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Security As Seen From Bucharest

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# SECURITY AS SEEN FROM BUCHAREST\*

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National security, in its broadest sense, is defined in two dimensions, objectives and capabilities.<sup>1</sup> Both dimensions are identified in external and internal domains which are distinct but interdependent. The national security bill introduced into the Romanian Senate in early 1991 reflects this analytical framework:

Romania's national security is seen, as it is conceived by the initiators of the bill, as the ensurance and consolidation of the social, economic and political stability required by the existence and development of the state of law, of the country's sovereignty, independence and integrity, [and] of the climate for the exercise of the citizens' fundamental rights and freedoms. National security is ensured by knowing, preventing and removing internal and external threats that can harm all the value protected by law.<sup>2</sup>

Whatever the alleged continuities between Ceaușescu's Romania and post-revolutionary Romania, the discontinuity in national security strategies is apparent. Post-revolutionary Romania has, through its foreign policy achievements and the publicly articulated positions of President Ion Iliescu, former Prime Minister Petre Roman, and Foreign Minister Adrian Năstase, radically reoriented its concept of national security away from a semi-isolationist, autarkic (or at least neo-mercantilist) and revisionist policy distance from the "old world order" toward a cooperatist, interdependent and "status quo" identification with the "new world order." Such a reorientation has required a concurrent restructuring of the military, diplomatic and other means of achieving security goals. Thus far, changes in the means have not kept pace with changes in orientation.

For more than two decades Romania was the Soviet bloc's odd man out: calling for the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact (along with that of NATO); refusing to allow ground maneuvers on its territory and to participate significantly in similar exercises in other member-states; rejecting Soviet calls for increased military spending; diversifying its sources of arms while building up an arms industry of its own; declining to send its military officers to Soviet command and staff schools; and, formulating its own military doctrine and implementing territorial defense policies inconsistent with the coalition warfare doctrines of the Pact.<sup>3</sup> Similar to France's relationship with NATO, Romania continued to be an active and often obstreperous participant in the Warsaw Pact's political deliberations while refusing to compromise national control of its armed forces, the ultimate means of maintaining national security against any potential foe. The Ceaușescu regime thus benefited from the Pact's proven guarantee of party-regimes' continuation in power as well as against any non-Soviet external threat to its sovereignty while avoiding the internally delegitimizing loss of autonomy fuller participation would have implied.

Romania's relationship with the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) was hardly more consistent with bloc norms. In the 1960s and 1970s Romania diversified its foreign markets and suppliers and declined to participate in CMEA projects deemed

unacceptably integrationist. However, the adoption of austerity measures in the early 1980s and Romania's increasing political isolation, the result of the Ceaușescu regime's abysmal human rights record, forced a partial reorientation of Romanian foreign trade toward the CMEA, particularly the Soviet Union.<sup>4</sup>

Neither were the Romanian Communist Party's relationships with the Soviet and other European ruling parties harmonious either before or after the Soviet leadership changes of the mid-1980s. Contacts with other "independent" ruling parties, such as those of China, Yugoslavia and North Korea, were nurtured in an initially successful effort to acquire non-Soviet ideological legitimacy. After M. S. Gorbachev's succession to the Soviet party's leadership, Ceaușescu's position became even more isolatingly Stalinist than it had been before. He continued to decry Gorbachev's reformism until he was overthrown.

Significantly, not only did Ceaușescu's Romania pursue autonomous foreign and national security policies, but the Soviet Union allowed Romania to pursue those policies. Romanian deviations were never more than annoying to the Soviet leadership. One might even argue that probable Soviet complicity in Romania's vaunted autonomy strengthened an otherwise incompetent regime, lending it nationalist legitimacy in the absence of material and spiritual inducements for popular support.<sup>5</sup>

Romanian autonomy also benefited from the West's economic and diplomatic support. The West's, and particularly the United States', policies of "differentiation" rewarded Romania's security policy deviations from the bloc norm with significant economic assistance and splashy diplomatic visits. The trade-off for whatever benefits might have been derived from fuller cooperation with the Soviet bloc was deemed more than adequate compensation and entailed few if any Romanian risks. While the Ceaușescu regime's escalating human rights abuses were nervously noted in the West in the late 1970s, it was not until the austerity program of the 1980s had created substantial Romanian trade surpluses and had darkened Romanian streets and emptied markets and until Ceaușescu's personality cult had reached pharonic proportions that the West terminated its support of the regime. At that point full reintegration into the bloc was not possible given the incompatibility of Gorbachev's reformist expectations and Ceaușescu's stubborn Stalinism. Reliance on extra-bloc support from the West, the non-Soviet East and much of the South was no longer a viable alternative. Ceaușescu's Romania, which had once manipulated its international prestige to garner domestic legitimacy, was, in the end, isolated from both the East and the West; a international pariah, denied external support of its security and ever more reliant upon the "Securitate" and other domestic instruments of coercion for perpetuation of a thoroughly incompetent and corrupt regime.

Ceaușescu's concept of national security ultimately led to Romania's isolation. Rejecting economic interdependence with either the East or the West, he pursued trade and financial policies incompatible with Romania's resources, devastating a richly endowed country and impoverishing an industrious work force. Refusing to meet the West's standards of human rights or the East's expectations of acceptable alliance behavior, Ceaușescu placed too great a burden on national capabilities for external and internal security. The revolutionary environment of 1989 thus furnished the occasion rather than the cause of the Ceaușescu regime's downfall.

The consequences of Ceaușescu's concept of national security on the Romanian armed forces were substantial. As stipulated in the Law on National Defense (1972)<sup>6</sup>, the Romanian military was strictly subordinated to the RCP, and thus to Ceaușescu himself, through a Defense Council. Identifying the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact member-states as the most probable adversaries, Romanian military doctrine, "the whole nation's war," based its defensive and deterrent strategies on the survivability of small, lightly armed and territorially based "patriotic guard" units, the hit-and-run tactics of which would render the costs of prolonged occupation greater than its potential benefits. Defensive self-reliance implied the establishment of an adequate but "low tech" arms industry and a proportional reduction in the acquisition of relatively expensive foreign military technology.

Territorial defense also diffused the exclusive competence of the professional military, a deprofessionalization compounded by the regime's use of military labor in the general economy. Despite the appeal of the policies' inherent anti-Russian and anti-Hungarian nationalisms, the demoralizing consequences of technological backwardness and deprofessionalization coupled with the politicization of promotion and the penetration of the armed forces by the ubiquitous "Securitate," apparently triggered a number of military plots against the regime.<sup>7</sup> "Unreliable" officers went unpromoted or were pensioned off early. Ceaușescu sycophants "earned" quick promotions to jobs they were ill-prepared to fill. Thus, at the time of the revolution, the primary traditional instrumentality for implementing externally oriented national security policies was demoralized, politicized, poorly led and anachronistically equipped but probably marginally equal to the tasks assigned to it.

The national economy was not a viable instrument for achieving national security goals just prior to the revolution. In March, 1989, Ceaușescu announced that Romania's external debt, which had amounted to almost \$11 billion in 1981, had been completely eliminated. What he did not announce was the austerity program's halving Romania's standard of living, the rapid depreciation of productive assets due to the choking off of imported technology, and the pervasive foreign distrust of Romania as a trade partner.<sup>8</sup> Autarky is a luxury afforded large

resource-rich developed economies, not a pauperized Romania slipping deeper into comparative underdevelopment.

Romanian statesmanship and diplomacy, once the admired hallmark of the Soviet bloc's maverick regime, had, by the mid-1980s, declined to international irrelevance. Ceaușescu no longer commanded respect. His duplicitous foreign dealings were no longer of value to either the East or the West. Ceaușescu sycophants held important ambassadorial posts in spite of their transparent incompetence. Then again, brilliant statesmanship was not required for a policy of evolving isolation.

Given the success of the revolution, even the internal security forces--the troops of the Ministry of the Interior, the "Securitate," and the militia--were unreliable protectors of the domestic order, much less the regime itself.

Regardless of one's opinion of the genuineness of the Romanian revolution, the events of 1990 and 1991 have revealed a distinctly different approach to national security.<sup>9</sup> One may argue that this reorientation represents the opportunistic machinations of the unreformed "nomenklaturist" leaders of the National Salvation Front (NSF) desperately seeking external economic assistance rather than a structured rejection of nationalistic self-reliance.<sup>10</sup> Indeed, the international community's willingness to accept Romania's new course at face value is constrained by the relative incompleteness of domestic change: recurrent examples of interethnic conflict; heavy handed

suppression of dissent; failure to remove former communist officials from positions of authority; hesitating marketization and privatization of the economy; restrictions on the media; and, the reluctance of both the NSF and the opposition to accept Western standards of democratic politics.

Alternately, one may see in post-revolutionary Romania's national security and foreign policies a reclamation of the interwar logic of Nicolae Titulescu whose memory Foreign Minister Năstase seldom forgets to invoke. Titulescu's policies were based on the assumption of the insufficiency of Romania's capabilities alone and on the efficacy of legal and institutional guarantees at the bilateral, regional and global levels to compensate for national deficiencies. Titulescu pursued these policies under regimes of varying commitments to democracy and in international environments ranging from overtly hostile to supportively benign. His policies were above party politics. His was a highly structured inclusivist policy which assumed Romania's place as a European nation and each state's responsibility for an indivisible peace.<sup>11</sup> It is more than coincidence that Foreign Minister Năstase, a respected international legal scholar in his own right, is President of the Nicolae Titulescu Foundation and often justifies current policies and aspirations as having their inspiration in those of his interwar predecessor.<sup>12</sup> Without dismissing the validity of the former interpretation of post-revolutionary Romanian national

security policy, the remainder of this essay will assume the accuracy of the latter interpretation.

As in the 1930s, among the most thorny national security issues facing Romania are its relations with the Soviet Union and Hungary. An imposed common ideology no longer silences mutual animosities. Centuries of territorial disputes and interethnic conflict characterize Romanian-Russian and Romanian-Hungarian relations, the foci of which are Bessarabia (the Moldovan Republic) and Transylvania. Romanian majorities inhabit both areas. The Moldovan Republic is precariously independent but still under some control by what is left of the U.S.S.R. and Transylvania is part of Romania. Similar ethnic tensions are the grist of East Central Europe's new nationalist politics.<sup>13</sup> All the region's governments officially abjure territorial revision, rendered problematic by the Helsinki Final Act (CSCE), while at the same time they all retain some level of "interest" in their co-nationals living in neighboring countries.

In early April, 1991, Presidents Iliescu and Gorbachev signed a Romanian-Soviet Treaty of Cooperation, Good Neighborliness and Friendship. In its vagueness the treaty resembles a very brief draft treaty initialed by Titulescu and Maxim Litvinov in July, 1936. Negotiated without consultation with the NSF's opposition and with only limited contact with the Moldovan government, the new treaty was harshly criticized by Western analysts and domestic opponents of the NSF alike.<sup>14</sup> The

government, accused of selling out Romanian national interests as well as the aspirations of the Moldovan people, somewhat lamely refuted its critics. In fact, as Vladimir Socor points out, Romania's need for Soviet raw materials, purchased on a barter rather than on a hard currency basis, may have hastened the conclusion of a poorly drafted treaty.<sup>15</sup> Indeed, as of November, 1991, the treaty had not been submitted to the Romanian parliament for ratification and both President Iliescu and Foreign Ministry State Secretary Ionel Sandulescu were calling for its renegotiation in light of the rapid disintegration of the U.S.S.R.<sup>16</sup> The NSF government responded quickly and correctly in August, 1991, condemning the Moscow putsch and earning the praise of the West.<sup>17</sup> Whatever is left of the Soviet Union is [are] likely to remain Romania's most important trading partner[s] and to be the essential third party [parties] in the hoped for reunification of Bessarabia, and, less likely, Northern Bukovina, with the rest of Romania. The treaty, regardless of its manifestly poor preparation and shortsightedness, temporarily and incompletely normalized relations with the U.S.S.R. and served as the vehicle for high level Romanian contacts with officials from Russia and Ukraine.

The process of normalization is more difficult with Hungary. In Budapest the plight of Romania's Hungarian minority is the crux of bilateral relations. All other bilateral issues are dependent upon its favorable settlement. Bucharest, on the other

hand, maintains that minority issues should be addressed multilaterally within the CSCE and United Nations contexts.<sup>18</sup> Each country's extreme right manipulates mutual animosities, making it difficult for either government to appear willing to compromise. Still, some "confidence building" measures have been agreed upon, notably an "open skies" convention signed in May, 1991. Romania and Hungary also exchanged drafts of a bilateral treaty of cooperation and friendship although its actual negotiation will not likely follow quickly.<sup>19</sup> These positive steps are drowned out by the din of nationalist rhetoric which tends to polarize Romanians and Hungarians and to obscure their economic and political community of interests the mutual recognition of which might lead to Titulescu's vision of a "spiritualization" of the frontier. Additionally, Hungary's participation in the Pentagonale and Visegrad groupings and their refusal of Romanian requests to join them is interpreted in Bucharest as a Hungarian attempt to prolong Romania's isolation. By and large the Romanian opposition (with the obvious exception of the Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania) is as anti-Hungarian as the NSF, making it improbable that a change in government would positively affect bilateral relations. Titulescu counseled patience, step-by-step confidence building, and reliance on international law and organizations in interwar Romania's relations with Hungary. It appears that the

post-revolutionary Romanian government is trying, albeit nervously, to follow his advice.

Arrangements structuring bilateral relations with the U.S.S.R. and Hungary might be labeled "pre-emptive" because of the potential threats to Romania's political sovereignty, territorial integrity and social stability which they have historically represented. Bilateral relations with other states might more easily be classified as "supportive" or "symbolic" in that they increase Romania's capabilities militarily, diplomatically or economically or they enhance Romania's international prestige. Relations with Bulgaria, Turkey and Yugoslavia are normal, even close. Contacts with Czechoslovakia and Poland are only slightly less cordial. Bilateral relations with the Western European states improved as the events of March and June, 1990, faded from the media. In this respect French President Mitterand's isolation-breaking April, 1991, visit to Bucharest, his pledge of French economic and political support, and his signing, with President Iliescu, of a bilateral treaty of friendly understanding and cooperation in November, 1991, were significant events.<sup>20</sup> Supportive political and economic relations with Western Europe are essential if Romania is to achieve a minimum of economic and political security. Prime Minister Roman's March tour and President Iliescu's July visits to Latin American are more symbolic than supportive but they underscore

the "Latin connection" which has yielded positive results in supportive relations with France, Italy and Spain.

European multilateral relations have evolved on both continental and regional levels. Because of its desperate need for economic assistance, its isolation following the June events, and Hungary's successful courting of European opinion on the minority issue, a symbolic readmission to Europe was sought and received when, following the release of the Romanian parliament's reports on the Tîrgu Mureş and Bucharest events<sup>21</sup>, the Council of Europe granted Romania special guest status.<sup>22</sup> Shortly thereafter the European Parliament ratified the commercial and cooperation agreement Romania had negotiated with the EEC in 1990.<sup>23</sup> As part of this package Romania gained access to PHARE (Economic Reconstruction Aid for Poland and Hungary) and Group of 24 financial assistance which, when coupled with Romania's initial 48 million ECU stake in the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, represented Western Europe's commitment to Romania's economic security.<sup>24</sup>

At the regional level Romania's proposals for multilateral arrangements differ from those of Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland. While it supported the dissolution of both the Warsaw Pact and the CMEA<sup>25</sup>, the Romanian government conceded that a security vacuum had been created in the process. Taking a cue from Titulescu's support of Louis Barthou's Eastern Pact (1934), in April, 1991, Foreign Minister Năstase proposed the creation of

an inclusive Central and East European Union, patterned on the model of the West European Union and open to observers from the United States, Western Europe and the Soviet Union. Năstase's aim was clear:

. . . our idea is to set up a forum for political consultation to avoid fragmentation into little subregional groups which would eventually increase competitiveness among the region's countries and further add to the existing tensions, instead of ensuring greater stability. . . . the aim is to set up a forum for political consultations which would not have a military dimension. . . . This formula would only be temporary, until the establishment of a pan-European security system.<sup>26</sup>

Năstase's proposal, as well as a variation directly subordinating a similar commission to CSCE<sup>27</sup>, was aimed at undermining the Visegrad group, which had curtly rejected Romania's bid for inclusion<sup>28</sup>, and the somewhat less objectionable Pentagonele. Romania perceives these groupings as threatening its equal access to the West and thus as potentially negative influences on national security.<sup>29</sup>

Romania itself had led the effort for post-revolutionary Balkan cooperation but had been stymied by its potential partners' inability to settle their long standing disputes; had proposed the idea of a primarily economic Danubian grouping with a reunited Germany and the Soviet Union as the axes; and, had supported the Turkish proposal for a Black Sea economic zone.<sup>30</sup> All of these initiatives, as President Iliescu underscored in his speech to the United General Assembly (October 3, 1990), were subordinated to the CSCE process from which a pan-European

security system should emerge.<sup>31</sup> Each one of these groupings, like Titulescu's Balkan and Little Ententes, would be open to all region's states, provided that each member subscribed to their basic purposes (i.e., economic collaboration and the CSCE security framework), in sharp contrast with the Visegrad and Pentagonale groupings which are patently exclusive. Exclusive groupings tend to increase the security apprehensions of non-members whereas inclusive groupings distribute membership benefits in accordance with mutually reassuring agreements.

Romania's escape from isolation following the image-damaging events of 1990 was not only a function of time but also of circumstance. When Saddam Hussein's forces invaded Kuwait Romania's ambassador to the United Nations, Aurel Dragoş Munteanu, was just assuming his duties as President of the Security Council. For the next month the world watched a Romanian diplomat presiding over the United Nations' most determined enforcement of collective security since the Korean War. The international community's favorable impression of Romania's commitment to the United Nations was also bolstered by Bucharest's potential loss of up to \$3 billion in refining revenues and in defaulted Iraqi loans and by the dispatch of Romanian medical units to the Saudi desert.<sup>32</sup> Echoing Titulescu's willingness to sacrifice Romanian interests at the time of the Abyssinian crisis, President Iliescu promised Romania's continuing commitment to the United Nations Charter, precisely

because a fully functioning global collective security system would be the surest guarantee of Romanian national security.<sup>33</sup> As a result of Romania's regaining of some international respectability and complementing Europe's commitments to Romania's economic reconstruction, loans and credits were granted by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and Japan.<sup>34</sup> Foreign investment in Romania doubled in 1991 and, in October, the United States restored Romania's most favored nation status.<sup>35</sup> These international commitments to Romania's economic security remain fragile as the initial foreign reaction to the September, 1991, miners' rampage in Bucharest demonstrated.<sup>36</sup> Irrespective of Romania's foreign policy, as long as the domestic political environment remains unstable and as long as democratization proceeds at a snail's pace, international and European lenders and investors will remain cautious in their assessments of Romania's creditworthiness, perhaps, thereby, exacerbating the very economic conditions which cause the instability and hinder democratization.

The events of March and June, 1990, had unlocked the international community's embrace of revolutionary Romania and had reimposed the isolation to which Ceaușescu had condemned the country. While the international media remains less than sympathetic to the errors and hardships of democratization<sup>37</sup>, by June, 1991, Romania was again an increasingly active member of the international community. The partial escape from imposed

isolation was the product of a structured approach to external threats to and supports for the Romanian government's national security priorities and was accomplished at bilateral, multilateral and global levels by diplomats of talent. Unfortunately, as Foreign Minister Năstase has repeatedly pointed out, such diplomats are too few in number and the Foreign Ministry is grossly underfunded, some embassies making due with a fraction of their former staffs.<sup>38</sup>

External guarantees of security, however desirable, are not a substitute for domestic capabilities, nor, in a post-revolutionary situation, are external threats usually as dangerous as domestic instability. The sources of Romanian instability are not difficult to detect: a floundering economy, including inflation and unemployment; a disruptive opposition convinced that it has the right to govern with or without an electoral mandate; ethnic minority protests and extreme nationalist reaction; and, a plummeting confidence in political, economic and social institutions.<sup>39</sup>

The proposed national security law identifies the Romanian Intelligence Service (RIS), the Ministry of National Defense, the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Justice as those government agencies with responsibilities for national security.<sup>40</sup> In the absence of domestic stability and in the presence of perceived external threats, these agencies are the primary internal components of Romania's national security system. To be

effective they must be adequately equipped, trained and led and, more importantly, they must be invested with the public's faith in their ability to fulfill their assigned functions.

That faith is compromised by lingering doubts about the military's role in the revolution of December, 1989. General Victor Stănculescu, the former Minister of Defense, maintains that the army never fired upon the people, either in Timișoara or in Bucharest.<sup>41</sup> General Stefan Guse, who was with Stănculescu and General Mihai Chitac (Minister of the Interior at the time of the June, 1990, miners' rampage) in Timișoara from December 17 to 22, is not quite as categorical but maintains that the army presence in Timișoara was justified by solid intelligence on foreign involvement in the unrest.<sup>42</sup> General Iulian Vlad, the chief of State Security at the time of the revolution, identifies the foreign agitators as Hungarians supported by the Soviet Union and the United States.<sup>43</sup> This web of denials and excuses is complicated by the infamous interview granted to Adevărul (August 23, 1990) in which Silviu Brucan and General Nicolae Militaru attempted to expropriate the revolution and give it to a shadowy Military Resistance Committee, allegedly led by Militaru and composed of other generals in forced retirement.<sup>44</sup> Herein lies the army hierarchy's continuing credibility problem. No one denies that major army units, commanded by courageous junior officers, joined the revolutionaries and bore the brunt of the fight against the Ceaușescu loyalists. Still to be determined is

whether the army hierarchy, all of whom, active and retired, owed their positions to Ceaușescu, were the leaders or the followers in the army's actions.

Indeed, General Militaru's inability to persuade the democratic officers of his commitment to the revolution was the cause of his dismissal as Minister of Defense at the end of January, 1990.<sup>45</sup> His replacement was Colonel General Victor Stănculescu who purged the most outspokenly democratic officers, organized as the Action Committee for the Democratization of the Army (CADA). He made no apologies for getting rid of a "handful" of officers "who violated some basic rules of military life."<sup>46</sup> These violations apparently included questioning the democratic credentials of the largely unchanged army hierarchy.

General Stănculescu may also have raised the suspicions of at least part of the NSF leadership. As Minister of Defense he was outspokenly nationalistic:

To let ourselves [be] dragged in[to] total culpability [for the Ceaușescu dictatorship] without discernment means . . . to play the game of those who want to bring the Romanian people to [their] knees in [their] own country so that they may dictate the policy [we] should pursue, a policy intended to serve foreign interests.<sup>47</sup>

He also claimed the military's unique right to define military policy and doctrine.<sup>48</sup> He proclaimed that the army must be above politics in order that it not be used as an instrument of government repression.<sup>49</sup> These insinuations of autonomy for the military appear to contradict the provisions of the two

organizational laws on national defense passed by the Romanian parliament.<sup>50</sup> In March, 1991, a poll revealed that the army was the government institution in which the sample expressed the most confidence.<sup>51</sup> The army's sponsorship of the rehabilitation of Marshal Ion Antonescu, another general who had "saved" a Romania beset by external and internal foes<sup>52</sup>, and the adoption of many of Stănculescu's positions by the neo-Ceaușescist extreme right<sup>53</sup> may have motivated Prime Minister Roman's transfer of Stănculescu to the Ministry of Industry (April 29, 1991) where his reputation was bound to suffer. Indeed, even as the miners again subjected Bucharest to their unwelcome and violent presence in September, 1991, Stănculescu's name was mentioned as a potential prime minister and his participation in what eventually became the government headed by Theodor Stolojan was rumored to have been yet another bone of contention between President Iliescu and outgoing Prime Minister Petre Roman.<sup>54</sup>

Stănculescu's successor as Minister of Defense is Major General Constantin Spiroiu, whose relative youth, 55, and technical background partially distance him from association with Ceaușescu. Almost immediately Spiroiu set about rejuvenating the hierarchy, naming a 48 year-old as Chief of Staff. Spiroiu also promised to release a documented report on the army's involvement in the revolution and quoted King Ferdinand (!) regarding the army's proper role in society. He has echoed Stănculescu's concern about the army's preparedness, advocating a professional

core and conscript ranks, and about the armed forces' equipment, promising to reinvigorate the defense industry.<sup>55</sup> While he concedes the emptiness of "the whole nation's war" doctrine, he has endorsed the concept of a purely defensive war with the participation of territorial units.<sup>56</sup> Perhaps because of his relative youth, Spiroiu claims to have a better rapport with his democratically oriented younger officers to whom, he has stated, he listens respectfully.<sup>57</sup> Most importantly, the new Minister of Defense, whose mandate was renewed in the Stolojan government, rules out the army's intervention in politics, with one caveat:

To my mind, the Army's assuming a role in governing the country is out of the question. We consider that the army should remain politically neutral. But it should be an element of stability, a warrantor of independence, of territorial unity and integrity, of the order of law, when this is beyond the possibilities of the bodies with attributions on this line. In such moments the Army too, has to take action according to the law, to ensure the constitutional order of law and only that.<sup>58</sup>

The NSF now appears to have an unthreatening Minister of Defense who will implement its, not his own, policies. It remains to be seen if the opposition will view him as favorably.

During the first two years of post-revolutionary turmoil the army has been used sparingly and never violently against the Romanian people despite devastating strikes, disrupting demonstrations and the manifest failure of the other forces of order to prevent wholesale corruption and endemic criminality. Two of Stănculescu's pronouncements sum up this risk averse posture toward domestic crises:

. . . the army has not and will never fire on its own people. . . .<sup>59</sup>

. . . the army's duty is to defend the country from outside enemies. Concerning domestic enemies, the task of the powers that be is to organize the Ministry of the Interior so well that it can ensure the quietude and safety of all citizens.<sup>60</sup>

In terms of use of the armed forces against external enemies, both Stănculescu and Spiroiu have decried the Romanian army's technological backwardness, the result of Ceaușescu's policies of self-reliance.<sup>61</sup> Despite promising contacts with Western sources as well as with those of the former Soviet bloc<sup>62</sup>, the military budget of only half a billion dollars does not augur well for foreign supplied technological modernization.<sup>63</sup> Even so, the most probable external adversary, Hungary, is little better off. Thus, it is doubtful that, with the exception of the unthinkable event of a Hungarian invasion, the Romanian armed forces are capable of defending Romanian security from either external or internal threats.

The Ministry of the Interior has two militarized forces, the police (formerly the militia) and the gendarmerie (formerly the uniformed troops of the Ministry). Few institutions under the "ancien regime" were as corrupt as the militia. The common suspicion remains that all policemen are for sale. Former Interior Minister Doru Viorel Ursu conceded that changing the public image of the police, as well as the corrupt behavior of the police themselves, will be a prolonged process.<sup>64</sup> The gendarmes have more direct responsibility for insuring public

order, as opposed to controlling criminal activity.<sup>65</sup> Neither of these forces is respected by the people and, judging by the level of crime and the number of public disruptions, neither is an effective force for achieving domestic security. In partial recognition of this poor perception of the police forces, as well as their own poor self-image, Prime Minister Stolojan recruited Victor Babiuc, a respected jurist and Minister of Justice in Roman's government, to be Minister of the Interior in the aftermath of the police's unusually inept handling of the miners' September, 1991, invasion of Bucharest. Babiuc pledged to start the process of demilitarization of the police and to build its professionalism and confidence.<sup>66</sup>

The most hated and feared component of Ceaușescu's apparatus of oppression was the "Securitate." "Securitate" loyalists were allegedly the perpetrators of most of the violence during the revolution. Immediately after the revolution the "Securitate" passed to the control of the Ministry of Defense which retained its material assets. On April 24, 1990, the Romanian Intelligence Service (RIS) was established, allegedly employing only 6000 of the 15,000 "Securitate" personnel at the time of the revolution.<sup>67</sup> RIS's mission is to identify and track threats to Romania's security at home and abroad.<sup>68</sup> These tasks recall the official missions of Ceaușescu's "Securitate" and generate much concern and distrust. While it is difficult to assess the success of an organization which is inherently publicity shy, the

relative ease with which political opponents of the regime have been rounded up would suggest that the RIS is capable of fulfilling its assigned tasks domestically.

Revelations, such as the continuing profitability of "Securitate" commercial fronts<sup>69</sup> and the decision to seal "Securitate" files for forty years<sup>70</sup> do nothing to quell the public's suspicions that "securiști" are merely biding their time, patiently awaiting the moment to resume their "rightful" place in a neo-authoritarian state. During the September, 1991, crisis conspiracy theories involving RIS (i.e., "Securitate") manipulation of the miners were plentiful.<sup>71</sup> Further, unlike Interior Minister Ursu's and Defense Minister Spiroiu's parliamentary accounts of their forces' activities during the violence, RIS Director Virgil Măgureanu's report was highly politicized and totally "exculpatory."<sup>72</sup> His tone and less than satisfactory explanations were apparently enough to cause outgoing Prime Minister Petre Roman to call for Măgureanu's replacement with an "authentically democratic personality."<sup>73</sup> Still, Măgureanu stayed on and the RIS was given statutory structure and legitimacy in November, 1991. It is widely believed that the RIS director's relationship with President Iliescu and the conservative faction of the NSF is a close one and that these forces used the RIS to rid the government of Roman and the NSF "reformers."

The Romanian government equates national security with the maintenance of an interdependent, inclusive and supportive network of international guarantees of Romania's territorial integrity and political sovereignty and with a stable domestic environment in which the government may pursue gradual economic and political reforms. Romania's economic and political weakness is so great, its legacy of isolation and inept management of its national security assets so burdensome that neither its foreign nor its domestic environments offer encouraging prospects for achieving the government's desired level of security.

At the heart of the matter is the incompatibility of the government's pace, and particularly President Iliescu's vision, of reform and both the international community's and Romanian society's willingness to forswear contradictory political and economic agendas. Additionally, the traditional instrumentalities for compensating for these discrepancies are neither capable of fulfilling their functions nor invested with the requisite public trust to render their maintenance of order legitimate. Only the complete reform of the economic and political systems, perhaps realizable in the full implementation of the Stolojan reform program, in the adoption of a truly democratic constitution, and in genuinely free elections held in early 1992, will produce the domestic stability and the international support required for the achievement of Romanian national security.

## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup>"For states, as much as for individuals, security is an ongoing effort to sense and assess threats, to diminish or limit them if possible, and to always retain capacities equal to or greater than the threats to one's environment. 'Capacities,' in this context, are the raw ingredients of power--human and material resources--that have been fashioned into economic, military, political, or social strengths." Daniel N. Nelson, "Europe's Unstable East," Foreign Policy, 82(Spring, 1991), p. 138.

<sup>2</sup>ROMPRES, April 25, 1991, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, East Europe Daily Report, 26 April 1991, p. 28 [Hereafter cited as FBIS, date, page].

<sup>3</sup>See Walter M. Bacon, Jr., "Romanian Military Policy in the 1980s," in Daniel N. Nelson (ed.), Romania in the 1980s (Boulder: Westview Press, 1981), pp. 202-218.

<sup>4</sup>J. F. Brown, Surge to Freedom: the End of Communist Rule in Eastern Europe (Durham: Duke University Press, 1991), p. 217.

<sup>5</sup>E.g., Vladimir Socor, "The Limits of National Independence in the Soviet Bloc: Rumania's Foreign Policy Reconsidered," Orbis, XX, 3(Fall, 1976), pp. 701-732.

For an overview of Romania's relations with the rest of the Soviet bloc see George Cioranescu, "Romania and Its Allies," in Vlad Georgescu (ed.), Romania: 40 Years (1944-1984) (New York: Praeger, 1985), pp. 40-60.

<sup>6</sup>Legea Nr. 14/1972 din 22 noembrie 1972 privind organizarea apărării naționale a Republicii Socialiste România (București: Buletinul oficial, 1973), passim.

<sup>7</sup>For a good descriptive summary of the policies and consequences see William Crowther, "'Ceaușescuism' and Civil-Military Relations in Romania," Armed Forces and Society, XV, 2(Winter, 1989), pp. 207-225.

<sup>8</sup>Brown, Surge to Freedom, p. 210.

<sup>9</sup>I have relied on Radio Free Europe's weekly Report on Eastern Europe, volumes I and II, for analyses of post-revolutionary Romanian happenings. I have also used Anneli Ute Gabanyi, Die unvollendete Revolution: Rumänien zwischen Diktatur und Demokratie (München: Piper, 1990); Mark Almond, "Romania Since the Revolution," Government and Opposition, XXV, 4(Autumn, 1990), pp. 484-496; Matei Calinescu and Vladimir Tișmaneanu, "The 1989 Revolution and Romania's Future," Problems of Communism, XL,

1-2 (January-April, 1991), pp. 42-59; and, Jean-Yves Potel, "Les lenteurs de la recomposition roumaine," Le Monde Diplomatique, No. 452, novembre 1991, p. 20. For primary materials I relied on the translations in FBIS East Europe Daily Report and on occasional copies of Adevărul, România Liberă, and România Mare.

<sup>10</sup>E.g., Mihai Sturdza, "The Politics of Ambiguity: Romania's Foreign Relations," Report on Eastern Europe, II, 14 (April 5, 1991), pp. 13-20.

<sup>11</sup>See Walter Bacon, Jr., "Nicolae Titulescu and the Limits of Institutionalism," Revue Roumaine d'Études Internationales, XVI, 6 (1982), pp. 473-480. For Năstase's more eulogistic interpretation, see Adrian Năstase, "Le concept de la paix dans les vues de Nicolae Titulescu," Revue Roumaine d'Études Internationales, XVI, 3 (1982), pp. 199-209.

<sup>12</sup>E.g., Azi, March 21, 1991, p. 4, in FBIS, 27 March 1991, p. 35.

<sup>13</sup>See F. Stephen Larrabee, "Long Memories and Short Fuses: Change and Instability in the Balkans," International Security, XV, 3 (Winter, 1990/91), pp. 58-91, especially pp. 81-87.

<sup>14</sup>E.g., Vladimir Socor, "The Romanian-Soviet Friendship Treaty and Its Regional Implications," Report on Eastern Europe, II, 18 (May 3, 1991), pp. 25-33; and for domestic criticism, 22, 12 (March 29, 1991), p. 1, România Liberă, April 2, 1991, p. 4, and Dreptatea, May 3, 1991, p. 1 in FBIS, 8 April 1991, pp. 42-43, Ibid., pp. 43-44, and Ibid., 15 May 1991, pp. 31-32.

<sup>15</sup>Socor, "treaty," p. 31.

<sup>16</sup>ROMPRES, November 19, 1991, in FBIS, 20 November 1991, p. 17 and ROMPRES, October 30, 1991, in FBIS, 31 October 1991, p. 28.

<sup>17</sup>E.g., Le Point, 988 (24 aout 1991), p. 27.

<sup>18</sup>E.g., Foreign Minister Năstase's interview in the Berliner Zeitung, May 17, 1991, p. 8, in FBIS, 23 May 1991, p. 16.

<sup>19</sup>ROMPRES, May 6, 1991, in FBIS 7 May 1991, p. 33 and Nepszabadsag, November 21, 1991, pp. 1 and 3, FBIS, 26 November 1991, pp. 33-4.

<sup>20</sup>Le Figaro, April 20-21, p. 2 and ROMPRES, November 20, 1991, in FBIS, 21 November 1991, p. 20.

<sup>21</sup>ROMPRES, January 23, 1991, in FBIS, 24 January 1991, pp. 49-56.

<sup>22</sup>ROMPRES, February 1, 1991, in FBIS, 4 February 1991, p. 41.

<sup>23</sup>ROMPRES, February 22, 1991, in FBIS, 25 February 1991, p. 49; Sergei Svirin, "Difficult Parting with Dictatorship," New Times, 15(April 16-22, 1991), p. 29.

<sup>24</sup>ROMPRES, April 30, 1991, in FBIS, 1 May 1991, p. 41; ROMPRES, April 11, 1991, in FBIS, 15 April 1991, p. 39.

<sup>25</sup>ROMPRES, January 18, 1991, in FBIS, 23 January 1991, p. 21; ROMPRES, March 7, 1991, in FBIS, 8 March 1991, p. 41.

<sup>26</sup>Azi, May 25, 1991, pp. 1 and 4, in FBIS, 4 June 1991, p. 22.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid, p. 23.

<sup>28</sup>ROMPRES, February 21, 1991, in FBIS, 22 February 1991, p. 35.

<sup>29</sup>Ioan Mircea Pascu, chief foreign affairs advisor to President Iliescu, in an interview with Nepszabadsag, March 21, 1991, p. 3, in FBIS, 28 March 1991, p. 36.

In his assessment of regional security Czech and Slovak Foreign Minister Jiří Dienstbier does not even acknowledge shared security concerns with the region's non-members of either grouping. "Central Europe's Security," Foreign Policy, 83(Summer, 1991), pp. 119-127.

<sup>30</sup>Vasile Sandu, "The New Romania in Europe and the World," International Affairs (Moscow), 1(1991), p. 68; ROMPRES, March 6, 1991, in FBIS, 7 March 1991, p. 31; and, Azi, May 25, 1991, pp. 1 and 4, in FBIS, 4 June 1991, p. 23.

<sup>31</sup>ROMPRES, October 3, 1990, in FBIS, 4 October 1990, pp. 39-42.

<sup>32</sup>Sturdza, "Politics of Ambiguity," p. 14.

<sup>33</sup>ROMPRES, October 3, 1990, in FBIS, 4 October 1990, p. 40.

<sup>34</sup>See Prime Minister Stolojan's accounting of foreign credits and loans in ROMPRES, November 13, 1991, in FBIS, 14 November 1991, pp. 27-8.

<sup>35</sup>ROMPRES, October 24, 1991, in FBIS, 30 October 1991, p. 30 and ROMPRES, October 30, 1991, in FBIS, 31 October 1991, p. 28.

<sup>36</sup>Dan Ionescu, "Riots Topple Petre Roman's Cabinet," Report on Eastern Europe, II, 42(October 18, 1991), p. 21.

<sup>37</sup>Sandu, "New Romania," p. 70. Foreign Minister Năstase admitted that a lot of public relations work was needed and probably wished he could recreate Titulescu's Agence Sud-Est. Azi, May 25, 1991, pp. 1 and 4, in FBIS, 4 June 1991, pp. 23-24.

<sup>38</sup>E.g., Tineretul Liber, October 19-20, 1991, p. 3, in FBIS, 23 October 1991, p. 36.

<sup>39</sup>Not much has changed since Michael Shafir's insightful "Promises and Reality," Report on Eastern Europe, II, 1(January 4, 1991), pp. 32-37.

<sup>40</sup>ROMPRES, April 25, 1991, in FBIS, 26 April 1991, p. 28.

<sup>41</sup>Victor Stănculescu, "Refuzul de a trage în propriu popor: evenimentele din România - decembrie, 1989," Viața Armatei, (December, 1990), pp. 2-5.

<sup>42</sup>Adevărul, February 1, 1991, p. 2.

<sup>43</sup>ROMPRES, February 16, 1991, in FBIS, 20 February 1991, p. 60.

<sup>44</sup>For the translated text see the East European Reporter, IV, 3(Autumn/Winter, 1990), pp. 74-77. For an excellent and critical analysis of the events alleged to have taken place, see Michael Shafir, "Preparing for the Future by Revising the Past," Report on Eastern Europe, I, 41(October 12, 1990), pp. 29-42.

<sup>45</sup>According to President Iliescu in an interview on Radio Bucharest, January 30, 1991, in FBIS, 31 January 1991, p. 42.

<sup>46</sup>România Liberă, April 18, 1991, pp. 1-2.

<sup>47</sup>Libertatea, January 18, 1991, p. 1, in FBIS, 23 January 1991, p. 32.

<sup>48</sup>Tineretul Liber, March 2, 1991, pp. 1-2, in FBIS, 6 March 1991, p. 44; România Liberă, April 18, 1991, p. 1.

<sup>49</sup>ROMPRES, January 7, 1991, in FBIS, 8 January 1991, p. 38.

<sup>50</sup>"Law on [the] Ministry of National Defense," Viitorul, January 19, 1991, p. 3, in FBIS, 1 February 1991, pp. 34-36; "New Law on [the] Supreme Defense Council," Monitorul Oficial, December 13, 1990, pp. 2-3, in FBIS, 15 February 1991, pp. 43-44.

<sup>51</sup>ROMPRES, March 20, 1991, in FBIS, 21 March 1991, p. 27.

<sup>52</sup>Viata Armatei, (October, 1990), pp. 4-6 and 12.

<sup>53</sup>România Mare, May 17, 1991, pp. 1-2, in FBIS, 29 May 1991, p. 31. For "retired" army and security officers' association with the "neo-Ceaușești" România Mare Party, see Michael Shafir, "The Greater Romania Party," Report on Eastern Europe, II, 46 (November 15, 1991), p. 27. Even after the events of September, 1991, the România Mare Party continued to agitate for military participation in a government of order. ROMPRES, October 14, 1991, in FBIS, 16 October, 1991, p. 27.

<sup>54</sup>Liberation, September 30, 1991, pp. 23-4, in FBIS 2 October 1991, p. 26; România Liberă, October 4, 1991, p. 1; and, Dan Ionescu, "The New Government," Report on Eastern Europe, II, 45 (November 8, 1991), p. 32.

<sup>55</sup>Adevărul, May 10, 1991, pp. 1-2, in FBIS, 17 May 1991, pp. 20-2; Tineretul Liber, October 24, 1991, pp. 1 and 3, in FBIS, 8 November 1991, p. 32; and, ROMPRES, October 23, 1991, in FBIS, 24 October 1991, p. 27.

<sup>56</sup>Tineretul Liber, October 23, 1991, pp. 1 and 3, in FBIS, 29 October 1991, pp. 29-30.

<sup>57</sup>Tineretul Liber, October 25, 1991, pp. 1 and 3, in FBIS, 5 November 1991, p. 27.

<sup>58</sup>ROMPRES, October 23, 1991, in FBIS, 24 October 1991, p. 27.

<sup>59</sup>România Liberă, April 18, 1991, p. 2.

<sup>60</sup>Democrația, 4 (February, 1991), pp. 3 and 6, in FBIS, 4 March 1991, p. 32.

<sup>61</sup>Ibid. and Adevărul, May 10, 1991, pp. 1-2, in FBIS, 17 May 1991, p. 21.

<sup>62</sup>ROMPRES, January 22, 1991, in FBIS, 23 January 1991, p. 29; Report on Eastern Europe, II, 3 (January 18, 1991), p. 58; ROMPRES, October 23, 1991, in FBIS, 24 October 1991, p. 27.

<sup>63</sup>ROMPRES, May 2, 1991, in FBIS, 3 May 1991, pp. 32-33.

<sup>64</sup>Tineretul Liber, May 3, 1991, pp. 1 and 3 and May 4-5, 1991, pp. 1-3, in FBIS, 14 May 1991, pp. 31-34.

<sup>65</sup>Dimineata, January 4, 1991, p. 2, in FBIS, 7 February 1991, p. 34.

<sup>66</sup>Tineretul Liber, November 15, 1991, pp. 1 and 3, in FBIS, 26 November 1991, pp. 35-7.

<sup>67</sup>ROMPRES, January 7, 1991, in FBIS, 8 January 1991, p. 39.

<sup>68</sup>Interview with Major General Mihai Stan, First Deputy Director of the RIS in Tineretul Liber, February 8, 1991, pp. 1 and 3, and February 9, 1991, pp. 1-2, in FBIS, 28 February 1991, pp. 31-36.

<sup>69</sup>România Liberă, July 25, 1991, p. 3.

<sup>70</sup>ROMPRES, November 15, 1991, in FBIS, 19 November 1991, p. 28.

<sup>71</sup>E.g., Expres Magazin, 39(October 2-8, 1991), p. 6; România Liberă, October 4, 1991, pp. 1-2; and, most spectacularly, Senator Gelu Voican-Voiculescu's "detective novel" speech to the Senate carried on Radio Bucharest, Program One, September 30, 1991, in FBIS, 2 October 1991, pp. 26-31.

<sup>72</sup>Radio Bucharest, Program One, September 30, 1991, in FBIS, 3 October 1991, pp. 20-3 (Ursu); 2 October 1991, pp. 33-5 (Spiroiu); and, 2 October 1991, pp. 31-3 (Măgureanu).

<sup>73</sup>Cotidianul, October 4, 1991, p. 1. Roman's suggestion was widely echoed in the press. E.g., Acum, 39(October, 1991), p. 11.