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1-1-1984

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Recommended Citation

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Youth and the National Question in the
East and West German Peace Movements

by

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SECURITY AND THE SUCCESSOR GENERATIONS:
YOUTH AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION IN THE EAST
AND WEST GERMAN PEACE MOVEMENTS

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Abstract

The results of various public opinion studies interpreted by this author point to the existence of three demographically distinct German "successor generations." A unique geo-strategic location, demographic polarization, the absence of a shared sense of national identity and the accelerated pace of political-economic change are seen to have played a key role in the mobilization of youth protesters in particular, based on a comparison of the East and West German peace movements. The three generations are seen to differ significantly in the political "meaning" ascribed by each to the anti-nuclear movement, as well as in their fundamental political orientations towards the German "national question." The younger generations in the FRG and the GDR evince parallel tendencies towards "privatism" or apoliticism; they moreover share the distinctive problem of a "missing national identity," which is expected to influence their perception of German security needs and interests. The author posits that these new security concerns, in turn, are likely to hold important political consequences for the future of German-German relations.

Wenn Ihnen ein Deutscher sagt, die Nation spielt

keine Rolle mehr, dann seien Sie misstrauisch.

Glauben Sie ihm nicht. Entweder ist er dumm,

oder er ist falsch, und beides ist gefährlich.

--Egon Bahr

Was wird aus den Deutschen?

Man muss die status quo akzeptieren, um ihn zu verändern.

--Willy Brandt

The historical discontinuities experienced by the East and West German successor generations have been nothing short of extreme. A number of unique "socializing experiences" -- the Berlin blockade from 1948 to 1949, the Soviet intervention in East Germany on June 17, 1953, the construction of the Berlin Wall in August, 1961, the student movement of the late sixties, the anti-Viet Nam protests of the seventies -- have done more to widen the gap between the postwar generations in the two Germanies than they have to provide a basis for a new, shared historical identity. For the most part, these critical socializing events have derived from dramatic changes in the international environment.

In linking the concept of "generational units" to the process of socio-political change more than half a century ago, Karl Mannheim (1928/1965) posed a question that has yet to receive a satisfactory empirical response: namely, to what degree does political stability in a democratic system depend upon the presence or absence of a "successor generation?" To what extent does system responsiveness to dramatic changes in the international environment require the inputs of younger citizens who have few personal or political

attachments to the patterns of diplomatic or military interaction that preceded their enfranchisements? As intimated by these questions, generational succession appears to be quintessential to socio-political progress, insofar as each society depends upon, indeed requires, a new generation to help it shake itself free of obsolescent, obstructive values that have accumulated over time. At a minimum, each generation's contribution to progress rests in its requisite ability to "forget," that is, in its power to emancipate society by reducing "the amount of historical ballast, which eases the prospects for future living" (Mannheim, 1928/1965: 39).

The fact that Germany is no stranger to the historical "problem of generations" finds empirical support in studies conducted by a wide range of social scientists (Bettelheim, 1965; Braungart, 1982; Klönne, 1983; Laqueur, 1962; Lowenberg, 1974; Mommsen, 1983). This "problem" seems to have taken on a new significance in the 1980's, however, in view of growing evidence that the conflict between diverse political generations within a single nation -- loosely defined -- is likely to become an important variable in the conduct of relations between the NATO and Warsaw Pact alliances. Generational influence on political development is nonetheless subject to modification in the larger context of a turbulent, rapidly changing international environment. This essay undertakes to explore potential linkages between an extraordinary amount of "historical ballast," a highly conflictual pattern of generational politics, and the rapid mobilization of youth that has occurred in conjunction with the West and East German peace movements. The central thesis can be summarized thus: The political and historical experiences of three, distinct successor generations have resulted in conflicting definitions of "security" in postwar Germany, as reflected in the significance attributed by each to the born-again peace movement of the 1980's. Concomitantly, growing concern that

the two Germanies will serve as "ground zero" in the event of a nuclear exchange between the superpowers has led to a renewed interest in the Gretchenfrage of postwar European history, namely, the question of German national identity.

The complex problem of national identity that has plagued the German state for well over a hundred years will not be resolved here. This author's intentions are much more modest, namely to pull together what are often judged to be centrifugal analytical themes surrounding the postwar division of Germany. The treatment will be weighted in favor of West German developments, if only because the data are more easily accessible. Part one will look briefly to the problem of "generational succession" and a resurgence of youth unrest in Europe since the late seventies. Part two provides empirical background on youth participation in the peace movements in both the German Federal (FRG) and the German Democratic (GDR) Republics, with a stress on youth participation. The third part of the paper advances a number of speculations with regard to postwar generations' attitudes towards peace protest and the "national question," the resolution of which would go a long way in easing the historical burden that continues to weigh heavily upon German youth. The fourth and final part takes a broader view of the differences between the generations, the significance each ascribes to the peace movement and their relation to the unique "security dilemma" confronting the two German states. No matter how systematically one endeavors to link a study of generational succession with an analysis of political development, the outcome is unlikely to be the discovery of a simple cause and effect relationship. The German case nevertheless affords a golden opportunity for examining the new cohort-social change connection.

THE PROBLEM OF GENERATIONS

In establishing important conceptual parameters for the study of successor groups, Mannheim posited that the rate as well as the character of change occurring within a given polity will largely determine the speed with which new generations are granted access to the political process (Samuels, 1977:6). He further presumed that an acceleration in the rate of social change would result in a concomitant increase in the number of potential "socializing" events, along with an increase in the number of politically significant generational differences. In the case of the two Germanies, a shared historical legacy, a unique geo-strategic location, and parallel processes of miraculous economic reconstruction, counterbalanced by a commitment to mutually exclusive ideological systems, can be expected to increase the number of potentially significant socializing events, as each German state has seen itself compelled to respond directly to developments in the other. Three factors, the dramatic transformation of the basic socio-economic structures in the two German states, the postwar personnel vacuum precipitated by emigration, and the "missing generation" phenomenon, have created a situation in which new generations can be expected to experience more rapid access to positions of influence within the dominant political institutions.

A discussion of the methodological problems inherent to generational research is best left to others whose competence in this area far exceeds my own (Adler, 1980; Glenn, 1977; Huntington, 1977; Ryder, 1965) The socio-cultural dimensions of "the problem," rather than the methodological issues, comprise the focus of this study. In summary it is worth noting, however, that of the three models commonly invoked in the study of generations -- experiential, life-cycle and interactional -- it is the interaction model which appears to suit best the kaleidoscope of generational conflicts observed

in the German cases.[1]

Generational conflict became something of a chronic social disease once industrialization eliminated physical strength as the primary determinant of one's capacity for political influence and economic success. Society sought a resolution to a state of recurrent conflict by prolonging earlier stages of the life cycle, i.e., through expansion of the educational system and, ultimately, in the redefinition of the social functions of youth. Social scientists have since discovered that the prolongation strategy has in fact generated many new problems, given the shortened intervals at which socio-economic and scientific-technological changes are occurring in the post World War II era.

Germans conceived in the 1940's personified the rebirth of political idealism; thus, throughout the 1950's and early 1960's, youth was accorded both a positive political image and an active social role. The adoption of mass enfranchisement, steps toward mass education, and developments in mass communications contributed to a partial leveling of class differences after the war. The growth of youth-oriented leisure industries, the designation of youth as the soon-to-be-affluent consumer, the role of youth as a trend-setter and source of social experimentation: these are developments which colored the daily lives of adolescents born in the 1950's, the beneficiaries of a new constitutional order, an "economic miracle" and a scientific-technical revolution.

Paradoxically, a McLuhanesque transformation of the media and advances in mass communication in a variety of Western states led to parallel discoveries of inequality at home and abroad by youth activists during the late 1960's. Awareness spread that affluence was not to be confused with a veritable diffusion of economic power and a redistribution of political rights (e.g.,

for women). The higher educational opportunities made available to ever larger numbers of adolescents exacerbated a sense of relative deprivation by generating unrealistic expectations among graduates regarding their chances for access to elite careers. As the media conveyed the news of one environmental catastrophe after another in the 1970's (e.g., Three Mile Island), faith in the prospects of a "technological fix" began to wane. The world experienced a measure of ostensible "peace" resting upon a balance of terror; the superpowers meanwhile were seen to fight their surrogate wars on the soil of underdeveloped countries.

Youth responses and adult reactions to the globalized crises and conflicts that arose during the seventies differed significantly. While the adolescents of the 1970's heard the same evening news reports of pending global crises, caught wind of the same environmental disasters, and grew increasingly disillusioned with the same political structures as their parents and older siblings, the youngest generation nonetheless was expected to assimilate these experiences without the benefit of the same psychological foundation of reconstruction-optimism to which the earlier cohorts had been privy.

The relatively higher rates of unemployment afflicting those who would enter the labor market for the first time have made youth of the eighties cognizant of how tenuous and marginal its position has become (Frackmann et al., 1981; Haase et al., 1983). The "limits to growth" paradigm adopted by industrialized nations since the OPEC oil embargo of 1973 explains only part of the problem; rising youth unemployment rates must also be attributed to demographic mathematics. Both the East and West German baby booms, delayed by the imperatives of reconstruction, have begun to peak just as economic conditions are deteriorating rapidly. These developments have impelled

authorities to undertake dramatic cutbacks, rather than to expand further the network of educational and occupational opportunities judged important by youth; this has resulted in critical limitations on younger citizens' psychological identification with their respective socio-economic system.

In summary, the social functions ascribed to youth have been significantly redefined over the last four decades. Yet it is perhaps the very imprecision or tentativeness of youth's status in this day and age that permits a degree of receptivity to new ideas and an openess toward new patterns of socio-political interaction. The East and West German adolescents who constitute the focus of this study find themselves in a transitional stage in the life-cycle; at the same time, dramatic changes are occurring in rapid succession in the larger political environment. Rather than setting them adrift in a stormy sea of international tensions, perhaps one owes the younger generation an opportunity to demonstrate that "the pace of personal change increases sensitivity to the possibilities of social change" (Ryder, 1965: 856).

YOUTH PARTICIPATION IN THE GERMAN PEACE MOVEMENTS

Seeking "Peace without Weapons" in the Federal Republic

Targeted against the deployment of additional theater nuclear forces as mandated by the NATO Double Decision of 1979, the West German peace movement is rediscovering its roots in a thirty-year old tradition of pacifist protest (Mushaben, 1985). Not surprisingly, the first national protest campaign was directed against the proposed rearmament of the Western occupation zones under an integrated NATO command in the early fifties. Adenauer's willingness to accept American-supplied tactical nuclear weapons spurred the mobilization of an intense but short-lived "Fight Atomic Death" campaign, 1957-1959; opposition ran aground subsequent to a Federal Constitutional Court verdict

proscribing a national referendum on the nuclear issue.

The early sixties marked a period of major economic expansion and widespread consensus with respect to domestic policy. Consensus with regard to foreign policy began to erode toward the middle of the decade, as signaled by the growth of a German Easter March Movement modeled after the British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. By the late sixties the Easter marches came to serve as mobilizational base for a vociferous student movement, as well as for a citizen campaign against the Emergency Powers Legislation, 1966-1968. The Social Democrats' (SPD) decision to participate in the Grand Coalition, 1966-1969, gave birth to an Extraparliamentary Opposition Movement (APO) dominated by university students. Brandt's successful electoral bid in 1969, based on a promise to "dare more democracy," enabled protesters to pursue a dual strategy: Unconventional APO tactics ("demos," sit-ins) in opposition to the Viet Nam war complemented plans for a "long march" through the institutions.

The Viet Nam war ended rather abruptly in 1972, but the level of mobilization among leftists remained quite high. The period 1972-1977 witnessed the transfer of protest momentum from one social movement to another. Finding common cause in the threat of environmental destruction, feminists, leftists, experienced pacifists and blooming ecologists suddenly redirected their protest energies against nuclear power plants and ecological hazards. A proliferation of local and regional Bürgerinitiativen ("citizen initiatives") lent emphasis to the connection logically presumed to exist between the dangers inherent to civilian and military applications of nuclear technology (Witt and Lorenz-Meyer, 1983). Boasting of 2-3 million members, some 38,000 citizen initiatives provided fertile grounds for the seeds of a new anti-nuclear weapons movement (Gronemeyer, 1977).

Since 1981, the Federal Republic has come to occupy a pivotal position among the European peace movements. Current mobilization efforts, in contrast to the movements of the fifties and sixties, are characterized by significantly less homogeneity and ideological purity. A strong religious component, an independent ecology element, and a growing "alternative" or subcultural component enjoy pre-eminent influence in what has loosely been labeled "the movement." While "youth" is indeed physically represented at all of the major peace events, its participation tends to be indirect; there is little evidence of the self-mobilization typical of student activists during the late 1960's and early 1970's.

Youth interest in the peace movement was sparked by the 19th annual Congress of the German Evangelical Church (EKD), which drew 150,000 largely uninvited delegates to Hamburg in June, 1981. The official theme "Fear Not" engaged some 300 organized peace groups and 65 specifically religious initiatives, while the large youth turnout resulted in the imposition of a counter-theme, "Have Fear -- Atomic Death Threatens Us All" (Der Spiegel, 22. June 1981). Whether or not the EKD leadership intended to do anything more than provide a forum for discussion, its de facto endorsement of the peace movement won it a measure of respect among otherwise openly anti-establishment youth. The June, 1983 Evangelical Congress likewise attracted a reported 200,000 observers to Hannover.

A rapid increase in the number of young German males filing for conscientious objector status serves as one measure of youth's burgeoning commitment to the peace cause. Subsequent to the promulgation of the Law of Military Obligation in 1956, C.O. applications averaged about 3,000 a year through the 1960's (this excludes males residing in Berlin, who are automatically exempt from the 18 months of mandatory service by virtue of the

city's unique Four-Power status). A temporary liberalization of filing requirements produced a flood of applications in 1977, until a Federal Constitutional Court decision reimposed tighter "test standards." By 1981, the number of military service resisters had risen nonetheless to a dramatic 50-60,000. The year 1984 ushered in efforts to promote a nationwide conscription-resistance campaign.

As the ex officio (but no longer exclusive) parliamentary wing of the peace movement, the Green parties enjoy implicit support among otherwise apolitical youth, including members of the New Wave and squatters' scenes. (Jugendwerk, 1981). But as 1,075 interviews conducted by German Shell reveal, the mood among 15-24 year olds is more Spenglerian than futuristic: 95 percent reject the possibility that wars will cease to plague the human race; 80 percent anticipate a future of economic crises, scarce resources and famines; 76 percent hold that chemistry and technology will indeed destroy the environment (Jugendwerk, 1981: 384).[2]

In summary, the West German youth movement is linked with, but by no means equivalent to the peace movement. Their ranks include born-again churchgoers, punks, squatters, a small number of "violent pacifists," and many "normal" teens who append themselves at will to the peace movement in search of "action," music and solidarity. Basically pro-ecology and anti-consumption, the most striking tenet of youth's creed is its refusal to commit itself to a comprehensive plan for society. Youth's criticisms are directed against the organized Left as well as against the Right, focusing specifically on the fear that it will have "No Future" in the event of a nuclear confrontation between the superpowers (Mushaben, 1983).

"Swords to Plowshares" in the German Democratic Republic

As of January, 1984, the GDR has had to contend with the presence of nuclear devices within its own borders, rendering it just as vulnerable to "ground zero" effects as the FRG. Although the East German protests lack much of the intensity, breadth and depth associated with the thirty-year protest tradition in the neighboring state, it is not a movement born yesterday (Mushaben, 1984). Directly challenging the legitimacy of the omnipresent Socialist Unity Party (SED) is the protest against an increasing militarization of East German society from within.

During the immediate postwar period, the SED adopted Marxism-Leninism as "the peace concept par excellence"; emphasizing the class character of war, party ideologues denounced pacifism as a vehicle for undermining the resistance of the masses to imperialist forces. Failing to meet its recruitment goals for the "volunteer" National People's Army in the late 1950's, the SED introduced universal conscription in 1962. Responding to pressure from the East German wing of the Evangelical Church, the Party created a special army division, the "construction units," in 1964 which permitted a form of military service without weapons for religious objectors (Bausoldaten); the Party has consistently refused to consider a non-uniformed service independent of military control, however.

Paramilitary training programs, in the form of sports tournaments, apprenticeships, etc., continued to expand through the 1960's, the purpose of which was to foster a positive identification between children, the state and the National People's Army. After 1973 most schools were expected to identify and nurture those students who evinced military leadership potential in the ninth, eighth or even as early as the fifth grade. The incorporation of a military training module into the ninth and tenth grade curriculum, along with

a 12-day intensive, obligatory (military or paramedic) session for Arbitur classes in 1973 triggered significant parental and parish opposition.

In the afterglow of Ostpolitik negotiations, the state began to see certain advantages in upholding the Church as a credible yet responsible forum for limited socio-political "competition." The years 1975-1977 were marked by growing unrest among youth who clashed with police over the reglementation of free time; a ban on rock concerts precipitated major outbreaks in East Berlin, Wittenberg and Erfurt (Winkler, 1983; Grunenberg, 1983). In June, 1978, the Minister of Education announced the addition of compulsory military education to the regular ninth and tenth grade curricula, including "voluntary" participation in actual small caliber weapons training for boys (girls would learn first aid). Parents and clerics objected that military training for school children would perpetuate an atmosphere of anxiety, foster a hatred of "the enemy" contradictory to Christian teachings, and instill in impressionable youth the belief that military action was an acceptable mode of conflict resolution.

The onset of the 1980's brought a new activism to the East German peace movement. Eight regional Lutheran synods chose peace as their discussion theme; concurrently, the laiety sponsored peace weeks under the rubric, "Swords to Plowshares" (adopting as a symbol the Soviet memorial statue at the UN). Analogous to the 1981 Congress in Hamburg, the Dresden Forum in February, 1983, attracted over 5,000 young participants despite state efforts to suppress publication of time and place. The Forum message soon attracted crowds of 2,000-7,000 assembled at synods from Jena to Brandenburg (Büsher et al., 1982; Hildebrandt, 1983).

Recognizing that the creation of a formal anti-conscription organization would immediately be proscribed as inimical to the state, the Lutheran Church

has provided a de facto mobilizational base for conscientious objectors. An estimated 5,000 East German males have refused regular induction since 1964 (requiring 18 months of active and 2 years of reserve duty up to age 50), opting to work in the "construction units." While the number of Bausoldaten averaged 350-700 annually over the last decade, a record 1,000 males applied in 1982 (Wensierski, 1983). This figure excludes the "total resisters," e.g. religious fundamentalists, who face 3-10 year prison sentences. An estimated 250-280 youth are drafted into the construction corps at 18 month intervals; another 500, mostly theology students, escape the call into service altogether (Ehring and Dallwitz, 1982).

Having publicized enthusiastic reports of anti-NATO demonstrations in the West since 1981, the SED finds it more and more difficult to repress comparable mobilizations within its own borders (Neues Deutschland, 1981, 1983). Officials have attempted to counter extra-party opposition by rallying the Communist youth organization (FDJ) in support of the official "peace movement" (Neues Deutschand, 27. September 1983) -- thereby encouraging the unofficial campaign. Propounding the themes "Make Peace Against NATO" and "Peace Must be Defended, Peace Must Be Armed," FDJ organizers have adopted clever if subversive tactics; they emulate the headbands, badges and T-shirts of the "other" movement, schedule officially-sanctioned rock concerts and lead candlelight marches "like in Bonn" (Die Zeit, 28. May 1982).

The GDR youth movement is "homegrown"; it has arisen in reaction to specific state policies, not merely in response to protest developments in the West. The peace/ecology connection is a salient, if not as highly developed feature of the movement, as is the rejection of accelerated consumption and the reglementation of "personal space" (Ash, 1981; Wensierski and Büscher, 1981). In contrast to young malcontents in the FRG, however, the majority of

those resisting induction and mobilizing for peace in the GDR tend to be manual or semi-skilled workers and apprentices, not the upwardly mobile students who are cautious not to jeopardize their chances for university admission and professional careers. East German youth unrest follows in the wake of an educational reform that has raised achievement requirements while intensifying ideological indoctrination. Disruptions involving youth have moreover increased in frequency amidst official efforts to "reprocess" history -- e.g., rehabilitating Martin Luther, as well as Otto von Bismarck! -- hence, this unrest may augur important changes transpiring within the polity at large (Honecker, 1980; Jacobmeyer, 1983; Wensierski, 1983).

SUCCESSOR GENERATIONS AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION

By 1980, the percentage of the total population considered to comprise the "postwar" generations numbered 62.4 and 63.8 percent for the FRG and GDR, respectively (Statistisches Bundesamt, 1982:59; Staatliche Zentralverwaltung, 1982:346). Admittedly, all of the industralized nations experienced a postwar increase in the proportion of their populations under age 30, but these figures hold a particular political significance for a nation still held singularly responsible for provoking a war in which by now almost two thirds of its citizens never participated. Another unique aspect of German demographic developments rests with the the "missing generation" problem -- missing is a large contingent of males over 58, the very "successor generation" that remains conspicuously active in the political establishments of other European nations.

This unique demographic gap accounts in part for the proliferation, the diversity and the extremely vehement nature of the generational conflicts witnessed in Germany during the late sixties and early seventies. The breakdown in communication between the generations derives from the younger

postwar generations' lack of historical perspective and, consequently, from their general insensitivity to the age-old problems of German statehood and German nationalism (Löwenthal, 1979; Mommsen, 1983). But youth itself cannot be held accountable for this insensitivity, as Tenbruck explains:

A mute generation of parents not only remained quiet with respect to the past it had experienced, but it also eschewed all questions of political and historical responsibility.... Thus there had to grow up later a generation which recognized the nationality "German" as a classification for administrative purposes, with which it neither could nor wanted to identify. Through the enthusiasm for Europe, through the distance from the concept "German," albeit as a familiar trait, through the cultivation of other identities, it sought to free itself from German history, to force the realization among the fathers' generation that this history had come to an end, and to comprehend itself as [part of] a history-less new beginning (Tenbruck, 1974: 292).

Here it becomes extremely important to distinguish among the degrees of national identification and perceptions of German security needs found not within the successor generation, but among three successor generations very much at political odds with each other. The first I would label the Wirtschaftswunder generation, encompassing those born between 1930 and 1945. The second I have named the "Post-Materialist" (FRG) or the "Scientific-Technocratic" (GDR) generation, to cover those born between 1945 and 1959. Members of the youngest generation, counting anyone born after 1960, have to some extent designated themselves the "No Future" or the Null Bock generation, respectively.3

Generational differences found among the citizens of East and West

Table 1. Patterns of Political Thought and Political Action
among East and West German Postwar Generations

Generational Patterns

Orientations	Wirtschaftswunder 1950's Cohorts[a]	Postmaterialist 1960's Cohorts[b]	No Future 1970/80's Cohorts[c]
Type of political orientation	Old Left Old Right	New Left	Non-Left or Eco-Left
Socio-political priority, political options	Economic Growth	Structural Reform	Environmental Preservation
Perception of Threat	Direct threat by East/West	Indirect threat through 3rd World conflicts	Generalized threat of European Nuclear War
Willingness to defend own country	Yes, if no nuclear weapons	Limited if no nuclear weapons	Limited or not at all
Stances towards planned deployment of additional nuclear weapons in Europe	Acceptance reluctant to low	Rejection	Rejection
Security-Alliance preference	Superpower alignment, close ties to NATO (or Warsaw Pact-GDR)	Regional, European option	Neutralism or Neutronationalism
Stances towards new social movements	Rejection or indifference	Sympathy or active membership	Sympathy or active membership
Attitudes towards non-conventional participation	Rejection	Acceptance or involvement	Acceptance
Organizational strategy	Systemic emphasis, neocorporatism	Mass movement	Decentralization
Arena for Action	Formal political institutions	Extraparliamentary, citizen iniatives	Private sphere
Allies and Sympathizers (perceived)	Political parties, trade unions	Other protest groups, progressive unions	Evangelical Church, the "Greens"
Political role, Self as political actor	Reconstruction, Institution-building, "Building Socialism"	Citizen/Expert input, "Dare more democracy"	"Political Dialogue? Neine, Danke"

a) Born during the period 1930-1945.
b) Born during the period 1945-1959.
c) Born during the period after 1960.

Germany are far from academic. Cohort experiences and environmental influences have resulted in radically different patterns of political thought and action, which I have attempted to summarize in Table 1 below. Different locations in historical time have affected each generation's level of interest in politics, as well as its determination of what the "critical issues of its time" are. They have defined the limits of cohorts' involvement pursuant to specific goals, as well as the intensity with which those goals are held. Hence, for each generation, the East and West peace movements and their relation to German security needs acquire a different historical-political significance as well.

TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

Historically speaking, "the Germans" have evinced an extraordinary capacity for shifting from one extreme to another, expecially along the nationalism dimension (Calleo, 1978; Craig, 1982). From the 1870's to the 1940's, they moved along the spectrum from zuwenig to zuviel (von Thadden, 1983). Between the mid-1940's and the 1980's, they shuttled from zuviel to what critics from diverse ideological camps now judge to be zuwenig (Bender, 1981; Brandt and Ammon, 1981; Hättich, 1983). Because concrete steps in the direction of reunification were out of the question during the occupation years, what little national consciousness or "love of Fatherland" remained had to anchor itself to the realities of two states stripped of their sovereignty. More deep-seated, emotional attachments were not pursued, for fear of raising suspicions among the victorious powers, on the one hand, or because they could have compromised a widespread, albeit abstract belief in the promise of reunification, on the other (Mommsen, 1983). Both Germanies

more or less consciously opted for a pride-in-nation vested in the material accomplishments of their respective economic miracles, as a non-antagonistic surrogate for national identity. Decades later, "love of country" has yet to find a home.

As a general trend, the Vaterland concept no longer evokes much emotional intensity or national pride. A 1981 Allensbach survey found that 59 percent of those questioned thought it had a "nice ring," 39 percent considered it "not relevant." But a focus on the 16-29 year old segment revealed a 69 percent rejection rate (Rausch, 1983: 128). These general and specific trends towards ever less emotional identification are further supported by data in Tables 2 and 3, indicating that the degree of Gleichgültigkeit in the late 1970's was highest among the youngest, while strong pride was more characteristic of the older cohorts.

TABLES 2 AND 3 ABOUT HERE

The Wirtschaftswunder generation has long supported a variation of the "better dead than red" theme [alternatively, "better communist than capitalist-imperialist"], and is likely to respond with ambivalence when pressed on the question of national identity. This is the generation fed on the dream of reunification, albeit a dream to which both East and West German leaders were willing to ascribe only if it could be realized under their own (irreconcilable) terms. Wrangle though they might over the right to issue passports and to preserve the Prussian cultural legacy, for the leaders of this generation, the question of nationalism is best left undiscussed, out of a reluctance "to open old wounds" (Die Zeit, 20. November 1981).

Members of the "Postmaterialist" or "Scientific" generation who are now

Table 2 "Love of Country" (<u>Heimatliebe</u>)

Question: Could you live in a different state?

Agreement	Certainly	14%
	Probably	16%
	Probably not	26%
	Not at all	40%
	Don't know	4%

Question: Do you feel more like a European than a German?

Agreement	Completely	16.5%
	Probably	21%
	Probably not	30%
	Not at all	30%
	Don't know	2.5%

Source: Martin and Sylvia Greiffenhagen, <u>Ein schwieriges Vaterland.</u>
<u>Zur politischen Kultur Deutschlands.</u> Frankfurt a. M.: Fischer,
1979, p. 428.

Table 3 "National Pride" (Nationalstolz)

Question: Are you proud of being a German? (in percents)

	Total %	M	F*	14-19 Years	20-29 Years	30-49 Years	50-64 Years	65+ Years	Elementary (Volksschule)	Middle School	Abitur or University
I am very proud of being a German	22	28	21	14	16	20	24	33	25	16	12
I am proud of being a German	52	44	54	48	44	53	58	50	54	52	39
I am ashamed of being a German	2	2	2	2	1	3	1	3	2	2	1
The fact that I am German means nothing to me.	23	25	21	35	38	22	17	13	18	28	46
No answer.	1	1	1	1	1	2	--	1	1	2	2
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1002	457	545	104	137	387	221	153	662	245	95

Source: M. and S. Greiffenhagen, Ein schwieriges Vaterland, op. cit., p. 426.

* F-column total does not equal 100, Error appears in original table.

settling into the professions, if forced to make a choice between "dead/red/imperialist" express their preference for coexistence and a measure of competitive cooperation, against the prospects of mutual annihilation. This group is more likely to admit to a sense of supranationalism, hoping for the emergence of a European "third force." Younger East and West German intellectuals, in particular, see in the "national question" the need to "conquer the past," in order to throw off a thirty year old "hostage consciousness" (Die Zeit, 20. November 1981). But here the emphasis falls on combined German-German national interests, vis-à-vis those of the superpowers. From this vantage point, the Postmaterialists and, to a degree, members of the GDR's second generation (especially the intelligentsia) would appear to advocate a national-neutral or neutro-nationalist stance (Deutschland Archiv, No. 3, March 1982).

The all-but-deceased hopes for reunification have hardly been supplanted by wild enthusiasm for a new identity rooted in a united Europe, as evidenced by Tables 4, 5 and 6. The Postmaterialist cohorts have a modest lead in the "feeling European" categories.

TABLES 4, 5 AND 6 ABOUT HERE

There is a surprisingly strong tendency on the part of East Germans of the third generation, however, to identify with their Western counterparts, one that finds little parallel in the Federal Republic (Ash, 1981; Winkler, 1983). In fact, a recent survey of 1,500 FRG teens indicates that 43 percent are inclined to consider the GDR "a foreign country;" only 17 percent feel "closely linked" to East German citizens (Der Tagesspiegel, 2. August 1983; Der Spiegel, 10. April, 1978). But it is generally true of both groups that

Table 4 "Reunification" (Wiedervereinigung)

Question: What do you think is the most important question with which the Federal Republic ought to concern itself today?
-Among other topics: German Reunification

Year	%	Year	%
1965	45%	1971	3%
1968	23%	1972	1%
1970	12%	1978	1%

Source: M. and S. Greiffenhagen, Ein schwieriges Vaterland, op. cit., p. 424.

Table 5 "Single Nation" (Eine Nation?)

Question: Do you believe that despite the division into the Federal Republic and the GDR there will exist in the future one "Volk," that one German nation will remain, or do you believe that we will over time grow apart like Germans and Austrians?

	Will grow apart %	Will remain One German nation %	Undecided, no opinion %
Total population	65	21	14
16-29 years	69	16	15
30-44 years	74	18	8
45-59 years	60	30	10
60 years and older	55	22	23
SPD - sympathizers	67	22	11
CDU/CSU - sympathizers *	68	22	23
FDP - sympathizers	62	25	13

Source: M. and S. Greiffenhagen, Ein schwieriges Vaterland, op. cit., p. 423.

* CDU/CSU figures do not add up to 100%. Error contained in original Table.

Table 6 "European or National Feeling" (Europäisch oder National?)

Question: Nowadays one often speaks of a European or National Orientation. How would you personally rank yourself along this scale? Is your orientation more European or more National?

		Total	M	F	14-19 Years	20-29 Years	30-49 Years	50-64 Years	65+ Years	Elem. Ed.	Middle School	Abitur or University
European	1	10	9	11	9	13	10	9	8	8	10	19
	2	6	5	7	5	5	7	5	6	6	6	6
	3	15	16	13	15	24	16	12	6	12	21	21
	4	14	14	14	19	16	12	18	10	13	16	18
	5	15	17	14	16	12	17	16	15	16	15	9
	6	12	14	9	13	9	11	11	14	13	9	8
	7	11	10	12	6	9	12	11	12	12	7	9
	8	7	6	8	7	3	8	8	7	8	5	5
	9	4	3	6	5	5	3	3	8	4	5	2
National	10	4	4	3	4	2	2	5	8	4	4	3
No Answer		3	2	3	3	2	2	2	6	3	2	--
N		1014	469	545	103	128	397	224	162	699	195	120
Total		100%	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: M. and S. Greiffenhagen, Ein schwieriges Vaterland, op. cit., p. 427.

identification with their respective political and economic systems has declined, without being replaced by an attraction to the other system. Nor do they see in their differences the basis for ongoing conflicts that might affect them personally. For this generation, the question of nationalism has become superfluous; their lack of any kind of system identification would classify them as apolitical neutralists.

Based on past experiences, one would be ill-advised to write off the current protest movements as a passing phenomenon, or merely as a repetition of past patterns of youth unrest. The peace movement, as Szabo has argued, is

a manifestation of a deeper change in values and identity that coincides with generational change. This change reaches far beyond the issue of peace and nuclear weapons and has important implications for the US-German relationship (Szabo, 1983: 58).

For Szabo, the most important question is whether the policies of "the successor generation" that is expected to dominate the West German foreign policy apparatus by the end of the decade will result in a continuation of the Atlantic Alliance along old lines. At issue is whether or not subsequent postwar generations will press for new security arrangements based on the recognition of changing socio-economic conditions and increasingly diverse national interests. Equally significant, I would argue, are the kinds of changes likely to be effected with respect to the pattern of German-German (or German-Soviet) relations, tied to value changes at the individual level.

Whether or not the structure of the existing alliance systems dividing East from West will be maintained is likely to depend on responses to three questions yet to be answered. The first asks which values will ultimately gain the upper hand in the struggle to determine the substantive dimensions of a new "national consciousness" in both German states -- presuming that "the

question is not what should be used to replace the Nationalstaat, but rather in what direction it should develop" (Hättich, 1983: 281). The second unresolved issue is whether or not a new sense of national identity will entail the actual rejection of a belief in national sovereignty, to the benefit of European integration. The third question, focused inward, is whether or not in their efforts to shake off the "historical ballast," the shapers of this new identity will avail themselves of the opportunity to inject German political culture with a larger dose of political tolerance and pluralism (Weidenfeld, 1983). Projected outwards, this might enable Germans to escape an historical "security fixation" (Stürmer, 1983), and thus further enhance the possibility of breaking down a "bloc mentality" with regard to defense strategies.

What clearly divides the Wirtschaftswunder from the Postmaterialist generation in the FRG is the fact that members of the latter "do not have the emotional link to the US, that unique combination of subservience and awe shaped by the immediate postwar years, that dominated the 1950's" (Szabo, 1983: 64). Those emotional ties were severed during the Viet Nam years. Consequently, the amount of faith and trust placed in one's respective "protector-power" has declined considerably, raising the issues of "anti-Americanism" and "national-neutralism" implicit in Tables 7 and 8.

TABLES 7 AND 8 ABOUT HERE

The generational differences come to light in Tables 9 and 10. While the most pressing security question to confront the reconstruction generation was "what will we do if the Russians come?" the one posed by subsequent generations now reads "what will we do if the Americans stay?" Once it had put

Table 7 "Trust in the USA" (Vertrauen)

How much trust do you place in the ability of the US to deal with the current array of global problems?

	Total %	Greens	CDU/CSU	SPD	FDP
Much trust	9	--	14	6	14
A fair amount	53	22	56	57	52
Not too much	28	27	25	27	28
Almost none	8	51	4	10	5

Source: Werner Harenberg, "Sichere Platz links von der SPD? Die Wähler der Grünen in den Daten der Demoskopie; in Jörg R. Mettke, Die Grünen - Regierungspartner von Morgen? Reinbeck bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, p. 42.

Table 8 "Neutrality in the FRG" (<u>Neutralität</u>), 1981

Question: Which of the two outlooks do you hold in regard to the future of the Federal Republic?

-- It would be best for the Federal Republic if we would become a neutral country. Then we would not have to suffer so much from the tensions between the Superpowers. One can see from the Austrian example that neutrality is a good thing.

-- The Federal Republic needs the political and military alliance with the USA and with the other Western states. A neutral Germany would be isolated and would not be capable enough of resisting pressure from the Soviet Union.

	Total %	Greens %	CDU/CSU %	SPD %	FDP %
For neutrality	35	82	30	37	24
Against neutrality	63	17	69	62	75

Source: Werner Harenberg, "Sicherer Platz," op. cit., p. 41.

TABLES 9 AND 10 ABOUT HERE

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behind it the horrors of the Nazi regime, the first postwar generation devoted its political energies to the struggle against the new enemy, Soviet Communism. This group has adhered to the principle of linkage; it therefore deems any assault on "American imperialism" as unacceptable and attempts to downplay talk of cracks in the Alliance foundation because it sees the NATO military presence as quintessential to the preservation of its security vis-à-vis the East (Mommsen, 1983). An analogous attitude is presumed to dominate leadership thinking in the GDR.

The second generation, socialized in a world already divided into mutually exclusive ideological fronts, objected in the sixties that it had inherited the national guilt complex, but little concrete information about the fascist past. Efforts to uncover the socio-economic roots of fascism led to a rejection of monopoly capitalism and to a demonization of its chief representative, the USA. Many of those who were active to various degrees during the Third Reich were reinstated after the war and continue to occupy prominent positions in the power structure (including recently retired Bundespräsident, Karl Carstens). The fact that these same individuals, e.g., Hans Filbinger, were responsible for the 1972-77 spread of blacklisting practices (Berufsverbot) employed against Leftists as a punishment for the "sins of youth" has not, of course, contributed to a mitigation of inter-generational tensions.

However, it cannot be said of the second generation that it has become subservient to its own idealistic notions of life in a socialist system. The Postmaterialists have an almost daily opportunity to compare their own living

Table 9 FRG Relations with Other Nations

Question: There are very different opinions about what kind of relations the Federal Republic ought to have with other countries; here are two of them. Which would you sooner prefer?

	June 1982	Sept./Oct. 1983	M	F	16-29 years	30-44 years	45+ years	CDU/CSU	SPD	FDP	Greens	Peace Movement Sympathizers
"The Alliance with America and with the other friendly countries of the Western world has secured peace and freedom for the Federal Republic for over 30 years. As a neutral state we would be too weak to defend ourselves in case of an attack."	69	58	60	57	50	57	64	79	44	65	16	41
"The freedom of the Federal Republic will not be threatened if it becomes neutral. We could do more for world peace and for understanding among nations if we did not belong to either of the military blocs."	19	25	26	24	34	28	18	9	38	22	70	42
Undecided	12	17	14	19	16	15	18	12	18	13	14	17

Source: Survey conducted by the Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach, consisting of a representative sample of 2,033 West Germans over the age of 16 between September 22 and October 4, 1983. Results were reported in Stern, "Angst vor den Raketen," October 20, 1983, p. 71.

Table 10   The Failure of Geneva Negotiations

Question: Do you believe that the two Superpowers, the USA and the Soviet Union, tried hard enough to have the Geneva disarmament negotiations reach a successful conclusion, or didn't they try hard enough?

	Total	M	F	16-29	30-44	45+	CDU/CSU	SPD	FDP	Greens
The Superpowers did try hard enough.	10	9	11	7	8	12	12	8	7	4
They did not try hard enough.	68	75	61	69	74	64	65	75	76	84
Impossible to say.	22	16	28	24	18	24	23	17	17	12

Question: Which of the two did not try hard enough - America or the Soviet Union?

	Total	M	F	16-29	30-44	45+	CDU/CSU	SPD	FDP	Greens
America	6	7	4	7	8	4	1	10	1	12
Soviet Union	22	22	22	18	21	25	37	11	23	4
Both Superpowers	70	69	71	74	70	68	60	77	76	83
Impossible to say	2	2	3	1	1	3	2	2	--	1

Source: <u>Stern</u>, "Angst vor den Raketen," op.cit., p. 76.

standards and degrees of personal freedom with those of their Eastern counterparts. On the other hand, one can posit a similar lack of emotional attachment to things Soviet on the part of the GDR's "Scientific-Technocratic" generation. The cohorts of later years do not recall the Soviet Union as the Great Liberator of May, 1945; instead they have borne witness to Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan. Not all interventions are construed as justifiable in terms of "German" defense needs. They recognize that détente is divisible. Socialism is accepted among members of this generation for the welfare-state functions it performs, as well as for the professional mobility and career opportunities it afforded during the sixties and seventies, not because Soviet Marxism holds for them a compelling, teleological appeal (Conner, 1983: 154). This generation has supported the principle of détente, because members have recognized its positive effects on living conditions in their own bloc and because they have benefited from the degree of internal liberalization (i.e., access to international conferences, cultural exchanges) that generally accompanies a reduction in East-West tensions (Conner, 1983; Mann et al, 1979).

These generations have acquired their experiences in "layers;" what counts is the order in which perceptions or events constituting each layer have been incorporated, creating the framework for the classification and interpretation of subsequent experiences (Mannheim, 1928). What may have been considered exceptional forms of political action and participation -- at least initially -- by one generation, are sooner contrued as the "norm" by its successor. On both sides of the Wall, complaints against the increasing bureaucratization of society are being voiced with greater frequency and intensity. Hence, many of the values that will be up for grabs in the quest for a new national identity will relate to the extent of citizen involvement

judged harmful or beneficial to the determination of defense policy. The acceptance of nonconventional modes of participation has been extended by and/or has spilled over into the peace movement, according to the Allensbach findings presented in Table 11.

TABLE 11 HERE

The suspicion that the individual's priorities are of little concern to the state has nonetheless produced different behavioral responses. Whereas second generation protesters of the 1960's hoped to effect a radical transformation of the dominant socio-economic structures (or at least to achieve "socialism with a human face"), for the younger cohorts "the point is to survive and prosper within a system seemingly quite resistant to change" (Conner, 1983:145; Gruneberg, 1983; Rudolph, 1983). Translation: "Political Dialogue? Nein, Danke." The new generation will not wait to be told what its interests are, how they should be articulated, and to whom they should be addressed. Organization is out, apoliticism is in -- as is non-identification with either the "nation" or "the state." All three generations nevertheless seem to share a perception that the peace movement has acquired a significance extending beyond the specific protest events of the early 1980's (Filmer and Schwan, 1982; Weede et al., 1983).

CONCLUSION: THE PEACE MOVEMENT AND THE GERMAN SECURITY PARADOX

As perceived by the three postwar generations, the political significance of the German peace movements will not be measurable in terms of how many Pershing II, cruise and SS-series missiles are actually deployed through the 1980's. For the Wirtschaftswunder generation, the peace movement is perceived as a (short-term?) menace to the existing military alliance structures. The

Table 11 Actions to prevent deployments

Question: There are different steps one can take, when one is opposed to the deployment of the new missiles. How do you stand, in which of these activities would you participate?

	Total	M	F	16-29	30-44	45+	CDU/CSU	SPD	FDP	Greens	Peace Movement Sympathizers
Participate in a discussion	54	61	48	67	64	43	46	62	60	86	75
Take part in a church service involving peace	48	40	54	47	45	49	47	51	52	57	59
Participate in a peaceful demonstration	33	35	31	51	38	21	17	47	22	85	60
Put a bumper-sticker on my car	27	28	26	46	29	15	13	37	21	76	49
Wear a button or a pin	25	26	24	41	27	15	12	34	23	75	45
Contribute money to a peace organization	19	17	21	25	23	13	9	27	16	53	38
Distribute leaflets for a peace group	15	15	16	29	15	8	5	22	8	60	34
Hang a poster from the peace movement on my house or in the window	14	14	13	24	15	8	6	16	10	63	29
Participate in a blockade of military installations, in a sit-in blocking exits and entrances, for example	7	8	6	16	7	2	1	8	2	51	17
If necessary, use force at a demonstration	1	2	1	4	1	1	--	2	1	6	3
No response	25	25	25	18	22	31	33	18	20	3	8

Source: <u>Stern</u>, "Angst vor den Raketen," op. cit., p. 74.

senior, and often most vehement, critics juxtapose against the movement the image of an external enemy, perhaps in an unconscious effort to deflect attention from the domestic sources of socio-economic unrest. Continuity and stability are judged to be the most important prerequisites to the maintenance of peace at the global level. The Postmaterialist/Technocratic generations append to the peace movement a growing desire to break with the past, to modify drastically existing alliance structures -- if not to end their dependency on an outside power whose political acts of the last two decades have sooner served as a source of moral approbation than as a source of democratic/socialist inspiration. As is often articulated by activist-leaders of this generational group (inter alios, Petra Kelly, Oskar Lafontaine, Jo Leinen, Roland Vogt), the peace movement is symptomatic of a need for greater internal democracy, the stress falling on the policy-process level. For the "No Future" generation, whose energies are concentrated at the individual level, the peace movement boils down to a question of existential Angst and physical security. As far as the youngest cohorts are concerned, a world divided into ideological spheres of influence is an historical given, and not a particularly useful one at that. For adolescents whose "shared destiny" is grounded in a state of prolonged marginalization, arms expenditures have become a major source of alienation and resentment towards one's own system, not only against the superpowers who stand behind them.

While each generation does appear to ascribe a different "meaning" to the last three years of peace protest in the two Germanies, surveys indicate that movement support has not been limited to a particular age group (see Table 12). Moreover, all three generations evince a degree of sensitivity to the

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TABLE 12 ABOUT HERE

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spill-over effect that movements on one side of the Wall have had on the other. Movements devoted to the same themes (peace, ecology), availing themselves of the same vehicles (Church forums, rock music), are forging new links between the FRG and the GDR (Bahro, 1982). The deployment of additional theater nuclear forces in Central Europe is expected to hold serious, primarily negative consequences for relations between the two-states-in-one-nation, as seen in Table 13.

TABLE 13 ABOUT HERE

There is no "generational solution" to the common problems of structural unemployment, relative deprivation and international brinkmanship that have precipitated youth interest in these movements. There may be a rudimentary generational solution, however, to the unresolved national identity problem affecting the two Germanies, as argued by Peter Wensierski:

The existence of similar alternative movements in the East and West heralds the possibility of a new type of Entspannungspolitik [tension-reducing policies]. It serves, finally, to create a point of reference for individuals on both sides of the Wall, by which they may be treated less as the objects and more as the subjects of such policies....There are so many forces in the East and West who earnestly wish to begin a dialogue to counteract the stagnation, to move beyond the deadend of negotiations conducted from above. This, in essence, is the new dimension of global relations, by means of

Table 12 Personal Identification with the Movement

Question: How do you stand personally in regard to the Peace Movement in the Federal Republic? Would you say that you yourself are a member of the peace movement? If yes, do you actively work in the movement to try to persuade others -- or do you just feel close to it?

	Nov. 1982 Total	Sept./Oct. 1983	M	F	16-29	30-44	45+	CDU/CSU	SPD	FDP	Greens
Yes, member of the peace movement	32	35	33	37	46	41	26	20	46	29	88
Active Member	3	4	5	4	9	5	1	1	5	3	34
Non-Active Member	29	31	28	33	37	36	25	19	41	26	54
No, not a member	68	65	67	63	54	59	74	80	54	71	12

Source: Stern, "Angst vor den Raketen," op. cit., p. 70.

Table 13   Possible ramifications of NATO deployments

Question: What do you think will happen, if the negotiations in Geneva are a failure and the new American missiles are deployed in the Federal
Republic?

	Total*	CDU/CSU	(Sympathizers) SPD	FDP	Greens
There will be even bigger demonstrations and more unrest.	80	77	83	81	92
If war breaks out, the Federal Republic will especially be endangered..	78	71	87	83	85
East-West relations will deteriorate.	72	62	80	81	89
Relations between the Federal Republic and the GDR will worsen.	65	57	74	71	73
The Federal Republic will become more dependent on America.	50	35	65	48	73
Not much will change.	40	50	31	37	18
A world war will beomce more likely to occur.	35	19	50	24	68
World peace will be more secure.	21	33	12	24	2
The Federal Republic will become less credible.	20	12	29	22	40
German-American relations will deteriorate.	19	13	22	24	28
The Federal Republic will have to withdraw from NATO.	7	5	10	6	15
No response	2	2	2	1	1

Source: Stern, "Angst vor den Raketen," op. cit., p. 73.

* Percents total more than 100 because respondents were permitted to choose more than one possible development.

which the emergence of each new social movement becomes part of a
new political calculation (Wensierski, 1983:15).

Individually and collectively, the FRG and the GDR are confronted with a
unique security paradox that is being played out at two levels, one domestic,
the other international. On the one hand, the Federal Republic, almost four
decades after its creation, "is, by any standards, the most stable among the
major states of Western Europe. But its own citizens will simply not accept
it. Objective stability is not matched by a subjective sense of security"
(Löwenthal, 1978:75; von Krockow, 1983). The GDR suffers from a "double
legitimacy deficit," domestically speaking, because of its own citizens'
tendency to compare their lot with that of family and friends in the FRG (von
Bredow, 1983); hence its insecurity. On the other hand, the very division of
Germany that holds the two states hostage to insecurity has become one of the
stablest elements in an unstable confrontation between the Eastern and Western
blocs (Stürmer, 1983). The national question cannot be divorced from the
dialectic of international relations.

This leads to the speculation that,

if both German states have to deal today with a protest movement
that brings into play the antithesis between East and West, as well
as the division of Germany ... then they might also have an interest
in quelling these movements either together or separately, in order
to preserve their respective [new] identities. If, on the contrary,
under the influence of these movements or on their own, they evince
a tendency to get closer or to provide mutual support, then they may
find a common interest in so shaping their relations as to achieve
an optimal balance between cooperation and segregation, in order to
reconcile simultaneously the preservation of one German identity

> with their own specific identities; [they would do this] in order to
> balance out the obligations to their alliances and respective
> superpowers by means of a certain type of autonomy to be gained by
> playing out inter-German relations in the right way (Hassner,
> 1983:300).

The qualitatively new type of political leverage such a development would
afford both Germanies internationally raises an even more intriguing question
as to

> whether it is really pacifism and environmental consciousness that
> gives impetus to a national-community feeling, or whether it is not
> the reverse, that by invoking ... the special responsibility of the
> two German states, it is the "national feeling" that is attempting
> ... to express itself and to legitimize itself at home and abroad
> (Hassner, 1983:298).

I contend that the former sooner holds true, that nuclear anxieties and
ecological concerns have fostered a sense of interdependence and interest in
inter-German security. Article 5 of the 1972 "Basis of Relations Treaty"
obliged the two Germanies to search for measures to bring about European arms
reductions and to support policies establishing effective international
controls; yet neither side was inclined to move quickly in this direction
prior to the events of 1979. The picture changed dramatically with the first
round of NATO deployments in the FRG and Soviet counterdeployments in the GDR
initiated in December, 1983. The interest in a new dialogue seeking to "limit
the damages" has generated a flurry of exchanges and letters [even between Jo
Leinen (BBU) and Erich Honecker!] despite verbal reprimands from the
respective superpowers. It is this dialogue grounded in an "association of
responsibility" (Verantwortungsgemeinschaft) -- with its historical

"collective guilt" nuances -- that foretells a somewhat brighter future for Deutschlandpolitik.

It is hardly coincidental that long time Ostpolitik-critic Franz Josef Strauss initiated a spectacular DM 1 billion credit agreement between the two states at the outset of the "Hot Autumn" of 1983, and that Neues Deutschland failed to reprint Pravda's warnings (August 2, 1984) about West German "revanchism" one month prior to Honecker's first FRG visit planned for September, 1984 (although the Soviets ultimately succeeded in forcing a cancellation of that trip). Ostpolitik has not only been born again; its dimensions are undergoing a significant expansion, this time through intensified efforts on the part of the GDR.

The German dream is no longer one of reunification; rather, the dialogue is an expression of a mutual desire for a normalization of relations between the two-states-in-one-nation. The common perspective on security that is beginning to evolve has grown out of a question put to the "founder" generation by the successor generations -- whether Germany, however defined, must be destroyed in order to be defended (Lafontaine, 1983). Youth's involvement in the East and West German peace movements serves as a critical reminder that politics and protest are ongoing social processes, not simply a chain of historical events. While perhaps posing a challenge to the stability of the existing institutions, youth's identification with the peace movement has ensured that the patterns of sociopolitical interaction within and between the two states will not remain static in any case, for German adolescents of the 1980's are little inclined to carry around the "historical ballast" of earlier generations. The search for a new, untainted national identity is already in the making.

NOTES

1. The <u>interaction</u> model (Huntington, 1977) stresses the cyclical nature of generational conflict, and consequently, the cyclical pattern of socio-political developments that arises from each new cohort's reaction to (and usually against) the values of the one preceding it. The two other models commonly invoked are the <u>experiential</u> model (locating a cohort in historical space and imparting a sense of "shared destiny" to its members), and the <u>life-cycle</u> model (presuming a tempering of values and a redefinition of political roles, based on physical maturation). For an extensive discussion of conceptual and measurement aspects of the "generational" variable, along with a wide range of applications, see the special edition of the <u>Journal of Political and Military Sociology</u> on "Life Course and Generational Politics," Richard G. Braungart and Margaret M. Braungart, eds., Vol. 12, No. 1, (Spring), 1984.

2. These are crude identification estimates at best, since that segment of German youth really "on the move" refuses to participate in such surveys altogether; prospective interviewees fear personal consequences for responses that are not <u>system-konform</u>, and they clearly distrust the use to which the data may be put (e.g., <u>Berufsverbot</u>). That 31.3 percent of a 1980 Infratest target sample refused to respond to questions on the subject of political extremism attests to the inadequacy of these measures (Infratest, 1980).

3. The birth years used here to delineate these generations rest on my assessments of the speed with which respective cohorts have advanced through certain stages of the life cycle. I choose 1930 as a starting point (as opposed to 1935), realizing that these cohorts may have consciously witnessed World War II but were probably spared direct

participation in it. Economic imperatives, along with the physical destruction of many higher educational facilities, delayed the point at which numerous members of the 1930-35 cohorts were able to take up careers and positions of influence -- this delay was reinforced when "denazification" ended, and many pre-war figures were allowed to return to leading administrative and economic posts.

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