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Frederic S. Pearson

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PATTERNS OF FOREIGN MILITARY  
INTERVENTION: 1948-67

Frederic S. Pearson

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1948-67

INTRODUCTION

The movement of one country's troops to a foreign state's territory usually profoundly affects politics and life in both countries, and may even implicate third countries. Yet, researchers are just beginning to discover what those effects are. For instance, the Vietnam war has been costly in human life and material resources, but there is remarkably little accurate information about the war's costs and effects. Death statistics have been inflated for one side and probably deflated for another; the number of "refugees" has been reported, but people who enter relocation centers are no longer counted as refugees--a highly unrealistic policy; inflation in South Vietnam and the US has increased, but the precise consequences of this increase for groups in Vietnamese or American society remain unclear--inflation may benefit certain people in powerful positions. Perhaps popular revulsion at war has increased and will limit future Vietnams; but perhaps, also, traditional apathy will reemerge and decrease such restraints, while those who view Vietnam as either profitable or useful may increase their decision-making power. If so little is known about the consequences of one of history's most widely publicized and controversial interventions, how great is our ignorance of the factors leading to and consequences of other, less noted military interventions!

If the object is to understand and control the factors leading to and stemming from foreign military intervention, existing treatments of the intervention notion are not very helpful, because: (1) they leave out many instances of intervention; (2) they do not allow for the possibility that military intervention is not a single phenomenon, but

rather that there are a variety of types of intervention, each type normally preceded and followed by a different set of circumstances; and (3) they do not include efforts to identify the circumstances, behavior patterns, and consequences of each particular type of intervention.

In this study foreign military intervention is classified to correct for previous shortcomings, cover cases overlooked in previous intervention analyses and specify particular types of intervention, each of which seems to stem from particular sets of circumstances (some of which may be manipulated to affect the probability of various types of intervention) or to entail particular sets of consequences. A basic assumption is that in foreign military interventions, troops of one country undertake military action inside another (target) country, and thereby, affect the sovereignty of the target country; such military actions since 1948 (listed in the Appendix and derived from the New York Times, regional chronologies such as the Middle East Journal and African Research Bulletin, previous conflict studies such as Bloomfield and Beatties' in 1971, and from scholarly histories of certain conflicts--using only events reported as fact in such sources rather than those alleged by various governments to have occurred but which are never reported as fact in media or research) have been reviewed. From this review, it appears that certain key factors help distinguish interventions: the characteristics of countries involved in the interventions (level of military power, type of governmental political goals, internal political or social conditions,

etc.), the political, social, or economic issues involved, the "affect" of the military action (friendly or hostile to certain actors), the geographical location of the intervention, the duration and magnitude of fighting or military action, the political situation in intervening country, target, region, or world. Because of location, extent of fighting, power and political position (supporting or opposing intervention) of actors, and type of political situation, particular interventions may become major international issues with implications for many countries (Suez, Vietnam, Korea), while others concern certain regions or powers (India-Pakistan, Cyprus, USSR-Hungary-1956), and still others remain relatively isolated and of little international concern (Ethiopia-Somalia, Pakistan-Afghanistan, France into certain African states in the 1960's). French interventions in the Middle East (including Suez and North Africa) and Indo-China created world-wide interest and grave political consequences for France and the target states, while French interventions in Sub-Saharan Africa (an area evidently of relatively little super-power interest) went essentially unnoticed in the rest of the world, and seem to have had much more desirable results for the French government. If the effects of intervention are ever to be understood, and if intervention probability is ever to be controlled, reasons for such variations must be discovered; the reasons seem to involve the variables mentioned above and discussed in this study.

#### Previous Intervention Studies

Previous studies and definitions of intervention do not help identify the actors, issues, affect, duration, or political circumstances

of specific interventions or types of intervention; they also fail to include certain military actions with important political, social, or economic implications. Obviously, interventions and their effects on intervener, target, or other countries cannot be explained or controlled unless the researcher is able to specify the onset and duration of, as well as military actions involved in, the intervention. Previous studies have failed to clearly delimit and describe, let alone account for, interventions.

Many theorists conceive of interventions (in much of the literature no distinction is made between military and non-military intervention, but the definitions can be applied specifically to military intervention) as intrusions directed at target states' authority structures. (See Rosenau, 1969, 160-65.) This evidently means that interventions affect the probability that the government in the target state will continue to hold office or that the target's form of government will remain the same. Often interventions are seen as hostile intrusions opposing or coercing target governments (see Beloff, 1968:198), and some theorists (Young, 1968:177-78 and Sullivan, 1969:2) would exclude from intervention definitions attempts to affect targets' policies which do not also affect authority structures. (Young, 1968:177-78) Rosenau (1969:160-65) adds the additional provision that military interventions are "convention-breaking," i.e., that they break regularized patterns of behavior (here, convention-breaking evidently does not mean violation of formal international conventions--such as the Geneva Convention).

These definitions are overly restrictive, exclude too many military intrusions which have implications for target state's sovereignty, fail to differentiate cases of intervention which might relate to certain sets of variables, but not to other sets, and give too few benchmarks to determine when interventions begin and end. Troops may be moved to target states to aid rather than oppose target governments (whether or not domestic disputes between government and opposition groups occur in the target state); such intrusions affect a target's political system, but are not necessarily hostile or coercive to the target government or factions. UK interventions in oil-rich or strategically located Arab sheikhdoms would be examples of such friendly action. Furthermore, it is very difficult to determine when an intervention is "aimed at authority structures." Any troop movement into a target state--whether border incident, pursuit of fleeing refugees, attack on terrorist sanctuaries (e.g., Israel into Lebanon)--has implications for targets' authority structures. Any time troops enter a foreign state, that state's population may hold its government responsible. Yet troops chasing refugees or attacking terrorists may not clearly direct actions at the government or central political system of the country they enter. Such actions may affect target government's policies rather than authority structures; leaders' tenure in office may not be threatened, but leaders may see needs to change their policies, appease, or oppose the invaders. Obviously, it could be argued that any change of policy is ultimately motivated by concern for tenure in office, but some threats to authority structures are more immediate than others. It may be important to distinguish

interventions with immediate impacts on tenure in office from those with more long-range impacts. In any case, it seems futile arbitrarily to include in intervention definitions effects on authority structures while excluding effects on policies.

The requirement of effects on authority structures is too vague to be useful in defining interventions. How must authority structures be affected? Must there be a serious threat to continued tenure in office? Can the authority structure of one state be affected by attacks on another state, and is this intervention in both states? Must invading forces directly engage the forces of the target state, and are consequences for the target different if they do or do not engage these forces? If consequences vary, perhaps intervention is not a singular concept, and perhaps not all interventions affecting authority structures are equal. It is difficult to see effects on authority structures; often these must be assumed, and it might be assumed that any military action affects authority structures somewhere. Thus, unless many clear distinctions are made about types of effects on authority structures, and unless clear guidelines for identifying such effects are given, the authority structure criterion is of little use in deciding which cases to include or exclude in intervention studies and which interventions seriously affect disputes, policies, or conditions in various states.

The suggestion that interventions must be "convention-breaking" is also unworkable in identifying and describing interventions. The Vietnam war became highly "conventional"--i.e., people got very used to it--after eight (or more) years; yet it would be a distortion to



say that American intervention in South and North Vietnam ended before all troops were removed. The fact that parties grow accustomed to a situation does not change the nature of the action (unless the intervening country formally annexes the target); in its eighth year, U.S. Vietnam policy was as much (or more) an intervention in internal and external Vietnamese affairs as it was in the first year. Furthermore, it is very difficult to determine when relations and behavior patterns become regularized; this varies from case to case.

While some theorists argue that interventions cease when relations become regularized, others (Sullivan, 1969) note a new intervention whenever a new military action takes place. Thus, in the US Dominican Republic intervention, every time US troops went to downtown Santo Domingo and were shot at, a new intervention would be noted. Obviously this is not a useful approach; the number of such "interventions" that could be identified for Vietnam alone would be incomprehensibly large (evidently for this reason, neither Vietnam nor Korea is included in the Sullivan study). It seems reasonable to conclude that there was a single US intervention in the Dominican Republic (perhaps two, if the initial evacuation is separated from subsequent intervention in the Dominican domestic dispute). Vietnam and Korea each seemed to entail two or three US interventions--with new interventions identified when step-level changes in intensity of fighting occurred, or when new political, social, economic, or strategic goals or issues were associated with the intervention.

Thus, the commencement and duration of interventions can be specified according to the level of troop commitment or fighting, the type of goals enunciated by leaders or reasonably associated with

the intervention in historical accounts, and any lulls in or resump-  
tions of military action. If there is a step-level change in the  
number of troops or severity of fighting at any point, if goals are  
clearly changed, or if troops are reintroduced into a target after  
a prolonged ceasefire or lull, a new intervention, and perhaps a new  
type of intervention, may be identified. Admittedly, it may be dif-  
ficult to identify step-level changes or lulls in activity, but such  
changes and lulls, along with political, economic, social, or stra-  
tegic motives (where given and credible) or circumstances of inter-  
vention, seem to be the most meaningful and useful criteria for de-  
limiting military interventions.

#### Types of Foreign Military Intervention

The least ambiguous way to determine when foreign military inter-  
vention occurs is to look for the movement and action of troops or  
military forces--the movement of troops or military forces, under  
orders or with some official leadership, by one independent country  
(or group of countries in concert) across the border of another in-  
dependent country, or action by troops already stationed in the tar-  
get country. Moving or encamping regular troops in, or unleashing  
military forces (including bombing and shelling) on a target are  
relatively clearly defined acts, relatively easily identified. Troops  
may do various things once inside the target--fight, advise, spend  
money, conceive children, install new governments--but since almost  
anything they do will affect policies or conditions in the target,  
their presence constitutes interference with target government's  
sovereignty regarding domestic and/or foreign policy. (The provision

about orders or leadership of troops is included to diminish the possibility that random or accidental border crossings--by lost or drunken soldiers, for example--will be counted as interventions; orders need not come from governments, but rather--as in the case of Japanese action in Manchuria--may come from army commanders.)

While, in general, any organized border crossing by military units is an intervention, this covers a wide variety of actions, some of which may entail greater consequences and relate to different sets of variables than others. Through empirical analysis of interventions since 1948 (see Appendix), specific types of intervention can be identified and associated with particular sets of variables. Consequences and causes of intervention may vary according to at least three factors: length of intervener presence, duration of combat-related activity by intervener, and affect of intervener toward target government. As Table 1 illustrates, intervener may station troops on target territory for long periods, or may withdraw quickly. At the same time, intervener may undertake extensive continuing military action to accomplish goals in the target, or may stay mainly on the sidelines, advising or assisting targets' indigenous forces but taking little direct hand in military activities. Furthermore, intervener may favor the target government (or oppose rebels who threaten that government) in "friendly" interventions, or oppose target government (or favor rebels) in "hostile" interventions (or remain essentially neutral toward target government--quite a rare occurrence). Troops may enter the target frequently, staying for only short periods; border disputes entail such lightning strikes--

TABLE 1

Duration Of Encampment And Of Military Action  
In Hostile And Friendly Interventions

Duration of Action

|                        |       | Hostile                           |                             | Friendly          |             | Neutral        |               |
|------------------------|-------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------|-------------|----------------|---------------|
|                        |       | Short                             | Long                        | Short             | Long        | Short          | Long          |
| Duration of Encampment | Short | India-Portugal (GOA) <sup>1</sup> | Ethiopia-Somalia            | US-Lebanon        | India-Nepal | US-Gabon       | Israel-Jordan |
|                        | Long  | France-Tunisia (Bizerte)          | North Vietnam-South Vietnam | USSR-East Germany | UAR-Yemen   | US-Cuba (1958) | UN-Cyprus     |

<sup>1</sup>Presuming intervention ceases when annexation takes place.

either to oppose the target government in an attempt to take territory (Ethiopia-Somalia) or to aid the target and help patrol its border areas (India-Nepal). On the other hand, intervening troops may become long-term residents of the target state--undertaking frequent action to support or oppose the target government (UAR-Yemen and North Vietnam-South Vietnam) or staying mainly on bases (USSR-East Germany and France-Tunisia). Obviously, "friendly" interventions--such as those of the USSR in East Europe or US in Vietnam, especially after Diem, can have significantly coercive overtones. As seen below, depending on the mix of the encampment, action, and affect factors interventions produce greater or less disruption in target states.

The interventions listed in the Appendix do not include cases in which troops were sent to target countries and acted solely as advisers or stayed mainly on military bases. Examples of such interventions since World War II would be dispatch of Soviet military personnel to Egypt, Syria, and Cuba, and of US troops to Libya, Spain, West Germany and many other countries. These are interventions of long duration with little or no direct intervener military action inside the target country. However, these interventions may have profound effects on target's policies or conditions; US bases greatly affect target states' economies, and US or Soviet troop presence is likely to give great pause to decision makers contemplating policies contrary to US or Soviet interests. Of course, as Khadafi and Sadat (not to mention de Gaulle) have shown, it is possible to call for and obtain the removal of troops stationed by mutual agreement.

Occasionally troops stationed in a foreign country come out of bases and take action to affect target's domestic disputes, conditions, or policies (they may affect target's foreign policies as well), and in such cases, agreement between government and intervener may be quite difficult to maintain. Soviet troops have taken direct action to put down rebellions in Poland, East Germany, Hungary and (after 1967) in Czechoslovakia. In the Hungarian and Czechoslovakian cases, new and ill-fated governments hardly agreed to such intervener action.

Only interventions entailing at least some direct military action by the intervener are included in the Appendix. The effects of such interventions are not confined to the economic sector, nor to giving policy-makers second thoughts about contemplated decisions; direct military action affects disputes, policies, or conditions in the target through the use or open demonstration of intervener's force. The more the intervener undertakes direct action in the target--either opposing or supporting the government--the more controversies will arise and the more policies, in addition to the economy, will be affected (though not always in ways preferable to the intervener). Furthermore, the more foreign troops try to assert themselves in a country, and the longer the stay (even to support the target government), the greater the risk of popular resentment and defiance of their presence.

Specific effects of intervener presence in targets depend on the length of intervener's stay, the extent and duration of intervener's military activity, the magnitude of military force employed, the size

and power of the intervening state in relation to the target, and the extent of other powers' interest in the target. Troops of major powers long encamped in a small power target may have a more profound economic and social effect on the target than troops of another small power, since they probably have more money to spend and since there may be more of them. US troops seem to have had a greater economic and social impact (increasing inflation and job opportunities, depopulating countryside, and fathering children in South Vietnam) than Egyptian troops had in Yemen. Furthermore, tensions between target government and friendly intervener probably grow faster when intervener is a major rather than minor power.

Major power intervention is less likely to be disruptive if military action by the intervener is infrequent and quick, and if encampment does not last long. The continued presence of British and French officers in the armies of East Africa and former French Equatorial Africa even after independence (along with low pay for indigenous troops) constituted a grievance for African military factions which mutinied in the 1960's. Massive British and French interventions followed to restore order, prop-up shaky governments, and reinstate governments that had already fallen. Thus, long-term encampment was one factor (along with economic and regional power balance interests) leading to the perceived need for active intervention. (See Morrison, et. al., 1972.) Such interventions did not cause great condemnation of "neo-colonialism" mainly because host governments needed major power help (on the other hand, French action in Suez, Algeria, and Tunisia was hardly at African government behest)

and did not denounce the troop movements (the East African states-- normally vocally anti-imperialist--could not object to French action in Gabon and elsewhere since they had called for British help). (See Wallerstein, 1969:74-79.) The fact that the bulk of major power troops did not stay long (Nigeria soon replaced the UK in Tanganyika)--that army dissidents (as opposed to entrenched guerillas) could be relatively quickly disarmed--meant that conflicts and resentments at intervener presence did not have time to grow. Other large powers kept out of the situation, also reducing possible tensions, and British and French forces had relatively clear-cut military objectives. Thus, the quagmire nature of the Congo interventions (with vague and ever-expanding military objectives, competitive military intervention and political or economic interference by various states, widespread violence, and competing mass-based political movements) was absent in East and Equatorial African interventions. (See Hoffman, 1962.)

In some cases, encampment may be short--troops may quickly enter and exit the target country--and yet military actions may be repeated so frequently that they constitute a single on-going intervention (in delimiting such interventions, researchers can look for gaps and lulls in activity, ceasefires, intervener's changing political or military goals or concerns, or step-level changes in magnitude of military activity or number of troops employed). India's frequent aid to Nepal, Israel's border clashes and raids on neighbors' territories, Greek border clashes with Balkan neighbors in the late 40's



and early 50's, or Ethiopian-Somalian clashes in the 60's all tended to come in clusters of specific incidents which could be linked together over certain time periods and, because they came so frequently, while the same issues continued to preoccupy interveners, could reasonably be considered single on-going interventions. Such interventions, often involving border disputes, seem to produce relatively few economic effects on the targets, but may generate popular resentment and have profound political implications for the target governments. Borders are continually crossed or violated; the political and/or military weaknesses of the target government are highlighted, as the government is either incapable of preventing border penetrations or in constant need of outside interveners' help. Target governments may lose constituent support in such cases, and leaders may feel compelled to change domestic or foreign policies either to eliminate conditions which attract the intervener (e.g., Lebanese and Jordanian crackdowns on Palestinian groups) or protect the borders (Egypt installs better Soviet anti-aircraft missiles).

Some interventions involving short-term encampment and continued military action may be neutral with regard to the target government. A state may act to eliminate terrorists operating from or taking refuge in a neighbor's territory. These might be termed "remedial" interventions, since intervener attempts to directly remedy offensive conditions in the target state. Remedial interventions may or may not be meant to pressure the target government to act against terrorists or change offensive conditions; sometimes the target government might be relieved to see foreign troops controlling a politically volatile situation (e.g., Jordan-Palestine guerrillas--Israel).

Thus, duration of encampment in targets seems to increase the probability that further active intervention will be necessary, and to affect economic and social conditions, and public reaction, inside the target country (and hence the target government's long-term political standing). Extent and duration of military action seems to affect certain of the target governments' policies which interest the intervener, the immediate political popularity of the target government, the safety of individuals, and the loss or destruction of property inside the target.

Two types of intervention seem to entail different combinations of encampment and military action, and hence different sets of consequences for intervener and target: (1) interventions in targets' domestic disputes; and (2) interventions affecting targets' policies or conditions in the absence of domestic disputes (or in which intervener does not openly take sides in the dispute). Domestic disputes are situations in which an elite or mass group or faction (popular, military, or governmental) threatens or seeks to overturn the government in an irregular power transfer. Interventions in domestic disputes either favor or oppose the government or opposition groups. It is more useful to speak of interventions which either do or do not affect targets' domestic disputes than to speak of interventions "aimed at authority structures," since the existence of domestic disputes is relatively easily determined, and since different variables and cost-benefit calculations lead to or stem from interventions in such disputes, as opposed to interventions in the absence of such disputes. Again, it is important to distinguish hostile and friendly interventions, (Table 2) since different predictor variables seem to relate to certain classes of intervention.

TABLE 2

Hostile And Friendly Interventions In Domestic Disputes  
Or Affecting Policies And Conditions

|         | Hostile                     | Friendly                       |
|---------|-----------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Dom-Dis | China-Tibet                 | France-Cameroon                |
| Pol-Con | Pakistan-India<br>(Kashmir) | UK-South Arabian<br>Sheikhdoms |

Once a country establishes significant interests in another target state, decisions about hostile interventions, whether in domestic disputes or affecting policies or conditions in the absence of disputes, seem most likely to be affected by variables concerning the potential strength of the target state's military and government. Hostile interventions since 1948 have involved interveners and targets of roughly equal military power, or interveners with significant power advantage over targets.<sup>1</sup> (See Table 3) States seldom intervened in targets more powerful than themselves, and major power interveners (US, USSR, UK, France, China) seldom picked on states their own size (though the US clashed with both the USSR and PRC--in seldom noted interventions--during the Korean war, and though the USSR and PRC have clashed in publicized interventions). In all, there were ten hostile interventions with intervener and target of roughly equal power (nine among small and minor powers), sixteen in which intervener was at least two steps above the target in power (on a six point scale), twenty in which intervener was one power step above target, thirteen in which intervener was one power step below the target, and one (Indonesia into UK at Sarawak) in which target was more than one power step below intervener. Note, as well, that because of the single ranking of states' power, circa 1957-59, certain interventions in Korea and Israel were categorized with intervener less powerful than target. However, in 1950, South Korea was not as powerful as it later became, and North Korea probably held a power advantage. Evidently most Arab leaders felt they had a power advantage over Israel when they invaded in 1948,

TABLE 3

Intervener Power Advantage In  
Hostile Interventions

| Power of<br>Intervener (1957-59) | Power of<br>Target (1957-59) | Number of Hostile<br>Interventions (Excluding<br>Alleged Interventions), 1948-67 |
|----------------------------------|------------------------------|--|
| 1 <sup>1</sup>                   | 6 <sup>6</sup>               | 0  |
| 1                                | 5 <sup>5</sup>               | 2  |
| 1                                | 4 <sup>4</sup>               | 0  |
| 1                                | 3 <sup>3</sup>               | 0  |
| 1                                | 2 <sup>2</sup>               | 1  |
| 1                                | 1                            | 1  |
| 2                                | 6                            | 4  |
| 2                                | 5                            | 2  |
| 2                                | 4                            | 1  |
| 2                                | 3                            | 1  |
| 2                                | 2                            | 0  |
| 2                                | 1                            | 0  |
| 3                                | 6                            | 2  |
| 3                                | 5                            | 3  |
| 3                                | 4                            | 1  |
| 3                                | 3                            | 0  |
| 3                                | 2                            | 1  |
| 3                                | 1                            | 0  |
| 4                                | 6                            | 2  |
| 4                                | 5                            | 2  |

TABLE 3 (Cont'd)

| Power of Intervener (1957-59) | Power of Target (1957-59) | Number of Hostile Interventions (Excluding Alleged Interventions), 1948-67 |
|-------------------------------|---------------------------|--|
| 4                             | 4                         | 0  |
| 4                             | 3                         | 2  |
| 4                             | 2                         | 1  |
| 4                             | 1                         | 0  |
| 5                             | 6                         | 15   |
| 5                             | 5                         | 8  |
| 5                             | 4                         | 1  |
| 5                             | 3                         | 0  |
| 5                             | 2                         | 0  |
| 5                             | 1                         | 0  |
| 6                             | 6                         | 1  |
| 6                             | 5                         | 9  |
| 6                             | 4                         | 0  |
| 6                             | 3                         | 0  |
| 6                             | 2                         | 0  |
| 6                             | 1                         | 0  |

---

<sup>1</sup>USSR and US

<sup>2</sup>PRC, UK, France

<sup>3</sup>West Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Poland, Brazil, Spain, Turkey, Mexico, Canada

TABLE 3 (Cont'd)

<sup>4</sup>Australia, Indonesia, Belgium, Sweden, East Germany, Argentina, Netherlands, Czech, Romania, Pakistan, Yugoslavia, South Korea, Taiwan

<sup>5</sup>Hungary, Thailand, Egypt, Bulgaria, Greece, Iran, Malaysia, Portugal, Israel, Burma, South Vietnam, North Vietnam, North Korea, South Africa, Philippines, Denmark, Austria, Venezuela, Norway, Colombia, Finland, Cuba, Chile, Nigeria, Algeria, Morocco

<sup>6</sup>Peru, Congo (K), Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Afghanistan, Ireland, Uruguay, Ceylon, Ghana, Ecuador, Tunisia, Guatemala, Dominican Republic, Sudan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Kenya, Singapore, Tanzania, El Salvador, Jamaica, Cambodia, Nepal, Luxembourg, Costa Rica, Uganda, Haiti, Honduras, Cameroon, Bolivia, Trinidad, Panama, Albania, Cyprus, Nicaragua, Jordan, Paraguay, Liberia, Somalia, Iceland, Laos, Libya, Togo, Mongolia, Gabon, Zanzibar, Arab Sheikdoms, Muscat and Oman, Abu Dhabi, Hyderabad, Tibet, Bhutan, Brunei, Senegal, Kashmir, Central African Republic, Congo (B), Rhodesia, Zambia, Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Dalawi, Dahomey, Ivory Coast, Iraq, Switzerland, New Zealand

as well. Thus, cases in which a clearly inferior power intervened in a clearly superior power were even rarer than Table 3 indicates. These findings generally correspond to those of Lewis F. Richardson (1960) for bilateral interstate wars from 1820 to 1929. Richardson found that 61 percent of wars took place between small powers, 36 percent with major powers (defined by naval strength) attacking small powers or with small attacking major powers, and only three percent with majors fighting majors. The advent of nuclear weapons may have accentuated these trends; it seems unlikely (though not inconceivable) that interventions will take place between states able to inflict quick and severe damage on each other. Of course, long-standing hostile relations, such as border disputes, lead to hostile interventions even when force ratios are less than favorable to the intervener. Interveners often forget grievances, however, if costs of intervention seem great, and costs of hostile interventions, especially when intervening and target troops clash, are significantly raised by military strength of target governments.

When contemplating interventions, whether friendly or hostile, in domestic disputes in foreign countries, governments will consider certain key aspects of force ratios. Friendly interveners will usually not be as interested in their own force advantage over target governments as in target government's force, organizational, and popularity advantage over opposition groups in the target. Hostile interveners will calculate both their own force advantage and rebels' advantage vis à vis target government. Obviously, interveners usually pursue their own interests, and may, if the stakes seem great enough, choose



to ignore weaknesses in factions they propose to aid or in their own military position. Major powers can afford more costly interventions than minor powers, and may rely (e.g., US in Vietnam) on their own supposed power advantage over target factions to assure successful intervention. In certain US and USSR interventions, factions "calling for intervention" have been created where none existed so that intervention in pursuit of major power interests could be legitimized. Generally, though, factions' strength and popularity, and the extent (geographic, magnitude of fighting, duration, threat to governmental structures) of the domestic dispute will help condition willingness (especially of small powers) to intervene in domestic disputes. Severe and prolonged disputes in a target may indicate target government's weakness and/or rebels' strength. Potential interveners, noting signs of rebel or governmental weakness, may be reluctant to back losers (President Nasser intervened in Yemen to back a government unable to oust rebels, and perhaps he ignored signs of rebel strength or governmental weakness, though the rugged Yemeni terrain gave the rebels extra advantages).

The possibility of stalemated, long-lasting, and costly involvement seems somewhat greater for domestic dispute than for policy-condition interventions (13 of 14 hostile and 23 of 42 friendly interventions in domestic disputes lasted more than six months; most friendly and hostile interventions to affect policies and conditions also lasted more than six months, but 10 of 34 hostile policy-condition interventions also lasted less than one week). Interveners seem wary of hostile entanglements in other countries' domestic disputes; 78 percent of domestic

dispute interventions from 1948 to 1967 were friendly (support government or oppose rebels--which are not always the same thing; Belgian action in the Congo at times opposed both the central Congolese government and dissident or mutinous groups), while 62 percent of policy-condition interventions are hostile. There seems comparatively little reluctance to bomb target states, carry out border raids, or even seek to detach and annex target territory, as long as force ratios seem even or favorable to intervener, and as long as intervention does not entail taking sides--especially against the government--in on-going domestic disturbances.

It is, of course, important to determine how many and what types of domestic disputes attracted hostile or friendly intervention; in an initial study using the World Handbook II (Taylor and Hudson, 1972) data on domestic conflict, it appears that while domestic upheaval is not a sufficient condition for interventions, it borders on being a necessary condition. While most states undergoing many riots, deaths due to domestic violence, or "armed attacks" (organized groups seeking power by violent means) from 1960-67 have not had interventions, 61 percent of states receiving interventions in domestic disputes had many riots; 50 percent (3 of 6) of states receiving social protective interventions (interventions protecting a social group--either minority or majority--in the target from the target government) had many riots (while all six states receiving such interventions had some riots); 83 percent of targets for interventions in domestic disputes were high deaths due to domestic violence 70 percent of countries receiving friendly interventions had many domestic armed attacks, while 44 percent of countries receiving hostile interventions had many such domestic

attacks; 17 of 18 countries with domestic dispute interventions and 13 of 15 with policy-condition interventions had at least some internal armed attacks; in 75 percent of states (16) receiving hostile interventions, governments issued many sanctions against political organizations, and 43 percent of countries with many such sanctions had interventions (in future research it will be important to determine whether domestic conflict preceded or followed interventions). Thus, in general, in the 1960's, interventions, and particularly friendly interventions, were considerably more common in states with some internal conflict than in those with none. On the other hand, some types of internal conflict--such as assassinations, elections, protest demonstrations, and political strikes--had little or no relation to the probability of intervention. These conflicts seem to entail less threat to continued government tenure than armed attacks, riots, and widespread violence.<sup>2</sup>

Friendly and hostile interventions depend on the types of relations established between intervener and target governments or societies, as well as on intervener's calculation of power ratios (though potential interveners may ignore long-standing friendships and refuse to aid shaky governments in domestic disputes). As UK interventions in oil-rich or strategically located Middle Eastern states have shown, when desirable policies or conditions in a target are threatened by other states (or by factions within the target state), friendly interveners may take account of valued relations with the target and respond militarily (depending, as well, on the policies and power of countries which might oppose the interventions). Long standing hostile relations with a target state, or long standing friendly relations which are suddenly jeopardized by a new target government or policy, may bring intervention to oppose the target government, provided force ratios

seem favorable to interveners and alternatives to intervention do not seem available (alternatives will be more readily available to large, wealthy, and powerful states than to small, poor, or weak states, but force ratios are more likely to be favorable to the former as opposed to latter type of states as well).

Several types of relations between states may lead to interventions--especially friendly interventions. Both "affective" and "transactional" relations may exist between states and may relate to interventions. (See Mitchell, 1970.) Affective relations consist of ideological and religious ties and similarities, family, clan, and tribal links, and ethnic or racial ties between states. These relations, and controversies concerning them, have most often characterized small power interventions since World War II--in Africa (Somalia-Ethiopia), Asia (Indonesia-Malaysia), and even Europe and the Middle East (Greece-Turkey-Cyprus). This is not to say that affective interests caused these interventions--strategic and political (increase power, change regional power balances, take territory) may have been involved as well. However, such clan, tribal, or kinship ties have been common between small power interveners and targets, much more common than between major power interveners and their targets.

Transactional interests have commonly characterized major power interventions; these include international transactions such as social, economic, military, and political exchanges, in which people or goods move back and forth between countries. Major powers are likely to have many more transactional links, such as trade, investments, economic and military aid, or diplomatic relations, than small powers; small power transactions are likely to be with major powers, since these powers have the resources and markets needed by small states.

Small powers are unlikely to be in a power position to intervene inside major powers to protect such interests, while major powers do have the capability to intervene in pursuit of such interests in smaller states (e.g., UK and France into Suez, UK into Jordan, etc.). Ex-colonists have retained many transactional interests in Asian and African states, and such interests have been strong in targets of British and French intervention (Malaysia, for instance). Strategic and political concerns about regional power balances also related to these interventions, so that transactions alone may not warrant interventions, but regional power balances also may assure protection of transactional interests. (For evidence of US concern--though not necessarily of US proneness to intervene--in this regard, see Peterson, 1973.)

Ideological interests are affective, and yet such interests have related to both major and minor power interventions (US-Dominican Republic; UAR-Yemen; on ideological interventions see Zartman, 1968:188; and Boals, 1970.) In general, ideology refers to organized belief systems and doctrines, such as Communism--anti-Communism, Zionism--anti-Zionism, or "pan" movements designed to unify populations. Communism--anti-Communism seems most likely to concern the US and USSR as well as certain of their smaller client states (e.g., South Korea or East Germany). Other ideologies may concern medium or small powers in certain regions. Ideological interests may seem threatened by wide-spread and severe domestic disputes which seem to threaten the governmental structures of a target state. Yet, ideological disputes may serve as justifications for interventions planned for other reasons, such as

to impose policy changes on the target state, or to preserve or change regional power balances. For example, power positions and territorial grievances, rather than ideology, may be the main bones of contention between Russia and China; however, such grievances can easily become molded into ideological doctrines (Mao may raise territorial claims for domestic purposes in intraparty struggles, with little hope of actually regaining lost territory), so that it is difficult to separate ideology from more concert or short-term interests.

Notice that in many interventions to affect ideological positions or regional power balances, intervener's concern may not be strictly or even mainly with policies or conditions inside the target; rather, the intervener may be concerned with the way the target fits into broader international priorities--e.g., the "Socialist camp" or the "stable region." It might not matter who specifically rules the target or what domestic policies are followed so long as foreign policy doctrines do not seem to threaten intervener interests. Hungarian reforms seemed acceptable to Khrushchev in 1956 until they came to include renunciation of the Warsaw Pact; since the intervention, many of the internal reforms sought in 1956 have been achieved in Hungary. In general, ideological and regional power balance interventions seem to entail more diverse mixtures of international and intra-national interests for interveners than other varieties of intervention, and hence may have less long-term impact on policies and conditions inside the target than other forms of intervention.

In addition to ideology and regional power balances, territorial, social, economic, diplomatic, and military issues may all be raised during interventions, and may lead to interventions for evacuation as

well as to affect target's policies, conditions, or domestic disputes. It is important to examine interventions concerning various of these issues separately since they seem to involve different circumstances and consequences. Issues connected with interventions may not be mutually exclusive, of course, and motives for intervention are seldom unmixed. Belgian intervention in the Congo, for instance, concerned economic, military-diplomatic (safety of diplomats and troop installations) interests, and evacuation of nationals. We can never know all the motivations for national leaders' actions. However, some motivations may stand out in public statements or historical analyses, and these can be used to classify interventions. Variables associated with these predominant motivations may be manipulable, so that the incidence and effects of certain types of intervention can be controlled.

For instance, geographic proximity of intervener and target, along with population pressure on resources inside the intervening state, may strongly condition interventions to annex territory. Geographic proximity may not be manipulable, but population pressure on resources may be eased if resources are obtained peacefully abroad. (On such population "lateral" pressure, see Choucri and North, 1972) Furthermore, interventions to annex territory may not involve as many complicated political goals as interventions to help a faction in the target gain power. The outcome of territorial intervention is, therefore, usually clearer (intervener either succeeds or fails to occupy territory) and secondary socio-economic effects (inflation, corruption) of intervention may not be as severe or long-lasting as the effects of prolonged military meddling in targets' domestic disputes (though if segments

of a population are detached in territorial interventions, communications and travel may be seriously restricted). Of course, extent of political goals in territorial intervention may depend on the degree of resistance to and duration of fighting involved in the territorial intervention (territorial interventions are more likely to be coercive than other forms of intervention--normally territory is taken from the target state), as well as on the extent of territory invaded. Total conquest of a foreign country may involve more than territorial interests; it may concern desired changes in target's political, military, social, or economic policies as well. On the other hand, while annexation of limited territory along a border may involve administrative problems, there may be little effort to change local politics; territory may be the main prizes (as in Algerian-Moroccan interventions).

Territorial interventions often relate to social or economic interests in the target. However, interveners may also undertake economic or social protective intervention without serious territorial ambitions (e.g., British and French economic intervention at Suez, and, because interventions were clearly social protective, while territorial ambitions were less clear, Greek and Turkish interventions on Cyprus). Social protective interventions tend to protect segments of the public, whether minorities or majorities, in the target state, as opposed to elite political factions (interventions in domestic disputes protect such factions, and become social protective as well, if elite factions have a conspicuous mass following which the intervener moves to protect), from the target government. Irredentist interventions, designed



to unify or reunify segments of a target state's population with the population of the intervening state, would be included here as well, and usually relate to territorial claims (e.g., Ethiopia-Somalia).

Economic protective interventions entail action by one state to establish, protect, or guarantee access to economic interests--business enterprises or access to natural resources--in another state. Economic protective interventions are perhaps the most difficult to clearly identify, since interveners are sensitive to charges of imperialism and exploitation and may cover up economic motives (probably even more than they cover up territorial motives) with talk of regional power balances, "stability," or social protection. French interventions in former central African colonies in the 1960's may have related to uranium deposits and the French nuclear weapons program, according to the New York Times, but their most easily detectable effect was to reinstate threatened governments. Research identifying, classifying, and seeking causes and effects of interventions must include careful attempts to uncover policy debates, records, or statements (from intervener, target, or third country sources) revealing intervener's goals, to determine what interveners' troops did once they entered the target, and to identify patterns of economic, social, military, or political behavior inside the target (or its region, or in intervener-target relations) which reveal effects of the intervention.

Interventions may also tend (whether successful or not) to protect diplomatic or military interests--a besieged embassy or military post--in the target state. French action at the Bizerte naval base

in Tunisia would fall under the diplomatic-military protective category. These interventions may or may not involve evacuations of civilians as well. They are usually less politically complicated than social or economic protective intervention, partly because they involve mainly military, as opposed to political, goals--it is very difficult to force a government to denationalize a foreign-owned business or to stop persecuting a minority; it may be militarily easier to protect a military base or embassy, while diplomats try to negotiate a settlement of disagreements with the target government or factions.

Distinctions among ideological, regional power balance, territorial, economic, social, and military-diplomatic protective interventions allow the creation of intervention profiles and specification of the kinds of actors and circumstances likely to be involved in various types of intervention (Table 4). This is useful for those hoping to control the incidence and effects of intervention. Since super and great powers settled most of their territorial and irredentist claims before World War II, they have undertaken very few territorial or social protective interventions since 1948 (Table 4), while minor powers have undertaken many such interventions. Territorial and social issues are likely to preoccupy neighboring states, and small powers are able to carry out interventions in nearby states. The welfare of ethnic and minority groups inside target states was of little interest to super powers; instead, super powers were almost completely preoccupied with ideological and regional strategic interventions. Events inside target states interested US and USSR decision-makers

TABLE 4

Intervener's Power And Types Of Intervention\*  
(1948-67), Excluding Alleged Interventions

## Intervention Types

| Intervener<br>Power | Territory--<br>Social Protect | Ideology--<br>Regional Balance | Economic--<br>Military-Diplomatic |
|---------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
|                     | 1                             | 0*                             | 31                                |
| 2                   | 4                             | 21                             | 14                                |
| 3                   | 12                            | 4                              | 0                                 |
| 4                   | 6                             | 15                             | 2                                 |
| 5                   | 17                            | 33                             | 2                                 |
| 6                   | 8                             | 14                             | 0                                 |

\*Numbers in cells represent numbers of interventions of that type by that type of power.

- 1 US and USSR (listed in order of intervention frequency).
- 2 UK, France, PRC (listed in order of intervention frequency).
- 3 India, Turkey (listed in order of intervention frequency).
- 4 Australia, Indonesia, Pakistan, Belgium, S. Korea (listed in order of intervention frequency).
- 5 Israel, UAR, S. Vietnam, Greece, Thailand, N. Vietnam, Malaysia, S. Africa, N. Korea, Philippines (listed in order of intervention frequency).
- 6 New Zealand, Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Somalia, Ethiopia, Yemen, Ghana, Nigeria, Lebanon, Singapore (listed in order of intervention frequency).

mainly as they related to regional power balances. Thus, leaders worried about super power interventions would do well to keep arguments about regional security policy out of violent domestic conflicts. Leaders worried about small power hostility would do well to establish policies that provided their neighbors access to resources or territory, and assurance that minority groups would not be mistreated.

Great powers (UK, France, PRC) were also concerned with ideology and power balances, but, in the British and French cases, combined this with economic and military-diplomatic interests, in ex-colonies. Suez was the characteristic intervention in this regard. British and French decision-makers worried both about the economic "lifeline" of the Canal, and about Nasser's impact on regional "stability." Economic interests were more clearly related to great power than to super power interventions from 1948-67, although this is not to say that desire for continued or increased business relations with target states did not affect some super power intervention decisions, since these desires often relate to definitions of regional or ideological "stability." Economic and diplomatic-military interventions by middle, small, and minor powers (ranks 4, 5, and 6) were much less frequent, though certain lesser powers pursued such interests (Belgium sought to preserve an economic toehold on the Congo, and North Vietnam and Israel had military-diplomatic installations to protect in neighboring states during their lingering disputes). Small states do not normally have many economic interests in neighboring small states--resources and markets are seldom found close to home, and poor states often produce relatively similar commodities. Poor states are seldom able to afford many foreign military

or diplomatic installations either, and have difficulty moving military forces great distances (even Belgium relied on US air transport for its later Congo interventions, and the UK required US transport in its Mid-East interventions of 1958). Thus, opportunities for small and minor power economic-military-diplomatic interventions are quite rare, and interests must be quite great--as in North Vietnam's need to maintain the Ho Chi Minh Trail--before such states will undertake such interventions.

Small and minor powers show a marked tendency for territorial and social protective interventions--which sharply contrasts with super and great power behavior--and for ideological and regional power balance interventions. Such lesser powers' strategic concern may be somewhat surprising to those who think of the "balance of power" as a major power game. Regional power patterns greatly concern small powers with regional political ambitions--states like the UAR or Indonesia, which pursue ideological and strategic interests in places like Yemen and Malaysia. Small powers' ideological and security interests may be quite different from, and perhaps even in conflict with, those of major powers. Small regional powers are unlikely to be greatly concerned with the world-wide "cold war" or communism; their ideologies are often related to "pan" movements and processes of social change. Small powers may use such ideologies to oppose other regional powers. The UAR misadventure on behalf of a "progressive" regime in Yemen began shortly after the breakup of the Syrian-Egyptian UAR, and may have been conceived as a way of discrediting Syrian claims to Arab leadership. Small powers interested in local balances may, on occasion,

find common ground with major powers from outside the region (Iran could someday become an anti-leftist intervener in the Persian Gulf area and this could correspond to certain US interests), but countries inside and outside a region are likely to have divergent interpretations of events in and different priorities for the region. The data show that small local powers take more interest in internal social policies of target states than major powers, and carry territorial claims into regional power balance or ideological interventions (Indonesia claimed Malaysian territory and combined--or ornamented--this with a pan-Indonesian ideology).

#### Conclusion

Several types of intervention have been identified through empirical analysis of cases from 1948 to 67. Variables associated with (leading to or affected by) interventions differ among: (1) hostile vs. friendly interventions; (2) interventions in domestic disputes vs. interventions affecting targets' policies or conditions in the absence of domestic disputes; and (3) territorial vs. economic vs. military-diplomatic vs. social protective vs. regional power balance vs. ideological interventions. This may not be an exhaustive classification, and intervention-related issues (territorial, etc.) are certainly not mutually exclusive. However, it is clear that major powers have tended to indulge in ideological, power balance, economic and diplomatic-military protective interventions, while lesser powers have undertaken mainly territorial, social protective, and regional balance or ideological interventions. Clearly, as well, most domestic dispute interventions

have been friendly, while policy-condition interventions were mainly hostile, and seemingly produced fewer political complications and consequences in the target than domestic dispute interventions. Interveners seemed wary of undertaking hostile as opposed to friendly interventions, especially in distant countries. Costs of hostile interventions--especially in domestic disputes--may appear quite high (and only major powers can afford them at great distances). Spheres of influence also seem to affect cost calculations; relatively few interventions of any kind took place in the neighborhood of major powers--most targets from 1948 to '67 were located in Africa, West and East Asia. (See author's citation, 1973.) Interests and alternatives, as well as cost, determine the incidence of interventions; major powers seem to have great transactional interests in other states both in and out their neighborhoods, but with their wealth, major powers have many alternatives to military intervention as well. Leaders of small powers may perceive few alternatives to direct military action if they hope to influence events inside neighboring states. Major powers seem to react to threats to transactional interests and regional power balances, while small powers are concerned by affective interests and regional balances. Perceived threats to such interests can lead to interventions: (1) in domestic disputes, or (2) to affect policy or conditions in the absence of a dispute; but unfavorable force ratios are likely to discourage hostile long-term involvement in domestic disputes. Policy-condition interventions, since 1948, have been somewhat shorter-lived, and force disadvantages may not be quite such deterrents.

The intervention classifications should make it easier to determine what effects any particular intervention has on intervener or target authority structures, economy, or society. If intervener is present for long periods in target (as is likely in economic or social protective, as well as domestic dispute interventions), if troop contingents are large and fighting is prolonged, and if intervener is hostile to the target government (as in most territorial and policy-condition interventions), target citizens are likely to be displaced from their homes, target communication and transportation are likely to be disrupted, intervener's citizens may become impatient and restive, costs of troop maintenance will rise, and intervening troops will increasingly conflict with target population. Shorter-lived and more limited military actions involved in military-diplomatic protective, or ideological interventions, in evacuations, or in friendly domestic dispute interventions backing basically popular and efficient governments may produce less disruption in the target. Further study of particular interventions should reveal the specific accompanying consequences--for instance, during the French interventions in Morocco and Tunisia in 1956 (which were partly designed to prevent rebel movements across the Algerian border), many sectors of Moroccan and Tunisian society were affected. At one point a labor dispute arose over the unloading of ammunition for US forces in Morocco (sometimes simultaneous interventions greatly compound problems!). Previously, French army guards had supervised handling of ammunition shipments, but Moroccan unions came to view this as an affront to their nation's sovereignty and ordered workers off the docks. A settlement was finally reached whereby Moroccan



guards would man the wharf and French guards would take over after ammunition left the wharves. (New York Times, November 28, 1956, p. 9). Furthermore, even technically friendly interventions may produce tensions and hostilities in the host society and provoke the hostility of the host government. It is politically embarrassing for a government to admit that it cannot protect other states' citizens or facilities in its country, that it needs foreign assistance in domestic disputes, or that it has acquiesced in foreign police actions in its country or along its borders.

Generalizations about interventions are possible; patterns repeat themselves and vary according to type of intervention. However, if the particular features of certain interventions are not to be overlooked, intervention classifications must assure maximum homogeneity of events in a particular class and provide enough classes to describe intervener or target behavior in most interventions. The classification presented here, according to affect (friendly-hostile), political circumstances (domestic disputes vs. policies-conditions), and economic, political, military, territory, or social issues associated within classes and account for most post-war interventions, their predictor variables, and consequences. Many other interventions could be cited as examples in cells of Tables 1 and 2. Border disputes seem to represent a certain genre of interventions with short encampment and frequent military action, which contrast quite sharply with prolonged interventions in domestic disputes. Of course, interveners may seize upon target's internal disturbances to attack a border area, and neighboring states may be affected

by domestic disturbances as refugees or terrorists flee and are pursued. A move against a border may constitute intervention in domestic disputes. However, if encampment is short and attacks are confined to border areas, such interventions may produce fewer problems for and seem less costly to the intervener than total immersion in target's domestic dispute (fully backing a faction) à la Vietnam or Yemen. Distinctions among intervention types and characteristics allow more adequate explanations and predictions of intervention occurrence and consequences than are possible in studies which treat intervention as a single and/or vague phenomenon.

## APPENDIX

A data set with interventions was available (Sullivan, 1970) as this study was undertaken, but it was thought best to re-collect, re-code, and augment the data because of certain conceptual and methodological problems. (See p. 7 above.) Therefore, all events in the existing data lists were checked in the New York Times and other sources. Additional information about the events and surrounding political circumstances was provided by scholarly histories of the interventions (Indonesia-Malaysia, for example). Every event was provided with a specifiable political or conflict context, thus eliminating unexplained or perhaps random skirmishes or incursions (such as an apparently isolated border incident). In addition, the data were supplemented with interventions reported by Luard and Bloomfield (1968:62-64, 96; Luard, 1970:8-9; Bloomfield and Beattie, 1971:33-46) and in several regional chronologies.

The final data list used in this study is presented and categorized in this Appendix; the original data were used only as a starting point, and they have been changed so much that the author alone bears responsibility for the results.<sup>3</sup> In the final data set, distinction is made between interventions alleged by some government or faction, and those reported "factually" (still not completely substantiated, of course) by non-government media, by scholars, or admitted by intervening governments. Political and conflict context were determined from statements by governments involved, and by issues reported in the press or by scholars.

All coding in this study was done jointly by the author and primary research assistant (Robert Baumann); the appropriateness of each case to the intervention definition was discussed as it was coded; missing or questionable information was noted, and efforts were made to obtain complete information from books or articles before final coding. If we could not say that troops crossed a border in the context of some political issue or conflict, no intervention was recorded. An intra-coder reliability check (repeat coding for a subset of the data--a complex subset with many reported or alleged skirmishes) was run on data for the Ethiopia-Somalia interventions, and it was found that agreement on all 52 substantive variables was 96 percent.

Here are the sources used in deriving this data:

1. New York Times
2. Associated Press
3. Asian Recorder
4. African Research Bulletin
5. Middle East Journal
6. Middle Eastern Affairs
7. Facts on File
8. African Diary
9. H. D. Purcell, Cyprus, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1969)
10. Fred J. Khouri, The Arab-Israeli Dilemma, (Syracuse, New York University Press, 1968)
11. Nadav Safran, From War to War, (New York: Pegasus, 1969)
12. Harold James and Denis Sheil-Small, The Undeclared War: The Story of the Indonesian Confrontation 1962-1966, (Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 1971)
13. David Rees, Korea: The Limited War, (Baltimore, Maryland: Penguin Books Inc., 1970)
14. The Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars, The Indochina Story, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1970)

15. St. Louis Post-Dispatch
16. The Economist
17. Marcus G. Raskin and Bernard B. Fall (eds.), The Viet-Nam Reader, (New York: Vintage Books, 1965)
18. The Pentagon Papers, vol. I, (The Senator Gravel Edition; Boston: Beacon Press, n.d.)
19. The Pentagon Papers, vol. II, (The Senator Gravel Edition; Boston: Beacon Press, n.d.)
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22. Neil Sheehan et al., The Pentagon Papers, (The New York Times, ed.; New York: Bantam Books, 1971)
23. Michael Leifer, Cambodia, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1967)
24. Donald E. Nuechterlein, Thailand and the Struggle for Southeast Asia, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1965)
25. Robert Shaplen, Time Out of Hand (London: Andre Deutsch, Ltd., 1969)
26. Hugh Tinker, The Union of Burma (3rd Ed.), (London: Oxford University Press, 1961)
27. Robert Blum, The United States and China in World Affairs, (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966)

32. Leon V. Sigal, "The 'Rational Policy' Model and the Formosa Straits Crises," International Studies Quarterly, vol. 14 no. 2 (June 1970) p. 121-156
33. Charles A. McClelland, "Action Structures and Communication in Two International Crises: Quemoy and Berlin," p. 473-482, in James N. Rosenau (ed.), International Politics and Foreign Policy, (New York: The Free Press, 1969)
34. Edgar O'Ballance, Malaya: The Communist Insurgent War, 1948-60, (London: Faber & Faber Limited, 1966)
35. J. M. Gullick, Malaya, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1963)

List of Interventions, 1948-67

Key: A=Alleged (By a Government or Political Group)  
 R=Reported (By Non-Governmental Media or Scholars)  
 I=Hostile  
 II=Friendly  
 III=Neutral or Non-supportive  
 1=In Domestic Dispute  
 2=To Affect Policies or Conditions if no Dispute  
 3=Pre-emptive or Remedial  
 a=Territorial  
 b=Social Protective  
 c=Economic Protective  
 d=Military-Diplomatic Protective  
 e=Evacuation  
 f=Ideological  
 g=Regional Power Balance

|              | <u>DATE</u>    | <u>TARGET</u>        | <u>INTERVENER</u> |
|--------------|----------------|----------------------|-------------------|
| AIII,3,      | Feb. 25, 1958  | Spain (Sp. Sahara)   | France            |
| AI2,3,       | Dec. 21, 1961  | Senegal              | Portugal          |
| AI2          | Apr. 8, 1963   | Senegal              | Portugal          |
| AI2          | Jan., 1965     | Senegal              | Portugal          |
| RIII         | Jan. 13, 1960  | Cameroon             | France            |
| RIIIe        | Apr., 1964     | Gabon                | United States     |
| RIII d       | Feb. 19, 1964  | Gabon                | France            |
| A2,3         | Mar. 16, 1964  | Central African Rep. | Sudan             |
| RIII         | Nov. 11, 1967  | Central African Rep. | France            |
| AI1          | Feb. 14, 1965  | Congo (Kinshasa)     | Uganda            |
| RIII         | Jul. 10, 1967  | Congo (Kinshasa)     | United States     |
| RIII         | Aug. 13, 1964  | Congo (Kinshasa)     | United States     |
| RIIIe        | Nov. 23, 1964  | Congo (Kinshasa)     | United States     |
| RIII,3,c,d,e | Jul. 10, 1960  | Congo (Kinshasa)     | Belgium           |
| RIIIe        | Nov. 23, 1964  | Congo (Kinshasa)     | Belgium           |
| RIIIb,e      | Jul. 23, 1960  | Congo (Kinshasa)     | United Nations    |
| RIII         | Jul., 1967     | Congo (Kinshasa)     | Ethiopia          |
| A2           | Feb., 1967     | Congo (Kinshasa)     | Portugal          |
| RIII         | Jul. 20, 1967  | Congo (Kinshasa)     | Ghana             |
| A2           | Sept. 10, 1965 | Congo (Brazzaville)  | Congo (Kinshasa)  |



|           | <u>DATE</u>    | <u>TARGET</u>       | <u>INTERVENER</u> |
|-----------|----------------|---------------------|-------------------|
| RII2      | Aug. 1963      | Congo (Brazzaville) | France            |
| RIIId     | Jan. 24, 1964  | Kenya               | United Kingdom    |
| RIIId     | Jan. 23, 1964  | Uganda              | United Kingdom    |
| A2,3      | Sept. 16, 1965 | Uganda              | Sudan             |
| AI2       | Mar. 26, 1965  | Uganda              | Congo (Kinshasa)  |
| A2        | Nov. 29, 1966  | Tanzania            | Portugal          |
| RIIId     | Jan. 25, 1964  | Tanzania            | United Kingdom    |
| RIIIe     | Jan. 12, 1964  | Zanzibar            | United Kingdom    |
| RIIIe     | Jan. 13, 1964  | Zanzibar            | United States     |
| AI2a      | Nov. 1963      | Dahomey             | Niger             |
| A2        | Oct. 1966      | Malawi              | Portugal          |
| RIIa,b    | Feb. 1964      | Ethiopia            | Somalia           |
| AIIa,b    | June 11, 1965  | Ethiopia            | Somalia           |
| AIIa,b    | Nov. 1963      | Ethiopia            | Somalia           |
| AIIa,b    | Apr. 1966      | Ethiopia            | Somalia           |
| AI2a      | Feb, 6, 1964   | Somalia             | Ethiopia          |
| AI2a      | Apr. 1966      | Somalia             | Ethiopia          |
| RII2,3    | Dec. 3, 1965   | Zambia              | United Kingdom    |
| AI2,3     | Nov, 1966      | Zambia              | Portugal          |
| RII1,3, g | Aug. 23, 1967  | Rhodesia            | South Africa      |
| RI2,3     | May 19, 1956   | Tunisia             | France            |
| RI2,3,d   | Feb 8, 1958    | Tunisia             | France            |
| AI2       | Feb. 14, 1959  | Tunisia             | France            |
| AI2d      | July 19, 1961  | Tunisia             | France            |
| RII1      | March, 1964    | Tanganyika          | Nigeria           |
| R3d       | July 3, 1956   | Morocco             | France            |
| A2        | May 21, 1958   | Morocco             | France            |
| AI2,3     | Oct. 7, 1961   | Morocco             | France            |

|              | <u>DATE</u>    | <u>TARGET</u>      | <u>INTERVENER</u> |
|--------------|----------------|--------------------|-------------------|
| AI2          | July, 1962     | Morocco            | France            |
| AI2a         | Oct. 8, 1963   | Morocco            | Algeria           |
| AI2a         | July, 1962     | Morocco            | Algeria           |
| A2           | Feb. 26, 1965  | Guinea             | Portugal          |
| AI2a         | Oct. 14, 1963  | Algeria            | Morocco           |
| AI2a         | July 6, 1962   | Algeria            | Morocco           |
| A2           | June 1962      | France (Algeria)   | Morocco           |
| AI2          | Oct. 1957      | Libya              | France            |
| A2,3         | Feb. 1964      | Burundi            | Rwanda            |
| AI2,3        | Sept. 10, 1966 | Sudan              | Chad              |
| AI2          | Mar. 18, 1967  | Sudan              | Ethiopia          |
| AIII         | July 26, 1963  | Cuba               | USSR              |
| A            | Sept. 6, 1963  | Cuba               | United States     |
| RIII3d       | July 28, 1958  | Cuba               | United States     |
| AIII3        | Aug. 15, 1963  | U.K. (Bahamas)     | Cuba              |
| RIII d,e,f,g | Apr. 28, 1965  | Dominican Republic | United States     |
| RIII b,d,e   | May 23, 1965   | Dominican Republic | OAS               |
| AIII2,3,c,g  | Dec. 31, 1958  | Mexico             | Guatemala         |
| RIIIe        | April 11, 1948 | Columbia           | United States     |
| AIII         | Mar. 1948      | Costa Rica         | Nicaragua         |
| AI1          | Dec. 11, 1948  | Costa Rica         | Nicaragua         |
| AI           | Nov. 1959      | Costa Rica         | Nicaragua         |
| AI2a         | Apr. 1957      | Honduras           | Nicaragua         |
| AI           | Feb. 1960      | Honduras           | Nicaragua         |
| AI2a         | May 1957       | Nicaragua          | Honduras          |
| AI2a         | Nov. 1965      | Chile              | Argentina         |
| AI2a,b,e     | Nov. 1965      | Argentina          | Chile             |
| RIII         | June 17, 1953  | East Germany       | USSR              |

|          | <u>DATE</u>   | <u>TARGET</u> | <u>INTERVENER</u> |
|----------|---------------|---------------|-------------------|
| AI12,3,f | Nov. 1956     | Bulgaria      | USSR              |
| AI       | Apr. 4, 1948  | Bulgaria      | Greece            |
| RI2,3,f  | May 7, 1949   | Bulgaria      | Greece            |
| A        | Apr. 19, 1950 | Bulgaria      | Greece            |
| A        | 1953          | Poland        | USSR              |
| RI,f,g   | Oct. 20, 1956 | Poland        | USSR              |
| RII1,f,g | Oct. 24, 1956 | Hungary       | USSR              |
| AI       | Oct. 27, 1949 | Hungary       | Yugoslavia        |
| AI       | Apr. 18, 1948 | Albania       | Greece            |
| AI2,3,f  | Aug. 2, 1949  | Albania       | Greece            |
| AI       | 1959          | Albania       | Greece            |
| A        | Sept. 6, 1948 | Yugoslavia    | Greece            |
| AI       | May 30, 1949  | Yugoslavia    | Greece            |
| AI2      | Apr. 16, 1950 | Yugoslavia    | Bulgaria          |
| AI       | Sept. 6, 1953 | Yugoslavia    | Bulgaria          |
| AI       | Apr. 23, 1951 | Yugoslavia    | Rumania           |
| AI2a     | Dec. 1951     | Yugoslavia    | Hungary           |
| AI       | Mar. 1952     | Yugoslavia    | Albania           |
| AI1,f    | Sept. 8, 1948 | Greece        | Yugoslavia        |
| AI       | Oct, 1948     | Greece        | Albania           |
| AI2a     | July 26, 1950 | Greece        | Bulgaria          |
| Rb       | Dec. 25, 1963 | Cyprus        | Greece            |
| Rb       | June 1964     | Cyprus        | Greece            |
| Rb       | Dec. 25, 1963 | Cyprus        | Turkey            |
| Rb       | June 1964     | Cyprus        | Turkey            |
| Rb       | Dec. 30, 1963 | Cyprus        | United Kingdom    |
| RIII1b   | Mar. 27, 1964 | Cyprus        | United Nations    |

|           | <u>DATE</u>    | <u>TARGET</u> | <u>INTERVENER</u> |
|-----------|----------------|---------------|-------------------|
| RI1b,f    | May 15, 1948   | Israel        | Egypt             |
| RI1b,f    | May 15, 1948   | Israel        | Iraq              |
| RI2,g     | June 6, 1967   | Israel        | Iraq              |
| RI1a,b,f  | May 15, 1948   | Israel        | Jordan            |
| RI2,g     | June 5, 1967   | Israel        | Jordan            |
| RI1b,f    | May 15, 1948   | Israel        | Syria             |
| RI2,g     | June 5, 1967   | Israel        | Syria             |
| RI1b,f    | May 15, 1948   | Israel        | Lebanon           |
| RI1b,f    | May 15, 1948   | Israel        | Saudi Arabia      |
| RI1b,f    | May 15, 1948   | Israel        | Yemen             |
| RI12a,f,g | June 1, 1948   | Jordan        | Israel            |
| AI2a      | Aug. 27, 1950  | Jordan        | Israel            |
| RIII2,3   | Oct. 1953      | Jordan        | Israel            |
| RIII2,3   | May 27, 1965   | Jordan        | Israel            |
| RIII2,3   | Sept. 2, 1965  | Jordan        | Israel            |
| RIII2,3   | Apr. 29, 1966  | Jordan        | Israel            |
| RIII2,3   | Nov. 13, 1966  | Jordan        | Israel            |
| RI2,3,a,g | June, 1967     | Jordan        | Israel            |
| RII3,g    | Mar. 1949      | Jordan        | United Kingdom    |
| RII13,g   | July 17, 1958  | Jordan        | United Kingdom    |
| RII1,3,g  | July 17, 1958  | Jordan        | United States     |
| RI2,f,g   | May 23, 1948   | Lebanon       | Israel            |
| RIII2,3   | Oct. 28, 1965  | Lebanon       | Israel            |
| RII1,f,g  | July 15, 1958  | Lebanon       | United States     |
| RI2,f,g   | May 1948       | Syria         | Israel            |
| RIII2,3,a | Dec. 10, 1955  | Syria         | Israel            |
| RI2,3,a   | March 16, 1962 | Syria         | Israel            |

|            | <u>DATE</u>   | <u>TARGET</u>                     | <u>INTERVENER</u> |
|------------|---------------|-----------------------------------|-------------------|
| RI2,3a     | Nov. 13, 1964 | Syria                             | Israel            |
| RI2,3      | July 14, 1966 | Syria                             | Israel            |
| RI2,3      | Apr. 7 1967   | Syria                             | Israel            |
| RI2,3a,g   | June 1967     | Syria                             | Israel            |
| RIII2,3    | Feb. 28, 1955 | Egypt                             | Israel            |
| RI2,3      | Nov. 1, 1955  | Egypt                             | Israel            |
| RI2,3,g    | Oct. 29, 1956 | Egypt                             | Israel            |
| RI2,3a,d,g | June 5, 1967  | Egypt                             | Israel            |
| RI2,3 c,g  | Oct. 31, 1956 | Egypt                             | United Kingdom    |
| RI2,3c,g   | Oct. 31, 1956 | Egypt                             | France            |
| RIII,g     | Nov. 15, 1956 | Egypt (UAR)                       | United Nations    |
| AI2a       | Feb, 1958     | Egypt                             | Sudan             |
| RI2,3,g    | June 1967     | Iraq                              | Israel            |
| AI2        | Aug. 16, 1962 | Iraq                              | Turkey            |
| RIII       | June 1963     | Iraq                              | Syria             |
| AI2,3      | Aug, 15, 1962 | Turkey                            | Iraq              |
| RI2a       | Feb. 1958     | Sudan                             | Egypt             |
| RI2,3      | Nov. 1962     | Saudi Arabia                      | UAR               |
| AI2,3      | Mar. 1965     | Saudi Arabia                      | UAR               |
| AI2,3      | Oct. 14, 1966 | Saudi Arabia                      | UAR               |
| AI2,3      | Jan. 27, 1967 | Saudi Arabia                      | UAR               |
| AI2,3      | May 11, 1967  | Saudi Arabia                      | UAR               |
| AI2        | Oct. 1955     | Saudi Arabia                      | United Kingdom    |
| RII2,g     | Sept. 2, 1949 | South Arabian Sheiks<br>and Sults | United Kingdom    |
| R,g        | Apr. 1952     | So. Arabian Sheiks<br>and Sults   | United Kingdom    |
| RII2,g     | May 1956      | So. Arabian Sheiks<br>and Sults   | United Kingdom    |

|         | <u>DATE</u>    | <u>TARGET</u>                     | <u>INTERVENER</u> |
|---------|----------------|-----------------------------------|-------------------|
| R112,g  | Aug. 1957      | South Arabian Sheiks<br>and Sults | United Kingdom    |
| R2,g    | July 1966      | South Arabian Sheiks<br>and Sults | United Kingdom    |
| AI2a    | May 1, 1954    | South Arabian Sheiks<br>and Sults | Yemen             |
| AI2a    | Jan. 1957      | South Arabian Sheiks<br>and Sults | Yemen             |
| AI2     | July 30, 1966  | South Arabian Sheiks<br>and Sults | UAR               |
| AI2,3,g | Sept. 1949     | Yemen                             | United Kingdom    |
| AI2,g   | June 1956      | Yemen                             | United Kingdom    |
| AI2,g   | Jan. 1957      | Yemen                             | United Kingdom    |
| AI2,g   | July 1959      | Yemen                             | United Kingdom    |
| AI1,g   | Mar. 1965      | Yemen                             | United Kingdom    |
| R111,f  | Oct. 1962      | Yemen                             | UAR               |
| R113c,g | July 1, 1961   | Kuwait                            | United Kingdom    |
| R113,g  | July 2, 1961   | Kuwait                            | Saudi Arabia      |
| R113    | Sept. 1961     | Kuwait                            | Arab League       |
| AI2a    | Oct. 1955      | Muscat and Oman                   | Saudi Arabia      |
| R112    | Oct. 1955      | Muscat and Oman                   | United Kingdom    |
| R111c,g | July 1957      | Muscat and Oman                   | United Kingdom    |
| AI11    | May 1958       | Muscat and Oman                   | United Kingdom    |
| R111c,g | Nov. 1, 1958   | Muscat and Oman                   | United Kingdom    |
| AI2a    | Oct. 1955      | Abu Dhabi                         | Saudi Arabia      |
| R112    | Oct. 1955      | Abu Dhabi                         | United Kingdom    |
| R112    | Sept. 15, 1953 | Abu Dhabi                         | United Kingdom    |
| RI      | June 12, 1949  | Afghanistan                       | Pakistan          |
| AI2a    | Sept. 30, 1950 | Pakistan                          | Afghanistan       |

|           | <u>DATE</u>    | <u>TARGET</u>      | <u>INTERVENER</u> |
|-----------|----------------|--------------------|-------------------|
| AI        | 1951           | Pakistan           | Afghanistan       |
| AI        | Jan. 2, 1948   | Pakistan           | India             |
| RI        | Aug. 20, 1948  | Pakistan           | India             |
| RI1,3     | Aug. 16, 1965  | Pakistan (Kashmir) | India             |
| RII1a     | Oct. 27, 1947  | Kashmir            | India             |
| RI1a,b    | July 17, 1948  | India (Kashmir)    | Pakistan          |
| RI2a      | Aug. 7, 1965   | India (Kashmir)    | Pakistan          |
| AI2       | Dec. 9, 1961   | India              | Portugal (Goa)    |
| RI2a      | Sept. 1958     | India              | China             |
| A3        | Sept. 1959     | India (Sikkim)     | China             |
| RII2,fg   | Nov. 1962      | India              | United States     |
| RII1      | Feb. 1951      | Nepal              | India             |
| RII1      | July 14, 1951  | Nepal              | India             |
| RII1      | July, 1953     | Nepal              | India             |
| AI        | June 27, 1960  | Nepal              | China             |
| AIII3     | 1959           | Nepal              | China             |
| RI2,3a    | July 26, 1948  | Hyderabad          | India             |
| RI2,3a    | Sept. 13, 1948 | Hyderabad          | India             |
| RI2a,b,g  | Dec. 18, 1961  | Portugal (Goa)     | India             |
| RI2,a,b,g | Dec. 18, 1961  | Portugal (Diu)     | India             |
| RI2,a,b,g | Dec. 18, 1961  | Portugal (Damao)   | India             |
| AI2,3     | Oct. 21, 1959  | China              | India             |
| RI2a,g    | Apr. 11, 1962  | China              | India             |
| AII2,3,f  | Mar. 1950      | China              | U.S.S.R.          |
| RI2       | Aug. 27, 1950  | China              | United States     |
| AI1,3,fg  | June 1950      | China              | United States     |
| AI2a,f    | Apr. 1951      | China              | Taiwan            |

|            | <u>DATE</u>   | <u>TARGET</u> | <u>INTERVENER</u> |
|------------|---------------|---------------|-------------------|
| RI2        | Aug. 27, 1950 | China         | United Nations    |
| RII3,f,g   | June 1950     | Taiwan        | United States     |
| RII2e      | Jan. 1955     | Taiwan        | United States     |
| RII2,3,f,g | Sept. 4, 1958 | Taiwan        | United States     |
| RI2a,f,g   | Jan. 10, 1955 | Taiwan        | China             |
| RI2a,g     | June 25, 1950 | South Korea   | North Korea       |
| RII2e,g    | June 27, 1950 | South Korea   | United States     |
| RII2       | July 8, 1950  | South Korea   | United Nations    |
| RI2,3,f,g  | July 2, 1950  | North Korea   | United States     |
| RI2a,f,g   | Oct. 1, 1950  | North Korea   | South Korea       |
| RI2        | Oct. 7, 1950  | North Korea   | United Nations    |
| RII2,g     | Oct. 14, 1950 | North Korea   | China             |
| RI2        | Oct. 8, 1950  | U.S.S.R.      | United States     |
| RI2        | Oct. 8, 1950  | U.S.S.R.      | United Nations    |
| RIIa,g     | Mar. 1950     | Tibet         | China             |
| A          | Aug. 29, 1959 | Bhutan        | China             |
| R2,3,f,g   | Mar. 19, 1964 | Cambodia      | United States     |
| RIIId,g    | 1964          | Cambodia      | North Vietnam     |
| RI2a       | Aug. 11, 1962 | Cambodia      | Thailand          |
| RI2a       | Apr. 1966     | Cambodia      | Thailand          |
| AI2        | Apr. 28, 1956 | Cambodia      | South Vietnam     |
| RI2,3,f    | June 1958     | Cambodia      | South Vietnam     |
| RIIIe,f,g  | Oct. 25, 1962 | Cambodia      | South Vietnam     |
| AI2,3      | Oct. 1953     | Thailand      | Burma             |
| RII2,3,f,g | May 17, 1962  | Thailand      | United States     |
| RII2,3,f,g | May 24, 1962  | Thailand      | United Kingdom    |
| RII2,3,f,g | May 24, 1962  | Thailand      | Australia         |



|            | <u>DATE</u>    | <u>TARGET</u> | <u>INTERVENER</u> |
|------------|----------------|---------------|-------------------|
| RII2,3,f,g | May 24, 1962   | Thailand      | New Zealand       |
| AIIIc      | 1949           | Thailand      | Taiwan            |
| AIII       | 1955           | Laos          | Taiwan            |
| AIIIc      | 1949           | Laos          | Taiwan            |
| AIa,f      | Mar. 1958      | Laos          | North Vietnam     |
| AI1,f      | July 1959      | Laos          | North Vietnam     |
| AI1,f      | Dec. 29, 1960  | Laos          | North Vietnam     |
| RII1,f     | Mar. 1961      | Laos          | United States     |
| RII1,3,f,g | May 1964       | Laos          | Unites States     |
| AIII       | June 27, 1964  | Laos          | South Vietnam     |
| AI1,f      | Oct. 1961      | Laos          | U.S.S.R.          |
| AIII,3,f,g | Nov. 1965      | Laos          | Thailand          |
| AI2        | May 1964       | South Vietnam | Cambodia          |
| RIIa,b,f,g | Oct. 1960      | South Vietnam | North Vietnam     |
| RII1,f,g   | Dec. 11, 1961  | South Vietnam | United States     |
| RIIId,f,g  | Mar. 7, 1965   | South Vietnam | United States     |
| RII1,f,g   | June 1, 1967   | South Vietnam | Australia         |
| RII1,f,g   | July 15, 1965  | South Vietnam | New Zealand       |
| RII1,f,g   | July 23, 1966  | South Vietnam | Thailand          |
| RII1,f,g   | Aug. 15, 1966  | South Vietnam | South Korea       |
| RII1,f,g   | Sept. 11, 1966 | South Vietnam | Phillipines       |
| AI2a       | Jan. 1959      | North Vietnam | Laos              |
| A2         | Dec. 6, 1959   | North Vietnam | Laos              |
| RI2,f,g    | July 30, 1964  | North Vietnam | South Vietnam     |
| RI2,3,f,g  | Feb. 8, 1965   | North Vietnam | South Vietnam     |
| RI2,3,f,g  | Aug. 4, 1964   | North Vietnam | United States     |

|          | <u>DATE</u>    | <u>TARGET</u>                          | <u>INTERVENER</u> |
|----------|----------------|--|-------------------|
| RIIlc    | Dec. 8, 1962   | Brunei                                 | United Kingdom    |
| RII,f    | Apr. 12, 1963  | United Kingdom<br>(Sarawak)            | Indonesia         |
| RIIlc,g  | Sept. 16, 1963 | Malaya                                 | United Kingdom    |
| RII,f,g  | Aug. 31, 1957  | Malaya                                 | United Kingdom    |
| RII,f,g  | Aug. 31, 1957  | Malaya                                 | Commonwealth      |
| RIIa,f,g | Dec. 29, 1963  | Malaya                                 | Indonesia         |
| RIIL,f   | Nov. 1966      | Malaya                                 | Indonesia         |
| RIII     | Sept. 1964     | Malaya                                 | New Zealand       |
| RII,g    | Oct. 1964      | Malaya                                 | Australia         |
| RIII     | Aug. 18, 1965  | Malaya                                 | Singapore         |
| AI       | Dec. 1963      | Indonesia                              | United Kingdom    |
| AI       | June 1965      | Indonesia                              | United Kingdom    |
| AI2      | Mar. 15, 1964  | Indonesia                              | Malaya            |
| RII,f    | Nov. 1966      | Indonesia                              | Malaya            |
| RII,f,g  | Jan. 1952      | United Kingdom<br>(Malaya)             | Australia         |
| RII,f,g  | Jan. 1952      | United Kingdom<br>(Malaya)             | New Zealand       |
| RII,f,g  | Sept. 1955     | United Kingdom<br>(Malaya)             | Commonwealth      |
| AI2a,f   | Jan 15, 1962   | Netherlands (West<br>Irian-New Guinea) | Indonesia         |
| RIII     | Oct. 25, 1951  | Phillipines                            | United States     |
| AI2a     | July 1956      | Burma                                  | China             |
| A3,f,g   | 1951           | Burma                                  | China             |
| AIIII    | 1949           | Burma                                  | Taiwan            |

## FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>For purposes of this study, power was treated as "potential to intervene" and measured as a country's average ranking, among all other countries, on gross national product and military personnel. Gross national product indicates industrial, productive, and technological capability to support a military intervention, and, as Rummel (1972) has shown, is related to a country's size (population). Military personnel indicates forces-in-being; a state like Switzerland, which is technologically rather sophisticated, may be relatively unable to intervene because of small armed forces. Obviously, these are gross measurements; Israel, with a small population, relatively low GNP in the 1950's, and relatively small army, has repeatedly emerged as more powerful than its neighbors in battle. Technological superiority, along with effective use of weapons (a state can have few troops and launch many weapons) can make up for numerical inferiority in population and troops. Some states may be more or less powerful than they appear in Table 3; armies may be large but relatively poorly equipped (Mexico or Brazil in the 1950's) or concerned with domestic police action (Spain); transportation--planes, ships, etc.--may be lacking; armies may be topheavy with officers and may lack fighting troops (Italy). Nevertheless, if a state has many military personnel, it is in a position to use these forces abroad--especially in neighboring states, and with the addition of more weapons, troops, and transport, to mount rather large-scale intervention; a large GNP helps a state provide these additional factors. Power was measured for the 1957-59 period utilizing data from Russett et. al., 1963; this interval fell roughly in the middle of the 1948-67 period. States independent after 1960 were rated for power, utilizing data from Taylor and Hudson, 1973. Six power categories were derived, a more complete rating than the usual great power-middle power-small power classification, though still a rather rough measurement.

<sup>2</sup>These findings differ somewhat from a study by Sullivan (1969) which employed a different intervention data set and multiple regression analysis.

<sup>3</sup>To obtain some idea of what might have been missed by starting from an existing data set instead of completely re-collecting the data, the New York Times Index was complete rechecked for the years 1948 and 1964, and all events which fit the intervention definition for all countries in the study were recorded. For 1948, the existing data included all New York Times interventions except those concerning the Palestine War. For 1964, all Times-reported interventions except UK into Uganda and UN into Cyprus appeared in the original data. Thus, on the basis of the two sampled years, the existing data set, while not complete, offered a reasonable starting point for careful recoding and augmentation.

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