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## The Economic Representation Deficit

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# ELECTIONS IN EUROPE IN TIMES OF CRISIS

*Contributions from the*  
2013 EUDO DISSEMINATION CONFERENCE

*Edited by*  
LUCIANO BARDI,  
HANSPETER KRIESI &  
ALEXANDER H. TRECHSEL



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
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# THE ECONOMIC REPRESENTATION DEFICIT. RECONSIDERING ECONOMIC POLICY CONGRUENCE BETWEEN VOTERS AND THEIR REPRESENTATIVES

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## 1. Introduction<sup>43</sup>

Since 2008, Europe has seen an on-going banking, economic and budgetary crisis. Politicians have offered different solutions for this crisis. On the right, politicians, like German chancellor Angela Merkel, have argued for austerity policies. Left-wing politicians, like French president François Hollande, have campaigned on the promise of higher taxes for the wealthy and increased government spending. This left-right conflict in Europe fits the traditional model of political science: evidence has shown that the economic left-right dimension is persistent at the level of the political elite (Benoit and Laver 2006; Budge and Robertson 1987; Hix and Noury 2009). There is increasing evidence, however, that voters do not understand economic issues in those terms (Achterberg, Houtman, and Derks 2011; Derks 2004, 2006; Goerres and Prinzen 2011). Voters' views are far more diverse:

A single common left-right dimension is an important precondition for policy congruence between the views of citizens and the political elite (Costello et al. 2012; Downs 1957; Thomassen 1999). If the structures that underlie the policy preferences of politicians and voters differ, there can be no congruence between the policy preferences of the electorate and their representatives: because there are no party politicians catering to the preferences of citizens that do not fit in the structure underlying the opinions of politicians. If all parties offer either policy bundles that consist out of higher taxes and investments in public services or bundles that consist out of lower taxes and austerity, voters that prefer lower taxes and investments in public services cannot be represented adequately. This article tests whether the structure underlying the views of European vot-

ers and party politicians on economic matters is identical. If the policy positions of politicians on economic matters can be modelled in terms of a single dimension and the ideal points of voters on economic matters cannot, this undermines the quality of democratic representation.

This looks specifically at the policy preferences of candidates for the European Parliament and the policy preference of those citizens who voted for their party in the European Parliament elections. The focus is on economic matters. This is particularly relevant, because, as Costello et al. (2012) argue, the bulk of the work of the European Parliament is economic nature and because of the ongoing economic crisis, economic questions have become even more central to the European political agenda.

The core argument of this stands in contrast to a recent article by Costello et al. (2012). Their study used the same data and one of the methods employed here, but answered a different question; they asked whether a three-dimensional European political space (with an economic, cultural and European dimension) fit the answers of citizens and whether politicians and citizens stood close to each other on these dimensions. They determined that voters and politicians stood *closest* to each other on the economic dimension. On European integration and cultural issues, they found that citizens and their political representatives stood further apart. Their model included a control for acquiescence bias, the tendency of respondents to answer questions affirmatively. This will show that acquiescence bias is not the reason for the lack of coherence. This will spend special attention on the theory and method of the article of Costello et al. (2012).

This will have the following structure: first, the theory section will show the importance of the notion that voters' views and politicians' views

43. The author wants to thank Rory Costello for sharing his replication data and code and Matthijs Rooduijn for his assistance with confirmatory factor analysis in Stata.

have the same structure for the theory of representation. Next, the method section will discuss techniques assessing the dimensional structure underlying the view of respondents. In order to ensure that the findings presented here are not the result of some methodological fluke, different techniques will be employed. Then, the results sections will show how the structure of the views of voters and politicians differs. The result section will also address acquiescence bias and then it will show what these results mean for the quality of democratic representation. The conclusion sketches an agenda for further research.

## 2. Left, Right and Representation

A key model in the literature of representative democracy is the Responsible Party Model (APSA 1950; Thomassen 1999). In this model, elections function as instruments to link citizens' policy preferences to the policy positions of their representatives (Costello et al. 2012; Thomassen 1999; Mair 2013). For this model to function three conditions must be met: first, on the supply side of politics, politicians or parties differentiate themselves by offering different bundles of policies; second, on the demand side of politics, voters must choose between party politicians on basis of their preferences for these policies (Thomassen 1999). Third, party politicians' and voters' positions must be structured by a single common policy dimension: i.e. the positions of parties in programs, the actions of members of parliaments and the policy preferences of voters should be constrained by the same dimension (Costello et al. 2012; Downs 1957; Thomassen 1999). The reason for this is that parties offer bundles of policies. In order to assure that the bundle of policies does not contain policies that the voter opposes, there must be a common policy dimension that structures the positions of party politicians and voters. One party may favour liberalizing markets and lowering taxes in order to create a better climate

for enterprises to thrive; another party may favour nationalising the healthcare sector and increasing taxes in order to ensure that citizens have free access to this service. By voting for one party, voters get the whole bundle (Costello et al. 2012; Thomassen 1999). Voters that want lower taxes but citizens to have free access to healthcare cannot be serviced by parties that either offer lower taxes or free healthcare.

### 2.1 *Economic Left and Right*

The question which dimensions structure the voter and the party space is a key in political science. Scholars disagree over the extent to which a single left-right dimension, rooted in economic issues suffices to understand voting and political decision-making. Some argue that the left-right economic dimension is 'a super issue' which includes all these issues or pushes other issues off the political agenda (Inglehart and Klingemann 1976). Other authors have argued that alternative dimensions are necessary. These include dimensions concerning religious morality, the environment, immigration, European integration and law and order (Costello et al. 2012; Gabel and Anderson 2002; Inglehart 1984; Kitschelt 1994; Kriesi et al. 2008; Lipset 1960).

The question is not only which dimensions structure the political space, but also whether the dimensions that structure the voter and the party space are identical. Kriesi et al. (2008) and Costello et al. (2012) found that all over Europe voters and party politicians could be placed in a common space. Three dimensions that respectively concern economic, cultural and European issues structure this space. In contrast, Van der Brug and Van Spanje (2009; Van der Brug 2008) problematise the notion of a common space in which voters and party politicians position themselves: they find that a one-dimensional solution suffices for the party space, while a multidimensional solution



is necessary for the voters' positions: the left-right dimension structures positions of party politicians, while among citizens positions on cultural and economic issues are independent from each other.

This article moves away from the ambition to build a comprehensive model of voter and party spaces and focuses on the dimensionality of one, important, issue: the economy. The economic dimension is key for understanding of politics: most political decision-making concerns economic questions. One famous definition of politics itself sees it as the way society answers the question 'who gets what, when and how?' (Laswell 1936). In the classical model of democracy of Downs (1957) economic decision-making, and specifically the role of the government in the economy, is seen as the overarching political question.

In the literature there is broad agreement that the economic dimension concerns two different elements (Bobbio 1996; Costello et al. 2012; Downs 1957; Knutsen and Kumlin 2005; Kriesi et al. 2008; Lipset et al. 1954): the extent to which one prefers government intervention in the economy to the free market principle of *laissez-faire* (*economic interventionism*); and the extent to which one prefers redistribution of income in the interest of the less well of (*economic egalitarianism*). In general, leftwing voters, parties and politicians favour a government that intervenes in the economy, redistributes income, runs nationalized public services, levies high taxes and ensures generous welfare state benefits. Rightwing voters, parties and politicians favour a small government that abstains from interfering in the economy, levies low taxes, lets enterprises supply services, does not intervene in the income distribution and limits welfare state benefits.

## 2.2 Voters and Representatives

On basis of the existing literature one may expect politicians to have coherent views about economic matters. Existing evidence shows that certainly on economic questions the left-right dimension is strong and persistent: in terms of the views of parties expressed in party manifestos (Budge and Robertson 1987), their ideal positions according to expert surveys (Benoit and Laver 2006) and positions of politicians expressed in the European Parliament (Hix and Noury 2009).

Why is this the case? One reason may be that party politicians balance responsibility and representation when taking positions (Mair 2009). Representation comes from the 'responsible' party model (APSA 1950):<sup>44</sup> in order to win elections, the positions of parties and politicians must match those of potential voters. Party politicians also bear responsibility for the economic policies of the government: Mair (2009) defines a responsible policy as prudent and consistent. According to Mair (2009) prudence and consistency limits the *range* of positions party politicians can take: parties cannot immediately nationalize all public services or abolish all taxes. This argues that responsibility limits *combinations* of positions party politicians can take: only by raising taxes can the government afford to nationalize public services, or tax cuts must be accompanied by spending cuts. This is because economic issues come with their own logical constraints (Milyo 2000). Preferences about economic policies are not primitive or independent but they cohere in an economic logic (Milyo 2000): for instance, the level of government spending (one element of the economic left-right dimension) has implications for taxation levels, price levels and income levels (other elements of the economic left-right dimension). Because responsible politicians will not

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44. The word 'responsible' in this model is quite confusing as in the literature this element can rather be described as 'responsive'

favour inconsistent policies, the policy positions of politicians will tend to cohere.

For voters, the economy may be a particularly ‘hard’ issue (Carmines and Stimson 1980): many economic measures are technical. The relationship between policy ends, such as income equality, and policy means, such as government intervention, may not be apparent. In general, the views of citizens may be less constrained: Converse (1964) already observed that in the United States many voters simply did not have meaningful beliefs, not even on questions that dominated the political debate for years. His findings have been found in other countries and more recent time periods (Butler and Stokes 1974; Zaller 1992). Although some argue that these findings come from measurement error and that using multi-item scales the views of voters are more consistent (Achen 1975; Ansolabehere et al. 2008; ). Recent literature on public opinion, using multi-item scales, has shown that a large share of citizens has views on economic matters that are inconsistent from the perspective of a single left-right dimension (Achterberg et al. 2011; Derks 2004, 2006; Goerres and Prinzen 2011).<sup>45</sup> This pattern has been shown in different countries, different studies, for general economic issues and specific questions about the welfare state and using different methods of measuring scale quality. This leads to the following hypothesis, which will be tested in the remainder of this:

***The economic views of politicians fit better into a single-dimensional economic left-right model than the views of citizens about the same subject.***

Earlier studies have treated the lack of coherence in the views of citizens as a measurement problem (Costello et al. 2012; Wagner and Kritzing 2012; Walczak, Van der Brug, and de Vries, 2012) or a country-specific anomaly (Sperber 2010). Costello et al. (2012), for instance attribute the lack of

45. ‘Inconsistent’ is not meant as a moral judgment of the views of citizens, but as a methodological assessment.

coherence in the views of citizens to acquiescence bias. They control for the fact that citizens with weak opinions tend to answer questions affirmatively independent of the questions. This tendency of citizens to acquiesce is already a sign that the views of citizens on these issues are underdeveloped. From the perspective of democratic representation, the difference in the coherence between citizens and politicians is a theoretical problem. On issues where the structure that underlies the positions of party politicians and voter positions differs ‘elections are doomed to fail as an instrument of linkage with regards to those issues’ (Costello et al. 2012).

### 3. Methods

Spatial models are built on the assumption that respondents do not choose their positions at random. Their answers reflect a latent low-dimensional structure. Methods of data reduction model this latent structure on basis of observed items. Applying methods of data reduction in itself is a process of creation. Researchers choose particular observations and specific measurement models (Coombs 1964). Each method comes with its own advantages, drawbacks, assumptions, options and diagnostics. Therefore, it may be that studies with different methods, especially when they seek to answer dissimilar questions, come to different conclusions about the dimensionality of the political space. This also means that there is no “true” map of voter or party positions (Benoit and Laver 2006). Data also does not have a correct dimensionality, what one can assess whether a one-dimensional model fits the views of politicians better than the views of voters (cf. Otjes 2011). In order to ensure that the results presented here are not an artefact of some specific method, the results will be crossvalidated using three methods.

### 3.1 *Methods of data reduction*

Methods of data reduction come in two families: item response theory and classical test theory. The methods of classical test theory, such as Cronbach's  $\alpha$ , confirmatory factor analysis, essentially, build further on correlation. Cronbach's  $\alpha$  measures the reliability ('internal consistency') of a scale (Cronbach 1951). This is operationalised as the correlation between the items in the scale and the latent dimension. Reliability is a pre-condition for unidimensionality, but not a sufficient condition (Cortina 1993). Factor analysis can be applied in an exploratory and a confirmatory way (Brown 2006). This will employ confirmatory factor analysis, as the goal is to *test* whether the positions of voters on a range of economic issues can be understood in terms of one dimension. Data must meet the assumptions of regression for use in these classical test theory methods; these assumptions include a normal distribution and a linear relation between the items. If the data does not conform to these assumptions, classical test theory methods tend to overestimate the number of dimensions (Van Schuur and Kiers 1994). One drawback of structural equation modelling is that models sometimes do not converge (Brown 2006): this is a sign of poor specification. The number of cases may be too low, making the result sensitive to outliers. The data may not fit the assumptions. The model may also be too complex for the data. While the models can be slightly adjusted in order to converge, this will not be pursued here, because then the models can no longer be compared between for instance elite and mass level responses.

Mokken scaling is a method from the item response theory family (Mokken 1971; Van Schuur 2003). This method has fewer assumptions about the distribution of the data. The method was developed for educational tests. The Mokken scaling algorithm builds a structure that ranges from

items that most respondents correctly answer ('easy items') to items which least respondents give the correct answer ('difficult items'). In this case it will model items from left to right. A scale is consistent if a one-dimensional structure underlies these answers. The extent to which answers follow a one-dimensional structure is expressed in terms of the number of errors that are made: respondents that answer easy questions wrong and difficult answers correctly. While Mokken scaling was originally developed for dichotomous items, polytomous Mokken scaling was developed for ordinal items such as the ones employed here (Van der Ark 2007).

These methods come with their own diagnostic statistics of model quality. The main question of this is whether party politicians have significantly more consistent opinions than voters. Therefore this will assess whether the responses of voters have a worse fit in a one-dimensional model than the responses of politicians. Confirmatory factor analysis has a number of goodness or badness of fit measures: here the Comparative Fit Index (CFI) will be used. This is preferred over other standard measures such as the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation and the Standardised Root Mean Square Residual, which tend to overestimate errors in small sample sizes (West et al. 2012). Therefore, they cannot be used to compare fit between the larger samples of voters and the smaller samples of politicians. The CFI is acceptable if it is larger than 0.9 (Brown 2006). In assessing the model fit of the CFA models it is important to also examine the direction of the factor loadings: these are important, because confirmatory factor analysis does not test the assumption that relationships are in a particular direction, while the Mokken scale analysis and Cronbach's do. So results can show a good fit in confirmatory factor analysis, even when the relationships go in against the expected direction. The H-value of Mokken scaling and the eponymous Cronbach's are the single diag-

nostic statistics of these methods. An value above 0.5 indicates acceptable levels of internal consistency (Kline 1999). An H-value above 0.3 indicates acceptable levels of scalability (Mokken 1971).

**Table 1: Number of Respondents**

Country	Candidates	Respondents
Austria	42	897
Belgium	56	796
Bulgaria	6	826
Cyprus	7	882
Czech Republic	21	908
Denmark	24	824
Estonia	24	858
Finland	40	897
France	112	871
Germany	140	931
Greece	20	915
Hungary	25	869
Ireland	7	880
Italy	59	844
Lithuania	38	827
Latvia	30	771
Luxembourg	15	877
Malta	9	685
Netherlands	72	920
Poland	35	844
Portugal	17	790
Romania	23	739
Slovakia	26	838
Slovenia	18	914
Spain	56	824
Swedish	159	884
United Kingdom	242	892

**Table 2: Items**

Label	Question	Options	Direction
State	Public services and industries should be in state ownership.	A: 5	Leftwing
Enterprise	Private enterprise is best to solve [country's] economic problems.	A: 5	Rightwing*
Interventionism	Politics should abstain from intervening in the economy	A: 5	Rightwing*
Egalitarianism	Income and wealth should be redistributed towards ordinary people.	A: 5	Leftwing
Abortion	Women should be free to decide on matters of abortion	A: 5	Leftwing
Immigration	Immigration to (country) should be decreased significantly	A: 5	Rightwing
Sentences	People who break the law should get much harsher sentences than now	A: 5	Rightwing
Marriage	Same-sex marriage should be prohibited by law	A: 5	Rightwing
Referendum	EU treaty changes should be decided by referendum	A: 5	Anti-European
Parliament	The European Parliament takes into consideration the concerns of European citizens	A: 5	Pro-European
Trust	You trust the institutions of the European Union	A: 5	Pro-European
Democracy	How satisfied are you with the way democracy works in the EU?	P: 4	Pro-European

A: Agreement;

P: Position on a scale; number of answer categories.

\* indicates that the items was recorded in the Mokken and Cronbach's a analyses.



### 3.2 Data Sources

This analyses whether the positions of citizens and voters on economic questions can be understood in terms of a single dimensional model. The 2009 European Elections Survey (EES) and the 2009 European Elections Candidate Survey (EECS) will be employed here (Weßels and WZB 2010; Van Egmond et al. 2010). Voters and candidates were asked to answer the same questions. This allows one to compare the extent to which their views cohere. The EES was held in all 27 EU member states after the 2009 European Parliament election. A thousand voters were sampled in each country. For the EECS all candidate MEPs were asked to answer a questionnaire. 25% of candidate MEPs responded. The total respondents per country differed strongly, as can be seen in Table 1. Candidates and citizens will be analysed separately. Only models with 40 or more respondents will be presented given how especially Confirmatory Factor Analysis is sensitive to the number of respondents (Brown 2006). This means that candidate surveys from 17 member states will be excluded. Because so many countries were excluded a model for the candidates from all member states is also included.

The EES and EECS were selected, because they are the only survey that includes both politicians and voters from such a high number of countries. The only drawback of the study is that it includes only four economic items (listed in Table 2). This may be too little basis to assess the coherence of the economic left-right dimension. However, given the strength that the scholarly literature ascribes to the left-right dimension, one would expect that these items that concern closely related issues, especially in the domain of government intervention, cohere. Respondents with missing items were deleted list-wise per analysis. All items have been recalculated so that they are in a left to right conceptual direction.

### 3.3 Acquiescence Bias

This research is similar to that of Costello et al. (2012). Using confirmatory factor analysis, they find that a three-dimensional structure fits a combined candidate and voter data set. This structure includes a three-item economic dimension. Their model only shows sufficient fit when they control for acquiescence bias, the tendency of respondents to answer affirmatively to survey questions, independent of what the questions concerns substantively (Billiet and McClendon 2001). This section will discuss some methodological issues with the solution of Costello et al. (2012) and how these will be addressed in this.

They follow Billiet and McClendon's (2001) solution for acquiescence bias: the idea is to construct a model for two sets of items that are balanced. This means that they have an equal number of items with 'positive' or 'negative' wording. And then one can estimate three factors: two substantial factors related to one of the two sets of items and then a third factor which has a fixed loading of one for all items. This would be called a 'response style factor'.

Costello et al. (2012) estimate three substantive dimensions: an economic one, a cultural one and EU one. They use three economic items (two with a left-wing orientation and one with a right-wing orientation), while there are four economic items in the EES (two left-wing and two right-wing). They exclude the item on interventionism.<sup>46</sup> This is problematic for two reasons: first, the economic set of items is not balanced; and second, interventionism is core part of the notion of the economic left-right dimension (Downs 1957). None of their sets of items are balanced. They use four cultural items (three with 'conservative' wording and one with 'progressive' wording) and four European items (two with pro-European wording, one with

46. They do not explain why the interventionism item has been excluded but Costello et al. (2012, footnote 3) do lament the lack of balance in their items.

**Table 3: Voter-Level Indicators of Scale Quality**

Polity	H	a	Confirmatory Factor Analysis				
			CFI	State	Egalitarianism	Enterprise	Interventionism
Austria	0.21	0.50	0.9	0.45 (0.34, 0.55)	0.36 (0.26, 0.46)	-0.64 (-0.75, -0.52)	-0.36 (-0.45, -0.28)
Belgium	-0.01	-0.02	0.87	0.53 (0.30, 0.75)	0.20 (0.07, 0.33)	0.22 (0.10, 0.35)	0.53 (-0.30, -0.76)
Bulgaria	0.09	0.25	0.89	0.80 (0.61, 0.99)	0.42 (0.3, 0.55)	-0.29 (-0.38, -0.21)	0.17 (0.08, 0.26)
Cyprus	0.01	0.02	0.80	0.33 (0.20, 0.47)	0.43 (0.26, 0.61)	0.18 (0.05, 0.32)	0.28 (0.13, -0.43)
Czech Republic	0.08	0.24	0.82	0.90 (0.26, 1.55)	0.33 (0.08, 0.57)	-0.14 (-0.24, -0.04)	0.07 (-0.03, 0.16)
Denmark	0.10	0.28	Non-convergence				
Estonia	0.01	0.02	0.68	0.41 (0.26, 0.55)	0.43 (0.30, 0.57)	0.07 (-0.06, 0.21)	0.40 (0.54, 0.25)
Finland	0.09	0.25	0.89	0.28 (-0.02, 0.58)	0.93 (-0.04, 1.90)	-0.12 (0.25, 0.04)	0.03 (0.04, 0.10)
France	0.13	0.34	0.83	0.57 (0.35, 0.79)	0.24 (0.13, 0.34)	-0.37 (-0.52, -0.20)	-0.22 (-0.34, -0.09)
Germany	0.23	0.5	0.84	0.44 (0.33, 0.55)	0.44 (0.33, 0.55)	-0.52 (-0.64, -0.41)	-0.41 (-0.51, -0.31)
Greece	0.09	0.27	Non-convergence				
Hungary	0.00	0.01	0.88	0.31 (0.17, 0.44)	0.66 (0.39, 0.92)	0.07 (-0.03, 0.16)	0.27 (0.14, 0.40)
Ireland	0.04	0.11	0.89	0.36 (0.14, 0.58)	0.50 (0.22, 0.78)	-0.14 (-0.28, -0.01)	0.18 (0.07, 0.30)
Italy	0.00	0.00	0.88	0.40 (0.26, 0.53)	0.46 (0.31, 0.61)	0.04 (-0.08, 0.16)	0.35 (0.22, 0.48)
Lithuania	0.01	-0.02	0.88	0.39 (0.27, 0.51)	0.55 (0.383, 0.708)	0.20 (0.08, 0.32)	0.29 (0.17, 0.42)
Latvia	0.00	0.03	0.72	0.56 (0.10, 1.01)	0.27 (0.06, 0.48)	-0.05 (-0.22, 0.13)	0.29 (0.05, 0.53)
Luxembourg	0.06	0.17	Non-convergence				
Malta	0.01	0.01	0.85	0.55 (0.34, 0.76)	0.50 (0.31, 0.69)	0.12 (-0.02, 0.25)	0.24 (0.13, 0.36)
Netherlands	0.08	0.21	0.73	0.28 (0.02, 0.53)	0.16 (-0.05, 0.37)	-0.26 (-0.46, -0.07)	-0.33 (-0.58, -0.07)
Poland	0.09	0.25	0.79	0.55 (0.35, 0.74)	0.37 (0.23, 0.53)	-0.32 (-0.45, -0.19)	0.04 (-0.07, 0.15)
Portugal	0.02	0.06	0.78	0.82 (-0.23, 1.86)	0.19 (-0.06, 0.43)	0.04 (-0.05, 0.14)	0.14 (-0.07, 0.35)
Romania	0.07	0.2	Non-convergence				
Slovakia	0.09	0.27	Non-convergence				
Slovenia	0.05	0.14	Non-convergence				
Spain	0.07	0.20	0.60	0.43 (0.130, 0.73)	0.42 (0.12, 0.72)	-0.19 (-0.32, -0.05)	0.10 (-0.04, 0.23)
Sweden	0.16	0.41	0.91	0.47 (0.39, 0.56)	0.61 (0.50, 0.71)	-0.51 (-0.60, 0.41)	0.00 (-0.1, 0.09)
United Kingdom	0.09	0.26	0.82	0.57 (0.44, 0.70)	0.45 (0.33, 0.56)	-0.40 (-0.5, -0.31)	0.14 (0.04, 0.24)


*Diagnostic statistics for Mokken, Cronbach's and CFA and CFA factor loadings with 95% confidence intervals.*

**Table 4: Candidate-Level Indicators of Scale Quality**


Country	H		Confirmatory Factor Analysis				
			CFI	State	Egalitarianism	Enterprise	Interventionism
EU27	0.49	0.77	0.99	0.62 (0.58, 0.66)	0.74 (0.70, 0.78)	-0.77 (-0.81, -0.74)	-0.56 (-0.61, -0.52)
Austria	0.73	0.89	1	0.77 (0.63, 0.91)	0.84 (0.73, 0.96)	-0.92 (-1.00, -0.84)	-0.81 (-0.93, -0.68)
Belgium	0.51	0.75	1	0.65 (0.44, 0.85)	0.64 (0.44, 0.85)	-0.7 (-0.89, -0.5)	-0.73 (-0.92, -0.55)
Bulgaria	Too little cases						
Cyprus	Too little cases						
Czech Republic	Too little cases						
Denmark	Too little cases						
Estonia	Too little cases						
Finland	0.32	0.59	0.91	0.31 (-0.09, 0.71)	0.63 (0.29, 0.97)	-0.72 (-1.07, -0.37)	-0.5 (-0.82, -0.17)
France	0.57	0.80	1	0.74 (0.64, 0.85)	0.75 (0.64, 0.86)	-0.84 (-0.94, -0.75)	-0.51 (-0.66, -0.35)
Germany	0.67	0.86	1	0.79 (0.71, 0.87)	0.77 (0.69, 0.85)	-0.87 (-0.93, -0.81)	-0.72 (-0.82, -0.63)
Greece	Too little cases						
Hungary	Too little cases						
Ireland	Too little cases						
Italy	0.44	0.71	1	0.71 (0.53, 0.88)	0.72 (0.55, 0.89)	-0.85 (-1.01, -0.70)	-0.21 (-0.48, 0.06)
Lithuania	Too little cases						
Latvia	Too little cases						
Luxembourg	Too little cases						
Malta	Too little cases						
Netherlands	0.49	0.75	0.89	0.58 (0.36, 0.80)	0.7 (0.50, 0.89)	-0.75 (-0.93, -0.57)	-0.67 (-0.86, -0.48)
Poland	Too little cases						
Portugal	Too little cases						
Romania	Too little cases						
Slovakia	Too little cases						
Slovenia	Too little cases						
Spain	0.48	0.73	0.87	0.62 (0.36, 0.89)	0.63 (0.36, 0.90)	-0.85 (-1.10, -0.61)	-0.54 (-0.78, -0.29)
Sweden	0.55	0.79	1	0.71 (0.61, 0.81)	0.73 (0.63, 0.83)	-0.78 (-0.88, -0.69)	-0.6 (-0.72, -0.48)
United Kingdom	0.45	0.74	0.97	0.6 (0.51, 0.71)	0.71 (0.61, 0.81)	-0.78 (-0.88, -0.69)	-0.49 (-0.61, -0.38)

*Diagnostic statistics for Mokken, Cronbach's and CFA and CFA factor loadings with 95% confidence intervals.*

**Figure 1: Model specification A**



**Figure 2: Model specification B**



anti-European wording and one freely loading item). Including a freely loading item).

This will test two models with a response style factor to see to what extent controlling for acquiescence bias truly solves their problem: model specification A, visualised in Figure 1 follows Billiet and McClendon (2001) as precisely as possible. Three factors are estimated on two sets of items: an economic left-right dimension with all four economic items and a three-item European dimension (one pro-European, one anti-European and one freely loading item). The second model, specification B visualised in Figure 2, follows the specification of

Costello et al. (2012)'s specification as closely as possible. The only difference is that all four economic items were included. The basic model without a response style factor is a base line for the analysis: models including a response style factor must perform better than these baseline models. One can only compare the direction and strength of the factor loadings for the four economic items included in both models. One cannot compare the model fit measures, because these depend on the strength of other relationships as well (in this case the cultural factor, the European factor and the response style factor).



## 4. Scaling Results

This section looks at the results of the different scaling methods. Table 3 and 4 present the H-values of Mokken scaling, the Cronbach's  $\alpha$ -values, CFI for voters and politicians respectively. Moreover, the factor loadings for the state, egalitarianism, enterprise and interventionism variables are presented

According to the H-levels in Table 3 in none of the 27 EU member states, the four economic items fit in an ordinal scale: in no country the threshold level of 0.3 is met. The best results are in Germany and Austria. The H-values for the elite-level, in Table 4, provide more justification for a single-dimensional interpretation. In the 10 countries, where enough MEPs are included in the survey, the views of these MEPs meet the 0.3-threshold. The same is true for the analysis with the candidate MEPs from all 27 member states of the EU. This means that the views of politicians from all included countries can be modelled in terms of one dimension. When comparing the H-levels of the mass and elite-level one can see that the former are always lower than the latter. The average difference in the H-values between elite and voters is 0.37, which reflects the fact that among voters the H-values are all insufficient, while at the elite-level they are sufficient. These results are in line with the expectation that voters have less consistent views than party politicians.

The  $\alpha$ -values reflect a similar discrepancy between voters and politicians. For voters the Cronbach's  $\alpha$ -values are insufficient in all but one country (Austria). At the elite-level the values are sufficient in all included countries and in the pan-European data set. This means that among voters the economic left-right dimension cannot be reliably measured by means of these four items, while it can be reliably measured at the level of the candidate. The average difference between the two values is 0.50, which again reflects the fact that among voters the

$\alpha$ -values are all insufficient, while at the elite-level they tend to be sufficient. Again, these results sustain the hypothesis.

Table 3 shows the results of twenty-seven confirmatory factor analyses at the voter-level. Six of them failed to converge under this specification. In only two countries, Austria and Sweden, the CFI is above the threshold level. In all but three countries (Austria, Germany and France) at least one of the factor loadings is either statistically indistinguishable from zero (i.e. there is no relationship) or goes in against the left-right dimension. For the state-item the factor loadings in two countries are indistinguishable from zero. The factor loadings for egalitarianism in three countries are indistinguishable from zero. When it comes to the enterprise variable, the problems become more pressing: for three countries the factor loadings are *significantly* in the wrong direction. This means that in these countries those who favour free enterprise more often than not also favour nationalisation of economic sectors. In another seven countries, the enterprise factor loading is indistinguishable from zero. This means that for just over half of the countries, the factor loading for enterprise is significant and in the expected direction. For the interventionism item, however, the problems are even larger: in six countries the factor loading is indistinguishable from zero. In another eleven countries the factor loading is significant but in the incorrect direction: those who favour an equal distribution of incomes more often than not want less government intervention. This leaves only three countries (the aforementioned Austria, Germany and France), where the factor loading is significant and in the correct direction. All in all, the confirmatory factor analyses indicate that only in a single country, Austria, the four-item economic model fits a one-dimensional model.

At the candidate-level, all ten national models that were ran and the pan-European model. Many indi-

cators of model fit showed (near) perfect results. In all but two countries, Spain and the Netherlands, the value of the CFI met the threshold. But even in Spain and the Netherlands the CFI for voters is lower than the CFI for candidates. Also in Austria, where the CFI for voters met the threshold level, the CFI for voters is lower than the CFI for politicians.

All in all, in each of the factor analyses, the results at the voter-level and the results at the candidate-level stand in contrast. In every country, the H-value and the Cronbach's  $\alpha$  for voters are lower than these values for politicians and the CFI-values are higher for voters than for politicians. In all but one country the views of citizens on economic matters clearly cannot be scaled into a single dimensional interpretation. The CFI and Cronbach's  $\alpha$  indicate that the views of voters in Austria can be modelled in terms of a single dimension, although the Mokken scaling results. At the same time, the views of candidates for public office from all over the European Union meet most of these requirements. This provides ample evidence for the hypothesis that voter views are less single-dimensional than views of politicians.

## 5. Acquiescence Bias

Above two model specifications that controlled for acquiescence bias were introduced. Model specification A (see Figure 1) followed the prescription of Billiet and McClendon (2001) as closely as possible and estimate three factors (two substantive and one response style factor). This includes a four-item economic dimension. These results are shown in Table 5. With this specification only fifteen models converged. The lack of convergence may be an indicator that the model is too complex for the data. The key result is that the enterprise and interventionism factor loading are both in the correct direction and significantly different from zero, in two countries: Germany and France. In

those countries, these factor loadings already conformed to this pattern in the model without the response style factor. In the thirteen other models, at least one of the factor loadings is not significantly different from zero or in the incorrect direction. That means that including a response style factor leads to a model where moving to the left on an issue like egalitarianism makes it more likely for voters to be right-wing on interventionism. Therefore the results would not lead to a significantly different interpretation than the model without a response style factor, namely that substantively the items do not fit an economic left-right interpretation.

The model specification B (see Figure 2) follows the four-factor model of Costello et al. (2012) as closely as possible. These results are shown in Table 6. This model converges for nineteen countries. In five countries, all items are significantly different from zero and in the correct direction: namely in Slovenia, Spain, Austria, France and Germany. In three of these, Austria, France and Germany, the factor loadings already were in the correct direction and significantly different from zero without the inclusion of a response style factor. For one of these countries the results without the response style factor did not converge (Slovenia). This means that *only* in Spain the inclusion of a response style factor under specification B would lead to a different interpretation. As above: in the thirteen remaining models, the results would not lead to a significantly different interpretation, namely that substantively the items do not fit an economic left-right interpretation.

The main conclusion would be that the lack of coherence in the views of citizens on the economic issues is, at least in twenty-one of the twenty-two cases where one of these models did converge, the result of the response style of the voters. Especially, the interventionism item, which Costello et al (2012) excluded is problematic, while sub-

**Table 5: Voter-Level Indicators of Scale Quality for Model Specification A**

Country	Confirmatory Factor Analysis				
	CFI	State	Egalitarianism	Enterprise	Interventionism
Austria	Non-convergence				
Belgium	Non-convergence				
Bulgaria	0.99	0.64 (0.51, 0.77)	0.36 (0.25, 0.46)	-0.45 (-0.55, -0.34)	0.07 (-0.03, 0.18)
Cyprus	Non-convergence				
Czech Republic	0.91	0.70 (0.46, 0.95)	0.31 (0.18, 0.43)	-0.29 (-0.41, -0.17)	0.00 (-0.10, 0.10)
Denmark	Non-convergence				
Estonia	0.93	0.44 (0.30, 0.58)	0.37 (0.26, 0.48)	-0.19 (-0.32, -0.07)	0.26 (0.15, 0.39)
Finland	Non-convergence				
France	0.95	0.53 (0.37, 0.69)	0.25 (0.14, 0.35)	-0.46 (-0.60, -0.32)	-0.18 (-0.29, -0.07)
Germany	0.93	0.49 (0.40, 0.58)	0.46 (0.38, 0.55)	-0.55 (-0.64, -0.46)	-0.41 (-0.49, -0.32)
Greece	Non-convergence				
Hungary	Non-convergence				
Ireland	0.97	0.33 (0.18, 0.49)	0.48 (0.27, 0.69)	-0.18 (-0.33, -0.02)	0.21 (0.08, 0.33)
Italy	0.98	0.44 (0.28, 0.61)	0.47 (0.28, 0.66)	-0.02 (-0.27, 0.23)	0.29 (0.07, 0.51)
Lithuania	0.97	0.34 (0.21, 0.47)	0.50 (0.31, 0.69)	0.04 (-0.09, 0.16)	0.14 (0.02, 0.27)
Latvia	0.95	0.39 (0.21, 0.57)	0.26 (0.11, 0.40)	0.05 (-0.11, 0.22)	0.44 (0.24, 0.64)
Luxembourg	Non-convergence				
Malta	Non-convergence				
Netherlands	Non-convergence				
Poland	0.94	0.49 (0.34, 0.63)	0.35 (0.23, 0.47)	-0.43 (-0.58, -0.29)	-0.03 (-0.16, 0.10)
Portugal	0.95	0.23 (0.08, 0.37)	0.36 (0.12, 0.59)	-0.17 (-0.32, -0.01)	0.12 (-0.05, 0.297)
Romania	Non-convergence				
Slovakia	Non-convergence				
Slovenia	0.98	0.39 (0.21, 0.57)	0.27 (0.13, 0.41)	-0.22 (-0.27, 0.18)	0.00 (0.13, 0.13)
Spain	0.91	0.39 (0.17, 0.62)	0.37 (0.15, 0.60)	-0.27 (-0.56, 0.01)	0.02 (-0.212, 0.27)
Sweden	Non-convergence				
United Kingdom	Non-convergence				

*Diagnostic statistics for CFA and CFA factor loadings with 95% confidence intervals.*

**Table 6: Voter-Level Indicators of Scale Quality for Model Specification B**


Country	Confirmatory Factor Analysis				
	CFI	State	Egalitarianism	Enterprise	Interventionism
Austria	0.9	0.45 (0.37, 0.54)	0.4 (0.31, 0.49)	-0.69 (-0.79, -0.6)	-0.33 (-0.41, -0.25)
Belgium	Non-convergence				
Bulgaria	0.95	0.6 (0.47, 0.72)	0.37 (0.25, 0.48)	-0.46 (-0.57, -0.34)	0.05 (-0.06, 0.17)
Cyprus	0.89	0.15 (-0.03, 0.34)	0.33 (0.1, 0.57)	-0.18 (-0.35, -0.01)	0.06 (-0.06, 0.19)
Czech Republic	Non-convergence				
Denmark	Non-convergence				
Estonia	0.83	0.44 (0.29, 0.59)	0.31 (0.2, 0.43)	-0.22 (-0.36, -0.08)	0.27 (0.15, 0.39)
Finland	0.81	0.44 (0.32, 0.56)	0.54 (0.4, 0.68)	-0.21 (-0.32, -0.1)	-0.01 (-0.12, 0.1)
France	0.9	0.43 (0.34, 0.53)	0.26 (0.17, 0.36)	-0.54 (-0.64, -0.45)	-0.19 (-0.29, -0.09)
Germany	0.85	0.48 (0.39, 0.57)	0.46 (0.37, 0.54)	-0.57 (-0.66, -0.48)	-0.43 (-0.51, -0.34)
Greece	Non-convergence				
Hungary	0.93	0.48 (0.35, 0.62)	0.29 (0.19, 0.39)	-0.18 (-0.3, -0.07)	0.09 (-0.02, 0.21)
Ireland	0.84	0.48 (0.35, 0.62)	0.29 (0.19, 0.39)	-0.18 (-0.3, -0.07)	0.09 (-0.02, 0.21)
Italy	0.86	0.29 (0.13, 0.45)	0.3 (0.12, 0.48)	-0.41 (-0.6, -0.23)	0.03 (-0.11, 0.18)
Lithuania	0.92	0.36 (0.23, 0.49)	0.45 (0.3, 0.6)	0.03 (-0.1, 0.15)	0.12 (-0.01, 0.25)
Latvia	Non-convergence				
Luxembourg	Non-convergence				
Malta	Non-convergence				
Netherlands	Non-convergence				
Poland	0.84	0.43 (0.31, 0.55)	0.4 (0.28, 0.53)	-0.42 (-0.56, -0.28)	-0.04 (-0.17, 0.09)
Portugal	0.88	0.19 (0.06, 0.32)	0.44 (0.22, 0.65)	-0.2 (-0.34, -0.06)	0.06 (-0.08, 0.21)
Romania	0.88	0.43 (0.31, 0.56)	0.39 (0.26, 0.51)	-0.4 (-0.53, -0.27)	0 (-0.13, 0.13)
Slovakia	0.85	0.66 (0.48, 0.84)	0.27 (0.15, 0.4)	-0.4 (-0.53, -0.28)	-0.09 (-0.2, 0.02)
Slovenia	0.8	0.66 (0.24, 1.08)	0.17 (0.03, 0.3)	-0.19 (-0.35, -0.03)	-0.11 (-0.22, -0.01)
Spain	0.82	0.24 (0.14, 0.35)	0.23 (0.12, 0.34)	-0.58 (-0.71, -0.45)	-0.19 (-0.3, -0.08)
Sweden	0.89	0.5 (0.42, 0.59)	0.6 (0.52, 0.69)	-0.55 (-0.63, -0.47)	-0.07 (-0.16, 0.02)
United Kingdom	Non-convergence				

*Diagnostic statistics for CFA and CFA factor loadings with 95% confidence intervals.*



stantively the question is whether one supports or opposes government intervention in the economy. With two different specifications, the inclusion of the response style factor only leads to a substantially different interpretation for the interventionism item in a single case. Therefore the poor results are more likely to be substantive in nature than that they are the cause of a methodological singularity.

**Figure 3: Distances between parties and voters in one and four-dimensional models**



## 6. Policy Representation

One may wonder: ‘so what, why does it matter? Is this more than a matter of academic importance?’ The dimensionality of the political space has a strong effect on the quality of representation, as Thomassen (1999) has argued. The results indicate that a large segment of voters has views that are ‘inconsistent’ from the perspective of traditional left-right dimension: for instance they favour income equality but oppose government intervention in the economy. Politicians’ views however come in two flavours: more income equality *and* more government or less government *and* less income equality. This means that when one collapses the political space into a one-dimensional

left-right dimension, one would place voters with strongly inconsistent views (like those who strongly favour redistribution but also strongly oppose government intervention) in the centre of the political space. In the two-dimensional representation, however, these voters are actually as far from the centre as voters who strongly favour redistribution and government intervention. If party politicians are concentrated along an economic left-right dimension and voters are spread out in the space more evenly, there will be a large discrepancy between voters and party politicians, especially those voters with ‘inconsistent’ views.

Costello et al. (2012) offer a way to express the quality of representation by examining the distance between party politicians and voters: they propose calculating the distance between the average position of the voters for a party and the average position of the candidates of that party. In order to illustrate the effect of a one- and a multi-dimensional model, the Euclidian distance between party politicians and voters is calculated in a one-dimensional model, which distorts voter positions, and between party politicians and voters in a four-dimensional model, where each economic item represents a separate dimension. The distances are divided by the maximum distance in the space.<sup>47</sup> Following Costello et al. (2012), these differences are only calculated for parties that have 40 or more citizens voting for them in the European Parliament elections and 5 or more candidates running for office. Figure 3 illustrates the distances between party candidates and their voters per party. The x-axis shows the distance between parties and voters on a one-dimensional scale. On average, this distance is 0.12 (maximum is 1). If one unpacks the political space and represents the true diversity in the positions of voters, however, the average distance is 0.18: 47% greater. These values are shown in the y-axis of Figure 2.

47. The maximum is four for the one-dimensional model and eight for the four dimensional mode.

As one can see the policy distances are consistently larger in the four-dimensional space than in the one-dimensional space. This shows that a one-dimensional model of economic issues underestimates the representation problem.

## 7. Conclusion

The results presented in this show that voters have less consistent views about economic matters than party politicians. On economic issues voters' views are not constrained and structured, while on the same issues, the views of politicians are. The views of politicians from all over Europe meet all requirements for a single-dimensional model: politicians that favour a more equal distribution of income also support the government intervention necessary to realise it. The views of politicians tend to cohere logically: for them the relationship between policy means and policy ends is clear. For citizens, however, economic issues are far more complex. They do not see the economic logic between means and ends. Therefore their answers do not fit easily into a single-dimensional model. This has implications for the quality of democratic representation in Europe.

Elections are an instrument to translate the preferences of voters to the political level (Costello et al., 2012). A key condition for policy representation is that that voters' views and the policy positions of candidates are constrained by the same ideological dimension. If one distorts the positions of voters and force them into a one-dimensional scale, they are closer to party positions than in a four-dimensional representation. Voters with extreme but inconsistent views cannot be represented well by the established parties: they may want less government intervention in the economy and a more equal distribution of resources; and all that they can choose is more government and more equality or less government and less equality. This means that on economic issues, the representation deficit

does not just concern differences in positions (e.g. voters are more left-wing than candidates) but it concerns the way in which voters and politicians use to understand economic questions.

From the results presented in this, one can derive an agenda for further research. The first and most pressing issue is whether the patterns presented here are the result of an anomaly of one particular set of questions, or whether this phenomenon can be seen consistently in different European states. The findings presented here may also be the result of the context of the questionnaire, which was executed during the 2009 European Parliament election. It may be that the ongoing euro-crisis has diminished the strength of the economic left-right dimension at the voter-level, as traditional leftwing and rightwing answers no longer fit the economic complexity. Therefore, it may be valuable to reanalyse existing voter and candidates' surveys from different countries and from different periods. Doing this may help one to understand when, where and under what conditions voter positions on economic issues do cohere.

The second issue is whether the discrepancy that was found here actually matters for political behaviour. One example: a large segment of citizens with 'inconsistent' views may find it difficult to find representation in a party system that is highly structured. This may have consequences for their volatility: these voters may be more volatile in their vote choice, because the framing of the elections matters. Previously, Van der Brug and Van Spanje (2009) argued that because a large segment of voters has left-wing and authoritarian views but parties only offer rightwing-authoritarian or leftwing-libertarian bundles, they may switch parties dependent on how the elections are framed, in terms of a choice over cultural issues or over economic issues: they may opt for the 'left' when elections concern economic issues and opt for the 'right' when elections concern immigration

and integration. It may be that this phenomenon is also visible for the economic dimension itself: if economic issues are framed as to concern redistribution, the left may be stronger, if economic issues are framed concern government intervention, the right may profit.

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