



**ASSOCIAÇÃO DE POLITÉCNICOS DO NORTE (APNOR)  
INSTITUTO POLITÉCNICO DE BRAGANÇA**

## **Evolution of Corporate Lobbying Activities in the European Union**

**Ogun Kurt**

Final Dissertation submitted to *Instituto Politécnico de Bragança*

To obtain the Master Degree in Management, Specialisation in Business  
Management

**Alcina Maria de Almeida Rodrigues Nunes**

***Bragança, January, 2022.***



**ASSOCIAÇÃO DE POLITÉCNICOS DO NORTE (APNOR)  
INSTITUTO POLITÉCNICO DE BRAGANÇA**

## **Evolution of Corporate Lobbying Activities in the European Union**

**Ogun Kurt**

Final Dissertation submitted to *Instituto Politécnico de Bragança*

To obtain the Master Degree in Management, Specialisation in Business  
Management

**Alcina Maria de Almeida Rodrigues Nunes**

***Bragança, January, 2022.***

## **Abstract**

Lobbying is itself not a very new topic. However, the current practices of the lobbying in the European Union (EU) and the relationship between lobbying firms' expenditures and their main performance indicators, like firms' annual turnover, their annual productivity growth, annual value-added, annual patents, annual profit margins and firms' annual regulation intensity are still a new topic and has not been drawn enough attention in the literature. The literature mostly focuses on the lobbying tactics, success-failure of the lobbyists and generally provides theoretical and qualitative analyses. This research aims to shed light on the current practices of lobbying in the EU and the correlation between lobbying expenditures and firms' key performance indicators by using qualitative and quantitative analysis. The purpose of the current study was to investigate the evolution and current practices of lobbying in the EU, examine the particular case of Portuguese Businesses and determine if there is any relationship between lobbying firms' expenditures and their annual turnover, annual productivity growth, annual value-added, annual patents, annual profit margins and annual regulation intensity. The study undergoes exploratory research in which both qualitative and quantitative data is gathered and analysed. The research used the online quantitative data set available regarding the lobbying activities of European countries and their firms between 2016-2020. One of the main data sources used provides information about the last five years. The other source of information used provides information since 2008.

The study findings show that lobbying activities and registration in the transparency register increased in the last ten years, and the volume of lobbying expenditures also increased significantly. The digital, banking, energy, technology, and car manufacturing sectors were found to be spending the most. It is also found that there is a positive relationship between a firm's expenditures and the firm's annual turnover, its value-added yearly, and its yearly regulation intensity in the EU.

**Keyword:** Lobbying, Lobbying activities, Lobbying expenditure, European Union

## Resumo

O *lobbying* em si não é um tópico muito novo. No entanto, as práticas atuais de lobby na União Europeia (UE) e a relação entre os gastos das empresas de *lobbying* e seus principais indicadores de desempenho, como a faturação anual das empresas, o crescimento anual de produtividade, valor anual acrescentado, as patentes, as margens de lucro anuais e a intensidade da regulamentação anual das empresas ainda são um tópico novo e não têm atraído atenção suficiente na literatura. A literatura concentra-se principalmente nas estratégias de *lobbying* ou no sucesso/fracasso dos lobistas e, geralmente, fornece apenas análises teóricas e qualitativas. Assim, este trabalho de investigação visa lançar uma luz sobre as práticas atuais de *lobby* na UE e a correlação entre as despesas de *lobbying* e os principais indicadores de desempenho das empresas, usando uma análise qualitativa e quantitativa. O presente estudo teve como objetivo investigar a evolução e as práticas atuais de *lobbying* na União Europeia, examinar o caso particular das empresas portuguesas e determinar se existe alguma relação entre as despesas das empresas em *lobbying* e o seu volume de negócios anual, produtividade anual, crescimento, valor acrescentado anual, patentes anuais, margens de lucro anuais e intensidade de regulamentação anual. O estudo constitui-se como um trabalho de investigação exploratório em que dados qualitativos e quantitativos são recolhidos e analisados. A investigação utilizou um conjunto de dados quantitativos disponíveis online sobre as atividades de *lobbying* dos países europeus e suas empresas entre 2016-2020. Uma das fontes de dados utilizadas fornece informações sobre os últimos cinco anos. A outra fonte de informação utilizada fornece informações desde 2008. Os resultados do estudo mostram que as atividades de *lobbying* e o seu registo aumentaram nos últimos dez anos assim como o volume das despesas. Os setores digital, bancário, de energia, tecnologia e produção de automóveis foram os que mais gastaram. Também se constatou que há uma relação positiva entre os gastos de uma empresa e a sua faturação anual, o seu valor acrescentado anual e sua intensidade de regulamentação anual na UE.

**Palavra-chave:** *Lobbying*, Atividade de *Lobbying*, Despesas, União Europeia

## **Acknowledgement**

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my advisor, Prof. Alcina Maria de Almeida Rodrigues Nunes, whose sincerity and encouragement I will never forget. She has been an inspiration as I hurdled through the path of this master's degree. This work would not have been possible without the constant support, guidance, and assistance of my major advisor. She has guided me and encouraged me to carry on through these years and has contributed to this thesis with a major impact. Thank you as well for guiding me, often with big doses of patience, through the subtleties of scientific writing.

Nobody has been more important to me in the pursuit of this project than my family members. I would like to thank my parents, whose love and guidance are with me in whatever I pursue. They are the ultimate role models. They selflessly encouraged me to explore new directions in life and seek my own destiny. This journey would not have been possible if not for them, and I dedicate this milestone to them. Further, yet importantly, a sense of respect goes to my father Ibrahim Kurt, mother Gulay Kurt and my family for their strong support economically and regular encouragement in every step to make me in the present stage.

## **Abbreviations and Acronyms**

CEO: Corporate Europe Observatory

EC: European Commission

EP: European Parliament

EU: European Union

FDI: Foreign Direct Investment

FTE: Full Time Equivalent

IIA: Inter-Institutional Agreement

NGOs: Non-Governmental Organisations

OECD: The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development

Sig.: Significance

UK: United Kingdom

USPTO: United States Patent and Trademark Office

USA: United States of America

WTO: World Trade Organization

## Table of Contents

List of Figures.....	vi
List of Tables.....	vii
Introduction.....	1
1. Literature Review .....	3
1.1. Lobbying: A Strategy and Technique for Intervention .....	3
1.2. Current Practices of Lobbying in the European Union .....	4
1.3. How Lobbying Works in the European Union .....	6
1.4. Corporate Lobbying in the EU.....	8
1.5. Lobbying Activities of Portuguese Businesses in the EU.....	10
2. Research Methodology .....	12
2.1. Research Objectives.....	12
2.2. Description of Data Collection.....	12
2.2.1. Qualitative data .....	13
2.2.2. Quantitative data .....	13
2.3. Data Analysis .....	15
2.3.1. Trend Analysis .....	15
2.3.2. Correlational Analysis .....	15
2.4. Research Hypothesis and Research Model.....	16
3. Presentation and Analysis of Results.....	18
3.1. Frequency distribution of Registered Entities Conducting Lobbying.....	18
3.2. Trend analysis of lobbying expenditure.....	19
3.3. The trend analysis of the Top-10 ranked lobbying companies in the EU.....	21
3.4. Correlational Analysis .....	26
Conclusion, Limitations and Future Research Lines.....	33
References.....	35

## List of Figures

Figure 1: Percentual distribution of lobbying by type of registered entities .....	19
Figure 2: Trend Analysis of Lobbying in the EU .....	20



## List of Tables

<b>Table 1.</b> Research hypothesis .....	17
<b>Table 2.</b> Annual Lobbying Costs and Growth Rate in the EU (2010-2019) .....	20
<b>Table 3.</b> Top-10 ranked lobbying companies with EP passes in the EU with the highest lobbying budget in 2017.....	22
<b>Table 4.</b> Top-10 ranked lobbying companies with EP passes in the EU with the highest lobbying budget in 2018.....	23
<b>Table 5.</b> Top-10 ranked lobbying companies with EP passes in the EU with the highest lobbying budget in 2019.....	24
<b>Table 6.</b> Top-10 ranked lobbying companies with EP passes in the EU with the highest lobbying budget in 2020.....	25
<b>Table 7.</b> Annual Average Meetings with EC and EP Passes by Lobbying Companies in the EU .....	26
<b>Table 8.</b> Correlation between firm's lobbying expenditure and annual turnover .....	27
<b>Table 9.</b> Correlation between firms' lobbying expenditure and annual productivity growth .....	28
<b>Table 10.</b> Correlation between firms' lobbying expenditure and annual patents .....	29
<b>Table 11.</b> Correlation between firm's lobbying expenditure and annual value-added .....	30
<b>Table 12.</b> Correlation between firm's lobbying expenditure and annual profit margins .....	30
<b>Table 13.</b> Correlation between firm's expenditures and the firms' annual regulation intensity .....	31

## Introduction

Lobbying activities are usually assumed to provide sectorial information and knowledge to the policymakers to make informed decisions. However, when these activities go far beyond such motives and are conducted to influence politicians and policymakers to restrict or mould regulations to benefit favoured firms and prevent openly regulated markets, they result in welfare decrease (Bhagwati, 2012). These firm's practices are well evident in the theoretical literature like the Stigler (1971) theory of regulation proposal. However, not much empirical evidence supports these facts, mainly because these activities are not exercised transparently and are not often documented. Generally, the word lobbying is assumed to be a negative term in media or the minds of the general population, suggesting a one side representation of a business interest. One-part benefits from the loss or damage of the other party. In politics, it is considered nepotism or corruption. Considering the facts and consequences of lobbying in most countries, especially where the democratic system is still in its infancy stage and where the powerhouse rules the political games, it is not wrong to presume it as a foul practice or corruption. However, the practice of lobbying has evolved as many authors believed that it is the most influential business or political strategy to achieve personal or mutual goals (Bienefeld, 2015).

If reforms are compared in different sectors, it is evident that product market firms are the main industries that use their influence for reforms in regulation, mainly when firms in euro area countries are analysed (Bhagwati, 2012). However, recently labour markets have been observed to exert a lot of pressure and influence on decision-making processes. Such resistance to reform programs are also seen in countries that are making economic adjustments. Under this light, international institutions argued that the main reason the market reform programs are not successfully passed and implemented is the strong resistance from various interest groups. Individually or together with other parties are powerful enough to impact policy makers' decisions (Dür et al., 2015).

In Europe, the practice of lobbying is, however, different from the rest of the world. This is because it is more systematic, documented, and registered firms and institutes participate in lobbying activities. The claim of these interested firms is mainly that these activities are conducted for public interests. However, studies have indicated that most of the lobbying is done for the private gains of the firms (Biliouri, 2019).

The current study's objective is to critically analyse lobbying's structure, functioning and current practices in the European Union (EU) and look at the special case of Portuguese businesses. Further, the study aims to provide empirical evidence on how many different industries spend on or are engaged in lobbying activities and how they relate to and if they have any relation on the firms' performance indicators, like annual turnover, productivity growth, value-added, patents, profit margins and regulation intensity, how

strong the relationship is. The study will shed light on EU lobbying activities by creating a data set obtained from different online sources, given in the methodology section.

To achieve these objectives, the researcher has opted for an exploratory research design. Both qualitative and quantitative data have been gathered to answer the research questions. An extensive literature review is conducted to provide the theoretical base for how lobbying evolves and is practiced in the EU. Secondly, statistical analysis is applied to the available data set, which is downloaded from The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (OECD, 2021), which is an international organisation that helps in establishing standards with the help of governments, citizens and policymakers to address various environmental, economic and social issues, and from Lobbyfacts.eu and from Transparency register. It is conducted an empirical analysis demonstrate the lobbying costs and their relation to the firms' performance indicators.

The research has the following sections. An introduction, which explains the study background, objectives, and research significance. These sections help the reader to get an idea of what they should expect from the research below. The literature review provides the analysis of the existing literature on the subject of lobbying and discusses in detail the current scenario and lobbying practices in the EU. Follows a section that presents the research methodology, this is the research methods, research variables and the process of data collection and data analysis methods. This section provides details on how the researcher adopts different research techniques to collect and analyse the data. In the section of presentation and analysis of results, the data analysis is presented, along with the interpretations and main findings of the research. Finally, the section of conclusions and future recommendations presents the study conclusions based on the study results and findings and provides some recommendations on how lobbying practices can be transparently done.

## **1. Literature Review**

This section presents the related theories, concepts, and work of previous researchers on the topic under study. First, the concept of lobbying is explained with reference to relevant theories, then the development of lobbying in the EU is discussed with relevant references.

### **1.1. Lobbying: A Strategy and Technique for Intervention**

Lobbying is not a recent concept. For centuries, technocrats have been using it as a vision to achieve publicity. Originally, the term lobbying is traced back to the nineteenth century, expressed by the President of the United States of America (USA) General Grant after he reached the White house. While his stay in a hotel, the President complained that people on the ground floor (lobby) were tried to influence him. Being a cornerstone of American democracy, the history of lobbying can also be studied in ancient Greek civilisations (McGrath, 2018).

By definition, there are generally four types of lobbying discussed in the literature. The first is the "public lobbying" that includes advisory services, parliamentary affairs, and ministries' communication. Second is the "institutional lobbying", including the corporate and institutional affairs and the development of government relations in corporate departments. The third is the "class-based lobbying", usually expressed as class entities, and the last is the "private lobbying", which constitutes the lobbying of consulting offices and private institutes. All types of lobbying are basically the strategies and techniques of influencing and intervening in government actions and decisions (Burgermeister, 2018)

In developing modern society, lobbying emerged as a powerful strategic tool to mould the policy-makers beliefs and perceptions to bring evolution. Formerly, lobbying was conducted by a powerful person with social and government contacts who was able to influence the decision-makers through his personal

relations (Davies, 2018). It was neither a sophisticated nor a very effective approach towards change. This type of traditional lobbying exists because of the complex nature of international matters requiring modern approaches and techniques. Current lobbying is a combination of rigorous engineering techniques and varied disciplines and encourages the change to happen on a global level (Harris, 2017).

In a political system like the one of the United Kingdom (UK), the political parties must use lobbying techniques that convey the message of the general public to the interests group. There are several pressure factors or groups because various political parties could not express their needs and requirements. Some pressure groups develop gradually while others are more organised and start their own private lobbying to sabotage leading powers' aims (Sagstetter, 1978). In these efforts, together with the help of some political parties that use them for their own interest, they become essential mediation political agents. These enterprises intend to intervene in the public and leading authorities' decisions for the same purpose as other organisations try to achieve. Based on an organisation's circumstances and objectives, they can use pressure groups as their tools for lobbying about their own goals. In trying to do so, they usually agreed on mutual terms that are beneficial for both parties. These pressure groups can be used as specialised agencies, private services or as a service by an organisation. According to the requirement, they can be utilised in all three forms or as individual forms (Hartmann, 2010).

The strategies of lobbying set by enterprises are usually unchallengeable and developed once in a lifetime. However, these tactics depend on different factors and their evolution. These include the structure and characteristics of the enterprise, its business segment and management practices, social and political perceptions that are embedded in their culture, their motivations for interventions for the public interest, the significance of the issue in government administration, their approach and distribution skills in various legislative, regulatory and government components. All these factors act as critical variables for the effectiveness of lobbying of any particular enterprise. Organisations must consider or take into account all these mentioned variables while developing and identifying their strategic options for lobbying. This helps establish achievable targets that will influence the decisions of the leading bodies that determine the future policies and the future of people. So basically, lobbying can be characterised as an activity that involves actions that help intervene or influence any process of rules, standards, and elaboration, application or general decisions of the legislative and leading public authorities (Markman, 2016).

## **1.2. Current Practices of Lobbying in the European Union**

The landscape of European lobbying is vastly diversified. According to Guéguen, there are over 1000 trade associations (organisations funded by businesses that operate in the specific sector) in Europe that comprise over 750 Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) representing the families, consumers, ecologists, world aid and so on, representative bodies of almost 500 companies, about 150 regional

offices, specialist law organisations for European law, a large number of unspecified consultants that play their role in community program monitoring and finance management (Bienefeld, 2015).

They can be observed with reference to their structure (movements, traditional associations, being spontaneous and their involvement), their motivational background or their legal forms. Commonly the literature classified the groups based on the interests of the organisations that pursue lobbying. Private and public interests are classified separately. They are distinguished based on their characteristics. For instance, public groups are interested in actions and decisions that benefit society as a whole, such as tax reductions, better protection, and sustainable environmental practices. On the other hand, private groups are interested in actions that only benefit their close members (Biliouri, 2019).

Some authors, however, did not believe in these categories of private and public interests. According to them, all types of lobbying are made just to achieve a person's, group or organisations personal interest. This differentiation can imply false assertions. For instance, this implies that public interest groups always pursue decisions that are best for the public interest and the interests of private groups are merely selfish. They use terms like civic interests and producers' interests (Padovani & Gibson, 2011). The European Commission (EC) distinct them as profit-making organisations (consultants, legal advisors, public relations) and non-profit making organisations (International and European federations and associations) (Weil, 2018). Despite all distinctions outlined above, lobbying activities in all its forms are recognised as a legitimate way of political participation by the EC (European Commission, 2021) since lobbyists or interest groups provide knowledge, information, and expertise in various areas which the EU can make a decision on, and their input and inclusion in the decision-making process also help to reduce the democracy deficit of the EU (Bache et al., 2017). However, lobbying activities need to be transparent and accountable at the EU level and individually among its member states. To enforce transparency and ensure accountability, the rules or law must be integrity about lobbying among its states and strong requirements (European Commission, 2021).

The rules and regulations about lobbying practices in the EU, for the first time, started in 1996. The European Parliament (EP) regulated lobbyists' access to its premises and introduced a pass system. The EP also required lobbyists to disclose information about their structure and the intent of their activities and accept a code of conduct setting minimal ethical standards. In 2008, the EC created a voluntary register, The EC Register of Interest Representatives, for lobbyists. However, the lobbyists who register themselves now are required to abide by a code of conduct. The EP also approved a resolution on a framework to discuss the development of the European bodies' lobbying activities. A working group called the Joint Working Group between two EU bodies (the EP and the EC), started to prepare the Inter-Institutional Agreement (IIA). The IIA launched the Joint Transparency Register, in which lobbyists can voluntarily register their activities by disclosing information about their expenditure, resources, and aims. Timeline of the development of European Lobbying Regulations can be found on the LobbyEurope's website (<https://lobbyeurope.org/rules-and-regulations/>). In 2021, the EC enacted new legislation on the

Interinstitutional agreements. In this legislation, the EP, the EC, and the Council of the European Union agreed on a mandatory transparency register which makes registration of interest representatives is a precondition for carrying out interest representation activities, restricts access to the meetings, hearings, conferences or any similar activities and also requires disclosing details about organisation, expenditure, the goal of the activities being performed for lobbyists (Publication Office of the European Union, 2021).

In conclusion, it can be said that lobbying in the EU is now a legal and regulated practice and is considered a useful mean to influence the EP's decisions. It is regarded as a means to achieve and maintain a relationship within EP to achieve public confidence and secure solid interests. Currently, organisations and associations are spending a large amount of money and resources on lobbying, which is evident in the statistics available on publicly released documents (Laville, 2019). This is because lobbying plays a significant role in bringing legitimacy to European institutions and becoming an important platform where games and politics of business and non-business interests are played. Corporate lobbying has increased significantly and posed some serious consequences, yet it needs to be analysed more systematically. Regulations of lobbying are established to protect wider public concern issues like transparency, protect democracy, and give the rights to the European Citizens. The main philosophy behind regulating lobbying is to make it open and transparent. However, some authors or politicians argued that these codes should be legally binding to make them more effective. In contrast, others believe there is no need for legal binding as long as it is enforced regularly.

### **1.3. How Lobbying Works in the European Union**

The major focus of the European associations, consultants dealing with European affairs and other lobbying organisations is to establish or maintain a favourable regulatory environment for their clients, organisations, and members (Krajewski, 2013).

Initially, in 2002, there was a permanent office in Brussels established by 2600 interest groups. The main members of these interest groups were trade federations, private companies, commercial consultants, Human rights, environmental and health care NGOs, labour and business associations, regional officers of international firms and people called think tanks (Kothakota, 2017).

The literature suggested that the activities of the pressure group and lobbyists are divided into four general groups. These are: (i) "lobbying function", which involve activities that try to influence the process of decision making from the outside like participation in public hearings or using public relation owner; (ii) "service function", that involve service providing activities like special services (information gathering) for clients or members (iii) "decision-making function" that involves influencing the decision making process from within the system like by participating directly in the decision making process and selecting projects and proposals based on their respective position; and, the last, is the (iv) "implementation

function", that is practised by people who are the part of policymaking and implementation team and take over the management function and influence the decision implementation process (Klingelhöfer, 2018).

The service and lobbying functions are mostly done to serve a specific client or organisation. In contrast, the decision making, and implementation function serve in other ways like in governance of a particular policy or public policy making done by any governmental sector. The majority of the EU interest associations comprise of large companies or national organisations, or both. The small firm dominated sectors are usually represented by associations of national organisations, while direct company member organisations dominate the highly concentrated sectors. EU firms and business associations are the key players in lobbying and have their government offices established in Belgium. Either the main sectors or their sub-business sectors conduct the activities, there is a high level of specialisation observed (Bitonti & Harris, 2017).

Some EU business associations are also involved in a large number of different lobbying activities. For instance, in Europe, some national consumer firms and organisations utilised different strategies to attract new members. These types of traditions are also seen practising at the European level that these consumer organisations practise (Bunea, 2019). It is a fact that different lobbying groups have distinctive differences in their practising approaches. They might have some particular resources, preferences, lobbying styles and management forms. These differences usually originated from aspects like type of organisations, geographical origin and current situation. One of the major issues these interests groups face is the maintenance of power balance in European institutions (Prentice, 2018). The existence of qualified voting members in the Council resulted in the shifting of veto power from the Member states in many economic areas. This co-decision process promoted and highlighted the role of lobbying in the EU as, with the help of lobbying, the legislation that the Council favours could not be accepted. Such types of events and situations helped underpin the significance of non-state actors, commonly known as civic representatives, in policymaking (Voltolini, 2017).

Additionally, the EU has introduced new policies and initiatives like social, environmental, and consumer policy in the last decade. They have also introduced their single currency. The increasing authority in the EU implies the need to have more information on regional economic issues and provide opportunities where the EU legislation could be influenced in these policy areas. The Court of Justice has also played a significant role in encouraging civic interests, especially to overrule national legislation that was only designed to benefit a particular corporate or individual at the expense of the general public (Oliveira & Hersperger, 2018).

The political market is often used as a metaphor while describing the activities of lobbying. As in economics, the equilibrium price determines the interplay of demand and supply. Similarly, in lobbying, the impact and level of lobbying are determined by the demand and supply of information and the resources provided by the lobbyist politicians and offices. The price formation in the commercial market can hence be considered as parallel to the development of consensus in the political market of the EU



(Bunea & Ibenskas, 2015). This means that not all the proposals presented or pursued in the EU are concerned with the whole industry or society; they can also be just to please a certain enterprise or authoritative individual. In all such cases, if the viewpoint and proposals presented and addressed are back up with European lobbying efforts, there is a greater chance that these viewpoints will be considered seriously. Therefore, interested groups try to make alliances with European associations that can impact the EU in their decision making so that their agendas get some consideration and significance while making policies (Kanol, 2014).

Authors who have studied the knowledge and understand the EU functioning can easily classify which participants are successful and unsuccessful in this lobbying theatre. The desired outcomes of the interest groups can be viewed as dependent variables. At the same time, factors like expertise in the decision-making process and stakeholder position can be considered important independent variables (Hanoteau, 2014).

Other than these interests, there also exists a certain symbiosis between bureaucrats and interest groups. The interest groups are debated to tend to maintain stable relationships and environment, while bureaucracy is usually viewed as working to secure some kind of negotiable order (Markman, 2016). Interest groups also took an interest in public bureaucracies and considered them valuable sources for gathering reliable information and an important factor for influencing planned or unplanned legislative measures and public policies. The increasing significance and practice of lobbying, in close association with EU institutions that can impact their image, have led to a more critical regulation of lobbying activities. Public affair professionals or lobbyists have set their code of conduct that demands them to identify themselves as a company name or an individual. They will also clearly specify what organisations or clients they are representing (Burgermeister, 2018).

These codes outlaw any action that involves bribing politicians or government officials. The EP has also established its ten lobbying conduct codes set under the Parliament Rules of Procedure. These rules and codes of conduct were established to refrain lobbyists to involve in any form of illegal activity to gather information dishonestly and try to make a forceful relationship with Parliament while representing third parties. Lobbyists are defined as parties or persons that seek to involve in Parliamentary processes or premises to collect valuable information for their clients and members. The possession of such information gives them distinguish position among other lobbyists, and they become favoured people for the interested groups and organisations (Sluban et al., 2018).

#### **1.4. Corporate Lobbying in the EU**

Another aspect of lobbying that interest group researchers have found is increased and increased corporate lobbying at various international platforms. Initially, researchers like Salisbury (1984) and Scholzman (1984) were the first who conducted empirical studies to identify the role and significance of

individual firms in the USA lobbying community. Their studies indicated that, at that time, firms and corporations constituted a large part of most of the lobbying activities and interest groups in Washington (Bombardini & Trebbi, 2012). Over time, a lot of research was conducted that documented and explained the role of corporations in the USA lobbying community. Similar patterns of lobbying in the UK by corporations were also identified by Aizenberg and Hanegraaff (2019). Even though the UK left the EU on January 31, 2020 (European Commission, 2021), it is still one of the biggest lobbyists in the EU, with 979 registered organisations. It is still relevant to the research (Transparency International, 2021). According to it, corporations enter the lobbying community to overcome the current political influences and interest groups. Now they are the largest players having the largest share over the last two decades. The researcher identified these patterns of corporate lobbying in the USA and the UK and in nations that have neo corporatist systems like the Netherlands (Aizenberg & Hanegraaff, 2019). Additionally, this culture of corporate lobbying is not only exclusive to domestic systems. It can be clearly observed on international political and social platforms as well. For instance, the work of several researchers indicates that firms and corporations have systematically increased their political influence through their lobbying role at platforms like World Trade Organization (WTO), especially in its judicial arm (Carroll & Rasmussen, 2017). Although the literature suggests a consistent trend towards increasing corporate lobbying, its true context in the EU political system remains unclear. This is because the micro and macro-level studies on EU interest organisations are usually limited to two main categories that are non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and associations that represent business interests (Berkhout & Hanegraaff, 2019). These studies do not include firms altogether. Recently, some micro-level studies were focused on identifying the factors and determinants that explain why firms make choices of engaging directly in lobbying activities and explain their role as political representatives and interests in the EU. The main limitation of these studies was that they were mostly cross-sectional analysis that does not allow to draw an inference on overtime variations of firms that whether their share and lobbying activities in the EU increase over time as compared to other interest groups (Chen et al., 2015)

Studying such aspects is important since increasing corporate lobbying is associated with various political and legal concerns. These concerns usually revolve around a firm's influence on political and legal institutions, making their actions and decisions more biased, resulting in political outputs favouring only limited interests rather than diffused ones. This can be problematic as it can lead to long-term worrying consequences like political and economic decline as well as the disillusionment of the functioning of democracy (Poletti et al., 2015).

As discussed, that increase in corporate lobbying can lead to some serious democratic and political concerns as leading players in this regard can result in yielding worrying normative implications. Either firm's lobby alone or collaborate with sectorial associations, they definitely involve policymakers and use their influence to generate potentially biased systems and laws to get the desired outcomes. This is because the main focus of corporate lobbying is to secure policies through distributing wealth to get favours for particular interests in society (Hanegraaff, 2019). Researchers also believe that the increase

in firm's lobbying can impair the tendency of the political system to make policies and decisions that facilitate the broader interest of society and limit or pressurise them to work in a directed direction (Dür et al., 2015). The whole scenario also results in limiting most of the wealth in few hands.

On the other hand, some researchers also debated that corporate lobbying is not only for gaining unfair advantages. Studies in the USA, indicate that increase in lobbying expenditure by firms results in lowering the tax rates to some extent that benefit overall industries. Further, lobbying was also associated with less monitoring and charges by governments (Werner, 2016). Some studies also indicated that a firm's lobbying results in several advantages related to organisational characteristics like productivity, annual turnover, profit margins, and regulation intensity. Gordon and Hafer (2015) provide empirical evidence that corporations use their resources and influences to mould regulators in their favour. Their results indicate that firms spend more on lobbying to obtain leniency from regulatory institutions so that they will be less monitored. It was also found out that lobbying is positively associated with the financial performance of the organisations. Also, firms with the highest lobbying were found to outperform better than their competitors in their overall portfolios.

Despite these potentially significant normative implications of corporate lobbying, there is still a lack of empirical research that systematically analyse the increase of corporate lobbying in the EU. Studying this aspect is important because the EU constitutes the largest political system involved in regulating the largest economy in the world and represent the largest system for representation. The role of firms in EU policymaking has not been ignored in this regard as there has been some work done by researchers like Coen (1997) and Bouwen (2002), who revealed that individual firms do play a significant role in EU policymaking (Coen et al., 2020). But there is a lack of systematic review on the rise of corporate lobbying in the EU. The current study also tries to fill in this gap through empirical analysis.

## **1.5. Lobbying Activities of Portuguese Businesses in the EU**

Lobbying is defined and perceived differently in Portugal based on who is explaining the concept. The perception of lobbying in the general public is considered a negative connotation and mystery. The industry of lobbying is debated to be still in its infancy stage in Portugal. There are few professional lobbyists, and most lobbying activities are carried out by legal advisors, lawyers, or communication agencies. The process of influencing the regulatory, legislative, and decision-making process involves informal contacts, internal pressure networks, or paid tasks for law firms and agencies in the country (Helena Terrinha, 2019). On October 3, 2021, there were 186 Portuguese businesses registered in the transparency register. Considering that there are 12980 registrants to the date, the Portuguese registration number stays low. The category of NGOs, platforms, networks, and similar represent the highest number of registrants with 48 out of 186 (Transparency Register, 2021). One of the most important ways to track lobbying activities and their impacts is to ensure that officials and businesses

are subject to asset and interest disclosure obligations. However, these obligations are different in the scope, transparency and accessibility of the information disclosed, the system's verification, and its enforcement at the national levels. Portugal introduced new obligations to declare and publish complete and consolidated asset declarations online. Also, the Parliament in Portugal advanced new measures to increase the transparency of law-making and the quality of legislation (European Commission, 2021).

Overall, there is a lack of transparency related to the activities conducted by interest groups to impact the legislative, political and administrative decisions. There is no track information or legislative footprint that enable the citizens to track or monitor the individuals or interest group who indirectly play their part in making the new policies and laws. Clearly, it can be assumed that the governing mechanism for monitoring the behaviour of public decision-making in Portugal is not satisfactory at all (Helena Terrinha, 2019).

Senior civil servants and ex-politicians start working as facilitators/consultants and employees of large domestic and international firms and use their political and social relations for their benefit. These lawyers' offices and consultants offer services to the private and government firm to conduct business with states, which are also another source of conflicting interests and lead to illegitimate representation of their members and clients' interests and utilize illegal means to gather inside information. The state often recruits these offices and consultants without fully filling any formal legal tender requirements and usually hire former politicians as consultants and lawyers. The advisory and study groups established by executive branches are also sources of concern as they serve the same function. Additionally, retired senior officers of the state and former ministers of political parties use their personal relations and social networks they created during their service years to influence the policymakers and decision-making bodies to pursue interest groups (Costa, 2018).

## **2. Research Methodology**

This section presents the research methodology opted by the researcher to achieve the research objectives. It also presents detailed information on how the data has been analysed and the research samples used. Further, this section provides details on instruments of data collection and data collection tools.

### **2.1. Research Objectives**

The research objectives of the current study are stated as follows:

- To critically analyse under the light of recent theories and researches the meaning of lobbying and how it is used as a strategic tool by interest groups.
- To critically analyse and discuss the development and practice of lobbying in the EU and how lobbying works.
- To discuss the role and status of lobbying activities of Portuguese businesses.
- To provide empirical results on the growth of lobbying expenditures of different industries in the EU.
- To provide empirical evidence on the association among the lobbying expenditures lobbying costs/expenditures and the turnover of the lobbying firms in the EU, the productivity growth of the lobbying firms in the EU, product's value-added of the lobbying firms in the EU, the profit margin of the lobbying firms in the EU and the regulation intensity of the lobbying firms in the EU and how strong these relationships are.

## **2.2. Description of Data Collection**

The objectives of the study require the collection of both qualitative and quantitative data and in the following sections it is explained what types of data are used and how they are collected for the research paper.

### **2.2.1. Qualitative data**

Qualitative data is the type of data that can be characterised and approximates. It can be recorded or observed. It is non-numerical data. The qualitative data collection process is exploratory as it involves an in-depth analysis of the presented information and helps identify key ideas and themes. The data's main focus is to get an insight into the topic under discussion and offer reasoning towards a particular behaviour, situation, or characteristic, allowing a deeper understanding of an idea with an in-depth perspective. Some of the most common qualitative data collection methods involve one-to-one in-depth interviews, focus groups, record keeping, and observations (Gibbs, 2018).

For this current study, the qualitative data technique was used in the literature review. Theoretical evidence is collected and presented based on previous research, reports, and existing databases to answer the research objectives. The sources include books, journal articles, annual reports, online databases and other online and offline sources. This data has been presented in the form of literature and in the discussion section to support the study results.

### **2.2.2. Quantitative data**

Quantitative data is the numeric data collected and generated through quantitative data collection techniques. It is the data set that is obtained in the form of a numeric value. This data offers the researcher the opportunity to apply statistical analysis techniques to generate quantifiable results. So, it provides answers like how, when and how much an issue or topic under study responds or occur. The statistical analysis helps get quantifiable results that are also very helpful for future studies (Wetcher-Hendricks, 2011).

This study aims to get an insight into the lobbying activities, and how firm's performances are impacted and affected by their lobbying activities and expenditure, this research made use of the online quantitative data set available regarding the lobbying activities of European countries and their firms. This is called reusing the existing data. This method has many advantages as data available on government websites, reports, and surveys are extensive, high quality and reliable. That is usually not possible for the researcher to produce by themselves. Such data sets provide the researchers numerous

opportunities to explore new questions and utilise different methods to obtain results. Additionally, such type of data sources also allows the researcher to use data that has been collected over time. So, they can also provide time-series data.

The main sources of data are:

**1.** LobbyFacts.eu is a joint project established and managed by Lobby Control and the Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO). Lobby Control is an organisation that combines scientific background, current research and data from campaign work and reports on media activities, lobbying and business-oriented campaigns. Similarly, the CEO is a campaign and research group that exposes corporations' access and influence in EU policymaking through their lobbying activities. The website project lobbyfacts.eu provides official data, like lobbying costs, head office, number of meetings with the EC and Head Office, from the EU Transparency Register for sorting, filtering, and analysing by the researchers, journalists, and activities for public interest and tracking the lobbying activities and influence of private and government corporations at the EU over the last five years.

**2.** The transparency register is an open data portal of the EU. It allows the stakeholders and citizens to access information about all the activities that are undergone to influence the EU policy and law-making mostly by lobbying activities. The website provides a dataset available both in Pdf, XML and Excel format and can be downloaded. These datasets provide data about lists of corporations and people that have access to the EP over the years.

The data selected was based on the availability of data on these websites. The transparency register provides information about lobbying activities over the last decade. The data on the category of registration, registration date, head office country, the annual turnover and other financial information to be able to conduct the analysis was extracted from the transparency register.

More than 20 000 firms are involved in lobbying activities in the EU. However, there were around 11.000 registrants in the transparency register. Therefore, only registered lobbyists in the transparency register were analysed to make the analysis reliable since the information about the non-registrants cannot be trusted. Furthermore, not all firms available in the data obtained from the transparency register had all the variables that we intended to use to test if there exists any relationship among firms' costs/spend, turnover, product's value-added, firms' profit margin, the patent and the firms' regulation intensity. Therefore, the researcher conducted the analysis with these 2000 firms between 2016-2020. Nevertheless, it should also be noted that not all the 2000 firms' turnover, product's value-added, profit margin, the patent and the regulation intensity values were not up to date. We had to take the average value rather than the latest values to overcome this deficit since it was not available.

## **2.3. Data Analysis**

There are many types of data analysis techniques that are used based on the research requirement and type of data collected. Here in this study, it is used trend analysis, correlational analysis.

### **2.3.1. Trend Analysis**

Trend analysis is a statistical analysis technique that allows the researcher to look into the changes in data that have been collected over a period of time. This type of analysis is suitable when the researcher needs to evaluate any performance or change of activities over a period of time. These periods can be intervals of months, years or quarters based on the requirement. The main aim is to calculate the change that has been occurred between time intervals (Kawamae, 2011). This analysis enables the researcher to calculate the change in lobbying expenditures in European countries and different industries in the last two decades.

### **2.3.2 Correlational Analysis**

Another statistical analysis method used in this research is correlational analysis. This analysis is used to measure the strength and weakness of a relationship among two quantitative variables. A high correlation demonstrates a strong relationship, and a weak correlation demonstrates that the relationship among the variables is weak. The values of correlation vary between +1 and -1 (Curtis et al., 2016). The following indicators are used to demonstrate the strength of the relationship among the variables: (i) the value 0 indicates the absence of a linear relationship, (ii) a perfect positive linear relationship is indicated by +1. This means that if the value of one variable increases, the value of another variable will also increase; (iii) a perfect negative linear relationship is indicated by -1, demonstrating that an increase in one value decreases the value of another variable, (iv) the weak positive (negative) linear relationship is indicated by values between 0 and 0.3 (0 and -0.3); (v) a moderate positive (negative) relationship is indicated by values between 0.3 and 0.7 (-0.3 and -0.7); and, (vi) a strong positive (negative) relationship is indicated by values between 0.7 and 1.0 (-0.7 and -1.0).

For this study, the researcher utilised the Spearman correlation analysis to assess the relationship among two variables through monotonic function. As our study aims to determine the monotonic relationship among lobbying costs/expenditures and the firm's turnover, the firm's productivity growth, product's value-added, firm's profit margin and the firm's regulation intensity, the Spearman correlation analysis was the most appropriate analysis for the available data set. The researcher analyses if there is somehow any relation or correlation among lobbying costs/expenditures and the firm's turnover, the firm's turnover, the firm's productivity growth, product's value-added, firm's profit margin and the firm's regulation intensity, if there is any relation among these variables, and how strong the relationships are.



The study utilises statistical data analysis techniques to analyse the data. The results are presented in tables and figures, which are presented in the next section.

## 2.4. Research Hypothesis and Research Model

A firm's turnover refers to the number of sales made by companies in a certain period of time. It is also referred to as income or gross revenue. It is different from firms profit as it measures the earning while measuring turnover is important for analysing the performance of any business. In lobbying literature firm's turnover is considered as an important outcome because of lobbying activities. Lobbying expenditures are believed to increase the firms' revenue (Chen et al., 2015). A total of 44% of the major lobbying firms report increasing their lobbying revenue by 10% or more in 2020 compared to the previous year. This results in high retention of clients over time, 1 out of 3 major lobbying firms had short-term retention of 90% or higher, which affects the firm's performance in a positive way. Furthermore, major lobbying firms with \$1 million or more in revenue *per lobbyist* comprise 19%. (Bloomberg Government, 2021). So, the first hypothesis is

*H1: Lobbying expenditures of firms have a positive relationship with the firms' annual turnover*

Studies indicated that lobbying has a positive impact on a firm's overall productivity rate. For instance, in an empirical research conducted by Huneus and Kim (2018) they suggested that a 1% increase in lobbying expenditure leads to increased productivity growth by 0.057%. Their study concluded that the productivity of lobbying firms is generally greater than those of non-lobbying firms. The second hypothesis developed for the study is:

*H2: Lobbying expenditures of firms have a positive relationship with the firm's annual productivity growth*

Value-added refers to the increase in the value of the products at all stages of production, independently of their initial costs. Lobbying expenditures are associated with increased value-added as firms that can influence trade policies and taxation in their favour. The majority of the literature address value-added while discussing overall firm performance. It was found out that firms gain a 2% increase in the value-added of their products when they increase their lobbying expenditures by 10% (Bombardini & Trebbi, 2012). So, the third hypothesis was developed as

*H3: Lobbying expenditures of firms have a positive relationship with the firm's annual product's value added*

Patents in business are described as the rights that allow firms to prevent others from using their inventions and ideas and enable them to allow others to use their inventions and technology under agreed terms. The majority of the technology giants like Google and Microsoft are spending an "insane" amount of money on lobbying to get maximum patents. For instance, recently, Google earned the 2nd most patents with 875 obtained the USA patents from the United States Patent and Trademark Office

(USPTO) fast-track system as a reward for their massive spending on lobbying in 2014 by surpassing Huawei Technologies which obtained only 147 patents via the same platform (Quinn & Brachmann, 2015). In 2012, Microsoft spent more than one billion to get the patents of American Online (AOL), an internet service provider. Based on these facts, the fourth hypothesis was developed as:

*H4: Lobbying expenditures of firms have a positive relationship with the firm's annual patent*

Researchers have put considerable effort into determining the role of lobbying in increasing the firm's profit margins. Chalmers and Macedo (2020) studied the link between lobbying and a firm's profit margin in EU. They observed 728 firms over four years period and their regression analysis supports the fact that lobbying expenditures increase the firm's profits. They concluded that the more firms are involved in lobbying activities the more return on their investment can be expected.

*H5: Lobbying Expenditures of firms have a positive relationship with the firm's annual profit margin*

As discussed by various researchers, the main purpose of lobbying is to impact rules and regulations in favour of the lobbying firms. Firms and interests groups focus their lobbying activities and expenditures on increasing their influence on policymaking and decisions. Chalmers and Macedo (2020) discussed that because of effective lobbying, firms could avoid regulations in markets where they might find them a hindrance in their business growth. Based on this, the last hypothesis developed as:

*H6: Lobbying expenditures of firms have a positive relationship with the firm's annual regulation intensity*

Based on the hypothesis developed above, the researcher developed the research model that is shown in Table 1.

**Table 1.** Research hypothesis

<b>Correlational Analysis Between Variables</b>		
H1	Lobbying Expenditures	←————→ Firms' Annual Turnover
H2	Lobbying Expenditures	←————→ Firms' Annual Productivity Growth
H3	Lobbying Expenditures	←————→ Firms' Annual Value-Added
H4	Lobbying Expenditures	←————→ Firms' Annual Profit Margin
H5	Lobbying Expenditures	←————→ Firms' Annual Patents
H6	Lobbying Expenditures	←————→ Firms' Annual Regulation Intensity

Source: Author's elaboration

The correlation analysis will determine if there is any relationship or not among lobbying costs/expenditures and the turnover of the lobbying firms in the EU, the productivity growth of the lobbying firms in the EU, product's value-added of the lobbying firms in the EU, the profit margin of the


lobbying firms in the EU and the regulation intensity of the lobbying firms in the EU and if there is any relationship among these variables, how strong this relationships are.

### **3. Presentation and Analysis of Results**

This section presents the study analysis and results. First, it presents the percentage analysis of lobbying firms and their expenditures in the EU. Then a trend analysis is conducted to determine the growth of lobbying activities by different industries in the last three decades. After that, trend analysis and correlational analysis is conducted. The results are presented in the form of tables and figures.

#### **3. 1. Frequency distribution of Registered Entities Conducting Lobbying**

When Transparency Register was developed in 2016, it had almost 7 700 registered firms and institutes that were participating in lobbying activities. However, in 2020, the number of registered entities in the transparency Register is 11 000. Figure 1 shows the percentage of institutes and entities involved in lobbying in 2020.



**Figure 1.** Percentual distribution of lobbying by type of registered entities

Source: Author's Elaboration using Information from Transparency Register (2020).

By looking at Figure 1, it is found out that the largest sub-sector is the private business and trade associations (44.9%). These firms are involved in direct lobbying activities and another private sector: law firms and consultancies (10.12%). Another prominent subsector is the one that includes the Non-Government Organisations that accounts for 31.90% of the total firms. The other small subsectors represent firms from academic institutions (8.10%), think tanks, municipal and regional, and religious authorities. From this data available, it can also be analysed that how much lobbying increases over time. Within the last five years, the number of registered firms involved in lobbying increases by 30%, indicating a solid growth of lobbying in the EU.

### 3.2. Trend analysis of lobbying expenditure

The researcher was able to get the data on lobbying costs and expenditure in EU over the last ten years. In Table 2 estimated lobbying costs on lobbying in the EU as reported by lobbyfact.eu is presented. With the data on lobbying costs, we also conducted a trend analysis on lobbying expenditure in EU to analyse the trend. The trend line is shown in Figure 2.


Table 2 presents that annual estimated average lobbying costs in the EU by lobbyists increased from 400,000.00 Euros in 2010 to 1,800,000.00 Euros, the highest cost recorded in 2016 and 2017 and the average estimated lobbying costs between 2010 to 2019 is also calculated as 1,090,000.00 Euros. Even though the annual growth rate of the lobbying costs in the EU was not consistently increasing every year

and there was a huge decrease in 2018, the overall average growth rate of the lobbying costs is calculated as 14.94%. The highest annual growth rate was 75% in 2012.

**Table 2.** Annual Lobbying Costs and Growth Rate in the EU (2010-2019)

<b>Year</b>	<b>Annual Estimated Average Lobbying Costs in the EU</b>	<b>Annual Growth Rate of the Lobbying Costs in the EU, in percentage (%)</b>
2010	€ 400,000.00	-----
2011	€ 400,000.00	0.00
2012	€ 700,000.00	75.00
2013	€ 1,100,000.00	57.14
2014	€ 1,100,000.00	0.00
2015	€ 1,100,000.00	0.00
2016	€ 1,800,000.00	63.64
2017	€ 1,800,000.00	0.00
2018	€ 1,100,000.00	- 38.89
2019	€ 1,400,000.00	27.27

Source: Author's elaboration using Information from lobbyfacts.eu (2020).



**Figure 2.** Trend Analysis of Lobbying in the EU

Source: Author's elaboration using information from lobbyfacts.eu (2020).

The trend analysis in Figure 2 indicates annual average lobbying costs for the EU lobbyists which means that it may not represent direct total spend since few firms' lobbying costs were not available and some firms' lobbying costs were mentioned as a range on lobbyfacts.eu, and estimated linear lobbying costs, which means keeping the cost stable/unchanged for each firm and multiplying the number of lobbyists that is increasing each year. Figure 2 shows an upward slope indicating a positive growth in lobbying expenditures, with the years 2016 and 2017 demonstrating the highest spending on lobbying between 1.5-2 million Euros. However, there is a negative slope after hitting the top in 2017 and lobbying expenditures stayed at the level of 1.1-1.4 million Euros until 2020.

### 3.3. The trend analysis of the Top-10 ranked lobbying companies in the EU

In this section, the researcher presents the top-10 ranked lobbying companies with EP passes between 2017-2020 to see how the trend is for those companies and the change in their rankings over these years. The researcher also chooses the only lobbying companies which are holding EP passes since

many organisations do not hold EP passes, register their total budget and total staff instead of registering their lobbying spend and the number of lobbyists, so the data cannot be trusted and used for the analysis (Lobbyfacts, 2021). It should also be noted that the number of meetings that companies hold with the EC indicates how active they participate in lobbying activities. That is why the researcher will focus more on companies with the highest number of meetings with the EC.

Table 3 shows the top-10 ranked lobbying companies that had the highest lobbying costs/expenditures in the EU in 2017.

**Table 3.** Top-10 ranked lobbying companies with EP passes in the EU with the highest lobbying budget in 2017

Organisation Name	Head Office	Lobbying Costs	EP passes	Lobbyists (Full Time Equivelant(FTE))	Meetings with EC
ExxonMobil Petroleum & Chemical	Belgium	4,750,000.00 4,999,999.00	5	8	35
Shell Companies	Netherlands	4,500,000.00 4,749,000.00	8	10.25	85
Terna spa	Italy	4,500,000.00 4,749,000.00	2	19.75	24
Google	United States	4,250,000.00 4,499,999.00	7	8.25	279
Microsoft Corporation	United States	4,250,000.00 4,499,999.00	6	8.5	172
Dow Europe GmbH	Switzerland	3,750,000.00 3,999,999.00	3	6.5	55
Deutsche Bank AG	Germany	3,904,000.00	7	7.5	88
General Electric Company	United States	3,000,000.00 3,249,999.00	8	10.75	92
Huawei Technologies	China	3,000,000.00	6	8.25	68
Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft	Germany	2,800,000.00	4	15.5	81

Source: Author's elaboration using information from Lobbyfact.eu (2021).

The table 3 indicates that top-10 ranked lobbying companies with EP passes are engaged in meetings with the EC at least 24 times, and 8 out of 10 companies have engaged in more than 50 meetings in 2017. For instance, Google is at the top active lobbyist in the list with more than 4,250,000.00 Euros



spending in that year on lobbying, and it was able to get 279 meetings with the EC. Similarly, Microsoft and General Electric Company are the other top active lobbyists that managed to get 172 and 92 meetings with the EC. It is also notable that 5 out of 10 companies were only the EU originated companies while the other five companies in the list were outside of the EU zone, and the USA based companies were the most engaged in meetings with the EC in 2017. The majority of the companies with the highest number of meetings with the EC are from the digital economy. Daniel Freund, one of the directors at Transparency International EU, stated a strong relationship between the amount of money spent by companies and the number of meetings they get from the EU. Companies that spend a lot on lobbying have great access, especially to digital, financial, and energy portfolios (Transparency International, 2015).

Table 4 shows the top-10 ranked lobbying companies with the highest lobbying costs/expenditures in the EU in 2018.

**Table 4.** Top-10 ranked lobbying companies with EP passes in the EU with the highest lobbying budget in 2018

Organisation Name	Head Office	Lobbying Costs	EP passes	Lobbyists (FTE)	Meetings with EC
General Electric Company	United States	5,250,000.00 - 5,499,999.00	6	9.25	92
Google	United States	5,250,000.00 - 5,499,999.00	7	8.25	279
ExxonMobil Petroleum & Chemical	Belgium	4,500,000.00 - 4,749,000.00	9	8	35
Microsoft Corporation	United States	4,500,000.00 - 4,749,000.00	6	8.5	172
Shell Companies	Netherlands	4,500,000.00 - 4,749,000.00	9	11	85
Deutsche Bank AG	Germany	3,379,000.00	5	6.75	88
BASF SE	Germany	3,200,000.00	11	11.75	36
BP p.l.c.	United Kingdom	2,750,000.00 - 2,999,999.00	4	5.25	48
Huawei Technologies	China	2,800,000.00	4	7.25	68
Daimler Aktiengesellschaft	Germany	2,500,000.00 - 2,749,000.00	5	7.75	44

Source: Author's elaboration using information from Lobbyfact.eu (2021).

The table indicates that top-10 ranked lobbying companies with EP passes are engaged in meetings with the EC at least 35 times in 2018. Google still preserved to be the top active lobbyist in the list with more than 5,250,000.00 Euros spending in that year on lobbying while 4,250,000.00 Euros lobbying spent was in 2017 and it was able to get 279 meetings with the EC as the previous year. Similarly, Microsoft and General Electric Company were the other top active lobbyists who managed to get 172 and 92 meetings with the EC. However, it is also notable that 7 out of 10 companies from 2017 were still in the top-10 ranked in 2018 while General Electric Company with 5,250,000.00 Euros lobbying spent in 2018 from 3,000,000.00 Euros lobbying spent in 2017 climbing to top of the list together with Google. It should be also worth noting that 6 out of 10 companies were only the EU originated companies (the UK was still part of the EU at the time) while the other four companies in the list were outside of the EU zone and the USA based in companies are the most engaged in meetings with the EC in 2018. Table 5 shows the top-10 ranked lobbying companies with the highest lobbying costs/expenditures in the EU in 2019.

**Table 5.** *Top-10 ranked lobbying companies with EP passes in the EU with the highest lobbying budget in 2019*

Organisation Name	Head Office	Lobbying Costs	EP Passes	Lobbyists (FTE)	Meetings with the EC
Google	United States	6,000,000.00 - 6,249,999.00	9	8.5	279
Microsoft Corporation	United States	5,000,000.00 - 5,249,999.00	6	8	172
Shell Companies	Netherlands	4,500,000.00 - 4,749,000.00	8	10.25	85
ExxonMobil Petroleum & Chemical	Belgium	3,750,000.00 - 3,999,999.00	7	5.75	35
BASF SE	Germany	3,300,000.00	10	11.75	36
Dow Europe GmbH	Switzerland	3,000,000.00 - 3,249,999.00	2	5	55
Equinor ASA	Norway	3,000,000.00 - 3,249,999.00	5	7.5	51
Siemens AG	Germany	3,230,419.00	14	12	52
BP p.l.c.	United Kingdom	2,750,000.00 - 2,999,999.00	4	5.25	48
General Electric Company	United States	2,750,000.00 - 2,999,999.00	2	7.5	92

Source: Author's elaboration using information from Lobbyfact.eu (2021).

The table indicates that top-10 ranked lobbying companies with EP passes are engaged in meetings with the EC at least 35 times in 2019 as it was the previous year. Google still preserved to be the top active lobbyist in the list with more than 6,000,000.00 Euros spending on lobbying while 5,250,000.00 Euros lobbying spent was in 2018 and it was able to get 279 meetings with the EC as the previous year. Similarly, Microsoft and General Electric Company were the other top active lobbyists who managed to get 172 and 92 meetings with the EC. However, it is also notable that 7 out of 10 companies from the previous year were still in the top-10 ranked in 2019, while Google managed to climb to the top of the list alone with 750,000.00 Euros increase in lobbying spending. Furthermore, 5 out of 10 companies were only the EU originated companies (the UK was still part of the EU at the time) while the other five companies in the list were outside of the EU zone and the USA based in companies were still the most engaged in meetings with the EC in 2019.

Table 6 shows the top-10 ranked lobbying companies that have the highest lobbying costs/expenditures in the EU in 2019.

**Table 6.** Top-10 ranked lobbying companies with EP passes in the EU with the highest lobbying budget in 2020

Organisation Name	Head Office	Lobbying Costs	EP passes	Lobbyists (FTE)	Meetings with EC
Google	United States	8,000,000.00 - 8,249,999.00	7	8.5	279
Microsoft Corporation	United States	5,000,000.00 - 5,249,999.00	6	10	172
Shell Companies	Netherlands	4,500,000.00 - 4,749,000.00	9	11.25	85
Bayer AG	Germany	3,925,000.00	6	15	40
Facebook Ireland Limited	Ireland	3,500,000.00 - 3,749,000.00	6	10	176
Siemens AG	Germany	3,522,448.00	9	12.5	52
ExxonMobil Petroleum & Chemical	Belgium	3,250,000.00 - 3,499,999.00	8	5.25	35
BASF SE	Germany	3,300,000.00	12	11.75	36
Deutsche Bank AG	Germany	3,287,000.00	4	4.5	88
Dow Europe GmbH	Switzerland	2,750,000.00 - 2,999,999.00	1	5.5	55

Source: Author's elaboration using information from Lobbyfact.eu (2021).

The table indicates that top-10 ranked lobbying companies with EP passes are engaged in meetings with the EC at least 35 times in 2020 as it was the previous year. Google still preserved to be the top active lobbyist in the list with more than 8,00,000.00 Euros spending in that year on lobbying while 6,000,000.00 Euros lobbying spent in the previous and it was able to get 279 meetings with the EC as the last year. The increase in the spending on lobbying by Google in 2020 is impressively high compared to previous years. However, Microsoft was surpassed by Facebook Ireland Limited as the second most active lobbyist that managed to get 176 while Microsoft still preserved to get 172 meetings with the EC as ranked down to the third place. Furthermore, Facebook Ireland Limited's activism on the meetings with the EC is worth noting because it was the first time Facebook Ireland Limited was in the top-10 ranked lobbying companies with EP passes since 2017, and it managed to hold the second-highest number of meetings with the EC. In 2020, it can be said that the EU dominated the list of originated companies (7 out of 10 companies were EU originated companies).

Overall, Google and Microsoft are at the top of the list with the highest lobbying budget and highest number of meetings with the EC. Over the years, these tech giants like Google, Microsoft, Facebook have spent millions on lobbying. Google maintained its position as the most influential Tech Company as the largest monopoly in the USA and in the EU, controlling five out of 6 top billion user websites, including web browser, search, video, mobile, and maps. It also leads 13 out of 14 commercial web functions (Feiner, 2021).

Table 7 shows average annual meetings held with the EC and annual average EP passes of all lobbying companies with EP passes between 2017-2020.

**Table 7. Annual Average Meetings with EC and EP Passes by Lobbying Companies in the EU**

<b>Financial Year</b>	<b>Annual Average Meetings with the EC by Lobbying Companies in the EU</b>	<b>Annual Average EP Passes by Lobbying Companies in the EU</b>
2017	15.88	2.6
2018	15.6	2.6
2019	15.89	2.6
2020	15.3	2.5

Source: Author's elaboration using information from lobbyfacts.eu (2021).

It can be said that top-10 ranked lobbying companies with EP passes in the EU with the highest lobbying budget between 2017-2020 always held more than a double number of meetings (at least 35 meetings each year) with the EC while the average was between 15.3 to 15.89. However, we cannot say that the lobbying costs always correlate with the number of EP passes held by top-10 ranked lobbying companies

with EP passes in the EU with the highest lobbying budget between 2017-2020 while the average was 2.5-2.6 since there were companies with 1 or 2 EP passes in the top-10 ranked.

### 3.4. Correlational Analysis

Based on our hypothesis created and the literature presented, the research focuses on firms' performance indicators like annual turnover, productivity growth, value-added, patents, profit margins and regulation intensity, as measured by the OECD Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Statistics. An international organisation that helps in establishing standards with the help of governments, citizens and policymakers to address various environmental, economic and social issues.

Not all firms available in the data obtained from the transparency register had all the variables we intended to use to test the formulated hypothesis. However, 2000 firms had shown all the variables. To check their relationship with firms lobbying expenditure, a correlational analysis was conducted. The researcher will test 6 hypotheses generated to analyse the relationship among the variables by using correlational analysis.

**H1: Lobbying expenditures of firms have a positive relation the firm's annual turnover**

In this hypothesis, the researcher is analysing if there is a positive relationship between lobbying expenditures and an annual turnover of the 2000 firms analysed by using Pearson's correlation method and using a two-tailed test of significance since it has a better precision than the one-tailed test of significance (Chetty, 2015). The value of person correlation and significance (Sig.) are complementary to each other; therefore, both the values are considered important when writing the results, and further, if one value is acceptable, then the other will be acceptable too.

**Table 8.** Correlation between firm's lobbying expenditure and annual turnover

<b>Correlation matrix</b>			
		Firms Lobbying Expenditure (LE)	Annual Turnover
Firms Lobbying Expenditure (LE)	Pearson Correlation	1.000	0.648***
	Sig. (2-tailed)		<0.001
	n	2,000	2,000
Annual Turnover	Pearson Correlation	0.648***	1.000
	Sig. (2-tailed)	<0.001	
	n	2,000	2,000

Notes: \*\*\*. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). Sig (2-tailed): Gives the value of significance of the correlation between the two variables at a 99% confidence interval

Source: Author's elaboration using information from Transparency Register (2020).

Table 8 shows the correlation analysis between the firms' lobbying expenditure and firms' annual turnover. The correlation value obtained is 0.648, which indicates a moderate positive relationship. The relationship is significant at a 1% level of significance. So, with 99% of confidence, it can be said that even if the relationship is just moderate, it is still positive, so the H1 is accepted.

***H2: Lobbying expenditures of firms have a positive relationship with the firms' annual productivity growth***

In this hypothesis, the researcher is analysing if there is a positive relationship between lobbying expenditures and productivity growth of the 2000 firms analysed by using Pearson's Correlation method and a two-tailed test of significance.

**Table 9.** Correlation between firms' lobbying expenditure and annual productivity growth

<b>Correlation matrix</b>			
		Firms Lobbying Expenditure (LE)	Annual Productivity Growth
Firms Lobbying Expenditure (LE)	Pearson Correlation	1.000	-0.178
	Sig. (2-tailed)		0.405
	n	2,000	2,000
Annual Productivity Growth	Pearson Correlation	-0.178	1.000
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.405	
	n	2,000	2,000

Note: Sig (2-tailed): Gives the value of significance of the correlation between the two variables

Source: Author's elaboration using information from Transparency Register (2020).

Table 9 shows the results of correlation analysis between the firms' lobbying expenditures and the firms' productivity growth. The value obtained is  $r=-0.178$ . The value shows a weak negative relationship between these two variables; however, the results are not statistically significant since the level of significance is higher than 10%. For that reason, the second hypothesis, which indicates that an increase in a firm's lobbying expenditure increases the firm's annual productivity growth, is not accepted for the 2000 firms analysed.

**H3: Lobbying expenditures of firms have a positive relationship with firms' annual patent**

In this hypothesis, the researcher is analysing if there is a positive relationship between lobbying expenditures and firms' patents of the 2000 firms analysed by using Pearson's Correlation method and use a two-tailed test of significance.

**Table 10.** Correlation between firms' lobbying expenditure and annual patents

<b>Correlation matrix</b>			
		<b>Firms Lobbying Expenditure (LE)</b>	<b>Annual Patents</b>
<b>Firms Lobbying Expenditure (LE)</b>	Pearson Correlation	1.000	0.051
	Sig. (2-tailed)		0.491
	n	2,000	2,000
<b>Annual Patents</b>	Pearson Correlation	0.051	1.000
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.491	
	n	2,000	2,000

Note: Sig (2-tailed): Gives the value of significance of the correlation between the two variables

Source: Author's elaboration using information from Transparency Register (2020).

Table 10 shows the correlation results between the firms' lobbying expenditures and the firm's patents. The value obtained is  $r=0.051$ . The value shows a weak positive relationship between these two variables; however, the results are not statistically significant since the level of significance is higher than 10%. The third hypothesis, which an increase in a firm's lobbying expenditure increases firms' annual patent, is not accepted for the 2000 firms analysed.

**H4: Lobbying expenditures of firms have a positive relationship with the firms' annual value-added**

In this hypothesis, the researcher is analysing if there is a positive relationship between lobbying expenditures and firms' value-added of the 2000 firms analysed by using Pearson's Correlation method and use two-tailed test of significance.

**Table 11.** Correlation between firm's lobbying expenditure and annual value-added

<b>Correlation matrix</b>			
		Firms Lobbying Expenditure (LE)	Annual Value-Added
Firms Lobbying Expenditure (LE)	Pearson Correlation	1.000	0.498***
	Sig. (2-tailed)		<0.001
	n	2,000	2,000
Annual Value-Added	Pearson Correlation	0.498***	1.000
	Sig. (2-tailed)	<0.001	
	n	2,000	2,000

Notes: \*\*\*. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Source: Author's elaboration using information from Transparency Register (2020).

Table 11 shows the correlation results between the firms lobbying expenditure and the firms' value-added. The value obtained is  $r=0.498$ , which indicates that the relationship between these two variables is moderate positive. The relationship is significant at a 1% level of significance and the relationship is moderate significant. So, with 99% of confidence, it can be said that even if the relationship is just moderate, it is still positive, that is why hypothesis 4 is accepted.

#### **H5: Lobbying expenditures have a positive relationship with the firms' annual profit margin**

In this hypothesis, the researcher is analysing if there is a positive relationship between lobbying expenditures and firms' profit margin of the 2000 firms analysed by using Pearson's Correlation method and use a two-tailed test of significance. The value of person correlation and Sig. are complementary to each other; therefore, both values are considered important when writing the results. Further, if one value is acceptable, the other will be acceptable too.

**Table 12.** Correlation between firm's lobbying expenditure and annual profit margins

<b>Correlation matrix</b>			
		Firms Lobbying Expenditure (LE)	Annual Profit Margins
Firms Lobbying Expenditure (LE)	Pearson Correlation	1.000	0.189
	Sig. (2-tailed)		0.186
	n	2,000	2,000
Annual Profit Margins	Pearson Correlation	0.189	1.000
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.186	
	n	2,000	2,000

Note: Sig (2-tailed): Gives the value of significance of the correlation between the two variables

Source: Author's elaboration using information from Transparency Register (2020).



Table 12 shows the correlation results between Firms lobbying expenditure and the firms' profit margin. The value obtained is  $r=0.189$ , which indicates that the relationship between these two variables is positive but weak; however, the results are not statistically significant since the level of significance is higher than 10%. The fifth hypothesis, which an increase in a firm's lobbying expenditure increases firms' annual profit margins, is not accepted for the 2000 firms analysed.

***H6: Lobbying expenditures of firms have a positive relationship with the firms' annual regulation intensity***

In this hypothesis, the researcher is analysing if there is a positive relationship between lobbying expenditures and firms' value-added of the 2000 firms analysed by using Pearson's Correlation method and use a two-tailed test of significance. The value of Person's correlation and Sig. are complementary to each other; therefore, both values are considered important when writing the results. Further, if one value is acceptable, the other will be acceptable too.

**Table 13.** Correlation between firm's expenditures and the firms' annual regulation intensity

<b>Correlation matrix</b>			
		Firms Lobbying Expenditure (LE)	Annual Regulation Intensity
Firms Lobbying Expenditure (LE)	Pearson Correlation	1.000	0.232*
	Sig. (2-tailed)		0.091
	n	2,000	2,000
Annual Regulation Intensity	Pearson Correlation	0.232*	1.000
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.091	
	n	2,000	2,000

Notes: \*. Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (2-tailed). Sig (2-tailed): Gives the value of significance of the correlation between the two variables at a 90% confidence interval

Source: Author's elaboration using information from Transparency Register (2020).

Table 13 above shows the correlation result between firms' lobbying expenditure and their regulation intensity. The value obtained is  $r=0.232$ , which means a positive but weak relationship exists between these two variables, and the significance level is 9,1%. So, with 90% of confidence, it can be said that even if the relationship is just weak, it is still positive. So, the hypothesis generated here is accepted.

Based on the analysis above and in the light of our research objectives, the findings support the fact that there is an increasing trend of lobbying activities and lobbying expenditures in the EU, especially digital firms found to be spending the most on lobbying activities. And the researcher aimed to find out if there

is any positive relationship between lobbying expenditures/costs and the firm's annual turnover, the firm's annual productivity firm's annual growth, the firm's annual product's value-added, firm's annual patent, firm's annual regulation intensity and firm's annual profit margin and how strong these relationships are. The correlation analysis did not strongly support all the research hypotheses; however, the relationship between lobbying expenditures and firms' annual turnover, firms' annual value-added, and firms' annual regulation intensity were found to be positive. Furthermore, the relationship between the firms' annual expenditure and the firms' annual turnover and the value-added was moderately positive, and the relationship between lobbying expenditure and the firms' annual regulation intensity was weak positive. The researcher could not find a relationship among lobbying expenditures and the firms' annual profit margin, the firms' annual productivity growth and the firms' annual patent since the analysis results were statistically insignificant. Hence, three other hypotheses, which are lobbying expenditures, have a positive relationship the firms' annual profit margin, lobbying expenditures of firms to have a positive relationship the firms' annual patent and lobbying expenditures of firms have a positive relationship to the firms' annual productivity growth are not accepted.

## **Conclusion, Limitations and Future Research Lines**

The purpose of the study was to explore, investigate and analyses the evolution and trend of lobbying in the EU. The researcher took several perspectives in understanding the topic under study. Both qualitative and quantitative research approaches have been utilised to answer the research questions. The research concluded that there is significant growth in the number of registrants every year and the lobbying costs of the registrants. There is a significant evolution of lobbying activities in the EU, especially the new regulations requiring lobbyists to register themselves and disclose information about their lobbying activities and financial aspects. These activities are conducted mainly in terms of gaining public and private gains. In Europe, especially, lobbying is considered one of the most useful strategic tools to manipulate or influence policymakers for personal, organisational and industrial gains. The literature suggested that in Europe, lobbying activities are now conducted legally with registered firms and a proper track record to analyse its benefits to the public and private sectors.

The study also examined a particular case of lobbying by Portuguese businesses whose registration number stays at a low level with only 186 registrants. The highest registered category is NGOs, platforms, and networks, with 48 out of 186 registrants. Further, the study undergoes trend analysis and correlational analysis to measure the growth of lobbying expenditures in the EU and their relationship with the firms' annual turnover, the firm's annual productivity growth, the firm's annual value-added, the firm's annual patents, the firm's annual profit margins and the firm's annual regulation intensity. The results and findings indicated very positive growth of lobbying expenditures in the EU within the last decade, mainly digital, banking, energy, technology, and car manufacturing sectors found to be spending the most. There is found to be a positive relationship between the firm's expenditure and the firm's annual turnover, the firm's annual value-added, and the firm's annual regulation intensity in the EU. It should be noted that the researcher could not find a relationship between lobbying expenditures and the firms' annual profit margin, the firms' annual productivity growth and the firms' annual patent. Furthermore, NGOs and in house lobbyists (business and trade associations) were found to be more involved in lobbying activities as compared to other sectors since they represent 76,90% of lobbyists (see figure 1, p.20).

The current research had several limitations. First, not all lobbying firms in the EU are registered on the transparency register, which is the main data source. So, there is a possibility that the results may not be the same or applicable to all lobbying firms as it does not represent all the lobbying firms in the EU. Secondly, the data of some firms are not up to date, so we had to take the average value rather than the latest values. For future research, it is suggested that two or more different sectors or industries be analysed separately. The researcher can reach out to the legal firms' managers and director generals of institutes that manage business activities and lobbying activities to access and obtain accurate and up-to-date data on their engagement and involvement in the lobbying process and firm's performances, such as annual turnover, productivity growth, value-added, patents, profit margins and regulation

intensity. Then the researchers can make a comparison that how lobbying of one industry or sector is different from other and how the EU regulations differ from industry or sector to industry or sector. This will help in getting a better insight into how firms and corporates use lobbying tactics to influence EU decisions and policies and how the relationships are among all lobbying firm's expenditure and the firm's annual turnover, the firm's annual value-added, the firm's annual creativity/patents and the firm's annual regulation intensity in the EU.

## References

- Aizenberg, E., & Hanegraaff, M. (2019). Time is of the Essence: A Longitudinal Study on Business Presence in Political News in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. *The International Journal of Press/Politics*, 25(2), 281-300. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1940161219882814>
- Bache, I., Bulmer, S., Geroge, S., & Parker, O. (2017). *Politics in the European Union* (4<sup>th</sup> ed.). Oxford University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1093/hepl/9780199689668.001.0001>
- Berkhout, J., & Hanegraaff, M. (2019). No borders, no bias? Comparing advocacy group populations at the national and transnational levels. *Interest Groups & Advocacy*, 8(3), 270-290. <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41309-019-00060-1>
- Bhagwati, J. (2012). Lobbying, dup activities and welfare. *Journal Of Public Economics*, 19(3), 395-401. [https://doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727\(82\)90064-0](https://doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(82)90064-0)
- Bienefeld, E. (2015). The Basque Lobby at the EU level: A matter of expertise and networks. *International Journal Of Iberian Studies*, 28(1), 21-41. [https://doi.org/10.1386/ijis.28.1.21\\_1](https://doi.org/10.1386/ijis.28.1.21_1)
- Biliouri, D. (2019). Environmental NGOs in Brussels: How powerful are their lobbying activities?. *Environmental Politics*, 8(2), 173-182. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09644019908414472>
- Bitonti, A., & Harris, P. (2017). *Lobbying in Europe*: public affairs and the lobbying industry in 28 EU countries. *Palgrave Macmillan*. <https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-55256-3>
- Bloomberg Government. (2021). *2020 Top-Performing Lobbying Firms*. The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. <https://www.s-3group.com/BGOV-2020-Top-Lobbying-Firms-Report.pdf>
- Bombardini, M., & Trebbi, F. (2012). Competition and Political Organisation: Together or Alone in Lobbying for Trade Policy?. *Journal of International Economics*, 87(1), 18-26. <https://doi.or/10.1016/j.jinteco.2011.11.011>
- Bouwen, P. (2002). Corporate lobbying in the European Union: the logic of access. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 9(3), 365-390. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13501760210138796>
- Bunea, A. (2019). Regulating European Union lobbying: in whose interest?. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 26(11): 1579-1599. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2018.1539115>
- Bunea, A., & Ibenskas, R. (2015). Quantitative text analysis and the study of EU lobbying and interest groups. *European Union Politics*, 16(3), 429–455. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1465116515577821>
- Burgermeister, J. (2018). France, Italy, and Spain split from EU Doctors' lobby group. *BMJ*, 337 (aug26 2), a1433-a1433. <https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.a1433>

- Carroll, B., & Rasmussen, A. (2017). Cultural capital and the density of organised interests lobbying the European Parliament. *West European Politics*, 40(5), 1132-1152. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2017.1303243>
- Chalmers, A., & Macedo, F. (2020). Does it pay to lobby? Examining the link between firm lobbying and firm profitability in the European Union. *Journal of European Public Policy*. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2020.1824012>
- Chen, H., Parsley, D., & Yang, Y. (2015). Corporate Lobbying and Firm Performance. *Journal of Business Finance & Accounting*, 42(3-4), 444-481. <https://doi.org/10.1111/jbfa.12109>
- Chetty, Priya. (2015). *Correlation of variables in SPSS*. Knowledge Tank, Project Guru. [On-line]. Available: <https://www.projectguru.in/correlation-variables-spss/>
- Coen, D. (1997). The European Business Lobby. *Business Strategy Review*, 8(4), 17-25. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8616.00044>
- Coen, D., Guidi, M., Yordanova, N., & Héritier, A. (2020). The Logic of Regulatory Venue Shopping: A Firm's Perspective. *Public Policy and Administration*, 36(3), 323-342. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0952076718814900>
- Costa, A. (2018). *O Mau Cheiro Vem Do Esgoto? Uma Análise Do Caso Da Desestatização Da Desestatização Da Cedaé Pela Visão Da Atividade Política Corporativa* [Unpublished Master's thesis]. Universidade Federal Fluminense
- Curtis, E., Comiskey, C., & Dempsey, Orla. (2016). Importance and use of correlational research. *Nurse Researcher*, 23(6), 20-25. <https://www.doi.org/10.7748/nr.2016.e1382>
- Davies, M. (2018). Lobbying Parliament: the London Companies in the Fifteenth Century. *Parliamentary History*, 23(1), 136-148. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1750-0206.2004.tb00724.x>
- Dür, A., Bernhagen, P., & Marshall, D. (2015). Interest Group Success in the European Union: When (and Why) Does Business Lose?. *Forthcoming in Comparative Political Studies*, 48(2), 1-52. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414014565890>
- European Commission. (2021). *Relations with the United Kingdom*. [https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/relations-non-eu-countries/relations-united-kingdom\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/relations-non-eu-countries/relations-united-kingdom_en)
- European Commission. (2021). *The rule of law situation in the European Union*. [https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/communication\\_2021\\_rule\\_of\\_law\\_report\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/communication_2021_rule_of_law_report_en.pdf)
- Feiner, L. (2021). *TECH Google cut its lobbying spending nearly in half in 2019, while Facebook took the lead*. CNBC. [On-line]. Available: <https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/22/how-much-google-facebook-amazon-and-apple-spent-on-lobbying-in-2019.html> <https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/22/how-much-google-facebook-amazon-and-apple-spent-on-lobbying-in-2019.html> Access date: 11.06.2021.

- Gibbs, G. (2018). *Analysing Qualitative Data* ( 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed.). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Gordon, S., & Hafer, C. (2005). Flexing Muscle: Corporate Political Expenditures as Signals to the Bureaucracy. *American Political Science Review*, 99(2), 245-261. <https://doi.org/10.1017/s0003055405051634>
- Hanegraaff, M. (2019). Whose Side Are You On? Explaining the extent to which National Interest Groups Support States in Global Politics. *JCMS: Journal Of Common Market Studies*, 57(3), 563-579. <https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12835>
- Hanoteau, J. (2014). Lobbying for carbon permits in Europe. *Recherches Économiques de Louvain*, 80(1), 61-87. <https://doi.org/10.3917/rel.801.0061>
- Hartmann, T. (2010). *The Hidden History of Guns and the Second Amendment* (1st ed.). Express Publishers.
- Harris, B. (2017). Parliamentary Legislation, Lobbying and the Press in Eighteenth-Century Scotland. *Parliamentary History*, 26(1), 76-95. <https://doi.org/10.1353/pah.2007.0002>
- Heleno Terrinha, L. (2019). Democracy and Integrity: The Lobbying Draft Legislation in Portugal. *SSRN Electronic Journal*. <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3419492>
- Huneus, F., & Kim, S.(2018). The Effects of Firms' Lobbying on Resource Misallocation. *MIT Political Science Department Research Paper*, 2018(23), 1.50. <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3275097>
- Kanol, D. (2014). Book Review: Europe: Lobbying in the European Union: Interest Groups, Lobbying Coalitions and Policy Change. *Political Studies Review*, 12(3), 460-460. [https://doi.org/10.1111/1478-9302.12067\\_118](https://doi.org/10.1111/1478-9302.12067_118)
- Kawamae, N. (2011). Trend analysis model: Trend consists of temporal words, topics, and timestamps. *In WSDM '11: Proceedings of the fourth ACM international conference on Web search and data mining*. February 2011. 317–326. <https://doi.org/10.1145/1935826.1935880>
- Klingelhöfer, J. (2018). Lobbying and Elections. *Bulletin of Economic Research*, 71(1), 1-17. <https://doi.org/10.1111/boer.12148>
- Kothakota, N. (2017). Disclosure of Lobbying Activities and Transparency. *SSRN Electronic Journal*. <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3198364>
- Krajewski, M. (2013). Legal Framework for a Mandatory EU Lobby Register and Regulations. *SSRN Electronic Journal*. <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2284843>
- Laville, S. (2019). *Top oil firms spending millions lobbying to block climate change policies, says report*. [On-line]. <https://www.theguardian.com/business/2019/mar/22/top-oil-firms-spending-millions-lobbying-to-block-climate-change-policies-says-report>.

- LobbyEurope. (2021). *Rules And Regulations*. [On-line]. Available: <https://lobbyeurope.org/rules-and-regulations/>
- Lobbyfacts. (2021). *How to*. [On-line]. Available: <https://lobbyfacts.eu/how-to>, Access date: 13.10.2021.
- Markman, S. (2016). Lobbying Strategies and Success in the EU: a Policy-centered Study. *Bestuurskunde*, 25(4), 105-106. <https://doi.org/10.5553/bk/092733872016025004011>
- McGrath, C. (2018). British Lobbying in Newspaper and Parliamentary Discourse, 1800-1950. *Parliamentary History*, 37(2), 226-249. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1750-0206.12363>
- OECD. (2021). *Foreign Direct Investment Statistics: Data, Analysis and Forecasts*[On-line]. Available: <https://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/statistics.htm>.
- Oliveira, E., & Hersperger, A. (2019). Disentangling the Governance Configurations of Strategic Spatial Plan-Making in European Urban Regions. *Planning Practice & Research*, 34(1), 47-61. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02697459.2018.1548218>
- Padovani, M., & Gibson, R. (2011). The Determinants of Banks' Lobbying Activities. *SSRN Electronic Journal*. <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1785435>
- Poletti, A., De Bièvre, D., & Hanegraaff, M. (2015). WTO Judicial Politics and EU Trade Policy: Business Associations as Vessels of Special Interest?. *The British Journal Of Politics And International Relations*, 18(1), 196-215. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-856x.12071>
- Prentice, C. (2018). The "State" of Nonprofit Lobbying Research: Data, Definitions, and Directions for Future Study. *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly*, 47(4), 204-207. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0899764018758957>
- Publication Office of the European Union. (2021). Interinstitutional Agreements. *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 207(1), 1-22.
- Quinn, G. & Brachmann, S. (2015). *Google Collects Patents While Lobbying Against Them*. [On-line]. Available: <https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/05/03/google-collects-patents-while-lobbying-against-them/id=57302/>, Access date: 21.10.2021.
- Sagstetter, K. (1978). *Lobbying*. New York: Watts.
- Salisbury, R. (1984). Interest Representation: The Dominance of Institutions. *The American Political Science Review*, 78(1), 64-76. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1961249>
- Scholzman, K. (1984). What Accent the Heavenly Chorus? Political Equality and the American Pressure System. *The Journal of Politics*, 46(4), 1006-1032. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2131240>



Sluban, B., Mikac, M., Kralj Novak, P., Battiston, S., & Mozetič, I. (2018). Profiling the EU Lobby Organisations in Banking and Finance. *Applied Network Science*, 3(1). <https://doi.org/10.1007/s41109-018-0099-7>

Stigler, G. J. (1971). The Theory of Economic Regulation. *The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science*, 2(1), 3–21. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3003160>

Transparency International. (2015). *Lobby meetings with EU policy-makers dominated by corporate interests*. [http://www.transparency.org/news/pressrelease/lobby\\_meetings\\_with\\_eu\\_policy\\_makers\\_dominated\\_by\\_corporate\\_interests](http://www.transparency.org/news/pressrelease/lobby_meetings_with_eu_policy_makers_dominated_by_corporate_interests)

Transparency Register. (2020). *Search the Register*. <https://ec.europa.eu/transparencyregister/public/consultation/reportControllerPager.do>

Transparency Register. (2021). *Search the Register*. <https://ec.europa.eu/transparencyregister/public/consultation/reportControllerPager.do>

Voltolini, B. (2017). Framing processes and lobbying in EU foreign policy case study and process-tracing methods. *European Political Science*, 16(3), 354-368. <https://doi.org/10.1057/eps.2016.18>

Weil, S. (2018). The strange case of pluralist lobbying in a corporatist setting: Defending Western business interests in China. *Business and Politics*, 20(1), 70-97. <https://doi.org/10.1017/bap.2017.15>

Werner, T. (2016). The Business of America Is Lobbying: How Corporations Became Politicised and Politics Became More Corporate by LeeDrutman. *Political Science Quarterly*, 131(1), 181-183. <https://doi.org/10.1002/polq.12441>

Wetcher-Hendricks, D. (2011). *Analysing Quantitative Data: An Introduction for Social Scientists*. John J. Wiley & Sons, Inc.