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### Signaling trouble

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*Document Version*  
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record

*Publication date:*  
2013

[Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database](#)

*Citation for published version (APA):*

Benjamin, T. M. (2013). *Signaling trouble: on the linguistic design of other-initiation of repair in English conversation*. s.n.

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**Signaling trouble**  
**On the linguistic design of other-initiation of repair in English conversation**

Trevor Benjamin



The work presented here was carried out under the auspices of the Center for Language and Cognition Groningen (CLCG) of the Faculty of Arts of the University of Groningen and the Netherlands Graduate School of Linguistics (LOT).



Grodil Dissertations in Linguistics 121  
ISSN: 0928-0030  
ISBN: 978-90-367-6525-1 (Print edition)  
ISBN: 978-90-367-6526-8 (Ebook)

Printed by: Netzo Druk print services, Groningen, The Netherlands.

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groningen

## **Signaling trouble**

**On the linguistic design of other-initiation of repair in English conversation**

Proefschrift

ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de  
Rijksuniversiteit Groningen  
op gezag van de  
rector magnificus, prof. dr. E. Sterken  
en volgens besluit van het College voor Promoties  
De openbare verdediging zal plaatsvinden op  
donderdag 21 november 2013  
om 11.00 uur

door

**Trevor Michael Benjamin**

geboren op 2 juli 1981  
te Saint John, Canada

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*To Lisa and Maya*



## Acknowledgements

It's strange that the things that come first in a book are always the last to be written—in my case, only days before it was due at the printers. Let this stand simultaneously as a sign of the importance I place on these acknowledgements (save the best for last!) and as an apology to anyone whose name I have forgotten.

Harrie and Gisela, I will forever be grateful for having you as my supervisors. Every good team needs an organizer, and Gisela—you've been it. You've made sure that we met every deadline, filled out every form, and dotted all the i's and crossed all the t's (up until the bitter end!). This book absolutely would not have been finished in four years without you. For this and countless other things, thank you. Harrie, from even before I began this project you have been a beacon of support, both academically and personally. You have played an instrumental role in developing the analysis offered in this book and indeed in developing me as an analyst (and teacher). You've provided direction and criticism when it was needed, but also allowed me an incredible amount of flexibility and space. I also can't count the number of times you've let me sleep in your home(s!), use your office, borrow your books, eat your food, and ramble on while you offer a kind and reassuring ear. It should go without saying, but I will say it anyway: you are far more to me than a supervisor.

To my reading committee, Paul Drew, Nick Enfield, and Marja-Leena Sorjonen, I would like to express deep gratitude. Your praise has humbled me and your criticisms have made this thesis stronger. It is an honour to have three researchers whose work I admire so much as members of the committee. I also want to thank you all for providing me the opportunity to visit over the years. I have benefited immensely from meeting with you and others at your respective institutions. I'd especially like to thank you, Paul, for having faith in my ability from early on, for challenging me to think just a little bit less as a linguist, and for helping me to better recognize the social nature of linguistic practices.

From my visits to Nijmegen, thanks especially to Kobin Kendrick, Kaoru Hayano, Giovanni Rossi and Tanya Stivers. From York, thanks to John Local, Richard Ogden, Merran Toerien, and especially Traci Walker. Traci, I nearly soiled myself when you asked if I'd be interested in developing my silly little class presentation into a full blown paper (see Chapter 6). You've been a great mentor and a great friend. As our better-halves would say: Cheers!



From my trips to Loughborough, thanks especially to Charles Antaki. You continue to be an incredible help in guiding me through the ins and outs of the far too often strange world of academia. From my visit to Helsinki, thanks to—well—everybody. I've never been somewhere which manages to be so stimulating and yet so utterly warm and welcoming at the same time. In addition to Marja-Leena, I especially want to thank Elizabeth Couper-Kuhlen, Salla Kurhila and Markku Haakana. Finally, I want to thank those who I've met and gained much from along the way at conferences, workshops and the like. In particular, thanks to Maria Egbert, Cecelia Ford, Barbara Fox, Geoff Raymond, Jeff Robinson, and Jack Sidnell.

My time in the CLCG has been incredibly rewarding, in large part due to the collegiality of those who make it up. I've benefited greatly from participation in discussion groups, data sessions, committees and the countless chats in the hallways and over coffee. I'd especially like to thank: Karin Beijering, Jan Berenst, Ildikó Berzlánovich, Gisi Cannizzaro, Kostadin Cholakov, Çağrı Cöltekin, Agnes Engbersen, Christina Englert, Myrte Gosen, Rimke Groenewold, Marieke Haan, Dicky Gilbers, John Hoeks, Petra Hendriks, Jack Hoeksema, Mike Huiskes, Tim Kallenborn, Tom Koole, Daniël de Kok, Dörte de Kok, John Nerbonne, Muriel Norde, Remco van Pareren, Esther Pascual, Lucas Seuren, Laurie Stowe, Nynke van der Vliet, Martijn Wieling, and Jan-Wouter Zwart. I'd similarly like to thank my two office mates, Tom Abuom and Ruggero Montalto, and my neighbors Alessandro Grazi and Joanna Krawczyk-Cöltekin. Finally, for making the CLCG such a pleasant and trouble-free place to work, thanks ever so much to Wyke van der Meer, Gorus van Oordt and all the other administrative and support staff in the Secretariaat Cluster Nederlands, the Audiovisuele Dienst, the Graduate School for Humanities, and the International Office.

My next thanks goes to my paranympths—or, in my case, trio of nymphs. Thank you Nanna, Rain and Viv for all of your help in making my defense one to remember. I know the efforts you have made have been heartfelt and earnest, and I genuinely appreciate them. Similarly, thanks to all the other exceptional friends who've made my time in Groningen unforgettable (Ryan, Velia, Geoff, Pontus, Kashmiri, Marrit, Margaret 'Parks' and Brino, to mention but a few).

Which leaves my family. My heartfelt appreciation to my parents, grandparents, my brother Sean, Matthew and Julie, and my in-laws. You have all been a great source of inspiration, support and encouragement throughout my (long!) academic journey. And lastly, to my two loves. While it does not show in the text, you are the reason each and every page of this book exists. It is for your undying love, encouragement and sacrifice that I dedicate this book to you, my xiǎoest of the xiāos.

October 17, 2013



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# 1 | Introduction

Breakdowns in communication are no trivial matter. If we do not understand what we are saying to each other, then the possibility of coordinating our actions evaporates. It is essential that we possess shared tools for resolving communicative problems quickly and efficiently when they arise. These “repair” practices underlie our capacity to talk together, act together, and indeed, understand each other (Clark & Schaefer, 1989; Schegloff, 1992). In this thesis, I examine the interactional and linguistic organization of repair in everyday English conversation. In particular, I investigate how one person signals that they have trouble with something another has said, and asks them to repeat, clarify, correct or otherwise repair it. I show that many of these actions, so-called *other-initiations of repair* (see below), are linguistically designed to help diagnose what is causing the trouble (e.g. a word, a reference, or an utterance as a whole) and what the problem with it is (e.g. it wasn’t heard or understood). This work contributes to our understanding of repair in two main, interlocking ways. First, it highlights the linguistic variety and complexity one finds among other-initiations of repair. These actions are carefully coordinated with respect to the words and grammatical constructions employed, the ways in which these lexico-syntactic items are formally (cohesively) tied to the troublesome talk, and, finally, in how they are delivered prosodically. Second, by demonstrating the diagnostic consequences of these linguistic choices, this thesis underscores the active and essential role played by the recipient (the initiating speaker) in the process of repairing communicative troubles. The re-establishment of intersubjectivity is truly an interactional accomplishment.

This chapter situates the current study by successively zooming in on its particular analytic focus. It then introduces the data and methodology employed, and overviews the remaining chapters.

## 1.1 Other-initiations of repair: Anatomy and terminology

There are many ways in which the participants of a conversation call “time out” to address a trouble in speaking, hearing or understanding. These repair activities are organizationally related to one another, but have their own distinct properties (Schegloff, Jefferson & Sacks,

1977). In this section, I introduce the particular class of repair activities which are the focus of this thesis and the terminology I will use to describe them.

The following data extract is taken from a phone call between Kim and her friend Jill. Audio files for this and most other data are available for download from my website.<sup>1</sup> See section 1.4 below for transcription conventions (essentially a simplified version of the Jeffersonian system).

**Extract 1** [CallHome-4844, 5:26]

1 Kim: she had a baby right  
 2 (0.2)  
 3 Jill: who  
 4 (0.5)  
 5 Kim: your sister in law=  
 6 Jill: =yeah yeah (.) yeah

About five minutes into the call, Kim asks Jill the question we see in line 1 (“she had a baby right”). In order for Jill to answer, she needs to have an adequate grasp of what she is being asked. This requires, among other things, that she can work out who the “she” is referring to. It appears she can’t. In line 3, she signals trouble with this reference and asks Kim to fix it (“who”). Kim complies (“your sister in law”, line 5) and Jill then resumes the conversation (line 6), her problem evidently resolved.


It is this class of repair activity, launched by a recipient’s “who?”, “huh?”, “you mean this weekend?”, or similar action, which is the focus of this thesis. A review of the literature reveals that these phenomenon have been studied under many names. Within linguistics they are known as clarification questions, echo questions or rejoinders (Halliday & Hasan, 1976), within psychology as grounding utterances/sequences (Clark & Schaefer, 1987; 1989), within artificial intelligence as clarification/correction (sub)dialogues (Litman & Allan, 1987; Grosz & Sidner, 1986), within research on second language acquisition as feedback or uptake (Lyster & Ranta, 1997), and so on. The reason for this plurality is clear: These phenomena are “so ubiquitous that very few approaches within the human and social sciences have avoided commenting on, or contending with them, in some way” (Hayashi et al., 2013, p. 1).

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<sup>1</sup> <https://sites.google.com/site/trevormbenjamin/audiofiles>

In this thesis I shall refer to these activities and their component parts using the terminology of conversation analytic (CA) research on “repair” (for recent reviews see Kitzinger, 2013, Fox et al., 2013, Hayashi et al., 2013). Returning to extract 1, Kim’s “she” (line 1) is the SOURCE of the trouble (which must be distinguished from the TYPE or nature of the trouble, in this case an understanding problem). The component of the activity designed to fix this problem, Kim’s subsequent “your sister in law” (line 5), is the REPAIR (or repair proper). It is a *SELF-REPAIR* because Kim is repairing her own talk, but it is *OTHER-INITIATED* because Jill asked her to. That is, Jill is the one who actually called the “time out” and set this repair activity in motion. The means by which she did this, her “who” in line 3, is an *OTHER-INITIATION* of repair, or simply an OI. These actions are often called *Next Turn Repair Initiations* (NTRIs), but there are both empirical and conceptual reasons to avoid this label (see Schegloff 2000b and below). Similarly, I will use the term *NEXT POSITION* rather than next turn to describe where these repair initiating actions occur.

Each of these three core elements—the trouble-source (“she”), the OI (“who”) and the repair proper (“your sister in law”)—are contained within a distinct turn at talk (indeed, a distinct *TURN CONSTRUCTIONAL UNIT*).<sup>2</sup> These encompassing units form a three part interactional sequence (Schegloff 2007b) through which the repair activity is accomplished. The OI begins the sequence, treating something that was already said as a source of trouble, and turning it into something to be repaired in the next turn (see Schegloff, 2007b, p. 217-9 on “retro sequences”). Figure 1.1 below highlights this pivotal role played by the OI.



**Figure 1.1:** An other-initiation “creates” both the trouble-source (retroactively) and the repair proper (prospectively, by making it the next relevant action).

<sup>2</sup> Turn Constructional Units (or TCUs) are the building blocks of turns at talk. A TCU is the minimal utterance which, in context, can constitute a complete contribution to the interaction. While both TCUs and turns can be extended, the possibility of a transition to a next speaker becomes relevant as they reach their completion (See Clayman, 2013 for a review). As we shall see, there will be many times when it is important to distinguish between TCUs and turns.



A full descriptive label for this repair activity (as compared to its components) is NEXT-POSITION OTHER-INITIATED SELF-REPAIR (NP-OI-SR). While laborious, each element is necessary to fully distinguish it from other kinds of other-initiated repair activities. On the one hand, recipients can correct the prior speaker, replacing something which they claim to be “wrong”. In these cases, the recipient both initiates and executes repair in next position (NP-OI-OR). On the other hand, recipients can initiate repair when subsequent talk displays that they have misunderstood what’s been said. This action occurs in a fourth position relative to the trouble-source-turn (*FP-OI-SR*; see Schegloff, 1992; 2000b; and Chapter 7 below). When there is no chance of confusion, however, I shall refer to our focal activities (NP-OI-SR) with the shorthand OI-SEQUENCE or simply REPAIR SEQUENCE.<sup>3</sup>

A variety of interactional contingencies can result in OI-sequences which deviate from canonical cases like extract 1. For instance, someone may speak following the (incipiently) troublesome unit of talk, before an OI-sequence is launched. This results in an OI which is in a non-contiguous next position (compare this with Jill’s “who” which was the very next unit of talk following Kim’s question; see Schegloff, 2000b; Wong, 2000; and Chapter 7 below for discussion). Also, the repair offered in response to an OI does not always adequately resolve the trouble at hand. In these cases, the participants regularly engage in further attempts at repairing the trouble, resulting in expanded OI-sequences. The terminology necessary to describe these and other deviations will be introduced as they are encountered.

Finally, when referring to the participants themselves, I shall seldom use pseudonyms as I did for extract 1 (Kim and Jill). I will instead use labels based on the role the participants are playing within the particular OI-sequence I am focusing on. The participant whose talk is causing the trouble (Kim in this case) is SPEAKER A. The participant who is having the trouble, and initiates its repair (Jill), SPEAKER B. Similarly, I will sometimes use the label A-SPEAKERS as a shorthand for “trouble-source speakers” (or “repairing speakers”) and B-SPEAKERS for “repair-initiating speakers”.

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<sup>3</sup> The common name in the CA literature is “other-initiated repair” (or OIR). Note, however, that this label can describe both the activity as a whole and the repair proper (“your sister in law” is indeed a repair initiated by “other”). While this ambiguity is motivated – repair activities are launched *in order to* bring about the repair proper – I will avoid this term. Similarly, I will avoid “repair initiator”, a term regularly used to refer to both the repair initiating speaker (Jill) and the means by which they do it (the repair initiation “who”).

## 1.2 The diagnostic properties of other-initiations

In diagnosing the problems that afflict our bodies and our machines, doctors and mechanics rely on highly “tuned” instruments, designed and developed with these problems in mind. A relevant question, then, is to what degree other-initiations of repair (OIs) are “tuned” to the problems *they* address—those which occur when we talk with one another. It is this question which I seek to address in this thesis.

For those unfamiliar with research on this topic, the answer may seem simple. When we have trouble with what others say, we tell them precisely what it is: “I don’t know who Maya is”, “did you say Maya”, “could you repeat that”, and so on. However, research on naturally occurring conversation has found that people overwhelmingly *do not* initiate repair in such verbose, lexically explicit ways. In the example above, Jill did not initiate repair with “who do you mean” or “who is she”. She simply said “who”. This is typical. Consider the “taxonomy” of OIs offered by Schegloff, Jefferson & Sacks (henceforth SJS) in their classic paper on the organization of repair (1977, p. 367-9). These five methods, illustrated below, are (among) the most common ways of initiating repair in everyday English conversation. While we lack clear distributional figures (see Clark & Schaefer, 1987; Kendrick, 2012, however), my data contains hundreds of these OIs, but only a handful of the lexically explicit cases mentioned above. What’s more, research on other languages/cultures finds locally inflected versions of these five methods turning up again and again (Moerman, 1977; Selting 1988; Egbert, 1996; Wu, 2006; Kim, 1999; Sidnell, 2007; Svennevig, 2008; Bolden, 2009a; Hayashi & Hayano, 2013; Enfield et al., 2013; among others).

**Method 1:** A “huh”, “pardon”, “sorry” etc.

A: are you going to camp  
(0.2)  
B: huh  
(0.4)  
A: are you going to camp [Callhome-4432, 9:23]

**Method 2:** A question word (“who”, “when”, “where”)

A: but he used to work with Bill in Washington right  
(0.2)  
B: who  
(0.6)  
A: Jared [CallFriend-s4162, 22:10]

**Method 3:** A question word framed by a partial repeat (“been where”, “who did”, “a what”)

- A: ... he was so tired I could tell that he he'd been there  
for- he had been there for three and a half hours  
.hhh
- B: been where  
(0.3)
- A: at the library [CallFriend-s6914, 19:31]

**Method 4:** A repetition (“a French guy”, “pullover”)

- A: and then there's a: French guy hh  
(.)
- A: Raphael  
(0.7)
- B: a French guy
- A: yeah hhhh [CallFriend-n6093, 4:29]

**Method 5:** A possible understanding of the trouble-source (“Michael Stipe”, “you mean on Tuesday”)

- B: he's about to take his pants down  
(0.2)
- A: M- Michael Stipe  
(.)
- B: yeah [Callhome-4838, 4:01]

Faced with these methods of other-initiation, the question of diagnostic tuning is much less straightforward to answer. Consider first how these OIs diagnose (or locate) the *source* of the trouble. SSJ noted that most OIs pick something out of the prior unit of talk. A “who” specifies that the trouble-source is a reference to a person (Method 2), “a French guy” repeats it (Method 4), and so on. However, the clues offered by this lexico-syntactic “tuning” can be ambiguous. In the “who” example, the prior unit contains two person references (“he” and “Bill”). Which is the trouble-source? Similarly, does “a French guy” signal trouble with the repeated element as a whole or only part of it? A bigger problem is that “huh?”, “what?”, etc. (Method 1) do *not* offer any lexico-syntactic clues. Faced with this type of OI, a repairing speaker has no choice but to rely on pragmatic/contextual reasoning (broadly defined), backed by the possibility of a “second try” if they repair the wrong item (see Chapter 2).

Things become even less clear when we consider tuning to the *type* of trouble. With the exception of “you mean on Tuesday?” (Method 5), the OIs in SJS’s taxonomy do not offer explicit, lexical clues about this dimension of the trouble (compare “huh?” with “I can’t hear you”, and “who” with “who do you mean” or “who did you say”). At the same time, the set

of possible trouble-types which can be signaled by OIs is “vast” (Robinson, 2013b, p. 263), ranging from troubles in speaking (e.g. speaking unclearly or too quietly; or saying something untrue, irrelevant, or otherwise “unacceptable”; Svennevig, 2009) to troubles in the recipient’s hearing, attention (Egbert, 1996; Robinson, 2006), or understanding of what was said (e.g. the meanings of the words used, the action(s) they are performing, how this action connects with the preceding context). Taken together, it seems clear that repairing speakers must draw heavily on context in working out the trouble-type (see Drew, 1997; Svennevig, 2008; Robinson, 2009; 2013b among others). But is this all they rely on?

This thesis, and the research on which it builds, demonstrates that there is in fact considerably more diagnostic tuning among the OIs in SJS’s taxonomy. It is simply done in less explicit ways. For instance, in Method 1 both the lexical and prosodic design of the OI can be used to diagnose the trouble-type. Robinson (2006) has shown that by initiating repair with “sorry?” (rather than “what?” or “huh?”), a recipient claims responsibility for the trouble, and so delimits the trouble to one hearing or understanding what was said. Similarly, Selting (1996) has shown that by designing these OIs with particular clusters of pitch and loudness, a recipient claims that the trouble is one of “expecting” what was said.<sup>4</sup> In a similar manner, this thesis will show that:

- The final pitch movement of a “who” (Method 2) or “been where” (Method 3) provides information about both the kind of reference causing the trouble (e.g. a name vs. a pronoun) and nature of the trouble with it (e.g. hearing vs. understanding). Once this additional “tuning” is taken into account, the “who” above is no longer (or at least much less) ambiguous (Chapters 3, 4 and 5).
- Repetitions (Method 4) produced with a high rise-fall intonation contour specify that the trouble is accepting (rather than hearing or understanding) what’s been said. Moreover, the placement of the high rise pitch accent can locate the trouble-source precisely. In the example above, the recipient claims that what is “wrong” is the person’s gender (“a French GUY” as compared to “a FRENCH guy”, see Chapter 6).

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<sup>4</sup> Selting’s (1996) work is on German “was?” (what) and “bitte?” (pardon). A similar type of OI exists in English, though it remains to be systematically documented. Both Selting (1996) and Robinson (2006) will be discussed in detail in Chapter 2.

- Designing an OI with semantically “redundant” grammar (e.g. “you mean on Tuesday” as compared to “on Tuesday”; Method 5), can serve as a signal that the OI is not in its default, contiguous position. This positional “tuning” can help combat the problems these OIs may otherwise cause in locating the trouble-source (if an OI is non-contiguous, and not marked as such, the repairing speaker may wrongly assume that it targets something in the prior unit of talk; see Chapter 7).

The upshot of these types of findings is clear. The methods in SJS’s taxonomy are not the actual tools participants use to initiate repair, merely classes of related tools. And when the tools themselves are identified, many turn out to be more finely tuned than intuition and much prior research would suggest. Recipients can and do offer diagnosis of their communicative troubles.

### 1.3 Interactional practices and their generic properties

To discover the tools speakers of English use to initiate repair, this thesis combines detailed linguistic analysis with the methods and theoretical framework of conversation analysis (CA). From a CA perspective, the tools themselves are *interactional practices*. A practice involves saying or doing something in a distinctive way, in a particular interactional context, in order to handle some particular task or contingency (Heritage, 2010a, p. 213). Saying someone’s name as you begin to speak, for instance, is a practice for selecting that person as the (primary) recipient of that turn (Lerner, 2003). Answering a question with “of course” (cf. “yes”) is a practice for communicating that it needn’t have been asked (Stivers, 2011). And issuing a request with “I was wondering if...” (cf. “could you ....”) is a practice for claiming a lack of knowledge of what may be involved in granting the request and/or a lack of entitlement to ask (Curl & Drew, 2008). In a similar manner, I will show for a variety of different linguistic forms that initiating repair in *this* way is a practice for offering *this* diagnosis of the trouble being signaled.

In analyzing interactional practices, there are a number of basic distinctions which need to be made. First, the general, type-level properties of practices must be distinguished from the specific, token-level instances of their use. Other-initiations of repair are always deployed in a particular interactional moment to address a particular (putative) trouble; and, perhaps, in the service of some further interactional or interpersonal goal (Robinson, 2013b, p. 263).

However, by reference to which OI practice is used, this particularized action will necessarily have some general, formal properties. This is the object of my study—uncovering the general, diagnostic properties which undergird the use of these practices. While much more can—and should—be said about their particularized uses, this thesis offers a “system-oriented” rather than “interaction-oriented” study of the practices of other-initiation (Schegloff 1996b; cf. Schegloff, 2013 on the practices *self-initiated self-repair*).

A related point is that we must distinguish the use of a practice from whatever cognitive or psychological factors/states motivate that use. In saying, for example, that a recipient’s other-initiation signals an understanding trouble, or that a speaker’s repair diagnoses a hearing trouble, I am not making any claims about what is “really going on” in the minds of the participants. Instead, the claim and (and the object of study) is what they display through the design of their talk (their other-initiations, repairs, and other actions). To what degree this public, social reality reflects (or fails to reflect) the participants’ private, cognitive realities is a distinct question (see Drew, 1997, p. 97-8 for discussion).

Finally, it is important to distinguish interactional practices from linguistic and other semiotic forms/resources (e.g. words, constructions, intonation contours, repetition, gestures). Practices *use* these resources, but always in a particular interactional (action-sequential) context—a name *at the beginning of a turn*; an “of course” *as an answer to a question*; “who” with final falling pitch *as an other-initiation of repair*; and so on. Consequently, while this thesis discusses a wide range of linguistic forms, they are not the object of study. I do not attempt to account for *their* general properties. This is common practice in conversation analytic research, which aims to understand how interaction is organized, not necessarily how language is organized. That being said, “the interaction system” and “the language system” are clearly intertwined (Levinson, 2005), and studies of the former can bear on our understanding of the latter.

#### **1.4 Data and methodology**

This thesis investigates practices of other-initiation in the wild, culling instances of their use from recordings of naturally occurring interactions. In addition to its “ecological validity”, the use of this type of data has a number of analytic benefits. First, the talk and other conduct which leads up to and follows the occurrence of a particular OI serves as a valuable source of

evidence for describing how it works (see interaction analysis below). Second, examining naturally occurring data often generates new findings—some of the practices documented in this thesis, and in the literature more generally, were discovered by chance, while examining data for some other reason. Experiments are designed to test hypotheses and hypotheses require something to hypothesize about. As Sacks (1984) notes : “a base for using close looking at the world for theorizing about is that from close looking at the world we can find things that we couldn’t, by imagination, assert were there” (p. 25).

#### 1.4.1 The data

The data examined include approximately 150 hours of recordings, taken from just under 500 naturally occurring social interactions (see Figure 1.2 below for an overview; and the references section for sources).<sup>5</sup> Most are casual conversations between family and friends, though some are more formal interactions, e.g. calls to local businesses (parts of Field, Newport, LA97), work related talk among veterinarians, bankers, and politicians (parts of SBCSAE, Watergate), and the planning of a class project among a group of university students (Free Lunch). The recordings were made at various points over the past 50 years, and the participants involved vary considerably in their socio-economic background, age, and language variety (e.g. many dialects of American English and some 12 hours of British data). This thesis makes few attempts to document the constancy or variation of various OI practices across different social contexts, settings or groups. Nevertheless, the range of data suggests that most are quite generic and widespread (see Chapter 5 for some exceptions).

While the corpus contains 9 hours of video recordings and an additional 22 hours of audio-recorded face to face interactions (Santa Barbara Corpus), the bulk of the interactions (80%) took place over the telephone. Phone calls are, of course, limited in the number of participants involved (typically only two) and the types of semiotic resources that can be used (no gestures, gaze, etc.), two factors which have been shown to be consequential for the study of other-initiation of repair (see Egbert, 1997; Bolden, 2011; and Egbert, 1996; Seo & Koshik, 2010; Enfield et al., 2013 respectively). While in one sense a weakness, this type of data can also be seen as a “natural experiment”. Phone calls offer an accountable basis for excluding these more complex cases (Schegloff, 1968).

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<sup>5</sup> All data is used with permission, and all names and other identifiers have been anonymised.

CORPUS	SIZE		ORIGIN		TYPE (* AUDIO ONLY)	TALK BANK ?
	HOURS,	INTERACTIONS	REGION,	PERIOD		
Call Home	42	120	Amer	1990s	Phone	No
Call Friend	50	120	Amer	1990s	Phone	Yes
Field	8	95	British	1980s	Phone	No
Rahman	2	23	British	1980s	Phone	No
Newport Beach (NB)	3	27	Amer	1960s	Phone	Yes
LA97	1	5	Amer	1990s	Phone	No
Other phone calls <sup>6</sup>	2	12	Mixed	Mixed	Phone	No
Watergate	14	22	Amer	1970s	Mixed*	Yes
Santa Barbara Corpus of Spoken American English	22	60	Amer	1990s?	Face to Face*	Yes
Free Lunch	7	5	Amer	2000s	Face to Face	Yes
Kanes09	1	1	British	2000s	Face to Face	No
Virginia	0.5	1	Amer	1970s	Face to Face	No
Chicken Dinner	0.5	1	Amer	1970s	Face to Face	No

**Figure 1.2:** An overview of the data used in this thesis

A large portion of the data (61%) are taken from the Call Friend and Call Home corpora. These data consist of 240 telephone calls between family members and friends, collected in the late 1990s as part of a research project on speech recognition. Participants were recruited in the United States via the internet, advertising, and word-of-mouth. They were given a free 30-minute phone call anywhere in the United States (Call Friend) or the world (Call Home), with the only stipulation being that both callers be native speakers of American English. Additionally, the Call Friend corpus is segmented into two sections, one for speakers from “Northern” dialects and one for “Southern” dialects. The telephone calls in these corpora were recorded in stereo, with separate channels for each speaker. This has proved extremely helpful for phonetic/prosodic analysis.

#### 1.4.2 Transcripts, figures and symbolizing pitch

As aids for both analysis and presentation, a variety of transcripts and other representations of the data were created, in many cases building on earlier transcripts. However, it is important to make clear that the recordings themselves are the data. Many are freely available for download from the Talk Bank project (MacWhinney, 2000;<sup>7</sup> see the final column

<sup>6</sup> This includes other standard CA data: Debbie & Shelly, Gerry & Shelly, Hyla & Nancy, TG, SN4, Madeline, and a subset of the Heritage Corpus.

<sup>7</sup> <http://talkbank.org/CABank/>



of Figure 1.2) and most of the data fragments presented in the thesis itself are available for download from my website (see note 1). Readers are encouraged to consult the recordings themselves.

(0.3)	Timed pause (greater than 0.1 sec)
(.)	Micropause (0.1 sec or less)
=	Latching between two turns or elements within a turn
[	Beginning of overlapping speech
]	End of overlapping speech
.h, .hh	Inbreath (each [h] represents 0.1 sec)
h, hh	Outbreath (each [h] represents 0.1 sec)
@	A beat of laughter
wo@rd	A word/syllable infiltrated by laughter
:	A “stretched” sound
-	A cut-off sound
?	Final rising pitch
.	Final falling pitch
–	Final flat (level) pitch
xx	Inaudible syllable
(...)	Transcriber doubt
(..)/(..)	Two candidate hearings
...	Talk omitted
((...))	Additional information, including relevant non-verbal behavior

**Figure 1.3:** Transcription conventions

I have (re-)transcribed all data fragments presented in the thesis using a simplified Jeffersonian system, with standardized orthography (see Figure 1.3 above for conventions; see Walker, 2004, p. 39-50; 2013 for motivation). Intonation and other prosodic features are sporadically marked in the transcripts using the symbols discussed below. When additional phonetic/prosodic detail is needed, it is mentioned in the analysis, sometimes with an accompanying figure displaying a pitch trace and/or sound-pressure waveform of the relevant talk. These figures—created using PRAAT version 5.3.15 (Boersma & Weenink, 2012)—were inspected for tracking errors, then plotted logarithmically relative to the speaker’s pitch range. Their baseline and topline were calculated on the basis of one minute of their speech from the relevant interaction. Dotted vertical lines mark either word or syllable boundaries, with any nonstandard spelling reflecting English syllable structure. All pitch measurements are given in semitones rather than Hertz, as semitones provide a

perceptually more appropriate representation of pitch (Couper-Kuhlen, 1996; Nolan, 2003). A semitone (ST) is equivalent to the difference in pitch between two keys on a keyboard (12 ST equals 1 octave).

Because the final pitch movement of many other-initiations of repair is diagnostically consequential, I will symbolize this feature of their design both in the transcripts and in the body of the text (unless it is not relevant to the analytic argument I am making). Final rising pitch is symbolized with a question mark (?), final falling pitch with a period (.) and final flat pitch with an underscore (\_). I do not distinguish symbolically between, say, “mild rise” versus “high rise” (symbolized as , and ? in the Jeffersonian system), because these distinctions do not appear to be relevant to the practices being examined. Further symbolic conventions will be introduced when more complex intonation contours are discussed (see Chapter 6 especially).

### 1.4.3 Building collections

For each of the focal practices analyzed in the thesis, I systematically searched my data for other-initiations of repair containing the relevant feature(s) in their linguistic design. This is important for the reliability and robustness of the analysis offered (see below on distributional evidence and quantification). This extraction was done over a series of manual “data runs” through portions of the data set, supplemented when possible by standard corpus linguistic key word searches of the transcripts. I started broadly and then refined the collection as my inductive understanding of the practice developed. Indeed, part of the analysis is providing grounds for the inclusion or exclusion of each instance from the collection.

One critical criterion which should be made explicit here is that the utterances were, indeed, other-initiations of repair. Many of the forms which can be used as OIs can, in other contexts, deliver distinct (although perhaps related) actions (see Schegloff, 1997a). For instance, a “who” produced with final falling pitch (“who.”) *can* be used as an OI (see Chapter 3), but it can also be used as a go ahead response following an action like “guess who I saw this weekend”, and as a topic developing question following an announcement like “some people came over for dinner last night”. Interesting as these formally similar utterances are, they are seldom mentioned and always excluded from the analysis.

#### 1.4.4 Interactional analysis

The analysis of interaction follows principles established within Conversation Analysis (CA) (see for instance Wootton, 1989; Schegloff, 1996a; Heritage, 2010a). The central tenet of CA is that analytic claims should be grounded in what is observable in the data—in the participants' conduct and how it displays an understanding of their actions. This involves a sequential analysis of the talk and other conduct which precedes and follows the interactional moment in question. In documenting the general (or generic) properties of a particular practice (see 1.3 above), this amounts to examining where it is *deployed* and how it is *treated* across a collection of cases. As an illustration, consider the practice of beginning a turn with an address term, mentioned above. Lerner (2003) shows that this practice is regularly deployed in situations where the named person is not, or may not be, available (e.g. when they are engaged in some other activity or when a prior attempt at addressing them had failed). He also shows that overwhelmingly the person who is named in fact responds, often turning their gaze to the speaker soon after the address term is produced. An analysis of both the deployment and treatment of this practice across instances of its use thus provides strong evidence that it does indeed select the named person as the recipient of the incipient turn.

A second principle in CA methodology is that analysis should proceed on a case by case basis with inductive generalizations being formed and tested along the way. This insures that the analysis is both sensitive to the particular details of each individual case and general enough to account for what unites them. This involves exploring the boundaries of both what the practice is (and isn't) and what it does (and doesn't do) (Schegloff, 1996a; 1997a). Similarly, when cases are found which don't fit with the proposed analysis, these "deviant cases" are afforded extra attention, not brushed under the statistical rug. In some cases, this leads to refined analysis which better accounts for the aggregate of instances (see Schegloff, 1968). In other cases, the instance is shown to be only superficially deviant. The participants display that the "rules" have been "broken", and hence orient to the normal (and normative)

use of the practice.<sup>8</sup>

A third principle is that analysis should, whenever possible, be comparative. At each interactional juncture, there are typically multiple possible actions which could be relevantly done next and each of these could be done in different ways (employing different practices and/or resources). For instance, in responding to a yes-no question a speaker must choose whether they will confirm, *dis*-confirm, claim not to know the answer, etc., and then how they will design that action (“of course”, “yes”, “sure”, a repetition of the question, etc.; Stivers, 2011, *inter alia*). In a similar manner, if a participant is having trouble with the reference to Bob in “Bob stopped by this afternoon”, they must choose whether they will initiate repair, and then if so how (“Bob?”, “who’s Bob?”, “who?”, “who did?”, etc.). Ultimately, then, understanding the import of a particular practice requires comparing it with its *pragmatic alternatives* and locating its position within the broader system (or paradigm) of choices available (see Sidnell, 2009; Enfield et al, 2013 for recent relevant discussion; see also Lerner, 2004, p. 180-1; 2013; on “slot alternatives”).

#### 1.4.5 Linguistic analysis

Every other-initiation of repair is linguistically complex, constructed through a variety of different forms (or resources), operating at different levels of linguistic organization. For instance, an “understanding check” can be prefaced by “oh” (“oh Michael Stipe?”) or not (the example under Method 5 above); it can be embedded in a clausal structure (“you mean Michael Stipe?”) or not; it can be framed with repetition (“Michael Stipe is?”) or not; it can be produced with rising final pitch (vs. falling, flat, etc.); it can be produced quietly (vs. loudly); and so on. For each practice considered in this thesis, I attempt to determine which of these linguistic features are “part of” the practice and which are not. In part this involves comparing OIs which differ only slightly in their design. If the focal cases can be shown to be deployed and treated differently, this provides strong evidence that the contrasting feature is a constitutive element of the practice. As much as possible I describe the bounds of the

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<sup>8</sup> This does not mean, however, that *every* instance in a collection must necessarily confirm the analysis being offered. There will almost undoubtedly be some small number of unexplainable disconfirmatory cases (Robinson, 2007). The reason: “Participants do not have to *behaviorally* orient to rules (and thus provide data-internal evidence) in order to *understand* rules and their accountable implications, and this is just “tough methodological luck” for conversation analysts” (p. 71).

linguistic variability within and across the practices I investigate. This is an important part of zeroing in on the particular “tools” used by participants to initiate repair (as compared to describing classes of related tools).

#### 1.4.6 Quantification and coding

Basic quantitative techniques are often used to provide distributional weight to the analytic claims being made. This will serve as an important source of evidence in arguing that an OI practice offers a *particular* diagnosis of the trouble. It should be noted here that at its heart CA is a qualitative methodology. Some practitioners go so far as to argue that it is unlikely that quantitative methods can be meaningfully and rigorously applied to this type of data (see Schegloff 1993 for instance). However, a growing body of research demonstrates that quantitative techniques can be rigorously combined with CA methods, both in “applied” CA (Heritage et al., 2007) and in “pure” (basic) CA research (Robinson, 2007; Stivers, 2010; Rossano, 2013). The core requirements are that coding be based on analytically grounded (qualitatively understood) categories and that the collection building process is systematic (see above).

### **1.5 Overview of the thesis**

Combining linguistic analysis with conversation analytic methods, this thesis studies the “diagnostic” properties of some of the most commonly used other-initiations of repair (OIs) in English conversation. In chapter 2, I introduce a set of analytic and methodological tools for uncovering these properties and apply them to “huh?”, “hm?”, and similar OIs (Method 1 in Schegloff, Jefferson and Sacks’ taxonomy, see section 1.2 above). I provide a body of evidence that these OIs offer no diagnosis of the trouble whatsoever. The trouble-source can be the prior unit of talk as whole or some unspecified part of it. The trouble-type can vary from hearing what was said, to understanding it, to believing or otherwise accepting it. These all-purpose OIs serve as a useful point of comparison for practices considered in the subsequent chapters, all of which are in some way “tuned” to the trouble they signal.

In chapters 3 through 5, I examine requests for repair built from question words, either on their own (“who”, “where”) or framed by cohesive ties to the troublesome talk (“who did”, “been where”, “he what”; Methods 2 and 3 in SJS’s taxonomy). I argue that through

other aspects of their linguistic design, these OIs subdivide into a number of diagnostically distinct practices. First, I show that the OI's final pitch movement is consequential. With final falling pitch, a "who", "been where", etc. requests specification of a pronoun or some other "indexical" reference. With final rising pitch, however, it signals trouble in hearing or recognizing a name or some other contextually less dependent form. Prosody thus delimits both the source and nature of the trouble (Chapter 3). Second, I show that the falling-intoned cases can both "echo" the trouble-source unit ("I bought it for him" ← "for who."), and grammatically expand it ("I bought it already" ← "for who."). While in each case the trouble-source is a referent which is (wrongly) assumed to be contextually available, in the latter it is something which wasn't linguistically encoded. The cohesive design of the repair request is thus also diagnostically consequential (Chapter 4). Finally, I show that for some dialects of (southern) American English, "do what?" (final rising pitch) does not cohesively tie to the prior talk, nor does it restrict the trouble-source (Chapter 5). These and other "opaque" repair requests suggest that Method 3 practices can fossilize into Method 1 practices ("huh?", "what?", etc.)

Chapter 6 turns to OIs which repeat the source of trouble (SJS's Method 4). A recurrent finding in the literature is that repetition-OIs can be used to manage a wide array of troubles—from hearing the repeated talk, to understanding its sense or its action import, to doubting or accepting it. This chapter shows that when a repetition-OI is produced with a high rise-fall intonation contour it unambiguously claims that the repeated talk is unacceptable, i.e. "wrong" and in need of correction.

Chapter 7 analyses understanding checks, the final Method in SJS's taxonomy. It argues that by adding "you mean" to a candidate understanding ("you mean John?" compared with "John?") a recipient signals that it has become separated from the troublesome unit of talk. By indexing its delayed, non-default positioning, this practice aids the prior speaker in locating the source of trouble. A variety of similar practices are collected together to suggest that this type of positional "tuning" is widespread among OIs across both methods and languages.

Chapter 8 concludes with a summary of the major finds of this thesis.



## 2 | Open-Class Repair Requests

### 2.1 Introduction

Other-initiations of repair like “huh?”, “what?”, and “pardon?” signal trouble with the prior talk, but offer no linguistic clues as to what is causing it or how it may be fixed. This makes them extremely versatile (for the person with the trouble) and at times rather tricky to respond to (for the person whose talk is causing it). In this chapter, I examine this diagnostically unrestricted or “open” class of repair requests (Drew, 1997; Schegloff, 2004) with the following aims:

- To introduce the analytic tools through which other-initiations of repair (OIs) and their diagnostic properties can be examined (see Chapter 1). This will serve as a core methodological framework for the remainder of this thesis.
- To provide a point of comparison for the OIs discussed in the subsequent chapters. Most other practices *do* diagnose the trouble in some way.
- To provide a body of evidence that “huh?”, “what?”, etc. are indeed diagnostically open. A number of the phenomena mentioned below have not, to my knowledge, been documented in the literature (at least in the context of this class of OI). These include “mixed” repairs (section 2.4), “rejected” and “revised” repairs (section 2.6), and “upgraded” OIs (section 2.5).
- To offer an incremental refinement to our understanding of open-class repair requests. These practices are sometimes treated as if they necessarily signal trouble with the *entirety* of the prior unit of talk. While they can, and often do, the data make clear that the trouble can also be located in just one part of it (a word, a reference, etc.). This is one important sense in which they are diagnostically open.

This chapter is organized as follows. I begin by describing the practice(s) involved in doing an open-class repair request (or OCRR). I then consider exactly what is meant in claiming these repair requests are diagnostically open. The bulk of the chapter offers a body of evidence in support for this account.



## 2.2 The practice(s): Doing an open-class repair request

To do an open-class repair request one must utter (1) the right words, (2) in the right way, (3) in the right context. Let's begin with the third criterion. A plethora of language and communication research has demonstrated that there is seldom (if ever) a one to one mapping between the linguistic form of an utterance and the speech act (or social action) it delivers. Context, in various forms at various levels, plays a critical role in determining what an utterance does (see Schegloff 2007b; Heritage, 2012a; Levinson, 2013 for recent discussion). In this case, a key level of context is the *sequential positioning* of the utterance—where within the “flow” of conversation it is produced. The place for doing OCRRs is immediately following a co-participant's turn or shortly thereafter (see the next section). In other positions the same linguistic form may deliver a different action. For example, while a “huh?” can deliver an OCRR, when said following one's *own* talk it does not. It pursues a response (Schegloff, 1997a). The following extract illustrates.

**Extract 1** [taken from Schegloff, 1997a, p. 509]

1    A:    you want a wing  
 2            (0.2)  
 3    C:    Melodie's h[aving marshmallow soup  
 4 → A:                   [huh?  
 5            (1.0)  
 6    B:    yeah

Prior to the data shown here, speaker B has indicated that she wants something from the table. In line 1, speaker A checks if it is a piece of chicken. B does not immediately respond (see line 2) and A expands her turn with “huh?” (line 4), pursuing a response. Following another gap, B then confirms that this is what she had requested (line 6). This “huh?” was neither deployed nor understood to be doing an OCRR, precisely because of its positioning.

But of course position is not everything. Only certain types of utterances can do open-class repair requests. One must first use the right lexico-syntactic resource(s). According to the literature, the set of options is quite wide, including “huh”, “what”, “hey”, “ey”, “hm”, “mm”, “what's that”, “excuse me”, “pardon”, “I beg your pardon”, “pardon me”, “sorry”, and “I'm sorry” (but see below). Second, the utterance must be produced with the right prosody, specifically the right intonation contour. OCRRs of all lexico-syntactic (and

phonetic) varieties are overwhelmingly produced with a final rising pitch movement (see Curl, 2002, p. 178; and also Drew, 1997, p. 73; Schegloff, 1997a, p. 506; Robinson, 2006, p. 148-9; Enfield et al., 2013). In many if not all cases this is a constitutive feature of these practices. The same lexico-grammatical resources produced with different prosody can perform a different action, even when produced in next position. Consider the following example.

**Extract 2** [Callhome-4702, 6:01]

1 B: ...and this new girl singer and she pla@ys tru@mpet  
 2 (0.4)  
 3 A: no::=  
 4 B: =I've known her for years as a trumpet player:  
 5 she [went to all the music schools here  
 6 A: [(she)  
 7 (.)  
 8 → A: huh.  
 9 (.)  
 10 A: she's [a German ch]ick  
 11 B: [and sh:- ]  
 12 (0.5)  
 13→ B: huh?

Speaker B is an American musician living in Germany. He's telling his friend back home about a colleague who, surprisingly, can both sing and play trumpet (see lines 1-3). In lines 4-5, B continues with some additional information, and his friend (speaker A) responds in next position with "huh" (line 8). Critically, he produces this utterance with *falling* pitch, in this case falling 9 semitones (ST)<sup>1</sup> over its production. Neither participant treats this as a request for repair. A asks a topic-pursuing question (line 10), and in overlap, B moves to continue his telling (line 11). A's "huh" is instead hearable as claiming that what B has just said (lines 4-5) is interesting, or at least informing (see Wilkinson & Kitzinger, 2006 on reaction tokens). Contrast this with what happens in the very next turn. In line 13, speaker B says "huh", but produces this with *rising* pitch (13 ST in this case). As we'll see below, this *is* treated as requesting a repair of the preceding talk (line 10). A difference in pitch thus results in, or at least contributes to, a difference in action.

We see the same sort of "switch" in action with other lexico-syntactic items as well. While "sorry?" (rising pitch) delivers a request for repair, "sorry." (falling pitch) delivers an

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<sup>1</sup> A semitone (ST) is equivalent to the difference in pitch between two keys on a keyboard (so 12ST equals 1 octave). See Chapter 1.4.2

apology (Robinson, 2006). In other cases, the change in action is more subtle. As we will see repeatedly throughout this thesis, prosody can distinguish different *practices* of other-initiation. Consider for instance “what” and “what’s that”. Both with final rising and falling pitch these lexico-syntactic items can request repair (when produced in next position). However, whereas “what?” and “what’s that?” are open class, “what.” (extract 3 below) and “what’s that.” (extract 4) are significantly more restricted.

**Extract 3** [Chicken Dinner, 13:36]

1 A: it's getting too mushy I don't know  
 2 (0.7)  
 3 → B: what.  
 4 (1.4)  
 5 A: Wings of War ((*a television program*))

**Extract 4** [SBC-58, 10:44] ((“...” = affected Italian accent))

1 A: you want mozzarella  
 2 (0.8)  
 3 → B: what's that.  
 4 (0.4)  
 5 A: “mozzarella” that's that white cheese that gets  
 6 all stringy and melted

Both these repair requests locate something specific in the prior talk as the source of trouble, namely a reference to an object (“it” in extract 3; “mozzarella” in 4). They also specify the nature of the trouble with it. “What.” (falling 2ST in this case) claims that this reference is vague, and requests that it be specified (Egbert et al., 2009). “What’s that.” (falling 4ST on “that”) claims that the *kind* of object being referred to is unfamiliar, and requests that it be explained (Chapter 5). Unlike “what?” and “what’s that?”, these repair requests do a considerable amount of work to diagnose the trouble being signaled.

In sum, the practice for doing an OCRR consists (minimally) of saying “huh”, “what”, etc., with final rising pitch in the next position following the troublesome talk. A question often raised in the literature is to what degree these linguistic variants are functionally equivalent and indeed if they are even open class at all. In the coda to this chapter (section 2.9) I will discuss two practices—“sorry?” in English and some prosodic variants of “was?” (“what?”) and “bitte?” (“pardon?”) in German—which have been argued to delimit the type of trouble being signaled in some way (Robinson, 2006; Selting, 1996). The methodological

and theoretical implications of these not-quite-open repair requests are significant. For the bulk of what follows, however, I will follow tradition and bracket out this issue. That is, I will not differentiate between lexico-syntactic and phonetic-prosodic variants within this class of repair requests.

My analysis is based on a collection of some 250 cases taken both from my data (see Chapter 1) and from the literature. My aims here are to contribute to our *qualitative* understanding of OCRRs and the repair sequences they generate. Consequently, in contrast to the following chapters, I was not particularly systematic in building my collection and I make no real claims about the representativeness of the phenomena I consider. Undoubtedly much could be learned from a more systematic, quantitative study of OCRRs, particularly once differences in their linguistic form are taken into account.

### **2.3 The Argument: What it means to be diagnostically “open”**

When one participant (speaker B) initiates repair, the job of the trouble-source speaker (speaker A) is to say something which resolves the trouble, allowing the conversation to resume. This involves working out *what* is causing the trouble, *why* it is causing trouble, and *how* this trouble might actually be remedied. In saying that an other-initiation (OI) like “huh?”, “what?”, etc. is diagnostically “open”, the claim is that its linguistic design provides no help in answering these three questions. To diagnose B’s trouble, speaker A must rely exclusively on the positioning of the OI (see below), together with contextual features and general pragmatic principles (see Drew, 1997; Sidnell, 2010; Svennevig, 2008; among others). In this section, I will place some conceptual bones on this initial characterization of diagnostic “openness”.

#### 2.3.1 Delimiting the source of trouble

A critical activity which participants engage in during repair activities is locating the source of trouble (Schegloff et al, 1977). To gain an analytic handle on how this is achieved, it is useful to think in terms of the “search clues” which speaker B provides speaker A—how their OI helps specify where A should look to find the trouble-source. Two related but distinct questions need to be answered. The first is one of “reach”: How far back into the conversational history must A look to find the trouble-source? The second question is one of

“scope”: How much of what’s been said (or not said) is causing the trouble? The first question, as we shall see, is largely answered by the sequential positioning of B’s OI, the latter by its linguistic design.

Most previous research on open-class repair requests (and OIs more generally) has taken the prior turn at talk as the relevant locus for answering both the reach and scope questions. In effect, the claim is that OCRRs instruct speaker A to limit their search to their prior turn. A representative example of this is the following:

[OCRRs] indicate that there has been trouble with the just-preceding turn of another, but they leave unspecified what in the preceding turn was the source of the trouble and what the nature of the trouble is/was—hearing, understanding, alignment, etc. (Schegloff & Lerner, 2009, p. 101, emphasis added).<sup>2</sup>

While such turn-based accounts have proved extremely powerful, both theoretically and empirically, there is a recent line of research which argues for a more refined analysis. Robinson & Kevoe-Feldman (2010) suggest that OCRRs reach not across the prior turn as a whole, but only to the immediately prior *turn constructional unit* (TCU; see Sacks et al., 1974 and Chapter 1.2). Robinson (2013a) develops and tests this analysis by systematically investigating OCRRs which occur after turns consisting of multiple TCUs (e.g. “Okay. And your age.”; see extract 10 below). Across a large collection of such cases he found that overwhelmingly, the trouble-source is restricted to the immediately prior TCU (“and your age”). Earlier TCUs in the turn were seldom repaired, either alone or in combination with the contiguous TCU. Moreover, upon examining deviant cases—those in which an earlier TCU *is* (also) repaired—Robinson found evidence that it is not the prior TCU per se which is being repaired, but the prior *action*. When an action is done across multiple TCUs, the repair may indeed encompass all of them, and hence the prior action as a whole.<sup>3</sup>

The question of reach is thus answered largely by norms governing when B-speakers initiate repair. They should not (and overwhelming do not) wait, but do so immediately, as the next unit of talk following the possible completion of the TCU/action in (or from) which the trouble arose. This contiguous positioning provides the participants with a pair of

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
<sup>2</sup> See also Drew, 1997, p. 73; Schegloff, 2000b, p. 223; among others. In some cases, the relevant unit of analysis is taken to be the prior *utterance*. See for instance Clark & Schaefer, 1987, p. 29; Schegloff 1997a, p.507; Enfield et al., 2013, p. 233.

<sup>3</sup> Robinson (2013a) notes that the misconception that OCRRs target the prior *turn* results from a skewing in conversational data. Most turns at talk consist of one TCU and most actions are done in one TCU.

complementary, coordinated assumptions to aid in locating the trouble: if the speaker B initiates repair contiguously, then speaker A can limit their search to the prior TCU/action (see Chapter 7 below). This account of the reach of OCRRs seems to largely hold for my collection, though I will not address it explicitly here. My analysis will instead focus on the question of scope—on how much (or how little) of the prior TCU/action is the source of B's trouble. The maximum scope of the trouble, as we have seen, is the prior TCU/action as a whole. We have yet to consider the minimum.

Robinson & Kevoe-Feldman (2010) suggest that “practices of other-initiation of repair can be differentiated in terms of whether or not they locate an entire TCU, and thus an entire action, as the repairable, or merely one part of a TCU/action” (p. 233.). To illustrate this distinction they contrast two repetition-based other-initiations – those which repeat a part of the prior TCU/action (Partial Repeats) and those which repeat the prior TCU/action as a whole (Full Repeats). They convincingly argue that the former unambiguously signal partial-scope troubles, the latter full-scope troubles. The authors recognize, of course, that this distinction extends far beyond just these two practices. To the set of partial-scope OIs they add “who?”, “where?” and other bare question words with final-rising pitch/intonation (p. 233). We can also add “what.” (with final falling pitch; see extract 3) and “what’s that.” (extract 4) and many of the practices discussed in the subsequent chapters. To the set of *full-scope* other-initiations they add “what do you mean” and—critically—“huh?”, “what?” and other open-class repair requests (p. 233, 254).

In this chapter, I will argue that this analysis of OCRRS is not quite right. A “huh?” or “what?” does not locate the prior TCU/action as the *source* of trouble, but as the general domain of trouble. Although B's problem may be with this TCU/action as a whole (full-scope), it may also be with some unspecified part of it (partial-scope). OCRRs are *variable-scope* OIs, not full-scope OIs, subsuming Robinson & Kevoe-Feldman's (2010) dichotomy rather than fitting within it. Figure 2.1 portrays this distinction visually (in section 2.7 I will return to this difference between Full Repeats and OCRRs).



**Figure 2.1:** “Huh?”, “what?”, etc. (dotted oval) do not specify the scope of the trouble. They are variable-scope other-initiations of repair.

This variable-scope analysis of OCRRs is by no means new. Some accounts either imply or explicitly state that the trouble may be with a part of what was said (see the Lerner & Schegloff quotation above; and especially Schegloff, 2004, p. 107). Nevertheless, the analysis by Robinson & Kevoe-Feldman (2010) and others in the literature suggest that a systematic argument for this diagnostic property is in order.

### 2.3.2 Delimiting the type of trouble

Diagnosing a trouble involves not only locating its source, but determining its type and selecting an appropriate method of repair—it’s of little use repeating a word if your coparticipant doesn’t know what it means. Again, the linguistic design of an other-initiation can aid in these tasks. The kind and specificity of this delimiting work varies from practice to practice, as the following chapters and research cited there demonstrate. Some OIs delimit the nature of the trouble, leaving A to work out how to fix it. Others go further and request specific methods of repair. “Huh?”, “what?” and other OCRRs, it is argued, do neither. While signaling a hearing problem (or requesting repetition) may be their canonical use, most research has recognized it as one among many.<sup>4</sup> Following this line of research, I will argue that “huh?”, “what?”, etc. do not specify the trouble-type or the repair-method (but again, see section 2.9 for an important caveat).

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<sup>4</sup> See for instance the Schegloff & Lerner quotation section 2.3.1 above; Drew, 1997; Schegloff, 2004; Robinson, 2006; Enfield et al, 2013. For claims to the contrary see Clark & Schaefer, 1987, p. 29. For an attempt at reconciliation see Svennevig, 2008, p. 345-6.

### 2.3.3 Summary

Building on prior research this chapter argues that “huh?”, “what?”, etc. are diagnostically “open” or unrestricted. While they are sequentially positioned to delimit the domain of trouble (the prior TCU/action), their linguistic design does nothing to delimit the scope of the trouble, its type, or the repair method which should be used to fix it. In the following sections I will evidence this account by analyzing how participants treat these repair requests in everyday conversation. I will show that both in the aggregate and within particular instances, they display *their* understanding that these repair requests are diagnostically open.

## **2.4 Evidence from the repair proper**

### 2.4.1 Introduction

By examining how something (an utterance, a gesture, a silence, etc.) is subsequently treated, one can often see the interactional work it has done. Beginning with individual cases, and then moving to collections of similar cases, patterns can emerge which provide crucial insight into the generic, type-level practices which underlie the specific, token-level occurrences in the data. Applied to the present study, this methodological principle—the so-called “next turn proof procedure” (Sacks et al., 1974, p. 728)—suggests that an examination of the *repairs* received by an other-initiation (OI) can provide evidence of its diagnostic properties. And indeed, across many OI practices one finds the following pattern: A-speakers overwhelmingly offer a diagnostically “fitted” repair; that is, one which offers a diagnosis of the trouble which is consistent with the diagnosis offered by the OI (e.g. a specification of the trouble-source in a response to a request for specification; see Chapters 3-5). Equally importantly, repairs which are *not* fitted to the OI are not only less common, they are typically (1) done for a reason, e.g. A cannot or will not offer a fitted repair; and/or (2) they are treated as abnormal or inappropriate (see section 2.7 for further discussion).

In this section I will show that this pattern of diagnostic fittedness holds for “huh?”, “what?”, and other open-class repair requests. A-speakers routinely offer repairs which vary considerably along all three of the parameters discussed above—the scope of the trouble, the type of trouble, and the repair method employed. This (lack of a) pattern in repairs is consistent with the argument that these repair requests do not delimit the trouble in any



way. A-speakers produce such a wide array of repairs precisely because B-speakers use OCRs to *signal* such a wide array of troubles. My analysis in this section focuses on the repairs themselves. Their subsequent treatment, including issues of their “success” and “failure”, will be discussed later.

### 2.4.2 Hearing repairs

The most common way of responding to a “huh?”, “what?”, etc. is to say again what was said before. By lexically repeating<sup>5</sup> their prior talk, speaker A “claims that it was both understandable and “appropriate” in its original form, and thereby strongly delimits the trouble type to that of the repair-initiator’s hearing” (Robinson, 2006, p. 146). Critically, however, from case to case A-speakers differ in *how much* of their prior TCU they repeat, and consequently how much they assume B hasn’t heard. The following two extracts illustrate. In each case, A asks B a question; B requests repair with a “huh?” (marked in a huh?); and A offers a repetition (marked with highlighting).

#### **Extract 5** [FreeLunch-3-18-09, 8:18]

1 A: did you get into M S O  
 2 (0.6)  
 3 B: huh?  
 4 (0.5)  
 5 A: M S O  
 6 (1.1)  
 7 B: I don't know

#### **Extract 6** [Callhome-4432, 9:23]

1 A: are you going [to camp  
 2 B: [xx  
 4 (0.2)  
 5 B: huh?  
 6 (0.4)  
 7 A: are you going to camp  
 8 (.)  
 9 B: I don't know about that either hhh

---

<sup>5</sup> While it is clear from the transcripts that A reissues the same lexical items and the same syntax, the recordings make equally clear that they do so with *different* phonetics-prosody. These phonetic-prosodic differences can be interactionally consequential, both in repetition repairs (see Curl 2004; 2005; Chapter 3) and repetition OIs (see Chapter 6). It is precisely this feature which I am indexing with the label “lexical repetition”. However, I will typically use the less cumbersome “repetition” when referring to methods which share this gross feature.

In extract 5, A repeats only his reference to M S O (an internship program). By “focusing” his repair on this portion of his prior TCU/action, he locates it specifically as the source of B’s (putative) hearing trouble (see Schegloff, 2004, p. 107). The rest (“did you get into ...”), he tacitly treats as unproblematic. He presupposes that B has heard these words, understood what they meant, and what action he was doing with them (i.e. asking a question; see Robinson & Kevoe-Feldman, 2010 p. 238).<sup>6</sup> In contrast, in extract 6 speaker A repeats his prior question in full (“are you going to camp”). By not syntactically focusing on any part of this TCU, he makes fewer assumptions about what precisely B has (and hasn’t) heard. A full repeat functions as a generalized hearing-repair, simultaneously addressing anything up to and including a total lack of (adequate) hearing.

This distinction between partial-scope (extract 5) and full-scope (extract 6) repairs is critical to the argument that “huh?”, “what?”, etc., are variable-scope practices of other-initiation. It is thus worthwhile dwelling on a few less straightforward cases. Consider extract 7 first.

**Extract 7** [Field-VI-B-2-7, 1:08]

1 B: now wh- what's his wife ca- (0.3) [name  
 2 A: [Gwen  
 3 (0.4)  
 4 B: [sorry?  
 5 (0.2)  
 6 A: [Gwen  
 7 (0.2)  
 8 B: .hhhh Gwen

In the prior examples speaker A’s prior TCU was clausal (“did you get into M S O” and “are you going to the camp”). In extract 7 it is a single word (“Gwen”) and hence a less segmentable linguistic unit. This minimalism strongly delimits the possible scope of B’s trouble, making the partial- vs. full-scope distinction largely irrelevant (but see the discussion of problems of presupposition and omission below).

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<sup>6</sup> This analysis draws heavily on Robinson & Kevoe-Feldman’s (2010) analysis of partial repeats used as repair *initiations*. Evoking the (Neo-)Gricean principle of quantity “What you do not say is not the case.” (Levinson, 2000), they suggest that “What the practice of repair initiation does not locate as troubling is not troubling for the person initiating repair.” (Robinson & Kevoe-Feldman, p. 238ff). I am making the same kind of argument here: “What is not repaired is treated by the repairing speaker as not troubling the initiating speaker”.

The hearing repairs in extracts 8 and 9 below further problematize this distinction. As in extract 5 above, an OCRR is met with a repetition of something less than the prior TCU-as-a-whole (see the **bolded** items).

**Extract 8** [FreeLunch--4-22-02, 2:45] *B's name is Louis*

1 ((Speaker B drops his keys on the table))  
 2 (0.7)  
 3 A: got your car **Louis**  
 4 (0.7)  
 5 B: **what?**  
 6 (0.3)  
 7 A: got your car  
 8 (0.2)  
 9 B: yeah

**Extract 9** [CallHome-4838, 0:18] *B's nick name is Snap*

1 A: [ @ @ @  
 2 B: [ @ @ @ @ @ .hhh[hh  
 3 A: [ .hhhh **so how's your Snap life @**  
 4 (0.3)  
 5 B: **huh?**  
 6 A: .hh **how's your Snap life**  
 7 (0.3)  
 8 B: .hhhh oh my Snap life is turning into ...

While these may look like partial-scope hearing repairs, they result from fundamentally different interactional processes. Speaker A is redoing their prior action as a whole, but simply “dispensing” with elements which are no longer relevant (Schegloff, 2004). In extract 8, the turn-final address term “Louis” is no longer required, as B has displayed his reciprocity by requesting repair (p. 110-112). Similarly, in 9 the initial “so” had connected A’s inquiry with what had come before it, but B’s OCRR has now replaced this prior talk as its “proximate predecessor” (p. 99-102). The “omission” of these item from the repair turn are thus driven not by A’s analysis of B’s trouble, but by the change in sequential context.<sup>7</sup> They are full-scope, not partial-scope hearing repairs.

In sum, it is true that A-speakers often treat “huh?”, “what?”, etc. as signaling hearing troubles, repeating or otherwise saying again what they’d said before (Schegloff, 2004).

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<sup>7</sup> That being said, sometimes these items *are* retained, and for repair-related purposes (see the discussion of “and” in extract 19 below). These choices are not automatic, as Schegloff (2004) stressed.

However, this does not mean that OCRRs necessarily “presuppose no hearing” as some have suggested (e.g. Clark & Schaefer 1987, p. 29). On the one hand, A-speakers sometimes “focus” their hearing-repairs on specific components of their prior TCU, treating B’s trouble as a *partial* hearing problem only (see extract 5 above; and 30, 32, 36 below). On the other hand, A-speakers sometimes offer repairs which address troubles *other* than hearing. It is to these cases which we now turn.

### 2.4.3 Understanding repairs

Rather than repeating what they’ve said, A-speakers sometimes specify, clarify, or explain what they *meant*. With these methods of repair, they diagnose B’s trouble as one of understanding. In some cases, like extract 10 below, A’s repair addresses the general understandability of their prior TCU/action-as-a-whole (a full-scope understanding repair; see Robinson & Kevoe-Feldman, 2010; Drew, 1997). In other cases, like extracts 11-13, the repair “focuses” on a single, specifiable part of their prior TCU, treating the remainder, and the action being done, as unproblematic (a partial-scope understanding repair).

The A-speaker in extract 10 is asking B some questions as part of a survey (see lines 1-3). In line 6 he asks for his address and then in line 9 for his age. It is this follow up question, which B treats as problematic, requesting repair with an OCRR (“pardon?”).

#### **Extract 10** [CallFriend-s6933, 0:11]

1 A: and what I was going to do was ask you a few questions  
 2 they all have numbers and names in 'em .hhhh I mean uh- words  
 3 in 'em that- that are commonly u:sed  
 4 (0.2)  
 5 B: uh huh ((*confirmation*))  
 6 A: so: (.) what is your address  
 7 (0.6)  
 8 B: uh twenty six oh three Lake Circle  
 9 A: m kay and your (.) age  
 10 (1.0)  
 11 B: pardon?  
 12 (0.2)  
 13 A: how old are you  
 14 (0.2)  
 15 B: oh.=I'm sixty one

A common feature of next questions is that they linguistically cohere to (tie to, exploit) their prior (Heritage, 2010b; Mazeland, 2013). In this case, “and your age”, presupposes the questioning-frame of “what is your address” (line 6), re-enforcing this linguistic and action dependency with an “and” preface (Heritage & Sorjonen, 1994). With his repair, “how old are you”, speaker A reformulates his question.<sup>8</sup> He shifts from an (implicit) “what age” format to a more familiar (less formal) “how old” format and makes the questioning component explicit. This design both clarifies the action being delivered and is less dependent on the preceding context for its interpretation (see Robinson & Kevoe-Feldman’s, 2010 p. 239 for relevant discussion). A treats B’s OCRR as signaling an understanding problem, not a hearing problem.

The same is true for extract 11 below. Here, however, speaker A clarifies only a single, specifiable component of what she’s said (rather than her prior TCU/action-as-a-whole). The participants are talking about a man who has just moved back to town. In line 3, A receipts and checks on something that B has said about him (“oh he’ll walk”). Speaker B requests repair with an OCRR (“huh?”, line 6).

**Extract 11** [CallFriend-s6578, 16:10]

- 1 B: I saw him a couple times walking early in the morning  
 2 as I was going to work [uh  
 3 A: [oh he'll walk  
 4 (0.5)  
 5 B: huh?  
 6 (0.2)  
 7 A: like exercise  
 8 (.)  
 9 B: yeah

With “like exercise”, A clarifies which sense of “walk” she had intended: a form of exercise, not transportation (a misreading not entirely unlikely, given the prior context). By focusing her repair on this verbal component specifically, she tacitly treats the rest of her prior TCU as unproblematic – the person this activity is being ascribed to (“he”), its temporal/aspectual construal (“will”), and the action this TCU-as-a-whole is delivering (the “oh”, however, is “dispensed with” due to the change in sequential context; Schegloff, 2004).

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<sup>8</sup> Note that he does not repair the first TCU/action in this turn, the receipt “m kay” (Robinson 2013a; and section 2.3.1 above) and that he “dispenses” with the turn initial “and” (see Schegloff, 2004; and 4.2 above).

Extract 12 below provides a second example of a partial-scope understanding repair. Speaker A is talking to her son, speaker C, about the success of Mississippi State College in a recent football championship. At line 3 she cuts off her turn to C to check a detail with her husband (speaker B) off phone. He doesn't respond (line 4) and she revises her question (line 5). B now responds with an OCRR ("what?", line 9).

**Extract 12** [CallFriend-s6973, 25:20] *B's name is Don*

1 A: .hhhh well I think Don had turned the T V on like two weeks ago  
 2 and .hhhh (0.6) they-  
 3 Don had they just finished playing that game ((*off phone to B*))  
 4 (2.1)  
 5 or were they just announcing that they were going to  
 6 be: (.) in the finals  
 7 (1.0)  
 8 A: [(that)-  
 9 B: [what?  
 10 A: .hhh Mississippi State  
 11 (0.6)  
 12 B: they lost (in the semifinal)

In both versions of her question speaker A had referred to Mississippi State with a pronoun ("they"). Her repair ("Mississippi State") specifies this reference, treating this in particular as the source of B's trouble. All other elements of the prior TCU(s), and the question(s) they deliver, are tacitly treated as heard and understood.

Extract 13 below illustrates a third and final example. Speaker A has been telling the group about his complicated computer password. At line 1, he asks speaker C (Louis) about his password. Following a short sequence (not shown), he then asks speaker B (Emiko) about hers (line 2). She responds with an OCRR ("hm?").

**Extract 13** [FreeLunch--4-16-04, 8:52] *B's name is Emiko*

1 A: Louis how complicated is your password  
 ---10 seconds removed---  
 2 A: is yours Emiko  
 3 (0.5)  
 4 [(0.3)  
 5 [(*B turns gaze to A*)  
 6 B: hm?  
 7 (0.5) / ((*mutual gaze*))  
 8 A: complicated  
 9 ((*B shakes head laterally*))

A's question to B ("is yours Emiko") cohesively ties to his earlier question to C ("how complicated is your password", line 1). "Yours" indexes the reference to a password, and "is" the assessment term. A's repair, "complicated", addresses the second of these items, treating all other aspects of the question as unproblematic (though the address term "Emiko" is dispensed with, cf. extract 8 above). As in the previous extract, this repair specifies something deemed necessary for understanding the trouble-source TCU/action. Here, however, it was something implicit in, or assumed by, this TCU (i.e. not linguistically encoded; see chapter 4 for further discussion).

Repairs like those in extracts 10-13 diagnose understanding problems, often due (in part) to the sequential context in which the prior TCU/action was produced (see Drew 1997; Robinson & Kevoe-Feldman, 2010). In some cases, A figures that B's problem is making sense of what they've said /done as a whole (extract 10). In other cases, A figures the problem resides only in a single, specifiable part of it—an ambiguous term (extract 11), a vague reference (extract 12), something presupposed (extract 13), etc. (see also extract 28 below). That A-speakers routinely offer both types of understanding repairs provides evidence that OCRRs can be used to signal both types of understanding troubles. OCRRs are variable-scope repair initiators, marking out a general domain of trouble only. We now turn to our third and final gross category of trouble-type.

#### 2.4.4 Acceptability repairs

Faced with an OCRR, speaker A sometimes figures that B has both fully heard and fully understood what they've said/done, but simply doesn't agree, accept, or in some other way align with it (see Drew, 1997; Schegloff 2004, p. 96; 2007, p. 207; Svennevig, 2008; and Chapter 6 below). These "acceptability" troubles are varied, as are the repair methods which A can employ to address them. The following two extracts illustrate.

Extract 14 opens with B announcing that she's going to get her hair cut (line 1). Following up on this, speaker A asks "so soon" (line 6). This question is met with a "what?" (line 8).

#### **Extract 14** [Hyla & Nancy, 7:12]

1 B: getting my hair cut tomorrow  
 2 (.)  
 3 A: oh really

4           (.)  
 5 B: yea[:h ]  
 6 A: [oh (so ] soon) / (for food)  
 7           (0.7)  
 8 B: what?  
 9           (0.3)  
 10 A: cuz remember you said you w[ere gonna m]ake an appo[intment]  
 11 B: [.hhh ] [oh: y]eah  
 12 B: yo@u know what I thou@ght you said .hhh =[for f]oo:d  
 13 A: [what ]  
 14 B: @:::[::] ]  
 15 A: [ f@or ]f@oo@d

Speaker A does not respond to B's OCRR by repeating, clarifying or in any other way redoing her prior TCU/action (either in part or in full). Instead, she offers a different, but related action—a *justification* for asking her question ("cuz remember you said you were gonna make an appointment", line 10). As Robinson (2006) notes, this provides evidence that A took B's OCRR "as communicating both that [B] *heard* [her] question, and as projecting that [A's] question was possibly unwarranted. That is, [A] understands [B's OCRR] as a form of interpersonal disalignment." (p. 147)

The repair offered in extract 15 below also diagnoses an acceptability problem, albeit one of a rather different kind. It addresses the "(im)propriety" of A's prior TCU/action (Drew, 1997, p. 96; Wooton, 2007).

**Extract 15** [from Drew, 1997, p. 97]

1 A: (pull up) the ro:pe with thi:s do:wn  
 2           (0.9)  
 3 B: I beg your pardon  
 4           (.)  
 5 A: plea:se

In line 1, a child (speaker A) makes a request to his mother (speaker B). B requests repair with an OCRR, and A responds with "please". With this repair, A assumes that B has both heard and understood her request, but will not accept it without the appropriate form of politeness (a "sin of omission").

It is unclear whether the repairs in extracts 15 and 16 are addressing the prior TCU/action-as-a-whole or only some specifiable "part", dimension or aspect of it. For this reason, I won't push the full- vs. partial-scope distinction here (but see extract 28 below for a



clear full-scope case). Nevertheless, such cases provide further evidence that “huh?”, “what?”, etc. can address a wide range of trouble-types.

#### 2.4.5 Mixed repairs

Thus far we’ve considered repairs which offer a single diagnosis of B’s trouble—a hearing problem, an understanding problem, or an acceptability problem. But speakers also respond to open-class repair requests with turns which combine multiple distinct repairs, simultaneously addressing multiple distinct candidate troubles. With these “mixed” repairs, speaker A concretely displays their diagnostic uncertainty, orienting to the openness of B’s repair request.

To the best of my knowledge this phenomenon has not been mentioned in the literature (though see the discussion of “Sack’s substitution” in Schegloff, 1989; 2004). To be clear, some of the cases examined in this section have been discussed before, but it has not been fully appreciated that these “mixed” repairs contrast with the “pure” cases discussed above, nor that they provide important evidence for the openness of OCRRS. The following examples are a case in point.

#### **Extract 16** [an extension of extract 15 above]

1 A: (pull up) the ro:pe with thi:s do:wn  
 2 (0.9)  
 3 B: I beg your pardon  
 4 (.)  
 5 A: plea:se  
 6 (1.1)  
 7 B: no: I don't understand what you're saying=what

#### **Extract 17** [from Drew, 1997, p. 96]

1 A: put on the li::ght  
 2 (0.9)  
 3 B: pardo:n  
 4 (.)  
 5 A: put on the light please  
 6 (.)  
 7 B: xx better

In each case a child (speaker A) makes a request to his mother (speaker B); his mother requests repair with an OCRR; and the child repairs the propriety of his request with the

politeness marker “please” (as noted by Drew, 1997). These sequences differ, however, in *what else* the child does in their repair turn. As noted, the first child produces the word “please” alone, treating his request as heard and understood. The second child, in contrast, appends his “please” to a full repetition of his request (“*put on the light please*”). By including this second repair, he addresses the alternative possibility that his mother simply didn’t hear him. He thus (nominally) offers two candidate diagnoses of B’s troubles: “either you didn’t hear me *or* you won’t accept this request in its impolite form”. In this way, he displays an understanding of the diagnostic underspecification inherent in his mother’s OCRR.

These two extracts offer some hints of the potential payoffs of mixed repairs over pure repairs. In 16, we see B’s problem was, in fact, one of hearing/understanding the request (“no I don’t understand what you’re saying”, line 7). A’s minimal “please”—a pure acceptability repair—failed to remedy this type of trouble (see Drew, 1997, p. 95 and section 2.6 below). In contrast, B’s “better” in extract 17 (line 7) suggests that her trouble was indeed the (im)propriety of A’s request. A’s mixed hearing-acceptability repair succeeded in remedying this trouble, *as it likely would have had it been a hearing problem*. By firing multiple diagnostic arrows, mixed repairs are more likely to hit whatever it is that is causing B trouble. They are an excellent resource for combating the diagnostic openness of a “huh?”, “what?”, etc.<sup>9</sup>

The two candidate troubles addressed with “put on the light please” are, as noted, a hearing problem (via the repetition) or an acceptability problem (via the “please”). As open-class repair requests can also signal understanding problems, it is not surprising that A-speakers also “mix” hearing repairs with understanding repairs. Extract 18 below contains two initial examples. This is taken from the beginning of a phone call between a son (speaker A) and his mother (speaker B). A’s question at line 1 references a message played to the participants asking for their consent to be recorded.

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<sup>9</sup> However, what mixed repairs gain at the sequential level, they lose at the turn/linguistic level. Doing “extra” repairs often requires extra words, as these two extracts illustrate. The same holds for choosing a generalized, full-scope repetition over a focused, partial-scope repetition (see 2.4.2 above). For further discussion of this type of trade off see Sacks & Schegloff (1979), Schegloff (1979), Levinson (1987; 2007), Heritage (2007).

**Extract 18** [CallFriend-s6726, 0:00]

1 A: did you hear that  
 2 B: .hhhh yes I did  
 3 hh[hh  
 4 A: [.hh you sound weird;  
 5 (0.6)  
 6 B: pardon?  
 7 (0.2)  
 8 A: you sound like you're in a box;  
 9 B: =oh  
 10 (0.2)  
 11 B: I have a bad cold  
 12 (0.3)  
 13 A: do you  
 14 (.)  
 15 B: yes I do  
 16 hh[h  
 17 A: [it's not the thing;  
 18 B: .hhhh pardon?  
 19 h[hhh  
 20 A: [it's not the telephone;  
 21 B: .hh no I don't think so honey I think it's just cause  
 22 I have a bad cold

At lines 6 and 18 B initiates repair on A's prior TCU/action with an OCRR ("pardon?" in both cases). The first trouble-source TCU/action, A's "you sound weird" (line 4), is a comment on the quality of B's voice (or the audio). With his repair, A clarifies his assessment term ("weird" ← "like you're in a box"), but embeds this repair within a repetition of the remainder of his action—"you sound like you're in a box". Similarly, in response to B's second OCRR, A embeds "telephone"—a specification of the generic/pro-form "thing" (see Schegloff, 2004, p. 108-10)—into a repetition of his question ("it's not the telephone", line 20). To understand what these repairs are doing, we need to once again compare them with repairs A could have given but didn't (Schegloff, 1996a, p. 148-51). Consider Figure 2.2 below.

SPEAKER A'S PRIOR TCU	you sound weird	it's not the thing
"MIXED" REPAIR (given)	you sound like you're in a box;	it's not the telephone;
"PURE" HEARING REPAIR (compare with section 2.4.2)	you sound weird	it's not the thing
"PURE" UNDERSTANDING REPAIR (compare with section 2.4.3)	like you're in a box;	The telephone;

**Figure 2.2:** Possible responses to the open-class repair requests in extract 18

A full repetition of the prior TCU (row 2) would have diagnosed B's trouble as a generalized hearing trouble: "You're having trouble hearing my prior TCU (or some part of it)". Alternatively, a clarification or specification (row 3) would have diagnosed the trouble as a partial-scope understanding problem: "You're having trouble understanding this one part of my TCU/action. The rest you've heard, understood, etc." The repairs actually given—full repetitions *combined* with a partial-scope specification/clarification (row 1)—address both potential problems simultaneously: "Either you didn't hear my prior TCU or you did but you're having trouble understanding this one part of it." These are mixed hearing understanding repairs.

Extract 19 below offers a third example. Here, the understanding repair addresses the interpretability of the prior TCU/action as a whole (rather than a single, specifiable part of it). Speaker A has just asked his girlfriend, who's currently in Manila, if she's been back to visit the nude beach she'd been to previously. She hasn't, she explains, because it's "five hours away", "on really rough road" (data not shown). This account culminates with her assertion in line 1, "if I'm ever gonna go back there I'm gonna have to take the plane." A's subsequent "and you're gonna have to take a boyfriend" (line 10), the eventual trouble-source TCU/action, is a joke building off this turn (note the connective "and", and the lexical and structural repetition). B responds with an OCRR.

**Extract 19** [CallHome-6521, 25:47]

1 B: .hhhh if- if I'm ever gonna go back there  
 2 I'm gonna have to take the plane  
 3 (0.8)  
 4 B: I don't want to drive  
 5 (0.5)  
 6 A: and you're gonna have to take a boyfriend  
 7 (1.0)  
 8 B: what?  
 9 (.)  
 10 A: and you're gonna have to also take a boyfriend  
 11 (0.8)  
 12 B: I'm going to take my boyfriend yes  
 13 (0.7)  
 14 A: @ @ @ @ @=  
 15 B: =I'm going to have to .hhh I'm gonna have to show  
 16 my boyfriend this: (.) this island

A responds to B's "what?" by inserting the word "also" into a full repetition of his prior TCU/action. Through its additive semantics, "also" makes the parasitic relationship between this TCU/actions and A's earlier comment more explicit (If you ever go back, there's something *else* "you're gonna have to take"). This connection is further reinforced by A's decision to *retain* (rather than dispense with) the TCU-initial "and" (see section 2.4.2 above). Consequently, A's repair addresses both a hearing trouble and a potential understanding trouble, specifically how this TCU/action-as-a-whole connects to the prior talk.<sup>10</sup>

In each of the mixed repairs considered thus far, speaker A redoes their prior TCU/action as a whole. By leaving nothing out, they make no assumptions that A has heard any part of what they'd said. In this way, they address anything up to and including a full-scope hearing trouble (in addition of course to the relevant acceptability or understanding problem). In contrast, the mixed repair in extract 20 below involves a *partial-scope* hearing repair only. B has been complaining to A that she regularly breaks plans with her, offering some examples of this in lines 1-2 ("there've been parties, like here come here do this or whatever"). In line 4, A responds with an aligning concession of sorts ("you were at the Halloween thing"; see also 11-13). This TCU/action is met with an OCRR ("huh?").

**Extract 20** [Shelly and Debby, 6:56]

1 B: well you shouldn't be defensive I mean there've been parties  
 2 like here come here do this or whatever 'n  
 3 .hhhh[h  
 4 A: [you were at the Halloween thing]  
 5 (0.4)  
 6 B: huh?  
 7 (0.2)  
 8 A: the Halloween p[arty]  
 9 B: [right  
 10 (1.9)  
 11 A: well- you're right I didn't go to that and I  
 12 pro[bably (should have)  
 13 B: [I mean (you) don't even call- I'm- I don't even care  
 14 anymore

<sup>10</sup> The sequential positioning of the trouble-source TCU/action provides additional evidence that the trouble being diagnosed here is indeed one "connection". A's joke builds off B's earlier comment ("...I'm gonna have to take the plane", line 1-2), but it is not positioned immediately following it. At line 4 Speaker B extended her turn ("I don't want to drive"), likely in pursuit of a response from A (see the gap at line 3; Pomerantz, 1984b). This non-contiguity may have contributed to A's diagnosing a possible connection problem (see Drew, 1997 for relevant discussion).

A's repair, "the Halloween party", specifies that the "thing" she's mentioning is a "party" (as noted by Schegloff, 2004, p. 108). It thus addresses a partial-scope understanding problem. Arguing that it *also* addresses a hearing problem—indeed a partial-scope hearing problem—requires once again considering other possibilities. The relevant alternatives here are (1) "the Halloween thing" and (2) "the party" (or "that party", "you know, that party"). Like the repair A gives, these hypothetical alternatives focus only on this one reference (contrast this with "you were at the Halloween party"). The first alternative is a repetition of the entire nominal. By not making any (lexical) changes, this repair would diagnose a hearing trouble only (a "pure" partial-hearing repair). The second alternative, "the party", is a specification of the word "thing". By omitting the modifier "Halloween", this repair would treat this word, along with the rest of the TCU/action, as heard and understood (a "pure" partial-understanding repair). The repair which A actually gives, "the Halloween party", arguably combines these two repairs: "Either you didn't hear me say "the Halloween thing" or you did but you didn't know what I was referring to". It is a mixed *partial*-hearing, partial-understanding repair.

Extracts 17-20 have shown that the components of a mixed repair can vary in trouble-scope (full vs. partial) and trouble-type (hearing, understanding, acceptability). Extracts 21 and 22 below, our final two examples, extend this even further. They show that A can mix more than two repairs into their response. Extract 21 opens with speaker A asking B (William) about his guitar playing, first at line 1 then at line 3. B responds to the second of these questions with an OCRR ("sorry?"). This extract has been discussed in the literature, though never with respect to its status as mixed repair (see Drew, 1997; Robinson & Kevoe-Feldman, 2010).

**Extract 21** [Field-V-1-1, 0:29] ((% = "crunching" sounds, perhaps A's chin on the receiver))

```

1 A: hi William how's the guitar playing going
2 B: oh not too ba:[d at the moment [no:    ]
3 A:                [%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%[played-];(. )recently
4                    (0.5)
5 B: [sorry?]
6 A: %% have you [done any:: .hhh thing for the school; recently
7 B: no:- no(n) (. ) not (. ) not since that last failure,
```

Speaker A's repair, "have you done anything for the school", is the result of three distinct repairs operating on her prior question, "played recently". The first, "have you", specifies the action's question frame which was originally presupposed (similar to the repair in extract 10 above). The second, "done anything for the school", clarifies that "played" meant "participated in a gig/show" rather than "just practiced" (similar to the clarification of "walk" in extract 11; see Drew, 1997). These first two repairs address the possibility that B hasn't understood what's being asked (as noted by Robinson & Kevoe-Feldman, 2010, p. 255). The third repair in the mixture—the repetition of "recently"—does not. Instead, retaining this item makes his repair a *full redo* of his prior question. By making no presuppositions that has B heard or understood any part of his TCU, it also remedies a possible full-scope hearing problem. Note that A could have omitted this item. The hypothetical "have you done anything for the school" (or "done anything for the school") would have treated this temporal component of the question as heard and understood.

The repair in extract 21 mixes a full-hearing repair with two different understanding repairs. Extract 22 is even more complex. The trouble-source TCU/action is A's "seems like we was up to something on that before" (lines 4-5). This is a move to resume a prior topic/activity, and perhaps more importantly to close down the current one (which culminated in B rejecting an invitation from A to come visit over thanksgiving, not shown).

**Extract 22** [CallFriend-s5847, 17:17]

1 A: I hadn't been there in a long time  
 2 B: .hhhhh me neither  
 3 A: .hhhhhhhh um hhhhhhhhh (1.5)  
 4 seems like we was up to something on that before  
 5 (0.9)  
 6 B: huh?  
 7 (0.4)  
 8 A: seems like we were uh:: talking about something  
 9 before all that got started h  
 10 B: just the computer stuff

A full analysis of A's response is outside the scope of this study. Note, however, that it performs no fewer than six operations on the trouble-source action (unmarked in the transcript):

- (1) a repetition of the epistemic preface "seems like"
- (2) a repetition of the subject position self-reference "we"

- (3) a replacement of the auxiliary verb (the non-standard “was” ← the standard “were”)
- (4) a replacement of the verbal core (“up to something” ← “talking about something”)
- (5) a deletion of the adjunct “on that”
- (6) an expansion of the temporal reference (“before” ← “before all that got started”)

At least three of these operations appear to be performing understanding repairs, targeting (at least) two different parts of the action. Operations 4 and 5 arguably clarify its verbal core. The replacement, “talking about something”, is less idiomatic and semantically simpler than the original “up to something” (it lacks the possible connotation of mischievousness). The removal of “on that” (operation 5) may also aid understanding (what role this item played in this verbal expression is unclear to me—and so perhaps to B). Operation 6, the expansion of “before”, specifies a different part of this action, the indexical, meta-communicative reference to the prior talk/activity (the Thanksgiving plans). Finally, note that A’s repair, like most we have seen, also addresses a possible full-scope hearing problem. All the major components of the prior action were retained,<sup>11</sup> some in their original form (operations 1, 2), others in a modified form (operation 3, 4, 6). Again, this was not necessary. A could have conceivably repaired only the verbal core by applying operation 4 alone (cf. extract 11); the predicate by applying operations 4-6; or perhaps even the subject pronoun by applying a variation of operation 2 alone (“you and me”; cf. extract 12).

To conclude, A-speakers sometimes respond to OCRRs by “mixing” repairs—a full-hearing repair with an acceptability repair (extract 17), a partial-hearing repair with a partial-understanding repair (extract 20), and so on. By addressing multiple possible troubles simultaneously, speaker A concretely displays some uncertainty as to the “real” cause of B’s trouble. They are struggling with the diagnostic openness of B’s repair request (or at least displaying that they are). What’s more, the fact that the component repairs can vary in both trouble-type and trouble-scope suggests that A-speakers are producing a context sensitive mix from amongst the range of possible troubles which B could be having with their prior TCU/action. This provides even further evidence that OCRRs are diagnostically unrestricted.

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<sup>11</sup> The only items omitted are the initial “uh” and medial “on that”. This former, rather than being part of the prior action *per se*, was a piece of scaffolding used in its production. Self-repairs are seldom if ever incorporated into redoes. The latter, operation 4, was discussed above.



It may turn out that some of the features of these repair turns that I have analyzed here as “doing repair” may be doing something else instead (or in addition). Each turn at talk must manage a variety of tasks simultaneously, and at different organizational levels. We have seen already that the shift in sequential positioning between the repair turn and the trouble-source turn can influence what gets included and what gets left out (Schegloff, 2004). Other organizational forces are undoubtedly at work. For instance, we know from research on *self*-initiated self-repair that the grammatical system (or habits) of the speakers will influence what they include in their repair. If a speaker of English chooses to “focus” their repair on a nominal head, for instance, they will likely also include a determiner (see Kärkkäinen et al., 2007; Fox, 2013; *inter alia* for relevant discussion). This framing element is produced not because it was part of the (perceived) problem but simply because it “needs” to be there. This may well be the case in some of the *other*-initiated repairs considered here (i.e. the repairs I have offered as hypothetical alternatives may in fact not be). Similarly, we know that speakers sometimes self-initiate repair not so much to fix something which is broken, but to “fine tune” their talk to better fit the action(s) it is delivering (Drew et al., 2013; Lerner et al., 2012; Schegloff, 2013, p. 46-7). Again we should expect the same in *other*-initiated repair, when speaker B effectively gives them a second chance at their TCU/action.

The methodological problem here of course is that these different organizing forces—repair, sequential positioning, grammar, fine-tuning—do not always unambiguously mark out their products. This can make it difficult to discern what in the repair turn is, in fact, doing repair. Judgments will undoubtedly vary, both from case to case and analyst to analyst, due in large part to a lack of ready evidence for one analysis over the other.<sup>12</sup> Future research is undoubtedly necessary.

#### 2.4.6 Summary

In this section, I have examined some of the ways in which speakers respond to “huh?”, “what?” etc. Across a collection of cases, one finds repairs which differ in the type of the

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<sup>12</sup> For instance, Schegloff’s (2004) “dispensables” include a very wide array of phenomena, including the specification of pronouns and other indexical references (see also Schegloff, 1989 on “Sacks’ Substitution”). As my analysis of extracts 18 and 20 make clear, however, I would leave open the possibility that at least in some cases these operations may be diagnosing possible understanding problems, either in addition to or perhaps even instead of “just” doing positioning (see Schegloff 2004, p. 108 for a note about a possibly equivocal analysis).

trouble diagnosed (hearing, understanding, acceptability), the scope of the trouble located (the prior TCU/action as a whole or in general vs. a single, specified part of it only), and the repair method employed (lexical repetition, addition, clarification, justification, etc.), all seemingly without restriction. This distributional (lack of a) pattern suggests that A-speakers are working these things out on a case by case basis. Additionally, each time an A-speaker produces a “mixed” repair they orient to the possibility of multiple distinct troubles. We thus have evidence, both in the aggregate and in particular instances, that A-speakers understand that OCRRs are diagnostically open.

A critical part of this argument is that these different repair types are produced in a routine, straightforward manner. As noted above, A-speakers occasionally produce repairs which do not “fit” diagnostically with B’s repair initiation. Non-fitted repairs typically share two properties: they are done for some particular reason, making them relatively infrequent; and they are treated as abnormal, deviant or inappropriate. In contrast, each of the repair types I have presented here are taken from collections of similar cases, and are treated as entirely appropriate responses (see section 2.7 below for further discussion of this point).

## 2.5 Evidence from “upgraded” other-initiations of repair

To find additional support for our argument, this section examines a second repair-related action which can occur following a “huh?”, “what?”, etc. On occasion B-speakers “upgrade” their other-initiations. At possible completion, or in the transition space, they offer a *second* OI which further delimits the source and/or nature of their trouble. The diagnosis offered in the upgrade gives some data-internal evidence of the trouble B had signaled with their *first* OI (see Egbert et al, 2009). Consequently, the patterns which emerge across a collection of such cases can help reveal its diagnostic properties. As the following four extracts illustrate, the upgrades which follow open-class repair requests vary considerably, both in the nature and scope of trouble they diagnose. This provides further evidence that “huh?”, “what?”, etc. are diagnostically open.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> What I am calling upgraded OIs are similar to what have been called “doubles” in the CA literature. Note though, that the label “double” does not fully specify the phenomenon of interest. B-speakers sometimes redo the same (or a diagnostically equivalent) OI (“huh?” ← “what?”), or even shift to a less explicit OI (“who?” ← “what?”). Only diagnostically stronger second OIs provide evidence of the diagnostic properties of the first.

Extract 23 provides a first illustration of an upgraded OCRR. Speaker C has called A as part of the Call Friend project (see Chapter 1). A is telling her roommate (speaker B) off phone about the nature of the call/project (C has just taken another call).

**Extract 23** [CallFriend-n5000, 0:09]

1 A: we're being recorded for educational research- .hhhh (0.2)  
 2 .hhh purposes .hh a:nd (.) so it's free for her  
 3 (1.7)  
 4 B: what?  
 5 (.)  
 6 → B: I don't understand  
 7 (0.2)  
 8 A: xx- she has a free- so she sh- she can call:- (.) long  
 9 distance for free to have it- and then it's recorded  
 10 they're using it for .hhh (0.7) educational purposes

In line 4, speaker B requests repair with an OCRR (“what?”). Following a small gap, she expands her turn with “I don’t understand” (see the arrowed line →). Relative to the open class “what?”, this assertion-based OI upgrades B’s diagnosis of her trouble. It indicates that her trouble is specifically one of understanding (rather than any type of trouble) and that it is grounded in A’s prior action as a whole (rather than either full *or* partial scope; see A’s repair in 8-10).

Contrast this with the following case. Here, speaker B’s second OI specifies that her trouble is a *partial*-scope understanding problem. A and B are having trouble arranging a get-together over the holidays. A suggests that B come see him, but she expresses difficulty getting there (data not shown). In line 1, he offers a possible solution (“what if you were picked up”).

**Extract 24** [CF-n6157, 15:23]

1 A: .hhhhhh what if you were picked up h=  
 2 B: =shi[t h  
 3 A: [hm I don't know .hhhhhh I don't know  
 4 (.)  
 5 B: huh?  
 6 (0.2)  
 7 → B: picked up- (0.4) you mean by you  
 8 (0.2)  
 9 A: yeah

In line 5, Speaker B initiates repair on B's suggestion/proposal. She begins with an OCRR ("huh?"), but then, following a small gap, expands her turn with "picked up- (0.4) you mean by you" (→). This OI, an understanding check, formulates and seeks (dis)confirmation of a candidate understanding of what A has said (see Chapter 7). In this case, the trouble is with *who* would do the picking up (the agent of the activity). This partial-scope OI claims no trouble with the proposition as a whole or the action A is performing (a hypothetical solution/offer).

In the following case, B's upgrade specifies a partial-scope *hearing* problem. In line 1, B enquires into the general well-being of A and her children. A offers a general, summary response (line 2) and then expands with an account of her daughter Samantha's recent recovery from illness (line 5-6).

**Extract 25** [Heritage01-9, 1:16]

```

1   B:  how are things with you and all your kids
2   A:  oo they're very well
3       (2.0)
4   B:  [they're all very [well  ]
5   A:  [(Saman) um          [Samanth]a seems to (have) recovered (0.3)
6       pretty well xx xx
7       (0.3)
8   B:  what?=
9   →  =who's that?
10      (0.3)
11  A:  Samantha seem[s (to have recovered) from her (pneumatic) fe]ver
12  B:          [Samantha: (.) seems to be recovering          ]

```

In next position, B initiates repair with an open-class "what?" and then immediately upgrades to "who's that?" (→). With this second OI, he specifies that his trouble is hearing who she has said is recovering. (Note that A's mention of Samantha was produced in overlap; it was the *only* part of the trouble-source TCU which was overlapped; and B is subsequently able to redo A's trouble-source TCU/action after only having access to the very beginning of A's full-scope repair: "Samantha seem[s", lines 11-12).

Extract 26 offers a fourth and final example. Speaker A has just mentioned getting new computers at work (data not shown).

**Extract 26** [CF-s6953]

- 1 B: .hhh what uh: (.) what megahert Pentiums are they do you know=  
 2 A: =thousand  
 3 hhhhh .hhhhh ((1.1s total))  
 4 B: [do what?]-  
 5 → =no: nah they- they can't be a thous[and]  
 6 A: [what uh what what uh  
 7 what are the- options

In lines 1-2, Speaker B asks, and A answers, a question about the speed of these new computers. B responds with an OCRR<sup>14</sup> and then immediately expands his turn with a rejection/correction of B's answer ("no: nah they- they can't be a thousand"; the fastest processor at the time was 166 megahertz, as B subsequently explains in data not shown). Here, then, B specifies that his trouble, first signaled by an OCRR, is a matter of *accepting* what A has said.

As extracts 23-26 illustrate, the upgrades we find following OCRRs vary in both the scope and type of trouble they diagnose. We thus see the same diagnostic "fit" between OI and upgrade as we do between OI and repair (see section 2.4). In these next actions, A-speakers and B-speakers alike display an orientation to the diagnostic "openness" of "huh?", "what?", etc. We now turn to the next step in the repair sequence, to what happens *after* A's repair.

## 2.6 Evidence from the interactional outcome of the repair sequence

### 2.6.1 Introduction

Grossly speaking, speaker A's repair can either "fail" or "succeed" at resolving the trouble B signaled with their "huh?", "what?", etc. In this section I will provide evidence that, seemingly without restriction, all types of repairs—full-scope hearing, partial-scope understanding, etc.—can meet both fates. This further supports the argument that these repair requests are diagnostically open. "Anything" can succeed *or* fail precisely because "anything" can be the problem.

Throughout this section I will unpack what I mean by success and failure. As a first step, I want to stress that my primary interests are in the interactional, rather than cognitive,

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<sup>14</sup> I argue in Chapter 5 below that, despite appearances, "do what?" does not restrict the source of trouble for these speakers. It can signal full-scope troubles, as we see here.

outcomes of the repair sequence. The critical question is whether or not B's trouble has been resolved for "all practical purposes" (Garfinkel, 1967); whether their understanding of the prior talk is now sufficient to allow the conversation to continue. We will thus be looking at what the participants do immediately following A's repair. The two types of actions we'll be interested in are *expansions* of the repair sequence on the one hand, and *resumptions* of the suspended activity on the other. With some caveats (discussed below), these can be taken to reflect, and constitute, the interactional failure or success of A's repair, respectively. We will be focusing primarily on speaker B's actions. The repair was, after all, produced *for them*, at their request (the OCRR). It is their job to indicate its adequacy. However, speaker A can also offer judgments of their own repairs, either by offering a second repair ("presumed failure") or resuming the activity themselves ("presumed success"). I will begin with cases of "failure". Despite being the rarer outcome, they are the most important analytically.

### 2.6.2 Failure

There are at least three reasons why a repair sequence may "fail" and need to be expanded. First, there may be a problem in A's "execution" (or B's uptake) of the repair (e.g. it may not be properly heard, requiring a repetition; or understood, requiring a clarification). Second, the repair may in fact resolve whatever trouble formed the basis for B's initiation, but there turns out to be a second, "higher order" trouble (e.g. having heard what was said, B now has trouble understanding it; on the nested ordering of communicative actions see Austin, 1975; Clark 1996). Both these types of failure provide no evidence for (or against) our argument. The cases we are interested in are those in which speaker A gets things wrong. In the face of openness of B's repair request, they *misdiagnose* the trouble (as we proceed an important and by no means straightforward question to consider is how we can, empirically, distinguish between these different types of failure).

The "please" case, reprinted below, provides a first illustration of a misdiagnosis. Recall that speaker A responded to his mother's OCRR with the word "please". With this repair he assumes that his mother has both heard and understood his request, but wouldn't accept it in this impolite form. To find evidence that he was right, or wrong, in his diagnosis we—like he—must focus on what happens next.

**Extract 27** [from Drew, 1997]

1 A: (pull up) the rope with this do:wn  
 2 (0.9)  
 3 B: I beg your pardon  
 4 (.)  
 5 A: plea:se  
 6 (1.1)  
 7 → B: no: I don't understand what you're saying=what

Following a gap (see discussion below), speaker B expands the repair sequence with a turn which makes explicitly clear that it has failed, and precisely because A's repair has misdiagnosed her trouble (see the arrowed → line). She rejects the repair ("no"); formulates the "true" nature of her trouble ("I don't understand what you're saying"); and then requests repair again ("what"). Her trouble was *not* accepting A's action she claims, but understanding it.

In this section I will present evidence that there is nothing particularly special about this case (expect perhaps for its explicitness). Seemingly without restriction *all* types of repairs are susceptible to misdiagnosis. This provides strong evidence that "huh?", "what?" etc. are diagnostically open. Any diagnosis A offers can be wrong (or not fully right) precisely because anything can be the problem. For expository reasons I've organized my examples according how the repair sequence is expanded, but what's crucial is the nature of A's diagnosis and how it fails.

In extract 27 speaker B claimed that A had misdiagnosed an understanding problem as an acceptability problem. In extract 28 the reverse occurs. This case also shows that A-speakers can misdiagnose the *source* of B's trouble. As this extract opens, A announces that her sister "might have Graves' disease". B responds with an OCRR ("what?", line 4) and A begins what looks like—and as we'll see is taken as—an explanation or description of this disease ("you know like the", line 6). Our focus is once again on how B treats this repair (→).

**Extract 28** [Callfriend-n6278, 4:44]

1 A: she might have Graves' disease hh  
 2 (0.7)  
 3 A: [she's] thrilled  
 4 B: [what?]  
 5 (0.2)

6 A: you know [like the]  
 7 → B: [when did] that- (0.2) no I know what it is  
 8 (0.2)  
 9 A: hhhhhhhh  
 10 → B: but she's (0.4) [I thought th]at was like older people=  
 11 A: [I guess- ]  
 12 B: =no no I guess a lot of young people get it

With “no I know what it is”, B explicitly rejects A’s diagnosis of her trouble. She then goes on formulate the real basis for her OCRR. From what she knows/believes about this disease, A’s sister is too young to have it (line 10).<sup>15</sup> The trouble she signaled with her OCRR was not one of understanding what A had said, but of expecting it (Selting, 1996), perhaps even accepting it (see also her cut off question at line 7). Also note that B’s trouble was not with this (or any other) *part* of A’s announcement, but with the asserted proposition-as-a-whole (that A’s sister has this disease). A misdiagnosed both the nature and the source (scope) of her trouble.

Hearing repairs can also be explicitly rejected. While I did not find any such cases in my primary data set, the following offers an example from a conversation reported on a medical website. The writer, a hearing aid professional, is recounting a conversation she had with a client/patient who had just scored perfectly on a hearing test.

**Extract 29**<sup>16</sup> (line numbers are added but punctuation and paragraph marking is original)

1 I then ask him, "Does my voice sound good?"  
 2 "Yes," he says.  
 3 "Distinct?"  
 4 "What?"  
 5 In surprise I ask him, "Didn't you hear me? I said distinct" and  
 6 → he says, "I heard you, I just didn't understand what it was you  
 7 asked."

The writer reports that she asked her client two questions about her voice (lines 1 and 3) and that he requested repair of the second (“What?”, line 4). The writer diagnoses a hearing problem (line 5), but the client rejects this, claiming an understanding problem instead (“I heard you, I just didn’t understand what it was you asked.”, lines 6-7).

<sup>15</sup> Graves’ disease is an autoimmune disease which most commonly presents during midlife, but it can appear earlier, even during childhood (Graves’ Disease & Thyroid Foundation, n.d.). That B was evidently mistaken (see also line 12) is irrelevant to the argument.

<sup>16</sup> taken from [http://www.walnutcreekhearingaidcenter.com/aid\\_user\\_dissatisfaction.html](http://www.walnutcreekhearingaidcenter.com/aid_user_dissatisfaction.html), accessed on Oct. 11<sup>th</sup>, 2012



Extracts 27-29 have shown that speaker B can reject A's repair, claiming that it has misdiagnosed the nature and/or source of the trouble they had signaled with their OCRR. These are the most explicit cases, and thus provide the clearest support for our argument. But evidence of misdiagnosis can be found in other kinds of sequence expansions as well. Consider extract 30 below. Speaker B has plans to visit her daughter (speaker A) the following week. A's husband Mark will pick B up at bus station part way (see lines 1-10, and 13), and also (perhaps together with A) drive her back. At line 12, speaker A turns to this second leg of B's journey ("and we'll go as late as we can on Tuesday"). B requests repair with the open class "pardon?" and A offers a partial-scope hearing repair, repeating *when* she's said they'll be travelling back ("as late as we can on Tuesday", line 16). Our focus is again on what happens next (→).

**Extract 30** [Field-VI-2-8, 6:35]

1 A: .hh so anyway we'll see you on (.) next Saturday=  
 2 B: =yes o[kay love]  
 3 A: [ .hhhh] early in the morning=  
 4 B: =yes  
 5 (.)  
 6 A: have the coffee on=  
 7 B: =eleven o'clock  
 8 (0.3)  
 9 Mark said d[idn't he  
 10 A: [yes  
 12 A: and we'll go as late[as we can] on Tuesd[ay ]  
 13 B: [(okay) ] [xx ] xx  
 14 xx xx- (.) pardon?  
 15 (0.6)  
 16 A: as late as we can on Tu[esday ]  
 17 B: [(what do you)]  
 18 (0.3)  
 19 → B: what- what do you mean as late as you ca[n  
 20 → A: [we'll go  
 21 (.)  
 22 B: oh yes .hh um [[*launches new activity*]]

With "what do you mean as late as you can"(→), B initiates repair a second time, signaling trouble in understanding A's repair (see Schegloff, 1997a; Robinson & Kevoe-Feldman, 2009; Hayashi et al., 2013; for a discussion of this practice of OI). On first blush it appears that A has correctly located the source of B's trouble (the temporal expression) but perhaps mistaken an understanding problem for a hearing problem. However, the ensuing

talk provides evidence that it has failed for the opposite reason. B *did* have trouble hearing, but A has repeated the wrong talk or more likely not enough talk—the scope of B’s hearing trouble extends over more of A’s prior TCU.

From the design of B’s second OI, it is evident that she has not grasped the import of A’s “and we’ll go as late as we can on Tuesday” (line 12). B shifts to the exclusive “you” (“what do you mean as late as *you* can”) even though she was, of course, included among the “we” to be driving home after her trip! A reasonable explanation for this misunderstanding is that B *had not* heard A say “we’ll go”. Having missed this core element of A’s TCU/action, she is trying to interpret this temporal modifier (“as late as we can on Tuesday”, line 16) *in its own terms*, an incredibly difficult task especially given that A has shifted from one topic and temporal frame to another (from her arrival to her departure; see Drew, 1997). On this understanding, A repeats this “missing” element (“we’ll go”, line 20). Speaker B claims understanding (“oh yes”) and the conversation resumes (line 22).

On the basis of a displayed misunderstanding (“you” rather than “we”), speaker A presumed that her repair had misdiagnosed B’s trouble and revised it—in this case, expanding the scope of a hearing repair. But A-speakers can revise their repairs on the basis of much less direct evidence. Extract 31 below is a case in point. B has just bought a car and is telling her friend (speaker A) what’s covered on the warranty. At line 3, in overlap, A asks her about her car *insurance* (“do you have (a) deductible on your insurance”). B requests repair (“huh?”, line 5), and A offers a full hearing repair (line 6).

**Extract 31** [CallFriend-n5615, 12:13]

1 B: automatic windows,  
 2 .hh[hhhhhh [ transmissi]on=  
 3 A: [do you have (a) deducti[ble on your insurance]  
 4 B: =huh?  
 6 A: .hhh do you have deductible on your insurance  
 7 (0.9)  
 8 → A: [your car- ]  
 9 B: [what about] insurance=  
 10 B: =a deductible do you have a deductible=  
 11 A: =I forget

Like speaker A we’re interested in whether or not her repair has resolved B’s trouble for all practical purposes. Positive evidence would be an answer to her question or some other sequentially relevant response from B (see the next section). Instead, B remains silent, and a

gap emerges following the repair (see line 7). One way for A to interpret B's silence is as evidence she still has trouble with the question. On this understanding, A may presume that her repair has failed and offer a second. This is precisely what she does. Her continuation (→) was projectably heading towards a partial specification of her question ("your car" or perhaps "your car insurance").

What's critical for our purposes is that A's second repair *revises* the diagnosis she had offered with her first repair, shifting from a full hearing repair to a (partial) understanding repair. Compare this with a full or partial redo (lexical repetition) of her first repair. While both actions orient to the potential inadequacy of A's repair, they do so differently. A redo addresses the possibility that the repair was not properly heard/understood (compare with the discussion of "execution troubles" at the beginning of this section). A revision, on the other hand, addresses the possibility that the first repair had misdiagnosed B's trouble. It indexes A's diagnostic uncertainty or "doubt", and thus evidences the openness of B's repair request.<sup>17</sup>

Note that it is the doubt itself which is important for our argument, not whether it turns out to be justified. A revision, after all, is premised on a complex, nested set of assumptions based on a quite tacit signal. Speaker A treats B's lack of (immediate) uptake as an index of (i) continued trouble with her prior TCU/action (ii) grounded in the failure of her repair (iii) to correctly diagnosis B's trouble. Naturally, one or more of these assumptions may turn out to incorrect. We see here, for instance, that while B's gap evidently did foreshadow continued trouble (assumption ii), it wasn't the result of a misdiagnosis (assumption iii) but of an execution trouble. In overlap with A's second repair B initiates repair again (line 9), but in a way *consistent* with A's original diagnosis. "What about insurance" signals a hearing problem scoping over the bulk of the prior action—"I heard you say something about

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<sup>17</sup> It is well documented in the CA literature that the absence of a next turn can indicate some problem with the preceding turn, among them troubles in hearing, understanding and acceptance/alignment (see e.g. Pomerantz, 1984b; Bolden et al., 2012; Rossano, 2012). However, very little research has examined the interactional import of an emerging gap within this particular sequential position (i.e. following an other-initiated self-repair), the types of actions that can occur there, and the evidential import of these actions for understanding the diagnostic properties of the OI which generated the repair sequence.

insurance, but I couldn't catch what" (see line 10).<sup>18</sup> Although it turned out to be based on "faulty" assumptions, A's revision nonetheless orients to the *possibility* of a misdiagnosis.

A final note before we continue. The revised repair we see in extract 31, "do you have a deductible on your insurance" ← "your car (insurance)", is comparable to hypothetical *mixed* repair "do you have a deductible on your **car** insurance" (see section 2.4.5 above). In both cases, speaker A produces a "repair turn" containing two repairs diagnosing two different candidate troubles. With mixed repairs, the two repairs are produced together, as a single TCU. With revised repairs, the second repair is produced contingently, on possible signs of further trouble. While differing in their precise interactional logic, both provide A-speakers with resources for combating the diagnostic openness of "huh?", "what?", etc.

In extract 31 above speaker A revised a hearing repair by specifying a sub-part of what she'd repeated. In the following case, A instead repeats *more* of the trouble-source action, expanding the scope of his repair (compare with extract 30 above). This data is taken from a mistaken call to the fire department (see lines 9-11). At line 1 speaker A asks to speak to "Mister Garrison at nine". Speaker B, the call taker, initiates repair with an OCRR ("pardon me?"). A responds by repeating the person's name only "Mister Garrison" (see Schegloff 2004, p. 106).

**Extract 32** [Earthquake, IV:50, from Schegloff, 2004, p. 106, retranscribed]

1 A: I'd like to speak to **Mister Garrison** at nine please  
 2 (0.4)  
 3 B: **pardon me?**  
 4 (0.3)  
 5 A: **Mister Garrison**  
 6 (1.6)  
 7 → A: at nine  
 8 (2.0)  
 9 B: this is the fire department sir  
 10 (0.3)  
 11 A: oh I'm sor(ry) I must have the wrong number

As in the previous extract, a gap emerges following A's repair (line 6). Taking this as a sign of B's continued trouble with his prior action, A revises his repair ("at nine", →). In this

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<sup>18</sup> This practice of other-initiation has not been documented, and this is the only instance I have found in my data. A proper analysis must wait.

case, A maintains his original trouble-type diagnosis (hearing trouble), but extends its scope by repeating more of his prior TCU.

Extract 33 provides a final example. Here it is an understanding repair which is revised. At line 4, speaker A launches a new topically disjoint sequence, announcing that “the shuttle just came in”. B requests repair OCRR (“huh?”, line 8), and A specifies her reference to the shuttle (“the **space** shuttle”, line 8).

**Extract 33** [CallFriend-s6886, 2:45]

1 B: but he's got two more coming  
 2 (1.7)  
 3 so[:  
 4 A: [ah: **the shuttle** just came in  
 5 (0.6)  
 6 B: **huh?**  
 7 (0.5)  
 8 A: **the: space shuttle**  
 9 (0.2)  
 10→ B: is [it on TV  
 11 A: [it's landing it's boom boom  
 12 (0.9)  
 13 B: could you hear it up there where you are  
 14 (0.2)  
 15 A: yeah  
 16 (0.5)  
 17 B: you could hear it  
 18 (0.3)  
 19 A: yeah it comes right across us

As in the previous extracts, a gap develops and A expands her repair turn (→). With “it’s landing it’s boom boom”, A offers a second specification of her announcement, this time focusing not on the shuttle, but on the action she’s ascribing to it (note that she refers to the shuttle pronominally, treating it as now unproblematic). She thus diagnoses a second possible source for B’s trouble. (Incidentally, we see in B’s overlapping and subsequent questions that her trouble runs deeper, line 10, 13 and 17. She has trouble understanding the proposition as a whole, or perhaps even accepting it.)

In response to an open-class repair request, seemingly all types of repairs—hearing, understanding, and acceptability; partial and full—can turn out to be “wrong”; to have misdiagnosed, or at least presumed to have misdiagnosed, the nature and/or scope of B’s trouble. Not all possibilities have been documented in this section, nor even attested in my

data set, but the variability is considerable. This provides strong evidence that “huh?”, “what?”, etc.—the requests which generated these misdiagnosis—offer no diagnostic help. OCRRs force speaker A to make a best guess, and like all best guesses they can fail.

### 2.6.3 Success

In this section I will provide evidence that the same wide array of repairs which can fail can succeed. This is equally important for understanding the diagnostic openness of “huh?”, “what?”, etc. While a particular type of diagnosis may turn out to be “wrong” in one situation, in another it could have been “right” (or at least adequate, see below). Speakers produce this variety of repairs precisely because OCRRs allow it.

Unlike failure, which as we have seen can become quite explicit, success is overwhelmingly managed implicitly. This holds for repair sequences, as it does at many other levels of interactional organization (Levinson, 1987; Heritage, 2007). Consider extract 34 below. Speaker B has been struggling to formulate her thoughts/feelings about a troublesome relationship (see lines 3 and 11 for instance). Her friend (speaker A) has offered a number of candidate attempts, but B has systematically rejected them. It is this pattern which we see in lines 1-3 below and which forms the basis for A’s “just keep striking out with you” (line 4). At line 6, speaker B requests repair with “what?”, and A repeats her comment in full (line 7). Our focus is once again on what the participants do next and how these actions offer (implicit) judgment of A’s repair.

#### **Extract 34** [Callfriend-n6062, 25:08]

```

1   A: ... he should feel bad but instead you feel bad
2       and you're trying work on that
3   B: .hhhhh no (.) .hhh (0.2) like (0.4) ((sigh)) (0.5) .hhhh (0.2)
4   A: .hhh [just keep striking out with y]ou=
5   B:      [me- okay like my- .hh      ]
6   B: =uh- [what?] hh
7   A: [just keep striking out with you
8       (.)
9   → A: go [ahead]
10 → B:      [ oh]: (hhh)/(@)
11 → m: .hhhh (0.2) um hhh (1.0) because ...

```

Following A’s repair both participants start speaking (lines 9-10). First, by claiming a “change of state” with “oh” (line 10), speaker B communicates that the trouble(s) she has

signaled with her OCRR has been resolved (Heritage, 1984a; Golato & Betz, 2008). Following this sequence closing action, she resumes the suspended course of action (line 11). Similarly, with her overlapping “go ahead” (line 9) speaker A *prompts* B to continue (note that the A’s comment had interrupted B’s turn at line 3, the repair sequence delaying it further). By moving to close the repair sequence herself, A “presumes” that it has been successful.

Both participants have treated this repair sequence as a success—as having resolved B’s trouble for all practical purposes. Extract 35 provides a second example, though here success is indexed even less explicitly. Speaker A asks B a question (line 1); B requests repair with “huh?” (line 3); and A offers a partial-scope hearing repair (“M S O”). Consider what happens next.

**Extract 35** [reprint of extract 5 above]

1 A: did you get into M S O  
 2 (0.6)  
 3 B: huh?  
 4 (0.5)  
 5 A: M S O  
 6 → (1.1)  
 7 → B: I don't know

For just over a second, neither participant talks (line 6). In line 7, speaker B breaks the silence, offering conditionally relevant response to A’s question (“I don’t know”). Rather than claiming that his trouble is resolved (cf. with the “oh” in extract 34), he simply resumes the suspended activity, indexing success entirely in passing. Speaker A’s treatment of her repair is similar. By *not* revising or redoing her repair at any moment throughout this emerging gap, she displays confidence in its adequacy (recall that *speaker B’s* silence in this sequential context can index further repair-related trouble).

Extracts 34 and 35 illustrate interactionally successful repair sequences. B requests repair with an OCRR; A offers one; and then the suspended activity is resumed, either immediately or following an explicit display of success (e.g. an “oh”). Consequently, the repair A offered was deemed adequate for all practical purposes. A review of the repair sequences presented in section 2.4 above will show that they too were successful. And because the repairs in these sequences differed widely in their scope (full vs. partial), their type (hearing, understanding, acceptability) and the particular repair method employed (repetition, insertion, etc.), this

provides indirect evidence that OCRRs—the actions which generated this variety of repairs—are capable of signaling this variety of troubles, across instances of their use.

Why *indirect* evidence? Although A's repair was deemed adequate, there is no direct evidence that it correctly diagnosed, or even played a (major) role in resolving, B's trouble. There are at least two reasons for this methodological cautiousness. First, any repair which goes *beyond* what is necessary in resolving B's trouble is entirely unproblematic (and this likely includes all mixed repairs; see section 2.4.5). A full-scope repetition will remedy a partial-scope hearing problem; a clarification will typically provide B with the resources to resolve a hearing problem; and so on. Although these "over-repairs" may not be the most efficient, optimal, etc. solution to B's problem, they still get the job done. B-speakers are thus very likely to let them pass, providing us with no evidence that A has "misdiagnosed" their trouble. Second, and even more problematic, speaker A's repair can actually be *irrelevant* to the resolution of B's trouble. We know this from cases like the following, but its methodological implications run much deeper.

**Extract 36** [Callhome-4702, see extract 2 above]

1 B: =I've known her for years as a trumpet player:  
 2 she [went to all the music schools here  
 3 A: [xx  
 4 (.)  
 5 A: huh.  
 6 (.)  
 7 A: she's [a German ch]ick  
 8 B: [and sh:- ]  
 9 (0.5)  
 10 B: [huh?]  
 11 (.)  
 12 A: [Germ-]  
 13 → B: [ ye]ah .hhhh and she si@ngs great ...

**Extract 37** [Field-I-2-9, 0:54]

1 A: ... can you work it all out  
 2 (0.2)  
 3 B: [pardon?]  
 4 (0.3)  
 5 → B: oh yes yes yes of course I could

The B-speaker in extract 36, an American musician living in Germany, is telling his friend about one of the people he's been playing with (see lines 1-2). At line 7, speaker A checks



whether this person is German (line 7); and B responds with a “huh?” (line 14). As with all cases presented thus far, speaker A responds by repairing his prior TCU/action. His cut-off “Germ-” in line 12 was projectably heading towards “German” or perhaps “German chick”, a partial-scope repetition. Critically, at precisely the same time, B responds to A’s prior action, confirming that this person is German (“yeah”, line 13). Speaker B thus initiates a repair sequence but then immediately closes it, evidently having resolved the trouble himself. Indeed, repair sequences are sometimes closed without a repair ever being produced at all (as noted by Drew 1997). In extract 37, A asks a question (line 5); B requests repair (“pardon?”, line 8); but B then immediately (i.e. as the next unit of talk) gives an answer (line 9).

Both “over repairs” and “no repairs” demonstrate speaker B’s overarching orientation to sequential progressivity (see Lerner 1996; Stivers & Robinson, 2006; Schegloff, 2007b; Heritage, 2007). As soon as their trouble has been resolved, they resume the business at hand. The methodological upshot of this is that we cannot directly infer from a successful repair *sequence* that A’s repair correctly diagnosed B’s trouble. It may have been wrong but “good enough” or it may have played no real role in the resolution of B’s trouble (except, perhaps, in offering extra time for B to work things out on their own; Drew, 1997). While this uncertainty is largely irrelevant to the participants, it does impact the conclusions we can draw from their conduct. What is sufficient for all their practical purposes may not be for all of our analytic purposes.

#### 2.6.4 Summary

In this section, I considered the interactional outcomes of the repair sequences launched by open-class repair requests. I examined some of the ways in which participants subsequent actions offer (implicit) judgment of the adequacy of A’s repair in resolving B’s trouble. Drawing on these analytic resources, I provided evidence that seemingly without restriction all types of repairs can both “succeed” *and* “fail”. This provides further support for the central argument of this chapter. Repair requests like “huh?” and “what?” are diagnostically open.

## 2.7 Delimiting the scope of the trouble: OCRRs versus Full Repeats

In this final section, I will briefly compare “huh?”, “what?”, etc. with another practice of other-initiation (OI). This comparison will help clarify the diagnostic properties of OCRRs, in particular their status as variable-scope (rather than full-scope) practices. It will also solidify the idea that some repair types can be normatively inappropriate in response to certain types OI. This idea is critical both for the current argument and those offered throughout this thesis.

The practice in question is the Full Repeat, mentioned in section 2.3.1 above and analyzed in detail by Robinson & Kevoe-Feldman (2010), henceforth R/K-F. Extract 38 below offers a canonical case, taken from R/K-F’s paper (my analysis is a greatly simplified version of theirs, p. 239-40). The participants are talking about a woman who B has recently seen and who A has lost track of over the years. In line 1 speaker A asks if she is pretty, and B initiates repair by repeating A’s entire question, in an utterance produced with rising pitch (“is she pretty?”, line 3).

**Extract 38** [CallHome-5352, re-transcribed, 12:41]

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1  A:  is she pretty
2      (.)
3  B:  is she pretty?
4      (.)
5  A:  she ever get good looking (.) or no
6  B:  I think she looks the same I don't know it's a very (.)
7      [( )]
8  A:  [I always thought she was in an awkward stage] she'd grow out
9      of but maybe not @ @ @

```

R/K-F argue that by initiating repair in this way, with a Full Repeat, B unambiguously locates A’s question-as-a-whole as the trouble-source (as well as delimiting the trouble-type to one of understanding or acceptability). In support of this analysis, they offer two observations about how Full Repeats are responded to. First, A-speakers nearly always offer full-scope repairs. Here, for instance, A’s “she ever get good looking or no” (line 5) redoes and reformats his *entire* question, clarifying that he was not asking about, say, this person’s “base line” physical attractiveness but specifically about any changes in her appearance since he’d last seen her (note especially the replacement of “is” with “ever get”, see also his comment in lines 8-9). Second, and equally important, on the rare occasion when an A-

speaker *does* produce a partial-scope repair, it is treated as abnormal or inappropriate. Extract 39, also taken from their collection, illustrates (once again, R/K-F offer a much richer analysis, see p. 243-44).

**Extract 39** [CallFriend-6661, re-transcribed, 29:15]

- 1 B: @ [ @ @ ]  
 2 A: [you know-] let me te(11)--ask you about one thing  
 3 do you know nirvana  
 4 (1.2)  
 5 B: do I know nirva[na? ]  
 6 A: [the p-] group h=  
 7 A: =[do you know their music ]  
 8 B: [ oh I- I thought @]y@ou=@ @ @  
 9 B: [.hh [have I been to nirvana [hh hh[@ @ [.hhhh h .h ]  
 10 A: [hh=@ [ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ [ @ @ [.hhh[ are you in nirvan]a  
 11 B: uh:m: (0.2) I've heard of them ..

As before, speaker A asks B a question (line 3) and B initiates repair with a Full Repeat (“do I know nirvana?”, line 5). Here, however, A responds with a *partial*-scope repair (“a group” line 6), clarifying his reference to “Nirvana” only (the American rock band, not the spiritual/emotional state of enlightenment, joy, etc.).<sup>19</sup> Critically, speaker A’s subsequent conduct shows that he understood that B’s Full Repeat was “indexing trouble that extends beyond [his] understanding of the referent Nirvana to one of understanding what [A’s] question-as-a-whole is asking about” (p. 243). First, immediately following the possible completion of his repair, he expands his turn with “do you know their music” (line 7). This extension reformats his prior question as a whole, effectively revising the repair from partial- to full-scope. Second, by competing in an extended bout of overlap with B (see line 8), he does interactional work to produce this revision.

In sum, a partial-scope repair like “the group” is atypical in response to a Full Repeat; both in distributional terms across a collection of cases, and in A’s non-routine treatment of it in this particular case. This provides strong evidence that this type of repair is *normatively inappropriate* in response to this type of other-initiation. In contrast, in response to “huh?”,

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<sup>19</sup>As R/K-F note there is strong evidence that B’s trouble was indeed one of understanding A’s question as a whole (see line 8-11). A’s “do you know nirvana” is interpretable in two ways: first, as checking if B is familiar with the music of the rock band Nirvana; and second, as inquiring if B has experienced or achieved a spiritual/emotional state of nirvana. While A intended the former, B entertained/adopted the latter. Consequently, while A’s treatment of this Full Repeat is deviant, B’s *deployment* of it was not.

“what?” and other OCRRs, partial-scope repairs are entirely appropriate. As we have seen throughout this chapter they are straightforwardly produced (and receipted), without any orientation to their being abnormal, noticeable, etc. And while certainly less common than full-scope repairs, they are by no means rare. Unlike Full Repeats, open-class repair requests can signal partial-scope troubles. They are variable-scope OIs, not full-scope OIs (see Figure 2.1 in section 2.3.1 above).<sup>20</sup>

A relevant question at this stage is *why* Full Repeats and OCRRs differ in scope. Why do these practices work the way they do (see Schegloff, 1996a, p. 200)? As R/K-F note (p. 239), by repeating the prior TCU/question in full a Full Repeat demonstrably and transparently locates *the entirety of this TCU*, and the action it is delivering (a question), as the source of trouble. In a similar manner, the cohesive design of a Partial Repeat transparently locates a single, specifiable part of the prior TCU/action, as does a “who?”, “where?”, etc. (p. 238-9). In contrast, “huh?”, “what?” and the other forms used as OCRRs lack the linguistic affordances to locate anything, either a part *or* a whole. They simply mark out the prior TCU/action as a general domain of trouble, leaving it up to repairing speaker to work out what in or about it is causing the trouble. That they are variable-scope OIs thus falls out “naturally” from their linguistic form (but see Chapter 5).

## 2.8 Conclusion

In this chapter I have examined what is perhaps the most basic, familiar and frequent way of initiating repair on a co-participant’s talk. I have argued that by uttering “huh?”, “what?”, “pardon?” etc., a recipient claims only that they have a problem with the prior turn constructional unit (TCU) and that it should be fixed. The linguistic design of the request does nothing to indicate what specifically is causing the trouble, what type of trouble it is, nor what could/should be done to remedy it. These practices are, as Schegloff (1997) notes, “the weakest of the repair initiations, or the strongest, depending on how you look at it.”

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<sup>20</sup> There is a distinction between a repair’s normative (in)appropriacy and its (in)adequacy in resolving the trouble at hand. The former is a feature of a type of repair in response to a type of OI. The latter is a feature of a *particular* repair in response to a *particular* OI. On the one hand, a partial-scope repair is an appropriate response to an OCRR, but may occasionally fail to resolve B’s trouble (see section 2.6.2 above). On the other hand, a partial-scope repair is an inappropriate response to a Full Repeat; but, when given, may nonetheless adequately resolve B’s trouble in that particular instance. We see in extract 39, for instance, that immediately following A’s “the group”, and so uninformed by A’s “upgrade” to a full-scope repair, speaker B signals a change of state and begins to formulate his misunderstanding (line 8).

(p. 507). “Strongest” in that they are always available—it doesn’t matter what the prior speaker has said, you can always signal trouble with an OCRR. “Weakest” in that they display no grasp of what has been said, and offer no help in repairing it.

To support this analysis I provided a body of evidence from how this class of repair request is treated in everyday English conversation. First, I demonstrated that A-speakers routinely offer repairs which differ along all three of the relevant parameters—the *scope* of the trouble, its *type*, and the *repair-method* employed. Second I showed that, on occasion, A-speakers concretely index their diagnostic uncertainty by addressing multiple possible troubles simultaneously (e.g. embedding a specification of reference within a full repetition of the prior TCU). Third, I provided evidence that B-speakers show a similar (lack of a) pattern in how they “upgrade” their OCRRs, offering a range of diagnostically diverse second OIs. Finally, by considering what happens *following* A’s repair, I provided (sometimes quite indirect) evidence that all types of repairs can both “fail” and “succeed”, further supporting the argument that OCRRs are diagnostically open.

Beyond providing this substantial body of evidence, this chapter develops our understanding of just how open “huh?”, “what?”, etc. are. Most OIs specify whether the trouble is located in the prior TCU/action-as-a-whole (full-scope) or in some specifiable part of it only (partial-scope). Open-class repair requests, I argued, do not. They are variable-scope, marking out the prior TCU/action a general domain of trouble only. This analysis raises some interesting questions about some other, less studied practices of other-initiation. For instance, do repair requests like “what do you mean”, “what did you say”, etc. and assertion-based OIs like “I didn’t hear you”, “I don’t understand”, etc. necessarily signal trouble with the prior TCU/action as a whole (like Full Repeats), or can they also signal partial-scope troubles (like OCRRs)? Similarly, consider “he what?”, “to what?”, “a what?” and other cohesively framed uses of “what”, produced with final rising pitch (see Chapter 5). While these OIs lexico-syntactically “rule out” full-scope troubles, it is not always clear whether the “what” necessarily specifies the precise *source* of trouble or merely marks out a general domain of trouble. While the answers to these questions must be left for future research, hopefully the present chapter, and the research on which it builds, provides the conceptual and methodological tools to do so.

## 2.9 Coda and outlook

I would like to finish this chapter by briefly returning to the question of how one does an open-class repair request. In particular, to the linguistic forms one can use to deliver this particular type of OI. This chapter has followed the common practice of identifying OCRRs intuitively and/or formally. Repair requests like “who”, “he went where”, “what do you mean”, etc. and assertion-based OIs like “I can’t hear you” or “I don’t understand” were excluded as each of these forms offers an explicit account of the (putative) source and/or type of B’s trouble (cf. Drew, 1997, p. 72-3). It’s on the basis of this type of gross sorting that we’re left with “huh?”, “what?”, “sorry?”, “pardon?”, and the long list of formal variants mentioned in section 2.2. These, as noted, are typically taken to be the set of OCRRs.

However, what defines an open-class repair request is not its form, but what it does (or better doesn’t do). Two prior studies have argued that some OIs which “look” diagnostically open are not. They delimit B’s trouble, but in a linguistically subtle way. Robinson (2006) argues that by using an *apology* to initiate repair speaker B claims that they, rather than speaker A, are responsible for the trouble (see also Schegloff, 2005). In this way, “sorry?” and “I’m sorry?”, unlike “huh?” and “what?”, preclude the possibility that B’s trouble is that A has said something inappropriate, unacceptable, etc. Second, Selting (1996) argues that “was?” and “bitte?”, the German equivalents of “what?” and “pardon?”, are not always diagnostically open, even when produced with final rising pitch (see section 2). Certain clusters of pitch and loudness features can be employed to produce what she calls “astonished” OIs. Unlike prosodically “unmarked” OIs, these practices restrict the nature of the trouble to one of “a contrast or a contradiction derived from their own expectations with respect to [their] interlocutor’s prior talk” (p. 264) (A similar practice appears to exist in English, though it remains to be systematically documented).

Note that in both cases the author offers a cogent functional account for why *this* form—an apology or a form with “astonished” prosody—does the restrictive work that it does. The core issue, though, is that each provides strong evidence that these initiators are *treated differently* than OCRRs (cf. Section 2.7 above). For instance, Robinson (2006) found that across his large (n=101) collection of apology-based OIs most repairs were verbatim lexical repetitions; and most other repair types (including back downs, justifications etc.) were either absent or accountable. And Selting (1996) found that B-speakers treat hearing and/or

understanding repairs as inappropriate in response to their “astonished” OIs. Following such repairs, they typically push again with an action which maintains their claim of unexpectedness (see chapter 6 below for a similar phenomenon).

These studies have both substantive and methodological consequences for what follows. First, they provide clear evidence that OIs can restrict not only the source of B’s trouble (Schegloff et al, 1977, p. 377), but its *type*. This will be a recurrent theme among the following chapters. Second, they demonstrate that the diagnostic properties of an OI are intimately connected with its linguistic design, both at the lexico-syntactic and phonetic-prosodic levels. The upshot is that the functional-interactive analysis of OIs should ultimately be done hand in hand with a detailed formal-linguistic analysis. It is only then, when we compare like with like, that we will truly be able to describe the precise practices which participants use for signaling communicative troubles and initiating their repair.

### 3 | Bare Question Words

**Abstract:** With practices like “huh?”, “pardon?”, etc. as a backdrop, we now begin to explore how other-initiations of repair can offer a “diagnosis” of the trouble being signaled. Continuing with requests for repair, this chapter and the following two examine practices which use a “who”, “where”, “when”, etc. to classify the source of trouble. I begin with question words used on their own (this chapter) and then framed with repetition or other cohesive ties to troublesome talk (Chapters 4 and 5). I will argue that in both cases the final pitch movement of the repair request is diagnostically consequential. Both in the types of references they locate (e.g. names vs. pronouns) and the types of trouble they address (e.g. hearing vs. understanding), a “who?” (rising pitch) differs from a “who.” (falling pitch); a “who did?” from a “who did.”; a “Bob who?” from a “Bob who.” and so on. This work demonstrates the fundamental role played by prosody in the diagnostic “tuning” of other-initiations of repair.

#### 3.1 Introduction

Question words like “who”, “where” and “when” are among the most basic resources available for building requests for repair. Speakers rely on their classificatory semantics and grammatical properties to help locate the source of trouble (see Jefferson, 1972; Schegloff et al., 1977, p. 367; Clark & Schaefer, 1987; Selting, 1988; 1992; 1996; Egbert, 1996; Schegloff, 1997a; Sidnell, 2007; Egbert et al., 2009; among others). In this chapter I examine the use of “who” when it is produced on its own, as complete turn constructional unit (TCU). Requesting repair in this way, with a bare “who”, makes three broad claims about the source of trouble. At the most general level, it claims that the trouble is located in a part of the prior speaker’s talk. This differs from repair requests like “huh?” and “what?”, as well as “what do you mean” and “what did you say”, which can signal trouble with their prior TCU/action as a whole (see Chapter 2; Robinson & Kevoe-Feldman, 2010). Second, and more specifically, bare “who” claims that the trouble-source is a reference, indeed a *person* reference, here contrasting with “where”, “when”, but also “he what”, “to what”, etc. which locate other types of items (see Chapter 5). Finally, bare “who” claims that the trouble-source reference (TS-reference) is, in grammatical terms, either a subject or an object (direct, indirect or oblique). Compare this with “whose”, which grammatically restricts its target to a person



reference playing a possessing (genitive) role, e.g. “*Maya’s* slippers” or “*his* wife” (see section 3.5 below).<sup>1</sup>

We see this classificatory work in the word “who” itself, in its inherent semantic and grammatical properties. But we also see it in the types of repairs these requests receive. In extract 1 below, speaker A responds to B’s bare “who” with “Jared”, a repair of “he”, the person reference playing the role of subject in her prior TCU/action. Similarly, in extract 2, A’s “Percy” repeats (and thus repairs) her prior reference to Percy. As we will see, this pattern holds in the overwhelming majority of cases. Moreover, when A repairs something other than (or more than) a person reference, it is typically done for some particular, context-specific reason.

**Extract 1** [CallFriend-s4162, 22:09]

- 1 B: that is [a (.) (bi-)]  
 2 A: [ but **he** u]sed to work with Bill in Washington right  
 3 (0.2)  
 4 B: **who**  
 5 (0.6)  
 6 A: **Jared**  
 7 (.)  
 8 B: uh-uh ((*a disconfirmation*))

**Extract 2** [NB-Assassination1, 7:44]

- 1 B: u[h:  
 2 A: [(but) **Percy** goes with (.) Nixon I'd sure like that  
 3 (0.2)  
 4 B: **who**  
 5 (0.2)  
 6 A: **Percy**

What is clear, however, is that this gross level of diagnostic delimitation is seldom (if ever) sufficient to account for the *particular repairs* we find in response to a bare “who”. In offering “Jared” (extract 1) and “Percy” (extract 2), these speakers had to select from among multiple, distinct person references in their prior TCU/action (“he” and “Bill” in 1; “Percy”

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<sup>1</sup> The question word “whom”, which is grammatically restricted to non-subject (accusative) positions, is rare in present day English conversation. While it is occasionally used in framed repair requests (e.g. “met whom”; see Schegloff, 2007b, p. 105), I have not found any bare cases of “whom” used as a repair request (if it can be used in this way at all). For a discussion of the role of case-marking in German—a language with a much richer system—see Egbert (1996).

and “Nixon” in 2). They also had to choose a particular repair method, and hence diagnose a particular type of trouble (understanding via the specification of “he”; and hearing via the repetition of “Percy”). A fundamental question, then, is how A-speakers are able to arrive at a particular diagnosis of B’s trouble. What analytic resources are they relying on?

One reasonable answer is that speakers “fill in” these particulars on the basis of contextual features and pragmatic principles alone. We have seen, after all, speakers’ incredible capacity to do this in response to open-class repair requests like “huh?” and “what?” (Chapter 2). Without denying the fundamental role of contextual/pragmatic reasoning, this chapter will demonstrate that A-speakers are, in fact, getting considerably more help from speaker B than the minimal specifications outlined above. As we shall see, in fact, the B-speaker in 1 has strongly delimited both the source and nature of his trouble.

To see how this extra diagnostic work is being done, we need to *listen* to these repair requests. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 below show waveforms and pitch traces of the bare “who” in extract 1 and 2 respectively. In these and all figures, pitch traces were inspected for tracking errors, then plotted logarithmically relative to the speaker’s baseline and topline as calculated on the basis of one minute of their speech from the current interaction. These figures are created using PRAAT version 5.3.15 (Boersma & Weenink, 2012).

Figure 3.1 shows that the first “who” is produced with a falling pitch contour, 18 semitones (ST, see Chapter 1.4.2) in this case. Figure 3.2 shows that the second “who” is produced with a *rising* pitch contour (6 ST). In what follows, I will argue that this difference in pitch is diagnostically consequential. Falling bare-*who* (“who.”) and Rising bare-*who* (“who?”) make different claims about what is causing the trouble and why. I will first show that these practices target different *types* of person references for repair: pronouns and other “indexicals” in the case of “who.”; names and other “non-indexicals” in the case of “who?”. I will then show that these practices address different types of troubles. “Who?” can signal both problems in hearing and recognition, whereas “who.” unambiguously claims that the trouble is one of vagueness/underspecification. Finally, I will provide initial evidence that these differences extend to some other bare question words (“where”, “when”, etc.). This chapter builds on a line of research which recognizes the diagnostic import of the final pitch movement of repair requests. I will compare my findings to this previous literature in the concluding section.




Figure 3.1: The bare “who.” in Extract 1




Figure 3.2: The bare “who?” in Extract 2

My analysis is based on a collection of 26 cases of Rising Bare-*who* and 36 cases of Falling Bare-*who*, systematically extracted from my data set (see Chapter 1). What I describe in words as “falling pitch” and “rising pitch”, and symbolize with a period (“who.”) and question mark (“who?”), are both audible and acoustically measurable.<sup>2</sup> Among the Falling Bare-*whos*, the mean fall is 7.2 semitones (ST), with a maximum of 18.0ST and a minimum of 1.4ST. Similarly, among the Rising Bare-*whos*, the mean rise is 7.1ST, with a maximum of 16.1ST and a minimum of 1.5ST. It is important to note, however, that I have not conducted a full parametric phonetic analysis of these collections (see Kelly & Local, 1989a,b, Local &

<sup>2</sup> Due to poor recording quality and/or overlapping talk, 8 of the 36 cases of “who.”, and 5 of the 26 cases of “who?” were not measurable.

Walker, 2005; and Chapter 6 below). Further research is thus required to investigate the relevance of the remaining variation (or, of course, the lack of it).

### 3.2 Indexical vs. non-indexical references: The classifying work of final pitch

Both Falling Bare-*who* (“who.”) and Rising Bare-*who* (“who?”) request repair of references to people, whether to an individual (e.g. John Smith), a group (e.g. Harry and Veronica), or some kind of personified organization (e.g. the Tupperware Company, or an airline). In addition, they both overwhelmingly target *recognitional* person references – those which embody the claim that this recipient will be able to use this form, in this context, to identify the person(s) in question (Sacks & Schegloff, 1979; Schegloff, 1996b; Enfield & Stivers, 2007).<sup>3</sup> Critically, however, “who?” and “who.” do not target the same *kinds* of recognitional forms. Table 3.1 demonstrates.

FORM OF THE TROUBLE-SOURCE	RISING BARE-WHO	FALLING BARE-WHO
Name	19/26 (73%)	0
Coordinated reference	2/26 (8%)	0
Description	2/26 (8%)	3/36 (8%)
Implicit reference	0	2/36 (6%)
Pronoun	0	31/36 (86%)
<i>Mis-Fitted</i>	3/26 (12%)	0

**Table 3.1:** The type of references targeted for repair by “who?” and “who.”

<sup>3</sup> “Who?” (but not “who.”) is occasionally used to request repair of a *nonrecognitional* reference form, i.e. one which B is not expected to be able to use to identify the person in question. In the extract below, for instance, speaker A is telling B who he should contact for a job. He mentions a number of different people, including “a woman named Mina” (line 1). This nonrecognitional form is targeted for repair with a “who?”, rising 10 ST. A responds first by repeating the name (line 5) and then spelling it (line 6). He thus treats B’s trouble first as a hearing problem, and then (perhaps) as an unfamiliarity with the name itself. These nonrecognitional cases have not been included in the core collection (outlined in table 3.1), nor will they be considered any further.

1 A: um either one of them (.) or a woman named **Mina**  
 2 (0.4)  
 3 B: **who?**  
 4 (0.5)  
 5 A: **Mina**  
 6 A: .hhhhhhh M I N A ((*spelled out*))  
 7 (0.3)  
 8 A: okay [CallHome-4829, 0:41]

Consider first the 26 cases of Rising Bare-*who* (middle column). Three quarters ( $n = 19$ ) target references done by names, whether a first name (“Shelly”), last name (“Percy”), binomial (“Sal Einstein”), or nickname (“Kamu” for Kim). The remaining target recognitional descriptions (“Sibbie’s sister”) or coordinated references (“Harry and Tabatha”). Critically, there are no cases of “who?” which target a pronoun (unless as part of a coordinated reference, as in “*him* and his Mom”). In fact, a comparison extracts 3 and 4 below—coded as “Mis-fitted”—suggests that “who?” simply cannot do this.

**Extract 3** [CallFriend-s6855, 17:00]

1 B: quit now Ken you get pissed off at me ((*off phone to Ken*))  
 2 [for doing it]  
 3 A: [ it's been] so pitiful here at work  
 4 (0.3)  
 5 B: who?  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 6 (0.4)  
 7 A: pitiful ((*begins projected story about work*))

**Extract 4** [CallFriend-n5615, 13:40]

1 A: yeah I need to call her  
 2 B: .hhhh and xx [something must be going o]n  
 3 A: [specially since (it's all)]  
 4 A: .hhhh I'll call her today since I'll be around this weekend  
 5 B: hhhhhh who?  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 6 (0.5)  
 7 A: since I'll be around- what's wrong with my phone

The B-speaker in 3 was talking to her boyfriend off phone immediately preceding, and indeed in overlap with, A’s “it’s been pitiful here at work” (line 3). Evidently her hearing of this TCU was so poor that she mistakenly thought it contained a person reference. Speaker A responds to B’s mis-fitted “who?” by repeating the core of her prior TCU (“pitiful”, line 7). Compare this with extract 4. Again, A treats B’s “who?” as grounded in a substantial mishearing of the prior TCU. She offers a broad scope repetition, and then cuts off and explicitly formulates the presence of an acoustic problem (“since I’ll be around- what’s wrong with my phone”, line 7). Critically, however, here A’s prior TCU *does* contain a person

reference, a *pronoun* (“her”, line 4; see also 1 and 3).<sup>4</sup> The fact that A treats this “who?” as “mis-fitted” provides additional evidence that this practice simply cannot target this form of person reference.

Now, contrast this with the 36 cases of Falling Bare-*who* (right column, Table 3.1). Here, the vast majority (86%, n = 31) do target pronouns, mostly to third persons (“she”, “him”, “them”, etc.) but occasionally also to speaker B (“you”) or to collectives involving speaker A (“we”). Three cases target semantically minimal descriptions: two cases of “that girl”; and one case of “the three of us”. The final two target references which are in one way or another “implicit” in the prior TCU. This includes a “zero”, i.e. a semantically presupposed but syntactically unexpressed reference playing a core clausal role (“I called by the way” meaning “I called *them*”); and a reference picked up by “ellipsis” from the preceding talk (“I did” meaning “I did *have to send him stuff*”). Critically, no cases target names, coordinated references, or descriptions like “Sarah’s cousin”, “my friend”, or “her doctor”.

Despite working within the same broad domain, “who.” and “who?” do not target the same types of recognitional references. Instead they mark out two coherent sub-classes. The “who.” sub-class consists of semantically minimal forms which claim that their referent is highly available in the current context, typically because they are anaphoric (referring again to someone mentioned before) or deictic (referring to one of the participants for instance). In contrast, the reference forms targeted by “who?”—names, kinship terms, and “heavier” descriptions—do not claim/require this level of contextual accessibility. They simply presume that the referent can be identified on the basis of the form offered (but see note 4). I shall refer to these two sub-classes of recognitional reference forms as “indexicals” (following Egbert et al., 2009’s study of “what.”, discussed below) and “non-indexicals” (for lack of a better term).

Whatever the precise nature of this difference, the fact that there *is* a difference has two important consequences. First, despite their remarkable linguistic similarity, “who?” and “who.” are not *pragmatic alternatives* (see Chapter 1). That is, there is seldom if ever an interactional/sequential context in which a B-speaker can (or must) choose between them. If, for instance, speaker B is having trouble with the person reference in “Bob came by

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<sup>4</sup> It also contains the first person pronominal reference “I”. Unlike the *plural* “we”, I do not have any cases in which this form is targeted for repair by speaker B.

yesterday” then the options available are “who?”, “who did?”, “who’s Bob.”, “which Bob.”, “Bob?”, “your brother?”, “I don’t know who that is.”, etc. (and of course “huh?” or “what?”). Falling Bare-*who* (“who.”) is no more a possibility here than “where?” is. Second, this sub-classification is highly relevant for A-speakers. Knowing what *kind* of person reference the trouble-source is can help them locate it. Consider the following two extracts.

**Extract 5** [reprint of extract 1 above]

1 B: that is [a (.) (bi-)  
 2 A: [but **he** used to work with Bill in Washington right  
 3 (0.2)  
 4 B: **who.**  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 5 (0.6)  
 6 A: **Jared.**  
 7 (.)  
 8 B: uh-uh ((no))

**Extract 6** [see extract 17 below for more context]

1 A: **they** said that **Phillips** got uhm (0.5) knee walking drunk at  
 2 the reception  
 3 (0.5)  
 4 B: **who?**  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 5 (0.3)  
 6 A: **Phillips**

In each case, speaker B’s repair request follows an action which contains multiple references to distinct people (marked in **bold**). At this gross level of description, it would appear that there is some ambiguity as to which reference is being targeted (as suggested above). Critically, however, in each case one of the references is indexical (“he”, “they”) and the other is not (“Bill”, “Phillips”). Consequently, the A-speaker in extract 5 can be assured that B’s “who.” (falling pitch) is targeting “he”, not “Bill”. And conversely in 6, that B’s “who?” (rising pitch) is targeting “Phillips”, not “they”.

Examples like 5 and 6 demonstrate the power of “who.” and “who?” to discriminate between what otherwise might be thought to be competing targets in the prior talk. This delimitation of the trouble-source is done via a sub-classification of the various ways of referring to people—indexicals on the one hand, and names and other less contextually

bound forms on the other. In many ways, this split mirrors the classificatory work done by the system of question words (“who”, “where”, “when”, etc.). In extract 2, speaker A needn’t consider his *place* reference (“Washington”) as a possible trouble-source precisely because the B-speaker in 2 requested repair with a “who”.<sup>5</sup> The “who.” vs. “who?” sub-classification is similar, though critically: (1) it is based on contextual rather than inherent properties (indexicality vs. descriptive category); and (2) it is achieved *intonationally* rather than lexically.

While both robust and powerful, this delimitation does not always uniquely locate the trouble-source reference. In extract 2 above, B’s “who?” follows a TCU/action with two named references, and hence two candidate targets (“but **Percy** goes with **Nixon** I’d sure like that”; as noted by Jefferson, 1972, p. 296; Heritage, 1984a; p. 317; Enfield, 2013). This type of “ambiguity” is not uncommon in my collection. Four of the Rising Bare-*whos* follow a TCU/action with multiple non-indexical person references to distinct people, and seven of the Falling Bare-*whos* follow an action with multiple indexicals. Thus in roughly one in five cases, speaker A must go beyond the linguistic form of B’s request, relying on context and/or pragmatic principles to work out the source of B’s trouble.

In sum, when used to request repair, a bare “who” does more to delimit the trouble-source than we would expect on the basis of its lexical form alone. If produced with final falling pitch (“who.”), it signals trouble with a pronoun or some other “indexical” person reference. If produced with final rising pitch (“who?”) it signals trouble with a name or other “non-indexical”. This provides a first key difference between these two practices. The following two sections will illustrate that these practices also differ fundamentally in how they diagnose the *type* of B’s trouble.

### 3.3 Signaling troubles in hearing or recognition with “who?”

#### 3.3.1. Introduction

When a recipient requests repair with a Rising Bare-*who* (“who?”), they do not offer a clear, unambiguous diagnosis of what type of trouble they are having. This was first observed by

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<sup>5</sup> This is not to say that there isn’t some level of construal required on the part of the participants. A business, for instance, can sometimes be treated as a “who”, a “what”, or a “where”.



Heritage (1984a). In an analysis of the “Percy” example above, he notes that B’s “who?” fails to “discriminate the *type* of trouble being proposed as either a hearing problem or a recognition problem” (p. 317). Drawing on a wider range of examples, Sidnell (2010) similarly observes that “who?” can signal either a trouble in hearing or recognition failure (p. 125; see also 2007, p. 307). These authors note that in designing their repairs, A-speakers must necessarily make a choice between these two alternative trouble-types. This introduces the contingency that their diagnosis may fail, and that the repair sequence will be expanded (see also Sacks & Schegloff, 1979, p. 20-21; Levinson, 2007; Enfield, 2013).

In this section I will develop these observations. Based on a systematic analysis of 26 instances of “who?”, I will demonstrate that participants do indeed orient to the possibility of these two alternative trouble-types. There is a diagnostic ambiguity or “openness” inherent in this repair request (albeit of significantly more restricted type than that found in “huh?”, “what?” etc., see Chapter 2).

### 3.3.2 Alternative recognitional vs. repetitions: Two distinct types of repair

Faced with a Rising Bare-*who*, A-speakers sometimes offer a different recognitional form than the one first offered. Having given a name, they give a kinship triangulation (“Janet” ← “Sarah’s sister”, see Sidnell, 2007, p. 284) or a different name (see below). This method of repair—an alternative recognitional—diagnoses B’s trouble as “a failure to locate [the] referent on the basis of the form used” (ibid; see also Sidnell, 2010 p. 124-5; Stivers, 2007). Extract 7 below offers an example from my collection.

#### **Extract 7** [CallFriend-s6629, 2:28]

1 A: you heard from **Kamu** hh  
 2 (0.4)  
 3 B: **who?**  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 .....  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 4 (.)  
 5 A: **Kim**  
 6 (0.2)  
 7 A: that little Kim  
 10 (1.3)  
 11 B: yeah  
 12 (1.0)  
 13 A: Ka- I call her Kamu sh@e gets so ma@d a@t me @ @ @

14 (0.5)  
 15 A: .hhhhhhhhh  
 16 (1.2)  
 17 B: Robert (and them xx) come up last night

This extract opens with A checking if B has heard from a mutual friend (line 1). He goes on to confirm that he has (line 11), and to report that this friend's partner had in fact visited the previous night (line 17). The delivery of this news is delayed, however. At line 3, B requests repair with "who?", rising 5ST over its production (see the in-line pitch trace). The problem, it seems, is that A has referred to their friend using a form which is evidently unfamiliar to B ("Kamu" is speaker A's teasing, diminutive pet name for this person; see line 7 and 13). A explicitly addresses this (possible) recognition failure by referring to this person again using her normal, everyday name ("Kim", line 5).

Compare this method of repair with the one given in the "Percy" case (reprinted below). As noted, A responds to B's "who?" by re-issuing the *same* recognitional form ("Percy" ← "Percy"). In this way, A re-asserts her claim that B can identify this person, on this basis of this form. She diagnoses a hearing trouble, not recognition trouble.

**Extract 8** [reprint of extract 2]

1 B: u[h:.  
 2 A: [(but) Percy goes with (.) Nixon I'd sure like that  
 3 (0.2)  
 4 B: who  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 .....  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 5 (0.2)  
 6 A: Percy

The fact that Rising Bare-*whos* receive both recognition-repairs (alternative recognitionals) and hearing-repairs (repetitions) provides evidence that this practice is diagnostically open to both these types of trouble (as Sidnell 2007; 2010 notes). Also note that both types of repairs are produced straightforwardly, i.e. without any hesitation or self-repair. This suggests that they are both normal, appropriate ways of responding to this type of repair request (see Chapter 2).

A relevant question, however, is how *often* these two repair-methods are produced. Table 3.2 below outlines what happens immediately following the Rising Bare-*whos* in my collection, excluding the three "mis-fitted" cases (see section 3.2 above). Twenty two of the 23

cases are responded to with a repair. Of these cases, 82% (n=18) are (or include) repetitions of the trouble-source (TS) reference, and only 9% (n=2) are alternative recognitionals. Recognition-repairs are thus significantly less common than hearing-repairs. While this does not make them any less real, or consequential for our argument, it does suggest that we should search out additional evidence.

TYPE OF RESPONSE	NUMBER OF INSTANCES
Repair	22/23 (95%)
Repetition of TS-reference	18/22 (82%)
Alternative Recognitional	2/22 (9%)
Other Repairs	2/22 (9%)
No Response	1/23 (4%)

**Table 3.2:** Response types for Rising Bare-*who* (“who?”)

Additional evidence can be found by looking more closely at the 18 repetition cases. In the way these repairs are both designed and treated, participants regularly orient to their (possible) inadequacy in resolving B’s trouble. First, I will show that A-speakers often (n=8) follow up repetitions with a second repair which explicitly addresses a possible recognition failure (see Heritage, 1984a; Sacks & Schegloff, 1979). Similarly, B-speakers sometimes (n=3) respond to A’s repetition by requesting (or offering) a recognition-repair themselves. These cases of “misdiagnosis” (or presumed misdiagnosis) provide considerable additional evidence that “who?” can signal recognition failure (cf. Chapter 2.6). Finally, I will argue that repetitions of the trouble-source reference, at least when they are bare (cf. embedded in a more substantial turn), can be delivered with “uncertainty”. I will offer evidence that producing a repetition with final rising pitch (or “try making”, see below) anticipates a possible recognition failure, and thus casts some degree of doubt on their diagnosis of a hearing trouble. The 7 cases of try-marked repetitions (see Table 3.3 below) thus provide further evidence of the diagnostic ambiguity of “who?”.

TYPE OF REPETITION	NUMBER OF INSTANCES
Bare, with try-marking	7/18 (39%)
Bare, without try-marking	10/18 (56%)
Embedded in longer repair turn	1/18 (6%)

**Table 3.3:** The types of repetition repairs following Rising Bare-*who* (“who?”)

The remainder of this section examines the “bare” repetitions in my collection. After a brief review of prior work on try-marking, I consider the 10 cases produced *without* try-marking (i.e. with final falling or flat pitch); and then the 7 cases with try-marking. Demonstrating that and how these two sets of cases differ provides important evidence that rising pitch is indeed meaningful. I will then conclude by briefly offering a few further sources of evidence that “who?” is indeed ambiguous between these two types of trouble.

### 3.3.3 Try-marking and epistemic stance

Sacks & Schegloff (1979) describe a practice by which a speaker can “test” a recognitional reference form: “If a speaker anticipates that the recognitional form being used will, on this occasion, for this recipient, *possibly be inadequate for securing recognition*” (p. 18, emphasis added) they can signal this uncertainty by producing the reference “with an upward intonation contour, followed by a brief pause” (ibid.). This practice, which they call “try marking”, launches a small sequence of action, embedded within the ongoing talk (Schegloff, 2007b, p. 237-240). If the recipient *can* identify the person on the basis of this form, they should indicate this (e.g. with a nod or an “uh huh”); otherwise, the speaker can contingently add additional materials to help secure recognition.

Try-marking is routinely mentioned in the literature, both within and outside CA, but many questions remain as to how precisely it works. For instance, it is unclear if try-marking is discrete or continuous, (i.e. if higher pitch indexes greater uncertainty). It is also unclear in precisely which linguistic/sequential contexts producing a person reference with rising intonation, followed by pause, delivers this action (claiming uncertainty and eliciting a display of recognition). These problems aside, I will now argue that this account largely fits with what we find in the repair sequences generated by Rising Bare-*who* (“who?”). When speaker A repeats the TS-reference with final falling (or flat) pitch (i.e. *without* try-marking) they claim relative confidence or certainty that B knows this person, in this way. They are thus confident in their diagnosis of hearing problem only. However, when they produce a repetition with final *rising* pitch (i.e. *with* try-marking), A claims some level of uncertainty. Although diagnosing a hearing problem (via the repetition), they anticipate the possibility of a recognition failure (via the try marking). In this sequential context at least, there is a paradigmatic contrast between these two prosodic designs, each indexing a distinct *epistemic*

*stance* (which may or may not be congruent with the speaker's actual state of knowledge or *epistemic status*; see Heritage, 2012a).

Similar precedent for this analysis can be found in prior work on the prosodic design of repair initiations, specifically candidate hearing or understanding checks. Bolden (2010) argues that "rising intonation [...] suggests a wider epistemic gap between the speaker and the addressee, while falling intonation displays the speaker's stronger epistemic stance" (p. 11). This, in turn, fits with the general observation that across a number of polar (yes-no) type actions the selection of a final pitch movement indexes the degree (or "gradient") of the gap in knowledge between the participants (see Couper-Kuhlen, 2012; Raymond, 2010; Heritage & Raymond, 2012).

### 3.3.4 Repetitions without try-marking: Indexing diagnostic confidence

We begin with repetitions of the TS-reference produced with final falling or flat pitch (i.e. *without* try-marking). Extract 9 below provides a first example. The focal repair sequence begins with B's "who?" at line 19.

#### **Extract 9** [CallHome-4325, 20:51]

1 A: um Maria is pregnant  
 2 (0.4)  
 3 B: oh is she  
 4 (.)  
 5 A: mhm  
 6 (0.5)  
 7 A: .thhhh and I think Sarah: (.) and her husband  
 8 have finally separated  
 9 (0.4)  
 10 B: oh you're kidding  
 --- 7.7 seconds removed ---  
 11 B: that's too bad  
 12 (0.2)  
 13 B: mhm  
 14 (1.5)  
 15 B: an:d (0.4)  
 16 B: well at [least she's]  
 17 A: [ **Shawna's**] doing okay  
 18 (0.3)

19 B: who?  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 20 ( 0 . 3 )  
 21 A: Shawna.

Speaker A has been updating B about their mutual cousins: first Maria (lines 1-5) and then Sarah (lines 7-13). At line 15 and 17 she moves on to a next cousin (“and” + “Shawna’s doing okay”). Speaker B requests repair with a Rising Bare-*who* (“who?”, line 19), and speaker A repeats her reference (“Shawna”, line 21). This repair is not try-marked. A’s pitch drops 2ST from the first syllable (“Sherr-”) to the second (“y”), and then remains relatively flat (see Figure 3.3 below; this prosodic feature is symbolized with a period in the transcript).




Figure 3.3: The non-try-marked repair in extract 9

My argument is that this repair method—a repetition *without* try-marking—indexes relative confidence that this reference form is adequate. A claims that B knows this person, and knows her *as* “Shawna”. In this way, she unambiguously and confidently diagnoses B’s trouble as one of hearing this reference. Evidence can be found by considering both the precise contexts in which this repair method is deployed (i.e. above and beyond being produced in response to a “who?”); and how it is subsequently treated.

The following contextual features in extract 9 make it likely that A would be confident that B’s “who?” signaled a problem hearing (not recognizing) the TS-reference. First, Shawna is A and B’s cousin, giving A strong interaction-external grounds to belief B knows her, and knows her as “Shawna” (see Robinson 2013 for relevant discussion). Second, A and B have been engaged in an extended discussion of their other cousins. This provides strong activity-

based expectations that *this* “Shawna” is cousin Shawna. Third, B was talking when the troublesome talk, and indeed TS-reference was produced (“[Shawna’s] doing okay”, see line 15). This overlap may well have interfered with B’s hearing this reference (see Schegloff, 2000b). Finally, note that B’s repair request was produced rather promptly, only three tenths of a second following the possible completion of the troublesome unit of talk. There is some indication in the literature that repair requests addressing hearing troubles are produced sooner than those addressing understanding and acceptability troubles (see Robinson, 2006; Sidnell, 2007; 2010). In sum, this non-try-marked repetition was produced in a context in which speaker A has strong grounds, external and internal to the interaction, to believe that B’s trouble is not one of recognition, but of hearing. The same holds for many other cases in the collection (though systematic comparison here is difficult). Additional, and arguably stronger evidence can be found in how A-speakers subsequently *treat* their non-try-marked repetitions.

By requesting repair speaker B suspends the ongoing activity. This makes a resumption of this activity the next relevant action following speaker A’s repair. When speaker B does not do so, this may index their continued trouble. On this basis, A-speakers sometimes offer a second repair in this emerging transition space. Often the second repair differs from the first, indexing A’s “doubt” in their initial diagnosis (see Chapter 2.6 on “revised repairs”). As we shall see below, A-speakers regularly follow up *try-marked* repetitions with a recognition-repair. In contrast, this happens only once in the 10 cases of *non-try-marked* repetitions in my collection (extract 10 below). The fact that A-speakers regularly “hold firm” provides strong evidence they were indeed (claiming to be) confident in their diagnosis of a hearing trouble. The “Shawna” example is particularly telling in this regard. The extract below shows the continuation of this sequence.

#### Continuation of extract 9

17 A: [Shawna's] doing okay  
 18 (0.3)  
 19 B: who?  
 20 (0.3)  
 21 A: Shawna.  
 22 (0.4)  
 23 B: [.hh  
 24 A: [.hhhhh (yeah)/(hear) she's doing okay

25 (0.2)  
 26 B: how about Vivian

Following speaker A's non-try-marked repetition ("Shawna.", line 20), speaker B should respond to the announcement that "Shawna's doing okay" (line 16). She does not and a small gap emerges (line 21). Speaker A inhales (perhaps providing further opportunity for a response), and then re-issues her announcement (line 23). Critically, she pronominalizes her reference to Shawna ("*she's* doing okay"). It's clear, then, that this action, whether pursuing a response or moving to close down this sequence, was *not* designed to address a possible recognition failure. Speaker A is—and with her non-try marked repetition was—claiming confidence that this form is sufficient; that B's "who?" was signaling a hearing trouble only (and indeed, it seems she was correct, see line 25).

The one exception to this pattern of "holding firm" is the "Percy" example, reprinted below with additional context. Here, speaker A *does* offer a recognition repair following a non-try-marked repetition. It is interesting to note, however, that there is considerable orientation from both parties that B *can* identify the person in question.

**Extract 10** [continuation of extract 2 above]

1 B: u[h:.  
 2 A: [(but) Percy goes with (.) Nixon I'd sure like that  
 3 (0.2)  
 4 B: who?  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 5 (0.2)  
 6 A: Percy.  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 7 (0.4)  
 8 A: that young fella that- uh (0.5) his daughter was murdered  
 ((See Figure 3.4 below))  
 9 (0.7)  
 10 B: .hhh[OH:: YE::AH:=  
 11 A: [(they)/(and)  
 12 B: =YE:A[H y-]  
 13 [ they] said something about his going together on  
 14 the ticket

The participants, two middle-aged sisters, are discussing the then-upcoming 1969 American presidential election. In line 2 speaker A refers to Nixon's possible running mate,



senator Charles Percy, by last name (“Percy”). Speaker B requests repair with “who?”, and A repeats the same reference form (“Percy.”, line 6). This repair is not try-marked. There is a 5 ST downstep in pitch from “Per-” to “-cy”, and it falls a further 5 ST over the course of this second syllable (see the in-line pitch trace following line 6).

Following A’s repair, a small gap emerges (line 7), and she speaks again, offering a second reference to this person (“that young fella that uh (0.5) his daughter was murdered”). By shifting from a name to a description, A orients to the possibility B may *not* be able to identify this person by last name alone; that the problem may be *more* than just hearing (as noted by Heritage, 1984a, p. 317; Enfield, 2013, p. 445-7). Nonetheless two features of this second repair suggest that A is maintaining a relatively strong claim that B can identify this person. First, this recognition-based second repair, unlike most (see below), is not (fully) try-marked (pace Enfield, 2013). As Figure 3.4 below illustrates, the final portion of this reference is produced with relatively flat, mid level pitch. There is a small 0.6 ST step-up from “mur-” to “dered”, but this is still 0.6 ST lower than the peak in the second syllable of “daughter”. Thus, while not falling, it is certainly not rising. Speaker A, it seems, is maintaining some degree of confidence that B can recognize the person.<sup>6</sup>




Figure 3.4: The second repair (line 8) in extract 10

<sup>6</sup> It may well be that this repair is poised between try-marking and non-try marking. Either try-marking is discrete, and this is done to avoid/mask A’s choice; or try-marking is gradient, and A is doing “mid-level” confidence. Again, try-marking demands a systematic study.

The second feature, noted by Enfield (2013), is the use of the determiner “that” rather than “the”. This device, the “recognitional demonstrative”, appeals to some personally shared access to the reference. It claims that this is someone *we* know through common experience: “you know *that* guy”, “remember *that* guy”, etc. (Ariel, 1990; Himmelman, 1996). Consequently, although A is pulling back from her claim of “common ground” by repairing her name-only reference, she may be “nonetheless still explicitly appealing to that common ground by using the recognitional demonstrative form “that”” (Enfield, 2013, p. 447). In sum, through both the prosodic and lexico-syntactic design of her second repair speaker A maintains a claim of confidence in B’s ability to recognize this person.

Note further that following this second repair, a second, longer gap develops (line 10). This could once again index speaker B’s continued trouble with this reference, and prompt a *third* repair (cf. extract 6 below). While A does speak again here (line 11), it appears that this cut-off production—whether “and” (Heritage, 1984) or “they” (Enfield, 2013)—was not another repair but a first attempt at the action she subsequently produces in line 13 (“they said something about ...”). By moving to resume the suspended course of action, speaker A *presumes* the success of her repairs, and so, B’s ability to recognize this person (as in extract 9 above). Finally, note that in overlap, speaker B claims recognition of this person (“yeah”) and indexes prior trouble in achieving it (“oh”, Heritage, 1984a; 2007, p. 266). She produces this receipt in a rather exaggerated manner—with a very high pitch onset, a wide pitch range, high intensity, and considerable stretching (also note the re-doing of “yeah” in line 12; see Stivers, 2004). B thus orients *strongly* to the fact that she does know this person. Retrospectively, then, there is evidence that A was right to be confident that B knows Percy (or, alternatively, when faced with this claim of confidence, B responds in aligning manner).

In sum, A-speakers often respond to a Rising Bare-*who* by repeating the TS-reference, and doing so with final falling (or flat) pitch. The evidence presented here suggests that this method of repair not only diagnoses a hearing trouble, but claims (relative) confidence that

nothing further will be required.<sup>7</sup> And indeed in most of these cases nothing else *is* required. We now turn to cases in which speaker A offers a repetition of the TS-reference, but anticipates that this repair may *not* be sufficient. By indexing two distinct types of trouble— hearing (via the repetition) and recognition failure (via the try-marking)—speaker A orients to the possibility that B’s “who?” may be signaling either.

### 3.3.5 Repetition with try-marking: Indexing diagnostic uncertainty

Extract 11 below offers a first example of a try-marked repetition, offered in response to Rising Bare-*who* (“who?”). The focal repair sequence begins at line 13.

#### Extract 11 [CallFriend-n6255, 8:44]


- 1 A: yeah I got a picture of Sarah Wilson's little baby  
 2 (0.3)  
 3 B: oh have you  
 4 (0.4)  
 5 A: yeah  
 6 (0.5)  
 7 A: (it's) really cute  
 8 (0.2)  
 9 B: yeah hh  
 10 (1.5)  
 11 A: and then Kelly sent me a picture of all of her little kids  
 12 (1.1)  
 13 B: who?  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 14 (0.4)  
 15 A: Kelly?

Speaker A is telling her father about receiving pictures from her friends, first from “Sarah Wilson” (line 1) and now “Kelly” (line 11). Following this second announcement, her father

<sup>7</sup> Additional evidence can be found by considering the prosodic design of *non-repetition* repairs. First, both of the alternative-recognition repairs in my collection of Rising Bare-*who* (see table 1) are produced with final falling pitch. A’s “Kim” repair in extract 7, for instance, falls 7ST. Recall that the trouble in this case was B’s unfamiliarity with the nickname she had used (“Kamu”). Speaker A had every reason to believe that B knows Kim, and knows her by her normal name. Similarly, as we shall see below, the repairs produced in response to “who.” (Falling Bare-*who*) are (almost) always produced with final falling pitch. In both these cases, the possibility of non-recognition is not relevant (or at least highly reduced), and speaker A does indeed produce their repair *without* try-marking. (Note, then, that this practice—achieved prosodically—appears to be “separable” from the lexico-syntactic form of the repair. This fits with the literature mentioned in section 3.3.3 above.)

requests repair with “who?” (line 13). A responds with a *try-marked* repetition of her reference to Kelly (“Kelly?”, line 15). This repair is produced with (strongly) rising final pitch, rising 10 ST over the syllable “-y” (see Figure 3.5 below; this is symbolized as a question mark in the transcript).

This repair method, I am arguing, is a practice for indexing relative diagnostic uncertainty. By repeating her initial reference form, A maintains some claim that this form is referentially adequate. By try-marking it, she anticipates that it might not be. To support this analysis we can again consider the contexts in which these try-marked-repetition repairs are deployed, comparing them with the non-try marked cases. Note that here, Kelly is a friend of B’s only, not a mutual friend or a family member; the TS-reference is not overlapped; and B’s “who?” is relatively delayed (1.1 seconds). Any or all of these features may have provided A with a reason to anticipate that her father’s trouble may be a recognition failure, not a hearing trouble.





**Figure 3.5:** The try-marked repair in extract 11

Further and arguably stronger evidence can be found in the participants’ subsequent treatment of these repairs. Recall that following non-try-marked repetitions A-speakers overwhelmingly (in 9 of 10 cases) “stand firm” in their diagnosis of a hearing trouble. In contrast, in 5 of the 7 cases of try-marked cases, speaker A expands their turn with a second repair which explicitly addresses possible recognition failure. Whether with an alternative recognitional (“Phillips” ← “Pat Benson’s husband”, extract 17 below); a clausal description (“Jenny Poppin” ← “she was in my classes last year”, extract 12); or a last name (“Gary” ←

“Wilson”, extract 13), speaker A provides B with additional resources to identify the person in question, thus casting “doubt” on their initial analysis of a hearing trouble. The continuation of the “Kelly” case, presented below, provides a first illustration.

### Continuation of extract 11

- 15 A: Kelly?  
  
 16 (0.7)  
 17 A: Kelly Nelson?  
  
 18 (0.6)  
 19 B: oh Kelly of (.) her kids okay  
 20 A: yeah  
 21 (0.6)  
 22 B: okay

As noted, A responds to B’s “who?” with a try-marked repetition of “Kelly?” (line 15). A gap emerges and she offers a second repair—a try-marked<sup>8</sup> “Kelly Nelson?” (line 16). By providing this person’s last name, she now explicitly addresses the possibility that B may not, after all, be able to identify this person on the basis of her first name alone. By try-marking this second repair, she anticipates that perhaps even *this* will be insufficient. She thus offers a different diagnosis of B’s trouble—it’s not (only) a hearing problem, but a recognition failure. Following a second gap (line 18), speaker B claims recognition and the sequence resumes (line 19).



Extract 12 provides a second example. Here, speaker A is ultimately unable to identify the person in question (or at least is unwilling to fully claim that she has).

### Extract 12 [CallHome-6825, 17:21]

- 1 A: and the other- other thing that went on toda-  
 2 well other than the swing party that's going to be tonight  
 3 .hhhhh that happened today which is kind of unnerving

<sup>8</sup> Interestingly, this second repair is produced with less final rising pitch than the first, rising 4ST over the final syllable (“Kelly Nelson”, max 310 Hertz) compared to 10ST (“Kelly”, max 395 Hertz). This “drop” in pitch, which can be seen in the inline pitch traces, is comparable with the other cases in my collection. This could, perhaps, index A’s greater certainty given the extra referential material, supporting the idea that try marking is gradient. Alternatively, it could be a product of its sequential position (i.e. being produced second).

4 [is  
5 B: [(and) I'm sorry I'm not going to be there  
6 A: Sal Einstein got married  
7 (1.2)


8 B: who?  
  
9 (0.2)  
10 A: Sal Einstein? h  
  
11 (0.2)  
12 A: .hhhhh she's in like (.) in our class  
13 she was in my classes last year  
14 (1.5)  
15 A: um you probably don't know her hhh  
16 (0.8)  
17 B: I know the name  
18 (0.5)  
19 B: x[x xx]  
20 A: [um ]  
21 (0.2)  
22 A: .t (.) hangs out with like you know (0.4) Jen  
23 and Sandy and Geoff  
24 (0.2)  
25 A: .hhhhh um[:] short [she has l]ike long: hair c- (0.5)=  
26 B: [m] [okay ]  
27 A: =not really long .hhhhh um curly black hair  
28 (0.7)  
29 B: mhm  
30 (0.3)  
31 A um h (0.3)  
32 B: who'd she get married to

Following some preliminaries (line 1-4), A announces that “Sal Einstein” has just got married (line 6). B requests repair with “who?” (line 8); and A responds with a try-marked repetition of this name, rising 3ST over the final syllable (“Sal Einstein?”, see in-line pitch trace). A gap emerges (line 11), and A then offers a recognition-repair, in this case a description (“...she was in my classes last year”, lines 12-13). A second gap develops, and A expands his turn once more, now explicitly formulating A’s likely inability to recognize this person (“you probably don’t know her”, line 15). Following an ambivalent response from B (“I know the name”, line 18; see Heritage, 2007), A makes a number of further attempts (lines 22-3, 25-27 and perhaps 31). Still not having claimed recognition, B closes the repair sequence (line 32).

Again, this sequential development supports the argument that A's try-marked repetition indexed his diagnostic uncertainty in the face of B's Rising Bare-*who*. The same is true of this next, and final example. This sequence is regularly mentioned in the literature. My hearing of the repair turn, and hence my analysis, differs however.<sup>9</sup>

**Extract 13** [NB-1-1-1/Golf, 0:00]


1 B: hello  
 2 A: hello is Johnny there  
 3 (0.4)  
 4 B: oo just (0.2) who?  
 5 (0.2)  
 6 A: Johnny?=  
 7 =Wil[son  
 8 B: [oo just a minute



Speaker A has called to speak to his friend, but someone else (speaker B) has answered the phone. In line 2, A asks B if he can speak to “Johnny”. B begins to respond but cuts off and requests repair with a Rising Bare-*who* (“oo just (0.2) who?”, line 4). Speaker A responds with a try-marked repetition of this person’s first name (“Johnny?”, line 6). Immediately following the possible completion of this repair, he offers a second: Johnny’s last name (“Wilson”, line 7).<sup>10</sup> Figure 3.6 below illustrates the temporal and prosodic relationship between these utterances. Note the rising pitch across “Johnny” (7ST); the final lengthening of “-y”; and the pitch reset at the beginning of “Wilson”. A pitch trace of “-son” is unavailable due to overlap, but it is audibly rising.

<sup>9</sup> This example was first discussed in Schegloff & Sacks (1979). There, and in all subsequent discussion (e.g. Levinson, 1987; Stivers et al., 2007; Sidnell, 2010), the TS-reference is transcribed as a nickname (e.g. “Curly” or “Shorty”), likely on the basis of Gail Jefferson’s original transcription of this call. A’s repair is thus treated as a (try-marked) alternative recognitional, not a repetition. As extract 13 reflects, my hearing is that they are in fact the *same* reference form. Beyond their extreme phonetic similarity, there is some evidence for this hearing in the subsequent talk. When Johnny picks up the phone a few moments later, A checks if it is him (see Schegloff, 1986). Critically, he does so with the name Johnny, as Jefferson herself transcribes (“Johnny?”). If A *does* have a nickname for Johnny, we would surely expect him to use it here, when addressing him. Moreover, A self-identifies as “Guy Dutweiler” rather than just “Guy”, suggesting some level of formality in their relationship.

<sup>10</sup> Note that here A’s second repair is a bare last name (“Wilson?”). In extract 11 above, it was a binominal reference (“Kelly Nelson?”). By redoing the person’s first name, this latter repair is arguably “mixing” their recognition-repair with a second hearing repair (see Chapter 2). It is possible, then, that relative to the bare last name this design embodies an even stronger claim that B *can* identify this person on the basis of their first name alone (and A claims precisely this in his receipt; “oh Kelly”, line 19).



**Figure 3.6:** The first and second repairs in extract 13

As in the previous two examples, speaker A follows up his try-marked repetition with additional recognitional material. While it is of little consequence to our argument (see Chapter 2.6), in this case this second repair was evidently unnecessary. In overlap with, and so perhaps uninformed by A's "Wilson", speaker B responds to A's request ("oo just a minute", line 7). By resuming the suspended activity, she tacitly indicates that A's first repair (the repetition) was sufficient. She *could* recognize this person (her husband!) on the basis of his first name only (see Sacks & Schegloff, 1979; Levinson, 2007).

The types of sequences we see in extract 11-13 are extremely important, and in two distinct ways. First, they evidence A's misdiagnosis (or presumed misdiagnosis) of the trouble B has signaled with their "who?". By shifting to a recognition-repair, speaker A casts "doubt" on their initial diagnosis of a hearing trouble (whether justified or not). In and of itself this provides evidence that "who?", the repair request which generates these sequences, is diagnostically ambiguous. This was precisely the sort of reasoning which underlay Heritage's (1984a) initial observation about the "who?" in the "Percy" example:

In producing her repair, A first addresses the trouble as a hearing problem [...] by repeating "Percy". Having got no immediate receipt, A then attempts to remedy a hypothesized recognition problem by elaborating additional particulars of the referenced person (p. 317)

Recall, however, that the "Percy" example is a bit of rarity. It is the only case in which this type of second repair follows a non-try-marked repetition. Overwhelmingly repair



revisions occur following *try-marked* repetitions. This, I have argued, provides important evidence that this latter repair method (prosodic design) indexes A's diagnostic uncertainty: B's "who?" may be signaling hearing trouble, in which case the repetition will be sufficient; but it may also be signaling recognition trouble, in which case further material can be provided contingently. Consequently, the examples in 11-13, and the other 4 cases of try-marked repetitions (see Table 2), provide a second source of evidence that "who?" is ambiguous. They show that A-speakers can index their diagnostic uncertainty within the design of their repair itself.

Try-marked repetitions are not the first repairs we've seen which index multiple possible troubles. Recall that open-class repair requests like "huh?" and "what?" sometimes receive complex responses built from "mixing" multiple, distinct repairs (see Chapter 2). In extract 14 below, speaker A embeds an alternative reference form within a full-scope redo of his prior TCU/action ("is uh *Green* down", line 5). He thus addresses two possible troubles simultaneously—a full-scope hearing trouble and the recognitional failure of "Bill" (the TCU final items are "dispensed with" due to the change in sequential context; see Schegloff, 2004).

**Extract 14** [NB-Golf, 1:05]

1 A: is Bill down by any chance=do you know  
 2 (0.4)  
 3 B: huh?  
 4 (0.2)  
 5 A: is: uh: Green down  
 6 (0.3)  
 7 B: yeah he's down

Try-marked repetitions are not diagnostically *equivalent* to mixed repairs of course. They offer only one repair—one remedy. However, by anticipating the possible need of a second, they share an important feature. They index A's uncertainty of B's trouble, and hence the diagnostic underspecification, or "openness", of B's repair request.


### 3.3.5 Summary and some additional evidence for the ambiguity of Rising Bare-who

There is strong evidence that "who?" can, and regularly does, signal a hearing trouble. Repetitions make up the majority of repairs in my collection (82%, see table 3.2), and in roughly half these cases this repair is deemed adequate. Further evidence comes from three

“mis-fitted” / “mis-hearing” cases considered in section 3.2 above (relevantly, there are no such cases in my collection of *Falling-whos*, a practice which unambiguously signals an understanding trouble). However, hearing problems are not the *only* type of trouble that a “who?” can signal. Both in the designs of their repairs (alternative-recognitionals and try-marked repetitions), and in their subsequent conduct (second repairs), A-speakers regularly orient to the possibility of a “deeper” trouble—the failure to achieve recognition given this reference form. There are two further sources of evidence for this. First, B-speakers occasionally produce Rising Bare-*whos* in contexts where A explicitly anticipates the possibility of recognition trouble. In extract 15 below, for instance, B’s “who?” occurs in response to a pre-positioned recognition check (“you know Gordy Tuffs”, line 2; see Schegloff, 2007, p. 45-7); and in extract 16 it occurs in overlap with a similar sort of action produced as a transition-space repair (“do you know [them”, line 5; see Heritage, 2007).


**Extract 15** [CallFriend-s6581, 6:43]

1                   (7.8)  
 2    A:  h uh you know Gordy Tuffs  
 3                   (1.5)  
 4    B:  [who?]



**Extract 16** [CallHome-4490, 1:14]

1    B:  so it shouldn't be too bad then you know  
 2           [if we can [spend the day togeth- ]  
 3    A:  [.hhh           [           you know Harry] and Veronica live there  
 4           (0.2)  
 5    A:  do you know [them  
 6    B:                   [who?]



The second source of evidence comes from speaker B’s conduct following repetition repairs. In three such cases in my collection, speaker B produces a second OI which explicitly addresses a recognition failure. These cases evidence A’s misdiagnosis of B’s trouble, much like the second repair cases considered above. In the following extract, in fact, both actions occur simultaneously.

## Extract 17 [Virginia, 11:19]

- 1 A: I heard today at first national bank you know **Phillips**  
 2 works at first national (0.2) so I went down to the bank and  
 3 Pam did and they were telling me about the wedding (0.2) .t  
 4 they said that **Phillips** got uhm (0.5) knee walking drunk at  
 5 the reception  
 6 (0.5)  
 7 B: **who?**
- 
- 8 (0.3)  
 9 A: **Phillips?**  
 10 (0.4)  
 11 B: wh[o's Phillips ]  
 12 A: [Pam Bensen]'s (0.4) husband  
 13 (0.9)  
 15 B: he- (0.5)  
 16 A: he got knee walking drunk ...

Speaker A is telling the group about Pam Benson's wedding. In lines 1-4, she twice references the groom by name ("Phillips"). At the possible completion of this turn, Speaker B requests repair with "who?" (line 6). A repeats this name, produced with (mild) try-marking, rising 1.2 ST over the final syllable ("Phill-ips?"). A small gap emerges (line 10), and then speaker A and B begin speaking (nearly) simultaneously. Consistent with the cases above A produces a second repair, here an alternative recognitional ("Pam Benson's husband", line 12). *Speaker B* requests repair a second time, using a practice which explicitly diagnoses a recognition failure ("who's Phillips", line 11; Sacks 1992, Schegloff, 1996b; 2000b). As A had anticipated, B's "who?" was *not* addressing a hearing problem. She couldn't identify this person on the basis of their name.


In sum, there is considerable evidence that Rising Bare-*who* ("who?") is diagnostically ambiguous. It can signal both a hearing trouble and recognition failure. We see this in the positioning of B's request; the design of A's repair; and in both participants' subsequent treatment of this repair. We now move on to Falling Bare-*who* ("who."), a practice which unambiguously diagnoses the nature of B's trouble.

### 3.4 Requesting specification with “who.”


#### 3.4.1 Introduction

Extracts 18 and 19 below provide some examples of “who.” (falling pitch) used as a repair request (see also extract 1 above).

#### Extract 18 [CallHome-4844, 5:26]

1 A: she had a baby right  
 2 (0.2)  
 3 B: who.  
  
 4 (0.5)  
 5 A: your sister in law=  
 6 B: =yeah yeah (.) yeah

#### Extract 19 [CallFriend-s4843, 19:05] A and B have been arguing their daughter’s childcare

1 B: just because people in the church don't trust everybody  
 2 in the church (ok[ay] )  
 3 A: [that girl] remind of Sam so much  
 4 (0.4)  
 5 B: who.  
  
 6 (0.3)  
 7 A: that girl in C L C ((C L C is a Church))  
 8 (0.3)  
 9 A: (I never) I don't really remember Sam but I think  
 10 she look like her

Moments before the data shown in extract 18, A and B had been talking about B’s sister in law. In line 1, A checks if “she” (the sister in law) has had a baby. Speaker B evidently has some trouble resolving this indexical reference, and requests repair with a bare “who.” (line 3), falling 6 ST across the vocalized portion of this word (see the in-line pitch trace). Speaker A responds by specifying this reference (“your sister in law”, line 5). Extract 19 is similar, though here the trouble-source reference is a first (locally initial) mention (Fox, 1987; Schegloff, 1996). Speaker A indexically refers to “that girl”, appealing to their shared experience with the “recognitional that” (see Ariel, 1990; Himmelman 1996; and discussion

above). B requests repair with a Falling Bare-*who* (line 5), and A further specifies this reference (“that girl” ← “that girl *in C L C*”).

In this section I will provide evidence that the diagnostic properties evident in these extracts are systematic. With a Falling Bare-*who* (“who.”), speaker B claims that a pronoun or other “indexical” person reference (see section 3.2 above) is vague, and requests its specification. To the best of my knowledge this practice has never been studied, or even explicitly noted in the CA literature outside of a footnote in a paper on repair requests in German (Selting, 1992, p. 331). As I will outline in the conclusion, however, there is a considerable amount of work, both on German and English, which anticipates the analysis I offer in this section.

RESPONSE-TYPE	NUMBER OF INSTANCES
No Response	13/36 (36%)
Response	23/36 (64%)
Specification Repair	21/23 (91%)
Other Response	2/23 (9%)


**Table 3.4:** Response types for Falling Bare-*who*

Table 3.4 above outlines what happens immediately following the 36 Falling Bare-*whos* in my collection. In 36% of cases (n=13), the talk which follow B’s Falling Bare-*who* is something *other* than a repair (or other response) from A (see below on “No response”). Of the remaining 64% (n=23), a full 91% (n=21) are repairs which specify the TS-reference. This provides strong distributional evidence that A-speakers understand that Falling Bare-*who* requests this type of repair in particular. But what precisely does a specification repair involve?

### 3.4.2 Specification repairs

One reference specifies another if it refers to the same person, but adds additional information to help pick out who that is (see Levinson, 2007; Egbert et al., 2009). In extract 19, for instance, speaker A’s “that girl *in C L C*” specifies her prior “that girl” by adding a locational modifier. And in extract 18, A upgrades her pronominal reference (“she”) to a full form reference (“your sister in law”). Note that there do not appear to be any constraints on the *type* of reference used to do this specifying. This is clearly illustrated in Figure 3.7 below.

The ellipses represent the major categories of person reference, and the arrows represent the 21 specification repairs in the collection (see section 3.2 above for a discussion of the “implicit” category). The tail of the arrow represents the form of the trouble-source reference (e.g. “that girl”) and the head the form of the repair-reference (e.g. “that girl in C L C”).<sup>11</sup>



**Figure 3.7:** The form of specification repairs offered in response to Falling Bare-*who*. The tail of each arrow represents the form of the trouble-source reference and the head the form of the repair.

Among the pronominal TS-references, for instance, we see that names (“he” ← “Jared”, “he” ← “Michael Jackson”); descriptions (“she” ← “your sister in law”, “they” ← “the airline”); coordinated references (“we” ← “me and his mother”); and even pronouns (“she” ← “you”)<sup>12</sup> are all possible. The only requirement is that the repair specifies the TS-reference in some way.

<sup>11</sup> Levinson (2007, p. 54) also makes use of this type of representation, and for similar purposes.

<sup>12</sup> The extract below illustrates a case of a specifying pronoun. Speaker C (Judy) has just given B some books. In line 3, speaker A makes a comment about B (his wife, Judy’s mother). Because this turn is addressed to C (his daughter), he refers to B in the third person (“*she*’s building up her own library”). Speaker B evidently has some trouble with this TCU/action and requests specification of this pronoun (“who.”, line 6). A responds with “you”, a pronoun appropriate for this new participation framework. Although it is another pronoun, “you” places further constraints on the intended referent (there are more potential referents for “she” than for “you”).

1 B: oh these are wonderful Judy  
 2 C: aw:[:. ]  
 3 A: [ sh]e's building up her own library  
 4 (1.8)  
 5 C: well (0.5)  
 6 B: who.  
 7 (0.9)  
 8 A: you. [SBC-31, 9:18]

It is this semantic/pragmatic relationship between the TS-reference and the repair-reference which is at the heart of these repairs. However, there are three other features of their design which are relevant to our argument. To begin, all of the 21 specification cases consist of the repair-reference alone. A does not “frame” this nominal with additional (repairing) items. Compare “that girl in C L C” with the hypothetical “that girl in C L C reminds me of Sam”, “that girl in C L C looks like your girlfriend”, etc.<sup>13</sup> By focusing their repair on the TS-reference alone, speaker A aligns with B in treating it specifically as the source of trouble. This supports the argument that “who.” (like “who?”) is a partial-scope repair request (see section 3.1 above).

A second relevant feature of these specifications is that with only one possible exception they are produced with final falling (or flat) pitch. In extract 19, for instance, speaker A’s pitch falls by 2 ST over the final syllable of her repair (“...C L C ”; see Figure 3.8 below); and in extract 18, A’s pitch falls by 2 ST over “in law”. This feature of A’s repair supports the argument that Falling-Bare-*who* claim a trouble of underspecification, and not a more severe type of understanding trouble (as we saw above Rising Bare-*who*, which can diagnose recognition failures, quite frequently receive try-marked repairs).




Figure 3.8: The non-try-marked specification-repair in extract 19

<sup>13</sup> But also compare “that girl in C L C” with the hypothetical “in C L C”, a free-standing modifier which also undoubtedly specifies the TS-reference. It appears that Bare-falling-*who* requires (or at least overwhelmingly receives) a full nominal repair. Compare this with the second repairs seen in the previous section (“Johnny” ← “Wilson”), and those requested by “Bob who.”, “Sharon who.”, etc. (Chapter 4 below).

A final point is that specification repairs are produced in a straightforward or routine manner. There are no signs from speaker A that this type of response is in any way unusual, inappropriate etc. Repairs which *are* inappropriate are sometimes displayed as such (see Chapter 2 above). This again supports the argument that this it is precisely this type of repair which is requested.

In sum, in those cases where A responds to B's Bare Falling-*who*, they overwhelmingly (91%) and straightforwardly do so with a non-try-marked, bare specification of an indexical person reference from their prior TCU/action. We will turn to the responses coded as "Other" in a moment (n=2), but let's first consider the 38% (n=14) of cases coded as "No response" in Table 3.4.

### 3.4.3 No response cases: Evidence from "upgraded" repair requests

The "No response" category includes all cases in which the talk which follows B's "who." is something *other* than a response from A. While such cases may on first blush seem irrelevant—a residual category to be swept under the rug—they can and do provide important evidence for our argument.

B-speakers sometimes follow up a repair initiation (OI) with a second, diagnostically stronger one. These "upgrades" can provide additional information about the source and/or nature of B's trouble, and consequently about the diagnostic properties of their *first* OI (see Chapter 2.5; Egbert et al. 2009). For instance, upgrades which follow "huh?", "what?", etc. vary considerably in their diagnosis of both the source and nature of B's trouble. This provides evidence that B's initial OI (the "huh?", "what?", etc.) is indeed diagnostically "open". In stark contrast, the upgrades following "who." are consistent. All 10 cases (which together comprise 71% of the 13 "No response" cases) offer a *candidate specification* of an indexical person reference from the prior talk.<sup>14</sup> This provides strong evidence, from speaker B's perspective, that a specification is precisely the type of repair being requested. The following two extracts illustrate. The upgrades are marked with an arrow (→).

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<sup>14</sup> There do appear to be differences in the degree of "confidence" claimed in the candidate specification however. Some candidates are produced with final rising pitch (see e.g. extract 3 and 4 below), while others have flat or falling pitch. As noted in section 3.3.3 above, these prosodic differences have been argued to index differences in speaker B's epistemic stance. Moreover, in one case speaker B's upgrade consists of two *alternative* candidate specifications ("Jane or her mother").




**Extract 20** [CallFriend-s5755, 3:44]

- 1 A: they got snakes (0.2) .thhhhh (0.7)  
 2 a um spider (0.9) uh (0.6) four ducks (0.5)  
 3 B: who.  
 (.)  
 4 A: two chickens (0.3)  
 5 → B: Un- Unc- Uncle Johnny('s)

**Extract 21** [CallFriend-n5435, 5:57]

- 1 A: so i- is he poor  
 2 (0.4)  
 3 B: who.=  
 4 → =Shawn ((see Figure 3.9 below))

The A-speaker in extract 20 has just told B that she's recently visited "Uncle Johnny's house" and "Mister Tony's brother's house" (data not shown). Here, she begins listing the various animals that "they've got" (lines 1-2). Speaker B evidently has trouble resolving this pronoun, and requests specification with "who." (line 3). Rather than providing this repair, however, A continues listing animals ("two chickens", line 4). Speaker B pursues a repair, offering a candidate specification of the TS-reference himself ("Uncle Johnny?", →). Extract 21 is similar, though here the candidate specification ("Shawn?", →) is produced immediately upon completion of the "who.". Figure 3.9 below shows the temporal relationship between these two OIs. Note that A's pitch does indeed fall over "who" (5 ST) before it starts to rise on "Shawn" (see note 14).



**Figure 3.9:** Lines 3 and 4 in extract 21

The candidate specifications offered by speaker B are typically produced before A responds to their Bare-Falling-*who* (hence their inclusion in the “No response” category). However, as they occur in the same sequential slot as A’s projected repair, the two actions can occur in overlap. Consider extract 22 below. Speaker B requests repair with “who.” (line 9), and A offers a specification (“Greg.”, line 11). In overlap, B produces her own candidate version (“Greg?” →). In a single extract we see both speakers’ orientation to the precise diagnostic properties of this practice of repair request.

**Extract 22** [SBC-31, 20:29]

1 A: and the:n the who:le thi:ng about that (.) Greg went  
 2 through in (0.3) the first part of second grade  
 3 his first .hhhhh and she was so: up[set because ]  
 4 B: [what happened]  
 5 (.)  
 6 B: what hap[pened]  
 7 A: [ they] wanted to test him for a  
 8 A: reme[dial] class=  
 9 B: [who.]  
 10 → B: =Gr[eg?  
 11 A: [Greg.  
 12 B: yeah they wanted to test him

3.4.4 A (potentially) deviant case

All of the cases considered thus far, including the bulk of “No response” cases, clearly support the argument that Falling Bare-*who* unambiguously requests specification of an indexical reference. In this final section, I consider one of the remaining two cases in my collection, categorized as “Other” in Table 3.4. In this case, presented in extract 23 below, speaker A responds to B’s Bare-Falling-*who* with a *repetition* of the TS-reference. This, of course, is a method regularly used to diagnose *hearing* problems, as discussed above. On first blush, this case provides counterevidence to the claim that Falling Bare-*who* is dedicated to signaling understanding problems (and problems of underspecification in particular). As I will argue, however, this (apparent) deviancy can be accounted for.

## Extract 23 [CallFriend-s4843, 14:40]

1 B: but when he came home at night time he di-  
 2 how come he didn't see d- Sasha  
 3 (1.0)  
 4 A: at night time [me and Sasha ] was sleep  
 5 B: [when he ]  
 6 (0.4)  
 7 B: oh  
 8 (5.2)  
 9 B: Sasha where you [think you (going)] ((*off phone*))  
 10 A: [ really] tripping  
 11 over there ain't you  
 12 (0.4)  
 13 B: who.

---

14 (0.3)  
 15 A: you.  
 16 (0.4)  
 17 B: tripping over what  
 18 (0.6)  
 19 A: over there  
 20 (0.4)  
 21 B: over what David ((*Speaker A's name is David*))  
 22 (0.5)  
 23 B: about Kevin  
 24 (0.3)  
 25 A: yeah  
 26 B: how am I s:- tripping I'm just asking you

This extract is taken from a phone call between David (speaker A) and Tanya (speaker B), a separated couple. Their daughter Sasha lives with B and is present in the room with her. Leading up to this extract A and B have been discussing A's brother Kevin. B has been accusing, and A defending, Kevin's (lack of) involvement in Sasha's life. This activity/topic continues in lines 1-7, where it is (again) brought to possible completion. In the ensuing gap (line 8) Sasha evidently scampers off somewhere in the background, and B (playfully) admonishes her for this ("Sasha where you [think you (going)]", line 9). It is here, in overlap, that A produces the eventual trouble-source TCU/action ("[really] tripping over there ain't you"). As the ensuing talk makes clear, this action was addressed to B, and directed at the prior talk about Kevin ("tripping" was intended here to mean angry). However, its sequential positioning provides grounds for hearing it as instead dealing with B and Sasha's activity in some way (perhaps someone is actually "tripping", i.e. falling over). Perhaps

grounded in this possible understanding, B initiates repair (“who.”, line 13), using a Bare falling-*who* to request specification of who is “tripping”. This reference was first made implicitly with a “zero” subject, and then explicitly with a pronoun in the tag “ain’t *you*”. As noted above, A responds with “you” (line 15)—a repetition of the trouble-source reference.

In what follows I will present *two* alternative analyses of this repair—first because of my uncertainty as to which correctly accounts for what is happening here; and second because each provides additional and distinct insight into this practice. The first analysis rests largely on the linguistic nature of “you”, the reference B is targeting for repair. Most pronouns, in most contexts, can readily be specified in a straightforward manner. Third person singular pronouns (“he”, “she”) and first and third person plural pronouns (“we” and “they”) can be specified with names, descriptions, lists, etc. Specifying a *second* person pronoun is slightly more complicated. In Present Day English, the form “you” is widely used both for singular and plural reference (addressee alone, or addressee plus others). When a plural “you” needs to be specified, there are many resources available: a coordinated reference (“you and Sasha”), a description (“you two”) or a dedicated second person plural pronoun, present in most (if not all) varieties of English (“ya’ll” for these speakers, “you guys”, “you lot”, “yous”, etc. for others). However, what speaker A in this extract needs to do is specify a *singular* “you”. He must make clear that he is referring to his addressee (speaker B) alone. How can he do this?

One option would be to follow the usual strategy and offer a different form which “upgrades” the first. The problem, however, is that it’s unclear what this form would be. Unlike many other languages, Present Day English simply lacks an idiomatic, dedicated second person singular pronoun. Moreover, intuition suggests that the other forms which exist, e.g. “Tanya” (speaker B’s name), “you alone”, “just you”, “you you”, “you Tanya”, would be rather awkward here. Perhaps on this basis, B employs a different strategy. He re-issues *the same form*, relying upon context to do the specifying work. Recall that the contextually available, “competing” referent for A’s first “you” (the TS-reference) is the collective consisting B and Sasha together. Had A intended this plural reference, he could have easily specified this in his repair: “you and Ashley”, “you two”, “ya’ll”, etc. The fact that he does *not* offer one of these forms is thus contrastively meaningful. It communicates

that the intended referent of his second “you” (and so also his first “you”) is B alone. Rather than being a “repetition”, B’s repair is a contrastively meaningful re-do.<sup>15</sup>

Under this candidate analysis, the repair in extract 23 is not, in fact, deviant. In line with the other cases in the collection, A’s “you” specifies the TS-reference, but simply employs a different strategy for doing so. However, there is a second possibility. By repeating/re-doing the TS-reference, speaker A may be resisting B’s claim that it *needs* to be specified. That is, he may be making the counter claim that “you know full well who I mean. This reference form *is* sufficient”. Every other-initiation embodies the claim there *is* a problem, and speakers on occasion challenge this. This is clear from responses like “you know who/where/what/etc” and “you heard me” (see extract 24 below). Re-doing a reference in response to a specification request may simply be a less explicit, and likely less severe, version of this type of action (for further discussion of withholding, or resisting, repair see Robinson 2009; Llewellyn & Spence, 2009; and Chapter 6 below).

**Extract 24** [CallFriend-s4843, 27:41]

- 1 A: .hhhhh I know how to raise a child xx I'm not that ignorant  
 2 (0.7)  
 3 B: what?  
 4 (0.6)  
 5 A: you heard me

To conclude, there are two possible ways of analyzing A’s “you” repair in extract 23. He is either specifying the TS-reference via a contextually defined contrast set or resisting A’s claim that this reference was underspecified. Certainly more extensive analysis of both this extract, and a larger collection of similar cases, is necessary to work out which (if either) analysis is correct. Nevertheless, in either case A’s repair is consistent with the analysis of “who.” being offered here (Extract 23 also highlights the importance of interpreting repairs in a context sensitive manner. Although a repetition repair most frequently addresses a hearing trouble, it may not necessarily be doing so.)

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<sup>15</sup> The TS-reference “you” could also, potentially be hearable as referring to Sasha alone. While this action was clearly designed for B, it could have been nominally addressed to Sasha (a playful sort of comment on her behavior). This candidate understanding of the TS-reference (and unit/action) would also be ruled out by A’s repair. As B requested repair, she is unambiguously the addressee of the repair turn (Sacks et al., 1974; Lerner, 2003). She is thus undoubtedly included as a referent in this second “you” and so by inference the first.

### 3.4.5 Summary

In this section I have argued that Falling Bare-*who* (“who.”) requests specification of an indexical reference. The evidence presented focused on the subsequent treatment of these requests. I showed that overwhelmingly (see Table 3.4) one of the following things happened: (1) Speaker A provided a specification repair (i.e. a bare, full nominal, produced with final falling pitch, which provides a more precise reference than the one initially offered); and/or (2) speaker B offers a *candidate* specification themselves, typically following signs that A will not respond. I then considered and accounted for a potentially deviant case.

	RISING BARE-WHO (“WHO?”)	FALLING BARE-WHO (“WHO.”)
TROUBLE-SOURCE	Non-indexical form (e.g. name)	Indexical form (e.g. pronoun) <b>or</b> “Implicit” reference
TROUBLE-TYPE	Hearing problem <b>or</b> Recognition failure	Underspecification

**Table 3.5:** The diagnostic differences between “who?” and “who.”

The analysis I have presented demonstrates that “who?” (final rising pitch) and “who.” (final falling pitch) are distinct practices for requesting repair. While they share some general properties (section 3.1), they differ in the kinds of person references they locate as the trouble-source (section 3.2), and in the types trouble they can signal (sections 3.3 and 3.4). Table 3.5 above provides a summary of these diagnostic differences.

### 3.5 A brief look at other question words

At this stage, a relevant question is whether the intonational split between “who?” and “who.”, and its associated division of labor, holds for repair requests built from *other* bare question words. Extract 25 offers a first, rather trivial example suggesting that it does.

**Extract 25** [FreeLunch-4-16-08, 8:29]

- 1 A: I think **his** old wife was way better  
 2 (0.4)  
 3 B: **whose.**  
 4 (1.2)  
 5 A: **the guy's** old wife

In line 1, speaker A offers an assessment of “his old wife”, a character in a movie the participants have been discussing. In line 3, B requests repair with a bare “whose” (line 3). By using the genitive/possessing form, she grammatically restricts the trouble-source to the man (“his old wife”), not his former wife (“his *old wife*”). B’s “whose” is produced with (mild) falling pitch (1.4 ST). Consistent with “who.”, the trouble-source is indexical reference (the pronoun “his”), and speaker A responds with a specification, though here embedding it within a redo of the encompassing reference (“*the guy’s old wife*”, line 5).

My data also suggest that this pattern extends beyond person references, holding for bare “where”, “when”, “how”, “how much/many” and “which” (“what” is more complicated, see Egbert et al., 2009 and below). Extracts 26 and 27 illustrate.

**Extract 26** [CallFriend-n6401, 14:30]

1 A: what about h .hhhh well- (.) uh- (0.3) you know that Matt  
 2 Munro: is working at Sonnenshein and Nath  
 3 (1.1)  
 4 A: have [you  
 5 B: [where?  
 6 (.)  
 7 A: s:- a(t) Sonnenshein and Nath?  
 8 (0.4)  
 8 B: h s@ay it again  
 9 (0.3)  
 10 B: a s[innen- sh]ein?  
 11 A: [um ]  
 12 (.)  
 13 A: Sonnenshein S O N N E N .hhhhh S C H I- E I N ?  
 14 (.)  
 15 B: never heard of it where is it

In extract 26, speaker A asks B if she’s heard that one of their mutual acquaintances is working “at Sonnenshein and Nath”, a law firm (line 1-2). Speaker B requests repair on this place reference with a bare “where?” (line 5), produced with rising pitch (8 ST). Consistent with “who?”, the TS-reference is non-indexical (contrast “at Sonnenshein and Nath” with “there” or “at that place”), and there is some tension about the nature of the trouble. Speaker A responds with try-marked repetition of the TS-reference (line 7, rising 8 ST of “Nath”), diagnosing a hearing trouble but indexing uncertainty (see above). B responds by requesting repetition (“say it again”, line 8), and then offering a candidate hearing (line 10). Following a

second repetition and a spelling out of the name (line 13), B explicitly claims that this place/company is unfamiliar to her (line 15).

As before a bare question word produced with final rising pitch offers an ambiguous diagnosis of the trouble-type. Compare this with the bare “when.” (falling pitch) in extract 27 below, our final example. Speaker A and his wife B have been to London (as has C, see lines 1-6). It is now late in the evening on the same day.

**Extract 27** [Canes09, 35:12]

1 C: and then got back at [about:: ]  
 2 A: [you got (on to)] the motorway okay=  
 3 C: =yeah [no trouble at [all  
 4 A: [xx [yeah  
 5 (0.3)  
 6 C no trou[ble (at all)]  
 7 A: [ because we ]came on the motorway came back  
 8 at about **five o'clock** didn't we (on the motorway)  
 9 (0.4)  
 10 A: **six**  
 11 (1.0)  
 12 B: when.  
 13 (. )  
 14 A: coming back ton[ight]  
 15 B: [ tod]ay=  
 16 A: =yeah=  
 17 B: =we left at six I think

In lines 7-8, A checks with B if they left London “at about five o’clock”, repairing this time reference to “six” in the transition space (line 10). Following a second gap (line 11), speaker B requests repair with “when.”, falling 1.5 ST over its production. Had this request been produced with final *rising* pitch (“when?”), it would have been heard as signaling trouble with these non-indexical time references (“at about five/six o’clock”).<sup>16</sup> However, as both A’s repair (“coming back tonight”, line 14) and B’s overlapping candidate understanding (“today”) make clear, her trouble was working out the general, temporal frame for this event. With “when.”, B claims this information—which was left implicit in A’s

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<sup>16</sup> Almost undoubtedly a trouble in hearing. Speaker A could rule out a recognition trouble because “everyone” knows what “at five/six o’clock” means. Note, though, that for some time references, and for some recipients, this would be less clear, e.g. “at oh nine hundred hours” (military time), “in the year of the goat” (Chinese zodiac), “for Purim” (a Jewish holiday). For a detailed discussion of the role of this type of knowledge-based (epistemic) reasoning in repair sequences see Robinson (2013b). See also the discussion of extracts 9 and 11 above.



question—was wrongly assumed to be available, much like the cases of “who.” targeting zero anaphora and other “implicit” references (section 3.2; see also the next chapter). Once again, we see that the final pitch movement of a bare question word can delimit the *source* of the trouble, and its type.

### 3.6 Conclusion

This chapter has examined two distinct ways of requesting a repair of a problematic reference. The first is used to request specification of a referent which was assumed to be contextually accessible, either with an “indexical” form (e.g. a pronoun or a deictic) or by being left implicit in the prior talk (e.g. a zero anaphora or an implicit temporal frame). The second practice signals a problem in hearing or recognizing a name or some other contextually less dependent form. As it turns out, these diagnostically distinct practices are identical at the lexico-syntactic level. They consist of the question word “who” (or “whose”, “when”, “where”), produced on its own, as a single turn constructional unit. Where they differ, is in how they *sound*. The first is produced with falling pitch (“who.”), the second with rising pitch (“who?”). Intonation is a constitutive feature of these practices.

This study is by no means the first to make the connection between the final pitch movement of a repair request and the diagnosis it offers. Within the CA literature,<sup>17</sup> the earliest and most substantial is Selting’s work on German (see Selting 1988; 1992; 1996 for English publications, Selting 1987a; b; c for German). She argues that when “questions-words like *was* (‘what’), *wo* (‘where’), *wie* (‘how’), but not *warum*, *weshalb*, *wieso* (‘why’), are substituted for the problematical item, intonation is used to differentiate between the signaling of referential problems and acoustic problems” (1992, p. 329). Schegloff (1997a) similarly observes that, in English, “where?” differs from “where.”, and “when?” from “when.”, noting that the downward intoned cases can be used when the trouble-source reference is “conveyed non-lexically” (p. 116–119, compare with “implicit” references). Finally, building on this earlier work, Egbert, Golato & Robison (2009) offer a systematic analysis of “what.” (falling pitch) in English, and “was.”/“was denn.” in German. They argue that, in contrast to the diagnostically unrestricted (or open-class) “what?”/“was?” (rising

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<sup>17</sup> There are earlier, and in many ways overlapping claims made within the linguistics literature (e.g. Quirk et al., 1985). See the next chapter for discussion.

pitch), these practices restrict the trouble-source to an “indexical” object reference in the prior talk (e.g. “it”, “this”, “the big one”), and request its specification—an almost perfect parallel to the account of “who.”, “when.”, “where.”, etc. offered here.

The present chapter contributes to, and develops this line of research in the following ways:

- Based on a systematic interactional and intonational analysis, it shows that the diagnostic import of final pitch extends to repair requests which use a bare “*who*”<sup>18</sup> (cf. “when”, “where” or “what”).
- It demonstrates that while the rising intoned practices (“who?”, “where?”, etc.) may most commonly signal (or be treated as signaling) hearing/acoustic problems, they can also signal a type of understanding problem, namely a *recognition failure*.
- Building on Egbert et al. (2009), it shows that final pitch can delimit the *trouble-source* (not just trouble-type). It does this by sub-dividing references into pronouns and other “indexicals” on the one hand, and names and other “non-indexicals” on the other. This classificatory work is similar to that done by the system of question words (“who”, “where”, “when”, etc.) Critically, however (i) it is based on contextual rather inherent properties (indexicality vs. descriptive category); and (ii) it is achieved intonationally rather than lexically.

In the following two chapters, I will extend this line of research even further. I will show that repair requests of the form “who did”, “been where”, “Bob who”, “a what”, etc. display the same prosodic split and associated division of diagnostic labor.

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<sup>18</sup> Presumably Selting’s analysis holds for the various grammatical variants of “who” in German, but she does not explicitly state this, nor exemplify it (in her English publications at least).



## 4 | Cohesively Framed Question Words

**Abstract:** Like many of the objects we encounter in our daily lives, other-initiations of repair are built from a variety of material resources, of quite different kinds. In the last chapter we saw that question words can be—indeed must be—combined with prosodic resources, and the practices which result from these combinations have distinct diagnostic properties. In this chapter, I will extend this by examining repair requests which are lexico-syntactically complex. My focus will be on question words which are framed with words which repeat or otherwise cohesively tie to the prior talk. This chapter highlights the fundamental role played by *cohesive resources* in shaping the design of an OI and the precise action it delivers.

### 4.1 Introduction

Turns at talk are lexico-syntactically organized at two distinct levels: internally, by the words and grammatical constructions they contain; and externally, by the ways in which these items are formally related to the prior talk. This relational or cohesive level of grammar<sup>1</sup> is fundamental to how other-initiations (OIs) locate sources of trouble and to how they indicate what type of repair is relevant. An OI of the form “John?”, for instance, can be used both to check a possible hearing (in response to “Is *John* coming over tonight?”) and a possible understanding (“Is *he* coming over tonight?”). Similarly, “how?” can both request a repair (“he fixed it *with his eyes closed*”) and check a hearing (“*how* is she related to you?”). In each case, the method of OI hinges on whether it *repeats* or *substitutes* the trouble-source—on the cohesive resource (or tying technique) it has used. In this chapter, I will show that cohesive design of OIs is also critical for distinguishing practices *within* these broader methods. Specifically, I will show that repair requests with internal designs like “to who”, “Bob who”, “been where”, etc. can be tied to the trouble-source unit in consequentially different ways. At the same time, I will show that the prosodic design of these “framed” question words is diagnostically consequential, as it is with “bare” question words (Chapter 3). Lexico-syntax is only part of a repair request’s design.

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<sup>1</sup> For foundational work on this level of linguistic organization see Halliday & Hasan’s (1976) “Cohesion in English” and Sacks’ (1992) work on “tying techniques” (see Bolinger, 1957 for earlier ideas). For recent discussion of cohesion within a CA/Interactional Linguistics framework see Lerner (2004); Auer (2009); Benjamin (2009) and Drew (2013). See also Du Bois (2003; 2007) on “dialogic syntax”. Note that I’m talking here about cohesion at the lexico-syntactic level only. For work on phonetic-prosodic “tying” across turns at talk, see Curl (2005); Szczepek Reed (2006); and Ogden (2006).

## 4.2 Requesting repair with “echoed” question words

### 4.2.1 Introduction

As a point of entry into this class of repair requests, consider extracts 1-4 below. At the internal lexico-syntactic level, “who does” (1), “who is” (2), “from who” (3), and “to see who” (4) share only two features. They contain the question word “who” and it is syntactically positioned *in situ*, i.e. where it would occur in a declarative structure rather than necessary in initial position as in canonical English interrogatives (compare “she stole five hundred from *who*” and “from *who*”, with “*who* did she steal five hundred from” and “*who* from”; see König & Siemund, 2007 *inter alia*). What binds these in-situ interrogatives into a coherent class, and makes them useful as requests for repair, is their cohesive design.

#### Extract 1 [CallFriend-n6952, 10:47]

1 A: I said well if Sally sa- if Sally thinks he should do it  
 2 that's it  
 3 (.)  
 4 A: @ [ @ ]  
 5 B: [who]does

#### Extract 2 [SBC-1, 20:32]

1 A: Jenny's gonna have a baby by the way  
 2 (0.3)  
 3 B: who is

#### Extract 3 [LA97-A&A, 6:30]

1 A: and she stole five hundred from Jodie  
 2 .hhhhhhh[hhh  
 3 B: [from who

#### Extract 4 [CallFriend-n5615, 0:46]

1 A: a:nd after that I had planned on going up to see to see Tracy  
 2 this weekend  
 3 .hhhhhhh (.) [ in Rich]mond  
 4 B: [to see who]

These repair requests are cohesively segmented into two parts. The question word is the core locating component, standing in for the trouble-source reference itself (both

highlighted). The “framing” component provides further clues by recreating its syntactic position in the prior talk (boxed). When the TS-reference is in subject position, the framing substitutes (“...Sally *thinks* ...” ← “who *does*”) or repeats (“Jenny *is gonna* ...” ← “who *is*”) the following verb/predicate. And when the TS-reference is in a post-verbal position, the framing repeats the preceding preposition (“... stole five hundred *from* Jodie” ← “*from* who”) or verb/predicate (“...going up *to see* Tracy this weekend” ← “*to see* who”). Together the question word and the framing “echo” or replicate (a portion of) the troublesome talk.<sup>2</sup>

In this section I will show that this class of repair requests, built from echoed in-situ interrogatives, function parallel to those built from bare question words (see Chapter 3). The key difference, of course, being that the cohesive framing provides “extra” resources for locating the trouble-source (as noted by Schegloff et al., 1977, p. 368; Clark & Schaefer, 1987). Most relevantly, I will show that there are two diagnostically distinct practices, differing in their final pitch movement. Those with final falling pitch indicate that the TS-reference is a pronoun or other “indexical” form, and that the nature of the trouble is underspecification. Those with final rising pitch indicate that the trouble-source is not an indexical (e.g. a name) and that the trouble is one of hearing or recognition failure. Framed questions words thus divide up communicative problems in precisely the same way as bare question words. I will show this first for framed-*who*, then briefly consider framed-*where* (see Chapter 5 on framed-*what*).

To the best of my knowledge, the prosodic split and associated division of diagnostic labor among this class of repair requests has not been systematically documented within the CA literature (but see Kelly & Local, 1989, p. 282-85 and Sidnell, 2010, p. 125-8 for discussion of framed-*what*). There is, however, some relevant analysis within the linguistic literature on “echo questions”. On the basis of invented examples Quirk et al. (1985) claim that echoed in-situ interrogatives request repetition when produced with rising intonation (“recapitulatory

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<sup>2</sup> This two part cohesive description is necessary to distinguish the OIs in 1-4 from those like the following. Speaker B’s “for what” in line 4 is a “hearing check” targeting an utterance which just happens to be an in-situ interrogative (see A’s confirmation in line 5). Speaker B’s “for” is not framing the trouble-source, it is *part* of it; and the question word does not substitute the trouble-source, it *repeats* it.

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1 B: .h[h (0.2) ] everything is hhh
2 A:   [for what]
3     (0.2)
4 B: for what?
5 A:  mhm                [CallHome-5777, 9:20]
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echoes"; see also Bolinger, 1989), and clarification when produced with falling intonation ("explicatory echoes"; p. 835-7). As we will see, these intuitions fit largely (though not wholly) with what we find in naturally occurring conversational data. It should be noted that the label "echo question" incorporates far more than the types of utterances/actions in extracts 1-4. On the one hand, it includes other forms used to initiate repair, e.g. canonical ("fronted") interrogatives which repeat the prior talk (compare "who did she steal five hundred from" with extract 3), bare question words ("who"), and repetition-only forms ("from Jodie?", see also note 2). On the other hand, it includes other uses of these forms, e.g. (aligning) displays of surprise or "exclamation" (see Bolinger, 1957; 1989; Halliday & Hasan, 1976, p. 214-17; Quirk et al., 1985; Iwata, 2003; among others). My focus here is on a particular lexico-syntactic form (echoed in-situ interrogatives) used in a particular action-sequential environment (as requests for repair).

#### 4.2.2 Final rising vs. final falling pitch

Figures 4.1 and 4.2 below offer labeled pitch traces for two of the cohesively framed-*whos* in my collection, indeed two instances of "who is" (presented in extracts 8 and 10 below). The first is produced with a final rising pitch movement ("who is?"), 7 semitones (ST) in this case. The second is produced with a final falling pitch movement ("who is."), 9ST in this case.<sup>3</sup> I describe these as *final* pitch movements precisely because they occur on the final portion of the repair request (not necessarily on the word "who" itself). As these figures illustrate, the majority of pitch movement on "who is" is over the vocalized portion of "is". Indeed, the pitch need not rise (or fall) throughout the entire request. The framed-*who* in Figure 4.3 below, "she looks like who", is hearable and treated as a "rising" case (see extract 14). However, B's pitch remains relatively flat over "looks" and even falls 3 ST over "like". Her pitch only rises—stepping up 3 ST and then rising a further 9 ST—over the *final syllable* of the request (which, in this case, is "who"). It is this prosodic feature which appears to be diagnostically consequential.

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<sup>3</sup> These figures are created using PRAAT version 5.3.15 (Boersma & Weenink, 2012). See Chapter 1.4.2 for details.




Figure 4.1: The repair request in extract 8 below




Figure 4.2: The repair request in extract 10 below




Figure 4.3: The repair request in extract 14 below

My analysis in this section is based on a collection of roughly 30 cases, systematically extracted from my data set (see Chapter 1). Given the linguistic complexity and variety among them, this collection is admittedly small. A larger data set is thus required to corroborate and develop my findings.



4.2.3 Framed-*who* with final rising pitch (“who is?”, “to who?”)

Extract 7 (“to see who?”) and 8 (“who is?”) below offer two examples of Rising Framed-*who*. Consistent with my collection as a whole, the TS-reference is non-indexical (a name in these cases) and the trouble is either hearing or recognizing this form. These examples were chosen because they clearly display the participant’s orientation to this diagnostic ambiguity.

**Extract 7** [expansion of 6 above]

1 A: I was in Greensburo going to go see my customer (0.3)  
 2 a:nd after that I had planned on going up to see to see Tracy  
 3 this weekend  
 4 .hhhhhhh (.) [ in Rich]mond  
 5 B: [to see who?]  
 6 (0.4)  
 7 A: Tracy?  
 8 B: .hhhhh xx- xx- [can we ] change phones  
 9 [Murphy?]  
 10 (0.3)  
 11 A: what's wrong with your phone  
 12 (0.6)  
 13 B: I don't know why  
 14 (0.2)  
 15 A: (oh) sounds fuzzy [okay  
 16 B: [(and I might) (.) (just 'n) like (.)  
 17 .hh (there)/(just) is a little static on it  
 18 .hhhhh[hh  
 19 A: [mhm  
 20 (0.3)  
 21 B: but I was driving to see my customer and I was going  
 22 straight through a light ...

The A-speaker in extract 7 is telling her friend B about the events leading up to a recent motor accident she was involved in. In lines 2-3, she mentions that she had planned on visiting a mutual friend (Tracy) after finishing with her work. Although this report pragmatically and phonetically projects more talk to come (the continuation we see in line 21), A leaves a space for some form of acknowledgement in line 4. Instead, speaker B remains silent and then requests repair (line 5). “To see who?” cohesively replicates a portion of the verbal expression in A’s prior TCU, locating its object—the non-indexical “Tracy”—as the trouble-source (“I had planned on going up to see Tracy”, line 2). B’s pitch remains relatively flat over “to see” and then rises 3ST over “who”, the final syllable.

There is clear evidence that B used this Rising Framed-*who* to signal a hearing trouble. Immediately following A's repair, she asks if they can change phones (line 8) because A's phone (line 11) sounds "fuzzy" (line 15). However, there is evidence that A took B's trouble to be of another type—namely, *recognizing* who "Tracy" refers to. She responds to B's repair request with "Tracy?", rising 7ST over "-y". This repair method—a try-marked repetition of the trouble-source reference (Chapter 3)—addresses a possible hearing trouble (via the repetition), but also anticipates a possible recognition trouble (via the rising pitch). In line 9, she then offers a second repair which explicitly addresses a recognition failure—a try-marked version of Tracy's last name ("Murphy", rising 3 ST over "-y"). Finally, note that A treated B's silence in line 4 as indexing trouble, and recognition trouble in particular. She incremented her turn with what is arguably a transition space repair providing further materials for identifying this person, i.e. it's the Tracy "in Richmond" (see Heritage, 2007, p. 262; Walker, 2004, p. 159-60).

In sum, B's Rising Framed-*who* ("to see who?") targeted a non-indexical person reference ("Tracy") and signaled a hearing trouble. However, due to the ambiguity inherent in this practice, speaker A "misdiagnosed" it as a trouble recognizing this person on the basis of the name offered. Extract 8 is similar, though here it looks like the trouble *was* a recognition failure.

**Extract 8** [expansion of 4 above]

1 A: Jenny's gonna have a baby by the way  
 2 (0.3)  
 3 B: who is?  
 4 (.)  
 5 A: Jenny\_  
 6 (1.3)  
 7 B: Bria[n's ]: (.) wife?  
 8 A: [Brian's]  
 9 (1.0)  
 10 B: I didn't even know she was pregnant three months ago  
 11 (1.7)  
 12 B: [of course] I guess they [can get big in three months] too  
 13 A: [well ] [xx xx I I (told) you ]  
 14 C: what's her name? ((to B))  
 15 (0.8)  
 16 B: Je- (0.3) what's her name? ((to A))  
 17 (0.7)  
 18 A: Jenny ((to B))

19                   (0.5)  
 20 B: Jenny ((to A))  
 21                   (0.2)  
 22 A: uh-huh ((a confirmation))  
 23                   (0.4)  
 24 B: Jenny ((to C))

In line 1 speaker A announces to B (and C) that “Jenny” is expecting a baby. Speaker B responds with “who is?”, cohesively recreating the clausal core of this TCU and targeting its subject (“Jenny”) for repair. Her pitch rises 7ST over this utterance, as seen in Figure 4.1 above. As in the previous case, this Rising Framed-*who* is met with a repetition of the TS-reference, here produced with a “raspy” voice quality and, perhaps because of this, relatively flat pitch (“Jenny\_”). A substantial gap develops (line 6), and A then begins what was projectably heading towards “Brian’s wife”, a reference form offering an alternative means for recognizing this person. With this second repair, A casts doubt on her initial diagnosis of a hearing trouble—and evidently with good reason. In overlap, speaker B offers precisely the same reference form herself (“Brian’s wife?”)—a candidate understanding of who is being referred to. Moreover, only moments later, when prompted by a third participant to (re-) produce this person’s name, she can’t and has to check with A (lines 14-24). While she clearly knows this person (see line 10), she knows her as Brian’s wife (i.e. relationally), not as Jenny (by name). There is thus considerable evidence B’s Rising Framed-*who* was indeed signaling a recognition trouble.

As extracts 7 and 8 suggest, framed-*whos* produced with final rising pitch target non-indexical person references and can signal both troubles in hearing and recognition. This provides a first piece of evidence that the diagnostic import of final pitch seen in bare-*whos* (Chapter 3) extends to this cohesively framed class of repair requests. We now turn to framed-*whos* with final *falling* pitch.

#### 4.2.4 Framed-*who* with final falling pitch (“who is.”, “to who.”)

Consistent with the other cases in my collection, “to who.” (extract 9) and “who is.” (extract 10) request specification of an indexical person reference (a pronoun in these cases). In this way, these repair requests are diagnostically similar to “who.” (Falling Bare-*who*) and different from “who is?”, “to who?”, etc. (Rising Framed-*who*).

The A-speaker in extract 9 is an amateur musician. She recently had a concert in nearby city, and some of her friends came along to see her. She is telling B about this experience. Our focus is on the repair sequence beginning at line 8.

**Extract 9** [CallHome-6079, 5:38]

1 A: I had my concert on Saturday night did Tara tell you  
 2 .hhhhhhh  
 3 (0.2)  
 4 B: oh I heard it was awesome

((14 seconds removed: discussion of other aspects of trip))

5 A: but anyway .hhhhh it was [so: nice] it was so nice=  
 6 B: [hhhhh @ ]  
 7 A: =that they came I can't even tell you like .hhhh  
 8 like (0.6) just seeing them like I was performing to them  
 9 (.)  
 10 like I was sm[iling at th]em like  
 11 B: [to who. ]  
 12 A: .hhhh Juliette, Sam: and (.) and Tara  
 13 (0.2)  
 14 A: .hhhh [like]  
 15 B: [ aw]::[:  
 16 [like I sang [[*Song Name*]] straight to  
 17 their faces you know like

In line 5, A closes down a discussion of other aspects of the trip (“but anyway .hhhhh”) and begins to tell B how nice it was that her friends came. All of her references to these people in this spate of talk are pronominal (“they came”, “seeing them”, “to them”, line 5-8). Evidently this causes B some trouble. In line 11, she requests specification, targeting the immediately prior reference (“...performing *to them*” ← “to who.”). Her pitch remains relatively flat on “to”, and then falls roughly 5ST over “who”, ending in creaky voice. In response, speaker A specifies the targeted reference (“Juliette, Sam and Tara”, line 12), and then both participants move to resume the suspended activity (line 14 and 15 respectively).

Both participants treat B’s Falling Framed-*who* as requesting specification of an indexical reference. Extract 10 offers a similar example, though here the specification repair is embedded within a more substantial turn.

## Extract 10 [CallFriend-s6578, 22:15]

1 B: why don't you call Danielle to come  
 2 (0.3)  
 3 A: .hhh (0.2) I might  
 4 (0.6)  
 5 B: xx I think that would thrill her to death  
 6 (0.3)  
 7 A: well we're going to Memphis with a bunch of people  
 8 (0.5)  
 9 B: who is.  
 10 (0.3)  
 11 A: well Tara .uh doesn't know this but we're going  
 12 shopping with some- just (.) going to Memphis (and)  
 13 .hhhhh with some students and Shawn and Dan  
 14 (0.2)  
 15 B: on (s)/(f)::: saturday  
 16 A: yeah  
 17 (0.7)  
 18 B: you don't want to call (.) Danielle to meet you all  
 19 for lunch or anything

Speaker A is telling B (her mother) that her friend Tara is visiting for the weekend. A plans to take Tara to “go out to eat” and “hang out” with some other friends (Shawn and Dan). In lines 1-5, B pushes A to include Danielle, a relation/family friend, in her plans. In line 7, an already reluctant B (see line 3) offers an account for why this may be problematic: their plans are in another town (Memphis) and involve “a bunch of people”. It is here that speaker B initiates repair. With “who is.”, falling 9ST (see Figure 4.2 above), she asks A to specify who is involved (who exactly the “we” in “we’re going to Memphis ...” refers to). B complies, but embeds her listing of these people within an extended turn which introduces further complications which may bolster her rejection of B’s suggestion (Tara is unaware of this trip to Memphis). This context sensitive work results in a repair turn deviates from the normal, minimal case. Nevertheless, it specifies the indexical form located by B’s Falling Bare-*who*.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> There is an additional/alternative reason for this non-minimal repair. The prior TCU contains two overlapping person references—the recognitional “we” and the non-recognitional “a bunch of people”. It is thus less straightforward to specify who is involved (note the “well” prefacing of the repair turn, which conveys that this answer will be non-straightforward; Schegloff & Lerner, 2009).

#### 4.2.5 A brief look at other question words

This prosodic split, and division of diagnostic labor, is not particular to repair requests targeting person references (framed-*who/whom/whose*). My data suggests it holds in a parallel manner for echoed in-situ interrogatives using “where”, “when”, “how”, and “how many/much” (“what” is similar, but more complicated, as I’ll show in the next chapter). The following pair of framed-*wheres* illustrate.

##### Extract 11 [CallHome-4829, 1:21]

- 1 A: ... I would definitely recommend not you know working in Gunma  
 2 (1.0)  
 3 B: not working where?  
 4 (0.2)  
 5 A: in Gunma Prefecture [where I ]  
 6 B: [where you're] working  
 7 A: where I work

##### Extract 12 [CallFriend-s6914, 19:31]

- 1 A: ... he was so tired I could tell that he he'd been there for-  
 2 he had been where for three and a half hours  
 3 A: .hhh  
 4 B: been where.  
 5 (0.3)  
 6 A: at the library  
 7 (0.4)  
 8 B: uh huh

The A-speaker in extract 11 tells his friend B that he shouldn’t work “in Gunma” (line 1), the prefecture in Japan where A is now working. B requests repair of this place reference with the cohesively framed “not working where?”, rising 12 ST over “where”. Note that this place was named (“working *in Gunma*”), not referenced indexically (“working *here*” or “working *in this prefecture*”); and that there is an orientation to both a potential hearing and recognition trouble (see lines 5 and 6). Contrast this with the Falling Framed-*where* in extract 12. Speaker B’s “been where.”, falling 2 ST on “where”, targets a indexical place reference (“...he had *been there* for three and a half hours”); and A responds by specifying this reference (“at the library”, line 6).

4.2.6 Summary and some questions

In this section I have provided evidence that repair requests like “who did.”, “from who.”, and “been where.” (final falling pitch) differ diagnostically from those like “who did?”, “from who?”, and “been where?” (rising pitch). The former request specification of an indexical reference (e.g. a pronoun). The latter signal trouble hearing or recognizing a non-indexical reference (e.g. a name). This is precisely the same split found with bare question words (Chapter 3). It seems that the diagnostic import of final pitch generalizes across both lexico-syntactically defined classes of repair request.

At the same time, we’ve seen that framed question words are diagnostically “stronger” than their bare equivalents (see Schegloff et al., 1977; Clark & Schaefer, 1987). The cohesive framing provides the repairing speaker with extra resources for locating the trouble-source and they systematically use it (i.e. they repair the cohesively targeted reference). That being said, it is not always clear that initiating speakers *deploy* framed question words expressly to do this restrictive work. We regularly find framed-*whos* in entirely unambiguous contexts (just as we sometimes find bare-*whos* in ambiguous contexts, see Chapter 3.2). Consider the following examples.

**Extract 13** [expansion of 5 above]

1 A: and **she** stole five hundred **from Jodie**  
 2 .hhhhhhh[hhh  
 3 B: [from who?  
 4 A: Jodie  
 5 (0.3)  
 6 B: she did

**Extract 14** [CallFriend-n6865, 0:55]

1 A: **she** looks just like **her grandma**  
 2 (0.9)  
 3 B: .hhhhh **she** looks like **who?**  
 4 (0.3)  
 5 A: (like) her grandma

The participants in extract 13 have been talking about a girl at school who’d been caught stealing. In line 1 A announces that she also stole money “from Jodie” (line 1). B requests repair with “from who?”, rising 9 ST. Through this framing, she unambiguously locates the

reference to Jodie as the source of trouble (see A's repair in 4). Critically, however, in this context a bare "who?" would have done the same job. The only other person reference in A's announcement is indexical ("she") and hence ruled out as a possible target (see Chapter 3). An important line for future research will be to work out what interactional work, either within or outside the domain of repair, B was doing by choosing "from who?" over "who?", and hence going beyond what was minimally required. And similarly, what would have driven her to go further and echo the prior TCU as a whole ("she stole five hundred from who?", compare with extract 14).

### 4.3 Requesting "missing" items with grammatically expanded question words

The repair requests considered thus far share two important features: the trouble-source is a *full reference form* which was *linguistically encoded* within the prior talk. I will now illustrate that similar forms can be used to request repair of something presupposed, implicit or otherwise "unsaid" (this section); and/or a sub-component of a reference (the next). Exploring these practices will further demonstrate the fundamental role played by cohesive resources in the design of repair requests. It will also provide additional evidence of the diagnostic import of final pitch. Those cases with final falling pitch request specification and those with final rising pitch signal either a hearing trouble or a recognition failure. Note, however, that as these repair requests target different kinds of objects, the distinction between indexical and non-indexical forms is no longer directly relevant.

As noted, the lexico-syntactic design of a repair requests consists of (1) the words and constructions employed; and (2) the ways in which these items are cohesively tied to the prior talk. The repair requests considered in Section 4.2 consisted of (1) an in-situ interrogative which (2) replicates what's been said, with the question word locating a trouble-source within it. However, in-situ interrogatives can also be used to create something which *wasn't* said and locate that as the trouble-source. The two cases of "to who" below illustrate this difference.



**Extract 15** [excerpt of 9 above]

8 A: ... like I was performing to them  
 9 (.)  
 10 like I was sm[iling at th]em like  
 11 B: [to who. ]

**Extract 16** [Callhome-4926]

1 A: did he make it sound like he's going to come  
 2 (1.4)  
 3 B: to who.  
 4 (.)  
 5 A: me

The “to who” in 15, discussed above, replicates a portion of A’s talk (“... to them”) and requests repair of a reference within it. Contrast this with the “to who” in extract 16. Speaker A is asking B about a relative’s plans. Her question, “did he make it sound like he’s going to come” (line 1), leaves implicit where this person may be going (to stay with A as it turns out, see line 5). Evidently this causes B some trouble and she asks A to fill in what is, for her, “missing” information (cf. Lerner, 2004). She does this by creating an oblique argument for the clause/event encoded in A’s question (“he’s going to come” ← “to who”). The “to” identifies the relevant semantic/syntactic relationship (compare with “with”, “for”, “by”, etc.) and the “who” stands in for the requested item (the person that this relative may or may not be going to visit). Internally these repair requests may be the same, but externally they are not.<sup>5</sup>

Expansion—the cohesive resource used in 16—differs significantly from repetition and substitution. Rather than retracting syntactic slots in the prior talk, it creates new ones (cf.

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<sup>5</sup> The extract below illustrates a third way in which “to who” can be cohesively tied to prior talk. Speaker A is asking B about the school project they’re working on. In line 3, she syntactically projects a nominal/reference (“email our questions to”), but then displays trouble producing it. With “to who”, speaker B enters her turn space, and prompts her for this undelivered item—a less presumptive, but less helpful, alternative to “guessing” what she was going to say (see Schegloff, 1987a). While the target of this request is also “missing”, it was syntactically projected. This “who” is thus a *completion*, not expansion of A’s talk (cf. Lerner 1996, 2004).

1 A: like can we like ask questions::  
 2 (0.3)  
 3 A: like email our questions to: (1.6)  
 4 B: to who  
 5 (.)  
 6 A: like the company [FreeLunch-4-16-01]

Auer, 2009). It goes beyond what was encoded, exploiting its grammatical (syntagmatic) possibilities. Using expansion, then, can involve some degree of choice. For instance, the B-speaker in 16 could have indexed greater access to the state of affairs in question by further specifying her request (“...he’s going to come” ← “to visit who”, “to stay with who”). Alternatively, she could have been less presumptuous and requested a *place* reference (“to where” or just “where”); or less still and asked for the reason he is coming (“to do what”, “for what”). Indeed, there do not appear to be any syntactic or semantic constraints on the nature of the relationship between this grammatical “parasite” and its “host”. Any information which A *could* have encoded as a constituent, but did not, can be requested using an appropriately designed expansion (though of course in some cases this action will *progress* rather than retard the ongoing activity—not all requests for information are requests for repair; see Schegloff, 1997, p. 519-20).

Also note that the expansion can be combined with elements which *retract* slots in the prior talk (though what motivates this “extra” framing is unclear, cf. section 4.2.6 above). This holds both when the expansion is a bare question word—compare “where” with “going where” (extract 17 below; see also Chapter 3)—and when it is a question word embedded in-situ within a role-defining structure—compare “against who” with “someone takes action against who” (18); or “for what” with “coming down there for what” (19). These cases demonstrate that the defining feature of this class of request is the cohesive relationship between that *question word itself* and trouble-source unit. Only this core locating element need be an expansion.

**Extract 17** [Rahman-1, 3:06]

1 A: uh::: she's not going tonight either  
 2 she said we'll will go on Monday night  
 3 (0.3)  
 4 B: going where.:


**Extract 18** [Watergate-4-12NC, 11:45]

1 A: Watergate is not going to destroy the Presidency because  
 2 eventually the facts will come out they have to (1.0)  
 3 once they come out (1.0) as long as hhh (0.7)  
 4 someone takes action (1.2) then it's going to be s-  
 5 then it's going to be: (0.9) (I) mean you can't keep  
 6 then talking about the god damn thing=  
 7 B: =.hhh someone takes action you mean against uh who.

**Extract 19** [CallHome-4077, 12:53]

- 1 A: so you coming down here hh  
 2 (0.2)  
 3 B: coming down there for what.

Asking someone to fill in something which is “missing” from their talk is, of course, a type of specification request. We would thus expect these cases to be produced with final *falling* pitch. And it seems they are. In extract 16, B’s pitch falls 6 ST over the final syllable of “to *who*” (see Figure 4.4 below). Extracts 17-19 are similar, with B’s pitch falling 13 ST over “... *where*”; 7ST over “... *who*”; and 9ST over “... *what*”. This appears to hold generally, providing further evidence for the diagnostic import of final pitch (see Egbert et al., 2009 on expanded “for what.” in English, and “für was.” in German; and the discussion of “implicit” references in Chapter 4).



**Figure 4.4:** The repair request in extract 16

In sum, there are two gross classes of repair requests which make use of forms like “where”, “to who”, “been where”, “coming down for what”, etc. (bare and framed question words). The first locate something “said” (linguistically encoded) as a trouble-source. The second locate something “unsaid” but (wrongly) assumed to be available (zero anaphora, implicit temporal or locative frames, etc.). What separates these two classes at the grammatical level is their cohesive design, specifically the relation between the core locating element and the trouble-source unit. The question word either *substitutes* the trouble-source, or *expands* the grammatical structure of the trouble-source TCU.

#### 4.4 Requesting repair of sub-components with “the who?”, “Bob who.”, etc.

There is a second, cross-cutting distinction to be made among repair requests. Whether substitution-or expansion-based, or even bare or framed, all cases considered thus far have targeted a *full* reference for repair. But cohesive framing can also be used to target a subcomponent of a reference form. The following extract offers a first illustration. Speaker B has just asked A where she works. We see her answer in line 1.

**Extract 20** [Connie and Dee, 9, from Schegloff 2007 p. 149, re-transcribed]

- 1 A: .hhhhh (.) well I'm working through:: the Amfat Corporation  
 2 (0.9)  
 3 B: the who?  
 4 (0.2)  
 5 A: Amfat Corpora[tion.]  
 6 B: [ oh]:  
 7 (0.2)  
 8 A: it's a holding company  
 9 (.)  
 10 B: yeah

B's repair request (“the who?”, line 3) replicates the internal structure of “the Amfat Corporation”, locating its nominal head specifically as the source of trouble (compare this with “through who?”, “you're working through who?” or “who?”, which would target the reference as a whole). The evidence for this level of fine-grained targeting comes not only from the cohesive design of B's request, but from A's repair. She repeats “Amfat Corporation” only (line 5).

There is evidence that the diagnostic import of final pitch appears to extend to these subcomponent cases as well. B's “the who?” is produced with final rising pitch (9ST over “who”) and there is an orientation to two possible types of trouble. A addresses a possible hearing trouble first (the repetition in line 5),<sup>6</sup> but then offers a recognition repair (“it's a holding company”, line 8). Schegloff (2007b, p. 150) notes that B “registers the repeat of the company's name as news with his “oh”, but when [A] goes on to offer a further description

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<sup>6</sup> In light of my earlier analysis of try-marked vs. non-try-marked repetition repairs (Chapter 3), I should note that in this example, and the following, speaker A produces their repair with final falling pitch (non-try-marked), but then goes on to offer a second, recognition-based repair. Either these cases weaken my earlier argument or they indicate that this confidence-indexing contrast does not apply in these subcomponent cases. As noted previously, try marking demands a systematic study in its own right.

of the company, [B] receipts with ... “yeah” ... treat[ing] what has preceded as not constituting new information”. The diagnostic upshot of this observation is that B claims his problem was only hearing, not recognizing this reference. Nevertheless, speaker A did offer this second repair. Extract 21 below provides a second, similar example.

**Extract 21** [FreeLunch-3-18-01, 1:03]

- 1 A: ... **Thomas Simmons** is making me stay here  
 2 (.)  
 3 B: **Thomas** who?  
 -----  
 -----  
 4 A: Simmons.  
 5 (0.6)  
 6 A: a head of:: (0.5) H C I ((*Human Computer Interaction*))  
 7 (0.3)  
 8 A: undergrad  
 9 (0.2)  
 10 B: why is he making you stay here

In line 1 Speaker A complains that “Thomas Simmons” (his supervisor) is making him work over the holidays. Speaker B responds with “Thomas who?”, rising 3ST over “who” (see the in-line pitch trace). This repair request cohesively replicates A’s reference to this person, targeting his last name specifically as the trouble-source. As in the previous case, A responds first with a repetition of the targeted sub-component (“Simmons.”, see note 6) and then offers additional repairs which describe the referent (lines 6 and 8).

Extracts 20-21 suggest that even in subcomponent cases final rising pitch offers an ambiguous diagnosis of B’s trouble. It may be a hearing trouble or it may be recognition failure. What about final falling pitch? Can it be used to request specification? Consider the following extract.

**Extract 22** [SBC-19, 11:39]

- 1 A: **Bob** came by this afternoon  
 2 (0.2)  
 3 B: **Bob** who?  
 -----  
 -----  
 4 (0.3)  
 5 A: um [ (.) Ash]ton.=  
 6 C: [ Ashtone.]

7 A: =and (0.3) uh (0.3) he has his miter thing  
 8 B: he took it

In line 1, speaker A launches a sequence to tell B that “Bob”, one of their neighbors, had come by to pick up a tool that B had borrowed. In line 3, B requests repair with “Bob who.”, *falling* 5 STs over the word “who” (see in line pitch trace). Like the “Thomas who?” above, “Bob who.” exploits the “grammar” of binomial person references in order to request someone’s last name. The first name slot is filled with a repetition, the last name slot with the word “who”. However, because here the A-speaker had referred to this person by his first name only (“Bob”), this “who” is an *expansion* of the prior talk, not a substitution (see the previous section). By requesting this “unsaid” last name, speaker B claims that A has wrongly assumed that he can identify this person on the basis of their first name alone.

Again we see a cohesively framed-*who* with final falling pitch used to request specification (A last name specifies a first name, just as “that girl from Church” specifies “that girl” or “John” specifies “he”). Due to its fine-grained cohesive framing, however, the “NAME who.” practice differs in two important ways from these other cases. First, this practice does not signal trouble with an indexical reference, but with a name (indeed a *first* name). Despite similarities in form (final falling pitch) and function (specification request), “NAME who.” is not usable in the same sequential contexts as “who did.” and “who.” Conversely, it *is* a pragmatic alternative to the linguistically dissimilar “who did?” and “who?”. A second difference is that the “NAME who.” practice places considerably more constraints on A’s repair than the other falling pitch cases we’ve seen. Whereas “who.” or “who did.” allow any form of specification (see especially Figure 3.5 in the previous chapter), the only appropriate response to a “NAME who.” is the person’s last name. We see this in the form of the request, but also in how it is treated. In extract 22 above, speaker A does indeed provide Bob’s last name (“Ashton”), as does a third participant (speaker C) in overlap (lines 5-6).<sup>7</sup> This is consistent with 5 of the 7 cases of “NAME who.” in my collection, providing some (admittedly weak) distributional support. More importantly, in both the deviant cases we see a clear orientation to the normative requirement of this particular method of repair. Extract 23 is a case in point.

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<sup>7</sup> In fact each participant offers a slightly different version: “Ashton” (line 5) vs. “Ashtone” (line 6). The fact that one (or both) do not know this person’s last name precisely is irrelevant. They are both producing what they *think* to be his last name.

**Extract 23** [CallHome-5388, 28:13]

- 1 A: .hhhh (.) um have you talked to: (ever-) um (.)  
 2 what's her name Sharon  
 3 (0.7)  
 4 B: Sharon who.:  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 5 (0.2)  
 6 A: Sharon um (0.6) Ja- um what's her name  
 7 [ Jani]ne and them's sister.  
 8 B: [Jones?]  
 9 A: xx-xx (still)  
 10 (.)  
 11 A: you see her still?  
 12 B: the twins getting ready to graduate girl.

In lines 1-2 speaker A asks her friend B if she is still in contact with “um (.) what’s her name Sharon”. In next position, speaker B requests repair with “Sharon who.”, falling 3 ST on “who” (line 4). The repair which speaker A (eventually) offers is *not* Sharon’s last name, but a kinship triangulation (“Janine and them’s sister”, line 7). Critically, however, A displays her understanding that this was not the type of repair requested. She begins her response (line 6-7) by repeating Sharon’s first name and then, with “um”, indicating possible trouble in producing the next item due. In this sequential and grammatical context, this next item is of course Sharon’s last name (making her “um” a form of “pre-precise hesitation”; Lerner, 2013). A displays that she is *trying* to produce this requested item. The ensuing 0.6 second pause provides further evidence, as does her turn continuation. She begins what is likely the kinship triangulation eventually produced (“Janine and them’s sister”), but then cuts off (“Ja-”) and replaces it with an explicit, meta-communicative search item (“um what’s her name”; see Papantoniou, 2012). Despite evidently having this alternative repair at hand, she nevertheless treats a continued search for the person’s last name as a preferred action.

By producing her repair in this non-straightforward manner, speaker A displays that it is normatively inappropriate in response to this type of repair request (see Chapter 3.7 above).<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>8</sup>Also note that after A had begun searching for Sharon’s last name, speaker B offers a candidate version herself (“Jones”, line 7). Though slightly different from the cases of “upgraded” repair requests seen in previous chapters, this action nonetheless displays B’s understanding that this was the type of repair she was after. The second deviant case in my collection is *precisely* an “upgrade” case. Speaker B requests repair with “Kevin who.” and then upgrades it with “Kevin Thompson?”. She could have chosen any candidate specification (“the tall one”, “Sam’s friend”, “from Math class”), but she chose this one in particular.

This example thus provides especially strong evidence that “NAME who.” delimits not only the type of trouble (underspecification), but the *repair method* A should provide to remedy it (the person’s last name). It also shows how this level of diagnostic precision can be a double-edged sword. By telling speaker A exactly what is wanted/needed, speaker B relieves them of much of the burden of analyzing their trouble. However, participants don’t always know, or have readily available, the last names of the people they have reason to refer to. Whereas in most circumstances they can work around this with descriptions, kinship terms, etc., a “NAME who.” puts them on the spot to formulate this person’s last name. We see the A-speaker in 23 struggle to do so *despite* having other resources available, e.g. the fact that Sharon is Janine’s sister (see also line 16 of extract 8 above). From A’s perspective, then, a more “open” repair request might have been welcomed.

But what would this be? How could B request specification of “Sharon”, but place less restrictions on how this is done? Specification requests like “who.” or “to who.” would be perfect, but they cannot target names. And while “who?” or “to who?” can, they aren’t specification requests. The same problem extends to “who’s Sharon”, “who’s that”, “I don’t know who that is”, etc. These practices all claim too little access to the trouble-source reference. B’s trouble isn’t unfamiliarity with this name/person, or trouble in recalling them. She is simply claiming that this name, on its own, it isn’t sufficient for her to identify the intended referent. There *is* a relevant specification request, but to find it we must dig even deeper into the “design space” for repair requests.

An initial analysis suggests that “*which* Sharon.” and “*which* one.” (falling pitch) requests specification, but allows A to specify the TS-reference with either a description (“Nadine’s sister”, “the one who...”, “the doctor”) or the person’s last name (“Jones”). Interestingly, though, it appears that the “which X” practice construes the trouble in a slightly different manner than “Sharon who.” (or “who.”, “to who.”, “what cousin.”, etc). By using the interrogative pronoun “which”, this practice claims that the reference form is *ambiguous*, rather than vague/underspecified. That is, B claims to have multiple referents “in mind” which could be referred to this way. A’s job is simply to indicate *which* of these it is.<sup>9</sup> If this analysis is correct, this practice claims greater access to the TS-reference than any of the

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<sup>9</sup> Sidnell (2007) offers a similar analysis of an OI practice in the English Creole spoken on Bequia (a Caribbean island), and in fact offers “which NAME” as an English gloss.



other's considered: "recognition failure" < "underspecification" < "ambiguity". As always, though, the differences are not necessarily tied to some objective nature of the trouble, but to how speaker B construes it through their selection of a particular practice of repair initiation (see Drew, 1997; Robinson, 2006 for relevant discussion).

#### 4.5 Requesting repair without a question word

In this final section, I will briefly consider a class of repair requests which work similarly to those using cohesively framed question words. The key difference is that they do away with question word itself, locating the trouble-source with cohesive framing only. I will show that these framing-only practices can locate sources of trouble which are both "said" (linguistically encoded) and "unsaid" (presupposed, implicit, etc.). The difference hinges again on whether the core locating element—a syntactic "gap" in this case—substitutes or expands the prior talk. Let's begin with the latter cases.

**Extract 24** [from Lerner, 2004, p. 170]

- 1 A: Mom I think my calendar's a little **too high up**
- 2 B: for
- 3 A: writing, crossing things out and stuff

**Extract 25** Field notes from a beginner's Dutch language class in 2010. I am A, B is the teacher

- 1 A: the structure is very different
- 2 B: different than
- 3 A: English

Lerner (2004) has shown that syntactically incomplete expansions like "to", "about", "rather than", etc. can be used to prompt a prior speaker to specify something claimed to be missing from their talk, namely the item constructed as a syntactic gap. In extract 24, speaker B's "for" prompts A to specify the types of activities that her calendar is "too high up" for, something A left implicit in her prior turn (line 1). Compare this framing-only request with the hypothetical "for what." (and the "to who." in extract 16 above). Similarly, an incomplete expansion can be combined with a (partial) repeat of the trouble-source unit, as extract 25 documents. Compare B's "different than" with the hypothetical "than" (and 24) on the one hand, and "different than what." (and 18, 19) on the other. Finally, repetition framing on its own can be used to request something "missing". Extract 26 below illustrates.

## Extract 26 [CallHome-6825, 18:16]

1 A: but weddin- wedding was in Great Hall um (0.8)  
 2 .hhhh (1.6) Liz, Mike Gorey and h (0.6) um (0.5)  
 3 Scott (.) **played** at the end h  
 4 (0.8)  
 5 A: .hhhhhh after everyone had [left  
 6 B: [play::ed\_  
 7 (0.5)  
 8 A: um: (0.6) whatever instruments they happened to play

Speaker A is telling B about a wedding. In lines 2-3 she reports that “Liz, Mike Gorey and Scott played at the end” (line 2-3), meaning—but not saying—that they played music. Evidently this causes B some trouble and she asks A to specify the object of this verb. However, rather than using a form like “played what.” (cf. extract 18 above), she simply repeats the verb (“played”, line 6), constructing this trouble-source as a gap to be “filled in” (see A’s repair in 8). Note that here there are no inherent syntactic signs of incompleteness in this repair request (cf. the “for” and “different than” above). Instead, the gap is created entirely through *prosodic* incompleteness. Framing repeats are typically produced with flat, mid-level pitch and lengthening over their final portions (“play::ed\_” in Jeffersonian conventions). See the inline pitch trace for extract 26, and Figure 4.5 below for extract 27 (see Walker & Benjamin, in prep. for details; see also Bolinger, 1957, p. 167; Koshik, 2002, p. 288, Lerner, 2004, p. 172-4).




Figure 4.5: The repair request in extract 27

Extract 26 illustrated that framing repeats can locate “unsaid” sources of trouble. But they can also target things which *were* said. In line 2 of extract 27 below, speaker A announces, in overlap, that he’s made some progress on a homework assignment (“oh my Apollonius paper is half written”). Speaker B’s “your Apollonius pape::r\_” (see Figure 4.5 above) requests A to repair what came after this repeated item, operating much like “your Apollonius paper what?” or “your Appolonius paper is what?” would (see A’s repair in line 6). The gap created by this framing repeat is thus a substitution of the prior TCU, not an expansion.

**Extract 27** [CallHome-6825, 25:19]

1 B: ye[ah sh: here (there isn't that) much going on ev]eryone=  
 2 A: [(well-) uh oh **my Apollonius paper** **is- half written**]  
 3 B: =everyone's gone again  
 4 B: .h h h h **your Apollonius pape::r\_**  
 5 (0.3)  
 6 A: **is half written** I'm on page six out of ten

While we tend to associate requests for repair with question words, these framing-only practices demonstrate that they can be done without them. Conversely, while repetitions typically deliver hearing checks and other yes/no-type actions (see Chapter 6), framing repeats demonstrate that this too is contingent. To work out the precise nature of the action delivered by a repair initiating utterance, participants must attend to the words and constructions used, the ways in which these items are cohesively tied to the prior talk, and their prosodic delivery.

## 4.6 Conclusion

When we move beyond open-class practices (“huh?”, “pardon?”, etc., Chapter 2) and question words used on their own (“who?”, “when.”, etc., Chapter 3), there is an explosion in the lexico-syntactic variety and complexity of requests for repair. As I have shown in this chapter, one reason for this is the extensive use of cohesive framing as an aid for locating the trouble-source. For framing to be of any use, it must change as the trouble-source unit changes. We see this in the endless variants of the “same” framed question word (“who did”, “who is”, “to who”, “for who”, etc.), but this cohesive variety runs deeper. I have shown that these forms can be used to request repair both when the trouble was something linguistically

encoded in the prior talk (e.g. “for who” following “I bought it for him”); and when it was something wrongly assumed to be recoverable from context (e.g. “for who” following “I bought it already”). In the former case, the trouble-source is located by cohesive *substitution*, in the latter by an *expansion* of grammatical structure of the trouble-source unit. There is thus a cohesive “split” among these repair requests, with substitution-based practices on the one hand and expansion-based practices on the other.

Indeed, a parallel split exists among bare question words (“who”, Chapter 3), framing-only practices (“for”, section 4.5), and indeed for most other methods of other-initiation besides. Compare “for Kevin?” following “I bought it for him” and “I bought it already”. These two understanding checks differ in precisely the same way. The first substitutes a “said” trouble-source, the latter locates an “unsaid” trouble-source with grammatical expansion (see Sacks, 1992; Schegloff, 1997a; Lerner, 2004; and Hayashi & Hayano, 2013 on “appendor questions”). Similarly, alternative questions used as OIs can be both substitution- and expansion-based (see Koshik 2005 for an analysis of the former, and extract 27 below for an example of the latter). Finally, consider “huh?”, “hm?”, and other open-class repair requests. While these OIs themselves don’t cohesively split, the *repairs* they receive can. In extracts 28 and 29 below, a speaker responds to a “hm?” by specifying something that they previously “left out” (on the assumption it was contextually available). These expansion-based *repairs* contrast with those which repeat and/or substitute elements within the trouble-source unit (see Chapter 2 for examples).<sup>10</sup>

**Extract 27** [CallFriend-n6899, 26:09]

1 A: I mean the hail sounded like it was going  
 2 to break all the windows  
 3 (1.0)  
 4 A: @ @ [ @ ]  
 5 B: [ at ] the house; or [ at work ]

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<sup>10</sup> This ability to handle both “said” and “unsaid” trouble-sources is one further sense in which “huh?”, “what?”, etc. are diagnostically “open”. The trouble may be the prior TCU/action as a whole, something within it, or something “missing” from it.

**Extract 28** [FreeLunch--4-16-04, 8:52]

- 1 A: is yours Emiko ((*speaker B's name is Emiko*))  
 2 (0.8)  
 3 B: hm?  
 4 (0.5)  
 5 A: complicated

**Extract 29** [CallFriend-n6157, 2:57]

- 1 B: is that Francis ((*a third party*))  
 2 (0.6)  
 3 A: hm? hh  
 4 B: in the background

In sum, other-initiations (and repairs) are defined not only by the words and grammatical constructions they use, but by the ways in which these items are formally tied to trouble-source unit (or not, see the next chapter). A difference in cohesive design can result in a different method of OI or a different practice within the same method.

At the same time, however, other-initiations are made up of more than lexico-syntax. In the previous chapter, I showed that repair requests built from bare “who”, “where”, “when”, etc. can be—indeed must be—combined with intonation contours which provide diagnostic information about the trouble being signaled. In this chapter, I showed this prosodic split holds in a parallel manner for cohesively framed versions of these question words. Those with final falling pitch request specification of either an indexical reference (e.g. a pronoun) or something left “unsaid”. Those with final rising pitch signal either a hearing or recognition problem with some non-indexical element in the prior talk (e.g. a name). Table 4.1 below offers an overview of these diagnostic differences.

	FINAL RISING PITCH	FINAL FALLING PITCH
ILLUSTRATION	“who?”, “to who?”, “been where?”	“who.”, “to who.”, “been where.”
TROUBLE-SOURCE	Non-Indexical form (e.g. name)	Indexical form (e.g. pronoun) <b>Or</b> “Unsaid” item
TROUBLE-TYPE	Hearing problem <b>Or</b> Recognition failure	Underspecified

**Table 4.1:** The diagnostic import of final pitch for bare and cohesively framed “who”, “where”, etc.

This chapter thus further demonstrates that there is a widespread, systematic difference between repair requests produced with final rising and falling pitch (Selting, 1988; 1992; 1996; Schegloff, 1997; Egbert et al., 2009; see also Chapters 3 and 5). An important line for future research will be not only to further study these and related practices, both linguistically and interactionally, but to determine which other languages employ prosody to do this type of diagnostic work. Does this usage extend beyond West Germanic languages?<sup>11</sup> If it doesn't, do other languages make a similar division, using other kinds of linguistic resources (e.g. other prosodic features, or particles)?

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<sup>11</sup> Sidnell (personal communication) suggests that the English Creole spoken on Bequia also distinguishes between "who." and "who?" in this manner (see Sidnell, 2007 for relevant discussion).



## 5 | Opaque Repair Requests

**Abstract:** This chapter examines the use of “do what?” (final rising pitch) as a request for repair. It is shown that this practice does *not* cohesively tie to the prior talk, and the trouble is (or at least may be) with the *entirety* of what the prior speaker has just said. In other words, “do what?” is more akin to “huh?” and “what?” than it is to “to what?”, “did what?” and even “do what.” (final falling pitch). Critically, this “opaque” (non-compositional, non-cohesive) usage of “do what?” appears to be restricted to some dialects of (southern) American English. For other speakers, it transparently delimits the source of trouble. Interestingly, neither this practice nor any of the other cases of opaque repair requests considered have received any attention in the academic literature. Yet, they are a phenomenon which lay at the intersection of many different areas of interest and expertise.

### 5.1 Introduction

Requests for repair fall into two broad categories: Those which linguistically restrict the source of the trouble and those which do not. In most cases, the lexico-syntactic form of the repair request transparently reflects its membership in one class or the other. Requests like “where?”, “to who?”, “Bob who?” are built from resources capable of cohesively locating something in the prior talk. They belong to the restrictive class (see Chapters 3 and 4; Schegloff et al., 1977; Selting, 1988; 1992; 1996; Egbert, 1996; Schegloff, 1997a; Sidnell, 2007; Egbert et al., 2009). Requests like “huh?” and “sorry?” are built from resources which lack these locative affordances, and so belong to the *non*-restrictive class (see Chapter 2; Drew, 1997; Curl, 2005; Schegloff, 2004; Robinson, 2012). However, as I will show in this chapter there are a small number of repair requests which *look* restrictive but are not, thus upsetting this natural, transparent relationship between form and function. To provide the analytic tools necessary to identify and appreciate these “opaque” practices, I will first consider repair requests like “my what?”, “he did what?”, “you what them?”, etc. In the majority of cases, these framed-*whats* do indeed transparently restrict the source of trouble. This will serve as a point of departure for our focal practice—the non-restrictive, and hence opaque, use of “do what?”.



## 5.2 The transparent use of cohesively framed “what”

Repair requests built from “he what?”, “move what?” and other transparent framed-*whats* are regularly mentioned in the literature, both within CA (see for instance Schegloff et al., 1977; Kelly & Local, 1989a, p. 282-85; Sacks, 1992, p. 723-4; Drew, 1997, p. 72; and Sidnell, 2010, p. 125-8) and linguistics, typically under the name “echo questions” (see for instance Bolinger, 1957; Halliday & Hasan, 1976; Quirk et al., 1985; and Iwata 2003). While this chapter advances our understanding of these repair requests, a more in-depth and systematic analysis (both linguistically and interactionally) awaits future work. My analysis is based on a collection of some 150 cases, systematically extracted from my data set (see Chapter 1).




Figure 5.1: A framed-*what* with final rising pitch




Figure 5.2: A framed-*what* with final falling pitch

There are at least two distinct practices of framed-*whats*, distinguished by their final pitch movement (compare with Chapters 3 and 4; see also note 4 below). The framed-*what*

illustrated in Figure 5.1 above *rises* 8 semitones (ST) over its final portion (“what is?”). The framed-*what* in Figure 5.2 *falls* 6 ST over its final portion (“what is.”).<sup>1</sup> While diagnostically distinct, these practices are alike in their use of framing to restrict the source of trouble. I will focus first on the final rising cases (“what is?”), and then briefly consider the final falling cases (“what isn’t.”).

### 5.2.1 Framed-what with final rising pitch

Transparent framed-*whats* with final rising pitch restrict the source of trouble in the following way: The request as a whole cohesively replicates or echoes (a portion of) the prior talk, with the “what” substituting or standing-in for the trouble-source itself. My data includes cases targeting full nominals (“on what?”), nominal heads (“my what?”), verbs (“to what?”), predicative adjectives (“it was kind of what?”), attributive adjectives (“a what company?”), verb phrase/predicates (“he what?”, “we’ll just what?”), full clauses (“because what?”, “that’s when what?”, “but what?”), components of acronyms (“H I T what?”), among others. Indeed, it seems that the “what” can locate any kind of linguistic object for repair—a natural language equivalent of the “wild card” symbols used in the formal syntax for search queries.

How do we know that framed-*whats* restrict the trouble-source in this way? One piece of evidence, of course, is that we can see this in the inherent linguistic design of the request. However, what is more important, and as we will see necessary, is that framed-*whats* are used this way by participants. They are routinely *deployed* in order to do this restrictive work (by the speaker initiating repair) and *treated* as having done so (by the speaker of the troublesome talk). This is most straightforwardly seen in cases like 1-3 below. As the highlighting illustrates, speaker B’s framed-*what* cohesively “fits” with A’s prior talk, and, in a parallel manner, A’s repair “fits” with B’s framed-*what*. In extract 1, B’s “my what?” (rising 7ST over “what”) cohesively recreates A’s reference to her tape (“you forgot *your tape*”), and with her repair A then “fills in” the targeted nominal head (“tape”). Similarly in 2, B’s “to what?” (rising 3ST over “what”), recreates A’s verbal adjunct (“they have now till

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<sup>1</sup> These figures were created using PRAAT version 5.3.15 (Boersma & Weenink, 2012). See Chapter 1.4.2 for details

Wednesday *to work on their thing*") and A's "to work on their stuff" repairs it. Finally, in 3, B's "on what?" (rising 2 ST over "what"), recreates the locational phrase in A's prior action ("we went *on the Back to the Future ride*") and A's repair "stays within" the delimited nominal ("Back to the Future").

**Extract 1** [CallFriend-s6943, 2:21]

1 B: hhh[hhhh ]  
 2 A: [you forgot] to get your tape  
 3 (0.4)  
 4 B: my what?  
 5 (.)  
 6 A: tape

**Extract 2** [FreeLunch-3-18-09, 0:12]

1 A: cause they have now: till Wednesday to work on their (thing)  
 2 (1.1)  
 3 B: to- what?  
 4 (0.8)  
 5 A: to work on their stuff

**Extract 3** [SBC-35, 14:20]

1 C: what did you go on while you were there then=  
 2 A: =we went on the Back To The Future ri@de  
 3 (0.4)  
 4 A: simulation=  
 5 B: =on [what?]  
 6 C: [oh ] really  
 7 (0.4)  
 8 A: Back To The Future

The routine production of these fitted<sup>2</sup> cohesive patterns provides important evidence that framed-*whats* are indeed deployed and understood to be doing this restrictive work. By

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<sup>2</sup> As extracts 2 and 3 illustrate, the cohesive fit between A's repair and B's request needn't be perfect. In 2, A's repair repeats the framing "to" ("to work on their stuff"). This is relatively common in my collection, especially with functional/grammatical words. More interestingly, in extract 3 A repairs "Back to the Future", rather than "the Back to the Future Ride" as a whole. She treats this modifier specifically as the source of trouble—"you heard and understood that I went on a ride, you're just not sure which one". While quite rare, cases like extract 3 suggest that these repair requests (transparent framed-*whats* with final rising pitch) may not always specify the trouble-source fully. Their lexico-syntax restricts a domain of trouble (in this case to the object of "on"), but how much (or little) of it is actually causing the trouble must be worked out in situ by the participants. If this analysis is correct, then the scope of the trouble signaled by "on what?", "he what?", etc. can vary from use to use, as it can with a "huh?", "what?", etc. (Chapter 2). Unlike these open-class repair requests, however, their scope never extends to the TCU/action-as-a-whole.

presupposing (or “leaving out”) the other parts of the prior TCU/action, both B (in their repair request) and A (in their repair) implicitly treat them as unproblematic (see Robinson & Kevoe-Feldman, 2009; Chapter 2). We can find additional evidence by considering those cases which deviate from this pattern (i.e. negative or deviant cases). Consider first cases in which B’s request “mis-frames” the trouble-source action in some way. Extract 4 illustrates.

**Extract 4** [CallFriend-n6503, 24:06]

1 A: .hhhhh (before everything gets) crazy  
 2 hh[hh  
 3 B: [what is?  
 4 (.)  
 5 A: before everything gets craz[y  
 6 B: [oh I know

One common function of framed-*whats* with final rising pitch is to signal (claim) a problem in hearing. This is evidenced in part by the fact they are very often responded to with a repetition of the targeted talk, as in extracts 1-3 above (see discussion of repetition repairs in Chapter 2 and 3). This usage introduces the unsurprising contingency that sometimes speaker B may also have trouble hearing *other* parts of the A’s talk, including what they have recycled in their request. This mishearing, in turn, may generate a mis-framing. In extract 4 above, B evidently heard A say something “is crazy”, when in fact she claims to have said “everything gets crazy”. B *tried* to fit her request to the prior talk, but simply failed.<sup>3</sup> These cases—fully accountable by the norms outlined above—form the majority of mis-framings in my collection (in one other case in my collection, B intentionally mis-frames A’s prior talk in order to make a joke).

A second class of deviant cases occur when A repairs more than what was located by B’s request. An analysis of such cases reveals that they are typically done for a reason and/or treated as abnormal, inappropriate, or at least noticeable actions. Extract 5 is a case in point.

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<sup>3</sup> A “mis-fitting” other-initiation resulting from mishearing is a general and widespread phenomenon. We saw in Chapter 3 that “who?” (rising pitch) is sometimes produced following turns without person references (or the wrong *kinds* of person references), again likely due to a mishearing. Schegloff (1997a) makes a similar point about “hearing checks” accomplished via a candidate repetition of the trouble-source (p. 525).

## Extract 5 [CallFriend-n6239, 0:56]

1 B: what did you do in Puerto Ric[o]  
 2 A: [.hhhhh everything  
 3 it was so good I mean well (0.7) it wasn't like (0.8)  
 4 I don't know the nightlife was kind of slow she was like  
 5 you know this is really weird you know there's nothing  
 6 .hhhhh (0.3) I don't know [it just wasn't x-  
 7 B: [it was kind of what?  
 8 A: .hhhhh the nightlife was slow hh[h  
 9 B: [slow  
 10 A: m- u- but um (0.8) we [went ]  
 11 B: [who ca]res when you're on vacation

Speaker A is telling her friend B about a recent trip (see lines 1-6). In line 7, B requests repair with “it was kind of what?”, rising 8 ST over “what”. This framed-*what* cohesively recreates A’s assessment in line 4 (“the nightlife was kind of slow”), locating the assessment term “slow” specifically as the source of her trouble. What we would expect, then, is that A would repair this word only. She doesn’t. She repairs the entire assessment (“the nightlife was slow”, line 8).

If a “fitted” repair is normatively appropriate here, then we would expect that speaker A has deviated from this for a reason. Similarly, we would expect that B would notice that this repair is mis-fitted. We can see evidence of both. Consider first B’s acknowledgment of this repair in line 9. Rather than using a more generic practice such as “oh”, “right”, or “okay”, she repeats and thus targets the talk she is acknowledging (Schegloff, 1997a). Critically, she repeats *only* what she had requested with her framed-*what*—the assessment term “slow”. The rest of A’s repair, “the nightlife was...”, is left unacknowledged. This provides evidence that speaker B noticed that A’s repair went beyond what was asked for.

But why did speaker A produce this mis-fitted repair in the first place? A reasonable explanation is that she was addressing a potential ambiguity in B’s repair request; not in what part of the assessment was being targeted, but *which* of the four assessments in A’s prior turn was being targeted. The following extract illustrates the relevant talk, with additional annotation (discussed below):

## Extract 6 [see extract 5 above more context]

- 1 A: [it<sub>trip</sub>] was [so] good  
 2 I mean well (0.7) [it<sub>trip</sub>] wasn't [like] (0.8)  
 3 I don't know [the nightlife] was [kind of] slow  
 4 she was like you know [this<sub>slow-nightlife</sub>] is [really] weird  
 5 you know there's nothing .hhhhh (0.3)  
 6 I don't know [it just wasn't x-  
 7 B: [it] was [kind of] what?  
 8 A: .hhhhh [the nightlife] was slow hh[h

The item being assessed in the trouble-source unit is the nightlife (line 3). Rather than repeating this reference (“the nightlife”), B refers to it with a pronoun (“it was kind of slow”). While typically unproblematic, pronominalization introduces a level of semantic generality which, in the right (or wrong) context, may cause problems. This seems to be one of those contexts. First consider A’s turn in lines 1-6. While “the nightlife was kind of slow” is the only “perfect match” for B’s repair request, there are three other assessments of the form **OBJECT REFERENCE** + “BE”-VERB + **MODIFIER** + **ASSESSMENT TERM**. And in each case a different object is being assessed: the trip as a whole in 1 and 2; the nightlife in 3; and the fact that the nightlife is slow in 4. Finally, note that B’s repair request is not positioned contiguously with its target (i.e. at the end of line 3). All of this combines to introduce some potential ambiguity as to which assessment B is targeting with her framed-*what*.

Further evidence can be found in the design of A’s repair itself (“the nightlife was slow”, line 8). Note first that A spells out the assessed object rather than repeating the pronoun which B had used to refer to it in her request (“it”). This may be a way of combating the possible alternative targets (i.e. the trip as a whole, the fact that the nightlife was slow). Also note that she does not redo the modifier “kind of”. What exactly drove this choice is unclear, but it suggests that this modifier was not (or no longer is) a core part of her assessment. Again, this provides evidence that, for speaker A at least, B’s repair request was potentially ambiguous. This in turn provided A with grounds to repair more than what was requested.

In sum, repair requests like “my what?”, “to what?”, etc. use cohesive framing to transparently locate the source of trouble (or at least the domain of trouble, see note 4). While this analysis fits with our linguistic intuitions, the most critical evidence is that we can see that participants routinely *use* them this way, both in normal and deviant cases. We now turn briefly to transparent framed-*whats* produced with final *falling* pitch.

### 5.2.2 Framed-what with final falling pitch

When produced with final falling pitch, framed-*whats* are significantly more restricted (acting very much like the bare “what.” described in Egbert et al., 2009). The word “what” can only stand in for a reference to an object or event/activity (in comparison to any linguistic object, see above); this reference must be a pronoun or some other “indexical” form; and the trouble is specifically one of determining what this indexical reference refers to. Note that these are the normal classificatory semantics of “what”, what we see in questions like “what did she buy you” (an object) or “what did she do for you” (an event/activity). There is thus a “switch” in semantics, similar to what we see when “what” is used to request repair on its own (“what.” is restricted but “what?” is not). The following extracts illustrate the indexical nature of the trouble-source.

#### Extract 7 [SBC-33, 10:13]

1 A: don't start it  
 2 (1.1)  
 3 B: start what.  
 4 (0.5)  
 5 A: that- (0.6) way of j- speaking

#### Extract 8 [FreeLunch-3-18-03, 8:33]

1 A: ... I could do it- (0.4) tomorrow  
 2 (1.0)  
 3 B: xx- do what.  
 4 (0.4)  
 5 A: start on the (0.3) algorithm

With “start what.”, falling 4 ST over “what”, the B-speaker in extract 7 claims trouble resolving the object reference “it” in A’s prior action (“don’t start it”). A responds by specifying what she was referring to with this indexical form (“that way of speaking”). Similarly in extract 8, speaker B’s “do what.”, falling 4 ST over “what”, targets A’s indexical

reference to an activity (“... I could *do it* tomorrow”). Again A responds with a “fitted” specification (“start on the algorithm”).<sup>4</sup>

Although these framed-*whats* differ in important ways from those with final rising pitch, they share a critical diagnostic feature. They deploy cohesive framing to delimit the trouble-source. We see this in the cohesive patterns between trouble-source turn, repair request, and repair. With these transparent cases of framed-*whats* in hand, we now turn to those which are opaque.

### 5.3 The opaque use of “do what?”

In the following extract, speaker A jokingly asks his son if he wants to take a ride in his truck, referring to it as a “limousine ride” (line 1). B responds by requesting repair with “do what?”, *rising* 5 ST over “what” (see the arrowed → line).

#### Extract 9 [CF-s6668, 20:52]

- 1 A: you want to take a limousine ride  
 2 (1.4)  
 3 → B: do what?  
 4 (0.4)  
 5 A: you want to take a limousine ride  
 6 (0.5)  
 7 B: yeah  
 8 (0.3)  
 9 A: .hhhhhh good when you come home you ride in my truck  
 10 cause it rides like a limousine  
 11 B: @ @ @

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<sup>4</sup> There is a second, distinct class of framed-*what* produced with final falling pitch. By *expanding* the grammatical structure of A’s prior TCU, these forms can be used to request A to specify something presupposed, left implicit, or otherwise “unsaid” (see Chapter 4.2). The following extracts illustrate. The first is a “pure” expansion (“games” ← “of what”) while the second combines expansion with repetition.

#### Extract A [CallHome-4838, 1:36]

- 1 A: yeah the most consecutive **games** he'd break the record  
 2 (.)  
 3 B: of what.: ((4 ST fall over “what”))

#### Extract B [CallHome-5888, 26:15]

- 1 A: ... who won anyway  
 2 (.)  
 3 B: who won what.: ((9 ST fall over “what”, ending in creak))



On the basis of its linguistic form, we would expect B's "do what?" to restrict the source of his trouble. Specifically, by comparing this request to the "do what." in extract 8 (note the difference in pitch), or the hypothetical "want to do what?", we would expect it to target "take a limousine ride", the verbal core of A's prior action.<sup>5</sup> However, there is in fact considerable evidence that these intuitions are incorrect: "do what?" does *not* cohesively tie to the prior talk and it does *not* restrict the trouble-source in this way. Instead, it can be used in response to any TCU/action and it can (perhaps even must, see below) locate that TCU/action as a whole as the trouble-source – that is, for *these* speakers.

This opaque (non-compositional, non-cohesive) usage of "do what?" is evident in only some dialects of (southern) American English. I have found no cases in my data from northern American dialects, nor in my British Data. For these other varieties, it seems "do what?" is a transparent framed-*what*. I will return to this issue of locality later. The following analysis is based on a collection of 13 cases of this practice, all occurring in the southern American section of the Call Friend corpus (see Chapter 1). Two cases have post-positioned affectionate address terms ("do what babe/hun?"), and five a post-positioned "now" ("do what now?"). "Now"-tags are a relatively common feature of repair requests among these speakers: "where's that now", "what now?", etc. Like "do what?" itself, these tags do not cohesively tie to the trouble-source action.

My claim is that, for these speakers, "do what?" does not restrict the source of trouble. It can (and perhaps must) signal a trouble with the prior TCU-as-a-whole (a full-scope trouble, see Chapter 2; Robinson & Kevoe-Feldman, 2010). A first crucial piece of evidence is that A-speakers routinely (i.e. straightforwardly, unaccountably) respond to "do what?" with full-scope repairs. In extract 9 above, for instance, speaker A repeats his entire prior TCU, not just "take a limousine ride" (the transparent verbal target for "do what?"). Neither participant treats this response as in any way abnormal (contrast this with extract 6 above). The same holds for all (but perhaps one) of the remaining 12 cases in my collection. The following two examples offer further illustration, as well as additional sources of evidence.

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<sup>5</sup> The pro-form "do" belongs to a grammatical paradigm ("do", "does", "did", "doing", and "done"), with each form being restricted to specific verbal forms. The form "do" itself is restricted to bare infinitives ("I will/could/did *take a ride*", "Will/could/did he *take a ride*", etc.) and some simple present tense forms (e.g. "I *take rides* with her on Thursdays").

**Extract 10** [CF-s6931, 13:55]

1 A: what.=did Ronda come for the second night too  
 2 (0.4)  
 3 → B: do what now?=  
 4 A: =did Ronda come for the second night too or  
 5 (0.2)  
 6 B: yeah yeah

The B-speaker in extract 10 has just finished a story. In line 1 A checks (or topicalizes) something he has gleaned from it (“did Ronda come for the second night too”). In next position, B requests repair with “do what now?”(line 3). As before, there is a transparent verbal target, “come for the second night too”, but speaker A offers a full-scope repair (“did Ronda come for the second night too or”). This supports the argument that “do what?” is not cohesive, and can signal full-scope troubles. Further evidence can be found in A’s addition of an “or”-tag to his repair. This item downgrades A’s confidence in his question as a whole (Drake, 2013), and thus operates at the level of the clause (or the TCU/turn; Schegloff, 1996c), not at the verbal level.

In our final example, extract 11 below, A and B are disputing the whereabouts of a mutual friend. A is arguing that this friend is in Little Rock, together with his girlfriend (see lines 1-3). In line 5, B initiates repair with “do what now?”(line 5). As before, A repairs his entire prior TCU (line 7) (underlining here represents “contrastive stress”)

**Extract 11** [CallFriend-s6285, 12:09]

1 B: no:: she's in Little Rock I'm sure  
 2 (1.4)  
 3 A: she is in Little Rock he went out with her about a week ago  
 4 (2.0)  
 5 → B: do what now?  
 6 (0.3)  
 7 A: he went out with her about a wee[k ago]  
 8 B: [oh ] h @ I thought you said  
 9 I di@d I was like .hhhh  
 10 A: no[:  
 11 B: [no::  
 12 (0.2)  
 13 A: you're not that lucky

Extract 11 offers two further pieces of evidence that “do what?” is not cohesive and that it can signal full-scope troubles. First, if “do what?” *were* cohesive, then we would expect it to

be consistently used following TCU/actions which contain a transparent verbal target. However, this is not the case here. The only verbal expression in the prior TCU is in the simple past (“he **went out** with her about a week ago”) and hence grammatically incompatible with “do” (the appropriate form would be “did what?”, see note 7 above). The same holds for roughly half the cases in my collection. This pattern provides further evidence that “do what?” is selected independently of the linguistic structure of the prior TCU/action. Like “huh?”, “what?”, etc. it is a generic, non-cohesive practice. The second piece of evidence comes from B’s turn in line 8: “oh I thought you said I did” (with contrastive stress on the second “I”). With this post mortem diagnosis he indicates that his trouble was with the preposterous proposition that he (thought he) had heard. The trouble-source was thus either the subject/agent (B himself) or the assertion as a whole (that he had dated or at least “gone out” with their friend’s girlfriend). In either case, he evidently had no trouble hearing, understanding, or accepting anything inside the verbal core of A’s TCU. “Do what?” does no restrictive work.

In sum, there is considerable evidence that, for these speakers, “do what?” is *not* cohesive, *not* compositional, and does *not* restrict the trouble-source to the verbal level. Despite appearances, this repair request is less akin to “to what?”, “did what?”, and even “do what.” (falling pitch) than it is to open-class repair requests (OCRRs, see Chapter 2) like “huh?”, “what?”, “pardon me?”. Note, though, that I have not provided evidence that “do what?” is diagnostically *equivalent* to “huh?”, “what?”, etc. This would require showing, ironically enough, that “do what?” can in fact signal troubles which are partial in scope (i.e. grounded in only a part of the prior action). As noted, my small data set contains only full-scope repairs (with one possible, ambiguous exception not shown here). Second, it would require showing that “do what?” can diagnose a wide array of trouble types—not only hearing, but understanding and accepting what was said. On the basis of my small data set both these questions must unfortunately remain unanswered.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Note, however, that there is some orientation to a possible acceptability problem in extract 10 (see also extract 26 in Chapter 2). Recall that speaker A appends a downgrading “or”-tag to his repetition. By “mixing” these two repair operations (see Chapter 2), he orients to the possibility of both types of trouble (a hearing trouble *or* acceptability trouble).

## 5.4 Other opaque requests for repair

I have argued that for some speakers of (southern) American English the repair request “do what?” does not restrict the source of B’s trouble. Evidence for this analysis was based not on this request’s form, but on its use—how it is in fact deployed and treated in everyday conversation. In this section I offer a number of additional, candidate cases of opaque repair requests. These observations must, of course, be verified in a similar manner.

Consider first the repair request “you what?”. For many speakers of English this is a transparent case of a framed-*what*. We see this in the following extract, taken from the (northern) Call Friend corpus:

**Extract 12** [CallFriend-n6093, 17:20]

1 A: did I tell you that I flunked physics right  
 2 (0.4)  
 3 → B: ye- (0.2) you what?  
 4 (0.3)  
 5 A: I flunked physics  
 6 B: I'm sorry.

Speaker B’s “you what?” (line 3), rising 21 ST over “what”, is cohesively fitted with A’s prior TCU/action (“did I tell you that *I flunked physics* right”); and it receives a cohesively fitted repair in turn (“I flunked physics”).<sup>7</sup> This is consistent with the other cases in my North American data (as well as with my intuitions as a native speaker of Canadian English). For some *British* speakers, however, “you what?” appears to be opaque. Extract 13, taken from the British National Corpus, illustrates (I was unfortunately unable to locate any cases in my core British data, see Chapter 1).

**Extract 13** [BNC, KD0 – original transcript, the data itself is unavailable]

1 A: Our sunroof’s pretty isn’t it?  
 2 → B: You what?  
 3 A: Our sunroof’s pretty isn’t it?  
 4 B: Very stylish.

---

<sup>7</sup> Although A repeats the framing “I”, he does *not* repeat (or otherwise) repair any of the rest of his prior TCU (“did I tell you that ...”). See note 2 above.

In contrast to extract 12, this “you what?” does not fit cohesively with the prior TCU/action and it receives a full-scope repetition as a repair. Examples like this, together with my own experiences of confusion,<sup>8</sup> suggest that this framed-*what* can act as a (quasi-)OCRR—though for a different group of speakers.

Opaque repair requests can resemble grammatical forms other than framed-*what*. Consider the form “what’s that”. When produced with final falling pitch (“what’s that.”), these words can function as an entirely transparent (compositional) request for repair. In extract 14 below, for instance, B uses “what’s that.” (line 3), falling 4ST on “that”, to claim that mozzarella (mentioned in line 1) is an unfamiliar object (see A’s explanation in lines 5-6).<sup>9</sup>

**Extract 14** [SBC-58, 10:44] ((“...” = affected Italian accent))

- 1    A:   you want mozzarella  
2           (0.8)  
3 → B:   what's that.  
4           (0.4)  
5    A:   “mozzarella” that's that white cheese that gets  
6           all stringy and melted

However, when these very same words are produced with final *rising* pitch, this compositionality disappears. Extract 15 below is a case in point. In line 7, B requests repair with “what’s that?”, rising 8 ST over “what”. As before, A’s prior TCU/action (“I’ve only dated a few more than that so”) does not contain a “natural target” for this request (in this case an object reference); and A responds with a full-scope repetition (line 8). This and the other 19 cases in my data suggest that “what’s that?” is also a (quasi-)OCRR.

**Extract 15** [CallFriend-n6938, 2:11]

- 1    B:   like I've only had two boyfriends  
2           (.)  
3    B:   [one was Ryan O'Donnell                    ]

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<sup>8</sup> I know some British speakers who use “do what?” in this opaque manner. The first few times I heard it used in what was, for me, a mis-fitting context, I distinctly remember thinking—and eventually saying—“I didn’t anything!”.

<sup>9</sup> This account is based on an analysis of about a dozen cases. Note that this practice differs diagnostically from requests like “what.” and “start what.” (i.e. bare and cohesively framed cases of “what”, produced with final falling pitch; see above). With “what’s that”, the trouble is with the type of object mentioned—understanding the meaning of these words, not identifying their referent.

4 A: [oh I've only dated a few more] than that so  
 5 (.)  
 6 @: @ [ @ .hh]h  
 7 → B: [what's that? ]  
 8 A: I said I've only dated [a few more than that] so ]  
 9 B: [ @: :: ] @ ]

Interestingly, in comparison to “do what?” and “you what?”, the opaque use of “what’s that?” appears to be extremely widespread. Both my data and intuitions suggest that it is used in many dialects of English across both sides of the Atlantic (at least). In fact, native familiarity with this practice initially prevented me from recognizing that it is, indeed, non-compositional.

One final (candidate) practice: It would be surprising, of course, if opaque repair requests were restricted to English, and indeed it appears they are not. In (Mexican) Spanish, “qué cosa?” (literally “what thing?”) is evidently also non-compositional. This request does not restrict the source of trouble to an object reference but, once again, acts as a (quasi-)OCRR. The following blog post provides an outsider’s account (and confusion).

On the topic of ‘huh?’ in Spanish: we hosted an exchange student from Mexico when I was in high school, and he said “Que cosa?” a lot. (Sorry for the lack of accents.) [sic] It confused the heck out of me. Until I looked in a dictionary and figured out it was yet another way to ask for clarification, I kept repeating to him the last noun I had used, thinking he had meant “What thing?”<sup>10</sup>

In a sense, what we see here with “do what?”, “you what?”, “what’s that?”, and “qué cosa?” is the converse of what Robinson (2006) has shown about the repair request “sorry?” (see the discussion in Chapter 2 above). Although “sorry?” may *look* like “huh?” and “what?”, an analysis of its use shows that it works differently. By requesting repair with an apology, B restricts the nature (cf. source) of the trouble to B’s hearing and/or understanding the prior talk (hence “ruling out” a problem of acceptance/alignment). The functional dissimilarity of “sorry?” to “huh?”, just like the *similarity* of “do what?” to “huh?”, highlights the need for caution in relying on lay linguistic intuitions in analysing the diagnostic properties of other-initiations of repair. This is as true at the lexico-syntactic level as it is at the phonetic-prosodic level (see also chapter 7 below).

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<sup>10</sup> Posted on April 14<sup>th</sup>, 2004 at [<http://www.languagehat.com/archives/001272.php>], accessed in October, 2012.

## 5.5 Conclusion

I am not the first person to notice – nor be confused by – “do what?”. There is quite extensive discussion of this practice on amateur linguistic websites, including quite insightful analysis of what it does, where it is used, its level of formality/politeness, and so on. The following entries illustrate:<sup>11</sup>

I just learned about a regionalism I hadn't been aware of: "Do what?" as an equivalent of "excuse me?" or "pardon me?" when someone says something you didn't catch. According to this [web link] it's native to the Texas hill country, North Carolina and Alabama.

["Do what?" is] absolutely the most annoying phrase Texans say! I have lived down here the past 14 years and have never gotten used to it. It still rubs my Yankee ears the wrong way. It means "I can't hear you or I don't understand"

"Do what?" sounds alien to me [...] I can't get it sounding right in my head. I've never heard it in Australia, I think I'd probably respond with "Sorry?" if I ever heard someone say it.

To the best of my knowledge, however, “opaque” repair requests like “do what?” have not received any attention in the academic literature. Yet, they are a phenomenon which lay at the intersection of many different areas of interest and expertise. To begin, “do what?”, “what’s that?”, etc. offer clear examples of non-compositional grammatical forms (idioms, prefabricated units, chunks, multi-word expressions, etc.), and are thus of interest to linguists working within usage-based theories of grammar/language. Similarly, an understanding of how these constructions (or practices) can arise – likely through the pragmatic extension of the transparent requests they mirror – will require a careful analysis of their diachronic development. Second, the functional contrasts between “do what?” (final rise) and “do what.” (final fall), “what’s that?” and “what’s that.”, etc. offer clear illustration of how intonation can entirely transform both what an utterance means and what it does. This is surely of interest to those working at the interface of pragmatics and prosody (see also Chapters 2, 3 and 6). Third, understanding precisely which groups of people do (and do not) use these requests in this opaque manner, and the social meanings which may result from these differences, will require sociolinguistic methods and analysis. Indeed, the accounts given above (including my own) suggest that opaque repair requests are one small, but very

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<sup>11</sup> The first and third are taken from LanguageHat (see note 10). The second is an entry for “do what” in the Urban Dictionary [www.urbandictionary.com].

concrete way, in which differences in “culture” may lead to “breakdowns” in communication (ironic considering they are deployed to *resolve* communicative problems!). Finally, and for our purposes perhaps most importantly, opaque repair requests reiterate a tenet central to the methodological underpinning of conversation analytic research. While of course our intuitions are critical to our understanding linguistic and interactional phenomena, they can steer us wrong. We must ultimately ground our analysis in the conduct of the participants themselves, in what they display themselves to be doing in and through their talk.

## 5.6 Outlook

With this chapter we conclude our discussion of other-initiations (OIs) which, strictly speaking, *request* repair (cf. Schegloff, 2004). In the next two chapters I will consider practices which rely on other methods for signaling trouble and initiating a sequence for addressing it. Chapter 8 looks at OIs offer a candidate understanding of the trouble-source (e.g. “are you talking about Keith?” and “you mean the actual picture?”). The next chapter looks at OIs which locate the trouble-source by repeating it.





## 6 | High Rise-Fall Repetitions

**Abstract:** As a general method of other-initiation, repetition can be used to signal a wide array of troubles—from hearing the repeated talk, to understanding its sense or its action import, to doubting or accepting it. However, particular practices employing this method can offer much more precise diagnosis. This chapter shows that repetitions produced with a high rise-fall intonation contour claim specifically that this talk is “wrong” and in need of correction. There is an incongruity between two versions of the world—the one presented in the repeated speaker’s talk, and the one which the repeating speaker knows or believes to be true, appropriate or acceptable. The ensuing sequences are routinely expanded and morally charged as the participants jostle for epistemic or moral authority over the matter at hand, and work to repair the incongruity. Thus, in addition to further exploring the ways in which other-initiations can be “tuned” to the troubles they signal, this chapter develops our understanding of the ways in which matters of truth, appropriateness, and acceptability are raised, and managed, within the course of everyday conversation.<sup>1</sup>

### 6.1 Introduction

Troubles can arise when a participant in a conversation says something incorrect, inappropriate, or in some other way “unacceptable” (Svennevig, 2008). In the following extract, for instance, Sherry twice uses the wrong term and then replaces it—“package” for “box”, and “pepperoni” for “pastrami.”

**Extract 1** [SBC-58, 23:34] ((Sherry and her son are making pizza))

1 Sher: .hhhhh you know what let's open that box of-  
2 or that (0.2) package of (0.2) pastrami (0.3)  
3 not pastrami pepperoni

In cases like these, a speaker retroactively treats an element of her own turn as unacceptable and replaces it through self-initiated self-repair (Jefferson, 1974; Schegloff, 2013). It can also happen that the *recipient* of a turn at talk finds it in some way unacceptable. Faced with this interactional contingency, the recipient must determine whether to address this problem and, if so, how. In this chapter, we document one practice available, the high rise-fall (HRF) repetition. With this practice, recipients tell prior speakers that (a part of)

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<sup>1</sup> A version of this chapter, written in collaboration with Traci Walker, has been published as: Benjamin, T. & Walker, T. (2013). Managing problems of acceptability through high rise-fall repetitions. *Discourse Processes*, 50, p. 107-138.

what they've said/done is "wrong" and in need of correction. That is, they claim the repeated talk is incongruent with what they believe to be correct, appropriate, or acceptable and initiate a repair sequence for addressing this trouble (Schegloff, 2000b; Schegloff, Jefferson, & Sacks, 1977). Like many other-initiations (OIs), HRF repetitions precisely locate the source of the recipient's trouble—the repeated talk. But, unlike more generic practices, they also strongly delimit the *nature* of this trouble; the problem is not one of hearing or understanding what was said but of accepting it. The HRF pitch pattern is a constitutive part of this delimiting work.

Before moving on to a full description of the form and function of HRF repetitions, we briefly discuss alternative practices for managing problems of acceptability.

## 6.2 Managing problems of acceptability

Previous research has shown that recipients who are faced with talk they consider incorrect, inappropriate, or unacceptable have a variety of options available for managing this situation (Drew, 1997; 2003; Haakana & Kurhila, 2009; Jefferson, 1987; 1988; 2007; Schegloff et al., 1977; Svennevig, 2008). To begin, in many cases they can—and perhaps should—simply let it pass. Unlike most troubles in hearing and understanding, it is often unnecessary to address these types of troubles. If a recipient is in a position to notice that something is "wrong," they likely have a good enough grasp of what was said, meant, and done to simply ignore it and allow the conversation to continue (Schegloff et al., 1977, p. 380). This is nicely captured in this exchange discussed by Jefferson (2007).

**Extract 2** [taken from Jefferson, 2007, p. 452]

- 1 A: why didn't you tell me
- 2 B: I knew what you meant

A second reason for ignoring acceptability problems is that addressing them can be socially or morally charged. By claiming that what another has said is wrong, a recipient makes a claim of greater access to and/or authority over the offending issue (Haakana & Kurhila, 2009; Norrick, 1991) and can call into question their coparticipant's competency (Jefferson, 1987; Pomerantz, 1984a; Svennevig, 2008). Ignoring the incongruity avoids these delicacies and, as with all types of problems, provides speakers with more opportunities to

notice and address the issue themselves (Schegloff et al., 1977). Finally, addressing these problems can generate rather substantial sequences of arguments, accounts, complaints, and related actions (see Jefferson 1972; 1987 and discussion below). In addition to any interpersonal repercussions, this can greatly delay, and in some cases derail, the activity that was underway (see, for example, lines 5–6 of Extract 6).

Nevertheless, in some cases recipients cannot or will not let an incongruity pass and go about setting things right. The following extracts illustrate what is perhaps the most covert means of doing this.

**Extract 3** [taken from Jefferson, 1987, p. 93]

1 Cust: mm, the wales are wider apart than that.  
2 → Sale: okay, let me see if I can find one with wider threads

**Extract 4** [Callfriend-n6557, 28:54]

1 Ray: .hhh think I have- do I have a demo tape of yours  
2 (0.2)  
3 Ray: .h[hhh  
4 → Joe: [.hhhhhhhhh you have my album hhhhhh  
5 Ray: yes: on tape

In Extract 3, the customer refers to the threads of a screw using the term “wales” instead of “threads.” The salesperson addresses this incongruity by re-referencing this item in the course of his next turn, using the correct term (Jefferson, 1987; Kurhila, 2001). Similarly, in Extract 4, Ray checks if Joe has a copy of his “demo tape” (line 1). Joe confirms that he does but embeds within his answer what he considers the appropriate term for his work—“album” (Stivers & Hayashi, 2010).

In cases like these, recipients address an incongruity by embedding a replacement, or correction, within a next turn that forwards the ongoing course of action. Recipients can instead initiate a sequence of repair, suspending sequential progressivity. Two distinct ways of doing this have been discussed in the literature. First, the recipient can indicate a trouble, request that it be fixed, but “mask” (or at least not specify) its nature. This strategy gives the speaker another chance to “make things right” without the recipient having officially said anything was wrong.

By not quite “getting” what was said, they [other-initiations of repair: TB] raise the possibility that it was “not quite right,” often leaving the respects in which it was not quite right unexplicated. More to the point for the actual working out of the “problem,” they provide a place in the very next turn in which the prior speaker can make some adjustment in what was said—to make it more accessible, and perhaps more “acceptable.” (Schegloff, 2007b, p. 151; see also Pomerantz, 1984b; Svennevig, 2008)

Mom’s “pardon?” at line 3 in the following extract demonstrates this practice.

**Extract 5** [taken from Drew, 1997]

1 Child: put on th' li::ght  
 2                   (0.9)  
 3 → Mom: pa:rdon?  
 4                   (.)  
 5 Child: put on the light please  
 6                   (.)  
 7 Mom: xx better

Mom does not explicitly claim an incongruity. Like “huh?”, “what?”, “hm?”, etc., her “pardon?” is “diagnostically open” to the (claimed) problem being one of hearing or understanding what was said (see Chapter 2). Nevertheless, as the child’s repair (“please,” line 5) and Mom’s assessment of it (“better,” line 7) show, “the repairable trouble is manifestly not a problem of hearing etc. but rather one associated with the propriety of the prior turn—here the absence of appropriate forms of politeness” (Drew, 1997, p. 95).

In contrast to this relatively “covert” or “off record” strategy, recipients cannot only initiate but actually do the repair themselves. By contradicting (Extract 6) and/or correcting (Extract 7) the source of their trouble, they explicitly indicate their non-acceptance. In Extract 6, Rich is reading back Hyla’s phone number to her. She confirms and then tells him to dial one first. This is evidently incongruent with what Rich believes, and he contradicts her as a next action (“no you don’t dial one from here,” line 3).

**Extract 6** [Hyla&Rich, 25:36]

1 Rich: oh oh four ei[ght  
 2 Hyla:                   [yeah and dial one first  
 3 → Rich: no you don't dial one from here h  
 4                   (.)  
 5 Hyla: yes you [do  
 6 Rich:                   [no you don't h

In extract 7, Frank is describing a scale model of the solar system, and in line 1 compares another planet with Earth as represented by a staple. Earlier in the conversation (data not shown), he had said it was the size of a paperclip. At line 3, Melissa repairs this mistake by providing the correct item (“paperclip”).

**Extract 7** [SBC-19, 19:38]

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1 Frank: well compared to Earth being a staple (0.5)
2 Ron: yeah
3 → Melis: uh [paper]cli[p
4 Frank: [(ho-)] [hole
5 (0.7)
6 Frank: or paperclip hole

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In sum, previous research has described a variety of ways in which recipients can manage an incongruity arising from a prior speaker’s talk. They can let it pass, they can embed a correction into a sequence that progresses the action, or—most relevantly here—they can initiate repair, either “masking” the nature of their trouble or doing a full-blown correction. In this article we document an additional and distinct resource available to recipients. We show that with a HRF repetition a recipient claims that what has been said is “wrong” and that it should be corrected. In a sense, this practice of repair initiation lies somewhere between the two discussed above. On the one hand, HRF repetitions are like covert corrections (“pardon?”, Extract 5) in that they initiate repair but leave it to the trouble-source speaker to produce the repair proper. On the other hand, they are like overt contradictions/corrections (“no you don’t ...”, Extract 6) in that they explicitly communicate that the problem is in accepting what was said (not in hearing or understanding it).

### 6.3 The practice and the collection

Before demonstrating what high rise-fall repetitions do (section 6.4), we must first describe precisely what they are. With the label “HRF repetition” we are referring to utterances with the following properties:

- They are lexical repetitions of a co-participant's talk (*other-repetitions*)
- They are positioned immediately following the turn construction unit (TCU) containing the repeated talk<sup>2</sup>
- They initiate repair on the repeated talk
- They are produced with a high rise-fall pitch contour (see below)

We systematically collected all and only those utterances which matched these criteria from our data set (some 400 recorded interactions, totaling about 80 hours, see Chapter 1). As is common in this kind of research (see Curl, Local & Walker 2006; Local & Walker 2005) we have carried out the functional/sequential and the phonetic analysis in tandem, not one after the other. This process yielded approximately 40 instances, and our analysis is based on this collection. The boxed utterance in the following extract provides a first example.

**Extract 8** [York-NJC] (see extract 11 below for additional context)

1 Bella: who directed [it ]  
 2 Amy: [was] naff  
 3 (0.3)  
 4 Bella: [is it-]  
 5 Amy: [Ja:mes] Cameron  
 6 (0.2)  
 7 Bella: James (.) James Cameron  
 8 Amy: I think no it can't be he did Titanic didn't he

In line 7, Bella repeats Amy's immediately prior TCU (the highlighted "James Cameron"). It is produced with a high rise-fall pitch pattern, rising 8 semitones (ST) over the first two syllables, and falling 17ST (see Figure 6.1 below).<sup>3</sup> As we see from the subsequent turn, this utterance initiates repair on the repeated item (see the next section for details).

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<sup>2</sup>We mean "immediately" not in the temporal sense, but in the turn-sequential sense. That is, as the next unit of talk (see Schegloff, 2000; Chapter 8). Speakers in fact quite often temporally withhold their HRF repetitions slightly, perhaps to create further opportunities for the speaker of the troublesome talk to self-initiate repair (Schegloff, Sacks & Jefferson, 1977, p.374; Schegloff, 2000, p. 224-30; Kendrick, 2012).

<sup>3</sup>This and all figures were created using PRAAT version 5.3.15 (Boersma & Weenink, 2012). See Chapter 1.4.2 for details. In figure 6.1 only, the dashed horizontal line shows the speakers topline of 528 Hertz, as the speaker reaches it within this utterance.




Figure 6.1: The HRF repetition in Extract 8

An integral part of the design of the HRF repetitions is not only that but *how* they repeat some prior talk produced by another speaker. The first point is that they are recognizable as repetitions of a complete “piece” of the prior turn—they do not omit and thus frame a “missing” lexical item or grammatical chunk. The trouble-source is thus (a part of) what was repeated, not what should have come after it (compare with the “framing only” repetitions discussed in Chapter 4.5 above).

Another relevant aspect of their linguistic design is their phonetic makeup – the utterances in question are recognizable as *lexical* repetitions, but in certain key respects they are not *phonetic* repetitions of the prior speaker (see Couper-Kuhlen 1996 on quoting and mimicry for instance). We conducted a parametric phonetic analysis (Kelly & Local, 1989a,b; Local & Walker, 2005) of the repeated tokens relative to each other as a set, and relative to the words they repeated (see Curl, 2005; Curl et al., 2006 for similar methodological approaches). No evidence was found of a consistent prosodic relationship between the repetition and the prior turn.<sup>4</sup> Nor was any relationship found between the duration or tempo of HRF repetitions and the corresponding first sayings. That is, after controlling for metrical structures (i.e. ensuring that the stress and rhythm of the first saying and repetition are

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<sup>4</sup> However, the turn subsequent to the HRF repetition did, in many cases, exhibit some elements of prosodic matching (i.e., similar intonation contour and placement in the speaker’s range), but an investigation of that turn is beyond the scope of this study.



comparable) some repetitions are faster (i.e. shorter in total duration), some nearly the same tempo/duration, and some slower (i.e. longer in total duration). Generally, the HRF repetitions are, perceptually, louder than surrounding talk by the same speaker, as well as seeming louder than the talk they repeat, but this is likely due to the speakers' use of higher fundamental frequency (high pitch accents) in the repeated speech.

The distinct pitch pattern of a high rise-fall intonation contour was in fact the only regularity. What we describe in words as "high rise-fall" is audible, as well as measurable, as a rise to a peak (a pitch accent) before a (usually) long fall. The range of the rises is 12ST, with a mean of 8.2ST; and the range of the final fall is 20ST, with a mean of 12.4ST. In other words, there is more variability in the falling section of the contour than in the rising section.<sup>5</sup>

Although the high rise-fall contour is often described as an indicator of contrastive focus (see Cruttenden, 1997 for an example of a functional description; Ladd, 1996 for a more phonetic/phonological one); we prefer to avoid the use of terms such as focus and contrast. It is clear that within any turn, many different functions may be being enacted by prosodic means; the traditional linguistic terms for them might be marking focus (be that narrow, broad, or contrastive) and/or referring to given/new information (see Xu & Xu, 2005 for an experimental approach that untangles focus from other functions marked by pitch, such as information load). While such theoretical constructs may be useful in analyses underpinned by theoretical assumptions that differ from ours, we find no compelling reason to privilege them over our analysis, which relies on the analysis of turn design and participant orientation.

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
<sup>5</sup> Some have questioned how high the pitch peak needed to be to warrant inclusion in our collection; we cannot give a numerical answer to this but instead relied on our systematic impressionistic transcriptions of the data. The contour needed to be recognisable as "the same" as other contours produced by other speakers employing different lexical items, whilst simultaneously fulfilling all the other sequential-interactive criteria. Given the multiplicity of functions that pitch/intonation is employed to manage in natural interaction, we cannot isolate a cut-off point below or above which a contour could/could not "count" as HRF. Additionally, it should be noted that we are not claiming that high rise-fall pitch contours are the sole means available for using a repetition to point out an incongruity in the prior talk. See section 6.5 for further discussion of the discriminability of the practice we are describing.

In order to clarify what types of repetition we did include in the collection analysed here, we should also make clear what we did *not* include.<sup>6</sup> Utterances like Dad’s “pullover” in the following extract were excluded on phonetic grounds (the fourth criterion).

**Extract 9** [CallFriend-n5635, 28:54] (see extract 18 below for additional context)

- 1 Laura: it's a pullover  
 2 (0.2)  
 3 Dad: pullover=  
 4 Laura: =yeah it doesn't button up front it pulls over your head

While Dad’s “pullover” repeats, and initiates repair on, an element of Laura’s prior utterance (see her subsequent confirmation and clarification), it is not produced with a high rise-fall pitch contour; it is nearly monotonic, with a 2ST upstep on the final syllable (see Figure 6.2). For this reason, we do not consider it an instance of our focal practice (we will, however, use cases like this as a point of comparison, see section 6.5 below).



**Figure 6.2:** The non-HRF repetition in Extract 8

While extract 9 was excluded on formal grounds, other utterances were excluded on functional grounds (see the third criterion). Typical of most conversation analytic research,

<sup>6</sup> The findings reported here are not primarily comparative—that is, we include examples of other sorts of repetitions only to support our claim that the HRF repetitions are being used to perform a particular, differentiated function. In Walker & Benjamin (in prep.) we present the results of a comparison of the various phonetic realizations of other-repetitions used to initiate repair.

we are not examining the use of a linguistic resource *in general*, but in a specific action-sequential environment (see Schegloff, 1997a for instance). Here, we are only interested in high rise-fall repetitions *used to initiate repair*.<sup>7</sup> Excluded from our analysis, then, are utterances like Jen's "Aiden Hendricks" at line 7 in the following extract (the @ symbol represents a beat of laughter).

**Extract 10** [CallHome-4184, 3:42]

```

1  Bill:  and guess who called here last night (.) looking
2         for your address
3         (0.7)
4  Jen:  who
5         (0.6)
6  Bill:  Aiden Hendricks @:: @
7  Jen:  Aiden Hend[ricks]
8  Bill:  [ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ [ @
9  Jen:                                     [why [hhhhh
10 Bill:                                     [.hhhhh well
11         Mommy and I were sea- seated with his mother
12         I'm sure this is why

```

This utterance *is* an other-repetition (see line 6), and it *is* produced with a high rise-fall pitch contour. However, it does not initiate repair. Bill does not clarify, correct, or even confirm Jen's utterance, nor does she treat this type of response as absent. What is this utterance doing?

In line 6 Bill announces that Aiden Hendricks, a shadow from their past, has just come looking for Jen's address. He has constructed this news as "surprising" through his pre-announcement at line 1, and his laughter in line 6. In this sequential context, a relevant next action would be to share in Bill's surprise. And it seems that this is precisely what Jen is doing with her high rise-fall other-repetition—an aligning display of surprise (see Wilkinson & Kitzinger, 2006 for relevant conversation analytic work). To reiterate: despite involving the same linguistic resources, this utterance is excluded from our analysis because it is not initiating repair. It is an instance of a different practice (see section 6.6 for further discussion).

In the remainder of this chapter, we refer to the participants in terms of the interactional roles made relevant by this practice (rather than by pseudonym). The participant who

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<sup>7</sup> Our argument is not circular. The only functional (action-sequential) requirement was that the utterance initiated repair *of some kind*. That HRF repetitions "turned out" to only manage problems of acceptance (and not hearing and/or understanding) is indeed a finding.

produces the repetition (initiates repair) is speaker B. The participant whose talk is repeated (the speaker of the trouble-source) is speaker A. The syllable upon which the pitch peak is reached is in CAPS, and prefaced by a caret symbol (^). Thus, schematically, the sequences under examination have this structure:

A: ...example...	Trouble-source Turn
B: ex^AMPlE	Repair Initiation

#### 6.4 Managing incongruities with HRF repetitions

The data show that participants use HRF repetitions in order to (1) claim an incongruity between the repeated talk and what they know, think or believe might be correct, appropriate, or acceptable; and (2) initiate a repair sequence for addressing it. We first show that in the talk following the HRF repetition both participants orient to the (un)acceptability of the repeated talk. The second source of evidence is a negative observation: we do not find cases in which HRF repetitions are treated as having claimed some other type of problem, e.g., hearing or understanding (see section 6.5). They are thus discriminable from other practices, including other types of repetition-based repair initiations.

In all cases in our collection, the participants treat HRF repetitions as having claimed that the repeated talk is “wrong”, and in need of correction. The analysis in this section demonstrates this orientation, as well as documenting some of the variation in the collection, both in the nature of the incongruity claimed and the way the participants go about addressing it.

We’ll begin by returning to the “Cameron” case from above. The participants are talking about the 1996 David Cronenberg film *Crash*, which A has just seen. B asks A who directed the film, and A answers “James Cameron” (line 5).

##### Extract 11 [York-NJC]

```

1 B:   who directed [it ]
2 A:           [was] naff
3       (0.3)
4 B:   [is it-]
5 A:   [Ja:mes] Cameron
6       (0.2)
7 B:   James(.) James ^CAMeron
8 A:   I think no it [can't be he did Titanic didn't he
9 B:           [.hh no he's an action mo@vi@e
```

10 A: well this was action there was car sma[shes every two minutes  
 11 B: [yeah but  
 12 (0.6)  
 13 B: he he: (.) kind of (.) [normally] does films that you (0.3)  
 14 A: [does ]  
 15 B: don't have to think about  
 16 (0.4)  
 17 A: hm: somebody beginning with Cee anyway (.) directed it

As noted in Section 6.3, B initiates repair on A's answer by repeating it with a rise-fall pitch pattern, rising 8ST and falling 17ST. What we have yet to consider is the *type* of repair this action initiates. As we'll show in section 6.5 below, some repetition-based OIs are treated as hearing checks (i.e. "is this what you said?"), others as requests for clarification ("what do you mean by this?"). B's HRF repetition, however, is not. Both participants treat it as claiming that James Cameron is *not* the director of this film. The repeated talk is wrong, and in need of correction.

Speaker A responds by epistemically downgrading her answer ("I think"); then flat out rejecting/contradicting it ("no it can't be"); and finally, checking if she's even got the right person in mind ("he did Titanic didn't he"). Each of these actions treats the HRF repetition as challenging the veracity of her answer. Moreover, in speaker B's subsequent (overlapping) turn, line 9, she aligns with A's retraction ("no"), and then provides the epistemic grounds for her challenge: "he's an action movie", continuing in lines 13-15 to explain that based on what she knows or expects from James Cameron, this film isn't the type of film he'd direct (earlier the participants had described it as "film noir" and "smutty porn"). Speaker B thus confirms that she has heard, and understood A's answer perfectly well. Her HRF repetition was both designed and understood to claim it was wrong, and in need of correction.

Like many of the cases in our collection, speaker A provides an account for having said what she said. First, with "well this was action there was car smashes every two minutes" (line 10) A argues that this movie *is* consistent with "action"—B's description of the movies Cameron directs (see line 9). Second, even as A moves to close the sequence, she maintains some semblance of the appropriacy of her answer—"somebody beginning with Cee anyway (.) directed it." She thereby claims that her answer, while mistaken, is understandable (it was *sort of* an action movie) and not totally wrong (she has the first letter of the name right).

We also see the HRF repetition speaker working to justify her claim of incongruity. After A's counter claim about "car smashes" (line 10), B offers a second basis for her challenge,

again grounded in her knowledge or beliefs about the issue: Cameron typically directs “films you don’t have to think about” (lines 13-15). So here, and across the collection, we see HRF repetitions generating quite extended sequences of arguments, counter-arguments, accounts and the like. The suspended course of action is resumed only after a “negotiation” of the incongruity, a process which can continue over several turns, and indeed in some cases much longer<sup>8</sup> (contrast this with the examples in section 6.5 below).

The following provides a similar case. The participants have been discussing the current whereabouts of several mutual acquaintances.

**Extract 12** [CallFriend-n4175, 14:33]

1 B: uh yeah (I) think he's just (0.3) you know a real standup guy  
 2 or whatever [he's like- ] really (.) workaholic [and (every)]  
 3 A: [yeah ] [he got ]  
 4 a job in uh Utah right  
 5 (0.4)  
 6 B: ^Utah  
 7 (0.2)  
 8 A: I think so  
 9 B: .t I can't re[member]  
 10 A: [ Ida]ho  
 11 A: Utah  
 12 (0.3)  
 13 A: yeah Utah  
 14 (0.9)  
 15 A: cause he's [(near) ] Idaho  
 16 B: [really ]  
 17 (0.6)  
 18 B: [oh ]  
 19 A: [well] you find out you can ask  
 20 B: yeah I'll find out

At lines 3-4 speaker A asserts that, John, the person under discussion, got a job in “Utah”. This assertion is admittedly epistemically downgraded by his use of turn-final “right” (Heritage & Raymond, 2005). B initiates repair by repeating “Utah” with a high rise-fall pitch pattern, rising 10ST on the first syllable, and falling 13ST on the second (see Figure 6.3).

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<sup>8</sup> In one case in our collection, the sequence continues for over four minutes. Despite a number of attempts by both participants, it is only successfully closed—though the incongruity still unresolved—when a third participant (speaker C) complains off phone from the background about their “arguing”. This rather dramatic case illustrates both the capacity of HRF repetitions, and the claim they embody, to derail talk; and the extent to which participants will work to defend their versions of the world (see section 6.6).

Again, this action is treated by both participants as claiming that the repeated talk is in need of correction.




Figure 6.3: The HRF repetition in Extract 12

As in the previous extract, speaker A responds to B's HRF repetition by backing down. He first further downgrades the epistemic basis of his assertion of John's whereabouts ("I think so", line 8), and then provides a candidate correction ("Idaho", line 10).

In this case, however, A goes on to defend not only the spirit of his initial claim, but the claim itself. He (re)asserts that John *does* work in Utah ("Utah (0.3) yeah Utah", lines 11-13). Critically, speaker B does not align with these actions. While unable to name where John *is* working (see line 9, "I can't remember"), B maintains his claim that he is *not* working there, first with silence (line 12 and 14), and then with the potentially doubt-indicative "really?" (see for instance Drew, 2003, p. 930-33).

Speaker A finally abandons his attempt to convince Speaker B of the veracity of his information, and invites him to "find out" himself (line 19). This sequence, initiated by B's HRF repetition, concludes with B clearly displaying that he has still not accepted Speaker A's version of events: "yeah I'll find out" (line 20).

Extract 13 provides a third example. In this case, A does not immediately "back down" or "correct" herself in the face of B's HRF repetition.

## Extract 13 [Field-3B-1-5, 14:09]

1 A: oh how's Mary keeping cause uh her allergies are they:  
 2 (0.5) / ((A *breathing*))  
 3 B: well she came in blotchy the other day and they didn't (.)  
 4 couldn't decide what it was  
 5 (0.3)  
 6 A: hm:  
 7 B: I mean I feel  
 8 A: .hhh  
 9 (0.2)  
 10 B: uh:::::m: (0.3) I mean she seems very well she certainly lost  
 11 some: weight and she looks ever so nice she's g- obviously had  
 12 some new: .hh clothes which (0.2) you know (.) suit her very well  
 13 A: oh good  
 14 B: yes so: that- (.) that's very ni:c[e in fact we find=  
 15 A: [hm:  
 16 B: =we're wearing more of the same colors we have to be careful  
 17 B: .hh[hh]  
 18 A: [o:]h:  
 19 (.)  
 20 B: @[:  
 21 A: [ye:s:  
 22 (.)  
 23 A: [cause sh-  
 24 B: [(well) beige and navy  
 25 (.)  
 26 A: .hh oh yes cause she can't wear blue:  
 27 (0.5)  
 28 B: she ^CAN'T wear blue=  
 29 A: =no: that's one of the colors she's allergic to  
 30 (0.3)  
 31 B: well that's funny she was wearing all blue the other  
 32 da[:y  
 33 A: [.hhhh oh eh she has to wear a specific sort of blue  
 34 .hhh uh-one: (.) e-eh she can only wear things .hhh  
 35 that don't have indigo in them  
 36 (.)  
 37 B: oh:::  
 38 (0.7)  
 39 B: well- and she-[told me how this'd suddenly started=  
 40 A: [((sniff))  
 41 B: =over the last (.) year two years[an-  
 42 A: [ye:s  
 43 B: the sun is another one isn't it

As the extract begins, the speakers are engaged in a discussion of the rather extreme allergies of Mary, a work colleague of theirs. B goes on to report that they are beginning to dress alike, and that they “have to be careful” (line 16). After some laughter but little uptake



from A, B increments her turn with “(well) beige and navy” (line 24), and A then produces “oh yes cause she can’t wear blue”. In next turn, B repeats “she can’t wear blue” with a high rise-fall pitch contour, rising 5ST and falling 17ST, with the pitch peak realised on the vocalic portion of the word “can’t” (see Figure 6.4).<sup>9</sup> With this action she claims that A’s statement is false. Mary *can* wear blue—B herself has just claimed that “navy” is one of the colors she and Mary have both been wearing.




Figure 6.4: The HRF repetition in Extract 13

In comparison with the previous two examples, speaker A does not immediately back down in the face of B’s HRF repetition. Instead, she confirms (“no”) and then evidences her prior claim: she [Mary] can’t wear blue because “that’s one of the colors she’s allergic to” (line 29). B does not accept this response. In the following turn she describes a recent firsthand experience which is entirely incompatible with A’s claim, explicitly signaling this epistemic lack of fit with a preface (“well that’s funny she was wearing all blue the other day”, line 31-32). The design of this turn clearly shows that she is (and, with her HRF repetition, was) challenging the veracity of A’s earlier statement.

<sup>9</sup> This extract, as well as a few other cases in our collection, has a final rise rather than the more common final fall. However, we can find no difference between the few HRF + rise cases, and the HRF + no rise. Therefore we conclude that the high rise fall is the most salient aspect of the repetition, with the final pitch movement dealing with other, possibly unrelated, issues.

The next extract shows that the incongruity claimed by HRF repetitions needn't arise from the truth or accuracy of the repeated talk, but can extend more broadly into matters of its moral appropriacy or acceptability. In this extract, B does not display doubt about what A has said, but he does display that he doesn't like it. This case also shows that instead of backing down from (extracts 11-12), or evidencing (extract 13) their prior talk, speaker A can simply confirm B's HRF repetition. As this and similar cases show, this action embodies an act of *resistance* (compare with Robinson, 2009; Chapter 3.4.4): Speaker A is standing firm in the face of B's claim of incongruity, maintaining the acceptability of *her* version of the world.

**Extract 14** [CallFriend-6093, 4:29]

1 A: I found out who: is going to be my: (.) my: house  
2 m- house sisters whatever mates

---11 seconds omitted---

3 A: we like to know where we're living next year okay @  
4 we're girls we're like that

---70 seconds omitted---

5 A: and then the third girl h (0.2) .hhhh is Jolene

---55 seconds removed---

6 A: .hhhh and then we have a:: hhhh German .hhhhhhhhh American who's  
7 been- raised in Germany who's for the first time been the States  
8 [.hhhh]hhh

9 B: [m hm ]

10 A: and then there's a: French guy hh  
11 (.)

12 A: Raphael

13 (0.7)

14 B: a French ^GUY

15 A: yeah hhhh

16 B: you're having a guy in your girl house  
17 (0.4)

18 A: we have t- two guys we need guys we're:  
19 we would never live in a house alone

20 (0.4)

21 B: uh @:[::: ]

22 A: [(oh sorr]y) that's Latin (y'know)/(no)

23 B: that's what

24 A: that's Latin

25 (0.2)

26 B: well I don't know (if it's) Latin or not

27                   (1.0)  
 28 B: (m) (0.3) but if that's the way y- it's gonna go  
 29           that's the way it'll go

As the extract begins, A is describing the people she'll be sharing a house with the following year. As the lines 1 to 5 illustrate, she has described it as a house of girls. At line 10, she mentions the last person in the house, "and then there's a French guy". Speaker B responds with a HRF repetition (line 14). The entire high rise-fall contour is located on the monosyllabic word "guy", and rises 6ST and falls 8ST, ending in creaky voice.

Phonetically, this particular example is slightly more complicated than the others presented so far in this paper, due to a change in stress in the repetition. Speaker A has employed what many would call narrow focus in stressing the "new" information in her turn at line 10: "a: French guy" (we have added underlining to indicate stress). This turn design matches her prior turns in which she has been listing the nationalities of her other new housemates; she continues to focus (in both a technical and non-technical sense) on nationality here. Speaker B, in his repair-initiating turn, shifts the stress or prominence to "guy" ("a French guy"). With this feature of the HRF repetition's design, he locates precisely the source of the incongruity; this person's gender is the problem, not his national origin (Bolinger, 1958, 1965; Ladd 1980; see also Jefferson, 1972 on "framing" in repetition-OIs).<sup>10</sup>

In response to B's HRF repetition, A offers a simple confirmation ("yeah", line 15)—it is indeed a French guy that she'll be living with. If B were signaling a trouble of hearing what was said this may well have been sufficient, and the suspended activity could have resumed (compare with extract 16 below). However, as their subsequent talk makes clear, both participants understood that this was *not* the trouble. First, B does not accept A's confirmation. Rather than providing a sequentially relevant next action, he pushes on with "you're having a guy in your girl house?" (line 16), again accenting "guy". This spells out more explicitly the incongruity he claimed through his HRF repetition—it's a problem that he's a "guy" specifically because it is a "girl house". He does not, however, explicitly claim that this state of affairs is inappropriate, or unacceptable, as saying "you can't do that" or even "does your mother know" would have. Nevertheless, this is precisely how A treats his

---

<sup>10</sup> We see no reason that the HRF contour could not be doing the function we claim – initiating repair on an incongruity – and simultaneously marking narrow focus. See the discussion of contrast and focus in Section 3.

actions. She accounts for the described conduct, first as a matter of safety (“we need guys we would never live alone”, line 18-19) and then on cultural grounds (“that’s Latin”, line 22).<sup>11</sup> This shows that A understood—and with her confirmation *resisted*—the non-aligning import of B’s HRF repetition.

Speaker B’s subsequent response provides further evidence that his trouble was indeed the moral unacceptability of A’s living arrangements. First, he implicitly aligns with her treatment of his prior turns simply by passing on the opportunity to clarify them. He doesn’t say, for instance, “No I didn’t mean that...” or “I wasn’t being critical”. Second, what he does do is begrudging acquiescence—“if that’s the way it’s gonna go, that’s the way it’ll go” (line 28) conveys that since she’s made up her mind, there’s little he can do, all the while maintaining a non-aligning stance.

These cases have shown that HRF repetitions claim that something is wrong, and launch a sequence to address it. In this final case, extract 15, the incongruity is grounded not in what A has described, i.e. not in some state of affairs external to the current interaction, but in the action itself. Speaker B claims that it has not designed appropriately for him, at this interactional juncture. This case also shows that speaker B sometimes continues speaking following the repeat, immediately spelling out the nature of the incongruity being claimed.<sup>12</sup>

Speaker A has called a friend, and been put on the phone with this friend’s roommate. They know *of* each other, but have never spoken (or perhaps only once, see lines 17-20).

**Extract 15** [Callfriend-n6065, 6:05]

- 1 A: hi Roy
- 2 B: hi
- 3 A: hi how are you
- 4 B: how are you
- 5 (.)

---

<sup>11</sup> Unfortunately what she means by this is rather opaque, at least to outsiders like us. Relevant, however, is that both participants are Hispanic-American, and throughout this conversation have strongly oriented to their Latin backgrounds, for instance by contrasting or in other ways distancing themselves from “Americans”.

<sup>12</sup> Schegloff (1997a) and Bolden (2010) document similar cases of “repeat + talk” turns in English and Russian respectively. Bolden’s collection of repetitions with and without subsequent talk by B contrast clearly in terms of action. The former deal “with issues of intersubjectivity or understanding while repeat prefacing is reserved for problematizing actions (that are quite clearly understood)” (p. 140). In contrast, in our collection of HRF repetitions, we do not see any difference across the two subsets. All serve, in Bolden’s words, to “problematize” actions which are clearly understood.

6 A: okay:  
7 (0.4)  
8 A: what's new@: @ @  
9 B: what's ^NEW um:=  
10 A: =@ @ @ [@ @  
11 B: [well that implies that we've spoken in the past [and so]  
12 A: [ @ @]  
13 @ @ [.hhhh [ o[kay tha[t's true ]  
14 B: [there've[ b-[ (0.3) [that there've] been developments  
15 since the last time we spoke  
16 (0.2)  
17 A: .hhh I think I spoke to you once didn't I  
18 (0.3)  
19 B: um I don't know but [that's o]kay  
20 A: [like ]  
21 A: @ [@  
22 B: [I'm just giving you a hard time

Following the opening sequence, A launches a first topic with “what’s new” (line 8). B responds with a HRF repetition, rising 5ST and falling 8ST, followed by a turn-projecting “um” (Clark & Fox Tree, 2002; Schegloff, 2010). In his turn continuation, line 11, he explicitly spells out the nature of his problem: in his words, what’s new “implies that we’ve spoken in the past ... that there’ve been developments since last time we spoke”. There is an incongruity, he claims, between the nature of their relationship and the presuppositions embodied in the design of A’s topic elicitor. Unlike “what’s up” or “what’s going on”, this formulation asks for updates, and you can’t get updates from someone you’ve never spoken to before. B is thus claiming that this action was designed inappropriately for him, as a recipient (note, though, that A defends her use of this expression: “I think I spoke to you once didn’t I”, line 17, claims that her presupposition was, in fact, not so unfounded.)

In this section, we have shown that HRF repetitions are treated by both relevant participants—the repeating speaker (B) and repeated speaker (A)—as claiming that the repeated talk is “wrong”. In some cases, it’s a matter of veracity; B claims what A has said is incorrect, or inaccurate (extracts 11-13). In other cases, it’s a matter of moral appropriateness or acceptability; while not doubting the repeated talk, B isn’t happy with it (extract 14). In still other cases, B’s problem is not with moral conduct or state of affairs described, but in the immediate contextual appropriateness of A’s action (extract 15).

We’ve also shown that HRF repetitions launch a sequence in which correction of the repeated talk is made relevant. Sometimes speaker A immediately self-corrects, backs down

or otherwise aligns with B's claim (extract 11-12). In other cases, they resist, offering evidence for the repeated talk (extract 13) or a simple confirmation (extract 14). Critically, in the face of resistance, speaker B pushes again, often with a more explicit claim of epistemic or moral authority over the offending issue. As these cases make clear, HRF repetitions do not merely point out something curious or surprising in A's talk, asking for clarification or comment—they are used to explicitly claim that this repeated talk is “wrong”, and in need of correction.

## 6.5 Discriminability of the practice

In this section we briefly compare HRF repetitions with a number of other repair-initiating other-repetitions. This will help discriminate our practice, and support our argument that the high rise-fall pitch contour is a constitutive part of the interactional work HRF repetitions do.

Repetition has long been identified as one of the principal methods available for initiating repair on a co-participant's talk.<sup>13</sup> Typical of this research is the recognition that repetition-OIs can be used to manage a wide array of troubles. The following cases, for instance, appear to be addressing hearing and understanding problems.

### Extract 16 ((continuing extract 11))

- 1 A: hmm: somebody beginning with Cee anyway (.) directed it  
 2 (0.2)  
 3 A: @ @  
 4 (0.4)  
 5 B: C:[ee  
 6 A: [.hhhh yeah

---

<sup>13</sup> For conversation-analytic work on English see Jefferson (1972), Schegloff et al. (1977), Kelly & Local (1989a), Sacks (1992) Schegloff (1997a), Drew (2003), Robinson (2006), Wilkinson & Kitzinger (2006), Sidnell (2010), Robinson & Kevoe-Feldman (2010), Robinson (2009; 2013b). For CA work on a variety of other languages see Sorjonen (1996), Selting (1996), Kim (1999), Wu (2006), Svennevig (2008), Englert (2008) and Bolden (2009). Within linguistics, there is a substantial, and in some cases overlapping body of literature exploring the design and use of “echo questions”. See for example Bolinger (1957), Halliday & Hasan (1976), Quirk et al. (1987), Iwata (2003), Siedland et al. (2005). To the best of our knowledge, the present paper is the first to tie repetitions with this phonetic design (HRF) to this type of trouble (acceptance). The closest is a suggestion by Robinson & Kevoe-Feldman (2010). In their analysis of full-scope repetitions (the Full Repeats discussed in Chapter 2), they observe that, in contrast to final *rising* pitch, final *falling* pitch seems to delimit the nature of the trouble to problems of acceptance (p. 236). While this certainly aligns with our work in some ways, our repetitions involve a more complex pitch movement and can be both partial- and full-scope.

7 (0.3)  
8 B: Kubrick?<sup>14</sup>

**Extract 17** [SBC-05, 7:46]

1 A: and then we went to the chalk- (0.3) fair  
2 and then he took off with Tobias=  
3 B: =the chop fair  
4 (0.2)  
5 A: the chalk  
6 (0.2)  
7 B: [oh ]  
8 A: [ the cha]lk f[air]  
9 B: [un ]hunh  
10 A: .hhhhh and he took off with Tobias

**Extract 18** [CF-n5635; expansion of extract 9]

1 A: ... I do not want that one .hhh but there's a blue one  
2 (.)  
3 A: it's all blue  
4 (0.7)  
5 B: just is it is it [(.) reg]ular ski like a s[mooth ]  
6 A: [xx xx] [it's a pu]lllover  
7 (0.4)  
8 B: huh?  
9 A: it's a pullover  
10 (0.2)  
11 B: [pullover]=  
12 A: =yeah it doesn't button up front it pulls over your head  
13 B: all [blue huh ]  
14 A: [and it ] yeah and it has a hood

In response to speaker B's repetition-OI, speaker A confirms (line 6, extract 16), repeats (line 5, extract 17), or clarifies (line 12, extract 18) what B has repeated. B then treats this repair as sufficient by resuming the suspended course of action, perhaps following a third position receipt ("oh", line 7, extract 17; Heritage, 1984a). Schematically:

- 1 A: Trouble-source
- 2 B: Repair-initiating other-repetition
- 3 A: Confirmation/repetition/clarification of the trouble-source
- 4 B: Resumption of the suspended course of action

<sup>14</sup> This example highlights the difficulty of rendering the relevant sounds of an interaction in readable English orthography. Both speakers produce [si:] for the letter "C". Although the subsequently proffered candidate name, Kubrick, is spelled with a "K", there is no orientation by either participant to this being an incorrect or improbable guess, even though the orthographic transcription may bias readers towards that interpretation.

These extracts show that some repetition-OIs can manage problems in hearing and understanding. Critically, however, those produced with *high rise-fall* pitch contours cannot. All of the approximately 40 cases in our collection are treated by the participants as managing problems of acceptability, as detailed in the previous section.

What separates cases like those exemplified in extracts 16-18 from the practice documented in this chapter is the phonetic design of the repetition. Figure 6.5 below shows the monotonicity of the OI in Extract 16; the 2ST rise on the OI in Extract 18 was shown in Figure 6.2 (section 6.3). The OI in Extract 17 is produced with a fall to mid; however, no pitch trace can be extracted due to overlapping speech on the recording. Thus, a difference in sequential trajectory is directly linked to a difference in the phonetic realization of the OI (see also Walker & Benjamin, in prep). High rise-fall repetitions are a discriminable practice, with their phonetic design playing a constitutive part.




Figure 6.5: The non-HRF repetition in Extract 16

Before concluding, it is important to clarify the “direction” of our argument. We are *not* claiming that HRF repetitions are the *only* type of repetition-OI that can manage acceptability problems. Indeed, the majority of research (see note 13) suggests otherwise. For instance, repetition-OIs produced with final rising pitch have long been known to be capable of managing these kinds of problems too (see Robinson, 2013b for a recent account). Extract 19 illustrates this.



## Extract 19 [CallHome-6071, 27:32]

- 1 B: well: you know but it would be nice to meet a guy with a  
 2 real job who can support himself .hhhhh I mean not even  
 3 someone who will (.) you know pay for me necessarily but  
 4 .hhh (0.3) somebody who can just like pay for himself: you  
 5 know and would pay for me once in a wh[ile  
 6 A: [.hh well can't Geoffrey  
 7 (1.0)  
 8 B: can't Geoffrey  
 9 A: couldn't Geoffrey=  
 10 B: =yeah he could  
 11 (0.4)  
 12 A: yeah so  
 13 (0.3)  
 14 A: .hhh[h  
 15 B: [but you know (0.9)
- 16 A: .hhhh[h  
 17 B: [Geoffrey is like (0.4) mister noncommittal I hated that  
 18 wishy washy shit that he did that hot and cold stuff

B's turn in lines 1-5 is hearable as complaining about the guys she dates. With his "well can't Geoffrey" in line 6, A provides a possible exception to her troubles/misfortunes (this turn ties elliptically back to B's "somebody who can just like pay for himself", line 4). In line 8, B initiates repair by repeating "can't Geoffrey" with a pitch rising 8ST across the entire utterance (see Figure 6.6).

Through its present tense construction, A's "well can't Geoffrey" (the trouble-source action) presupposes Geoffrey's current and continued relevance for B. In fact, B and Geoffrey are no longer dating, something which A should know—he was told earlier in this very call. We see that it is precisely this incongruity which A addresses in his repair. He redoes his turn with the correct *past* tense ("couldn't Geoffrey", line 9).

So here we have a *non*-HRF repetition being used to manage a problem of acceptability. A relevant question is how cases like these differ from ours. While a full comparison is beyond the scope of this study, we'd like to note two important differences. First, unlike our HRF cases, the OI used here can also manage hearing and understanding problems (again, see Robinson, 2013b). Second, the incongruity here does *not* become the focus of the interaction. A does not apologize for his "mistake", or account for it. He simply corrects it. Similarly, speaker B does not subsequently criticize him, laugh, etc. She simply resumes the suspended sequence ("yeah he could", line 10).




Figure 6.6: The non-HRF repetition in Extract 19

Perhaps, then, the diagnostic “openness” of repetition-OIs with final rising pitch affords the possibility of addressing acceptability problems covertly, as we see here (compare this with the use of “huh?”, “what?”, “pardon?” etc. discussed in section 6.2 above). In contrast, HRF repetitions—by design—explicitly claim that A is “wrong”, and bring the incongruity into interactional focus.

## 6.6 Conclusion

In this chapter, we have described a practice for claiming that a co-participant’s talk is “wrong”, and in need of correction. The data suggest that high rise-fall repetitions claim an incongruity between two versions of the world—the one presented in the repeated speaker’s talk, and the one which the repeating speaker knows or believes to be true, appropriate or acceptable. Both participants orient to this claimed incongruity, resulting in expanded, varied, and socially-charged sequences.

Previous research on repair-initiating other-repetitions has shown that they can manage a wide array of troubles—from hearing the repeated talk, to understanding its sense or its action import, to doubting or accepting it. An important question, then, is how repeated speakers are able to work out *why* their prior turns are being treated as problematic, and consequently, how to respond (see, e.g. Robinson, 2013b). In this paper, we have shed some additional light on how they manage this analytic task. We have shown that, at least when

the other-repetition is produced with high rise-fall intonation, their co-participants *tell* them, in gross terms, what type of trouble it is.

This chapter thus further contributes to the body of literature which demonstrates how the practices of repair initiation (OIs) and trouble-types are less than fully independent (see Selting, 1988; 1996; Robinson, 2006; Sidnell, 2007; Egbert et al., 2009; Robinson & Kevoe-Feldman, 2010; Walker & Benjamin, in prep.; and Chapters 2 through 5 above). Contrary to conventional wisdom in the repair literature, this work shows that repair-initiating participants can offer quite detailed analyses of what type of trouble they're having with the prior talk. In this way, they play an active role not only in *locating* the source of trouble (Schegloff et al., 1977), but in *diagnosing* its nature. Discovering these “diagnostic properties” has required a careful analysis of the linguistic details of OIs, in this case of their phonetic-prosodic design in particular.

This work also demonstrates the importance of distinguishing between linguistic resources, interactional practices, and actions. First, it shows that even within a potential practice category such as “repair-initiating other-repetition” (or repetition-OI), different aspects of turn design (i.e. linguistic resources) can do distinctive work (see also Selting, 1996; Robinson & Kevoe-Feldman, 2010; Walker & Benjamin, in prep.). Lexical repetitions with a non-HRF pitch pattern, even when clearly initiating repair, are used and treated differently from HRF repetitions. This work thus reiterates the point that it is crucial to regard repetition as a linguistic resource—as a *component* of a practice—rather than a practice in itself (see also Curl, 2004; Curl et al., 2006).

Second, we have shown that while lexical repetitions with a high rise-fall pitch contour may, in other action-sequential contexts, be used to “do surprise” (see extract 10 above), such uses do not automatically initiate repair. Different interactional practices may deploy the very same linguistic resources to perform different actions. Our findings, then, do not support the (widespread) view that intonation contours have “meanings” independently of their instantiation in a particular turn at talk (see Cruttenden, 1997; Ladd, 1996; Pierrehumbert & Hirschberg, 1990; Wichmann, 2000; among others). Indeed, the use of a similar intonation contour, but with a different interactional/sequential outcome, only supports the contrasting argument that cognitive/emotional states such as surprise or astonishment are interactional achievements, not static properties of certain pitch

configurations (Local & G. Walker, 2008; Selting, 1996; T. Walker, *forth.*). Cruttenden (1997, p. 92-93), in trying to unpick what he concedes are two very different meanings of the rise-fall contour, namely “impressed” vs “challenging”, makes a similar point in his discussion of the local meanings of tones in English: “...but in this case of the meaning of rise-fall, the explanation seems to lie in different speaker-listener relations.” Thus, even though he is clearly of the opinion that intonation contours *can* be assigned meaning, the local occasions of their use are still named as the deciding factor in how they are actually understood.<sup>15</sup>

High Rise-Fall repetitions are noteworthy for an additional reason. They exemplify another way in which asymmetries in the access to and authority over knowledge and conduct become, or are made, relevant in social interaction (Heritage & Raymond, 2006; Stivers, Mondada & Steensig, 2011; Heritage, 2012). The act of claiming that something is “wrong” is another resource that participants have for patrolling and defending their knowledge and beliefs about how things are or should be. As these extracts show, this includes not only beliefs about the facts of the world—e.g. who directed a particular movie (extract 11)—but also about what counts as acceptable conduct—e.g. having a “guy” living in an “all girl house” (extract 14)—and about the way actions should be designed for particular recipients (extract 15). Thus, these claims of unacceptability embody not only epistemic claims of greater access to, or authority over, the offending issue, but also address issues of moral impropriety. These claims are implicit in the repair-initiation itself, but, as we have seen, can become quite explicit in the ensuing sequence as the repair-initiating and trouble-source speakers jostle for epistemic or moral primacy.

The sequences engendered by HRF repetitions show that there can be more to addressing an incongruity than merely pointing it out. In a study of other-corrections, Jefferson (1987) notes that:

In the course of the business of correcting we can find such attendant activities as, e.g. ‘instructing’, [ . . . ], ‘complaining’[ . . . ], ‘admitting’[ . . . ], ‘forgiving’[ . . . ], ‘accusing’[ . . . ], ‘apologizing’, ‘ridiculing’, etc. That is, the business of correcting can be a matter of, not merely putting things to rights, [ . . . ] but of specifically addressing lapses in competence and/or conduct.

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<sup>15</sup> Cruttenden’s assertion that one (local) meaning of the rise-fall contour is “challenging” fits nicely alongside our analysis, but the fact remains that we disagree with the practice of assigning meaning to pitch (or any phonetic parameter) outside of the actual context of use.

While HRF repetitions differ from other-corrections in certain ways (see section 6.2), they share an important commonality: in addition to being a resource for (re-)establishing a shared understanding of what's right, they're a resource for holding others accountable for being wrong (see also Robinson, 2006).

And indeed, it is the norm in our collection for the repeated speaker to work at length to make their prior talk accountable, on occasion even after admitting it was wrong (see extract 11). Despite the fact that "fighting back" or resisting the claim of incongruity is a high-cost option – by expanding the repair sequence, this speaker runs the risk of being unable to progress his or her previous activity – participants repeatedly do so. There must, therefore, be a moral benefit to disputing the claim of incongruity flagged by HRF repetitions. These sequences thus attest to the importance participants place on displaying themselves as competent interactants who produce accountable social actions.

Finally, our description of the sequences engendered by this type of repair initiation contributes to Heritage's (2012b) notion of an "epistemic engine" as one of the drivers of social interaction. The data show how conversational sequences can emerge, in part, from interactants' insistence on displaying who knows what (and whether what they know is "right"), and who's who (to each other, and to others in the world). With a HRF repetition, one speaker disputes another's implicit claim of what's true or acceptable, making their own implicit claim of greater epistemic or moral (deontic) authority. *This* claim, in turn, regularly leads to more talk in which both speakers work toward creating a symmetrical balance of shared knowledge or understanding (even if, in the end, they agree to disagree).

## 7 | “You mean” Marked Understanding Checks

**Abstract:** Occasionally an other-initiation of repair (OI) is issued some time after the offending talk has passed. This might pose a puzzle to the previous speaker, who would normally expect troubles to be signaled immediately. This chapter argues that recipients can help them, by signaling that their OI has become separated from the source of the trouble. This is first shown for the particular practice of adding “you mean” to an understanding check (“you mean John?” compared with “John?”). A variety of similar practices are then collected together to suggest that this puzzle is quite generic and widespread, and that adding additional, generic lexicosyntax to an OI is a common resource for managing it. Finally, it is shown that these practices can have consequences for our understanding of repair more broadly. Examining their use allows us to refine our characterization of where OIs normally occur, and provides evidence that this contiguous positioning is preferred over non-contiguous positioning.<sup>1</sup>

### 7.1 Introduction

When a participant in a conversation has trouble hearing, understanding or accepting something someone else has said, they can—and regularly do—indicate the problem and ask that it be fixed (Schegloff, 2000b). This action, an other-initiation of repair (or OI), is typically done shortly following the troublesome talk. In the following two extracts, speaker B has been asked a question which they evidently find problematic. They initiate repair as a next action.

#### Extract 1 [Field-V-1-8, 0:05]

1 A: hello is Gordy in please  
2 B: .hhh who  
3 (0.3)  
4 A: Gordy  
5 (0.2)  
6 B: .hhhh oh no who is it hhh

#### Extract 2 [SBC-2, 17:04]

1 A: do you need a partner  
2 (1.3)  
3 B: to go there

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<sup>1</sup> A version of this chapter has been published as:  
Benjamin, T. (2012). When troubles pass us by: Using “you mean” to help locate the source of trouble. *Research on Language and Social Interaction*, 45, 82–109.

- 4 A: yeah  
 5 (0.2)  
 6 B: no

When it comes to describing the positioning of other-initiations, the turn is regularly taken as the relevant metric: the OI (“who” and “to go there”) is in the *turn* immediately following the troublesome *turn* (“hello is Gordy in please” and “do you need a partner”). This “next turn” characterization, while correct for such cases, runs the risk of ignoring the internal organization and dynamics of turns at talk. That is, the units and practices through which they are built, and the relevance of transition to another speaker at their possible completion (Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson, 1974). Re-examining extracts 1 and 2, we see that the OI is in fact the first turn constructional unit (TCU) following the possible completion of the TCU in which the trouble-source arose. Beyond occurring in the next turn, these OIs are the very next thing to happen—they are *contiguous* with the trouble-source TCU.<sup>2</sup> Contrast these cases with those below (the trouble-source TCU has been highlighted)

**Extract 3** [NB-1-1-1/Golf, 0:07]

- 1 A: hello is Johnny there  
 2 (0.4)  
 3 B: oo just (0.2) who  
 4 (0.2)  
 5 A: Johnny?=  
 6 =Wil[son?  
 7 B: [oo just a minute


**Extract 4** [NB-3-1-1/Invitation, 0:16]

- 1 B: are you up at your grandma’s  
 2 A: no I’m at (.) the beach  
 3 (0.3)  
 4 A: and I wanted her to come down for a few days  
 5 (0.2)  
 6 B: you’re at the beach  
 7 A: yeah

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<sup>2</sup> As the 1.3 second gap in extract 2 illustrates, contiguity is not to be understood in the temporal sense, but in the turn-sequential sense. Recipients in fact often withhold their repair-initiations temporally, creating further opportunities for the speaker to initiate repair themselves (Schegloff, Sacks & Jefferson, 1977, p. 374; Schegloff, 2000b, p. 224-30; Kendrick, 2012).

While also in the next turn, “who” and “you’re not at the beach” are not in the next turn constructional unit. Instead, as the incipiently troublesome TCU comes to possible completion, some other talk is produced. In extract 3, it is the beginnings of a response by the eventual repair-initiating speaker (“oo just-”). In extract 4, it is a turn continuation by the trouble-source speaker (“and I wanted her to come down for a few days”). As this talk fills the next TCU “slot”, the (eventual) OIs are separated from their targets. Figure 7.1 below schematically represents the contiguous (left panel) and non-contiguous (right panel) positioning of OIs. The figure is presented in “staff” notation. The trouble-source speaker is on the top line and the repair-initiating recipient is on the bottom. Time runs left to right.



**Figure 7.1:** Contiguous (left) vs. non-contiguous (right) positioning

These two alternatives are by no means equivalent: previous research suggests that non-contiguous OIs occur much less frequently, and only under special circumstances. While we lack clear distributional figures for contiguity as defined in this paper, prior studies report that between 70 to 90% of OIs occur in next turn (Schegloff, 2000b; Kendrick, 2012 for English; Egbert, in press for German). The portion of these which are contiguous is likely substantial. This disparity in frequency has been argued to result largely from differences in the interactional occasions which generate these alternatives. Contiguity is the *default* or “business as usual” option, and non-contiguity occurs when some contingent event “prevents” it. This has been argued most extensively by Schegloff (2000b) who outlines a variety of contingencies in turn construction, turn-taking, and preference organization which can lead to non-contiguity. Further contingencies include incomplete initial understandings (Wong 2000) and a recipient’s engagement in multiple competing activities (Egbert, in press).

Under the assumption of contiguity, speakers faced with other-initiations are armed with a reliable and powerful heuristic for locating what’s causing the trouble: they need only look in the prior turn-constructional unit. When other-initiations are non-contiguous, however,



they have to override this assumption and look beyond their immediate sequential environment. This chapter begins with the observation that abnormal situations often require extra work to be handled smoothly. As Schegloff (2000b) writes

The basic design of the class of constructional forms used to implement other-initiation of repair is suited to next-turn position [TB: or better yet, *contiguous* position]. When deferred to some remove from the trouble-source, the OI may require additional resources to identify the trouble source to which it is addressed (p. 224)

This chapter begins by documenting one of these “additional resources”. I argue that marking an understanding check with “you mean” signals that it is non-contiguous, and that the default assumption should be overridden. I then outline two consequences of this work for our understanding of the organization of repair. First, I show that examining where this practice is used allows us to refine the characterization of the default positioning. Second, it provides evidence that contiguity is structurally preferred over non-contiguity. Finally, I collect together a range of similar practices in English, Dutch, German, Russian and Finnish (including those identified by Schegloff, 2000b; Bolden, 2009; Haakana, 2011; Egbert, in press). This suggests that non-contiguity is a recurrent interactional problem, and the grammatical design of an OI is widespread resource available for managing it.

## 7.2 The practice: “You mean” marked understanding checks

The focal practice examined in this chapter are understanding checks containing “you mean”. The following extract, taken from the Watergate scandal tapes, provides a first illustration. In line 1, Haldeman (speaker A) offers ‘he may be victimized on it’ as a possible motivation for a colleague’s upcoming testimony. In line 4, Nixon (speaker B) initiates repair on this TCU with “you mean by his lawyer”.

### Extract 5 [WG-4-13-nh, 3:40]

- 1 A: he may be victimized on it  
 2 (0.6)  
 3 A: I'm not sure he's ma[king]  
 4 B: [you ]mean by his lawyer  
 5 B: [hhhhhhhhh]  
 6 A: [yeah or ](. ) somebody else

Properly describing this practice requires situating it within a broader constellation of repair practices. This in turn requires three distinct levels of description—repair actions, other-initiation methods, and linguistic formats/resources. At the highest level, “you mean by his lawyer” initiates repair but leaves it to the speaker of the trouble-source to perform the repair proper (in this case, the modified confirmation in line 6). It is an other-initiation of self-repair (or an OI). This repair-related action contrasts with others which recipients can perform, such as correcting the prior speaker (other-initiated other-repair) or offering a possible solution during a word search (self-initiated other-repair) (Schegloff, Jefferson & Sacks, 1977; and Chapter 1). At the next level, “you mean by his lawyer” contrasts with other *methods* of doing OIs. Understanding checks request that the prior speaker (dis)confirm a possible understanding of their TCU/turn, some component of it, or something presupposed, implied by or inferable from what was said (Heritage, 1984a; Selting, 1996; Bolden, 2010; Hayashi & Hayano, 2013) Other methods such as an open-class repair requests (“huh?”, “what?”, Chapter 2) and restricted-class repair requests (“who.”, “when?”, see Chapter 3) locate the trouble-source differently and make different types of repair relevant.<sup>3</sup> At the third and final level, “you mean by his lawyer” contrasts with other understanding checks in the particular *linguistic resources* employed in its design. Crucially here, “by his lawyer”—the actual candidate understanding to be checked—has been combined with the lexico-syntactic item “you mean”. As the understanding check “to go there” in extract 2 makes clear, this core component can occur alone.

The practice being examined, then, is the inclusion of “you mean” (a particular linguistic resource) in an understanding check (a particular method of other-initiation). It is important to note that this same linguistic resource can be employed in other repair actions including other-corrections (as noted in Schegloff, Jefferson & Sacks, 1977, p. 378) and candidate word search solutions. Neither of these practices will be discussed in what follows. “You mean” can also be used in *fourth position repairs* (as noted in Schegloff, 1988, p. 56; Schegloff, 2000b,

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<sup>3</sup> There appears to be some inconsistencies in the use of the term “understanding check” in the literature. While many use the term to refer to the particular method described above, others use it more broadly. Kelly & Local (1989), for instance, use the term to cover other-initiations employing repetition (e.g. “aside” ← “aside”) and question words framed by repetition (e.g. “when did it happen to you” ← “when did it happen what”) (p. 263-85). In the usage adopted here, neither of these are understanding checks (see Chapters 6 and 5 respectively for a discussion of these alternative methods of OI)

p.211). As this is relevant in what follows, it is important to distinguish this type of other-initiation from the more familiar type—what we could call *next position repair*.<sup>4</sup>

Fourth position repair and next position repair differ in when and how the recipient ‘discovers’ the trouble. In fourth position repair, discovery occurs quite late, on the basis of some subsequent talk by the trouble-source speaker. A speaker produces a turn and a recipient provides a normal response. The speaker then (or later) produces a turn which builds on the understanding displayed in this response. Something in this third turn, however, provides the recipient with grounds to re-analyze their initial understanding and they initiate repair (Schegloff, 1992). In next position repair, the trouble is typically discovered during or shortly after the production of the troublesome talk itself, and repair is then initiated “in relatively close proximity” (Schegloff, 2000b, p. 211). While in some non-contiguous cases, the discovery itself seems “delayed” (Wong, 2000; Schegloff, 2000b, p. 230-33), the crucial difference is that any re-analysis is grounded entirely “within” the recipient themselves, rather than the trouble-source speaker’s subsequent conduct (Schegloff, 2000b, p. 237, fn.1). As we will see later, in some sequential environments it can be difficult—at least for analysts—to determine if a “you mean” marked other-initiation is in non-contiguous next position or fourth position.

Previous research on understanding checks has uncovered a number of linguistic resources for modifying the claimed degree of confidence in the candidate understanding (Heritage, 1984a; Selting, 1996; Golato & Betz, 2008; Wu 2009; Bolden, 2010). In English, this includes the selection of a final pitch movement (Bolden, 2010)<sup>5</sup>, “oh” prefacing (Heritage, 1984a, p. 323) and, most likely, the use of tags such as “or” and “isn’t it”. This paper argues the selection of “you mean” is driven by something different—the understanding check’s positioning relative to the trouble-source TCU. This is the first substantial claim made about this practice despite a long history of mention in the literature. Schegloff, Jefferson and Sacks

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<sup>4</sup> This label draws on both this repair action’s relative position in the repair initiation opportunity space (Schegloff, 1992), and the now defunct label “next *turn* repair initiator” (see Schegloff 2000b, p. 211; and Chapter 1).

<sup>5</sup> Bolden (2010) argues that “rising intonation [...] suggests a wider epistemic gap between the speaker and the addressee, while falling intonation displays the speaker’s stronger epistemic stance” (p. 11). This fits with the general observation that, across a number of actions, the selection of a final pitch movement appears to index the claimed gap in knowledge, or the action’s “epistemic gradient” (see Couper-Kuhlen, 2012; Raymond, 2010; Heritage & Raymond, 2012; and also the discussion of “try marked” *repairs* in Chapter 3.3 above)

(1977) include “you mean” marked understanding checks among their classic taxonomy, but contrast them directly with other methods of other-initiation (see above). Later work more explicitly recognizes “you mean” as just one formatting option for this method (e.g. Schegloff 1998), but it has never been examined with regards to what (if any) interactional work it accomplishes. This study aims to fill this gap.

Eighty-two instances of “you mean” marked understanding checks were collected and analyzed using the methods of conversation analysis. To the degree to which it is possible, this procedure was systematic and unbiased. All candidate instances of the practice were extracted and examined, irrespective of their sequential positioning and other features. The bulk (73) were extracted from some 70 hours of recordings, with the remainder taken from the literature. The data examined include a range of naturally occurring interactions recorded over the last 40 years (see Chapter 1).

A linguistically varied set of “you mean” marked understanding checks were included in the collection as they seem to operate uniformly with respect to their sequential positioning. The items differ in:

- the composition of the “you mean” component: “mean” vs. “y’mean” vs. “you mean” vs. “do you mean”
- the relative positioning of the “you mean” and candidate understanding: “you mean ...” vs. “... you mean”
- the presence of other lexical-syntactic items: “*oh* you mean ...”, “*what* you mean...”, “you mean ... *or*”, etc.
- the way in which the candidate understanding component cohesively locates its target: via expansion (“...victimized on it” ← “by his lawyer”) or substitution (“it” ← “the actual picture”) (see Chapter 4)
- the phonetic/prosodic design of the understanding check: unit final pitch movement (e.g. rise vs. fall), speech rate, etc.

It appears that the selection of final pitch, “oh”-prefaces and “or”-tags across the collection fit with the accounts mentioned above, suggesting that these various epistemic-modulating resources are selected independently of “you mean”. Further research is

required both to corroborate this and to investigate the other linguistic variation. In any case, these differences do not appear to impact this chapter's argument, and will thus be bracketed in what follows.

### 7.3 The action: Signaling non-contiguity

This section argues that marking an understanding check with "you mean" signals its non-contiguity with the trouble-source TCU. To begin, a number of extracts are presented to illustrate this non-contiguous positioning. Some relatively straightforward cases are presented first, followed by more difficult ones. Descriptive statistics of the collection are then given to provide distributional weight to the argument. Finally, three additional types of evidence are given.

#### 7.3.1 Some simple cases

This section analyses eight instances of understanding checks marked with "you mean" (henceforth these will simply be referred to as *you-means*). Each case is shown to be non-contiguous with the trouble-source TCU. The extracts are ordered first according to whose talk generated the non-contiguity. Cases separated by the trouble-source speaker's (speaker A's) talk are presented first, followed by those separated by the (eventual) *you-mean* speaker's (speaker B's) talk (see Figure 7.1 above).<sup>6</sup> Within each group, extracts are ordered according to the *you-mean*'s sequential "distance" from the trouble-source TCU. This is useful for demonstrating the diversity of situations in which "you mean" is employed. However, no evidence has been found that the participants themselves orient to these (or other) distinctions in their selection of the "you mean" format. Instead, the driving factor seems to be the binary, discrete distinction between contiguity and non-contiguity.

*The trouble-source speaker continues their turn.* As a TCU comes to possible completion, transition to a next speaker becomes relevant. However, the current speaker can continue their turn (Sacks et al., 1974). This can happen when the speaker receives no recipient uptake

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<sup>6</sup> There is third possibility: a third participant—neither the trouble-source speaker nor the repair-initiating speaker—responds initially to the (incipient) trouble-source TCU (see Schegloff, 2000b, p. 216-8). No *you-means* were found in such environments. It remains to be seen whether this is merely an artefact of the particular data set examined (a large portion of which is two-party interaction).

(Pomerantz, 1984b) or when they employ a special practice, such as a “rush through”, to mask this transition relevance place and secure an additional TCU (Schegloff, 1982; Local & Walker 2004; Walker, 2007; 2010). In any case, a turn continuation fills the next TCU slot, bypassing the opportunity for a contiguously positioned other-initiation of repair. Recipients can still initiate repair past this point, but locating the trouble-source then requires “jumping over” the turn continuation (cf. Schegloff, 2000b, p. 225-30). Starting from the trouble-source TCU and moving forward, *you-means* were found intersecting turn continuations (see item 1 in Figure 7.2 below), at their possible completion (item 2), or following additional continuations (item 3).




Figure 7.2: The trouble-source speaker continues their turn

The following two extracts illustrate *you-means* in this first environment, intersecting a turn continuation (cf. Schegloff, 2000b, p. 225-30). Again, speaker A’s trouble-source TCU and B’s other-initiation have been boxed. The “you mean” component itself has been marked in bold.

Extract 5 [repeated from above]

- 1 A: he may be victimized on it
- 2 (0.6)
- 3 A: I'm not sure he's ma[king]
- 4 B: [you ]mean by his lawyer
- 5 B: [hhhhhhhhh]
- 6 A: [yeah or ](.) somebody else

**Extract 6** [SBC-47, 12:48]

- 1 A: (.hh) so it'll help me cause I don't have uh any  
 2 steady income now if I don't sell I don't make money  
 3 I got uh (0.2)  
 4 A: you mean you don't (.) even get minimum  
 5 (.)  
 6 B: well we get (0.6) six hundred dollars a month

In extract 5, seen above, speaker A continues his turn following a gap (lines 2-3). At a point of non-completion, B enters in overlap, offering a candidate expansion of the just-completed TCU (“he may be victimized on it” ← “you mean by his lawyer”). Extract 6 is similar. In line 2, A elaborates his report with “if I don’t sell I don’t make money”. Early into a second continuation (“I got uh (0.2)”), his recipient enters his turn space to check an inference from the just-completed TCU (“you mean you don’t even get minimum”, line 4). Both of these understanding checks occur just within the borders of a next TCU past the trouble-source TCU, and thus just past contiguous position. Their non-contiguity is indexed with the “you mean” format.

While similarly positioned, these two cases are by no means identical. Briefly exploring their differences will lend additional support to the argument that it is precisely the abstract, binary (non-) contiguity distinction which drives the selection of “you mean”. First, the extracts differ in what generated the turn continuation. In 5, the trouble-source TCU (“he may be victimized on it”) was possibly complete syntactically, phonetically and pragmatically (cf. Ford & Thompson, 1996). Speaker B could/should have responded in line 2 but did not. It was only here that A continued his turn. In extract 6, however, the A-speaker *works* to produce his continuation. While “if I don’t sell I don’t make money” is syntactically and perhaps pragmatically possibly complete, A masks this point of possible completion phonetically (line 3). Through a range of phonetic features, including (at least) pitch, duration and phonation, “if I don’t sell I don’t make money” is designed to come off as not complete and “I got uh” to continue it. The final metric foot of the first unit (“money”) does not fall as low in pitch as other cases of unit/turn final falls by this speaker, and it is shorter in duration. The beginning of the second unit (“I got”) continues the previous pitch contour (rather than resetting), and there is no break in phonation across the boundary (see Walker, 2010; Local & Walker, 2012 for discussion). A second difference is that while both *you-means* enter into the turn space of a turn continuation, they differ in what was occurring at the point

of intersection: in 5 the continuation was progressing fluently; in 6 it had been halted by self-repair (“uh (0.2)”). The first *you-mean* is thus produced in bald overlap, while the second exploits a “blip” in the continuation’s production. To re-iterate: as both these understanding checks contain “you mean”, these additional differences do not seem to drive this format’s selection.

Moving forward from the trouble-source TCU, *you-means* were also found at the possible completion of a turn continuation (see item 2 in Figure 7.2 above). In extract 7, A is asking B about her upcoming wedding. B answers briefly and then moves stepwise away from this topic (lines 3-5).

**Extract 7** [SN-4] (analyzed in Schegloff, 1996c, p. 67; 2000b, fn. 17)

1 B: .hh so what have you called any other hotels or anything  
 2 (0.2)  
 3 A: yeah I called the Ambassador and stuff  
 4 I’ve got so much work (that) I don’t believe it  
 5 so I’m just now even thinking about that  
 6 [now  
 7 B: [in school you me[an  
 8 A: [yeah  
 9 (0.2)  
 10 B: you haven’t been in school in five weeks doesn’t matter

As speaker A’s multi-unit turn reaches a point of possible completion, B initiates repair with “in school you mean” (line 7). This understanding check “jumps over” the final TCU (“so I’m not even thinking about that”) and targets a prior one (“I’ve got so much work” ← “in school”).

This next extract illustrates a *you-mean* following a series of turn continuations (see item 3 above). Speaker B has just told A that she will ride her bike down for a visit. As this extract opens, B asks if A has put on (line 1) and tried (line 4) training wheels/stabilizers (evidently A has had some problems riding *her* bike). A’s multi-unit answer is the turn of interest (lines 5-7).

**Extract 8** [NB-II-5-R-2/Goldbridge, 6:33]

1 B: um (0.5) (uh) did you put your traini[ng wheels]  
 2 A: [yeah ]  
 3 (0.4)



- 4 B: have you tried th[em  
 5 A: [yeah and I still have a little problem  
 6 I'm scared to death but I'll do it I'll get out there  
 7 with you  
 8 (0.2)  
 9 B: you mean you still topple over with the training wheels  
 10 (0.2)  
 11 A: well you got to balance that front wheel too  
 12 (0.2)  
 13 A: but I'll do it [I'll do it I'll show you  
 14 B: [xx  
 15 B: okay I'll be down

Speaker A affirms that she has tried the training wheels but reports continuing problems (line 5). It is clear that B's eventual understanding check targets this TCU: "you mean you still topple over with the training wheels" offers a candidate instantiation or specification of "have a little problem" framed with repetition. While in the next turn, this understanding check is separated from the actual trouble-source TCU by a series of post-trouble-source continuations (lines 6-7).

This granularity of analysis is sufficient to show that B's *you-mean* is non-contiguous. However, it is worthwhile digging deeper to explore *how* it came to be so. This will help foreground the diversity of situations in which recipients draw on "you mean" to index non-contiguity. To begin, "and I still have a little problem" could easily be taken by B as projecting an elaboration. B's questions (line 1 and 4) probe into the possibility of a shared bike ride (see also lines 6-7 and 13). This targeted TCU is thus in a position ripe for a report bearing on this project (Raymond, 2000), and its gloss or preface like design only heightens the expectation (Terasaki, 2004/1976; see also Goodwin, 1996 on "prospective indexicals"). Consequently, initiating repair here, in *contiguous* position, would simply not be appropriate. Throughout her continuations, however, A does not elaborate. She first negatively assesses her problem ("I'm scared to death") and then offers a contrastive upbeat semi-aphoristic summary ("but I'll do it I'll get out there with you"). This last continuation is analyzable as a move to close down this sequence and with it the call (see lines 13-15; Drew & Holt, 1998; Schegloff, 2007b, p. 186). As evidently no elaboration is coming, B initiates repair, probing the "little problem" herself. Unlike many of the cases in the collection, non-contiguity did not result from a recipient who was 'late' or 'delayed' in initiating repair. It is indexed with "you mean" nevertheless.

*The you-mean speaker responds first.* The "you mean" formatted understanding checks examined so far have been separated from the trouble-source TCU by talk from the trouble-source speaker (speaker A). The next four cases are separated (at least in the first instance) by talk from the eventual *you-mean* speaker (speaker B). That is, a speaker comes to a point of possible completion, their recipient provides a sequentially appropriate response, and only then initiates repair on the prior talk. The collection contains *you-means* occurring "within" speaker B's initial response (see the first item in Figure 7.3 below), at its possible completion (item 2), or even following additional turns at talk (item 3). As before, the crucial point is that in each of these environments, the *you-mean* is non-contiguous with the trouble-source TCU.




Figure 7.3: The *you-mean* speaker responds first

These first two extracts illustrate *you-means* following and replacing an abandoned initial response (see the first item in Figure 7.3, and Schegloff, 2000b, p. 230-3).

Extract 9 [CallHome-4887, 5:01]

1 A: I mean: (0.2) what kind of a reception did it get  
 2 (1.5)  
 3 B: mostly just like a gossip (1.4)  
 4 I mean **you mean** the actual picture  
 5 (1.4)  
 6 B: [I mea- i-[ hhhhhh ]  
 7 A: [no I [I meant I] no no I meant what you're saying  
 8 just gossip

Extract 10 [Madeline2, 0:12]

1 A: okay I was just wondering you know .hhh (0.5) could- (0.3)  
 2 do you think you might (.) want to rent (.) you know like  
 3 the bottom part of your (0.3) garage like to me for a  
 4 while (0.2) something like that  
 5 (0.5)

- 6 B: wel[l- (0.3) [oh **you mean** for] living in Madeline  
 7 A: [(I think [ )]  
 8 A: yeah

In extract 9, speaker B has told A that an acquaintance has recently appeared in *Playboy* magazine. In line 1, A asks what kind of reception “it” got. B begins to answer (“mostly just like a gossip”) but then abandons this response in order to check she’s understood this pronoun—she pauses, self-initiates repair (“I mean”), and then other-initiates (“you mean the actual picture”). In extract (10) speaker B cuts off much earlier into her response—during the first word (“well- (0.3) oh you mean for living in Madeline”, line 6). Both of these understanding checks, separated from the trouble-source TCU by an abandoned TCU, index their non-contiguity with “you mean”.

In some cases the *you-mean* occurs at the possible completion of an initial response (see the second item in Figure 7.3, and Wong, 2000). In extract 11, for instance, speaker A shifts the topic from her work to B’s work with her question in line 1. B is living in Israel but has plans to return to her native America.

**Extract 11** [CallHome-5777, 8:45]

- 1 A: what about you have you gotten any job (0.3) offers  
 2 or anything going [on]  
 3 B: [ o]h god  
 4 (0.3)  
 5 A: **you mean** in Ameri[ca]  
 6 B: [ye]ah in New York  
 7 (0.6)  
 8 A: no we're not even looking yet because uh- w- nobody  
 9 will offer you anything unless they see you

Speaker B first responds by assessing the item probed by this question (“oh god”, line 3). Before delivering the projected negative answer and explication (see lines 8-9), she checks to see if the question is indeed referring to her upcoming job search in America (rather than possible offers in Israel).

In the final extract in this section (extract 12), an initial response by speaker B is followed by additional talk from the trouble-source speaker. Unlike the instances considered thus far, *you-means* in this position are no longer in the next turn (see the third item in Figure 7.3). For the sake of brevity, when four turns are involved—the (incipiently) troublesome turn, the

initial response, the next turn by the speaker, and the other-initiation—they will be referred to as T1, T2, T3 and T4 respectively.

**Extract 12** [NB-IV-13-R-4/Meatless, 5:57]

- 1 A: (well) they're coming down this weekend hh  
 2 (0.2)  
 3 B: (uh huh) oh  
 4 (0.5)  
 5 A: so I'll ha[ve them[this]  
 6 B: [ (t-) [ (.) ] **you mean** the next weekend  
 7 (0.5)  
 8 A: this next Saturday and Sunday yeah

Speaker A has just told B about her family's visit the previous weekend. A then announces that they are “coming down this weekend” (T1). B responds minimally (T2) and A continues her announcement (T3). Before this unit reaches possible completion, Lottie use a *you-mean* to initiate repair on this ambiguous time reference (“this weekend” ← “you mean the next weekend”). This initiation is in (an overlapping) fourth turn relative to the trouble-source.

In each extract presented in this section, a “you mean” marked understanding check was shown to be separated from its trouble-source TCU. There was “intervening” talk either in the trouble-source turn *after* the trouble-source TCU, in the repair-initiating turn *before* the *you-mean*, or over a series of turns. Shortly, this non-contiguous positioning will be shown to be representative of the collection as whole. First some slightly more complex cases will be examined.

7.3.2 Multiple mentions

Consider extract 13 and 14 below. On first blush these *you-means* appear contiguous with their targets: “you mean to stay there alone” (extract 13, line 9) and “you mean (.) (in-) June” (extract 14, line 9) each target an item which was mentioned in the immediately preceding TCU (“but I'm still kind of *scared*” and “and then (0.2) I have to ge- gr- get grades in by *the twenty third*” respectively). To account for such cases, the idea of a TCU “containing” a trouble-source item needs to be unpacked.

**Extract 13** [NB-IV-10-R/SwimNude, 29:28] ((Speaker B's name is Lottie))

1 A: I don't know Lottie what's going to happen I don't know hhh  
 2 (0.5)  
 3 B: yeah well[ x[x  
 4 A: [.hhh [I'm not so scared as I was hhhh  
 5 (0.4)  
 6 A: but [I'm still kind of scared  
 7 B: [xx-  
 8 (0.5)  
 9 B: you mean to stay there a[lone  
 10 A: [no

**Extract 14** [from Wong 2000, p. 248, re-transcribed]

1 A: .h you sort of want- (0.3) this is the um (1.6)  
 2 B: final week  
 3 A: well not quite we had finals hh (0.6) um (1.3) about the  
 4 sixteenth I guess it is (let's see) (0.7) seventeenth and  
 5 nineteenth and then (0.8) I have to ge- gr- get grades in  
 6 by the twenty third hh  
 7 (0.7)  
 8 B: you mean (.) (in-) June  
 9 A: (yeah)/(yes)  
 10 (0.3)  
 11 B: oh

Like all interactional objects, the act of mentioning (see Schegloff, 1996b; 2007a) a person, date, state of affairs etc. cannot be considered out of its sequential context. Mentions regularly occur in “chains” consisting of a (locally) initial mention followed by one or more subsequent mentions (see Fox, 1987; Schegloff, 1996b and the literature on topic/referential continuity, e.g. Givon, 1983). When we track backwards in extracts 13 and 14 we see that these trouble-source items had in fact been mentioned earlier in speaker A's turn. In 13, A had already mentioned that she was scared (“I'm not so scared as I was”, line 4) and in 14, A had mentioned a number of dates in this month (“sixteenth”, “seventeenth” and “nineteenth”, lines 4-5). In these cases, the (incipiently) troublesome item is mentioned multiple times before it is targeted for repair with a *you-mean*. The following three extracts provide additional illustration. Mentions of the trouble-source item have been underlined.

Extract 15 [NB-IV-10-R/SwimNude, 3:55]

1 A: ... she went up there and got some tennis shoes  
 2 god is that ever a good place to get tennis shoes  
 3 up there by the (0.2) .hh Rope Lounge  
 4 (0.8)  
 5 A: oh boy have you ever seen that (0.2) p-  
 6 (0.2)  
 7 B: yeah I got a pair in there  
 8 A: yeah  
 9 (0.2)  
 10 B: you mean uh the discount [place]  
 11 A: [ yea]h  
 12 B: yeah I g- yeah I get those topsiders there now ...

Extract 16 [from Schegloff, Jefferson & Sacks, 1977, p. 379]

1 B: somehow you [endure it  
 2 A: [there's an- there's an answer to that  
 3 (2.0)  
 4 A: hhhh a physical answer t(hh)oo hhh  
 5 B: you mean taking laxative at night  
 6 A: no suppositories


Extract 17 [SBC-58, 10:44]

1 A: you want mozzarella  
 2 (0.8)  
 3 B: what's that  
 4 (0.4)  
 5 A: "mozzarella" that's that white cheese that gets all  
 6 stringy and melted (( "... = *affected Italian accent* ))  
 7 (0.5)  
 8 B: you mean the one that I (0.7) kind of like um (.) Figaro  
 9 (0.6)  
 10 A: hmm

In extract 15, speaker A is re-counting a friend's shopping trip the previous day. In lines (2-3) she mentions a store where her friend bought some tennis shoes, and then checks if B knows the place (line 5). B eventually initiates repair ("you mean the discount place": line 10), but not before mentioning the store herself ("yeah I got a pair in there": line 7). In extracts 16 and 17 the next mention is a first attempt at repairing the trouble-source item (see Schegloff, Sacks & Jefferson, 1977, p. 372; Schegloff, 2000b, p. 212-3). In 16, this repair attempt is *self-initiated*. Speaker B is finishing a report about having "trouble in the bathroom". A responds with a rather opaquely formulated suggestion ("there's an answer to that") and

then self-initiates repair in the emerging transition space (“a physical answer too”, line 4). Evidently this slightly more detailed formulation is insufficient, and B checks her understanding (“you mean taking laxatives at night”, line 5). In extract 17, the initial repair attempt is *other*-initiated. In line 1 A asks her son B if he’d like mozzarella on his pizza. B *other*-initiates repair on this evidently unfamiliar item (“what’s that”, line 3). A describes it (lines 5-6), but B initiates repair again, this time with an understanding check (“you mean the one that I (0.7) kind of like um (.) Figaro”). In cases like these, a next attempt at repair is formatted with “you mean”.

In extracts 13-17, a speaker has produced a turn constructional unit in which they mention something for a (locally) first time. This item turns out to be problematic, and is eventually targeted for repair with a *you-mean*. First, however, it is mentioned again (and, evidently, in a way which does not resolve this trouble). The result is a trouble-source item which—through repeated mention—is “contained” in multiple TCUs, including the TCU immediately preceding the other-initiation of repair. The only pertinent difference between these cases and those considered previously is that here the troublesome item is subsequently mentioned and there it was not. In extract 8 above, for instance, a speaker made an initial mention (“have a little problem”), and then continued their turn in a way which did not directly “re-use” this (incipiently) troublesome item (though, as argued, it undoubtedly informed the continuation’s production and interpretation). Figure 7.4 illustrates this difference.



**Figure 7.4:** Trouble-source item is subsequently mentioned (top) or not (bottom)

The occurrence or non-occurrence of a subsequent mention is of course contingent. Some items get “re-used” and some don’t. What unites these situations is that there was a first opportunity for an other-initiation of repair (at the arrow in Figure 7.4) but for whatever

interactional reason(s) the (eventual) *you-mean* was not produced there. Consequently, rather than signaling the non-occurrence of the trouble-source item in the previous TCU, the “you mean” format signals the non-occurrence of the understanding check in its default contiguous position (following possible completion of a TCU containing the *first mention* of the incipiently troublesome item). The labels “trouble-source TCU” and “target” should thus be understood in this slightly more abstract way, not in a way which suggests that the ‘target’ is the first mention rather than a subsequent mention, or the TCU containing the first mention rather than a TCU containing a subsequent mention.

### 7.3.3 “You mean” marked fourth position repairs

This section examines two additional cases of “you mean” marked initiations of repair. The first (extract 18) is a clear case of fourth position repair (see section 7.2 above). The second (extract 19) is equivocal between being in fourth position or non-contiguous next position. As fourth position repairs also target troubles originating prior to the immediately preceding TCU, the use of “you mean” for this repair action could perhaps be seen as additional evidence that this format signals non-contiguity.

Extract 18, analyzed in detail in Drew (2005, p. 176-9), opens with A announcing to her friend B that she got “some nice cotton tops” (line 1). This is T1: the exact nature of these “tops” will be the target of B’s eventual repair initiation (“oh weh- what (0.2) duh-a-outer (.) wear tops you mean”, line 9). At this point, however, she produces a standard response—a topic-promoting news mark (“oh did you”, line 3; see Maynard, 1997)—and A continues her report (lines 2, and 4-6). These are T2 and T3 respectively.

#### **Extract 18** [Field-III-B-1-2, 2:58]

1 A: and I got some nice cotton tops  
 2 I'm not going to [tell Skip ].hhh  
 3 B: [ oh did y]ou  
 4 A: yes I meant (.) only to get one or two .hhhh but  
 5 they're (0.2) you know I mean if I stock up now then I  
 6 don't need to do it again do @I [@ @ .h]hhhh  
 7 B: [yeah right]  
 8 A: yes [xx  
 9 B: [oh weh- what (0.2) duh-a-outer (.) wear tops **you mean**  
 10 A: .hhh well no some I can wear underneath  
 11 (.)  
 12 B: oh



Recall that fourth position repairs are grounded in a next turn (T3) by the trouble-source speaker which “uncovered” a misunderstanding in the sequence so far. There is evidence that B’s “you mean” marked initiation is indeed grounded in an incongruity in A’s report. To paraphrase Drew’s analysis, on the one hand, A’s joke in line 2 suggests she has bought something substantial, something worth hiding from her husband. On the other hand, she then claims to have “stocked up” on these tops (lines 4-6). For reasons of both fashion and finance, this is something one wouldn’t expect with a substantial item of clothing. It seems that B initially had the first understanding (“outerwear tops”), but was no longer certain. She initiates repair from fourth position, and she formats this action with “you mean”.

As we have seen, “you mean” marked understanding checks can also follow third turns by the trouble-source speaker (see the third item in Figure 7.3 above). In extract 12 above, B initiates repair following a minimal response and the beginning of a third turn (“so I’ll have them this”). In extract (17), B’s *you-mean* follows an initial repair-initiation (“what’s that”) and a repair attempt by Mom. These cases are clearly non-contiguous next position repairs: the other-initiation in 12 seems to be produced “independently” of the third turn—it is “delayed” in the sense of Wong (2000) (note the “oh” and 0.5 s gap in lines 3-4); in 17 the trouble had already been addressed by the first repair-initiation and was thus clearly ‘uncovered’ much sooner than the third turn. Some other cases, however, are more equivocal. Consider the following:

**Extract 19** [SBC-3, 15:22]

- 1 A: in the national museum they have a gold room  
 2 (.)  
 3 A: that has all this [ gold ] stuff it’s really neat  
 4 B: [oh god ]  
 5 B: you mean (0.5) not made out of gold [just ]  
 6 A: [no ]  
 7 (0.5)  
 8 A: I mean it's this xx- it's called the gold room

In line 1, speaker A reports that the museum in Jakarta has “a gold room”. This formulation allows multiple readings: the room could be *made* of gold, or merely be *called* a gold room. B responds initially with a relatively strong assessment (“oh god”, line 4), suggesting perhaps that she has adopted the first reading. This response is positioned in overlap with, and thus uninformed by, T3 in the sequence: A’s description of the room as

having “all this *gold stuff*” (line 3), a continuation which strongly favors the first reading (also see line 8). Perhaps B’s subsequent initiation of repair (line 5) was grounded in this piece of information (and hence in fourth position), perhaps it was not (and hence in non-contiguous next position). In either case, it targets a trouble which arose in a non-contiguous TCU, and it is formatted with “you mean”.

#### 7.3.4 Distributional evidence

Each of the “you mean” marked understanding checks presented above was non-contiguous—it did not occur as a first action at the possible completion of the TCU in which the trouble-source was first mentioned. As the following Table illustrates, this positioning is representative of the collection as a whole.

	CONTIGUOUS	NON-CONTIGUOUS	TOTAL
Systematically collected	7% (n = 5)	<b>93%</b> (n = 68)	100% (n = 73)
Taken from literature	0% (n = 0)	<b>100%</b> (n = 9)	100% (n = 9)

**Table 7.1:** The positioning of “you mean” marked understanding checks

Of the 73 systematically collected *you-means*, 93% are non-contiguous, as are all of the cases found in the literature which could be checked. This robust tendency, taken together with the relative rarity of non-contiguous other-initiations in general, provides strong distributional evidence that “you mean” indexes this discrete positional feature. The next section provides further evidence.

#### 7.3.5 Additional evidence

The aggregate tendency outlined in the previous section can be argued to result from the participants case by case, normative orientation to the appropriate use (and non-use) of “you mean” as practice for signaling non-contiguity. There are (at least) three types of qualitative evidence for this.

*The “same” candidate understanding in different positions.* If it is the sequential positioning of an understanding check which drives the use (and non-use) of “you mean”, we would expect ‘the same’ candidate understanding to be packaged differently depending on where it occurs. Extract (20) below suggests this is the case. The participants have been

discussing the difficulties of teaching in a university with only masters degrees. A has recently been demoted within her department (referred to as “they” in this extract), and in line 3 it emerges that she didn’t write a masters thesis.

**Extract 20** [CallHome-4544, 15:43]

- 1 B: and I didn't write a thesis for my masters  
 2 (0.7)  
 3 A: yeah that's my problem also  
 4 (0.2)  
 5 B: .hh[h they ]  
 6 A: [so if I] do a doctorate I have to do an um  
 7 [ah thes-  
 8 B: [w- wait a minute .hh  
 9 and so you mean they know you didn't do a thesis]  
 10 (0.5)  
 11 A: well  
 12 (0.8)  
 13 B: well  
 14 A: if if if I get accepted into a doctoral program they  
 15 would want to see my thesis and if they if they don't  
 16 have a thesis ...

Following A’s turn in line 3, A and B begin speaking simultaneously. B first cuts off her emerging turn (“.hhh they”: line 5), and then succeeds in claiming a turn in which she targets line 3 with an understanding check (“and so you mean they know you didn’t do a thesis?”, lines 8-9). There is evidence that her abandoned turn was a first attempt at this understanding check, targeting the same trouble-source and offering the same (sort of) candidate understanding. First, “.hhh they” was positioned contiguously with A’s TCU, and thus in the default position to target it for repair. Second, and most crucially, it begins with the same word as the core component of her (second) understanding check (“they know you didn’t do a thesis”). “Losers” of overlap resolutions (as B is here) regularly retrieve their lost turns by recycling its words (Schegloff, 1987b; 1996a, p. 200-201; Local, Auer & Drew, 2010). This practice establishes that what is being said/done now is the same as what was being said/done before.

In this extract, it appears the “same” candidate understanding (“they ...”) was attempted twice: when contiguous, it was unmarked; when produced only moments later, it was marked with “you mean” (It is likely that the preface “and so”, which was absent in the first attempt, is also addressed to this loss of contiguity.)

*Re-designing emerging understanding checks.* In the previous extract, a subsequent version of an understanding check was re-designed to display its new position. In the following two extracts, a single emerging understanding check is re-designed. A recipient, initiating repair from a non-contiguous position, begins with an unmarked candidate understanding but then incorporates “you mean” into the emerging turn. This mid-turn re-design displays a preference for this format in this sequential environment (see Drew et al., 2013).

In this first extract, A has just finished telling her siblings a story about a “guy that used to live around the corner from mom and dad”. Here, she begins actively pursuing their recognition/recollection of this person (note her multiple tries at lines 4 and 6-7, even 1-2). In lines 8-9, her brother B claims recognition (“oh yeah yeah”) and produces an understanding check.

**Extract 21** [SBC-49, 4:49] ((A simultaneous, unrelated conversation has not been presented))

1 A: you migh- oh well (well) you know the- you know who  
 2 I mean  
 3 (0.9)  
 4 A: the guy that used to live around the corner  
 5 (0.7)  
 6 A: that during bussing had the illiterate spelt wrong  
 7 on the side [of his house]  
 8 B: [oh yeah yeah] the Italian guy that li-  
 9 [you mean] the guy that lived in Charles[town]  
 10 A: [yes ] [yeah]

B’s understanding check is indeed non-contiguous: he could/should have claimed recognition earlier (e.g. at line 5 or even 3). Moreover, the candidate understanding component incorporates lexical and structural repetition of line 4, clearly locating this as its target (compare the fist with last two lines in the following figure).

4 A:	the	guy	that	used to live	around the corner
8 B:	the Italian	guy	that	li-	
9 B: you mean	the	guy	that	lived	in Charlestown

Mid-production, B cuts off and re-designs his understanding check. With the exception of two features—the category term “Italian” and the pre-positioned “you mean”—the post-cut-off understanding check *repeats* the lexico-syntactic (and also prosodic) design of the initial understanding check (compare the bottom two lines of the above figure). It appears, then,

that B re-designs his turn in order to replace a format which does not index non-contiguity (an unmarked candidate understanding) for one which does (a *you-mean*).

Extract 22 provides a second example. Speaker A is offering an account for his local symphony's new name (the Southwestern Michigan Symphony). B responds twice to this turn, first with a continuer (line 3) and then with "who play in it" (line 5), a relative clause checking A's mention of people/teachers from Kalamazoo (a city in Southwestern Michigan).

**Extract 22** [SBC-19, 5:27]

- 1 A: because they draw a lot of people from (.) you know  
 2 like music teachers from Kalamazoo [(and)]  
 3 B: [ m]hm  
 4 (0.7)  
 5 B: who play in it  
 6 (0.2)  
 7 B: you mean  
 8 A: yeah who play in it  
 9 B: mhm  
 10 A: and uh (.) I remember hearing some guys complain ...

As in the previous extract, a recipient is in a non-contiguous position (here following an initial response) and initiates repair. In this case, however, the recipient brings their unmarked candidate understanding to a point of possible completion syntactically and phonetically (line 5). The re-design comes when the requested confirmation is not produced. Following a gap (line 6), B pursues response (Pomerantz, 1984b) with "you mean?", thus retroactively transforming his understanding check into a *you-mean*. Note that he further orients to his repair initiation as being 'out of place' by re-doing his continuer (line 9) following A's confirmation (line 8).

*Reported conversation.* A third and final piece of evidence can be found in *you-means* occurring in reported conversations. Often such cases display the same pattern as real cases: the *reported you-mean* is non-contiguous with its *reported* trouble-source. It is of course irrelevant whether the understanding checks being reported were actually formatted this way (let alone whether they even occurred). What is important is that in incorporating this detail into their reports, speakers orient to the significance of this practice and to how it works. In the following extract Mary is telling Sally about a conversation she had with Tom Graves, a colleague who apparently doubted her exceptional hearing.

**Extract 23** [CallFriend-s6962]

1 Mary: Tom Graves knows that cause they- (.) whispered in his office  
 2 before=the door was shut and .hhhh he asked me what they  
 3 said and I told them what they said  
 4 Sal: @ @ @ @ [ @ @ @ @ ] @ @ @  
 5 Mar: [ @ @ ]  
 6 Mar: [ .h h h h h h ] [ ((clears throat)) ]  
 7 Sal: [ he said "good" grief [ missie" ]  
 8 he said "you mean we're gonna have to start doing lips"  
 9 I said "I guess so Tom cause" I said "I can't see worth a  
 10 darn .hhh but I sure can hear good"

In lines 1-3, Mary recounts a stunt she pulled to dispel Tom's disbelief: she parroted back to him what someone had whispered behind closed doors. Following a sequence of laughter, she reports Tom's response: an assessment ("he said good grief missie", line 7) followed by a (mock) inference formulating understanding check ("he said you mean we're gonna have to start doing lips", i.e. reading lips, line 8). This understanding check, reported as separated by an initial response, is marked with "you mean".

7.3.6 Summary so far

Based on a substantial and systematically organized collection, this section has argued that marking an understanding check with "you mean" signals its separation from the trouble-source (the turn constructional unit in which the trouble-source item was first introduced or mentioned). After exploring the interactionally diverse environments in which *you-means* occur, it was shown that they overwhelmingly (some 93% of the time) share the feature of being non-contiguous. It was then shown that participants orient to the positional sensitivity of "you mean" in additional ways (e.g. by packaging the "same" candidate understanding differently depending on its position). Having provided an argument for what this practice does, the next section puts it to work.

**7.4 Two consequences for the organization of repair**

Examining the exact conditions in which understanding checks are treated as "out of place" leads to two refinements in our understanding of next position other-initiations of repair. First, it allows a more fine grained description of where exactly contiguous positioning occurs. Second, it provides evidence that this positioning, beyond being the default, is

structurally preferred. These arguments draw specifically on “you mean” as a position-indexing practice, and would be significantly strengthened by validation across formats, other-initiation methods, and languages (see the next section).

#### 7.4.1 The default position for other-initiations of repair

As noted in the introduction, it is commonplace to speak about other-initiation of repair in terms of turns. Participants’ use of “you mean” provides significant evidence that this level of description is too coarse. First, in most of the cases presented above, an other-initiation is positioned in the turn following the trouble-source turn, and yet, is marked as “out of place” with “you mean”. This suggests that participants are operating below the level of turn. As a next approximation, it was suggested that they orient to the TCU “containing” the trouble-source item. As cases like extract 13 made clear, however, even this is too coarse.

**Extract 13** [repeated from above]

4 A: .hhh I'm not so sca:red as I was hhhh  
 5 (0.4)  
 6 A: but [I'm still kind of sca:red  
 7 B: [xx-  
 8 (0.5)  
 9 B: you mean to stay there alone

Speaker B’s “you mean to stay there alone” (line 9) immediately follows a TCU which mentions the trouble-source item (A’s being scared, see line 6). Drawing on the observation that this is a subsequent mention of this item (see line 4), it was concluded that “you mean” is sensitive not to turns, or even TCUs per se, but to the first opportunity for repair initiation (here at line 5). The “you-mean” format indexes the fact that, for whatever interactional reason(s), this understanding check was not positioned *there*.

A direct result of this practice is a refined characterization of the default positioning of next position other-initiations of repair: *The “first” or “contiguous” opportunity for an OI is at the possible completion of the turn constructional unit in which the trouble-source item was first mentioned.* This level of granularity seems necessary to correctly capture the way in which the participants organize their conduct. Consequently, while glosses like “trouble-source turn” and “next turn repair initiator” can undoubtedly be useful, they ought to be used with an eye to this underlying level of organization (see Schegloff, 2000b for similar comments). Having

offered a refined characterization of this default position, evidence will now be given that it is also normatively preferred.

#### 7.4.2 A preference for contiguity

One of the central and recurrent findings of conversation analytic research is that interaction is normatively organized (see Heritage, 1984b). This can be demonstrated by examining how participants locally manage violations of interactional "rules". Take for instance the rule that one speaker should speak at a time (Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson, 1974). While overwhelmingly turns at talk occur serially, one following the next (Stivers et al., 2009), there are exceptions. Most result from accidental "collisions" (Drew, 2010), but participants sometimes intentionally begin a turn in the midst of the current speaker's turn. Rather than disproving the rule, however, participants handle these violations in a way which demonstrates their normative orientation to it. First, speakers routinely index their mid-turn entries by modifying their (prosodic) design (French & Local, 1986). Second, participants can treat these violations as accountable, if not sanctionable events (Schegloff, 2002; Drew, 2010). Finally, participants quickly resolve overlapping talk, thus re-installing the rule's operation (Schegloff, 2000a).

There is thus considerable evidence that participants continually and normatively orient to the 'one speaker at a time' rule. Although not as strong, similar evidence can be found that participants orient to contiguous placement as the *preferred position* for other-initiations of repair (preference is being used here in the technical, structural sense; see Pomerantz, 1984a; Sacks, 1987). As noted in the introduction, OIs are overwhelmingly contiguous, providing strong distributional support for this preference. On examining "violations" (i.e. non-contiguous OI), we can see at least three additional types of evidence. Reconsider the extracts 5 and 6.

#### **Extract 5** [repeated from above]

- 1    A:  he may be victimized on it  
 2               (0.6)  
 3    A:  I'm not sure he's ma[king]  
 4    B:                               [you ]mean by his lawyer



**Extract 6** [repeated from above]

- 1 A: (.hh) so it'll help me cause I don't have uh any  
 2 steady income now if I don't sell I don't make money  
 3 I got uh (0.2)  
 4 B: you mean you don't (.) even get minimum

First, while non-contiguous, these OIs are nevertheless placed so as to maximize their closeness to the contiguous position, in this case by entering the turn space of the trouble-source speaker (see Schegloff, 2000b, p.228-30). Second, both participants treat this turn-taking violation as entitled: the repair initiating speakers do not employ any turn competitive features either in their incoming (French & Local, 1986) or following the onset of overlap (Schegloff 2000a); and the trouble-source speakers cede their turn (either with immediate drop out, or lack of resumption). Finally, and for our purposes most importantly, with the “you mean” format, these OIs formally index their non-contiguity, and hence violation of this rule. Had they been positioned contiguously, we would expect them to be formatted as unmarked candidate understandings, i.e. “by his lawyer” and “you don’t even get minimum” (compare with extract 20 above).

While certainly more systematic investigation is required, this evidence in turn design, turn positioning and interactional entitlement suggests a preference for contiguity over non-contiguity in other-initiations of repair. It is not a random occurrence, then, that recipients regularly initiate repair as *the* next action; it is a normatively organized achievement (see Sacks, 1987 on the preference for contiguity in other interactional domains).

### 7.5 Non-contiguity: a generic interactional problem

An integral part of repairing a problem is locating the talk which is causing it. The normative preference for contiguity outlined above provides speakers and recipients with a pair of complementary, coordinated assumptions for aiding them in this task: if the recipient initiates repair contiguously, the speaker can limit their search to the prior TCU. Through signaling that this assumption must be overridden, adding “you mean” to an understanding check thus plays an important role both locally—in locating *this* trouble-source—and globally—in maintaining the “integrity” and “smooth operation” (Schegloff 1997, p. 37-8) of

this valuable search heuristic.<sup>7</sup> It is not surprising, then, that there are other practices which perform this same function. Previous research has uncovered the following:

- English open-class initiators framed with repetition of the trouble-source TCU.  
e.g. "are you serious, **because there was a light**" (Schegloff, 2000b)
- Finnish open-class initiators which use clausal formats rather than lexical formats  
e.g. *mitä sie sanoit* = "what did you say" (cf. *mitä* = "what") (Haakana, 2011)
- Russian constituent requests which contain repetition of the trouble-source TCU marked with the particle *-te* or *-ta*  
e.g. *A kak zhe dosch ta tak* = "how did they make it rain-**ta**" (Bolden 2009)
- German constituent requests of the form: question word + weak verb (e.g. copula) + indexical (e.g. pronoun or deictic).  
e.g. *wo war das* = "where **was that**" (Egbert, in press)

My preliminary investigations suggest that there are others (of course each must be analyzed systematically and properly documented):

- English alternative questions marked with "you mean"  
e.g. "**you mean** Jane or her mother"
- English understanding checks marked "you talking about" (cf. "you mean" )  
e.g. '**you talking about** Mom and Dad'
- The Dutch equivalent of "you mean" marked understanding checks  
e.g. *Oh de bel bedoel je* = 'oh the phone **you mean**'
- The English equivalent of Egbert's (in press) format for constituent requests  
e.g. "who's **that**"
- The English equivalent of Haakana's (2011) format for open-class initiators  
e.g. "what **did you say**"

Practices for signaling non-contiguity thus exist both across languages (English, German, Dutch, Russian, Finnish) and across methods of other-initiation (understanding checks, alternative questions, open-class and constituent requests). This suggests two things. First, sequential position is an important factor influencing the design of other-initiations of repair (Schegloff, 2000a; Egbert, in press). Second, the non-contiguous positioning of an OI is a

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<sup>7</sup> This is not to exclude more context sensitive, or even strategic, uses of this (and similar) practice(s). For instance, Egbert (in press) suggests that signaling non-contiguity can also serve to index the repair-initiating participant's reduced level of involvement in the activity in which the problematic talk was produced.

generic interactional problem. In some ways, this last point is not at all surprising. Outside the domain of repair, problems associated with non-contiguity have long been noted, and various resources documented. By default, each item of talk (a turn, a TCU, a word, etc.) connects with the previous item (Sacks, 1987; Sacks et al., 1974) and deviations from this are regularly signaled, for instance through discourse markers and/or prosodic design (for recent overviews, see Bolden, 2009 and Walker, 2013, respectively). What is perhaps most interesting about “you mean” (and also “who’s that”, “you talking about”, “what’d you say”) is that here non-contiguity is signaled through the turn’s core grammatical design. This leaves us with two important questions. First, does this position-indexing function of grammar extend beyond other-initiations of repair? Second, “what suits this practice for doing this action? How does it work?” (Schegloff, 1996a, p. 200). While properly addressing these questions is certainly beyond the scope of this paper, there is space for some initial speculations on the latter.

While formats which involve repetition seem to have a clear functional basis—tying to and thus re-invoking the trouble-source (see Schegloff, 2000b)—these grammatical formats do not. There is nothing inherent in “**you mean** the actual picture”, “**who’s that**”, or “**what did you say**” which point to this non-contiguity signaling function. Instead, these formats seem to work simply through their meta-linguistic, paradigmatic contrast with other formats available for this action (see Levinson 2000; Schegloff, 2006, p. 85-6; Stivers et al., 2007). The linguistically minimal formats exemplified in “the actual picture”, “who”, “what” seem to be the default or pragmatically unmarked way of doing other-initiations of repair. By adding extra, semantically redundant, generic grammatical structure, repair-initiating speakers signal that the current situation is not “business as usual”. In this case, that the default assumption of a contiguous trouble-source should be overridden. Uncovering the logic behind which grammatical structures can and cannot be employed in this way will require further, cross-linguistic, research.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> A similar phenomenon can be found *within* the grammar of some languages, such as Warlpiri and other so-called “free word order” or “non-configurational” languages. When two semantically related elements (e.g. a noun and a modifier) are contiguously positioned, only one tends to be overtly marked (e.g. with a case marker). When they are non-contiguously positioned, however, both tend to be marked (see Croft, 2001, Chapter 5 for discussion). This again points to the generic need (or benefits) of marking things which are “out of place”.

If this account is correct, it also provides some initial insight into a rather curious distributional fact about these alternative other-initiation formats. While the prolix forms occur (almost) exclusively in non-contiguous positions, the minimal formats seem to occur routinely in both (see e.g. extract 3 above, and the many examples in Schegloff 2000, Wong 2000). These minimal formats, then, do not seem to “do positioning” in the same way the prolix forms do. They do not, as it were, signal contiguity. Instead, as the default or pragmatically unmarked option they are usable in a wider range of situations. Further research will be required to investigate the exact conditions under which speakers drop these all-purpose tools in favor of their more specialized alternatives.

## 7.6 Conclusion

I began this chapter by documenting a practice for signaling that an other-initiation of repair is not in its default position. I then examined some of the ways in which such a practice can shed light on the organization of repair more broadly. Finally, by collecting together a number of similar practices, I identified the non-contiguity of an OI as common interactional problem, and the inclusion of generic lexico-syntax in its design as a common solution. Hopefully I have demonstrated the methodological importance and theoretical payoff of studying linguistic—in this case lexico-syntactic—practices within the precise action-sequential environments in which they occur.

Recognizing *what* “you mean” does required understanding the particular interactional pressures, factors and contingencies organizing other-initiations of repair (e.g. the task of locating the trouble-source). Moreover, to complete the circle, the workings of this practice have grounded and developed our understanding of this very same environment. Finally, a full understanding of *why* or *how* this practice works the way it does will require contrasting it with its pragmatic alternatives (e.g. unmarked candidate understandings), as has been fruitful across other action-sequential environments in the accumulated work on talk-in-interaction.



## 8 | Conclusion


Discovering the practices of other-initiation and their diagnostic properties has formed “a major strand of conversation-analytic research” (Robinson & Kevoe-Feldman, 2010, p. 222) with overlapping work in linguistics, cognitive science, and related fields (see Chapter 1). The first major contribution was made by Schegloff, Jefferson & Sacks (1977) in their classic paper on the organization of repair. SJS noted that most other-initiations of repair (OIs) are lexico-syntactically designed to help locate the source of trouble. This is evidenced by all but the first of the methods in their taxonomy of OI-types: “huh?” and other open class OIs (method 1), bare question words (method 2), cohesively framed question words (method 3), partial repetitions (method 4) and understanding checks (method 5). Subsequent CA research on this topic can be roughly grouped into three streams, each building on SJS’s work in some way. The first examines the robustness of this taxonomy across languages, cultures and settings (Moerman, 1977; Schegloff, 1987; Egbert, 1996; Kim, 1999; Svennevig, 2008; Enfield et al. 2013; among others). The second documents methods which were not included in the taxonomy, e.g. alternative questions used as OIs (“John or Jim”, Koshik, 2005), lexically explicit repair requests (e.g. “what do you mean”, Hayashi et al., 2013 *inter alia*), assertions used as OIs (“I don’t understand the question”, Sidnell, 2010), and *full* repetitions (Robinson & Kevoe-Feldman, 2010). The third stream offers more fine-grained accounts of the various OI methods, often by “carving” them up into linguistically and diagnostically distinct practices. In this concluding chapter, I outline how this thesis has contributed to this third stream of research, and thus to our understanding of the tools participants use to signal trouble and initiate its repair. I begin with findings tied to particular OI methods and then consider those which cut across them.

### 8.1 Method-specific findings

#### Method 1: “Huh?”, “what?”, etc.

This thesis has contributed to our understanding of “huh?”, “what?” and other method 1 OIs in three main ways. First, at the conceptual level, Chapter 2 argued that these OIs do not locate the prior unit of talk as the *source* of trouble, but as the general domain of trouble.

While the problem may be with this TCU/action as a whole, it may also be with some particular—but unspecified—part of it (e.g. a word, a reference or even something “unsaid”; see Chapter 4 and below). This ability to signal both full- and partial-scope troubles makes “huh?”, “what?”, etc. different from most, if not all other types of OI (including the full repeats described in Robinson & Kevoe-Feldman, 2010; see Figure 8.1 below)



**Figure 8.1:** “Huh?”, “what?”, etc. (dotted oval) do not specify the scope of the trouble. They are variable-scope other-initiations of repair.

A second contribution of Chapter 2 was providing a substantial body of evidence that “huh?”, “what?” and most other Method 1 practices are indeed all-purpose tools, in no way “tuned” to the trouble being signaled (see Selting, 1996; Robinson, 2006 for exceptions). Many of the phenomena analyzed were un-described (or at least under-described) in the literature. For instance, I showed that repairing speakers sometimes “revise” their repair following a lack of uptake (e.g. shifting from a hearing repair to understanding repair or expanding the scope of their initial repair) or they “mix” multiple repairs together in the first place (e.g. embedding an understanding repair within a repetition of the trouble-source TCU). I also showed that initiating speakers sometimes “reject” the repair which is offered, claiming that it has misdiagnosed their trouble. These practices all serve to combat the diagnostic underspecification of these OIs, and in so doing provide evidence of this underspecification.

Finally, this thesis documented some of the stranger inhabitants of Method 1. In Chapter 5 I showed that, for some speakers, “do what?”, “you what?” and “what’s that?” do not restrict the trouble-source, despite what one would expect from their form. The regional nature of these “opaque” practices means that they do not “translate” well across dialects and languages, sometimes leading to confusion (compare with Enfield et al.’s 2013

discussion of the typological stability of “huh?” and “what?”). It was also shown that these lexico-syntactic forms deliver Method 1 OIs only when they are produced with final rising pitch. With final *falling* pitch, the same forms often “transform” into requests which restrict both the source and type of trouble (compare with “what?” vs. “what.”; Egbert et al, 2009).

#### Method 2: Question words (“who”, “where”, etc.)

In Chapter 3, I developed a line of research which argues that intonation carves Method 2 up into diagnostically distinct subclasses. I began by systematically demonstrating that “who.” (final falling pitch) and “who?” (final rising pitch) are distinct practices, “tuned” to different communicative problems. “Who.” requests specification of a referent which is assumed to be contextually accessible (e.g. one encoded by a pronoun, deictic, or similar form; see also below on “unsaid” sources of trouble). “Who?” signals trouble hearing or recognizing a name or some other contextually less dependent form. I then provided preliminary evidence that bare “whose”, “where”, “when”, “how” and “how many/much” display the same split.

Chapter 3 contributes to prior work on Method 2 OIs in three major ways. First, it demonstrates that this split—shown first for German—holds systematically for English as well. Second, it shows that the rising intoned practices (“who?”, “where?” etc.) can signal both hearing *and* recognition troubles. Considerable evidence of this diagnostic ambiguity can be found in how these OIs are treated. For instance, repairing speakers sometimes index their diagnostic uncertainty by offering a repetition of the trouble-source reference, produced with final rising pitch. By “try marking” their hearing repair, they anticipate the possibility of a recognition failure (and indeed, in many cases subsequently offer some kind of recognition repair). A third and final contribution is demonstrating that these two subclasses delimit the *source* of trouble as well (cf. Egbert et al. 2009 on “what.”). Knowing whether the trouble-source is “indexical” (“who.”) or “non-indexical” (“who?”) provides robust clues for locating it, in a manner similar to knowing whether it is person reference (“who”) or a place reference (“where”).

#### Method 3: Cohesively framed question words (“been where”, “who did”, “a what”)

Method 3 OIs are regularly mentioned within linguistics (“echo questions”), but have received very little attention within CA. Perhaps this is because a “to see who”, despite its



relative linguistic complexity, seems to be just “a somewhat stronger version” of a “who” (Kitzinger, 2013, p. 249). In chapters 4 and 5 I tested and—with a few important qualifications outlined below—confirmed this analysis. The question word does the bulk of the locative work, with the framing elements providing support by repeating (“he had *been* there...” ← “*been* where”) or anaphorically substituting (“Sally *thinks* ...” ← “*who does*”) the linguistic elements surrounding the trouble-source (contrast this with OIs like “who’s Bob”, “I don’t know who Bob is”, “which Bob”, “what did you say about Bob”, etc. which offer lexico-syntactic clues about the trouble-*type*). This analysis was further supported by the prosodic design of these OIs. Framed question words demonstrate the same intonational split and division of diagnostic labor as bare question words (see Figure 8.2 for a summary).

	FINAL RISING PITCH	FINAL FALLING PITCH
ILLUSTRATION	“who?”, “to who?”, “been where?”, “what is?”	“who.”, “to who.”, “been where.”, “what is.”
TROUBLE-SOURCE	Non-Indexical form (e.g. name)	Indexical form (e.g. pronoun) <b>Or</b> “Unsaid” item
TROUBLE-TYPE	Hearing problem <b>Or</b> Recognition failure	Underspecified

**Figure 8.2:** The diagnostic import of final pitch for OIs in Methods 2 and 3

As noted, this account requires a few qualifications. First, in some cases the cohesive framing does more than *support* the locative work done by the question word. This is most apparent when there is no question word—cohesive framing on its own can request repair (Chapter 4). But it is also true of “a what?”, “to what?”, “because what?” and most other framed-*whats* with final rising pitch (Chapter 5). For these OIs, the “what” (or the syntactic gap) is a “dummy term”, delegating all of the classificatory work to the framing itself. But even when the question word *is* class-restrictive, the framing can play a critical role. OIs like “the who?” and “Mark who?” target a subcomponent of a reference form (Chapter 4), something a bare question word simply cannot do (expansion-based cases, reviewed below, offer another example).

The final qualification is perhaps the most important. While cohesive framing undoubtedly provides extra clues for locating the trouble-source, it is not always clear that it is deployed for this purpose (see Chapter 4). Framed questions words are often found in contexts where the corresponding bare question word would have unambiguously located

the trouble-source. Similarly, the framing offered is not always “minimal” (compare “she looked like who” with “like “who”). These observations leave future research with an important question: What factors, within or outside the realm of repair, drives the decision to cohesively frame a question word (and then, how much framing should be used)?

#### Method 4: Repetitions of the trouble-source


A review of the literature suggests that some repetition-OIs (Method 4) are all-purpose tools, capable of signaling a wide array of trouble-types. In contrast, Chapter 6 argued that repetitions with *high rise-fall (HRF) intonation* strongly delimit the trouble to one of accepting (cf. hearing or understanding) what was said. By claiming that the repeated talk is “wrong”, and in need of correction, HRF repetitions embody a claim of authority over the offending issue, much like an outright other-correction does. This authority can be grounded in epistemic claims about the facts of the world (e.g. who directed a particular movie), but it can also encompass deontic (moral) claims about what counts as acceptable conduct (e.g. having a “guy” living in an “all girl house”), or about the way actions should be designed for particular recipients (e.g. asking someone “what’s new” the first time you meet them). Repeated speakers sometimes align with the claim of unacceptability (e.g. by backing down from or correcting their talk), but they often resist it (e.g. with a straightforward confirmation) leading to subsequent pushes from the repeating speaker. In these and other ways, the repair sequences launched by HRF repetitions regularly become expanded and morally charged, a feature which sets them apart from those addressing more “benign” trouble-types (though these OIs *can* be resisted; see Chapter 3 and Robinson 2009)

It was also shown that the placement of the pitch accent within a HRF repetition can locate the trouble-source precisely. For instance, “a French GUY” claims that what is “wrong” is this person’s gender, whereas “a FRENCH guy” would claim it is their nationality. The remaining material merely “frames” this core locating element (cf. Jefferson, 1972), much like the framing in “who *did*”, “*been* where”, etc. (Method 3). In both these ways, Chapter 6 demonstrates that Method 4—like Methods 1, 2 and 3—are “carved up” into diagnostically distinct sub-classes. We now turn to findings which cut across the various methods of other-initiation.

## 8.2 Cross-cutting findings

### Non-contiguous OIs

Chapter 7 examined the relationship between the lexico-syntactic form of an OI and its sequential position. The focus was on “you mean”-marked candidate understandings (“you mean John?”, Method 5), but the findings generalize. Across methods (and languages) there are practices for formally marking an OI when it is “delayed” or otherwise “out of place” (i.e. not contiguous with the turn constructional unit which is or which contains the trouble-source; see the right panel in Figure 8.3 below). While these positionally “tuned” practices may be employed for particularized, context-sensitive reasons (see Egbert, in press), I argued that signaling that an OI is non-contiguous serves an important diagnostic function. Given the tendency, if not organizational preference, for recipients to initiate repair contiguously (left panel, Figure 8.3), repairing speakers are armed with a powerful heuristic for locating what’s causing the trouble: they need only look in the immediately prior TCU. By signaling that this assumption should be overridden, recipients actively work to maintain the integrity of this valuable search heuristic.



**Figure 8.3:** The contiguous (left) vs. non-contiguous (right) positioning of other-initiations of repair

Interestingly, many of these non-contiguity signaling OIs are built simply by adding semantically redundant clausal lexico-syntax to the corresponding “normal” OI (i.e. the practice unmarked for position). Compare “**you mean** John?” with “John?” (a bare candidate understanding)(Chapter 7); the Finnish “mitä **sie sanoit**” (*what did you say?*) with “mitä” (*what?*) (Haakana, 2011); the German “wo **war das**” (*where was that?*) with “wo” (*where?*) (Egbert, in press); and so on. This pattern suggests that the “marked” situation of a non-contiguous OI can be handled simply by using an “marked” form (in line with the (Neo-)

Gricean idea of a Manner Implicature, Levinson, 2000). The solution—like the problem—is generic and widespread.

### Substitution-based OIs vs. expansion-based OIs

There is a second split across the methods of other-initiation, based on a distinct (and cross-cutting) feature of the trouble-source. While canonical OIs locate words, references, or other linguistically encoded items, there is, as SJS themselves noted, “a separate class of [OI]—in large measure using an overlapping set of lexical items—which locate as repairables referents which were not actually components of prior turn” (1977, p. 369ff). These OIs treat as “missing” something which was presupposed, implicit, or otherwise “unsaid” (zero anaphora, implicit oblique arguments and temporal frames, and the like).

This thesis has contributed to the study of this “said” vs. “unsaid” split in a number of ways. First, drawing on the independently motivated notion of cohesive resources (or tying techniques), I have attempted to offer a linguistic description of this split which is straightforward, theoretically non-presumptive, and empirically robust. The core idea is that each element in an OI can be formally tied to the trouble-source unit in distinct and consequential ways. This is transparently clear when we compare *across* methods of OI. An utterance of the form “John?” can be used to check a possible understanding (in response to “Is *he* coming over tonight?”; Method 5) or a possible hearing (“Is *John* coming over tonight?”; Method 4). Similarly, “how?” can both request a repair (“he fixed it *with his eyes closed*”; Method 2) and check a hearing (“*how* is she related to you?”; Method 4). In each case the difference in method hinges on how the OI cohesively ties to the trouble-source. My argument is that the “said” vs. “unsaid” split *within* OI methods is of fundamentally the same kind (and so much in line with early descriptions by linguists like Bolinger, 1957, p. 68 and Halliday & Hasan, 1976, p. 215).

To help illustrate this, consider the following scenario. Speaker A announces to her friend B that she has just visited a cafe on B’s recommendation. She designs this turn in a way which assumes—wrongly as it turns out—that this referent is available to B. In the “said” scenario, she says “I went *to that place* last night” (left column, Figure 8.4 below). In the “unsaid” scenario, she says “I went last night”, leaving the referent implicit (right column). There are a variety of ways in which B could locate this trouble for repair. I’ve included each

of the OI methods in SJS's taxonomy which display this split (2, 3, 5), as well as "framing only" repair requests (Chapter 4; Lerner, 2004) and alternative questions used as OIs (Koshik, 2005). While these examples are invented, there are parallel cases in my data, most of which were presented in previous chapters (documenting these practices constitutes a second contribution of this thesis to our understanding of this split).

TROUBLE-SOURCE UNIT	I went to that place last night	I went last night
METHOD 2	where	where
METHOD 3	went where	went where
FRAMING-ONLY OIs	went to went to	went to went to
ALTERNATIVE QUESTIONS	to the cafe or the park the cafe or the park	went to the cafe or the park to the cafe or the park
METHOD 5	to the cafe you mean oh the cafe	went to the cafe you mean to the cafe

Figure 8.4: Locating "said" (encoded) trouble-sources with substitution (left) and "unsaid" (presupposed, implicit, etc.) trouble-sources with expansion (right).

Each of these OI methods relies on a "core" locating element which stands in for the trouble-source itself—a question word (methods 2 and 3), syntactic "gap" (framing only OIs), or candidate version(s) of the trouble-source (methods 4-5 and alternative questions).<sup>1</sup> The only grammatical difference between the "said" and "unsaid" subclasses, I am suggesting, is how this core element ties to—and hence locates—the trouble-source. In the "said" subclass, it anaphorically substitutes the trouble-source (or repeats it in the case of

<sup>1</sup> Method 1 OIs ("huh?", "what?") do not lexico-syntactically locate a source of trouble and hence do not cohesively split. However, the repairs they receive can (see Chapter 4.6 for examples). This ability to handle both "said" and "unsaid" trouble-sources is one further sense in which these OIs are diagnostically "open".

method 4). In the “unsaid” subclass, it locates the “missing” item by **expanding** the grammatical structure of the trouble-source unit.<sup>2</sup>

This core locating element may be—and for many methods *must* be—combined with additional elements. These include framing elements (e.g. words which *repeat* the words surrounding the trouble-source) and a variety of **non-cohesive** elements (e.g. “oh” or “you mean”). For instance, there are expanded candidate understandings framed with repetition (“*went* **to the cafe**”, right column) and/or marked with “you mean” (“**you mean** **to the cafe**”); framing repeats whose “gap” is an expansion (“*went*” in the right column); and alternative questions offering multiple candidate expansions (“**to the cafe** or **the park**”, right column). OIs can thus be segmented into distinct parts, which cohesively tie to the trouble-source unit in different ways (via repetition, substitution, expansion or not at all). Again, what is critical for the “said” vs. “unsaid” split is how the OI’s core locating element ties to the trouble-source unit. The former are substitution-based OIs, the latter expansion-based OIs.

The account of “said” vs. “unsaid” OIs is meant as a formal—indeed grammatical—description only. Further linguistic and/or interactional differences may exist between these subclasses. Indeed, a final contribution of this thesis was documenting such a difference for methods 2 (“where”) and 3 (“went where”). In chapters 3-5 I provided evidence that when locating “said” trouble-sources these OIs can vary in their final pitch movement (“where?”, “where.”), but when locating “unsaid” trouble-sources it seems they cannot. In my data, these expansion-based repair requests were systematically produced with final falling pitch (see also Schegloff, 1997; Egbert et al, 2009, p. 123-5). This pattern, I argued, is a consequence of the diagnostic import of these pitch movements (see Figure 8.2 above for an overview). Final rising pitch signals troubles in hearing or recognition—trouble-types which are simply not relevant for “unsaid” trouble-sources. Final falling pitch, in contrast, is used to request specification of a referent which is (wrongly) assumed to be available in the context. This

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<sup>2</sup> Depending on one’s theoretical convictions, this distinction may seem to be moot for the hypothetical example presented in figure 8.4. Many would treat the object of “went” in the “unsaid” case as a “zero” or “elided” form, and hence part of the lexico-syntactic structure of the trouble-source unit (see Couper-Kuhlen & Ono, 2007 for relevant discussion). However, expansions can display much looser syntactic/semantic relationships to their grammatical “host”. Any information which *can* be encoded as a constituent, but is not, can be located in this way (though of course doing so may *progress* rather than retard the ongoing activity—not all questions initiate repair; see Schegloff, 1997, p. 519-20).

includes referents encoded by pro-forms, deictic references and other “indexical” forms, but—critically—extends to those which are “unsaid” but presumed relevant. Beyond using an “overlapping set of lexical items” (Schegloff et al, 1977, p. 369ff), these two subclasses employ intonation in a diagnostically consistent manner.

### The diagnostic import of prosody

Finally, this thesis has re-iterated that the diagnostic properties of OIs are shaped by more than their lexico-syntax. In some cases, a difference in prosody leads to difference in OI method. “What’s that?” and “what?” belong to Method 1, but “what’s that.” and “what.” restrict the trouble-source (see Chapter 5 and Egbert et al., 2009 respectively). Similarly, whereas most repetitions repeat the trouble-source and deliver a yes-no type action (Method 4), those produced with flat, mid-level pitch and final lengthening *frame* the trouble-source and *request* its repair (“my Apollonius paper is half written” ← “your Apollonius pa:per::\_”; Chapter 4). In other cases, however, the diagnostic differences are subtler. As this thesis has shown, “who?” and “who.” (Chapter 3), “Bob who?” and “Bob who.” (Chapter 4), and repetitions like “James Cameron?” and “James ^CAMeron.” (high rise-fall; Chapter 6) differ not in method, but in the *type* of trouble they signal and in other fine-grained ways.

At a very general, systems level, it is clear why prosody is used to do this type of diagnostic “tuning”. Repair activities have the organizational aim of resolving troubles quickly and efficiently, thus minimizing the disruption to the ongoing activity (Schegloff et al., 1977; Schegloff, 1992; Heritage, 2007). Consequently a diagnostically stronger OI will be preferred in most cases, as it increases the chance that a single, minimal repair will be sufficient (see Schegloff et al. 1977; Clark & Schaefer, 1987; but see Pomerantz, 1984b; Svennevig, 2008 for reasons to be circumspect when initiating repair). At the same time, however, lexico-syntactically explicit OIs like “could you repeat what you just said” (rather than “huh?”) or “I don’t know who that is” (rather than “who?”) will be *dispreferred* because of their verbosity (see Zipf, 1949; Levinson, 1987). The use of *prosody* thus offers an extremely elegant solution to these cross-cutting preferences. A minimal form can still deliver considerable diagnostic punch.

### 8.3 Summary

This thesis has advanced our understanding of each of the major methods of other-initiation, from open-class repair requests (“huh?”) through to understanding checks (“you mean Maya?”). The central finding is that within these broader methods there are linguistically and diagnostically distinct practices. Through their lexico-syntactic, cohesive and/or prosodic design, many of these practices provide non-trivial information about both the source and type of trouble. The tools for initiating repair are more “tuned” to the troubles they signal than intuition and some prior research would suggest. This has implications for our understanding of sequences of other-initiated repair more broadly (see Chapter 1). While of course repairing speakers must draw on contextual and pragmatic reasoning in diagnosing their co-participant’s trouble, they are often doing so under a guiding hand. The resolution of communicative problems, and hence re-establishment of intersubjectivity, is truly an interactional accomplishment.





## Summary

This thesis examines how speakers of English signal that they have trouble hearing, understanding or accepting what another person has said. The principal finding is that these actions, so-called “other-initiations of repair”, regularly offer a diagnosis of the trouble being addressed. Through aspects of their lexico-syntactic, cohesive and—especially—prosodic design, they provide non-trivial information about what is causing the trouble (e.g., a word, a reference, or an utterance as a whole) and what the problem with it is (e.g., it wasn’t heard or understood). By delineating both the source and nature of their trouble, repair-initiating speakers play an active and essential role in the process of repairing communicative troubles. The study combines the methods and framework of Conversation Analysis with close linguistic analysis. The data consist of recordings of some 150 hours of naturally occurring conversation.

Chapter 2 introduces a set of analytic tools for uncovering the diagnostic properties of other-initiations of repair (OIs) and applies them to “huh?”, “what?”, and other so-called “open class” practices. The evidence provided demonstrates that these OIs offer no diagnosis of the trouble whatsoever. The source of the trouble can be the prior unit of talk as a whole or some unspecified part of it. The nature of the trouble can vary from hearing what was said, to understanding it, to believing or otherwise accepting it. These all-purpose OIs serve as a useful point of comparison for practices considered in the subsequent chapters, all of which are in some way tuned to the trouble they signal.

Chapters 3 through 5 examine requests for repair built from question words, either on their own (“who”, “where”) or framed by cohesive ties to the troublesome talk (“who did”, “been where”, “he what”). It is shown that these OIs can be subdivided into a number of diagnostically distinct practices by considering other aspects of their linguistic design. First, the final pitch movement of the OI is consequential. With final falling pitch, a “who”, “been where”, etc. requests specification of a pronoun or some other “indexical” reference. With final rising pitch, however, it signals trouble in hearing or recognizing a name or some other contextually less dependent form. Prosody thus delimits both the source and nature of the trouble (Chapter 3). Second, it is shown that the falling-intoned cases can both “echo” the trouble-source unit (“I bought it for him” ← “for who.”) and grammatically expand it (“I

bought it already" ← "for who."). While in each case the trouble-source is a referent which is (wrongly) assumed to be available, in the latter it is something which wasn't linguistically encoded. The cohesive design of the repair request is thus also diagnostically consequential (Chapter 4). Finally, it is shown that for some dialects of (southern) American English, "do what?" (final rising pitch) does not cohesively tie to the prior talk, and it does not restrict the trouble-source. In other words, these and other "opaque" repair requests function much like "huh?", "what?", and other open-class repair requests (Chapter 5).

Chapter 6 turns to OIs which repeat the source of trouble itself. A recurrent finding in the literature is that these repetitions can be used to manage a wide array of troubles—from hearing the repeated talk, to understanding its sense or its action import, to doubting or accepting it. This chapter shows that when a repetition is produced with a high-rise fall intonation contour it unambiguously claims that the repeated talk is unacceptable, i.e. "wrong" and in need of correction.

Finally, chapter 7 analyses OIs which offer a candidate understanding of what has been said (so-called "understanding check"). It argues that by adding "you mean" to a candidate understanding ("you mean Maya?" compared with just "Maya?") a recipient signals that their OI has become separated from the troublesome unit of talk. By indexing its non-default, delayed positioning, this practice aids the prior speaker in locating the source of trouble. A variety of similar practices are collected together to suggest that this type of positional tuning is widespread across both methods of other-initiation and languages.

This thesis thus advances our understanding of each of the major methods of other-initiation, from open-class repair requests ("huh?") through to understanding checks ("you mean Maya?"). The central finding is that these broader methods are comprised of linguistically and diagnostically distinct practices. Through their lexico-syntactic, cohesive and/or prosodic design, many of these practices provide non-trivial information about both the source and type of trouble. The tools for initiating repair are more "tuned" to the troubles they signal than intuition and much prior research would suggest. This has implications for our understanding of sequences of other-initiated repair more broadly. While of course repairing speakers must draw on contextual and pragmatic reasoning in

diagnosing their co-participant's trouble, they are often doing so under a guiding hand. The resolution of communicative problems, and hence re-establishment of intersubjectivity, is truly an interactional accomplishment.



## Samenvatting

Dit proefschrift onderzoekt hoe sprekers van het Engels aangeven dat ze een probleem hebben met het horen, begrijpen of accepteren van wat de vorige spreker zojuist gezegd heeft. De studie toont aan dat zulke ander-initiëringen van herstel ('repair') vaak ook een diagnose bevatten van het soort probleem waarom het gaat. De lexico-syntactische vormgeving van de ander-initiëring, de cohesie daarvan met de talige vorm van de voorgangeruiting, en de prosodie leveren cruciale informatie over wat het probleem veroorzaakt (of dat bijvoorbeeld een woord is, een verwijzing, of de uiting als geheel), en wat de aard ervan is (een hoorprobleem, een begrijpelijkheidsprobleem of een acceptatieprobleem). Door zowel de bron van het probleem te lokaliseren als de aard ervan af te bakenen, dragen herstel-initieerders actief bij aan het oplossen van communicatieve problemen. De studie is gebaseerd op een corpus van 150 uur gesprekken, en combineert gedetailleerde linguïstische beschrijving met conversatie-analytische methoden en theorie.

Hoofdstuk 2 introduceert de analytische instrumenten waarmee de diagnostische eigenschappen van ander-initiëringen van herstel (AI's) bepaald kunnen worden, en past die toe op 'huh?', 'what?', en andere zogenoemde 'open-class' herstelverzoeken. Dit type AI levert geen diagnostische informatie over wat het probleem is. Het probleem kan de vorige beurt in zijn geheel zijn, of een niet-gespecificeerd deel daarvan; de aard van het probleem kan variëren van niet (goed) gehoord hebben, niet begrepen hebben, tot niet accepteren van wat er gezegd is. Zulke 'all-purpose' ander-initiëringen leveren een bruikbare vergelijkingsbasis voor de technieken die in de volgende hoofdstukken bestudeerd worden. Die zijn namelijk allemaal juist op de een of andere manier afgestemd op het soort probleem dat ermee gesignaleerd wordt.

In de hoofdstukken 3 tot en met 5 worden herstelverzoeken onderzocht die met een vraagwoord geformuleerd worden, hetzij een vraagwoord alleen ('who', 'where'), hetzij vraagwoordconstructies die door middel van cohesieve links aan de probleemuiting gerelateerd worden ('who did', 'been where', 'he what'). Deze ander-initiëringen kunnen op grond van verdere vormkenmerken ingedeeld worden in een aantal subtypen die elk een specifieke diagnostische kwaliteit hebben. Allereerst speelt het toonverloop aan het eind van de AI een rol (hoofdstuk 3). Met een dalende uitingsfinale intonatie wordt met 'who', 'been

where', enzovoorts, een verzoek gedaan tot specificatie van een voornaamwoord of een vergelijkbaar soort indexicale verwijzing. Met een stijgende finale intonatie signaleert een herstel-initieerder daarentegen juist een probleem met de referentie van een minder context-afhankelijke vorm (een eigenaam of een meer expliciete beschrijving). De intonatie van de AI helpt dus niet alleen de bron van het probleem te lokaliseren, maar ook de aard daarvan te bepalen. Hoofdstuk 4 beschrijft vervolgens hoe AI's met dalende finale intonatie de eenheid met de probleembron ofwel recyclen ('I bought it for him' ← 'for who. '), ofwel grammaticaal uitbreiden ('I bought it already' ← 'for who. '). Voor beide gevallen geldt dat de probleembron een referent is waarvan de vorige spreker (mogelijk onterecht) aanneemt dat die gegeven is, maar in het tweede geval gaat het om een argument dat linguïstisch impliciet gebleven was. Dus ook het soort cohesie dat het herstelverzoek heeft met de voorafgaande beurt, heeft diagnostische consequenties. Hoofdstuk 5 ten slotte laat zien dat in sommige zuidelijke Amerikaans-Engelse dialecten 'do what?' (met stijgende finale intonatie) juist geen cohesieve relatie legt met de vorige beurt, en ook niet de probleembron afbakent. Dergelijke opake ander-initiëringen zijn dus eerder vergelijkbaar met 'huh?', 'what?' en andere 'open-class' herstelverzoeken.

Hoofdstuk 6 is gewijd aan ander-initiëringen die de probleembron herhalen. In de literatuur wordt over het algemeen aangenomen dat sprekers zulke herhalende AI's voor een breed scala aan problemen inzetten – van hoorproblemen, het begrijpen van de betekenis of van de bedoeling, tot twijfel en afwijzing. Wanneer echter naar de prosodie van herhalende AI's gekeken wordt, kan aangetoond worden dat een herhalende AI met een eerst hoog-stijgende en vervolgens dalende intonatiecontour onmiskenbaar aangeeft dat datgene wat herhaald wordt onacceptabel of fout gevonden wordt, en correctie behoeft.

In hoofdstuk 7 ten slotte worden ander-initiëringen onderzocht waarmee de spreker zijn begrip test met een 'understanding check'. Sprekers voegen soms 'you mean' toe aan zulke kandidaat-interpretaties ('you mean Maya?' in plaats van enkel 'Maya?'). AI's met zo'n 'you mean'-frame blijken te worden gebruikt om aan te geven dat de AI later komt dan normaal, – dat wil zeggen, niet onmiddellijk na de beurt met de probleembron. Sprekers markeren de afwijkende, verlate positie van de herstel-initiëring en helpen de gesprekspartner zo om de probleembron verder terug te lokaliseren. Bestudering van andere vergelijkbare technieken

doet vermoeden dat deze manier van positionele markering van herstel-initiëringen geen incidenteel verschijnsel is en ook in andere talen te vinden is.

Het proefschrift verdiept onze kennis van elk van de belangrijkste technieken om ander-initiëring van herstel te doen – van ‘open-class’ herstelverzoeken (‘huh?’) tot begripsverificaties (‘you mean Maya?’). Het belangrijkste resultaat is dat de linguïstische vormgeving van elk van deze manieren om herstel te initiëren een specifieke diagnostische waarde heeft. Op grond van het lexico-syntactisch en prosodisch ontwerp en de cohesieve relatie met de uiting in de probleembeurt leveren herstelverzoeken informatie over de bron en de aard van het probleem. De instrumenten waarmee herstel wordt geïnitieerd, zijn veel fijner afgestemd op de problemen die ermee gesignaleerd worden dan tot nu toe over het algemeen in de literatuur aangenomen wordt. Ons inzicht in ander-geïnitieerde herstellequenties verandert daardoor ook. Natuurlijk moeten sprekers ook context-gebonden pragmatisch redeneren wanneer ze bepalen wat voor probleem de gesprekspartner heeft, maar ze worden daarbij geholpen door subtiele aanwijzingen in het linguïstische ontwerp van het herstelverzoek. Het oplossen van een communicatief probleem in een herstellequentie en de daaruit resulterende herbevestiging van een werkbare intersubjectieve basis zijn het resultaat van methodisch interactioneel werk.





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The following data are publicly available through the TalkBank Project (see MacWhinney, 2000 and <http://talkbank.org/>)

- Santa Barbara Corpus of Spoken American English TalkBank version (N. Martey)
- Callfriend American English TalkBank version (M. Yaeger-Dror)
- Newport Beach Corpus TalkBank version (G. Jefferson)
- Watergate tapes TalkBank version (G. Jefferson)
- The FreeLunch corpus (unknown)





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