

# **The evolution of the relationship between language and identity politics in contemporary Taiwan**

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I, Marie-Alice McLean-Dreyfus, declare that this Honours thesis is my own original work, and that all sources have been acknowledged.

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## List of abbreviations

KMT	The Chinese National People's Party 中國國民黨 (Kuomintang)
DPP	Democratic Progressive Party 台灣民主進步黨
PRC	People's Republic of China
STM	Standard Taiwanese Mandarin
BMS	Beijing Mandarin Standard
CSSTA	Cross Strait Services Trade Agreement 海峽兩岸服務貿易協議
EY	Executive Yuan 行政院
LY	Legislative Yuan 立法院

## Abstract

There exists a wide literature on Taiwanese identity. However, less research has been conducted into how language practices and policies have impacted upon Taiwanese identity, that is, the feeling of commonality amongst all those living in Taiwan. This thesis will evaluate the role of language in the evolution of national identity in Taiwan. Through review of Taiwan's various historical periods, the European, Qing Dynasty, Japanese and then the authoritarian Kuomintang rule this thesis will show how the role of local languages and Mandarin has evolved in Taiwan. Via analysis of survey data and features of the written and spoken language from the March 2014 Sunflower Movement in Taiwan, this thesis argues that in the contemporary era local languages are now a symbolic part of identity while Standard Taiwanese Mandarin has now been accepted as a language of Taiwan. This thesis further argues that the non-linguistic aspects of national identity have become increasingly important. These include identifying with the *place* Taiwan, respecting Taiwan's democratic institutions and looking forward to Taiwan's future. This thesis adds nuance to the wide body of research discussing the relationship between language and national identity.



## Note on transcription conventions, scope and limitations

With various forms of transliteration of Chinese names into English, I have adopted the *hanyu pinyin* 漢語拼音 Romanisation system. Proper names begin with surnames followed by given names, with exceptions for well-known names known by other Romanisation systems, (for example, Chiang Kai-shek). Accepted place names will be used. For some specific Chinese terms, the first reference will be given with Chinese characters and Romanisation, with all successive references in italicised Romanisation.

The first of the two main languages focused on in this thesis is Taiwanese, known by several names, including: Hokkien, Taiwanese Hokkien, Southern Min, Holo, Hoklo, Tâi-gí, and *taiyu*, 台語. This paper will adopt Tâi-gí due to the unresolved and ongoing debate about its name and the difficulty in selecting a name that ‘reflect[s] both local authenticity and a clear demarcation from mainland Chinese linguistic varieties’ while not antagonising ‘speakers of Taiwan’s non-Mandarin languages’ (Klöter 2009: 109). The second main language is referred to as Mandarin in this thesis. In Taiwan it is commonly referred to as *guoyu* 國語. On the Mainland it is known as *Putonghua* 普通話, literally the common language.

This paper will use the term Mainland China to refer to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In Taiwan political statements are made by the term used to refer to China. The Chinese National People’s Party 中國國民黨 (Kuomintang [KMT]) calls it ‘the Mainland’ 大陸. The Taiwan Democratic Progressive Party 台灣民主進步黨 [DPP] prefers to call it ‘The Chinese Mainland’ 中國大陸 adding ‘Chinese’ to differentiate Taiwan from China (Wachman 1994: 81). The DPP and the KMT are the two main political parties in Taiwan.

Discussion of ‘Chinese’ is complicated due to imprecision in English terminology. The English word ‘Chinese’ can refer to both ethnic identity (for example Australians of Chinese ancestry) and national identity (citizens of the PRC). In Mandarin Chinese this is remedied by the distinction between *hanren* 漢族人 or *huaren* 華人 which refer to someone of Chinese ethnicity without implying that that person is necessarily a Chinese national, and *Zhongguoren* 中國人 which refers to the nationality and citizenship of someone living in the PRC. In Taiwan, this was complicated as the ruling KMT used *Zhongguo ren* to justify its claims to be the government of China. In this thesis I use ‘Han Chinese’ to refer to the ethnic identity and ‘Chinese’ to refer to the national identity of people in the PRC (following Brown 2004: 1).

The history of Taiwanese aboriginals is immensely rich, yet due to word limitations of this thesis, justice would not be done to include their history in this discussion. However, hopefully it will be the subject of future study. Thus, references to ‘the Taiwanese’ in this paper specify the Taiwanese population of Han Chinese descent, while discussion of Taiwanese identity is also limited to Han Chinese.

## Introduction

Professor Wu Yi-cheng, a psychiatrist in Taiwan, had always been interested in social issues and suffering in society. This interest intensified in 2013 following an explosion of social movements in Taiwan. One day Wu heard the English song ‘Do you hear the people sing?’ from the musical *Les Miserables*. The lyrics issue a cry for social justice and express compassion for those who suffer. These themes resonated with him and he translated it into Tâi-gí. While initially only intending to share it with his close family and friends, he nevertheless posted it online. To his surprise within days the song had become an online hit and had been adopted as a protest song by many of Taiwan’s social movements. It continues to remain popular to this day and most recently was sung widely during the March Sunflower Movement. The song’s popularity also raises interesting questions about language usage and identity in Taiwan. Why was it that: ‘Do you hear the people sing’, which has existed in English for over 30 years, was only adopted by the people of Taiwan once it was translated into Tâi-gí? Why was it that a song sung in a language in decline and spoken by roughly 70% of the population became the unofficial anthem of a number of social movements? Finally, why was it that Taiwanese people identified more with a European cultural artefact than with a song from their own Han Chinese heritage? This thesis will answer these questions and will also shed light on the complex relationship between language and identity in Taiwan.

To answer these questions, this paper will ask: ‘what is the role of language in the evolution of Taiwanese identity politics?’ It will show that language was once used as one important marker of identity in Taiwan, distinguishing ‘the Taiwanese’ from other people who lived there. However, with changes in the political, social and economic spheres, language is no

longer used to divide the Taiwanese population. Instead, it is used to unite and forms part of a new identity on *place*, with language playing a role that is important but largely symbolic.

### Historical and sociolinguistic background

Taiwan is an island of 35,980 square kilometres in East Asia. It borders the East China and South China seas. The earliest evidence of colonisation in Taiwan was by Neolithic people, speakers of Austronesian languages approximately 5,500 years ago (Blust 2013: 25). Before Dutch and Spanish settlement in 1622, it is estimated the Indigenous population numbered 100,000. There were 14 distinct groups living along the west and north coastlines and nine groups inhabiting the area along the central mountain range. Settlement patterns suggest a hunter and gatherer lifestyle (Knapp 1999: 10-11). Today, Taiwan's indigenous population makes up only 2% of the 23 million population. This reflects the fact that after the start of Chinese migration to Taiwan in the 16<sup>th</sup> century, the Han Chinese population grew until it vastly outnumbered the island's indigenous residents. Taiwan is a multilingual society. Mandarin is its only official language and is spoken by 90% of the population. Tâi-gí is spoken, at least to some extent, by 73% of the population and Hakka is spoken by 10% of the population (Huang 1993). These two languages are, like Mandarin, part of the Sino-Tibetan language family. Along with the aboriginal languages, in this thesis, Tâi-gí and Hakka are referred to as local languages or *bentu yuyan* 本土語言. Japanese is still spoken by a number of residents, remnants of the Japanese occupation, but like Mandarin is not referred to as a local language.

## National identity in Taiwan

The accepted view is that national identity creates a feeling of shared commonality amongst a country's fellow-members even though they may never have met one another. It creates an 'imagined community' (Anderson 1991: 6), which allows those who form part of the nation to feel an emotional attachment to their country whilst giving legitimacy to the state (Kellas 1991: 1). Language is often invoked in the creation of a national identity. Various regimes within Taiwan have used language as one of the paramount criteria to foster unity.

Language as a symbol of individual and collective identity and humanity's main way of expressing beliefs and opinions has often been invoked as a unifying symbol used in nation building (Fishman 1968: 6). Since the French enlightenment, language has been 'at the heart of nationalism' playing a key role in the nation building process (Wright 2004: 8). Having a standardised linguistic market 'dominated by the official language' and homogenising the linguistic habits of citizens has become indispensable for efficient government and also therefore for nation-state building, establishing the correlation between strong nation states and the one nation, one language ideology (Bourdieu 1990: 45, 48). However, selecting a national language is not a 'pragmatic' process or dispassionate. If it were, as Eric Hobsbawm writes, then the variety with the highest probability of being spoken or understood would be selected. Rather, it is a political process subject to manipulation to ensure the nation's cohesiveness or creation of national identity (Hobsbawm 1990: 95-96).

Given its various periods of outside rule, Taiwan's national language has several times been chosen not on pragmatic factors such as number of speakers, but chosen with the intent of attaining political objectives such as nation building. Consequently, language became

inextricably linked with national identity in Taiwan and forms part of the contested nature of Taiwanese identity politics.<sup>1</sup>

Taiwan's geographic insularity, its small size and strategic location, enabled various outside regimes to rule Taiwan, imposing on the local population a shared set of historical experiences which kindled the start of a unique Taiwanese identity and society (Cabestan 2005; Shi-ming 1992: 9). Taiwan has experienced numerous waves of outside rule starting with the Dutch (1622-1662), a Ming dynasty loyalist Zheng Cheng-gong 鄭成功 (often referred to as Koxinga), (1662-1683) and then Qing dynasty rule (1683-1895).

It is widely held the first time language was used politically started with Japanese rule in 1895. The Japanese language was imposed and local languages suppressed to foster greater loyalty to the Japanese empire. It was during Japanese rule that the term "Taiwanese" 台灣人 was first coined. The term referred to all the residents of the island, excluding the Japanese (Tu 1998: 80). Moreover, local languages (in particular Tâi-gí) were used to establish a separate Taiwanese identity. They acted as a symbol of Han Taiwanese culture and marked the appearance of an alternative Taiwanese identity distinct from the Mainland and Japanese identities (Heylen 2005: 508).

After the Japanese were defeated in World War II in 1945, Taiwan was returned to China. Following their defeat at the hands of the Communists, the KMT arrived in Taiwan starting a period of authoritarian rule (1945-1989). This started the division between the Han Chinese on the island, with the *bensheng ren* (本省人—meaning 'those coming from the province of Taiwan')

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<sup>1</sup>Although this thesis treats only the identity politics concerning Mandarin and Tâi-gí speakers, this is not to negate the emerging 'Hakka consciousness' or 'Aboriginal consciousness.' Similarly, although this paper focuses only on the history of the Han Chinese, the author acknowledges the history of Taiwan's indigenous populations long pre-dates that of the Han Chinese in Taiwan.

pitted against the *waisheng ren* (外省人—meaning ‘those coming from outside the province of Taiwan’).<sup>2</sup> The division between these two groups also continued the linking of language and identity in Taiwan. Local languages became associated with a Taiwanese *bensheng ren* identity while Mandarin was associated with a Mainlander *waisheng ren* identity. This fact marked the start of the tension in the Taiwanese identity debate where ‘Taiwaneseness is often set against Chineseness’ (Cabestan 2005; Tu 1998: 73).

A unique Taiwanese identity developed during the Japanese colonial rule and the subsequent KMT authoritarian period. The lifting of martial law in 1987 signalled the start of a more democratic system and allowed democratisation to flourish. From the start of this new period, the Taiwanese could embrace their ‘lost’ local languages and culture. The period marked the revitalisation of all things ‘Taiwanese’ (Wang: 2005: 56). Democratisation saw the emergence of the trend of “indigenisation” (*bentuhua* 本土化, hereafter referred to as ‘Taiwanisation’).<sup>3</sup> According to John Makeham (2005: 1), the trend of Taiwanisation was the ‘single most important aspect of cultural and political change in Taiwan over the past quarter-century.’ It has contributed to and enhanced the formation of related constructs including “Taiwan consciousness” 台灣意識, and “Taiwanese identity” 台灣認同. These constructs relate to the feeling that Taiwan has its own unique and distinct society and that ‘the fate of Taiwan ought to be determined by those who share the physical and mental burden of being an integral part of a form of life’ on the island (Tu 1998: 73).

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<sup>2</sup> There is great diversity within both these groups. Amongst the *bensheng ren*, those speaking Tâi-gí account for the largest number, with Hakka and Taiwanese aboriginals not necessarily identifying with this group. Similarly, within the *waisheng ren*, there is also great variety different languages and customs, however Mandarin Chinese is now considered a lingua franca amongst this group. (Chen 2010: 124-125).

<sup>3</sup> This term is also known as “Localisation” or “Nativisation.” Bruce Jacobs notes that *bentuhua* places the focus on Taiwan rather than China while the *hua* indicates this process is ongoing. He suggests that “Taiwanisation” is the ‘correct’ translation as this makes the process clear in the English language (Jacobs 2003: 18).

Democratisation finally allowed the Taiwanese to have linguistic freedom. Local language movements sought to revitalise local languages (Tâi-gí and Hakka) and they entered the education curriculum. Language played a key role in the emergence of the early ‘Taiwanisation’ movements (Hsiau: 1997, 2012). Politicians saw the political gain to be won from using local languages. Both sides of the political spectrum put in place education policies introducing local languages into the curriculum (Hsiau 2000; Shih 2003).

The aim was to enhance the role in society of local languages which had been suppressed for years. But, even though the policies were implemented, Mandarin was already the dominant language (Klötter 2004: 8).

Mandarin is now accepted as a language of Taiwan,<sup>4</sup> but Taiwanese identity is still framed in political opposition to Mainland China. There is a continued sense of separation from the Mainland heightened by the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989, the missile crisis of 1996 and increasing hostility from the Chinese Communist Party which sees Taiwan as part of the Mainland (Corcuff 2002b: 245). The official Chinese nationalism imposed by the KMT during the martial law period no longer exists, yet anti-Communist and anti-Chinese sentiment still remain in society and has allowed ‘mainland China and the mainland Chinese to be defined as the Other’ (Chen 2010: 57). Examination of the language of the Sunflower Movement shows how this feeling of ‘otherness’ is present within society where a separate Taiwanese identity is made distinct from a Chinese Mainland identity. Surveys examining the sense of identity of Taiwanese people reflect a feeling of isolation from the Mainland. For example, Bruce Jacobs (2013: 576-577) found the trend of Taiwanese people identifying as Taiwanese has continued to rise. The percentage of the population identifying solely as Taiwanese surpassed 50% for the first time in 2012.

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<sup>4</sup> Refer to chapter 4 for discussion on the differences between the Mandarins of Mainland China and Taiwan.



Thus, according to the literature, language is a significant national identity marker. This thesis argues, however, that language is only one of many national identity markers. A growing number of people identify as Taiwanese. Yet there is an increasing shift towards Mandarin and away from local languages. This suggests that ‘Mandarin has become a language of Taiwan’ (Scott and Tiun 2007: 68) with local languages retaining significant symbolic status as a Taiwanese identity marker. This point is developed throughout the thesis and evidence is provided in Chapter four which considers the Sunflower Movement.

The fact that there are other components which contribute to the developing new inclusive national identity is encapsulated by the former, first Taiwan-born president Lee Teng-hui’s 李登輝 term ‘New Taiwanese’ 新台灣人 discussed in detail in his book *Advocacy for Taiwan* 台灣的主張. Lee’s ‘New Taiwan’ 新台灣 for ‘New Taiwanese’ 新台灣人 is big enough to accommodate Taiwanese aboriginals, *bensheng ren* and *waisheng ren*, all of whom have the shared experience of living in Taiwan and all of whom want what’s best for Taiwan (Lee 1999: 271). It is also mirrored in the concept of ‘four great ethnic groups’ (the Tâi-gí, Hakka, *waisheng ren* and aboriginals), created by Taiwan’s first opposition party, the DPP. The concept of the ‘four great ethnic groups’ aims to overcome accusations of cultural chauvinism and to provide an alternative to the dominant division within society of ‘Taiwanese’ and ‘Mainlanders’ (Makeham 2005: 4-5). The concept has now been widely accepted by society and is used as a frame of reference when theorising about ethnic and nationalist issues (Makeham 2005: 5).

The evidence above suggests there is now ‘a new political identity that is civic in nature’ which exists irrespective of one’s ethnic background. According to it, being Taiwanese allows people to have multiple identities: political Taiwanese and a cultural Han Chinese identity (Lin 2002: 219-220). While language was previously used divisively in Taiwanese society, this new

inclusive identity has also spread to language. Now, regardless of the language spoken, a person can identify as Taiwanese. Cao Yong-he's *Taiwan Island History* 台灣島史 illustrates this. Cao takes a holistic view and proposes a Taiwanese identity that encompasses all aspects of Taiwan's history and previous national profile including Taiwan's diverse ethnic groups, languages, cultures and people (Cao 2010: 448). This new inclusive identity was evident during the March Sunflower protest in Taiwan, where a unifying discourse was constructed not on dividing factors such as language or ethnicity, but rather on an inclusive identity based on love of Taiwan, the island, and its democratic institutions.

Democratisation has brought an awareness of local languages to the forefront of debate but there has been a shift in the attitude of the Taiwanese towards local languages. Even though speaking a local language is no longer a pre-requisite of Taiwanese identity, local languages continue to play a significant symbolic role in identity politics. Much of the literature on nationalism has stressed the importance of a single national language for national unity and nation-building (Wright 2004; Bourdieu 1991; Hobsbawm 1990), but Taiwan proves an interesting case study that suggests that under some circumstances language may be less important. Now, no matter what language they speak people can still identify as Taiwanese — something that was demonstrated during the Sunflower Movement where both local languages and Mandarin featured prominently. This thesis will examine how Mandarin became accepted as a language of Taiwan and how local languages still retain a symbolic value.

## Layout of the thesis

This thesis is divided into four chapters. The first chapter will establish the historical context of Taiwanese language policy from European rule to the start of democratisation. This

chapter will argue that the connection between national identity and language usage commenced in the Japanese and KMT periods.

Chapter two will argue that in the post-martial law period, democratisation, globalisation, the increasing ubiquity of English, and difficulties in implementing meaningful local language policies changed the link between national identity and language practices.

Using survey data concerning the Taiwan people's sense of national identity and their language habits, chapter three will argue that identification with Taiwan is rising while local language usage is declining. It will further argue that local languages are now used as a symbol of national identity and that Standard Taiwanese Mandarin is a way for Taiwanese to express their national identity.

The final chapter is a case study of Taiwan's March 2014 Sunflower Protest Movement. Examining songs, banners, slogans and notes, it will argue that national identity is strongly connected to Taiwan as a *place* and to democratic ideals that are prized in Taiwan but not China. It will argue that local languages are used symbolically along with Mandarin to express Taiwanese identity.

Through analysing the linguistic evidence, this paper will conclude that language practices have changed in relation to national identity. Identifying with the *place* Taiwan, valuing Taiwan's democratic institutions, using local languages symbolically, and speaking Mandarin while emphasising elements that distinguish it from the *Putonghua* spoken in the PRC are all components of Taiwanese identity.

## **Chapter One – Historical Background**

Waves of colonisation have impacted upon Taiwan's ethno-linguistic and political development. This chapter will trace the course of language policy. It will identify the periods of identity formation in Taiwan's history, from the periods of European and Qing dynasty rule where there was no official language policy, to periods of Japanese and KMT influence where language policy was implemented to achieve political ends. This chapter will argue that Taiwan's early history, until the end of martial law, influenced the link between what language people spoke and their sense of national identity.

### **Language policy up until 1662**

Prior to the Dutch arrival there was limited Chinese movement to Taiwan and there were around 1,500 Chinese living in Taiwan (Andrade 2008: 116). This interaction was primarily for fishing and for trading deer with the Taiwanese aboriginals (Knapp 1999: 11). In 1622 following a failed attempt to capture Macao from the Portuguese the Dutch landed on the Penghu Islands, before moving to mainland Taiwan. During this time the Dutch ruled Taiwan in the south (1624-1662) and the Spanish in the north (1626-1642). In 1642, the Dutch defeated and forced out the Spanish, starting the period of Dutch colonial rule (Andrade 2008: 11). The Dutch recognised the fertility of the land and potential profits available in Taiwan. Yet due to the exorbitant cost of importing labour from Europe, they turned to Mainland China to seek workers to till the land. In return the Dutch offered stability, security, free land, no tax and other incentives in exchange for establishing rice and sugar agriculture in Taiwan (Andrade 2008: 118). According to Andrade (2008), this allowed Taiwan to become 'Chinese' and started the sinicisation of the island.

The period 1624-1662 coincided with the early days of the Qing Dynasty in Mainland China, a time characterised by economic and social instability which drove the first wave of Chinese migrants to Taiwan and coincided with the Dutch need for manpower. (Tse 2000: 153; Wu 2011: 18). These early migrants originated predominantly from the southern prefectures of Zhangzhou and Quanzhou in Southern Fujian province. Varieties of Southern Min were spoken in both prefectures along with dialectal differences between these two cities all of which were brought over to Taiwan. People from Quanzhou tended to settle more in the South leading to some lack of mutual intelligibility among Southern Min speakers in the north and south of Taiwan (Tse 1981: 34). A smaller number of Cantonese and Hakka speakers also migrated to Taiwan. Following the large influx of Southern Min speakers, their language, later known as Tâi-gí, became dominant. Tâi-gí speakers surpassed in number speakers of both Hakka and Austronesian languages (Chen 2010: 83; Heylen 2005: 498).

Dutch colonisers wanted to promote trade and Christianity. Their attitude to language was 'pragmatic' and not 'particularly repressive or discriminatory' (Tse 2000: 155). Dutch missionaries believed local languages were more useful than Dutch for trade and spreading Christianity. (Wu 2011: 18). In this pre nation-state period, language was used pragmatically acting as a tool of administration and religion (Tse 2000: 155). Ernest Gellner (1983: 10) writing about the agrarian epoch in human history, in what he calls 'agro-literate' societies, described the objectives of the state as 'extracting taxes, maintaining the peace and not much else and has no interest in promoting lateral communication between its subject communities.' Taiwan under Dutch rule also shared these objectives with no official policy on language use, or on which language was to be used for administrative purposes. This laissez-faire approach to the language of government allowed the Chinese immigrants to Taiwan from different dialect areas to maintain

their own dialects, working for their own self-benefit without the cohesion that comes with a unifying language.

### Sinicisation: Zheng Cheng-gong (1662-1683) and the Qing Dynasty (1683-1895)

The period following Dutch rule was also characterised by a laissez-faire language policy. Dutch rule ended in 1662 when the pro-Ming dynasty warlord, Zheng Chenggong, left Southern Fujian province with a small force and defeated the Dutch. Although Zheng died in 1662, his rule continued under his son until 1682. As Zheng was from Southern Fujian province, the majority of settlers he brought with him to Taiwan also came from this area and were speakers of Southern Min varieties. In this time the population doubled to between 50,000 and 100,000 (Tsao 1999: 331; Jacobs 2012: 571). As in the European period, those living in Taiwan continued to have the freedom to use whatever language most suited the goals of interaction without outside interference from those ruling the island.

Zheng introduced the diglossia that had begun on the Mainland between what people wrote and what people spoke. He established Taiwan's first Chinese language schools which taught written classical Chinese (*wenyanwen* 文言文) and used the local vernacular, Tâi-gí, as the language of instruction (Heylen 2005: 488). There was no official language policy during this period. While government officials would use the official high spoken language, termed 'Official's Language' (*guanfang yuyan* 官方語言), this scarcely impacted on the language practices of the local population. Tâi-gí remained the dominant language in everyday talk (Heylen 2005: 488).

Zheng's rule of Taiwan ended in 1683 with a peaceful surrender when the new Qing rulers, led by Admiral Shi Lang, took control of Taiwan as part of their power expansion (Shepherd 1999: 108). The Qing government's original plan was to abandon Taiwan and repatriate the Chinese back to the Mainland. By 1684 almost half of the Chinese population had left the island (Shepherd 1999: 108). However, Shi Lang then convinced the Qing Rulers in Beijing of the economic and strategic significance of the island and the Qing government decided to keep Taiwan. This continued the "external" rule of Taiwan by 'foreign invaders' (Teng 2004: 252). Nevertheless, Taiwan was loosely administered maintaining the taxation and control mechanisms implemented by the Dutch. It was also 'quarantined' with further colonisation limited through restricting family migration (Shepherd 1999: 109-110).

Under Qing rule the administrators continued to implement education in the Chinese style introduced by Zheng. As in Zheng's rule, the majority of settlers also hailed from Fujian Province and spoke Southern Min varieties which continued Tâi-gí's linguistic dominance (Wu 2011: 19). *Guanfang yuyan* (henceforth 'Mandarin') was the official spoken language of the Qing Dynasty and *wenyanwen* (henceforth 'Classical Chinese') was the official written language. This division was established and enforced through the civil service examination where knowledge of written classical Chinese was essential. However, only a small number of Qing dynasty officials sent from the Mainland used Mandarin (Sandel 2003: 528) and since 'Chinese language' was the medium of instruction in schools, this usually meant that one of the local languages, Tâi-gí or Hakka, was taught (Tse 2000: 155). As more settlers arrived on the island, Tâi-gí and Hakka were established as Taiwan's 'local languages.' Tâi-gí became the dominant language forcing Hakka speakers to become bilingual in Hakka and Tâi-gí (Sandel 2003: 528; Chen 2010: 83). On the Mainland, Mandarin pronunciation was accepted as the standard amongst officials, but there was

no mass acquisition due to lack of transport and long distances (Chen 1999: 12). In Taiwan, there was no mass acquisition of the Mandarin standard due to the Qing rulers' ambivalent attitude towards Taiwan and the relatively limited resources put into governing Taiwan (Tse 2000).

Taiwan under Qing dynasty rule was characterised by divisions between ethnic groups. There was no national cohesive 'Chinese' identity. Those living in Taiwan respected their ancestral and cultural ties to Mainland China; however there was no unifying sentiment within the whole society (Lamley 1999: 208). Society was split into clans based upon ethnicity stemming from a practice whereby people from particular villages in China brought along other people from the same village who created landlord and tenant communities (Harrell 1990: 107-108). In this period, local and clan identities were much stronger than national identity. Local landlords competed for influence. Linguistic and cultural differences were noted and were drawn upon for ethnic struggles, but they were secondary to landholders' primary political objectives of striving to increase their influence and territory (Harrell 1990: 108-109). This has much in common with medieval Europe. Taiwan, like medieval continental Europe, was a divided society where group membership was characterised by locality (Wright 2004: 24). There was little to promote linguistic convergence. Instead, the structure of society encouraged greater linguistic diversity. This prevented a supra-national identity from developing.

### Japanese Rule 1895-1945

Japanese rule marked the end of two hundred years of a relatively stable language ecology and started the correlation between what language people spoke and identification with the nation-state. Following the defeat of China in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, Taiwan (including the Penghu islands) was handed to Japan with the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki (*Maguan Tiaoyue* 馬關條約 in Chinese) on 17 April 1895. Once the Japanese arrived



in 1895, they gave the Taiwanese residents of Chinese origin an ultimatum: return to China within two years or become a Japanese citizen. Nearly 23% of the Chinese-born population (6,400 people) took up this offer to return to the Mainland (Lamley 1999: 208). The ceding of Taiwan to Japan and consequent passing of the deadline to return to China demonstrated that Taiwanese were no longer of Chinese nationality and Taiwan was no longer part of China's territory (Tse 2000: 158).

Starting from 1898, major modernisation projects including infrastructure, health and communication reforms, were put in place under the rule of Governor General Kodama Gentarō and his Chief of Civil Administration Gotō Shimpei. These policies transformed Taiwan from a subsistence economy to a market economy improving the standard of living and resulting in the population increasing to over six million by 1945 (Huang 2000: 141; Simpson 2007: 238). Kodama and Gotō's administration (1898-1906) was tolerant of Han Taiwanese society and its traditional and local customs. Japanese was the national language, but Tâi-gí and Hakka had the status of local languages and the Taiwanese people were able to use their language in broader society. Much Japanese language teaching was done via instruction in local languages which were used in commerce as well as religious and social festivals. In this way Taiwan's local languages continued to be the medium of common communication (Heylen 2005: 500).

Then Japan changed its policy towards Taiwan and began to implement the policy of *dōka* – assimilation (同化 *tonghua*). The change started from 1918 following increasing integration of Taiwan's economy into Japan's. Other influences were changing relations between Japan and China and Japan's continued colonial expansion (Ching 2001: 102).

Due to the importance of universal literacy for the development of national identity (Hobsbawm 1990: 93-94), the main avenue for the promotion of Japanese was the establishment

of public schools. Exclusively for Taiwanese children, these elementary schools had 70% of total weekly teaching hours conducted in Japanese. Their twofold aim was to teach the children Japanese and to inculcate them with the values of Japanese citizenship (Hsiau 2000: 35). *Dōka* denied the Taiwanese opportunities for political representation (Ching 2001: 104). Taiwanese wages were lower than those of their Japanese counterparts, segregated schools (separating local Taiwanese children and those of Japanese expatriates) were implemented, and Taiwanese people were barred from senior bureaucratic and political positions (Brown 2004: 55). Reaction against these policies united the local Taiwanese population and started the creation of a new and unique Taiwanese identity linked to their common interests and common territory (Huang 2000: 141).

Following the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937, a campaign of extreme Japanisation commenced. The objective of the campaign, known as *kōminka* (literally ‘to make into the Emperor’s people’ *huangminhua* 皇民化), was complete ‘Japanisation’ (Heylen 2005: 505). During this period, implementation of the language policies enforcing the use of Japanese language became more severe. Local languages were banned from the media, in schools all instruction was carried out in Japanese and the Japanese language and cultural campaigns were intensified (Heylen 2005: 505). By 1943, as a result of these policies, 80% of the whole Taiwanese population could comprehend Japanese (Hsiau 2000: 45-46). Japanese was the dominant language in the public domain.

### Impact of language policy on Taiwanese society under Japanese rule

The effects of this Japanisation campaign had profound impacts upon Taiwan’s linguistic environment. Local languages were not eliminated, but Japanese was used across all domains and had become the language of modernity and prestige. People used Japanese to communicate new

ideas related to intellectual matters such as economics, politics and education. Meanwhile, local languages were restricted to informal and familial domains, preventing the Taiwanese from using them to express ideas beyond the ‘trivialities of everyday life’ (Wei 2006: 98), and led to the borrowing of many words from Japanese (Simpson 2007: 239; Scott and Tiun 2007: 56).

Fifty years of Japanese colonial rule led to some respect for improvements the Japanese made to the island, but did not succeed in creating a Japanese identity in Taiwan. It did, however according to Shih, lead to the formation of a ‘hybrid’ identity which was neither Japanese nor Chinese (Shih 2003: 91). More importantly, the Japanese assimilation policies developed a sense of Taiwanese identity being linked to a specific territory separate from Mainland China and from Japan, leading to a ‘sense of bonding and common identity’ amongst the various ethnic groups in Taiwan (Simpson 2007: 240).

### Authoritarian KMT Rule 1945-1987

With the defeat of Japan in 1945, Taiwan came under KMT rule in a ceremony on 25 October 1945 under the lead of Chen Yi 陳儀, the island’s highest-ranking government official. The day came to be known as Retrocession Day (*Guangfujie* 光復節), carrying with it the implication of restoring Chinese sovereignty over the island and implying Chinese rule over Taiwan as legitimate (Phillips 2003: 44). In 1949, the KMT were defeated in Mainland China by the Communists. Its leader Chiang Kai-shek (*Jiang Jieshi* 蔣介石) fled to Taiwan bringing with him nearly two million people who were dubbed *waisheng ren* by those who had lived under Japanese rule.

The arrival of KMT rule forced the Taiwanese to re-negotiate their identity. Originally the Taiwanese were happy to see the arrival of the KMT. Then, hopes of a seamless reunification

started to dissipate as the Taiwanese realised the new regime would not be an improvement upon Japanese colonial rule. They would continue to be subjects in a regime that dominated them. The recently arrived Mainlanders, like the Japanese before them, filled most senior posts within the government and bureaucracy and abused positions of power for their own wealth accumulation (Edmondson 2002: 27). The Mainlanders moved into Japanese homes, imposed Mandarin as the national language and replaced portraits of the Japanese Emperor with portraits of Chiang Kai-shek and Sun Yat-sen (*Sun Zhong-shan* 孫中山). From the Taiwanese point of view, the KMT was merely replacing Japanese colonial rule. In other words, the “pigs” (Mainlanders) had replaced the “dogs” (Japanese) (Edmondson 2002: 27). Economic mismanagement by the newly arrived regime, in the period immediately following their arrival in Taiwan, saw much of the island’s wealth vanish. It is estimated that up to 17% of Taiwan’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was squandered. Almost 36,000 Taiwanese lost their employment in the public service (Lai et al. 1991: 170).

Tensions towards the KMT soon erupted in the anti-government uprising on 28 February 1947 known as 2-28 (in Chinese 二二八事件). Government and anti-government supporters were killed including many of those who criticised the newly arrived government (Phillips 1999: 296). Estimates of the number killed vary. Those close to the Nationalist government give lower estimates (as low as 500) while supporters of Taiwanese independence give higher figures. The most common estimate given is 10,000 killed (Phillips 1999: 296). This 2-28 incident, according to Huang (2000: 141), ‘crystallized the development of Taiwanese nationalist feelings’ and was critical for the development of a Taiwanese identity. According to Fuchang Wang (2003: 71), it was during the oppressive crackdown following 2-28 that the division between *waisheng ren* (associated with the State, the military and the ruling elite) and *bensheng ren* (the people, the

oppressed) became the dominant division in society. During the street protests, in order to distinguish *waisheng ren* from *bensheng ren*, Taiwanese *bensheng* protesters required potential targets of attack to sing songs or speak in Japanese or local languages (particularly Tâi-gí). If their target could not respond in the same language it would often result in beating or death (Hsiao 2000: 57).

Following 2-28, the KMT launched an investigation. It found the uprising had occurred due to Japan's negative influence on the Taiwanese people and the threat from the Communists. The first Governor General of Taiwan Chen Yi (who ironically spoke fluent Japanese and was married to a Japanese woman [Lai et al 1991: 59]) announced that Taiwan was in a state of civil war and that martial law was to be put in place. This period of martial law came to be known as "The White Terror" 白色恐怖 (Edmondson 2002: 29). Under martial law, the formation of opposition parties was forbidden, censorship was rife and courts had great power to convict civilians for sedition and other crimes (Tien and Shiau: 1992).

During the period of martial law, differences between *bensheng ren* and *waisheng ren* had profound implications. Initially, the term *waisheng ren* would not have been used spontaneously by either group. Local Taiwanese referred to the KMT troops as 'Mainlanders' (*daluren*) and the troops used their province of origin to refer to themselves (Corcuff 2002a: 165). However, following 2-28, the actions of the troops consolidated a sense of 'Otherness' between the two groups which had been building since the arrival of the KMT. The term *waisheng ren* became associated with the Chinese Mainland, the new regime, police force and the 'ideology of winning back the lost continent' (Corcuff 2002a: 166). At its origin the term 'did not designate the "Chinese" as opposed to the "Taiwanese"' but it soon took this meaning, implying that *waisheng ren* could not be Taiwanese (Corcuff 2002a: 166).

## Impact of KMT language policy on social development

The start of martial law marked the start of the shift towards Mandarin, the commencement of Mainlander domination over the local Taiwanese majority and the loss of much of the vitality of local languages. The KMT did not respect local Han Taiwanese culture or the people. From the KMT's perspective, fifty years of Japanese rule meant the Taiwanese had 'lost their national identity' and were not fully Chinese (Lo 2001: 306; Wang 2003: 74; Phillips 2003). The KMT decided education was the best means to 'de-Japanise' (*qu Ribenhua* 去日本化) and sinicise (*Zhongguohua* 中國化) the population (Hsiao 1997: 305). It would do this through teaching Mainland Chinese history, spoken Mandarin and written Chinese. So, in 1946, the National Language Movement was implemented imposing *guoyu* 國語 – literally 'the language of the state' (hereafter Mandarin) – as the national language (Simpson 2007).

When the KMT first arrived, local languages were permitted as a way of eradicating vestiges of Japanese language influence and facilitating the transition to Mandarin (Hsiao 2012: 118). Starting from 1946, Mandarin replaced Japanese as the language of instruction. Written Japanese was banned from all newspapers and magazines (Hsiao 1997: 306). Once Japanese had been suppressed, the Taiwanese people were then required to sacrifice using local spoken languages in favour of Mandarin. The choice of Mandarin as the national language was not a pragmatic decision. If Taiwan's new rulers had been searching for the most commonly understood non-Japanese language they would have chosen Tâi-gí. In selecting Mandarin, the KMT government made a political decision to demonstrate that Taiwan was part of China. The KMT saw local languages as promoting independence and threatening state unity. They enforced

monolingualism in Mandarin to overcome this threat (Hsiau 1997: 306). To quell the tension within the local population, the KMT declared that all local spoken languages such as Tâi-gí, Hakka and Indigenous languages had the status of “dialect” 方言, while only Mandarin had the status of ‘language’ 語言 (Hsiau 2012: 237).

From 1946, Mandarin was used as the language of instruction in all schools using the Beijing standard as a model. Starting from 1956, children in primary and middle schools who spoke local languages were fined or received other sorts of punishment (Hsiau 2012: 238). Additionally, textbooks were re-written emphasising Mainland Chinese history. These textbooks contained only the history, geography and culture of the Mainland, ignoring that of Taiwan (Simpson 2007: 245). These things were carried out in conjunction with Chiang Kai-shek’s Cultural Renaissance Movement (1966-1979) whose objectives were to revive and save traditional Chinese culture in response to the Cultural Revolution on the Mainland (Tozer 1970: 81-82). Emphasising Mainland China’s history was a legitimising mechanism for the KMT to strengthen its control over Taiwan. Consequently, the pre-1945 Taiwanese were made to feel negatively about their own heritage, cutting them off from identifying with their own Han Taiwanese or Indigenous culture and forcing them instead to identify with an ‘idealised Chinese national culture’ (Simpson 2007: 245; Wang 2003: 80).

Linguistic restrictions also applied in the arts. Despite there being no exclusions on using local languages in film-making, films made in Mandarin received preferential treatment and funding. On the radio, non-Mandarin programs could only be broadcast for under half (45%) of AM radio air-time, and only be on air for a third of the time (33%) on FM radio (Dreyer 2003: 396). The first television channel started broadcasting in 1962 and at this time the KMT government limited non-Mandarin programs to less than 16% of broadcast time. However, as

Tâi-gí was the mother tongue of the majority of Taiwanese residents, the popularity of programs in Tâi-gí continued to increase and these regulations were often flouted (Hsiau 2012: 241).

Reacting to this disobedience, the Culture and Education Bureaus implemented in 1972 the “Enforcement Rules of the Radio and Television Act” based upon nation building principles which required the reduction in the diffusion of non-Mandarin shows. It also required that Tâi-gí programs should run for less than one hour a day (Huang 1993: 370). One of the key legislators responsible for the implementation of this law, Mu Chao 穆超, said ‘Tâi-gí was a backward dialect’<sup>5</sup> (quoted in Huang 1993: 366). Reducing the usage of dialects in the population was officially viewed as being crucial if the nation-building efforts of the government were to succeed. This point is illustrated by Mu’s own words

‘we hope in reducing the usage of dialects, everybody will start using *guoyu* [Mandarin] ... we are promoting *guoyu* and reducing dialects in order to unite the population and strengthen nationalist spirit in the population’<sup>6</sup> (quoted in Huang 1993: 364).

The budget allocated for programs broadcast in Tâi-gí was much lower than for Mandarin programs. The roles given to those who spoke local languages were those of street vendors, maids, scoundrels or other demeaning parts. All of which reinforced the notion that speaking local languages was vulgar and rude and marked one out as of a lower class (Wu 2011: 21).

Speaking Mandarin was also enforced in other areas of society. Following the arrival of the KMT in 1949, proficiency in Mandarin became a requirement for employment in government positions further reinforcing Mainlander hegemony in government. In 1965, the government declared that public servants must speak only Mandarin during office hours. Mandarin was also established as the language of courts irrespective of whether those in the proceedings could understand it or not (Hsiau 2000: 54, 129).

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<sup>5</sup> 閩南語也是落後方言的一種。

<sup>6</sup> 而希望逐漸減少方言，一期人人都用國語…減少方言是為團結國民，加強民族意識。



Many of the younger generation (including *bensheng ren*) stopped using Tâi-gí in all but a few domains and so did not develop Tâi-gí vocabulary in many areas of life such as education, medicine and technology (Hsiau 2012: 243). The promotion of Mandarin was successful in creating a society of bilinguals where Mandarin became the language of education, media and politics and served as a lingua franca between different ethnic groups.

### Economic growth and language shift

Rising economic prosperity in Taiwan, in conjunction with the KMT's success in enforcing its national language policy of promoting Mandarin and restricting local languages, transformed Mandarin into the language of modernity and high socio-economic status.

Following the end of World War II and the retreat of the Nationalists to Taiwan, the newly arrived government faced high inflation, a plunging currency and a floundering economy (Copper 1997: 13). As economic collapse was one of the reasons for the KMT's "loss of China," the KMT was unwilling to make the same mistake twice. It put in place a series of reforms to transform the Taiwanese economy and add legitimacy to its rule (Wang 2007: 324). An important reform of which was land reform packages. At the end of the war, Taiwanese society was predominantly agrarian and rural (Huang 2006: 30). Agricultural productivity was enhanced as a result of the KMT's land reform packages, including abolishing landlord and tenant systems and improving agricultural technology (Copper 1997: 13; Wang 2007: 325). These improvements in technology meant that the number of people involved in agriculture declined. In 1952 over 50% of the population was involved in agriculture, declining to 19.5% in 1980 and then to 7.8% by 2000 (Huang 2006: 30; Taiwan Statistical Data Book 2001). This change was also linked to industrialisation as Taiwan moved to a capital-intensive economy based on heavy industry. This boosted per capita income, which tripled between 1951 and 1975 (Wang 2007: 328; Copper

1997: 14). When people moved to cities to take advantage of higher wages and career opportunities, the population composition changed. Since rural areas are traditionally conservative in language use (speaking local languages), the decline of those involved in agriculture decreased the number of communities in which local languages were the primary means of everyday communication and facilitated the spread of Mandarin as the primary language of industrialisation.

Rising wealth also had social impacts as the government sought to improve educational opportunities. Literacy levels were raised to cater to the newly industrialised society. Initially there were six years of mandatory schooling. In 1968, the KMT extended this to nine years of compulsory education (Copper 1997: 26). With all school and university instruction conducted in Mandarin, augmenting the hours of schooling impacted upon the language habits of those living in Taiwan. According to Robert Cheng (1994: 367-368), the KMT strived for language unification through ‘suppression of linguistic differences.’ Local languages were not permitted as the language of instruction at any school level. Many parents encouraged their children to speak Mandarin due to its prevalence and the need to be proficient in it to obtain a good education. Some parents even switched from speaking local languages to speaking Mandarin to help their children get higher marks at school and further their social advancement (Cheng 1994: 365). Economic and educational necessity further accelerated the shift to Mandarin.

Rising education levels and incomes led the growing middle-class to become disenchanted with a seemingly frozen political structure and limited freedom of expression. Thus, from the 1970s a period of political activism began. During this period a new movement emerged, called the *dangwai* 黨外 (literally those outside the party). This group was non-aligned with the KMT and predominantly *bensheng ren* in its membership. It was also a precursor to the

DPP opposition party (Li 1987: 128; Wang 2003: 85). The *dangwai* was unwilling to accept the KMT's authoritarian rule and did not want to recognize that Taiwan was a province of China (Rubinstein 1999: 440). The ruling KMT regime had no room for dissenting voices in its political structure and tensions erupted during the Kaohsiung incident of 1979. In this protest, *dangwai* members organised a demonstration of 30,000 people in Kaohsiung. Police disrupted it and arrested the leaders. According to Wang (2003: 93), this crackdown undermined the legitimacy of the KMT regime and led to a swelling of support for a more democratic system.

Ideological change in Taiwan was also influenced by international events. In 1979 the United States transferred diplomatic recognition from the Republic of China (Taiwan) to the People's Republic of China and in 1971 Taiwan lost its seat at the United Nations in New York (Copper 1997: 514-515). These factors, along with mounting dissension within society and the appreciation of the New Taiwan Dollar by 40% in the 1980s, led to a legitimacy crisis for the regime in Taiwan.

## Summary

This condensed account of Taiwan's historical development demonstrates the politicisation of language in Taiwan since the start of the Japanese colonial period. Imposing non-native national languages in Taiwan diminished the status and prevalence of local languages in Taiwanese society. The KMT national language policy was largely successful in making Mandarin the lingua franca of Taiwan. However, its policies consolidated the identification of pre-1945 languages with the 'old' Taiwan, the *bensheng ren* and opposition to the KMT's authoritarian rule. As a result, the foundations were laid for the Taiwanisation movements and emancipation of Taiwanese culture when martial law was lifted in 1987 which is the subject of the next chapter.

## Chapter Two — Democratisation and ethnic politics in contemporary times

KMT rule until the 1980s had been marked by lack of linguistic and political freedoms. However, the party's decreasing legitimacy and increasing economic prosperity brought about language and political reforms. This chapter will argue how the end of martial law, start of democratic rule and linguistic freedoms continued to shape the relationship between spoken language and identification with Taiwan.

In 1987 President Chiang Ching-kuo (*Jiang Jing-guo* 蔣經國) ended forty years of martial law in recognition of his government's legitimacy crises and the Taiwanese population's desire for change. The declaration marked the start of democratisation. Opposition parties were legalised and restrictions were lifted allowing Taiwanese residents to visit the Mainland (Rubinstein 1999: 447). The period after 1987 also saw the renaissance of local languages, as restrictions upon the usage of Taiwanese local languages were lifted. Children were no longer punished for speaking local languages at school and programs in Tâi-gí and Hakka were added to the regular broadcasting schedule (Simpson 2007: 247). Lifting these restrictions emancipated Taiwanese citizens as local languages could now be used in the public domain without fear of recrimination or judgement.

Upon Chiang Ching-kuo's death in 1988, his appointed successor, Lee Teng-hui (*Li Deng-hui* 李登輝), took over smoothly. Lee, a *bensheng ren* from a Hakka family, became the first Taiwan-born president. He was fluent in Mandarin, Tâi-gí, Hakka, Japanese and English and had completed a PhD at Cornell University (Jacobs 2003: 34). To reach out to the wider population, President Lee actively promoted greater democratisation in Taiwan (Rubinstein 1999: 452). He promoted "Taiwanisation" to incorporate more *bensheng ren* into the political and business elite

and also promoted “Taiwan consciousness” to ‘distinguish the “Taiwanese Nation” from the “Chinese Nation”’ (in reference to the PRC) (Tsai 2007: 15-16).

In 1994, the Taiwanese constitution was further reformed to allow for direct Presidential elections and direct election of province governors and city mayors. In 1996, the first direct presidential election was held under this new system (Rubinstein 1999: 460).

The *dangwai* movement announced it was formally establishing the DPP in 1986. As Taiwan’s first opposition party, the DPP’s primary objective was to challenge the KMT. The DPP’s first target was the so-called ‘Chinese Consciousness’ (referring to the Mainland identity) (Hsiau 2012: 204). According to Wang (2003: 96), the DPP claimed to represent all Taiwanese people, defined as anyone who identified with the geographic island of Taiwan. It hoped this definition of what it meant to be Taiwanese would not lead to a split between *waisheng ren* and *bensheng ren*. But, as the formation of the DPP stemmed primarily from an opposition to the KMT, the DPP’s primary supporters were nonetheless *bensheng ren* (Wang 2003: 96).

Given the high proportion of *bensheng ren* within the DPP, Tâi-gí soon became politicised. DPP politicians began using language to declare their Taiwanese identity, differentiate themselves from the KMT and to use local languages at political rallies to mobilise voters and win elections by showing that they were ‘one of the people’ (Wei 2008: 40). The Tâi-gí language was also turned into a symbol of ‘political discontent and ethnic loyalty’ (Hsiau 1997: 309) as opposition politicians used Tâi-gí in parliament to question bureaucrats knowing they would not understand and so embarrass them (Anonymous August 7 1993: 38). The pervasiveness of local languages soon spread to the ruling KMT. Party members, bureaucrats and first generation Mainlanders realised it was necessary to learn local languages if they wished to pursue any sort of political career and to show they were also one of the people (Baum 30 August

1990: 32). Hsiao argues (1997: 309) that this usage of local languages turned Tâi-gí into the ‘language of elections’ as Tâi-gí and Hakka were used to attract votes.

The election in 2000 of the first DPP President Chen Shui-bian 陳水扁 continued the politicisation of language, this time by the *bensheng ren*. In 2001 the Ministry of Education [MOE] announced its new Language Equality Law 語言平等法 which referred to Mandarin not as *Guoyu* but instead as *huayu* 華語 — Chinese language. However, Tâi-gí was written in Roman script and in parentheses was referred to as ‘Taiwanese.’ Referring to Tâi-gí as ‘Taiwanese’ led to calls from the KMT about language chauvinism and ‘de-sinicisation’. Hakka and other minority language groups echoed this cry (Wu 2011: 25). Tâi-gí’s privileged position as often the only Mother-Tongue language taught as a second language, along with its changed status under the DPP’s proposal, illustrates the heavy-handed approach taken by some advocates of Taiwanese language. As Chen points out, the moves verified the dictum that ‘every minority has its own minorities’ and fears that the trend of ‘Taiwanisation’ could lead to a new wave of oppression threatening other minority languages (Chen 2010: 88).

The Language Equality Law was not passed. In 2007, the Council for Cultural Affairs took over its redrafting, changing the focus from ‘language as a right’ to ‘language as a cultural artefact’ (Wu 2011: 25). This change in direction illustrates how most policy makers wished to avoid the perception of Tâi-gí as another hegemonic language power like Mandarin and Japanese. At the same time, a proposal was put forward to name all minority languages as Taiwanese (not just Tâi-gí as was previously the norm). The moves illustrate an attempt to form a new supra-ethnic identity – a Taiwanese national identity (Scott and Tiun, 2007: 59).

## Education policies in the democratic era:

Democracy's advent permitted the revitalisation of local languages and the construction of an authentic Taiwanese identity. Educational policy reform was an important mechanism for building this new identity. The desire for educational reform permeated the whole society and the 1980s saw the rise of "Taiwan studies fever." More works were published on Taiwan's own history. Fewer than 30 books appeared annually before 1987. The number had tripled to nearly 100 in 1990 and then quadrupled to over 450 in 1995 (Wang 2005: 70). Due to the combined pressures of the "Taiwanisation" movement and the threat from the DPP, the ruling KMT party announced in 1993 that a Local Language Policy would be introduced from 1997. The policy stated students from years three-to-six were to spend one hour per week learning local language and culture. Local language was to be the object of instruction, not the medium of instruction. There was a choice between Tâi-gí, Hakka and Indigenous languages (Chen 2006: 329). The aims of this policy, apart from fostering knowledge of local languages, were also to preserve them (Chen 2006: 328). However, Huang believes (2000: 146) that this policy was a token measure (doing little to stem the decline of local languages) as the Education Department's objectives were not to achieve competence in native languages, but were, rather, a 'get-to-know-your-native-land educational package.'

The 1997 Local Language Policy evolved. The Ministry of Education implemented the Nine-Year Integrated Curriculum for Primary and Junior High Schools 國民中小學九年一貫課程 in 2001. Its objective was to confront the combined pressures of greater globalisation, competition from neighbouring countries and increased calls for local language education. As part of the new curriculum, all students from year one to year six were required to study at least one of three local languages (Hakka, Tâi-gí or one of twelve Indigenous languages) (Scott and Tiun 2007: 60).

These same reforms lowered the time to start learning English from year five to year three. These reforms promoted ‘both internationalisation 國際化 and indigenisation 本土化’ (Scott and Tiun 2007: 60).

In spite of aiming to increase greater local language acquisition, the local-language policy has been hampered by numerous challenges. The obstacles stemmed primarily from the dominance of non-linguistic goals. First, to respond to the emergence of civil movements which expressed support for local languages. Second, to benefit politically from the trends of de-Sinicisation and Taiwan consciousness (Chen 2006: 335). The result was lack of adequate language planning which prevented the policy from attaining its linguistic goals. According to Chen, the first biggest obstacle in implementing the local-language policy was the lack of adequately trained teachers. There were three types of local language teachers. The first were substitute or part-time teachers (certified or not) who were proficient in one local language. Regular classroom teachers assigned to other subjects as well as a local language (even if they were, or were not, proficient in it) were the second type. The third was full-time teachers with qualifications for teaching a local language. The first two categories were the most common (Chen 2006: 329).

The fact the policy was restricted constituted a second obstacle to its success. The guidelines stipulated compulsory education only for primary school students and limited it to one hour of local-language teaching weekly. Teaching content and methodology were not specified or codified in the guidelines and there were no standard or prescribed textbooks (Chen 2006: 330). The majority of schools used mass-produced commercial textbooks to teach Tâi-gí. These books primarily used the Tâi-gí Southern standard *Lam-po-im* 南部音, while an accompanying chart showed the differences between the Southern standard and the Northern *Pak-po-im* 北部音



standard. Instruction in the textbooks to write Tâi-gí generally used Chinese script and two accompanying phonetic scripts (one based on the Latin alphabet and one on Taiwan's phonetic writing system). However, as there is no agreed standard, different textbooks had words written with different characters and phonetics (Scott and Tiun 2007: 62-63). Additionally, many teachers were unfamiliar with the writing system in these textbooks. Since many believed that local languages should be used to communicate with members of the older generations and not for general literacy, they preferred to write their own material including proverbs, folk songs and sayings (Chen 2006: 330). Focusing only on folk and cultural usage further reinforced the message that local languages were suitable only for informal occasions and were inadequate for the demands of modern life and formal or serious occasions (Scott and Tiun 2007: 64).

Despite these obstacles in implementing it and the inability to achieve the goal of language maintenance, the Mother Tongue Language Policy was important to demonstrate that local languages and their speakers were valued. In turn, this belief assisted in the emergence of a new sense of national identity (Chen 2006: 335).

### Writing reform

The lack of a standardised writing system for local languages, particularly Tâi-gí, has hampered efforts to allow local languages to compete with Mandarin. This is so despite the abolition of repressive linguistic policies, the advent of democracy in 1987, and the emergence of Taiwanisation movements.

Due to the suppression of local languages under the Japanese and KMT periods, there was little language engineering. Local languages were not used as the medium of instruction in schools so there was no need to create new words for new concepts. When words were needed, they were borrowed from Mandarin or Japanese. This is how local languages were prevented

from acting as a ‘medium of cultural production and reproduction’ (Hsiao 2000: 131). Borrowing words from other languages does not usually result in negative perceptions. For example, Japanese borrows many words from English, but is still regarded as a prestigious language. Yet, due to the unequal status and historical tensions present between Mandarin and Tâi-gí, the influx of foreign words further diminished Tâi-gí’s status. Consequently, many young people prefer to use Mandarin as their primary language of communication and many cannot speak local languages (Hsiao 1997: 308).

Another major factor contributing to the preference of Mandarin over local languages is the lack of orthographic standardisation in the latter. There is a long history of using Chinese characters to write Tâi-gí. It dates back at least 600 years. But, 5% of Tâi-gí morphemes have no corresponding Han characters and the 5% of morphemes with no corresponding Han characters account for 15% of characters in written Tâi-gí text (Chiung 2001: 504). Therefore, different writers borrow different Han characters or create their own to write these 15% of characters. Despite the creation of many Tâi-gí orthographies, no forms have been standardised. Consequently, the Tâi-gí writing systems have not been accepted by the wider public which has resulted in the separation of the Tâi-gí written word from spoken speech (Chiung 2001: 503).

Chiung (2001: 502) outlines three main systems to write Tâi-gí: Han characters only; colloquial writing containing a mix of characters along with Romanisation; Romanisation only. Historically, Christian missionaries used Romanisation for Tâi-gí due to its ‘economy and learnability’ in comparison with Han (traditional Chinese) characters. Even though it seems easier, Romanisation (phonetic depiction) is perceived by those who have mastered Chinese characters as ‘childish writing’ (Chiung 2001: 505). Also, due to misunderstanding about the nature of Chinese characters, there is a belief amongst those living in Taiwan that Han characters

are ‘ideally suited for the Han language family’ (which includes Tâi-gí). Many Taiwanese people believe, therefore, that Tâi-gí can only be expressed in Han Chinese characters (Chiung 2001: 505). Since advocates of writing Tâi-gí believe that Taiwanese people can remove the ‘undesirable influence of Chinese culture by renouncing the use of Mandarin’ (Hsiau 2000: 140), and since Romanisation script is perceived as ‘foreign,’ the implementation of the latter (Romanisation) can be seen as supporting ‘Taiwanisation or De-sinicisation’ (Scott and Tiun 2007: 66-67).

Although it has been difficult to implement a standardised Tâi-gí writing system there is a strong will to do so. Advocates of written Tâi-gí maintain that it is only via a writing system, that local Han Taiwanese culture will be preserved and come to represent ‘the development of a new national identity’ (Hsiau 2000: 140).

### English language education

Ever since the arrival of the Japanese, local languages have had to compete with the dominant languages of Japanese, then Mandarin. Globalisation has brought another competitor: English. With English making inroads into the island, local languages must contend with both Mandarin and English. English has long been recognised as an international language. Growing globalisation is promoting the spread of English worldwide as the importance of learning English to remain globally competitive is recognised (Crystal 2003: 24; Krashen 2003). This is the case in Taiwan where English is seen as an ‘economic commodity’ offering opportunities for entry to higher education, competitive employment and upward social mobility (Chen 2006: 335).

English has always enjoyed an important place in Taiwan’s curriculum. Since the relocation of the KMT to Taiwan, English has been included in the curriculum. It was made compulsory for students in middle school in 1968 (Chen and Tsai 2012: 182). With increasing

globalisation, the government has responded to calls to further strengthen the position of English in the educational and socio-political agenda (Oladejo 2006: 149). It has created bilingual environments including the mandatory translation into English of road signs and public signs in large cities, and provides official documents in English and Chinese (Oladejo 2006: 149). The curriculum has been changed to increase English acquisition. The starting age to learn English dropped from year seven to year five in 2001 and then to year three in 2005 (Chang 2008: 425). The goals of the new English language curriculum are to develop student communicative competences, cultivate student interest in learning English and raise student awareness of local and foreign customs (Ministry of Education 2000).

But the ‘obsession’ with learning English poses threats to local languages (Chen 2011: 209). Due to the poor provision of resources as well as the fact they have been allocated only one hour of instruction per week, parents, teachers and children pay little attention to local languages preferring to divert resources into learning English (Chen 2011: 210). Also, the higher status attached to English relative to local languages encourages governments, schools, parents and students to place emphasis on acquiring English, resulting in students being less interested in learning local languages (Chen 2006: 334-335).

The trends described are indicative of what Edwards calls the ‘pull’ of globalisation. Due to the perceived benefits that learning an international language can bring, greater emphasis is placed on acquiring the global language and less on preserving local languages and may lead to their demise. (Crystal 2003; Edwards 2006: 69). Wang and Ho (2012: 44) concur. They write that in Taiwan it is commonly believed that for internationalisation (for example, learning English) to succeed, less emphasis should be placed upon localisation (such as local languages and culture).

## Summary

While progress has been made in advancing local languages, there are many difficulties confronting attempts to make them into languages of wider communication. Taiwan's integration into the global economy and the rise of English as a global lingua franca have created economic and cultural reasons for giving prominence to English in the national curriculum. The pressure placed on students to learn both English and Mandarin at school often makes it difficult for them to focus on local languages as well. This mirrors the situation in much of Asia where nations are responding to globalisation via giving English a more prominent position in the curriculum which is forcing them to renegotiate their existing national, cultural and social identities (Tsui and Tollefson 2007).

Despite the waning use of local languages as languages of wider communication, their use retains political importance as it marks politicians as somehow 'authentically' Taiwanese. Like the use of either French or English in Canada (Wei 2008: 67), the use of either local languages or Mandarin in Taiwan shows how language choice can be used as a political strategy for ethnic mobilisation. Nevertheless, local languages are still important because they remain the home languages of *bensheng ren* and are used in appropriate contexts to signify attachment to Taiwan, as a place, at the heart of modern Taiwanese identity. The next chapter will examine in greater detail the cultural attachment Taiwanese feel towards local languages and the more inclusive identity forming in Taiwan. It will also further examine reasons for the shift towards Mandarin.

### **Chapter Three — Language and feelings of national identity in the 2000s**

A unique sense of Taiwanese collective identity continues to grow in Taiwan despite a shift towards the use of Mandarin. There is a great sense of a Taiwanese identity even though Mandarin is understood and spoken by the entire population and despite a continued decline in the use of local languages. The thirty years of KMT authoritarian rule saw the successful imposition of Mandarin as the language used in Taiwan. By 1981 over 94% of the population could speak Mandarin (Tse 1981: 36). But, the KMT did not succeed in fostering a ‘Chinese’ identity in Taiwan. That is, an identity where the Taiwanese (*bensheng ren*) felt they were part of a greater China (including both Mainland China and Taiwan). This chapter will argue that despite a shift to Mandarin and recognition of its importance, there is a rising sense of Taiwanese identity. It will further argue that local languages are now valued as a symbol of Taiwan. The emergence of Standard Taiwanese Mandarin, which has made Mandarin meaningful for Taiwan’s national identity, is now also symbolic of Taiwanese identity.

Taiwan continues to live in a political setting susceptible to change. However, its democratic system and emancipated and liberal society has facilitated an environment allowing for openness and unification amongst its people. Under martial law, the Taiwanese people were denied the opportunity to identify with the island on which they lived. Instead they were forced to develop or feign an attachment to greater China the definition of which included both the Mainland and Taiwan.

The creation of a more Taiwan-centred school curriculum in the 1990s and the spread of Taiwanisation movements occurring in the 1990s and early 2000s were important. They created an ‘embracing ideology’ which ‘looks from the present forward to what Taiwan must be rather than from the present backward to cling to an ideal that was not realised’ (Wachman 1994: 104).

This concept is similar to that described by Cao Yong-he in his work *Taiwan Island History*. In this work Cao writes that when theorising about Taiwanese identity, one should take the island named Taiwan as the starting point to frame what it means to be Taiwanese instead of using a political perspective (Cao 2010). This new definition of ‘Taiwanese’ joins all people together based on their experiences of living on the island and looking forward to what Taiwan’s future can be. It allows all Taiwan’s ethnic and linguistic groups to identify as Taiwanese.

### Increasing identification as Taiwanese

The emergence of this new identity is demonstrated via results from telephone polls which measure if Taiwanese people identify as ‘Taiwanese’, ‘Chinese’ or both ‘Taiwanese and Chinese.’<sup>7</sup> There has been a constant decline in the number of people identifying as Chinese, but a rise in the number identifying as Taiwanese, according to surveys on identity conducted by the authoritative Election Study Centre at the National Chengchi University (Election Study Centre N.C.C.U., Important political attitude trend distribution: 2014).<sup>8</sup> The centre’s findings show a constant decline in the number identifying as Chinese but a rise in those identifying as Taiwanese.<sup>9</sup> When the survey was first held in 1992 those identifying as both Taiwanese and Chinese scored the highest with 46.4% followed by Chinese (25.5%) and then Taiwanese (17.6%). In subsequent years the number of those who saw themselves as Taiwanese increased sharply while the number of people identifying as Chinese and as Chinese and Taiwanese has

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<sup>7</sup> This paper acknowledges that this question is structured on only two variables: Chinese and Taiwanese and that identity is much more complex than a measurable variable. However, this data is nonetheless useful for showing an important trend (Harrison 2006: 188-190).

<sup>8</sup> For chart showing interview sample sizes, refer to Appendix A, Figure 1.

<sup>9</sup> The question was: “In our society, there are some people who call themselves ‘Taiwanese,’ some who call themselves ‘Chinese,’ and some who call themselves both. Do you consider yourself to be ‘Taiwanese,’ ‘Chinese,’ or both?” (我們社會上，有人說自己是「台灣人」，也有人說自己是「中國人」，也有人說都是。請問您認為自己是「台灣人」、「中國人」，或者都是?) (Election Study Centre N.C.C.U. 2014).

declined steadily. In the latest results, June 2014, the percentage identifying as Taiwanese tripled peaking at 60.4%. The number claiming dual identity declined to 32.7%. The steepest decline was for those identifying as Chinese. Only 3.5% of the population identified as Chinese — seven times less than in 1992 (Election Study Centre, N.C.C.U. 2014).




Figure one: ‘Changes in Taiwanese/Chinese identity of Taiwanese.’  
Source: Election Study Centre, N.C.C.U., Important political attitude trend distribution: 2014.

### Decreasing number of local languages speakers

Interestingly, while the number of people identifying as Taiwanese continues to increase, the number of those speaking Tâi-gí, the language most closely associated with a Taiwanese identity has continued to fall. Mandarin is now accepted as a lingua franca of Taiwan and proficiency in local languages is no longer required as a mark of Taiwanese identity. Honouring



local languages by maintaining a symbolic role for them, along with identifying with Taiwan as one's own country and its political and civil institutions, are important components of Taiwanese identity. This is demonstrated in the 2003 Taiwan Social Change Survey conducted by the National Science Council [NSC] where 2,016 people were asked about their attitudes to identity.<sup>10</sup> For instance, one question asked 'When you want to express personal feelings, which language feels the most natural?'<sup>11</sup> The most basic results showed 37.1% used Mandarin and 46% Tâi-gí (NSC 2003). Jean Francois- Dupré's study on language in Taiwan (Dupré 2013: 438) broke down this data further and found there has been a steady shift from local languages to Mandarin (this survey counted Tâi-gí and Hakka but not Indigenous languages). Over 60% of those in the age groups between 60-79 used Tâi-gí to express their emotions, while less than 10% of the same group used Mandarin. If we contrast this with the younger generations, over 60% of those aged 39 and below used Mandarin to express their emotions, while only 25% of those aged 30-39 and 18% of those aged 30 and below used Tâi-gí to do so. The situation is more dire for those speaking Hakka. Less than 2% of those aged under 30 said they used it (NSC 2003, quoted in Dupré 2013: 434).

The survey also asked a series of questions relating to identification with Taiwan. Results showed that, overall, linguistic aspects of Taiwanese identity ranked lower than civic and political components. The survey asked 'to be a real Taiwanese citizen, is speaking *Guoyu* (Mandarin) important?'<sup>12</sup> Less than a quarter of respondents, 23.4% replied that it was 'very important', while 34.8% said that it was 'important.' Similar figures also applied for Tâi-gí with 20% saying 'very important' and 32.1% saying 'important.'

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<sup>10</sup> Refer to Appendix A, Figure 2 for Chinese and complete translations for questions discussed in this section.

<sup>11</sup> 當您表達私人感情，那一種語言最自然？

<sup>12</sup> 要成為我們真正的同胞，您覺得會說國語重不重要？

In respect to the question, if to be a real citizen should one ‘identify with our country’, more than half, 56.5% believed that doing this was ‘very important’, and 33% believed it to be ‘important.’ When it was asked if one should respect Taiwan’s political system and laws in order to be a real citizen, 53.8% said very important and 34.2% described it as important. Table one summarises these findings.

Table one: Aspects pertaining to being ‘Taiwanese.’

<i>Q: To become a true citizen of Taiwan, which of these do you think is important:</i>	<i>Very important</i>	<i>Important</i>
Identify with our country	56.5%	33%
Respect Taiwan’s political system and laws.	53.8%	34.2%
Have Taiwanese citizenship.	43.4%	34.5%
Lived in Taiwan for most of one’s life.	33.9%	37.7%
Speak <i>Guoyu</i> (Mandarin).	23.4%	34.8%
Speak <i>Tâi-gí</i> .	20%	32.1%
Have Taiwanese ancestry	21.6%	28.1%
Been born in Taiwan.	32.7%	31.5%
Respect Taiwanese folk customs.	7.5%	17.9%
Speak Hakka.	5.2%	19.2%

Source: Adapted from the 2003 Taiwan Social Change Survey.

Chen (2010: 101) in her study notes the incursion of Mandarin into all domains of Taiwanese life and its use for all functions. Scott and Tiun (2003: 68) believe that this shows that ‘Mandarin has now become a language of Taiwan’ and no longer carries with it the association of

being a *waisheng ren* while later generation *waisheng ren* are starting to identify with the expanded definition of being Taiwanese.

As in Taiwan, the Māori language in New Zealand acts as an important identity marker and yet the number of its speakers continues to decline. Despite this, the Māori language has increasingly taken on a role as a ‘symbol of national identity’ (Benton 2007: 177). Similarly the 2003 survey in Taiwan showed high levels of support are present for local languages to be taught, but also present is the recognition of the importance of English and Mandarin. When asked if in primary and middle school there should be an emphasis on learning Tâi-gí, Hakka and other local languages, 18.7% agreed ‘very much’ and 61.1% of people ‘agreed.’ However, when asked to choose if their child could only learn one language which would it be (between English and local languages), 56.4% respondents replied English, with 40.3% replying local languages (NSC 2003). Respondents were asked if there could only be one common language in Taiwan which would they choose, 59.6% of respondents selected ‘*Guoyu*’ (Mandarin, Beijing Standard), while only 23.2% chose Tâi-gí (NSC 2003). High levels of support are present for local languages to be taught, but there is also recognition of the importance of English and Mandarin. These results and analysis suggest there is strong support for the language regime currently in place which gives a symbolic place to local languages in the curriculum. The survey results demonstrate the pragmatic approach taken by Taiwanese towards language. Taiwanese people accept the symbolic role of local languages as a marker of Taiwanese identity and accept Mandarin as the official language and lingua franca of Taiwan. The results show the public accepts the practical role that Mandarin and English play in Taiwanese society.

## Local languages, the media and language attitudes

There has been a growth in the production of local language media since the Taiwanisation movement started despite the shift away from local language for pragmatic reasons. For example, a Mandarin-Tâi-gí dictionary was published in August 2000. The dictionary was written in characters with the Taiwanese phonetic system explicating Tâi-gí pronunciation (Wu 2000). Tâi-gí has made the transition into popular music via artists such as Wu Bai 五百 and Jeannie Hsieh 謝金燕 as well as into the local film industry. More literature written in dialect (most commonly Tâi-gí) has been published (Klötter 2009: 114-115). Authors when writing in Tâi-gí, commonly use Chinese characters. But, for the 15% of Tâi-gí morphemes which cannot be represented by existing Chinese characters, authors either create new characters to represent these sounds or borrow existing characters (Hsiau 2000: 138). As there is no standardised approach to these uncoded morphemes, even native speakers may find it hard to understand these writings (Hsiau 2000: 138).

Additional studies now to be examined, reveal a newfound public re-appraisal of local languages, in particular of Tâi-gí. If attitudes towards language are looked at, it is clear this reappraisal has not permeated the whole of society. Two studies, one conducted by Baran, the second by Su, conclude adolescents' attitudes towards Tâi-gí have not changed. Baran, discussing language attitudes of adolescents writes that

Success in the educational system demands proficiency in Mandarin, leading to the reproduction of ideologies which link Mandarin with cultural prestige. Taiwanese [i.e., Tâi-gí] is meanwhile constructed as inherently less 'refined,' less polite, less appropriate for use in formal settings or by speakers who wish to – or are expected to – identify with cultural prestige, such as female students or students with high marks.

(Baran 2005: 14, quoted in Klötter 2009: 116).

This was also one of the findings from Su's study (2008), which found that Mandarin is now the norm in most formal settings such as universities, institutions and during interviews. According to the respondents in her study, although Tâi-gí is regarded as no less structurally sophisticated than Mandarin, it still remains associated with characteristics of 'backward[ness] and vulgarity' (Su 2008: 350). For females this is especially the case. Su found the most commented upon characteristic in her survey was Tâi-gí's higher usage by males than females (Su 2008: 346). This may be due to Mandarin's association with elegance and refinement, qualities associated with and desired by females. Tâi-gí still maintains connotations with profanity, males and rural workers (Su 2008). Explanations for this stem from Taiwan's historical experiences. First, Mandarin was the only language of education. Tâi-gí was restricted to familial domains. Mandarin, thus, became more prestigious. Most Taiwanese had to learn Mandarin at school where textbooks would not contain vulgarities, and so Tâi-gí became the dominant language for expressing profanities. Second, Tâi-gí was forbidden in public domains, so speaking it while it was prohibited established a symbolic association between Tâi-gí and 'rebelliousness and toughness.' These are features associated with males and characteristic of confrontational situations in which profanities usually occur (Su 2008: 347).

These conclusions are also reflected in Tâi-gí's usage in film and comedy. Gunn found in his analysis of code-switching in slapstick comedies that

Mandarin is part of fitness for social mobility, cultural capital. Taiwanese Southern Min [Tâi-gí] remains at best the language of intimate settings between friends, at home, and only an older generation of the uneducated employ Taiwanese as the language of choice in public or institutional situations.

(Gunn 2006: 76).

In conclusion, when it comes to a language of wider communication Mandarin remains the dominant and preferred language in Taiwan. It is true that the number of speakers of local languages continues to decline. Nevertheless, local languages, such as Tâi-gí, have an open and publicly valued role to play as a symbol of Taiwan.

### Standard Taiwanese Mandarin

Mandarin is the prominent language in Taiwan but it is now accepted that there are three types of Mandarin spoken. Each differs syntactically, phonologically, and lexically from Mainland China's Beijing standard (Li 1985; Kubler 1985; Su 2008; Chen 1999). When the KMT first arrived, the language of instruction in schools was the Beijing standard. Over time this language in its spoken form has been influenced by numerous factors including the large number of Tâi-gí speakers and the fact that the majority of Mainlanders who arrived with the KMT were not actually speakers of Mandarin. These Mainlanders brought with them Cantonese, the languages of Shandong (Santong), Sichuan and Hunan varieties (Li 1985: 123), as well as non-Chinese languages such as Mongolian. Japanese and English have also influenced this form of Mandarin spoken in Taiwan. Some semantic differences are also the result of the changes made in the PRC after 1949, whereas Taiwan continues to use the pre-1949 terms. This situation led to the emergence of different varieties of Mandarin.

The three forms of recognised Mandarin in Taiwan include, first, the Beijing Mandarin Standard [BMS], used as the medium and object of instruction taught in schools and used in the media. Standard Taiwanese Mandarin [STM] is the second form of recognised Mandarin. The third form is substandard Taiwanese Mandarin, also known as *Taiwan Guoyu* 台灣國語. *Taiwan Guoyu* is characterised by the substitution of Tâi-gí phonetic and syntactic forms for their

Mandarin counterparts. (Li 1985: 126-127). It is a form of Mandarin that was ridiculed in the 1970s. Su notes in her interviews with young Taiwanese students that speaking *Taiwan Guoyu* is still associated with the traits of backwardness, vulgarity, lack of refinement and low education (Baran 2014; Su 2008: 342; Li 1985: 128).

STM, on the other hand, is recognised as a form of Chinese distinct from the forms of Mandarin spoken in China or Singapore and *Taiwan Guoyu*. This variety started gaining recognition in the 1970s. For example, in 1979 when the Department of English at the Peking Foreign Language Institute collated that year's Chinese-English dictionary it included many expressions intelligible to speakers of STM (Li 1985: 126). Talking STM is a way for Taiwanese people to assert their own cultural and linguistic identity as distinct from the Mainland and uneducated Taiwanese (Li 1985; Kubler 1985). STM is now accepted as a language of Taiwan. It is not regarded poorly as in the case of *Taiwan Guoyu*. Some academics now posit that this form of Mandarin is now Taiwan's own and is associated with an emerging sense of identity (Chen 1999).

One of the most important phonological features of STM which sets it apart from BMS is that it does not rhotacise the final [r] characteristic of BMS. Other phonological features of STM which set it apart from other forms of Mandarin include (examples from Kubler 1985: 157-161; Kubler and Ho 2010: 5-8):

1. The initials zh, sh, ch lose their retroflexion and merge with their dental sibilants z, s, and c. For example: *zhu* 豬 (pig) sounds like *zu* 租 (to rent), *chu* 出 (to go out) sounds like *cu* 粗 (to be coarse) and *shu* 書 (book) sounds like *su* 酥 (to be flaky).
2. Finals [ing] and [eng] tend to converge into the sounds [in] and [en].
3. The third tone usually has no rise even in final position and the neutral tone occurs less frequently.

These phonological differences differentiate BMS from STM. They also distinguish STM from many varieties of Mandarin spoken in the PRC that are also phonologically and

phonetically different from BMS. For example, Chen found 12 deviations from BMS in Shaoxing in Zhejiang Province (Chen 1990 quoted in Chen 1999: 42). However, these elements of distinction have not been incorporated into an ideology of national distinctiveness, as has happened in the case of STM in Taiwan.

STM also varies grammatically from BMS. One of the more striking variations is: *you meiyou* 有沒有 which in standard Mandarin acts as a function phrase and negative counterpart of the aspect marker *le* 了 (Chen 1999:97). In STM, *you meiyou* also acts to mark the ‘occurrence or non-occurrence of an action’ or ‘existence or non-existence of a situation’ (Chen 1999: 97). For example, in STM it would be acceptable to say

Ni you chifan le meiyou? 你有吃飯了沒有?  
You have eat meal *le* not have?  
‘Have you eaten yet?’

However, in *Putonghua* (BMS) the expression would be incorrect. The sentence should be

Ni chiguo fanle ma? 你吃過飯了嗎?  
You eat [past] *le* q-particle?  
‘Have you eaten yet?’

The difference stems from the influence of Tâi-gí on Mandarin. In Tâi-gí the two function words *bô* and *ū* are used for the same function as illustrated above. According to Chen, when native speakers of Tâi-gí use Mandarin they use the semantic structure of their native language and replace the Tâi-gí function words with the more-Mandarin sounding *you meiyou* (Chen 1999: 98)

Lexical differences also exist between the two varieties of Mandarin and may lead to misunderstandings. Some variations are tabulated in Table two (Chen 1999: 106)



Table two: semantic differences between STM and Beijing Standard.

	Taiwan		Mainland	
Taxi	Jichengche	計程車	Chuzuche	出租車
Bicycle	Jiaotache	腳踏車	Zixingche	自行車
Disabled	Canzhang	殘障	Canji	殘疾

Finally, the use of traditional characters in Taiwan and not the simplified characters of the Mainland also differentiates STM from BMS. When the KMT first arrived in Taiwan, traditional characters were used to counteract ‘the vandalism of the Communists on the mainland’ (Fang 1969, quoted in Chen 1999: 162). Initially, this was done to show the KMT as the true protectors of Han Chinese culture. Now, it is held that traditional characters are used as a source of pride in Taiwan to set it apart from the Mainland where only simplified characters are used (except for calligraphy). This is also reflected in the different terminology used to refer to ‘traditional characters.’ In Taiwan they are referred to as ‘authentic or proper characters’ 正體字 while in the PRC they are known as ‘complicated characters’ 繁體字.

What is happening in Taiwan is similar to the linguistic situation in Ireland. Support exists for the Irish language as an ethnic symbol, but does not extend to its communicative aspects. Edwards observes while Irish Gaelic proficiency is decreasing, this does not mean Irish people have abandoned their language completely. Conversely, the Irish people have maintained ‘a sense of national or group identity by enshrining it in an English that they have steadily made their own’ (Edwards 2010: 124-125). The result is known as Hibernian English. It includes features from both Irish Gaelic and English. In Ireland an increasing number of people are using

Hibernian English which is linked to a distinct Irish identity. The Taiwanese also use STM as a language they have made their own. It too is linked to a unique sense of national identity.

Despite the language shift towards Mandarin and away from local languages, the Taiwanese still maintain their sense of cultural distinctiveness. Valuing local languages as a symbol of ethnic and national identity and creating a national identity based on non-linguistic factors has ensured the creation of a unique identity.

### Summary

Analysis of survey results and attitudes towards languages in Taiwan illustrates how the Taiwanese see local languages as a symbol of national identity. This is similar to the situation in Hong Kong where the use of Cantonese reinforces a distinctive Hong Kong identity. The survey results also shows how the Taiwanese hope the education curriculum will continue to give local languages a symbolic place within the curriculum without hindering the acquisition of the more practical languages: English and Mandarin. The Taiwanese people have found another expression of their national identity via ‘domesticating’ Mandarin making a variety which is their own. It shows how Mandarin can also be used as a symbol of the nation. Domestication of Mandarin parallels the rise of many hybrid varieties including the Hinglish of India, the Singlish of Singapore and the Malandarin of Malaysia (Gunn 2006: 207). These hybrid varieties, like STM in Taiwan, are an expression of identity and solidarity for members of these populations, allowing them to identify with something created by their populations to express their own distinct cultural and national identity.

## Chapter Four — The Sunflower Movement and identity politics

My fellow compatriots, we all care about Taiwan, and we can express differing view regarding public policies. But we are all on the same boat, and we share in common the responsibility for Taiwan to move forward. At this moment in time, we must unite for Taiwan, and I believe that the democratic system is the best way to resolve conflicts. Only in this way may Taiwan continue its progress. God bless Taiwan. Let us all strive to make Taiwan better. (President Ma Ying-jiu quoted in *Apple Daily* 29 March 2014)<sup>13</sup>

We must be our own masters  
This is why you are here today  
This is not just a struggle between anti-CSSTA and pro-CSSTA forces  
This is a struggle between an autocratic executive branch and the people demanding democracy...  
Brothers must unite!  
Unity is strong!  
(Chen Wei-ting 30 March 2014).

The Sunflower Movement which blossomed in Taiwan in March 2014 adopted its name after a supporter left a bunch of sunflowers for the protestors. He hoped that they, like sunflowers, would be able to shed light on the perceived darkness of Taiwan's democratic institutions – institutions that are central to Taiwanese identity and that an overwhelming majority of Taiwanese want to protect. This chapter will take the Sunflower Movement as a case study. It will argue that Taiwan's democratic institutions and the land of the island itself constitute an important component of Taiwanese identity. Through analysis of protest materials and songs it will further argue that local languages have a symbolic link to Taiwanese identity. Additionally, Taiwanese people have now reconciled their increasing use of Mandarin with Taiwanese identity by emphasising the distinctive features of STM. The Taiwanese have re-imagined Mandarin so that it is now accepted as a language of Taiwan.

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<sup>13</sup> See Appendix B for original Chinese.

President Ma Ying-jiu's quotation is from his speech to the Sunflower protestors. It was the first time he directly addressed them. Protest leader Chen Wei-ting's quotation is his response to President Ma. It was delivered at a rally of protestors held in Taipei city on 30 March 2014. These speeches demonstrate how both the supporters and opponents of the Cross Strait Services Trade Agreement [CSSTA] 海峽兩岸服務貿易協會 drew upon the same arguments to support their position. Ma and Chen's speeches were both delivered in Mandarin, and both stressed the importance of democracy, unity and commonality amongst Taiwanese people. Through examining the protest movement's language, this chapter will argue Taiwanese identity is now able to be reconciled with local languages *and* Mandarin. The fact the majority of primary sources are written in Mandarin or sung in Mandarin illustrates how one can speak Mandarin and still identify as Taiwanese. When Mandarin was first brought to Taiwan, it was not associated with Taiwanese identity. Now, with Mandarin's domestication in Taiwan, it can be used as an expression of Taiwanese identity. The protest materials demonstrate the acceptance in Taiwan of both local languages and Mandarin. They also highlight the non-linguistic aspects of Taiwanese identity widely shared by those living in Taiwan.

### The start of the Sunflower Movement

The dispute over the CSSTA, according to Mark Harrison, a Taiwan scholar who researches Taiwanese social movements, touches upon Taiwan's identity debate, as it highlights the longstanding ambiguity about the relationship between China and Taiwan and China's place in Taiwan's social, economic and cultural life (Harrison 2014).

The CSSTA was to extend the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement [ECFA] 兩岸經濟合作架構協議 signed in 2010 which reduced tariffs and other barriers between China and

Taiwan. The CSSTA signed in mid-2013 would open up 64 of Taiwan's services industries to China removing restrictions on services including education, telecommunications, finance and retail. The agreement met opposition when first signed in 2013. The DPP stated that it was not opposed to trade agreements with China, but it voiced its concerns about the potential economic impacts of the agreement (DPP 2014). The DPP stated that due to sensitivity in cross-strait relations there must be greater consultation. In reaction to this political pressure, under an agreement brokered by the Speaker of the Legislature Wang Jin-ping 王金平, the KMT announced on 25 June 2013 that the agreement would first undergo a review in the legislature (known as the Legislative Yuan [LY] 立法院) before proceeding to a vote.

According to the KMT, the CSSTA was necessary for Taiwan's continued economic growth. It would open up investment opportunities on the Mainland while boosting Taiwan's international credibility. However, according to the Chung-Hua Institute for Economic Research (July 2013) the CSSTA would only increase Taiwan's GDP between 0.025-0.034%.

Sunflower protestors and their supporters voiced fears about Chinese influence. While neither anti-trade nor anti-China, the protestors were concerned about the political ramifications which could result from signing such a far-reaching agreement. They wanted to see mechanisms put in place to ensure Taiwan's way of life and political institutions remained unchanged for any agreement signed with China (Cole 13 August 2014). Of particular concern was the agreement's drafting process. The protestors referred to it as 'black box' (*heixiang* 黑箱), and believed it was conducted behind closed doors with the public kept in the dark about the process. They stated that in keeping with Taiwan's democratic system any decision affecting Taiwan's future should be decided by Taiwan's 23 million population and not decided solely by the executive (Lin quoted in Setnews 31 March 2014).

The international norm for trade deals is for negotiations to be conducted between governments in secret, behind closed doors. This was the case for the Free Trade Agreements signed between Taiwan and other countries (such as Singapore and New Zealand). Since China maintains Taiwan is a part of China, the negotiations are not those of two independent countries. Also, there were concerns held by many Non Government Organisations (NGOs), academics and members of the public that the CSSTA would lead to 'reunification by default.' Opening up sectors of Taiwanese society including education, finance and cultural industries would give China direct control over key industries which could lead to China exerting influence over Taiwan's cultural and social life (Harrison 18 April 2014).

Signing the CSSTA raised concerns that Taiwan could move in the direction Hong Kong has taken vis-à-vis its relations with Mainland China, known as 'Hongkongisation.' Features of this include increasing economic dependence on China, an influx of Mainland tourists and interference in Taiwan's media (as evidenced by Want Want holdings, a pro-Beijing business purchasing *The China Times*) (Kaeding 2014: 127-128). Another concern arising from the Hong Kong experience is the potential occurrence in Taiwan of what is known as 'Mainlandisation.' This is a process whereby Hong Kong becomes 'politically more dependent on Beijing, economically more reliant on the Mainland's support, [and] socially more patriotic toward the motherland' (Lo 2007: 186, quoted in Jones 2014: 25). There are fears that 'Mainlandisation' will lead Hong Kong to lose its individual identity as distinct from the Mainland (Jones 2014: 26). Like Taiwan, Hong Kong has also experienced rallies including those in July 2014, in a movement called 'Occupy Central' and the October Umbrella Revolution. During these protests tens of thousands of protestors marched demanding political reform and democratic rights for selecting their leaders (Bradsher et al. 1 July 2014). The occupation of the LY in Taiwan and

protests in Hong Kong, demonstrates the disquiet of many people in both societies about Mainland China's increasing influence on their institutions and way of life.

### Progression of the Sunflower Movement

On 17 March 2014, the KMT announced the 90 days approved for review had expired and the CSSTA was to move straight to a vote. This cut short the review process agreed upon between the KMT and DPP. As the KMT holds the majority of seats in the LY (65 out of 113) the CSSTA would be sure to pass. During these deliberations, student, civic groups and other protestors gathered outside the LY. On 18 March 2014, these protestors entered the LY at what they saw as a breakdown in the democratic process of review. Thus commenced a 23-day siege of the parliament, throughout which peace and non-violence were stressed (Cole 20 March 2014; Chen Wei-ting quoted in NTDTV: 29 March 2014).

As the occupation of the LY continued on 23 March a breakaway group of protestors broke into the buildings of the Executive Yuan (政治元 [EY]), the executive branch of the government, responding to the President's refusal to back down from the agreement during a press conference. The occupation of the EY did not have the support of the main student leaders. It was also a step too far for the Government, and police were ordered to forcibly remove protestors using batons, shields and water cannons. Dozens of protestors were injured. The occupation of the EY was not viewed favourably by the Taiwanese public, neither was the use of force which recalled other events in Taiwan's history where blood had been spilled in the cause of democracy (such as 2-28 and the 1979 Kaohsiung Incident). A poll carried out by the TVBS poll centre of 886 respondents showed 35% supported the occupation of the EY and 56% disapproved (TVBS 24 March 2014).

Both pro and against sides in the CSSTA debate appealed to the same values to defend their actions. The official response of the government condemned the actions of the students. The government said the students' actions were undemocratic as they had not followed the correct procedures of democracy and that the CSSTA was needed for Taiwan's continued economic prosperity (Rauhala 2014). In arguing that the CSSTA would bring benefits to Taiwan, the KMT appealed to the Taiwanese people's attachment to the island. By saying the students' occupation was an attack on Taiwan's parliamentary democracy they also invoked Taiwan people's attachment to their democratic institutions.

Interestingly the Sunflower protestors used these same arguments to defend their actions. The protestors stated that terminating the review process, conducting negotiations behind closed doors and being unwilling to talk to the protest leaders showed the dominance of executive power and threatened to undermine Taiwan's democratic system. In appealing to the same values of democracy and an attachment to the island of Taiwan, both sides in the movement indicated how these are now fundamental aspects of Taiwanese identity. Overall, there was reasonable support for the movement in Taiwanese society, with the TVBS poll showing 51% of respondents supported the students' occupation of the LY and 38% disapproving. The majority (63%) agreed that Taiwan should withdraw from the Services agreement and that the agreement should be returned to the LY for revision (TVBS: 24 March 2014).

The Sunflower Protest drew on Taiwan's established tradition of civil society (defined in this context as 'pro-reform advocacy social movements and civic protests') demanding concessions and policy change from the government (Hsiao 2012: 44). In Taiwan, civil society started to emerge in the political liberalisation period (1980-1987) gaining momentum after martial law's end (Hsiao 2012: 46).



An important civil society movement was the Wild Lily Movement of 1990, a sit-in in Taipei city that demanded greater democracy via the direct election of Taiwan's president and vice-president. The Sunflower Movement echoed the 1990 action and has in common with it the adoption of a floral name. The custom was also seen in the 2011 Chinese pro-democracy protest labelled the Jasmine Revolution whose name was based on a Tunisian protest of the same name.

The Sunflower protest was largely made up of students, initially members of the student-led activist The Black Island Youth Alliance group. This group had been set up in 2013 to campaign against the CSSTA and was led by student leaders Lin Fei-fan 林飛帆 and Chen Weiting 陳為廷. Lin and Chen had experience organising and participating in protests. They were involved in the Wild Strawberry Movement of 2008 when the government cracked down on protests against a visit by the chairman of a Chinese organisation, the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits. They participated in the 2012 Anti-Media Monopoly Movement, as well as the 2013 protests sparked by demolitions of housing in the Dapu community to make way for new developments (Hioe 16 May 2014; *Focus Taiwan* 31 March 2014; Harrison 2014). Having outlined the background of the Sunflower Movement, this chapter will now move into an investigation of the language used during the Sunflower protest.

## Data

Analysis of language from the Sunflower Movement is made up of two types of data: data I collected during my fieldwork in Taiwan held and preserved in Academia Sinica, Taiwan's premier research institution,<sup>14</sup> and songs and music videos from the March protest (six in Mandarin, four in Tâi-gí).

During my research in Taiwan, I visited Academia Sinica to collect primary material for analysis. Sources were chosen based on two criteria: the language(s) used to write in and themes. Thematically, sources were chosen if Taiwanese identity was directly referred to or inferred. Not a lot of primary material was gathered due to the fact the number of people occupying the LY and taking part in the wider protests was small in relation to the population as a whole. However, these materials from the protest do reflect feelings shared within the wider public. My data includes

- nine text-only post-it notes
- seven letters, five in Mandarin, two in English and Mandarin
- 34 messages/graffiti expressing thoughts and thanks to the protest organisers, including two with drawings of Taiwan, two with English and Mandarin and two in English
- 22 placards/posters, including two with images, six combining English and Mandarin, one in Tâi-gí and three in English
- three pages of writing

All sources are collated in Appendix C with photos, Chinese and English translations into English.

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<sup>14</sup> In the night following the evacuation of the LY, academics from Academia Sinica, worked with student volunteers to photograph, collect and move all material (including posters, flyers, banners, placards, notes, letters and signs) to Academia Sinica where they are currently held in the Humanities and Social Sciences Faculty.

## Methodology

The sources include images, music and text. These various overlapping means of representation require multimodal discourse analysis (MDA). MDA is ‘the study of language in combination with other resources, such as images, scientific symbolism, gesture, action, music and sound’ (O’Halloran 2011: 120). It is primarily concerned with analysing texts which make meaning in multiple articulations which can include print materials, websites, film, news of day-to-day events, music videos, and music (O’Halloran 2011: 120; Kress and Van Leeuwen 2001: 4). I use the two-part framework put forward by Kress and Van Leeuwen (2001: 111, 114). First, the semiotic resources of communication referring to the modes and media used. Second, the communicative practices meaning the way texts are represented and the manner in which people interact with them. Using this framework allowed me to analyse the multiplicity of modes and mediums in each text as well as human engagement with these texts, which contribute to the overall meaning.

## Findings

There were four key slogans of the protest. Analysis of my primary sources is organised thematically around these slogans. Key slogans are those that occurred with high frequency during the protests. These slogans occur repeatedly throughout my selected data and in numerous other sources. Each of them identified a key element in Taiwan's emerging sense of identity.

Table three: The Sunflower Movement's key slogans.

Key Slogan	Frequency in corpus	Photos
Oppose the black box process, oppose the services agreement ( <i>fan heixiang, fan fumao</i> 反黑箱反服貿)	5	2, 4, 10, 42, 53
Defend democracy ( <i>hanwei minzhu</i> 捍衛民主)	10	2, 14, 16, 18, 20, 21, 24, 39, 40, 54
God Bless Taiwan ( <i>tianyou Taiwan</i> 天佑台灣)	10	10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 19, 21, 22, 51
Come on Taiwan ( <i>Taiwan jiayou</i> 台灣加油)	16	2, 3, 4, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 21, 24, 25, 26, 36, 50, 51, 53

### *Defending democracy: setting Taiwan apart from China?*

The first key slogan analysed is 'Oppose the black box process, oppose the services agreement', which appears to be concerned only with the Sunflower Movement. However, in writing 'oppose the black box process' the slogan implies support for democracy since the black box process was perceived to be undemocratic. 'Oppose the services agreement' implies protestors do not support increased PRC influence which would result from an agreement signed with China. The importance of democracy is explicitly mentioned in the second key slogan 'Defend democracy'. Protecting Taiwan's democracy and the importance of freedom was the

most common theme, explicitly mentioned in 13 pieces of the primary materials.<sup>15</sup> This illustrates how democracy and protecting Taiwan's democratic institutions and freedoms is an important component of Taiwanese identity. For example, in photo 52 in a letter to the protest leaders the author writes 'our democracy and freedom is in danger. We need your leadership to win'.

The desire to protect democracy and the importance of a free and democratic Taiwan is connected to another key theme represented in the corpus: Taiwanese people feel that their democratic style of governance and different historical experiences (including their aboriginal heritage and Japanese colonial experiences) sets them apart from China (Brown 2004: 27). This was made explicit in the sources which differentiated Taiwan from Mainland China, especially in eight items indicating anti-Chinese sentiment.<sup>16</sup> For example, a number wrote some variant of the slogan in Photo 4 'I'm not a Mainlander.' The same message of difference was expressed in photo 48 'If we repeal the Service's Agreement then Taiwan will refuse to be controlled by the Chinese locusts.' This is of particular note as it recalls the protests in Hong Kong where a statue of a giant locust was placed over Lion Rock as a metaphor for Mainlanders 'invading' Hong Kong and competing with Hong Kong residents for limited resources such as property and places in schools and hospitals (Jones 2014: 22). As mentioned above, there are fears Taiwan will move in the direction of Hong Kong in its relations with the Mainland. Photos 8, 25, 35 explicitly rejected the idea that Taiwan should become like Hong Kong, as in the slogan in photo 8 'Don't want to become a second Hong Kong.'

*Home is where the heart is: the centrality of the island that is Taiwan*

The third of the key slogans 'God Bless Taiwan' illustrates another key theme running through the primary materials. That is, Taiwanese identity is linked to the island, Taiwan, as

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<sup>15</sup> Photos: 2, 3, 14, 15, 16, 18, 21, 24, 39, 40, 42, 52, 54.

<sup>16</sup> Photos 1, 4 (x2), 5, 6, 20, 27, 48.

distinct from any other entity<sup>17</sup> implying only those living in Taiwan can decide Taiwan's future. Four pieces of data<sup>18</sup> were accompanied by drawings of the island showing how it was central to identity. Other sources, without images, nonetheless indicated that being Taiwanese is linked to the experience of living on the island.<sup>19</sup> Strong warrior-like vocabulary appeared in these examples (such as 'protect 守護,' 'fighting 戰,' and 'warrior 勇士'). This language indicates how some Taiwanese protestors view the current protest as a fight needing to be won. This can be seen in photo 35 'If we don't fight today, then tomorrow we will become like Hong Kong' and photo 51 'We are Taiwanese citizens, we are Taiwanese warriors, God Bless Taiwan.'

The notion that Taiwan is facing a challenge is reflected in the final key slogan, *Taiwan jiyau* which I have translated as 'Come on Taiwan'. The Chinese word *jiayou* is notoriously difficult to translate with no direct English equivalent. It is frequently invoked as encouragement in sporting contests or wishing luck before an exam or challenging event. Thus, '*Taiwan jiyau*' indicates how Taiwan is facing a challenge and needs extra encouragement from its supporters (the Taiwanese) to overcome it. Protestors chanting this slogan position themselves as supporters of Taiwan.

In conclusion, the message presented in the majority of the materials indicates the emergence of a Taiwanese identity unconnected to the Mainland and instead closely connected with the island of Taiwan.

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<sup>17</sup> Photos 2, 7, 9, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 31, 37, 51.

<sup>18</sup> Photos 12, 22, 37, 51.

<sup>19</sup> Photos 9, 13, 15, 41, 43, 44.

### *Significance of songs during the Sunflower Movement*

This protest saw a proliferation of related songs as some of the songwriters of Taiwan, inspired by the movement, used their vocation to encourage more Taiwanese people to participate.

Songs, by their very nature, inspire solidarity as

‘Groups make use of popular music to indicate shared identifications, and to celebrate and honour shared events. Audiences ... create commonalities tied to music ... groups drawn together through minority status or a lack of political power adopt songs to represent members’ common concerns and interests.’

(Klein 2009: 112-113).

This was the case in the Sunflower Movement when songs were sung to unite the protestors, encourage more Taiwanese to participate and serve as a mechanism for protestors to express their concerns. Singers performed on stages set up at the protest site. This made music an integral part of the Sunflower Movement. As songs have meaning only if they resonate with listeners this analysis will adopt the methodology put forward by Allan Moore (2012) in his seminal work on popular song analysis: *Song Means*. The framework adopted is based around two questions. The first is the musical experience questions of what, how and why. What range of meaning does the song have? How to make sense of it? And, why is it expressed in this way? The second is whether the songs achieved their objectives (Moore 2012: 4-5). The analysis is broken into two sections. It will start with a broad overview of the themes presented in the songs followed by a deeper analysis of two songs: ‘Island Sunrise’ sung in Tâi-gí by indie band Fire Ex., with lyrics by leader singer Sam Yang, and the Tâi-gí version of the *Les Miserables* song ‘Do you hear the people sing.’ The songs for analysis include the songs sung in Mandarin ‘Sunflower’ by A Kuan and Pete C, ‘I am embracing the you who’s been pretending to be brave this whole time’ by Huang Jian-wei, ‘Dawn’ by NIC the lead singer of the band *The Second World*, ‘Sunflower’ by Dwagie, ‘Rainy Day Sunflowers’ by *The Savage People*, and ‘Where the heart

takes you' by *The National Technology University Music Group*. The songs sung in Tâi-gí include 'Our dreams are here' by Huang Jian-wei and 'Goodnight Taiwan' by *Fire Ex*.<sup>20</sup>

*Taiwan as envisioned by Sunflower protestors: connecting past, present and future*

Songs of the protest reveal several key themes: Love for the island of Taiwan and the pride the songwriters feel in identifying as Taiwanese. Via the lyrics the songwriters express their wish that despite the current pressures and challenges facing Taiwan, Taiwan will continue to thrive. For example, in 'Sunflower' Dwagie raps

Maybe Taiwan does have too many issues and unsolvable problems  
But if you gave me 1000 lives to be born  
This is the only place I choose to be born  
If you gave me 1000 lives to die  
This is the only place I choose to die

These words illustrate the strong feelings of identification many citizens have towards Taiwan and the sense of feeling 'Taiwanese.' In the final stanza of the music video (shot entirely in black and white) we see student leader Chen Wei-ting with his back to the viewers walking among candle-waving supporters down a path towards a bright light. The bright light and people channel a concrete representation of the symbolic hope Taiwan will persevere during challenging times. Similar sentiments are expressed in the song 'Rainy Day Sunflowers' by *The Savage People*. In the final line they sing 'we all grew up on the same piece of soil'. In the words superimposed on the song 'Island Sunrise,' a similar sentiment is echoed as Chinese characters appear stating 'we must be honest and responsible to our own land.'

The symbol of the sun is common throughout many of the songs. It symbolises how sunlight needs to shine on the black box decision-making process (from which the movement got

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<sup>20</sup> Complete Chinese version and author's own English translations (unless otherwise specified) for songs are found in Appendix D, Figure 1.2.



its name), and also signifies the new inclusive identity forming in Taiwan. The sun is referred to in A Kuan's 'Sunflowers,' 'Rainy Day Sunflowers,' 'Dawn,' 'Where the heart takes you', 'Goodnight Taiwan' and 'Our dreams are here'. In 'Sunflower,' Dwagie epitomises the emergence of this new identity symbolised by the sun. He raps that 'they have freed the country from the strangle of blue and green, this time they will navigate the fate of this island on their own.' Here, blue refers to the KMT. Green refers to the DPP. The imagery illustrates how younger generations no longer feel inhibited by the previous division between KMT and DPP and, by extension, *waisheng ren* and *bensheng ren*. Instead, people are united by love and concern for the island Taiwan.

That Taiwanese people must protect their future which belongs to them is another strong sentiment expressed in the songs. The superimposed words in the music video of the song 'Island Sunrise' music video express this sentiment. The words declare 'we want to once again seize control of our future. We have to fight for our free and lasting future.' The song concludes 'We can bravely develop the future that belongs to us, the future that should belong to Taiwan'. In the song 'Goodnight Taiwan' by *Fire EX.*, the lyrics also exhort the future wellbeing of Taiwan. The song proclaims: 'Beautiful weather will accompany the coming of dawn, I hope all goes well in Taiwan ... I hope there is peace in Taiwan'. Here dawn symbolises the future of Taiwan and the wish that, just as dawn brings a new day, a new future will also come to Taiwan.

The recollection of two previous occurrences in Taiwanese history is another theme present in the songs. These events, crucial to the formation of Taiwanese democracy and identity were 2-28 and the Kaohsiung Incident. Dwagie in his song 'Sunflower' raps 'high pressure water truck appears from history textbook to refresh your memory.' A Kuan's song 'Sunflower' also evokes this memory with 'Do you remember the blood that was shed in the last generation, which left behind our valued democracy?' Images of Sunflower protestors bleeding are displayed in the

accompanying music videos, clear indications that these events played a key role in forming Taiwanese identity amongst all generations.

Finally, the theme of ‘sunflowers’ is present in five of the songs analysed. These songs make reference to sunflowers but they do not use the traditional Chinese word for sunflower *xiangri kui* 向日葵 or the Tâi-gí word *ritou hua* 日頭花.<sup>21</sup> Instead they use the literal translation of the English word ‘sunflower’ — *taiyang hua* (太陽 sun 花 flower). The protestors calqued the word from English and adopted it as the name of the movement. It is evidence of the use of English as a counterforce to Mandarin and local languages in Taiwan. Another example is the popularity of the song ‘Do you hear the people sing.’

*Singing volumes: what language can tell us about emerging Taiwanese identity*

The majority of the discourse of the movement was conducted in Mandarin. Most songs were sung in Mandarin. But the unofficial anthem of the protest ‘Island Sunrise’ was sung in Tâi-gí. The majority of Sunflower Movement protestors, mainly students, would have had limited proficiency in Tâi-gí, given the declining rate of mother tongue acquisition in younger generations. Although Mandarin is now accepted as a lingua franca in Taiwan, using Tâi-gí still evokes strong emotional reactions as it links the song and protest to a language long associated with Taiwan.

‘Island Sunrise’ is sung in the first person and from the perspective of a protestor. It is an address to the singer’s mother and loved ones. The song’s objective is to encourage more Taiwanese citizens to join the protest and is imbued with a feeling of hope the protest movement will succeed and achieve its goals. The video clip made by students from Taipei National

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<sup>21</sup> Appendix D, Figure 1.1

University of the Arts is composed of protest images which resonate on a sentimental level. The opening scenes have only a black screen with a voiceover recording from the actual protest exhorting listeners (in Mandarin) to

‘Occupy the podium  
Reopen the negotiations  
Aim for transparency  
Because we are ...  
Taiwan’s democracy!!!’

The clip then bursts into the opening strains of the song accompanied by images of large crowds of people protesting at night-time during the occupation. These first scenes are important as they set the style, genre and tone of the song (Moore 2012: 168). In this case the opening is musically stirring. Driving drumbeats, cymbal crashes and major piano chords create an uplifting tone imbued with hope while drawing viewers into the experience of the protest.

The name of the song: ‘Island Sunrise’ illustrates how the new sense of identity is moving away from previous identity constructions shaped by characteristics which divide. Now, characteristics forming identity are based instead on *place*. *Place* is an inclusive concept that can be shared by all people who identify with the island. The word ‘sunrise’ itself connotes a new day, a new beginning. It is a metaphor for a new period starting in Taiwan’s history and society.

The song is sung in Tâi-gí. The accompanying subtitles are in Chinese characters. In Mandarin these characters represent words whose sounds are an approximate phonetic match for the sounds of the semantically dissimilar Tâi-gí words in the lyrics. The use of the characters is also indicative of an emergent Taiwanese identity since the characters are ‘domesticated’ or ‘nationalised’ by being made to convey the sounds and hence the meaning of Tâi-gí words. For instance, the word for ‘we’ traditionally written as 我們 pronounced *women* in Mandarin is instead written as 阮們 pronounced *ruanmen* in Mandarin, a character meaning a traditional

Chinese instrument, but much more closer to the Tâi-gí phonetic sound of ‘we’ (pronounced gún). Taiwanese people would see this as borrowing Chinese characters to express Tâi-gí. They would not view it as written Chinese. Chinese characters have merely been used to express Taiwanese sounds. It is further evidence of the ‘domestication’ of Mandarin that is occurring in Taiwan. Mandarin has now not only evolved into STM, a variety of the language unique to Taiwan, but it is also used to represent Tâi-gí. Tâi-gí is therefore being made more accessible to all people in Taiwan regardless of their proficiency in Tâi-gí.

The language used during the Sunflower protests shows that language in Taiwan still has links to identity. This identity can be shared and expressed by speakers of any language, even those who only speak Mandarin. For example, ‘Island Sunrise’ uses Chinese characters to represent the phonetic sounds of Tâi-gí. The sources that featured in the occupation of the Legislative Yuan, however, used Chinese characters to write Mandarin. This is known because the grammar of the writing is that of Mandarin not Tâi-gí. Additionally, as Chinese has over 100,000 characters with 5,000 in common use, the characters used in the data are those normally used to represent the semantics and phonetics of Mandarin. These two examples show how Taiwanese identity can be expressed in any language.

Another commonly sung song during the protest was a Tâi-gí translation, done by Professor Wu Yi-Cheng, of the song ‘Do you hear the people sing’ from the musical *Les Miserables*. ‘Do you hear the People Sing’ is a stirring revolutionary song exhorting people to overcome adversity and setbacks. The song originates from the book ‘Les Miserables’ by the French author Victor Hugo written in French, translated into English, then adapted into the musical form during the 1980s. ‘Do you hear the people sing’ expresses a sense of revolution where the oppressed rise up against their oppressors. In the Taiwanese context, the song’s

popularity illuminates many new social phenomena. First, the theme of the oppressed rising up evokes the idea that members of the Taiwanese population are rising up against what they see as an unjust regime. Second, it was first sung in English and was then translated into Tâi-gí. This points to the spread and growing popularity of English. It is also an indicator of how the Taiwanese are turning to Europe before China when they want to find a protest symbol. European culture and a European language (English) are being used as counterpoints to Mandarin and Chinese culture. The themes of other protest songs are echoed in ‘there is a life about to start when tomorrow comes’ with its imagery of a new day.

Songs in Tâi-gí were popular during the Sunflower Movement. For example Fire EX.’s Tâi-gí song ‘Goodnight Taiwan’ was also widely sung and played throughout the protest. The reason, of course, that Tâi-gí songs were popular is that local languages have become a mechanism for Taiwanese people to reclaim their identity. Even if the Taiwanese cannot speak these languages, they have become an avenue for Taiwanese people to express their identity and demonstrate that their heritage and history are linked to the island Taiwan. For example, ‘Do you hear the people sing’ was originally sung in English. Its setting was in Paris. Taiwanese people gained ownership over the song by translating it into Tâi-gí thus making it relevant in the local context. The same song has been translated into Cantonese and was sung during the recent ‘Occupy Central’ and Umbrella Revolution protests in Hong Kong (Sun and Woodhouse 2014).

The use of Tâi-gí shows that it retains a role as a symbol of a separate identity, but that proficiency in it is not necessary for group membership. This is similar to the linguistic situation in Ireland and New Zealand. In Ireland Gaelic is not spoken widely, nor is Maori in New Zealand, but both languages are still used emblematically to express a distinctive identity (Edwards 2010; Benton 2007). Likewise, in parts of indigenous Australia, traditional languages are seen to be

something inherited from parents and grandparents, associated with the land and tribal identity. Among indigenous Australians, as in Taiwan, they are used emblematically as a means of identification. Take, for example, the traditional Australian language Kurna. Even though its last first-language speaker died in 1929, Kurna has undergone a successful reclamation. It is now used in place names in the Australian city of Adelaide. While the language is no longer employed as a language of communication, its emblematic as a traditional language which has enhanced the respect that indigenous Australians feel towards their culture and become a part of their identity (Simpson: CAEPR Seminar May 2013).

## Summary

Analysis of the songs and slogans in the Sunflower Movement (both Mandarin and Tâi-gí) point to the emergence of a Taiwanese identity based on several themes: a love of country, attachment to place and respect for democratic institutions. These non-linguistic aspects of Taiwanese identity drawn upon by both pro and anti CSSTA supporters are an important component in contemporary Taiwanese identity. Language, however, retains an important role as well. The popularity of Tâi-gí songs demonstrates how Tâi-gí (and local languages in general) are emotionally and symbolically important to Taiwanese national identity. The use of Chinese characters to represent Tâi-gí demonstrates the continued ‘nationalisation’ of Mandarin. Finally, Mandarin’s position as the dominant language of the protest’s discourse shows that Mandarin has become ‘nationalised’, consolidating its position as an accepted language of Taiwan. Speaking Mandarin and loving Taiwan are no longer linked to rival nationalisms, but have become complementary features of a common Taiwanese identity.

## **Conclusion**

This thesis set out to explore the relationship in Taiwan between language and national identity. Language is defined as a symbol of ethnic-cultural identification at both the national and local level. National identity is defined as a feeling of shared commonality amongst its members and attachment to the nation they share. The thesis sought to answer the question: ‘what is the role of language in the evolution of Taiwanese identity politics.’ It has shown language has been, and continues to be, an important part of Taiwanese national identity. In the current era, national identity is based on a more inclusive identity pertaining to Taiwan the island, its democratic institutions and wanting what is best for Taiwan’s future. Language, however, remains an important component of identity. Local languages act as an important emblem of national identity. Moreover, Mandarin in Taiwan has been domesticated and this nationalised version of the language is accepted as a language of Taiwan. Analysis of language from the Sunflower Movement in which both local languages and Mandarin were used, indicates how both are accepted as languages of Taiwan. Local languages, in addition to Mandarin are all able to express Taiwanese identity.

In the age of nationalism which started in the period following the French Enlightenment some parts of the world were subjected to linguistic imperialism. Under this system, inhabitants were compelled to speak a certain language to unify the nation or to unify it to its subject empire. This is precisely what happened in Taiwan. Prior to the age of nationalism, during European and Qing dynasty rule, in Taiwan, the language which best enabled communication was used without recourse to an official language that was imposed on the population. Under Japanese colonial rule, by contrast, the Taiwanese were forced to speak Japanese to unify them with the Japanese empire. Similarly, under post-1945 KMT authoritarian rule, the Taiwanese were compelled to

speak Mandarin to unify the country under the rule of a Chinese nationalist regime and prepare for eventual reunification with the Mainland. During this period Taiwan was dominated by the one nation-one language ideology of “I am Japanese/Chinese if I speak the national language of Japan/China” (Sandel 2003: 532).

Following the end of martial law and in the early democratic period some of the extreme linguistic nationalists in the Taiwan independence movement also strived to create a similar ideology based on Tâi-gí. This push was not successful. Mandarin survived as Taiwan’s national language. By 1987, due to years of suppression of local languages, increasing prosperity and higher levels of education, Mandarin had become the main language of the younger generation, the language of written communication, the language of progress and upward mobility and Taiwan’s lingua franca. Mandarin is likely to keep its present status, if not become more prominent as China has now become Taiwan’s number one trading partner. The dominance of Mandarin also highlighted the difficulties confronting Tâi-gí as a language of written communication. Tâi-gí has no standardised writing system and 15% of frequently used morphemes are unable to be codified using existing Han characters. These aspects have prevented it from challenging the dominance of Mandarin. Adding further pressure to local languages is competition with English. The increasing ubiquity of English, driven by globalisation, the imperatives of global trade, and its use as an international lingua franca, have contributed to the shift away from local languages as languages of everyday communication. Taiwanese are now turning to English and European cultural artefacts to express themselves and find symbols for protest as they did in the Sunflower Movement by calquing English words and adopting English songs. Consequently, Taiwan has now joined the ranks of countries in which national identity is not linked strongly to the dominance of a particular language.



Taiwanese identity is now mainly constructed around non-linguistic factors. First, this includes a loyalty to Taiwan as a place. This notion takes Taiwan, the *place*, as the starting point for Taiwanese identity. Loyalty to a sense of place allows all people to join together based on their experiences of living on the island, sharing the same education system and looking forward to what Taiwan will be and can be. It allows all Taiwan's ethnic and linguistic groups to identify as Taiwanese. Second, identity is also based on commitment to Taiwan as a democracy. Taiwan's successful transition to democracy is a source of pride for those living in Taiwan. It is also the key factor drawn upon to distinguish Taiwan from the Mainland. This was clearly illustrated in the Sunflower Movement. When making their cases both sides in the Sunflower Movement, the pro and anti CSSTA supporters, used the same values to support their argument. The values referred to included respecting Taiwan's democracy and the hope that Taiwan will continue to flourish in the future. References by both sides in the movement to these values demonstrated how they now underpin Taiwanese identity.

In the wake of the failures of successive linguistic nationalisms, how does language relate to national identity in contemporary Taiwan? Despite the construction of Taiwanese identity primarily around loyalty to Taiwan as a place and commitment to Taiwan as a democracy, language still plays an important but different role. First, local languages are taught, respected and used as symbols of the nation. This is seen through their role in the local curriculum. While the Taiwanese recognise the important and practical role played by English and Mandarin, they also want the education system to retain a place for local languages to serve a symbolic purpose without preventing the acquisition of English and Mandarin. Thus, the current curriculum which mandates one hour of local language teaching per week ensures that local languages can continue to serve their symbolic role. The popularity of Tâi-gí songs during the Sunflower Movement manifested how local languages retain great value as expressions of Taiwanese identity. Second,

Mandarin is becoming 'nationalised' in Taiwan with an emerging form, Standard Taiwanese Mandarin (STM) that is distinguishable from forms spoken in other Mandarin-speaking places. In Taiwan the development of STM combined with the continued use of traditional Chinese characters has ensured that Taiwan can distinguish itself from the Mainland and maintain a distinct identity whilst embracing the practicality of Mandarin. The dominance of Mandarin during the Sunflower protest for expressing Taiwanese identity clearly demonstrates the acceptance of Mandarin as a language of Taiwan.

Linguistic nationalism was once imposed on the Taiwanese population to unify Taiwan to meet the objectives of the rulers of those periods. However, in our globalised world where linguistic, national and economic boundaries are increasingly breaking down, Taiwan has now joined the ranks of countries where national identity is not strongly linked to a particular language. While language still retains a great symbolic value, it is not the only emblem of Taiwanese identity. If those living on the island of Taiwan personally identify as Taiwanese and value the systems, institutions, and different languages that make Taiwan unique, then that is sufficient for them to identify as Taiwanese.

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## Appendix A

Figure 1. Election Study Centre, N.C.C.U., important political attitude trend distribution.<sup>22</sup>

Year	Cases
1992	4120
1994	1209
1995	21402
1996	10666
1997	3910
1998	14063
1999	9273
2000	11062
2001	10679
2002	10003
2003	14247
2004	34854
2005	7939
2006	13193
2007	13910
2008	16280
2009	20244
2010	13163
2011	23779
2012	18011
2013	13359
2014	9978

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<sup>22</sup> Chou, Ying-lung. 2014. Election Study Centre, N.C.C.U., important political attitude trend distribution: methodology. *Election Study Centre: National Chengchi University* last modified 9 July 2014. <http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/course/news.php?Sn=166> (accessed 29 September 2014).

Figure 2. Questions from the 2003 Taiwan Social Change Survey conducted by the National Science Council.

1. 'When you want to express personal feelings, which language feels the most natural?' 當您表達私人感情，那一種語言最自然？
2. To be truly Taiwanese, how important is it to be able to speak Mandarin? 要成為我們真正的同胞，您覺得會說國語重不重要？
3. To be truly Taiwanese, how important is it to be able to speak Tâi-gí? 要成為我們真正的同胞，您覺得會說閩南語重不重要？
4. To be truly Taiwanese, how important is it to identify with our country? 要成為我們真正的同胞，您覺得感情認同我們國家重不重要？
5. To be truly Taiwanese, how important is it to respect our political system and laws? 要成為我們真正的同胞，您覺得尊重政治體制與法律重不重要？
6. To be truly Taiwanese, how important is it to have Taiwanese citizenship? 要成為我們真正的同胞，您覺得有我們國家的國籍重不重要？
7. To be truly Taiwanese, how important is it to have lived in Taiwan for most of one's life? 要成為我們真正的同胞，您覺得一生中多數時間住我們國重不重要？
8. To be truly Taiwanese, how important is it to have Taiwanese ancestry? 要成為我們真正的同胞，您覺得祖先是本國人重不重要？
9. To be truly Taiwanese, how important is it to have been born in Taiwan? 要成為我們真正的同胞，您覺得我們國家出生重不重要？
10. To be truly Taiwanese, how important is it to respect folk customs? 要成為我們真正的同胞，您覺得有沒有拜拜重不重要？
11. To be truly Taiwanese, how important is it to be able to speak Hakka? 要成為我們真正的同胞，您覺得會說客家話重不重要？
12. Do you agree or not: there should be an emphasis on learning Tâi-gí, Hakka, other local languages for middle and primary school children? 贊不贊成：中小學加強閩南語、客家話…等語言教育。
13. If you could only chose one language for your child to learn at school out of local languages and English, which would it be? 若鄉土語言與英文只能選一種，您希望您的小孩一定要學會哪一種？
14. If there could only be one official language in Taiwan, which language would you choose? 如果只能有一個共同語言，您偏好採用哪一種語言？

## Appendix B

Figure 1. President Ma Ying-jiu's speech to the student protestors on 29 March 2014.

回應學生4訴求：馬總統記者會全文<sup>23</sup>

反服貿學運風暴越演越烈，總統馬英九於今天下午6點召開中外記者會，再度針對服貿爭議進行說明。記者會全文如下：

### 第一、兩岸協議監督機制法制化：

昨天江宜樺部長已經在記者會上明確宣布，政府對這個議題採取開放的態度，在此進一步明確承諾，我們支持兩岸協議監督機制法制化，也呼籲立法院朝野黨團，希望盡可能在本會期結束之前完成兩岸協議監督機制法制化。國民黨團在今年2月19日已經提出一個四階段的監督溝通機制，行政院也表示願意接受，這個協議就是兩岸監督機制在進入立法院前，公眾監督的一個標準作業程序（SOP），包括議題形成、業務溝通、協議簽署前、協議簽署後。目前陸委會已經研擬具體法制化措施，下周對外公布。

### 第二、先立法再審服貿：

目前服貿協議已經回到爭議前的原點，在立法院進行逐條討論與表決，這是去年6月底朝野協商的結論，也是同學們在今年3月18日，進入立法院之後所提出的第一項訴求，總統府的立場是在國會自主的原則下，尊重立法程序與進度，剛已承諾要促請朝野立委盡速完成兩岸協議監督機制的法制化，未來還沒有簽訂或者簽訂後還沒送到立法院的兩岸協議，都可以藉由這個監督機制受到更周延的監督，但是對於已經簽訂並送到立法院審議的協定，可以同步進行審查，這可以並行不悖，以免再走向委員會做專案報告或召開公聽會這種回頭路。

### 第三、召開公民憲政會議：

對於服貿協議這次社會上討論的深度和廣度，在台灣歷來公共政策的討論上是前所未見，對於社會各界不同的看法，要如何進一步促成各界的許多建議，包括國是會議、公民憲政會議、經貿國是諮詢會議等，這些要怎麼看待，已要求行政院進行整理評估，廣徵各界意見，將來把各界意見向大家報告。

### 第四、退回服貿協議：

服貿協議從去年6月簽訂到現在，超過9個月，法定程序上已經進入法定審查階段，我們支持立法院進行逐條討論表決，但不支持行政院撤回服貿協議，否則對台灣會造成非常大的傷害。我們推動服貿是為了振興台

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<sup>23</sup> Chinese version from *Apple Daily*.

Ma, Ying-jiu. 2014. 'Huiying xuesheng 4 suqiu: Ma zongtong jizhe huiquanwen.' *Apple Daily*, 29 March. <http://www.appledaily.com.tw/realtimenews/article/politics/20140329/369438/> (accessed 23 September 2014).

灣服務業，為了確保台灣經濟活力動能，創造台灣加入亞太區域經濟整合的有利條件，這三點對台灣都非常重要。先引用這幾天專家與業界看法，央行總裁彭淮南說台灣要走出去，不能被邊緣化，服務貿易可以幫助台灣融入世界經濟。商總理事長賴正鎰先生說，希望立法院的學生回到學校，讓立法院恢復運作，並讓服貿協議逐條審查。而台達電榮譽董事長鄭崇華先生說，服貿對台灣企業不會造成影響，不能拖誤太久，應該趕快通過。根據《今周刊》最新調查，國內 13 所大學經濟系系主任有 12 人支持服貿協議，因為這對台灣有利。又根據中華經濟研究院分析與評估，兩岸服貿協議簽訂後，未來我方服務業對大陸出口可增加 37%，總產值估計將增加 120 億台幣，就業人數增加 1.2 萬人，所以挺服貿就是挺台灣服務業，挺台灣就業市場，挺台灣經濟。當然有人問會不會有產業受到影響，需要政府關心，政府已經匡列 982 億元預算，針對不同情況受到影響的廠商，提供不同程度的幫助。而兩岸服貿協議是 ECFA 的一部分，而 ECFA 又是世界貿易組織 (WTO) 之下的雙邊貿易協議，如果服貿協議不通過，將嚴重傷害我國國際信用與貿易自由化的努力。也一定會影響我國目前努力想加入的跨太平洋經濟夥伴協定 (TTP) 與區域全面經濟夥伴協定 (RECP) 的機遇，會傷害整個台灣經濟的未來，如果明明知道對台灣有利卻裹足不前，我身為總統何以對台灣人民交代。

馬強調這幾天政府很努力與各相關單位研商與回應同學訴求，有的做得到，有的需要時間，無法一步到位，有的對台灣經濟不利，確實難以辦理，他說：「能做得到的我們願意做，如果難以做到也會誠實告訴人民，希望大家了解，不能不負責誤導民眾。」對這些回應相信還是會有一部分同學會有不同意見，民主本來就是服從多數、尊重少數、容忍歧見的過程。「我心理期盼對任何意見不同的人一定要以和平理性的態度去討論尊重，希望大家在民主法治精神下和平共處達成共識。」他也呼籲學運學生「現在大家應該考慮把議場還給國會了，各位親愛的國人同胞，我們都關心台灣，可以對公共政策有不同的意見，但是我們都在同一條船上，我們都傳承台灣要往前走的使命與責任，此時此刻我們必須為台灣團結，相信民主機制是最好的解決爭端的機制，唯有這樣台灣才能繼續向前走，天佑台灣，讓我們一起為台灣奮鬥。」（即時新聞中心／綜合報導）

## Full text of President Ma Ying-jeou's [Jiu's] press conference: Ma's response to the four demands of the student movement.

March 29, 2014, 7:00 pm<sup>24</sup>

As the student movement against the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA) continues to boil, President Ma Ying-jeou held a press conference at 6:00 today (March 29), with Taiwanese and foreign journalists in attendance, to address the controversy surrounding CSSTA. Following is a full transcript of the press conference.

1. Legislation of a monitoring mechanism for cross-strait negotiations. Premier Jiang Yi-huah has already stated in very clear terms yesterday that the government remains open-minded on this issue. I hereby further guarantee that we support the legislation of a monitoring mechanism for cross-strait negotiations, and I call on all parties in the Legislative Yuan to strive to complete such legislation during their current session. The KMT has, on February 19 of this year, already

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<sup>24</sup> English from Sunflower Movement Facebook page.

Sunflower Movement. 30 March 2014. Full text of President Ma Ying-jeou's press conference Ma's response to the four demands of the student movement 29 March 2014, 7:00 pm [Facebook status update]. <https://www.facebook.com/sunflowermovement/posts/320655401392955> (accessed 23 September 2014).

proposed a four-step monitoring and communication mechanism, which the Executive Yuan has said they will accept. This agreement is part of a standard operating procedure (SOP) for such a cross-strait monitoring system to go through before any mechanism enters the Legislative Yuan; the SOP covers aspects from the formation of such issues, working communication, and what happens before and after an agreement is signed. The Mainland Affairs Council is currently studying concrete measures for such legislation, and will announce these measures next week.

2. Legislation before review of CSSTA. Currently CSSTA has returned to the starting point before the controversy started, where the Legislative Yuan will conduct deliberations and votes item-by-item. This is the consensus reached by both the ruling and opposition parties late last June, and was the first demand issued by the students after they entered the Legislative Yuan on March 18. The Presidential Office's stance is that we will respect the legislative process and progress in accordance with the autonomy of the parliament. I have just stated that I call on legislators from all parties to expedite legislation of a monitoring mechanism for cross-strait negotiations, and all future cross-strait negotiations, whether they have not yet been signed, or have been signed but not sent to the Legislative Yuan, will be put under ample monitoring procedures under such a monitoring mechanism. However, for agreements that have already been signed and sent to the Legislative Yuan for deliberation, a review can be conducted alongside the deliberation. Such concurrent procedures will be allowed, so as not to return back to the fruitless process of committees issuing reports or holding hearings.

3. Hold a Citizens' Constitutional Assembly. The controversy has ignited discussions across all sectors of society, at a breadth and depth unseen in the history of public policy discussions in Taiwan. I have already requested the Executive Yuan to evaluate how to incorporate the differing views across society, and how to initiate recommendations and proposals through holding either a national affairs conference, a citizens' constitutional assembly, or a conference for advice on economic and trade matters. I will seek opinions on this from all sectors of society, and will report them to you.

4. Send back CSSTA. After CSSTA was signed in June of last year, nine months have passed, and in terms of legal procedure CSSTA has now entered the stage of legal review. We support the Legislative Yuan in conducting item-by-item deliberation and voting, but we do not support the retracting of CSSTA by the Executive Yuan, which will result in major damage to Taiwan. The reason we are pushing for CSSTA is that we wish to stimulate Taiwan's service industries, to ensure Taiwan's economic vitality, and to create advantageous conditions for Taiwan to join in the economic integration of the Asia-Pacific region. All these three points are crucial for Taiwan. I cite here experts and industrial opinions. Governor of the Central Bank Pengerng Fai-nan says that Taiwan needs to step out to avoid becoming marginalized, and CSSTA will help Taiwan to integrate with the world economy. Chairman of the Central Chamber of Commerce Lai Chang-yi hopes that the students in the Legislative Yuan will return to their schools, to enable the Legislative Yuan to resume operations, and conduct an item-by-item review of CSSTA. Honorary chairman of Delta Electronics Bruce Cheng believes CSSTA will not impact Taiwan's businesses, and should be passed without delay. According to the latest survey conducted by Business Today, 12 of the 13 chairpersons of university economic departments support CSSTA, because it will be beneficial to Taiwan. Further, according to analysis and evaluation from the Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research, after CSSTA is ratified, Taiwan's service exports will increase by 37%, while total production value will increase by NT\$12 billion, creating 12000

jobs. Therefore, supporting CSSTA is equivalent to supporting Taiwan's service industries, Taiwan's job market, and Taiwan's economy. Of course, some will ask if there will be industries that will be impacted and need governmental concern. The government has set aside a NT\$98.2 billion budget to assist affected businesses according to their needs. Further, CSSTA is a part of ECFA, and ECFA was a bilateral trade agreement signed under the WTO, so if CSSTA does not pass, it will severely damage Taiwan's efforts to improve international credibility and liberalization of trade, and will certainly affect Taiwan's chances of entering the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which Taiwan is currently striving for. This will severely damage the future of Taiwan's economy. As the president of Taiwan, how will I be able to face the people of Taiwan if I stall on something that I know for certain will benefit Taiwan?

President Ma stressed that the government has spared no effort in discussing the issue with relevant authorities, and responding to the demands of the students. Some can be accomplished, some need time to be carried out, and some are difficult to implement due to the negative impact they will have on Taiwan's economy. He said, "Anything we can do, we are willing to do. If we have difficulties we will honestly let the people know. I hope that everyone understands this, and will not mislead the people using irresponsible methods." As some students will inevitably disagree with this response, Ma stressed that democracy is by nature a process of obeying the majority, respecting the minority, and tolerating disagreement: "I sincerely hope that all will respect and talk with anyone who holds disagreement in a peaceful and rational way, and I hope that everyone will prosper under peace, and reach a consensus in the spirit of democracy and the rule of law." He also asked students to "consider that we now should return the chamber to parliament. My fellow compatriots, we all care about Taiwan, and we can express differing views regarding public policies. But we are all on the same boat, and we share in common the responsibility for Taiwan to move forward. At this moment in time, we must unite for Taiwan, and I believe that the democratic system is the best way to resolve conflicts. Only in this way may Taiwan continue its progress. May the heavens bless Taiwan. Let us all strive to make Taiwan better."

## Figure 2 Student Leader Chen Wei-ting's speech on Ketagalan Avenue on 30 March<sup>25</sup>

We have been occupying the Legislative Yuan for 13 days now  
Frankly, when I stormed in on the first day, I never thought it would be like this now  
With me standing here in front of so many people  
In these 13 days, we inside the chamber have been under unprecedented pressure  
Our average age is 25  
Many of us are taking part in a social movement for the first time  
But what we face inside the chamber is non-stop bombardment by the media  
With all kinds of information constantly flooding in

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<sup>25</sup>English from Facebook page.

Sunflower Movement. 31 March 2014. Student leader Chen Wei-ting's speech on Ketagalan Avenue on Mar. 30 [Facebook status update]. <https://www.facebook.com/sunflowermovement> (accessed 23 September 2014).

We face the constant threat of police evicting us  
We face repeated attempts by the government to smear and divide us  
Using misinformation to purposely mislead people  
We face every day the international media  
Asking us what thoughts we have on our country's future  
And our views on the current political situation  
Even though we are on average only 25 years old  
What we face is the full force of the state apparatus  
The people who have for so long controlled every facet of our country  
Yet we have endured all of this  
What we have seen in these past few days  
Is the government saying they want to talk  
While at the same time being insincere in all their responses  
This government thinks they can defeat us like this  
Being stuck in the chamber for days and nights on end  
And facing attacks from the outside  
There were times when we lost faith  
When we declared that we would march out on Ketagalan Boulevard the other day  
Some people asked me and Lin Fei-fan, "What if there aren't that many people?"  
I replied, "I don't know either.  
Damn it, we'll get people to come here!"  
And when I woke up this morning, there really were a lot  
The reason everyone is here today  
Is because the government thinks that they know how to handle things  
Ma Ying-jeou and King Pu-tsung think that the methods they used to deal with opponents  
Can also be used to deal with us students, who are still wet behind the ears  
But the fact that you are here today sends them a message  
We are not afraid!  
Your presence here right now is a direct response to those in the Presidential Palace  
Your dirty tactics are of no use to the citizens of Taiwan  
Everyone here today has demonstrated the determination of the people  
Just before this mass assembly today  
Ma Ying-jeou held a press conference yesterday  
Which was delayed again and again  
From 10 am, to 3 pm, and then to 6 pm  
What he responded in the end was interpreted by some media  
That he has responded to 3 of the students' 4 demands  
This may seem like a gesture of good will  
But if you paid enough attention to it  
You will have seen that he didn't respond to our fundamental demands at all  
What are our demands? Repeat with me again:  
Legislation before review!  
But did Ma promise this yesterday?  
No!  
What he said was, he can have legislation and review  
But these two things must be separate  
The reason we are demanding legislation



Is because we want to change the current system  
This system can't keep in check any negotiations and agreements with China  
And is the reason why we saw the farce of Chang Ching-chung passing CSSTA in 30 seconds  
We demand legislation because we want to stop such things from happening  
We demand the legislation of a monitoring mechanism for cross-strait agreements  
It must not be just an executive order  
It must be passed by the legislature, undergo public debate and approval  
And become a legal act that can regulate CSSTA and future agreements  
Yet Ma said that legislation is possible  
But executive orders are also an option  
This is a hollow option requiring only governmental reports and declarations  
Without any actual participation from the legislature nor the people  
Do we want this kind of legislation?  
No!  
It is obvious that Ma has not replied to this demand  
Second, Ma said that a review can be done  
But it must be done concurrently with the process of legislation  
He said that CSSTA can go under review  
But even so it must be sent back to the committee for item-by-item review  
Do you believe that this will be the quality review that we demand?  
No!  
Without legislation in place  
Any review by a committee simply reverts back to before Chang Ching-chung's 30 seconds  
Ma is telling us that the maximum good will he can offer  
Is to revert back to before the 30 seconds  
Do you accept this?  
No!  
I can't accept this at all.  
We have seen Ma and the KMT secretly sign too many agreements  
We have seen Chang Ching-chung use 30 seconds to destroy an agreement with the opposition  
We can't trust such a government at all  
Third, regarding legislation before review  
Ma said that this is impossible  
What is his reason?  
We should carefully look at this  
Because this shows the basic paradox behind why we are here today  
He said that there are two reasons to why this is impossible  
First, CSSTA has already been signed for nine months  
And the time for legislation to pass will be very long  
So we can't wait for so long  
Therefore we can't pass legislation before reviewing CSSTA  
Second, if legislation does come before review  
And if when under review  
The legislature and the people decide to send CSSTA back for negotiations  
This will damage Taiwan's international credibility  
Due to these two reasons, Ma said that legislation before review is impossible  
Do you accept this?

No!

He said that international protocol says that this can't be done

But this is a blatant lie

FTAs signed between the US and South Korea, and in fact FTAs around the world

have countless examples of being sent back after parliamentary review

Some of these have undergone negotiations for more than 10 years

This is to ensure that during the negotiations, executive power is not left unchecked

And the people can participate in deliberations

So that the future of the people is not decided by a clique of politicians and businessmen

And we can be our own masters, and find our own future

But Ma told us that he doesn't need the people's backing to negotiate

He only needs his autocratic executive power

He said that it will cost Taiwan its international credibility

But in fact what is lost is not the international credibility of the Taiwanese

At stake is Ma's own personal credibility both at home and abroad

This should be the responsibility of the government and Ma

The protestors are not interfering with Taiwan's future development

It is Ma's government who didn't think that they needed to talk with the people

And who didn't think they needed the legislature to participate

This is why we are in this situation right now

We can go further and look at what Ma is afraid of

What is he afraid of?

Right!

If legislation is passed and CSSTA is sent back

Which means that CSSTA is sent back to the Executive Yuan

And is resubmitted to the Legislative Yuan for review after legislation is passed

But during review there is the future possibility that negotiations need to be restarted

But why is Ma so afraid of passing a law to let the people take part in the review?

He is afraid of the promise he already made with Beijing

Beijing has kept ordering him to finish review before June

And to let negotiations for an agreement on trade in goods begin before year's end

So why is Ma so afraid that he doesn't even let the people participate?

He says it's out of concern for Taiwan's future, but I don't believe it

Do you believe it?

No!

What he is really afraid of, what he is pursuing

Is not the common future of the Taiwanese people

Otherwise he would not keep the people from actually participating

What Ma is really going after is collusion with the Chinese government

He is after his own place in history

He is after the agreements he already promised to the Chinese government

To pass an agreement on trade of goods

And to pass a peace agreement they have been negotiating ever since 2012

This is the basic paradox we are facing today

Because of this, you are here not only to oppose CSSTA

We demand a monitoring mechanism for cross-strait agreements

Not just to deal with CSSTA, but also to deal with the agreement of trade of goods





And also all the agreements they sign with China  
We are not against interacting with China  
But we demand that when we interact with China  
All the people here, all the Taiwanese people, can participate and decide how to interact  
We must be our own masters  
This is why you are here today  
This is not just a struggle between anti-CSSTA and pro-CSSTA forces  
This is a struggle between an autocratic executive branch and the people demanding democracy  
I want to call out again to the Ma administration  
Ma has repeatedly said he is willing to talk  
As if it is the students who don't want to talk  
But every time he talks, including his response last night,  
We have already responded a long time ago  
Yet he still keeps on saying the same stuff  
It doesn't seem like he's reading the newspaper or Facebook  
Nor does he seem to understand what our demands are  
He has only been beating around the bush  
As if he can persuade the people using just this propaganda and misinformation  
And weaken the force of our protests  
We call on the Ma administration to stop evading the issue, to stop feeling smug  
The Ma administration must directly face up to all of you here  
According to information I received when I got here, there are 350,000 people here and counting  
President Ma, I call on you to meet us and the demands we have here  
I will return to the Legislative Yuan later  
We demand that he pass legislation before proceeding with review  
The Legislature is a sacred temple of democracy and our battlefield  
I want you to come with me at 7:00  
I welcome you to come and meet me and Lin Fei-fan  
We will continue to defend our parliament, the people's parliament  
We continue to demand legislation before review  
Finally, let us chant some slogans  
Send back CSSTA!  
Defend democracy!  
And finally a slogan I chanted at yesterday's press conference  
This is something Chian Wei-shui said against the Japanese  
When everyone was being repressed by the colonial masters  
This is a slogan chanted by the Taiwanese  
Brothers must unite, unity is strong  
Shall we chant this together?  
Brothers must unite!  
Unity is strong!  
Come out, Ma Ying-jeou!  
Thank you!

Chinese version: Audio only.

NTD [NTDChinese]. 31 March 2014. "*fan fumao da youxing*" *xueyun zong zhihui Chen Weiting yanjiang* ["Oppose the services agreement rally" student leader Chen Wei-ting's speech] [video file]. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p8Gpw-mu-TE> (accessed 23 September).

## Appendix C

Figure 1. Post-it notes

1		<p>Photo 1: 'Oppose the Services Agreement! I'm not a Mainlander' (反對服貿!我不是大陸人)</p>
2		<p>Photo 2: 'Save Democracy, Go Taiwan!' (捍衛民主, 台灣加油)          Photo 2: Oppose the black box process, oppose the services agreement, go Taiwan (反黑箱, 反服貿, 台灣加油)</p>
3		<p>Photo 3: 'All of us Taiwan people, need to keep barracking for Taiwan!' (台灣咱大家: 要繼續為台灣加油啊! )          Photo 3: 'Everybody please, defend what's left of our freedom' (請你們捍衛剩餘的自由)</p>
4		<p>Photo 4: 'I don't want to be a Mainlander (我不要當大陸人)          Photo 4: In order to stop Taiwan from being occupied by China, oppose the black box process, oppose the services agreement, go Taiwan!(為了不讓台灣被中國佔領反黑箱, 反服貿, 台灣加油! )</p>







5		<p>Photo 5: 'I don't want to be a mainlander' (我不想當大陸人)</p>
6		<p>Photo 6: I oppose the Services Agreement. It is because I don't want to let Mainlanders come here. I'm not discriminating against them but they damage the earth, waste our resources, and have poor sanitary habits etc., the negative aspects are too many. I don't want to let the Taiwan I love, be destroyed. Oppose the services agreement, oppose the black box process. (對於服貿~ 我反對。只是不想讓大陸人來，不是歧視他們，是因為他們破壞地球、浪費資源、衛生環境差的等等負面太多。不希望，我愛的台灣，我國的淨土被破壞。反對服貿反對黑正)</p>





Figure 3. Messages and graffiti




7		<p>Photo 7: 'Taiwan is ours' (台灣是我們的)</p>
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8		<p>Photo 8: ‘Oppose the black box process, Don’t want to become a second Hong Kong’ (反黑箱不要當第2個香港)</p>
9		<p>Photo 9: ‘Protect our national territory’ (守護國土), Photo 9: ‘We are Taiwanese’ (我們是台灣人)</p>
10		<p>Photo 10: ‘I love Taiwan so I stand up’ (我站出來), Photo 10: ‘God Bless Taiwan, Taiwan will win. (天佑台灣, 臺灣勝利) Photo 10: ‘Oppose the black box, oppose the services agreement, support the 318 student movement’ (反黑箱, 反服貿, 支持318學運)</p>
11		<p>Photo 11: ‘Go Taiwan! God bless Taiwan’ (台灣加油, 天佑台灣)</p>

12		<p>Photo 12: <i>Drawing of Taiwan</i>  ‘Go Taiwan! Repeal the services agreement. God bless Taiwan’  (台灣加油, 退回服貿, 天佑台灣)</p>
13		<p>Photo 13: ‘Our own country, we will save it’ (自己國家、自己救)</p>
14		<p>Photo 14: ‘I love Taiwan’,  Photo 14: ‘We won’t give up, go! Keep going everyone!’ (永不放棄, 加油, 大家辛苦了, 加油)  Photo 14: ‘God bless Taiwan, defend democracy!’ (天佑台灣, 捍衛民主)</p>
15		<p>Photo 15: ‘Our own country, we will save it!! God bless Taiwan, go Taiwan’ (自己國家、自己救!! 天佑台灣, 台灣加油),  Photo 15: ‘Keep barracking for Taiwan’s democracy and freedom, it is all worth it!’ (台灣的民主、自由加油, 這一切都是值得)  Photo 15: ‘Go Taiwan, never give up’  Photo: 15 ‘I love Taiwan’ (我愛台</p>



		灣)
16		<p>Photo 16: ‘Such a great Taiwan! Because of you, we can only have the present, keep going Taiwan!’ (這麼棒的台灣! 有你們才有現在。台灣加油!!),</p> <p>Photo 16: Go Taiwan! Defend democracy, go Taiwan! (台灣加油, 捍衛民主, 台灣加油)</p> <p>Photo 16: Go Taiwan, God bless Taiwan(台灣加油, 天佑台灣)</p>
17		<p>Photo 17: ‘we only want to be Taiwanese’ (我們只想做台灣人)</p>
18		<p>Photo 18: ‘Fear cannot stop us. We are doing the right thing. I am a Taiwanese person, I love Taiwan, safeguard democracy and the people’s freedom’ (害怕並不能阻止我們做正確的事我是台灣人我愛台灣捍衛民主人民自由)</p>
19		<p>Photo 19: ‘Taiwan is not for sale, God bless Taiwan’ (天佑台灣)</p>

20		<p>Photo 20: 'Repeal the services agreement, Mainlanders eat cock, defend democracy, Taiwan is awesome' (退回服貿大陸吃屎, 捍衛民主台灣超屌)</p>
21		<p>Photo 21: '330 Go Taiwan! Defend democracy. (330, 台灣加油, 捍衛民主)</p> <p>Photo 21: 'God bless Taiwan, oppose violence, boycott the black box process (天佑台灣, 反對暴力, 抵制黑箱)</p> <p>Photo 21: 'I love Taiwan' (我愛台灣)</p>
22		<p>Photo 22: 'The Gods care about Taiwan' (眾神護台灣)</p> <p>Photo 22: 'God bless drawing of Taiwan' (天佑)</p>
















23		<p>Photo 23: ‘Today everything you see, is a group of Taiwanese who are friendly and courageous. When the government does what it pleases without listening to the people, then the people will stand up and protest. (今日所看見的是一群善良且勇敢的台灣人。當政府一意孤行人民只有站出來反抗)’</p>
24		<p>Photo 24: ‘Go Taiwan, oppose violence, defend democracy’ (台灣加油，反對暴力，捍衛民主)</p>
25		<p>Photo 25: ‘Don’t let Taiwan become the next Hong Kong’ (不要讓台灣變成下一個香港)          Photo 25: ‘I’m an indigenous person! Go Taiwan!’ (我是原住民! 台灣加油!)          Photo 25: ‘I’m a person, I don’t submit’ (我是人我不服)</p>

Figure 4. Placards and posters

26		<p>Photo 26: Let’s keep going! Protect Taiwan! (加油，守護台灣加油)</p>
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27		<p>Photo 27: 'I don't want to be Chinese, Chinese people, don't want us' (我不配當中國人, 中國人 不要我們了爽+1)</p>
28		<p>Photo 28: 'I can tolerate incompetent rulers but I'm unable to accept selling Taiwan' (無能治國我可忍但我不能接受)</p>
29		<p>Photo 29: I will embrace you with love because after all, you have a homeland you long to return to. I will resist you with love because after all, I have a homeland I long to protect and cherish. (我可以愛包容你因為你畢竟有朝思暮想的祖國。但我也必須用愛對抗你因為我還有相惜相擁的島嶼)</p>
30		<p>Photo 30: 'Stay away from my country. KMT step down. Oppose the black box process and services agreement' (KMT 快下台, 反對黑箱服貿)</p>
31		<p>Photo 31: 'Who Am I? Who Are You? All We Are Taiwan's Child'</p>

32		Photo 32: 'Love Taiwan'
33		Photo 33: 'Step down Ma Ying-jiu' (馬英九下台)
34		Photo 34: 'Step down Jiang Yi-hua' (江宜樺下台)
35		Photo 35: 'If we don't fight today, then tomorrow we will become like Hong Kong' (今天不戰，明天變香港)
36		Photo 36: 'Go the people of Taiwan' (Taiwan 人民加油)
37		Photo 37: 'I love Taiwan' ( <i>'I in Taiwan drawn to look like the island of Taiwan'</i> ) Photo 37: 'Taiwan is my country' (on a map of Asia)

38		<p>Photo 38: 'I am here for our future, regardless of your position and regardless of your party affiliation' (不論立場非關黨派)</p>
39		<p>Photo 39: 'Repeal the services agreement, defend democracy' (退回服貿, 捍衛民主)</p>
40		<p>Photo 40: 'defend democracy' (捍衛民主)</p>
41		<p>Photo 41: 'The people will decide Taiwan's future love and justice' (台灣的未來人民決定)</p>
42		<p>Photo 42: 'Don't let Taiwan's democracy enter history. I oppose the services agreement. (別讓台灣民主走入歷史我反服貿)</p>
43		<p>Photo 43: 'Young people are the future of a country, courageously fighting for their future' (年輕人才是國家未來的主人勇於爭取自己的未來)</p>






44		Photo 44: 'Our country, we will save it' (自己國家, 自己救)
45		Photo 45: 'When dictatorship is a fact, revolution is a duty' (黨獨裁成為事實, 革命就是義務)
46		Photo 46: I am Taiwanese, I'm advocating the repeal of the Services Agreement. Góa sī Tâi-Oân-lâng, Góa chú-tiū thè-hôe hòk-bū bō-èk hiáp-gī (我是台灣人我主張退回服貿協議)

Figure 5. Pages of writing

47		Photo 47: 'I demand the Control Yuan immediately impeach Jiang Yi-hua and Wang Zhuo-jin for two matters: executive negligence over the Services Agreement and for using excessive force when students entered the Executive Yuan. Moreover, they should apologise to the people of Taiwan.' (我要求監察院立即就服貿行政疏失與違反比例原則鎮壓行政院抗議民眾二事，彈劾江宜樺與王卓鈞。並且向台灣人民道歉！)
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48		<p>Photo 48: ‘If we repeal the Service’s Agreement then Taiwan will refuse to be controlled by the Chinese locusts’ (退回服貿台灣拒絕被中國蝗蟲掏空)</p>
49		<p>Photo 49: ‘This isn’t propaganda, please take photos and upload them onto Facebook, let other people see the message, if we keep on spreading it, then when the services agreement is put in place, Taiwan’s most important ‘freedom of speech’ will be lost.... Loving Taiwan, isn’t just a slogan, please wake up those Taiwanese people who are sleeping around you, thank you (還不是文宣，請拍照上傳 FB 後把它交給其他人，一直傳下去當服貿進來了，台灣最重要的【民主，言論自由】就會完成消失。。。愛台灣不是口號請喚醒周圍沉睡的台灣人，謝謝你！)</p>

Figure 6. Letters

50		<p>Photo 50: ‘Government Incompetence The government’s incompetence has been a reality for decades. But the Taiwanese people also have a responsibility to voice their concerns about industrial upgrading, educational reforms, issues which have not seen the government attention. The television only broadcasts issues such as political parties’ internal struggles and corruption. Today even the president ignores popular opinion. This attempt at dictatorship tramples on decades of Taiwanese people’s hard fought efforts to achieve democracy.</p> <p>Opening Up of the Economy</p> <p>The target for Taiwan’s signing of trade agreements</p>
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is not only China. These past few years, American spokesmen have said that Europe and America would also like to sign trade agreements with Taiwan, and that Taiwan is often suppressed by China in the international domain. However, this does not mean that the government can rest on its laurels. We hope that in the area of trade the government can make efforts towards greater internationalisation and does not blindly focus on signing agreements with China with its malign intentions.

#### My final Hope

People of Taiwan, if we are all willing to love and protect this land we call home, then we have a mutual understanding and we ought not to oppose one another. Even though we may have different stances on issues, through listening, communicating and understanding we can reach consensus on how to work together to enable Taiwan to progress. Therefore I fervently hope we will not divide and oppose one another. We are all Taiwanese. We ought to have the same objective, to make Taiwan even better. Therefore, we can learn to be more tolerant and less narrow-minded and work toward the goal of reducing conflicts.



Everyone here together, keep on persevering! No matter if you are students, workers, media, police, grandma/grandpa, we are all Taiwanese citizens and we need to work together. After that, the government can come out and face us.'



(政府無能

台灣政府無能已是好幾十年的事 只能說台灣人民也有責任 一些關於產業升級 教育改革的問題真的沒見政府用心 電視上盡撥些政黨鬥爭等 貪污之類的新聞 如今甚至總統漠視民意 企圖專政 踐踏了台灣努力了好幾十年的民主成果

經濟開放

貿易協定的簽定對象不只是只有中國 前幾天美國發言人也說 台灣是歐美想簽定貿易協定的對象 而台灣在國際地位上常被中國打壓 但不代表政府沒有努力的空間 希望政

		<p>府在貿易方面可以朝國際化努力 而不是一味的想和別有居心的中國簽協定</p> <p>最後希望</p> <p>台灣的人民們 只要願意愛台灣這塊土地 基於這同樣的出發點 我們就不應該對立 雖然立場不同 但可以經由傾聽 溝通 相互瞭解然後達成共識 一起為台灣的進步努力 所以真心希望大家不要分化 對立 大家都是台灣人 應該是有同樣的目標 希望台灣更好 所以多點容忍 少些憤怒 對立便會減少</p> <p>在場的大家辛苦了 不管是學生 上班族 媒體 警察 阿伯阿婆們 大家都是台灣公民 一起加油 然後政府出來面對)</p>
51		<p>Photo 51: ‘We are Taiwanese citizens, we are Taiwanese warriors, God Bless Taiwan’ (我們是台灣的人民, 我們是台灣的勇士天佑台灣)</p> <p>Photo 51: ‘We can do it together! Let’s keep fighting! We must protect our own country, we need to fight for our rights!! We mustn’t give up! When dictatorship is a fact, don’t be afraid, revolution is our duty, don’t be afraid. Success is within reach, as long as we keep fighting then there is hope. Go Taiwan~ Because of us the Sunflower Movement will keep blooming (我們一起加油! 堅持下去自己的國家自己保護~自己的權利自己爭取!! 我們不要放棄! 正義會站在我們黨獨裁已成事實莫及莫慌, 華民就是義務莫害怕, 成功就不在遠處~只要我們堅持下去就有希望&lt;3 台灣加油~太陽花因為我們而綻放)</p>
52		<p>Photo 52: Our democracy and freedom is in danger. We need your leadership to win. No matter how disorderly the Legislative Yuan is, please remember there is crowd of people behind you silently supporting you and thanking you for the efforts you are making on our behalf. This postcard’s message is that of a simple joy, whenever I am feeling down I see them smiling so happily then I also smile with them. I really like this card, so I’m sending it to you I hope it helps. God Bless Taiwan. (現在民主自由面對危險。我們需要你們的帶領來打贏這場硬戰。不管立法</p>

		<p>院裡有多亂，切記有一群人在背後默默支持你們。也謝謝你們為人民的付出。這張明信片傳達給我的訊息是簡單快樂和自由每當情緒不住時。可看看你們送的多開心自己也跟著笑了是我很喜歡的一張。送給你們。希望有幫助。(God bless Taiwan)</p>
53		<p>Photo 53: ‘Even though I can’t protest with you in person, I’m there with you in spirit! You can do it! We can work together for Taiwan’s future together! Together we can oppose the services agreement!! (我雖然不能與你們一起抗議但是精神與你們同在！你們要加油！台灣的未來一起努力！讓我們一起反服貿！！)</p>
54		<p>Photo 54: ‘Defend democracy, repeal the services agreement, <i>Today, now, we get together, doing the right thing! So don’t be fear! Carry on!</i> (捍衛民主退回服貿)</p> <p>Photo 54: Dear friends: No matter how cold the weather or how hot the sun, No matter the end result, I’m very happy you and I are all here, working for the future of every Taiwanese. You need to have faith in your beliefs, keep striving for what you want, the people of Taiwan will be better! Peace and Joy! (各位親愛的朋友： 不管天氣如何的寒冷，太陽如何的曬很開心你我都在這，為了每一位台灣人民的未來努力，不論最後的結果。何堅信你所相信的，堅持你的想要的，台灣人民一定會更好的！ 平安喜樂)</p>

## Appendix D

Figure 1. Gloss of the word ‘Sunflower’

Language	Gloss		
Mandarin	向	日	葵
	Towards	Sun	Genus of sunflower flower
Tâi-gí	日	頭	花
	Sun	Towards	Flower

## Figure 2. Songs from the Sunflower Movement.<sup>26</sup>

大支  
太陽花<sup>27</sup>

### (v1)

救護車的聲響 伴隨著學生入睡  
然後被大陣仗警察驚醒在午夜  
糾察隊內疚心痛 說無法保護群眾  
然後跪著向英勇 留下的學生鞠躬  
記者問女學生等等驅離怕不怕呢  
女學生說很怕但她第一天就準備好了  
然後學生們舉起雙手 表示不抵抗  
接著該在胸腔 的熱血撒在地上  
警察沒得休息 爸媽打不通孩子手機  
老師為了學生被攻擊 倒地抽蓄  
噴水車從歷史課本裡 出現幫你溫習  
滿頭鮮血學生喊著不是警察的問題  
受傷學生哭著應答 說爸爸也是警察  
人民被逼到廝殺對立不斷激化  
這是時代悲歌 這回合 我們沒轍  
接著 早上了 但台灣天空是黑的

### (Chorus)

我們受盡了命運巨棒的揮打  
我的頭在流血 但不曾垂下  
我們爬過那佈滿鐵絲的拒馬  
放上一朵照亮陰暗角落的太陽花

### (v2)

他們不是為自己發出怒吼聲

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<sup>26</sup> Songs are arranged with the Mandarin version given first, followed by Tâi-gí (where applicable), followed by an English translation.

<sup>27</sup> Translation and Chinese from Dwagie's blog.

Dwagie. 2014. Sunflower feat. J. Wu ying-ri wen fanyi ban [Sunflower feat. J. Wu English-Japanese translation]. *Dazhi renren you gonglian* [Dwagie everyone has attack training] [web log]. <http://dogg.pixnet.net/blog/post/40944796-%E5%A4%A7%E6%94%AF%E3%80%90%E5%A4%AA%E9%99%BD%E8%8A%B1%E3%80%91feat.j.wu---dwagie%E3%80%90sunflower-%E3%80%91fea> (accessed 13 September 2014).

為的是分不到餅的無助窮人  
他們讓人民張大眼睛 關心討論  
這是溫暖圍巾 還是要命絞繩  
他們怒斥商人價值觀崩壞掉  
自由不是錢能買到 但為錢我們賣掉  
他們提醒我不能不感憤怒  
老話一句 羊一般民眾會培養狼一般政府  
他們激勵我們對正義不能觀望和駐足  
別再當思想的巨人 行動的侏儒  
他們讓國家不再受控藍綠瓶頸

這次要自己引領 這島嶼命運  
他們在貧瘠土壤中是 最率真種子  
透視 權力慾望充斥 的政治公式  
太陽花綻放或凋零 都請別心痛  
黑島曙光早已 存在大家的心中

### (Chorus)

我們受盡了命運巨棒的揮打  
我的頭在流血 但不曾垂下  
我們爬過那佈滿鐵絲的拒馬  
放上一朵照亮陰暗角落的太陽花

### (v3)

或許新聞還是有偏頗的現象  
但現場 還是有正值媒體堅強 在對抗  
或許政客還是不懂權利誰給予的  
但我們會記得 不會再投給你了  
或許學運很多瑕疵能探討  
但學生被打還有人叫好 你更難熬  
你砍掉嘴臭網友理由很簡單  
“你可以不為自由而戰 但你不該為高牆添磚”  
或許討論政治朋友變你仇家  
但不討論政治恐怕 會失去國家  
或許我們會一直爭吵開戰  
但我們還是無可救藥的愛著我們痛恨的台灣  
或許 台灣真的有太多的惡習 和太多無解的課題  
但如果給我生一千次 我只願意生在這裡  
如果給我死一千次 我只願意死在這裡

(Chorus)

我們受盡了命運巨棒的揮打  
我的頭在流血 但不曾垂下  
我們爬過那佈滿鐵絲的拒馬  
放上一朵照亮陰暗角落的太陽花

*Dwagie featuring J.Wu*  
*Sunflower*

(v1)

The ambulance siren accompanies the students to sleep  
Just to be stormed awake by hordes of police at midnight  
The volunteer guards disheartened and apologize for unable to protect  
Then kneel down and bow to the courageous students  
The journalists asks a female student if she is afraid of police evacuation  
She says very much so but I have been ready since day one  
Then the students raise their hands in the air, showing no resistance  
Just to see their boiling blood spilled on the ground  
No time for cop to rest, no line for parent-children to connect  
A teacher taking the hit for the students, twitching on the ground  
High pressure water truck appears from history textbook to refresh your memory  
Students covered in blood yelling 'it's not the cop's fault'  
Injured students cried 'my father is also a cop'  
People are forced to confront, polarized, tension rising  
In this round, we are helpless. This is the threnody of our era  
At the break of dawn, the sky in Taiwan is still dark

(Chorus)

We are beaten by the baton of fate  
My head is bleeding, but we have never let it down  
We climb across the barbed wire and barricade  
To place a sunflower to light up the darkest corner

(v2)

They are not shouting in anger for their own sake  
They are shouting for the helpless poor  
They open the eyes of the people, to bring to their attention  
Is this a warming scarf or a hangman's knot?  
They criticize the tumbling core value of the businessmen  
You can't buy freedom with money, but for money you're selling us out  
They remind us not to stay complacent

Just as the old saying goes  
A nation of sheep will beget a government of wolves  
They inspire us not to be the bystander of justice  
Stop being the mind of a giant yet the act of a dwarf  
They have freed the country from the strangle of blue and green  
This time they will navigate the fate of this island on their own  
They are the truest seeds in the poorest soil  
Seeing through the political formulas of power and greed  
Whether the sunflowers blossom or wilt. Please do not be sad!  
The black island's ray of sunlight will forever be in our hearts

(Chorus)

(v3)

Maybe the news is still twisted  
But there are still righteous press at scene to resist  
Maybe the politicians still don't understand where their power is granted from  
But we will remember not to vote for you again  
Maybe there are a lot of flaws to be discussed in this student movement  
But to witness people cheering when students take a beating, it's unbearable  
One simple reason to uncheck your badmouthing friends  
You can choose not to fight for freedom  
But you shouldn't lay more bricks for the wall  
Maybe discussing politics could turn your friends into enemy  
But without discussing politics you might lose your country  
Maybe we will continue to argue  
But we are still hopelessly in love with the Taiwan that we hate with a passion  
Maybe Taiwan does have too many issues and unsolvable problems  
But if you gave me 1000 lives to be born  
This is the only place I choose to be born  
If you gave me 1000 lives to die  
This is the only place I choose to die

雨天的太陽花

詞/曲：野人

唱：白芯羽<sup>28</sup>

滴滴答答 雨落在柏油路上 你今天好嘛?  
唧唧喳喳 麻雀笑你是傻瓜 都下雨了 還不回家

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<sup>28</sup> Chinese lyrics from Youtube site, translation author's own.

Huang, A. [Arvin Huang]. April 8 2014. *Yutian de taiyanghua – ci/qu: yeren –chang: Bai Xin-yu* [Rainy day sunflowers – words/melody: Savage People – sung by: Bai Xin-yu]. [video file]. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c8CXYK86BUQ> (accessed 13 September 2014).



因為我們 都仰望同一道光  
因為我們 都長在同一片土壤  
因為我們 都相信 就算天下雨 會雨過天晴

雨天的太陽花 找不到了太陽  
雨天的太陽花 暫時失去了方向  
但雨總會停吧 太陽花會一直綻放  
會一直守護我們的家

雨天的太陽花 雖然感到沮喪  
雨天的太陽花 雖然也曾經徬徨  
但雨總會停吧 太陽花會更加堅強  
在大雨裡 默默的發光

*Rainy Day Sunflowers*  
*Lyrics by: The Savage People*  
*Sung by: Bai Xin-yu*

Pitter patter the sound of rain falling on the asphalt road, how are you today?  
Chitter, chatter, the sparrows are laughing at you fool, for not returning home as it rains.

Because we are all turning towards the same light.  
Because we all grew up on the same piece of soil.  
Because we all believe that even when it is raining, rainy days will once again become sunny.

On rainy days sunflowers can't find the sun  
On rainy days, sunflowers temporarily lose their direction.  
But rainy days always come to an end and sunflowers will once again be able to bloom.  
They will always protect our home.

Although sunflowers feel dispirited on rainy days  
Although sunflowers hesitate on rainy days  
But rainy days always come to an end and sunflowers will once again stand strong  
Even under heavy rain they still have an inner glow.

太陽花：獻給318 太陽花學運  
阿寬 & Pete C<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> Chinese lyrics from *Apple Daily*, translation authors own.

Anonymous. 2014. Liuxuesheng xie ge zhi MV ting taiyanghua xueyun [Overseas student writes lyrics, creates MV for protestors in the Sunflower Movement]. *Apple Daily*. 31 March.

<http://www.appledaily.com.tw/appledaily/article/headline/20140331/35735855> (accessed 13 September

夜很黑 我輾轉難眠  
心破碎 那留下的眼淚  
我曾思索 這辛苦是為誰  
更難過 民主的倒退  
這一切 這一切  
不是上天的恩惠  
這一刻 這一刻  
我們要抵抗蔽日的強權

太陽花是自由的表彰  
太陽花是威權的反抗  
太陽花是不屈服的夢想  
站在這守護著未來的希望

你問我 黑白與是非  
我只求 我內心的無愧  
你還記得 流血的上一輩  
留下的 民主的珍貴  
這一切 這一切  
不是上天的恩惠  
這一刻 這一刻  
我們要抵抗蔽日的強權

太陽花 是自由的意象  
太陽花 有無限的力量  
太陽花 綻放著燦爛光芒  
站在著守護著幸福的臉龐

打死不退 這是憤怒的無言  
勇敢抵抗 不因流言而疲憊

太陽花是勇氣的表彰  
太陽花是威權的反抗  
太陽花是不屈服的夢想  
站在這守護著未來的希望

太陽花 是自由的意象  
太陽花 有無限的力量  
太陽花 綻放著燦爛光芒  
站在著守護著幸福的臉龐

我們一起走過這漫漫的長夜 我們等待陽光到來的明天

*A-kuan and Pete C*  
*Sunflowers : Dedicated to the 18/03 Student Movement*

The night is black, I toss about in bed, unable to sleep,  
My heart is broken, there are tears in my eyes  
I once asked myself, who is all this work for?  
As democracy went backwards I became even sadder  
Everything, everything  
This is not the grace of heaven  
This moment, this moment  
We want to stand up to the power that is hiding our light

Sunflowers are the expression of freedom  
Sunflowers are a force of resistance  
Sunflowers are not a dream that can be suppressed  
We stand here ready to protect our future hopes.

You ask me, is it black and white or right and wrong  
But I only seek to have a clear consciousness  
Do you still remember the blood that was shed in the last generation?  
Which left behind our valued democracy  
Everything, everything  
This is not the grace of heaven  
This moment, this moment  
We want to stand up to the power that is hiding our light

Sunflowers are the epitome of freedom  
Sunflowers have unlimited power  
Sunflowers will bloom as magnificent rays of light  
They stand here and will protect our happy faces

They will fight to the death, this is the anger of silence  
They will courageously resist, we won't give up because of gossip

Sunflowers are the expression of freedom  
Sunflowers are a force of resistance  
Sunflowers are not a dream that can be suppressed  
We stand here ready to protect our future hopes.

Sunflowers are the epitome of freedom  
Sunflowers have unlimited power  
Sunflowers will bloom as magnificent rays of light  
They stand here and will protect our happy faces

We will spend the long and slow night together, waiting for the sun's rays to shine light on tomorrow.

家常飯菜：謝謝// 以溫柔的力量，勇敢守護夢想你  
張涵雅<sup>30</sup>

一路上跌跌撞撞，離家越遠越冷的方向  
心依然揪在那擁抱的溫暖  
搖曳的小尾巴上  
繫著說不出口的期望  
掛念的眼角忍著淚光

就這樣告別了白髮蒼蒼  
飛向夢想的遠方  
就這樣離別了熟悉的味道  
尋找我的堅強

我的家別來無恙，我已經不一樣  
現在知道，你們藏了什麼在臨別的飯菜香  
家的溫暖，放在心上  
淚會努力往那肚裡藏

我的家別來無恙，我已經不一樣  
飽經風霜，意志更堅強，那是現在的我呀  
行李箱裝滿，遊子回家的嚮往  
謝謝你們，讓我去追尋未知的夢想

轟轟烈烈離開家鄉，化做現實的孤單徬徨  
自己要扛下肩上的重量  
異鄉的風吹乾了想家的淚光

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<sup>30</sup> Lyrics from *Mojim*, translation authors own.  
Zhang, Han-ya. Jiachang fancai [Home-cooked meals]. *Mojim*. From <http://mojom.com/twy100823x2x1.htm> (accessed 22 September 2014).

房間裡的閒話家常  
那溫暖 是永遠放不下的行囊

廚房裡 淡淡滋味的家常飯菜，  
內心迴盪酸甜苦辣  
沙發上 肩並肩的模樣  
化不開的朝思暮想

我的家別來無恙，我已經不一樣  
現在知道，你們藏了什麼在臨別的飯菜香  
家的溫暖，放在心上  
淚 會努力往那肚裡藏

我的家別來無恙，我已經不一樣  
飽經風霜，意志更堅強 那是現在的我呀  
行李箱裝滿 遊子回家的嚮往  
謝謝你們，讓我去追尋未知的夢想

謝謝你們，讓我去追尋未知的夢想

*Home-cooked meals: 'Thank you for your tender strength, may courage protect your dreams'*

*Zhang Han-ya*

I trip and stumble on the road as I move further away from home on a cold and distant road  
But my heart remains warm from the warm embrace.  
Like the swaying of an animal's tail  
I clam up and won't talk about my hopes  
My worried eyes glisten with tears

In this ways I say good bye to all that is old and familiar.  
I fly to my dreams in a distant place  
I thus leave behind all the familiar tastes and smells  
Searching for my perseverance.

Even though my house is in good health, but I'm no longer the same  
I now know what you hid in my parting meal  
The warmth of home placed in my heart  
I can now push my tears down

My home has been unaffected by it all but I'm no longer the same  
Having suffered the hardships of life, my determination is now even stronger, this is the new me  
My suitcases are ready, I'm ready to go home

Thank you for letting me chase my unknown dream

Violently leaving home, I have become a loner pacing back and forth  
I want to throw off the burdens weighing down my shoulders  
The wind of a foreign land has dried my tears of missing home  
The room is full of gossip from home  
Even in that warm place I'm still far from the place where I can finally place my travelling bags.

In the kitchen there is the faint smell of family cooking  
My heart is reverberating with all the joys and bitterness of life  
Sitting shoulder to shoulder on the sofa  
I long for you day and night

Even though my house is in good health, but I'm no longer the same  
I now know what you hid in my parting meal  
The warmth of home placed in my heart  
I can now push my tears down

My home has been unaffected by it all but I'm no longer the same  
Having suffered the hardships of life, my determination is now even stronger, this is the new me  
My suitcases are ready, I'm ready to go home  
Thank you for letting me chase my unknown dream

島嶼天光

滅火器樂團<sup>31</sup>

作詞：楊大正

作曲：楊大正

親愛的媽媽 請你毋通煩惱我  
原諒我 行袂開跤 我欲去對抗袂當原諒的人  
歹勢啦 愛人啊 袂當陪你看電影  
原諒我 行袂開跤 我欲去對抗欺負咱的人

天色漸漸光 遮有一陣人  
為了守護咱的夢 成做更加勇敢的人  
天色漸漸光 已經不再驚惶  
現在就是彼一工 換阮做守護恁的人

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<sup>31</sup>Chinese lyrics and English translation from *Fire Ex*. Facebook page.  
Fire Ex. ca. 2009. *Facebook* [Page type]. <https://www.facebook.com/FireEX?fref=ts> (accessed 22 September 2014).

已經袂記哩 是第幾工 請毋通煩惱我  
因為阮知影 無行過寒冬 袂有花開的彼一工  
天色漸漸光 天色漸漸光  
已經是更加勇敢的人

天色漸漸光 咱就大聲來唱著歌  
一直到希望的光線 照著島嶼每一個人  
天色漸漸光 咱就大聲來唱著歌  
日頭一(足百)上山 就會使轉去啦

天色漸漸光 咱就大聲來唱著歌  
一直到希望的光線 照著島嶼每一個人  
天色漸漸光 咱就大聲來唱著歌  
日頭一(足百)上山 就會使轉去啦

現在是彼一工 勇敢的台灣人

### **Voiceover at start<sup>32</sup>**

全面佔領主席台 X 2 ( call and reply )  
重啟談判  
公開透明  
因為我們是...  
民主的台灣!!!

### **Words superimposed on top:**

本片獻給  
挺身而出的台灣公民們  
在這個島嶼最黑暗的時刻  
你我都是炎熱的太陽

特別感謝  
提供影像記錄的朋友們

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<sup>32</sup> Inscription of words superimposed on top and voiceover transcribed and translated by author.  
Wu, D. [Wu DarKuen]. March 29 2014. Daoyu tianguang [Island's Sunrise] *Yishu gongmin jihua taiyanghua xueyun gequ* [Songs from the Sunflower Movement citizens artist program] [video file].  
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iV8JDbtXZm4> (accessed 22 September 2014).

讓我們透過影像的持續關注  
將真相散佈更遠的地方

當在位者忽視民藝  
當民主程序崩潰  
當國家主權被私相接受  
當壓不住的民意，終究爆發

退回服貿捍衛民主

請將一切攤開在眼光下  
一退回服貿協議  
二兩岸協議監督法制化。先立法，再審查服貿協議  
三召開公民憲制會議  
四要求朝野立委站出來響應人民的需求

我們不是暴民  
我們想重新掌握自己的未來  
我們想爭取自由寬廣的視野  
我們想誠懇而面對自己的土地

“我不懂為甚麼社會大眾對握有權利者這般地寬容，但對於手中無權，卻提出事實的人，卻次如何的嚴苛？”

提出來吧！  
在我們再也說不出話之前，讓我們吶喊出，心底最後的希望。

革命也許不會那麼快成功  
但我們可以依靠彼此的肩膀  
用力開發應該屬於我們的未來  
應該屬於台灣的未來

*Fire Ex.*  
*'Island Sunrise'*  
*Lyrics: Sam Yang*  
*Composition: Sam Yang*

Dear mother, please don't worry  
Forgive me, I cannot leave  
Cause I must fight those unforgivable ones  
I'm sorry, my love



I cannot go to the movies with you  
Forgive me, cause I cannot leave  
I must fight the ones that are making us bleed

Dawn is near  
There are people here  
Who resolve to protect our dreams  
And thus vow to become stronger than before  
Dawn is near  
Don't be afraid  
Today is the day  
That I protect you for a change

The days seem endless, but please don't worry  
Because I know  
That when winter comes, spring shall soon arrive  
Dawn is near  
Dawn is near  
We are braver than before

Dawn is near  
Let's sing it out loud  
Until the rays of hope  
Shines upon everyone on this island  
Dawn is near  
Let's sing it out loud  
Once the sun reaches the mountain  
Then it's time to go home

Dawn is near  
Let's sing it out loud  
Until the rays of hope  
Shines upon everyone on this island  
Dawn is near  
Let's sing it out loud  
Once the sun reaches the mountain  
Then it's time to go home

Today is the day  
For the brave Taiwanese

**Voice over at start**

Occupy the podium X2  
Reopen the negotiations  
Aim for transparency  
Because we are ...

Taiwan democracy!!!

### **Words superimposed on top**

This song is dedicated to  
Taiwan citizens who came forward  
During this island's darkest moment  
You and I are both rays of hot sunlight

We would especially like to thank  
Our friends who provided us with the images  
Via these images, these will let us continue to show our concern  
Will let us to spread the truth even further

When those in charge ignore the voice of the people  
When the process of democracy collapses  
When the authorities of the country are influenced by private interests  
When you can no longer suppress the people any longer, then the situation will reach breaking point

Repeal the services agreement and safeguard democracy

We lay out our demands before you:

1. Repeal the services agreement
2. Cross strait agreement needs to go through a review process. It must first return to the legislative yuan, then we must review the services agreement
3. Convene a meeting for the people to discuss the constitution.
4. We request those in the government to come and meet the people to discuss our demands.

We are not violent citizens  
We want to once again seize control of our future.  
We have to fight for our free and lasting future  
We must be honest and responsible to our own land

“I don't understand why the majority of people in our society are tolerant of those who are in power but are harsh to those without power but armed with truth.”

Rise up!  
Until we are no longer able to make a sound, let us shout out loud the hopes in the depths of our heart.

Revolution can't be accomplished in such a short amount of time.  
But we can lean on each other  
We can bravely develop the future that belongs to us  
The future that should belong to Taiwan.

黃建為

我擁抱的是一路裝作勇敢的你(太陽花民歌七號)<sup>33</sup>

當世界都睡了 我沒想到是你  
披上了件風衣 就這樣狂奔而去

而世界還是黑的 我就這樣望著你  
用生命的炙熱 燃燒一絲光明

於是我看到了 你溫柔的心  
他用力的跳動著 還有倔強的脾氣

我害怕著失去你 才望著你的背影  
我擁抱的是一路裝作勇敢的你

我等待的是風起 祈禱的是和平  
我愛上的是獨自站在黑暗中的你

當快樂都不見了 我們能去哪裡  
再漂泊的靈魂 還是想找到安寧

當夢想都實現了 我默默望著你  
為什麼還是有一種 寂寞的表情

於是我看到了 你溫柔的心  
他固執的跳動著 還有倔強的脾氣

我害怕著失去你 才望著你的背影  
我擁抱的是一路裝作勇敢的你

我等待的是風起 我祈禱的是和平  
我愛上的是你眼裡閃爍的風景

我害怕著失去你 才望著你的背影

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<sup>33</sup> Lyrics Youtube. Translation authors own.

Huang, J. [Huang Jian-wei]. 26 March 2014. *Wo yongbao de shi yiyilu zhongzuo yonggan de ni* [I'm embracing the you who's been pretending to be brave this whole time]. [video file]. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ewz6mHyTRFs> (accessed 22 September 2014).

我擁抱的是一路裝作勇敢的你

我等待的是風起 我祈禱的是和平

我愛上的是獨自站在黑暗中的你

我捨不得的是你從不願落下的淚滴

*Huang Jian —wei*

*'I am embracing the you who's been pretending to be brave this whole time' (Sunflower Movement People's song number 7).*

While the whole world was sleeping, I didn't expect it to be you  
Draping a wind cheater over my shoulders as we left running wildly

But the world still has darkness and because of this I long for you  
Using the heat of life to shine out a ray of light

Thus when I first saw your tender heart  
Beating energetically with stubbornness

I watch your back leave only because I'm afraid to lose you  
I hold onto the path that will make me brave like you

I'm waiting for the wind to rise and praying for peace  
I love the solitary you who stands in the dark

In times of happiness we can't see but we can go anywhere  
The soul that leads a wandering life still hopes to find tranquility

Even though my dreams have become reality I still silently long for you  
Why does loneliness still remain?

Thus, when I see your tender heart  
Beating energetically and with stubbornness

I watch your back leave only because I'm afraid to lose you  
I hold onto the path that will make me brave like you

I'm waiting for the wind to rise and praying for peace  
I love the sight of your shining eyes

I watch your back leave only because I'm afraid to lose you  
I hold onto the path that will make me brave like you

I'm waiting for the wind to rise and praying for peace  
The one I love is you, who stands alone in the darkness

I don't want to see you reluctantly shed tears.

天亮

詞：阿茹茹

曲：第二世<sup>34</sup>

致 318 學運動所有台灣同胞們

人們唱著天快要亮了，  
我卻看見烏雲在飄著，  
看見電視對立的人們社會真的生病了！  
是什麼？讓你哭出聲。  
那些假裝和平的偽善者。  
煽動叛亂不真實的公正，盲從不是唯一選擇

chorus

天將漸漸微亮，只要我們不要再盲目衝撞  
人說團結是力量，難道忘了嗎？非得對立嗎？  
天將漸漸微亮，只要我們不要再分化希望  
那些邪惡的伎倆，敵不過信仰！終亮夢一場！  
別忘了！我們最初的善良！

天將漸漸微亮，只要我們不要再盲目衝撞  
人說團結是力量，難道忘了嗎？非得對立嗎？  
天將漸漸微亮，只要我們不要再分化希望  
那些邪惡的伎倆，敵不過信仰！終亮夢一場！  
別忘了！我們最初的善良！

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<sup>34</sup> Lyrics transcribed from Youtube video, translation authors own.

Shi, er-di. 4 April 2014. *Tianliang (yu tuanjie ban) zhi 318 xueyun suoyou Taiwan tongbaomen* [Dawn (call for unity version) dedicated to our compatriots in the 3/18 student movement]. [video file]. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H1VJnl1kBDg> (accessed 22 September 2014).

*'Dawn'*  
*Lyrics: A Ru-ru*  
*Composition: The Second World*

Dedicated to our compatriots in the 3/18 student movement

The people are singing that the sky will soon be light  
But I only see black clouds in the sky  
Those antagonistic people on TV make me think that there is something wrong with our society  
What is it that makes you cry in such a loud sound? Those hypocrites faking peace  
It isn't fair, inciting people to rise up in rebellion, blindly following isn't the only option

The sky will gradually become light, as long as we don't blindly bump into each other again  
People say joining together is strength, how can you forget? Must we oppose?  
Sky is gradually getting light, as long as our hope is not divided.  
Those wicked tricks are not match for our faith, in the end it's just a dream  
Don't forget our good will!

The sky will gradually become light, as long as we don't blindly bump into each other again  
People say joining together is strength, how can you forget? Must we oppose?  
Sky is gradually getting light, as long as our hope is not divided.  
Those wicked tricks are not match for our faith, in the end it's just a dream  
Don't forget our good will!

心之所向<sup>35</sup>  
台科大

我來自台科大我反對黑箱服貿那你呢?

是否你也和我一樣  
在此等夜裡徬徨  
害怕改變會失去所有  
當下熟悉的現況

難免也會有些遺憾  
難免也會有些失望  
但誰說我們就該這樣  
保持沮喪在浪潮中跌盪

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<sup>35</sup> Lyrics from YouTube video, translation authors own.

Lin, Jian-yu. 4 April 2014. 'Taiyanghua xueyun' laizi Taikeda de gequ: xin zhi suo xiang ['Sunflower student movement' The National Technology University music group: where the heart takes you] [video file]. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZE6KqPXeK8M> (accessed 22 September 2014).

張開那被恐懼震懾的翅膀  
讓生命敲擊出應有的火光

難免也會有些遺憾  
難免也會有些失望  
但誰說們就該這樣  
保持沮喪在浪潮中跌盪

張開那被恐懼震懾的翅膀  
讓生命敲擊出應有的火光  
為了一份愛而狂  
為了一對眼光而倔強  
為了夢想能情願受盡多少冰雪和風霜

為了一份感動而闖  
為了什麼樣的路而迷惘  
反正最壞也就一生懸命追逐著渴望

今後我不再冷漠的旁觀  
今後我不再放棄任何一絲希望  
儘管面對時代巨輪蠻橫而無情的碾壓 我也要挺身阻擋

我有我的過往  
也曾蒙蔽了眼框 但是現在我  
無法再忍受眼前的殘破不堪

為了一份愛而狂  
為了一對眼光而倔強  
為了夢想能情願受盡多少冰雪和風霜  
為了一份感動而闖  
為了什麼樣的路而迷惘  
反正最壞也就一生懸命追逐著渴望

就讓我猖狂  
雄視的直闖  
那怕跌跌撞撞  
告訴我妳心之所向

*Where the heart takes you*  
*The National Technology University Music Group*

I'm from Taipei Technology University, I oppose the black box decision making process, do you?

Whether or not we are the same, as we pace back and forth waiting for the night, I'm afraid in the changes we will lose everything familiar

Who can avoid not having regrets, who can avoid being disappointed, but who said we should be like this, falling in the tide and carrying on our crying?

Opening up the night's frightening and intimidating wings, letting light shine through.

Who can avoid not having regrets, who can avoid being disappointed, but who said we should be like this, falling in the tide and carrying on our crying?

Opening up the night's frightening and intimidating wings, letting light shine through.

For one moment of love, be crazy

Be strong for a moment of conviction

When accomplishing your dream there will be sorrow and hardship

Charge forward for a moment of resolution.

To be perplexed at finding the right road

At worst, you are for ever chasing after your dreams

From today I will no longer be an indifferent onlooker

From today I won't give up any rays of hope

I will do my best to face the wheel of fortune of our generation, I will stand up and fight against it

For one moment of love, be crazy

Be strong for a moment of conviction

When accomplishing your dream there will be sorrow and hardship

Charge forward for a moment of resolution.

To be perplexed at finding the right road

At worst, you are for ever chasing after your dreams

Just let me be wild

Stand tall and charge forward

Even if I stumble and fall I still need to keep going

晚安台灣

滅火器樂團<sup>36</sup>

作詞：楊大正

作曲：楊大正

編曲：滅火器

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<sup>36</sup> Chinese and Tâi-gí version from *Mojim*, translation authors own.

Fire Ex. Wan'an Taiwan [Goodnight Taiwan]. *Mojim*.

<http://mojom.com/twy105739x2x5.htm> (accessed 22 September 2014).



*(Mandarin version)*

在這個安靜的暗暝  
我知道你有心事睏袂去  
想起你的過去 受盡凌遲  
甘苦很多年

在這個安靜的暗暝  
我知道你有心事睏袂去  
想起你的過去 受盡凌遲  
甘苦很多年

在這個安靜的暗暝  
我知道你有心事睏袂去  
煩惱你的未來要對叨去  
幸福在哪裡

啊～啊

黑暗他總會過去  
日頭一出來猶原攔是好天氣  
你有一個美麗的名字

啊～啊

天公伯總會保庇  
日頭一出來猶原攔是好天氣  
望你順遂 台灣

啊～啊

黑暗他總會過去  
日頭一出來猶原攔是好天氣  
你有一個美麗的名字

啊～啊

天公伯總會保庇  
日頭一出來猶原攔是好天氣  
望你平安 台灣  
望你順遂 台灣

*(Tâi-gí version)*

佇即個安靜兮暗暝 我知影汝有心事睏袂去  
想起汝兮過去 受盡凌治 艱苦真濟年

佇即個安靜兮暗暝 我知影汝有心事睏袂去  
想起汝兮過去 受盡凌治 艱苦真濟年  
佇即個安靜兮暗暝 我知影汝有心事睏袂去  
煩惱汝兮未來卜對底去 幸福佇底位

啊~啊 烏暗伊總會過去  
日頭一出來猶原固是好天氣  
汝有一個美麗兮名字  
啊~啊 天公伯總會庇庇  
日頭一出來猶原固是好天氣  
願汝順遂臺灣

啊~啊 烏暗伊總會過去  
日頭一出來猶原固是好天氣  
汝有一個美麗兮名字  
啊~啊 天公伯總會庇庇  
日頭一出來猶原固是好天氣  
願汝平安臺灣  
願汝順遂臺灣

*Goodnight Taiwan*  
*Fire Ex.*  
*Lyrics: Sam Yang*  
*Composition: Sam Yang*  
*Arranged by: Fire Ex.*

At the silence of the setting sun  
I know your heart is heavy and you want to sleep  
You wish to forget your suffering of a thousand deaths  
The joys and sorrows of many years

At the silence of the setting sun  
I know your heart is heavy and you want to sleep  
You wish to forget your suffering of a thousand deaths  
The joys and sorrows of many years

At the silence of the setting sun  
I know your heart is heavy and you want to sleep  
I'm concerned about where your future lies  
And where you will be able to find happiness

Ahhhhhh

In the darkness he will always come  
Beautiful weather will accompany the coming of dawn  
You have a beautiful name

Ahhhhh

The Lord of Heaven will always protect you  
At first light, the weather is still good  
I hope all goes well for Taiwan

Ahhhhhh

In the darkness he will always come  
Beautiful weather will accompany the coming of dawn  
You have a beautiful name

Ahhhhh

The Lord of Heaven will always protect you  
Beautiful weather will accompany the coming of dawn  
I hope there is peace in Taiwan

I hope all goes smoothly in Taiwan

你敢有聽着咱的歌  
台文歌詞: 吳易澄<sup>37</sup>

你敢有聽著咱的歌 唱出艱苦人的苦痛  
這是咱毋願一世人成做奴隸的心聲  
咱的心振動袂定 若親像勇敢的鼓聲  
向望有一工活出自由的新性命

請你加入阮的革命 阮毋願閣再驚惶  
舉頭看著天頂一個世界夢中嘛毋捌聽  
咱為民主為自由 佻伊拚咱袂孤單

你敢有聽著咱的歌 唱出艱苦人的苦痛  
這是咱毋願一世人成做奴隸的心聲

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<sup>37</sup>Wu, Yi-cheng. 2013. Huhuan gongyi de banzou: 'ni gan you tingzhe zan de ge' de tianci chuanguo lichen [Call for justice: 'Do you hear the people sing?' the creative process behind the lyrics]. *Kuangye Zazhi* (185). <http://www.cap.org.tw/W/w-185-2.html> (accessed 22 September 2014).

咱的心振動袂定 若親像勇敢的鼓聲  
向望有一工活出自由的新性命

你敢有決心付出一切 團結一心做伙行  
毋管犧牲抑是活命 堅持做人的形影  
你的血我的汗 沃落佇 Formosa  
你敢有聽著咱的歌 唱出艱苦人的苦痛  
這是咱毋願一世人成做奴隸的心聲  
咱的心振動袂定 若親像勇敢的鼓聲  
向望有一工活出自由的新性命

*Do you hear the people sing?*<sup>38</sup>  
*From: Les Miserables*

Do you hear the people sing?  
Singing a song of angry men?  
It is the music of a people who will not be slaves again!  
When the beating of your heart  
echoes the beating of the drums  
there is a life about to start when tomorrow comes!

Will you join in our crusade?  
Who will be strong and stand with me?  
Beyond the barricade is there a world you long to see?  
Then join in the fight that will give you the right to be free!

Do you hear the people sing?  
Singing a song of angry men?  
It is the music of a people who will not be slaves again!  
When the beating of your heart  
echoes the beating of the drums  
there is a life about to start when tomorrow comes!

Will you give all you can give so that our banner may advance  
Some will fall and some will live will you stand up and take your chance?  
The blood of the martyrs will water the meadows of France!

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<sup>38</sup> Do you hear the people sing. n.d. *Les Miserable Wiki*.  
[http://lesmiserables.wikia.com/wiki/Do\\_You\\_Hear\\_the\\_People\\_Sing%3F](http://lesmiserables.wikia.com/wiki/Do_You_Hear_the_People_Sing%3F) (accessed 22 September 2014).

Do you hear the people sing?  
Singing a song of angry men?  
It is the music of a people who will not be slaves again!  
When the beating of your heart  
echoes the beating of the drums  
there is a life about to start when tomorrow comes!

咱的夢在這  
公青行進曲四號  
詞/曲 黃建為<sup>39</sup>

你係我 每一日的眠夢  
你係我 最寶貝的心肝  
你係我 胸口的牽掛  
你係我 想要打拼的寄託

聽著這條風中的歌  
不怕路歹行  
不願隨浪隨風親像船沒港  
我要在這追咱的夢

這是我的青春  
我的希望  
我心中的憨膽  
因為相信有你的陪伴  
甘願作伙來作憨人

等待下個天亮  
花蕊都開  
美麗的福爾摩莎  
只要有你溫暖的陪伴  
咱的世界就有希望

台灣人 你係尚古錐的囡仔

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<sup>39</sup> Lyrics from Youtube, translation authors own.

Cho, Ju-ping. 22 March 2014. *Huang Jian-wei— zan de meng zai zhe gong qing xingjin qu sihao* [Our dreams are here youth of the public symphony number four] [video file]. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xrAdP2swZwg> (accessed 22 September 2014).

你係我 尚甲意的那款人  
有時候 一身憨憨的好膽  
甘願來 受風雨的折磨

*Our dreams are here*

*No 7 ...*

*Lyrics/composition: Huang Jian-wei*

You are my dreams of every night's sleep  
You are my most precious darling baby  
You are the worries in the pit of my stomach  
You are the one, I wish to entrust with my struggles

Listening to this song in the wind  
I'm not afraid to walk on this evil road  
I don't want to be like a boat without a harbor to dock in pushed aimlessly around by the wind  
I want to chase my dreams here.  
This is my youth,  
My hopes  
The foolish bravery of my heart  
Because I trust I will have you by my side  
We can be foolishly brave together

Waiting for the next ray of light  
The flower buds have all opened  
Most beautiful Formosa  
If you tenderly accompany us,  
Then our world has hope

People of Taiwan you are the most precious child  
You are my most favourite person  
Sometimes, a moment of brave foolishness  
ready and willing to suffer the torments of hard times.

