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International Organization for Migration (IOM)
The UN Migration Agency

WORLD MIGRATION REPORT 2018



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IOM is committed to the principle that humane and orderly migration benefits migrants and society. As an intergovernmental organization, IOM acts with its partners in the international community to: assist in meeting the operational challenges of migration; advance understanding of migration issues; encourage social and economic development through migration; and uphold the human dignity and well-being of migrants.

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Top: South Sudanese refugees enter a tent at a way station in Gimbi, Ethiopia. © IOM (Photo: Rikka Tupaz)
Middle: Gyeongbokgung Palace in Seoul, Republic of Korea. The palace is a major attraction for tourists from around the world. © IOM (Photo: Muse Mohammed)
Bottom: People enjoy a weekend shopping in downtown in Dublin, Ireland. © IOM (Photo: Muse Mohammed)

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International Organization for Migration (IOM)

The UN Migration Agency

WORLD MIGRATION REPORT 2018



This volume is the result of a highly collaborative venture involving a multitude of partners and contributors under the direction of the editors. The *World Migration Report 2018* project commenced in September 2016 and culminated in the launch of the report in November 2017 by the Director General at the 108th Session of the IOM Council.

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All reasonable efforts have been made to ensure the accuracy of the data referred to in this report, including through data verification. We regret, however, any data errors that may remain. Unless otherwise stated, this report does not refer to data or events after June 2017.

The stories behind the photographs can be found on page v.

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Photographs

Cover

Top: South Sudanese refugees enter a tent at a way station in Gimbi, Ethiopia. © IOM (Photo: Rikka Tupaz)

Middle: Gyeongbokgung Palace in Seoul, Republic of Korea. The palace is a major attraction for tourists from around the world. © IOM (Photo: Muse Mohammed)

Bottom: People enjoy a weekend shopping in downtown in Dublin, Ireland. © IOM (Photo: Muse Mohammed)

Chapter 1

Lidya immigrated to London, United Kingdom, to study International Relations and Journalism, two fields that did not have many job opportunities in her homeland of Lithuania. Today, she owns and runs a public relations firm, which mainly caters to UK clients. She feels that part of her success in London is the result of her exposure to different cultures, including the British culture, which she credits for helping her understand the various needs of her UK-based clients. © IOM (Photo: Muse Mohammed)

Part I

People enjoy weekend shopping in downtown Dublin, Ireland – a country with a diverse migrant population. In the 2016 population census, 12 nationalities with more 10,000 people accounted for 73.6 per cent of all non-Irish nationals. A further 32 nationalities with populations ranging between 1,001 and 10,000 accounted for 19.7 per cent. Nationals from over 150 different countries made up the rest of the non-Irish population. © IOM (Photo: Muse Mohammed)

Chapter 2

Syrian refugee children get ready for class in Turkey. Many of these children are originally from Aleppo and escaped the ongoing civil war. Today, the children attend class at the Syrian Social Gathering, a multi-service centre supported by IOM. The centre provides services to all Syrian refugees, such as free legal advice for women, adult education in the evenings, and psychosocial care for those who have undergone traumatic experiences in the Syrian Arab Republic. © IOM (Photo: Muse Mohammed)

Chapter 3

A woman and her child pose outside of their makeshift home built from a collection of fabrics inside the Farm Centre internally displaced persons (IDPs) camp in Maiduguri, Nigeria. She joins several others who have had their villages razed by the armed group, Boko Haram. © IOM (Photo: Muse Mohammed)

Chapter 4

Candida Antonia Basurto Holguín is an 80-year-old Ecuadorian woman who lives in the community of El Juncal, Tosagua, province of Manabí, Ecuador. She lost her house and belongings during the 2016 7.8 magnitude earthquake that devastated her community. IOM, the Government of Japan and the European Commission's Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection department (ECHO) supported Mrs Basurto by building her temporary shelter. © IOM (Photo: Carolina Celi)

Part II

The Farm Centre IDP camp is one of several IDP camps in Maiduguri, Nigeria. As the insurgency by Boko Haram has spread in Northeastern Nigeria, many Nigerians have fled from their villages to Maiduguri, the only safe haven within Borno state. As the number of IDPs within the state grew, they began to occupy various sites ranging from public school buildings, incomplete housing projects and farming centres. © IOM (Photo: Muse Mohammed)

Chapter 5

The IOM 107th Council at the United Nations Palais in Geneva, Switzerland, which marked the 65th anniversary of the Organization's founding on 5 December 1951. The Council is the highest authority of IOM and meets for one regular session annually. Its main functions include determining policy, reviewing reports, approving and directing the activities of the Standing Committee on Programme and Finance and the Director General, and reviewing and approving the programme, budget, expenditure and accounts of the Organization. © IOM (Photo: Amanda Nero)

Chapter 6

Syrian refugees take a moment to photograph the sunset at 30,000 feet. For many, this is their first time on a plane as they fly to Toronto, Canada. In late 2015, IOM facilitated the resettlement of over 35,000 Syrian refugees to Canada in a matter of months. Syrians living in countries such as Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey were flown to new homes in Canada. With some having waited for years to be resettled, the flight across the Atlantic marked the beginning of a new life for them. © IOM (Photo: Muse Mohammed)

Chapter 7

Osman was inspired by two-time Olympic bronze medalist Rohullah Nikpai, who is an ethnic Hazara like himself. "It is not easy being a Hazara in Afghanistan; we are often discriminated against by other ethnic groups and the Taliban who do not see us as 'real' Afghans," he says. Over the years he graduated his way up to black belt and won a local competition. Later the Taliban discovered Osman's identity and threatened to kill him, so he left Afghanistan for Indonesia. He has been awaiting refugee resettlement for several years and uses his time in South Sulawesi to train the local community in the sport he loves. © IOM (Photo: Muse Mohammed)

Chapter 8

Mark is an electronics technician in Dublin, Ireland. Originally from Poland, he moved to Ireland shortly after his father motivated him to work abroad, arriving in Dublin during the economic boom of 2006. He focuses largely on repairs and is amazed by the little care many people put into their electronics. He compares this to his homeland, where people used to be much more careful with their valuables but today simply choose to replace their electronics with newer ones. © IOM (Photo: Muse Mohammed)

Chapter 9

The Protection of Civilians (PoC) site in Bentiu, South Sudan was established in December 2013 and currently houses an estimated 120,000 IDPs. Many people displaced by conflict in South Sudan have increasingly fled to UN PoC sites for safety. The UN and various humanitarian agencies are working together with the community to improve the living conditions in the PoC area. © IOM (Photo: Muse Mohammed)

Chapter 10

Toronto, with a population of 2.7 million people (5.9 million in the Greater Toronto Area) is among the most multicultural cities in the world. In 2006, the City of Toronto was home to almost 8 per cent of Canada's population, 30 per cent of all recent immigrants and 20 per cent of all immigrants. Toronto is the most linguistically diverse city in Canada and one of the most diverse in the world, with over 140 different languages and dialects spoken here. © IOM (Photo: Muse Mohammed)

References

Children play in the waters of the Carteret Islands, Papua New Guinea. © IOM (Photo: Muse Mohammed)

Appendices

A Syrian woman looks out towards the Swiss Alps while on her flight to Toronto. It's her first time aboard a flight as she heads towards starting a new life with her family in Canada. She is among tens of thousands of Syrians refugees who were resettled in Canada in 2015 and 2016. © IOM (Photo: Muse Mohammed)

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Foreword

This report is the ninth in the World Migration Report series. Since 2000, IOM has been producing world migration reports to contribute to increased understanding of migration throughout the world. Indeed, it is one of IOM's key contributions, and it has taken on heightened importance in an era of "post-truth" politics, "information overload" and "fake news". The chance for evidence and knowledge to help explain migration and how it is changing seems to be diminishing at a time when, more broadly throughout the world, facts and expertise seemed to have increasingly taken a back seat to opinion and politics.

IOM is now the United Nations' migration agency. Even though our Organization has worked in close partnership with the United Nations since our inception, this recognition and the responsibilities that it embodies have made us reflect deeply on all aspects of our work, as we undertake the transitions necessary to fully assume our new role. We have an obligation to demystify the "world" of migration to policymakers, practitioners, researchers, students and the general public. It is our intention to promote a balanced understanding of migration's complexities, present relevant data and information in an accessible way, explain salient, complex and emerging issues and share over 65 years of our diverse experience across the world.

The *World Migration Report 2018* – the first since IOM assumed its role as the United Nations Migration Agency – seeks to achieve this goal. We have refined and reinvigorated the series to prioritize its longer-term contribution to fostering a better and more balanced understanding of migrants and migration. We have strengthened our collaborative partnerships with scholars and applied researchers because we want to draw benefit from their varied expertise and knowledge. We made these changes to increase the World Migration Report's utility and enhance its contribution to the interconnected areas of migration policy, practice and research that has a strong evidence base.

The report also acknowledges IOM's continuing emphasis on migrants' rights and to paying closer attention to those migrants most in need of assistance. This has not come about since joining the UN but has involved sustained effort over recent years and decades, particularly (but not only) in the areas in which IOM works to provide humanitarian assistance to people who have been displaced, including by weather events, conflict and persecution, or to those who have become stranded. IOM provides assistance, support and services to those migrants who are in need, rather than those who have the capacity and means to navigate migration processes themselves. Likewise, IOM remains committed to supporting Member States in developing regions which can most benefit from technical support to enhance their capacity to manage migration, such as through statistical data collection, reporting and analysis, the development of border management and immigration policies and practices, and the practical integration of migrants in communities.

In this era of heightened interest and growing activity affecting migration and migrants, we hope this 2018 edition of the World Migration Report, IOM's flagship publication, is a close companion and a useful reference. We hope it helps you to make better sense of this challenging and dynamic topic as you endeavour to carry out actions and interventions that serve to improve the situation of migrants and the societies in which we all live.



William Lacy Swing
Director General



MARIE MCAULIFFE
MARTIN RUHS

1 REPORT OVERVIEW: MAKING SENSE OF MIGRATION IN AN INCREASINGLY INTERCONNECTED WORLD¹

Introduction

International migration is a complex phenomenon that touches on a multiplicity of economic, social and security aspects affecting our daily lives in an increasingly interconnected world. Migration is a term that encompasses a wide variety of movements and situations involving people of all walks of life and backgrounds. More than ever before, migration touches all States and people in an era of deepening globalization. Migration is intertwined with geopolitics, trade and cultural exchange, and provides opportunities for States, businesses and communities to benefit enormously. Migration has helped improve people's lives in both origin and destination countries and has offered opportunities for millions of people worldwide to forge safe and meaningful lives abroad. Not all migration occurs in positive circumstances, however. We have in recent years seen an increase in migration and displacement occurring due to conflict, persecution, environmental degradation and change, and a profound lack of human security and opportunity. While most international migration occurs legally, some of the greatest insecurities for migrants, and much of the public concern about immigration, is associated with irregular migration.

The prominence of migration as a public policy issue and newsworthy topic has perhaps never been more pronounced. Migration is increasingly seen as a high-priority policy issue by many governments, politicians and the broader public throughout the world. Its importance to economic prosperity, human development, and safety and security ensures that it will remain a top priority for the foreseeable future. This is becoming more pronounced at the national level as the focus on migration intensifies, but it is also evident at the international level. Incremental advancements in international cooperation on migration have taken a further step with States committing to agree a global compact for safe, orderly and regular migration in 2018.

Barely a day goes by without multiple media reports – whether in traditional or newer forms of media – focusing on aspects of migration, frequently on negative aspects. While this may reflect, in part, the changing nature of migration in certain regions of the world, it is important to be aware how media and news are constructed and produced – news reporting continues to place greater emphasis on “bad” news. Social media is widely acknowledged as a forum that provides little or no filter, with the consequence that there tends to be much greater emphasis on opinion than on facts and analysis. Amid the often polarized political, public and media discussions and debates on migration, evidence, knowledge and balanced analyses that encompass historical insights as well as strategic implications appear to have little space or traction. Nonetheless, such aspects continue to be critical to developing a better understanding of the various forms and manifestations of migration, as well as how best to enhance its opportunities and benefits and respond to the challenges that it can present.

Against a backdrop of growing interconnections between people and States, making migration safer and better regulated have become key global priorities. This is reflected, for example, in the United Nations 2016 New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, which sets out the intention of States to develop a global compact

1 Marie McAuliffe, Head, Migration Research Division, IOM and Martin Ruhs, Associate Professor of Political Economy at the University of Oxford. The opinions expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of any of the organizations or institutions with which the authors are affiliated.

on migration as well as a separate global compact on refugees by the end of 2018. The specific content and commitments agreed in these Compacts are still under discussion at the time of writing this report. However, the fact that States have agreed to discuss and negotiate these new instruments of global governance shows that there is growing recognition of the importance of improving our common understanding of the dynamics and complexities of international migration and displacement, and of addressing these issues at a global level.

In this context, the *World Migration Report 2018* seeks to use the body of available data and research to contribute to more evidence-based analysis and policy debates about some of the most important and pressing global migration issues of our time. By their very nature, the complex dynamics of global migration can never be fully measured, understood and regulated. However, as this report shows, we do have a continuously growing and improving body of data and evidence that can help us make better sense of the basic features of migration in an increasingly interconnected and interdependent world.

How is migration changing?

In most discussions on migration, the starting point is usually numbers. The current global estimate is that there were around 244 million international migrants in the world in 2015, which equates to 3.3 per cent of the global population.² A first important point to note is that this is a very small minority of the global population, meaning that remaining within one's country of birth overwhelmingly remains the norm. The great majority of people in the world do not migrate across borders; much larger numbers migrate within countries (an estimated 740 million internal migrants in 2009³). That said, the increase in international migrants has been evident over time – both numerically and proportionally – and at a greater rate than had been anticipated by some. For example, a 2003 projection was that by 2050 international migrants would account for 2.6 per cent of the global population or 230 million (a figure that has already been surpassed).⁴ In contrast, in 2010, a revised projection for 2050 was 405 million international migrants globally.⁵ However, in formulating global population projections (of which international migration is one part) demographers note that “international migration was the variable that had shown the greatest volatility in the past and was therefore most difficult to project with some accuracy”.⁶ Notwithstanding this uncertainty, which is in part related to significant economic and geopolitical events (such as the global financial crisis in 2008 and the current conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic), it is likely that the underlying fundamentals related to increasing connectivity will see the trend continue. Given the considerable rise in migration in certain parts of the world over the past few years, it is likely that the next estimate of the global number of international migrants produced by UN DESA will show a further rise in the scale of international migration and perhaps also in the proportion of migrants in the global population.

In recent years we have also seen a significant increase in displacement, both internal and across borders, which has largely stemmed from civil and transnational conflict, including acts of violent extremism outside actual war zones. Current data indicate that in 2016 there were 40.3 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) worldwide and 22.5 million refugees.⁷ Further, the total number of people estimated to have been displaced globally is the

2 UN DESA, 2016.

3 UNDP, 2009.

4 See, for example, IOM's 2003 *World Migration Report*, which drew upon UN population data (UN DESA, 2002) and migration data (IOM, 2000).

5 IOM, 2010.

6 UN DESA, 2003.

7 IDMC, 2017; UNHCR, 2017.

highest on record. At the time of writing, more than half a million Rohingya refugees had fled from Myanmar to Bangladesh since late August 2017, adding further to the world's displaced population. It is likely that 2017 estimates of displacement will remain as high as the 2016 global figure, if not reaching higher.

When considered together, these numbers paint a concerning picture of migration and displacement globally, and more pointedly, they indicate that such large numbers of people moving (including under duress) are related in part to significant events, such as conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic.⁸ The global migration picture must, therefore, be seen as a sum of many parts and it is important to put recent developments in specific regions into global and historical contexts. Migration corridors that have developed over time often have a foundation in geographic proximity, but they are also shaped by trade and economic factors, conflict and human (in)security, and community and ethnic ties, as well as smuggling and trafficking. Further chapters in this report examine these aspects, including by geographic region (see chapter 3); a global overview of migration and migrants is presented in chapter 2.

Notwithstanding a natural tendency to focus on the challenges that migration presents, so that they can be better understood and therefore managed, it is well worth revisiting briefly what we know about some of the considerable benefits of migration. In a period of heightened internal and international displacement (and related irregular migration), the enormous benefits of migration can become somewhat lost in the debate. The need to rebalance considerations of migration has been recognized by many international organizations, and there has been a recent resurgence in critical examinations of the relationship between human development, economic growth and migration at the global level. Recent work by the IMF, McKinsey Global Institute and the OECD, as well as the ongoing work of the World Bank and regional development banks, highlight the importance of ensuring that we remain focused on the successes of migration as well as the challenges.

Benefits of migration

Migration can generate very large benefits for migrants, their families and countries of origin. The wages that migrants earn abroad can be many multiples of what they could earn doing similar jobs at home. For example, a study conducted in 2009 found that the ratio of wages earned by workers in the United States to wages earned by identical workers (with the same country of birth, years of schooling, age and sex, and rural/urban residence) abroad ranges from 15.45 (for workers born in Yemen) to 1.99 (workers born in the Dominican Republic), with a median ratio of 4.11.⁹ The wage differences and relative income gains from migration are largest for lower-skilled workers, whose international movements around the world are the most restricted.¹⁰ The increase in migrants' earnings can also lead to considerable improvements in the welfare and human development of migrants' families, either directly if they are with the migrant in the host country, or indirectly through remittances. Importantly, the beneficial effects of migration for migrants and their families go beyond economic impacts and frequently include improvements in other dimensions of human development, such as education and health.¹¹ For example, according to a recent report by the World Bank, "migrants from the poorest countries, on average, experienced a 15-fold increase in income, a doubling of school enrolment rates, and a 16-fold reduction in child mortality after moving to a developed country".¹²

8 UN DESA, 2017.

9 See Clemens, Montenegro and Pritchett, 2009.

10 See, for example, the influential study by Gibson and McKenzie (2011), which evaluated the costs and benefits for migrant workers from participating in new low-skilled labour immigration programmes in Australia and New Zealand.

11 See UNDP, 2009.

12 World Bank, 2016.

In addition to benefiting individual migrants and their families, there is a large research literature that evidences the wider beneficial effects that emigration can have for migrants' countries of origin.¹³ Emigration can reduce unemployment and underemployment, contribute to poverty reduction, and – with the appropriate supportive policies – foster broader economic and social development in origin countries in a variety of ways. For example, the remittances sent by migrants back to their countries of origin provide significant financial capital flows and a relatively stable source of income. Remittances are generally a less volatile and more reliable source of foreign currency than other capital flows in many developing countries.¹⁴ According to the World Bank, in 1990 migrants remitted around USD 29 billion to lower- and middle-income countries in 1990.¹⁵ This amount had more than doubled to USD 74 billion in 2000 and reached USD 429 billion in 2016.¹⁶ Globally, remittances are now more than three times the amount of official development assistance. Migration can also result in the transfer of skills, knowledge and technology – effects that are hard to measure, but that could have considerable positive impacts on productivity and economic growth. Beyond these economic impacts, emigration can generate beneficial societal consequences for countries of origin, including poor and fragile States. For example, it is increasingly recognized that migrants can play a significant role in post-conflict reconstruction and recovery.¹⁷

There is widespread agreement that migration can also generate economic and other benefits for destination countries. The precise nature and size of these benefits at a given time critically depends on the extent to which the skills of migrants are complementary to those of domestic workers, as well as on the characteristics of the host economy. In general, immigration adds workers to the economy, thus increasing the gross domestic product (GDP) of the host country. There are also a variety of ways in which migrants can have positive effects on labour productivity and GDP per head, e.g. if migrants are more skilled than national workers and/or if immigration has positive effects for innovation and skills agglomeration.¹⁸ By nature or necessity, migrants are often more likely to be risk takers, and this quality has led to enormous contributions to many destination countries in areas such as technology, science, the arts and a range of other fields. In addition to enhancing national income and average living standards in destination countries, immigration can have a positive effect on the labour market by increasing labour supply in sectors and occupations suffering from shortages of workers, as well as helping address mismatches in the job market. These positive labour market effects are not just evident in high-skilled sectors, but can also occur in lower-skilled occupations.¹⁹ Immigration increases both the supply of and the demand for labour, which means that labour immigration (including of lower-skilled workers) can generate additional employment opportunities for existing workers. Of course, immigration can also have adverse labour market effects (e.g. on wages and employment of domestic workers), but most of the research literature finds that these negative impacts tend to be quite small, at least on average. Beyond the labour market and macroeconomy, the immigration of young workers can also help with easing pressures on pensions systems of high-income countries with rapidly ageing populations. Finally, in contrast to popular perceptions, a recent OECD study found that the net fiscal effects of immigration, i.e. the taxes migrants pay minus the benefits and government services they receive, tend to be quite small and – for most OECD countries analysed in the study – positive.²⁰

13 For a recent brief review, see, for example, World Bank, 2017. Also see UNDP, 2009.

14 World Bank, 2016.

15 World Bank Databank, 2017.

16 World Bank, 2017.

17 For a critical discussion of different forms of diaspora engagement in conflict settings, see, for example, Van Hear, 2011.

18 For a review of the research evidence on these issues, see, for example, Migration Advisory Committee, 2014.

19 See Ruhs and Anderson, 2010.

20 OECD, 2013.

The World Migration Report Series

IOM's first World Migration Report (WMR) was published in 2000, initially as a one-off publication designed to increase the understanding of migration by policymakers and the general public. Its contribution to migration policy as well as migration studies was timely, and its success heralded the world migration report series. Since 2000, nine world migration reports have been produced by IOM (see text box below) and it has become the organization's flagship publication series. Its continued strong focus is on making a relevant, sound and evidence-based contribution that increases the understanding of migration by policymakers, practitioners, researchers and the general public.

World Migration Report 2000

World Migration Report 2003: Managing Migration – Challenges and Responses for People on the Move

World Migration Report 2005: Costs and Benefits of International Migration

World Migration Report 2008: Managing Labour Mobility in the Evolving Global Economy

World Migration Report 2010: The Future of Migration: Building Capacities for Change

World Migration Report 2011: Communicating Effectively about Migration

World Migration Report 2013: Migrant Well-Being and Development

World Migration Report 2015: Migrants and Cities: New Partnerships to Manage Mobility

World Migration Report 2018

At a time of heightened concern of migration, and its increasing complexity and growing interlinkages with a multitude of other public policy issues, there is an even stronger case for maintaining the series' contribution to understanding migration. However, as the profile of migration has increased, so too has its various manifestations and its increasingly complex processes, including those that are becoming more transnational in nature. It is not hard to comprehend why people may at times feel overwhelmed by what they may read in media on migration, some of which may confound and confuse readers rather than clarify in a balanced way some of the complexities that continue to emerge under the ever-widening umbrella-term of "migration". In light of this, the world migration report series has been refined in order to focus on two key contributions for readers:

- Part I: key information on migration and migrants (including migration-related statistics).
- Part II: balanced, evidence-based analysis of complex and emerging migration issues.

It is our intention that the two parts of this and future world migration reports, therefore, provide both overview information that helps to explain migration patterns and processes globally and regionally, as well as insights and recommendations on major issues that policymakers are or will soon be grappling with. Refinement of the series is also in recognition that as the focus on, and complexity of, migration intensifies, reports limited to a single theme have the potential to understate or miss entirely the broader changes that are occurring in migration transformations globally. A world migration report series that is better able to provide overview information on migration and migrants along with analyses of more topical issues, is more likely to be an important resource for a greater number of people. In addition, we are cognizant that IOM's capacity as a publisher of migration-related material provides ample opportunity for thematic reports to be produced outside of the world migration report series (see, for example, the discussion in chapter 4 on IOM's research-related publications).

A further consideration of the series is its intended “value-add”. As an intergovernmental organization, and a new United Nations related organization, it is critical that IOM ensures the world migration report serves the public in providing information and analysis that is relevant, accessible, sound, accurate and balanced. IOM also recognizes, however, the existing substantial published material on migration, and so the world migration report must also be able to serve as a significant reference publication on migration that is able to draw on existing body of evidence and knowledge. Given recent work on migration governance, such as IOM’s Migration Governance Framework and the Migration Governance Index (now called Migration Governance Indicators) produced in collaboration with the Economist Intelligence Unit, the need to avoid duplication or significant overlap is a genuine one. In this way, the world migration report series has been reframed to offer a strategic focus on complex and emerging issues facing migration policymakers, rather than describe or assess current policy and governance on migration. The series is intended to complement rather than duplicate existing work.

World Migration Report 2018

This edition of the world migration report is the first in the revised series designed to better contribute to understandings of current and strategic migration issues. Part I, on “key data and information on migration”, includes separate chapters on global migration trends and patterns; regional dimensions and developments; and a discussion of recent contributions to migration research and analysis by academia and a wide range of different organizations, including IOM. These three chapters have been produced institutionally by IOM, drawing primarily on analyses by IOM experts, practitioners and officials around the world based on data from a wide range of relevant organizations.²¹

The six chapters in Part II are authored by applied and academic researchers working on migration and mobility. They cover a range of “complex and emerging migration issues” including:

- the development of global governance frameworks for international migration;
- the relationship between migration and rapidly changing levels and types of transnational connectivities;
- migrants’ perspectives on migration journeys;
- media reporting on migration and migrants;
- the relationships between migration and violent extremism; and
- migrants and cities.

While the choice of these topics is necessarily selective and subjective, all the chapters in Part II of this report are directly relevant to some of the most prominent and important debates about migration in the world today. Many of these topics lie at the heart of the conundrums that face policymakers as they seek to formulate effective, proportionate and constructive responses to complex public policy issues related to migration. Accordingly, the chapters aim to inform current and future policy debates by providing a clear identification of the key issues and questions, a critical overview of relevant research and analysis, and a discussion of the implications for future research and policymaking. The chapters are not meant to be prescriptive, in the sense of advocating particular policy “solutions”, but informative and helpful to what can be highly contested debates that preclude “silver bullet” solutions. In many of the chapters, the need to formulate multifaceted responses that take into account relevant evidence as well as emerging strategic issues is highlighted as critical for migration policy and practice.

21 Guy Abel, a global expert on migration data, also contributed to the analysis in this part, especially to the analysis and presentation of statistical data in chapter 3.

All the chapters of the *World Migration Report 2018* are relatively self-contained and can also be downloaded as individual chapters and contributions. There are, however, a number of important cross-cutting themes and issues that are discussed throughout the report. For example, a major cross-cutting issue relates to the important *variations* of migration and its impacts, as well as of public and policy debates about migrants, across space (e.g. between different countries and regions), demographic groups (e.g. by gender and age), and/or across different levels of governance (distinguishing, for example, between policymaking and debates at the level of cities, subnational regions, States, world regions and globally). The report's emphasis on highlighting geographic, demographic and political variations is meant to provide a more nuanced and – we argue – more accurate picture of global migration, than the highly simplified and often misleading pictures of global migration sometimes painted by popular media reports. To be more effective and evidence-based, public and policy debates on global migration issues need to be aware and take account of these important variations.

A second key issue discussed and highlighted throughout the report is that migration is not an isolated phenomenon that can be effectively analysed, debated and regulated without considering a range of important interconnections across:

- “space” (e.g. between policies of different countries), scale and levels of governance (e.g. linking cities, regions, States, supranational and global governance structures);
- migration types, categories and policies (e.g. considering the links and often blurred lines between migration for work, protection, family reasons and study);
- “time” (e.g. across temporary and permanent migration flows and policies); and
- migration and wider public policies (such as labour market policies, welfare policies, education and training, housing policies, etc.).

These interconnections and linkages are critical to understanding and responding to global migration and mobility.

Overall, the *World Migration Report 2018* thus suggests that, to make better sense of migration and regulate migration more effectively, we need to be aware of and consider the important geographic, demographic and geopolitical variations of migration issues, as well as to recognize the many interconnections in the analysis and policymaking on migration. Although these fundamental insights are in many ways obvious, they are frequently ignored in public and policy debates on migration and migrants around the world. They should instead be at the heart of debates about migration, including the current international debates about how to develop a new global compact on migration as well as a global compact on refugees. Where relevant, the various chapters of this report highlight key insights and implications for these two global compacts.

Part I

Chapter 2 provides an overview of global data and trends on international migrants (stocks) and international migration (flows). It also provides a discussion of particular migrant groups – namely, migrant workers, refugees, asylum seekers and IDPs – as well as of remittances. In addition, the chapter highlights the growing body of IOM programmatic data, particularly on missing migrants, assisted voluntary returns and reintegration, migrant health, resettlement, displacement tracking, diaspora mapping and human trafficking. While these data are generally not global or representative, they can provide insights into changes that have occurred in relevant IOM programming and operations globally. The chapter also discusses key data gaps and challenges.

Following the global overview, chapter 3 provides a discussion of key regional dimensions of, and developments in, migration. The discussion focuses on six world regions as applied by UN DESA: Africa, Asia, Europe,

Latin America and the Caribbean, Northern America and Oceania. For each of these regions, the analysis includes: i) an overview and brief discussion of key population-related statistics; and ii) succinct descriptions of “key features and developments” in migration in the region, based on a wide range of data, information and analyses, including from international organizations, researchers and analysts. To account for the diversity of migration patterns, trends and issues within each of the six regions, descriptive narratives of “key features and recent developments” are presented at the subregional level.

There is a substantial amount of research and analysis on migration that is being undertaken and published by a range of actors such as academics, governments, intergovernmental organizations and think tanks. Chapter 4 provides a selective overview of such contributions, focusing mainly on academics and intergovernmental organizations and covering the period 2015–2016. The knowledge derived from rigorous analysis and research can and should play an important role in informing people, including policymakers and migration practitioners, about the changing world around us, including migration. Understanding the variety, nature and characteristics of the different types of research and analysis being produced on migration is important for people who may be studying migration, working on migration policies or in migration practice, or trying to develop a better understanding of migration.

Part II

Chapter 5 critically discusses the global governance of international migration. The chapter first reviews some of the major global norms and institutions relevant to the global governance of migration and then discusses the following three themes and recent developments:

- key dialogues and initiatives instrumental to building momentum and confidence towards greater action at the global level;
- specific initiatives build normative frameworks to enhance protection of migrants;
- the integration of international migration into global-level responses on other issues.

The chapter argues that the step-by-step process of consultation, cooperation and confidence-building that has taken place to date has shown that progress can occur, albeit in incremental ways. The authors of the chapter suggest that this incremental progress remains the most promising path towards more effective global migration governance.

Recent advances in transportation and telecommunications technology have heralded massive changes in how we access information and interact globally in real time. Increasing transnational connectivity is shaping how people move internationally in ways that were not previously possible. Chapter 6 examines what this increasing transnational connectivity means for mobility and migration, and how related processes are being shaped. Following a brief overview of the key advances in transportation and telecommunications technology globally, the chapter discusses how transnational connectivity is affecting migration processes via impacts on migrants, non-State actors and States. The authors provide examples of how transnational connectivity can affect these different migration actors and conclude with implications for migration governance, including the global compact on migration.

Chapter 7 discusses the importance of understanding migration from migrants’ perspectives, principally by listening to and learning from migrants through rigorous research. While all migrants make decisions before and during their journeys – some decisions being of greater consequence than others, and even involving life and death scenarios – this chapter focuses more on people who have fewer means and more restricted

choices. The chapter first provides a brief discussion of migrants' self-agency (i.e. migrants' abilities to make and act upon decisions and choices) and the continuum of agency that explains variations in choice when it comes to migrating. It then analyses four key issues and factors that can have important impacts on migrants' considerations and decisions during the migration process: (mis)information, preference for visas, risk and reward, and pressures to migrate. The chapter also reviews recent advances in research methods and technology that are making migrant-centric research more feasible globally. The authors argue that better understandings of migrants' choices about migration and migration journeys are of fundamental importance to more effective policymaking on migration. Their chapter concludes with implications for research and policy initiatives, including those related to the global compact on migration.

The media can play an important role in shaping how and what people think about migration, including policymakers and migrants themselves. Chapter 8 critically discusses media reporting on migrants and migration. Drawing on existing research in different countries, the analysis addresses four key questions: What do media around the world say about migration and migrants? What impacts does this coverage have on what members of the public, policymakers and migrants themselves think and do? How does the practice of journalism itself contribute to coverage? What implications arise from recent experiences of media and migration for future research and practice? The authors argue that variations of media coverage of migration partly reflect the considerable differences in how countries' media systems operate. While there is a growing body of research on the relationships between media, public opinion and policies on migration, the authors argue that much more research needs to be done into the role of the media in transit and origin countries – and particularly migrants' own use of, and preferences for, different types of media. This is especially important for understanding how and to what extent information sources shape perceptions.

Around the world, a number of political leaders, reflecting varying degrees of popular sentiment, are linking migrants and migration with the rising threat of violent extremism. Recognizing that this is a sensitive topic that has attracted significant media attention, chapter 9 provides an analysis of the existing evidence on the relationships between migration, violent extremism and social exclusion. The chapter starts with a brief overview of definitions and data, emphasizing the need for analytical clarity, pointing to a shortage of reliable data, and highlighting the challenge of distinguishing causation from correlation. Next, a simple typology of the intersections between migration and violent extremism is developed, following the logic of the migration cycle from departure to settlement and, at times, return. The chapter ends with a series of preliminary implications for further policy debate.

Chapter 10 is a follow-up to *World Migration Report 2015*, which was devoted to a single theme: the relationship between migration and the cities of the world. Building on the foundations of *WMR 2015*, the chapter looks at the role of the modern city in migration governance, taking advantage of some of the recent research on the evolving nature of cities and their roles in the world. This includes discussion of sanctuary cities and, more generally, the role of cities in responding to the recent large-scale displacements and migrations. The authors argue that the continuing growth in the influence of cities over social and economic affairs and over migration trajectories, both international and internal, demands greater attention from both scholars and policymakers.

Overall, this world migration report has been produced to help deepen our collective understanding of the various manifestations and complexities of migration. We hope that all readers are able to learn something new from this edition, as well as to draw on its contents as they undertake their work, study or other activities.

PART I

DATA AND INFORMATION ON MIGRATION







2

MIGRATION AND MIGRANTS: A GLOBAL OVERVIEW

Introduction

Human migration is an age-old phenomenon that stretches back to the earliest periods of human history. In the modern era, emigration and immigration continue to provide States, societies and migrants with many opportunities. At the same time, migration has emerged in the last few years as a critical political and policy challenge in matters such as integration, displacement, safe migration and border management. In 2015, there were an estimated 244 million international migrants globally (3.3% of the world's population) — an increase from an estimated 155 million people in 2000 (2.8% of the world's population).²² Internal migration is even more prevalent, with the most recent global estimate indicating that more than 740 million people had migrated within their own country of birth.²³

It is important to understand international migration and its various manifestations in order to effectively address evolving migration dynamics, while at the same time adequately accounting for the diverse and varied needs of migrants. International movement is becoming more feasible, partly thanks to the digital revolution, distance-shrinking technology and reductions in travel costs.²⁴ Factors underpinning migration are numerous, relating to economic prosperity, inequality, demography, violence and conflict, and environmental change. While the overwhelming majority of people migrate internationally for reasons related to work, family and study, many people leave their homes and countries for other compelling reasons, such as conflict, persecution and disaster. Overall, displaced populations such as refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) comprise a relatively small percentage of all migrants; however, they often capture and demand collective attention and action as they frequently find themselves in highly vulnerable situations. These are the people who are often most in need of assistance.

This chapter, with its focus on key global migration data and trends, seeks to assist migration policymakers, practitioners and researchers in making better sense of the bigger picture of migration, by providing an overview of information on migration and migrants. The chapter draws upon sources of data compiled by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the International Labour Organization (ILO), the World Bank, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM). The chapter provides an overview of global data and trends on international migrants (stocks) and international migration (flows). It also provides a discussion of particular migrant groups – namely, migrant workers, refugees, asylum seekers and IDPs – as well as of remittances. In addition, the chapter highlights the growing body of programmatic IOM data, particularly on missing migrants, assisted voluntary returns and reintegration, migrant health, resettlement,

22 UN DESA, 2015a.

23 UNDP, 2009.

24 See, for example, chapter 6 of this report on transnational connectivity.

displacement tracking, diaspora mapping and human trafficking. While these data are generally not global or representative, they can provide insights into changes that have occurred in relevant programming and operations globally. As the United Nation's new migration agency, with activities relevant to all the themes discussed in this chapter, IOM has the capacity to provide further insights on migration and its various dynamics, including the diverse needs of migrants.

This chapter also highlights the challenges in achieving comparability and uniformity in data collection that make a comprehensive analysis of global migration trends difficult. Recent and ongoing efforts to collect and improve data have led to an expansion in available migration data. However, issues of fragmentation, and lack of uniformity and comparability, remain key challenges in developing a truly global picture of all key aspects of migration.²⁵ Similarly, defining migration and migrants is complex, as discussed in the text box below.

Defining migration, migrant and other key terms

Outside of general definitions of *migration* and *migrant*, such as those found in dictionaries, there exist various specific definitions of key migration-related terms, including in legal, administrative, research and statistical spheres.^a There is no universally agreed definition of *migration* or *migrant*, however, several definitions are widely accepted and have been developed in different settings, such as those set out in UN DESA's 1998 *Recommendations on Statistics of International Migration*.^b

Technical definitions, concepts and categories of migrants and migration are necessarily informed by geographic, legal, political, methodological, temporal and other factors. For example, there are numerous ways in which migration events can be defined, including in relation to place of birth, citizenship, place of residence and duration of stay.^c This is important when it comes to quantifying and analysing the effects of migration and migrants (however defined). We encourage readers to refer to primary sources cited in the chapter for information on specific definitions and categorizations underlying the data. A summary of key technical definitions of migration-related terms is provided in appendix A.

Readers may also find the IOM *Glossary on Migration* to be a useful reference. The glossary is available at the IOM online bookstore: www.publications.iom.int/.

a See, for example, Poulain and Perrin, 2001.

b UN DESA, 1998.

c See, for example, de Beer et al., 2010.

25 In general, explanatory notes, caveats, limitations and methodologies on specific sources of data can be extensive and are therefore not included in this chapter. However, sources have been clearly identified so that readers can refer to them.

International migrants: numbers and trends

UN DESA produces estimates of the number of international migrants globally. The following discussion draws on its estimates, which are based on data provided by States.²⁶

The *United Nations Recommendations on Statistics of International Migration* defines an *international migrant* as any person who has changed his or her country of usual residence, distinguishing between “short-term migrants” (those who have changed their country of usual residence for at least three months, but less than one year) and “long-term migrants” (those who have done so for at least one year). However, not all countries use this definition in practice.²⁷ Some countries use different criteria to identify international migrants by, for example, applying different minimum durations of residence. Differences in concepts and definitions, as well as data collection methodologies between countries, hinder full comparability of national statistics on international migrants.

Overall, the estimated number of international migrants has increased over the past four-and-a-half decades. The total estimated 244 million people living in a country other than their country of birth in 2015 is almost 100 million more than in 1990 (when it was 153 million), and over three times the estimated number in 1970 (84 million; see table 1).²⁸ While the proportion of international migrants globally has increased over this period, it is evident that the vast majority of people continue to live in the country in which they were born. Most international migrants in 2015 (around 72%) were of working age (20 to 64 years of age), with a slight decrease in migrants aged less than 20 between 2000 and 2015 (17% to 15%), and a constant share (around 12%) of international migrants aged 65 years or more since 2000.

Table 1. International migrants, 1970–2015

Year	Number of migrants	Migrants as a % of world's population
1970	84,460,125	2.3%
1975	90,368,010	2.2%
1980	101,983,149	2.3%
1985	113,206,691	2.3%
1990	152,563,212	2.9%
1995	160,801,752	2.8%
2000	172,703,309	2.8%
2005	191,269,100	2.9%
2010	221,714,243	3.2%
2015	243,700,236	3.3%

Source: UN DESA, 2008 and 2015a.

Note: The number of entities (such as States, territories and administrative regions) for which data were made available in the 2015 UN DESA *Revision of International Migrant Stock* was 213. In 1970, the number of entities was 135.


26 Data are also provided to UN DESA by territories and administrative units. For a summary on UN DESA stock data sources, methodology and caveats, please see UN DESA, 2015b.

27 UN DESA, 1998.


28 UN DESA, 2008.

Snapshot of International Migrants

The international migrant population globally has increased in size but remained relatively stable as a proportion of the world's population




The proportion of international migrants varies significantly around the world




Note: Names and boundaries indicated on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by IOM.

244 million international migrants in 2015 out of a global population of 7.3 billion:
1 in every 30 people



52% of international migrants are male, 48% are female




Most international migrants (72%) are of working age (20-64) years

* Age groups above 75 years omitted (male 4.5%, female 6.8%).

Note: Snapshot based on infographics by IOM's Migration Research Division and Global Migration Data Analysis Centre (IOM, 2017d), which draw on UN DESA data (UN DESA, 2015a).

Europe and Asia hosted around 75 million migrants each in 2015 – 62 per cent of the total global international migrant stock combined (see figure 1). These regions were followed by North America, with 54 million international migrants in 2015 or 22 per cent of the global migrant stock, Africa at 9 per cent, Latin America and the Caribbean at 4 per cent, and Oceania at 3 per cent. When compared with the size of the population in each region, shares of international migrants in 2015 were highest in Oceania, North America and Europe, where international migrants represented, respectively, 21 per cent, 15 per cent and 10 per cent of the total population.²⁹ In comparison, the share of international migrants is relatively small in Asia and Africa (1.7% each) and Latin America (1.5%). However, Asia is the region where growth in the resident migrant population between 2000 and 2015 was most remarkable, at over 50 per cent (around 25 million people, in absolute terms).³⁰

Figure 1. International migrants, by major region of residence, 2000 to 2015 (millions)



Source: UN DESA, 2015a. Datasets available from www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates15.shtml (accessed 22 June 2017).

The United States of America has been the main country of destination for international migrants since 1970.³¹ Since then, the number of foreign-born people residing in the country has almost quadrupled — from less than 12 million in 1970, to 46.6 million in 2015. Germany has been the second top country of destination per UN DESA estimates since as early as 2005, with over 12 million international migrants residing in the country in 2015. Prior to 2005, the Russian Federation had been the second largest host country of international migrants for roughly 15 years, since the fall of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1991. A list of the top 20 destination countries of international migrants is provided in the left-hand column of figure 2 below.


²⁹ UN DESA, 2015a.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ UN DESA, 2008; UN DESA, 2015a.

The list of largest migrant source countries is shown in the right-hand panel in figure 2. Nearly half of all international migrants worldwide in 2015 were born in Asia,³² primarily originating from India (the largest country of origin), China, and other South Asian countries such as Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan. Mexico was the second largest country of origin, followed by a number of European countries that have sizable numbers of emigrants.

Figure 2. Top 20 destinations (left) and origins (right) of international migrants in 2015 (millions)



Source: UN DESA, 2015a. Datasets for the 2015 Revision available at www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates15.shtml.

In regard to the distribution of international migrants by countries' income group,³³ about two thirds of international migrants resided in high-income economies in 2015 – around 157 million. This compares with 77 million foreign-born who resided in middle-income countries (about one third of the total migrant stock) and almost 9 million in low-income countries in the same year.

UN DESA estimates of foreign-born populations do not reflect immigration status or policy categories (such as students, highly skilled migrants, or refugees). Capturing such attributes is inherently difficult for several key reasons. First, a person's immigration status can be fluid and change quickly, arising from circumstances and legal-policy settings. For example, many international migrants who may be described as “undocumented” or “irregular” enter countries on valid visas and then stay in contravention of one or more visa conditions. In fact, there are many paths to irregularity, such as crossing borders without authorization, unlawfully overstaying a visa period, working in contravention of visa conditions, being born into irregularity, or remaining after a negative decision on an asylum application has been made.³⁴ Second, countries have different immigration policy settings and different ways of collecting data on migrants, which makes it difficult to establish a harmonized approach to capturing irregular migrant stocks globally. The pace of change in the migration policy arena also poses an extra dimension of complexity, as people may slip into and out of “irregularity”. Various analysts use different methods to produce intermittent estimates of irregular migrant populations. Table 2 shows a few existing estimates of irregular migrant populations in selected countries and regions. However, these should be treated with caution, as the estimation exercise can often be imprecise (for example, there are variations in the estimates of irregular migrant populations in the European Union and the United States). This is partly a reflection of the problematic nature of quantifying irregular migrant populations, given the often clandestine nature of irregularity, the difficulty in accessing administrative data on immigration status, and the fact that a migrant's status can change.³⁵ Migration flows are discussed in the following section.

Diaspora populations or transnational communities?

The term *diaspora* is used in academic and policy circles to refer to people (and often their descendants) from a specific country who are living abroad. However, there is no single agreed-upon definition of the term. In fact, it has been suggested that the term *transnational communities* may better describe the reality of contemporary migration experiences, where migrants may establish and maintain connections with people in their home communities or migrants in other countries. Indeed, IOM uses the terms *diaspora* and *transnational communities* interchangeably (IOM, 2017c). See appendix B for a further discussion on the term *diaspora* and the difficulties in quantifying global diaspora populations, as well as IOM's work in this area.

33 Per World Bank Country Income Group Classifications, in *World Bank Country and Lending Groups*. Available from <http://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519-world-bank-country-and-lending-groups> (World Bank, n.d.a).

34 Gordon et al., 2009.

35 Koser, 2010.

Table 2. Estimates of irregular migrant populations in selected countries and regions

Country/region	Year	Estimated population (stock)	Source
Australia	2011	58,400	(a)
European Union	2008	1.9–3.8 million	(b)
	2008	8 million	(c)
Germany	2014	180,000–520,000	(d)
Greece	2011	390,000	(e)
Israel	2015	150,000	(f)
Italy	2008	279,000–461,000	(b)
Russian Federation*	2011	5–6 million	(g)
South Africa	2010	3–6 million	(h)
Spain	2008	354,000	(i)
United Kingdom	2007	417,000–863,000	(j)
United States	2014	11.1 million	(k)
	2016	11.3 million	(k)

* Estimate refers to irregular migrant workers.

Source: (a) ANAO, 2013; (b) Clandestino Research Project, 2009a; (c) Frontex, 2010; (d) Clandestino Research Project, 2015; (e) Clandestino Research Project, 2012; (f) Fleischman et al., 2015; (g) OECD, 2012a; (h) South African Police Service, 2010; (i) Clandestino Research Project, 2009b; (j) Gordon et al., 2009; (k) Krogstad, Passel and Cohn, 2017.

International migration flows: definitions, numbers and gaps

While data on migrant stocks are widely available, data on global migration movements (flows) are much more limited. Available UN DESA estimates on global migrant stocks are extensive and global in scope; however, the database of migration flows only encompasses 45 countries.³⁶ Capturing data on migration flows is challenging for several reasons. First, while international migration flows are generally accepted as covering inflows and outflows into and from countries, there has been a greater focus on recording inflows. For example, while countries such as Australia and the United States count cross-border movements, many others only count entries and not departures.³⁷ Additionally, migration flow data in some countries are derived from administrative events related to immigration status (for example, issuance/renewal/withdrawal of a residence

36 Laczko, 2017.

37 Koser, 2010.

permit) and are thus used as a proxy for migration flows. Furthermore, migratory movements are often hard to separate from non-migratory travel, such as tourism or business. Tracking migratory movements also requires considerable resources, infrastructure and IT/knowledge systems. This poses particular challenges for developing countries, where the ability to collect, administer, analyse and report data on mobility, migration and other areas is often limited. Finally, many countries' physical geographies pose tremendous challenges for collecting data on migration flows. Entry and border management, for example, is particularly challenging in some regions because of archipelagic and isolated borders, and it is further complicated by traditions of informal migration for work.³⁸

Migration flows

There are currently two main international datasets on international migration flows, both of which are derived from national statistics: UN DESA's International Migration Flows dataset and OECD's International Migration Database.³⁹ Since 2005, UN DESA has compiled data on the flows of international migrants to and from selected countries, based on nationally available statistics. The latest revision (2015) comprises data from 45 countries that collect this information (only 43 on emigration flows), up from 29 countries in 2008 and 15 countries in 2005.⁴⁰ Progress in extending the dataset is encouraging; however, the ability to conduct trend analysis is limited.⁴¹

Researchers and analysts have made numerous attempts to better understand global or regional migration flows by using changes in migrant stock data as a proxy for flow data. Guy Abel and Nikola Sander recently undertook a sophisticated approach to this issue by analysing changes in international migrant stocks to estimate migration flows, visualizing data using circular plots.⁴² Figure 3 provides an update to this work by presenting estimated migration flows between 2010 and 2015.⁴³

38 Gallagher and McAuliffe, 2016.

39 Other projects have made contributions to the monitoring of migration flows at a regional (non-global) level. Of note, the *Migration Modelling for Statistical Analyses (MIMOSA)* project (commissioned by Eurostat) measured migration flows (immigration and emigration) as well as population stocks in Europe (de Beer, van der Erf and Raymer, 2009; Raymer et al., 2011). The *Integrated Modelling of European Migration (IMEM)* project (Raymer et al., 2013) notably presents bilateral migrant flow data disaggregated by age and gender, but is also limited to countries in Europe.


40 For UN DESA migrant flow data, as well as for the specific countries included, please see UN DESA, 2015c.

41 For a summary of UN DESA migrant flow data sources, methodology and caveats, please see UN DESA, 2015d.

42 Abel and Sander, 2014.

43 Prepared by Guy Abel in 2017.

Figure 3. Estimated regional migration flows, 2010–2015



Source: UN DESA, 2015a. Datasets for the 2015 revision of International migration flows to and from selected countries available from www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/empirical2/migrationflows.shtml.


Note: The direction of the flow is indicated by the arrowhead. The size of the flow is determined by the width of the arrow at its base. Numbers on the outer section axis, used to read the size of migration flows, are in millions. So, for example, between 2010 and 2015, there was an increase of around 4 million people in Northern America who were born in Asia.

The OECD data on migration flows have been collected since 2000, which allows for limited trend analysis, as shown in figure 4 (though data are not standardized, as explained in the note under the figure).⁴⁴ The data estimates suggest that permanent migration inflows to OECD countries increased from 3.85 million in 2000 to 7.13 million in 2015, with a temporary lull occurring around the time of the global financial crisis (figure 4). Germany was the main OECD destination country in 2015, with over 2 million new international migrants (more than double the levels registered in 2000) arriving that year, followed by the United States (just over 1 million) and the United Kingdom (about 480,000 new migrants).⁴⁵

⁴⁴ This subsection is based on data from the OECD International Migration Database, available from OECD, 2015. For additional data on migrant flows and other migrant data in OECD countries, please see OECD, n.d.a.

⁴⁵ These are the top OECD countries for permanent inflows of foreign nationals for which data were made available in 2015.

Figure 4. Inflows of foreign nationals into OECD countries, permanent migration, 2000–2015 (millions)



Source: OECD, 2015.

Note 1: Data are not standardized and therefore differ from statistics on permanent migration inflows into selected countries contained in OECD's International Migration Outlook 2016 (OECD, 2016a and 2016b).

Note 2: The 35 countries typically included in OECD statistics are the following: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Latvia, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States. In some years, data for particular countries are not made available: data were made available for 31 countries in 2000, and 33 countries in 2015. Notably, data for Greece have not been reported since 2012 and data for Turkey have not been reported since 2010.

Disaggregation of migration flow data by sex and age

Data on age and sex profiles of international migration flows are not available from UN DESA or OECD. A methodology for sex disaggregation of bilateral migration flows using UN DESA stock data is presented in Abel, Samir and Sander.^d Raymer et al.^e provide bilateral migration flow estimates by sex and age, but only for European countries. Finally, Nawrotzki and Jiang^f estimated bilateral *net* migration flows disaggregated by age and sex for the year 2000; the information is contained in the publicly available Community Demographic Model International Migration (CDM-IM) dataset. Statistics on bilateral migration flows are also available from the Determinants of International Migration (DEMIG) Country-to-Country database, which contains bilateral migration flow data for up to 34 countries over the period 1946–2011. The database also provides gender breakdowns, where available.

d Abel, Samir and Sander, 2013.

e Raymer et al., 2013.

f Nawrotzki and Jiang, 2015.

Typically, migration flow data of the sort described above encompass people who have migrated (or are residing) regularly on a visa or entry permit. Most such data do not capture irregular migration flows, which involve “movement that takes place outside the regulatory norms of the sending, transit and receiving country”.⁴⁶

It is important here to distinguish irregular migration (flows) from irregular migrants (stocks), as they are interlinked, but conceptually and practically distinct, although the two terms are often incorrectly used interchangeably.⁴⁷ As mentioned earlier in this chapter, a person may, for example, enter a country regularly on a valid visa (thereby *not* engaging in irregular entry) and then overstay or contravene a visa condition, for example, and thus *become* irregular. Estimates of irregular migrants (stocks) were discussed in the previous section. For further discussion on irregular migration flows, see appendix C.

Human trafficking and migrant smuggling

Trafficking in persons often involves movements within countries or across international borders. In different contexts, migrants (including workers, refugees, asylum seekers and IDPs) can become victims of human trafficking. Due to the clandestine and underreported nature of this activity, however, systematic data collection is problematic and global estimates of human trafficking are limited. For information on available data, as well as on IOM's work in this area, see appendix D.

Global-level data on migrant smuggling on routes traversing land, air and sea are unavailable. Tragedies involving smuggled migrants are often a key glimpse into the potential scale and vulnerabilities associated with such movements. In recent years, in recognition of the need for a better understanding of migrant smuggling dynamics, efforts have been made to review existing data and research (see, for example, McAuliffe and Laczko, 2016).

See appendix A for definitions of the terms *trafficking in persons* and *smuggling of migrants*.


Migrant fatalities and IOM's Missing Migrants Project

In the wake of the tragic events of October 2013, in which an estimated 368 migrants died in the sinking of two boats near the Italian island of Lampedusa, IOM began collecting and compiling information on migrants who perish or go missing on migratory routes worldwide, within its Missing Migrants Project (MMP). Information on migrant fatalities is collected daily and made available on the Missing Migrants Project's online database, managed by IOM's Global Migration Data Analysis Centre (GMDAC). MMP also provides analysis of issues and data on migrant deaths. Data sources include official records of coast guards and medical examiners, media stories, reports from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and United Nations agencies, and interviews with migrants. Data collection challenges are significant. For instance, the majority of deaths are among migrants travelling irregularly, which often occurs at sea, or in remote areas (chosen with the aim of evading detection), meaning bodies are not found. Few official sources collect and make data on migrant deaths publicly available. Relying on migrant testimonies and media sources may also be problematic due to inaccuracies and incomplete coverage.

47 McAuliffe, 2017.

According to IOM's MMP, 7,927 migrants worldwide died or went missing in 2016, 26 per cent more than the number of deaths and missing migrants recorded in 2015 (6,281). The number of deaths and missing migrants recorded in the Mediterranean Sea increased by 36 per cent in 2016, from 3,785 in 2015 to 5,143 in 2016. The Mediterranean accounted for more than 60 per cent of migrant deaths and missing migrants recorded by MMP in both years. Nearly 1,400 deaths and missing migrants were recorded in North Africa in 2016, mostly due to the harsh natural environment, violence and abuse, dangerous transportation conditions, and sickness and starvation. Figures for other regions are highlighted below.

Recorded migrant deaths and missing migrants worldwide, 2016



Source: IOM, n.d.i.

Note: Figures correspond to deaths that occurred during the process of migration. All numbers reflect only those incidents about which IOM is aware. An unknown number of deaths remain unreported and therefore, these data comprise minimum estimates. Figures include both bodies found and migrants who are missing and presumed dead. Names and boundaries indicated on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by IOM.

For more on MMP, see <https://missingmigrants.iom.int/about>. New data sources are constantly added and efforts are ongoing to improve data collection globally. For a discussion of the challenges of collecting data on migrant deaths, please see <http://missingmigrants.iom.int/methodology>.

IOM's Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration Programmes

IOM has implemented assisted voluntary return and reintegration (AVRR) programmes since 1979. IOM's AVRR support to migrants comprises a range of activities, and typically includes: the provision of pre-departure counselling, the purchase of flight tickets, administrative and travel assistance and, where possible, the provision of reintegration assistance.

On average, between 2005 and 2014, IOM assisted 34,000 migrants per year through AVRR. In line with the rise in the volume of migration in recent years, the number of returns has significantly increased. In 2016, AVRR support was provided to 98,403 migrants returning from 110 host or transit countries to 161 countries or territories of origin. This amounts to a 41 per cent increase compared with 2015 (69,540). Of the 98,403 AVRR beneficiaries in 2016, approximately 32 per cent were women and 27 per cent were children. Over 3 per cent of these returnees were victims of trafficking, unaccompanied migrant children, or migrants with health-related needs. Approximately 39,000 beneficiaries were provided with financial support in cash and/or in kind, before departure or upon arrival in their countries or territories of origin.

Top 10 host/transit countries and countries/territories of origin of AVRR beneficiaries (2016)

Host or transit countries		Countries or territories of origin	
Germany	54,006	Albania	17,976
Greece	6,153	Iraq	12,776
Austria	4,812	Afghanistan	7,102
Niger	4,788	Serbia	6,978
Netherlands, the	4,635	Kosovo/UNSC 1244	5,889
Belgium	4,117	Ethiopia	5,675
Yemen	2,594	The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	4,986
Finland	2,116	Iran (Islamic Republic of)	4,485
Djibouti	1,803	Ukraine	3,438
Norway	1,459	Russian Federation	2,058

As highlighted in the above table, in 2016, the majority of AVRR beneficiaries (83%) returned from the European Economic Area (EEA) and Switzerland, particularly from Germany, Greece, Austria, the Netherlands and Belgium. Returns from the EEA and Switzerland increased from 55,851 in 2015 to 81,671 in 2016. Recent trends also indicate that South–South returns, including from transit countries, are increasing. In 2016, returns from Niger and Morocco to countries such as Cameroon, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau and Senegal, for example, amounted to more than 6 per cent of the global total. The main regions of origin for AVRR beneficiaries in 2016 were South-Eastern Europe, Eastern Europe and Central Asia (49% of total), Asia and the Pacific (16%), and the Middle East and North Africa (16%). Together, the top 10 countries and territories of origin accounted for 72 per cent of the total number of AVRR beneficiaries.

For more information, see www.iom.int/assisted-voluntary-return-and-reintegration and www.iom.int/sites/default/files/our_work/DMM/AVRR/AVRR-2016-Key-Highlights.pdf.

Migrant workers

The latest available estimates for the global stock of migrant workers, which are based on 2013 data, indicate that there were roughly 150.3 million, accounting for a little under two thirds of the global stock of international migrants (232 million) in that year.⁴⁸ When compared with the global population of international migrants of working age – regarded as 15 years or older (207 million) – migrant workers account for more than 70 per cent. For a range of reasons, however, these global figures are likely to be underestimates.⁴⁹ While earlier global estimates of migrant workers are available (36–42 million in 1995, 86.2 million in 2000 and 105.5 million in 2010), the ILO notes that these cannot be compared with the 2013 figures, due to definitional differences and changes in methodology and data sources.

In 2013, most migrant workers – an estimated 112.3 million (75%) – were in high-income countries, with another 34.4 million (23%) in middle-income countries. Only about 2 per cent of migrant workers went to low-income destination countries. The share of migrant workers in the total workforce across the clustered income groups was relatively low (around 1.4%) and quite similar across low- and middle-income countries, but much higher (at 16.3%) for the high-income group of countries.

Male migrant workers outnumbered female migrant workers by almost 17 million in 2013, with 83.7 million males (55.7%) and 66.6 million females (44.3%), in a context where males comprised a higher number of international migrants of working age (107.2 million against 99.3 million). See table 3 for further breakdowns.

Table 3. Migrant workers, by sex and income level of destination countries (2013)

	Low income			Lower middle income			Upper middle income			High income			Global Total		
	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M	F	Total
Migrant workers (millions)	1.8	1.8	3.5	9.4	7.5	16.9	10.4	7.2	17.5	62.1	50.1	112.3	83.7	66.6	150.3
As a proportion of all migrant workers (%)	1.2	1.2	2.4	6.3	5.0	11.2	6.9	4.8	11.6	41.3	33.3	74.7	55.7	44.3	100

Source: Based on ILO, 2015.


Most migrant workers were engaged in services in 2013 (106.8 million or 71.1%). Manufacturing and construction (26.7 million or 17.8%) and agriculture (16.7 million or 11.1%) accounted for the rest. Of the more than 70 per cent engaged in services, almost 8 per cent were domestic workers.

48 The content in this subsection is based on and drawn from ILO, 2015. Please refer to this document for explanatory notes, deeper analysis, and limitations and caveats associated with the numbers and trends presented. More generally, information on foreign-born employment in OECD countries is available from OECD, n.d.b.

49 See, for example, ILO, 2015.

In 2013, there were an estimated 11.5 million migrant domestic workers, comprising more than 17 per cent of all domestic workers (67.1 million) and over 7 per cent of all migrant workers. Of the 11.5 million, 8.45 million were female and 3.07 million were male. Migrant domestic workers were overwhelmingly located in high-income countries; and this was true of both female and male migrant domestic workers (see figure 5). IOM's work on migrant health, as discussed in the following box, is particularly relevant for migrant workers and refugees (discussed in the next section).

Figure 5. Migrant domestic workers by destination country income level and sex as of 2013 (millions)



Source: ILO, 2015.

IOM's work on migrant health

IOM delivers and promotes preventative and curative health programmes through its Migration Health Division. Upon request from receiving-country governments, IOM provides physical and mental health assessments for migrants prior to their departure, whether for the purposes of resettlement, international employment, or for obtaining temporary or permanent visas. Specific services include tuberculosis testing and control; HIV, syphilis and hepatitis tests; physical exams; laboratory diagnostic services; medical escort services; and pre-departure immunization.

Such health assessments contribute to the epidemiological knowledge base on selected migrant populations, allowing for the development of evidence-based programmes and health interventions. Data collection is standardized and centralized among IOM country offices, which also enables IOM to decrease processing time, conserve resources and integrate all migration health activities at the country level. IOM is also in the process of developing a medical data repository to facilitate analysis of current and historical operational data.

In 2015, IOM conducted more than 346,000 health assessments among migrants in more than 80 countries, covering both immigrants (65%) and refugees (35%). The majority of assessments were conducted in Asia (45%), followed by Africa (29%), the Middle East (14%) and Europe (13%). In 2016, IOM conducted almost 450,000 health assessment (52% immigrants and 48% refugees), representing an overall 27 per cent increase compared with 2015. Again, the majority of assessments were carried out in Asia (35%), followed by Africa (30%), the Middle East (23%) and Europe (12%). These figures are consistent with a steady growth in the number of global health assessment activities conducted by IOM over the preceding five years.

Beginning in 2012, IOM engaged with US agencies to develop and implement a vaccination programme for United States-bound refugees within the context of the US Refugee Admissions Program. The programme sought to introduce vaccinations early in the resettlement process to protect refugees against many of the common vaccine-preventable diseases. By the end of 2015, this programme had been implemented in over 12 countries. Overall, between 2012 and 2016, this programme was implemented in 21 countries with more than 215,000 refugees having received one or more vaccines.

For more on IOM's work on migrant health, see www.health.iom.int/.

Remittances

Remittances are financial or in-kind transfers made by migrants directly to families or communities in their countries of origin. The World Bank compiles global data on remittances, notwithstanding the myriad data gaps, definitional differences and methodological challenges in compiling accurate statistics.⁵⁰ Its data, however, do not capture unrecorded flows through formal or informal channels, and the actual magnitude of global remittances are therefore likely to be larger than available estimates.⁵¹ Despite these limitations, available data reflect an overall increase in recent decades, from USD 126 billion in 2000, to USD 575 billion in 2016, although the past two years have witnessed a decline. Between 2015 and 2016, global (inward) flows of remittances contracted by an estimated 2.7 per cent, from USD 596 billion in 2014 to USD 582 billion in 2015, and by another 1.2 per cent between 2015 and 2016. Consistent with this trend, remittances to developing countries (which account for the majority of the global total) have also declined for two consecutive years – a trend that has not been seen for three decades, according to the World Bank. Nonetheless and, notably, since the

50 The content of much of this subsection, unless otherwise noted, is based on and drawn from the World Bank's data in relation to migration and remittances, available from World Bank, n.d.b; and publications on the topic, available from World Bank, n.d.c. In particular, the World Bank's annual remittances datasets (World Bank, n.d.b), the Migration and Development Brief 25 (World Bank, 2015), Migration and Development Brief 26 (World Bank, 2016b), the Migration and Development Brief 27 (World Bank, 2017a) and its April 21 Press Release (World Bank, 2017b) are key sources of information. Please refer to these sources as well as the World Bank's Factbooks on Migration and Development, including its latest, published in 2016, for explanatory notes, deeper analysis, caveats, limitations and methodologies associated with the numbers and trends presented.

51 World Bank, 2016a.

mid-1990s, remittances have greatly surpassed Official Development Assistance (ODA) levels,⁵² defined as government aid designed to promote the economic development and welfare of developing countries.⁵³

In 2016, India, China, Philippines, Mexico and Pakistan were (in descending order) the top five remittance-recipient countries, although China and India were well above the rest, with total inward remittances exceeding USD 60 billion for each country (see table 4). Each of the remaining three countries received less than USD 30 billion in the same year. Many of these countries have remained in the top spots in this century. When remittances are viewed as a percentage of GDP, however, the top five countries are Kyrgyzstan (at 35.4%), followed by Nepal (29.7%), Liberia (29.6%), Haiti (27.8%) and Tonga (27.8%) in 2016.

High-income countries are almost always the main source of remittances. For decades, the United States has consistently been the top remittance-sending country, with a total outflow of USD 61.38 billion in 2015, followed by Saudi Arabia (USD 38.79 billion) and Switzerland (USD 24.38 billion). China, which is classified as an upper-middle income country by the World Bank, is also a major source (in addition to its role as a top recipient), with an outflow of USD 20.42 billion in 2015. The fifth-highest remittance-sending country in 2015 was the Russian Federation (USD 19.7 billion). Table 4 provides further details and trends.⁵⁴

Table 4. Top countries receiving/sending remittances (2000–2015) (current USD billions)

Top countries receiving remittances							
2000		2005		2010		2015	
India	12.84	China	23.63	India	53.48	India	68.91
France	8.61	Mexico	22.74	China	52.46	China	63.94
Mexico	7.52	India	22.13	Mexico	22.08	Philippines, the	28.48
Philippines	6.96	Nigeria	14.64	Philippines, the	20.56	Mexico	26.23
Republic of Korea	4.86	France	14.21	France	19.90	France	23.35
Spain	4.86	Philippines, the	13.73	Nigeria	19.75	Nigeria	18.96
Turkey	4.56	Belgium	6.89	Germany	12.79	Pakistan	19.85
United States of America	4.40	Germany	6.87	Egypt	12.45	Egypt	16.58
Germany	3.64	Spain	6.66	Bangladesh	10.85	Bangladesh	15.38
United Kingdom	3.61	Poland	6.47	Belgium	10.35	Germany	15.36

52 See *ibid.*, for example.

53 See, for example, OECD, n.d.c, which also contains data on ODA. There is a growing body of work exploring the developmental, economic and social impacts of this trend.

54 Breakdowns for 2016 were unavailable at the time of publication.

Top countries sending remittances							
2000		2005		2010		2015	
United States of America	34.40	United States of America	47.25	United States of America	50.78	United States of America	61.38
Saudi Arabia	15.40	Saudi Arabia	14.32	Saudi Arabia	27.07	Saudi Arabia	38.79
Germany	9.04	Germany	12.71	Russian Federation	21.45	Switzerland	24.38
Switzerland	7.59	Switzerland	9.99	Switzerland	16.88	China	20.42
France	3.77	United Kingdom	9.64	Germany	14.68	Russian Federation	19.70
United Arab Emirates	3.68	France	9.48	Italy	12.89	Germany	18.56
Republic of Korea	3.65	Italy	7.55	France	12.03	Kuwait	15.20
Israel	3.26	Russian Federation	6.83	Kuwait	11.86	France	12.68
Japan	3.17	Luxembourg	6.70	Luxembourg	10.64	Qatar	12.19
Netherlands, the	3.13	Republic of Korea	6.67	United Arab Emirates	10.57	Luxembourg	11.35

Source: World Bank, n.d.b. (accessed May 2017).

Note: All numbers are in current (nominal) USD billion.

Refugees and asylum seekers

By the end of 2016, there were a total of 22.5 million refugees, with 17.2 million under UNHCR's mandate and 5.3 million refugees registered by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East.⁵⁵ The total number of refugees is the highest on record, although the annual rate of growth has slowed since 2012. There were also 2.8 million people seeking international protection and awaiting determination of their refugee status, referred to as asylum seekers. Of the roughly 2 million first-instance applications for asylum lodged in 2016, Germany remained the top recipient, with over 720,000 applications, followed by the United States (262,000) and Italy (123,000).

UNHCR estimates that, at the end of 2016, those under 18 years of age constituted roughly 51 per cent of the global refugee population. Indeed, between 2003 and 2016, according to available disaggregated data, the proportion of children among stocks of refugees was very high, fluctuating between 41 and 51 per cent. The proportion of women remained relatively stable, at between 47 and 49 per cent, over the same period. Consistent with broader global dynamics, refugees were increasingly based in urban settings, with 60 per cent of refugees located in urban areas at the end of 2016.⁵⁶

⁵⁵ The content in this subsection is based on and drawn from UNHCR 2016 and 2017. Please refer to these documents for explanatory notes, deeper analysis, caveats, limitations and methodologies associated with the numbers and trends presented. UNHCR's previous Global Trends reports, as well as its Population Statistics database (available from UNHCR, n.d.) are other key sources of information.


⁵⁶ See UNHCR's 2016 and 2017 reports for limitations applicable to these assessments related to age, sex and location.

Unaccompanied and separated children lodged an estimated 75,000 individual asylum applications in 70 countries in 2016 – down from the exceptionally high number of applications in 2015 (98,400), yet still more than double the number reported in 2014.⁵⁷ Consistent with the overall global trends in asylum application submissions, Germany received more than half of all reported claims from unaccompanied and separated children.

As in other years, unresolved or renewed conflict dynamics in key countries contributed most significantly to current figures and trends. Of the refugees under UNHCR’s mandate at the end of 2016, the top 10 countries of origin – Syrian Arab Republic, Afghanistan, South Sudan, Somalia, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Central African Republic, Myanmar, Eritrea and Burundi – accounted for roughly 13.5 million, or 79 per cent. Many of these countries have been among the top sources for refugees for at least five years.

The ongoing conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic saw the number of refugees from that country reach approximately 5.5 million. The instability and violence that have made Afghanistan a major source of refugees for over 30 years has continued, with the country being the second top origin country in the world, with 2.5 million refugees; this is a slight decrease from 2015 figures (2.7 million), largely due to returns from Pakistan. Large-scale violence that erupted in South Sudan in the middle of 2016 saw it become the third largest origin country for refugees, with over 1.4 million at the end of the year. Refugees from Afghanistan, South Sudan and the Syrian Arab Republic comprised 55 per cent of the refugees under UNHCR’s mandate. Figure 6 shows the trends in refugee numbers for selected major countries of origin between 2000 and 2015. The impact of the Syrian conflict is clearly illustrated in figure 6; in 2010, the Syrian Arab Republic was a source country for fewer than 30,000 refugees and asylums seekers, whereas it was the third largest host country, with 1,005,500 refugees, primarily originating from Iraq.⁵⁸

Figure 6. Number of refugees by major countries of origin as of 2016 (millions)



Source: UNHCR, n.d. (accessed on 18 July 2017).


Note: Lines indicate five-year trends and crosses indicate a single year’s data. South Sudan became a country in 2011.

57 See UNHCR, 2017, on why these figures are underestimates.

58 UNHCR, 2010.

In 2016, for the third consecutive year, Turkey was the largest host country in the world, with 2.9 million refugees, mainly Syrians (2.8 million). Reflecting the significant share of Syrians in the global refugee population, two other bordering countries – Jordan and Lebanon – also featured among the top 10. Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran were also among the top refugee-hosting countries, as the two principal hosts of refugees from Afghanistan, the second largest origin country. Uganda, Ethiopia, Germany, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Kenya comprised the rest. The vast majority of refugees were hosted in neighbouring countries. According to UNHCR, the least developed countries, such as Cameroon, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda, hosted 28 per cent of the global total (4.9 million refugees). It is only when refugees are measured against national populations that high-income countries such as Sweden (fifth) and Malta (ninth) rank among the top 10. Figure 7 shows trends in refugee numbers for major host countries between 2000 and 2015.

Figure 7. Number of refugees by major host countries as of 2016 (millions)



Source: UNHCR, n.d. (accessed on 18 July 2017).

Note: Lines indicate five-year trends and crosses indicate a single year's data.


A key component of UNHCR's mandate is to seek permanent solutions for refugees. Within this context, UNHCR also compiles statistics on the three traditional solutions: voluntary repatriation, local integration and resettlement. For many, return home is the preferred solution. However, for various reasons, as evidenced by the numbers discussed below, only a very small proportion of refugees achieve a solution in any given year, contributing to the protracted nature of many refugee predicaments.

During 2016, over 550,000 refugees returned to their countries of origin – more than double the number in 2015 and a notable increase from previous years. The majority of returns (384,000) were to Afghanistan, primarily from Pakistan. Prolonged and renewed conflicts have contributed to low levels of voluntary repatriation, with levels of returns between 2011 and 2015 accounting for only 10 per cent of all returns over the last two decades.

While there are many challenges to measuring those benefiting from local integration, UNHCR estimates that, in 2016, 23 countries reported at least one naturalized refugee (compared with 28 countries in 2015), with a total of 23,000 naturalized refugees for the year (compared with 32,000 in 2015). Canada, which naturalized an estimated 16,300 refugees in 2016 (compared with 25,900 in 2015), represents the greatest proportion, with France, Belgium and Austria contributing the bulk of the rest.

The number of countries that are a part of UNHCR’s resettlement programmes increased from 33 in 2015 to 37 in 2016; States in Europe and Latin America, in particular, established new resettlement programmes, or made new resettlement commitments. Notwithstanding this increase, the traditional resettlement countries of Australia, Canada and the United States continued to conduct the majority of the world’s refugee resettlements. In 2016, almost 190,000 refugees were admitted for resettlement globally, representing a 77 per cent increase from 2015 (107,100). Syrian, Congolese, Iraqi and Somali refugees were the key beneficiaries. Figure 8 provides an overview of resettlement statistics for key countries between 2000 and 2016.

Figure 8. Number of refugees resettled by major resettlement countries in 2000–2016 (thousands)



Source: UNHCR, n.d. (accessed on 23 June 2017).

IOM's role in resettlement

IOM arranges safe and organized travel for refugees through resettlement programmes, as well as for other vulnerable persons of concern moving through other humanitarian pathways. Beyond classical refugee resettlement and humanitarian admission programmes, more States are interested in or are currently carrying out other forms of admission, such as humanitarian visas, private sponsorships, academic scholarships and labour mobility schemes. IOM's movement data for resettlement assistance refer to the overall number of refugees and other persons of concern travelling under IOM auspices from various countries of departure to destinations around the world during a given period.

During calendar years 2015 and 2016, IOM supported some 43 States in carrying out resettlement, humanitarian admission and relocation initiatives in over 140 countries of departure, with significant operations conducted in Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon, Malaysia, Nepal, Thailand, Turkey and the United Republic of Tanzania. In 2015, a total of 126,867 individuals travelled to 30 States under IOM auspices for resettlement assistance; the top nationalities were Syrians, Burmese, Iraqis, Afghans and Somalis. In 2016, a total of 204,937 individuals travelled to 39 States under IOM auspices for resettlement assistance; the top nationalities were Syrians, Congolese, Iraqis, Afghans and Somalis. Each year, the gender breakdown remains the same, with 51 per cent males and 49 per cent females resettling to third countries. Between 2010 and 2016, annual resettlement by IOM increased by more than 103 per cent, with over 100,000 vulnerable persons of concern in 2010, and close to 205,000 in 2016. This is largely due to the emergency resettlement of Syrians and admission of Iraqi and Afghan translators/interpreters through special immigration visas. An increase in Syrian resettlement began in the latter half of 2015, notably to Canada, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and a number of European countries such as Germany and Sweden.

Under cooperative agreements, IOM provides stakeholders with necessary information and shares data with key partners such as UNHCR, resettlement countries and settlement agencies. IOM works in close collaboration with UNHCR on a regular basis to verify and better align aggregate data related to resettlement, specifically around departures figures.

For more information on IOM's resettlement activities, see: www.iom.int/resettlement-assistance.

Internally displaced persons

IDMC compiles data on two types of internal displacement: new displacements during a given period, and the total stock of IDPs at a given point in time. At the end of 2016, there were 31.1 million new internal displacements in 125 countries.⁵⁹ Disasters triggered by rapid-onset hazards were associated with the majority,

⁵⁹ The content in this subsection is based on and drawn from IDMC, 2017 and IDMC, 2016. Please refer to these documents for explanatory notes, deeper analysis, caveats, limitations and methodologies associated with the numbers and trends presented. The year 2016 was the first year that IDMC produced a single and combined annual report that included figures for conflict and violence as well as disasters. IDMC's previous Global Estimates reports (available from www.internal-displacement.org/global-report/), as well as its Global Internal Displacement Database (available from IDMC, n.d.), are other key sources of information.

at 24.2 million new internal displacements in a total of 118 countries. Conflict and generalized violence accounted for the rest, at 6.9 million in 37 countries. In its latest report, IDMC reiterates the complexities associated with distinguishing between conflict and disasters as the immediate cause of displacement, and it highlights the growing need to identify better ways to report on displacement in the context of multiple drivers.⁶⁰

The total global stock of people internally displaced by conflict and generalized violence at the end of 2016 was 40.3 million, having fallen from 40.8 million in 2015 – the highest on record since IDMC began monitoring in 1998. As with trends for refugees (discussed in the previous section), intractable and new conflicts have meant that the total number of persons internally displaced by conflicts and generalized violence has almost doubled since 2000, and has risen sharply since 2010. Total global stock figures for persons displaced by disasters are unavailable, although efforts are being made to address this issue. Available data indicate that, over the nine years since 2008, there have been 227.6 million displacements associated with disasters. Sample case data documented in 2015 also suggest that protracted displacement, ranging between 1 and 26 years, is affecting hundreds of thousands of people.

Since 2003, conflicts and violence resulted in an average of 5.3 million new displacements per year. This translates into about 15,000 men, women and children being forced to leave their homes every day.⁶¹ Between 2000 and 2015, the average was even higher, at 7.6 million per year or more than 20,000 people per day. The 2016 total of 6.9 million new displacements falls between the two averages, reflecting an overall rising trend since 2003. In 2015, Yemen was the worst-affected country in terms of new displacements (2.2 million) followed by the Syrian Arab Republic (1.3 million) and Iraq (1.1 million). In 2016, however, Yemen, the Syrian Arab Republic and Iraq (which had accounted for more than half of the global total of new displacements for 2015 at 8.8 million), recorded significantly lower figures,⁶² but still featured among the top 10, as did many other countries that were on the list in 2015. The Democratic Republic of the Congo, noted as an overlooked area of displacement crisis, topped the list in 2016 (with 922,000 people displaced), followed by the Syrian Arab Republic (824,000) and Iraq (659,000). When new displacement by conflict and violence is measured as a proportion of the population, the Syrian Arab Republic re-emerges at the top (with 4,400 displacements per 100,000 inhabitants), followed by El Salvador (3,600 per 100,000 inhabitants) and Libya (2,500 per 100,000 inhabitants). IDMC notes that El Salvador has consistently been one of the most violent countries in the last decade; however, the internal displacement stemming from criminal and gang violence in that country is largely invisible.

The 40.3 million people displaced by violence and conflicts at the end of 2016 are hosted in 56 countries and territories, although there is little variation in the countries that feature at the top. Colombia (with 7,246,000 people displaced) and the Syrian Arab Republic (6,326,000) are well above others and together comprise close to a third of the global stocks. These are followed by Sudan (3,300,000), Iraq (3,035,000), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (2,230,000), then Yemen, Nigeria, South Sudan, Ukraine and Afghanistan. Over 30 million of the global total of 40.3 million people displaced are located in these 10 countries. Indeed, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iraq, Sudan and South Sudan have featured in the top 10 every year since 2003.


60 Beyond conflict, generalized violence and disasters brought on by rapid-onset natural hazards, global figures on internal displacement do not capture the many other contexts in which people flee their homes, such as criminal violence, development projects and slow-onset crises related to drought and environmental change. In *GRID 2016*, IDMC highlights their efforts to collect data on these forms of displacement and the complexities inherent in this challenge. (See, for example, IDMC, 2016.)

61 IDMC, 2017.

62 IDMC highlights possible reasons for these changes, including stabilization of front lines of conflicts, ceasefires, restrictions on freedom of movement, and changes in methodology for data collection.

Each year since 2008, an average of 25.3 million people have been newly displaced by disasters.⁶³ This is far greater than the average for conflict and violence, and reflects the indiscriminate, unpredictable and uncontrollable nature of certain hazards. These dimensions are strikingly apparent when considering the number of countries hosting the newly displaced: 118 for disasters, compared with 37 countries for conflict and violence. In 2016 (as in previous years), disasters triggered by climate and weather-related hazards, such as floods and storms, accounted for the bulk of the 24.2 million total (23.5 million or 97%). Since 2009, disasters triggered by geophysical hazards have caused an average of 2 million displacements per year, and have been the second largest contributor to global figures. However, the figures for 2016 were well below average, with roughly 700,000 new displacements recorded. China (7,434,000), the Philippines (5,930,000) and India (2,400,000) had the highest absolute numbers in 2016. As in previous years, the 24.2 million total, while a little less than the running average, far outnumbers new displacements associated with conflicts and violence, as figure 9 shows. IDMC does note, however, that a significant portion of the global total of those newly displaced by disasters is usually associated with short-term evacuations in a relatively safe and orderly manner.

Figure 9. Newly displaced IDPs (millions)



Source: IDMC, n.d. (accessed on 23 June 2017).

IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix

IOM's displacement tracking matrix (DTM) system tracks displacement in countries affected by conflicts or natural disasters. The DTM system is designed to capture, process and disseminate information on the movements and evolving needs of displaced populations and migrants. Data are shared in the form of maps, infographics, reports, interactive web-based visualizations and raw or customized data exports.

63 IDMC, 2017.

Based on a given situation, the system can gather information on populations, locations, conditions, needs and vulnerabilities using one or more of the following methodological tools:

- (i) Tracking mobility and cross-sectoral needs in specific locations to target assistance;
- (ii) Tracking movements (“flows”) and the overall situation at origin, transit and destination points;
- (iii) Registering individuals and households for beneficiary selection, vulnerability targeting and programming;
- (iv) Conducting surveys, to gather specific information from populations of interest.

In 2015, the DTM system tracked over 14.5 million people caught in conflict and natural disasters in 23 countries. IOM’s 2015 and 2016 data were the reference for several country estimates on internal displacement compiled by IDMC^{g,h}. In October 2015, the DTM system established an information portal on migration flows to Europe, which is available from <http://migration.iom.int/europe>. The portal publishes information on movement trends, transit routes, and stranded and missing migrants.

For more information on IOM’s DTM, see: www.globaldtm.info.

g IDMC, 2017.

h IDMC, 2016.

Data gaps and challenges

As evident throughout this chapter, there are several key gaps and challenges associated with the collection and analysis of data on migration. The following section provides a brief overview of some of these key gaps and challenges. However, there is an important body of work that explores these issues in greater detail and we encourage readers interested in the topic to refer to this work.⁶⁴

Our knowledge and understanding of the scale of international migration is primarily derived from estimates of the stock of international migrants, or the number of people living in a country other than their country of birth at a specific point in time. However, the availability and quality of migrant stock data vary considerably between countries and regions due to limitations in data collection, such as failure to disaggregate key characteristics. For example, censuses, which are an important source of data for measuring migrant stock, are generally performed only every decade or so. They often only record immigrants and not emigrants, and do not document age, or year of migration.⁶⁵ For example, some countries do not record country of birth, instead focusing on citizenship. This lack of uniformity in concepts and definitions of international migrants at international and national levels makes it difficult to estimate global migrant stock figures.

Data on migration flows are more limited than migrant stock data. Despite increasing efforts to aggregate data on migration flows from national sources, and to improve their comparability and standardization, data on these

64 See, for example, Poulain, Perrin and Singleton, 2006; Raymer and Willekens, 2008; de Beer et al., 2010; Kraler and Reichel, 2011.

65 Willekens, 2016.

dynamics of international migration are not available for most countries in the world.⁶⁶ The UN DESA has compiled flow data for only 45 countries, while the OECD reports migration flows for some of its members. However, in both datasets, the duration used to define a migration event, and the coverage of population at risk, can vary, thereby hampering analysis. There is even less information on the scale, patterns and dynamics of irregular migration flows, due to the clandestine and fluid nature of this form of migration.⁶⁷ The recent increase in such flows across the Mediterranean has prompted some actors to improve efforts to collect data on movements to Europe, but relatively little is known about numbers, patterns and characteristics in other parts of the world.⁶⁸

Knowledge on the global scale and characteristics of labour migration is primarily based on estimates compiled by the ILO. These figures likely underestimate the true scale, due to a range of factors, such as the frequent undercounting of short-term labour migration movements. As with global migrant stocks, estimates of migrant workers and their respective characteristics suffer from statistical, definitional and methodological complexities. Estimates of global remittances are available annually through the World Bank but, again, there are caveats and considerable limitations associated with the available figures.

Several actors – notably, UNHCR, IDMC, UNODC and IOM – continue to improve the availability and coverage of global data on populations in situations of vulnerability (such as refugees, asylum seekers, IDPs and victims of trafficking), even though data collection in the context of conflicts, violence and disasters is inherently challenging. Methodological, operational and political complexities arise due to the nature of emergencies, as well as the characteristics, vulnerability and “visibility” of the populations being measured. The shortage of quantitative data on movements associated with environmental change, including climate change, however, represents a key gap. The multicausal nature of such movements presents particular challenges. Evidence on long-term trends associated with disasters, such as duration of displacement and subsequent movements and trajectories, is also scarce. These gaps have been recognized and efforts are under way to innovate and overcome these barriers.

Conclusion

In recent years, there has been an undeniable increase in available information and knowledge, as well as interest in migration globally. Spurred in part by large-scale movements of migrants (including refugees) and a growing interest in international cooperation on migration, governments, international organizations and other actors are engaged in ongoing efforts to build a stronger evidence base on the scale and characteristics of migration globally. There are also noteworthy gaps in knowledge at the global level. As this chapter illustrates, the available information is in many ways limited and fragmented, with more known about certain countries and regions than others. There are myriad complexities associated with collecting and comparing data on specific facets of migration. Even so, and despite evolving migration drivers and patterns, there is momentum for improving the availability and quality of global data on international migration through innovation and concerted effort, aided in part by its inclusion in the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda⁶⁹ and technological transformations.

66 UN DESA, 2015c; Vezzoli, Villares-Varela and de Haas, 2014; Lemaitre et al., 2007; Poulain, Perrin and Singleton, 2006.

67 Kraler and Reichel, 2011.

68 McAuliffe and Mence, 2017.

69 UN DESA, 2015e.

In this chapter, we have provided a global overview of migration and migrants, based on the current data available. Notwithstanding the data gaps and challenges in providing a global big picture, several high-level conclusions can be drawn. The available data can provide insights into global migration dynamics and trends, and contribute to informed decision-making. They also tell a story.

While we know that most people in the world continue to live in the country in which they were born, more people are also living in other countries, especially those within their region. At the same time, many are migrating to high-income countries that may be further afield. International migrants constitute a small – albeit growing – portion of the world's total population. Global data on irregular migrant stocks, on the other hand, are unavailable.

Innovations and improvements are required for a better understanding of global trends in regular migration flows, so that coverage can expand beyond the 45 or so countries for which information exists. There is also growing recognition that people around the world are dying while migrating, particularly when using clandestine channels that rely on the services of smugglers and traffickers. This type of information is relatively new, and its quality and coverage require improvement.

Work is the major reason that people migrate internationally, and migrant workers constitute a large majority of the world's international migrants. Most live in high-income countries and are engaged in the service sector. Male migrant workers outnumber females, while male migrants also have a higher labour force participation rate than female migrants. Most of the top remittance-sending countries remained the same between 2000 and 2015, as have the world's top remittance-receiving countries. Overall, total global flows of remittances increased substantially between 2000 and 2016.

Finally, global displacement caused by conflict, generalized violence and other factors is at a record high. Intractable, unresolved and recurring conflicts and violence have led to an upsurge in the number of refugees around the world, with women and children comprising a substantial portion of the total. While a handful of countries continue to provide solutions for refugees, overall, these have been insufficient to address global needs. Similar factors have displaced millions of people within their own countries, while displacement associated with conflict and violence has nearly doubled since 2000. Yet, each year, new displacements associated with rapid-onset hazards far outnumber those due to conflict and violence, and there is a recognized need to gather better cumulative data. Better data on movement associated with environmental change, including the effects of climate change, are also required.



3

MIGRATION AND MIGRANTS: REGIONAL DIMENSIONS AND DEVELOPMENTS

Introduction

The previous chapter on global migration data and trends provides an overview of the “big picture” in migration, with specific reference to international migrants (stocks) and international migration (flows); particular migrant groups, including migrant workers, refugees, asylum seekers and internally displaced persons; and remittances. Chapter 2 concentrates primarily at the global level, with some reference to regional variance and occasional country-level examples. In this chapter, with its focus on regional dimensions and developments, we set out a different, but complementary perspective of migrants and movements in different parts of the world.

Our starting point is geographic, rather than thematic, given that geography is one of the fundamentals underpinning migration, both in the present and certainly historically. Notwithstanding recent advances in transportation and telecommunications technology – which many argue are shrinking the world we in which we live (see, for example, the chapter on mobility, migration and transnational connectivity in this report) – geography is often one of the most significant factors in shaping patterns of migration and displacement. Many people who migrate across borders do so within their immediate region, to countries that are close by, countries to which it may be easier to travel, that may be more familiar, and from which it may also be easier to return. For people who are displaced, finding safety quickly is paramount when moving away from disasters and crises such as transnational or civil conflict, extreme violence, and rapid-onset hazards such as catastrophic weather events. People, therefore, tend to be displaced to safer locations nearby, whether that is within a country or across a border.

This chapter seeks to assist migration policymakers, practitioners and researchers in making better sense of international migration by using a geographic perspective to present regional migration overviews. The analysis in this chapter focuses on six world regions as defined by the United Nations, and used by UN DESA and other organizations:

- Africa
- Asia
- Europe
- Latin America and the Caribbean
- Northern America
- Oceania

For each of these regions, the analysis includes: (i) an overview and brief discussion of key migration statistics based on data compiled and reported by UN DESA and UNHCR⁷⁰; and (ii) succinct descriptions of “key features and developments” in migration in the region, based on a wide range of data, information and analyses from international organizations, researchers and analysts. To account for the diversity of migration patterns, trends

70 Please refer to chapter 2, appendix A for definitions of key terms, such as “international migrant”.

and issues within each of the six regions, the descriptive narratives of “key features and recent developments” are presented at the subregional level. For Africa, for example, this cascade approach allows for the presentation of insights from statistical data on Africa as a whole, followed by summary information on subregions including North Africa, West and Central Africa, and Eastern and Southern Africa. A breakdown of the regions and subregions is provided in appendix A. These subregional overviews provide information on migration patterns from, within and to the subregions.⁷¹ Beyond this, attention has been paid to particular features that exist in a subregion, such as labour migration and remittances, irregular migration, migrant smuggling, displacement (internal and international), and integration. The subregional overviews are not intended to be exhaustive, but are designed to be illustrative of key trends, patterns and issues.

As highlighted in the previous chapter, we now have more data on migration than at any other time in history, although important data gaps still exist – migration data across the world tend to be fragmented and lacking in uniformity, at times hampering our collective ability to undertake analysis and inform policy, programmes and operations.⁷² The chapter draws heavily on the existing evidence base and sources are provided in footnotes and references section. We encourage readers to refer to sources cited in this chapter to learn more about topics of interest.

Africa⁷³

Migration in Africa involves roughly equal numbers of migrants moving either within or out of the region. As shown in figure 1, in 2015 over 16 million Africans were living in another African country, while an additional 16 million were living in a different region. The population of African migrants residing within the region grew from 2000 onwards, especially during the last five-year period. It is important to note that the large numbers and relatively small sizes of some countries in Africa have an effect on how international migration within the region is measured and therefore reflected in statistical data. Other factors, such as free movement agreements, porous borders, and migration and displacement drivers, are discussed in the *key features and developments* section below.

Figure 1 reflects that while international migration within the African region has increased since 2000, the most significant growth by far has occurred in migration from Africa to other regions. Since 1990, the number of African migrants living outside of the region has more than doubled, with the growth to Europe most pronounced. In 2015, most African-born migrants living outside the region were residing in Europe (9 million), Asia (4 million) and Northern America (2 million).


One of the most striking aspects to note about international migrants in Africa, as shown in figure 1, is the small number of migrants who were born outside of the region and have since moved there. While this has increased over time, in 2015 Africa was home to a relatively modest 2.3 million migrants from outside the region, most of whom were from Asia and Europe.

71 Please note that subregions relate largely to migration dynamics and so may differ from those of UN DESA. Details are provided in appendix A.

72 Please note that all reasonable efforts have been made to ensure the accuracy of data referred to in this chapter, including through data verification. We regret, however, any data errors that may remain. Please refer to primary sources for technical and explanatory notes, limitations and caveats on data.

73 See appendix A for details on the composition of Africa.

Figure 1. Migrants to Africa, within Africa and from Africa between 1990 and 2015




Source: UN DESA, 2015a.

Note: "Migrants to Africa" refers to migrants residing in the region (i.e. Africa) who were born in one of the other regions (e.g. Europe or Asia). "Migrants within Africa" refers to migrants born in the region (i.e. Africa) and residing outside their country of birth, but still within the African region. "Migrants from Africa" refers to people born in Africa who were residing outside the region (e.g. in Europe or Northern America).

The African countries with the largest number of emigrants tend to be in the north of the region. These are shown on the left-hand side of Figure 2, where countries are ranked by their overall numbers of migrants (i.e. the combination of immigrants in the country and emigrants from the country). In 2015, Egypt had the largest number of people living abroad, followed by Morocco, Somalia, Sudan and Algeria. In terms of the number of immigrants, South Africa is the most significant destination country in Africa, with around 3.1 million international migrants residing in the country (or around 6% of its total population). Other countries with high immigrant populations as a proportion of their total populations included Gabon (16%), Djibouti (13%), Libya (12%), Côte d'Ivoire and Gambia (both 10%).

Figure 2. Top 20 African migrant countries in 2015



Source: UN DESA, 2015a.


Note 1: The population size used to calculate the percentage of immigrants and emigrants is based on the UN DESA total resident population of the country, which includes foreign-born populations.

Note 2: "Immigrant" refers to foreign-born migrants residing in the country. "Emigrant" refers to people born in the country who were residing outside their country of birth in 2015.

There are significant migration corridors within and from Africa, many of which are related to geographic proximity and historical ties, as well as displacement factors. The size of a migration corridor from country A to country B is measured as the number of immigrants from country A who were residing in country B in 2015. Migration corridors represent an accumulation of migratory movements over time and provide a snapshot of how migration patterns have evolved into significant foreign-born populations in specific destination countries. Some of the largest migration corridors involving African countries, as shown in figure 3, are between North African countries such as Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia to France, Spain and Italy, in part reflecting post-colonial connections. There are also significant labour migration corridors to Gulf states – see Egypt to United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia

for example. Importantly, just over half of the main migration corridors shown in figure 3 were within Africa, with the corridor between Burkina Faso to neighbouring Côte d'Ivoire constituting the second largest for Africa overall. Selected migration corridors are discussed in more detail below in the *key features and developments* section.

Figure 3. Top 20 migration corridors involving African countries




Source: UN DESA, 2015a.

Note: Corridors represent an accumulation of migratory movements over time and provide a snapshot of how migration patterns have evolved into significant foreign-born populations in specific destination countries.

Displacement within and from Africa is a major feature of the region, as shown in figure 4. Most refugees and asylum seekers in Africa were hosted in neighbouring countries within the region. The top 10 countries in Africa, ranked by the combined total of refugees and asylum seekers both hosted by and originating from a given country, are shown in figure 4. In 2016, South Sudan had the highest number of refugees in the region, and the third highest in the world. Most were hosted by Uganda and Ethiopia. Somalia has produced the second highest number of refugees after its long history of conflict and recent droughts, with the majority hosted in neighbouring countries such as Ethiopia and Kenya. Other large refugee populations have originated from Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Central African Republic and Eritrea. The main drivers of displacement include conflict and violence, which in some cases has exacerbated food insecurity issues. Many of these countries also host large refugee populations. Figure 4 also shows that several countries are both origin countries of significant numbers of refugees, as well as host countries of refugees – namely South Sudan, Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Figure 4. Top 10 African countries by total refugees and asylum seekers, 2016



Source: UNHCR, n.d.a.

Note: "Hosted" refers to those refugees and asylum seekers from other countries who are residing in the receiving country (right-hand side of the figure); "abroad" refers to refugees and asylum seekers originating from that country who are outside of their origin country. Chapter 2 (appendix A) includes definitions of key terms such as "refugee". The top 10 countries are based on 2016 data and are calculated by combining refugees and asylum seekers in and from countries.

Key features and developments in Africa

*North Africa*⁷⁴

- **Migration of North Africans to Europe and Gulf States continues to be a defining feature of the migration dynamics of the region, and one that has developed over several decades.** Migration of North Africans to countries outside of Africa has been, and continues to be, much higher than migration to other countries within the subregion and within Africa.⁷⁵ Two distinct streams have characterized outflows from North Africa: migrants from the north-west (e.g. Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia) have historically moved to Europe, owing to their geographic proximity, previous labour recruitment agreements and post-colonial ties,⁷⁶ while those from the north-east (e.g. Egypt and Sudan) have predominantly sought temporary work in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)⁷⁷ countries. Large income disparities between the origin and destination countries, and the high levels of unemployment in North Africa, remain significant drivers of migration. As of 2015, about 10.6 million North Africans were living outside their country of birth, with roughly half in Europe and about 3 million living in Gulf States.⁷⁸
- **Although the North African subregion is primarily a migrant transit area, it also hosts notable populations of international migrants, including refugees.** Libya had the largest number of international migrants in the subregion, at over 770,000 in 2015.⁷⁹ Sudan also had large foreign-born populations originating from South Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Chad. The number of international migrants in Egypt increased between 2010 to 2015, from 295,000 to 491,000, with migrants primarily originating from the Palestinian Territories, the Syrian Arab Republic, Somalia and Sudan.⁸⁰ While Morocco has traditionally been a country of emigration, it is increasingly becoming a destination country, including of migrants from other regions in Africa, who stay for an indeterminate period while looking for a way to cross over to Europe.⁸¹
- **Conflict and violence within and in surrounding subregions has contributed to displacement in North Africa.** At the end of 2016, there were nearly 650,000 refugees from Sudan, the majority of whom were hosted by the neighbouring countries of Chad and South Sudan.⁸² Sudan also had approximately 3.3 million internally displaced persons (IDPs), making it the country with the third highest population of IDPs in the world.⁸³ At the same time, Sudan is also a prominent host country of refugees, with over 400,000 refugees, most of whom were from South Sudan.⁸⁴ Algeria also hosted over 90,000 refugees by the end of 2016,⁸⁵ while Egypt hosted over 210,000 refugees, primarily originating from the Syrian Arab Republic, the

74 See appendix A for the composition of North Africa.

75 Flahaux and de Haas, 2016.

76 Natter, 2014.

77 The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is a regional political organization comprised of six countries: Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

78 UN DESA, 2015a.

79 Ibid.

80 Ibid.

81 Reifeld, 2015.

82 UNHCR, 2017a.

83 IDMC, 2017.

84 UNHCR, 2017a.

85 Ibid.

Palestinian Territories and other African countries.⁸⁶ A volatile security and political situation in Libya has contributed to a total population of more than 300,000 IDPs by the end of 2016, while also affecting the more than 38,000 refugees and asylum seekers residing in Libya.⁸⁷

- **As a key hub of transit activity for migrants originating from many countries to the south, the North African subregion is confronted with protection challenges associated with irregular migration to Europe.** Between 2011 and 2016, approximately 630,000 people used the “Central Mediterranean route” to reach Italy.⁸⁸ In 2016 alone, more than 181,000 people were detected on the Central Mediterranean route (the main route of arrival via irregular migration to Europe in 2016), with the majority arriving in Italy.⁸⁹ The majority departed from Libya (almost 90%), with other departure countries including Egypt, Algeria and Tunisia.⁹⁰ Of those who disembarked in Italy in 2016, the majority were from Western and Eastern Africa (Nigeria, Eritrea, Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Senegal, Mali and Somalia) and over half applied for asylum.⁹¹ Of the more than 180,000 migrants who disembarked in Italy in 2016, 13 per cent (approximately 24,000) were women, while 15 per cent (28,000) were children – the vast majority (91%) of whom were unaccompanied. The proportion of children, including unaccompanied children, has increased.⁹² Others travelled from Morocco and Algeria to Spain, along the so-called “Western Mediterranean” route. Protection challenges and serious human rights violations along these corridors are profound and include deaths at sea, in the desert and in other transit locations; missing migrants, exploitation, physical and emotional abuse, trafficking, smuggling, sexual and gender-based violence, arbitrary detention, forced labour, ransom demands and extortion; and other human rights violations.⁹³ Some migrants – including refugees – also become stranded in countries in the region.⁹⁴

*West and Central Africa*⁹⁵

- **Intraregional migration, which is significant in West and Central Africa, is characterized by mixed migration flows influenced by multiple drivers.** While there are significant data deficits on migration flows within Africa and accurate numbers can be difficult to ascertain, more recent estimates reflect that the vast majority of international migrants in West and Central Africa move within the subregion.⁹⁶ The high number of people moving within West Africa is linked to several factors, including visa-free movement among the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) members, the relatively small sizes of many countries in the region and the strong networks among the many ethnic groups scattered across the subregion.⁹⁷ Importantly, intraregional migration within ECOWAS is mostly due to labour mobility, with seasonal, temporary and permanent migrant workers moving largely from countries such as Niger

86 UNHCR, n.d.a.

87 UNHCR, 2017a.

88 European Commission, 2017a.

89 European Commission, 2017b.

90 Ibid.

91 Ibid.

92 Ibid.; see also, IOM, 2016d.

93 See, for example, IOM’s Missing Migrants Project; Mixed Migration Hub, 2015; Altai Consulting and IOM, 2015a; Kelly, 2017; UNHCR, 2017d.

94 Altai Consulting and IOM, 2015a.

95 See appendix A for details on the composition of West and Central Africa.

96 Adepoju, 2016.

97 Flahaux and de Haas, 2016.

and Mali toward coastal countries such as Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire.⁹⁸ Unlike West Africa, where economic factors are important drivers of intraregional migration, conflict and instability have played a larger role in displacement to neighbouring countries in Central Africa.⁹⁹ However, labour migration is not absent in Central Africa, with Gabon, for example, home to a large number of migrant workers from within Central Africa who work in its oil and lumber industries.¹⁰⁰

- **Notwithstanding free movement agreements, irregular migration remains prevalent in West and Central Africa.** For many West and Central African migrants attempting to cross the Mediterranean to reach Europe, Niger is an important country of transit and as well as a major smuggling hub.¹⁰¹ The use of smugglers to cross borders even within free movement areas such as ECOWAS is not uncommon, particularly in circumstances where people do not possess documents such as passports or travel certificates.¹⁰² It is important to emphasize, however, that most West Africans who are smuggled overland begin their journeys as regular migrants under the free movement protocol and only violate immigration laws after exiting the ECOWAS area.¹⁰³ Moreover, a number of borders in West Africa are extremely porous, enabling unauthorized movements between countries, with several ECOWAS borders cutting across politically unstable and sparsely populated areas, which are also characterized by security deficiencies.¹⁰⁴
- **Conflict and violence linked to political upheavals, communal and ethnic tensions, and Boko Haram extremism, have meant that most countries in West and Central Africa are affected by internal or cross-border displacement, although the magnitude varies dramatically.** As with other subregions in Africa, countries in West and Central Africa have long histories of hosting and producing displaced populations, often simultaneously. For example, at the end of 2016, there were close to 540,000 refugees from the Democratic Republic of the Congo globally, while the country was host to over 450,000 refugees originating from other countries; this was in addition to around 2.2 million IDPs in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.¹⁰⁵ Other countries in the region with similar dynamics in 2016 include Central African Republic, Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, Mali and Niger.¹⁰⁶ The scale of the displacement crisis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2016 meant it was in the top 10 globally as (a) a refugee host country (ninth); (b) an origin country of refugees (sixth); (c) a country with total new internal displacements due to conflict and violence (first); (d) a country with new internal displacement relative to population (eighth); and (f) total stock of IDPs (fifth).¹⁰⁷ IDMC has termed the situation “an overlooked displacement crisis”, while UNHCR notes that the socioeconomic context (one of the world’s poorest countries when measured by gross national income per capita), combined with insecurity and access constraints, present significant challenges for protection and assistance.¹⁰⁸

98 Devillard, Bacchi and Noack, 2016.

99 IOM, n.d.d.

100 Ibid.

101 Altai Consulting and IOM, 2015b.

102 Ibid.

103 Carling, 2016.

104 Ibid.

105 UNHCR 2017a; IDMC, 2017.

106 Ibid.

107 Ibid.

108 IDMC, 2017; UNHCR, n.d.b. For internal displacement, more generally, see also IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix (IOM, n.d.c), particularly for Cameroon and Mali, available at www.globaldtn.info.

- **Environmental changes in West and Central Africa are impacting human livelihoods and mobility.** For example, although precipitations in the Sahel¹⁰⁹ are slowly increasing, they are becoming increasingly variable, leading to the frequent occurrence of droughts and floods.¹¹⁰ At the same time, rapid population growth has led to the intensification of cropping, deforestation and overgrazing, contributing to land degradation.¹¹¹ Despite an increase in the scale of agriculture in the region, food insecurity still affects millions.¹¹² For example, as of June 2016, 4.6 million people were severely food insecure in the Lake Chad Basin, with numbers expected to increase in 2017.¹¹³ Millions of people in West and Central Africa depend on Lake Chad; however, the lake's volume has decreased by 90 per cent in area in the last 40 years due to increased drought, as well as human-related causes such as increased irrigation withdrawals.¹¹⁴ The complex and interconnected environmental changes such as droughts and floods, over-exploitation of resources and climate change are contributing factors to rural-urban and cyclical mobility within countries and across borders in the region. Migration is one strategy used to increase livelihoods and reduce risks in the Western Sahel, particularly in light of uncertain agricultural returns.¹¹⁵ Research has also highlighted the interconnections between, on the one hand, impacts of climate change on natural-resource-dependent livelihoods and food insecurity, and on the other hand, tensions, conflicts and mobility.¹¹⁶

Eastern and Southern Africa¹¹⁷

- **For several countries within Eastern and Southern Africa, emigration, immigration and forced displacement underpin substantial intra- and extraregional movement, as well as inflows of migrants from outside the continent.** Eastern and Southern Africa have long been major destinations for non-African migrants, with immigrants of largely Asian descent moving to work temporarily or settle permanently. Immigration from India has historically been significant in countries such as Uganda, Kenya and South Africa,¹¹⁸ while recent years have seen a sharp increase in the number of Chinese migrant workers moving to countries in the subregion.¹¹⁹ Intraregional labour migration is also well established in Southern Africa, where significant numbers of people have traditionally migrated from countries such as Malawi, Lesotho, Zimbabwe and Swaziland to work in key sectors such as mining in South Africa and Botswana.¹²⁰ Owing to its advanced economy and relative political stability, South Africa has experienced high volumes of immigration in recent years, attracting migrants, asylum seekers and refugees from within and outside Southern Africa. The number of international migrants in South Africa increased

109 The Sahel region is a semi-arid tropical savanna ecoregion spanning many countries in West and Central Africa, including Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Nigeria, Chad and Sudan.

110 Hummel, Doevenspeck and Simimi, 2012.

111 Ibid.

112 UNEP, 2011.

113 FAO, 2016; FAO, n.d.

114 Gao et al., 2011.

115 Hummel and Liehr, 2015.

116 UNEP, 2011.

117 See appendix A for details on the composition of Eastern and Southern Africa.

118 Flahaux and de Haas, 2016.

119 Cook et al., 2016.

120 Nshimbi and Fioramonti, 2013.

from 1.9 million in 2010 to 3.1 million in 2015.¹²¹ Meanwhile, Eastern Africa continues to experience considerable levels of outward labour mobility, driven by poverty, low wages and high unemployment.¹²² This is most evident in the recent spike in the number of low and semi-skilled East Africans moving to GCC States on temporary work contracts. The Gulf States' proximity to Eastern Africa, the employment opportunities they offer, as well as recent labour agreements between countries such as the United Arab Emirates and Kenya¹²³ and Saudi Arabia and Ethiopia,¹²⁴ mean that labour migration to GCC countries is likely to rise.

- **Migration in Eastern and Southern Africa continues to involve high numbers of irregular migrants, characterized by mixed migration flows and underpinned by multiple drivers, including socioeconomic factors, conflict and political instability.** In addition to socioeconomic factors, conflict and political instability remain important drivers of irregular migration to and from Eastern Africa. Migrant smuggling is particularly prominent in both subregions, with people increasingly using the services of smugglers to reach their intended destinations. Many smuggling networks are based in the Horn of Africa, while countries that are members of the East African Community (EAC) such as Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania are largely transit countries.¹²⁵ The Middle East, Europe and Southern Africa are the three major destinations for migrants from Eastern Africa, who use four major routes, including the western route via Sudan, into Libya and across the Mediterranean; the northern route via Egypt to Israel; the southern route down the Eastern Corridor toward South Africa; and the eastern route transiting through Yemen to Saudi Arabia and beyond.¹²⁶ Similar to Eastern Africa, irregular migration is widespread in Southern Africa, involving intraregional migrants such as those from Zimbabwe to South Africa as well as those from outside the subregion. Many migrants originate from the Horn of Africa, notably from Ethiopia and Somalia. These migrants frequently utilize the services of smugglers.¹²⁷ However, these persons often face a significant number of vulnerabilities, including extortion, physical and sexual violence, kidnapping and robbery, with many losing their lives as a result of being transported in inhumane conditions.¹²⁸
- **Intractable conflicts, political and communal violence and peacebuilding setbacks have displaced millions in Eastern Africa, with most countries in the subregion affected.** At the end of 2016, for example, there were over 1.4 million South Sudanese refugees (the majority of whom were children) and over 1.8 million IDPs.¹²⁹ Somalia was the origin of over 1 million refugees and more than 1.1 million IDPs, while Burundi, Eritrea, Rwanda and Ethiopia also produced significant populations of refugees, IDPs, or both.¹³⁰ The scale of displacement stemming from South Sudan and Somalia has meant that they are among the top origin countries in the world.¹³¹ The civil war in Somalia, for example, has

121 UN DESA, 2016.

122 Manji, 2017.

123 Ibid.

124 GCAO, 2017.

125 Majidi and Oucho, 2016.

126 Danish Refugee Council and RMMS, 2017.

127 Frouws and Horwood, 2017.

128 Schwikowski, 2016.

129 UNHCR, 2017a; IDMC, 2017.

130 Ibid.

131 UNHCR, 2017a.

pushed people into other countries in the region, as well as eastward to countries such as Yemen;¹³² however, the unrelenting conflict in Yemen has created intolerable conditions, forcing migrants to return to Eastern Africa, while generating new asylum and refugee arrivals, including non-African nationals such as Yemenis.¹³³ Meanwhile, Uganda, Ethiopia, Kenya and the United Republic of Tanzania are major hosts of refugees, predominantly from the subregion, as is South Sudan – notwithstanding the conflict that has prompted large-scale displacement from and within that country.¹³⁴ The complex and multicausal factors triggering displacement and inhibiting solutions have meant that these host countries – some of the least developed in the world – continue to provide long-term refuge to a disproportionate share of the world's displaced.¹³⁵

- **Environmental change and disasters in Eastern and Southern Africa are prevalent and increasing, and are influencing human movement and displacement.** The subregion has faced increased variability in precipitation and higher occurrence of drought in recent decades.¹³⁶ These slow-onset environmental changes have a major impact on food security, given that agriculture is a dominant economic sector in both Eastern and Southern Africa.¹³⁷ Recently, drought influenced by an El Niño climate cycle in 2015 and 2016 has caused a humanitarian crisis related to widespread food shortages and famine,¹³⁸ contributing (in addition to other non-environmental factors) to human displacement in a number of countries.¹³⁹ Rapid-onset disasters such as flooding in 2016 also displaced around 300,000 people in Ethiopia, 40,000 in Kenya, 70,000 in Somalia, and thousands more in the United Republic of Tanzania and Madagascar.¹⁴⁰

Asia¹⁴¹

Asia – home to 4.4 billion people – was the origin of over 40 per cent of the world's international migrants in 2015. Over half (59 million) were residing in other countries in Asia. As shown in the middle panel of figure 5, intraregional migration within Asia has increased significantly over time, rising from 35 million in 1990. Considerable growth has also occurred in Asian-born migrant populations in Northern America (15.5 million in 2015) and Europe (20 million in 2015). Migration from Asia to these two regions drove much of the increase in the number of Asian migrants outside the region, reaching 40 million in 2015.

132 Ibid.

133 Danish Refugee Council and RMMS, 2017.

134 UNHCR, 2017a.

135 IOM, n.d.c.

136 Climate and Development Knowledge Network, 2014a.

137 Tierney, Ummenhofer and deMenocal, 2015; USAID, n.d.


138 UNOCHA, n.d.a; UNOCHA, n.d.b.

139 IDMC, 2017.

140 Ibid.

141 See appendix A for details on the composition of Asia.

Figure 5. Migrants to Asia, within Asia and from Asia between 1990 and 2015



Source: UN DESA, 2015a.

Note: “Migrants to Asia” refers to migrants residing in the region (i.e. Asia) who were born in one of the other regions (e.g. Europe or Africa). “Migrants within Asia” refers to migrants born in the region (i.e. Asia) and residing outside their country of birth, but still within the Asian region. “Migrants from Asia” refers to people born in Asia who were residing outside the region (e.g. in Europe or Northern America).


The number of non-Asian-born migrants in Asia has remained at relatively low levels. Europeans comprise the largest group of migrants from outside Asia in the region. These numbers include migrants from the European part of the former Soviet Union now living in Central Asia. During the same period, the number of Africans – the other sizable group of migrants in Asia – has grown.

The two Asian “population giants”, India and China, have the largest absolute numbers of migrants living abroad (figure 6). It is important to add that these large absolute numbers of emigrants constitute small shares of the total populations of India and China. Migrants from China made up the fourth largest population of foreign-born migrants in the world after India, Mexico and the Russian Federation. Over two million Chinese-born emigrants resided in the United States, which was also home to other large Asian migrant groups from India, the Philippines and Viet Nam. Other countries with large numbers of migrants residing abroad include Bangladesh and Pakistan, many of whom are in GCC countries.

In GCC countries, migrants make up high proportions of the total national populations (figure 6). For example, in 2015, migrants accounted for 88 per cent of the population in United Arab Emirates; around 74 per cent in Kuwait; 76 per cent in Qatar; and 51 per cent in Bahrain.¹⁴² Many migrants came from Africa, South Asia (e.g. India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal), and South-East Asia (e.g. Indonesia and the Philippines). Further discussion of labour migration, including to Gulf States, is outlined in the *key features and developments* section below.

It is also important to note that current data on foreign-born migrants also partly reflect significant historical events, such as the 1947 Partition resulting in the mass displacement of people from and to India and Pakistan. This is evident in 2015 data, which show that over 5.2 and 3.6 million foreign-born migrants (respectively) resided in the two countries.

Figure 6. Top 20 Asian migrant countries in 2015



Source: UN DESA, 2015a.


Note 1: The population size used to calculate the percentage of immigrants and emigrants is based on the UN DESA total resident population of the country, which includes foreign-born populations.

Note 2: "Immigrant" refers to foreign-born migrants residing in the country. "Emigrant" refers to people born in the country who were residing outside their country of birth in 2015.

Figure 7 shows the top 20 migration corridors from Asian countries, with most of them occurring within the region – 13 of the 20. They represent an accumulation of migratory movements over time and provide a snapshot of how migration patterns have evolved into significant foreign-born populations in specific destination countries. The largest corridor is from India to the United Arab Emirates, where 3.5 million Indians were residing in 2015.

Further discussion of selected migration corridors is included below in the key features and developments section.

Figure 7. Top 20 migration corridors from Asian countries




Source: UN DESA, 2015a.

Note: Corridors represent an accumulation of migratory movements over time and provide a snapshot of how migration patterns have evolved into significant foreign-born populations in specific destination countries.

International displacement within and from Asia is a major feature of the region, as shown in figure 8. Refugees from the Syrian Arab Republic and Afghanistan constituted more than a third of the world's refugees at the end of 2016. The impact of the Syrian conflict on displacement can be clearly seen in figure 8, with refugees and asylum seekers from the Syrian Arab Republic dwarfing numbers from Afghanistan. Afghanistan was previously the highest refugee-producing country in the region prior to the deepening of the Syrian conflict. In 2016, the vast majority of refugees from Asian countries lived in neighbouring countries. Refugees from the Syrian Arab Republic, for example, were predominantly hosted in Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan, while refugees from Afghanistan were in Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran. However, as shown in figure 8, it is also important to note that origin countries such as Pakistan, the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq are also themselves hosting refugees.

Figure 8. Top 10 Asian countries by total refugees and asylum seekers, 2016



Source: UNHCR, n.d.a.

Note: "Hosted" refers to those refugees and asylum seekers from other countries who are residing in the receiving country (right-hand side of the figure); "abroad" refers to refugees and asylum seekers originating from that country who are outside of their origin country. Chapter 2 (appendix A) includes definitions of key terms such as "refugee". The top 10 countries are based on 2016 data and are calculated by combining refugees and asylum seekers in and from countries.

Key features and developments in Asia

*Eastern Asia*¹⁴³

- **Eastern Asia is in the midst of unprecedented demographic change, with several countries experiencing low fertility rates and ageing populations, leading to a reconsideration of immigration policies.** Countries such as Japan are already undergoing negative population growth, while the Republic of Korea has the lowest birth rate and the fastest-ageing population profile among OECD countries.¹⁴⁴ These demographic changes are expected to have significant implications for both social policy and long-term economic growth, particularly in relation to increasing health care costs and lower productivity levels, as the proportion of people of working age reduces.¹⁴⁵ These realities are prompting policymakers to reassess historically restrictive approaches toward immigration, which have been associated with a relatively high degree of cultural homogeneity in some countries, more limited experience in immigration policy compared with other regions and subregions, and the relative unpopularity of immigration in many countries.¹⁴⁶ Both the Republic of Korea and Japan, for example, are increasingly promoting temporary foreign labour immigration, with the Republic of Korea employing over 500,000 foreign workers under its General Employment Permit System by the end of 2015.¹⁴⁷
- **Migration in Eastern Asia is increasingly characterized by significant outward and inward student mobility.** The number of international students from Eastern Asia, particularly at tertiary level, has increased rapidly in recent years, while the number of foreign students within the subregion also continues to grow. Driven by the prospect of better-quality education, a high number of international students from Eastern Asia study in destinations such as the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom. In the academic year 2015/2016, China, the Republic of Korea and Japan were among the top 10 countries of origin of international students in the United States, with more than 300,000 students from China alone.¹⁴⁸ In 2014, of the world's total population of students studying abroad, one out of six were from China.¹⁴⁹ However, Eastern Asia is not only a major origin of international students, but is also gradually becoming an important destination for foreign students, many of them coming from within the subregion. More students from the Republic of Korea, for example, are choosing to study in China, with those from the Republic of Korea accounting for the largest number of international students in China in 2015.¹⁵⁰ Japan plans to attract around 300,000 international students by 2020.¹⁵¹
- **Outward labour migration, particularly from China, has meant that the subregion is one of the largest recipients of remittances in the world.** In 2015, Chinese-born international migrants were the fourth largest foreign-born population in the world after Indians, Mexicans and Russians, with nearly

143 See appendix A for details on the composition of Eastern Asia.

144 Moon, 2015.

145 World Bank, 2015.

146 Staedicke, Batalova and Zong, 2016.

147 Park, 2017.

148 IIE, 2016.

149 ICEF Monitor, 2015a.

150 Ministry of Education of the People's Republic of China, 2015.

151 ICEF Monitor, 2015b.

10 million Chinese migrants living outside of China.¹⁵² Global remittance flows in 2016 amounted to an estimated USD 575 billion, with China receiving USD 61 billion, the second largest share of remittances worldwide after India.¹⁵³

- **While this chapter is focused primarily on international migration, it is important to note that in this context, internal migration remains a very significant feature in East Asian countries, involving unprecedented movement of people from rural areas to urban centres.** This has most notably been the case in China, where the economic and social reforms of the 1980s¹⁵⁴ initiated one of the largest human migrations in history. Hundreds of millions of underemployed peasants left the countryside for the cities, driven by the prospect of employment opportunities and higher incomes.¹⁵⁵ Most people have migrated from China's Western provinces to its Eastern provinces. The socioeconomic dynamics between Western and Eastern China are important factors, with the West characterized by high population growth rates, a surplus of workers and lower incomes, while the East contends with a shortage of workers in metropolitan areas and boasts both higher incomes and education levels.¹⁵⁶

*Southern Asia*¹⁵⁷

- **Migration from Southern Asia to other subregions is a key feature, with many temporary migrant workers in the GCC countries originating from this subregion.** Since the 1970s, the oil-rich Gulf countries have been a major destination for a vast number of temporary labour migrants from South Asia. While India and Pakistan were initially the major origin countries of labour to GCC countries, the origin of migrant workers has since diversified, attracting workers from Sri Lanka, Nepal and Bangladesh.¹⁵⁸ Southern Asians currently make up the largest migrant labour workforce in GCC countries.¹⁵⁹ The prospects of higher wages and accessible employment opportunities have resulted in a significant increase in the number of people leaving the subregion in recent years.¹⁶⁰ For countries in the subregion with significant labour surpluses, migration has relieved labour pressures, while helping to reduce poverty through remittances. Indeed, Southern Asia is among the largest recipients of remittances in the world. In 2016, remittance inflows to India amounted to USD 62.7 billion, the largest in the world; and in countries such as Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, remittances exceeded 5 per cent of GDP in the same year.¹⁶¹
- **Migration within the subregion is a dominant feature in Southern Asia, driven by economic and labour market differentials.**¹⁶² Intraregional movement, both regular and irregular, is related to strong common historical roots, geographic proximity, and cultural and kinship ties between countries.¹⁶³ In

152 UN DESA, 2015a.

153 World Bank, 2017.

154 *Hokou* is a household registration system devised to record and control internal migration (UN DESA, 2011).

155 Hu, 2012.

156 Hugo, 2015.

157 See appendix A for details on the composition of Southern Asia.

158 Oommen, 2015.

159 Ibid.

160 Doherty et al., 2014.

161 World Bank, 2017.

162 Srivastava and Pandey, 2017.

163 Ibid.

2015, just over 85 per cent of the 14.1 million international migrants in Southern Asia originated from other countries in the subregion.¹⁶⁴ Major migration corridors include Bangladesh–India, Afghanistan–Pakistan, India–Pakistan and Nepal–India. There are millions of Bangladeshi and Nepalese labour migrants working in India, for example, primarily in the informal sector as construction labourers and domestic workers.¹⁶⁵ Internal migration within Southern Asia countries is extensive and larger in scale than international migration, related primarily to temporary and seasonal migration from rural to urban areas.¹⁶⁶ Rural–urban migration in Southern Asia is substantial. Between 2001 and 2011, Southern Asia’s urban population grew by 130 million people, and is forecast to rise by almost 250 million more in the next 15 years.¹⁶⁷

- **Irregular migration both within and from the region is common in Southern Asia, and is often aided by loose smuggling networks.** While the exact number of people undertaking irregular migration within the region is not known, partly because of its relatively porous borders, there are estimated to be large irregular migrant populations within the region.¹⁶⁸ India, for example, is home to significant populations of irregular migrants from Bangladesh, Nepal, and to a lesser extent, Sri Lanka.¹⁶⁹ Additionally, Australia, Europe and the United States are all popular destinations for irregular migrants from the region.¹⁷⁰ For those heading to Europe, migrants are primarily smuggled through Central Asia and the Russian Federation, as well as through the Middle East into the Western Balkans. Other irregular migrants are smuggled through to Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia for work, or through these countries onwards to Australia.¹⁷¹ There have been many documented cases of migrants being exploited and abused by smugglers in Southern Asia, including rape, other forms of abuse, and forced starvation.¹⁷²
- **Long-standing conflict, political instability, violence, and repression have made Southern Asia both a significant source of displacement and a leading host of displaced populations.** In recent history, every country in the subregion (other than the Maldives) has been an origin or a host of displaced populations. Most notably, for over 30 years, large portions of Afghanistan’s population have been displaced internally, across immediate borders into neighbouring countries and further afield. At the end of 2016, there were 2.5 million Afghan refugees, the second largest refugee population in the world, and over 1.5 million IDPs, the tenth largest IDP population in the world; in effect, more than one in 10 Afghans were displaced.¹⁷³ The neighbouring countries of Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran hosted most Afghan refugees and accordingly, featured among the top host countries in the world.¹⁷⁴ Pakistan, with its porous border and close ethnic, linguistic, religious and economic ties, has been the major host for decades, with its nearly 1.4 million refugees at the end of 2016 almost exclusively

164 UN DESA, 2015a.

165 Srivastava and Pandey, 2017.

166 Ibid.

167 Ellis and Roberts, 2016.

168 Srivastava and Pandey, 2017.

169 Jayasuriya and Sunam, 2016.

170 Ibid.

171 Ibid.

172 Ibid.

173 UNHCR, 2017a; IDMC, 2017.

174 UNHCR, 2017a.

Afghans;¹⁷⁵ 2016 also saw a 12-year high in terms of returns, as over 380,000 Afghan refugees returned from Pakistan.¹⁷⁶ Returnees cited a range of interlinked reasons regarding their decision to return, including harassment and pressure by authorities, fears of arrest and deportation, economic hardship, perceptions relating to improvements in Afghanistan, return assistance packages, and a desire to reunite with family.¹⁷⁷ Returnees also face a range of reintegration challenges, including access to land and housing, employment and livelihoods, access to food and health, and insecurity.¹⁷⁸ At the end of 2016, the Islamic Republic of Iran hosted close to 1 million refugees, making it the fourth largest refugee host country in the world, while both India and Bangladesh continued to host large IDP populations.¹⁷⁹

- **Southern Asian populations are particularly vulnerable to slow-onset and rapid-onset disasters related to natural hazards and climate change.** Insufficient infrastructure, high dependency on land resources, and highly dense populations living in vulnerable areas are underlying challenges that contribute to human displacement in the context of disasters.¹⁸⁰ In 2016, there were almost 3.6 million new internal displacements due to disasters in Southern Asia, with India, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka all featuring among the top 10 countries in the world for disaster-related displacements that year.¹⁸¹ In Bangladesh, disasters such as Cyclone Mora in May 2017 displaced hundreds of thousands of people.¹⁸² In Nepal, disasters caused by the Gorkha and Udayapur earthquakes in 2015 led to immense internal displacement,¹⁸³ while around half a million people were estimated to be displaced by severe flooding in Sri Lanka in May 2017.¹⁸⁴ Migration and mobility are particularly important coping strategies in response to environmental change events in Southern Asia – including sea level rise, coastal erosion, flooding and groundwater depletion – all of which are considerable in the region.¹⁸⁵

*South-East Asia*¹⁸⁶

- **For many countries in South-East Asia, migration entails significant levels of both emigration and immigration, as well as transit migration.** Considerable income disparity in the subregion is a major factor underpinning the strong trend of people to migrate from lower-income countries to higher-income countries within (and beyond) the subregion. There are nearly 10 million international migrants within the subregion and just over 20 million total migrants from the subregion, 6.9 million of whom migrated to other countries within South-East Asia.¹⁸⁷ The advanced economies of Malaysia and Singapore are notable destinations for migrants. There is also a strong geographic aspect to migration, with higher

175 Ibid.

176 UNHCR, 2017a; UNHCR, 2017b.

177 UNHCR, 2017b; see also IOM, 2017b.

178 IOM, 2017b; UNHCR, 2017b.

179 UNHCR, 2017a; IDMC, 2017. For internal displacement, more generally, see also, IOM DTM, particularly for Afghanistan, India, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.

180 IOM, 2016a.

181 IDMC, 2017.

182 Solomon, 2017.

183 IOM, 2016a.

184 IOM, 2017a.

185 Climate and Development Knowledge Network, 2014b. See also Ionesco, Mokhnacheva and Gemenne, 2017.

186 See appendix A for details on the composition of South-East Asia.

187 UN DESA, 2015a.

levels of migration occurring between countries sharing borders, particularly along Thailand's border with neighbours Cambodia, Lao People's Democratic Republic and Myanmar.¹⁸⁸ Intraregional, long-term migration corridors are evident, which are mainly dominated by temporary labour migration, with smaller components of permanent (skilled and family) migration, student migration and forced migration.¹⁸⁹

- **Migration involves high proportions of irregular migration, mostly in relation to temporary labour migration, but also in response to protection issues and environmental change.**¹⁹⁰ The prevalence of unauthorized entry and irregular migrant populations is linked to a number of aspects, including labour market regulation, industry/sector reliance on irregular migrants, human trafficking and migrant smuggling.¹⁹¹ Indeed, migrant smuggling is considered to be a widespread phenomenon within South-East Asia, and countries in the region are particularly focused on countering smuggling through bilateral cooperation, as well as through multilateral mechanisms such as ASEAN and the Bali Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime. Many migrants also transit the region using the services of smugglers.¹⁹² Mixed migration flows (involving movements of people with and without international protection needs) occur as do migration flows underpinned by mixed motivations. Many migrants face exploitation in South-East Asia, stemming from their irregular status. Migrant workers in particular industries also face forced labour, exploitation and serious abuse (e.g. fishing, agriculture, construction and manufacturing).¹⁹³
- **There has been an absence, in more recent years, of large-scale acute displacement stemming from civil or transnational conflict, but there exist instead discrete long-term flows associated with systemic persecution and marginalization.** The largest populations of refugees in 2016 were hosted in Malaysia (92,000) and the largest origin country of refugees and people in refugee-like situations is Myanmar, at just over 490,000 in 2016.¹⁹⁴ However, the largest intraregional migration corridor based on foreign-born population data (see figure 7 in the Asian regional overview) is from Myanmar to Thailand, and relates both to displacement due to conflict and violence and to cross-border migration for income generation, family reunion and other reasons. Refugee resettlement of people from the region is mainly undertaken by "traditional" resettlement countries (e.g. United States, Canada, Australia) and there is little by way of "protection infrastructure" within the region.¹⁹⁵ There are also large populations of IDPs and stateless populations in the region, with six countries in the region hosting stateless populations (the largest of which is in Myanmar).¹⁹⁶
- **In early 2015, South-East Asia experienced a migration-related humanitarian crisis in the Bay of Bengal and Andaman Sea, when around 7,000 migrants became stranded at sea in dire conditions.**¹⁹⁷ Migrants were stranded on vessels abandoned by smugglers for several weeks, with several hundred

188 Hugo, 2014; Hatsukano, 2015.

189 Ibid.

190 Hickey, Narendra and Rainwater, 2013.

191 UNODC, 2015; Djafar and Hassan, 2012.

192 UNODC, 2015.

193 Gois, 2015.

194 UNHCR, n.d.a.

195 McAuliffe, 2016. "Protection infrastructure" encompasses domestic law, national policies as well as administrative practices on protection; see Sitaropoulos, 2000.

196 Southwick, 2015; UNHCR, n.d.a.

197 IOM, 2015a; Royal Thai Government, 2015.

having died during the crisis.¹⁹⁸ As the humanitarian crisis grew, countries in the region embarked on a series of bilateral and multilateral meetings to formulate an immediate response, including on the rescue, relief and temporary shelter of those in need. Subsequent meetings focused on longer-term responses such as protecting people at sea, preventing irregular migration and smuggling, addressing the root causes of movement, and creating livelihood opportunities for those at risk of displacement and irregular migration.¹⁹⁹

*Middle East*²⁰⁰

- GCC countries have some of the largest numbers of temporary labour migrants in the world.** Driven by oil wealth, GCC countries have undergone remarkable economic development over the last few decades, drawing both skilled and semi-skilled workers to various sectors, including construction, retail and domestic service. The increase in labour migration to GCC States has created tremendous demographic change in destination countries. Today, with the exceptions of Oman and Saudi Arabia, migrants make up the majority of the population in GCC countries – comprising 88 per cent of the population in the United Arab Emirates, 76 per cent in Qatar and 74 per cent in Kuwait.²⁰¹ Labour migrants in GCC countries primarily originate from Asia, including from India, Bangladesh and Pakistan, as well as from regions such as North and sub-Saharan Africa. Income differentials between origin and destination countries are a key driver of migration, with the Gulf countries providing higher wages and greater employment opportunities to labour migrants.²⁰² Despite progress, regulation and protection of migrants' rights remain a challenge in the region. The Kafala sponsorship system,²⁰³ which ties migrant workers to their employers and is practised across a number of GCC States, has also come under scrutiny. However, a number of Gulf States are gradually taking steps to reform the Kafala system to ensure enhanced mobility for migrant workers in the labour market.²⁰⁴
- Civil conflict, intensification of sectarian violence and the proliferation of terrorism (particularly by Daesh) have resulted in extensive levels of internal and international displacement in the subregion in recent years.** Three countries in the subregion – the Syrian Arab Republic, Iraq and Yemen – are facing a “level 3 (L3) emergency” (the global humanitarian system’s classification for the most severe, large-scale humanitarian crises) and are key contributors to the world’s total displacement figures.²⁰⁵ The conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic, in its seventh year in 2017, has displaced well over half of the country’s population, with over 5.5 million refugees, over 6.3 million IDPs and over 184,000 asylum seekers at the end of 2016.²⁰⁶ About 65 per cent of Syrians are now displaced.²⁰⁷ Successive

198 IOM Missing Migrants Project, <http://missingmigrants.iom.int/latest-global-figures>.

199 McAuliffe, 2016.

200 See appendix A for details on the composition of the Middle East.

201 UN DESA, 2015b.

202 Jacobsen and Valenta, 2016.

203 “The Kafala system restricts family reunification for unskilled migrants, ties them to a single employer, disallows them from marrying locals, and enforces other restrictions on rights and movements so that migrants stay as transient workers in the Gulf countries” (Rahman, 2013).

204 ESCWA and IOM, 2015.

205 UNOCHA, n.d.c.

206 UNHCR, 2017a; IDMC, 2017

207 UNHCR, 2017a.

waves of displacement in Iraq – a feature since the beginning of the century – have continued and intensified in 2016 and into 2017. This has occurred in the context of efforts to retake territory and counter Daesh. Over 3 million Iraqis are displaced within the country, and numerous challenges and protection risks inhibit sustained return.²⁰⁸ Yemen's political and security situation has continued to deteriorate, and the ensuing violence and volatility has left the country hosting almost 2 million IDPs at the end of 2016, down from 2.5 million at the end of 2015.²⁰⁹ High rates of return and secondary displacement are also occurring in Yemen, with estimates indicating that during the 24-month period ending in March 2017, 10.4 per cent of Yemen's population have experienced displacement.²¹⁰

- **The Middle East continues to host a significant share of the world's refugees.** As at the end of 2016, the Middle East subregion hosted over 45 per cent of all refugees globally, including the refugees registered with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA).²¹¹ Neighbouring countries inevitably share a disproportionate burden when it comes to hosting people seeking refuge in other countries, and this dynamic is a key feature of contemporary displacement patterns in the region. As countries bordering the Syrian Arab Republic and the principal hosts of Syrian refugees, Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan are all among the top 10 host countries in the world in 2016 (Turkey is first, Lebanon third and Jordan seventh).²¹² The depth of their responsibility is particularly apparent when the number of refugees in each country is compared against the national population – in Lebanon, one in six people was a refugee, in Jordan, one in 11, and in Turkey, one in 28 – ranking them the top three countries in the world under this measure.²¹³ Other countries in the region, including those affected by conflict, also host many refugees, including Yemen and Iraq, and even the Syrian Arab Republic.²¹⁴ The close to 5.3 million refugees registered with UNRWA are also located in the subregion.²¹⁵
- **Irregular migration within and from the region continues to pose challenges for migrants and States.** The very large numbers of Syrian refugees hosted in neighbouring countries, together with protracted conflict and the low probability of return to the Syrian Arab Republic, have seen refugees undertaking irregular migration onward to other countries, most notably those in Europe via the Eastern Mediterranean route. For example, Syrians departing from Turkey accounted for around half of the more than 850,000 who travelled to Greece by boat across the Aegean Sea in 2015; others were from Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan and a range of other countries.²¹⁶ Migrant smugglers have been instrumental in these movements, making significant profits, and at times engaging in abuse and exploitative practices.²¹⁷ There has been considerable political and public focus on the Eastern Mediterranean route during the last two years; discussion of the EU-Turkey statement is included in the Europe region below.

208 IDMC, 2017.

209 IDMC, 2017.

210 IOM, 2017g.

211 UNHCR, 2017a.

212 Ibid. At the end of 2016, Turkey hosted over 2.8 million refugees, Lebanon over 1 million and Jordan over 680,000.

213 Ibid.

214 Ibid.

215 UNRWA, n.d.

216 UNHCR, 2016b.

217 McAuliffe and Koser, 2015; İçduygu and Koser Akcapar, 2016.

Central Asia²¹⁸

- **Migratory movements in Central Asia occur in large part out of the region, and most noticeably northward to the Russian Federation.** In 2015, for example, there were just under 5 million migrants born in Central Asia who were living in the Russian Federation.²¹⁹ In recent years, the economic slowdown and policy changes in the Russian Federation – including the imposition of re-entry bans on migrants for administrative infringements – have been partially responsible for a relative decline in migration from Central Asia. This has affected livelihoods and income generated through remittances, which are an important source of capital for the subregion.²²⁰ In response to changes in the Russian Federation, migrants have either returned to their country of origin, remained irregularly, or sought out alternative destinations, most notably Kazakhstan (see discussion below).²²¹ People from Central Asia also migrate to Europe and China, where work and family ties are relatively strong. Germany, for example, was home to just over 1 million migrants from Kazakhstan in 2015, second only to the Russian Federation, where 2.56 million Kazakh-born people resided.²²²
- **Intraregional migration is a key feature in the region and is underpinned by geographic, cultural, economic, political and social links that are historical in nature.** Central Asia is home to millions of international migrants, mainly from within the region, but also from further afield. Migrants primarily originate from countries of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), many of which are current members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).²²³ In 2015, Kazakhstan, for example, had a substantial foreign-born population (3.55 million), of whom 2.35 million were born in the Russian Federation.²²⁴ Kazakhstan is now predominantly a country of transit and of immigration, attracting skilled workers from various countries and, increasingly, becoming a destination for migrant workers from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. In recent years, Central Asian countries have revised policies regulating intraregional migration, including through the conclusion of bilateral agreements on entry and readmission.²²⁵ For example, the establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union in 2015 allows people from its Member States – including Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan – to move freely to live, work and study in other Member States of the Union.²²⁶ Further cooperation is currently occurring in the region on enhancing the management of mixed flows, including on aspects related to border management, migrants' rights and protection, and irregular migration.²²⁷ Both male and female migrant workers from Central Asia can be vulnerable to exploitation and abuse, particularly within informal employment such as construction, agricultural and domestic work.²²⁸

218 See appendix A for details on the composition of Central Asia.

219 UN DESA, 2015a.

220 IOM, 2016c.

221 Ibid.

222 UN DESA, 2015a.

223 Ibid.

224 Ibid.

225 OSCE, 2016.

226 Russell, 2017.

227 IOM, 2016e.

228 IOM, 2016c.

- **Remittances play an important role in Central Asian economies, especially for the less developed countries in the region.** Two of the world's top 10 remittance-receiving countries relative to GDP are in the region – Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.²²⁹ In Kyrgyzstan, remittances have been estimated to reduce the national poverty rate by 6–7 per cent.²³⁰ Remittance flows into Central Asian countries largely reflect migration patterns within and from the region, which are closely linked to work and income generation. Remittances from the Russian Federation, for example, have been substantial over time, aided by the relatively low transfer costs from the Russian Federation to the Central Asian countries. However, the recent economic slowdown and policy changes in the Russian Federation have had a negative impact on overall remittance flows. Between 2014 and 2015, remittance levels to Kyrgyzstan decreased by nearly 50 per cent, and by nearly 60 per cent to Uzbekistan, while personal money transfers from the Russian Federation to Tajikistan dropped by nearly 70 per cent during the same time period.²³¹ Devaluation of the Kazakh tenge between 2015 and 2016 has also contributed to reduced remittance flows to several Central Asian countries, including Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.²³² The reductions are having a negative impact on communities, especially those that have a heavy reliance on remittances for basic needs, including food and shelter, such as in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.²³³ Households with family members working abroad are faced with a worsening of their living standard that might push some into poverty due to the decrease in money transfers. This issue is further exacerbated by a shortage of provisions to accommodate returned migrants' needs and furthering their potentials.²³⁴

Europe²³⁵

Almost one third of the world's international migrants (75 million) lived in Europe in 2015. Over half of these (40 million) were born in Europe, but are living elsewhere in the region, which has increased from 27 million in 1990 (figure 9). In 2015, European to European migration was the second largest regional migration corridor in the world (after Latin America and the Caribbean to Northern America). The population of non-European migrants in Europe reached over 35 million in 2015. Migrants born in Asia, Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean experienced similar growth patterns over the past 25 years. Each grew steadily in the 1990s, more rapidly during the 2000s and finally slowing thereafter.

In 1990, there were roughly equal amounts of Europeans living outside Europe as non-Europeans living in Europe. However, unlike the growth in migration to Europe, the number of Europeans living outside Europe mostly declined during the last 25 years, except for the past five years when it rose back to just under 20 million (similar to the level in 1990). In 2015, European-born migrants living outside the continent were based primarily in Northern America. There was also some gradual growth of European migrants in Asia and Oceania between 2010 and 2015.

229 World Bank, 2017.

230 Slay, 2015.

231 IOM, 2016c. Note: numbers are measured in USD terms. Estimates based on data collected by Central Bank of the Russian Federation.


232 IOM, 2016c.

233 *The Economist*, 2016.

234 IOM, 2016c.

235 See appendix A for details of the composition of Europe.

Figure 9. Migrants to Europe, within Europe and from Europe between 1990 and 2015




Source: UN DESA, 2015a.

Note: "Migrants to Europe" refers to migrants residing in the region (i.e. Europe) who were born in one of the other regions (e.g. Africa or Asia). "Migrants within Europe" refers to migrants born in the region (i.e. Europe) and residing outside their country of birth, but still within the European region. "Migrants from Europe" refers to people born in Europe who were residing outside the region (e.g. in Latin America and the Caribbean or Northern America).

Many countries in the east of Europe, such as the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Poland and Romania have some of the largest emigrant populations within the region (figure 10). At over 10 million emigrants in 2015, the Russian Federation had the third largest population of its citizens living abroad in the world. The migration of people from countries in the former USSR such as Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Belarus accounted for the top four European migrant corridors (see figure 11). After the Russian Federation and Ukraine, the United Kingdom had the third largest European emigrant population (4.9 million). Many of these lived outside the continent, in Australia and the United States of America. Bosnia and Herzegovina had the highest share of emigrants in comparison with the resident population in 2015, many of whom left during the breakup of the former Yugoslavia. Portugal and Ireland, two countries that have long histories of emigration, also had high shares of populations abroad in comparison with their population sizes.

In 2015, Germany had the largest foreign-born population in Europe. Of Germany’s 12 million migrants, the largest groups came from Poland, Turkey, the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan, with each exceeding one million. The populations of France and the United Kingdom each included over 7.5 million foreign-born people in 2015. Migrants born in French-speaking North African countries made up some of the largest foreign-born populations in France. In the United Kingdom, the largest migrant populations were from India and Poland. With foreign-born populations in excess of 5.5 million, Spain and Italy were the fourth and fifth most popular migrant destinations in Europe in 2015. Many of the foreign-born populations in these countries came from elsewhere in Europe, such as Romania, Germany and the United Kingdom, or from North African countries such as Morocco. As illustrated in figure 10, of the top 20 migration countries in the region, Switzerland had the highest share of migrants in its population (29%) followed by Austria, Sweden and Ireland.

Figure 10. Top 20 European migrant countries in 2015




Source: UN DESA, 2015a.

Note 1: The population size used to calculate the percentage of immigrants and emigrants is based on the UN DESA total resident population of the country, which includes foreign-born populations.

Note 2: “Immigrant” refers to foreign-born migrants residing in the country. “Emigrant” refers to people born in the country who were residing outside their country of birth in 2015.

Figure 11 shows the top 20 migration corridors involving European countries, representing an accumulation of migratory movements over time, and providing a snapshot of how migration patterns have evolved into significant foreign-born populations in specific destination countries. One of the more striking features of the main migration corridors involving European countries is that most are intraregional corridors. The Russian Federation features heavily in the main corridors. Russian-born populations in former Member States of the USSR such as Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan form some of the largest European migrant corridors in 2015. The Russian Federation was also the second largest destination of migrants in Europe after Germany. Further discussion of migration corridors and recent changes are in the *key features and developments* section below.

Figure 11. Top 20 migration corridors involving European countries




Source: UN DESA, 2015a.

Note: Corridors represent an accumulation of migratory movements over time and provide a snapshot of how migration patterns have evolved into significant foreign-born populations in specific destination countries.

In 2016, Germany hosted the largest population of refugees and asylum seekers in Europe, and close to half were asylum seekers (figure 12). Germany received the largest number of new asylum applications in Europe in 2016 (and globally), with most claims made by people from the Syrian Arab Republic, Iraq and Afghanistan. Some of the largest refugee populations in France and Austria were from the Russian Federation. In 2016, France was also host to sizable refugee populations from Sri Lanka and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Ukraine and the Russian Federation were the main European origin countries (figure 12). Over 220,000 Ukrainian refugees were in the Russian Federation, many moving after conflict commenced in 2013.

Figure 12. Top 10 European countries by total refugees and asylum seekers, 2016



Source: UNHCR, n.d.a.

Note: "Hosted" refers to those refugees and asylum seekers from other countries who are residing in the receiving country (right-hand side of the figure); "abroad" refers to refugees and asylum seekers originating from that country who are outside of their origin country. Chapter 2 (appendix A) includes definitions of key terms such as "refugee". The top 10 countries are based on 2016 data and are calculated by combining refugees and asylum seekers in and from countries.

Key features and developments in Europe

Northern, Western and Southern Europe²³⁶

- Intraregional migration is particularly dynamic in Europe.** As of 1 January 2016, there were 16 million persons living in one of the European Union (EU) Member States with the citizenship of another Member State.²³⁷ Such a high degree of intraregional migration is made possible by free movement arrangements, which enable citizens to cross internal borders without being subjected to border checks. The border-free Schengen Area, which comprises 22 EU Member States and 4 non-EU Member countries, guarantees free movement to over 400 million citizens.²³⁸ In 2016, Romania had the highest number of its citizens living abroad in other European Union and European Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries at around 3 million, followed by Poland, Italy, Portugal and the United Kingdom.²³⁹ However, free movement in Europe faces challenges. From the second half of 2015, several Schengen Member States temporarily reintroduced border controls.²⁴⁰ There is also a degree of uncertainty following the June 2016 EU membership referendum in the United Kingdom about future migration settings arising from “Brexit” negotiations.
- Migration issues have remained high on the European agenda in 2016 and 2017 and have regularly been tackled in ministerial and heads of State or government meetings.** Most migrants coming to Europe via the Mediterranean crossed by boat from Libya to Italy, or from Turkey to Greece through the Aegean Sea. In 2016, nearly 390,000 people arrived in Europe through the Mediterranean region by both land and sea,²⁴¹ over 360,000 of whom arrived by sea.²⁴² Following the EU-Turkey Statement of 18 March 2016, the number of arrivals by sea in Greece dropped dramatically, reaching just over 170,000 in 2016, which was a significant decrease compared with the over 850,000 arrivals by sea to Greece in 2015.^{243,244} In 2016, over 180,000 migrants arrived in Italy by sea, a 16 per cent increase compared with 2015.²⁴⁵ The Central Mediterranean route from Libya to Malta and Italy was by far the deadliest route for irregular migrants in the world in 2016, with estimates of over 4,500 fatalities and missing migrants – the largest number ever reported in the region.²⁴⁶ Many more deaths at sea, but also along the different migratory routes, including while transiting through the Sahara Desert, were undoubtedly unreported.²⁴⁷ Of the maritime arrivals to Europe in 2016, over half came from one of the world’s top 10 refugee-producing countries, particularly the Syrian Arab Republic, Afghanistan and Iraq.²⁴⁸ Single women, as well as unaccompanied or separated children, represent a particularly vulnerable population of migrant arrivals. In 2016, 92 per cent of all children arriving through

236 See appendix A for details of the composition of Northern, Western and Southern Europe.

237 Eurostat, 2017a.

238 European Commission, n.d.a.

239 Eurostat, 2017a.

240 European Commission, n.d.b.

241 Arrivals identified in Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, Italy and Spain (IOM, 2017d).

242 IOM, 2017d.

243 Among the Statement’s provisions was an agreement to return to Turkey “all new irregular migrants crossing from Turkey into Greek islands”. In addition, for every Syrian returned to Turkey, another Syrian was to be resettled from Turkey to the EU on the basis of existing commitments, which totalled up to a ceiling of 72,000 resettlement places (European Council, 2016).

244 IOM, 2017d.

245 IOM, 2017e.

246 IOM, n.d.b.

247 IOM, 2017f.

248 UNHCR, 2017f.

the Central Mediterranean were unaccompanied or separated children.²⁴⁹ In 2016, more than 60,000 asylum applications were submitted by unaccompanied children in EU Member States.²⁵⁰

- **Arrivals of large numbers of migrants and refugees to Europe via the Mediterranean was at times met with anti-migrant rhetoric in the political discourse, policies and media.** All in all, the perception of migrants in many European societies has tended to be negative: migration of people from outside the EU evoked a negative feeling for a majority of Europeans (56%) in a May 2015 survey.²⁵¹ Across 10 European countries, an average of 56 per cent of the public stated that all further migration from mainly Muslim countries should be stopped.²⁵² Many Europeans largely overestimate the number of migrants and Muslims in their country.²⁵³ These negative perceptions towards migrants can have concrete implications. As of November 2016, the EU's Agency for Fundamental Rights indicated that violence, harassment, threats and xenophobic speech targeting asylum seekers and migrants remain grave, be they committed by State authorities, private companies or individuals, or vigilante groups.²⁵⁴ The persistence of negative perceptions towards migration has created challenges for governments' efforts to promote integration. Yet, forecast labour and skill shortages in the short to medium term will challenge both employment and economic growth prospects for the EU. For instance, population projections estimate a loss of more than 19 million people in the EU labour supply between 2023 and 2060.²⁵⁵ In the context of an aging European population, migrants can make an important economic contribution if they are well integrated in a timely manner, starting with early integration into education and the labour market.

South-Eastern and Eastern Europe²⁵⁶

- **For most South-Eastern and Eastern European countries, emigration rather than immigration has been the key feature over recent years and decades, with fairly low levels of immigration compared with other subregions of Europe.** Due to this and other factors, several countries in the region are projected to experience very significant population decline by 2050 (including Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Romania, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine).²⁵⁷ Emigration from Eastern European countries to Western Europe has been a growing trend, particularly since the expansion of the European Union in both 2004 and 2007 to encompass more Eastern European Member States, while extending the external borders of the European Union outward towards non-member countries in the East.²⁵⁸ More recently, this trend has been reinforced by the economic slowdown in the Russian Federation (see below). South-Eastern European countries have traditionally been countries of emigration, primarily to the European Union. South-Eastern European countries have also been migrant transit countries, particularly along the "Western Balkans route".
- **The Russian Federation remains the major destination country in the subregion (and one of the most significant in the world).** In 2015, the country hosted over 11.6 million international migrants.²⁵⁹

249 UNHCR, UNICEF and IOM, 2017.

250 Eurostat, 2017b.

251 European Commission, 2015.

252 From a survey conducted between December 2016 and February 2017 (source: Raines, Goodwin and Cutts, 2017). Countries surveyed include Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Spain and the United Kingdom.

253 Ipsos MORI, 2016.

254 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2016.

255 European Commission, 2014.

256 See appendix A for details on the composition of South-Eastern and Eastern Europe.

257 UN DESA, 2015b.

258 European Commission, 2007.

259 UN DESA, 2015a.

Most immigrants have come from neighbouring countries, most notably the CIS²⁶⁰ members, although the recent economic slowdown and changes in immigration policies in the Russian Federation have seen migrant inflows and remittances outflows fall compared with previous years.²⁶¹ In 2015, Ukraine also had a significant foreign-born population at over 4.8 million, with migrants originating in large part from the Russian Federation, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and the Republic of Moldova.²⁶² However, conflict in Eastern Ukraine and an overall economic decline in the country are likely to result in a decrease in the total foreign-born population in Ukraine in the next release of international migrant statistics by UN DESA.

- **Displacement within and from the region witnessed an increase in recent years, mainly as a direct result of the protracted conflict in Eastern Ukraine.** As of 2016 there were an estimated 1.7 million IDPs in Ukraine.²⁶³ Protracted insecurity in Eastern Ukraine has also generated an outflow of migrants and refugees to neighbouring states and to the European Union. In 2015, the global number of Ukrainian refugees peaked at over 320,000²⁶⁴, and remained high in 2016, declining to just under 240,000.²⁶⁵ A large number of Ukrainians have also applied for asylum in the Russian Federation, where Ukrainian asylum applications accounted for 98 per cent of the country's total for 2015.²⁶⁶ To put this in context, the Russian Federation received around 85 per cent of all asylum applications made by Ukrainians worldwide in 2015; 175,500 were made by Ukrainians globally.²⁶⁷ In addition, an increasing number of Ukrainians left the country as migrant workers, particularly to Poland. These developments have further added to an already significant IDP population in the region, notably in the Western Balkans and the South Caucasus, many of whom are in protracted situations as a result of the conflict/displacement events of the late 1980s and the 1990s.
- **In 2015 and early 2016, there was a sharp increase in transit migration from and through Turkey and the Western Balkans, particularly via the Eastern Mediterranean and the Western Balkans routes to reach countries in the north of the EU (primarily Austria, Germany and Sweden).** This brought the level of mixed migration through these routes to record levels and increased the number of asylum seekers and vulnerable migrants in the region. The subsequent establishment of border restrictions along the Western Balkans route, followed by the EU-Turkey Statement adopted on 18 March 2016, led to a significant drop in the number of people moving along the Western Balkans route.²⁶⁸ However, the closure of the route has left more than 70,000 people stranded.²⁶⁹ This situation is linked to increased vulnerability of migrants to abuse, exploitation or practices that may amount to human trafficking.²⁷⁰ In this context, as migrants could no longer rely on transportation provided by the authorities in the Western Balkans after the closure of the route, smuggling of migrants remains a major challenge.²⁷¹

260 The Commonwealth of Independent States consists of nine Member States: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Republic of Moldova, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, as well as two associate States: Turkmenistan and Ukraine.

261 IOM, 2016c.

262 UN DESA, 2015a.

263 IDMC, 2017.

264 UNHCR, 2016c.

265 UNHCR, 2017a.

266 UNHCR, 2016c.

267 Ibid.

268 Frontex, 2017.

269 IOM, 2016b.

270 IOM, 2017f.


271 Frontex, 2016.

Latin America and the Caribbean²⁷²

A key feature in the Latin America and the Caribbean region is migration to Northern America. In 2015, nearly 25 million migrants had made the journey north and were residing in Northern America. As shown in Figure 13, the Latin American and the Caribbean population living in Northern America has increased considerably over time, from an estimated 10 million in 1990 to just under 25 million in 2015. Another 4.6 million were in Europe, an increase from 1.1 million in 1990.

The total number of migrants from other regions living in Latin America and the Caribbean has remained relatively stable, at around three million over the last 25 years. These were comprised mostly of Europeans (whose numbers have declined slightly over the period) and Northern Americans, whose numbers have increased.

Figure 13. Migrants to, within and from in Latin America and the Caribbean between 1990 and 2015



Source: UN DESA, 2015a.


Note: “Migrants to Latin America and the Caribbean” refers to migrants residing in the region (i.e. Latin America and the Caribbean) who were born in one of the other regions (e.g. in Europe or Asia). “Migrants within Latin America and the Caribbean” refers to migrants born in the region (i.e. Latin America and the Caribbean) and residing outside their country of birth, but still within the Latin America and the Caribbean region. “Migrants from Latin America and the Caribbean” refers to people born in Latin America and the Caribbean who were residing outside the region (e.g. in Europe or Northern America).

272 See appendix A for details of the composition of Latin America and the Caribbean.

Mexico was by far the largest emigration country in Latin America and the Caribbean (figure 14). Over 12.5 million people born in Mexico lived abroad in 2015, making it the second largest migrant origin country in the world after India. Most Mexican emigrants lived in the United States, which continues to be the largest country-to-country migration corridor in the entire world (figure 15). Many other Central American countries such as El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras also have large migrant populations in the United States, as do South American countries such as Colombia, Ecuador, Brazil and Peru. Large populations of South American migrants resided elsewhere in the region. In 2015, almost 1 million Colombians lived in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, although more recent events (discussed below in the key features and developments section) have seen migration patterns change in recent years.

Argentina was home to the largest foreign-born population in the region (with over 2 million migrants), mainly from neighbouring countries such as Paraguay and Plurinational State of Bolivia. The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela had the next largest migrant population, followed by Mexico and Brazil. In Mexico, there were 880,000 American-born migrants. As illustrated in figure 14, of the top 20 migration countries in the region, Costa Rica had the highest immigrant share of its total population (almost 9%), due to longstanding migration from neighbouring Nicaragua. Other countries in the region outside of the top 20 had higher migrant populations as a proportion of the total population, such as Belize at 15 per cent.

Figure 14. Top 20 Latin America and the Caribbean migrant countries in 2015




Source: UN DESA, 2015a.

Note 1: The population size used to calculate the percentage of immigrants and emigrants is based on the UN DESA total resident population of the country, which includes foreign-born populations.

Note 2: "Immigrant" refers to foreign-born migrants residing in the country. "Emigrant" refers to people born in the country who were residing outside their country of birth in 2015.

The most striking feature of the main migration corridors within and from the region (figure 15) is the dominance of the United States as the main country of destination. Most of the corridors are to the United States, with the remainder all occurring within the Latin American and Caribbean region (e.g. Colombia to the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela). These migration corridors represent an accumulation of migratory movements involving countries in Latin America and the Caribbean over time, and provide a snapshot of how migration patterns have evolved into significant foreign-born populations in specific destination countries.

Figure 15. Top 20 migration corridors involving Latin America and the Caribbean countries




Source: UN DESA, 2015a.

Note: Corridors represent an accumulation of migratory movements over time and provide a snapshot of how migration patterns have evolved into significant foreign-born populations in specific destination countries.

In 2016, Colombia was the largest origin of refugees in the Latin America and Caribbean region, driven by long-standing internal conflict. Most of the refugees from Colombia were hosted in neighbouring Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and Ecuador. Haiti is the second largest origin of refugees in the region; it was also the origin of more than 20,000 asylum seekers, while Mexico was the origin of 64,000, followed by El Salvador (62,000), Guatemala (46,000), Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (45,000) and Honduras (35,000). Many of these asylum seekers were in the United States.

Figure 16. Top 10 Latin America and Caribbean countries by total refugees and asylum seekers, 2016



Source: UNHCR, n.d.a.

Note: "Hosted" refers to those refugees and asylum seekers from other countries who are residing in the receiving country (right-hand side of the figure); "abroad" refers to refugees and asylum seekers originating from that country who are outside of their origin country. Chapter 2 (appendix A) includes definitions of key terms such as "refugee". The top 10 countries are based on 2016 data and are calculated by combining refugees and asylum seekers in and from countries.

Key features and developments in Latin America and the Caribbean

*Central America, Mexico and the Caribbean*²⁷³

- **Migration northward is the predominant trend in Central America, Mexico and the Caribbean, although there are a number of intraregional trends worth noting.** Mexico remains a prominent origin country, with thousands emigrating mainly to the United States each year. It is also a significant transit country for migrants travelling northward to the southern United States border. However, within a context of improving economic conditions and rising educational levels in the country, as well as stricter immigration enforcement in the United States, Mexico is an increasingly significant destination country for international migrants. The total number of foreign-born persons in Mexico increased from around 970,000 in 2010 to nearly 1.2 million in 2015 – a majority of whom were Americans, but also an increasingly larger portion of whom were migrants from other Latin American and Caribbean countries.²⁷⁴ However, the United States is by far the most popular destination of Central American migrants – 78 per cent of Central American migrants lived in the United States in 2015, with 15 per cent residing in other countries in the region and in Mexico.²⁷⁵ The most prominent intraregional migrant corridors involve Nicaraguans, Panamanians and other Central Americans moving to Costa Rica for temporary or permanent labour, and Central Americans (primarily from Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador) migrating to Belize because of instability and a lack of employment opportunities.²⁷⁶ In the Caribbean, the most prominent intraregional migrant corridors include Haitians migrating to the Dominican Republic.²⁷⁷
- **Irregular migrant flows in the region are shifting and becoming increasingly diversified.** Mexicans represented the vast majority of irregular migrants apprehended while attempting to cross the United States–Mexico border for many years. However, in 2014, and again in 2016, apprehensions of Central Americans originating from the “Northern Triangle” region of Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador exceeded that of Mexicans at the United States–Mexico border.²⁷⁸ Additionally, flows of irregular migrants through Central America and Mexico have diversified considerably to include large numbers of Caribbean migrants, as well as a growing number of Asians and Africans. Overall, there were over 55,000 apprehensions of non-Latin Americans at the United States–Mexico border in fiscal year 2015.²⁷⁹ Over 6,000 “inadmissible” Haitian migrants reached south-western United States border ports of entry in fiscal year 2015, while nearly 8,000 African and Asian migrants arrived at Mexican immigration checkpoints in the first half of 2016, representing a substantial increase over previous years.²⁸⁰
- **New and diversified flows throughout the region have prompted a response by transit and destination countries to increase border enforcement and protection.** In response to increasing irregular migrant flows, particularly of Cubans and Haitians, Nicaragua closed its southern border in November 2015, while Costa Rica closed its border to Cubans in December 2015 and later to all irregular

273 Please see appendix A for details of the composition of Central America, Mexico and the Caribbean.

274 UN DESA, 2015a.

275 Lesser and Batalova, 2017.

276 ILO, 2016.

277 Ibid.

278 Gonzalez-Barrera and Krogstad, 2016.

279 Bolter, 2017.

280 Ibid.

migrants in August 2016.²⁸¹ Further, Mexico implemented its “Southern Border Plan” in 2014 to reduce irregular migrant flows from Central America. Between 2013 and 2015, the number of apprehensions by Mexican authorities increased from over 86,000 to over 198,000.²⁸² Migrant smuggling is also a major feature of the region, as people attempt to bypass border controls in Central America and Mexico. Along the United States–Mexico border, smuggling networks are a profitable industry overseen by international crime groups.²⁸³ Smuggled migrants are known frequently to fall victim to predatory practices ranging from demands for bribes to mass kidnapping and extortion.²⁸⁴ There appears to be low risk of arrest for the smugglers, many of whom pretend to be irregular migrants themselves and are often repatriated as opposed to apprehended.²⁸⁵

- **Socioeconomic conditions and generalized community-level violence in a number of Central American countries contribute to migration, notably of high numbers of women and children.** The United States received over 250 per cent more asylum claims from the “Northern Triangle” countries (El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala) in 2015 compared with 2013, and twice the number of 2014.²⁸⁶ The number of unaccompanied children migrating from Central America has also risen substantially, with a 1,200 per cent increase in unaccompanied minor children apprehended at the United States–Mexico border between fiscal years 2011 and 2014.²⁸⁷ Additionally, the number of asylum applications lodged in Mexico has risen substantially in recent years, increasing by 155 per cent from over 3,400 in 2015 to nearly 8,800 in 2016.²⁸⁸

*South America*²⁸⁹

- **Intraregional migration within South America has intensified.** Overall, the number of intraregional migrants in South America increased by 11 per cent between 2010 and 2015, and approximately 70 per cent of all immigration in the region is intraregional.²⁹⁰ Fueled by economic and labour market disparities between countries, a majority of the region’s migrants move for work.²⁹¹ Notably, South American economic restructuring, as well as increased demand for female migrants by service and care sectors, have also led to the feminization of intraregional movement.²⁹² Southern Cone countries of Chile, Argentina and Brazil – which all witnessed increases of between 16 and 20 per cent in migrant populations between 2010 and 2015 – have some of the largest migrant populations in South America, attracting labour migrants from the Andean countries, as well as Paraguay.²⁹³ The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela is home to a large number of intraregional migrants from Colombia and Ecuador.²⁹⁴ In the context of increased intraregional migration,

281 Ibid.

282 WOLA, 2016.

283 UNODC, n.d.

284 Sanchez, 2016.

285 UNODC, n.d.

286 Sturm, 2016.

287 Meyer et al., 2016.

288 Luna, 2017.

289 Please see appendix A for details of the composition of South America.

290 IOM, 2017c.

291 Ibid.

292 Cerruti, 2009.

293 IOM, 2017c.

294 UN DESA, 2015a.

subregional blocs such as the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR), as well as the Andean Community of Nations (CAN), have made notable efforts to liberalize intraregional migration. For example, MERCOSUR Residence Agreements have led to enhanced labour migration and a decrease in irregular migration within the region.²⁹⁵

- **Millions of South Americans continue to reside outside of the region, while at the same time the number of migrants from outside the region is slowly growing.** Emigration from South America is mostly related to work, fuelled by economic crises and political instability in origin countries.²⁹⁶ The United States and Spain are the two largest destination countries of South American migrants, with 2.8 million and 1.8 million migrants residing in these two countries respectively.²⁹⁷ The countries with the highest numbers of emigrants residing outside of South America in 2015 were Colombia (around 1.4 million emigrants), followed by Brazil (1.3 million extraregional emigrants) and Ecuador (over 1 million extraregional emigrants).²⁹⁸ At the same time, reduced opportunities in labour markets abroad, as well as improved economic conditions in the region, are contributing to the return of many South American migrants and a decrease in the rate of extraregional migration.²⁹⁹ The number of migrants in South America from outside the region is also growing. For example, since 2010, more people have emigrated from the European Union to Latin America and the Caribbean overall, than from Latin America and the Caribbean to the European Union.³⁰⁰ Many of these people are not return migrants, but rather European Union nationals primarily from Spain, Italy and Portugal.³⁰¹ Migrants from these three origin countries collectively represented a population of over 700,000 people in South America in 2015.³⁰² Increased numbers of Haitians, Cubans and Dominicans have also migrated to South America.³⁰³
- **Though localized to particular countries, conflict and violence contribute to human displacement and migration in the region.** In Colombia, over 7.2 million people remained internally displaced as of the end of 2016 – higher than any other country in the world.³⁰⁴ By the end of 2016, over 300,000 Colombians were living as refugees or in refugee-like situations abroad.³⁰⁵ There were also nearly 1.2 million Colombians in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and Ecuador in 2015. However, as Colombia begins to transition out of five decades of violence with peace talks in late 2016 and 2017, deteriorating economic and social conditions in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela are leading many Colombians to return home, while many Venezuelans continue to leave their country, both across the border to Colombia and elsewhere.³⁰⁶ Asylum applications lodged by Venezuelans in the United States, for example, increased by 168 per cent between fiscal 2015 and 2016,³⁰⁷ and from a total of 27,000 worldwide in 2016 to nearly 50,000 in the first half of 2017 alone.³⁰⁸

295 Acosta, 2016.

296 IOM, 2017c.

297 UN DESA, 2015a.

298 Ibid.

299 IOM, n.d.a.

300 IOM, 2015b.

301 Ibid.

302 UN DESA, 2015a.

303 IOM, 2017c.

304 IDMC, 2017.

305 UNHCR, 2017a.

306 Carvajal, 2017.


307 Krogstad and Lopez, 2016.

308 UNHCR, 2017e.

Northern America³⁰⁹

Migration in Northern America is dominated by migration into the region. As shown in figure 17, over 51 million migrants were residing in Northern America from a variety of regions in 2015. The largest group was from Latin America and the Caribbean (25 million), followed by Asia (15.5 million) and Europe (7.5 million). During the last 25 years, the number of migrants in Northern America has almost doubled in size, driven by population growth in Latin American and the Caribbean, and Asia, as well as by economic growth and political stability in Northern America.

Figure 17. Migrants to, within and from Northern America between 1990 and 2015



Source: UN DESA, 2015a.


Note: "Migrants to Northern America" refers to migrants residing in the region (i.e. Northern America) who were born in one of the other regions (e.g. Europe or Asia). "Migrants within Northern America" refers to migrants born in the region (i.e. Northern America) and residing outside their country of birth, but still within the Northern American region. "Migrants from Northern America" refers to people born in Northern America who were residing outside the region (e.g. in Europe or Africa).

309 See appendix A for details on the composition of Northern America.

The number of Northern American migrants living within the region or elsewhere was relatively small compared with the foreign-born population in the region. In 2015, more Northern American-born migrants lived outside the region – principally in Latin America and the Caribbean (1.3 million) – than had moved elsewhere within the region (1.2 million).

In 2015, the United States had the largest foreign-born population in the world, while Canada had the seventh largest. Over 85 per cent of the foreign-born populations in the region lived in the United States, where they comprise over 14 per cent of the total population. As shown in figure 18, the share of Canada's total population that was foreign-born (at over 20%) was considerably higher than in the United States in 2015. Canada also had a larger share of its citizens who had emigrated (as a per cent of its total home population) compared with the United States.

Figure 18. Main migration countries in Northern America in 2015




Source: UN DESA, 2015a.

Note 1: The population size used to calculate the percentage of immigrants and emigrants is based on the UN DESA total resident population of the country, which includes foreign-born populations.

Note 2: "Immigrant" refers to foreign-born migrants residing in the country. "Emigrant" refers to people born in the country who were residing outside their country of birth in 2015.

Figure 19 shows the top 10 migration corridors involving Northern American countries, representing an accumulation of migratory movements over time and providing a snapshot of how migration patterns have evolved into significant foreign-born populations in specific destination countries. The largest migrant corridors in Northern America all involve migrants either from Asia, or Latin America and the Caribbean, to the United States of America. Mexican-born migrants form the biggest migrant group, with over 12 million living in the United States in 2015. The next largest migrant groups come from populous Asian countries, including China, India and the Philippines. Some of the other large migrant groups from Viet Nam, the Republic of Korea and Cuba in the United States grew rapidly after conflicts or political changes in their countries many years ago.

Figure 19. Top 10 migration corridors involving Northern America countries




Source: UN DESA, 2015a.

Note: Corridors represent an accumulation of migratory movements over time and provide a snapshot of how migration patterns have evolved into significant foreign-born populations in specific destination countries.

The United States hosted over 700,000 refugees and asylum seekers in 2016. As apparent from figure 20, the majority were asylum seekers. Refugees in the United States came from a vast range of countries; however, the largest refugee populations were from China, Haiti, El Salvador, Guatemala, Egypt and Ethiopia. Canada is also host to a large refugee population. The largest origin countries are Colombia and China. Recent changes in refugee resettlement to the United States and Canada are discussed in the following *key features and developments* section.

Figure 20. Numbers of refugees and asylum seekers in and from Northern American countries, 2016



Source: UNHCR, n.d.a.

Note: “Hosted” refers to those refugees and asylum seekers from other countries who are residing in the receiving country (right-hand side of the figure); “abroad” refers to refugees and asylum seekers originating from that country who are outside of their origin country. Chapter 2 (appendix A) includes definitions of key terms such as “refugee”.

*Key features and developments in Northern America*³¹⁰

- Migration trends in the United States are characterized by high levels of immigration, primarily from Latin America and Asia, although the demography of international migrants is changing.** As of 2015, Mexican-born migrants were still by far the largest foreign-born population living in the United States, at just over 12 million.³¹¹ However, fewer Mexicans were migrating to the United States compared with the past. In addition to economic barriers caused by the slow recovery of the United States economy following the 2008 global financial crisis,³¹² and immigration enforcement barriers in the United States, many Mexicans and their children are voluntarily choosing to return to Mexico.³¹³ For example, between 2009 and 2014, 870,000 Mexicans migrated to the United States, while around one million Mexican immigrants and their children born in the United States moved from the United States to Mexico.³¹⁴ Those Mexicans who returned to Mexico cited family reunification as the primary motive for return.³¹⁵ In contrast, the number of Central Americans living in the United States increased tenfold between 1980 and 2015.³¹⁶ After Mexico, migrants from Asian countries – particularly from China, India and the Philippines – comprised the largest foreign-born populations in the United States in 2015.³¹⁷ China and India have now overtaken Mexico in terms of recent immigrant arrivals to the United States.³¹⁸ This trend is expected to continue, and current estimates suggest that Asian immigrants will comprise the largest foreign-born group in the United States by 2055.³¹⁹ The largest immigration pathway for Asians migrating to the United States is through family-sponsored visas,³²⁰ although many are also students; in 2014–2015, Asian students accounted for 76 per cent of international students enrolled in United States higher education institutions.³²¹
- Migrant populations in Canada continue to increase, representing a growing percentage of the country's total population.** In 2000, foreign-born persons represented about 18 per cent of Canada's total population, increasing to 18.8 per cent in 2005, 20.5 per cent in 2010 and nearly 22 per cent in 2015.³²² However, while migrant populations in Canada have originated primarily from European countries in the past, the composition of the country's foreign-born population has shifted to include large populations of migrants from Asian countries. For example, in 2000, the largest origin country of international migrants in Canada was the United Kingdom (610,000), followed by China (410,000), India and Italy. By 2015, both China and India had surpassed the United Kingdom as the largest origin country, with the Philippines newly featuring in the top five and Italy no longer featuring among the top five.³²³ Other Asian countries including Viet Nam and Pakistan also featured in the top 10

310 See appendix A for details on the composition of Northern America.

311 UN DESA, 2015a.

312 Gonzalez-Barrera, 2015.

313 Ibid.

314 Krogstad, 2016.

315 Gonzalez-Barrera, 2015.

316 Lesser and Batalova, 2017.

317 UN DESA, 2015a.

318 Zong and Batalova, 2016.

319 Ibid.

320 Malik, 2015.

321 Zong and Batalova, 2016.

322 UN DESA, 2015a; UN DESA, 2017.

323 UN DESA, 2015a.

largest populations within Canada's total 7.84 million total foreign-born population in 2015.³²⁴ In 2015, Canada admitted over 270,000 new permanent residents, representing the highest number since 2010.³²⁵

- **The estimated number of irregular migrants in the United States has remained relatively stable in recent years and is much larger when compared with Canada.** Overall, irregular migrants were estimated to comprise 3.4 per cent of the total United States population in 2015.³²⁶ Taking into account caveats and data limitations for measuring irregular migrant populations, as of 2016, the total preliminary estimated population of irregular migrants was 11.3 million, of whom half (around 5.6 million) were Mexicans.³²⁷ However, the number of undocumented Mexicans has been decreasing since 2009, while the number of Asian irregular migrants in the United States has increased over time, reaching an estimated 1.5 million in 2015.³²⁸ Overall, while undocumented migrants may enter the country unauthorized, a large number are visa overstayers who entered regularly. In fiscal year 2015, there were over 527,000 estimated instances of people who overstayed their visas in the United States.³²⁹ In Canada, a number of estimates have indicated that there are between 200,000 and 400,000 irregular migrants in the country.³³⁰ An unspecified number of irregular migrants are rejected asylum seekers who have not departed.³³¹
- **The United States and Canada have resettled record numbers of refugees, representing the two largest resettlement countries in the world.** In 2016, the United States resettled more refugees than any previous year since 2010 (nearly 85,000), the majority of whom originated from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (at over 16,000), followed by the Syrian Arab Republic, Myanmar, Iraq and Somalia.³³² However, the number of refugees resettled to the United States is likely to decline from an expected 110,000 to 50,000 in 2017.³³³ Overall, Canada resettled nearly 47,000 refugees in 2016 – the largest number of refugees resettled in the country since 1980.³³⁴ Refugees resettled in Canada in 2015 and 2016 primarily originated from the Syrian Arab Republic, Iraq, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea and Myanmar.

Oceania³³⁵

In 2015, Oceania was the destination for nearly seven million migrants from outside the region. As shown in figure 21, the foreign-born migrant population was primarily composed of two large groups from Asia (38%) and Europe (37%). Throughout the last 25 years, the Asian migrant group has grown, while the number from Europe has remained steady. Migrants from Oceania were more likely to end up within the region than outside. Out of all of the six regions, Oceania had the lowest number of migrants outside its region in 2015, partly a reflection of the low total population size of the region, although there was a steady increase in their number during the previous 25-year period. Most of those born in Oceania living outside the region resided in Europe and Northern America.

324 UN DESA, 2015a.

325 Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada, 2016.

326 Krogstad, Passel and Cohn, 2017.

327 Ibid.

328 Passel and Cohn, 2017.

329 United States Department of Homeland Security, 2016.

330 Bertelsmann Stiftung and Migration Policy Institute, 2012.

331 Smick, 2006.


332 United States Department of State, 2016; Igielnik and Krogstad, 2017.

333 Krogstad and Radford, 2017.

334 UNHCR, 2017c.

335 See appendix A for details on the composition of Oceania.

Figure 21. Migrants to, within and from Oceania in 2015




Source: UN DESA, 2015a.

Note: "Migrants to Oceania" refers to migrants residing in the region (i.e. Oceania) who were born in one of the other regions (e.g. Europe or Asia). "Migrants within Oceania" refers to migrants born in the region (i.e. Oceania) and residing outside their country of birth, but still within the Oceania region. "Migrants from Oceania" refers to people born in Oceania who were residing outside the region (e.g. in Europe or Asia).

The vast majority of migrants in Oceania were living in either Australia or New Zealand (figure 22). Most countries in the region have skewed migration profiles, being either large net senders or net receivers. For example, Tonga, Samoa and Fiji all have high counts of emigrants in comparison with their native population and very low shares of foreign-born populations. Their emigrants were located primarily in New Zealand and to a lesser extent in Australia. Australia and New Zealand have high shares of foreign-born populations as a portion of total population, comprising over 28 per cent and 23 per cent respectively.

Figure 22. Oceania migrant countries in 2015




Source: UN DESA, 2015a.

Note 1: The population size used to calculate the percentage of immigrants and emigrants is based on the UN DESA total resident population of the country, which includes foreign-born populations.

Note 2: "Immigrant" refers to foreign-born migrants residing in the country. "Emigrant" refers to people born in the country who were residing outside their country of birth in 2015.

Figure 23 shows the top 10 migration corridors involving Oceania countries, showing an accumulation of migratory movements over time, and providing a snapshot of how migration patterns have evolved into significant foreign-born populations in specific destination countries. The top 10 migration corridors in the region were all to Australia, with the largest being of migrants born in the United Kingdom. All the largest migrant corridors in the region were based on populations moving to Australia. These include a variety of countries from outside Oceania, including China, India, Viet Nam and the Philippines, many of which have experienced rapid growth over recent decades. New Zealand had high shares of migrants abroad, predominantly in Australia, and many international migrants residing within the country.

Figure 23. Top 10 migration corridors involving Oceania countries




Source: UN DESA, 2015a.

Note: Corridors represent an accumulation of migratory movements over time and provide a snapshot of how migration patterns have evolved into significant foreign-born populations in specific destination countries.

In 2016 Oceania hosted under 100,000 refugees and asylum seekers. Australia was the largest host country in this region, followed by Papua New Guinea and New Zealand. Most of the refugees in these countries originated from Asia, such as Indonesians in Papua New Guinea or Afghans and Iranians in Australia. Globally, there were just over 2,000 refugees and asylum seekers from countries in the Oceania region in 2016.

Figure 24. Numbers of refugees and asylum seekers in and from Oceania countries, 2016



Source: UNHCR, n.d.a.

Note: "Hosted" refers to those refugees and asylum seekers from other countries who are residing in the receiving country (right-hand side of the figure); "abroad" refers to refugees and asylum seekers originating from that country who are outside of their origin country. Chapter 2 (appendix A) includes definitions of key terms such as "refugee". The top 10 countries are based on 2016 data and are calculated by combining refugees and asylum seekers in and from countries.

Key features and developments in Oceania

- Migrant populations in both New Zealand and Australia have continued to increase.** In 2015–2016, New Zealand experienced a net migration increase of 19 per cent over the previous year,³³⁶ while Australia, experienced a 3 per cent increase in 2015–2016 over the previous year.³³⁷ Between 2000 and 2015, the United Kingdom continued to be the largest origin country of international migrants living in Australia at nearly 1.3 million in 2015, followed by migrants from New Zealand (around 640,000 in 2015).³³⁸ A majority of the other top origin countries of migrants in Australia in 2015 were Asian, including China, India, Viet Nam and the Philippines.³³⁹ By the end of June 2016, over 28 per cent of Australia's total population was foreign born.³⁴⁰ The United Kingdom has consistently been the main origin country of migrants in New Zealand for decades, with a notable increase in the number of Asian migrants, particularly from China and India, as well as a considerable population of people from the Pacific Islands, including Fiji, Samoa and Tonga.³⁴¹ In 2015, New Zealand's foreign-born population constituted nearly 23 per cent of the country's total population.³⁴² In both Australia and New Zealand, there are a significant number of temporary workers, with almost 200,000 people granted a work visa in New Zealand in 2015–2016.³⁴³ The largest origin country

336 New Zealand Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, 2016.

337 Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2017a; UN DESA, 2015a.

338 UN DESA, 2015a.

339 Ibid.

340 Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2017b.

341 UN DESA, 2015a.

342 Ibid.

343 New Zealand Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, 2016.

of temporary migrant workers in New Zealand was India in 2015–2016, followed by the United Kingdom.³⁴⁴ In Australia, there were under 100,000 primary holders of temporary work visas as of 31 March 2017.³⁴⁵ Both countries also attract a large number of international students. The number of international students has increased since 2012 in Australia, reaching a record high of over 700,000 in 2016,³⁴⁶ while there were over 100,000 international students in New Zealand in 2015, primarily from China, India and Japan.³⁴⁷

- **Intraregional migration in Oceania is a prominent and continuing trend.** Historically, large numbers of people have migrated between New Zealand and Australia (mostly from New Zealand to Australia), assisted by movement agreements between the two countries. However, the number of New Zealanders returning to New Zealand from Australia increased substantially between 2014 and 2016, with a net gain in the number of Australians in New Zealand as well.³⁴⁸ Intraregional migration of Pacific Islanders to both Australia and New Zealand is also prominent, as discussed in further detail below.
- **Both Australia and New Zealand participate in refugee resettlement.** Australia's refugee resettlement programme is the third largest in the world.³⁴⁹ The country offered a minimum of almost 14,000 places for refugees in 2015–2016.³⁵⁰ An additional 12,000 humanitarian places have been made available in Australia for people displaced by conflicts in the Syrian Arab Republic and Iraq.³⁵¹ In addition, Australia resettles refugees who have been living in neighbouring countries (e.g. Malaysia and Indonesia) who originate from other countries, such as Myanmar and Afghanistan. Australia's policy is to transfer those who arrive irregularly as asylum seekers to offshore processing centres on Manus Island in Papua New Guinea and in Nauru. In July 2013, Australia also announced that all persons arriving by boat would not be resettled to Australia.³⁵² New Zealand is also a refugee resettlement country, announcing the resettlement of 750 Syrian refugees in 2015–2016. International/Humanitarian Stream approvals in New Zealand also come from the Pacific, constituting 1,600 people approved for residence in 2015–2016.³⁵³
- **Economic and environmental challenges influence emigration from Pacific Island countries.** The total number of Pacific-born migrants living in OECD countries is now 420,000, most of whom come from Fiji, Samoa and Tonga.³⁵⁴ Development challenges and a so-called "youth bulge" throughout the Pacific Islands have introduced significant employment shortages, leading to high degrees of labour emigration, particularly to New Zealand, as well as to Australia and other countries.³⁵⁵ Almost 12,000 people from the Pacific arrive in Australia and New Zealand each year through seasonal work programmes.³⁵⁶ Environmental change and degradation are also among the array of factors influencing many Pacific Islanders to migrate, with half of the population in Kiribati and Tuvalu in particular living in overcrowded urban areas on atolls

344 New Zealand Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, 2016.

345 Australian DIBP, 2017.

346 Australian Department of Education and Training, 2016.

347 Infometrics and National Research Bureau, 2016.

348 Stats New Zealand, 2016.

349 UNHCR, 2016a.

350 Australian DIBP, 2016.

351 Ibid.

352 Refugee Council of Australia, 2017.

353 New Zealand Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, 2016.

354 Curtain et al., 2016.

355 Ibid.

356 Ibid.

of narrow strips of coral with limited access to water and land.³⁵⁷ Incremental sea level rise, saltwater intrusion and drought are important factors among others impacting people's decision to migrate in the region, both internally and internationally.³⁵⁸ In this context, there is also growing discussion around the need for planned relocation of groups and communities.³⁵⁹

Conclusion

There is a tendency in public policy debates to generalize about the characteristics of global migration, its impacts on national economies and societies, and the ensuing policy challenges across different countries and regions of the world. Indeed, as chapter 2 of this report shows, there are important global trends and patterns in migration. There are also clearly some similarities across countries in terms of the economic, social and cultural effects of migrants on the domestic population, as well as the fundamental challenges migration raises for public policymakers. Considering these similarities and commonalities in the characteristics and impacts of international migration is of fundamental importance to global and national policy debates and policymaking. A key message of this chapter is that it is equally important, however, to pay attention to regional dimensions and variations in international migration and displacement that can have critical implications for debates and regulation, especially (but not only) at global and supranational levels.

This chapter has drawn on a wide range of data and information to provide regional overviews of international migration and mobility around the world. The chapter focused on six broad world regions (Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, Northern America and Oceania) and provided discussion of key issues and developments in multiple subregions within each of the broader regions. The discussion was necessarily limited and selective in its approach, aiming to highlight key features rather than to provide a comprehensive overview of international migration and mobility in each subregion. As chapter 2 on "global trends and patterns" shows, there are important gaps in data and information about global migrant stocks and migration flows. As this chapter has shown, the same caveat applies to the analysis of regional migration trends and patterns. In addition, there are large variations in the quantity and quality of data and research on migrants across different regions of the world. These geographic asymmetries in the availability and quality of data and research on migrants should be a key issue of concern for global and national policymakers.

Overall, the chapter points to important differences across regions and subregions, as well as growing complexities in migration dynamics around the world. To give a basic example of regional differences, migration in Asia has been predominantly intraregional (i.e. from one Asian country to another) which far exceeds migration to other regions of the world (i.e. from Asian to non-Asian countries). In Africa, intraregional migration has always been and remains important, but the number of African migrants who have moved to other parts of the world (especially Europe, North America and the Middle East) is now roughly the same as the number of African migrants who have moved within the region. In contrast, in Latin America and the Caribbean, migration is dominated by emigration to other world regions, especially North America, with intraregional migration playing a relatively limited role.

357 Curtain et al., 2016.

358 UNESCAP, 2015.

359 See, for example, Georgetown University, n.d., for a range of resources on planned relocation.

A key aspect and illustration of the important, but often underappreciated complexity of migration dynamics in different regions of the world, is that a number of countries are simultaneously “producing” large numbers of refugees who flee to other countries as well as “hosting” sizable refugee populations from other countries. It is well known that many countries, such as Germany and the United Kingdom, experience large immigration and emigration flows, often driven by two-way flows of labour migrants, family migrants and students. It is perhaps less well known that, as shown in this chapter, this also applies to some countries in the specific case of refugees. Examples include Sudan, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Iraq.

These differences and complexities (some of which are specific to place and time, while others are relatively common across regions) raise important questions and challenges for policymaking. For example, fundamental differences in migration experiences and dynamics across regions clearly need to be considered when discussing desirable regimes for the global governance of international migration. Differences can also have implications for applying good practices and in ensuring that governance approaches are tailored to meet regional dimensions. Similarly, growing complexities in migration dynamics create direct challenges for national regulators and have important consequences for the most desirable forms of governance and cooperation across countries. Greater recognition of regional and subregional migration patterns, variations and complexities, would assist in formulating strategic and sustainable policy responses.



4

MIGRATION RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS: GROWTH, REACH AND RECENT CONTRIBUTIONS

Introduction

As the interest in migration has risen over time, so too has the amount of information published on this increasingly complex and most pressing global issue. Ideally, the knowledge originating from rigorous analysis and research on migration should be the prime source and starting point for informing policymakers, practitioners, students, scholars and the public about migration and how it is changing. However, the growth in publically available material on migration makes this increasingly hard. In an era of “information overload”, it can be challenging to identify, collect and digest relevant and robust material on migration.

This chapter provides an overview of research and analysis on migration being undertaken and published by a range of actors such as academics, governments, intergovernmental organizations and think tanks. Understanding the variety, nature and characteristics of the different types of research and analysis being produced on migration is important for anybody working on migration policies, studying migration, or wanting to develop an informed opinion on migration.

The chapter shows that there has been a dramatic increase in the research and analysis of migration. While it is impossible to retrieve, count and classify every single piece of research on migration, we provide an account of basic quantitative aspects, such as estimates of the volume of articles/books published in recent years. Our qualitative analysis summarizes topics from a sample of academic articles, as well as key content from a set of intergovernmental organizations’ flagship publications. We also provide basic measures of “reach” and “impact” of published material.

It is important to highlight at the outset that there are fundamental differences in the publishing processes for academic and non-academic material, and each has its strengths and weaknesses. The academic publishing system is largely focused on producing journal articles and books. This process typically involves multi-stage reviews and editorial comments involving authors, editors and reviewers. Most published academic research (“white” literature) are behind paywalls (that is, not freely accessible), and often managed by commercial publishers. In contrast, the production of research and analysis publications outside of academic publishing (“grey” literature) generally involves faster and simpler processes that are typically, although not always, characterized by more limited peer review. Contributions to the grey literature (such as research reports, working papers and government/official documents) are usually freely available. A report such as this, designed to contribute to our collective understanding of migration in an increasingly interconnected world, would clearly be incomplete without describing the role of grey literature, which has been “recognized as a key source of evidence, argument, innovation, and understanding”.³⁶⁰

The volume, diversity and growth of both white and grey literature preclude a systematic review of all the material produced and published on migration in 2015 and 2016. Instead, this chapter highlights examples

360 GreyNet International, 2014.

of key contributions made during this period, published in English by a selection of academic journals and intergovernmental organizations. The next section describes the different actors involved in migration research and analysis. The third section features recent, selected contributions from academia and intergovernmental organizations. The fourth section outlines the reach and impact of some of the migration research materials published.

Main producers of migration research and analysis

Academia

Ideally, researchers create new knowledge that is supported by strong evidence and is useful for others. Research findings are produced for, and disseminated to, different target audiences. Traditional academic work can be highly technical and narrowly focused, although academic researchers are increasingly encouraged to disseminate their work beyond academic spheres.³⁶¹ Some communication of research findings, for example, involves the spreading of knowledge to non-experts, including members of the general public, through means such as media (traditional and newer forms) and events such as public lectures/seminars, science festivals and so forth. Researchers analysing policy-relevant issues are often keen to engage with policymakers to impart knowledge that can inform policy deliberations and help shape policymaking. Effective research contributions for policy audiences tend to take the form of short papers and blog articles, as well as policy workshops, interactive expert meetings, high-level consultations and conferences. The turbidity of the policymaking environment and the high turnover rate of ministers, senior officials and others can make communication challenging, partly because shifts towards managerialism in public administration have seen expertise and content knowledge diminish over recent decades.³⁶² At the same time, information overload is challenging knowledge-building and policymaking processes, while policy complexity and interlinkages continue to grow.³⁶³

In academia, the dissemination system rotates around publication, with some forms of publication (such as academic journals) having much greater credibility and weight than others. A key strength of academic publications is that they have usually been peer-reviewed by experts in the field, which typically enhances the robustness and credibility of the research. The growing number of outlets for academic publications is, however, characterized by a wide range of quality standards applied in peer-review processes. Arguably, one of the weaknesses of academic research is that the pressure to publish has contributed to a large quantitative – although not always a corresponding qualitative – increase in academic output in recent years. Appendix A provides a summary of academic publishing, including details of peer-review processes, citations and impact assessment.

Within the many thousands of peer-reviewed journals currently being produced covering all disciplines, topics and research fields,³⁶⁴ we identified over 130 migration-related journals publishing in English, French or Spanish.³⁶⁵ Mainstream academic publishers tend to publish in English, which has both the advantage of standardizing outputs and the downside of excluding those who are not able to submit manuscripts with an acceptable level of English.

361 McAuliffe, 2016.

362 Box, 1999; Kirkpatrick, Ackroyd and Walker, 2005.


363 Nutley and Webb, 2000; Weinberger, 2011.

364 Ware and Mabe, 2015.

365 A list of the journals can be found on the IOM website on the research page (www.iom.int/migration-research).

Number of academic publications on “immigration” or “emigration”

The figure below shows the search results of the query “immigration” or “emigration” in Scopus – the largest database of academic peer-reviewed literature. Journal articles constitute the largest share of publications, with a clear and constantly increasing trend peaking in 2015. The long-term trend suggests an increasing scholarly production on migration matters: is this just a reflection of the general expansion of academic literature production, or is migration research developing for specific reasons?



Source: www.scopus.com.

Note: Querying the term “migration” alone returns figures that are more than 10 times higher. However, these include usage of the term “migration” in disciplines that are irrelevant to the current research, such as computer science (data migration), biology (cell migration), zoology (bird or fish migration) and many others. Using the Scopus advanced search, we excluded subject areas such as chemistry, physics, astronomy, neuroscience and so forth.

Governments

Historically, government administrative data on persons entering and/or leaving a country’s territory constitute the earliest sources of information on international migration.³⁶⁶ The earliest scholarly work on migration in the modern era, however, was on internal migration dynamics based on national census data collected by authorities in the United Kingdom.³⁶⁷ To this day, data enumerated by population censuses, population registers, representative surveys and other official statistical sources often constitute the basis for migration-related databases. The centrality of migration-related data within a government context is recognized, for example, by the IOM Development Fund, which supports (among other things) capacity-building of Member States on migration-related statistics.

Beyond statistical data collection, administration and reporting, some governments are also significant contributors of information on migration, particularly in the form of policy-related materials, such as evaluations, studies and discussion papers. They may also commission research with partners in academia, applied researchers, intergovernmental organizations and think tanks. The increasing relevance of migration has led to governments

³⁶⁶ Poulain, Perrin and Singleton, 2006.

³⁶⁷ Ravenstein, 1885.

providing funding for empirical work, thereby opening up new research areas and broadening the scope of migration studies.³⁶⁸ This has led to some criticism of government-commissioned research being overly focused on policy issues and for, at times, suggesting “simplistic, short-term remedies to complex, long-term social issues”,³⁶⁹ or of researchers being used to legitimize immigration policy.³⁷⁰ There has also been some evidence of researchers being pressured into “produc[ing] politically useful results” in policy-related research more generally.³⁷¹ Understandably, issues addressed in government-commissioned dedicated migration research vary widely, and can depend on the countries’ role in the migration process.³⁷² Equally, there is recognition that policy-*irrelevant* research is also crucial – particularly migration research that looks beyond the policy frames of reference to explore less visible aspects of migration.³⁷³ It is also important to note that research commissioned by governments can provide useful and rigorous examinations of migration – particularly in partnership with academic and other researchers, who can bring different perspectives, knowledge and analytical approaches to the examination of complex, multifaceted migration issues, including by drawing upon administrative data that might not otherwise be accessible. As Khalid Koser has noted:

...genuine collaboration and partnerships have the ability to recognize the different but complementary expertise that resides inside and outside of government. In the right circumstances, powerful and productive partnerships can be formed that are able to draw on critical thinking to address complex migration issues in a policy relevant and strategic manner.³⁷⁴

Indeed, some have argued that there should be much greater efforts to collaborate, and that “researchers need a better understanding of the policy process [...] and policy makers should become more involved in the conceptualisation and conduct of research”.³⁷⁵

In addition to funding discrete research projects, such as through calls for proposals or direct commissioning, some governments have also implemented formal migration research programmes. While multifaceted, multi-year research programmes are much less common than the funding of research on a project-by-project basis, they have been implemented in a range of countries. Some of the benefits include the ability to better link aspects of migration research and analysis, as well as the ability to examine issues from a longer-term perspective and from a range of angles and disciplines. Broader research programmes (rather than specific research projects) also offer governments the ability to support comparative research spanning multiple geographic locations. For example, the Migrating out of Poverty research programme is a seven-year research programme consortium funded by the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID) and coordinated by the University of Sussex. It focuses on the relationship between internal and regional migration and poverty and is located in five regions across Asia, Africa and Europe. In contrast, the Australian Irregular Migration and Border Research Programme is focused on a narrow thematic topic (irregular migration and border management) but with an emphasis on placing Australia’s experience in broader global and migration contexts.³⁷⁶ One innovative, large-scale government-funded

368 Castles, 2010.

369 Ibid.

370 Boswell, 2008.

371 The LSE GV314 Group, 2014.

372 Iredale, Asia-Pacific Migration Research Network and UNESCO, 2001.

373 Bakewell, 2008.

374 Koser, 2014.

375 Black, 2001.

376 McAuliffe and Parrinder, 2015.

research mechanism is the New Opportunities for Research Funding Agency Co-operation in Europe (NORFACE) – a collaborative partnership of national research funding agencies from 19 European countries in the area of social and behavioural sciences. In 2007, NORFACE established a research programme on migration, focusing on three main themes: Migration, Integration, and Cohesion and Conflict. The programme ran for five years (2009 to 2014) and involved 12 transnational research projects on aspects of migration, including mapping European migration flows, migrant integration, labour market outcomes and transnational families.³⁷⁷

Intergovernmental organizations

As publishers and institutional authors, intergovernmental organizations make specific contributions to our collective understanding of migration and mobility. In some circumstances, such organizations may be the only source of information, and multiple references to publications by intergovernmental organizations are therefore often found in academic literature. A commercially published edited volume or article on an aspect of international migration or displacement, for example, can typically refer to material from the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the International Labour Organization (ILO), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and/or the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), among others. Some university guides on conducting migration research refer to materials produced by a range of intergovernmental organizations (such as the *Georgetown University Research Guide on International Migration and Refugees* and the *Berkeley Law Library Global Migration Issues Research Guide*). Scholarly publications also note that intergovernmental organizations are now among the main producers of information on migration, which reflects a broader growing interest in the issue of migration.³⁷⁸

Although definitions of intergovernmental organizations may vary, Davies and Woodward define the term as “formal, continuous structures founded by an authoritative instrument of agreement between members (including two or more sovereign States) or an existing international organization through which members pursue their common interest”.³⁷⁹ Since the first half of the last century, the number, diversity and influence of intergovernmental organizations have grown,³⁸⁰ so much so that a systematic review of contributions on migration by such organizations is well beyond the scope of this chapter. The focus of this chapter is on *global* contributors within the UN system, specifically UN DESA, UNHCR, ILO, OHCHR, UNICEF, UNODC and IOM, which in no way diminishes the work of other organizations, including those operating at a regional or national level.³⁸¹ As programmes or units within the principal organs of the UN or semi-autonomous, specialized or related agencies, the intergovernmental organizations discussed in this chapter all have global reach, access to the inputs and expertise of diverse stakeholders and, in some cases, global operations that enable them to shape discourse and practice on migration and mobility.

377 Caarls, 2016.

378 See, for example, Mason, 1999; Pécoud, 2015.

379 Davies and Woodward, 2014.

380 Ibid.

381 Many other intergovernmental organizations (both UN and non-UN) also produce material on aspects of migration, including the World Bank, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD). Future editions of the *World Migration Report* are expected to highlight the work of additional intergovernmental organizations. Future reports will also highlight some of the growing body of work by not-for-profit and for-profit international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), which is beyond the scope of this chapter.

The mandates, missions or competencies of some of the organizations (such as IOM and UNHCR) are focused on specific forms of migration and displacement, while others have responsibilities relevant to particular aspects: UN DESA for data; the ILO for migrant workers; OHCHR for migrants' rights; UNICEF for migrant children; and UNODC for transnational criminal aspects (such as human trafficking and migrant smuggling). Their various mandates enable these intergovernmental organizations to collect significant quantities of data and/or access data from States. These organizations also convene and report on dialogues and conferences related to migration and mobility, in addition to generating and publishing background, technical, operational, state-of-the-art and agenda-setting research and analysis, including on global statistical data. As with other publishers, intergovernmental organizations are not immune to criticism related to quality, framing and agenda-setting. However, there is clearly also recognition of the responsibility of producing rigorous and robust data and research. Intergovernmental organizations, for example, routinely work in collaboration with leading migration-related data analysts and researchers as a means of drawing on critical skills and expertise.

IOM produces a large number of research and analysis publications on a range of aspects of migration. Given the organization's focus on the provision of technical assistance and direct support to migrants and Member States, publications produced by IOM outside the realm of research and analysis typically include corporate reports (such as meeting/workshop reports and *Migration Initiatives*), training materials, handbooks and guides, and information materials for migrants (including graphic novels). It is worth acknowledging the mandate and context within which IOM operates as well as its status as a new UN-related organization.³⁸² IOM's role as a service-delivery agency over 65 years has necessarily shaped how it articulates aspects of migration, including the links between its operations and migration practice, as well as migration policy and governance. Programmatic data, for example, have been a mainstay of IOM migration data – a reflection of IOM's strong and enduring role in migration and displacement, including for example, the support of internally displaced persons, the resettlement of refugees globally, health assessments, assistance to victims of human trafficking, and support to migrants returning home. Concomitantly, IOM has long recognized the need to support more nuanced understandings of migration, including through its focus on specific thematic areas (such as migration health and environmental migration).

Think tanks

The role of think tanks in informing policymaking is capturing increasing political and academic attention. Despite the growing prominence of think tanks, a generally accepted definition of the term remains elusive. For the purpose of this discussion, we draw on a global think-tank index definition developed by the University of Pennsylvania:


Think tanks are public-policy research analysis and engagement organizations that generate policy-oriented research, analysis, and advice on domestic and international issues, thereby enabling policymakers and the public to make informed decisions about public policy. Think tanks may be affiliated or independent institutions that are structured as permanent bodies, not ad hoc commissions.³⁸³

³⁸² IOM was established as an intergovernmental organization in 1951 and became a UN-related organization in September 2016.

³⁸³ McGann, 2016.

As major contributors to grey literature, and in an era of increasing contestability of policy advice to governments, think tanks have emerged as important producers of migration-related information and analysis. This has become particularly pronounced as the interest in mobility, migration and displacement globally has increased, and governments have sought to adapt to increasingly dynamic and complex environments. In this context, and in the absence of any available data on this issue, we sought to quantify changes in the number of think tanks working on migration over recent decades. In examining this issue and quantifying the trend, the first step involved reviewing the University of Pennsylvania’s listings of think tanks working on migration. We supplemented this initial review by conducting online searches to identify additional think tanks globally. We defined “working on migration” as having worked regularly on migration-related topics for a minimum of five years, including publishing migration-related material and/or convening events on migration. Our review is limited to material published in English, although we recognize that there is likely to be sizeable output in other languages also. We also note, however, that more than half of all think tanks worldwide are located in the United States of America and Europe.³⁸⁴ There are many think tanks located in non-English-speaking regions that publish in English. While noting language and geographic limitations, we found that there has been enormous growth in the number of think tanks working on migration globally, as shown in figure 1.

Figure 1. Number of think tanks working on migration and publishing in English, 1970–2015



Source: Based on the University of Pennsylvania’s 2015 *Global Go To Think Tank Index Report*, with supplementary research conducted on migration-related aspects.

384 Ibid.

In the context of think tanks in general having proliferated in the late twentieth century, figure 1 shows a rapid increase in migration-related think tanks since the year 2000, which highlights the growing importance of migration in social, (geo)political and economic agendas. Given the number and nature of high-profile migration events of recent years – such as the mass displacement of people within and from countries in conflict such as the Central African Republic, South Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic, Ukraine and Yemen; the mass migration of hundreds of thousands of people to Europe; the 2015 maritime migration crisis events in the Andaman Sea and Bay of Bengal; the role of anti-immigration sentiment in the “Brexit” referendum; and the 2017 US Presidential executive order on border security and immigration enforcement – we expect that migration will continue to receive the attention of a growing number of think tanks.

Research conducted or reported by think tanks, however, is of variable quality. While it is necessary for think tanks to establish and maintain networks to ensure that their research is relevant, the need to avoid undue pressure from interest groups, political parties, media and lobbyists is central to credibility. That said, the think tank sphere is characterized by a diversity of voices and agendas. Think tanks tend to act as brokers of policy knowledge, centres of research and incubators of new ideas, including by providing advisory services to governments and civil society, conducting training activities, publishing research reports, collaborating with the media and undertaking advocacy work. Many think tanks produce high-quality work and thus play an important role in generating and disseminating new data and information about migration. For example, commenting on recent work by the Overseas Development Institute, Carling³⁸⁵ noted that:

Grey literature is, by definition, flexible in format and content. This flexibility can be used to great effect in documentation of migrant smuggling experiences. Hagen-Zanker and Mallett (2016),³⁸⁶ for instance, combine illustrative primary research, solid ties with the academic literature, and excellent research communication in their report on migrant journeys to Europe.

Examples of think tanks working on migration

- Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (Afghanistan)
- Brookings Institution (United States)
- Bruegel (Belgium)
- Center for China and Globalization (China)
- Centro de Divulgación y Conocimiento Económico para la Libertad (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela)
- Danish Institute for International Studies (Denmark)
- Institute of Southeast Asian Studies – Yusof Ishak Institute (Singapore)
- Inter-American Dialogue (the Americas)
- Friedrich Ebert Foundation (Germany)

385 Carling, 2016.

386 Hagen-Zanker and Mallett, 2016.

Lowy Institute for International Policy (Australia)

Migration Policy Institute (United States)

Overseas Development Institute (United Kingdom)

Pew Research Centre (United States)

South African Institute of International Affairs (South Africa)

Note: Drawn primarily from the University of Pennsylvania's 2015 *Global Go To Think Tank Index Report*. The examples reflect the geographic diversity of think tanks working on migration. The think tank above in bold is the only one in the list focusing exclusively on migration.

Blogging: growth, utility and concerns

In the last two decades, there has been a massive increase in the amount of material being produced on the Internet, particularly in the form of blogs. Blogs (short for “weblogs”) first appeared in the mid-1990s and are typically concise articles posted on a host website. While there are no definitive data on blogs globally, estimates suggest that numbers have risen significantly in recent years, from 35.8 million in 2006 to 173 million in 2011.^a

The rise of blogs has enabled individuals to communicate directly with very large numbers of people, at little or no cost. In more recent years, blogs have been increasingly utilized by think tanks, governments, non-governmental organizations, academics (individuals and institutions), political parties and international organizations (among others) to disseminate information.^b Part of the expansion and diversification of blogs is due to the desire to reach new audiences and to provide users with alternative ways of accessing material^c or of influencing people who may be beyond the reach of traditional political media.^d The unregulated nature of blog publishing has raised concerns about an increasing dominance of opinion over facts and analysis, and the potential for false information to be promulgated in an increasingly “post-truth” world.^e There have been high-profile instances of blogs being used to present misinformation, and even of bogus blogs re-posting analysts’ material without permission.^f It is unclear how much agenda-setting occurs in the “blogosphere”. Equally, however, there is recognition of the increasing significance of research-related blogs in academia as well as in policy spheres.^g

Research-related blogs tend to draw upon the findings of empirical research and, rather than replacing other publishing outlets (such as academic journals), they have become an additional form of dissemination, potentially enhancing the accessibility of research findings in policy and public spheres. Such articles can provide useful and more easily digested research-related material and, although concerns about rigour may remain, blogs that seek to summarize peer-reviewed empirical research

are more likely to make a solid contribution towards our understanding of migration. Indeed, more generally, empirical research has revealed that the perceived credibility and trustworthiness of the blogger have an impact on readers' receptiveness to information.^h

a Statista, 2017.

b Farrell, 2012; Wortham, 2007.

c Cavanagh, 2009; Chong, 2010.

d Farrell, 2012.

e Weinberger, 2011.

f Williamson and Eisen, 2017.

g Aldred et al., 2008; Mewburn and Thomson, 2013.

h Chu and Kamal, 2008.

Recent contributions: 2015 and 2016 in focus

Having reviewed the characteristics of the key producers of migration research and analysis, we now turn to a discussion of examples of recent contributions by academia and intergovernmental organizations.

Academia

The large number of scholarly publications on migration precludes a review of all material published in 2015 and 2016. We instead examine a sample of contributions from the scholarly community, focusing on seven peer-reviewed migration-related journals. Future editions of the *World Migration Report* will feature other journals. For the current edition, we focused on some of the key, long-standing migration journals as well as newer entrants, including the *African Human Mobility Review*, the *Asian and Pacific Migration Journal*, *International Migration*, the *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, the *Journal of Refugee Studies*, *Mobilities*, and *Population, Space and Place*. Our list includes many, although not all, of the leading migration journals in the world.³⁸⁷ The examination comprised two components: analysis of all article titles published by these journals in 2015 and 2016 (totalling 538 articles); and editors' overviews of their journal's key contributions for this two-year period. This exercise allowed for deeper insights into journal contributions, highlighting their similarities as well as different interests and areas of focus, including geographically and thematically. Each editor's overview is provided in full in appendix B. Excerpts of journal editors' overviews are included in text boxes throughout the remainder of this chapter.

Contributions from the editors of *International Migration* and the *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* suggest several reasons for the increase in migration-related research. First, "...the sheer quantity of academic

³⁸⁷ We have attempted to provide geographic diversity in the contributions obtained from the main migration journals. This exercise will be repeated in future editions of the *World Migration Report*, for which other journals will be invited to provide input. Nine journals were selected and their editors agreed to provide input, but only seven submitted material. *International Migration Review* and *Migraciones Internacionales* did not end up providing input.

research that is being undertaken [is] in response to the high social relevance of migration issues in the world today” (Statham – see appendix B). Second, the launch in 2016 of a process to establish a global compact on migration and a global compact on refugees is commanding greater attention from migration researchers; such a high-visibility and high-level policy initiative is encouraging – directly or indirectly – more research on global migration governance (Duncan – see appendix B). Third, migration “...has become an important interpretive lens through which societies and people understand the core changes that they are experiencing as a consequence of globalization” (Statham – see appendix B).

African Human Mobility Review

In recent years, the debate revolving around the migration–development nexus has spurred growing global interest in human mobility. This is also the case in sub-Saharan Africa, where researchers have sought to describe trends and patterns of migration and to suggest actions to harness its economic, social and human benefits for the development of the continent. In this respect, evidence-based research is widely accepted to build and expand the body of knowledge by testing hypotheses, validating existing theories and elaborating new ones. Ultimately, research findings need to be published and disseminated to a larger and diverse audience comprising of academics, practitioners, civil society and government representatives. Publication is, therefore, a key component that promotes not only the visibility of the research, but also the credibility of the empirical work conducted by researchers. In particular, peer-reviewed scholarly journals are a fundamental tool for fostering intellectual debate and inquiry. However, at present, there is a lack of peer-reviewed journals of high quality in sub-Saharan Africa addressing, amongst others, the issue of human mobility. Researchers face challenges in presenting research findings in African journals in this field, either because such journals are published irregularly, or simply because they do not exist.

Source: Mulugeta Dinbabo, Editor. The full submission is in appendix B.

Based on the titles of the 538 articles published in our sample of journals, the word cloud in figure 2 highlights the main areas of focus recurring in scholarly publications on migration. Under the assumption that an article’s title reflects its content, we attempted to use the most frequent terms as cues for highlighting salient thematic issues. Not surprisingly, terms such as *migration*, *migrant* and *mobility* are used extensively in titles. Interestingly, both *immigrant* and *immigration* appear in the top 10, while *emigrant* and *emigration* did not feature among the 75 terms that form the word cloud.³⁸⁸ This suggests a dominant “receiving country” perspective – at least in the articles published in the selected journals. While this is undoubtedly related in part to the specific journals we selected for analysis, our sample does include journals with traditional migration “origin” perspectives. Furthermore, *Europe* is the only geographical term in the top 10.³⁸⁹

³⁸⁸ We truncated the word cloud source list to 75 terms since the low weight of the remaining words makes them illegible. As a reference, the seventy-fifth term is *generation* (bottom-right, below *migrant*).

³⁸⁹ According to *International Migration Report 2015* (produced by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA), of 244 million international migrants in 2015, 76 million lived in Europe, 75 million in Asia, and 54 million in Northern America (UN DESA, 2016).

One other very frequently used term is *social*, which occurs 44 times within the 538 article titles (8%). This adjective naturally fits many migration-related nouns: usages include, for instance, *social integration*, *social change* and *social protection*. But the most frequent association within our sample is *social network*, which highlights how instrumental networking can be in shaping migrants' experiences. Examples of issues discussed in academic articles on social networks include the social networking experiences of immigrants from Turkey to Canada, the social networks and labour-market access among Brazilian migrants in Ireland, and the role of social networks for Indian migrants to New Zealand.

Not surprisingly, given the "...new relevance of refugees in global political, media and popular discourse" (Koser – see appendix B), the term *refugee* was in the top 10 terms in the word cloud. As one would expect, analysis shows that the *Journal of Refugee Studies* alone accounts for 46 per cent of all references to the term *refugee* in article titles within our sample, while the remaining 54 per cent occur across the remaining journals. Another noun appearing in the top 10 terms is *labour*.³⁹⁰ Again, this is not surprising. The search for better income and working conditions is one of the most important drivers of migration: of all the international migrants in 2015, 72 per cent were of working age, and 71 per cent lived in high-income countries. Between 2000 and 2015, high-income countries absorbed 81 per cent of the growth in international migrants.³⁹¹ The last word in the top 10 is *policy*. Analysis within our sample reveals that the terms most frequently associated with this word are *immigration policy*, *labour policy* and *asylum/refugee policy*.

Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies

In 2017, JEMS will publish 16 issues, or approximately 160 articles of 9000 words each of original research in the field of migration and ethnic relations [...]. Our reason for publishing so much is that we want academic research to be out in the public domain so that it has the chance to inform public understandings. The findings of original academic research can give legitimacy to claims by lobbyists and politicians, and contribute to debunking 'false' claims, but to do this they need to be publicly visible and on record [...].

While five years ago, I think it is fair to say that the journal was primarily 'European' in focus, we have made concerted efforts in recent years to engage more directly with scholars in North America (those working on the US as well as on Europe), and arguably more importantly, encourage academics from Asia and Africa to see JEMS as a forum for their debates. Again this reflects the important changes in the world that are driven by migration. If there have been 240 million internal migrants within China over the last decade, surely this needs to be something that the migration academic community is engaging with? In a modest way, we hope that greater exchanges across continents may take us as academics out of our silos and comfort zones and thereby challenge some of the accepted 'truths' that permeate our understandings. Many understandings of migration and ethnic relations are drawn from the experiences of South to North migration in the post war era and written by scholars from receiving countries.

Source: Paul Statham, Editor. The full submission is in appendix B.

390 Synonyms such as *labour*, *work* and *profession* were aggregated into *labour*.

391 UN DESA, 2016.

Relevance of scientific/academic writings for policymakers emerged as an important aspect for some journals. Three editors acknowledged that academics and policymakers tend to be disconnected because "...policy makers often require their evidence immediately while academic research takes time, and peer review adds further to this time, meaning that some research is published after the policy need" (Duncan – see appendix B). The time frames applied in the policy and academic environments were referred to as a critical difference: "...the production of research-based knowledge is time- and process-intensive, which may not be compatible with the sometimes fast-paced and contentious context of policymaking" (Asis – see appendix B). Possible solutions could be "...the production of concise policy briefs, the holding of policy dialogues, or collaborating with media to produce more accessible and timelier reports" (Asis – see appendix B).

International Migration Journal

[...] migration is a phenomenon of longer-term trends whose patterns are often visible only over time. Academic researchers are in a better position to understand these trends than many policy makers who are required to deliver analysis and advice more quickly. Although policy making is often done with urgency, it is an inherently conservative business. Emerging trends identified by research can be slow to be recognized by policy, making it all the more important that the empirical research be done well and be peer-reviewed.

The past few years have seen a growing interest in the decision processes and intentions of individuals leading to their migration; this is in marked contrast to the proliferation of macro analyses of push and pull factors of classical migration theory, but serves as a complement, not a substitution.

Source: Howard Duncan, Editor. The full submission is in appendix B.

Intergovernmental organizations

The contributions of key United Nations (UN) organizations working on migration reflect mandates as well as current trends in migration, including some of the shifts we have seen in migration patterns such as the increase in children migrating internationally. UN DESA, for example, coordinates the assembly of data, including in relation to migration – a process that has highlighted limitations in the capabilities of national statistical offices.¹⁹ In 2016, its Population Division published the *International Migration Report 2015* – a biennial publication that presents information on levels and trends in international migration for major areas, regions and countries of the world. The Population Division maintains the United Nations Global Migration Database, which is the most complete set of statistics on international migrants enumerated in countries or areas, and classified by age, sex and country or area of birth or citizenship, as well as a smaller dataset with annual data on international migration flows for 45 countries.

Examples of key global material published in 2015 and 2016

UN DESA	<i>International Migration Report 2015</i>	2015
	United Nations Global Migration Database	Ongoing
	Dataset on International Migration Flows	Ongoing
UNHCR	<i>Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2015</i>	2016
	<i>Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2014</i>	2015
	<i>Asylum Trends 2014</i>	2015
	Population Statistics Database	Ongoing
ILO	<i>Promoting Fair Migration: General Survey Concerning the Migrant Workers Instruments</i>	2016
	<i>ILO Global Estimates on Migrant Workers</i>	2015
OHCHR	<i>Situation of Migrants in Transit</i>	2015
	<i>Behind Closed Doors: Protecting and Promoting the Human Rights of Migrant Domestic Workers in an Irregular Situation</i>	2015
UNICEF	<i>Uprooted: The Growing Crisis of Refugee and Migrant Children</i>	2016
UNODC	<i>Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2016</i>	2016

Note: IOM publications are discussed below.

As a UN agency with a mandate to pursue protection, assistance and solutions for refugees, UNHCR produces a wealth of publications and has a dedicated research repository – refworld. Released annually in June, *Global Trends* is one of UNHCR's flagship publications. It presents and analyses annual trends worldwide in relation to refugee and other populations of concern to UNHCR. While not global in focus (primarily due to the nature of asylum flows), UNHCR's annual report *Asylum Trends* provides statistical data and related analysis on asylum seeker applications in 44 industrialized countries. UNHCR is also the key source of global statistics on refugees and other populations of concern, as reported in its online Population Statistics Database.

The International Labour Organization (ILO) is a standard-setting body responsible for coordinating the development and supervising the implementation of international labour standards. In 2016, it focused its annual in-depth General Survey on migrant workers. *Promoting Fair Migration: General Survey Concerning the Migrant Workers Instruments* examines the application and impacts of ILO's migrant worker instruments. In the context of its efforts to improve the collection and production of labour migration statistics, ILO Global Estimates on Migrant Workers provides estimates of the proportion of labour migrant workers among the total number of migrants worldwide, with a special focus on migrant domestic workers.

Part of the United Nations Secretariat, OHCHR is the principal UN office mandated to promote and protect the human rights of all persons, including migrants. In addition to supporting UN human rights mechanisms, such as treaty bodies and Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council, OHCHR produces a wealth of relevant materials.

At the request of the UN Human Rights Council, OHCHR carried out a study of migrants in transit, subsequently publishing the *Situation of Migrants in Transit* in 2015, which revealed a clear protection gap for this migrant group. In 2015, OHCHR also published *Behind Closed Doors*, which sheds light on the exploitation, abuse and vulnerabilities that irregular migrant domestic workers can face and outlines the human rights framework that applies to them.

Although UNICEF's flagship annual publication – the *State of the World's Children* – does not necessarily single out migrant children, UNICEF published *Uprooted: The Growing Crisis of Refugee and Migrant Children* in 2016. It presents global data and analysis on the lives and situations of the approximately 50 million children who have migrated across borders or have been displaced.

Within its mandate to assist States in addressing international crimes, UNODC undertakes efforts to combat transnational organized crime, including human trafficking and migrant smuggling, and produces a variety of reports on these themes. The third *Global Report on Trafficking in Persons*, published in 2016, provides an overview of patterns and flows of trafficking in persons and is based primarily on trafficking cases detected between 2012 and 2014.

IOM published a wide range of research and analysis materials in 2015 and 2016 – most notably in the form of standalone studies and reports, many of which stemmed directly from specific projects. For example, under the European Union-funded *Migration, Environment and Climate Change: Evidence for Policy* project, research reports assessing the evidence base on migration and climate change were published in 2015 and 2016 on the six countries involved in the project: Dominican Republic, Haiti, Kenya, Mauritius, Papua New Guinea and Viet Nam. The total number of studies and reports produced largely relates to project cycles, thereby accounting in part for the significant increase in 2016 over the previous year (see table 1). Many reports are produced locally by IOM missions, particularly if they stem from individual projects.

Table 1 also shows that standalone studies and reports form the bulk of research-related publications, although IOM's support of migration journals – *International Migration* and *Migration Policy Practice* – were also important contributors on migration research. Additionally, Migration Profiles provide country-specific migration overviews (largely funded by the IOM Development Fund) to support, among other things, capacity-building on migration data, research and analysis in Member States.

Table 1. IOM bookstore publications, 2015 and 2016

Publication type	2015	2016
World Migration Reports ^(a)	1	0
Global Migration Data Analysis Centre (GMDAC) publications ^(b)	1	9
Migration Research Series	1	1
Migration Profiles	8	6
<i>Migration Policy Practice</i> issues	5	5
Studies and reports	35	73
Policy Briefs	8	12
<i>International Migration</i> issues ^(c)	3	9
Other	9	16
Total	71	131

Source: IOM.

Note: (a) The *World Migration Report 2015* was produced in several languages; (b) GMDAC was established in September 2015; (c) the editor of *International Migration Journal* changed over in 2015.

Key IOM research-related publications produced in 2015 and 2016

World Migration Report 2015 – Migrants and Cities: New Partnerships to Manage Mobility

Fatal Journeys Volume 2: Identification and Tracing of Dead and Missing Migrants

Assessing the Evidence: Opportunities and Challenges of Migration in Building Resilience Against Climate Change (several country reports)

Migrant Smuggling Data and Research: A Global Review of the Emerging Evidence Base

Measuring Well-governed Migration: The 2016 Migration Governance Index (with The Economist Intelligence Unit)

Global Migration Data Analysis Centre Data Briefs

Migration, Environment and Climate Change Policy Briefs

Migration Profiles (several country reports)

Nutrition Surveillance reports (under the IOM Health Assessment Programme)

Labour Exploitation, Trafficking and Migrant Health: Multi-country Findings on the Health Risks and Consequences of Migrant and Trafficked Workers


Measuring reach

Academia

As the interest in migration has increased, and the amount of migration research and analysis material has grown, it would be reasonable to expect that the reach (through expanding readerships, for example) has also increased. This appears to have been the case for the journals examined in this chapter, which generally saw an average increase in their “impact” in 2015 (+21%) and 2016 (+4%; see figure 3). The recent average Impact Factor³⁹² increase suggests that the articles published in these journals are receiving more attention: citing a paper reasonably implies that it has been read, and that some of its content was helpful in adding to the evidence base and/or generating debates, building knowledge, or informing migration policy and practice.

³⁹² The Impact Factor is a citations–publications ratio. For a given year, it takes into account citations and publications from the preceding two years. For more information, please see the example in appendix A.

Figure 3. Impact Factor of selected journals



Source: *InCites Journal Citation Reports*, Thomson Reuters.

Note: *African Human Mobility Review* was not indexed by *InCites* at the time of writing (June 2017). The impact factor is the ratio of citations to publications.

Publication metrics based on citation counts (including the impact factor) clearly have various limitations and downsides.³⁹³ First, citations tend to accumulate slowly, given academic publishing timelines and the time it takes to compile/release statistics. Second, citations are a matter almost solely within the academic context, which is one reason alternative measures (discussed below) have been developed. Third, citations do not measure quality of material but are a way of quantifying impact (see the discussion on this point in appendix A). While citation metrics have become a priority for academic publishers and scholars, they are likely to be less relevant to people outside academia.

Population, Space and Place

In terms of the total number of published papers, migration is a prevalent focus of interest in *Population, Space and Place*. Papers cover both international migration and internal mobility. Some researchers even question the validity of distinguishing the two terms, given the complexity of contemporary human mobility, and also given the common drivers that underpin many human movements and displacements.ⁱ

Arguably the most important conceptual advance has been the recognition that human mobilities (including many kinds of migration) are relational [...]. It is relational between the linked lives of people who share a household and who may move together.^j It is also relational between movers and non-movers (for example between parents who migrate internationally for work and their children

393 For a recent overview of Impact Factor limitations, see Williams and Padula, 2015. For a broader account of Impact Factor misuse, see PLoS Medicine Editors, 2006.

often left behind with their grandparents),^k or between immigrants arriving in a community and non-movers living in the same community and adjusting their lives to the impact of new arrivals.^l And it is relational between migrants and those with power to enable and/or to block mobility (for example those allocating housing to new arrivals), or those who govern migration policy and who establish which people have permission to stay and who must return to their place of origin.^m

Source: Allan M. Findlay, Clara H. Mulder and Darren P. Smith, Editors. The full submission is in appendix B.

i Hickey and Yeoh, 2016; Hugo, 2016.

j Van Bochove and Engbersen, 2015.

k Murphy, Zhou and Tao, 2016.

l Phillips and Robinson, 2015.

m Lietaert, Broekaert and Derluyn, 2015.

New metrics are being developed for scholarly publications to assess their impact outside of academia. One such metric is the Altmetric Attention Score,³⁹⁴ indicating "...how many people have been exposed to and engaged with a scholarly output".³⁹⁵ For any research output, the Attention Score "...provides an indicator of the amount of attention that it has received",³⁹⁶ with some sources having more weight than others. For instance, coverage in the news has the highest weight of 8, since "it's easy to imagine that the average newspaper story is more likely to bring attention to the research output than the average tweet".³⁹⁷ Other high-weight sources include blogs (5), Wikipedia (3), policy documents (3) and Twitter (1). Altmetrics are relatively new, having commenced in 2012. They have been recognized as "...tools that aim to measure the real-time reach and influence of an academic article".³⁹⁸ Academics found "positive but relatively weak correlation with citations",³⁹⁹ supporting the idea that "citation and altmetrics indicators track related but distinct impacts".⁴⁰⁰ Mentions in blogs are particularly "able to identify highly cited publications"⁴⁰¹ – an empirical finding that supports the important weight assigned to blogs within the altmetric algorithm, further highlighting the increasing importance of this form of dissemination of scientific material.

We analysed views/downloads and the Altmetric Attention Score of 512 peer-reviewed articles published in 2015 and 2016 by six of the seven journals under consideration in this chapter (*African Human Mobility Review* was not publishing these data at the time of writing). The Attention Score was chosen for two main reasons: first, it was freely available on all the journal publishers' websites. Second, the available evidence supports its use, especially for tracking recent research output.⁴⁰² The analysis allowed us to unveil quantitative aspects of

394 See: www.altmetric.com

395 www.altmetric.com/about-altmetrics/what-are-altmetrics/. Accessed on 9 April 2017.

396 <https://help.altmetric.com/support/solutions/articles/6000060969-how-is-the-altmetric-attention-score-calculated->. Accessed on 9 April 2017.

397 Ibid.

398 Warren, Raison and Dasgupta, 2017.

399 Costas, Zahedi and Wouters, 2015; Thelwall et al., 2013.


400 Priem, Piwowar and Hemminger, 2012.

401 Costas, Zahedi and Wouters, 2015.

402 Just like classic citation metrics, altmetrics offer benefits and disadvantages. See Bornmann, 2014 for a deeper discussion.

academic publications on migration such as how many were mentioned, viewed and/or downloaded. Figure 4 shows the Attention Score distribution of the 512 sampled articles. At a first glance, it appears that the largest share of scholarly articles received little or no attention: 129 (25%) articles scored zero, meaning that they were not mentioned online by any source. More than half (289 or 56%) had a score of 2 or lower, meaning that they attracted, at most, the equivalent of a couple of tweets. Only 14 articles (3%) scored higher than 20 – roughly the equivalent of one mention in the news and one in a blog plus 5 tweets.

Figure 4. Distribution of Altmetric Attention Score for 512 articles from 2015 and 2016, for selected journals



Source: www.altmetric.com

Note: *African Human Mobility Review* was not publishing altmetric data at the time of writing (April 2017).

Mobilities

[...] borders have become a highly politically charged contemporary topic that call into question conventional analyses of migration through re-bordering. The political debates over the reception of refugees from Syria and Afghanistan within Europe; the popular vote in favour of the UK to leave the European Union – ‘Brexit’; and the proposed building of a wall between the USA and Mexico all testify to


new physical and symbolic processes of re-bordering. It has been recognised that borders are ‘not merely empirical phenomena, but are used and constructed and opened and closed depending on who crosses them and on how contentious they become in political debates’.ⁿ

Source: Kevin Hannam, Mimi Sheller and David Tyfield, Editors. The full submission is in appendix B.

n Scuzzarello and Kinnvall, 2013. Rebordering France and Denmark Narratives and Practices of Border-Construction in Two European Countries. *Mobilities*.

Concerning article views and downloads, not all journals provide such data on their website. At the time of writing, two journals (*Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, and *Mobilities*) were providing views only, one (*Asian and Pacific Migration Journal*) provided only downloads, and one (*Journal of Refugee Studies*) provided views and downloads. Three journals (*African Human Mobility Review*, *International Migration and Population*, *Space and Place*) were not showing any data on article views or downloads. To overcome this lack of standardization, we aggregated views and downloads. Figure 5 shows the distribution of views/downloads of 353 articles from the four available sources, grouped by hundreds. The skewed shape of the distribution – similar to the Attention Score – highlights a relatively low level of reach. Only 28 articles (8%) were viewed/downloaded more than 1,000 times. The views/downloads data indicate that most academic writings have fairly limited readership.

Figure 5. Distribution of numbers of views and downloads of 353 articles from 2015 and 2016, for selected journals



Source: Journal publishers’ websites.

Note: *African Human Mobility Review*, *Population, Space and Place* and *International Migration* were not publishing data on views or downloads at the time of writing (April 2017).

In summary, our quantitative analysis shows that migration as a topic is receiving increasing attention: the number of publications and citations are a sign of heightened interest, at least within the academic community. Measures of views/downloads and altmetrics suggest that there is room for improving the reach and readership of scholarly production on migration. One of the main obstacles to this is the fact that academic publications tend to be behind paywalls, significantly limiting access to material beyond academia. Journal subscribers, for example, are often academic institutions and the cost of downloading single articles for non-subscribers can be prohibitive. Open access for academic publications enables free downloads but usually requires publisher fees to be paid by the author or their institution. More open-access journals (such as *Comparative Migration Studies* and *Anti-Trafficking Review*) have, however, been publishing on migration.⁴⁰³ In addition, academic language and writing style tend to be more technical than in other areas of publishing, and the topics tend to be narrower. Dissemination of findings, however, through both traditional and newer forms of media, offer opportunities for academic research on migration to inform public and policy discourses. The potential reach of blogs on migration, for example, is discussed further below.

Journal of Refugee Studies

Refugees are encountering new challenges: an increasing proportion is in protracted situations without any realistic prospect of a durable solution, and more are relocating to urban settings where it is harder to protect and assist them. While refugees have always suffered discrimination, this is perhaps more systematic today than ever before, with more restrictions on refugees; a number of leaders for the first time suggesting an explicit link between refugee flows and the risk of violent extremism and terrorism; and a rising incidence of xenophobic attacks on refugees. More positively, the 2016 New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants potentially paves the way for significant reform of the international refugee regime and response. As a result, the *Journal of Refugee Studies* is flourishing, attracting record highs of quality submissions from a widening range of disciplines and from all over the world, and doubling its impact factor over the last two years [2015 and 2016].

Source: Khalid Koser, Editor. The full submission is in appendix B.


IOM

In recent years, the IOM online bookstore has been upgraded and improved. Launched in 2009 as a means of facilitating greater access to IOM publications, the online bookstore is now able to track and support analysis of data on the number of downloads of IOM publications. These data provide insights into accessibility and reach of IOM publications, supplementing readers' surveys of specific outputs. As of the end of 2016, the bookstore contained over 1,370 electronic publications in 27 different languages, most of which could be accessed free of charge. While download data do not allow for an assessment of the quality of publications (such as can be done through reader surveys or peer review, for example), they do provide some insights into the individual publications that have high download rates, as well as the themes and geographic nature of the research-related

403 Open access involves making published material available for free, not on a fee/subscription basis.

publications that are produced and accessed globally. In 2016, the cumulative number of downloads from the IOM bookstore exceeded 2.38 million, relating to publications that had been produced over many years. An examination of research-related publications that were each downloaded more than 1,000 times shows that some themes were more prominent than others, with cross-cutting publications featuring heavily – including, for example, country migration profiles that traverse multiple thematic issues. Interest in migration law and governance (as well as in migration and the environment) increased in 2016 (see figure 6).

Figure 6. Proportion of IOM research-related downloads in 2015 and 2016, by theme




Source: IOM.

Note: "IM" means irregular migration. Only publications downloaded more than 1,000 times in a year have been included (downloads in 2015 have been prorated as data for the entire year are not available). Downloads could be classified by more than one theme. n=1,743,167 downloads.

Global publications featured more heavily than regional or national publications (see figure 7), which is largely a reflection of the wide reach of the *World Migration Report* (WMR). The report, which is published every two years, is the principal IOM research-related report, and both current and past editions tend to be widely downloaded. There is a clear appetite for the WMR, and download data provide useful insights into how readers have responded to WMR material. It is interesting to note, for example, that the WMR 2010 background paper on irregular migration and mixed flows was downloaded several thousand times in 2016, reflecting the salience of the issue, given the peak migration flows to Europe in 2015–2016.

Figure 7. Proportion of IOM research-related downloads in 2015 and 2016, by geographic category



Source: IOM.

Note: Only publications downloaded more than 1,000 times in a year have been included (downloads for 2015 have been prorated as data for the entire year are not available). Categories are discrete. n=1,743,167 downloads.

Blogs

As part of the broader tendency towards greater interest in migration and migration-related research, there has been a concomitant rise in the number of blogs that feature articles on migration. It is well beyond the scope of this chapter to examine in detail the changes in blog publishing specifically on migration, however, examples of widely read migration articles are provided in the text box below. They show that some blog articles can reach large audiences and, because of this, are likely to be influential in informing discussions on migration.⁴⁰⁴ It is also important to acknowledge that some argue that blogs tend to be written on “hot” or controversial migration topics, such as irregular or mass migration, refugees and asylum seekers, while less controversial topics are often neglected.⁴⁰⁵

404 Aldred et al., 2008.

405 Ozimek, 2012.

Examples of migration-related articles published on blogs

Four maps that will change how you see migration in Europe, by Alex Gray, published by the World Economic Forum's Agenda blog on 16 August 2016 – **905,126 views**.

Countries where you can buy citizenship, by Joe Myers, published by the World Economic Forum's Agenda blog on 28 July 2016 – **176,065 views**.

Unintended consequences: How migrant smugglers are exploiting the international protection system, by Marie McAuliffe and Khalid Koser, published by the Asia and the Pacific Policy Society's Policy Forum on 15 February 2015 – **over 100,000 reads**. The majority of readers were in Canada, India, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia and the United States of America.

The challenge of Syrian refugees, by John Hewson, published by the Asia and the Pacific Policy Society's Policy Forum on 11 September 2015 – **over 18,000 reads**. The majority of readers were in Australia, China, India, Ireland and the United States of America.

One step forward for Central America: The Plan for the Alliance for Prosperity, by Manuel Orozco, published by the Inter-American Dialogue's blog on 16 March 2016 – **662 views**.

Note: The number of reads or views and related analytics were provided by the relevant blog editor in late February 2017.

Conclusions

This chapter has provided an overview of the key written contributions of some of the main producers of migration research and analysis to our collective understanding of migration. We found that there has been a significant increase in the interest in migration as a topic over time, including by some of the major producers of research and analysis, reflecting the growing salience of the topic globally. We also found that different types of migration-related output have different strengths and weaknesses, which are important to understand when reading and utilizing such material, particularly in informing policymaking. Academic research and analysis, for example, may involve greater rigour than other forms; however, the long lead times involved can diminish their usefulness for policymakers, who often need material more quickly than academic publishing regimes can accommodate. Conversely, the merits of grey literature, especially when compared with academic peer-reviewed research, include shorter production times, greater access to unpublished research and data, and the ability to draw on expertise in academic and policy spheres.⁴⁰⁶ Grey literature also tends to be freely accessible. On the other hand, it is sometimes of inconsistent (and poor) quality and review standards, with irregular publication schedules and a lack of standard bibliographical identifiers.⁴⁰⁷

⁴⁰⁶ Pappas and Williams, 2011.

⁴⁰⁷ Banks, 2012; Pappas and Williams, 2011; Schöpfler, 2011; Rucinski, 2016.

It has also been criticized as being used to set agendas or legitimize policy.⁴⁰⁸ As with potential merits, however, these drawbacks do not necessarily apply to all such publications.

There is a case to be made for playing to the strengths of the different types of material on migration. Some of the highest quality blogs on migration, for example, are based on carefully elaborated and conducted studies and insightful analysis drawing on years of research. The fact that it is becoming more common for senior migration academics to maintain their own blog and/or write blog articles for other publishers indicates some recognition in the academic community of the utility of this form of communication and dissemination. This is also reflected by the growing use of altmetrics, which measure a journal article's reach in non-academic publishing, including via blogs. At the same time, it is often difficult to assess whether blogs and other forms of grey literature, including substantial research reports, make influential contributions to our collective understanding of migration or whether they are another agenda-setting tool more suited to advocacy. In the academic environment, the number of citations provide an indicator of the value – or lack thereof – of an individual article; impact factors provide a similar tool for assessing scientific journals over time. Similar systematic assessments are not available for grey literature, and its variability and diversity are recognized as weaknesses as well as strengths. Technology is available, however, to assist publishers of online grey literature in assessing the level of interest in a series or even an individual article, report or study.

The information garnered for this chapter (including that from blog editors) has shown that, somewhat surprisingly, some online migration-related research and analysis has had extraordinary reach. The fact that some material can be so widely viewed, read or downloaded confirms the need for the quality of published material on migration to be further strengthened. There is no good reason, for example, why material outside academia cannot be peer-reviewed; in the quest for a more robust evidence base to inform migration policy and practice, tools for improving the overall quality of published research and analysis are important. Similarly, there is no apparent reason why measuring reach via views/downloads/altmetrics could not be embraced by more publishers of migration research and analysis, especially in the non-academic sphere. At the same time, it is desirable that academic publishing try to embrace the best features of grey literature – namely accessibility and speed. Open access is one such solution, and the use of other communication strategies, such as blogs, can certainly enhance accessibility. Efforts are also being made to shorten publication times, with an increasing number of high-quality journals being able to provide peer review in two or three weeks. However, this means adding tight deadlines to an already voluntary, unpaid, highly skilled workforce of academic reviewers.

As we have seen, both white and grey literature are complementary and useful sources of information on migration. We have highlighted some of their strengths and weaknesses, and have suggested a few initial actions that could help expand their reach to achieve a more balanced discourse on migration. We underline that the analysis in the current chapter relates to contributions from a subset of academic journals and intergovernmental organizations. Although we think that the picture that emerges provides a fair account of recent research and analysis on migration, it does not purport to be exhaustive. We expect to extend the breadth of this analysis in future editions of the *World Migration Report*, including these and other sources in order to provide a more complete description of the empirical contributions to the migration discourse over time.

408 Boswell, 2008; Sageman, 2014.

Finally, we encourage policymakers, practitioners, researchers and others to explore and exploit the wealth of written material on migration with a critical eye. We also underscore the importance of activities and initiatives that bridge the gap between the research and policy spheres by bringing migration scholars, researchers, practitioners and policymakers together, including through workshops, conferences, briefing sessions, and related consultations. The opportunity to listen and share knowledge on migration can support new lines of thinking and help craft more effective policy responses.

PART II

COMPLEX AND EMERGING MIGRATION ISSUES







SUSAN MARTIN
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5

GLOBAL MIGRATION GOVERNANCE: EXISTING ARCHITECTURE AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS⁴⁰⁹

Introduction

In recent decades, there have been incremental and substantial efforts to improve the global governance of migration, building on the norms and institutions developed over the course of the last century. In the *2016 New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants* (New York Declaration) – the negotiated outcome of the most high-profile plenary meeting to take place on human movements at the United Nations (UN) General Assembly (GA) – States committed to set in motion a process of intergovernmental negotiations leading to the adoption of a global compact for safe, regular and orderly migration. In an area in which global governance has lagged other transnational issues, this development is particularly noteworthy. It reflects the extent to which confidence in multilateral approaches has been built by efforts to strengthen international cooperation through informal dialogues and initiatives that allowed States to consult and share information. Yet, as at other times in history, it is also emblematic of the need for global cooperation in the face of underlying political, demographic, environmental and socioeconomic drivers of migration.

This chapter describes key aspects of the existing architecture relevant to the global governance of migration and reviews recent developments. It focuses on movements of people across international borders and on governance at the global level – that is, governance relevant to, or open to participation by, all UN Member States. In this context, governance encompasses the following substantive rules and norms, processes for decision-making, and mechanisms for implementation and monitoring:

1. Binding laws and norms, non-binding normative frameworks, and agreements among States to cooperate on various aspects of migration;
2. Institutional actors and institutional frameworks and mechanisms; and
3. Processes such as dialogues and initiatives that have taken place at the global level or that relate to governance at the global level.⁴¹⁰

The next section begins with a discussion of the benefits of governing migration at the global level and identifies some of the main barriers inhibiting greater progress to this end, followed by an overview of key norms and institutions. This provides the context for the discussion in the penultimate section, which highlights three major themes: (1) key dialogues and initiatives instrumental to building momentum and confidence towards greater action at the global level, with particular focus on the 2016 UN High-level Meeting on Addressing Large Movements of Refugees and Migrants (2016 UN High-level Meeting) and the negotiations over the global compacts on refugees and migration; (2) initiatives specifically aimed at building normative frameworks to enhance protection of migrants, such as the Nansen Initiative on disaster-induced cross-border displacement and the Migrants in

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410 See Appendix A for a definition of global governance and definitions of other key terms used in this chapter.

Countries in Crisis (MICIC) Initiative; and (3) the integration of international migration into global-level responses on other salient issues, such as sustainable development and climate change. The conclusion brings these strands together to discuss steps that may be taken to further advance the global governance of migration.

Benefits and barriers to global migration governance

There are advantages to enhancing the global governance of migration. Managing movements of people across international borders cannot be achieved through unilateral State action alone; rather, the development and implementation of migration policy benefits from international cooperation in addressing the complex drivers and processes of migration. By definition, international migration involves at least two countries – origin and destination – and increasingly implicates numerous other countries that serve as transit points, competitors for talent, collaborators in combating organized crime and movement of terrorists, and participants in the global financial system that moves remittances. Moreover, migration also involves non-State actors that intersect with governments and each other in managing movements of people. Some of these have formal, sanctioned roles (e.g. multinational corporations, labour recruitment agencies, humanitarian aid organizations and trade unions) whereas others are engaged in illicit activities (e.g. migrant smuggling and human trafficking). Furthermore, international migration intersects with other transnational issues, including development, trade, security, environmental change, conflict resolution, disaster risk reduction, human rights and humanitarian action. But, unlike these other areas, efforts to develop global governance systems to respond to existing and emerging challenges have lagged in the migration area.

In the face of global cooperation and coordination problems, a more effective system of global migration governance has the potential to improve collective responses and create opportunities for mutual benefits. Such a system can bring States together to discuss issues of mutual concern; identify common goals and strategies; create the space for learning and understanding; and allow States to coordinate and cooperate, including in the development and implementation of systems, processes and initiatives. Global norms, including principles, rules and guidance, whether legally binding or not, establish benchmarks against which State behaviour can be measured. Even when they are not widely ratified or adhered to, global norms can affect State behaviour. Ultimately, the benefits stemming from the global governance of migration should also be judged by the extent to which such a system enhances the realization of rights and the well-being of migrants. In this sense, the system for global migration governance and any improvements to it should necessarily be grounded in a recognition and acceptance that migrants, like everyone else, are entitled to inalienable rights.⁴¹¹

In his final report as the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on International Migration (SRSG), Sir Peter Sutherland cautioned that global migration governance cannot be achieved by fiat:

Progress is likely to hinge on the involvement of those directly affected and those responsible for policy implementation, while reaching agreement on common minimum standards, principles and approaches that should apply across the board. The latter provides predictability for inter-State cooperation, based on clearly articulated mutual expectations and responsibilities, and for migrants, whose rights must be protected wherever they happen to move in the world.⁴¹²

411 On grounding claims about “better” global migration governance, see, for example, Betts, 2011; Martin, 2014 and 2015; and Betts and Kainz, 2017; See also, Koser, 2010.

412 SRSG, 2017.

Efforts to improve global governance of migration are not new. The post-World War I and II eras saw significant progress in establishing international norms, rules, procedures and institutions in the area of labour migration and refugee movements, as part of the broader establishment of the modern international system dealing with a range of economic, social and political issues.⁴¹³ At the same time, however, the global governance of migration remains fragmented, with robust international law in some areas, significant gaps in others, and inadequate decision-making processes and mechanisms for implementation of policies. The legal and institutional frameworks are strongest and oldest for refugees, with a widely ratified UN convention and a clear lead agency, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). International treaties on human trafficking and migrant smuggling are also relatively widely ratified. By contrast, the various instruments to protect migrant workers have received less support. While migrant workers, and indeed all migrants, are covered under core international human rights instruments, normative gaps also remain, especially with regard to access to territory and stay for migrants in highly vulnerable situations, including those who do not qualify for protection as refugees.⁴¹⁴

A number of factors have impeded progress in establishing a more coherent system of global migration governance. The first is concern articulated by a number of States about the effect on their sovereignty. Migration is understood to affect sovereignty directly by its impact on the integrity of borders, economic growth, social relationships, demography, cultural values and – in rare cases – political stability. These impacts are felt not only by countries of destination, but also by origin and transit countries. Immigration, for example, is a pathway in many States towards citizenship, which determines who will be making decisions about the identity and future of the country. Large-scale or specific manifestations of emigration (such as of highly skilled or leadership groups) can have a detrimental effect on a country's stability. Concerns about loss of sovereignty in the context of international cooperation are significant, but often misconstrue the nature of global governance systems. Recognition of the sovereign rights of States to manage migration is likely to be a core feature of any system of global migration governance. Even when States agree to the free movement of people across their borders, they retain the right to reinstate border controls when they believe national interests dictate such action, as occurred in some European Union Member States in 2015. States understandably prefer to operate on a “mutual interest” basis, rather than relinquish aspects of sovereignty to other countries that may have vastly different interests at stake.

Second, migration is often a contested issue in domestic politics. Publics are divided as to whether migration is a problem or an opportunity.⁴¹⁵ Interest groups tend to take more consistent stances in favour of, or opposed to, enlarging or contracting immigration, but they may cancel each other out in public immigration debates. Moreover, even among those who see migration as an opportunity, there are concerns that governments are increasingly unable to manage it well in the context of deepening globalization.⁴¹⁶

Third, and related, effective international cooperation requires States to consider the interests of other countries, which is difficult when States are conflicted about their own interests with regard to migration. When States are unclear about what they want to achieve through their own migration policies, it is difficult for them to engage constructively with others in international forums. Many States are, at one and the same time, countries of origin, transit and destination. Their interests may differ significantly, depending on the topic under discussion or the agreements being negotiated. Finding consensus is all the more difficult because there is little agreement

413 For a detailed account of these historical developments, see, for example, Martin, 2014.

414 This is not to say that significant implementation and enforcement gaps do not exist in practice under existing frameworks.

415 See, for example, German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2014.

416 Ibid.

as to whether all parties to any accord would, on the whole, benefit from specific migration policies. Even though the economic research literature suggests that migration can generate significant economic benefits,⁴¹⁷ economics is not the only – or sometimes even the most important – factor in considering the effects of population movements. Social, fiscal, cultural, religious and other impacts may be as salient to governments when weighing how to manage flows of people or enter into agreements with other States.

Fourth, there is a natural asymmetry in the process of building a global migration governance system. Most destination countries tend to be global or regional hegemony in relationship to the countries of origin from which people migrate. This is equally true for South–South and South–North migration. Destination countries are generally wealthier and are often also strategically and militarily dominant. In negotiations, the destinations can have disproportionate power to define the terms by which their visas will be allocated. Even among countries with similar economies and political systems, agreement on policies is often elusive. The European Union has been working on such issues for decades and has still not achieved the level of policy coherence it has sought. Similarly, as early as 1992, the *Treaty of the Southern African Development Community* stated that Southern African Development Community (SADC) shall “develop policies aimed at the progressive elimination of obstacles to the free movement of capital and labour, goods and services, and of the people of the Region generally among Member States”.⁴¹⁸ The *2005 SADC Protocol on Facilitation of the Movement of Persons*, adopted to fulfil this commitment, is yet to come into force.⁴¹⁹

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, migration is fundamentally about people, in contrast to the global regimes to address movement of capital and goods. For the system of global migration governance to benefit States, migrants and societies, the very people to be regulated have to be engaged in developing and improving relevant frameworks, institutions and processes. However, incorporating migrants into such a system is exceedingly difficult, particularly since it is not always clear who can represent migrants’ interests in any given context. Some progress has been made at the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) through the establishment of a civil society component, which includes representatives of migrant and diaspora-led organizations. As the GFMD is a consultative rather than a decision-making process, however, whether these organizations would indeed represent the interests of the vast array of different types of migrants is an open question.

Given these barriers, progress in establishing international norms, procedures and rules of decision-making has been slow, focused mostly on building confidence among States and between States and other partners. Two decades ago, the UN Secretary General (SG) asked States if they wanted the UN to convene an international conference to discuss greater cooperation in migration management. The opposition to such a discussion at a global level was strong. The SG concluded:

The disparate experiences of countries or subregions with regard to international migration suggest that, if practical solutions are to be found, they are likely to arise from the consideration of the particular situation of groups of countries sharing similar positions or concerns with the global international migration system. In the light of this, it may be expedient to pursue regional or subregional approaches whenever possible.⁴²⁰

417 World Bank, 2006.

418 Article 5(2)(d), SADC, 1992.

419 SADC, 2005.

420 UN SG, 1997.

In fact, the proliferation of regional and cross-regional consultative processes was already under way, having begun in the mid-1980s and expanded subsequently. Some of these processes included like-minded countries experiencing similar challenges as origin or destination countries. Others were composed of both origin and destination countries. The opposition to global meetings on migration has since dissipated, as evident in the 2006 and 2013 High-level Dialogues on International Migration and Development (HLD) and the 2016 UN High-level Meeting. As many of their supporters believed they would, regional consultative mechanisms have provided constructive input to the emerging global consultative arrangements discussed further below.

Norms and institutions

The normative and institutional architecture for the global governance of migration has developed, evolved and proliferated over time, particularly during the last century, and now embodies a relatively detailed – albeit fragmented – set of norms, rules and institutions that regulate the behaviour of States and other actors. This section provides an overview of key aspects of the legal/normative architecture and the institutional architecture.

Overview of legal and normative architecture

Stemming from a State's authority over its territory and population, international law recognizes a significant role for unilateral State action in regulating migration. States possess broad powers in this field, which include authority to determine admission, residence, expulsion and naturalization laws and policies. Yet this authority is also constrained by substantive and procedural norms relating to the exercise of State power. States have entered into treaties and agreements, and agreed to customary international law that restrict their authority to regulate migration, as an exercise of their sovereignty and in pursuance of their interests and duties.⁴²¹ Thus, in essence, under international law, States have expressly or implicitly consented to limits on their power to regulate migration.

This has meant that the laws and norms relevant to migration governance are found in customary international law and diverse instruments, including multilateral treaties, bilateral agreements and domestic laws. Some of these instruments relate to specific facets of migration, although, given its multidimensional nature, migration governance naturally intersects with and is influenced by laws and norms in many other areas. While acknowledging these practical implications, this subsection focuses principally on global-level treaties relevant to *international* movements associated with persecution and torture, smuggling and trafficking, labour and services, and family unity, as well as modes of movement.⁴²²

International human rights law permeates and is applicable to each of these themes. In the area of human rights, through deliberations and practice, States have undertaken significant obligations towards individuals and groups, including migrants. International human rights law imposes duties on States to respect, protect and fulfil human rights. The 1966 *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* (ICCPR), the 1966 *International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights* (ICESCR), the 1948 *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (UDHR) and seven other core human rights treaties articulate civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights that are inherent to all human beings in light of the recognition and acceptance of the fundamental importance

421 See Appendix A for a definition of customary international law. More generally, see for example, Aleinikoff, 2002.

422 The subsection does not delve into implementation and enforcement gaps, although these are significant and arguably impede the global governance of migration in ways that affect the interests of migrants as well as those of States.

of safeguarding human dignity.⁴²³ Since human rights inhere due to a person's status as a human being and not because of citizenship, the vast majority of human rights are guaranteed to migrants and citizens alike, regardless of immigration status or other characteristics.

While all human rights are applicable to State action on migration, the principle of non-discrimination is among the fundamental rights that impose obligations on States.⁴²⁴ This principle does not mean all distinctions between citizens and migrants are prohibited. For differential treatment to be permissible, in general, it must be "reasonable and objective" and the overall aim must be "to achieve a purpose which is legitimate" under human rights law.⁴²⁵ With respect to freedom of movement, Article 12 of the ICCPR articulates the contours of the right. Persons lawfully within State territory have the right to liberty of movement within the territory and freedom to choose their residence. Everyone is also free to leave any country, including their own, and no one can be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter their own country. However, States are permitted to impose restrictions that are based in law and consistent with the other rights in the ICCPR, if the restrictions are necessary to protect national security, public order, public health or morals, or the rights and freedoms of others.

Persecution, torture and war

The most elaborate, well-established and widely adopted global laws and norms relate to movements associated with persecution, particularly to persons who can satisfy the legal definition of a refugee. The *1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees* and its *1967 Protocol* (Refugee Convention) establish a framework of surrogate protection for any person who "owing to a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country".⁴²⁶ In its preamble, the Refugee Convention explicitly recognizes the international scope and nature of refugee problems and the need for international cooperation in achieving solutions.

Even though the UDHR recognizes the right to seek and to enjoy asylum from persecution in other countries, under the Refugee Convention, States do not have a corresponding obligation to admit asylum seekers, since international law does not articulate a general right to enter a State of which one is not a citizen.⁴²⁷ The principal duty relates to *non-refoulement*, an obligation against the forcible return to territories where life or freedom would be threatened on account of the traits noted above.⁴²⁸ However, *refoulement* is permitted under the Convention if there are reasonable grounds to believe that a person presents a danger to the security of the country or to its community because of a final conviction for a particularly serious crime. Article 31 explicitly requires States to refrain from imposing penalties on refugees, recognizing that seeking asylum can breach immigration rules. Once asylum seekers are recognized as refugees, States are obligated to grant a range of rights and benefits; some rights are automatic, while other entitlements accrue, for example, as a function of the nature and duration of the attachment to the host State.⁴²⁹

423 See Appendix B for ratifications relating to the treaties discussed in this chapter.

424 See, for example, Article 2(1), ICCPR; Article 2(2), ICESCR.

425 UNHRC, 1989.

426 Article 1A(2), Refugee Convention.

427 Article 14, UDHR.

428 Article 33(1), Refugee Convention.

429 Hathaway, 2005.

Burgeoning State practices directed at deterring, preventing and punishing irregular entry call into question the robustness of the Refugee Convention in fulfilling its original objective to provide international protection. Even though international human rights law has expanded the interpretation of the Convention definition of a refugee and thereby the breadth of persons who may fall within the definition, its circumscribed nature – the need to show persecution based on one of five grounds – means that it is poorly equipped to protect people who cross international borders in the context of war or natural disasters, absent these factors. Regional instruments have sought to fill some of the gaps by expanding the refugee definition to cover persons who cross borders in the context of wars and civil unrest, and there have been recent efforts to address normative gaps associated with cross-border movements in the context of disasters and environmental change (on the latter, see the next section).

Victims of torture who cross international borders – whether or not they qualify as refugees – can also seek protection on the basis of human rights treaties and customary international law. The *1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment* (CAT) prohibits the return of persons to torture, while the ICCPR prohibits return to torture and other forms of ill-treatment. Unlike the Refugee Convention, the CAT contains an express and absolute prohibition against *refoulement* of a person to a State where there are substantial grounds for believing that the person would be subject to torture.⁴³⁰ The prohibition is implied in the ICCPR.⁴³¹

Trafficking and smuggling

The other thematic areas in which a relatively large number of States have converged on the need for an international approach and agreed to global laws and norms relate to human trafficking and migrant smuggling. The *2000 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children* (the so-called “Palermo Protocol”) to the *Convention against Transnational Organized Crime* (UNTOC) defines “trafficking in persons” as comprising three key elements: an act; a means or method; and a purpose or motivation.⁴³² This means trafficking in persons, as defined, can apply to both internal and international movements, even though the Protocol’s scope is limited to offences that are transnational in nature and where trafficking involves an “organized criminal group”.⁴³³ Among the Protocol’s objectives are protection and assistance of victims of trafficking with full respect for human rights,⁴³⁴ and the Protocol explicitly articulates ways of achieving this,⁴³⁵ although these have been criticized for insufficiently addressing the interests and needs of victims.⁴³⁶ States are required to consider laws or other measures that would allow victims to remain temporarily or permanently on their territory;⁴³⁷ however, subject to the State’s international protection obligations such as those stemming from refugee or human rights law, victims can be repatriated.⁴³⁸

430 Article 3(1), CAT.

431 Article 7, ICCPR; UNHRC, 1992.

432 See Appendix A for definition of trafficking in persons.

433 See Appendix A for definition of organized criminal group.

434 Article 2(b), Palermo Protocol.

435 Article 6, Palermo Protocol.

436 See, for example, Gallagher, 2010.

437 Article 7, Palermo Protocol.

438 Article 8 and 14, Palermo Protocol.

Smuggling, on the other hand, a key means through which irregular migration takes place, is generally viewed as a commercial transaction rather than a situation of vulnerability, although contemporary research is generating greater insights into its complexity.⁴³⁹ The commercial lens is arguably due in part to the definition in the *2000 Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air* (Smuggling Protocol) to UNCTOC, which characterizes “smuggling of migrants” as a transaction between the smuggler and a migrant that entails a benefit to the smuggler.⁴⁴⁰ Unlike trafficking, smuggling requires the crossing of an international border and the unauthorized entry of a migrant into a State in which the person is not a national or a permanent resident. The Protocol’s purpose is to prevent and combat the smuggling of migrants and to promote cooperation among States’ parties towards these ends, while protecting the rights of smuggled migrants.⁴⁴¹ Importantly, this means that the smuggler can be subject to criminal prosecution for smuggling, but not the smuggled migrant.

Labour and services

In contrast to movements associated with persecution, torture, trafficking and smuggling, there is less convergence and cooperation at the global level on laws and norms for migrant workers. To regulate international movements related to labour and services, States have primarily adopted bilateral agreements and multilateral agreements at regional and subregional levels, including under broader frameworks for free movement. Nonetheless, a number of relevant laws exist at the global level: the *1990 Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families* (ICRMW); the *1949 Migration for Employment Convention (Revised)* (ILO Convention No. 97); and the *1975 Convention Concerning Migrations in Abusive Conditions and the Promotion of Equality of Opportunity and Treatment of Migrant Workers* (ILO Convention No. 143). Although individually these instruments are not widely ratified, about 86 States have ratified at least one of the three; together, they “comprise an international charter on labour migration, providing a comprehensive framework covering most issues of treatment of migrant workers and members of their families.”⁴⁴²

The ICRMW seeks to secure for migrant workers the rights guaranteed by the UDHR and core human rights treaties. The ICRMW relates to the whole labour migration process, including prevention of abuses; it covers migrants in both regular and irregular situations and includes substantive and procedural safeguards. The two binding ILO conventions, which are supported by non-binding recommendations, also relate to the protection of migrant workers throughout the labour migration process. Among the key themes covered by ILO Convention No. 97 are the conditions governing the orderly recruitment of migrant workers, as well as equal treatment with nationals for lawfully resident migrants in respect of working conditions, trade union membership and enjoyment of benefits including collective bargaining, social security and employment taxes.⁴⁴³ ILO Convention No. 143 supplements ILO Convention No. 97; for example, it includes provisions specifically on migrants in irregular situations. In addition, the ILO’s eight fundamental rights conventions – recognized as fundamental to the rights of human beings at work as well as ILO instruments of general applicability, such as the *2011 Convention Concerning Decent Work for Domestic Workers* (ILO Convention No. 189) – are relevant to migrant workers.

⁴³⁹ See, for example, McAuliffe and Laczko, 2016.

⁴⁴⁰ Article 3, Smuggling Protocol. See Appendix A for definition of smuggling of migrants.

⁴⁴¹ Article 2, Smuggling Protocol.

⁴⁴² Cholewinski, 2012.

⁴⁴³ Ibid.

The *1994 General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)*, a key instrument in international trade law further liberalizing the trade in services, contains provisions indirectly supporting the temporary movement of persons between trading partners, thus facilitating international mobility at the global level. GATS applies to all measures by 164 WTO Members affecting trade in services, except where services are supplied in the exercise of governmental authority (on a non-commercial basis).⁴⁴⁴ GATS contains rules and a framework for countries to make specific commitments to open particular service sectors to foreign suppliers. GATS establishes four possible modes through which services can be traded between WTO Members. Under Mode 4, WTO Members can commit to permit the presence of natural persons from other WTO Members for purposes of supplying services. GATS commitments are subject to national immigration provisions and accordingly, GATS does not require WTO Members to confer rights to live in their territories. GATS commitments are enforceable in the WTO.⁴⁴⁵

Family unity

There are no global treaties specifically on international movements related to family unity. Indeed, the term “family unity” is not expressed as such in international instruments; it is generally used to describe rights that respect, protect and support the family, including its ability to be together.⁴⁴⁶ Similarly, while the family is regarded as the fundamental unit of society, a single internationally accepted definition does not exist. The United Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) has interpreted the term, as contained in the ICCPR, in broad terms as embodying “all interpersonal relations that are held to constitute a family in the society concerned.”⁴⁴⁷ Protection of family unity is underscored by universal rights, including Articles 12 and 16 of the UDHR, Articles 17 and 23 of the ICCPR, and Article 10 of the ICESCR, as well as provisions in the *1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child* and the *ICRMW*. These rights interact with, and impose constraints on, State authority to regulate on migration, particularly in situations where a State seeks to deport a non-citizen member of a family residing within their territory or to deny entry to a non-citizen seeking to join family members residing in the territory.

Modes of movement

State interests have also converged at the global level to regulate modes of movements. Customary international law and key global treaties are relevant to, and impose obligations on States, and in some instances on other actors, in the context of movements by sea and air. These treaties and customary international law are particularly relevant in an environment and context where States, through bilateral agreements and other mechanisms, increasingly seek to prevent and deter movements. Arguably, lack of clarity under international law on certain critical issues has also created the space for such arrangements. Key treaties on maritime movements and international transport by air are:

- *1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea (UNCLOS)*;
- *1979 International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR)*;
- *1974 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS)*; and
- *1944 Convention on International Civil Aviation* (also known as the “Chicago Convention”), in particular Annex 9.

444 Article 1, GATS.

445 For more on GATS and movement of persons, see, for example, WTO, n.d.

446 See, for example, Jastram, 2003.

447 Kälin and Künzli, 2009, drawing on UNHRC, 1988 and 1990.

Movements across land or “green” borders, the other key mode of entry for migrants, tend to be controlled unilaterally or via bilateral agreements.

Overview of institutional architecture

This subsection highlights the roles of the International Organization for Migration (IOM), UNHCR and the International Labour Organization (ILO), the three international organizations with the most robust normative and/or operational mandates related to the global governance of migration. It also touches upon the roles and missions of the Global Migration Group (GMG) and the SRSG, while acknowledging that a host of other institutional actors play important direct and indirect roles.

Since its founding in 1951, IOM has adapted significantly, expanding from a regional organization with primarily logistical responsibilities to a global one with a much broader set of objectives, especially in humanitarian engagement. Established through a State-led process outside the UN system and under a different name and without the underpinnings of a convention, IOM joined the UN as a related organization in September 2016.⁴⁴⁸ IOM’s Constitution does not exhaustively define or limit the populations able to benefit from IOM’s efforts and services in pursuance of its purposes and functions.⁴⁴⁹ This has allowed IOM to be entrepreneurial and flexible in responding to evolving political and humanitarian needs.⁴⁵⁰ Since 2001, IOM has convened an annual International Dialogue on Migration (IDM) as a key global forum that brings together relevant stakeholders to discuss emerging and complex migration governance themes. IOM’s Migration Governance Framework, adopted in 2015, is particularly relevant to the themes of this chapter. The framework identifies essential elements for facilitating orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration (and mobility) of people through planned and well-managed migration policies. It articulates three principles: (1) adherence to international standards and fulfilment of migrants’ rights; (2) formulation of policy using evidence and a whole-of-government approach; and (3) engagement with partners to address migration and related issues; and three objectives: (1) advance the socioeconomic well-being of migrants and society; (2) effectively address the mobility dimensions of crises; and (3) ensure that migration takes place in a safe, orderly and dignified manner.⁴⁵¹

Established as a temporary regionally focused organization tasked to provide legal protection, over time in the context of evolving political and mobility landscapes and humanitarian exigencies, UNHCR’s responsibilities and operations have adapted and expanded significantly. It is the primary global institution responsible for protection and assistance to refugees, asylum seekers and stateless persons.⁴⁵² Under the Refugee Convention, States undertake to cooperate with UNHCR in the exercise of its functions, particularly to facilitate UNHCR’s specific duty to supervise the Convention’s application.⁴⁵³ In this sense, UNHCR is the “guardian” of the Refugee Convention and promotes and monitors implementation and compliance. UNHCR’s mandate and functions are set out in its 1950 Statute; its core mandate is to provide international protection and seek

448 Initially established as the Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe (PICMME) and later the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM) and the Intergovernmental Committee for Migration (ICM), the current name was adopted in 1989.

449 Article 1(1), IOM, 2017.

450 Bradley, 2017.

451 IOM, 2015.

452 The UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) provides assistance and protection to Palestinian refugees in Jordan, Lebanon, Syrian Arab Republic, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. See, for example, UNRWA, n.d.

453 Article 35, Refugee Convention.

permanent solutions for refugees.⁴⁵⁴ The Statute also provides for UNHCR's mandate and activities to evolve, based on instructions and policy directives from the GA and the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).⁴⁵⁵ UNHCR also convenes agenda-setting global consultations, hosts the annual High Commissioner's Dialogue on key protection challenges and publishes Guidelines on International Protection to clarify the application of the Convention. Its Executive Committee, which is comprised of 101 Member States,⁴⁵⁶ is "the only specialized multilateral forum at the global level responsible for contributing to the development of international standards relating to refugee protection."⁴⁵⁷

The ILO's operational role is much narrower than either of the other two organizations, but it continues to play an important normative function. In addition to its conventions, the ILO's non-binding Multilateral Framework on Labour Migration, adopted in 2006, and developed in the context of the ILO's general commitment to decent work, represents consensus on the part of the three sets of actors that make up the ILO's governing structure: governments, employers and trade unions. Its aim is to assist States "in implementing more effective policies on labour migration, including on rights, employment and protection of migrant workers."⁴⁵⁸ Operationally, the ILO supports programmes to enhance social protection of migrants, such as the negotiation of agreements that allow portability of benefits; prevent human trafficking; improve migrant labour recruitment practices; enhance skills recognition of migrants; support reintegration of migrants; and protect domestic workers. In contrast to UNHCR and IOM, migration is one among many priorities within the ILO.⁴⁵⁹

Beyond these three key UN agencies, a whole host of other institutional actors and mechanisms are relevant to the governance of migration at the global level.⁴⁶⁰ In recognition of the complexity of the institutional landscape, the GMG was established to promote greater cooperation and coordination. It is comprised of 22 entities that meet regularly at heads of agency and working levels.⁴⁶¹ In its terms of reference, the GMG identifies establishing comprehensive and coherent institutional responses to international migration and working to ensure full respect for rights of international migrants, including protection to vulnerable migrants, among its key priorities.⁴⁶²

A final important actor is the SRSG on International Migration. The office, established in 2006 in the lead-up to the UNHLD, supports and advises the Secretary-General in promoting and advocating the UN agenda on international migration and provides policy advice and coordinates the engagement of UN entities on

454 UNGA, 1950.

455 See in particular UNGA, 1950. The Statute and GA and ECOSOC resolutions identify persons who may qualify as refugees and fall within UNHCR's mandate as well as other "persons of concern" who may fall within UNHCR's competence. See also, UNHCR, 2013.

456 UNHCR, n.d.

457 Loescher, 2014.

458 ILO, 2006.

459 Labour migration is one of more than 40 issues listed on the ILO's homepage under "topics"; see, for example, ILO, n.d.a. It is one of 10 areas in which the budget is organized; see, for example, ILO, n.d.b.

460 Among them are the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the population division within the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA). The OHCHR has a mandate to promote and protect the enjoyment and full realization of human rights of all people, including migrants. The office also supports the Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council, including the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants and the Special Rapporteur on Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children. Among other aspects, UN DESA prepares global migrant stock estimates and supports dialogues and meetings on international migration within the UN.

461 Members are: FAO, IFAD, the ILO, IOM, OHCHR, UN Regional Commissions, UNEP, UNICEF, UNCTAD, UN DESA, UNDP, UNESCO, UN Women, UNHCR, UNIDO, UNITAR, UNODC, UNFPA, UNU, World Bank, WFP and WHO. Some notable organizations are not members, including WTO, ICAO and WMO. See GMG, n.d.a.

462 GMG, n.d.b.

migration-related issues. The office has led efforts to foster international cooperation, including initiatives on specific issues such as migrants affected by crises and will coordinate the work to implement the New York Declaration (see next section). Louise Arbour succeeded Sir Peter Sutherland as SRSG in 2017.

Efforts to improve global governance (2001–2016)

During the twenty-first century, there have been recurrent efforts to improve global migration governance through formal UN mechanisms as well as through informal State-led mechanisms. This section briefly examines three sets of such activities: (1) dialogues and consultative processes to build confidence and consensus among States; (2) mini-multilateral normative initiatives to enhance protection of migrants; and (3) efforts to ensure that migrants are included in decision-making on other, related global issues.

Dialogue and consultation

The last two decades have seen a marked increase in global-level dialogues and consultative mechanisms on international migration, as awareness has grown of its multidimensional and transnational nature and of the need for multilateral cooperation on various aspects of the issue. Table 1 highlights key dialogues and consultations held at the global level since 2001, organized by States or the UN, and presents an overview of major outputs or outcomes. These dialogues and initiatives are not without criticisms at the substantive and procedural levels.⁴⁶³ Nonetheless, the growing salience and priority of governing migration at the global level is reflected in the fact that past reluctance and disagreements have shifted somewhat towards increased cooperation with greater recognition of the benefits to be gained from global discussions and action.

According to a recent analysis of nine global dialogues and initiatives, the following broad thematic clusters have featured in all of them: (1) minimizing the negative aspects of migration by addressing drivers and consequences of displacement and irregular migration; (2) acknowledging and strengthening the positive effects of migration for countries of origin and destination, as well as for migrants; and (3) protecting migrants' rights and ensuring their well-being.⁴⁶⁴ While the dialogues and initiatives have approached these broad themes from different angles and with varying degrees of emphasis, there has been convergence on the importance of making progress with regard to a number of subthemes across the dialogues and initiatives. The main subthemes where tensions are apparent include recommendations related to opening more legal avenues for migration, considering low-skilled labour migration outside temporary channels, and the rights of migrant workers, especially as articulated in the ICMWC.⁴⁶⁵

463 See, for example, Newland, 2005.

464 Bauloz, 2017. The paper examined the Berne Initiative, annual meetings of IOM's IDM, the so-called "Doyle Report", the Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM), the GMG, the 2006 HLD, GFMDs, the 2013 HLD and the 2016 UN High-level Meeting. See discussion of some of these in the table below.

465 Ibid.

Table 1. Selected dialogues and consultations at the global level during the twenty-first century⁴⁶⁶

Year	Dialogue or Initiative	Key Outcome
2001–2004	Berne Initiative, launched by Switzerland and State-owned.	International Agenda for Migration Management including: (1) common understandings outlining fundamental shared assumptions and principles underlying migration management; and (2) effective practices on a range of migration issues that draw on actual and practical experiences of States.
2003–2005	Global Commission on International Migration, co-chaired by Switzerland and Sweden, with over 30 States as part of a core group. ^a	Migration in an Interconnected World: New Directions for Action , laying out a framework for the formulation of coherent responses to the issue of international migration at national, regional and global levels. ^b
2006	UN High-level Dialogue on International Migration and Development.	Resolution (A/RES/61/208) on International Migration and Development adopted by the General Assembly by consensus in December 2006. The Summary of the High-level Dialogue by the President of the General Assembly (A/61/515) noted support for continuing the global dialogue on international migration and development.
2007–present	Global Forum on Migration and Development.	State-led process that allows for consultation, dialogue and cooperation on international migration issues with growing and extensive government participation. Civil society discussions have preceded State discussions with common space for interaction.
2013	UN High-level Dialogue on International Migration and Development.	Negotiated Declaration adopted unanimously by General Assembly (A/RES/68/4), which recognized and reaffirmed the need for international cooperation and action in managing migration and protecting the rights of migrants.
2016	UN High-level Meeting on Addressing Large Scale Movements of Refugees and Migrants.	First summit at the Heads of State and Government level on large movements of refugees and migrants. Resulted in the New York Declaration adopted unanimously by all 193 UN Member States.

a The GCIM was established following recommendations stemming from the so-called “Doyle Report”. See, for example, GCIM, n.d.; see also Doyle, 2004.

b The GMG, discussed earlier in this chapter, was established as a response to this recommendation.

⁴⁶⁶ Even earlier, at the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) in Cairo, 179 States adopted a 20-year Programme of Action that was intended to “serve as a comprehensive guide to people centered development action.” It contained a whole chapter on international migration and arguably launched further dialogue on migration. See, for example, UNFPA, 2014. Summaries of the dialogues and initiatives highlighted in this table have been drawn from relevant websites. More generally, see for example, Newland, 2011.

The 2016 UN High-level Meeting deserves special attention. The summit came in the aftermath of several major refugee and migration crises affecting many parts of the world. The large-scale movements of people from and through the Middle East and North Africa into Europe brought particular attention to the issue, but significant movements of Central Americans through Mexico into the United States and people from Bangladesh and Myanmar into other Southeast Asian countries also raised its global visibility.

The SG's report for the 2016 UN High-level Meeting focused on both refugees and migrants, highlighting trends, causes of large movements, and needs both en route and upon arrival. It called for "new global commitments to address large movements of refugees and migrants, commencing with recommendations to ensure at all times the human rights, safety and dignity of refugees and migrants".⁴⁶⁷ The report also elaborated the need to address the causes of movements and protect those who are compelled to move, and to prevent discrimination and counter xenophobia against refugees and migrants.⁴⁶⁸ The New York Declaration recognized that although there are separate legal frameworks governing refugees and migrants, both have the "same universal human rights and fundamental freedoms [and] [t]hey also face many common challenges and have similar vulnerabilities, including in the context of large movements."⁴⁶⁹ In this context, the New York Declaration endorsed a set of commitments that apply to both refugees and migrants, as well as separate sets of commitments for refugees and for migrants. The Declaration acknowledged that States have "a shared responsibility to manage large movements of refugees and migrants in a humane, sensitive, compassionate and people-centred manner" and to do so through international cooperation, while recognizing that there are varying capacities and resources to respond.⁴⁷⁰

With regard to refugees, the SG's report called for "[a] more predictable and equitable way of responding to large movements of refugees ... through the adoption of a global compact on responsibility-sharing for refugees, and [by setting out] elements of a comprehensive response plan for refugees".⁴⁷¹ It called on Member States to adopt a compact that would "commit to sharing responsibility for hosting refugees more fairly" and to "take immediate steps ... to ensure ... the impact of [refugee] flight is not borne disproportionately by countries and regions on the basis of their proximity to countries of origin alone."⁴⁷² Responsibility-sharing could manifest itself through, among other things, "financial and in-kind support, technical assistance, legal or policy measures, personnel and resettlement places or other pathways for admission of refugees, and to endeavour to make contributions proportionate to the global needs of refugees and to the diverse capacities of each Member State".⁴⁷³ In the New York Declaration, States committed to a "more equitable sharing of the burden and responsibility for hosting and supporting the world's refugees, while taking account of existing contributions and the differing capacities and resources among States."⁴⁷⁴ And, despite the fears of many advocates for refugees, the declaration strongly endorsed the existing normative framework for refugee protection. These statements were a significant achievement in themselves, as "[t]he 19 September summit was the first time ever that the UN General Assembly had expressed a collective commitment to sharing responsibility for refugees."⁴⁷⁵ The New York Declaration gave UNHCR principal responsibility for drafting the compact on refugees, which is to be included in the High Commissioner's annual report to the GA in 2018.⁴⁷⁶

467 UNSG, 2016.

468 Ibid.

469 UNGA, 2016.

470 Ibid.

471 UNSG, 2016. The work on refugees was informed by several other high-level meetings in 2016 that sought greater cooperation in responding to crises, including the Supporting Syria and the Region Conference, held in London in February 2016; the High-level Meeting on Global Responsibility Sharing through Pathways for Admission of Syrian Refugees, held in Geneva in March 2016; and the World Humanitarian Summit, held in Istanbul in May 2016.

472 UNSG, 2016.

473 Ibid.

474 UNGA, 2016.

475 Ferris, 2017.

476 UNGA, 2016.

On migration, the SG's report called for "strengthening global governance of migration through the development of a global compact for safe, regular and orderly migration, in a process to be initiated now and realized in the coming years."⁴⁷⁷ Instead of proposing language for the compact, the SG asked for "a State-led process to elaborate a comprehensive international cooperation framework on migrants and human mobility ... and to hold an intergovernmental conference on international migration in 2018 to adopt the global compact".⁴⁷⁸ The New York Declaration confirmed this approach and indeed, responsibility for drafting the migration compact rests firmly with States. The process for developing the migration compact is led by the President of the UNGA, who named the governments of Mexico and Switzerland as co-facilitators. The UN Secretariat and IOM are jointly servicing the negotiations, the former providing capacity and support and the latter extending technical and policy expertise.⁴⁷⁹ The global compact on migration is to set out "a range of principles, commitments and understandings among Member States regarding international migration in all its dimensions."⁴⁸⁰ Annex II of the New York Declaration lists a non-exhaustive set of 24 issues to be addressed in the compact. They range from the very general (for example, cooperation at the national, regional and international levels on all aspects of migration) to the very specific (for example, promotion of faster, cheaper and safer transfers of remittances through legal channels).

In his final report as SRSR, Sir Peter Sutherland recommended an agenda for action that highlights five policy priorities for the global compact: (1) managing crisis-related movement and protecting migrants in vulnerable situations; (2) building opportunities for labour and skills mobility; (3) ensuring orderly migration, including return; (4) fostering migrant inclusion and development benefits; and (5) strengthening governance capacities. Others have emphasized that the global compact should primarily reinforce the human rights framework for the protection of migrants.⁴⁸¹

A further major outcome of the 2016 UN High-level Meeting related to institutional arrangements for global migration governance. The New York Declaration endorsed IOM's entry into the UN, "which will assist and protect migrants more comprehensively, help States to address migration issues and promote better coherence between migration and related policy domains."⁴⁸² Member States expressed their wish that IOM's admission as a related organization would not change its mission or mode of operation.⁴⁸³ Director General, William Lacy Swing, made this point at the signing of the agreement between IOM and the UN during the 2016 UN High-level Meeting:

We will continue to keep our Member States fully and regularly informed. We will continue to insist on being cost-effective with our business model: where 97 per cent of our 10,000 people are overseas, and out of a budget of 1.5 billion we will use less than 50 million to run the organization. We will also [sic] to continue to offer quick delivery – the same sort of openness that allowed us to come to consensus on this agreement.⁴⁸⁴

From a policy and UN coordination perspective, however, as a member of the UN family of agencies, IOM should be better positioned to bring greater attention, coherence and more effective responses to migration issues within the overall UN system and among its Member States.

477 UNSG, 2016.

478 Ibid.

479 UNGA, 2017a.

480 UNGA, 2016.

481 Guild and Grant, 2017.

482 UNGA, 2016.

483 According to the UN, "The term 'related organization' has to be understood as a default expression, describing organizations whose cooperation agreement with the United Nations has many points in common with that of Specialized Agencies". See, for example, United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination, n.d.

484 IOM, n.d.

Mini-multilateralism in filling normative protection gaps

The New York Declaration called for a State-led, consultative process to improve protection and assistance for migrants in vulnerable situations and to give favourable consideration to implementing the recommendations of the Nansen Initiative on cross-border movements in the context of natural disasters and climate change, and the MICIC Initiative. These two initiatives represent what are called mini-multilateral approaches to norm-building to fill gaps in binding international law, particularly ones that are unlikely to be filled by new conventions or treaties.⁴⁸⁵ Sir Peter Sutherland, the former SRSG on international migration, argued strongly that such “willing coalitions of States, working with other stakeholders, can begin to tackle ... priorities and gradually broaden the consensus on what a functioning international architecture for migration should look like in 2018 and beyond.”⁴⁸⁶

Nansen Initiative Agenda for the Protection of Cross-Border Displaced Persons in the Context of Disasters and Climate Change

The State-led Nansen Initiative was launched by Norway and Switzerland in light of broad consensus surrounding the need to address the normative gap for the protection of people displaced across borders in the context of disasters, including those related to climate change. Focused on the protection of people, but with a wider scope, including the need to address issues of international cooperation and solidarity, the Nansen Initiative’s aim was to develop a more coherent and consistent approach at the international level and help the international community develop an effective normative framework.^a

As a State-led, bottom-up, intergovernmental consultative process, the Initiative built a global evidence base and consensus on the needs of such people, and in October 2015 launched an Agenda for the Protection of Cross-Border Displaced Persons in the Context of Disasters and Climate Change, which was endorsed by 109 government delegations.

To assist States and other stakeholders to improve preparedness and responses to address cross-border displacement, the Protection Agenda conceptualizes a comprehensive approach – a toolbox that not only focuses on protecting those who cross borders, but also presents measures to manage risks in the country of origin. The Agenda compiles a broad set of effective practices and highlights three priority areas for action at the national, (sub)regional and international levels:

- (a) Collecting data and enhancing knowledge on cross-border displacement;
- (b) Enhancing the use of humanitarian protection measures for those who cross borders in the context of disasters and climate change; and
- (c) Strengthening the management of disaster displacement risk in the country of origin by:
 - (i) Integrating human mobility within disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation strategies and other relevant development processes;
 - (ii) Facilitating migration with dignity as a potentially positive way to cope with the effects of natural hazards and climate change;

⁴⁸⁵ Naim, 2009.

⁴⁸⁶ SRSG, 2017.

- (iii) Improving the use of planned relocation as a preventative or responsive measure to disaster risk and displacement; and
- (iv) Ensuring the needs of persons displaced internally in disaster situations are specifically addressed in relevant laws and policies on disaster risk management and internal displacement.

For more on the Nansen Initiative, including its Protection Agenda, see: www.nanseninitiative.org/. For more on the successor to the Nansen Initiative, the Platform on Disaster Displacement (PDD), see: <http://disasterdisplacement.org/>.

a Kälin, 2012.

MICIC Initiative Guidelines to Protect Migrants in Countries Experiencing Conflict or Natural Disaster

The MICIC Initiative has also been praised as an important effort at mini-multilateralism. Launched at the 2014 GFMD in Sweden by its co-chairs the United States and the Philippines, the Initiative was a response to a series of calls to action, including at the 2013 HLD where former Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon noted the need to address the plight of migrants caught in situations of conflict or natural disaster. These calls stemmed from recognition – evidenced most acutely during the 2011 Libyan crisis, when over 800,000 migrants fled the country in a matter of months – that migrants can fall through the cracks of preparedness and response efforts in the context of crises and that this is an issue of global concern.^b

Following its launch, a committed working group – comprised of the co-chairs, the governments of Australia, Bangladesh, Costa Rica and Ethiopia, the European Commission, IOM (which also served as the secretariat), UNHCR, the Office of the SRSO, the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) and Georgetown University's Institute for the Study of International Migration (ISIM) – undertook a broad and inclusive evidence-gathering and consultative process. The MICIC Initiative's main outcome, the non-binding and voluntary Guidelines to Protect Migrants in Countries Experiencing Conflict or Natural Disaster, launched at the UN in New York and Geneva in June 2016, provides practical guidance to States, international organizations, private sector actors and civil society on better ways to protect migrants prior to, during, and in the aftermath of conflicts or natural disasters. The document entails 10 fundamental and cross-cutting precepts (Principles); 15 targeted suggestions organized by theme and by phase (Guidelines); and a non-exhaustive selection of illustrative practices (Practices).

The MICIC Initiative and its Guidelines have been regarded as a useful model, both in terms of process and outcome, for tackling issues of concern to the global community of States. Like the Nansen Initiative, the salience and relevance of the MICIC Initiative for addressing the needs and protection of migrants has been recognized in the 2016 New York Declaration.

For more on the MICIC Initiative, see: <https://micicinitiative.iom.int/>.

b For more on the impacts of crises on non-citizens, see, for example, Weerasinghe et al., 2015.

There are a number of reasons to be optimistic about mini-multilateralism as a way to fill persistent gaps in protection. Martin, observing these processes from the inside, concluded that informal, non-binding, State-led processes for reform are seen by States as pragmatic approaches to norm-filling.⁴⁸⁷ The ad hoc nature of these processes allows them to address emerging issues and concerns more effectively than more formal mechanisms that are often tied to specific mandates. Because States are leading these efforts, there is a built-in constituency for ensuring their implementation. Moreover, these processes have been highly inclusive in terms of regional scope and participation. The resulting recommendations have been vetted with multiple stakeholders, although responsibility for issuing them ultimately rested with the State leads. These processes will only work, however, if States are willing to implement policies consistent with the recommended principles and guidelines. As Martin concluded: “Enhancing protection of those displaced by conflict, natural disasters and other crises will require sustained attention. In the long term ... they will only be as effective as the willingness of States and other stakeholders to implement the recommendations and offer protection on a non-discriminatory basis to all who flee life-threatening situations.”⁴⁸⁸ Betts and Kainz also caution that mini-multilateralism, because it may generate overlapping initiatives on similar issues, “exemplifies a trend towards fragmentation in global migration governance” that could impede efforts to develop a more universal system.⁴⁸⁹

Negotiations on new approaches to protect migrants in vulnerable situations, as proposed in the New York Declaration, will be a greater test of mini-multilateralism than the Nansen or MICIC Initiatives, largely because vulnerability is an amorphous concept that potentially encompasses a very large number of people. How vulnerable situations are defined will be indicative of the commitment of States to protect persons who are not covered under existing laws and frameworks. Vulnerable migrants may include persons who do not qualify for protection under refugee frameworks, but who face a range of life-threatening situations in their home countries, such as communal, electoral, gang, cartel and terrorist violence; nuclear accidents; epidemics and pandemics; and disasters, to name a few.⁴⁹⁰ They can also include migrants with personal crises, including those stranded in a transit country en route to a final destination. Vulnerability can also stem from inherent or experienced characteristics, such as “women at risk, children, especially those who are unaccompanied or separated from their families, members of ethnic and religious minorities, victims of violence, older persons, persons with disabilities, persons who are discriminated against on any basis, indigenous peoples, victims of human trafficking, and victims of exploitation and abuse in the context of the smuggling of migrants.”⁴⁹¹ By contrast, the Nansen and MICIC Initiatives addressed more specific populations in need of protection – disaster displaced and non-citizens in countries experiencing crisis, respectively.

GMG Principles and Guidelines on the Human Rights Protection of Migrants in Vulnerable Situations within Large and/or Mixed Movements

Since 2016, the GMG Working Group on Human Rights and Gender Equality, has been leading efforts to develop a set of principles and guidelines, supported by practical guidance, on the human rights protection of migrants in vulnerable situations within large and/or mixed movements. The framework, which has been developed through a multi-stakeholder, expert process, seeks to provide guidance to

487 Martin, 2016.

488 Ibid.

489 Betts and Kainz, 2017.

490 For more on diverse humanitarian crises and their impacts on populations that may not qualify for refugee protection, see, for example, Martin, Weerasinghe and Taylor, 2014.

491 UNGA, 2016.

States and other stakeholders on how to implement obligations and duties to respect, protect and fulfil the rights of persons in vulnerable situations within large and/or mixed movements who might not fulfil the conditions of the refugee definition. The precarious nature of large and/or mixed movements places some migrants in particular situations of vulnerability and they are therefore, in need of specific protection interventions.

For more on the Principles and Guidelines on the Human Rights Protection of Migrants in Vulnerable Situations, see: www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Migration/Pages/Draftsforcomments.aspx.

Migration and other areas of global governance

This section discusses the ways in which States, usually within the UN framework, have committed to integrate migration and human mobility more generally, often for the first time, into other global governance areas. Four major global meetings merit attention, as they highlight the ways in which migration governance intersects with governance of other transnational issues, including development, climate change, disaster risk reduction and urbanization. Although it is too soon to tell if significant progress will be made in implementing the commitments made with regard to migration, getting migration into these agendas has been one of the most significant achievements of the past two years.

Migration and development

With the incorporation of migration into the *2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*, States rectified the failure to acknowledge the linkages between migration and development in its predecessor, the Millennium Development Goals. The Agenda, adopted at the GA in September 2015, comprises 17 goals and 169 targets to end poverty, protect the planet, and promote peace and prosperity.⁴⁹² The inclusive Agenda, which promises to “leave no one behind”, incorporates migration, mobility and migrants in its introduction, its sustainable development goals (SDGs) and targets, and in the *2015 Addis Ababa Action Agenda* – the outcome agreement of the latest international conference on financing for development. Migration is no longer seen as a consequence of lack of development; the Introduction and various goals and targets recognize the multidimensional reality of migration and its ability to contribute to inclusive growth. The 17 SDGs comprise concrete measures to implement the sustainable development agenda. At least 10 of the 169 targets include references directly related to migration, mobility or migrants.⁴⁹³ Goal 10 “to reduce inequality within and among countries” calls on countries under target 10.7 to “facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through the implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies”.⁴⁹⁴

Migration and climate change

Human mobility has featured in global outcome declarations on climate change since 2010, when the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the *1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change* (UNFCCC) adopted the Cancun

492 See, for example, UN Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform, n.d.

493 UN DESA, 2015.

494 See, for example, UN Sustainable Development Goals, n.d.a.; UN DESA, 2015.

Adaptation Framework. The Framework called on all countries to take “measures to enhance understanding, coordination and cooperation with regard to climate change induced displacement, migration and planned relocation, where appropriate, at national, regional and international levels”.⁴⁹⁵ Subsequent UNFCCC action has focused mostly on displacement, with passing reference to migration and none to relocation.⁴⁹⁶ In 2012, the COP noted the need for greater understanding of “how impacts of climate change are affecting patterns of migration, displacement and human mobility”.⁴⁹⁷ The Advisory Group on Climate Change and Human Mobility, composed of UNHCR, IOM and other agencies, recommended at COP 21 in Paris in 2015 that the COP establish a facility that would “serve as a forum for sharing experience and enhancing capacities to plan and implement climate adaptation measures that avoid displacement, facilitate voluntary migration, and encourage participatory and dignified planned relocation.”⁴⁹⁸ The Paris Agreement instead committed to the establishment of “a task force ... to develop recommendations for integrated approaches to avert, minimize and address displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change”.⁴⁹⁹ The task force’s terms of reference specify that it will consider approaches at the international level, recognizing that some significant cross-border movements will also occur. It is charged with identifying legal, policy and institutional challenges, good practices and lessons learned in developing its recommendations, which are to be delivered at the COP in 2018.⁵⁰⁰

Migration and disaster risk reduction

Another global document and the outcome of stakeholder consultations and intergovernmental negotiations – the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 (SFDRR), adopted by 187 country delegations in 2015 at the Third UN World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction and subsequently endorsed by the UNGA – also contains several explicit references to human mobility. The Framework seeks to substantially reduce disaster risk and losses through the prevention of new, and the reduction of existing, disaster risk. In its preamble, the SFDRR acknowledges that displacement is one of the devastating effects of disasters and that migrants are a relevant stakeholder. The multiple references to different forms of mobility throughout the SFDRR reflect the fact that both displaced persons and migrants are encompassed with the SFDRR’s global targets. The Framework encourages “the adoption of policies and programmes addressing disaster-induced human mobility to strengthen the resilience of affected people and that of host communities”.⁵⁰¹ It states that “[m]igrants contribute to the resilience of communities and societies and their knowledge, skills and capacities can be useful in the design and implementation of disaster risk reduction”.⁵⁰² In addition, the Sendai Framework also makes references to evacuations and relocations.⁵⁰³ On the latter, for example, the Framework calls on States to develop public policies to relocate “human settlements in disaster risk-prone zones”.⁵⁰⁴

495 UNFCCC, 2011.

496 IOM, UNHCR and the World Bank – through its Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development (KNOMAD) – have taken up migration and planned relocation as important issues. Research is showing that these mechanisms can have a positive impact in building resilience and reducing vulnerability to the impacts of climate change when there are safe and legal avenues through which people can migrate or relocate and the rights and future well-being of those who move are protected. For more, see Martin and Bergmann, 2017.

497 UNFCCC, 2012.

498 Advisory Group on Climate Change and Human Mobility, 2015.

499 UNFCCC, 2015.

500 UNFCCC, n.d.

501 UNGA, 2015.

502 Ibid.

503 On evacuations, see, for example, paras. 33(h) and 33(m).

504 UNGA, 2015. For more on Planned Relocations, see, for example, Brookings Institution, Georgetown University and UNHCR, 2015 and Georgetown University, IOM and UNHCR, 2017.

Migration and urbanization

The 2016 UN Conference on Housing and Sustainable Urban Development focused on “the important challenges of how cities, towns, and villages can be planned and managed, in order to fulfil their role as drivers of sustainable development, and how they can shape the implementation of the SDGs and the Paris Agreement on climate change.”⁵⁰⁵ As internal and international migration are major contributors to the growth and dynamism of cities, inclusion of migration into the outcome document was important. In the *New Urban Agenda*, in line with the New York Declaration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, States committed to “ensuring safe, orderly and regular migration through planned and well-managed migration policies”.⁵⁰⁶ A particular focus was the role of local authorities. Involving local actors in the formulation of policies, especially for integration of migrants, is an important but often neglected component of migration governance.

Conclusion

This chapter has focused on the existing architecture and contemporary deliberations and reflections regarding global migration governance. At some future time, there may be a paradigm shift that opens broad, new, as yet unnamed opportunities for international cooperation that would more closely mirror the trade and capital regimes – migration’s counterparts in globalization – and result in less fragmentation. At present, what we have is a slow, albeit accelerating process of change, in which States are building confidence in the process, exhibiting greater willingness to engage in multilateral action, and establishing mechanisms for enhancing international cooperation in diverse aspects of migration.

In many ways, the progress attained to date in improving global migration governance is remarkable. In an era of increasing nationalism, in which publics and politicians alike rail against globalization, States have been willing to cooperate in formulating strategies and approaches to address one of the great transnational issues on the global agenda. Despite great reluctance only a decade ago to engage with migration in the context of the UN, States are now willing to negotiate UN resolutions, declarations and global compacts, to hold summits and shepherd the entry of IOM into the UN system as its migration agency.

The progress made to date has built on the regional processes, dialogues and consultative mechanisms that began in the mid-1980s and continue until today. These initiatives were important confidence-building exercises that enabled States to discuss common interests and concerns, identify options and effective practices, understand each other’s perspectives and needs, and collaborate in training and technical assistance activities. In more concrete ways, they paved the way for the GFMD in showing that informal consultative processes could be sustained over time and provide benefits to participants.

Admittedly, global governance in the migration area still lags the systems in place to manage the international flow of capital and goods. Migration governance more generally also lacks the strong normative bases that guide responses to refugees and UNHCR’s activities. Yet, even here, there has been progress in gaining universal recognition that the rights and safety of migrants must be at the centre of any actions taken to manage movements of people across international borders. Significantly, States affirmed in the New York Declaration that they “will fully protect the human rights of all refugees and migrants, regardless of status; all are rights holders” and that their “response will demonstrate full respect for international law and international human rights law and, where applicable,

505 United Nations Sustainable Development Goals, n.d.b.

506 UNGA, 2017b.

international refugee law and international humanitarian law.”⁵⁰⁷ Equally salient, the Declaration emphasized the benefits, not just the costs of international migration, and the important contributions that migrants make to their countries of origin and destination.

The challenge ahead is to move from what are now largely consultation and ad hoc efforts to greater joint action that ultimately mitigates the level of fragmentation in the system. Notwithstanding the progress to date, there is no assurance – as States weigh the practical advantages and, in some cases, the political costs of strengthening global migration governance – that they will forge a more coherent system that enables them to make and implement mutually beneficial decisions on the movement of people across international borders. Yet, without such agreement, States are unlikely to find solutions to global-level cooperation and coordination problems or to benefit from common opportunities. As this chapter has pointed out, attempting unilaterally to solve the complex challenges that migration presents is likely to fail. A challenge for proponents of international cooperation is to identify the issues and thematic areas most amenable to global, rather than national or regional, responses. When is global governance an effective response for migrants and societies, as well as States? How can global-level cooperation and coordination create mutual benefits? The global compacts on migration and on refugees provide the opportunity to move ahead in strengthening the norms, principles, rules and decision-making processes that will allow for more effective international cooperation in responding to what is a defining issue of our times. Whether States seize that opportunity is still to be known.

Providing continued institutional support to address these issues and implement the outcomes of the global compacts will be a challenge. The entry of IOM into the UN system is promising, but by no means sufficient. A principal obstacle to IOM assuming this role as the global leader on migration is its financing mechanism. Its “projectized” funding model has meant that IOM has necessarily had to focus on its operational programmes, with few resources available for policy-related work. Improving global migration governance, however, requires a stream of funds untied to operations that will allow IOM to enhance its role in protecting the rights and safety of migrants and in assisting States and other entities to develop and implement policies that contribute to safe, orderly and regular movements of people worldwide. A further impediment in the view of critics is the non-normative basis for IOM’s activities.⁵⁰⁸ In this regard, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants has recommended that IOM take on responsibility for ensuring implementation of the ICRMW, much as UNHCR has responsibility for the Refugee Convention.⁵⁰⁹ In earlier work, one of the co-authors of this chapter has recommended that IOM Member States amend its Constitution to make explicit that an important role of the organization is to protect the rights of migrants under international law.⁵¹⁰

Coordination among the various institutions with mandates, programmes and interest in migration issues will be another important challenge. The GMG potentially can serve an important role in this regard, but it is neither staffed nor funded to meet the challenges ahead. Many of the members of the GMG have a narrow focus, and few resources (sometimes only one or two staff) devoted to migration, while some have little or no field presence. As the Chair rotates among members, it is difficult for them to provide effective leadership across the broad migration spectrum when they assume this position. In 2014, the organizations chairing the GMG took on annual, rather

⁵⁰⁷ UNGA, 2016.

⁵⁰⁸ See, for example, Guild and Grant, 2017.

⁵⁰⁹ See, for example, UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrant, 2013: “IOM would need to be given a legal protection mandate and guided by the core international human treaties, including the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, and the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations would need to be integrated into its Constitution.”

⁵¹⁰ Martin, 2014.

than the previous semi-annual responsibility for the group, enabling more time for accomplishing goals; however, this applied even more pressure on the organizations with marginal roles or interest in migration. On the positive side, GMG has engaged in stock-taking exercises related to, for example, crisis-related migration and rescue at sea. These have identified areas of strengths and weaknesses within UN agencies to tackle these problems and provided recommendations to the heads of agencies on priorities for improvement. However, moving from stock-taking to coordinated action will require a new level of engagement by the GMG, such as in monitoring implementation of its recommendations. Strengthening the SRSg's office will also be a challenge. The staffing of the office has been very limited and largely reliant on external sources of funding from private foundations and donor governments.⁵¹¹

The principal State-led global initiative on international migration, the GFMD, which has entered its eleventh year of operation, may also need to grapple with a range of complexities. The GFMD was created as an ad hoc, State-led, non-binding venue for discussion and consultation outside the UN. During this first decade, it has largely played a confidence-building role in enabling government officials responsible for migration to get to know and learn from each other. Whether it will continue to succeed, however, depends largely on its agenda in the years ahead. The outgoing SRSg recommended that the GFMD focus its attention on implementation of the various international commitments made in recent summits, particularly the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda and the 2016 UN-High level Meeting. Other commentators have recommended that the GFMD strengthen its working groups, capacity to engage more actively between annual meetings, and interactions with civil society and the private sector.⁵¹² The formation of the GFMD Business Mechanism and the continuing and active participation of civil society in GFMD meetings are signs of progress and should be nurtured.

International migration is an important global issue that requires a more effective system of global governance. States have demonstrated willingness during the past decade, since the first HLD and establishment of the GFMD, to explore ways to enhance their cooperation both within and outside of the UN. At the same time, international organizations charged with helping States manage the movement of people and protect their rights have also shown greater willingness to cooperate among themselves and with States. The entry of IOM into the UN family is but the latest manifestation. Nonetheless, barriers to global migration governance abound and will grow if States turn inward and xenophobia is not addressed. Countering these forces will be difficult but not impossible.⁵¹³ The step-by-step process of consultation, cooperation and confidence-building that has taken place to date has shown that progress can occur, albeit in incremental ways. It remains the most promising path towards global migration governance.

511 Significant resources to date have come from the MacArthur Foundation, which recently eliminated its funding programme on international migration.

512 Martin, 2014.

513 The New York Declaration condemned xenophobia ("We strongly condemn acts and manifestations of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance against refugees and migrants, and the stereotypes often applied to them, including on the basis of religion or belief.") and welcomed the Secretary-General's global campaign to counter xenophobia: UNGA, 2016.



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6

MOBILITY, MIGRATION AND TRANSNATIONAL
CONNECTIVITY⁵¹⁴

Introduction

In an age of information overload and online connectivity, there is a sense that we are more closely linked globally than ever before. Routine activities in everyday lives are testament to a modern-day transnationalism. For example, e-mails written by people displaced by conflict can reach relatives in safer lands in real time, providing news of escapes and reassurance. Hard-earned money transferred back to family thousands of kilometres away buys much-needed food and supports access to education for the next generation. These types of everyday activities – sending e-mails, wiring cash, video-conferencing on smartphones, and downloading apps – have become an integral part of many people's lives in recent years, dramatically increasing our access to information, places, capital, goods, people and ideas. More is available at our fingertips than ever before. Yet the degree of access and interconnectedness between and within communities and people varies significantly.

At the same time, current public and political discourses abound with talk of an increase in anti-globalization sentiment, of communities and people feeling left behind and of some societies finding it increasingly difficult to reconcile global advancement, human development and public expectations. This has become particularly pointed and highly relevant to emigration and immigration processes – how they are analysed, how they are discussed and debated, and how they are responded to – within a broader context of global trends that have altered fundamental aspects of daily life in many parts of the world. Alongside recent changes in the overall tone of the discussion on globalization, there exists a rich and diverse body of work on the topic, its meaning, its impacts, its benefits and its costs.⁵¹⁵

What is globalization?

Globalization is a set of processes resulting in the growing breadth, intensity, speed and impact of worldwide interconnectedness as a result of:

- the stretching of social, political and economic activities across political frontiers, regions and continents;
- the intensification or increased magnitude of flows of trade, investment, finance, migration, culture and so on;
- the speeding up of global interactions and processes; and
- the deepening impacts of global interactions, such that the effects of distant events can become highly significant elsewhere, blurring the boundaries between domestic matters and global affairs.

Source: Held et al., 1999.

⁵¹⁴ The authors of this chapter are Marie McAuliffe, Head, Migration Policy Research Division, IOM; Alexandra M. Goossens, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva; and Anita Sengupta, Director, Asia in Global Affairs and Senior Fellow and Coordinator, Calcutta Research Group.

⁵¹⁵ Lechner and Boli, 2015; Steger, Battersby and Siracusa, 2014.

Migration processes are profoundly affected by globalization, which, after all, fundamentally involves interactions that span multiple geographic places, transcending nation States. These interactions involve ideas, capital, goods, services and information, as well as people who virtually and actually connect with others across boundaries. The links between international migration and complex processes of greater interconnectedness are of growing importance for several reasons. Firstly, a better understanding of the linkages provides some insight into the broader global dynamics affecting populations likely to move, including those at risk of displacement and/or irregular migration. Secondly, it can help us appreciate the role and limits of policies in influencing and shaping migration trends and patterns. Thirdly, greater interconnectedness can present considerable challenges to better managing unsafe, irregular migration. Fourthly, the recent advances in transportation and telecommunications technology have heralded massive change already, which appears to be part of a longer-term trend that is unlikely to change course. Examinations of transnational connectivity, mobility and migration are relevant now and will remain so well into the future.

In this chapter, we examine one specific aspect of globalization: transnational connectivity, which we define as both physical and virtual connectivity between people. We focus specifically on changes to transportation and telecommunications technology over time, and on international migration rather than internal migration. The second section provides a brief overview of the key advances in transportation and telecommunications technology globally. The third section discusses how transnational connectivity is affecting migration processes. The fourth and final section briefly discusses the implications for migration governance.

The evolution of transportation and telecommunications technologies

The significant increase in international mobility has been spurred by increased transportation links and the rapid growth in telecommunications technology. The transport revolution (from sail to steam and the development of railroad), starting in the nineteenth century, dramatically increased the intensity and velocity of international flows of people⁵¹⁶ and, in the latter half of that century, emigration became a mass phenomenon.


By the mid-1960s, rapid technological changes in aviation, such as the development of the jet engine, resulted in the boom of air transportation. These advances allowed aircrafts to reach far-off destinations and at much lower cost, thus leading to greater changes in cross-border movements of people and goods.⁵¹⁷ With the availability of air transport, long-distance and real-time telecommunications, globalization has allowed transnational communities to flourish. The falling costs of ocean freight, transatlantic telephone calls, air transport and satellite charges have resulted in a "death of distance".⁵¹⁸ Recent data show a continuing downward trend of travel costs (see figure 1) and an increase in international tourist arrivals (see figure 2). While tourist arrivals are only one facet of international mobility, the data show that the volume of movements around the world is increasing and shows no signs of abating.

516 Lucassen, Lucassen and Manning, 2010.

517 Hoovestel, 2013.

518 Cairncross, 1997.

Figure 1. Unit cost and price of air travel, adjusted for inflation




Source: IATA/Tourism Economics Air Passenger Forecasts (2014); available from www.iata.org/pax-forecast.

Note: RTK = revenue tonne kilometres.

ATK = available tonne kilometres.

Figure 2. International tourist arrivals (millions), 1995–2016



Source: UNTWO, 2017.

Importantly, it does not follow that geography and space constraints have vanished. They remain of fundamental importance with regard to mobility, including the movements of people that are variously circumscribed, such as the cross-border movements of people fleeing armed conflict, disasters or those embarking on perilous sea journeys in search of better lives elsewhere. This is demonstrated, for example, by the number of foreign-born residents globally, which shows that people who move to another country are much more likely to remain within their immediate region than move further afield (as discussed in chapter 3 on the regional dimensions of migration). Furthermore, geographic proximity has long been acknowledged as a central factor underpinning migration patterns and processes, as far back as Ravenstein's "laws of migration".⁵¹⁹ Advances in technology, however, mean that more people than ever before can overcome the issue of distance. The volume of cross-border movements being managed by many countries around the world is continuing to increase. In the United States, it is estimated that up to 390 million cross-border movements occurred in 2016,⁵²⁰ which was up from 225 million in 1980.⁵²¹ In Australia, 14.5 million cross-border movements were recorded in 1996–97, compared to 31.6 million in 2011–12.⁵²² The current estimate is that, by 2020, Australia will experience 50 million movements per year across its borders.⁵²³ In Japan, estimates of selected cross-border movements⁵²⁴ indicate an increase from 7.2 million in 1985 to about 36 million in 2015.⁵²⁵

In recent decades, advances in telecommunication technologies have also been pronounced, particularly in the last decade (see text box on key telecommunications advances), although not uniformly. Access to mobile telephones appears to have increased dramatically, as can be seen in figure 3. Global Internet usage has also grown rapidly, although it is unevenly distributed. There is a digital gender gap with higher Internet access rates for men than for women in all regions of the world; globally, men's access rate is 51 per cent and women's is 44.9 per cent.⁵²⁶ Indeed, increased user rates alone do not necessarily reflect an even take-up of new technologies. Differential access by class, gender and ethnicity are factors in technological engagement.⁵²⁷ Furthermore, there is a digital divide between developed and developing countries, with 81 per cent of individuals using the Internet in developed countries, compared to 40 per cent in developing countries and only 15.6 per cent in the least developed countries.⁵²⁸ The number of mobile broadband subscriptions in developing countries, however, is growing at a fast rate. In Myanmar, for instance, there was a dramatic increase of 4 million new mobile phone subscribers in the third quarter of 2016, following a recent liberalization of the national telecommunications network.⁵²⁹

519 Ravenstein, 1885.

520 US Customs and Border Protection, 2017.

521 White House, 1998.

522 ABS, 2007; Australian DIBP, 2012.

523 Australian DIBP, 2012.

524 In the context of Japan, selected cross-border movements include the number of foreign nationals entering Japan and the number of Japanese departing Japan. These figures have been summed up to provide global estimates of selected cross-border movements.

525 Statistics Bureau, 2016.

526 ITU, 2016.

527 Panagakos and Horst, 2006.

528 ITU, 2016.

529 Ericsson, 2016.


Key telecommunications advances

- 1876 Telephone
- 1890s First radio wave experiments
- 1920s First television transmissions
- 1930s Invention of the modern computer
- 1960s E-mail entering use
- 1980s Cellphone and GPS available for public use
- 1993 Internet is shared in the public domain
- 1994 Start of blogs and social networks
- 2001 Start of 3G smart phones
- 2004 Facebook is launched
- 2006 Twitter is launched
- 2007 Cloud computing – first iPhone is launched
- 2010 First iPad and rapid growth of tablet usage
- 2017 197 billion mobile applications (Apps) downloads worldwide, estimated to grow to 352.9 billion in 2021. Approximately 70,000 new blogs created each day, nearly one every second.

Mobile apps, social networks and mobile operating systems that did not exist in 2006 include: WhatsApp, Uber, Airbnb, Android, Instagram, Snapchat, Tumblr, WeChat and Facebook Messenger

This summary of key dates is based on several sources including The Library of Congress, Statista and The Encyclopaedia Britannica.

Figure 3. Global Internet and mobile telephone access



Source: Adapted from data extracted from World Bank World Development Indicators on 21 October 2015 (see: www.data.worldbank.org). A similar version of this graph was published by the Brookings Institution on 25 February 2014 (see: www.brookings.edu/research/interactives/2014/snapshot-6-rorschach-tests-international-order).

Note: By 2016, the mobile phone subscription penetration rate was over 100%, which means there are now more subscriptions globally than people (Ericsson, 2016).

Globally, it appears that the number of smartphone⁵³⁰ subscriptions has now surpassed those for basic mobile phones, accounting for 55 per cent of all mobile subscriptions.⁵³¹ With the increase in smartphones and broadband connectivity, access to social media is growing – to the point that smartphones are now often the platform for people’s first experience with the Internet. It is important, however, not to overestimate the impact of newer communications technologies. Although the Internet is considered a global communications medium, access is still limited in many locations. Accurately measuring the Internet’s level of influence is difficult.⁵³² While there are considerable cross-country and cross-regional variations, we can also see that, in recent years, even the least developed countries have experienced great leaps in connectivity. In Afghanistan, for instance, according to estimates, mobile telephone subscriptions increased from 1.2 million people (4.8%) in 2005 to almost 20 million people (61.6%) in 2015.⁵³³

Some communities and people face the anomaly of virtual connectivity and physical immobility. Brownkey Abdullahi, a blogger and activist in the Dadaab refugee camp, shared her perspective on the limits of globalization (see text box below). While Brownkey Abdullahi is *virtually* connected globally, she remains *physically* isolated.

The world is not as globalized as you think

As someone who was born and raised in the world’s oldest and largest refugee camp, I’m here to tell you the world isn’t as globalized as you think.

Opened in 1992 and originally intended to provide temporary sanctuary for 90,000 people, Dadaab is the world’s largest and oldest refugee camp. Today, almost half a million people call it home. Like many people in the camp, I was born here, and it is the only place I have ever known. I have never left Kenya, the country where I was born, raised and educated, but have no right to citizenship.

Thanks to radio stations and spotty internet access, we can still connect with the world we are not able to experience first-hand. We stay in the loop with global developments, and thanks to social media I can now meet (if only virtually) people from other countries through a temperamental internet connection on my mobile phone.

These are but small tastes of the benefits of globalization that many people take for granted, but they have made an enormous difference. For several years now I have been campaigning in my camp against gender-based violence and female genital mutilation. What little internet access we have has allowed me to share that message with a larger international audience through my blog.

Source: Abridged excerpt of an article by Brownkey Abdullahi published by the World Economic Forum on 6 July 2016 (Abdullahi, 2016).

530 Smartphones, using third-generation (3G) technology (and beyond), are mobile phones that have an integrated computer, an operating system, Internet access and the ability to run “Apps”. Basic mobile phones, using second-generation (2G) technology, did not have Internet access.

531 Ericsson, 2016.

532 Rabogoshvili, 2012.

533 ITU/World Bank, 2017.

Transnational connectivity and migration actors

Even though innovations in transport and telecommunications technology have increased interconnectivity and facilitated movement, they have not always resulted in more migration, although they may alter the underlying migration processes. This section explores how increased interconnectivity is affecting migration processes and different migration actors.

Current estimates of international migrants over time show that migration is increasing, although the proportion remains small, rising from 2.2 per cent in 1970 to 3.3 per cent in 2015, within the context of a substantial increase in the world's population. According to UN DESA estimates, in 2015, 244 million people were living in a country other than their country of birth – almost 100 million more than in 1990 (153 million), and over three times the estimated number in 1970 (84 million). Migration patterns have not been uniform, however, with two thirds of all international migrants currently residing in high-income countries.⁵³⁴

An examination of some major works on migration (such as *The Age of Migration*;⁵³⁵ *Global Migration Governance*;⁵³⁶ *Global Migration: Old Assumptions, New Dynamics*;⁵³⁷ and *The Routledge International Handbook of Migration Studies*⁵³⁸) shows that, while they all acknowledge the increase in transnational connectivity, there is not much discussion on the role played by connectivity's most rapidly changing aspect: telecommunications. In this section, therefore, we examine how transnational connectivity is shaping migration processes. In doing so, we focus on three main sets of migration actors – migrants, non-State actors and States – with particular reference to geography (origin, transit journeys and destination). Our discussion provides examples of how transnational connectivity can affect these different migration actors.

Transnational connectivity and migrants

In countries of origin, migrants and their communities are experiencing increasing connectivity in a multitude of ways, including in the form of social contact, remittance flows and the migrants' return to their country of origin, such as for significant holidays and events. The impacts can be many and varied, depending on the circumstances of the origin country (economic, social and political) as well as the situations of the migrants themselves. Recent research, for example, focusing on the economic determinants and impacts of migration identified a "positive effect of broadband on migration flows between 1995 and 2009 [...] by improving the flow of information about the host, which affects migration decisions from the origin",⁵³⁹ This needs to be viewed in a broader (structural) context, however, as increased information through greater connectivity may not necessarily result in decisions to migrate and, therefore, higher levels of migration.

534 UN DESA, 2015.

535 Castles, de Haas and Miller, 2014.

536 Betts, 2011.


537 Acosta Arcarazo and Wiesbrock, 2015.

538 Gold and Nawyn, 2013.

539 Unver, 2015. The study was based on flows to OECD countries: "The main host countries here are Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden and the UK. The selection of both OECD and non-OECD origin countries [is] based on the magnitude of the flows, examining those with a minimum number of 100 people" (Unver, 2015).

There is a substantial body of research and analysis on the determinants of migration that has identified multiple factors underpinning migration patterns and processes, including those related to economics and trade, social and cultural links, demography and demographic change, safety and protection, as well as geography and proximity.⁵⁴⁰ One line of research on the links between “maturity” of migration and human development, for example, shows that, at a certain point, higher incomes enabling increased emigration can then become a stabilizing influence and reduce outward migration. In other words, as GDP per capita increases, emigration initially increases and then decreases. This phenomenon, depicted in figure 4,⁵⁴¹ has been referred to by some authors as the “mobility transition” or the “migration hump”.⁵⁴² The complex processes of migration and development need to be viewed in the context of broader globalization dynamics, as highlighted by Held et al.,⁵⁴³ including the acceleration of transitions enabled by much greater connectivity.

Figure 4. Mobility transition



Source: Adapted from Clemens, 2014:7–8.

Note: Clemens found that overall higher economic development (higher incomes) is associated with reduced emigration. Refer to Clemens (2014) for further discussion of data analysis.

540 See, for example, writings on cumulative causation (Massey, 1990), neoclassical economics (Todaro, 1989), world system theory (Portes and Walton, 1981), social capital theory (Massey, 1987), new economics of labour migration (Stark and Bloom, 1985), and social network theory (Boyd, 1989).

541 Clemens, 2014.

542 Zelinsky, 1971; Clemens, 2014.

543 Held et al., 1999.

Increased telecommunications between migrants and their families and communities – depending on the migration and development interactions within the origin country – can affect (but may not necessarily increase) the migration of family members left behind. Greater social and financial contact can have a stabilizing effect on many families and communities that otherwise might be under pressure to also migrate. In Sri Lanka, for example, remittance inflows have steadily increased over the last 30 years, rising from 1.9 per cent of GDP (USD 60 million) in 1979 to 8.7 per cent in 2015 (USD 7 billion).⁵⁴⁴ They play a significant and stabilizing role in helping households meet their basic needs and increase their ability to cope with adverse shocks (such as in the aftermath of the 2004 Asian tsunami), but they also enable them to purchase land, releasing households from indebtedness, promoting small-scale enterprise development, and increasing investment in education and health.⁵⁴⁵

The enhanced and extended connectivity for the transfer of capital, similar to the flow of information, can support or stabilize populations. Importantly, some people in origin countries have been more vulnerable to exploitative money transfer practices, due to their geographic isolation from formal and reliable banking systems. Mobile money technology, however, has seen the geographic barriers to better money transfer services dissipate and the costs of remitting decrease.⁵⁴⁶

Mobile money has become a significant phenomenon in recent years, largely due to “the convergence of advanced mobile communication technologies and the ability to use it for data services in mobile money transfer”.⁵⁴⁷ In their recent review of mobile money and technology trends, MIT researchers Shrier, Canale and Pentland drew on a range of data to find that:

Of the 2.5 billion people as of 2012 that did not have a financial account, 1.7 billion had a mobile phone. As of 2012 there were more mobile money accounts than traditional bank accounts in Kenya, Madagascar, Tanzania and Uganda.⁵⁴⁸

Telecommunications technology has also proved to be an important factor enabling migrants to access information in real time while in transit countries.⁵⁴⁹ The large-scale movement of people to Europe from Turkey in 2015, for example, highlighted in a very visible manner the application of smartphone technology in the migration of refugees and other migrants and the operations of smugglers⁵⁵⁰ (see the text box on the “appification” of migration). Real-time connectivity enables information to be sourced and verified, particularly where migrants are likely to undertake unsafe journeys or rely on smugglers.⁵⁵¹

544 World Bank, 2017.

545 Sri Lanka Ministry of Foreign Employment Promotion and Welfare, 2013.

546 Shrier, Canale and Pentland, 2016.

547 Tobbin and Kuwornu, 2011.

548 Shrier, Canale and Pentland, 2016.

549 Kuschminder and Koser, 2017; McAuliffe, 2013.

550 McAuliffe and Koser, 2015; Zijlstra and van Liempt, 2017.

551 Triandafyllidou and Maroukis, 2012.

The “appification” of migration: lessons from the 2015 Mediterranean maritime migration flows

The world has changed fundamentally in the almost 70 years since the largest refugee crisis in Europe following the aftermath of World War II when the Refugees Convention was being developed and refugee movements beyond war-torn Europe were regulated by states (including under the United Nations). The UN coordinated repatriation, returns and resettlement of refugees to third countries. In today’s terms, movements were slow, highly regulated and very selective. Information for refugees was largely the monopoly of states and opportunities for migrating to other regions were limited to formal channels. Things are very different now.

Some 70 years on conflict and persecution may still be occurring at frustrating and tragic levels but the context has changed. The ‘appification’ of migration has taken off, making migration processes fundamentally different in specific but important ways. Firstly, mobile phone technology has become the norm, linking migrants to family, friends, humanitarian organisations and smugglers, but equally linking smugglers to agents, corrupt officials, and their networks of fellow smugglers in dispersed locations.^a The telecommunications revolution is enabling the creation of unregulated migration pathways that are fast and affordable for an increasing number of people. There are many apps available for people travelling to and through Europe. For example, *InfoAid* has been set up by a Hungarian couple to provide real-time advice on how to cross borders. Other apps help refugees integrate, such as *Refugermany* and *Arriving in Berlin*. Connectivity is supporting movements to safer regions for many but pathways are often extremely dangerous and at times deadly.

Secondly, and for the first time in decades, large numbers of refugees and other migrants in transit and host countries such as Turkey are not sitting and waiting for resettlement or return. They are taking matters into their own hands, principally because they can. Information, advice and money can be shared quickly, and the constraints of geography more easily overcome. The massive and sudden growth in movements through the Eastern Mediterranean route to Greece in 2015 was aided by strong connectivity.

Telecommunications helped shape the size, composition, speed and geography of the European flows. Real-time coverage of movements and operations enable migrants – refugees, asylum-seekers and others – to access useful information on where, when and how to travel. The strong preference for Germany over other European countries is not by chance. It has been realised by migrants themselves as sharing of information increases. In the context of limited access to visas, unregulated asylum pathways risk becoming a funnel for refugees and non-refugees alike.^b

a Khalaf, 2016.

b McAuliffe and Koser, 2015.


Source: Abridged excerpt of an article that first appeared in ANU’s Policy Forum in January 2016 (McAuliffe, 2016).

In destination countries, the use of modern information and communication technologies (ICT) enables more and more migrants to “maintain remote relations typical of relations of proximity and to activate them on a daily basis”.⁵⁵² By compressing time and distance, telephone calls, voice and video chats, social media and e-mails enable migrants to stay connected with families and relatives, and to know what happens to them wherever they are, across national boundaries. For example, a recent study explored how young Koreans from transnational families in Canada choose and use different mobile platforms in different contexts.⁵⁵³ The study found that they use global platforms (especially Facebook) to widen their peer networks in Canada, while using the Korean-based mobile platform of Kakao Talk to maintain their ties with the Republic of Korea and/or ethnic communities in Canada. Social connectivity is also important for displaced persons, including refugees. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is currently undertaking a project to improve refugee well-being through enhanced Internet and mobile connectivity (see text box below).

Connectivity for refugees

UNHCR carried out a global assessment of refugees’ access to, and use of, the internet and mobile phones where available, to help inform the development of a new UNHCR Global Strategy for Connectivity for Refugees.

One of the key findings of the research is that while 7 per cent of refugee communities lack the requisite digital infrastructure for internet access and mobile communications, most refugees in urban areas live in place that have 2G or 3G mobile coverage. For those in rural areas, however, the situation is far worse, with 20 per cent living in areas with no connectivity.



Source: Abridged excerpt from UNHCR, 2017, accessed on 5 April 2017.

552 Diminescu, 2008.

553 Yoon, 2016.

While connectivity may benefit migrants by enabling them to stay connected with families and relatives, greater transnational connectivity – via mobile phones, especially – has also been found to amplify the pressure and demands on migrants in destination countries to send money home.⁵⁵⁴ These findings support long-standing evidence suggesting that migrants can face considerable pressure to remit.⁵⁵⁵ In his study, Hunter found that pressures to remit were amplified by the use of mobile telephony.⁵⁵⁶

Transnational connectivity and non-State actors

Just as we have seen significant changes in the day-to-day lives of migrants and their communities brought about by advances in technology and greater interconnectedness, non-State actors involved in supporting, facilitating or reporting on migration and mobility have been profoundly affected in a variety of ways. Broadly defined, non-State actors are groups, organizations or individuals that are not part of State structures yet may exert influence on national and international processes and systems. Examples of non-State actors include: migration agents; migrant smugglers and human traffickers; employers; civil society, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and philanthropists; and international organizations.⁵⁵⁷ Non-State actors are increasingly operating transnationally and their businesses and activities are much less confined by geography than ever before. As geography becomes less of an issue, migration processes are inevitably affected. This section provides examples of specific non-State actors and how they engage in migration processes.

Migrant smuggling and human trafficking networks are using ICT (especially smartphone technology) to organize international travel, connect with clients and (in some cases) extract ransoms from family back home.⁵⁵⁸ Smugglers also use social media to connect with new clients and advertise their services. Facebook and other social media platforms provide information on smuggling services, including to certain destinations, which is changing the way in which irregular migration is occurring and smugglers operating.⁵⁵⁹ Increased connectivity enables people to check smugglers, as it also extends the ability of migrants to transmit information to make others aware of smugglers to avoid.⁵⁶⁰

The use of ICT has also become a dominant force in the emergence of the “mobility industry”, which is operating in response to increasing demands by the relatively wealthy wanting to temporarily or permanently migrate to lower-cost countries with good health care and other services.⁵⁶¹ The innovative use of blogging, social media platforms and other interactive online practices have tapped into and expanded a growing market – for example, for US citizens seeking to move to Mexico; in 2015 there were estimated to be around 1 million US citizens residing in Mexico.⁵⁶² Similar mobility and migration facilitators abound in various locations, including South-East Asia, Southern and Eastern Europe, and North Africa, typically offering a range of relocation services that include migration but extend well beyond this aspect into housing, study/education, health-care services and employment.

554 Hunter, 2015.

555 Carling, 2008; Vargas-Silva, 2016.

556 Hunter, 2015.

557 For the purposes of this chapter, migrants (who are technically non-State actors) are discussed in the previous section.

558 McAuliffe and Laczko, 2016.

559 Brunwasser, 2015.


560 Triandafyllidou and Maroukis, 2012.

561 Bantman-Masum, 2015.

562 UN DESA, 2015; US Department of State, 2017.

In terms of the migration industry, migration-related agents and brokers have proliferated as opportunities for transnational labour recruitment have expanded. Even at a most basic administrative level, Internet-based visa application processes, for example, have become much more common over time, allowing for reduced visa counter services at embassies, and an expansion in Internet-based brokers and agents who can facilitate migration through virtual means. Figure 5 shows the various layers involved in transnational recruitment practices, which are widely acknowledged as having increased in scale, complexity and speed, raising a raft of challenges for regulators.⁵⁶³

Figure 5. Transnational labour migration brokers



Source: Pittman, 2013.

It is not uncommon to find fraudulent practices among unscrupulous private recruitment agencies offering non-existent jobs; misrepresenting conditions of work and wages; falsifying contracts; or confiscating documents. This puts increasing pressure on policymakers and governments to examine and regulate private recruitment practices. In some cases, however, digital technology advances enhance transparency and support better recruitment practices. The Filipino-based LBS Recruitment Solutions Corporation, for instance, is using online media and emerging social media applications to deal directly with employers and workers. The changes have had a positive impact and, in 2014, results showed that the company's supply chain of applicants had improved, advertising costs had decreased, and no recruitment violations or money claim cases had been reported.⁵⁶⁴

⁵⁶³ Pittman, 2013.

⁵⁶⁴ IOM, 2014.

Other non-State actors are responding to migration in innovative ways through the use of technology. IOM, for instance, is developing a mobile phone application (MigApp) that aims to provide migrants with access to reliable and practical information on the migration process and on available services in destination countries – providing, for instance, updated information regarding visa and travel regulations, as well as a platform for interaction with legitimate service providers.⁵⁶⁵

Other recent initiatives have involved the emergence of philanthropists, NGOs and other individuals supporting migrants undertaking unsafe, irregular maritime journeys by providing humanitarian assistance en route. The use of drone technology to detect migrant vessels in distress and target humanitarian relief is an example of the application of newly accessible technology that was barely conceivable a decade ago.⁵⁶⁶ The Migrant Offshore Aid Station, for example, is a registered foundation based in Malta that aims to save lives by assisting migrants who find themselves in distress on unsafe vessels. In 2016, it launched a mission involving two drones to patrol Mediterranean waters using day- and night-sensitive optics to send back high-resolution images.

Real-time connectivity is also being used in conflict and displacement situations where mass movements are taking place and tracking becomes important for a range of reasons, including population assessments to guide humanitarian service delivery, as discussed in the text box below. Biometrics technology is considered by several aid agencies to be highly efficient. UNHCR, for example, is using biometrics to register people in refugee camps and to monitor food and aid distribution to refugees to ensure that the amounts provided match the number of refugees. However, this needs to be balanced with concerns about the monitoring and surveillance of people and the authorities' usage of data against migrants. Technologies, such as biometrics, iris scans or fingerprints, used by States to monitor human mobility, are political tools that can violate privacy.⁵⁶⁷

Biometrics in developing countries

If you follow the news of large-scale biometrics programmes, one fact becomes immediately obvious. A surprisingly large percentage of these initiatives are in developing nations. At least, it's a surprise until you start looking more closely at the context in which these programmes are being implemented. In many cases, the situation is ripe for such solutions because of both need and opportunity.

"Food and non-food aid provision, and food distribution, was one of the original use cases," says [Justin] Hughes, a procurement and supply chain expert for PA Consulting Group who has led the company's work with the United Nations.... "It's also a population fixing tool for when you've got mass migration, when you've got refugees streaming across a border. It provides the ability to create a database that doesn't necessarily identify an individual..."

⁵⁶⁵ IOM, 2017a.

⁵⁶⁶ Bryant, 2015.

⁵⁶⁷ Dijstelbloem, 2017.

It isn't just a case of biometric systems being more efficient than paper-based ones – sometimes there's little alternative. "When people flee a disaster zone or a conflict zone, they don't take papers with them, and they don't have the opportunity to bring any other form of documentation with them," says Hughes.

"Or they may have discarded their papers intentionally, if they felt that carrying a passport identifying them as part of a particular group may have increased a risk. So for a number of different reasons, people will often not appear with what we would recognise as a traditional paper-based or card-based form of identification. With biometrics, you're carrying your identity card with you on your fingers or on your irises, so that's been the main advantage, and the fact that there is this level of technological rigour around it."

*Source: Abridged excerpt of Mansfield-Devine (2015), Biometrics in developing countries, *Biometric Technology Today*.*

State actors and broader implications for managing migration

While the growing convergence between the processes of globalization, social transformation and migration has been recognized,⁵⁶⁸ it is difficult to provide a comprehensive assessment of the various ways in which States' migration policies and regulatory processes have been affected by the increase in transnational connectivity. The impact of increased connectivity on States is likely to be uneven, fragmented, diverse and dependent on a country's global migration status as country of origin, transit and/or destination.

This section provides examples of how States have (re)acted in relation to changes in migration processes underpinned by transnational connectivity. As access to international movement has increased, States have sought to implement a range of strategies to manage this increase in scale, pace and diversity, and some States have sought to maximize the benefits of migration. Immigration and border management policies and practices have evolved rapidly to account for perceptions of risk associated with the movement of large numbers of people, such as those associated with migrant smuggling, human trafficking and irregular migration flows. Furthermore, as greater interconnectedness affects various aspects of migration, States have used technology to manage or facilitate migration more efficiently. Technological advances therefore affect the management of migrant populations in various ways.

ICT potentially provides powerful tools for enhancing the quality of life of people, especially those living in remote locations. An emerging practice between States and the private sector involves using the potential ICT and transnational connectivity offer to lessen migration pressure in rural or remote areas, such as outlined in the text box on the Digital Island project in Cox's Bazar.

568 Castles, de Haas and Miller, 2014.

Emerging practice: public–private partnerships to improve connectivity in rural/remote areas to lessen migration pressure – Moheshkhali GiGA Digital Island project in Cox’s Bazar

In February 2016, Korea Telecom Corporation, one of the largest telecommunication service providers in the Republic of Korea, signed a tripartite memorandum of understanding with the Government of Bangladesh and IOM for a pilot project to enhance government services in hard-to-reach areas through better online connectivity. Reflecting a renewed emphasis on private–public partnerships and the importance of technology in development, the parties have come together to pilot a service provision model utilizing a high-speed Internet connection on Moheshkhali Island – a remote part of Bangladesh’s Cox’s Bazar region, one of the poorest areas in the country, with limited and low-quality access to services. The initiative is aligned with the Digital Bangladesh national development strategy (which is part of the government’s “Vision 2021” initiative).

(...) In practice, the project will deliver social services, such as education and health care, relying on e-tools, such as online content and remote teaching, m-Health tools for diagnostics and e-consultations with specialists. Rural Bangladeshis may, as a result, feel less of a need to travel several hours to visit a doctor, and children may receive school lessons at home or at community centers. In addition, through facilitating market access through e-commerce platforms, rural Bangladeshis may also feel more confident about their sources of income and feel less pressure to migrate for better earnings.

Source: Abridged excerpt of IOM, ILO and UNDP, 2016.

For countries of origin, another way of supporting migrant populations lies in regulating overseas employment recruitment processes. In the Philippines, for instance, within the Department of Labor and Employment, the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration provides in real time, through their website, an updated list of overseas job openings as well as brokers’ contact information, and the number of vacancies available. Furthermore, there is a mandatory deployment process, which includes pre-departure orientation seminars and the issuance of an Overseas Filipino Worker identification card. This process aims to provide Filipino migrant workers with information regarding their destination country and resources available to them at embassies or consulates, as well as financial management information (about remittances and the use of banks and ATM cards). Similarly, in order to tackle some of the challenges posed by private recruitment practices and to create a smoother and more transparent migration process, the Government of Nepal inaugurated in 2014 a “labour village” in Kathmandu – a complex that houses under one roof all the foreign-employment-related services, including country-specific offices that advertise jobs, NGOs and social welfare organizations, government agencies (such as the Foreign Employment Promotion Board), recruiting agencies, pre-departure orientation and skills training providers, a health centre and a guest house.⁵⁶⁹ The Government is providing

⁵⁶⁹ Nepal Ministry of Labour and Employment, 2014.

migrants with online services for banking and insurance and is looking into developing innovative services, including mobile and digital technology, so that households receive remittances faster, more cheaply and closer to their residence.⁵⁷⁰

States also make use of increased connectivity and technological advances to manage migrant populations through enhanced border management. Increasingly sophisticated technology relying on real-time connectivity is being applied to border management to support the emergence of “virtual borders” by destination countries. Australia, for example, has progressively enhanced its virtual border since the introduction of the universal visa regime in 1975.⁵⁷¹ With the aid of real-time transnational connectivity, visa integrity, security and other checks of passengers travelling by air to Australia occur well before people board planes in origin countries. This multi-layered, geographically dispersed border processing model requires considerable technology involving multiple IT systems with increasing capacity to detect identity and other fraud.⁵⁷²

Similar advances have been made in other parts of the world, with border processing systems, such as detection of false documents via X-ray and fingerprint scanning, e-passport scanning, automated e-gates and biometric visas, becoming increasingly sophisticated, particularly since 11 September 2001.⁵⁷³ For example, in 2013, the European Union launched the Smart Border initiative, which aims at expanding and harmonizing automated border-crossing via the use of e-gates and real-time entry and exit information-sharing across the region. The information will be linked to fingerprint records and watch lists held by police and made available to border control and immigration authorities. Technology has also supported cooperation with airlines, such as through the development of agreements about the physical return of people refused entry at borders upon arrival, a key component of which is financial penalties imposed on airlines that incorrectly board passengers without conducting agreed checks.⁵⁷⁴ The extension of borders well beyond the physical border through the increasing use of technology to facilitate real-time checking has caused some commentators to raise concerns about the “relocation” of sovereignty through the extraterritorial application of norms⁵⁷⁵ and about the human rights impact of the indiscriminate sharing of personal data.⁵⁷⁶

Important developments in managing and supporting migrant populations have emerged to enhance integration processes. Some State authorities have been using telecommunications technologies to better promote the integration of migrants in their communities. In the Netherlands and Sweden, for example, ICT with visual and audio learning methods are being used. Migrants have been able to develop their language proficiency faster, with ICT applications being used in the classroom to address the specific needs of each person and, outside of the classroom, providing opportunities for independent learning.⁵⁷⁷ Germany recently launched a smartphone app called “*Ankommen*” [Arrive] to help migrants and asylum seekers integrate by offering a basic German language course, information on the asylum application process and on how

570 Nepal Ministry of Labour and Employment, 2015.

571 ANAO, 2006.

572 Ibid.

573 Jeandesboz, 2008.

574 Taylor, 2008.

575 Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2008; Godenau and Lopez-Sala, 2016.

576 Valkenburg and van der Ploeg, 2015.

577 Driessen et al., 2011.

to find jobs or training, as well as information on German values and social customs. The app – available in several languages – was jointly developed by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, the Federal Employment Agency, the Goethe Institute, and Bayerischer Rundfunk (a public radio and TV broadcaster).

Furthermore, thanks to the technological advances of the digital age, local governments can avail of a new array of tools for better understanding the needs of – and engaging with – the populations they serve. Web portals or mobile applications in different languages are to improve access to public services.⁵⁷⁸ For instance, New York City has developed an interactive online self-service called NYC311 that is available in 50 languages. This web platform enables all residents to submit service requests, file formal complaints and access public information anonymously and confidentially.

Greater transnational connectivity also provides States with tools for providing consular services and assistance to migrants. For the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Guatemala, for example, IOM Guatemala developed a mobile application to provide such services. Among its various features, the mobile app enables direct contact between migrants and Guatemalan consular agents, while also providing real-time data registration and reporting. Migrants will be able to use this tool to contact national authorities when natural hazards, such as earthquakes or hurricanes, strike. Additionally, it seeks to enhance visibility of diaspora communities by establishing a digital mechanism for posting content and promote special activities.⁵⁷⁹

While it is beyond the scope of this chapter to provide a comprehensive account of the multiplicity of State impacts and responses to migration and mobility stemming from and utilizing greater transnational connectivity, it has highlighted the diversity of those impacts and approaches, as well as the many ways technology is utilized in migration processes. In the context of empirical research showing how the globalization of migration has been skewed towards major destination countries,⁵⁸⁰ the emerging paradox between the extent of State control and populist expectations takes on heightened importance. Over time, there has been a significant increase in State regulation in a variety of areas of economic and social life, resulting in higher expectations of State control. A historical perspective on the emerging regulation-expectation paradox is provided in the text box below.

The regulation-expectation paradox

As the capacity of modern nation States has grown—economically, socially and technologically—so too has the ability of States to regulate societies. Governance has increased while becoming increasingly sophisticated and complex. Areas that had long been regulated by nation States (and kingdoms, empires, tribes, etc., before them), such as taxation of citizens and residents, along with the regulation of aspects of business and social protection, expanded to cover areas previously unregulated, such as telecommunications, media and broadcasting, environmental protection/conservation, public health, among many others. As part of this expansion of regulation and increasingly sophisticated

578 Mattoo et al., 2015.

579 IOM, 2017b.

580 Czaika and de Haas, 2014.

governance, international migration—immigration and (in some countries) emigration—has become increasingly regulated, with regulation involving the formulation of new legal-policy frameworks as well as the growing complexity of those frameworks. In Australia, for example, the original *Migration Act 1958* was 35 pages long and provided significant discretion to delegated decision makers. By 2005, the *Migration Act 1958* had expanded to 744 pages with the additional Regulations comprising nine volumes totalling an additional 1,993 pages,^c and clearly containing much greater details of the rules that applied to the administration of migration.


It is important, however, to recognise that the growth in regulation—both the number of issues being regulated and the increasing complexity of those regulations—is not specific to migration alone. As shown below, the number of pages of primary legislation in Australia has increased significantly in recent decades, and most particularly since the 1970s. This is mirrored, for example, by regulatory increases in other countries such as the United States (see below).

Number of pages of federal legislation passed in Australia, 1901–2006



Source: Berg, 2008.

Number of pages of federal regulations added to the United States federal register, 1936–2010



Source: Crews, 2012.

An important consequence of increasing regulation—both in terms of its sophistication as well as its overall coverage—is the impact on perceptions of State control. The more States regulate aspects of social and economic life, the more they strengthen the perception that phenomena can be regulated and controlled, even those occurring transnationally and beyond the direct control of national or sub-national regulators. This ‘regulation-expectation’ paradox poses considerable challenges for States, not least of which involves explaining to citizens and societies the impact of globalization on a range of aspects of daily life, including migration. And yet in many countries, there remains the populist discourse that immigration can be ‘controlled’ when the reality brought about by increasing interconnectedness means that migration ‘management’ is far more applicable.

Against this broader backdrop of the evolution of migration regulation, recent developments in transnational connectivity take on heightened relevance with potentially profound implications, including for the deepening of the regulation-expectation paradox.

c Kelly, 2005.

Source: Abridged excerpt of a book chapter on regulating international migration (McAuliffe and Goossens, 2017).

Conclusions

Globalization processes are altering aspects of daily life in the modern era. Recent advances in transportation and telecommunications technology have heralded massive changes in how we access information and interact globally in real time. Increasing transnational connectivity is shaping how people move internationally in ways that were not previously possible. While access to such technology remains uneven across the world, the continuing extension of advanced telecommunications means that greater numbers of people are connected online. This chapter has examined what this increasing transnational connectivity means for mobility and migration and how related processes are being shaped.

We have seen that transnational connectivity has uneven and varied impacts on migrants and States, in terms of shaping migration processes. However, it is perhaps clearer than ever before that non-State actors are playing an increasing role in migration through the application of advanced telecommunications and other technology (such as drones). While the expansion of non-State actors in international migration processes has distinct benefits, such as in the field of humanitarian assistance for migrants, it also has some potentially negative effects, such as facilitating the expansion of human trafficking networks transnationally.

The complex interactions between greater interconnectedness and international migration processes are of growing importance. While the drivers of migration may remain largely unchanged, the circumstances in which people are considering and making decisions about their migration options have changed considerably, and it is in this context that we highlight the following implications for policy.

- Continued investments need to be made in developing technologies that can be used by migrants to avoid dangerous and possibly deadly migration pathways as well as abuse and exploitation. **Innovative ways of using technology, social media and apps** (such as the mobile phone application, MigApp, by IOM to provide migrants with access to reliable and practical information on migration processes and on services in destination countries) **can support and facilitate safe, orderly and regular migration.**
- Such technologies need to be rolled out and made available on a more even basis. The recent improvements in global connectivity, even in some of the more remote and least developed countries, needs to be further supported so that new technologies and applications (such as those related to mobile money) can assist communities worldwide and reduce the risk of uneven implementation.

- While States have invested in technology based on real-time connectivity to enhance their ability to monitor borders and detect and prevent irregular entry into their territory, **similar investments in analytical capability are needed for a better understanding of the incremental shifts in migration processes**, including in relation to how migrants think about and assess their migration options.
- As globalization and transnational connectivity deepen, **further research on the impact on human rights of the indiscriminate sharing of personal data is necessary to support more effective policy responses**, including on global governance of migration.
- Finally, greater recognition of the role of technology in migration management will be central in the development of global responses, such as the 2018 global compact on migration. Although greater connectivity and the ability to move information, money and ideas in real time may pose challenges, especially in curbing illicit and unsafe migration activities, it is likely that some of the most effective responses can also be found in emerging technology.



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7 UNDERSTANDING MIGRATION JOURNEYS FROM MIGRANTS' PERSPECTIVES⁵⁸¹

Introduction

Today, just as happens every day, many thousands of people throughout the world will be setting off on journeys in the hope of being able to forge safe and meaningful lives in a new country. Some will be carrying passports containing visas issued by the country to which they are heading, many having gone through visa application processes to secure the right to start a new phase of their lives in another country. These people will most likely be able to choose many aspects of this new phase: their new job or vocation; the city in which they intend to live; the mode of travel they will take; the timing and length of their journey; with whom they go; and how long they intend to stay. They should be considered the luckier ones, and more likely than not, they will be citizens of developed countries.

Today, just as happens every day, many others will be setting off on journeys they know will be long and dangerous – so much so that they may allow themselves the realization that they may be abused, exploited or even die en route. These people will most likely be facing considerable uncertainty about the journey ahead and, if they do make it to their destination, what awaits them in their new country. Many will not have visas in their passports and some won't even have a passport or travel document. They may know in general terms how to get to various places along the way; on whom they can rely to help them; how much different legs of the journey might cost; and the modes of travel they will need to take. Equally, many things will remain unclear. These are not the luckier ones, and more likely than not, they will be from developing countries and fragile States, some having had their lives up-ended by civil conflict, persecution or various other forms of disaster.

While our introductory remarks are squarely rooted in the realities of the day, migration is a constant in human history and has long been related to livelihoods, culture and disastrous events, as well as exile. Central to any discussion on migration are the people who migrate – who they are, how they migrate, and why they migrate – which is often deeply connected to the circumstances in which they find themselves and the degree of choice they have in contemplating and undertaking migration. There is increasing recognition of the importance in better understanding how migrants contemplate migration options (including *not* migrating) and undertake migration journeys. This recognition is in part fuelled by the increasing visibility of dangerous and sometimes deadly migration journeys. IOM's Missing Migrants project, for example, has found that more than 46,000 migrants have died during migration journeys since 2000.⁵⁸² Concerns for migrants' safety and rights has grown at the international level, as demonstrated by the September 2016 New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, which has a significant focus on these two issues.⁵⁸³ The Declaration includes a commitment to adopt a global compact for safe, orderly and regular migration in 2018, which in and of itself is an indicator of the heightened concerns regarding *unsafe, disorderly and irregular* migration. One of the key points to note is that the Declaration and commitment to agree upon such a compact have in part been in reaction to the mass migration to and through Europe in 2015, during which migrants (including refugees) demonstrated significant determination in reaching particular destinations such as Germany, Sweden and Austria.

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582 IOM, 2017.

583 UNGA, 2016.

This chapter discusses the importance of understanding migration from migrants' perspectives, principally by listening to and learning from migrants through rigorous research. While all migrants make decisions before and during their journeys – some decisions being of greater consequence than others, and even involving life and death scenarios – this chapter focuses more on people who have fewer means and more restricted choices. The contemplations of those with significant degrees of freedom, such as the millionaire Chinese manufacturer migrating to Australia in retirement, is less of a focus, partly because those with wider choices are less likely to find themselves in situations of vulnerability. The chapter discusses migration journeys and how migrants consider migration before and during such travel, acknowledging that there is a great diversity of experiences, but that nevertheless, some important aspects can be drawn from current migration research and practice. The next section provides a brief examination of migrants' "self-agency" (i.e. migrants' abilities to make and act upon independent decisions and choices) and the "continuum of agency" that explains variations in choice when it comes to migrating. Section three then discusses key and emerging issues in migration research that are signalling shifts in how contemplations of migration and migration journeys have been changing for migrants themselves in recent years: (mis)information; preference for visas; risk and reward; and pressures to migrate. In the following section, we summarize some of the recent advances in research methods and technology that are making migrant-centric research more feasible globally. The conclusion then discusses implications for research and policy initiatives, including those related to the global compact on migration. Overall, we argue that better understandings of migrants' choices about migration and migration journeys are of fundamental importance to more effective policymaking on migration.

Considerations of self-agency in migration

There has been considerable research and enquiry into the reasons underpinning migration, both internal and international, over many decades, stretching back in the modern era as far as the 1880s.⁵⁸⁴ Ongoing examination of migration drivers and factors principally involves attempts to explain migration patterns as well as the structures and processes that influence and shape the movement of people from one place to another (both within a State and between States). Underpinning all major migration theories, a central consideration is the extent to which people are able to exercise free will, or self-agency.⁵⁸⁵ All general migration theories involve a consideration of migrant agency (or a lack thereof) to varying degrees, and there is recognition that greater emphasis on migrants' roles, decision-making and behaviour before and during migration is increasingly important in helping to explain how migration occurs. In other words, the extent of migrants' self-agency is becoming a crucial aspect in any attempt to make sense of migration patterns, processes and consequences.⁵⁸⁶

Historically, and particularly in the aftermath of World War II, a binary construct explaining migration in terms of people's agency – forced migration versus voluntary migration – tended to dominate policy as well as research. Subsequently, and particularly over the last two decades, there has been widespread recognition that a continuum of agency exists, rather than a voluntary/involuntary dichotomy.⁵⁸⁷ Faist, for example, argues that such a continuum should be thought about in terms of "degrees of freedom, as ranging from high to low",⁵⁸⁸ with de Haas suggesting that "the 'voluntary'/'forced' migration dichotomy is simplistic because it assumes that one category of migrants enjoys total freedom and the other category has no choice or agency at all".⁵⁸⁹ In this context, how migrants contemplate and undertake migration, including those who may have extremely limited ability to choose where to go and how to get there, has emerged as a critical issue in migration research and policy:

584 Ravenstein, 1885 and 1889.

585 See for example writings on cumulative causation (Massey, 1990), neoclassical economics (Todaro, 1989), world system theory (Portes and Walton, 1981), social capital theory (Massey, 1987), new economics of labour migration (Stark and Bloom, 1985), and social network theory (Boyd, 1989).

586 McAuliffe and Jayasuriya, 2016; Triandafyllidou, 2017.

587 de Haas, 2011; Faist, 2000; Massey et al., 1998.

588 Faist, 2000.

589 de Haas, 2011.

Different forced migrants, however they are categorised, have different areas of choice, different alternatives, available to them, depending not just on external constraining factors but also on such factors as their sex, age, wealth, connections, networks etc. This means that we have to understand the point of view and experiences of the people making the decision to move ... We have to see them as agents, however limited, in a physical sense, their room for manoeuvre may be.⁵⁹⁰

In the context of labour migration, there has been a considerable focus on agency and structure, and how people contemplating migration navigate through a range of “intervening obstacles”.⁵⁹¹ While the popular view remains that so-called “economic migrants” are active in their pursuit of migration and exercise a considerable degree of agency, this is too simplistic. Research and analysis in more recent decades, for example, has found wide variation in the ability of labour migrants to make choices, depending on the constraints and options they face; these include conditions of bonded labour, as well as labour migration that involves people trading off their rights in pressurized environments.⁵⁹² The extent to which labour migrants are able to exercise agency and choose aspects of their migration can be heavily circumscribed, although in most circumstances some choice remains, including as to whether to migrate – the main point of concern in most studies on migrants’ agency – where to migrate, how to migrate, and whether or when to return home.⁵⁹³ There is a related increasing appreciation of the need to better understand, by asking migrants themselves, how they contemplate migration before and during their migration journeys. This is particularly important if we are to better understand the dynamic and changing nature of migration patterns and processes.

Migration and the lottery of birth

Examining the overall quality of life by country, and the ability to migrate in terms of visa access, reveals that access to regular migration options is in some ways related to the “lottery of birth”. It appears, for instance, that some nationality groups are much less likely to have access to visas. Table 1 summarizes global indices of human development, fragility and visa access of selected countries.⁵⁹⁴ The Visa Restrictions Index, a global ranking of countries according to the travel freedom of their citizens,⁵⁹⁵ for example, reveals that an individual’s ability to enter a country with relative ease is in many respects determined by nationality. Visa access also broadly reflects a country’s status and relations within the international community and indicates how stable, safe and prosperous it is in relation to other countries. The data also show two other aspects: that there are some significant differences between highly ranked human development countries and others; and that mid-ranked development countries can be significant source, transit and destination countries simultaneously. Nationals from countries with very high levels of human development can travel visa free to around 85 per cent of all other countries worldwide.⁵⁹⁶ These countries are also significant and preferred destination countries.⁵⁹⁷ Toward the bottom of the table, however, the visa restrictions in place for these countries indicate that regular migration pathways are problematic for citizens. Irregular pathways are likely to be the most realistic (if not the only) option open to potential migrants from these countries.

590 Turton, 2003.

591 Lee, 1966.

592 Ruhs, 2013.

593 Khalaf and Alkobaisi, 1999; Ullah, 2010.

594 The Human Development Index is a composite index measuring average achievement in three basic dimensions of human development: life expectancy, education and a decent standard of living. The Visa Restrictions Index measures visa restrictions in place in 218 countries and indicates the capacity of individuals to travel to other countries with relative ease. The higher the rank, the more countries an individual can enter visa free. The Fragile States Index, produced by the Fund for Peace, is an annual ranking of 178 nations based on their levels of stability and the pressures they face. It includes social, economic, political and military indicators.

595 Henley & Partners, 2017.

596 Ibid.

597 Esipova, Ray and Pugliese, 2017; Keogh, 2013; McAuliffe and Jayasuriya, 2016; UN DESA, 2016.

Table 1. Human development, fragility and visa rankings, selected countries

	Country (in HDI rank order)	Human Development Index 2016	Fragile States Index 2016	Visa Restrictions Index 2017
		Rank	Rank	Rank
Very High Human Development	Norway	1	177	4
	Australia	2	172	7
	Switzerland	2	174	6
	Germany	4	165	1
	Denmark	5	175	3
	Singapore	5	161	4
	Canada	10	169	6
	United States	10	159	3
	Sweden	14	171	2
	United Kingdom	16	162	4
	France	21	158	4
	Italy	26	148	3
Greece	29	130	6	
High Human Development	Malaysia	59	115	13
	Iran (Islamic Republic of)	69	47	95
	Turkey	71	79	52
	Sri Lanka	73	43	95
	Lebanon	76	40	96
	Mexico	77	107	26
	Thailand	87	74	67
	Tunisia	97	88	73
	Libya	102	25	99
Medium Human Development	Egypt	111	38	88
	Indonesia	113	86	79
	Iraq	121	11	103
	Morocco	123	89	78
	India	131	70	87
	Bangladesh	139	36	95
	Pakistan	147	14	102
Low Human Development	Syrian Arab Republic	149	6	101
	Haiti	163	10	86
	Sudan	165	4	97
	Yemen	168	4	98
	Afghanistan	169	9	104
	Ethiopia	174	24	96
	Eritrea	179	18	98
	Somalia	n/a	1	100
	A number 1 ranking means:	Very high human development	Most fragile country	Most mobile passport citizenship
	The lowest ranking means:	Low human development	Least fragile country	Least mobile passport citizenship

Source: UNDP, 2016; FFP, 2016; Henley & Partners, 2017.

Note: Somalia is not included in the HDI. According to UNDP, to include a country in the HDI requires recent, reliable and comparable data for all three dimensions of the Index. For a country to be included, statistics should ideally be available from the national statistical authority through relevant international data agencies.

While the contexts in which migration takes place impact on how people migrate, it is also worth acknowledging the enduring facet of human nature that makes us prone to seeking “better lives” including through migration. A stark manifestation of this quest for a better life can be seen when examining migration patterns by country income levels. Two thirds of all international migrants, for example, currently reside in high-income countries.⁵⁹⁸

Migrant-centric approaches: What can (potential) migrants tell us

In trying to better understand how migrants think about and decide upon migration, research findings are able to support or refute some of the popular assumptions made about migrants’ behaviour and anticipated behaviour.⁵⁹⁹ While some policymakers have access to a wider range of information and data than ever before, it is apparent that there still exists a level of presumption and a lack of knowledge about potential and actual migrant decision-making and experiences. For example, it is generally assumed that the huge number of people who make extremely dangerous sea journeys every year would be much reduced if they had access to information about the risks involved in the journeys, including those of death. However, while better information has been shown to have some impact on decision-making, it is only one part of the picture.⁶⁰⁰ Better understandings of why some people choose to take highly risky journeys, even in the knowledge of the risks to their lives, are important to develop deeper knowledge about migration from migrants’ perspectives (see below concerning the specific issue of risk and risk-taking). One of the major advantages of research that focuses on migrant decision-making and experiences is precisely that it is migrant-centric, not policy-centric. Rather than replacing evaluative research on policy settings, asking potential and actual migrants how they think about migration and the journeys they may take or are taking can provide important insights into the changing dynamics in origin and transit settings. Feeding this knowledge into sustainable responses that are more effective at protecting migrants both before and during their journeys is a top priority. Such information can also be used to develop different conceptual frameworks that more accurately account for migrants’ views.⁶⁰¹

How potential and actual migrants contemplate migration journeys at various stages is of keen interest to migration researchers as well as policymakers. The existing evidence on this topic points to a number of important considerations. First, there have long been acknowledged distinctions between the *desire* to migrate, the *intention* to migrate and *actual migration behaviour*.⁶⁰² While research on migrants’ aspirations and intentions can contribute to our understanding of possible future migration trends, a desire or intention to migrate does not necessarily (or often) translate into actual migration. A recent example of this is reflected in the latest results of the *Gallup Survey on Migration Intentions*, which illustrate the significant differences between aspirations, intentions and realization. Conducted annually since 2005, the latest survey results indicate that an estimated 710 million adults (14% of the world’s adult population) would like to migrate to another country if they had the opportunity. The figures reduce dramatically, however, when it comes to migration *plans* (66 million) and to actual preparations (23 million, or 0.4% of the world’s adult population).⁶⁰³

598 UN DESA, 2016.

599 Hernández-Carretero and Carling, 2012.

600 RMMS, 2014; Alpes and Sorensen, 2015.

601 McAuliffe and Jayasuriya, 2016; Triandafyllidou, 2017.


602 Stark, 1981; Carling, 2002.

603 Esipova, Ray and Pugliese, 2017.

Second, how migrants think about and undertake migration occurs in dynamic and sometimes fast-paced environments, so that people may need to respond to changes in circumstances quickly. This dynamism is being supported by increased transnational connectivity via more sophisticated and accessible telecommunications technology (as discussed in chapter 6). The dynamic nature of migration settings requires that we continue to invest in researching migrants' views and experiences, rather than see it as a "one-off" exercise.

Third, there has been less of a focus on people who do not want to migrate, partly because remaining at home is often considered the norm. However, there are indications that pressures on people and communities to migrate internationally may be increasing in some circumstances.⁶⁰⁴ The longer-term development of "cultures of migration" may pose problems for an increasing number of communities in the future that would prefer to remain at home, but are less able to do so.⁶⁰⁵

Figure 1. Top desired destination countries of potential migrants, 2010–2015



Source: Gallup Survey on Migration Intentions (2017), IOM GMDAC.

The Gallup Survey (2017) shows that some destination countries are strongly preferred over others, most particularly the United States. This appears to be regardless of the likelihood or ability of respondents to migrate to these countries. These survey data need to be treated with caution, for the survey results also indicate that far fewer people are planning migration compared with those desiring or intending to migrate. This is also reflected in many other studies, which have shown that only very small proportions of

604 Bylander, 2014.

605 Mescoli, 2013; Ball, Butt and Beazley, 2017; Mbaye, 2017.

those who may want to migrate, actually do so.^a More often than not, explanations of preferred destinations focus on economic issues: wealthy countries with higher wages tend to be popular destination countries in studies such as this. However, for some groups, other factors can be more important; and perceptions of a country's multiculturalism/tolerance, the extent to which the rule of law applies, and how safe it is, can feature more prominently than income-generation and opportunities for work.^b

a Jayasuriya, McAuliffe and Iqbal, 2016; McAuliffe and Jayasuriya, 2016.

b McAuliffe and Jayasuriya, 2016.

Central to any discussion on migrants' perspectives is the role of information and how it interplays with migration processes, especially in light of the increasing use of social media and telecommunication technologies. This aspect is discussed in the next section, before we examine the remaining key and emerging issues heralded by migrant-centric research. We include examples of recent empirical research to illustrate how migration considerations are changing in some communities.

(Mis)information

Information is central to migrants' contemplations and perceptions of migration, whether considering their options, choosing a destination, or determining the safest and most financially feasible routes. Information is also central to considerations of returning home. The quality and validity of information available plays a crucial role for a journey to be successful, however this is defined. Extensive research shows that the source of information is a very important aspect for migrants when deciding whether they can trust it or not and how much weight to give it.⁶⁰⁶ Information can come from social connections such as families, friends and other networks, both at home and in destination countries; and research over several decades confirms that information provided by those close to the migrant (in social, not geographic terms) is most valued.⁶⁰⁷ Several recent studies confirm this understanding, finding that information from close social connections is considered by migrants, before and during journeys, as the most important source, because it is information they can trust.⁶⁰⁸

Conversely, as social connections are more trusted than official sources, it may happen that valid information, such as government information about migration policies, may not be perceived as accurate by migrants and is less likely to shape migration decisions. Moreover, in some cases, distrust in the government or corrupt practices of government officials may impact on how information is perceived. This is particularly relevant to information campaigns (including deterrent messaging) by destination countries aimed at potential irregular migrants. Some research has found that information campaigns are generally ineffective and that asylum seekers do not know much about (European) destination countries.⁶⁰⁹ However, it also appears that migrants seem to recognize that not all governments are the same, and that some are much more likely to provide accurate information on migration than

606 Wall, Campbell and Janbek, 2015.

607 Pickering et al., 2016; Komito and Bates, 2011.

608 Kuschminder and Koser, 2016; Marouf, 2017; Hagen-Zanker and Mallett, 2016.

609 Gilbert and Koser, 2006; UK Home Office, 2004.

others in specific circumstances. Research conducted in Indonesia in late 2014, for example, found that 39 per cent of Afghan respondents indicated that “their most trusted source of information to inform them of their onward journey to Australia was the Australian Government”.⁶¹⁰

The transmission of information is also evolving and recent dramatic advances in telecommunication technologies have transformed the nature of information exchange. Social media and real-time telecommunications applications (such as Facebook, Skype, Viber, WhatsApp and other instant messaging applications) are providing new ways of sharing information on the potential risks and rewards of making journeys. This appears to be influencing migration decision processes and having an impact on migration patterns, as exemplified by the large-scale movements of people to Europe in 2015 (see discussion in chapter 6 on Mobility, migration and transnational connectivity). A study undertaken by a German non-profit organization, for example, looked at how Syrian and Iraqi refugees navigated information sources before, during and after their journeys to Germany.⁶¹¹ Above all, the interviewees trusted social connections such as family and friends. The findings, however, also indicate that increasing reliance is being placed on information from less well-known networks via social media, especially when preparing for a planned transit.⁶¹²

Further, social media provide a platform for contact between people seeking to migrate and those advertising migration services, both lawful and unlawful (e.g. travel services and recruitment agencies, as well as smugglers selling fraudulent identity documents and visas). Although many are aware that the information provided may not be accurate, prospective migrants may use social media to locate smugglers.⁶¹³ In a survey undertaken in 2016, the European Commission asked 21 European States how social media and other relevant online platforms are used by migrants and by the smugglers themselves to recruit their customers. From the results, it appears that there are groups, on Facebook for instance, where migrants and asylum seekers “search for travelling companions and ask for advice on dangers, risks and reliable smugglers.” There are also more informative groups disseminating information on routes, destinations, asylum practices, political situations, legislation and welfare benefits. States further mention YouTube videos in which people give advice and detailed instructions in several languages on how to migrate, seek asylum and proceed in practice.⁶¹⁴

A strong preference for visas

Where possible, migrants will choose to migrate through regular pathways on visas.⁶¹⁵ As highlighted in our opening remarks, there are stark differences between travelling on a visa and travelling without a visa. From a migrant's perspective, the experience can be profoundly different in a number of important ways that can impact on the migrant as well as his/her family, including those who may remain in the origin country. First, visas denote authority to enter a country and so offer a form of legitimacy when arriving in and travelling through a country. A valid visa provides a greater chance of being safeguarded against exploitation. Conversely, travelling without a visa puts people at much greater risk of being detained and deported by authorities, or exploited and abused by those offering illicit migration services, such as smugglers or traffickers, and having to operate largely outside of regulated systems.

610 Pickering et al., 2016.

611 MiCT, 2016.

612 Ibid.

613 Frouws et al., 2016.

614 EC/EMN, 2016.

615 Please note that while “regular” migration does not necessarily require visas, the discussion refers to visas because these are often a requirement, most especially for migrants from developing countries. In addition, the term “visa” is much more widely understood than “regular” by migrants and the general public.

Second, travelling on visas is undoubtedly much easier logistically, as the availability of travel options is far greater. In some cases, it can mean the difference between a journey being feasible or not, most especially in relation to air travel, which tends to be heavily monitored and controlled at departure, transit and entry points. Third, visas provide a greater level of certainty and confidence in the journey, which is much more likely to take place as planned, including in relation to costs. Travelling on visas is more likely to be safer, more certain and more easily able to accommodate greater choice, such as length of journey, travel mode and with whom to travel (if anyone).

It is unsurprising then that there is often a strong preference for travelling on a visa. Access to visas within decision-making contexts, therefore, features heavily in the minds of potential migrants and has been shown to be a key factor when the possibilities of migrating are explored while in the country of origin. In recent research on online job search and migration intentions, for example, the availability of visas was found to be a determining factor in how people conducted online job searches.⁶¹⁶ Similarly, changes in visa settings have been found to have an impact on potential migrants' contemplations of migration, as well as their eventual migration. This can be seen, for example, in the changes that occur after visa restrictions are removed for specific groups, including by citizenship.⁶¹⁷ While there is a myriad of examples, such changes have been prominent when visa liberalization has occurred in key destination countries or regions, such as in the United States in the 1960s and within the EU as Schengen arrangements expanded over time, taking in an increasing number of countries.⁶¹⁸

Knowledge of the availability of visas is found to be relevant in a range of different settings, including those where the underlying reasons for wanting to migrate may be due to a multitude of circumstances and factors. In Sri Lanka, for example, the use of labour migration pathways to States within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has been found to be associated with underlying protection needs. In the absence of accessible protection options, people have sought to migrate using the options that are available to them, and in this case, that has meant migrating as labour migrants. The findings of this study are reported in the text box below.

Labour migration as an alternative for asylum seekers facing protection issues

This study represents possibly the first longitudinal study on migration intentions, actual migration, and immobility undertaken in a post-conflict country. It is clear that using labour migration as an escape route does not apply to people living inside areas severely affected by conflict relative to those outside areas severely affected by conflict. Results suggest that those facing persecution ... do actively consider, and in some cases use, labour migration as an escape strategy. That labour migration, as opposed to seeking asylum, is considered an escape strategy is not strange in an environment of restricted asylum seeking options^c and where resources needed for labour migration are estimated at twenty times less than those needed to seek asylum.^d

From a policy perspective, this paper demonstrates that people needing to escape persecution, and seeking other forms of protection may, if presented with the option, migrate to countries for work through regular pathways, rather than to other countries for asylum via irregular pathways. These are not refugees

616 Sinclair and Mamertino, 2016.

617 Czaika and de Haas, 2016.

618 Ortega and Peri, 2013.

who enter the labour market,^e but people who *could* be refugees, and instead choose regular labour migration pathways in a destination country (usually the Middle East) that may not be their preferred choice. Hence, a possible option is to explore the feasibility of encouraging low-skilled labour migration for potential asylum seekers – and even refugees waiting in UN camps – to Middle Eastern countries. An alternative strategy could be for developed countries to assist vulnerable people to improve their vocational skills and work with key destination countries to improve recognition rates, which could guide them into regular migration pathways. However, it is noted that it is unlikely that developed countries would recruit low-skilled workers on any significant scale, especially if labour-intensive and low-paying service industries, such as cleaning, are already filled by irregular migrants.^f

c Jayasuriya, McAuliffe and Iqbal, 2016.

d Van Hear, 2014.

e Salt, 1992.

f Ibid.

Excerpt of Jayasuriya, 2016.

Unsurprisingly, the preference for visas and regular pathways extends to other aspects of migration, including migration status after arrival as well as how people engage in return migration. Georgian migrants in Greece, for instance, would often rather try to obtain a residence permit than apply for asylum or stay irregularly.⁶¹⁹ Recent research on assisted voluntary return also found that one of the main factors involved in the decision-making of return migrants was their preference to be law-abiding.⁶²⁰ While this was by no means the only factor, that people would prefer to remain within the law of the country they are in, including during return migration decision-making, not only makes intuitive sense, it is also practical from migrants' perspectives. Remaining within the law may have implications for return to origin as well as for any future international migration plans that may eventuate.

Risk and reward

Most people may have preferences for law-abiding behaviour, including for authorized, visa-related travel, but what happens when regular pathways and authorized entry are not available? We can see from table 1 that for some people, there can be little hope of securing a visa to travel to most countries. Afghans, for example, currently rank last on the Henley visa index, meaning that access to regular migration pathways to preferred destinations is severely restricted. In the absence of accessible regular migration options to many countries, people are more restricted in their ability to migrate internationally, with remaining at home; migrating to less desirable, but accessible countries; and irregular migration options (to preferred destinations) being more feasible. This may result in "involuntary immobility",⁶²¹ whereby people who would prefer to migrate are not

619 Marouf, 2017.

620 Koser and Kuschminder, 2015.

621 See Carling's discussion of involuntary immobility (Carling, 2002).

able to do so, or in people resorting to high-risk journeys through irregular migration. For some people, there may be variations in between these extremes, such as migrating to countries that may not necessarily be preferred, but are at least accessible. This appears to be a stark reality for many; while the United States may be the most preferred destination country in the world, most people who migrate internationally do not get to the United States, but instead pursue other options. This is supported by current data on international migrants, for example, which show that in some regions, intraregional migration far outstrips outmigration from the region. This is most notable within Africa, where migration within the region accounts for the vast majority of current migration and is partly related to regional free movement agreements (see discussion in chapter 3).

Notwithstanding information campaigns, media reporting and information from family, friends and other migrants, in some circumstances potential migrants continue to contemplate high-risk irregular migration journeys. Recent survey research undertaken by the Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat in Ethiopia found that despite a very high proportion of potential migrants (92%) being aware of the risks associated with irregular travel to Yemen and Saudi Arabia, 42 per cent indicated that the benefits of migration were worth the risks faced during the journey and upon arrival in transit and destination countries.⁶²² Tolerance of different types of abuse and/or physical hardship during migration was found to have ranged from between 1 per cent (sexual abuse) to 44 per cent (degrading treatment and verbal abuse).⁶²³ Another recent study involving interviews with around 500 people in Europe who had crossed the Mediterranean found that many of them were not oblivious to the risks posed by these irregular migration journeys, and that they chose to embark on the sea crossing despite being cognizant of the real dangers.⁶²⁴ There has also been research into the psychological mechanisms people utilize when contemplating and undertaking high-risk irregular maritime migration. Carling and Hernández-Carretero, for example, examined how potential migrants in Senegal related to the risks of maritime migration to the Spanish archipelago.⁶²⁵ They found that in the face of high-risk journeys, people adopted several psychological mechanisms, including forms of avoidance, discrediting negative information and engaging in harm minimization. The ability to reach a desired destination via irregular maritime migration, which would otherwise be out of reach, appears to invoke resignation to the “pain” of such migration, as well as some psychological strategies to lessen the pain. Abuse, exploitation and trauma during migration journeys, however, remain an under-researched, and perhaps not well understood, facet of irregular migration. What we know of the extreme conditions some migrants face is often from investigative journalists, non-governmental organizations or international organizations, who have the ability to relay migrants’ stories quickly from migration routes that may be difficult for others to access. Information on experiences and exploitation can help us better understand the difficult choices migrants are making and the changes that are occurring in migration corridors – see, for example, the text box on the Darién Gap corridor taken from an investigative journalism article published in *Outside* magazine. Importantly, the context in which people make migration decisions and the opportunity for a better life (however defined) can be a considerable incentive, despite the risks involved.

622 RMMS, 2014.

623 Ibid.

624 Crawley et al., 2016.

625 Carling and Hernández-Carretero, 2011.

Darién Gap: A terrifying journey through the world's most dangerous jungle

The Darién Gap is a lawless wilderness on the border of Colombia and Panama, teeming with everything from deadly snakes to antigovernment guerrillas. The region also sees a flow of migrants from Cuba, Africa and Asia, whose desperation sends them on perilous journeys to the U.S.

...

As traditional pathways to the U.S. become more difficult, Cubans, Somalis, Syrians, Bangladeshis, Nepalis, and many more have been heading to South American countries and traveling north, moving overland up the Central American isthmus. The worst part of this journey is through the Gap. The entire expanse, a roadless maze that travelers usually negotiate on foot and in boats, is dominated by narco traffickers and ... guerrillas who've been waging war on the government of Colombia since 1964. Hundreds of migrants enter each year; many never emerge, killed or abandoned by coyotes (migrant smugglers) on ghost trails.

...

A pudgy Bangladeshi man named Momir, his face ghoulishly pale from fever, rejects the coyote's order to get out of the boat when it runs aground. Arafat shows us a large gash on the bottom of his foot and refuses to walk any farther. The men are weak from days of traveling in muggy, 90-degree temperatures, subsisting on crackers and gulping river water. And they are scared. ... Jafar starts to cry, triggering an outburst of desperate pleas from the men. They flash scars on their wrists and stomachs; one is missing part of a finger. ... It's easy to understand why any sane person would leave such grim prospects behind. Harder to grasp is how these men ended up on the southern edge of the Darién Gap, half a world away from home, without the faintest idea of the grueling trials ahead. Their willpower is amazing, but the Gap's shadowy depths have swallowed travelers far more prepared.

Another [motel manager] Montero video showed a group of Nepalis hunched over paper plates ... Authorities had caught them and brought them to Montero's for a meal before deportation. "Of course, I never called customs on any of the ones who stayed here, because I don't agree that those looking for a better life should be sent back," Montero said. "Their motivation is incredible."

Excerpt: Jason Motlagh, published 19 July 2016 by *Outside* magazine.

Besides, there is now clear recognition of the increasing pressure being placed on the international protection system, which provides asylum seekers with a lawful, but nevertheless irregular migration option for many people who are unable to access visa-related travel. From migrants' perspectives, irregular asylum migration can sometimes be the only option available and is one that is being increasingly exploited by migrant smugglers, many of whom are driven by profits at the expense of migrants' well-being.⁶²⁶ Particular corridors have become extremely dangerous as smuggling and trafficking networks have expanded to take advantage of people with very few options. The international protection system risks becoming a "funnel" for people who may not have protection needs under the Refugee Convention, but may nevertheless be extremely vulnerable at home and during migration journeys:

626 Carling, 2016; McAuliffe and Koser, 2015.

I hope that, after enduring the risks and hardships of this journey, the boys study there and have a better future – because we knew that they had no future in Kabul. We are happy that they safely made this journey. Only God knows about their future. I would like to go and join them in Germany. Younger siblings too would like to join them in Germany. Afghanistan is not a safe anymore and everyone wants to live in a safer place. We are happy with this decision now. If, God forbid, something happens to us in Kabul, then two of our family are safe and alive in Germany.

Mother of two migrants
from Kabul⁶²⁷

Along with the risks and how people contemplate dangerous journeys, the potential rewards need to be acknowledged. For some communities, the rewards can be long term, allowing the next generation and their children access to better education, health services and living standards, while at the same time supporting family members and communities in origin countries. For other groups, including those that may have been marginalized economically, socially or politically in their home countries, international migration has become a survival strategy whereby family and community members engage in migration to access resources and safety, often along kinship or ethnic lines.⁶²⁸

Pressures to migrate

Even where regular pathways via visas are available, the existing evidence is pointing to increasing pressures on some families and communities to migrate internationally, including people who may prefer to remain at home.⁶²⁹ Notwithstanding the benefits of international migration, this points to a potentially negative consequence for some communities related to the longer-term development of “cultures of migration” – described, for example, as a culture in which “non-migrants observe migrants to whom they are socially connected and seek to emulate their migratory behaviour”.⁶³⁰ The development of such cultures has been found to impact on how potential migrants think about their futures: “Young people who grow up and come of age increasingly expect to migrate internationally in the course of their lives”.⁶³¹ And yet, more recent research is highlighting that over time there can be emerging pressures on people who want to remain at home, but are finding it increasingly difficult to do so. Overall, this appears to be affecting young people across a variety of settings – for instance, facing increased pressure from family members to move overseas and provide remittances back to extended families.⁶³² In research undertaken in 2016 on Afghans who migrated to Europe in 2015, remarks by migrants’ families who remained at home highlight the issue:

After the insurgents killed our brother, and set our house on fire, the decision was made to send our brother away ... All the family decided together that we would send our brother to Europe so that he can help out the whole family financially once he makes it to Europe.

Brother of migrant
from Takhar⁶³³

627 Afghanistan Analysts Network, 2016.

628 Monsutti, 2005.

629 Ball, Butt and Beazley, 2017.

630 Kandel and Massey, 2002.

631 Ibid.

632 Heidbrink, 2017.

633 Afghanistan Analysts Network, 2016.

In West Africa some families rely heavily on remittances sent from children and spouses, and the pressure to migrate on behalf of the entire family can be significant:

The Anne family relied on other sons to help financially...Now, it is up to Arouna Anne, the last male in the family, to make a better life for his parents and the children his dead brothers left behind. He is just 14 years old. ... Arouna hasn't seen his parents for six months. He sends a bit of money to them from time to time. It's not enough. "I am the only remaining son now," he said. "I have to support the family." Arouna knows well the dangers of the trip to Europe. One of his friends from home also tried the trip not long ago and died in Libya.⁶³⁴

Similar findings are evident in quite different settings, although peer pressure is also playing a role. For example, in a 2016 study of migrant adolescent girls from Ethiopia and Eritrea to Sudan, researchers found that the situation of families had a significant impact on the girls' and young women's decisions to migrate. They were more likely to migrate when coming from families that had experienced some kind of crisis, such as the absence of one or both parents. Although constrained by a lack of opportunities and options and by limiting gender norms (see text box on gender dimensions), their "desire to do 'something' about their situation points to the agency of the girls who by deciding to leave take control of their lives".⁶³⁵ The research also found that migrant girls from Ethiopia and Eritrea felt pressured by the community "culture of migration", in which migration is becoming a competition and those who decide to stay behind or who cannot move are stigmatized. This peer pressure defining those who have migrated as the "successful ones" also affects migration decision-making processes.⁶³⁶

The number of children migrating around the world has risen significantly in recent years. The challenges and vulnerabilities that migrant children face during migration journeys can be extreme, raising a plethora of issues in formulating effective responses. Appendix A includes discussion on migrant children journeys, with case studies on Afghan unaccompanied minors and children from Central America transiting through Mexico.

Additional findings on the development of long-term labour migration corridors point to an increasing reliance on remittances as key components of household incomes, which in turn locks people into specific migration patterns. While the positive benefits of improved household income and related social changes can be clear, some are feeling the impact of significant pressure to migrate and a sense that options to stay at home are no longer as viable as they once were. The case of the Nepalese migrant workers highlights aspects of this phenomenon. Over the last ten years, the massive outmigration from Nepal for foreign employment, mostly to the Gulf and Malaysia, has changed the livelihoods and social structure of rural Nepal. Within this context, migration by Nepalese men has become a ubiquitous phenomenon, and although studies have found that decisions to migrate are generally taken at the

634 Searcey and Barry, 2017.

635 Grabska, Del Franco and de Regt, 2016.

636 Ibid.

household level, there is increasing pressure to migrate. Research found that migration decisions have increased in social significance and a “culture” of migration has increasingly emerged.⁶³⁷ The study on left-behind women in Nepal shows that male migration on a large scale has also had profound impacts on women and families who have remained, including in relation to their agency. In terms of family well-being, migration has clearly improved the well-being of households through increased income, improved food security, land and livestock leasing, and greater access to girls’ education. It has also resulted in increased workloads for women, but not necessarily by their own agency with respect to household decisions. Major decisions still tended to be made by migrant men through mobile phone communication, although there was a clear increment in women’s authority to make decisions.

Gender dimensions: decisions, feminization and gender roles

Migration-related decision-making processes can have strong gender dimensions. In traditional societies, for example, patriarchy affects a range of social and familial interactions, including on migration. In some societies, female participation in decision-making is still rare. Family traditions, status, cultural practices and religious beliefs play roles in who make decisions within families. For example, in the Philippines, migration decisions of young single women are usually structured with respect to potential benefits for the household as a whole. This means women’s decision to migrate may be based on household needs rather than on their own individual advancement.^g In Afghanistan, there tends to be a strong “masculinity” aspect to migration, especially irregular migration of young men and boys, which is seen as a “rite of passage” to adulthood.^h

A central aspect of migration–gender relationships is the change in the gender composition of international migrants – the so-called “feminization” of migration.ⁱ Women comprise roughly half of the world’s international migrant population; however, the proportion varies considerably by region, and there are countries (such as Indonesia, the Philippines, Sri Lanka and Thailand) where the majority of emigrants are female.^j There has also been a qualitative change in that today, female migrants are more likely to move independently rather than as dependants,^k including from the countries mentioned above. This has also meant that women are more involved in sending remittances and supporting their families from abroad, which in turn is altering social and familial dynamics and decision-making. Recent empirical research undertaken in Java highlights the changing nature of international migration:

Men and women’s (im)mobilities are deeply intertwined with their roles and positions in the household ... The case studies illustrate a range of outcomes of gendered decision-making, even in the highly patriarchal Javanese context. We highlight how the decision-making process surrounding labour migration access is a function of changes in gender and intergenerational dynamics within the household ‘in flux’. Gender intersects with prevailing ideologies and migration systems (over time) to enable previously immobilised households and individuals to access labour migration. Relatedly the migration experience of individuals can have a relational effect on other household members’ imagined or actual migrations and futures, such as in Gendered

637 Adhikari and Hobley, 2015.

migration within households 'in flux'. Zaitun's household where her daughter-in-law's migration has a bearing on other members' mobility. Similarly, Khalid's unpleasant illegal migration journey laid the foundation of support for Riana's mobility through formal channels.^l

g Chant and Radcliffe, 1992; Oishi, 2002.

h Monsutti, 2007.

i Castles and Miller, 2003; Pfeiffer et al., 2007.

j United Nations, 2006; Martin, 2007.

k Ullah, 2013.

l Khoo, Platt and Yeoh, 2017.

Advances in research technologies

Over the last few decades, the world has seen an exponential growth in Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs). Innovations such as the Internet, social media and mobile devices have changed not only the way people communicate, but also how information is produced and disseminated. The impact of these technological advances has been far-reaching, touching all facets of human life and all fields of study, including migration. Technology is increasingly changing migration research and data collection methods in ways that have elicited both considerable support and raised concerns. While traditional research methods such as face-to-face interviews and paper-based surveys undoubtedly continue to be highly relevant, technological advancements have opened up new research avenues, providing further opportunities to enhance our understanding of migrants' views and movements.

Online research tools, software and hardware devices

Internet tools such as web-based surveys and online interviews have expanded the ability to conduct migration-related research in places that are difficult to reach. They have made it possible for researchers not only to expand greatly their geographic reach, but also to access specific groups quickly and efficiently.⁶³⁸ The Internet has also enhanced inclusion in the research process, allowing for the participation of migrants whose voices and circumstances would otherwise not be heard.

For researchers whose work focuses on sensitive subjects such as smuggling or irregular migration, Internet-based research methods have proven to be indispensable. Irregular migrants, for example, may hesitate to participate in studies that use traditional research methods such as face-to-face interviews out of fear that their identities may be exposed, as "research into irregular migration inevitably deals with sensitive issues".⁶³⁹ By using tools such as web-based surveys, researchers can increasingly provide greater anonymity for respondents.⁶⁴⁰ There is growing recognition that these types of surveys, when applied to sensitive subjects, are able to elicit

638 Oiarzabal and Reips, 2012.

639 Düvell, Triandafyllidou and Vollmer, 2008.

640 Reips and Buffardi, 2012.

more honest and personal answers from participants.⁶⁴¹ A 2013 study on irregular migrants in Australia, for example, used tablet computers with self-completion surveys translated into multiple languages.⁶⁴² By giving migrants more control – granting them the ability to switch to their preferred language while completing the surveys – the research successfully generated what could be reasonably considered honest and candid responses from the survey participants.⁶⁴³ Online methods are demonstratively less intrusive and can empower migrants in their role as research subjects. These methods have also been shown to reduce both social anxiety and desirability effects, thereby producing more truthful answers in research results.⁶⁴⁴

Furthermore, longitudinal studies, which are key in understanding migrants' decision-making, have been enhanced by technologies such as GPS capabilities. For example, where consent is granted, the GPS capability of personal devices has made it easier for researchers to track migrant journeys.⁶⁴⁵ New and emerging software and hardware tools also mean that data can be collected relatively cheaply, as well as faster, and can be stored for longer periods of time.⁶⁴⁶ These ICTs provide researchers with the ability to maintain participant engagement as well as improve data retention for studies that stretch on for long periods of time.⁶⁴⁷

Social media and big data

Social media technologies are emerging as formidable tools in social science research. With the rise of sites such as Facebook and Twitter, with Facebook alone boasting more than 1.9 billion users worldwide as of May 2017,⁶⁴⁸ social media sites have become useful repositories of information on migrants. Importantly, these sites enable researchers to access a much broader community of migrants by providing powerful search capabilities for potential study participants. Social media sites can be particularly useful when conducting research on diaspora communities, which are increasingly using these platforms for all kinds of network activity.⁶⁴⁹ Reips and Buffardi expressly argue that “social media can provide migration researchers with a unique insight into migrants' thoughts and behaviours that are occurring naturally in their social networks”.⁶⁵⁰ Moreover, sources of big data⁶⁵¹ such as social media and Internet search patterns can provide geocoded data that can be helpful in locating people, including migrants. The Syrian Humanitarian Tracker, a mapping system that uses machine-mining techniques and crowdsourced photo, video and text reports,⁶⁵² has proven to be one of the most successful big data tools since the Syrian conflict started. It has been used not just by researchers to follow trends in the conflict, including migrants' movements, but also by internally displaced persons, refugees and migrants themselves in search of safe travel routes and to steer clear of human traffickers.⁶⁵³

641 Kays, Keith and Broughal, 2013.

642 McAuliffe, 2013.

643 Ibid.

644 Joinson, 1999.

645 Taylor, 2015.

646 Banati, 2017.

647 Farabee et al., 2016.

648 Fiegerman, 2017.

649 Crush et al., 2012.

650 Reips and Buffardi, 2012.

651 “Big data is the practice of using collected data to create algorithms, models, and analytics to better understand human behavior” (Kuang, 2017).

652 See Syrian Tracker, www.humanitariantracker.org/syria-tracker.

653 Ashton et al., 2016.

Challenges and opportunities

The benefits that new technologies bring to migration research are undeniable. However, these new research tools and methods have also been criticized on methodological and ethical grounds. Some contend that research conducted online, for example, often fails to consider the significance of the interactions between subject and scholar.⁶⁵⁴ The failure to recognize subtle cues such as tone of voice and facial expressions during online interviews can hinder researchers from fully comprehending the views of the study participants.⁶⁵⁵ Additionally, the fact that Internet access is not universal raises the spectre of research bias, as the so-called “digital divide” excludes people who do not have access to these technologies.⁶⁵⁶ However, the increasing use of highly portable tablet technology enables researchers to work in remote locations, as well as with respondents who may need support when completing surveys. Another concern associated with methods such as web-based surveys is verifying that those completing them are the intended participants. However, advances in online surveys now provide the ability to automatically verify survey responses,⁶⁵⁷ with the use of database technology allowing for the corroboration of the identity and age information provided by the participants.⁶⁵⁸

Issues surrounding privacy, data protection and confidentiality, especially in studies that use big data sources such as social media, continue to pose risks and challenges for both study participants and researchers.⁶⁵⁹ “Stalking” on social media, for example, where a researcher may not inform or get the required consent of those being observed, raises ethical concerns. Researchers are also increasingly finding it difficult to differentiate between personal and public data, as the line between the two is no longer clear-cut. Consequently, there is a growing body of work on how social science researchers can better conduct studies using new technologies without compromising themselves or their research subjects.⁶⁶⁰ While the use of new research technologies evidently comes with pitfalls, ICTs have also generated enormous advantages for social science research. As migration researchers increasingly embrace these technologies, it is imperative to ensure not only that the appropriate methods are used, but also that ethical challenges – which can be amplified in the digital age – are addressed.

Implications for policy and research

Human migration is an age-old phenomenon, with migration decision-making processes occurring before, during and after migration continuing to be shaped by broader economic, social and cultural conditions. While the inherent nature of decision-making may not have changed substantially over time, the conditions within which it takes place are evolving. Increasing transnational connectivity and telecommunications advances in particular, means that we are more able than at any other time in history to see, read and hear about how people live their lives in far-off locations. We are now afforded a greater sense of our shared humanity that extends beyond culture, creed or wealth, just as we are more able to see and (virtually) experience the personal costs of war, famine and abject poverty. Our increasing global connectivity is also extending into supporting interactions, including the sharing of (mis)information, the transfer of money, and the exchange of ideas and knowledge, with interactions now able to occur in real time. This has implications for many aspects of our daily lives, including how we think about migration and mobility.

654 Ignacio, 2013.

655 Ibid.

656 Hargittai, 2010.

657 Andrews, Nonnecke and Preece, 2003.

658 Nash et al., 2013.

659 Harriman and Patel, 2014.

660 Gold and Nawyn, 2013; Hesse-Biber, 2011; Kays, Keith and Broughal, 2013; Karpf, 2012.

In this chapter, we have examined how migrants think about migration journeys in different settings, drawing on emerging findings from a significant body of work on the topic. We are seeing more research being done in origin and transit countries, most especially in relation to irregular migration. One of the most interesting aspects and emerging tensions concerns the consideration of migrants as actors with (expanding) agency within research domains, including the traditional categories of “forced” migrants, such as refugees. This builds on the recognition in recent decades of the move away from the binary forced-voluntary construct towards a continuum of migrant agency. The ways in which migrants are accessing and utilizing information from a range of sources continues to be of interest, and research is showing that it is an area that is evolving rapidly, including the consumption of social media as well as the changing nature of contact with people who facilitate migration journeys, such as recruitment agents and migrant smugglers. The issue of increasing transnational connectivity and migrants’ communication patterns is discussed in chapter 6.

Within the context of the 2018 global compact for safe, orderly and regular migration, a more nuanced understanding of potential and actual migrants’ perspectives and considerations allows for deeper reflection of sustainable policy responses that are more able to incorporate population support and stabilization, and enhanced human security during journeys, as well as expanding visa-related travel options. In this context, we find the following points to be relevant for research and policy:

- **Researchers need to take more notice of migrants’ agency, understanding how people contemplate migration vis-à-vis policy categories** and place less emphasis on the policy categories that are central to regulated systems. Rather than citizenship, skills or other attributes to meet visa requirements, for example, the ability to pay for illicit migration services and enact strategies to manage risky journeys appear to be increasingly more significant in determining who moves and where, raising broader issues for the regulation and management of migration and support for populations in home and host countries.
- Reconciling aspirations to migrate as well as increasing pressures to migrate in some communities with the need for States to manage regulated entry and stay of migrants continues to be challenging. **Further investment in the formulation of innovative and practical ideas on how regular pathways can be enhanced without inadvertently creating overwhelming increases in “demand” for migration is a priority.** Understanding how migrants contemplate migration and migration journeys is central to the development of effective approaches.
- The dynamic nature of migration settings, supported by increased transnational connectivity via more sophisticated and accessible telecommunications technology, **requires that we continue to invest in understanding migrants’ views and experiences** by undertaking longitudinal surveys rather than seeing surveys as an occasional, “one-off” exercise.
- As the pressures on people and communities to migrate internationally may be increasing in some circumstances, the longer-term development of much stronger “cultures of migration” may pose problems for an increasing number of communities in the future who would prefer to remain at home, but are less able to do so. It is important, therefore, to **better understand the factors that are involved in preferences to not migrate** (including in conflict and other perilous environments). This will assist in being able to better support people who would prefer to remain in their communities.
- Harnessing the **opportunities as well as managing the risks that new research technologies continue to present** will remain a critical aspect in fostering effective and ethical research into migration. Big data analysis, for example, provides a new way of analysing migration dynamics, but this must not be at the expense of compromising migrants’ privacy and confidentiality.



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8

MEDIA REPORTING OF MIGRANTS AND MIGRATION⁶⁶¹

Introduction

Most people reading this will have met migrants in their neighbourhoods, workplaces or social circles, or they themselves will be migrants. Moreover, many people have encountered the subject of migration in the media. Ranging from films and newspapers to tweets, that coverage may have portrayed migration in one way or another, or simply raised it as a topical issue. To a large extent, our perceptions, attitudes or beliefs about migration are based on both direct experiences and those channelled through the lens of the media, although the precise mixture likely depends on our individual situations. Many people, including researchers, journalists, politicians and members of the public, present and debate particular viewpoints about migration while ignoring others. Sometimes, this deliberately encourages us to think in particular ways. Other times, it is unintentional or related to the fact that media content is often produced quickly and tends to be of limited length.

In this chapter, we aim to address four key questions:

- What do media around the world say about migration and migrants?
- What impacts does this coverage have on what members of the public, policymakers and migrants themselves think and do?
- How does the practice of journalism itself contribute to coverage?
- What implications arise from recent experiences of media and migration for future research and practice?

In addressing these questions, we acknowledge how media and migration are contested terms that take different – and changing – forms in different times and places. This chapter recognizes that, while much media research tends to focus on traditional news reporting, usually in high-income democracies typically thought of as destination countries for migrants, this is only part of the picture. This chapter also considers newer ways of communicating through websites and social media that offer different ways of identifying, generating and sharing content with others.⁶⁶² Some of this content may be familiar news, but other types may be closer to entertainment and art. Modern media are extraordinarily varied in their content and forms. The chapter also points out that media coverage of migration reflects differences in how countries' media systems operate. The degree of press freedom is an important variable here, but even relatively "free" media may be more or less objective or partisan in their approaches. While we are limited in terms of space as well as the scope of research, wherever possible we have tried to reflect the variety – if not the volume – of media interest in migration, particularly from different geographic perspectives. We examine research published in English, but have included (where possible) studies that considered media content in its original language.

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662 Beckett, 2010.

Background and context

Arguably, humans have always communicated about migration in whichever ways were available to them: even petroglyphs in Azerbaijan, some 10,000 years old, depict humans on the move.⁶⁶³ Fleeing persecution, travelling to improve one's economic situation, talking about homelands, foreigners and exile: these kinds of ideas and stories appear throughout history.⁶⁶⁴ But what makes migration – and, particularly, media coverage of the issue – so important now?

One reason might be rising levels of anti-immigration rhetoric and recent gains by anti-immigration political parties in many countries. Across Europe, for example, some voters have moved away from mainstream parties towards “challenger parties” on the basis of their migration policies, especially those who are more politically right-wing.⁶⁶⁵ Negative, even hostile, coverage of migration has accompanied similar rises in anti-immigration parties and political rhetoric.⁶⁶⁶

Political debates often scapegoat migrants by reducing the complex causes, impacts and types of migration into easily repeated stories or phrases.⁶⁶⁷ But laying blame solely on the media alone for negative attitudes towards migration would oversimplify as well. Other factors, including demographic change, actual or imagined socioeconomic impacts, and wider policies (such as economic austerity) are also likely to play some part.⁶⁶⁸

Changing contexts also influence patterns in coverage. Two important factors include the degree to which media are free, and the ways that media now operate in a digital world. A free media environment is “where coverage of political news is robust, the safety of journalists is guaranteed, state intrusion in media affairs is minimal, and the press is not subject to onerous legal or economic pressures”.⁶⁶⁹ Freedom of the media is widely considered a necessity for democracy.⁶⁷⁰ This is because media can inform voters about current events, scrutinize institutions or hold public servants to account without excessive interference from the very institutions or officials being criticized. Levels of media freedom greatly differ around the world. In 2017, 13 per cent of the world's population lived in countries with a free press, while nearly half (45%) of people lived in countries without a free press.⁶⁷¹

Even in countries with high levels of media freedom, the news often reflects the language and topics that governments and other powerful groups prefer.⁶⁷² This is because reporters often depend on government officials for information, especially about political issues. Media also operate in different ways around the world.⁶⁷³ They can be highly professionalized and commercial (the “liberal” model), as seen in Anglo-American traditions. Or media can be extensions of political parties (a “polarized pluralist” approach often seen in Southern European countries). A third approach sees media as professional and autonomous yet representing and connecting viewpoints from many distinct social groups including trade unions, voluntary associations and parties (the “democratic corporatist” model seen in Northern European countries). The third model is generally more open to multiple points of view, whereas both the liberal and polarized pluralist systems tend to reflect official political debate, although to different degrees and for different reasons.

663 Cherry and Leppard, 2015.

664 Anderson, 2013.

665 Hobolt and Tilley, 2016.

666 Wodak, KhosraviNik and Mral, 2013.

667 Greenslade, 2005.

668 For more comprehensive views of immigration attitude formation, see Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014.

669 Freedom House, 2016: 1. Freedom House recently included treatment of digital media and their producers, such as blogs and bloggers, in their rankings.

670 Zielonka, 2015.

671 The remainder (42%) lived in countries with a partly free press. Freedom House, 2017.

672 Entman, 2004.

673 Hallin and Mancini, 2004.

Meanwhile, media coverage differs between democratic and autocratic regimes. Most research focuses on media systems and coverage in democracies. In autocracies, however, media coverage of migration and other issues may tend to reflect State interests.⁶⁷⁴ For example, some argue that lower visibility of migration in Russian and Chinese media coverage of Russian Federation–China border relations might indicate declining levels of emphasis among national and regional elites.⁶⁷⁵

The rise of the Internet, and the subsequent prevalence of social media as sources of (or distractions from) news, has also changed the media landscape in several ways. Some argue that digital transformations are threatening traditional newspapers by allowing users to find all kinds of content – news, advertising, sports coverage and lifestyle issues – when and where they want.⁶⁷⁶ As a result, there is less need to buy full packages of content bundled into individual papers or subscriptions. Meanwhile, more people get their news from social media: one study showed that nearly half (46%) of US citizens did so.⁶⁷⁷ Higher rates, focusing solely on social media use rather than all online sites, were seen in Brazil (70%), Portugal (66%), Ireland (52%) and Canada (48%). However, the two worlds are not entirely separate, as in the case of blogging: research into the relationship between blogs and traditional media tends to find that they influence each other, sometimes sparking follow-up while other times reacting to content.⁶⁷⁸

Social media also connect people in new ways that enable action – sometimes very rapidly. For example, people have used social media to mobilize support for protest movements during the Arab Spring.⁶⁷⁹ Non-governmental organizations, as well as local communities, also use social media to rally support for individual migrants facing the threat of deportation.⁶⁸⁰

But changes in media also introduce whole new sets of challenges. “Digital divides” – or inequalities in access to, and use of, information and communication technologies⁶⁸¹ – risk reinforcing gaps, as well as creating new ones. Also, social media may contribute to “echo chambers” or “bubbles”, whereby users only encounter news passed along – and approved – by like-minded friends.⁶⁸² These media effects reinforce political polarization, challenging efforts to promote consensus or compromise, especially on migration policy.

Media coverage around the world

Immigration sentiment

How positive or negative is media coverage about migration? Much of the research evidence shows media associating bad news⁶⁸³ with migrants around the world. During 2013–2014, unfavorable print and online coverage of migration in six countries with very high human development levels (such as Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland and the United Kingdom) was more than twice as visible as favourable content.⁶⁸⁴ This gap was particularly pronounced in Australia and the United Kingdom, while less so in Canada and Switzerland. Meanwhile, media content in sampled countries with lower levels of human development (such as Afghanistan, Bangladesh,

674 Luo, 2014.

675 Sullivan and Renz, 2010.

676 Starr, 2009.

677 Newman et al., 2016.

678 Meraz, 2009.

679 Khondker, 2011.

680 Patler and Gonzales, 2015.

681 Selwyn, 2004.

682 Sunstein, 2017.

683 Philo, Briant and Donald, 2013.

684 McAuliffe, Weeks and Koser, 2015.

Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Viet Nam) also showed significantly more unfavourable content than favourable. Among these countries, Malaysian and Thai media were the most likely to have negative content. Furthermore, media in both sets of countries were most negative towards irregular migration.⁶⁸⁵

More detailed studies of particular national media often confirm this general trend. For example, Danish and, to a more moderate extent, Dutch newspapers published more negative than positive content about migration between 2003 and 2010.⁶⁸⁶ Similar analysis of migrants in German news (print and broadcast television) between 1998 and 2005 showed that these media tended to portray these groups negatively, too.⁶⁸⁷

But there are reasons to be cautious about this narrative of negativity. First, negativity is not unique to migration coverage, as journalists generally tend to emphasize problems across most topics. Second, there are exceptions to the bad news trend. There has been some movement towards more positive – or at least more neutral – coverage of migration issues across several destination and origin countries that does not seem to be attributable to any particular event.⁶⁸⁸ Media in specific countries, such as Switzerland and Viet Nam, also demonstrated noticeable increases in positive content, even if the overall media landscape appears to be more polarized.⁶⁸⁹ Newspapers in New Zealand have also shown “more nuanced and sympathetic reporting after 2000”.⁶⁹⁰ Furthermore, as explored in greater detail later, changes in traditional media (as well as the proliferation of social media outside of conventional journalism) provide opportunities for migrants to produce and promote their own content highlighting positive aspects of migration.

Framing migration: competing issues, different approaches

Migration coverage is not only positive or negative, but also presents a variety of different issues, narratives and viewpoints. For the purpose of this chapter, these techniques can be broadly thought of as different ways to frame migration, although we recognize that the framing concept is itself not always well defined.⁶⁹¹ Identifying how matters are framed is important because, as explored later, media frames affect how people think about migration.

Traditional media in the United States and Europe often cast migration as an issue of “law and order” or security.⁶⁹² For example, this link became more visible in Italian media from the 1970s to the 1990s.⁶⁹³ British media also have depicted immigrants as “illegal”,⁶⁹⁴ and asylum seekers and refugees as “bogus” or linked to terrorist threats.⁶⁹⁵ Meanwhile, from 1999 to 2014, English-language newspapers in Malaysia and Thailand also tended to refer to immigrants as “illegal” – a pattern particularly strong in the Malaysian case.⁶⁹⁶ Recent research argues that economic aspects, which emphasize the costs and fiscal impacts of migrants in destination countries, are significant – equalling if not exceeding concern about crime.⁶⁹⁷ Generally, these aspects of legal

685 McAuliffe, Weeks and Koser, 2015.

686 van Klingeren et al., 2015.

687 Boomgaarden and Vliegthart, 2009.

688 McAuliffe, Weeks and Koser, 2015.

689 Ibid.

690 Spoonley and Butcher, 2009.

691 Cacciatore, Scheufele and Iyengar, 2016.

692 Suro, 2011.

693 Sciortino and Colombo, 2004.

694 Blinder and Allen, 2016b.

695 Esses, Medianu and Lawson, 2013.

696 Anderson, 2013.

697 Caviedes, 2015.

status, criminality and economic impacts mix and interrelate in media content about immigration, as found in Spanish newspaper coverage of Latin American migrants.⁶⁹⁸

Another approach involves dividing migrants from the “native” population, portraying them as threats to national identity, culture or cohesiveness. The Latino Threat Narrative, documented in US media,⁶⁹⁹ portrays immigrants from Latin America as incapable of successful integration.⁷⁰⁰ Local media in Guangzhou, China, also tend to portray African immigrants as threats to public safety and “racial purity” – a narrative that spills into online domains, too.⁷⁰¹ Meanwhile, media also increasingly link populist rhetoric against Islam with broader questions about culture and immigration, as seen in public debate in Norway related to the July 2011 white supremacist terror attacks in Utøya and Oslo.⁷⁰²

Media coverage can also remove migrants metaphorically from the population altogether through dehumanizing language. A notable example of this involves metaphors casting migration as a form of natural disaster (often a flood) or migrants as animals, especially insects (“swarms”). This practice is relatively widespread, appearing in national media such as the United Kingdom,⁷⁰³ Australia,⁷⁰⁴ South Africa,⁷⁰⁵ the United States⁷⁰⁶ and countries in the Middle East hosting Syrian refugees (see the text box ‘How media in host and non-host countries depict Syrian refugees’).^{707,708} Both economic and sociocultural threats also apply to coverage of “illegal” or “irregular” migration.⁷⁰⁹

How media in host and non-host countries depict Syrian refugees

Media in countries experiencing forced migration flows might be expected to cover the issue differently from the media in countries further removed from the conflict. One study^a compared Western and Arab online media coverage of Syrian refugees since March 2011 to see whether either group used more “water” or “pressure” metaphors – such as waves of refugees putting a *strain* on services.

Arab, host-country media in the study (which included Lebanese, Jordanian, Egyptian and Turkish news) tended to use more metaphors when referring to Syrian refugees than non-host country media (comprising US, British, Saudi Arabian and United Arab Emirates sources). These choices matter because they tend to portray Syrians as an indistinguishable group, as well as emphasizing the burdens refugees place on host societies. Documenting the visibility of metaphors and what they communicate is an important part of understanding the global significance of media coverage.

a Abid, Manan and Rahman, 2017.

698 Igartua, Cheng and Muñiz, 2005.

699 Chavez, 2013.

700 In the United States of America, the kind of narrative that divides people by race is not new, as Flores (2003) shows in media coverage about deportation campaigns affecting Mexicans and Mexican-Americans in the 1920s and 1930s.

701 Lan, 2016.

702 Wigger, 2012.

703 Gabrielatos and Baker, 2008.

704 Pickering, 2000.

705 Banda and Mawadza, 2015.

706 Santa Ana, 1999.

707 Abid, Manan and Rahman, 2017.

708 However, not all uses of metaphors in the context of migration are negative, as Salahshour (2016) explores in the case of New Zealand: they can also communicate positive, economic aspects.

709 Thorbjørnsrud, 2015.

In contrast to narratives of threat, division and inhuman qualities, other studies demonstrate an explicitly humanitarian frame that “portrays immigrants as victims of an unfair system”.⁷¹⁰ Several cases demonstrate this way of covering immigration in Western European media, including those in Belgium,⁷¹¹ France⁷¹² and the Netherlands.⁷¹³ Interestingly, this kind of frame actually dominated press coverage in the Republic of Korea over the 1990–2008 period, which reported that “immigrants have mostly been portrayed as vulnerable victims”.⁷¹⁴ It also appears in coverage about emigration, too (see the text box ‘Emigration in Bangladeshi and Romanian media’). Usually, however, this frame appears with the other approaches mentioned above. For example, Malaysian press outlets cast asylum seekers and refugees as both threats and victims, depending on the publications’ ideological leanings.⁷¹⁵

Emigration in Romanian and Bangladeshi media

While many media studies focus on immigration into traditionally “destination” countries, other research also looks at how “sending” countries’ media cover emigration issues. One study focused on Romanian broadsheet newspapers’ portrayal of emigrants and their economic remittances back to Romania during 2011–2012.^b These newspapers tended to view remittances as positive sources of development for Romania – although other, less frequent opinions raised questions about possible losses of skills and disruption to families.

Another study looked at the media in Bangladesh, among other developing countries.^c Although the media commented on opportunities abroad for Bangladeshi workers, they also mentioned concerns about exploitation and mistreatment, especially affecting female workers. These findings demonstrate how emigration, as one of many types of mobility, also receives different kinds of coverage.

b Mădroane, 2016.

c McAuliffe and Weeks, 2015.

Accounting for different scales and media

These trends also have geographic dimensions. Journalists working in regional and local press, for example, may cover immigration differently because of their specific networks and connections to the location, as demonstrated in the contrasting cases of coverage about asylum seekers in Yorkshire and Wales in the United Kingdom.⁷¹⁶ Meanwhile, analysis of Spanish regional newspaper coverage in Castilla and Leon revealed that, while local papers could be just as negative towards immigrants, they “tend to be more community service oriented in contrast with ‘bad is good’ news” found in national tabloids.⁷¹⁷ This echoed earlier studies in the Netherlands,

710 Thorbjørnsrud, 2015.

711 Van Gorp, 2005.

712 Benson, 2013.

713 Bos et al., 2016.

714 Park, 2014.

715 Don and Lee, 2014.

716 Finney and Robinson, 2008.

717 Cheng et al., 2014.

where regional newspapers tended to emphasize human interest frames regardless of local residents' opinions on asylum.⁷¹⁸ This pattern coincides with divergent perceptions: citizens may perceive immigration as a significant problem nationally while viewing diversity positively or neutrally in their local areas.⁷¹⁹ However, national debates can also catalyse local conflict and negative perceptions.⁷²⁰

Other research, comparing local and national newspapers in Canada and the United Kingdom from 2001 to 2012, questions how much these scales actually matter: in those countries, locally felt factors such as unemployment and the actual numbers of migrants did not cause any substantial change in framing.⁷²¹ This debate illustrates how media content and effects are often specific to a particular context, making it hard to draw general conclusions.

Scale also moves upwards, as seen in international media coverage of other nations' migration policies. Observing from a distance can change the tone of coverage or the prominence of a given issue. For example, in February 2014, Australian media reported on "riots" occurring in detention centres in Papua New Guinea, operated on behalf of Australia. Although international media used these events "to question the legality of the Australian government's actions"⁷²² and raise awareness of asylum seekers' plights in detention, they still portrayed these migrants as being somehow different. Later in this chapter, we explore factors specific to the practice of journalism that may help explain the form and content of migration coverage.

Advances in data collection and analysis also facilitate research into online media. Although these techniques are still developing, they are already giving glimpses into the ways that public discussion about migration happens outside of traditional newspapers (see the text box 'Alan Kurdi and images that spread across 20 million screens'). For example, a study of Twitter data revealed peaks and troughs of public attention to immigration – and particular individuals trying to lead the public discussion – as the United States Senate debated immigration reform in 2013.⁷²³ Blogs and online forums may also provide anonymous opportunities for even stronger, more dehumanizing language directed at migrants than might be used in conventional outlets.⁷²⁴ However, they can also expose people to more diverse viewpoints, as seen in the Republic of Korea online communities that tend to contain more nuanced depictions of migrants than do mainstream online media.⁷²⁵ Meanwhile, social media forums continue to link male asylum seekers and refugees from Middle Eastern countries with terrorism and sexual deviancy, fuelling perceptions "they do not conform to received visual expectations of what a 'refugee' looks like".⁷²⁶

Alan Kurdi and images that spread across 20 million screens

In September 2015, images of the drowned Syrian toddler Alan Kurdi (mistakenly reported as "Aylan") flashed across upwards of 20 million screens around the world, largely thanks to social media. Research into its impacts showed that tweets using the word *refugee* not only spiked immediately afterwards, but also spread rapidly from a limited geographical area, to wider Middle Eastern audiences and to the rest of the world.^d

718 d'Haenens and de Lange, 2001.

719 Blinder and Allen, 2016a.

720 Hopkins, 2010.

721 Lawlor, 2015.

722 Laney et al., 2016.

723 Chung and Zeng, 2016.

724 Musolff, 2015.

725 Yi and Jung, 2015.

726 Rettberg and Gajjala, 2016.

While various countries (including Canada, Germany and the United Kingdom) announced steps to increase support for refugees in the immediate aftermath of the picture's publication, there are debates about how, and to what extent, this image has moved public debate in Europe about refugees.^e But there is no doubt it marked an important moment in wider migration narratives, with the image coming to symbolize the closed border of the European Union and the risks desperate people will take to cross it. It also raises questions about the responsibility of social networks as platforms for many kinds of content, not all of which readers or viewers will agree with or find appropriate.

d Vis and Goriunova, 2015.

e Vollmer and Karakayali, 2017.

Media content also includes many topics and genres. For example, research into Spanish prime-time fictional television programmes (such as sitcoms, series or feature films) found that immigrant characters were not only underrepresented compared to the actual foreign population, they were also portrayed as having less education, intelligence and stable employment, as well as being more violent⁷²⁷ – a finding echoed in studies of US broadcast media.⁷²⁸

Media coverage about athletes who happen to have migrant backgrounds also provide opportunities to highlight – as well as reframe or even set aside – questions about national identity and integration.⁷²⁹ Examples include reporting about the French national football team,⁷³⁰ and UK newspaper coverage of British Olympians with migrant backgrounds.⁷³¹ Also, Slovenian broadcast coverage of naturalized Olympic athletes (many of whom were African) used terms such as “imported” and “untrue”, having the rhetorical effect of emphasizing differences between them and viewers.⁷³²

Migrant-led media and journalism

In the midst of reporting that emphasizes migrants' differences in relation to the host or native population, it is important to explore how migrants themselves access, produce and share media content. Newsrooms that are now catering to different migrant audiences – as well as digital technologies that disrupt and circumvent traditional media altogether – produce new opportunities and challenges for covering immigration. Research comparing Spanish- and English-language media in the United States, for example, shows that the former cover immigration issues more positively than the latter – with potential effects on what their audiences subsequently think.⁷³³

“Immigrant journalism” does not take a single approach. Instead, it varies in style, formality, motivation and degree of ties to the home country.⁷³⁴ Chinese media in Canada and the United States,⁷³⁵ Venezuelan journalists in

727 Igartua, Barrios and Ortega, 2012.

728 Mastro and Behm-Morawitz, 2005.

729 Maguire, 2013.

730 Garcia-Arjona, 2012.

731 Allen and Blinder, 2012.

732 Ličen and Billings, 2013.

733 Abrajano and Singh, 2009.

734 Shumow, 2014.

735 Zhou, Chen and Cai, 2006.

Florida,⁷³⁶ or historically Black newspapers' coverage of West Indian immigrants to the United States in the early twentieth century⁷³⁷ all demonstrate how migrants can relate to – and communicate with – host countries in different ways. For example, refugees use Twitter and Facebook to directly communicate their own experiences, indicating that: “a seeming shift towards a self-staged testimony appears to offer a potential autonomous self-management of social media presence by the refugees themselves”.⁷³⁸ This technique can extend to other media and geographic regions. As argued later, however, the extent to which these messages and ways of producing coverage are effective depends on the purpose at hand.

Impacts of media coverage on public perceptions, policymaking and migrants

Media coverage, in all its forms, relates to the wider world. Media provide important sources of information that affect how people act, what people think, how policymakers prioritize agendas, and how migrants make decisions.

Media coverage and public opinion about migration

“The press”, we are reminded, “is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about.”⁷³⁹ The previous section showed how media coverage of migration varies around the world – and not just within traditional newspapers, but in other media, too. But what impacts do these various portrayals and approaches have on what people think, on policy developments and on migrants themselves?

In the early twentieth century, Walter Lippmann suggested that what we think about an issue is based on the “pictures in our heads” that we either create ourselves, through direct experience, or receive from other sources.⁷⁴⁰ Whether explicitly or not, this idea has formed the basis of much research into how media influence what people think: does changing pictures similarly change perceptions and opinions?⁷⁴¹

One aspect of these perceptions involves how many migrants there are in the country. People regularly overestimate minority groups' actual numbers.⁷⁴² This can occur because people perceive immigrants as threatening (and exaggerate that threat) or because they receive and use incorrect information. The media often promote these feelings and information, especially on symbolic issues such as immigration, where individuals may not have direct experience of all types of migration and refugee issues.⁷⁴³

Changing the information available to people can make a difference in attitudes towards immigration.⁷⁴⁴ For example, survey experiments in Europe and the United States found that accurate information about migrant populations influences perceptions. Researchers provided factual information about the number of migrants in their respective countries to a random subset of participants. In most countries, people who were given the

736 Shumow, 2012.

737 Tillery and Chresfield, 2012.

738 Rettberg and Gajjala, 2016.

739 Cohen, 1963.

740 Lippmann, 1997.

741 There are differences between perceptions and opinions – notably, that the latter indicate evaluation of an attitude object while the former simply refer to general awareness or to cognitive links between an entity and associated characteristics. For the purpose of this chapter, these terms may be used interchangeably to broadly indicate the idea of “what people think”. For more detail, see Fiske and Taylor (2016).

742 Herda, 2010.

743 Vliegenthart et al., 2008.

744 Grigorieff, Roth and Ubfal, 2016.

accurate information were less likely to say that their country had too many immigrants, compared to those who were not given that information.⁷⁴⁵ This difference was particularly pronounced in Greece, Italy and the United Kingdom, but less so in France and the Russian Federation.⁷⁴⁶

Another aspect involves understanding more about the nature of migrant populations: why migrants are arriving, and where they come from. For example, when the British public thought of migrants as asylum seekers or labour migrants, official figures actually showed that students were the largest group at the time – but this group is rarely covered in the media.⁷⁴⁷ Meanwhile, in Finland, a substantial minority (22%) of citizens thought that most migrants came not from the Russian Federation (the correct geographic origins of most migrants in the country) but from Somalia or other places.⁷⁴⁸ In this case, Finns who relied on print media were more accurate in their perceptions than those who primarily used television sources.

These differences between perceptions and reality are important in shaping public opinion about immigration. Also, different ways of portraying reality may impact perceptions (see the text box ‘Are numbers or narratives more convincing among migrants?’). Studies in Europe and the United States have revealed that people tend to be more opposed to migration when they think that their country hosts a large population of migrants.⁷⁴⁹ These perceptions, rather than the real size of the foreign-born population, are correlated with anti-immigrant views.⁷⁵⁰ Also, citizens who perceive migrants to be from different (and less privileged) groups than the host country also tend to be more negative about migration, as confirmed by studies in Finland,⁷⁵¹ Spain⁷⁵² and the United States.⁷⁵³ It is safe to say that media coverage plays an important role in providing information about the size and nature of migrant populations, which in turn seems likely to have an impact on public opinion.

Are numbers or narratives more convincing among migrants?

Messages about migration and integration take several forms, affecting migrant and host audiences alike. One study^f presented identical facts about the experiences of young Muslim women in the Netherlands to Muslims living in Amsterdam – some migrants, and some children of migrants born in Amsterdam. The information appeared either as personal testimony involving a specific person, or numerical data reflecting the situation of Muslim women as a whole.

Muslims born in Amsterdam (whom the study called “second-generation”) responded more strongly to the narrative testimony, becoming more open to gender equality, sexual minorities’ rights and secularism in public life. Meanwhile, those born in Muslim-majority countries (whom the study called “first-generation”) became more open to these issues when presented with numerical information, though less strongly than the second-generation participants. This pattern held even after considering how comfortable people felt with numbers.

745 Transatlantic Trends, 2014.

746 Providing information about migrants’ share of the population did not change perceptions in Poland, while it actually slightly increased the percentage of people in Sweden who said that there were too many immigrants (Transatlantic Trends, 2014).

747 Blinder, 2015.

748 Herda, 2015.

749 Alba, Rumbaut and Marotz, 2005; Hooghe and de Vroome, 2015.

750 Strabac, 2011.

751 Herda, 2015.

752 Igartua and Cheng, 2009.

753 Brader, Valentino and Suhay, 2008.

Why did this happen? One possibility the study suggests is that people raised in largely individualistic cultures may connect with personal stories of actual individuals, while those raised in more collective societies may respond more to numbers reflecting opinions or experiences of larger groups. Although research in other countries is needed to confirm this finding, it does suggest that message styles – as well as content – matter for different audiences.

f Wojcieszak et al., 2015.

Emotions, particularly negative ones such as anxiety or fear, also influence how strongly media affect people. This happens because emotions may cause people to interpret information in ways that match their feelings. For example, the combination of feeling anxious and being given negative information about Latinos in the United States resulted in greater levels of hostility,⁷⁵⁴ and in a tendency to seek out further negative information.⁷⁵⁵ This is especially true for people who use the media more often.⁷⁵⁶ Similar results came from a Spanish study that linked crime with migrants of Moroccan – rather than Latin American – origins.⁷⁵⁷ Anger is also an important emotion that impacts how people view immigration, as found among Dutch citizens.⁷⁵⁸ Less is known about how positive emotions such as amusement, enthusiasm or compassion work in shaping perceptions of migration.⁷⁵⁹

Media and policymaking

In addition to affecting what the public thinks about migration, media can also influence the agendas of policymakers.⁷⁶⁰ Studies in this area show that media effects on legislators vary, depending on the issue being covered and on the chosen media (see the text box ‘The British press and Brexit’).⁷⁶¹ In 1990s Belgium, for example, newspapers seemed to have a greater effect on policymakers’ attention than broadcast journalism – particularly on sensational, symbolic issues.⁷⁶² Other studies show how the media are less important to policymakers and the public on issues felt more directly, such as inflation.⁷⁶³

The British press and Brexit

In the years leading up to the June 2016 United Kingdom European Union membership referendum (also known as the Brexit referendum), British newspapers focused more on rising “net migration” levels, along with the

754 Brader, Valentino and Suhay, 2008.

755 Albertson and Gadarian, 2015.

756 Seate and Mastro, 2016.

757 Fernandez et al., 2013.

758 Lecheler, Bos and Vliegenthart, 2015.

759 Griskevicius, Shiota and Neufeld, 2010.

760 Baumgartner and Jones, 1993.

761 Walgrave and Van Aelst, 2006.

762 Walgrave, Soroka and Nuytemans, 2007.

763 Soroka, 2002.

perceived rate and size of immigration, than on the referendum itself. During 2013–2014, there was a large increase in the coverage of European Union (EU) migration, as well as negative depictions of Romanian migrants, in particular. Some commentators argue that an important factor in the Brexit vote was how the United Kingdom’s influential Eurosceptic and anti-immigration newspapers focused on EU migration.^g Indeed, the detailed picture of British newspaper coverage of migration arguably charts the rise in populist language since 2006.

However, it is difficult to conclusively connect media coverage with political outcomes – especially in complicated events such as Brexit. Public perceptions come from many sources, and other factors, such as recent increases in the United Kingdom’s EU migrant population,^h must be taken into account.

g Cummings, 2017.

h Vargas-Silva and Markaki, 2016.

The impact of media also depends on how politically advantageous media content (or even the lack of media content: see the text box ‘Choosing *not* to report on migration: Australian media and policy change’) might be for parties and officials.⁷⁶⁴ An experiment involving Swiss members of parliament showed that negative news coverage on issues that a party “owns” elicited a stronger action – although more often among junior members.⁷⁶⁵ Further evidence from the Netherlands and Sweden shows that political parties are more likely to respond to media coverage that fits their platforms: “the right framing helps the party attain its policy goals”.⁷⁶⁶ Also, expanding to other levels of government, such as at the city level, may reveal how the media play stronger roles in shaping policy agendas more locally.⁷⁶⁷ In contrast, in China, where central government has greater control over both traditional newspapers and (some) online forums, commercial and non-official media do not appear to impact “official” policy discussion very much.⁷⁶⁸

Choosing *not* to report on migration: Australian media and policy change

Discussing what media report about migration and migrants is only half of the story. The narratives that are not reported are often just as important. Research documenting Australian media coverage and policy developments relating to asylum looks at this question.ⁱ

In the late 1970s, the Australian Government tried to humanize depictions of asylum seekers. These efforts were broadly ignored by media organizations, however, which preferred to increase the prominence of negative portrayals and their proponents. This unwillingness to report sympathetic stories arguably helped push policy and public sentiment in more negative directions for decades, eventually leading to Australia’s policy of offshore processing of asylum seekers.

i Doherty, 2015.

764 Thesen, 2013.

765 Helfer, 2016.

766 van der Pas, 2014.

767 Scholten, 2013.

768 Luo, 2014.

Impacts on migration and migrants

Confronted with largely negative media portrayals in host countries, migrants can react in several ways. Sometimes, as found among Latin American migrants in the United States, they emphasize themselves as hardworking people who are different from “other” criminal migrants: “[...] these immigrants need to show that they have the traits of productive citizens [...] because this counters the negative images of themselves in the media.”⁷⁶⁹ Meanwhile, media that reflect discrimination against foreigners can cultivate perceptions among immigrants that public opinion in the host country is similarly biased. South American immigrants in Chile, who typically viewed the Chilean media (which included negative stereotypes about other Latin American people), were more likely to think that Chilean society was more discriminatory, even if they themselves had not personally experienced this.⁷⁷⁰

At a more general level, media in host countries also affect migrants’ perceptions, behaviours and attitudes in other ways. Depending on their personal motivations or situations, migrants may selectively use the media to learn more about their new place, as seen among Hazara men in Brisbane, Australia.⁷⁷¹ They may also turn to the media either in home or host countries aimed at migrant audiences like themselves to retain some aspects of their national or ethnic identity; a study of Asian women living in the Republic of Korea showed how some turned to familiar home country media to remember their native language and keep up with news back home.⁷⁷² Russian-speaking families from the former USSR living in Germany and Israel also used host, homeland and international media to help them to integrate into their new societies, as well as a way of passing down cultural traditions to their children.⁷⁷³

Meanwhile, exposure to Western media can change migrants’ perceptions of their home countries, too. For example, Chinese students in the United States became more sceptical and critical of their own government after reading news coverage about censored issues such as ethnic disputes or poor national economic performance.⁷⁷⁴ Also, online forums and websites catering to diaspora members can provide venues for discussion about – and with – countries of origin, as seen on Zimbabwean social media, where participants disagree with and contradict one another on issues relating to national identity or historical events.⁷⁷⁵

At one level, the stories told by media may be mostly informative, alerting people to realities, events or opportunities. In a study of forced migration during civil conflict in Nepal from 1996 to 2006, authors suggest (but do not explicitly test) how media reporting on violent clashes and deaths may have raised public awareness of threats that subsequently influenced individuals’ decisions to move.⁷⁷⁶ Meanwhile, decisions of Lebanese medical students to move and work abroad are partly due to extensive international marketing via online media.⁷⁷⁷

At another level, media can exert an influence in more diffuse ways by shaping expectations and aspirations to move. For example, in-depth research among Mexican and Salvadoran women in the United States shows how images in the media of a “good” childhood impacted them: “[...] mothers’ decisions to migrate were

769 Menjivar, 2016.

770 Etchegaray and Correa, 2015.

771 Tudsri and Hebbani, 2015.

772 Yoon, Kim and Eom, 2011.

773 Elias and Lemish, 2011.

774 Tai, 2016.

775 Mpofu, 2013.

776 Bohra-Mishra and Massey, 2011.

777 Akl et al., 2007.

strongly influenced by ideals of a childhood free from want, ideals they construed as diametrically opposed to their own experiences of childhood in their countries of origin”.⁷⁷⁸ Also, media imagery helped build an international image for Badolato – a village in southern Italy – as a hospitable haven for refugees. Migrants and asylum seekers draw upon media, as well as other sources, “to imagine connections between places and people across borders and opportunities that may carry them forward”.⁷⁷⁹

Understanding factors that influence media coverage on migration

Why does media reporting on migration vary around the world? This section considers a range of reasons related to journalism practice – from economic and social contexts in which media exist, to everyday decisions made by individual editors and practitioners.

Among media in predominately open or partly open contexts, there are financial reasons for particular kinds of migration coverage. In these cases, most media are largely commercial enterprises, and their primary responsibility is to sell content effectively in order to keep the business functioning.⁷⁸⁰ As a result, editors need to understand the people who are buying their products.

If news organizations are selling their products to people who are likely to either be broadly opposed to, or in favor of immigration, they are likely to reinforce and validate rather than challenge their audiences’ viewpoints. Building trust is complicated. It requires audiences to see the media outlet as fair and objective,⁷⁸¹ which can involve making some efforts to present counter-arguments and alternative voices, even if in cursory ways.

Social and organizational factors specific to journalism also shape media content. One of these relates to employment. Creative and media industries increasingly rely on freelance workers via the “gig economy”.⁷⁸² This precarious employment means that journalists may be reluctant to challenge employers on socially controversial issues, or to move away from established ways of communicating about immigration that the organization perceives to be appropriate for their audiences.

The day-to-day work of choosing, selecting and producing stories also can affect migration coverage. Sometimes, the political nature of these choices is implicit or taken for granted rather than explicitly ideological.⁷⁸³ As seen across several European countries (including Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland and the United Kingdom), several factors interact to produce migration news. These include decisions about the intrinsic value of the news item – a decision that is often related to the agendas of policymakers, routines in selecting what eventually gets published, the editorial position of the outlet, and how much journalists trust different sources.⁷⁸⁴ Also, “getting the story” in the first place often involves understanding how these sources may use off-the-record information to advance their own agendas.⁷⁸⁵

Journalists’ own backgrounds can also influence how they choose to cover migration, within the constraints

778 Horton, 2008.

779 Nikunen, 2016.

780 Croteau and Hoynes, 2006.

781 Tsfati and Cappella, 2003.

782 Markova and McKay, 2011.

783 Schudson, 2011.

784 Gemi, Ulasiuk and Triandafyllidou, 2013.

785 Peterson, 2001.

(real or perceived) imposed by editors, organizations and audiences.⁷⁸⁶ For example, research among German journalists working in print and broadcast media⁷⁸⁷ revealed how having a migrant background sometimes brings benefits: it can provide valuable access to key groups, or signal expertise in a particular situation. In other cases, however, it can lead to either “tokenism”, when staff may feel they are hired solely for their perceived advantages, or outright exclusion, with them being treated as less competent. Some news organizations try to address these problems via diversity training, whereby journalists aim to foster intercultural understanding through intensive engagement. Although these kinds of programmes may confer benefits for individual practitioners – wider interpersonal networks, for example – they may be less effective at challenging deeper, more institutional biases in migration coverage.⁷⁸⁸

Conclusion: implications and future research

We have considered the different ways that media around the world cover migration; how these portrayals affect what people (including migrants and policymakers) think and do; and why this coverage takes the forms it does. Addressing these questions raises further issues – for where we are right now, as well as for the future.

Given the media’s largely negative coverage of migration – and the extent of its influence – raises the question of how media should talk about such a complicated, diverse issue. One perspective argues that the ability to try to convince others of our own views and beliefs is a fundamental characteristic of democratic societies: “[...] freedom of speech and its democratic corollary, a free press, have tacitly expanded our Bill of Rights to include the right of persuasion.”⁷⁸⁹ Therefore, we should acknowledge the media in all of their forms as playing important roles in public debate.

However, in a world of media sources that are often allied with particular political and commercial interests, do we really make our own decisions about issues, including migration? Or are we pushed towards agreeing with conclusions that we might otherwise not have chosen? In a complicated world, individuals cannot be expected to make new and informed political choices every time they are asked. Instead, sources such as media provide the raw materials that help readers use mental short-cuts to make sense of events that occur in a social and political world that extends far beyond any individual’s ability to directly perceive it. As shown earlier, media organizations can promote negative perceptions about migrants and migration by using disaster metaphors or by emphasizing the costs or threats that migration might bring. There is a strong case for encouraging media coverage of migrants that is reasonable, measured and moves away from an assumed position of suspicion, though how to practically do this is less clear (see the text box ‘Changing narratives on migration: a commercial path?’ for one possibility).⁷⁹⁰ There are also legitimate reasons for media to discuss different types of migration and their impacts, trade-offs and consequences by sometimes acknowledging potential costs and threats.⁷⁹¹

786 Cottle, 2000.

787 Graf, 2010.

788 O’Boyle et al., 2013.

789 Bernays, 1947.

790 Triandafyllidou, 2013.

791 Migration Observatory, 2015.

Changing narratives on migration: a commercial path?

One response to anti-migrant coverage in the British press has been the Stop Funding Hate campaign. By targeting companies that advertise with media outlets perceived to be deliberately fuelling negative portrayals of migrants, it aims to create change through an economic path. For example, the campaign claims to have succeeded in persuading Lego® to end a corporate partnership with the *Daily Mail*. However, critics of this tactic consider it a worrying precedent for liberal democracy if large companies are encouraged to use their advertising budget to put pressure on editorial policies of news organizations.^j

j Ponsford, 2016.

As online and social media rapidly multiply and diversify, they also raise the problem of dealing with misleading or untrue content. For example, the 2016 US Presidential election – and subsequent policy actions involving migration, among other topics – was beset by fake news deliberately generated with little or no concern as to whether it would be exposed for its fraudulence. To a certain extent, migration stories of this type are already part of the repertoire of coverage, as seen in a discredited German article (and its subsequent retraction) reporting on “attacks” in Frankfurt by migrants⁷⁹² and the Swan Bake headline in the United Kingdom’s *The Sun*, claiming that asylum seekers were poaching the Queen’s swans and cooking them in British parks.⁷⁹³ However, those news items that we see likely represent only the tip of the fake news iceberg. Social media make it easy to approach specific audiences with political messages and materials, in ways that can be hard to detect and scrutinize. Such microtargeting of persuadable audiences, identified and contacted through their social media activity, is a growing phenomenon.⁷⁹⁴

The concept of fake news is not new, however. Producing false – or at least questionable – information for political ends is a standard propaganda technique. Furthermore, it is not a single object, but rather many objects with many purposes – from information that may unintentionally mislead, and material deliberately constructed to deceive, to a label we may attribute (rightly or wrongly) to ideas we strongly disagree with.⁷⁹⁵ As a result, fake news may be forcing people to reassess their use of media – possibly by moving back towards respected and trusted media, or using fact-checking organizations and other sources of research evidence.⁷⁹⁶

Yet this possible backlash raises the question of whether the combination of fraudulent news, targeted messaging and the sheer speed of on-demand information is eroding our faith in free media as a means of identifying and working towards more socially constructive goals. The known existence of fake news offers politicians and others an opportunity to use the “fake” label to dismiss accurate reporting that they dislike for political reasons. It is also possible that extreme political ideologies can take root in online communities that act as a kind of echo chamber, in which participants are only exposed to messages and sentiments from one ideological perspective.

792 Eddy, 2017.

793 Medic, 2004.

794 Bennett, 2016.

795 Beckett, 2017.

796 Graves and Cherubini, 2016.

The future of media and migration

It is clear that the media contribute to our thinking about migration, but the extent to which they drive actions in any direction depends on many factors that vary in different contexts. Indeed, consensus about the power of the media has shifted over the decades.⁷⁹⁷

Our overview of what the media say about migration, their impacts and some of the journalistic factors that contribute to coverage, presents several implications and areas for future research:

1. More research needs to be done into the role of media in transit and origin countries – and particularly migrants' own use of, and preferences for, different types of media. This is especially important for understanding how and to what extent information sources shape perceptions.
2. Further evidence on whether and how different types of messages and emotions shape public perceptions and policy activity on mobility would be valuable both within and beyond the world of research. Applied studies can help a range of groups develop communication interventions that are more effective for the audiences and topics at hand.
3. There needs to be more attention given to different media systems and how they may (or may not) produce different kinds of content regarding migration.
4. The presence of highly differentiated experiences around the world suggests that greater levels of public debate about the appropriate role of media in specific contexts will move forward the conversations already happening in policy, civil society and research.

These conclusions also raise further ethical and policy questions. What should be done about fake news and propaganda without overly limiting press freedoms? What is the proper balance between economic, partisan and humanitarian motivations in covering migration? In a world where a single image such as Alan Kurdi's can have more influence on public opinion than hundreds of well-researched articles, how should the media balance powerful imagery with substantive reporting in an honest but less sensationalistic way?

Questions such as these will be debated differently across varied local, national and international contexts. As a result, both producers and consumers of research should recognize that there is no single, universal way to sum up the role of the media, or to change media coverage of migration (see the text box 'What is the United Nations doing about migration and media?' for an example of what is already being done). Not only is migration itself a contested, diverse phenomenon that encompasses different types of movement, but media also comprise dynamic, multilayered and multisited forms of communication.

What is the United Nations doing about migration and media?

The TOGETHER initiative (www.together.un.org) is a global effort to mobilize the United Nations, Member States, civil society, the private sector and researchers in community-level activities that promote solidarity towards migrants and refugees. It uses a wide range of media to both showcase the shared benefits of migration and acknowledge legitimate concerns of host communities. TOGETHER aims to speak to – and engage with – communities around the world, particularly through migrants' own stories. Launched in 2016, the initiative has hosted and supported many events internationally, including film festivals, workshops and discussion forums.

797 Cacciatore, Scheufele and Iyengar, 2016.



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9

MIGRATION, VIOLENT EXTREMISM
AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION⁷⁹⁸

Introduction

Over many decades, research has shown that international migration can generate considerable benefits for all sides involved. Yet, around the world, a number of political leaders, reflecting varying degrees of popular sentiment, are linking migrants and migration with the rising threat of violent extremism and terrorism. It is always important to remember, as emphasized in this chapter, that migrants, asylum seekers and refugees are more likely to be the victims of violent extremism than the perpetrators; nevertheless, there is a belief in certain political groups in North America, Europe and beyond, that large flows of asylum seekers and migrants may be infiltrated by members of terrorist groups.

On occasion, asylum seekers and migrants have indeed perpetrated attacks against host societies. Furthermore, this is not an entirely new phenomenon – migrants and diaspora groups have been involved in terrorist attacks in the past, for example in France or Spain before the World War I. Looking into the near future, there are concerns that returning foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) may pose a threat to their countries of origin if they are not apprehended, but these are mainly nationals of the countries in question.

Without therefore denying the potential of migrants (or refugees) to turn to extreme violence, the risk is that isolated contemporary incidents, or distant historical examples, are taken out of context and then projected into the future and used as the basis for sweeping generalizations about the threat that large-scale migration and asylum flows may pose to national and regional security. This may in turn inform policy choices.

Recognizing that this is a sensitive topic that has attracted significant public and media attention, this chapter is intended to put into perspective the relationship between migration and violent extremism. It is necessary to analyse the linkages between migration and violent extremism for a number of reasons: First, there have been isolated incidents of violent extremism perpetrated by migrants and we need to try to understand why these occurred. Second, it is important to bring data and evidence to bear on an often misinformed public debate, acknowledging from the outset important research and data gaps. Third, there are linkages between migration and violent extremism, but not those that normally attract attention. Finally, looking to the future, the risk of radicalization among migrants may grow unless evidence-based policies and interventions to prevent violent extremism are developed now.

The remainder of this chapter is structured in three main parts. It starts with a brief overview of definitions and data, emphasizing the need for analytical clarity, pointing to a shortage of reliable data, and highlighting the challenge of distinguishing causation from correlation. Next, a simple typology of the intersections between migration and violent extremism is developed, following the logic of the “migration cycle” from departure to settlement and at times return. The chapter ends with a series of preliminary implications for further policy debate.

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Definitions and data

Part of the challenge in responding to concerns about the linkages between migration and violent extremism is the inaccurate use of terminology. In the European debate, for example, there is little distinction in public discourse between migrants, asylum seekers and refugees. Yet these are separate (but sometimes overlapping) legal and policy categories, which entail different rights and responsibilities; where intersections occur between them and violent extremism, the causes and consequences may differ. Equally, it is likely that individual experiences are actually more significant than legal status in explaining why some people may become radicalized. This chapter makes clear throughout which category is the focus as different intersections are discussed, and to what extent migration experience really is a pertinent factor, based on the limited existing research. Almost all the examples discussed here concern cross-border or international migration, although there is also limited evidence of radicalization to violent extremist agendas among internal migrants and internally displaced persons (IDPs).

A further distinction needs to be made between migrants, citizens and settled ethnic minorities. Some recent violent extremist attacks in Europe have been perpetrated by newly arrived asylum seekers or migrants. A sizeable proportion of those who have left European countries to become FTFs, on the other hand, are citizens of these countries and descendants of migrants (sometimes referred to as second- or third-generation migrants). In most cases, returning FTFs will be citizens of the countries to which they return. This matters, as different types of interventions may be appropriate. Attacks perpetrated by recently arrived migrants or asylum seekers, for example, may point to the need for better migration management; whereas the departure of European citizens with a migration background may be symptomatic of a long-term failure of integration, resulting in social exclusion. Different responses are also called for; migrants may be deported, citizens may not. (To further complicate this, in some countries there are proposals to strip returning FTFs of citizenship of their country of settlement where they have dual citizenship, thereby potentially making them eligible for deportation).

Analysis is further hampered because there is no clear definition of what constitutes violent extremism, nor is there agreement about what radicalizes people, nor what conditions permit violent extremism to flourish (and therefore, what the best intervention strategies are). The United Nations (UN) has no formal definition for “violent extremism”, nor has the European Union.⁷⁹⁹ Some States have developed definitions in their own national policies and strategies, and these often differ, for example, on the question of whether violent extremism is always political or covers a wider spectrum. The Government of the United States, for instance, has adopted a fairly broad definition, holding that violent extremism means “...advocating, engaging in, preparing, or otherwise supporting ideologically motivated or justified violence to further social, economic or political objectives”.⁸⁰⁰ For some commentators, it is critical to achieve consensus on a definition; in the view of others, this risks still further delaying long overdue action on the issue.⁸⁰¹

One specific intersection between migration and terrorism where there is a clear definition is for FTFs, defined by the United Nations as “...individuals who travel to a State other than their State of residence or

799 Glazzard and Zeuthen, 2016.

800 USAID, 2011.

801 Koser and Rosand, 2016.

nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts or the providing or receiving of terrorist training, including in connection with armed conflict”.⁸⁰²

The drivers of violent extremism are often categorized into “push” and “pull” factors. Push factors are those that are “...important in creating the conditions that favor the rise or spread in appeal of violent extremism or insurgency”, while pull factors may be financial or psychological and are “...associated with the personal rewards which membership in a group or movement, and participation in its activities, may confer”.⁸⁰³ It is also widely accepted that “radicalization to violent extremism” is at the same time an individual process as well as context-specific. Perhaps unsurprisingly, there is neither consensus on how to address the drivers of violent extremism, nor how to reduce their impact. Even the terminology – countering violent extremism (CVE) and preventing violent extremism (PVE) – is contested. The Global Center on Cooperative Security proposes the following definition: “...although emerging from efforts to address terrorism, CVE activities represent a range of initiatives designed to identify and prevent threats arising from violent extremism, which can include community tensions, regional instability, and conflict”.⁸⁰⁴

While statistical systems on migrants and migration remain underdeveloped – especially for irregular migration, which may be particularly relevant for analysing violent extremism – they are certainly more robust than data on violent extremism. Where such data do exist, they tend to focus more on incidents and victims, rather than on perpetrators. According to the 2016 Global Terrorism Index (GTI),⁸⁰⁵ which analyses worldwide data on terrorist attacks from the previous year, 72 per cent of all deaths from terrorism in 2015 occurred in just five countries: Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Pakistan and the Syrian Arab Republic.

Data on the intersections between migration and violent extremism are even scarcer. An immediate observation – expanded below – is that three of the countries identified in the GTI top-10 countries impacted by terrorism are also reported by UNHCR as the three countries worldwide that generated over half of the world’s refugees in 2015, namely the Syrian Arab Republic, Afghanistan and Somalia.⁸⁰⁶ At the individual level, data, for example, on pre-screening of migrants or candidates for refugee resettlement who raise security flags are rarely available; nor is there a clear and simple profile of perpetrators of violent extremism, whether migrants or not. What is more, information-sharing among domestic and international law enforcement and intelligence agencies is far from perfect, and there is a lack of uniformity in the way countries identify and catalogue migrants, especially irregular migrants. This chapter does not attempt to offer direct technical recommendations, but it does highlight the need for more coordinated and centralized information-sharing.

There is a particular lack of data from non-OECD countries, where the majority of violent extremist attacks occur, and where the majority of the world’s refugees and IDPs and at least half the world’s migrants can be found. The holes in the various datasets significantly inhibit any systematic analysis of, or reaching overarching conclusions on, the linkages between migration and violent extremism.

A final caveat worth mentioning here, in part arising from the definitional and data challenges already identified, is the challenge of discerning causation from correlation when examining the intersections between migration and violent extremism. Some refugees may be fleeing direct experiences of violent extremism; other

802 UNSC, 2014.

803 USAID, 2011.

804 Global Center on Cooperative Security, n.d.

805 Institute for Economics and Peace, 2016.

806 UNHCR, 2016.

migrants may be leaving their homes because of factors related to the emergence of violent extremism, for example, lack of opportunities to make a living for themselves and their families. Some migrants and refugees may themselves perpetrate acts of violence because of their traumatic migration experience; others partly due to conditions in the countries where they arrive, or for reasons not related to either situation. Sometimes the perpetrators may in fact be terrorists posing as migrants. Some migrants may actively seek violent extremist opportunities, while others may be vulnerable to recruitment to violent extremism.⁸⁰⁷

Migration and violent extremism: a typology

It is possible to sketch an approximate fourfold typology of the intersections between violent extremism and migration, broadly following the logic of the migration cycle, from departure, through transit, to settlement, and sometimes return; specifically: (i) violent extremism as a driver for displacement and migration; (ii) the risk of radicalization in refugee, IDP and possibly migrant transit camps and centres; (iii) the risk of terrorist infiltration of migration and asylum flows; and (iv) the challenges of integration resulting in social exclusion. A final intersection – which concludes the migration cycle, but is not included here for want of data and analysis – is the possibility that return and failing or unsustainable reintegration may exacerbate drivers of violent extremism for some returnees.⁸⁰⁸

Violent extremism as a driver for displacement and migration

The very superficial comparison of GTI and UNHCR data above at least hints at some sort of link – whether causal or correlative – between the occurrence of violent extremist attacks and refugee flight.

Focusing first on forced migration – and also thus widening the lens from refugees exclusively to include, for example, IDPs and others who leave their homes involuntarily – it is important to distinguish between those fleeing direct experience or threat of violent extremism and those fleeing its indirect effects. There are populations in the world today that can quite clearly be demonstrated to be fleeing because they have been targeted by violent extremism and violent extremist groups. One example would be Christian minorities in the Levant: *The Economist* reported that by 2014, over half a million of 1.8 million Syrian Christians had been displaced.⁸⁰⁹ Another example is those displaced in northern Nigeria: there is evidence that displacing people from their villages may be a deliberate strategy for Boko Haram, as it was earlier for the Lord's Resistance Army in northern Uganda. Further examples of populations fleeing violent extremism directly affecting religious minorities occur in South-East Asia, including from Rakhine State in Myanmar.

Equally, many people are probably displaced by the secondary effects of violent extremism, rather than directly being threatened, for example, where violent extremism disrupts labour markets, agricultural production, or results from cessation of social welfare provision.⁸¹⁰ In Afghanistan there is evidence that some people have been displaced internally by the effects of counter-terrorism measures.⁸¹¹ Moving further along the spectrum from forced to voluntary migrant, it is also possible to consider people leaving their country not because of

807 For a more in-depth look at these causal chains, we refer the reader to Schmid, 2016.

808 Koser and Kuschminder, 2015.

809 *The Economist*, 2014.

810 Connor, 2016.

811 Koser, 2013.

any direct or indirect effect of violent extremism, but because they no longer see a future in a country where there is an environment that allows violent extremism to develop and flourish.⁸¹²

Violent extremism and displacement in Latin America

Historically, violent extremism in Latin America has been characterized by sharp socioeconomic and political divisions, a number of which have included armed insurgent movements fighting to depose seated governments.

The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), for example, fought the longest-running insurgency in the Western Hemisphere until 1 December 2016, when a peace deal between the rebels and the Government of Colombia was approved by the country's Congress. Founded in 1964 as a response to perpetual land disputes and growing inequality, the group's main target was government security forces. However, incidents of civilian kidnappings, the bombing of social gatherings, and the destruction of infrastructure were also commonplace.^a At the beginning of 2017, Colombia had over 7 million IDPs and 340,000 of its citizens living as refugees in neighbouring countries, including Ecuador, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Panama and Costa Rica.^b The FARC is not the only group whose violence has caused mass displacement in Colombia. The National Liberation Army (ELN), considered a terrorist group by both the United States and the European Union, has been known to kidnap civilians for ransom as well as to commit acts of violence against both security forces and civilians.

In other Latin American countries such as Peru, violent extremism has been driven by communist groups such as the Shining Path. Established in the late 1960s, the Shining Path unleashed violence in the 1980s and 1990s that claimed tens of thousands of lives across the country and forced hundreds of thousands of people out of their homes.^c While the group has largely been dismantled and most of those who were displaced have returned to their homes, a few remaining cells continue to operate within the country, and an estimated 62,000 people remain in protracted displacement.^d

a Sullivan and Beittel, 2016.

b UNHCR, 2017.

c *The Economist*, 2017.

d IDMC, 2017.

Radicalization in camps

There have been examples of refugee (and IDP) camps becoming spaces for violent extremism in at least three ways. One is where camps may become bases for violent extremist fighters to rest and recuperate.⁸¹³ Examples include the use of Namibian refugee settlements in Angola by the South-West Africa National Liberation Army

812 Cunningham and Koser, 2015.

813 Zolberg, Suhrke and Aguayo, 1989.

(SWANLA); Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan by the Taliban; and border camps by Nicaraguan Contras and Cambodian Red Khmer. A more recent example was the use of refugees in the Yarmouk camp outside Damascus as “human shields” by Daesh fighters.⁸¹⁴

A second and related example is where refugee camps may become recruitment grounds for violent extremist groups. In 2015 Najat Rochdi, the United Nations Resident Coordinator in Cameroon, publicly expressed his worries that the Minawao camp in northern Cameroon risked becoming a “...fertile ground for recruitment by Boko Haram”.⁸¹⁵ The Kenyan authorities have also expressed similar concerns that Al-Shabaab may be recruiting in the Dadaab camp complex in the north of the country. There have also been largely uncorroborated reports that Daesh may be recruiting within refugee settlements in Turkey and Lebanon.

Third – and perhaps the most pervasive example of the intersections between refugee camps and violent extremism in the still limited literature – is the risk of refugees becoming radicalized to violent extremism.⁸¹⁶ There is certainly evidence of radicalization leading to violence within refugee camps, including in Pakistan (at the Jalojai camp for Afghan refugees), Yemen (at the Somali refugee camps in Kharaz), Cameroon (at the Minawao camp for Nigerians) and Jordan (at the Zaatari camp for Syrian refugees). Europe has also experienced this phenomenon in refugee centres. In September 2016, authorities in Cologne, Germany arrested a 16-year-old Syrian refugee for planning to carry out a terrorist attack. Arrested at a refugee centre near Cologne, where he was living with his parents since having fled the civil war in the Syrian Arab Republic in 2015, authorities discovered bomb-making materials (including a battery carrier with wires, sewing needles and a small butane gas canister) and evidence of Internet chats with Daesh members. “The court attributed the boy’s radicalization to loneliness at the refugee centre and spending most of his time on a cell phone. In addition, he spent a lot of time online and with chat contacts ... through these contacts he developed an Islamist-jihadist worldview”.⁸¹⁷

Existing literature highlights three particular conditions that allow for radicalization to violent extremism to take root in refugee camps: poor education, especially where the gap is filled by extremist religious indoctrination; a lack of work; and the absence of freedom of movement.⁸¹⁸ These three conditions are prevalent in many of today’s under-resourced and overcrowded IDP and refugee camps, and the risk increases the longer such situations are protracted. Equally, they point towards intervention opportunities that may help reduce the risk of radicalization to violent extremist agendas in such settings.

Lessening the risk of refugee radicalization: lessons for the Middle East from past crises

A recently published RAND Corporation report suggested that reducing the risk of radicalization among refugees goes beyond providing humanitarian assistance and requires a multipronged approach that gives refugees viable choices for their future.^e There is, however, no system as yet to evaluate each situation in sufficient depth to create such an approach. The study demonstrates that any effective programme will require the collaboration, sharing of information and alignment of objectives among donors, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the local population and the host government, as much as with the refugees.

814 Ban, 2015.

815 Larson, 2015.

816 Lischer, 2006.

817 Deutsche Welle, 2017.

818 Martin-Rayo, 2011.

Addressing economic and financial needs is also important, even if these are not the main drivers of radicalization. Refugees seek means to support their families and skills that might be useful for the longer term. Those needs must be fulfilled within the country of refuge, where refugees may compete with local people for both jobs and consumer goods. This means that attempted solutions should engage local players not usually directly involved in refugee issues, such as the business community.

Interviewees recommended that funding streams by donors need to be flexible and less “siloesd” to accomplish this successfully. Another common problem with international relief funds is that they are available at the start of a crisis, but dwindle over the long term.^f Policymakers and stakeholders can increase their dialogue about long-term financial planning for refugee crises.

At the same time, jobs and education are only a partial answer. Psychological and security needs are key components. Refugees have experienced trauma^g in escaping their country of origin and often face abuse, humiliation and powerlessness in their place of refuge. This arena is where militant groups may step in and try to radicalize vulnerable populations with narratives of empowerment through violence. Providing refugees opportunities to participate in their own governance, such as in camp administration, can also help mitigate this risk.

e Sude, Stebbins and Weilant, 2015.

f Makdisi and Prashad, 2016.

g Hawilo, 2017.

There has been no significant research yet on the risks or occurrence of violent extremism within transit camps for migrants. However, given that conditions there may often resemble those found to heighten risks in refugee camps, it seems reasonable to suppose that the risk exists.

The risk of infiltration of asylum and migrant flows

Progressing along the migration cycle: In Europe as well as North America, perhaps the most politicized question – as large numbers of asylum seekers and migrants continue to arrive from Africa and the Middle East, and policymakers consider resettling significant numbers of refugees from the Syrian Arab Republic, among other origin countries – is whether or not there is evidence to support claims that terrorists are systematically infiltrating irregular migration flows to perpetrate attacks on foreign soil.

In April 2016, reports surfaced and have since been corroborated that a man arrested in 2015 at a refugee camp in Salzburg was part of the original group of terrorists that carried out the November 2015 attacks in Paris, France. According to his own testimony, he was part of a group that included two of the Paris suicide bombers (Iraqi brothers who blew themselves up outside the Stade de France) who had travelled from the Syrian Arab Republic to Greece in October. Initially this Algerian man, along with a Pakistani man, was arrested in Leros for failing a passport check, but both were later released, whereupon they continued their journey to Austria, where

they were arrested again.⁸¹⁹ According to an investigation by the BBC, "...the two men bought ferry tickets to leave Leros to continue their journey through Europe with Syrian refugees".⁸²⁰

At the very least, this illustrates a failure to share information adequately across European jurisdictions. As more information about those responsible for the Paris attacks has come to light, there appears more evidence to suggest that a number of the gunmen and suicide bombers had travelled to the Syrian Arab Republic to train and fight alongside Daesh. What remains unclear is whether these attackers returned to Europe as part of " sleeper cells", intentionally positioned by Daesh leadership to coordinate attacks against France, or whether they returned to their countries of nationality as FTFs. As the refugee "crisis" was gaining attention throughout 2014 and 2015, and terrorist groups grew in notoriety, several smugglers interviewed reported having transported Daesh recruits.⁸²¹ In early 2015, Daesh "threatened at one moment to flood Europe with half a million refugees through Libya. It also claimed that 4,000 jihadist fighters would be sent to Europe via Turkey".⁸²² One smuggler attested to having sent at least ten Daesh fighters posing as refugees to Europe, and claimed that the fighters, once settled, were awaiting their orders to launch attacks on European soil. Two smugglers interviewed in Turkey also reported transporting fighters across the Mediterranean Sea. Such reports have increased in frequency.

Without underestimating how vital it is to manage and neutralize any such risk, it is still important to urge caution: smugglers are hardly the most reliable source of information and in almost all other contexts are routinely described as criminals and liars by politicians and policymakers. It is worth emphasizing that the majority of recent terrorist attacks in Europe, as in the United States, were "homegrown", that is, committed by citizens of that country, although many of them had an immigration background (see discussion in the next section). It is, of course also important to keep in mind that the overwhelming majority of terrorist attacks worldwide still occur outside Europe and the United States.⁸²³

Ultimately, there is scant evidence to support assertions that Daesh and other groups are systematically and on a large scale exploiting asylum flows to send fighters to Europe. Even if smugglers are to be believed, the number of terrorist recruits reported to have been imported to Europe is very small compared to the hundreds of thousands of people seeking refuge there. While it is important to try to guard against the risk, for example through pre-screening candidates for visas or resettlement, and post-arrival registration and screening, any policy response needs to be proportional and should not serve as a pretext for denying access to asylum for all those in genuine need of protection and assistance.

Migrants, violent extremism and social exclusion

A fourth intersection between migration and violent extremism takes place after migrants and refugees have settled; there is wide acknowledgment that radicalization to violent extremism among settled migrants and refugees and their descendants is a symptom of social exclusion. This remains a contested concept, but most definitions note that it is a dynamic and multidimensional process driven by unequal power relationships interacting across four main dimensions – economic, political, social and cultural – and at different levels

819 Rose, 2016.

820 BBC, 2016.

821 Giglio, 2014.

822 Schmid, 2016.

823 Institute for Economics and Peace, 2016.

including individual, household, group, community, country and global levels. The overall process results in a continuum of inclusion/exclusion conditions characterized by unequal access to resources, capabilities and rights, which then leads to inequalities.⁸²⁴

According to research collected by New America, “every jihadist who conducted a lethal attack inside the United States since 9/11 was a citizen or legal resident”.⁸²⁵ An overwhelming majority of Americans charged with engaging in terrorist acts (domestically or internationally) during this time period are/were permanent, legal residents, and many are the children of first-generation immigrants. Some of the most fatal recent terrorist attacks have been perpetrated by second-generation immigrants, including the Orlando nightclub attacker, who was a US citizen and the son of Afghan immigrants. In the case of the San Bernardino shooters, one was a US citizen and the son of Pakistani immigrants; the other, Tashfeen Malik, was a Pakistani national and conditional United States permanent resident who came to the United States on a fiancée visa.⁸²⁶

A September 2016 report from the Cato Institute undertook a comprehensive review of visas used by terrorists in the United States to offer a risk analysis. According to the Cato study, Americans have a 0.00003 per cent chance of dying in an attack perpetrated by a foreign-born terrorist.⁸²⁷ Specifically, the Cato analysis identifies 154 foreign-born terrorists in the United States who killed 3,024 people in attacks from 1975 through the end of 2015, which – it should be noted – includes the almost 3,000 victims of the 11 September 2001 attacks. Of these 154 foreign-born terrorists,

...ten of them were illegal immigrants, 54 were lawful permanent residents, 19 were students, 1 entered on a K-1 fiancé(e) visa, 20 were refugees, 4 were asylum seekers, 34 were tourists on various visas, and 3 were from Visa Waiver Program countries. The visas for 9 terrorists could not be determined. During that period, the chance of an American being murdered by a foreign-born terrorist was 1 in 3,609,709 a year. The chance of an American being killed in a terrorist attack committed by a refugee was 1 in 3.64 billion a year.⁸²⁸

According to the Migration Policy Institute’s analysis of the 745,000 refugees resettled in the United States of America since 9/11 to the end of 2015, only three have been arrested on terrorism charges.⁸²⁹ What is unclear however, is whether these individuals were already radicalized to violent extremism when they arrived, became radicalized subsequently, or whether they were deliberately sent to the United States by terrorist groups.

824 Rudiger and Spencer, 2003; UN DESA, 2016.

825 New American Economy, 2017.

826 Friedman, 2017.

827 Willingham, Martucci and Leung, 2017.

828 Nowraseth, 2016.

829 Newland, 2015.

Perhaps another indicator of social exclusion is the incidence of FTFs, of whom it has been estimated about 30,000 are fighting in the Syrian Arab Republic and Iraq, mainly with Daesh.⁸³⁰ According to a report by the Soufan Group, at that time the top ten source countries for FTFs in absolute numbers were, in declining order: Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Russian Federation, Turkey, Jordan, France, Morocco, Lebanon, the United Kingdom and Germany.⁸³¹ While detailed profiles on these individuals are unavailable, it is clear that from some countries, like Tunisia, the vast majority are nationals and not migrants or their descendants. In contrast, it appears that the majority of foreign fighters from France and Germany do have a migrant background. However, they make up a proportion of total FTFs in two countries that combined are the source of a small proportion of the total number of FTFs. This suggests that globally, FTFs are not necessarily a major migration problem. It is worth noting, according to the Global Coalition, that “the number of Da’esh fighters in Iraq and Syria has been reduced to the lowest levels in more than two and half years– around 12,000-15,000, nearly half of the high-end estimate of fighters in 2014”.⁸³²

Such data – albeit scattered and unsystematic – do nevertheless indicate that, at times, settled migrants and refugees, and their descendants, may become radicalized to violent extremism; and not just in OECD countries. Something is clearly going wrong for some people, and it is worth considering the explanations.

Some analysts have focused on structural level drivers to radicalization among migrants and their descendants, although these alone are not usually sufficient to explain individual radicalization. In the cases of Belgium and France, for example, it has been suggested that the political culture, an overly secular manner of governance, has ostracized some minority communities, in particular Muslims of North African lineage. According to some analysts:

As with the Francophone finding overall, we're left with guesswork as to why exactly the relationships between French politics, urbanization, youth unemployment, and Sunni militancy exist. We suspect that when there are large numbers of unemployed youth, some of them are bound to get up to mischief. When they live in large cities, they have more opportunities to connect with people espousing radical causes. And when those cities are in Francophone countries that adopt the strident French approach to secularism, Sunni radicalism is more appealing.⁸³³

In contrast, the Soufan Group report referred to above focuses more on personal rather than (socio)political drivers. It is certainly true that some migrants and their descendants experience marginalization and disenfranchisement, identified as “push” factors to violent extremism, making some young Muslim people and recent converts to Islam more vulnerable to recruitment.

Current policy responses include promoting “integrated identities” (meaning that, for example, an individual can have two or more identities, e.g. religious and national) and providing them with a sense of opportunity – in essence, enhancing a person’s belief or perception that they have access to opportunities and can see a future for themselves where they can actualize an option open to them. According to Daniel Köhler, Director of the

830 The Soufan Group, 2015.

831 Ibid.

832 The Global Coalition, 2017.

833 McCants and Meserole, 2016.

German Institute on Radicalization and De-Radicalization Studies, “...over the last few years, counter-terrorism strategy in Germany has focused massively on working with families to prevent radicalisation taking place. Preventing radicalisation amongst refugees, however, will require lots and lots of catching up”.⁸³⁴

Radicalization among Central Asia’s migrants

In an effort to discover why a sizeable number of terrorist incidents are perpetrated by Central Asians, Edward Lemon and John Heathershaw undertook a rigorous, but limited analysis and found that violent extremist groups were targeting and specifically recruiting migrants.^h In their analysis of radicalization of a relatively small number of people from Central Asian countries, Lemon and Heathershaw draw on the limited information and data available, noting that:

...we still know very little about this phenomenon and that it remains very rare. Policy research on this topic is currently weak and driven by misconceptions, while academic research is rare and often out-of-date.

Lemon and Heathershaw offer observations on the possible relationships to migration, noting that most of those radicalized have been targeted by jihadist groups after they have left their home countries. They note that despite recent high-profile terrorism incidents carried out by Central Asian militants – the April 2017 St. Petersburg metro bombing, the January 2017 Istanbul nightclub attack and the June 2016 Ataturk airport bombing – there is no clear evidence that religious, economic or political root causes in Central Asia are responsible for it “exporting” terrorism.

Lemon and Heathershaw argue that while no single factor explains why an individual would decide to join an extremist group, many appear to have experienced isolation of some type, and this may explain why recruiters have targeted those at the margins of societies, including people working abroad. What is more, according to their research “most Central Asian migrants are literate and semi-skilled, but often work in jobs far below their capability and find themselves exploited by their employers”.ⁱ Many young men from Central Asia who have migrated for work spend their late adolescence away from their homes; they are subject to daily economic hardship, are undervalued in their jobs, suffer racial abuse and sometimes State harassment. This can make them more vulnerable to jihadism, underscoring the need to combat xenophobia and mistreatment of migrant workers, which in and of itself is important for all societies. The possibility of radicalization does not alter this, but highlights the rare and possibly extreme consequences of falling short.

^h Lemon and Heathershaw, 2017.

ⁱ Ibid.

While it is too soon to assess whether such interventions will be successful, there have been concerns expressed that other policy options may be harmful. Many migrants, asylum seekers and refugees have experienced difficult situations in their lives and face discrimination. Furthermore, they are also often tainted by false or dubious assertions concerning their impact on the economy, social cohesion, ideological beliefs and motivations, and national identity. To portray them additionally as a threat to national security and seeing them as potential terrorists only adds to their hardship. It may result in the unintended consequence of further alienating them, thus increasing their susceptibility to violent extremist narratives and agendas.⁸³⁵ Such concerns have recently been expressed about the US 2017 Executive Order Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States.⁸³⁶

A final angle on the links between migrants, violent extremism and social exclusion, concerns the prospective challenge of reintegrating returning FTFs. According to the United Nations, FTFs:

...increase the intensity, duration, and complexity of conflicts and may constitute a serious danger to their States of origin, transit, destination, as well as neighboring zones of armed conflict in which they are active. The FTF threat is evolving rapidly changing and is unlikely to be fully contained in the short term. A significant longer-term risk is posed by FTFs returning to their countries of origin or upon their arrival in third countries.⁸³⁷

Scholars, civil society and a handful of policymakers have remarked that the rehabilitation and reintegration of FTFs must become a priority; we risk further radicalizing individuals and communities if we rely on detention as the sole means to treat returning FTFs. Indeed some may be able to help with preventing further violent extremism:

Promoting the rehabilitation and reintegration of violent extremist offenders is a critical component of addressing the full lifecycle of violent extremist radicalization and recruitment. Amid growing numbers of returning foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) and the active prosecution of suspected terrorists in general, the need to support their rehabilitation and reintegration after imprisonment is paramount in order to minimize recidivism and to build trust among local communities and law enforcement.⁸³⁸

Defectors and reintegration

In the eastern Danish city of Aarhus – the second-largest city in the country – the police, city council and local NGOs engage with one another in coordinated activities aimed at preventing at-risk youth from joining violent extremist groups.¹ For the residents and law enforcement of Aarhus, the primary concern for at-risk youth has been their interest in leaving the city to fight alongside militant jihadi groups abroad,

835 Cunningham and Koser, 2015

836 Amnesty International, 2017.

837 UNSC, 2014.

838 Global Center on Cooperative Security and International Centre for Counter Terrorism – The Hague, 2016.

primarily Daesh in Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic. To prevent this, local stakeholders prioritize social integration for marginalized and vulnerable youth. For Aarhus residents who have travelled abroad to support Daesh and have returned home, there is also support offered.^k In Denmark, the national policy states that returning jihadists whose involvement in terrorism has been established will be prosecuted; and that those with no proven record of participation in terrorist activities are eligible for assistance.^l Reportedly, the programme has reduced the number of young people joining Daesh and other groups linked to terrorism, especially when compared with the foreign fighter flows of other European nations. According to a piece by National Public Radio, which highlighted the unique approach of the Aarhus model, in 2012, 34 citizens of Aarhus left Denmark to fight for Daesh, of whom 18 returned home and were enrolled in the rehabilitation programme, six were killed and an estimated 10 remained as of July 2016. However, by 2015 when foreign fighter flows from Europe to the Syrian Arab Republic and Iraq were at one of their highest levels, only one citizen from the city left the country to fight.^m Specifically, the programme involves assisting with school enrolment, counselling, housing and employment, as well as conducting meetings with parents. Reintegrated and deradicalized defectors have played a key role in encouraging their peers to return home, while demonstrating that reintegration within Danish society is possible.ⁿ

There is growing recognition in both the policy and academic fields that defectors can be a powerful force in preventing violent extremism, as their experiences have the potential to serve as a deterrent to those with aspirations of joining groups such as Daesh. Stressing the significance of defectors, Anne Speckhard and Ahmet Yayla argue that

...disillusioned cadres of those who can speak from experience and tell their authentic stories about life inside IS may be the most influential tool for preventing and dissuading others from joining...^o

Governments need to create the right conditions that make it easier for defectors not only to reintegrate, but also to speak out against extremist groups. These include the resettlement of former jihadists, providing them with services, and ensuring their safety and security.^p If we do not allow for the reintegration of low-level violent extremists and their sympathizers, we risk making disillusioned individuals into hardened supporters as a result of prolonged incarceration and marginalization.

j Crouch and Henley, 2015.

k Ibid.

l Lister, 2015.

m Rosin, 2016.

n Ibid.

o Speckhard and Yayla, 2015.

p Neumann, 2015.

Implications for policy debates

Starting off by justifying engagement with such a politically sensitive topic, and recognizing the risks of inflaming prejudice against migrants, this chapter has tried to provide an analytical framework for understanding better the intersections between migration and displacement on the one hand, and violent extremism and terrorism on the other. It has acknowledged existing definitional and data deficits, and stressed the challenges of establishing any causal link; implying significant reservations on the conclusions not just of this chapter, but of current discourse and policy in this area. The chapter has followed the logic of the migration cycle to develop a preliminary typology of the intersections between migration, displacement and violent extremism. This chapter has also raised concerns about some unintended consequences of certain current policy responses in this field.

On the basis of this preliminary analysis, the following seven implications for policy debate may be offered:

- Closer dialogue is required between policymakers responsible for migration and those charged with preventing violent extremism; this is a particular challenge as the latter are variously located in security and development agencies, with internal as well as external mandates;
- A better analytical framework, based on better definitions, more comprehensive data and empirical evidence is required, in order to support more rigorous analysis and inform policy;
- While the evidence on the risk of infiltration by terrorist groups is currently slim, it is necessary to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of migration management and inter-State collaboration, including via appropriate pre-screening of candidates for refugee resettlement and migration, enhanced intelligence-sharing among governments and the appropriate usage of biometrics;
- A more integrated approach to tackling the causes of displacement and migration should include interventions specifically focused on countering and preventing violent extremism – there is growing evidence that preventing violent extremism may be one way to address the drivers of migration;
- Greater efforts may be required to guard against the risk of radicalization across all displacement conditions, including in refugee and transit camps, with an emphasis on providing education, access to work, and, where possible, greater freedom of movement;
- More effective integration and social inclusion policies are required to reduce social exclusion and the risk of radicalization to violent extremist agendas amongst migrants and their descendants;
- It is important not to undermine migration or refugee policy by focusing too much on preventing violent extremism agendas, for example by ensuring that PVE interventions respect the rights of migrants and refugees.

To conclude on a positive note, it may be possible also to conceive migration as part of a potential solution to violent extremism. There is a real risk that focusing on migration and displacement only as a cause or consequence of violent extremism will simply exacerbate the threat. This focus may become an excuse to restrict the entry of migrants, asylum seekers and refugees; to limit their rights; or to force people to return to unsafe situations in their home countries. A focus on solutions, in contrast, can show how a rights-based approach to migration and displaced persons can be an integral component of the global effort to prevent violent extremism.⁸³⁹

839 Koser, 2015.

Well-managed migration can promote mutual understanding; migration also has significant impacts on poverty reduction in countries of origin through remittances, reducing the appeal of violent extremism. Migration is a symbol of the hard-won principles of openness and globalization that violent extremism seeks to overturn and that therefore should be protected. The challenge for policymakers is to promote the positive aspects of migration, rather than merely focusing on the low potential risk of importing violent extremists when offering opportunities to migrants and protection to refugees.



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MIGRANTS AND CITIES: STEPPING BEYOND WORLD MIGRATION REPORT 2015⁸⁴⁰

Introduction

The 2015 edition of the World Migration Report (WMR) was devoted to a single theme: the relationship between migrants and the cities of the world. With more than half of the world's population now living in urban areas, it is not surprising that cities are gaining recognition from those who write policy, conduct research, invest or migrate. Nearly all migrants, whether international or internal, are destined for cities, for it is in the city that their human capital is most rewarded. The fact that the WMR 2015 was devoted to cities was a clear and timely acknowledgement that cities must be better appreciated as the destinations of the world's migrants, and that it is not only national authorities that influence where migrants go and how they fare once they arrive. Rather, it is the city that often is the primary draw for migration, and it is the city within which the integration of migrants often takes place. How we think of the governance of migration or, indeed, the governance of societies more broadly, is changing in recognition of the rapidly growing importance of the world's cities to the workings of societies and their economies. The *World Migration Report 2015* covered much ground. This chapter of the WMR 2018 is a short update to the 2015 work, and we hope that it stimulates new research and causes policy officials at all levels of government to think deeper into the workings of cities and their governance roles.

With chapters on migration and urban diversity, the vulnerability and resilience of migrants, migration and urban development, and governance through partnerships, the WMR 2015 offered an examination of the migrant-city relationship in both the Global North and the Global South, with its emphasis on the well-being of migrants and the protection of their rights – now often described as “the right to the city”.⁸⁴¹ The report noted that migrants are willing partners in local governance and willing contributors to the fortunes of the city in which they live and, therefore, that the governance of urban areas ought to include the migrants and attend explicitly to their interests. Recommendations were made with a view to the inclusion of migrants in the workings of their cities and to the benefits that this form of inclusion will have for the cities themselves. It is, the report urged, in the best interests of both migrant and city that cities “put inclusive urban policies in place for basic services and socioeconomic inclusion”. Furthermore, “cities that strengthen their economic, political and cultural positioning within the global system should draw on the potential opportunities presented by migrant populations living in their communities”.

840 Howard Duncan, Executive Head of the Metropolis Project and Secretariat and Ioana Popp, Migration Policy Officer, IOM.

841 The New York-based organization, Right to the City, describes its founding idea as “born out of the power of an idea of a new kind of urban politics that asserts that everyone, particularly the disenfranchised, not only has a right to the city, but as inhabitants, have a right to shape it, design it, and operationalize an urban human rights agenda”. See <http://righttothecity.org/about/mission-history/>. The origin of the idea is attributed to the French philosopher, Henri Lefebvre, and it has been taken up by many others and developed to apply to migration and to the development of suburbs. See also the recent work by COMPAS at the University of Oxford: *Global Migration and the Right to the Cities of the Future* (available from www.futureofcities.ox.ac.uk/research/global-migration-and-the-right-to-the-cities-of-the-future/).

In this chapter, we will build upon the foundation of the WMR 2015, which was launched at the IOM's conference, *Migrants and Cities*, held in Geneva in October of that year. We will look at the role of the modern city in migration governance, taking advantage of some of the recent research on the evolving nature of cities and of their roles in the world. The growth in the influence of cities over social and economic affairs and over migration trajectories, both international and internal, demands greater attention from both scholars and policymakers. In providing a brief update to, and building upon, the WMR 2015, we will highlight areas that we believe deserve further scrutiny by researchers and by members of the policy community, whether locally, nationally or internationally. As such, this chapter is selective in its coverage, not pretending to be a comprehensive review of the current literature and not duplicating what the WMR 2015 explored.

The recent international context

Migrants and their relationship to cities have been the focus of an unusually large number of activities in the international community over the past two years. The IOM Migrants and Cities Conference convened mayors and other officials for wide-ranging discussions intended to raise our collective awareness of how city administrations and other local institutions affect migration and its outcomes and to stimulate further work in the area.⁸⁴²

The Third Global Mayoral Forum on migration and development took place in Quezon, the Philippines, in September 2016, led by the Joint Migration and Development Initiative, IOM and the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR).⁸⁴³ Part of that conference included work on how local authorities can benefit from and support the Migrants in Countries in Crisis Initiative – another example of how cities are featuring in national and international initiatives. The Fifth World Summit of Local and Regional Leaders took place in October 2016 in Bogota, Colombia and, for the first time, migration issues were included in the agenda of the three-day event. The Summit culminated in a Declaration – the Bogota Commitment – in which signatories called for local action towards sustainable urbanization.⁸⁴⁴ The Global Parliament of Mayors, launched shortly ahead of Habitat III to enable political city leaders to jointly advocate for local interests, adopted migration as one of its two priorities.

The traditional focal point of the United Nations for urban issues has been UN-Habitat, and the Habitat III conference, which took place in Quito, Ecuador in October 2016, gave a very high degree of prominence to migration in its New Urban Agenda. The wording on undocumented migrants in the world's cities – that all migrants ought to be accorded the same rights, regardless of their legal status – received much attention. The conference participants agreed that: all inhabitants, including migrants, whether living in formal or informal settlements, be enabled to lead decent, dignified and rewarding lives and to achieve their full human potential. This commitment recognizes the fact that, although migration takes many forms, all migrants are rights holders, whether that migrant is moving or has moved across an international border or within a State away from his or her habitual place of residence; regardless of the person's legal status; whether the movement is voluntary or involuntary; whatever the causes for the movement are; or whatever the length of the stay is.⁸⁴⁵

842 The recommendations from this conference are in IOM, 2015a.

843 The report is available from www.globalmayoralforum3.ph/index.php.

844 IOM, 2016.

845 United Conference on Housing and Sustainable Development (Habitat III), 2016.

The Habitat III conversation took advantage of the IOM's Migration Governance Framework, which has been adapted to create an Urban Migration Governance Framework, formally known as the Migration Toolbox for Urban Governance.⁸⁴⁶

More recently, the United Nations adopted the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, which launched processes to develop two global compacts to respond to the perceived migration and refugee crises in different areas of the world – perhaps most notably as a result of the Syrian civil war. One of the compacts will be on refugees and the other will focus on ways to promote safe, orderly and regular migration. Elements of these compacts may well include a recognition of the efficacy of, and responsibilities for, cities with respect to migration and integration. Furthermore, in February, 2017, the United Nations General Assembly received the *Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary General on Migration*.⁸⁴⁷ This report (often referred to as *The Sutherland Report*, after its author, Sir Peter Sutherland) offered an extensive analysis of the global migration situation and the challenges that it presents, together with recommendations for the international community to manage these challenges. The report highlights five areas: crisis-related migration; labour migration; orderly migration, including return; inclusion; and migration governance. Recommendation 14 speaks to the empowerment of cities and local governments in ways that reflect some of the themes of this chapter, as well as those of the WMR 2015 and the report of the Migrants and Cities Conference.

An updated image of cities

Urbanization has increased to such an extent throughout most countries of the world that its effects may force a re-thinking of many aspects of governance, including the governance of migration. Migration has nearly become synonymous with urbanization, given the dominance of the city as the destination of most migrants. Some cities are finding it difficult to manage the rapid growth in their populations, while others are trying to find their way as their residents leave for cities elsewhere. The urban agenda has been growing in academic circles for a number of decades and, with regard to migration, has perhaps been most advanced by such scholars as Saskia Sassen,⁸⁴⁸ Manuel Castells,⁸⁴⁹ and Nina Glick Schiller and Ayse Çağlar.⁸⁵⁰ Sassen alerted us to the global city (as distinct from the older concept of the world city) and the impact that it has, well beyond its country's borders – in particular, as a result of the globalization of finance and other industries through information and communication technology (ICT), and the consequent weakening of the State, often over-stated but nonetheless real. Global cities and the firms that power them can operate beyond the reach of national policy and regulation. Scholars have for some time been shifting their concentration from States to local authorities in furthering our understanding of migration and other phenomena, noting the increased efficacy of the city in determining migration flows, partly due to ICTs and other aspects of globalization.⁸⁵¹ Glick Schiller and Çağlar in their recent collection, *Locating Migration: Rescaling Cities and Migrants*,⁸⁵² extend this recent approach, some of it building upon the earlier insight of Castells, to see cities as spaces of flows rather than as static physical settlements, and with migrants as significant agents in the evolution of a city's character. Hein de Haas and Mathias Czaika recently noted:

846 IOM, 2015b.

847 UNGA, 2017.

848 Sassen, 1991.

849 Castells, 1996.

850 Glick Schiller and Çağlar, 2010.

851 Skelcher, Sullivan and Jeffares, 2013; Buch et al., 2013; Combes, Démurger and Li, 2017.

852 Glick Schiller and Çağlar, 2010.

Human resources and economic activities have become increasingly concentrated in a relatively low number of countries or, more precisely, metropolitan areas within a few countries – which reflects processes of urbanization and internal (rural–urban) migration.⁸⁵³

These developments are not of merely academic interest. They suggest that cities may be more influential and capable than even their own officials realize. National governments need to build into their migration and integration policy frameworks a robust role for city administrations and other local actors, and cities need to acknowledge their degree of influence and note that responsibility for migration and the migrants who live in their cities is not that of national jurisdictions alone.

Cities have become significant determinants of global migration flows and their patterns – because, once again, it is the city that most rewards a migrant’s human capital.⁸⁵⁴ Seto argues:

Migration to urban centers in mega-deltas is an outcome of many forces: economic policies and incentives, local and destination institutions, government policies to develop small towns, and the geographic concentration of investments. Massive influx of capital to many deltas has transformed the local economic base from a primarily agricultural one to a manufacturing and processing economy. This has created uneven spatial economic development, which is the underlying driver of migration to cities in the mega-deltas regardless of geographic context or size. Going forward to 2060, one critical challenge for all the deltas is to increase the labor skill of their workforce and foster technology innovation. Continued economic growth in these regions will require substantial investments in education and capacity building and the ability of urban centers to absorb the migrant labor pool.⁸⁵⁵

Despite this reality, the migration literature and data collection continue to emphasize *countries* as sources and destinations, the role of national migration and integration policy, national employment statistics, and other national-level phenomena. But it is not only national policies or a country’s need for labour that determine migration flows. It is city administrations, together with the other local institutions in the private and non-governmental sectors, that attract economic activity and that promote interest, investment and immigration. National policy regimes provide a background within which local activity takes place, but increasingly it is city institutions that recruit and retain migrants. We have long heard that it is cities that are responsible for the lion’s share of integration, but we hear less of the city’s role in determining migration flows themselves. This lack of recognition has resulted in a significant gap in both research and migration policy development – a gap wherein those who are arguably the major determinants of migration flows are largely absent from the policy discussions. The point of emphasis is not the older point of whether cities are sufficiently equipped to manage the arrival and integration of migrants. The fundamental point here is that cities are not part of national migration policy development, despite the fact that they are increasingly among the principal determinants of migration.

853 de Haas and Czaika, 2014.

854 Price and Benton-Short, 2007. See also Scott and Storper, 2003 for another classic treatment.

855 Seto, 2011.

Migration, urbanization and challenges to governance

The *World Migration Report 2015* drew our attention to the formation of partnerships within cities for managing migration, including for the economic development of the cities themselves. The report argued that migration should be seen, not as an unfortunate burden for cities to cope with, but as representing significant potential benefits for cities. Many of the partnerships explored in the report were between cities and migrants, with migrants seen as major contributors as employees, as entrepreneurs and employers, and as bridges for trade, commerce and culture between the city and the migrants' homelands. But the report also looked at the relations between national and local government and saw not only a degree of policy fragmentation but also potential for effective partnerships between these levels of government. Given this policy fragmentation, as well as the newer approach to cities reported in the academic literature, some countries might benefit from a repositioning of authorities, with more responsibility and autonomy given to local governments. This point is also alluded to in *The Sutherland Report*.

As the principals in the global competition for talent, cities are the main draw, but they are restricted in exercising and directing their influence, due to their limited authority over migration policy, tax revenues and, hence, programmes to attract, support and retain migrants. There are many different aspects to the overall question of local governance of migration and its effects, and we will touch on a few that received less attention in the WMR 2015, relating to its call for enhanced national–local policy partnerships. It should be recognized that, given this chapter's focus on governance, we emphasize the institutions of governance – whether the formal administrative institutions of local government or the private and civil society sectors. What one learns, however, especially from the less formally structured activities of residents (including migrants), is that much of what characterizes a city is determined by its residents. This goes beyond the scope of their efforts to improve their local economic and social lives; the international connections that migrants retain and that other residents forge through business, family affairs, education and culture shape the character of a city. It is often through these efforts that innovation is born and replicated – perhaps most impressively evident in slums and peri-urban settlements where reliance on formal governance institutions may be unrealistic.⁸⁵⁶

Sanctuary cities

Some cities have simply asserted themselves with regard to some aspects of migration policy by, for example, directly promoting their city as a preferred destination for migrants or, along an entirely different line, declaring themselves to be a *sanctuary city*, in open defiance of national law with respect to the treatment of those in a country illegally. The Sanctuary City movement is most prominent in the United States of America but exists elsewhere, and it demonstrates a city's displeasure with national immigration law and its unwillingness to be part of the enforcement of those laws to which it takes exception. In his 2017 article, Harald Bauder analysed the concept of the Sanctuary City from the perspective of Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, finding significant differences in how the concept of sanctuary is understood and applied in these three countries.⁸⁵⁷ The relative informality of Sanctuary Cities as a movement means that there are differences among them, with more similarities between the Canadian and US cities than those in the United Kingdom, which tends to use the term "Cities of Sanctuary". There, the concept

856 Rufin, 2016; Deininger et al., 2010.

857 Bauder, 2017.

emphasizes communities welcoming and supporting refugees and other migrants in open defiance of national immigration law.⁸⁵⁸

The existence of Sanctuary Cities is, perhaps, a result of the lack of involvement of cities in setting immigration policy and determining how such policy is implemented. With the United States of America now proposing to financially or otherwise sanction self-declared Sanctuary Cities, it is clear that declaring a city to be a Sanctuary City can constitute an act of civil disobedience. These examples of cities exerting a degree of autonomy over migration affairs reflect the current lack of involvement of cities in national migration policy development and point to the need for local–national partnerships (such as those mentioned in the WMR 2015) to be developed.⁸⁵⁹

Slums in the world's megacities

The discussion of local migration-related governance challenges tends to start from how cities can manage population growth – especially growth that brings with it increased diversity. Nowhere is this challenge more keenly felt than in the world's megacities, most of which are in developing countries. In 2016, there were over 30 megacities in the world – cities with at least 10 million residents – led by Tokyo with over 38 million residents.⁸⁶⁰ Many of the world's megacities have large slums – some with over 1 million residents. The world's largest slum – Neza-Chalco-Izta, in Mexico City – has over 4 million residents and is referred to as a “mega-slum”.⁸⁶¹ The governance problems associated with slums are legion and well documented; suffice it to say that, in slums, one experiences inadequate, crowded and unsafe housing, a lack of basic infrastructure and public utilities, such as safe drinking water, sanitation services, garbage removal, adequate streets and roads, even for the passage of emergency vehicles, access to affordable transportation, and more. These conditions lead to risks of disease, violence, lack of education and other opportunities for human development, and elevated harms from natural disasters. Slum formation has been a central characteristic of rapid urbanization – both from internal and international migration – in the Global South and is expected to continue well into the future. For cities facing these challenges, continued high levels of migration represent a significant problem. Some cities in the Global South have adopted measures to try to curtail rural-to-urban migration simply because they are unable to offer the level of services and basic infrastructure required to meet the needs of the newcomers whose rate of arrival can far outstrip the rate at which local government can respond.

Although most rural-to-urban migration takes place within national boundaries, national governments can support local authorities in managing this form of migration, perhaps with help from the international community. Megacities that grow through the enlargement of slums rather than through increased economic prosperity risk severe problems to the point of becoming ungovernable. Finding ways to turn internal rural-to-urban migration into a net positive for the world's megacities and other large cities is becoming increasingly urgent, especially with few signs that such migration will abate. In other words, it is unlikely that the solution will be to slow, let alone stop, the movement of people to the city. But the challenge of upgrading slums immediately meets the challenge of doing so inclusively.

858 See <https://cityofsanctuary.org/>.

859 Chen, 2015.

860 UN DESA, 2016.

861 See <https://borgenproject.org/category/slums/>.

Upgrading slums inclusively

The misery of slums has been a major challenge in the development literature for decades. Here we wish to point to a relatively recent shift in perspective – a shift that accompanies the interest in inclusive development. The UN-Habitat Participatory Slum Upgrading Programme is an example of the interest in *inclusive urban development* in its desire for empowering “key urban actors, especially slum dwellers themselves, to contribute to the incremental eradication of urban poverty at community, city-wide and national levels”. Inclusive development in general seeks to involve all stakeholders in development decision-making processes, with the aim that development goals (such as those expressed through per capita GDP growth rates) not be achieved at the expense of the poorest members of a society. Having the residents of slums involved in the development process should not only enhance economic outcomes and improve living conditions but also enhance the quality of governance in the city. Having the migrant residents of a slum engaged in its development can be a powerful means of integrating them into the life of the city; it is a way for migrants to take partial responsibility for their own integration, assuming a greater degree of agency as opposed to remaining in a condition of vulnerability.

This brings us back to the innovation potential that many now see in slums as their residents develop their own solutions to the many challenges of daily life. Because formal governance institutions cannot be relied upon to solve all of the many problems in the slums, the residents become the agents of improvement and the developers of new ideas for managing the neighbourhood.⁸⁶² In this, many see hope, but others caution against overly romanticizing the slum.

Comments from the Global South at IOM’s Migrants and Cities Conference

Slum formation has been a central characteristic of rapid urbanization in the Global South and is expected to continue well into the future. Many of the world’s megacities have large slums, some with over 1 million residents. K.B. Wiafe, the Mayor of Kumasi, Ghana, pointed to the creation of slums as a significant detrimental effect of migration to the city; those living in slums have but poor access to electricity and potable water. He expressed the hope that migration to Kumasi could be reduced to ease the pressure on the city’s housing supply and considered incentives to offer people to remain in their rural homes. Mark Owen Woyongo, Minister of the Interior, Ghana echoed these comments in the context of his country; the city of Accra has 43 per cent of its population living in slums. Ambassador Ndayisaba of Burundi made similar points about his capital city. Alex Ross of the World Health Organization (WHO) noted the link between living in a slum and poor health as a result of crowding, a lack of drinkable water, poor sanitation and poverty. He described WHO’s approach towards solutions for urban health as based upon capturing data on health inequities, prioritizing interventions, developing migrant sensitive health systems, establishing cultural competency and linguistic access, looking at urban planning and public health together, differentiating responses according to conditions, and enacting these measures through partnerships.

862 Smedley 2013; Mano et al., 2016. The innovation potential of slums is also highlighted in Saunders, 2010.

Peri-urban slum settlements

Peri-urban settlements in developing countries have grown with rapid urbanization – through both internal and international migration – and are presenting challenges that, while similar to those of urban slums, are markedly different, owing to their location not only outside the city limits but often outside the legal jurisdiction of the city. Peri-urban slums can be even less formal than urban slums, with even fewer services and resources. As a result, living conditions (including sanitary conditions) can be much worse than in urban slums, employment is often distant and difficult to access, and the reach of urban planners tends not to extend as far as the peri-urban settlements, leaving a major gap in governance. Being at or beyond the periphery of a city, peri-urban areas can be virtually ungoverned, not only leaving problems unsolved and needs unmet, but also leaving these settlements vulnerable to control by organized criminal groups.⁸⁶³ These informal settlements can be found on the periphery of cities throughout much of the developing world. Much has been written on this phenomenon in South Asia, Africa and Latin America, and this growing body of literature speaks not only of the difficulties that migration to peri-urban regions produces but also of the resourcefulness and innovations that can arise from these settlements.⁸⁶⁴ The Mathare Valley Slums in Nairobi, Kenya offer an example of how the residents of what is regarded as an illegal and impermanent settlement have responded to the lack of official governance over the settlement by creating their own economic and informal governance mechanisms.⁸⁶⁵

The growth of peri-urban areas is not only found in developing countries but also on the periphery of cities in the Global North in a more recent variant on urban sprawl. The accelerating cost of housing, together with migration into Europe, has, for example, led to the establishment of many peri-urban settlements. Academic researchers are turning more of their attention to these informal and illegal settlements, which are stressing the governance capacities of neighbouring cities such as Lisbon, Athens and Rome.⁸⁶⁶

Shrinking cities

At the opposite end of the spectrum of growing cities are cities that are shrinking as a result of a combination of outmigration and low fertility levels, leaving them not only with smaller populations and therefore smaller tax bases but often with older populations as well. Nearly 1 in 10 cities in the United States is shrinking⁸⁶⁷ and this is replicated in many other countries in both the Global North and the Global South as people move elsewhere for economic or other advantages. Often, it is the very large cities that are attracting people from smaller urban centres – for example, in Japan where many are leaving medium-sized cities for greater fortunes in Tokyo.⁸⁶⁸ In other cases, such as in the Russian Federation and Ukraine, overall national population decline is resulting in population decline in some cities. Among developing countries, it is the cities of China and India that are experiencing the greatest shrinkages.⁸⁶⁹ Some cities that experience population decline bounce back, as is well-illustrated by the city of London, United Kingdom. Although the city experienced a period of decline when its population in 1991 dropped to 6.4 million from nearly 9 million in 1939, its economic fortunes then reversed, followed by a population recovery, and it is now projected to become a megacity

863 Amerasinghe and Marshall, 2017; Shivendra and Ramaraju, 2013.

864 Narain, Anand and Banerjee, 2013.

865 Thorn, Thornton and Helfgott, 2015.

866 Raposo, Crespo and Lages, 2017; Salvati et al., 2014.


867 *The Economist*, 2015.

868 Takahashi and Sugiura, 1996.

869 The Robinson Rojas Archives, 2008.

before 2020.⁸⁷⁰ American cities such as Detroit have become well known for their population decline (figure 1) and, in partnership with State of Michigan authorities, are making strong efforts to attract migrants to the city to reverse this long-term trend. Modest success has been achieved with many of the new arrivals being from Muslim-majority countries; Detroit now boasts the largest Arab-American community in the United States.⁸⁷¹ The economic and demographic fortunes of cities such as Detroit are highly intertwined, and the future of this and other cities that have experienced population decline must be observed for lessons learned. Although there is reason for optimism in the experiences of London and New York, which also suffered a steep population loss in the 1970s, the harsher reality for many future and currently shrinking cities is that historically low fertility rates mean that some of these cities will need to develop strategies to manage the effects of permanent population loss.⁸⁷²

Figure 1. Detroit's population, 1840–2012



Source: Myler, 2013.

The response of cities to the 2015–2016 mass migration and displacement

More specifically with regard to the role of cities in migrant integration and inclusion, much attention is being given to the efforts of civil society organizations that have come to the foreground – for example, in the settling and integration of refugees and other migrants who came in exceptionally large numbers to

⁸⁷⁰ GLA Intelligence, 2015.

⁸⁷¹ Arab American Institute, 2012.

⁸⁷² Pallagst, 2014.

Austria, Germany and Sweden in 2015–2016.⁸⁷³ Their contribution has been widely recognized as both a form of emergency response and a vital part of a longer-term solution to the challenge of so many people adjusting to their new social and economic contexts.

The example of Canada, which has resettled approximately 40,000 Syrian refugees since 2015, has caught considerable attention, owing to the role of local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in not only contributing to the early arrival and settlement of Syrians, but also acting as formal refugee sponsors.⁸⁷⁴ The privately sponsored refugee programme in Canada allows locally based civil society organizations to enter into an agreement with the Government whereby the private sponsor incurs the costs of settlement and integration for the refugees for one year and the Government accordingly provides visas following security and medical screening.⁸⁷⁵ A number of countries have looked to this programme as a possible model for their NGO sector to follow. The Global Refugee Sponsorship Initiative was launched in response, with the support of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Government of Canada and the Open Society Foundation; their objective is to help other countries implement their own version of Canada's private refugee sponsorship programme.⁸⁷⁶ Although this form of programming is under national government jurisdiction, it is important to note that it functions only through local community actors and local government agencies who take the initiative in sponsoring the refugees. Characteristically, demand for sponsorships ran higher than the available visas and, in fact, outpaced the administrative ability of the national government to process applications. This indicates not only a willingness on the part of people to support the settlement and integration of refugees in their communities but also a capacity to organize the settlement process as this formal government programme demands.

However, it is the cities in the Middle East and Turkey that have borne the greatest share of the responsibility for the caring of the refugees from Iraq, the Syrian Arab Republic and surrounding countries, and it is here that the response has been most remarkable. Although many refugees are in camps, whether UNHCR camps or others, a large number are urban refugees living in the cities of Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey. Only 8 per cent of refugees in Turkey are in camps, with the rest living in Turkish cities. Istanbul alone is home to 539,000 Syrians, at last count, and the registration process continues.⁸⁷⁷ National–local government relations have proved challenging in this exceptional environment, and Murat Erdogan argues that: “Municipalities should be regarded as the primary institutions that determine migration, refugee and cohesion policies rather than as institutions that might or might not be consulted in this regard depending on the central government's preference.” He also recommends that the following practices be implemented:

Another practice that would be as efficient as the previous one is the development of mechanisms to gather all relevant public institutions under one roof. It is important to create areas for refugees where all services can be offered in one place. [...] In local services, refugees should be involved in the decision-making process. We should consider the needs, suggestions and concerns of Syrians, as we are living together with them now. Both legal and administrative arrangements may be made in

873 Glorius and Doornik (eds), 2016. See also the Brookings Institution, n.d.

874 Government of Canada, 2015.

875 Hyndman, Payne and Jimenez, 2017; Tito and Cochand, 2017; Garcea, 2016.

876 UNHCR, 2016.

877 Erdogan, 2017.

this regard. It is also very important that local governments, especially municipalities, work on preventing potential tension between local people and refugees while providing services to refugees in this process. The performance of municipalities on local harmonization will directly affect the overall harmonization in society. Programs involving social inclusion are extremely valuable in terms of developing the capacity to cope with social conflicts.⁸⁷⁸

Governance: beyond policy to urban planning

Since the launch of the *World Migration Report 2015*, recognition of the power of cities to influence global migration flows and their role in the integration of migrants has only grown among academic and other researchers.⁸⁷⁹ The importance of cities to migration is not a temporary matter but a consequence of the degree to which the world's population has urbanized. Many of our attitudes towards cities were shaped when societies were considerably more rural than they are now, and this is particularly evident with regard to their role in the governance of our societies. Both national and other higher jurisdictions and cities need to recognize that the growth in the importance and influence of cities requires shifts in our attitudes about governance roles. National and other upper levels of government need to find ways to bring cities to the migration and integration policy tables, among others. Given that there are usually numerous cities in individual countries, how cities are represented at the policy table will require some serious consideration, but associations of municipalities such as the Federation of Canadian Municipalities, the National League of Cities (US), Eurocities and Africa's Municipal Development Partnership might be able to play this role at national policy tables. Local governments and institutions need to recognize the influence that they have – either in reality or potentially – and assume a degree of responsibility and leadership appropriate to their circumstances. In other words, cities should be further empowered and should accept this empowerment.

Jurisdictional change takes time, especially if it requires amendments to a constitution. Granting municipalities greater authority over revenue generation, land use determination and infrastructure development (some of the standard responsibilities of local governments) will not happen quickly if allocating authorities is a zero sum proposition. And offering local governments any form of authority over migration policy would prove yet more difficult. As long as local decisions affecting migration, settlement and integration can be over-ridden by higher jurisdictions, there is all the more reason to encourage deeper cooperation among governments and to find ways to bring local authorities to the policy table of higher-level governments, leaving possible formal reassignments of jurisdictional authorities to the longer term. The call for national-level governments to bring local authorities to the policy table is for the purposes of more judiciously adjusting the numbers of migrants who are admitted yearly, helping societies to better compete for the migrants that they and their economies need, and achieving better integration and a greater degree of inclusion for the migrants and their families. The development of national migration and integration policies will be enhanced if local partners are involved. Much of the discussion of the role played by cities within their own jurisdictions has emphasized policy (particularly policy that is inclusive of the migrants and their interests) whose implementation confers the benefits of inclusion on the migrants and the benefits of social harmony, an enriched culture, and a more vibrant economy on the city and its residents. The calls for better alignment of local with higher-level policy are

878 Erdogan, 2017.

879 See, for example, The Guardian, 2015 and the LSE Cities centre website (<https://secities.net/>).

reflected in the WMR 2015, but where cities most powerfully come into their own is with planning, and it is the interface of planning and migration that requires more attention than it has so far received. Urban planning is an aspect of governance often neglected in discussions of managing migration, which tend to consider higher-level policy; more attention needs to be paid to this highly important but quotidian aspect of governance.

Declaring a policy of, for example, migrant inclusion, openness to migrant entrepreneurs and support for their integration is one thing, but it is in planning that concrete implementation begins. Plans embody priorities for allocating resources, and they frame decisions made by administrators and elected officials. A policy of inclusion may be thwarted by city plans that do not allow migrant-owned business or places of worship to be established. The planning process itself can be an act of inclusion by ensuring the representation of migrant communities or businesses or religious, cultural and other institutions on planning committees. The participation of migrant and minority groups at the planning table will not only be itself an act of inclusion but, more importantly, will ensure that the interests and needs of these communities are understood and appreciated from a planning perspective. There are many examples to consider, among them the location of services, the provision of basic infrastructure including transportation, communications, health care, education, social services and access to ICTs. Issues relating to values, rights and politics matter; in the everyday lives of migrants, however, it can be the more practical planning issues that take on the greatest salience for the inclusion of migrants in a city. Is the migrants' neighbourhood served well by public transit? Can a new ethnic grocery store be opened in the neighbourhood? Can a place of worship be built, with sufficient parking spaces? Can a library branch be opened nearby? Can migrant-serving agencies be located nearby? These and similar practical matters are the domain of urban planners more than that of elected or other policy officials.

Planning for diversity

With the strong interest in the rights of migrants, the right to the city movement, and inclusive local policy development, urban planning has often been neglected in the discussion of migrant integration. To a certain extent, planning for the effects of migration is parallel to that of planning for a growing population, where top priorities are infrastructure, service provision and economic development. But planning around migration must go beyond these fundamentals, owing to the diversity that migration brings to a city's people. Many argue that diversity can be an advantage to a society, and the City of Toronto years ago adopted *Diversity Our Strength* as its motto. Furthermore, many networks devoted to the advantages of managing diversity as a strength have emerged, including the Council of Europe's *Intercultural Cities Programme* and *Cities of Migration*, which was created by the Maytree Foundation of Toronto. Planning theory offers what has been called "multicultural planning" as a set of principles to guide urban planners in their work to incorporate migration and diversity into their planning and plans. Although not often put into practice, the theory warrants serious consideration and deserves to be better known in the fields of migration and urban planning.

In brief, multicultural planning is the planned alteration of the built environment and/or planning processes in response to the multi-ethnic composition and orientation of the local population.⁸⁸⁰ Traditional forms of urban planning tend to homogenize the residents, seeking to serve the broad public good. Multicultural planning takes the diversity of a population directly into account, noting the distinct interests of its composite groups, where they live, work and carry out their lives. In many large cities in North America, for example, migrants

880 Van der Horst and Ouwehand, 2011.

from Asia are settling directly into the suburbs, foregoing the earlier initial stay in an inner-city enclave.⁸⁸¹ The development pressures on suburbs in Los Angeles, Toronto or Vancouver, not only with respect to housing but also to business development and other activities with strong implications for land use, require a different way of thinking about the suburbs, with a different approach to planning and those involved in the process.

Minority ethnic retail areas provide a significant challenge for urban planners, given the complexity of the uses to which ethnic communities may put these areas, which can go well beyond shopping for goods. Zhixi Cecilia Zhuang's recent work on these districts in Toronto offers strong directions for planners.⁸⁸² It is in the small aspects of daily life, such as shopping and moving about through one's community and engaging with one's fellow residents, that a city's degree of inclusiveness is revealed. Planning decisions have a significant impact on the quality of these daily life experiences, which is the point of multicultural planning. High-level policy statements are meaningless if they are not implemented through urban plans.

Planning for diversity: the example of retail land use by Zhixi Cecilia Zhuang

Municipalities should explore creative ways to support immigrant groups in expressing their cultures and lifestyles. City-wide policies, such as official plans, urban design guidelines and cultural plans, should explicitly recognize the ethno-cultural diversity manifested in urban landscapes. In addition, site-specific policies should be developed in minority ethnic retail areas, which will allow ethnic communities to work with city officials to incorporate cultural expressions on design and planning matters including, but not limited to, streetscapes, architectural façades, storefront decorations, sidewalk spaces, signage, street vending, public arts and community events. Possible policy outcomes could be secondary plans, special area studies, strategic plans, streetscape design guidelines, or comprehensive community improvement plans that will provide city officials with explicit guidance as to how to maintain and enhance such profound ethnic landscapes. City officials can play a key role in reflecting community needs, optimizing various resources and improving the physical business environment. Specifically, city planners, urban designers and economic development officers, as the frontline professionals, are accountable for addressing issues related to neighbourhood changes and expressions of identity, design quality of public spaces, and economic development and revitalization.^a

a Zhuang, 2015.

Mohammad Qadeer takes a broader look at multicultural planning and offers a set of principles that he believes should guide urban planners who want to ensure that their city welcomes diversity and is inclusive.⁸⁸³

881 Hiebert, 2015; Gold, 2015; Li, 2008.

882 Zhuang, 2015.

883 Qadeer, 2009; Qadeer and Agrawal, 2011.

Advice to cities in planning for diversity, as recommended by Mohammad Qadeer

- Provide minority language facilities, translations and interpretation, in public consultations.
- Include minority representatives in planning committees and task forces, as well as diversifying planning staff.
- Include ethnic/minority community organizations in the planning decision-making processes.
- Recognize ethnic diversity as a planning goal in official/comprehensive plans.
- Include city-wide policies for culture-specific institutions in plans – such as places of worship, ethnic seniors' homes, cultural institutions, funeral homes, fairs and parades.
- Routinely analyse ethnic and racial variables in planning analysis.
- Study ethnic enclaves and neighbourhoods in transition.
- Establish policies/design guidelines for sustaining ethnic neighbourhoods.
- Establish policies/strategies for ethnic commercial areas, malls and business improvement areas.
- Include culture/religion as an acceptable reason for site-specific accommodations/minor variances.
- Accommodate ethnic signage, street names and symbols.
- Address ethnic-specific service needs.
- Address immigrants' special service needs.
- Establish policies/projects for ethnic heritage preservation.
- Develop guidelines for housing to suit diverse groups.
- Promote ethnic community initiatives for housing and neighbourhood development.
- Develop strategies that take into account intercultural needs.
- Promote ethnic entrepreneurship for economic development.
- Promote ethnic art and cultural services.
- Accommodate ethnic sports (such as cricket and bocce) in playfield design and programming.

City plans are often developed for 10–25-year periods and, therefore, represent the long-term strategic planning of the sort necessitated by demographic change. Although migration trends can sometimes shift unexpectedly, often (especially with managed migration systems) they can be predicted to no small extent, and this allows for more effective longer-term urban planning. This is particularly useful with regard to high-capital-cost infrastructure development such as for transportation, housing, electricity, water and sanitation systems, communications, and the location of commercial and retail sectors. Stable and predictable immigration trends, together with research findings on settlement patterns for new arrivals to the city, offer advantages to planners tasked with mapping out the long-term future of a city. Again, our hope in this section is to draw greater attention to the importance of urban planning in the local governance of migration. Calls for inclusive local policy have been a step forward in this discussion, but the development of policy alone is not enough. For inclusiveness to be achieved, the appropriate policies must be implemented through on-the-ground planning.

Looking ahead

A Global North bias in the discussion?

These concerns of urban planning and the incorporation of multiculturalism into planning spring largely from the experiences of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. The discussion on migration and cities, including its urban planning aspects, can be deeply slanted towards the concerns of fully developed societies and their mature economies. When this happens, these discussions may leave out the situations faced by cities in developing countries, whether those cities are modestly sized or megacities. Many cities in developing countries face the challenges of slums, which, by their nature, are unplanned. Slums are not only places of poverty; they also lack basic services, including drinkable water, sanitation, electricity and public transportation. They may include areas unreachable by motor vehicles (including ambulances) and may be considered ungovernable and beyond the reach of planning initiatives.

The principal challenge of slums, however, is substandard housing – a major theme of the Habitat III Conference. The New Urban Agenda that emerged from the Habitat III Conference in Quito is exceptionally ambitious and comprehensive. Despite its being a non-binding agreement, it offers very useful long-term guidance to local and national governments on how to make cities more livable, sustainable and inclusive. But, even here, and with the involvement of national governments of developing countries, the question remains whether the New Urban Agenda is more realistic for wealthier countries than for those of developing nations. One fundamental concern must be with the lack of planners in developing countries; not all cities have a planning office, and many do not have even a single planner. In other words, the capacity of the world's cities to implement the New Urban Agenda is not equal, and the wealthier countries are likely to perform best in implementing it.

With regard to the local management of migration effects, it is, once again, the cities in the world's wealthier countries that will fare best as they have a greater resource capacity, including for planning, and they have a higher capacity to manage migration flows than countries in the Global South. While we can applaud the fact that UN Member States reached agreement on the Sustainable Development Goals, which included numerous references to cities and to migration, as well as the fact that they reached agreement on the New Urban Agenda, which also includes references to migrants, it is debatable whether universal agreements of these sorts are fully appropriate for all societies at the same time. Societies that are currently unable to fully implement these goals may still find them useful, over time. But some cities in developing countries face problems that are simply different and far more severe than those faced by cities in the world's richer countries, and this will affect their ability to implement the full range of objectives. To which should they give priority?

While financial resources are important, we have seen time and again that many places are not prepared to use new resources if they were made available, and in fact do not use resources that are readily available now. Local capacity is the biggest obstacle [...]. There is a scarcity of human capacity. India is estimated to have some 3,000 trained planners, even though it has 5,000 places with populations exceeding 10,000 people. Even if we allocated only one planner per place – an absurd proposition, given the size of New Delhi or Mumbai – 40 percent of the places would be without a planner. Furthermore, few planners have backgrounds in

public finance, and most public finance professionals do not have well-demonstrated planning skills, leaving most places with inadequate capital budgeting and difficulty maintaining existing infrastructure.⁸⁸⁴

To these cautionary remarks should be added the fact that fully developed countries can learn from the experiences of those less wealthy. As was remarked briefly with regard to slums, there are innovations being developed by the less wealthy. Such innovations are of value in their own right but also demonstrate the potential of a less formal approach to city management – an approach that leaves more room for residents, including migrants, to develop solutions to local problems, ideas for economic advancement, and the means to strengthen social cohesion.

Some implications

Each of the areas discussed here, however briefly, warrants further examination by academic, government and civil society researchers, as well as by local and national policy officials, and by the international community, which is becoming increasingly engaged in these matters. Further discussions on the themes covered in this chapter, with emphasis on the following, are warranted:

- Cities as determinants of migration flow patterns and what this means for governance: how national and local governments should collaborate on setting immigration levels, on the global competition for talent, on best practices for settlement and integration, and on the role of non-governmental actors, including the business community and civil society organizations, in managing migration for social and economic benefits for the cities of destination.
- The challenges specific to cities of migration in the Global South, including megacities and slums, such as coping with very rapid population growth and pressures on infrastructure and basic services, the expansion of slums and peri-urban settlements, and the lack of an adequate planning capacity.
- Migration and urban planning, including planning explicitly for diversity: introducing urban planners into discussions of the challenges faced by cities in both the Global North and South, with respect to migration – discussions designed to elicit best practices in long-term urban planning for migration.

The emergence of cities as world leaders in determining migration patterns is the result of continuing urbanization, now a fully global phenomenon. Cities are the major magnets for the world's top talent, but they are also the destinations for those millions of migrants seeking employment of any form, greater security for themselves and their families, and the hope of a better future. It is not only global cities or larger cities that attract migrants; indeed, as larger cities become in some ways less livable, due to congestion and crowding, some smaller cities will become increasingly sought after as destinations, and these cities, perhaps with less experience in managing migration and integration, will benefit from the learned wisdom of others. This chapter is a call for enhanced mutual exchanges of knowledge and experience among cities, their elected leaders, their policy officials, their planners, and the many institutions within them whose actions contribute to the outcomes of the migration processes. Although we recognize that it remains the purview of national authorities to manage borders and migration policies, we urge national governments to also enable

⁸⁸⁴ Citiscope, 2016.

cities to take on more responsibilities as the global actors that they have become in international migration. Urbanization, long-term history would suggest, is not going to be reversed, making it ever more appropriate for cities to be represented at national migration policy tables. Furthermore, the international community can serve as conveners of city officials and institutions to enhance our collective thinking on how to go about this complex business.



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Chapter 9

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Appendices

Chapter 2

Appendix A. Key migration concepts and definitions

Internally displaced person (IDP)

The 1998 UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement define IDPs as:

[...] persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border.

For more information on IDPs, and applicable definitions and associated caveats, refer to the IDMC documents and sources referenced in that section.

International migrant

The 1998 United Nations Recommendations on Statistics of International Migration, Revision 1, set out the key concepts related to the measurement of international migration. The Recommendations define an international migrant as *any person who changes his or her country of usual residence* (p. 9).¹

Per the Recommendations, the country of usual residence is *that in which the person has a place to live where he or she normally spends the daily period of rest*.² Also, people travelling abroad temporarily *for purposes of recreation, holiday, business, medical treatment or religious pilgrimage*³ should not be included in the international migrant group, as these cases do not imply a change in the country of usual residence.

The Recommendations also distinguish between *long-term migrants* and *short-term migrants*. A *long-term migrant* is defined as *a person who moves to a country other than that of his or her usual residence for a period of at least a year (12 months), so that the country of destination effectively becomes his or her new country of usual residence* (p. 10).⁴ Short-term migrants are defined as *persons who move to a country other than that of their usual residence for a period of at least 3 months but less than a year*⁵ – except for those travelling for the purposes indicated above, which exclude a change in the country of residence.

Therefore, an immigrant must not have been a usual resident, and will establish usual residence in the country he or she has entered. An emigrant should have been a usual resident of the country from which he or she is departing, and should be establishing usual residence in another country. Use of this definition

1 UN DESA, 1998.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid.

allows for the collection of internationally comparable data on migration. While the UN recommends that such a definition be adopted by national data systems, this should not be confused with administrative and legal definitions of an international migrant used in each country.⁶ It should also be noted that core concepts and definitions on international migrant embodied in national practices may often differ from concepts and definitions recommended by the UN; statistics on international migrant stocks presented in this chapter reflect national definitions and not necessarily those recommended by the UN.

Irregular migration

Although there is no universally accepted definition of irregular migration, it can be broadly defined as “movement that takes place outside the regulatory norms of the sending, transit and receiving countries”.⁷ From the perspective of a destination country, irregular migration may imply entry, stay or work in a country without the necessary authorization or documents required under immigration regulations. From the perspective of a sending country, irregularity implies not fulfilling the administrative requirements for leaving the country, or leaving such country without a valid passport or travel document.

Migration stocks and flows

Statistics on the size of the migrant population are normally based on *stocks* (the total number of international migrants present in a given country at a specific point in time) and *flows* (the number of migrants entering or leaving a country during a given period – typically one year). The term *country* used in these definitions may also refer to other units (such as territories and areas).⁸

The main criteria used for categorizing migrant stocks and flows are *country of birth* and *citizenship*, which are defined below. (Actual or intended *duration of stay* is a further element required for collection of statistics on migration flows.)⁹

- Citizenship indicates the particular legal bond between an individual and his or her country (State), acquired by birth or naturalization, whether by declaration, choice, marriage or other means according to national legislation.
- Country of birth refers to the country of residence (in its current borders, if the information is available) of the mother at the time of the birth or, in default, the country (in its current borders, if the information is available) in which the birth took place.

6 IOM, n.d.h.

7 Ibid.; and IOM, 2017a.

8 UN DESA, 2015b.

9 IOM, n.d.h.

Migrant worker

Article 2(1) of the 1990 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families defines the term *migrant worker* as: “a person who is to be engaged, is engaged, or has been engaged in a remunerated activity in a State of which he or she is not a national”. Article 3 goes on to note that the Convention does not apply to a number of groups, including refugees, stateless persons and trainees, among others.

Other global-level, legal definitions of the term *migrant worker* and related terms can be found in ILO Conventions, including the Migration for Employment Convention (Revised) 1949 (No. 97) and the Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention 1975 (No. 143).

For more information on migrant workers, and applicable definitions and associated caveats, refer to the ILO documents and sources referenced in that section.

Refugee

Article 1 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, read together with its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, defines persons who fall within the global legal definition of a *refugee*. Article 1(A) (2), in particular, states that the term shall apply to any person who:

[...] owing to well founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.

Other provisions in Article 1 provide further guidance on persons who do not fall within this definition or persons who may cease to be refugees. Additionally, UNHCR’s Statute, UN General Assembly Resolutions and ECOSOC Resolutions also provide further guidance on persons who may fall within UNHCR’s competence.¹⁰

For more information on refugees and asylum seekers, and applicable definitions and associated caveats, refer to the UNHCR documents and sources referenced in that section.

Remittances

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) refers to remittances as “household income from foreign economies arising mainly from the temporary or permanent movement of people to those economies”.¹¹ Following the same definition, “remittances include cash and noncash items that flow through formal channels, such as via electronic wire, or through informal channels, such as money or goods carried across borders. They largely consist of funds and noncash items sent or given by individuals who have migrated to a new economy and

¹⁰ For more, see UNHCR, 2013.

¹¹ IMF, 2009.

become residents there, and the net compensation of border, seasonal, or other short-term workers who are employed in an economy in which they are not residents".¹²

Therefore, remittances are normally calculated as the sum of "compensation of employees" and "personal transfers".¹³ "Compensation of employees", in relation to remittance calculations, is defined as "the income of border, seasonal, and other short-term workers who are employed in an economy where they are not resident and of residents employed by nonresident entities";¹⁴ this means that salaries earned by resident employees of international organizations, embassies and consular offices, and other non-resident businesses are included in remittance calculations, although they technically do not (necessarily) imply transfer between resident migrants and non-resident households. Such amounts may also be very significant in certain countries where non-resident entities are numerous or employ high numbers of people. "Personal transfers" consist of all "current transfers in cash or in kind made or received by resident households to or from nonresident households", thus including "all current transfers between resident and nonresident individuals".¹⁵ Personal transfers may thus also provide an overestimate of actual transfers between resident migrants and non-resident households, which are what is commonly regarded as remittances. At the same time, the upward bias caused by counting remittances as the sum of personal transfers and compensation of employees may be partly offset by the probable undercounting of migrant remittances sent through informal channels. The extent of these biases is, however, very difficult to assess.

For more information on remittances, and applicable definitions and associated caveats, refer to the World Bank documents and sources referenced in that section.

Smuggling of migrants

Article 3(a) of the Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air defines "smuggling of migrants" as:

[...] the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident.

Articles 3(b) and (c) provide further clarification:

- (b) "Illegal entry" shall mean crossing borders without complying with the necessary requirements for legal entry into the receiving State;
- (c) "Fraudulent travel or identity document" shall mean any travel or identity document:
 - (i) That has been falsely made or altered in some material way by anyone other than a person or agency lawfully authorized to make or issue the travel or identity document on behalf of a State; or

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Alvarez et al., 2015.

¹⁴ IMF, 2009.

¹⁵ Ibid.

- (ii) That has been improperly issued or obtained through misrepresentation, corruption or duress or in any other unlawful manner; or
- (iii) That is being used by a person other than the rightful holder;

Trafficking in persons

Article 3 of the 2000 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, defines “trafficking in persons” as:

- (a) [...] the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs;
- (b) The consent of a victim of trafficking in persons to the intended exploitation set forth in subparagraph (a) of this article shall be irrelevant where any of the means set forth in subparagraph (a) have been used;
- (c) The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation shall be considered “trafficking in persons” even if this does not involve any of the means set forth in subparagraph (a) of this article;
- (d) “Child” shall mean any person under eighteen years of age.

For more information on human trafficking, and applicable definitions and associated caveats, refer to the UNODC documents and sources referenced in that section.

Chapter 2

Appendix B. Diaspora

The term *diaspora* has been extensively discussed and defined in a variety of ways, across several academic disciplines, although there is no single agreed-upon definition. In general, it refers to a country's nationals or citizens abroad and their descendants. The term *diaspora* literally means *dispersion* (from *dia speirein* or "to scatter across" in Greek). Some scholars agree that the distinguishing characteristic of diasporas from other migrant groups is the presence of strong cultural, linguistic, historical, religious and affective ties with the country or community of origin, or a sense of shared identity and belonging.¹⁶ Defining diasporas on the basis of nationality (for example, the Chinese or Indian diasporas) may often hide differences between groups, such as religion or ethnicity. Others suggest that the term *transnational communities* may better describe the reality of contemporary migration experiences, whereby migrants may establish and maintain connections with people in their home communities or migrants in other countries, thus "belonging to two or more societies at the same time".¹⁷

Defining diaspora for statistical purposes is extremely challenging. The complexity, sensitivity and lack of a common definition hinder the compilation of internationally comparable statistics on diaspora populations. At the national level, countries may have a statistical definition of diaspora, often reflecting their historical and political trajectories; however, emigrants and their descendants may or may not identify as members of diaspora, independently of the definition and political approach that their country of origin may utilize towards diaspora. Moreover, collection of information on emigrants often relies on data from host countries, which may be available for foreign nationals, but less so for their children or descendants. National population censuses and household surveys in countries of origin may provide some information on nationals living abroad, but issues of frequency (of censuses) and sampling (of surveys) are the main obstacles to a timely and comprehensive picture of diaspora groups. Therefore, even for single countries, quantification and qualification of diaspora groups – *diaspora mappings* – are hard to accomplish. IOM has assisted a number of countries in their efforts to map their diasporas; see the text box below on IOM's work. For these reasons, generating a reliable estimate of the global stock of diasporas is an almost impossible task, unless the definition is narrowed down to groups of emigrants for whom data are available for most countries. This has been attempted by the OECD and the World Bank.¹⁸

16 Vertovec and Cohen, 1999.

17 Vertovec, 2005.

18 See, for example, OECD, 2012b. In this 2012 OECD report, diasporas were defined as foreign-born persons aged 15 or older by country of birth, and their children born in destination countries. However, as mentioned in the report, information on children of migrants in destination countries is often not disaggregated by a number of characteristics. Therefore, information on sex and age of diasporas is not provided in the report. Also, only groups residing in OECD countries are considered, and statistics refer to the year 2008. The largest diasporas in the entire group of OECD countries were those of Mexico, with about 20 million people (or 16% of the total diaspora in OECD countries in that year), followed by Italy (with 5.2 million – 4% of the total), Germany (4.1 million – 3% of the total), India (3.8 million – 3% of the total), and the United Kingdom (2.9 million – 3% of the total). An update to this OECD report was released in 2015.

IOM's diaspora mapping

Within IOM, the term *diaspora* is used interchangeably with *transnational communities*. Both terms refer to migrants or descendants of migrants, whose identity and sense of belonging have been shaped by their migration experience and background. IOM uses the term *transnational communities* because, in a world of unprecedented global mobility, these communities comprise people who are connected to more than a single country. This allows for a more comprehensive approach and facilitates information and data collection.

To provide relevant information on diaspora populations, while identifying potential individuals who would be interested in investing and contributing their skills in their native countries, IOM maps data and ideas that are ultimately used in formulating policy propositions and recommendations. In many cases, the determining factor for IOM to engage transnational communities in its programming is a request from the government of the diaspora-hosting country or the country of origin. The guiding principle for IOM's participation should be that of serving the interests of all partners: the countries that transnational communities are connected to, the diaspora themselves, and the source country communities. IOM has formulated a comprehensive approach based on the 3Es for action: to Enable, Engage and Empower transnational communities as agents for development, with each stage involving interventions by governments and other stakeholders, supported by IOM through policy advice and programming.

Enabling	Engaging	Empowering
Maximizing the potential of transnational communities	Knowing and understanding transnational communities	Facilitating the mobilization of skills, expertise and resources of transnational communities

From 2000 to 2016, IOM produced more than 100 diaspora mapping reports for up to 61 countries of origin and 75 countries of destination, most of which were European or other OECD countries. More than a third of the mapping reports relate to migrants originating from the Asia and the Pacific, and Central and West Africa regions. Diaspora mapping focuses on different priorities, depending on the context in which the diaspora engagement takes place. Although most of the reports focus on the sociodemographic and economic profiles of diaspora communities, the objectives of such mappings vary from an analysis of the communication channels that particular diaspora communities utilize, to the identification of highly and semi-skilled professionals, among others. IOM is particularly involved in supporting the active participation of diaspora professionals in their countries of origin – for instance, in the health and education sectors, where specific development needs have been identified.

Chapter 2

Appendix C. Irregular migration flows

As discussed in chapter 2, analysing data on the movements of people between countries and regions who are using *regular visa* and migration pathways is inherently difficult, as relatively few countries systematically collect and report such information. The difficulties are even more profound when it comes to capturing data on *irregular migration flows* – which, by their very nature tend to be clandestine, given that most (but not all) migrants seek to evade the authorities during such migration journeys. Consequently, there are no available data on irregular migration flows globally or regionally. In addition, relatively few countries globally have the capacity to fully monitor and collect data on irregular migration flows into or out of their territory. (Some notable exceptions include the more remote countries of Australia and New Zealand, where the atypical geographical isolation makes data collection much more straightforward.)¹⁹ Many countries around the world continue to invest in border management capabilities and technologies allowing for the capture of data related to irregular migration flows. Some commentators question the utility of attempting to quantify irregular migration, citing the practical difficulties as well as the underlying rationale for collecting and citing such statistics, which can amount to alarmism.²⁰ There are, however, clear benefits to attempting to quantify irregular movements from the perspectives of national governments, regional and local governments, humanitarian service providers and others. A better understanding of the nature and extent of irregular migration flows would facilitate the development of more effective responses and mitigation strategies, particularly for populations at risk of displacement or irregular migration.²¹

Irregular migration *flows* are commonly considered to mean irregular entry into transit and destination countries, although irregular departure has also been a feature of certain regions and countries historically (for example, East Germany between 1949 and 1990) and contemporaneously (for example, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or North Korea). Some people who undertake irregular migration – departure and/or entry – have an express need *not* to evade authorities, but rather to engage with authorities or others (such as UNHCR) in order to seek protection. At certain times and in certain locations, refugees and asylum seekers may make up a substantial proportion of people moving irregularly along particular migration corridors. Irregular migration may place migrants in dangerous and life-threatening situations, as tragically demonstrated by the estimated number of migrant fatalities and disappearances globally recorded by IOM's Missing Migrants Project (see text box on IOM's MMP in chapter 2).

The little that is known of global irregular migration flows is deduced from estimates of irregular migrant stocks (as imprecise as they may be), under the assumption that irregular migrants entered via irregular means (that is, without prior permission of authorities). To some extent, this is likely to be true; however, many irregular migrants do not engage in unauthorized entry but, instead, take on irregular immigration status deliberately or unknowingly after arrival. Against this backdrop, irregular *maritime* migration flows, with their heightened visibility in recent years, may appear to be more significant and perhaps larger in scale than they are in practice, compared with other similar flows. This is particularly relevant to irregular maritime migration flows to developed countries such as Australia, Greece, Italy, Spain and the United States.

19 McAuliffe and Koser, 2017.

20 Castles, 2002; Clarke, 2000.

21 McAuliffe, 2017.

That is not to downplay the challenges and difficulties posed by irregular migration flows; however, in the absence of other data and information, it is extremely difficult to place these flows, which are often closely monitored, in a broader context. This is illustrated in the text box on irregular maritime migration flows.

Irregular maritime migration flows

Unlike other forms of irregular migration, the numbers of irregular maritime migrants moving from poor, less developed and/or conflict-ridden countries to developed countries, such as the flows heading for Australia, Europe and the United States, are relatively well documented. One of the reasons that this movement is monitored so closely is that it is highly visible. It also tends to be a focus of intense public interest. Consequently, highly regulated border-management processes have recently been developed, thereby increasing certain countries' capacity to count and report on the scope of irregular maritime flows. The U.S. Coast Guard, for example, reports precise figures going back to 1995. The EU's Frontex has increased its capacity, especially since 2008, to report on the number of persons detected while undertaking maritime migration in the Mediterranean and North Atlantic. These flows are typical of the focus on South–North movement and highlight the interest in monitoring irregular maritime migration to the North.

The scale of irregular maritime migration is difficult to quantify outside of the main South–North migration corridors. That said, even as recently as 10 years ago, such movement into Europe was not monitored and reported on in the highly systematized way it is today through Frontex. Data tend to capture interdictions/detections, and so clearly do not capture all attempts (successful or otherwise). It is likely that there are successful undetected maritime ventures in all contexts but, arguably, this is less likely in some circumstances. For example, it is possible that failing to be intercepted off the north-west coast of Australia by authorities may result in irregular migrants perishing in the very harsh and isolated coastal regions; the need to be detected by authorities is a genuine one.

Based on McAuliffe and Mence (2017).

Chapter 2

Appendix D. Human trafficking

Trafficking in persons is defined in Article 3 of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children.²² Due to the clandestine, invisible and underreported nature of human trafficking, however, global estimates of victims of trafficking are limited and extremely challenging to collect. The latest available data, which are from 2014, indicate that 17,752 victims of human trafficking were detected in 85 countries.²³ Between 2012 and 2014, 63,251 victims were detected in 106 countries and territories. UNODC notes that the majority of victims detected between 2012 and 2014 (57%) were trafficked transnationally, while the rest were trafficked within national borders.²⁴ For the same reasons that there are limited data, actual numbers of victims are likely to be much higher than the detected number of victims.²⁵

Of the total victims detected in 2014, women and girls comprised the majority, at 71 per cent of the total. Since the UNODC began collecting data on trafficking in persons in 2003, females have constituted the majority share of detected victims, although this proportion has decreased from 84 per cent in 2004, in line with the increasing recognition that males are also victims. Between 2012 and 2014, one in five detected victims were men. The share of children among detected victims has also risen from 13 per cent in 2004 (10% girls and 3% boys) to 28 per cent in 2014 (20% girls and 8% boys), down from a peak in 2011 at 34 per cent.

While detected victims were trafficked for a variety of reasons, including sexual exploitation, forced labour, forced marriage, begging and organ removal, sexual exploitation has predominated since 2003. The proportion has changed since 2008, however, from 61 per cent to 54 per cent in 2014. During the same period, the share of detected victims trafficked for forced labour has also changed from 31 per cent to 38 per cent, although 2011 and 2013 saw higher proportions (40% and 39%, respectively). When the total number of detected victims is disaggregated by sex and form of exploitation, it becomes apparent that greater proportions of women are subject to sexual exploitation (for example, 72% of the total detected female victims in 2014), while greater proportions of males are subject to forced labour (for example, 85.7% of the total detected male victims in 2014). UNODC notes that about four out of 10 detected victims were trafficked for forced labour between 2012 and 2014. Of these victims, 63 per cent were men.

There is recognition of the need to obtain better data on victims of trafficking. The adoption of the UN's Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) provides fresh impetus to improve the data, with the "number of victims of human trafficking per 100,000 population, by sex, age and form of exploitation" included as an indicator under Goal 16 (Indicator 16.2.2).²⁶ IOM's operational efforts also provide useful insights.

22 See appendix A for definition of *trafficking in persons*.

23 The content in this subsection is based on and drawn from UNODC, 2016. Please refer to this document for explanatory notes, deeper analysis, caveats, limitations and methodologies associated with the numbers and trends presented here. UNODC's previous Global Reports on Trafficking in Persons are other key sources of information. Another key global source of information on trafficking is the United States Department of State's Trafficking Persons Reports, available from United States Department of State, 2017.

24 Given the definition, human trafficking may sometimes be inaccurately understood to involve international or internal migration. However, such *movement* is unnecessary for someone to be classified as a victim. In this context, the number of detected victims does not necessarily mean *migrant* victims of human trafficking. That said, many cases of trafficking do involve internal or international migration.

25 For example, the Global Slavery Index estimates that, in 2016, there were 45.8 million people living in modern slavery in 167 countries, with 58 per cent of this population in just five countries: Bangladesh, China, India, Pakistan and Uzbekistan (see Walk Free Foundation, 2016, and www.globalslaveryindex.org/findings/). In 2012, the ILO estimated that, globally, there were 20.9 million victims of forced labour, with 9.1 million (or 44%) having moved internally or internationally (see ILO, 2016). While the legal definitions of *forced labour*, *slavery* and *trafficking in persons* are distinct, there are overlaps between the definitions such that persons estimated as victims of forced labour or slavery can also be victims of trafficking.

26 UN DESA, 2017.

IOM's data on assistance to victims of human trafficking


IOM began assisting victims of trafficking in the 1990s. IOM's global database, the largest of its kind, contains data, including primary data, on 46,000 *identified* victims of trafficking, who have been: (1) identified; (2) assisted; or (3) identified and assisted by IOM. These victims represent 140 nationalities and have been identified in 150 countries. This database continues to increase by approximately 5,000 cases per year. For various reasons, however, not all the victims assisted by IOM are always recorded in the database. Additionally, IOM data are only collected in locations where IOM has counter-trafficking operations.

Among the victims of trafficking recorded in IOM's database, between 2005 and 2015, the proportion of male human trafficking victims has increased, the proportion of victims subject to sexual exploitation has declined, and the proportion subject to forced labour has grown. During the same period, the average age of victims was 26 years (at the time of assistance), and half of the victims were aged between 18 and 34 years.

During 2015 to 2016, 8,976 victims of human trafficking were identified, assisted, or identified and assisted. The average age was 29 years, although male victims were older, on average, than females. Of the total for the period, approximately 15 per cent were children.

The graph below shows IOM's data disaggregated by sectors of exploitation. Those found in sectors such as mining, construction, and low-level crime are almost exclusively men, whereas prostitution, hospitality and transport are dominated by women.

Sectors of exploitation of identified, assisted, or identified and assisted victims, 2005–2015 (%)



IOM also collects data on indicators of the presence of human trafficking and other exploitative practices along migration routes. The Human Trafficking and Other Exploitative Practices Prevalence Indication Survey has been conducted as part of IOM's DTM operations since December 2015. These data indicate that over 30 per cent of the 16,000 migrants interviewed along the Central and Eastern Mediterranean migration routes during 2016 experienced human trafficking or other exploitative practices during the journey.

For more information on IOM's data and work with victims of trafficking, see www.iom.int/counter-trafficking. IOM's primary data on identified victims of human trafficking are available for download at www.ctdatacollaborative.org/.

Chapter 3

Appendix A. United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs: Regions and Subregions

Please note that this table reflects the UN DESA geographic regions and subregions and does not imply official endorsement or acceptance by IOM.

AFRICA				
Eastern Africa ^a	Middle Africa ^b	Northern Africa ^c	Southern Africa ^d	Western Africa ^e
Burundi	Angola	Algeria	Botswana	Benin
Comoros	Cameroon	Egypt	Lesotho	Burkina Faso
Djibouti	Central African Republic	Libya	Namibia	Cabo Verde
Eritrea	Chad	Morocco	South Africa	Côte d'Ivoire
Ethiopia	Congo (the)	Sudan	Swaziland	Gambia (the)
Kenya	Democratic Republic of the Congo	Tunisia		Ghana
Madagascar	Equatorial Guinea	Western Sahara		Guinea
Malawi	Gabon			Guinea-Bissau
Mauritius	São Tomé and Príncipe			Liberia
Mayotte				Mali
Mozambique				Mauritania
Réunion				Niger
Rwanda				Nigeria
Seychelles				Saint Helena
Somalia				Senegal
South Sudan				Sierra Leone
Uganda				Togo
United Republic of Tanzania				
Zambia				
Zimbabwe				

a Eastern Africa has been combined with the Southern Africa subregion in the chapter, although the countries/territories/areas within remain the same.

b This subregion has been renamed "Central Africa" in the chapter and combined with Western Africa.

c This subregion renamed "North Africa".

d This subregion has been combined with Eastern Africa.

e This subregion has been renamed "West Africa" and combined with Central Africa (UN DESA *Middle Africa*) in the chapter.

ASIA				
Central Asia	Eastern Asia	South-Eastern Asia ^f	Southern Asia	Western Asia ^g
Kazakhstan	China	Brunei	Afghanistan	Armenia
Kyrgyzstan	China, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region	Darussalam	Bangladesh	Azerbaijan
Tajikistan		Cambodia	Bhutan	Bahrain
Turkmenistan		Indonesia	India	Cyprus
Uzbekistan	China, Macao Special Administrative Region	Lao People's Democratic Republic	Iran (Islamic Republic of)	Georgia
	Democratic People's Republic of Korea	Malaysia	Maldives	Iraq
	Japan	Myanmar	Nepal	Israel
	Mongolia	Philippines (the)	Pakistan	Jordan
	Republic of Korea	Singapore	Sri Lanka	Kuwait
		Thailand		Lebanon
		Timor-Leste		Oman
		Viet Nam		Qatar
				Saudi Arabia
				State of Palestine
				Syrian Arab Republic
				Turkey
				United Arab Emirates
				Yemen

f This subregion renamed "South-East Asia".

g This subregion renamed "Middle East".

EUROPE^h			
Eastern Europeⁱ	Northern Europe	Southern Europe	Western Europe
Belarus	Channel Islands	Albania	Austria
Bulgaria	Denmark	Andorra	Belgium
Czech Republic	Estonia	Bosnia and Herzegovina	France
Hungary	Faroe Islands	Croatia	Germany
Poland	Finland	Gibraltar	Liechtenstein
Republic of Moldova	Iceland	Greece	Luxembourg
Romania	Ireland	Holy See	Monaco
Russian Federation	Isle of Man	Italy	Netherlands (the)
Slovakia	Latvia	Malta	Switzerland
Ukraine	Lithuania	Montenegro	
	Norway	Portugal	
	Sweden	San Marino	
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Serbia	
		Slovenia	
		Spain	
		The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	

h Some countries in this subregion, particularly members of the European Union, may have been included both in the discussion of *South-Eastern* and *Eastern Europe*, as well as the subregional discussion on *Northern*, *Western*, and *Southern Europe* within the chapter.

i Northern, Western and Southern Europe are combined in the chapter, excluding the following countries in Southern Europe: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, Serbia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which have been included in *South-East Europe* in the chapter, under the subregion *South-Eastern* and *Eastern Europe*.

LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN		
Caribbean	Central America ^j	South America
Anguilla	Belize	Argentina
Antigua and Barbuda	Costa Rica	Bolivia (Plurinational State of)
Aruba	El Salvador	Brazil
Bahamas	Guatemala	Chile
Barbados	Honduras	Colombia
Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba	Mexico	Ecuador
British Virgin Islands	Nicaragua	Falkland Islands (Malvinas)
Cayman Islands	Panama	French Guiana
Cuba		Guyana
Curaçao		Paraguay
Dominica		Peru
Dominican Republic		Suriname
Grenada		Uruguay
Guadeloupe		Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)
Haiti		
Jamaica		
Martinique		
Montserrat		
Puerto Rico		
Saint Kitts and Nevis		
Saint Lucia		
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines		
Sint Maarten (Dutch part)		
Trinidad and Tobago		
Turks and Caicos Islands		
United States Virgin Islands		

^j The subregion "Central America" has been combined with Mexico and the Caribbean in this chapter.

NORTHERN AMERICA			
Bermuda			
Canada			
Greenland			
Saint Pierre and Miquelon			
United States of America			

OCEANIA			
Australia and New Zealand	Melanesia	Micronesia	Polynesia
Australia	Fiji	Guam	American Samoa
New Zealand	New Caledonia	Kiribati	Cook Islands
	Papua New Guinea	Marshall Islands	French Polynesia
	Solomon Islands	Micronesia (Federated States of)	Niue
	Vanuatu	Nauru	Samoa
		Northern Mariana Islands	Tokelau
		Palau	Tonga
			Tuvalu
			Wallis and Futuna Islands

Legend:

Region
Subregion ⁱ
Country/territory/area ^{ii,iii}

Note: For methodology as well as explanatory notes, see *Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 2015 Revision "CD-ROM Documentation"* available at www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/docs/MigrationStockDocumentation_2015.pdf.

- i Subregions utilized within the chapter may differ from those utilized by UN DESA's Statistical Division either by name, or by countries/territories/areas included within.
- ii "The names of countries or areas refer to their short form used in day-to-day operations of the United Nations and not necessarily to their official name as used in formal documents. These names are based on the United Nations Terminology Database (UNTERM), which can be found at: <https://unterm.un.org/UNTERM/portal/welcome> The designations employed and the presentation of material at this site do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations [or the International Organization for Migration (IOM)] concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries." For further information, see <https://unstats.un.org/unsd/methodology/m49/>.
- iii The entities included in this table, from which the previous chapter draws upon, include countries, as well as territories, areas and special administrative regions. Please note that this table is not intended to be fully comprehensive.

Chapter 4

Appendix A. A brief overview of academic publishing

The scholarly dissemination system rotates around a well-established gravitational centre: publication, with some forms of publication (such as academic journals) having much greater credibility and weight than others (and within that, individual academic publishers have different standings). Publishing the results of research in academic journals is without any doubt the paramount objective of today's scholars.¹ Journals alone constitute about 40 per cent (books 16%) of the revenues of the broader scientific, technical and medical publisher's market, the size of which has been estimated at USD 25.2 billion in 2013.² Through academic publishing, scholars formally share their findings within the scientific community. This exchange enables other researchers to learn about the latest advancements, to design new studies for filling current knowledge gaps, to compare their findings with the ones of their peers and perhaps to avoid reinventing the wheel. Moreover, publication constitutes "...a permanent record of what has been discovered, when and by whom - like a court register for science".³ The world's first academic journal - *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society* - appeared as early as of 1665, as an expression of the Royal Society's policy of promoting the progress of science through open sharing of results and ideas supported by empirical evidence. Since then, the number of active scholarly peer-reviewed English language journals has reached 28,100 in 2014,⁴ and it has been calculated that the global scientific output doubles every nine years.⁵ Many scholars today are overwhelmed by the mass of academic literature, and it is becoming impossible to find the time to read every piece of literature, even on the narrowest topic.

Publications are the core of career advancement for academics, whereas researchers working in applied research settings are not necessarily working under the same degree of pressure to publish. Overall, the academic reward system is responsible for the very significant increase in the number of publications but, arguably, a quantitative increase does not automatically lead to an increase in the average "quality" of published academic research.

Measuring quality is a complex and debated issue. In terms of the major form of output (journal articles), we can say that an article's quality is evaluated mainly *qualitatively before* publication, and mainly *quantitatively after* publication. The type of qualitative evaluation that occurs before publication in academic journals is called "peer-review". The term "peer" refers to the fact that the people performing reviews of the submitted article are meant to be of equal (or greater) expertise on a topic. Peer review in academia is almost always unpaid. Peer review of journal articles "...has traditionally been seen as part of the professional obligations of the researcher",⁶ and a large scale-survey amongst 40,000 research papers authors found that most of them considered peer review as "...essential to the communication of scholarly research". Ninety-one per cent of the respondents stated that "...the review process improved the quality of the last paper they published", and 86 per cent declared that "...they enjoy reviewing and will continue to review".⁷ The most tangible incentive for reviewing is perhaps earning recognition: journals usually publish a yearly "reviewers thanksgiving" document

1 Other means of scholarly communication include books, conference presentations, seminars, e-mail lists and so forth.

2 Ware and Mabe, 2015.

3 Sense About Science, 2005.

4 Ware and Mabe, 2015.

5 Van Noorden, 2014.


6 Ware and Mabe, 2015.

7 Mulligan, Hall and Raphael, 2013.

in which they list the names of people who served as reviewers.⁸ Being on those lists can improve a researcher's CV, especially if s/he plans to seek funding/job in that specific field. Reviewers thoroughly examine the methods, results and conclusions before submitting their recommendation (accept/revise/reject) to the journal's editor. The review process iterates until the editor is satisfied with the manuscript, which can finally enter the production pipeline (copy-editing, typesetting, online publication and possibly printing). Overall, the peer-review process lasts from a few weeks to several months, with considerable variance among disciplines and journals. After publication, abstracts are free of charge, while access to the full text may require access through academic libraries (that typically pay subscriptions to the publishers), or require pay-per-view fees. The "open access" publishing model grants free full-text access to anyone, courtesy of the author's institution having paid publication fees to the publisher.

The peer-review process examines a piece of writing before publication using mainly a *qualitative* approach, while a *quantitative* approach dominates the assessment of material after publication. Citation – the act of quoting – is the single unit at the base of bibliometrics (the statistical analysis of written publications). Crudely put, the more the citations, the higher the impact, the better the supposed quality of a paper/article/book. Basic citation metrics for any publication can be obtained using [Google Scholar](#), the most used search engine by academics worldwide. For instance, a search for "migration" in Google Scholar returned 3.8 million results and the following first page:⁹

Figure 1. Example of Google Scholar search results



8 See for instance <http://iovs.arvojournals.org/article.aspx?articleid=2277067>.

9 Search results may vary depending on user settings (e.g. whether logged in to Google or not) and geographic ISP location.

You can see at a glance (Fig.1, bottom-left) that the book “The age of migration: International population movements in the modern world” has been cited - as of January 2017 - by more than 8,000 other publications. By clicking on “Cited by 8219” you can see all the citing publications since the first edition (1993). If you click on the author’s name (S. Castles) you will see the author’s citation indices.

Building on raw citation counts, various so-called “impact metrics” can be calculated at the publication level, author level, journal level and so forth. For instance, a journal’s Impact Factor (the *citations/publications* ratio) is widely used as a proxy for the relative importance of a journal, while the h-index¹⁰ provides a measure of a single author’s impact (though it can be also calculated for a department, institution or country). The citations/publications ratio most commonly involves examination of a two-year publishing cycle over three years. For example, for Journal X’s 2015 impact factor, 122 citations of articles published in 2013 and 2014 are divided by the total number of articles published in 2013 and 2014 (166), so that the 2015 impact factor for Journal X is 0.735 (or 122 citations divided by 166 articles).

The debate on the usefulness of impact metrics is still open, the aim being finding the right balance between research funders’ needs of measuring the impact of their spending, and academics’ desires for fair evaluation systems of their work (and consequent funding). Recently, alternative impact metrics (altmetrics) have been developed, taking into account, for instance, number of mentions in news articles and blogs, Twitter, Facebook and so forth.

The pressure to achieve within an academic reward system that values publication in peer-reviewed journals is acknowledged as having some serious downsides,¹¹ including in relation to quality. The “publish or perish” culture has been found to stifle research innovation,¹² lower research publication standards,¹³ encourage peer-review fraud¹⁴ and negatively affect the ability of researchers to work on applied research tailored to policymakers.¹⁵ At the same time, academics are under pressure to undertake innovative research, publish in the top journals and present evidence to policy audiences and ultimately influence policy.¹⁶

10 The h-index is the number of publications that have at least *h* citations. For instance, Author X has written 4 publications: A (cited by 27 others), B (cited by 14 others), C (cited by 2 others), and D (not yet cited). Author X’s h-index is 2 at present. In the future, the h-index may be 3, if publication C will be cited at least 1 more time.

11 Smith, 2006.

12 Foster, Rzhetsky and Evans, 2015.

13 Colquhoun, 2011.

14 Prosser Scully, 2015

15 Cherney et al., 2012.

16 Ibid.

Chapter 4

Appendix B. Contributions from academic journals¹⁷

*African Human Mobility Review*¹⁸

Chief Editor: Mulugeta F. Dinbabo

In recent years, the debate revolving around the migration-development nexus has spurred, growing global interest on human mobility. This is also the case of sub-Saharan Africa, where researchers have sought to describe trends and patterns of migration and to suggest actions to harness its economic, social and human benefits for the development of the continent. In this respect, evidence-based research is widely accepted to build and expand the body of knowledge by testing hypothesis, validating existing theories and elaborating new ones. Ultimately, research findings need to be published and disseminated to a larger and diverse audience comprising of academics, practitioners, civil society and government representatives. Publication is, therefore, a key component that promotes not only the visibility of the research, but also the credibility of the empirical work conducted by researchers. In particular, peer-reviewed scholarly journals are a fundamental tool for fostering intellectual debate and inquiry. However, at present, there is a lack of peer-reviewed journals of high quality in Sub-Saharan Africa addressing, amongst others, the issue of human mobility. Researchers face challenges in presenting research findings in African journals in this field, either because such journals are published irregularly, or simply because they do not exist.

African Human Mobility Review (AHMR) is an interdisciplinary journal created to encourage and facilitate the study of all aspects (i.e. socio-economic, political, legislative and developmental) of human mobility in sub-Saharan Africa. Established in 2014, AHMR aims at being one of the leading scholarly journals in sub-Saharan Africa in the field of international/domestic migration, ethnic group relations and refugee movements. The main purpose of AHMR includes building the capacity of young African researchers who have an additional opportunity to publish and disseminate their work; publishing and disseminating research outputs on the socio-demographic, economic, political, psychological, historical, legislative and religious aspects of human migration and refugee movements from and within sub-Saharan Africa. In addition, AHMR helps in identifying best practices and in suggesting guidelines for correct implementation of migration policies in Africa. It also promotes SIHMA's vision and mission. In general, AHMR actively contributes to SIHMA's overall goal of disseminating research that fosters understanding of human mobility and informs policies that ensure the rights and dignity of migrants, asylum seekers and refugees in Africa.

At the moment, AHMR publishes three issues per year in January, May, and November. The journal also publishes occasional special issues. In the past two years, a number of articles were received by the editorial office, of which, after the critical peer review process, only 25 were published in six issues. Scholarly manuscripts that advance the body of knowledge are encouraged and considered for publication. AHMR publishes original theoretical and applied contributions, including topics such as migration and development, migration and human rights, migration of unaccompanied minors, mobility and employment and xenophobia, integration and social cohesion.

¹⁷ The contributions in this appendix have been submitted by each journal's respective chief editor(s), and have not been edited.

¹⁸ Articles cited in the journal editor's contribution can be found at: <http://sihma.org.za/online-journal/>.

AHMR online publication has increased accessibility of information for practitioners, researchers, students, academicians and policy makers. As part of the strategy to ensure evidence-based policy making, AHMR regularly interacts with relevant government departments, civil society and academic/research institutions in sub-Saharan Africa. The feedback obtained from readers and partners clearly indicated that AHMR's electronic publications enhanced the internet search ability. It also increases the sources of relevant information and decreases the costs for both publisher and users of the journal. So far, AHMR has received very positive feedback from authors and Board Members, as well as from readers in the form of views and downloads. This is one of the evidence that AHMR is receiving greater attention in the field across Sub-Saharan Africa and the rest of the world due to its exclusive online and free of charge distribution. The journal has, in fact, the advantage of being accessible to a larger audience and this allows for immediate feedback and engagement with the readers. Worldwide, open-access scholarly journals have arisen as an alternative to traditional subscription journals. They make their articles freely available to everyone while providing services common to all scholarly journals, such as the peer-review process, production, and distribution. On the other hand, there is a resistance of many scholars to publish in an online medium resulting from the lack of credibility of online publications. For example, many authors in academic settings place importance upon the acceptance by a peer-reviewed journal. This is connected to credibility problems that arise in decisions of advancement at universities where online journal publications carry less weight than print journals (Collins & Berge, 1994). To overcome this problem, a few printed copies of AHMR are published each year and distributed across South African universities.

Between 2014 and 2016, AHMR published a *Special Issue* on international migration, development and xenophobia. Professor Shimelis Gulema from the Stony Brook University in the United States, acted as the Guest Editor of the *Special Issue*. Papers in this collection included: *Violent xenophobic episodes in South Africa: 2008 and 2015; Preventing Xenophobia in Africa: what must the African Union Do?; Violent conflict and forced displacement in the Horn of Africa: Government and Donor Policies and Programs in Search of Durable Solutions* and *Development-induced displacement and its impacts on the livelihoods of poor urban households in Bahir Dar, North Western Ethiopia*.

The *Special Issue* is a novel undertaking by AHMR. The idea germinated in the wake of an unprecedented wave of attacks against African immigrants in South Africa, a development that was unusual, if not unique. It brings together studies on a range of issues, all tied to the general theme of the special issue and each demonstrating the interconnections between poverty and underdevelopment, conflict, displacement, migration and xenophobia. A deeper exploration of issues of displacement, xenophobia, conflict, and migration, as indicated in the four contributions, serves to underscore larger, often global, processes including globalization and transnationalism but also inequality within and between countries and regions. In addition, the papers offer a critique of existing assumptions, interpretations and practices, as in the case of the term xenophobia; call for a rethinking in a way that enables a deeper understanding of the issues at hand, and suggest measures to tackle existing challenges, including displacement and xenophobia, among others.

Other AHMR publications included eminent authors like: Simon Bekker, Emeritus Professor of Sociology in the Sociology and Social Anthropology Department, University of Stellenbosch and Laurence Piper, Professor of Political Studies at the University of the Western Cape, who has published extensively on xenophobia, Zulu nationalism, the Inkatha Freedom Party and electoral politics in South Africa. Professor Jonathan Crush, Director of the Southern African Research Centre at Queen's University in Canada, who has been appointed as the Guest Editor for the *Special Issue on Migration & Entrepreneurship*.

Even though AHMR has been successful for the past few years in terms of achieving its objectives, there are some challenges, for example low representation of researchers from non-English speaking regions and from smaller academic communities in Sub-Saharan Africa.

To summarize:

AHMR is one of the few peer-reviewed scholarly journals in the field of migration in sub-Saharan Africa and is popularly used by researchers in the field. It covers a variety of continental level issues and topics in field of human mobility. AHMR articles have been cited in decisions by the South African Supreme Court and Court of Justice, and dispute panels. AHMR also publishes student-written work and pieces on recent developments in migration policy in Sub-Saharan Africa. AHMR leads discussion and debate at the Institute for Social Development, University of the Western Cape by hosting speakers on Postgraduate level course, i.e. Migration and Development. AHMR recent Symposium topics have included: Migration and Xenophobia in South Africa; Migration and Returns and the Impact of Migration on Development in South Africa. So far, AHMR undertaken a number of activities and achieved tremendous results. AHMR continue to publish high-quality research outputs that will advance, encourage and facilitate the study of all aspects of human mobility in sub-Saharan Africa.

*Asian and Pacific Migration Journal*¹⁹

Chief Editors: Graziano Battistella and Maruja M.B. Asis

The Asian and Pacific Migration Journal (APMJ) celebrated its 25th year in 2016. When it was launched in 1992, large-scale temporary labor migration in the region was entering its second decade and was not showing any signs of a slowdown. Back in 1992, academic journals dedicated to migration were very few, and in particular, APMJ was about the only one specifically focused on migration-related phenomena in the Asia-Pacific region. The journal was introduced to disseminate research on migration in, to and from the region, and to encourage the development of migration scholarship that promotes understanding of the region's realities and perspectives. In his review of the articles published in APMJ the last 25 years, Jerrold Huguet commented on the role of the journal as a chronicler of what is happening in the area of migration (mostly international migration, but also including some articles about internal migration, especially in China) in the region. Although APMJ aims to cover the whole region, the contributions that had been published do not sufficiently encompass the different sub-regions. Earlier reviews by Asis, Piper and Raghuram (2010) and Asis and Piper (2008) had remarked on the uneven regional coverage of published articles—mostly about East and Southeast Asia, not much on South and West Asia, and hardly any about Central Asia—and remained unchanged in the more recent review by Huguet (2016). In terms of discipline, there has been a trend towards more disciplines being represented by contributors. Economists, demographers and sociologists are now joined by contributors coming from anthropology, psychology, political science, and a few from social work. The shift has been accompanied by a rise in articles based on qualitative research.

Having been associated with APMJ since 1997 (initially as associate editor and later as co-editor), I agree with the view that the articles published by APMJ are generally indicative of the migration scenario in the Asia-Pacific and are a reflection of the state of research, policy discussions, and advocacy issues. Considering not just the published articles but the universe of submissions received by APMJ, those which do not make the grade for external review are disconnected from the existing literature and thus lacking in theoretical

19 Articles cited in the journal editors' contribution can be found at: <http://journals.sagepub.com/home/amj>.

framing and analysis. We receive a good number of submissions about migration from other sub-regions, but unfortunately, they tend to be statistical exercises and are still wedded to the push-pull framework of analysis. The slew of submissions about South Korea and China in recent years significantly increased the representation of East Asian articles in APMJ, reflecting the main issues of interest to these countries. Articles on multiculturalism and marriage migration in South Korea have received the most attention, which in turn, indicate the flurry of research (and funding support) on these issues in South Korea. Most articles on China deal with internal migration, although in the last few years, return migration and student migration have surfaced (as further noted below).

The articles published in 2015 and 2016 included many articles on South Korea and China, but overall, the last two years point to diversity in the types of migrants, origins and destinations covered. Articles on student migration, for example, pertained to Chinese and Indian students, incidentally the top two groups of international student migrants. Articles about unaccompanied adolescent Korean students in the US (which depart from the astronaut family migration observed earlier, with mothers accompanying their children while husbands are left back home), the return of Chinese students, and some focus on Japanese student migration have expanded the discussion on the topic. Articles about Filipino teachers in Indonesia, Chinese immigrant entrepreneurs in Singapore and Afghan-native fertility differentials in Iran are some examples of articles which reveal relatively less known aspects about intra-regional migration while the articles about Vietnamese in Poland provide an update on the old migration and characteristics of new Vietnamese migration to Poland. Children affected by international migration were the topics of several articles. The adaptation of multicultural children in South Korea is a welcome development, expanding the lens beyond marriage migrants (mostly women). A special section dedicated to probing the notion of Third Culture Kids drew attention to children who are migrating with their families to Asia. This theme is a relatively new topic in a region where research on children has been mostly about those “left behind.” Overall, the articles published in 2015-2016 are a combination of old or persisting issues and new or hitherto under-researched questions.

Gaps and challenges facing APMJ

Although APMJ aims to disseminate research-based information to a wide audience, as an academic journal, its primary audience is largely the academic community. At the same time, the knowledge products disseminated by APMJ rest largely on the contributions of the academic community as knowledge producers. The journal relies on contributions by researchers whose work is subjected to the review process undertaken voluntarily by peer reviewers. The review process is an important mechanism in fostering dialogue between authors and reviewers. However, since it is a double-blind process, the exchange and dialogue between the two parties does not allow for debate and discussion promoted by face-to-face discussion. Nonetheless, the feedback provided by reviewers helps improve the papers, which is in generating evidence-based knowledge about migration.

Beyond the academic community, it is difficult to gauge the impact of APMJ on policymaking. Various factors contribute to this condition. For one, the production of research-based knowledge is time- and process-intensive, which may not be compatible with the sometimes fast-paced and contentious context of policymaking. Policymakers tend to be sensitive to the opinions and views of their superiors, constituents, and the general public (and the media too), and research findings which run counter to public opinion will may not find their way in informing and influencing policymaking. The time entailed by data gathering and analysis can be outpaced by unfolding events. For example, in the first half of 2015, several Asian countries (Bangladesh, Myanmar, Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand) were confronted by the Rohingya refugee crisis. The plight of the Rohingyas, adrift at sea on rickety boats, and with no country willing to welcome them posed

a challenge to the ASEAN region. Media reports provided a running commentary on the developments of the crisis and the subsequent conferences organized to discuss immediate and temporary solutions. There were no contributions touching on the Rohingya issue in 2015 and 2016.

It is not only “at the moment” developments which APMJ missed out on in 2015-2016. Over the long term, the issue of unauthorized migration, which is very significant in the region, has not received much attention from researchers. The issue has been conflated and confused with human trafficking, which has instead gotten enormous research, policy and advocacy attention. (Interestingly, the Rohingya crisis of 2015 was also framed as irregular migration in some reports.) This is an example of how funding-driven research can dominate the research agenda and publication outputs.

The translation of research findings into policy implications that will be actually considered by policymakers is not automatic and is beyond the work of journals like APMJ. This will require other interventions, such as the production of concise policy briefs, the holding of policy dialogues, or collaborating with media to produce more accessible and timelier reports. More fundamentally, most government agencies in the region need to develop a culture of data appreciation and their value to policymaking (some exceptions are Australia, New Zealand and South Korea, which invest in migration research and data).

The production of knowledge and access to a variety of knowledge products had been affected by developments in ICT and social media. Online journals and open access journals on migration have also increased in number. In reflecting about APMJ’s experiences since 1992, founding editor Graziano Battistella (2016) acknowledged how these developments have impacted on the work and operations of journals like APMJ. Up until 2014, APMJ was produced by SMC. However, technological developments and strategies adopted by major publishing companies have made it difficult for independent publishers to thrive in an increasingly competitive milieu. The marketing and distribution aspects were particularly challenging. In 2015, APMJ took up the offer to partner with SAGE Publications, with SAGE taking care charge of the production and marketing aspects of the journal and SMC remaining primarily responsible for content. Despite the many challenges of producing an academic journal, the scrutiny provided by the peer review process continues to be strength of journals like APMJ. In the years to come, with the continuing support and participation of the academic community, APMJ hopes not just to chronicle migration in Asia and the Pacific but also to contribute significantly to scholarship, policymaking and advocacy in the region.

*International Migration*²⁰

Chief Editor: Howard Duncan

The journal, *International Migration*, owned by the International Organization for Migration, publishes empirical research to advance scholarship and support the world’s migration policy community. This is challenging because policy makers often require their evidence immediately while academic research takes time, and peer review adds further to this time, meaning that some research is published after the policy need. Crises aside, however, migration is a phenomenon of longer-term trends whose patterns are often visible only over time. Academic researchers are in a better position to understand these trends than many policy makers who are required to deliver analysis and advice more quickly. Although policy making is often done with urgency, it is an inherently conservative business. Emerging trends identified by research can be slow to be recognized by policy, making it

20 Articles cited in the journal editor’s contribution can be found at: [http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/\(ISSN\)1468-2435](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1468-2435).

all the more important that the empirical research be done well and be peer-reviewed. The journal aims to offer new insights for scholars and policy makers alike and to support what is ultimately a collective endeavour to enhance the outcomes of migration for all.

Over the past two years, *International Migration* has published on a wide range of themes, breaking new ground and further articulating paths trodden before. In this short section, we will describe points made on selected themes over the course of 2015 and 2016, that is, since the publication of the IOM's World Migration Report 2015. For those wishing more details, we suggest going to the journal's website. The broad themes that we will cover are: migration patterns, migration and development, migration governance, and data and methodology.

Migration patterns

As a migration journal, *International Migration* receives many articles that analyze migration patterns, going beyond the statistical compilations found on national and other statistical agency websites. Our authors look behind the data to uncover causes underlying the trends. The past few years have seen a growing interest in the decision processes and intentions of individuals leading to their migration; this is in marked contrast to the proliferation of macro analyses of push and pull factors of classical migration theory, but serves as a complement, not a substitution. Mendoza (2015) offered insights into emigration patterns from Mexico City by comparing households with and without emigrants; her logistic regression models reveal the importance of social networks in motivating departures.

In looking at contemporary Kosovo, a fledgling country suffering from high levels of departures, Ivlevs and King noted the lack of confidence in the future of the country and its economy amongst especially those Albanian Kosovars with higher levels of education. Emigration aspirations have returned to levels not seen since before independence, a trend that may itself fuel an even greater demand to leave this struggling country. Cohen, Duberley and Ravishankar considered how Indian scientists employ international mobility as a career enhancer, a strategy that allows them gain valuable international experience while preserving cultural ties to India as well as their ability to return to India in a more advanced position. This helps us to understand better the phenomenon of multiple migration to which the late Graeme Hugo drew our attention. Weeks and Weeks examined the role of transnationalism in contemporary emigration from Latin America to the United States, going beyond the lure of better-paying jobs that support remittances to the supportive roles increasingly played by their homeland governments in protecting their rights while abroad and encouraging their return. Staying within Latin America, Silva and Massey detailed the role of violence in motivating migration out of Colombia. Not as straightforward as one might be tempted to imagine, violence tends to lead to emigration predominantly for those with higher levels of education and stronger social networks abroad. While violence can bring about a decision to leave, it is social capital networks that determine destinations.

Bylander took us to Cambodia to explore how actual *and anticipated* environmental distress motivates decisions to emigrate. Gerver brought the perspective of moral philosophy to voluntary repatriation, offering a careful normative analysis of the tension between facilitating repatriation to restore rights and ensuring that the repatriation is in fact voluntary. In a look at mass emigration from Lithuania, the first Soviet state to declare independence in 1990, Klusener et al used census and registration data to document that it is characteristics such as employment status, education, and prior migration experience that influence decisions to leave. The "new mobility" of which we often speak is revealed not only by highly skilled economic migrants moving from one laboratory or corporate headquarters to another but, also, by some asylum seekers who, as persons with full human interests, may seek more than safety. Lukić took us to Serbia to show the workings of contemporary

transit asylum migration. Also looking at asylum seekers' decisions regarding destinations were McAuliffe and Jayasuriya, who asked 35,000 potential asylum seekers whether and why they preferred some destination countries over others and found Australia to be widely preferred.

We have long-surmised that higher levels of human capital increase one's mobility, and Rodríguez-Gutiérrez and Canal-Domínguez showed us how foreign language skills affect people's motivations to migrate as well as their choice of destination. Also looking at the motivations to move were Ozcurumez and Aker who compared the motives of Turks who moved to Germany with those who moved to Canada. It was more than the money, they discovered.

Another area of increasing attention is return migration, an ever-present but previously neglected subject owing to the traditional assumption that migration was largely one-way and either permanent or very long-term. But we now recognize that among their effects, globalization and transnationalism have yielded the "new mobility" which makes it easier and less costly for migrants to return home after even a relatively short period at their destination. For many migrants, especially the more highly-skilled, their migration intentions are for shorter rather than permanent stays. For some, time spent working abroad is intended to offer better fortunes at home. Those workers returning to their homelands, perhaps with higher skill levels than when they left, can however find a less-than-smooth transition to the labour market. Barcevičius (2016) explored how returning high-skilled Lithuanians fare back home and whether they intend to stay for long.

The relationship between migration and development

With the international community's focus on the relationship between migration and development and its concern over rising anti-immigration politics, demonstrating the benefits of migration has become a mainstream theme. Even the flight of refugees and asylum seekers from danger can fall into this category as shown by Vecchio who looked at how asylum seekers in Hong Kong take advantage of its status as a global city. Living there, even as an undocumented migrant, offers the advantages of global interconnections that support economic activity across borders, resulting in asylum seekers making net contributions to Hong Kong's already vibrant economy.

Over the past decade, much has been made of the development benefits of remittances with calls for reducing the costs of sending them and suggestions for how their benefits can be enhanced. But Jawaid and Raza offered some prudent cautions, noting that, while remittances are generally of considerable value to homeland economies, under some circumstances they are seen to increase voluntary unemployment and reduce economic growth. Busetta, Cetorelli, and Stranges examined remitting behaviours among migrants to Italy, finding a surprising degree of invariance over time. The European Union has long supported the management of migration for development purposes. Keijzer, Héraud and Frankenhaeuser found, however, that migration policies of individual member states do not always reflect the EU's position on the relationship between migration and development, that some member states still regard migration primarily as a domestic problem to manage unilaterally. Resende-Santos explored the perspective of a small, low income island society and demonstrates the signal importance of migration and the Cape Verdean diaspora for its economy. Akçay and Demirtaş broke new ground in looking at the impact of remittances on energy consumption, in a case study that further articulates the details of how remittances are actually used.

Migration governance

With the pronounced entry of the international community into the global migration discussion and especially with the launch of the process to establish a Global Compact on migration and a Global Compact for refugees, the governance of migration has taken centre stage and is beginning to command the attention of academic researchers. Emerging squarely from the discussions is the fact that governance has become a multi-sectoral affair, with not only governments at all levels participating but doing so alongside many other actors including NGOs, the business community and other employers, the education sector, and arguably, the migrant smuggling and trafficking industries. In 2015, we devoted two special sections to the role of NGOs, one explicitly on democratic governance and the other on the play of interests regarding those with and those without legal authorization to be in our countries and to receive the services and entitlements of the state. Rother collected four articles that examine the concept of democracy through some of the challenges that contemporary migration presents to it. These challenges include the expanding concept of citizenship, the particularities of democratization of some of the Arab states since the 2011 uprisings, the growing awareness of the precarious nature of residence and work for many of the world's migrants, and a careful look at migration governance within the ASEAN group of states. Throughout these articles, we find the central role that civil society plays in the debates together with expressions of how these roles are a force for further democratization. Bearup examined the role of NGOs in the area of the reintegration of trafficked persons, focusing on Cambodia, and offering less-than-encouraging findings.

The second collection of articles, edited by Castañeda and Yarris, looked at assessments of the deservingness of different groups of migrants by state authorities. As the discussion of migration hardens in many societies, so too do the distinctions between those with and without documented authorizations to reside, work, attend school, and receive health and social services; and we see a similar hardening of distinctions even among those with legal authorization according to whether they are economic migrants or refugees. These articles considered the Roma in Germany, Karen refugees in California, unauthorized migrants in Israel, and day labourers in the United States. We see challenges to the exercise and the principles of democracy as well as the role that civil society plays regarding the interests of vulnerable migrants.

For many national administrations, the ultimate but often elusive goal is managed migration, with the numbers of arrivals per year and their human capital characteristics matching labour market needs and the capacity of a society to welcome and integrate them. Emilsson looked at the effect of Sweden's 2008 labour-migration policy change wherein most state control was abandoned and an employer-led selection was introduced. The UK has been eyeing reduced net migration targets for a number of years now, and Cangiano explained the surprising level of difficulty encountered in managing migration to these sorts of target. Hofmann, Carboni, Mitchneck, and Kuznetsov explored how economic and socio-political objectives vie for dominance in attempts by Russia, now with one of the world's largest migration stocks, to manage the inflows of people from some former Soviet states.

Australia and Canada have commanded attention for many years owing to their points-based systems for managing the selection of skilled worker permanent residents. Picot, Hou and Qiu looked at the recent income performance of those selected to come to Canada through its celebrated points system, which favours high human capital. Although they found that those selected in this way fare better than others, they also found that a good amount of patience is required by both the migrants and those who administer the policy. Australia has long been Canada's main competitor in the selection system contest, with both countries continually refining their systems for ever greater advantage. Islam and Parasnis offered the results of their study into

which of the immigrants' human capital characteristics are currently best rewarded in the Australian labour market. The American model of immigration policy making with sole central government authority over the entry of immigrants without direct subnational input has not served subnational US interests well, according to Thangasamy. This model has been inefficient in meeting labour and population needs in the US states. His article considered the problem of sole central government immigrant entry policy making in the US and examined alternative models from Canada and Australia for adoption in the US context.

The world would be a simpler place if all migration were regular and for the circulation of the world's talent. But such is far from the case. The complexities of managing asylum-seeking have risen to the top of the agenda. One way of attempting to manage asylum-seeking has been through agreements with countries of origin on returns, both voluntary and forced. Janmyr looked at the effectiveness of Norway's agreements with Iraq and Ethiopia and found them wanting. As complex as asylum policy is, so too are the economics of providing asylum. Surajakumaran and Tamura did us a service by offering explanations of the econometrics of asylum provision in ways that the rest of us can hope to understand. The new mobility is revealed not only by highly skilled economic migrants moving from one laboratory or corporate headquarters to another but, as well, by some asylum seekers who, as persons with full human interests, often seek more than safety. Lukić took us to Serbia to show the workings of contemporary transit asylum migration.

Managing migration is also not only about managing entry; managing exit is the pre-occupation of many states, especially of developing societies. Concerned about the number of women leaving for employment as domestic workers in countries not well-known for protecting their interests and concerned about the well-being of their children left behind, Sri Lanka introduced measures to restrict this type of emigration. Although the numbers of emigres has declined, Weeraratne described how many have chosen to skirt the new regulations by using irregular means of migrating and thereby subjecting themselves to greater vulnerabilities in their countries of destination.

And it is not only governments at national and local level that are involved. Supra-national governance was the target in Šalamon's look at the asylum systems of the Western Balkan states that are unable to achieve what the European Union expects with regard to such basic matters as identifying and registering asylum seekers and carrying out refugee status determination. Also with regard to supra-national governance, Gülzau, Mau, and Zaun compared the visa policies of the members of such regional authorities as the EU, MERCOSUR, ASEAN, and others, finding, perhaps unsurprisingly, no small degree of divergence. And Recchi looked at what he calls the "citizenship gap" in the EU, comparing, indeed contrasting, the life chances of immigrants and nationals that persist regardless of integration policy.

Data and methodology

One expects methodological advances in an academic journal and *International Migration* is no exception. Caselli showed us how one Italian think tank has dealt with the elusive matter of defining and measuring immigrant integration. In August 2015, we offered five articles on data collection and analysis, articles that confront the "appalling state of migration data" and lead the way to a better state of affairs through innovations in collection, estimations, analysis, and practical applications.

Gold et al offered a remarkable innovation in ascertaining refugee populations, one that was borrowed from a way of estimating wildlife populations. The *capture-recapture* approach to estimating populations was applied to refugees in smaller geographical locales, and they demonstrated how this method can be used by local

authorities to allocate resources to refugees. Makaryan, noting the many alternative methods for estimating migrant populations, considered the special problems in so doing in developing countries, specifically 15 states of the former Soviet Union. She noted the variety of definition of 'migrant' used and the attendant ambiguities that this lends the data, the failure of censuses to capture temporary migrants, and the provisional value of household surveys in measuring migration. Moses responded to the state of migration data by launching *EMIG 1.2: A global time series of annual emigration flows*, an open-source database that is in its early stages of development but yet already offers significant potential to enhance our understanding of emigration should the global migration community participate in further developing the database. Analyses of the data to date confirm that not only are migration rates lower now than they were early in the twentieth century, they have been falling since 1994, something that took many of us by surprise. Bailey and Lau turned our attention to Hong Kong which has undergone a major shift in migration since the re-unification with China which has led to a highly dynamic two-way flow of workers, students, and settlers. They proposed a new method for categorizing and measuring flows as well as new institutional mechanisms to co-ordinate data collection with policy making. With the increased attention being given to Turkey as a result of the refugee crisis in that region, we welcomed Tolay taking us through the development of a new field of scholarship that looks at migration to Turkey, noting its academic strengths and relative weaknesses and pointing to directions that future research in the area ought to take.

Throughout the two years that we are covering here, *International Migration* published on many other topics including immigrant integration where, for example, Fokkema and de Haas gave us the results of an extensive study on the determinants of socio-cultural integration, at the political participation of immigrants, the role of entrepreneurship in integration, the role that cities are playing, what some academics refer to as the securitization of migration, transnationalism, student migration, among others. This brief section of the WMR 2018 hopes only to indicate some of the areas on which we published. But this is no substitute for reading the articles themselves.

*Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*²¹

Chief Editor: Paul Statham

The Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies is known to most academics and practitioners simply as "JEMS". JEMS entered her 43rd year of publication in 2017 and so is one of the longest standing international academic journals as well as one of the leading and highest ranking ones. Like the study of migration, the journal has transformed and expanded massively, especially over the last 20 years, as issues of migration have moved from the relative margins to the core of politics and global societal change. This is not to say that migration and ethnic relations are more important today than before, but issues about movement, mobility, and the increasing cultural and ethnic diversity this brings are now seen as important challenges to states, legal systems and how people live with one another. Migration as a topic has become an important interpretive lens through which societies and people understand the core changes that they are experiencing as a consequence of globalization. This can be 'for good', for example, in public mobilizations to support refugees and people displaced from their homes by international conflicts, or 'for bad' in the reactionary populist politics that attempts to justify anti-immigration policies by stigmatising 'groups' on religious, ethnic or racial grounds, such as 'Muslim bans' and 'Building Walls'. Here is not the place to explore these important topics, but JEMS is a forum where academics

21 Articles cited in the journal editor's contribution can be found at: <http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/cjms20/current>.

do precisely that. As the editor of JEMS, I see the journal as the space where academics and those practitioners who have a foothold in the academic world can put out their original research findings on the crucial issues about migration in the world to their peers, in order to advance knowledge by stimulating scrutiny, responses and debate. Although JEMS is primarily a forum for publishing original academic research and inquiry, we make great efforts to publicise our articles and their core points to broader audiences, not least through social media (twitter and facebook). In this way, the cutting-edge research on migration of the day has the chance to be picked up, resonate and inform other public forums for policy, NGO, and media debates.

In 2017, JEMS will publish 16 issues, or approximately 160 articles of 9000 words each of original research in the field of migration and ethnic relations. Each published article has undergone double-blind peer review, which basically means that reviewers don't know the authors and vice versa. We have an acceptance rate of about 20% that remains pretty much constant. This gives an idea of the industrial-scale of academic production and reviewing (all undertaken voluntarily by academics) that we manage as an academic editorial team working with colleagues at the publisher Taylor and Francis. It also gives an idea of the sheer quantity of academic research that is being undertaken in response to the high social relevance of migration issues in the world today. Our reason for publishing so much is that we want academic research to be out in the public domain so that it has the chance to inform public understandings. The findings of original academic research can give legitimacy to claims by lobbyists and politicians, and contribute to debunking 'false' claims, but to do this they need to be publicly visible and on record. At JEMS we think the best way to serve the academic community is to make research visible. Our reviewing standards are thorough and our publication threshold is relatively high compared to many journals, but at JEMS we aim to be 'quick', so that published findings address contemporary debates. Accepted articles are published online within a month and usually are in print within six months. So our prodigious volume is a result of our policy of 'getting high quality academic research on migration out into the public domain quickly', so that it has a chance to influence how we see the world. Given the current state of the world, there is no sign of academic curiosity waning on migration, at least when judged by the burgeoning number of submissions we receive. In the last three years the amount of submissions has risen by about a third. Our agreement with the publisher is that we try to publish as much research per annum that crosses our threshold – building up a backlog serves no one.

JEMS is perhaps the broadest of the international academic journals in the field when judged by its topical, geographical and disciplinary coverage. We are disciplinary 'pluralists' within the social sciences, drawing research from sociology, political science, development studies, human geography, anthropology and demography. Simply put, our main criterion is 'high quality' that is judged by peer assessment with our editorial team playing a hands-on 'gatekeeper' role. We aim to publish high quality research on migration and ethnic relations that can come in any shape or form. We are happy to include research on important niche topics, such as ethnographies on rural migrants in remote parts of the world, as well as controversial but highly resonant articles, such as an article on religious fundamental Islam in Europe, a six country empirically-based comparison published in 2015 that over two years has been downloaded more than 13000 times. We are pleased to embrace systematic research based on empirical analysis of large data-sets and small 'n' qualitative studies, as well as studies that apply a combination of approaches and methods. Finally, we are comfortable with contributions that advance theoretical understanding as well as those that target specific policy domains.

While five years ago, I think it is fair to say that the journal was primarily 'European' in focus, we have made concerted efforts in recent years to engage more directly with scholars in North America (those working on the US as well as on Europe), and arguably more importantly, encourage academics from Asia and Africa to see JEMS as a forum for their debates. Again this reflects the important changes in the world that are driven by

migration. If there have been 240 Million internal migrants within China over the last decade, surely this needs to be something that the migration academic community is engaging with? In a modest way, we hope that greater exchanges across continents may take us as academics out of our silos and comfort zones and thereby challenge some of the accepted 'truths' that permeate our understandings. Many understandings of migration and ethnic relations are drawn from the experiences of South to North migration in the post war era and written by scholars from receiving countries. In an era of globalization processes, of which migration is both a driver and outcome, it is important to join up the processes that link different world regions, but also to acknowledge that 'one size may not fit all' and that some perspectives that aspired to be of 'general' application may actually be bound by context and time. Is it really the case that discussions about 'multiculturalism', citizenship and ("super") diversity in Singapore and Hong Kong should take their cue from knowledge generated about Canada or European countries? Or are they distinct, and if so, how and why?

In JEMS we publish stand-alone articles of original research and then each year a number of Special Issues that are 'guest edited' by academics who bring together a number of colleagues to produce a relatively integrated collection over a specific key theme or topic on migration. The guest editors manage the first round of review and we on the editorial team review the collection with the aid of an external review. Special Issue proposals are selected from responses to a competitive call that runs twice a year. Those published and in the pipeline from 2015 onwards reflect the broad range of topics and disciplines that characterise the journal. We have contributions that address migration, mobility and cultural diversity with regard to: the transformation of Asia-Pacific cities; the global economic crisis and recession; superdiverse cities as places where migrants mobilize; EU and European migration governance; Gulf 'subjectivities' as migrants; comparative research on Muslims and Islam in liberal democracies; ageing as a migrant; high skilled migration between the global North and South; the IOM as an organization; international academic mobility; new perspectives on the 'migration industries'; aspirations to migrate; undocumented and unaccompanied children; diaspora policies and mobilization; Asian cultures of education; sustainable development and gender; explaining attitudes to immigration; highly skilled migration to the Gulf; care and medical migration; transnational migrations between Europe and Thailand; migration 'brokerage'; strategic citizenship; global smuggling; and circular and return migration to Afghanistan.

A final feature of JEMS is that we hold a day-long Conference each year where a keynote and other leading figures from across the disciplines are invited to present their research. The Conference is free and open to attend and hosted by the Sussex Centre for Migration Research (SCMR) at the University of Sussex which serves as the mothership for JEMS and is the institutional location of the core in-house academic members of the editorial team: Paul Statham (me), James Hampshire, Laura Morosanu, and Sarah Scuzzarello. The idea of the Conference is to serve as a reminder that academic engagement does not only take place via email and electronically, but sometimes requires a physical space where people can meet and critically exchange. More than 200 people have attended the last two conferences, including students and practitioners, and our keynotes over the last years have been Rogers Brubaker, Richard Alba, Irene Bloemraad and Roger Waldinger.

You can find out more about our annual conference at www.sussex.ac.uk/migration/seminars/conferences and JEMS on Facebook at www.facebook.com/scmrjems and on Twitter @scmrjems as well as the journal website www.tandfonline.com/loi/cjms20.

*Journal of Refugee Studies*²²*Chief Editor: Khalid Koser*

This year is the 30th anniversary of the *Journal of Refugee Studies*; and its core focus has never been more relevant. There are more refugees today than at any time since the Journal began: according to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees there were 21.3 million refugees at the end of 2016, including 5.2 million Palestinians. While the world's attention over the last few years has been on refugee flows to Europe in particular from Syria, in fact this is a global crisis: 53 percent of the world's refugees came from three countries, Syria (4.9 million), Afghanistan (2.7 million), and Somalia (1.1 million); and some 85 percent of the world's refugees are settled in poorer countries. Even the majority of Syrian refugees are not in Europe, but in neighbouring Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey.

Refugees are also encountering new challenges: an increasing proportion is in protracted situations without any realistic prospect of a durable solution, and more are relocating to urban settings where it is harder to protect and assist them. While refugees have always suffered discrimination, this is perhaps more systematic today than ever before, with more restrictions on refugees, a number of leaders for the first time suggesting an explicit link between refugee flows and the risk of violent extremism and terrorism; and a rising incidence of xenophobic attacks on refugees. More positively, the 2016 New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants potentially paves the way for significant reform of the international refugee regime and response.

As a result, the *Journal of Refugee Studies* is flourishing, attracting record highs of quality submissions from a widening range of disciplines and from all over the world, and doubling its impact factor over the last two years. But part of this success is not just the new relevance of refugees in global political, media and popular discourse, but also that the Journal has begun to diversify away from a sharp focus on refugees in recent years, to include a wider set of 'forced migrants'.

A growing proportion of submissions and published articles do not focus exclusively or explicitly on refugees (in contrast to migrants, there is a clear legal definition of a 'refugee' in the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, stipulating individual experience or risk of persecution by the State and departure from the home country). Submissions from mainly Europe-based scholars over the last few years, for example, have increasingly been concerned with asylum seekers – that is individuals claiming to be refugees but who in many cases are found not to satisfy the quite strict criteria defining a refugee. Some of these asylum seekers receive some form of 'complementary protection', acknowledging that they are not refugees, but that it may still be unsafe for them to return home. Others are rejected outright, and may be subject to deportation; and on the whole these are people moving for largely economic reasons, but pretending to be fleeing persecution as a means to access industrialized countries.

In contrast, many US-based scholars have submitted articles on refugees permanently resettled to the US – until the recent and it is to be hoped temporary ban on refugee resettlement the US has resettled by far the highest number of refugees worldwide. Yet arguably resettled refugees have more in common with citizens than with other refugees: while they may certainly endure life-long trauma as a result of their experiences, most have a pathway to citizenship in rich countries, and enjoy the full rights of citizens; and many go on to be very successful. A study of resettled refugees would likely be as pertinent for a journal on citizenship or entrepreneurship as for a journal on refugees.

22 Articles cited in the journal editor's contribution can be found at: <https://academic.oup.com/jrs>.

Similarly articles on the experiences of people after they repatriate to their homes having once been refugees are not strictly about refugees. In other ways too, the people included in articles published by the *Journal of Refugee Studies* may not be defined as refugees; for example there has been significant attention to internally displaced persons (IDPs) – forced from their homes but not living outside their country; as well as to people who have fled their countries, but mainly as a result of the effects of environmental change, not conflict or persecution.

Although there have been some vigorous debates in the pages of the *Journal of Refugee Studies* about the risk of ‘mission creep’, especially regarding coverage of IDPs, most scholars would today accept that asylum seekers, IDPs, and resettled and returning refugees comfortably fall within the broad scope of ‘refugee studies’, and tend to be a better fit here than for example in journals on migration. There are at the same time populations and experiences for whom this is a harder call. For example most articles on the victims of human trafficking are submitted to and published by migration journals (as well as various disciplinary journals), yet many have been forced from their homes and moved involuntarily, just like refugees, and perhaps have assistance and protection needs akin to those of refugees. What is more, at least some refugees (and IDPs) may also become victims of trafficking.

The diversification of populations included in the *Journal of Refugee Studies* reflects three new realities in particular. The first is that the reasons that people flee their homes and countries today are not always the same as they were when the 1951 Convention was drafted. Many people flee to get out of harm’s way rather than because of a direct individual threat; many flee persecution by non-State actors (like Da’esh); many cannot make it out of their own countries but still need the support of the international community. The second is that the distinctions between people moving for economic reasons (migrants) and political reasons (refugees), on which the international legal, normative and institutional framework is still based, are no longer easily discernible or necessarily relevant. Most people move for mixed motivations: the underlying cause for a refugee to flee may be political, for example conflict or persecution, but the precipitant factor may be economic, for example losing a job, or social for example losing access to education or healthcare.

Third, increasingly people moving for largely different reasons often move together in ‘mixed migration’: asylum flows to Europe often combine people fleeing persecution (refugees), people moving in response to the effects of environmental change (who might receive ‘complementary protection’), and economic migrants taking advantage of the asylum system.

These realities impact as much on migration as refugee journals. The challenge for the editors of these journals is to maintain their core focus and audience, while also adapting to changing circumstances and as far as possible avoiding overlap or competition. This new initiative by IOM’s World Migration Report to include short contributions from various of these journals provides a unique forum to compare notes, and forward our joint agenda to promote critical scholarship and informed policy and practice on migration and refugees.

*Mobilities*²³

Chief Editors: Kevin Hannam, Mimi Sheller and David Tyfield

The concept of mobilities has been developed, particularly in the journal *Mobilities* but also elsewhere in the humanities and social sciences to theorise and analyse the diverse connections between different forms and practices of mobility. One constituent element of mobility is, of course, migration. The journal *Mobilities* differs

23 Articles cited in the journal editors’ contribution can be found at: <http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/rmob20/current>.

from mainstream journals of migration in that it aims to provide a platform for studies of the large-scale movements of people, objects, capital, and information across the world, as well as more local processes of daily transportation, movement through public and private space and the travel of material objects in everyday life. It highlights how, for example, new transportation and digital infrastructures and innovations in social and cultural practices pose important challenges for co-ordinating and governing mobilities and for mobility rights and questions of access. Thus it promotes critical thinking about mobility practices and their inequalities as well as developing new theorisations of multiple forms of mobility which may be embodied, representational and/or infrastructural (on the latter see Burrell, 2016).

In this short review we wish to highlight some of the key developments in terms of mobilities research in relation to migration practices over the past two years as published in the journal *Mobilities*. To begin with we note some of the special issues related to reconceptualising migration that have been published in the journal *Mobilities* to exemplify the diversity of approaches needed to take the study of migration forward. Next, we focus on recent analyses of empirical data relating to different forms of mobile migration in terms of crossing borders, physically and metaphorically. Finally, we look ahead and conclude by reflecting briefly upon the current processes of geopolitical re-bordering that may lead to increased inequalities and immobilities.

Theorising Mobilities and Migration Practices

In their special issue of the *Mobilities* journal Paul Basu and Simon Coleman (2008), highlighted the connections between migration and materiality. They argued that “while much scholarly work exists on both migration and material culture, there is remarkably little literature explicitly concerned with how these areas of study converge” p. 313. They theorise the reframing of migration into some areas of concern that have been of long-standing importance within anthropology (the gift, temporality, translation), which have not necessarily been those raised most frequently in relation to migration studies. Focussing on the inter-relations between love, sexuality and migration in terms of theorising multiple mobilities, Nicola Mai and Russell King (2009, p. 295), meanwhile, attempted to map figuratively and empirically some of the key issues that are “informed by a variety of emotional, affective and sexual liaisons, attachments and expectations, which can be powerful and necessary motivations for mobility and for the risks taken in crossing boundaries.” They argued for both a ‘sexual turn’ and an ‘emotional turn’ in mobility studies to better understand the nuances of contemporary migration practices. Similarly, in their introduction to the special issue on *Mobilities and Forced Migration*, Nick Gill, Javier Caletrio and Victoria Mason, (2011, p. 301) noted that, “[w]hether precipitated by political or environmental factors, human displacement can be more fully understood by attending to the ways in which a set of bodily, material, imagined and virtual mobilities and immobilities interact to produce population movement.”

Crossing borders

In the recent collated special issue of *Mobilities* entitled *Crossing Borders* published in 2016, we brought together a number of papers that critically analysed migration practices from a mobilities perspective. Paolo Boccagni, Jean-Michel Lafleur and Peggy Levitt (2016), “propose that processes such as circulation, portability, and contact, viewed through a transnational optic, help to nuance recent research on political transnationalism.” Hence, they argue that:

As the boundaries of politics shift, we need new ways to conceptualize, study, and evaluate political processes that cross, intersect, and challenge national borders. It is

not just the migration of bodies that causes individuals, communities, and nations to define themselves as transnationally constituted. The circulation of people is intimately connected to the circulation of political ideas, practices, and projects. Therefore, we need strategies for understanding politics in motion: how political participation and institutions change and are changed by the concomitant circulation not only of political beings, but ideas, values, skills, and projects as well. We need ways of conceptualizing the spaces and places in which this circulation takes shape and ways to evaluate its impact on political institutions and arrangements. (Boccagni, Lafleur and Levitt, 2016, p.445).

In one example of this kind of in depth analysis of mobility, Philipp Schröder and Manja Stephan-Emmrich (2016, p. 420) present “in-depth case studies which explore how Central Asians engage in ‘business-making’, ‘evolve’ their Muslim piety, transgress rural–urban boundaries and experience ethnic marginalization in between ‘home’ and cities in Russia, China or Egypt.” They emphasise how mobility practices such as migration can become ‘institutionalised’ as a learnt behaviour across Central Asia in a variety of contexts.

Marcu’s (2016) research into EU mobilities, meanwhile, focuses on how migrants from Eastern Europe learn about mobility practices as relatively new citizens of Europe by engaging with borders. She analyses the experiences of Eastern Europeans engaged in labour mobility in Spain, in order to understand how EU enlargement has influenced the mobilities of these citizens and the ways in which they interpret cross-border practices. Importantly, she analyses whether borders can be seen as an “instrument for learning mobility or as an obstacle to current human mobility” (p. 344). For these migrants, she argues, “the border between the former and the current country of residence is not situated around their lives, but has moved to the centre of their lifeworld” (p. 354).

Szewczyk (2016) further argues that aspirant Polish migrants have sought a variety of different strategies including obtaining British citizenship and British passports, in order to enhance their motility and potential ability to migrate outside of Europe. She highlights the possibility of a go-stop-go mobility, a stepped approach to (global) citizenship, which she argues, “is a key feature of the new elite cohort of young European graduates, who use their European citizenship to obtain an alternative citizenship that acts as a passport literally and metaphorically to mobility beyond Europe” (p. 362).

Conclusions

Whilst the previous examples demonstrate how mobility and migration can be learnt and institutionalised through processes of de-bordering, borders have become a highly politically charged contemporary topic that call into question conventional analyses of migration through re-bordering. The political debates over the reception of refugees from Syria and Afghanistan within Europe; the popular vote in favour of the UK to leave the European Union – ‘Brexit’; and the proposed building of a wall between the USA and Mexico all testify to new physical and symbolic processes of re-bordering. It has been recognised that borders are “not merely empirical phenomena, but are used and constructed and opened and closed depending on who crosses them and on how contentious they become in political debates” (Scuzzarello and Kinnvall, 2013, p. 93).

Since September 2015 the mobility of refugees and/or migrants has entered centre stage in terms of the geopolitics between Western Europe and Eastern Europe with Central Europe being re-imagined as a space of transit for those seeking a new life away from the fragility of becoming human in Syria, Afghanistan and elsewhere. The reception has been polarised between those that welcomed these new arrivals and those that

expected their government to enforce the borders and prevent so called abuse of the EU's system of asylum. Meanwhile, with a significant number of ageing British migrants resident abroad in the EU, processes of re-bordering could become a long-term and a significant issue as many rely on reciprocal health agreements.

The popular vote in favour of Brexit in the UK (although not in Scotland) has been seen to be a reflection of UK citizens being worried about too much immigration, and, in particular, the wrong type of immigration. Much of this sentiment was developed by the media who have emphasised the economic impact that potential migrants might have on UK taxpayers (Vollmer, 2017). A passport literally signifies the ability to move across national boundaries unhindered but with Brexit this ability to move will lead to new real and perceived frictions of travel where border crossings are slowed and the movement of people and things become more regulated and subject to surveillance and sorting (Adey, 2002). Finally, it remains to be seen how the building of a wall between the USA and Mexico will lead to new practices of engagement with this border.

*Population, Space and Place*²⁴

Chief Editors: Allan M. Findlay, Clara H. Mulder and Darren P. Smith

Migration and changing population geographies in a time of flux

In terms of the total number of published papers, migration is a prevalent focus of interest in *Population, Space and Place*. Papers cover both international migration and internal mobility. Some researchers even question the validity of distinguishing the two terms, given the complexity of contemporary human mobility, and also given the common drivers that underpin many human movements and displacements (Hickey & Yeoh, 2016; see also Hugo, 2016). The content of recent research papers in *Population, Space and Place* reflects the extraordinary times in which we live, in terms of issues such as refugee flows (Van Houte et al., 2015), migration and climate change (de Campos, 2016), migration responses to global recession (Vargas-Silva, 2016), and the upsurge in international student mobility (Frandsberg, 2015; Tan & Hugo, 2016).

Any reader of the journal will notice, however, that migration research published by *Population, Space and Place* is distinctive. This is because of our focus on migration as a key dimension of population geography and geographical population studies (Findlay & Mulder, 2015). It is in relation to this rather specific canvas that we explore five themes that illuminate the significant scholarly advances that have been achieved by authors publishing in our journal. We commence by reviewing some conceptual advances, before turning to research on the act of migration itself, the consequences of migration for particular people, issues relating to social segregation, and, finally, transnational perspectives.

(Re)conceptualising migration

Population geographers are interested in the multiple contexts of space, place and demography. Arguably the most important conceptual advance has been the recognition that human mobilities (including many kinds of migration) are relational. For researchers this has meant that migration is no longer viewed as an isolated 'event' driven by an individual decision-maker. Instead, there has been increasing recognition of human movement being relational, linking lives over time(s) and space(s). It is relational between the linked lives

24 Articles cited in the journal editors' contribution can be found at: [http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1002/\(ISSN\)1544-8452](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1002/(ISSN)1544-8452).

of people who share a household and who may move together (van Bochove et al., 2015). It is also relational between movers and non-movers (for example between parents who migrate internationally for work and their children often left behind with their grandparents (Murphy et al., 2016), or between immigrants arriving in a community and non-movers living in the same community and adjusting their lives to the impact of new arrivals (Phillips & Robinson, 2015). And it is relational between migrants and those with power to enable and/or to block mobility (for example those allocating housing to new arrivals), or those who govern migration policy and who establish which people have permission to stay and who must return to their place of origin (Lietaert et al., 2015).

An attempt to offer a wider conceptual framework bringing order to diverse migration studies is provided by Findlay et al. (2015: 394) who suggest a three-level schema for interpreting changes in migration and other human mobilities over time. At one level more fluid lifecourses and longer lifespans have produced changes in the human mobilities of individuals and linked lives within households (Coulter et al., 2016). Second, structural influences such as those operating in globalising labour markets (Visser, 2016) or segmented housing markets have produced distinctive 'period effects' in human mobility (Vargas-Silva, 2016). Third, the embedded nature of people's lives in regional, national and global space-time transformations have produced long term shifts in many aspects of human mobility. This has been in relation to forces as varied as the upturn in secular rootedness (Champion et al., 2016a), and the impact on youth mobility of the UK government's policy to expand Higher Education opportunities (Champion et al., 2016b).

Two key points arise from this discussion of conceptual advances in migration research. These are, first, that knowledges of mobility should be based on the recognition of migration as a relational practice, and, second, that migration should be regarded as a key mechanism that inescapably shapes all human geographies, both of movers and non-movers (Jons, 2015).

The act of migration

A major research focus in *Population, Space and Place* is describing and explaining the act of migration itself, either in terms of aggregate migration flows or in terms of behaviour of individuals. Measuring migration is not always straightforward, and Bell et al. (2015) describe the worldwide variation in measurement of internal migration flows (within a country). Sander and Bell (2016) show how migration flows can be disentangled along the lines of age, period and birth cohorts (generations born in the same time). Most other work goes into much more detail with regard to how migration is related to individual characteristics. While some of this work aims to explain the likelihood of moving in general (Thomas et al., 2016), most articles have a more specific focus. Various articles are concerned with specific migration destinations, such as rural areas (Eimermann, 2015; Stockdale, 2016). Other articles concentrate on specific population categories, such as parents and their children (Bennett et al., 2015), doctoral students (Pásztor, 2015) and older people (Marjavaara & Lundholm, 2016). Yet, other articles focus on specific types of migration, such as return migration (Amcoff & Niedomysl, 2015; Erdal et al., 2016; Model, 2016), onward migration to a third country (Ahrens et al., 2016) or temporary migration (Zander et al., 2016). There are also studies on what motivates people to move (Clark & Maas, 2015; Coulter & Scott, 2015; Vilhelmson & Thulin, 2015), and one study focuses on migration decision-making (Baláz et al., 2016).

The consequences of migration

If one thing becomes clear from the contributions to *Population, Space and Place* published in 2015 and 2016, it is that migration has numerous individual and societal consequences. While migration is generally beneficial to individuals in the sense of labour-market outcomes, labour migrants in some contexts are vulnerable and affected by labour policies and the economy in host countries (Maher & Cawley, 2016) or suffer from discrimination (Wang et al., 2015). For the case of return migration to Afghanistan, Van Houte et al. (2015) argue that migration reinforced existing socio-economic stratification rather than change it. And even though highly-skilled migrants likely experience important positive consequences of their move, they also face considerable risks (Bradatan 2016, and other papers in the Special Issue on highly-skilled migrants to which her article forms the introduction). Kveder and Beauchemin (2015) describe how migration experience is associated with investments in real estate and business assets in the home country. Other articles focus on the impact of migration on social networks (Newbold et al., 2015), mortality (Mberu & Mutua, 2015; Zarulli, 2016) or health and well-being (Murphy et al., 2016).

Segregation by migration

Internal and international migration flows into, within and between, and out of neighbourhoods are key constituents of contemporary population geographies of segregation. Numerous recent papers in *Population, Space and Place* have highlighted the ways in which diverse forms of migration are (re)producing socio-spatial segregation, as well as underpinning the formation of new spatialities of segregation. With a prevalent focus on dynamic ethnic compositions in local neighbourhoods, recent research papers have shown a growing diversification of (non)segregated neighbourhoods (Johnston et al., 2016), some increasing levels of social and spatial mixing (Catney, 2016), and evidence of inter-ethnic coexistence fuelled by immigration (Kohlbacher et al., 2015). Differential factors here include the effects of key axes of social difference (e.g. religion, ethnicity, culture, social class) based, for example, on differences between countrywide and specific regional places of origin (Aradhya et al., 2016), and divisions tied to rural and urban migrant identities (Wang et al., 2017). Compelling evidence has revealed how and why segregation is perpetuated via self-selective/elective in-migration (Zucotti & Platt, 2016), as well as segregation that is reproduced through immobility/non-migration linked to anchored senses of local attachment to people and places, such as familiarity, social ties and neighbourliness (Fong & Hou, 2015; Clark et al., 2015; Holton, 2015). Key here are subsequent inter-generational effects of immigrant social groups that either 'stay put' in particular segregated neighbourhoods and / or become socially mobile, in situ, within those neighbourhoods (Goodwin-White, 2016), or move into to different segregated (and diverse) neighbourhoods (Gustafsson et al., 2016). Other recent papers illuminate how socio-spatial segregation extends beyond residential spheres to distinct public spaces for social and recreational interactions (Neal et al., 2015), and increasingly within occupational/work spaces (Gandini & Lozano-Ascencio, 2015).

Transnational Perspectives

Researchers have a long history of studying transnationalism and its transformative effects on localities and regions of origin and destination (Fauser et al, 2016). Recent research has added a new dimension by showing the powerful connectivities between different kinds of mobilities (Janta et al., 2015). In particular transnational migration has been shown to be a precursor to lots of short-term mobilities involving migrants visiting friends and family in their region of origin as well as flows in the other direction of families visiting

migrants living in transnational communities in other parts of the world. Research (Humbracht, 2015) shows that these visitor mobilities are not just about tourism, but that they also are important in the provision of care, the affirmation of identities and also the maintenance of rights (e.g. territorial rights).

Another emergent research topic is transnational social protection (Faist, 2015). Migrants have different strategies to offer informal social protection to their family living in other countries. Their social practices have been shown to be critical process in the production of new social and geographical inequalities. This raises many questions about the implications of social protection for the life chances of migrants and their families living in other countries.

Conclusion

Clearly, scholars in the fields of population geography and geographical population studies who publish in *Population, Space and Place* have a broad interest in migration and its causes and consequences. This broad interest becomes manifest in a wide variety of research, ranging from conceptual explorations via analyses of large-scale datasets, and research employing experimental methods to research employing qualitative methods such as in-depth interviews. Recent research papers clearly highlight the important and diverse ways that contemporary migration processes and outcomes are (re)shaping population geographies across the globe in extraordinary ways.

Chapter 5

Appendix A. Definitions

Definitions are organized by first word alphabetical order.

Customary International Law

Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) identifies key sources of international law. These are:

(a) International conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting States; (b) *international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law*; (c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; (d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.¹

The ICJ's case law, including in particular the North Sea Continental Shelf case, provides further guidance on customary international law (CIL) and its content.²

Global Governance

One definition of global governance suggests it can be defined in either procedural or substantive terms:

On a procedural level, it can be understood as the process by which states engage in collective action to address common problems arising around a particular issue. This process involves agenda-setting, negotiations, monitoring, implementation, and enforcement. On a substantive level, global governance is identifiable by the norms, rules, principles, and decision-making procedures that regulate the behaviour of states (and other transnational actors) in a particular issue area.³

Organized Criminal Group

Article 2 of the UNCTOC defines "Organized criminal group" as:

A structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences established in accordance with the Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit.

1 Emphasis added. For the full article, please see the Statute of the International Court of Justice, available at: www.icj-cij.org/en/statute (accessed: 18 July 2017).

2 North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark), 1969.

3 Betts, 2011. See also Krasner, 1983, for a definition of "regime", which is incorporated into the above.

Smuggling of Migrants

Article 3(a) of the Smuggling Protocol defines “smuggling of migrants” as:

The procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident.

Articles 3(b) and (c) also provides further clarification:

- (b) “Illegal entry” shall mean crossing borders without complying with the necessary requirements for legal entry into the receiving State;
- (c) “Fraudulent travel or identity document” shall mean any travel or identity document:
 - (i) That has been falsely made or altered in some material way by anyone other than a person or agency lawfully authorized to make or issue the travel or identity document on behalf of a State; or
 - (ii) That has been improperly issued or obtained through misrepresentation, corruption or duress or in any other unlawful manner; or
 - (iii) That is being used by a person other than the rightful holder.

Trafficking in Persons

Article 3(a) of the Palermo Protocol defines “trafficking in persons” as:

The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.

Article 3(b), (c) and (d) also provide further clarification:

- (b) The consent of a victim of trafficking in persons to the intended exploitation set forth in subparagraph (a) of this article shall be irrelevant where any of the means set forth in subparagraph (a) have been used;
- (c) The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation shall be considered “trafficking in persons” even if this does not involve any of the means set forth in subparagraph (a) of this article;
- (d) “Child” shall mean any person under eighteen years of age.

Chapter 5

Appendix B. Global multilateral treaties and state parties

Conventions are listed under a primary thematic area. Some Conventions relate to more than one theme; in such cases, they are listed only once.⁴

Thematic Area	Treaty	Adopted	Entered into Force	No. of State Parties	Link for No. of State Parties
Human Rights	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)	1966	1976	169	https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4&clang=_en
	International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)	1966	1976	165	https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-3&chapter=4&clang=_en
	International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD)	1966	1969	178	https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-2&chapter=4&clang=_en
	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)	1979	1981	189	https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-8&chapter=4&clang=_en
	Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT)	1984	1987	162	https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-9&chapter=4&clang=_en
	Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)	1989	1990	196	https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-11&chapter=4&clang=_en

⁴ Unless otherwise noted, information on adoption, entry into force, and State Parties were accessed between 18 and 23 July 2017.

Thematic Area	Treaty	Adopted	Entered into Force	No. of State Parties	Link for No. of State Parties
Human Rights	International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (ICRMW)	1990	2003	51	https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtmsg_no=IV-13&chapter=4&clang=_en
	Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD)	2006	2008	174	https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtmsg_no=IV-15&chapter=4&clang=_en
	International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance	2006	2010	57	https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtmsg_no=IV-16&chapter=4&clang=_en
Refugee Law	Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention)	1951	1954	145	https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtmsg_no=V-2&chapter=5&Temp=mtmsg2&clang=_en
	Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees	1967	1967	146	https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtmsg_no=V-5&chapter=5&clang=_en
Trafficking and Smuggling	UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC)	2000	2003	188	https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtmsg_no=XVIII-12&chapter=18&clang=_en
	Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing UNTOC (Palermo Protocol)	2000	2003	171	https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtmsg_no=XVIII-12-a&chapter=18&clang=_en
	Protocol Against Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, Supplementing UNTOC (Smuggling Protocol)	2000	2004	145	https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtmsg_no=XVIII-12-b&chapter=18&clang=_en

Thematic Area	Treaty	Adopted	Entered into Force	No. of State Parties	Link for No. of State Parties
Labour and Services*	Migration for Employment Convention (Revised) (ILO Convention No. 97)	1949	1952	49	www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NOR_MLEXPUB:11300:0::NO:11300:P11300_INSTRUMENT_ID:312242:NO
	Convention Concerning Migrations in Abusive Conditions and the Promotion of Equality of Opportunity and Treatment of Migrant Workers (ILO Convention No. 143)	1975	1978	23	www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NOR_MLEXPUB:11300:0::NO:11300:P11300_INSTRUMENT_ID:312288:NO
	Convention Concerning Decent Work for Domestic Workers (ILO Convention No. 189)	2011	2013	24	www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NOR_MLEXPUB:11300:0::NO:11300:P11300_INSTRUMENT_ID:2551460:NO
	General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)	1994	1995	164 Members of WTO**	www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm
Modes of Movement	International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, as Amended (SOLAS)	1974	1980	163	www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/StatusOfConventions/Documents/Status%20-%20202017.pdf****
	International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, as Amended (SAR)	1979	1985	110	www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/StatusOfConventions/Documents/Status%20-%20202017.pdf****

* The ILO's Eight Fundamental Conventions, noted in the body of the chapter, are accessible here: www.ilo.org/global/standards/introduction-to-international-labour-standards/conventions-and-recommendations/lang--en/index.htm.

** Members of the WTO include States, Hong Kong (Special Administrative Region China), Taiwan Province of the People's Republic of China and the European Union.

*** See p. 16; document dated 11 July 2017.

**** See p. 410; document dated 11 July 2017.

Thematic Area	Treaty	Adopted	Entered into Force	No. of State Parties	Link for No. of State Parties
Modes of Movement	UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)	1982	1994	168	https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXI-6&chapter=21&Temp=mtdsg3&clang=_en
	Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention)	1944	1947	191	www.icao.int/publications/Documents/chicago.pdf
Climate Change	UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)	1992	1994	197	https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7&chapter=27&Temp=mtdsg3&clang=_en
	Paris Agreement	2015	2016	154	https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7&chapter=27&clang=_en

Chapter 7

Appendix A. The migration of children: Drivers and challenges

Tom K. Wong, Nadia Hartvisgen and Elizabeth Arroyo¹

Just as with adult migrants, a wide range of factors help to explain why children migrate, and such decisions are rarely reducible to any single determinant. However, the migration of children – especially without parents or other adults – raises more pressing questions about the variable roles (or lack thereof) that children may have in migratory decisions. In addition, for children left behind after their parents migrate, it may be that “immigrant children are active agents in family reunifications and are able to (re)make and negotiate kin relations”.²

It is important to keep in mind that the majority of the world’s child migrants are not refugees and asylum seekers who are fleeing violence or escaping persecution. These children may migrate in order to pursue improved prospects in other countries, such as greater economic prospects and expanded access to educational opportunities. The role of family is deserving of special attention here. Family dynamics may themselves serve as push factors for migration, for example, when family breakdown (e.g. loss of the breadwinner or the head of household) creates an economic necessity to move elsewhere. Dynamics within families may also lead to children, particularly adolescents, shouldering the migratory burden, because they are more physically capable of making what can be difficult journeys abroad. In some cases, families may also strategically decide that children have a higher likelihood of succeeding in the country of destination.³

However, children may also migrate as the result of decisions to leave difficult conditions or exigent circumstances – conflict, persecution and discrimination, abuse and violence, and environmental disasters, are just a few examples of the factors that can drive child migration. Conflict is deserving of special attention, as children are particularly vulnerable to recruitment by armed forces or armed groups, among many other severe forms of abuse and exploitation. Indeed, conflict displaces millions of families and children each year.⁴

It is important to recognize that not all child migrants lack agency in migratory decisions. The migration of adolescents may be less tied to the decisions of adults than the migration of younger children. For example, whereas for younger children, parents may face the decision to leave them behind with family members or bring them along with them, adolescents may be given a choice. While child migrants, whether adolescents or younger children, may have little agency in making migratory decisions in the context of conflict-induced migration, adolescents may have more agency than do younger child migrants in other contexts; for example, when migratory decisions centre on pursuing better economic or educational opportunities.⁵

Afghan unaccompanied minors

Afghanistan has experienced conflict and political instability nearly continuously since the late 1970s. As a consequence, Afghan displacement and migration have been a constant feature of the global landscape in recent

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2 See Caneva, 2014, for a review of children’s roles in migratory processes. See also Tyrrell and Kallis, 2016.

3 Mougne, 2010; Edmonds and Salinger, 2007; Suárez-Orozco and Suárez-Orozco, 2009.

4 UNICEF, 2016.

5 For example, see Vervliet et al., 2015.

decades. Afghans have consistently been one of the largest groups of asylum seekers in Europe.⁶ In this context, many Afghan children have begun these journeys alone, or become separated somewhere en route.

A recent study of Afghan unaccompanied minors in Europe finds many are second-generation migrants, meaning they have little or no connection to Afghanistan, were living in a country other than Afghanistan, and have now made the journey to Europe.⁷ Interviews with Afghan unaccompanied minors suggest that many do not envision their futures in Afghanistan, nor in neighbouring countries such as the Islamic Republic of Iran or Pakistan, and are prepared to risk their health and safety to reach Europe.⁸ Afghan unaccompanied minors are thus likely to continue to seek refuge in Europe. Afghan unaccompanied minors accounted for more than one half of all unaccompanied minors who lodged an asylum claim in the European Union in 2015.⁹

When it comes to why Afghan unaccompanied minors are leaving Afghanistan for Europe, the Afghanistan Research Unit and the UNHCR find, “Children were motivated to engage in unaccompanied journeys due to a combination of frequently interrelated factors, including poverty, insecurity, inadequate opportunities for education and employment, and family and peer expectations”.¹⁰ Moreover, especially in high-sending areas, where migration and smuggling networks have developed, decisions to leave Afghanistan were often shared by the heads of the family and the children. It is important to note that research unpacking the decision-making logic that families use when sending their children on their own to Europe finds that, in many cases, the risks involved are well known a priori. However, these risks are eclipsed by the potential benefits of migrating, or because families feel they have no other choice but to send their children.¹¹

During transit, these children, mostly adolescent boys aged between 13 and 17,¹² are vulnerable to physical violence, harassment by smugglers and law enforcement officials, sexual exploitation, and many other forms of abuse. In interviews conducted by researchers with Afghan unaccompanied minors, while some openly discussed their migratory journeys, many did not want to recall their experiences.¹³ As mentioned above, as Afghan unaccompanied minors often leave for Europe with the consent and support of their families, the trauma that unaccompanied Afghan minors experience is thus “compounded by their expectations and the pressure not to disappoint their families back home”.¹⁴ These pressures are made heavier by the debt that families accrue when children are entrusted into the care of smugglers. Personal aspirations and hopes for a better life can add even greater pressure, which can lead Afghan unaccompanied minors into risky and dangerous situations.¹⁵ Still, despite all of this, “both children who returned from unaccompanied journeys and their family members strongly affirmed that they would engage in further unaccompanied travel once they could finance the trip”.¹⁶ Moreover, in a recent IOM report based on 1,206 interviews with unaccompanied child migrants in Greece, 42 per cent of the children, primarily from Afghanistan (as well as Pakistan), were intent on reaching their final destination in Europe, regardless of the services provided to them in Greece; only around 23 per cent expressed

6 Echavez et al., 2014.

7 Donini, Monsutti and Scalettari, 2016.

8 Boland, 2010.

9 Eurostat, 2017.

10 Echavez et al., 2014.

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.

13 Boland, 2010.

14 Donini, Monsutti and Scalettari, 2016.

15 Mougne, 2010.

16 Echavez et al., 2014.

the desire to return to their country of origin. The remainder of those interviewed expressed willingness to return to origin countries, but later decided to remain in Greece.¹⁷

Unaccompanied children from Central America transiting through Mexico

In 2014, a deteriorating humanitarian situation in the Northern Triangle of Central America, which includes El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, led many unaccompanied minors to leave their homes. Whereas some went to neighbouring countries, many sought refuge in the United States and made the trek north through Mexico. During that year, the United States Border Patrol apprehended 52,000 Central American unaccompanied minors who arrived at the southern border of the United States.¹⁸

As the movement of Central American unaccompanied minors through Mexico has increased, so too has the country's immigration control efforts. In 2015, Mexico's Instituto Nacional de Migración (INM) (National Institute of Migration), apprehended nearly 36,000 Central American unaccompanied minors who were transiting through Mexico.¹⁹ By comparison, in 2014 this figure was significantly less at just over 23,000.

One of the main drivers of the movement of Central American unaccompanied minors to the United States is violence. Homicide rates in the Northern Triangle are among the highest of any region in the world.²⁰ Unaccompanied minors often leave the Northern Triangle to avoid recruitment by gangs who force young people to commit crimes, including homicide and extortion, or coerce them into drug or sex trafficking.²¹

Migrating within the Northern Triangle can be less fraught than the journey through Mexico, where unaccompanied minors enter Mexico in the town of Tenosique in the state of Tabasco (Mexico's northern border with Guatemala), or in Ciudad Hidalgo in the state of Chiapas (Mexico's southern border with Guatemala). Unaccompanied minors generally enter Mexico on cargo trains or are smuggled into the country by human smugglers. Images of children riding atop cargo train cars, often with nothing more than the clothes on their bodies or a backpack, and often with nothing to hold onto except thin rails along the edges of the train cars, make vivid the dangers of this harrowing journey. Moreover, the strong presence of the INM in certain areas has led migrants to abandon safer routes and attempt to transit through Mexico along more dangerous routes to avoid apprehension. In addition, via Plan Merida (the Merida Initiative), the United States has appropriated billions of dollars to help Mexico tighten security along its southern border and expand its immigration detention capacity, including for unaccompanied minors,²² among other measures. While this has made transit through Mexico more difficult, it has also increased demand for smugglers. As unaccompanied minors transit through Mexico, they can be subject to kidnapping, extortion by organized criminal networks, labour exploitation and sexual exploitation, among other forms of abuse.²³

While transit through the country has become more dangerous, Central American unaccompanied minors continue to make the journey through Mexico to the United States. Recognizing this, the Government of Mexico has also

17 IOM, 2016a.

18 Meyer et al., 2016. The 52,000 Central American unaccompanied minors who were apprehended at the border in 2014 represented a 150 per cent increase from the previous year and a 1,200 per cent increase compared with 2011.

19 Secretaría de Gobernación, 2016.

20 For example, in 2015, El Salvador and Honduras ranked first and second in the number of intentional homicides per 100,000 people. See World Bank, n.d.

21 For example, see Ward, 2013; see also Serna, 2016.

22 Bochenek, 2016.

23 Kinne, Goździak and Martin, 2016.

made efforts to provide assistance to unaccompanied minors. One example is the creation of the *Oficiales de Protección de la Infancia*, whose mission is to provide assistance and support to migrant children. In 2014, Mexico also passed the *Ley General de los Derechos de Niños, Niñas y Adolescentes* (General Law on the Rights of Children and Adolescents), which included measures to provide legal assistance for unaccompanied minors.

Protection challenges

Child migration creates many unique protection challenges, as child migrants face the “double vulnerability” of being both a child and a migrant.²⁴ Empirically, child migrants are particularly vulnerable to violence, exploitation and trafficking; and concerns about these abuses intensify when children are migrating alone or become separated from their families. Even if children may initially migrate alongside their families, they can for various reasons become separated during their journey. As UNICEF describes, “violence may come in the form of state action (particularly during migration enforcement or detention), the general public (in the form of xenophobic attacks), employers (in various forms of child labor), other children (including bullying and abuse in schools) or within families (in the form of domestic violence)”.²⁵

Child forced labour and child forced marriage are among the most severe forms of exploitation to which children are uniquely vulnerable. When children or their families are forced to rely on smugglers, concerns about such exploitation becomes even more acute. Of course, while migrant smuggling and human trafficking²⁶ are distinct, concern about the exploitation of children by smugglers often engenders concern about trafficking in children. Although global estimates of victims of trafficking are limited and challenging to collect, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimates that 28 per cent of detected victims of human trafficking were children in 2014, with approximately 20 per cent of victims being girls and 8 per cent being boys.²⁷

The death of child migrants makes even more urgent the need to address the protection challenges that attend child migration. According to the IOM’s Missing Migrants Project, there have been at least 46,000 migrant deaths since 2000, and many of those who died were children.²⁸ In 2015, for example, the IOM estimates that roughly one out of every three migrant deaths in the Aegean Sea was of a child.²⁹ Moreover, one quarter of the nearly 24,000 migrants who were rescued at sea in the Mediterranean by *Médecins San Frontières* (MSF) between May and December 2015 were children.³⁰

The disappearance of child migrants also demands our urgent attention. In 2016, the disappearance of an estimated 10,000 unaccompanied children in Europe captured international media headlines. In addressing Members of the European Parliament, Europol noted that while some of these children may have left in search of family in Europe, many are likely being exploited by smugglers, including for the purposes of labour exploitation (used for begging or being forced to commit crimes) and sexual exploitation.³¹

24 UNICEF, 2016.

25 Ibid.

26 For definitions of the terms “migrant smuggling” and “human trafficking”, as well as other related concepts, see Appendix A in Chapter 2 of this report, *Migration and Migrants: A global overview*.

27 UNODC, 2016.

28 IOM, 2016b.

29 Ibid.

30 Ibid.

31 European Parliament News, 2016.



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