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Abstract and Keywords

This chapter discusses how to measure the closeness and range of party–union relationships empirically, and presents our data and methods in detail. It starts by defining what is meant by organizational closeness or distance between parties and trade unions. It then shows how this is operationalized. Next, the chapter presents the case selection, discussing its limitations as well as its plus points, and shows how, using comparative datasets, the cases score on most of the contextual variables presented in Chapter 1. Finally, the chapter briefly summarizes how the original data on relationships have been collected and systematized, focusing both on the mapping of party-union statutes and the construction of a questionnaire to key informants on both sides. It also discusses how to measure the strength of (formal) links quantitatively with one or more aggregate scores

Keywords: parties, social democratic, labour, trade unions, organization, links, closeness, range, comparative dataset, questionnaire, Mokken

Introduction

In Chapter 1 we presented the descriptive research questions and theoretical propositions that guide this empirical study of the relationship between left-of-centre parties and trade unions. The overall aim is to interrogate the common wisdom which claims that traditional left-of-centre party–trade union

relationships are no longer close and exclusive. But we also want to look at variation and try to explain the current state of play as well as the trends.

Studies of party–union links have long suffered from a lack of agreement on how to conceptualize 'relationships' and measure their 'closeness', and this has prevented clear conclusions from being drawn. We therefore try to be very specific, asking to what extent and how parties and trade unions are connected as organizations, and how they behave towards and deal with each other. Party–union links are those means by which a party and an interest group may interact repeatedly—such as corporate membership, joint committees, or regular elite contact. This specificity allows us to maintain a clear focus across cases.

In what follows, we first define what we mean when we talk about the closeness or distance between parties and trade unions and the range of relationships each of them may or may not enjoy with other organizations. We then show how we operationalize all this. Second, we present our case selection—the countries, parties, and trade unions to be studied. We discuss the selection's limitations as well as its plus points, and conclude that, taken as a whole, it enables us to generate several interesting insights into the relationship between left-of-centre parties and trade unions in mature democracies. We also show how our country cases score on most of the contextual variables presented in Chapter 1, based on existing comparative datasets. Finally, we briefly summarize how the original data on relationships have been collected **(p.27)** and systematized for this book and the datasets on which it draws, focusing both on the mapping of party–union statutes and the construction of a questionnaire to key informants on both sides. We also discuss how to measure the strength of (formal) links quantitatively with one or more aggregate scores. In sum, this chapter provides an essential backdrop for reading and interpreting the empirical evidence collected and presented by our country teams in the chapters that follow.

The Concept of Closeness: Basic Categorization of Links
The study of party–interest group relationships in terms of organizational closeness is not an entirely novel enterprise. However, we will argue that existing approaches have been unable to cover all the possible permutations— ranging from full integration to complete detachment. A new conceptualization is needed—one specified in terms of concrete links. This can provide us with a basis for trying to create aggregate measures of the strength of at least formal links.

Poguntke (2006, 397–8) argues that European parties may have more or less close relationships with *collateral organizations.* These can be corporately linked to the party (through collective membership), through being formally affiliated (through guaranteed representation in decision-making bodies) or informally linked (through exclusive negotiations) based on a broad commonality of interests. As long as ancillary organizations are excluded, this classification is

certainly useful when trying to measure fairly close or very close party–interest group relationships.

There is obviously a fundamental difference between organizations that are, according to the party statutes, partly incorporated in the party structure, on the one hand, and formally independent groups, on the other. Likewise, parties can have *ex officio* seats in other organizations, or else they have no such connections. However, parties can have a fairly close relationship with an interest group without links like collective membership and formal affiliation. Historically there are, for instance, many examples of trade unions that have been strongly linked with a social democratic party without being incorporated in the party's structures (Padgett and Paterson 1991, 179–85).[1] We need a conceptual tool which specifies non-statutory links that promote contact between parties and interest groups in the pure organizational sense, namely without the notion of belonging to the same political camp. Put differently, the distinction between formal versus informal links is not sufficient because it cannot capture the importance of some non-statutory links, especially if they cut across ideological affinity.

 (p.28) True, relations not regulated by party statutes are less formal than those which are: as Poguntke (2006) points out, integration of interest groups into the party structure establishes a special relationship. But we also want to capture 'official' contacts with groups which are not written into the party rules. The relationship between formally autonomous parties and trade unions is not necessarily unofficial and poorly organized, and non-statutory links may constitute significant structures promoting interaction and contact between parties and interest groups (cf. Minkin 1991, xv). Therefore, we think, a useful basic distinction can be made between *overlapping organizational structures* (such as corporate membership or formal affiliation) on the one hand and *inter-organizational links* for contact (such as liaison committees) on the other.

We also recognize that significant links can materialize outside well-organized settings (Kitschelt 1989, 231–3), as emphasized by American scholars (Herrnson 2009; Witko 2009).[2] However, such links are more contingent upon political circumstances and leadership personalities (Poguntke 1998, 156–7), and therefore probably create a less binding, more flexible relationship (cf. Schwartz 2005, 44). They may, but do not necessarily, revolve around tacit norms for representation or contact. Personnel overlaps—namely the extent to which party elites hold positions in unions and vice versa—appear, in particular, to be different from other measures, which are about frameworks and activities. In theory, care might be taken to ensure that the two hats worn by the same person are not mixed up in formal meetings (see e.g. Yishai 1991, 131). But those overlaps should still be included as a separate category since they open up multiple opportunities for contact between decision makers.

Finally, it should be noted that overlapping organizational structures and unorganized links promoting contact are by definition reciprocal, although it could be argued that in cases where only one of the sides enjoys *ex officio* seats on the other's decision-making bodies the formal representation is one-sided. Collective membership does not represent an arrangement for contact between the party and the union itself (cf. Poguntke 2002, 50), but collective membership often guarantees one-sided/mutual representation in national decision-making bodies, and has been seen as indicative of parties 'made up by unions' (Duverger's notion of 'indirect parties').

To conclude, we believe we should distinguish between the following major classes of links:

> • *Overlapping organizational structures*: Links regulated by party and/or union statutes (e.g. *ex officio* representation in executive bodies).
> • *Inter-organizational links*:
>> • Reciprocal, durable links: joint party–union arrangements (e.g. joint committees).
>> • One-way, occasional links: party/union-arranged meetings (and invitations to party/union events).
>> **(p.29)** • Reciprocal, occasional links: Regular formal (i.e. official) meetings at the individual level.
> • *Individual-level links* (e.g. personnel overlaps and regular informal meetings).

We assume such links may exist between trade unions and both parties' central organization and legislative group, even if they are probably stronger outside the latter since unions cannot be formally affiliated to a legislative party group. The categorization refers to the *dyads*, that is, pairs of parties (or 'party faces') and interest groups. Therefore, corporatist bodies, where party and union elites meet with each other but also with the government, do not count and are treated as exogenous to party–union relationships. So, *pace* Valen and Katz (1964, 313–15) and Kvavik (1976, 97), is the joint management of agencies such as educational organizations and newspapers.

The party and union in question do not need to enjoy links of all three kinds to qualify as having a relationship. That said, statutory links generally suggest a higher degree of closeness, since such links probably involve a higher degree of commitment between the two sides. Arguably, overlapping structures are required before the two sides can be said to enjoy a completely integrated relationship organizationally. By the same token, at least some durable inter-organizational links are needed before a relationship can be said to be fairly close in the organizational sense. A relationship that would consist of only

occasional organizational links could be described as less close, yet not distant due to the regularity of activities involved. A relationship without even a few occasional links should be considered distant or inactive/non-existent at the organizational level.

Although we should emphasize the fact that we believe there is a hierarchy between the three main categories or levels, this does not imply that we assume *a priori* that formal links are more significant politically than those generated at the individual level. This is, at the end of the day, an empirical question. Patterns that are kept 'informal' for some reason may be self-reproducing and perfectly 'organized'. The hierarchy we suggest simply means that we think some links are stronger than others in a technical organizational sense—likely but not guaranteed to involve a different degree of commitment. By mapping the number of types and links we are able to cover all the possible permutations—ranging from full integration to complete detachment. However, we pay most attention to links measured at the organizational level (the links shaded grey in Table 2.2). As noted in Chapter 1, for reasons of tractability, we concentrate on the national/leadership level of politics, fully acknowledging that in doing this we are forced to discount potentially important interactions in federal states and at the local level in all of the polities we look at.

Before aggregating an overall score, we investigate whether or not the different kinds/types of links can be captured in one dimension (see the **(p.30)** section on 'Measuring the Overall Strength of Organizational Links' for the links each category denotes in practice).

Case Selection: A Multi-level Design
The 'cases' of this book are parties and trade unions, or their relationships. However, they operate—and are nested—in different countries. As mentioned in Chapter 1, our focus is on mature democracies, i.e. countries that were democratized for the first time before or in the 1940s, and have been continuously democratic since then, on three continents: Australia, Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the US.

Countries Selected

Table 2.1a. Country selection and various contextual variables[1]

Year/country	Size of working class (sector)[2a]		Size of working class (occupation) 2b		Size of lower service segment[2c]			Degree of class voting[3]		Size of public sector[4]		Union density[5]		Union fragmentation[6]		Left party fragmentation[7]	
	1960	2008	1969	2008	1969	1995	2008	1961–70	1981–90	2000	2013	1960–5	2011	1960–5	2011	1960–4	2013
Australia	48.7	20.1 (12)	41.9	25.9	16.5	13.6 (97)	15.0	29.3	19.4	15.1	14.3 (12)	49.1	18.0	2.9	1.9 (08)	1.0	1.0
Austria	49.6 (69)	28.0 (11)	36.2 (84)	30.4	19.7 (84)	13.1	13.9	27.4	18.3	–	–	67.0	28.1 (10)	1.0	1.0 (10)	1.1	1.9
Finland	44.8	26.2	31.6 (77)	28.3	19.6 (77)	14.8 (00)	15.6	50.2	35.7	22.2	24.4 (11)	35.2	69.2 (09)	3.9	2.8	2.4	3.4
France	48.8	22.8 (06)	–	30.2	–	12.2 (03)	12.5	18.3	11.7	25.0	17.9	19.7	7.6 (08)	4.3	7.9	1.9	1.9
Germany	56.8	30.7 (09)	39.0 (70)	30.5	19.9 (70)	10.8	12.2	24.8	13.4	16.4	14.3 (11)	33.7	18.5 (10)	1.5	1.6	1.0	2.3
Israel	42.9 (69)	19.7 (11)	37.4 (70)	15.6	20.1 (70)	16.8	16.3	–	–	17.3	16.5 (08)	74.0 (69)	34.0 (06)	–	–	2.1	3.1
Italy	48.8 (62)	30.5 (10)	–	34.3	–	15.7	11.4	14.5	13.1	15.3	16.0	25.5	35.1 (10)	2.8	3.4	1.8	1.5

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	Size of working class (sector)[2a]		Size of working class (occupation) 2b		Size of lower service segment[2c]			Degree of class voting[3]		Size of public sector[4]		Union density[5]		Union fragmentation[6]		Left party fragmentation[7]	
Year/ country	1960	2008	1969	2008	1969	1995	2008	1961–70	1981–90	2000	2013	1960–5	2011	1960–5	2011	1960–4	2013
Netherlands	38.0 (75)	18.5	32.7 (77)	23.6	20.7 (77)	12.6	14.1	14.7	15.5	20.4	21.3 (11)	38.7	18.2	4.2	2.2	1.2	1.9
Sweden	41.0 (70)	21.8	37.7 (70)	25.6	21.5 (70)	18.1 (97)	19.0	40.7	32.7	29.0 (01)	25.8	69.4	54.6	1.7	2.9 (10)	1.2	1.4
Switzerland	35.3 (86)	23.0 (09)	–	24.1	–	12.3	13.2	–	12.8	14.7 (01)	17.3	34.2	17.8 (09)	2.7	3.4 (10)	1.0	1.0
United Kingdom	50.2	18.1 (12)	–	17.9	–	17.7	15.8	38.3	23.4	18.0	21.5	38.7	25.8	1.8	1.4	1.0	1.0
United States	38.2	21.6 (02)	35.3 (70)	21.8	18.5	27.6 (03)	28.0	7.7	8.1	14.8	14.6 (08)	29.1	11.3	1.7	2.7 (09)	1.0	1.0

Notes

([1]) Details regarding measurements and sources are, with a few exceptions, not provided in the tables' notes but in the Appendix to Chapter 16 (Table A16.2). The year of estimate is provided in parenthesis when it differs from that stated in the second row. A hyphen indicates that data are missing from the source(s) used. For Germany, pre-1990 figures are for the Federal Republic of Germany.

(^{2a}) Share of employees working in the industrial sector (except Israel and Switzerland, see end of note). Figures from 1960 are based on ISIC rev. 2 (categories 2–5: mining and quarrying, manufacturing, electricity, gas and water, and construction). The Finnish 1960 figure is based on category 3 and 5 only; the Italian figure is based on category 3 only. Figures from 2008 are based on ISIC rev. 3 (categories C–F: mining and quarrying, manufacturing, electricity, gas and water, and construction). For Israel, the figures concern the share of civilians employed in the industrial sector. For Switzerland, the figures concern employment in the industrial sector. Sources: Bank of Israel Report 2013 (2014); OECD (2014).

(^{2b}) Share of employees working in industrial occupations. Figures from 1969 are based on ISCO-68 (categories 7–9: production and related workers, transport equipment operators, and labourers). Figures from 2008 are based on ISCO-88 (categories 7–9: craft and related trade workers, plant and machine operators, and assemblers and elementary occupations). The Israeli 2008 figure does not include category 7; the British and American figures do not include category 9. Source: ILO Labour Statistics (2014).

(^{2c}) Share of employees working in sales and services. Figures from 1969 and 1995 are based on ISCO-68 (categories 4–5: sales workers and service workers). Figures from 2008 are based on ISCO-88 (category 5: service workers and shop and market sales workers). Note that the 2008 figures are not directly comparable to the ones from 1969 and 1995 since they are based on a less inclusive classification scheme. Source: ILO Labour Statistics (2014).

(^{3}) Level of class voting measured by the Alford Index. Source: Nieuwbeerta (1996: 356).

(^{4}) Public sector employment as a share of the labour force. Public sector employment covers all employment of the general government sector as defined in the System of National Accounts plus employment of public corporations. Source: OECD (2011; 2013b; 2015).

(^{5}) Share of employees who are members of a trade union. The 1960–5 figures are a calculated mean. The Israeli 1969 figure concerns party membership in the general Histadrut among wage and salary workers. In addition, about 5 per cent of wage and salary workers were organized in trade unions that were not part of Histadrut. Sources: Cohen et al. (2003, 695); Mundlak et al. (2013); OECD (2013a).

(^{6}) Effective number of unions. The 1960–5-figures are a calculated mean. Source: Visser (2015).

(^{7}) Effective number of left parties on the votes level. Sources: Swank (2013); Döring and Manow (2016).

Table 2.1b. Country selection and various contextual variables[1]

Year/ country	Corporatism 8a		Routine involvment of unions and employers' organizations in government 8b		State funding to parties (2013)[9]		Party finance restrictions (2013)[10]				Federalism[11]		Parliamentary government 12		Electoral system[13]		Effective number of parties[14]	
	1960	2000	1960	2013	Permanent	Electoral	Individuals	Corporations	Trade unions	Foreign	1960–5	2008–14	1960–5	2008–14	1972	2005	1960	2011
Australia	−0.2	−0.3	0	1	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	1	1	0	0	4	4	3.0	3.3
Austria	0.6	0.5	2	2	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	1	1	1	1	3	3	2.5	4.8
Finland	0.5	0.4	0	1	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	0	0	1	1	3	3	5.2	6.5
France	−0.2	−0.4	0	0	Yes	Yes	Yes	Forbidden	Forbidden	Forbidden	0	0	0	1	2	2	6.1	4.1
Germany	−0.04	−0.1	1	1	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	2	2	0	0	4	4	3.6	5.6

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	Corporatism [8a]		Routine involvment of unions and employers' organizations in government [8b]		State funding to parties (2013)[9]		Party finance restrictions (2013)[10]				Federalism[11]		Parliamentary government [12]		Electoral system[13]		Effective number of parties[14]	
Year/ country	1960	2000	1960	2013	Permanent	Electoral	Individuals	Corporations	Trade unions	Foreign	1960–5	2008–14	1960–5	2008–14	1972	2005	1960	2011
Israel	–	–	2	0	Yes	Yes	Yes	Forbidden	Forbidden	Forbidden	0	0	0	0	3	3	5.2	7.3
Italy	0.3	0.3	0	1	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	0	0	0	0	4	4	3.9	3.8
Netherlands	1.0	0.01	2	2	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	0	0	0	0	3	3	4.5	7.0
Sweden	1.0	0.4	2	1	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	0	0	0	0	3	3	3.3	4.8
Switzerland	−0.1	−0.2	2	2	No	No	No	No	No	No	2	2	2	2	3	4	5.0	6.4

	Corporatism [8a]		Routine involvment of unions and employers' organizations in government [8b]		State funding to parties (2013)[9]		Party finance restrictions (2013)[10]				Federalism[11]		Parliamentary government [12]		Electoral system[13]		Effective number of parties[14]	
Year/ country	1960	2000	1960	2013	Permanent	Electoral	Individuals	Corporations	Trade unions	Foreign	1960–5	2008–14	1960–5	2008–14	1972	2005	1960	2011
United Kingdom	−0.5	−1.1	0	0	No	No	No	No	No	Forbidden	0	0	0	0	1	1	2.3	3.7
United States	−1.5	−1.6	0	0	No	Yes	Yes	Forbidden	Forbidden	Forbidden	2	2	2	2	1	2	2.0	2.2

Notes

([1]) Details regarding measurements and sources are, with a few exceptions, not provided in the tables' notes but in the Appendix to Chapter 16 (Table A16.2). The year of estimate is provided in parenthesis when it differs from that stated in the second row. A hyphen indicates that data are missing from the source(s) used. For Germany, pre-1990 figures are for the Federal Republic of Germany.

(^{8a}) Standard-score index of employer organization, union organization (index of union density, union peak association power, as for employers, and policy-process integration of labour), and the level of collective bargaining. Source: Martin and Swank (2012a; 2012b).

(^{8b}) Coded: (0) no concertation, involvement is rare or absent, (1) partial concertation, irregular and infrequent involvement, and (2) full concertation, regular and frequent involvement. Source: Visser (2015).

(^{9}) Existence of permanent and electoral state subsidies. Source: Casas-Zamora (2005, 19–20), updated by means of International IDEA (2016) and other sources (coded by us).

(^{10}) Existence of restrictions on donations to parties from individuals, corporations, trade unions, and foreign actors. Note that in Germany, the restrictions for foreign actors do not apply to EU nationals. In Italy, the restrictions for individuals do not apply if the donations are to the parties' routine expenses; for corporations, specific types of donations are forbidden. Source: Casas-Zamora (2005, 19–20), updated by means of International IDEA (2016) and other sources (coded by the authors).

(^{11}) Coded: (0) non-federal, (1) weakly federal, and (2) strongly federal. Source: Armingeon et al. (2014).

(^{12}) Coded: (0) parliamentary, (1) mixed (semi-presidential), and (2) presidential democracy. Note that France went from parliamentary to mixed (semi-presidential) in 1965. Source: Cheibub et al. (2010).

(^{13}) Type of electoral system for legislative elections. Coded: (1) plurality (first past the post), (2) majority, (3) proportional representation (PR), and (4) mixed systems (combination of PR and either plurality or majority). This option includes situations in which a single chamber contains seats selected by different methods, or situations in which all of the seats in a chamber are chosen by the same method, but each chamber is selected through different methods. Source: Regan et al. (2009). For Israel: Gideon Rahat.

(^{14}) Effective number of parties on the votes level. Source: Armingeon et al. (2014).

The selection of countries ensures that we study parties and unions that operate in national-level settings across several continents that differ in some potentially significant respects. They are all economically developed, industrialized, and urbanized, and as Lijphart (1999) points out, all of them belong to the Western, originally Judeo-Christian world. But they also vary along several relevant system-level variables. The key differences, reflecting the hypotheses on country-level variables discussed in Chapter 1, are presented in Tables 2.1a and 2.1b.

The differences are relatively small as far as employment patterns/class structure goes, but we see that Finland and Sweden are characterized by relatively high union density, whereas France and the US are at the other end of the scale, marked by low union density. Austria has a low, indeed the lowest, level of union fragmentation, whereas France is at the other extreme where the probability that any two union members are in the same confederation is particularly low. Here it is worth noting, however, that some of the countries with low fragmentation, like the United Kingdom, may have only one peak association but that this is not necessarily strong. The average number of left-of-centre parties has increased but varies across the selected countries: whereas there is only one significant left-of-centre party in the US and UK (Democrats and Labour), there are multiple competitors in other countries.

As far as corporatism goes, we see that despite a trend of decline, there is still significant variation across countries (see Table 2.1b). According to Martin and Swank's composite measure of corporatism, the most corporatist state today is Austria, whereas the least corporatist (most pluralist) are the United **(p.31) (p. 32) (p.33) (p.34)** States and the United Kingdom. If we concentrate on routine involvement of trade unions and employers' organizations in government decisions on social and economic policy, we see that Austria, the Netherlands, and Switzerland are characterized by 'full concertation, regular and frequent involvement', whereas France, Israel, the United Kingdom, and the United States are at the other end of the spectrum, marked by 'no concertation, involvement is rare or absent'. The question is whether and how this affects party–union relationships, as discussed in Chapter 1.

When it comes to state subventions, Switzerland and the United Kingdom stand out with virtually no public support to parties, whereas four countries in our selection both provide general support and election support: Austria, France, Italy, Australia, and Israel. In France, Israel, and the US, donations from trade unions to parties are forbidden, and in Italy there are limitations, whereas in all other countries such transfers are completely legal. However, it should be noted that, although the American system limits private financial contributions, it has been unable to place limits on campaign expenditures. As a result, parties and interest groups have tried to find ways around the regulations. One such are the independent political action committees (PACs) attached to interest groups

whose purpose is fundraising for candidates. That said, parties in two countries both depend more strongly on unions' financial support than others and are also allowed to receive such donations, namely in Switzerland and the United Kingdom, although legislation recently mooted by the UK's Conservative government looks as if it may reduce such funding to the Labour Party in the long term. The selected countries also differ as regards state structure and the relationship between the legislature and the executive.

In other words, the countries we have included certainly vary along the variables highlighted in Chapter 1. Our priority in this book is to give a broad overview of party–union links in mature democracies in different parts of the world and to explore variation at the level of parties and unions. How and indeed whether this variation turns out to matter will be one of the key questions addressed in Chapter 16. Although one challenge we have to surmount is the mismatch between a large number of country-level variables and a limited number of country cases, we think there is enough variation and there are enough cases to generate new insights on how party–union relationships vary across different settings. The contextual information is also used by country experts when they describe the system-level conditions, and changes herein, for links between left-of-centre parties and trade unions in a comparative perspective.

Political Parties Examined

As noted in Chapter 1, the party focus of this study are the social democratic/labour/socialist/communist parties associated with the historic labour **(p.35)** movement. This means that 'old' left-of-centre parties are included, while new left parties—for instance, those that first got going in the 1970s—are excluded. But if splinter groups from old left parties have established new significant left parties (after the Second World War), these have been included as well as they can be argued to have roots in the old labour movement.

Since we will look at today's relationships in the light of historical facts, we limit ourselves to parties with enduring representation in parliament by excluding left-of-centre parties that made what turned out to be only a passing appearance on the political scene in the post-war period. Moreover, to be included, parties have to have held seats in one of the last three legislative terms. As a result, between one and three left-of-centre parties are studied in every country.

In addition, in cases where trade unions were split historically and where some unions have had strong links to non-socialist parties (such as Christian democratic parties) that still exist, these parties are included in the country analyses in order to give a more complete country description seen from the unions' point of view. But because we focus on the labour movement, the comparative element of our work only addresses the old social democratic/labour/socialist/communist parties. Information on links to other parties, however, will be described in order to cast light on the cross-national

comparison of old left-of-centre party–trade union relationships. After all, historical closeness to other parties might be one explanation for relative distance to left-of-centre parties today.

We look both at *extra-legislative central party organizations* (CPOs) and at *legislative party groups* (LPGs), since parties in some countries (for instance, the UK) only have relatively weak and politically insignificant organizations outside the national legislature and, as a result, by no means all significant contact will take place on a party headquarters to union headquarters basis. In this way, we can also compare across two 'faces' of parties, and touch more directly upon public decision-making rather than just on party programmes and manifestos.

Trade Unions Surveyed

A trade union is an association of labourers/employees in a particular trade, industry, company, institution, or organization created for the purpose of securing improvements in pay, benefits, working conditions, and/or social and political status through collective bargaining. Changes and variety in the trade union world have, in many countries, been more pronounced than they have been in the party system. As a result, we include both old unions and unions that have been founded (sometimes as the result of mergers of older unions) relatively recently. In this way, we might be able to see whether left-of- **(p.36)** centre parties have widened the range of their relationships from blue-collar unions to include different types of employees (on an equal footing).

At the same time, we have chosen to narrow the universe we aim to cover to peak associations, at least where they exist. Hence, *in each country all today's union confederations are included*, no matter when they were founded. In this way, we can generalize about the peak associations, and will cover unions with different interest profiles: both white collar (administration and service) and blue collar (industry and business), as well as both public and private sector unions—and unions with partisan and non-partisan origins.

A few identification/selection issues should be noted. In the countries where peak associations are few and far between and/or relatively unimportant—in the US, the UK, and Australia—we have included 4–5 major individual unions (including 'super-unions' that recent processes of consolidation have produced) as equivalents, making sure we covered both white-collar and blue-collar, public and private sector, unions. In Austria, where the peak association is strong but there is only one, the three largest unions, in terms of membership, are also included in order to capture variation in union profiles. In Germany, where one out of three peak associations completely dominates (DGB), and the two others (DBB and CGB) are not full-blown alternatives, we have instead included four individual unions for the same reason. In France, the number of confederations is particularly high, and including every single one might have significantly reduced the chance that the parties would complete our survey. Here we have

therefore excluded one fragmented peak association (G10) and one managerial one (CGC-CFE).[3]

The Party-Union Dyads

The primary unit of analysis is *pairs of parties and confederations/unions* (i.e. party-union dyads). Or more precisely, we have identified one set of pairs consisting of relationships between the party CPOs and individual confederations/unions, and one set consisting of relationships between party LPGs and confederations/unions. In other words, every party CPO and every party LPG is 'paired' with all the confederations/unions studied in the given country. To illustrate: if there is one party and three confederations, as in the Italian case, there will be 3 + 3 party-union dyads: the three relationships between the Democratic Party's CPO and the confederations—CGIL (Italian General Confederation of Labour), CISL (Italian Confederation of Workers' Trade Unions), UIL (Italian Union of the Labour)—and three relationships between the Democratic party's LPG and CGIL, CISL, and UiL respectively. A complete list of parties, confederations/unions and party-union pairs/dyads is included in the Appendix at the end of this chapter. There are 81 (CPO) + 81 (LPG) left-of-centre party-union pairs to be mapped altogether in **(p.37)** the cross-country analyses, although not all will be included in the scaling analysis due to missing values (i.e. 'unclear values', see section on 'Measuring the Overall Strength of Organizational Links'). A complete list of parties, confederations/unions, and party-union pairs/dyads is included in the Appendix at the end of this chapter.

Data Collection: Combining Multiple Sources

The datasets underpinning this book are based on multiple sources. First, the statutes of the organizational units involved have been collected and country experts have also searched for other relevant organizational documents (like annual reports) and reliable secondary sources. Second, we have elicited both information and evaluations through questionnaires—mainly about organizational facts—sent to key informants in both parties and the union confederations/unions. Each country team started by identifying a contact person/key informant in each organization and invited them to participate in advance, selected according to formal position: The secretary-general (elected or employed) in the party's/parties' central organization or his/her equivalent, head of staff in the party's/parties' legislative group, and the leader (elected) or secretary-general in the given peak association/unions. In most cases the informants were party/union officials of very high rank. However, in some cases country experts found it necessary, and just as informative, to talk to people a little lower down the pecking order. The main point was to get access to a particularly well-informed person who could respond *on behalf of* its party/ organization. In a couple of countries it was very difficult to get responses back, and country experts conducted a structured interview instead.

As already explained, we mapped links between unions and both the party in central office and the party in public office (and in particular the legislature), and decided to seek information directly from the latter rather than assuming one key informant could cover both. Therefore we constructed three generic versions of the questionnaire: one for the union confederations/unions, one for the parties' legislative group, and one for the extra-legislative party organization. Among other things, we have asked both the parties and the confederations/unions about the existence of every link type and created a data set of dichotomous link variables. So the questions were mainly identical, and in this way we increased the validity by having two sources. Moreover, we are able to see whether the parties and unions evaluate their relationship differently when it comes to their own *perceptions of closeness*, and in this way also include both formal and informal meetings. It is not a given, for example, that they have a shared view on how 'close' they are even though the **(p.38)** formal status of the relationship is clear. Diverging views on relationships is a key issue in dyadic data analysis (e.g. in psychology). In addition, in the union questionnaire we included a couple of questions regarding links to *other* parties in general (even if these are not included in the study as separate units).[4]

The survey was conducted in the autumn of 2013, but in a few cases the questionnaires were sent out at the end of 2013/beginning of 2014. However, we do not consider this time gap to be a major problem, as most questions deal with situations over the last five years. The questionnaires were translated from British English into US English, Dutch, Finnish, French, German, Hebrew, Italian, and Swedish by both language professionals and country experts.

The total response rate was about 70 per cent, among both parties and unions. When returned, the data were input into three country data files by the project's research assistants: one for confederations/unions, one for the legislative parties, and one for the extra-legislative parties. After checking by country experts, three comparative datasets were then created based on these files. Thereafter, these three comparative datasets provided the basis for creating one dyadic dataset across countries (see section on 'The Problem of Missing and Diverging Party/Union Answers'). Responses to open-ended questions and the specification of 'other alternatives' etc., were translated by the country teams and then inserted in a joint text (Word) file with responses attached to unique unit numbers.[5]

Third, biographical data have—if available—been collected from encyclopaedias and the websites of parliament/MPs (see country chapters for details) during winter/spring 2013/14 to see what proportion of them hold or have held positions (as officials or staff) in different trade unions. The aim was to map only the permanent representatives and deputy representatives who attended for the entire term (e.g. for a minister), and to include positions at both the national and

local level, but to distinguish between them as we focus on the national level of politics.

As for the independent variables, these data are based on our party/union surveys and imported from, or calculated based on, reliable, publicly available comparative datasets (see details in Chapter 16, including the Appendix).

The Problem of Missing and Diverging Party/Union Answers
A few methodological problems, and one joint solution, should be noted. The total response rate was an impressive 70 per cent, among both parties and unions, but the willingness/ability to respond varied between countries: ranging from a 100 per cent response rate in Finland and Switzerland to less than **(p. 39)** 20 per cent returned questionnaires in the case of US and Australia. In a study where we are surveying a complete but limited universe (not a random large N-sample), that is of course a challenge. The preparation of the data files has also, naturally, revealed some missing answers and, in addition, divergent party/union answers to identical questions in some countries. The possibility of differing views is one of the reasons why we thought it was important to ask both sides, and this aspect of the research design is partly what makes our study innovative. However, we do not think that party–union relationships are merely social constructions, and our main aim is to map organizational facts: links that either exist or do not exist. Despite room for interpretation and perception regarding the less institutionalized links, we sought, wherever possibly, to discover the actual truth.

Whatever the reasons for unreturned questionnaires, missing answers and divergent party/union responses, we decided to consider the three datasets created from the survey as the official version of the relationship that the two sides decided to report. Party/union responses to similar questions may be identical or they may not. Those who did not respond were also included with missing only. Next, in the dyadic dataset we constructed variables that capture convergence/divergence. Then, in addition we included variables with 'definitive' expert codings regarding the organizational facts, accepting that, where responses contradict each other or have proven impossible to obtain, the country specialists should answer according either to information available from public sources (the ideal) or else an expert judgement call on their part. What seems likely to be the truth in cases where answers differ/are missing? This is to be considered a 'coded judgment' by the country expert, based on *both* the surveys *and* other sources. If the party and union in a given case both responded and agreed, this value was as a general rule used for the expert coding. We have in this dyadic file also created a variable to measure the degree of confidence, ranging from 0 to 100. The country experts were asked to choose 'unclear/don't know' if they weren't confident about their codings (less than 40 degrees). The average degree of confidence is across all countries is 93. The range goes from a

minimum value of 46 to the maximum 100, but no country has a mean degree-of-confidence score lower than 75.

The closeness of the relationships involving the party CPOs and the party LPGs are assessed separately in each step of the analysis, as these are different party units and not all links relevant for the CPOs apply to the LPGs—an obvious example being the collective affiliation of unions. When comparing dyads we distinguish between their basic features in terms of type of party/union 'members':

Party side (SideP_IDx):

> • Major old left-of-centre party (socialist, social democrat or equivalent).
> • Communist or other left-of-centre party with origins in the old left.
> **(p.40)** • Other left-of-centre party with origins in the old left.

Union side (SideU_IDx):

> • Traditional left-of-centre union ally.
> • Traditional right-of-centre union ally.
> • Other.

By 'traditional ally' we mean a confederation/union that has been known for having a fairly close/close relationship with one or more left-of-centre parties *or* a centre-right party (such as the Catholic parties/Christian Democrats). These variables were coded by country experts, in line with our general conceptualization. The dyads/pairs in which we are most interested are the relationships between the CPOs/LPGs of the major old left-of-centre parties (socialist, social democrat, or equivalent) and the confederations and/or major unions closely associated with the historical labour movement.

Degree of Closeness and Range: Indicators of Links

Table 2.2. Sub-groups of links providing contact between parties (CPO/LPG) and unions at the national level, with items listed in hierarchical order of strength (measures at the organizational level in shaded area)

Overlapping organizational structures	Inter-organizational links	Individual-level links
National/local collective affiliation (membership) of a union* (assuming parties are not affiliated to unions) The party enjoys representation rights in the union's national decision-making bodies (one or more): ■ National congress ■ National executive ■ Board of representatives The union enjoys representation rights in the party's national decision-making bodies (one or more) ■ National congress ■ National executive ■ National council	*Reciprocal, durable— joint arrangements/ agreements*: Tacit (*de facto* official) agreements about mutual representation in national decision-making bodies Permanent joint committee(s) Temporary joint committee(s) Formal (written) agreements about regular meetings between party and union Tacit (*de facto* official) agreements about regular meetings between party and union Joint conferences Joint campaigns *One-way, occasional— party/group-arranged meetings*: Invitation to party to participate in the organization's national congress Invitation to organization to participate in the party's national congress/conference	*Meetings*: Various forms of informal (i.e. unofficial) contact of political relevance between individual representatives and spokesmen: ■ Informal written communication like personal letters, memos ■ Informal written communication via SMS, e-mail and social media (Facebook, Twitter etc.) ■ Informal face-to-face meetings ■ Informal oral contact via telephone/ Skype etc.

Overlapping organizational structures	Inter-organizational links	Individual-level links
	Invitations to organization to participate in the party's ordinary meetings, seminars, and conferences Invitations to party to participate in ordinary organization meetings, seminars, and conferences Invitations to organization to special consultative arrangements initiated by the party Invitations to party to special consultative arrangements initiated by the organization	*Personnel*: Personal overlaps in—or transfers to—the party's/union's decision-making bodies:** ■ Party/union top elite members who hold or have held office in union/party (share of overlap between bodies in sum) ■ Party/union top elite members who are or have been staff members at the national or local levels in party/union

Overlapping organizational structures	Inter-organizational links	Individual-level links
	Reciprocal, occasional—formal (i.e. official) meetings at the individual level: ■ Formal face-to-face meetings or telephone/video calls ■ Speakers at each other's seminars/conferences ■ Formal written letters (including electronic)	

(*) Local collective membership is included although it is not per se a national feature. The reason is that collective membership at the local level indirectly implies a potentially strong formal 'bottom-up' link to the national party organization *and* it is regulated by national party statutes.

(**) Overlapping regular memberships are not included, as the focus is on links opening up for contact between parties and interest groups, i.e. the organizational level or decision-making elite level.

Our aim is to measure the extent to which links create a structured and highly formalized system that enables contact between the organizations involved based on the conceptualization presented in the previous section. Table 2.2 presents the dichotomous link variables that guided the mapping of party-union statutes and construction of questionnaires. The table's columns cover extra-legislative and legislative party together, but note that the links labelled 'collective membership' and 'invitation to the party's annual congress' are only relevant in the case of the extra-legislative party organization. Based on what we know, we have also assumed that *ex officio* representation of unions is irrelevant in the case of parties' legislative groups. The list is not exhaustive; but it is extensive and based on a review of existing literature (see e.g. Duverger 1954/1972; Valen and Katz 1964; Kriesi and van Praag 1987; Kitschelt 1989; Padgett and Paterson 1991; Quinn 2002; Poguntke 2002; 2006; Sundberg 2003).

In addition we asked whether 'official social media connections (such as mutual followers on twitter)' exist, but this turned out to be a problematic item (generating mostly missing values) and is thus excluded from the analysis. We believe social media connections are best studied by data generated directly from social media.

Our primary focus is organizational, but we also include less formal links insofar as they are politically relevant. Hopefully, this means we avoid giving a really fine-grained analysis for old, strongly institutionalized links, while links which are probably crucial these days due to developments in ICT are simply **(p.41)** **(p.42)** bundled into a residual category, labelled 'informal'. Personnel overlaps —namely the extent to which party elites hold positions in unions and vice versa —may be different from other measures, which are about frameworks and activities. But, since one can argue that 'being' is as important as 'doing' in any relationship, they should ideally be included, not least because they open up multiple opportunities for contact between decision makers.

However, we will only be able to get a crude measure of personnel overlaps/ transfer and we will not be able to map formal and informal meetings at the individual level—just the key informants' views on what kind of contact they find most common.[6] Therefore our total quantitative scores will summarize those links measured at the organizational level, based on party statutes and information provided by our key informants, and the data we have on other (informal) kinds of links at the individual level will be presented separately. That said, we try to look at the relationship between links at the organizational level and those materializing at the individual level: are statutory and inter-organizational links supplemented and reinforced by informal personnel links, or do such ties seem to be something which compensates for weak links at the organizational level?

Finally, we are interested in the overall range of individual parties' and unions' relationships: are left-of-centre parties only or primarily linked to their traditional union ally or have they established (equal) links with a wide range of employee organizations and unions with and without a partisan history? We will also briefly touch upon the relationship of trade unions with other (green, new left, new/radical right, or centre-right) parties in general.

Measuring the Overall Strength of Organizational Links

Table 2.3. Left-of-centre party-trade union relationships: item and scale scalability values[1]

Variable (link items)	Party CPO-unions		Party LPG-unions		Party-unions	
	H_i	(%)	H_i	(%)	H_i	(%)
Collective union affiliation to party (local/national)	1.00	1	–	–	1.00	2
Union delegates at party conference	0.89	3	–	–	0.89	3
Party delegates at union conference	1.00	1	–	–	1.00	2
Party *ex officio seats* in union executive	n/a	0	–	–	–	–
Union *ex officio seats* in party executive	n/a	0	–	–	–	–
Party *ex officio seats* in union council	n/a	0	–	–	–	–
Union *ex officio seats* in party council	n/a	0	–	–	–	–

Variable (link items)	Party CPO-unions		Party LPG-unions		Party-unions	
	H_i	(%)	H_i	(%)	H_i	(%)
Tacit agreement about mutual representation	0.86	19	0.62	6	0.88	21
Permanent joint committee(s)	0.78	16	0.52	11	0.83	15
Temporary joint committee(s)	0.83	12	0.55	6	0.94	11
Formal agreement about regular meetings	0.74	4	0.81	3	0.95	3
Tacit agreement about regular meetings	0.85	35	0.66	20	0.86	38
Joint party-union conferences	0.78	18	0.41	8	0.82	20
Joint party-union campaigns	0.69	16	0.55	15	0.66	20
Party invited to union's conference	0.82	46	0.70	42	0.81	52

Mapping Party–Trade Union Relationships in Contemporary Democracies

Variable (link items)	Party CPO-unions		Party LPG-unions		Party-unions	
	H_i	(%)	H_i	(%)	H_i	(%)
Union invited to party's conference	0.71	60	–	–	0.62	59
Union invited to party's ordinary meetings, seminars, etc.	0.75	51	0.79	48	0.81	53
Party invited to union's ordinary meetings, seminars, etc.	0.72	47	0.76	45	0.79	50
Union invited to party's special consultative arrangements	0.74	69	0.68	76	0.82	79
Party invited to union's special consultative arrangements	0.76	51	0.50	50	0.43	59
H	0.78		0.64		0.80	
Standard error	0.06		0.06		0.05	
N	68		66		66	

(^{1}) This table concerns the relationships between communist, social-democratic, and other old left-of-centre parties and all confederations of trade unions/selected unions in every country (pairs of individual parties and confederations/unions). The empty cells (-) represent links we assume are mostly not applicable in the case of LPGs and that we have not surveyed.

Next, we need to consider how we can aggregate and measure the strength of organizational-level—statutory and formal inter-organizational—links. We would like to know whether an additive index is justified given the structure of the responses. In Table 2.2 the possible links are hierarchically ordered internally from stronger to weaker in terms of the degree of 'institutionalization' involved (see shaded area). It could be argued that our basic distinction implies the following: in order to have a completely integrated relationship overlapping structures are required; to have a (fairly) close relationship at least some formal and durable inter-organizational links are needed; a purely ad hoc relationship, however, consists of only occasional organizational links. But the relationships between and within these categories of links are by no means given, so we will start by testing this empirically.[7] Does the relationship between the various links appear to be hierarchical, as we assume, and do **(p.43)** they tap a one-dimensional scale of 'closeness' or multiple scales? In order to integrate the items—the kinds of organizational-level links included in the questionnaire (see Table 2.3)—to a scale, one would need to know whether all the items empirically measure the same underlying concept. Do the most institutionalized (strongest) links preclude—even render superfluous—links at a lower level or do they instead nurture more links?

It might be that parties and trade unions tend either to have overlapping structures or inter-organizational links, thereby making addition across the main categories we have identified less meaningful (see e.g. **(p.44)** Rasmussen and Lindeboom 2013). A similar question concerns the association between different types of inter-organizational links: do units with the strongest links also tend to have the weaker kind too? The different types of link are not necessarily mutually exclusive. If that is the case, then having fewer 'institutional' links *in addition* to stronger ones might increase the degree of closeness. We therefore use a scaling analysis to explore the dimensionality empirically. We assume the link items *mirror* one or more fundamental ways of being connected so that we can expect items mirroring the same underlying dimension/concept to go together. Do some clusters of items cohere, but not all items?

The choice of scaling method has strong implications for the results that one gets: ultimately, data reduction is a process of creation (Coombs 1964). Researchers choose specific scaling methods and construct certain spaces. It is important to choose a method that fits the structure of the data that one examines. The data we have here are dichotomous: specific kinds of links either do or do not occur. This means that correlation-based methods such as factor analysis cannot be used here: they are mainly appropriate for data with a normal distribution. Instead, we employ Mokken scaling (Mokken 1971; van Schuur 2003), a method that was specifically developed for dichotomous data—such as, for correct and incorrect answers in exams. Mokken wanted to assesses the extent to which items with correct and incorrect answers could be integrated into a single scale, running from easy items (that most people answer correctly)

to difficult items (that most people answer incorrectly). In other words, his scale incorporated a hierarchical element, while its quality can be judged on the number of errors: namely the number of times people who answer the difficult questions correctly get the easy questions wrong—expressed in the H-value.

In our context, Mokken scaling would mean that a single scale runs from the more common weaker (occasional) links to the strongest (most institutional) uncommon ones. Hence, we will test whether pairs of parties and trade unions that have unusually strong links also enjoy the links that occur in many party–union relationships. If all items line up, then we can construct a single scale. The strength of the scale is expressed in the H-value. An H-value below 0.3 is unacceptable. An H-value below 0.4 is poor. An H-value below 0.5 is mediocre and an H-value above 0.5 is good. We can also zoom into the relationship between one item and the other items in the scale. This is expressed in the H_i-value. It is important to note that in Mokken scaling analysis, as in most kinds of regression analysis, cases with one or more missing values (i.e. 'unclear'/'don't know' in our case) are removed from the analysis. This means that 68/66 of the dyads (84/82 per cent) are included in the scaling analysis of the dyads involving unions and the party's central organizations and legislative party groups respectively.

Since we cover the entire population of surviving left-of-centre parties and peak associations (major unions) in the countries concerned, there are no sampling errors involved. However, we should keep in mind that those dyads **(p.45)** including individual unions are slightly underrepresented compared to those including confederations. Moreover, the excluded relationships are not evenly distributed between countries. Only four out of eight of the Austrian party-union pairs are included in the scaling analysis, and only three out of six Italian dyads. In the case of the United Kingdom, the scaling analysis only covers the relationship of Labour's CPO with the only British 'confederation' (TUC) and one individual union (GMB), and in parliament only the relationships between Labour and two individual unions (GMB and Unite). In the case of Sweden, two of sixteen dyads are excluded (including the previous communist party, *Vänsterpartiet*). In the Swiss case, one dyad involving the main Social Democratic Party, LPG, and the confederation SGB, the traditional union ally, is excluded. Finally, in the Australian case the scaling analysis only includes the relationships between the Labour Party's central organization and the only Australian confederation of trade unions (ACTU) and one individual union (ANMF). A complete of list of included units can be seen in Table A2 in this chapter's Appendix.

Table 2.3 provides an overview of the scaling results for the remaining cases. First we look at the dyads involving the parties' central party organizations (CPO). The H-value for the scale for these dyads is very high (H value of 0.78). Every individual item relates sufficiently strongly to the other items, as the

H_i-values show. The results are somewhat weaker for the dyads involving legislative party groups (LPGs), with a lower number of possible links, but the scale is still 'good' (H value of 0.64). Every individual item has sufficiently strong relations with the other items in the scale. We also see that some (the strongest) links are unusual, others (the weaker ones) are more common, and some could even be said to be prevalent. We will get back to the frequency of links in detail in the descriptive cross-national analysis in Chapter 15.

In the column to the right, we provide a scaling analysis based on values of the CPO-union dyads and LPG-union dyads combined. We assigned the values as follows: a value of 1 if a union link exists either with the LPG or the CPO and value of 0 if there is no link with either of them. For other cases, namely where there is a 0 ('no link') and at least one entry of 'unclear/don't know' as a coded judgement, a missing value is entered. The result was 66 valid cases. We see the links items scale very well (H = 0.80).

Next we zoom into the difference between confederations and individual trade unions. In our data we have sixteen dyads involving an individual trade union and about fifty including confederations, within and outside the legislative arena. As for analysis of the CPO and LPG dyads combined, we have forty-six dyads including confederations and twenty including individual unions. This gives us six types of party-union groups (see Table A2.2 in the Appendix). For all four groups the H-value is sufficient.

To conclude, the scaling results are strong at the transnational level. Therefore, we have created an additive overall score of 'organizational **(p.46)** closeness', by counting the number of 'yes values' for all the links used in the scaling analysis for all those dyads without any 'unclear values'. On the basis of the scaling analysis, a low score points to the existence of only weak (if common) ties, whereas the highest scores point to the existence of both weaker (common) and strong (less common) ties. We are, in line with the scaling analysis, able to assign an overall scale of closeness to 84/82 per cent of the cases. Links exist in the excluded cases as well, but it is not possible to assign an overall score due to one or more 'unclear values'. Since we assume the strongest links (those creating overlapping structures) are not applicable in the case of LPGs and hence have not been surveyed, we calculate separate total scores for the party-union pairs involving CPOs and LPGs, with 20 and 12 as maximum scores respectively. In Chapter 15 we will show that the two additive indexes are strongly correlated, and we calculate a combined score across 'party faces', running from 0 to 20, in order to get one score for the relationships between union confederations/unions and the party/parties at large (for 82 per cent of the cases). The combined score will be what we focus on in the statistical analysis at the end of the book (Chapter 16).

We have also checked the results for individual countries, and they are more varied (see Table A2.3 in the Appendix). At least two dyads (with no missing values) are required to be assigned a scalability value. Moreover, there must be sufficient variance on the items: if there is zero variance on any item, no scale is produced. As a consequence, we cannot report individual scalability for Austria, Australia, Italy, the United Kingdom, Israel, and the union-LPG dyads of Switzerland. Of the remaining countries with sufficient valid cases, we find very strong scales in Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden. and France. The United States' dyads involving the central party organization of the Democrats still have sufficient scaling scores but they are much lower. The scales for dyads involving the US union-LPG and the German union-LPG dyads are insufficient. This means that in these countries the items relate somewhat differently than they do in the rest of the cases. Hence, one should be careful when disaggregating the data and examining the scales at the national level. We will focus our attention at the actual underlying data. That said, we see that we have scalability values for all countries for the analysis based on values of the CPO-union dyads and LPG-union dyads combined, and that these H-values are high in all countries (between 0.64 and 1.00).

The Issue of Political Significance

An exploration of the extent to which party–union links have consequences for political decision-making, and whether degrees of organizational closeness **(p. 47)** matter for party–union patterns of influence, is beyond the scope of this book. Nevertheless, we will briefly address this issue towards the end of each country analysis (see Chapter 1). In this way, we also highlight that the strength of links may over time affect party-union resources. An initial indication can perhaps be provided by looking more closely at the content of the contact that goes on, based on secondary sources or information from additional interviews. Some meetings and correspondence might be fairly trivial and non-political in character, while contact in other cases may be marked by real attempts to influence decision makers (Svensson and Öberg 2002, 305).

A big question, of course, is whether the unions with which the parties interact actually influence political decisions. Do they, for instance, lead the party to formulate a policy proposition differently than would have been the case in the absence of any contact? And how much influence do parties have on the stances of trade unions? To reveal such changes of position is, not surprisingly, a very difficult task methodologically: a change in a party's policy preferences corresponding to the stance of a union (and vice versa) does not necessarily mean that the other side has caused this change. The party, for example, may have reached a similar conclusion independently, or other actors may have had an impact, for instance through the mass media. Clearly, a full exploration of this subject would require the examination of a host of possible intervening factors and would call for analyses of a wide range of specific policy fields.[8] Our rather more modest goal, however, is simply for the country teams to discuss whether

the links generally seem to have a real impact based on their national expertise, including new knowledge obtained through their data collection.

Conclusion

Our goal is to understand how parties and trade unions are connected as organizations, by concentrating on specific links (be they overlapping organizational structures or other opportunities for interaction) that should allow us, ultimately, to look cross-nationally at organizational closeness/distance (the strength of links) between parties and trade unions and the range of each side's relationships (the variety of associates). In this chapter we have focused on how we define and operationalize both these dimensions. We have also presented our case selection and discussed its limitations as well as its advantages. And we have explained how the original data on relationships have been collected and systematized via the mapping of party-union statutes and a questionnaire to key informants on both sides. Lastly, after showing how we measure the overall strength of links quantitatively, we have discussed the **(p. 48)** question of their political significance. Chapters 15 and 16 will put all this together so we can paint a composite picture of the contemporary relationships between left-of-centre parties and trade unions. Before we can do that, however, we need to drill down further into the cases themselves.

Table A2.1. List of countries, political parties, confederations and unions, and party-union pairs[1]

Country	Party name	Confederation name	Union name	Pair/dyad
Australia	ALP (Australian Labor Party)	ACTU (Australian Council of Trade Unions)	SDA (Shop Distributive and Allied Employees Association) ANMF (Australian Nursing Federation) AEU (Australian Education Union) CPSU (Community and Public Sector Union) AWU (Australian Workers' Union)	ALP (CPO)/ACTU *ALP (CPO)/SDA* ALP (CPO)/ANMF *ALP (CPO)/AEU* ALP (CPO)/CPSU *ALP (CPO)/AWU* ALP (LPG)/ACTU *ALP (LPG)/SDA* ALP (LPG)/ANMF *ALP (LPG)/AEU* ALP (LPG)/CPSU *ALP (LPG)/AWU*
Austria	SPÖ (Social Democratic Party of Austria)	ÖGB (Austrian Trade Union Federation)	GÖD (Public Services Union) PRO-GE (Union of Production Workers) GPA-djp (Union of Salaried Private Sector Employees and of Printers, Journalists and Paper Workers)	*SPÖ (CPO)/ÖGB* *SPÖ (CPO)/GÖD* SPÖ (CPO)/PRO-GE SPÖ (CPO)/GPA-djp *SPÖ (LPG)/ÖGB* *SPÖ (LPG)/GÖD* SPÖ (LPG)/PRO-GE SPÖ (LPG)/GPA-djp

Country	Party name	Confederation name	Union name	Pair/dyad
Finland	SDP (Social Democratic Party of Finland) VAS (Left Alliance)	SAK (Central Organization of Finnish Trade Unions) STTK (Finnish Confederation of Professionals) AKAVA (Confederation of Unions for Professional and Managerial Staff in Finland)		SDP (CPO)/SAK
				SDP (CPO)/STTK SDP (CPO)/AKAVA SDP (LPG)/SAK SDP (LPG)/STTK SDP (LPG)/AKAVA VAS (CPO)/SAK VAS (CPO)/STTK VAS (CPO)/AKAVA VAS (LPG)/SAK VAS (LPG)/STTK VAS (LPG)/AKAVA
France	PS (Socialist Party) PCF (French Communist Party)	CGT (General Confederation of Labour) FO (General Confederation of Labour—Workers' Force) CFDT (French Democratic Confederation of Labour) **(p.49)** CFTC (French Confederation of Christian Workers) UNSA (National Union of Autonomous Unions) FSU (United Trade Union Federation) USS (Solidarity Trade Union)		PS (CPO)/CGT

Country	Party name	Confederation name	Union name	Pair/dyad
				PS (CPO)/FO
				PS (CPO)/CFDT
				PS (CPO)/CFTC
				PS (CPO)/UNSA
				PS (CPO)/FSU
				PS (CPO)/USS
				PS (LPG)/CGT
				PS (LPG)/FO
				PS (LPG)/CFDT
				PS (LPG)/CFTC
				PS (LPG)/UNSA
				PS (LPG)/FSU
				PS (LPG)/USS
				PCF (CPO)/CGT
				PCF (CPO)/FO
				PCF (CPO)/CFDT
				PCF (CPO)/CFTC
				PCF (CPO)/UNSA
				PCF (CPO)/FSU
				PCF (CPO)/USS
				PCF (LPG)/CGT
				PCF (LPG)/FO
				PCF (LPG)/CFDT
				PCF (LPG)/CFTC
				PCF (LPG)/UNSA
				PCF (LPG)/FSU

Country	Party name	Confederation name	Union name	Pair/dyad
				PCF (LPG)/USS
Germany	SPD (Social Democratic party of Germany) Die Linke (The Left)	DGB (German Trade Union Confederation)	IG Metall (Industrial Metal Workers' Trade Union) Ver.di (United Services Trade Union) IG BCE (Trade Union for Mining, Chemicals and Energy Industries) GEW (German Education Union)	SPD (CPO)/DGB SPD (CPO)/IG Metall SPD (CPO)/Ver.di SPD (CPO)/IG BCE SPD (CPO)/GEW SPD (LPG)/DGB SPD (LPG)/IG Metall SPD (LPG)/Ver.di SPD (LPG)/IG BCE SPD (LPG)/GEW Die Linke (CPO)/DGB Die Linke (CPO)/IG Metall Die Linke (CPO)/Ver.di Die Linke (CPO)/IG BCE Die Linke (CPO)/GEW Die Linke (LPG)/DGB Die Linke (LPG)/IG Metall Die Linke (LPG)/Ver.di Die Linke (LPG)/IG BCE Die Linke (LPG)/GEW

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Country	Party name	Confederation name	Union name	Pair/dyad
Israel	Labour Meretz	Histadrut (The New Labour Federation) HL (The National Labour Federation) KL (Power to the Workers)		Labour (CPO)/Histadrut Labour (CPO)/HL Labour (CPO)/KL Labour (LPG)/Histadrut Labour (LPG)/HL Labour (LPG)/KL Meretz (CPO)/Histadrut Meretz (CPO)/HL **(p.50)** Meretz (CPO)/KL Meretz (LPG)/Histadrut Meretz (LPG)/HL Meretz (LPG)/KL
Italy	PD (Democratic Party)	CGIL (Italian General Confederation of Labour) CISL (Italian Confederation of Union Workers) UIL (Union of Italian Workers)		PD (CPO)/CGIL PD (CPO)/CISL *PD (CPO)/UIL* *PD (LPG)/CGIL* PD (LPG)/CISL *PD (LPG)/UIL*
Netherlands	PvdA (Labour Party) SP (Socialist Party) GreenLeft	FNV (Dutch Trade Union Movement) CNV (Christian National Trade Union Confederation) MHP (Confederation for Middle and Higher Personnel)		PvdA (CPO)/FNV

Country	Party name	Confederation name	Union name	Pair/dyad
				PvdA (CPO)/CNV
				PvdA (CPO)/MHP
				PvdA (LPG)/FNV
				PvdA (LPG)/CNV
				PvdA (LPG)/MHP
				SP (CPO)/FNV
				SP (CPO)/CNV
				SP (CPO)/MHP
				SP (LPG)/FNV
				SP (LPG)/CNV
				SP (LPG)/MHP
				GreenLeft (CPO)/FNV
				GreenLeft (CPO)/CNV
				GreenLeft (CPO)/MHP
				GreenLeft (LPG)/FNV
				GreenLeft (LPG)/CNV
				GreenLeft (LPG)/MHP

Country	Party name	Confederation name	Union name	Pair/dyad
Sweden	SAP (The Social Democrats) VP (The Left Party)	LO (Trade Union Confederation) TCO (Swedish Confederation of Professional Employees) Saco (Swedish Confederation of Professional Associations) SAC (Central Organization of Swedish Workers)		SAP (CPO)/LO SAP (CPO)/TCO SAP (CPO)/Saco SAP (CPO)/SAC SAP (LPG)/LO SAP (LPG)/TCO SAP (LPG)/Saco SAP (LPG)/SAC VP (CPO)/LO *VP (CPO)/TCO* *VP (CPO)/Saco* VP (CPO)/SAC VP (LPG)/LO VP (LPG)/TCO VP (LPG)/Saco VP (LPG)/SAC
Switzerland	SP (Social Democratic Party of Switzerland)	SGB (Swiss Federation of Trade Unions) Travail.Suisse (Umbrella Group for Workers' Unions) KV (Swiss Association of Commercial Employees)		SP (CPO)/SGB SP (CPO)/Travail.Suisse SP (CPO)/KV *SP (LPG)/SGB* SP (LPG)/Travail.Suisse SP (LPG)/KV

Country	Party name	Confederation name	Union name	Pair/dyad
(p.51) *United Kingdom*	Labour Party	TUC (Trades Union Congress)	Unite UNISON GMB (Britain's General Union) NUT (National Union of Teachers) USDAW (Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers)	Labour Party (CPO)/TUC *Labour Party (CPO)/Unite* *Labour Party (CPO)/ UNISON* Labour Party (CPO)/GMB *Labour Party (CPO)/NUT* *Labour Party (CPO)/ USDAW* *Labour Party (LPG)/TUC* Labour Party (LPG)/Unite *Labour Party (LPG)/ UNISON* Labour Party (LPG)/GMB *Labour Party (LPG)/NUT* *Labour Party (LPG)/ USDAW*

Country	Party name	Confederation name	Union name	Pair/dyad
United States	Democratic Party	AFL-CIO (American Federation of Labour and Congress of Industrial Organizations) CTW (Change to Win)	SEIU (Service Employees International Union) AFT (American Federation of Teachers) UBC (United Brotherhood of Carpenters) UAW (United Auto Workers)	Democratic Party (CPO)/ AFL-CIO Democratic Party (CPO)/ CTW Democratic Party (CPO)/ SEIU Democratic Party (CPO)/ AFT Democratic Party (CPO)/ UBC Democratic Party (CPO)/ UAW Democratic Party (LPG)/ AFL-CIO Democratic Party (LPG)/ CTW Democratic Party (LPG)/ SEIU Democratic Party (LPG)/ AFT Democratic Party (LPG)/ UBC Democratic Party (LPG)/ UAW

([1]) Units excluded from the scaling analysis of CPO-union and LPG-union dyads are in italics.

Table A2.2. Scale scalability (H) values for confederations and individual unions

	Party CPO-union dyads	N	Party LPG-union dyads	N	Party -unions	N
Confederation	0.76	52	0.68	50	0.84	46
Individual union	0.92	16	0.57	16	0.61	20

(p.52)

Table A2.3. Scale scalability (H) values per country

	Party CPO-union dyads		Party LPG-union dyads		Party-union dyads	
	H	N	H	N	H	N
Austria	NA	2	NA	2	1.00	4
Finland	1.00	6	0.56	6	0.91	4
France	0.87	14	1.00	14	0.98	12
Germany	0.65	10	-0.19	10	0.80	9
Italy	NA	2	NA	1	1.00	3
Netherlands	0.90	9	0.74	9	1.00	5
Sweden	1.00	6	1.00	8	0.96	8
Switzerland	0.77	3	NA	2	1.00	3
United Kingdom	NA	2	NA	2	0.64	4
United States	0.31	6	-0.13	6	1.00	3
Australia	NA	2	NA	0	1.00	5
Israel	NA	6	NA	6	0.69	6

Notes:

(1.) Poguntke's notion of 'independent' or 'informal' collateral organization acknowledges this, but emphasizes exclusiveness and permanent exchange (van Biezen et al. 2012) and includes an ideological element in terms of a 'broad commonality of interests' (Poguntke 2006).

(2.) More precisely, Kitschelt (1989, 231) distinguishes between arms-length relations, selective communication, organized ties, and clientelism. The first type denotes a minimum of contact, the others increasing density of communication and coordination. The problem is, however, that the categorization is not one-dimensional, although it is presented as such. The issue of arms-length relations implicitly refers to frequency of contact, while clientelism denotes a situation where the movement organization tries to shift the burden of protest mobilization to the party (Kitschelt 1989, 232–3). Kitschelt also adds that 'cultural interpenetration'—a continuous flow of symbols and ideas—may compensate for weak organized ties (1989, 246). However, ideological overlap is not treated as an indicator of links in this context, since the major phenomenon to be explained is parties' links for contact with interest organizations.

(3.) The choice of including both individual unions and confederations in the same analysis means that one will, in a sense, count an individual union twice. We have chosen to do so, however, since unions and peak associations are involved in distinct relationships with parties despite not being independent of each other. We can check whether the results differ between the relationships involving individual unions and confederations.

(4.) In some cases, it was very difficult to get responses back, and country experts conducted a structured interview instead.

(5.) All these datasets, and questionnaires and code books, will be made publicly available via Elin H. Allern's university website <http://www.sv.uio.no/isv/english/people/aca/elinal/>.

(6.) The intensity of links—frequency of meetings and overlaps, etc.—at both the organizational and individual level, of both formal and informal contact, is obviously important but can be difficult to get at. It is beyond the scope of this study to assess the strength of each individual kind of link in this sense.

(7.) It is worth noting that only five central party organizations, three legislative party organizations, and seven unions mentioned that they also had 'other kinds of links'. Moreover, not all of the 'alternatives' were clearly different from those we listed, and these borderline cases might have been covered by expert judgments, on which our scaling is based.

(8.) For a review of the literature on measuring power and influence, see Baumgartner and Leech (1998, 58ff.).

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