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Two shades of Green? The electorates of GreenLeft and the Party for the Animals

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The Netherlands has two electorally significant parties that might be considered to be part of the ‘Green’ family: GreenLeft and the Party for the Animals. These two parties appeal to different niches of the Green electorate, identified on the basis of issue dimensions, demographics, and their trust in government. GreenLeft tends to attract voters from the traditional Green niche: those with egalitarian, cosmopolitan, environmentalist, and libertarian values. The Party for the Animals attracts another type of Green voter: significantly less cosmopolitan and evincing lower levels of political trust.

Keywords: Green parties; Green voters; political trust; dimensions of conflict; the Netherlands; animal advocacy parties

Introduction

Both the Netherlands and Germany have well-established Green parties: *GroenLinks* (‘GreenLeft’; GL) and *Bündnis ’90/Die Grünen* (‘Alliance ’90/The Greens’), respectively.¹ However, in 2014, two animal advocacy parties entered the European Parliament: the Dutch *Partij voor de Dieren* (‘Party for the Animals’; PvdD) and the German *Mensch Umwelt Tierschutz* (‘Human, Environment, Animal Protection’) or *Tierschutzpartei*. In fact, in the 2014 European Parliament elections, animal advocacy parties also competed in the UK, Spain, Portugal, and Cyprus. The Dutch PvdD has ties to nine more parties, from Turkey to the USA.² This leads to the question of why these parties are successful and how they differ from ‘traditional’ Green parties. Do animal advocacy parties have an ideology distinct from that of Green parties? Do they appeal to the same voters or to a new ‘type’ of Green voter?

Voters who support established Green parties have been shown to have a distinct egalitarian, environmentalist, and cosmopolitan ideological opinion profile (Dolezal 2010, Van der Kolk 2010). These parties attract voters who distrust mainstream politics (Berlin and Lundqvist 2012). Less is known about the voters

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for the animal advocacy parties, but Lucardie (2012) sees a new party family with a distinct ideology emerging.

The central question that guides this study is whether these parties attract voters from the same egalitarian, cosmopolitan, and environmentalist voter group or whether they appeal to a different electoral niche. The Netherlands is an important case in the study of new political parties (Krouwel and Lucardie 2008, Lowery *et al.* 2013), since the absence of an electoral threshold provides new parties with a greater opportunity to win representation, compared with other democracies. Studying the voters of the two Green parties in the Netherlands is also particularly relevant for those interested in the German case: the Dutch and the German Green parties are particularly similar (Dolezal 2010, online appendix). Given these similarities, it may very well be that the German *Tierschutzpartei* occupies a similar niche in relation to the German Greens, as the PvdD does to GL in the Netherlands.

The present research is not only of interest of those studying the electoral support base of Green and animal advocacy parties. The differentiation between animal advocacy and Green parties may reflect a distinction with political theory between environmentalists and animal advocates. While the former are concerned with the stability of ecological systems, the latter are concerned with the welfare of individual animals (Callicott 1980, Sagoff 1984). Green and animal advocacy may appeal to different niches in the Green political space, indicating different ways to think about Green politics in general.

Theory

In order to test whether those who vote for Green parties and animal advocacy parties fit the profile of traditional Green voters, we first sketch a portrait of the Green voter on the basis of existing literature in terms of their positions of issue dimensions, their demographic characteristics, and their attitudes towards politics. Our base expectation is that Green and animal advocacy parties have a similar 'Green' electorate. Hence, our first hypothesis:

H1 – Identity hypothesis: Green parties and the animal advocacy parties appeal to the same voters.

Voter positions: attitudes towards the environment, the economy, and culture

Since the 1980s, the rational choice approach in voting behaviour has been dominant (Rabinowitz and Macdonald 1989): choice is based on voters' position in a low-dimensional political space, such as the left–right dimension. Voters with left-wing preferences would vote for left-wing parties, while right-wing voters would vote for right-wing parties. In order to understand voting behaviour, we must know which dimensions structure the political space.

As we are studying voters of Green and animal advocacy parties, we will begin with a description of the political space concerning environmental issues. With regard to environmental issues, researchers tend to utilise an environmentalism dimension that separates those who value ecological stability over economic growth and *vice versa* (Dolezal 2010, Van der Kolk 2010, Clements 2012). Green voters believe that ecological stability has priority over economic growth, and therefore measures should be taken to limit pollution, resource depletion, and climate change, even if this has negative economic implications in the short term.

With regard to animal advocacy, however, such a simplistic model does not suffice. Political theorists have differentiated between environmentalists, who are primarily concerned with the preservation of ecological stability, and animal advocates, primarily concerned with animal welfare. As Dobson (1994, p. 41) states: '[a]n ethic for animals is by no means the same as an ethic for the environment'. The key difference is that environmentalists value collective entities such as ecosystems, while animal advocates are concerned with individual animals (Callicott 1980, pp. 321–322; Sagoff 1984, p. 305; Wissenburg and Schlosberg 2014, p. 8). These attitudes are most noticeable when it comes to attitudes of some environmentalists and animal advocates towards animals in factory farming. Animal advocates such as Singer (1990, ch. 3) are greatly concerned with the treatment of animals in agriculture, while the attitude of some prominent environmentalist theorists, such as Aldo Leopold, has been described as 'indifference' (Callicott 1980, p. 315). Therefore, some have argued that the political debate about the environment and animals is multidimensional, with environmentalism and animal advocacy forming separate poles (Callicott 1980). The difference between the two poles should be overstated (Jamieson 1998, Callicott 1988; Wissenburg and Schlosberg 2014, p. 2). Existing research on attitudes towards animal use shows a correlation between attitudes towards animals and environmental attitudes (Pifer *et al.* 1994, pp. 105–106). Still, we can, theoretically, conceive of a multidimensional space where environmental and animal concerns form separate dimensions. This leads to further hypotheses:

H2 – Environmental dimension hypothesis: the voters of both animal advocacy and Green parties have more pro-environmental positions, in comparison with other voters.

H3 – Animal dimension hypothesis: the voters of both animal advocacy and Green parties are more concerned with animal welfare, in comparison with other voters.

Kriesi *et al.* (2008) offer a framework to understand the party preferences of West European voters on issues other than the environment. In their view, the political space in Western Europe has been consistently two-dimensional. The economic dimension differentiates between left-wing voters and parties and right-wing voters and parties. Left and right are divided over the issue of

economic equality: '[b]y left we shall mean advocating social change in the direction of greater equality – political, economic or social; by right we shall mean ... opposing change towards greater equality' (Lipset *et al.* 1954, p. 1135). The left–right dimension consistently played a major role in understanding voting behaviour between the 1970s and the 2000s (Kriesi *et al.* 2008). We also know that Green voters are consistently committed to economic egalitarianism (Dolezal 2010) and that the environmental and left–right dimensions are closely related (Carroll *et al.* 2009).

There are those who argue that the economic left–right dimension no longer suffices for understanding economic policies in the Netherlands (Otjes 2015, *forthcoming*). According to this view, since 2010, a dimension is necessary that separates voters who favour reforms of the welfare state and voters who oppose measures that are not necessarily redistributive between classes but redistribute opportunities between generations. We expect Greens, with their long-term focus on environmental issues, to be concerned with financial sustainability of the welfare state as well. Thus, two further hypotheses:

H4 – Old Economic dimension hypothesis: the voters of both Green parties and animal advocacy parties have more egalitarian positions on economic issues, in comparison with other voters.

H5 – New economic dimension hypothesis: the voters of both Green parties and animal advocacy parties have more progressive positions on economic issues, compared with other voters.

According to Kriesi *et al.* (2008), in addition to the left–right dimension, another dimension matters for voting behaviour. This second dimension has changed over time. In the 1970s, it mainly concerned issues such as abortion, pitting voters and parties with more traditional values against voters with more libertarian values. Green parties often have their roots in the social movements of the 1970s that rallied in favour of greater freedom for women and sexual minorities, and Green parties tend to attract voters with libertarian views on moral issues (Dolezal 2010).

Between the 1970s and the 1990s, due to globalisation, this second, cultural dimension changed to embrace concerns about so-called 'new cultural' issues, such as immigration, integration of minorities, and European integration (Kriesi *et al.* 2008). This cleavage divides 'nationalist' voters who favour national demarcation (restricting immigration and retaining national sovereignty) and 'cosmopolitan' voters who favour international integration (EU integration and open borders). Green parties historically had a mixed position on these issues. On the political question of European integration, Green voters were pulled in different directions; they tend to support international cooperation, but their distrust of politics as usual makes them skeptical about further integration into the EU in its present form. While Green parties and voters have been wary of the

pro-market focus of the European integration process, most Green voters still support European integration (Carter 2010) and, on issues such as immigration, Green voters generally favour protecting marginalised groups (Dolezal 2010). On the whole, Green voters tend to be on the cosmopolitan end of the integration–demarcation divide. This leads us to further hypotheses:

H6 – Old cultural dimension hypothesis: the voters of both Green parties and animal advocacy parties have more libertarian positions on old cultural issues, in comparison with other voters.

H7 – New cultural dimension hypothesis: the voters of both Green parties and animal advocacy parties have more cosmopolitan positions on new cultural issues, in comparison with other voters.

Attitude towards politics

In addition to their stances on political issues, Green voters are characterised by a distrust of political institutions. Their distrust of ‘politics as usual’ reflects Green parties’ roots in social movements and the anti-establishment politics of the 1960s and 1970s (Berlin and Lundqvist 2012). Green voters distrust traditional politics because the traditional parties often defend vested interests and have little inclination for radical reform. Green parties tend to be radical: their post-materialism, for instance, includes anti-elite, anti-authority, and anti-tradition elements, and their program entails radical change (Catterberg and Moreno 2005). This may create a clean hands approach to politics: Green voters prefer to vote for parties that represent their ideals, but do not relish compromises with established parties. Hence, a further hypothesis:

H8 – Cynicism hypothesis: the voters of both Green parties and the animal advocacy parties are more politically cynical, compared with other voters.

Demographic characteristics: young highly educated women

Green voters are younger, more often women, and more highly educated than voters of other parties. The age of Green party voters coheres with the values that these voters have. Green parties draw voters from younger age groups who tend to be more concerned with environmental issues (Clements 2012). Hence:

H9 – Age hypothesis: the voters of Green parties and animal advocacy parties are younger than other voters are.

Women tend to vote for Green parties more often than men: women are more likely to share the redistributive and environmentalist positions of Green parties (Dolezal 2010, Clements 2012). Hence:

H10 – Gender hypothesis: the voters of both Green parties and animal advocacy parties are more often women than other voters are.

Green parties draw support from more highly educated voters, who are more aware of environmental issues and have more cosmopolitan positions on new cultural issues, such as immigration (Bovens and Wille 2010, Clements 2012). Hence:

H11 – Education hypothesis: the voters of both Green parties and animal advocacy parties are more highly educated than other voters are.

Finally, Green voters tend to be less religious (Dolezal 2010). This reflects their libertarian preferences on old cultural issues, such as same-sex marriage. Hence:

H12 – Religiosity hypothesis: the voters of both Green parties and animal advocacy parties are less religious than other voters are.

Two Dutch Green parties?

In many ways, the Netherlands constitutes ideal territory for parties that focus on Green politics, due to the open electoral system and the widespread post-materialist values among the population. The Netherlands has an extreme form of proportional representation, which is very conducive for the success of new parties (Rohrschneider 1993, Müller-Rommel 1998, Hug 2001, Smith 2005, Meguid 2007, Lowery *et al.* 2013), and a very environmentalist and culturally libertarian population (Wilensky 2002). This is crucial for the electoral success of Green parties (Kitschelt 1988, Müller-Rommel 1998, Hug 2001, Smith 2005, Meguid 2007). It is, therefore, not surprising that both a Green and an animal advocacy party have won seats in several national elections: the GL (since 1989) and the Party for the Animals (since 2006).

GreenLeft

Because of the pro-environmental attitudes of Dutch voters, parties focused on environmental issues relatively early, which inhibited the formation of a Green party (Kitschelt 1988, Inglehart and Andeweg 1993, Rohrschneider 1993, Müller-Rommel 1998, Meguid 2007). Four existing small left-wing parties focused on environmental issues (Inglehart and Andeweg 1993; Hug 2001, pp. 20–21): the Pacifist Socialist Party (*Pacifistisch Socialistische Partij*; PSP), the de-Stalinised Communist Party of the Netherlands (*Communistische Partij Nederland*; CPN), and two progressive Christian parties – Political Party Radicals (*Politieke Partij Radicalen*; PPR) and Evangelical People's Party (*Evangelische Volkspartij*; EVP). In 1972, these parties together won more than

10% of the vote. By 1986, they were left with only 3% of the vote. At the 1989 elections, these four parties presented a common list, and in 1991, they merged to form a single party, GL (Lucardie and Voerman 2010). This label was a compromise: the PSP and the CPN wanted to signal that the new party was left wing, the PPR wanted an alliance with a Green profile.

This compromise was also visible in its 1992 declaration of principles. One of the five principles of GL was ‘a habitable environment and a restoration of the ecological balance’ (Legendijk *et al.* 1992). The party realised that a sustainable economy would limit material consumption and called for redistribution of income to compensate the worst off. In its 2008 declaration of principles, this combination of environmentalist and redistributive politics was still visible. Environmental concerns are not the exclusive focus of the party. It also strives for reform of the welfare state to ensure its financial sustainability, for an open culture, and for European cooperation (GroenLinks 2008). After the rise of the right-wing List Pim Fortuyn in 2002, immigration became quite important in Dutch politics (Pellikaan *et al.* 2007); GL is one of the most multiculturalist parties against the monoculturalism of the right-wing populists.

As can be seen in Figure 1, the electorate of GL has been quite unstable: in 2010, it had its second best national performance, but in 2012, the party suffered its worst defeat. Under the leadership of Jolande Sap from 2010, GL supported decisions of the centre-right minority government, such as a police-training mission to Afghanistan and the 2013 budget, which the PvdD and other left-wing parties voted against. Internally, Sap’s leadership was challenged by a fellow MP, but the party executive managed this challenge poorly. After weeks




Figure 1. GL and PvdD electoral results 1989–2012. National election results of the GL (full line) and the PvdD (broken line).

of speculation, the executive decided to allow all members to vote on the party's leadership. The members voted for Sap, but the conflict showed structural deficits in the party's organisation (Van Dijk *et al.* 2013). A final factor was competition from the centre-left Labour Party (*Partij van de Arbeid*), which exerted a strong pull on left-wing voters.

Party for the Animals

The idea of a Dutch animal advocacy party dates back to the early 1990s (Kruijt 2007). The party itself was founded in 2002 by members of an anti-fur advocacy organisation, who felt that existing parties, including GL, did too little for animals, and hoped that their presence in the electoral arena would pressure established parties to pay greater attention to animals (Krouwel and Lucardie 2008). The party's name was a strategic choice; it could also have been called 'Party for the Environment', but that would not make a lasting impression. By calling itself Party for the Animals, the new party could attract media attention (De Telegraaf 2007, De Pers 2008, Van Os 2010). The PvdD offers a non-anthropocentric programme (Van der Heijden 2010), almost 70% of it concentrated on agriculture or animal welfare policies (Otjes 2014). Ideologically, the PvdD has been characterised as 'animalist' (Lucardie 2012). In its 2005 declaration of principles, the party states that the human ability to respect the integrity of all living beings should form the basis of the way in which humans should interact with each other, animals, and the environment (Partij voor de Dieren 2005). The party wants to reduce human use of animals, for instance in entertainment and as food. On other economic and environmental issues, the PvdD takes a left-wing position (Lucardie 2006). The party is skeptical about European integration. During the 2014 European election campaign, it wanted to express a 'Green Eurocritique' (Partij voor de Dieren 2014).

The PvdD does not target the constituency of a particular pre-existing party. Party leader Marianne Thieme (2006) claimed that animal issues transcend the traditional political divisions, and asked voters to voice their dissatisfaction about the treatment of animals, independent of who wins power (Thieme 2006, p. 115). In 2006, the party won two seats in the lower house of parliament (with 2% of the vote), which it maintained in three subsequent elections (see Figure 1).

Methodology

In the following section, we justify our use of multiple data sets, and describe the variables included in this study.

Data

As animal advocacy parties are relatively small, they are usually underrepresented in representative surveys, which hampers analysing their support. We

overcome this limitation by analysing different samples of voters: the PvdD has been included in the 2010 and 2012 Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies (DPES; Van der Kolk *et al.* 2012, 2014), and is well represented among the users of the Voting Advice Application (VAA) Election Compass (*Kieskompas*) in 2012 and 2014.³ Each VAA data set contains 30 questions on a wide range of political issues. In addition to their stance on issues, users were also asked about their propensity to vote (PTV) for all parliamentary represented political parties. Numerous users also answered a list of additional questions concerning their demographic background and attitudes towards politics and politicians. Here, we only examine those respondents who answered the additional questions. This ensures that only ‘serious VAA users’ are included in our analyses. We look at Election Compass users who visited the VAA in the 2010 and 2012 National Parliamentary elections and the 2014 European Parliament election, comparing DPES and *Kieskompas* data to reduce the effect of contingent factors. This approach allows us to cross-validate results from different data sources and different time points in order to obtain a balanced perspective on electorates of GL and the PvdD.

Table 3 gives an overview of the number of respondents included and the descriptives of the variables employed. We use the PTV variables to identify party preferences (Van der Eijk 2002). We prefer these variables over vote intention variables because we are studying small parties, and many surveys only sample a very small number of voters for such parties (Van der Eijk *et al.* 2006: 425).⁴ The relationship between party preference and party choice is quite strong (Van der Eijk *et al.* 2006). In order to compare variables that explain the PTV for the PvdD and the GL directly, we need to analyse them in a single model. We follow the research design proposed by Van der Eijk *et al.* (2006, p. 440): we create a stacked data set. The dependent variable is the observed PTV for either the PvdD or GL. The independent variables are included twice, once for the PTV for the PvdD and once for the PTV for GL. We run a regression analysis with an interaction that indicates whether the PTV in the independent variable concerns GL or the PvdD. This allows us to compare the coefficients for GL and PvdD directly and assess to what extent the two electorates differ. We use ordinary least squares regression with robust standard errors, which do not assume a homoscedastic distribution of the error terms, in order to compensate for the fact that the PTVs have skewed distributions (following Van Spanje and Van der Brug 2009).

Clearly, Election Compass does not offer a probability sample of the population. A cursory glance at the descriptive statistics (Table 1) shows that users of the tool are more often male, highly educated, less religious, and younger than the probability sample of the national election studies. Therefore, we need to be very conscious about the limits of these data. We cannot draw inferences to the general population, as the data were collected online and users opted in voluntarily. Most online surveys are subject to problems of under-coverage and self-selection that can potentially bias estimates (Bethlehem 2010). However, these

Table 1. Descriptive values of simple variables.

Variable	DPES 2010	Election Compass 2010	DPES 2012	Election Compass 2012	Election Compass 2014
N^a	750	19,750	1113	2933	8213
Female = yes	51%	37%	51%	25%	38%
No religion = yes	52%	63%	53%	69%	n/a
Year of birth mean ^{bc}	1961 (17)	1966 (16)	1962 (17)	1965 (15)	1970 (16)
Higher education = yes	27%	37%	31%	33%	66%
Vote = PvdD	1%	–	2%	2%	–
Vote = GL	6%	–	2%	8%	–
PTV GL ^c	5.2 (2.7)	4.9 (3.1)	4.1 (2.7)	4.6 (3.2)	4.7 (3.0)
PTV PvdD ^c	2.7 (2.3)	2.1 (2.5)	3.1 (2.6)	2.1 (2.7)	2.6 (2.8)

^aThe maximum N that have been used in the analyses, after the removal of cases that had missing values on relevant variables.

^bThis variable was divided by 10 for interpretative purposes.

^cMean (with standard deviation in parentheses).

large N opt-in data sets allow one to capture fringe groups, including supporters of marginal parties, who are often found in limited numbers in probability samples. Online opt-in samples have proven to be better for reaching population groups that are less easily accessible through traditional polling methodologies. Even if estimates obtained from Internet surveys cannot be extrapolated to the entire population, VAA data can still be used to cross-validate patterns from a probability sample such as the national election study. In order to minimise and control for likely bias in the VAA data, both data sets will be analysed separately, with the DPES data leading for our substantive conclusions.

Dimensionality of the Dutch voter space

The key explanation of the Green vote choice is the position of voters in a political space. The value dimensions are, as far as possible, operationalised by multi-item indices. This is more than a control for measurement error (Ansolabehere *et al.* 2008). The underlying assumption of using this kind of opinion item is that these measure an underlying value dimension (Coombs 1964). We assess whether this is actually the case by means of scaling methods. As the justification for these dimensions is deductive, we base them on the theoretical explanations discussed above.⁵ We test the quality of these scales using Mokken scaling (Mokken 1971). This technique has previously been designed to assess the quality of the spatial models underlying voting advice

applications (Louwse and Otjes 2012, Otjes and Louwse 2014). We choose this method over alternatives such as factor analysis because Mokken scaling makes minimal assumptions about the distribution of the data, while factor analysis has expectations, for instance about a normal distribution of voter positions (Van Schuur and Kiers 1994). Mokken scaling was used to test the quality of exams; scales run from ‘easy’ items (that most respondents answer correctly) to ‘difficult’ items (that most respondents answer incorrectly). The quality of the scale is expressed in the number of errors: the number of times respondents who answer the difficult questions correctly, get the easy questions wrong. This expressed in the H-value. A H-value <0.3 is unacceptable. Here, models run from, for instance, left to right instead of from easy to difficult. Polytomous Mokken scaling is applied on items with multiple, ordered answer categories (Van der Ark 2007).

We create six issue scales from a large number of items⁶: an old economic dimension (concerning redistribution, such as progressive taxation), a new economic dimension (concerning welfare state reform, such as raising the retirement age), an old cultural dimension (concerning moral issues, such as same-sex marriage), a new cultural dimension (concerning EU integration and immigration), an environmental dimension (concerning classical environmental issues, such as nuclear energy), and animal dimension (in all three Election Compasses data sets, one issue concerning animals was included). The correlations between these animal issues and the environmental dimensions are limited.⁷ These items are almost always multi-item scales selected because, despite different wordings, they tap into the same conceptual differences.

As can be seen in Table 2, all these dimensions meet the basic requirements of scalability (a H-value ≥ 0.3). In the regression models, in order to aid comparison, all these scales have been recoded so that they have a minimum of zero and a maximum of one.

Table 2. Scaling coefficients of complex variables.

Data set	DPES				Election Compass					
	2010		2012		2010		2012		2014	
	<i>N</i>	H	<i>N</i>	H	<i>N</i>	H	<i>N</i>	H	<i>N</i>	H
New cultural	15	0.45	16	0.37	6	0.49	9	0.48	14	0.53
Old cultural	5	0.35	4	0.47	2	0.38	2	0.40	2	0.37
New economic	1	–	1	–	3	0.32	5	0.43	1	–
Old economic	3	0.45	2	0.58	3	0.44	2	0.46	2	0.64
Environmental	1	–	1	–	2	0.42	2	0.45	3	0.44
Animal	–	–	–	–	1	–	1	–	1	–
Trust	23	0.44	12	0.43	12	0.60	13	0.55	1	–

N = number of dimensions

H = H-value

In addition to these value dimensions, we also construct a measure of political trust. These scales consist of items that concern the faith that respondents have in government and politicians and their political cynicism. While trust and cynicism may be different concepts, Table 4 shows that these multi-item scales are sufficiently homogeneous.

Understanding Green voters

Below, we present two types of analyses. First, we look at the extent to which the PTV scores for the GL overlap with those for the PvdD. Second, we examine the extent to which electorates of GL and PvdD are similar in terms of their values and their attitude towards politics.

Overlapping electorates

Table 3 gives an overview of the intersection of GL and PvdD voters in terms of vote propensity, on a scale from 1 to 10. We use DPES data because we are interested in the distribution of these variables in the electorate. For reasons of representation, we have truncated the 10-point variable to one with the following three points: 1 (will never vote for the party), 2–6 (unlikely to vote for the party), and >6 (likely to vote for the party).⁸

About a third of voters in the 2010 DPES sample indicate that their chance of voting for GL in the future is >60%. For the PvdD, it is much smaller (only 10%). In 2010, the overlap between the potential electorates of GL and the PvdD is 5% of all voters. The intersection between the PvdD and GL is relatively lop-sided: half of those likely to vote for PvdD also consider GL as a viable option. At the same time, only one in seven of those likely to vote for GL consider voting for the PvdD. We could interpret this as follows: to some extent PvdD voters form a subset of potential GL voters, but the potential of GL reaches beyond this. In 2012, the PTV for GL declined (following the electoral decline of the party). The PTV for the PvdD

Table 3. Overlap in propensity to vote-scores of PvdD and GL.

			PvdD			Total
			1	1 < x ≤ 6	x > 6	
Dutch Parliamentary Election Survey 2010 N = 2101	GL	1	10%	2%	1%	13%
		1 < x ≤ 6	25%	24%	3%	52%
		x > 6	13%	17%	5%	35%
		Total	48%	42%	10%	100%
Dutch Parliamentary Election Survey 2012 N = 1416	GL	1	20%	3%	2%	25%
		1 < x ≤ 6	17%	31%	4%	54%
		x > 6	5%	9%	6%	21%
		Total	43%	44%	13%	100%

Table 4. Correlations between propensity to vote scores.

		PvdD	
		Correlation	<i>N</i>
GL	Dutch Parliamentary Election Survey 2010	0.22***	2101
	Dutch Parliamentary Election Survey 2012	0.39***	1416
	Election Compass 2010	0.39***	452,990
	Election Compass 2012	0.37***	503,409
	Election Compass 2014	0.38***	90,008

Pearson's *r*; significance levels: 0.1 > * > 0.05 > ** > 0.01 > ***.

increased slightly. The overlap between PvdD and GL is still lopsided: about half of prospective PvdD-voters also consider GL, but <30% of GL voters consider the PvdD. This means that there is a correlation between considering voting PvdD and GL. Table 4 indicates that the correlation between the interval variables for PTV is weak but significant in 2010 and 2012. We find broadly similar results in the Election Compass non-probability samples (see Table 4).

These results show that the intersection between GL and the PvdD appears lopsided and small. PvdD voters appear to be a subset of the GL electorate, but GL has a broader appeal. In general, the PvdD and GL occupy distinct electoral niches. In the following section, we assess to what extent PvdD and GL voters differ from each other.

Voter characteristics

We now assess whether the PTV for GL and the PvdD can be explained by the traditional characteristics of Green party voters. Table 5 reports the results in detail. When we compare the PTV for PvdD and GL, a number of consistent patterns emerge from the data.

Both GL and the PvdD have a similarly environmentalist electorate. In the 2010 and 2012 DPES, environmentalism has a positive and significant effect on voting for both parties. In both analyses, we find no significant difference between the two parties. The Election Compass data confirms these results. Like the DPES analysis, the environmental dimension has a significant, positive effect on voting for both parties. There are small but significant differences between the PvdD and GL in the Election Compass analyses, but these are inconsistent between the analyses: the effect of environmentalism is stronger for GL than for PvdD in the 2010 and 2012 data sets, but not in 2014. All in all, as hypothesised, the PvdD and GL have a pro-environmentalist electorate compared with those who prefer other parties.

Do the PvdD and the GL have a similarly pro-animal welfare electorate? While the DPES does not include such variables, these are included in the Election Compass data sets. The results indicate that the effect of pro-animal

Table 5. OLS regressions.

Source	Election Compass			DPES	
	2010	2012	2014	2010	2012
Intercept	-32.71*** (2.26)	-0.29 (0.33)	-17.42*** (3.35)	-30.03*** (9.88)	-19.91** (8.82)
GL	14.22*** (3.20)	5.187*** (0.47)	16.49*** (4.74)	49.65*** (14.00)	-19.02 (12.48)
Gender (women)	0.02 (0.04)	-0.06 (0.06)	0.00 (0.06)	0.15 (0.16)	-0.16 (0.15)
Education (higher)	-0.11*** (0.04)	-0.04 (0.06)	0.00 (0.06)	-0.09 (0.18)	-0.32* (0.17)
Year of birth	0.17*** (0.01)	0.21*** (0.02)	0.10*** (0.02)	0.16*** (0.05)	0.11** (0.04)
Religion (none)	0.17*** (0.04)	0.06 (0.06)	-	0.06 (0.17)	0.20 (0.16)
New cultural	0.58*** (0.09)	1.09*** (0.17)	-1.15*** (0.15)	0.53 (0.59)	0.92* (0.53)
New economic	0.08 (0.09)	-0.98*** (0.15)	-0.35*** (0.10)	0.54 (0.40)	-0.28 (0.37)
Old cultural	0.01 (0.10)	-0.21* (0.13)	0.68*** (0.12)	1.23** (0.53)	1.04*** (0.35)
Old economic	0.52*** (0.08)	0.80*** (0.12)	0.97*** (0.11)	1.30*** (0.47)	1.41*** (0.36)
Environmental	1.42*** (0.08)	2.25*** (0.12)	3.81*** (0.15)	1.13*** (0.26)	1.18*** (0.27)
Animal	1.84*** (0.06)	1.75*** (0.08)	3.17*** (0.10)	-	-
Political trust	-1.36*** (0.28)	0.41* (0.23)	-0.21* (0.16)	-1.68*** (0.62)	0.36 (0.53)
GL × gender (women)	0.01 (0.05)	0.24** (0.08)	0.56*** (0.08)	0.18 (0.23)	0.49** (0.21)
GL × education (higher)	0.37*** (0.05)	0.42*** (0.08)	0.32*** (0.08)	0.64** (0.26)	0.37 (0.23)
GL × year of birth	-0.10*** (0.02)	-0.06** (0.03)	-0.05** (0.02)	-0.25*** (0.07)	0.08 (0.06)
GL × religion (none)	0.42*** (0.05)	0.11 (0.21)	-	0.13 (0.24)	0.12 (0.23)
GL × new cultural	4.52*** (0.14)	5.30*** (0.24)	7.47*** (0.21)	4.69*** (0.84)	5.13*** (0.75)
GL × new economic	-0.32** (0.13)	2.06*** (0.21)	-0.18 (0.14)	-0.68 (0.56)	0.39 (0.52)
GL × old cultural	0.15 (0.14)	0.62*** (0.18)	0.48*** (0.18)	1.77** (0.75)	0.38 (0.50)
GL × old economic	1.73*** (0.11)	0.67*** (0.17)	0.89*** (0.16)	1.75*** (0.66)	0.86* (0.51)
GL × environmental	0.92*** (0.11)	0.40** (0.17)	-0.47** (0.21)	0.07 (0.36)	0.27 (0.38)
GL × animal	-0.82*** (0.08)	-1.21*** (0.12)	-2.75*** (0.14)	-	-

(continued)

Table 5. (Continued).

Source	Election Compass			DPES	
	2010	2012	2014	2010	2012
GL × political trust	5.97*** (0.39)	1.04*** (0.33)	0.10 (0.16)	3.58*** (0.88)	0.20 (0.76)
R^2	0.48	0.42	0.48	0.41	0.22
N	39,146	18,034	16,422	1506	2230

attitudes is positive and significant in each analysis. There is, however, contrary to the hypothesis, a significant difference between the PvdD and GL in every survey, with the PvdD electorate significantly more pro-animal than the GL one, although the appeal of both parties is related to pro-animal attitudes.

In two DPES analyses, preferences for both parties are positively and significantly related to egalitarianism. However, the effect for GL is significantly stronger than that for the PvdD. The same pattern is visible in the three Election Compass analyses. Therefore, contrary to the hypothesis, we conclude that these two electorates differ on economic issues.

On the new economic dimension, i.e. favouring or opposing economic reform, in none of the DPES analyses is there a significant relationship between preferring GL or the PvdD. There are some significant effects for preferring the PvdD in the Election Compass data: the PvdD attracts anti-welfare state reform voters in 2012 and 2014, while GL attracts pro-welfare state reform voters in 2012, but anti-welfare state reform voters in 2010 and 2014. Given the lack of significant effects in the DPES, the mixed effects for GL, and the small size of the effects, we cannot confirm the hypothesis that both GL and PvdD voters are more favourably disposed towards welfare state reform than other voters.

On the old cultural dimension, i.e. attitudes towards moral issues such as same-sex marriage, in both DPES analyses, there is a positive significant effect of moral libertarian positions on likelihood to vote for GL and the PvdD; both GL and PvdD voters are more libertarian than other voter groups. For GL, four out five – and for the PvdD, three out of five – analyses indicate that the party attracts more libertarian than traditionalist voters. All in all, there appears to be a weak but significant difference between the two parties, GL attracting consistently more libertarian voters than the PvdD. In this sense, GL's electorate is closer to the traditional image of a Green electorate than the PvdD's.

Considering the new cultural dimension, i.e. attitudes towards EU integration and integration of immigrants, in both DPES analyses, there is a significant effect of cosmopolitan positions on the new cultural dimension and preferring to vote GL, but the relationship is only weakly significant for the PvdD in one year (2012). The analyses of the Election Compass data indicate that the relationship between preferring GL and cosmopolitan attitudes is also

positive, sizeable, and significant, while the effect for the PvdD is inconsistent (positive in 2010 and 2012, but negative in 2012) and also much smaller. All of the results indicate that GL attracts a significantly more cosmopolitan electorate than the PvdD. All in all, we have to reject the notion that both the PvdD and GL fish in the same cosmopolitan pool. GL fits the niche of Green parties better than the PvdD.

Green parties traditionally attract voters with low levels of political trust. We find different patterns for the PvdD and GL. In one of the two DPES analyses, there is a significant, negative relationship between political trust and preferring the PvdD (in 2010), while the same analysis shows that GL attracts a politically more trusting electorate. The same pattern is visible in the Election Compass analyses: in two of three analyses, GL has a significantly more politically trusting electorate than the PvdD does. All in all, there appears to be a consistent difference between the two parties. Contrary to the literature, GL tends to appeal to voters with more political trust, while the PvdD tends to attract less trusting voters and so conforms to the traditional image of Green party voters.

The effects of demographic variables are small, but often the difference between the two electorates is significant. The PvdD consistently attracts younger voters; the pattern for GL is more mixed. In one DPES analysis, there is no significant difference between the PvdD and GL (2012), but in the other analyses, GL attracts a significantly older electorate than the PvdD.

There is no significant relationship between gender and preferring the PvdD. Overall, women are more likely than men to vote for GL, but not for PvdD.

One of two DPES and one of the three Election Compass analyses indicate that the PvdD attracts a less-educated electorate. One of the DPES analyses and all three Election Compass analyses show that GL attracts a higher number of educated voters. Thus, GL's electorate conforms to the traditional higher-educated image of Green voters, but PvdD's does not.

Finally, in neither of the two DPES analyses, and in one of the two Election Compass analyses, is there a significant relationship between religiosity and preferring the PvdD or GL. The hypothesis that the electorate of the PvdD or the GL differs from other voters in terms of their religiosity is rejected.

Discussion and conclusion

We have explored to the extent to which GL and the PvdD appealed to voters with similar opinion structures and background characteristics. We found that the overlap between the GL and PvdD electorates is asymmetric: while potential GL voters form about half of potential PvdD voters, PvdD voters form less than a third of potential GL voters. The PvdD seems to appeal to a niche in the electorate of GL, while GL has a broader appeal than the PvdD. Therefore, one must reject the hypothesis that the two electorates are identical.

Table 6 summarises our results. The two parties differ significantly with regard to the kind of voters that they appeal to. GL is more likely to attract

Table 6. Summary table.

Year	PvdD	GL	PvdD–GL similarity
Environmental	+	+	+
Animal	(+)	(+)	–
Old economic	+	+	–
New economic	0	0	0
Old cultural	0	+	–
New cultural	0	+	–
Political trust	+	-	–
Gender (women)	0	+	–
Education (higher)	0	+	–
Year of birth	+	0	–
Religion (none)	0	0	0

PvdD: Do PvdD-voters fit expectations about Green voters?

GL: Do GL-voters fit expectations about Green voters?

PvdD–GL Similarity: Is the expectation that voters of PvdD and GL are *both* similarly and significantly different from other voters correct?

+, consistent, significant effect conform expectations;

0, no consistent or significant effect;

–, consistent, significant effect contrary to expectations. (+), only a significant difference in the Election Compass data.

women and highly educated voters than PvdD, and so GL's voters conform to the image of Green party voters. Yet, younger voters are more likely to vote for PvdD. For religiosity, we do not find consistent effects.

When we look at the issue dimensions, we find that the parties appeal to different kinds of voters. Both appeal to an environmentalist electorate. When it comes to issues concerning animals, both parties' electorates are 'pro-animal' but PvdD voters significantly more so. Thus, the conceptual difference between environmentalism and animal advocacy signalled in the literature resonates empirically.⁹

GL consistently appeals to cosmopolitan voters, which cannot be said for the PvdD. This difference on the new cultural dimension is by far the strongest difference between the two electorates. We also find weaker and less consistent differences on old economic and old cultural issues: both parties appeal to voters with egalitarian positions, but GL appeals to a more traditionally left-wing electorate. Finally, GL tends to appeal to voters with libertarian positions on the old cultural dimension, while for the PvdD, this effect differs between studies.

Another crucial difference between GL and PvdD voters is their attitude towards politics: GL appeals to voters with positive attitudes towards politics, while the PvdD tends to appeal to the politically cynical, and so only PvdD voters conform to our expectations about Green voters.

Overall, the potential electorate of GL conforms quite well to the general expectations derived from the literature on Green party voters. Those who consider voting for GL are cosmopolitan in outlook, favour egalitarianism, are overall libertarian, and have environmentalist positions. The party also appeals more to women and highly

educated voters than do other parties. This means that GL is a genuine niche party with limited electoral potential. It can only hope to attract voters who share its agenda of multiculturalism, sustainability, and redistribution. GL and its potential voters adopt many extreme issue positions that often place them in a minority position. This is most clear on the new cultural dimension, which consistently defined GL potential voters best and separates them from other voter groups.

The strongest difference between GL and PvdD voters is on the so-called new cultural issues, such as immigration and EU integration. PvdD voters are far less cosmopolitan than GL voters. The tension between favouring cosmopolitanism and opposing politics as usual, between favouring deeper European integration and opposing the current course of the European Commission, articulates itself in two separate parties in the Netherlands: one more oriented towards globalisation, and one more oriented towards national demarcation. Moreover, PvdD voters were more politically cynical. PvdD voters have the same environmentalist positions as GL voters but take more extreme positions on animal issues. They have egalitarian economic positions but are less outspoken on this dimension than GL voters. They are also less progressive on old cultural issues than GL voters, and so do not have the typical demographic characteristics of Green party voters: the PvdD is not a party that appeals to the highly educated ‘winners’ of globalisation, who favour multiculturalism and EU integration (Kriesi *et al.* 2008, Dolezal 2010). Thus, the PvdD occupies its own distinct niche: a Green protest party, protesting politics as usual and opposing globalisation.

What do these results mean beyond the borders of the Netherlands? There is a distinct space for two types of Green parties in the Netherlands, but it may also be available in other countries. The recent German European Parliament election results support this. On the one hand, there are Green parties that, like GL, appeal to cosmopolitan, pro-European, pro-multicultural politically trustful voters, many of whom are highly educated women. On the other hand, there may be room for Green parties such as the PvdD, whose electorate is more cynical about established politicians and more Euro-skeptic, more monoculturalist, and more nationalist. Thus, the cleavage between those who favour national demarcation and those who favour global integration may run right through the Green party family.

Disclosure statement

In addition to his position as a researcher at the University of Groningen, Simon Otjes is a part-time, independently contracted consultant for the GreenLeft on electoral issues, one of the parties included in this study.

Notes

1. In fact, the Netherlands and Germany both have a third Green party: *De Groenen* (‘the Greens’) in the Netherlands, a small deep Green party that has never won parliamentary representation on its own, but has until recently been represented in local and provincial councils; and *Ökologisch-Demokratische Partei* (‘Ecological Democratic Party’) in

- Germany with a more traditionalist policy positions on moral issues, which has also won seats in the European Parliament in 2014 and has local representation.
2. PvdD (2014) 'Other Animal Parties' <http://www.partyfortheanimals.nl/index.php/home/other-animal-rights-parties/>
 3. The 2010 data set contains 800,742 users; the 2012 data 757,052 users, and the 2014 data 185,758 users.
 4. The analyses presented here were also performed for the variable vote choice. In the 2010 and 2012 DPES, only an extremely small number of voters for these parties is sampled (PvdD 2010: 22, 1%; 2012 28, 2%; GL 2010: 145, 6%; 2012 38; 2%). Under such circumstances the usual logistic regression methods are problematic. Still, the key result of our analysis is replicated, as Appendix 1 shows: PvdD voters are significantly more conservative on cultural issues than GL voters.
 5. An inductive Mokken scaling analysis, Automatic Item Selection Procedure for the 2010 and 2012 Election Compass data, yields the very similar results.
 6. A full list of items can be found online at <http://home.kieskompas.nl/en/portfolio/two-shades-of-green-the-electorates-of-greenleft-and-the-party-for-the-animals%E2%80%8F/>.
 7. 2010 (0.33), 2012 (0.03), 2014 (0.34).
 8. These are arbitrary cut-offs, but the substantive conclusions do not change for other cut-offs.
 9. This difference could not be assessed from the probability sample, but only from the sample of VAA users, because no item on animal issues was included in the DPES questionnaires.

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Appendix 1: Logistic regressions

Source	Election Compass		DPES	
	Year		2010	2012
Intercept	-7.64*** (1.16)	-73.58 (51.26)	-18.17 (30.94)	
GL	6.72*** (1.29)	86.58 (56.05)	-28.92 (41.61)	
Gender (women)	0.04 (0.19)	0.28 (0.78)	0.24 (0.50)	
Education (higher)	0.23 (0.21)	0.98 (0.88)	-0.40 (0.58)	
Year of birth	0.17*** (0.06)	0.34 (0.26)	0.07 (0.16)	
Religion (none)	0.05 (0.23)	1.15 (0.91)	-0.59 (0.53)	
New cultural	0.12 (0.55)	1.26 (2.56)	0.19 (1.66)	
New economic	-0.58 (0.50)	3.00 (2.16)	1.69 (1.27)	
Old cultural	-0.64 (0.46)	-0.35 (2.70)	3.33** (1.45)	
Old economic	-0.03 (0.43)	1.34 (2.44)	2.74** (1.35)	
Environmental	3.87*** (0.47)	1.50 (1.28)	1.27 (1.00)	
Animal	3.26*** (0.38)	-	-	
Political trust	-0.63 (0.78)	-3.58 (2.63)	1.02 (1.78)	
GL × gender (women)	0.14 (0.22)	0.39 (0.86)	-0.12 (0.77)	
GL × education (higher)	0.11 (0.24)	-0.55 (0.96)	1.38* (0.77)	
GL × year of birth	-0.16** (0.07)	-0.43 (0.28)	0.12 (0.21)	
GL × religion (none)	-0.13 (0.25)	-1.50 (0.98)	0.21 (0.70)	
GL × new cultural	5.11*** (0.67)	5.28* (2.93)	6.24** (2.46)	
GL × new economic	2.18*** (0.56)	-3.71 (2.34)	0.55 (1.69)	
GL × old cultural	0.55 (0.51)	2.35 (3.06)	-2.21 (1.91)	

(continued)

(Continued).

Source	Election Compass	DPES	
Year	2012	2010	2012
GL × old economic	1.70*** (0.50)	0.99 (2.68)	0.34 (1.84)
GL × environmental	-1.33** (0.53)	-0.10 (1.41)	1.62 (1.42)
GL × animal	-2.94 (0.41)	-	-
GL × political trust	1.05 (0.89)	4.66 (3.01)	0.31 (2.50)
AIC	4842	389	402
N	16,552	1512	1984