

California State University, San Bernardino

CSUSB ScholarWorks

Theses Digitization Project

John M. Pfau Library

2010

A study of democracy in Africa: The Senegalese experience

Ryan Robert Riley

Follow this and additional works at: <https://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/etd-project>



Part of the [African History Commons](#), and the [Political Theory Commons](#)

Recommended Citation

Riley, Ryan Robert, "A study of democracy in Africa: The Senegalese experience" (2010). *Theses Digitization Project*. 3846.

<https://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/etd-project/3846>

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the John M. Pfau Library at CSUSB ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses Digitization Project by an authorized administrator of CSUSB ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact scholarworks@csusb.edu.

A STUDY OF DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA:
THE SENEGALESE EXPERIENCE

A Thesis
Presented to the
Faculty of
California State University,
San Bernardino

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts
in
Social Sciences

by
Ryan Robert Riley

September 2010

A STUDY OF DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA:

THE SENEGALESE EXPERIENCE

A Thesis

Presented to the

Faculty of

California State University,


San Bernardino

by

Ryan Robert Riley

September 2010

Approved by:


Donovan Chau, Chair, Political Science


Timothy Pyteli, History

August 23, 2010
Date

ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the development of democracy in Senegal, one of the few democracies in Africa. It will focus on analyzing a historical background of Senegal starting at the beginning of the twentieth century. This historical background will conclude on August 20, 1959, when Senegal became an independent nation. It will then focus on the political events following independence that saw Senegal transform from a one-party state to a competitive, multiparty democracy. This development was driven by the political opposition in its desire for political equality, Senegal's general population, and by the actions of Senegal's political leaders.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

There are several people that deserve recognition, who without their help I would never have completed this thesis. First, I would like to acknowledge my thesis committee: Dr. Donovan Chau and Dr. Timothy Pytell. Both professors have given me great counsel, friendship, and guidance throughout this whole process. Dr. Tiffany Jones deserves thanks as well for working with me step-by-step through the intricacies of writing about Africa and trying to understand the complexities of African History. Also, Dr. Jones brought to my attention several important resources such as H-Net, Interlibrary Loan, and World Cat. These resources benefitted me tremendously throughout the research process as did her extensive personal expertise. There is no doubt that without her help, I never would have finished this thesis. I would also like to thank my family, notably my father Tim Riley and older sister Shannon Riley. Thank you, without all of you, this would not be possible.

To the Senegalese people

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	iv
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY	
Background	1
Literature Review	2
Democracy in Africa	6
Senegal	14
Limitations of the Study	16
Thesis Organization	18
CHAPTER TWO: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND	
French Influence in Senegal	19
Association	25
The Emergence of Senegalese Politics	31
CHAPTER THREE: POST-INDEPENDENCE SENEGAL	38
Problems with the <i>Union Progressiste Sénégalaise</i> ...	41
Senegal as a One-Party State	43
The 1970 Constitutional Mandates	47
Senegal as a Limited Multiparty State	49
Senegal's Poor Economy	55
Abdou Diouf as Senegal's President	58
CHAPTER FOUR: CONCLUSION	
Modifications to the Electoral Code	62

The Splintering of the <i>Parti Socialiste</i>	64
Reexamining the Electoral Code	68
The 2000 Presidential Election	69
Summary	74
Recommendations	76
Implications for Future Research	80
REFERENCES	83

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

Background

Senegal is designated as a partly free, electoral democracy by the Freedom House Index¹ (Freedom House Index, 2010). This is significant as there are few examples of democracies on the African continent and most are extremely fragile (Bratton & Mattes, 2001). According to the Freedom House Index (2010), an electoral democracy exists when a country's political institutions meet a number of standards. First, the establishment of a competitive, multiparty political system is essential. The country must also have granted universal adult suffrage to the citizens of the country. Third, it must have a set schedule of elections that protect voter secrecy and that are in the absence of voter fraud. Finally, political parties must have the ability to reach the electorate through media and open campaigning.

¹The Freedom House is an independent watchdog organization that promotes democracy and advocates for human rights worldwide. The Index is a measure that ranks each country based on its civil liberties and political freedom. For more information, please visit <http://www.freedomhouse.org>.

Literature Review

In order to understand how democracy succeeds in Senegal, it is necessary to come to some general understanding on what democracy is. One of the most widely cited examples of democracy comes from the work of Robert Dahl. Dahl (1971) identifies eight democratic institutions that are necessary in order for a government to be a democracy: freedom of association, freedom of expression, the right to vote, unbiased sources of political information, universal eligibility for office, the right to campaign, free and fair elections, and making government policies depend on an electoral mandate. This is the most comprehensive definition of democracy when it comes to pure political criteria, but does not touch on some of the things that are crucial to the average person living in a country. Some of these things will be addressed later by other authors.

Michael Bratton & Robert Mattes (2007) argue that democracy is a political system that allows groups of people to compete for power. Also, it is a system that allows citizens to elect representatives to make binding decisions for themselves and the country. While these are important concepts, further specialization is needed for a

viable definition of democracy. Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, & Seymour Martin Lipset (1988) offer a more in-depth definition of democracy that revolves around political competition, participation, and the existence of civil and political liberties. For this definition, the authors state that they are attempting to define democracy in political terms without connecting it to economic and social conditions. According to these authors, democracy is:

A system of government that meets three essential conditions: meaningful and extensive *competition* among individuals and organized groups (especially political parties) for all effective positions of government power, at regular intervals and excluding the use of force; a highly inclusive level of *political participation* in the selection of leaders and policies, at least through regular and fair elections, such that no major (adult) social group is excluded; and a level of *civil and political liberties*—freedom of expression, freedom of the press, freedom to form and join organizations—sufficient to ensure the integrity of political competition and participation (Diamond, Linz, & Lipset, p.xvi, 1988).

The inclusion of civil liberties expands on the ideals of freedom of speech and freedom of expression that Dahl (1971) included in his criteria of democracy. Freedom to form and join organizations is an important one as it creates a competitive political environment that is central to democracy.

Other authors such as John Wiseman (1990) and David Brown, Jordin Cohen, Kristian Gleditsch, & et al. (1998) define democracy in similar ways. Wiseman (1990) argues that having a choice on who to vote for as well as a politically competitive environment is crucial. Also, regular elections, freedom of speech, and the existence of a critical opposition must be present in a political system for it to be considered a democracy. Brown, Cohen, Gleditsch, & et al. (1998) state that democracy generally refers to a system that encourages inclusion, participation, open competition, and institutionalized constraints. The constraints are designed to help prevent those in power from exploiting their positions and corrupting the political system. This is the first definition that has included a requirement of restraining the political power of those in office. A nation that wants

to be democratic must protect its government from corruption.

David Beetham (1994) defines democracy as a group of people who collectively make decisions and establish a system of institutions and procedures that help these decisions become realized. He notes that the focus on democracy tends to be on the existence of fair and free political elections that are competitive between multiple parties. Akwasi Aidoo (1993) also argues that a country needs to have a multiparty political system as one of the requirements for democracy. However, Beetham (1994) notes that it is important to realize that multipartyism is not a means to democracy in itself and ruling parties need to be held accountable for their actions to their electorate. The presence of multipartyism should not be used as the sole example of why a country is a democracy. If elections are fraudulent, it does not matter how many legal political parties there are, it is not democracy.

From this examination of debates of scholars about democracy, although not all agree with each other, it is possible to generate a general definition of democracy. Democracy is a system of government that has regular elections that are competitive, fair, and free. In

addition, it must be a multiparty political system that elects its leaders based on the votes from its citizens. The citizens of the country must have certain civil liberties including freedom of assembly, organization, and speech. Moreover, voters must be protected from being pressured to vote for a particular party. Also, the government must have institutionalized restrictions against the ruling party to prevent it from exploiting its political power. These are all aspects of democracy that were examined in previous definitions of democracy. Also, the presence of a critical and uncensored media to which all parties have equal access is essential. An independent media acts as a self-check on a country's government and will work as an anti-corruption measure. In addition, it serves as a way for the population to become familiar and knowledgeable with different political actors and issues. Finally, it must promote an atmosphere within the country that allows equal economic and social opportunities for its citizens.

Democracy in Africa

Establishing democracy in Africa has been difficult for almost every nation on the continent that has attempted

it. In order to understand why democracy has been such a challenge to establish and maintain in Africa, it is necessary to account for the broad effects of European colonization. Aimé Césaire (1972) wrote about how the European powers in their attempts to "modernize" the people of Africa disrupted their natural cultural progress. He argues that Europe through colonization, destroyed the African way of life including their culture, means of supporting themselves, and disturbed the future of the whole continent. So in fact, colonization did not modernize any African society, but set it back. Frantz Fanon (1963) also addressed this issue, but with more focus on the effects of colonization on the cultural fabric of African people.

Colonial domination, because it is total and tends to oversimplify, very soon manages to disrupt in spectacular fashion the cultural life of a conquered people. This cultural obliteration is made possible by the negation of national reality, by new legal relations introduced by the occupying power, by the banishment of the natives and their customs to outlying districts by colonial society, by

expropriation, and by the systematic enslaving of men and women (Fanon, p. 236, 1963).

In this sense, independence granted upon a former colonial territory did little to set any country up for a successful future. While colonization may have established infrastructure and setup a bureaucratic system in some African nations, it did more harm than good. The people of the former colonies and its institutions must undergo a process of decolonization in order to create their own identity and forge their own path. In many African countries, however, the process of decolonization was never fully realized. Thus, democracy faces serious obstacles in Africa.

One of the major debates surrounding African democracy is the question of whether it is different than Western democracy. Claude Ake (1993) argues that it has to be different from Western democracy given the history and culture of the continent. He suggests that Africa exists in a state that is largely pre-industrial, with the majority of people relying on agricultural means for subsistence. Also, African culture historically views family and the community as more important than the individual. In this communal type of setting, he purports that the traditional

Western method of democracy does not adapt efficiently. Moreover, it makes the pursuit of individual goals less important to the African people. Reason Wafawarova (2008) also argues that Africa's social and political framework is vastly different than in the United States and Western Europe where a premium is placed on the pursuit of individual growth and success.

Another tenet of this debate is whether African democracies should be held to the same standard as Western democracies. Keith Richburg (2008) argues that it should be for a few reasons. The international community has allowed one-party states to rise in many African countries over the last few decades. He believes this is because these governments create a "stable" environment where violence has been minimized. The international community will often look the other way on civil and human rights violations, if there is no blatant violence within the country. However, this style of government even if it provides a level of stability has no accountability to its people for economic opportunities and human rights.

Wafawarova (2008), on the other hand, believes Africa should not be subjected to the same standards as Western democracy. The process of creating a nation-state within

boundaries dictated by European powers has been extremely difficult. He believes that every geographical region has its own version of democracy and that a one size fits all mentality will cause democracy to fail in places other than the West. Wafawarova (2008) also states that on a continent where poverty is a very real threat, the guarantee of food, land, and shelter needs to be prioritized compared to the rights of association and expression. In these places, democracy is connected with economic livelihoods just as much as political freedoms.

Another problem with democracy is the popular Western notion that it is established in a systemic and linear fashion. Emeka Nwokedi (1995) examines the democratization process and argues against it being a linear process. Theoretically, it is easy to view the onset of democracy occurring in stages, but in reality it rarely occurs so cleanly. The "development"² of democracy could easily stagnate and regress until the actors inside of a country determine that they want to pursue democratization again. This process does not diminish the legitimacy of a

² I am aware of the economic connotations that the term "development" has in Africa. However, in this sense, it is purely meant to describe the evolution or progression of democracy from the African people themselves.

democracy in a country, but rather reinforces it. It is easy for those in Western democracies to forget the struggles of their own countries to establish democracy and assume that their development of democracy was a relatively smooth process. With this mindset, when an African democracy does not meet the same standards as a Western democracy, it is easy to write it off as a "failed state" instead of existing within the natural evolution of democracy.

Culture has a large part in determining the success of a democracy. W.I. Jennings (1963) discusses some of the fundamental issues surrounding the development of democracy in Africa. The major difficulty for Jennings is the process of establishing democracy and its ideals in a culture. He argues that "democracy has succeeded in North-Western Europe and in a few countries outside Europe because it has become entwined in the traditions of the people" (Jennings, p.68, 1963). This is a long process and can be derailed if a country experiences dictatorship, economic breakdown, and poor social conditions. Bratton & Mattes (2007) also state the importance of institutionalizing democracy. It takes time for a group of people to accumulate institutional knowledge about democracy and how it works. Institutional

knowledge represents the beliefs, skills, and values developed by a group of people while interacting with specific institutions. In order for a democracy to be successful the people, government, and political institutions have to believe it to be the right government and this can take time.

Wiseman (1990) further discusses some of the major obstacles that democracy faces in Africa. The current nation-states in Africa were drawn up by European powers during the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885. This process divided the continent into territories that were convenient to European powers and did not take into account the reality on the ground. Territories were drawn up based on European desires, economic interests, and policies. The governments of African countries must now attempt to create nations out of groups of people with different cultures, historical experiences, and languages. Wiseman (1990) further states that African countries tend to be economically underdeveloped, poverty is a prevalent problem, and African standards of living tend to be ranked low. Moreover, mass education continues to be a problem in many African countries. Even though a small number of students in most African countries receive a university

education, this dream is not realized for the majority of African students.

African democracy is certainly different than Western democracy. Institutionalizing democracy is a difficult, long process and it is hard to imagine people in Africa accepting democracy whole-heartedly until they see proof that it works in their nations. This proof can only be evidenced over time as regimes change, politicians are held accountable, and the general standard of living increases. The first Western democracies were not compared and held to some outside standard of performance because they were the first countries to implement a democratic system in modern nation-states. African democracies should be viewed similarly as they are being implemented on a new continent with a different culture and history. As noted, these new democracies have to overcome the legacies of their colonial occupations, which is no easy task. This is not to say that African politicians should not be held accountable for their actions. Each nation has a responsibility to hold its politicians responsible via its constitution and appropriate legislation. However, the successful democratization of an African nation will be a long-term

process and will experience setbacks and should be appropriately measured in such terms.

Senegal

This thesis seeks to analyze why democracy in Senegal has been successful and advanced to its current position. Certainly Senegal has faced serious challenges to its democracy. Scholars argue that one of main issues facing Senegal is the need to overcome its history of French colonialism. From a political standpoint, Sheldon Gellar (2005) argues that since the French colonial authority ruled Senegal as an authoritarian state that it gave rise to a one-party state after independence. The highly autocratic colonial system implemented by the French pressured Senegalese politicians to adopt French institutions of governance. Also, post-independence Senegal was led by Léopold Sédar Senghor, who was French-educated and encouraged close ties with France even after independence. Basil Davidson (1992) argues that the acceptance of French institutions as a means to govern was extremely problematic for African societies. Party politics had not been defined and established in Senegal, which were crucial to having a smooth transition to an effective,

multiparty political system. Instead, Senghor was able to gain control of the government and essentially turn Senegal into a one-party state.

. Mohamed Mbodj (1993) explores the influence of French colonialism on the economy of Senegal. The French emphasis on growth and production of the groundnut industry left behind an export-based economy that was inefficient and at the mercy of the world market price for groundnuts.

François Boye (1993) expands further on this investigation and examines the Senegalese economy since independence. He finds that Senegal has failed to follow any significant school of economic thought to stimulate growth and has relied heavily on international sources to pay its debts. Thus it has continued to be at the mercy of Western countries' interests. Nonetheless, Senegal managed to transition to a democracy.

This thesis examines the reasons how and why democracy developed in Senegal. Through such an examination, it will be evident that democracy can succeed in Africa, but it is a difficult process. Senegal's uniqueness as a former French colony cannot be denied. It endured colonialism, maneuvered its way through independence and evolved into a democracy. This occurred through the efforts of the

Senegalese people and political opposition, whose actions led to the erosion of obstacles that were preventing the country from becoming democratic. This forced Senghor, Diouf, and other members of the *Parti Socialiste du Sénégal* (PS) to make democratic concessions to the political opposition. This process began in 1976, when Senghor introduced limited multiparty politics and was realized in 1981 when Abdou Diouf removed the last restraints on a full multiparty political system. It was during this time that democracy began to take root in Senegal.

Limitations of the Study

There are limitations in the study that need to be addressed. As it stands, the research done for this thesis comes heavily from secondary sources: academic publications, journal and newspaper articles, and area studies. The small sampling of primary sources can allow for misinterpretation of the reality on the ground in Senegal. This is complicated by the fact that none of the research for the thesis was done first-hand within the country of Senegal. Therefore, it was important to find multiple sources giving the same information in order to verify reliability.

Another limitation has been the amount of scholarly work focusing on Senegal's democracy. Although there is a healthy amount that has been published on the subject, it is small compared to the literature published on a country like South Africa. A large amount of the literature focusing on Senegal refers to religion and how it influences other parts of society (Clark, 1999; O'Brien, 1971; O'Brien, 1975; Searing, 2002; and Villalòn, 1999). I have declined to include religion and its effects on democracy in Senegal to a great extent, as that is something that needs to be addressed in a larger study. These things have limited the thoroughness in which the thesis can examine the events in Senegal to some degree.

Another limitation is the limited scope of the analysis. Following the democratic progress of a country is an extremely difficult task as it takes place over many years. The goal is that by examining a small segment of Senegal's history, it will show key points when democracy was able to develop. The analysis of how a democracy is established and progresses is a difficult task in any scenario. In order to do this, I have focused on studying the French colonization, key political events during Senegal's process of decolonization, the consequences of

these events, and how the democratic process shifted in response to these events.

Thesis Organization

The remainder of the thesis will be organized into three separate chapters. Chapter two will outline the historical background of French colonialism in Senegal starting with its assimilation policies in the early part of the twentieth century. It will cover much of Senegal's political history until independence on August 20, 1959. Chapter three will analyze how Senegal's political environment changed from independence up until the early 1980s. The focus of the chapter will be to examine the period from 1976 to 1981 in Senegal, when multipartyism was established. This five year period saw the beginning and birth of a political environment in which democracy was able to take root and begin its development. Chapter four will conclude the thesis by examining the political events in Senegal following 1981 and how democracy has fared since multipartyism was established. This chapter will also include a summary of the thesis, recommendations derived from the study, and the implications for future research on Senegal.

CHAPTER TWO

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

French Influence in Senegal

The style of government that a nation has does not just develop by accident. It is a result of the historical experiences of the culture and people that live within the nation. In order to understand how democracy has developed and been established in Senegal, it is necessary to analyze what has influenced Senegal and its political system. This analysis will focus on the time period from 1900 until independence on August 20, 1959. This historical background will provide knowledge on the influences that affected Senegal leading up to independence. It will show the uniqueness of the development of Senegalese politics and the political actors responsible for running Senegal post-independence.

Senegal is located on the western coast of Africa and is roughly 76,000 square miles in size. Most of Senegal's major cities, both historically and present-day, have been port cities due to its proximity to the Atlantic Ocean (Ross, 2008). It is surrounded by Mauritania to the north, Mali to the east, and Guinea and Guinea-Bissau to the

south. Also, Senegal almost completely surrounds The Gambia besides its small coast on the Atlantic Ocean. Senegal lies in the Sahelo-Sudanic zone, which is a bioclimatic, semiarid region that stretches across Africa south of the Sahara desert. It is a relatively flat country with the highest elevation being only 1,906 feet in the Bassari Hills of the southeast (Ross, 2008). As a result of this, it made for an easy launching point for European settlers. In addition, in the northern part of the country runs the Senegal River from which the country derives its name.

Starting with the French Revolution in 1789, democratic ideals and values were espoused as central to the French way of thinking. The French enlightenment belief that all people who were exposed to the proper culture and education would become rational, sovereign individuals was professed by French bureaucrats and philosophers. Senegal is unique because it has a long history of liberal and democratic practices. As early as 1848, certain areas of Senegal enjoyed voting rights (Grovoqui & Hayward, 1987). Also, Senegal was the first of France's African colonies and served as a gateway to the interior of the continent. It is also unique because it experienced both French policies of colonial rule: direct rule during assimilation

as well as the indirect method of rule called association (Johnson, 1971).

The French administration of Senegal appeared to reflect this during the early stages of their colonial rule. This policy was known as assimilation, where the French believed that it was their mission to assimilate the Senegalese people into French society and standards (Gellar, 2005). This appeared to be based in French enlightenment beliefs and French officials were quick to promote their desire to help "modernize" their African brothers. However, assimilation and the justification behind it had much deeper roots fixated in European superiority and racism.

The separation between the official French policy of assimilation and the reality on the ground existed throughout the entirety of the French colonization of Senegal. One of the true goals of assimilation was to replace Senegalese culture with French culture (Lewis, 2000). The French believed that their culture was superior to the Senegalese and that was what had allowed them to colonize Senegal in the first place. In this sense, assimilation was a policy that would accomplish the goal of including Senegal into a greater French empire, but also

create a new population of "Frenchmen" out of the Africans (Lewis, 2000).

The French policy of assimilation went into full effect by the start of the twentieth century. France designated Dakar, Gorée, Rufisque, and Saint-Louis in Senegal as communes. This gave the four areas the same political status as a French metropolitan area. The citizens living in the Four Communes did enjoy some benefits to their location. They had the right to form political associations, run for office, and vote (Johnson, 1971). Senegalese living outside of the communes, who were known as *indigenes* were granted no such rights and could only become citizens by meeting a rigorous set of standards (Gilbert & Reynolds, 2008). Moreover, *indigenes* were subject to a special law code known as the *indigenat*. This law allowed French colonialists to punish non-citizen Senegalese without due process and levy hefty fines and punishments on the *indigenes* (Gilbert & Reynolds, 2008).

For the Senegalese living in the communes, the only political difference according to assimilation policy was that these Senegalese lived outside of France and in a French territory. Each commune had a municipal council that was elected by the citizens of the city, and the mayor and

his staff was selected from members of the council (Johnson, 1971). Although it was the duty of the mayor to perform French administration mandates, the mayor held several powers in his own right. The mayor made independent decisions regarding local taxes, public health, law enforcement, and other important matters that affected the commune.

However, many Senegalese were not happy with assimilation even those living in the communes. Senegal's first political group was formed in 1912 in protest. They were the *Jeunes Sénégalais*, or Young Senegalese (Johnson, 1971). This group advocated for better standards of living for Africans including better jobs, salaries, cost-of-living benefits, educational facilities, and scholarships to study at French institutions. The Young Senegalese proceeded to endorse and campaign for Blaise Diagne, a young African who would go on to win the 1914 deputy election and become the first African to serve in the French Parliament. Diagne was educated in France and Senegal and served 22 years overseas as a French customs agent before entering politics (Clark & Phillips, 1994). This came as a major shock to the French colonial administration. A native Senegalese man had won the

deputyship election and it made the French rethink their colonial policy. The idea of Africans, even if they were assimilated being able to vote one of their own politicians into the French parliament terrified the French (Burns & Collins, 2007).

This fear along with the events during World War I caused assimilation to fall out of favor as a colonial policy. Several thousand Senegalese had been conscripted to fight for France during World War I (Suret-Canale, 1971). These soldiers were known as *tirailleurs sénégalais* and many were killed in battle, creating hostility from the families of these soldiers towards the French. In addition, assimilation was viewed as unrealistic by French administrators, who had experienced the high monetary cost of the policy. High tensions from World War I and the large number of French bureaucrats in Senegal that assimilation required began to take its toll. The goal of creating Frenchmen out of Africans was failing. By 1922, only 100 *indigènes* in all of French West Africa had become citizens (Gilbert & Reynolds, 2008). Assimilation became heavily criticized from within France and a new policy known as association was embraced by the colonial administration.

Association

Association was proclaimed by French officials as endorsing a mutual respect for the cultures of both parties involved, whereas assimilation had sought to remove African culture and customs (Suret-Canale, 1971). In reality though, the policy of association was seen as a veiled theory of races. Author Jean Suret-Canale (1971) states that "this pretended 'association', linked to maintenance of the 'rights of domination', was nothing but the association of the horse with its rider..." (p. 85). Association was first legitimately discussed as a replacement for assimilation by Jules Harmand. In Harmand's *Domination et colonisation* (1910), he portrayed association to be a colonial system that allowed the conqueror to benefit economically from a territory while maintaining control through the native people's institutions (Betts, 1961). However, since the French had already dismantled much of the pre-colonial structure of Senegalese society, this was a difficult task.

Association was inspired by the British colonial system of indirect rule. Several former French administrators in Africa, including the notable former governor-general of Senegal Louis Faidherbe, realized that

millions of Africans were not going to be turned into Frenchmen. As a result, French officials who were proponents of association protested against transferring French institutions to Senegal. As mentioned, the Senegalese people were not satisfied with assimilation on any level. Many Africans who studied to teach were given the least desirable positions and lowest pay. Urban schools were built in the neighborhoods of the French and were expected to accept all French and Creole students, leaving African students with the regional schools that did not offer the same level of instruction (Johnson, 1971). Ultimately, the French preferred to use the Senegalese as proxies that they could manipulate rather than Western educated Senegalese, who were aware of things like freedom, democracy, and equal human rights (Gellar, 2005).

French association did differ from British indirect rule in several ways. It was not unusual for British administrators and native authorities to coexist in Britain's African colonies. This was not the case in French colonies since association was viewed as being direct rule through Senegalese proxies (Johnson, 1971). This scenario is best explained by Burns & Collins (2007):

Many French officials believed, however, that association was little more than assimilation disguised by a cloak of hypocrisy in which it was wrapped. French officials continued to maintain complete control of the administration of their colonies unchecked by the chiefs, who had been converted into convenient petty officers rather than representatives of their people. French administrators had no illusions about this contradiction but were quite content to ignore it in order to replace African customs, for which they had little more than contempt, with the relentless dissemination of the French language and culture (p. 303).

French colonialism was met with strong resistance from African intellectuals internationally. Martinican poet Aimé Césaire, future Senegalese President Léopold Sédar Senghor, and Guianan Léon Damas created the *Négritude* movement in the 1930s. *Négritude* represented a black African consciousness and an embrace of native African culture (Hymans, 1971). The preservation and celebration of an African's background, culture, future, and humanism were at the heart of the *Négritude* movement (Hymans, 1971). A non-dogmatic type of socialism, Senghor envisioned *Négritude* as

unique blend of European and African values (Cox & Kessler, 1980). Senghor even advised an "Assimilate, don't be Assimilated" policy starting in 1937. His goal was for the Senegalese to remain Senegalese, while taking what benefits they could from the French and European culture (Hymans, 1971). Frantz Fanon (1963) states that Senegalese nationalists said this of Senghor: "'We have demanded that the higher posts should be given to Africans; and now Senghor is Africanizing the Europeans'" (p. 46). Senghor and *Négritude* attempted to turn French colonial policies on its head and use them for the benefit of Africans.

The first sign of a shift away from traditional French colonial policy came during World War II. On January 20, 1944, a conference in Brazzaville, Congo was held to discuss the future of French colonialist policies in Africa (Mortimer, 1969). Charles De Gaulle presided over the conference, which sought to establish a method in which a French Community could be established that included the colonies in Africa (Mortimer, 1969). This policy shift came about for a few reasons. First, the countries that had lost World War I had been stripped of their colonial territories and France was currently occupied by Germany. Also, Germany's invasion of France in 1940 and France's call for

help from its colonial territories has damaged its aura of invincibility among French African colonies:

...the realization that she(France) actually needed their help, that they were no longer being lectured like children but appealed to as brothers, was clearly going to make it difficult to retain an authoritarian system of government after the peace" (Mortimer, p. 29, 1969).

In fact, the capital of Free France was located in Africa during the German occupation of France during World War II (Mortimer, 1969).

When the Allied powers defeated Nazi Germany to end World War II, it was apparent that France would no longer be able to continue its colonial policies. This was due to the widespread knowledge of the atrocities committed by Germany against racial minorities in Europe during the war. The Allied victory legitimized the belief that racial policies were not humane and would not be tolerated. France could no longer govern Senegal on the basis that Africans and Europeans were inherently different (Gellar, 2005). The French also had enlisted thousands more *tirailleurs sénégalais* to fight during World War II. The gratitude of

the French for Senegalese military service was epitomized in Tiaroye, Senegal in November 1944 (Mortimer, 1969).

Tirailleurs sénégalais who had been German captives during the war had been repatriated to a camp in Tiaroye. These soldiers were promised that they would be paid arrears for their service. However, payment never came and the French ordered the former soldiers to board vehicles headed to Bamako, Mali. When the *tirailleurs sénégalais* refused, it was declared a mutiny and the French opened fire. Nearly 40 soldiers were killed and the same number injured. Some of the surviving soldiers were sentenced to 10 years imprisonment by a Dakar military tribunal in 1945 (Mortimer, 1969). No apology was made by French authorities, infuriating the Senegalese population. This event represented an indictment of the entire French colonial system. It represented the reality about French colonialism that from the French perspective, the Senegalese were not Frenchmen but French subjects and they were expendable.

French colonial policy shifted on October 28, 1946, the date of the signing of the constitution of the Fourth French Republic. The preamble of the constitution stated that colonial territories, overseas protectorates, and

France would all be a single entity under a new French Union (Gellar, 2005). The French Union was to share the same liberties, rights and democratic ideals regardless of location, race, and religion. Originally, the African colonies had pushed for a federation, but this had been rejected out of French fear that it would make France a colony of her colonies. However, Senegal and other African nations joined the French Union on the belief that they would be treated as associates and political apprentices (Skurnik, 1972). This had a profound effect on Senegal immediately as the Senegalese people became involved in the politics of their country on a new level.

The Emergence of Senegalese Politics

Lamine Guèye and his Socialist Party, the *Parti Sénégalais d'action Socialiste* (PSAS) gained political control of Senegal immediately following the war due to their popularity in the Four Communes. Guéye was well-known in Senegal as he had been elected deputy to the French parliament in 1945 and had passed two "Loi's"³ improving Senegalese rights by the end of World War II (Schaffer,

³A *Loi* is a law that is passed in the French parliament (Schaffer, 1998).

1998). However, when voting rights were extended to all Senegalese citizens in June 1956 with the passing of the *Loi-Cadre*, the PSAS had a difficult time attracting new voters. The *Loi-Cadre* established several important things in Senegal. First, it required universal suffrage in Senegal. It also had a mandate that created the Senegalese National Assembly, a unicameral legislative body for the country. Next, regional assemblies in Senegal would receive additional responsibilities including taking over government services previously offered by the French Union (Skurnik, 1972). France was gradually removing its direct control over Senegal, but still wanted it to remain as part of the French empire.

Most new voters were drawn to a new party, known as the *Bloc Démocratique Sénégalais* (BDS), formed in 1948 (Schaffer, 1998). The BDS was led by Léopold Sédar Senghor, who was a famous poet and was popular among the Senegalese people, and Mamadou Dia. Senghor, like Guèye, was a deputy in the French parliament, elected in 1945. He had been educated in Senegal and later France during the 1930s. Senghor had also been a prisoner of war from 1940 to 1942 while fighting for France in World War II (Clark & Phillips, 1994). In March 1957, the BDS won 47 of the

available 60 seats in the Senegalese National Assembly elections (Roche, 2001). Many rural voters had been drawn to Senghor's *Négritude*, which emphasized the importance of community and religion (Clark & Phillips, 1994). The convincing political defeat persuaded Guèye and the PSAS to join with the BDS (Beck, 2008). This created a dominant political party led by Senghor known as the *Union Progressiste Sénégalaise* (UPS) in early 1958.

The UPS was now faced with a population that had grown increasingly nationalistic and was calling for freedom from France. Independence and self-governance was seen as an inalienable right and many Senegalese were anxious to break away from France. Senghor, who was still serving in the French parliament, was selected for the Consultative Constitutional Committee (CCC) (Skurnik, 1972). The CCC was charged with writing the portion of the new French constitution that dealt with French overseas territories. Senghor's main goal while being on the CCC was for the new constitution to allow Africans the option of choosing independence within a five year period. Senghor's efforts were rewarded when on September 28, 1958; France presented Senegal and the rest of newly renamed French Community (formerly the French Union) with a referendum that gave

each territory three options: integration into a greater French republic, independence, or self-government within the French Community (Beck, 2008).

While the Senghor-led UPS controlled the Senegalese legislature, there were other strong political groups involved with this decision. The *Parti Africain de l'Indépendance* (PAI), a Marxist group, and the *Parti du Regroupement Africain-Sénégal* (PRA-S) were the primary opposition groups (Beck, 2008). The PRA-S was formed by a group of radical idealists who wanted immediate independence from French control. However, the UPS feared that immediate independence would cause groups like the PRA-S to rise up and attempt to seize control of the country. There was a group of people in the UPS known as the "young Turks" who advocated strongly for independence as well (Hymans, 1971). Senghor was determined to maintain close ties with France for the economic benefit of Senegal. Therefore, Senghor and the UPS campaigned for self-governance within the French Community to help preserve their control of Senegal and stay in France's good graces. Senghor's influence and popularity among the Senegalese population was evident as 97 percent of Senegal voted for the same option the UPS desired (Beck, 2008).

Senghor's philosophy on governance was based in the belief that Africa's best path to modernization lay in a close economic and political union with Europe. Senghor had remained hesitant to publically support any notion of true independence from France. Senghor biographer Jacques Hymans (1971) states, "Throughout his political career Senghor had proceeded with caution, only supporting what seemed acceptable to France" (p. 174). However, the political landscape had shifted in Africa and by 1958; the continent had grown increasingly nationalistic. In order to protect himself and the power of the UPS, Senghor was careful to advocate any path that distanced Senegal to far from France. Senghor still believed that for Senegal to develop, it must maintain close ties with France.

Shortly after Senegal's vote, Senghor approached Dahomey (present-day Benin), Upper Volta (present-day Burkina Faso), and Soudan (present-day Mali) in October 1958 about creating a regional federation within the French Community (Kurtz, 1970). This was viewed as a threat by other countries in the region and by French citizens living in West Africa, as it would have created a regional power greater than any individual country. Due to pressure from France and other countries in West Africa, Dahomey and

Upper Volta opted out of creating a regional federation (Kurtz, 1970). However, in March 1959, Senegal and Soudan approved a constitution that created the Mali Federation. In July 1959, political leaders from the Mali Federation requested independence from France and French President Charles de Gaulle granted their request (Kurtz, 1970). President de Gaulle was partial to granting former colonies independence because he was focused on building a strong France after the collapse of the Fourth Republic.

The Mali Federation was short lived and by August 1959, it was clear there were serious political disagreements within the government. Senghor, serving as vice president, felt that Senegal would be taken advantage of since he was not the president of the Mali Federation (Kurtz, 1970). He had received little support from Soudan citizens in his bid for president. The Mali Federation was led by Modibo Keita, who was from Soudan. These tensions erupted on August 19, 1959, when Senegal and Soudan mobilized their respective militaries in an attempt to protect their own territory (Clark & Phillips, 1994). The Senegalese military outmaneuvered the Soudanese military and captured and exiled its leaders to Soudan. Dia then called a midnight session of the Senegalese National

Assembly and on August 20, 1959, Senegal declared its independence from the Mali Federation. France quickly recognized both Senegal and Soudan (renamed the Mali Republic) as independent countries (Kurtz, 1970). Although the Mali Federation had been a failure, Senegal gained its independence and its new statehood with Senghor selected as president and Mamadou Dia as prime minister.

Senegal had endured the trials of French colonialism and gradually won its freedom from French control. Senghor and the UPS had emerged as the dominant political force in Senegal. The Senegalese people were filled with ambition and hope with their newfound independence. Certain democratic institutions were already in place such as the ability to vote, the presence of political parties, and a National Assembly. However, Senegal would quickly be confronted with some of the challenges that democracy faces in Africa as the Senghor-led UPS would move quickly to try to consolidate political power and control Senegal in a one-party state.

CHAPTER THREE

POST-INDEPENDENCE SENEGAL

Adam Przeworski (1986) discusses four reasons why authoritarian regimes can collapse. First, the regime has accomplished whatever goal that led to its establishment. This warrants the regime obsolete and it collapses. Second, the regime loses its legitimacy for any number of reasons and disintegrates. Third, conflicts between individuals or groups within the regime break out and cannot be resolved. Some members reach for outside support causing the regime to splinter and fall apart. Finally, outside pressures calling for democracy force the authoritarian regime to compromise its power and eventually lead to its downfall.

There is substantial evidence that a combination of these effects were coming into play in Senegal during the 1960s and 1970s. The population was unhappy with the government's role in running the country. Economically, politically, and socially; the people of Senegal felt disenfranchised and disempowered. It became evident that something needed to be done in order for the UPS to remain in control and to rebuild some of its reputation around the country. These factors created enormous pressure on Senghor

to make some political changes. He finally did this in 1976, when he had the constitution amended to create a limited multiparty political system in an attempt to diffuse the pressures facing his administration.

Prior to this, the UPS had remained a strong political force following independence in Senegal. In the National Assembly elections of April 1959, the UPS had won every single legislative seat in the new government (Beck, 2008). However, the UPS was soon challenged in September 1961, when the *Bloc des Masses Sénégalaises* (BMS), a conservative party was formed. The BMS quickly gained a substantial following as it was comprised of older socialists that had important family connections around Senegal. Senghor knew the BMS represented a substantial threat to the UPS and began attempts to remove the BMS from political competition. Senghor attempted to coerce the BMS leaders to join the UPS, but this strategy failed as the Secretary-General Cheikh Anta Diop declined. Diop was a trained historian who had been educated in both Dakar and Paris (Clark & Phillips, 1994). He was highly critical of Senghor and the UPS. In retaliation, Senghor had Diop imprisoned in an effort to dissolve the BMS party (Grovoqui & Hayward, 1987).

Diop's imprisonment caused a split in the BMS with half of the group remaining loyal to Diop and the other half accepting the UPS offer to combine parties. The UPS absorbed the willing half of the BMS and disbanded the remainder of the party on October 14, 1963. The BMS party was no more. This became a popular tactic of Senghor, who absorbed eight of the 21 political groups that formed between 1948 and 1966 into the UPS (Grovoqui & Hayward, 1987). However, the remainder of the disbanded BMS party refused to surrender and soon formed the *Front National Sénégalais* (FNS) with Diop as their Secretary-General when he was released from prison. Like the BMS, the popularity of the group grew quickly due to its members, but it was permanently banned in 1965 (Clark & Phillips, 1994). The reason for its removal was given in a statement by Senghor in which he claimed to support the plurality of the political system, but would not allow the presence of subversive and violent groups (Grovoqui & Hayward, 1987). The legal Senegalese opposition was basically eliminated during this time either by being outlawed or by being absorbed by Senghor and his party.

Problems with the *Union Progressiste Sénégalaise*

Despite their political success, the UPS began to experience some internal conflict. Senghor's philosophy differed from Mamadou Dia's on many topics (Le Vine, 1967). Dia had worked with Senghor since after World War II and before that had been an economist, journalist, and teacher. In 1961, Dia created the *Office de Commercialization Agricole* (OCA), which created cooperatives between rural groundnut farmers. This alienated many European businessmen who had acted as merchants for groundnut farmers in the rural part of Senegal and supported Senghor. As a result of these activities, he was known as a vigorous administrator (Clark & Phillips, 1994). Dia also suggested that Islamic *marabouts*⁴, who had acted as vote-getters for Senghor in the villages, remove themselves from politics and focus on spiritual guidance. These policies alienated Dia from Senghor, who began to see Dia as a threat to his power. This conflict culminated in 1962 when a motion of censure

⁴For more information on the *marabouts* and their influence on Senegal, please see O'Brien, D.B.C. (1971). *Mourides of Senegal: The Political & Economic Organization of an Islamic Brotherhood*. London: Oxford University Press, O'Brien, D.B.C. (1975). *Saints & Politicians: Essays in the Organization of a Senegalese Peasant Society*. London: Cambridge University Press, and Searing, J.F. (2002). *"God Alone is King": Islam and Emancipation in Senegal*. Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann.

was entered into the National Assembly against Dia (Beck, 2008). Dia responded by having four of the UPS deputies that were leading the campaign to oust him arrested. The army was called in and surrounded the Assembly building and arrested Dia as he tried to leave. Dia was charged with an attempted coup d'état and sentenced to life imprisonment (Beck, 2008). He was eventually released from prison in 1974.

This event struck a blow against the prospects of democracy in Senegal. Senegal adopted a new constitution in March 1963 that changed Senegal from a parliamentary state to a centralized presidential system (Beck, 2008). This constitution eliminated the post of prime minister and had a specific article that gave the president enormous control over the government's operations. In other words, Senghor removed the only other political position that could challenge his authority and gained the right to rule Senegal individually. In addition, elections were now in the form of a winner-take-all system. Government ministers deferred to Senghor's authority on all important decisions and the National Assembly approved any legislation introduced by the president (Beck, 2008).

Moreover, independent media began to disappear at this time. The only daily newspaper in the country was the non-political *Dakar-Matin*, which was French-owned and run. Senghor took control of all radio stations and the national journalist association to ensure that only positive things were published about him (Gellar, 2005). Foreign newspapers were subject to censure and seizure if they contained any information that could be viewed as anti-Senghor. This infraction on the free media was another example of Senghor's desire to achieve complete political control of Senegal.

Senegal as a One-Party State

President Senghor and the UPS now controlled Senegal in a one-party state (Fatton, 1987). Senghor had fashioned himself in the role of a chief and considered the Senegalese people as his villagers. He not only made the laws, but was above the law itself. He appointed ministers to see over various aspects of the government, which allowed him to focus on cultural and foreign affairs (Fatton, 1987). A side benefit to Senghor's creation of a large bureaucracy was that it allowed him to avoid dealing with daily political procedures. As Adamolekun (1971)

points out, Senghor surrounded himself with a large bureaucracy as a survival method. He did this to avoid major criticism from the opposition and the populace, as he was able to blame his ministers for any shortcomings of the government. Also, he could claim to critics that the best minds in the country were addressing each problem (Adamolekun, 1971).

Senghor's regime was not without any difficulties however. By the mid-1960s, Senegal was facing serious problems. Economic growth and prosperity had not occurred as expected and the Senegalese people were growing impatient. In 1966, the *Office national de cooperation et d'assistance au développement* (ONCAD) was created to help implement state control over the rural economy. ONCAD was designed to help liberate the peasants from their debts accumulated in the groundnut industry. The groundnut industry represented nearly 80 percent of the country's exports and rural employment (Beck, 2008). However, it ended up being nothing more than a way for the bureaucrats to extract resources from the rural interior to Dakar (Fatton, 1987). This problem was magnified when in 1967; France eliminated all price supports towards Senegal's

groundnut industry. A severe drought hit Senegal during this same year compounding the issue.

The drought severely affected peanut exports and even with the world price of peanuts almost doubling from 1968 to 1973, profits shrunk considerably (Beck, 2008). Smaller profits, less arable land, and the elimination of French subsidies led to a large, disgruntled group of farmers who were unhappy with the government's management of agriculture. At the same time, urban migration was creating a large population of unemployed Senegalese in the cities. The plight of the Senegalese farmers was matched with the frustrations of the urban working class and university students. This culminated in riots and strikes in May and June of 1968 in Dakar (Fatton, 1987). Urban workers protested in response to low and unpaid salaries, the high rate of unemployment, and the high price of food (Beck, 2008). Students joined in the protests as they were unhappy that French culture and methods dominated Senegal's university system (Fatton, 1987).

The demonstrations and unhappy populace led President Senghor to take measures to lower food prices and raise pay (Beck, 2008). These events served as a wakeup call to the UPS. It forced Senghor to realize that despite his firm

grasp on the country's political system, he could not ignore the population's needs. The power of the Senegalese people was being asserted and the UPS recognized that even they would not be able to rule the country without the support of the population. The act of gaining independence from France had instilled a belief in Senegal that it was possible to change bad circumstances if people worked towards it. The Senegalese people had failed to benefit from the fruits of independence and decolonization was moving far too slowly to present economic opportunities across the country.

Frustrated with Senegalese life, the intellectual class was driven to try and force some change in Senegalese politics. In early 1969, a group of civil servants and intellectuals formed the *Club Nation et Développement* (CND). This organization was founded to organize and give a voice to the deep unhappiness with the current state of Senegalese affairs. As Schumacher (1975) points out, the CND focused on the lack of dynamism in the ruling party, the need for continued modernization including constitutional reform, the need to expand political participation opportunities, and to rejuvenate Senegal's political class.

Senghor, who was trying to distance his politics from the poor conditions of life in Senegal, supported the group and its work. Senghor claimed that the national government unloaded the majority of its responsibilities on him and that 70 percent of the work he had to do could be handled by ministers. He felt that he was unfairly burdened with day-to-day politics and was unable to fulfill his role as the head of the state. Senghor's opinion of the failure of the Senegalese state was in part supported by the CND, as some of his cabinet was members in the organization (Fatton, 1987). Senghor was determined to make constitutional amendments to force change and did this by establishing a board of five jurists to draw up all revisions necessary to improving the government. This was done in an effort to legitimize the Senghorian regime in the eyes of the Senegalese people.

The 1970 Constitutional Mandates

On February 22, 1970, the constitutional mandates the board had decided on were put to a national vote and passed. The new mandates established the official duties of the president, which were to determine national policy, supervise how the policy was carried out by the government,

and act as the country's arbitrator (Schumacher, 1975). Moreover, these mandates reestablished the post of prime minister in the national government. This position was filled by 35 year old technocrat Abdou Diouf. Diouf had been educated at the University of Dakar and received a law degree from the University of Paris. He had previously served as head of Senghor's private office from 1963 to 1965, secretary general of presidency from 1965 to 1968, and minister of planning and industry from 1968 to 1970 (Wiseman, 1990).

Due to Diouf's extensive service in positions close to Senghor, he was well known as Senghor's protégé in political circles (Clark & Phillips, 1994). However, this was not meant to create a power-sharing agreement between the president and prime minister, but to decentralize some of the political requirements on the president and to allow Senghor to train the next leader of Senegal. In the new constitution, if the ruling president retired, the prime minister would gain the presidency until the end of the former president's elected term (Schumacher, 1975).

In the new Senegalese government, the president could appoint and dismiss the prime minister as necessary. The prime minister would appoint the ministers of his cabinet

as long as the president approved the selections. The prime minister and his colleagues would be subject to the control of the National Assembly. The National Assembly was protected by a new mandate that stated that the legislation could only be disbanded if a motion of censure was introduced by a quarter of its members and was passed by an absolute majority (Schumacher, 1975). It became clear that the UPS was taking a new approach to governing Senegal. Diouf appointed several people to the government who had never held a government post before and were technocratic in nature like himself.

Senegal as a Limited Multiparty State

Senghor's reforms culminated in March and April of 1976, when the National Assembly voted on revisions that established a tripartite political system (Fatton, 1987). The three political parties were designed to represent the different ideologies of the Senegalese population as determined by Senghor. The first party was Senghor's party, the UPS, now renamed as the *Parti Socialiste du Sénégal* (PS). The PS represented the social-democratic ideology. The *Parti Démocratique Sénégalais* (PDS), headed by Abdoulaye Wade, represented the liberal-democratic

ideology. It was included due to its presence as the largest opposition party in Senegal. The constitution also called for a communist party, which was filled by the PAI and led by Majhemout Diop. A communist party was included because the PS believed it would help divide the political left and silence some of the loudest critics, which happened to be communist (Fatton, 1987).

The constitution stated that the three legal political parties had to adhere to these assigned ideologies (Fatton, 1987). If a party attempted to change its ideology, the government would have full authority to dissolve the party. This was done to create a political environment where the political parties were constantly locked in ideological conflict with one another. The PS believed that the ideologies of the political parties represented the contemporary political beliefs of the Senegalese people. The rigid guidelines created a large sense of dissatisfaction in Senegal within the PAI, PDS, and with other political parties that were not legally recognized by the constitution.

Senghor and the PS opted to deal with their critics by bringing them into the political process instead of oppressing them. Robert Fatton (1987) explains it as such,

"The formative efforts of the ruling class were rooted in the need to create a new hegemony capable of legitimizing the Senghorian state" (p. 63). The PS postulated that democracy should not be constricted to a single party, but should not allow for an unlimited number of political interests either. One party would limit the extent of a democratic society and an unrestricted number of parties would lead to chaos. Senghor stated, "We should not multiply parties. Otherwise, we risk falling into anarchy. We must build solidly" (Fatton, 1987, p. 19). Eventually in 1979, the Senghorian-led government approved a fourth political party to fulfill the conservative ideology, the *Mouvement républicain sénégalais* (MRS) (Fatton, 1987). Now the legal political spectrum in Senegal reflected perspectives from conservatives, liberals, socialists, and communists.

Linda Beck (1997) argues that Senghor introduced limited reform in the political system to preserve his own power. However, it did open up the political system to be competitive for the first time with legalized multipartyism. The fact that Senghor and the PS implemented a liberalization of the political process from above was a rare event. Robert Fatton (1987) analyzed the time period

from 1975 to 1985 in Senegal and determined that a "passive revolution" occurred. This "passive revolution" was self-induced and moved Senegal from a one-party state towards a liberal democracy. This transition was ignited by the economic, political, and social pressures facing the Senghor regime. Although these pressures were not unique to Senegal, the result of these pressures was, in that Senegal moved towards a democratic system. One reason is because Senghor recognized that losing political power was a real possibility and he decided to make constitutional reforms in order to appease the population and maintain power.

Not everyone approved of the new political system, especially those opposition groups who had been made illegal with the new constitutional amendments. The *Rassemblement National Démocratique* (RND) led by Cheikh Anta Diop was the most vocal of the unrecognized political organizations (Fatton, 1987). The RND believed that the tripartite political system outlined by the constitution was constricting and would never allow for the entire Senegalese population's ideologies to be represented (Fatton, 1987). The RND was supported by several hundred Senegalese intellectuals who paid for an advertisement to

run in *Le Monde*, a daily newspaper, condemning the government and rejecting the tripartite system.

The intellectuals proclaimed that the political liberalization was carried out solely to diffuse the social pressures brought on by a failing agricultural system and a weak economy (Fatton, 1987). Opposition parties began to unite in response to Senghor's unwillingness to establish unlimited multipartyism. In 1978, six unofficial political parties created the *Coordination de l'opposition sénégalaise unie* (COSU) (Fatton, 1987). COSU was designed to protest limited multipartyism and demand for full democracy. COSU also became the main source of criticism against Senghor and accused his regime of being corrupt and neocolonial.

One legal political party, the PDS, supported Senghor's tripartite system, but disagreed with the method of selecting the parties. Senghor had created the system without the input of the National Assembly, which undermined the Senegalese democratic process (Fatton, 1987). The PDS proposed that the two opposition parties should be chosen through popular vote to better represent the views of the populace. It was easy for the PDS to make this argument as it was a legally protected political party. By taking this position, the PDS was attempting to

make it more attractive to potential voters. The PDS did not argue against the limit on the number of legally recognized political parties, however. Additional political parties would represent a threat to its status as the major opposition political party and potentially steal voters away (Fatton, 1987).

The introduction of multipartyism allowed for competitive elections to be held for the first time in 1978. Senghor won re-election overwhelmingly with 82 percent of the vote as did the PS in capturing 82 out of 100 seats in the National Assembly. The PDS captured the other 18 seats and the PAI failed to gain any representation in the government (Fatton, 1987). However, this marked development in Senegalese politics as it was the first time in the country's history that an opposition party held seats in the National Assembly (Fatton, 1987).

Senghor's decision to create a limited multiparty political system also allowed the presence of non-government controlled media to reappear. The PDS established the newspaper *La Democrate* in 1974 to reflect its policies and viewpoints (Gellar, 2005). Even political parties that were not authorized by the central government, in particular Marxist parties, began publishing their own

underground newspapers to express their views. Senegal's first satire newspaper was established in 1977 known as *Le Politicien* (Gellar, 2005). However, opposition newspapers still only reached a small number of citizens mainly living in the Dakar area and were largely ineffective.

Senegal's Poor Economy

The introduction of limited multipartyism and the move away from democratic authoritarianism did not have a positive effect on Senegal's poor economy. Senegal was still plagued with high food and oil prices, high inflation, and a decrease in the world market price of its two biggest exports: groundnuts and phosphates. Senegal also suffered from a massive drought in the mid-1970s that wiped out most of the groundnuts crop, adding further tensions to the economic crisis (Fatton, 1987). A couple of factors contributed to this poor economic state. First, by 1980, nearly 65 percent of groundnuts were being illegally smuggled and sold in The Gambia (Boone, 1990). State control over the groundnuts industry and the important revenue gained from it had slipped away. Moreover, a reverse flow of illegal goods such as clothing, cosmetics, enamelware, shoes, and textiles began flooding into the

rural areas of the country and into urban markets (Boone, 1990). High cost local manufacturing could not match prices with these illegal goods leading to a decline in local production and revenue.

By the end of the 1970s, Senegal's debt reached over \$1 billion United States dollars (USD). In order to deal with this debt, Senegal entered into an economic plan with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. The plan recommended by both organizations called for reducing the balance of payments owed and budgetary deficits, eliminating inefficient public sector organizations, reducing government spending, reducing government control of the economy, and encouraging private sector growth (Gruhn, 1983).

Senegal attempted to fulfill many of these recommendations in the hope of receiving emergency loans from the two organizations. It eliminated subsidies on bread and sugar, taxed alcohol, kept wages at the rate of inflation, and raised tariffs on imports (Gruhn, 1983). In response to these actions, the IMF and World Bank both granted Senegal loans under their Structural Adjustment

Programmes (SAP)⁵ in 1980, but ended up cancelling the remainder of the loans by 1983 (Gruhn, 1983). The falling world price of groundnuts and phosphates caused Senegal to report a 15 percent drop in export earnings rather than the 19 percent increase as projected by the IMF and World Bank (Gruhn, 1983). Both organizations acknowledged the difficulties faced by Senegal, but claimed that Senegal had not responded swiftly enough to these crises to remain credit-worthy. One of the biggest criticisms was that in 1981 Senegal failed to increase the national public savings to investment ratio from 15 percent to 25 percent (Gruhn, 1983).

The Senghorian method of running the economy had failed utterly in the two decades since independence. Senegal had been nearly bankrupted and was heavily dependent on France, the IMF, and the World Bank for funding. This poor economic state combined with the

⁵It has been recognized that SAP's have been extremely harmful for African nations. High debt, high levels of poverty and poor growth rates have remained consistent in many nations that implemented SAP's. Senegal is not exempt from this status as well. For more information on this, please see: African Development Bank Group. (2001). *Senegal: Evaluation of the Structural Adjustment Programme II*. Tunis, Tunisia: Author, Delgado, C.L. & Jammeh S. (Eds.). (1991). *The Political Economy of Senegal under Structural Adjustment*. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, and Naiman, R. & Watkins, N. (1999). *A Survey of the Impacts of IMF Structural Adjustment in Africa: Growth, Social Spending, and Debt Relief*. Washington, DC: Center for Economic and Policy Research.

political criticism over Senghor's refusal to grant unlimited multipartyism creating mounting pressure on the government. In response, Senghor decided to resign as president on December 31, 1980. This made Senghor the first civilian president in post-independence Africa to voluntarily relinquish his political power (Wiseman, 1990). Abdou Diouf, who was currently serving as prime minister, would ascend to the presidency as was dictated by the Senegalese constitution (Beck, 2008).

Abdou Diouf as Senegal's President

Upon taking office, President Diouf faced a difficult political situation. Diouf had become president only because Senghor has stepped down while in office. Some forces in Senegal called for the military to take control of the government and to hold emergency elections to elect a president. However, the military chose to abide by the constitution and refused all calls for a coup d'état (Fatton, 1987). Additionally, Diouf faced an angry population who had grown increasingly frustrated with the state of Senegal's economic affairs. In April 1981, the Diouf-led National assembly removed all constraints on the number of political parties and their ideologies (Fatton,

1987). Diouf did this to silence any critics who might attack him for the Senghorian legacy of limited multipartyism. Diouf also believed that it would help him evade political pressure from the population of Senegal from the poor economic and social environment of the country.

The legalization of all political parties was a shrewd political move by Diouf and the PS. While it did remove restrictions on Senegal's political process, which undoubtedly made Senegal more open and democratic, it also had some benefits for the PS. Coalitions such as COSU were rendered useless now that all of the members were now legal political parties. By early 1982, there were 14 recognized opposition parties (Beck, 2008). The opposition including COSU, having lost their reason of unification, which was the goal of being granted unlimited multipartyism, was divided against one another. The former COSU members as well as the PAI and PDS attempted to stay unified by signing the *plate-forme d'unité d'action des partis de l'opposition* in 1983 (Fatton, 1987). This document identified the PS and Senghor regime as the source of economic and social crises facing Senegal and called for a new program of national renewal. However, nothing ever grew

from this document and the opposition remained disconnected. This fragmentation ultimately hurt the opposition cause as they were crushed by the PS in the 1983 National Assembly elections.

When President Diouf removed all restrictions on political parties in 1981, he also eliminated all restrictions on print media (Gellar, 2005). By the presidential elections of 1983, there were over 20 newspapers operating in Senegal. However, the Diouf regime kept a strict control on the radio and television industries. This hampered the efforts of the opposition party to become publicly known outside of the urban areas. Most citizens in the interior were not literate and did not receive newspapers (Gellar, 2005). The rural population relied on the radio for political coverage of events occurring in Dakar. Therefore, the opposition struggled to portray their views to the majority of Senegalese citizens.

Despite this, this period of time in Senegal beginning in 1976 gave birth to large developments for democracy. Prior to this, Senegal had been a one-party state that was virtually ruled by Senghor. This transition had been caused by civil unrest and a poor economic climate, which forced the Senegalese population to openly protest the Senghor

regime. This civic movement had a strong effect in forcing legal reforms to the constitution that promoted a more democratic Senegal. It was the Senegalese population and its voice that forced Senghor and the PS to react to its demands. Diouf took this even further in an attempt to separate him from the Senghorian regime and improve his standing with the public. By doing so, he opened Senegal up to a level of equality and freedom that were necessary for a democratic nation.

CHAPTER FOUR

CONCLUSION

This would be an incomplete study if it did not examine how democracy has fared in Senegal since the onset of multiparty politics. As discussed in the introduction of this study, democracy is a struggle that can easily take steps backwards before progressing forward (Nwokedi, 1995). Democracy is something that needs to be worked at, especially in its early stages. Progress is rarely measured in a straight line and this certainly has been the case for Senegal's democracy since President Diouf's reforms helped realize multipartyism.

Modifications to the Electoral Code

Tremendous gains had been made for the Senegalese political opposition from 1976 to 1981. However, Diouf and the PS were still determined to remain in power, despite their seemingly democratic interests. This became evident when Diouf had the electoral code rewritten in the lead-up to the 1983 elections. This rewritten code included many changes that hurt opposition parties and would help the PS retain their dominant position in Senegalese politics.

One of the changes was the prohibition of electoral coalitions in trying to win seats in the National Assembly (Beck, 2008). Electoral coalitions are when one opposition party works in tandem with other opposition parties in an attempt to gain seats in an electoral vote (Diermeier, Kern, Medvec, & et al., 2008). It also altered the way deputies were elected. Instead of having all deputies elected in a proportional vote, only half would be chosen in this way. The other half would be elected in a winner-take-all system. Linda Beck (2008) claims that "the two-list compromise protected the PS majority while guaranteeing symbolic representation of the increasingly vocal opposition" (p. 59).

The effect of the new electoral code was felt for most of the next decade. The 1988 presidential and legislative elections came and went with the PS claiming a decisive victory. Opposition parties went on to boycott the 1990 local elections due to the fact that the electoral code had not been changed. The opposition believed that the current electoral code would allow the ruling party to commit widespread fraud. Pressure from abroad began to grow in tandem with domestic pressures. Many international organizations including the World Bank threatened to stop

giving "democratic bonuses" to Senegal if it did not provide fair democratic elections (Beck, 2008). Senegal's fragile democracy was beginning to suffer from the apparent lack of competition in elections.

The Splintering of the *Parti Socialiste*

The 1990s brought new hope to the opposition parties in Senegal. Each presidential election during the 1990s saw President Diouf's margin of victory diminish. The PS majority in the National Assembly also diminished throughout the 1990s (Beck, 2008). This led to serious concerns among the PS leadership and they began to reorganize in order to prepare themselves for the future. Moreover, it led to conflict within the PS, as Minister of the Interior Djibo Leyti Ka was passed over for first-secretary of the PS in 1996. Ka was an economist who had been educated at the University of Dakar and had served in various ministry positions within the PS government. Infuriated with what he perceived as a slight against his character, Ka and his followers known as the *renouveauteurs* publicly denounced Diouf's selection of Ousmane Tanor Dieng as the first-secretary of the PS and were subsequently censored by the party in November 1997. Dieng had served in

the PS since 1978 and had been the minister in charge of presidential services and affairs since 1993 (Beck, 2008).

The *renouveauteurs* responded by getting 300,000 signatures in a petition calling for a new list of candidates from the PS for the 1998 National Assembly elections. The PS subsequently cast out the *renouveauteurs* from the party and the group created their own political party, the *L'Union pour le Renouveau Démocratique* (URD) (Beck, 2008). This splintering combined with the growing popularity of the PDS, which had emerged as the leading opposition party, threatened the PS and its political authority. In the 1998 National Assembly elections, the PS received only 50.4 percent of the vote (Beck, 2008). This was still a majority, but the lowest percentage of votes the PS had ever received in an election. Tensions grew in the party as the certainty of Diouf's success in the 2000 presidential election began to disappear.

The PDS was the one opposition party that represented a significant threat to the PS. The PDS had begun to play a large role in Senegalese politics during the 1980s (Schaffer, 1998). The party became associated with a number of reforms that called for the development of democracy and a more equal political process. The first reform was to

create an independent commission to publish voting results from each polling station (Schaffer, 1998). Currently, this was handled by the Ministry of the Interior, which had been accused of fraud in several previous elections. The PDS also sought to have this commission handle the administration of elections and allow all political parties to have representatives at each polling station. Moreover, the PDS wanted to force citizens to show identification before they were allowed to vote to prevent illegal voters from stuffing ballot boxes (Schaffer, 1998). The PDS wished to lower the voting age to 18 and to citizens living abroad. These were two groups that the PDS enjoyed considerable support from. The right to form electoral coalitions, equal access to state media, and a return to secret voting were other issues that the PDS campaigned for (Schaffer, 1998).

The PS responded by defending the electoral system point by point. The PS argued that coalitions would lead to an instable and weak government. They defended the option of public voting by stating that it conformed to traditional methods of voting in Senegal, a dubious claim (Schaffer, 1998). In 1976, the PS had made private voting optional, which allowed PS representatives the opportunity

to put pressure on citizens in voting stations. The PS's final argument was against the notion of requiring identification before allowing a person to vote. According to Schaffer (1998), the PS, "... also contended that requiring voters to produce identification would lower voter turnout, and waste time at the polling stations" (p. 28).

The clear differences between the PS and the PDS came to a head in 1988. In February 1988, Diouf was reelected as president and a chorus of protests broke out claiming election fraud. Diouf had received 73.5 percent of the vote and the PDS candidate Abdoulaye Wade received 25.8 percent of the presidential vote. In the general election, the PS won 103 out of 120 seats and the PDS won the other 17 (Clark & Phillips, 1994). There was a large controversy as some observers stated there had been fewer voter irregularities, but the opposition believed there had been ballot-box stuffing and voting fraud. Protestors began burning buses used for public transportation in Dakar and other urban areas (Schaffer, 1998). Senegal was declared to be in a state of emergency and opposition leaders including Wade were imprisoned for several months by the PS.

Reexamining the Electoral Code

The outcry of the populace and the boycott of the 1990 local elections by opposition parties was enough to force Diouf to reexamine the electoral process. In 1991, Diouf announced the decision to create an independent commission to develop a new electoral code. The commission was comprised of members from each political party and had an independent magistrate to preside over it (Schaffer, 1998). The process took less than a year and included many of the PDS reforms. The most prominent PDS reforms included were the mandatory use of private voting booths, required voter identification, a reduction in the voting age to 18, and legalized political party coalitions. The final piece of the new electoral code gave authorization to each political party to monitor, participate, and supervise various stages of the electoral process (Schaffer, 1998). This new transparency regarding the election process was applauded around Senegal and internationally. Moreover, it promised a fair environment where voters were protected from being intimidated into voting for any one party. Also, it prevented any party from stuffing ballot boxes or using fake names to inflate their vote counts. These political regulations helped improve Senegal's status as a democracy.

Unequal access to state media finally began to change during this time as well with the creation of the *Haut Conseil de la Radio-Télévision* (HCRT) in 1992 (Gellar, 2005). The council was charged with the responsibility of setting guidelines to provide better access to state media for opposition parties and to observe the government's cooperation with the guidelines. During the campaign season leading up to the 1993 presidential elections, opposition parties had the most access to radio and television in their history (Gellar, 2005). This was an important change for Senegal, where the ruling party had always held a monopoly over the media. Moreover, radio represented the predominant method for citizens to get educated on the political candidates and issues involved with each election. Print media was still rare outside of the urban areas and for citizens living in rural areas; they relied on the radio to stay involved with the political goings occurring in Dakar.

The 2000 Presidential Election

With all of the gains made by the opposition during the 1990s, the PS grew uncertain that Diouf would be able to win the 2000 president election in the first round. In

order for a candidate to achieve victory in the first round of an election, they must receive the votes of at least 25 percent of registered voters (Beck, 2008). To combat this, the PS passed a constitutional reform eliminating the 25 percent requirement and required the winning candidate to just receive a majority of the votes cast in the first round (Beck, 2008).

The PS hoped to gain enough votes against a scattered opposition to win in the first round. The PS was aware that the opposition would be united against Diouf if the voting went to a second round. However, the likelihood of avoiding the second round grew even slimmer when Moustapha Niasse, a former minister, formed the *Alliances des Forces de Progrés* (AFP) and split from the PS in 1999 (Beck, 2008). Niasse had served briefly as prime minister of Senegal in 1983 and had held the post of foreign minister until leaving the PS. To make things worse for Diouf, opposition parties had already begun rallying behind Abdoulaye Wade as it became clear he was the strongest candidate of the opposition.

The buildup to the 2000 election created a volatile atmosphere. Tensions continued to grow when nearby Cote d'Ivoire had a coup d'état in 1999 (Beck, 2008). Wade encouraged this tense atmosphere by making statements in

December 1999, calling on the army and youths to rise up if Diouf won re-election unfairly (Beck, 2008). These two events created a dangerous environment in Senegal. Wade later clarified his remark by stating that he simply would not tolerate any cheating or fraud in the election, not that he was necessarily opposed to Diouf retaining the presidency as long as Diouf won the election fairly (Beck, 2008). Another important aspect of the campaign before the election was the use of language. Wade adopted the Wolof word *sopi* meaning "change" as his slogan. Diouf used the French phrase *Le Changement dans la Continuité* meaning "Change in Continuity" as his. Wade's ability to move back and forth between French and Wolof appealed to many rural Senegalese voters, whereas Diouf felt most comfortable campaigning in French (Gellar, 2005).

The press played a huge role in the dynamics of the campaign during this time as newly approved private radio stations provided independent analysis of the election. A notable example of this was *Oxy-Jeunes*, who setup a campaign to get the Senegalese people to listen in, register, and vote in the upcoming election. Other prominent radio stations included *Sud-FM* and *Wal-Fadjri-FM*, who helped organize political debates in Wolof (Gellar,

2005). It also granted a newfound transparency of the election as the PS did not have control over all of the media commentating on the election.

On February 27, 2000, the first round of voting was held in Senegal. This did not go as planned the PS, as Diouf was forced into a second round of voting after only receiving 41.3 percent of the cast vote. PDS candidate Wade also gained a slot in the second round of the voting after receiving 31.3 percent of the vote (Beck, 2008). The two former PS party members who had left to form their own political parties, Ka and Niasse, received a combined total of 23.9 percent of the vote with the rest going to smaller opposition candidates (Beck, 2008). The defections of Ka and Niasse with their supporters proved costly to Diouf and the PS as it prevented them from winning the election in the first round of voting.

The second round of voting was scheduled for March 19, 2000. Leading up to the second round of voting, Wade initially enjoyed the support of Ka, Niasse, and the other opposition parties. Wade had promised Niasse the post of prime minister if he was elected, so Niasse was firm in his support of Wade. Ka was also promised a high position in the new government by Wade, but Diouf offered him the post

of prime minister in his government if he was re-elected (Beck, 2008). This was enough to convince Ka to defect his support from Wade to Diouf. However, the late timing of this action proved costly to Diouf because Ka's supporters ended up splitting their votes between Diouf and Wade (Beck, 2008). As a result, Wade easily won the second round of voting with an overwhelming margin of 58.9 percent of the vote. For the first time in Senegal's history, the PS had been defeated in an election and Diouf peacefully left office.

This represented a huge event in the development of Senegal's democracy. A peaceful political transfer of power is often viewed as one of the most crucial standards of a democracy. According to the U.S. Department of State (2010), the 2000 president election was approved as fair, free, and transparent. Senegal achieved a new level of legitimacy as the PDS had unseated the ruling PS party. Diouf was willing to do what many rulers in Africa had been unwilling to do by stepping away from power peacefully (Doyle, 2000). By abiding by the constitution, Diouf helped democracy become a reality in Senegal.

Summary

Democracy is not a style of government that is easily achieved or easily defined. There are a multitude of definitions that exist trying to get a firm grasp on what democracy truly is. To make this more difficult, the question of whether democracy is a different phenomenon in different parts of the world exists. This study has attempted to answer what democracy is, particularly in Africa in the country of Senegal and how it developed. By studying Senegalese history and political events throughout the twentieth century, it is clearer how Senegal is unique from many other African nations.

From the literature review, this thesis generated a general definition of democracy. Democracy is a style of government that has competitive, multiparty political elections that are fair, free, and held on a regular basis. Civil liberties such as freedom of assembly, organization, and speech should be established and protected by the constitution. Also, a critical media should exist that provides coverage free from state influence. All political parties should share equal access to this media as well. There should be a set of institutionalized standards that prevent the party in power from exploiting that power

either to their own benefit or to the harm of the political opposition. Finally, democracy should provide an environment where economic and social freedoms exist and are available to its citizens.

Now it is necessary to apply this definition to the reality of Africa and in particular Senegal. Some authors would argue that the European colonization of the continent did nothing but disrupt a natural path of African culture and modernization (Césaire, 1973 and Fanon, 1963). Other authors argue that the adoption of colonial institutions, both economic and political, have contributed greatly to the poor standard of living in Senegal and other parts of Africa (Boye, 1993, Davidson, 1992, Gellar, 2005, and Mbodj, 1993). These are all realities that each African country faced as it undertook the process of decolonization from European rule.

African democracy as it exists has often fallen short of Western standards of what democracy should be. Another question that needs to be answered is whether African democracy should be held to the same standard as Western democracy. Authors such as Richburg (2008) say yes, whereas Ake (1993) and Wafarova (2008) argue no. According to the latter authors, the cultural differences and historical

experiences of Africa will provide for a different type of democracy than that of the West.

These differences are not a matter of the willingness of African nations to try democracy. Senegal, like many other African nations, gave democracy a chance in the years after independence. However, what was unique was Senegal's determination and patience to stick with democracy despite years of one-party rule and poor economic circumstances. Instead of resulting to revolutions or military rule, Senegal's political actors and general population worked towards a better government. The Senegalese experience with democracy shows that democracy is possible in Africa. It is a complex and difficult process and it should not be surprising if the development of democracy is slow or even suffers from setbacks. However, democracy appears to be here to stay in Senegal and this is a triumph not just for the Senegalese people or Africa, but for the world and democracies everywhere.

Recommendations

The process of decolonizing from French rule and establishing a democracy has been a tenuous process for Senegal. Beginning with French colonialism, through

independence, and leading up to the Wade's presidential election in 2000 Senegal has struggled. At times, Senghor and Diouf seemed to encourage the growth of a better democracy, and at others times seemed intent of keeping themselves in power indefinitely. However, both men stepped down peacefully from power and did not cause conflicts that have been present in many African countries. Senegal has successfully moved towards a democracy, but it is still fairly young and could be derailed. This is especially true in a political environment where the presidency and the access to state resources are the ultimate spoils of winning an election (Gellar, 2005). Senegal needs to continue developing its democracy, educating its citizens, and creating regulations that will protect the progress that has already been made.

As has been previous mentioned in the study, economic opportunity is often tied to democracy. Therefore, economics has become and will continue to be a major feature in the success of Senegal's democracy. According to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (2010), Senegal in 2009 experienced a decline in private investment, less tourism, and fewer remittances leading to an aggregate reduction in economic activity. Senegal's real

gross domestic product only grew by 1.5 percent in 2009. Once the global economic crisis is recovered, Senegal needs to take steps to improve its economy. Economic growth for the country and more economic opportunities for its citizens will benefit Senegal's democracy immensely.

Another threat to Senegal's democracy is the defection of politicians from opposition parties to the ruling party. Ruling party members are granted high-level government positions such as minister of a specific agency, which offer lucrative benefits and the ability to provide for one's family and friends (Gellar, 2005). However, if politicians do not truly represent their ideologies and bandwagon with whatever party is in power, this will weaken the healthy competition that is necessary for a democracy to be successful. It is important for Senegal to guard against this and have established penalties for politicians that engage in this behavior if it is driven by personal gain. Politicians need to abide by the constitution and not abuse their positions for their own needs. This is true especially for the president, since many African leaders have abolished laws or legislative bodies to stay in power. If Senegal can accomplish these things, it will bode well for its future as a democracy.

Further development of the Senegalese population as involved citizens should be a high priority for the country. The people need to have easy access to media sources that will provide them with the issues involving the government and the position that each politician takes on these. The number of newspapers that are in print does not guarantee that all citizens are aware of the political issues. Newspapers tend to only be read by affluent citizens who could afford them and read French. Independent radio stations have the ability to reach a larger population of Senegalese as they are broadcast in Wolof, which is spoken by nearly 80 percent of the population (Gellar, 2005).

In recent elections, political debates were often organized and broadcast over the radio allowing constituents the chance to hear each party's position on different political issues (Gellar, 2005). In fact, a national survey in 2000 showed that showed that 62.2 percent of people used the radio as their main source of information during the buildup to the 2000 presidential election. This is compared to only 2 percent of people who got their information from print media. This represents an

opportunity for Senegalese political parties to introduce themselves to the Senegalese people.

Implications for Future Research

There are several areas regarding Senegalese democracy that could be researched and provide quality findings. The study of how Senegal's economy has grown since independence would be a worthy endeavor. Senegal has maintained close economic ties with France and now China and the U.S. in recent times. Economics and politics have always been closely linked and it would be beneficial to understand how economic failures and successes affected Senegal's politics. Also, this thesis focuses predominantly on the internal affairs of Senegal, with the exception of examining their colonial relationship with France. Therefore, a research project on Senegal's foreign policy and international relations throughout the 20th century could provide other insights regarding Senegalese democracy. Skurnik (1972) examines Senegal's foreign policy and the effects it has on the country. However, he does not focus on the effects of foreign policy on democratic development.

For more current studies, it would be prudent to research how Senegal's status as an Islamic country is currently affecting events in the nation. Given that the Middle East has a series of conflicts ongoing it would be interesting to see if Senegal has made closer ties with the Middle East or distanced itself from it. This would give serious implications to the direction the government is trying to take Senegal. Moreover, there is some evidence that Wade has moved Senegal away from the peak of its democracy in 2000 in the last decade (Sy, 2005 and Sy, 2007). There are rumors that Wade's son, Karim Wade, is being trained as his potential successor. Some fears of this were assuaged with the PDS defeat in the March 2009 regional elections, which saw Karim Wade lose a mayoral race for Dakar (Bojang, 2009). Regardless, this is a topic that warrants further investigation.

Also, there have been studies on Senegalese-Sino relations and how these have developed over the past few decades. It could be argued that Senegal is moving away from Western partnerships to Asian partnerships and this is something that deserves to be looked at in-depth. Senegal is a strategic point on Africa, not just for its geographic location, but by nature of it being a democracy. Anything

that threatened this deserves to be studied on a deep level.

REFERENCES

- Adamolekun, L. (1971). Bureaucrats and the Senegalese political process. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 9(4), 543-559.
- African Development Bank Group. (2001). *Senegal: Evaluation of the structural adjustment programme II*. Tunis, Tunisia: Author.
- Aidoo, A. (1993). Africa: Democracy without human rights? *Human Rights Quarterly*, 15(4), 703-715.
- Ake, C. (1993). The unique case of African democracy. *International Affairs*, 69(2), 239-244.
- Beck, L.J. (1997). Senegal's "patrimonial democrats": Incremental reform and the obstacles to the consolidation of democracy. *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 30(1), 1-31.
- Beck, L.J. (2008). *Brokering democracy in Africa: The rise of clientelist democracy in Senegal*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Beetham, D. (1994). Conditions for democratic consolidation. *Review of African Political Economy*, 21(60), 157-172.
- Betts, R.F. (1961). *Assimilation and association in French*

- colonial theory, 1890-1914*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Bojang, S. (2009, March 24). Local elections setback for presidential succession plans. *Radio France Internationale*. Retrieved from http://www.rfi.fr/actuen/articles/111/article_3257.asp.
- Boone, C. (1990). State power and economic crisis in Senegal. *Comparative Politics*, 22(3), 341-357.
- Boye, F. (1993). Economic mechanisms in historical perspective. In M.C. Diop (Ed.), *Senegal: Essays in statecraft* (pp. 28-84). Oxford: CODESRIA.
- Bratton, M., & Mattes, R. (2001). Support for democracy in Africa: Intrinsic or instrumental? *British Journal of Political Science*, 31(3), 447-474.
- Bratton, M., & Mattes, R. (2007). Learning about democracy in Africa: Awareness, performance, and experience. *American Journal of Political Science*, 51(1), 192-217.
- Brown, D.S., Cohen, J.S., Gleditsch, K.S., Lofdahl, C.L., O'Loughlin, J., Reilly, D., & et al. (1998). The diffusion of democracy, 1946-1994. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 88(4), 545-574.
- Burns, J.M., & Collins, R.O. (2007). *A history of sub saharan Africa*. London: Cambridge University Press.

- Césaire, A. (1972). *Discourse on colonialism*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Clark, A.F. (1999). Imperialism, independence, and Islam in Senegal and Mali. *Africa Today*, 46(3/4), 149-167.
- Clark, A.F., & Phillips, L.C. (1994). *Historical dictionary of Senegal* (2nd ed.). Metuchen, NJ: The Scarecrow Press.
- Cox, P., & Kessler, R. (1980). 'Après Senghor'—a socialist Senegal. *African Affairs*, 79(316), 327-342.
- Dahl, R. (1971). *Polyarchy: Participation and opposition*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Davidson, B. (1992). *The black man's burden: Africa and the curse of the nation-state*. London: Times Books.
- Delgado, C.L., & Jammeh S. (Eds.). (1991). *The political economy of Senegal under structural adjustment*. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers.
- Diamond, L., Linz, J.J., & Lipset, S.M. (1988). *Democracy in developing countries: Africa*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Diermeier, D., Kern, M.C., Medvec, V.H., & Swaab, R.I. (2008). The micro-dynamics of coalition formation. *Political Research Quarterly*, 61(3), 484-501.
- Doyle, M. (2000, March 21). Senegal: Where democracy was

- the winner. *BBC News*. Retrieved from
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/686001.stm>.
- Fanon, F. (1963). *The wretched of the earth*. New York: Grove Press.
- Fatton, R., Jr. (1987). *The making of a liberal democracy: Senegal's passive revolution, 1975-1985*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Freedom House Index. (2010). *Senegal*. Retrieved from
<http://www.freedomhouse.org>.
- Gellar, S. (2005). *Democracy in Senegal: Tocquevillian analytics in Africa*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Gilbert, E., & Reynolds, J.T. (2008). *Africa in world history: From prehistory to the present* (2nd ed.). Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
- Grovogui, S.N., & Hayward, F.M. (1987). Persistence and change in Senegalese electoral processes. In F.M. Hayward (Ed.), *Elections in independent Africa* (pp. 239-270). Boulder: Westview Press.
- Gruhn, I.V. (1983). The re-colonization of Africa: International organizations on the march. *Africa Today*, 30(4), 37-48.
- Harmand, J. (1910). *Domination et colonisation*. Paris: Ernest Flammarion.

- Hymans, J.L. (1971). *Léopold Sédar Senghor: An intellectual biography*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Jennings, W.I. (1963). *Democracy in Africa*. London: Cambridge University Press.
- Johnson, G.W., Jr. (1971). *The emergence of black politics in Senegal: The struggle for power in the Four Communes, 1900-1920*. Stanford, California: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace.
- Kurtz, D.M. (1970). Political integration in Africa: The Mali Federation. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 8(3), 405-424.
- Le Vine, V. (1967). *Political leadership in Africa: Post independence generational conflict in Upper Volta, Senegal, Niger, Dahomey, and the Central African Republic*. Stanford, California: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace.
- Lewis, M.D. (2000). One hundred million frenchmen: The assimilation theory in French colonial policy. In J.M. Burns, E.K. Ching, & R.O. Collins (Eds.), *Historical problems of imperial Africa*. Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers.
- Mbodj, M. (1993). The state of the groundnut economy: A 30

- year crisis. In M.C. Diop (Ed.), *Senegal: Essays in statecraft* (pp. 85-129). Oxford: CODESRIA.
- Mortimer, E. (1969). *France and the Africans 1944-1960: A political history*. New York: Walker and Company.
- Naiman, R., & Watkins, N. (1999). *A Survey of the impacts of IMF structural adjustment in Africa: Growth, social spending, and debt relief*. Washington, DC: Center for Economic and Policy Research.
- Nwokedi, E. (1995). *Politics of democratization: Changing authoritarian regimes in sub-saharan Africa*. Munster, Germany: Lit Verlag.
- O'Brien, D.B.C. (1971). *Mourides of Senegal: The political & economic organization of an Islamic brotherhood*. London: Oxford University Press.
- O'Brien, D.B.C. (1975). *Saints & politicians: Essays in the organization of a Senegalese peasant society*. London: Cambridge University Press.
- Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development.
(2010). *African economic outlook 2010*. Issy-les-Moulineaux, France: Author.
- Przeworski, A. (1986). Some problems in the study of the transition to democracy. In G. O'Donnell, P.C. Schmitter, & L. Whitehead (Eds.), *Transitions from*

- authoritarian rule: Prospects for democracy* (Part III: pp. 47-63). Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.
- Richburg, K. (2008, October 16). Head to head: African democracy. *BBC News*. Retrieved from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7646295.stm>.
- Roche, Christian. (2001). *Le Sénégal à la conquête de son indépendance: 1939-1960: chronique de la vie politique et syndicale, de l'Empire français à l'indépendance*. Paris: Karthala Publishers.
- Ross, E.S. (2008). *Cultures and customs of Senegal*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Schaffer, F.C. (1998). *Democracy in translation: Understanding politics in an unfamiliar culture*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.
- Schumacher, E.J. (1975). *Politics, bureaucracy and rural development in Senegal*. Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- Searing, J.F. (2002). *"God alone is king": Islam and emancipation in Senegal*. Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann.
- Skurnik, W.A.E. (1972). *The foreign policy of Senegal*. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press.
- Suret-Canale, J. (1971). *French colonialism in tropical Africa: 1900-1945*. New York: Pica Press.

- Sy, H.T. (2005, July 25). Is Senegal's 'model democracy' tarnished? *BBC News*. Retrieved from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4714475.stm>.
- Sy, H.T. (2007, February 24). Senegal's praised democracy on trial. *BBC News*. Retrieved from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6390869.stm>.
- U.S. Department of State. (2010). *Background note: Senegal*. Retrieved from <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2862.htm>.
- Villalòn, L.A. (1999). Generational changes, political stagnation, and the evolving dynamics of religion and politics in Senegal. *Africa Today*, 46(3/4), 129-147.
- Wafarova, R. (2008, October 16). Head to head: African democracy. *BBC News*. Retrieved from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7671283.stm>.
- Wiseman, J. (1990). *Democracy in black Africa: Survival and revival*. New York: Paragon House