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R. Seidelmann

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German Defense Policy

by

R. Seidelmann

The Federal Republic of Germany and the Policies of Defense

Reimund Seidelmann

1. Specific characteristics of the FRG case

The Federal Republic of Germany has a set of characteristic conditions for its policies of security, which differ fundamentally from those of other Western European countries. These factors limit, direct, and accelerate FRG security policies and are working relatively independently from the present or future governments. In other words, they are structural, i.e. relatively independent from time and actor. Policy has in the long run only two choices: either to take them into account and follow their limitations or to gradually overcome them by structural changes, which requires a large amount of political time and energy.

These specific characteristics are:

1. Still in present times historical experiences in German aggressive warfare in the 20th century are valid both in Eastern Europe and the USSR and Western Europe. Especially in the USSR the tradition of the Second World War patriotic traditions are kept up and serve as an important - though now irrational - motivation for patriotic integration, glorification of the armed forces and the military service, and deep-rooted security needs for defense against the West, especially German military forces¹. Though in Western Europe most of similar experiences with the "Deutsches Reich" have been overcome by the past three decades of the Federal Republic of Germany cooperation with the West, there is still a certain special attention for German military behavior.

This historical factor should not be overestimated. Policies in the East and West are formulated according to present capabilities, behavioral patterns, and objectives. But internal legitimization and political climate between nations in Europe are giving this factor not only a minor relevance to be taken into consideration but are stimulating the FRG European behavior towards a certain responsibility against history.

2. In economic terms, i.e. in quality, quantity, and growth of the industrial capability, the FRG is one of the major powers of Western Europe and its economic cooperation with the East has created certain one-sided medium dependencies of Eastern economic growth from FRG support in technology and investment goods². This economic capability and its role for the European and international market is giving the FRG an important political value - both as an object for political pressure and for political cooperation. The relevance of this factor is increased by the FRG influence in European Community (EC) policies, both in economic and political aspects. Influencing FRG policies means simultaneously getting access towards EC decision-making.

3. In terms of classical military strategic thinking the FRG is one of the most exposed countries of NATO. The common border line with the German Democratic Republic (GDR), the Central location, and the highest concentration of troops and nuclear warheads within the NATO territory are forcing both Western and Eastern military and security policies to give special attention towards developments in this country.

On the other hand this exposed location means, that each potential conventional attack from the East would hit directly

the FRG⁴ and would destroy even in a few days most of its economic capability, infrastructure, and population - due to the present ways of military operation and the amount of destruction capability of troops fighting in this area.

In present times the FRG armed forces in connection with the FRG arms production is - besides the US forces in Europe - one of the biggest, modernized, and - in matters of motivation - most efficient conventional armed forces within NATO. Similar to the economic field this gives a special influence within NATO decision-making towards FRG demands and offers.

4. Both economic and military orientation to and integration in Western Europe are more or less irreversible, if the present level of economic growth and security is to be kept up.

5. The key role in development and implementation of political détente led to a certain credibility for FRG initiatives in reducing the risk of war in Europe. In combination with the other factors the FRG plays a key role in promoting political détente, completing it by military détente, and development of the relevant All-European structures for peaceful conflict solution.

These five factors must be seen as a set of factors, i.e. in combination. For the USSR it is the combination of the historical factor and the military strength and influence on the one hand and the economic possibilities on the other hand which lead to the specific bilateral relations with the FRG which developed in the last years. For other Western European countries the military, economic, and political influence within EC and NATO lead to both concern and to demands for greater FRG involvements especially in spending resources.

Whereas the détente community is stressing the specific historical responsibility and the political possibilities as a result of the key role in European political détente the defense community is arguing with the exposed military situation and the necessity of keeping up the freedom of political and economic action.

2. The principal security dilemmas of the FRG

Security policy in and for the FRG is facing several principal dilemmas, i.e. problems with contradicting elements. Like the specific characteristics and heavily linked to them these dilemmas, are the main problems to be solved - at least to be managed - by FRG policy. Though some of them are similar to those of other Western and Eastern countries because of the international interdependence not only within Europe but with European and US-USSR security problems, some of them reflect the specific FRG characteristics and are responsible for specific national aspects of the FRG détente and security policy.

2.1 The defense-destruction dilemma

It belonged to the third specific characteristic for the FRG that it is located directly at the NATO-WTO border line and plays a key role for conventional attacks. Even limited conventional attacks from the East would destroy vital parts of the FRG. Therefore it was one of the main aims of all FRG security policies to shift the front line as much as possible towards its Eastern borders to avoid conventional warfare on its middle and Western regions. Simultaneously it was the other main objective to get as much as possible NATO and especially US guarantees for assured deterrence, i.e. escalation from conventional towards nuclear warfare. The idea, to put Atomic Demolation Material (ADM) at the border line,

is one of the examples of how the FRG military tried to combine both elements.

Assured deterrence by US nuclear capability - one of the main Western European objectives and fears - even in case of a limited conventional attack⁵ could be enforced both by its own nuclear forces or by an involvement of US troops as early as possible. The nuclear option like the French or British one, had to be excluded, though first attempts were made under the defense minister Strauss who wanted to get access at least to the transport capabilities for nuclear eurostrategic warheads⁶. Second attempts were made in the Multi-lateral nuclear Force (MLF)-project and third attempts were made in promotion ideas of a bi-or-trilateral cooperation in the military nuclear field between the FRG, France and the UK. It is the combination of the historical specific characteristic and the strength and influence of the FRG, which lead to the renunciation of a national middle range nuclear force or the direct access to multilateral nuclear capability. Western European allies feared the breakdown of their nuclear duopoly, Eastern Europe and the USSR saw and see in FRG access to nuclear military power a major political escalation in the East-West conflict and a direct threat to their security.

The possibilities left were first the use of the US troops in the FRG as trip wire and second close political cooperation with the USA to get political guarantees. The FRG policies - independent from the party in government - combined both. Threatened by the idea the USA might reach a deal with the USSR on the costs of FRG security and freedom of action the FRG risked even political differences with the other EC member countries to keep up and to intensify the atlantic cooperation. Simultaneously the FRG tried not only

to stop or to delay the reduction of US troops in the FRG but was able to get new US troops into the Bremen area, which is sensitive for possible conventional attacks because of its harbor.

Nevertheless the principle dilemma could not be solved. If deterrence would fail those aims who should be defended would be destroyed. A military solution was unsatisfactory and created a dependency on atlantic cooperation which lead to intra-EC conflicts. A conventional build-up to equal Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) conventional strength was regarded as too expensive and not necessary, because of the NATO triad concept. International détente lead to another option, i.e. to lower the risk of military intervention, limited or major war on the FRG territory and to reduce the security dependency on the US nuclear guarantees. The leading ideas for FRG détente policies as an European regional détente were based on the combination of several factors: first to increase security by decreasing the probability of use of military forces in Europe, second to come to a more European solution of European security without loosing US overall nuclear guarantees and third to reduce the specific dependency on US security guarantees and Atlanticism in order to reduce internal EC political differences about relations to the USA. Because of the problem, that the defense-destruction dilemma could not be solved by traditional security policy, one had to look for alternative solutions, resulting both in higher security and lower militarisation of interstate behavior in Europe.

2.2 The Berlin-dilemma

Berlin and especially West Berlin has become the symbol for realised US security guarantees in the FRG. This is one of the major

outcomes of the blockade of West Berlin. West Berlin marks on the one hand the limitations of FRG sovereignty and on the other hand the dependency of FRG policy on US security guarantees. Though highly vulnerable because of geographical isolation, FRG policy made West Berlin's political freedoms one of the vital objectives of FRG security policy. Worsening of the status of West Berlin would create a sharp decrease in public support for any FRG government. Discussing political alternatives for the future of West Berlin is highly tabooed and claims that West Berlin belongs to the FRG are one of the steadily repeated statements in FRG official policy.

Nevertheless both the vulnerability and the special status of West Berlin and the several USSR-GDR attempts to come to a solution more favorable to their interest have made clear, that the present situation is unsolved and unsatisfactory. During the development of US-USSR *détente*, the question was put forward within the FRG, whether the USA might sacrifice West Berlin if USSR pressures combined with enticements in other world regions. This was in principle the same question discussed for US behavior in case of a limited attack against the FRG, but still more sensitive, because of the higher vulnerability of West Berlin. The four-power-treaty on Berlin, an essential part of the new Eastern policy of the FRG after 1969, did not bring any important news other than the reassurance of the status quo in terms of international law. It did not solve or adequately reduce the uncertainty about future US behavior; neither did it inhibit the greater integration of East Berlin into the territory of the GDR. And the FRG had to learn in the future, especially in connection with the discussions about West Berlin in economic and other treaties with Eastern European countries and the USSR, that the East did not accept the status quo as a stable and satisfactory solution.

Like the overall security problem the Europeanisation of European security problems - or at least the attempts to find adequate European solutions - opened perspectives for doubling the unstable security of the city. Taking the participation in the European direct elections of 1979 as a starting point the FRG did not extend the formal links to West Berlin but modified the West Berlin problem from an FRG-Four-Allies problem to an FRG-Four-Allies-EC-problem using the possibilities the last treaty left open. This is an attempt to establish doubled guarantees, first the US ones and second the EC ones. But, this strategy of diversification of political responsibility creates an old new-problem, namely the difficulties of combining Atlanticism with European orientation. And - though it might be regarded as improvement - it does not solve the principal problem and opens FRG foreign policies towards Eastern offers and/or pressures in the West Berlin issue.

2.3 The armament-détente dilemma

Though FRG's East policy had followed US-USSR détente development with a certain time lag but with higher speed and concentration on the European region, it could not avoid the fundamental dilemma of present East-West conflict behavior, namely promoting détente by cooperation in the economic, cultural, and political field and going on with armament, i.e. conflict behavior in the military field with only small tendencies for cooperation in the military détente field. This dilemma has created in general and for the FRG in specific two main problems. First to which extent military détente offers should be made and which negotiation tactic should be used and second to which extent the WTO conventional and eurostrategic military

build up should be met by adequate military and security reactions.

The first aspect touches both East and West in their political interactions. The fundamental dilemma is, that each unilateral step forward from the one side may weaken its negotiating position, because it strengthens those hardline domestic groups which are not interested in adequate response and are stopping them arguing that such a voluntary offers is a sign for weakness, which has not to be met by own reactions. There were mainly three important military offers, of which one called for adequate reaction. The first was the reduction of the enlistment period from 18 to 15 months, mostly due to the high amount of draftees but simultaneously a reduction in available fully-trained combat units. The second was the re-organization of the logistics of the Bundeswehr and its de-mobilization, which was done explicitly to increase the defensive character of the Bundeswehr, which was not able anymore to make advanced mediumrange attacks towards the East because of its logistics based mainly on depots on FRG territory. The third and explicit offer was the way the neutron bomb issue was handled from the FRG side. Though the neutron weapons must be regarded as an answer to WTO superiority in numbers of tanks combined with an offensive military strategy and organization, it was brought into negotiation and limited to an option. All three offers were not met neither in adequate military terms, i.e. by a decrease of enlistment periods, a more defensive structure, and a slow down of tank modernization and enlargement nor in functional equivalent military reactions. The fundamental self-restrictions of the FRG armed forces, i.e. the full integration into NATO, the renunciation of nuclear forces,

and its more or less defensive orientation are handled as concessions which are not counting in military détente negotiations. The limitation of FRG arms export and military assistance, the measures to reduce enemy-images against the East in domestic socialisation, and the whole treatment of conscientious objection are not accepted in arms negotiations or met with similar developments either in the USSR or in the GDR⁸.

This lack of adequate response towards present limitations and offers creates the negotiation dilemma, in which the strategy of bargaining chips built up pays off more than offers. The failure of past and present strategies is leading to the discussion whether FRG security policy should be based more on the doctrine "to arm in order to disarm and to get adequate reactions simultaneously" or on the self-limitation and the strategy of gradual and attractive offers. This discussion, going on between government and opposition on the one hand and between the détente and the defense community on the other hand, is facing its crucial tests in the next national elections in 1980, where security policy will be one of the major issues.

The second aspect touches specifically the FRG and its military part within NATO. Facing a Soviet conventional and eurostrategic build-up, which is both a modernisation and enlargement, the question is put forward, how long the FRG can delay its own conventional build-up and how long NATO can delay eurostrategic reactions. On the present base of assured deterrence and flexible response especially in the conventional field mostly by modernization and enlargement of anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons of the FRG armed forces the FRG can delay reactions at least for some years. But the foreseeable decrease

in the number of available draftees in the middle of the 80-ies, and the steady growth and modernization rate of the WTO armed forces are creating a destabilizing asymmetry in the future, which may lead USSR military to the opinion that numerical superiority could be used for political pressures. Therefore the present reaction of self-limitation, offers, and delay of a Western equivalent conventional build up faces the dilemma that, if the WTO side does not react sufficiently in the future, destabilizing elements could be introduced, which could be met on the price of increased armament and arms race and of temporarily overproportional asymmetries.

2.4 The domestic demilitarisation dilemma

Under the successes of political détente within the FRG a détente community within and between parties, cultural elites, and public opinion developed. This domestic pressure group for ongoing détente helped to organise the necessary public support for the change of the FRG Eastern policies towards détente. Facing a small majority in parliament and sharp political attacks from a reorganizing opposition domestic consensus about the present course in security policy especially military policy cannot be found. Polarization between the détente community and the defense community takes place and is escalating. The general support for a policy of foreign normalization and détente has not lead to a spill over in the security field. Historical experiences, traditions of anticommunism and knowledge about the internal development in the GDR, and day-to-day social experiences are favoring a political culture, supporting political culture, supporting political détente but rejecting self-limitation and the strategy of offers. This is enforced by an extremely limited knowledge about conditions, dynamics, and results of military

détente within the population and even leading elites and the argument of the defense community of the lack of concrete pay-offs in terms of WTO behavior.

The fundamental dilemma of FRG military détente policies lies not so much in the lack of support from the opposition, the public critique of military experts and politicians within the ruling parties, but mainly in the lack of popular support for the present appeasement, deescalation-oriented, and bargain-opening armament policy without first obtaining concrete results either in multi-lateral negotiations like the Material and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) or in bilateral response by the GDR or the USSR⁹.

3. The Principal options

Security policy for and in the FRG has several options to solve, manage and to reduce these dilemmas. The choice of option depends both on the freedom of action given by the reactions of the East and the Western allies and the extent of internal consensus given by the reaction respecting support of the main important national elites and the population.

3.1 The status quo option

The status quo option can be regarded as - in political short-term thinking - the cheapest, i.e. that option with a minimum of risks concerning changes of internal support and stabilizing power base and external pressure. On the base of the present reduction of the war risk in Middle Europe as a result of political détente and military deterrence, present strategic military stability can be upheld by both reacting to WTO armament by improvement of NATO, especially FRG military capabilities and upholding the present climate in

the military detente negotiations. The status quo option is based on the unchanged mix of political detente, limited economic cooperation, and armament reactions of the conventional and eurostrategic field to compensate for WTO armament by its own relevant armament. It is based on a strong US-orientation in military and security policies, the acceptance of the leadership and priority of US initiatives for Western European security, and a military detente policy, which is mainly directed to confidence building measures and to delay both reduction of US troops in Europe and arms control or disengagement within NATO and especially the FRG armed forces.

This option has the advantage, that both internally and externally no risks are taken. It reflects the domestic strength of the opposition and its support within the military and great parts of the population. It reflects the external dependence on US security guarantees and the idea to stabilize US commitments for the FRG and West Berlin security by acceptance of US foreign policy in this field both in matters of substance and strategy. But the crucial aspect of this option is, that though problems are managed they are not solved. The status quo does not solve the present dilemmas. It is in this respect a time-buying strategy independent from present possibilities of developing new and alternative concepts for problem solution.

3.2. The detente-completion option

In comparison with the status-quo option the detente-completion option is more initiative-oriented, questions the long-term rationality of the present way of reaching security, and is aiming towards a step-wise, gradually balanced but overall decrease in military danger, military possibilities and capabilities in Middle Europe. The fundamental idea of this option is, that the detente process

must have a certain dynamic not only in matters of political détente and economic cooperation but by the completion of political détente by military détente. Based on the cooperation in the political and economic field a spill-over effect has to be integrated in the whole detent concept. A European security solution means reduced dependencies on US security guarantees and higher probabilities for internal democratisation processes in Eastern Europe and the USSR.

Because of the step-wise and gradual approach this option differs from the status-quo option mostly in the strategy and tactic in military détente negotiations. Whereas the status-quo option wants to limit military détente to confidence building measures and is rather defensive or reactive towards WTO military détente offers, the completion option looks at confidence building measures as a first step, which is slowly and gradually going into concrete changes of WTO military strategy, especially its offensive character. The second difference lies in the introduction of new initiatives by the FRG government which changes the traditional follower-mentality towards a more active policy based on the integration of its own interest into the framework of NATO interests. The third is the strategy to test possibilities and limitations of WTO military détente by offers to negotiate upon weapon systems before - and not after - development, production, and deployment. The most typical example is the neutron weapon case, used as a pretest for USSR reactions in the modernisation of eurostrategic weapons.

This option is based on assured deterrence, concentrating on the first element of the NATO triad. Facing the WTO conventional and eurostrategic build up it looks for a reaction which on the one hand restabilizes East-West deterrence balance in Europe and on the other hand does not stimulate the WTO for further armament. There are

several examples for such a policy: the reorganization of the logistics for the FRG armed forces limiting its offensive range drastically, the modernization and the enlargement of anti-tank weapons as a substitute for the neutron weapons, the ideas to meet the last conventional build up of the WTO by a step-wise reintegration of France into NATO, and not to enlarge NATO by admitting Spain. Such a policy based on the principal acceptance of USSR security needs, especially limitation of FRG military capability to defense only, and avoiding any steps which could be used by the WTO military elites for legitimization of its own armament and political influence programs. However, such a policy has its own limitations. If the WTO continues with the growth and modernisation rate for its military capacities, the FRG reaches - probably in the middle of the 80-ies - a point in which decisions about new weapon systems of a higher destructive capacity will become necessary. If the strategy of negotiation offers-as for instance in the neutron weapon case - does not lead to adequate reactions or adequate offers from the WTO side, it will be regarded as a failure and be replaced by a strategy which does not favor concrete negotiations before steps in armament.

3.3. The domestic debate about the options

In front of the background of the next federal elections in 1980, in which only a small change in percentage can lead to a change in government¹⁰, the discussion of which option should be pursued by FRG foreign and military policy is going to become a major political issue. The choice of option is linked to domestic strategies of getting public support and specific party consensus

The status-quo option is mostly propagated and supported by the liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP), parts of the social democratic defense community and the conservative CDU/CSU. It is the present course of the FDP and

its Foreign Ministry to smooth down too far-reaching social democratic and liberal minority concepts for completing political by military détente. One of the main reasons for the course of the FDP leader and Foreign Minister Genscher - made clear in the support of unconditioned modernisation of eurostrategic weapons of NATO - is both the reduction of foreign risks and the search for domestic party consensus combined with an open-door-policy for CDU/CSU ideas. This political course, even supported by the defense-oriented groups within the SPD, is not directed to question the results of political détente or economic cooperation with the East. It is more or less a limitation of further détente in other than the traditional fields and the change of negotiation strategies, based on the argument, that the present completion policies did not lead to sufficient reactions by WTO and mostly the USSR.

This argument is one of the reasons, why the SPD stresses the necessity to reach concrete results or in-between-results at the MBFR negotiations to prove the properness of its attempts to implement the détente-completion option. The general domestic discussion has reached internal governmental decision-making. Initiatives from the Chancellor Schmidt or via social democratic party communication links towards the East and West and the discussion about the establishment of an FRG ACDA in order to promote military détente and to limit the influence of the liberal Foreign Ministry towards military détente negotiations show the problem. The public debate over a statement from Herbert Wehner, leader of the SPD faction in the FRG parliament and one of the SPD's leading triumvirate, that the USSR behavior is mainly defensive is more a debate of how far and whether military détente should be promoted by FRG initiatives or not.

The debate is still open. After the replacement of the Defense Minister Leber, who backed the status-quo option, by the more flexible Hans Apel, and the necessity of the SPD to keep up a progressive and active profile in détente policies to mobilize party and electorate, the SPD is developing a compromise between its different groups towards a limited but clear completion option. The FDP is still split on this question, but facing difficulties to regain the necessary percentage of votes, the course of the status-quo option is not questioned in public. The CDU/CSU strongly propagating the status-quo and criticising heavily the completion option, are limited in their influence because the government does not harmonise this part of its policy domestically and the election campaign demands certain self-limitations. Therefore, the main problems are the speed, scope, and tactics of military détente negotiations. Domestic developments coupled with WTO reactions will determine which options will be considered and adopted.

4. The general orientation

FRG's foreign policy is characterised by two elements: first integration and second orientation towards the West. Both are based on economic and security interdependencies and have led to relevant and specific political behavior. Both elements are - compared to German history - new and compared to other European medium powers like France and Great Britain relatively strong. Nevertheless national interests and EC and NATO policies can and have differed which has led to certain internal disputes about the general orientation of the FRG foreign policies, partially influenced from French discussions.

4.1. Integration

Economic EC-integration, military and political NATO-integration,

and political cooperation within the framework of the European Political Cooperation were developed in the 50-ies and are the results of external interests to control German economy and military capacities and the concept of the CDU/CSU under Adenauer to improve the political position and influence of the FRG by accepting this control and active integration. In contradiction to this concept the SPD of that period adhered to the traditional concept of national foreign policy, which developed out of the traditional (since the 19th century) experience in attempting to mediate between East and West. The main point under discussion between those two concepts was the re-unification debate. Whereas integration into the Western alliances stopped all perspectives the neutral mediator concept was open at least for some kinds of re-unification. Though in the middle of the 50-ies the SPD changed its policies and accepted the successful concept of West integration and remiliarisation, ideas to use German geographical position in the middle of Europe and to come to a certain perspective for the German-German cooperation by a political opening towards the East, i.e. Eastern Europe and the USSR were still valid in the FRG East policy since the end of the 60-ies.

In connection with the development of détente in Europe the FRG policy of the USSR gave specific attention towards political and economic cooperation with the FRG. Today one can speak of special relations between the FRG and the USSR, which go far beyond the economic and military relevance of the FRG in Western Europe. The USSR being aware of specific FRG interests in security and German-German relations is trying to compensate the FRG integration

by a bilateral policy which sometimes excludes realization of EC or NATO objectives. This relates mostly towards the economic field, but in political and military détente several attempts were made to come to similar developments.

A review of the economic, military, and political advantages of the integration shows that cooperation with the West not only on the European but on the global level is vital for the FRG. The advantage of using its strong position within the EC and the European part of NATO for influencing EC - and NATO-policies is by far higher than of any regression into national independence for example of the Finland type. But an isolation from the East cuts not only necessary communication lines within Europe but forces Eastern European countries into greater dependence upon WTO and COMECON integration. The opening of FRG policies towards intensified communication and limited cooperation with the East and especially the USSR must be seen in the history of German-Eastern Europe and USSR-relations, in the necessity to look for Middle European conflict management and conflict solution, and in the specific FRG dilemmas including the high political value of each improvement of FRG-GDR relations seen from the FRG population. This opening should not be mixed up with so-called neutralisation-reunification ideas, which have only historical relevance. It has been useful for the development of political détente in Europe and is essential for the development of any military détente. It is limited by the structural interdependence with Western Europe, which does not allow any major disintegration and this is reconfirmed by the mechanism of intense intra-European communication and harmonization within EPC and the Euro-Group of NATO. The funda-

mental orientation towards an integrated foreign policy in its economic, military, and political aspects is unchanged. The opening of communication channels towards the East is an additional aspect and a precondition for any All-European political solutions.

4.2. Atlantic or European orientation

Together with certain regional concentration of US foreign policy on the global level different interests and different strategies of pursuing these interests have led to minor conflicts between Western Europe or the EC and the USA. After the build-up of an US-EC partnership in the economic field similar attempts have been made in the security issue. Due to the general security dilemmas of the Western Europeans the different national détente policies and mostly the CSCE mark the development of the Europeanization of the European security problems. Europeanization includes the US - necessary because of the NATO structure and function - but means to strengthen European initiatives to reduce the danger of war, military intervention and pressure. This was especially promoted both by US-USSR bilateral cooperation, in which the Western Europeans feared that their interests were not sufficiently represented, and US arms control and military détente priorities, which gave regional solutions for Europe only a small relevance. The US behavior in the CSCE of Belgrade, sometimes regarded as an attempt to slow down intra-European understanding and to restabilize superpower dependencies, stimulated the process of the Europeanisation or the regaining of Western and Eastern European identity for activities and initiatives in the matter of European security. Political success in the solution of the Portuguese, Spanish, and Greek problem by intra-Western European approaches and assistance cooperation. This may lead to conflicts of interest or priorities in

promoted Western European political identity further on.

Within the FRG, atlantic and European orientations go beyond party lines and have long traditions. Though the specific FRG security dilemmas and the economic and political links to the USA direct FRG's foreign policy towards atlantic cooperation, competition with the USA and the search for specific European identity is not only a matter of Western European pressure on the FRG but a domestic political issue. Based on economic global influence demands are put forward to adjust FRG-US relations to be more rational cooperation, in which FRG interests are not always neglected. The latest examples for such an attitude are the FRG-Brazil nuclear deal and the demands that the USA should compensate the AWACS deal by ordering FRG military products. Standardization of NATO weapon systems and improvement of US-FRG military and exercises are other demands. Such discussions should not be mixed up with a Western European isolationism combined with an opening towards the East. Regional and global economic interests, the heavy and principal dependency of all Western Europeans on strategic nuclear US guarantees, and the tradition of cooperation for decades are fundamental for Western Europe cooperation with the USA. But as in the economic field, similar developments of the establishment and the political realization of specific European interests take place in questions of security and military policies. This corresponds with a global tendency for regionalisation relieving the USA of part of its burdens.

The question is not whether to choose atlantic or European orientation but in which extent European problems can be managed and solved by Europeans in the framework of an overall atlantic

specific US - Western European issues. Developments in the economic field between the EC and the US lead simultaneously to a new quality of cooperation based on partnership and rational interest policy.

1. It is important to remind, that the present USSR leadership has personal experiences of the World War II.
2. The present export to the Eastern European countries and the USSR uses up to 2% of the FRG industrial capacities and between 0.4% and 0.6% of its employment. It is roughly 7% of all exports. The FRG import from the East is below 5% of all imports, with the exception of uranium supply no raw material import exceeds the 10% line. For the Eastern side the relative figures have to be doubled. In some cases - for instance the USSR in its imports of machinery - FRG imports are roughly 80% of all imports.
3. The European Political Cooperation (EPC) is the harmonization of the foreign policies of the EC countries. It is institutionalized.
4. This is different to France, Netherlands, etc.
5. Like the PRC's intervention into Vietnam.
6. This was one aspect of the Starfighter F-104 G. The same problem will come again when the question will be discussed, whether the FRG will get cruise missiles.
7. This aspect is stressed by local politicians very often.
8. There are positive developments in Poland for example.
9. This is one of the reasons for the interest of the FRG government in an agreement in the MBFR case before summer 1980.
10. Though opinion polls are showing that because of the person of Strauss as potential chancellor the CDU/CSU will have problems to reach its present percentage the ecology movement threatens

both SPD and FDP, because most of its voters are coming from the traditional SPD/FDP electorate. Special danger is given to the FDP, which can fall below the 5% mark because of the ecology movement. In such a case there will be, because of the German election system a majority for the CDU/CSU in parliament.