2012

Law Enforcement Intelligence Recruiting Confidential Informants within "Religion-Abusing Terrorist Networks"

Hursit Ucak
Virginia Commonwealth University

Law Enforcement Intelligence Recruiting Confidential Informants within
"Religion-Abusing Terrorist Networks"

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree
of
Doctor of Philosophy at Virginia Commonwealth University.

by
Hursit Ucak

B. S., Polis Akademisi, Ankara, 1995
M.S., University of North Texas, Denton, 2003

Director: William W. Newmann, Ph.D.
Professor
L. Douglas Wilder School of Government and Public Affairs

Virginia Commonwealth University
Richmond, Virginia
May, 2012

Acknowledgment

Table of Contents

List of Tables

List of Figures

Abstract

LAW ENFORCEMENT INTELLIGENCE RECRUITTING CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS WITHIN "RELIGION-ABUSING TERRORIST NETWORKS"

By Hursit Ucak, Ph.D.

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at Virginia Commonwealth University

Virginia Commonwealth University, 2012

Major Director: William W. Newmann, Ph.D., Professor of Political Science, L. Douglas Wilder School of Government and Public Affairs

This study examines the motivation factors that make some individuals (terrorists) confidential informants. The study is based on the assumptions of Maslow's hierarchy of needs and Herzberg's motivation-hygiene theories. Accordingly, main assumption of the present study is that some individuals with unsatisfied needs in religion-abusing terrorist (RAT) networks choose to become confidential informants to satisfy their predominant needs. The main hypothesis for the purpose of this study is "The individuals' decision-making processes to cooperate with law enforcement intelligence (LEI) as a confidential informant is affected by some motivation factors during recruitment process." The present study tests 27 hypotheses in order to answer two main research questions. To meet its objectives the present study uses quantitative research methodology, constructs a cross-sectional research design, and employs secondary data analysis to test the hypotheses of the research questions.

A dataset was formed based on official records of Turkish National Police by including all confidential informants within eight different RAT networks in Turkey. First, individual effect of each motivation factor on being a confidential informant is tested and discussed in detail. Then two group specific multivariate models for being an informant in Al-Qaeda and Turkish-Hezbollah are illustrated, compared and contrasted.

Both bivariate and multivariate statistical analyses not only revealed the extent of individual effects of motivations among RAT groups, but also helped us to build fitting multivariate models that explain the probability of being informants in certain RAT networks. By doing so, the present study aims to make contributions to the literature and practice on this relatively unexplored phenomenon. Findings indicate that while some motivation factors are common among all RAT networks, the strength and direction of their effects vary among different RAT networks.

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

Introduction

The end of cold war and advancements in technology created an illusion within the intelligence community, which led them to rely mostly on Technical intelligence (TECHINT) such as signals intelligence, satellites and etc. This trend consequently resulted in underestimation of HUMINT (Ucak, 2003). Accordingly, less investment on HUMINT ended up with little attention on confidential informants who have played crucial role in almost every conflict situation throughout the history. For instance, the 9/11 commission findings indicate a significant intelligence deficiency on terrorism related issues. Among the factors mentioned in the report, deficiency in human intelligence is the hardest one because it requires long-term investment in human capital, such as training and education in different foreign languages and cultures, that are not familiar to American minds (Kean & Hamilton, 2004). Furthermore, human intelligence is very dangerous. Undercover agents who will penetrate into terrorist networks will be risking their lives. At this point, recruiting informants who are already

in a terrorist network and using them to collect intelligence is more efficient, less risky, and can pay back in a short time (Ucak, 2003).

In fact, human intelligence (HUMINT) is not new; it has always been an important component of the intelligence community regardless of department, agency, or nation throughout history. The famous historical case of Judas Iscariot, a paid informant, is a well-known example. His name has become inextricably entwined with betrayal as it was his information that resulted in the capture of Jesus by the Romans (Bloom, 2002; Madinger, 2000). Sun Tzu, 2000 years ago in another part of the world, mentioned the significance of spies in his historical book "The Art of War" and identified five different types of spies. Accordingly, his contemporary, Tu Mu, summarized five principle motivations for informing: greed, fear, ego, revenge, and perversity— most of which are still active today (Madinger, 2000; Sun Tzu, 1994).

There is no doubt that informants—one of the crucial elements of HUMINT—have a significant role in collecting inside intelligence about the dispositions of a target group. Recruiting somebody within the target group and infiltrating timely information about the assets, personnel, logistics, or plans of the enemy can provide a substantial advantage to the intelligence community. It should be recognized that without the ability to use confidential informants the mission of law enforcement intelligence in the fight against terrorism would be seriously handicapped.

Therefore, informants have vital importance in combating terrorism in terms of attaining intelligence that is not possible to collect by other means of intelligence.

From the literature review it has become clear that no study has been conducted specifically focusing on motivating factors of confidential informants in terrorist networks. Most of the studies have either been conducted in the areas of drug trafficking, organized crime, or corruption. On the other hand, the ones in the area of terrorism focus either on the recruitment process to the terrorism, or on the motives leading to specific acts and behaviors of terrorists in their terrorism life cycle (Unal, 2010; Victoroff, 2005; Yilmaz, 2009). The gap in the literature in terms of empirical studies regarding confidential informants especially for the ones active in terrorist networks is obvious. This study intends to fill such a gap.

Knowing the motivations and handling the informant in accordance with his/her predominant needs play a crucial role in the attainment of informant recruitment process. Therefore, the purpose of this study is threefold. The first is to find out motivation factors that are effective on confidential informant's decision to choose to cooperate with Law Enforcement Intelligence (LEI). This is done by testing and analyzing motivation factors of informants in different fields—narcotics, corruption, organized crime, etc.—to see which ones are effective on confidential informants active in Religion-Abusing Terrorist (RAT) networks in Turkey.

The second purpose of this study is to find a theoretical explanation for the phenomena. This study utilizes two important conceptual approaches to motivation—Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs, and Herzberg's Two-Factor Theory—in order to understand the reasons underlying the decision of a terrorist to become an informant.

Both of these theories focus on the factors—needs and incentives—within the person that cause—energize, direct, sustain, and stop—behavior. They both attempt to determine the specific needs that motivate people (C.P. Alderfer, 1969; Hersey, Johnson, & Blanchard, 1996; Herzberg, 1959; Ivancevich, Konopaske, & Matteson, 2005; A. Maslow, 1954; Robbins & Judge, 2007; Simsek, 2008; Steers & Black, 1994). Even though these theories are mainly used to explain employee motivation in work force environments, I have tested if there is an empirical support in my study to these theories and to what degree the phenomena can be explained by these approaches.

Based on Maslow's theory, the main hypothesis of this study is that motivating factors—needs and incentives—that are valid, effective and, predominant during the recruitment process of individuals in RAT groups are the main reasons that make them choose to be confidential informants.

Based on Herzberg's theory, members of RAT groups who are dissatisfied with the lack of Herzberg's "hygiene factors" in the terrorism setting will develop an inclination to leave terrorism. When they have the opportunity, they will leave terrorism. If Herzberg's theory is correct, then the informants' initial motive during the recruitment process should be in the "hygiene" category of Herzberg's theory.

According to Maslow's theory, if the LEI officer offers appropriate opportunities to meet the unsatisfied predominant needs of RAT members, then this will lead to successful recruitment of an individual as confidential informant. If Maslow's theory is correct, then the informants' initial motive during the recruitment process should be in

accordance with his/her social and economic status and be in one of the five categories of Maslow's theory. Studies and evidence relating to each of these frameworks are discussed in detail in Chapter Two.

Each informant recruitment process begins with roughly the same procedures under various circumstances, but every informant has his/her own story and relatively different motivational factors that are effective on his/her decision to perform as a confidential informant for the Istihbarat Dairesi Baskanligi (IDB), LEI department of the Turkish National Police (TNP). All of the subjects of this study are informants within Religion-Abusing Terrorist (RAT) networks in Turkey. Besides, each RAT group has its own peculiar characteristics. Thus, the strength and direction of these factors on the decision to cooperate with Law Enforcement Intelligence (LEI) as a confidential informant is expected to vary among individuals who are active in different terrorist groups. It is also expected that these peculiar characteristics of RAT groups do not outweigh or overshadow the similarities within each RAT group. Therefore, the third aim of this study is to discover whether there are group level models about motivating factors affecting the recruitment process of confidential informants in RAT networks. The model is grounded in information from an analysis of RAT networks in Turkey.

The dependent variable of this study is "*a decision by a militant to be a confidential informant*". The independent variables are "*motivation factors*". In the literature regarding the informant development, studies that have been conducted in the areas of drug trafficking, organized crime, and corruption eleven motivations— fear,

revenge, perverse, egoistical/vanity, mercenary, repentance, ideology, friendship with officer, jealousy, altruism, and police enthusiasm— are commonly mentioned as having an effect during the recruitment process (Billingsley, Nemitz, & Bean, 2001; Bloom, 2002; Blum, 1972; Copeland, 1974; Fitzgerald, 2008; Harney & Cross, 1968; Jacobson, 1981; Lee, 2004; Madinger, 2000; Natapoff, 2009; O'Hara, 1973; Skolnick, 1994; Wilson, 1978). These with some other motivations based on my personal 17 years of field experience are considered important and are used as independent variables. This study also includes some "*socioeconomic, and demographic*" variables as control variables to eliminate alternative explanations*.*

For the research design, this study employs cross-sectional research design to answer the research questions. A dataset is formed by conducting archival surveys on the official records of Turkish National Police (TNP) for the secondary data analysis. I used these records to come up with data regarding their motivations during their recruitment. The findings are coded in a Microsoft Excel® worksheet for every confidential informant served in our target terrorist groups, RATs, sometime in the past two decades.

These then are analyzed with appropriate statistical methods to test the main hypothesis, i.e., that the individuals' decision-making processes to cooperate with LEI as a confidential informant is affected by some motivation factors during recruitment process.

6

For the research strategy, I conduct an exploratory design in the first phase of this study by including as many variables as possible, which are collected from the subjects of the target population. In addition to descriptive statistical analyses, bivariate statistics such as crosstabs and Chi Square are used to test the effects of these variables.

The second phase of this study has an explanatory nature. First, motivational factors acquired in the first phase of the study are classified based on the main assumptions of motivation theories. Then, variables in these classifications are analyzed with appropriate statistical methods such as logistic regression to test whether they support the hypotheses derived from theories.

Both bivariate and multivariate statistical analyses in the second phase not only help us to see the extent of individual effects of motivations among RAT groups, but also help us to build a fitting multivariate model that explains the probability of being an informant in our target population. The final model is a major contribution to the literature and practice as well. It will help the intelligence agencies to develop group specific models by using their organizational memory. Our model will also increase the success of the intelligence officer in the field by making it possible to foresee some potential outcomes.

Research Questions

1. What are the motivational factors that make some individuals (terrorists) in RAT groups confidential informants? What motivating factors have an effect on the individual's decision to choose to be an informant within RAT networks? In other words, what general motivating factors of recruiting informants in the literature are applicable to confidential informants within RAT networks?

2. How do the content approaches of human motivation—Maslow's need hierarchy, and Herzberg's motivation-hygiene theories—affect the likelihood of becoming of certain RAT group informant? This question will be answered by answering the following two sub questions:

2-a. What is the effect of hygiene factors-dissatisfiers-on the individual's decision to leave terrorism in RAT networks? This is essentially a question related to Herzberg's theory.

Following sub questions are related to Maslow's theory:

2-b. Are there significant motivational differences in the probability of becoming Turkish-Hezbollah informant relative to the probability of becoming other RAT informants?

2-c. Are there significant motivational differences in the probability of becoming Al-Qaeda informant relative to the probability of becoming other RAT informants?

Hypotheses

<u>*Hypotheses for Research Question One*</u>

H1. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants with an expectation of reduced sentence during the trial.

H2. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants as a result of friendly relationship with LEI officer.

H3. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants because of their gratitude or indebtedness to the LEI officer.

H4. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants to satisfy their mercenary needs.

H5. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants because of fear of incarceration.

H6. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants because of revenge motivation.

H7. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants to satisfy their need for repentance or desire to reform their criminal life.

H8. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants because of their

patriotic motives.

H9. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants as a result of fear from their terrorist associates.

H10. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants because of their selective law enforcement or altruistic motivations.

H11. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants as a result of jealousy within the RAT group.

H12. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants as a result of ideological conflict in morality with the RAT group.

H13. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants to satisfy their desire to be a spy. (James Bond syndrome, police wannabe).

H14. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants to fulfill their need for excitement and egoistical motives.

H15. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants because of a hidden perverse motivation.

H16. Most recruits from RAT groups expressed the state of frustration to some extend during the recruitment.

H17. Most recruits from RAT groups expressed the fear of being labeled as snitch as a barrier to cope with while choosing to become informants.

H18. Most recruits from RAT groups expressed the fear of being discarded by police as a barrier to cope with while choosing to become informants.

H19. Most recruits from RAT groups expressed an ideological opposition to the state and system as a barrier to cope with while choosing to become informants.

Hypotheses for Research Question Two

There are motivational differences between becoming Turkish-Hezbollah/Al-Qaeda informant and becoming other RAT informant.

H20. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants to satisfy their predominant physiological needs.

H21. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants to satisfy their predominant safety (security) needs.

H22. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants to satisfy their predominant social (affiliation) needs.

H23. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants to satisfy their self-esteem and esteem from others predominant needs.

H24. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants to satisfy their

predominant Self-Actualization needs.

Hypothesis for the question 2-a:

H25. Lack of Herzberg's hygiene factors in terrorism settings leads most recruits from RAT groups to make the decision to leave terrorism to satisfy their predominant needs by becoming informants.

Hypothesis for the question 2-b:

H26. There are significant motivational differences (Maslow's need categories) and demographic differences in the probability of becoming Turkish-Hezbollah informant relative to the probability of becoming other RAT informants.

Hypothesis for the question 2-c:

H27. There are significant motivational differences (Maslow's need categories) and demographic differences in the probability of becoming Al-Qaeda informant relative to the probability of becoming other RAT informants.

Background Information

A Historical Overview of RAT Groups

Terrorism has long been connected to religious extremism. When we look at the Oxford English Dictionary, many of the terms we use today in connection with terrorism have their roots in religious extremism- "zealot" originally referred to a Jewish sect that

fought in A.D. 66– 73 against the Roman Empire and used public killings as a form of psychological warfare; "thug" has its origins in a seventh-century religious cult in India; "assassin" derives from a radical offshoot of the Muslim Shi'a Ismaili sect who between A.D. 1090 and 1272 tried to repel the Christian Crusaders, by individual killings (Oxford, 2000). They also assassinated commanders of Salahadeen Al-ayyubi's army and several Sunni Islamic scholars during the same period as well.

Until the 19th Century, religion was the primary motivation for terrorism. Secular terrorism coincided with the fall of divine monarchical rule in Western Europe and the rise of nationalism combined with radical schools of thought- i.e., Marxism, anarchism and nihilism. During the 20th Century ethno-nationalist/separatist and ideologically motivated terrorism became more dominant as anti-colonialist movements took hold in Asia, the Middle East and Africa (Juergensmeyer, 2008; Rapoport, 1984).

Then in 1979 the Iranian Revolution occurred, bringing in a fundamentalist theocracy headed by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (Juergensmeyer, 1994, 2008). Of the sixty-four identifiable terrorist groups active in 1980, only two were religious in nature: the Iranian-backed Shi'a organizations Al-Dawa and the Committee for Safeguarding the Islamic Revolution. By 1992 the number of RAT groups had increased to eleven, and by 1994 sixteen of the forty-nine terrorist groups were RATs. Within a year this had increased to twenty-six out of the forty-six identified terrorist groups. The trend continued, and by 2004 fifty- two out of the 110 groups were RATs (Hoffman, 2006).

The abuse of religious norms seems to have made the attacks less discriminating and far more violent (Juergensmeyer, 2008). RATs committed only 6 percent of recorded terrorist attacks between 1998 and 2004, yet their actions accounted for 30 percent of the total number of fatalities recorded during that time period. Specifically, Shi'a groups committed only 8 percent of all international terrorist incidents between 1982 and 1989,[1] yet they were responsible for 30 percent of the recorded fatalities in that time, and a Salafi group, Al-Qaeda, claims responsibility for 19 percent of the fatalities between 1998 and 2004,[2] despite having only performed 0.1 percent of the actions (Hoffman, 2006).

Core Characteristics of RATs

The reasons for the markedly more violent and indiscriminate acts perpetrated by RATs compared to secular terrorists are rooted in radically different value systems, concepts of morality and general worldview as well as the mechanisms for justification and rationalization in accordance to their interpretation of their sacred writings. To the RATs, violence is a sacramental duty in response to a theological imperative or demand. They feel that they transcend the political, moral and practical constraints that may

---

[1] According to the RAND Terrorism Incident Database, between 1982 and 1989 Shi'a terrorist groups committed 247 terrorist incidents and were responsible for 1,057 deaths (Hoffman, 2006).

[2] According to the RAND Terrorism Incident Database, there were a total number of 11,769 terrorist attacks recorded between 1998 and 2004. Al Qaeda was responsible for 22 of those incidents but caused a total of 3,457 fatalities (Hoffman, 2006).

restrain secular terrorists (Juergensmeyer, 1994, 2008). Whereas secular terrorists avoid indiscriminate mass killings because such tactics are considered counterproductive to their political purposes and goals, as well as immoral, RATs view broad-spectrum attacks as being justified and moral according to their beliefs. Their so-called religious leaders, considered to be speaking for the divine as interpreters of the sacred texts, view current events through the lens of faith and justify the use of violence. This is why the blessings of clerics are so important to RATs before they undertake an attack (Hoffman, 2006; Juergensmeyer, 2008).

But more importantly, a secular attack has different aims than a RAT attack. A secular terrorist sees his actions as a way of forcing changes in a flawed but basically good system or as a means to creating a new and improved system. RATs view themselves not as parts of a system that is worth preserving but as outsiders to the system seeking to destroy it to make fundamental changes in order (Juergensmeyer, 2008). This sense of alienation explains why RATs are willing to consider extreme acts against broadly defined enemies, namely anyone who is not a part of their religious sect or group. It also explains why manifestos from these groups often use similar rhetoric, referring to "holy fire" and terming their enemies as infidels, dogs, children of Satan and the like. This demonization and dehumanization of others further enables them to commit horrific acts with less empathy for their targets, who they see as subhuman and not worthy of living (Hoffman, 2006).

Thus far the description has been generic and can be applied to any religious group, and examples may be drawn from recent events to illustrate how this has been done within the United States to justify the bombings of abortion clinics and other acts of violence, but it is most closely associated with RATs in Islam, especially Iranian based ones, Al-Qaeda and its associates. The 1979 revolution in Iran was a pivotal event in the growth of modern RAT. At the core of the revolution was the intent of expanding the fundamentalist Iranian interpretation of Islamic view to other countries. The Iranian revolution has been held up as an example for groups who were resisting the intrusion of the Western influences into the Middle East. It reflects the beliefs and history of Shi'a Islam as viewed by Khomeini and his followers in the Middle East. It is rooted in the belief of Shi'a as a centuries-old minority within Islamic religion, persecuted for its special revelations and knowledge, but also includes a conviction of the inherent illegitimacy of any secular government. In their view, legitimacy can only be conferred by the adoption of Shi'a law to facilitate the return of the Mahdi to earth as the return of the Messiah. Since Iran is the only nation to have begun redemption by returning to a "true Islamic" state, it must be the advocate for the oppressed of the world. Acts of violence and coercion are not only acceptable in the fight to spread their ideology worldwide, but they are considered necessary to attain this divine goal. The alienation and need for fundamental changes to the world order can be seen in the

16

writings of many Shi'a theologians. For example, Baqer al-Sadr wrote, "The world as it is today is how others shaped it," (As cited in Hoffman, 2006, p. 90). Similarly, Khomeini said, "We have two choices: either to accept it with submission, which means letting Islam die, or to destroy it, so that we can construct the world as Islam requires (As cited in Hoffman, 2006, p. 90).

Hussein Mussawi, the former leader of Lebanon's Hezbollah, said, "We are not fighting so that the enemy recognizes us and offers us something. We are fighting to wipe out the enemy" (As cited in Taheri, 1987, p. 8).

Clerical support of terrorist actions has always been crucial in both Shi'a and Salafi organizations. The roots of it go back to 13th century writings of Ibn Taymiyya and several others. Ibn Taymiyya was born during Mongolian incursions and his childhood was effected by the conflicts of the time. Later, he criticized four main Islamic sects and scholars, and issued several fatwas based on his own ideas most of which were contrary to the mainstream Islam. As a result, he was imprisoned exiled several times, and died in a prison in 1328. A fatwa (a legal ruling or statement of legal issues, given by a mufti- a qualified jurist- at the request of a religious court) may be issued ordering an attack, as in the case of Salman Rushdie or the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center. Clerics have also given support or even blessings to self-martyrdom, despite suicide being expressly forbidden by Islamic law (Hoffman, 2006).

Religious motivations are commonly cited, but are heavily debated. Islam, Christianity, Judaism, Buddhism and Hinduism do not teach violence, and are in fact

against it. It is when religion becomes politicized that violence is brought forward. This is done by deliberate misinterpretations of sacred texts and using quotes taken out of context to justify political aims (Canan, 2004; Capan, 2004; Simonsen & Spindlove, 2004).

Specifically, Islam has been claimed to justify attacks as *jihad*, despite the term being defined in the Qur'an as more than simply "holy war"- it literally means *struggle* or *effort* (Martin, 2009). The Qur'an says, "Not all people will believe (like Muslims)"[3] and "There is no coercion in (the choice of) religion; truly the right way has become clearly differentiated from the erroneous one."[4] These verses clearly indicate that there is to be no forcible conversion to Islam, and that everyone is entitled to worship as they see fit (Bulac, 2004; Capan, 2004; Nikbay, 2009).

Jihad can be viewed as the struggle to live in accordance to God's ways. In literature there are two types of jihad: the big jihad and the small jihad. The big jihad is the internal struggle of the individual to overcome his temptations to do evil. The small jihad is the external struggle to defend Islam, either with or without weapons. The Prophet Muhammad said to the soldiers coming to their homes from the Battle of Badr, "You have now returned from the minor jihad to the major one" When they asked him what the major jihad was, he answered that "the major jihad is the one against to the *nafs*"—the carnal self of each individual (Bulac, 2004; Nikbay, 2009).

---

[3] Yusuf Sura, verse 12:106 of the Qur'an

[4] Baqara Sura, verses 2:256 of the Qur'an

The militants, however, overlook the big jihad entirely, and emphasize the small jihad. They deny the clarification and denounce it as heresy. According to the militants, adherents to other religions should be slaughtered and driven out of the lands (Laqueur, 1999). While the militants seek confrontation, the battles of the Prophet Mohammed were always defensive in nature. He never provoked conflict or attacked others for following a different religion (Aktan, 2004; Martin, 2009).

Along with jihad, the concept of martyrdom has been warped from its original meaning of "witness or someone whose existence is a living testimony even after his death" (Dolnik, 2003, p. 29). The original word is *shahid,* meaning one who lives with his faith so intensely that he is willing to risk death for the truth according to the Qur'an. Therefore those who die in jihad are martyrs (Bulac, 2004; Nikbay, 2009).

However, merely dying for a cause is not sufficient to become a martyr according to Islamic teachings. The final judgment is with Allah, who looks into the hearts and motivations to determine if the person was truly acting as a Muslim. Martyrdom is a spiritual rank, one of the four glorified roles in the Qur'an and the teachings of the Prophet Mohammed, and is an honor to be prayed for. It is not to be attained by suicide attacks as suicide is clearly prohibited in Islamic principles (Hudson & DIV., 1999; Israeli, 1997; Nikbay, 2009).

The Qur'an also states that "…whoever kills a soul, unless it be for manslaughter or for mischief in the land, is like one who killed the whole mankind; and whoever saves

a life, is like one who saves the lives of all mankind…."[5] "If a man kills a believer intentionally, his recompense is Hell, to abide therein (forever): and the wrath and the curse of Allah are upon him, and a dreadful chastisement is prepared for him"[6] (Nikbay, 2009).

Martin (2003) credits two major historical events for the resurgence of radical jihad in recent times: the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Ziya ul-Haq, the former President of Pakistan, thought that the invasion was a good reason to declare jihad against the godless Communism. Similarly, the US thought it useful to mobilize almost one billion Muslims against its enemy in the Cold War, and began CIA operations to finance jihad against the Soviet Union (Nikbay, 2009).

Osama bin Laden in 1996 and 1998 declared two *fatwas*[7] to justify Al-Qaeda's actions, instructing Muslims to "kill the Americans and their allies, civilians, and the military." There is no justification for this in Islam, nor did he have the authority to declare a fatwa (Malka, 2003). Jihad is only to be used as a last resort, and can only be declared by a state representing a legitimate communal authority (Aktan, 2004). No individual or political or social group can declare jihad (Bulac, 2004; Capan, 2004).

---

[5] Maida sura, verse 5:32 of the Qur'an

[6] Al-Nisa sura, verse 4:93 of the Qur'an

[7] For the texts in English see:
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/international/fatwa_1996.html.
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/international/fatwa_1998.html.

America and the West have been viewed as the great opponent responsible for the problems in the Middle East due to their support of Israel and their distancing themselves from Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982. The Islamic Resistance Movement (Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya), better known by its Arabic acronym, Hamas (which also means "zeal"), has also declared war against Israel in which the enemy is to be obliterated. Hamas's founder and spiritual leader, Imam Sheikh Ahmad Ibrahim Yassin declared, "Six million descendants of monkeys [i.e., Jews] now rule in all the nations of the world, but their day, too, will come" (Hamas, 1993, p. 4).

Al-Qaeda has similarly taken an absolutist stance against the United States. In a May 1998 interview with ABC News, bin Laden stated: "We believe that the worst thieves in the world today and the worst terrorists are the Americans . . . We do not differentiate between those dressed in military uniforms and civilians: they are all targets" (Kean & Hamilton, 2004, p. 47).

Development of RAT Groups in Turkey

In late 1960s radical books from Egypt and Pakistan started to be translated into Turkish and got published in the 1970s. Right after the revolution in Iran, vast amounts of Shi'a ideological books were translated into Turkish and spread throughout the country via some publishing companies with the clandestine support of Khomeini regime. Turkish people also met with the Salafi ideology during the USSR-Afghan war era. Eventually, some people who were reading these translations started to form

groups around the bookstores and publishing companies. These ideas were new to Turkish people, and Turkey has been facing with religious radicalism for the first time in its history. Subsequently, members of these radical groups continuously made long trips to Iran and Afghanistan. During these long stays, they not only got ideological and military training, but also several of them joined the Jihadists in Afghanistan, Chechnya, Kosovo, etc. (Turkoglu, 2006)

Starting from the early 1990s, Turkey also has become a target for RATs because of its democratic and secular government structure, and being allies with Israel and the U.S. Thus, RAT networks, which have ruthlessly attacked governmental and civilian targets in Turkey in the past two decades, will be the focus of this study. These RAT networks include but are not limited to: Al-Qaeda, Turkish Hezbollah, Hizbut-Tahrir, Selam-Tevhid, IBDA/C, and other relatively smaller groups such as: ICCB-AFID, Vasat, and Islamic Movement.

It is important to mention at this point that all subjects of this study- confidential informants- were already in one of above-mentioned RAT networks at the time law enforcement intelligence officers recruited them. Therefore, factors that had an effect on their decision to cooperate with LEI are crucially important for the success of LEI in recruiting future informants. However, before focusing on our main research it is useful to know some basics about informants, which will be discussed in the following paragraphs.

A Historical Overview of Informants

The use of informants has long historical roots. As long as there have been any sort of competing groups, there have been informants (Ucak, 2003). Generally, there are two types of informants: incidental and confidential. Incidental informants generally only act once, in reference to a specific crime situation. Confidential informants provide a steady stream of information over a period of time.

In ancient Greece informants were rewarded for reporting acts of treason. If the information was accurate the informant was granted impunity, and if not he was executed. Ancient Rome made extensive use of informers to quell subversion by using grain merchants, who had contacts across the Mediterranean as they supplied the legions (Bloom, 2002).

The most famous case of a paid informant, of course, is Judas Iscariot. His name has become inextricably entwined with betrayal as it was his information that resulted in the capture of Jesus by the Romans (Madinger, 2000).

During the Middle Ages in England, informants were used in cases of felony prosecution (Zimmerman, 1994). In 1275 England created the "approver system" which was similar to that used by the Greeks an informer could gain pardon by providing good information, but would be executed for false information. This unfortunately led to corruption as innocent people were threatened with accusation unless they paid money (blackmail) and eventually the system collapsed. It was replaced by the common

informer system in which the informer was "a person who brought certain transgressions to the notice of the authorities and instituted proceedings, not because he, personally, had been aggrieved or wished to see justice done, but because under the law he was entitled to a part of any fine which might be imposed" (Zimmerman, 1994, p. 166). Again, this system fell prey to corruption and collapsed.

In the early 19th Century France in particular began to make more use of informants. François Vidocq was imprisoned for a minor crime, but managed to gain his freedom by providing information about the other prisoners. He then founded Paris Sûreté, a criminal investigation unit of the Paris police, and hired former criminals as his detectives. From 1810 to 1827 he pioneered surveillance and investigative techniques (Marx, 1989). In 1877 Howard Vincent established a similar system in England called the Criminal Investigation Department, but by the 1920s is had become corrupt (Boyd, 1984). And in the United States, the Pinkerton Detective Agency came into existence. As a private company with corporate clients it became the de facto law enforcement agency of the American West during the late 19th Century, and still exists today. They used agents to infiltrate organizations and gather information, as in the case of the Molly Maguires (Horan & Swiggett, 1951).

In 1908 Theodore Roosevelt formed the Federal Bureau of Investigations, which developed a network of domestic informants across the United States. It has used informants to infiltrate what it considered to be radical groups, from the Black Panthers to the Progressive Labor Party. It has also used informants in criminal investigations,

such as organized crime cases. In November 1998 the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin addressed the topic of informants directly, focusing on the problems that have plagued the informant systems from their inception. It also discussed recruitment, documentation of information and how to assess the value of the gathered intelligence, as well as how to judge its veracity (Bloom, 2002).

The Turkish National Police was formed in 1846, which developed an effective informant system in a couple of years. Since the 19th century, the TNP has been using informants in criminal investigations, such as terrorism, organized crime, narcotics and mafia cases.

Informants are considered a critical tool today. For instance, According to CNN, on October 29 2010 with the help of an informant in Yemen, British investigators found a bomb concealed as a toner cartridge in a plane flying from Yemen to Chicago in London (Candiotti, 2010).

According to BBC News, on January 22 2010 120-suspected Al-Qaeda members were arrested in a major nationwide anti-terror operation in Turkey. Confidential informants had played crucial roles in plotting the Al-Qaeda cells and hideouts before the operation. In coordinated predawn raids in 16 provinces of Turkey the TNP netted weapons, fake identity cards, camouflage clothing and documents disclosing details of extremist militant activity in Turkey (Head, 2010).

"Informant" is a generic term often used by law enforcement, intelligence or military personnel. It refers to a wide range of people who confidentially pass along information regarding illegal activity. Throughout the world, law enforcement or investigative agencies at Federal, state, local or tribal levels have a variety of terminologies and policies regarding the identification and utilization of informants in every nation (Fitzgerald, 2008).

As an example, the FBI Manual of Investigative Operations and Guidelines (MIOG) 137.2.1 defines an informant as "any person or entity who furnishes information to the FBI on a confidential basis" (FBI, 2000).

The CIA refers to informants as "assets" and are often termed "agents". The information they provide for the CIA is referred to as Human Intelligence, or HUMINT, indicating that it was obtained from a human source. The CIA employees who oversee assets, gather information and do field work are known as case officers (Davis 1997 as cited in Fitzgerald, 2008).

The U.S. Attorney General Guidelines Regarding the Use of Confidential Informants (Section I.B.6) defines confidential informant or "CI" as: -"any individual who provides useful and credible information to a JLEA (Department of Justice Law Enforcement Agency) regarding felonious criminal activities, and from whom the JLEA

expects or intends to obtain additional useful and credible information regarding such activities in the future" (DOJ, 2001).

In section I.B.1, it also lists the department of justice law enforcement agencies or "JLEA's" that are bound with the guidelines as: "The Drug Enforcement Administration; The Federal Bureau of Investigation; The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS); The United States Marshals Service; and The Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General" (DOJ, 2001).

In section I.B.13, Confidential Informant review Committee or "CIRC" is created by a JLEA for purposes of reviewing certain decisions relating to the registration and utilization of CIs (DOJ, 2001).

Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA): This is an investigative agency within the U.S. Department of Justice. In the DEA Agents Manual the term " Confidential Source" or "CS" is used instead of informant. CS is "a person who, under the direction of a specific DEA agent, and with or without expectation of compensation, furnishes information on drug trafficking or performs a lawful service for the DEA in its investigation of drug trafficking" (Fitzgerald, 2008, p. 8).

Internal Revenue Service (IRS): This is the investigative agency of the U.S. Treasury Department. In the Internal Revenue Service Manual Confidential informant is defined as "an individual who is not expected to testify but may be paid for the information provided and/or gathers information and evidence at the direction of IRS" (Fitzgerald, 2008, p. 13).

U.S. Marshals Service (USMS): This is within the Justice Department. The US Marshals Service Manual defines "informant" as "an individual who furnishes information to the marshal's service. Such information may be furnished on the informant's own initiative or because of being directed to furnish information by a USMS employee." A "Confidential Informant" is "one who requests that his name be held in strict confidence"(Fitzgerald, 2008, pp. 13-14).

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI): Accordingly, informants who fall into one of the following three categories require approval from the FBI's Confidential Informant Review Committee: "Long term confidential informant; High-level confidential informant; Privileged confidential informant" (DOJ, 2001).

FBI informants in the area of antiterrorism law enforcement and intelligence gathering are operated under the Attorney General's Guidelines for National Security Investigations and Foreign Intelligence Collection, a partially classified document which states that informants used in international terrorism, foreign intelligence, or foreign counterintelligence investigations are referred to as assets (Fitzgerald, 2008).

In 2006 the Department of Justice issued a specific set of guidelines to the FBI, titled "The Attorney General's Guidelines Regarding the Use of FBI Confidential Human Sources". These guidelines are similar to the more general ones issued in 2002, but establish additional documentation, authorization and ongoing evaluation requirements for establishing or using an existing confidential informant. The documentation is to contain material such as formal statements of any promises or arrangements made to

the informant. These conditions include that the information must be truthful and that the informant not engage in any illegal activities beyond what is already under investigation. The guidelines also set limits on the agents, such as inability to grant immunity (which may only be granted by a prosecutor) and prohibiting socialization between the agent and the informant. These guidelines are intended to limit corruption and to prevent rogue informants (Natapoff, 2009).

The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP): The IACP through its National Law Enforcement Policy Center produced a "Concepts and Issues Paper" entitled "Confidential Informants" in 1990. According to the IACP: "A confidential informant could be defined as a private citizen who has entered into a confidential agreement with a law enforcement agency to provide information about criminals or criminal activity in exchange for monetary or other consideration" (Rudovsky, 1992).

Each law enforcement Agency has its own agency policy that is formulated within the environment it operates. Laws, court rulings, ordinances, regulations, administrative decisions, agency resources and adopted criminal justice philosophies have an impact on the formulation of this policy.

According to IACP, to be useful as a Confidential Informant, an individual should have one or more of the following qualities. A good CI:

- Has firsthand knowledge of, or has intimate information of active criminals.
- Has a residence or an occupation that is convenient to gathering relevant information about criminals and their plans.

- Is known to the criminal justice system, in being on parole or probation, being out on bail, has been convicted and is awaiting sentence, or is imprisoned.

- Is a civilian who has entered into an agreement with law enforcement to provide confidential information about criminals and their activities in exchange for compensation (Rudovsky, 1992).

Based on the IACP qualifications, Fitzgerald (2008) defines a confidential informant as "a private citizen who has entered into a confidential agreement with a law enforcement agency to provide information about criminals or criminal activity in exchange for monetary or other consideration" (Fitzgerald, 2008, p. 16).

Types of Informants

Madinger (2000) defines informant as an individual who has access to information about a crime or criminal activity, and has the motivation to provide that information, and is willing to accept the control of a law enforcement officer.

From law enforcement perspective Madinger (2000) classifies informants into 7 distinct categories based on the roles they play during cooperation with the government:

- *Witness/Informants:* The person in this category has no longer access to information but testifies about historical events. As in the Monica Lewinsky

case, cooperation of this person is known by many people. These individuals usually go into a Witness Security Program after the testimony.

- *Active Informants:* The informants in this category maintain their status in criminal setting. As long as their identities are kept secret, they provide timely inside information about current and future criminal activities. The problems involved with this type of informant are significant, as they may need to continue to commit criminal acts to avoid notice from their associates and stay active in the investigation. This may result in law enforcement being complicit in crimes. Informants in this category are invaluable, but hard to obtain as they cooperate at great risk to themselves.

- *Source of Information:* People in this category are the ones who reside in neighborhoods where criminal activity occurs or people who come into contact with criminal activities because of their occupation. If they are accordingly motivated by law enforcement officers, airline employees, pawnbrokers, or parcel service employees can be made good sources of information by conveying suspicious activities happening around them.

- *Jailhouse Informants:* The people in this category are either witnesses or actively involved in criminal activities. These people are highly motivated to go out sooner. Therefore, they can provide information about a current criminal activity inside the prison, a past crime that another inmate has admitted to, or additional information about an unresolved case. However, as

they are so strongly motivated their information is often suspect and is usually mistrusted by prosecutors and investigators.

- *Unwitting Informants:* An individual in this category provides information to law enforcement believing himself to be talking to another criminal or a reporter. He is unaware of the real occupation of undercover officer and may react unfavorably when the truth is revealed. Similarly, they may be giving their information to another informant who, unknown to them, is passing it to law enforcement.

- *Agent Provocateur:* The individuals in this category incite crimes. They usually induce their associates to take some action—riot—enabling the law enforcement to intervene —arrest, or dispersion— of the group. Use of these is generally avoided, as it may result in the entrapment of otherwise innocent people. Usually this situation occurs when an informant goes beyond the control of their handler and acts independently.

- *Special Employees:* This term was used in the past to describe active informants who were filling special needs—a Chinese person speaking Cantonese—that were used to buy drugs and testify in the court. The term is no longer used to avoid blurring the lines between informers and law enforcement (Madinger, 2000).

Overview of Theoretical Framework

The motivations of terrorists are vitally important to understand, yet little has been written on this subject. Based on the review of literature, no theory has yet been applied to informants in terrorism. We must therefore rely on theories proposed regarding the motivations of individuals in various fields such as industry.

There have been many studies done in various fields to analyze motivations. Hersey, Blanchard and Johnson (1996) define motives as the "whys" of behavior. An individual's activity is prompted by hundreds of competing motives (needs) within an individual. The strongest need at a particular moment determines behavior and leads to activity (Hersey, et al., 1996).

The most applicable motivation theories are the ones proposed by Maslow and Herzberg, although Alderfer's ERG (Existence, Relatedness and Growth) theory is of use as well to expand on Maslow's needs theory.

Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs

Abraham Maslow wrote one of the classic theories of motivation in which he classified needs in a hierarchy, from the most basic to the highest level. These needs are defined as follows:

Physiological needs: the needs for shelter, clothing, food and relief from discomfort. The physiological needs have the highest strength until they are somewhat

satisfied. Until these needs are fulfilled to a certain degree, needs at other categories will provide little motivation (Steers & Black, 1994).

Safety and security needs: the security need for freedom from threatening events or threatening environment. When a person's life is in danger, or he faces a significant threat to his/her safety, other things become negligible (Steers & Black, 1994).

Belongingness, social, and love needs: the need for friends, belonging to a group, social interaction, and love. Individuals at this need level will strive for belonging and being accepted by several groups (Steers & Black, 1994).

Esteem needs: the need for positive self-image and for approval from others. When these needs are fulfilled they yield feelings of self-confidence, power, control and prestige.

Self-actualization needs: the need to feel satisfaction by using abilities, skills, talents and living up to full potential. (Ivancevich, et al., 2005; Simsek, 2008) Self-actualization is the desire of an individual to maximize his potential (Hersey, et al., 1996).

Maslow cautioned that this hierarchy is not absolute, but should be considered a general guideline for motivations and behaviors. It is also important to realize that absolute fulfillment of one level of need is not required before higher needs become influential, and that at times individuals may perceive higher needs as more important than basic needs. An unfulfilled need will not suddenly arise, but will become influential

over time, and a satisfied need will no longer be a motivator. He also observed that people who have been generally satisfied in their youth will be more resistant to unfulfilled needs, and that people who have had their higher needs frustrated for most of their lives will be satisfied to have only their lower needs met. He added that the most important exception to the needs hierarchy is the person who is motivated by their ideals and values, who may martyr themselves to their beliefs. Patriotism and altruism are motivations that are especially difficult to fit into Maslow's hierarchy, and an individual acting from these motivations may sacrifice his most basic needs or even his life, which runs counter to Maslow's theory.

When applied to RAT networks, numerous needs become readily apparent as being unlikely to be met. Physiological needs are likely to be a problem, as the majority of RATs live in primitive and harsh circumstances. Safety and security are both constantly threatened, both from law enforcement and from within as the members tend to be highly suspicious toward one another. Belonging and social needs may initially be met as they join a cause, but may be quickly eroded by suspicion and the hardships of living in poor conditions, and only high ranking members may attain self-actualization. The lower ranking members may feel very motivated to become informants, but are held in check by fear of reprisals.

Alderfer's ERG Theory

Clayton Alderfer refined Maslow's theory to group motivations as being necessary for Existence, Relatedness or Growth. He defines them as:

1. *Existence:* Needs satisfied by such factors as food, air, water, pay, and working conditions.

2. *Relatedness:* Needs satisfied by meaningful personal and interpersonal relations.

3. *Growth:* Needs satisfied by an individual making creative and productive contributions (C.P. Alderfer, 1972).

The assumptions which differentiate Alderfer's theory from Maslow's are that where Maslow assumes that only one category of needs is dominant at any given time, Alderfer asserts that several levels of need may be active simultaneously; and where Maslow claims that needs at a lower level must be satisfied for the individual to move on, Alderfer counters that frustration at a higher level will cause the individual to regress and focus on lower level needs more.

Alderfer's theory can also be applied to RAT networks in that the majority of RATs are operating primarily on the most basic levels, with Existence needs being met and some Relatedness needs being addressed as well. However, as Alderfer noted, frustrations at the higher levels increase frustrations with the most basic needs, which may motivate lower ranking members to abandon the network. Multiple motivations will be at work on the individuals, pressuring them from different directions. Based on

Alderfer's assumptions, the recruits will be expected to mention multiple motivations for providing information.

<center>Herzberg's Motivation-Hygiene Theory</center>

The other major applicable theory is that of Frederick Herzberg, who proposed the Motivation-Hygiene theory. The original research brought two conclusions: first, that there are extrinsic conditions in the work environment which give rise to employee dissatisfaction if they are lacking; and second, there are intrinsic conditions related to job content that will bring strong positive motivation that may result in improved job performance. The extrinsic conditions are classified as Hygiene factors, while the intrinsic conditions are classified as Motivators.

Hygiene factors include, but are not limited to Salary, job security, working conditions, status, company procedures, quality of supervision, quality of interpersonal relationships with supervisors, among peers, and with subordinates. Herzberg also referred to these as Maintenance factors, as constant effort is needed to maintain satisfaction in these matters and allowing them to lapse will create dissatisfaction in the workplace. Satisfying these factors will not boost productivity, but will prevent losses.

Motivators include, but are not limited to achievement, recognition, responsibility, advancement, the work itself, and the potential for growth. Herzberg chose this term because the presence of these influences causes increased motivation and satisfaction among workers.

Herzberg concluded that these two groups are independent of one another and have different effects on behavior. When people are unhappy or frustrated in their jobs they tend to focus on their work environment, but when they are happy they focus on the work itself. Prior to Herzberg's study job satisfaction was assumed to be unidimensional, with satisfaction at one end of a continuum and dissatisfaction at the other.

The major criticisms of Herzberg's theory are related to the fact that he based it on a limited sample of engineers and accountants living in the United States and that his data collection required introspection and subjective judgment on the part of the people polled. However, empirical studies in other nations have supported this theory.

Herzberg also theorized that another aspect of dissatisfaction is the result of overspecialization in the workplace, with people being frustrated by limitations placed on them by their supervisors. He noted that overhiring- using overqualified people to perform simple tasks- likewise results in frustration and dissatisfaction.

In reference to RAT networks, the conclusions are fairly clear: if a RAT member is well compensated, is secure in the position, has a good relationship with both peers and management, and is given duties that he perceives as interesting, he will be less likely to become an informant. However, if he is not well compensated, feels insecure and threatened, is bored and not challenged by his work and is generally dissatisfied he will be eager to quit and therefore more likely to become an informant.

Maslow's theory helps to identify needs and motives, while Herzberg's theory provides insights into the goals and incentives to help satisfy those needs. Used together, it becomes apparent that physiological, security, social and some esteem needs are hygiene factors while esteem can be broken down into both hygiene factors (status) and motivators (peer recognition and esteem). If an individual's strongest needs can be identified, hygiene factors may be identified and addressed, while identification of the individual's goals will assist in assessing their higher needs. This can enable a competent manager to motivate the individual to better performance- or to demotivate them into quitting.

A detailed review of these theories is included in Chapter 2.

Overview of Common Informant Motivations in Literature

Fear:

Broadly speaking, fear is a desire for self-preservation. A situation that threatens the safety or security of a person will lead to a strong reaction. They will continue to react as long as they perceive the threat existing. Informants who act on the basis of fear are generally responding to fear of either law enforcement or by criminals.

Fear of Incarceration: the threat of incarceration is a very strong motivator for criminals. Having the possibility of a long jail sentence will certainly induce fear, while

the possibility of reducing the sentence or even dropping the charges in a plea bargain is a powerful incentive for cooperation. The combination of the threat and the possibility of having that threat removed gives considerable control over an informant.

Fear of Criminals: since people involved in crime tend to associate with other criminals, they tend to find themselves in precarious circumstances. Not only do they have to fear arrest, but also they have to fear that one of their associates may turn on them for some perceived slight. Self-preservation may induce them to seek protection from their associates by law enforcement (see Mafia cases for examples) (Billingsley, et al., 2001; Blum, 1972; Copeland, 1974; Harney & Cross, 1968; Jacobson, 1981; Lee, 2004; Madinger, 2000; O'Hara, 1973; Skolnick, 1994; Wilson, 1978).

Ideology:

An individual may join a group due to his ideology, and then over time find that the group's ideology or morality differs from his own on some crucial aspect. He may realize that they have distorted religion in a way he cannot tolerate, or may perform or condone something that he considers to be immoral. At that point he will wish to distance himself from the group or even see them abolished, and may approach a trusted officer. (Researchers own experience)

Revenge:

Individuals may provide information in retaliation. A person who has been swindled or betrayed may wish to inflict pain in retribution. Informants giving information for revenge are generally good sources, especially when their grievance is

fresh in their mind. They often have close inside information, and the closer they were to the person who injured them the greater their desire is for revenge. However, once their emotions have had time to cool off they may be less willing to provide information (Billingsley, et al., 2001; Blum, 1972; Harney & Cross, 1968; Jacobson, 1981; Lee, 2004; Madinger, 2000; O'Hara, 1973; Wilson, 1978).

Perverse:

Some informants may act out of a desire for some unusual advantage. They usually hide their true motive, as it will often be some advantage that the police would ordinarily prefer not to give. Their motivations may not coincide with that of law enforcement, and the information given is often suspect. Motivations may include:

- Providing information about business rivals, in hopes that the police will eliminate competition for them.

- Minimizing his own role to deflect police attention away from his own activities.

- Keeping in contact with police in order to learn of investigative techniques, gaining information about law enforcement operations or to identify officers, especially undercover operatives.

- Using his contacts to steal from the police department

- Trying to expose police "corruption" or misconduct.

If no other motivation can be determined, the officer should assume a perverse motive and proceed cautiously. Information gained from such an informant should

rarely be used, if at all (Harney & Cross, 1968; Jacobson, 1981; Lee, 2004; Madinger, 2000; O'Hara, 1973; Wilson, 1978).

Egotistical:

These informants are motivated by a desire to bolster their self-esteem. They may be small time criminals who wish to be thought of as influential and important, or they may be people who wish to be law enforcement officers but are unable to fulfill the requirements. Both of these will often exaggerate the importance of their information or their closeness to the source, and have the potential to endanger an investigation. They may also act independently and make decisions on their own.

Another type of egotistical informer is the one who does so out of a sense of superiority. They may wish to prove that they can outwit those they see as inferior. They tend to be more common in espionage, where there is intense competition to be the most clever. They may also try to prove themselves by outwitting the law enforcement officers.

The motivation of this group will last only as long as their ego needs are being fed. Once that need has been satisfied they may stop cooperating, even in the middle of an investigation (Copeland, 1974; Harney & Cross, 1968; Madinger, 2000; O'Hara, 1973; Skolnick, 1994).

Mercenary:

Though relatively rare, some will give information for monetary gain. They frequently have other motivations as well, such as a desire for help with an unrelated

legal problem or desire for protection. As they have usually already made up their minds to cooperate fully before they walk in, they are often willing to stay committed to their decision, at least until money is no longer sufficient incentive (Billingsley, et al., 2001; Blum, 1972; Copeland, 1974; Harney & Cross, 1968; Jacobson, 1981; Lee, 2004; Madinger, 2000; O'Hara, 1973; Skolnick, 1994; Wilson, 1978).

Repentance or Desire To Reform:

Though relatively rare, some desire to leave the life of crime behind them. They tend to have very valuable information due to close access. Their motivations may be fed by needs of self-esteem and belonging, and may view their past associations as standing in the way of improving their lives. Due to their rarity, the officers must be cautious and determine that no other motivation exists (Blum, 1972; Harney & Cross, 1968; Lee, 2004; Madinger, 2000).

In addition to these, other motivations may apply:

Jealousy:

Similar to revenge, the informant will be acting on a strong but transient emotion. Rather than the person being wronged, they are motivated by a desire to eliminate someone who is challenging their relationship. Their information is often exaggerated, stretched or even false (Jacobson, 1981; Lee, 2004; Madinger, 2000; O'Hara, 1973).

Cop Wannabe/James Bond syndrome:

The motivation is similar to the egotistical informant. The individual will be acting on a desire for the perceived excitement of police or espionage work, and may mimic officers with whom he works. Like the egotistical informant, he may start testing his boundaries and acting independently (Blum, 1972; Jacobson, 1981; Madinger, 2000).

Good Citizen: Patriotic Motives:

The motivations of the good citizen are not in question, but the degree of access they actually have may be questionable. The exceptions are people in service industries who may actually have contact with criminals, such as taxi drivers, hotel managers, airline employees, delivery people and business operators (Billingsley, et al., 2001; Copeland, 1974; Harney & Cross, 1968; Jacobson, 1981; Madinger, 2000; O'Hara, 1973; Skolnick, 1994).

Mentally Disturbed Individuals:

Some informants will come forward with bizarre or incomprehensible information that stems from some form of delusion. Their information tends to be unreliable at best. While generally harmless, they can consume time better spent on other efforts (Harney & Cross, 1968; Madinger, 2000).

Selective Law Enforcement:

The informant may not particularly object to various criminal acts, but will witness something that they consider intolerable. They will bring in law enforcement to

eliminate what they consider to be the more egregious criminals (Harney & Cross, 1968; Madinger, 2000). The ones that dislike the crime can also be included in this group (Billingsley, et al., 2001).

Indebtedness- Appreciation or Gratitude Toward Police:

If an informant has been in legal trouble and has been treated fairly and was well treated, he may feel gratitude toward the people who he perceives as helping him. After the operation has ended the informant may come forward in the future with information regarding new cases (Billingsley, et al., 2001; Harney & Cross, 1968). Similarly, if the informant has received good treatment from the authorities- for example, humanitarian aid for his family despite being known to be part of a terrorist cell- he may feel gratitude toward the government.

Terrorists, it must be remembered, are people with needs like any other. If the authorities have aided them in a time of need- responding to a fire, or taking a child to the hospital for treatment- the individual may feel a sense of indebtedness to the authorities, or to a particular officer. They may choose to repay that debt by giving information.

Friendly with officer:

At times a person in a RAT group may form an acquaintance with an individual in law enforcement and develop a casual relationship. Over time the officer may gain the RAT's trust and form a bond of empathy. The RAT may feel a degree of friendship with

the officer and desire to pass information to someone he knows he can trust (Billingsley, et al., 2001).

Overview of Methodology

From the review of literature it has become clear that studies regarding the informant motivations have been conducted in the areas of drug trafficking, corruption, organized crime, homicide or other street level crimes. However, no study with a specific focus on confidential informants acting in terrorism has been conducted yet. Therefore, this study is exploratory at the first phase in terms of exploring the motives that may have an effect on terrorists' decision to cooperate as an informant. In this phase, terrorist autobiographies were surveyed. Surveying autobiographies is a well-known data collection technique in terrorism studies.

In the second phase, I conduct a multivariate binomial logistic regression analysis to look for significant differences in terms of motivations between becoming a Turkish-Hezbollah/Al-Qaeda informant and becoming a different RAT informant controlling for all the other motivational and demographic variables.

For the research design, this study employs cross-sectional research design to answer the research questions. A dataset was formed by conducting archival surveys on the official records of Turkish National Police (TNP) for the secondary data analysis. The

TNP has been employing informants over a century for law enforcement purposes, and keeps records of them confidential under different departments. These records include very detailed information about informants ranging from demographic and social data to their hobbies; they are also asked such questions, "Why did they choose to become informants?" etc. The intelligence department of TNP, the IDB, is responsible for recruitment, development, management, and protection of all confidential informants within terrorist networks. Therefore, after getting a top-secret clearance from the TNP, handwritten autobiographies, and F10 forms which contain detailed information about the recruit that were filled out by every confidential informant during the recruitment process and available at IDB archives, were searched.

My data set contains detailed information about all individuals that served as confidential informants for more than a year within any of 8 different religion abusing terrorist groups in the last two decades (N= 138).

By saying so, this study didn't utilize any sampling procedure; instead, it utilized the entire population of confidential informants within RAT networks in Turkey. Working with the population also reduces threats to internal and external validity of the study since the significance levels become irrelevant, and the results of the study directly reflect the social reality of the phenomena. Moreover, according to the literature, inferential statistics are used to draw conclusions about the population based on analysis of the sampling data. If the analysis is focusing on population, than descriptive

statistics are used. Similarly, most of the variables included in this study are in fact population parameters (Demirci, 2008; Nardi, 2006; Yang, 2010).

However, I did an exception to this general rule in this study. I applied inferential statistics to some extent and illustrated group level models for Turkish-Hezbollah and Al-Qaeda RAT groups in order to illustrate practical implications of the study for the practitioners. It would be good to form individual models for each RAT network. Nevertheless, sample sizes of RAT networks other than Turkish-Hezbollah are insufficient, largest being n=22, which would not only result in loss of power, but also end up with statistically insignificant results. The ratio of sample size to the number of parameters is critically important in logistic regression since it uses maximum likelihood estimation. It is strongly recommended in literature that the number of cases in the smallest group should be at least ten times the number of predictors in logistic regression models (Gray & Kinnear, 2012; Hosmer David & Stanley, 2000). Even though the sample size of Al-Qaeda (n=22) was not quite adequate, I ran a multivariate analysis for Al-Qaeda in order to shed a light to motivations of Al-Qaeda informants too.

Details of the sources and data collection methods are explained in the methodology chapter.

Significance of the study

When we look at the literature, it becomes apparent that there are as of yet very few empirical studies openly available to the general public about confidential informants. These studies have either been conducted in the areas of drug trafficking, organized crime, or corruption. There is no doubt that the ability to use confidential informants gives substantial advantage to law enforcement intelligence in the fight against terrorism, but no study has been conducted specifically focusing on confidential informants in terrorist networks yet.

Moreover, the studies that are available to general public are mainly at descriptive level written by practitioners for tactical purposes such as handbooks, service manuals, personal experiences or legal documents. These studies are not immune to cultural bias, cognitive inflexibility, or attribution error until there is ample empirical support. This is primarily a consequence of the secret nature of the phenomena. Because of the legal barriers put to ensure confidentiality, it has been almost impossible for researchers to obtain and analyze confidential information about the issue. However, as some researchers have argued, no matter how much they despise terrorist actions, behavioral scientists should avoid making biased judgments and instead act as interpreters of observed behavior. (Skolnick, 1994; Victoroff, 2005). According to Victoroff (2005) isolating practitioners from theorists is a separation akin to isolating engineers from the discoveries of physicists.

Accordingly, it took two years of endeavor for the researcher to obtain a top-secret clearance and an approval letter from the TNP in order to conduct such a study on confidential informants active in RAT networks. With this significant advantage, this study is the first empirical work open to general public on motivating factors that make some individuals in RAT networks confidential informants.

As a result this study intends to fill such a gap in the literature in terms of empirical studies regarding to the confidential informants especially for the ones active in terrorist networks.

CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

The motivations for terrorists to turn into informants are important to understand; yet there is relatively little literature that is directly applicable to the subject. Instead we must focus on existing literature from studies of criminal informants, psychologists, and corporate motivational studies.

Throughout history, it has been of great interest to behavioral scientists to understand the reasons or driving forces underlying an individual behavior at a particular time. They all tried to understand why a particular individual behaves in one way while others choose to behave in another way. There are hundreds or even thousands of studies that have tried to give sound explanations to the question. Among them, the ones that looked at the issue from a motivational perspective show potential to shed light on the phenomena we are trying to explain in this study. According to them, motives are defined as wants, drives, or needs within an individual that prompts him/her to action. Hersey, Blanchard and Johnson (1996) define motives as the "whys" of behavior. They argue that individuals' direction of activity is determined and

maintained by hundreds of competing motives (needs) within an individual. The strongest need at a particular moment determines behavior and leads to activity (Hersey, et al., 1996). They seem to be the reasons that underlie individual behavior.

Therefore, this study utilizes motivation theories in order to understand the reasons underlying the decision of a terrorist to become an informant.

In this study, two important content theories of motivation—Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs, and Herzberg's Two-Factor Theory— are considered to be very important conceptual approaches in exploring the mindset of the confidential informant during the recruitment process. Moreover, another breed of Maslow's theory, Alderfer's ERG— Existence, Relatedness and Growth—theory is also added in discussions to enrich and increase the explanatory power of the study. All three of these theories focus on the motivation factors— needs and incentives— within the person that cause—energize, direct, sustain, and stop—behavior. They attempt to determine the specific needs that motivate people at a given situation (C.P. Alderfer, 1969; Hersey, et al., 1996; Herzberg, 1959; Ivancevich, et al., 2005; A. Maslow, 1954; Robbins & Judge, 2007; Simsek, 2008; Steers & Black, 1994).

While these theories have historically been used in explaining employee motivations in the workplace and for personnel management, they may also be used to predict the likelihood of a recruit within a RAT network to become a confidential informant by studying his environment within the network and his perceptions of it. As they are human beings, they also have needs, incentives and ambitions that may not be

addressed within the RAT network; therefore the informants are also expected to show similar behaviors to employees in corporations. Accordingly Herzberg's theory is expected to explain why the recruits seek to leave terrorism and Maslow's theory is expected to explain what motivation factors lead them to become informants.

After discussing the theories and relevant empirical studies, studies in various fields such as narcotics, corruption, and organized crime are analyzed and discussed in detail in order to determine informant motivations that can be applied to confidential informants within RAT networks.

Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs

An individual's behavior at a particular moment is usually determined by his/her strongest need. Abraham Maslow developed a classical framework that helps explain the strengths of certain needs that are commonly most important to people (A. Maslow, 1954). According to Maslow, human needs are arranged in a hierarchical order, as illustrated in Figure 1

```
(High)

            Physiological

Strength of needs
                            Safety
                            (Security)

                                        Social
                                        (Affiliation)

                                                    Esteem
                                                    (Recognition)

                                                                Self-Actualization

(Low)
```

Figure 1: Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs (Hersey, et al., 1996)

The main point of Maslow's theory is that needs are arranged in a hierarchical manner, starting from the physiological needs, which are the most basic, to the self-actualization needs (Kaplan, 1998). These needs are defined as follows:

Physiological needs:

The physiological needs are the basic human needs—air, water, food, clothing, and shelter—to sustain life itself. The physiological needs have the highest strength until they are somewhat satisfied. Until these needs are fulfilled to a certain degree, needs at other categories will provide little motivation (Steers & Black, 1994). Therefore, these needs are at the top of the needs-hierarchy. When physiological needs are gratified to some extent, they become less important and needs at other levels of

the hierarchy emerge. They start motivating and dominating the individual behavior. When they are somewhat fulfilled, other needs further down the hierarchy arise (Hersey, et al., 1996).

The most basic of our needs is generally associated with money. It is generally assumed that the desire for money is directly linked to the need for food, clothing, shelter and other basic needs. However, money can play a strong role in satisfying other needs as well. The ability of a given sum of money to satisfy may decrease as higher level needs come into play, such as social needs that might be met by membership into an exclusive club, or the esteem granted by an expensive car or elaborate house. But the farther one gets from basic physiological needs, the less appropriate money becomes as a tool for satisfying (Hersey, et al., 1996).

Security/Safety needs:

When basic human needs are fairly fulfilled, the needs for security or safety become predominant (Hersey, et al., 1996). This need can be defined as preservation instinct for the moment and the future. Security need includes being free of the fear of physical danger and deprivation of the physiological needs. When a person's life is in danger, or he faces a significant threat to his/her safety, other things become negligible (Steers & Black, 1994).

These needs tend to take two forms- conscious and unconscious. Conscious forms are readily apparent- the desire to be free from disease, poverty, disaster, violence, and so on. Security may play a large role in choice of career for some, as in

availability of health care or perceived job security (Drucker, 1968). Providing this sort of security makes people more docile and less likely to engage in behaviors that might threaten their tranquility.

The unconscious needs are a bit more subtle. They may be formed in childhood by poverty and other hardships, by overprotective parents, or by their social settings (Gellerman, 1963). An unexpected disruption to their lives may seem devastating to them, and is strongly feared.

Belongingness, social, and love needs:

Following the adequate satisfaction of physiological and security needs, social or affiliation needs become predominant (Hersey, et al., 1996). Since people are social beings, they will do their utmost for meaningful relationships with others. Individuals at this need level will strive for belonging and being accepted by several groups (Steers & Black, 1994).

People being essentially social creatures, the need for social interaction is strong. Schachter (1959) suggests that people will often seek affiliation with a group to help reinforce beliefs, especially if a belief has been recently shaken. People in this circumstance will seek out others in an effort to make order of chaos and re-establish some control over their lives (Schachter, 1959).

Esteem needs:

Once social and belongingness needs become gratified, the individual's esteem needs-both self-esteem and esteem from others-dominate his behavior (Hersey, et al.,

1996). Individuals have a need for recognition and respect from others. Most people want to feel that they are useful and have an effect on their environment—self-esteem. They also want to be recognized by others—esteem from others—through constructive behavior and expect a high evaluation of themselves that is firmly based in reality. When these needs are fulfilled they yield feelings of self-confidence, power, control and prestige. But there are also those esteem needs that are blocked and cannot be satisfied through adaptive behavior. Frustration of esteem needs may consequently yield to immature or disruptive behaviors such as engaging in work restriction or arguments with supervisors, co-workers or subordinates, much like a child throwing a temper tantrum to gain attention (Hersey, et al., 1996).

The need for esteem may take any of several forms:

- *Prestige:* "a sort of unwritten definition of the kinds of conduct that other people are expected to show in one's presence; what degree of respect or disrespect, formality or informality, reserve or frankness" (Gellerman, 1963, p. 27). People tend to have a universal need to have their relative importance clarified, and desire a high valuation of themselves based upon the recognition and respect given to them by others.

- *Power:* the ability to manipulate and control the actions of others to suit one's own purposes. This may be personal power (charisma) or the power of position (authority) (Hersey, et al., 1996).

Self-actualization needs:

After individuals begin to satisfy their esteem needs, the self-actualization needs begin to emerge (Hersey, et al., 1996). Maslow articulates self- actualization as "What a man can be, he must be". It is the need to become what he is capable of becoming (A. H. Maslow, Frager, & Fadiman, 1970). The motivation for self-actualization may be to win battles for a general, to play music for a musician, to write for a poet, or to teach for a professor. Self-actualization is the desire of an individual to maximize his potential (Hersey, et al., 1996). A fireman may courageously run into a burning building to save a child trapped in the fire, knowing that chances for injury are high. His motivation for action is what he thinks is important at the moment, not for affiliation or recognition. In this case, the firefighter can be considered as self-actualized—to have maximized the potential of what is important at the time.

Self-actualization motives can change over time (Hersey, et al., 1996). For example, a VCU student might express self-actualization by playing basketball at VCU Rams basketball team. As his horizon broadens or as his physical attributes change over time, the same individual, eventually, might be self-actualized by teaching at VCU as a professor.

The most difficult to define, self-actualization needs seem to fall into two motives:

- *Competence:* the ability to manipulate environmental and social factors to one's favor proactively. This may manifest in childhood as a need to master a sport or

in taking things apart and putting them back together. In adults it may be mastering a profession or skills. A routine or closely supervised job may frustrate this need.

- *Achievement:* the need to excel in an area beyond the ability of one's peers. People to whom achievement is important tend to gravitate toward higher-risk situations and careers (Hersey, et al., 1996).

Maslow didn't intend to mean that the hierarchy inevitably follows the pattern described in the theory and applies universally. Rather, it should be looked at as a general tendency or a typical pattern that operates most of the time. He mentions the Indian leader Mahatma Gandhi as an example of someone who sacrificed his physiological and safety needs while he was operating at self-actualization level. During the days India was struggling for independence from Great Britain, Gandhi sacrificed his basic needs and fasted for several weeks to protest British government (Hersey, et al., 1996).

It is important to mention here that while changing the dominance of motives between need categories, it shouldn't be assumed that dominating need at one category has to be completely satisfied before the next-high level needs emerge. Rather, somewhat fulfillment of motivations at one level would be sufficient for the emergence of other levels of needs to predominate the behavior of the individual. Maslow's need hierarchy theory is not an "all-or-nothing" framework. In real life

situations, most people tend to be partially satisfied and partially unsatisfied at each level. This approach is considered useful to anticipate likelihood of potential individual behaviors during recruitment of informants (Hersey, et al., 1996).

Traditionally Maslow's needs hierarchy has been depicted as a pyramid, with the physiological needs at the bottom and the self-actualization needs at the top. Maslow himself has never referred to a graphic, and one criticism of the pyramid depiction is that it implies that in order for higher needs to be met one much completely fulfill the more basic needs. Maslow's own commentary states that this is an incorrect assumption. Therefore, it is assumed that below illustration, which shows how higher level needs may be partly met while basic needs are not completely fulfilled, is a better fit for Maslow's theory (Saeednia & Md-Nor, 2010).

P= Physiological
S= Safety
L= Belongingness and love
E = Esteem
SA= Self actualization

A new suggestion for scheming Maslow's hierarchy (fairly satisfied); a result of exploring Maslow's hierarchy of basic needs

Figure 2: Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs (Saeednia & Md-Nor, 2010)

Later, Abraham H. Maslow in his book "*Motivation and Personality"* made the following statements about his theory:

- While his theory may "give the false impression that a need must be satisfied 100 percent before the next need emerges", in actual fact, "most members of our society who are normal are partially satisfied in all their basic needs and partially unsatisfied in all their basic needs at the same time" (A. H. Maslow, et al., 1970)

- When a new need arises, "this emergence is not a sudden, saltatory phenomenon, but rather a gradual emergence by slow degrees from nothingness."(A. H. Maslow, et al., 1970)

- "A satisfied need is not a motivator." (A. H. Maslow, et al., 1970)

- "People who have been satisfied in their basic needs throughout their lives, particularly in their earlier years, seem to develop exceptional power to withstand present or future thwarting of these needs simply because they have strong healthy character structure as a result of basic satisfaction." (A. H. Maslow, et al., 1970)

- "There are other apparently creative people in whom the drive to creativeness seems to be more important than any other counter-determinant. Their creativeness might appear not as self- actualization released by basic satisfaction, but in spite of lack of basic satisfaction" (A.

H. Maslow, et al., 1970). An example of this is the stereotype of the starving artist.

- "In certain people the level of aspiration may be permanently deadened or lowered." A person who has been denied fulfillment of his higher needs for most of his life will be content to only have his basic needs met.(A. H. Maslow, et al., 1970)

- "Perhaps more important than all these exceptions are the ones that involve ideals, high social standards, high values and the like. With such values people become martyrs; they will give up everything for the sake of a particular ideal or value." (A. H. Maslow, et al., 1970)

The main assumption of Maslow's need-hierarchy theory is that an individual attempts to satisfy physiological needs before directing behavior toward satisfaction of upper-level needs. Some other assumptions of this theory which are considered have an impact during the recruitment process of informants in RAT networks include:

- When a need is satisfied it ceases to have motivating power.

- Frustration, conflict, and stress are potential outcomes of unsatisfied needs.

- Individuals have a tendency to grow and develop; therefore, they persistently will attempt to move up the hierarchy in terms of need gratification (Ivancevich, et al., 2005).

Mary Kay, Inc., uses Maslow's need hierarchy to manage its workforce of over one million beauty consultants in 34 markets around the world. The company is best known for its award of the Mary Kay Pink Cadillac for outstanding sales and teamwork. According to Mary Kay Annual Report (2002) their consultants report that their motivations are sales commissions and incentives (financial), being part of a team (social), recognition (esteem) and the chance to help others (self-actualization). Mary Kay's management understands the importance of needs and motivators, and recognizes that pay, incentives, recognition and teamwork are a combination of factors that their consultants seek. (Ivancevich, et al., 2005)

Maslow estimates that the typical adult in society has satisfied about 85 percent of the physiological need, 70 percent of their need for safety and security, 50 percent of the social and love need, 40 percent of the esteem need and 10 percent of self-actualization. Many critics disagree with his estimates, in particular the low percentage of self-actualization (Ivancevich, et al., 2005).

Alderfer's ERG Theory

Clayton Alderfer of Yale University revised and realigned Maslow's theory and developed the ERG–existence (E), relatedness (R), and growth (G)-theory (C.P. Alderfer, 1969). Alderfer agrees with the idea of Maslow that individual needs are

arranged in a hierarchy. Unlike Maslow, according to Alderfer there are three sets of needs:

1. *Existence needs:* Needs satisfied by such factors as food, air, water, pay, and working conditions.

2. *Relatedness needs:* Needs satisfied by meaningful personal and interpersonal relations.

3. *Growth needs:* Needs satisfied by an individual making creative and productive contributions (C.P. Alderfer, 1972).

As demonstrated in Table 1 needs in Alderfer's Existence group corresponds to Maslow's physiological and safety groups; relatedness group corresponds to Maslow's social needs; and growth group corresponds to Maslow's esteem and self-actualization group needs. (Ivancevich, et al., 2005)

Table 1: Comparison of Maslow's and Alderfer's Categories of Needs

MASLOW	ALDERFER
Self-Actualization	Growth
Esteem	
Social	Relatedness
Safety	Existence
Physiological	

According to Robbins and Judge (2007) the ERG theory's two core assumptions make it more meaningful and valid in describing the need hierarchy:

1. According to Maslow only one category of needs are preponderant on the individual behavior at a given time. The ERG theory asserts that more than one need can dominate the behavior more or less equally. For example, safety and social needs, which are in different categories, can equally dominate the individual's behavior at the same time.

2. Maslow argues that an individual remains at one need level until his needs are somewhat gratified. On the other hand, Alderfer proposes that if an individual's needs are blocked or frustrated at one need level, he regresses to needs at a lower level (Robbins & Judge, 2007).

Maslow's need hierarchy and Alderfer's ERG theory differ not only in the number of categories but also on the movement of individual through the different sets of needs. According to Maslow (1954) higher-level of needs are not triggered and the person does not progress up the need hierarchy until predominant needs at that level are adequately satisfied. When needs at one level are somewhat gratified, the next-higher level needs emerges and the individual progresses up the need hierarchy.

In addition to this satisfaction-progression process, Alderfer (1972) augments a frustration-regression process to his model. According to the ERG theory when satisfaction of a need—for example, a growth need—is persistently blocked or the individual is continually frustrated in attempts to satisfy this need, lower-order needs—relatedness needs—reemerge as preponderant motivation and consequently, the

individual conveys efforts towards gratification of a lower-order need category (Ivancevich, et al., 2005).

Alderfer's theory of motivation gives an interesting insight for managers about employee behavior. If an employee's needs are being blocked, so there is no opportunity for growth- for instance, if he feels stagnated in his position- then the manager should try to guide the employee's efforts to relatedness or existence needs. The ERG theory suggests that people's behavior is motivated by satisfying one of the three sets of needs.(Ivancevich, et al., 2005)

Alderfer's ERG model hasn't received enough research support for its empirical verification yet.

Herzberg's Motivation – Hygiene Theory

Herzberg (1959) developed a theory that claims two factors of motivation. These are termed the dissatisfiers-satisfiers or the hygiene-motivators or the extrinsic-intrinsic factors. It has been observed that higher needs such as esteem and self-actualization seem to become increasingly important over time as people develop. Frederic Herzberg studied this extensively and has developed a theory of work motivation that has been shown to be effective in the workplace in increasing morale and productivity (Herzberg, 1959). Although Herzberg's theory was developed to study conditions in the corporate

environment, it is considered to be applicable to other organizations, including terrorist networks.

The original research brought two conclusions: first, that there are extrinsic conditions in the work environment which give rise to employee dissatisfaction if they are lacking. If they are present these conditions don't motivate employees, but they prevent dissatisfaction. These factors include, but are not limited to: Salary, job security, working conditions, status, company procedures, quality of supervision, quality of interpersonal relationships with supervisors, among peers, and with subordinates.

Second, there are intrinsic conditions related to job content that will bring strong positive motivation that may result in improved job performance. If these conditions are lacking, the job will not be satisfying. These satisfiers include, but are not limited to: achievement, recognition, responsibility, advancement, the work itself, the potential for growth. These satisfiers are related to the work itself. When they are present they contribute to positive motivation (Ivancevich, et al., 2005; Steers & Black, 1994).

While developing his theory, Herzberg argued that knowledge of motivation and human nature could be very important to organizations:

"To industry, the payoff for a study of job attitudes would be increased productivity, decreased absenteeism, and smoother working relations. To the individual, an understanding of the forces that lead to improved morale would bring greater happiness and greater self-realization" (Herzberg, 1959).

Herzberg's study was on job attitudes with the goal of gathering data from which to form assumptions about human behavior. The motivation-hygiene theory was the result of analysis by Herzberg and his colleagues at the Psychological Service of Pittsburgh. They intensively interviewed about two hundred engineers and accountants from eleven companies in Pittsburgh, asking what elements of their jobs made them happy or unhappy, satisfied or dissatisfied (Herzberg, Mausnes, Peterson, & Capwell, 1957).

In his analysis Herzberg concluded that there are two categories of needs that are independent of each other and have different effects on behavior. When people are unhappy or dissatisfied in their jobs they tend to focus on their work environment, but when they are happy they tend to focus on the work itself. He referred to the first category as *hygiene* or *maintenance* factors, because hygiene refers to the work environment and serves to prevent job dissatisfaction and maintenance because the people have to be maintained as they are never completely satisfied. The second category was labeled *motivators* because they seem to be effective in motivating people to better job performance (Herzberg, 1959).

Hygiene Factors:

Work conditions, salary, status, job security, interpersonal relationships and company policies and administration may be considered to be maintenance needs. They are not inherent to the jobs themselves, but are related to the work environment. Herzberg chose the term hygiene for its medical meaning of environmental factors and

prevention. He found that hygiene needs did not promote increased worker productivity, but only prevented losses in productivity due to worker restrictions (Hersey, et al., 1996).

Motivators:

Factors that promote feelings of achievement, recognition and professional growth in the job are referred to as motivators. Herzberg chose this term because the factors tend to increase job satisfaction, often resulting in an increase in productivity (Hersey, et al., 1996).

More recently motivation-hygiene research has been expanded to other parts of organizations to include everyone from hourly workers to upper management (Cumming, 1994; Deeprose, 1995) In a study at Texas Instruments, Myers (1964) found that Herzberg's motivation-hygiene theory "is easily translatable to supervisory action at all levels of responsibility. It is a framework on which supervisors can evaluate and put into perspective the constant barrage of 'helpful hints' to which they are subjected, and hence serves to increase their feelings of competence, self-competence, and autonomy" (Myers, 1964).

Herzberg concludes that satisfiers and hygiene factors can be used to understand environmental (extrinsic) conditions for factory workers in most countries. The Global OB, which combines data and research for a variety of researchers, supports the use of Herzberg's two-factor theory in various cultures (Herzberg, 1987) An other

study of employees in Turkey, Cyprus, Nigeria, and Great Britain reported general support to Herzberg's theory (Adigun, 2000).

Herzberg's theory assumes that job satisfaction is not one-dimensional, but that there are two dimensions needed to ensure job satisfaction. Prior to Herzberg's research, job satisfaction was considered to be unidimensional, with job satisfaction at one end and dissatisfaction at the other. The assumption was that if a condition caused job satisfaction, removing it would cause dissatisfaction, and that the inverse was true as well (Ivancevich, et al., 2005).

One of the appeals of Herzberg's theory is that the terminology he used is work-oriented, so there is no confusion arising from the use of psychological terms. However, the theory has been criticized on a number of levels- some researchers feel it oversimplifies the nature of job satisfaction, while others criticize the methodology, which requires introspection on the part of the workers. Another criticism is that Herzberg has done little testing of the theory's motivational and performance consequences. In his initial research only self-evaluations were used, and generally the respondents described work that had gone on over a long period.(Ivancevich, et al., 2005)

Despite the criticisms to the theory, the impact of the theory on management should not be underestimated. The concept of job enrichment has arisen from the theory, which consists of recognition, challenge, growth opportunities, responsibility and

personal achievement within a person's career. This increases the individual's motivation by providing more independence and accountability when performing challenging tasks (Steers & Black, 1994).

Many managers feel comfortable with Herzberg's two-factor approach. From a scientific perspective this presents some dangers of misuse, but the theory is still applied in many organizations. Examples include providing time and money for working on ideas to improve products and processes in manufacturing, introducing flex-time schedules to give employees greater job discretion, and implementing a profit-sharing plan to provide both recognition and achievement to employees to reward employees who exceed expectations.(Ivancevich, et al., 2005)

Herzberg observed that the overspecialization seen in many industries contributes to job dissatisfaction, and speculated on what was termed "job enrichment", the deliberate upgrading of challenge, responsibility and scope of one's work. An example of this is given by Lawler (1990) where a group of janitors, who had been noted for being lazy and apathetic, were given complete responsibility for housekeeping within their plant and autonomy in purchasing equipment and supplies. Any sales representatives were referred to the janitors, as were any housekeeping concerns. After a time their performance improved dramatically, as did their appearance and morale (Lawler III, 1990).

Similarly, over hiring—bringing overqualified people into simple jobs—results in boredom, apathy and high levels of turnover. Marrow et al (1967) tells of an industrial

plant that hired security people with a minimum of a high school diploma and three years of experience to check badges and lunch pails, and had a problem with boredom and turnover. The hiring requirements were changed so that a high school diploma was considered overqualified, and people with fourth-and fifth-grade educations were hired instead. These people had lower job expectations, and found having a position of some responsibility and authority to be rewarding, resulting in a more effective workforce (Marrow, Bowers, & Seashore, 1967).

Hygiene factors can be satisfied to reduce dissatisfaction and frustration, but will not motivate a person to increase their capacity or performance. However, increasing the positive motivators will allow a person to grow and develop new abilities, increasing his productivity. We can therefore conclude that hygiene factors affect a person's willingness, while motivators affect their abilities.

Based on assumptions of this theory, if a RAT member is well compensated, is secure in the position, has a good relationship with both peers and management, and is given duties that he perceives and interesting and challenging for which he will be accountable will be highly motivated in terrorist setting. This type of militant is expected to be less likely to be informants.

On the other hand, if members of a RAT group are not well compensated, do not feel secure in their positions, have poor relationships with peers and management and are not given challenges and are bored with their work, they will not be motivated in the terrorist setting. Expected outcomes would be poor performance, absenteeism and

high rate of turnover. Based on Herzberg's theory this would be the best case where most members of RAT group would be eager to be informants because both hygiene factors and satisfiers are not present in this setting.

The Relationship of Herzberg's Theory to Maslow's Theory

Maslow's theory helps to identify needs and motives, while Herzberg's theory provides insights into the goals and incentives to help satisfy those needs. Therefore, in a motivating situation, if the LEI officer can identify the strongest needs (Maslow), he should be able to derive the goals he is able to provide in a given environment to motivate the recruit. Similarly, if the officer can determine the individual's goals he can predict what their high-strength needs will be. This is possible because it has been found that benefits and compensation tend to satisfy the physiological and security needs, while interpersonal relationships and supervisory relations are examples of hygiene factors that tend to satisfy social needs, and challenging assignments, opportunities for growth and development are motivators that satisfy esteem and self-actualization needs. Figure 3 shows the relationship we feel exists between the Maslow and Herzberg frameworks (Hersey, et al., 1996).

Figure 3: The Relationship of Maslow's Theory to Herzberg's Theory

It is apparent that physiological, security, social and some esteem needs are hygiene factors. Esteem needs can be broken down into esteem, status and professional recognition. Status is generally a reflection of one's position, which may have been gained through family ties or networking and may not be representative of personal achievement or peer recognition, while recognition is gained through competence and performance. Therefore, status should be regarded as a hygiene factor, while recognition and esteem should be considered to be motivators (Hersey, et al., 1996).

Select Studies about Theories

Salancik and Pfeffer (1977) suggest that needs models have become of interest because they agree with other theories about rational choice and because they give credit for freedom to individuals. The idea of an individual's choices shaping their actions to satisfy needs gives direction and purpose to activities. The theories are also popular because they are easily expressed and simple to understand relative to human behaviors (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1977).

Maslow's needs hierarchy has been the subject of several studies attempting to field test it. The first reported research testing a modified version of the hierarchy was performed by Porter (1961). At the time Porter assumed that management had their physiological needs adequately satisfied, and substituted a higher order need called *autonomy* which he defined as the individual's satisfaction with opportunities for independent decisions, setting goals and working with minimal supervision (Porter, 1961).

Research studies about Maslow's theory have reported:

- Managers higher in the hierarchy of a company place greater importance on autonomy and self-actualization (Porter, 1964)

- Managers in lower positions in smaller firms (less than 500 employees) are more satisfied than similar managers at larger companies (more than

5000 employees), while upper management at larger companies are more satisfied than those of smaller companies (Porter, 1963).

- American managers working overseas tend to be more satisfied with opportunities for autonomy than are domestic managers (Ivancevich, 1969).

Despite the findings of the research, there are a number of issues remaining regarding the needs hierarchy. Data from the managers of two different companies suggests that a needs hierarchy may not exist. The data suggests that only two levels of needs exist: physiological and everything else. Researchers have noted that as managers advance in the hierarchy of their organizations, their need for security diminishes, while their needs for social interaction, achievement, recognition and self-actualization increase. (Hall & Nougaim, 1968; Ivancevich, et al., 2005)

Mwangi (1993) investigated the motivations of extension agents relative to the theories of Maslow and Herzberg, among others. His overall finding was that motivation and job satisfaction were directly linked, and that the factors related to job satisfaction varied among individuals (Mwangi, 1993).

In his analysis of Maslow's theory, he agrees with the criticisms by Dowling & Sayles (1971), Heneman, Schwab, Fossum, & Dyer (1980), and Davies, Ellison, Osborne, & West-Burnham (1990) noting the following:

- Maslow's theory ignores the possibility of altruistic behavior that may reject subordinate levels in favor of self-actualization.

- It does not account for individual differences in preference for rewards- for example, some may value self-esteem over social needs.

- It fails to provide a conceptual link between satisfaction and performance.

- Continual satisfaction of a need may diminish its relative importance.

- Satisfaction of higher level needs may change the perception of what constitutes satisfaction of lower-level needs.

- Work is not the only source of satisfaction.

- Managers cannot assume a homogenous workforce.

- The self-actualization concept is vague and difficult to define for managers (Davies, Ellison, Osborne, & West-Burnham, 1990; Dowling & Sayles, 1971; Heneman, Schwab, Fossum, & Dyer, 1980; Mwangi, 1993).

Mwangi (1993) cites following limitations of Herzberg's theory after comparing and contrasting the studies of Herzberg (1972), Buford, Bedeian, & Lindner (1995), and Kreitner (1989):

- Over-generalization. Herzberg's study was based on 200 accountants and engineers in the Pittsburg area, and so may not be a good representation of general workforces.

- Research has not supported Herzberg's assertion that hygiene factors can prevent dissatisfaction but cannot satisfy employees.

- Research studies indicate that professional and non-professional employees have different work preferences for which Herzberg did not account.

According to Wahba and Bridwell (1976) Maslow's theory does have some limitations. They reviewed the research on Maslow's model and concluded "there is no consistent support for the hierarchy proposed by Maslow." They added that there is "no clear evidence that human needs are classified in five distinct categories, or that these categories are structured in a special hierarchy" (Wahba & Bridwell, 1976, p. 224).

However, Maslow's hierarchy should not be discarded. Wahba and Bridwell's study is not definitive, as the theory is difficult to test empirically, but they note that the studies done used a rank-order system of categorizing needs, which may not be a "valid test of Maslow's need hierarchy, since rank ordering is not a Maslow concept." Modifications of the theory may be needed when studying people of other cultures. Needs hierarchy has also been used to explain the dominance of different needs of people over time, and can be invaluable for improving employee retention (Castillo, 2003).

Herzberg's theory has also been tested, and his original findings supported (Friedlander & Walton, 1964; Myers, 1964; Saleh, 1964; Weissenberg & Gruenfeld, 1968), and concluded that factors causing job satisfaction (motivators) are different from, and not merely opposite to, factors causing job dissatisfaction (hygienes). But some studies (Dunnette, Campbell, & Hakel, 1967; Friedlander, 1965; Myers, 1964) showed a particular attribute causing job satisfaction in one sample and job dissatisfaction in another, while other studies (Ewen, 1963; Gordon, 1965) found the

same factor causing job satisfaction and job dissatisfaction within the same sample. An example would be that Ewen (1963) found that salary, considered a hygiene, was a motivator in one group but both a source of satisfaction and dissatisfaction in another, while prestige, a motivator, caused satisfaction and dissatisfaction within a group. Bockman (1971) comments that "the Herzberg results cannot be generalized beyond the situation that they were obtained" (p. 164).

Ewen (1963) and Ewen, Smith, Hulin & Locke (1966) claim that Herzberg's "recall" method of data collection is subject to bias while Friedlander (1965) criticized the "self report" technique because, as reported by Bockman (1971), "self perception may be quite different from objective perception of what occurred" (p. 184). French, Metersky, Thaler & Trexler (1973) commented that others who have used data collection methodologies different from Herzberg's have obtained results not supportive of the theory. However, in employee retention Herzberg contributes a valuable idea in that the nature of the work environment- pay, challenge, flexible hours- is important in maintaining high job satisfaction and preventing employees from leaving.

Castillo (2003) studies recruitment and management in maquiladoras, which are export factories in Mexico near the US border. According to her Human Resources (HR) is a vital function of an organization. Identifying needs is central to HR Management (HRM). Castillo notes that needs may vary from one culture to another, and that the majority of theories have been based upon studies of the needs of workers in the US.

In her study the recruitment process is broken down into stages. The first stage is to identify potential applicants; second is to narrow the pool of applicants down using various recruitment and selection tools; third is to make an offer to the desired applicant. Part of this is identifying "inducements", a general term loosely defined by Rynes and Barber (1990) as "deliberate modification of job and organizational attributes for the explicit purpose of enhancing the attractiveness of a job to potential applicants" (p. 294).

The problem of employee retention is also addressed. Turnover is problematic in that it requires additional recruitment and training of new employees, both of which require expenditure of resources. To avoid turnover, management must identify the needs of employees and ensure that they are met (Castillo, 2003).

She based her study on Maslow's and Herzberg's theories after outlining and discussing them in detail. She found that the needs identified in one culture as important may be of lesser importance elsewhere- for example, American workers identified social needs as the third most important while Mexican workers considered this to be least important (Castillo, 2003).

Other empirical studies are noted. Reitz (1975) found that among blue-collar workers in twenty six industrial plants across eight countries, self-actualization was ranked as the most important, while among more educated workers security was held as of lesser importance than among less educated workers.

Overall the studies indicate that Maslow's hierarchy and Herzberg's theory do not necessarily translate universally to other cultures, and must be considered to be approximate guidelines only.

Select Studies About Informants and Their Needs

Miller (1996) defines confidential informants (CI) as people who, rather than simply pass along information to law enforcement, actively seek out information to bring forth. They are typically criminals themselves who operate within a criminal environment. According to DeGarmo (1972), large metropolitan police forces keep files on their informants containing signed forms that 1) waive legal liability on the part of law enforcement for their personal safety, 2) state any agreements between the CI and law enforcement, and 3) specify violations while in the role of informant that may cause dismissal or prosecution of the CI.

According to Miller (1996) the motivations of informants are generally:

- The "hammered" informant- one who is informing due to having been caught and pressured by law enforcement.

- The mercenary informant- one whose motivation is financial.

- The vengeful informant- one who wants to see someone else brought down in retaliation for some past conflict.

- The "police buff"- one who wants to be a cop and have excitement (Miller, 1996).

The focus of Skolnick (1994)'s work is on the narcotics force of a police precinct. There are some parallels between this and terrorism networks, in that the low-ranking members of the organization are the most visible and take the greatest risks while the highest-ranking individuals who are responsible for the overall actions of the group are well hidden.

Skolnick references Harney and Cross (1968) in describing the motivations of informants in general, but goes into detail regarding narcotics informers. The primary types of informers tend to be either addicts or people who work in places frequented by them. The motivation for the addicts is typically either to avoid incarceration or to reduce the severity of the punishments for their crimes. The second group, those who have casual contact with the addicts, may be motivated by a desire to avoid legal trouble that comes with having illegal activities occurring in their place of business or a simple desire to have the addicts removed from their place of business as they tend to be less than desirable clientele (Skolnick, 1994).

Cultivating informants is often more than simply offering money or incarceration. Skolnick uses as an example a sergeant whose techniques for cultivating informants included using egalitarian symbols, such as asking to be addressed by his first name rather than as "sir"; using a non-judgmental affect in his interactions with them, in the

manner of a therapist addressing an illness rather than a crime; expressing interest in the informant's well being and showing concern. This builds trust with the informant and helps create a rapport. Of equal importance is to protect the identity of the informant, as his safety would be at risk if it were generally known that he was assisting law enforcement. Betraying the confidence of one informant can damage the trust of the others as well (Skolnick, 1994).

Lee (2004) mentions four main purposes of DEA to use confidential informants:

- "To gather information from sources not readily available to law enforcement officers.

- To make observations in places where strangers would immediately be suspect.

- To conduct undercover negotiations.

- To gain firsthand, timely intelligence" (Lee, 2004, p. 64).

Lee then identifies following motivational factors for drug informants:

Fear: The threat of incarceration is a strong motivator. Combined with the offer of reduced sentence or even dropped charges, this can be a powerful incentive to give information. The threat of danger from his associates may also lead the informant to seek protection from law enforcement. One consideration in this case is that if the informant's associates know of his arrest, they may cut off all contact with him to avoid being set up. Action must be taken quickly before knowledge of the arrest spreads (Lee, 2004).

Revenge/Jealousy: Revenge or jealousy may prompt a criminal to inform on a competitor in hopes of getting them eliminated. Once the arrest has been made, the officer may use the situation to gain information on his former informant as well (Lee, 2004).

Repentance: An individual may express repentance for his crimes, but this is rarely genuine. Typically they are attempting to impress upon law enforcement how good of a person they are now and a desire to make amends for past crimes, but their true motivations may be devious (Lee, 2004).

Altruism: People may pass along information out of a desire to do good- for example, airline employees or package delivery workers who have noted something odd. As their access is limited, their information may not be very useful (Lee, 2004).

Mercenaries: A person may pass on information in exchange for money. Mercenaries often have a criminal past of their own, and their familiarity with crime and criminals enables them to gain valuable information. They may also introduce undercover agents who can then infiltrate and ultimately arrest the criminals. Mercenaries may be involved more closely and for longer than would be practical for an undercover agent. While valuable, they may have other motivations which should be explored (Lee, 2004).

Egotism: Commonly encountered informants are those who act out of a need to bolster self-esteem. They may ostensibly be seeking monetary reward, but in reality they need attention and praise. They may be difficult to control, wanting to take a more

active part in the investigation or drawing it out to obtain more money and praise. If they feel they are not receiving adequate praise they may go to a different official or agency. The ego of the handling agent should never be in conflict with the ego of the informant (Lee, 2004).

James Bond Syndrome: Some informants will be motivated out of a desire to act out fantasies of fast cars and amazing weapons. They may attempt to take control of the investigation themselves. Their information may be exaggerated in an attempt to get them into the act, to play their fantasy role (Lee, 2004).

The Wannabe: Wannabees are typically people who have desired a career in law enforcement from a young age, but for various reasons fail to qualify. They may try to emulate their handling officers, and often reveal themselves to unconcerned third parties, implying that they have authority and prestige that they don't. Their information is usually limited at best as they lack criminal associations themselves (Lee, 2004).

Perversely Motivated Informants: An informant with ulterior motives may be able to give valuable information, but they may be dangerous. Some will cooperate to learn the identities of undercover agents, to gain information on the progress of an operation, or about the weapons and capabilities of law enforcement. They may glean more information than they give (Lee, 2004).

Harney and Cross (1968) defined an informant as "a person who gives information to an investigator because of a definite personal motive." They then categorize the motives as: Fear, Revenge, Perverse, Egotistical, Mercenary, Detective Complex, Selective Law Enforcement, Appreciation or Gratitude Toward Police, and Repentance or desire to reform.

Fitzgerald (2008) mentions 13 different motivation factors in getting a person to cooperate as an informant in criminal investigations: money, fear of punishment, fear of criminal associates and revenge, becoming citizen informants, walk-in informants, jailhouse informants or furloughed informants, repentance, excitement, being police enthusiasts, acting as double agents, being unwitting informants, and becoming brokered informants.

Generally informants have to be motivated to act, and their motivations usually fall into more than one category. Their handlers should do their best to identify as many of these motivations as possible and keep them in mind.

Money: The most common motivator. The mercenary motive has a long history, from the biblical accounts of Judas Iscariot to the Wanted posters of the American West in the 1800s. The amount of money paid to an informer varies, but is the most easily understood motivator (Fitzgerald, 2008).

Fear of punishment: As the majority of informants are criminals who have been recently caught, this too is a common motivator. The person will trade information for a reduced sentence or other advantages (Fitzgerald, 2008).

Fear of criminal associates and revenge: Many informers will provide information in hopes that someone who has threatened them will be incarcerated, or as a form of revenge against someone who has wronged them. The informants may also seek future protection by law enforcement from other former associates (Fitzgerald, 2008).

Citizen informants: Non-criminal sources of information, acting as a concerned citizen. They may be hotel workers, neighbors, airline workers, delivery people, or have some other casual contact with persons of interest. Generally they are not able to supply a continual stream of information as they are not closely involved with the criminals, but may have information about individual events (Fitzgerald, 2008).

Walk-in informants: These are somewhat rare, and often will not have useful information. They may be motivated by any number of things- hoping for money, being a dutiful citizen, wanting to be rid of criminals from their neighborhood, etc. Like citizen informants, their knowledge is often very limited (Fitzgerald, 2008).

Jailhouse informants: Inmates may provide information in hopes of getting their sentences reduced, gaining privileges, being transferred to a better environment or other advantages while incarcerated (Fitzgerald, 2008).

Furloughed prisoners: A convicted criminal may be brought out of prison temporarily to assist in an investigation by interfacing with persons of interest in order to gather evidence (Fitzgerald, 2008).

Repentance: The informant may wish to make up for past crimes to clear their conscience. This may be in conjunction with other motivations, such as fear of imprisonment or fear of their former associates (Fitzgerald, 2008).

Excitement: Also known as James Bond complex, these informants are difficult to control as they are eager to act out fantasies based on action movies and crime dramas. They see investigations as glamorous adventures, and may be dangerous to themselves and to the investigation (Fitzgerald, 2008).

Police buffs: Similar to the James Bond wannabees, these informers are people who wish to be police officers themselves but are unable to qualify due to physical reasons or being unable to pass a background check. They may be members of a neighborhood watch or other organization. However, as they are not closely involved their information is likely to be limited (Fitzgerald, 2008).

Double agents: Also known as perversely motivated, this informant has ulterior motives which may be disadvantageous to law enforcement. They may provide valid information, but are also looking for information themselves about the law enforcement- information about investigations, identities of undercover officers, weaponry and resources available to law enforcement, etc. (Fitzgerald, 2008).

Unwitting informant: The informant may be unaware that the person they are talking to is with law enforcement. They may be an associate of a criminal informant who will then claim the information as his own, without law enforcement knowing the

true source. The information gathered this way is generally very reliable (Fitzgerald, 2008).

Brokered informants: If a criminal has nothing to offer law enforcement, they may call upon resources such as friends or family to help obtain information. While the information may be good, the danger to the civilians is high (Fitzgerald, 2008).

With the help of previous studies and 25 years of personal law enforcement experience Madinger (2000) identifies 10 common informant motives. These motivations are: Fear (both threat of incarceration, and threat of harm by associates), Revenge, Perverse, Egoistical, Mercenary, Repentance or desire to reform, Jealousy, Cop wannabe/James Bond, Good citizen (Patriotic motive), and Mentally disturbed individuals. All of these motivations are considered important and included in the present study except for the mentally disturbed individuals. According to Madinger (2000) some informants will come forward with bizarre or incomprehensible information that stems from some form of delusion. Their information tends to be unreliable at best. While generally harmless, they can consume time better spent on other efforts. Since none of the subjects of the present study were mentally disturbed, this variable is not tested in the present study.

Madinger (2000) uses Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs theory to explain these motives, and utilizes 12 case studies to exemplify and confirm the validity of these categories. Among the findings of Madinger regarding the informant motivation the following are considered important for the purposes of my study:

89

- Informants will often have multiple motivations

- The motivations are flexible, of varying strength or even in competition with each other depending on time and circumstances in the informant's career

- Knowing the status of the informant's motivations and what are the strongest influences at a given time is the best means of exercising the control needed to ensure his success as well as our own (Madinger, 2000).

The most obvious motivators are not necessarily the ones that the informant needs to have immediately addressed. Threatening an informant with additional punishments that may be avoided by cooperation may be the most direct, but addressing his need to be valued and respected by treating him with dignity and expressing appreciation for his help can be far more effective. Positive reinforcement should never be overlooked as a motivator (Madinger, 2000).

In summary, Madinger concludes following in his study:

- Motivations are the most critical element in informants- people who have access to information are many.

- The reasons against becoming an informant are many and powerful. The motivations to provide information must be strong enough to overcome the very strong prejudices against betrayal.

- There are several common reasons for people to cooperate with law enforcement, all related to the potential informant's perceived needs.

- Most informants have multiple reasons for cooperating, and those motivations may change over time, as their perceived needs shift.

- It is critical that the officer working with the informant be aware at all times of the informant's motivations (Madinger, 2000).

Blum (1972)'s study is one of the most cited books in the literature regarding to informants. In his study Blum interviewed 35 police informants in an attempt to put together a profile of a typical informant. He found that the majority were males between 25 and 45 years old and had not completed high school. They had various occupations, the most common being prostitutes. Twenty percent were career criminals.

According to Blum (1972) becoming an informant most often starts with an arrest in which the suspect is offered a deal in exchange for information. Fear of punishment is the most common motivation, followed by money, friendship with a particular officer, and vengeance. Some seek safety with law enforcement, some are trying to build up good will with law enforcement against a future time when they may be arrested, while a few get a thrill from the secrecy and double identity involved.

Over time the relationship between law enforcement and the informant tends to change. As fear or desire for revenge fade, the desire for money may grow, along with friendship with the handler. The informer may also come to enjoy the feeling of playing

cop. The former associates of the informer may come to be perceived as undesirable, as the informer tries to justify betraying their trust (Blum 1972).

Law enforcement reports their most common problems with informants are finding them, being limited to secure channels to communicate with them, increasing greed over time, reliability of information over time, providing adequate safety for the informant, and being drawn into the informant's personal life (Blum 1972).

For the informants the biggest problems are the risks of being found out by his associates, which will incur their vengeance, and the possibility of losing their job if they are informing against an employer (Blum 1972).

Some common themes emerged in Blum (1972)'s study in regards to the informer relative to his associates:

- Most inform on persons engaged in the same type of crime as the informant.
- The majority inform on people of their own ethnicity.
- About half inform on people of their own gender.
- About half inform on people in their own age group.
- About a third inform on people who work with or near them.
- About a third inform on their clients or customers.
- Over a third inform on their competitors.
- Over a third inform on their neighbors.
- Some inform on former lovers.
- Some inform on co-workers at legitimate jobs.

- A few inform on spouses and relatives.

- A few inform on their employees.

- A few inform on close friends (Blum 1972).

Officers, when asked to describe the differences between the informers and those they inform upon, mostly describe the informers as acknowledging that the crime is wrong and that they consider themselves to be acting in a more proper and moral way than their associates. Some are characterized as being merely more clever or more greedy than the others, and a few are described as being no different (Blum 1972).

When officers have been asked to describe their informants the picture they give is of a person of average or above intelligence, much in need of praise, needing to feel important, seeking appreciation, and not tolerant of boredom. They tend to seek excitement, and get depressed when times are dull. About half are reasonably well-adjusted normal people, with drive and ambitions, loyal to at least one person in their group, eager to please, rather insecure, perhaps a bit vain and conceited, ambivalent toward authority, idealistic and unrealistic, impulsive with poor judgment, having poor self-control, often vengeful and harboring grudges, unreliable, cunning, and without direction or meaning in life. They are often called losers, drifters, and other pejoratives. A very few may be fanatical, dogmatic, angry, bitter zealots. They are often slippery, devious people. These characteristics may be consistent with psychopathic personalities, which may be what drew them into crime originally (Blum 1972).

Natapoff (2009) in her extensive study discusses problematic issues about the use of informants. According to Natapoff (2009) passing information to law enforcement is generally held in contempt by the public, often with good reason as an informant may implicate an innocent to gain advantages for himself. There are documented cases where informants have given false information resulting in false arrests or even accidental shootings of innocents. The term "snitch" has strong negative connotations for this reason.

Informing is not always straightforward. There is the problem of verifying the information, and even if the information was valid and helpful the deals struck with the informants often result in criminals being released or even able to commit crimes with impunity as the police may turn a blind eye to their activities. This has resulted in an anti-snitch bias in crime-ridden communities as the community sees very little reward for passing information while taking great risks of reprisal (Natapoff, 2009).

Additionally the informants themselves may be vulnerable. The informant may be placed in danger while trying to cooperate in a police sting operation, or may run the risk of their identity becoming known. Witness intimidation is common under these circumstances. Information may even be obtained online from such websites as Who's A Rat (http://www.whosarat.com/).

Backlash against informants in the United States reached the point of a Stop Snitching campaign being mounted in Baltimore MD. This became nationally known when a DVD was produced. When a witness wore a Stop Snitching shirt to court he

explained, "Guys doin' all this crime and not doin' no time because they're telling on the next man " (Natapoff, 2009, p. 121).

On a larger scale, Natapoff (2009) also references high-profile Mafia cases, such as Sammy "The Bull" Gravano's testimony against John Gotti which resulted in Gravano entering Witness Protection, only to commit new crimes under his new identity.

Political informants tend to fall into one of two categories: infiltrators and agent provocateurs, and those who expose corrupt politicians. Examples given for the first type were those who infiltrated the Black Panther movement resulting in the police raid of 1969 and infiltration of the Communist Party. The second type is exemplified by the Abscam sting operation in the 1970s in which twenty five politicians were indicted for taking bribes (Natapoff, 2009).

Financial, or white-collar crimes are also known for informants receiving light sentences. Examples include Michael Milken in 1986, who only served two years of a ten year sentence for insider trading because he agreed to testify against his former colleagues (Natapoff, 2009).

Since 11 September 2001, greater attention has been paid to obtaining information on terrorists. The federal government of the United States actively courts informants and rewards them with money, visas and protection. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and PATRIOT Act were passed, and FISA created the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, a secret court used to obtain wiretaps and other covert surveillance. Unfortunately since much of this is classified, it is difficult to

know the exact extent of the use of informants. This enhanced secrecy also lends itself unfortunately to abuses similar to those noted with more conventional criminals (Natapoff, 2009).

Natapoff (2009) has recommendations for reforming the current informant system. She proposes the following goals:

- Increasing legislative and public knowledge about criminal informant practices.

- Strengthening police and prosecutorial accountability, both internal and external, for informant practices.

- Improving the accuracy of information obtained from informants and fairness to defendants against whom informants are used.

- Calibrating informant practices more closely to the goals of crime prevention, violence reduction, social and racial equality, and personal and community security (Natapoff, 2009).

One of the rare empirical studies about motivational factors of informers is Billingsley (2000)'s research. He surveyed 120 police informers in 12 police forces and other law enforcement agencies throughout England. He sought to identify initial motivational factors (reasons) for informing and how these motives may change over time. In terms of methodology he utilized semi-structured questions with an open-ended format (Billingsley, 2000).

Billingsley lists motivations for informants that he has identified:

- *Financial:* the mercenary motivation.

- *Dislike the crime:* the informant may feel that a particular crime has "crossed the line" and is intolerable, and will turn evidence out of a sense of morality.

- *Reduced sentence:* giving information in return for leniency.

- *Revenge:* striking down someone who has wronged them.

- *Right side of the law:* the desire to leave crime behind and become a good citizen.

- *Looking for a favor:* the informant may be hoping to curry favor with law enforcement so they will look the other way regarding his own activities.

- *Friendly with officer:* the informant may know an officer on a personal level and have a friendship with him, and wish to help that individual officer.

- *Police pressure:* reaction to threat of arrest and incarceration.

- *Take out competition:* if the criminal has an adversary, he may inform on them in hopes that the competitor will be arrested and therefore eliminated as a threat.

- Part of a deal: if the informant has already been arrested they may give information in exchange for some favor- transfer to a better prison, leniency in sentencing, etc.

- *The challenge:* the informant may feel a sense of pride and excitement in assisting with law enforcement, and want to excel in their opinion.

- *Gratitude:* the informant may feel that they were treated fairly by law enforcement and prosecution, and feel grateful toward them for helping him out of a difficult situation.

Enjoyment: for some, the thrill of taking the risks of being an informant is rewarding in itself (Billingsley, 2000).

The frequency distribution table of reasons for starting as informers is as follows:

Table 2: Motivations Found Effective in Billingsley's Study

Initial reason	Frequency
Financial	32
Dislike the crime	17
Reduced sentence	16
Revenge	15
Right side of the law	9
Looking for a favor	9
Friendly with officer	8
Police pressure	4
Take out competition	3
Part of a deal	2
The challenge	2
Gratitude	2
Enjoyment	1
Total	120

(Billingsley, et al., 2001)

According to Billingsley (2001)'s findings the motivations of an informant may change over time. Informants motivated by revenge or by a situational fear (threats of incarceration, for example) will not be motivated by the same stimulus once their situation has been changed. If they continue to supply information, it will be for different reasons than those they started with. However, those initially motivated by self-interest (money, taking out competition) will likely maintain those motivations.

Billingsley's findings are considered important and will be included in my study to test to what degree these motives of informants in criminal cases are effective on confidential informants in religion abusing terrorist networks.

Developing an Informant

So far we have reviewed theories focused on human motivations behind individual behavior. We also have reviewed the studies that focus on informants in different fields, however it is important to note how the recruitment process of informants is conducted.

When a potential informant has been identified, great care must be taken to build a relationship with him. Mishandling the informant will make him uncooperative. As with any relationship, it must be taken in steps (Madinger, 2000).

The agent should begin by finding out as much information as possible about the informant and his background. Finding things in common with the informant before meeting him will help to make the informant more comfortable.

The first meeting should be held in a quiet and private place, and should be held with as few people present as possible. The relationship with the informant is a personal one between two individuals, not between one person and a group. Having privacy and individual communication is far less intimidating for the informant.

The agent must have a clear understanding of the informant's needs. If the informant is in need of protection, for instance, the agent must be aware of this and offer to help to protect the informant and his family. However, it is important to remember that the most obvious needs are not necessarily the most important ones. The agent must let the informant determine what his needs are and communicate them. After all, the informant is not working for the agent, but for his own benefit (Madinger, 2000).

Once the needs have been identified and agreed upon, there must be a negotiation in which the terms are made clear on both sides what the benefits and responsibilities of the arrangement will be. The agent should be clear as to what he will provide for the informant, and show the informant the benefits of the arrangement for the informant. The agent should never promise more than he can deliver- the agreement must bind the agent as well as the informant. The terms of the agreement should be laid out in a very precise and logical manner (Madinger, 2000).

After the terms have been laid out, the agent should use persuasion to sell the agreement to the informant. Appeals to the informant's emotions are needed at this point. Convincing the informant that the arrangement is in his best interests and making him feel comfortable with it will influence his decision to accept it and cooperate (Madinger, 2000).

The agent must develop a rapport with the informant. He must be sympathetic and empathetic to the informant's emotional state and develop a friendship based on

trust and mutual respect. This will enable the informant and the agent to understand and agree with each other and develop more open communications. Care should be taken to not get too emotionally involved with the informant, but the relationship should be comfortable and open (Madinger, 2000).

Lyman (1987) outlines a general interviewing procedure for confidential informants as follows: Interview the potential informant for general knowledge; Determine the extent of their detailed knowledge; Take a separate statement about the CI's knowledge about individual persons of interest or groups; Take down detailed information about persons or groups of interest; Get description of vehicles, associates and places frequented; Verify the information given by the CI; Check vehicle registrations; Check the CI's criminal record (Lyman, 1987, pp. 108-110).

Lyman (1987) also recommends rules for engaging confidential informants: Be fair; Be truthful and don't overpromise; Keep the informant in his place, but be tactful; Guide the informant so he doesn't entrap the person of interest; Don't let the CI know too much about his handler; Don't tolerate crimes committed by the CI; Be careful not to let the handler's morals slip to the level of the criminals; Beware of informers of the opposite sex, as sexual advances may compromise the handler (Lyman, 1987, pp. 108-110).

Frustration

One condition that can become extremely counterproductive is frustration. If an individual is blocked from achieving a goal they will become frustrated, and will react with aggression. If the source of the frustration cannot be attacked, the individual may find scapegoats to attack instead.(Hersey, et al., 1996)

Aggression is only one of the ways in which frustration may be shown. If frustration persists, the actions may take one or more of the following forms:(Maier, 1955)

- *Rationalization*- creating excuses to justify the failure to achieve the goal. (Blaming others is a common form of this.)

- *Regression*- acting immaturely, often in a childish manner (Brown, 1986).

- *Fixation*- making the same attempt repeatedly, despite lack of success, and not taking alternatives. "Frustration can freeze old and habitual responses and prevent the use of new and more effectual ones"(Brown, 1986).

- *Resignation*- giving up on achieving the goal.

- *Apathy*- not having any emotional investment in whether the goal is achieved or not (Hersey, et al., 1996).

If an agent sees that his informant is becoming frustrated he should work to alleviate the frustration and help the informant reach his goals. He should empathize and try to help to resolve the blockage.

In terrorists frustration is common, and may lead to becoming an informant. Alderfer and Guzzo (1979) states that frustration stems from unsatisfied needs, and that an unsatisfied higher need may result in more focus on lower needs. An example might be that a person in the lower ranks of a terrorist organization may be frustrated by being unable to rise into a leadership position (self-actualization and esteem needs) and focus his frustration on lack of money, poor quality living environment, or being at continual risk.

An agent may be able to resolve some of the individual's frustrations by rewarding him as an informant. He may offer financial help (physiological needs), protection (security needs), and may use praise and recognition (esteem needs). In this way he can turn the informant's frustrations into motivators and develop a relationship with him.

Conclusion

The literature review may be considered to be two parts: content theories of motivations as researched primarily in the workplace, and more specific literature of the motivations of confidential informants in law enforcement are reviewed.

In summary, Maslow's hierarchy is useful in explaining how specific needs may motivate individuals in a given direction- for instance, how basic needs arising from poverty, hunger and insecure living conditions may be very strong motivators for RATs

to provide information to law enforcement in exchange for money, food and protection, while their needs for esteem from peers may be of lesser importance to them at that moment. Using Maslow's needs hierarchy to anticipate the needs of the recruits may help law enforcement to motivate them to become active informants. Alderfer's theory is similarly useful and helps to emphasize that multiple motivations may be at work at a given time and highlights the importance of the role that frustration may play.

Herzberg's Motivation-Hygiene theory is especially useful in understanding the motivations of recruits. Hygiene factors are often lacking within RAT networks, resulting in bored, frustrated people who may be very eager to leave the network. Law enforcement can use this knowledge to advantage by accentuating these lacks to recruits.

Knowledge of the more specific motivations common to confidential informants in law enforcement is also invaluable as it underscores the strengths of some motivations while giving cautions regarding others- for example, fear or revenge will motivate recruits in a very straightforward manner, while claims of patriotism and altruism may be viewed more skeptically. Being aware of ulterior (perverse) motivations or thrill seekers is likewise important to prevent potential damage to investigations.

Reviewed Literature is summarized in Table 3 for the motivations attributed to informants.

Table 3. Summary of Literature: Motivations Attributed to Informants

Motivation	Reviewed Literature											Relevant Theory		
	Blum	Copeland	Harney&Cross	Jacobson	Lee	O'Hara	Skolnick	Wilson	Fitzgerald	Madinger	Blinglsley	Maslow	Herzberg*	Alderfer
Reduced Sentence	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Mercenary	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Fear from Police			+						+			+	+	+
Fear from Criminals	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+		+	+	+
Revenge	+		+	+	+	+		+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Egoistical		+	+			+	+			+		+	+	+
Perverse			+	+	+	+		+		+		+		+
Repentance or Desire to Reform	+		+		+				+	+		+	+	+
Jealousy				+	+	+				+		+	+	+
Altruism					+									
Self-Esteem					+							+	+	+
James Bond Syndrome					+					+		+	+	+
Police Wannabe	+			+	+					+		+	+	+
Detective Complex			+									+	+	+
Selective L.E.			+							+	+	+	+	+
Gratitude Toward Police			+								+	+	+	+
Excitement									+		+	+	+	+
Patriotic		+	+	+		+	+			+	+			
Mentally Disturbed			+							+		+		+
Dislike the crime											+	+		+
Right side of the law											+	+	+	+
Friendly with Officer											+	+	+	+
Looking for a Favor											+	+	+	+
Take out Competition											+	+	+	+

CHAPTER III: METHODOLOGY

Introduction

This chapter provides a discussion concerning the research design and analytical methodologies used in the present study. This chapter includes following components: Research questions, strategy of the research methodology, secondary data source and analysis, research design, analytical techniques, validity & reliability Issues, and limitations of the study.

The main hypothesis for the purpose of this study is "The individuals' decision-making processes to cooperate with LEI as a confidential informant is affected by some motivation factors during recruitment process." The present study tests 27 hypotheses in order to answer two main research questions. To meet its objectives the present study uses quantitative research methodology, constructs a cross-sectional research design, and employs secondary data analysis to test the hypotheses of the research questions.

Research Questions

1. What are the motivational factors that make some individuals (terrorists) in RAT groups confidential informants? What motivating factors have an effect on the individual's decision to choose to be an informant within RAT networks? In other words, what general motivating factors of recruiting informants in the literature are applicable to confidential informants within RAT networks?

2. How do the content approaches of human motivation—Maslow's need hierarchy, and Herzberg's motivation-hygiene theories—affect the likelihood of becoming of certain RAT group informant? This question will be answered by answering the following two sub questions:

2-a. What is the effect of hygiene factors-dissatisfiers-on the individual's decision to leave terrorism in RAT networks? This is essentially a question related to Herzberg's theory.

Following sub questions are related to Maslow's theory:

2-b. Are there significant motivational differences in the probability of becoming Turkish-Hezbollah informant relative to the probability of becoming other RAT informants? This question is related to Maslow's theory.

2-c. Are there significant motivational differences in the probability of becoming Al-Qaeda informant relative to the probability of becoming other RAT informants?

Strategy of the research methodology

From the review of literature it has become clear that studies regarding the informant motivations have been conducted in the areas of drug trafficking, corruption, organized crime, homicide or other street level crimes. Moreover, most of these studies are at descriptive level written by practitioners for tactical purposes such as handbooks, service manuals, personal experiences or legal documents. Thus, these studies are not immune to cultural bias, cognitive inflexibility, or attribution error until there is ample empirical support. On the other hand, no study with a specific focus on confidential informants acting in terrorism has been conducted yet. This is primarily a consequence of the secret nature of the phenomena. Because of the legal barriers put to ensure confidentiality, it has been almost impossible for researchers to obtain and analyze confidential information about the issue.

Therefore, this study is exploratory at the first phase in terms of exploring the motives that may have an effect on terrorists' decision to cooperate as an informant. In this phase, terrorist autobiographies are surveyed. Surveying autobiographies is a well-known data collection technique in terrorism studies. In the first phase of the present study, I conduct an exploratory design by including as many variables as possible, which are collected from the subjects of the target population. In addition to descriptive statistical analyses, bivariate and multivariate statistics such as crosstabs, Chi Square, and logistic regression are used to test the effects of these variables.

The second phase of this study has an explanatory nature. First, motivational factors acquired in the first phase of the study are classified based on the main assumptions of motivation theories. Then, variables in these classifications are analyzed with appropriate statistical methods such as multivariate binomial logistic regression to test whether they support the hypotheses derived from theories or not.

Secondary data source

The dataset of the present study was formed by conducting archival surveys on the official records of Turkish National Police (TNP) for the secondary data analysis. The TNP has been employing informants over a century for law enforcement purposes, and keeps confidential records of them under different departments. These records include very detailed information about informants ranging from demographic and social data to their hobbies and needs. The intelligence department of TNP, the IDB, is responsible for recruitment, development, management, and protection of all confidential informants within terrorist networks. Therefore, after getting a top-secret clearance from the TNP, handwritten autobiographies and F10 forms which contain detailed information about the recruit that were filled out by every confidential informant during the recruitment process and available at IDB archives were searched.

F10 questionnaire forms contain several structured questions in addition to some open ended questions such as, "Why did they choose to become informants?" etc. for

the recruits to fill out during the recruitment. They also contain "official use only" sections for the recruiters to include their observations, comments and evaluations about the subjects during the recruitment.

Handwritten autobiographies are attachments of F10 forms and are used in the present study because they contain valuable background information about the recruit's family, socioeconomic status, demographics as well as the motivations that led him/her to be an informant in his own words. The IDB asks the recruits to write their autobiographies as part of the recruitment procedure. The reason for asking autobiographies is two-fold: First, the IDB wants to know the motivation of the new recruits in detail. Second, they ask new recruits to write about their backgrounds, connections, motivations and other things that he/she wants to mention so that they can crosscheck the information in F10 forms and know the applicant better. Recruits usually write their autobiographies in essay format and they are free about what to include.

Based on the limitations of the approval letter and top-secret clearance from the TNP, special consideration was taken in keeping their IDs secret while forming the data set about the confidential informants. While some variables such as motivation factors were taken directly, some others such as name, occupation, birth place, number of children, date of birth etc. were not directly included in this study in order to keep confidentiality and not to reveal the identities of confidential informants. Some demographic and socioeconomic variables are recoded and included as control

variables. For instance, recruitment age was calculated by subtracting date of birth from the recruitment date and included as a variable in our data set. Income was not used directly; instead it was recalculated based on average cost of living in the city where he was living at the time he was recruited. Similarly, job and occupation were collapsed into a new dichotomous variable, employment status, meaning 1 for employed and 0 for unemployed.

Accordingly, my data set contains detailed information about all individuals that served as confidential informants for more than a year within any of 8 different religion abusing terrorist networks—Al-Qaeda, Turkish Hezbollah, Selam Tevhid, Hiz-but Tahrir, HD ICCB (AFID), IBDA/C, Vasat, and IHO—in the last two decades (N= 138).

<div align="center">Research Design</div>

Cross sectional research design is used in the present study. The cross sectional design is the most common design in the social sciences particularly in terrorism related studies. The cross sectional research design is suitable for studies that entail collected data measured at a single point in time on all appropriate variables (Nachmias & Nachmias, 2000; Olsen & St George, 2004).

Because of confidentiality and the secret nature of the phenomena it was not possible for the researcher to employ experimental or quasi-experimental research designs in the present study. The researcher had neither a way of accessing the

<div align="center">111</div>

informants systematically to form control and experiment groups, nor did he have access to situations where he can methodically manipulate and control motivating factors affecting the informant's decision. Cross sectional research design helps to ensure that the appropriate information was collected and that the data analysis was correct. With the implementation of bivariate and multivariate analysis, it allows the researcher to investigate relationships among numerous variables—motivation factors—and their influences on the individual's decision to choose to be a confidential informant (O'Sullivan, Rassel, & Berner, 2003). Moreover, the cross sectional research design offers an advantage to researchers with different interests and different models to work with dataset derived from a single cross sectional study, and analyze the phenomena from different points of views (Nachmias & Nachmias, 2000; O'Sullivan, et al., 2003).

These issues made a cross sectional design suitable for the present study.

Population and Sampling

The unit of analysis in this study is individual, confidential informant within RAT networks in Turkey.

In general there are two types of confidential informants used in criminal settings. In the first type, the law enforcement agency recruits somebody who fits the job, trains him and infiltrates him into the target group. The advantage of this type is that it is easier to find the right individual and the recruitment phase is safe but it is

very risky for the informant. It takes time for the informant to gain the trust of the criminals and get access to the information needed. In the second type, the law enforcement agency recruits somebody who is already in the target group. This type of informant is hard to obtain and the risks are great at the beginning, especially at the recruitment phase, but it pays off quickly and has a lot of advantages over the previous type as they were already in the criminal setting. As a rule the IDB prefers to employ the second type of informant to reduce risk to civilian lives, so the sources cited in this study were within the terrorist network when recruited.

Another criterion of IDB about the recruit to be classified as a confidential informant is the trial period, which is usually one year. After the initial recruitment, the individuals are treated as informants and at the end of the trial period if they meet the criteria of the IDB then they become confidential informants. Thus, all of the subjects of this study have served a minimum of one year as confidential informants in RAT networks.

The population of this study is all confidential informants within RAT networks in Turkey in the past two decades (N=138).

By saying so, this study doesn't utilize any sampling procedure; instead, it utilizes the entire population of confidential informants within RAT networks in Turkey (n=N=138). Working with the population also reduces threats to internal and external validity of the study since the significance levels become irrelevant, and the results of the study directly reflects the social reality of the phenomena.

Analysis

According to the literature, inferential statistics are used to draw conclusions about the population based on analysis of the sampling data. If the analysis is focusing on population, then descriptive statistics are used. Similarly, most of the variables included in this study are in fact population parameters (Demirci, 2008; Nardi, 2006; Yang, 2010).

However, I did an exception to this general rule in this study. I applied inferential statistics to some extent and illustrated group level models for Turkish-Hezbollah and Al-Qaeda RAT networks in order to illustrate practical implications of the study for the practitioners. It would be good to form individual models for each RAT network such as Islamic Movement, Vasat, Selam-Tevhid etc. Nevertheless, sample sizes of other RAT networks are insufficient, largest being n=16, which would not only result in loss of power, but also end up with statistically insignificant results. The sample size for Al-Qaeda was also not large enough (n=22) but a multivariate model was tested for it in order to make some predictions about them. The ratio of sample size to the number of parameters is critically important in logistic regression since it uses maximum likelihood estimation. It is strongly recommended in literature that the number of cases in the smallest group should be at least ten times the number of predictors in logistic regression models (Gray & Kinnear, 2012; Hosmer David & Stanley, 2000).

Analytical techniques

Research questions and hypotheses of the present study will be analyzed in four phases: First, data preparation and descriptive statistics will be performed before any in-depth analyses. Second, hypotheses relating to research question one (hypotheses one through nineteen) are analyzed through bivariate analysis techniques. Bivariate analysis refers to the analysis of two variables at the same time. Since this study is an exploratory research the relationship between the dependent variable and every independent variable should be examined separately on a one-to-one bases.

Third, motivation factors—variables tested in hypotheses one through fifteen— are collapsed into five new categorical variables (physiological needs, security needs, social needs, esteem needs and self-actualization) based on Maslow's need hierarchy theory and a new categorical variable (hygiene) is formed by collapsing motivation factors (variables tested in hypotheses one through fifteen) into a new variable based on Herzberg's motivation-hygiene theory. Hypotheses based on these new variables relating to research question two (hypotheses twenty through twenty five) are analyzed through bivariate analysis techniques.

Fourth, two new dependent variables (Hezbollah and Al-Qaeda) are formed for multivariate analyses. Hypotheses relating to research question two (2b and 2c) (hypotheses twenty five and twenty six) are analyzed through multivariate analysis techniques. Multivariate analysis refers to examining more than two variables

simultaneously. Multivariate analysis of combined effects of motivations based on Maslow's theory is considered essential. Multivariate analysis is also required in establishing a final model for being an informant in a RAT group.

Bivariate Hypothesis Testing

Among several statistics available in the literature to measure the strength and significance of bivariate association between dependent and independent variables in the present study contingency tables using the crosstab function of the SPSS is considered appropriate because the level of measurements of DV and IVs are nominal and all are treated as dichotomous measures in hypotheses one through twenty-five. Pearson's chi-square and the Mantel-Haenszel chi-square (or linear-by-linear association) are used in determining statistical significance. Results having a p-value less than .05 are considered statistically significant at the .05 alpha level.

Multivariate Hypothesis Testing

Hypothesis twenty-six and twenty-seven are tested using stepwise multivariate binary logistic regression analysis. Binary logistic regression was appropriate multivariate analysis technique to predict a dichotomous DV from a set of nominal, ordinal, and interval IVs. However, control variables are also included in these hypotheses; therefore, stepwise binomial logistic regression is used to calculate the

effect size made by each IV and to determine the amount of variance in the DV that is explained by the combined IVs.

Research Questions and Hypotheses

The main question to be answered in this study is: What makes some individuals (terrorists) in RAT groups choose to become confidential informants? From the review of literature and relevant theories it has become clear that motives are the reason or driving force underlying an individual behavior at a particular time. Therefore, in this study, I am primarily focusing on the motivating factors during recruitment process. I also included some demographic factors as control variables to see the extent of their effect. Accordingly, my primary research question is:

Research Question One

R.Q.1: What are the motivational factors that make some individuals (terrorists) in RAT groups confidential informants? What motivating factors have an effect on the individual's decision to choose to be an informant within RAT networks? In other words, what general motivating factors of recruiting informants in the literature are applicable to confidential informants within RAT networks?

Dependent variable: A decision by a militant to become a confidential informant (level of measurement: nominal)

Independent Variables: Motivating factors (level of measurement: Nominal)

Hypotheses for the Question One

What motivating factors have an effect on the individual's decision to choose to be an informant within RAT networks?

All motivations mentioned in the literature are included as hypotheses and tested to see which ones are applicable to terrorism field. First the question is answered by testing the following hypotheses derived from literature. Hypotheses from H1 through H15 test the effect of motivation factors derived from literature and the researcher's own field experience. Hypotheses H16 through H19 test the effect of negative motivations- barriers to cope with- that the informant might expresses during recruitment. It is also important to mention here that all of these hypotheses are also associated with Maslow's and Herzberg's motivation categories. In the first question since I don't have non-informants in our dataset I only made descriptive analysis within informants. Contingency tables—crosstabs—with Pearson Chi Square are used to test following hypotheses.

H1. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants with an expectation of reduced sentence during the trial.

H2. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants as a result of friendly relationship with LEI officer.

H3. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants because of their gratitude or indebtedness to the LEI officer.

H4. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants to satisfy their mercenary needs.

H5. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants because of fear of incarceration.

H6. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants because of revenge motivation.

H7. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants to satisfy their need for repentance or desire to reform their criminal life.

H8. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants because of their patriotic motives.

H9. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants as a result of fear from their terrorist associates.

H10. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants because of their selective law enforcement or altruistic motivations.

H11. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants as a result of jealousy within the RAT group.

H12. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants as a result of ideological conflict in morality with the RAT group.

H13. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants to satisfy their desire to be a spy. (James Bond syndrome, police wannabe).

H14. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants to fulfill their need for excitement and egoistical motives.

H15. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants because of a hidden perverse motivation.

H16. Most recruits from RAT groups expressed the state of frustration to some extend during the recruitment.

H17. Most recruits from RAT groups expressed the fear of being labeled as snitch as a barrier to cope with while choosing to become informants.

H18. Most recruits from RAT groups expressed the fear of being discarded by police as a barrier to cope with while choosing to become informants.

H19. Most recruits from RAT groups expressed an ideological opposition to the state and system as a barrier to cope with while choosing to become informants.

Research Question Two

R.Q.2: How do the content approaches of human motivation (Maslow's need hierarchy, and Herzberg's motivation-hygiene theories) affect the likelihood of becoming of a RAT group informant?

This question is answered by answering the following questions:

2-a. What is the effect of hygiene factors (dissatisfiers) on the individuals' decision to leave terrorism in RAT networks? This is essentially a question related to Herzberg's theory.

Dependent variable: Rat Group membership (level of measurement: nominal)

Independent Variable: Hygiene factors (level of measurement: Nominal)

2-b. Are there significant motivational differences in the probability of becoming a Turkish-Hezbollah informant relative to the probability of becoming other RAT informants?

Dependent variable: Binary Hezbollah (level of measurement: nominal)

Independent Variables: Maslow's Motivation categories (level of measurement: Nominal)

2-c. Are there significant motivational differences in the probability of becoming an Al-Qaeda informant relative to the probability of becoming other RAT informants?

Dependent variable: Binary Al-Qaeda (level of measurement: nominal)

Independent Variables: Maslow's Motivation categories (level of measurement: Nominal)

The sub questions 2-b and 2-c are related to Maslow's theory. I examine the effect of all motivation factors together and then demographic variables are integrated into the model as control variables to make statistical control.

In order to answer the second research question, need groups are formed based on assumptions of Maslow's need hierarchy, and Herzberg's motivation-hygiene theories by including all motivation factors that are relevant to the theories. Some demographic and socioeconomic variables that were available during the data collection are also added to our model to test the extent of their effects.

Since I don't have non-informants in the model I created two dichotomous dependent variables for sub questions 2b and 2c of second research question as follows:

Binary Hezbollah variable is computed by making Hezbollah as group 1 and all the others as 0. For *Binary Al-Qaeda* I computed Al Qaeda informants as 1 and all the others as 0. I used these both dichotomous variables as dependent variables in my Logistic Regression analyses. By doing this I made a contribution to the literature by examining the effect of motivational factors and demographics on becoming Hezbollah/Al-Qaeda vs. other RAT informants.

The sub questions of the second research question are answered by testing hypotheses derived from Maslow's need hierarchy and Hertzberg's motivation-hygiene theories. Multivariate binary logistic regression models for Turkish-Hezbollah, and Al-Qaeda RAT groups are considered a good fit to answer questions 2b and 2c. For hypothesis H20, H21, H22, H23, H24 and H25, contingency tables using the crosstab function of the SPSS is considered appropriate to measure the strength and significance of bivariate association and Pearson's chi-square is used in determining statistical significance.

Hypotheses for the question Two

There are motivational differences between becoming Turkish-Hezbollah/Al-Qaeda informant and becoming other RAT informant.

Hypotheses from H20 through H24 test the individual effect of categories based on assumptions of Maslow's hierarchy of needs theory.

H20. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants to satisfy their predominant physiological needs.

H21. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants to satisfy their predominant safety (security) needs.

H22. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants to satisfy their predominant social (affiliation) needs.

123

H23. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants to satisfy their predominant self-esteem and esteem from others needs.

H24. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants to satisfy their predominant Self-Actualization needs.

Hypothesis for the question 2-a

H25. Lack of Herzberg's hygiene factors in terrorism settings leads most recruits from RAT groups to make the decision to leave terrorism to satisfy their predominant needs by becoming informants.

H25 is formed to answer this question. This question is answered by testing the effect of Herzberg's hygiene category on recruit's decision to leave terrorism. Contingency table with Pearson's chi-square is considered a good fit to measure the strength and significance of bivariate association.

Hypothesis for the question 2-b

H26. There are significant motivational differences (Maslow's need categories) and demographic differences in the probability of becoming a Turkish-Hezbollah informant relative to the probability of becoming other RAT informants.

Hypothesis H26 is formed to answer this question. Multivariate binary logistic regression model for Turkish-Hezbollah, and other RAT groups is considered a good fit to answer this question.

<u>*Hypothesis for the question 2-c*</u>

H27. There are significant motivational differences (Maslow's need categories) and demographic differences in the probability of becoming an Al-Qaeda informant relative to the probability of becoming other RAT informants.

Hypothesis H27 is formed to answer this question. Multivariate binary logistic regression model for Al-Qaeda, and other RAT groups is considered a good fit to answer this question.

Variables and Level of Measurement

Dependent Variables

<u>*For Bivariate Analyses*</u>

RAT Network membership is used as a dependent variable: A decision by a militant to become a confidential informant. (Level of measurement: nominal)

According to Maslow individuals constantly progress and make decisions to satisfy their predominant needs at a given time. According to Herzberg when the

hygiene factors are lacking in their environment, individuals tend to leave that environment and look for other options where the hygiene factors are present. Therefore, individuals in RAT networks who have needs—motivation factors—and cannot satisfy them in a terrorist setting look for other means to fulfill their unmet needs. Eventually when they have the opportunity offered by the LEI officer to satisfy their predominant needs they decide to cooperate with the LEI. Accordingly this decision is used in this study as a dependent variable.

For Multivariate Analyses

Binary Hezbollah: Becoming an informant in Hezbollah relative to other RAT networks. It is used as a dependent variable for research question 2-b: This variable is computed by collapsing the dependent variable in the bivariate analyses, RAT network membership, by making Hezbollah as group 1 and all the others as 0. (Level of measurement: nominal, discrete).

Binary Al-Qaeda: Becoming an informant in Al-Qaeda relative to other RAT networks. It is used as a dependent variable for research question 2-c. This variable is computed by collapsing the dependent variable in the bivariate analyses, RAT network membership, by making Al Qaeda informants as 1 and all the others as 0. (Level of measurement: nominal, discrete).

I used these both dichotomous variables as dependent variables in my Logistic Regression analyses.

126

Independent variables

<u>*For Bivariate Analyses*</u>

Following motivation factors derived from literature and researchers own field experience are used as independent variables:

Mercenary

Source of this variable is literature. Informants in this category are motivated primarily by financial gain. They may be in financial hardship and need the money or other material rewards for relief, or (more rarely) see informing as a way of gaining money for luxuries (Billingsley, et al., 2001; Blum, 1972; Copeland, 1974; Harney & Cross, 1968; Jacobson, 1981; Lee, 2004; Madinger, 2000; O'Hara, 1973; Skolnick, 1994; Wilson, 1978). For the purposes of the present study confidential informants who mentioned any kind of mercenary needs are categorized in this variable. (Level of measurement: nominal, discrete).

Reduced Sentence

Source of this variable is literature. If a person has been sentenced and is incarcerated, they may find that they have access to information on other crimes either unrelated to their own offense or future crimes. They may volunteer information in exchanged for reduced imprisonment time. For the purposes of the present study

confidential informants who mentioned that they expect a reduced sentence by being an informant are categorized in this variable. (Level of measurement: nominal, discrete).

Fear of Incarceration

Source of this variable is literature. The drive for self-preservation is one of the strongest motivations there is. A person motivated by fear will continue to be motivated as long as the threat is perceived. Law enforcement may have caught the person committing a crime, and will offer a choice: a long sentence in prison, or a lesser punishment in exchange for information (Billingsley, et al., 2001; Blum, 1972; Copeland, 1974; Harney & Cross, 1968; Jacobson, 1981; Lee, 2004; Madinger, 2000; O'Hara, 1973; Skolnick, 1994; Wilson, 1978). For the purposes of the present study confidential informants who mentioned a fear of incarceration during the recruitment are categorized in this variable. (Level of measurement: nominal, discrete).

Fear of Terrorist Associates

Source of this variable is literature. A criminal may find himself being threatened by his associates, or find that the activity they are involved in is too dangerous for him. If he leaves the group, he may be in considerable danger. At this point he may turn to law enforcement for protection in exchange for information (Billingsley, et al., 2001; Blum, 1972; Copeland, 1974; Harney & Cross, 1968; Jacobson, 1981; Lee, 2004; Madinger, 2000; O'Hara, 1973; Skolnick, 1994; Wilson, 1978). This variable is based on review of F10 forms and autobiographies. The fear of associates may include threats of

death, injury, blackmail, seizing of assets, and penalties of various types (including monetary). An example would be if an individual or one of his relatives is suspected of assisting the enemy (government), the RAT network will convene a court and hold a trial, and may demand that the person pay a substantial sum of money or assassinate the person suspected. If the respondent mentioned any form of fear of his terrorist associates, either threatening the respondent or his family, the variable was assigned a value of 1. If not, the value assigned is 0 (Level of measurement: nominal, discrete).

Perverse/Hidden Motive (Double Agent)

Source of this variable is literature. A person may come forward ostensibly with information regarding a crime, but may have ulterior motives. They may be seeking information on the activities of rivals, or perhaps information on law enforcement- the resources available, the weaponry, identities of undercover operatives, etc. Their information may be of limited use, as their true motives are not to assist law enforcement (Harney & Cross, 1968; Jacobson, 1981; Lee, 2004; Madinger, 2000; O'Hara, 1973; Wilson, 1978). For the purposes of the present study confidential informants who were identified as having a perverse/hidden motive during the recruitment are categorized in this variable. (Level of measurement: nominal, discrete).

Egotistical, excitement

Source of this variable is literature. Informants of this category are motivated by a need to bolster self-esteem. They may be low-ranking criminals who wish to appear more powerful and influential than they really are, or in some cases may be seeking the

thrill of outwitting others and acting as a double agent. As long as their ego is being boosted they will be helpful, but once their needs are not met they may stop cooperating (Copeland, 1974; Harney & Cross, 1968; Madinger, 2000; O'Hara, 1973; Skolnick, 1994). For the purposes of the present study confidential informants who mentioned excitement as a driving force for being an informant during recruitment are categorized in this variable. (Level of measurement: nominal, discrete).

Revenge

Source of this variable is literature. A person who has been injured or wronged may provide information in retribution. The angry informant will likely have good information and will be eager to share it while his grievance is fresh in his mind, but may be more reluctant in time when he is calmer (Billingsley, et al., 2001; Blum, 1972; Harney & Cross, 1968; Jacobson, 1981; Lee, 2004; Madinger, 2000; O'Hara, 1973; Wilson, 1978). For the purposes of the present study confidential informants who were seeking an opportunity to take revenge from somebody in terrorism during recruitment are categorized in this variable. (Level of measurement: nominal, discrete).

Jealousy

Source of this variable is literature. Like revenge, the informant will be acting on emotion, perhaps impulsively. They may be trying to eliminate someone who poses a threat to someone dear to them, or possibly their own rival. Their information is often exaggerated and should be considered suspect (Jacobson, 1981; Lee, 2004; Madinger, 2000; O'Hara, 1973). For the purposes of the present study confidential informants who

showed signs of jealousy as a motivation during recruitment are categorized in this variable. (Level of measurement: nominal, discrete).

Ideological Conflict in Morality

Source of this variable is researchers own field experience. An individual may join a group due to his ideology, and then over time find that the group's ideology or morality differs from his own on some crucial aspect. He may realize that they have distorted religion in a way he cannot tolerate, or may perform or condone something that he considers to be immoral. At that point he will wish to distance himself from the group or even see them abolished, and may approach a trusted officer. For the purposes of the present study confidential informants who were having an internal ideological conflict with the RAT network in religious norms during recruitment are categorized in this variable. (Level of measurement: nominal, discrete).

Repentance or Desire To Reform

Source of this variable is literature. Some criminals may have a desire to leave crime, due perhaps to some traumatic event that has caused them to re-evaluate or due to increasing uneasiness with their activities and their associates. They may provide information from a need for absolution (Blum, 1972; Harney & Cross, 1968; Lee, 2004; Madinger, 2000). For the purposes of the present study confidential informants who mentioned that they were seeking to reform their criminal life during recruitment are categorized in this variable. (Level of measurement: nominal, discrete).

Selective Law Enforcement

Source of this variable is literature. A criminal may feel comfortable with some levels of crime but feel outraged over some act they consider to be egregious and wish to eliminate the persons responsible (Harney & Cross, 1968; Madinger, 2000). The ones that dislike the crime can also be included in this group (Billingsley, et al., 2001). For the purposes of the present study confidential informants who mentioned some acts of RAT group that they could not tolerate during recruitment are categorized in this variable. (Level of measurement: nominal, discrete).

Patriotic/Altruistic Motives

Source of this variable is literature. A person may provide information out of a sense of civic duty. Their motivation will likely be superficial, but should not be disregarded as they may be really motivated by this motivation. With the support of other motivations patriotic or altruistic motivations can provide valuable informants for the law enforcement intelligence agency (Billingsley, et al., 2001; Copeland, 1974; Harney & Cross, 1968; Jacobson, 1981; Madinger, 2000; O'Hara, 1973; Skolnick, 1994). For the purposes of the present study confidential informants who mentioned during recruitment that they chose to become informants primarily for patriotism or altruism are categorized in this variable. (Level of measurement: nominal, discrete).

Cop Wannabe/James Bond syndrome

Source of this variable is literature. Similar to the egotistical informant, this category is motivated by a desire for the perceived excitement of being in law

enforcement or espionage. They may mimic officers and wish to take an active role in the investigation, and could endanger themselves and the investigation (Blum, 1972; Jacobson, 1981; Madinger, 2000). For the purposes of the present study confidential informants who mentioned during recruitment that they have a strong desire to be a spy are categorized in this variable. (Level of measurement: nominal, discrete).

Indebtedness- Appreciation or Gratitude Toward Police

Source of this variable is literature. If a person has been in legal trouble previously and feels that he was treated well and fairly, or if he has at some time been aided by law enforcement, he may feel a sense of gratitude toward his benefactors and volunteer information to help them (Billingsley, et al., 2001; Harney & Cross, 1968). Similarly, if the informant has received good treatment from the authorities- for example, humanitarian aid for his family despite being known to be part of a terrorist cell- he may feel gratitude toward the government.

Terrorists, it must be remembered, are people with needs like any other. If the authorities have aided them in a time of need- responding to a fire, or taking a child to the hospital for treatment- the individual may feel a sense of indebtedness to the authorities, or to a particular officer. They may choose to repay that debt by giving information. For the purposes of the present study confidential informants who mentioned that they chose to become informants primarily for the feeling of indebtedness towards a particular officer are categorized in this variable. (Level of measurement: nominal, discrete).

Friendly with officer

Source of this variable is literature. At times a person in a RAT group may form an acquaintance with an individual in law enforcement and develop a casual relationship. Over time the officer may gain the RAT's trust and form a bond of empathy. The RAT may feel a degree of friendship with the officer and desire to pass information to someone he knows he can trust (Billingsley, et al., 2001). For the purposes of the present study confidential informants who mentioned that prior friendly relationship with an officer had an effect on their decision during recruitment are categorized in this variable. (Level of measurement: nominal, discrete).

Fear of Being Labeled As a Snitch

Source of this variable is researchers own field experience. In any group operating illegally there is great pressure to keep secrets. Informing on the organization- or even one individual- is considered unforgivable, a violation of trust. If it becomes known that an individual has given information he may be shunned by the community, and his life may be endangered as well as the lives of his family and friends. This is a powerful threat and is extremely effective in discouraging informants. For the purposes of the present study confidential informants who mentioned that they were afraid of being labeled as snitch during recruitment are categorized in this variable. (Level of measurement: nominal, discrete).

Fear of Being Discarded

Source of this variable is researchers own field experience. If an individual comes forward with information, one of his fears may be being abandoned by the law enforcement officers. He fears that his trust in them may be violated- that once they have the information they want, they will discard him. Considering the risks involved in being an informant, this is not an insignificant fear. For the purposes of the present study confidential informants who mentioned that they fear of being discarded by law enforcement after the operation are categorized in this variable. (Level of measurement: nominal, discrete).

Opposition to State System

Source of this variable is researchers own field experience. The potential informant may be motivated to give information by a number of factors, but still be reluctant to come forward because they are deeply opposed to the government system or other authorities. They may feel that they have to make a difficult choice between the lesser of two evils. For the purposes of the present study confidential informants who mentioned that they don't legitimize the state system or they don't trust the authorities are categorized in this variable. (Level of measurement: nominal, discrete).

Physiological motivations

Source of this variable is Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs Theory. The most basic drives are those pertaining to physiological needs, i.e., food, shelter, clothing. If the individual is lacking in any of these it becomes the predominant need. For the purposes of the present study mercenary needs are recoded to form this variable. (Level of measurement: nominal, discrete).

Security motivations

Source of this variable is Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs Theory. All individuals desire security- freedom from violence, sickness, poverty, war, famine. If these are threatened the individual will be driven by that need.

For the purposes of the present study, I first created a *total security* variable by summing reduced sentence, fear of incarceration, and fear from terrorists variables. Then I recoded this total variable as a dummy variable by assigning "0" as "No" and all the other values as "1". Thus, a reference category for this variable represents for no need for security and the other category represents the security needs factor as a motivation that has an effect on the decision of individual during recruitment. (Level of measurement: nominal, discrete).

Social Motivations

Source of this variable is Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs Theory. The need to belong to a group is strong, both for security and for reassurance of their beliefs from like-minded individuals.

For the purposes of the present study, I first created a *total social* variable by summing repentance or desire to reform, indebtedness towards police officer, and friendly with officer variables. Then I recoded this total variable as a dummy variable by assigning "0" as "No" and all the other values as "1". Thus, a reference category for this variable represents for no social motivation and the other category represents the social needs factor as a motivation that has an effect on the decision of individual during recruitment. (Level of measurement: nominal, discrete).

Self-esteem and esteem from others

Source of this variable is Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs Theory. Self-esteem is the need for one to feel important, to have made a difference in the world. This is derived from one's sense of accomplishments, and from the esteem and admiration from others in the social group.

For the purposes of the present study, I first created a *total esteem* variable by summing perverse hidden motive, egotistical/excitement, revenge, jealousy, selective law enforcement, and cop wannabe/James Bond syndrome variables. Then I recoded this total variable as a dummy variable by assigning "0" as "No" and all the other values as "1". Thus, a reference category for this variable represents for no esteem and the

137

other category represents the esteem factor as a motivation that has an effect on the decision of individual during recruitment. (Level of measurement: nominal, discrete).

Self-Actualization

Source of this variable is Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs Theory. If the individual feels that their personal goals have not been met, they will feel a sense of frustration and feel unfulfilled. This may be professionally or in some aspect of their personal life.

For the purposes of the present study, none of the motivation factors available with were directly fitting in this category. Among them only ideological conflict in morality and patriotic/altruistic motives were considered to be at this level. However, in Maslow's own words these motives were given as examples of exceptions to the theory. Therefore these two variables are included in multivariate analyses as separate variables rather than representing self-actualization. (Level of measurement: nominal, discrete).

Hygiene factors

Source of this variable is Herzberg's Motivation-Hygiene Theory. Hygiene factors, or dissatisfiers, were defined in Herzberg's Motivator-Hygiene theory. These are extrinsic factors in one's environment which, if lacking, tend to cause dissatisfaction, frustration and high turnover. For the purposes of this study, I first created a *total hygiene* variable by summing mercenary, reduced sentence, fear of incarceration, fear of terrorists, revenge, jealousy, ideological conflict and morality, repentance, selective law enforcement, patriotic/altruistic motivation, indebtedness and friendly with officer

variables. Then I recoded this total variable as a dummy variable by assigning "0" as "No" and all the other values as "1". The combined effect of these motivations was used as hygiene factors. Thus, a reference category for this variable represents for presence of hygiene factors in RAT setting and the other category represents the lack of hygiene factors in RAT setting as a factor that has an effect on the individual's decision to leave terrorism by being a confidential informant. (Level of measurement: nominal, discrete).

Control Variables

Age at Recruitment

In order to prevent confidentiality and not to reveal IDs of any confidential informant, variables date of birth and recruitment date are not directly included in the present study. Instead, For the purposes of the present study *Recruitment age* was calculated by subtracting date of birth from the recruitment date and included as a variable in our data set. (Level of measurement: interval).

Marital status

Married is defined as having a spouse. This may be according to government records, but includes those who have been married in a private ceremony but have not filed for a marriage license due to their anti-government ideology. This is done intentionally to protect confidentiality. Divorced is defined as having been previously married but are no longer married. Widowed is defined as having a deceased spouse.

For the purposes of the present study, married individuals at the time of recruitment are referred to as 1 and divorced, widowed, or single are referred to as 0. (Level of measurement: nominal, discrete).

Home Ownership

Home ownership is formed based on F-10 forms, which contain detailed information about the recruit. If the individual or family owns their house they are referred to as 1, if they rent their home they are referred to as 0. (Level of measurement: nominal, discrete).

Military Experience

Military experience was formed based on the official records and his handwritten autobiographies. If the recruit had received military training in a terrorism setting or he had served his mandatory military service before the recruitment, then he was categorized as 1. On the other hand, the ones that didn't have military experience or hadn't received any sort of firearm training were categorized as 0. (Level of measurement: nominal, discrete).

Employment Status

To provide confidentiality, occupations are not identified. Job and occupation were collapsed into a new dichotomous variable, *employment status.* Those who are employed or own a business or have another source of constant income (for example,

retirement) are referred to as 1 and those who are unemployed are referred to as 0. (Level of measurement: nominal, discrete).

Income

In order to prevent confidentiality, real income numbers are intentionally not included in this study. Individuals with steady income from conventional sources (employment, collected rents, business income, retirement, etc.) were compared to the average cost of living in the area of residence at the time he was recruited and were recoded as a new variable *income*. If the income was around or above the average cost of living based on the family size it was categorized as medium or high income. If it was below the average cost of living it was categorized as low income. (Level of measurement: ordinal).

Insurance

Health insurance may be provided by the government to its employees, but also to poor individuals in a program similar to Medicaid the United States. Small business owners and their employees are also provided health insurance from the government at a reduced rate. There is also private health insurance available. Lack of health insurance is rare in Turkey, as most people are eligible and the insurance covers the entire family. Generally individuals who lack insurance are willingly uninsured. While there are individuals who are not qualified for any insurance, these are rare. RATs, being ideologically opposed to government in all its forms, will often refuse to accept insurance. Exceptions to this may be small business owners who are part of a RAT

network and their employees, or individuals who secretly accept insurance for the benefit of their family. Recruits who have health insurance, whether government provided or privately provided are referred to as 1. Recruits who are uninsured are referred to as 0. (Level of measurement: nominal, discrete).

SES (Factor analysis)

Among the control variables homeownership, employment status, income and having health insurance are all related to economic status. It is assumed that these variables seem to measure similar construct. Therefore, they are considered to be conceptually collinear. Factor analysis is commonly employed to reduce large number of variables into a small number of factors. Even though factor analysis assumes that variables included in the analysis are interval/ratio level, Kim and Mueller (1978) consents the use of dichotomous variables when there is moderate correlation($\leq$.70) between the variables. Therefore, I first checked bivariate correlation coefficients between the variables (homeownership, employment status, income and health insurance). Since all of the coefficients were below the .70 level there was not a multicollinearity issue.

Then, I conducted a factor analysis (Appendix A) to have a factor that represents these variables. Using common criteria of eigenvalue of 1 I created a factor, SES, with 1.945 Eigenvalue, which explains 48.6 percent of total variation that exist within these four variables. This is an acceptable level of representation of these four variables. Moreover, the component matrix shows that the smallest loading for these variables is

.448. Having a factor analysis also removes the potential multicollinearity issue. (Level of measurement: ratio).

Table 4: Variables in Dataset and Measurement Levels

Name	Type	Values	Measurement Level	Relevant Theory		
				Maslow	Herzberg*	Alderfer
RAT group	DV	1-8	Nominal			
Binary Hezbollah	DV	1,0	Dichotomous			
Binary Al-Qaeda	DV	1,0	Dichotomous			
Mercenary	IV	1,0	Dichotomous	+	+	+
Reduced sentence	IV	1,0	Dichotomous	+	+	+
Fear of Incarceration	IV	1,0	Dichotomous	+	+	+
Fear from terrorists	IV	1,0	Dichotomous	+	+	+
Perverse/Hidden motive	IV	1,0	Dichotomous	+		+
Egoistical Self-Esteem Excitement	IV	1,0	Dichotomous	+		+
Revenge	IV	1,0	Dichotomous	+	+	+
Jealousy	IV	1,0	Dichotomous	+	+	+
Ideological Conflict in Morality	IV	1,0	Dichotomous		+	
Repentance or Desire to Reform	IV	1,0	Dichotomous	+	+	+
Selective Law Enforcement / Good Citizen	IV	1,0	Dichotomous	+	+	+
Patriotic Motive / Altruism	IV	1,0	Dichotomous			
James Bond Syndrome	IV	1,0	Dichotomous	+		+
Indebtedness toward Police	IV	1,0	Dichotomous	+	+	+
Friendly with officer	IV	1,0	Dichotomous	+	+	+
Fear of being labeled as Snitch	IV	1,0	Dichotomous	+	+	+
Fear of being Discarded	IV	1,0	Dichotomous	+	+	+
Frustration	IV	1,0	Dichotomous	+	+	+
Opposition to State System	IV	1,0	Dichotomous	+	+	+
Physiological Motivations	IV	1,0	Dichotomous	+		
Security Motivations	IV	1,0	Dichotomous	+		
Social Motivations	IV	1,0	Dichotomous	+		
Self-Esteem and Esteem	IV	1,0	Dichotomous	+		
Self-Actualization	IV	1,0	Dichotomous	+		
Hygiene Factors	IV	1,0	Dichotomous		+	
Age Recruitment	CV		Interval			
Marital Status	CV	1,0	Dichotomous			
Home Ownership	CV	1,0	Dichotomous			
Military Experience	CV	1,0	Dichotomous			
Employment Status	CV	1,0	Dichotomous			
Income	CV	0-3	Ordinal			
SES	CV		Ratio			
Insurance	CV	1,0	Dichotomous			

* Refers to Herzberg's Hygiene category only

Validity and Reliability Issues

This section discusses the reliability and validity issues regarding the present study. First, this study has content validity since it examined the literature and looked at several dimensions of the study. Almost all of the variables that previous research used are included as measurement instruments in addition to some new ones to cover and measure attributes of the concept more effectively as the data was available (Nachmias & Nachmias, 2000). Including a wide selection of relevant variables also ensures the empirical validity by giving the researcher to test whether different variables yield the same results or not. Using different theories to test and explain why an individual chose to become a confidential informant ensures construct validity of the present study (O'Sullivan, et al., 2003). The present study is a population study because it includes every confidential informant in RAT networks in Turkey. Therefore, findings of it directly reflect the reality about the population, which ensures the external validity.

Generally, reliability refers stability, equivalence, and internal consistency of the study (O'Sullivan, et al., 2003). This study is the first in field of terrorism measuring the effects of motivation factors on the individual's decision to be a confidential informant. Therefore, it is hard to say at this point that our measure has the ability to yield the same results time after time—stability—, or consistent results over and over in different studies—equivalence—done by other researchers. On the other hand, including several

measures of motivation ensures the internal consistency of the present study (O'Sullivan, et al., 2003).

For the source of data, the information used in the present study is derived from official government records of the intelligence department of the TNP. The particular dataset used in this study is coming from the classified records—F10 forms and attached handwritten autobiographies—of an intelligence department, the IDB, which verifies every piece of information before entering it into the official records. In terms of data collection archival surveys on official records and the survey of autobiographies are special types of secondary data analysis and are both considered valid and reliable sources of data and methods of data inquiry (Nachmias & Nachmias, 2000). Especially for hidden populations where the researchers have no access to the original sources to collect primary data and in the absence of other means of data sources they are considered very valuable. Therefore it is very common in terrorism studies to use official records and biographical information as a data source for secondary data analysis because of the clandestine nature of the phenomena.

According to Nachmias and Nachmias (2000) records that are produced to mislead or that are unconsciously misinterpreted are considered inauthentic. Autobiographies always have the potential to have some bias and problems with reliability and validity. Especially when a confidential informant is talking about his feelings, intentions, or motivations it is always possible to deviate from the truth. For instance, motivation factors at self-actualization level, patriotism and altruism, which

are derived from the hand written autobiographies, are hard to crosscheck. These may be overemphasized by the recruits to give a more honorable image of themselves to the officers, rather than admitting to more selfish motivations which may be seen as craven or cowardly. This may also possibly be an attempt to rationalize their actions to reduce their sense of guilt over betraying their associates. Therefore, these two variables are considered to be weak in terms of validity. To ensure authenticity, the motivation factors mentioned in the autobiographies are critically examined and crosschecked with the motivations recorded in F10 forms to ensure authenticity.

Limitations of the study

According to Nachmias and Nachmias (2000) using secondary data has some limitations. Primary limitation of secondary data is that usually the aim of data collection was different than the aim of desired study; therefore, the available information may not cover all aspects of the desired study. Even if the information is available, some parts of it may still not be allowed to use for research purposes because of restricted access, which is the case in the present study (Nachmias & Nachmias, 2000).

Accordingly, this study has several limitations. Confidentiality is the main limitation because of the secret nature of intelligence. First, this study is limited with the boundaries of clearance level and approval letter given specifically for this study by the TNP, which took more than two years to obtain.

Second, some of the subjects of this study were still active in the field during the study; therefore, any piece of information that might reveal their identity would have risked their lives. Thus, special consideration is taken to keep their IDs secret which caused the researcher to sacrifice some details and valuable pieces of information by keeping them out of the scope of this study. For instance, doing group specific analysis would not only reveal the similarities and differences between terrorist groups, but also would help us to build specific models for each group (Al-Qaeda, Hezbollah, IBDA-C, Hezbut-Tahrir etc.). Establishing models for each group would be a very valuable contribution to the literature. Nevertheless, this study will be openly available to general public including the terrorists; therefore, demographic profiles or group specific models might also help each terrorist group to take precautions or to narrow down their search for the betrayed individual. Eventually, it might pose a significant risk by surfacing of active informants, or by preventing recruitment of future informants. Therefore, this study will illustrate sample models for only Turkish-Hezbollah and Al-Qaeda RAT networks. On the other hand, the bulk of information left out of this study will also be analyzed and discussed in details, but will be shared only with intelligence experts on a need to know basis. These sensitive parts of the analysis and findings will not be shared in public and will be kept out of the scope of this study in order to keep the confidentiality and to not risk the life of any confidential informant.

Third, this study is limited with the information available in the archives of TNP, which was archived for law enforcement intelligence purposes; therefore, findings of

this study may not fully reflect the needs and potential findings of national security or military intelligence fields and may partially be applicable to these fields especially at the international arena.

This also poses another limitation to the data collection method and data analysis. Since the target population, confidential informants, is a hidden population and their identities are kept secret from the public, it is almost impossible to contact them and collect primary data for research purposes. Thus this study is limited to the archival survey and secondary data analysis.

Handling confidential informants is another aspect of the issue. The strength of factors and motives used to recruit informants change gradually after the recruitment (Billingsley, 2000). Some of them disappear, some become less effective, and some new factors emerge and become more important. Therefore, right after recruitment the motives that are important while handling confidential informants become critically important. However, this issue will be out of the scope of this study. An extensive research needs to be conducted on that aspect of the issue too.

To summarize, the aim of this study is to find common variables and patterns among confidential informants that are applicable to all Religion Abusing Terrorist (RAT) groups.

CHAPTER IV: ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Descriptive Statistics for Research Question One

Descriptive statistical analyses were performed on all cases in the dataset to determine population characteristics (Table 5). In our dataset there were 138 subjects and they were all male. The distribution of informants to RAT networks was as follows: 22 (15.9%) of them were in Al-Qaeda, 69 (50%) of them were in Turkish Hezbollah, 16 (11.6%) of them were in RAT Group 1, 12 (8.7%) of them were in RAT Group 2, 5 (3.6%) of them RAT Group 3, nine of them (6.5%) of them in RAT Group 4, four (2.9%) of them RAT Group 5, and only one (0.7%) of them was in RAT Group 6 at the time they were recruited.

Among 138 recruits 96 (69.6%) of them were married, whereas less than one third of them, 42 people (30.4%) were single. Similarly, 96 (69.6%) of them were employed, and 42 of them (30.4%) were unemployed. More than half of them, 77 (55.8%) didn't have health insurance, and 61 (44.2%) of them had health insurance before they were recruited. For the home ownership, almost half of them, 65 people (47.1%) were living in their own houses, while 73 (52.9%) of them were living in

apartments or rental houses and didn't own any kind of residence anywhere in the country. Most of the recruits, 110 people (79.7%) had prior military experience either during mandatory military service or in terrorist training camps. On the other hand only 28 (20.3%) of them didn't receive any kind of firearms or military training. Age was a metric variable ranging from 18 to 44 and average age was 30 among all confidential informants during the recruitment.

Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for Research Question One

VARIABLES	Frequency N=138	Percent %
RAT Groups		
Al-Kaeda	22	15.9
Turkish Hezbollah	69	50.0
RAT Group 1	16	11.6
RAT Group 2	12	8.7
RAT Group 5	5	3.6
RAT Group 4	9	6.5
RAT Group 5	4	2.9
RAT Group 6	1	0.7
Marital Status		
Single	42	30.4
Married	96	69.6
Employment Status		
Unemployed	42	30.4
Employed	96	69.6
Health Insurance		
Not Present	77	55.8
Present	61	44.2
Home Ownership		
Not Owner	73	52.9
Home Owner	65	47.1
Prior Military Excellence		
No Military Experience	28	20.3
Has Military Experience	110	79.7
Recruitment Age		
Min	18	NA
Max	44	NA
Average	30	NA

Bivariate Statistics for Research Question One

As mentioned earlier in Chapter 3 outlining the methodology, Hypotheses 1 through 19 are bivariate hypotheses. Therefore, they were tested by Chi-square. In order to test them, Crosstab function of the SPSS is used and contingency tables are formed for each hypothesis. Statistical significance of the associations for the nominal variables are tested by Pearson's Chi-square. For the ordinal variables the Mantel-Haenszel chi-square (or linear-by-linear association) is used in determining statistical significance. Results having a p-value less than .05 are considered statistically significant at the .05 alpha level.

Hypothesis 1

H1.   Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants with an expectation of reduced sentence during the trial.

From the review of case processing summary there were no missing cases in this variable. This hypothesis was rejected because 97.8% of respondents did not mention any expectation of a reduced sentence for becoming an informant. As seen in table 6, only 1 individual in Hezbollah (1.4%) and two individuals in Al-Qaeda (9.1%) reported such an expectation as an incentive for becoming an informant. As a result, the expectation of reduced sentence appeared to have no significant impact on being an

informant (The Pearson chi-square test of the hypothesis didn't show significance beyond .05 level: $\chi2$ (7)= 6.614; p=0.521).

The motivation tested in this hypothesis, looking for a reduced sentence, is associated with Maslow's security needs category and Herzberg's hygiene factors category. As the individual is in a criminal environment and is in danger of incarceration, according to Maslow the individual will make reduction of sentence his highest priority. However, this turns out not to be the case for this particular motivation according to the results of this binomial analysis.

This is generally an expected outcome for the recruits within RAT networks in Turkey because reduced sentence is very rare in the Turkish criminal justice system especially in terrorism related crimes. RAT networks active in Turkey are aware of that and accordingly don't expect a reduced sentence as a result of being an informant. The relatively higher percentage in Al-Qaeda (9.1%) is construed that some members of Al-Qaeda are temporarily in Turkey and are not familiar with the Turkish criminal laws. Thus they are expecting reduced sentences as they might expect in other countries.

Table 6: Statistics for Hypothesis One

RAT Groups		Looking for Reduced Sentence		
		No	Yes	Total
Al-Kaeda	Count	20	2	22
	%	90.9%	9.1%	100.0%
Turkish Hezbollah	Count	68	1	69
	%	98.6%	1.4%	100.0%
RAT Group 1	Count	16	0	16
	%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 2	Count	12	0	12
	%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 3	Count	5	0	5
	%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 4	Count	9	0	9
	%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 5	Count	4	0	4
	%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 6	Count	1	0	1
	%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
Total	Count	135	3	138
	%	97.8%	2.2%	100.0%
Chi-Square Values		$\chi^2 = 6.614$	df = 7	p = 0.521>0.05

Hypothesis 2

H2.   Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants as a result of a friendly relationship with an LEI officer.

Case processing summary showed no missing cases in this variable. This hypothesis was rejected because 88.4% of respondents did not have a friendly relationship with the LEI officer before the recruitment. In other words, only 16 people

153

(11.6%) mentioned that having a friendly relationship with the LEI officer had a positive effect on their decision to become an informant. On the other hand, as seen in table 7, at least one confidential informant in almost every RAT network mentioned this motivation as an incentive for becoming an informant. As a result, having a prior friendly relationship with the LEI officer appeared to have no statistically significant impact on being an informant (The Pearson chi-square test of the hypothesis didn't show significance beyond .05 level: $\chi2$ (7)= 7.105; p=0.418).

The motivation tested in this hypothesis, a friendly relationship with an LEI officer, is associated with Maslow's social needs category and Herzberg's hygiene factors category.

This is also an expected outcome for all individuals that are associated with terrorist networks because in any terrorist network individuals having relationships with law enforcement are under suspicion of snitching among their peers. They can easily be labeled for betrayal. Moreover, most terrorists and their associates usually try to avoid identification and stay away from law enforcement. Maslow's social affiliation and love needs category is valid under ordinary circumstances, but appears not to apply in terrorism because satisfying this need may threaten their security needs. Associating with government officials will seriously endanger them within the RAT network.

Table 7: Statistics for Hypothesis Two

RAT Groups		Friendly with Officer		
		No	Yes	Total
Al-Kaeda	Count	21	1	22
	%	95.5%	4.5%	100.0%
Turkish Hezbollah	Count	62	7	69
	%	89.9%	10.1%	100.0%
RAT Group 1	Count	14	2	16
	%	87.5%	12.5%	100.0%
RAT Group 2	Count	11	1	12
	%	91.7%	8.3%	100.0%
RAT Group 3	Count	3	2	5
	%	60.0%	40.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 4	Count	7	2	9
	%	77.8%	22.2%	100.0%
RAT Group 5	Count	3	1	4
	%	75.0%	25.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 6	Count	1	0	1
	%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
Total	Count	122	16	138
	%	88.4%	11.6%	100.0%
Chi-Square Values		$\chi2 = 7.105$	df = 7	p = 0.418>0.05

Hypothesis 3

H3.   Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants because of their gratitude or indebtedness to the LEI officer.

There were no missing cases for this variable in case processing summary table. This hypothesis was rejected because 89.9% of respondents did not mention any type

of gratitude or indebtedness to the LEI officer who recruited them. As seen in table 8, nine individuals in Hezbollah (13%), one individual in Al-Qaeda (4.5%), and four individuals in other RAT groups reported that indebtedness towards LEI officer had an effect on their decision to become a confidential informant. As a result, the motivation of gratitude or indebtedness to the LEI officer had a slight impact on being an informant during the recruitment but was not statistically significant (The Pearson chi-square test of the hypothesis didn't show significance beyond .05 level: $\chi2$ (7)= 4.881; p=0.675.)

The motivation tested in this hypothesis, gratitude or indebtedness to LEI, is associated with Maslow's social needs category and Herzberg's hygiene factors category.

This motivation is very rare in terrorism settings. As mentioned earlier individuals who are associated with terrorism usually stay away from any type of contact with law enforcement. However, in instances such as a terrorist whose daughter was in need of a kidney transfer or another terrorist whose life was saved by a police officer who donated blood to him after a traffic accident in a small town, these actions can produce gratitude or indebtedness to the police officer. This is especially true in cases where the terrorist is aware that the officer did it despite the officer knowing of the individual being associated with a terrorist network.

As mentioned previously, Maslow's social affiliation and love needs appears not to apply in terrorism (especially as associating with government officials is extremely

rare, since the government is their declared enemy). Becoming indebted to a government official often brings more problems than benefits for RAT network members, which explains its rarity as evidenced by the findings, but the benefits to LEI officers are great enough to make the effort of befriending potential recruits worthwhile.

Table 8: Statistics for Hypothesis Three

RAT Groups		Indeptness, Appreciation or Gratitude toward Police		
		No	Yes	Total
Al-Kaeda	Count	21	1	22
	%	95.5%	4.5%	100.0%
Turkish Hezbollah	Count	60	9	69
	%	87.0%	13.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 1	Count	13	3	16
	%	81.3%	18.8%	100.0%
RAT Group 2	Count	11	1	12
	%	91.7%	8.3%	100.0%
RAT Group 3	Count	5	0	5
	%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 4	Count	9	0	9
	%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 5	Count	4	0	4
	%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 6	Count	1	0	1
	%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
Total	Count	124	14	138
	%	89.9%	10.1%	100.0%

Chi-Square Values	$\chi^2 = 4.881$	df = 7	p = 0.675>0.05

Hypothesis 4

H4.   Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants to satisfy their mercenary needs.

This hypothesis was accepted because of its significance level (p=0.000<0.05). Of 138 respondents 73 (52.9%) expressed a mercenary motivation having an impact on their decision to become informants. As seen in table 9, 6 individuals in Al-Qaeda (27.3%), 49 individuals in Hezbollah (71%), 10 individuals in RAT Group 1 (62.5%), 4 individuals in RAT Group 2 (33.3%) and 4 individuals in RAT Group 4 (44.4%) reported becoming an informant to satisfy their physiological needs. As a result, Maslow's physiological needs category appeared to have statistically significant impact on being an informant (The Pearson chi-square test of the hypothesis showed significance beyond .05 level: $\chi2$ (7)= 28.811; p=0.000).

The motivation tested in this hypothesis, mercenary needs, is associated with Maslow's physiological needs category and Herzberg's hygiene factors category.

The statistics show a dichotomy in the effectiveness of monetary gains in recruiting informants. For most RAT networks, especially those active in rural areas, such as Turkish Hezbollah (71%) this is a very effective motivation; however, this motivation is less effective with Al-Qaeda members relative to other RAT networks. This appears to be because networks active in rural areas are living in more primitive

conditions and are in greater need of basic physiological considerations while those active in urban areas may satisfy these basic needs more effectively due to their proximity to stores and other amenities.

These findings support Maslow's theory in that physiological needs are a stronger motivation among rural terrorists than among urban terrorists, so the physiological motivations are more dominant than higher-level motivations. This also supports Herzberg's theory in that lack of hygiene factors within the RAT network causes sufficient dissatisfaction for the terrorists to fulfill their needs elsewhere.

Table 9: Statistics for Hypothesis Four

RAT Groups		Mercenary needs		
		No	Yes	Total
Al-Kaeda	Count	16	6	22
	%	72.7%	27.3%	100.0%
Turkish Hezbollah	Count	20	49	69
	%	29.0%	71.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 1	Count	6	10	16
	%	37.5%	62.5%	100.0%
RAT Group 2	Count	8	4	12
	%	66.7%	33.3%	100.0%
RAT Group 3	Count	5	0	5
	%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 4	Count	5	4	9
	%	55.6%	44.4%	100.0%
RAT Group 5	Count	4	0	4
	%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 6	Count	1	0	1
	%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
Total	Count	65	73	138
	%	47.1%	52.9%	100.0%
Chi-Square Values		$\chi^2 = 28.811$	df = 7	p = 0.000<0.05

Hypothesis 5

H5.   Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants because of fear of incarceration.

This hypothesis was rejected because only seven (5.1%) of respondents mentioned that fear of incarceration had an impact on their decision to become a

confidential informant. Among these seven people three of them were recruits from Al-Qaeda (13.6%) as seen in table 10. Based on the findings the impact of fear of incarceration was not statistically significant on being an informant (The Pearson chi-square test of the hypothesis didn't show significance beyond .05 level: χ^2 (7)= 8.210; p=0.314).

The motivation tested in this hypothesis, fear of incarceration, is associated with Maslow's security needs category and Herzberg's hygiene factors category.

Terrorists, especially the ones in RAT networks, think that their acts are for a divine goal. Therefore, most of them don't fear incarceration or even death as can be seen in suicide attacks. Accordingly, individuals recruited from RAT networks have little fear of incarceration.

The fear of incarceration is not eliminated, as shown by the 5.1% who acknowledged this to be a factor, overall this illustrates Maslow's exception regarding higher level motivations overruling lower level motivations, as illustrated by martyrs or the case of Gandhi sacrificing his basic needs (fasting) for the sake of his cause.

Table 10: Statistics for Hypothesis Five

RAT Groups		Fear of incarceration		
		No	Yes	Total
Al-Kaeda	Count	19	3	22
	%	86.4%	13.6%	100.0%
Turkish Hezbollah	Count	67	2	69
	%	97.1%	2.9%	100.0%
RAT Group 1	Count	16	0	16
	%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 2	Count	11	1	12
	%	91.7%	8.3%	100.0%
RAT Group 3	Count	4	1	5
	%	80.0%	20.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 4	Count	9	0	9
	%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 5	Count	4	0	4
	%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 6	Count	1	0	1
	%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
Total	Count	131	7	138
	%	94.9%	5.1%	100.0%
Chi-Square Values		$\chi^2 = 8.210$	df = 7	p = 0.314>0.05

Hypothesis 6

H6.   Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants because of revenge
motivation.

This hypothesis was rejected because only 4.3% of respondents mentioned that
they were seeking revenge from terrorists by becoming confidential informant. As seen
in table 11, other than five individuals in Hezbollah (7.2%) and one individual in Al-

Qaeda (4.5%) none of the recruits reported revenge as an incentive for becoming an informant. The majority of recruits (95.7%) didn't seek any sort of revenge during the recruitment. Therefore, the revenge motivation appeared to have little impact on being an informant (The Pearson chi-square test of the hypothesis didn't show significance beyond .05 level: $\chi2$ (7)= 3.532; p=0.832).

The motivation tested in this hypothesis, seeking revenge, is associated with Maslow's self-esteem needs category and Herzberg's hygiene factors category.

As illustrated in Table 11, revenge is a rare motivation among RAT network members to become an informant, but when present it is a strong factor in the decision to inform. This is more common in other networks where females are being sexually abused. Due to the lack of females in our sample, this was not seen in this study. The revenge motivation may also be strong in cases where family members are victims of terrorist acts.

Table 11: Statistics for Hypothesis Six

RAT Groups		Seeking revenge		
		No	Yes	Total
Al-Kaeda	Count	21	1	22
	%	95.5%	4.5%	100.0%
Turkish Hezbollah	Count	64	5	69
	%	92.8%	7.2%	100.0%
RAT Group 1	Count	16	0	16
	%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 2	Count	12	0	12
	%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 3	Count	5	0	5
	%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 4	Count	9	0	9
	%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 5	Count	4	0	4
	%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 6	Count	1	0	1
	%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
Total	Count	132	6	138
	%	95.7%	4.3%	100.0%
Chi-Square Values		$\chi2 = 3.532$	df = 7	p = 0.832>0.05

Hypothesis 7

H7.   Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants to satisfy their need

for repentance or desire to reform their criminal life.

Among all confidential informants 132 (95.7%) of them did not mention any sort

of repentance from their life in terrorism as a motivation for being an informant. This

164

hypothesis was accepted even though only 4.3% of respondents mentioned that they have a desire to reform their criminal life by becoming confidential informant. As seen in table 11, one individual in Hezbollah (1.4%), two individuals in Al-Qaeda (9.1%), two individuals in RAT Group 4 (22.2%), and one individual in RAT Group 5 (25%) mentioned repentance as a driving force for becoming an informant. Based on the chi-square results the repentance motivation appeared to have statistically significant impact on being an informant (The Pearson chi-square test of the hypothesis showed significance beyond .05 level: χ^2 (7)= 15.146; p=0.034).

The motivation tested in this hypothesis, need for repentance, is associated with Maslow's self-esteem needs category and Herzberg's hygiene factors category.

While this motivation may be present, it does not show up as a primary motivation often. A guilty conscience may be hidden beneath other motivations listed, such as patriotism or altruism being overemphasized out of feelings of shame.

Table 12: Statistics for Hypothesis Seven

RAT Groups		Repentance or desire to reform		
		No	Yes	Total
Al-Kaeda	Count	20	2	22
	%	90.9%	9.1%	100.0%
Turkish Hezbollah	Count	68	1	69
	%	98.6%	1.4%	100.0%
RAT Group 1	Count	16	0	16
	%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 2	Count	12	0	12
	%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 3	Count	5	0	5
	%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 4	Count	7	2	9
	%	77.8%	22.2%	100.0%
RAT Group 5	Count	3	1	4
	%	75.0%	25.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 6	Count	1	0	1
	%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
Total	Count	132	6	138
	%	95.7%	4.3%	100.0%
Chi-Square Values		$\chi2 = 15.146$	df = 7	p = 0.034<0.05

Hypothesis 8

H8.   Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants because of their patriotic and altruistic motives.

This hypothesis was rejected because of its significance level (p=0.401>0.05). Among all confidential informants 47 people (34.1%) mentioned that they chose to become informants because of patriotic or altruistic motivations. On the other hand 91

of confidential informants (65.9%) did not mention anything about effect of patriotism or altruism on their decision to become informants. As seen in table 13, altruistic or patriotic motivations are common and mentioned by several respondents in almost every group. Even though these motivations were heavily mentioned, they appeared to have no statistically significant impact on being an informant (The Pearson chi-square test of the hypothesis didn't show significance beyond .05 level: $\chi2$ (7)= 7.271; p=0.401).

The motivation tested in this hypothesis, patriotism/altruism, is not associated with any of Maslow's needs categories. Though it may seem to fit in as part of Maslow's self-actualization need, Maslow himself as an exception specifically mentions this to his needs hierarchy. It does, however, fit Herzberg's hygiene factors category.

It appears that the respondents overemphasized these motivations. It is thought that this motivation is commonly listed because the informants feel shame for having been motivated by more base needs, and wish to appear more noble and trustworthy in the eyes of LEI and themselves. This appears to be rationalization on the part of the recruits to ameliorate their betrayal of their associates.

Table 13: Statistics for Hypothesis Eight

RAT Groups		Patriotic and Altruistic motives		
		No	Yes	Total
Al-Kaeda	Count	17	5	22
	%	77.3%	22.7%	100.0%
Turkish Hezbollah	Count	48	21	69
	%	69.6%	30.4%	100.0%
RAT Group 1	Count	9	7	16
	%	56.3%	43.8%	100.0%
RAT Group 2	Count	6	6	12
	%	50.0%	50.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 3	Count	3	2	5
	%	60.0%	40.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 4	Count	6	3	9
	%	66.7%	33.3%	100.0%
RAT Group 5	Count	1	3	4
	%	25.0%	75.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 6	Count	1	0	1
	%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
Total	Count	91	47	138
	%	65.9%	34.1%	100.0%
Chi-Square Values		$\chi2 = 7.271$	df = 7	p = 0.401>0.05

Hypothesis 9

H9.   Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants as a result of fear of their terrorist associates.

This hypothesis was accepted because of its significance level (p=0.00<0.05). Among 138 confidential informants 40 of them (29%) mentioned that they fear from

terrorist associates. On the other hand, the effect of this motivation was very high for Al-Qaeda relative to other RAT networks. More than two thirds (68.2%) of Al-Qaeda informants mentioned that they fear of being executed by their terrorist associates. As seen in table 14, twenty respondents in Hezbollah (29.%), four respondents in RAT Group 2 (33.3%), and one respondent in RAT Group 1 (6.3%) reported fear of terrorist associates during recruitment. As a result, the motivation, fear from terrorist associates, appeared to have statistically significant impact on being an informant (The Pearson chi-square test of the hypothesis showed significance beyond .05 level: $\chi2$ (7)= 28.304; p=0.00).

The motivation tested in this hypothesis, fear of their terrorist associates, is associated with Maslow's security needs category and Herzberg's hygiene factors category.

From the review of the findings, the fear of associates is seen to be common only in RAT networks which apply brutal punishments to those who attempt to leave. Those who leave the network are often accused of being infidels or spies and are persecuted. This is especially true for Al-Qaeda and Turkish Hezbollah. The high percentage for Al-Qaeda is considered to be a result of broadcasts of video recordings of the brutal killings of individuals who were claimed to be spies. Broadcasting video recordings showing Al-Qaeda slaughtering individuals and chopping their heads off has severe psychological effects on both the public and their peers, traumatizing the viewers and intimidating them. This puts a big barrier for the LEI officer who recruits

informants in these RAT networks too.

Table 14: Statistics for Hypothesis Nine

RAT Groups		Fear from terrorist associates		
		No	Yes	Total
Al-Kaeda	Count	7	15	22
	%	31.8%	68.2%	100.0%
Turkish Hezbollah	Count	49	20	69
	%	71.0%	29.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 1	Count	15	1	16
	%	93.8%	6.3%	100.0%
RAT Group 2	Count	8	4	12
	%	66.7%	33.3%	100.0%
RAT Group 3	Count	5	0	5
	%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 4	Count	9	0	9
	%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 5	Count	4	0	4
	%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 6	Count	1	0	1
	%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
Total	Count	98	40	138
	%	71.0%	29.0%	100.0%
Chi-Square Values		$\chi^2 = 28.304$	df = 7	p = 0.000<0.05

Hypothesis 10

H10.   Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants because of their selective law enforcement, dislike the crime or good citizen.

This hypothesis was rejected because 90.6% of respondents did not mention

selective law enforcement (dislike the crime or good citizen) motivation for becoming an informant. As seen in table 15, only 7 individuals in Hezbollah (10.1%) and two individuals in Al-Qaeda (9.1%) reported such an motivation as an incentive for becoming an informant. As a result, selective law enforcement (dislike the crime or good citizen) motivation appeared to have no statistically significant impact on becoming an informant (The Pearson chi-square test of the hypothesis didn't show significance beyond .05 level: $\chi2$ (7)= 3.084; p=0.877).

The motivation tested in this hypothesis, selective law enforcement, is associated with Maslow's esteem needs category and Herzberg's hygiene factors category.

Unlike other crimes mentioned in the literature, this motivation is not common among terrorists. This motivation is generally cited by people who find some acts to be intolerable, usually violent crimes. As this is part of the nature of terrorism, it is thought that this motivation may be masked under the altruism motivation. This motivation may be explained in part by Maslow's self-esteem need, as the individuals try to protect their self-image.

Table 15: Statistics for Hypothesis Ten

RAT Groups		Selective Law Enforcement, Dislike the crime, Good Citizen		
		No	Yes	Total
Al-Kaeda	Count	20	2	22
	%	90.9%	9.1%	100.0%
Turkish Hezbollah	Count	62	7	69
	%	89.9%	10.1%	100.0%
RAT Group 1	Count	15	1	16
	%	93.8%	6.3%	100.0%
RAT Group 2	Count	10	2	12
	%	83.3%	16.7%	100.0%
RAT Group 3	Count	4	1	5
	%	80.0%	20.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 4	Count	9	0	9
	%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 5	Count	4	0	4
	%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 6	Count	1	0	1
	%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
Total	Count	125	13	138
	%	90.6%	9.4%	100.0%
Chi-Square Values		$\chi^2 = 3.084$	df = 7	p = 0.877>0.05

Hypothesis 11

H11. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants as a result of jealousy within the RAT group.

This hypothesis was rejected because only two individuals (1.4%) mentioned jealousy between peers in the RAT network as a motivation for becoming an informant.

172

As seen in table 16, only one individual in RAT Group 4 (11.1%) and one individual in RAT Group 2 (8.3%) reported jealousy between peers in the RAT network as a motivation for becoming an informant. As a result, jealousy appeared to have no statistically significant impact on being an informant (The Pearson chi-square test of the hypothesis didn't show significance beyond .05 level: $\chi2$ (7)= 11.585; p=0.115).

The motivation tested in this hypothesis, jealousy, is associated with Maslow's esteem needs category and Herzberg's hygiene factors category.

This motivation is very rare among RAT networks as a reason to become an informant. None of the respondents admitted to jealousy in their autobiographies, but LEI determined it to be a motivation in two of the informants as listed in the F10 forms. As this is considered to be an unworthy reaction with strong negative associations among most people, none of the recruits will admit to it, so it is seldom recorded.

Based on Maslow's theory, this motivation can be ascribed to self-esteem. For example, if the individual feels professional jealousy toward someone who was promoted over him, he may use this as an opportunity to remove his perceived competition and promote himself. This is also an outcome of lack of Herzberg's hygiene factors.

Table 16: Statistics for Hypothesis Eleven

RAT Groups		Jealousy and Take out Competition		
		No	Yes	Total
Al-Kaeda	Count	22	0	22
	%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
Turkish Hezbollah	Count	69	0	69
	%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 1	Count	16	0	16
	%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 2	Count	11	1	12
	%	91.7%	8.3%	100.0%
RAT Group 3	Count	5	0	5
	%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 4	Count	8	1	9
	%	88.9%	11.1%	100.0%
RAT Group 5	Count	4	0	4
	%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 6	Count	1	0	1
	%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
Total	Count	136	2	138
	%	98.6%	1.4%	100.0%

Chi-Square Values	$\chi^2 = 11.585$	df = 7	p = 0.115>0.05

Hypothesis 12

H12. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants as a result of ideological conflict in morality with the RAT group.

This hypothesis was accepted because of its significance level (p=0.000<0.05). Of 138 respondents 27 (19.6%) mentioned that they were facing ideological conflict with their moral/religious norms versus those of the RAT network. As seen in table 17,

18 individuals in Al-Qaeda (81.8%) and 6 individuals in Hezbollah (8.7%), 2 individuals in RAT Group 1 (12.5%) and only one individual in RAT Group 4 (11.1%) reported such a moral conflict as an incentive for becoming an informant. As a result, the moral conflict appeared to have statistically significant impact on being an informant (The Pearson chi-square test of the hypothesis showed significance beyond .05 level: $\chi2$ (7)= 65.625; p=0.000).

The motivation tested in this hypothesis, ideological and moral conflict, is associated with Maslow's self-actualization needs category and Herzberg's hygiene factors category. However, this is another instance of Maslow's exception for zealotry.

This shows that the majority of Al-Qaeda members develop ideological differences over time with the ideology of Al-Qaeda itself, compared to lesser percentages in other RAT networks. Often members joining will have limited religious knowledge and have ideals based on false premises, but when exposed to mainstream religious writings and the Koran become disillusioned with Al-Qaeda. Others may already have religious knowledge, but upon becoming involved will discover that the ideals of Al-Qaeda are in conflict with their own ideals. Additionally, as found in Hypothesis 9, fear of their associates was cited by over two thirds (68.2%) of all Al-Qaeda informants. Therefore their ideological objections are kept secret to avoid execution, but when given the opportunity to escape by informing on the group, Al-Qaeda members are strongly motivated to do so.

Per Herzberg's theory, social interactions with peers are hygiene factors. In this

instance the individuals are not only unable to express their true opinions, but are actively opposed to the ideals of the organization. This is a strong dissatisfier and influences the individual to leave.

Table 17: Statistics for Hypothesis Twelve

RAT Groups		Ideological conflict in morality		
		No	Yes	Total
Al-Kaeda	Count	4	18	22
	%	18.2%	81.8%	100.0%
Turkish Hezbollah	Count	63	6	69
	%	91.3%	8.7%	100.0%
RAT Group 1	Count	14	2	16
	%	87.5%	12.5%	100.0%
RAT Group 2	Count	12	0	12
	%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 3	Count	5	0	5
	%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 4	Count	8	1	9
	%	88.9%	11.1%	100.0%
RAT Group 5	Count	4	0	4
	%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 6	Count	1	0	1
	%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
Total	Count	111	27	138
	%	80.4%	19.6%	100.0%

Chi-Square Values	$\chi2 = 65.625$	df = 7	p = 0.000<0.05

H13.   Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants to satisfy their

desire to be a spy. (James Bond syndrome, police wannabe).

This hypothesis was rejected because of its significance level (p=0.478>0.05).

Of 138 respondents, 92% did not mention any desire to be a spy as motivation for

becoming an informant. As seen in table 18, only 5 individual in Hezbollah (7.2%), two

individuals in Al-Qaeda (9.1%), one individual in RAT Group 1 (6.3%) and three

individuals in RAT Group 2 (25%) reported such an desire as an incentive for becoming

an informant. As a result, the desire to be a spy appeared to have no statistically

significant impact on being an informant (The Pearson chi-square test of the hypothesis

didn't show significance beyond .05 level: χ^2 (7)= 6.541; p=0.478).

The motivation tested in this hypothesis, James Bond/police wannabe syndrome,

is associated with Maslow's self-esteem needs category and Herzberg's motivation

factors category.

This motivation was not strongly represented as a motivation for becoming an

informant. However, as noted by Blum (1972), informants tend to be thrill seekers,

devious and slippery people who often enjoy the excitement of their work. This fits

Maslow's self-esteem need as well as Herzberg's feelings of achievement (motivation

factor). Therefore this motivation is included in Maslow's esteem motivation but not in

Herzberg's hygiene factor in the multivariate analysis in Research Question 2.

Table 18: Statistics for Hypothesis Thirteen

RAT Groups		James Bond Syndrome, Police Wannabe		
		No	Yes	Total
Al-Kaeda	Count	20	2	22
	%	90.9%	9.1%	100.0%
Turkish Hezbollah	Count	64	5	69
	%	92.8%	7.2%	100.0%
RAT Group 1	Count	15	1	16
	%	93.8%	6.3%	100.0%
RAT Group 2	Count	9	3	12
	%	75.0%	25.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 3	Count	5	0	5
	%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 4	Count	9	0	9
	%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 5	Count	4	0	4
	%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 6	Count	1	0	1
	%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
Total	Count	127	11	138
	%	92.0%	8.0%	100.0%

Chi-Square Values	$\chi2 = 6.541$	df = 7	p = 0.478>0.05

Hypothesis 14

H14.   Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants to fulfill their need

for excitement and egoistical motives.

This hypothesis was accepted because of its significance level (p=0.049<0.05).

178

Of 138 respondents 12 (8.7%) mentioned that they were looking for excitement in becoming informants. As seen in table 19, 3 individuals in Al-Qaeda (13.6%) and 5 individuals in Hezbollah (7.2%), 1 individual in RAT Group 1 (6.3%) and two individuals in RAT Group 2 (16.7%) reported looking for excitement as an incentive for becoming an informant. As a result, looking for excitement appeared to have statistically significant impact on being an informant (The Pearson chi-square test of the hypothesis showed significance beyond .05 level: $\chi2$ (7)= 14.154; p=0.049).

The motivation tested in this hypothesis, egotistical/excitement, is associated with Maslow's self-esteem needs category and Herzberg's motivation factors category.

Like the James Bond syndrome, the informants are motivated by excitement and enjoyment of the thrill of being a secret agent, but may not be willing to admit to it. This was not mentioned in the autobiographies, but was noted by LEI in the F10 forms. It has been observed that this motivation develops more over time as the nervousness and frustrations of recruitment fade and they begin to enjoy the task.

Table 19: Statistics for Hypothesis Fourteen

RAT Groups		Looking for Excitement (self-esteem, egotistical)		
		No	Yes	Total
Al-Kaeda	Count	19	3	22
	%	86.4%	13.6%	100.0%
Turkish Hezbollah	Count	64	5	69
	%	92.8%	7.2%	100.0%
RAT Group 1	Count	15	1	16
	%	93.8%	6.3%	100.0%
RAT Group 2	Count	10	2	12
	%	83.3%	16.7%	100.0%
RAT Group 3	Count	5	0	5
	%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 4	Count	9	0	9
	%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 5	Count	4	0	4
	%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 6	Count	0	1	1
	%	.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Total	Count	126	12	138
	%	91.3%	8.7%	100.0%
Chi-Square Values		$\chi2 = 14.154$	df = 7	p = 0.049<0.05

Hypothesis 15

H15. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants because of a hidden perverse motivation.

This hypothesis was rejected because of its significance level (p=0.912>0.05). Of 138 respondents, only three individuals (2.2%) did appear to have a hidden perverse

180

motivation (double agent) for becoming an informant. As seen in table 20, only one individual in Hezbollah (1.4%), one individual in Al-Qaeda (4.5%) and one individual in RAT Group 1 (6.3%) approached LEI with an apparent hidden perverse motivation for becoming an informant. As a result, the perverse motivation appeared to have no statistically significant impact on being an informant (The Pearson chi-square test of the hypothesis didn't show significance beyond .05 level: $\chi 2$ (7)= 2.691; p=0.912).

The motivation tested in this hypothesis, egotistical/excitement, is associated with Maslow's esteem needs category and Herzberg's motivation factors category. This motivation was not mentioned by any respondent in the autobiographies, as expected. However, LEI officers identified this motivation in the F10 forms in three cases. This was determined by crosschecking information sources such as other confidential informants.

Table 20: Statistics for Hypothesis Fifteen

RAT Groups		Has a perverse hidden motive (double agent)		
		No	Yes	Total
Al-Kaeda	Count	21	1	22
	%	95.5%	4.5%	100.0%
Turkish Hezbollah	Count	68	1	69
	%	98.6%	1.4%	100.0%
RAT Group 1	Count	15	1	16
	%	93.8%	6.3%	100.0%
RAT Group 2	Count	12	0	12
	%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 3	Count	5	0	5
	%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 4	Count	9	0	9
	%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 5	Count	4	0	4
	%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 6	Count	1	0	1
	%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
Total	Count	135	3	138
	%	97.8%	2.2%	100.0%
Chi-Square Values		$\chi2 = 2.691$	df = 7	p = 0.912>0.05

Hypothesis 16

H16.   Most recruits from RAT groups expressed the state of frustration to some extent during the recruitment.

This hypothesis was accepted because of its significance level (p=0.000<0.05). Of 138 respondents 12 (8.7%) expressed the state of frustration during recruitment. As

seen in table 21, 8 individuals in Al-Qaeda (36.4%), three individuals in Hezbollah (4.3%) and one individual in RAT Group 2 (8.3%) expressed the state of frustration during recruitment. As a result, the state of frustration appeared to have statistically significant impact on being an informant (The Pearson chi-square test of the hypothesis showed significance beyond .05 level: $\chi2$ (7)= 26.190; p=0.000).

The motivation tested in this hypothesis, frustration, does not fit any of Maslow's needs categories, or Herzberg's categories, but is included in the multivariate analysis as a separate variable.

The frustration is seldom mentioned by the respondents, but is observed by the LEI officers during recruitment. When the data was reviewed it was noted that two thirds of the frustrated individuals were members of Al-Qaeda. This is considered to be due to the more brutal nature of Al-Qaeda compared to the other RAT networks as detailed in Hypothesis 9.

Table 21: Statistics for Hypothesis Sixteen

RAT Groups		Being in a state of Frustration		
		No	Yes	Total
Al-Kaeda	Count	14	8	22
	%	63.6%	36.4%	100.0%
Turkish Hezbollah	Count	66	3	69
	%	95.7%	4.3%	100.0%
RAT Group 1	Count	16	0	16
	%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 2	Count	11	1	12
	%	91.7%	8.3%	100.0%
RAT Group 3	Count	5	0	5
	%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 4	Count	9	0	9
	%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 5	Count	4	0	4
	%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 6	Count	1	0	1
	%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
Total	Count	126	12	138
	%	91.3%	8.7%	100.0%
Chi-Square Values		$\chi2 = 26.190$	df = 7	p = 0.000<0.05

Hypothesis 17

H17.   Most recruits from RAT groups expressed the fear of being labeled as snitch as a

barrier to cope with while choosing to become informants.

This hypothesis was rejected because of its significance level (p=0.845>0.05).

Of 138 respondents, 36 individuals (26.1%) feared being labeled as a snitch while

184

becoming informants. As seen in table 22, 17 individuals in Hezbollah (24.6%), four individuals in Al-Qaeda (18.2%), four individuals in RAT Group 1 (25%), four individuals in RAT Group 2 (33.3%), two individuals in RAT Group 3 (40%), three individuals in RAT Group 4 (33.3%) and two individuals in RAT Group 5 (50%) reported fearing being labeled as a snitch. As a result, feared being labeled as a snitch appeared to have no statistically significant impact on being an informant (The Pearson chi-square test of the hypothesis didn't show significance beyond .05 level: $\chi2$ (7)= 3.411; p=0.845).

This variable comes from the researcher's own field experience. The variable tested in this hypothesis, the fear of being labeled as a snitch, is not included as a motivation factor; rather it is tested as a barrier for the recruit to overcome during the decision to become an informant. Therefore it is not categorized in either Maslow's or Herzberg's theories during the multivariate analysis of motivation categories.

Although it is statistically not significant, the fear of being labeled as a snitch is mentioned by 36 recruits in their handwritten autobiographies. It is a not uncommon fear among recruits, so LEI must be aware of this factor and accordingly be reassuring to the recruit.

Table 22: Statistics for Hypothesis Seventeen

RAT Groups		Fear of being labeled as Snitch		
		No	Yes	Total
Al-Kaeda	Count	18	4	22
	%	81.8%	18.2%	100.0%
Turkish Hezbollah	Count	52	17	69
	%	75.4%	24.6%	100.0%
RAT Group 1	Count	12	4	16
	%	75.0%	25.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 2	Count	8	4	12
	%	66.7%	33.3%	100.0%
RAT Group 3	Count	3	2	5
	%	60.0%	40.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 4	Count	6	3	9
	%	66.7%	33.3%	100.0%
RAT Group 5	Count	2	2	4
	%	50.0%	50.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 6	Count	1	0	1
	%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
Total	Count	102	36	138
	%	73.9%	26.1%	100.0%
Chi-Square Values		$\chi 2 = 3.411$	df = 7	p = 0.845>0.05

Hypothesis 18

H18.   Most recruits from RAT groups expressed the fear of being discarded by police as a barrier to cope with while choosing to become informants.

This hypothesis was rejected because of its significance level (p=0.240>0.05). Of 138 respondents, 21 individuals (15.2%) expressed the fear of being discarded by

police at the beginning of recruitment. As seen in table 23, 11 individuals in Hezbollah (15.9%), two individuals in Al-Qaeda (9.1%), four individuals in RAT Group 1 (25%), two individuals in RAT Group 2 (16.7%), one individual in RAT Group 4 (11.1%), and one individual in RAT Group 6 (100%) expressed the fear of being discarded by police at the beginning of recruitment. As a result, the fear of being discarded by police appeared to have no statistically significant impact on being an informant (The Pearson chi-square test of the hypothesis didn't show significance beyond .05 level: χ^2 (7)= 9.179; p=0.240).

This variable comes from the researcher's own field experience. The variable tested in this hypothesis, the fear of being discarded by police, is not included as a motivation factor; rather it is tested as a barrier for the recruit to overcome during the decision to become an informant. Therefore it is not categorized in either Maslow's or Herzberg's theories during the multivariate analysis of motivation categories.

Although it is statistically not significant, the fear of being discarded by the police is mentioned by 21 recruits in their handwritten autobiographies. It is a not uncommon fear among recruits due to depictions in the media, so LEI must be aware of this factor and accordingly be reassuring to the recruit that, unlike a criminal informant, he is a confidential informant and will not be called upon to testify or be revealed.

Table 23: Statistics for Hypothesis Eighteen

RAT Groups		Fear of being discarded by police		
		No	Yes	Total
Al-Kaeda	Count	20	2	22
	%	90.9%	9.1%	100.0%
Turkish Hezbollah	Count	58	11	69
	%	84.1%	15.9%	100.0%
RAT Group 1	Count	12	4	16
	%	75.0%	25.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 2	Count	10	2	12
	%	83.3%	16.7%	100.0%
RAT Group 3	Count	5	0	5
	%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 4	Count	8	1	9
	%	88.9%	11.1%	100.0%
RAT Group 5	Count	4	0	4
	%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 6	Count	0	1	1
	%	.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Total	Count	117	21	138
	%	84.8%	15.2%	100.0%
Chi-Square Values		$\chi^2 = 9.179$	df = 7	p = 0.240>0.05

Hypothesis 19

H19. Most recruits from RAT groups expressed an ideological opposition to the state
and system as a barrier to cope with while choosing to become informants.

188

This hypothesis was accepted because of its significance level (p=0.000<0.05). Of 138 respondents 7 (5.1%) expressed an ideological opposition to the state and system. As seen in table 24, 6 individuals in Al-Qaeda (27.3%) and only one individual in Hezbollah (1.4%) expressed an ideological opposition to the state and system. As a result, the ideological opposition to the state and system as a barrier to trusting the police during recruitment appeared to have statistically significant impact on being an informant (The Pearson chi-square test of the hypothesis showed significance beyond .05 level: $\chi2\ (7)= 26.910$; p=0.000).

This variable comes from the researcher's own field experience. The variable tested in this hypothesis, opposition to the state system and lack of trust in the police, is not included as a motivation factor; rather it is tested as a barrier for the recruit to overcome during the decision to become an informant. Therefore it is not categorized in either Maslow's or Herzberg's theories during the multivariate analysis of motivation categories.

It is statistically significant that opposition to the state system and lack of trust in the police is mentioned by seven recruits in their handwritten autobiographies, six of whom were Al-Qaeda members. Al-Qaeda does not recognize the legitimacy of the state and the six Al-Qaeda recruits are still actively opposed to it despite their cooperation. That they mention it in their handwritten autobiographies should be considered a warning that they are cooperating due to a greater opposition to Al-Qaeda than to the state, yet other factors are sufficiently strong to motivate them to continue

to cooperate, including trust of individual LEI officers.

Table 24: Statistics for Hypothesis Nineteen

RAT Groups		Opposition to State System, No Trust to Police		
		No	Yes	Total
Al-Kaeda	Count	16	6	22
	%	72.7%	27.3%	100.0%
Turkish Hezbollah	Count	68	1	69
	%	98.6%	1.4%	100.0%
RAT Group 1	Count	16	0	16
	%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 2	Count	12	0	12
	%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 3	Count	5	0	5
	%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 4	Count	9	0	9
	%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 5	Count	4	0	4
	%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 6	Count	1	0	1
	%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
Total	Count	131	7	138
	%	94.9%	5.1%	100.0%

Chi-Square Values	$\chi 2 = 26.910$	df = 7	p = 0.000<0.05

Descriptive Statistics for Research Question Two

Descriptive statistical analyses were performed on all cases in the data set to determine population characteristics for the multivariate analyses (Table 25). In our data set there were 138 subjects.

For the dependent variable Binary Al-Qaeda, 22 were Al-Qaeda members and 116 of them were members of other RAT networks. For the dependent variable Binary Hezbollah, 69 were Hezbollah members and 69 of them were members of other RAT networks.

In terms of Maslow's needs, 73 (52.9%) mentioned the need for physiological; 43 (31.2%) mentioned the need for security; 33 (23.9%) mentioned the need for social; 41 (29.7%) mentioned the need for esteem.

In terms of Herzberg's theory, 134 mentioned the lack of hygiene factors in RAT networks.

For other motivations, 47 respondents (34.1%) reported becoming informants due to patriotic/altruistic motivations; 27 (19.6%) mentioned having an ideological conflict in morality within the RAT network; 12 (8.7%) were in a state of frustration during recruitment; 42 (30.4%) were single, 96 (69.6%) were married; 88 (63.8%) were from low-income backgrounds, 50 (36.2%) were from medium or high income backgrounds. Of all respondents, 110 (79.7%) had prior military experience; the minimum age was 18, the maximum age was 44, and the average was 30.

Table 25: Descriptive Statistics for Research Question Two

VARIABLES	Type & Values	Frequency N=138	Percent %
Binary Al-Qaeda	**DV**		
Al-Qaeda Member	1	22	15.9
Other RAT Member	0	116	84.1
Binary Hezbollah	**DV**		
Hezbollah Member	1	69	50.0
Other RAT Member	0	69	50.0
Physiological Needs	**IV**		
Present	1	73	52.9
Not Present	0	65	47.1
Security Needs	**IV**		
Present	1	43	31.2
Not Present	0	95	68.8
Social Needs	**IV**		
Present	1	33	23.9
Not Present	0	105	76.1
Esteem Needs	**IV**		
Present	1	41	29.7
Not Present	0	97	70.3
Lacking Hygiene in RAT	**IV**		
Hygiene in RAT	0	4	2.9
No Hygiene in RAT	1	134	97.1
Patriotic and Altruistic	**IV**		
Present	1	47	34.1
Not Present	0	91	65.9
Frustration	**IV**		
Present	1	12	8.7
Not Present	0	126	91.3
Ideological Conflict	**IV**		
Present	1	27	19.6
Not Present	0	111	80.4
Marital Status	**CV**		
Single	0	42	30.4
Married	1	96	69.6
Income	**CV**		
Low Income	0	88	63.8
Medium or High Income	1	50	36.2
Prior Military Excellence	**CV**		
No Military Experience	0	28	20.3
Has Military Experience	1	110	79.7
Recruitment Age	**CV**		
Min		18	NA
Max		44	NA
Average		30	NA
SES (Factor)	**CV**	138	100

Bivariate Statistics for Research Question Two

As mentioned earlier in Chapter 3 outlining the methodology, Hypotheses H20 through H24 are bivariate hypotheses that test the individual effect of categories based on assumptions of Maslow's hierarchy of needs theory. and Hypothesis H25 tests the combined effect of Herzberg's hygiene category needs.

Thus, they were tested by Chi-square. In order to test them, Crosstab function of the SPSS is used and contingency tables are formed for each hypothesis. Statistical significance of the associations for the nominal variables are tested by Pearson's Chi-square. Results having a p-value less than .05 are considered statistically significant at the .05 alpha level.

Hypothesis 20

H20. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants to satisfy their predominant physiological needs.

This hypothesis was accepted because of its significance level (p=0.000<0.05). Of 138 respondents 73 (52.9%) expressed a need that fits within Maslow's physiological needs category. As seen in table 25, 6 individuals in Al-Qaeda (27.3%), 49 individuals in Hezbollah (71%), 10 individuals in RAT Group 1 (62.5%), 4 individuals in RAT Group 2 (33.3%) and 4 individuals in RAT Group 4 (44.4%) reported becoming an informant to satisfy their physiological needs. As a result, Maslow's physiological needs category

appeared to have statistically significant impact on being an informant (The Pearson chi-square test of the hypothesis showed significance beyond .05 level: $\chi2$ (7)= 28.811; p=0.000).

The variable tested in this hypothesis, physiological needs, is Maslow's first category in the hierarchy of needs theory.

The findings support the theory that Maslow's physiological needs category has a statistically significant effect on the individual's decision to become an informant within the RAT networks. This is particularly noted in rural RAT networks (Hezbollah) rather than urban ones (Al-Qaeda).

The statistics show a dichotomy in the effectiveness of physiological needs in recruiting informants. For most RAT networks in poorer areas, such as Turkish Hezbollah (71%), this is a very effective motivation as mentioned by Maslow in his discussion about childhood experiences influencing adult needs; i.e., people who have spent most of their lives in poverty are more strongly motivated by lower level needs than those raised in affluent surroundings. However, this motivation is less effective with Al-Qaeda members relative to other RAT networks, as they are active more in urban areas and may satisfy these basic needs more effectively due to their proximity to stores and other amenities.

These findings support Maslow's theory in that physiological needs are a stronger motivation among RAT networks, especially ones active in rural areas than among

urban networks, so the physiological motivations are more dominant than higher-level motivations.

Table 26: Statistics for Hypothesis Twenty

RAT Groups		Presence of any need in Maslows physiological needs category		
		No	Yes	Total
Al-Kaeda	Count	16	6	22
	%	72.7%	27.3%	100.0%
Turkish Hezbollah	Count	20	49	69
	%	29.0%	71.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 1	Count	6	10	16
	%	37.5%	62.5%	100.0%
RAT Group 2	Count	8	4	12
	%	66.7%	33.3%	100.0%
RAT Group 3	Count	5	0	5
	%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 4	Count	5	4	9
	%	55.6%	44.4%	100.0%
RAT Group 5	Count	4	0	4
	%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 6	Count	1	0	1
	%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
Total	Count	65	73	138
	%	47.1%	52.9%	100.0%
Chi-Square Values		$\chi2 = 28.811$	df = 7	p = 0.000<0.05

Hypothesis 21

H21.   Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants to satisfy their predominant safety (security) needs.

195

This hypothesis was accepted because of its significance level (p=0.001<0.05). Of 138 respondents 43 (31.2%) expressed a need that fits within Maslow's security needs category. As seen in table 26, 15 individuals in Al-Qaeda (68.2%), 22 individuals in Hezbollah (31.9%), one individual in RAT Group 1 (6.3%), 4 individuals in RAT Group 2 (33.3%) and one individual in RAT Group 3 (20%) reported becoming an informant to satisfy their security needs. As a result, Maslow's security needs category appeared to have statistically significant impact on being an informant (The Pearson chi-square test of the hypothesis showed significance beyond .05 level: $\chi2$ (7)= 25.356; p=0.001).

The variable tested in this hypothesis, safety (security) needs, is Maslow's second category in the hierarchy of needs theory.

The findings support the theory that Maslow's security needs category has a statistically significant effect on the individual's decision to become an informant within the RAT networks.

According to Maslow, when security needs are threatened all other needs become negligible. Fear of being killed in operations, fear of their associates, fear of being caught and imprisoned- all of these threats and more are very real and imminent dangers for RAT group members. Accordingly 43 of 138 respondents mentioned that security needs were predominant in their decision to become informants. From the review of the findings, the need for security is strongly mentioned by Al-Qaeda members (68.2%) and Turkish Hezbollah (31.2%), who apply brutal punishments to those who attempt to leave. Those who leave the network are often accused of being

infidels or spies and are persecuted.

Table 27: Statistics for Hypothesis Twenty-One

RAT Groups		Presence of any need in Maslows security needs category		
		No	Yes	Total
Al-Kaeda	Count	7	15	22
	%	31.8%	68.2%	100.0%
Turkish Hezbollah	Count	47	22	69
	%	68.1%	31.9%	100.0%
RAT Group 1	Count	15	1	16
	%	93.8%	6.3%	100.0%
RAT Group 2	Count	8	4	12
	%	66.7%	33.3%	100.0%
RAT Group 3	Count	4	1	5
	%	80.0%	20.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 4	Count	9	0	9
	%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 5	Count	4	0	4
	%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 6	Count	1	0	1
	%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
Total	Count	95	43	138
	%	68.8%	31.2%	100.0%
Chi-Square Values		$\chi2 = 25.356$	df = 7	p = 0.001<0.05

Hypothesis 22

H22. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants to satisfy their predominant social (affiliation) needs.

This hypothesis was rejected because of its significance level (p=0.793>0.05). Of 138 respondents 33 (23.9%) expressed a need that fits within Maslow's social needs category. As seen in table 27, 4 individuals in Al-Qaeda (18.2%), 16 individuals in Hezbollah (23.2%), 4 individuals in RAT Group 1 (25%), 2 individuals in RAT Group 2 (16.7%), 2 individuals in RAT Group 3 (40%), 4 individuals in RAT Group 4 (44.4%) and one individual in RAT Group 5 (25%) reported becoming an informant to satisfy their social needs. As a result, Maslow's social needs category appeared to have statistically no significant impact on being an informant (The Pearson chi-square test of the hypothesis didn't show significance beyond .05 level: $\chi2$ (7)= 3.887; p=0.793).

The variable tested in this hypothesis, social (affiliation) needs, is Maslow's second category in the hierarchy of needs theory.

The findings support the theory that Maslow's social needs category does not have a statistically significant effect on the individual's decision to become an informant within the RAT networks.

Because of the nature of terrorism, terrorists are always under the surveillance of their peers and all of their contacts are monitored and reported to their superiors. Any suspicious contacts or activities may bring threats to their security; therefore their social needs take a lesser role relative to physiological and security needs within the RAT network.

These needs also cannot be met outside of the network, as any potential friendships with police or other government officials will bring immediate suspicion. The

motivation factors collapsed to form the social needs variable were repentance, indebtedness or gratitude toward law enforcement and friendship with police officers. These factors were the only ones available to form this variable; however in real life there are other factors involved in social needs. Therefore other influences were not taken into account. The findings only represent the limited combined effect of the aforementioned social needs.

Table 28: Statistics for Hypothesis Twenty-Two

RAT Groups		Presence of any need in Maslows social needs category		
		No	Yes	Total
Al-Kaeda	Count	18	4	22
	%	81.8%	18.2%	100.0%
Turkish Hezbollah	Count	53	16	69
	%	76.8%	23.2%	100.0%
RAT Group 1	Count	12	4	16
	%	75.0%	25.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 2	Count	10	2	12
	%	83.3%	16.7%	100.0%
RAT Group 3	Count	3	2	5
	%	60.0%	40.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 4	Count	5	4	9
	%	55.6%	44.4%	100.0%
RAT Group 5	Count	3	1	4
	%	75.0%	25.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 6	Count	1	0	1
	%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
Total	Count	105	33	138
	%	76.1%	23.9%	100.0%
Chi-Square Values		$\chi2 = 3.887$	df = 7	p = 0.793>0.05

H23.   Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants to satisfy their self-esteem and esteem from others predominant needs.

This hypothesis was rejected because of its significance level (p=0.151>0.05). Of 138 respondents 41 (29.7%) expressed a need that fits within Maslow's esteem needs category. As seen in table 28, 6 individuals in Al-Qaeda (27.3%), 21 individuals in Hezbollah (30.4%), 4 individuals in RAT Group 1 (25%), 7 individuals in RAT Group 2 (58.3%), one individual in RAT Group 3 (20%), one individual in RAT Group 4 (11.1%) and one individual in RAT Group 6 (100%) reported becoming an informant to satisfy their esteem needs. As a result, Maslow's esteem needs category appeared to have statistically no significant impact on being an informant (The Pearson chi-square test of the hypothesis didn't show significance beyond .05 level: $\chi2$ (7)= 10.731; p=0.151).

The variable tested in this hypothesis, self-esteem (and esteem from others) needs, is Maslow's fourth category in the hierarchy of needs theory.

The findings support the theory that Maslow's esteem needs category does not have a statistically significant effect on the individual's decision to become an informant within the RAT networks.

The factors collapsed to form this variable were perverse (hidden) motive, excitement, revenge, jealousy, selective law enforcement, and James Bond/police wannabe. Of 138 respondents, 41 mentioned a need for self esteem or esteem from

others. Although it was statistically insignificant, almost one third of respondents mentioned a need for esteem. Therefore it is interpreted in the present study that esteem factors also have some effect on the individual's decision to become an informant.

Table 29: Statistics for Hypothesis Twenty-Three

RAT Groups		Presence of any need in Maslows esteem needs category		
		No	Yes	Total
Al-Kaeda	Count	16	6	22
	%	72.7%	27.3%	100.0%
Turkish Hezbollah	Count	48	21	69
	%	69.6%	30.4%	100.0%
RAT Group 1	Count	12	4	16
	%	75.0%	25.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 2	Count	5	7	12
	%	41.7%	58.3%	100.0%
RAT Group 3	Count	4	1	5
	%	80.0%	20.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 4	Count	8	1	9
	%	88.9%	11.1%	100.0%
RAT Group 5	Count	4	0	4
	%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 6	Count	0	1	1
	%	.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Total	Count	97	41	138
	%	70.3%	29.7%	100.0%
Chi-Square Values		$\chi2 = 10.731$	df = 7	p = 0.151>0.05

Hypothesis 24

H24. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants to satisfy their predominant Self-Actualization needs.

This hypothesis was not tested directly because the motivation factors fitting this category of Maslow's theory (patriotic/altruistic motivations and ideological conflict in morality) are contradictory and considered exceptions in Maslow's own words. Therefore they are not categorized together under self-actualization and are tested separately under Hypotheses H8 and H12. Patriotic/altruistic motivations (H8) were heavily mentioned by confidential informants, but appeared to have no statistically significant impact on being an informant (The Pearson chi-square test of the hypothesis H8 didn't show significance beyond .05 level: $\chi 2$ (7)= 7.271; p=0.401). On the other hand, the ideological and moral conflict motivation (H12) appeared to have statistically significant impact on being an informant (The Pearson chi-square test of the hypothesis H12 showed significance beyond .05 level: $\chi 2$ (7)= 65.625; p=0.000).

The variable tested in this hypothesis, self-actualization needs, is Maslow's fifth category in the hierarchy of needs theory.

H25. Lack of Herzberg's hygiene factors in terrorism settings leads most recruits from RAT groups to make the decision to leave terrorism to satisfy their predominant needs by becoming informants.

In order to test Herzberg's theory a new variable, hygiene, was formed by collapsing all relevant variables within the present study. Before conducting any multivariate analysis when descriptive statistics were run, in crosstab tables it became apparent that 134 (97.1%) of all 138 confidential informants were mentioning the lack of hygiene factors within terrorism setting. 97 percent of respondents strongly agreed with hygiene item. This lends support to the idea that there is broad consensus on the absence of hygiene factors within terrorism settings.

This hypothesis was accepted because of its significance level (p=0.000<0.05). Of 138 respondents 134 (97.1%) mentioned deficiencies in RAT networks which fit Herzberg's hygiene category and that these deficiencies had a significant effect on their decision to leave terrorism by becoming informants. As seen in table xx, only two individuals in Hezbollah (2.9%), one individual in RAT Group 2 (8.3%) and one individual in RAT Group 6 (100%) did not mention lack of hygiene factors in the RAT networks as their reason for leaving terrorism. As a result, Herzberg's hygiene factors category appeared to have statistically significant impact on being an informant (The

Pearson chi-square test of the hypothesis showed significance beyond .05 level: $\chi2$ (7)= 36.431; p=0.000).

Because Hygiene item has very limited variance it is excluded from further analysis. It is very close to become a constant.

As noted in the previous hypotheses, most of the motivations listed fit Herzberg's hygiene factor category. Out of 138 respondents, 134 mentioned a lack of at least one hygiene factor in the RAT network setting, leading them to leave terrorism. As Herzberg stated, a lack of hygiene factors will cause dissatisfaction within an organization, leading to high amounts of turnover. Similarly, lacks of hygiene factors have an effect on the recruit's decision to leave terrorism.

Herzberg's motivation-hygiene theory states that factors not inherent to the work itself, extrinsic factors such as pay, security and environment, need to be addressed and satisfied to prevent turnover. If these factors are not satisfied, the effect will be dissatisfaction and frustration, which essentially pushes the person out of that environment. In our findings almost all of the respondents mentioned lack of hygiene factors in the terrorism setting during the recruitment process. Therefore, we conclude that lack of hygiene factors had a statistically significant effect on their decision to leave terrorism.

Table 30: Statistics for Hypothesis Twenty-Five

RAT Groups		Lack of Hersberg's Hygiene factors		
		No	Yes	Total
Al-Kaeda	Count	0	22	22
	%	.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Turkish Hezbollah	Count	2	67	69
	%	2.9%	97.1%	100.0%
RAT Group 1	Count	0	16	16
	%	.0%	100.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 2	Count	1	11	12
	%	8.3%	91.7%	100.0%
RAT Group 3	Count	0	5	5
	%	.0%	100.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 4	Count	0	9	9
	%	.0%	100.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 5	Count	0	4	4
	%	.0%	100.0%	100.0%
RAT Group 6	Count	1	0	1
	%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
Total	Count	4	134	138
	%	2.9%	97.1%	100.0%
Chi-Square Values		$\chi2 = 36.431$	df = 7	p = 0.000<0.05

Multivariate Statistics for Research Question Two

I used multivariate binomial stepwise logistic regression model to determine the effect of motivational and demographic factors on the likelihood of becoming Turkish Hezbollah or Al-Qaeda informant relative to becoming other informants.

H26.   There are significant motivational differences (Maslow's need categories) and

demographic differences in the probability of becoming a Turkish-Hezbollah

informant relative to the probability of becoming other RAT informants.

Multivariate binomial stepwise logistic regression model is used to determine the

effect of motivational and demographic factors on the likelihood of becoming Turkish

Hezbollah informant relative to becoming other RAT informants.

In the first step I entered physiological, security, social and esteem variables

based on Maslow's theory. Instead of Maslow's self-actualization category, I included

patriotic/altruistic motivation, and ideological conflict in morality motivation in the

analysis together as separate variables. In the next step I included demographic factors

in the same model. When I used becoming a Hezbollah informant as a DV the only

significant variables were physiological needs and ideological conflict in morality ones in

the first step controlling for the other motivational factors (Appendix B). Specifically

having physiological needs "yes" corresponded with more likelihood of becoming

Turkish Hezbollah informant. Ideological conflict in morality "yes" has a negative

relationship with the DV in that ideological conflict in morality "yes" corresponded with

less likelihood of becoming a Turkish Hezbollah informant.

In the next step, after adding demographic variables in the model, both

motivational variables remained significant and in the same directional relationship

(Appendix B). In other words, controlling for demographic variables these two motivational factors remained significant. The model in the second step improved by increasing explained variance approximately 8% (from 24 to 32).

Controlling for motivational factors marital status and age were significant demographic factors in the model.

A unit increase in age corresponded with less likelihood of becoming a Turkish Hezbollah informant. Married people were more likely to become a Turkish Hezbollah informant.

The model was significant at all steps (the significance of chi square is less than .05).

Table 31: Statistics for Hypothesis Twenty-Six

Variables in the Equation	Logistic Regression Analysis for Turkish-Hezbollah					
	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Binarysecurity	0.411	0.485	0.719	1	0.397	1.508
Physiological	1.446	0.444	10.583	1	0.001	4.245
Binaryesteem	-0.072	0.436	0.028	1	0.868	0.930
Binarysocial	-0.452	0.494	0.837	1	0.360	0.636
Ideological_Conf._in_Morality	-1.293	0.619	4.364	1	0.037	0.275
Patriotic_Altruistic	-0.158	0.458	0.119	1	0.730	0.854
Frustration	-0.884	0.849	1.084	1	0.298	0.413
SES	0.229	0.236	0.947	1	0.331	1.258
Marital_Status	1.235	0.538	5.268	1	0.022	3.438
Age_Recruitment	-0.084	0.036	5.502	1	0.019	0.919
Miltary_Experience	-0.503	0.549	0.840	1	0.359	0.605
Constant	1.642	1.036	2.514	1	0.113	5.167

Based on the above-mentioned findings of multivariate analysis, it became clear that physiological motivation factors have a positive effect on the likelihood of becoming a Hezbollah informant relative to the other RAT networks. In other words, offering

physiological comforts to potential recruits within Turkish Hezbollah will increase the probability of becoming an informant. On the other hand, mentioning ideological conflicts in religious norms has a negative effect on the likelihood of becoming a Turkish Hezbollah informant relative to the other RAT networks. In other words, mentioning ideological conflicts in religious norms to potential recruits within Turkish Hezbollah will decrease the probability of becoming an informant. Moreover, age has a negative effect on the likelihood of becoming a Turkish Hezbollah informant- that is, older individuals are less likely to become informants. On the other hand, marriage has a positive effect on the likelihood becoming a Hezbollah informant- that is, married people are more likely to become informants.

Though it is not statistically significant, offering security increases the likelihood of the potential recruit becoming an informant in Hezbollah. On the other hand, offering esteem, social interaction or mentioning patriotic or altruistic motivations or being in a state of frustration will decrease the likelihood of the potential recruits becoming a Hezbollah informant. While being in a better socioeconomic status increases the probability of recruitment, having previous military experience decreases the likelihood.

Hypothesis for the Research Question 2-c

H27. There are significant motivational differences (Maslow's need categories) and demographic differences in the probability of becoming an Al-Qaeda informant relative to the probability of becoming other RAT informants.

I used multivariate binomial stepwise logistic regression model to determine the effect of motivational and demographic factors on the likelihood of becoming Al-Qaeda informant relative to becoming other informants.

In the first step I entered physiological, security, social and esteem variables based on Maslow's theory. In the next step I included demographic factors in the same model. When I used becoming Al-Qaeda informant as a DV the only significant variables were frustration and ideological conflict in morality ones in the first step controlling for the other motivational factors (Appendix C). Specifically having ideological conflict in morality "yes" corresponded with more likelihood of becoming Al-Qaeda informant. Frustration "yes" has a positive relationship with the DV in that frustration "yes" corresponded with more likelihood of becoming Al-Qaeda informant. In the next step, after adding demographic variables in the model, both motivational variables remained significant and in the same directional relationship (Appendix C). In other words controlling for demographic variables these two motivational factors remained significant. The model in the second step improved by increasing explained variance approximately 8% (from 68 to 76).

Controlling for motivational factors age was a significant demographic factor in the model. A unit increase in age corresponded with more likelihood of becoming an Al-Qaeda informant controlling for other motivational and demographic factors.

The model was significant at all steps (the significance of chi square is less than .05). The model significantly developed at each step.

Table 32: Statistics for Hypothesis Twenty-Seven

Variables in the Equation	Logistic Regression Analysis for Al-Qaeda					
	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Binarysecurity	1.884	1.019	3.416	1	0.065	6.577
Physiological	-1.624	1.106	2.158	1	0.142	0.197
Binaryesteem	-1.288	1.020	1.596	1	0.206	0.276
Binarysocial	-0.409	1.026	0.159	1	0.690	0.664
Ideological_Conf._in_Morality	4.774	1.250	14.586	1	0.000	118.39
Patriotic_Altruistic	-1.510	1.175	1.652	1	0.199	0.221
Frustration	3.262	1.263	6.675	1	0.010	26.112
SES	0.359	0.536	0.447	1	0.504	1.431
Marital_Status	-1.169	1.232	0.901	1	0.343	0.311
Age_Recruitment	0.204	0.086	5.607	1	0.018	1.226
Miltary_Experience	1.006	1.261	0.636	1	0.425	2.736
Constant	-9.977	3.075	10.528	1	0.001	0.000

Based on the above-mentioned findings of multivariate analysis, it became clear that ideological conflict in morality motivation and frustration factors have a positive effect on the likelihood of becoming an Al-Qaeda informant relative to the other RAT networks. In other words, mentioning ideological conflicts in religious norms to potential recruits within an Al-Qaeda will increase the probability of becoming an informant. Similarly, being in a state of frustration for the potential recruit will increase the probability of becoming an informant. Moreover, age has a positive effect on the likelihood of becoming an Al-Qaeda informant- that is, older individuals are more likely to become informants.

Other factors didn't have a statistically significant effect on the decision to become an Al-Qaeda informant relative to other RAT networks. Although they were not statistically significant, offering physiological comforts, esteem and social needs or

mentioning patriotic or altruistic factors decreased the likelihood of the recruit becoming

an Al-Qaeda informant. On the other hand, offering security increases the likelihood of

the potential recruit becoming an informant in Al-Qaeda. Moreover, having a better

socioeconomic status and having previous military experience increases the probability

of the potential recruit becoming an informant while being married decreases the

likelihood.

CHAPTER V: DISCUSSIONS

Introduction

This study had three purposes initially: to find which motivation factors were effective for persuading potential informers to cooperate with LEI; to find a theoretical explanation for the phenomenon of turning terrorists into informants; and to create group level models to predict the probability of individuals becoming informants in various RAT groups. These three goals have been accomplished.

In order to accomplish the first goal, this study began with a comprehensive literature review of various studies regarding informants in various fields and the identified motivational factors were noted and listed.

The first goal, finding motivational factors, was accomplished by testing hypotheses derived from the literature and the researcher's own field experience. The findings of these hypotheses showed that some motivation factors were more significant than others as expected, and were applicable to the study of terrorism.

The second goal was accomplished by a comprehensive literature review of theories that might have been applicable. No theories were found which had already

been applied to informants in terrorism; that is why, two theories were selected which seemed to best fit the study. Hypotheses derived from the main assumptions of Maslow's hierarchy of needs and Herzberg's motivation-hygiene theories were tested to determine to what extent they explained the phenomena.

The third goal was accomplished by conducting multivariate analyses of the data obtained on RAT networks and by testing the hypotheses derived from two previous goals against the analyses to form group level models for Turkish Hezbollah and Al-Qaeda.

<center>Overview of Findings</center>

<center>*Motivational factors*</center>

From the bivariate test of motivational factors, following results were significant: Mercenary needs (H4), repentance or desire to reform their criminal life (H7), fear of their terrorist associates (H9), ideological conflict in morality with the RAT group (H12) and excitement (H14). However, as mentioned earlier in chapter three, this study is a population study. It does not utilize any sampling procedure; instead, it utilizes the entire population of confidential informants within RAT networks in Turkey (n=N=138). Therefore, the significance levels in statistical tests become irrelevant, and the results of the present study directly reflect the social reality of the phenomena (Demirci, 2008; Nardi, 2006; Yang, 2010). Thus, following table showing the frequency of each

motivation mentioned by individuals as having an effect on their decision to become a confidential informant during the recruitment is considered a good representation of findings.

Table 33: Frequencies of Motivation Factors

Hp	Variable Tested	Frequency N=138	Percent %	Sig. Level
H1	Reduced sentence	3	2.2	-
H2	Friendly relationship with LEI officer	16	11.6	-
H3	Gratitude or indebtedness to the LEI officer	14	10.1	-
H4	Mercenary needs	73	52.9	+
H5	Fear of incarceration	7	5.1	-
H6	Revenge motivation	6	4.3	-
H7	Repentance or desire to reform their criminal life	6	4.3	+
H8	Patriotic and altruistic motives	47	34.1	-
H9	Fear of their terrorist associates	40	29	+
H10	Selective law enforcement, dislike the crime	13	9.4	-
H11	jealousy within the RAT group	2	1.4	-
H12	Ideological conflict in morality with the RAT	27	19.6	+
H13	Desire to be a spy (James Bond syndrome)	11	8	-
H14	Excitement and egoistical motives	12	8.7	+
H15	Hidden perverse motivation	3	2.2	-

In addition to motivational factors, confidential informants also mentioned some negative factors that had an affect on their decision during the recruitment. These were also tested in the present study and summarized in table 34. Among 138 recruits 12 were reported as being in a state of frustration. 36 recruits (26.1%) feared of being labeled as snitch, 21 (15.2%) feared of being discarded by police, and 7 (5.1%)

mentioned their opposition to state or system as barriers that they had to cope with in their decision to be an informant.

Table 34 Frequencies of Negative Factors

Hp	Variable Tested	Frequency N=138	Percent %	Sig. Level
H16	Frustration	12	8.7	+
H17	Fear of being labeled as snitch	36	26.1	-
H18	Fear of being discarded by police	21	15.2	-
H19	Ideological opposition to the state and system	7	5.1	+

Findings about theories

Hypotheses H20 through H23 tested need categories formed based on Maslow's main assumptions. As seen in Table 35, among all respondents 73 individuals (52.9%) had physiological needs, 43 (31.2%) had safety (security) needs, 33 (23.9%) had social (affiliation) needs, 41 (29.7%) had self-esteem or esteem needs during the recruitment. On the other hand, self-actualization needs could not be tested in the present study since none of the motivations were directly fitting in this category of Maslow's theory. Hypothesis H25 tested the effect of Herzberg's hygiene category. 134 (97.1%) of 138 recruits complained about lack of one or more of Herzberg's hygiene factors in RAT setting.

Table 35 Frequencies of Motivation Categories

Hp	Variable Tested	Frequency N=138	Percent %	Sig. Level
H20	Physiological needs	73	52.9	+
H21	Safety (security) needs	43	31.2	+
H22	Social (affiliation) needs	33	23.9	-
H23	Esteem needs	41	29.7	-
H24	Self-Actualization needs	-	-	-
H25	Lack of Herzberg's hygiene factors	134	97.1	+

Theoretical remarks

The present study has empirical support for Maslow's theory that individuals acting in one of the needs hierarchy categories were choosing to be informants to satisfy their predominant needs. It also has empirical support for Alderfer's theory that most of the individuals were choosing to become informants because of multiple needs in different categories at a given time. Unlike Maslow, Alderfer assumes that individuals make decisions to satisfy their needs in different categories simultaneously. We also found empirical support for Herzberg's theory that most of the individuals report needs that made them to choose to become informants in the hygiene category of Herzberg's theory. 97 percent of recruits complained about lack of Herzberg's hygiene factors in RAT setting. This means that some terrorists leave the terrorism environment because of lack of hygiene factors in the terrorism setting.

There is no single theory at this point that truly explains the motivations for terrorists to become informants. Prior to this study, no one has attempted to apply motivational theories to informants within terrorist groups. That said, Herzberg's theory fits surprisingly well when applied to terrorist networks. Or is it really a surprise? The living conditions are harsh, the rewards are few and not large, the people involved are under constant threat of exposure by law enforcement as terrorists or by their own associates as being potential risks to the network, isolation is constant, boredom is rampant, and often the only thing preventing them from deserting is the threat of reprisals from their associates. In such a dire environment, the prospect of leaving the network must be almost irresistible at times.

At the same time, Maslow's and Alderfer's theories are well represented in the motivations of informants. When offered the things that they lack in RAT groups such as security, good food, decent shelter, freedom from persecution and death threats, the option of becoming an informant becomes a tempting one. The RAT network may be dismantled and made powerless and the informant may go free or face minimal punishment, simultaneously alleviating fears of associates and fears of incarceration while providing monetary assistance and increasing their sense of security.

When viewed not as competing theories but in conjunction with each other, the motivational theories help to explain the behaviors of confidential informants and give insight into the people who should be approached.

Al-Qaeda vs. Turkish Hezbollah

From the statistics some general trends are very suggestive. A rough picture begins to emerge from the trends for informants in Al-Qaeda and Hezbollah in particular, from which one can construct a very general profile of the sort of person most likely to become an informant for each of these groups. Unfortunately there were not enough data points to form similar profiles for other RAT groups, and the profiles for Al-Qaeda and Hezbollah are contradictory.

For Al-Qaeda, the more likely candidates will be found in urban areas, older men with a higher socioeconomic status than most, unmarried, and showing signs of frustration. He will likely be proud and idealistic, so approaching him with offers of material aid (money, food and the like) or security assistance will be rebuffed and will offend him. He is also not seeking friendship or admiration, and will respond negatively to attempts to stroke his esteem. What he will most likely respond positively to are discussions of ideology. He will be troubled by the differences he sees between Al-Qaeda's ideology and mainstream Islam ideology and want to discuss it in detail. Having a copy of mainstream interpretations of the Qur'an at hand to look up particular verses to show the entire verse in context may be helpful in persuading him to help LEI.

Hezbollah, however, is almost a polar opposite. Younger males are better candidates, especially ones who are married. If they come from a higher socioeconomic childhood background, they may feel frustrated with living in poor conditions in rural

areas and will respond positively to offers of material or financial aid. If they have former military training, either provided by the government or by terrorist networks, they are less likely to be persuaded. They are also not particularly motivated to debate ideology and in fact may respond negatively to such discussions.

Policy implications

Educate the public. Much of the power that the terrorist leaders have comes from quoting portions of the Qur'an out of context to put their own interpretations on it. If the quotes are read in their original context, the meanings become clear and the radical interpretations are shown to be distortions.

Therefore theological scholars should be recruited to write an informative booklet on the true meanings of the portions of the Qur'an being quoted, and the booklets distributed throughout areas known to be sympathetic to the RAT groups. This will decrease the number of people willing to join the RATs and confuse the minds of RAT militants.

Remove violent videos from RAT groups from the internet as soon as they are discovered. Videos showing beheadings, mutilations and other atrocities committed on people who have been condemned as infidels by RAT groups are traumatizing to watch. The viewers are intimidated by the cruel brutality shown and develop a strong fear of the RAT group responsible, which gives the RAT group that much more power over its

members and the public, and spreads their fame. The fear of associates in Al-Qaeda significantly dissuades repentant RAT members from leaving terrorism as seen in the findings of hypothesis H27. Treating these videos in the same way that child pornography is treated will reduce the influence of the RAT groups.

Offer reduction of sentence for providing useful information. At the present time, the Turkish justice system makes no allowances for reduction of sentence. Plea bargaining is not used, nor is reducing jail time for informants. Therefore, a useful source of information is being neglected. Offering reductions in punishment to informants as is done in other countries such as the United States may yield a valuable new source of confidential informants.

Invest more on HUMINT. As mentioned earlier, human intelligence has been increasingly replaced by technical intelligence (TECHINT). Since the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, human intelligence (HUMINT) has been increasingly replaced with other means of intelligence collection. As illustrated by the capture of Osama bin Laden, the RAT groups have taken to using very low-tech methods of communication involving scraps of paper and elaborate delivery systems that cannot be tapped electronically. When the right person is recruited the outcome becomes incomparable. There are times a good confidential informant can produce more valuable intelligence than any other intelligence asset.

Increase HUMINT budgets. Budget constraints should be reconsidered about human intelligence. Budget should be balanced between TECHINT and HUMINT.

Considering annual costs of aircrafts or reconnaissance satellites, the amount spent for confidential informants becomes negligible.

Allow more researchers to study and analyze the available information. Because of the secret nature of the phenomenon and confidentiality the data to conduct such analyses is highly classified, so very few people have access to the data. The result is that there is very little information available to researchers on current human intelligence, so empirical studies such as this study have not been done. This can be accomplished by giving clearances to certain researchers for specific purposes and allowing them to study the phenomena empirically, as was the case for the present study. Otherwise it would be like separating engineers from the discoveries of physicists.

Be aware of potential needs of informants. Understanding the enemy is crucial in the global fight against terrorism. This can be done by analyzing the available data about the target group and figuring out the patterns among the group members.

Train intelligence officers more about the target group. Knowing the enemy and training the agents accordingly is crucial in fighting terrorism. Knowing strengths and weaknesses, internal norms, their mindsets, contradictions among their ideals, norms or goals, conflicts in their minds, factors that may make them leave terrorism can help the LEI to be more successful in recruiting informants within terrorist networks. Based on our findings we can conclude that new training programs should be established by LEI agencies for the recruiters to train and learn about the needs and common factors that

are effective on a given terrorist group. This will increase their success in recruiting new informants.

Conduct more PSYOPS against RATS. Hunting the terrorists is one aspect of fighting terrorism and should continue until they no longer become a threat. Making the terrorists leave the terrorism by conducting Psychological operations (PSYOPS) is another aspect. For example, based on findings of the present study, conflict in moral and religious norms of the individual and the ones alleged, enforced or dictated in the Al-Qaeda RAT network is extremely common among confidential informants who were recruited within Al-Qaeda and has a significant effect on their decision to leave terrorism. Knowing this and attacking them from this weakness would accelerate the dissociation or dissolution of Al-Qaeda members and the network globally. Every four out of five Al-Qaeda informant (81.8%) mentioned that conflict between the mainstream religious and moral norms of Islam and the ones that they were exposed in Al-Qaeda was the main factor in their decision to leave terrorism. Being a confidential informant is just one of the options in leaving terrorism. If the real interpretation of sacred texts or religious norms are promoted and spread more in public, it would not only be harder for the RAT networks to convince people with their misinterpretations but also would increase the questioning of these abused norms in the minds of militants among all RAT networks. (Spread of Mainstream interpretations of sacred texts in any religion which are intentionally misinterpreted and abused by RAT groups to meet their perverse political goals can produce more benefits in the long run.) Informing the public

of how they are abused and misinterpreted and what their real meanings are by globally or nationally accepted and well-known mainstream scholars would be an effective strategy in fighting RAT networks.

Recommendations for future studies

The limited scope of this study has resulted in data trends among the two largest groups in the sample, but cannot make further predictions. A more extensive study of existing records of confidential informants would yield more information on these and other groups, enabling LEI to construct better profiles of people likely to cooperate and become informants.

This study is limited to RAT networks active in Turkey. To generalize the findings it should be replicated among different cultures that these RATs are active with the available data of different intelligence departments.

The findings of the present study show the law enforcement perspective of the phenomena. In order to see a broader picture of the phenomena more studies need to be conducted in national security and military intelligence arenas respectively.

Moreover, the present study was limited with secondary data available at the time it was collected. In order to understand underlying factors that had an effect on the recruit's decision to cooperate with law enforcement a more extensive qualitative study needs to be conducted.

Another aspect of recruitment is the LEI officer who recruits informants. Recruitment usually occurs between two individuals: the recruit and the recruiter. Understanding the needs, perspectives, and constraints of the recruiters in the field would enrich and shed light on a different aspect of the issue. That aspect of the phenomena needs to be studied intensively too.

Finally, handling confidential informants becomes crucially important right after the recruitment. This phase of the phenomena needs to be studied extensively to improve the success of HUMINT.

Conclusion

Terrorists are human beings with needs, goals and emotions that drive their actions; therefore finding their needs can be used to direct their behaviors toward the desired goals of LEI of recruiting informants to help dismantle RAT networks. A comprehensive study of records collected about confidential informants may be used to form group level models for the behaviors of various RAT networks to assist LEI in recruiting informants by providing profiles of likely recruits. For example, as illustrated for Al-Qaeda, a successful recruit will have the following characteristics: male, older, unmarried, from a moderately wealthy background, with frustrations regarding ideology. A successful approach to this person will involve the discussions of ideology but will avoid offers of material assistance or additional protection or friendship and

admiration. However, it must be noted that this profile does not fit recruits from Turkish Hezbollah, as their perceived needs are different from those of Al-Qaeda.

This study demonstrates that such group level modeling and profiling are possible and will be helpful in the future to law enforcement, and should be undertaken immediately by all nations to dismantle RAT networks as they are found.

This study was a quantitative study and was limited to the available secondary data that was not primarily collected for research purposes. Therefore, these findings shed light only on a portion of the phenomena in Turkey. More detailed qualitative researches are needed to understand and perform in-depth analyses of the phenomena, guided by the findings of this present study. As these organizations are not limited to individual nations, further studies in other nations need to be done.

The findings of this study only represent law enforcement intelligence informants; it needs to be replicated in the national security and military intelligence fields and in other countries and cultures to provide a more comprehensive view. Furthermore, as this study has demonstrated that different RAT networks produce potential recruits with vastly different needs, analyses should be performed on each RAT network to determine the characteristics of each group.

List of References

List of References

Adigun, I. O. (2000). Cross National Differences in Work Motivation: A Four-Nation Comparison. *International Journal of Management, 17*(3), 372-378.

Aktan, H. (2004). Acts of Terror and Suicide Attacks in the Light of the Qur‚Äôan and the Sunna. *Terror and Suicide Attacks: An Islamic Perspective*.

Alderfer, C. P. (1969). An empirical test of a new theory of human needs. *Organizational behavior and human performance, 4*(2), 142-175.

Alderfer, C. P. (1972). Existence, relatedness, and growth: Human needs in organizational settings.

Alderfer, C. P., & Guzzo, R. A. (Writers). (1979). Life Experiences and Adults' Enduring Strength of Desires in Organizations [Article], *Administrative Science Quarterly*: Administrative Science Quarterly.

Billingsley, R. (2000). An examination of the relationship between informers and their handlers within the police service in England'. *Unpublished Ph. D. thesis, Loughborough University*.

Billingsley, R., Nemitz, T., & Bean, P. (2001). *Informers: Policing, policy, practice*: Willan Pub.

Bloom, R. M. (2002). *Ratting: The use and abuse of informants in the American justice system*: Praeger Publishers.

Blum, R. H. (1972). *Deceivers and deceived: Observations on confidence men and their victims, informants and their quarry, political and industrial spies and ordinary citizens*: Charles C. Thomas.

Bockman, V. M. (1971). The Herzberg Controversy. *Personnel Psychology, 24*(2), 155-189.

Boyd, A. (1984). *The informers: A chilling account of the supergrasses in Northern Ireland*: The Mercier Pr.

Brown, J. (1986). The social psychology of industry: Human relations in the factory: Penguin Books (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England and New York, NY, USA).

Buford, J. A., Bedeian, A. G., & Lindner, J. R. (1995). *Management in extension*: Ohio State University Extension.

Bulac, A. (2004). The Development of the Concept of Jihad. In E. Capan (Ed.), *Terror and Suicide Attacks: An Islamic Perspective*. New Jersey: Light Incorporation.

Canan, I. (2004). Islam as the religion of peace and tolerance. In E. Capan (Ed.), *Terror and Suicide Attacks: An Islamic Perspective*. New Jersey: Light Incorporation.

Candiotti, T. F. D. B. J. M. M. N. S. (2010, 10.29.2010). Al Qaeda in Yemen behind 'credible terrorist threat' against U.S. Obama says. CNN Latest News Retrieved from http://news.blogs.cnn.com/2010/10/29/hazmat-incident-at-philadelphia-airport/

Capan, E. (2004). Suicide Attacks and Islam. *An Islamic Perspective Terror and Suicide Attacks. E. Capan. New Jersey, Light Incorporation*.

Castillo, M. N. (2003). *The Utilization of Perceived Needs Importance in Explaining and Predicting Responsiveness to Organizational Inducements.* University of Texas--Pan American.

Copeland, M. (1974). *Without cloak or dagger: the truth about the new espionage*: Simon and Schuster.

Cumming, C. M. (1994). Incentives that really do motivate. *Compensation & Benefits Review, 26*(3), 38.

Davies, B., Ellison, L., Osborne, A., & West-Burnham, J. (1990). *Education management for the 1990s*: Longman.

Deeprose, D. (1995). *The team coach: vital new skills for supervisors & managers in a team environment*: Amacom Books.

DeGarmo, J. W. (1972). Must identity of informants be on record. *Law and Order 20*(4), 80-83.

Demirci, S. (2008). Examining spatiotemporal change in neighborhood crime using social disorganization as a theoretical framework: A 10-year analysis of homicide in the city of Richmond, VA.

DOJ. (2001). *Department of Justice Guidelines Regarding the Use of Confidential Informants*. US Dept. of Justice, Office of the Attorney General.

Dolnik, A. (2003). Die and let die: Exploring links between suicide terrorism and terrorist use of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 26*(1), 17-35.

Dowling, W. F., & Sayles, L. R. (1971). *How managers motivate: the imperatives of supervision*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Drucker, P. F. (1968). How to be an Employee. *Psychology Today*(March).

Dunnette, M. D., Campbell, J. P., & Hakel, M. D. (1967). Factors contributing to job satisfaction and job dissatisfaction in six occupational groups. *Organizational behavior and human performance, 2*(2), 143-174.

Ewen, R. B. (1963). Determinants of Job Satisfaction. *American Psychologist, 18*, 414-420.

Ewen, R. B., Smith, C., Hulin, C., & Locke, E. (1966). An empirical test of the Herzberg's two factor theory. *Journal of Applied Psychology, 50*, 544-550.

FBI. (2000). *Manual of investigative operations and guidelines*. FBI Scholarly Resources.

Fitzgerald, D. G. (2008). *Informants and undercover investigations : a practical guide to law, policy, and procedure*. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press.

French, E. B., Metersky, M. L., Thaler, D. S., & Trexler, J. T. (1973). Herzberg's two factor theory: Conslstency versus method dependency. *Personnel Psychology, 26*, 369-375.

Friedlander, F. (1965). Comparative work value systems. *Personnel Psychology, 18*(1), 1-20.

Friedlander, F., & Walton, E. (1964). Positive and negative motivations toward work. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 194-207.

Gellerman, S. W. (1963). *Motivation and productivity*: American Management Association New York.

Gordon, G. (1965, September). *The Relationship of Satisfiers and Dissatisfiers to Productivity, Turnover and Morale.* Paper presented at the meeting of the American Psychological Association, Chicago.

Gray, C. D., & Kinnear, P. R. (2012). *IBM SPSS statistics 19 made simple*: Psychology Press.

Hall, D. T., & Nougaim, K. E. (1968). An examination of Maslow's need hierarchy in an organizational setting. *Organizational behavior and human performance, 3*(1), 12-35.

Hamas, I. J. (1993). The Muslim Brotherhood: Islamic Extremists and the Terrorist Threat to America, 4 New York: Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith.

Harney, M. L., & Cross, J. C. (1968). *The informer in law enforcement*: CC Thomas.

Head, J. (2010, 01.22.2010). Turkey police arrest 120 al-Qaeda suspects BBC News. Retrieved 03.02.2012, 2012, from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8474174.stm

Heneman, H. G., Schwab, D. P., Fossum, J. A., & Dyer, L. D. (1980). *Personnel/human resource management*: R. D. Irwin.

Hersey, P., Johnson, D. E., & Blanchard, K. H. (1996). *Management of organizational behavior : utilizing human resources* (7th ed.). Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall.

Herzberg, F. (1959). The motivation to work. In B. Mausner (Ed.): John Wiley & Sons, Inc. New York.

Herzberg, F. (1972). *Work and the nature of man: (6. printing)*: World Publishing, Times Mirror.

Herzberg, F. (1987). Workers' needs: the same around the world. *Industry Week, 21*, 29-32.

Herzberg, F., Mausnes, B., Peterson, R. O., & Capwell, D. F. (1957). Job attitudes; review of research and opinion.

Hoffman, B. (2006). *Inside terrorism*: Columbia Univ Pr.

Horan, J., & Swiggett, H. (1951). *The Pinkerton Story*. New York: Putnam.

Hosmer David, W., & Stanley, L. (2000). Applied logistic regression. *John Wiley&amp*.

Hudson, R. A., & DIV., L. O. C. W. D. F. R. (1999). *The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why?* : Defense Technical Information Center.

Israeli, R. (1997). Islamikaze and their Significance. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 9*(3), 96-121.

Ivancevich, J. M. (1969). Perceived need satisfactions of domestic versus overseas managers. *Journal of Applied Psychology, 53*(4), 274.

Ivancevich, J. M., Konopaske, R., & Matteson, M. T. (2005). Organizational Behavior and Management.

Jacobson, B. (1981). Informants and the Public Police (From Criminal and Civil Investigation Handbook, P 4-63 to 4-80, 1981, Joseph J Grau and Ben Jacobson, ed.-See NCJ-84274).

Juergensmeyer, M. (1994). *The new Cold War?: religious nationalism confronts the secular state* (Vol. 5): Univ of California Pr.

Juergensmeyer, M. (2008). *Global rebellion: religious challenges to the secular state, from Christian militias to al Qaeda* (Vol. 16): Univ of California Pr.

Kaplan, A. (1998). Maslow on management: John Wiley & Sons.

Kean, T. H., & Hamilton, L. (2004). *Nine/eleven Commission report, final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States*: WW Norton & Company.

Kim, J. O., & Mueller, C. W. (1978). *Factor analysis: Statistical methods and practical issues* (Vol. 14): Sage Publications, Inc.

Kreitner, R. (1989). *Management*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Laqueur, W. (1999). *The new terrorism: Fanaticism and the arms of mass destruction*: Oxford University Press, USA.

Lawler III, E. E. (1990). *High Involvement Management*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Lee, G. D. (2004). *Global drug enforcement: practical investigative techniques*: CRC.

Lyman, M. D. (1987). *Narcotics and crime control*: C.C. Thomas.

Madinger, J. (2000). *Confidential informant : law enforcement's most valuable tool*. Boca Raton, Fla.: CRC Press.

Maier, N. R. F. (1955). *Psychology in industry: a psychological approach to industrial problems*: Boston, Houghton Mifflin.

Malka, H. (2003). Must innocents die? The Islamic debate over suicide attacks. *Middle East Quarterly*.

Marrow, A. J., Bowers, D. G., & Seashore, S. E. (1967). *Strategies of Organizational Change*. New York: Harper & Row.

Martin, G. (2009). *Understanding terrorism: Challenges, perspectives, and issues*: Sage Publications, Inc.

Marx, G. T. (1989). *Undercover: police surveillance in America*: Univ of California Pr.

Maslow, A. (1954). *Motivation and personality*. New York: Haper & Brothers.

Maslow, A. H., Frager, R., & Fadiman, J. (1970). *Motivation and personality* (Vol. 2): Harper & Row New York.

Miller, J. M. (1996). *The snitch: a sociology of confidential informing.* University of Tennessee, Knoxville.

Mwangi, J. G. (1993). *Factors related to the motivation of extension agents in Kenya's Rift Valley Province.* Ohio State University.

Myers, M. S. (1964). Who are your motivated workers. *Harvard Business Review, 42*(1), 73-88.

Nachmias, C., F., & Nachmias, D. (2000). Research methods in the social sciences: New York: Worth Publishers.

Nardi, P. M. (2006). *Interpreting data: A guide to understanding research*: Pearson/A & B.

Natapoff, A. (2009). *Snitching: Criminal informants and the erosion of American justice*: NYU Press.

Nikbay, O. (2009). An application of anomie and strain theories to terrorism: Suicide attacks in Turkey.

O'Hara, C. E. (1973). *Fundamentals of criminal investigation* (Vol. 1973): Thomas.

O'Sullivan, E., Rassel, G., & Berner, M. (2003). *Research Methods for Public Administrators*: Addison Westely Longman Inc.

Olsen, C., & St George, D. (2004). Cross-sectional study design and data analysis. Retrieved September 2011, from The Young Epidemiology Scholars Program (YES) http://www.collegeboard.com/prod_downloads/yes/4297_MODULE_05.pdf

Oxford. (2000). *Oxford English dictionary*. [Oxford, England?] :: Oxford University Press.

Porter, L. W. (1961). A Study of Percieved Need Satisfaction in Bottom and Middle-Management Jobs *Journal of Applied Psychology*(February), 1-10.

Porter, L. W. (1963). Job attitudes in management: IV. Perceived deficiencies in need fulfillment as a function of size of company. *Journal of Applied Psychology, 47*(6), 386.

Porter, L. W. (1964). *Organizational patterns of managerial job attitudes*: American Foundation for Management Research.

Rapoport, D., C. (1984). Fear and Trembling: Terrorism in Three Religious Traditions. *American Political Science Review, 78*(3), 658-677.

Reitz, H. J. (1975). The relative importance of five categories of needs among industrial workers in eight countries. *Academy of Management Proceedings*, 270-273.

Robbins, S. P., & Judge, T. (2007). *Organizational behavior* (Vol. 11): Prentice Hall.

Rudovsky, D. (1992). Police abuse: Can the violence be contained. *Harv. CR-CLL Rev., 27*, 465.

Rynes, S. L., & Barber, A. E. (1990). Applicant attraction strategies: An organizational perspective. *Academy of Management Review, 15*(2), 286-310.

Saeednia, Y., & Md-Nor, M. (2010). Innovation in scheming Maslow's hierarchy of basic needs. *US-China Education Review, 7*(5), 94-100.

Salancik, G. R., & Pfeffer, J. (1977). An examination of need-satisfaction models of job attitudes. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 427-456.

Saleh, S. D. (1964). A study of attitude changes in the pre-retirement period. *Journal of Applied Psychology*(48), 310-312.

Schachter, S. (1959). *The psychology of affiliation: Experimental studies of the sources of gregariousness* (Vol. 1): Stanford Univ Pr.

Simonsen, C. E., & Spindlove, J. R. (2004). *Terrorism today: the past, the players, the future*: Prentice Hall.

Simsek, Y. (2008). Impact of Terrorism on Migration Patterns in Turkey.

Skolnick, J. H. (1994). *Justice without trial: law enforcement in democratic society*: Macmillan Coll Div.

Steers, R. M., & Black, J. S. (1994). *Organizational behavior*: Harpercollins College Div.

Sun Tzu, S. (1994). *Art of war*: Basic Books.

Taheri, A. (1987). *Holy terror: The inside story of Islamic terrorism*: Hutchinson London.

Turkoglu, M. E. (2006). *The background reasons for religiously appeared terror in Turkey.* MS Masters, Sutcu Imam Universitesi, KahramanMaras. Retrieved from http://www.belgeler.com/blg/125w/turkiye-de-dini-motifli-terorun-arka-planindaki-nedenler-the-background-reasons-for-religiously-appeared-terror-in-turkey

Ucak, H. (2003). *A descriptive study of the intelligence community in the United States of America.* University of North Texas.

Unal, T. (2010). An assessment of the methods that are used to recruit college students into the Turkish Hezbollah.

Victoroff, J. (2005). The mind of the terrorist. *Journal of Conflict resolution, 49*(1), 3-42.

Wahba, M. A., & Bridwell, L. G. (1976). Maslow reconsidered: A review of research on the need hierarchy theory. *Organizational behavior and human performance, 15*(2), 212-240.

Weissenberg, P., & Gruenfeld, L. W. (1968). Relationship between job satisfaction and job involvement. *Journal of Applied Psychology, 52*(6), 469-473.

Wilson, J. Q. (1978). *The investigators: Managing FBI and narcotics agents*: Basic Books New York.

Yang, K. (2010). *Making sense of statistical methods in social research*: Sage Publications Ltd.

Yilmaz, I. (2009). *Patterns of Differential Involvement in Terrorist Activities: Evidence from DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah Cases.* Virginia Commonwealth University.

Zimmerman, C. S. (1994). Toward a New Vision of Informants: A History of Abuses and Suggestions for Reform. *Hastings Const. LQ, 22*, 81.

Appendices

Appendix A

Factor Analysis Outputs

Total Variance Explained

Component	Initial Eigenvalues			Extraction Sums of Squared		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	1.945	48.613	48.613	1.945	48.613	48.613
2	0.905	22.632	71.245			
3	0.704	17.592	88.838			
4	0.446	11.162	100.000			

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Component Matrix[a]

	Component
	1
Home_Ownership	0.448
Employment_Status	0.772
Income	0.814
Health_Insurance	0.697

Extraction Method: Principal

a. 1 components

Appendix B

Logistic Regression Analysis Outputs for Turkish Hezbollah

Block 1: Method = Enter

Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients

	Chi-square	df	Sig.
Step	27.905	7	0.000
Block	27.905	7	0.000
Model	27.905	7	0.000

Model Summary

-2 Log likelihood	Cox & Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
163.404a	0.183	0.244

a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 4
   because parameter estimates changed by less than .001

Variables in the Equation						
Variables	**B**	**S.E.**	**Wald**	**df**	**Sig.**	**Exp(B)**
Binary_Security	0.560	0.463	1.463	1	0.226	1.750
Physiological	1.356	0.408	11.062	1	0.001	3.879
Binary_Esteem	0.024	0.414	0.003	1	0.955	1.024
Binary_Social	-0.280	0.454	0.381	1	0.537	0.756
Ideological_Conflict_in_Morality	-1.471	0.576	6.520	1	0.011	0.230
Patriotic_Altruism	0.061	0.426	0.020	1	0.887	1.063
Frustration	-0.709	0.784	0.820	1	0.365	0.492
Constant	-0.539	0.429	1.576	1	0.209	0.584

Variable(s) entered: Binary_Security, Physiological, Binary_Esteem, Binary_Social, Ideological_Conflict_in_Morality, Patriotic_Altruism, Frustration

Block 2: Method = Enter

Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients

	Chi-square	df	Sig.
Step	9.863	4	0.043
Block	9.863	4	0.043
Model	37.768	11	0.000

Model Summary

-2 Log likelihood	Cox & Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
153.540a	0.239	0.319

a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 5 because parameter estimates changed by less than .001

Variables	Variables in the Equation					
	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Binary_Security	0.411	0.485	0.719	1	0.397	1.508
Physiological	1.446	0.444	10.583	1	0.001	4.245
Binary_Esteem	-0.072	0.436	0.028	1	0.868	0.930
Binary_Social	-0.452	0.494	0.837	1	0.360	0.636
Ideological_Conflict_in_Morality	-1.293	0.619	4.364	1	0.037	0.275
Patriotic_Altruism	-0.158	0.458	0.119	1	0.730	0.854
Frustration	-0.884	0.849	1.084	1	0.298	0.413
SES	0.229	0.236	0.947	1	0.331	1.258
Marital_Status	1.235	0.538	5.268	1	0.022	3.438
Age_Recruitment	-0.084	0.036	5.502	1	0.019	0.919
Miltary_Experience	-0.503	0.549	0.840	1	0.359	0.605
Constant	1.642	1.036	2.514	1	0.113	5.167

Variable(s) entered: SES, Marital_Status, Age_Recruitment, Miltary_Experience.

Appendix C

Logistic Regression Analysis for Al-Qaeda

Block 1: Method = Enter

Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients

	Chi-square	df	Sig.
Step	70.638	7	0.000
Block	70.638	7	0.000
Model	70.638	7	0.000

Model Summary

-2 Log likelihood	Cox & Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
50.445a	0.401	0.686
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 7 because parameter estimates changed by less than .001		

Variables in the Equation						
Variables	**B**	**S.E.**	**Wald**	**df**	**Sig.**	**Exp(B)**
Binary_Security	1.366	0.798	2.929	1	0.087	3.920
Physiological	-1.269	0.837	2.302	1	0.129	0.281
Binary_Esteem	-0.354	0.807	0.193	1	0.660	0.702
Binary_Social	-0.341	0.900	0.144	1	0.704	0.711
Ideological_Conflict_in_Morality	3.959	0.850	21.67	1	0.000	52.39
Patriotic_Altruism	-0.993	0.829	1.434	1	0.231	0.371
Frustration	2.913	1.127	6.682	1	0.010	18.41
Constant	-3.392	0.922	13.53	1	0.000	0.034

Variable(s) entered: Binary_Security, Physiological, Binary_Esteem, Binary_Social, Ideological_Conflict_in_Morality, Patriotic_Altruism, Frustration

Block 2: Method = Enter

Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients

	Chi-square	df	Sig.
Step	10.626	4	0.031
Block	10.626	4	0.031
Model	81.264	11	0.000

Model Summary

-2 Log likelihood	Cox & Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
39.819a	0.445	0.762

a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 8 because parameter estimates changed by less than .001

Variables in the Equation

Variables	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Binary_Security	1.884	1.019	3.416	1	0.065	6.577
Physiological	-1.624	1.106	2.158	1	0.142	0.197
Binary_Esteem	-1.288	1.020	1.596	1	0.206	0.276
Binary_Social	-0.409	1.026	0.159	1	0.690	0.664
Ideological_Conflict_in_Morality	4.774	1.250	14.586	1	0.000	118.39
Patriotic_Altruism	-1.510	1.175	1.652	1	0.199	0.221
Frustration	3.262	1.263	6.675	1	0.010	26.112
SES	0.359	0.536	0.447	1	0.504	1.431
Marital_Status	-1.169	1.232	0.901	1	0.343	0.311
Age_Recruitment	0.204	0.086	5.607	1	0.018	1.226
Miltary_Experience	1.006	1.261	0.636	1	0.425	2.736
Constant	-9.977	3.075	10.528	1	0.001	0.000

Variable(s) entered: SES, Marital_Status, Age_Recruitment, Miltary_Experience.

Vita

Hursit Ucak was born in 1971, in Dinar, Afyon, Turkey and is a Turkish citizen. He graduated from Denizli Anadolu Lisesi, Denizli, Turkey in 1990. He received his Bachelor of Science in Criminal Justice from Polis Akademisi, Ankara, Turkey in 1995. He received his Master of Science degree in Criminal Justice from University of North Texas, Denton, Texas in 2003. He has been working with the intelligence department of the Turkish National Police, the IDB, since 1995. He has been teaching HUMINT related courses at the Intelligence Academy of the IDB since 2003. Ucak has several publications including a book, and has presented at various conferences in the U.S. and abroad.