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**Ostdeutsche Lebensverläufe im Transformationsprozeß**

**Political Loyalty and Career Mobility  
in the German Democratic Republic and the  
People's Republic of Poland**

Bogdan W. Mach and Heike Solga

Arbeitsbericht 7/1997



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**Inhaltliche Schwerpunkte:**

- die (vergleichende) Sozialstrukturanalyse individueller Lebensverläufe in Ost- und Westdeutschland
- die Analyse individueller Handlungsstrategien im Transformationsprozeß
- die Analyse der gesellschaftlichen Transformation in Ostdeutschland und ihre Auswirkungen auf individuelle Lebensverläufe

**Datenbasis**

**Grundgesamtheit:**

Die deutsche Wohnbevölkerung der Geburtsjahrgänge 1929-31, 1939-41, 1951-53, 1959-61 und 1971 in den Neuen Bundesländern im Oktober 1990

**Stichprobe:**

Personenstichprobe aus dem infas-Master-Sample, das im Oktober 1990 aus dem zentralen Einwohnermelderegister der ehemaligen DDR gezogen wurde

**Erhebungszeiträume:**

Pilotstudie: Februar/März 1991  
Pretest: Mai/Juni 1991  
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Erstbefragung Kohorte 1971: März - Dezember 1996  
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**Erhebungsmethode:**

Persönliche (mündliche) Interviews auf der Basis eines standardisierten Lebensverlaufsfragebogens; Aufzeichnungen der Interviews auf Tonband  
Postalische schriftliche Befragung  
CATI (computerunterstützte Telefoninterviews); CAPI (computerunterstützte persönliche Interviews)

**Realisierte Fälle:**

Pilotstudie: 34  
Pretest: 71  
Probeinterviews: 81  
Haupterhebung: 2331  
Schriftliche Zusatzerhebung: 1254  
Panelbefragung: ca. 1700  
Kohorte 1971: ca. 700  
Non-Response: ca. 600

# POLITICAL LOYALTY AND CAREER MOBILITY IN THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF POLAND

## *Abstract:*

Research on "path dependency" of East European transitions from socialism on national particularities before 1989 has established itself as an important area of sociological analysis. In this paper we contribute to that research by comparing the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) and pre-1989 Poland with regard to the link between political loyalty and career mobility in these countries under state socialism. Using national samples stratified by cohorts, we show that (1) the relationship between political loyalty and mobility opportunities was consistently stronger in the former GDR than in pre-1989 Poland, and (2) neither country exhibited a decrease in the relationship between membership in the Communist Party (or "allied parties") and opportunities for career mobility during the period of state-socialist development. We interpret these findings as indicating that no substantial convergence to Western stratification patterns occurred before 1989 in either country. The persistence of the Party's political influence on mobility opportunities in both countries up until 1989 may help explain the depth of change required for the current transition to a market economy. The more extensive influence of the East German SED may be partly responsible for the more radical nature of changes there after 1989 compared to Poland, although both countries face difficult tasks in the implementation of a market economy.

*"The Party's personnel policy [was]: No one has to be competent in any post; he merely has to be loyal." (Stefan Staszewski, A Warsaw Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party (Toranska 1987, cited in Kornai 1992: 58))*

## I. INTRODUCTION<sup>1</sup>

The inspiration for this paper has been the conviction that the East European socio-political change of 1989 should give new incentives to comparisons within the state-socialist system<sup>2</sup> "as it was" rather than render these comparisons obsolete. A pivotal feature of current developments in East European societies is their path-dependence on institutional

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<sup>1</sup> The paper is part of the Project "Life Histories and Historical Change in the Former GDR" headed by Johannes Huinink and Karl Ulrich Mayer at the Max Planck Institute for Human Development and Education, Berlin.

<sup>2</sup> Following Giddens (1973) and Lane (1976), we use the term "state socialism" to refer to pre-1989 societies of Eastern Europe. In choosing this term we want to express no more than the opinion that (1) these societies should not be described as simply "socialist" because their realities to a great extent were not compatible with normative aspects of the nineteenth- and twentieth-century socialist social philosophy, (2) the dominance of the state over the society was the fundamental expression of that incompatibility, and (3) abandoning the "socialist" label altogether in reference to these societies has not yet yielded any generally accepted solution to the problem of defining their systemic identity. Szelenyi (1987) provides a long (although not complete) list of terms applied to societies of Eastern Europe in political economy, sociology and political science.

arrangements and attitudinal and behavioral patterns left behind by state socialism.<sup>3</sup> Both the pace and the outcomes of change in Eastern Europe are heavily conditioned by past economic, social, and cultural policies. Comparative analyses of state-socialist pasts thus offer a unique opportunity for a first-hand understanding of "structural legacies" which continue to influence present East European transitions to a market economy. Hence, although preparing scenarios of the future of former state-socialist countries is legitimately an important task of social sciences, the interest in such forecasting implies that "researchers should avoid the temptation of studying what has not yet happened ... and do the archival work to reconstruct the past" (Stark 1992: 85).<sup>4</sup>

The paper contributes to this future-oriented reconstruction of the past of state socialism. It focuses on the historical development of the link between loyalty to the political system and career mobility under state socialism. This link has long been recognized as a central part of redistributive processes taking place in state-socialist societies (Feldmesser 1960; Walder 1985)--the "nomenklatura" will probably be the longest remembered symbol of the organizational power of the Communist Party in offering career opportunities to politically loyal citizens (Voselensky 1984; Harasimov 1969).

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<sup>3</sup> As David Stark (1992: 80) has put it "the new [in Eastern Europe] does not come from the new--or from nothing--but from reshaping existing resources." In Stark's work on Eastern Europe this general idea has crystallized in many testable hypotheses--the most recent being his hypothesis about "recombinant property" in East European capitalism (Stark 1996).

<sup>4</sup> Mayer (1994: 53) made the same point in the context of the current studies on the history of the GDR. It is a fortunate coincidence that this "archival work" can be done under conditions of sociologists' easy access to high-quality data sets from Eastern Europe which were largely unavailable for comparative analyses before the breakdown of the Communist rule in 1989. An excellent empirical example of such "archival" research is the analysis of the social composition of the Czechoslovak and Hungarian Communist Parties in the 1980s done by Wong (1996) on the assumption that "socialist legacies [of the Communist parties] will continue to shape and reshape the stratification systems in the present and the future (p.64)."

The relationship between political loyalty and career mobility in Eastern Europe has, however, never been studied systematically. Before the socio-political change of 1989, it was recruitment into the Party itself rather than Party-sponsored intragenerational occupational mobility that was of primary interest to researchers.<sup>5</sup> The role of political loyalty in shaping occupational careers under state socialism has also remained largely understudied after the change of 1989, as both popular and scientific interests in the Communist Party shifted by then to the "outflow" problem, that is, whether former Party members and cadres have been among the winners or the losers of the transition to market economy (Mateju and Rehakova 1993; Mach and Slomczynski 1996; Rona-Tas 1994; Solga 1997). Although recruitment and outflow perspectives as depicted above are highly relevant for understanding state socialism, they do not deal directly with the central problem of the redistributive control exerted by the Communist Party via its power to offer career opportunities to citizens.<sup>6</sup> Research on the universality of a state-socialist loyalty-mobility link deals directly with that problem.

Studying this loyalty-mobility link in comparative perspective is still today productive for at least three reasons, helping us: (1) to distinguish between state-socialist universals and national particularities in the way political control over careers was exercised in state-socialist countries, (2) to understand national patterns in transition to a mar-

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<sup>5</sup> This interest has led to analyses of general patterns of recruitment into the Communist Party (Szelenyi 1987) and analyses of specific recruitment patterns into the "nomenklatura" and Party elite positions (Harasimov 1969; Voslensky 1984). The impact of political loyalty on career mobility between categories of the state-socialist occupational structure have remained largely unaddressed in those studies.

<sup>6</sup> In this respect, research on China seems to be more systematic. Walder's (1995) analysis of Tianjin in the mid 1980s focuses, for example, not only on the determinants of attainment of party membership, but also deals directly with the role of party membership in mobility toward higher occupational positions. The market transition theory, most vigorously developed in the research on China (see Nee and Matthews 1996; and Symposium on Market Transition 1996 for an overview) does not only deal with the narrow problem of actual winners and losers of the transition, but also examines in detail the current relevance of pre-transition institutional arrangements in which system loyalty and mobility chances were intrinsically linked.

ket economy and to predict future developments of these countries, and (3) to assess the empirical validity of competing conceptual paradigms on state socialism.

To these aims, we compare the pre-1989 Poland and the German Democratic Republic (GDR). In view of their divergent historical development after the II World War, these two state-socialist countries are commonly considered to represent the two poles of the state-socialist sociopolitical system. The GDR serves as an example of a state-socialist country with tight political control over the society, while pre-1989 Poland is an example of a state-socialist country characterized by a relatively weaker political control.<sup>7</sup> In our empirical analyses we focus on differences and similarities between the two countries in the way in which loyalty to the political system was used as a "channel" for career mobility.

Our approach to career mobility is more typical of political sociology than of "social stratification and social mobility research." In contrast to study the development and permeability of social structure, we focus on controlling mobility chances as an element of exercising institutionalized political control over a society.<sup>8</sup> Highly consistent with our approach is Walder's (1995) analysis of how party membership helps in getting into the

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<sup>7</sup> The claim that the political control over society was weak in Poland and strong in the GDR can be justified by many considerations ranging from individual human rights (for example almost no constraints on freedom to travel abroad in Poland and almost no freedom to travel in the GDR ) to institutionalized political opposition (for example legal recognition of "Solidarity" movement in Poland and almost no--or very late--organized political opposition in the GDR). Furthermore, the GDR had the highest number of members of the Communist Party in Eastern Europe (13.8 percent in 1986), whereas in Poland it was only 5.7 percent (see Staar 1987). Excellent overviews of the political histories of the GDR and Poland under state socialism can be found in Staritz (1985) and Paczkowski (1995).

<sup>8</sup> It must be stressed that we only deal with some aspects of the Party's control over the society. It is obvious that in many instances this control was exercised without using the Party as a channel for mobility. For example, political screening for some positions did not always use Party membership as a signal of eligibility. In this analysis we skip over this problem. It should be also added that we confine ourselves to the problem of intragenerational mobility. The problem of the Party's control over intergenerational mobility will be dealt elsewhere.



occupational elite in China. Such an approach assumes that "if the allocation of opportunity and privilege according to party loyalty has been an important foundation of communist states, then career mobility might provide some clues regarding their decline" (Walder 1995: 310).

The paper is divided into seven sections. After these introductory remarks, we begin our analysis with a short review of two prominent paradigms in the research on state-socialist societies (Section 2). This is necessary since the development of hypotheses on the link between loyalty and occupational mobility is highly dependent on the conceptualization of "state socialism." In Section 3, we develop such hypotheses on the link between political loyalty and occupational mobility. In Section 4, we specify them as country-comparative hypotheses applying to East Germany and Poland. The description of the data, variables, and classifications used follows in Section 5. Our empirical results are presented in Section 6. We start with an exploratory analysis of inter-country differences in the loyalty-mobility link and move on to logit regression models testing for the significance of these differences. In Section 7, we summarize our findings and discuss their implications for understanding the present and the future of post-communist countries.

## **II. "ANTI-INSTITUTIONAL CONVERGENCE" AND "INSTITUTIONAL DISTINCTIVENESS": TWO PARADIGMS IN CONCEPTUALIZING STATE SOCIALISM**

The key contrast between market and state-socialist societies is the structure of political power. Market societies are characterized by a pluralistic distribution of power and a high degree of market autonomy, while the latter are marked by a monocentric authority structure and direct political control over the economy. Thus, whereas in capitalist economies, market structures mediate and stratify the relationship between individual

characteristics and socioeconomic outcomes, under state socialism the abolition of market competition made room for a new stratifying agent--the political authority structure. State socialism, with its Party-controlled distribution and redistribution of goods, resources, and opportunities for individual advancement, is therefore an example of a modern system in which rewards are "allocated to various social groups or strata in conformity with the aims and principles of those who occupy the seat of power" (Parkin, 1971: 168).

Models of "Soviet-type society" developed in the social sciences over years capture differently "the essence" of state-socialist societies. These models can be assigned to two basic paradigmatic perspectives. The first paradigm assumes that both systems--the capitalist as well as the state-socialist--are genotypically similar, that both are examples of the modern (post)industrial society. This perspective allows for ongoing convergence between state socialism and capitalism. In contrast, the second paradigm assumes that they are genotypically different, representing two inherently different types of societal coordination. It envisages the two systems as fundamentally distinct. By using the labels "anti-institutional convergence" and "institutional distinctiveness" in this section's title, we stress the fact that state socialism was intentionally "designed" by its ideological creators to be institutionally incompatible with any convergence toward the West. Thus, any actual Westward convergence is legitimately described as "anti-institutional," and any distinctiveness found between the two systems is "institutional."

Under the label "anti-institutional convergence", we refer summarily to many variants of the modernization theory (Bell 1973; Kerr et al. 1960; Konrad and Szelenyi 1979; Rostow 1960; Skilling and Griffiths 1971; Solomon 1983). The major assumption of modernization theory in its different versions is that the pluralization of economic and political life--associated with cultural modernization of state-socialist societies--chal-

lenged over time the institutional identity of state socialism and led to an ongoing convergence towards capitalism. Furthermore, it assumed that the generic similarity of both systems would require a zero-sum developmental trajectory in which, irrespective of historical national contexts, the Party would necessarily lose its power and the market forces would become essential. The results would be a relatively smooth replacement of the Communist Party by the market – taking more and more over the part of the main agent of social development in state-socialist countries.

Under the label of "institutional distinctiveness", we condense the theories of totalitarianism (Friedrich 1954) and "communist neo-traditionalism" (Walder 1986) as well as the "new institutional analysis" of state socialism (Stark and Nee 1989; Kornai 1992). These approaches differ greatly in defining the "distinctiveness" of state socialism. Adherents of the theory of totalitarianism focus on the existence of an impassable, fear-based fundamental gap between the Party elite and the masses. The "communist neo-traditionalism" perspective concentrates on personal (often informal) networks of patron-client relations bridging the gap between the Party and the people by providing patterned exchange of citizens' loyalty for career opportunities and goods distributed by the Party. The "new institutional analysis" departs even further from the dogmatically state- and Party-centered approach of the totalitarianism theory. It locates the basic difference between state socialism and capitalism not in domination by a single political party, but in the essentially non-market character of redistributive arrangements--both Party-controlled and Party-independent--existing there (Nee and Matthews 1996). Although these three currents of the distinctiveness perspective obviously differ on many points, they all share the basic assumption about the generic incompatibility between the market economy and state socialism. This assumption denies the possibility the state-socialist societies develop Western-typed market arrangements. It casts doubts on the pre-

dictions about smoothness of market transition, and calls for historical contextualization of that research.<sup>9</sup>

The two paradigms described above have different theoretical implications not only for characterizing the social life under state socialism, stet also for describing the patterns and the pace of the present transformation of Eastern Europe. If the hypothesis of convergence holds true for some countries, it can be argued that these countries were already in transition to a market type society before "officially" starting system transformation in the late 1980s. If, by contrast, the hypothesis of distinctiveness holds true, transition to a market-type society started with the collapse of the political regime in the late 1980s. Implicitly, this also means that in such countries there was no early market "preparation" and that all market-oriented changes have had to unfold within the present transformation.

### **III. THE PARTY'S IMPACT ON INDIVIDUAL SOCIOECONOMIC OUTCOMES AND OCCUPATIONAL MOBILITY UNDER STATE SOCIALISM**

The "convergence" and "distinctiveness" perspectives differ sharply in their conceptual approaches to occupational mobility--which is a general mechanism of securing socio-economic outcomes under both capitalism and state socialism. Their differences are mirrored fundamentally in the role they ascribe to the Party in influencing career mobility under state socialism.

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<sup>9</sup> We do not agree with the view that 'distinctiveness' was a unique feature of earlier periods in the history of state socialism, whereas 'convergence' was a frequent characteristic of later periods. Such a view would reject the very notion that state socialism had its own fundamental dynamics. This does not mean, of course, that there were no distinct periods of state-socialist development (see Dallin and Bresluer 1970). They were, however, related to the "technology" of running the system but not to changes in its basic system identity. Such changes did not occur earlier than in 1989.

Following the convergence perspective, the baseline assumption is that under state socialism--as well as under capitalism--economic development generates a type of social structure in which jobs and rewards are allocated to people primarily on the basis of their merit, skills, and achievements, and not on the basis of their Party card. This assumption reflects the conviction that under state socialism the legitimacy of the system was ultimately based on the economic effectiveness of the system; society's talents had, therefore, to be explicitly promoted. Consequently, the logic of economic development is seen as the primary factor shaping mobility opportunities under both capitalism and state socialism.

Development-driven meritocracy, whether in the context of free market exchanges or job-assignment bureaucracies, should thus standardize mobility patterns by subjecting them to universal structural requirements of economic development. The impact of political institutions and political ideologies in state-socialist societies is seen as a minor, or at least declining, factor in determining these patterns. The underlying assumption is that--irrespective of intentions of the Party--the Party's policies were mainly exogenously constrained, by the universal requirements of economic development, and less endogenously driven by an ideological project or country-specific historical developments. This also implies that even if the Party's dominance over the society was firm and stable, the Party's control over mobility channels necessarily decreased over time. If the Party's dominance or mass support for the Party declined, then the Party's impact on mobility processes would have decreased even faster.

Paying only little attention to historical contexts, the convergence perspective predicts a consistently decreasing role of the Party in influencing individual socioeconomic outcomes in all state-socialist countries. Under this perspective, the only

possible survival of the state-socialist system would have ultimately been no more than a "civilized death" of the Party and the replacement of its power monopoly by that of the intellectuals on their "road to class power" or that of state-socialist managers on their road to market socialism--both developments paving the way for ultimate convergence to Western-type market economy.

Based on the assumption that capitalist and state-socialist societies were two fundamentally different types of the modern society, the baseline model of the distinctiveness paradigm for the loyalty-mobility link predicts inherent, ever-present, and non-declining political determination of socioeconomic outcomes under state socialism. The absence of a market-mediated reward structure and political domination by a single ideological group are seen as both enabling and requiring a "reward structure especially responsive to ideological demands" (Parkin 1969: 360). Hence, mobility within this structure should have been dependent--directly and indirectly--on some manifest adherence to the ideology of the ruling party. Under such conditions, controlling mobility channels is part of the continuous exercise of political power, and any significant let-up in exercising this power is incompatible with the institutional identity of state socialism as construed by advocates of the distinctiveness paradigm. Accordingly, economic development can not erode or endanger the political functions of mobility because mobility is seen as determined to a greater extent endogenously by the Party's politics of "the development of socialism" than exogenously by universal modernization trends.

In making predictions about the Party's influence on mobility, the distinctiveness paradigm calls for taking into account country-specific historical developments. In viewing state socialism as inherently politicized system, this paradigm can not--without endangering its own logical coherence--predict a decline in the Party's control over

opportunity structure.<sup>10</sup> Even if the Party weakened and lost social support, the absence of both the market alternative and the organized political opposition would generally enable the Party to maintain its strategic control over career opportunities. But historical circumstances of increased "rejection" of the Party by the society may even "force" the Party to strengthen its control as citizens' loyalty and cooperation may be critically needed under such circumstances of instability in the Party's rule. If that happened, those who still would be ready to cooperate with the Party could expect especially high rewards and the gap between the Party-loyal people and the rest of the society would broaden. Depending on the historical development of the relationship between the Party and the society in a given country the one or the other outcome can be expected.

Under "normal" conditions of relative stability in the relationship between the Party and the society<sup>11</sup>, the Party' control over opportunities for mobility would remain fairly stable at the level determined by some basic institutional identity of state socialism. But it could also increase, if--for historical reasons--its initial level were low. Therefore, according to the distinctiveness paradigm, an increase in political determination of mobility can take place under both conditions: under an increasing or only stable Party's domination over society.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> Still, there are significant differences among the variants of the distinctiveness perspective with respect to how firm in reality this non-declining Party's control over the opportunity structure could be. The new institutional approach allows for much less Party control than the totalitarian or neo-traditional perspectives. Although it postulates that there were distinctive state-socialist institutional processes through which the system was reproduced over time, it also assumes that state socialism in its everyday practice--at least in countries like Hungary or Poland--operated as a mix of mechanisms of political and quasi-market control (Szelenyi's "socialist mixed economy")--whereby the latter grew to be the more active part of the new emerging institutional identity of state socialism.

<sup>11</sup> In this paper, we do not deal with a situation in which the dominance of the Party over society increases in time. This would relate to a specific, post-revolutionary development which should be analyzed using a different conceptual framework.

<sup>12</sup> The "distinctiveness" perspective does not deny that even under state socialism there was room for mobility driven by non-political factors fostering economic development. The "convergence" perspective likewise acknowledges the influence of political factors on mobility outcomes. The difference between

In sum: Whereas--irrespective of the historical development of the relationship between the Party and the society--the convergence perspective predicts a decrease in the effectiveness of Party membership in influencing career mobility, the perspective of distinctiveness suggests that, depending on country-specific historical context, this effectiveness remains stable or even increases over time. Analytically, the combination of a conceptual approach to state-socialism (convergence versus distinctiveness) and the historical development of the strength of the Party's dominance over the society (decrease versus stability) differentiates the two general trends into three specific predictions about the temporal change in the "loyalty-mobility" link. These predictions are depicted in Figure 1.

#### **IV. DETAILED HYPOTHESES ON THE „LOYALTY-MOBILITY“ LINK IN POLAND AND THE GDR**

In this Section, we formulate testable hypotheses about the "loyalty-mobility" link in Poland and the former GDR--applying the predictions drawn from the convergence and distinctiveness paradigms (see Figure 1). Both perspectives assume that political loyalty did influence occupational mobility opportunities in Poland as well as East Germany. But, if it is the case that the historical development of state socialism actually followed the pattern of the convergence tendency in the two countries, we should be able to observe a historical decline in this impact. On the other hand, if the pre-1989 development in Poland and East Germany followed the logic of the distinctiveness perspective, an increasing or at least stable impact should be observed. However, the final outcome--in-

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"institutional distinctiveness" and "anti-institutional convergence" is rather in their specific focus on the tension between political and non-political determination of mobility: whereas the latter stresses the influence of economic/non-political determination, the first, conversely, emphasizes the subordination of economy and, thus, the dominant role of political determination and control.



cluding the actual amount of increase or decrease--is determined by country-specific historical developments in the dominance of the Communist Party over the society and other nation-specific historical contexts as well.

In Poland, the dominance of the Communist Party over the society had never been extreme. The powerful Catholic Church and private farming were significant pockets of constant, organized resistance to the communist rule throughout the whole span of state-socialist development. The Party lost much of its organizational grip on the society especially in the 1970s and 1980s, and since the mid-1970s the social support for the Party had been decreasing dramatically. In the 1970s, the main reason for this decline was a multi-faceted "opening" to the West which followed the Helsinki Treaty on Security and Cooperation in Europe and significantly strengthened political opposition to Party rule. Moreover, the rise of "Solidarity" and its legal recognition in 1980 weakened Party rule as well. Imposition of martial law in December 1981--intended to restore the communist dominance--produced countereffects as the Party lost much of its "systemic" importance to the army and a new hierarchy of non-Party people who supported the "force solution" of the conflict between the Solidarity and the Party. It thus seems legitimate to think about the Polish development as congruent with the scenario of a profound historical decline in the dominance of the Communist Party over the society.

By contrast, the Party in the GDR was organizationally and institutionally powerful until the very end of the system. Whereas in Poland the Catholic Church enjoyed a substantial degree of autonomy and was acknowledged by the Communist Party, in East Germany the churches were openly discriminated against and religious behavior was sanctioned. In East Germany, there was no alternative that could mitigate the policies of the group in power--as the Catholic Church in Poland did. Nevertheless, there was a decline

in the GDR as well in the extent to which overt system loyalty was delivered by the population (Engler 1992; Solga 1994). This decline did not, however, have much impact on the Party's policies since the Party's dominance over the society found its ultimate sanction in the Wall, in the sense that many of those who were overtly against the system were forced to leave for West Germany. Second, the absence of an organized opposition movement (except the very late 1980s) is explained by the existence of a second German state (the Federal Republic of Germany)--the "living", but capitalist, alternative to the state-socialist GDR. This constellation discouraged overt opposition even among those people who believed in the idea of "socialism" but were against its "real-existing" expression like the GDR-state (Joppke 1995). Taking all this into account, it seems legitimate to characterize the GDR as a state-socialist country with a fundamental stability in the dominance of the Communist Party over society.

Seen from the convergence perspective, the country profiles sketched above lead to different predictions for Poland and the GDR. In Poland, one could expect that a spectacular decrease in the Party rule in the 1970s and 1980s should make room for the free unfolding of convergent properties said to be inherent in the state-socialist system. Cohorts entering the labor market in the 1970s and 1980s should experience much less exposure to Party control over their careers than older cohorts; the influence of the Party on mobility processes should, thus, strongly decline in more recent cohorts (HYPOTHESIS P-C).

By contrast, the development of convergent tendencies in the GDR with its continuously strong Party rule could not mean much more than a progress in Party-controlled modernization processes. Across cohorts, this progress could result in a partial replacement of political loyalty with meritocratic criteria becoming the main factor

influencing individual mobility. Operating in the context of an organizationally strong Communist Party, devoted ideologically to the planned economy, modernization processes could contribute to only minor changes in the loyalty-mobility link. A decline in the political determination of mobility should thus be rather modest and definitively weaker than in Poland (HYPOTHESIS G-C).

Under the distinctiveness perspective, general knowledge about the historical development in the dominance of the Communist Party over the society is not sufficient in order to make specific predictions about the role of system loyalty in shaping career opportunities in both countries. Other country-specific aspects of national contexts have to be taken into account, among them important are the national differences between "worlds" of every-day life in the Party.

The Polish Communist Party had always had recruitment troubles (see Wrona 1995 for the situation in the 1940s and the early 1950s; Sulek 1990 for the later period). At times, it resorted to "hunting for candidates" to remedy the shortage. In addition, there were purges and waves of leaving the Party during political crises of 1956, 1968, and 1980-81. In Poland, thus, entering the Party was only barely selective--almost anyone was welcome "on board" at anytime. Nevertheless, between 1981 and 1987, the number of Party members dropped from 3.1 million to 2.1 million (Sulek 1990). Although leaving the Party was selective and decreased the internal differentiation of Party population, the net result of easy access to the Party was a highly heterogeneous Party composition--with regard to both individual life histories and attitudinal characteristics. As a consequence, a socially distinguishable type of a "Party man" hardly existed in Poland and the behavioral and psychological "border" between the Party and non-Party was probably fuzzier there than elsewhere in Eastern Europe. This lack of such a sharply defined border threatened

the Party's social identity particularly in times of social instability, and forced the Party to extend its search for new devoted members.

The situation in the former GDR can be described as the inverse of the Polish pattern. Recruitment to the Party was much more selective in the GDR. Trying to legitimize its popular and all-nation character, the Party's policy was to recruit its members proportionally from all segments of the social structure. Therefore, group-specific limits on the number of those who were eligible to enter the Party were established. Since it was difficult--even in the GDR--to find enough candidates among workers, upper service class persons (intelligentsia) who were willing to enter the Party had to "wait in line" until the proportion of the working class Party members was sufficient to "let" them into the Party. There was only one alternative route. Any upper class member who was at one time a member of the working class was treated as a worker and therefore had easier access to the Party. Furthermore, in the GDR, there was no wave of resigning from the Party (except 1953 and in the second half of 1989). All this led to a degree of continuity and social and psychological homogeneity of the Party which was unmatched by the Polish situation. In consequence, the Party' social identity was better developed in the GDR compared to the Polish situation, and the Party's willingness and ability to control and influence its social environment could be based on a fairly stable, long-term ideological project.

What do these inter-country differences mean with respect to predictions based on the distinctiveness paradigm? In Poland, the weakening power of the Party in the 1970s and 1980s suggests that the Party had to increase its control over mobility processes in younger cohorts in order to increase attractiveness of the Party both to possible candidates and to those who were still Party members. With the growing shortage of Party members

and dramatic decline in popular support, the Party had to struggle to stabilize its rule and the popular legitimacy of the state-socialist system. For this purpose, those who were still overtly loyal or were ready to become loyal were in a good position to be exceptionally rewarded.<sup>13</sup> They could improve their chances of upward mobility as well as lower their risks of downward mobility. However, as a practical matter, it might have been impossible to stage a large-scale, Party-controlled job transfer with substantial decrease in the overall Party's domination over the society and growing disappointment with the Party rule. Hence, the increase in the impact of political loyalty on mobility opportunities was probably rather slight (HYPOTHESIS P-D). One could also imagine a moderate version of this prediction, namely that under such conditions even the mere lack of historical decrease in the level of the Party's impact would be enough to confirm the distinctiveness hypothesis.

Similarly, the "distinctiveness" of state socialism in the GDR should also lead to a slight increase in the effect of political loyalty on mobility. Under the conditions of (1) decreasing acceptance of the regime by the younger generations, (2) decreasing structural opportunities for upward mobility across cohorts (Solga 1995), but also (3) stable or even increasing organizational dominance of the Party over the society, the Party was forced more and more to provide extra rewards to those who were still overtly loyal. Although, the Party in the GDR had a stronger position in the society than in Poland, the above mentioned circumstances (1 and 2) required that Party members were not too openly and too extensively rewarded via outstanding occupational mobility opportunities. Hence, the resulting increase had--as in Poland--to be rather modest (HYPOTHESIS G-D). Also for

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<sup>13</sup> Consistent with this interpretation is the finding by Slomczynski and Liu (1994) who showed that, controlling for education, the impact of being in the nomenklatura on income was stronger in the 1980s than in earlier decades.

East Germany we can not also exclude the possibility that stable Party's control over mobility would be a sufficient criterion for effective rule of the Party (fulfilling the distinctiveness paradigm). The four hypotheses developed above are summarized in Figure 2.

These hypotheses concerning the relative change in the degree of political determination of social mobility within the two countries can also lead to expectations about between-country differences. From our earlier discussion, it can be reasonably assumed that the Party's organizational and institutional fortifications were always stronger in the GDR than in Poland. This suggests that the impact of Party membership on mobility opportunities was always stronger in the GDR than in Poland. On the other hand, because of a relative "short supply" of Party members in Poland, one could, conversely, expect higher rewards for being in the Party there, especially in younger cohorts. Both predictions are justified, and it is the goal of empirical research like ours to decide which one holds true. In our opinion, more evidence points to a prediction of tighter loyalty-mobility link in the GDR. As already mentioned above, the national differences in the "worlds" of everyday life in the Party also suggest that the impact of Party membership was more patterned and consequential in the GDR than in Poland throughout the whole period of state-socialist development in respective countries.

## V. DATA AND VARIABLES

The East-German data are from the study "Lebensverläufe und historischer Wandel in der ehemaligen DDR" [Life histories and historical change in the former GDR] carried out by the Center for Sociology and Study of the Life-Course at the Max Planck Institute for Human Development and Education in Berlin. The research team included Johannes Huinink (principal investigator), Martin Diewald, Karl Ulrich Mayer, Heike Solga, An-

nemette Sorensen, and Heike Trappe. The data were collected between September 1991 and October 1992 and are representative of the East German population as of October 1990. The study comprises four birth cohorts: 1929-31, 1939-41, 1951-53, and 1959-61. The total number of cases in the data set is 2,323. The response rate is 53% (Solga 1996). In the following analyses, we treat the two older cohorts jointly as "older cohorts" the two younger cohorts together as "younger cohorts".

The Polish data stem from the study "Social Structure II" carried out by the Research Group on Comparative Social Inequality at the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences. Members of the Group were: Kazimierz M. Slomczynski (principal investigator), Ireneusz Bialecki, Henryk Domanski, Krystyna Janicka, Bogdan W. Mach, Zbigniew Sawinski, Joanna Sikorska, and Wojciech Zaborski. The data were collected between November 1987 and January 1988 and are representative of national population. The number of cases in the data set is 5,854. The response rate is 71%. In the following analyses, we selected a sub-sample from these data in order to come--with respect to our research aims--as close as possible to the East-German life history data set. It consists of persons who were economically active in 1988, were born in 1929-41 (older cohorts) or 1951-61 (younger cohorts) and provided valid information on the first job they had. The number of cases in this subset is 2,658. The number of cases in the comparable subset of the original East-German data set is 2,000. Table 1 displays a short summary of the data sets analyzed in this paper.

In Table 2A and Table 2B, we present occupational categories we use to define upward, lateral, and downward moves. The occupational categories are modelled after Solga (1995). The definitions of various forms of intragenerational mobility are very similar between the two countries, but we deliberately did not make them identical. In the

German data, we found it necessary to introduce cohort-specific definitions of mobility out of the category of farmers. The reason for doing this was that in the older cohorts about 60% of men and 80% of women did not have any occupational training, while in the younger cohorts almost all farmers had vocational education (apprenticeships). In the Polish data, we introduced gender-specific definitions of the flow between skilled blue-collar workers and skilled white-collar employees. For males, we treat this movement--in either direction--as lateral mobility while for women a move from the blue-collar to the white-collar occupational world is treated as upward mobility, and a move in the opposite directions as downward mobility. Here, the reason is a rather strong traditional male-centered working class culture which inhibits male mobility towards "shuffling papers" occupations and encourages female mobility toward "clean" clerical jobs. There are also few other differences between Polish and German definitions, mostly reflecting the low educational level of Polish farmers and the general backwardness of Polish agriculture. In Table 3, we summarize shortly variables used in the analyses.

We decided to treat all persons who were members in the Communist Party or in one of the "allied" parties in 1988/89 as "system loyal." This, of course, might seem problematic for studying the causal inference between loyalty and mobility. However, relating this measure only to the time before moving into current job would not solve the problem. The sequence of the first job, party membership, and the current job is intrinsically unclear. Quite often people who were upwardly mobile on the Party's "recommendation" were forced to join the Party after they started the new job. But, even though they were not party members before, they did show a kind of "overt" loyalty to the system which was one--perhaps the main--reason they were selected by the Party for upward mobility. In this sense, it makes little theoretical difference whether party membership started before or after the begin of the better job. However, in either case,



using "party membership in 1988/89" actually measures "overt system loyalty" as an allocation mechanism for Party-initiated mobility. Hence, it seems doubtful if only considering party membership before mobility occurs is an adequate strategy for capturing the causal sequence. Instead, we argue that party membership starting at any time in the occupational career and lasting until 1988/89 is preferable for studying the causal link between loyalty and mobility. Moreover, it should be mentioned that only taking "party membership" might be a limited measure of "system loyalty." Also, other kinds of political activities--like being leaders or high-rank functionaries in the trade union or youth organizations--served to overtly express loyalty to the system. Unfortunately, life-history data describing memberships in these organizations are only available in the East German data set. As analyses with the East German data show (see Solga 1994) using only party membership as an indicator underestimates the total impact of overt system loyalty on mobility chances.

## **VI. EMPIRICAL RESULTS**

### **VI.1 General Patterns of Career Mobility in Poland and the Former GDR**

In Tables 4 and 5 we compare general career mobility patterns of German and Polish men and women. As already stressed in Section 1, we do not analyze these tables from the point of view of standard "mobility research", i.e., we are not interested in sorting out "fluidity" and "structural change" or in comparing detailed flows between specific categories. Rather, we are looking for basic inter-country differences which are relevant for the analysis of the link between system loyalty and social mobility.

In this respect, two differences between Poland and the former GDR--especially in patterns of male mobility--are clearly visible. First, although the highest category of pro-

professionals and managers was much smaller in Poland than in Germany, its "retention power" was higher in the former GDR. In Poland, about 20% of those who started their occupational life in the highest category experienced downward mobility and left for other jobs. In the GDR, there was virtually no downward career mobility from the highest category. Second, as the amount of moves into the class of professionals and managers from other classes indicates, access to this class was more likely in the GDR than in Poland. There was much less upward career mobility into the highest class in Poland: upward moves of farmers and unskilled workers into positions of professionals and managers were practically non-existent. In the former GDR by contrast about 15% of those who started their careers as farmers or unskilled workers experienced such upward mobility.<sup>14</sup>

These findings could lead to the conclusion that the Polish occupational elite (if the term "elite" can be applied to the highest category of professionals and managers) was relatively closed to outsiders, but its "retention power" was far from being perfect. In the former GDR, the situation was very different, "elite" positions were more accessible from other occupational groups and were highly protected against downward mobility. It seems that the German rather than the Polish mobility patterns are consistent with the idea that system loyalty is important in fostering upward moves and protecting against downward moves. However, the results presented in Tables 4 and 5 also allow for another explanation, namely, that it was on-the-job training or formal education completed after

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<sup>14</sup> On the contrary, it should be added that outflows from the group of unskilled workers into the group of skilled workers was more frequent in Poland than in the GDR. In Poland, half of unskilled workers became over their careers skilled workers, whereas in Germany only one fourth of them did so. One explanation for this is that in East Germany the position of "skilled workers" was (and still is) almost necessarily coupled with the completion of adequate apprenticeships. This "credentialized occupationalism" is typical for the GDR as a "German" state and holds less for Poland. It must be noted that the situation among women was different--there were more moves of that type in Germany than in Poland.

entering the labor force rather than system loyalty that was the important push factor in the GDR. On-the-job training, late formal education, and loyalty might have coincided as well.

The only conclusions which can be drawn so far is that, based on the mobility definition presented in Tables 2A and 2B, East Germans had better/more occupational mobility opportunities than Poles. In the GDR, the rate of upward moves was higher than in Poland (men: 28% vs. 23%; women: 27% vs. 20%), and the rate of downward moves was lower (men: 9% vs. 14%; women: 18% vs. 23%).

## **VI.2 The Amount of System Loyalty and Global Relationships Between System Loyalty and Career Mobility**

Before analyzing the impact of loyalty on mobility, we first give an impression of how widespread party membership was generally in the two countries: Table 6 reports the amount of system loyalty measured by membership in the Communist Party or an "allied" party in 1988/89. The highest percentage of party members is found among the older East German men (43%)--the lowest among the younger Polish women (6%). In both the older and the younger cohort, system loyalty was higher in the former GDR than in Poland. This difference applies to men as well as women. In addition, apart from German women who through an inter-cohort increase in loyalty were catching up with the level of German men, the level of system loyalty declined in both countries over the cohorts, but the pace of decline was generally higher in Poland. The net result of these tendencies was that the inter-country difference was rather growing than declining over time.

Moreover, Table 6 shows that this development also holds true for two important occupational groups, that is for the skilled blue-collar workers (strategically important to the Party in the first phase of building the system) and the professionals and managers

(more extensively targeted by the Party in the more recent years of "post-mobilization" or "social reproduction"). It turns out that, once again with the exception of German women, the level of system loyalty was uniformly lower in younger cohorts.

Tables 7 and 8 display the global relationship between upward and downward mobility and system loyalty. Considering upward mobility flows (Table 7), it can be concluded that in both countries Party membership was a factor positively influencing prospects for career mobility. This applies to both sexes and to both cohorts; only in the case of younger Polish women was the difference between Party members and non-members negligible. Table 7 also reveals that there were possibly two changes in the "competitive advantage" of system loyal persons over time (as expressed by odds ratios easily computable from the table): (1) loyalty lost its impact for younger Polish women, and (2) the advantage of loyalty increased for younger German men. The first development would be consistent with a convergence scenario for Poland; the second with a distinctiveness scenario for Germany. If these scenarios hold true will be tested later by multivariate analyses controlling for other determinants of mobility.

In addition, Table 7 shows differences in the pure amount of upward moves between the cohorts and the countries. While in the GDR the older cohort had significantly higher chances for upward moves, in Poland the younger cohort had better upward mobility opportunities. This applies first of all to men and indicates that mobility opportunities of the younger German men were blocked. This observation fits nicely with the possibility that in the GDR the Party's control over mobility was distinctively tighter in this cohort.

For downward mobility (Table 8) we see that in both countries Party members were protected against demotion more effectively than non-members (with the exception of the

younger Polish men). In both cohorts and for both sexes, the protective effect of party membership was always stronger in the GDR than in Poland. Furthermore, the degree of this protection remained fairly stable in the GDR, but declined in Poland. Comparing the two countries also seems to indicate that the GDR was--even in the late 1980s--"distinctive", whereas Poland was "convergent". Whether this is the appropriate way to interpret state socialism in Poland and the GDR is the main issue of the multivariate analysis presented in the following section.

### **VI.3 Final Models of the Relationship between System Loyalty and Career Mobility**

Table 9 presents the final models which are the results of estimating and fitting different logit regression models.<sup>15</sup> Of special interest to us were possible interactions between first job, Party membership, cohort, and country. Before discussing the single effects of the best fitting model chosen and presented in Table 9, we will mention two important results.

First, to our disappointment, none of the models fitted revealed a single significant interaction between occupational position held in the first job and country or Party membership. Hence, it seems that there were neither inter-country differences nor Party vs. non-Party differences in the mobility prospects of specific occupational groups. This suggests that one should treat Party membership as an across-the-board determinant of mobility. In other words, Party membership operated across the whole occupational structure--and this with regard to upward as well as downward mobility.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> We used GLIM 3.77.

<sup>16</sup> That is the reason why we only control for the first job--excluding even reasonable interaction effects with this variable. Moreover, when controlling for first job we could not also control for education since these two variables highly correlate in both countries--especially in the GDR.

Second, the three-way interaction involving Party membership, country and cohort was not significant either. Thus, the relationships between Party membership and career mobility must be characterized by trends that are common to either both countries or both cohorts.<sup>17</sup>

What do we learn from Table 9 about upward mobility and Party membership in particular? For male upward mobility, our results are in line with results from earlier Tables. The country effect (Table 9, column 1) signals that--net of other determinants controlled--the chances for upward mobility in state-socialist Poland were only half as great as the chances characteristic for the former GDR (odds ratio=.56).

Considering the inter-cohort difference, we find a highly significant cohort effect for the GDR. Here, the chances of upward mobility for the younger men were only one fifth as high as those of the men of the older cohort (odds ratio=.22). In Poland, the difference between the two cohorts was much smaller (odds ratio=.22\*3.46=.76). The difference between the cohorts in the GDR can be explained by several factors. On the "technical" side, it could be explained by the shorter exposure to occupational opportunities and the superior "starting point" of younger cohorts. However, the highly significant "country by cohort" interaction we found signals that these purely structural--largely country-independent--"exposure" and "starting point" explanations are only partial as they apply

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<sup>17</sup> However, in evaluating these two results, we can not exclude the possibility that our "inability" to find significant interactions--especially those involving occupational groups--might be caused by technical problems originating in the small number of people in some cells. Later in the text, when dealing with "constrained" cohort and Party effects, we do show that in fact some interactions involving these variables did exist. In addition, recall the definition of "system loyalty" and its constraints. Especially, in the younger generation--as explicitly known from the East German data see--other forms of overt system loyalty than party membership (e.g., occupying leading political positions in the Free German Youth the youth organization of the Party) played an important role. This "underestimation" of system loyalty in the younger generation might also contribute to our "inability" to find an increasing impact of loyalty on mobility chances over time.

barely to Poland.<sup>18</sup> Substantive historical explanations, referring to eradication of institutional barriers to job mobility for the younger GDR cohorts must be also taken into account. The finding of decreasing chances for upward mobility in the younger GDR cohorts allows, for example, for the historical interpretation that the period of "stabilized socialist development" there witnessed an operation of a "societal seniority principle" which built on the Party's earlier "investment" in mobility of loyal members of the older cohorts in the "period of reconstruction." It could be postulated that on the individual level this development was underlying particular firm-based seniority principles causing job queues in which members of younger cohorts had to wait for generational change in job incumbency. The validity of this interpretation is, of course, conditional on the general significance of Party membership in shaping mobility flows in the population.

Therefore, we now turn the attention to the role of Party membership in determining these chances. In both countries, male Party members had significantly higher chances of moving upward than non-members. In the GDR, their chances were three times as high as those of the others (odds ratio=3.32). In Poland, the interaction effect of Party membership and country reduces the advantage for Polish Party members to only twice of that of the other Poles (odds ratio=3.32\*.64=2.12). Thus, for men, the Party's impact was stronger in the GDR.

To some extent upward female mobility mirrors male mobility. Compared to Poland, in the GDR women's chances for upward mobility were twice as high (odds ratio=.53). In both countries, the younger cohort had much poorer chances than the older

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<sup>18</sup> Controlling for the length of exposure to occupational opportunities by comparing older and younger cohorts at age 30 also confirms the finding of declining upward mobility chances in the GDR (Huinink, Mayer and Trappe 1995; Solga 1995).

one, but in East Germany the cohort difference was more pronounced than in Poland (odds ratio for the GDR = .31; for Poland  $.31 * 2.03 = .63$ ).

Furthermore, there are also important differences in the political determinants of male and female upward mobility. The simple contrast between Party members and non-members did not prove to be significant for women. After some tests, we decided to retain a constrained Party membership effect in our final model. It contrasts all female Party members in East Germany and the female Party members in the older Polish cohort with the rest of our female respondents. This effect proved to be significant (odds ratio=2.15). This finding indicates that Party membership was conducive to upward mobility to the same extent in both cohorts in the GDR and in the older cohort in Poland; however, its impact disappeared for younger women in Poland. This means that, at least for women in Poland, the Party lost its relevance for upward mobility--a finding which also leads to the conclusion that the impact of system loyalty on upward mobility for women was stronger in the GDR than in Poland.

Let us turn to downward mobility. Considering male downward mobility, we find that (1) the risk of moving down was 39% higher in Poland than in the GDR (odds ratio=1.39), and (2) the younger generation had to face a 23% lower risk of downward mobility than the older generation (odds ratio=.77). The fact that we could not find a country difference with respect to decreasing risk of downward mobility might result from a continuously growing proportion of younger men obtaining educational credentials in both countries. This would have affected the mobility opportunities in the two countries in the same way, namely in that these credentials proved to be an effective protection against downward mobility.



Moreover, we also find only a significant cohort-independent Party membership effect--which turns out to only hold true for the GDR. In the GDR, Party membership protected against downward moves, that is, Party members faced less than half as great a risk of downward moves than non-members (odds ratio=.39). In Poland, being system loyal was almost ineffective in this respect. There, Party members were only slightly better protected against downward moves than non-members (odds ratio=.39\*2.29 = .85). Thus, the Party's influence in the GDR was effective and stable over time, whereas it close to nonexistent in Poland.

Finally, considering downward mobility for women, we find that the risk of moving down the occupational ladder was 1.7 times higher in Poland than in East Germany. With respect to differences between cohorts, a simple contrast between the older and the younger cohorts did not prove to be significant. Here, we only find a "constrained" cohort effect. It contrasts the younger Polish cohort with the rest of the female respondents. The odds ratio for this contrast is .87, implying that the risk of being demoted was 13% lower in the younger Polish cohort than in either the Polish older cohort or the two GDR cohorts (odds ratio=.87). As with female upward mobility, we only found a significant constrained Party membership effect on downward mobility. Compared to the younger Polish cohort, the downward risk for female Party members in the Polish older cohort and in both cohorts in the GDR was almost 3 times lower (odds ratio=.36). Hence, over time the Party's impact declined in Poland but remained stable in the GDR.

In general, the weaker impact of Party membership on the risk of downward mobility in Poland implies that the loyalty-mobility link was less substantial in Poland than in the GDR.

## VII. DISCUSSION

In the last Section, we summarize our findings by interpreting them in the frame of the hypotheses of convergence and distinctiveness introduced earlier. We concentrate on the findings drawn from Table 9 where we presented our best specified logit regression models. Judging from these models, there are five major empirical findings in our paper:

(1) On the most aggregate level, in the former GDR, the chances for upward career mobility for both men and women were better and risks of downward mobility lower than in Poland. But due to a very strong temporal decline in chances for upward moves for the younger GDR generation, the chances of upward mobility were better in Poland.

(2) Among men, there was a decrease in both countries in the chances for upward mobility from the older to younger cohort. This decrease was, as just mentioned, much more pronounced in the GDR. Here, opportunities for promotion in one's career were seriously blocked in younger cohort. With respect to downward mobility, the younger cohort in both countries faced a slightly smaller risk than the older cohort. This decrease occurred almost to the same extent in both countries.

(3) Among women--like among men--in both countries, the younger generation suffered a decline in chances for upward mobility, and--again like among men--this decline was more pronounced in the former GDR. In contrast to that of men, the risk of women's downward moves did not change over the cohorts in the GDR, but to a small extent improved for the younger Polish women.

(4) Among men, the political determination of mobility by loyalty to the system was stronger in the former GDR than in Poland. This was true for both directions of occu-

pational mobility. Party membership played a stronger role in promoting chances for upward mobility as well as in constraining risk of downward moves in the GDR than in Poland. In neither country, however, there was a change in the degree of political control over mobility between older and younger cohort. Inter-cohort changes in these opportunities were, thus, the same for system-loyal persons and for those who were not overtly supporting the system.

(5) Among women, the degree of political determination of mobility (both upward and downward) was stable over time in the former GDR, but declined in Poland. The level of political control over mobility among the older generation of Polish women was no different from the level characteristic of the East German women. In Polish younger cohort, however, this control was close to nonexistent.

Final conclusions from the above findings are rather clear-cut. Career mobility was generally more tightly politically controlled in the GDR than in Poland. With respect to female career opportunities, this difference can be seen first of all in the lack of any competitive advantage of system loyal persons over other persons in the younger generation of Polish women. With respect to male career opportunities, the inter-country difference in both cohorts was visible in the form of distinctively weaker advantage of loyal persons in Poland. Except for female mobility in Poland, the empirical findings suggest that in both countries, there was neither a drop nor a rise in the intensity of the loyalty-mobility link.

Which of our hypotheses are supported by these findings? The hypothesis of convergence for Poland has predicted that the Party membership played an important role in determining career prospects of the older cohorts, but it lost its impact in the younger co-

hort whose members attained their place in the occupational system in the 1970s and 1980s (i.e., under conditions of the weakening Party rule and progressive modernization of economic and social life). This hypothesis clearly holds true for the Polish women, but not for the Polish men. Their situation and mobility determination is more adequately captured by the hypothesis of distinctiveness. According to this hypothesis, system loyalty was an ever-present main factor in allocation of career opportunities--in the older as well as in the younger cohort.

Under a more "radical" version of this hypothesis, the expectation was that the loyalty-mobility link became stronger over time because the general level of loyalty in the population and the organizational power of the Party declined and, hence, the "functional importance" of loyalty for the Party increased. The Party had to respond through an increase in sponsoring, promoting, and protecting of politically loyal persons. In the case of Polish men, we could not support for the "radical" version of the hypothesis. But the "moderate" version--predicting stability in the relationship between loyalty and mobility--is firmly confirmed.

Considering now the former GDR, the hypothesis of convergence predicts--given the fact that the Party rule was strong there and the Party could afford a sort of meritocracy on the way to "a developed socialist society"--that system loyalty played an important role in the older cohort during the "social reconstruction" stage, but a weaker one in the younger cohort during the "social reproduction" phase. As our findings reveal, this did not actually occur in the GDR--neither for men nor for women. In the GDR, the hypothesis of convergence can, thus, be firmly rejected. Does this mean that the Party--safe behind the Wall which was intended to stand for "a hundred years"--increased political control over mobility to compensate for declining popular support in the post-Wall era? Our findings

do not support such scenario. Rather, as in the case of Polish men, we find the "moderate" version of the distinctiveness hypothesis confirmed. In East Germany, this hypothesis holds true for developments of both male and female mobility determination--in both cases, there seemed to be no change in strength of the link between loyalty and mobility.

In sum, our conclusion is that, as far as historical changes in the political determination of female mobility is concerned, we found a significant inter-country difference. The Polish case is consistent with the hypothesis of convergence, while the GDR pattern is consistent with the "moderate" version of the hypothesis of distinctiveness. By contrast, we did not find any difference with respect to male mobility. In both countries, the historical development of the loyalty-mobility link among men followed a pattern that is consistent with the "moderate" version of the distinctiveness argument.

It seems that convergence predictions were too optimistic in estimating the Party's openness to Western-type modernization and underestimating the pervasiveness of the Party's control over the society and the Party's commitment to this control. Of course, this does not mean that there were no modernization processes going on under state socialism. No doubt, state-socialist countries modernized substantially during recent decades not only in the economy but also in culture, education, and personal development. However, there were no discernible Westward developments in the way in which political power was used to reward loyal persons with career opportunities.

Therefore, political determination of occupational mobility, or more broadly, of rewarding people with favorable living conditions, seems to be a universal feature of state socialism. In analyzing the GDR and state-socialist Poland, we have chosen two countries which maximize many differences existing within the state-socialist system. Still, in both

cases, we found "distinctiveness" and not "convergence" as a general developmental pattern--and this till the very end.

Nevertheless, the results also show that important nation-specific patterns have to be emphasized, too. First, the level of the "distinctiveness"--as judged from the strength of the loyalty-mobility link--was visibly lower in Poland. Second, in the case of female mobility, the "distinctiveness" was not only less pronounced in Poland; it was actually declining there. Thus, in no way can it be argued that state socialism had a sweeping effect, overriding inter-country institutional and historical differences. The weaker relationship between system loyalty and mobility we found in Poland may also help to understand current inter-country differences in dealing with citizens who were loyal to the "old" system. In East Germany, one can now observe an overt and effective discrimination against formerly political loyal persons; in Poland, however, a great measure of tolerance assuring convertibility of former political capital into economic position under the new system (the "thick line" separating the past from the present in the domestic policy of first non-communist governments in Poland).

The fact that in the GDR we could not find any convergent tendencies in the historical development of the strength of the loyalty-mobility link might suggest that the transition toward market economy and democracy started with the collapse of the SED-regime and reunification and is not a process which can easily build on developments prior to 1989. In Poland, by contrast, the consistently lower degree of the Party's control over career opportunities might signal that the current transition there can--at least partially--build on pre-1989 development in individual psychology, behavioral patterns and institutional practices. This means, that because of the lower degree of the Party's penetration into their careers, the Poles could more easily develop self-centered attitudes

and behave in a self-directed way than people in the GDR--which might help the Poles in their adjustment to post-communist capitalism. An economic and cultural openness toward the West, which started in Poland in the early 1970s and had not effectively been arrested even under Martial Law in the early 1980s, contributed to these developments. In the GDR, the Party's penetration into the society was stronger than in Poland. Here, the prevalence of attitudes of the type "the Party as an omnipotent provider" certainly favors the development of coping mechanisms which were built upon external locus of control and hindered adjustment to the new system.

It must be also said, however, that the ability to adjust to capitalism should not be seen as determined by past state-socialist experiences only. The transparency of the structure to which adjustment has to be made is surely greater for the East Germans. The West-German institutional arrangements provide a clear frame of reference for strategies of adaptation by residents of the former GDR. In Poland, the social structure is in a flux and the future institutional setting is not as clear, yet.

Finally, we would also like to stress another contribution to the theoretical and practical understanding of political control over career opportunities under state socialism, namely that it was not only related to male but also to female employment--even though country-specific policies toward female labor force differentiated its impact. In the GDR, with its extremely high female labor force participation and high integration of women into occupational categories at all levels of social structure, women were strategically more important to the Party's social policies than was the case in Poland--and probably also elsewhere in Eastern Europe. In Poland, female participation in the labor force was lower and gender inequality and gender segregation was higher. The more traditional culture--dominated by the Catholic Church--constrained the normative support for

women's involvement in the occupational world. Compared to the GDR, female employment in Poland was rather peripheral. The Party's policy toward female employment was only partially directed against this traditional culture and the problem of gender equality was not supported by the Party to the extent found in the GDR. In this context, controlling female mobility might have been of less importance to the Polish Communist Party than to the SED in Germany.

However, even the many differences between the Polish People's Republic and the German Democratic Republic do not justify to conclude that state-socialist Poland was far ahead of the GDR in the process of converging towards the West. The role of system loyalty in the occupational career was indeed smaller in Poland, but it did not decline either. Although pre-1989 Poland took more steps towards "mixing" its socialist economy with market elements and in taking the "socialist" out of "socialist democracy" than did the GDR, the findings presented in the paper suggest that there was also no visible change in treating individual advancement as a Party-controlled reward for loyalty in Poland. Rewarding loyalty to the system was a universal process of matching social resources and social outcomes under state socialism, and, in this sense, even the People's Republic of Poland remained distinctively "state-socialist" until its very end.



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**Figure 1: Predictions about the "mobility-loyalty" link under state socialism--dependent on the theoretical paradigm employed and the historical development of the dominance of the Communist Party**

Theoretical paradigm	Historical development of the dominance of the Communist Party over the society	
	<i>Dominance was stable over time</i>	<i>Dominance decreased over time</i>
<i>Convergence paradigm</i>	Impact of loyalty on mobility <i>slightly decreased</i>	Impact of loyalty on mobility <i>strongly decreased</i>
<i>Distinctiveness paradigm</i>	Impact of loyalty on mobility was <b>stable or increased</b>	

**Figure 2: Country-specific hypotheses on the "loyalty-mobility" link**

	<i>Poland</i>	<i>East Germany (GDR)</i>
<i>Convergence paradigm</i>	<b>strong decline</b> in the impact of loyalty (P-C)	<b>slight decline</b> in the impact of loyalty (G-C)
<i>Distinctiveness paradigm</i>	<b>no change or slight increase</b> in the impact of loyalty (P-D)	<b>no change or slight increase</b> in the impact of loyalty (G-D)

**Table 1: Data Used in the Analysis**

<i>Data Source</i>	<i>Interview time</i>	<i>Number of Cases</i>	
		<i>Females</i>	<i>Males</i>
<b>GDR:</b> <i>„Life Histories and historical change in the former GDR“</i> (Max Planck Institute for Human Development and Education) Older cohort: Born 1929-31/1939-41 Younger cohort: Born 1951-53/1959-61	1991/92	528 537	425 510
<b>Poland:</b> <i>„Social structure and social mobility II“</i> (Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences) Older cohort: Born 1929-41 Younger cohort: Born 1951-61	1988	539 843	551 725

**Table 2A: Definition of Upward, Lateral and Downward Moves between First Job and the Job Held in December 1989 in the Former GDR**

<i>Occupational position</i> <i>First job</i>	Professional/ managerial personnel	Semi- professionals	Skilled white-collar workers	<i>Job in 1989</i> Skilled blue-collar workers	Farmers	Self-employed	Unskilled workers
Professional and managerial personnel	L	D	D	D	D	D	D
Semiprofessionals	U	L	D	D	D	D	D
Skilled white-collar workers	U	U	L	L	L	L	D
Skilled blue-collar workers	U	U	L	L	L	L	D
Farmers, Farm workers	U	U	(old) U (young) L	(old) U (young) L	L	(old) U (young) L	D
Self-employed	U	U	L	L	L	L	D
Unskilled workers	U	U	U	U	U	U	D

**Legenda:** L = lateral move; U = upward move; D = downward move

**Table 2B: Definition of Upward, Lateral and Downward Moves between First Job and the Job Held in 1988 in Poland**

<i>Occupational position</i> <i>First job</i>	Professional/ managerial personnel	Semi- professionals	Skilled white-collar workers	<i>Job in 1988</i> Skilled blue-collar workers	Farmers	Self-employed	Unskilled workers
Professional and managerial personnel	L	D	D	D	D	D	D
Semiprofessionals	U	L	D	D	D	D	D
Skilled white-collar workers	U	U	L	(male) L (female) D	D	L	D
Skilled blue-collar workers	U	U	(male) L (female) U	L	D	L	D
Farmers, Farm workers	U	U	U	U	L	U	L
Self-employed	U	U	U	L	D	L	D
Unskilled workers	U	U	U	U	L	U	L

**Legenda:** L = lateral move; U = upward move; D = downward move

**Table 3: Definitions of Variables Used in the Analysis**

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Former GDR</i> N=2,000	<i>Poland</i> N=2,656
COHORT	0=1929-31/1939-41 1=1951-53/1959-61	0=1929-41 1=1951-61
GENDER	1=male / 2=female	
FIRST JOB	First paid job lasting at least 3 months	
LAST JOB*	Job held in December 1989	Job held in 1988
OCCUPATIONAL POSITION	[for categories see Table 2A & 2B]	
SYSTEM LOYALTY	1 = membership in the Communist Party or an "allied" party in 1988/89 (those who left the Party or "allied" party after commencing the 1988/89 job are treated as "loyal") 0 = no membership in the Communist Party or an "allied" party in 1988 (Poland) or 1989 (GDR)	

\* Main job with at least 15 hours workload.



**Table 4: Career Mobility of Women in the Former GDR and Poland (Outflow Percentages)**

<i>Occupational Position</i>		<i>Job in 1988/1989</i>							<i>%</i>	<i>N</i>
		<i>Professional managerial personnel</i>	<i>Semi-professionals</i>	<i>Skilled white-collar workers</i>	<i>Skilled blue-collar workers</i>	<i>Farmers</i>	<i>Self-employed</i>	<i>Unskilled workers</i>		
<i>First job</i>										
<b>Professional and managerial personnel</b>	<b>GDR</b>	96	4	-	-	-	-	-	8	77
	<b>Poland</b>	89	9	2	-	-	-	-	4	46
<b>Semiprofessionals</b>	<b>GDR</b>	8	78	6	1	1	-	6	15	145
	<b>Poland</b>	12	70	10	2	3	2	1	20	253
<b>Skilled white-collar workers</b>	<b>GDR</b>	10	19	53	1	2	3	12	30	283
	<b>Poland</b>	4	22	53	5	4	2	10	26	337
<b>Skilled blue-collar workers</b>	<b>GDR</b>	1	8	22	31	5	1	32	15	141
	<b>Poland</b>	-	7	15	40	11	1	26	13	169
<b>Farmers, Farm workers</b>	<b>GDR</b>	1	9	19	4	33	-	34	11	100
	<b>Poland</b>	-	-	3	3	80	-	14	23	288
<b>Self-employed</b>	<b>GDR</b>	-	-	100	-	-	-	-	0	1
	<b>Poland</b>	-	11	-	-	-	45	44	1	9
<b>Unskilled workers</b>	<b>GDR</b>	2	14	21	9	7	1	46	20	188
	<b>Poland</b>	1	8	10	15	9	2	55	14	174
<b>%</b>	<b>GDR</b>	13	23	27	7	7	1	22	100	935
<b>N</b>	<b>GDR</b>	120	219	249	68	60	11	208		
<b>%</b>	<b>Poland</b>	7	22	20	10	22	2	17	100	
<b>N</b>	<b>Poland</b>	84	281	260	126	283	21	221		1276

**Table 5: Career Mobility of Men in the Former GDR and Poland (Outflow Percentages)**

<i>Occupational Position</i>		<i>Job in 1988/1989</i>							<i>%</i>	<i>N</i>
		<i>Professional managerial personnel</i>	<i>Semi-professionals</i>	<i>Skilled white-collar workers</i>	<i>Skilled blue-collar workers</i>	<i>Farmers</i>	<i>Self-employed</i>	<i>Unskilled workers</i>		
<i>First job</i>										
<b>Professional and managerial personnel</b>	<b>GDR</b>	100	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	97
	<b>Poland</b>	80	5	3	6	2	4	-	7	91
<b>Semiprofessionals</b>	<b>GDR</b>	44	50	-	4	-	2	-	5	50
	<b>Poland</b>	29	43	9	7	4	7	1	9	122
<b>Skilled white-collar workers</b>	<b>GDR</b>	23	24	26	12	1	3	10	8	91
	<b>Poland</b>	8	15	44	15	6	8	4	5	66
<b>Skilled blue-collar workers</b>	<b>GDR</b>	8	8	6	62	4	2	10	55	583
	<b>Poland</b>	5	6	6	67	7	5	4	46	633
<b>Farmers, Farm workers</b>	<b>GDR</b>	13	2	7	18	44	-	16	12	128
	<b>Poland</b>	1	3	2	14	72	1	7	20	272
<b>Self-employed</b>	<b>GDR</b>	-	-	-	50	-	-	50	0	2
	<b>Poland</b>	-	-	-	36	7	50	7	1	14
<b>Unskilled workers</b>	<b>GDR</b>	15	14	4	27	7	3	30	11	114
	<b>Poland</b>	2	8	5	50	10	5	19	13	184
<b>%</b>	<b>GDR</b>	21	11	7	40	8	2	11	100	1065
<b>N</b>	<b>GDR</b>	220	114	73	429	89	19	121		
<b>%</b>	<b>Poland</b>	11	9	7	42	20	5	6	100	1276
<b>N</b>	<b>Poland</b>	147	130	95	582	271	72	85		

**Table 6: Percentage of Membership in the Communist Party or an "Allied" Party in Poland and the Former GDR**

<i>Occupational position in 1988/89</i>	<i>Former GDR</i>		<i>Poland</i>	
	<i>Old</i>	<i>Young</i>	<i>Old</i>	<i>Young</i>
<b>Men</b>				
Professional and managerial personnel	67	49	56	28
Skilled blue-collar workers	29	15	20	9
<i>All</i>	<i>43</i>	<i>26</i>	<i>30</i>	<i>14</i>
<b>Women</b>				
Professional and managerial personnel	30	40	27	10
Skilled blue-collar workers	10	10	15	5
<i>All</i>	<i>17</i>	<i>23</i>	<i>8</i>	<i>6</i>

**Table 7: Upward Mobility and Party Membership in Poland and the Former GDR**

	<i>Percentage of upward moves</i>			
	Former GDR		Poland	
	Old	Young	Old	Young
<b>Men</b>				
Party members	59	28	39	30
Not in the Party	32	9	27	18
Total(%)	43	13	30	19
N (on risk)	498	470	503	788
<b>Women</b>				
Party members	50	30	34	23
Not in the Party	32	18	16	21
Total(%)	35	20	18	21
N (on risk)	404	454	537	693

**Table 8: Downward Mobility and Party Membership in Poland and Former GDR**

	<i>Percentage of downward moves</i>			
	East Germany		Poland	
	Old	Young	Old	Young
<b>Men</b>				
Party members	6	6	14	14
Not in the Party	14	10	18	13
Total(%)	10	9	16	13
N (on risk)	452	499	299	627
<b>Women</b>				
Party members	6	7	8	15
Not in the Party	22	21	29	21
Total(%)	20	17	26	21
N (on risk)	306	441	254	560

**Table 9: Logit Regression Models on the Chances of Upward Mobility and the Risks of Downward Mobility, Poland and the Former GDR (Odds Ratios)**

Effects	Chances of upward mobility*		Risks of downward mobility*	
	Men	Women	Men	Women
<b>COUNTRY</b> (GDR=0, Poland = 1)	<b>0.56</b>	<b>0.31</b>	<b>1.39</b>	<b>1.72</b>
<b>COHORT</b> (old = 0, young = 1)	<b>0.22</b>	<b>0.53</b>	<b>0.77</b>	-
<b>CONSTRAINED COHORT</b> (younger cohort in Poland = 1, others=0)	-	-	-	<b>0.87</b>
<b>COUNTRY* COHORT</b>	<b>3.46</b>	<b>2.03</b>	-	-
<b>PARTY MEMBERSHIP</b> (yes =1, no=0)	<b>3.32</b>	-	<b>0.39</b>	-
<b>CONSTRAINED PARTY MEMBERSHIP</b> (All Party members in the GDR and Party members in the Polish older cohort =1, others =0)	-	<b>2.15</b>	-	<b>0.36</b>
<b>COUNTRY* PARTY MEMBERSHIP</b>	<b>0.64</b>	-	<b>2.19</b>	-
Chi square statistics [-2(Log L/LB)]** [degrees of freedom]	561.4 [10]	195.7 [9]	45.3 [9]	100.6 [8]
Total Ratio	576/2259	474/2088	219/1877	320/1561

\* Controlled for first occupation

\*\* LB = Scaled deviance on the basis of the model estimating the mean only  
**significant at 0.05; significant at 0.1**

## **Bisherige Veröffentlichungen der Projekte 'Lebensverläufe und historischer Wandel in der ehemaligen DDR' und 'Ostdeutsche Lebensverläufe im Transformationsprozeß'**

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the 1990s, the number of people in the UK who are aged 65 and over has increased from 10.5 million to 13.5 million (19.5% of the population).

There is a growing awareness of the need to address the needs of older people, and the Government has set out a strategy for the 21st century in the White Paper on *Ageing Better: The Government's Strategy for Older People* (Department of Health 1999). This strategy is based on the following principles:

- (1) Older people should be able to live independently and actively in their own homes.
- (2) Older people should be able to live in their own communities.
- (3) Older people should be able to live in their own homes and communities for as long as possible.

The White Paper also sets out a number of key objectives for the Government:

- (1) To ensure that older people are able to live independently and actively in their own homes.
- (2) To ensure that older people are able to live in their own communities.
- (3) To ensure that older people are able to live in their own homes and communities for as long as possible.

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