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EAST EUROPEAN SECURITY IN THE WAKE OF REVOLUTION

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EAST EUROPEAN SECURITY IN THE WAKE OF REVOLUTION:

Daniel N. Nelson

INTRODUCTION

After velvet and violent revolutions swept through Eastern Europe¹, the security of each state collapsed as well. Hated Soviet hegemony evaporated and a security vacuum grew to encompass post-communist Europe. This paper considers the conflicts emerging within and between states in the eastern half of Europe and the policy dilemmas for Western democracies in light of these dangers.

Preceding 1989 events were years of political repression and fraudulent economic performance--decades during which anti-regime attitudes intensified and alternative societies grew in even the most severe police states.²

The ripening of resentment toward both party elites and Soviet hegemony, combined with the courage of peoples within Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and the weakening of the USSR itself, eroded communist power. Their abject surrender of state control was a magnificent story about which we marveled as walls fell, playwrights became president, and tyrants were overthrown.

As understandable as our euphoria in 1989 may have been, however, it was premature. No one can now doubt that building new political and socioeconomic structures in countries long ruled by communist parties requires, first, tearing down remnants of Leninist institutions. Even more pressing, however, is the difficult task of excising the norms of rigid authoritarianism and state ownership from individual and group behavior.

The resuscitation of Eastern Europe is not, then, "merely" a process of socioeconomic

or political development. These countries cannot simply begin on the road towards socioeconomic and political recovery from where they were. A prerequisite is a rapid, purposeful destruction of structures from a one-party system and from a state-owned, centrally-planned economy.

A preliminary diagnosis of Eastern Europe in the wake of revolution confronts a dangerous paradox. Leninist parties' failure and precipitous retreat--seen by some as a "victory" of the West in the Cold War--have left populations that are well educated, advanced and cultured in the midst of severely weakened socioeconomic and political institutions. Notwithstanding their understandable pride and high expectations, East Europeans will almost certainly run headlong into the limitations of nascent post-communist systems.

These are proto-democracies of a post-communist sort. They occupy a peculiar subset of all political systems wherein movement towards a rule of law, free and competitive elections and other fundamental tenets of democratic polities have been inaugurated after the collapse of Leninist dictatorships. Yet, further progress towards such objectives is far from being secure.

As weak political systems in a threat-rich environment, the countries of Eastern Europe confront diversified external dangers and intensified internal challenges. At the same time, the West's efforts to reinforce East European proto-democracies have been belated and desultory. During the next decade, the dichotomy between the needs of post-communist Europe and the strategic vision of the West may lead to disastrous consequences for both.

POST-COMMUNIST GOALS

Eastern Europe's first generation of post-communist political leaders must concentrate their energies on developing a new basis for national security, institutionalizing political

democracy and creating a free market. These inextricably intertwined issues trouble Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel as much as Bulgarian President Zhelyu Zhelev. No leader can ensure a stable democracy, a prosperous free market economy, or a threat-free security environment without achieving all three goals at once. Yet, none of these goals can be achieved absent a substantial cost extracted from progress toward the others.

Pursuing all three goals simultaneously is necessary but destabilizing. The urgency of building a free market economy is understood by everyone, for example. Yet trying to institute a fully convertible currency, free prices from government control, dismantle central planning, open up domestic markets to foreign products, and sell state-owned assets are all measures that engender severe short-term effects on living standards.

In a tragic irony, many of the citizens who keenly sought an end to communist rule--peasants and industrial workers, for example--are among those whose lives are most harmed by economic dislocation of marketization. Non-competitive factories close, unemployment rapidly escalates, and the prices of goods and services skyrocket well beyond the means of industrial or agricultural labor. Strikes by displaced workers, protests by urban consumers, and parliamentary deadlocks over issues of socioeconomic policy have escalated and more are likely. If market reforms are implemented in an open political environment, where freedom of expression and association are being observed but where broadly-based parties through which competing interests might be coalesced are still underdeveloped, marketization itself may endanger proto-democracies.³

Similarly, few observers disagree that the egregious weight of military effort in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union contributed to poor economic performance and popular

antagonism.⁴ To de-militarize security, however, may require a confrontation between newly installed non-communist leaders and those who have held the reins of national security for decades. There is little room for compromise. Either the civilian leaders wrest control of national security policy, the military budget, and defense industry weapons development and production, or civil authorities lose a critical battle. The only alternative to such conflict is an implicit bargain that leaves the national security agenda outside the competence of democratic politics--an outcome that can be debilitating if discovered by a population much too weary from years of intra-elite deals.

External security for fledgling post-communist democracies is closely linked to the resolution of internal disputes between civil and military authorities. The demise of the Warsaw Pact in 1991, applauded in Eastern Europe and the West, nevertheless leaves questions about how external threats to the region will be identified and countered. Except for Poland, none of these states is sufficiently large and advanced to mount a credible conventional defense against a concerted attack. Under what security umbrella, and supported by which security guarantees, will Eastern Europe enter the twenty-first century?

The principal tasks confronting post-communist governments of Eastern Europe in the 1990s--security, democracy and market--are neither benign nor quiescent. As much as they are each necessary pillars for a "Europe whole and free", achievements in all three domains will extract political and socioeconomic costs from policy makers and populations, with success far from certain.

CHALLENGES OF PROTO-DEMOCRACIES

Progress towards each of the goals noted above requires surmounting five principal

hurdles that dissipate capacities of proto-democracies in Eastern Europe: Ethnonationalism, the political costs of marketization, bureaucratic opposition from the residual communist *nomenklatura* and secret police, uncertain civil-military relations, and the political apathy of the populace towards authority.

Most debilitating for Southeastern Europe--the Balkans, principally--is ethnonationalism. A virulent symbiosis between ethnic identity and intolerant chauvinism, ethnonationalism has brought conflagration to Yugoslavia, and threatens to spread.

Yugoslavia's tragic path towards dissolution began long before events of 1989 in the rest of Eastern Europe; the federation's artificial creation at Versailles after World War I brought together an amalgam of antagonistic nations, formerly provinces of the disintegrating Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires, into a fragile state. After World War II, Yugoslavia's multiplicity of languages, religions and socioeconomic conditions were held together by fear of Soviet intervention, by the Yugoslav People's Army and League of Yugoslav Communists, and by Josef Broz Tito's own charismatic authority.

While Tito's death in 1980 did not lead to immediate political turmoil, economic deterioration, corruption, and widening inequalities soon exacerbated schisms among nationalities.⁵ Politicians, especially Serbian communist President Slobodan Milosevic, were ready and willing to take up the cause of their nation's grievances and fanned the flames of ethnic conflict. The fast-growing Albanian population in Yugoslavia, concentrated in the Serbian province of Kosovo and in the Macedonian republic, was a target of particularly inflammatory Milosevic rhetoric during 1989-90.

In 1991, Yugoslavia slipped over the precipice toward which it had edged during the

1980s. Serbs and Croats began their wanton self-destruction in the summer of 1991, even as Slovenia moved away on its own hard-won independent course while other republics and ethnic groups waited nervously for violent outbreaks and Army intervention.⁶ For Albanians, who constitute 90 percent of the population in the province of Kosovo in southern Serbia, a virtual state of military occupation prevails already.⁷ Unless the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) or the Western European Union (WEU) has the will and capacity to form a multinational peacekeeping force to separate combatants in Croatia, Kosovo, and elsewhere, it is certain that the 1990s will be tragically violent throughout Yugoslavia.⁸

Romania and Bulgaria exhibit a strong potential for ethnonationalist unrest as well. In Romania, the Hungarian and Gypsy minorities are the largest, with the rights of perhaps two million Hungarians in Transylvania remaining a principal inter-state issue between Bucharest and Budapest.⁹ An unsavory Romanian nationalist organization, Vatra Romaneasca (Romanian Hearth or Cradle), has tried to exploit anti-minority sentiment, with vitriol directed against Hungarians, Jews, and Gypsies. Cooler heads in the Romanian and Hungarian governments seek to diminish the sensitivity of this issue. The Romanian Ministry of Culture, for example, issued a statement in late July, 1991 condemning the nationalist extremism of several publications¹⁰, while Prime Minister Roman reportedly was considering banning "racist, chauvinistic and nationalist" publications including Vatra's "Romania Mare".¹¹ Militaries of the two countries have taken steps (such as a symbolic "Open Skies" confidence and security-building agreement) to defuse tensions.¹²

Turks in Bulgaria (who account for 10% or more of the total population) represent a large proportion of the young work force and the army's conscript pool. A recent and disturbing

record of Bulgarian-Turkish inability to coexist peacefully in the Bulgarian state was evident during the last decade of communist rule. Under Todor Zhivkov, the Bulgarian communist government tried to obliterate the Turkish identity by, for example, forcing individuals to adopt Bulgarian surnames. These and other harsh measures precipitated a violent backlash, followed by army intervention, and a mass exodus by more than 300,000 Turks in the summer of 1989 that further destabilized the Bulgarian economy and hastened the end of Zhivkov's regime.¹³

These are the most volatile cases of ethnonationalism, but they are not alone. The fiendishly complex interweaving of peoples and borders in East-Central and Southeastern Europe involves a diaspora for almost every nation--Poles in Lithuania, Byelorussia and the Ukraine, Hungarians in Czechoslovakia, Romania and two Yugoslav republics, Germans in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania and the USSR, and so on.¹⁴ Even in a case such as Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia--an issue that Hitler utilized malevolently in 1938, but one that involves few people alive today--has made a Czechoslovak-German treaty far more controversial because of demands that Prague compensate families for lost property and grant people and their heirs a right to resettle.¹⁵ And, any steps by the Federal or Czech Republic governments to acknowledge German claims exacerbates already fragile ties with Slovakia, where Slovak nationalism is moving that republic inexorably towards separation from the federation.¹⁶ Perhaps most irreparable is the issue of what Macedonia is or should be--a dispute involving every nationality and state within the Balkans.¹⁷ As one of the oldest and most intractable of this litany of ethno-nationalist disputes, Macedonia may yet emerge as a matter about which Balkan regional peace breaks down.

Poland and Hungary exemplify the conditions that attend the rapid and fundamental shift

towards a free market economy. Freeing prices, selling state-owned property, and making the currency convertible send waves of dislocation throughout the economy; these wrenching changes leave many enterprises, and a high proportion of the work force, out of an economy where profitability determines employment.¹⁸ Admonitions from Western economists to persevere in the face of daunting recessions are little solace to workers in Lodz, Katowice or Nowa Huta.

Poland's dramatic turn towards a market economy was inaugurated in January, 1990 by former Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki and Finance Minister Balcerowicz. That they were willing and able to launch such a rapid abandonment of a state-controlled economy was due to their enormous popularity at that time, and the legitimacy of the first non-communist Polish government since the 1940s.¹⁹

Mazowiecki's government eroded its political legitimacy as elements of a market economy were put into place. Work stoppages by miners and railway workers in May 1990 were the first sign that the government's radical economic policies were not being well received by industrial labor. In the months before the late 1990 presidential election, extreme fringes of the political spectrum who were dissatisfied with the government's economic program coalesced around Stanislaw Tyminski--a wealthy emigre who had returned from living in Peru and Canada. Tyminski outpolled Mazowiecki in this first truly post-communist election, but lost to former Solidarity leader Lech Walesa in the runoff election. Walesa also played to people's dissatisfaction with the country's economic transformation, never defining his own policies clearly, but always suggesting that he would be the best guardian of the workers' interests.²⁰ That Walesa has allowed and even encouraged criticism of Balcerowicz brought about, by the

fall of 1991, the Finance Minister's decision not to run again for Parliament.

Poland is much further along in moving to a market economy than are its East European neighbors. By July 1991, the reservoir of positive sentiment towards government policy had evaporated; 81% interviewed for one national survey said that living standards of Poles were bad, and 76% thought people "are becoming poorer".²¹ Simultaneously, strikes spread to key sectors such as transportation, while budget deficits rose, requiring a 15% budget cut by the Bielecki government. The Prime Minister offered his resignation in August, 1991, which was refused by Walesa; but the costs of shifting to a market economy are being absorbed daily by the post-communist governments of Poland.²²

A broader point applies to the entire eastern half of Europe. Even in the best of cases such as Hungary--where ample foreign investment has poured into the country--inflation has risen from about 29% in 1990 to a projected 38% in 1991. Czechoslovak unemployment rose 20% in one month (June to July, 1991), reaching 4.6% of the workforce, while annual inflation for 1991 was projected to hit 61%.²³

In much worse shape is Bulgaria, where another 40% hike in food costs in mid-summer, 1991 led Prime Minister Dimitar Popov to contemplate government intervention to hold the line on prices.²⁴ A strike by miners and another by 80% of all the country's medical personnel were only two of the most serious labor disputes in late summer, 1991, propelled not only by price increases, but also by perceived governmental inattention to the plight of workers.²⁵

Creating a market economy is not devoid of conflict. Broadly consensual movements that had opposed communist rule break down into competing groups and strata once the unambiguous adversary--communism--has been defeated and narrow economic interests are introduced.

Publics seem to support strongly the notion of a free market economy, but at the same time appear to reject individual responsibility for each citizen's well-being, emphasize the contributions made by socialism, and urge cautious change.²⁶ Solidarity has broken apart in Poland, and the Union of Democratic Forces that toppled communists in Bulgaria has now split into two factions broadly "representing" more *laizze faire* versus social democrat orientations.

For each proto-democracy, a challenge also arises from within--from the stratum of *nomenklatura* who occupied significant local and national posts throughout the communist period, and from the secret police establishments that underpinned every communist regime. Arrests, "retirements", and departures to other countries have been routes by which those who administered communist party rule have been removed from responsible positions. But there are too many people in too many critical jobs to extract all of them. For at least a generation, people who have been active in the administration of communist party governments will remain embedded throughout East European proto-democracies.

The unavoidable consequence of such a personnel challenge for post-communist Eastern Europe is a diminished efficacy of decision-makers. Although this problem is most evident in Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania, prime ministers in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary must also confront the recalcitrant implementation of their market-oriented, Western-style policies from within ministries, local governments, research institutes, courts and other institutions. And, quite apart from reluctance, there is also purposeful sabotage of non-communist governments' policies--by adherents to old Leninist parties, by right-wing extremists, and by the old secret police for whom ideology is less important than power and prerogatives.²⁷

Another obstacle strewn in the path of fledgling East European systems is the uncertain

boundary between civil and military authority. With the exception of the Czechoslovak army, none of the militaries in East-Central and Southeastern Europe stayed out of politics earlier in the century. In cases such as the Bulgarian army, coups or plots became a leitmotif of pre-World War II activity.²⁸

During the post-World War II decades, all of the region's armies were intertwined with ruling communist parties. At first, the army was the communist party in Yugoslavia and Albania in 1945, while in other states the "people's" army became, bracketed by Soviet troops, an ultimate guarantor of communist power. Each East European military benefitted greatly during these decades, with unbridled access to manpower and material resources to the detriment of both society and economy.²⁹

But today, where are do the loyalties of erstwhile communist militaries lie? Given that internal and external threats to states in this corridor of Europe seem to be intensifying, we can presume that military leaders would oppose budget reductions and drastic cuts in their order of battle.

Unemployment pressures further argue against cutbacks in defense industries; in Slovakia, for example, retaining an active production line for T-72 tanks was seen as a test for the economic policies of the federal government in Prague and as an issue of Slovak autonomy. President Havel, federal Prime Minister Calfa and other officials defended foreign sales, including an agreement to provide several hundred tanks to Syria, on the basis of such economic necessity.³⁰

Positive signs emerged in 1991 that East European civil authorities were obtaining necessary cooperation from general staffs and defense industrial managers to restructure forces

and cut back weapons. In some cases where resistance to cutbacks was apparent, wholesale generational shifts have been implemented in the officer corps; major Bulgarian military commands were changed in mid-1991, for example, with replacements usually being younger, with Western experience in 1990-91.³¹

The most dangerous and intractable challenge for Eastern Europe may be the apathy and/or antipathy people have towards politics.³² After almost forty five years of one-party authoritarianism following earlier decades of depression and war, there is no collective memory of how a democratic polity functions; the active engagement of citizens is needed more in these new systems than in any state where democracy has firm roots.

Czechoslovakia alone managed to maintain an inter-war democracy, but was unable to break from the orthodox communist mold after the 1968 Soviet invasion ended the Prague Spring. Poland and Hungary had transitional "reform" periods while still nominally ruled by communists in which alternative associations and economic activity became widely accepted. But even in those two cases, not to mention the Balkan states, public political life was muted for so long that individuals lost any sense that the system would respond to their needs or solve their problems. Creating a legitimate, self-sustaining public political sphere, that is, one not dependent on mobilization, out of a population that sees political authority as corrupt and irrelevant, is a formidable task. The depth of such a problem was suggested by a recent survey in Poland that found 71 percent of respondents agreeing that "corruption in Poland is a major problem".³³

A damaging consequence of such popular assessments is a purposeful apathy towards public life and political authority. This is not merely an apathy born of ignorance or subservience. Rather it is a rejection of involvement because of a perceived futility. In

Hungarian by-elections during 1991, results were voided because of 17% turnout.³⁴ In one national sample, 34% of Hungarians surveyed said that they were unlikely to vote, and another third said voting was only "probable".³⁵

Given these obstacles, achieving the three principal goals of East European post-communist systems appears remote. A wholly negative assessment, however, would err greatly. We ought not ignore the talents and courage of the region's peoples, their awareness of what failure would imply (i.e., a return to conditions in which their rights are denied and sovereignty threatened), the useable economic infrastructure upon which a recovery can build, and the West's considerable interest in avoiding worst-case scenarios.

Unless all of these obstacles to security, democracy and market can be overcome, however, the consequences for Eastern Europe during the next decade will be disquieting.

EASTERN EUROPE 2001

Within the coming decade, East-Central and Southeastern Europe are certain to exhibit political instability of varying degrees. Such turmoil may take peaceful forms in the northern part of this corridor, with consequences ranging from high turnover rates among cabinet-level officials, frequent governmental resignations, persistent work stoppages and student protests, and related events.

Such an unsettled environment is not incompatible with a nascent democracy. Provided that the resolution of each new crisis enables structures and processes of free governments and free economies to become further institutionalized, the first decade of post-communism may see the cathartic effects of systemic "cleansing" take place.

Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and the five laender of Germany that had been the

German Democratic Republic are all certain to undergo periods during which dangerous shoals are not far away. Polish President Walesa has chafed under the constraints of an early 1990 "Round Table" agreement that assured communists a majority in the Sejm (parliament), and made vague threats about dissolving parliament in spring 1991 when the deputies would not accept his proposal for a new electoral law.³⁶ At the same time that such political uncertainty persists, the Polish economy continues its tortuous shift towards capitalism with vital signs mixed to say the least.³⁷ Institutions on which Poles had long relied such as Solidarity have begun to lose support, and the popularity of a national hero such as Lech Walesa deteriorates.³⁸

But there are certainly factions within each country that will seek to exploit unrest in order to advance their extremist cause--of nationalist intolerance, of militarism, or theocracy. Although far from certain, a second scenario is thus much more disturbing; in such an environment, post-communist systems will edge towards a slippery slope down which lies disaster for the region and for Europe. Substantial intra-state violence, albeit at levels less than civil war--including frequent assassinations, killing of protesters by police and military units, clashes among ethnic groups, and similar episodes--would indicate that the precipice is not far away.

Once over the precipice, a limited civil war may begin between ethnic groups with territorial claims, or between those trying to promote the extremism of one political organization versus another. The Yugoslav case exhibits an ethnonationalist civil war, exacerbated by socioeconomic and political divisions. Irredenta in the Balkans could easily spark fighting that, while failing to reach levels of open conventional warfare, nevertheless, costs thousands of lives.

Yugoslavia's limited civil war now focused on fighting between Serbs and Croats cannot

be controlled from within the former federal state or by indigenous institutions. Combat between Slovenes and Serbs may not be part of this round of fighting, but Slovenia would surely be drawn back into an all-Yugoslav conflagration³⁹, as would the Albanians in Kosovo, Macedonia, and all the surrounding states.

An inter-state conflict short of war, included armed confrontations at borders, trade wars, rupture of diplomatic relations and mutual threats and accusations can follow from the spread of civil war or be driven by other interests. Limited potential for this scenario exist between many combinations of states--between Albania and Serbia, Turkey and Bulgaria, Albania and Greece, Romania and Hungary, Poland and Germany, Poland and Byelorussia, the Ukraine or Lithuania, and elsewhere.

A large-scale inter-state war remains a horrible, yet thankfully dim possibility. Neither the wherewithal for sustained inter-state warfare nor the political capacity to inaugurate such combat exists in Eastern Europe. Yet, the considerable anxiety of countries bordering on Yugoslavia concerning the intentions of the federal (largely Serbian-led) Yugoslav army could precipitate a much wider conflict; the Albanian government, for instance, issued a warning in early August, 1991 of a "second front" in Kosovo, and put its army on alert against Serbian incursions.⁴⁰ It is this remote, but unnerving fear that sent European leaders scurrying in a desperate search for an avenue, via CSCE, EC or other mechanisms, away from war in Yugoslavia.

WESTERN INTERESTS

Doubts about Eastern Europe's relevance to U.S. interests arise if one ignores the continuing potential for cataclysms in the eastern half of Europe (including the USSR west of

the Urals) to endanger American security. Data on intra-European conflict portray a continent that has only in the last two generations ceased to be the world's killing field⁴¹--an image we so often ascribe to the underdeveloped world. And, even in the absence of wars between major powers, civil war, terrorism, secessionist movements, and political repression have killed hundreds of thousands since World War II. History may not repeat itself. But we would be foolish to assume that European and American security will be, now and in the future, immune from threats that arise from conflicts having their origins in Eastern Europe.

Because Cold War bipolarity is gone, the certainties of those decades are no more. We now see a Russian heartland from which we hear members of the "Soyuz" political faction and military High Command saying that reformist policies lost Eastern Europe, intend to end socialism and to dismantle the USSR.⁴² At the same time, a reunified Germany understandably extends its economic predominance toward the east which, notwithstanding Germany's democracy, is discomfiting to Polish and Hungarian nationalists. The role of other major powers necessitates U.S. and European Community involvement both to enhance regional security and to ensure that de-facto dominance is not reasserted from any direction.

Many of the hostilities deeply embedded within Eastern Europe involve direct, longstanding NATO and U.S. interests. That Bulgaria and Greece have developed, since the late 1980s, a de facto alliance versus Turkey matters because any conflict would harm both the North Atlantic alliance and American interests in the Aegean and eastern Mediterranean.

But it also matters that destabilizing migration could easily result from a wider civil war in Yugoslavia, from bloodshed in Albania, ethnic conflict in Bulgaria, or catastrophic economic conditions in Poland, Romania or elsewhere. Already Albanians have overwhelmed Italian ports

and Greek border crossings⁴³, illegal Romanian emigration has become a problem at borders throughout Central Europe⁴⁴, Poles have streamed into Germany, and Russians, Ukrainians and others from the USSR may have similar inclinations. If Germany, Austria, Italy, Greece, and Turkey were all affected negatively by unrest in Eastern Europe, becoming less stable or secure themselves, then U.S. security would have suffered a grievous loss.

Economic dislocations due to such intra-European migration are likely to be severe and prolonged. The costs of social services provided to refugees, housing shortages created by their influx, and a tightening job market are all sure to be immediate consequences; simultaneously, countries from which people flee could be stripped of industrial or agricultural labor as well as the educated elite.

Were violence to be an imminent cause of such flight, guerilla bands may seek sanctuary in neighboring states, inviting "hot pursuit" by a state's armed forces. The specter of hostages, cross-border terrorism, and other unstable conditions would quickly return to Europe.

At the core of our concern about Eastern Europe, however, must lie principles that we and our European allies have long sought for peoples who were ruled by communist parties. As enunciated in the 1975 Helsinki Accord, and enlarged by the CSCE Charter of Paris in 1990, all of the Euro-Atlantic region must be governed by the same standards of international and domestic conduct. Security for individuals, groups, nations and states within Europe's eastern half cannot be regarded as less vital than elsewhere from the Atlantic to the Urals. To the degree that the U.S. and Western Europe pay less attention to intra-national unrest in a Balkan country vis-a-vis France, Italy or Spain, the whole fabric of a "Europe whole and free" is weakened.

AN AGENDA

The United States, its European allies and Japan should become fully engaged in East Europe's quest for security, democracy and market. Our tasks are to help these post-communist systems surmount the obstacles that may preclude an uninterrupted pursuit of such goals. Our own economic and security interests demand such attention and effort.

The United States has, of course, joined in the new European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), headquartered in London, to spur the market transition of East European (and Soviet) economies. "Support for East European Democracy" (SEED) legislation has funded new U.S. Agency for International Development programs in Eastern Europe, while the Peace Corps, the National Endowment for Democracy and other federally-funded efforts have channeled developmental assistance into both socioeconomic and political projects. These endeavors, coupled with those of other governments and innumerable private foundations, institutes, and businesses have meant an ample supply of Western advice, start-up technical assistance, and small grants to entrepreneurs, scholars and others.

But the economic underpinnings of proto-democracies require much more. The United States and the European Community should increase considerably East European access to Western markets by raising or ending import quotas on key products such as textiles.⁴⁵ Action in that direction is underway in the U.S. Congress for the northern tier countries of Eastern Europe, and should be applied to the Balkan states as well. We should advocate doubling the capitalization of the EBRD, now at just above \$12 billion--of which the U.S. share would be no more than \$1.2 billion--and end our adamancy about denying credits for public sector projects. Debt swaps should be encouraged as American policy, tax incentives should be provided to

American companies that invest in Eastern Europe, and COCOM restrictions should be much less restrictive.

And, in the realm of security, the United States must quickly reassess its insistence that CSCE play a role secondary to NATO in securing Europe. The Helsinki process has now matured sufficiently, given the end of an East-West confrontation, to warrant a far different status for U.S. and Western security planning. In human rights and confidence and security-building, CSCE has proved to be a flexible and durable forum, instrumental in bringing about changes in Europe during the 1980s. In the 1990s--beginning at the Helsinki "II" meeting in March, 1992--the CSCE should begin its metamorphosis into a new Euro-Atlantic Security Organization.

The need for a truly Euro-Atlantic security architecture is palpable. Former Warsaw Pact members are unlikely candidates for NATO membership; such a step would be precisely the provocation sought by anti-reform, anti-democratic elements on the Soviet scene. In the Yugoslav crisis, neither the EC nor its security arm, the Western European Union, was able to create any decisive policy, other than to send in unarmed truce observers. The CSCE did little more, but was the only forum in which every state--including the U.S. and USSR--was present.

But out of the current minimal CSCE structure, much more is required. The Conflict Prevention Center in Vienna should be invested with far greater authority, symbolized by ambassadorial rank representation, and it should become forum vested with the potential to utilize peace-keeping forces. It ought to have the power to insist on mediation of disputes, with economic sanctions as an enforcement mechanism. The CSCE Secretariat ought to be expanded considerably, planning for CSCE annual summits that bring together foreign and defense

ministers of all Atlantic to the Urals states. And the CSCE should receive a mandate to move forward on innovative confidence and security-building measures, particularly in the East European corridor, including bilateral "open skies" arrangements, de-militarized zones along borders, and many other efforts to raise transparency and lessen uncertainties.

SUMMARY

A "new world order" and a "Europe whole and free" are phrases that epitomize the hopeful rhetoric born of East European revolutions in 1989. In the two years since we were awed by the courage of citizens disgusted with communist party rule, and surprised by the rapidity of such regimes' demise, socioeconomic and political realities have dimmed hopes and constrained expectations. The work of building free governments and free markets from decades of neglect and abuse faces East Europeans in the 1990s and beyond.

The dangers suggested above are not hyperbole, and represent real and present threats to the hopes of Poles, Romanians, etc. for better futures. Comparisons across the region are much less valid than at any time in the last half century. Nevertheless, the goals of post-communist leaders--security, democracy and market--face similar extraordinary challenges that can easily derail these processes. Americans and our longstanding allies cannot ensure the survival and further development of East European democracy, but we must certainly be more engaged in helping them help themselves.

NOTES

1. "Eastern Europe" has been a North American political short-hand for the nation-states ruled by communist parties from mid or late 1940 to the end of the 1980s. It referred, generally, to political entities from the Baltic to Black to Adriatic seas, in regions that are geographically, culturally, and historically disparate. In this essay, since I consider the aftermath of changes in those same states, I retain the term, but use it interchangeably with longer phrases that more accurately denote the area being discussed, e.g., "East Central and Southeastern Europe". The states considered here include Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, the five eastern laender of Germany (which were, formerly, the territory of the German Democratic Republic), Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, Yugoslavia and independent republics within it.
2. An empirical study detailing the attitudinal shifts in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary during the 1970s and 1980s is Daniel N. Nelson, "The Diffusion of Non-Supportive Participatory Involvement in Eastern Europe", Social Science Quarterly, Vol. 67, No. 13 (Winter, 1986), pp. 636-644.
3. The debate about radical marketization was first raised in the spring of 1990 as Poland instituted a program for a sudden abandonment of the state's involvement in economic matters. Two argumentative essays about the Polish case are Jon Wiener, "Capitalist Shock Therapy", The Nation (25 June, 1990) and Jeffrey Sachs and David Lipton, "Poland's Economic Reform", Foreign Affairs (June, 1990), pp. 47-66. In both of these articles, the social consequences of a rapid shift into a market economy are acknowledged, but there is wide disagreement about the political ramifications and the potential for unrest. I have been less equivocal in my essay "Free Market Prophets", San Francisco Chronicle (16 October, 1990), reprinted in In These Times (30 November-4 December, 1990).
4. After 1985, data and observations became more accessible, and the costs and trade-offs of Soviet and East European military establishments began to become clearer. A compilation of views on the Soviet case was Henry S. Rowen and Charles Wolf, Jr., eds., The Impoverished Superpower: Perestroika and the Soviet Military Burden (San Francisco: ICS Press, 1990). For a larger view, incorporating Eastern Europe, see my "Power at What Cost? The Burden of Military Effort in the WTO", Journal of Soviet Military Studies, Vol. 2, Number 3 (September, 1989), pp. 317-345.
5. Yugoslavia's mounting ethnic, economic and political difficulties are discussed in Daniel N. Nelson, "L'ambime yougoslave", Revue d'Etudes Comparatives Est-Ouest, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Fall, 1990).
6. Peter Maass, "Hungarians Face Uncertain Future in Serbia", Washington Post (13 August, 1991).

7. Peter Maass, "Ethnic Albanians Feel Serbian Crackdown", Washington Post (10 August, 1991), p. A20.
8. There were efforts to generate CSCE action to separate antagonists in Yugoslavia and to mediate disputes. But CSCE, of course, was still a very underdeveloped institution itself in 1991, and mechanisms for its action were incomplete or rudimentary. See, for example, Judy Dempsey, "CSCE Does Its Best to Rise to the Occasion", Financial Times (9 August, 1991) and Ariane Genillard, "CSCE Will Attempt to Convene Peace Talks on Yugoslavia", Financial Times (8 August, 1991).
9. Bennett Kovrig, Of Walls and Bridges (New York: New York University Press, 1991), pp. 216-217 provides comments about the continuation of Hungarian-Romanian tension concerning Transylvania even after Ceausescu was overthrown.
10. See this Ministry statement published in Romania Libera (24 July, 1991), p. 1.
11. RFE/RL Daily Report, #150 (August 8, 1991), p. 2.
12. Author's interviews with Hungarian Defense Ministry officials, Budapest, April, 1991.
13. A brief synopsis of the anti-Turkish measures by Zhivkov and their consequences was Gunter Lerch, "Für viele eine Flucht in Ungewisse . . .", Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (August 5, 1989). I have discussed the mounting Bulgarian crisis in "Society, Politics, and the Military in Bulgaria", Berichte des Bundesinstituts 32-1990 (Köln: Bundesinstitut für Ostwissenschaftliche und Internationale Studien, 1990).
14. See Magarditsch Hakschikjan, "Von der doppelten Mitgift der Altlasten . . .", Konrad Adenauer Stiftung #27 (1991), p. 7 for a more complete listing.
15. See, for example, comments made by Jiri Grusa, Czechoslovak ambassador to Bonn, made to Cologne's Deutschlandfunk Network on 5 August, 1991 as printed in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) West Europe: Daily Report 91-152 (7 August 1991), p. 6.
16. Jiri Pehe, "Growing Slovak Demands Seen As Threat to Federation", Report on East Europe (12/1991), pp. 1-10.
17. Among the many books that highlight the Macedonian issue, one of the most informative remains Stephen E. Palmer and Robert R. King, Yugoslav Communism and the Macedonian Question (Hamden, Connecticut: Shoe String Press, 1971).
18. For example, the five eastern Länder of Germany (the former GDR) reached an unemployment level of 12.1% by July, 1991, with prospects that a level of 15% would be reached by the end of the year. July data were reported in RFE/RL Daily Report #150 (8 August, 1991), p. 3.

19. The initial public response to the Mazowiecki government was very positive. After largely free elections in June, 1989, over 80% of those surveyed said they trusted the Cabinet of Prime Minister Mazowiecki. See Stanislaw Nowicki, "Polska i Polacy" (Osrodek Badan Prasoznawczych Report) in Polityka (December 23/30, 1989), p. 7.
20. See my commentary on the Polish Presidential election in Studium, a journal of Polish studies (Spring, 1991).
21. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Daily Report (Number 149, August 7, 1991), p. 3.
22. See Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty Daily Report (by Fax), #156 (19 August, 1991), p. 7.
23. RFE/RL Daily Report (by Fax), #155 (16 August, 1991), P. 3.
24. See reports on these matters in RFE/RL Daily Report #149 (7 August, 1991), p. 2 and p. 3.
25. Reuters Dispatch, "Bulgarian Miners' Strike Endangering Economy", New York Times (19 August, 1991).
26. For example, in public opinion polls completed in Albania, 90% of those sampled thought that a free market was essential, but only a third said that individuals should take more responsibility for their well-being. Most thought socialism was of benefit to Albanian history, and a majority favored gradual socioeconomic changes. See USIA, "Albanians Speak Out on Economic Issues" and "Albanians Speak Out on Political Issues", both produced in the U.S. Information Agency Research Memorandum series (July 15, 1991 and July 12, 1991, respectively).
27. For example, Bulgarian Radio on August 4, 1991 accused "middle level, communist nomenklatura" of having "set off . . . price increases in order to hamper economic reform". See RFE/RL Daily Report (Number 149, August 7, 1991), p. 3.
28. A useful review is John Jaworsky's chapter, "Bulgaria" in Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, Christopher Jones, et al., Warsaw Pact: The Question of Cohesion Phase II, Vol. 3 (Ottawa: Ministry of Defense, ORAE, 1985), p. 9.
29. During the communist period, the best empirical work concerning East European defense expenditures and trade-offs implicit to those expenditures was done by Thad Alton and his collaborators. See, for example, Thad P. Alton, "East European Defense Expenditures, 1965-1982", in U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, East European Economies: Slow Growth in the 1980s (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985). A related discussion was Condoleeza Rice, "Defense Burden-Sharing" in David Holloway and Jane Sharp, eds. The Warsaw Pact: Alliance in Transition? (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984).
30. Many reports surfaced about this sale and the rationale for it.

31. Author's conversations with Bulgarian Army and Air Force officers in Washington, D.C. during June, 1991. These officers, and others from East European states, have been brought to the U.S. by various organizations including the Atlantic Council of the U.S., Rand, etc. Exchanges with the National Defense University, the Bundeswehr academy, Sandhurst, and other Western military education institutions have been begun.
32. A theoretical and empirical examination of this topic in the case of Poland is David S. Mason, Daniel N. Nelson and Bohdan M. Szklarski, "Apathy and the Birth of Democracy: The Polish Struggle", East European Politics and Societies Volume 5, Number 2 (Spring, 1991), pp. 205-235.
33. This finding from a government-sponsored survey was reported in RFE/RL Daily Report #150 (8 August, 1991), p. 3.
34. RFE/RL Daily Report (by Fax) #152 (12 August, 1991), p. 3.
35. See Judith Pataki, "Popularity of Major Political Parties Decreases", Report on East Europe Vol. 2, #31 (2 August, 1991), p. 7-8.
36. For details, consult David McQuaid, "The War Over the Election Law", Report on East Europe, Vol. 2, # 31 (2 August, 1991), p. 11-28.
37. Among the alarming figures is the continued rise in unemployment, which had reached 9.4% of the work force by the end of June, 1991, i.e., 1,850,000 people. This is expected to continue to increase into 1992, perhaps to as many as 2.5 million. RFE/RL Daily Report Number 151 (August 9, 1991), p. 3.
38. By July, 1991, 23 percent of a national sample said that ". . . a new dictatorship under the Solidarity banner had taken the place of communism", while only 11 percent thought that "democracy was arising in place of the communist dictatorship". Walesa's performance as President was regarded as very good or good by only 20 percent, while 30 percent said that his performance was bad or very bad. See the text of a Warsaw TVP Television Network report of 25 July, 1991 translated in FBIS Daily Report: East Europe 91-144 (26 July, 1991), p. 19.
39. This, at least, is the view of Slovene Defense Minister Janez Jansa speaking in Ljubljana on August 7, 1991. See the Radio Slovenia Network report of 7 August, 1991 as translated in FBIS Daily Report: East Europe, 91-153 (8 August, 1991), pp. 30-32.
40. The Albanian news agency ATA announced these measures on 7 August, 1991 in a text translated by FBIS Daily Report: East Europe 91-153 (8 August, 1991), p. 2 and p. 3.
41. For example, see the data collected by William Eckhardt, discussed and presented in Ruth Leger Sivard's annual volume, World Military and Social Expenditures (Washington, D.C.: World Priorities, 1991), pp. 20-25.

42. There are many examples. Two particularly vehement statements by Soviet Defense Minister Yazov and Chief of the General Staff Moiseyev were in Krasnaya Zvezda mid 1990. See the interview of Moiseyev (18 May, 1990), p.2 and of Yazov (5 June, 1990), p.2.

43. Of many reports on the Albanian exodus, the Financial Times has provided thorough coverage. See, for instance, Haig Simonian's article, "Italy Acts to Repel Influx of Albanians", Financial Times (9 August, 1991). In the same newspaper, see "Italy Begins Sending Albanians Home" (10 August, 1991).

44. A representative example of German reporting on the Romanian influx is story in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (24 July 1991), p. 5.

45. This point was emphasized by Czechoslovak Federal Finance Minister Vaclav Klaus in an interview in Respekt, #29 (22-28 July, 1991), pp. 5-6.