Temporary organisations as hybrids : Challenges and mechanisms for public value creation

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Introduction

Contemporary policymaking has become increasingly complex. Society faces a wide range of challenges that require rapid policy changes, different techniques, new governance tools and fundamental systematic change within and beyond the nation state (Torfing *et al.*, 2012; Jacobsson, Pierre and Sundström, 2015). Although governance problems and challenges differ and solutions to them might require different approaches, they tend to have two things in common. Firstly, they are multidimensional and complex to the extent of constituting wicked problems. Secondly, they need to be urgently addressed, placing increased pressure on finding governance mechanisms that contribute to sustainable solutions (Munck af Rosenschöld, 2017).

The search for new governance mechanisms stimulates the emergence of hybrid organisational forms and solutions (Skelcher and Smith, 2015, p. 433). The benefits of hybrid organisations relate to their expected ability to satisfy both public and private sector aims, their ability to draw on multiple sources of funding and their aim at legitimising the value of their activities, thereby producing more flexible and efficient ways of organising. Hybrids encompass many different organisational forms such as public-private-partnerships (PPP), non-profit organisations (NPO), joint ventures and contracting out. However, hybridisation is not only a matter of structures and organisational forms (Skelcher, 2007). Hybrids can also be conceptualised from a processual point of view (Kastberg and Lagström, 2019). Formal organisations need to collaborate to address problems such as climate change, economic and regional development and poverty, but the collaborative patterns and the applied policy instruments vary over time because of changing problem perceptions, resources and contexts. Consequently, organisations are subject to continuous processes of hybridisation and de-hybridisation, particularly within complex policy fields. Hybrids require coordination among actors from different sectors and domains representing disparate interests, professional identities and organisational traditions as well as synchronisation of different temporal understandings and regularities. Temporal tensions,

perceived as competing or contradicting temporal perceptions and norms, may affect mechanisms for value creation considerably (Stjerne, Söderlund and Minbaeva, 2019, p. 347).

Many of the global challenges facing societies increase the speed and number of interactions among elements and levels in the global system. Timescales are compressed, and processes become increasingly non-linear and unpredictable. Consequently, managing complexity to enhance public value (PV) creation is not only a matter of structural relationships between differentiated organisational forms representing different logic. It is also a matter of ability to manage increasingly differentiated and competing timeframes and the available strategic alternatives. Hence, the temporal dimension becomes crucial in assessing the potential of hybrid arrangements for creating PV. The focus of this chapter rests on these mechanisms or, more precisely, on *how the temporary forms of organisation affect mechanisms for PV creation in hybrid settings.*

The chapter draws on research on public sector project management and projectification. As public sector projects usually are inter-organisational and cross-sectoral by nature, they bear similarities with hybrid forms of organisation. Being explicitly time-centred, projects are excellent organisational forms for analysing temporal effects on mechanisms for value creation. Furthermore, existing research on public sector projects draws attention to the temporal dimension of the current political and organisational life (Godenhjelm, Sjöblom and Jensen, 2019).

This chapter contributes to the understanding of the space in between public and private (Johanson and Vakkuri, 2018, pp. 5–6), as well as the temporal mechanisms in hybrids. The chapter is structured as follows: We start by discussing the mechanisms for value creation in hybrid governance settings. We then establish a link between project organisations and hybrid characteristics. Drawing on projectification research, the aim of the subsequent sections is to discuss solutions highlighting the temporary dimension and specify the mechanisms for value creation in temporary forms of hybrid governance. Finally, the chapter summarises the findings and presents a concluding discussion on

how the research on temporary organisations can contribute to identifying and assessing procedures and mechanisms for value creation, particularly in temporary hybrid contexts.

Mechanisms for value creation in hybrid governance

Despite the increasing interest in PV creation, the debate has been rather vague about the specific kinds of mechanisms, practices and procedures necessary to produce PV. Previous research on hybrid arrangements has concentrated on institutional forms and organisations in hybrid settings rather than the ways in which governments, decision makers, service users and citizens assign value to these arrangements (Johanson and Vakkuri, 2018, p. 117). Hence, there is an evident need for conceptual and empirical developments in general and for systematic knowledge on how temporal features of hybrid settings affect mechanisms for PV creation in particular.

Perceived as a paradigm, PV creation has been considered for a shift away from strong ideological positions of market versus state provision towards a recognition of the social values inherent in public services (Moore, 1995). The paradigm signals a move from the primary focus on results and efficiency towards the achievement of the broader governmental goals of PV creation (Alford & Hughes, 2008; O´Flynn, 2007).

PV creation is a highly debated and controversial concept. According to some scholars, it offers a new paradigm and a different narrative of reform through redefinitions of how to meet the challenges of efficiency, effectiveness and accountability (Stoker, 2006). From a holistic point of view, the concept of PV represents an attempt to measure the total benefits of government action in ways that could be beneficial for the relationship between government and citizens (Kelly, Mulgan and Muers, 2002). Others perceive public value performance (PVP) mainly as a performance measurement story in which the words 'public' and 'value' have been attached to a standard framework for measuring

outcomes and cost-effectiveness (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004). Regardless of what stance we take towards PV creation as a concept, definitions of 'public value' have remained varying and elusive.

It is not the purpose of this chapter to develop new definitions or conceptualisations of PV. We agree with the definition presented by Bryson et al. (2017) that PV is that which is valued by the public or is good for the public as assessed against various PV criteria such as equity, procedural fairness or efficiency. As argued by Sherman and Lewis (2015, p. 1), the PVP framework helps focus managerial attention on key areas that are necessary for creating greater success. More significantly, it connotes an active sense of adding value rather than a passive sense of safeguarding interests. It also underscores that mechanisms related to organisational design, entrepreneurial spirit, strategic action, dialogue and leadership can be keys to promoting PV (cf. Bryson *et al.*, 2017).

However, PV is highly relative to circumstances in the environment (Moore, 2013). A policy or purpose is valuable in the context of the social problems that arise in a specific social and institutional environment. Involved actors may not be able to define what is valuable in absolute terms, but they can seek to decide whether a given goal is more valuable than another in a particular circumstance, as well as the means and mechanisms by which the preferred goals are achieved (Alford & O'Flynn, 2009). For our purpose, there is no point in elaborating on the potential of general governance mechanisms in the creation of PV. We argue that the mechanisms also have to be defined and assessed with respect to the specific temporal qualities of hybrid contexts.

If we perceive hybrids as specific organising forms to combine multiple institutional logics, then the processes through which the organisations instantiate multiple social rationales in their values, structures, goals and practices become crucial for understanding their actions and outcomes (Battilana, Besharov and Mitzinneck, 2017; Matinheikki, Aaltonen and Walker, 2018, p. 300). According to the scientific discourse, hybrid forms of organising are especially necessary for organisations that involve a wide variety of stakeholder interests, pursue multiple and conflicting goals and engage in divergent or inconsistent activities (Matinheikki, Aaltonen and Walker, 2018;

Kastberg and Lagström, 2019). Following this line of reasoning, mechanisms for managing reconfiguring and mediating conflicts and inconsistencies are particularly important in terms of PV creation or, to be more specific, mechanisms that can prevent conflicts and inconsistencies from becoming detrimental with respect to goal attainment and value creation. Such conflicts are about goals and interests, which are key elements of all political activities. Four types of potential conflicts or inconsistencies are caused by which facilitating mechanisms are central in hybrid arrangements. All of these are sensitive to temporal perceptions and the temporal context of the activities:

1. Although managing ***value conflicts*** is a key element in all political activities, there is limited systematic evidence on how value conflicts are addressed in multi-organisational and multi-level settings (Bryson *et al.*, 2017, p. 649). Drawing on studies of public decision making in general, many mechanisms and strategies have been suggested, such as establishing value hierarchies, balancing values, separating conflicting values by sequential attention and cycling, i.e. alternatively emphasising conflicting values over time (Martinsen and Jørgensen, 2010; Bryson *et al.*, 2017). However, the basic challenge behind value conflicts is the identification problem. The literature shows no consensus on a preferred method for identifying PVs (Bozeman, 2018, p. 5). As values are mutable, changes in values over time exacerbate the identification problem. Managing value conflicts appears to require a minimum of the continuous involvement of stakeholders in discussion, deliberation and translation of values to operational guidelines. There is, however, mixed evidence on the extent to which stakeholder inclusion contributes to PV creation in terms of achieving desired outcomes.

2. According to ideal conceptions of collaborative governance, stakeholder inclusion is a means also for mediating potentially ***conflicting goals and interests*** and for securing better results and innovative solutions (cf. Sørensen and Torfing 2011). In temporal respects, mediating diverse goals and interests is especially important for achieving desired long-term outcomes through hybrid solutions. In situations where hybrid solutions are applied in predominantly public contexts, the role of public managers as orchestrators of collaborations is seen as a prerequisite

for securing long-term PV creation by means of collaborative actions (Crosby, Hart and Torfing, 2017; Vento and Sjöblom, 2018). However, as will be shown later in this chapter, it is unclear under what conditions public managers are able or willing to adhere to the orchestrating role or whether such an engagement contributes to the creation of PV.

3. ***Temporary tensions and conflicts*** over the policy cycle are a third type of inconsistency that is likely to occur in hybrid settings because parliaments and service organisation enterprises operate according to diverse timeframes. Temporal tensions can be defined as dilemmas and conflicts that emerge at the boundaries of opposing and competing temporal understanding, implying that actors must be able to perform temporal boundary work and capitalise on timing norms to manage the tensions (Stjerne, Söderlund and Minbaeva, 2019, p. 349).

4. A final tension is the one between ***temporary and permanent organisations***. If we perceive hybrids as processes rather than structures, it is evident that organisational structures, collaborations and applied policy instruments vary over time. To the extent that policy development and execution rests on temporary hybrid arrangements, mechanisms for securing knowledge transfer between levels and long-term PV creation are required at the end of the policy cycle. Although evidence on their significance is mixed, evaluation systems and mechanisms for control and accountability have been suggested as means for strengthening the relationship between temporary and permanent structures and establishing contextually sensitive interlinking mechanisms (Godenhjelm, 2013, 2016; Godenhjelm, Lundin and Sjöblom, 2015).

In the next section, we will establish a link between project organisations and hybrids. Then the aforementioned tensions and mechanisms will be applied to a hybrid context using findings and examples from research on public sector projectification.

Project organisations as hybrids

Previous research has indicated that hybrid organisations can take many different forms but seldom explains how hybrids arise (Skelcher, 2007; Skelcher and Smith, 2015). We argue that temporary project organisations fall exceptionally well within this hybrid debate. A frequently used definition of a project is 'a temporary endeavour undertaken to create a unique product, service or result' (Project management Institute, 2004, p. 5). Projects are considered as action-driven temporary organisations, created to achieve a specific goal within a predetermined timeframe and contain a strong element of change (Lundin and Söderholm, 1995).

Projects have increased drastically especially in the industry, construction and IT sectors. Today, projects are frequently used in the public sector as a form of governance. Some refer to the increased use of projects in the public sector as the rise of a project state or society, as well as public sector projectification (Godenhjelm, Lundin and Sjöblom, 2015). Projects ideally include a wide variety of public and private sector actors, draw on multiple sources of funding and are generally regarded as flexible and adaptive organisations that produce outputs on a just-in-time basis (Sjöblom, Löfgren and Godenhjelm, 2013). Much like hybrid organisations, conceptualisations of projects also suffer from a lack of understanding of the interface between public and private, the legitimacy of the actions that they produce and what the value of the generated outputs are for different actors.

In relation to hybrid governance, projects are mainly seen as a form of joint ventures, enabling governments to gain access to private capital and to transfer risk to the private sector (Skelcher, 2007, p. 352). We agree that these are some of the important functions that projects entail but not all. Research on the projectification of the public sector shows that projects play a central role in combining public and private interests, for instance in the European regional development policy (Büttner and Leopold, 2016).

Hybrids can take many different forms that constitute 'impure' species, which have created drawbacks in terms of ownership and control. A dichotomous view of markets and hierarchies has

analytical and theoretical benefits for clarity and conceptual frameworks. However, the increasing use of new governance methods such as projects and hybrids characterised by mixed ownership, goal incongruence, multiplicity and social control do not always follow this division (Johanson and Vakkuri, 2018). They draw particular attention to procedural prerequisites of PV. As will be discussed later, the contribution that research on projectification might have for the hybrid governance debate and its links to value creation has yet to be fully realised. The main findings of the discussion are summarised in Table 1 and will be elaborated in the text below.

Table 1. Public value challenges and projectification features from a hybrid perspective

	Public value challenge	Central projectification features
VALUE CONFLICTS AND CHANGES	Managing inter-organisational value conflicts and identifying value changes over time	• Extensive stakeholder inclusion • Continuous discussion, deliberation and translation of values
CONFLICTING GOALS AND INTERESTS	Mediating diverse goals and interests for achieving desired long-term outcomes	• Mediating mechanisms, emphasising particularly the role of public managers
TEMPORARY TENSIONS AND CONFLICTS	Managing diverse timeframes and temporal understandings of involved actors	• Temporary boundary work and translation of multi-level objectives • Capitalising on timing norms
TEMPORARY AND PERMANENT ORGANISATIONS	Managing the multi-level problem and transferring information and knowledge from temporary to permanent organisations	• Evaluation systems • Mechanisms for control and accountability

Managing value conflicts and value changes – implications for value creation in hybrid contexts

Project governance resonates well with the hybrid characteristic of mixed ownership, which highlights mixed ownership between public and private sector actors in the pursuit of politically driven goals. In terms of project governance characteristics, *ownership between public and private actors and stakeholders* is particularly interesting. From a PV perspective, one shortcoming of the traditional use of the PVP is that it tends to be public-manager-centred in an increasingly complex world where elected officials and actors from different sectors and levels are called to have a key role in producing PV.

The perceived benefits of organising by projects have opened up several new application areas (Godenhjelm, 2016) and, consequently, new mixed forms of ownership. Projects, however, have a strong business management heritage, which also means that they suffer from a rationalistic bias and tend to follow project management ideals associated with private sector logic (Sjöblom and Godenhjelm, 2009, p. 170). The use of such business logic is presumed to lead to increased efficiency while public ownership is believed to solve grievances among customer groups (Godenhjelm and Johanson, 2018). A central part of the believed efficiency gains achieved by project organisations stems from the identification, selection and involvement of the 'right' network actors, entrepreneurs or stakeholders that are particularly well suited to complete the unique task at hand (Lundin and Söderholm, 1995). Stakeholder inclusion, involvement and collaboration are believed to lead to better results or even new and innovative solutions (Sørensen and Torfing 2011). In this case, projects are central as they usually involve a network of stakeholders and can thereby serve as forums where knowledge is effectively produced and shared (Eggers and O´Leary, 2009).

Ideally, project stakeholder collaboration builds up relationships, increases trust and provides a fruitful ground for innovation and shared learning (Grabher, 2004; Brady and Hobday, 2011). Consequently, some refer to projects as temporary knowledge organisations that are expected to

generate new solutions to solve multi-causal problems (Sbarcea and Matrins, 2003). Project funding has also become a way of legitimising public interventions by involving affected interests and stakeholders (Godenhjelm, Lundin and Sjöblom, 2015, p. 337). Projects thereby have the potential to act as arenas that enable broader civic engagement, deliberation and increased PV.

Research shows that a considerable number of stakeholders is involved in projects that constitute a form of mixed ownership. For instance, in their research on European Union (EU)-funded projects, Godenhjelm and Johanson (2018) show that mixed ownership and the pursuit of politically driven goals can clearly be seen in EU-funded regional development projects. In short, their research illustrates how projects aim to contribute to *politically set EU programme goals* such as the promotion of innovation activity and networking and the reinforcement of knowledge structures. In their analysis of 275 EU-funded regional development innovation projects in Finland during the 2007–2013 programming period, the results showed that projects *include a wide variety of actors from different sectors*.

Actor affiliations ranged from municipalities or federations of municipalities, national or regional authorities and privately owned companies to NPOs. The variety among actors not only applied to project managers but also to staff, the steering group and stakeholder composition. Overall, the 275 projects included a network of almost 11 000 public or private sector stakeholders from different fields.

The vast network of actors included in the projects *did not produce innovations as expected*. In fact, only 13% of all funded projects produced innovations. In addition, the analysis of knowledge brokers showed that actors with interlinking membership in the networks decreased the odds of project innovation. The extent to which projects succeed in involving stakeholders, how this affects the quality of the decisions i.e. translation of values, and to what extent public sector projects enable the inclusion of 'public interest' on non-state actors (Sjöblom, 2009) is unclear. As indicated in

Godenhjelm´s and Johanson´s example, assessing the involved public sector networks and the diverse stakeholder group interests creates difficulties.

Some argue that failure to include key stakeholders might cause serious damage to the project (El-Gohary, Osman and El-Diraby, 2006). Stakeholders might be included as a response to unexpected events such as misunderstandings between the focal project organisation and local stakeholders (Aaltonen *et al.*, 2010). Critically speaking, stakeholders might be included for purely symbolic reasons, to safeguard interests or to promote conformity rather than variety and innovation, and they may not be able or willing to contribute to the task at hand (Loorbach, 2010). Thus, it is unclear whether stakeholder inclusion leads to extended participation or the exclusion of interests (Godenhjelm, 2016, p. 59).

Following this line of reasoning, one can identify several value components that relate particularly to mixed ownership characterising hybrid arrangements as well as temporary organisations. People are, according to the PVP concept, motivated by their involvement in networks and partnerships; that is, their relationships with others formed in the context of mutual respect and shared learning (Stoker, 2006, p. 56). Following the procedural aspect of the PVP debate, one would then perceive the ***degree of involvement*** of stakeholders in ***shared learning processes*** as important value components. A third component is mutual ***trust***. Even if formal service and outcome targets are met, a failure of trust will effectively destroy PV (Kelly, Mulgan and Muers, 2002, p. 17). However, as Godenhjelm´s and Johanson´s (2018) example of temporary project organisations showed, stakeholder involvement might be almost detrimental with respect to the policy objectives in questions. It appears that the procedures related to stakeholder involvement and mixed ownerships are extremely sensitive in contextual respects. Therefore, their effects should be assessed systematically when comparing various organisational alternatives.

Mediating conflicting goals, interests and timeframes from a value creation perspective

Goal incongruence and its emphasis on competing institutional logic between profit-seeking and effectiveness in terms of achieving social impacts on society and citizens (Johanson and Vakkuri, 2018) are characteristics that are of particular relevance for temporality of project governance. Projects are ideally suited tools for managing potential problems of goal incongruence not only by including stakeholders but also by means of *decoupling, delimiting and extracting clearly defined targets* from the permanent organisation(s) and / or broader policy contexts. Although PVP recognises the value of vision, mission and goals, it primarily emphasises entrepreneurial imagination as the key to value creation. In creating PV, Moore (1995, p. 162) asserts that good strategic managers learn not only how to plan actions but, equally, how to exploit unanticipated opportunities as they arise.

This places public managers in a proactive and productive role, which tends to downplay the roles of other actors (e.g. elected officials, social entrepreneurs and business leaders) (Bryson *et al.*, 2017). We agree in the notion that it is an open and empirical question of what role the mixture of different actors, often from different sectors, can and do play in the processes of value production. PV entrepreneurs face the same tasks of obtaining authorisation and legitimation, building organisational capacity and discerning, defining and creating PV (Bryson *et al.*, 2017, p. 642). Stoker (2006) also argues that a PV management paradigm has emerged in the aftermath of New Public Management (NPM) as a means of solving the 'puzzle' of balancing democracy and efficiency. His central idea is that 'the governance of the public realm involves networks of deliberation and delivery in pursuit of public value' (Stoker, 2006, p. 47).

This is also important in projects that are dependent on a limited number of defined tasks to legitimise the project. According to the seminal work of Lundin and Söderholm (1995), the task definitions are the *raison d´être* for the temporary organisation and serve as a point of departure for the optimal project team composition to be formed around it. Reaching the project´s task requires fragmentation to delimit or simplify it but also to secure commitment among the potential project members. This

enables the project to be decoupled from other activities and ideally provides an element of order in complex and at times 'wicked' environments (Godenhjelm, Sjöblom and Jensen, 2019). In reality, few projects can, however, be regarded as entirely stable and predictable. They always embody a chaotic element that is multi-contextual and dependent on the partly competing wishes and demands of a multitude of stakeholders (Lundin and Steinthórsson, 2003, p. 247). As discussed previously, the focus on project task and its temporal limitation also affects knowledge creation because of the value in solving a particular problem or task with the right composition of actors.

In a public policy setting, a central objective is also acceleration, i.e. to increase the operational speed of policy systems. Decoupling might, however, mean that 'organisations symbolically endorse practices prescribed by one logic while actually implementing practices promoted by another logic' (Pache and Santos, 2012, p. 974). In terms of projects, decoupling may mean that innovative actions are endorsed by organisations rhetorically but not carried out in practice (Fred, 2018, p. 47). In the literature, these issues are usually perceived as tensions between temporary and permanent organisations (Godenhjelm, Sjöblom and Jensen, 2019). Furthermore, there is a temporal tension between long-term and short-term effectiveness. Many policy fields are characterised by parallel policies with considerably diverse time horizons. For instance, in fields like environmental management and regional development, a *simultaneous* demand for both instant and longer-term action exists. Sometimes even generational time perspectives are needed in terms of outcomes (Munck af Rosenschöld, Honkela and Hukkinen, 2014).

Studies on EU cohesion fund projects in Finland show that state agencies face the challenge of managing tensions between bureaucratic and collaborative ideals, which can lead to goal incongruence. Cross-sector collaborations vary not only depending on the explicit motives of the involved actors but also because of confrontations between the different rationales, traditions and procedures that the actors represent. In their research on government agencies, Vento and Sjöblom (2018) show that by influencing collaborative procedures, government agencies have a considerable

impact on the performance of collaborations. Collaborative and participatory actions are facilitated towards performance gains by means of an extensive involvement of government agencies. Conversely, performance gains from collaboration and participation are lower when their involvement is limited or non-existent. Although it is an empirical question what actors serve as PV entrepreneurs in project settings, Vento´s and Sjöblom´s example clearly illustrates how public managers are in a key position in mediating conflicting goals and values. In other words, they have to balance economic, technical and political concerns to secure PV (Hefetz and Warner, 2004, p. 171).

Government agencies expect non-state actors to play the right game and have a considerable moderating influence on the relationship between collaboration and performance. More importantly, the influence is strengthened if project managers are responsive towards the bureaucratic rationale of the administration. These collaborative patterns may well be beneficial for achieving policy objectives and goals in a narrow sense – objectives close to the target area of the respective policies. It is, however, questionable to what extent they facilitate innovation, change and other payoffs beyond the policy targets that project organisations are expected to generate, provided they are granted sufficient discretion. Projectified structures should not only be judged on their ability to effectively achieve the project task or goals but also on their ability to *sustain* and implement information and knowledge. Institutionalised norms and values might affect the seemingly unique project in becoming standardised, resembling a 'pearl necklace' where similar projects follow each other (Sahlin-Andersson and Söderholm, 2002). Thus, there is an evident risk that projectification will contribute not so much to getting things done and action but to a de-synchronisation of policies and interventions. Therefore, adaptation in complex governance systems is not only a question of the relationships among differentiated organisational forms with different logics. It is also a question of controlling increasingly differentiated and competing timeframes (Godenhjelm, Lundin and Sjöblom, 2015).

According to this logic, managers using agile planning processes should only concentrate on a few critical indicators. However, these few indicators still need to measure all three value dimensions that are necessary for successful implementation (i.e. value strategy, political management and operational capacity). Most of the past performance measures concentrate only on the operational capacity. In addition to operational capacity it is important for the public manager to keep track of the progress they are making in the political arena as well as the value they are creating for the public (Sherman, H. and Lewis, 2015).

Hence, in procedural respects goal incongruence is not necessarily a problem for PV creation. Essential value components are the capacities of key actors – particularly the public manager's ability to *mediate among potentially conflicting concerns* and the capacities for fast *adaptation to changing conditions* in the environment. However, research lacks an understanding of the impact of dissonance – how diverse goals and ambiguous criteria for performance evaluation go together. This also holds true for understanding the design and uses of systems of performance evaluation and measurement in hybrid forms of governance (Hodges, 2012).

Managing the multi-level problem from a value creation perspective

As indicated previously, a multiplicity of funding arrangements between public and private actors exist, including investors and financiers, e.g. several types of PPPs or Private Finance Initiative (PFI) arrangements in financing public service delivery (Hodge and Greve, 2009). Contemporary hybrid governance arrangements need monetary capital from different sources in order to function; they also need to gather the intellectual capital necessary to complete complicated tasks (Johanson and Vakkuri, 2018). In terms of project governance characteristics, *the complex multi-level context in which public sector projects operate* is particularly interesting.

PVP and the project logic underline the importance of novel and unique resource combinations in the strategy-formation and policy processes. Such resource combinations do not necessarily follow any

predefined rules and evade rational calculation (Johanson and Vakkuri, 2018). This is often irrelevant in situations where innovation and creativeness serve as a mode of evaluation, and the results may thus appear in the form of learnt and changing capabilities. The forms of interaction are taking place within project organisations, and resource combinations consist of actors from different sectors with the aim of producing PV for actors at different levels.

The necessity of setting out targeted predefined goals, however, raises the question if innovative and creative results can be evaluated if they do not correspond to the predefined project goals. Paradoxically, it would seem that the project organisation corresponds more to what Johanson and Vakkuri (2018) refer to as the domestic world, where hierarchy and traditions function as criteria for the evaluation and not their definition of the project world, which is based on flexible, non-permanent relationships between individuals and organisations.

However, as Johanson and Vakkuri (2018) argue, the successes and failures of hybrid arrangements in terms of economic parsimony are contingent upon the ways in which the costs of such collaborative design can be controlled. As described by Fred and Mukhtar-Landgren (2019), the translation of macro-level goals into subnational funding criteria highlights the importance of actors' 'translating' and 'interpreting' macro-level goals and modifying them into local projects. It also stresses the need for evaluation criteria or indicators that focus on the varying forms of perceived or actual value created in interagency practices and by cross-sector collaboration. Experiences for public sector projects show that neither costs nor benefits of the collaborative design are measured or evaluated in terms of PVP. The results are also in line with previous research according to which there is a lack of policy networks that create 'organised feed-back loops' and argue that governability within the field of EU structural funds only results in fragmentation and loose couplings between autonomous actors (Heinelt *et al.*, 2003, pp. 137–138).

An important feature of decentralised NPM and New Public Governance (NPG) reforms of recent decades is the emergence of horizontal governance ideals that supplement traditional vertical

problem-solving capabilities (Godenhjelm, Sjöblom and Jensen, 2019). One important consequence is that different forms of international, national and local fund and support systems supplement or replace the existing tax-based financial structure (Büttner and Leopold, 2016).

A prime example of such funding systems is the EU structural funds that aim to modernise public administrations and foster good governance (Fred, 2018). National innovation systems and different development programmes carried out as public–private partnerships are also examples. Public sector projects have thus become symbols of flexibility, innovation and something post-bureaucratic (Godenhjelm, 2016; Fred, 2018). This resonates well with the values and ideals of the aforementioned reform agendas as well as with the multiplicity of funding arrangements discussed in the hybrid governance debate.

Büttner (2019) presents a particularly useful overview of the EU structural fund system and its consequences in terms of projectification. According to this overview, EU funding is provided by structural and investment funds such as the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the European Social Fund (ESF) that allocate approximately 60 % of the entire EU budget through project-funding systems (Büttner and Leopold, 2016). However, structural fund projects have to be at least partly co-funded by the recipients themselves or by the respective local or regional authorities.

Godenhjelm´s and Johanson´s (2018) analysis of ERDF innovation projects in Finland during the 2007–2013 programming period showed that projects were co-funded by public, private and NPOs with project budgets ranging from under 10 000 euros to multi-million euros. On average, they lasted almost 3 years and included 50 stakeholders per project, most of which were categorised as privately held companies. The most active stakeholders (≥ 9) within these projects were large multi-national companies within the forestry sector, mining industry or technology sector.

The programme objectives are planned and compiled in collaboration with the European Commission or by employees of the Directorate Generals (DGs) of the Commission responsible for the respective policy area but also involve cooperation with local and national experts, stakeholders and local

policymakers (Büttner, 2019). By means of regulations, rules and programmes, the administrative levels determine the orientation of individual projects that have to be in line with the agreed upon guidelines (Godenhjelm, Lundin and Sjöblom, 2015). EU funding has thus become a highly distinctive field of practices requiring both knowledge and competence for those who are or who want to be 'eligible' for receiving EU funding (Büttner, 2019).

The translation of macro-level goals into subnational funding criteria is no simple matter and highlights complexities associated with the multiplicity of funding arrangements. For instance, in their research on interpreting EU programme objectives at the local level, Fred and Mukhtar-Landgren (2019) highlight the challenge for local actors involved in translating macro-level policy goals into local projects. In their analysis of how information is translated in a multi-level context, they point out that projectification, to a great extent, has focused on questions relating to what, where and why something happens but rarely poses the question of how. In a situation where increasing reliance is on the projects, funding to cover public sector tasks becomes highly relevant.

In their analysis of 33 municipalities in southern Sweden, they show that a variety of different steering instruments, organisational techniques and practical tools aimed at facilitating EU projects exist and that local strategies often clash with macro-level goals. The 'translation' of macro-level goals into practice at the subnational level often requires new public sector actors, resembling knowledge brokers or boundary spanners that interpret, disseminate and modify local, politically set policies and goals so that they match the necessary criteria to apply for project funding. While such actors are necessary in a situation where public sector projectification is increasing and could be highly beneficial for information gathering and diffusion, they also pose a threat to democracy if the translation comes at the expense of the local democratic process. However, even though the EU can be regarded as the key driver of the increasing use of projects in the public sector, a multitude of other examples or projectification at lower levels also exist that do not adhere to higher administrative levels at all (Godenhjelm *et al.*, 2012).

An important question is to what extent added value in terms of complementarity actually is achieved. The funding provided by the structural funds is not intended to replace national funding but to serve as a complement to achieve both local and supranational goals and create value for the actors involved. As Fred´s and Mukhtar-Landgren´s example shows, this is no simple matter and places new public actors capable of navigating in the complex multi-level policy field in a key powerful position. The temporary organisational form required to obtain funding (i.e. the project organisation) also raises the question if the monetary benefit provided by new funding opportunities comes at the expense of intellectual capital that may operate according to different timelines and be needed to complete complicated tasks or achieve innovations. Therefore, PVP should be measured in terms of contributions to the goals set by the funders, which would also be in line with the EU partnership principle. The ability to assess indicators on interagency practices and procedures for cross-sector collaboration, as well as maintaining legitimacy of methods of measurement and policy goal clarity, are thus important value components.

As previously described, the translation of macro-level goals into subnational funding criteria also illustrated how levels are built into constitutions, legislation, regulations and funding arrangements. PVP does not explicitly attend to levels. Similarly, the hybrid logic is of a horizontal rather than vertical nature. ***Attending to levels is important because in any given multi-actor and multi-level situation,*** there are multiple PV strategies at play and, by consequence, multiple sources for conflicts, trade-offs and complementarities in PVs (Bryson *et al.*, 2017, p. 645). In multi-level contexts, the ***procedures for translating supranational goals to subnational targets*** and funding criteria thus become key procedures for PV creation.

Knowledge and information transfer across levels from a value creation perspective

Hybrid arrangements have been argued as representing a complex mix of public and private forms of financial and social control that are hard to distinguish from one another (Johanson and Vakkuri, 2018). Control forms can include regulatory control of the markets, professional self-control and customer-driven market control within a single system of service delivery, e.g. multi-faceted control and audit systems of organisations operating on professional clan control and customer-driven satisfaction logics (Kelly, 2005). Hybrid arrangements are thus influenced by multiple pressures that follow different mentalities (Johanson and Vakkuri, 2018). In terms of project governance social control, the *legitimacy of evaluation systems* and possibilities for *accountability* are of key importance.

The PVP implies a shift in models of accountability away from narrow performance contracts, such as project indicators and evaluation mechanisms, for example, towards the use of more complex systems. The PVP recognises that a more pragmatic approach to selecting providers to deliver public services would create more space for the maximisation of PV. As Stoker (2006) argues, such radical paradigmatic change has important and wide-ranging implications for public sector management and public sector managers. In part, this reflects the positioning of politics at the centre of the PVP, as opposed to its construction as an input in previous models. In a PVP, managers negotiate and engage with different constituencies. They must negotiate up into their authorising environment or the political realm and out towards clients. Placing politics at the centre is crucial in terms of accountability. The problem is, however, that neither evaluation nor accountability can be achieved through negotiation procedures only.

The governance approach emphasises well-institutionalised structures as a prerequisite for cooperation and flexible adjustment in public governance (Torfing *et al.*, 2012, p. 104). As shown above, projects include a multitude of stakeholders, which give them the potential to increase both lay and expert stakeholder involvement. They are expected to enhance effective problem solving,

especially in 'wicked' transboundary policy areas such as environmental management, which require both oversight and leeway. Measuring and controlling the effects of projects in complex settings is, however, no straightforward issue in terms of social control. As indicated above, instead of solving grievances, tensions might arise when project management ideals and particularised solutions confront permanent governance structures and routines within the public sector that should support policy coherence.

The temporary nature of projects also highlights the importance of controlling and taking stock of the results that the projects produce. This is often challenging, especially in projects that aim to produce innovative results to solve complex challenges such as environmental issues or problems. The way in which projects are evaluated is therefore not only important to maintain social control but also to achieve sustainable results. In his meta-evaluation of EU fisheries, policies and projects funded by the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF) in Finland, Godenhjelm (2013) demonstrated that the employed evaluation criteria mainly focus on outputs rather than long-term outcomes.

Many of the indicators used to control and measure project effects were simple measurements even though they concerned highly complex issues. The most frequently used, and from an environmental standpoint probably the most important, indicators constituted dichotomous measures of whether the project had a positive environmental impact. Interviews with project actors revealed that the interpretations of what actually constituted an environmentally friendly impact varied greatly. For instance, a professional fisher regarded an effective seal safe fish trap as valuable and environmentally friendly because of its ability to keep seals from eating the fish that were caught in the trap. However, an environmental activist might present a different view about the consequences of the fish trap, its effect on the fish stock and its impact on the endangered seal species.

The results thus indicated that the evaluation approach was based on highly standardised and quantitative evaluation criteria that to a limited extent were able to capture varying viewpoints on project achievements and what the added value of the projects funded actually were. The research

suggested that the connection between the evaluation system and the project management logic was weak and highlighted the need for a broader understanding of the logic that different project actors might have.

Institutionalised control and evaluation systems reflect the delicate balance between over-institutionalisation to secure coherence and synchronised activities and a high degree of autonomy for pursuing experimental, innovative and decisive actions. Over-institutionalisation and strong structural dependencies might reduce the flexible, innovative and integrative capacities that are usually associated with temporary organisations and long-term policy design. Meanwhile, a high degree of autonomy makes organisations and instruments operating in a short-term context extremely vulnerable to asymmetric power relations and hard to integrate into frameworks for democratic institutions (Sjöblom, Löfgren and Godenhjelm, 2013). Rigid control mechanisms could thus present a risk that responsibilities and policies are increasingly fragmented and desynchronised. Accountability becomes a highly situational relationship based on the nature of the actor or the conduct rather than the democratic nature of the obligation (Bovens, 2007, p. 461).

An important implication is that PV frameworks and assessments should include indicators on ***interagency practices***, ***procedures for cross-sector collaborations*** and the ***legitimacy of methods of evaluation and measurement***, as they drive the institutional legitimacy of social activities (Johanson and Vakkuri, 2018, p. 117). Studies on projectification indicate that standardised evaluation systems meet such requirements only to a very limited extent, which also suggests that PV maximisation can be questioned.

Concluding discussion

The overarching aim of this chapter was to contribute to an increased understanding of the governance of hybrid organisation and its challenges and mechanisms for PV creation by drawing on the research on temporary forms of organisation and the literature on public sector projectification in particular.

More specifically, the chapter aimed to increase the theoretical understanding of key characteristics of hybrids by discussing how different forms of PV are transformed, mixed and effused and the utilisation, enactment, valuation and measurements of hybrid activities in society. We argue that research on projectification can be beneficial to this understanding as it draws attention to the procedural aspects of value formation and the prerequisites for PV creation in a complex politico-administrative context. Previous research on organisational hybrids has concentrated on institutional logic and forms of organisations in hybrid settings but not so much on the procedures and mechanisms through which governments, decision makers, service users and citizens assign value to these arrangements. In light of existing projectification research, we have in the analysis elaborated on a number of key characteristics attached to hybrid organisations in relation to core PV challenges. While the examples presented could be discussed in relation to several PV challenges, some are more illustrative than others.

For instance, in terms of *value conflicts*, the results show the need to secure and motivate central stakeholder involvement so that spaces for shared learning processes and new knowledge can be created. Mutual trust among stakeholders is a key component. In response to *conflicting goals and interests,* the results highlight the significance of mediation between potentially conflicting interests and the utilisation of diverse interests in achieving targeted goals while maintaining the capacity for rapid adaption to changing conditions within the project boundaries. *Temporary tensions and conflicts* that arise require a delicate balance between complementing public funding sources instead of replacing funding. This way, policy coherence can be maintained and fragmentation risks across levels avoided. *Temporary and permanent organisations* also require the assessment of the indicators used in interagency practices and the procedures for cross-sector collaboration so that the legitimacy of methods of measurement and policy goal clarity can be maintained.

Hence, research on temporary organisations has an important contribution to make in identifying and assessing procedures and mechanisms for value creation in hybrid contexts. Hybrid forms of

governance face many challenges. . Some of these challenges strongly relate to the temporal qualities of organisations, which are designed to operate as hybrids in the space between government and market.

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