yet this loss of diversity does not necessarily contribute to the credibility of journalism.

In 2019, a study commissioned by Infratest on behalf of the WDR (West German Broadcasting) on the question of whether there are political guidelines for reporting stated:

“Four out of ten Germans (38 per cent, minus 2) still suspect that there are political guidelines for media reporting. 58 per cent see no political influence, which is five percentage points more than one and a half years ago. In Eastern Germany, even a slight majority of 50 per cent of those surveyed believe that there are guidelines from state and government. 47 per cent do not believe this” (WDR online 2019, translated from the German).

According to this study commissioned by the WDR, around 20 per cent of Germans would speak of a *Lügenpresse*, a 'lying press', including – not surprisingly – a particularly large number of AfD supporters.

What are the reasons behind this development? Is it possible to regain the trust that was lost? One reason for this development is probably that in recent years there has been something like an increasing, albeit unwanted, synchronisation between official government policy and reporting on some major issues. This may have led to the fact that, according to the study, 42 per cent of those surveyed assume that politics sets guidelines for the media. Even if this frighteningly large minority finds it difficult to be convinced otherwise, nothing was ordered from 'above'. However, even reporters too often simply float along in the mainstream, without properly accounting for their mainstream orientation.

One example is the coverage of the Ukraine conflict in 2014. Hardly any media outlets initially reported on Russia's concerns, which were triggered by Ukraine's orientation toward the West. The idea that NATO and the EU would, here too, advance to the Russian border was a strong driving force behind Russian policy on Ukraine at the time. When a German commentator mentioned this concern of the Russians, he was quickly derided as a *Putin-Versteher* – a 'Putin sympathiser' or, more literally, a 'Putin understander' – although understanding the other is an important foundation for sustainable journalism and a good policy in general. After all, understanding does not necessarily imply condoning.

Franziska Augstein, editor at the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, went so far as to speak of a "self-enforced conformity of the German press" (Augstein 2005: n.p., translated from the German) as early as 2005. And Manfred Bissinger, a former journalist at the *Stern* magazine and the weekly newspaper *Die Woche*, feared in 2015 that the press would give up its 'gatekeeper function' (cf. Krüger 2016).

Even well-intentioned partnerships with politicians damage the media's credibility. When, for example, BILD 2015 launched their Refugees Welcome initiative during the influx of refugees, people rubbed their eyes in amazement and perhaps even delight, although this had nothing to do with journalism. Journalists who take part in such well-intentioned actions leave their posts as critically distanced observers of events and turn themselves into participating actors. Thus, this initiative was also a kind of self-enforced conforming to the Chancellor's open refugee policy, which rode the tide of the Refugees Welcome euphoria. The legitimate concerns and fears of many citizens were often edited out at the time. Such behaviour also opens the flood gates to the '*Lügenpresse* disciples'.

Undoubtedly, the missing, belated, and then initially inadequate reporting on the sexual assaults against women in the large public square by Cologne's main train station and the Cologne Cathedral on New Year's Eve 2015/2016 is also one of the most drastic examples of how journalists can needlessly squander public trust. In my opinion, carelessness, sloppy research, and perhaps also a kind of 'bite inhibition' toward the refugees – but not intentional 'top-down' control – all played an important role at the time.

While the accusation of top-down control is nonsense, a little more public self-criticism would promote credibility; because nobody expects journalists to be infallible. That is why it was smart for the then *Tagesschau* editor-in-chief Kai Gniffke to admit that there were omissions in their reporting on Ukraine. Perhaps they had “too easily followed the news mainstream” (Huber 2014: n.p., translated from the German).

“Nothing has a more truthful effect than the confession of having failed, despite one’s great efforts to do everything right,” acknowledged Die Zeit newspaper’s editor-in-chief Giovanni di Lorenzo on Zeit online two years later in his Dresden speech “Our Reputation Is at Stake” (Lorenzo 2016: n.p., translated from the German).

Not only the reputation, but also the most important asset of journalism, credibility, are at stake here. Citizens who feel inadequately informed or misinformed and feel that they are not being taken seriously by the ‘big’ media are constructing a kind of parallel world on the internet in which they believe they are better served. For example, if they are looking for alternative information that confirms their distrust of the mass media, the algorithms are quickly at hand and conjure up content on the screens that allow users to feel validated. This is called an ‘echo chamber’: As one cries from the mountain into the valley, the cry comes back. This echo does not transport anything new.

What will happen to our democracy if it actually comes to a systematic ‘politics of lies’? A politics that deliberately deploys lies destroys the essential trust between citizens and politicians; it destroys the open system as such, which is based on a relationship of trust. Such a damaged political culture can only be repaired with great difficulty. Since political lies cannot simply be banned, it is important that they be made the subject of constant debate. Through parliament, in the media, and in the worst cases also through investigations by public prosecutors and the courts.

But fake news on Facebook and co. will not be brought under control by the penal code alone, if one wants to prevent freedom of opinion from being damaged in the process. What is needed is a minimum level of self-responsibility on the part of the media platforms and a research-intensive press that does not simply take over news, but checks on and questions the news itself. In addition to trust and credibility, doubt is also another important asset of a democracy.

References

- Augstein, Franziska (2005): Einfalt oder Vielfalt. Rede vom 11. November 2005, gehalten auf der “Berliner Zeitungskonferenz”, 11.11.2005; <https://augstein.org/2005/11/11/einfalt-oder-vielfalt> [01.02.2021].
- Beuth, Patrick (2018): Facebooks halbherziger Kampf gegen den Hass. In: Spiegel online, 16.08.2018; <https://www.spiegel.de/netzwelt/web/facebook-in-myanmar-halbherziger-kampf-gegen-den-hass-a-1223480.html> [01.02.2021].
- Huber, Joachim (2014): Tagesschau-Chef bloggt “Selbstkritik”. In: Der Tagesspiegel, 30.09.2014; <https://www.tagesspiegel.de/gesellschaft/medien/ukraine-berichterstattung-in-der-ard-tageschau-chef-bloggt-selbstkritik/10772964.html> [01.02.2021].
- Krüger, Uwe (2016): Medien im Mainstream. Problem oder Notwendigkeit? In: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte. Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung. No. 30–32, pp. 22–27; <https://www.bpb.de/apuz/231307/medien-im-mainstream> [01.02.2021].
- Lorenzo, Giovanni di (2016): Unser Ruf steht auf dem Spiel. In: Zeit online, 29.02.2016; <https://www.zeit.de/kultur/2016-02/dresdner-rede-dresden-giovanni-di-lorenzo> [01.02.2021].
- Niggemeier, Stefan (2006): Das Publikum an der Macht. In: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 30.01.2006; <https://www.faz.net/aktuell/feuilleton/debatten/medienrevolution-das-publikum-an-der-macht-1302598.html> [01.02.2021].
- Niggemeier, Stefan (2020): Bedeutungsverlust der Presse. Journalisten müssen von Friedrich Merz nicht gebraucht werden. In: Über Medien, 17.02.2020; <https://uebermedien.de/46251/journalisten-muessen-von-friedrich-merz-nicht-gebraucht-werden> [01.02.2021].
- Roose, Kevin (2017): Forget Washington. Facebook’s Problems Abroad Are Far More Disturbing. In: New York Times, 29.10.2017; <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/29/business/facebook-misinformation-abroad.html> [01.02.2021].
- Specia, Megan/Mozur, Paul (2017): A War of Words Puts Facebook at the Center of Myanmar’s Rohingya Crisis. In: New York Times, 27.10.2017; <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/27/world/asia/myanmar-government-facebook-rohingya.html> [01.02.2021].
- United Nations Human Rights Council (2018): Statement by Mr. Marzuki Darusman, Chairperson of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar, at the 37th Session of the Human Rights Council, 12.03.2018; <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=22798&LangID=E> [01.02.2021].
- WDR online (2019): WDR-Studie. Glaubwürdigkeit deutscher Medien leicht gesunken – gute Werte für Tageszeitungen und öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunk. In: WDR online, 20.11.2019; https://presse.wdr.de/plounge/wdr/programm/2019/11/20191120_glaubwuerdigkeitsstudie.html [01.02.2021].

About the Author

Jörg Armbruster, born in 1947, is a former ARD correspondent for the Near and Middle East. After studying political and social sciences, he began working as a journalist in 1970, first at WDR Radio and later at SDR Radio and Television. His main focus was on domestic politics and foreign affairs, with assignments in Southern Africa and the Middle East. In 1999 he was sent to the Middle East as a correspondent for ARD. From 2003 onward, he reported on the Iraq War. And from mid-2005 onward, Jörg Armbruster was head of the foreign department of the new SWR and moderator of the Weltspiegel TV programme. From January 2010 until his retirement in 2013, he was back in the Middle East. During this time, his focus was on reporting on the so-called 'Arab Spring' in Egypt and on the wars in Libya and Syria. Since his retirement, he has been writing books and newspaper articles, with a focus on the Middle East.

On the Photo Spreads: Realities, Challenges, and Visions through Photographers' Eyes

The present volume brings together three photo spreads that deal with the interactions and connections between realities, challenges, and visions in multiple ways. The photographers' perspectives reveal hidden realities, challenges, and visions in their everyday lives and in their experiences in foreign countries. These three dimensions can be seen in the visual motifs as well as in the layouts of the photo spreads: While Jochen Maier's photographs are arranged in an objective, almost austere manner, Edita Štulcaitė's images present some challenges to the alert viewer with their full- and double-page spreads and their uninterrupted layouts. In contrast, the arrangement of Christian Vögtle's photographs includes a large amount of white space, and the photographs themselves create a tension between an antiquated photographic technology and an unusual choice of motifs and layout.

Edita Štulcaitė

Edita Štulcaitė was born in Klaipėda, Lithuania, in 1991, and studied political science and European ethnology (Empirische Kulturwissenschaft) at the University of Tübingen. Afterwards, she earned a master's degree in social and cultural anthropology at the University of Marburg. For the past several years, Edita Štulcaitė has been conducting anthropological research on Georgia, recently focusing on the heritage-based tourism development strategy for the country's highlands. Edita Štulcaitė's photographs unfold an authentic, yet often slightly dreamy view of Georgia's and Armenia's landscapes. At first glance, the photographs seem to capture the 'harsh reality' in these Eastern European countries, with their Soviet pasts and recent experiences of territorial conflicts. But Edita Štulcaitė's view is not solely a 'realistic' view of Georgia and Armenia, it is much more: The photographer's thoughtful choice of motifs shows that she knows about the challenges these countries faced in the past and are about to face in the future. The viewer can sense that Edita Štulcaitė expresses more than a documentary interest in Georgia and Armenia in her photographs: In fact, the photographs show her dedication to the countries' past and future and her commitment as a researcher. A text by Edita Štulcaitė (pp. 55–58) explores her very personal approach to Georgia as it has developed, while combining the different roles she found herself in as she returned to Georgia again and again.

Christian Vögtle

Born in 1990, Christian Vögtle works as a high school teacher of Art and German and as a freelance artist in Karlsruhe, Germany. He studied painting and graphics in the class of Prof. Erwin Gross and Matthias Bitzer at the State Faculty of Fine Arts in Karlsruhe (AdBK), and in the class of Prof. Glòria Muñoz and Prof. Alfonso de Castro at the University of Barcelona (UB), and German language and literature at the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT). His works in the fields of painting, drawing, and photography have been shown in several solo exhibitions. He frequently visits different countries, such as Mexico, Russia, Israel, and Burkina Faso, to develop his artistic ideas, seeking new inspirations as well as deeper understandings of these foreign cultures. The photographs included in this publication were taken during his stays in Moscow and New York. In addition to his single-lens reflex camera, he has recently also begun using a Polaroid Camera. Bound to the 'one-shot-chance' of the Polaroid system, he never leaves a place he just photographed before the taken Polaroid is fully developed, which means he sometimes ends up waiting for several minutes at unusual spots. As motifs, he often chooses close-ups of architecture and everyday objects in suburban outskirts, and uses the narrowed focus to emphasise the universal structures more than the individual traces of each object – until the photos finally reveal something close to the 'essence of urbanism' by presenting just basic structures and patterns which can be found everywhere in the world. The realities and challenges caught through the lens become disconnected from their material objects and appear abstract, placeless, and, through this, visionary and new. Unexpected perspectives on familiar objects reveal their future-oriented aspects and their multi-layered potential for being the starting point for tomorrow's visions. For more information, see www.christianvoegtler.com

Jochen Maier

Jochen Maier was born in 1960 and is a pastor in Kirchheim unter Teck, Germany. He studied protestant theology at the University of Tübingen. In 2008 he completed the advanced training course *playingarts* within the Experimentelle Bildungsräume (Experimental Education Rooms) programme, which was offered by the Protestant Church in Württemberg. Art has accompanied him since his youth. His forms of expression and design are mainly drawing, collage (papier découpé), watercolour, mixed media, and monotyping. He has participated in various exhibitions, and in late

2020 he had a solo exhibition *Wunsch nach Wandlung* (Desire for Transformation) in Kappel Abbey in Kappel am Albis, Switzerland. His creative approaches and forms of expression are regularly implemented in art projects within church work. Out of this context originate some of Jochen Maier's photographs. He regularly organises trips for the church community and is passionate about capturing unique impressions through his lens while travelling. His photographs provide the viewer with glimpses of realities, challenges, and visions of the world he experiences during his journeys individually and within church group activities. The viewer is invited into different perspectives of fellowship and travelling, and into different perceptions of everyday life.

List of Photographs

- pp. 60/61: Jumah Mosque in Tbilisi; © Edita Štulcaitė 2014
- pp. 62/63: Eye Contact in Kakheti; © Edita Štulcaitė 2017
- pp. 64/65: Untitled; © Edita Štulcaitė 2014
- pp. 66/67: Cemetery at the Armenia-Turkey Border; © Edita Štulcaitė 2014
- pp. 68/69: Rustavi IV; © Edita Štulcaitė 2014
- pp. 70/71: Rustavi V; © Edita Štulcaitė 2014
- pp. 72/73: Rustavi VI; © Edita Štulcaitė 2013
- p. 74: Coffee Break in Kakheti; © Edita Štulcaitė 2017
- p. 120: Eins. From the series *Interferenzen*; © Christian Vögtle 2019
- p. 121: Rillen. From the series *Interferenzen*; © Christian Vögtle 2019
- p. 122: zentriert. From the series *KOCMOC*; © Christian Vögtle 2019
- p. 123 (top): Trialog. From the series *Interferenzen*; © Christian Vögtle 2019
- p. 123 (bottom): Ligovsky Ave. From the series *KOCMOC*; © Christian Vögtle 2019
- p. 124: SVO. From the series *KOCMOC*; © Christian Vögtle 2019
- p. 125: ostrot. From the series *KOCMOC*; © Christian Vögtle 2019
- p. 126: abblättern. From the series *Interferenzen*; © Christian Vögtle 2019
- p. 127: Freistreifen. From the series *KOCMOC*; © Christian Vögtle 2019

- p. 128: PMMA. From the series *KOCMOC*; © Christian Vögtle 2019
- p. 129: gülden. From the series *KOCMOC*; © Christian Vögtle 2019
- p. 130 (top): umschlungen. From the series *Interferenzen*; © Christian Vögtle 2019
- p. 130 (bottom): District 1. From the series *KOCMOC*; © Christian Vögtle 2019
- p. 131: Kratzer. From the series *Interferenzen*; © Christian Vögtle 2019
- p. 133: Doppelhelix. From the series *Interferenzen*; © Christian Vögtle 2019
- p. 236: musician; © Jochen Maier 2012
- p. 237: traveller; © Jochen Maier 2012
- p. 238: outlook; © Jochen Maier 2012
- p. 239: network; © Jochen Maier 2008
- p. 240: making way; © Jochen Maier 2020
- p. 241: waves of light; © Jochen Maier 2019
- p. 242: mirror of the past; © Jochen Maier 2019
- p. 243: jump; © Jochen Maier 2019
- p. 244: big; © Jochen Maier 2020
- p. 245: point of view; © Jochen Maier 2020
- p. 246: passenger; © Jochen Maier 2016
- p. 247: waiting; © Jochen Maier 2017
- Book Cover: Würfel; © Jochen Maier 2008

The Academic Council on Culture and Foreign Policy (WIKA)¹

WIKA was founded in 2004 by ifa, the Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen. Its aim is to provide academic support for foreign cultural policy in Germany and Europe, to develop concepts in dialogue with politicians and intermediary organisations active abroad, to bring together representatives from university teaching, research, and practice, to promote the topic of foreign cultural policy in research and teaching, and to introduce more university students to this topic. WIKA is an association of scholars from numerous humanities and social science disciplines who deal with the theory and practice of cultural exchange. More than 160 experts have worked at WIKA in recent years as speakers or authors. In addition to university lecturers, young academics and representatives of intermediary foreign cultural policy organisations are particularly involved in WIKA.

Membership in WIKA is free of charge and open to scholars, students, and private persons who engage with topics of foreign cultural and educational policy in theory and/or practice. Interested parties can easily learn more about becoming a member of WIKA by writing to the WIKA management.²

Since 2013, Prof. Dr. Caroline Y. Robertson-von Trotha of ZAK | Centre for Cultural and General Studies at the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT) has been the chairperson of WIKA. Her predecessors in this honorary office were Prof. Dr. Bernd Thum from KIT's Institute for German Studies from 2007 to 2013, and the founding chairman, Prof. Dr. Volker Rittberger from the Institute for Political Science of the University of Tübingen from 2004 to 2007.

¹ Translated from the German by Kareem James Abu-Zeid.

² For more information, see <https://www.ifa.de/en/forschung/wika> [01.02.2021].

Conferences

Since 2005, 16 WIKA Workshops on topics pertaining to foreign cultural and educational policy (Auswärtige Kultur- und Bildungspolitik, AKBP) have been organised in cooperation with various universities and research institutions. Some of these conferences have resulted in working groups and EU-funded conference series. For example, the working group “Culture and Cultural Policy” in DeGEval – Evaluation Society (Gesellschaft für Evaluation e.V.) was founded as a result of the WIKA Workshop on Evaluation, and the workshop “The Union for the Mediterranean” was the prelude to a series of conferences on “Culture and Development”, which was jointly organised by ifa, the Goethe-Institut, the Deutsche Stiftung für internationale Entwicklung (DSE, the German Foundation for International Development), the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ, the German Society for International Cooperation), and Deutsche Welle (DW), and which was supported by the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF). In 2019 the WIKA Workshop topic followed a proposal submitted by the Civil Society Working Group of the German Federal Foreign Office: “The Role of Civil Society in Cultural Relations”. Within this framework, three panels were organised and held to discuss “Cultural Cooperation and Shrinking Spaces”, “Youth as Civil Society Actors”, and “Civil Society and Statehood”. In the final panel, feedback for the Civil Society Working Group was developed. For the first time, the Anna Lindh Foundation was secured as a cooperation partner. The workshop pre-event on “Youth as Central Actors of Civil Society” was organised with funds from that foundation. In 2020 the WIKA Workshop took place exclusively in a digital format for the first time.

The WIKA Workshops view themselves as forums for dialogue between scholars from different disciplines and representatives of practice in the field of foreign cultural and educational policy. A particular concern is the promotion of young scholars, their integration into the interdisciplinary discourse, and the mediation of connections to relevant fields of practice. For several years now, the workshops have been documented on ZAK’s YouTube channel,³ which allows the discussions of the workshop topics to be conveyed to a young generation of researchers and a larger specialist public. Furthermore, international experts from the domains of science and education policy, with their specific perspectives, are increasingly finding opportunities to speak. The topics and partners of the past WIKA Workshops were:

³ See <https://www.youtube.de/ZAKVideoclips> [01.02.2021].

- 2020: Cultures Underway. Cultural Divides within and across Societies / ZAK | Centre for Cultural and General Studies at the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT)
- 2019: The Role of Civil Society in Cultural Relations / ZAK | Centre for Cultural and General Studies at the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT)
- 2018: Models of Future Cultural Relations: Realities, Challenges, Visions / ZAK | Centre for Cultural and General Studies at the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT)
- 2017: Kultur: Umbruch – Aufbruch – Neuorientierung (Culture: Upheaval – Breakthrough – Reorientation) / ZAK | Centre for Cultural and General Studies at the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT)
- 2016: Diaspora – Netzwerke globaler Gemeinschaften II (Diaspora – Networks of Global Communities II) / ZAK | Centre for Cultural and General Studies at the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT)
- 2015: Diaspora – Netzwerke globaler Gemeinschaften (Diaspora – Networks of Global Communities) / ZAK | Centre for Cultural and General Studies at the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT)
- 2014: Auswärtige Kultur- und Bildungspolitik in Europa zwischen Renationalisierung und Globalisierung (Foreign Cultural and Educational Policy in Europe between Renationalisation and Globalisation) / State Representation of Baden-Württemberg in Berlin, ZAK | Centre for Cultural and General Studies at the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT)
- 2013: Kulturelle Faktoren von Geopolitik (Cultural Factors of Geopolitics) / ZAK | Centre for Cultural and General Studies at the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT)
- 2012: Fort- und Weiterbildung für Akteure der Auswärtigen Kultur- und Bildungspolitik (Further and Continuing Education for Actors in Foreign Cultural and Educational Policy) / MitteleuropaZentrum (MeZ, Centre for the Study of Central Europe) at the Technische Universität Dresden
- 2011: Migration der Künste – Künste der Migration (Migration of the Arts – Arts of Migration) / University of Tübingen
- 2010: Bildung, Kultur(en), Außenpolitik (Education, Culture(s), Foreign Policy) / University of Bayreuth
- 2009: Die Union für das Mittelmeer: Kultur und Entwicklung von Rabat bis Helsinki? (The Union for the Mediterranean: Culture and Development from Rabat to Helsinki?) / Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Universitätsclub Bonn e.V.

- 2008: Europäische Integration als Herausforderung Auswärtiger Kulturpolitik (European Integration as a Challenge for Foreign Cultural Policy) / Stiftung Universität Hildesheim (the University of Hildesheim Foundation)
- 2007: Der Beitrag der Hochschulen zum euroislamischen Dialog (Universities' Contributions to the Euro-Islamic Dialogue) / Universität Karlsruhe (TH, Karlsruhe University of Applied Sciences)
- 2006: Evaluation in der Auswärtigen Kulturpolitik (Evaluation in Foreign Cultural Policy) / Center for Evaluation (CEval) of Saarland University
- 2005: Kultur und Krisenprävention – Zum Stand der wissenschaftlichen Diskussion (Culture and Crisis Prevention – The State of the Scholarly Discussion) / The German Development Institute (DIE, Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik), Bonn

In addition to the workshops, so far ten annual meetings of WIKA have taken place, at which WIKA members elect the chairman or chairwoman for a three-year term, discuss the further development of WIKA and future workshop topics, and present their own projects. For example, teaching modules on foreign cultural policy were presented, plans for an online seminar entitled “Foreign Cultural and Educational Policy – International Cultural Relations” and a “Virtual Map of Euro-Mediterranean Places of Remembrance” were also presented, and a report was given on the development and background of a parliamentary discussion of foreign cultural and educational policy in the German Bundestag.

In addition to the workshops, 15 Master/Doctoral WIKA Colloquia for young scholars took place in preparation for current theses on topics of foreign cultural and educational policy. At the colloquia, the young researchers are given the opportunity to present their projects and discuss them in a larger circle familiar with scholarly issues and questions surrounding foreign cultural and educational policy. Since 2004, almost 90 young researchers have presented their research projects at the WIKA Colloquia, some of them over consecutive years, and have come away with numerous suggestions for their further work from those discussions.

On the occasion of the tenth anniversary of WIKA, on 4–6 December 2014, the WIKA Annual Conference, the Master/Doctoral Colloquium, and the WIKA Workshop took place for the first time in Berlin at the Baden-Württemberg State Representation. The workshop was concluded by a debate between the author Tanja Dückers, the Head of the Department of Culture and Communication at the Federal Foreign Office,

Dr. Andreas Görgen, and the Director of the European External Action Service, Prof. Dr. Gerhard Sabathil, on the topic of “Europa in der Zerreißprobe: Neue Wege der Zusammenarbeit nach innen und nach außen?” (“Europe in the Crucial Test: New Ways of Cooperating Inwardly and Outwardly?”).

Publications

To date, WIKA has published more than 90 information letters and a collection of essays under the title *Deutsche Hochschulen im Dialog mit der Arabischen Welt* (German Universities in Dialogue with the Arab World, 2009). Since 2011, WIKA has been publishing the WIKA Report within one of ifa’s publication series, the ifa Edition Culture and Foreign Policy.

With the WIKA Report, for the first time since the 1960s, a periodical on the dialogue between research and practice in foreign cultural and educational policy is being published. The first edition of the report was published in September 2013 under the title *Internationale Bildungsbeziehungen* (International Educational Relations), documenting the WIKA Workshop 2010 in Bayreuth. Volume 2 examines *Kulturelle Faktoren der Geopolitik* (Cultural Factors of Geopolitics), publishing the contributions of the 2013 WIKA Workshop in Karlsruhe. Volume 3, entitled *Diaspora – Netzwerke globaler Gemeinschaften* (Diaspora – Networks of Global Communities), summarises the two WIKA Workshops of the same name that took place in 2015 and 2016, while the present fourth volume presents the results of the WIKA Workshops “Kultur: Umbruch – Aufbruch – Neuorientierung” (Culture: Upheaval – Breakthrough – Reorientation, 2017), “Models of Future Cultural Relations: Realities, Challenges, Visions” (2018) and “The Role of Civil Society in Cultural Relations” (2019).

In the coming years, WIKA will continue to increase the visibility of foreign cultural and educational policy through conferences and publications, introduce young scholars to the field of culture and foreign policy, further expand its interdisciplinary network, and act as a bridge between cultural practice, politics, media, and academia.

Gudrun Czekalla

Managing Director of WIKA and Head of the ifa Library

Competence Centre Culture and Foreign Policy

Networking

Academic Council on Culture and Foreign Policy (WIKA)

Network for scholars, students and
foreign cultural policy actors

- annual workshop
- annual colloquium for MA and PhD students
- WIKA info letter every two months

International Cultural Relations Research Alliance (ICRRA)

Worldwide network of research institutes
of international cultural policy

- annual network meetings
- support of evidence-based research
- ifa-managed digital platform with open access
to the institutions' research literature

10 years Research Programme 'Culture and Foreign Policy'

- research on current issues of foreign
cultural and educational policy
- recommendations for strengthening and further
developing international cultural relations
- reflection in expert discussions, at international
conferences and public discussions
- publications:
ifa Edition Culture and Foreign Policy and
shortpaper ifa Inputs at www.ssoar.info, keyword ifa

20 years ifa Research Award Foreign Cultural Policy

honours dissertations making an outstanding
contribution to further progress and development
in research by addressing subjects that

- are at the interface between culture and foreign policy,
- are relevant to foreign cultural policy practice

Documentation and Information

Specialised library


on international cultural relations

- 445,000 volumes
- 750 periodicals
- extensive online services

ifa (Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen)
Charlottenplatz 17
70173 Stuttgart
Germany

+49.711.2225.147
research@ifa.de

<https://www.ifa.de/en/research/>



In light of global power shifts and increasing nationalisms in the digital age, and intensified by the collective experience of a worldwide pandemic, foreign cultural and educational policy is faced with new questions and tasks. Comprising scientific analyses, hands-on cultural work, and photography, this volume ventures to take stock of the current state of affairs. With selective recourses to historical bases of civil society work, we ask:

How are democratisation, education, and processes of civil society involvement connected, and what are the effects of renewed authoritarianisms? On which foundations are stable networks and successful international and intercultural cooperation projects built? And how can realities be changed by involving civil society actors?

ife Institut für
Auslandsbeziehungen

ZAK Centre for Cultural and General Studies
Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT)

ISBN 978-3-7315-1057-4



9 783731 510574 >