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The Impact of Sincerity of Terrorists  
on Committing Terrorist Activities  
in Turkey

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of  
the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at  
Virginia Commonwealth University

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## **Acknowledgement**

I wish to thank several people who helped me during this tedious journey.

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## **Abstract**

### **THE IMPACT OF SINCERITY OF TERRORISTS ON COMMITTING TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN TURKEY**

By Ahmet Turer, Ph.D.

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at Virginia Commonwealth University

Virginia Commonwealth University, 2012

Dissertation Chair:

This study explores the impact of sincerity of terrorists on committing terrorist activities in Turkey. The researcher is a Chief of Police in Turkey and has worked in the Anti-terror Department for a considerable part of his professional career. His professional experience has shown that the more sincere a terrorist is the more violent or heedless the terrorist activity is. Thus this research academically and statistically examines this observation and finds that sincerity affects level of violence. Attachment and adherence to the terrorist organization turn even the characteristically non-violent people into blood seeking terrorists.

## **Chapter 1**

### **Introduction**

#### *Terrorism*

Although terrorism became a popular subject and topic of academic interest after the incident of 9/11 in the U.S., the concept of terrorism is neither new nor a diminishing topic of public and professional attention of the Turkish government and Turkish National Police. Turkey has suffered immensely from terrorism over the last couple of decades, however understanding the dynamics of terrorism has not been of much academic concern in Turkey as opposed to fighting it through government forces. Academic studies in Turkey on terrorism limited both in number and scope mainly focused on reasons of terrorism, the relationship between socio economic dynamics and terrorism, the impact of migration on terrorism and finance of terrorism. However understanding the motives of terrorism and terrorist actions on an individual level is crucial in solving the equation. Thus, this research focuses on one of the important and yet unexplored territories within the domain of terrorism: the impact of sincerity.

There are many reasons for becoming a member of a terrorist organization and just like in any other crime motive is a key element in understanding the recruitment of a terrorist to its organization. This chapter provides a general overview of the terrorism problem in Turkey. Specifically, historical and theoretical backgrounds of terrorism concerning sincerity and its relationship to violence of terrorism will be addressed in two sections. In the first section, introductory information about terrorism and its history will be presented. In the second section

theories that explain sincerity and its relationship to crime and terrorism are examined.

### *Terrorism in Turkey*

Turkey came to face the terrorism problem full force during the 1970s. Starting in the 1960s, Turkey was affected by terrorist activities of mainly leftist groups, which emerged in part as the result of resurgence of terrorism in Europe (Laqueur, 1999). Extremist left-wing ideologists began to commit terrorist activities after the dramatic failure of the Socialist Turkish Labor Party in the election of 1969, which resulted in public disorder and strikes.

The government was unable to prevent the disorder in the country and lost control. In 1960, the armed forces took control over by declaring martial law. Military power ruled the government for an eighteen month period and civil rule was restored in 1961 (Bal & Laçiner, 2001). Laqueur (1999, p. 31) explains that the root causes of Turkish terrorism was due to the rapid urbanization and the resulting unequal distribution of economic resources. This leftist movement received support from Bulgaria and the eastern bloc countries. The right used religious institutions for the same purpose. During 1978 and 1979, 2,400 political murders had been committed. The military took the power over again in 1980 to restore order within the country (Laqueur, 1999).

In late 70's another face of terrorism demanding separation of south east of Turkey appeared using Kurdish population of Turkey. This was mainly in the non-urban areas (Laqueur, 1999). The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) was a militant, separatist organization that aimed to create an independent Kurdish state in the southeastern part of Anatolia (Button, 1995). Although Turkish authorities have argued that there is no Kurdish problem in Turkey, Kurds have vigorously demanded more cultural, linguistic, and political rights. However, the reality shows that citizens of Kurdish ethnic heritage enjoy full rights as Turkish citizens (Ahmed &

Gunter, 2000; Keyman, 2007; Kirisci & Winrow, 1997; Lytle, 1977; MacDonald & O'Leary, 2007; Taspinar, 2005).

Terrorist acts have also been committed by extremist religious groups. Such groups have been trying to change the secular Kemalist reforms and replace a secular, constitutional Turkish state with an Islamic Sharia based state following the Iranian model (Laqueur, 1999). These groups enjoyed wide Iranian support and often acted on behalf of Iranian local and regional, political and strategic interests. The reaction of Turkish authorities in the past to Islamic terrorist activity was limited and thus encouraged leaders of these groups and their sponsors to continue escalating violence hoping it will bring down the secular democratic regime in Turkey. In Turkey and by many observers abroad, the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) has been considered as the main threat to the Turkish state's national unity and defense.

The Islamic terrorist activity in Turkey dates back to 1960s. As early as 1967 and 1973 the leaders of Hizb-al-Tahrir (Islamic Liberation Party) were captured for attempting to bring the Islamic State Constitution to Turkey. Islamic Jihad emerged as a real terrorist threat in the 1980s, following a series of assassinations against Jordanian, Saudi and Iraqi diplomats. In October 1991, Islamic Jihad took responsibility for murdering an American military officer and wounding an Egyptian diplomat in order to protest the Middle East peace conference held in Madrid. For many years, it was thought that this organization was a Lebanese Shiite terrorist group, however it was later discovered that a functioning Turkish branch existed, engaging in terrorist activities.

A report by the Turkish National Intelligence Organization (MIT) and the Security General Directorate of the Police in October 1991 mentions at least ten Islamic organizations that are active in Turkey: Turkish Islamic Liberation Army (IKO), Turkish Islamic Liberation Front

(TIK-C), Fighters of the Islamic Revolution (IDAM), Turkish Islamic Liberation Union (TIKB), World Sharia Liberation Army (DSKO), Universal Brotherhood Front-Sharia Revenge Squad (EKC-SIM), Islamic Liberation Party Front (IKP-C), Turkish Fighters of the Universal Islamic War of Liberation (EIK-TM), Turkish Islamic Fighters Army (IMO) and Turkish Sharia Revenge Commandos (TSIK).

#### *Purpose of the Study*

This study examine terrorism in Turkey in order to determine whether a relationship exists between sincerity of the members of various terrorist groups and the level of violence demonstrated in their activities. The sincerity of the members of terrorist groups is defined here as their willingness to stay within the organization for reasons other than economical and sociological considerations. This study attempts to analyze the membership process of terrorists by studying three different types of terrorist organizations, a leftist, a separatist and a religiously inspired. All organizations analyzed in this study are well known and have been recognized as terrorist organizations by the international bodies including the UN, the EU, and the US State Department.

The first terrorist organization is the DHKP/C, a leftist terrorist organization in Turkey, which is at the same time one of the only two active leftist terrorist organizations in Europe. The second is the PKK, an ethnic terrorist organization based in the eastern part of Turkey and Northern Iraq, and is also active in Europe. The last group of terrorist organizations are the radical Islamic groups namely Al-Qaeda, Hizb-urTahrir, and IBDA-CE which are active mostly all over Turkey. These organizations have members and activities all over Turkey and though they can be selective in terms of what they target and in terms of the modus operandi of their actions, they are all considered within the definition of law as terrorist organizations and their

actions as terrorism.

In the Turkish Anti-Terrorism Act (April 12<sup>th</sup>, 1991) terrorism is defined as follows:

"Terror refers to all kinds of activities attempted by a member or members of an organization for the purpose of changing the characteristics of the Republic which is stated in the constitution, and the political, jurisdictional, social, secular, economic system, destroying the territorial integrity of the state and the government and its people, weakening or ruining or invading the authority of the government, demolishing the rights and freedom, jeopardizing the existence of Turkish government and Republic, destroying the public order or peace and security" (Turkish Government, 1991).

Counter Terrorism Department and Intelligence Department within Turkish National Police, distinguish three categories of terrorist groups: (1) Leftist Terrorist Organizations – most of these groups fall into Marxist-Leninist groups; (2) Separatist Groups – primarily PKK and its sub groups fall into this category; (3) Religiously Motivated Terrorist Groups – these groups include Turkish Hezbollah, IBDA-CE, Hizb-urTahrir, and Al-Qaeda.

#### *Theoretical Framework*

Terrorism is a crime. Like many other crimes, terrorism involves deviant behavior, which can be explained by various criminological theories. It is the author's view that a single theory is not capable of providing an adequate explanation of terrorism. Terrorism is a multi dimensional phenomenon. Firstly, it is a social and cultural problem. Most terrorist conflicts arise from ethnic and heritage based conflicts. Secondly, regardless of ethnicity or social status, ideological dynamics play a role behind terrorism. Lastly, terrorism is simply as in the case of state terrorism. At the bottom line, terrorism involves an organized group of individuals acting towards a particular cause. Issues of ideological base, leadership, recruitment and retention of

members should be addressed in the research along with questions regarding commitment of criminal activities of these groups. In light of this view a number of criminological theories have been reviewed in the following paragraphs as they relate to the phenomenon of terrorism.

Social Disorganization Theory explains the observed relationship between inequality and crime. This theory was first developed by Clifford Shaw and Henry McKay in 1942, striving to explain urban crime and deviance. The most significant finding of their study was that the rate of delinquency in the lower class neighborhoods was highest near the inner city and decreased as you moved toward the more affluent areas (Akers & Sellers, 2009; Messner & Golden, 1992). It has been concluded that communities lacking in social capital are less effective in applying social control to reduce violence as compared to communities with higher levels of social capital (Robert J. Sampson, Raudenbush, & Earls, 2003).

Social Disorganization Theory explains that low economic status; high levels of racial/ethnic heterogeneity and residential mobility affect the community's level of social disorganization (Shaw & McKay, 2003). The areas in which Shaw & McKay (2003) found high delinquent rates are characterized by poor housing, physical decay, incomplete and broken families, high rates of illegitimate births, and an unstable population. Comparing low and high socioeconomic communities they found low socioeconomic status communities suffer from a weaker organizational base than higher status communities. Therefore these communities have less ability to engage in both social control and the appropriate socialization of their residents (R. J. Sampson & Groves, 1989).

They suggest that social disorganization is the result of these characteristics which undermine informal social controls within the community and are directly related to high crime rates as opposed to urban ecology, depressed economic conditions, or rapid social changes



(Bursik, 1988).

Anomie Strain Theory owes much to Emile Durkheim who first used the term “anomie” to refer to a lack of social regulation that promotes higher rates of suicide (Akers, 2000). By identifying inequality as a causal factor in crime, Merton (1938) made the first significant contribution to the inequality literature. His hypothesis states that “*crime is a symptom of specific sort of social disorganization: the unequal distribution of means of success in society necessary to achieve “the American dream”*”. He explains that inequality of opportunity creates situations in which certain individuals engage in crime, in order to achieve culturally defined success.

Anomie is the form that societal maladjustment takes when individuals seek levels of success that are not consistent with socially available means. In such conditions individuals may experience strain. This strain creates pressure as people attempt to succeed in an environment with limited opportunities. This lack of socially acceptable opportunities may push those individuals towards crime. Merton uses the concept of the American dream to help explain his theory. He states that the American dream promotes the idea that equal opportunity and therefore success is available to all. However, the reality is quite different as equal opportunity to achieve success is not available to all. For example, disadvantaged minority groups and the lower class do not have the same access to such legitimate opportunities (Akers, 2000).

Merton (1938) identified five types of adaptation to strain. He described “Conformity” or an attempt to strive for success within the restricted conventional means available. He named the most common deviant response, “Innovation”. In this form of behavior one maintains a commitment to success goals but takes advantage of illegitimate means to attain them. A third response, “Rebellion” rejects the system altogether, both means and ends, and tries to replace it with a new one. Finally, “Retreat” result when one gives up on both the success goals and the

effort to achieve them. In “Ritualism” one gives up the struggle to get ahead and concentrates only on retaining what little has been gained. This is accomplished in part by adhering strongly and zealously to the norms. This response is often produced by the disjuncture between society’s promise of equality and success and the actual inequalities in the distribution of opportunities. This inequality is most severe for members of the lower class, the disadvantaged, and minority groups.

Following the school of strain and normlessness further studies have been made. For instance, the General Strain Theory (GST) is a modified version of earlier strain theories (Cloward & Ohlin, 2003; A. K. Cohen, 2003; Merton, 1938), which argue that criminal behavior results from the structurally-induced gap between aspirations and expectations. Encompassing and expanding the classical Mertonian view of strain and delinquency, GST focuses on negative relationships (e.g., poor academics, failed romantic relationships, financial crisis, interpersonal violence, job loss, etc.) from a social psychological view (Agnew, 1985; Agnew & White, 1992). While retaining the original concept of strain by Merton (1938), the revised theory posits three types of strain: the failure to achieve positively valued goals, the removal of positively valued goals, and the presentation of noxious stimuli.

The addition of the new types of strain addresses some of the noteworthy weaknesses of Merton’s (1938) strain theory, which include “criminal and delinquent behaviors that are spontaneous, violent and emotionally-charged, and of which social structure is not a foundational factor” (Vegh, 2011, p. 17). Agnew’s perception of strain (1985, 1987, 2006) allows for a wider application of the theory on criminal and delinquent acts, such as substance use, traffic violations, juvenile crime, and violence related crimes (i.e. terrorism).

Marxist Theory tends to refer more to the control by the system than to the behavior

(Akers, 2000, p. 195). The first systematic application of Marxism to the crime discourse was introduced by Dutch criminologist Willem Bonger (1887-1940) who hypothesized that crime is produced by the “capitalist organization of society”(Bonger, 1916). Marxist theory hypothesizes that both the number and types of crime in a society are produced by the fundamental conditions of capitalism. With the maximization of profit as its central goal, capitalism promotes competition and individualism to the detriment of cooperation and is harmful to the community (Bohm, 1985; Messner & Rosenfeld, 2003). According to Bohm (1985), self-interest and competition are not limited to the working classes but can influence all members of a capitalist society and thus set up conditions conducive to criminal behavior among all classes.

According to Marxist theory, capitalism has a ruling class that dominates the proletariat. The latter has the majority of members but nothing to sell except their labor. But the ruling class, on the other hand, has the political power because the capitalists’ monopoly gives them that power. This power allows them to manipulate the legal and the criminal justice system to promote their interests and to maintain power. The masses of workers have no power to help establish their domination. Their only choice is to bring down the government and destroy the capitalist economy (Akers, 2000).

The introduction of rational choice theory to the study of terrorism has had enormous consequences. Among other things, it has ended with the sort of “methodological exceptionalism” that was endemic in the field. Terrorism can be studied like any other social phenomenon. The strategic interaction between TOs and the state cries out for game theory modeling. Likewise, the relationship between the terrorist organization and its supporters, the choice of terrorist tactics (including suicide missions) or the constraints that affect TOs are issues that can be analyzed with rational choice instruments. Rational choice theory has also been used

to propose counterterrorist policy recommendations (Frey & Luechinger, 2002).

Rational choice theory holds that people will engage in crime after weighing the costs and benefits of their actions to arrive at a rational choice about motivation after perceiving that the chances of gain outweigh any possible punishment or loss. Criminals must come to believe their actions will be beneficial to themselves, their community, or society, and they must come to see that crime pays, or is at least a risk-free way to better their situation (Hagan, 2011). Perhaps the most well-known version of this idea in criminology is routine activities theory (L. E. Cohen & Felson, 1979), which postulates that three conditions must be present in order for a crime to occur: (1) suitable targets or victims who put themselves at risk; (2) the absence of capable guardians or police presence; and (3) motivated offenders or a pool of the unemployed and alienated. Other rational choice theories exist which delve further into models of decision making. In the few models of collective violence that have found their way into criminology, the Olson (1971) hypothesis suggests that participants in revolutionary violence predicate their behavior on a rational cost-benefit calculus to pursue the best course of action given the social circumstances.

Rational choice theory, in political science, follows a similar line, and holds that people can be collectively rational, even when making what appears to be irrational decisions for them as individuals, after perceiving that their participation is important and their personal contribution to the public good outweighs any concerns they may have for the "free rider" problem (Muller & Opp, 1986).

Terrorism is not a pathological phenomenon. The resort to terrorism is not an aberration. The central focus of study ought to be on why some groups find terrorism useful, and in standard control theory fashion, why other groups do not find terrorism useful. Some groups

may continue to work with established patterns of dissident action. Other groups may resort to terrorism because they have tried other alternatives. Still other groups may choose terrorism as an early choice because they have learned from the experiences of others, usually through the news media. Crenshaw (1998) calls this the contagion effect, and claims it has distinctive patterns similar to the copycat effect as in other theories of collective violence (Gurr, 1970). There may be circumstances in which a terrorist group wants to publicize its cause to the world – a process Crenshaw (1995) calls the globalization of civil war.

Factors that influence the rational choice of terrorism include place, size, time, and the climate of international opinion. A terrorist plot in a democratic society is less likely to involve senseless violence than a scheme hatched under an authoritarian regime because under the latter, terrorists realize they have nothing to lose with the expected repercussions. Size is important because a small elite group is more likely to resort to terrorism when the population is passive. This means that more senseless acts of violence may occur in a stable society rather than in one on the verge of collapse. Time constraints are important because the terrorist group may be competing with other groups or attempting to manage a tit-for-tat strategy with counterterrorism. The climate of international opinion, if low for the problems of the host country, may force terrorists to take action that risks a repressive counterterrorist reaction, in hopes that their suffering will capture public attention. In short, terrorism is an excellent tool for managing the political agenda on a world stage.

The study of terrorism through the perspective of rational choice theory is still in its early stages. In recent years, a number of talented modelers have started to apply the analytical instruments of rational choice theory to explain terrorism. Along with that, it is reasonable to expect many other similar contributions in near future. The field is now under deep

transformation. Probably the definitive implosion will take place when formal models become integrated with empirical, comparative research.

This study will integrate different criminological theories in explaining the research question. Different theories explain different aspects of criminal behavior.

#### *Research Question*

The researcher uses secondary data analysis; data for sincerity level, violence level, and demographic and economic variable. The data have been derived from the testimonial statements of terrorist group members at Turkish National Police's database.

Does the sincerity / fidelity of the terrorists have any impact on committing terrorist activities?

Following the main research question, this study also explores whether socio-economic status has any impact on recruitment and level of activities engaged in by the terrorists. And the question of whether ethnic and religious affiliation matter in level of violence exerted by terrorists is also explored.

## **Chapter 2**

### **Literature Review**

#### *Introduction*

In an emergent study, data collection stage starts as soon as you have a research situation. You can then access literature as it becomes relevant. Glaser (1978) makes much of the prior background reading which provides the models to help make sense of the data. He recommends reading widely while avoiding the literature most closely related to what you are researching, because your reading may otherwise constrain your coding and memoing.

Following this suggestion, an extensive review of literature on terrorism has been done by the researcher. However, the terrorist groups and their ideas within the specific country described in this study are not well known in the literature. For that reason, each group and current situation of that specific group is explained in general.

#### *Defining Terrorism*

While one person can describe someone or a group as a terrorist, the other can describe them as freedom fighters (Ganor, 2002; Larabee, 2011; Saul, 2005; Sorel, 2003; Tripathy, 2010). This dilemma helps explain why terrorism does not have a single definition. This is a major problem in defining terrorism, and effects in the ongoing study and development of policies needed to respond to terrorism. Terrorism is a widespread problem, which threatens the modern world. It is a disease that attacks regardless of nation, religion, language, race and sect and kills innocent people in a way that cannot be justified by any religious, political, or ideological doctrine. Today no nation in our modern world can consider it self-safe against terrorism.

International and national terrorism have gained their places in the world literature as the most basic and up-to-date concepts of the post-Cold War period. Unfortunately, terrorism is not only threatening the lives and safety of citizens in countries where it spreads violence, but it also causes serious harm to the economy and politics of the related countries. Moreover, it may also create conflicts between the public and the state because of the security measures taken to combat terrorism.

The word “terror” has a Latin origin, and it was first used in its current form during the French Revolution. The term “terror” that we use today is derived from the Latin word “terrere” which refers to be filled with fear, to tremble with fear (Kaplan, 2011). The word “terrere” is derived from “tre”, which means to tremble in Latin. The word “terrorism” was first used in 1795, just after the French Revolution with the meaning “intimidation by state by means of creating fear,” and it was used as “terrorisme” in France. The concept of terrorism was introduced to the world literature by the British in 1798 and was regarded as “the systematic use of terror.” The term “terrorist” in its modern meaning was first used in 1947 referring to the tactics used by the Jews against the British on Palestinian territory. In addition, the word “terrorist” was used for the Revolutionists in Russia in 1866 and for the radicals and reformists, who were called the “Jacobins,” during the French Revolution in 1790s (Reitan, 2010).

The problem of defining terrorism is the main element in the fight against terrorism both in international and national terms. Although there have been various definitions of terrorism, the most frequently used definition contains two basic elements: use of violence and the desire to change the political system. Politicians, academicians, security experts, journalists and government representatives use various kinds of definitions in order to identify terrorism. While the definition of terrorism set forth by the governments is different from that of the scholars, it



may also differ between different state institutions. For instance, the United States has been very cautious while defining terrorism so as not to include the IRA organization. The USA did not include the IRA for many years in the list of terrorist groups throughout the world, which is declared every year. The underlying reason for this is thought to be that there are around 50 million US citizens with Irish nationality living in the country. Only lately, the IRA was included in the list of terrorist groups declared by the United States in the year 2000. However, the USA felt the necessity of making an explanation and stated the name of the organization as “the real IRA”. As this example illustrates, it seems difficult to attain a general definition of terrorism as of today. However, it depends on us to regard this difficulty as richness and to take advantage of this variety of definitions. In most basic terms, terrorism is the use of force with violence and threats in order to change the political system. Terrorism is a threat, a method of fighting or a strategy to achieve a particular target that absolutely includes use of “violence”. It aims at creating fear in the public by means of merciless and inhuman methods.

If we have a look at the definitions throughout the world, despite the fact that we face various and very different definitions, there are many common points. For instance, in the Encyclopedia Britannica, terrorism is explained as “terror, resorting to systematic violence acts against public or individuals with the aim to achieve a political target” (Terrorism, 2004).

In the Turkish Anti-Terrorism Act (April 12<sup>th</sup>, 1991) terrorism is defined as follows: "Terror is all kinds of activities attempted by a member or members of an organization for the purpose of changing the characteristics of the Republic which is stated in the constitution, and the political, jurisdictional, social, secular, economic system, destroying the territorial integrity of the state and the government and its people, weakening or ruining or invading the authority of the government, demolishing the rights and freedom, jeopardizing the existence of Turkish

government and Republic, destroying the public order or peace and security” ( Law of Terror Prevention,1991,p,1).

The definition of the U.N is that “‘Terrorism’ means any act of violence or threat thereof notwithstanding its motives or intentions perpetrated to carry out an individual or collective criminal plan with the aim of terrorizing people or threatening to harm them or imperiling their lives, honor, freedoms, security or rights or exposing the environment or any facility or public or private property to hazards or occupying or seizing them, or endangering a national resource, or international facilities, or threatening the stability, territorial integrity, political unity or sovereignty of independent States” (Freezing Funds, 2003).

In the British Anti-Terrorism Act (Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989) it is stated, "terrorism is the use of violence for political ends (including) any use of violence for the purpose of putting the public, or any section of the public in fear"(Prevention of Terrorism, 1989). On the other hand, France defines terrorism as “an act by an individual or group that uses intimidation or terror to disrupt public order” (How five foreign countries, 2000). Moreover, “In Germany, terrorism has been described as an enduringly conducted struggle for political goals, which are intended to be achieved by means of assaults on the life and property of other persons, especially by means of severe crimes” (Martin, 2002).

The FBI’s definition of terrorism is “the unlawful use of force or violence against persons, or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives” (Terrorism in the United States, 1997). In addition, according to the definition formulated by the US, “ terrorism is any violence perpetrated for political reasons by sub national groups or secret state agents, often directed at noncombatant targets, and usually intended to influence an audience” (Terrorism and America,

1998).

Different governments have different definitions. Likewise, different federal institutions have their own definitions of terror. For instance, the definition used by the FBI is different from that of the U.S. State Department. According to the definition of the FBI, individuals, as well as groups, have the possibility to carry out terrorist actions. In addition to political aims, the FBI includes social aims as well. However, the U.S State Department's definition comes from its own field.

As it can be understood from all these definitions, the element of "violence" has a dominant role. Violence is the most common characteristic in all the definitions stated above. Just as we have listed the definitions here, Alex P. Schmid has made a study of about 120 different definitions of terror in his book titled *Political Violence*. He has tried to figure out the common points in the definitions and reach a general assessment. According to the results of this research, violence and use of force have been the most common element appearing in about 90% of the 120 definitions. Therefore, violence and the use of force turn out to be the element accepted in most general terms. After violence, ideological or political aim appears in 65%, and concepts such as fear, threat, or psychological impact are third following the ideological or political aim. As a result, from all these studies and generally accepted definitions, it can be concluded that in general terms terror is: "all kinds of actions performed by a group and include violence and ideological/political aim" (Schmid, 1988). In light of the professional experience of the author, terrorism can also be defined as "all kinds of actions, not necessarily destructive or violent and even when within the limits of law, that are performed with the motives of ideological and or political gains via intimidation and organized activity".

Today, one of the most important bases of democratic societies is the non-governmental

organization. By means of these non-governmental structures, not only does the public find the opportunity to express itself, but also people can transmit their wishes to the political authorities, hence ensuring development of democracy. Non-governmental organizations carry out their activities to attain their demands only within a legal framework, and they never resort to violence. This is the clearest particularity that differentiates between non-governmental organizations and terrorist organizations. Although there are some similarities between terrorist organizations and non-governmental organizations in terms of structure and aim, the most significant characteristic of terrorist organizations is the fact that they take violence as the basis in achieving their goals.

In conclusion, although there are more than a hundred of different definitions of terrorism throughout the world made by states, international institutions, or scientists, and although each one of these definitions seems to be different, there are two main elements in nearly all of the said definitions: violence and use of force.

### **Violence and Use of Force**

The goal of achieving an ideological change in the order is a result of this violence and use of force.

Therefore, violence and use of force has taken its place in the world of terror literature as the most significant element. As a result, today, it cannot be right to regard actions which do not include violence as terror; moreover, countries declaring an organization as a terrorist organization in the international arena must be certain that this organization uses violence and force. If not, it is not a terrorist organization.

In addition, the definition of terrorist differs among the governments. For example, the U.S. government considers all terrorists as criminals, whatever their ethnic, religious, or other

affiliations are. (Terrorism in the United States, 1997). On the other hand, The Turkish Law of Terror Prevention (12.04.1991) first defines the terrorism as following:

"Terrorism is all kinds of activities to be attempted by a member or members of an organization for the purpose of changing the characteristics of the Republic which are stated in the constitution, and the political, legal, social, secular, economic system, destroying the territorial integrity of the state and the government and its people, weakening or ruining or invading the authority of the government, demolishing the rights and freedom, jeopardizing the existence of Turkish government and Republic, destroying the public order or peace and security (Official Gazzette, 1991)."

In the second article of the Law, referring to the first article, terrorist is defined as being a member of an organization which is aiming to realize the goals referred in the first article and to commit crimes for those ends (Official Gazzette, 1991). In short, a terrorist could be defined as a person who is a member of a terrorist organization and commits crime for the goals of that organization.

#### *Characteristics of Terrorism*

An unclear problem makes the solutions addressing that problem insufficient. In this regard, general characteristics of terrorism will be examined to better acknowledge the facts of terrorism. These characteristics are rather general and examples are provided from real life terrorist organizations or independence movements where appropriate.

#### **Violence**

Terrorists apply extreme random violence including brutal and cruel methods of violent activities, such as mass bombings and mass killings against the innocent. Their tactics mostly involve violent activities such as assassination, explosions, kidnapping, hijacking, suicide bombers, ambushes, and raids. Terrorists are also usually successful in their attacks as the targets are unaware of their plans. Terrorist violence is generally well-planned and organized through a chain of command.

Individual violent activities would not qualify as terrorism. In this regard, Hoffman

**Comment [JDR1]:** You need to flesh these sections out a little more. One half page is not enough given that you are trying to define terrorism in very specific terms

(1998) states that an incident to qualify as terrorism must involve violence and must be perpetrated by an organization which has conspiratorial political goals and an existing chain of command beyond a single individual act on somebody's own (Hoffmann, 1998).

### **Political and Ideological Agendas**

Many agree that terrorism uses violence as a strategy to achieve certain goals. Those who oppose existing governments can use violence, or people who want to maintain existing power can use it. Terrorism is a means of insurrection that can be used by people of different political convictions to gain political goals (Reitan, 2010).

Attaining a political goal is a significant and consistent concept used for defining terrorism. These political goals set terrorist acts apart from criminal acts. Politically motivated terrorism involves a deeply held sense of grievance over some form of social or economic injustice. Modern terrorist organizations justify their actions not only with stated political aims but also by appeals to some higher universal truth and the demand for political transformation (Kassimeris, 2008).

Terrorism always has a political agenda. This agenda may be motivated by various ideologies like Marxism, ethnical motivations or radical religious ideas. Terrorist organizations manage to survive because of the ideological motivations and support they have. Terrorist organizations break generally accepted norms or codes of behaviors of the society in pursuit of their political gains. Hoffman (1998), in his book *Inside Terrorism*, describes terrorism as fundamentally and inherently "political." He argues that terrorism is "ineluctably about power: the pursuit of power, the acquisition of power, and the use of power to achieve political change. Terrorism is thus violence – or, equally important, the threat of violence – used and directed in pursuit of, or in service of, a political aim" (p.2).

If the terrorist organizations did not represent any ideology, their violence would be on the level of organized crime, and their main purpose would be monetary gain. If the terrorist organizations did not fight for the sake of a political aim, it would be impossible for those organizations to find members and to get support from their followers. However, all of the terrorist organizations have their own ideologies, and they seek support from the believers by saying that they are fighting for the benefit of their ideology.

Also, the lack of opportunity for political participation regardless of the ideology would eventually create motivation for terrorism. Regimes that deny access to political participation create dissatisfaction and frustration in the denied group by forming discrimination. This discrimination might eventually become a terrorist movement if the authorities keep denying access to political participation (Whittaker, 2003).

### **Effects of Terrorist Violence**

Extremists always thrive on insatiability. In such revolutionary situations, the terrorists usually win (Frey & Luechinger, 2002). Psychological, economical, diplomatic, strategic and political consequences of the violence are more prominent than the attacks and incidents the terrorists are carrying out (Crenshaw, 1998, 1995). Short term effects of terrorism would involve an immediate psychological effect on the society including fear and vulnerability, whereas the long term effects would involve many potential political, ecological and/or economical outcomes. In fact, the consequences of terrorism tend to have a higher rank in the scale of the values (Chomsky & Achcar, 2002). The far-reaching effects of terrorism are quite clear from the recent September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks. The cost of the September 11th attacks exceeds one hundred billion dollars in the short term and in the long term the price tag is estimated around two trillion dollars (IAGS, 2004). Certainly, the direct effect of the terrorism is on the immediate victims

who got killed or wounded because of the terrorist activity (whether the victim was the direct target or happened to be a bystander). Then the close family circles of the victims suffer from the very immediate consequences of terror by losing their loved ones or by seeing the victims wounded.

This circle expands as the events are brought to the public attention by the media. As the terrorist events carry on, everybody in the society begins to feel the effect of terrorism. People begin to worry about their own life and suffer psychologically because of terror.

Terrorism also affects the economy for a variety of reasons: business interruptions because of the attacks, the loss of trust to the stability of international business which in turn causes a loss or decline of, and loss of tourism revenue as people are usually reluctant to spend their vacations where there are some serious concerns. An example of this would be the United States travel warnings for travelers to Turkey. After two synagogue bombings in Istanbul at the end of 2003, the U.S. State Department issued a travel advisory and asked its citizens not to travel to Turkey which was reversed on March 22<sup>nd</sup> 2004.

Another example of economic effect comes from the U.S. following the September 11th attacks, *American Transportation Policy* by R. Dilger (2002) writes "... *the possibility of an economic **panic**, the American stock exchange ceased trading on September 11, 2001, as news of the **terrorists'** attacks **spread** across the globe*" (pg. 112). Furthermore, many stock exchange markets around the world watched the aftermaths of the September 11 in panic. Politicians and bureaucrats also start to worry about the security and focus on the fight against terrorism instead of their daily routine. Terrorism and security become the primary issue in the country and may be replacing the welfare and health issues of the citizens. This list could be expanded. It is essential to understand that the terrorist activities are usually used to reach long term goals and



strategies.

### **Atmosphere of Chaos and Fear**

Terrorists try to spread and form an atmosphere of chaos, fear, and panic in the targeted population. With the help of publicity from their actions, terrorists try to reach people they are targeting to make them feel and believe that they are living in constant danger. In this regard, in most of the definitions and regulations, the words “fear”, “chaos” and “panic” are used to describe this situation. For example, the U.S. Department of Defense uses fear in its description of terrorism: “*use of violence or threat of violence to inculcate fear*” (Martin, 2003, p. 33). Similarly, Hall and Clark while studying the definition of terrorism and the U.S. codes in his book *Companion to American Law*, state that terrorism is “... *the political goals of terrorists often are ... create wide- **spread panic and chaos. The increased concern ...***” (2002, p. 102).

Accordingly, most terrorist organizations try to kill as many of their targets as possible to escalate the panic and chaos. For example, the Mau-Mau movement in Kenya terrorized the British who were the colonial invading power in Kenya during the 1950s. They spread such violence that both the British people living in Kenya were not able to go out because they were in such fear; additionally, even the British in London thousand of miles away from Kenya were also afraid (Gilbert, 2011). This movement eventually allowed the native Kenyans to gain autonomy. This example illustrates the far-reaching effects of terror. These psychological effects on the society evoke a sense of horror, fear, vulnerability and indignity (Armborst, 2010) and people begin to believe that anyone at anytime can be a victim of terrorism.

### *Conflict between the Society and the Governments*

Terrorists want to create conflict between the society and the governments. The terrorists desire that the fear and panic they are spreading will eventually galvanize the governments to go

after them very harshly which is considered to lead a conflict in the society between the government forces and the people. Eventually, this conflict is considered to be used for terrorists' own grounds to overthrow the governments or to have the governments to counter their own population for security reasons.

As a matter of fact, many philosophers argued that conflict is the only means for change in society. For example, Marxist ideology argues that a political change cannot be achieved without a conflict (Marx, 1887). Marx always argued that the workers and other people in the society, in order to get what they want, have to confront the government and the owners of the businesses to reach their demands.

Similarly, the Anti-Colonist philosopher Frantz Fanon argued that nobody would give up power willingly; therefore, the power had to be taken violently (Fanon, 1967). In this regard, terrorists always seek ways to force the governments they are terrorizing to go after them. The terrorists are looking for a fight because they want the current government to change or fail. The government typically responds with strict measures against their populations ranging from conducting body searches on the streets to moving people to camps as prisoners<sup>1</sup> or torturing the suspects.

According to Marx this kind of conflict is believed to alienate the society from their governments and have them to support the terrorist organizations in the long run to overthrow the governments or to acquire their demands. Latin American terrorism, like in Uruguay, constitutes a very good example for this pattern where most of the time the governments applied state terrorism in the name of fighting terrorism like Uruguay. When the Tupomaro movement began to spread its terror in Uruguay, the Uruguayan government began to terrorize its own citizens while looking for the suspects. The tactics of the Uruguayan government involved

torture, rape, beatings and murder, and those tactics were openly accepted by the officials. The officers saw themselves as doing their official job while they were torturing or killing people through their investigations to find the suspects. Being frightened from the terror of the state, the people of Uruguay began to support the Tupamaros which led the Tupamaros to run for office as they believed they could get the majority of the votes. However, they lost the elections and the newly elected right-wing government used similar tactics to fight against the Tupomaros involving many human right violations (Douglas, 2010).

Another good example of this pattern would be the Algerian independence movement after the First World War, which ended the French occupation in Algeria in 1962. The Algerians who wanted the French out of their country began to get organized under the leadership FLN (*Front de Libération Nationale, National Liberation Front*). Their main goal was to get their country back and to regain control of their countries' resources from the occupying French power (or they said, from the "whites"). They also wanted to get "those whites" from their country (Art & Richardson, 2007). As they began to terrorize the French and those Algerians who were collaborating with the French very closely, the French government took very strict measures to stop this movement. They emptied and burned villages, tried to arrest all of the men that were not working for them even if they had nothing to do with the FLN, imprisoned families in the camps on very high mountains, and even tortured and killed the suspects. However, none of those responses stopped the FLN members. In the conflict between the French and the Algerians, the French lost 15,000 soldiers, and over 1.5 million Algerian civilians were killed according to Algerians. However, French claimed there were 350,000 casualties (LOC, Algeria-a Country Study). At the end, the French had to leave Algeria, and the Algerians became independent in 1962 (Martin, 2008).

### *Secrecy*

Terrorist organizations are clandestine by nature, and they usually try to apply the highest secrecy standards inside the organization. They generally tend to be internally conservative and closed groups because they want to preserve themselves from the government powers (Crenshaw, 1995).

In order to maintain secrecy, the terrorists:

- Try to maintain a normal life style when looked from outside,
- Use fake IDs,
- Form terrorist cells,
- Cut their relations with their close circles like family members, relatives and close friends (this may differ in ethnic terrorism),
- Have strict rules on secrecy,
- Try not to use any traceable communication techniques,
- Do not talk about their backgrounds to their companions to avoid being identified,
- If they do not stay in cells, they might prefer to stay with the sympathizers because of security concerns because they believe that they will not survive if they are caught in their cells.

Terrorists survive by blending into society. They always obey their internal security rules to avoid revealing their locations, which is why they apply extreme caution while carrying out their activities (Crenshaw, 1998). Their actions are generally well-planned. Planning and approval of this plan are an intrinsic process that must be followed unless otherwise ordered by leaders of the organizations. Terrorists want to make sure that everything during their activities goes right without any problems; that's why they work on every detail before their attacks including their route and tactics after their actions.

Publicity of the terrorist activities has priority among the results of the terrorist incidents. Terrorist tactics usually attract worldwide publicity very quickly because their violence is designed to generate attention and publicity. As a matter of fact, publicity is a must for the terrorists in order for them to survive and recruit new members. Terrorists seek ways to be on the media to maintain publicity which helps them to gain recognition, present themselves as a group that should not be ignored and that must be taken account of, recruit more people and propagandize easier (Grunwald, 2001).

In fact, propaganda is impossible without the use of media, and it has been said that the media is terrorist's best friend as they are determined to give terrorist events maximum exposure (Laqueur, 1999). They know the importance of the media, and they try to use media for their own causes. This publicity, mostly due to the unpredicted and dramatic violent attacks of terrorism, keeps terrorism in the forefront of the public eye and the government's concern.

Also, the horrifying publicized face of terrorism forms an atmosphere of panic and fear which could cause some officers and people to exaggerate the strength and importance of the terrorist organization. There are many examples of the way publicity is manipulated a result of terrorist events. Jenkins (2011) compares the insurgents who fought in Angola, Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea to the Palestinians. The former groups used the standard tactics of guerilla warfare for years and were hardly noticed by the world. However, when Palestinian terrorists terrorized the Munich Olympics in 1972, they managed to gain publicity immediately, and they sparked world-wide concern by generating global awareness (Ward, 2003).

In terms of causality, terrorism has a low occurrence, but when it occurs, its effects are far-reaching (Sandler, 2011). Terrorist related casualties have a much lower probability when compared with the other causes of deaths; however, due to the nature of terrorism, it is highly

publicized. As the statistics are studied, it is obvious that the casualties that are the results of terrorist activities are far less than the other types of reasons of casualties such as traffic accidents.

For example, 6,694 people died because of terrorist-related incidents in 1998 in the world, whereas, only in the United States, almost 17,000 people were murdered. Traffic accidents took the lives of 41,504 people and over 7,000 people died from infections. Similar results come from Turkish statistics. For example, in 2001, almost 3,000 people died because of traffic accidents while only 53 people (including the law enforcement those died in the conflicts) died because of terrorism (TUIK, 2011).

When this rate is applied to the world's population, the probability increases significantly. As it is obviously seen from the statistics, there are many more causes of death which rank considerably higher than terrorism. However, the casualties that are as a result of terrorist activities attract more attention mostly due to publicity. Therefore, terrorism has low probability but high consequences in terms of causality.

#### *Unexpected Nature of Terrorism*

Terrorism is unpredicted or unexpected cruelty. Terrorists get to choose their weapons, place, and time of the attacks. Terrorists strike at unexpected times as most of the time the targets are incapable of defending themselves. Choosing the location and time of their attacks leads them to success in most of their attacks. Some scholars even used the word "unexpected" as one of the major elements of their definition of terrorism as Gurr calls terrorism: "*the use of unexpected violence to intimidate or coerce people in the pursuit of political or social objectives*" (Gurr, 1970, p. 32).

Terrorists do not obey or recognize the rules of war and they are not concerned about any

ethics. They have their own set of rules and announced enemies or targets. On the other hand, there are clear rules for wars, and the innocent are supposed to be protected in the wars. However, terrorists reverse the rules of wars or any ethical concerns by killing innocent people. They put bombs in the places where there are many civilian casualties including children, elderly and woman in order to kill as many as possible of them. Terrorists disregard the rules of war and their mass killings are the motivation partial accomplishments of today's terrorism, which cannot be achieved by conventional war (Ross, 2006).

Terrorists also don't wear uniforms and they blend in the society. It is impossible to distinguish them from everyday people. Anybody could be a terrorist, and it is nearly impossible to detect a private citizen who can hide explosives on his or her body easily.

Most of the terrorist movements fail to reach their long-term strategic goals and they rarely achieve what they are after in the long run. In fact, government powers generally overpower them and eventually the terrorists lose their power (Palmer & Palmer, 2008). However, in the short run, terrorists can be successful due to the nature and characteristics of their activities (Williamson, 2009). They can attract opponents of the current government, political opponents, they can recruit many members, they can spread a massive violence, or they can generate publicity and supporters.

For example, during their early establishments in Uruguay, the Tupomaros managed to be seen or considered as an alternative power of the government with very few members (Schelling, 1960). Being very sure of their success and support, they decided to run for office. However, their success came to an end when they began to kill the innocent people. Especially the killings of the innocent turned over people from them and they lost the elections. Furthermore, if the appropriate long term social precautions are not taken, the terrorists could win the long term by

winning the hearts of the society (Smith, 2008).

Terrorism is usually the weapon of the weak that lacks the conventional powers of military. The only exception to this is state terrorism (Douglas, 2010). The weaker party that cannot fight conventionally tries to gain advantage by using terrorism. Terrorism has been a low-cost high-influence method. Terrorism may enable small groups, nations, sub-national groups and even individuals to get around the requirements of national strength including political, economic, or conventional military power (Amos II & Stolfi, 1982).

Terrorism may not achieve a political objective in the long run, but it certainly gives the feeling of revenge and it also attracts the media and the world for the causes of the terrorists. As long as the issues behind the terrorism continue to exist, frustration and peer pressure will lead to other attempts of terrorism (Armborst, 2010). A terrorist in Palestine stated the following in an interview: *"Give me tanks and airplanes, and I shall stop sending suicide bombers into Israel"* (Faria, G, & M, 2005). The terrorists clearly try to justify themselves by arguing that they do not have the conventional means of war and required infrastructure to carry out a war.

On the other hand, fighting against terrorism is difficult for the states because most of the time they do not know where their enemy is or when and where the terrorists will strike. Furthermore, the cell structure that is used by most terrorist organizations helps to maintain the group's security and near immunity from the law enforcement, which makes the fight against terror more difficult.

A very good example for how terrorism becomes the weapon of the weak comes from history. A group named Assassins or Hashishins terrorized the Anatolia region, today where Turkey, Iran and Iraq intersects, for about 200 years. An Ishmaelite leader named Hassan bin Sabbah, formed a terrorist organization that managed to survive between 1090 and 1275. Sabbah



would recruit the young Ishmaelite 's who were called *fedains* by using his fake heaven where he served hashish to them by the hands of beautiful and young women which made those youngsters addicted to this place. Sabbah preyed on the young men's weakness and was able to control them. For the sake of the hashish and the women, those *fedains* would do anything Sabbah asked.

*Fedains* were very few in numbers; however, they managed to spread their terror so extensively that people were afraid of to go out in the public since they were afraid of being stabbed with the *fedains* ' poisoned daggers (Grunwald, 2001).

#### *Workers' Party of Kurdistan PKK*

Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) is a leftist Kurdish nationalist organization. It was founded in 1974 by a group of Turkish students of ethnic Kurdish descent who were active in communist circles within Turkey. PKK was operated informally until 1978 by Abdullah Ocalan. Influenced heavily by Maoist doctrine, the PKK's goal was to incite a revolution that would free the Kurdish people and establish an independent Kurdish state. When it was founded, the group was violently opposed to the Turkish government, believing that a Kurdish state could only be established if the oppressive and colonialist Turkish government was defeated (MIPT Database, 2006). The PKK is one of the bloodiest terrorist organizations in history. The PKK seeks to establish an independent Marxist state in southeastern Turkey. It was formally formed in 1978 in the capital city of Turkey, Ankara. It soon launched a violent campaign against people who openly support the government and its policies and Kurdish tribes that had historically been living peacefully with the Turkish government (Saladino, 2008).

By 1980, Turkey's internal security situation had gotten noticeably worse because of randomly applied PKK terrorism. By the early 1980s, the group had ruthlessly murdered about

250 people. Since 1984, random violence and the terrorist activities held by the PKK have claimed thousands of lives. Women, children and the old are not excluded from their attacks. People have been murdered in front of their family members or kidnapped and executed ruthlessly. Furthermore, the PKK has maintained a position as a sub-contractor of the international terror and drug dealer networks. It preserved interactions with some Middle Eastern, African, European, and Latin American terrorist groups as well as many drug traffickers. Today, the PKK still tries to maintain its activities in Turkey; however, its terror has dramatically declined after the capture of its leader, Abdullah Ocalan, who was arrested in Kenya and extradited to Turkey where he faced the death penalty on terrorism charges. However Turkey abolished the death penalty in 2002 and his sentence was changed to life imprisonment. The arrest of Ocalan seriously weakened the PKK. Following his arrest, Ocalan declared a unilateral cease-fire and announced his desire to establish a "peace initiative" with Turkey on Kurdish issues. The PKK affirmed Ocalan's wishes, purportedly disavowing its violent history. Currently, the PKK struggles to maintain its activities especially in Northern Iraq, Syria, and throughout Europe.

#### *Turkish Hezbollah*

Turkish Hezbollah was founded in southeastern Turkey during the early 1980's. Its goal was the establishment of a Sunni Muslim theocracy in Turkey, which they attempted to achieve by overthrowing Turkey's secular regime. Despite the common name, Turkish Hezbollah is unrelated to the Iranian-sponsored Lebanese Hezbollah. It is suspected that Turkish Hezbollah has also received Iranian funding and support, as Iran sought to spread its revolutionary Islamic ideology into Turkey. Turkish Hezbollah focused the bulk of its attacks on the PKK, which it accused of anti-Muslim activities. The group also focused on spreading its Islamic theology

through Turkey through bookstores and publishing houses. Because the Turkish government's main counterterrorism efforts at this time were directed against the PKK, some accuse the government of supporting and funding Turkish Hezbollah as a proxy, a charge they deny. Regardless of official government complicity, their focus on combating PKK allowed Turkish Hezbollah to act without fear of government reprisal. Charges of connections to the Turkish government are furthered by the fact that from its founding until 2000, Turkish Hezbollah was not involved in any violent confrontation with Turkish police or security forces (Arinç, 2010).

The group's situation greatly changed in the mid 1990's, as PKK's threat to Turkey waned, culminating in a 1999 truce. It became a target for the Turkish government when the group began to target secular academics and journalists, feminists and religious Muslims who did not support its goal of establishing an Islamic state in Turkey. Full-scale operations against the group by the Turkish government began in 2000, resulting in the deaths of hundreds of militants throughout southeastern Turkey. Turkish police, investigating the fraudulent use of a kidnapped businessperson's credit card, were led to small house in the city of Beykoz, where a shootout ensued and the group's leader, HuseyinVelioglu, was killed. Many of its remaining members have escaped to Iran and Iraq (Arinç, 2010).

#### *Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front DHKP/C*

DHKP/C is a Turkish leftist terrorist organization originally formed in 1978 as Devrimci Sol or Dev- Sol, which is a splinter faction of the Turkish People's Liberation Party/Front (THKP/C). After factional infighting, it was renamed in 1994 as the Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front DHKP/C. The group espouses a strong Marxist ideology is extremely anti-US, anti-NATO, and is an anti-western organization in purpose (Uslu, 2007).

DHKP/C's ideology is similar to that of other radical Turkish leftists. The group believes

that the Turkish government is a fascist regime, controlled by the domineering, imperialist forces of the West, especially the United States and NATO. The group seeks to destroy these Western influences through violence and Marxist revolution. In its early years, when it was still known as Dev Sol, the group focused largely on political assassinations.

A crackdown by Turkish authorities in the early 1980s forced the group to restrict its activities, though in the late 1980s Dev Sol was able to increase its attacks against Turkish military targets. Despite internal troubles, the DHKP/C has managed to retain the ideology and goals of the original Dev Sol movement. The group has continued to conduct violent attacks against Turkish government targets as well as against Western interests in Turkey. The group has also sought to bring attention to its imprisoned members by staging hunger protests.

More recently, the group has been intensely outspoken against US military operations in Afghanistan and in Iraq. DHKP/C believes that these operations are proof of the imperialist intentions of the United States. According to DHKP/C, creation of a classless society and the establishment of the revolutionary power of the people are essential. DHKP/C defines the term the revolutionary power of the people as the power of all the people's forces that are against oligarchy and imperialism. DHKP/C still remains active in Turkey and in most European countries including Belgium Italy, Holland, Germany, Greece and France. Its main activities include assassinations, arson, and bombings.

The Group's most noticeable activities were the assassination of a former Prime Minister and a former Justice Minister in Turkey and an attempt to assassinate the U.S. President George Bush during his visit to Istanbul in 1992. The movement is mainly active in the universities among the socialist idealist students. DHKP/C is one of the two European leftist terrorist organizations that were included in the U.S. State Department Foreign Terrorist List and it is also

considered as a terrorist organization by European countries.

DHKP-C's Political Army Fighting strategy specifies using rural and urban guerillas in order to weaken the authority and prepare the environment for a possible revolution. In 1992, Bedri Yagan was sent to the Bekaa Valley to start the guerilla training of the organization. The party trained many of its members in this training camp to send to Turkey. However after the 1992 split, the activities in the Bekaa Valley stopped and then were closed down by administration. Nevertheless, the organization today has some small armed-cells in big cities to plan and carry out some sensational actions.

The strategies of DHKP/C are different from the other terrorist organizations because they tried to start a revolution in both the cities and countryside at the same time. There are five stages in this revolution:

- Vanguard war
- Increasing vanguard struggle and starting a guerilla war
- Growing and spreading guerilla war out of the country
- Connecting to local units

This situation would lead Turkey to the fifth stage, a victory of communist revolution. In this strategy, although they believe that public support is very important to be successful, the army is the key element of revolution.

They believe that the only way to strike down the imperialism and set up communism is an armed struggle. The strategy of Devrimci Sol is the strategy of the People's War, which means they achieve power directly from the working people. According to Mahir Cayan, the founder of THKP/C, this strategy can be defined as: "The strategy which takes armed

propaganda as a basis and subordinates all other political, economic, and democratic forms of struggle to this basic form of struggle, is called the politicized-military war strategy" (Collected Works, 1995). Therefore, DHKP/C depends on armed struggle; in other words, the army unit is the based organization of this terrorist organization.

The main goal of DHKP-C is to overthrow the existing regime in Turkey and in its place, to set up a new regime based on Marxism and Leninism. DHKP-C believes that the party is the pioneer organization that will lead the public on the way of Marxist-Leninist revolution. DHKP/C plans to start a people's revolutionary war because of the belief that the only way to set up a communist government is through this war of the people to start to destroy the current government. They believe that if the current government were destroyed, the communist system may be founded easily.

#### *Radical Terrorism*

Until the French revolution, religions had been believed to be the major factor which determines the people's behaviors towards the authorities. Most of the religions, especially the celestial ones; Islam, Christianity, and Judaism, asked their members to conform to the teachings of their religious leaders. In fact, most of the authorities, in the west and east, were influenced by their religions in administrative issues. The French Revolution; however, was a turning point in this regard, transforming the classical religious state notion to the modern secular state in which the citizens have equal rights against the government. Marx, on the other hand, took the secularist approach one step further denying all kinds of religions and their informal regulations on the behaviors of the people against the authorities. To him, religion was a drug which inebriated people and helped them follow conformity encouraged by religion. With the spread of Marxism in the world, the religious movements, especially the Islamic movements, found

themselves in the defense of the religions as the Marxism was denying their religion. This caused a polarization between the people often living in the same country. Occasionally, this polarization was used to manipulate the religions through violence. Religions were sometimes used to spark independence movements and often used by the terrorist leaders to recruit and to spread their terrorism. This section of the literature review focuses on the issues related with the religion inspired terrorist movements. This starts with the definition of imperialism as it is frequently used in this literature and then the religions are studied for their approach to terrorism.

*Karl Marx, 1844*

Marxism emerged as a theory in response to the Industrial Revolution. There are three major aspects of the Marxist ideology including: philosophy, economics, and history. First, Marxism is an economic system in response to capitalism. Second, Marxism is a philosophy. Marxist philosophy is based on the ideas on human character and about how human beings function in the world. Marx is interested in the relationship between materialist and idealist philosophy (Smith, 2008). As a philosopher, Marx characterized a stem of philosophy called “dialectical materialism” to describe the materialist approach and human relations throughout history. In history, Marx studies the history of human kind and tries to prove how changed occurred as a result of struggles. In his theories, Marx defines religion as “the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, and the soul of soulless conditions” (Komorzynski, 1897). Moreover, Marx calls for the demolition of any religion for the happiness of the society. He says that “the abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of the people is the demand for their real happiness” (Komorzynski, 1897). To call on them to give up their illusions about their condition is to call on them to give up a condition that requires illusions. The criticism of religion is, therefore, in embryo, the criticism of that vale of tears of which religion

is the halo” (Marx, 1887).

Therefore, Marxism opposed any religion including Islam and other celestial religions, Judaism and Christianity. In an effort to follow Marx’s ideas, in the Soviet Russia and its followers around the world especially in the Easter Europe, the religions were harshly targeted, they were forbidden, the temples were closed and the holy books were burned. The newly emerged Communist Regimes completely prohibited religions and most of the time killed almost all of the religious leaders to ensure the decease of religions. The Communists extended a true war campaign against any religions in the eyes of the whole world as they were establishing their states. Many people suffered from these despot campaigns especially in the early establishments of the Communist States.

Most of the people who suffered from the Communist brutality against religion were the Muslims. There were many Muslims in the newly emerged Communist States and they quickly became the enemy of those states. Seeing this cruelty against their same religion brothers and sisters, the Muslim world interpreted Marxism as one of the greatest enemy causing a deep polarization between the Marxists and Muslims. Several Muslims felt hatred against the Marxists as they saw or read what happened to people under those regimes. Consequently, the Communist War against religion caused a deep contradiction and polarization between the Muslims and Leftists.

This contradiction led to radicalism among some communities as they believed they had to do something but they were not able to. In this regard, sometimes regional violent activities were a response to communism. In addition to regional activities, some people went overseas or abroad in an effort to help the people who were suffering under the communists. Consequently, this polarization and hatred caused radicalization among some Muslims. The recent Soviet



invasion of Afghanistan illustrates this point. Many people went to Afghanistan to help the Afghan Mujahideen in their fight against Soviet Russia. Unfortunately, sometimes good intentions and feelings were radicalized due to the harsh conditions of war by the extremists who were also fighting. When added with inadequate education and disconnection from the rest of the world, the former warriors against the Soviets were so ready to extend their war against new enemies.

A regional example comes from the Turkish Hezbollah in this sense. When the leftist and ethnic terrorist organization PKK emerged in the southern part of Turkey, the people living in the region who were targeted by the PKK formed a religious based terrorist organization with the sole aim of fighting against the leftist PKK. They considered themselves an enemy of Communism and tried to struggle with the PKK just because it was a leftist terrorist organization harming their society both ideologically and physically. However, this organization again could not draw lines for its activities and after a period of time the enemy list began to rise and they started to target other people. The Turkish Hezbollah, being only the exclusive enemy of the PKK, soon began to carry out attacks against the government forces and civilians.

#### *Dictatorships in Muslim Countries*

Almost, all of the countries in the Middle East and some of the other Muslim countries are governed by brutal dictators most of whom were granted authority through their fillies by their colonial powers after the First World War. Moreover, those dictators have enjoyed widely support from the modern world including the west and the United States. In fact, some of them are still considered the puppets of their old colonial regimes. In addition to this support, these dictators failed to represent the majority of the people they are governing as most of the times those dictators happen to be from a small minority group just like Saddam Hussein in Iraq or

Hafiz and Bessir Assad in Syria. Often those dictators opposed and suppressed their own people through their secret services, police and military. Moreover, the people under those regimes usually did not have some of the basic rights that the western world provides to its citizens. Even today, the image of Middle East in the world is disappointing. When the term “Middle East” is stated, people out of the “Middle East” thinks about either a ruler in luxury and dissipation, who is at the same time a despot, blood-thirsty president constantly oppressing his people and at the same time who is corrupted with the misuse of the oil revenues and foreign aid that was generously given to him or the Palestinian-Israeli conflict (Aras & Tokta, 2007).

Most people in the Middle East usually feel frustrated because of two reasons. First is the support of the western world to their dictators. Even though the western world including the U.S. always promoted democracy, it is a different story when it came to the Middle East. Most of the dictators enjoyed wide range support of the west especially military wise and politically. Seeing the support of the West and the United States, the people in the Middle East and some other Muslim countries became frustrated of the west. The people in the Middle East also become upset as they see the Western and the U.S. based military equipment used against them.

The second disturbance comes from the unavailability of basic rights that are provided the states. Especially with the availability of the internet and cable or dish television networks and through the visits to the other countries, the people in the Middle East realize the broad rights and luxury the west and the U.S. people are enjoying. Even though most of the Middle East countries have ample resources through oil revenues, people believe that their dictators use the oil revenue for their own sake and security. Therefore, the people in the Middle East are frustrated from their rulers who do not represent them, from the open political and military backing and support of the U.S. and the West and from being unable to benefit of the oil

revenues. As a result of this frustration and common grievances in those societies, some terrorist and radical organizations have the opportunity and atmosphere of easily manipulating the people, especially the emotional youth, through their causes most of the time by using the religion (Diamond, Plattner, & Brumberg, 2003; Kaylan, 2005).

#### *Understanding Terrorism before Developing Coping Strategies*

One of the most important ways of understanding terrorism is understanding why people become terrorists. This question is as vast as the question of why people commit crime. Thus as opposed to delving into all possible explanations of becoming a terrorist, a more practical approach would be more pragmatic. Understanding the recruitment process of the terrorist organizations is a practical way to approach this issue. Through an understanding of the recruitment process and the subsequent employment and abuse of the terrorist organization members, coping strategies can be developed.

#### *The Modus Operandi of Recruitment: The Dynamic Terrorist Recruitment Model*

Although the literature on terrorist recruitment provided some insights about the methods of recruitment (Bloom; Faria, et al., 2005; Gates, 2006; Klein, 2005; Stahl, 2006; Wanous, 1980), a general recruitment pattern is not supported by empirical evidence. Despite the large body of terrorism research on the psychological dimensions of terrorism and terrorists with regard to the root causes of joining terrorist groups and committing violence, only a limited number of researchers focused on the involvement process. In this regard, Klein (2005) suggest that it may be appropriate to investigate the involvement process rather than the psychological qualities of terrorists. Although the theory of which they spoke is not supported by research, they assert that important life events involving work, family, religion, and the like can pave the way to terrorism. Similarly, studies on risk assessment suggest that certain factors increase the

likelihood of involvement with terrorism (Jenkins, 2011; Miller & Mills, 2010; Wanous, 1980). Among these factors are social and economic conditions such as poverty, losses due to life events, and the like—factors that fall in line with previous studies. This study indicated that poor socioeconomic conditions are propagated by the terrorist organizations.

Considering that both the terrorist organizations studied here are selective of certain individual characteristics, the potential recruit is passive at the first stage of recruitment. This finding contradicts Ross's (2006) study regarding Al-Qaeda, mainly because Al-Qaeda has a larger recruitment pool as well as popular support. Additionally, Al-Qaeda appears to be an ideological movement rather than a small scale terrorist group. Therefore, there should be a demand for new recruits from the terrorist organization, since the potential recruit is passive. The demand for new recruits may, however, vary from time to time due to police operations, the political context of the country, and other external factors. For example, an organization may be reluctant to recruit new members during intense police crackdowns on terrorism. As mentioned by the TNP officers, for instance, some radical groups become popular at certain times depending on the political context of the countries.

Under suitable conditions for recruitment, the terrorist organization contacts ideologically prone individuals through friends, relatives, or associations of the organization. The majority of DHKP/C and Hezbollah terrorists are recruited by their friends or relatives. Previous research is supportive of this point. Accordingly, Combs (2010) mentions that for the individuals who become active terrorists the initial connection is often made by a friend or a group. Similarly, (2006) mentions that people are recruited through kinship and friendship associations. People are influenced to join a terrorist organization by seeking solidarity with family, friends, or acquaintances (Martin, 2011).

Thus, in this reciprocal association between the terrorist organization's agent and the potential recruit, the organization offers a sense of belonging, solidarity, self-esteem, and the like to the recruit through propaganda. Propaganda is a psychological process undertaken to influence the beliefs of a potential recruit. In this regard, ideology is used to justify the actions of the recruiter or the organization. During this stage, the individual is informed about the organization over time. If the individual demonstrates his or her willingness to be in the organization, as this study indicated, the next stage of recruitment starts.

The third stage of recruitment involves brainwashing and fostering ideological commitment. An individual is tested and expected to prove his or her dedication to the ideology and goals of the organization. This is one of the reasons why both DHKP/C and Hezbollah terrorists have higher criminal records; the terrorist group facilitates criminal activity. Terrorist organizations, in this stage, try to isolate individuals from their family and social groups in order to more easily impose their particular ideology. In this regard, it is essential to know the individual's social and institutional ties in order to discern whether the involvement is an adverse outcome of weak ties, but this information is unavailable in the current study data sets.


However, research on group dynamics in gangs suggests that potential terrorist recruits, like potential gang recruits, suffer from weak social and institutional ties, which in turn makes the individual more vulnerable for recruitment (Ness, 2007). Breaking the social and psychological ties of the potential recruits helps foster a consciousness of and investment in the collective movement and breed an inclination toward the terrorist organization. For example, a DHKP/C terrorist candidate is expected to participate in the Labor Day protests on May 1, follow the organization's publications, and attend the organization's meetings and activities. Terrorist groups, however, vary significantly from gangs due to the ideology factor in recruitment.

Ideology is an essential part of terrorist recruitment; the potential recruit comes to believe that the terrorist organization will remedy the existing problems both of the individual and the society. Ideology is like a holy book for the potential recruit, a resource that contains answers for every possible question.

Eventually, if the performance of the potential recruit is observed to be sufficient by the terrorist recruiter, he or she will be asked to report his or her detailed personal information. The contact person will then report this information to the terrorist organization. The police-seized terrorist resumes and interviewees views confirm this process.

In the final stage, depending on the organization's recruitment decision, a potential recruit is accepted to or rejected from the terrorist organization. As the current research suggests, it is highly unlikely that an applicant will be rejected by the organization after the submission of personal information, because the candidate has already been observed to be qualified by the recruiter. At every stage of the dynamic recruitment model, variations in the individual's and terrorist organization's behaviors are possible (See Figure 1).

In this recruitment approach, the terrorist organization plays the central role, because there should be a demand from the terrorist organization for recruitment regardless of how the potential recruit is motivated or what sorts of characteristics he or she holds. Recruitment to the terrorist organization is primarily a top-down process rather than a bottom-up process. This model may prove to vary, however, if the modus operandi of recruitment of other terrorist organizations is investigated.



**Figure 1. The Dynamic Terrorist Recruitment Model<sup>1</sup>**

*Conclusion*

Terrorism and non-traditional conflict have become a part of the daily life of Turkey and the Turkish National Police. The main problem with terrorism in Turkey is that there are no definite boundaries to what they might and might not do and who they are and who they are not.

<sup>1</sup> Adopted from Ekici (2006).

This study attempts to add to the understanding of the criminal mind of a terrorist and solve the puzzle of the effect of true belief on terrorist act.



## Chapter 3

### Research Design and Methodology

#### *Introduction*

Nachmias & Nacmias (1996) explain that a researcher should clarify fundamental problems before starting a research project. These are as follows: who is being studied, what is observed, how the data is collected, and how the data will be used. This chapter provides a discussion concerning the research approach, research design, unit of analysis, data collection, hypothesis, and data analysis procedures.

The research approach used in this study was secondary data analysis. Secondary data is any analysis of data collected by another researcher or organization for some other purposes(Hakim, 1987). The reason for the increased utilization of secondary data is its methodological advantages. In most general implementation, secondary data research the dataset is used to replicate the original research's results or to address an entirely different question (Hakim, 1987).

The main hypothesis of this study indicates that higher the sincerity of terrorists the higher the number of terrorist incidents and higher the violence levels. This study examines Turkey's terrorism problem in depth by using content analysis method in light of a mixture of the mainstream crime theories and identifies some factors that are related to the formation of terrorism. It is believed that this may assist policy makers develop new policies that can eliminate fertile ground where terrorism easily finds support.

To conceptualize the hypotheses the Content Analysis with the help of Integrated Crime

Theories approach will be used which can be described as a research method in which the theory is developed from the data, rather than the other way around. This approach makes this study an inductive approach. The study will be driven from the specific to the more general. Glaser and Strauss (1968) state that this method of study is essentially based on three elements: concepts, categories and propositions, or what was originally called “hypotheses”. However, concepts are the key elements of analysis since the theory is developed from the conceptualization of data, rather than the actual data.

The data for the variables of demographic indicators were gathered from the databases of Turkish National Police Testimonial Reports of Terrorist Members. Statistical analysis and content analysis were utilized as a statistical method for this study in order to examine the relationship of sincerity level, and violence level of terrorist incidents.

#### *Mixed Crime Theories*

There are numerous theories in criminology striving to explain the concept of delinquency in quite different ways. Since the 1960s the field has been dominated by a multitude of seemingly unrelated and competitive theories like anomie, social disorganization, differential association, social control, deterrence, labeling, ethnomethodology and conflict (Messner, Krohn, & Liska, 1989). According to some criminologists this large number of theories has made the field seem fragmented (Messner, et al., 1989); most criminologists would agree that the large quantity of theories does not enrich the field but it becomes an obstacle for scientific progress (T. J. Bernard, 1990). Recently, there is a trend in the field of criminology to reduce the number of numerous theories that creates confusion and reach a constructive solution.

Some believe that the way to reduce this number is through falsification. The idea is that the contradictory predictions of different theories can be subjected to competitive testing in

which research determines which predictions are supported by data and which are not. Theories that are falsified as a result of this process can be discarded and in this way the number of theories can be reduced (T. J. Bernard & Snipes, 1996). Others believe for a variety of practical reasons that the falsification process will fail since, as Bernard and Ritti (T. J. Bernard & Ritti, 1990) indicated, simply, some theories cannot be falsified as there is no precise and exact statement of what the theory asserts. Therefore integration is the alternative way to falsification to be taken in order to reduce the number of criminological theories (Vold, Bernard, & Snipes, 2002).

The current research findings in the form of criminological bits and pieces are unconnected to an overall theoretical structure or framework and this has led some practitioners of the field to reach the conclusion that it is time to bring order to the field by drawing related lines of theoretical assumptions and empirical evidence together (Gibbons, 1994). The idea of theoretical integration is not only consistently reasonable but it also might assist the field of criminology to make sense of existing evidence and might indicate the linkages between theoretical arguments that have not been apparent (Gibbons, 1994). However, no matter how logical the idea might be, integrating a couple of existing theories and creating a compound theory that would explain all the variances of the assumptions they included is not as easy as it sounds.

The definition of crime is quick to change and its ambiguity makes it impossible to be thoroughly explained by a single theoretical framework. Acts labeled as crime are so diverse that general theories can only explain similar phenomena. The causes of crime are too complex to fit in a single theoretical perspective and that's why efforts in the past toward a general theory of crime and the oppositional tradition failed (Elliott, Huizinga, & Ageton, 1985; Tittle, 1989).

There came a time where there was a clearly pressing need for theoretical development in order to explain a wide range of crime and therefore efforts were concentrated at theoretical integration (Messner, et al., 1989).

Through integration and by using joint explanatory power of different crime theories this study seeks to answer the terrorism related research question. The literature suggests that crimes are mostly committed by people between the ages 13 and 24 and then start to decrease as the age increases (Farrington, 1986). Therefore, a measure of age is included in the research design. According to Merton (2003) and Messner and Rosenfeld (2003) when social institutions such as the family are weak in developing the social norms, anomie or normlessness ensues. Thus a measure of supervision is also included in the design.

Besides, because of the lack of collective efficacy, communities become disorganized (Robert J. Sampson, et al., 2003; Shaw & McKay, 2003) and when informal social control mechanisms (social bonds and self control) do not operate efficiently (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 2003; Hirschi, 2003; Reckless, 2003) criminal behavior occurs. Thus measures of broken families (single female household, percent married population) and social disorganization (percent renters, percent living in urban areas) are added in the models. There are also theories that argue that males are more likely than females to engage in crime (Messerschmitt, 2003) and racial minorities are more likely to engage in crime (Anderson, 2003; Robert J. Sampson & Wilson, 2003).

#### *Content Analysis*

While theory integration is concerned with the discovery of hypotheses from texts, content analysis is concerned with testing hypotheses, usually, but not always, quantitatively. This requires (a) creating a set of codes, (b) applying those codes systematically to a set of texts,

(c) testing reliability of coders when more than one applies the codes to a set of texts, (d) creating a unit of analysis by variable matrix from the texts and codes and (e) analyzing that matrix statistically (H. R. Bernard, 2000).

With the data collected from Turkish National Police this research aims to determine the presence of certain words or concepts that implies sincerity, fidelity, and alienation. Later, this study quantifies and analyzes the presence, meanings and relationships of such words and concepts, then makes inferences about the messages within the texts. Texts can be defined as testimonial reports of 3 different terrorist groups during their custody within TNP. To conduct a content analysis on any such text, the text is coded, or broken down, into manageable categories on a variety of levels--word, word sense, phrase, sentence, or theme--and then examined using one of content analysis' basic methods: the conceptual analysis.

According to Krippendorff (2004), six questions must be addressed in every content analysis, and this study aims to find address these questions as well as the relationship with the sincerity and terrorist activity:

Which data are analyzed?

How are they defined?

What is the population from which they are drawn?

What is the context relative to which the data are analyzed?

What are the boundaries of the analysis?

What is the target of the inferences?

#### *Data Collection*

500 different terrorists' testimonial reports are collected from Turkish National Police database between 1999 and 2006 randomly. These cases represent most of the terrorist groups

such as PKK, Hezbollah, Ibda-C, Dev-Sol and Al-kaide.

The corpus of texts will be these 500 testimonial reports.

Unit of Analysis will be individual cases from terrorist groups.

Intercoder reliability will be tested with another Turkish coder, the idea is to see whether the constructs being investigated are shared whether multiple coders reckon that the same constructs apply to the same chunks of texts.

### *Hypotheses*

H1: There is a positive relationship between sincerity and level of violence.

Data collected by Turkish National Police (1996-2006) will be used to test this hypothesis based on the variables “Sincerity Level’ and “Violence Level”.

H2: The more educated terrorist has the more violent terrorist activities.

Data collected by Turkish National Police (1996-2006) will be used to test this hypothesis based on the variables “Education’ and “Total Score”.

H3: Males are the more likely to have more violent activities than the females.

Data collected by Turkish National Police (1996-2006) will be used to test this hypothesis based on the variables “Gender’ and “Total Score”.

H4: Singles are the more likely to have more violent activities than the married terrorists.

Data collected by Turkish National Police (1996-2006) will be used to test this hypothesis based on the variables “Marital Status’ and “Total Score”.

H5: Separatist group members are more likely to have more violent activities than the Leftists and Religiously Motivated terrorists.

Data collected by Turkish National Police (1996-2006) will be used to test this hypothesis based on the variables “Type of Terrorist Group’ and “Total Score”.

## **Methodology**

The research approach used in this study is based on official data. The official statements of terrorists are used as secondary data. Secondary data has some methodological and practical advantages like availability, low cost and large sampling.

Based on official data, a cross-sectional research design is employed in this study. The relationship between several relevant variables is examined using multivariate statistical analysis techniques.

The unit of analysis in this research design is the terrorist group member individuals. There are a total of 500 individuals examined in the data set. These individuals are convicted terrorists or terror suspects that are either candidate or veteran terrorists.

## **Variables**

### ***Dependent Variable***

The dependent variable in this study is a measure of the activities done by the terrorists. This is a limited continuous variable ranging from the less violent activity to the most violent activity. The terrorists' criminal actions have been classified into categories. These categories were based on their own statements, which they gave to the Counter Terrorism Department during the interrogation after they were captured. Based on the terrorists' own statements, which were taken by the Counter Terrorism Department when they were captured, their criminal actions were classified into categories and thus the first part of the variable is formed.

A score is assigned to each terrorist depending on his or her activity in the organization. This will allow to make comparisons among terrorists. Each terrorist also gets scores from their

activities in order to compare them to each other. For every year within the groups they will be scored by 10 points. If the terrorist has been in the organization for 5 years he or she will get 50 points, plus his or her terrorist activities will be count as each killing is 10 points, or each kidnapping is 6 points. This gives the researcher an opportunity to compare the new member to an older one.

**Figure 2 Measure of Terrorist Activity**



As shown in Figure 1, the more violent and the more intense the activities, the higher the score of the terrorist.

### ***Content Analysis***

This study uses content produced from terrorist statements and examine the content by analyzing relevant incidents and acts in order to identify the common themes of violence and various aggravated levels of criminal acts perpetrated with a view to achieve terrorist groups political or other goals. All statements within the data set were included in the content analysis. The unit of analysis is terrorist statements for the content analysis procedure.

All statements were coded according to four types of information: basic crime category, terrorist organization, individual factors, and modus operandi. 10 coders from the Turkish



National Police seeking masters of PhD degree attending several colleges and universities in the U.S. were selected for the coding process. Preferably, coders who previously worked at the anti-terror department in Turkey were selected.

In order to determine the level of violence the modus operandi of the criminal acts subject to legal action were examined for concrete actions such as use of firearms, possession of firearms, drug dealing for monetary gain for the organization, murder, theft, bombing etc. While some statements comprised a single criminal act, others were linked with other crimes and other incidents. Thus, each case were given a code based on the date and place of crime lest some incidents are coded twice. A code is a type of score. By assigning the same code to different acts of the terrorists, an analyst is ascribing the same and equal value to those acts.

### ***Independent Variables***

#### ***Sincerity Level***

One of the concerns of the previous studies on the psychological dimensions of the terrorists was whether terrorists are already abnormal individuals. Further research indicated that not all terrorists are criminals (Silke, 2003). Thus the question of why normal, non-violent individuals resort to violence when they become a member of the terrorist organization. If they start normal and later become violent then the personality traits of terrorists would be highly irrelevant. Studies show that terrorist groups do not specifically seek out criminals like gangs do (Jenkins, 2011; Klein, 2005; Lennings, Amon, Brummert, & Lennings, 2010; Miller & Mills, 2010; Stahl, 2006), and obviously the group's normative structure facilitates criminal activity.

In that sense, organizational attachment and blind adherence are left as an explanation. Sincerity in this study is used as a measure of attachment and adherence. Sincerity variable is

derived from the statements with content analysis technique. If the terrorist is mentioning the Turkish Government as different country and feels like he or she does not belong to it, s/he is considered as sincere, otherwise he or she will be considered as insincere. If the person does not fall into any category, he or she will be treated as ambiguous.

### ***Recruitment and Group Related Variables***

The question of how and through whom individuals contact terrorist organizations and become a member has been one of the concerns of the existing terrorism literature. Terrorist groups' social networks, as well as individuals' close circles are believed to play an important role in recruitment process. In this regard, as a similar group in terms of their group dynamics, associations in youth gang groups play a central role in becoming involved with the criminal group. For instance, having delinquent peers and having an existing family member in the gang were some of the statistically most reliable indicators of gang involvement. Studies indicate that terrorists extensively use social networks for recruitment (Crenshaw, 1998; Ekici, 2006; Laqueur, 1999; Silke, 2003). Friendship and family networks as well as legal organizational associations are the major tools used by terrorist organizations to reach out to potential recruits (Ekici, 2006).

#### **Length of membership in the Group**

This variable is a self-reported continuous variable.

### ***Reason for Joining the Group***

This is a nominal variable broken into dichotomous variables. In the interview the terrorists are asked to choose between 5 choices for reasons for joining the group (just curiosity, personal motivations, socialization, inadequate family supervision, low income). As a reference group personal motivations is left out.

### ***Status***

This is a dichotomous variable where the reference group is convicted (value is zero).

The other group is candidate (value is 1).

### ***Separatist***

This is dichotomous variable where the reference group is Leftist/Radical (value is zero).

The main group is separatist (value is 1).

### ***Socio-demographics***

#### ***Education Level***

Education level is a categorical variable where the lowest category signifies lowest level of education. This variable ranges from 1 to 5.

#### ***Age***

This variable is a continuous variable and calculated as of the date of the interview.

#### ***Gender***

This is a dichotomous variable where the reference group is females (value is zero).

#### ***Marital Status***

This is a dichotomous variable where the reference group is non-married (value is zero).

#### ***Occupational Status***

This is a dichotomous variable where the reference group is non-working (value is zero).

#### ***Economic Status***

This is a categorical variable. where the lowest category signifies lowest level of education. This variable ranges from 1 to 5.

#### ***Ethnicity***

This is a dichotomous variable where the reference group is Turk (value is zero).

#### ***Religious Affiliation***

This is a dichotomous variable where the reference group is Sunni (value is zero).

*Conclusion*

This study will examine the correlates of the level of violence in terrorist actions based on individual level data collected officially. The following sections reports the results of the statistical analyses based on the above outlined methodology.

## Chapter 4

### Statistical Analysis

#### *Introduction*

This chapter presents the research findings of the current study. The general strategy in presenting the results is to report descriptive statistics, and interview results for each piece of information obtained. Interview results are reported when relevant information is available. Multivariate statistics are presented at the end of the section for the impact of sincerity on terrorist activity across the various terrorist groups that operate in Turkey.

Basic descriptive statistics for the variables used in this section are given in Table 2.

**Table 1 Descriptive Statistics**

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
<b>Dependent Variable</b>					
Terrorist Activity	500	160.86	219.55	1.00	1150
<b>Explanatory Variable</b>					
Sincerity	500	0.009	0.383	-1	1
<b>Control Variables</b>					
Age	500	22.994	18.391	17	58
Gender (male)	500	0.817	0.387	0	1
Marital Status	500	0.708	0.456	0	1
Level of Education	500	0.385	0.751	1	5
Occupational Status	500	0.509	0.738	0	1

Ethnicity (Kurdish)	500	0.217	0.567	0	1
Religious Affiliation (Alevi)	500	0.301	0.497	0	1
Economic Status	500	0.459	0.674	1	5
Length of Membership	500	19.744	21.425	1	45
Curiosity	500	0.196	0.674	0	1
Socialization	500	0.246	0.525	0	1
Inadequate Supervision	500	0.178	0.298	0	1
Low Income	500	0.312	0.502	0	1
Status (Convicted)	500	0.478	0.389	0	1
Separatist	500	0.413	0.367	0	1

#### *Characteristics of the Terrorist Group*

The interviews showed that the most of the candidate and convicted terrorists are males with a percentage of 81%. Most of the terrorist organizations in Turkey have many legally established youth clubs and culture houses that provide social environments and activities for high school and college level students, where students from the opposite sex meet and establish new relationships. The study samples also showed that the majority of the terrorists are ethnically Turks. Convicted terrorists were found to be predominantly Turkish (89%), whereas the Turks made up only 55% of the candidate terrorists.

While ethnicity is not a determinant factor in the selection process for some terrorist organizations, PKK solely recruits Kurds. While by itself not an ethnical affiliation, being an Alevi in terms of religious belief is also considered as a separate ethnical group as this faith is followed only by a certain group. Due to the difference in their religious beliefs and due to the notion that they are being discriminated against, Alevi community members are ideal recruits for

terrorist organizations.

Some terrorist organizations abuse the Alevi community as a tool for their goals due to the left-oriented worldview of this community. In some cases, even those who are not Alevi are shown as Alevis by the terrorist organizations when they are killed in terrorist attacks or police/military operations. Organizations agitate Alevi community during the terrorist funerals. They publicize that the Alevi community in Turkey is suppressed and discriminated against. Thus, the Alevi community becomes more prone for new recruits.

One of the common characteristics of the candidate and convicted terrorists is their marital status. Eighty-eight percent of the candidate terrorists and 67% of the convicted terrorists were never married. In most terrorist organizations, marriage is only allowed for camouflaging purposes, which is generally referred to as “revolutionary marriage” inside the organizations.

Statistics show that the majority of terrorists have chosen to move from their original birthplace to another city. Sixty percent of the candidate terrorists and 79% of the convicted terrorists moved from their original birth place to the big cities to improve their quality of life, especially for job and education opportunities.

When we look at the statistics, we observe some differences between convicted and candidate terrorists in terms of several attributes. Candidate terrorists are more educated with 37% *university or higher* education than convicted terrorists are with 11%. In terms of job status, most of the convicted terrorists have a full-time or part-time job compared to candidate terrorists (56% and 14% respectively).

Table 2 Characteristics of the Candidate and Convicted Terrorists

Characteristics	Candidate Terrorists	Convicted Terrorists
Male (%)	67	83
Turk (%)	51	88
Alevi (%)	92	81
Never married (%)	88	67
Mobility (%)	60	79
Education (%)		
Primary and less	13	41
Secondary and high	55	51
University and upper	31	9
Job status (%)		
Full-time or part-time	13	51
Temporarily not working	30	17
Unemployed	51	17
Other	5	15
Type of job doing (%)		
Physical/labor	69	82
Office work	31	18

*Statistical Analyses*

While descriptive statistics tell a lot, when it comes to causal relationships they may be misleading, or simply cannot go beyond the obvious. As the name suggests descriptive statistics merely describes what is in hand but when we are interested in determining relationships between two variables and single out spuriousness out of the link, we need multivariate statistical analyses.

Before deciding on the final models, regular multiple regression diagnostics for outliers, non-linearity, heteroskedasticity, and multi-collinearity were completed using appropriate



procedures.<sup>2</sup> Since age and years spent in the organization were highly correlated and thus created a collinearity problem, age was not included in the analyses due to high collinearity.<sup>3</sup>

**Table 3 Regression Analysis of Terrorist Activity Index**

	<b>Model -1 Bivariate</b>	<b>Model -2 Recruitment</b>	<b>Model -3 Full Model</b>
<b>Explanatory Variables</b>	Coefficients	Coefficients	Coefficients
Sincerity	0.38*** (0.06)	0.31*** (0.06)	0.29*** (0.06)
<b>Control Variables</b>			
Length of Membership		0.13 (0.28)	-0.01 (0.24)
Curiosity		0.16 (0.1)	0.17 (0.14)
Socialization		0.21 (0.15)	-0.12 (0.18)
Inadequate Supervision		-0.02 (0.01)	-0.03** (0.01)
Low Income		0.03 (0.1)	-0.06 (0.1)
Separatist		-0.03** (0.01)	-0.03** (0.01)
Age			-0.11 (0.08)
Gender (male)			-0.01 (0.05)
Marital Status			-0.21 (0.12)

<sup>2</sup> No influential cases were detected in all of the models. Partial regression plots revealed linearity in models. As mentioned in tables robust standard errors were estimated to correct for heteroskedasticity.

<sup>3</sup> In cases when the variance inflation factor (VIF) is less than 10 and/or the tolerance (1/VIF) is larger than .1, no multi-collinearity is assumed (Belsley, Kuh, & Welsch, 1980; Greene, 2003).

Level of Education			0.34*** (0.14)
Occupational Status			0.86** (0.31)
Ethnicity (Kurdish)			-0.01 (0.24)
Religious Affiliation (Alevi)			-0.4 (0.24)
Economic Status			-0.04 (0.24)
Status (Convicted)			0.39* (0.18)
<hr/>			
Constant	4.79 (6.17)	-4.04 (5.41)	7.54 (4.04)
N	500	497	492
F	57.25***	49.99***	22.11***
R <sup>2</sup>	0.77	0.76	0.52

Significance levels based on a one-tailed test: \*\*\* p < .001, \*\* p < .01, \* p < .05.

Robust standard errors in parenthesis.

### Results

The cross-sectional data analysis results show that as sincerity increases the level of violence also increases. Thus, the main alternative hypothesis that whether sincerity affects the level of terrorist action is retained.

Also the regression analysis shows that the more educated a terrorist is the more intense the level of violence that she or he would exercise. The results show no significant relationship between males and females and between singles and married terrorists in terms of level of

violence.

Another important result is that there is a significant relation between the type of terrorist group and the level of violence. Separatists are more violent than Leftists or Radical Islamists.

## Chapter 5

### Discussion, Implications, & Recommendations

#### *Summary and Discussion of Key Findings*

This chapter discusses the major findings of the current research for the terrorist organizations in Turkey and offers a model that summarizes the attachment to the organization. A comparison of terrorist groups in Turkey in terms of their recruitment dynamics has shown some common recruitment and attachment to the organization patterns. Based on the research results a theoretical explanation using the principles of theory integration is given for the results of the study. Recommendations and policy implications are mentioned at the end of this chapter.

#### *A Theory of Terrorist Recruitment and Attachment in Turkey*

Terrorism can flourish as long as new recruits are added to terrorist organizations. Therefore, the future of terrorism depends on a successful terrorist recruitment and continuation of the attachment to the organization. The current study found important correlates for terrorist recruitment, as well as the process and the decision making of terrorist organizations in recruitment. Also how the sincerity of the organization members affect their attachment to the terrorist organization is tested. Before discussing the findings regarding each of the research questions, a few points should be clarified.

First, the recruitment process of the terrorist organizations is predominantly informal. Despite the submission of personal information to the terrorist organizations as an indicator of formal recruitment process, there is no formal cutoff point during acceptance to the organization.

Recruitment is a long process that requires consistent commitment to both violent and nonviolent group activities. After months or years of involvement with the terrorist group an individual is accepted to the cell house of the terrorist organization.

The second point is the freedom of choice in recruitment. The question of whether terrorist recruitment is a result of popular and unshakable support for terrorist activities or is an involuntary choice due to coercive external socioeconomic conditions is the main question here. The results of this research show that freedom of choice in recruitment thus sincerity should be accepted as the general rule, because there are many opportunities available to avoid joining the terrorist organizations. One piece of evidence for such freedom of choice in recruitment can be derived from the high percentages of mobility among Hezbollah terrorists. Those not volunteering to join the terrorist groups migrated to the western parts of Turkey from the Hezbollah and the PKK operating areas in the eastern and southeastern parts of the country (Ekici, 2006).

Third, without an opportunity to access the terrorist group, an individual cannot become a terrorist (Silke, 2003). An opportunity for accessing a terrorist organization can occur in two ways. A terrorist candidate must identify an accessible avenue into the group, or else the terrorist organization has to make that opportunity available to new members through various ways. If using the first method, an individual faces several risks and difficulties. First, terrorist groups almost always operate underground. Therefore, it is difficult to search them out. Second, even if a candidate can find an avenue to the terrorist organization, he or she risks coming across the wrong people or security forces. If using the second method, however, the terrorist organization can use a legal political or social organization to make contact, which is more efficient when the candidate shares the same ideology with the terrorist group and possesses the desired

characteristics. Candidate terrorists must demonstrate their commitment to the organization's goals and ideology by participating in various illegal activities such as protests.

#### *Implications, Limitations and Future Research*

This study used self reports (interviews). Self reports are useful when the researcher attempts to collect detailed information about individuals and the sociological, psychological, and environmental factors that affect an individual's behavior (Thornberry & Krohn, 1994); however, it is commonly believed that self reports have many flaws, such as under- or over-reporting, response falsification, bias-associated recall errors, the testing (interview) effect, and so on. Having mentioned the general limitations of self reports, the limitations of the data used in this research need to be considered as well. The interviews contain limited information therefore the reasons why terrorist organizations preferred certain individuals or what kinds of criteria they used for recruitment decisions are not precisely known.

One of the concerns of social sciences is generalization. Although current research collected samples from different regions of Turkey where terrorist groups operate actively, there are many other locations from which samples can be collected. Similarly, the ability to generalize the findings of this research to other terrorist groups operating in different countries needs to be investigated.

#### *Policy Implications*

Terrorism is still one of the major challenges the contemporary world faces today. Governments, policy makers, and other stakeholders have great difficulty identifying effective legal mechanisms for fighting terrorism, mainly because of uncertainties regarding both the targets and offenders of terrorist acts.

According to the literature on terrorism, there is no single policy paradigm for

counterterrorism. Among the policies offered include hardening potential terrorist targets, punishing terrorist acts for deterrence, and gathering information regarding terrorists and terrorist networks through intelligence-based interventions.

However, as mentioned before, due to the limitations of terrorism research, evidence-based policies are rare. For instance, some researchers made comparisons between the GDP (Gross Domestic Product), the educational level of a country, and the number of terror incidents or active terrorist groups to identify working policies against terrorism. Despite the fact that these studies might offer some insight, types of terrorist activity, profiles, and ideologies vary. Therefore, there is a demand for micro-level studies in order to develop effective policies.

The current research is a micro-level study that attempts to identify effective policies against main terrorist groups from Turkey. Because terrorists groups vary in their tactics, target selection, and ideologies, understanding attachment and further preventing recruitment to terrorist groups is believed to be one of the most effective terrorism prevention methods. To this end, this study suggests macro-level implementations that can be employed by the government and micro-level implementations that can be used by law enforcement agencies to prevent terrorism and terrorist recruitment.

This study suggests two types of policy implementations. The first is to improve socioeconomic conditions so that people will be less vulnerable to terrorist recruitment, a tactic that requires the identification of risk groups. The second is to detect terrorists and their networks, a tactic that requires the use of different types of intelligence and preventive interventions in the locations that terrorists primarily use for recruitment. The former implementation is a long-term and large-scale project, whereas the latter one is a short-term, small-scale project that appears to be more promising. The two are, however, interrelated.

Simply implementing the second tactic could prevent terrorism, but in the absence of the first tactic, terrorist groups will likely find other fertile ground in which to flourish.



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## Appendix 1

### Questionnaire

- 1- What is your age?
- 2- Where were you born?
- 3- What is your gender?  
A – Male                      B - Female
- 4- Your marital status  
A – Single                      B – Married                      C - Divorced
- 5- What is your level of education?  
A - Secondary (lower, incomplete)  
B - Secondary  
C - Higher (incomplete)  
D - Higher  
E - Candidate of Sciences
- 6- Occupation/Profession \_\_\_\_\_
- 7- Occupational category  
A – Employed                      B - Unemployed
- 8- What is your ethnicity?
- 9- How many siblings do you have?
- 10- How would you describe your family's economic situation?  
A- Very Poor                      B- Poor                      C- Average  
D- Rich                      E- Very Rich
- 11- What is your family's political background?  
A- Left wing                      B- Right wing close to center  
C- Center                      D- Left wing close to center  
E -Left wing
- 12- What is your terrorist organization that you were belong to?  
A- DHKP/C (Left)                      B- Turkish Hezbollah (Right)  
C- PKK (Separatist)
- 13- Do you have any relatives who work in the police or army force?

- A- Yes                      B- No
- 14- Do you have valid passport
- A- Yes                      B- No
- 15- Have you ever been abroad?
- A- Yes                      B- No
- 16- Can you speak any foreign language?
- A- Yes                      B- No
- 17- Do you know how to use a gun?
- A- Yes                      B- No
- 18- Where did you get in touch with terrorist organization at first?
- A- School
- B- Family gathering
- C- Religious Compound
- D- Prison
- E- Political meeting or event
- F- Other (Please explain).....
- 19- What was your relation to the person who gets in touch with you at first?
- A- Friend
- B- Relative
- C- Clergy
- D- Teacher
- E- Other (Please explain).....
- 20- What was the gender of the person who gets in touch with you at first?
- A- Male              B- Female
- 21- What was age of the person who gets in touch with you at first?
- 22- How did the recruiters contact with you?
- A- Individually
- B- Newspaper advertisements
- C- Internet
- D- Friend/relative advice
- E -Other (Please explain).....

When did you get in touch with the organization initially?

23- What was your age?

24- Which season

A- Autumn

B- Winter

C- Spring

D- Summer

25- Daytime or nighttime?

A- Day Time

B- Night Time

26. What was the basic reason that causes you to go with terrorist organization?

A- Just curiosity

B- Personal motivations (i.e. ego, sex or the lust for power)

C- Socialization from peers or the organization

D- Inadequate supervision of family

E- Low income

F- Other (Please explain).....

## **Vita**

Ahmet Turer was born on 12.08.1973 in Turkey and is a Turkish citizen. He graduated from Police College, Ankara, Turkey, in 1991. He received his Bachelor of Science in Security Sciences from Turkish Police Academy in 1995 and subsequently worked at the Department of Anti-terror in Ankara Provincial Police for 8 years. He received a Master of Science in Criminal Justice from University of North Texas in 2003. Dr. Turer is married with 3 children and currently the Chief of Protective Details and Human Resources at the Department of Prime Ministry Protection in Turkey.