



University of Groningen

The political economy of central bank risk management

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Theses

- 1. How the central bank manages risk on monetary policy operations has pervasive impact on financial markets and, hence, the evolution of capitalist societies
- 2. The central bank's collateral framework and other aspects of central bank risk management should be understood as policy tools in their own right
- 3. Central banks remain reluctant to acknowledge the societal impact of risk management, even if their economic importance has grown dramatically in the past years
- 4. The European Monetary Institute failed to agree harmonized rules for ECB collateral in the late 1990s because of the already at the time high stakes of inclusion
- 5. The ECB's 2005 minimum credit rating requirement and 2006 Single List of Eligible Collateral were the result of a process of internal depoliticization
- 6. The principle of market neutrality reflects central banks' erroneous understanding of themselves as apolitical actors
- 7. When political issues raised by risk management cannot be resolved internally, central banks should more readily refer them back to democratic institutions.
- 8. Universities should impose an internal levy on travel-related CO₂ emissions
- 9. It was a wise decision to not include a pun on making money in the title of this dissertation