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Lubbers, M.; Scheepers, P.

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Divergent trends of euroscepticism in countries and regions of the European Union

MARCEL LUBBERS¹ & PEER SCHEEPERS²

¹Utrecht University, The Netherlands; ²Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands

Abstract. Changes in different aspects of euroscepticism developed at different paces and in varying directions in the regions and countries of the European Union (EU) from 1994 to 2004. Using Eurobarometer data, along with data on country and region characteristics, information on the positions of the political parties and media attention paid to the EU, it is tested in detail whether opposite developments in euroscepticism were associated with opposite developments in influencing contextual characteristics. The authors found that the Netherlands became systematically more sceptical towards the EU, whereas the opposite trend was found in Spain. The introduction of the Euro partially explains these divergent trends, but the direction of this effect varies with countries' GDP. Changes in media attention on the EU further explain the changes in the public's attitude. However, this effect is contingent upon specific circumstances. Growing media attention increases political euroscepticism in countries with a negative EU budget balance, whereas it decreases such scepticism in countries with a positive balance. The effect of left-right ideological placement is contingent upon the EU budget balance as well. Finally, the effect of education on euroscepticism is found to be smaller in countries with a higher GDP.

Introduction

The rejection of the European Constitution in France and the Netherlands in the 2005 referenda made apparent that numerous citizens of the old Member States were hesitant to further European integration. In particular, the big Dutch '*nee*' came as a revelation because the Netherlands had always given the strongest public support for the European Union (EU) and further integration (Eichenberg & Dalton 1993; Deflem & Pampel 1996; Díez Medrano 2003; Lubbers & Scheepers 2005). The reduction of sovereignty of the nation-state in deciding on certain policy domains is one of the central controversies of the European Constitution. Resistance to this process, labelled 'political euroscepticism', has received far less scientific attention than 'instrumental euroscepticism' (i.e., considering membership of the European Union to bring few benefits or to be a 'bad thing') (Anderson 1998; Anderson & Reichert 1996; Deflem & Pampel 1996; Eichenberg & Dalton 1993; Hooghe & Marks 2005,

Gabel 1998a, 1998b; Mahler et al. 2000; Marsh 1999; McLaren 2006; Steenbergen et al. 2007). Trend research focused, almost exclusively, on instrumental euroscepticism, for which indicators have been available since the early 1970s in the Eurobarometer data. These refer to the evaluation of the Union in economic terms. After the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, other questions, related to political and cultural dimensions, became more relevant. The Treaty not only aimed at further economic integration; it also paved the way for further political integration. Moreover, the 'European citizen' was born, increasing the relevance of the extent to which scepticism towards the EU was induced by opposition to political integration and questions of (non-) identification with the EU. The extent to which changes in economic, political and cultural euroscepticism are affected by the same contextual characteristics is unknown, however.

Harmsen (2004) and Harmsen and Spiering (2004) focused on the evolution of the European political debate towards growing critical sentiments in the 1990s. They found this 'discursive shift' especially in Germany, the Netherlands and Ireland (Harmsen & Spiering 2004). To what extent the more recent shift has been reproduced in public opinion is not clear. Explanatory trend research is scarce, but Mahler et al. (2000) supplied this up to the mid-1990s. Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) provided macro-level analyses for the period 1973–1988. They extended this research by trying to explain the trends in euroscepticism from 1973 to 2004 – the longest time span so far covered by any study (Eichenberg & Dalton 2007). Slomczynski and Shabad (2003) provided an analysis of changes in Polish public opinion towards EU membership. Ray (2003) studied the extent to which changes in political party programmes and the salience attached by the parties to the EU affected the public's attitude.

Most recently, Steenbergen et al. (2007) extended this line of research with questions on mass-elite linkage and – as we defined it here – the development of instrumental euroscepticism. With this contribution, these lines of research are broadened by proposing a simultaneous test of different trend explanations and by testing these explanations for different expressions of euroscepticism – therewith providing comparisons with the research of Eichenberg and Dalton (2007). Because these authors showed that after the Treaty of Maastricht, there had been a notable change in euroscepticism trends, this study focuses on annual data from 1994 to 2004 on attitudes towards the EU that can be related to trends in country, as well as regional characteristics. Moreover, with multi-level analyses, we can answer questions about the changing relevance of individual-level characteristics for explaining attitudes towards the EU.

In this contribution, two questions will be addressed. First, to what extent can different aspects of euroscepticism be modelled as trends from 1994 to 2004, and to what extent do these trends vary between countries and regions?

And second, to what extent can changes in the composition of the population, or changes in the context of people's living conditions explain these trends? However, this research will not only focus on this contextual level, it will also take into account individual-level characteristics that have been found to be important determinants of euroscepticism. To answer these questions, an overview of previously proposed explanations is presented, constituting a more general synthesis of theoretical insights and empirical findings.

Changes in social composition between regions and countries over time

Trends in euroscepticism can be explained by changes in social composition with regard to the characteristics that previous research has shown to be related to euroscepticism. Previous studies (on socio-structural characteristics) reveal that lower social strata are particularly more eurosceptical (Gabel 1998a; McLaren 2006). Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) proposed to explain this with the human capital hypothesis. People experience different costs and benefits from EU membership and are therefore expected to differ in their attitudes towards the EU (Gabel & Palmer 1995). More educated and higher occupational category people are believed to profit more than those in lower social strata from the free movement of people and goods (Ultee 1989). Since privileged categories have better opportunities to apply their talents in an international setting than do lower strata categories, the former are expected to be more favourable to European integration (Gabel & Palmer 1995) and therefore less prone to subscribe to euroscepticism. However, there are other reasons for the eurosceptical sentiments in the lower strata. Recently, it has been stressed that people of certain social categories fear stronger denationalisation due to further EU integration (De Master & Le Roy 2000; McLaren 2006) and therefore support euroscepticism more strongly. It has actually been demonstrated that national identification as well as perceived threat from immigrants that both prevail among lower strata are more strongly correlated with euroscepticism than other attitudes (De Vreese & Boomgaarden 2005; Hooghe & Marks 2005; Luedtke 2005; McLaren 2006; Lubbers & Scheepers 2007).

Educational and social class composition effects may explain differences in euroscepticism between countries and regions. The decrease in euroscepticism over time in certain countries may be due to changes in the educational or class composition, among which would be increasing numbers of highly educated and service class people. Our first hypothesis proposes that differences over time in euroscepticism between countries and regions will be reduced after controlling for differences in the social structural composition of these populations.

Changes over time in left-right placement between regions and countries

Extreme left-wing and extreme right-wing parties have often been the strongest opponents of further EU integration. Euroscepticism was correspondingly often modelled as a curvilinear function of people's left-right placement (Steenbergen et al. 2007). The evidence, however, has not been consistent. We expect that the more people place themselves on the political right, the more they support European integration (Deflem & Pampel 1996): right-wing people are more supportive of EU membership and thus are less supportive of instrumental euroscepticism because they expect profits from European integration owing to liberal market policies. A curvilinear function can be expected when the far right opposes such liberal market policies (Steenbergen et al. 2007; Kitschelt 1995). Yet, others have shown that the left-wing is less sceptical towards the EU (Ladrech 2000; Tsebelis & Garrett 2000; Hix et al. 2007). Right-wing people would be more likely to fear denationalisation and consequently would be rather sceptical of transferring decision making to the EU, as has been shown by Ray (2004) and McLaren (2006). Taggart and Szczerbiak (2004) explain the position of voters by party-based euroscepticism, which assumes that voters follow clues from political parties (Hooghe & Marks 2005): left-wing parties promote a social Europe and take a critical position towards a neo-liberal Europe, whereas right-wing parties promote an economic Europe and take a critical stance on the EU's interference in other domains. Considering these somewhat inconsistent findings, we suppose that different aspects of euroscepticism are related to left-right placement. Overall, political placement composition effects are expected to cause variation in euroscepticism between countries and regions.

Changes in economic conditions of countries and regions

The main proposition regarding contextual-level effects on euroscepticism is that people living in countries that benefit more strongly from European integration are less eurosceptical (Gabel 1998a; Mahler et al. 2000; McLaren 2006; Lubbers & Scheepers 2007). This proposition was straightforwardly applied to the EU contribution of each Member State. People in the southern European countries and Ireland, then, are expected to be the least sceptical, whereas those in the largest net contributing countries (i.e., Germany, the Netherlands and Luxembourg) are expected to be the most sceptical. Negotiations between the countries lead to adjustments in the yearly contributions. Annual reductions of these EU contributions may be 'sold' by governments to

the general public as a financial improvement. It is therefore expected that changes over time in the net contribution may explain changes in attitudes towards the EU.

The literature on euroscepticism until now has focused more specifically on three contextual economic factors: GDP, unemployment and inflation (Eichenberg & Dalton 1993). In the traditional utilitarian approach (Mahler et al. 2000: 435), economic difficulties would produce more scepticism ‘as politicians are blamed for recessions’. As trust in national politics and European politics are highly correlated, so too the EU, as a political institution, is expected to be held responsible for worsening economic conditions: slower or even a negative growth of the national or regional GDP, rising national or regional unemployment, and larger inflation rates are expected to increase scepticism towards the EU.

The introduction of the euro in January 2002 led many countries to complain against rising prices. Almost throughout Europe, the increase in food prices was faster in the year *before* the introduction of the euro than the average increase between 1994 and 2004 (Eurostat 2005c). In some countries, this continued throughout 2002, but at a lower rate. We therefore propose that the introduction of the euro in general has increased euroscepticism. However, in richer countries with relatively stable currencies, this effect probably has been stronger. In these countries, increased fears over economic instability may have dominated, whereas in poorer countries an opposite process may have taken place. After the introduction of the euro, people in countries with higher GDP would have turned more sceptical towards the EU, whereas those in countries with lower GDP would have turned less sceptical. Hence, an interaction between the introduction of the euro and the level of the GDP is expected.

Changes in political climate

National party programmes do not differ strongly with respect to the EU issue. Van der Eijk and Franklin (2004: 45) describe the lack of choice: ‘[V]oters at all positions of the left-right scale are offered little choice with respect to EU integration by their parties in their system.’ Most political parties in the centre of the left-right spectrum showed their pro-EU position on further integration. Only those at the extreme ends, the – mostly – smaller parties proclaimed more eurosceptical stances (Hooghe 2003; Marks et al. 2006; Steenbergen et al. 2007). However, Steenbergen and Scott (2004) emphasised that, both within and between countries, variation exists in the salience attributed by the parties to European integration. Over the 1980s and 1990s, the average salience was

particularly low in the Netherlands and high in Denmark and Greece. In the new century, it seems that more parties have adopted eurocritical stances, if only to take the wind out of the sails of the far right-wing parties. Still, as European Commissioner Bolkestein once alarmingly observed, there is hardly a topic where the elite and voters differ so strongly, which makes the issue a political time bomb, even in national elections (Harmsen 2004). Ray (2003) showed, indeed, that the position of parties on European integration determines public opinion on European integration, modelled as variation between countries. Moreover, he showed that the influence of parties' stances on integration is contingent upon the salience parties attach to the subject. The position and salience of parties on European integration are expected to have developed at different paces across Europe. Steenbergen et al. (2007) showed that integration positions of parties affect the aggregated public's opinion only for the parties that attach high salience to the issue. It is expected that when political parties put more emphasis on European integration and take positions that strongly favour more European integration, the public will be less eurosceptic, regardless of the aspect of euroscepticism.

Changes in media coverage

Media provide knowledge about the EU (Hoddes 1997; Díez Medrano 2003; De Vreese 2003; De Vreese & Boomgaarden 2006; Kriesi 2007). According to Inglehart (1970), more information about the EU makes people better acquainted with it, and therefore less sceptical. A straightforward hypothesis would be that the higher the media attention to the EU, the less sceptical people would be towards the Union and the more they would identify with it. Yet we hesitate to propose this hypothesis for two reasons. First, more media attention to the EU is likely to be perceived as growing salience of the Union in politics. This actual or perceived importance may be accompanied by a perception of threat to sovereignty of the nation-state, which in turn induces a sceptical reaction. Second, more media attention provides the opportunity for more balanced stories, commentaries and more critical news. Díez Medrano (2003) and Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) provide evidence for the existence of various frames. As discussions in the news focus on problems rather than on positive events in the Union, it is expected that the higher the media attention to the EU, the more sceptical people would be towards it. Kriesi (2007) found differentiated eurosceptical mobilisation in election campaigns across countries based on the attention the EU received in print media and the extent to which the topic, historically, has cultural roots (Kriesi 2007; Díez Medrano 2003). Building on these insights, it is expected that more knowledge about the

EU, channelled through the media, induces country specific effects. In countries with higher contributions to the EU budget, more media attention will erode the positive connotation of the EU, and hence increase euroscepticism, whereas in countries that receive more than they pay, more media attention is expected to decrease euroscepticism.

Changes in individual-level effects

So far, the focus has been on possible explanations as to why public opinion has changed over time, and why at the same time, euroscepticism differs between countries and regions. Previously, Ray (2004) provided evidence for the proposition that individual-level effects on euroscepticism vary between countries. Following this research, one may expect the individual-level effects to vary not only between countries, but also over time. The logic is that groups react differently depending on their social contexts. The human capital hypothesis (Gabel 1998a) proposes that less educated people are more sceptical towards the EU. Decreasing economic circumstances are expected to harm people more severely when their human capital is low. Consequently, when GDP growth slows down, less educated people are expected to be more sceptical towards the EU as compared to more educated people. Another hypothesis to be derived from the utilitarian approach is that the influence of left-right placement is dependent on the EU budget balance. Right-wing people are, in terms of economic redistribution, more supportive of the free market and less supportive of government interventions. Generally, they will oppose the budgetary programmes of the Union. The difference in euroscepticism between right-wing and left-wing people is expected to increase when the EU budgetary balance turns negative – in other words, when the country contributes more than it receives.

Data and measurements

The Eurobarometer surveys provide the measurements for this study. As these studies are conducted repeatedly, they provide a large dataset, making estimates regarding regional variation possible. We used the Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File 2002 and selected Eurobarometers from 1994 to 2002. Later, Eurobarometers 58.1 (2002), 59.1 (2003), 60.1 (2003) and 61.0 (2004) were also used. The data cover 394,823 respondents from the old EU Member States only. For Austria, Sweden and Finland, the data cover the period from 1995, when these countries joined the EU. (For data documentation, see

Schmitt & Scholz 2005). The regional level consists mostly of the geographical units that are defined by Eurostat as NUTS2-level territories. However, for Germany and the United Kingdom where there were very few respondents at the lower level, the higher level – NUTS1 – territories were used. For Ireland and Denmark, no regional breakdown at the NUTS2 level exists. For Denmark, the Eurobarometer distinguishes four regions. For Ireland, the distinction is comparable to the NUTS3 administration. We distinguished 156 regions. The smallest number of respondents for the period 1994–2004 is in Spanish La Rioja ($n = 176$); and the largest number is in Danish Jylland (11,557).

Dependent variables

To obtain information on euroscepticism, we followed previous research that distinguished political and instrumental euroscepticism as well as non-EU identification (Lubbers & Scheepers 2005; McLaren 2006). Political euroscepticism was constructed from questions concerning policy areas that were available in 19 of the 25 datasets, used with a measurement in all years under study. People were first presented with the statement that ‘Some people believe that certain areas of policy should be decided by the (national) government, while other areas of policy should be decided jointly within the European Union’. Next, respondents were asked to judge whether the policies mentioned should be decided by the national government or jointly with the EU. Previous research has shown that those policy issues can be subsumed under ‘international policy issues’, issues of ‘migration and asylum’ and ‘socio-cultural issues’ (Lubbers & Scheepers 2005). *Political euroscepticism* is constructed as the sum of the scores on these three domains.

Instrumental euroscepticism was measured by the question that has been used most often in research on this topic: ‘Generally speaking, do you think that (*our country's*) membership of the European Union is (1) a good thing (2) a bad thing (3) neither good nor bad?’ The question of whether the respondent’s country has benefited from membership was also included. Both items are available in all the Eurobarometers under study. The two items correlate strongly (0.51) and reliability analyses show that the Cronbach’s alpha of 0.67 with two items is satisfactory.

Regarding *EU non-identification*, we used this question: ‘In the near future, do you see yourself as (1) nationality only, (2) nationality and European, (3) European and nationality (4) European.’ The categories were recoded such that – in conformity with the euroscepticism measurements – a high score implies strong non-EU identification. This measurement is available in 15 Eurobarometers and in ten of the 11 years studied. The measurements of

euroscepticism correlate between 0.20 and 0.30, showing that the measurements refer to different aspects of the EU evaluation. See Appendix 1 for the correlations for each country, while Appendix 2 presents descriptive statistics for all variables used in the analyses.

Independent characteristics at the individual level

Education was measured in four categories, one of them being students. The other three were categorised according to the age at which people have completed their school careers. Although it is not the ideal measure, this is how it has been included in the Eurobarometer survey since the 1970s. The first category refers to people who ceased education at age 15 or younger, the second to people who did so between ages 16 and 19, and the third category to people who stopped their educational careers at aged 20 and older. Occupational categories were pre-coded in the Eurobarometers. In some previous surveys, more categories were distinguished. Those categories were combined to make the measurements comparable across the surveys. Farmers were taken together with fishermen, and small and larger business owners were also subsumed into one category. People currently not working were categorised according to their last occupation. People who never had a job were taken as a separate category. Age also was pre-coded into six categories: 15–24 years; 25–34 years; 35–44 years; 45–54 years; 55–64 years; and 65 years and older. Gender was included, and women were the reference category. Left-right placement refers to a scale running from extreme left (1) to extreme right (10).

Contextual characteristics

Economic indicators of GDP, unemployment and inflation were taken from Eurostat. *Gross domestic product* at market prices was taken in Euros per capita at constant prices and exchange rates of 1995 (Eurostat 2005a). Luxembourg scores the highest, and its 1994 level was not exceeded by any country until 2004. GDP was lowest in Portugal in 1994. The annual *change in GDP* is expressed as percentage change. The largest growth of GDP was found in ‘Europe’s tiger’, Ireland, with a growth of over 10 per cent in 1997 and 1999. Next to Ireland, there has been sporadic growth of over 5 per cent only in Finland, Portugal and Luxembourg. The annual national *unemployment level* was derived from the harmonised unemployment statistics based on the EU Labour Survey (Eurostat 2005b). *Changes in the Unemployment level* reflect annual changes in the percentage of unemployed people. The lowest level of unemployment was in Luxembourg (2.0 per cent) and the Netherlands (2.1 per cent) – both in 2001. The highest unemployment level was in Spain (19.8 per

cent) in 1994, which was preceded by the largest growth in unemployment in the EU. *Inflation* figures were also derived from Eurostat and refer to annual figures from the harmonised indices of consumer prices (Eurostat 2005c). The presence or absence of the *euro* is a dummy, where 1 was scored for the countries that introduced the currency in January 2002.

We used expert survey data collected for the purpose of comparing parties' positions on European integration. Marks and Steenbergen (1999) conducted an expert survey asking for the position on the topic of European integration and the salience in 1999 for each party. They added their data to those of earlier expert surveys by Ray (1999), who conducted these surveys since 1984 onwards, from which we use the results of the surveys in 1994 and 1996. The Chapel Hill Party Dataset updated this for 2002 (Edwards et al. 2002). Two indicators measured *political climate*: the average stances adopted by political parties on European integration and the salience they attached to this subject. The first indicator was obtained by asking experts to rate the 'overall orientation of the party leadership towards European Integration'. The salience of European integration was assessed by asking the experts 'the relative importance of the issue of European integration in the party's public stance'. Both measurements were multiplied by the percentage of votes the party received, thus obtaining a weighted index in which the larger parties had a bigger influence on the country's political climate. We assigned the expert data scores from 1992 to the year 1994, and those from 1996 to the years 1995–1997; we assigned expert data scores from 1999 to the years 1998–2000, and the party position data from 2002 to the years 2001–2004.¹ The measurements show that the position on European integration turned somewhat more sceptical across Europe, and that the salience of the topic decreased slightly.

As for *media climate*, we managed to collect data for a number of countries: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and Great Britain. For Denmark, information was received from the newspaper *Jyllandsposten* directly. For other countries, the LexisNexis search engine was used (LexisNexis Group 2006). Attention to Europe, measured by counting the words 'Europe', the 'EU' or 'European Union' in newspaper headlines per year was used as indicator. The number of newspaper sources as well as the number of years for which electronic archives were available differed between countries. For each newspaper, we indexed the number of articles, taking 2000 as the reference year (indexed as 100). Among the countries with more newspapers, the attention to Europe in one newspaper correlated strongly with the attention to Europe in another newspaper.² Including this determinant of euroscepticism implies that the analysis is restricted to a limited dataset relating only to the countries mentioned.

Analyses

To estimate the variation between countries and regions over time and between individuals, we used multi-level modelling. As explained by Duncan et al. (1996), repeated cross sections can be analysed by building a four-level model. Individuals (level 1) were interviewed at different time periods (level 2), in different regions (level 3) within different countries (level 4). Contextual characteristics are dependent on time and geographical components. By introducing these as fixed effects in this multi-level model, the estimated parameters indicate the extent to which euroscepticism increases when a certain time/geographical condition changes. Changes in the geographical (either regional- or country-level) or time-level variation may indicate to what extent these changes are related to differences between countries or time points. To estimate specific trends for different countries, the contextual characteristics with a time component were randomly set over countries. In this way we could test, for each country, the extent to which specific contextual circumstances go hand-in-hand with increased euroscepticism, and whether the effects were similar in all countries. All ordinal variables – including the dependent variables – were standardised to a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one.

Results

The discussion of results starts with political euroscepticism as the dependent variable. In model 1 of Table 1, only the variance components are given. These show the extent to which political euroscepticism varies between individuals, time-points, regions and countries. Most variance exists between individuals. Between time-points, a reasonable level of variance exists as well, implying that Europeans have shown changes in their eurosceptic political views between 1994 and 2004. Between regions – controlling for differences between countries – evidence is also found for variance in political euroscepticism. Even though this regional level contributes the least to the variance decomposition, its inclusion increases model fit significantly. Countries differ strongly in the extent of their populations' support for political euroscepticism. The country level accounts for 8 per cent of the variance in political euroscepticism.

Model 2 includes the estimation of the linear trend in euroscepticism. This improves the model fit to some extent, and decreases the level 2 variance parameter – though only slightly – as well. The linear trend is positive ($b = 0.011$), implying that between 1994 and 2004 the overall level of political euroscepticism increased.

Table 1. A four-level model explaining political euro-scepticism

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
	b	s.e.	b	s.e.	b	s.e.	b	s.e.
Year (0 = 1994)			0.011**	0.001	0.011**	0.002	0.012*	0.006
Education								
low			0.129**	0.006	0.129**	0.006	0.129**	0.006
medium			0.064**	0.005	0.064**	0.005	0.064**	0.005
high								
student			-0.022**	0.009	-0.022**	0.009	-0.021**	0.009
Occupation								
higher professional								
employed professional			-0.028	0.019	-0.028	0.019	-0.028	0.019
manager			-0.074**	0.019	-0.074**	0.019	-0.074**	0.019
middle manager			-0.035*	0.015	-0.035*	0.015	-0.035*	0.015
desk employee			0.033*	0.015	0.033*	0.015	0.033*	0.015
service employee			0.055**	0.017	0.055**	0.017	0.055**	0.017
travel employee			0.052**	0.015	0.052**	0.015	0.052**	0.015
shop owner			0.037*	0.015	0.037*	0.015	0.037*	0.016
supervisor			0.091**	0.019	0.091**	0.019	0.091**	0.019
skilled manual			0.094**	0.015	0.094**	0.015	0.094**	0.015
unskilled manual			0.120**	0.015	0.120**	0.015	0.120**	0.015
farmer or fisherman			0.131**	0.018	0.131**	0.018	0.131**	0.018
never worked			0.101**	0.015	0.101**	0.015	0.102**	0.015

Age					0.035**	0.002	0.035**	0.002
Age ²					0.014**	0.002	0.014**	0.002
Men					-0.032**	0.004	-0.032**	0.004
Left-right placement					0.014**	0.002	0.014**	0.002
Left-right placement ²					0.015**	0.001	0.015**	0.001
Intercept	0.003	0.073	-0.046	0.073	-0.178	0.076	-0.186	0.070
Variance components								
(4) Country level	0.083	0.030	0.082	0.030	0.085	0.031	0.072	0.026
Random slope year							5.84 ⁻⁴	2.40 ⁻⁴
(3) Region level	0.006	0.001	0.006	0.001	0.006	0.001	0.009	0.003
Random slope year							2.12 ⁻⁴	0.85 ⁻⁴
(2) Time level	0.038	0.002	0.037	0.002	0.036	0.002	0.029	0.002
(1) Individual level	0.887	0.003	0.887	0.003	0.876	0.002	0.876	0.002
-2 log likelihood	714649		714619		711439		711284	

Notes: Superscript⁻⁴ indicates a multiplication by 10⁻⁴. * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01. b = beta coefficient. s.e. = standard error.
 Source: Eurobarometer (1994–2004).

In model 3, we added the individual-level characteristics. With this model, one can see not only which social categories have the most eurosceptic attitudes, but also to what extent composition effects exist. Controlling for composition does not, however, decrease the variance in euroscepticism on higher levels. At the country level, variance even increases somewhat, implying a reverse composition effect.

A look at the parameters shows that less educated people are significantly more politically eurosceptical than the more educated, as found previously. Occupational categories differ from each other in such a way that higher status groups are less eurosceptical than lower status groups. Unskilled manual workers deviate most strongly from the higher professionals. Remarkably, farmers and fishermen – who rely strongly on EU subsidies – are more eurosceptical politically as well. Older people are also more eurosceptical. The significant quadratic term for age indicates that a curvilinear function of age fits the data better than does the linear one, indicating that after a certain age the level of political euroscepticism increases even more strongly. Next, men are less eurosceptical than women. Political euroscepticism was modelled as a curvilinear function of left-right placement, with people of both the far left and the far right being more eurosceptical, and people with an average position (on this z-scored variable) being the least eurosceptical.

In model 4 we present the extent to which the trend in political euroscepticism varies between countries and regions. Model fit increases significantly with the trend slope allowed to vary. This implies that, both between countries and between regions, the trend in political euroscepticism varies. These findings are consistent with our expectation that, when controlling for differences in social composition and left-right placement, differences do exist between time periods in political euroscepticism, which can partly be modelled as linear trends. The estimated country effects presented in Table 2a show in which countries a positive or negative trend parameter was found. It can be seen that in eight countries, the linear trend effect deviates significantly from the overall estimated trend. For the Netherlands, the trend parameter is the most positive, implying that this country has the strongest trend towards more political euroscepticism. A stronger than average positive trend (meaning increased euroscepticism) is also found in Germany and Luxembourg. For two countries – Spain and Greece – a significant deviation from the general trend parameter was found, indicating decreasing political euroscepticism between 1994 and 2004. For Ireland, the trend parameter deviates significantly from the general trend as well, but the estimated trend effect is close to zero, implying stability in political euroscepticism between 1994 and 2004.

We also find differences between regions, both in the deviance from the country-level estimated intercept in euroscepticism and in the pace with which

Table 2a. Estimated trend effects, and low education effects on political euroscepticism by country; controlled for individual background (composition) in a four-level model

	Estimated trend (year)	Test on deviation from general		Estimated effect* Low education	Test on deviation from general		Year* Low education	Test on deviation from general	
		EU effect	EU effect		EU effect	EU effect		EU effect	EU effect
General EU effect	0.012			0.133			-0.003		
Austria	0.026			0.197	**		-0.002	**	
Belgium	0.004			0.100			-0.012	**	**
Denmark	0.016			0.157			0.008	**	**
Finland	0.031			0.183		*	0.005		
France	0.013			0.137			-0.004		
Germany	0.035		**	0.048		**	-0.003		
Great Britain	0.017			0.251	**		-0.000		
Greece	-0.043		**	0.140			-0.012		**
Ireland	-0.004		*	0.167			-0.002		**
Italy	0.002		*	0.059		**	-0.010		**
Luxembourg	0.033			-0.017		**	-0.006		**
The Netherlands	0.047		**	0.041		**	-0.004		**
Northern Ireland	0.007			0.176			0.001		
Portugal	0.003			0.208		**	0.004		**
Spain	-0.025		**	0.137			-0.004		**
Sweden	0.031			0.142			0.003		**
-2 log likelihood	711434			711206			711190		

Notes: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01.
Source: Eurobarometer (1994–2004).

the attitude has changed. The variance parameters are rather small though, indicating that at the regional level variance is much smaller than at the country level. Only in a few regions is the trend markedly different from the national trend. The general Greek trend, showing overtime decreases in euroscepticism is less strong in Dytiki Macedonia, but stronger in Thessalia. The Luxembourg trend, showing increases over time in euroscepticism, is stronger in the Northern region of this small country. Finally, the Spanish trend towards less euroscepticism is most pronounced in the region of Castilla-La Mancha.

The effect of low education in that less educated people are more eurosceptical politically as compared to the most educated (indicated by the parameter $b = 0.133$) generally holds for all countries except Luxembourg, where the effect is non-significant. The eurosceptic attitudes of the less educated and the more educated are also more similar to each other in the Netherlands, Germany and Italy because the effect of education is significantly smaller in these countries than on average in the EU. More pronounced educational differences are found in Great Britain, Portugal, Austria, Finland and Northern Ireland. The effect of education has decreased somewhat over time, but the effect of the average trend over countries is not significant. The differences between the less and more educated increased (a positive interaction effect) in Denmark and Finland, but decreased significantly in Belgium, Greece and Italy between 1994 and 2004.

Table 2b depicts how the effects of left-right placement (and its quadratic term) differ between the countries of the EU. The effect of left-right placement varies strongly between countries in predicting political euroscepticism. Whereas a curvilinear function best predicts political euroscepticism in general (indicating that people in the centre are least eurosceptical and people on the far right are somewhat more eurosceptical than those on the far left), the relation is linear rather than curvilinear in Germany, Great Britain and France: the further people are to the right, the more politically eurosceptical they are. In Denmark, Sweden and Greece, however, the curvilinear relation is much stronger than in the EU on average. Moreover, in these countries far left-wing people are politically more eurosceptical than the far right-wing people. We also estimated the extent to which trends exist in the changes over time in the effect of left-right voting on political euroscepticism. Although there is a small trend showing that right-wing people have become more eurosceptical in recent years, the trend is non-significant. Moreover, no significant country trends were found in the effect of left-right placement on political euroscepticism.

Contextual-level effects

Having found differences between countries in trends and changes in the effects of education and left-right placement, hypothesised interpretations of

Table 2b. Estimated left-right placement effects and trends in these effects on political euroscepticism by country; controlled for individual background (composition) in a four-level model

	Estimated effect of Left-right placement	Test on deviation from general EU effect	Estimated effect of Left-right placement ²	Test on deviation from general EU effect
General EU effect	0.026**		0.017**	
Austria	0.032		0.012	
Belgium	0.035		0.012	
Denmark	-0.090	**	0.039	**
Finland	0.023		0.008	
France	0.060	**	0.021	
Germany	0.071	**	0.013	
Great Britain	0.120	**	0.008	*
Greece	-0.062	**	0.039	**
Ireland	0.001		0.018	
Italy	0.024		0.015	
Luxembourg	0.020		0.011	
The Netherlands	0.030		0.021	
Northern Ireland	0.009		-0.000	**
Portugal	0.033		0.024	
Spain	0.030		0.022	
Sweden	-0.096	**	0.009	

Notes: * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$.

Source: Eurobarometer (1994–2004).

these changes are presented next. Table 3 shows the relationship between the contextual characteristics and political euroscepticism and the extent to which this relationship holds for the trends in these characteristics in each country. All parameters presented in Table 3 are controlled for the individual characteristics presented in Table 1. Only those parameters that deviate significantly from the EU average are presented in the table.

Overall and belying expectations, the unemployment level turns out to be negatively related to political euroscepticism. The higher the level of unemployment in a country, the lower is the level of political euroscepticism. One might interpret this effect as indicating that people are less sceptical towards a supranational institution when the country is economically less successful. However, this effect is zero in Ireland and positive in Greece and Spain – the three strongest net beneficiaries of the EU. The effect of unemployment is

Table 3. Contextual effects on political euroscepticism and their estimated trend effect by country. Effects are presented only when they deviate significantly from the general EU effect

	Unemployment	Δ Unemployment	Inflation	Euro introduced	GDP	Δ GDP	EU budget balance	Parties' position on EU integration	Parties' salience of EU integration	Media attention to EU
General EU effect	-0.080	0.021	0.008	0.008	0.132 0.346	-0.026	0.008 0.490	0.026	0.009	0.072 c
Austria										
Belgium										
Denmark			a		0.323			-0.197	-0.106	c
Finland									-0.068	
France									-0.164	
Germany				0.159	0.583	-0.090	1.065			
Great Britain			-0.143	a		0.050				
Greece	0.048	0.222		-0.312	-1.040	-0.207		0.675	-0.173	c
Ireland	-0.004			-0.111					-0.073	-0.051
Italy										
Luxembourg				0.123		0.033		b		c
The Netherlands	-0.192	0.101	0.123	0.344	0.539	-0.179	-0.857	-0.318	0.315	0.181
Northern Ireland				a						
Portugal		-0.097	-0.071	-0.218						c
Spain	0.052		-0.078	-0.190	-0.397		-0.361	-0.319	0.247	0.210 c
Sweden				a	0.371					c
-2 log likelihood	711701	711700	711720	711634	711606	711696	711684	b	b	c

Notes: Only figures are given when they deviate significantly from the EU average. Bold parameters denote effects significantly differ from zero at $p < 0.05$. All effect parameters are controlled for the individual characteristics. The linear effect of time is dropped. Also left-right placement, which we consider as a possible intermediate characteristic, is dropped from the model. ^a No effect estimation due to constant of variable. ^b Model without Luxembourg; party position and salience are tested together in a model. The interaction between position and salience is not significant. ^c Model without Austria, Finland, Greece, Luxembourg, Portugal and Sweden due to lack of data on media attention.
Source: Eurobarometer (1994–2004).

more strongly negative in the Netherlands than on average in the EU. At the same time, the increase in the unemployment level in the Netherlands is positively related to political euroscepticism.³ Overall, changes in unemployment rates are not related to changes in political euroscepticism. A similar conclusion holds for inflation levels as well.

By comparing the log likelihood statistics at the bottom of Table 3, one can see that the introduction of the euro itself is one of the strongest contextual determinants of the level of political euroscepticism. However, in general, the introduction of the euro seems to have divergent effects. In countries with an increase in euroscepticism, the introduction of the euro is related to higher levels of political scepticism – this holds for Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. In Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain, the effect of the euro is negative: euroscepticism is lower in the years the euro is in use.

GDP, over time, is an increasing variable – at least for most years in most countries. As a result, it largely replaces the trend that existed for years. Therefore, a better measure of economic climate is the changes in GDP, which show the relevance of economic growth or recession. However, overall, there is no significant relation to euroscepticism. The contextual-level effect from the actual EU budget balance is small and non-significant. It reaches significance and is in the expected direction only for Spain and the Netherlands.

Elite opinion and media attention

In the EU, one finds no general significant effect on political euroscepticism, either from the position that political parties take with regard to European integration ($b = 0.026$), or from the salience of the EU issue ($b = 0.009$). We did not find an interaction between the two. Again, there are some country-specific effects. A more pronounced pro-integration stance taken by political parties is accompanied by lower levels of scepticism in Denmark, the Netherlands and Spain, whereas higher salience from those parties in the latter two countries went with more scepticism. It was found that salience towards the issue of the EU decreased scepticism in three countries: Finland, Germany and Greece.

The media differed strongly in the amount of coverage about the EU. In most countries, there has been an increase in media reports. Overall, increased media attention to the topic led to stronger political euroscepticism, and this was particularly the case in Spain and the Netherlands. Only in Ireland was the effect reversed because there more attention was accompanied by less political euroscepticism.

Various expressions of euroscepticism

The final step of this contribution is to compare the effects of political euroscepticism with other measurements of euroscepticism, and for testing (cross-level) interactions. In Table 4, the parameters of a four-level model of political euroscepticism, including the individual-level characteristics and the trend estimates over countries and regions, are compared with the effects on instrumental euroscepticism and non-EU identification. The bottom part of the table presents the parameters of additional models, including interaction effects.

The variance components show that the largest variation over time, controlling for the composition and the linear trend, exists for political euroscepticism. Country-level variation is relatively large for instrumental euroscepticism. The variances at the regional level – that is, the smallest contributors in the variance decomposition – are more or less comparable among the three measurements of euroscepticism. A significant linear trend between 1994 and 2004 was found for both political euroscepticism and non-EU identification. For instrumental euroscepticism, the linear trend was not significant at the EU level.

The individual-level effects are largely comparable between the three dependent variables. Lower education increases the level of instrumental scepticism and non-EU identification. The differences between the less and more educated people are greater for these two attitudes than for political euroscepticism. For the effect of occupation, a similar conclusion can be drawn. In particular, manual workers and their supervisors, as well as farmers and fishermen, are more eurosceptic instrumentally, and identify themselves less with the EU.

The effect of age differs among the three measurements of euroscepticism. Figure 1 presents the results with z-scores as the function of the measurement of age (also in z-scores). Political euroscepticism is less widespread among younger people, but the curvilinear function shows that scepticism increases among older people. A similar but more pronounced outcome is found regarding non-EU identification. The younger group of the middle-aged shows less non-EU identification than the youngest respondents (those in their twenties or younger). Yet among older people, there is a strong increase in non-EU identification. The opposite relation is found with respect to instrumental scepticism. The youngest are the most likely to agree with the notion that one's country benefits from membership. When people get older, this instrumental scepticism increases, but the function flattens for the oldest people.

Effects from left-right placement (and its quadratic function) strongly depend on the kind of euroscepticism. The relationship of left-right placement to political euroscepticism is U-shaped, with both far left-wing and far right-wing people being more eurosceptical. Instrumental euroscepticism is stronger

Table 4. Hierarchical regression models for political and instrumental euroscepticism, and non-EU identification: Variance across countries, regions, years and individuals

	(1) Political euroscepticism		(2) Instrumental euroscepticism		(3) Non-EU identification	
	b	s.e.	b	s.e.	b	s.e.
Year (0 = 1994)	0.012*	0.006	-0.003	0.005	0.006*	0.003
Education						
low	0.129**	0.006	0.254**	0.005	0.287**	0.007
medium	0.064**	0.005	0.159**	0.004	0.177	0.006
high						
student	-0.021**	0.009	-0.070**	0.008	-0.096**	0.010
Occupation						
higher professional						
employed professional	-0.028	0.019	-0.019	0.016	0.011	0.021
manager	-0.074**	0.019	-0.052**	0.015	0.007	0.020
middle manager	-0.035*	0.015	0.021	0.013	0.065**	0.016
desk employee	0.033*	0.015	0.108**	0.012	0.143**	0.016
service employee	0.055**	0.017	0.180**	0.012	0.205**	0.016
travel employee	0.052**	0.015	0.185**	0.014	0.204**	0.018
shop owner	0.037*	0.016	0.165**	0.013	0.156**	0.017
supervisor	0.091**	0.019	0.189**	0.016	0.250**	0.021
skilled manual	0.094**	0.015	0.266**	0.012	0.289**	0.016
unskilled manual	0.120**	0.015	0.305**	0.013	0.337**	0.017
farmer or fisherman	0.131**	0.018	0.242**	0.015	0.328**	0.019
never worked	0.102**	0.015	0.204**	0.013	0.264**	0.017
Age	0.035**	0.002	0.023**	0.002	0.055**	0.003
Age ²	0.014**	0.002	-0.011**	0.002	0.042**	0.003
Men	-0.032**	0.004	-0.117**	0.003	-0.108**	0.004
Left-right placement	0.014**	0.002	-0.017**	0.002	0.045**	0.002
Left-right placement ²	0.015**	0.001	-0.001	0.001	-0.005**	0.001
Intercept	-0.186	0.070	-0.251	0.085	-0.382	0.066

Table 4. Continued.

	(1) Political eurosepticism		(2) Instrumental eurosepticism		(3) Non-EU identification	
	b	s.e.	b	s.e.	b	s.e.
Variance components						
Country level	0.072	0.026	0.112	0.040	0.062	0.023
Random slope year	5.84 ⁻⁴	2.40 ⁻⁴	4.38 ⁻⁴	1.65 ⁻⁴	1.56 ⁻⁴	0.71 ⁻⁴
Region level	0.009	0.003	0.009	0.002	0.014	0.003
Random slope year	2.12 ⁻⁴	0.85 ⁻⁴	0.21 ⁻⁴	0.24 ⁻⁴	0.95 ⁻⁴	0.43 ⁻⁴
Time level	0.029	0.002	0.011	0.001	0.014	0.001
Individual level	0.876	0.002	0.853	0.002	0.874	0.003
Interactions added to the model above						
Low education	0.133**	0.016	0.261**	0.014	0.271**	0.021
Δ GDP	-0.024**	0.009	-0.019**	0.006	0.004	0.007
Low education*Δ GDP	-0.005	0.006	0.014**	0.005	-0.001	0.006
Left-right placement	0.018**	0.001	-0.019**	0.002	0.043**	0.002
Left-right placement ²	0.016**	0.001	0.001	0.001	-0.003**	0.001
EU balance	-0.107**	0.031	0.008	0.022	0.003	0.023
Left-right placement*EU balance	-0.022**	0.002	-0.030**	0.002	-0.027**	0.002
Left-right placement ² *EU balance	0.006**	0.001	0.006**	0.001	0.005**	0.001
Euro	-0.081**	0.019	-0.027*	0.013	-0.105**	0.014
GDP per capita	-0.025	0.038	-0.071**	0.029	-0.039	0.029
Euro*GDP per capita	0.128**	0.015	0.034**	0.010	0.011	0.010
Media attention ^a	0.029	0.017	-0.003	0.011	-0.056**	0.012
EU budget ^a	0.032	0.022	-0.014	0.017	-0.001	0.020
Media attention*EU budget ^a	-0.064**	0.024	0.001	0.015	-0.028	0.017

Notes: ^a In models including media attention, Austria, Finland, Greece, Luxembourg, Portugal and Sweden are left out. * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; superscript⁻⁴ indicates a multiplication by 10^{-4} . b = beta coefficient. s.e. = standard error.
Source: Eurobarometer (1994–2004).




Figure 1. Political and instrumental euroscepticism, and non-EU identification as a function of the Z-score of age (everything else being constant).

among left-wing people than right-wing people, whereas the opposite is true for EU non-identification: the more people are to the right, the greater is this non-identification.

Finally, we tested for the interactions we formulated in our hypotheses. Lower education increases scepticism towards the EU, regardless of the kind of measurement. However, with respect to instrumental euroscepticism, the effect of education is greater when the increase in GDP per capita is stronger. This implies that the difference between the least and most educated in instrumental euroscepticism is larger in more affluent circumstances than in relatively poor economic circumstances. This contradicts our expectation that the difference between the less and the more educated is more pronounced in circumstances of lower or negative economic growth. The results show a negative effect of the GDP adjustment among the more educated people, whereas it is close to zero for the lowest educated. No such interaction effect was observed with regard to political euroscepticism and EU non-identification. The interaction effect of left-right placement with EU budget balance is the same for all three distinguished measurements. It reveals that euroscepticism among left-wing people is lower in countries with a negative EU budget balance, whereas in countries with a positive budget balance, stronger curvilinear relations exist. Generally, far left-wing people were the most eurosceptic in countries with a positive budget balance, whereas in countries with a negative budget balance, more eurosceptics were found among the far right-wing people.

It was expected that the introduction of the euro would increase scepticism in countries with a higher GDP, and decrease scepticism in countries with lower GDP. The main effect of the introduction of the euro at the average level of GDP in the EU is negative. The interaction effect between euro and GDP is, however, positive in respect of both political and instrumental euroscepticism. In countries with higher GDP ($> +1$ standard deviation), the effect of the introduction of the euro is positive. In richer countries, the effect is to increase euroscepticism, both politically and instrumentally. In poorer countries, a rather strong negative effect is observed from the introduction of the euro, implying less scepticism in these countries since the introduction of the euro.

It is argued that amplified media attention increases euroscepticism in countries that contribute significantly to the EU and decreases euroscepticism in countries that benefit more from the EU in terms of their EU budget balance. Evidence for this hypothesis is found only for political euroscepticism. The overall effect of media attention for countries and periods with an average EU budget balance is not significant. A positive EU budget balance decreases the effect of media attention by -0.064 . The effect of media attention is hence negative when the budget balance is more positive. Conversely, a more negative budget balance (the net-contributing countries) increases the effect of media attention and the effect becomes strongly positive: the more media attention the EU receives, the more this generates political scepticism. Interestingly, the effect of media attention is negative on non-EU identification (and the interaction is non-significant). More media attention towards the EU decreases non-EU identification.

Conclusions

We distinguished three different attitudes towards the EU and modelled the changes between 1994 and 2004, between countries and between regions. Political euroscepticism (opposition to joint supranational EU decision making) and EU non-identification (feeling a 'national' rather than European) are distinguished from instrumental euroscepticism (considering EU membership non-beneficial). Particularly, the former two modes of euroscepticism have gained more relevance since the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht, which aimed at further political European integration and gave birth to European citizenship.

In many countries, a trend towards stronger euroscepticism evolved. The Dutch have shown the strongest increase in euroscepticism. However, a reverse trend was found among the Spanish. One of the aims of this study has been to explain the divergent trends in the EU. Summing up, we must acknowledge that many of the changing conditions that were expected to explain different trends

turned out to be insignificant. Changing levels of unemployment, inflation and economic growth are hardly related to trends in euroscepticism. In previous research these parameters were successful in explaining cross-national variation in euroscepticism, but they are less successful in a dynamic perspective. In only a few countries are changes in the economic contextual indicators related to changes in euroscepticism. More systematic support is found for the divergent effects of the introduction of the euro. Based on the cost/benefit approach, we found evidence that the introduction of the euro has increased levels of euroscepticism, particularly in countries with a higher GDP, whereas the introduction of the new currency has reduced levels of euroscepticism in countries with a lower GDP. This, however, might represent a short-term effect.

We also focused on the role of political parties in explaining euroscepticism. From a dynamic trend approach, we found that stances adopted by political parties and political euroscepticism were related only to a limited extent. We found people to be less eurosceptic when political parties favoured EU membership only in Denmark, Spain and the Netherlands. Also, the salience attached to the issues of EU integration by political parties is associated with lower levels of scepticism only in certain countries. The results contradict recent findings from De Vries and Edwards (2009), who do find political climate effects, however, only tested with cross-national analyses rather than with longitudinal analyses. We were not able to substantiate or to replicate these previous findings. In the longitudinal study of Steenbergen et al. (2007) an interaction was found between parties' positions and salience. We could not replicate this finding when using a non-aggregated design and a shorter time span. We consider it to be relevant to find out which contextual-level effects account for cross-national differences in euroscepticism and which would also account for changes in euroscepticism over time.

Media coverage – the main source of information for people about the EU – has risen in most countries. We found that increased media attention to the EU has increased political euroscepticism, particularly in countries with a negative EU budget balance, whereas it has decreased scepticism in countries with a positive budget balance. These inferences are based on counting the number of articles that appeared on this topic in nine countries. Recently, more and more daily newspapers opened their archives online, offering an interesting approach for the study of cross-national differences, as demonstrated by the in-depth studies in some countries by Díez Medrano (2003) and De Vreese and Boomgaarden (2006).

Although these cross-national, cross-regional and 'over time' differences in euroscepticism often attract more societal interest, we emphasise that, just as in previous studies, more variance in euroscepticism is to be found and explained at the individual level. We found, again, that people (supposedly)

benefiting strongly from the EU are less eurosceptical, irrespective of the measure of euroscepticism, supporting the human capital approach (Eichenberg & Dalton 1993; Gabel 1998a): less educated rather than more educated people express their euroscepticism. This effect of education changed in some countries between 1994 and 2004, but it has not moved in the same direction. These differences suggest that the effect of education is contingent upon the (changing) circumstances in which people live. The effect of change in GDP appeared significant for the more educated people but not for the less educated, refuting the common belief that people with less human capital, in particular, would react to changing economic circumstances.

The impact of left-right placement in explaining attitudes towards the Union is contingent upon context as well. For each of the three euroscepticism attitudes, we found that the effect of left-right placement is positive when countries contribute more than they receive, implying that in these countries people on the right express their euroscepticism more strongly; however, the effect of left-right placement is more U-shaped when the EU budget balance is strongly positive, implying that in these countries both people on the (far) left and right express their euroscepticism.

This contribution provides evidence of divergent trends in euroscepticism. These trends are difficult to explain. We proposed general as well as (cross-level) interaction hypotheses. We think that this is a fruitful way to get more insight into different changes that occurred – and will occur – in the countries of the EU. Although changes in European identity are quite modest, the attention to national identity explanations – both at the individual and contextual levels (Lubbers & Scheepers 2007) – is quite promising. Previous studies stressed the importance of threats to national identity in explaining euroscepticism (Díez Medrano 2003; De Vreese & Boomgaarden 2005; McLaren 2006; Hooghe 2007; Lubbers 2008). This contribution demonstrates that there is ample scope for explaining over-time changes in euroscepticism based on non-economic and non-political explanations.

Appendix 1. Correlations between measurements of euroscepticism within the EU and countries of the EU

Correlations	Political euroscepticism/ Instrumental euroscepticism	Political euroscepticism/ Non-EU identification	Instrumental euroscepticism/ Non-EU identification
EU	0.22	0.24	0.25
Austria	0.23	0.24	0.29
Belgium	0.17	0.19	0.23

Appendix 1. Continued.

Correlations	Political euroscepticism/ Instrumental euroscepticism	Political euroscepticism/ Non-EU identification	Instrumental euroscepticism/ Non-EU identification
Denmark	0.31 (hi)	0.27 (hi)	0.27
Finland	0.19	0.20	0.28
France	0.22	0.26	0.30
Germany	0.20	0.21	0.27
Great Britain	0.29	0.29	0.32 (hi)
Greece	0.16	0.15 (lo)	0.19
Ireland	0.14	0.17	0.13
Italy	0.15	0.18	0.26
Luxembourg	0.12 (lo)	0.15	0.13 (lo)
The Netherlands	0.16	0.17	0.18
Northern Ireland	0.22	0.25	0.24
Portugal	0.17	0.19	0.21
Spain	0.20	0.21	0.22
Sweden	0.24	0.21	0.28

Note: All correlations are significant at $p < 0.001$.

Appendix 2. Descriptives of independent characteristics before standardisation

	Range	Mean
Education		
low	0–1	0.28
medium	0–1	0.38
high	0–1	0.24
student	0–1	0.11
Occupation		
higher professional	0–1	0.02
employed professional	0–1	0.02
manager	0–1	0.02
middle manager	0–1	0.10
desk employee	0–1	0.12
service employee	0–1	0.11

Appendix 2. Continued.

	Range	Mean
travel employee	0–1	0.04
shop owner	0–1	0.08
supervisor	0–1	0.02
skilled manual	0–1	0.16
unskilled manual	0–1	0.12
farmer or fisherman	0–1	0.03
never worked	0–1	0.17
Age	1–6	3.41
Men	0–1	0.48
Left-right placement	1–10	5.22
Unemployment	2.1–19.8	8.19
Change in unemployment	–2.7–10.8	–0.19
Inflation	0.1–7.9	2.22
Euro introduced	0–1	0.16
GDP	7.9–48.0	20.61
Change in GDP	–1.2–10.8	3.02
EU budget balance	–1.9–0.8	–0.07
Parties' positions on EU integration	3.9–6.4	5.34
Parties' salience of EU integration	2.3–4.0	3.19
Media attention to EU	55.4–191.3	98.51

Notes

1. In the expert datasets, the sum of votes the parties received did not reach 100 per cent in all countries, implying that not all minor parties were included in the data. Although in most countries the sum was over 95 per cent, in France it was particularly lower (around 86 per cent). The computations were adjusted – based on the percentages the parties received – such that in each country the sum of percentages was equal to 100 per cent.
2. For Belgium, only Flemish newspapers were used (*De Standaard*, *Het Nieuwsblad* and *de Tijd*) for information from 1998 to 2004. For Denmark, information from 1997 to 2004 was received from the *Yyllandsposten*. For France, the average for the trend from 1997 was obtained from *Le Figaro* and *Libération*. For Germany, information from 1994 onwards was obtained from the *Frankfurter Allgemeiner*, *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, *Welt am Sonntag*, *Taz Tageszeitung* and *Der Spiegel*. For Ireland, the archives of the *Irish Times*, have been the

source for data from 1994 to 2004. For Italy, the only information is from the daily *La Stampa*, also since 1994. For the Netherlands, five sources were made use of in computing the average since 1994: *De Volkskrant*, *De Telegraaf*, *Algemeen Dagblad*, *Trouw* and *NRC-Handelsblad*. For Spain, information is available from *El Pais*, but only for the period 1999 to 2004. For the United Kingdom, *The Times*, *The Guardian* and *The Sun* were referred to for information from 1994 onwards.

3. Changes within the Netherlands are stronger than those in other countries; therefore, a significant effect is more easily reached within the Netherlands than in other countries where there is hardly anything to explain as the level of euroscepticism has been fairly stable between 1994 and 2004.

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Address for correspondence: Marcel Lubbers, Utrecht University, ERCOMER/ASW, PO Box 80140, 3508 TC Utrecht, The Netherlands. Tel.: ++31 30 253 2297; Fax: ++31 30 253 4733; E-mail: M.Lubbers@uu.nl