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Scheepers, Peer; Gijsberts, Mérove; Coenders, Marcel

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# Ethnic Exclusionism in European Countries
## Public Opposition to Civil Rights for Legal Migrants as a Response to Perceived Ethnic Threat

*Peer Scheepers, Mérove Gijsberts, and Marcel Coenders*

**In this paper we focus on opposition among European citizens to the granting of civil rights to legal migrants, a phenomenon considered to be a crucial aspect of ethnic exclusionism. We set out to establish to what extent differences in support of ethnic exclusionism can be explained in terms of effects of particular (a) individual and (b) contextual characteristics, and in terms of (c) interactions between contextual and individual characteristics. We have systematically derived hypotheses from Ethnic Competition Theory. We used cross-national comparable data from 15 European countries and performed multi-level analyses (total N=12,728). We found that people living in individual competitive conditions perceive ethnic out-groups as a threat, and that this in turn reinforces ethnic exclusionism. Contextual competitive conditions, particularly the presence of non-EU citizens, also affect ethnic exclusionism.**

## Introduction

Most European governments have put the migration issue high on the political agenda. The migrants themselves have also become a major public issue in a social climate where 33 per cent of European citizens are considered to be racist (Eurobarometer Survey 47.1). In this contribution we will focus on stances regarding ethnic issues by addressing a question on a specific aspect of ethnic exclusionism: opposition to the granting of civil rights to legally administered resident migrants.[1] This issue is of particular relevance. Many of these legally administered migrants are entitled to stay in the host country and have been granted a number of civil rights, formally speaking. Many Europeans, however, do not think of civil rights for migrants in formal terms. On the contrary, they often oppose immigration and the presence of migrants and, moreover, oppose granting civil rights to these migrants. Opposition to the granting of civil rights to legal migrants implies social exclusion of migrants, which in turn implies

social non-integration that may lead to inter-ethnic tensions. This issue has become widely disseminated throughout the public and political arenas.[2]

In previous research, unfavourable attitudes towards migrants were described extensively by Fuchs, Gerhards, and Roller (1993), Pettigrew and Meertens (1995), and Hamberger and Hewstone (1997), on the basis of a European poll conducted in 1988. However, these studies focused exclusively on the individual level, thereby neglecting country-level explanations. Quillian (1995) set out to explain anti-immigrant and racial prejudice by relating it to both individual and contextual conditions, a contribution that we consider to be of great importance. In that contribution, however, the theoretical model was under-specified in the empirical analyses, especially by neglecting perceptions of ethnic threat.

We build on these previous studies, trying to improve them in several ways. To begin with, we

use recent survey data from almost 13,000 respondents in 15 European countries (Eurobarometer Survey 47.1). These data were collected in 1997, the year that social phenomena related to ethnic exclusionism became more explicitly visible to the public at large, not least because it was officially announced by the European Union as the year against racism. Furthermore, we consider some of the general theories in the field of ethnic exclusionism from which we derive hypotheses more systematically than has been done so far. We also improve upon previous measurements at the individual as well as the contextual level. Finally, we perform multi-level analyses to test our hypotheses adequately. The questions we set out to answer are: to what extent can differences in support for ethnic exclusionism, i.e. opposition to the granting of civil rights to legal migrants, be explained in terms of (*a*) individual and (*b*) contextual characteristics, and of (*c*) interactions between contextual and individual characteristics?

## General Theories of Ethnic Exclusionism

In order to explain cross-national differences in unfavourable attitudes towards other ethnic groups, we set out to explore two paradigms that we consider to be complementary – Realistic Conflict Theory and Social Identity Theory. Central to Realistic Conflict Theory is the proposition that competition over scarce resources between social groups is the catalyst of antagonistic inter-group attitudes. This proposition has been underlined by two quite different traditions, both dating back to the 1950s. Social psychological experiments have shown that competition between groups improves solidarity within a specific group and increases hostility between groups (Sherif and Sherif, 1969, 1979). Sociologists have focused on societal causes of group conflicts as well as on societal conditions under which these conflicts arise. Coser (1956) claimed that each social system is characterized by competition over scarce resources (material resources, power, and status) between social groups, such as ethnic groups.[3] In this theoretical tradition, Blalock (1967) made an analytical distinction between, on the one hand, actual competition and, on the other hand, perceived competition. With actual competition he

referred to macro, or meso socio-economic conditions, such as the availability of scarce resources and market mechanisms regulating the distribution of these scarce resources. Moreover, he suggested that actual competition may also refer to a micro level, i.e. competition between individuals from ethnic groups who hold similar social positions, e.g. work in similar niches of the labour market. Blalock proposed that these actual competitive conditions might affect the majorities' perceptions of competition, that is, the subjectively perceived socio-economic threat on the part of ethnic out-groups, which in turn may induce hostile, unfavourable stances toward these out-groups.[4]

Empirical studies have also shown that hostile, unfavourable attitudes towards out-groups are often strongly related to in-group favouritism (e.g. Adorno *et al.*, 1950/1982;[5] Levine and Campbell, 1972; Brewer, 1986; Scheepers *et al.*, 1990). This phenomenon, as such, may be explained in terms of a second paradigm we refer to – Social Identity Theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Tajfel, 1981, 1982; Turner, 1982). According to this theory individuals have a fundamental need to perceive their in-group as superior to ethnic out-groups. Consequently, they apply favourable characteristics that they perceive among members of the in-group to themselves via a mental process labelled as 'social identification', and they value out-groups negatively via mechanisms of social contra-identification. We propose that under competitive conditions, central to Realistic Conflict Theories, these processes may intensify. Therefore, we consider Social Identity Theory to be complementary to propositions from Realistic Conflict Theory.[6] We refer to the combination of these propositions as Ethnic Competition Theory. This theory can be summarized in a core proposition: competition, at an individual as well as at a contextual level, may reinforce the mechanisms of social (contra-) identification, the eventual outcome of which is referred to as ethnic exclusionism. At the contextual level, competition refers to macro-social conditions. At the individual level, competition may be specified in terms of social conditions of members of the dominant group; and it may be specified in terms of a perceived threat of competition that, we propose, mediates the effects of social conditions on ethnic exclusionism. This specification implies a more fully elaborated theoretical model.

The distinction between actual and perceived competition is often recognized in theoretical terms (cf. Castles and Kosack, 1973; Kinder and Sears, 1981; Hagendoorn and Janssen, 1983; Krauth and Porst, 1984). However, this crucial theoretical proposition is more often neglected in operational terms, with some exceptions (cf. Bélanger and Pinard, 1991; Taylor, 1998). Let us refer to some recent studies to underline this argument. Olzak (1992) set out to explain the rate of ethnic collective actions. Her ethnic competition theory boils down to the argument that whenever ethnic threat arises, whether it is due to macro-social conditions (such as large immigration flows or economic contraction), or meso-social conditions (lower ethnic segregation in disadvantaged jobs or the breakdown of ethnic enclaves), majority groups will react with exclusionary measures. They do so because of perceptions of threat (1992: 35). Obviously these perceptions are considered to be the intervening factor that, unfortunately, could not be measured. Quillian (1995, 1996) explicitly proposes that racial prejudice be regarded as a response to perceived group threat, the latter being measured by factors related to actual competition, such as the relative size of the subordinate group relative to the dominant group or a precarious economic situation (1995: 591, 1996: 820).[7] But then he emphasizes that 'surveys to date have not asked questions to measure perceived threat from other racial groups . . . as an intervening variable (1996:821).'[8] This consequently implies that a crucial part of ethnic competition theory has not yet been tested.

# From General Theories to Testable Hypotheses on Ethnic Exclusionism

## Individual Conditions

We use Ethnic Competition Theory to derive hypotheses with regard to the effects of individual characteristics on ethnic exclusionism. It is to be expected that the level of ethnic competition varies between social categories.[9] Those social categories that hold similar social positions to ethnic minorities, or those social categories whose members live close to ethnic enclaves, may experience higher levels of ethnic competition and therefore display

more widespread support for ethnic exclusionism. In many European countries, the overwhelming majority of non-indigenous ethnic residents are located in the lower strata of society, very often concentrated in urban areas. This means that lower-strata members of the European majority population who hold similar social positions to members of ethnic minorities – that is, those with a low educational level[10] or a low income level, those performing manual labour, those who are unemployed, or those who live in urban areas – will have to compete with ethnic minorities more than other citizens on average, for example in the labour market.[11] These actual competitive conditions might reinforce the process of social (contra-) identification, which may induce more widespread support for ethnic exclusionism, particularly among the social categories just mentioned. Hence, we expect that:

(1) ethnic exclusionism will be strongly prevalent among social categories of the dominant group in similar social positions as social categories of ethnic out-groups, more particularly among (1*a*) people with a low level of education, (1*b*) manual workers, (1*c*) unemployed people, (1*d*) people with low income, (1*e*) people living in urban areas.

## Individual Perceptions

Ethnic competition theorists are likely to claim that the effects of individual characteristics on ethnic exclusionism operate through perceptions of ethnic threat, as we explained above. However, this crucial part of Ethnic Competition Theory has hardly ever been rigorously tested. Moreover, this view may be controversial, since other theorists have derived conflicting hypotheses from general propositions of Realistic Conflict Theory. In particular, the symbolic racism researchers (Kinder and Sears, 1981; Sears and Kinder, 1985; Sears, 1988) have opted for a rather narrow definition of conflicting ethnic interests: racial threat refers to real and tangible threats that blacks pose to whites' personal lives, i.e. to their short-term material interests. Consequently, they have conceptualized conflicting interests as a tangible personal risk (Bobo, 1988). However, more often than not, these symbolic racism researchers found quite moderate effects of

threatened personal interests on the implementation of racial change.[12] Yet we consider these views to be valid. We will therefore include perceived threats to personal interests as opposed to collective interests. The hypotheses are that:

(2) ethnic exclusionism will be affected by (2*a*) the perception of collective ethnic threat and by (2*b*) the perception of personal threat, i.e. deteriorating personal conditions.

### Contextual Conditions

Ethnic Competition Theory offers a straightforward explanation concerning the effects of societal circumstances on exclusionistic reactions. Ethnic exclusionism varies with (changes in the level of) actual competition within countries. We propose that the level of actual competition may be related to conditions where there are (*a*) increasing numbers of people competing for, *ceteris paribus*, approximately the same amount of scarce resources, or (*b*) stable numbers of people competing for a decreasing amount of scarce resources.[13] These conditions all imply, *ceteris paribus*, a stronger competition for scarce resources between the dominant group and ethnic out-groups. Following this rationale, also suggested by Olzak (1992), Quillian (1995), and Coenders and Scheepers (1998), we propose that:

(3) ethnic exclusionism will be stronger in countries where the actual level of ethnic competition is relatively high, more particularly in contextual conditions of (3*a*) a relatively high proportion of non-EU citizens, (3*b*) a relatively high number of asylum seekers, (3*c*) a strong increase in the relative number of asylum seekers, (3*d*) a high rate of unemployment, and (3*e*) a large increase in the level of unemployment.[14]

### Interactions Between Individual and Contextual Characteristics

Finally, we examine whether the effects of individual characteristics on ethnic exclusionism vary within different societal contexts. In fact, these cross-level hypotheses, by their nature, involve combinations of, on the one hand, the hypotheses on individual characteristics and, on the other, hypotheses on contextual characteristics. Since this rationale provides us with quite an extensive set of hypotheses, we will

state these hypotheses in more general terms. We expect that the effects of the individual characteristics on ethnic exclusionism vary due to the level of actual competition. Following this rationale and building on the explications in previous sections, we expect that:

(4) in countries with higher levels of actual competition, dominant group members in similar social conditions as immigrants (such as manual workers, the unemployed, etc.) will exhibit more ethnic exclusionism, when compared to countries with lower levels of actual competition.

Figure 1 presents the structure of the explanation followed. The numbers refer to the four hypotheses that have been formulated in the paper.

# Data and Measurement

### Data

We will test our hypotheses using data derived from the Eurobarometer 47.1 survey (Melich, 2000*a*), which includes valid and presumably reliable data for all the phenomena we want to describe and explain, particularly on perceived threat, a measurement that was missing in a previous version of the Eurobarometer used by Quillian (1995). These more recent data were collected in the spring of 1997 in 15 countries of the European Union using face-to-face interviews with people aged 15 years and over (total N=12,728). The sample was drawn according to a multi-stage random design. First, so-called administrative regional units were drawn to represent metropolitan, urban, and rural areas. Secondly, within these units, a random starting address was drawn and further addresses were selected by random route procedures. Thirdly, at each address, the actual respondent was selected randomly. The data were weighted according to known national distributions for sex, age, and region. Since we are interested in the level of ethnic exclusionism of native-born respondents, we only included them in the analyses. For further details of Eurobarometer sampling methodology and survey design, see European Commission (1997*a*, 1997*b*) and Melich (2000*b*).

**Figure 1.** *The structure of the explanation*

## Dependent Variable

To measure the dependent variable *ethnic exclusionism*, we selected a number of items included in Table 1 on the denial of civil rights to legally administered immigrants.[15] The response categories were 'tend to agree' versus 'tend to disagree'. These items turned out to be strongly statistically associated. Tests for reliability, reported in Table A1, showed a range of figures. The pooled Cronbach's alpha is 0.70. We imputed missing values by means of the variable that showed the strongest association with the variable containing the missing score, for each country separately, but only if respondents had no more than three missing responses. We imputed scores for about 3000 respondents, which were about equally distributed over the 15 countries.

## Independent Variables

To measure the first of our independent variables, *educational attainment*, we used information on the age at which the respondent had completed full-time education.[16] *Income* was measured with a country-specific question. Missing values were imputed by the country-specific mean value. To

enable cross-national comparisons, the income was divided by the mean income of the specific country concerned. A measure of *social class* was constructed, using the available information in these secondary data, to resemble the cross-national comparable categorization of Erikson, Goldthorpe and Portocarero (1983). We distinguished a number of categories, based on their actual social position in the labour force: the service class (professionals, proprietors, general managers, and junior managers), routine non-manuals (people whose employment involves sitting at a desk), self-employed people (farmers, fishermen, and shop-keepers), and manual workers (unskilled and skilled workers as well as their supervisors). To these classes we added as distinct categories the people who were temporarily not active in the labour force: unemployed people, retired people, homemakers, and students. Finally, we constructed a dummy variable for people *living in large cities* to compare them with people living in other areas. Previously, differences between different religious categories were found (Gorsuch and Aleshire, 1974; Roof, 1974). Therefore, we also included *religion* as a control variable, distinguishing between non-religious people, religious people belonging to non-Christian

**Table 1.** *Indicators of ethnic exclusionism of legally established immigrants and perceived ethnic threat*

**Ethnic exclusionism**

| | |
|---|---|
| q5401 | Legally established immigrants from outside the European Union should have the same social rights as the [NATIONALITY] citizens. |
| q5402 | Legally established immigrants from outside the European Union should have the right to bring members of their immediate family in [OUR COUNTRY]. |
| q5404 | Legally established immigrants from outside the European Union should be sent back to their country of origin if they are unemployed. |
| q5405 | Legally established immigrants from outside the European Union should be all be sent back to their country of origin. |
| q5406 | Legally established immigrants from outside the European Union be able to become naturalised easily. |

**Perceived ethnic threat**

| | |
|---|---|
| q4901 | In schools where there are too many children from these minority groups, the quality of education suffers. |
| q4903 | People from these minority groups abuse the system of social benefits. |
| q4907 | The religious practices of people from these minority groups threaten our way of life. |
| q4910 | The presence of people from these minority groups is a cause of insecurity. |
| q4911 | People from these minority groups are given preferential treatment by the authorities. |
| q4915 | The presence of people from these minority groups increases unemployment in [COUNTRY]. |

denominations, and Christians. As other control variables we included straightforward measures of *gender* and *age*.

**Mediating Variables**

To measure the first of our mediating variables, *perceived ethnic threat*, we selected a number of items that clearly referred to ethnic minorities posing a socio-economic or socio-cultural threat to the majority. These items are also presented in Table 1. Again, the response categories were 'tend to agree'

versus 'tend to disagree'. Tests for reliability, reported in Table A1, were again quite satisfactory, Cronbach's alpha ranging from 0.61 in Portugal to 0.83 in France.

In some studies (Sears and Kinder, 1985; Bobo and Hutchings, 1996) it has been suggested that feelings of competitive threat do not differ sharply from prejudice.[17] In another study (Pettigrew and Meertens, 1995) it was proposed that items measuring ethnic threat as such may be embedded in a more general dimension of blatant prejudice. Both views contradict our claim that perceived ethnic threat and ethnic exclusionism are distinct. To test our claim, we performed a principal factor analysis on both sets of items simultaneously. As we only have dichotomous items, therefore violating some of the underlying assumptions of ordinary factor analysis, we used tetrachoric inter-item correlations (calculated in PRELIS). Next, we tested a bi-factorial solution on the pooled samples via LISREL. Table 2 shows that both measurements – ethnic exclusionism and perceived ethnic threat – are factorially distinct, with relatively high factor loadings on the separate factors, providing us with evidence that perceived collective ethnic threat may serve as a separate intervening factor, distinct from ethnic exclusionism.[18] Eventually, a sum of scores was computed for ethnic exclusionism and perceived ethnic threat. Next, we computed the means and standard deviations of both indices to gain an insight into the cross-country differences displayed in Table 3. It turns out that some countries score quite highly on ethnic exclusionism – e.g. Belgium, Germany, Austria, and Denmark – whereas countries like Spain, Ireland, and Finland have low scores on this variable.

A second intervening variable refers to the *perceived threat of self-interest*. We propose that this phenomenon is indicated by personal unemployment risk, data for which was ascertained by the straightforward question: 'how likely is it that you will lose your job in the years to come?' A second related variable refers to status anxiety: a question on the expectation that one's personal situation may get worse in the course of the years to come. We added a measure of subjective socio-economic frustration: a simple question on the extent to which respondents felt that their situation had deteriorated over the last five years.

**Table 2.** *Ethnic exclusionism and perceived ethnic threat: LISREL factor analysis on the pooled data-set of 15 countries[a]*

| | Factor loadings (lambda coefficients) | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Items | Ethnic exclusionism | Perceived ethnic threat |
| q5401 | 0.68 | |
| q5402 | 0.80 | |
| q5404 | 0.77 | |
| q5405 | 0.76 | |
| q5406 | 0.57 | |
| q4901 | 0.57 | |
| q4903 | | 0.78 |
| q4907 | | 0.76 |
| q4910 | | 0.69 |
| q4911 | | 0.72 |
| q4915 | | 0.69 |

*Note*: Factor analysis of dichotomous items in LISREL by analysing tetrachoric correlations. $\chi^2=228.59$ with 25 degrees of freedom, RMSR=0.032, AGFI=0.99, BIC=$-52.27$. Correlations between the error terms of the items measuring the same latent construct are allowed.

Since previous research has shown that post-materialism and a conservative political orientation may also affect attitudes towards out-groups (Fuchs, Gerhards and Roller, 1993), we included *postmaterialism* and *political orientation* as controls. Postmaterialism was constructed analogous to previous studies (Inglehart, 1990): respondents had to rank four political values, two materialistic, two postmaterialistic. There was merely one item available for political orientation, measured by the position respondents gave themselves on a scale from 1 to 10, often labelled as the left–right self-placement.

### Contextual Variables

Contextual characteristics are presented in Table A2. For all these characteristics we found direct, valid statistics such as those on the proportion of non-EU citizens; (changes in the influx of) asylum seekers; and (changes in) unemployment rates. Figures on the number of non-EU citizens as a percentage of the total population were taken from *Demographic Statistics* publications of the European Commission (1997). Figures on asylum-seekers were taken from SOPEMI (1998), where trends in international migration are registered. To adjust these figures for periodic and/or annual fluctuations, we calculated the average influx of asylum

seekers in each country over the years 1994–6, i.e. the years preceding the year in which the Eurobarometer survey was conducted. Figures on unemployment were derived from the *Statistical Yearbook of the United Nations* (1995).[19]

Examining the international statistics presented in Table A2, it becomes clear that substantial differences exist across Europe in the size of the immigrant population. In Germany and Austria the percentage of non-EU citizens is highest, whereas in Belgium, France, the Netherlands, and Sweden the percentage is lower but still substantial. In countries like Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain the percentage of non-EU citizens is relatively low. The same applies to the number of asylum seekers. Countries like the Netherlands, Germany, Sweden, Belgium, and Denmark receive many asylum applications. Hardly any asylum seekers can be found in Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. However, in some of these countries (Ireland and Portugal) the number of asylum seekers has increased rapidly (see Table A2).

### Analyses and Model Testing

To test our hypotheses, we used multi-level analysis that allows simultaneous modelling of individual-level and country-level effects and their interactions (Bryk and Raudenbusch, 1992, Snijders and Bosker, 1999). To model these effects we used the software program ML-wiN (Goldstein, 1995). Multi-level modelling enables the researcher to ascertain which part of the variation in the individual dependent variable is explained by country-level effects, and which part of the variance by individual-level effects. To explain differences between countries in ethnic exclusionism, the between-country variance should be reduced (either by country-level effects or by compositional effects of the individual-level variables). As the structure of the data is such that individuals are nested within countries (individuals are level 1 and countries level 2 units in the analysis), neglecting the error terms at level 2 underestimates the standard errors of the parameters. This in turn could lead to incorrect confirmation of hypotheses. We began by testing the models. Goodness-of-fit statistics for the different models are presented in Table 4. Improvements in model fit are indicated by the difference in the loglikelihood statistic, which

**Table 3.**  *Means and standard deviations of ethnic exclusionism of legally established immigrants and perceived ethnic threat (N=12,728)*

|  | Ethnic exclusionism[a] | | Perceived ethnic threat[b] | | N |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|  | **Mean** | **SD** | **Mean** | **SD** |  |
| Austria | 2.30 | 1.80 | 2.96 | 1.93 | 791 |
| Belgium | 2.58 | 1.84 | 3.80 | 1.93 | 839 |
| Denmark | 2.21 | 1.43 | 3.78 | 1.84 | 864 |
| Finland | 1.38 | 1.41 | 1.96 | 1.83 | 866 |
| France | 1.90 | 1.81 | 3.13 | 2.17 | 834 |
| Germany | 2.41 | 1.75 | 2.95 | 1.88 | 1482 |
| Greece | 1.50 | 1.50 | 2.95 | 1.54 | 829 |
| Ireland | 1.14 | 1.31 | 1.79 | 1.69 | 693 |
| Italy | 1.69 | 1.50 | 2.03 | 1.80 | 828 |
| Luxembourg | 1.72 | 1.52 | 2.36 | 1.85 | 509 |
| Netherlands | 1.73 | 1.44 | 2.65 | 1.94 | 903 |
| Portugal | 1.60 | 1.33 | 2.78 | 1.72 | 712 |
| Spain | .91 | 1.26 | 1.95 | 1.72 | 768 |
| Sweden | 1.66 | 1.47 | 2.77 | 1.96 | 766 |
| United Kingdom | 1.85 | 1.61 | 2.87 | 2.00 | 1044 |
| All countries | 1.82 | 1.62 | 2.75 | 1.95 | 12728 |

[a]Based on a five-point scale.
[b]Based on a six-point scale.

**Table 4.**  *Different multi-level models of ethnic exclusionism in 15 European countries*

| Models | | $-2*$loglikelihood | $\Delta$-2*loglikelihood | $\Delta$df |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | Intercept (individual-level variation) | 48457 | | |
| 1 | +random variation at country level | 47509 | 948 | 1 |
| 2 | +individual characteristics | 46890 | 619 | 14 |
| 3 | +intermediate variables | 43712 | 3178 | 6 |
| 4 | +country characteristics | 43694 | 18 | 5 |
| 5a | 4+random slope for education | 43687 | 7 | 2 |
| 5b | 4+random slope for manual worker | 43682 | 12 | 2 |
| 5c | 4+random slope for unemployed | 43693 | 1 | 2 |
| 5d | 4+random slope for income | 43692 | 2 | 2 |
| 5e | 4+random slope for large city | 43678 | 16 | 2 |
| 6b | 5b+interaction manual worker* country characteristics | 43677 | 5 | 5 |
| 6e | 5e+interaction large city* country characteristics | 43669 | 9 | 5 |

follows a chi-square distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number of parameters to be estimated.

We began by estimating a model including an intercept with only individual-level variation. Next we estimated a model that also incorporates country-level variation in the intercept (Model 1). This improved the model fit significantly, indicating that country-level variation in ethnic exclusionism is substantial. This random intercept model can be formally represented as:

$$Y_{ij} = \beta_{0j} X_0 \qquad (1)$$

with

$$\beta_{0j} = \beta_0 + \mu_{0j} + \varepsilon_{0ij} \qquad (2)$$

where $Y_{ij}$ is the level of ethnic exclusionism for individual $i$ in country $j$. $\beta_{0j}$ is the intercept that we allow to vary between countries and $X_0$ is a constant. In equation (2) the random term for the country level ($\mu_{0j}$) shows the deviation of the country-specific intercepts from the overall intercept ($\beta_0$). The random term $\varepsilon_{0ij}$ shows the random variation at the individual level.

Then, following the sequence of our hypotheses, we included all independent individual characteristics (like education and income) in our model (Model 2). This model is summarized in equation (3), where $\beta_1$ is the coefficient estimated for the individual variable $X_{ij}$. The random intercept is specified as in equation 2:

$$Y_{ij} = \beta_{0j}X_0 + \beta_1 X_{ij} \qquad (3)$$

We centred all individual-level variables (except for the dummy variables) by the overall mean across all countries. By including the individual variables in the model we can determine to what extent compositional differences between countries explain country-level variation in ethnic exclusionism. Table 4 shows a significant decrease of the loglikelihood. Next, we added the intervening individual characteristics in Model 3, which improved the model fit strongly. To test the hypotheses on country-level effects we subsequently entered contextual characteristics into the multilevel model, still only allowing a random intercept (Model 4):

$$Y_{ij} = \beta_{0j}X_0 + \beta_1 X_{ij} + \beta_2 Z_j \qquad (4)$$

In this model $\beta_2$ is the coefficient estimated for the country-level variable $Z_j$. The random intercept is again specified as in equation 2. Including the contextual variables as explanatory variables for the variance in intercepts between countries resulted in a significant decrease of the loglikelihood (Table 4). Finally, we tested for cross-level interactions by estimating random-slope models including interaction terms between country-level and individual-level variables:

$$Y_{ij} = \beta_{0j}X_0 + \beta_{1j}X_{ij} + \beta_2 Z_j + \beta_3 X_{ij}Z_{ij} \qquad (5)$$

with

$$\beta_{1j} = \beta_1 + \mu_{1j} \qquad (6)$$

In this model, $\beta_{1j}$ is the coefficient estimated for the individual variable $X_{ij}$, which is allowed to vary across countries $j$. Cross-level interactions ($X_{ij}Z_{ij}$) were added to the model. $\beta_3$ is the estimated coefficient for such an interaction effect. Equation (6) shows how the slope of variable $X$ varies across countries, thus allowing for random variation ($\mu_{1j}$) in the individual-level effects, i.e. the deviation of the country-specific slopes from the overall slope ($\beta_1$). Again the random intercept was specified in the same way as in equation (2).

First, we investigated differential effects of individual variables by allowing the specific slopes to vary across countries. However, it turned out that models with more than two random slopes could not be estimated with the ML-wiN program, probably due to the small number of countries. Therefore, we ran separate models each incorporating one random slope only (Models 5a to 5e).[20] Table 4 shows that only the random slopes for *manual worker* and *large city* increased the model fit considerably.[21] Consequently, we investigated whether the varying effects of, respectively, belonging to the category of manual workers and living in large cities are related to the level of actual competition in a country. Thus, we extended model 5b by including cross-level interactions between *manual worker* and the contextual characteristics measuring actual competition (model 6b), and we extended model 5e by including cross-level interactions with living in large cities (model 6e).

# Results

### The Effects of Independent Individual Characteristics on Ethnic Exclusionism

Table 5 presents parameter estimates and, in the lower part, variance components, of multi-level analyses to explain differences in ethnic exclusionism. Model 1 in Table 5 shows that the variance between countries (0.19) is much smaller than the variance between individuals within countries (2.44). To test our hypotheses regarding differences in ethnic exclusionism between social categories (hypothesis 1), we included the independent individual characteristics in our model (Model 2). It turned out that ethnic exclusionism is indeed strongly supported by people with a low level of education: the lower the level of educational attainment, the higher the level of ethnic exclusionism, which has been found in previous research time and again (cf. Vogt, 1997). Furthermore,

**Table 5.** *Parameter estimates from multi-level models on ethnic exclusionism of legally established immigrants in 15 European countries; standard errors in brackets (*N=*12,728)*

| | Ethnic exclusionism | | | | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | **Model 1** | **Model 2** | **Model 3** | **Model 4** | **Model 6b** | **Model 6e** |
| Intercept | 1.77(0.11) | 1.42(0.13) | 1.67(0.09) | 1.68(0.06) | 1.69(0.06) | 1.69(0.06) |
| *Individual characteristics* | | | | | | |
| Education | | **−0.05(0.00)** | **−0.02(0.00)** | **−0.02(0.00)** | **−0.02(0.00)** | **−0.02(0.00)** |
| Service class (ref.) | | | | | | |
| Manual worker | | **0.32(0.06)** | **0.12(0.05)** | **0.12(0.05)** | 0.11(0.06) | **0.12(0.05)** |
| Routine non-manual | | **0.16(0.05)** | 0.06(0.05) | 0.06(0.05) | 0.06(0.05) | 0.05(0.05) |
| Petty bourgeois | | **0.34(0.07)** | **0.13(0.06)** | **0.13(0.06)** | **0.13(0.06)** | **0.13(0.06)** |
| Housewife | | **0.33(0.06)** | **0.16(0.06)** | **0.17(0.06)** | **0.16(0.06)** | **0.16(0.06)** |
| Student | | −0.10(0.06) | −0.08(0.06) | −0.08(0.06) | −0.09(0.06) | −0.08(0.06) |
| Unemployed | | **0.23(0.07)** | **0.13(0.06)** | **0.14(0.06)** | **0.13(0.06)** | **0.14(0.06)** |
| Retired | | **0.32(0.06)** | **0.15(0.06)** | **0.15(0.06)** | **0.15(0.06)** | **0.16(0.06)** |
| Income | | **−0.10(0.04)** | **−0.07(0.03)** | **−0.07(0.03)** | **−0.07(0.03)** | **−0.07(0.03)** |
| Large City | | **−0.07(0.03)** | −0.04(0.03) | −0.04(0.03) | −0.04(0.03) | −0.04(0.04) |
| Male | | **0.11(0.03)** | 0.04(0.03) | 0.04(0.03) | 0.04(0.03) | 0.04(0.03) |
| Age | | 0.00(0.00) | **−0.00(0.00)** | **−0.00(0.00)** | **−0.00(0.00)** | **−0.00(0.00)** |
| No religion (ref.) | | | | | | |
| Christian | | **0.19(0.04)** | 0.06(0.03) | 0.06(0.03) | 0.06(0.03) | 0.06(0.03) |
| Non-Christian | | −0.07(0.08) | −0.11(0.07) | −0.12(0.07) | −0.10(0.07) | **−0.14(0.07)** |
| *Intermediate variables* | | | | | | |
| Perceived ethnic threat | | | **0.36(0.01)** | **0.36(0.01)** | **0.36(0.01)** | **0.36(0.01)** |
| Socio-economic frustration | | | 0.06(0.02) | **0.06(0.02)** | **0.06(0.02)** | **0.06(0.02)** |
| Status anxiety | | | 0.11(0.02) | **0.11(0.02)** | **0.11(0.02)** | **0.11(0.02)** |
| Chance of losing job | | | 0.02(0.02) | 0.02(0.02) | 0.02(0.02) | 0.02(0.02) |
| Postmaterialism | | | **−0.18(0.02)** | **−0.18(0.02)** | **−0.18(0.02)** | **−0.18(0.02)** |
| Left-right self placement | | | **0.07(0.01)** | **0.07(0.01)** | **0.07(0.01)** | **0.07(0.01)** |
| *Country characteristics* | | | | | | |
| % Non-EU citizens | | | | **0.10(0.03)** | **0.09(0.04)** | **0.11(0.04)** |
| Number of asylum seekers: 1995 | | | | 0.00(0.00) | 0.00(0.00) | 0.00(0.00) |
| Change in no. of asylum seekers: 1990–5 | | | | −0.01(0.01) | −0.01(0.01) | −0.01(0.02) |
| Unemployment: 1995 | | | | −0.01(0.01) | −0.01(0.01) | −0.01(0.01) |
| Change unemployment 1990–5 | | | | −0.02(0.03) | −0.02(0.04) | −0.01(0.04) |
| *Interaction terms* | | | | | | |
| Non-EU citizens*Worker | | | | | 0.08(0.03) | |
| Asylum seekers*Worker | | | | | −0.00(0.00) | |
| Change asylum seekers*Worker | | | | | 0.00(0.02) | |
| Unemployment*Worker | | | | | 0.01(0.01) | |
| Change unemployment*Worker | | | | | −0.01(0.04) | |
| Non-EU citizens*Large city | | | | | | −0.02(0.03) |
| Asylum seekers*Large city | | | | | | −0.00(0.00) |
| Change asylum seekers*Large city | | | | | | −0.03(0.02) |
| Unemployment*Large city | | | | | | 0.02(0.01) |
| Change unemployment*Large city | | | | | | −0.02(0.03) |
| *Variance components* | | | | | | |
| Individual | 2.44 | 2.32 | 1.81 | 1.81 | | |
| (% explained compared to Intercept Model) | | (5) | (26) | (26) | | |
| Country | 0.19 | 0.22 | 0.08 | 0.02 | | |
| (% explained compared to Intercept Model) | | (0) | (58) | (89) | | |

Note: Bold parameters indicate significance at p < 0.05.

we found that manual workers (0.32) as well as unemployed people (0.23) are substantially more in favour of ethnic exclusionism than people belonging to the service class. Regarding income, we found a minor, but statistically significant, effect consistent with our hypothesis: the lower one's income, the more one favours ethnic exclusionism. However, we had to refute our hypothesis regarding people living in large cities. It turned out that they were less likely to exclude ethnic minorities than people living elsewhere.

Overall, these findings largely corroborate our expectation that ethnic exclusionism will be more prevalent among social categories in similar social positions as ethnic out-groups in terms of education, social class, and income. Moreover, we found a number of other categories of people who were rather strongly inclined to exclude ethnic minorities: routine non-manuals, the petty bourgeoisie, housekeepers, and retired people support ethnic exclusionism more than the service class does; men do more than women; and Christians do more than the non-religious. The variance components in Table 5 show that by including the independent individual variables, the variance between individuals has dropped slightly from 2.44 to 2.32. The variance between countries did not decrease. This implies that differences between countries in the average level of ethnic exclusionism cannot be attributed, at least not predominantly, to differences in population composition.

### The Effects of Mediating Individual Perceptions on Ethnic Exclusionism

In the next step, we included all intervening individual variables (hypothesis 2) in order to explain why people in particular social conditions are more likely to support ethnic exclusionism than others. Model 3 in Table 5 shows that most effects of independent individual characteristics were strongly reduced as compared to Model 2. This implies that the intervening variables to a large extent explain differences between social categories in ethnic exclusionism. The parameter estimates with their standard errors show that the perception of ethnic threat is the most important predictor (0.36), whereas the effects of perceptions of personal threat are less strong. Socio-economic frustration (0.06)

and status anxiety (0.11) are, as expected, positively related to ethnic exclusionism, but the effect of personal unemployment risk is not significant. Moreover, ethnic exclusionism is more strongly prevalent among individuals with a materialistic value orientation and a conservative political orientation (see Table 5).[22]

The variance components for Model 3 show that the variances between individuals within countries as well as between countries have dropped considerably. By including independent and intervening individual characteristics, 26 per cent of the original amount of variance between individuals within countries (see Model 1) could be explained. In addition, the variance between countries decreased sharply following the inclusion of intervening individual characteristics: 58 per cent of the original variance between countries could be explained.

### The Effects of Contextual Characteristics on Ethnic Exclusionism

Next we turn to the relation between national characteristics and ethnic exclusionism. The expectation was that ethnic exclusionism would be stronger in countries with a high level of actual competition (hypothesis 3). Model 4 in Table 5 presents parameter estimates for the effects of contextual characteristics (together with all individual-level variables). As expected, we found that the larger the proportion of non-EU citizens living in a country, the more people are in favour of ethnic exclusionism (0.10). However, contrary to our hypothesis, the number of asylum seekers, as well as changes over time in the influx of asylum seekers, are not related to ethnic exclusionism. Moreover, it turned out that the level of unemployment as such is not related to ethnic exclusionism, nor does the change in unemployment have an effect.[23] These last findings may be due to the relatively small number of countries included in the analysis with, moreover, minor variances at the contextual level.

### The Effects of Cross-Level Interactions on Ethnic Exclusionism

Finally, we investigate whether the effects of individual characteristics vary across countries. We expected that the higher the level of actual competition in a country, the stronger the effects of

**Figure 2.** *Country-level residuals in ethnic exclusionism*

individual characteristics (like education and unemployment) on ethnic exclusionism (hypothesis 4). Building particularly on the findings of Models 5*b* and 5*e* in Table 4, we set out to test, in Model 6*b*, whether differences between manual workers (as compared to the service class) and, in Model 6*e*, whether differences between people living in urban areas (as compared to those not living in cities), depend on the amount of actual competition at the national level. It turned out that the more non-EU citizens were present in a country, the more manual workers were inclined to support ethnic exclusionism, which is in accordance with our expectation. However, none of the other cross-level interactions reached significance.

### Advantages of Multi-Level Analysis

The main question in this paper was how cross-national variation in ethnic exclusionism could be explained. It turned out that, first of all, variations in the composition of the population, not in the independent but in the intervening individual char-

acteristics, accounted for cross-national differences (composition effects). Moreover, inclusion of contextual characteristics decreased the variance between countries even more strongly, so that, eventually, almost all of the original country-level variance was explained. This is further illustrated in Figure 2, which displays the residuals for the 15 countries in three of our models.

The residuals of Model 1 correspond with the observed differences in ethnic exclusionism between the countries as presented in Table 3. By including all individual characteristics (both the independent and intervening variables), the country-level residuals are considerably reduced. By also including country-level variables, the residuals are again reduced. By comparing the residuals of the different models, one can ascertain how much is to be gained by including individual respectively contextual characteristics: in this case quite a lot.

The residuals for separate countries illustrate our models. For instance, ethnic exclusionism in Germany was quite high (see also Table 3). In Figure 2 we see that this high average is only to a

small extent the outcome of the specific composition of the German population, and more due to the outcome of the contextual characteristics of Germany, in particular the high proportion of non-EU citizens (see also Table A2). Likewise, the low level of ethnic exclusionism in Ireland and Spain stems from their population composition (especially the low level of perceived ethnic threat) as well as their specific national context, in particular the small number of non-EU citizens in both countries (see also Table A2).

## Conclusion and Discussion

In this paper we set out to explain European citizens' opposition to the granting of civil rights to legally administered resident migrants. The fact that people wish to deny civil rights to legal migrants already living in the country seems more serious than any other aspect of ethnic exclusionism, because the mere social presence of ethnic groups is marginalized if one denies these minorities civil rights.

In order to explain this phenomenon we explored Ethnic Competition Theory. The core proposition that we set out to test was that actual competition between ethnic groups, at an individual and contextual level, induces ethnic exclusionism. We proposed that actual as well as perceived competition might operate, at the individual level, to reinforce ethnic exclusionism. We found that many researchers recognize this theoretical proposition, however, they unfortunately neglected to include it in their measurements and consequently in their models. Taking this general proposition seriously led us, first, to distinguish between individual and contextual competitive conditions; secondly, to conceptualize and operationalize actual ethnic competition distinctively from the perception of ethnic threat; and, thirdly, to model perceived ethnic threat as a mediating factor to explain the relationship between, on the one hand, competitive inter-ethnic conditions and, on the other, support for ethnic exclusionism.

Regarding inter-ethnic competition at an individual level we found that indigenous people who hold similar social positions to ethnic minorities support ethnic exclusionism more strongly. Indeed, ethnic exclusionism is more strongly supported by

less-educated and lower-income groups, as well as by manual workers and unemployed people. Regarding contextual competitive conditions we found that the larger the proportion of non-EU citizens in a country, the stronger the support for ethnic exclusionism. We also found an important interaction between individual and contextual competitive conditions: the larger the percentage of non-EU citizens in a country, the more manual workers are in favour of ethnic exclusionism as compared to the service class. These findings are all in line with Ethnic Competition Theory. However, we found that residence in a large city does not evoke exclusionistic reactions.

Perceived ethnic threat turned out to be the most important predictor of differences in ethnic exclusionism: the more ethnic out-groups are perceived as a collective threat, the stronger the opposition to the granting of civil rights to legal migrants. Moreover, perceived ethnic threat explained differences between social categories in exclusionistic reactions to a large extent. These findings corroborate and specify Ethnic Competition Theory at an individual level. Our measure of perceived ethnic threat indicates to what extent ethnic minorities are perceived as a collective threat to the majority. Unfortunately, we lacked a valid measure of the perceptions of respondents that ethnic minorities pose a personal threat to them. However, the relative importance of our measure of perceived ethnic threat compared to other factors measuring (fear of) deteriorating personal conditions suggests that unfavourable attitudes towards ethnic out-groups are more strongly affected by feelings of collective ethnic threat than by feelings of personal threat, which we consider consistent with previous findings and interpretations (Bobo, 1983, 1988).

In many previous studies the perception of ethnic threat was proposed as the crucial mediating link between social conditions and aspects of ethnic exclusionism, but it has hardly ever been tested empirically. Eventually, Quillian (1995) claimed that including more direct measures of perceived threat would contribute to our understanding of prejudice, or more generally of ethnic exclusionism. In this contribution we have shown that:

– perceived ethnic threat is both theoretically and empirically distinct from, but nevertheless strongly related to ethnic exclusionism;

– perceptions of ethnic threat do indeed intervene effects in the impact of people's social conditions at the individual level on ethnic exclusionism; and

– actual inter-ethnic competition at the national level does affect ethnic exclusionism.

However, our paper has not taken into account the various sources of actual and perceived threat. At the contextual level, we failed to come to grips with non-socio-economic sources of competition, such as those stemming from cultural or historical conditions. Efforts to include these conditions run the risk of having no valid comparative contextual data to model their effects appropriately. None the less we feel that our empirical evidence corroborates and, moreover, adds insights to a rather general proposition explicated by Olzak (1992): rising competition, actual competition as well as perceptions of competition, drive dominant social groups towards ethnic exclusionism, be it in the form of restrictions on immigration or restrictions on the ability to live freely in a country resulting from the denial of civil rights to legal migrants.

# Notes

1. The group of legally administered resident migrants obviously consists of different immigrant groups with different migration as well as integration histories (c.f., Pettigrew, 1998). However, they have one important thing in common: they work and live legally in the European country they migrated to, whereas asylum seekers are still in the process of acquiring a legal status.

2. This political issue was initially only discussed by the political leaders of extreme right-wing parties in European nations. It was, however, soon picked up by the political leaders of conservative and liberal parties.

3. Although Coser did not actually refer to ethnic groups, it is clear that this general proposition may include competition between all types of social groups.

4. This argument was explicated in a similar fashion by Bobo (1988), building on Blumer (1958), proposing a relationship between 'external threat' and 'perceived threat' to explain opposition to racial policies.

5. In the line of research following Adorno *et al.* (1950/1982) the main argument is that ethnocentrism may be explained in terms of personality characteristics. In spite of many critiques, basic propositions along these lines have not been refuted empirically (cf. Scheepers *et al.*, 1990). In this contribution we will leave this argument aside, mainly for practical reasons: there are no valid measurements available.

6. This elaboration is considered to be odd by some (e.g. Forbes, 1997), but is underlined by others (Brown, 1995; Jones, 1997). In the early 1970s it was found that some level of in-group favouritism exists even in minimal (experimental) conditions, i.e. in conditions of 'random' social categorization (Tajfel *et al.*, 1971; Tajfel, 1981). This implies that there is some level of in-group favouritism, even without any actual or perceived competitive conditions. Realistic Conflict Theory proposes that actual competition between ethnic groups may reinforce both in-group favouritism and out-group hostility, i.e. ethnocentrism.

7. Quillian actually emphasizes this conceptual distinction between racial prejudice on the one hand and perceived group threat on the other hand. He makes a very clear statement in this respect: (1995: 592) 'it is the collective feeling that the dominant group is threatened that leads to prejudice.' Moreover, in his first hypothesis, he states that 'prejudice is a function of the perceived threat the subordinate group poses to the dominant group' which clearly implies this distinction: the former variable is the dependent and the latter is the independent or intermediate variable. Quillian also emphasizes the conceptual distinction between the actual contextual conditions that may induce perceived ethnic threat when he states (1995: 592) that 'perceived threat is influenced both by the economic situation and by the size of the subordinate group'. However, this crucial part of the theoretical analysis was not elaborated upon in the empirical analysis.

8. However, Taylor (1998) employs some items to measure perceived economic and political threat, using the 1990 General Social Survey. Moreover, some of the items Quillian (1995: 593) uses, may be considered to be measurements of perceived ethnic threat, like: 'they exploit social security benefits' and 'their presence is one of the causes of delinquency and violence', i.e. items that express that some collective goods, like welfare and order, are being threatened by ethnic minorities.

9. Here we follow the distinctions made by Tajfel (1982) between a social category, a collectivity, and a social group. A social category is an entity of people distinguishable by some external characteristic, like educational level. If they are aware of this joint external characteristic, the people of the entity are labelled as a collectivity. And if the people, moreover, attach

value to their collectivity, they are said to constitute a social group.

10. Several distinct mechanisms, other than the one we propose, might be responsible for the relation between low education and ethnic exclusionism (for an overview, see Vogt, 1997). However, the focus is not on these mechanisms as such.

11. According to Diez-Medrano (1994) ethnic exclusionism may also be caused by inter-group segmentation. However, as we do not have direct measures of ethnic labour-market segmentation in our data we are not able to test this hypothesis.

12. Therefore, they resorted to symbolic racism that they considered a stronger predictor of whites' responses to ethno-political issues than old-fashioned racism or personal threats (for an overview see Sears, 1988). Since, particularly, the measurement of symbolic racism has been severely criticized (Sniderman and Tetlock, 1986; see Sears, 1988, for a reply), we did not take it into account.

13. Olzak (1992) has suggested that the level of actual competition may also be related to conditions of increasing numbers of people competing for a decreasing amount of scarce resources. However, since these conditions do not prevail in the 1990s in Europe (cf. Table A2), we will not test this hypothesis.

14. In the same vein, it could be argued that ethnic exclusionism is likely to be widespread in countries with decreasing levels of GDP, as was proposed by Quillian (1995). However, since the European countries under consideration do not suffer from such deteriorating economic conditions, this hypothesis is considered unfit for the European context. Moreover, a number of other actual contextual conditions possibly related to perceived ethnic threat could be spelled out. We refer to contextual conditions at the meso-level as mentioned by Olzak (1992), or to other contextual conditions indicating actual competition but not necessarily related to socio-economic conditions, such as changes in political power or changes in the dominant values. However, since we have become aware of the lack of cross-national comparable data, we will not follow up this line of reasoning. Recently, complementary hypotheses on ethnic exclusionism have been suggested from quite a different angle. Thraenhardt (1995) argues that particularly conservative governments, or more generally conservative politicians, have paved the way for more widespread ethnic exclusionism. That is why these politicians have approved of restrictions on immigration and citizenship for ethnic minorities. However, testing whether exposure to particular governments increases ethnic exclusionism requires rather specific measurements relating to the knowledge of government policies that are unfortunately not available, or rather general measurements of exposure to these governmental policies (such as the percentage of conservatives in government or in any other democratic institution) which are only valid on the quite crude assumption that all the inhabitants of a country have been exposed to this political context equally.

15. Unfortunately the data do not allow us to distinguish between different immigrant groups. We acknowledge that Europeans' exclusionistic reactions could vary by immigrants' ethnicity or country of origin. However, for the issue at hand, i.e. to be able to compare exclusionistic reactions cross-nationally, the only option is to consider immigrants as an undifferentiated whole.

16. To compute the number of years the respondent had enjoyed educational training, we subtracted 6 years, i.e. the age at which formal education starts in most European countries. We prefer this procedure to that used by Quillian (1995: 595), who divided educational level into two categories, thereby 'wasting' variance. The same holds true for variables like social class and income that Quillian dichotomized into two categories.

17. Of course, one may argue that operational differences are not precise, since perceptions of ethnic threat may also be considered to be prejudices. We believe, however, that there are major conceptual and operational differences between both sets of items. The most important one is that there is no implicit or explicit reference to ethnic threat in the items on 'the denial of civil rights to immigrants', whereas this ethnic threat is implied quite explicitly in each of the items measuring 'perceived ethnic threat'. Therefore, we consider both sets of measurements to be valid for the purposes at hand.

18. Although the fit of this bi-factorial model, judged by $\chi^2$ (228, df=25) is rather poor, its fit is much better than the fit of a one-factorial model ($\chi^2$=355, df=26). We emphasize that this poor fit is, at least partly, due to the large sample size we employ: separate analyses per country did show quite acceptable chi-squares. Another fit measure not sensitive to the sample size, like the Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index, is very high (0.99 on a scale from 0 to 1). The Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC=$\chi^2$ − df*ln(n*k)), proposed by Raftery (1993) is negative, also indicating that the model fits the data well. Furthermore, the modification indices indicated merely minor cross-loadings, providing additional evidence that the exclusion and threat items are factorially distinct,

both on the pooled and on the separate sub-samples. Final evidence for the empirical distinction between these items is that there was hardly any tendency by respondents to give straight-line answers. Moreover, each response set contained response-set breakers.

19. Collinearity diagnostics show that there is no sign of multicollinearity between the contextual variables.

20. Including a random slope in a model is associated with a loss of 2 degrees of freedom: one parameter for the variance in random slope and one parameter for the covariance between random intercept and random slope. Together with the variance for the random intercept, such a model has three (co-)variance parameters at the second level. The variance at the second level can therefore no longer be displayed in a single figure. That is why we did not report the variance components for the random slope models in Table 5.

21. A random slope for education led to a significant, but very minor decrease in loglikelihood. However, inspection of the parameter estimates associated with the random slope (i.e. the variance in random slope and the covariance between random slope and random intercept) showed that both parameters are close to zero and not significant at the 5%-level. We therefore concluded that the effect of education does not substantively vary across countries, at least not across this sample of countries.

22. Additional analyses including individual characteristics and perceived threat alone result in similar parameter estimates: the effect of perceived threat is 0.38 instead of 0.36, and the effects of individual characteristics remain highly similar.

23. Although the effects of (change in) unemployment were non-significant, we looked more closely at the negative nature of these effects. Visual inspection of the bivariate relationships showed that this result could be strongly affected by outliers. Whereas the unemployment rate in Finland and Spain was extremely high in 1995 compared to the other countries, the support for ethnic exclusionism was relatively low in both countries; and whereas the rise of unemployment was extremely high in Sweden and Finland, the support for ethnic exclusionism was quite low in these countries; and whereas the change, i.e. the increase, in the number of asylum seekers was extremely high in Ireland, support for ethnic exclusionism was quite low. Given the rather small number of available countries, our results for country characteristics are sensitive to influential level-2 cases, that is, countries with an exceptionally high or low score on a specific country characteristic. Therefore, we decided to test for the stability of our final estimates

by successively eliminating outliers (i.e., Finland, Spain, Ireland, and Sweden). It turned out that the effect of unemployment, although it switched from negative to positive, remained non-significant. The other contextual effects (the change in the number of asylum seekers and change in the level of unemployment) remained negative and non-significant.

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# Author's Address

Peer Scheepers, Department of Sociology, University of Nijmegen, P.O. Box 9104, 6500 HE Nijmegen, The Netherlands. Tel.: +31-24–3613029; fax: +31-24–3612399 E-mail: p.scheepers@maw.kun.nl

# Appendix

**Table A1.**  *Reliability of the Likert scales (Cronbach's alphas).*

|                | Ethnic exclusionism | Perceived ethnic threat |
|----------------|---------------------|-------------------------|
| Austria        | 0.77                | 0.72                    |
| Belgium        | 0.78                | 0.73                    |
| Denmark        | 0.64                | 0.74                    |
| Finland        | 0.64                | 0.74                    |
| France         | 0.81                | 0.83                    |
| Germany        | 0.75                | 0.72                    |
| Greece         | 0.69                | 0.52                    |
| Ireland        | 0.59                | 0.68                    |
| Italy          | 0.65                | 0.68                    |
| Italy          | 0.65                | 0.68                    |
| Luxembourg     | 0.59                | 0.68                    |
| Netherlands    | 0.66                | 0.73                    |
| Portugal       | 0.52                | 0.61                    |
| Spain          | 0.71                | 0.69                    |
| Sweden         | 0.68                | 0.74                    |
| United Kingdom | 0.70                | 0.77                    |
| All Countries  | 0.70                | 0.74                    |

**Table A2.**  *Country characteristics: migration patterns and socio-economic indicators per country*

|                | % Non-EU[a] | AS 1995[b] | Δ AS 90–5[c] | U 1995[d] | Δ U 90–5[e] |
|----------------|-------------|------------|--------------|-----------|-------------|
| Austria        | 5.98        | 74.78      | 0.24         | 6.6       | 1.22        |
| Belgium        | 3.65        | 126.80     | 1.04         | 9.3       | 1.29        |
| Denmark        | 2.92        | 111.32     | 1.20         | 10.3      | 1.06        |
| Finland        | 0.96        | 15.03      | 0.45         | 17.4      | 5.12        |
| France         | 4.02        | 36.67      | 0.38         | 11.6      | 1.30        |
| Germany        | 6.39        | 148.30     | 0.62         | 12.9      | 1.79        |
| Greece         | 1.05        | 13.65      | 0.32         | 10.0      | 1.43        |
| Ireland        | 0.64        | 18.52      | 12.96        | 12.2      | 0.95        |
| Italy          | 0.98        | 2.43       | 0.11         | 11.1      | 1.01        |
| Luxembourg     | 3.12        | 58.33      | 1.69         | 2.7       | 2.08        |
| Netherlands    | 3.66        | 223.93     | 1.79         | 7.1       | 0.95        |
| Portugal       | 1.19        | 5.39       | 4.00         | 5.5       | 1.17        |
| Spain          | 0.62        | 19.05      | 1.07         | 22.9      | 1.40        |
| Sweden         | 4.05        | 125.09     | 0.37         | 7.7       | 4.81        |
| United Kingdom | 2.06        | 76.47      | 1.03         | 8.5       | 1.27        |

[a]Percentage of non-EU citizens in 1995 (related to the total population); data from European Commision, *Demographic Statistics* 1997.
[b]Number of asylum seekers per 100.000 inhabitants in 1995 (to correct for yearly fluctuations the average has been taken of the number of asylum seekers in the years 1994, 1995, and 1996); data from SOPEMI, *Trends in International Migration*, Annual Report, 1998 edition.
[c]Change in the number of asylum seekers from 1990 to 1995 (as the ratio of the average of the number of asylum seekers in 1994, 1995, and 1996 to the average in 1989, 1990, and 1991); data from SOPEMI, *Trends in International Migration*, Annual Report, 1998 edition.
[d]Total unemployment rate in 1995; data from *Statistical Yearbook of the United Nations* 1995.
[e] Change in unemployment rate from 1990 to 1995 (the ratio of the unemployment rate in 1995 to the unemployment rate in 1990 – Germany 1991 to 1995, Italy 1990 to 1994, Portugal 1990 to 1993); data from *Statistical Yearbook of the United Nations* 1995.