THE DISSERTATION COMMITTEE FOR JOHN VINCENT KUCSERA, JR. CERTIFIES THAT THIS IS THE APPROVED VERSION OF THE FOLLOWING DISSERTATION:

RACIAL MINDFULNESS: EXPLORING THE INFLUENCE OF MINDFULNESS ON RACIAL BIASES

Committee:

Richard Valencia, Supervisor

Kristin Neff

Richard Reddick

Diane Schallert

Tiffany Whittaker

RACIAL MINDFULNESS: EXPLORING THE INFLUENCE OF MINDFULNESS ON RACIAL BIASES

by

JOHN VINCENT KUCSERA, JR., B.A., M.A.

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Dedication

For my mother.

RACIAL MINDFULNESS: EXPLORING THE INFLUENCE OF MINDFULNESS ON RACIAL BIASES

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John Vincent Kucsera, Jr., Ph.D.

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Supervisor: Richard Valencia

We disbelieve it; we deny it; we even disguise it; but racial prejudice continues to permeate the United States. As a result, researchers labor to determine variables that can reduce these attitudes and consequently, improve social behavior. Three confirmed conditions that can reduce racial attitudes include: (a) awareness to racial biases, (b) motivation for bias reduction, and (c) cognitive strategies for prejudice regulation. However, racial awareness are usually nonexistent for White Americans, and when introduced, racial awareness can cause negative outcomes, such as guilt or denial, that can decrease motivation to reduce one's prejudice levels. The construct and practices of mindfulness may provide a solution to these limitations and help reduce racial prejudice levels for White individuals.

The present dissertation explored the initial steps of this racial mindfulness program of research by first investigating the influence of White participants' degree of mindfulness on their racial prejudice levels using structural equation modeling. Because mindfulness can increase awareness to stimuli, mindfulness could meet the first prejudice reduction condition (i.e., raise awareness to racial stimuli), and therefore, reduce racial prejudice levels directly. In addition, mindfulness has been found to increase similar variables that influences motivation to reduce racial prejudice levels, such as empathy and interconnectedness. Therefore, White participants' degree of mindfulness could decrease their racial prejudice levels indirectly as well. Results from this study indicated that mindfulness did not reduce racial prejudice levels directly or indirectly, although there were some methodology limitations that could have obscured the results.

The next step investigated if White participants' degree of mindfulness can attenuate the negative affects that can arise when Whites first become aware of racial biases, as mindfulness has been found to mitigate ego defensiveness and negative emotions when one's self-esteem is threatened. Written reactions to a White privilege article from White participants identified as holding a high and low degree of general mindfulness were subject to content analysis. The results indicated that participants with a high degree of mindfulness exhibited greater awareness and acceptance to White privilege and less negative reactions. The findings support the need to create and explore a racial mindfulness intervention.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Within the last 40 years, great strides have been made in the United States (U.S.) in relation to racial equality. Jim Crow is dead. Racial discrimination is illegal. Institutional barriers for advancement of people of color are departing. The U.S. is witnessing its first President of color. In every social sector, America appears closer to having an egalitarian society where all races have an equal opportunity to achieve the American Dream: an education, a home, a profitable career – even the presidency.

Yet, despite our progress, inequalities continue to exist between Whites and people of color. Persisting racial differences are found in social domains of education (Frankenberg, Lee, & Orfield, 2003), housing, employment (Quillian, 2006), health care (Nazroo, 2003), and income (Isaacs, 2007). Researchers have found that a substantial portion of these inequalities can be explained by past and present racial discrimination (i.e., behavior), which can be explained by existing but hidden racial prejudice (i.e., attitudes; Hanson & Hanson, 2006, Quillian, 2006).

As a result, researchers continue to explore and determine variables that can reduce racial prejudice and consequently, improve social behavior. Researchers (e.g., Devine, 2001; Dovidio & Gaertner, 1999) indicate three conditions are necessary to reduce racial attitudes. The first condition is an individual must be aware of and attentive to racial stimuli, such as hidden prejudice and existing racial discrimination. The second condition is the individual must be motivated to reduce or regulate such biases. This desire can result from the drive to reduce negative feelings that occur when an individual first becomes conscious of racial biases and experiences dissonance between these biases

and their egalitarian values or social norms (i.e., cognitive dissonance). In addition, awareness of similarities between racial ingroups and outgroups (i.e., social recategorization), attention to differentiation of racial group members (i.e., social decategorization), and empathy are other variables that prior research has found to motivate individuals to reduce racial prejudice levels. Finally, the third condition necessary for prejudice reduction is an individual, once aware and motivated, must have the cognitive resources to continue consciousness and regulation of racial biases.

For White Americans, however, these three reduction conditions may be a formidable task. First, most White Americans are unaware of hidden racial prejudice, existing discrimination, and inequalities. When (made) aware of inequalities, most Whites rationalize that these differences stem from a choice or lack of motivation from marginalized racial groups (therefore consistent with a nondiscriminatory America), rather than racial prejudice or discrimination (Henkel, Dovidio, & Gaertner, 2006). Further, when becoming aware of racial prejudice or discrimination, the negative feelings of guilt and compunction that Whites may experience can cause many to deny or debunk further that such biases exist (Quillian, 2006). For example, negative emotions arising from cognitive dissonance have been found to prevent social action and prejudice reduction (Pedersen, Walker, & Wise, 2005), as well as even increase Whites' racial prejudice levels (Branscombe, Schmitt, & Schiffhauer, 2007). Finally, even when White Americans are (made) aware of racial biases and positively overcome such initial negative emotions, the reduction in racial prejudice and discrimination are difficult to maintain. Therefore, reduction outcomes can be short-lived due to the degree of

cognitive resources required to continue consciousness and regulation of racial biases (Devine, 1989).

These limitations (i.e., Whites are often unaware of racial biases, negative outcomes can arise from Whites' awareness to racial biases, and racial prejudice reduction can be short-lived) combined with the social problem that inequalities and racial biases continue to exist, create an arduous issue for researchers and educators to tackle. Generally, scholars direct most of their efforts in exploring variables and interventions that can increase Whites' awareness and attention to racial stimuli, with the hope that such consciousness creates cognitive dissonance, recategorization or decategorization of racial group membership, or empathy, and therefore, result in a reduction of biases. Unfortunately, as mentioned above, prejudice reduction does not always occur, and when it does, reduction may not last long. A variable that might influence Whites' attention and awareness to racial biases; increase their level of acceptance to these biases (e.g., less ego-defensiveness resulting from cognitive dissonance); influence motivational variables of social recategorization, social decategorization, and empathy; and serve as a cognitive resource for continual consciousness and regulation of racial biases is the construct of mindfulness.

Mindfulness is defined as the attentiveness and awareness of internal and external stimuli with open receptivity or acceptance (Brown & Ryan, 2003). This mode of processing varies naturally across individuals, coming easier to some than others. But like most cognitive states, mindfulness may be enhanced by mental exercises, ancient and new.

Although a rather simple concept, the benefits of mindfulness are considerable. An increase in mindfulness has been found to increase connectedness with others and empathy (Miller, 1995; Shapiro, Brown, & Biegel, 2007; Shapiro, Schwartz, & Bonner, 1998), and decrease activation of subconscious ego defense mechanisms (Emavardhana & Tori, 1997). A rise in mindfulness has also been found to lead to a greater perceptivity and sensitivity to one's environment, more openness to new information, creation of new cognitive categories, and enhanced awareness to multiple perspectives (Langer 1989, 1997). Moreover, mindfulness has been found positively related to nonjudgment and self-compassion levels (Baer, Smith, Hopkins, Krietemeyer, Toney, 2006).

In relation to biases, mindfulness is suggested and found to reduce prejudgment and preconception. Thich Nhat Hanh (1975), a notable Vietnamese Zen master, suggests that mindfulness could affect an individual's perception of reality, indirectly freeing one from prejudice and stereotypes. Empirically, Langer, Bashner, and Chanowitz (1985) supported Hanh's assertion and found that teaching children mindfulness exercises reduced their erroneous and indiscriminate prejudice towards individuals with physical disabilities. In addition, Lillis and Hayes (2007) found that a racial prejudice session with mindfulness exercises significantly increased participants' intention of positive action, awareness, acknowledgement, thought control, diffusion, acceptance, and flexibility towards racial biases from pre to post and in comparison to a prejudice awareness session without such mindfulness exercises.

Therefore, mindfulness may reduce one's levels of racial prejudice indirectly by increasing levels of connectedness to others (i.e., social recategorization and decategorization) and empathy, and directly by increasing attention, awareness, and, more importantly, acceptance to racial biases. To date, only one published study has investigated mindfulness with racial prejudice (i.e., Lillis & Hayes, 2007), while a handful of scholars propose this plausible connection (Langer & Moldoveanu, 2000; Orr, 2002; Riskin, 2004; Vacarr, 2003). In this dissertation, I explain and explore how White students' degree of mindfulness can influence their degree of racial prejudice directly and indirectly through mediating variables of social recategorization and decategorization of racial group membership, and empathy. I also discuss and investigate how White students' mindfulness can decrease the negative outcomes that can arise from cognitive dissonance and increase their acceptance towards racial biases, such as with the construct of White privilege.

This study is therefore guided by the following research questions:

1. Does mindfulness influence White students' racial prejudice towards Blacks:
    a. directly by increasing awareness and attention to racial biases?
    b. indirectly through mediating variables of social recategorization and decategorization of racial group membership, and empathy?
2. When increasing White students' awareness of and attention to racial biases:
    a. does mindfulness attenuate the negative effects that can arise from cognitive dissonance?

b. does mindfulness influence acceptance towards the racial bias of White privilege?

These research questions are answered using a mixed-method research design. The first research question is empirically investigated by gathering White undergraduate students' degrees of previous racial outgroup contact, mindfulness, racial prejudice, social recategorization and decategorization of racial group membership, and empathy. Structural equation modeling is then used to explore the structural model that White students' mindfulness can influence their racial prejudice directly and indirectly through mediating variables of social recategorization and decategorization, and empathy, while controlling for previous racial outgroup contact. It is hypothesized that participants with a higher degree of mindfulness exhibit greater social recategorization and decategorization, greater empathy, and less racial prejudice.

The second research question is qualitatively explored in a second study by performing content analyses on White participants' written reactions to an article by Peggy McIntosh (1995) that describes 47 privileged circumstances she experienced as a White person. From the study's theoretical framework, it is expected that participants with a higher degree of mindfulness exhibit greater acceptance to White privilege and less negative outcomes (e.g., denial) resulting from cognitive dissonance.

The ultimate purpose of this dissertation is to begin a program of research on how to address the limitations that Whites often encounter in racial interventions and educational programs. A racial mindfulness intervention/program (e.g., mindfulness practices incorporated before, during, and after racial training) may serve as a solution.

However, explorative research is first needed. The studies within this dissertation serve as initial steps for such research by exploring the effects of participants' degree of general mindfulness on their racial prejudice levels, and evaluating White participants' reactions in relation to degree of general mindfulness from a brief, racial intervention simulation. The results will help determine the value of creating such a racial mindfulness intervention/program in the future.

Delimitations

In general within this dissertation, the term *race* refers to populations that humans have socially constructed for categorization purposes. With 94% physical variation lying within and 6% genetic variation existing between so-called racial groups, the belief that race refers to different human races of populations derived from genetic, ancestral, or physiological differences has been unsupported (American Anthropological Association, 1998). I have also deliberately chosen to focus on the current oppression experienced by people of color, although other marginalized populations in America could have been selected such as, but not limited to, women, non-Christians, the Lesbian Gay Bisexual Transgender and Queer/Questioning (LGBTQ) community, the young and the old, and people with disabilities. Discrimination and prejudice based on the social construct of race was chosen for three main reasons. First, the long history of racial discrimination and prejudice has created a strong research base to build upon, such as supported theoretical frameworks, findings from previous racial interventions, and psychometrically sound instruments. Additional motivation resulted from the current publicity and immediacy of race that has been sparked by the 2008 U.S. presidential election. Finally,

and on a personal note, identifying as a White person with family members that I identify as people of color, strikes a personal interest in such an exploration.

In particular within this dissertation, I am investigating White individuals' awareness, attention, and acceptance of racial biases towards Blacks. The choice of Whites stems from their position as an advantaged racial group, holding power, status, and privilege that can better serve a greater good by influencing social change. In addition, scholars continue to struggle with how to tackle White privilege and prejudice in America (Manglitz, Johnson-Bailey, & Cervero, 2005) and mindfulness may serve as an educational program for these concerns in the future. In relation to marginalized racial groups, a focus has been placed on Whites' prejudiced attitudes towards Blacks because of the extensive history of discrimination between and the established research based from these two groups.

Dissertation Overview

The subsequent chapters of this dissertation consist of the following. Chapter 2 begins with a brief overview of racial inequalities, followed by a detailed analysis of discrimination and racial prejudice research. Chapter 3 provides a discussion of current racial prejudice reduction models, ensued by model limitations. Next, a discussion of mindfulness is provided with a conclusion of how it may serve as a solution to limitations of current racial prejudice models. Chapter 4 presents a research design overview consisting of the two studies explored in this dissertation. Chapters 5 and 6 present the details of these studies, respectively, from methodology to discussion. Finally, chapter 7 concludes with a general discussion of findings in addition to implications and avenues

for future research.

CHAPTER 2: THE PROBLEM

> In a time of perfect calm, amid willing neighbors and streaming wealth, the social uplifting of 4,000,000 slaves to an assured and self-sustaining place in the body politic and economic would have been a herculean task; but when to the inherent difficulties of so delicate and nice a social operation were added the spite and hate of conflict…when suspicion and cruelty were rife…the work of any instrument of social regeneration was in large part foredoomed to failure.
>
> (Du Bois, 1901, pp. 359-360)

Racial Inequalities

If the prominent intellectual leader and political activist W.E.B. Du Bois was alive today, I believe he would applaud the *social uplifting* of Blacks and other marginalized groups in America over the last 40 years. However, I also think his celebration would be cut short, as these racial groups, as a whole, have yet to reach an *assured* and *self-sustaining* position in comparison to White Americans. Racial inequalities between White and marginalized racial groups continue to exist in almost every social sector. Examples of racial inequalities can be observed in domains of net income and worth, home equity and ownership, and academic success and schooling.

Net Income and Net Worth

In terms of economic differences, White families continue to earn more income and have more net worth than Black families. The median net income in 2001 of White families was roughly $55,000 but only $34,000 for Black families (see Figure 1; Kaplan & Valls, 2007). This difference has been found apparent for White compared to Black or

Latino males, even after controlling for education attainment, employment sector, human capital, and institutional differences (Sidanious & Veniegas, 2000). Many studies have also indicated that Whites have greater intergenerational and intragenerational transfer (i.e., economic mobility) than marginalized racial groups (Corcoran 1995; Hertz 2005, 2006; Isaacs 2007; Kearney, 2006; McBrier & Wilson, 2004). Economic mobility refers to the change in one's economic situation over one's lifetime (intragenerational) or from one generation to another (intergenerational). Issacs (2007) investigated economic mobility through a longitudinal study between Black and White families and found that White children live in families with much higher income, are more likely to surpass parental income, and more likely to move up the economic ladder than Black children; in fact, Black children were more likely to slide down the economic ladder in comparison to their parents.

Racial inequalities in net worth are even larger than differences in net income. As presented in Figure 1 above, White families in 2004 had a median of $118,300 and an average of $534,000 net worth, whereas Black families had a median of only $11,800 and an average of $101,400 (Wolff, 2007, as cited in Rivera, Cotto-Escalera, Anisha, Huezo, & Muhammad, 2008).



Figure 1. Net income and net worth comparisons of White and Black families.

Note: Net income figures from "Housing discrimination as a basis for Black reparations," by J. Kaplan and A.Valls, 2007, *Public Affairs Quarterly, 21*, p. 258. Net worth figures from Wolff, 2007, as cited from "*Foreclosed: State of the dream 2008*," by A. Rivera, B. Cotto-Escalera, D. Anisha, J. Huezo, and D. Muhammad, 2008, Boston, MA: United for a Fair Economy. p. 30.

Home Equity and Ownership

The consideration of home equity within net worth figures offers an explanation for the large difference in net worth between White and marginalized racial groups. Black and Latino families, on average, are far less likely to own a home than White families, and if they do own, the home is valued less and appreciates at a lower rate than the average home owned by a White family (Flippen 2004). The racial difference in home equity, and as a result, net worth, is also predicted to grow larger within the next few years due to the recent crash of the subprime (i.e., high interest) housing loan market. According to Rivera et al. (2008), people of color were one of the best candidates for these loans and are three times more likely to have subprime mortgage loans than Whites.

This finding suggests that Black and Latino families have and will continue to disproportionately suffer from a greater loss of accumulated household wealth, more foreclosures, and more spillover effects (e.g., crime, devaluation of neighborhoods) than White families.

Academic Success and Schooling

White Americans also tend to enjoy greater academic success and access to quality education than Blacks and Latinos (Sidanious, & Veniegas, 2000). Data from the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) indicated that graduating Black and Latino students have math and reading skills similar to those of White middle-school students (Education Trust, 2003a, 2003b). In addition, close to 50% of Black students and nearly 40% of Latino students attend high schools in which graduation is not the norm (Balfanz & Legters, 2004). These disparities can be explained by the differences in educational quality that is available for Whites and people of color.

Racial differences in educational quality are evident through the lack of racial integration in schools and the resulting quality of schools attended by students of color. According to the Civil Rights Project, the proportion of Black students in majority-White schools has decreased to a level lower than 1968, resulting in an emergence of virtually all minority campuses, called apartheid schools where "…enormous poverty, limited resources, and social and health problems of many types are concentrated" (Frankenberg et al., 2003, p. 5).

These apartheid schools or districts have been found to contain lower teacher quality (Peske & Haycock, 2006) and retention (Boyd, Grossman, Lankford, Loeb, & Wyckoff, 2007); less access to innovative or challenging curricula (Barth, 2003); less facility and capital improvements (Filardo, Vincent, Sung, & Stein, 2006); and receive substantially less state and local money per student in comparison to majority White schools and districts (Education Trust, 2003a). The consequence of these separate and unequal schools on marginalized individuals and community was the foundation for *Brown vs. Board of Education* (1954). Now, 55 years later, these negative effects may still exist, as Jonathon Kozol (1991), a nonfiction writer and activist, highlighted:

> Children [of color], of course, don't understand at first that they are being cheated. They come to school with a degree of faith and optimism, and they often seem to thrive during the first few years. It is sometimes not until the third grade that their teachers start to see the warning signs of failure. (p. 57)

In short, racial inequalities between Whites and people of color exist in America today. But what factors are influencing these inequalities? In the words of Du Bois (1901), inequalities are attributed to the *herculean task* of *socially uplifting* once considered lesser humans to an *assured and self-sustaining* position that is combined with current un*willing neighbors*, *spite and hate,* and *suspicion and cruelty*. That is, racial inequalities are attributed to past and current effects of racial discrimination and prejudice. Over a hundred years later, and despite forty years of improvement, research findings may continue to support Du Bois's claim.

Before we move to these findings, it is important to note that most White Americans refute that racial discrimination and prejudice are attributing to racial inequalities between Whites and people of color. Instead national surveys suggest that most Whites attribute a lack of meritocracy or motivation of members of marginalized racial groups as the main factor influencing their current inequalities (e.g., "If they [people of color] only worked harder;" Schuman, Steeh, Bobo, & Krysan, 1997). Later in this dissertation, however, we will soon see that this claim is itself a racial prejudiced belief.

Racial Discrimination

I argue in this section that past and modern racial discrimination substantially influences the racial inequalities existing today between Whites and people of color. Racial discrimination is defined here as the differential treatment on the basis of race or inadequately justified factors other than race that disadvantages a racial group (Blank, Dabady, & Citro, 2004). This section presents only a sample of illustrations to show how discriminatory behavior can affect racial inequalities today.

Past Discrimination

The U.S. clearly has had a troubled history of racial discrimination – if this term can even be used to reference the inhumane treatment many marginalized racial groups experienced. By the nineteenth century, the belief in Manifest Destiny[1] and social

[1] A term originating in the 19th century to justify the United States's westward expansion. Manifest Destiny implied that it was divine destiny to spread democracy by colonizing land inhabited by indigenous people in North America and expanding the United States into Mexican territory.

Darwinism (as well as supporting but falsified scientific evidence – see Gould, 1996), allowed the White race to justify the systematic dislocation, segregation, annihilation, or impoverishment of millions of marginalized races, such as Native Americans (Wilson, 1998), African Americans (Franklin & Moss, 2000), and Mexican Americans (Acuña, 2007).

By the twentieth century, a variety of people, events, experiences, and struggles led to a cognitive shift of Americans' dominant beliefs towards racial superiority and justification for discrimination. Ironically, one person we could attribute for this transformation is Adolf Hitler. The onset of World War II and Hitler's "…reliance on nature-based schemas of racial superiority and inferiority prompted Americans to view those schemas as illegitimate covers for hate-based injustice – a theme that was reinforced by the civil rights movements of the 1960s and 1970s" (Hanson & Hanson, 2006, p. 442). To illustrate, how could White Americans at the time explain the discriminatory treatment happening on their own soil while concurrently shun the injustice occurring halfway across the world? To deal with this contradiction, Americans began to distance themselves from notions of racial superiority and outright forms of discrimination. Yet, turning off this behavior was not as simple as turning off a switch. Discrimination continued, just not as obvious. It became institutionalized (Bonilla-Silva, 2001).

Examples of subtle or institutional discrimination are evident throughout our American history. One classic illustration was the discrimination practices within housing loan programs created around the New Deal era, such as the Federal Housing Authority

(FHA loans) and the Veteran Administration (VA loans). These loan programs greatly influenced decades of rapid home equity growth for Whites, leading to a significant source of wealth accumulation (Kaplan & Valls, 2007). However, these programs substantially discriminated against people of color. More than 98% of the $120 billion in home loans issued between 1934 and 1962 went to White homebuyers (California Newsreel, 2003) due to a variety of subtle racial discrimination practices within the FHA and VA loan systems, such as indicating Black or mixed neighborhoods were uninsurable and promoting the use of racial covenants (Jackson 1985; Kaplan & Valls, 2007; Katznelson 2005).

Housing discrimination from loan institutions or even realtors (e.g., steering; Charles, 2003), restricted most people of color to live in urban cities, while the majority of Whites moved to suburban areas. The effects of this move (often referenced as White flight) influenced many urban businesses to transfer to suburbia as well, which greatly reduced employment prospects for people of color. In addition, White flight helped establish the Federal Highway Act that connected suburbs to cities, while at the same time, destroyed and further depreciated predominantly minority, low-income housing (Kaplan & Valls, 2007). In any area with poverty and limited employment, other social ills have been known to follow, such as crime and demoralization – both of which further perpetuated the rippling effect of racial discrimination for people of color (Wilson, 1996). As a result, this residential segregation has been referred to as the *linchpin* of racial inequalities; as Taylor (2000) described, "segregated… neighborhoods, themselves the products of discrimination, are likely to produce other forms of discrimination:

underfunded, segregated schools…inferior public services, businesses, and recreational facilities…(and) concentrations of poverty" (p. 72).

Past racial discrimination not only blatantly oppressed people of color but also subtly denied them access to opportunities for wealth accumulation. Whites, on the other hand, were silently privileged with such opportunities of higher wages, access to home and business loans, higher quality schools, access to and tuition for college, closer employment opportunities or the ability to purchase a car to reach employment, and many other advantages, just from being White (Shapiro, 2005). In short, "American laws, policies, practices, customs, and expectations quietly and situationally combined in the last century to maintain, and even expand, the longstanding gap between Whites and [people of color]" (Kaplan & Valls, 2007, p. 450).

Current Discrimination

Although past discrimination from inhumane to subtle treatment can be argued to influence racial inequalities today, current subtle discrimination contributes to these differences as well. Measurement of current discrimination, however, is extremely challenging, as well as controversial, raising some difficult questions for researchers. How can one measure such practices in this egalitarian era when discrimination is illegal and often hidden or denied? How can discrimination be disentangled from other differences across racial groups, arising from culture or past discrimination practices, such as family size and stability, parenting style, education quality and importance, stereotype threat (Steele & Aronson, 1995), motivation, or career opportunities?

Researchers measuring current discrimination use a variety of approaches to address the following counterfactual: Would the observed outcome for an individual or group be different had the individual or group been of a different race? Although a multimethod approach is recommended, audit studies provide the best singular approach to addressing this counterfactual, inferring that an adverse outcome is likely the result of racial discrimination (Blank et al., 2004). Generally, a (racial) field audit study consists of quasi-experimental methodology that explores the difference in a situational outcome (e.g., applying for a job) from paired testers with similar and matched characteristics known to influence the outcome variable, such as same educational experience, but who differ on a variable of interest (race).

Most (racial) field audit studies have been employed to investigate the presence and effect of discrimination on housing and employment outcomes. These outcomes seem appropriate given that residential segregation is referred to as the lynchpin of racial inequalities and employment opportunities are assumed to provide "a way out" through upward economic mobility. The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) has conducted three of the largest audit studies in 1977 (Wienk, Reid, Herbig, & Lee, 1979, as cited in Quillian, 2006), 1989 (Yinger, 1993), and 2000 (Turner, Ross, Galster, & Yinger, 2002) to explore national housing discrimination for Black, Hispanic, and Asian racial groups in comparison to White counterparts.

In the 2000 study (Turner et al., 2002), pairs of auditors were recruited that consisted of a White and a person of color who were matched on gender and age, and assigned similar socioeconomic characteristics, such as marital status, family size, and income. These paired auditors were also given training on how to behave in front of a randomly selected agent in order to be as identical as possible except for race. Turner et al. explored four discriminatory practices (variables) in rental and sales markets for each matched pair, and investigated a fifth practice for sales markets only: 1) whether the auditor is told the unit is available and told of other units (availability), 2) whether the auditor can look at the unit (inspection), 3) cost of the unit (cost), 4) the extent of encouragement to rent the unit by the realtor (encouragement), and for sales markets, 5) whether the auditor is steered towards neighborhoods that match the auditor's race (racial steering).

The results of the study indicate that Whites were significantly favored in terms of availability and inspection compared to Black or Hispanic counterparts in rental markets. In sale markets, Whites were significantly favored in all practices compared to Blacks, cost and steering in comparison to Hispanics, and all practices except racial steering in comparison to Asians. This national study indicates that marginalized racial groups in the 21st century continue to face significant levels of housing discrimination.

In terms of employment, recent audit studies indicate similar conclusions (Bendick, Jackson, Reinoso, 1994; Pager, 2003). Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) conducted one of the largest employment field tests by investigating callback rates to 4,890 resumes sent to over 1,300 job postings in Chicago and Boston newspapers. In this

study, the researchers used actual resumes, stripped them of identification information, duplicated each resume, and categorized the pair (resume and corresponding copy) into a high or low qualified resume group. Following, two resumes from each group were assigned to a job posting and were randomly given stereotypical White-sounding names (e.g., Greg Smith) and stereotypical Black-sounding names (e.g., Jamal Williams). The results from over 1,300 job postings indicated that resumes with White-sounding names received twice as many callbacks than the same resumes with Black-sounding names. Further, the findings showed that low-quality resumes with White-sounding names received a higher callback rate (10%) than high-quality resumes with Black-sounding surnames (7.7%). All results were found statistically significant.

Sidanius and Pratto (1999) summarized more than 19 major employment audits in five different nations (U.S.A., Germany, England, Canada, and Holland). Regardless of the nation and with only a few exceptions, the results indicated a similar finding: a statistically significant level of employment discrimination against marginalized racial groups. In addition, these studies also indicated that discrimination occurred at all stages of the employment process for marginalized racial groups, such as fewer opportunities to interview, a lower starting salary, and less likely to be directed towards jobs with greater monetary or career advancement (e.g., managerial positions).

Results from these housing and employment audit tests, provides a sample of evidence that racial discrimination continues to permeate our egalitarian-valued society. This finding, coupled with the legacy effects of past inhumane and subtle discriminatory treatment, presents a case that racial discrimination has created and continues to create

societal and individual advantages for White Americans, and disadvantages for everyone else. The general catalyst for such racial discrimination is racial biases that exist within people's heads, that is, racial prejudice, which is the next area of discussion.

Racial Prejudice

Racial prejudice is defined as a favorable attitude towards one's racial ingroup that can result in a range of attitudes towards racial outgroups (Allport, 1954; Brewer, 1999; Fiske, 2005). In addition, this favorable, racial attitude can consist of an emotion, a cognition (e.g., stereotype), or a combination of the two (Henkel et al., 2006). As a result, the range of attitudes towards racial outgroups can vary from feelings of indifference to hostility, and lack of attributing positive stereotypes to endorsement of dehumanizing beliefs. This in-group love, whether it leads to out-group hate or not, is believed to be the primary force behind discriminatory behavior (Quillian, 2006).

Origins of Racial Prejudice

Prejudice is believed to develop from a variety of factors. Generally, racial attitudes are suggested to arise from normative cognitive processes, which are then promoted by motivational, psychodynamic, and sociocultural factors. The following section focuses on the discussion and interplay between cognitive and motivational processes – a general combination for study in prejudice research.

Cognitive Processes

At its root, prejudice is believed to result from the normative and necessary cognitive processes of categorization that enable humans to simplify and comprehend a complex and stimulating world. As Gordon Allport once indicated, "The human mind

must think with the aid of categories…Once formed, categories are the basis for normal prejudgment. We cannot possibly avoid this process. Orderly living depends on it" (1954, p. 19).

Numerous theories from the information processing and constructivism literature provide detailed frameworks and explanations for this normative categorization process. Following are similar aspects across these theories.

The first shared assumption is that the human mind is limited in capacity. Depending on the specific theory, this limitation can occur at various points of processing (e.g., selection or attention, Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968; perception, Kohler, 1959; temporal storage and manipulation, Miller, 1956; or organization, recall, and interpretation, Anderson, 1984). A second shared postulation is that the human mind develops and activates processes (e.g., selective attention, Gestalt effect, chunking, schemata) that are based on stimuli categorization in order to compensate for limited processing capabilities. A third premise is that this categorization process often becomes automatic, again to free our limited cognitive capacity (Baumeister & Sommer, 1997); as a result, the effect of automatic category activation can influence behavior without one's intention or awareness (e.g., Devine, 1989). In fact, "…most of a person's everyday life is determined not by their conscious intentions and deliberate choices but by mental processes….that operate outside of conscious awareness and guidance" (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999, p. 462). A fourth assumption is that once categories (i.e., schemata, templates, stereotypes) are formed, new external information is quickly assimilated (or accreted) and accommodated (or tuned) to preexisting categories, allowing for effective

cognitive development and efficient thought processing (e.g., Rumbelhart & Norman, 1978). A final aspect across theories is that humans strive to remain in a state of category equilibrium (e.g., Piaget, 1985). Therefore, external stimuli that contradict, or cannot be assimilated or accommodated into one's internal mental structures, are either created into new structures or often unseen, ignored, or rejected.

On the surface, these normative, efficient, and often automatic categorization processes enable humans to function and to identify stimuli quickly in an over-stimulated, fast-paced world. However, as with any benefit, there are tradeoffs. At the price of functionality and stimuli identification is the cost of increased inaccuracy in perceptions, judgments, and memories; as well as increased overgeneralizations (Yzebyt & Corneille, 2005). Also, categorizations can become inflexible and undifferentiated due to a lack of critical analysis, unless tied to one's self-interest. As Allport (1954) indicated, "While most of us have learned to be critical and open-minded in certain regions of experience…life is just too short to have differentiated concepts about everything" (p. 173). Finally, the automatization of category activation can make de-automatization of activation generally difficult when one's self-interest changes.

Cognitive categorization processes lead to social categorization of individuals into groups. Broadly, individuals begin to categorize themselves with individuals who are similar (ingroups) from individuals who are different (outgroups; Allport, 1954). Due to the limitations of categorization processing, a variety of negative social outcomes can arise from this grouping process, such as an overestimation of the homogeneity, consistency, and durability of group categories (Yzebyt & Corneille, 2005). As a result,

when an outgroup member is associated with a negative trait, aptitude, or behavior; these outcomes could be attributed to an inherent dispositional feature of the entire group simply because they are all alike. Combine this category-based assumption with a process that is automatic, often subconscious, and generally inaccurate; and the result is a potential insidious component of prejudice. But this is only the beginning.

Motivational Processes

With social categorization intact, motivational processes begin to influence favoritism of the ingroup over the outgroup. One motivational process influencing such ingroup favoritism is the theoretical assumption that a person's social identity is derived from memberships in social groups (e.g., Social Identity Theory, Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Self-Categorization Theory, Turner, 1985). Just as people are likely to believe and support good things about themselves (i.e., hold a positive self-identity or boost their self-esteem), they are likely to believe and support good things about their identified groups (i.e., hold a positive social identity; Tajfel, 1978). This need for holding a positive view of one's own group causes people to enhance views of their ingroup while, at times, derogating outgroups (e.g., ethnocentrism). In fact, numerous studies have found that intergroup biases can result from participants categorizing themselves into groups based on the most minimal and arbitrary factors – a phenomenon referred to as the minimal group paradigm (for review, see Brewer & Brown, 1998).

A second motivational process promoting intergroup biases is the perception of threats, conflict, or competition between ingroups and outgroups. At the core of various theories and models explaining different aspects of this process (e.g., Realistic Group

Conflict, LeVine & Campbell, 1972; Integrated Threat Theory of Prejudice, Stephan & Stephan, 2000; Social Dominance Theory, Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; System Justification Theory, Jost & Banaji, 1994; and Instrumental Model of Group Conflict, Esses, Jackson, & Armstrong, 1998) lies the central assumption that ingroups will be favored and outgroups, at times, will be discriminated against due to the perception of threat, conflict, or competition (Esses, Jackson, Dovidio, & Hodson, 2005). The classic Robbers Cave experiment can exemplify this process.

In a series of studies beginning in 1949, Sherif and colleagues assigned children to two groups and brought them to a campsite (Robbers Cave State Park in Oklahoma). The groups were first kept isolated from one another. After a handful of days, and as the students began to become more aware of the other group's presence, the researchers initiated competition activities between the groups. These activities lasted a couple of days, and for the remaining days, the researchers created a number of superordinate scenarios that affected both groups, such as the camp's drinking water supply running dry. The researchers found that competition between groups produced intergroup biases and discrimination, whereas cooperation and interdependence reduced such attitudes and behaviors (Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1988).

In summary, normative cognitive processes energized by motivational processes, such as favoring one's collective identity and perceiving group conflict or competition, may give rise to not only ingroup love, but also outgroup hate (Brewer, 1999). These processes are not only the cause and influence of racial prejudice, but also the unequal or discriminatory treatment towards racial outgroups.

Forms and Measurement of Racial Prejudice

Most people think of racial prejudice in its most obvious and blatant form. Within psychology, prejudice is seen as much more complex and multifaceted. From changing social norms and legislature acts in the last 40 years, researchers have found that blatant expressions of racial attitudes have evolved to more subtle forms of expression. In addition, due to recent advances in attitude measurement, psychologists have determined people can hold racial attitudes not only at the conscious level, but also at the subconscious level.

These modern forms of prejudice can lead to discrimination as detrimental as the more overt prejudice form. One example is the onset of racial microaggressions, referred to as "…subtle, stunning, often automatic, and non-verbal exchanges, which are 'put downs'" (Pierce, Carew, Pierce-Gonzalez, & Willis, 1978, p. 66). Examples of racial microaggressions include: failing to include classroom curriculum for people of color (further influencing invisibility), telling a person of color, "you are so articulate" (suggesting that this is unusual), asking an Asian-American, "where were you born" (suggesting that he or she is not American), stating "I'm not racist; I have several Black friends" (indicating immunity to racism and solutions), asking a Black person "why do you have to be so loud/animated" or to an Asian person "why are you so quiet?" (suggesting assimilation to the dominant [White] culture), or steering a family of color to a lower socioeconomic neighborhood to purchase a house (suggesting that they are not affluent; Sue et al., 2007). Ironically, racial microaggressions have been found to significantly increase more racial anger and frustration, and lower performance, and self-

esteem within people of color than more overt forms of discrimination (Solórzano, Ceja, & Yosso, 2000).

The consequences of modern racial prejudice are substantial. Further, the invisible nature of these prejudice forms, and their consequents such as microaggressions, prevent people from realizing, tackling, and regulating their attitudes and behavior, as well as their role in racial inequality. The next section provides a brief review of these findings with an emphasis on subtle conscious and subconscious forms of racial prejudice.

Blatant Conscious Prejudice

Before the Civil Rights era, racial prejudice was openly expressed and discrimination was legally supported (e.g., de jure school segregation; anti-miscegenation laws; see Klarman, 2004). Researchers have referred to this openly expressed and conscious form of prejudice as *blatant* (Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995), *old-fashioned*, or even *red-neck racism* (McConahay, 1986). To measure blatant prejudice, researchers asked direct survey questions about the biological inferiority or treatment of marginalized racial groups. For example, in 1942 and 1945, the National Opinion Research Center (as cited in Schuman et al., 1997) found that 53% of Whites agreed that their race was intellectually superior to Blacks and 55% of Whites agreed that Whites should obtain the first chance at a job opportunity over Blacks.

Near the end of the Civil Rights movement, legal discrimination was no longer espoused and normative pressures to be nonprejudiced gradually increased (Dunton & Fazio, 1997). These normative and legislature pressures led to a decline in blatant

prejudice on survey questionnaires (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1998). By the mid-1990s, a survey exploring Whites' support for equal treatment regardless of race received nearly unanimous support. As a result, researchers who first analyzed racial attitude surveys suggested that racial prejudice is on the decline to nonexistence in the U.S. (e.g., see Schuman et al., 1997, chapter 6).

However, current large racial inequalities and evidence of racial discrimination suggest that racial prejudice is persisting in our society (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2005; Quillian, 2006). Therefore, many theorists have argued that racial prejudice has not radically decreased but rather transformed in expression, and with consequences as detrimental as blatant prejudice (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Sears, 1988).

Subtle Conscious Prejudice

This evolved racial prejudice has been theorized and coined various names (see Table 1, first three columns). Despite the variation, there are three overlapping components across these theories. First, most Americans today possess normative racial attitudes and hold (or at least follow) egalitarian values. A second overlapping theme is that most Americans may not express these racial attitudes and behaviors blatantly due to current legislation and egalitarian social norms, aside from a small share of traditional racists. Finally, and as a result, most Americans will generally express their prejudice indirectly or subtly as when racial beliefs or behavior can be justified on some other factor than race.

Table 1
Subtle Conscious Racial Prejudice Theories

Name	Primary citation	Brief description	Set
Modern racism	McConahay (1986)	Reject blatant prejudice but view marginalized racial groups as receiving unfair, preferential treatment.	First set
Racial resentment	Kinder and Sanders (1996)	View marginalized racial groups as not trying hard enough to overcome difficulties they face and taking what they have not earned; Prejudice is expressed in the language of American individualism.	
Subtle prejudice	Pettigrew and Meertens (1995)	Antipathy towards an out-group expressed by defending one's in-group values, exaggerating out-group differences, and denying positive emotional responses towards out-group members.	
Symbolic racism	Sears (1988)	Reject blatant prejudice but express prejudice indirectly by opposing policies that could help marginalized racial groups because it runs against learned morals and values. Similar to modern racism.	
Ambivalent racism	Katz and Hass (1988)	Experience a conflict between positive and negative emotions towards marginalized racial groups.	Second set
Aversive racism	Gaertner and Dovidio (1986)	Believe in egalitarianism but have a personal aversion towards marginalized racial groups.	

Note: From "The Symbolic Racism 2000 Scale," by P. J. Henry and D. O. Sears, 2002, *Political Psychology*, *23*, pp. 253-283.

Subtle racial prejudice theories can be categorized into two different sets (Table 1, last column). The first set includes symbolic racism, modern racism, racial resentment, and subtle prejudice theories. These theories conceptualize prejudice each a little differently but with the shared assumption that: Whites harbor negative feelings or stereotypes towards marginalized racial groups, they express this prejudice indirectly or secretly by opposing public or social policies for preferential treatment, and justify their negative attitudes are due to marginalized racial groups (or public policies developed for these groups) violating or will possibly violate traditional American values (Henry &

Sears, 2002). For example, Whites may view affirmative action programs as unwarranted or preposterous because they violate direct American values of meritocracy or equal opportunity. They may view these programs as unfair impositions to the just and fair society of America and may question, "Why should they [marginalized racial groups] get special treatment?"

The major consequence of these theories is that subtle racial attitudes may influence Whites to discriminate and block public policies that could improve racial inequality and discrimination. Many researchers have found this set of theories helps explain why Whites oppose affirmative action, welfare spending, tax-reduction policies (Kinder & Sanders, 1996; Sears, 1988), why Whites oppose race-targeted government polices more than policies for the poor (Bobo & Kluegel, 1993) and why Black candidates for political office become so controversial (Kinder & Sears, 1981).

The second set of subtle racial prejudice theories, aversive and ambivalent racism, share some of the same features as the first set, but involve more mixed emotions and are more common attitudes of liberal and educated Whites. Sociologists Gaertner and Dovidio (1986) described their aversive racism as the following. Whites will tend to suppress or avoid expressing their racial biases because of their egalitarian self-image. Consequently, they will tend to experience anxiety and discomfort during interracial situations and try to avoid these situations or at least from "appearing racist." These individuals will regularly engage in forms of aversion and manifest their feelings in subtle, rationalized ways (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1999).

The description for the theory of ambivalent racism is somewhat similar to aversive racism. Katz and Hass (1988) suggested that Whites have both pro-Black feelings rooted in egalitarianism and sympathy, and anti-Black feelings due to dissonance with American (i.e., White) values. Both positive and negative feelings towards Blacks exist simultaneously within individuals, can create tension and discomfort, and can help explain the ambivalence for individuals endorsing egalitarian values but failing to support racial equality programs. For instance, in situations or contexts emphasizing egalitarianism, ambivalent racists would be positive toward Blacks viewing them as victims of discrimination or the "underdog" (e.g., "Yes, there should be more college scholarships for Blacks"). However, in situations that run against American values such as independence or self-reliance (or that create disadvantages for Whites because American values may actually represent White values; Devos & Banaji, 2005) ambivalent racists might be negative toward Blacks (e.g., "But this should not come as an expense to other students [meaning White students]").

Consequences of this aversive/ambivalent prejudice are similar to the first set of subtle racial theories—they can lead to resisting public policies designed to increase racial equality (Katz & Hass, 1988). In addition, researchers have found that ambivalent/aversive racism could motivate many forms of modern discrimination and prevent intergroup contact or integration. One classic example by Gaertner and Dovidio (1977) investigated how many times White participants suggested they would help either a White or a Black victim in two different scenarios: where the White participant was the only witness, or where the White participant was part of a group of White witnesses. The

researchers found that White participants would help both victims regardless of race when they were the only witness. However, when the White participant was part of a group of witnesses, the researchers found that White participants helped Black victims 38% of the time and White victims 75% of the time. Gaertner and Dovidio speculated that these White participants in this study rationalized a reason not to help based on some other factor than race (i.e., “There are other witnesses that can help”). These researchers have also found more recent and similar results with experiments investigating hiring and criminal justice decisions (for a review see Gaertner & Dovidio, 2005). Aversive racism has also been posited as some of the reasoning behind the controversy of the delayed response and racial accusations during the Hurricane Katrina aftermath (Henkel et al., 2006).

Generally, both sets of subtle racial prejudice theories are measured by subtle self-report scales. For example, the Subtle Prejudice Scale (Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995) is composed of three sub-scales: "defense of traditional values" (e.g., a target group violates one’s in-group values), "exaggeration of cultural differences" (e.g., belief dissimilarity triggered by stereotypes), and "denial of positive emotions" (e.g., Latinos are not lazy, but they are not ambitious either; pp. 59-60). Another example is the Symbolic Racism Scale (Henry & Sears, 2002) that is composed of four specific components: Blacks fail to progress due to their unwillingness to work hard, Blacks are demanding too much, denial that racial discrimination currently exists, and the sense that Blacks have received more than they deserve.

Subconscious Prejudice

Mainly in the 1990's, new advances in attitude measurement enabled cognitive psychologists to find a different expression of attitudes toward marginalized racial groups: subconscious (implicit) racial prejudice. From laboratory techniques focusing on behavior responses such as response latency procedures or priming tasks, psychologists found that conscious attitudes are only partly responsible for discriminatory behavior. Racial prejudice can operate or be expressed subconsciously—without conscious intent or awareness—and greatly influence judgment and action, even for individuals who renounce or score low on subtle prejudice measures (e.g., Devine, 1989, 2001; Dovidio, Kawakami, Johnson, Johnson, & Howard, 1997; Fazio & Olson, 2003).

The central tenet within subconscious prejudice research is that all individuals internalize or develop racial stereotypes, feelings, or evaluations of out-groups and these associations can be automatically activated without conscious awareness or control by the mere presence (actual or symbolic) of an external stimulus (e.g., a marginalized racial group member; Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995; Wittenbrink, Judd & Park, 1997). For example, an encounter with an African-American may trigger subconscious feelings, evaluations, or stereotypes in the same way an encounter with a pitbull may trigger a set of implicit associations.

Patricia Devine (1989) was one of the first researchers to investigate the consequences of subconscious racial prejudice, particularly subconscious stereotypes. To measure subconscious attitudes, Devine used a priming method that subliminally primed subjects by being quickly shown a word or image before beginning a task. Devine found

that subjects who were primed stereotypical words related to Blacks interpreted a hostile vignette much more aggressive than subjects primed with nonracial terms, even those subjects who scored low on subtle conscious prejudice measures. Other studies—using various subconscious laboratory techniques—have also shown discriminatory behavior effects of subconscious prejudice.

To list a couple, Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz (1998) measured subconscious racial attitudes using the computerized Implicit Association Test (IAT). The IAT measures a person's latency response time (association) between a discrimination of a target-concept, discrimination of an attribute dimension, the discrimination of the two tasks combined, and then the discrimination of the two tasks combined in reverse. In their study, the initial discrimination was to distinguish common White first names with Black first names, the attribute dimension was to distinguish pleasant versus unpleasant words, and then the combination and reverse combination of the two (e.g., White names with pleasant words and Black names with unpleasant words, and then White names with unpleasant words and Black names with pleasant words). The researchers found that almost all of the 26 White subjects were faster at matching pleasant words with their own race and Blacks with unpleasant words rather than the reverse order.

Correll, Park, Judd, & Wittenbrink (2002) also measured subconscious prejudice using latency response time but with a video shooting game that they developed. The game showed 10 Black and 10 White target images appearing in the game four times, twice as a target with a gun, and twice as a target without a gun. In the first study, 40

undergraduate (39 White, 1 Latino) students were told to decide to shoot a person holding a gun (by hitting a key on the keyboard) and not to shoot the person without a gun (hitting another keyboard key). The researchers found that participants, on average, decided to shoot Blacks who were armed more quickly than armed Whites, and decided not to shoot unarmed Whites more quickly than unarmed Blacks; the differences were statistically significant. In the second study, the researchers explored the error rates (accidentally shooting an unarmed target or not shooting an unarmed target) with 44 undergraduates (42 White, 1 Latino, 1 Asian). The results indicated that participants, on average, significantly and mistakenly decided to shoot an unarmed target more often if he was Black, and decided not to shoot an armed target more often if he was White.

From these results and numerous other studies, there are some basic postulations regarding subconscious racial prejudice. First, subconscious prejudice appears, at times, to be different than conscious racial attitudes. Fazio and Olson (2003) found that most studies investigating the relation between these two attitudes find low and insignificant correlations, particularly with subconscious and subtle conscious racial prejudice. A second finding is that subconscious prejudice appears to be nearly universal within individuals (Devine, 1989; Greenwald et al., 1998). For example, Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald (2002) found that 70 to 90% of 200,000 Whites sampled (recruited from the media and assessed through the IAT website) were found to have subconscious prejudice via the IAT towards Blacks. Third, subconscious prejudice can manifest into discriminatory behavior, especially if not controlled or monitored.

For instance, in Devine's 1989 study, the researcher found, on average, that both high level and low level subtle conscious prejudiced individuals (as measured by the Modern Racism Scale) held subconscious racial stereotypes of Blacks. However, only those with low subtle conscious prejudice were able to control and block these subconscious stereotypes from manifesting into discrimination. That is, when asked to list as many alternate labels for, and all of their thoughts in reference to, "Black Americans," low subtle conscious prejudiced individuals listed similar negative labels of Black Americans as high subtle prejudiced individuals. (This result confirms Devine's previous finding that both high and low subtle conscious prejudice individuals, on average, hold subconscious racial stereotypes.) On the other hand, with writing their thoughts about Blacks, low subtle conscious prejudice individuals listed more positive than negative thoughts and this was significantly different than high subtle conscious prejudiced individuals who listed more negative than positive thoughts. Therefore, Devine concluded that subconscious prejudice can lead to discrimination, but if a person has the motivation or desire (low subtle conscious prejudice), and the cognitive attention and ability to control these automatic thoughts, this could substantially decrease subconscious stereotypes from manifesting into behavior. However, she noted that having the attention and ability to control these automatic thoughts can be a very tedious, difficult, and cognitively taxing process.

For example, Correll and colleagues (2002) found in their videogame shooting experiment that subtle prejudice scores (as measured by the Modern Racism Scale) were not significantly related to participants' shooter bias, because, they reasoned, high and

low subtle prejudiced individuals had to make decisions under pressure. Therefore, low prejudiced individuals (although they had the motivation and desire) did not have the opportunity (like in Devine's study) to control their subconscious prejudice from manifesting into discrimination.

Dovidio, Kawakami, and Gaertner (2000) found that even when individuals have the desire to monitor and control these automatic attitudes (i.e., have low levels of subtle conscious prejudice) and the opportunity (e.g., after White students took a subconscious racial prejudice measure, these individuals participated in an interracial conversation with a Black confederate), subconscious prejudice still leaked out in more subtle behaviors, such as abnormal eye contact and body language (as observed by the confederates and triangulated by outside coders via taped videos of the conversations). These researchers implied that this could explain why intergroup situations are often awkward and uncomfortable for both parties.

Therefore, subconscious prejudice can lead to discrimination when individuals are unmotivated to control these attitudes (i.e., have higher levels of subtle conscious prejudice) or when decisions are made under pressure (i.e., when individuals are essentially not monitoring or controlling their automatic associations). Subconscious attitudes can also manifest in nonverbal discriminatory behavior even when the above criteria is met.

In summary, although blatant expressions of prejudice have declined within the last 40 years, racial discrimination continues to exist. To help explain this phenomenon, researchers have developed various theories suggesting that prejudice is now more

subtlety expressed, and that most Americans hold racial attitudes at the subconscious level that can influence behavior subconsciously. As a result from these attitudes, Whites may deny the existence of racial discrimination, rarely support government programs for racial equality, and attribute racial inequality or discrimination—when recognized—to factors other than race such as Latinos or Blacks not working hard enough (Quillian, 2006). In addition, Whites may also endorse cultural stereotypes, develop some negative feelings toward other groups (e.g., fear, disgust, discomfort), avoid intergroup contact, and cultivate more positive feelings of their own group (Henkel et al., 2006). Therefore, it appears that although current racial attitudes are less obvious, the consequences are still visible.

Chapter Summary

The social uplifting of people of color to an assured and self-sustaining position in comparison to White Americans has yet to be achieved. Evidence presented in this chapter indicates that past and current racial discrimination continues to influence these inequalities. Due to the rise in egalitarian beliefs and social norms within the last century, racial discrimination and prejudice has not decreased but rather altered to a subtler form. In addition, research has found that prejudice exists at the subconscious level, with consequences just as devastating as the effects of conscious attitudes. Because racial prejudice is believed to be the primary force behind discriminatory behavior, targeting variables that reduce these subtle and subconscious attitudes may provide the best hope for an instrument of social regeneration – a challenging task explored in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 3: THE SOLUTION

As a result of the persistence and consequences of racial prejudice, research has identified many psychological and intergroup processes that can improve racial attitudes, and therefore, discrimination. Recent models of prejudice reduction (e.g., Amodio & Devine, 2005; Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2001; Devine, Plant, Amodio, Harmon-Jones, & Vance, 2002; Dovidio & Gaertner, 1999) indicate that three general conditions are needed to improve racial attitudes. The first condition is an individual must be conscious of racial biases. Once conscious, the second condition is the individual must become motivated to change or regulate such biases. This desire can result from a variety of processes, such as resolving the cognitive dissonance one may experience between egalitarian values and racial biases, extending or reducing the benefits of social ingroup favoritism, or experiencing empathy. The last condition needed to reduce racial prejudice and discrimination is the individual must have cognitive regulatory strategies to continue consciousness and regulation of racial biases.

Conditions for Racial Prejudice Reduction

Racial Consciousness

For definitional purposes, consciousness refers to one's attention and awareness to thoughts, motives, emotions, as well as external stimuli. Awareness, in this context, refers to the background of consciousness, consisting of monitoring internal and external stimuli; attention is described as the process of focusing one's awareness, providing heightened sensitivity to limited stimuli for varying lengths of time (Brown & Ryan, 2003). Racial consciousness, therefore, is described as one's awareness and attention

specifically focused towards internal racial stimuli (e.g., racial prejudice – Rowe, Bennett, & Atkinson, 1994) or racial external stimuli (e.g., racial group members or discrimination – Banton, 1997).

An individual's racial consciousness can be influenced indirectly or directly. One indirect medium is contact with racial outgroup members. Racial intergroup contact has been found to increase awareness and attention to racial stimuli, which then influences mediating variables of racial prejudice reduction (discussed shortly), such as empathy and social categorization of racial groups, and finally, as a result, reduces racial prejudice levels (see review by Dovidio, Gaertner, & Kawakami, 2003). For example, Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) meta-analyzed over 713 research samples and found that in 94% of the studies reviewed, intergroup contact was associated with lower levels of racial prejudice[2].

Moreover, racial consciousness can be influenced through direct media such as participation in racial intervention programs like multicultural education, intergroup dialogue, or antiracism training. Regardless of the medium, an increase in racial awareness and attention can influence a decrease in racial attitudes and therefore, less discriminatory behavior with racial outgroups. This effect of racial consciousness on racial prejudice can be explained by a variety of mediating, motivational variables, three of which are cognitive dissonance, social re(de)categorization, and empathy.

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[2] In this meta-analysis, effect sizes were greater for studies that structured intergroup contact under Gordon Allport's (1954) optimal conditions: equal status between groups, common goals, intergroup cooperation, and the support of authorities. However, it should be noted that Pettigrew and Tropp found that these conditions were not essential (i.e., seventy-five percent out of the 670 studies found effective in reducing racial prejudice were not structured in line with Allport's conditions, although effect sizes were smaller as well).

Motivation Variables

Cognitive Dissonance

An increase in awareness and attention to external and internal racial biases can reduce conscious and subconscious racial prejudice, as well as promote favorable treatment towards racial outgroups by increasing one's cognitive dissonance. Because most Americans today endorse or follow egalitarian values, raising awareness of and attention to conscious racial biases can create cognitive dissonance within an individual. When one becomes aware of this inconsistency, it can arouse many negative feelings such as guilt or shame, which in turn "…motivate[s] the development of more favorable racial attitudes and produce more favorable intergroup behaviors (even nonverbal behaviors) several months later" (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1999, p. 102). As a result, this dissonance can influence people to inhibit or reprocess their own negative attitudes (Pedersen et al., 2005), as well as promote positive behavior towards racial outgroups.

An increase in cognitive dissonance can even reduce one's subconscious racial attitudes. The negative emotions that arise from becoming conscious of automatic stereotypical behaviors can motivate individuals who hold egalitarian values, or at least adhere to egalitarian social norms, to consciously inhibit negative responses, and with practice, can eventually eliminate negative stereotype activation (Devine & Monteith, 1993). For example, when low-prejudice individuals become aware of their failure to control subconscious prejudice, the dissonance they experience will create control cues for future situations; these cues can then influence individuals to carefully consider and prevent future automatic prejudices and behavior from manifesting (Monteith, Ashburn-

Nardo, Voils, & Czopp, 2002). However, Devine (1989) noted that awareness of and attention to racial biases to continually create cognitive dissonance, as well as consciously inhibiting prejudice once conscious, is difficult to carry through, much like a bad habit that requires much attention, effort, and time (i.e., cognitive resources).

Social Re(De)Categorization

A rise in racial consciousness can also reduce racial prejudice by increasing interconnectedness or realizing racial similarities between ingroups and outgroups (i.e., social recategorization), and realizing racial differentiation of racial grouped members (i.e., social decategorization). An increase in either of these variables can transform one's cognitive categorization of ingroup/outgroup membership, and therefore improve racial attitudes and behavior towards outgroups.

According to social categorization theories such as Social Identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), recategorizing or broadening an individual's conception of ingroup membership (e.g., realizing a superordinate membership or common humanity) would extend the benefits of ingroup favoritism to former outgroup members. As a result, social recategorization has been found to reduce racial attitudes and discriminatory behavior towards racial outgroups and members (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1999; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000).

Similarly, an increase in attention and awareness to racial group members can influence people to decategorize race membership. That is, people begin to perceive themselves, or members of racial outgroups, as separate individuals rather than members of racial groups. Therefore, this social decategorization process can either reduce the salience of ingroup identity, which can reduce ingroup favoritism; or reduce outgroup categorization, which can reduce racial attitudes towards the racial outgroup by undermining racial stereotypes (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2005).

Empathy

An increase in racial consciousness can also promote favorable behavior and reduce racial prejudice through a variable that is different but related to cognitive dissonance and transformation of one's categorization of group membership: empathy towards racial outgroups. Empathy generally refers to the ability of taking the perspective of another person (Stephan & Finlay, 1999). The greater the awareness and attention to racial outgroups and racial discrimination, the greater the possibility of perceiving the world from a racial outgroup's perspective. Stephen and Finlay reviewed studies investigating the effects of empathy on ingroups' attitudes and behavior towards a variety of marginalized outgroups from people who identify as gay to prisoners. Their review of the literature indicated that empathy improves attitudes and behavior towards a variety of outgroups – marginalized racial groups included.

Some explanations of how empathy can reduce racial attitudes and behavior include the following. Viewing the world from a racial outgroup member's perspective may increase the possibility of seeing racial discrimination directed towards this member,

which then may induce cognitive dissonance with one's egalitarian beliefs. Empathy could also influence one's perception of social categorization. For instance, perspective taking can increase perceiving similarities between ingroups and outgroups, which can reduce feelings of threat or competition with racial outgroups, or broaden one's ingroup categorization and therefore, extend one's ingroup favoritism towards former outgroups. Further, empathy can produce a greater concern of welfare for racial outgroup members, which therefore, influences more positive beliefs and affect towards members of these groups.

All three of these motivational variables (i.e., cognitive dissonance, social re(de)categorization, and empathy) can mediate the effect of an individual's degree of racial consciousness on her or his racial attitudes and behavior. In other words, the greater one's racial consciousness, the greater the possibility of influencing cognitive dissonance with one's egalitarian beliefs, seeing similarities across or differences within racial groups, and experiencing empathy, all of which have been found to reduce racial prejudice. However, previous researchers have found that consciousness and motivation are not the only conditions needed to reduce racial biases. To continue consciousness and regulation of racial biases, a cognitive regulatory strategy is required.

Cognitive Regulatory Strategies

Reducing racial prejudice is like breaking a bad habit (Devine, 1989). To break such a tendency, awareness and attention, as well as motivation, are of course required. However, if an individual does not possess cognitive resources to develop and practice

regulatory strategies to continue one's recognition or intention, the habit will likely persist (Devine et al., 2002).

Numerous studies have found that racial attitudes, especially subconscious prejudice, can manifest even when an individual is highly racial conscious and motivated (internally or externally) to overcome racial biases (e.g., Blair and Banaji, 1996; Kawakami, Dovidio, Moll, Hermsen, & Russin, 2000). However, other studies have found that some highly racial conscious and motivated individuals can regulate racial biases, even when cognitive constraints are high, due to developing and practicing cognitive regulatory strategies (see Devine et al., 2002).

Limitations to Racial Prejudice Reduction

The discussion so far appears to paint a rather optimistic picture: Higher racial consciousness can result in motivational processes that can reduce racial prejudice if sufficient and continual cognitive resources are present. However, most White Americans do not hold a high degree of racial consciousness. In addition, increasing Whites' low degree of racial consciousness may result in negative motivational outcomes, such as resistance to prejudice reduction or an increase in racial prejudice. Further, even if racial consciousness and motivation to reduce racial biases is increased, such as through intergroup contact, developing and practicing cognitive strategies to continue awareness of, attention to, and regulation of racial biases is particularly challenging. These limitations, which are explained in further detail below, help explain why racial discrimination continues to exist in our society between Whites and people of color, as

well as why scholars continue to struggle with how to tackle racial prejudice in America (Manglitz et al., 2005).

Low Racial Consciousness

Most White Americans do not hold, or continue to hold, a high degree of racial consciousness due to a variety of reasons. One main reason is that "[i]n addressing race, in the law, in literature, in popular culture, in communication studies, in religion or other areas of our lives, [W]hiteness is privileged, normalized, defied, and raceless" (Johnson, 1999, p. 1). Moreover, whiteness cannot see itself except through the reflection of what it sees itself as not. In other words, Whites are not aware and attentive to race simply because they do not need to (i.e., because of their White privilege, defined as the unearned advantages and immunity granted to or enjoyed by Whites just from being White). For instance, "Whites do not look at the world through a filter of racial awareness, even though Whites are, of course, members of a race. The power to ignore race, when White is the race, is a privilege, a societal advantage" (Wildman & Davis, 1997, pp. 317-318). However, when this social advantage or privilege is threatened or compromised, Whites increase their racial consciousness, at least in respect to their own racial identity. A prime example of such an occurrence is when Whites feel victims of reverse discrimination as a result of affirmative action policies. Some public opinion polls indicate that between half and three-fourths of Whites surveyed believe that, as a racial group, they are routinely discriminated against from such policies (Pincus, 2002).

A second reason Whites tend to have, and may continue to have, a low degree of racial consciousnesses is due to limited contact with racial outgroups. For instance, Whites in primary and secondary school, on national average, attend public schools with a student body that is 80% White (Frankenberg et al., 2003). In addition, current racially segregated neighborhoods and real estate steering, discussed in chapter 2, further prevent racial outgroup contact. And even if there is diversity within an environment (e.g., school, neighborhood, workplace), intergroup contact may still be unlikely, as people prefer to interact with people who look, and culturally act and talk like themselves (Moody, 2001).

Negative Motivational Outcomes

Because most Whites are not highly aware or attentive to racial biases, scholars have focused on programs or interventions to increase Whites' racial consciousness. However, one main limitation with this approach is that when Whites experience an increase in racial consciousness, they will likely experience self-esteem or ego threats, and negative or unwanted emotions (e.g., guilt, anger), which can increase resistance to exploration of their racial attitudes and behaviors (Pedersen et al., 2005).

For example, post-decisional cognitive dissonance is an uncomfortable feeling that people may experience when they realize that a rejected decision might have been better than their chosen decision (Brehm, 1956, as cited in Gawronski, Strack, & Bodenhausen, 2008). To reduce this threat or feeling, people will tend to emphasize or search for positive reasons of their chosen decision and negative reasons of the rejected (but better) decision (Gawronski et al.). Thus, those who have decided (or simply believe)

that they are not prejudiced or that discrimination does not exist may try to support their decision/belief when exposed to contrary evidence.

In fact, "…[attitude] change, especially when it is not sought by participants, is often difficult, stressful, uncomfortable, unpleasant, and perhaps coercive" (p. 23). Generally, most Whites experience a strong sense of guilt, denial, or "guilt by association" when first becoming aware of racial prejudice or discrimination, which can result in resistance as Tatum (1994) explained:

> These feelings are uncomfortable and can lead White students to resist learning about race and racism. And who can blame them? If learning about racism means seeing oneself as an oppressor, one of the bad guys, then of course there will be resistance. (p. 463)

The negative emotions or perceived threat resulting from an increase in racial consciousness can even increase Whites' racial prejudice levels. Branscombe et al. (2007) randomly assigned 189 White undergraduates to one of three conditions. In the two experimental groups, students were asked to write about ways they have been either privileged or disadvantaged because of their White racial group membership. In the control group, students were asked to write about their general life experiences. After the thought-listing task, all participants completed a racial prejudice measure. The researchers found that those who thought and wrote about White privilege expressed significantly greater racial prejudice than the other two conditions.

Difficulty with Developing and Practicing Cognitive Regulatory Strategies

Awareness of and attention to racial biases, as well as consciously regulating prejudice (especially subconscious attitudes) is a difficult task, requiring sufficient cognitive resources to develop and practice regulatory strategies (Devine & Monteith, 1993; Kawakami et al., 2000). Reasons for this regulation difficulty lie in cognitive constraints and the normative, cognitive, categorization process of racial attitudes highlighted in chapter 2, such as category automatization (Devine & Monteith, 1999).

Cognitive automatization research centers on how automatic processing contributes to successful mental functioning and adaptation. For instance, "…most of a person's everyday life is determined not by their conscious intentions and deliberate choices but by mental processes….that operate outside of conscious awareness and guidance" (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999, p. 462). Automaticity frees our mental capacity from tasks that no longer require attention in order to direct our energy and focus towards those things that need our concentration.

Unfortunately, activation of racial biases falls into this automatic cognitive process, especially for individuals who may have low racial consciousness and low self-interest. However, numerous studies from Devine, Monteith, and colleagues (see Devine et al., 2002) found that even Whites who hold a high degree of racial consciousness, may still express racial biases due to the difficulty of regulating racial biases; but the degree of expression is moderated by cognitive regulatory strategies.

In sum, an increase in racial awareness and attention can reduce racial prejudice through a variety of motivational variables when cognitive resources are and continue to be sufficient. Unfortunately, many Whites do not hold a high degree of racial consciousness, and if increased, many Whites may experience negative or unwanted emotions, which can resist exploration or increase levels of racial attitudes and behavior. Further, developing and practicing cognitive strategies to regulate racial biases is a difficult task even for high racially conscious individuals. Therefore, a process is needed to raise Whites' degree of racial awareness and attention, while at the same time, reduce negative motivational outcomes and provide cognitive regulatory strategies. A process that can offer a solution is an individual's degree of mindfulness towards race (i.e., racial mindfulness). However, before exploring how racial mindfulness can decrease an individual's level of racial prejudice, a thorough discussion of mindfulness is needed.

Mindfulness

The concept of mindfulness originates from Buddhist psychology. Translations from early Buddhist literature describe mindfulness as a state of awareness, free of reactions or judgment (Gunaratana, 1992; Mace, 2008). Current cognitive psychology describes the concept similarly. During consciousness, stimuli is brought into awareness and held in focal attention briefly, if at all, before an emotional or cognitive reaction is made. These reactions are filtered often in a discriminate nature usually in reference to the self, conditioned based on past or similar experience, and assimilated or accommodated into existing cognitive schemas (Brown, Ryan, & Creswell, 2007). The outcome of such processing is a well-oiled machine, imposing concepts, labels, and

judgments, often automatically, to stimuli brought into attention and awareness (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999). The process results in a variety of benefits, including "…the establishment and maintenance of order upon events and experience of relevance to the self, and the facilitation of goal pursuit and attainment" (Brown et al., p. 212). The main limitation with this mode of processing, however, is that stimuli are rarely observed impartially without biases in reference to the self or prior conditioning.

Contrary to consciousness, a mindfulness mode of processing involves attention and awareness to stimuli, but with open receptivity, preventing the overlay of discriminative, categorical and habitual reactions. An individual is "present" to reality as it is, rather than viewing the world through conceptual filters, categories, and biases. In this way, mindfulness is defined as attention to and awareness of present events and experiences with open receptivity (Brown & Ryan, 2003). In addition, mindfulness can be conceptualized as either as a state or a relatively stable disposition (i.e., tendency to abide in mindful states over time).

Paths and Benefits

A mindfulness mode of cognitive processing has been considered an inherent human capacity, varying naturally in degree of stability and frequency within individuals (Goldstein, 2002; Kabat-Zinn, 2003). Accordingly, mindfulness can be cognitively enhanced by exercises, ancient and new. Two different practices that can improve the stability and frequency of mindfulness are mindfulness meditation **(**stemming from Buddhist psychology) and actively drawing new cognitive distinctions or categories (accredited to cognitive psychologist Ellen Langer). Both paths have shown that an

increase in mindfulness can lead to many physical, psychological, and interpersonal benefits, regardless of which course is taken.

Mindfulness Meditation

The first path to cultivating mindfulness is mindfulness meditation—otherwise referred to as Vipasanna or insight meditation. This meditation practice is a process of deepening attention and awareness of oneself and involves:

> …examining who we are, with questioning our view of the world and our place in it, and with cultivating some appreciation for the fullness of each moment we are alive; most of all, it has to do with being in touch. (Kabat-Zinn, 1994, p. 3)

The meditation generally begins with the practitioner reconnecting the mind and the body, usually by focusing on one's breathing. The practitioner then tries not to constrict attention, but observe and welcome any emotional, mental, or physical experiences as they occur, and from a stance of nonattachment, nonjudgment, and noninterpretation. The breath is continually used as an anchor to return attention when the mind wanders or when the mind starts to attach, judge, or interpret an experience. This process of focused breathing and allowing thoughts and feelings to come and go as they please is repeated for a certain amount of time. In some mindfulness meditations, a certain concept is trained upon, or brought into focused awareness such as lovingkindness (Kabat-Zinn, 1994), openness, or nonattachment (Hanh, 1975).

Mindfulness meditation is suggested to develop many beneficial qualities. According to Chappell (2003), "Mindfulness meditation is a manner to defuse our ego, our hurts, and our attachments, and a way to find sympathy and compassion with others,

and an area for discovering creative new options" (p. 264). Anticipating these benefits, Western clinicians and psychologists have introduced mindfulness into many treatment programs. One of the more prominent programs is Jon Kabat-Zinn's Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction Program (MBSR; 1982). Other programs include Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy (MBCT; Teasdale et al., 2000), Dialectal Behavior Therapy (Linehan, 1993), and Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT; Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999) to name a few. By and large, mindfulness interventions have been found to reduce a variety of conditions including chronic pain, stress, anxiety, depression, somatization, and eating disorders, as well as enhance participants' overall sense of well-being (for review see Baer, 2003).

For example, Shapiro et al. (1998) investigated the effects of an 8-week mindfulness meditation intervention on 70 premedical and medical students using a randomized intervention group and a wait-listed control group (i.e., a group of participants that serve as a control group while the experimental group receives the intervention. The control group later receives the treatment after a waiting period, usually when the study is completed). Prior to treatment, the researchers found no significant differences on outcome measures between the two groups. However, after the intervention, analyses indicated that the intervention group, compared to the control group, significantly decreased on measures of overall psychological distress, depression, state anxiety, trait anxiety; and significantly increased on overall empathy and sense of spirituality.

In addition, Grossman, Niemann, Schmidt, and Walach (2004) meta-analyzed and aggregated effect sizes for 20 mindfulness studies (*N*=1605 in total) that included both uncontrolled and stringently controlled mindfulness meditation investigations. The researchers found significant medium effect sizes for mental and physical variables in both uncontrolled and controlled studies.

Aside from clinical settings, mindfulness meditation has also been incorporated into education, and with beneficial effects. Jack Miller from the University of Toronto has implemented this path of mindfulness within his holistic graduate courses to over 1000 students since 1988 (Miller & Nozawa, 2002). In these courses, students are required to practice mindfulness meditation and record their experience through reflective journaling. From the narrative descriptions within these journals, as well as evaluative feedback from students, Miller (1995) found reoccurring themes; mindfulness meditation increased the students' self-efficacy, awareness, connectedness with others, and personal well-being (e.g., reduction in stress). In a follow-up study (Miller & Nozawa), one student wrote:

> And that place of gentleness, and presence, and mindfulness, breathing and really living in some healthy way of connecting, well, it connects you with yourself, but it also connects you to those around you. I mean there's a sense of common soul. There's just a sense that we are all just one. (p. 189)

In short, meditation mindfulness has been empirically found to increase many physical and psychological outcomes. As a result, many Western researchers are

beginning to introduce this meditation practice to provide a variety of benefits within their areas of specialty.

Actively Drawing New Distinctions

Straying away from the traditional and reflective style of mindfulness meditation, a second path to cultivating mindfulness is attributed to Ellen Langer, a social psychology professor at Harvard. Langer (1989) found that a mindfulness mode of processing arises with stimuli that are novel or atypical; therefore, an individual can increase one's mindfulness by actively drawing new cognitive categories or distinctions. According to Langer and Moldoveanu (2000), "It does not matter whether what is noticed is important or trivial, as long as it is new to the viewer. Actively drawing these distinctions keeps us situated in the present" (pp. 1-2).

Most of Langer's research stems from investigating the mindset opposite to mindfulness, "mindlessness," as she poetically describes as, "When the lights are on, but no one is home" (p. 9). According to Langer (2000), when we are mindless we are experiencing automaticity. We are relying on distinctions drawn in the past, stuck in single or rigid perspectives, unaware of other ways of knowing, our behavior is routine and predetermined, and we our oblivious to noticing new things. However, when mindful, we experience all the opposite: We are more sensitive to the environment and to the present, we have a greater openness to new information, we create new or broader categories, and have an enhanced awareness of multiple perspectives.

In her book, *Mindfulness*, Langer (1989) summarizes numerous research studies showing the beneficial effects of mindfulness in relation to many psychological and physical outcomes. In over 30 years of experimental research, mindfulness results in a decrease in accidents, increase in creativity and memory, decline in stress, and an increase in competence, just to name a handful of the benefits.

In one experimental study, Langer and Perlmuter (1988, as cited in Langer 1989) investigated the effects of mindfulness intervention with nursing home patients. The first (lowest mindful) group was asked to monitor and evaluate their daily activities for a week. The second (low mindful) group was directed to monitor different behaviors each day. The third (high mindful) group was asked to do the same as the second group but also to list three alternatives they could have selected but did not for each behavior listed. The final (highest mindful) group performed the same as the third group but also chose which activities to monitor. At the end of the week, the investigators found that the more mindful the participants were, the less depressed and the more confident, dependent, alert, and differentiated in their choices they became.

Joss and Langer (1986, as described in Langer, Hatem, Joss, & Howell, 1989) investigated the effects of mindfulness on creativity with undergraduate students using three different conditions/groups. All three groups read a similar topic passage and were given a preceding test measuring retention and creativity. However, the passage for each group was written a little differently for each condition. The first group of students read a passage written in absolute terms (mindless). The second group read a passage with conditional (high mindful) terms such as “could be” or “possibly”. And the third group

read a passage written in absolute terms but introduced in a conditional (low mindful) manner (e.g., "As one possible model…"). The investigators found that the students in the mindless and low mindful groups were less creative in their responses and were unaware when a case in the passage was fabricated in comparison to students in the high mindful group.

In summary, regardless of whether one takes a meditative or a cognitive path towards the journey of mindfulness, the destination is generally the same: an increase in positive well-being, decrease in cognitive and emotional disturbance, and rise in cognitive flexibility and awareness. However, another possible benefit of mindfulness, which has yet to be extensively explored, is the reduction of racial prejudice and discrimination.

Racial Mindfulness

Racial mindfulness is defined here as the awareness of and attention to internal racial stimuli (e.g., racial prejudice) or racial external stimuli (e.g., racial group members or discrimination) with open receptivity; or simply, mindfulness directed towards race. Although research has yet to extensively investigate the relation of mindfulness with such racial concepts as prejudice and discrimination, statements from scholars, results from two published studies, and theoretical frames from the racial prejudice and mindfulness literatures, provide support for such a connection.

Advocates for Racial Mindfulness

Several scholars have advocated the possible benefits of a mindfulness mode of processing in racial relations. According to Deborah Orr (2002), a leader in holistic learning and anti-oppression, educators can utilize mindfulness practices to enhance the efficacy of anti-oppressive pedagogy. She asserts that mindfulness has the potential to address dualistic thinking and foster change both cognitively and affectively.

In the peace education literature, Leonard Riskin (2004), Director of the Center for the Study of Dispute Resolution at the University of Missouri-Columbia School of Law, stated that mindfulness could help peace negotiators in several ways. To wit: "[Although mindfulness]…provides methods for calming the mind, concentrating, experiencing compassion and empathy…mindfulness could help negotiators be more aware of certain deep assumptions, involving those based on ethnicity or culture" (p.86).

In addition, Barbara Vacarr (2003) posited that mindfulness training may help White teachers in developing the ability to respond with more empathy, less judgment, and greater awareness of White privilege to tense diversity moments in the classroom. In direct relation to prejudice, although not racial prejudice in particular, Hanh (1975) suggested that mindfulness can effect an individual's perception of reality, indirectly freeing one from prejudice and stereotypes. Results from two published studies also provide support for the relation between mindfulness and prejudice.

Mindfulness and Prejudice Studies

Langer et al. (1985) hypothesized that if students were taught to be more mindful or make more distinctions with people who have physical disabilities, students may be more differentiated, less prejudiced, and see that abilities and disabilities are dependent on context (e.g., "She may not be able to do X, but could do Y") and not global conditions (e.g., "She is disabled"). The researchers conducted the study with 47 sixth-grade students during class time for five days (the fifth day was left for administering the dependent measures). On two of the four days, half the students were shown slides of people with unnoticeable physical disabilities. For the other two days, the other half of students was presented with slides of people with noticeable physical disabilities. Students in both the unnoticeable and noticeable groups were randomly split by mindfulness treatment. Students in each group received identical looking booklets that either allowed several different answers to one question (high mindfulness; e.g., "How can this woman in the wheelchair drive a car?") or allowed one answer for each question (low mindfulness; e.g., "Can this woman in the wheelchair drive this car?"). This approach resulted in a 2 (high mindfulness versus low mindfulness) x 2 ("unnoticeable" versus "noticeable" people) factorial design.

As hypothesized, the researchers found that students in the high mindfulness group who were shown slides of people with noticeable physical disabilities were more likely to recognize context specific competencies of these individuals, were less condescending, expressed less superficial preference, and were less likely to avoid these individuals in hypothetical scenarios (e.g., were more likely to choose a blind person for

"pin the tail on the donkey" in comparison to low mindfulness groups who were more likely to choose a person with unnoticeable physical disabilities). That is, teaching children active distinction making (i.e., mindfulness) in this study reduced children's erroneous and indiscriminate prejudice against individuals with physical disabilities.

Langer & Moldoveanu (2000) later concluded that mindfulness could generalize and help reduce racial prejudice and stereotyping:

> When we do not stop drawing distinctions between people at some arbitrary point (e.g., skin color or accent), and we keep on drawing distinctions (down to feeding habits, music they listen to, or any of thousands of issues), then we may discover that most stereotypes that we have formed are not rooted in fact, but in choice. (p. 6)

In relation to racial prejudice, only one published study to date has explored mindfulness as a prejudice reduction intervention technique with conscious racial attitudes. Lillis and Hayes (2007) explored two classroom approaches to increase racial prejudice awareness among 32 college students: an educational lecture session designed from a multicultural psychology textbook, and a session incorporating discussion and experiential exercises based on a mindfulness technique – acceptance and commitment training (ACT). The mindfulness session was designed to increase participant's awareness of racial prejudice, acceptance of those biases as a natural result of learning and living in a prejudiced society, attention to the automaticity of evaluation and judgment, and reinforcement of positive actions that are consistent with one's egalitarian values.

Using a counterbalanced within-group design, results from pre- to post- and pre- to follow-up indicate that the mindfulness session increased participants' awareness and acknowledgement of racial prejudice, acceptance and flexibility towards racial biases, thought control and diffusion, and intentions of positive action. In comparison to the standard prejudice awareness session, the mindfulness session influenced significantly greater results on all outcomes. As a result, mindfulness not only helped participants' racial consciousness, but also increased their acceptance towards racial biases and served as a cognitive tool to possibly prevent future discrimination. A theoretical exploration of how mindfulness could provide such benefits is discussed next.

Theoretical Exploration of Racial Mindfulness

Mindfulness directed towards race can reduce racial prejudice in three ways. First, and similar to racial consciousness, racial mindfulness can increase one's attention and awareness of internal and external racial stimuli, in which the consciousness can motivate individuals to reduce or regulate racial biases through a variety of meditating processes (e.g., alleviating cognitive dissonance, de[re]categorizing social group membership, experiencing empathy). Second, racial mindfulness can raise attention and awareness to racial biases in an accepting and nonjudgmental fashion. This process could therefore reduce self-invoked, negative emotions and their consequential effects, often experienced from Whites when first coming to terms with racial biases. Finally, racial mindfulness can decrease racial prejudice by reducing cognitive constraints for one to develop and practice cognitive regulatory strategies, as well as providing two regulatory strategies

(meditation or active distinction making) that one can continue to use in the future and is context independent.

Awareness and Attention

As previously defined, mindfulness is attention to and awareness of present events and experiences with open receptivity (Brown & Ryan, 2003). Therefore, racial mindfulness may influence Whites to become more aware of their conscious racial prejudice, White privilege, and current racial discrimination of marginalized racial groups. From racial mindfulness, for example, Whites may begin to realize that American values are perhaps White values (Devos & Banaji, 2005) and an equal opportunity America may not exist for a person of color.

Racial mindfulness may also help reduce subconscious racial attitudes. Mindfulness has been described as the cognitive process of de-automatization, which can influence an individual to consciously respond to situations rather than responding subconsciously from habitual conditions (Deikman, 2000; Langer, 1989; Salomon & Globerson, 1987). As a result, racial mindfulness could increase awareness of and attention to one's subconscious racial attitudes or the habitual activation of these attitudes.

Similar to racial consciousness, racial mindfulness could reduce prejudice by influencing motivational and mediating variables found to reduce racial attitudes. Mindfulness has many benefits including awareness to internal and external stimuli, creation of new or broader mental categories, connectedness with others, awareness of multiple perspectives, empathy, and compassion for others (Baer, 2003; Langer, 1989,

2000; Miller, 1995; Miller & Nozawa, 2002; Shapiro et al., 1998). When applied to racial biases, these mindfulness benefits appear similar to the motivational variables that can reduce racial prejudice, discussed earlier in this section. That is, when applied to racial stimuli, the mindfulness benefit of increased awareness could increase the opportunity of experiencing cognitive dissonance with egalitarian beliefs or norms; the mindfulness benefits of creating new or broader mental categories and connectedness with others could help social re(de)categorizing racial group memberships (Lillis & Hayes, 2007); and the mindfulness benefits of empathy and compassion for others seems directly related to experiencing empathy towards racial outgroup members.

Acceptance

In addition to raising awareness to and attention of racial biases, and therefore, influencing motivational processes found to decrease racial attitudes, racial mindfulness can also affect one's level of acceptance towards racial biases. Mindfulness brings awareness of and attention to one's thoughts, feelings, and other experiences in a nonjudgmental fashion. Therefore, racial mindfulness can potentially prevent many of the negative or unwanted emotions (e.g., guilt, compunction) evoked within individuals who first become aware of racial biases that could cause avoidance to or even a rise in racial prejudice.

For example, Emavardhana & Tori (1997) conducted an experimental study investigating the effects of a seven-day mindfulness meditation intervention on individuals' self-esteem and ego defense mechanisms. The experimental group consisted of two combined cohorts (n^1=221, n^2=216, combined mean age=18.27). The control was

recruited to match the demographics and social factors of the experimental group (*N*=281, mean age=18.11). Pretest measures indicated no preliminary differences between groups. Using multivariate statistics, and controlling for pre-test scores, the researchers found that the mindfulness meditation treatment significantly increased participant's overall self-esteem and reduced subconscious ego defense mechanisms such as displacement, projection, and regression.

Others have supported this result, indicating that the open receptivity aspect of mindfulness attenuates cognitive or ego defensiveness (Hodgins & Knee, 2002), and negative emotions, which can arise when one's self-esteem or image is threatened (Heppner et al., 2008). Therefore, racial mindfulness may decrease individuals' (e.g., Whites') ego-defensiveness and negative feelings that can arise when they become aware of racial biases. This postulation is supported by Lillis and Hayes (2007) – the only published study to date that has explored the effects of a racial mindfulness intervention – where they found that racial mindfulness not only decreased participants' racial prejudice levels, but also increased their acceptance towards racial biases.

Cognitive Regulatory Strategies

Finally, racial mindfulness can reduce cognitive constraints for one to develop and practice cognitive strategies to regulate racial biases, as well as provide two regulatory strategies (i.e., meditation or active distinction making) that one can adopt. Racial mindfulness can reduce cognitive constraints due to the de-categorical and de-automatic nature of mindfulness.

As previously mentioned, cognitive psychology indicates that mindful processing entails drawing new categories or distinctions (Langer, 1989) or freeing oneself from such categories (Brown & Ryan, 2003). Therefore, mindfulness directed towards race may reduce the normative categorization process that has been theorized as the onset of racial prejudice (Allport, 1954). In addition, mindfulness has been referred to as cognitive de-automatization (Deikman, 2000; Langer, 1989), which is defined as "…the volitional, metacognitively guided employment of non-automatic, usually effort demanding processes" (Salomon & Globerson, 1987, p. 625). When mindful, an individual experiences a shift away from automaticity, and more towards monitoring mental processes (Deikman, 2000; Salomon & Globerson, 1987). Therefore, if mindfulness was directed towards racial stimuli, the de-automatization process can reduce cognitive constraints for one to develop and practice cognitive strategies to regulate racial biases. For example, mindfulness may create more time for an individual to consciously decide how to respond, rather than responding subconsciously and automatically to racial biases.

In addition, the two paths to increase mindfulness (i.e., meditation and actively drawing distinctions) can serve as cognitive strategies that an individual can adopt to regulate racial biases. One of the limitations of racial consciousness interventions is that the effects are often dependent on the program or context (e.g., intergroup contact). However, the paths of mindfulness (i.e., meditation and actively drawing distinctions) are non-contextual practices that an individual can continually use to regulate racial biases.

In sum, research has yet to extensively investigate mindfulness with such racial concepts as prejudice and discrimination. However, statements from scholars, results

from two published studies, and theoretical frames from the racial prejudice and mindfulness literatures, provide justification for investigating the effects of racial mindfulness.

Chapter Summary

Racial prejudice continues to permeate American society. As a response, prejudice researchers suggest three general conditions are needed to decrease racial attitudes: consciousness of, motivation to reduce, and cognitive strategies to regulate one's racial biases. However, most White Americans do not hold a high degree of racial consciousness, and if increased, Whites may experience negative outcomes. Further, due to the natural of prejudice, developing and practicing cognitive regulatory strategies is cognitively taxing and difficult for many. Mindfulness directed towards race may provide a solution to these limitations and reduce racial prejudice levels. However, racial mindfulness has yet to be extensively investigated. The proposed research described in the next chapter explores the effects of mindfulness on White students' conscious and subconscious racial prejudice, as well as their acceptance towards racial biases.

CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH DESIGN

Within the last 40 years, great strides have been made in America in relation to racial equality, yet inequalities continue to exist between Whites and people of color. Based on reviews of literatures related to racial inequalities, discrimination, and prejudice, I have illustrated that racial attitudes continue to affect our society today. From exploring models of racial prejudice reduction and research on mindfulness, I have argued that mindfulness directed towards racial stimuli, such as racial prejudice, discrimination, or inequalities, may reduce racial attitudes and overcome limitations often associated with current prejudice reduction models. The present research investigates the extent to White college students' degree of mindfulness can influence their degree of racial prejudice directly and indirectly through motivational mediating variables, as well their degree of acceptance towards racial biases.

Therefore, the research is guided by the following questions:

1. Does mindfulness influence White students' conscious (subtle) and subconscious racial prejudice towards Blacks:
    a. directly by increasing awareness and attention to racial biases?
    b. indirectly through motivational, mediating variables of social recategorization and decategorization of racial group membership, and empathy?
2. When increasing White students' awareness of and attention to racial biases, such as White privilege:

a. does mindfulness attenuate the negative effects that can arise from cognitive dissonance?
b. does mindfulness influence acceptance towards White privilege?

These research questions are answered using a mixed-method research design consisting of two studies. The first research question is empirically investigated in Study A, which gathers White participants' degree of previous racial outgroup contact, mindfulness, conscious (subtle) racial prejudice, subconscious racial prejudice, social recategorization and decategorization of group membership, and empathy. Structural equation modeling (SEM) is then used to explore the theoretical framework of whether participants' degree of mindfulness decreases their level of racial prejudices directly and indirectly through motivational, mediating variables of social recategorization and decategorization, and empathy, while controlling for previous racial outgroup contact.

The second research question is qualitatively explored in Study B by performing content analysis on White participants' written reactions to an article that describes White privileged experiences. From the study's theoretical framework, it is expected that participants with a higher degree of mindfulness exhibit greater acceptance to racial biases and less negative reactions resulting from cognitive dissonance.

CHAPTER 5: STUDY A

Study A explored if mindfulness influences White students' conscious (subtle) and subconscious racial prejudice towards Blacks using SEM. I considered using an experimental design, which would consist of creating and exploring the effects of a racial mindfulness intervention, in contrast to structural modeling. However, due to the limited amount of research on racial mindfulness, I decided that a strong theoretical and empirical exploration of mindfulness on racial biases should be first accomplished before time and efforts are directed in creating a racial mindfulness intervention.

Method

Participants

The study consisted of 341 undergraduate college students selected from the Department of Educational Psychology subject pool at The University of Texas at Austin using a stratified random sampling procedure. Two strata were used for selection: (a) students who racially identify as White, and (b) a balance of students who self-identify as male (*n*=164, 48%) and female (*n*=177, 52%). Participants consisted of first-year (*n*=17, 5%), second-year (*n*=38, 11%), third-year (*n*=102, 30%), fourth-year (*n*=150, 44%), fifth-year (seniors; *n*=24, 7%), and graduate level students (*n*=10, 3%). Of the 327 participants who provided the optional department name of their major or degree, the responses show a wide representation ranging from the Business school to "Undeclared," with Liberal Arts (*n*=98, 30%), Communication (*n*=65, 20%), and Business (*n*=55, 16%) colleges/schools as the most frequent.

Procedure

Students were randomly and equally selected into four different groups (Group A, B, C, and D). All groups received an introductory message of the study via email that included a SurveyMonkey Web address where electronic measures of the study can be accessed. The Web addresses in the email message, however, were different for each group, as the ordering of the electronic measures varied by group membership due to counterbalancing purposes; this ordering/counterbalancing process is explained in further detail shortly.

Once at the SurveyMonkey Web site, all groups first observed a consent form explaining the potential risks and benefits of participation with limited knowledge about the intention of the study in order to prevent participant bias, and the possibility of being randomly selected for a follow-up (Study B). One risk for participation was subject identification. The departmental subject pool requires students to provide their University of Texas electronic identification number (UTEID) in order to receive research credit. To reduce this risk, the consent form informed students that their number will be used for this research credit purpose only and how identification will be protected (i.e., each UTEID will be given a random 5-digit number, only the 5-digit number will be connected to responses, a separate list connecting UTEIDs with random 5-digit numbers will be password protected and accessed by the primary researcher only, and each entry on this list will be destroyed once research credit was given).

After agreeing to participate and entering their UTEID, all groups then responded to a set of demographic items, a qualifying item for participation in the follow-up study, and the following scales: (a) previous racial outgroup contact, (b) mindfulness, (c) empathy, and (d) social re(de)categorization measures, which are described in the next section.

Following these four measures, Group A and Group B completed a subconscious prejudice measure, ensued by a conscious (subtle) prejudice measure. Group C and Group D, on the other hand, completed the conscious (subtle) prejudice scale first and then the subconscious measure. Within each of these pairings for the subconscious measure, one of the groups (e.g., Group A and Group C) receives a chronological block order of the measure where the other group (e.g., Group B and Group D) receives a reversed (counterbalanced) block order (this measure and block orders are described in detail in the next section). Table 2 depicts an overview of the measurement administration for this study.

Table 2
Administration Order of Measures

Order	**Measures (All Groups)**			
First	Previous exposure scale			
Second	Mindfulness scale			
Third	Empathy scale			
Fourth	Social re(de)categorization scale			
	(Group A)	**(Group B)**	**(Group C)**	**(Group D)**
Fifth	Subconscious scale: chronological order	Subconscious scale: reverse order	Conscious (subtle) scale	Conscious (subtle) scale
Sixth	Conscious (subtle) scale	Conscious (subtle) scale	Subconscious scale: chronological order	Subconscious scale: reverse order

Measures

Previous Racial Outgroup Contact

Because of the indirect and direct effects of racial intergroup contact on racial prejudice, data on this variable was important to collect and later to control across participants in this study. A 7-item scale adapted from Chang (2002[3]; see Appendix A) collected participants' degree of previous racial outgroup contact. With these items, participants identified on a 5-point Likert scale (1= "0-20%" to 5 = "81-100%") the percentage of people who were/are White in each of the following groups: high school classmates, the neighborhood where they grew up, current close friends, current neighbors, immediate and non-immediate family members, and romantic partners. All item responses are reverse scored so a high total score indicates a high degree of previous racial outgroup contact.

Mindfulness

The Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ; Baer et al., 2006; see Appendix B) collected participants' current level of dispositional and general mindfulness. The FFMQ is designed to measure five facets of mindfulness, as well as an overall factor. The five facets are: observing, describing, acting with awareness, nonjudging of inner experience, and non-reactivity to inner experience. However, responses on the observing facet were initially excluded in this study, as Baer et al. (2006) found that this facet failed to fit the hierarchical mindfulness model with their study participants. Investigating the difference between a four-facet (excluding the

[3] There were no reliability or validity data reported for scores on this scale in Chang (2002).

observing facet) and a five-facet hierarchical model occurred during the model comparison, data analysis stage, described in the next section.

The full scale consists of 39-items (31-items minus the observe subscale) on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = "Never or very rarely true", 5 = "Very often or always true"), where a combined higher score reflects a higher degree of overall mindfulness. Sample items include "When I'm walking, I deliberately notice the sensations of my body moving (observing); I'm good at finding words to describe my feelings (describing); When I do things, my mind wanders off and I'm easily distracted (acting with awareness); I criticize myself for having irrational or inappropriate emotions (nonjudging);" and "I perceive my feelings and emotions without having to react to them (non-reacting)." The FFMQ has sound psychometric properties, and scores on the scale have been found to be valid and reliable with college student samples. For instance, internally consistency was .75 to .91 for scores determining the five facets of mindfulness with a college student sample (*N*=613; Baer et al., 2006).

Empathy

Three subscales from the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1980; Appendix C) collected participants' current level of empathy. The IRI is designed to measure four aspects of empathy: empathetic concern, perspective taking, fantasy, and personal distress (reverse coded) – as well as an overall empathy factor (Bäckström & Björklund, 2007; Cliffordson, 2002). In this study, participants took only the empathetic concern, perspective-taking, and personal distress subscales, consisting of 21 total items on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = "Does not describe me well" to 5 = "Describes me very

well"). The fantasy subscale, which measures the tendency to identify with fictional characters in movies and other situations, was not included in this study, as it was not deemed necessary. Sample items of the three subscales include: "I would describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person (empathetic concern); I try to look at everybody's side of a disagreement before I make a decision (perspective-taking);" and "In emergency situations, I feel apprehensive and ill-at-ease (personal distress)." A combined higher score reflects a higher degree of overall empathy.

The IRI is widely used for an empathy measure and has been found negatively related to conscious (subtle) racial prejudice (Bäckström & Björklund, 2007). Scores on the IRI have been found valid and consistent internally and over time with college student samples (e.g., α=.72 for empathetic concern, α=.78 for perspective-taking, and α=.78 for personal distress subscales, Davis [*N*=579]; and α=.82 for a hierarchical empathy factor, Bäckström & Björklund [*N*=456]).

Social Re(De)Categorization

A Social Re(De)categorization Scale collected participants' current level of social recategorization and decategorization levels of group membership. The 9-item scale was adapted from Gaertner, Rust, Dovidio, Bachman, and Anastasio (1994), which appears to be the only published study with a scale or items attempting to measure such constructs[4]. In this prior study, the researchers used four intergroup contact items to assess students' perceptions of social categorization of the student body on campus. Two items assessed

[4] Gaertner et al. (1994) developed four items from modifying the four highest loading items of the equal status factor of the School Interracial Climate Scale derived from the development and validation study of this scale (Green, Adams, & Turner, 1988).

social decategorization (i.e., "At school, it usually feels as though we belong to different groups [reverse scored]; At school, it usually feels as though we are individuals and not members of a particular group"), and the other two items were designed to measure students' social recategorization of students on campus (i.e., "Despite the different groups at school, there is frequently the sense that we are all just one group; Although there are different groups of students at this school, it feels as though we are all playing on the same team"). Incorporating modifications of these items and using them as a guide, five additional items were created, each with a 5-point Likert response scale (1= "Strongly Disagree" to 5 = "Strongly Agree").

The total 9-item, projected 2-factor, scale was then explored with a pilot study sample to determine factor structure and reliability of scores (Appendix D). The results indicated a 6-item, 2-factor scale. However, the reliability of scores on the Social Decategorization subscale, as well as the pattern and structure coefficients of two of the subscale items, were not as high as expected. Therefore, two items that were projected to measure social decategorization but dropped during the factor analysis procedure in the pilot study were modified and investigated here with Study A participants. In addition, the one dropped item projected to measure social recategorization was also modified and explored (in an attempt to create an over-identified measurement model during the next stage of data analysis). Therefore, participants in this study completed a 9-item scale that consisted of the validated six items and three modified items from the pilot study results (Appendix E). Higher scores on these subscales indicate a higher degree of social recategorization and decategorization of student groups on campus.

Conscious (Subtle) Racial Prejudice

The Symbolic Racism 2000 Scale (SR2K; Henry & Sears, 2002) collected participants' current level of conscious (subtle) racial prejudice. The SR2K scale is an 8-item measure with both Likert and non-Likert response scales (see Appendix F), where a combined higher score indicates a higher degree of conscious (subtle) prejudice. An example item is as follows: "Irish, Italian, Jewish, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same." The SR2K has predictive, convergent, and discriminant validity, as well as generalizability to college students, adults, and other racial groups besides Whites. Scores on the scale have been found to be adequately reliable (e.g., internal consistency was .79, *N*=702; Henry & Sears).

Subconscious Racial Prejudice

The Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald et al., 1998) collected participants' current level of subconscious prejudice. The IAT has quickly become the most widely used subconscious measure in psychology (Fazio & Olson 2003; Quillian, 2006) with over 200 research papers on subconscious attitudes of all sorts (e.g., religion, weight, age; see http://projectimplicit.net/nosek/iat/). Scores on the IAT have been found to have predictive validity (to conscious prejudice scales) and convergent/discriminant validity (see Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2007), as well as adequate reliability (e.g., alphas for internally consistency ranged from .7 to .9; Greenwald & Nosek, 2001).

The IAT is designed to measure the differential automatic associations of two target concepts (e.g., "Blacks" versus "Whites") with positive versus negative evaluations

(e.g., "pleasant words" versus "unpleasant words"), in a seven-block sequence (some of the blocks are used for practice to acquaint participants with the IAT). A participant taking the computerized IAT learns to use two keys, one on the left and one on the right, to quickly respond to stimuli on the computer screen.

For example, in Block 1, a participant learns to press the left-key each time a White face appears, and the right-key each time a Black face appears (see Table 3). Then in Block 2, the participant learns to respond with the same two keys to pleasant words such as “wonderful” (left-key) and unpleasant words such as “horrible” (right-key). In Blocks 3 and 4, both target faces and evaluation words are presented in a random sequence, and the participant is still asked to perform the responses previously learned (e.g., White faces and pleasant words = left-key). In Block 5, the initial assignment of keys to target concepts is reversed, so that the left- key is now assigned to Black faces and the right-key assigned to White faces. Finally, in Blocks 6 and 7, target faces and evaluation words are again presented in a random sequence, but now with the reversed assignment from Block 5 (e.g., White faces and unpleasant words = left-key).

Table 3
Block Sequences of the IAT

Block	**Trials**	**Left-key response**	**Right key response**
B1	20	White face	Black face
B2	20	Pleasant words	Unpleasant words
B3	20	White face + Pleasant words	Black face + Unpleasant words
B4	40	White face + Pleasant words	Black face + Unpleasant words
B5	40	Black Face	White face
B6	20	Black face + Pleasant words	White face + Unpleasant words
B7	40	Black face + Pleasant words	White face + Unpleasant words

A comparison of average latency between Blocks 3 and 4, and Blocks 6 and 7 are the critical stages to reveal the association strengths between faces and attributes. Participants who possess stronger and positive associations with Whites compared to Blacks will have a faster response time (and less errors) in Blocks 3 and 4 than Blocks 6 and 7. In most studies, half the sample completes the task in the above chronological block order, and the other half competes the task with a counterbalanced block order of 5, 2, 6, 7, 1, 3, and 4. The entire procedure takes around five minutes.

Greenwald, Nosek and Banaji (2003) have recommended a following algorithm to tally an individual's IAT score (summarized in Nosek et al., 2007):

> (1) Use data from Blocks 3, 4, 6, and 7; (2) eliminate trials with latencies > 10,000 ms; (3) eliminate subjects whom more than 10% of trials have latencies < 300 ms; (4) compute one standard deviation for all trials in Blocks 3 and 6, and another standard deviation for all trials in Blocks 4 and 7; (5) compute means for trials in each of the four blocks (3, 4, 6, 7); (6) compute two difference scores (one between Blocks 3 and 6 and the other between Blocks 4 and 7) subtracting what is intended to represent the high (positive) end of the measure from the block containing associations representing the low end (7) divide each difference score by its associates standard deviation from Step 4; and (8) average the two quotients from Step 7 (p. 12).

From this procedure, the IAT score (a D score) ranges from -2 to +2. Break points for scores include .15 (slight prejudice), .35 (moderate prejudice), and .65 or above (strong prejudice). A higher positive score indicates a higher degree of subconscious racial

prejudice towards Blacks and a higher negative score indicates a greater degree of subconscious racial prejudice towards Whites.

Data Analysis

First, I ran diagnostics using the SPSS program to determine that the assumptions of SEM have been met and to explore scale reliability. Following, using maximum-likelihood estimation via the Amos program, I employed latent variable SEM to examine the direct and indirect effects of mindfulness on racial prejudice, while controlling for previous racial outgroup contact.

Model Development

Confirmatory factor analysis was conducted on participants' scores on a majority of measures to help create the initial measurement model. Following, the initial structural model was specified. Finally, competing a priori models were compared to the initial structural equation model.

For the initial measurement model, presented in Figure 2, observed variables were obtained from (a) the total score for subconscious prejudice, (b) scale items for social recategorization and decategorization, and (c) item-to-construct parceling of the other, multi-item measures. It was necessary to item parcel in order to reduce the number of parameters estimated in the structural model. In addition, because the purpose of the study is to explore the relations between latent variables and not the relations among items comprising the measured variables, parceling was warranted (Little, Cunningham, Shahar, & Widaman, 2002).



Figure 2. Initial measurement model with observed variables and latent factors.

Note: M= Mindfulness, PRC = Prior Racial Outgroup Contact, SRC = Social Recategorization, SDC = Social Decategorization, CP = Conscious (Subtle) Prejudice, SP = Subconscious Prejudice, E = Empathy, and P = Item Parcels

With item parceling of unidimensional measures (i.e., previous racial outgroup contact and conscious [subtle] prejudice measures), parcels were established for each scale by first fitting a factor solution to each set of items and then averaging the items with the highest and lowest coefficients to form the first indicator, averaging the items with the next highest and lowest coefficients to form the second indicator, and so on. For multi-dimensional measures (i.e., mindfulness and empathy subscales), parcels were created following a domain-representative approach (Little et al., 2002). Using this approach, responses were first fitted to a factor solution for each set of subscale items.

Following, the subscale items with the highest coefficients were averaged together to form the first parcel (e.g., items with the highest coefficients for IRI subscales of empathetic concern, perspective taking, and personal distress were averaged together), subscale items with the second highest coefficients were averaged together, subscale items with the lowest coefficients were averaged together, and then subscale items with the second lowest coefficients were averaged. Therefore, the four parcels for each multidimensional measure reflect all of the dimensions present within the set of items.

For the initial structural model, findings from prior research (discussed in chapter 3) were first included in the model. Empathy (Stephan & Finlay, 1999), social recategorization (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1999; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000), and decategorization (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2005) have been found to directly reduce racial prejudice levels. In addition, prior racial outgroup contact has been found to directly decrease participant's conscious (subtle) prejudice and subconscious prejudice levels; this variable has also been found to increase participants' empathy and social categorization levels, which indirectly explains some of the effect racial outgroup contact has on one's prejudice (Dovidio, Gaertner, & Kawakami, 2003). In terms of mindfulness, prior researchers have shown that this variable can increase empathy (Shapiro et al., 1998) and interconnectedness (Miller, 1995; i.e., social categorization) as well.

After these prior research findings were included, predicted paths were then drawn in the structural model. First, mindfulness was hypothesized to initially occur before and therefore, affect prejudice (and not the other way around), which can be explained by the mere definition of mindfulness. According to cognitive psychology

theorists (e.g., Brown et al., 2007; Langer, 1989), mindfulness is a mode of cognitive processing that involves attention of and awareness to stimuli before the overlay of discriminative, categorical, and habitual reactions. Therefore, mindfulness generally appears to have time precedence over (occurs before) inflexible, categorical, and automatic cognitive processes (i.e., racial prejudice), at least initially. Second, because mindfulness has been found to increase empathy and interconnectedness (or social re[de]categorization), and these variables, on their own, have been found to decrease racial prejudice levels, mindfulness was hypothesized to decrease racial prejudice levels indirectly. Third, mindfulness was theorized to reduce racial prejudice levels directly based from the following: (a) statements from scholars postulating the effect of mindfulness on racial prejudice (e.g., Orr, 2002); (b) results from two published studies (Langer et al., 1985; Lillis & Hayes, 2007); (c) the finding that mindfulness increases two (meditating) variables (empathy and interconnectedness) that have been found to decrease racial prejudice levels; and (d) how mindfulness can influence other variables that have been found to decrease racial prejudice, such as an increase in one's awareness and attention to stimuli with open receptivity (e.g., acceptance to cognitive dissonance; Brown & Ryan, 2003), a reduction in cognitive automaticity, and an increase in mental monitoring (Deikman, 2000; Salomon & Globerson, 1987).

Therefore, it was theorized in the structural model that mindfulness cognitively and generally occurs before racial prejudice development, and can decrease racial prejudice levels both indirectly and directly. Figure 3 depicts this initial structural model with supported and predicted paths.



Figure 3. Initial structural model with supported and predicted effects. Based from prior research, red arrows indicate a path of increase and black arrows indicate a path of decrease. Blue arrows indicate predicted paths of decrease. For ease of presentation, the measurement model is excluded.

Note: M= Mindfulness, PRC = Prior Racial Outgroup Contact, SRC = Social Recategorization, SDC = Social Decategorization, CP = Conscious (Subtle) Prejudice, SP = Subconscious Prejudice, and E = Empathy.

Model Comparison

After this initial model was constructed, competing a priori models were compared to determine the best fitting model. Once the best fitting model was selected, the following goodness of fit indices were used to determine model fit: chi-square statistic (χ^2), Goodness-of-Fit Index (GFI), the Comparative Fit Index (CFI), root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA), and the standardized root mean square residual

(SRMR). For the GFI and CFI, values above .90 indicated an adequate fit and values above .95 indicated a good fit to the data (Keith, 2006). Values below .05 for RMSEA and .08 for SRMR indices indicated a good fitting model to the data (Hu & Bentler, 1998, 1999). Values of the RMSEA served as the primary focus of model fit, as this index is designed to assess the approximate fit of a model and therefore, suggested as a more reasonable standard than other indices for model evaluation (Keith).

To compare rival nested models, the chi-square difference test or change in chi-square ($\Delta\chi 2$; Keith, 2006) was used to determine the best fitting and most parsimonious model. A statistically significant change in chi-square suggests that the more constrained model should be rejected. In addition, because the chi-square can be sensitive to sample size (Keith), the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) were also investigated. To compare competing non-nested models, the AIC and BIC were used. Models with lower AIC and BIC values were preferred.

Two competing measurement models were specified and compared to the initial measurement model of this study. The first competing model consists of incorporating the Social Re(De)categorization items that were modified during a pilot study with this scale. Therefore in this alternative model, the Social Recategorization factor has four indicators (three validated items plus one modified item) and the Social Decategorization factor consists of five indicators (three validated items plus two modified items). The second measurement model consists of including the observing facet from the mindfulness measure. Therefore, item parcels for the hierarchical mindfulness factor include indicators from the observing subscale.

After the best fitting measurement model was determined, three competing a priori structural models were specified and compared to the initial structural model of this study. The first competing structural model explored the correlation between social recategorization and social decategorization factors, as this was predicted during scale development and validation for the Social Re(De)categorization Scale.

The second competing model investigated a correlation between the residuals of conscious (subtle) and subconscious racial prejudice. Most studies investigating the relation between these two attitudes find correlations below 0.2 (Fazio & Olson, 2003). However, some studies have found a larger and significant correlation (e.g., Kawakami, Dion, & Dovidio, 1998; McConnell & Liebold, 2001). Therefore, the first competing model included a correlation of the conscious (subtle) and subconscious measures within the initial structural model.

In the final competing model, direct effects/paths of mindfulness on conscious (subtle) and subconscious prejudice were excluded. Because this study is not measuring or influencing students' racial mindfulness specifically (only general mindfulness), the effects of mindfulness on racial prejudice may be majority (rather than partially) explained by the mediating variables of social recategorization, social decategorization, and empathy. In other words, expecting an individual's level of awareness of and attention to general stimuli with open receptivity (mindfulness) to include a direct focus on racial stimuli (racial mindfulness) may be too distal. However, the effects of mindfulness on variables of interconnectedness and empathy have been supported and

appear similar to the variables of social recategorization, social decategorization, and empathy that have been found to decrease racial prejudice levels.

Results

I first investigated participants' responses to measures, which included exploring data assumptions and conducting reliability analyses of scores on scales and subscales. Following, I developed and compared the measurement and structural models against alternative a priori models. Finally, using the best fitting structural equation model, I explored the indirect and direct effects of mindfulness on racial prejudice, as well as other effects.

Data Assumptions and Internal Consistency

Exploring participant responses to ensure SEM data assumptions were met resulted in the following findings. One item from the Prior Racial Outgroup Contact Scale (i.e., Item 5: percentage of immediate family members that were White) was not normally distributed and therefore, dropped from further data analysis. In addition, there were 10 participants who had more than 10% of their IAT trials with latencies under 300 milliseconds, which could reflect guesswork. Therefore, these cases were eliminated, which reduced the total sample size to 331 subjects. Besides these two cases, all other data assumptions were satisfied. Scale reliability was then assessed via estimates of the internal consistency of scores for each unidimensional and multidimensional measure. Correlations, means, standard deviations, and Cronbach's coefficient alphas for each scale and subscale are presented in Table 4. The means suggest that participants, on

average, have limited previous racial outgroup contact, low conscious (subtle) prejudice, but moderate subconscious prejudice towards Blacks.

Table 4

Correlations, Means, Standard Deviations, and Alphas among Total Scales and Subscales

Scale	**PRC**	**SRC[1]**	**SRC**	**SDC[2]**	**SDC**	**M[3]**	**M**	**M_O**	**M_D**	**M_A**	**M_NJ**	**M_NR**	**E**	**E_PT**	**E_EC**	**E_PD**	**CP**	**SP**
PRC	1.00																	
SRC[1]	.07	1.00																
SRC	.10	.94**	1.00															
SDC[2]	.07	.31**	.39**	1.00														
SDC	.05	.32**	.41**	.94**	1.00													
M[3]	-.15**	.01	.07	.20**	.22**	1.00												
M	-.14*	.04	.10	.25**	.27**	.95**	1.00											
M_O	.01	.09	.11*	.19**	.22**	.02	.32**	1.00										
M_D	-.09	.01	.08	.17**	.18**	.68**	.68**	.12*	1.00									
M_A	-.10	-.01	.02	.13*	.12*	.71**	.68**	.00	.30**	1.00								
M_NJ	-.12*	.01	.06	.10	.13*	.76**	.66**	-.20**	.28**	.43**	1.00							
M_NR	-.11	.01	.04	.15**	.17**	.56**	.57**	.15**	.21**	.14*	.36**	1.00						
E	.10	.20**	.26**	.21**	.21**	-.05	.00	.17**	.04	-.05	-.02	-.15**	1.00					
E_PT	.04	.21**	.30**	.30**	.31**	.20**	.25**	.20**	.16**	.12*	.15**	.12*	.73**	1.00				
E_EC	.07	.17**	.25**	.19**	.20**	.03	.08	.16**	.10	.02	.04	-.11	.83**	.48**	1.00			
E_PD	.11*	-.02	-.08	-.14**	-.16**	-.43**	-.42**	-.05	-.25**	-.30**	-.29**	-.36**	.38**	-.15**	.08	1.00		
CP	-.24**	-.08	-.10	-.12*	-.10	.12*	.11*	-.02	.08	.07	.10	.07	-.17**	-.09	-.11*	-.14**	1.00	
SP	.01	-.03	-.03	-.11*	-.09	.04	.03	-.02	.01	-.01	.09	.04	.00	-.02	-.05	.08	0.10	1.00
Mean	1.85	3.26	3.33	3.27	3.26	3.34	3.31	3.19	3.49	3.31	3.47	3.12	3.35	3.59	3.81	2.64	2.27	.49
SD	.76	.74	.66	.72	.49	.44	.37	.56	.67	.66	.75	.51	.39	.62	.63	.49	.51	.35
α	.81	.67	.64	.66	.45	.89	.86	.71	.89	.87	.9	.73	.81	.8	.81	.79	.79	.81

Note: PRC = Prior Racial Outgroup Contact, SRC = Social Recategorization, SDC = Social Decategorization, M= Mindfulness, M_O = Observe facet, M_D = Describe facet, M_A= Act with Awareness facet, M_NJ = Nonjudge facet, M_NR = Non-React facet, E = Empathy, E_PT = Perspective-Taking E_EC = Empathetic Concern, E_PD = Personal Distress, CP = Conscious (Subtle) Prejudice, and SP = Subconscious Prejudice

[1] Values represent only SRC items 3, 5, and 8.

[2] Values represent only SDC items 4, 6, 9.

[3] Values represent all mindfulness items except observing subscale items.

* $p<.05$; ** $p<.01$

Model Development and Model Comparison

Measurement Model

As previously mentioned, the initial measurement model consisted of the total observed score for the subconscious prejudice measure, subscale items for the social recategorization and decategorization measure, and item-to-construct parceling of the other, multi-item measures. Item parceling of unidimensional measures (i.e., previous racial outgroup contact and conscious [subtle] prejudice measures), parcels were established for each scale by first fitting a factor solution to each set of items using exploratory factor analysis and then averaging the items with the highest and lowest coefficients to form the first indicator, averaging the items with the next highest and lowest coefficients to form the second indicator, and so on. Table 5 depicts the factor structure of these unidimensional measures and how each parcel was created.

Table 5
Exploratory Factor Analysis Results and Item-to-Construct Parceling of Unidimensional Measures

Factor/Item	Eigenvalue	Variance	Coefficients	Item Parcels
PRC	3.12	51.96%		
PRC Item 1			.488	PRC Parcel 1
PRC Item 2			.654	PRC Parcel 3
PRC Item 3			.863	PRC Parcel 1
PRC Item 4			.495	PRC Parcel 2
PRC Item 6			.560	PRC Parcel 3
PRC Item 7			.782	PRC Parcel 2
CP	3.24	40.46%		
SR2K Item 1			.734	CP Parcel 1
SR2K Item 2			.612	CP Parcel 3
SR2K Item 3			.324	CP Parcel 1
SR2K Item 4			.588	CP Parcel 4
SR2K Item 5			.469	CP Parcel 2
SR2K Item 6			.557	CP Parcel 4
SR2K Item 7			.627	CP Parcel 2
SR2K Item 8			.552	CP Parcel 3

Note: PRC = Prior Racial Outgroup Contact Scale, CP = Conscious (Subtle) Prejudice, and SR2K = Symbolic Racism 2000 Scale.

For multi-dimensional measures (i.e., mindfulness and empathy subscales), parcels were created following a domain-representative approach (Little et al., 2002). Using this approach, responses were first fitted to a factor solution for each set of subscale items. Next, because subscales of these measures consist of multiple items, items with pattern and structural coefficients below .40 were deleted. Following, the subscale items with the highest coefficients were averaged together to form the first parcel, subscale items with the second highest coefficients were averaged together, subscale items with the lowest coefficients were averaged together, and then subscale items with the second lowest coefficients were averaged. Table 6 and 7, respectively, presents the factor structure of the mindfulness and empathy measures used in this study and how each parcel was created.

Created item parcels were then investigated and data assumptions from the individual item analysis remained satisfied. The initial measurement model was then developed, as well as competing models. Correlations, means, and standard deviations for the observed variables used in the initial model are presented in Table 8.

Table 6
Exploratory Factor Analysis Results and Item-to-Construct Parceling of the Mindfulness Measure

Factor/Item	Eigenvalue	Variance	Pattern Coefficients	Structure Coefficients	Item Parcels
NJ	7.83	23.73%			
FFMQ Item 3			.650	.667	M Parcel 4
FFMQ Item 10			.633	.666	M Parcel 3
FFMQ Item 14			.717	.765	
FFMQ Item 17			.715	.683	
FFMQ Item 25			.779	.811	M Parcel 2
FFMQ Item 30			.827	.825	M Parcel 1
FFMQ Item 35			.686	.711	
FFMQ Item 39			.672	.688	
D	3.86	11.71%			
FFMQ Item 2			.762	.761	M Parcel 1
FFMQ Item 7			.733	.735	
FFMQ Item 12			.714	.745	
FFMQ Item 16			.700	.729	
FFMQ Item 22			.509	.591	M Parcel 4
FFMQ Item 27			.657	.649	
FFMQ Item 32			.631	.636	M Parcel 3
FFMQ Item 37			.750	.765	M Parcel 2
A	2.81	8.51%			
FFMQ Item 5			.765	.712	M Parcel 2
FFMQ Item 8			.705	.743	
FFMQ Item 13			.807	.788	M Parcel 1
FFMQ Item 18			.580	.672	
FFMQ Item 23			.519	.591	M Parcel 3
FFMQ Item 28			.597	.657	
FFMQ Item 34			.535	.586	M Parcel 4
FFMQ Item 38			.684	.715	
NR	2.46	7.47%			
FFMQ Item 19			. 542	.560	
FFMQ Item 21			.427	.457	M Parcel 3
FFMQ Item 24			.596	.603	M Parcel 2
FFMQ Item 29			.738	.723	M Parcel 1
FFMQ Item 33			.497	.506	M Parcel 4
O[1]	1.85	5.62%			
FFMQ Item 15			.561	.598	M Parcel 1
FFMQ Item 20			.537	.556	M Parcel 2
FFMQ Item 26			.499	.519	M Parcel 4
FFMQ Item 31			.481	.506	M Parcel 3

Note: NJ = Nonjudge, D = Describe, A= Act with Awareness, NR = Non-React, O = Observe, FFMQ = Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire, and M = Mindfulness

[1] These observe subscale items are excluded from the item-to-construct parceling process for the initial measurement model and included as a competing model during model comparison analysis.

Table 7
Exploratory Factor Analysis Results and Item-to-Construct Parceling of the Empathy Measure

Factor/Item	Eigenvalue	Variance	Pattern Coefficients	Structure Coefficients	Item Parcels
EC	4.89	25.71%			
IRI Item 1			.702	.730	E Parcel 2
IRI Item 3			.458	.421	E Parcel 3
IRI Item 6			.475	.512	E Parcel 4
IRI Item 10			.755	.728	E Parcel 1
IRI Item 13			.593	.661	
IRI Item 15			.646	.704	
IRI Item 17			.512	.598	
PD	3.25	17.10%	.		
IRI Item 4			.624	.623	
IRI Item 7			.495	.512	E Parcel 3
IRI Item 12			.606	.601	E Parcel 4
IRI Item 14			.631	.646	
IRI Item 18			.817	.812	E Parcel 1
IRI Item 20			.662	.649	E Parcel 2
PT	1.62	8.52%			
IRI Item 2			.404	.529	E Parcel 3
IRI Item 5			.570	.595	E Parcel 4
IRI Item 8			.580	.645	
IRI Item 16			.605	.659	
IRI Item 19			.799	.723	E Parcel 1
IRI Item 21			.669	.662	E Parcel 2

Note: EC = Empathetic Concern, PD = Personal Distress, PT = Perspective-Taking, IRI = Interpersonal Reactivity Index, and E = Empathy

Table 8

Correlations, Means, and Standard Deviations among Measured Variables in the Initial Measurement Model

Variable	PRC_P1	PRC_P2	PRC_P3	SRC_3	SRC_5	SRC_8	SDC_4	SDC_6	SDC_9	M_P1	M_P2	M_P3	M_P4	E_P1	E_P2	E_P3	E_P4	CP_P1	CP_P2	CP_P3	CP_P4	SP
PRC_P1	1.00																					
PRC_P2	.65**	1.00																				
PRC_P3	.64**	.60**	1.00																			
SRC_3	.06	.13*	.02	1.00																		
SRC_5	-.05	.01	-.08	.57**	1.00																	
SRC_8	.11*	.12*	.09	.28**	.35**	1.00																
SDC_4	.10	.07	.08	.15**	.21**	.10	1.00															
SDC_6	-.01	.00	-.02	.18**	.12*	.06	.35**	1.00														
SDC_9	.09	.08	.03	.29**	.32**	.27**	.50**	.33**	1.00													
M_P1	-.09	-.12*	-.14**	-.03	-.02	-.03	.13*	.11	.07	1.00												
M_P2	.15**	-.14**	-.16**	.02	.05	.01	.15**	.09	.13*	.71**	1.00											
M_P3	-.10	-.05	-.14**	.10	.05	.06	.22**	.15**	.20**	.56**	.59**	1.00										
M_P4	.13**	-.16**	-.09	-.02	-.02	-.09	.13*	.08	.04	.56**	.55**	.56**	1.00									
E_P1	.04	.05	.04	.02	.02	.01	.03	-.15**	.03	-.08	-.02	.02	.07	1.00								
E_P2	.01	.04	-.02	-.01	.09	.05	.11*	-.02	.10	.04	.10	.14**	.03	.46**	1.00							
E_P3	-.06	-.04	-.09	-.08	-.11*	-.02	.03	.05	-.01	.21**	.25**	.19**	.20**	.15**	.13*	1.00						
E_P4	-.07	-.04	-.04	.04	.03	-.02	-.03	-.03	-.02	.10	.18**	.12*	.13*	.18**	.19**	.25**	1.00					
CP_P1	.21**	-.15**	-.10	-.06	-.12*	-.07	-.16**	-.14**	-.18**	.10	.07	.03	.11	-.05	-.02	.06	.18**	1.00				
CP_P2	.16**	-.18**	-.14**	.00	.00	-.01	.00	.04	-.03	.09	.09	.07	.18**	-.03	.01	.12*	.16**	.45**	1.00			
CP_P3	.15**	-.18**	-.15**	-.06	-.08	-.13*	-.10	.02	-.16**	.05	.05	.01	.11*	-.04	-.05	.04	.13*	.59**	.41**	1.00		
CP_P4	.16**	-.22**	-.18**	.00	-.01	-.04	-.05	-.07	-.10	.08	.10	.06	.13*	.01	.00	.15**	.11*	.52**	.63**	.42**	1.00	
SP	-.01	.05	-.01	.03	-.03	-.06	-.07	-.12*	-.06	.07	.03	.02	.06	-.07	-.08	-.08	-.02	.17**	.06	.01	.08	1.00
Mean	2.03	1.85	1.68	3.25	3.36	3.16	3.22	2.99	3.59	3.32	3.11	3.36	3.25	3.45	3.47	3.03	2.98	2.05	2.42	2.33	2.28	.49
SD	.86	.85	.92	.98	.93	.95	1.05	.86	.85	.54	.55	.53	.52	.49	.47	.48	.55	.59	.67	.69	.62	.35

Note: PRC = Prior Racial Outgroup Contact, SRC = Social Recategorization, SDC = Social Decategorization, M= Mindfulness, E = Empathy, CP = Conscious (Subtle) Prejudice, SP = Subconscious Prejudice, and P = Item Parcels.

* $p<.05$; ** $p<.01$

The initial measurement model was then compared to two competing models to determine the best fitting a priori model. The first competing model was nested with the initial model and included additional Social Re(De)categorization Scale items that were modified in a prior pilot study. The second alternative model was non-nested with the initial model and consisted of the inclusion of the Observe FFMQ subscale during mindfulness item-to-construct parceling. Model fit indices explored across the three a priori models were the change in chi-square (for the nested model only), AIC, BIC, and the RMSEA – to provide an idea of within model fit. Table 9 presents the comparative analysis results for the models.

Table 9
Model Fit Indices and Comparisons for Competing Measurement Models

Model	$\chi 2$	*df*	$\Delta\chi 2$	Δdf	*p*	**AIC**	**BIC**	**RMSEA (90% CI)**
Initial measurement model	335.19	189			.	463.19	706.53	.048 (.040-.057)
Including modified SDC and SRC items model	530.97	255	195.78	66	.000	670.97	937.12	.057 (.050-.064)
Including M_O subscale items model	342.75	189			.	470.75	714.09	.050 (.041-.058)

Note: SDC = Social Decategorization, SRC = Social Recategorization, and M_O = Mindfulness Observe facet

A comparison of the change in chi-square, AIC, and BIC indicated that the initial measurement model is a better fitting model to the data than the other two competing models. Further exploration of model fit for this measurement model produced the following values: GFI = .92, CFI = .93, and SRMR = .058. Therefore, these indices, and especially the RMSEA index, indicate that the initial measurement model provides a good fit to the data.

Structural Model

Using this initial measurement model, predicted paths were drawn to create the initial structural model. Next, the initial structural model was compared to three, a priori, alternative models to determine the best fitting structural equation model. The first competing model explored the possibility that the Social Recategorization and Social Decategorization latent variables correlate. Similarly, the second competing model explored whether Conscious (Subtle) Prejudice and Subconscious Prejudice correlate as well. The final alternative model explored the prediction that mindfulness reduces conscious (subtle) and subconscious prejudice indirectly rather than directly by deleting the direct paths from the Mindfulness variable to the prejudice variables. All three of these competing structural models nest with the initial structural model, and therefore, exploring the following indices will determine the best fitting structural model: change in chi-square, AIC, and BIC. In addition, investigating the RMSEA index for each model will present an idea of within model fit. Table 10 presents the model comparison findings.

Table 10
Model Fit Indices and Comparisons for Competing Structural Models

Model	***χ2***	***df***	***Δχ2***	***Δdf***	***p***	**AIC**	**BIC**	**RMSEA (90% CI)**
Initial structural model	378.42	193				498.42	726.54	.054 (.046-.062)
Correlated SDC and SRC model	338.66	192	39.76	1	.000	460.66	692.59	.048 (.040-.056)
Correlated CP and SP model	375.45	192	2.97	1	.085	497.45	729.38	.054 (.046-.062)
Indirect mindfulness only model	386.06	195	7.65	2	.022	502.06	722.58	.054 (.046-.062)

Note: SDC = Social Decategorization, SRC = Social Recategorization, CP = Conscious (Subtle) Prejudice, and SP = Subconscious Prejudice

A comparison of the change in chi-square, AIC, and BIC indicated that the first alternative model (correlating the Social Recategorization and Social Decategorization latent variables) is the best fitting model to the data than the initial model and the other two competing models. Further exploration of model fit for this model produced the following values: GFI = .92, CFI = .93, and SRMR = .058. Therefore, these indices, and the RMSEA index, indicate that this structural model is the final structural equation model for this study.

Path Coefficients and Effects

The primary focus of this study was to explore the direct and indirect effects of mindfulness on conscious (subtle) and subconscious racial prejudice. Using the final structural equation model for this study, Table 10 presents the unstandardized path coefficients (*b*) with their standard error and critical ranges, and standardized path coefficients (β). Following, Table 11 depicts the standardized direct, indirect, and total effects of latent variables using the final model.

Table 11

Unstandardized and Standardized Path Coefficients for the Final Structural Equation Model

Path		*b*	*SE*	*CR*	*p*	β
M	---> SRC	.050	.133	.380	.704	.027
	---> SDC	**.528**	**.154**	**3.430**	**.000***	**.268**
	---> E	.32	.067	1.963	.050	.154
	---> CP	.192	.095	2.010	.045	.144
	---> SP	.127	.065	1.960	.050	.131
PRC	---> SRC	.025	.071	.358	.720	.027
	---> SDC	**.169**	**.073**	**2.318**	**.020***	**.171**
	---> E	.020	.033	.604	.546	.047
	---> CP	**-.160**	**.047**	**-3.418**	**.000***	**-.240**
	---> SP	.026	.031	.847	.397	.054
SRC	---> CP	.013	.060	.213	.832	.018
	---> SP	.034	.041	.847	.397	.067
SDC	**---> CP**	**-.139**	**.064**	**-2.169**	**.030***	**-.206**
	---> SP	**-.088**	**.043**	**-2.034**	**.042***	**-.177**
E	---> CP	.037	.118	.315	.753	.024
	---> SP	-.144	.081	-1.773	.076	-.127

Note: M = Mindfulness, PRC = Prior Racial Outgroup Contact, SRC = Social Recategorization, SDC = Social Decategorization, CP = Conscious (Subtle) Prejudice, and SP = Subconscious Prejudice

Table 12
Standardized Effects for the Final Structural Equation Model

Effect	Variable	SRC	SDC	E	CP	SP
Direct	M	.027	.268	.154	.144	.131
	PRC	.027	.171	.047	-.240	.054
	SRC	.000	.000	.000	.018	.067
	SDC	.000	.000	.000	-.206	-.177
	E	.000	.000	.000	.024	-.127
Indirect	M	.000	.000	.000	-.051	-.065
	PRC	.000	.000	.000	-.034	-.034
	SRC	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
	SDC	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
	E	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
Total	M	.027	.268	.154	.093	.065
	PRC	.027	.171	.047	-.274	.019
	SRC	.000	.000	.000	.018	.067
	SDC	.000	.000	.000	-.206	-.177
	E	.000	.000	.000	.024	-.127

Note: M = Mindfulness, PRC = Prior Racial Outgroup Contact, SRC = Social Recategorization, SDC = Social Decategorization, CP = Conscious (Subtle) Prejudice, and SP = Subconscious Prejudice.

The path coefficients and effects contained within this model suggest a variety of findings. As predicted, mindfulness had a positive effect on participants' degree of social decategorization of group membership ($\beta = .27$), and social decategorization had negative effects on participants' level of conscious ($\beta = .21$) and subconscious ($\beta = .18$) racial prejudice. That is, given the adequacy of the model, for each standard deviation increase in degree of mindfulness, participant's degree of social decategorization will increase by .27 of a standard deviation; in addition, for each standard deviation increase in degree of social decategorization, participant's level of conscious (subtle) prejudice and subconscious prejudice will decrease by .21 and .18 of a standard deviation, respectively, with all things being equal. However, because of the positive effects (although not

statistically significant) from mindfulness to both conscious (β = .14) and subconscious prejudice (β = .13), as well as the similar positive but nonsignificant direct paths from empathy to conscious (subtle) prejudice (β = .02) and from social recategorization to conscious (subtle) prejudice (β = .02) and subconscious (β = .07) prejudice levels, the mediating effect of social decategorization was not large enough for mindfulness to have negative effects on racial prejudice levels.

Two other predictions that were attained from the final model relate to prior racial outgroup contact. This latent variable followed a similar path to mindfulness of having a positive effect on participants' degree of social decategorization (β = .17), although not as large as the Mindfulness variable. However, and different from mindfulness, the construct of Prior Racial Outgroup Contact had a negative effect on participants' degree of conscious (subtle) prejudice (β = –.24).

Contrary to theoretical predictions, mindfulness did not have negative effects on participants' levels of racial prejudice, empathy, or social recategorization. Empathy and social recategorization also did not have negative effects on participants' racial prejudice levels. Finally, prior racial outgroup contact did have negative effects on participants' levels of subconscious prejudice.

The results of the path coefficients and effects contained within the final structural equation model for this study indicate that after controlling for prior racial outgroup contact, mindfulness does not appear to significantly decrease conscious (subtle) or subconscious prejudice levels directly or indirectly through mediating variables of social recategorization, social decategorization, and empathy.

Discussion

The purpose of Study A was to explore if mindfulness influences White students' conscious (subtle) and subconscious racial prejudice towards Blacks directly by increasing awareness and attention to racial biases, and indirectly through motivational, mediating variables of social re(de)categorization and empathy. The final results indicated that mindfulness does not appear to affect prejudice levels directly or indirectly.

The overall finding that mindfulness did not directly decrease racial prejudice levels are contrary to prediction, but perhaps not surprising. Although, general mindfulness increases attention to and awareness of stimuli (e.g., leads to a greater perceptivity and sensitivity to one's environment, more openness to new information, creation of new cognitive categories, and enhanced awareness to multiple perspectives, Langer 1989, 1997), an increase in attention and awareness to racial stimuli, such as racial discrimination or one's own racial prejudices (i.e., racial mindfulness), may be too distal. Investigating the effects of a racial mindfulness intervention focused on increasing state mindfulness and directly educating individual regarding racial biases (in comparison to a control intervention) is the next step in this program of research, and should provide a clearer picture of the direct effects of mindfulness on racial prejudice levels.

However, the findings that general mindfulness did not increase racial prejudice levels indirectly were more unexpected. According to the final structural equation model in this study, although mindfulness significantly increased social decategorization and social decategorization then significantly decreased conscious (subtle) and subconscious

prejudice levels, mindfulness, overall, did not indirectly affect prejudice levels. One possible reason is how participants' degree of empathy was measured in this study.

The findings that general mindfulness did not increase empathy, and empathy did not decrease at least conscious (subtle) prejudice are quite contrary to prior research. The similar findings for social recategorization (a form of interconnectedness) were not deemed as important as this subscale was created for this study and therefore, may not be measuring the attended construct. In future research, an interconnectedness scale with confirmed construct validity, such as the Social Connectedness Scale (Lee & Robbins, 1995), will be explored.

Mindfulness has often been found related to or can increase an individual's empathy level (e.g., Miller, 1995; Shapiro et al., 1998, 2007). Similarly, empathy has often been found to decrease an individual's conscious (subtle) prejudice levels (Stephan & Finlay, 1999; Finlay & Stephan, 2000). Upon further investigation, the believed reason for the nonsignificant effect from mindfulness to empathy was due to one of the empathy subscales (i.e., personal distress), significantly correlating (but negative and weak) with the perspective-taking empathy subscale (r = -.15) and nonsignificantly correlating with the other empathy subscale, empathetic concern (r = .08; see Table 4). These subscales were predicted to correlate highly and determine a hierarchical empathy factor. To investigate, I dropped this subscale, reran the empathy item parceling process, and incorporated revised empathy item parcels into the initial measurement model and final structural equation model.

From this process, mindfulness did not improve the initial measurement model fit, but did significantly increase participants' degree of empathy ($\beta = .18$) in the final structural equation model. In addition, the path from empathy to conscious (subtle) prejudice changed in value (from to $\beta = .02$ to $\beta = -.08$). However, although this path from empathy to conscious (subtle) prejudice was negative, the coefficient was still small and nonsignificant. Therefore, other path coefficients in the final structural equation model did not change much. For example, mindfulness still did not directly, indirectly, or totally affect racial prejudice levels.

One possible reason why empathy did not significantly decrease conscious (subtle) prejudice, and therefore, why mindfulness did not decrease this prejudice variable indirectly through empathy and social decategorization with or without the personal distress subscale items included in the model, is because some prior researchers have indicated that empathy is more of an emotion and therefore, has an negative effect on the affective dimension of conscious (subtle) prejudice rather than the cognitive dimension (Esses & Dovidio, 2002; Tropp & Pettigrew, 2005). The conscious (subtle) prejudice scale used in this study was more measuring students' cognitive dimension of conscious (subtle) prejudice (e.g., "How much of the racial tension that exists in the United States today *do you think* Blacks are responsible for creating?) and therefore, provides reasoning why these predictions were not found. In future research, an affective measure, such as a feeling thermometer (i.e., an imaginary scale ranging from 0^{o} [very cold] to 100^{o} [very warm] that prompts participants to indicate their feelings to a certain

person or group; Campbell, 1971), will be used to more closely investigate the indirect effect of mindfulness on conscious (subtle) through the meditating variable of empathy.

The results found from this study must be interpreted in light of several limitations. The first limitation is that most of the data collected in this study were self-report. Social desirability and other issues, such as shared method variance, could have biased the results. For example, the mean score for the conscious (subtle) prejudice, self-report measure was relatively low in comparison to the mean score of the subconscious prejudice, implicit measure, which was moderately high, although these instruments were found to be measuring two different dimensions of prejudice or prejudice expression in this study. A second limitation is that the data were obtained from students at only one predominantly White institution (PWI). Incorporating students from other PWIs may have improved the study, at least the generalization of findings. The third limitation also relates to the sample. Because a large sample size is often needed in SEM, there were not enough participants in this study to randomly split the total sample and cross-validate the final structural model, which would have increased the validity of the findings. A fourth limitation is that subconscious prejudice was determined in the models by only a single observed indicator. Although reliability estimates were calculated for this measure, this construct could still contain invalidity and unreliability, which could have influenced the results. Similar to invalidity and unreliability issues, the fifth limitation in this study was the use of item parceling for some of the latent variables. However, because the purpose of the study was to explore the relations between latent variables and not the relations among items comprising the measured variables, parceling was deemed appropriate. The

final limitation relates to SEM, as well as other statistical methods (e.g., multiple regression and path analysis), is that the final structural equation model could have omitted common variables or causes, which could have affected the results of the study. However, it was believed that the randomly stratified and balanced sample, as well as incorporating and measuring prior racial outgroup contact, subsumed all of the common variables that can affect racial prejudice.

CHAPTER 6: STUDY B

Study B explored the second research question of this dissertation: When increasing White students' awareness of and attention to racial biases, such as White privilege, does mindfulness attenuate the negative effects that can arise from cognitive dissonance, and therefore, influence participants' degree of acceptance towards White privilege? This question was qualitatively explored by performing content analysis on White participants' written reactions to an article that described White privileged experiences. From the theoretical framework presented in chapters 2 and 3, it was expected that participants with a higher degree of mindfulness would exhibit greater acceptance to racial biases and less negative reactions resulting from post-decisional cognitive dissonance.

Method

Participants

The study consisted of 40 students who were selected one week later from the sample in Study A, using a stratified random sampling procedure. The strata used were participants who responded "No" to the following qualifying item asked during Study A, "Have you ever read an article by Peggy McIntosh (1989) entitled, 'Unpacking the Invisible Knapsack?'" and participants' overall scores on the mindfulness measure. Of students who met the first stratum, the 20 students with the highest overall mindfulness scores ($\bar{x}$=3.96) and the 20 students with the lowest mindfulness scores ($\bar{x}$=2.87) from Study A were recruited to participate in this study. The high mindful group consisted of first-year (*n*=2, 10%), second-year (*n*=2, 10%), third-year (*n*=10, 50%), and fourth-year

level students (*n*=6, 30%), with a little more than half self-identifying as female (*n*=12, 60%). The low mindful group consisted of first-year (*n*=5, 25%), second-year (*n*=3, 15%), third-year (*n*=6, 30%), fourth-year (*n*=5, 25%), and fifth-year (senior) level students (*n*=1, 5%), with close to half self-identifying as female (*n*=9, 45%).

Procedure

Participants received an introductory message about the study via email that included a SurveyMonkey Web address where electronic activities of the study were housed. Once at the SurveyMonkey Web site, all groups first observed a consent form that explained the potential risks and benefits of participation with limited knowledge about the intention of the study to prevent bias. After reading the consent form and agreeing to participate, students observed and completed a White privilege measure. Following, and adapted from a similar procedure in Ancis and Szymanski (2001), participants observed, read, and reacted to an article listing numerous benefits a White woman has experienced due to her skin color in contrast to people of color. Before the article was presented, the general directions read, "Please read the list below. Once finished, identify 3 to 5 (or more) of the conditions that the author describes as relating to White privilege, and within the blank template following, please provide reactions to the conditions chosen."

Measures

White Privilege Measure

The White Privilege Scale (WPS; Swim & Miller, 1999; Appendix G) measured participants' degree of awareness and acceptance towards the construct of White privilege. The WPS consists of five items based on McIntosh's (1989) White privilege article. Participants identified on a 5-point Likert scale (1= "Strongly Disagree" to 5 = "Strongly Agree") their degree of belief in White privilege. Sample items include: "My skin color is an asset to me in my everyday life;" and "White people have certain advantages that minorities do not have in this society." Prior analyses indicated that items reveal a single factor structure and scores are internally consistent (α=.72, N=102; Swim & Miller).

White Privilege Article

After responding to the WPS, participants read and openly reacted to Peggy McIntosh's (1989) article, "Unpacking the Invisible Knapsack" (Appendix H). This article lists 47 circumstances and conditions McIntosh has experienced as a White woman, in contrast to people of color. In this article:

> McIntosh describes her personal experiences of unearned advantages associated with White privilege such as (a) accurate, positive, and ample representation of her race in the media, academic institutions, and grade school materials; (b) being able to associate with members of her own race most of the time; (c) easily finding products and services associated with her race and cultural traditions; (d) not experiencing discrimination when renting an apartment or purchasing a home,

seeking medical assistance, shopping in a store, using credit cards or checks, and interacting with other White people; (e) engaging in behavior (e.g., talking with a full mouth, being late to a meeting, swearing, dressing in secondhand clothes) without it being attributed to her race; and (f) ignoring or devaluing the cultural values, traditions, and writings of people of color without experiencing any negative consequences (Ancis & Szymanski, 2001, p. 551).

Data Analysis

In this study, I explored four assumptions based on findings from prior research. The first assumption relates to the finding that most White individuals are unaware of their Whiteness or White privilege, as it has been normalized and invisible (Wildman & Davis, 1997). Therefore, it was assumed in this study that White participants with high mindfulness would not significantly differ from participants with low mindfulness on the White privilege measure, as both groups of participants will have relatively low scores.

I explored this assumption using the SPSS program by investigating frequencies (and if applicable, mean differences) of scores on the WPS between participants with high and low mindfulness scores. Participants with a high White privilege score (i.e., mean of 3.5 or above based on the 5-point Likert scale of the White privilege measure) were dropped from further data analysis, as these respondents are not likely to experience post-decisional cognitive dissonance from reading the article (i.e., they already were aware of or agree to the construct of White privilege). As mentioned in chapter 3, post-decisional cognitive dissonance is an uncomfortable feeling that people experience when

they realize that a rejected decision might have been better than their chosen decision (Brehm, 1956, as cited in Gawronski et al., 2008).

The second and third assumption relate to the prior research findings that many White individuals experience cognitive dissonance when first becoming aware of racial biases, and can respond to this negative or uncomfortable feeling by supporting (increasing) their racial prejudice levels or avoiding further investigation (Branscombe et al., 2007; Pedersen et al., 2005). Gawronski et al. (2008) provided an explanation for this latter phenomenon: When an individual experiences post-decisional cognitive dissonance, the person will tend to emphasize or search for positive reasons of their chosen decision and negative reasons of the rejected (but better) decision to reduce this threat or feeling. As a result, it was assumed in this study that participants would experience some degree of post-decisional cognitive dissonance after they indicate their initial decision (a low score on the White privilege measure) and then observe evidence for their rejected decision (read the White privilege article). In addition, to reduce their dissonance, it was assumed that participants would provide support for their low score on the White privilege measure (or lack of awareness and agreement to White privilege) and attempt to debunk the White privilege article.

The last assumption is related to the open receptive nature of mindfulness and its associated benefits. Prior research has determined that when one's self-esteem or image is threatened, the open receptivity (or acceptance) component of mindfulness can attenuate ego defensiveness and negative emotions (Emavardhana & Tori, 1997; Heppner et al., 2008; Hodgins & Knee, 2002). Therefore, it was assumed in this study that

mindfulness would mediate participants' ego-defensiveness and negative emotions resulting from participants' post-decisional cognitive dissonance. In other words, participants with high mindfulness scores would likely indicate greater acceptance and less negative emotions in their reactions to the White privilege article in comparison to participants with low mindfulness scores.

To explore these last three assumptions, a research team employed qualitative or non-frequency content analysis on participants' reaction papers. To allow multiple themes and patterns related to White privilege emerge from the data, constant comparative methodology (Lincoln & Guba, 1985) was the coding process used in this analysis procedure. In addition, responses were de-identified of mindfulness scores until content analysis was complete.

Throughout the coding process, I implemented numerous steps to ensure conformability (objectivity), transferability (external validity), and credibility (internal validity) of the results (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). I achieved conformability by analyst triangulation with a second researcher[5]. The second researcher and I achieved transferability by providing "thick descriptions" of the data and describing the context for the reader in the following section. In addition, the second researcher and I achieved credibility by having a diversity expert/auditor[6], unfamiliar with the research questions or

[5] The researcher is a doctoral graduate from the Department of Educational Psychology at The University of Texas at Austin. The researcher self-identifies as White and has years of experience with qualitative research, such as discourse analysis.

[6] The auditor is a master's graduate from the Department of Educational Administration at The University of Texas at Austin. The auditor self-identifies as a person of color and has years of experience with social justice and qualitative research.

purpose of the study, review the raw data, coding process and notes, and resulting themes and subthemes of the analysis.

The constant comparative methodology used in this study consisted of six different stages. In stage one, another researcher and I first read and reread, independently, participants' responses to become immersed in the data. A total of 27 pages were analyzed with responses ranging from 2 lines to 2.5 pages with an average of 15 lines or .5 a page. The number of White privilege conditions the students' responded to ranged from zero to six with an average of three conditions. After reading the data, we met to discuss general patterns and themes observed emerging from the first 5 responses. Upon initial discussion, we negotiated interpretive parameters around emerging categories and created an outline of categories from the data (Miles & Huberman, 1994), which resulted in four to eight categories for each response.

Next, stage two consisted of reviewing and open coding the next 10 responses independently using the initial list of categories. The second researcher and I met again to discuss the coding scheme and the findings for these responses. From this process, we revised our coding structure (i.e., combining two categories into one, and adding two new categories).

Stage three then consisted of reviewing the rest of the 25 responses independently with the revised coding scheme. Once completed, we compared findings. We experienced four disagreements of the meaningfulness of a statement/code within these last responses, which resulted in returning to the original data. These disagreements were discussed and resolved without dropping the statement or code from the analysis.

In stage four, once the open coding was complete, we met and began to group similar categories together and explore other patterns and themes across categories. Upon completion of the content analysis and coding procedure, stage five consisted of independently reviewing the final themes and subthemes of coding for each response to assess coding accuracy. Finally, stage six consisted of exploring themes and subthemes for participants with high- and low-mindfulness scores.

The auditor reviewed all six stages of this constant comparative process, as well as the original data and disagreements encountered during coding. The auditor supported much of the coding process but provided two recommendations, which were incorporated as revisions. The first suggestion included revising the language for one of our themes and the second consisted of revising coding for one response. Because this second suggestion was also one of the code/statements that was initially disagreed upon, the auditor's suggestion was incorporated.

Results

I first investigated participants' responses to the WPS. Following, the research team identified themes and subthemes resulting from participants' responses and coding process. Finally, I explored themes and subthemes in relation to participants who were categorized in high and low mindfulness groups.

White Privilege Scores

Investigating participants' scores on the WPS resulted in the following findings. Frequencies indicated that 10 participants (5 high- and 5 low-mindful participants) had a total score above 3.5, indicating a high level of awareness and agreement to the construct

of White privilege. Therefore, these participants were included in the first three stages of the content analysis process in order to aid open coding, but then deleted from subsequent stages. The mean score of the 15 low-mindful participants was 2.50 with a standard deviation of .684, and 2.32 with a standard deviation of .604 for the 15 high-mindful participants. For the total 30 participants, internal consistency was .74 for the scores on the White privilege measure. The new demographics of the high-mindful group consisted of first-year (*n*=2, 13%), second-year (*n*=2, 13%), third-year (*n*=7, 47%), and fourth-year level students (*n*=4, 27%), with still, a little more than half self-identifying as female (*n*=8, 53%). The low mindful group now consisted of first-year (*n*=3, 20%), second-year (*n*=3, 20%), third-year (*n*=6, 40%), fourth-year level students (*n*=3, 20%), with close to half self-identifying as female (*n*=7, 47%).

Themes and Subthemes of the Content Analysis

In relation to participants' responses to the White privilege article, our content analysis process led to 4 general themes with 11 corresponding subthemes (see Table 13). The general themes represent varying levels of awareness and agreement to the construct of White privilege from none (Theme 1: Unawareness and/or denial to White privilege) to little (Theme 2: Low awareness and/or agreement to White privilege) to moderate (Theme 3: Moderate awareness and agreement to White privilege) and finally to high (Theme 4: Profound awareness and agreement to White privilege). Each participant's response was coded into only one general theme and more than likely, was coded into multiple subthemes of the broad category. Student demographics, such as classification

(e.g., first-year, second-year, etc.) and gender, did not appear to vary across the four general themes.

Table 13
Themes and Subthemes of the Content Analysis

Themes
Theme 1: Unawareness and/or denial to White privilege
Subtheme 1A: Presenting counter examples
Subtheme 1B: Exhibiting anger or defensiveness
Subtheme 1C: Using strong or certain language
Subtheme 1D: Attributing differential treatment to nonracial factors
Theme 2: Low awareness and/or agreement to White privilege
Subtheme 2A: Partially attributing differential treatment to nonracial factors
Subtheme 2B: Indicating a decrease in (or a desire to decrease) differential treatment
Subtheme 2C: Presenting counter or reverse discrimination examples
Theme 3: Moderate awareness and agreement to White privilege
Subtheme 3A: Expanding on or providing additional examples of White privilege
Subtheme 3B: Partially attributing differential treatment to nonracial factors
Theme 4: Profound awareness and agreement to White privilege
Subtheme 4A: Indicating the negative effects of White privilege
Subtheme 4B: Expanding on or providing additional examples of White privilege

The mean White privilege score (based on the WPS) for participants whose responses were categorized into Theme 1, Theme 2, Theme 3, and Theme 4 were 2.39, 2.26, 2.77, and 1.8, respectively, indicating a general level of disagreement to the construct of White privilege across categories. As a result, the category themes and corresponding subthemes within each category can exemplify how these individuals dealt with the post-decisional cognitive dissonance they experienced from indicating

disagreement to White privilege and then reading 47 conditions of how White privilege exists from McIntosh's article.

Theme 1: Unawareness and/or Denial to White Privilege

Of the total participants, 12 out of 30 were categorized as demonstrating unawareness, denial, or both to the construct of White privilege. Basically, White privilege, racial discrimination, or racial prejudice did not exist for all of these participants. For example, 7 participants identified with McIntosh's condition #44 ("I can easily find academic courses and institutions, which give attention only to people of my race") and expressed unawareness and disagreement, such as one student's reaction:

> I think there would be an uproar in America today if an academic institution limited its attention to only Caucasians. I have never been to or heard of any such place, nor have I heard of any student groups or scholarships explicitly reserved for White people alone.

Some participants expressed more of an overall unawareness, such as "I never think about race affecting my day to day activities. I can agree with most all of the statements here because I don't believe race has a huge affect on my life."

There were also four other common (but not majority) subthemes found across these participants who presented unawareness, resistance, or both to the construct of White privilege. These subthemes overlapped and included: presenting counter examples to support their position, exhibiting anger or defensiveness, using strong or certain language in their disagreement, and attributing differential treatment to nonracial factors.

Subtheme 1A: Presenting counter examples. Of the 12 participants, 7 expressed exception-to-the-rule or reverse discrimination examples to counter the White privilege conditions in the article. The exception example cited by 3 participants was U.S. President Barack Obama, as one student indicated,

> In my opinion these statements are racist and generalizing to all White people. White people are a majority yes, but it doesn't mean that there are no multiracial people represented in powerful positions. One is being Obama, the President of the United States.

In terms of reverse discrimination, 4 participants presented a variety of examples to support their disagreement or unawareness position to White privilege, such as indicating that White people are treated in a "derogatory fashion" by people of color, or being looked over for a job if "if the company has yet to meet its quota for minority candidates." Further, in relation to McIntosh's condition 5 ("I can go shopping alone most of the time, pretty well assured that I will not be followed or harassed"), one student responded, "This is absolutely not true. White people are followed and harassed just as much as any other race, if not more."

Subtheme 1B: Exhibiting anger or defensiveness. Of the 12 participants who demonstrated disagreement to White privilege, 5 expressed anger and defensiveness in their responses. A range of expressions were used within and across responses that included the following:

- "I think that a majority of all 47 statements are bullshit."

- "I hate how you put 'I' in front of every sentence as to say that it relates to me in any way."
- "I am NOT privileged because I am White."
- "Most of these statements are ridiculous."
- "This is just stupid."
- "The rest [of the conditions] are absurd but I will humor the survey."

In some cases, participants' anger and defensiveness was followed by prejudicial language, such as, "I honestly don't care and don't feel they need to be griping about more rights" and "Minorities continue to cry and whine" or possibly stereotypical language, "I don't see how this [McIntosh's condition 17] can even be related to race unless it is a certain type of food, though I don't wish to list those foods at this time."

Subtheme 1C: Using strong and certain language. Another subtheme found across a third of the participants was a use of strong and certain language when disagreeing to the construct of White privilege. Such examples include, "This is *absolutely* not true; These statements are…*wrong*; Number 41 is *completely false*; I believe it would be almost *impossible* to find a class that serves only to whites; *fairly certain* that Equifax doesn't look at your profile, see 'African American', and then lower your credit rating by 100 points."

Subtheme 1D: Attributing differential treatment to nonracial factors. A final subtheme found with a third of participants who were classified as lacking awareness or denying White privilege was attributing differential treatment to factors other than race. These participants might be exhibiting a degree of subtle prejudice (i.e., expressing their

prejudice indirectly or subtly as when racial beliefs or behavior can be justified on some other factor than race). For example, some other nonracial factors attributing to differential treatment were gender ("I believe that my being a woman has more to do with inequality than my race"), personality ("I do not associate race with work ethic … That is a general personality trait"), and behavior ("It is because people live on credit and don't pay bills/rent on time").

Theme 2: Low Awareness and/or Agreement to White Privilege

Of the total participants, 11 out of 30 were categorized as having a low degree of awareness, agreement, or both to the construct of White privilege. In general, these participants appeared to show a degree of awareness to at least one out of minimal three McIntosh's White privilege conditions they, on average, referenced, and would either exhibit agreement to or contradict/justify the condition.

For example, a participant identified McIntosh's first condition ("I can, if I wish, arrange to be in the company of people of my race most of the time") and provided the following unaware response:

> This isn't so much a privilege as much as it is a reality. Most of the organizations I am involved in are mainly made up of White men and women so it's not very hard to be in the company of people of my race. Like I said, I don't really see this as a "privilege." It's just easier to find White people than it is to find other races.

However, for the another conditions cited, this participant indicated a degree of awareness and agreement to White privilege, such as in response to McIntosh's condition 25 ("If a traffic cop pulls me over or if the IRS audits my tax return, I can be sure I

haven't been singled out because of my race"): "Again, I have no idea what it feels like to be singled out because of my race so I see this as a privilege. I can imagine it would be quite frustrating though."

In addition with this broad theme, participant responses differed from participants in the first theme by not expressing anger or defensiveness in their responses. Moreover, the language used in participant responses in this group was more flexible, which differed drastically from those 4 students in the first theme that used strong and certain language. For instance, phrases, such as "I think…; I do not totally agree…;" or "I feel is unlikely…" were used often across participants in this group.

There were also three other common (but not majority), overlapping subthemes found across participants whose responses indicated a low degree of awareness, agreement, or both to the construct of White privilege. These included partially attributing differential treatment to nonracial factors (e.g., Whites being the majority), indicating a decrease in (or a desire to decrease) differential treatment, and providing numerous counter examples. Two of these subthemes were somewhat similar to two subthemes in Theme 1. The main difference, however, was that participants in this general theme indicated a degree of awareness to at least one of the minimal three White privilege conditions participants, on average, referenced, in comparison to participants in Theme 1. In addition, other differences between these subthemes exist and are minor, such as the subtheme of attributing differential treatment to nonracial factors, which differs between Theme 1 and Theme 2 by degree of attribution from full to partial attribution.

Subtheme 2A: Partially attributing differential treatment to nonracial factors. Of the 11 participants categorized in this broad theme, 8 were found to partially attribute differential treatment to factors other than race. These participants' appeared to indicate agreement to differential treatment but would somewhat justify that at least one of the treatments was based on such nonracial factors as money, personality trait, achievement, class, appearance, Whites being majority, choice, or gender.

For example, one of these participants cited three of McIntosh's conditions and indicated:

> I feel these three describe White privilege in America today. Although number three is really a privilege of any one who has enough money to support themselves and their family should be able to live in an area which they can afford and want to live, I think that all people should be able to do well in a challenging situation without it being called a credit to their race.

To provide a further example, another participant concluded with the following:

> I think racial attitudes are more based on personality and personal achievement than solely race. Some people of color do fall into the stereotypes that are culturally placed on them, but a large number have started to break through these stereotypes and now on a more even platform.

Subtheme 2B: Indicating a decrease in (or a desire to decrease) differential treatment. Of the total participants falling into Theme 2, 7 indicated a decrease in differential treatment from America's past to present society, or a desire for egalitarianism or being color-blind. Examples of the decrease in differential treatment

are exhibited in the following responses: “More and more people are beginning to value a cultured view of the world and ignorance is something that I feel is not looked on kindly;” “Number 24, I feel is highly unlikely in today's time. Speaking to the person in charge now does not necessarily mean that you will be speaking to a white person. We have taken long strides;” and “Today I feel that race has nothing to do with that factor.” In relation to egalitarian or color-blind desires, the following two responses provide evidence: “I am never asked to speak for all the people of my racial group. This is true, but no one should be asked to speak for all of the people in one racial group;” and “We are all people and doing well should give credit to the person not the color of their skin.”

Subtheme 2C: Presenting counter examples. A third subtheme for 6 of the 11 participant responses was the use of counter examples to help support the subthemes or the overall theme found for this group. For instance, 2 participants cited President Barack Obama as an example of our society decreasing in differential treatment. Others cited disagreement with one or more of McIntosh’s White privilege conditions, by providing examples of reverse discrimination. For example, a participant responded,

> In today's society, the "White privilege", in many cases, works against White people, especially in the legal sense. If a White person is on trial against a person of race, many times the jury will decide in favor of the person of race, believing that White person persecuted the person of race b/c there does exist a notion of "White privilege".

Theme 3: Moderate Awareness and Agreement to White Privilege

Of the 30 total participants, 6 were categorized as having a moderate degree of awareness and acceptance to the construct of White privilege. Overall, these participants demonstrated a degree of awareness and agreement to at least two of McIntosh's White privilege conditions. Or, participants exhibited awareness and agreement to at least one condition of the minimal three selected, but indicated the negative effects caused by the privilege(s). For an example of this latter criterion, a participant demonstrated awareness and agreement to only one White privilege condition (I can do well at something without having people call me a credit to my race) and then indicated:

> I definitely feel that successful minority members, and in particular African Americans or Latinos, are often seen in this light, by both Whites and members of their own race. Often times you hear people say things like, "I am a proud, successful black woman"; however, I doubt many White people would make a similar statement. It is hard to see the fine line between being a leader or success story for a group of people without having one's success perhaps treated differently because of your background.

There were also two other common (but not majority), overlapping subthemes found across participants whose responses indicated a moderate degree of awareness, agreement, or both to the construct of White privilege. These include expanding on or providing additional examples of White privilege, and partially attributing differential treatment to nonracial factors. This last subtheme is similar to the subtheme found from the 8 participants categorized in Theme 2.

Subtheme 3A: Expanding on or providing additional examples of White privilege. Of the 6 participants who demonstrated a moderate degree of awareness and agreement to White privilege, 4 expanded or provided additional examples related to the White privilege condition(s) they agreed to in their responses. An example of expanding on a White privilege condition(s) is from a participant who agreed to condition 7 ("When I am told about our national heritage or about 'civilization,' I am shown that people of my color made it what it is") and responded:

> …when studying American history, our national heritage and our civilization, the focus was mostly on the White race and their domination and cultivation of the Americas. Granted, studies were done on all kinds of other cultures that were not Caucasian, but they were done in short periods of time, while the majority of the time was spent on our White forefathers discovering and colonizing our country.

An example of providing further examples related to the agreeing White privilege condition(s) is from a participant who agreed to condition 22 ("I can remain oblivious of the language and customs of persons of color who constitute the world's majority without feeling in my culture any penalty for such oblivion") and concluded:

> …I see how the author is coming from a very Americanized point of view of "White privilege." In this country, individuals such as Hispanics have a very difficult time because they are expected to learn and speak "White people" language. However, if a White person were to go to Spain, India, or Africa, they would definitely be penalized if they remained oblivious of the language and customs of different people.

Subtheme 3B: Partially attributing differential treatment to nonracial factors. The last subtheme included 3 of the 6 participant responses and refers to the partial attribution of differential treatment to factors other than race for the White privilege condition(s) disagreed upon. These participants demonstrated agreement to differential treatment but would partially rationalize that the treatment was based on such nonracial factors as Whites being the majority, gender, or being uncultured. For example, in disagreement to condition 6 ("I can turn on the television or open to the front page of the paper and see people of my race widely represented"), a participant responded:

> Newscasts and television programs are predominantly casted with Caucasian people, so it's not unlikely to turn on the television and see someone of my race on the screen. Of course, the media industry has been improving over the past few decades.

Theme 4: Profound Awareness and Agreement to White Privilege

Only 1 out of the 30 total participants was categorized as having a profound degree of awareness and acceptance to the construct of White privilege. This participant demonstrated a degree of awareness and agreement to all of the McIntosh's White privilege conditions referenced, as well as exhibited the following two subthemes found often in the response: indicating the negative effects and expanding on or providing additional examples of White privilege.

Subtheme 4A: Indicating the negative effects of White privilege. The participant who demonstrated a profound degree of acceptance and awareness to White privilege, indicated many negative effects of White privilege throughout her or his response. For

example, in relation to the agreement of condition 7 (“When I am told about our national heritage or about ‘civilization,’ I am shown that people of my color made it what it is”), this participant responded:

> I think this is an important point because children need positive role models to look up to. If schools or other contexts concentrate on white history leaders, then a child of a racial minority is learning that people of their race did not contribute positively to their history or culture.

Another example is in relation to condition 22 (“I can remain oblivious of the language and customs of persons of color who constitute the world's majority without feeling in my culture any penalty for such oblivion”), where the participant responded, “…our lack of knowledge of other cultures is regrettable because it makes the people of the United States seem as if we don't care about people in other countries.”

Subtheme 4B: Expanding on or providing additional examples of White privilege. The final subtheme found often throughout this participant’s response is substantially expanding or providing additional examples of White privilege. One example is in response to condition 22, where the participant provided an additional example of failing to learn about other cultures:

> When our Secretary of State Hilary Clinton went recently to Russia, she committed cultural and language blunders when she gave him a "reset" button, which was translated into the Russian word for 'overload'. The Russian representative had to explain to her (in English) her mistake. This reflects poorly

> on the United States that we could not even find a translator, while the Russian diplomat was able to communicate in our language.

In relation to condition 35 ("I can take a job with an affirmative action employer without having my co-workers on the job suspect that I got it because of my race"), this participant expanded on this privilege:

> When an employer looking to up their quota of minority employees uses affirmative action at the expense of white candidates, it is no surprise when the White co-workers assume that their new employee's race was a deciding factor. Policies like this, although they may increase the amount of minority employees in that workplace, send the message that these minority groups can't be successful without help.

Low and High Mindfulness Participants

The purpose of Study B was to explore if participants with a higher degree of mindfulness would exhibit greater acceptance to racial biases and less negative reactions resulting from post-decisional cognitive dissonance. As a result, I explored the differences between themes and subthemes of low and high mindfulness participants. The number of participants in low and high mindfulness groups by themes and subthemes are presented in Tables 14 and 15[7].

[7] I considered using non-parametric tests, such as a chi-square test, to explore if these differences between low mindful and high mindful were statistically significant. However, one of the general assumptions for these types of tests is that cell sizes are 5 or larger, which is not the case for Themes 3 and 4.

Table 14
Themes and Subthemes by Participants in the Low Mindfulness Group

Themes	***Low mindful n (%)***	***Total n***
Theme 1: Unawareness and/or denial to White privilege	**7 (58%)**	**12**
Subtheme 1A: Presenting counter examples	4 (57%)	7
Subtheme 1B: Exhibiting anger or defensiveness	4 (57%)	5
Subtheme 1C: Using strong or certain language	2 (29%)	4
Subtheme 1D: Attributing differential treatment to nonracial factors	4 (57%)	4
Theme 2: Low awareness and/or agreement to White privilege	**6 (55%)**	**11**
Subtheme 2A: Partially attributing differential treatment to nonracial factors	4 (67%)	8
Subtheme 2B: Indicating a decrease in (or a desire to decrease) differential treatment	3 (50%)	7
Subtheme 2C: Presenting counter or reverse discrimination examples	3 (50%)	6
Theme 3: Moderate awareness and agreement to White privilege	**2 (33%)**	**6**
Subtheme 3A: Expanding on or providing additional examples of White privilege	1 (50%)	4
Subtheme 3B: Partially attributing differential treatment to nonracial factors	1 (50%)	3
Theme 4: Profound awareness and agreement to White privilege	**0**	**1**
Subtheme 4A: Indicating the negative effects of White privilege	0	1
Subtheme 4B: Expanding on or providing additional examples of White privilege	0	1

Table 15
Themes and Subthemes by Participants in the High Mindfulness Group

Themes	*High mindful n (%)*	*Total n*
Theme 1: Unawareness and/or denial to White privilege	**5 (42%)**	**12**
Subtheme 1A: Presenting counter examples	3 (60%)	7
Subtheme 1B: Exhibiting anger or defensiveness	1 (20%)	5
Subtheme 1C: Using strong or certain language	2 (40%)	4
Subtheme 1D: Attributing differential treatment to nonracial factors	0	4
Theme 2: Low awareness and/or agreement to White privilege	**5 (45%)**	**11**
Subtheme 2A: Partially attributing differential treatment to nonracial factors	4 (80%)	8
Subtheme 2B: Indicating a decrease in (or a desire to decrease) differential treatment	4 (80%)	7
Subtheme 2C: Presenting counter or reverse discrimination examples	4 (80%)	6
Theme 3: Moderate awareness and agreement to White privilege	**4 (77%)**	**6**
Subtheme 3A: Expanding on or providing additional examples of White privilege	3 (75%)	4
Subtheme 3B: Partially attributing differential treatment to nonracial factors	2 (50%)	3
Theme 4: Profound awareness and agreement to White privilege	**1 (100%)**	**1**
Subtheme 4A: Indicating the negative effects of White privilege	1 (100%)	1
Subtheme 4B: Expanding on or providing additional examples of White privilege	1 (100%)	1

In terms of the four general themes, it appears that participants with a low degree of mindfulness are associated more with a lack or low degree of awareness and agreement to White privilege (58% and 55%, respectively), where participants with a moderate to high degree of mindfulness are associated with a higher degree of awareness and agreement to White privilege (77% and 100%, respectively). Within Theme 1, participants with low mindfulness are associated with more anger or defensive reactions to, what is assumed to be, post-decisional cognitive dissonance (57%) than participants

with high mindfulness (20%). Therefore, the results of Study B appear to indicate that participants with a higher degree of mindfulness exhibited greater acceptance to racial biases and less negative reactions resulting from post-decisional cognitive dissonance.

Discussion

The purpose of Study B was to explore if mindfulness influences White students' degree of acceptance towards the racial bias of White privilege, and decrease negative reactions resulting from post-decisional cognitive dissonance. From analyzing written responses to an article that lists 47 White privilege conditions from 15 participants with the lowest overall mindfulness scores and 15 participants with the highest mindfulness scores in Study A, and who all initially reported in Study B a low agreement to the construct of White privilege, four overall themes relating to differing degrees of awareness and acceptance to the construct of White privilege emerged. The findings suggest that, as predicted, participants with a higher degree of mindfulness appeared to exhibit greater acceptance to the racial construct of White privilege and less negative reactions resulting from post-decisional cognitive dissonance. This finding was similar to the results from the racial mindfulness study by Lillis and Hayes (2007), where mindfulness increased participants' degree of awareness and acceptance towards racial biases.

There are some limitations to this study. The other White coder and I could have influenced our interpretations of the data due to our race. In addition, I could have biased the results due to my perspective on the construct of White privilege, as well as my understanding of the purpose of the study. These possibilities were the reason for the use

of a qualified research team including an auditor who identifies as a person of color, as well as implementing numerous steps to ensure conformability, transferability, and credibility. However, the study still needs to be replicated. Social desirability also could have affected participants' responses. For example, one participant provided the following two statements, which could indicate that this person was concerned with social desirability when responding: "To preface this, I'd like to say that I was raised in a household that typically condemned other races privately but was open to them in public" and "I don't see how this can even be related to race unless it is a certain type of food, though I don't wish to list those foods at this time." Another limitation is that McIntosh's list of conditions was based on her own observations from 1989. An updated version of the White privilege list was considered but not implemented. Due to the number of respondents who used President Barack Obama as a counter example to White privilege, a revision is recommended for future research.

CHAPTER 7: GENERAL DISCUSSION

Overview

Persisting racial differences between White and marginalized racial groups continue to exist in almost every social sector. Such examples of racial inequalities can be observed in domains of net income and net worth, home equity and ownership, and academic success and schooling. Researchers have determined that a substantial portion of these inequalities is explained by past and present racial discrimination, which is initially driven by past and present racial prejudice.

Due to the rise in egalitarian beliefs and social norms, present racial prejudice and discrimination has not decreased within the last century, but rather they have altered to subtler and subconscious forms; in addition, these present forms have been found to have consequences just as devastating as historical racial attitudes and behavior. Because racial prejudice is believed to be the primary force behind racial discriminatory behavior, and consequently, inequalities, many researchers have focused on investigating variables and creating interventions to reduce conscious (subtle) and subconscious racial prejudice.

Prejudice researchers suggest three general conditions are needed to decrease one's racial attitudes: (a) consciousness of racial biases, (b) motivation to reduce them, and (c) cognitive strategies for prejudice regulation. However, most White Americans do not hold a high degree of racial consciousness; therefore, interventions and educational programs are needed. In addition, when Whites' racial consciousness is increased, many experience negative motivational outcomes from cognitive dissonance, such as anger or guilt, which can influence Whites to avoid or increase their racial attitudes. Moreover,

due to the natural of prejudice, developing and practicing cognitive strategies to continually regulate and reduce prejudice is cognitively taxing, difficult for many, and generally not a focus within most racial intervention/education programs, such as intergroup contact.

The construct of mindfulness may provide a solution to these limitations and help reduce both conscious (subtle) and subconscious racial prejudice. Mindfulness is defined as awareness of and attention to stimuli with open receptivity or acceptance. Therefore, this construct may reduce racial prejudice directly due to its inherent nature of increasing attention and awareness to stimuli (i.e., perhaps increasing racial consciousness). More importantly, mindfulness may directly improve a White person's degree of acceptance towards her or his racial prejudice, again, due to its definitional nature. Also, there is prior research that has showed mindfulness can decrease ego defense activation. Furthermore, mindfulness may reduce racial prejudice indirectly due to the work of researchers who have found that mindfulness can influence, or is associated with, similar motivational variables that reduces racial prejudice levels, such as social recategorization or social decategorization (i.e., interconnectedness), and empathy.

When mindfulness is directed towards race or incorporated with racial content (i.e., racial mindfulness), introducing the construct and mindfulness practices should substantially reduce racial prejudice levels both directly and indirectly. Although this is the ultimate goal of this program of research, this dissertation explored the initial and needed steps before a racial mindfulness intervention should be created, by first investigating the effects of general mindfulness on racial prejudice, and then the effects

of general mindfulness on accepting racial biases, such as White privilege. These exploratory steps will not only help create the theoretical framework and support for a racial mindfulness intervention, but can also guide the framework and intervention if any findings result.

Therefore, the first exploratory step, Study A, investigated the extent to White students' degree of general mindfulness can influence their degree of racial prejudice towards Blacks directly through its conceptual nature of influencing attention and awareness to internal and external stimuli. In addition, Study A explored the extent to White students' degree of general mindfulness can influence their degree of prejudice indirectly through influencing motivational mediating variables of social recategorization, social decategorization, and empathy. In order to more clearly determine the direct and indirect effect of mindfulness on racial prejudice, both of these explorations included controlling for participants' prior racial outgroup contact. Using structural equation modeling to explore these effects, results indicated that general mindfulness does not appear to reduce racial prejudice levels directly or indirectly.

The nonsignificant direct effects of mindfulness on conscious (subtle) and subconscious racial prejudice levels were unexpected, but yet, perhaps not too surprising. Assuming that a person's degree of awareness and attention to general stimuli (i.e., general mindfulness) would include racial stimuli (i.e., racial mindfulness) was possibly too distal – especially for Whites who are generally not aware and attentive to race. Implementing mindfulness practices before or during an intervention focusing on racial content (i.e., exploring a racial mindfulness intervention), particularity for White

students, presents a more proximal research design to explore the direct effects of mindfulness on racial prejudice.

The nonsignificant indirect effects of mindfulness on racial prejudice levels from Study A were more unexpected, as mindfulness has been found to increase variables that can reduce racial prejudice levels. In this study, mindfulness did significantly increase social decategorization and this latter variable did significantly decrease both conscious (subtle) and subconscious prejudice levels. However, mindfulness did not significantly increase social recategorization and empathy, and these latter variables did not significantly decrease prejudice levels.

Possible explanations for these nonsignificant effects relate to some of the instruments used in the study. For example, the social recategorization subscale was created for this study and although reliability and factor analyses were conducted and provide some psychometric validity for scores on the measure, this subscale's construct validity was not investigated. Therefore, there is a possibility that this subscale was not measuring its attended construct. In addition, the reason a relation between empathy and conscious (subtle) prejudice was not observed is perhaps because the prejudice scale used in this study measured participants' cognitive dimension of prejudice; prior researchers have found that empathy influences the affective dimension of racial prejudice rather than the cognitive dimension. As a result, future research incorporating a different social recategorization and conscious (subtle) measure, as well as alleviating the personal distress subscale for the empathy measure in this study – discussed in chapter 5, may provide a clearer exploration of whether mindfulness can indirectly reduce racial

prejudice through social recategorization, social decategorization, and empathy.

The next exploratory step, Study B, investigated if mindfulness can attenuate the negative effects that can arise from cognitive dissonance, and therefore, influence White students' degree of acceptance towards racial biases, such as White privilege. Many findings emerged from content analyzing written reactions to a White privilege article from participants identified as holding a high and low degree of general mindfulness and who expressed low agreement initially to the concept of White privilege. Overall, there appeared to be a continuum of awareness and acceptance to White privilege, from a lack of awareness and denial to a profound degree of awareness and acceptance. The results also appeared to indicate that participants with a high degree of mindfulness exhibited greater awareness and acceptance to White privilege and less negative reactions resulting from post-decisional cognitive dissonance. For example, 30% (*n*=5) of the high mindfulness participants appeared to express a moderate to high degree of acceptance to the White privilege article in comparison to a little over 10% (*n*=2) of the low mindfulness participants. In addition, 7% (*n*=1) of the high mindfulness participants appeared to exhibit anger or defensiveness to the article in contrary to 27% (*n*=4) of the low mindfulness participants.

Implications and Directions for Future Research

These overall findings and other results from these two studies underscore the (a) importance of needing racial interventions and educational programs for White college students, (b) support the need for a racial mindfulness intervention/program, and (c) inform curriculum development and activities for such an intervention. In relation to the

need for racial interventions/programs, the finding that White participants in Study A, on average, have a moderate degree of subconscious prejudice towards Blacks is disheartening, but, according to research, was not unexpected. Moreover, the finding that 30 out of initial 40 White participants in Study B indicated a general disagreement to the construct of White privilege, and only 7 out of the 30 disagreeing participants appeared to express at least a moderate level of acceptance after reading a list of countering information, was again, discouraging. These findings may emphasize that racial interventions or educational programs are needed at higher education institutions with predominantly White students.

The results from Study B support the need for future research in creating and exploring the effects of a racial mindfulness intervention/program. In a way, Study B simulated a short racial intervention. For example, in such an intervention, students arrive with a set of beliefs and then receive information that could discredit their belief system. The responses from Study B may exemplify some of the ways students might initially react from this intervention. For instance, a strong majority of participants may still exhibit denial or low agreement to the information being presented. Of these participants, a quarter may respond in anger or defensiveness, close to half may disagree by providing counter or reverse discrimination examples, and half of the participants may disagree by fully or partially attributing differential treatment to nonracial factors.

Therefore, even if a racial intervention/program is offered to White college students, it could be expected from Study B findings (as well as the literature on conscious [subtle] prejudice and the limitations on prejudice reduction) that the

intervention could push some students away from further exploration of racial bias reduction or increase their biased levels. As the main results of Study B showed (similar to Lillis & Hayes, 2007), participants with a higher degree of mindfulness appeared to exhibit greater acceptance to racial biases and less negative reactions. Therefore, a racial intervention/program/course that incorporates the discussion and practices of mindfulness may be needed for White college students in order to increase acceptance of racial biases, decrease negative emotions resulting from the intervention, and hopefully improve racial prejudice levels.

The results from Study B also could inform curriculum development and activities for a racial mindfulness intervention/program/course. For example, discussion and practices of mindfulness should probably be included at the beginning of the program before any racial content or activities are incorporated in order to decrease, as much as possible, the negative effects of cognitive dissonance. In addition, once mindfulness practices are in place, the subthemes from Study B indicate various themes that should be incorporated within the racial intervention portion. For example, training efforts that challenge the notion that differential treatment is unrelated to racial factors is needed. Results from Study B also seem to indicate that the intervention/program model should often try to incorporate mindfulness into racial bias activities to continue awareness and acceptance levels throughout the program. For example, there were many participants within Theme 2 and 3 of Study B that seemed to waver back and forth between agreement to White privilege throughout their responses.

Conclusion

The desired outcome of many racial interventions and programs is for Whites to awaken to and challenge their own and others' racial biases. As discussed throughout this dissertation, an obstacle for many Whites is not only becoming aware and attentive to race, but also moving past negative emotions, such as shame and guilt, when becoming conscious of racial biases. The results from Study B appear to indicate that mindfulness may be a way Whites could experience less negative reactions and become more accepting when becoming conscious of racial biases, such as White privilege. The next step in this program of research is to explore a racial mindfulness intervention and its effects on White college students' acceptance towards racial biases, racial prejudice levels, continued prejudice regulation, and discriminatory behavior.

Racial prejudice is indeed normative and common; however, it is also pernicious, causing much of the racial inequalities in America. When approached in a compassionate manner with the help of mindfulness, it is the hope of this program of research that the results will be substantial, especially for people who racially identify as White.

APPENDIX A: PREVIOUS RACIAL OUTGROUP CONTACT SCALE

Directions:
For the following statements, please indicate the percentage of people who are (or were) "White." As noted on the consent form, your results will be kept confidential.

	0-20%	21-40%	41-60%	61-80%	81-100%
1. Percentage of high school classmates that were White:	O	O	O	O	O
2. Percentage of neighborhood where you grew up that was White:	O	O	O	O	O
3. Percentage of current close friends that are White:	O	O	O	O	O
4. Percentage of current neighbors that are White:	O	O	O	O	O
5. Percentage of immediate family members that are White:	O	O	O	O	O
6. Percentage of non-immediate family members that you contact with regularly that are White:	O	O	O	O	O
7. Percentage of people you have had romantic relationships with who are White:	O	O	O	O	O

Note: All items were reverse scored.

APPENDIX B: FIVE FACET MINDFULNESS QUESTIONNAIRE (FFMQ)

Directions:
For the following statements, please rate each of the following statements using the scale provided. Your answers should indicate what best describes your own opinion of what is generally true for you.

		Never or very rarely true	Rarely true	Sometimes true	Often true	Very often or always true
1.	When I'm walking, I deliberately notice the sensations of my body moving.	O	O	O	O	O
2.	I'm good at finding words to describe my feelings.	O	O	O	O	O
3.	I criticize myself for having irrational or inappropriate emotions.	O	O	O	O	O
4.	I perceive my feelings and emotions without having to react to them.	O	O	O	O	O
5.	When I do things, my mind wanders off and I'm easily distracted.	O	O	O	O	O
6.	When I take a shower or bath, I stay alert to the sensations of water on my body.	O	O	O	O	O
7.	I can easily put my beliefs, opinions, and expectations into words.	O	O	O	O	O
8.	I don't pay attention to what I'm doing because I'm daydreaming, worrying, or otherwise distracted.	O	O	O	O	O
9.	I watch my feelings without getting lost in them.	O	O	O	O	O
10.	I tell myself I shouldn't be feeling the way I'm feeling.	O	O	O	O	O
11.	I notice how foods and drinks affect my thoughts, bodily sensations, and emotions.	O	O	O	O	O
12.	It's hard for me to find the words to describe what I'm thinking.	O	O	O	O	O
13.	I am easily distracted.	O	O	O	O	O
14.	I believe some of my thoughts are abnormal or bad and I shouldn't think that way.	O	O	O	O	O
15.	I pay attention to sensations, such as the wind in my hair or sun on my face.	O	O	O	O	O
16.	I have trouble thinking of the right words to express how I feel about things	O	O	O	O	O
17.	I make judgments about whether my thoughts are good or bad.	O	O	O	O	O
18.	I find it difficult to stay focused on what's happening in the present.	O	O	O	O	O
19.	When I have distressing thoughts or images, I "step back" and am aware of the thought or image without getting taken over by it.	O	O	O	O	O

20.	I pay attention to sounds, such as clocks ticking, birds chirping, or cars passing.	O	O	O	O	O
21.	In difficult situations, I can pause without immediately reacting.	O	O	O	O	O
22.	When I have a sensation in my body, it's difficult for me to describe it because I can't find the right words.	O	O	O	O	O
23.	It seems I am "running on automatic" without much awareness of what I'm doing.	O	O	O	O	O
24.	When I have distressing thoughts or images, I feel calm soon after.	O	O	O	O	O
25.	I tell myself that I shouldn't be thinking the way I'm thinking.	O	O	O	O	O
26.	I notice the smells and aromas of things.	O	O	O	O	O
27.	Even when I'm feeling terribly upset, I can find a way to put it into words.	O	O	O	O	O
28.	I rush through activities without being really attentive to them.	O	O	O	O	O
29.	When I have distressing thoughts or images I am able just to notice them without reacting.	O	O	O	O	O
30.	I think some of my emotions are bad or inappropriate and I shouldn't feel them.	O	O	O	O	O
31.	I notice visual elements in art or nature, such as colors, shapes, textures, or patterns of light and shadow.	O	O	O	O	O
32.	My natural tendency is to put my experiences into words.	O	O	O	O	O
33.	When I have distressing thoughts or images, I just notice them and let them go.	O	O	O	O	O
34.	I do jobs or tasks automatically without being aware of what I'm doing.	O	O	O	O	O
35.	When I have distressing thoughts or images, I judge myself as good or bad, depending what the thought/image is about.	O	O	O	O	O
36.	I pay attention to how my emotions affect my thoughts and behavior.	O	O	O	O	O
37.	I can usually describe how I feel at the moment in considerable detail.	O	O	O	O	O
38.	I find myself doing things without paying attention.	O	O	O	O	O
39.	I disapprove of myself when I have irrational ideas.	O	O	O	O	O

Note: Items 3, 5, 8, 10, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 22, 23, 25, 28, 30, 34, 35, 38, and 39 were reverse scored; Items 1, 6, 11, 15, 20, 26, 31, and 36 are observe subscale items. Items 2, 7, 12, 16, 22, 27, 32, and 37 are describe subscale items; Items 5, 8, 13, 18, 23, 28, 34, and 38 are act with awareness items; Items 3, 10, 14, 17, 25, 30, 35, and 39 are nonjudge subscale items; Items 4, 9, 19, 21, 24, 29, and 33 are non-react subscale items.

APPENDIX C: INTERPERSONAL REACTIVITY INDEX (IRI)

Directions:
For the following statements, please indicate how well the item describes you.

		Does not describe me well		Neutral		Describes me very well
1.	I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me.	O	O	O	O	O
2.	I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the "other guy's" point of view.	O	O	O	O	O
3.	Sometimes I don't feel very sorry for other people when they are having problems.	O	O	O	O	O
4.	In emergency situations, I feel apprehensive and ill-at-ease.	O	O	O	O	O
5.	I try to look at everybody's side of a disagreement before I make a decision.	O	O	O	O	O
6.	When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective towards them.	O	O	O	O	O
7.	I sometimes feel helpless when I am in the middle of a very emotional situation.	O	O	O	O	O
8.	I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look from their perspective.	O	O	O	O	O
9.	When I see someone get hurt, I tend to remain calm.	O	O	O	O	O
10.	Other people's misfortunes do not usually disturb me a great deal.	O	O	O	O	O
11.	If I'm sure I'm right about something, I don't waste much time listening to other people's arguments.	O	O	O	O	O
12.	Being in a tense emotional situation scares me.	O	O	O	O	O
13.	When I see someone being treated unfairly, I sometimes don't feel very much pity for them.	O	O	O	O	O
14.	I am usually pretty effective in dealing with emergencies.	O	O	O	O	O
15.	I am often quite touched by things that I see happen.	O	O	O	O	O

16.	I believe that there are two sides to every question and try to look at them both.	O	O	O	O	O
17.	I would describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person.	O	O	O	O	O
18.	I tend to lose control during emergencies.	O	O	O	O	O
19.	When I'm upset at someone, I usually try to "put myself in his shoes" for a while.	O	O	O	O	O
20.	When I see someone who badly needs help in an emergency, I go to pieces.	O	O	O	O	O
21.	Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I were in their place.	O	O	O	O	O

Note: Items 2, 3, 10, 11, 13, and all personal distress subscale items were reverse scored; Items 2, 5, 8, 11, 16, 19, and 21 are perspective-taking subscale items; Items 1, 3, 6, 10, 13, 15, and 17 are empathetic concern subscale item; Items 4, 7, 9, 12, 14, 18, and 20 are personal distress subscale items.

APPENDIX D: PILOT STUDY FOR THE SOCIAL RE(DE)CATEGORIZATION SCALE

The purpose of this pilot study was to explore the psychometrics of the Social Re(De)categorization scale (adapted from Gaertner et al., 1994) that will be used in Study A of the dissertation. The Social Re(De)categorization scale was designed to measure two factors of group membership: social recategorization and decategorization using nine items on a 5-point Likert response scale. Four items of this scale have been used in prior research (Gaernter et al., 1994) and five new items were constructed for this dissertation. Therefore, scale psychometrics need to be explored.

A total 124 graduate students from the University of Texas at Austin completed the Social Re(De)categorization scale through a SurveyMonkey Web site. More of the participants identified as female (68%) and one student (1%) identified as transgender. In terms of race, most participants identified as White (63%), while others identified as Asian (20%), Black (2%), and Latina/o (15%). Participants' represented a wide range of departments from Biological Sciences to Spanish and Portuguese.

Participant responses were analyzed using exploratory factor analysis. Maximum-likelihood factoring was used to extract factors, followed by a direct oblimin rotation to obtain a simple structure and improve the interpretability of the initial solution. An oblique rotation was used, as it was expected social recategorization and decategorization factors would be correlated.

A scree test and a parallel analysis suggested two meaningful factors. Regarding identification of the rotated factors, an item was considered unidimensional (loading on

only one factor between -1 and +1), if the pattern and structure coefficients were greater than .40 for that factor. From this criterion, three items were deleted.

The remaining six items were then re-investigated with exploratory factor analysis for a final time and the same factors remained. Three items loaded on the first factor and three items loaded on the second factor. All items appeared to load on its projected factor. As a result, factor one was labeled Social Recategorization and factor two was labeled Social Decategorization. Based on these six items the initial eigenvalues and percentage of variance explained were 2.197 and 36.62% for Recategorization and 1.389 and 23.16% for Decategorization. The pattern and structure matrices from the direct oblimin model are presented in Table 15.

Table 16
Rotated Pattern and Structure Matrices for Responses to the Social Re(De)Categorization Scale

Social Re(De)categorization Item	Factor 1 – SR		Factor 2 - SD	
	Pattern	Structure	Pattern	Structure
SR 1. Despite the different groups around campus, there is frequently the sense that we are all just one group.	**.767**	**777**	.038	.237
SR 2. Although there are different groups of students on campus, it feels as though we are all playing for the same team.	**.654**	**.631**	-.087	.083
SR 3. I tend to feel that we are all the same even though there are different groups of students on campus.	**.683**	**.697**	.053	.231
SD 1. It is easy for me to see students as just people rather than as members of a particular group.	.159	.268	**.417**	**.458**
SD 2. I tend to first see another student on campus as a member of a group rather than as an individual.	-.073	.130	**.780**	**.761**
SD 3. It is difficult for me to see students on campus as members of a particular group rather than individuals.	-.024	.085	**.417**	**.411**

Note: SR indicates Social Recategorization and SD indicates Social Decategorization. Scale items were renumbered for ease of presentation.

Reliability was assessed via estimates of the internal consistency of scores for each factor of the Social Re(De)categorization scale. Cronbach's coefficient alphas for

the 6-item scale were .74 and .55, respectively, for the Social Recategorization and Social Decategorization subscales. Due to the responses on the Social Decategorization subscale failing to reach a desirable alpha of .70, or at least .60, as well as two of the subscale items having low pattern and structural coefficients, the two items that were predicted to measure social decategorization but were dropped during the factor analysis procedure above will be modified and reinvestigated during Study A. Incorporating these modified items will hopefully improve the factor structure and internal consistency of this subscale, which is presented in Appendix E.

APPENDIX E: SOCIAL RE(DE)CATEGORIZATION SCALE

Directions:
The following statements inquire about your perception of the student body here at The University of Texas at Austin. Below, please indicate the extent you agree with each statement.

		Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
1.	On campus, it usually feels as though we are individuals and not members of particular groups.	O	O	O	O	O
2.	Majority of the time, I have a hard time feeling a common bond with someone from a different group.	O	O	O	O	O
3.	Despite the different groups around campus, there is frequently the sense that we are all just one group.	O	O	O	O	O
4.	I tend to first see another student on campus as a member of a group rather than as an individual.	O	O	O	O	O
5.	Although there are different groups of students on campus, it feels as though we are all playing for the same team.	O	O	O	O	O
6.	It is difficult for me to see students on campus as members of a particular group rather than individuals.	O	O	O	O	O
7.	Around campus, it usually feels as though we belong to different groups.	O	O	O	O	O
8.	I tend to feel that we are all the same even though there are different groups of students on campus.	O	O	O	O	O
9.	It is easy for me to see students as just people rather than as members of a particular group.	O	O	O	O	O

Note: Items 2, 4, and 7 were reverse scored; Items 2, 3, 5, and 8 are recategorization subscale items; Items 1, 4, 6, 7, and 9 are decategorization subscale items. Items 1, 2, and 7 are the modified items from the pilot study results.

APPENDIX F: SYMBOLIC RACISM 2000 SCALE (SR2K)

Directions:
Please indicate your response to the following questions. As noted on the consent form, your results are completely anonymous.

1. It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if Blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as Whites.
   O strongly agree
   O somewhat agree
   O somewhat disagree
   O strongly disagree

2. Irish, Italian, Jewish, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same.
   O strongly agree
   O somewhat agree
   O somewhat disagree
   O strongly disagree

3. Some say that Black leaders have been trying to push too fast. Others feel they haven't pushed fast enough. What do you think?
   O trying to push too fast
   O moving at about the right speed
   O going too slowly

4. How much of the racial tension that exists in the United States today do you think Blacks are responsible for creating?
   O all of it
   O most
   O some
   O not much at all

5. How much discrimination against Blacks do you feel there is in the United States today, limiting their chances to get ahead?
   O a lot
   O some
   O just a little
   O none at all

6. Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for Blacks to work their way out of the lower class.
   O strongly agree
   O somewhat agree
   O somewhat disagree
   O strongly disagree

7. Over the past few years, Blacks have gotten less than they deserve.
   O strongly agree
   O somewhat agree
   O somewhat disagree
   O strongly disagree

8. Over the past few years, Blacks have gotten more economically than they deserve.
   O strongly agree
   O somewhat agree
   O somewhat disagree
   O strongly disagree

Note: Items 1, 2, 3, 4, and 8 were reverse scored.

APPENDIX G: WHITE PRIVILEGE SCALE (WPS)

Directions:
Please indicate the extent you agree with each statement below.

		Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
1.	White people have certain advantages that minorities do not have in this society.	O	O	O	O	O
2.	My status as a White person grants me unearned privileges in today's society.	O	O	O	O	O
3.	I feel that White skin in the United States opens many doors for Whites during their everyday lives.	O	O	O	O	O
4.	I do not feel that White people have any benefits or privileges due to their race.	O	O	O	O	O
5.	My skin color is an asset to me in my everyday life.	O	O	O	O	O

Note: Item 4 was reverse scored.

APPENDIX H: WHITE PRIVILEGE ARTICLE

Daily effects of white privilege

I decided to try to work on myself at least by identifying some of the daily effects of white privilege in my life. I have chosen those conditions that I think in my case attach somewhat more to skin-color privilege than to class, religion, ethnic status, or geographic location, though of course all these other factors are intricately intertwined. As far as I can tell, my African American coworkers, friends, and acquaintances with whom I come into daily or frequent contact in this particular time, place and time of work cannot count on most of these conditions.

1. I can if I wish arrange to be in the company of people of my race most of the time.
2. I can avoid spending time with people whom I was trained to mistrust and who have learned to mistrust my kind or me.
3. If I should need to move, I can be pretty sure of renting or purchasing housing in an area, which I can afford and in which I would want to live.
4. I can be pretty sure that my neighbors in such a location will be neutral or pleasant to me.
5. I can go shopping alone most of the time, pretty well assured that I will not be followed or harassed.
6. I can turn on the television or open to the front page of the paper and see people of my race widely represented.
7. When I am told about our national heritage or about "civilization," I am shown that people of my color made it what it is.
8. I can be sure that my children will be given curricular materials that testify to the existence of their race.
9. If I want to, I can be pretty sure of finding a publisher for this piece on white privilege.
10. I can be pretty sure of having my voice heard in a group in which I am the only member of my race.
11. I can be casual about whether or not to listen to another person's voice in a group in which s/he is the only member of his/her race.
12. I can go into a music shop and count on finding the music of my race represented, into a supermarket and find the staple foods, which fit with my cultural traditions, into a hairdresser's shop and find someone who can cut my hair.
13. Whether I use checks, credit cards or cash, I can count on my skin color not to work against the appearance of financial reliability.
14. I can arrange to protect my children most of the time from people who might not like them.
15. I do not have to educate my children to be aware of systemic racism for their own daily physical protection.
16. I can be pretty sure that my children's teachers and employers will tolerate them if they fit school and workplace norms; my chief worries about them do not concern others' attitudes toward their race.
17. I can talk with my mouth full and not have people put this down to my color.
18. I can swear, or dress in second hand clothes, or not answer letters, without having people attribute these choices to the bad morals, the poverty or the illiteracy of my race.
19. I can speak in public to a powerful male group without putting my race on trial.
20. I can do well in a challenging situation without being called a credit to my race.
21. I am never asked to speak for all the people of my racial group.
22. I can remain oblivious of the language and customs of persons of color who constitute the world's majority without feeling in my culture any penalty for such oblivion.
23. I can criticize our government and talk about how much I fear its policies and behavior without being seen as a cultural outsider.
24. I can be pretty sure that if I ask to talk to the "person in charge", I will be facing a person of my race.

25. If a traffic cop pulls me over or if the IRS audits my tax return, I can be sure I haven't been singled out because of my race.
26. I can easily buy posters, post-cards, picture books, greeting cards, dolls, toys and children's magazines featuring people of my race.
27. I can go home from most meetings of organizations I belong to feeling somewhat tied in, rather than isolated, out-of-place, outnumbered, unheard, held at a distance or feared.
28. I can be pretty sure that an argument with a colleague of another race is more likely to jeopardize her/his chances for advancement than to jeopardize mine.
29. I can be pretty sure that if I argue for the promotion of a person of another race, or a program centering on race, this is not likely to cost me heavily within my present setting, even if my colleagues disagree with me.
30. If I declare there is a racial issue at hand, or there isn't a racial issue at hand, my race will lend me more credibility for either position than a person of color will have.
31. I can choose to ignore developments in minority writing and minority activist programs, or disparage them, or learn from them, but in any case, I can find ways to be more or less protected from negative consequences of any of these choices.
32. My culture gives me little fear about ignoring the perspectives and powers of people of other races.
33. I am not made acutely aware that my shape, bearing or body odor will be taken as a reflection on my race.
34. I can worry about racism without being seen as self-interested or self-seeking.
35. I can take a job with an affirmative action employer without having my co-workers on the job suspect that I got it because of my race.
36. If my day, week or year is going badly, I need not ask of each negative episode or situation whether it had racial overtones.
37. I can be pretty sure of finding people who would be willing to talk with me and advise me about my next steps, professionally.
38. I can think over many options, social, political, imaginative or professional, without asking whether a person of my race would be accepted or allowed to do what I want to do.
39. I can be late to a meeting without having the lateness reflect on my race.
40. I can choose public accommodation without fearing that people of my race cannot get in or will be mistreated in the places I have chosen.
41. I can be sure that if I need legal or medical help, my race will not work against me.
42. I can arrange my activities so that I will never have to experience feelings of rejection owing to my race.
43. If I have low credibility as a leader I can be sure that my race is not the problem.
44. I can easily find academic courses and institutions, which give attention only to people of my race.
45. I can expect figurative language and imagery in all of the arts to testify to experiences of my race.
46. I can choose blemish cover or bandages in "flesh" color and have them more or less match my skin.
47. I can travel alone or with my spouse without expecting embarrassment or hostility in those who deal with us.

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VITA

John Vincent Kucsera, Jr. received a degree of Bachelor of Arts from the University of Texas at Austin in 2001. Following, he spent some time as a mental health counselor, crisis specialist, and then found his home as a special education teacher and diversity trainer. John then returned to the University of Texas at Austin to pursue advanced degrees in Educational Psychology; he received a Master of Arts in 2006. His research and teaching interests center on teaching effectiveness and educational programs for social equality. John considers himself racially prejudiced, and tries to mindfully regulate and counter such attitudes daily. He hopes to continue to influence growth, on paper or in person, small or large, for himself or for others.

Permanent Address: 6104 Laird Drive, Austin, Texas 78705

This manuscript was typed by the author.