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# Shapes of Commitment: Forms of State Support to Nonviolent Mass Resistance

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# Shapes of Commitment:

# Forms of State Support to Nonviolent Mass Resistance

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A Dissertation

Presented to

the Faculty of the Josef Korbel School of International Studies

University of Denver

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In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree

Doctor of Philosophy

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by

Maria A. Lotito

June 2021

Advisor: Erica Chenoweth

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# Abstract


Nonviolent mass movements are an important and increasingly ubiquitous element of interstate politics in the 21st century. Diverse states - democratic, autocratic, rich, and developing – all have supported movements in some form. Explaining the convergence of such state actors on support for usually pro-democratic mass resistance challenges our existing scholarly frameworks. Using a new dataset, I reconcile the differing explanations of foreign assistance to movements that political science would offer with deep descriptive analysis pursued inductively. First, I propose a conceptual foundation for external support, couching an individual state's support as the manifestation of an outcome-oriented foreign policy and offering five different categories of support types. To better compare amongst states supporters globally, though, I offer a way to detect the nature of a state's commitment to a supported movement based on the costs it assumes when providing assistance. In a heuristic case study, I examine the South African Anti-Apartheid movement and find that the most committed states offered diverse forms of support and had engaged domestic constituencies. I extrapolate from the broader South Africa findings to conduct a global analysis of support to movements between 2000-2014, which yields three ideal types of state supporters: willing revisionists, institutional stewards, and grievance legitimizers. The data reveal new dynamics in international politics. Most prominently, I show that in the face of a mass movement, countries most amenable to

a disruption in the status quo tend to limit direct involvement, while offering loud condemnations. Meanwhile, states most interested in the promotion of democracy work with the afflicted government quietly behind the scenes.

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# Chapter 1: Introduction

Protest movements, when sufficiently encompassing, threaten the survival of the regime they target. The early 21st Century has been in part defined by two events of protest movement contagion that have come with surprise and sudden downfalls of sitting governments. The Color Revolutions brought down governments in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan. During the Arab Spring, governments in Tunisia and Egypt fell. These regionally concentrated events have given way to more geographically dispersed episodes of mass protest in 2019-2020 that took place in Lebanon, Iraq, Belarus, Hong Kong, and included the ousting of Sudan's Omar al-Bashir after over 30 years in power.

Protests arise upon the convergence of three necessary conditions: group motivation, mobilization structure(s), and a perceived political opportunity (Davenport 2005, xv). Put differently, they utilize a propitious moment and some resource base to issue a shared claim to the sitting government. This action comprises a direct domestic challenge to the government's political authority. Because of the potency of the rebuke, mass movements usually encounter repression at the hands of the regime (Davenport 2005) that transgresses international human rights norms. The repression will likely include some form of physical violence, censorship, blocking of communication technologies, or civil society restrictions.

If governments would be right to fear protests, the International Relations literature rather depicts their core concern centering upon foreign support to those protests. The repression that so regularly goes with mass protest can bring stark and unhelpful international attention to the government's behavior.  This attention sometimes brings adverse consequences like sanctions that interfere with the regime's ability to put down dissent with any measure they choose. For some regimes, the specter of foreign involvement is existential. Protests are seen by autocratic governments as the gateway to forced democratization (Selth 2008; Wright 2017; Cooley and Nexon 2020). Thus, the uncertain power of a protest made more potent with foreign backing is perceived as a dangerous mix for a government seeking to repress. In seems plausible that a 21st century repressive state might not fear protests as much as it fears the tying of its hands in containing the protest the way it sees fit.

The 2007 Saffron Revolution in Burma exemplifies a familiar chain of events and highlights an important disconnect in the scholarly literature on foreign support to movements. In August, protests in Burma contested the sudden cutting of fuel and gas subsidies by the military government. Despite immediate arrests and beatings of protesters, including by regime sponsored militias, demonstrations continued. On September 5th in Pakokku, army officers fired weapons toward and beat monks that were also protesting the price hikes. This attack against a revered group of individuals spurred widespread outrage that breathed new life into the broader anti-government campaign. After demands from the All Burma Monks Alliance for an apology, reduction in fuel

prices, and release of political prisoners were ignored, the ABMA called for renewed protests on September 17th.

At first, authorities appeared permissive of these demonstrations and even allowed a group of monks to see and pray with Aung San Suu Kyi who was under house arrest at the time (Human Rights Watch 2007). Protests on September 24 in Rangoon were estimated at 150,000 people, including monks and civilians. However, the period of perceived laxity turned into a harsh and expedited crackdown in Rangoon beginning on September 26 that involved beatings, open firing on protesters, driving of vehicles through crowds, and at least 3,000 detentions and 31 deaths (Selth 2008; Human Rights Watch 2007).

The awe of international onlookers witnessing the mass resistance gave way to a shared horror that generated intensified international action. Before the September 26 crackdown, foreign support was mainly limited to US, UK, and EU statements in multilateral settings against repression. In the aftermath the September 26, though, the coalition broadened. Selth (2008) describes optimism surrounding a presidential statement issued by the UN Security Council calling for restraint and dialogue, supported by Russia and China. A rebuke by ASEAN, and China's willingness to support a UN Human Rights Council resolution condemning the violence provided further encouragement. Tangible measures against the regime included travel and financial sanctions by the UK, US, Canada, Australia, and the EU. Japan cancelled millions in aid. This impressive diversity of states willing to take a public stance aligns with Keck and

Sikkink's (1998) finding that the application of bodily harm to vulnerable populations is an issue area that particularly energizes international actors.[1]

Selth also predicted, though, that the international community was too easily wooed by Burma's subsequent offers of reform.

> Despite the announcement of a constitutional referendum, leading to a general election, there is no sign that the regime accepts the validity of the international community's concerns or has been persuaded to change its approach. It shows no inclination to seek a substantive dialogue with the opposition movement, nor does it seem likely to respond any differently should Burma's people once again take to the streets.

He appears to have been right. A constitutional referendum in 2008 promised elections, but the military was reserved enough seats to prevent undesirable constitutional change. The 2010 parliamentary elections were rejected as fraudulent by Western government and boycotted by the opposition. In the 2015 elections, opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi won and assumed power, but subsequent ethnic cleansing of Rohingya Muslims shows the persistence of the regime's brutality. And now, the deposal of Aung San Suu Kyi by military forces in 2021 has brought Burma back almost full circle to 2007. According to Selth, during the Saffron Revolution, international state support was quick to materialize, but also quick to dissipate, leaving behind only the veneer of real reform.

This idea of superficial international support sits awkwardly, though, with the emphasis by Selth and others (Wright 2017) that autocratic regimes deeply fear the role that external support could have in bringing about unwanted democratization. On one hand, Selth writes that aid to civil society in Burma, including to protests, is perceived by

[1] The legal equality of opportunity is the other issue area around which transnational campaigns rally effectively.

the regime as "part of a multi-layered campaign to subvert…the government" and ultimately bring about regime change (Selth 2008, 293). Indeed, it is part of the "soft war" being waged by Western democracies (Wright 2017). On the other hand, scholars that study social movements agree that external assistance might enable the movement along narrow lines but cannot account for movement outcomes (McFaul 2007; Johansen 2011; Chenoweth and Stephan 2021). Zunes and Ibrahim (2009) go further saying "no foreign government or NGO can recruit or mobilize the large numbers of ordinary civilians necessary to build a movement capable of effectively challenging the established political leadership, much less of toppling a government." What is striking then, is how the literature conveys foreign support to protests as both a source of great perceived threat, and as ineffective and uncoordinated gestures that do not bring about real change.

We might be tempted to attribute the disconnect to different disciplinary emphases in IR and CP and carry on. But, repressive regimes are not suffering their fear of foreign involvement in silence. They claim often that protests are the result of sovereignty-violating foreign interference as a way to distract from the legitimacy of the people's grievances. According to a new dataset featured in this dissertation, the Burmese regime, along with 40% of regimes targeted with maximalist nonviolent resistance, claim protesters are puppets of foreign powers or being incited and equipped by them. In one example, the government in Zimbabwe accused the US embassy of "mobilizing and funding disturbances, coordinating violence, and training insurgency" (AP, 28 July 2020). Unrest in Venezuela, Belarus, and Hong Kong has all been derided as foreign

plots. Whether the claims convey sincere concern or not, they risk delegitimizing the movements agitating for civil rights.[2] Usually, the regime claims foreign powers are fueling domestic insurrection to either destabilize the country or oust a sitting government. They are traitors, in other words, that would sacrifice the good of the country for individual political ends (Johansen 2009). Movement participants, in turn, fear and take efforts to avoid the irrevocable "foreign agents" label, which can jeopardize their popular appeal.

The fear of foreign involvement goes beyond sharp words. The intensity of the perceived threat has at least in part motivated global efforts by Russia and China to delegitimize Western democracy and offer up principles for an alternative global order (Cooley and Nexon 2020). At the level of practice, authoritarian governments, striving to prevent unwanted democratization, together are learning ways of restricting the development of civil society (Hall and Ambrosio 2017). Most striking is the degree to which nondemocracies have succeeded at closing domestic civil space (Carothers and Brechenmacher 2014). They are restricting the receipt of foreign funds by civil society groups, forcing foreign NGOs to submit to intrusive registration processes, and cultivating a subverted civil society friendly to the government (Depuy, Ron, and Prakash 2016; Christensen and Weinstein 2013; Robertson 2011; Cooley and Nexon 2020).[3]

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[2] Graeme Robertson (2011, 190) writes that physical coercion against protesters will be more likely when demonstrators can be depicted as foreign agents.

[3] Hall and Ambrosio (2017) note the Arab Spring instigated a period of authoritarian learning, remarkable for its velocity– Saudi Arabia's reforms in the wake of the successful revolution in Tunisia, are case in point.

Russia is a prominent example, but Belarus, China, Zimbabwe, and Eritrea have also taken measures (Johansen 2009, 199).

Work that bridges the chasm between IR's notion of the fearful government and the comparativist's notion of meandering foreign supporters can push back against, or at least help contextualize, the narrative of malingering foreign governments put forward by targeted regimes. To this end, this dissertation shows that for states, the political or pro-democratic goals of the movement, however noble, are usually merely a secondary consideration in the tooling and execution of foreign policy. This is to say that protesters' demands are genuine and not the machinations of Western powers. What preoccupies most foreign supporters is the balancing act between bilateral relations, strategic interests, international system implications, and of course, the national moral compass. Given the unprecedented ubiquity of mass protests today (Chenoweth et al. 2019), the importance of this form of international politics will only grow. External support to protests is not an issue only for Western democracies, but rather an international practice seizing attention from all states.[4] Thus, alongside the onset and broadening of transnational activism (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Tarrow 2005), we have also seen the emergence of varying forms and patterns of state support to nonviolent resistance abroad.

How, then, do states respond to foreign maximalist uprisings? Despite the growing importance of the topic, the field of political science has not yet studied it from a global systematic perspective. Thirty years after the end of the Cold War, we lack

[4] According to Ottaway and Carothers (2012), the end of the Cold War "dramatically reduced the assumption that any politically oriented aid was driven by underlying security concerns."

understanding of the approaches foreign governments take toward mass resistance despite it becoming a more prominent element of international social life than ever before. In particular, no work has yet characterized state support to maximalist campaigns in ways that depict the true diversity in actors and the variation in their behaviors. Related literatures in military intervention, development aid, and support to insurgency, while useful as a baseline, tend to characterize external support narrowly (usually in blunt financial or military terms) and in contexts incompatible with that of the primarily nonviolent mass campaign.

This dissertation aims to fill the void. I use a case study and new global dataset to provide descriptive and heuristic insight into the relationships foreign governments assume toward mass nonviolent resistance. Using a global set of 95 actors supporting 65 different mass movements, this research engages in quantitative theory building, approaching the topic from a view of outcome-oriented foreign policy making, appropriately contextualized. While drawing on the literatures of military intervention, democracy promotion, international norms, and external support to rebellion, I make the case that external support to movements merits focused attention so that we may properly set foundations.

## What has Stood in the Way?

Within political science, the study of social movements has fallen within the broader purview of contentious politics and democratization. Quantitative study of nonviolent resistance and its political ramifications is relatively new. It emerged with a

path breaking study that showed nonviolent resistance surpasses its violent counterpart in efficacy and explained why this is the case (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). This initial pooling of nonviolent and violent resistance made sense given the discipline's anchoring interest in conflict.

Although interest in nonviolent contention is growing, our emphasis on physical coercion has deep roots. Seminal work in the field argued that understanding war better may lead us to help prevent its onset (Waltz 1959), a noble sentiment that has guided the discipline for decades. The aim of ending physical violence surely drives the focus on armed conflict that includes work on terrorism (Byman 2005), great power war (Levy 2015), mass violence (Valentino 2004), and insurgency (Weinstein 2007), among others. [5] Studies that related nonviolent contention to violent rebellion and revolution have succeeded in bringing nonviolent resistance forward in the research agenda.

However, there are good reasons to put aside this pooled approach to look at nonviolent resistance on its own. Ackerman and Merriman (2019) make a compelling case that the use of nonviolence has lifesaving potential, too, and research thus far bears this out (Perkoski and Chenoweth 2018). Then, violent and nonviolent resistance are very

[5] Concern with physical violence encompasses the political science literature overall. This characteristic has the byproduct of missing important behaviors in a global system undergoing measurable change. War is becoming rarer (Goldstein 2012) with less mortality (Gat 2012). Even more broadly, systemic changes are afoot in the modern state system dragging regimes toward the norms of democracy even if such norms are routinely resisted (Bermeo 2016; Mitchell, Gates and Hegre 1999). More to the point for this project, though, contention is becoming nonviolent in nature and state support to nonstate actors appears to be following suit. Salehyan, Gleditsch, Cunningham (2011, 713) noted the shift from interstate war to external support to rebels following WWII. This support to rebels reflected well the ubiquity of civil war and rebellion that characterized the Cold War era. Since then, the collapse of the Cold War has seen an upsurge in nonviolent contention (Tarrow 2011; Della Porta and Tarrow 2005; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, n.d.) providing states new opportunities to intervene in others' affairs via less costly and more internationally legitimate ways.

different. To be sure, the mass movement is a subset of contentious politics that is transgressive and non-institutional like violent contention (Chenoweth and Cunningham 2013). These events create uncertainty, new political alignments, and a "residue of change" shaping future generations (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001, 9). But that is essentially where similarities with violent resistance ends. This dissertation hopes to, at least for now, push aside remnants of research on violent resistance that cloud efforts to achieve sharp understanding of nonviolent resistance. There are three incompatibilities that justify taking up external support to nonviolence explicitly.

First, unlike support to insurgency or violent rebellion, external support to nonviolent resistance is not necessarily adversarial toward a targeted government. Sometimes it is, and sometimes it is not. A key finding elaborated in later chapters is that very rarely do foreign governments materially support nonviolent resistance to the exclusion of also enabling civil society through official channels. In contrast, work on external support to insurgency, some of which incorporates nonviolent resistance, emphasizes the adversarial nature of the supporter and targeted regime, casting foreign supporters as either clearly pro-regime or pro-movement (San-Akca 2016; J. Jackson 2019).

The second incompatibility is the degree to which the outcomes of violent and nonviolent resistance depend on external assistance. The success of violent resistance groups like insurgents hinges on external support that usually furnishes arms and physical sanctuary (Record 2006; Salehyan 2007; Byman et al. 2001). On the other hand, as alluded to above, external support to nonviolent resistance movements is a more delicate

matter. This support tends to be less material in nature (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011), and can be unwelcome by the movement.[6] Dissident campaigns, rightfully wary of being branded as traitors or foreign puppets, dispute public claims of foreign affiliation in the media, and in some cases try to conceal or minimize the receipt of material support from abroad when they do receive it. A movement's success depends not on arms or sanctuary, but on sympathy from the population, domestic elites, and the military (Blair 2013, 89-90; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). Put simply, claims of foreign infiltration jeopardize the movement's wide appeal – a significant positive outcome for the regime.

Finally, the theoretical foundations often used to understand violent resistance do not work well when examining the nonviolent variety. The external support to insurgency literature, in particular, often relies on a principal-agent framework (Byman and Kreps 2010), which does not appropriately capture the dynamics inherent to state-movement relationships.[7] Whereas the political controversy behind armed movements will naturally limit the number of "principals" or supporters it might attract, potential supporters to a nonviolent movement can be numerous, muddying the allegiance a movement can provide to a single sponsor. In other words, mass movements would make quite inefficient agents. Not to mention, protest movements can arise and disperse suddenly,

[6] As an example, see discussion of the controversy surrounding accepting international support among members of the South African United Democratic Front in Seekings (2000, 119).

[7] The usefulness of an armed group as a state agent can coexist with nonviolent resistance. For example, during the anti apartheid struggle, we would be hard pressed to call the UDF the "agent" of any particular state. However, an analyst of the period did refer to the South African regime using the militant Inkatha Freedom Party as an offsetting force to the ANC (Marx 1992, 3072).

allowing less opportunity for strategic relationship building between principal and agent as can be the case between states and armed rebellion, which can last many years.

Theory building around support to nonviolent movements should be based on a clean slate. Prominent explanations of state support to violent resistance cannot be translated to the nonviolent context because they conflict with core realities featured in this dissertation. Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham (2011) find that potential state supporters of insurgency consider the capabilities of the prospect rebel group and preference alignment when deciding to offer support. I find reason, though, to believe that more capable protest would be *less* inclined to want or accept international support, and that states likely view the goals and political orientation of the protests as secondary, if at all (see the US-Venezuela vignette in Chapter 4). Ideational ties between state sponsor and rebel group emerges as a key explanatory variable for state support in San-Akca (2016). This variable, however, only makes more sense when analyzing support to nonstate actors coming from one or two state sponsors – not the international coalitions that sometimes emerge in support of nonviolent resistance. Finally, Daniel Byman's work portrays state support of terrorism as a tool of weak states. The global study below will show that, in contrast, support to protest movements is usually undertaken by states with *more* capabilities than the targeted government.

## Preview of the Argument and Findings

This dissertation places concept development and measurement forefront. Given our state of knowledge on external support to movements, and the difficulty in measuring

aspects of nonviolent resistance (Chenoweth and Cunningham 2013), I also adopt a heuristic approach to initial exploration into empirical patterns. I couch government support to foreign mass resistance as the result of a state acting on an individual policy objective. State supporters act to enable a certain outcome vis a vis the campaign that is compatible with that objective. Framing support as an outcome deriving from a selected policy objective places the debate in more concrete terms than the broader frameworks that usually guide our research such as interests, institutions, or ideas. In my framing, broad policy objectives (i.e., regime change, constructive engagement, or democracy promotion) drive states' decisions to select certain forms of support that might include: legitimating a movement, equipping it to persist, pressuring the regime to reform or negotiate, stabilizing the unrest with protective measures, or enabling civil society through official development aid channels (ODA).

Yet, because of the international legitimacy of using nonviolent resistance to achieve political rights, it is difficult to meaningfully compare state orientations toward movements based on observed behavior alone. Rather, a single foreign policy, like support to campaigns, could further multiple policy objectives that range from the instrumental to the idealistic. States can reap benefits from supporting pro-democracy protests that they cannot reap from arming an insurgency. The ambiguity of foreign support in the protest movement context has poignancy because of the wide acceptance of democratic norms in the extant international order. The dominant frameworks in political science do not provide a clear answer as to whether we should expect states to support movements primarily based on material interests, to generate international

stability, to promote certain institutions, or in defense of human rights. Rather, finding the answer typically falls to the individual researcher to choose a preferred epistemology, and work within those bounds. Thus, this dissertation, takes an inductive approach to state support, considering context and relational variables suggested by the literature as possible drivers. Following the approach put forward by Jackson and Nexon (2013), this supports a fundamental goal of "identifying recurrent patterns of interaction" that might be "*independent* of their cultural and temporal [but not social] context."

This dissertation's theory building case study on South Africa helps to set foundations by showing us the importance of the specter of instability and amenable geopolitical conditions for spurring states to support movements. Additionally, from foreign involvement in the Anti-Apartheid movement, we learn the importance of several variables that account for variation in states' commitment to campaigns: its bilateral relationship with the targeted government, economic ties, domestic support for the movement, and its embeddedness in the global human rights regime.

The global study redeems the usefulness of the five support types I propose in Chapter 2 and demonstrates that states do not support movements in a simple low to high sort of variation in intensity. Rather, less involved supporters provide narrow support of a single type, while more involved (and committed) states offer diversified repertoires that include both active measures and diplomatic moves. I contextualize state involvement in underlying conditions to find three "zones of commitment," each of which encompasses an ideal typical state supporter: a willing revisionist, an institutional steward, and an instrumental grievance legitimizer.

These three ideal types of state supporters vary in demonstrable ways according to underlying organizing principles. Prominent among these are the nature of the support provided, the foreign policy alignment of supporting and targeted state, and the degree to which the supporter is embedded in the global human rights regime. From this map we learn counterintuitively that those who would benefit most from a revision of the status quo are least likely to directly support a movement. Meanwhile, the most dedicated democracy promoters tend to work quietly behind the scenes. We also gain a new understanding for the degree to which the United States stands alone in its willingness to actively support movements in states with which it has a troubled bilateral relationship. Overall, the case study and the global analysis show how rare it is for states to jeopardize their own interests to act on behalf of a movement, and that the actual interests of the movement are rather marginal to state action.

## Introducing the Data

This research benefits from the new global dataset External Support for Nonviolent Campaigns (EX-D) that captures instances of support (material and performative) provided to maximalist campaigns between the years 2000-2014. A maximalist campaign[8] is a bottom-up groundswell of deep opposition to a sitting government, that occurs in a series of "observable, continuous, and purposive mass tactics or events in pursuit of a political objective" (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013). It

[8] In this dissertation maximalist campaign, protest movement, and social movement are used interchangeably.

becomes maximalist as a function of its objectives: overthrowing the existing regime, expelling foreign occupations, or achieving self-determination (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013). EX-D captures protest movements globally from the period of interest, which include the Color Revolutions and the Arab Spring. The South African Anti-Apartheid campaign is the one exception, whose peak years span 1984-1994. In this dissertation, the South Africa data is analyzed separately from the core sample.

EX-D is an extension of the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) dataset 2.1 and draws its subject campaigns from it (Chenoweth and Shay 2017). Contrary to NAVCO's inclusion of both nonviolent and violent campaigns, EX-D documents incidents of support only to campaigns considered primarily nonviolent. My sample of 95 state supporters provided assistance to 65 unique movements, which jointly received a total of 6,005 instances of support during the active campaign years. Of note, EX-D documents instances of foreign support provided to movements from governments, international government organizations (IGO), nongovernmental organizations (NGO), individuals, and others. This project focuses on the support provided by states, but I do use EX-D to create a variable indicating whether state support for a moment co-occurred with domestic nongovernment support.

During data collection, graduate student coders identified instances of support through two different data collection methods. First, they used standardized search terms to pull media records from LexisNexis, and they manually located academic publications, policy papers, and websites, as necessary. A second team of coders directed their efforts toward the AidData.org database. Using a uniform filter, coders reviewed tens of

thousands of instances of bilateral official development assistance (ODA) made available by AidData.org. Where information was available, we coded this support as financial assistance to the lowest possible level of recipient, such as a particular local organization. When no recipient was indicated, we coded the support as going to the host (i.e., targeted) government.

Many of the AidData.org observations in EX-D consist of financial support provided to an eligible government in support of civil society and human rights. According to the OECD, countries eligible to receive ODA are low- and middle-income countries, based on gross national income, as reported by the United Nations and the World Bank (OECD DAC n.d.). These observations mostly include funds provided to some government agency with the aim of enhancing political participation, providing election monitoring support, and cultivating respect of human rights. Although it might be counterintuitive to consider support to a government as support to a movement, we note that movements are reliant on an informed and engaged citizenry. Thus, in the dataset, we code ODA to a sitting government during peak campaign years as "enabling" the movement, given its applicability to mass mobilization potential.[9]

## Study Limitations

[9] Coders also identified support provided during a 5-year pre-campaign phase, and a 5-year post-campaign phase (see also Johansen 2011). For all phases, coders included only support that related to civil society, with one exception. In the post-phase of a campaign that took control of the targeted government (i.e., the Awami League in Bangladesh in 2009), any form of support to the newly seated government was coded. Support for newly seated governments, we argue, comprise a vote of confidence and an indication of support for the new governments' success.

This study has limitations given the nature of observational data. First, the data only include overt instances of external support. Some authors make mention of covert government involvement in protest movements (Zunes 2013; Johansen 2009) and such instances are not included in my data unless they were otherwise publicly reported by the time of data collection. Actually, it makes sense to focus on overt support that is publicly reported since this is most likely to influence public opinion regarding the campaign and influence foreign government behavior.

Second, the study is susceptible to some degree of bias in that I have data only on external support to movements and civil society that was likely accepted. Movements may have many reasons to not want to accept external support. The lack of foreign government support may reflect the wishes of the movement, seeking to avoid characterizations of foreign puppetry, rather than an absence of a willing supporter (Johansen 2009). Zunes and Ibrahim (2009, 96) describe how the Obama administration allocated support to Iranian dissident groups, but they were too fearful to accept it (although some also declined as a matter of principle). Denial or avoidance of U.S. government assistance also occurred during the South Africa Anti-Apartheid struggle (Lyman 2002, 41). Or, in some cases repression may be so strong as to make acceptance impossible. As Encarnacion (2011) writes, civil society may be merely another tool of the regime. Put simply, foreign state support to a movement could reflect more about the current political environment than the foreign policy of the supporting state or the merits of the movement's cause.

Third, a dataset that relies in part on media reports, as EX-D does, also carries caveats. On a general level, media reports suffer from selection bias and veracity concerns (Earl et al. 2004). Empirical analysis has shown that while useful at high levels of aggregation, media reports are more problematic for subnational, fine-grained analyses (Weidmann 2016), which is not conducted here. EX-D attenuates risk posed by coded media reports by consulting several different types of source material. Coders reviewed humanitarian reports, academic work, and ODA project descriptions alongside media reporting by international news wires. Also, EX-D relies on the "good" kind of media reported information: the who, what, where and when, rather than interpretations of local events. Thus, bias does not present a major concern although missing data could be an issue (Earl et al. 2004).

Fourth, I have limited the scope of the study in several ways. This study does not look at third-party support provided to the regime, even though we know this happens and is important (Chyzh and Labzina 2018; Zunes 2013). An additional interesting and important topic, rivaling third-party support (where one state supports a movement and its adversary props up the regime), is relatively rare and not considered here although it is elsewhere (J. A. Jackson, San-Akca, and Maoz 2020). In my sample of 779 supporter-protest dyads, rivaling support took place only 84 times. Finally, maximalist campaigns are themselves rare events compared with the whole universe of social movements that may be recipients of support. The claims offered by this dissertation apply only to support to maximalist movements, and not nonviolent resistance generally.

## Research Design & What's Ahead

The research design applied in this dissertation has an eye toward setting conceptual foundations and empirical bearings regarding support to nonviolent resistance. It is quantitative, but inductive and descriptive, having an orientation that differs from middle-level causal explanations typically more prized within the field of political science (P. T. Jackson and Nexon 2013). I undertake this project to, in Jackson and Nexon's language, map "basic substances and processes that constitute world politics," knowing that the stronger the underlying foundation, the better subsequent explanation is likely to be. Descriptive and heuristic work has made important marks on our knowledge (P. T. Jackson and Nexon 2013; Esping-Andersen 1990; Dahl 1971), and I hope to add to it.

In the next chapter, I outline the basis for undertaking inductive descriptive work. I wrestle with the current state of the literature relevant to external support, which demonstrates three weaknesses that prevent a clear telling of the external support story. First, we might think foreign support takes place to further the supporter's narrow self-interests – but this view shrouds cases where states have prioritized system stability over individual gain. External support also could be a democracy promotion story – but this view cannot easily account for the cases when autocracies support democracy abroad, and when democratic governments decline to do so. Finally, external support might be a sign of international solidarity with a global regime of human rights, but this could be questioned by work indicating that some government engage in performative signaling to reap material gains or distract from their own abuses.

To mediate amongst these weaknesses and uncover a more concrete launching point to study foreign support for nonviolent resistance, Chapter 3 offers a heuristic case study. I examine the South African Anti-Apartheid struggle with focus on the years 1984-1994. This case is the foremost example of a successful maximalist movement and boasts an unmatched supportive international coalition. The case study ventures an explanation of the timeframe and conditions underlying international convergence around the cause to end apartheid. Specifically, it shows that geopolitical conditions, entrenched international normative discourse, and the specter of deep instability were necessary to unite diverse persuasions of national governments around the same objective. These conditions inform the global study in the subsequent chapter.

In Chapter 4 I use a combination of quantitative techniques to map three zones of state commitment to protest movements. The analysis leverages three different methods. First, I use Bayesian Item Response Theory to create a single variable that captures the quality of observed support provided by each state based on five proposed support types. Then, I contextualize this variable by including it in a 2-D multidimensional scaling solution. I analyze the raw solution to first interpret the meaning of each axis. Then, to extract and interpret ideal types, I overlay the MDS map with *k*-means clusters. The clusters outline three zones of ideal typical state supporters, differentiable according to the quality of commitment they have toward the corresponding movement. At the center of each cluster (or "zone") are state-protest dyads most characteristic of that ideal type. I provide one vignette of each ideal type, point to an interesting outlier, and show a borderline case. A final section summarizes the dissertation's key findings, and explains

implications for scholars, policymakers, and activists. I include at the end of the dissertation a methodological appendix that discusses in more detail my reasoning for generating ideal types versus a typology of state supporters. It also explains the quantitative methods in more detail and provides some addition output, tables, and R code.

# Chapter 2: Finding its Place - External Support to Nonviolent Protest and Existing Frameworks in IR and CP

This dissertation asks what sorts of supportive postures do states assume toward protest movements and what brings them about? Despite the importance of mass movements in international politics and their ubiquity in recent years theory and empirics on state support for them remains sparse, crowded out by the field's traditional emphasis on the study of war and other forms of physical violence. The sparseness in existing literature has left the phenomenon of external support weakly situated within international relations theory and of only tangential interest in comparative politics. We lack a concrete conceptual foundation and guiding analytic frameworks – gaps this chapter hopes to fill. More importantly for my purposes, the theoretical orientation and conceptual foundation developed here will affect model specification decisions in later chapters.

One challenge of analyzing external support to movements is its ready accessibility to all states. Some support, like equipping movements and enabling a robust civil society, entails potentially large financial considerations. But other support, like offering public expressions of solidarity, requires hardly any material resources at all. Consider also that a single movement can see support from a diverse range of states: rich,

poor, democratic, authoritarian, and rival or friend to the targeted government. It is this diversity of supporters acting in concert that presents challenges for our existing frameworks. The story of external support cannot clearly be just one of democracy promotion, international norms, or sheer geopolitics. It must have space for all the above.

A strategy for addressing the ambiguity of state support to movements is needed at the outset. Two governments, both supporting a movement with acts of solidarity, may have a similar outward posture. Postures – conscious outward behavioral attitudes[10] - consists of observable behaviors amenable to being classified in a structured way. But, the view of these two governments' approach to the movement changes if we learn that one has a serious rivalry with the targeted regime and the other a warm peace (Goertz, Diehl, and Balas 2016). The support provided by the rival might be intuitive, but the support provided to the movement by the ally becomes more difficult to grasp. Aydin (2012, 35) writes that even with respect to military interventions, state motivations are inherently ambiguous based on observed behavior alone. At most, states that take the same actions can be assumed to have similar preferences as to the outcome:[11]

> …[states intervening as part of a coalition] are at best brought together by the precarious similarity in their preferences, and their motivations are hardly obvious from the specific actions they undertake in the war environment. In these coalitions, complex goals might be at work. Strategic incentives related to reputational issues such as fulfilling commitments to an organization or to a major power ally may affect coalition partners' decisions. Some interventions are simply symbolic, such as smaller power joining NATO efforts…States without any political and economic interest in the war country may be pulled into these coalitions or organizational endeavors to please international and domestic audiences.

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[10] Merriam-Webster Dictionary definition, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/posture?src=search-dict-hed, accessed April 8, 2021.

[11] Alexander Wendt (1999, 232) would take issue with this statement thought, writing that states act based not only on what they want, but what they think is possible to achieve.

Thus, analytically, it is useful to look beyond aligned behaviors and outcome preferences and begin to unearth driving conditions of support. Without such context, we are unable to answer: Is the support a demonstration of a government defending human rights internationally, or is it a manipulation of the normative environment aimed at papering over one's own abuses (see China's criticism of the U.S. during Black Lives Matter protests)? Is support to a protest movement an attempt to oust a sitting government or is it more akin to offering that government bitter medicine that neutral or friendly countries think it needs for stability and development?

At minimum, states supporting dissent in a rival should be differentiated somehow from a friendly state offering true advocacy for the respect of human rights. State supporters also vary in other consequential ways such as the supporters' vulnerability to retaliation by the targeted government, the depth of their economic ties, the strength of its domestic diaspora communities, or other domestic pressure to get involved. Security concerns, economics, and domestic politics all might drive a state's decision to support movements. Donnelly (2013) writes, "human rights are but one of many interests pursued in foreign policy," but I would add that many interests can be furthered by supporting human rights.

The framework proposed here situates support in a defined analytic context. I account for the idea that on one hand tangible support is an output of a particular state's foreign policy, and on the other, we ultimately need a global comparative view, most interestingly achieved if provided from the movement's perspective. Thus, I propose differentiating state support according to the varying qualities of a state's commitment to

the movement. If detected successfully, a state's commitment to a movement can help us compare state supporters on a global level. And, it accommodates a foreign policy lens by defining commitment as the degree of self-servitude involved in a state's support – in other words, we need to ask, at what cost to the supporter is the assistance provided? I find this framework to provide an alternative, more specific way to characterize the basis of state behavior than high-level concepts that most often guide research in political science like interests, institutions, or ideas.

This chapter aims to achieve two things. First, I make explicit the weaknesses in existing orientations that make deductive analysis of external support to nonviolent movements challenging. I organized the literature according to these three weaknesses that demonstrate the regularity with which we see contradictory empirical findings that preclude sharp theoretical expectations of external support. The lack of a clear foundation justifies my inductive approach to my research question and to the EX-D dataset.

Second, in support of that inductive work, which follows in subsequent chapters, I outline a conceptual framework. I propose that state postures toward movements vary according to the observable forms of support provided to a protest movement. A state's posture reflects its underlying policy objective – for example, a state that pressures the government, equips the movement, and is active diplomatically demonstrates an interest in a revision of the status quo. At a minimum we should expect that states provide support to movements in ways that they believe enable concrete outcomes on the ground that are compatible with higher policy objectives. But, only by contextualizing the observed behavior we can draw meaningful comparisons across state actors. A state's

commitment to a movement can be understood as such “contextualized involvement” that enables meaningful global comparisons.

## State Support to Nonviolent Movements: Frameworks and their Limits

Scholars generally rely on three general themes to make sense of why states do what they do: interests, institutions, and ideas. I discuss below how none on their own can convincingly characterize state support to nonviolent movements. They are approaches that operate at an abstract level, reflecting a state’s strategic desiderata, perhaps, but they cannot directly be applied to extract ideal types of state supporters.[12] In other words, even when we know something about a state’s interests, ideas, and institutions we do not, necessarily know much about how particular states are likely to behave toward a particular maximalist movement targeting a particular regime. Rather than three schools of thought, the literature presents us with three unintegrated theoretical orientations, each of which may apply, but we lack the foundations to determine how and when.

*Weakness 1: Narrow state interests might be subordinated to wider concerns with system stability.*

Nation-states are at once self-interested units and vested members of an international community. These two roles are not necessarily in contradiction – agreed upon parameters of membership in the state system allows members efficiencies in

[12] Morse (1970) drew an interesting distinction between transcendental foreign objectives and empirical ones.

pursuing their interests (Hurrell 2007, 39). Indeed, the empirical record shows states coming to support violent and nonviolent contention wearing both hats. On one hand, we could expect states to get involved in other's unrest in ways that further its narrow geopolitical interests and opportunistically jibe at rival governments. On the other hand, we see reason to expect restraint. As Ikenberry (2001) writes, most states observe their obligations and powerful states restrain their power.

Support *for* a movement, seen through the lens of narrow bilateral interest, becomes an act *against* the targeted government much in the spirit of foreign support to insurgency. In their study of state support to rebellion since the end of the Cold War, Byman et al. (2001, 23) found geopolitical and strategic motives to be drivers of external support, and more likely to be responsible than affinity-based motives like ideological, ethnic, or religious ties.[13] One goal, of several, is to destabilize neighbors. The proxy warfare literature echoes the suspicion that external support is a political gambit against the regime: fighting with another state via indirect means is a low-cost/low-risk opportunity to achieve a foreign policy objective (Swami 2004; c.f. Salehyan 2010). If support to nonviolent uprising is analogous in any way to support of violent rebellion - it could be simply a way for a state to notch some gain against an existing rival. Pro-democracy protests, which have been linked to periods of economic crisis (Brancati 2016), should then present opportunity for rivalrous antagonism.

[13] In later work, Byman (2005) argues that governments that choose to support armed nonstate actors might be weak relative to their rival.

The utility of the narrow self-interest frame, however, is restrained by work that brings out states' disinclination toward widespread destabilization. Pearson (1974) finds that states are unlikely to attack or mount a hostile intervention against a state beleaguered by violent uprising. Rather, he found such contexts associated with intervention friendly toward the government. Uzonyi and Rider (2017) show that regime-threatening instability rallies states to give foreign aid to an afflicted government, even in the presence of bilateral rivalry.[14]

The threat of mass instability is almost certainly on states' minds when addressing maximalist nonviolent campaigns. Maximalist campaigns are destabilizing to the afflicted country and to its neighbors (Gleditsch and Rivera 2017). They are powerful enough to end the reign of a sitting government and are relatively effective at doing so (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Shaykhutdinov 2010). And, in the South Africa case study (chapter 3), I show how the onset of unprecedented unrest corresponded with sudden and decisive international support to bring contending parties to the table for negotiations. These efforts were then followed by many years of international engagement that ultimately brought about the nation's first democratic election. The powers instilled in the UN security council and the relatively new architecture of Responsibility to Protect codifies the multilateral means for states to defend the existing system, forcibly if necessary.

Not only are states able to put aside narrow self interest in the security realm, but also in the economic one. Enhancing national prosperity is a central foreign policy

[14] Historical examples of the use of (militarized) intervention to instill stability in foreign lands exist, as well (see discussion in Jentleson and Levite 1992, 13).

objective (Morse 1970; Powell 1993) and should form a central consideration for states settling on policy objectives and postures toward protest movements. Economic interests have assumed even greater importance in the post war period (Joseph 2008). Intuitively, states with less economic entanglements should be emboldened to act against a regime, and states with economic ties would appear more likely to sit out.[15]

But the empirical record from South Africa during the Anti-Apartheid struggle shows some states setting aside economic interest for the broader good, while others only made pretenses to do so. Sweden for example, supported and upheld sanctions despite the costs to its own industry, whereas China undermined them (N. C. Crawford 1999b; Taylor 2000; Sellström 2002). Klotz (1995, 130) highlights newly independent Zimbabwe's role in the Anti-Apartheid movement whose support was at cross purposes with that state's short-term material interests. Zimbabwe's support reflected its objective to establish a regional system of states that shared its values: no minority rule, anti-capitalistic economic orientations, and a commitment to Pan-Africanism.[16] Whether in terms of strategic or material gain, states vary in the degree to which they subordinate their foreign policy to sheer interests.

*Weakness 2: The principle of institutional homophily is not inviolable.*

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[15] Waltz would disagree, of course, finding economic entanglements more likely to lead to conflict.

[16] FRELIMO in Mozambique supported Zimbabwean independence despite economic reliance on the Rhodesian settler government(Ohlson, Stedman, and Davies 1994, 54-56). Kenneth Kaunda's principled stand to abide by U.N.-imposed sanctions against Rhodesia cost Zambia's economy $744 million between 1969 and 1977 (Stedman 56). It was domestic pressure that led Kaunda to reopen trade with Rhodesia in contrast to wishes of other Frontline State allies (Tanzania's Nyerere and Mozambique's Machel)

Perhaps the story of foreign support to mass movements is more akin to one of institutional affinity. This foundational assumption finds prominence in both international relations and comparative politics. Risse and Babayan (2015) sum up the general expectation: "Western democracy promoters are likely to empower liberal groups in the target countries, while countervailing efforts by non-democratic regional powers will empower illiberal groups." Owen (2002) writes that countries involved in imposing certain domestic institutions abroad tend to promote institutions similar to their own. The affinity is logical enough, but empirical evidence shows regime-type homophily is not an iron-clad rule. Even though a generalized preference may exist, foreign policymaking shows important variations according to bilateral relationships. In this respect, the countervailing evidence is two-fold.

First, the literature suggests reasons why nondemocracies might have interest in supporting democracy abroad, which could include supporting protests. Even though the frame of a global struggle between autocracy and democracy remains prominent (Diamond, Plattner, and Walker 2016, 5) and has been amplified in the work on democratic backsliding (Waldner and Lust 2018) and autocratization (Lührmann and Lindberg 2019),[17] some work shows that autocracies benefit from relations with and proximity to democracies. Democracies may be better alliance partners given their higher likelihood of honoring commitments (for an overview of this debate see Gartzke and Gleditsch 2004). They are more politically stable (Jensen 2008). And, living amongst

[17] Saudi Arabia's efforts to forestall democratic reforms in Bahrain would comport better with the literature on autocratization (Roberts 2016, 294).

democracies makes one less vulnerable to experiencing conflict (Skrede Gleditsch and Ruggeri 2010; Enterline 1998). Not to mention, the presence of autocracy promotion (analogous to democracy promotion) remains very much in question (Hall and Ambrosio 2017).

Too, instances of autocratic support for pro-democracy movements are many and not something the framing of institutional affinity easily manages. China's support to the ANC, and the PAC conforms with explanations based on both ideological affinity *and* an interest in international prestige (Williams and Hurst 2018; Taylor 2000). Russia's encouragement of reform and negotiations during the Syrian Uprising in 2011 can be chalked up to concerns with stability of that country. And Iranian support to Egyptian protesters is consistent with antagonization of a rival. Still, autocratic governments in these cases support movements seeking rights that would not be respected within the supporter's territory. If the literature on authoritarian learning and autocratization is taken at face value, we should not see autocratic support for protests at all. We should assume that autocracies fear the feeding of precedent for domestic challenges, even though research challenges the degree to which this assumption is warranted (Saideman 1997).

Second, autocracies are not the only ones that violate the institutional homophily framing. On one hand, democracies have been known to shore up autocratic regimes when it suits their interests. Brownlee (2012) points to U.S. support for autocracy in Egypt. Ash (2011, 385-386) describes US support for martial law in the Philippines. On the other hand, existing work finds that democracy promotion is not necessarily always about promoting the most desirable and just form of government. Youngs (2009) offers a

skeptical account of the European Union's use of democracy promotion, which he sees as being used to bring geopolitically beneficial stability to countries like Belarus, Ukraine, and the Mediterranean and to secure certain resource access (i.e. gas contracts).[18]

The institutional homophily argument is limited by important characteristics of politically salient dyadic relationships. Salience could emerge from many different sources: resource dependence, geostrategic location, or transnational ties of kinship. Burnell (2008) writes that "instruments and approaches employed in promoting democracy are necessarily constitutive of the political relationship that the external actors have with countries and with different political constituencies within those countries" (421). San Acka (2016) writes with respect to support for rebel groups that state support is endogenous to interstate relations. These arguments highlight that bilateral relationships arise *sui generis*, which limits the degree to which we can expect institutional homophily to characterize external support to nonviolent protest.

*Weakness 3: International solidarity with human rights is sullied by disingenuous performance.*

External support to maximalist protest movements occurs in an international context in which the free market is prized and human rights are codified (Buzan 2004). Despite pluralism in modes of government, certain tenants of the liberal democratic order

[18] See also the European Union Directorate-General for External Policies policy paper that claims: "support for nonviolent action for human rights and democracy offers the EU an additional tool to use to establish the long-term conditions for peace and stability" (Dudouet and Clark 2009, 20).

hold universal legitimacy (Lake 2010; Deudney 2007).[19] Given this context, we might be tempted to trivialize foreign support to nonviolent movements. In this framing, states provide support to movements to buoy collectives of people agitating for principles and norms that have already been widely agreed to in international fora. In particular, external support in contexts where the targeted state uses violent repression is consistent with today's normative context focused on civilian protection (Bellamy and Williams 2011). This is especially plausible given evidence that international norms have great causal force of their own (Tannenwald 2007) and in fact, shape state interests (Finnemore 1996). Thus, support for movements might be explained simply as states acting in expected ways given today's international normative architecture.

The power and reach of international human rights norms, however, must be qualified by research that shows the degree to which individual states subvert and exploit them. For instance, existing work shows that selectively complying with or making pretenses to care about norms allows states to avoid negative consequences. Dixon (2017) highlights Bashir al Assad's efforts to engage in norm avoidance by framing "its violence as a type to which international norms against killing civilians did not apply."[20] Indeed, we know that norms-violating regimes sign UN protocols with no intention to

[19] Deudney writes "The second most important fact about the contemporary human situation is the liberal-democratic ascent, the rise to an historically unprecedented preeminence of the 'free world' composed of the United States and its democratic allies." Lake (2009) points to the primacy of the existing order by referring to acts of "symbolic obeisance," including for example, puzzling contribution of troops to US military operations actions.
[20] Dixon defines norm avoidance as: "arguing that a state's motivation or actions, or the outcome of its actions, fall outside the parameters of a given norm, and that the norm has, therefore, not been violated" (86). A similar dynamic is conveyed in Panke and Petersohn (2012).

honor them. Simply giving the appearance of abiding by international norms is seen to "relieve pressure" from international actors responding to abuses (Hafner-Burton 2012).

Promoting a sense of compliance attracts dividends, as well. States might voice support for international norms in order to cheaply accrue reputation in the international community given the absence of centralized enforcement of international conventions (Panke and Petersohn 2012; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Or, as Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990) write, elites experiencing domestic legitimacy crises may embrace "normative" shifts as a strategy to reconsolidate their rule. Lastly, a state performing democratic credentials to an international audience might be one relatively dependent on aid, attempting to capture their "democratic premium" (Hyde 2011). In other words, we have reason to question the sincerity with which states act in the name of norms. Linz (2000, 173) makes this point explicitly, writing that democratic claims of authoritarians should not be taken at face value since these sorts of "commitments largely condition the international response to such regimes and influence their later development, opening certain possibilities and excluding others." International norms, while prominent forces in the global system, can yet be subverted, exploited, and avoided.

The presentation of the Three Weaknesses illustrates the obstacles to crafting a clear story of external support to protest movements if we are vested in a single framework, or way of seeing the world. The primary guiding frameworks of interests, institutions, and ideas are ultimately limited in their applicability by compelling and important qualifications. Thus, the literature offers a limited guiding theoretical foundation for understanding foreign government support to movements, and the

weaknesses in the scholarly record hinder persuasive hypothesizing about its underlying conditions. For this reason, addressing my research question requires an inductive approach built upon a focused conceptual foundation that takes support to nonviolent protests seriously: as important in its own right, and not because of its corollaries to conflict research. In the next section, I define that guiding conceptual orientation, which forms the basis for inductive work in the chapters that follow.

## Extracting State Commitment from the Foreign Policy Process

This section aims to reduce vagueness surrounding foreign government support to protests, thereby establishing foundations necessary for data analysis.[21] To do this I propose a tailored conceptual foundation for foreign support that both enables the organization of the information available in EX-D and provides purchase against the stated research question. Key to this framework is the idea that states in today's system have a finite set of practices they can employ in support of protests (Pouliot 2016) so they may look outwardly similar. It is the conditions underlying those practices that matters for a global comparison amongst state actors – conditions that are both "situational and dispositional" (Goddard 2018).

The crux of meaningful difference between supporting states is the degree of cost they are willing to bear for the sake of the movement – in a word: commitment. States

[21] Giovanni Sartori discussed both conceptual ambiguity and vagueness – ambiguity refers to a weak connection between a concept's meaning and the term selected for it, whereas concept vagueness suggests difficulty in recognizing empirical cases of the concept (Collier and Gerring 2009). This section mostly deals with conceptual vagueness by trying to assign labels to observed behavior in ways that facilitate quantitative analysis.

may engage in the same acts of support, but the conditions they come with and the relational content between supporting and targeted state matters for determining whether support to the movement is earnest assistance in favor of its success or a mere "moral-add on" (Donnelly 2013). In our field, centered upon physical violence, the term resolve is perhaps more familiar (Kertzer 2016), but commitment remains elusive. Framing support to protests as a function of commitment appropriately conveys support in terms relevant to the protest movement and as a concept that can varies more in character than magnitude.[22]

Measuring commitment as an analytic goal is compatible with a view of the state as a corporate actor. Even though the state comprises a complicated bureaucracy that experiences internal disagreement, the movement mostly sees a unified actor, such as "the United States," or "Sweden." States, particularly when executing foreign policy, are thinly rational actors - that is, they are purposeful (Bengtsson and Hertting 2013). Thus, even though their repertoire of support might be limited by accepted practices in the domain of diplomacy (Pouliot 2008; 2016), the purposes and intent fueling their behavior range more vastly. Finally, within the state bureaucracy, although key individuals may lead the connection between movement and state (Mazur 2001), decisions are made in

[22] Bellin (2000) writes: "commitment [in her case of labor and capital to democracy] is always refracted through the prism of interest and can be predicted only on the basis of a clear understanding of this interest and the variables that shape it" (184).

groups (Maoz 1990) where officials together discern strategies, policy objectives, and action plans.[23]

Broad bilateral policy objectives usually precede the emergence of a campaign or movement and the state's response to it. An example of a broad policy objective is the oft-debated regime change policy for example, held by certain western states toward states engaging in human rights abuses or nuclear proliferation like North Korea, Syria, and Iran (Haas 2005, *Foreign Policy)*. The now infamous policy of "constructive engagement" held by the United States government toward apartheid South Africa (prior to the mass movement phase of the 1980s) offers an additional example. Beyond this, states may have governing policies that prioritize the defense of human rights, maintaining the status quo, nonintervention, or appeasement. If a clear policy objective exists, it serves as a grounding orientation shaping a state's response to the onset of mass nonviolent resistance.

Where does a protest movement fit within a state's policy agenda? *When confronted with an international event such as a maximalist campaign, each supporting state chooses actions that enable a certain movement outcome compatible with its broader policy or policies.* Aydin (2012, 72-74) outlines a similar account of the policymaking process in the context of a military intervention – she describes an intervener's cost calculus amongst various policy options as they relate to belligerents in the target country. Ultimate decisions to intervene end up enabling certain outcomes

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[23] Swedberg (2018, 189) summarizes the assumptions that Weber imputed to the ideal typical individual, which are more detailed, but not necessarily in conflict with the assumptions above. For Weber, the typical actor acts in a rational manner; has full knowledge of the situation, is fully aware of what he/she is doing; and makes no mistakes.

compatible with the intervener's interests – such as driving parties to a negotiating table or preventing escalation. Similarly, in the context of support to protest movement, the public statement made to a gaggle of reporters is not the culmination of a policy objective, but rather enabling an outcome with respect to a movement that makes (possibly small) strides toward its achievement.

The idea that from a foreign policy point of view, observed and recorded state action first and foremost enables outcomes compatible with a state's overall policy objective is demonstrated usefully by Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Chester Crocker in a statement to the House Foreign Affairs Committee in 1985. In it, he addresses criticism of the Reagan administration's policy toward South Africa amidst racial discrimination and violent repression of mass action. It is worth reciting at length:

> At this time of protests and other expressions of moral indignation-about apartheid and the killings of blacks in South Africa-we should be able to agree on two things. We are fully justified in expressing our moral indignation. At the same time, moral indignation by itself is not foreign policy. If we are to play a positive, constructive role, it will not do to proclaim simply that we must "do something" about apartheid and then select among proposals according to how good they make us feel. Of course, there is a role for protest politics in any free society, and we respect it. But I do not believe the American people vote for their elected leaders in Congress and the executive branch to shape our foreign policies without regard to the practical results of those policies. Hence, the onus is on all of us to consider carefully the consequences of current and alternative policies. We cannot throw our hands in the air and say, in effect, "We are not interested in the results in South Africa."

In this example, the United States' early response to mass resistance in South Africa reflected its policy objective of "constructive engagement." The U.S. in turn responded to the movement in ways that it thought would enable gradual reforms – not the fundamental change to universal franchise sought by activists and the African National Congress (ANC). Seeing foreign policy as inherently outcome orientated puts external

support in concrete terms rather than theoretical hunches that interests, institutions, or ideas are driving the behavior. Additionally, we can bracket state motive, that is, the force that shapes interests and gives rise to certain policy objectives. [24] With this background we can make better sense of the activities observed and start to categorize them in deliberate and analytically useful ways.

The set of supportive practices states engage in ranges from sending money to offering training, implementing sanctions, and marching in solidarity with protesters. EX-D codes state support as one of 10 possible categories, including all the above and more. I propose grouping such observed support in ways that reasonably correspond to movement outcomes a state would seek to enable through foreign policy channels. This scheme, which benefits from global observations of what states actually do is more comprehensive than other categorization schemes offered in the literature thus far. The most common way to categorize supportive practices puts them in terms of their orientation toward the targeted government. Support in this fashion is either positive (i.e., offering carrots, or encouraging reform) or punitive (applying sticks). Klotz (1995) writes that the positive/punitive categorization was how Margaret Thatcher saw the foreign policy options available to her in responding to the Anti-Apartheid struggle in the 1980s. Donnelly (2013) offers a similarly spirited distinction of diplomacy or sanctions with

[24] Motives might be understood as a driving force with an emotional nature (i.e., fear, diffidence, greed, moral obligation) that orients a state toward adopting particular interests. Interests help a state shape its foreign policy objectives. These objectives then culminate in observable behaviors, practices, and decisions. This association of motivation with an emotional quality is not a generally accepted definition. It does seem consistent with discussions of state motivation found in (Donnelly 2000; Hurd 1999, 381).

regard to supporting human rights internationally – there is a persuasive option, and a coercive one.

Other frameworks classify support from the vantage point of the movement. Jackson (2019) considered support to be either direct (the offering of funds, mediation, or other material support), or indirect (naming and shaming, media outreach and training). Landsberg (2012) distinguishes between physical and enabling support, echoing the sense of degree of contact with the movement. And, Sellström's interview with Gora Ebrahim, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs for the Pan-African Congress, conveys that activists at the time saw support in terms of whether it applied pressure on the South African regime, or supported the movement in continuing its struggle (Sellström 2002).

I expand on the previously proposed classification schemes, offering categories that encompass the full range of supportive practices. This framework integrates the foreign policy considerations of states with their actual effects on the ground. Starting with the 10 raw categories coded in EX-D, I collapse them into five analytical categories of support to movements. Some categories affect the movement directly, some target regime behavior, and some affect the context.[25] The categories are as follows – foreign governments might: bolster the movement, equip activists, enable civil society, pressure the regime, and stabilize the environment. Each are discussed in turn.

[25] I would have liked to have specified a sixth category of "shepherding" the targeted government, which would have separated the "stabilize" category into behaviors directed at the government and behavior directed at the campaign milieu. This coding scheme resulted in two very sparse categories, which jeopardizes statistical analysis.

**Bolstering** a campaign includes making public statements of support, offering physical displays of solidarity, or awarding honors to participants. The Canadian parliament's decision to award Aung San Suu Kyi honorary citizenship in 2008 following the most heated phase of the Saffron Revolution exemplifies this support type.[26] Such forms of support communicate to the movement that its cause is legitimate, and they communicate to the targeted government that the domestic challenge has merit. Tilly, Tarrow, and McAdam (2001, 158) refer to something similar called certification, which results in the "validation of actors, their performances, and their claims by external authorities." Bolstering performs a signaling function with respect to the movement. States that bolster cross the line between the silent observer and those states taking a public stance, however slight.

Governments also **equip** activists through the provisions of material assistance: they might provide equipment, facilities, and training, for example, or the funds to procure such things. States offering material assistance demonstrate a more active interest in the movement's endurance and success. Equipping activists is the most direct form of support a state can provide, and therefore, the most likely to draw ire from the targeted regime. Western support to activists of the 2000 Serbian Bulldozer Revolution exemplifies the fraught nature of equipping activists directly. During that campaign, British diplomats funneled communications equipment to activists via diplomatic pouch; Norway and Hungary sent funds and equipment to activists in diplomatic vehicles

[26] Sadly, this citizenship honor was revoked in 2018 because of Aung San Suu Kyi's lack of action with respect to military atrocities against the Rohingya minority in Myanmar (Neuman 2018).

coming from Budapest (Jennings 2009). This investment in a movement's success is compatible with a state tolerant of disruption to the status quo in the movement state.

Then, states offer support with the intention of altering the behavior of the targeted government. In this vein, states might apply **pressure**. This form of support comprises sanctions, public condemnations, and calls to third party organizations like the United Nations to act or engage in investigations. In EX-D, we use the broad definition of sanctions not restricted to the economic variety. Crawford (1999b, 5) defines sanctions in this sense, writing that sanctions are a "denial of customary interactions (strategic, economic, or social)." During the Saffron Revolution, the United States took such action, imposing visa restrictions on officials and financial sanctions in response to the violent crackdown on protesters (Marciel 2007). The pressuring of a targeted regime communicates a sense of urgency on the part of the supporter – usually provided with the aim of halting human rights abuses. A state applying pressure, therefore, may not have particular interest in the movement's achievement of its political goals, but rather an interest in creating space for the exercise of political rights, generally.

State support to protest movements could also favor reform, but be rooted in an inherently pro-status quo orientation, aiming to work with rather than against the targeted government. In this vein, a state might offer **enabling** support, which comprises the provision of official development assistance (ODA). This form of support is provided through official channels often to government organizations in the targeted state. During the Syrian Uprising, for example, the United Kingdom had five different ODA commitments to the Syrian government, all provided with the purpose of cultivating

democratic participation and civil society. We consider it as support to the movement because it is directed toward the cultivation of civil society, a resource without which mass resistance campaigns could not take place.[27] In EX-D, enabling support originates primarily from OECD countries that have sent money to the targeted state in support of the defense of human rights, election training, and cultivation of political participation.

Finally, states engage in supportive behaviors that **stabilize** the unrest. Stabilizing behaviors might include facilitating negotiations, recognizing the regime for positive reform, monitoring elections, sheltering the politically persecuted, and reporting on human rights abuses.[28] In 2011, the Iraqi government engaged in such support by trying to persuade the Syrian government to allow an Arab League observer mission in the wake of violence against protesters (AFP 2011). A multilateral example of what stabilizing might look like can be found in the United Nations' Commission on the Racial Situation in the Union of South Africa, which executed a fact-finding mission that lasted three years. The commission held a unique view of South Africa at the time. They advocated a

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[27] Carothers and Ottaway open their book by discussing how bilateral civil society aid was scarcely heard about in early 1990s, but by 2000 was a common feature. The authors point out that civil society support (rather than political group support) has been argued to be a way of supporting democracy without becoming too political "otherwise interfering unduly in the domestic politics of another country" (11). See also their definition of a civil society group as one that seeks interaction with the state to advocate citizen interests and oppose nondemocratic behavior while not competing for political office (11).

[28] Expressing support for reforming regimes has a direct role in stabilizing conditions on the ground. U.S. Ambassador to South Africa Princeton Lyman describes this, specifically "Repeatedly during this period [the early 1990s], there was criticism of the reward and recognition that went to de Klerk, whether in the award of the Liberty Medal in Philadelphia, discussed below, or of the Nobel Prize. These were important steps, however. At a deeper level there had to be recognition of the tremendous pressures under which de Klerk was operating, the dangers from his right wing and, potentially, from the security forces. Our policies would have been foolhardy and self-defeating had we advocated measures that would have undermined de Klerk's authority or political capacity to complete the negotiations" (79).

“fraternal” approach to South Africa in that it wanted to provide assistance through a difficult period, rather than further isolate the regime (Stultz 1991).

*Table 1 Categories of Support and Their Corresponding Supportive Activities*

| **Enable Political Reform** | **Stabilize the Environment** | **Pressure the Targeted Government** | **Bolster the Movement** | **Equip the Activists** |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Offer Official Development Assistance, targeted toward cultivating civil society or administering free/fair elections<br><br>Example: UK ODA to civil society in Syria during the 2011 uprising. | To the government or interim government offer moral, technical, or training support. Also includes acts of civilian protection and safe passage for defectors.<br><br>Example: Iraqi governments persuasion of Syrian government to accept an Arab League observer mission in 2011. | Sanctioning the targeted government, halting military aid, issuing public critiques of government activity. Includes pressuring third party actors to act against the targeted government.<br><br>Example: U.S. issuing financial and travel sanctions on Burmese officials during the Saffron revolution. | Offer moral or symbolic support, nonviolent civilian protection.<br><br>Example: Canadian government's awarding of honorary citizenship to Aung San Suu Kyi in the wake of the 2011 Saffron Revolution. | Offer financial, technical, or training support to any type of movement participant that is not an active government official.<br><br>Example: Norwegian government's covert provision of funds and equipment to Serbian activists during the 2000 Bulldozer revolution. |

The above five categories of support are crafted to put state behavior in terms that plausibly correspond to the policy objectives they might further vis a via a protest movement. As will be described in more detail in Chapter 4, states in my sample ultimately provided one or all forms of support to movements. The types of support provided comprises a sort of profile, which I refer to as a supportive repertoire. Taken on their own, these supportive repertoires raise many questions as to their underlying meaning. For example, what does it mean that both a rival and friendly state equip a

protest movement – should we believe that those states can be grouped together as the same "type" of supporter?

Consider that during the Anti-Apartheid struggle, Zambia equipped and bolstered the movement, while pressuring the government through international fora like the United Nations. It did so despite economic interdependence with South Africa. Zambia imported food from South Africa and exported half of its copper (its primary export) using South African rail and port infrastructure (Thompson 2001, 215). It is not sensible to group Zambia with the United States who experienced none of the same costs, despite providing similar forms of support in later years. [29]

As subsequent sections will show, we need to introduce more information into the analysis not only to understand the meaning of support provided, but also to engage in global comparison. With this chapter I hope to have justified the use of an inductive analytic approach, and to have laid the conceptual foundations for this approach, which will culminate in measuring state commitment to protest movements. Measuring state commitment requires empirical work that will illuminate the relevant conditions and relational content that can distinguish states supporters – even those that offer similar supportive repertoires.

The promise of using behavior and conditions to categorize can help to resolve the overdetermination of the phenomenon and partition states according to their unobservable, if detectable, commitment to a movement. The next chapter comprises the

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[29] Zambian support to the ANC despite threats of South African raids are case in point (Field 2007). According to trade union members, Sweden supported sanctions despite Swedish companies in South Africa suffering, and they did not try to maneuver around them like other countries [Gomomo Interview] (Sellström 2002, 129).

first step toward measuring commitment. I present a heuristic case study on the South African Anti-Apartheid movement as a plausibility check on the core concepts introduced here, and to provide preliminary validation of commitment as a useful differentiating concept.

# Chapter 3: Commitment and Convergence during the South African Anti-Apartheid Struggle

In South Africa between the 1940s and 1991 the government instituted and operated a system of racial classification that allotted core civil rights according to one's ascribed race. The insistence of the South African government on maintaining its system of institutionalized racism known as *apartheid* stood in stark contrast to the concurrent global shift toward norms of universal racial equality and political participation (Reus-Smit 2008). In addition to laws restricting interracial marriage and the right to be educated in the language of one's choice, nonwhites could not vote, organize, or enjoy freedom of movement through their own country (Sisk 1995). The South African government attempted to disown Black Africans, in particular, through the establishment of Homelands - an effort to deny the citizenship of nonwhite population while preserving the means extract their labor, which it veiled with euphemisms like "separate development" (Thompson 2001).

Apartheid and the anger it provoked resulted in "cycles of revolution and repression" (Sisk 1995) over four decades that galvanized a mighty international coalition along the way. States were but one form of participant alongside international NGOs, the United Nations, universities, grassroots activists, and corporations. Early support in the

fight against racial discrimination began in the late 1940s with India, and soon encompassed  communist countries, former African colonies, and "radically neutral" Sweden (Field 2007). Over the decades of the mass struggle, however, many more states joined the effort or at least spoke out. The South African Anti-Apartheid Movement stands out in the EX-D dataset for being supported by the highest number of foreign governments. During the peak years of the mass movement phase (1980-1994), 70 national governments showed up to challenge apartheid in some form – which was more than double the number supporting any other campaign in EX-D.[30]

The evolution of the global norm of racial equality and its role in the demise of apartheid has been richly discussed elsewhere (Klotz 1995; Sisk 2013). This chapter offers a different look at South Africa that expands the analytic focus from the importance of global norms to include several other conditions that led so many national governments to a shared policy objective of ending apartheid. Below, I draw out three conditions that formed the basis for the international convergence seen at the peak of the struggle: new levels of domestic mobilization and internal chaos not yet seen in South Africa; the easing of Cold War related geopolitical tensions; and the persistence of a deeply entrenched international discourse on racial equality.

According to data in EX-D, foreign government involvement in the Anti-Apartheid struggle peaked during the 3-year period of 1986-1988. This period coincides with the fallout of the "ungovernability campaign" called by the ANC in 1984 and township revolts in 1995, which generated new levels of mass mobilization and outright

[30] The second-most supported campaign was the Syrian Uprising of 2011.

chaos. The unrest triggered a brutal nationwide state of emergency that was broadcast internationally, horrifying onlooking governments and their constituents. Importantly, the unrest was preceded by breakthroughs in Cold War tensions and concurrent with the economic decline of the Soviet Union, which led that state to formally end military support to national liberation movements, including the ANC.

Still, a global reaction sympathetic to the movement was not inevitable. This consensus among so many governments followed years of work by South African organizations, transnational advocacy networks, international corporations, and intergovernmental organizations. It was the depth of Anti-Apartheid discourse, cultivated over decades, that allowed initially reticent nations to be folded into the cause when political conditions allowed. As John Ruggie (1998) wrote, ideas (such as racial equality) can be *reasons that certain causes have certain effects*. The entrenchment of racial equality in international discourse explains why the international developments in the 1980s gave way to the end of apartheid versus the alternative outcome of galvanizing governments to help the regime.[31] The ultimate consensus on the abhorrence of apartheid was so strong as to eventually unify the positions of the West and the nations of the Soviet bloc.

The purpose of this chapter is two-fold. First, I use the abundant documentation on the Anti-Apartheid case to study its history and extract the conditions that led to international convergence in 1986-1988. Later, I will extrapolate from these conditions to

[31] He describes – in a Weberian sense – how "ideational factors" help explain why international events are *so* and not *otherwise* (Ruggie 1998).

inform the global study in chapter 4. Second, I use the wide familiarity with the mass resistance phase of the Anti-Apartheid movement in South Africa to explore whether my specified types of support (described in chapter 2) and identified conditions can be used to group country supporters in expected ways. Particularly, I am interested to see if my support indicators and conditions reasonably cluster supporters according to their quality of commitment to the movement.

The next section offers historical context with an emphasis on mass action and subsequent bilateral foreign responses. After this, I explain in more detail that international convergence occurred against a backdrop of deep instability in South Africa, facilitated by a favorable geopolitical environment, and guided by a well-developed normative context.

Then, I present a quantitative analysis that uses multidimensional scaling (MDS) to map contextualized involvement – or commitment – of the various state supporters during the years 1986-1988. I provide evidence that my analytic approach can generate clusters of states according to their commitment to the movement. The variables that organize supporting states in the MDS solution serve as organizing principles that plot state supporters relative to each other. In the South Africa case, states mostly are distinguished according to the types of assistance provided, the nature of their bilateral relationship with the South African government, and their embeddedness in the global human rights regime. This analysis shows some indication that states cluster according to their trade relationship with South Africa.

## The Anti-Apartheid Struggle: Pre-War II Period

South Africa has deep roots in nonviolent struggle and a long history of prominent foreign influencers. Mohandas Gandhi pioneered the notion of passive resistance during his time in South Africa between 1893 and 1914, lobbying for the rights of Indians brought as indentured servants (Thompson 2001, 113, 171). His Natal Indian Congress lived on as one of three groups forming the South African Indian Congress established in 1919.

In that early period, resistance to pervasive discrimination was organized along racial lines. The African National Congress was formed in 1912 by American and British-educated black lawyers who until the First Defiance campaign in the 1950s strove for political equality within the existing political structures. The African Political Organization, an organization for "Coloured" people, emerged in 1902. More prominent was the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union, founded by Clements Kadalie, an immigrant from present day Malawi, who drew inspiration from the American Marcus Garvey and Marxism. His trade union for "Coloured" dockworkers grew to national stature. It broadened to incorporate high levels of Black membership and inspired early instances of defiance across South Africa. By the 1930s, though, mainstream resistance organizations had peaked in their efficacy, plagued by internal disagreements, a lack of overarching strategy, and inability to achieve large-scale mobilization (SAHO n.d.). They became "defunct" (Thompson 2001, 176) paving the way for a new phase of struggle.

The 1913 Natives Land Act outlawed Blacks from owning or leasing land outside of designated reserves. The reserves constituted less than 10% of South African territory,

though, despite the Black population considerably outnumbering Whites. The confinement of Blacks to the reserves, (except for working on White farms, in White households, or in the mines) meant severe overcrowding, abysmal educational systems, and an inability to meet basic needs for sustenance. Over time, great numbers of Blacks migrated into the towns to settle in shanty towns and seek work, despite restrictive "influx controls" put in place by the 1923 Native Urban Areas Act (Thompson 2001, 178).[32] Mass migration was accelerated by the draw of growing manufacturing centers, fueled by the WWII economy. As the number of black urban poor grew, some made efforts to organize. In 1943, for example, 20,000 people protested an increase in bus fares with a 10-day boycott, which required them to start their day at 3am to walk to work.[33]

Important resistance by Black mineworkers took place during the WWII era. In 1941, the Transvaal Province ANC committee called a miners' conference that resulted in the formation of the African Mineworkers Union (AMU). After several years of attempts to negotiate wage raises and improvement in working conditions, the AMU waged a now infamous 4-day strike in August 1946 amongst gold miners on the Witwatersrand – the gold mining capital outside Johannesburg. In this act, 74,000 workers refused to work –affecting eight different mines. The government used massive

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[32] The year 1936 was also an important year legislatively. At that time, the South African government passed the Native Trust and Land Act and the Representation of Natives Act. These laws increased the percentage of land allocated as "reserves" (the areas preserved for exclusive black ownership) but also eliminated parliamentary voting rights for Blacks in the Cape who retained them. From that point Blacks were permitted to elect only three Whites to parliament in an assembly of 150 seats and otherwise were represented by a Natives Representative Council, who only had advisory authority (SAHO n.d.).

[33] Thompson (2001, 209) describes this and a similar boycott in 1957 around Johannesburg/Pretoria where boycotters walked up to 20 miles per day.

force to end the strike "[driving] men underground at bayonet point" (Thompson 2001) among other atrocities. The killings, arrests, and assaults that characterized the government reaction provided a glimpse of how it would react to the mass resistance to come.

Soviet communism emerged as a formative foreign influence in this period. The ANC made direct contact as early as the 1920s, when ANC president Josiah Tshangana Gumede traveled to the USSR alongside South Africa Communist Party (SACP) official James LaGuma (Kempton 1989; Sivograkov 1999). Kempton (1989) reminds us that the treatment of South African Blacks was a topic of debate at the Fourth Congress of the Communist International of 1922. The SACP, founded by Whites in 1921, elevated the racial cause in South Africa above the class struggle as directed by Moscow in 1928 (Thompson 2001, 177). The close alliance and overlapping membership of the ANC and SACP would be used many decades later by anti-communist Western powers as justification to delay meaningful support to the movement.

## Post-war Period (1948 – 1984)

Although a discriminatory legal framework preceded the formal institution of apartheid in the late 1940s, in the post-war period the laws of exclusion and segregation were expanded to govern personal life choices and completely bar nonwhites from meaningful civic participation. When the Afrikaner National Party came to power in 1948, it instituted apartheid with a series of laws beginning with the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act in 1949. Then, in 1950 came the Immorality Amendment Act, the

Suppression of Communism Act, the Group Areas Act, and the Population Registration Act.[34] The formalization of Apartheid led the ANC to give up the idea of achieving equality through a "constitutional struggle." It turned at that point to passive resistance (Mandela 1987, 220).

This new phase of the Anti-Apartheid struggle began with the First Defiance Campaign, launched by a coalition of activist groups across racial lines in 1952. [35] In April, the ANC and South African Indian Congress held rallies, and activists entered European-only sections of train stations and post offices to protest segregation. In all, over 8,000 people were arrested. The 1952 protests were extinguished within the year: new laws passed in December such as the Public Safety Act and the Criminal Laws Amendment Act deterred further activity, and the ANC called off the campaign. The First Defiance Campaign and its quashing inspired a Congress of the People which adopted a Freedom Charter in 1955 that called for a non-racial democracy in South Africa. That document guided the work of the ANC and would ultimately be taken up by the United Democratic Front (UDF) in the 1980s. The South African government responded to the 1955 adoption of the Freedom Charter by arresting 156 people considered leaders of the

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[34] Other laws followed such as the Batu Authorities Act (1951) and the Bantu Education Act and Public Safety Act (1953).

[35] Women's groups also got involved. The Duran and District Women's League was formed in 1952, which played a role in organizing marches during the First Defiance Campaign (Meer 1987, 240). The League organized marches in Pretoria in 1956, and in support of "those detained in Durban" in 1960. It was banned that year.

Charter's passage and trying them for treason. A South African court ultimately acquitted all the accused.[36]

Pass laws had been a means for Whites to control the movements of slaves and mine laborers long before the infamous Sharpeville protests of 1960. After the founding of the Union of South Africa in 1910, Blacks were required to carry passes to justify their presence in White urban areas. This served to subject Blacks to harassment over inspection of the passes. Pass requirements separated those with rights to be in urban areas to work from their families who did not have such permission. Enforcement of pass laws waned during the WWII because of the great need for Black labor in urban areas. But pass law requirements became more specific and demanding in the early 1950s. Blacks needed to carry a more comprehensive set of identification documents and could remain in White areas for no more than 72 hours without special permission, or be arrested (McLachlan 1987).

Pass laws were the source of deep and acute anger, which translated into mass action in 1960. Answering a call issued by the Pan African Congress (PAC), on March 21, about 5,000 people protesting pass laws marched to the Sharpeville township government office. South African forces fired into the crowd, killing 67 black youth and wounding 186 (Thompson 2001, 210). This initial protest was followed by acts of resistance: marches, work stoppages, general strikes, and a culmination of a 30,000-strong march in Cape Town (Stultz 1991; Thompson 2001).

[36] Despite the government's attempts to frighten activists with the threat of treason, resistance continued: in 1956 the Federation of South African Women protested the application of pass laws to women and 1959 saw protests by the National Union of South African Students (Thompson 2001, 209).

At the international level, horror at the violent suppression of Sharpeville sparked definitive bilateral and grassroots responses. The British House of Commons passed a disapproving resolution on April 8, 1960 (Stultz 1991, fn 22). The US State Department blamed the South African government for the deaths and casualties (Gerhart 1987, 215). The Jamaican and Nigerian government boycotted South Africa alongside trade unions in Ghana, Tanganyika, Rhodesia, Malaya, Cyprus, Norway, and West Germany (Houser 1982, 16). The receipt of the Nobel prize by ANC president Albert Luthuli after Sharpeville demonstrated sympathetic Scandinavian attitudes. Solidarity marches broke out in Sweden, Australia, India, England, and Kenya (Field 2007).

Over the 1960s multilateral action deepened, continuing the discourse on racial equality in South Africa that began with Indian government efforts at the UN in the late 1940s. Multilateral action was forefront in the international response, persisting even as foreign attention waned with the banning of the ANC, PAC, and SACP in the wake of Sharpeville (Marx 1992).[37] From the perspective of international support, whereas the 1950s could be considered merely "hortatory" in terms of activity at the United Nations (Lyman 2002, 24), the 1960 Sharpeville massacre comprised a turning point. Action at the United Nations intensified including a voluntary Security Council arms embargo and the creation of the Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa, among other actions (see Figure 2 below).

[37] Although, the United States and Britain enacted arms embargos on South Africa in 1964 (N. Crawford and Klotz 1999, appendix).

International sports diplomacy began in earnest in the 1960s, which would deeply pain the proud sports-loving country. Not only was South Africa excluded from the 1964 Tokyo Olympic games by the International Olympic Committee, but also its athletes were not permitted to compete in the Commonwealth Games of 1961. Also in 1961, South Africa was suspended by the Federation of International Football Association (FIFA). In its boycott of sports exchanges with South Africa, the International Olympic Committee forced subordinate sporting associations to follow suit, or also be excluded from the Olympics (Kidd 1988). Faced with a widening boycott of the 1968 Olympic games by many states, the IOC again excluded South Africa, and in 1970 expelled it.

In the 1970s, with the political opposition underground or in exile, labor movements assumed the mantle of resistance. A 1973 workers strike in Durban involved 100,000 people. The wave of strikes that followed led to the government's reluctant legalization of trade unions in 1979, acknowledging their immutable political force. At the time 27 illegal unions already existed (Thompson 212, 224).[38] The decade also saw a revival of civil society (Ottaway 2012, 87) as education expanded and Africans began to enjoy some upward mobility. In this environment civil organizations led by educated youth mobilized over rent increases, poor infrastructure, and more overtly political issues like democratic rights (Seekings 2000, 13). [39] The 1970s saw the birth of the Stephen

[38] African trade union membership reached 1 million by 1986 between COSATU and the Black Consciousness oriented Council of Unions of South Africa-Azanian Confederation of Trade Unions.

[39] According to Ottaway, the revival owed not to the ANC but rather to grassroots organizations including civil society organizations, newly legalized trade unions, and black consciousness groups.

Biko's Black Consciousness movement, and the silent protests by women of the Black Sash (Thompson 2001, 205).

In 1973, Guinea, Nigeria, and the USSR put the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid forward to the UN General Assembly, which was ratified by 1976. But it was the Soweto Uprising of 1976 that turned the international tide even stronger against the government. On June 16, students in Soweto township inspired by the Black Consciousness movement held a mass rally to protest the law that mandated they be educated in Afrikaans language (Brooks and Bruckhill 1987; Seidman 1987). The demonstration culminated in two days of acute rioting, followed by months of strikes, boycotts, rallies (in the form of funerals to sidestep laws against political gatherings), and some cases of arson (Brooks and Bruckhill 1987, 234). Government repression resulted in 575 deaths over the course of 8 months, and a new fearlessness among black youth (Karis 1987). According to Waldmeir (1997), the violent force used against protesters pushed 14,000 young people out of the country to seek guerilla training.

The 1970s also saw an uptick in international economic pressure, highlighted by the adoption in 1977 of the American Sullivan Principles and the European Community's Code of Conduct. These principles required workplace racial equality in American and European companies operating in South Africa in terms of pay, facilities, training, and upward mobility. As the ANC and PAC advocated internationally for "an end to economic ties" with South Africa (Houser 1982, 24), these principles were meant to pre-empt the implementation of more drastic measures like economic sanctions. Most states

supported the voluntary nature of the codes, but the Netherlands, Ireland, and Denmark wanted to make them mandatory (Klotz 1995).

Waldmeir (1997, 22) writes that Soweto "gave South Africa a worldwide reputation for repression." The violence outraged international activists and NGOs who called for boycotts of South African goods and inspired further actions at the UN. Anger deepened with the government's killing of Black Consciousness leader Steven Biko in 1977. In November of that year, the UN Security Council escalated pressure by enacting a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa (Stultz 1991).[40] The U.S. assent to the embargo signaled the Carter administration's approval of stronger opposition to apartheid. In 1976, West German Chancellor Schmidt took advantage of a routine courtesy call with South African Prime Minister Vorster in Bonn to openly criticize Apartheid (Houser 1982; Kamm 1976). Select U.S. state and city governments forbade the use of public funds in loans or investments in South Africa, a gesture that would become more widespread with time. And, the Dutch parliament abrogated a cultural treaty with South Africa in 1981, having already frozen cultural relations in the late 1970s (AP 1981).

## Mass Action Phase (1984 – 1994)

[40] According to Houser (1982, 30) the United States actively enforced this embargo by, for example, holding the Sabre Research Corporation (SRC) accountable for shipments of shells and gun barrels to South Africa through Antigua. It reported the legal case to the United Nations, which resulted in jailtime for 6 SRC associates.

Sensing an urgency to offer a semblance of reform, in 1983, the South African government proposed a new constitution that awarded separate parliamentary chambers to Whites, "Coloureds," and Indians. The proposal excluded Blacks, which comprised 72% of the population at the time (Lyman 2002, 33). The reform was taken by the resistance, rightly, as evidence that the regime maintained no intention of instituting universal franchise. The prospect of folding Indians and "Coloureds" into the government while excluding Blacks motivated a call for a united front of resistance. The resulting United Democratic Front (UDF) rallied a coalition of around 600 grassroots organizations from all races, although its adherence to the 1955 Freedom Charter alienated certain Africanist groups (Seekings 2000). Internationally, the United Democratic Front epitomized "the grassroots struggle of black South Africans" (Landsberg 2012). Its membership would grow to over one million people. Early UDF activity included a lackluster Million Signatures Campaign, but a largely successful vote boycott of the tricameral constitution. Both efforts contributed to launching the UDF to national prominence.[41] Meanwhile, affiliated organizations continued local level resistance in the form of rent strikes and marches in the townships.

Ultimately, parliament approved the tricameral constitution, which occurred in a context of intensified enforcement of the pass laws and urban influx controls (Danaher 1987, 249). The seating of the new parliament coincided with a period between 1984 and

[41] In May 1984, on behalf of the UDF Cas Saloojee and Murphy Morobe received a human rights prize and financial award from Sweden. In September of the same year, seven UDF affiliated activists sought and were granted reluctant refuge in the British consulate in Durban, protesting the government's practice of detention without criminal charge. The British consulate protest resulted in the retreat from preventative detention by the government, garnered new international attention, and buoyed the movement (Seekings 2000, 116-118).

1985 known as the township revolts. Upheaval began in the Vaal Triangle in September 1984 (Amnesty International 1987; Seekings 2000), and spread nationally. Widespread resistance seen in the wake of the new constitution escalated to include more violent measures like sabotage and attacks on police (Thompson 2001, 229), executed by both the ANC and domestic grassroots actors (Seekings 2000, 135). The ANC, for its part, took the adoption of the new constitution to mean that new measures were needed for the movement to progress. In radio addresses ANC leadership including President Oliver Tambo called for outright disobedience - a campaign to make South Africa "ungovernable." In 1985, it distributed copies of the ungovernability message throughout the country (Field 2007; Seekings 2000).[42]

Ungovernability coincided with a "people's war" by the ANC, which saw intensified militant action, and new acceptance of civilian casualties.[43] Meanwhile, consumer and rent boycotts spread across South Africa at the grassroots level, sometimes enforced upon community members with violence. While the ANC intensified confrontation, the UDF advocated "people power," which entailed the creation of alternative governing structures. Township governments were collapsing and being replaced with so-called "street committees" coordinated from above by the ANC and UDF (Seekings 2000, 169). Nationwide stayaways were organized by the Congress of

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[42] Also in 1985, government officials opened fire on a funeral procession coinciding with the 25th anniversary of Sharpeville. Later called the Uitenhage (Langa) massacre, an estimated 20 people were killed.

[43] Tambo said "before the end comes, we expect rivers of blood to flow. Streams have started, and it will take the international community only. We are hopeful to restrict the duration of the slaughter" (Field 2007).

South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and drew in millions – these took place in May 1986 and May 1987.

The government predictably met this dynamic period with repression, but this time the world watched with greater attention. A partial state of emergency issued in July 1985 gave way to an expanded national version in June 1986. Tens of thousands of arrests were made, driving the UDF and local organizations underground, causing COSATU to take precautions, as well. Media restrictions, curfews, and banning of meetings occurred simultaneous to government attempts at township development to redeem the apartheid system. Security forces engaged in beatings, disappearances, and executions (Field 2007). Resistance in the form of rent boycotts, stayaways, and an "unban the ANC" campaign occurred despite the state of emergency (Seekings 2000, 207-209). By February 1988, though, the UDF was banned alongside 16 other organizations.

Shocking coverage of repression reverberated globally during that time, with images revealing states of outright military occupation of the townships. The unrest and states of emergency triggered deep concern by onlooking states over the stability of South Africa. In the 1980s, divestment campaigns in the U.S. took hold, seeing state and city governments, and 119 educational institutions restrict investment in South Africa (Lyman 2002, 33). The U.S. passed comprehensive sanctions in 1986 over President Reagan's veto with a crippling provision that ended new investment and new technology transfers. The U.S. then refused engagement with the government and instead offered

legal assistance to government victims, investigated protester deaths, and supported local nonprofits (Olson 1991).

As Sisk (1995, 74) writes of the end of the 1980s "the interaction of reform, revolt, and repression had yielded a political stalemate, one that imposed unacceptably high costs on the system and the struggle." Talks amongst unlikely parties were taking place: between the exiled ANC and business leaders in 1985; between ANC leaders and the South African government in England over three years between 1987-1989; and secretly between the imprisoned Nelson Mandela and the South African Minister of Justice. At the same time, the USSR was winding down its support to all liberation campaigns in Southern Africa, including to the ANC, pushed by a deteriorating economy.[44] It agreed in 1988, alongside the United States, to the tripartite peace accords, which ended South Africa's occupation of Namibia, and arranged for the removal of Cuban troops from Angola (Thomas 1996, 200).[45] Cold War tensions were easing. In December, Nelson Mandela wrote to President P.W. Botha with urgent interest in a political settlement (Thompson 2001, 245).

In 1989, South African President P.W. Botha suffered a stroke, lost his party leadership, and was replaced as president by F.W. De Klerk. Seeing a political settlement as the only path to retaining some degree of political power, De Klerk sought to seize

[44] Former Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze admitted as much: "There was a time when the Soviet Union was associated with the struggle against colonialism and the liberation of these countries from the colonial yoke. We rendered material, moral, and military assistance and spent a great deal on that. Today our capabilities are limited. We all know the conditions we live in and the situation in our country" (Landsberg 2004, 48-50).

[45] Chester Crocker had worked toward for the previous eight years, being the centerpiece of his "constructive engagement" foreign policy (Lyman 2002, 36).

initiative by announcing suddenly in 1990 the release of Nelson Mandela from prison and the unbanning of the ANC, PAC, and SACP. In turn, the ANC announced an end to its armed struggle. A series of talks unfolded over the next year and a half, with intensified political violence in the background centered in Natal between the ANC/UDF and followers of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). Three separate milestone agreements were needed before the ANC, the government, and IFP arrived at a National Peace Accord that established common commitment to nonracial democracy and institutions for managing the political violence that almost scuttled the peace process (Sisk 1995).

During this time, the international community's stance toward the Anti-Apartheid struggle had switched from proponents of the movement to champions for negotiations and reconciliation. The 1980s had seen an influx of official development assistance flowing to civic organizations, including local groups affiliated with the UDF. However, when negotiations took hold in the early 1990s the groups that had received the bulk of foreign aid were now passed over as assistance flowed to civic activities such as political party training, voter registration, human resources administration, and violence prevention programs. This shift resulted in resentment among the nonprofit community so abruptly left behind (Landsberg 2004).

International actors now shifted their orientation toward mass action – discouraging it given its potential to spark new violence and jeopardize talks (Lyman 2002, 64-68). At the same time, bilateral support faded into the background, supplanted by multilateral efforts. Foreign governments wanted peace in South Africa. They made that clear with UN Security Council resolutions that condemned political violence,

appointed a Special Representative to identify ways to end the violence, and the establishment of the UN Observation Mission in South Africa. UNOMSA peace observers were in South Africa almost two years, joined by observers from the European Community, Commonwealth of Nations, and the African Union (then the Organization of African Unity) (United Nations 2021).

The ANC and South African government persisted in their negotiations through violence, political power wrangling, and deadlock to travel the arduous road between the National Peace Accord and democratic elections in April 1994. Each breakthrough met subsequent upticks in political violence (Sisk 1995, 243). After two rounds of constitutional negotiations, a Record of Understanding and, finally, the Multiparty Negotiating Process, a date was set, and kept, for democratic elections. Sisk (1995, 13) attributes the success of the negotiations to the stubborn symmetry in bargaining power between the ANC and the government. The ultimate institution of nonracial democracy however, owed to something deeper: the convergence upon a new "broad based, multifaceted social contract."

## Unrest and International Convergence

The story above recounts the basic story of the anti-apartheid struggle – a century long effort that evolved from racially-stratified organizations of the early 20th century to unified mass demonstrations, armed struggle, international mobilization, and finally political settlement reached amidst political violence that alarmed the international community. International convergence preceded the domestic sort by only a handful of

years - it too, took decades, and a specific configuration of forces to materialize. Not until the mid-1980s did international actors of all forms - nongovernment and government - coalesce around the anti-apartheid cause in a rare moment of global consensus.

The data in EX-D show concretely when convergence among nation-states occurred. Figure one below shows that international support for the movement peaked during the years 1986-1988. The number of states involved grew markedly with the onset of ungovernability and the township revolts in 1985. The states of emergency drew in even more supporters until 1988. The sharp drop in state support in 1989 points to the fall of the Berlin wall, when the collapse of the bipolar international system diverted international attention. Foreign government support peaked again suddenly in 1990, however – corresponding to a watershed of approval offered in response to the release of Nelson Mandela from prison. Even governments that had previously stayed on the sidelines like Italy and Syria spoke out for the first time.

*Figure 1 International Presence in South Africa*




The chart also shows that during the peak of foreign government involvement between 1996-1988, supporters were offering more diversified supportive repertoires relative to other years. In Figure 1, the red line provides a sense of support depth. To get its value, I first summed

the number of support types provided by each country in each year using the categories proposed in Chapter 2: bolstering, enabling, equipping, stabilizing, and pressuring. Then I aggregated all country scores for each year, which offers a rough expression of cumulative bilateral support. The higher the red line relative to the bar, the more diversified was the support provided. In 1986, more states provided varied forms of support than in 1990. It will be shown later that the states providing diversified support were those known as particularly committed to the struggle.

What led to this period of convergence? The years in question correspond to fallout from the ungovernability campaign and township revolts, which saw 1,600 deaths between September 1985 and June 1986 (Cowell 1986). Importantly, foreign media documented the subsequent state of emergency, witnessing South African security forces apply intensified repressive techniques, the images of which galvanized global outrage. At the nation-state level, heads of government began to fear that South Africa would devolve into some form of state collapse. Rothchild describes it like this:

> Earlier experiences with sanctions in Ethiopia and Rhodesia showed how difficult it was to unite sovereign countries for concerted action; even so the moral indignation that existed over apartheid had proven to be unique in providing a basis for the use of extensive international diplomatic pressure to break the fatal drift toward the worst possible outcome; a deadly stalemate in intergroup relations. (Rothchild 1997, 210)

James Baker, former US Secretary of State, remembered his job (which he assumed in 1989) as “fashion[ing] a policy that reduced the chances of [a racial holocaust]” (Baker and DeFrank 1995).

As shocking as repression during the state of emergency was, and for as much moral indignation it inspired, two other conditions were in place that enabled convergence. First, operating in the background throughout the 1980s was a significant easing of Cold War tensions, aided by the economic collapse of the USSR. In these critical years, shifts were occurring within the USSR and internationally producing change in the bipolar international system. Second, a deeply engaged transnational activist community had successfully set the global discourse in such a way that once political opening occurred, all states hewed in the direction of ending apartheid.

*Geopolitical Easing*

Prior to international convergence, geopolitical interests defined by the pressures of the Cold War shaped the support provided by key states to the movement. The USSR was an early and prolific supporter. It provided critical military support to the ANC (which was allied with the South Africa Communist Party) beginning in 1961.[46] In addition to sending weapons and ammunition shipments to training camps established in Tanzania and Zambia, it provided backing in multilateral organizations like the United Nations and trained individuals at Soviet universities and "military centers" (Sellström 2002, 146). Through the Soviet Peace Fund, it sent food, clothing, school materials, medical supplies, and building materials to ANC camps outside the country.

[46] The ANC itself was banned in 1960 leading to the formation of its armed wing Umkhonto we Sizwe in 1961. According to Kempton, Mandela claimed that the ANC was internally financed until its banning, upon which it required support specifically for the armed struggle.

Soviet support to the ANC reflected its interest in a Soviet-friendly government in South Africa that would facilitate its access to strategic naval and air facilities and minerals (Vanneman 1990, 96). After the decline of the Soviet economy in the 1980s and the shift to negotiations in South Africa, the USSR adjusted its policy objectives. The USSR became more interested in reputational capital. It sought primarily to appear as co-equal to the United States in the region. But also, by supporting the turn to negotiations, the USSR aimed to convey itself as a progressive force with the ability to project power globally (Vanneman 1990, 96).

In contrast, the U.S. had strong ties to the South African government and many reasons to withhold support for the Soviet-linked ANC. Overall, the U.S. saw South Africa as a reliable friend given its contributions in both World Wars (Thomas 1996; Lyman 2002). The two countries cooperated in Cold War pursuits as well, specifically, the joint funding of the UNITA insurgency in Angola beginning in the 1970s (Lyman 2002). UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher similarly had concerns about the Cold War balance. She once said, "It is absurd that people should be prepared to put increasing power into the hands of the Soviet Union on the grounds that they disapprove of apartheid in South Africa" (Klotz 1995, 118). The UK under Thatcher was interested in maintaining the "family connection" with countries of its former empire including South Africa (Landsberg 2004, 25). It, like the US, strongly resisted economic sanctions against the South African government.

During the 1980s, however, important developments eased positions on both sides. The USSR softened its position toward market economics and allowed some form

of elections through the now infamous policies known as perestroika and glasnost. A 1985 Geneva summit and a 1986 Reykjavik summit between Reagan and Gorbachev signified an important transition in the US-USSR relationship (Carnegie 1997). Then, in 1988, the US and the USSR jointly facilitated the tripartite accords that achieved South African relinquishment of Namibia (which it had occupied since WWI) and Cuban military withdrawal from Angola (Waldmeir 1997, 135). Landsberg (2004, 46) considered the thawing of tensions to have been critical in the defeat of apartheid. He cites periodicals of the period calling the accords probably "the most far-reaching great power agreement on Africa since the Berlin conference of 1885."

The new geopolitical atmosphere paved the way for international actors to unify their positions with respect to the South African government. The United States opened dialogue with the ANC in 1987 (Lyman 2002, 46). At a March 1989 meeting hosted by Britain between Pretoria, Washington, and Moscow "the U.S. and Soviet delegates operated like a team; as if the Cold War has already ended and both sides ostensibly subscribed to the principles of genuine democratization" (Landsberg 2004, 62).[47] De Klerk's own words speak best to the shifting dynamics:

> The first few months of my presidency [commencing in September 1989] coincided with the disintegration of communism in Eastern Europe which reached its historical climax with the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989. Within the scope of a few months, one of our main strategic concerns for decades - the Soviet Union's role in southern Africa and its strong influence on the ANC and SACP - had all but disappeared. A window had suddenly opened which created an opportunity for a much more adventurous approach than had previously been conceivable. (quoted in Landsberg 2004, 86)

[47] Landsberg (2004, 48) writes that in the mid-1980s, Moscow began to "nudge the ANC in the direction of free market economic policies" at least in part to benefit from an economically stronger South Africa given its own economic travails.

Not only did USSR-US tensions ease, but also USSR-China relations improved. Bilateral talks between the USSR and China began in 1979. And, in 1981 the Communist Party of the Soviet Union finally recognized China as a socialist country (Joshi 1987, 61). Talks held in 1979, 1982, and high level meetings in 1984 put the relationship on more positive footing (Joshi 1987). Beijing's moves toward reconciliation with Moscow, aiming to generate a sense of distance from the US, opened the way for it to form a relationship with the ANC after 1983 and ultimately supported the commencement of negotiations with the government later in the campaign. By the end of the decade, the ANC was recognized by all key international players as a central actor in a struggle worthy of their support.

*Normative Entrenchment*

As deeply affecting as the geopolitical developments were, their manifestations could not have guaranteed the international convergence of nation-states upon the political objective of ending apartheid. In John Ruggie's 1998 essay "What Makes the World Hang Together?" he explains that ideas – like the abhorrence of apartheid – if not direct causes, can be the reasons that certain causal factors have certain effects. He draws on Max Weber, writing that ideas can produce "an outcome that is historically *so* and not *otherwise.* Absent those 'reasons,' however, and the same 'causes' would not have the same causal capacity" (Ruggie 1998, 869). Finnemore (1996) writes in the same spirit claiming that international norms create "permissive conditions for action but do not determine action." In the context of South Africa, this framing is useful for understanding why geopolitical easing and deep instability coincided with an international consensus

that apartheid had to fall. The decades of diplomacy, activism, and resistance internationally generated a shared discourse on the unacceptability of apartheid.

The United Nations was a principal arena for such discourse. In December 1946, the General Assembly took up the issue of discriminatory policies against Indians in South Africa. [48] This came only one year after the creation of the UN itself. In subsequent years the General Assembly passed more resolutions condemning apartheid as a whole and established special committees to study it (Stultz 1991; Houser 1982).[49] In those early days of the global struggle, though, many countries clung to Article 2(7) of the Charter, which featured noninterventionism, and they opted not

*Figure 2 Key UN Action on South Africa*

1946: General Assembly consideration of discrimination against Indians in South Africa.

1950: General Assembly declares apartheid racial discrimination.

1952: Establishment of UN Committee to Study Racial Situation in South Africa.

1954: General Assembly resolution claiming apartheid to be a grave threat to peaceful relations between ethnic groups in the world.

1960: Security Council condemns South Africa.

1961: General Assembly calls for states to consider bilateral action (rs 1598)

1962: Founding of the Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa

1963: UNSC implementation of voluntary arms embargo

1965: Creation of UN Trust Fund for South Africa

1977: UNSC resolution 418 implementing mandatory arms embargo on South Africa

1984: UNSC resolution 558 voluntary prohibition importing military arms and vehicles from South Africa

1986: UNSC resolution 591 enhancements of military equipment prohibition

[48] Such offending policies included the Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian Representation Act, which sparked a passive resistance campaign in South Africa and lobbying in New York by the ANC and South African Indian Congress (SAHO 2011; Stultz 1991).

[49] The Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa stands out for its wide advocacy in the 1960s among IGOs and nation states, and shifting in the 1970s to engaging nonprofits in countries with "substantial trade" in South Africa (Stultz 1991, 10).

to openly criticize the regime (Stultz 1991). Attitudes changed, though. By 1972 the UN Trust Fund for South Africa would receive financial support from 66 nations (Houser 1982, 19).[50] As the campaign progressed, the UN Security Council agreed on concrete action, particularly on a mandatory arms embargo in 1977. [51]

International activists also set the discourse on apartheid, mobilizing within the deep layers of international society inaccessible to multilateral diplomacy. With each major event in South Africa activists around the globe turned out in solidarity. Global protests broke out after the Treason Trials, Sharpeville, and Soweto (Field 2007). The United States saw the largest student protests since Vietnam (Field 2007) and activists succeeded in instantiating a massive university divestment campaign throughout the 1980s. In some cases, activists were mobilized with the help of international nongovernment organizations. The International Defense and Aid Fund (IDAF) in London, the World Council of Churches, and TransAfrica played critical roles in getting out demonstrators, keeping apartheid on the international human rights agenda, and amplifying the movement's call for economic sanctions.

Although most states waited until the political opening of the 1980s to bandwagon their support for the movement – others showed a deeper progressivism and played a role in turning the international tide against apartheid. Certainly, individual nation states were the ones to drive the actions taken at the UN, which began with India.

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[50] According to Stultz (1991), the trust fund "was to coordinate and centralize legal, educational, and humanitarian assistance to victims of apartheid and their dependents, including refugees." It had collected $31.2 million by March 1988.

[51]Britain and France abstained from the 1960 security council resolution. Sources for tonebox: (Stultz 1991; Houser 1982; SIPRI 2012)

Sweden, Denmark, and Norway provided sustained support to liberation movements well before convergence. Swedish support to the movement began in the 1960s, funneled initially through the UN, reaching $300 million by 1990 (Thomas 1996; Landsberg 2004). The IDAF received Nordic funding (Sellström 2002). Evidence from the period depicts a diverse international activist coalition against apartheid that was diverse, resourced, and organized.

## Clusters of Commitment

The conditions leading to convergence against apartheid in the mid- to late-1980s underlie a particularly high-profile case whose international backing has not been replicated in any mass nonviolent movement since. Still, the history of support to the movement reveals instructive variation in qualities of commitment across state supporters. In this final section, I consider how to extrapolate from the history of anti-apartheid struggle to identify variables that differentiate state supporters according to their commitment to the movement. This inductive move offers the opportunity to hypothesize about and test a strawman case before proceeding to a global study in the next chapter. Below, I offer evidence that anti-apartheid supporters cluster in "zones" of commitment visualized with a technique called Multidimensional Scaling (MDS) (introduced in more detail in Chapter 4 and explained in more detail in the Methodological Appendix). MDS depicts state supporters of the movement according to their similarities and dissimilarities on key variables. I restrict this analysis to supporters active during the "period of convergence" (1986-1988), which should maximize both the

number of supporters and variation in support. I describe each key hypothesized variable now.

The diversity of supportive repertoire provided should help distinguish state supporters according to their commitment to the movement. Recall the comprehensive set of support by the USSR to the struggle, which corresponds to a long-standing, well-known commitment to the ANC. Also, India offered diversified support by leading condemnations of the apartheid system in the UN, being the first to boycott South African goods, and assisting South African exiles obtain passports (Thomas 1996). Finally, note that multi-model support was more common during the peak period of 1986-1988 when the movement faced crushing government repression. Not all states responded with enhanced support during this time, but many did, suggesting useful variation. Thus, the nature of the assistance provided merits inclusion in an analysis clustering states according to their commitment. To this end, I include in the MDS binary indicators coded 1 or 0 for each support type the state offered. This introduces five different "stimuli" corresponding to the type(s) of support introduced in Chapter 2: bolstering, equipping, enabling, pressuring, or stabilizing.

As discussed previously, however, the conditions underlying the observed support – whether in the form of context or relational content – must also be considered to further discriminate between state supporters according to their commitment. I introduce four proposed variables here. First, we have reason to believe that supporting states vary in their buy-in to presiding international human rights norms. The South Africa case demonstrated that certain post-Colonial African states and India were forefront in

addressing political and human rights within international institutions like the United Nations. [52] Some states proposed resolutions and launched special committees to confront the profound violations of human rights occurring in South Africa. Fariss (2014) created a variable that can concretely measure the degree to which a country subscribes to the global human rights regime. Higher scores on this human rights embeddedness variable indicate countries that have ratified many treaties and conventions, signaling more investment in human rights norms. Thus, I include as a stimulus in the MDS a variable indicating with a "1" that a supporting state had an above average level of embeddedness in the global human rights regime.

Then, I use EX-D to generate a variable indicating whether domestic nongovernmental actors in the supporting state assisted the anti-apartheid movement in the same year as the government. The South Africa case indicates this could help distinguish between supporting states. As described above, the anti-apartheid campaign saw ample and passionate transnational solitary protests, divestment campaigns, and corporate pressure, which plausibly drove some governments to deepen their commitment. In the United States representatives of congress, some affiliated with the lobbying group TransAfrica, famously protested alongside activists.[53] Meanwhile, Klotz (1995) reasons that the parliamentary system in the UK shielded Margaret Thatcher from domestic pressure. The application of domestic pressure on one's government to act in defense of human rights globally corresponds to the so-called boomerang effect coined

[52] This is also well documented on a general level by Reus-Smit (2013).

[53] Finnemore (1996) mentions that US intervention in Cambodia against the Khmers Rouges appears to have been driven by domestic opposition to the brutality of regime.

by Keck and Sikkink (1998). It is of interest to judge whether it can help distinguish between state supporters.

Two potentially important dyadic variables – or indications of relational content – emerge from the South Africa Case. First, the nature of a state's bilateral relationship with the targeted South African government seems to have played a role in shaping a supporter's orientation to the struggle. The United States, which held deep historical affinity for the South African government and shared geostrategic goals took a more timid approach to addressing apartheid than "radically neutral" Sweden (Field 2007). And, note that the newly independent Zimbabwe, liberated from a minority government in 1980, took a novel adversarial approach to South Africa once in power and deepened support to the movement. Given the apparent importance of bilateral relationship, I included a stimulus indicating whether the supporter and South Africa were considered either serious or weak rivals based on the categorization scheme created by Goertz, Diehl, and Balas (2016).

Second, the importance of economic relations with the target likely distinguishes between supporting states in terms of their commitment. The case of Zambia, which supported the campaign in all ways possible despite the economic (and security) ramifications, stands out for supporting the movement at high cost to itself. Zambia's behavior stands in stark contrast to China, for instance. Before the warming in relations with the USSR, the PRC aimed to cultivate an image of supporting national liberation movements to generate prestige for itself on the world stage. After the relationship with the USSR and the ANC improved, China's policy changed from (albeit haphazard)

support to the Pan African Congress to consisting merely of “anti-apartheid posturing whilst encouraging negotiations” (Taylor 2000). The nature of its commitment became clear, though, from evidence that in the 1980s it was undermining the economic sanctions the international community lobbied so hard to implement.[54] Given the likely importance of economic ties, I included an indicator as to whether a supporter had prominent trade with South Africa, defined here as ~1% or more of the supporter’s GDP, based on the Correlates of War Bilateral Trade data (Barbieri and Keshk 2016).

*Figure 3 MDS Plot of Anti-Apartheid State Supporters (1986-1988)*




[54] Crawford (1999, 62) describes the acquisition of 35,000 AK47s from the PRC by South Africa from 1985-1989 by the Armaments Corporation of South Africa. The arms embargo against South Africa was lifted in 1994. Taylor (2000) describes China’s purchase of minerals from South Africa and export of grain through the 1980s.

Figure 3 shows the MDS solution, which maps the 52 state supporters that assisted the movement during the period of international convergence (1986-1988). The 2-dimensional MDS solution is a relatively good fit to the data, with the model explaining 86% of the variation in the distances between observations. Of note, the plot shows at center the movement's most ardent supporters: Russia (USSR), Sweden, Zambia, India, and Canada. Directly above those states in the top center, we mostly see states that were both ardent supporters of the movement, and active rivals of South Africa. The axes in Figure 3 are labeled according to the principles that organize observation in this space. The x-axis organized states according to the nature of support provided. The y-axis placed them according to the quality of political investment each had in the struggle.

We can interpret the axis as such given the following dimensional analysis allowed by MDS. As will be described in the next chapter, in addition to depicting distances, MDS solutions are useful for detecting underlying structure in data that is not immediately obvious to the human eye (de Leeuw and Mair 2009). Figure 4 displays a series of plots that show how underlying values on key variables correspond to an observation's location on the plot.

Along the x-axis, states are placed according to their supportive repertoire. States in the middle of the plot demonstrate more dynamic repertoires, offering multiple kinds of support. Most clearly, they bolster the movement and pressure the government. Those that equipped the movement, tried to stabilize the environment, and offered ODA are also in the central swath. For example, Botswana bolstered and pressured, and India equipped

the movement and pressured the government. The United States provided all types of support except offering ODA (which it started later). Countries on the left extreme limited supportive repertoires to bolstering the movement, whereas at the right extreme they opted only to pressure the South African government.[55] This is our first indication that states do not support movements in a simple low to high sort of variation.

The y-axis, on the other hand, has organized countries according to variables that signal their political vestiture in the movement. Specifically, countries above zero on the y-axis demonstrate either trade dependence on South Africa (in which case they limited their support to bolstering) or a bilateral rivalry (where they provide dynamic repertoires of multiple types of support). There is a third reason a state would be above zero on the vertical axis: it demonstrates lower than average embeddedness in the global human rights regime. This is the case for the United States.

According to the plot, all supporters of the Anti-Apartheid movement between 1986-1988 below zero on the vertical axis are well-embedded in the global human rights regime. No other variables included in the MDS solution provided such clear interpretation of a dimension. The demarcation of the y-axis according to this variable is striking and will be shown to be replicated in the global analysis.

[55] In these specific cases, Ireland, Israel, and Malaysia applied pressure for the release of Nelson Mandela.

*Figure 4 South Africa MDS Variables*




One last consideration of interest is the dynamics displayed along the full vertical central swath of the plot. As mentioned, this area corresponds to active supportive postures – a repertoire used by states willing to confront the South African government directly and aggressively. States with this repertoire are either highly embedded in the global human rights regime, such as Canada, Denmark, or Sweden, or, they have a bilateral rivalry. South Africa's rivals are concentrated in the top-center of the plot, corresponding to active supportive repertoires. The relevant states in this central zone of the chart include: Cuba, Botswana, Angola, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and Zambia. [56]

[56] Rivalry here is based on the Goertz, Diehl, and Balas (2016, 35) variable. A '1' for rivalry here indicates either a severe rivalry (a relationship where the military component of foreign policy is important, and conflicts between the states are linked), or a lesser rivalry (both states see the use of military force as a legitimate means for resolving disputes, but the method is less frequent or serious than in severe rivalries.

This shows that states assume active repertoires for more than one reason. Finally, states with active repertoires likely see concurrent domestic support for the movement. No countries with narrow supportive profiles saw domestic constituents advocating for the Anti-Apartheid movement.

In summary, multidimensional scaling has provided preliminary evidence that states can be clustered according to their latent commitment to a protest movement. Rivals with certain political ambitious clustered together as did the ardent supporters of the movement. On the left and right margins of the plots we see states that offered narrower support and are not considered by historical evidence to have had particular interest in the movement. These states comprise bandwagoners and those signaling weaker support for human rights.

Furthermore, the case study provided several inductively achieved insights that were needed before approaching a global study. Findings relevant to the global study are as follows:

- Supportive repertoires demonstrate a deeper-in-the-middle dynamic. These dynamic supportive postures are associated with rivalrous bilateral relations, or high human rights embeddedness. In both cases, active supportive repertoires correspond to an interested domestic constituency also supporting the movement.
- States with trade dependence on South Africa tended to offer only bolstering support and did not pressure the government.

- The United States emerged as an anomaly. It clustered with active rivals of South Africa based on its dynamic repertoire but was unique for its active support provided in the absence of HR embeddedness, rivalry, or trade interests.

In the next chapter we will see whether the conditions that differentiated supporters during the anti-apartheid struggle remain relevant in a more recent, global sample.

As a hypothesis generating case study the South African Second Defiance Campaign has had several advantages. First, as the nonviolent maximalist campaign most widely supported by foreign governments in the EX-D dataset, it offered the opportunity to test my concept of mapping commitment zones against a sample of countries with wide variation in involvement. Second, the movement is well-documented by secondary sources. The deep reserve of knowledge of the campaign meant that I could fit the EX-D data to it and see if they behave as expected given the facts of the case. We saw from South Africa that state postures vary in intuitive, but not immediately obvious ways. In the next chapter, I use the insight gained here to inform a global analysis of 95 state supporters to 65 different maximalist campaigns.

# Chapter 4: Zones of Commitment

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In Chapter 2, I argued that state commitment to a protest movement could be understood as a sort of contextualized involvement and when measured it should provide more textured insight into state support to movements. In this chapter, I use multiple quantitative methods to map state commitment to protests using a global sample. I show that there are three ideal types of state supporters, differentiable by the nature of their commitment to a movement. One type is the *willing revisionist* that is antagonistic to the sitting government, at best agnostic to the global human rights regime, and very interested in the movement's success likely because of the political implications for itself. The second type: an *institutional steward* that works with the sitting government as much as, if not more than, with the campaign. It refrains from public pressure, targeting gradual reform. The third is the *grievance legitimizer*. These states engage in public diplomatic tactics, issuing public condemnations, sometimes sanctions, and shows of moral support to signal its approval. It keeps arms-length distance from the movement itself, refraining from active measures on the ground. This group is most consistent with an instrumental approach to support for movements.

Identifying ideal types rather than a formal typology optimally conveys the three types of state supporters present in EX-D (see the Methodological Appendix for more

discussion on typology versus ideal types). Notably, scholars of International Relations are more accustomed to generating either descriptive or explanatory typologies (Elman 2005). Ideal types allow me to transcend this restriction built into existing typological epistemology and consider how descriptive and explanatory variables together comprise types of foreign supporters. As described by Jackson and Nexon (2013), the ideal typical approach is useful for mapping phenomena of interest and identifying organizing principles. In this approach, an observation will occupy a space on that map never epitomizing the ideal type itself, but rather differ from it and other observations in measurable ways. The zones of commitment provide concrete insight into social regularities, and "enable orientation to the social world" (P. T. Jackson and Nexon 2009).

The concern of this analysis with both observed behavior and the elements that contextualize it corresponds to the original intent of Weberian ideal types. According to Swedberg (2018), Weber considered social behavior to be action infused with meaning. Thus, although traditional quantitative analysis in political science tends to separate the observed behavior from explanatory conditions on opposing sides of a regression model, this analysis integrates them. Such an approach is not unprecedented. Esping-Anderson's study identifying the three worlds of welfare capitalism characterizes the welfare regime types both in terms of the type of benefits provided and the conditions that differentiate them (Esping-Andersen 1990).[57] Both Swedberg and Ahlquist and Breunig (2012)

[57] Esping-Anderson (1990) also separates analysis of welfare states in terms into two parts. First, he explains what makes them different (quality of social rights, social stratification, and the relationship between the state, market, and people), then he provides causal factors of what brings them about (the nature of working-class mobilization, class-political coalition structures, historical legacy of regime institutionalization).

mention the relative dearth of attention paid to methods of extracting ideal types. This chapter addresses that gap directly.

To get to ideal types and depict their expanse I first generate a new latent variable that summarizes the types of state support as a continuous variable. To do this I specify a Bayesian Item Response Theory model for the five support type indicators. Articulated in Chapters 2 and 3, these are bolstering, enabling, equipping, stabilizing, and pressuring support. The interpretation of the variable is interesting in its own right: negative values indicate a state supporter that relied on active measures to support the campaign such as equipping a movement or sending ODA funds. Positive values indicate a strictly diplomatic approach – public condemnations or statements of support, for example. The middle range of the variable signifies highly involved state support engaging in both active measures and diplomatic gestures – a hybrid repertoire corresponding to the most enthusiastic postures.

In the second step I embed the state postures into their relevant context again using multidimensional scaling (MDS), which visualizes state supporters according to their commitment to the movement in two-dimensional space. Using variables shown to be important from the South Africa case study, I show with MDS how supportive postures, human rights embeddedness, and dyadic foreign policy distance act as key organizing principles on this ideal typical map. Of note, in this global analysis, domestic civilian support does not appear to differentiate state supporters. Finally, imposing a 3-cluster *k*-means solution over the MDS plot shows concretely how the zones of commitment are situated and which state-protest dyads they include. To make the ideal

types more concrete, I provide one vignette of each ideal type. The details of the quantitative analysis are articulated in the Methodological Appendix. Below I focus on describing the main findings as non-technically as possible.

## Bayesian IRT Variable

I used a 2-parameter Item Response Theory (IRT) model, estimated in the Bayesian framework, to create a variable that conveys the quality of a state's supportive posture toward a protest movement – its outward behavioral attitude. The model takes in the five indicators of support types and converts them into a single latent scale. My indicator variables assume the value of 1 or 0, depending on whether a state provided each category of support at least one time over the duration of the campaign's peak years. These support types are bolstering the movement, enabling civil society, equipping the movement, stabilizing the environment, or pressuring the government. For clarity, I refer to this latent variable simply as one that measures that quality of a state's "involvement."

The Bayesian approach to estimating involvement is necessary because my data demonstrate the two key features that make traditional frequentist approaches problematic (Western and Jackman 1994): first, the EX-D data constitute all available observations from a population during the period of interest. Therefore, frequentist probability assumptions are not relevant because my dataset is not a sample from a larger population, and parameter estimates will not converge on their true values with repeated sample draws. Second, the data are not very informative about the parameters estimated given the low frequency of certain indicators relative to others (i.e., stabilizing support

*Figure 5 IRT Variable Indicator Frequencies*

| Bolster | Freq. | Percent | Total |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | 633 | 81.26 | 81.26 |
| 1 | 146 | 18.74 | 100.00 |

| Equip | Freq. | Percent | Total |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | 560 | 71.89 | 71.89 |
| 1 | 219 | 28.11 | 100.00 |

| Enable | Freq. | Percent | Total |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | 224 | 28.75 | 28.75 |
| 1 | 555 | 71.25 | 100.00 |

| Pressure | Freq. | Percent | Total |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | 620 | 79.59 | 79.59 |
| 1 | 159 | 20.41 | 100.00 |

| Stabilize | Freq. | Percent | Total |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | 721 | 92.55 | 92.55 |
| 1 | 58 | 7.45 | 100.00 |

occurs rarely compared to enabling support). Figure 5 shows how often states provided each type of support. Furthermore, my dataset is rather small – I have 779 observations consisting of state-campaign dyads. The unconventional structure of the dataset merits mention; in my dataset each supporting state appears as a unique observation for each movement that it supports.[58] There are 95 unique state supporters that assisted at least one of 65 maximalist movements.

The IRT model provides estimates for two parameters that aid in the interpretation of the involvement variable called item discrimination and difficulty (see the Appendix for more detail). In this section, I focus on discrimination because of the insight it

[58] The state-movement dyad unit of analysis may raise concerns that repeated measures of states that supported multiple movements should be accounted for. I attempted to incorporate random effects for states, movements, and a cross-classified model with state and movement effects. The data however do not support their use – incorporating random effects required constraining all indictors positive/negative for identification and ultimately yielded much higher standard errors than the simple model. Additionally, 53% of the supporters in the sample supported a single campaign whereas the most prolific supporter (the United States) supported 61 campaigns. This extremely unbalanced structure puts into question whether a random effect makes substantive sense.

provides into the latent continuum. Difficulty parameters for each item, reported in the methodological appendix, mostly were not statistically different from zero.

IRT discrimination parameters can be thought of as factor loadings: items with large discrimination parameters provide the substantive content to the continuum being measured (Jackman 2001). They also are indicative of an observation's likely value on the latent variable. The sign of the discrimination parameter tells us toward which end of the latent continuum an observation will trend – positive discrimination means that item pushes an observation toward the positive end of the scale. Item Characteristics Curves (ICC) illustrate discrimination across each item, displayed in Figure 6. Steeper curves indicate a more informative stimulus – in other words, a steep curve means that small

*Figure 6 Item Characteristic Curves*



movements along the latent scale translate to notable changes in the likelihood of a state offering that support.

Consider the indicator variable *enable* - it has a highly negative discrimination parameter, corresponding to a steep negatively sloped ICC. This means that states offering this type of support will trend heavily toward negative values on the latent variable. They could be pushed less negative if they offer support with positive discrimination parameters. *Bolster* and *pressure* have positive discrimination values, and correspondingly would push a unit's involvement score toward the positive zone. *Stabilize and equip* are rarely offered support types relative to the other indicators (they have the highest "difficulty"). These two items have low discrimination parameters, but are signed positive and negative, respectively, having slight effects on an observation's score.

We can look to the discrimination parameters to describe tendencies in foreign government supportive postures. Of interest is that enabling and equipping support both have negative discrimination patterns. In plain language, supporting governments that equip movements materially are mainly those that also provide official development assistance to enable civil society through government channels. The concurrence of material support for the movement and the enabling of civil society through the targeted government itself is surprising and discredits the idea that states that equip campaigns are inherently anti-regime. In fact, the dataset shows only 39 cases globally where a foreign government equipped the movement without also enabling civil society through official

channels. Equipping nonviolent resistance movements as a hostile actor, therefore, is not as common as targeted autocratic regimes would have us believe.

It now becomes possible to interpret the spectrum of involvement underlying state support to movements, which is summarized in Figure 7. The two indicators with negative discriminations comprise the "active measures" portion of the posture spectrum. Conversely, the indicators pressure, bolster, and stabilize have positive discrimination parameters. Together these forms of support together can be considered "diplomatic" aspects of support. State supporters with positive values on the latent variable are choosing public advocacy rather than material forms of support. This echoes the finding from the South Africa case study that state postures towards movements cannot be encompassed by a simple "low" to "high" or friendly to hostile scale. Rather, we see a novel qualitative continuum. Also, similar to South Africa, countries with relatively dynamic postures lie in the middle of the scale – these countries strike a hybrid posture entailing both active measures and diplomacy.

*Figure 7 Summary of IRT Variable Interpretation*

| | **Active Measures** | **Hybrid Repertoire** | **Diplomatic Actions** |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Location on Scale** | Negative values up to negative one | Negative one to zero | Positive Values |
| **Support Types** | High chance of enabling civil society through official. channels (i.e., ODA). Some chance of equipping the movement. | Supporter's repertoire includes both active and diplomatic measures. | Higher chance of bolstering, pressuring, or stabilizing. |

Figure 8 demonstrates the dynamics of the latent variable in more concrete terms using the Syrian Uprising as an example. Second to the South African Anti-Apartheid Movement, the Syrian Uprising received support from the most diverse set of foreign government supporters in EX-D. The dot-plot below shows each supporter's involvement score. Countries most negative on the latent variable had a posture defined by offering ODA via the Syrian government intended to benefit civil society. This characterizes the support provided by Ireland, Finland, Norway, and Belgium. The United Kingdom's value near zero demonstrates the hybrid approach – the government provided ODA, but also adopted diplomatic measures such as publicly boosting the movement and pressuring the government. As can be seen in the figure, most countries, from Israel to Egypt supported the movement only in sense of publicly pressuring the government. Pressure in this case meant public condemnations, and possibly sanctions. Iraq holds the most positive value on the latent variable here because it provided all three forms of diplomatic support – it bolstered the movement, pressured the government, and offered stabilizing support.

*Figure 8 Foreign Involvement Scores of all States in the Syrian Uprising*




**Involvement Scores show that the international response to the Syrian Uprising primarily comprised diplomatic responses, which is evident because most supporting countries have values above zero. Relatively fewer countries assumed hybrid postures (France, the UK, the US, and the Netherlands – all of whose scores were between -1 and zero). Certain states avoided public diplomacy, opting to restrict support to ODA (Belgium, Norway, Finland, and Ireland).*

Summarizing government posture toward movements on a single continuum is further useful for readily judging which states vary their support toward movements and which demonstrate internal consistency. The complete answer to that question lies outside the scope of this dissertation but is an area ripe for future investigation. States with varied postures toward movements might indicate ones more responsive to political conditions and self-interest. Recall the South Africa case study and the difference in

behavior between the United States and Sweden. Sweden assumed a consistent supportive stance toward the movement overall and the ANC as an organization very early whereas the United States did not intensify its support until the onset of favorable political conditions of the mid-1980s. Indeed, as shown in Figures 9 - 11, the involvement variable demonstrates much larger overall variation in American stances than in Swedish ones. China's postures across movements are also intriguing – showing almost perfect consistency toward the movements it supports, which all lie within its own geographical region.

*Figure 9 USA Involvement Scores across All Supported Campaigns (2000-2014)*




**US Involvement Scores indicate that it assumes all types of postures including active measures (x-axis values of -2 through -1), hybrid repertoires (x-axis values of -1 through zero), and diplomatic measures (x-axis values above zero).*

*Figure 10 Sweden Involvement Scores across All Supported Campaigns (2000-2014)*




**Sweden's Involvement Scores indicate that it primarily takes active measures (x-axis values of -2 through -1). Sweden assumed a single hybrid repertoire toward the Green Revolution (the point between -1 and zero). Sweden took a diplomatic posture toward the Syrian Uprising (i.e., the single point above zero).*

*Figure 11 China Involvement Scores across All Supported Campaigns (2000-2014)*




**China's Involvement Scores indicate that it takes exclusively diplomatic measures in response to protest movements given that all its involvement scores are above zero.*

Analysis of the estimated latent variable I crudely call "involvement" answers the first portion of this dissertation's motivating research question – what postures do states assume toward protest movements? Using IRT to analyze the five indicators of support shows that states take a posture of active measures or diplomatic acts, or some combination of both. The following section turns to the conditions that contextualize these supportive postures and best distinguish between state supporters.

## Mapping State Supporters

As discussed in Chapter 2 meaningfully characterizing foreign support to a protest movement requires going beyond observing supportive behavior. A country that engages in support to a campaign despite the hardship it might bring must differ from one that

provides assistance at little cost to itself. The difference between a supporter willing to bear costs to itself, and one that supports as a matter of convenience is a function of commitment to the movement. In that vein, this section presents a map of state commitment to protests as a culmination of the analysis presented thus far. The visualizations presented below contextualize involvement in protest movements amongst variables relating to the movement-supporter-target "triad" (San-Akca 2016). I again use multi-dimensional scaling (MDS) to depict state-protest dyads in two-dimensional space based on their relative similarities to one another. For this global sample, I overlay a 3-cluster *k*-means solution that visually partitions the different zones of commitment. I then offer a vignette of a state-protest dyad that is most characteristic of each commitment zone – in other words, the dyad that is closest to the zone's ideal type. I point out one interesting outlier, and a borderline case.

In the global study, I carry forward the variables used in the South Africa case, but I use them in their continuous form (versus discrete). Similar to before, I construct a profile for each observation that includes observed support (now condensed into a single continuous variable called "involvement") alongside important contextual and relational variables. Learning as we did from the case study the importance of human rights embeddedness, trade, and the presence of domestic support, these variables are included in the global MDS analysis. However, I change the variable measuring the quality of the bilateral relationship. The South Africa study used a categorical rivalry variable, but in the global study I use a variable called as "foreign policy distance." This variable, created by Bailey et al. (2017) measures the alignment of foreign policy preferences between

countries based on UN voting records. I could not use this variable in the case study given South Africa's suspension from the United Nations General Assembly between 1974 and 1994.

*Figure 12 Descriptive Statistics for MDS Auxiliary Variables*

| Variable | # Obs. | Mean | Standard Dev. | Minimum | Maximum |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Human Rights Embeddedness | 779 | 1.786 | 1.253 | -2.395 | 4.697 |
| Trade Dependence | 746 | .001 | .006 | 0 | .143 |
| Presence of Civilian Support | 779 | .116 | .32 | 0 | 1 |
| Foreign Policy Distance | 775 | -1.592 | .911 | -4.327 | -.001 |
| Share of Dyadic Military Capability | 710 | .666 | .299 | 0 | 1 |

Given the global nature of the sample, I add one additional variable of prominent interest in International Relations – relative power. I use the Correlates of War Composite Indicator of National Capabilities (CINC) measure to create a variable measuring the supporters' share of dyadic capabilities (Singer 1987). Plausibly, states that are weaker than the targeted government would be less likely to offer active measures, hoping to not provoke retaliation. At the same time, a weak state supporting a foreign protest targeting a stronger country likely has a notable level of commitment if not to the movement itself, then to human rights more broadly. Figure 12 shows basic descriptive statistics for the contextual variables included in the MDS. State-protest dyads with missing values on one or more contextual variables were still included in the MDS analysis, but their

dissimilarities from other observations on the missing variable were not considered for the MDS visualization.

A two-dimensional solution that incorporates all the variables described above yielded a .11 stress level meaning that the solution depicts 89% of the variance in the distances between observations. Figure 13 shows the MDS plot for the global sample.

*Figure 13 MDS Solution for Global Sample*

To determine the variables most responsible for the placement of observations in the map, I conduct visual dimensional analysis. I find that like the South Africa findings, the nature of support provided, human rights embeddedness, and an indicator of bilateral relations (here foreign policy distance rather than rivalry) give clear meaning to dimensions showing us the conditions that most differentiate state supporters. Figure 14 shows how closely the x and y-axes correspond to those three key variables.

The x-axis is well defined by negative to positive involvement scores and high to low embeddedness in the global human rights regime. Immediately, we see that states assuming active measures toward movements are also those highly embedded in the global human rights regime. Interestingly, recall that states taking active measures are those refraining from acts of public diplomacy. Thus, it is interesting that states embedded in global human rights choose to approach movements with direct, but quiet acts of support. The unembedded states on the positive side of the x-axis, rather, limit their support to acts of public diplomacy.

*Figure 14 Variables that Define Dimensional Interpretation*

The y-axis is well determined by the distance in foreign policy preferences between the supporting and the targeted state. States on the positive side of the y-axis have very different foreign policy preferences from the target state, and those in the negative zone are more aligned. The plots in Figure 14 show that supporters with large foreign policy distance with a targeted state offer a range of supportive repertoires ranging from active and diplomatic measures, or both. Thus, foreign policy distance (or

bilateral relationship) is not enough to predict how a state will respond to a movement. I return to this below.

The global analysis does not show that relative power between supporting and targeted states helps to differentiate between supporters, as can be seen in Figure 15. And, it brings into question the relevance of trade ties and domestic support – two variables that seemed important in the South Africa case study. These variables show no discernible pattern along the x and y axis, as shown in Figure 15. In terms of relative power, it appears that most supporters are relatively stronger than the targeted regime. Thus, support for protest movements is not a weapon of the weak as is perhaps state support for terrorism. Regarding domestic support, contrary to the South Africa case, there is no discernible pattern, and its presence is relatively rare. Still, this discrepancy between the role of domestic support in the South Africa case and the global sample makes sense: the Anti-Apartheid movement saw remarkable levels of grassroots support, so it is plausible that it shaped support at least in some states. The disappearance of civilian support in the more recent global sample, which lacks a movement of similar global attention, suggests the domestic support may not be as much of a factor in driving

*Figure 15 Variables that Do Not Define Dimensional Interpretation*



state behavior on a general level. It shows that overall, achieving the boomerang effect is quite difficult.

The ability of trade to cluster states in the South Africa study but not in the global study is also of interest. Supporters of contemporary movements simply do not tend to depend trade-wise on targeted regimes. However, even though deep trade ties are rare and the extent of trade has no identifiable pattern in the global sample, this is likely insufficient to rule out economic ties as a useful way to distinguish between state supporters. Simple exchange of goods and services as a percentage of supporter's GDP likely is too weak of a signal in the 21st century to register organizing effects. According to the South Africa case, trade did seem to matter, but economic exchange and reliance today is surely more complicated than only trade flows. Measuring economic dependence in the 21st century probably requires a more sophisticated measure of economic dependence, which I leave for future research.

## Defining the Zones of Commitment

A visual inspection of the MDS plot maps shows state-protest dyads mapped not in discrete clusters, but rather as a principal mass of supporters in the lower left with two extensions toward the upper and lower right. This pattern suggests graduated change across the dimensions, which supports the choice of extracting ideal types rather than discrete typological categories. In this section I present my approach for extracting ideal types from the MDS plot, and I introduce each one with a corresponding example.

Using a *k*-means clustering algorithm, I superimposed a range of clusters over the MDS solution in Figure 11 experimenting with 3 – 6 clusters to find the best fit. Then, I examined the mean values of the MDS variables described above for each cluster. The means depict the idealized center of the zone. To use Jackon and Nexon's language, the center quantitatively expresses "an idealization of a phenomenon's characteristics that can then be compared against other, related empirical instances" (P. T. Jackson and Nexon 2013). The 3-cluster solution demonstrated the clearest differentiation between groups.

Figure 16 shows which variables most define each cluster, but I consider all variables to propose ideal types. From the mean values, I can infer the quality of commitment a supporting state in each zone might have toward the corresponding campaign and use that to name each cluster. I argue that the three clusters encapsulate three ideal typical state supporters being: the willing revisionist, grievance legitimizer, and the institutional steward.[59] The nature of each supporter ideal type and its commitment to the movement are explained in more detail below. Although no state exactly encompasses the ideal type, my approach allows for the identification of the most prototypical case: the vignette provided below is the state-protest dyad located closest to the idealized center in Euclidean distance.

[59] According to Swedberg (2018, 188) "ideal type should be constructed in such a way that the effect of the social action it describes is clearly linked to the motivation of the actor. This way, so-called 'causal adequacy' is ensured."

*Figure 14 Ideal Type Characteristics*

| Cluster | Posture | Human Rights Embeddedness | Foreign Policy Distance | Trade Depend | Civilian Support | Ideal Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | -.452 | 1.24 | **-2.70** | .0008 | **.295** | Willing Revisionism |
| 2 | **.207** | -.232 | -.553 | **.0015** | .198 | Grievance Legitimation |
| 3 | -1.3 | **2.41** | -1.43 | .0013 | .0344 | Institutional Stewardship |

Zone 1: *Willing Revisionism*

The first ideal type exemplifies a state with a tolerance for disruption to the status quo in the target country. By tolerance for disruption, I mean the state is willing to disturb existing conditions for the sake of movement success, or otherwise significant political change. On average, these states have the lowest values of embeddedness in the global human rights regime, and the highest value of foreign policy distance with the targeted regime. Although domestic support for movements is rare in this global sample, this zone sees the highest likelihood of domestic support for the movement. These qualities are perceivable both in the mean values that define the ideal type, and by the location of the cluster on the plot. The position above zero on the vertical dimension indicates significant foreign policy differences with the targeted government, and the position to the right of zero on the horizontal axis suggests lower levels of human rights embeddedness.

One final note about this zone: it shows wide variation in supportive postures unlike the other zones. While the institutional stewards are couched firmly on active measures side of the x-axis, and the grievance legitimizers are on the diplomatic side, the willing revisionists encompass states offer all combinations of supportive repertoires. The

relatively vast variation in posture among this group merits investigation, but it is clear that revisionists act on their interests in very different ways.

On a broader level, note the positive trend along the x-axis for this group (seen in Figure 13 or 17) – as states increase their foreign policy distance from the targeted state, they become more likely to engage in supportive diplomatic measure toward the movement. This implies that supporters with deep differences in foreign policy preferences with (and in some cases, enemies of) the targeted regime are *more likely* to publicly condemn and *less likely* to be materially involved in support of the movement. It is both interesting and counterintuitive from our more usual conflict-based orientation that hostile states are the ones limiting their support to arms-distance encouragement versus tangible support.

*Figure 15 Shapes of Commitment*




*Labeled points are supporter-protest dyads, denoted with COW-NavcoID.*
*Dyad identities are as follows:*
*666-333 = Israeli Support to Green Revolution*
*666-282 = Israeli Support to Syrian Uprising*
*666-53 = Israeli Support to Cedar Revolution*
*2-252 = USA support to the Anti-Coup Venezuela Campaign*
*540-293 = Angolan Support to Pro-Outtara Campaign*
*255-149 = German support to the Anti-Government Nepalese Campaign*
*200-159 = United Kingdom support to Ukraine Orange Revolution*

US support to the Anti-coup Venezuela Campaign emerges as a central dyad in this first zone, and thus an illustrative example of the willing revisionist supporter. The Anti-coup Venezuela campaign took place in 2002 following the forced removal of President Hugo Chavez from power by senior military officers. Prior to the coup, Chavez had instigated public anger over controversial economic reforms that concerned land reform and the oil industry. Opposition business organization Fedecàmeras, and a union (Confederaciòn de Trabadores de Venezuela), called general strikes and marches beginning in December 2001 that culminated in violence between pro and anti-Chavez camps in early April 2002. The military coup took place on April 12, 2002, and the head of Fedecàmeras, Pedro Carmona Estanga, took over government. He remained in power only until April 14 in the wake of mass resistance to the new government and salvaged military support for Chavez (Human Rights Watch 2003).

According to Human Rights Watch, the US originally cast blame for the coup on the behavior of the Chavez government. Ultimately, though, it condemned the coup for transgressing the Venezuelan constitution, issuing critiques both in the Organization for American States, and bilaterally, through statements by the Secretary of State, Colin Powell. Throughout the crisis, the US continued sending ODA in support of human and civil rights. According to media reporting from the time, the United States was aware in advance of the coup plot. Criticism was waged that the US did not do enough to stop it, although government officials claimed they tried to dissuade the opposition from executing the coup and issued general warnings to Venezuelan officials of the threat (Forero 2004).

The US support for the Venezuela anti-coup campaign exemplifies the willing revisionist ideal type given its values on the key variables proposed by this dissertation. It is relatively unembedded in the global human rights regime and has a troubled bilateral relationship with the targeted government. The US was, and remains, an advocate of disruption to the status quo in Venezuela, and opposed to the *Chavista* form of governing. Against these conditions, US support to the movement included a supportive repertoire of both diplomatic and material gestures.

The U.S. – Venezuela case also suggests that certain state supporters may be more agnostic to the characteristics and political desires of the particular movement being supported than we might expect. Intuitively, the United States should have been less enthusiastic in its support for a campaign that supported the restoration of Chavez to power given the political differences therein. The US in its critiques of the coup, though, alleged an interest in the restoration of the constitutional process in Venezuela – not the reseating of Chavez, specifically. Even so, the US spoke out in support of the pro-Chavez protesters' objectives. To put another way, the US struck a revisionist posture toward a movement that was seeking restoration of the status quo that the US opposed. The blurred alignment of US foreign policy goals and the goals of the campaign that it supported raises the question of the degree to which a protest movement's goal matters to the state crafting the response.

One final point about the US as an actor is its heavy presence in the willing revisionist zone. In fact, US observations comprise most observations in this zone, and nearly all of those which assume hybrid postures. In the reproduced Figure 18 below, I

highlight the US observations in Zone 1 with darkened points. These are located high on the y-axis suggesting wide foreign policy differences, and central to the plot overall suggesting dynamic supportive repertoires. The US stands out as uniquely willing to actively support a protest in unfriendly territory.

*Figure 18 US Observations Dominate the Dynamic Portion of Zone 1*




Zone 2*: Instrumentalist Grievance Legitimation*

The second zone of commitment encompasses those states that do not wish to disrupt the status quo, but rather to substantiate the merit of the protesters' grievance. Zone 2 resides in the bottom right of the plot. Its state-movement dyads opt to restrict their engagement with movements to diplomatic means. They are very unlikely to be embedded in the global human rights regime, meaning they have ratified few international conventions. In this zone, more so than in the others, supporting states have

higher average trade dependence on the targeted state. Thus, even though trade appears to be a weak signal, this group shows some signs of being influenced by economic considerations. With little obligations to human rights conventions and countervailing pressures because of the trade relationship, these supporters choose public diplomacy over silence. Then, why support at all? This zone appears to contain the instrumentalists – in particular, regional actors are prominent here: such supporters could be speaking out to quell possible instability that could encroach on them. Or, they may be seeking a voice on regional matters to project leadership. Both policy objectives are compatible with a commitment to a movement that goes only as far as legitimizing its grievances and hewing to the status quo as long as circumstances permit.

Angolan support to Cote d'Ivoire Pro-Ouattara Campaign exemplifies this ideal type. The Pro-Ouattara campaign was a series of resistance actions in response to the November 2010 runoff elections in Cote d'Ivoire between Laurent Gbagbo and Alassane Ouattara. Neither candidate won the first-round outright and competed in a runoff election. The United Nations certified Ouattara as the winner of the run-off, but Gbagbo appealed the results to Cote d'Ivoire's Constitutional Council. The Council, stacked with loyalists, annulled the election results based on irregularities, violence, and a deadline technicality (Cook 2011). The dispute led to dire post-election violence. Pro-Ouattara protests met violence from pro-Gbagbo security forces, and by February, youth militias from both sides were seizing territory from one another, targeting foreigners, and engaging in gun battles in residential areas. Reports of the time noted rising violence late

February – early March 2011, which coincided with refugee outflows to Liberia and Guinea. By the end of March 2011, at least 460 people had been killed.

Angola was a reluctant supporter of the campaign and putting Ouattara in power. It opted initially for supporting Gbagbo's victory. According to Martins (2011) Angola was the only country present at Gbagbo's illegitimate swearing in, and initially offered conflict mediation support.[60] Martins attributes this behavior on one hand to Gbagbo's support to Angola in countering UNITA rebels, and on the other hand to Angola's large presence in regional politics. Amidst increasing violence and refugee flows, Angola offered official acknowledgement of Ouattara as the rightful leader of Cote d'Ivoire in late March, which coincided with the objective of the campaign. The coincidence of Angola's changing position with increasing indications of transnational stability echoes the finding of the case study that the specter of instability has the power to bring sideliners newly into the fray.

### Zone 3*: Institutional Stewardship*

Zone 3 resides the bottom left of the MDS plot, corresponding to the densest region. Here is the core constituency of foreign state supporters of civil society and human rights. Its members consistently take tangible measures to enable and equip civil society in the targeted state. But, these supporters shy away from public diplomacy. This quieter zone of support includes states motivated to achieve reform but also preferential of gradual change. These state supporters are highly embedded in the global human rights

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[60] The instance of conflict mediation was not detected by EX-D.

regime. Notably, not engaging in public diplomacy efforts like pressuring the regime or bolstering the movement does not mean that such supporters are not expressing disapproval behind closed doors (Lyman 2002).[61] Still, as it relates to the movement, these countries would not appear terribly committed to its goals, seemingly focused instead on reforming regimes from within.

German support to the Nepalese Anti-Government Campaign lies nearest to the center of this zone of commitment. The Nepal Anti-government crisis began early in the rule of King Gyanendra who after coming to power in 2001 dismantled the constitutional monarchy that had been in place since 1991. He dissolved parliament, dissolved the constitution, and declared a state of emergency. A coalition of opposition parties, trade unions, and Maoist Communists launched a campaign aiming to restore democracy. The coalition waged an all-encompassing national strike beginning on April 5, 2006. Participants called for a tax boycott, defied curfews, and braved violent repression and arrests. The King ultimately agreed to reinstate parliament on April 24th, and Girija Prasad Koirala was elected Prime Minister (Abbass 2010; Human Rights Watch 2005).

Germany provided no direct support to the movement itself, and we did not detect diplomatic gestures relating to the unrest. Rather, at the time, Germany had small ODA programs ongoing in Nepal dedicated to strengthening civil society (AidData #62717907, and #67599033). This behavior is consistent with the broader Germany-Nepal bilateral relationship. Outside of the mass campaign context, Germany is a principal bilateral

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[61] As Ambassador Princeton Lyman writes in his memoir of the transition process in South Africa, Chester Crocker offered to limit public criticism as an incentive for the South African government to go along with his tripartite accord (Lyman 2002, 32).

donor to Nepal, which suggests a more sustained interest in seeing Nepal democratize that goes beyond the mass movement. Media reports from the period indicate that Germany had provided over $1 billion in aid since the 1970s. Furthermore, following the 2006 Peace Agreement between Maoists and the government Germany pledged $42 million for development projects (*Deutsche Presse Agentur* 2006).

*Outliers and Borderline Case*

Plotting state-movement dyads in zones of commitment allows for facilitated identification of outliers and borderline cases. Such examples allow for examination in deeper detail of the usefulness of the ideal type scheme. Israel is a useful outlier worth a closer look. According to EX-D, Israel has publicly involved itself in three maximalist campaigns since 2000: those in Lebanon, Syria, and Iran. Showing remarkable internal consistency, each of Israel's supportive relations are plotted at the top right of the map – demonstrating active diplomatic gestures in support of movements targeting governments with which it has great foreign policy differences. Israel exemplifies the idea that staunch adversaries of the target government are not inclined to take active measures in support of a movement.

The United Kingdom's involvement in Ukraine's Orange revolution provides an illustrative borderline case. According to the *k*-means solution, the UK's support to the Orange Revolution lies in group 3 – the institutional steward. But its location on the outermost edge of the zone 3, and proximity to zone 1 and zone 2 makes it interesting to examine more closely. According to our data, the United Kingdom offered both official development assistance to the Ukrainian government and engaged in equipping the

demonstrators – a clear Institutional Steward repertoire. However, its low level of human rights embeddedness relative to others in the cluster pulls its rightward on the x-axis. Thus, even though the UK is located amongst a group of democracy promoters, its location on the border of the zone due to low embeddedness may put into question the human rights flavor of its policy objectives.

The plotting of state-movement dyads in three zones of commitments has illuminated several novel dynamics of foreign government support. With the respect to the willing revisionist zone, first I noted that its members demonstrate the widest variation in supportive postures. Second, this zone shows us that states particularly hostile to a targeted government are less likely to take active measures in support of a movement. On one hand, this makes sense because hostile state involvement with a protest movement, if discovered, would allow the targeted government to link the movement with an acute national rival, thereby seriously jeopardizing its popular appeal. On the other, a hostile state may not get materially involved in order to not distract from the targeted government's mismanagement of its domestic affairs (Meernik 2001).

Third, we saw that the United States emerges as a unique actor within the set of willing revisionists. It stands out for its strong action taken in support of protests targeting countries with which it has a difficult bilateral relationship. And finally, willing revisionists, although robust supporters of the movement, may only be peripherally interested in a movement's specific goals.

The other two zones provided novel insight, as well. Institutional stewards, or the traditional democracy promoters, tend to refrain from public condemnations or visible

bolstering of the movement. These states offer a quieter support and seem less interested in the success of the movement itself than the manifestation of democracy, broadly speaking. Finally, grievance supporters, the likely instrumentalists, limit their support to diplomatic gestures. They may, like Angola, be particularly likely to come off the bench, so to speak, in the face of deepening instability both as a measure of self-preservation or to project regional leadership.

# Chapter 5: Conclusions and Implications

On February 1, 2021, armed forces in Burma declared a state of emergency and forcibly detained the leaders of the National League for Democracy, which had just won an electoral majority of seats in parliament. The military stated the election was fraudulent. Thus far it appears that the democratic reforms promised following the Saffron Revolution have indeed proved temporary. The coup has been followed by mass protests, which while tolerated at first, within two months have met with mass government violence against activists resulting in 107 dead in a single day. The coup – in which the military prevented the certification of a newly elected government – rings familiar given the events of January 6, 2021 in the United States.

As these terrible events unfold in Myanmar, and elsewhere, major data projects in political science such as Freedom House and Varieties of Democracy agree that overall, the world is becoming less democratic (Repucci and Slipowitz 2021; Luhrmann et al. 2021). Not only that but scholars have begun to observe that autocrats are refining their toolkits while movements may be becoming less organized (Chenoweth et al. 2019). This project showed that even though a single state – the United States – is willing to actively challenge unfriendly regimes through support to civil society, most states are not. The foreign plot accusation appears to be exaggerated and not reflective of reality. Most willing revisionists publicly oppose the regime at arms-length, while most democracy

promoters work with the government quietly behind the scenes. As for those states that legitimize the movement's grievances through diplomatic channels - they appear to do so when stability concerns arise, or when they stand to accumulate useful political capital.

This dissertation aimed to make sense of the variation in foreign government behavior toward maximalist nonviolent protests such as the one in Burma in early 2021. For a range of stakeholders it is useful to know on a general level the types of state supporters that show up to these events and what sort of political baggage they bring. This dissertation's inductive approach to grouping state supporters by observed behavior, context, and relational content has highlighted some counterintuitive patterns that gesture toward equifinality of state assistance. This is to say that similar repertoires of support are undergirded by varying configurations of conditions. State support to movements, I have shown, is not monocausal, unidimensional, or fully described on a simple spectrum of low to high support.

I found that characterizing the supportive behavior can be done productively if couched in a foreign policy making frame. This specificity is necessary to cut through the ambiguity resident in key political science orientations of interests, institutions, and ideas. Support to maximalist movements cannot simply be a story of states pursuing their individual interests. The behavior of Sweden and Zambia during the Anti-Apartheid struggle shows that some states are willing to endure economic and material costs to uphold human rights. It also cannot simply be a story of democracy promotion. The span of countries that spoke out in favor of the Syrian Uprising includes both democracies and autocracies. Finally, ideas and international solidarity do not provide full explanation,

either. In fact, supporters are well distinguished by varying orientations to the global human rights regime. Only one of three ideal types – the institutional stewards – showed significant embeddedness in global human rights and ironically, the states in this zone are reticent in the public sphere. The more vocal states are those most likely to be seeking direct political gains, possibly at the expense of the targeted government.

The framework offered here invites analysts to consider how support to a movement enables or discourages outcomes that are compatible with a state's overarching foreign policy objective. However, whereas a supporting state executes foreign policy, movement actors rather perceive states with varying forms of commitment to their cause. The expanded categorization scheme of support accommodates both perspectives. The five supportive categories here – bolster, enable, equip, pressure, and stabilize – strike the balance of being specific enough to offer useful information while being general enough to apply to a global sample.[62] These categories proved useful for generating a scale that measures state involvement. We learn that states will choose one of three general supportive repertoires: an active approach that enables and equips civil society, a diplomatic approach that stays physically at arms-length while utilizing diplomatic channels, and a dynamic approach that draws from both ends of the spectrum. Without the data collected by the EX-D support, we would not know in this detail these tendencies of state support.

[62] As Collier et al (2012) put it "The challenge for both qualitative and quantitative measurement is to find the scope of comparison and level of aggregation – that is, the degree to which indicators are broken down into their constituent elements – best suited to the analytic goals of the study."

Certain themes have emerged over the course of the analysis that comprise this dissertation's main findings. First, according to my data there are three ideal types of state supporters: willing revisionists, grievance legitimizers, and institutional stewards. The primary conditions that place a particular state in a particular ideal type are the sort of support offered, the supporter's orientation toward global human rights, and the quality of its relationship with the sitting government.

This project did not benefit from data that could directly analyze the degree to which the relationship between the movement and supporter matter, but we got some hints. Specifically, states prove to be primarily self-interested actors that rarely take active interest in the concrete goals of movements. There is a rather small region on the plot that would be consistent with deep altruistic commitment to the movement and its goals, which comprises a subregion in the zone of institutional stewardship. Here state supporters could be characterized by their allegiance to global human rights and dynamic supportive profile. In that zone, states would not demonstrate particularly strong opposition to the targeted regime, thus have a mitigated risk of vested political interests. Outside this zone of altruism, though, support appears to be a way for states to achieve other things that have relatively little to do with the movement achieving its goals.

Dynamics in the MDS plot of the global sample presented another interesting pattern: as antagonism grows between a supporting and target state, supporters will tend toward public advocacy rather than active measures. Hostile enabling of a movement is quite rare, according to the data. One reason for this could be that intervening materially in a rival's protest could allow the targeted regime space to deflect from its own failings.

Meernik (2001) puts forward this line of reasoning – vulnerable states that are also bad at governance might draw attention to foreign material intervention as a convenient way to distract from domestic woes.

## Implications for Scholars

We now have a better idea of what supporting states do, and what distinguishes one from another. We can eschew overly simplistic notions that state supporters are inherently antagonistic to targeted governments, and we have reason to explore support to nonviolent movements on its own rather than only in reference to violent rebellion.

This dissertation surfaces several questions that merit further investigation. Even if we can categorize state supporters according to notions of their commitment to a movement, we can only guess what drives them to be a supporter in the first place. The above has provided some starting clues: states weaker than the target appear to rarely intervene, for example. Beyond that, more work is needed to explain the onset of state support.[63]

Second, any future exploration of this topic will need a better measure for economic ties between the supporting and target state. In the South Africa case study, trade ties did seem to have a meaningful relationship to the dimensions clustering state supporters. The importance of trade, however, mostly disappeared in the global sample. This mirrors reality in an important way – economic integration today is much more than

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[63] As the work by Clifford Bob (2005) highlights, activists can never be certain who or what organizations will latch onto their cause. Nor can they be sure which supporters are likely to "stay in" (Jentleson and Levite 1992) once they have shown up. These issues remain to be addressed, and hopefully this project provides a starting point.

exports and imports between states. A better economic variable would account for infrastructure dependence like Zambia's on South Africa. It would account for the strategic nature of things traded (i.e. minerals), which cannot be noted purely through trade volume. It might account for future trade expectations (Copeland 2014). And, it would account for FDI and the presence or absence of companies, both private and those linked to a potential supporting state.

Third, future investigation should consider the degree to which states delegate support to movements through multilateral organizations. This dissertation focused on the "triad" – interactions between the supporting state, the movement/civil society, and the targeted regime (San-Akca 2016). However, mass sums of money and effort are expended through IGOs like the European Community, and the UN (Burnell 2008). We do not know what causes states to choose direct or facilitated support, and how that choice affects recipients.

In a general sense, though, this dissertation shows the importance of allowing multiple frameworks to coexist when investigating a complicated international phenomenon. In looking at a single behavior, I have shown that states approach movements in ways that align with commonly offered schools of thought in international politics (Wheeler 1992). Willing revisionists may adhere more to a realist, Hobbesian approach. Institutional stewards, seeking to shore up states, align with an international society view, and the grievance legitimators could be argued to subscribe to universal international values at least superficially, albeit for instrumental reasons. Seeing various

frameworks integrated to explain a single phenomenon would not have been possible if I had invested upfront in a single theoretical approach.

## Implications for Policymakers

Policymakers might take away two main points. First, they find here a counter-narrative to the ubiquitous accusation that foreign governments are responsible for maximalist nonviolent movements. Certainly, the more menacing forms of foreign meddling in political institutions is a topic of growing salience. However, such activity (i.e., election interference, social media disinformation campaigns) comprise a small piece of a broader picture. Based on this data, the most unfriendly governments appear to keep their distance from events on the ground. More data will be needed to further interrogate this claim. In addition, the governments taking active postures are mostly those that have already been engaged with the targeted government through official development assistance channels, which quite possibly also includes support to its security apparatus.[64]

Second, this dissertation highlights that nondemocracies provide support to pro-democracy movements more often than we might think. This diversity in support offers some indication of the strength of the global human rights regime. Even if repression happens within the borders of China, Russia, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, these countries are still engaging in conventional diplomatic practice and speaking out against repression

[64] Highlighted in activist commentary at an ICNC event in 2021.

elsewhere. We might consider how to amplify such pro-democratic behavior on the part of nondemocracies.

## Implications for Activists/Practitioners

For practitioners, this dissertation offers a language and a framework to better understand the spectrum of state support they might expect. It provides a way to translate a foreign policy-driven government's behavior into a framework of commitment to their goals. Beyond that, though, this research gives activists reason (if they did not already have it) to question government supporters' interest in the success of their movement, specifically. The spectrum of possible support, after all, includes behaviors that are not only pro-movement, but also pro-stability, and anti-regime.

According to Weber, identifying the ideal points provides only partial insight into the phenomenon of interest. Now what remains is to explore the degree to which empirical cases differ from the ideal types, in what ways, and why that might be the case (Swedberg 2018). As Swedberg puts it, the ideal type must now confront reality.

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# Methodological Appendix: Maps versus Matrices

This dissertation offers an approach to systematic categorization that differs from the conventional approach of typology creation. Finding typological research overly restrictive, I turn instead to creating data-extracted ideal types using a collection of quantitative techniques. The difference is substantive – whereas typology "takes a high-dimensional object and returns one and only one value from a finite set" (Ahlquist and Breunig 2012), ideal types are heuristic devices to set our bearings in relation to a topic of interest (Swedberg 2018).

Typically, we define typologies as exhaustive and mutually exclusive systems for categories of things of interest (Collier, LaPorte, and Seawright 2012). Typologies in political science tend to be qualitative endeavors and there are multiple types. Usually typologies take one of two forms: descriptive or explanatory. Descriptive (or conceptual) typologies help to "explicate the meaning of a concept," or make explicit its attributes. Explanatory typologies, meanwhile, categorize outcomes by what brought them about. In the qualitative tradition of typology, scholars tend to choose a certain typology "type" and must carefully scope their cases and variables so that dimensions do not grow to become unwieldy (Elman 2005).[65] Collier et al. (2012) provide an extensive list of typologies in social science. They also convey a fascinating discomfort with typologies

[65] Elman (2005) offers helpful techniques to "compress" the property space, and even to "expand" it as necessary.

that do not fit neatly within a matrix – another restriction imposed by typological epistemology that this project sets aside.

The popularization of certain statistical techniques has made quantitative typologies possible. In 1980, Carmines and Stimson compared results from multiple probit models to categorize people into one of four groups according to issue-voter type (Carmines and Stimson 1980). Several studies in political science utilize latent class analysis, which is showing signs of becoming more popular.[66] As an example, Blaydes and Linzer (2008) use latent class analysis to identify different qualities of Islamic belief systems in women. They find four sub-groups (secular-liberal, religious, traditional, and fundamentalist) and argue that unemployed, married women with low levels of education and social class are most likely to subscribe to a fundamentalist belief system. Latent class analysis, thus, offers the opportunity to transcend the usual separation between descriptive and explanatory typologies.

Data-driven ideal types are less common, although appetite is growing to develop approaches that can achieve them (Ahlquist and Breunig 2012; Swedberg 2018).Three notable pieces of scholarship have extracted empirical ideal types: Gosta Esping-Anderson's three worlds of welfare capitalism, Robert Dahl's conception of democracy as an ideal type, and most recently, Stacie Goddard's (2018) piece using network analysis to explore ideal types of international order revisionists. The notable difference between work that extracts ideal types versus the work that seeks a typology is that scholars of

[66] Despite being an explicit way of deriving typology, LCA escapes mention in Collier, LaPorte and Seawright's (2012) piece on typology, who opt instead to discuss IRT and structural equation models, which have made significant inroads into political science relative to LCA (Fariss 2014; Armstrong 2011; Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten 2017).

ideal types usually embrace the Weberian stipulation that no observation fully encompasses the type with which it is associated. Esping-Anderson writes "we show that welfare states cluster, but we must recognize that there is no single pure case. The Scandinavian countries may be predominantly social democratic, but they are not free of crucial liberal elements. Neither are the liberal regimes pure types" (28). Dahl writes of democracy:

> In this book I should like to reserve the term "democracy" for a political system one of the characteristics of which is the quality of being completely or almost completely responsive to all its citizens. Whether such a system actually exists, has existed, or can exist need not concern us for the moment…As a hypothetical system, one end of a scale, or a limiting state of affairs, it can (like a perfect vacuum) serve as a basis for estimating the degree to which various systems approach this theoretical limit." (2)

The advantage of an ideal typical approach over a typological one lies in the appreciation of the distance from an empirical observation to the theorized ideal type. The difference between the observation and the ideal type is interesting, and an avenue for discovery, rather than a potential violation of categorical assignment. The inductive nature of this dissertation justifies an ideal typical approach rather than typology. It allows a descriptive and exploratory way to uncover the structure of data and manage many different variables suggested as important by the literature and the South Africa case study. This amounts to categorization as theory building (Ahlquist and Breunig 2012). Using methods of latent variable estimation, multidimensional scaling, and *k*-means clustering I produce ideal typical maps that up to this point have been referred to only metaphorically (P. T. Jackson and Nexon 2013). In this appendix I provide more detailed descriptions of the analytic approach and provide additional output.

## Bayesian Item Response Theory

As described in Chapter 4, I created a new variable that measures state involvement using item-response theory (IRT) in the Bayesian framework. I use IRT in this context to create a summary variable of five indicators of state support available from the raw EX-D dataset. Most commonly, IRT is used in education to assess individuals' levels of various kinds of academic ability, but it also has extensive applicability in political science. Past studies have used it to measure estimates of political information (Jackman 2000), to manage cross-national expert surveys (Pemstein et al. 2015), and to create measures of respect for human rights (Fariss 2014). This dissertation uses IRT in an almost mechanical fashion to learn about item quality, tendencies of states supporters, and to learn inductively the sort of continuum along which we can characterize state support. In this section I outline the process and code used to generate involvement scores and interpret the continuum of assistance provided to protests.

EX-D (introduced in Chapter 1) is an event dataset that reports raw instances of support from a provider to a recipient. After filtering the dataset to include only state-provided support, I collapsed it first into counts of each pre-defined support type (i.e., bolster, pressure, stabilize, enable, and equip) at the state-protest dyad unit of analysis. Then, I dichotomized these counts into simple 1s or 0s. Using dichotomous indicators was necessary because of the wide variation in counts. For example, western supporters that report ODA projects through AidData.org demonstrated very high numbers of enabling support because even the smallest disbursement of funds would be considered

an instance of support. Non-OECD countries, by contrast, showed much lower counts of enabling support (if any), predictably, since they do not provide ODA at the same levels or they do not report it publicly. Since the dataset includes financial assistance to movements detected in media reports it is feasibly that non-OECD countries "enabled" movements.

With the key indicators arranged in a matrix of zeros and ones, they can be fed into the IRT model. I use the classical 2-parameter IRT model with a logit link function, per Jackman (2000):

$$p_{ij} \equiv \Pr[y_{ij} = 1] = logit(\beta_{j1} Inv_i - \beta_{j2})$$

The model generates estimates that a given state supporter *i* would provide support type *j* based on three values, all of which are unknown prior to estimation: a state's latent level of involvement *Inv*, the item (support type) discrimination $\beta_{j1}$ and the item (support type) difficulties $\beta_{j2}$, where j = 1,..,5 for the five indicators of support. I estimate the model using the R Statistical Software, `R2jags` package.

In the Bayesian framework, estimating the model above becomes a "missing data problem" as explained in Jackman (2000), where each parameter is akin to a missing value that can be found through simulation techniques. The Gibbs sampler used by the program draws an arbitrary number of samples (7,000 in this case) from conditional distributions for each parameter, updating the distribution with each iteration based on information in the observed data. The model converges on a joint posterior distribution for the estimated parameters *inv,* $\beta_{j1}$, and $\beta_{j2}$. This is computationally simpler than maximum likelihood estimations, particularly in the presence of hundreds of parameters.

This model requires the estimation of 789 parameters (779 observations + five discrimination parameters + five difficulty parameters). Upon model convergence the marginal distributions for each parameter can be summarized with an appropriate statistic (mean or median) that serves as an estimate for further analysis.

To ensure parameter identification and aid convergence I treated the “enable” item as a reference parameter (Jackman 2001) and constrained it to the negative end of the variable continuum. Recall that enabling support indicated whether a state sends financial resources to a targeted state in support of civil society and democratization through official development assistance channels. With this constraint, the simple 2-parameter IRT model showed evidence of convergence where all monitored parameters corresponded to an rhat $< 1.1$, and effective iterations well over 100.

In the IRT model, I assume the newly created involvement variable is distributed normally with mean *mu* and a precision of one. As mentioned, the 2PL model provides posterior distributions for the item discrimination and difficulty. I specify diffuse normal priors for the discrimination and difficulty parameters, with mean zero and variance 10. The model featured significant discrimination parameters for all five support type indicators, indicating that “involvement” can reasonably be depicted on a unidimensional continuum with the indicators created (Jackman 2001). The items show weakness in terms of difficulty parameters, though. Posterior distributions for several item difficulty parameters included zero, specifically those for bolster, enable, and pressure. This can be interpreted to mean that a state’s position along the latent continuum ambiguously affects its likelihood of provided those types of support.

*Table 2 Item Parameters (* indicates that the 95% posterior distribution included zero)*

| Indicator | Discrimination (Posterior Mean) | Difficulty (Posterior Mean) | Sample Frequency |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bolster | 1.757 | .657* | .187 |
| Equip | -.383 | 1.295 | .281 |
| Enable | -3.242 | .707* | .712 |
| Pressure | 1.503 | .577* | .204 |
| Stabilize | .788 | 2.052 | .074 |

The dataset analyzed for the global sample is both nested (many states support the same protest), and cross-classified (the same state might support multiple movements). We attempted to account for the hierarchical and cross classified structure of the data with multilevel IRT models but were not able to achieve convergence despite runs of several hundred thousand iterations. When relatively straightforward models do not reach convergence with such a high number of iterations, the conventional wisdom says to simplify the model (Gelman and Hill 2006, 369). The inability to use protest movement random effects, state random effects, or both (none converged) reflects the extremely unbalanced nature of my sample. Certain protests in the global sample saw very few foreign supporters, while others saw a diverse range. Similarly, certain states supported many movements, whereas most supported one. Table 3 below shows lists the protest movements that received the highest and lowest supporters, and their rank in the full sample. Table 4 lists the most prolific supporters alongside examples of the many states that supported a single movement.

Data quality aside, the inability to assign random effects for state supporter or protest movement aligns with ideas presented earlier in this dissertation. From the US-Venezuela case, we have reason to suspect that intrinsic movement characteristics do not

matter very much in shaping state support. Second, as shown in plots that demonstrated some states (i.e. the United States) vary more in their behavior than others (i.e. Sweden) state effects are unlikely to be a systematic feature of support to protest movements. With the continuum of involvement specified as a single continuous variable, it can now be integrated with other continuous variables in a multidimensional scaling solution.

*Table 3 Most and Least Supported Movements in EX-D*

| Rank | Country | Year | Movement Name | # State Supporters |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Syria | 2011 | Syrian Uprising | 36 |
| 2 | Egypt | 2007 | January 25 Revolution (Anti-Mubarak) | 27 |
| 3 | Georgia | 2007 | Anti-Shashkvilli campaign | 25 |
| 4 | Belarus | 2006 | Denim Revolution (Belarus Pro-Democracy Campaign) | 22 |
| 5 | Senegal | 2000 | Anti-Diouf | 20 |
| 6 | Egypt | 2003 | Kifaya | 20 |
| 7 | Egypt | 2013 | Pro-Morsi Protests | 19 |
| 8 | Yugoslavia | 2000 | Bulldozer Revolution (Anti-Milosevic) | 19 |
| 9 | Haiti | 2005 | Pro-Aristide Campaign | 18 |
| 10 | Iran | 2009 | Green Revolution and Day of Rage | 18 |
| 11 | Kyrgyzstan | 2005 | Tulip Revolution | 18 |
| 12 | Egypt | 2013 | Anti-Morsi Protests | 18 |
| 54 | Mexico | 2006 | Anti-Calderon Movement | 5 |
| 55 | Maldives | 2012 | Nasheed Supporters | 5 |
| 56 | Bahrain | 2011 | Bahrain Anti-King Hamad | 5 |
| 57 | Russia | 2010 | Snow Revolution | 4 |
| 58 | Djibouti | 2011 | Djibouti Arab Spring | 4 |
| 59 | Turkey | 2013 | anti-Erdogan | 4 |
| 60 | Jordan | 2011 | Protest for Constitutional Reform | 3 |
| 61 | Indonesia | 2000 | West Papua Anti-Occupation | 3 |
| 62 | Tonga | 2005 | Tongan Pro-Democracy Protests | 2 |
| 63 | Bulgaria | 2013 | Dance With Me | 2 |
| 64 | Fiji | 2000 | Anti-Chaudhry Campaign | 2 |
| 65 | Thailand | 2013 | Civil Movement for Democracy | 1 |

*Table 4 Most and Least Prolific State Supporters*

| Rank | State Supporter | # Movements Supported |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | United States of America | 61 |
| 2 | Germany | 51 |
| 3 | Canada | 49 |
| 4 | United Kingdom | 42 |
| 5 | France | 41 |
| 6 | Sweden | 39 |
| 7 | Norway | 38 |
| 8 | Switzerland | 33 |
| 9 | Belgium | 30 |
| 10 | Netherlands | 30 |
| 86 | Ukraine | 1 |
| 87 | South Sudan | 1 |
| 88 | Mexico | 1 |
| 89 | Iceland | 1 |
| 90 | Gambia | 1 |
| 91 | Latvia | 1 |
| 92 | Cambodia | 1 |
| 93 | Slovenia | 1 |
| 94 | Niger | 1 |
| 95 | Dominican Republic | 1 |

*Table 5 Two-parameter IRT Model with 1 Constraint*

```
irt <-function(){

  for(i in 1:779){

    for(j in 1:5){

      items[i,j] ~ dbern(p[i,j])

      logit(p[i,j]) <- Inv[i]*g[j,1] - g[j,2]

    }

  }

  for(i in 1:779){

   Inv[i] ~ dnorm(mu.Inv[i],1)

    mu.Inv[i] <- mu

  }

  mu ~dnorm(0,.1)

  g[1,1]  ~ dnorm(0,1)
  g[2,1]  ~ dnorm(0,1)
  g[3,1]  ~ dnorm(0,1);T(,0)
  g[4,1]  ~ dnorm(0,1)
  g[5,1]  ~ dnorm(0,1)


for(j in 1:5){

    g[j,2]  ~dnorm(0,1)

    }

}

lca.dat<-list("items"=items)

lca.params<-c("g", "Inv", "mu")

irtfit<-jags(data=lca.dat, inits= NULL, lca.params, n.chains=2,
n.iter=7000, n.burnin=4000, n.thin = 1, model.file=irt)
```

## Multidimensional Scaling and Dimensional Analysis

MDS is a form of structural analysis that plots observations according to how similar they are to each other in a low-dimensional space. To run this analysis, I created a row profile for each state-protest dyad that includes the supporter's involvement score on the IRT variable, and its values on the key variables described in Chapter 4: the presence of domestic civilian support, relative bilateral capabilities, the level of supporter's human rights embeddedness, bilateral foreign policy distance, and trade dependence.

In MDS, the first step is to transform the raw data into a *n* x *n* matrix of dissimilarities using the `dist()` function in R. The following Euclidean formula is used to find the dissimilarities between each observation based on their values on each variable. It finds the differences on each variable and sums them for each pair, generating a square matrix of dissimilarities (Mair, Groenen, and de Leeuw n.d.).

$$Dissimilarities_{ij} = \sqrt{\sum_{p=1}^{5} (x_i - x_j)^2}$$

The scaling conducted in this project is *nonmetric*. This means the solution plots scaled dissimilarities on an ordinal rather than a ratio scale. Using the R `smacof` package, I specify the option for ordinal MDS, which transforms the dissimilarities matrix with a monotone step function. The result of the transformation is a disparity matrix $\widehat{d_{ij}}$, which is passed to the MDS function.

To find the optimal solution `smacof` uses majorization[67] to find coordinates for each observation in two dimensions that reflect as much of the information in $\widehat{d_{ij}}$ as possible. To do this it minimizes stress ($\sigma^2$). Stress is a measure of how much the visualized distances in the reduced two-dimensional space differ from the those in the disparity matrix $\widehat{d_{ij}}$. The matrix **X** contains the coordinates (called configurations) for each observation where:

$$d_{ij}(\mathbf{X}) = \sqrt{\sum_{s=1}^{2}\left(x_{is} - x_{js}\right)^2}$$

The function to be minimized to locate optimal coordinates in low-dimensional space is:

$$\sigma^2\left(\widehat{\mathbf{D}}, \mathbf{X}\right) = \frac{\sum_{i<j} w_{ij}\left(\widehat{d_{ij}} - d_{ij}(\mathbf{X})\right)^2}{n(n-1)/2}$$

Two-dimensional solutions are optimal from an interpretation standpoint, but nothing guarantees that two-dimensions appropriately fit the data. For that reason, using a loop I check the stress of one to five dimensions. After that I calculate the MDS solution. Stress for one dimension is .28, for two is .108, and for three is .04. Given the gains of a two-dimensional solution for interpretation, and an acceptable stress of 11%, I ultimately chose the 2-dimensional solution.

[67] Majorization is a way to optimize a function. According to de Leeuw and Mair (2009), majorization means to find a more simple surrogate function to optimize that majorizes the function of interest. A surrogate function $g(x, y)$ majorizes a function of interest $f(x)$ if for all x $g(x, y) \geq f(x)$.

*Table 6 Multidimensional Scaling Code*

```
#Calculate distance matrix using identified variables

dist.matrix <- dist(MDS.variables)


#Confirm dimensionality

ndim <- 5

result <- vector("list", ndim)

for (i in 1:ndim){

  result[[i]] <- smacofSym(dist.matrix, ndim=i, type="ordinal",
ties="primary")

}

stress <- sapply(result, function(x)x$stress)

stress


# Compute MDS Solution

global.mds <- smacofSym(dist.global, ndim = 2, type = "ordinal", ties
= "primary")


#Visualize locations of observations with high and low values of key
variables

HR <- ggplot(mds, aes(x=D1, y=D2, color = HREmbeddedness)) +

  geom_point(aes(colour = cut(HRembed,2)),

             size = 2,

             position=position_jitter(width=.01, height = .01))
```

## *K*-means Clustering

Cluster analysis seeks to identify groups of observations that are most similar internally while being as different as possible to the other groups. *K*-means clustering is known as a relocation clustering method where the analyst first specifies the number of

clusters to create and the algorithm optimally locates observations in each cluster (Ahlquist and Breunig 2012). Optimal placement is defined by a minimized distance to the "centroids," the middle location of a multidimensional space. Optimal distance refers to a minimized the within-cluster sum of squares. The cluster centroid is the mean value on each dimension of all points assigned to that cluster. In this analysis the centroids are the notional ideal types. Weaknesses of *k*-means, as described by Ahlquist and Breunig, include a risk of overinterpretation (seeing patterns that don't actually exist), and the artificial creation of spherical clusters as an artifact of the use of Euclidian distances.

*K*-means is executed in a series of steps that is repeated for each observation in the sample. It begins by selecting three candidate observations as initial cluster centers, and iterates through each observation finding which cluster it should belong to according to its distance from each cluster centroid (Hartigan and Wong 1979). After assignment, a new calculation is made to update the corresponding centroid. I use the `kmeans()` function from the R `stats` package to locate clusters. This function defaults to calculating distances according to Euclidean distances, which I retain. The variables used in the clustering are the coordinates provided by the MDS function described above.

*Figure 16 Cluster Selection Plot*




Because the analyst must set the number of clusters, I show how I visually determined the optimal number of clusters. Table 7 shows the information gains for each cluster configuration from 1 to 20, which is analogous to an $R^2$ score in regression. According to the plot below, the greatest gains in information occur up to three or four clusters. There is no obvious elbow in this plot confirming that states are not clustering in obvious ways. The three-cluster solution, however, provided well-differentiated centroids on key variables, which was why it was ultimately selected.

*Table 7 Cluster Selection Code*

```
#Identify number of clusters to use in solution

N=20

information=rep(NA,N)
for(i in 1:N){
  KM=kmeans(as.matrix(global.coords), centers = i, iter.max
= 35,nstart = 10)
  information[i]=KM$betweenss/KM$totss
}

plot(information~seq(1:N), type="b",pch=16, col=4,
ylab="Information Retained",lwd=2,

     xlab="Number of Clusters", main="Elbow Plot")

#Assign cluster membership and join with MDS coordinates

clust <- kmeans(as.matrix(global.coords), centers=3)

Groups <- as.factor(clust$cluster)

mds <- cbind(global.coords, Groups, MDS.final)


#Create plot

clusterplot <- ggscatter(mds, x = "D1", y = "D2",

          color = "Groups",

          palette = "jco",

          size = 1,

          ellipse = TRUE,

          ellipse.type = "convex",

          repel = TRUE)


clusterplot <- print(clusterplot +  labs(x= "", y=""))
```